Title: State v. Johnnie Carprue
Citation: 2004 WI 111
Docket Number: 2002AP002781-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 9, 2004

2004 WI 111 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-2781-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Johnnie Carprue,  
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2003 WI App 148 
Reported at: 266 Wis. 2d 168, 667 N.W.2d 800 
(Ct. App. 2003-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 9, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 14, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Jacqueline D. Schellinger   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Alan Lee, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by Stephanie 
G. Rapkin, Mequon, and oral argument by Stephanie G. Rapkin. 
 
 
2004 WI 111 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-2781-CR   
(L.C. No. 
01 CF 2532) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Johnnie Carprue,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 9, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   The State seeks review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals that reversed Johnnie 
Carprue's (Carprue) conviction for second-degree sexual assault.1  
The court of appeals concluded that the conviction had to be 
reversed because Carprue was denied due process by a circuit 
judge who appeared partial to the prosecution.  State v. 
Carprue, 2003 WI App 148, 266 Wis. 2d 168, 667 N.W.2d 800.  We 
conclude that when this case is analyzed in light of appropriate 
                                                 
1 Wis. Stat. § 940.225(2)(a) (2001-02).  All references to 
the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-02 version unless 
otherwise noted.  
No. 02-2781-CR  
 
2 
 
legal principles and standards, the result compelled by the 
court of appeals does not hold.  While prudence would have 
counseled less assertive conduct from the circuit judge, the law 
does not demand a reversal of Carprue's conviction.   
¶2 
To 
decide 
this 
matter, 
we 
reflect 
on 
judicial 
authority to call and interrogate witnesses at trial, the 
limitations to that authority, and how abuse of that authority 
in a criminal trial may impact a defendant's due process rights.  
Carprue asserts that the circuit judge presiding over his trial 
abused her authority, and, as a result, denied Carprue his 
constitutional right to a fair trial.  In addition, Carprue 
brings an ineffective assistance of counsel claim predicated on 
his trial attorney's failure to object to the circuit judge's 
actions.   
¶3 
The State argues, and we agree, that while the circuit 
judge's actions were inadvisable, the defendant has failed to 
demonstrate he is entitled to reversal of his conviction under 
any applicable legal theory.  Accordingly, we reverse.   
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶4 
Johnnie Carprue was released from the Milwaukee House 
of Correction (HOC) on May 9, 2001.  A day later, Carprue was 
taken into custody on a charge of second-degree sexual assault.  
The trial on this charge was held between August 29 and 
September 4, 2001, in the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, 
Jacqueline D. Schellinger, Judge. 
¶5 
The complaining witness, T.B., and Carprue provide 
sometimes similar, sometimes vastly different accounts of the 
No. 02-2781-CR  
 
3 
 
events that transpired following Carprue's release.  Both agree 
that T.B. became acquainted with Carprue through her sister's 
boyfriend, who was also serving time in the HOC.  While Carprue 
was confined at HOC, his communication with T.B. was primarily 
by telephone, although T.B. visited Carprue on two or three 
occasions and also saw him at a court appearance. 
¶6 
As Carprue's release date drew near, he needed a place 
to stay.  Because Carprue was to be a subject of "in-house" 
monitoring under the auspices of In-House Correctional Services, 
he was required to have a fixed address for monitoring purposes.  
Carprue attempted to make living arrangements with his aunt, but 
the arrangements fell through.  T.B. offered Carprue a place to 
stay, even though she had only recently moved to Milwaukee and 
was living with her sister.  Carprue accepted, and when he was 
released on the afternoon of May 9th, he was taken to T.B.'s 
sister's residence. 
¶7 
Carprue did not stay at that address long.  The 
sister's boyfriend did not want him there.  Carprue left, he 
called T.B. later that evening, and the two agreed to meet.  
Ultimately, they proceeded to Carprue's aunt's residence. 
¶8 
At this point, the accounts begin to diverge.  T.B. 
testified that when they arrived at the aunt's residence, they 
watched a movie in the living room.  She indicated she fell 
asleep during the movie and woke up a few hours later to braid 
Carprue's cousin's hair before he left for school.  She 
testified that she and Carprue did not engage in physical 
contact of a sexual nature up to that point.   
No. 02-2781-CR  
 
4 
 
¶9 
Carprue offers a different version of how the two 
spent the late evening and early morning hours of May 9th and 
10th.  Carprue testified that the two were in the living room 
for only a brief period.  During that time, the two were 
"kissing and hugging," and T.B.'s pants were unbuttoned.  When 
Carprue's aunt entered from outside, Carprue threw his coat over 
T.B. so that she could fasten her pants.  At about 3:30 in the 
morning, Carprue and T.B. then entered a bedroom where Carprue's 
cousin and a friend were playing video games.  Carprue testified 
that during the time in the bedroom with the others, he was 
fondling T.B.'s vagina without objection, and that her pants 
were again unbuttoned. 
¶10 Despite the inconsistencies in their testimony, both 
Carprue and T.B. recount that around 5:00 a.m., T.B. braided 
Carprue's cousin's hair.  Both agree that thereafter T.B. 
entered a back bedroom of the apartment.2  
¶11 T.B. testified that she was initially alone in the 
room and that she removed her pants to be more comfortable.  She 
then lay down on a makeshift sleeping pallet atop one blanket 
and beneath another, and fell asleep.  T.B. testified that she 
awoke when she sensed the presence of Carprue lying next to her.  
                                                 
2 The testimony is again inconsistent as to details.  
Carprue testified that he asked T.B. if she wanted to go to the 
back bedroom to go to sleep, but T.B. stated that she asked 
Carprue's cousin whether she could lay down in his room.  
Carprue indicated that he went in with her, and only left 
briefly to talk with his aunt, while T.B. testified that she 
went in the bedroom alone and fell asleep and Carprue entered 
later. 
No. 02-2781-CR  
 
