Title: Christopher v. State
Citation: 407 So. 2d 198
Docket Number: 55698
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: December 10, 1981

407 So. 2d 198 (1981)
William D. CHRISTOPHER, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 55698.

Supreme Court of Florida.
December 10, 1981.
*199 Jack O. Johnson, Public Defender and James R. Wulchak and David A. Davis, Asst. Public Defenders, Bartow, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and James S. Purdy, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.
ADKINS, Justice.
We have before us a direct appeal from a judgment imposing the death sentence upon William D. Christopher. Jurisdiction is pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution.
The appellant was found guilty on two counts of first-degree murder. The findings of fact by the trial court are as follows:
Appellant presents six procedural issues upon which he relies for reversal of the sentence of death, remand for a new trial, remand for imposition of a life sentence, or remand for a new sentencing hearing.
The six issues presented for our consideration are as follows:
As to the first issue, the law is settled that the competency of a challenged juror is a mixed question of law and fact and is to be determined by the trial judge in his discretion. Manifest error must be demonstrated before the judge's decision will be disturbed. Singer v. State, 109 So. 2d 7, 22 (Fla. 1959); Ashley v. State, 370 So. 2d 1191, 1194 (Fla.3d DCA 1979). No such error has been demonstrated in the case sub judice.
Turning to the second issue, the admissibility of the confession, we find no evidence that the appellant exercised his right to halt the interrogation. The appellant continued his conversation with the interrogating deputies of his own free will.
The test for admissibility of a confession is whether it is freely and voluntarily made. Howell v. State, 66 Fla. 210, 63 So. 421 (1913); Jarriel v. State, 317 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), cert. denied, 328 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 1976).
Appellant claims improper coercion during the course of the interrogation. A case in which improper coercion was found is Jarriel v. State, cited above. In Jarriel the defendant was improperly urged by direct *201 or implied promises to make a statement. The interrogating officer told defendant his wife would be arrested unless defendant made a statement. 317 So. 2d  at 141. No such urging or promising took place in the case sub judice. The confession was freely and voluntarily made, and was, therefore, properly admitted.
Next we proceed to the third issue, concerning the admissibility of the testimony regarding the appellant's sexual relations with his daughter. Appellant's claim is that the prejudicial impact of this evidence far outweighs its probative value, and therefore, the evidence should not have been admitted. We disagree. The trial judge found that incest was one of the theories upon which the state tried the case and that incest was a motive for the murders. The state contended that the primary reason for the murders was appellant's jealousy and anger over Ahern's sexual advances toward Norma. Appellant knew that Ahern had fondled Norma's breasts and that he had entered Norma's room at night and lifted her covers to see if she was naked. The state also contended that the abnormal relationship between appellant and his daughter was why he planned on taking Norma away from Naples, and that the plan resulted in two murders because Skillen tried to prevent Norma's departure by calling the police. It is well-established that "any material evidence tending to show motive is admissible on the trial of one charged with the offense of murder in the first degree... ." Beard v. State, 131 Fla. 512, 180 So. 1, 2 (1938). See also, McVeigh v. State, 73 So. 2d 694, 696 (Fla.), appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 885, 75 S. Ct. 210, 99 L. Ed. 696 (1954); and Dodson v. State, 334 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), cert. denied, 341 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 1977).
In Smithie v. State, 88 Fla. 70, 101 So. 276 (1924), a first-degree murder case, this Court held that certain evidence which tended to show an illegitimate intimacy between the defendant and the sister-in-law of the deceased, was admissible. The Court found that "some of the evidence obtained ... was relevant and perfectly proper, as showing motive or cause for antagonism between the two men... ." 101 So.  at 279. The Court further determined that "[t]he fact that the evidence also tended to show the defendant to be guilty of another crime, that of criminal intimacy with a girl not 18 years of age, would not render it inadmissible as evidence of so important an element as motive for the killing of the deceased." Id.
The testimony concerning appellant's sexual relations with his daughter was admissible.
We turn now to the fourth issue on appeal, whether the trial court, during the sentence proceeding, erred in denying the appellant's motion for a medical evaluation and for administration of sodium pentothol at county expense. We consider this issue in light of this Court's pronouncement in the case of Knight v. State, 97 So. 2d 115, 118 (Fla. 1957).
The trial court, in the case sub judice, made the following findings:
The judge acted properly. Appellant's fourth point is without merit.
We now consider the fifth issue, whether the trial court erred during the sentencing in granting the state's motion to preclude the introduction of polygraph results. Section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1977), is not ambiguous with respect to what evidence is admissible at the sentencing hearing. The statute provides that evidence as to any matter the court deems relevant to sentencing may be admitted. It is within the discretion of the trial court to determine what is relevant in the sentencing proceeding. Provence v. State, 337 So. 2d 783, 786 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 969, 97 S. Ct. 2929, 53 L. Ed. 2d 1065 (1977). Absent a showing of abuse of this discretion we will not disturb the finding of the trial judge. No such abuse has been shown in the case sub judice. The granting of the state's motion to preclude the introduction of the polygraph results was proper.
We now reach the final issue on appeal, the sufficiency of the trial court's findings with respect to aggravating and mitigating factors. The first aggravating factor found by the trial court is that the defendant was previously convicted of other felonies involving the use of violence to some person. Documents introduced by the state demonstrated that he was convicted for assault with intent to commit murder in the first degree, and for an attempt to commit rape. In addition, the appellant admitted the crime of assault with intent to commit first degree murder in one of his taped confessions. Furthermore, the pre-sentence investigation report ordered by the trial judge reflected a conviction for assault with intent to commit first degree murder, and a conviction for attempted rape. Appellant's challenge to this finding is without merit.
The second aggravating factor found by the trial court is that the murders were heinous, atrocious, or cruel. The facts support this finding. The appellant was in Naples to visit his daughter. He had no money and no place to stay. Bertha Skillen and George Ahern invited appellant to stay in their apartment. When Mrs. Skillen discovered that Norma was planning to leave Naples with the appellant she attempted to call the police. Appellant shot and killed Skillen at that time. Shortly after this Ahern returned to the apartment. He and Christopher went to the bank so that Ahern could give Christopher some money. When they returned to the apartment Christopher knocked Ahern down. Ahern then ran for the bedroom and tried to shut the door. Christopher pushed open the door and shot Ahern while Ahern was sitting on the bed.
It is common knowledge that discretion and judgment are essential to the judicial process and are present at all stages of its progression  arrest, arraignment, trial, verdict, *203 and onward through final appeal. State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 6 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943, 94 S. Ct. 1950, 40 L. Ed. 2d 295 (1974). Judicial discretion in the context of the sentencing statute, section 921.141, Florida Statutes, must be reasonable and controlled, rather than capricious and discriminatory. Id. at 7. The discretion exercised by the trial judge in entering a sentence of death was reasonable and controlled, as required in Dixon.
We also held in Dixon that when one or more aggravating circumstances are found, the death penalty is presumed proper unless the aggravating circumstance or circumstances are overridden by one or more of the mitigating circumstances. 283 So. 2d  at 9. In the instant case it does not expressly appear from the specific findings of fact that the trial judge found the existence of any mitigating circumstances. Indeed, his written findings expressly negate the existence of any mitigating circumstances.
The findings of the trial court are supported by the facts and testimony in the record. No reversible error has been demonstrated. We therefore hold that the judgment and sentence of death upon the appellant, William D. Christopher, are affirmed.
It is so ordered.
BOYD, OVERTON, ALDERMAN and McDONALD, JJ., concur.
SUNDBERG, C.J., concurs in the result only.
ENGLAND, J., dissents.