Title: State v. Burnett
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 100854
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: February 10, 2012

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 100,854 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
THEODORE G. BURNETT, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
When a party fails to object to a jury verdict form that is then challenged on 
appeal, an appellate court applies a clearly erroneous standard of review.  
 
2. 
A jury verdict form is clearly erroneous only if the reviewing court is firmly 
convinced there is a real possibility the jury would have rendered a different verdict if the 
trial error had not occurred. 
 
3. 
A double jeopardy claim is not ripe for appellate review if the defendant has not 
been punished twice for the same offense and the State is not attempting to punish the 
defendant a second time for the same offense.  
 
4. 
To be ripe for appellate review, issues must have taken shape and be concrete 
rather than hypothetical and abstract. 
 
2 
 
 
 
5. 
In reviewing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, an appellate court first 
determines whether the prosecutor's comments were outside the wide latitude allowed the 
prosecutor in discussing the evidence. If so, the court considers whether the improper 
comments constitute plain error; that is, whether the comments prejudiced the jury 
against the defendant and denied the defendant a fair trial. 
 
6. 
When a prosecutor deliberately misstates the controlling law, he or she steps 
outside the considerable latitude given prosecutors. However, even a misstatement of the 
law does not require reversal if it does not constitute plain error.  
 
7. 
In considering whether a prosecutor's remark in closing argument misstated the 
law, an appellate court does not consider the remark in isolation but instead considers the 
remark in the context of the entire closing argument and the instructions given to the jury. 
 
8. 
When a defendant argues photographs admitted at trial were overly repetitious, 
gruesome, or inflammatory, the appellate court applies an abuse of discretion standard in 
reviewing the admitted photographs. 
 
9. 
Judicial discretion is abused if judicial action (1) is arbitrary, fanciful, or 
unreasonable, i.e., if no reasonable person would have taken the view adopted by the trial 
court; (2) is based on an error of law, i.e., if the discretion is guided by an erroneous legal 
conclusion; or (3) is based on an error of fact, i.e., if substantial competent evidence does 
3 
 
 
 
not support a factual finding on which a prerequisite conclusion of law or the exercise of 
discretion is based. 
 
10. 
The party asserting an abuse of discretion bears the burden of showing such an 
abuse of discretion. 
 
11. 
In considering the admission of photographic evidence, an appellate court first 
determines whether the photos are relevant.  
 
12. 
In a murder case, photographic evidence is generally relevant if it depicts the 
extent, nature, and number of wounds inflicted. 
 
13. 
Photographs that are relevant and material to the jury's understanding of medical 
testimony are generally admissible, including photographs which aid a pathologist in 
explaining the cause of death. 
 
14. 
Because the State has the burden to prove every element of the crime charged, 
photographs used to prove the elements of the crime, including the fact and manner of 
death and the violent nature of the crime, are relevant even if the cause of death is not 
contested.  
 
4 
 
 
 
15. 
Because the inclusion in a jury instruction of the phrase "another trial would be a 
burden on both sides" is both misleading and inaccurate, a district court errs in giving a 
jury instruction that includes that phrase.  
 
16. 
A jury instruction is clearly erroneous only if the reviewing court is firmly 
convinced there is a real possibility the jury would have rendered a different verdict had 
the instructional error not occurred.  
 
17. 
Under K.S.A. 21-4721(c)(1), an appellate court lacks jurisdiction to consider 
sentencing challenges on direct appeal when a defendant has received a presumptive 
sentence.  
 
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; BENJAMIN L. BURGESS, judge. Opinion filed February 10, 
2012. Affirmed in part and dismissed in part. 
 
Sarah Ellen Johnson, of Capital Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief 
for appellant.  
 
Lesley A. Isherwood, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Nola Tedesco Foulston, 
district attorney, and Steve Six, attorney general, were with her on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
MORITZ, J.:  A jury convicted Theodore Burnett of capital murder and aggravated 
kidnapping for his role in the kidnapping and murder of C.B., a pregnant, 14-year-old 
girl. After the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict in the penalty phase of the 
5 
 
 
 
trial regarding imposition of the death penalty, the sentencing court imposed a life 
sentence with no possibility of parole on the capital murder conviction.  Further, the court 
imposed a consecutive aggravated presumptive prison sentence of 618 months on the 
aggravated kidnapping conviction.  
 