5 
 
She said Carprue asked for a kiss and she obliged.  He then 
asked if "he could have some."  T.B. took this to mean sexual 
intercourse.  She testified that she answered "no" and reminded 
him, as they had discussed in their telephone conversations, 
that her religious beliefs precluded her from having pre-marital 
sex.  According to T.B., he responded "You not going to give me 
none?" and she again answered in the negative, to which he 
grinned and told her he was going to "take some" anyway.  T.B. 
testified that at first she thought he was kidding, but soon 
knew he was serious when he pinned her down and raped her, 
overcoming her repeated verbal and physical attempts to stop 
him. 
¶12 Carprue presented a starkly different picture of 
events.  In his version, he briefly left T.B. alone in the back 
bedroom, and when he returned, he lay next to her on the 
makeshift bed.  T.B. had not fallen asleep.  He testified that 
they talked for a while.  Carprue denied asking T.B. for a kiss, 
and testified that she initiated kissing.  He then recited in 
explicit detail alleged consensual sexual activities.  He 
indicated that at some point their sexual intercourse became 
"rough," but nonetheless remained consensual. 
¶13 In Carprue's version of events, he exited the bedroom, 
which had no door separating it from the kitchen, and met his 
aunt who was entering the kitchen from the living room.  He and 
his aunt had a brief conversation regarding breakfast; then 
Carprue went back into the bedroom.  T.B. showed Carprue her 
coat, which had blood on it.  The coat had apparently been 
No. 02-2781-CR  
 
6 
 
underneath them during sexual intercourse.  T.B. became angry 
and they had an argument.  According to Carprue, T.B. was upset 
because the two were not supposed to have "gone that far" and 
that she had violated the tenets of her religious beliefs.  
Carprue testified that he explained to her that she did not have 
to confess her transgressions and that no one would find out.  
Carprue testified that she calmed down and said she still wanted 
to accompany him to his mother's house later that morning.  The 
two fell asleep.  Around noon, they awoke and T.B. left. 
¶14 For her part, T.B. recalls that Carprue abruptly ended 
the nonconsensual intercourse when he heard his aunt enter the 
kitchen.  She testified that, when he left, she went to the 
bathroom to clean up the blood on her clothing, but eventually 
gave up and returned to the bedroom to gather her jacket and 
purse.  However, Carprue would not let her leave because she was 
so upset, and she eventually appeased him by lying down with 
him, only to sneak out when he fell asleep.  
¶15 After she left, T.B. testified that she returned to 
her sister's apartment.  She did not call the police.  She 
talked with her sister about what happened, however, and her 
sister convinced her to seek medical treatment at the hospital.  
A nurse examined T.B. and later offered an expert opinion that 
the injuries she observed in T.B.'s vaginal area were consistent 
with forceful sexual contact and that the act of sexual 
intercourse was forced. 
¶16 A nurse at the hospital called the police.  Detective 
John Reesman of the Milwaukee Police Department testified that 
No. 02-2781-CR  
 
7 
 
he arrived at Mt. Sinai Hospital where an initial investigation 
had begun.  After being interviewed, T.B. led officers to 
Carprue's aunt's residence, where she pointed out Carprue, who 
happened to be sitting on the porch.  By the time Detective 
Reesman parked his squad car and arrived at the front door, 
Carprue was no longer on the porch.  The detective knocked on 
the door, and Carprue's aunt answered.  The detective was 
permitted to enter the apartment and, once inside, saw Carprue 
in the kitchen at the rear of the apartment.  When Carprue 
spotted Detective Reesman, who was accompanied by a uniformed 
police officer, he fled.  He ran down a back stairwell that led 
to the building's basement.  Carprue was eventually discovered 
hiding under the front porch, which he accessed through a window 
in the basement.  When asked at trial why he fled, Carprue 
responded: 
Cause I was supposed to be at In-House at one house, I 
knew I was violating it back at my auntie's house. 
I was supposed to be expedited [sic] to Gary [Indiana] 
for charges down there, that was dropped while I was 
in custody with the Milwaukee Police Department. 
But I was informed also, that once I got out of 
custody, they may bring the warrant back up. 
So it was like——I was both scared from violating being 
at another house while I was on In-House, and the real 
thing, my thinking they was trying to transfer me back 
to Gary. 
¶17 Earlier in the proceeding, T.B. testified that Carprue 
told her that he would be released from the HOC to "house 
arrest." After a sidebar with counsel, Judge Schellinger paused 
No. 02-2781-CR  
 
8 
 
to clarify what "house arrest" entailed.  She explained to the 
jury that "house arrest" was electronic surveillance, in which 
the subject of the surveillance is required to wear a "bracelet" 
that connects to a phone device so that when a monitoring agent 
calls, the agent can be sure that the subject is present at the 
residence. 
¶18 Later, with the jury absent, Carprue explained to the 
judge that he was not under electronic surveillance, as stated 
by the court.  He was subject to an "in-house" monitoring 
system.   
¶19 During Carprue's testimony the following day, when the 
"in-house" system again came up, Judge Schellinger called for a 
sidebar with counsel and then acknowledged to the jury that her 
earlier explanation was in error.  She explained that "in-house" 
monitoring does not involve a "bracelet."  Rather, it simply 
requires a subject to be at a specified location when a 
monitoring agent calls.  Judge Schellinger described the 
pertinent characteristics of "in-house" monitoring and took 
judicial notice of these facts. 
¶20 When Carprue finished testifying, the jury left the 
courtroom for lunch.  After the jury was out, Judge Schellinger 
stated: "I want to make sure that the questions that were asked 
and answers that were given, conform to In-House [C]orrectional 
[S]ervices reports."  Judge Schellinger then called Kenneth 
Morrow, the director of In-House Correctional Services to the 
stand.  Morrow was present because he was on Carprue's witness 
list in the capacity of "custodian of records" of Carprue's "in-
No. 02-2781-CR  
 
