Title: State v. Kinnell
Citation: 197 Kan. 456, 419 P.2d 870
Docket Number: 43,976, 44,000
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: November 5, 1966

197 Kan. 456 (1966)
419 P.2d 870
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee,
v.
DALE KINNELL, Appellant.
Nos. 43,976 and 44,000 (Consolidated)

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed November 5, 1966.
Glenn H. Louderback, of Fort Scott, argued the cause and was on the briefs for the appellant.
Charles M. Warren, County Attorney, argued the cause, and Robert C. Londerholm, Attorney General, was with him on the briefs for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
KAUL, J.:
The defendant, Dale Kinnell, appeals from a conviction of the offenses of kidnapping in the first degree (G.S. 1961 Supp., 21-449, now K.S.A. 21-449) and forcible rape (G.S. 1949, 21-424, now K.S.A. 21-424).
The defendant, pro se, filed a notice of appeal on April 9, 1964, which was docketed as No. 43,976. Subsequently, and on May 19, 1964, defendant through his attorney filed a notice of appeal which was docketed as No. 44,000. The two appeals were consolidated with the consent of defendant's attorney and will be treated as one case herein.
Defendant Kinnell was one of six men charged with offenses of kidnapping in the first degree and forcible rape in the district court of Bourbon County as a result of a gruesome series of events occurring on the night of August 20, 1962. Among those charged were *457 Gerald Lee Woods, Allan Davis, Melvin Lee Burnett, and defendant Kinnell. Woods was tried first and convicted by a jury on both charges, his conviction was affirmed by this court in State v. Woods, 191 Kan. 433, 381 P.2d 533, and a petition for a writ of certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court of the United States (376 U.S. 919, 11 L. Ed. 2d 615, 84 S.Ct. 676).
On November 6, 1963, Burnett and this defendant (Kinnell) were tried by the district court without a jury on the evidence offered in the trials of Woods and Davis. The transcripts of the Woods and Davis trials were submitted to the court under a stipulation of the parties. Burnett and Kinnell were convicted on both charges. Burnett appealed to this court and his conviction was affirmed on December 12, 1964, in State v. Burnett, 194 Kan. 126, 397 P.2d 346.
Kinnell has now perfected his appeal and asks us to set aside his convictions (1) because the trial court permitted defendant to waive his rights to trial by jury and to confront witnesses without first making inquiry to ascertain whether defendant was competent to waive said rights and whether the waivers were understandingly and intelligently made, and (2) the trial court's acceptance and approval of the stipulation was an invasion of defendant's constitutional rights to a fair trial. In a supplemental abstract and brief defendant makes a third specification of error in which he claims that the record in the Woods case contained inadmissible statements that implicated and incriminated defendant.
Defendant has not included an abstract of the evidence in his abstract on appeal but adopts the abstract of record on file with this court in the case of State v. Woods, supra. The details of the episode from which these cases arose are narrated in the opinion in the Woods case, a repetition is unnecessary for purposes of our consideration here.
The stipulation referred to was submitted to the district court on November 6, 1963. Even though it is identical with the stipulation set out in the Burnett opinion, except as to names, signatures and a challenge of the court's jurisdiction, we think a complete reproduction is necessary here to facilitate a thorough examination of the issues raised herein.
The stipulation entered into in open court in the presence of the defendant and his attorneys, reads as follows:
The transcript of proceedings before the trial court reveals that at the hearing on November 6, 1963, the defendant was present in person with his attorneys. The trial judge read the stipulation in open court and stated that he had carefully studied it and that he had reread the transcripts of the Woods and Davis trials. The trial judge then inquired of each defendant if he had examined the stipulation and gone over it with counsel. Defendant Kinnell replied in the affirmative. The court approved the stipulation and ordered it filed.
The journal entry of judgment reveals the following proceedings:
The motion for new trial was presented to the trial court on November 20, 1963. The journal entry reveals the following:
*460 The defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment on the first degree kidnapping charge and a term of five to twenty-one years on the charge of forcible rape. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently.
The first two contentions of defendant are identical with two of the questions presented to us in the Burnett appeal. They were fully discussed in the Burnett opinion and found to be without merit.
In State v. Burnett, supra, we pointed out the authorization for submitting a criminal trial to the court under the provisions of G.S. 1961 Supp., 62-1401, now K.S.A. 62-1401, in this connection we said:
The record shows that the defendant herein was fully advised of his rights and waived trial by jury with an understanding of what he was doing. There is no showing that indicates incompetency of the defendant. We are satisfied from our reading of the record that the trial court did ascertain whether defendant understood his position before it approved the conduct of the trial in the manner pursued.
We shall next turn to defendant's contention that the conduct of the trial in this manner was an invasion of defendant's constitutional rights by violating his fundamental right to a fair trial. This contention was also thoroughly discussed and completely answered in our opinion in the Burnett case. There we stated:
..............
Our research has disclosed a parallel case decided subsequently to our decision in Burnett by the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. In Wilson v. Gray, 345 F.2d 282 (1965), a habeas corpus applicant claimed an invasion of his constitutional rights by violating his fundamental right to a fair trial by the action of his court-appointed counsel stipulating in his presence to trial without a jury on the transcript of the preliminary hearing. Gray, the accused, was present in court when his counsel made the waiver but Gray, himself, did not expressly waive as was done by defendant in the instant case. In holding that proceeding to trial before the court without a jury on the stipulation was not a violation of due process the court in Wilson v. Gray said:
The two questions heretofore discussed were fully answered by our holding in Burnett. We find no reason presented in this record here or in the briefs of counsel that would give cause to disturb our holding in Burnett.
Lastly, the defendant contends in his supplemental abstract and brief that inadmissible statements were contained in the record in the Woods case and that such statements implicated and incriminated defendant. The statements referred to by defendant were those of Woods and a John Radford Walker, III, who was also a participant in the episode of August 20, 1962. With reference to the statements in question the county attorney on August 25, 1966, stipulated and agreed in writing with the attorney for defendant that no attorney was present to represent Woods or Walker at the time their statements were made to the sheriff.
We have examined the statements of both Woods and Walker and find the statements to show on their face that in each case Woods and Walker were advised as to self-incrimination, right to counsel, right of trial and right to remain silent. Each stated that his statement was given freely and voluntarily without fear and threat or promise. Nonetheless, defendant claims the statements were inadmissible pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's decision on June 13, 1966, in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602. The defendant argues the statements were wrongfully admitted in the Woods and Davis trials and that such error should be applied vicariously to his trial. We deem it unnecessary to consider this contention any further than to say the question is answered by the announcement of the United States Supreme Court on June 20, 1966, in Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 16 L. Ed. 2d 882, 86 S. Ct. 1772, that the decision in Miranda could be applied only prospectively; that is, to trials commencing after June 13, 1966. Woods, Davis and this defendant were tried long before the announced effective date of the decision in Miranda. We find this last contention of defendant likewise to be without merit.
The judgment is affirmed.
SCHROEDER, J., dissents.