9 
 
house" 
file. 
The 
judge 
questioned 
him 
about 
"in-house" 
procedures. 
¶21 First, Judge Schellinger inquired about documentation 
in Carprue's file relating to his two addresses.  The file 
contained the aunt's address as well as T.B.'s sister's address, 
with the former having been "Xed out" in favor of the latter.  
Morrow testified that he did not know why the placement was 
changed.  Morrow's testimony confirmed that law enforcement 
authorities had Carprue's aunt's address in Carprue's file, so 
that, had they been attempting to track Carprue down, they could 
have started with her address.  
¶22 Second, 
Judge 
Schellinger 
inquired 
into 
the 
technological compatibility of the "in-house" monitoring program 
with certain optional phone company services such as call 
waiting. During his testimony, Carprue had alluded to the fact 
that he had difficulty setting up telephonic monitoring at his 
aunt's house because she had certain phone company services that 
were 
incompatible 
with 
the 
"in-house" 
program's 
telephone 
monitoring system.  Carprue's explanation suggested that the 
"in-house" agents could not monitor him over the phone if 
certain phone services were present.  Morrow testified that if 
there were any such incompatibility, someone from "In-House" 
would stop by in person to check on the subject.3  At the same 
time, Morrow confirmed that In-House Correctional Services 
                                                 
3 Carprue's attorney also questioned Morrow.  On cross, 
Morrow corroborated in some measure Carprue's recollection that 
he could not have certain features on his phone.  
No. 02-2781-CR  
 
10 
 
preferred that a phone line not have "call management, where a 
computer answers the phone instead of a person." 
¶23 Finally, Judge Schellinger asked Morrow about the 
procedure employed when "In-House" personnel are unable to 
contact a subject of "in-house" monitoring, as well as what 
information 
subjects 
of 
monitoring 
would 
know 
about 
the 
consequences of a failure to make contact.  Morrow's answers 
suggested that Carprue had been informed before being placed on 
"in-house" monitoring that, if he could not be contacted, the 
service would report his violation to the court that ordered the 
monitoring.  The police would not be called.  However, Morrow 
conceded that, in some cases, the police could be called if 
authorities had obtained a bench warrant.4   
¶24 All this took place while the jury was absent from the 
courtroom.  After Morrow stepped down, Judge Schellinger 
explained: 
The 
court 
really 
never 
gets 
involved 
in 
the 
examination of witnesses, particularly in front of a 
jury, but there have been things said by the defendant 
                                                 
4 Morrow stated: 
[T]he standard instruction we give every client, is if 
there is no contact, we explain it, if we do not have 
contact with that person in a twenty-four hour period, 
if [] we can't determine what happened to that person, 
we're going to notify the court. 
The court issues a bench warrant and on occasion, 
knowing the bench warrant is issued, call the police 
myself to have person picked up, if I know where the 
person was. 
No. 02-2781-CR  
 
11 
 
in this case which are inconsistent with the way In-
House operates. 
That's why I have asked Mr. Morrow to come up here. 
I'm not commenting on whether or not the defendant has 
been untruthful or whatever, his understanding is 
different than that which is the case. 
¶25 During the jury's absence, Judge Schellinger also 
questioned Carprue regarding a letter he had written to a judge 
in a different case.  In the letter, Carprue requested leniency, 
and referred to his fiancée.  There were some inconsistencies 
between the letter and Carprue's testimony.  The letter was in a 
file that Judge Schellinger may have used to explain to the jury 
why Carprue had been in the Milwaukee County HOC, but this is 
not clear.  Several times Judge Schellinger instructed the jury 
that it was not to accord any significance to the fact that 
Carprue had been in the HOC and on "in-house" monitoring.  In 
order to defuse any lingering suspicion about his status, Judge 
Schellinger explained that "Carprue was the subject of a 
criminal complaint being filed in a traffic matter on February 
23rd, 2001."  The court in the other case released Carprue on a 
signature bond and, as a condition of the bond, Carprue was to 
be placed on "in-house" monitoring.   
¶26 When the jury returned to the courtroom, the State 
called Kenneth Morrow as a rebuttal witness.  The State asked 
Morrow what the "in-house" program tells its subjects about 
consequences of violating the terms of release.  Morrow 
responded in much the same manner as when the jury was not 
present.  Carprue's counsel then cross-examined Morrow, getting 
No. 02-2781-CR  
 
12 
 
him to admit that the subject of in-house monitoring is never 
expressly informed that the police would not be informed if the 
subject of monitoring could not be contacted. 
¶27 The jury returned a guilty verdict on second-degree 
sexual assault.5  Carprue appealed.  Carprue, 266 Wis. 2d 168.  
He alleged that the circuit court committed reversible error by 
calling and questioning Morrow and by questioning Carprue 
regarding the letter he wrote to another judge.  He also 
challenged his conviction on ineffective assistance of counsel 
grounds, based on his attorney's failure to object to the 
court's actions.  Id., ¶7.  The court of appeals reversed 
Carprue's conviction, holding that Judge Schellinger's conduct 
demonstrated that the court was acting as a "hinting advocate" 
for 
the 
prosecution. 
 
Id., 
¶16. 
 
It 
held 
that 
Judge 
Schellinger's conduct "threatened the fairness of the trial," 
id., 
¶13, 
and 
exceeded 
the 
parameters 
of 
acceptability, 
resulting in "the appearance of advocacy and partisanship."  
Id., ¶18.  The court of appeals concluded that Judge Schellinger 
"could no longer maintain impartiality and objectivity."  Id.   
¶28 In 
dissent, 
Judge 
Fine 
reasoned 
that, 
because 
Carprue's attorney did not object, his claim of error should be 
handled as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  Id., 
¶26.  Under that analysis, Judge Fine concluded that Carprue 
                                                 
5 In instructing the jury prior to its deliberations, Judge 
Schellinger conveyed the following instruction: "If any person 
has an impression about my opinion, whether the defendant is 
guilty or not guilty, disregard that impression entirely and 
decide the issues of fact as you view the evidence." 
No. 02-2781-CR  
 
13 
 
could show no prejudice because the jury was not present when 
the conduct at issue took place.  Id., ¶27.   
DISCUSSION 
¶29 From the outset, Carprue's appeal has focused on Judge 
Schellinger's calling and questioning of Kenneth Morrow and her 
questioning of Carprue about statements contained in his letter 
to another judge.  The issues presented by the court's actions 
could be addressed under any of three legal theories:  
(1) Judge Schellinger erred by exceeding the 
implicit limitations of her authority to call and 
interrogate witnesses under Wis. Stat. § 906.14;  
(2) Carprue was denied the effective assistance 
of counsel because his counsel did not object to Judge 
Schellinger's actions, thereby waiving a claim of 
error under § 906.14; or  
(3) Judge Schellinger violated Carprue's due 
process rights to a fair trial before an impartial 
judge.   
¶30 Carprue conflates two of these distinct legal theories 
by arguing that, when a judge exceeds her authority under 
§ 906.14, such actions automatically constitute a structural 
defect that violates due process.  Thus, Carprue advances only 
two theories.  First, considering the judge's actions, Carprue 
was denied due process.  Second, because his counsel did not 
object to the judge's actions, Carprue was denied the effective 
assistance of counsel.  The court of appeals rendered a decision 
along this line, blending the principles of a § 906.14 error 
claim with a due process claim.  The court disregarded 
"Carprue's second issue," ineffective assistance of counsel, on 
No. 02-2781-CR  
 
14 
 
grounds that, having decided the case on due process grounds, 
there was no need to discuss ineffective assistance of counsel.  
See id., ¶19 n.3.  We will discuss all three modes of analysis, 
relating the relevant facts to the applicable law. 
A. 
Judicial Authority to Call and Question Witnesses 
¶31 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 906.14 
is 
titled 
"Calling and 
interrogation of witnesses by judge."  It reads: 
 
(1) Calling By Judge.  The judge may, on the 
judge's own motion or at the suggestion of a party, 
call witnesses, and all parties are entitled to cross-
examine witnesses thus called. 
 
(2) Interrogation by Judge.  The judge may 
interrogate witnesses, whether called by the judge or 
by a party. 
 
(3) Objections.  Objections to the calling of 
witnesses by the judge or to interrogation by the 
judge may be made at the time or at the next available 
opportunity when the jury is not present. 
¶32 In substance, this rule is identical to Rule 614 of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence.  Fed. R. Evid. 614.  It is also 
based upon Wisconsin case law.  Wisconsin Rules of Evidence, 59 
Wis. 2d R, R200 (1973). 
¶33 Under subsection (1), a judge may call witnesses on 
her own motion.  There are no explicit limitations to this 
power, but limitations are implied by Wisconsin court decisions.  
The Judicial Council Committee's Note to subsection (1) reads in 
part: "It is expected that this authority will be used only in 
the exceptional case."  Id. 
¶34 Subsection (3) of § 906.14 authorizes objections, and 
it "defers the requirement of a timely objection . . . to the 
No. 02-2781-CR  
 
15 
 
next available opportunity when the jury is not present."  Id. 
R202.  This subsection appears to focus more on situations where 
the judge questions witnesses in front of a jury than where a 
judge questions a witness in a bench trial or outside the 
presence of a jury. 
¶35 Given the explicit authority to object to a judge's 
action, Carprue could 
have 
challenged 
Judge 
Schellinger's 
decision to call Kenneth Morrow to the stand.  He did not.  He 
could have objected to a particular line of inquiry.  He did 
not.  He could have offered a motion in limine to bar the State 
from calling Morrow as a rebuttal witness.  He did not.  
Consequently, Carprue waived his right to object to the judge's 
actions. 
¶36 There are several reasons why we are disinclined to 
overlook the defendant's failure to timely object.  First, the 
general rule in Wisconsin is that issues not raised in the 
circuit court are deemed waived.  State v. Polashek, 2002 WI 74, 
¶25, 253 Wis. 2d 527, 646 N.W.2d 330; Apex Elec. Corp. v. Gee, 
217 Wis. 2d 378, 384, 577 N.W.2d 23 (1998).  This case is very 
different from State v. Hayes, 2004 WI 80, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 681 
N.W.2d 203, where the defendant was able to point to a somewhat 
ambiguous statute to support the proposition that he did not 
have to object at trial to challenge the sufficiency of the 
state's evidence.  In this case, the relevant statute, § 906.14, 
specifically addresses a party's right to object.  Hence, as the 
court of appeals said in State v. Wolter, "[o]bjections to 
alleged judicial misconduct must be timely made.  A failure to 
No. 02-2781-CR  
 
16 
 
make a timely objection constitutes a waiver of objection."  
Wolter, 85 Wis. 2d 353, 373, 270 N.W.2d 230 (Ct. App. 1978). 
¶37 Second, the policies underlying the waiver rule are 
especially well illustrated in this case.  "The waiver rule 
exists to cultivate timely objections."  State v. Erickson, 227 
Wis. 2d 758, 766, 596 N.W.2d 749 (1999).  Timely objections 
promote efficient judicial administration by encouraging parties 
and courts to correct or avoid errors at trial.  Id. (citing 
State v. Agnello, 226 Wis. 2d 164, 173, 593 N.W.2d 427 (1999)); 
see also Vollmer v. Luety, 156 Wis. 2d 1, 11, 456 N.W.2d 797 
(1990).  They may eliminate the need for an appeal.  In 
addition, the waiver rule diminishes any strategic incentive to 
induce error in order to gain access to appellate review.  
Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d at 766; Vollmer, 156 Wis. 2d at 11.  Even 
where a timely objection fails to correct error, it creates a 
record that facilitates appellate review. 
¶38 Here, the judge acted outside the presence of the 
jury.  The defendant would not have been embarrassed in front of 
the jury by launching an immediate objection to either of the 
judicial actions about which he now complains.  Upon receiving 
objection, the court might have terminated questions and avoided 
any questionable conduct. 
¶39 Finally, because appellate courts are sensitive to 
judicial intervention by a trial judge in the form of judicial 
witnesses and judicial questioning, circuit courts are likely to 
be very cautious when they are given fair notice that their 
conduct raises concerns. 
No. 02-2781-CR  
 
17 
 
¶40 This court has dealt with these concerns since at 
least 1881.  Yanke v. State, 51 Wis. 464, 466-67, 8 N.W. 276 
(1881).  We have always recognized judicial authority to call 
and interrogate witnesses but simultaneously admonished caution 
against judicial abuse.  The tension is seen in the 1906 case of 
Komp v. State, where the court stated: 
The right of a trial judge, in the exercise of a sound 
discretion, to examine or cross-examine a witness 
cannot be doubted.  It is a right that is sometimes 
most valuable in the administration of justice, but it 
should be most carefully exercised, and the questions 
put should not betray bias or prejudice, nor carry to 
the jury the impression that the judge has made up his 
mind as to the facts.  The questions should be framed 
to make clear that which is not clear.  Within these 
limits there can be no just fault found with the fact 
that the trial judge asks some questions of a witness.   
129 Wis. 20, 24, 108 N.W. 46 (1906) (citations omitted).   
 
¶41 The struggle for balance appears again in State v. 
Nutley, 24 Wis. 2d 527, 129 N.W.2d 155 (1964), overruled on 
other grounds by State v. Stevens, 26 Wis. 2d 451, 463, 132 
N.W.2d 502 (1965).  In Nutley, we addressed a claim that, when 
the trial judge cross-examined the defendants in front of the 
jury, he "created the image of guilt in the jurors' eyes."  Id. 
at 561.  We noted that the judge questioned each defendant in 
relation to internal inconsistencies between his version of 
events and the version offered by the codefendants.  We 
concluded that the court's conduct was justified in order "to 
clarify a relevant and highly material line of inquiry."  Id. at 
562.  In reaching this conclusion, we quoted Judge Learned 
Hand's insight that: 
No. 02-2781-CR  
 
18 
 
It is permissible, though it is seldom very desirable, 
for a judge to call and examine a witness whom the 
parties do not wish to call.  A judge is more than a 
moderator; he is charged to see that the law is 
properly administered, and it is a duty which he 
cannot discharge by remaining inert.   
Id.  (quoting United States v. Marzano, 149 F.2d 923, 925 (2d 
Cir. 1945)).  In the conflicted manner typical of decisions in 
this area, we reasoned: "While the court cannot function as a 
partisan, it may take necessary steps to aid in the discovery of 
truth."  Id.   
 
¶42 In State v. Asfoor, the tension between the competing 
interests was very apparent.  75 Wis. 2d 411, 435-37, 249 
N.W.2d 529 (1977).  In Asfoor, the defendant appealed on the 
ground that the judge presiding over his criminal trial was 
biased against him.   Id. at 424.  The defendant directed the 
court's attention to several instances on the record that 
suggested bias, including what this court characterized as the 
judge's "somewhat active role in questioning witnesses."  Id. at 
437.  The court stated: 
There is a fine line which divides a judge's proper 
interrogation of witnesses and interrogation which may 
appear to a jury as partisanship.  A trial judge must 
be sensitive to this fine line.  However, the trial 
judge is more than a mere referee.  The judge does 
have a right to clarify questions and answers and make 
inquiries where obvious important evidentiary matters 
are ignored or inadequately covered on behalf of the 
defendant and the state.  A judge does have some 
obligation to see to it that justice is done but must 
do so carefully and in an impartial manner.  The 
questions asked here were appropriate and disclose no 
improper motive nor partiality.   
No. 02-2781-CR  
 
19 
 
Id.  The court concluded that the jury was not improperly 
influenced by "any action" of the court, and therefore rejected 
the defendant's bias claim.  Id. 
¶43 Over the years, this court has demonstrated particular 
concern about the impression that judicial questions might 
convey to a jury.  There has been reluctance "to hold that the 
trial court's involvement in the elicitation of testimony during 
a trial resulted in such prejudice as to require a new trial."  
Schultz v. State, 82 Wis. 2d 737, 742, 264 N.W.2d 245 (1978).  
But the court did order a new trial when the judge interrogated 
a witness about a conviction that was reversed on jurisdictional 
grounds, and, as a result, "[t]he jury may very well have gained 
the impression that the defendant was guilty nevertheless."  
Benedict v. State, 190 Wis. 266, 272, 208 N.W. 934 (1926).  In 
its opinion, the court commented that the practice of judicial 
interrogation "is a dangerous one, and if the discretion of the 
[trial] court in the premises is abused a new trial will be 
granted."  Id. at 273. 
 
¶44 The opinions of our appellate courts are replete with 
precatory admonitions that trial judges must not function as 
partisans or advocates, State v. Garner, 54 Wis. 2d 100, 104, 
194 N.W.2d 649 (1972), or betray bias or prejudice, State v. 
Driscoll, 263 Wis. 230, 238, 56 N.W.2d 788 (1953), or engage in 
excessive examination, Breunig v. American Family Insurance Co., 
45 Wis. 2d 536, 548, 173 N.W.2d 619 (1970), particularly in 
front of juries.  Last term, we reversed a conviction after a 
suppression hearing in which a circuit judge crossed the line of 
No. 02-2781-CR  
 
20 
 
propriety.  State v. Jiles, 2003 WI 66, ¶39, 262 Wis. 2d 457, 
663 N.W.2d 798 ("The court must not permit itself to become a 
witness or an advocate for one party.  A defendant does not 
receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing when the role of the 
prosecutor is played by the judge and the assistant district 
attorney is reduced to a bystander."). 
¶45 In the present case, if Carprue had objected, Judge 
Schellinger would likely have altered her conduct or taken the 
opportunity to more fully explain her actions.  In addition, the 
prosecution would have had an opportunity to explain whether it 
had planned to call Morrow as a rebuttal witness before Judge 
Schellinger intervened.  Since Carprue did not object, any error 
by the court went unchecked, and the record is devoid of any 
contemporaneous explanation that would have been present if an 
objection had been lodged.   
 
¶46 We presume that circuit judges try to be fair and 
impartial in their conduct of trials, and this presumption must 
be overcome by proof except in extreme cases of structural 
error.  A defendant's failure to promptly raise concerns or 
object when he believes a judge is committing error constitutes 
waiver. 
¶47 The absence of any objection warrants that we follow 
"the normal procedure in criminal cases," which "is to address 
waiver within the rubric of the ineffective assistance of 
counsel."  Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d at 766 (citing Kimmelman v. 
Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 374 (1986); Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 
U.S. 364, 380 n.6 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting); State v. 
No. 02-2781-CR  
 
21 
 
Smith, 207 Wis. 2d 258, 273, 558 N.W.2d 379 (1997); State v. 
Vinson, 183 Wis. 2d 297, 306-07, 515 N.W.2d 314 (Ct. App. 
1994)). 
B. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
¶48 Carprue asserts that, if his attorney waived objection 
to Judge Schellinger's conduct, he was denied the effective 
assistance of counsel and his conviction should be reversed.  
This court follows the two-part analysis for ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims established by the Supreme Court in 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  See State 
v. Pitsch, 124 Wis. 2d 628, 633, 369 N.W.2d 711 (1985).  Under 
this framework, Carprue must demonstrate "(1) that his counsel's 
representation was deficient and (2) that this deficiency 
prejudiced him so that there is a 'probability sufficient to 
undermine 
our 
confidence 
in 
the 
outcome' 
of 
the 
case."  
Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d at 768 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
694).   
¶49 When this court reviews an ineffective assistance of 
counsel 
claim, 
its 
purpose 
"is 
not 
to 
grade 
counsel's 
performance."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.  As a consequence, 
it is appropriate to assume for the sake of argument that 
counsel's performance was deficient and determine whether the 
claim can be disposed of on prejudice grounds.  State v. 
Johnson, 133 Wis. 2d 207, 222, 395 N.W.2d 176 (1986); see also 
State v. Lindell, 2001 WI 108, 245 Wis. 2d 689, 629 N.W.2d 223.  
"'If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the 
ground of lack of sufficient prejudice . . . that course should 
No. 02-2781-CR  
 
22 
 
be 
followed.'" 
 
Lindell, 
245 
Wis. 2d 689, 
¶128 
(quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).   
¶50 The jury empanelled for Carprue's trial was unaware of 
Judge Schellinger's conduct; all the potentially objectionable 
activity took place outside the presence of the jury.  Further, 
with respect to the questions posed to Carprue himself, none of 
the information disclosed was ever presented to the jury and 
thus could not have prejudiced the trier of fact.   
¶51 As to calling and questioning Kenneth Morrow, Carprue 
concedes that none of Morrow's testimony should have been 
excluded on grounds of some evidentiary defect.  As we 
understand 
Carprue's 
position, 
Morrow's 
otherwise 
relevant 
testimony was tainted because the jury would not have heard it 
but for Judge Schellinger's intervention.   Thus, in order for 
there to be a colorable basis to find prejudice, we must not 
only assume that trial counsel could have and should have 
objected at the time, but that the prosecution did not intend to 
present rebuttal evidence regarding the procedures of "in-house" 
monitoring.   
¶52 Carprue's argument substantially departs from the 
record in the case.  During the State's cross-examination of 
Carprue, the State asked: "Since when did you ever hear of the 
Milwaukee Police Department enforcing [i]n-[h]ouse?"  Defense 
counsel immediately objected, saying: "I'm going to object.  
That calls for facts not in evidence."  (Emphasis added.)  These 
passages indicate that the prosecutor was well aware of the 
No. 02-2781-CR  
 
23 
 
significance of in-house procedures before Judge Schellinger 
intervened. 
¶53 Even if we assume that the prosecution would not have 
attempted to establish evidence about "In-House" monitoring's 
actual procedures, we still cannot conclude that Carprue 
experienced prejudice from his trial counsel's failure to 
object.  The jury could have believed both Morrow and Carprue——
Morrow's 
testimony 
did 
not 
directly 
contradict 
Carprue's 
testimony.  It is entirely possible that Carprue truly believed 
that, if the "In-House" monitoring agents were unable to contact 
him, 
the 
police 
would 
be 
called. 
 
Carprue's 
attorney 
successfully elicited testimony that subjects of supervision 
were not told directly that the police would not be called. 
¶54 Carprue does not contend that all evidence of his 
flight from the police should have been suppressed.  The issue 
of flight was collateral to the primary issue in the case, 
namely, whether Carprue sexually assaulted T.B.  If the jury had 
fully accepted Carprue's explanation of his flight, it would 
have understood that he knew he had violated the conditions of 
his release from the HOC and was also potentially subject to 
criminal charges in Gary, Indiana.  His own version of events——
before 
Judge 
Schellinger 
ever 
questioned 
Morrow——damaged 
Carprue's credibility even more than the three prior convictions 
to which he admitted on direct examination.  
¶55 The 
prosecution 
presented 
ample 
evidence 
to 
substantiate 
T.B.'s 
claim 
of 
sexual 
assault, 
including 
bloodstained clothing and the testimony of an expert witness who 
No. 02-2781-CR  
 
24 
 
concluded that T.B.'s vaginal injuries were consistent with 
forceful sexual contact.  We have attempted to present a broad 
overview of Carprue's trial to provide perspective.  Even if the 
prosecution 
would 
not 
have 
presented 
Morrow's 
rebuttal 
testimony, the addition of that testimony did not distort the 
evidence or undermine our confidence in the outcome of the 
trial.   
¶56 Carprue asserts that prejudice should be presumed in 
this case.  He argues that "when errors occur the nature of 
which implies that the proceedings appear to be fundamentally 
unfair, it is necessary to deem them per se prejudicial."  While 
there are no doubt rare circumstances where prejudice is 
presumed, 
see 
Smith, 
207 
Wis. 2d at 
278; 
Erickson, 
227 
Wis. 2d at 770, the failure to object to a judge's possible 
violation of the authority to call and interrogate witnesses 
does not necessarily result in the "actual or constructive 
denial of the assistance of counsel altogether," a situation in 
which Strickland instructs that prejudice is to be presumed.  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692.   
¶57 Carprue's 
claim 
that 
the 
proceedings 
were 
fundamentally unfair stems from his allegation of a biased 
judge, not the effectiveness of his counsel.  If there were 
structural error in the trial, as addressed in the next section, 
such error could not be waived and there was therefore no need 
for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
C. 
Judicial Bias 
No. 02-2781-CR  
 
25 
 
¶58 Carprue contends that he was denied his due process 
right to a fair trial because Judge Schellinger was not 
impartial.  His evidence consists of the judge's actions in 
calling and questioning Morrow and in questioning Carprue.   
¶59 "A fair 
trial 
in 
a 
fair 
tribunal 
is a 
basic 
requirement of due process."  In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 
(1955); see also State v. Kywanda F., 200 Wis. 2d 26, 35, 546 
N.W.2d 440 (1996); State v. Walberg, 109 Wis. 2d 96, 105, 325 
N.W.2d 687 (1982); Asfoor, 75 Wis. 2d at 436; State ex rel. 
Mitchell v. Bowman, 54 Wis. 2d 5, 7, 194 N.W.2d 297 (1972).  
Case law makes clear that when a judge presides in a case where 
the judge has a direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest 
in the outcome of the proceeding, Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 
523 (1927), this constitutes "structural error" and would be 
subject to automatic reversal.  State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, 
¶37, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189.   
¶60 If 
Judge 
Schellinger 
were 
actually 
biased, 
the 
question would be whether she should have presided at all.  In 
this case, Carprue can do no more than allege that Judge 
Schellinger harbored general bias in favor of the State in 
criminal prosecutions based upon her actions.  He presents no 
basis to conclude that Judge Schellinger had any direct stake in 
the outcome of the proceeding.  "[O]nly in the most extreme 
cases would disqualification based on general allegations of 
prejudice or bias be constitutionally required."  Kywanda F., 
200 Wis. 2d at 36 (emphasis added) (citing Aetna Life Ins. Co. 
v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 821 (1986)); see also State v. Harrell, 
No. 02-2781-CR  
 
26 
 
199 Wis. 2d 654, 673, 546 N.W.2d 115 (1996) (Bradley, J., 
concurring).  Otherwise, "most matters relating to judicial 
disqualification [do] not rise to a constitutional level."  FTC 
v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 702 (1948), quoted in Lavoie, 
475 U.S. at 820.   Instead, "matters of kinship, personal bias, 
state policy, [and] remoteness of interest would seem generally 
matters of legislative discretion."  Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523; see 
also Kywanda F., 200 Wis. 2d at 36.   
¶61 Our legislature, in keeping with this principle, has 
established seven statutory situations that require judicial 
disqualification.  Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2).6  The only statutory 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 757.19(2) reads as follows: 
 
(2) Any 
judge 
shall 
disqualify 
himself 
or 
herself 
from 
any 
civil 
or 
criminal 
action 
or 
proceeding 
when one 
of 
the 
following 
situations 
occurs: 
 
(a) When a judge is related to any party or 
counsel thereto or their spouses within the 3rd degree 
of kinship. 
 
(b) When a judge is a party or a material 
witness, except that a judge need not disqualify 
himself or herself if the judge determines that any 
pleading purporting to make him or her a party is 
false, sham or frivolous. 
 
(c) When a judge previously acted as counsel to 
any party in the same action or proceeding. 
 
(d) When a judge prepared as counsel any legal 
instrument or paper whose validity or construction is 
at issue. 
 
(e) When 
a 
judge 
of 
an 
appellate 
court 
previously handled the action or proceeding while 
judge of an inferior court. 
No. 02-2781-CR  
 
27 
 
ground requiring disqualification that might apply under these 
facts 
is 
one 
that 
requires 
disqualification 
if 
a 
judge 
determines that he or she cannot, or it appears he or she 
cannot, act impartially in a case.  Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(g).  
We concluded 
in 
State v. 
American 
TV & 
Appliance, 151 
Wis. 2d 175, 182-83, 443 N.W.2d 662 (1989), that a judge's 
disqualification decision under this paragraph is subjective, 
that is, it is up to the judge's own determination.  This 
provision "leaves the responsibility of withdrawal to the 
integrity of the individual judge."  Harrell, 199 Wis. 2d at 
665.  If Judge Schellinger determined that she could not act 
impartially, she was required to disqualify herself.   
¶62 "The reviewing court must objectively decide if the 
judge went through the required exercise of making a subjective 
determination."  Id. at 664.  By instructing the jury that it 
was to disregard any impression that it might have regarding 
whether she believed the defendant was guilty or not guilty, we 
can infer that Judge Schellinger did consider the matter of 
bias.  See supra note 5.  In any event, because Carprue's claim 
rests upon an allegation of general bias, the record would not 
have contained a more thorough record of Judge Schellinger's 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
(f) When a judge has a significant financial or 
personal interest in the outcome of the matter.  Such 
interest does not occur solely by the judge being a 
member of a political or taxing body that is a party. 
 
(g) When 
a judge 
determines 
that, 
for any 
reason, he or she cannot, or it appears he or she 
cannot, act in an impartial manner. 
No. 02-2781-CR  
 
28 
 
subjective thought process unless the defendant had objected.  
In the absence of any objection, we assume that, by presiding, 
Judge Schellinger believed that she could act in an impartial 
manner. 
¶63 Carprue bases his claim on the broader argument that 
Judge Schellinger was anti-defendant.  As we noted above, for 
judicial disqualification based on general allegations of bias 
to be constitutionally required, Carprue must demonstrate that 
Judge Schellinger's conduct represented the "extreme" case.  The 
record does not warrant such a finding.   
¶64 In support of his contention that Judge Schellinger 
was partial, Carprue directs our attention to the same two 
incidents discussed above and characterizes Judge Schellinger's 
motivation for her actions as animated by partiality and bias.  
As to the questioning of Morrow, Carprue asserts that Judge 
Schellinger's purpose was to assist the prosecution by providing 
a blueprint to discredit Carprue's testimony.  Carprue also 
asserts that Judge Schellinger's questions to him required Judge 
Schellinger to go out of her way to obtain Carprue's file, 
canvass the file in search of negative information, and then 
question him about it in open court.  However, both of these 
incidents have more benign explanations.   
¶65 As to calling and questioning Morrow, the record 
reflects several points of confusion with respect to "in-house" 
monitoring.  The majority of Judge Schellinger's questions to 
Morrow were directed at clarifying this confusion.  While we 
discourage judicial intervention in this manner if it can be 
No. 02-2781-CR  
 
29 
 
avoided, the fact that Judge Schellinger had taken judicial 
notice of "In-House" Correctional Services' practices warranted 
that she assure herself that the information the jury was 
instructed 
to 
accept 
as 
fact 
was 
accurate. 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. § 902.01(7).  Moreover, Judge Schellinger dispelled 
any uncertainty about her motivation by explaining that she did 
not intend to imply that Carprue was being untruthful.  Instead, 
she made clear that she was attempting to ascertain what "In-
House" Correctional Services' procedures were, wholly apart from 
what Carprue believed them to be.  
¶66 With respect to the file Judge Schellinger obtained, 
the file was more likely in her possession because she wanted to 
mitigate any impression the jury might have by virtue of the 
evidence as to how Carprue and T.B. met, than because she was on 
a mission to impeach Carprue.  As previously stated, Carprue was 
in the Milwaukee County HOC and then on "in-house" monitoring.  
Several times Judge Schellinger explained that the jury was not 
to read anything into those facts.  She also explained that 
Carprue's confinement at the HOC was the result of a traffic 
offense, 
to 
allay 
suspicion 
of 
his 
involvement 
in 
more 
substantial criminal conduct.  While we do not condone the 
extensive questioning of Carprue about the letter to another 
judge, we cannot conclude that this action is so "extreme" as to 
deprive Carprue of due process.   
¶67 Were we to overreact to this situation in the absence 
of any discernible harm to Carprue, we would establish a 
precedent that would undermine the court's ability to take any 
No. 02-2781-CR  
 
30 
 
action that a defendant might view as helpful to the state, see 
Grover v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 282, 283, 212 N.W.2d 117 (1973) 
(allowing the state to introduce additional testimony after it 
rested), or adverse to the defendant, State v. Grinder, 190 
Wis. 2d 541, 527 N.W.2d 326 (1995) (shackling the defendant 
during trial).  Such a decision would seriously compromise the 
court's historic right to call and question witnesses.  We 
cannot embrace Carprue's position that "No court should be 
allowed to call and question a witness prior to completion of 
the presentation of evidence." 
¶68 Although we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals, we stand with the court of appeals in calling upon our 
circuit courts to foster an atmosphere of perfect impartiality 
and to strive for absolute objectivity in carrying out judicial 
functions.  Carprue, 266 Wis. 2d 168, ¶12 (citing Glasser v. 
United States, 315 U.S. 60, 82 (1942), superseded on other 
grounds by Fed. R. Evid. 104(a)).   
CONCLUSION 
¶69 Because there was no objection to Judge Schellinger's 
calling and questioning of Kenneth Morrow or questioning of the 
defendant, Carprue waived any claim of error in this regard.  As 
a result, the facts of this appeal should be addressed under the 
rubric of ineffective assistance of counsel.  Because Carprue 
cannot demonstrate prejudice, his claim fails.  In addition, 
Judge Schellinger's conduct, while unusual and not recommended, 
did not deprive Carprue of his right to a fair trial.  
Therefore, there was no structural error in the trial and the 
No. 02-2781-CR  
 
31 
 
court of appeals was incorrect in reversing Carprue's conviction 
for second-degree sexual assault.  We reverse the decision of 
the court of appeals and reinstate the defendant's conviction. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
All work on this opinion was completed on or before June 
30, 2004.  Justice Diane S. Sykes resigned on July 4, 2004. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 02-2781-CR  
 
 
 
1