In this direct appeal, Burnett argues his convictions must be reversed because the 
verdict forms used in the penalty phase of the trial did not allow the jury to express fact 
findings sufficient to constitute an acquittal on the death penalty. Thus, Burnett reasons 
the verdict forms insufficiently protected his constitutional right to be free from double 
jeopardy in any future prosecution. Because this claim is not ripe for appellate review, we 
decline to consider this issue.  
 
Burnett also claims the prosecutor committed reversible misconduct during 
closing argument by suggesting that Burnett's mere presence during the aggravated 
kidnapping of C.B. was sufficient to convict him of aiding and abetting the kidnapping. 
Further, Burnett argues the trial court erred in admitting autopsy photographs that Burnett 
claims were more prejudicial than probative and in instructing the jury that another trial 
would be a burden on both sides. Finding no reversible trial errors, we affirm Burnett's 
convictions.  
 
Finally, Burnett contends the sentencing court violated his constitutional rights 
when it imposed an aggravated presumptive sentence for the kidnapping conviction. 
Because we lack jurisdiction to review the imposition of a presumptive sentence, we 
dismiss that portion of Burnett's appeal. 
 
6 
 
 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
On the evening of June 9, 2006, C.B. went to a skating rink in Wichita with her 
friends, A.K. and M.D. At the time, C.B. was 14 years old and 9 months pregnant with 
Elgin Ray Robinson, Jr.'s child. At some point, C.B. left the skating rink with Robinson's 
friend, Everett Gentry, and told her friends that Gentry would take her to meet Robinson. 
C.B. never returned to the skating rink.  
 
On June 15, 2006, C.B.'s body was discovered near a field in Butler County, 
buried face down in a shallow grave. Homicide detectives quickly focused their 
investigation on Gentry and Robinson, who both initially denied involvement in C.B.'s 
murder.  Ultimately, Gentry implicated himself, Burnett, and Robinson in the murder.  
 
The State charged Burnett with capital murder, in violation of K.S.A. 21-
3439(a)(2) (intentional and premeditated killing pursuant to a contract or agreement), an 
off-grid person felony; and aggravated kidnapping, in violation of K.S.A. 21-3421, 
(kidnapping by deception with intent to inflict bodily injury, see K.S.A. 21-3420[c]), a 
severity level 1 person felony.  
 
At trial, Gentry testified for the State, providing the primary evidence implicating 
Burnett in C.B.'s murder and kidnapping. Gentry's testimony is summarized below. 
 
Gentry's trial testimony  
 
Several months before C.B.'s murder, Robinson told Gentry that he needed to get 
rid of C.B. because her parents intended to seek rape charges against Robinson after 
C.B.'s child was born and Robinson's paternity was established. Robinson offered Gentry 
$1,000 if Gentry would assist Robinson in carrying out C.B.'s murder. Gentry agreed to 
assist. 
7 
 
 
 
 
As Gentry and Robinson planned C.B.'s kidnapping and murder, Gentry believed 
Robinson would kill C.B. But a few weeks before the murder, Gentry and Robinson 
decided Robinson should be out of town when the murder occurred so that suspicion did 
not focus on Robinson. However, Gentry was unwilling to perform the act of killing 
C.B., so the two men discussed bringing in a third party.  
 
In the two months preceding C.B.'s murder, Burnett had allowed Gentry to sell 
crack cocaine out of Burnett's apartment in exchange for Gentry providing Burnett with 
crack cocaine for his personal use. Gentry eventually approached Burnett to assist him in 
murdering C.B., telling Burnett that Gentry had a "friend" who wanted someone 
murdered and was willing to pay someone to carry out the murder. Gentry offered to pay 
Burnett $500 if he would help him with the murder. Burnett "[p]retty much agreed to it."  
 
A few days before the murder, Gentry and Burnett dug a shallow hole near a city 
golf course, anticipating that they would place C.B.'s body there after her murder. But 
Burnett suggested the area was too populated, making it risky to bury a body there. So on 
the day of C.B.'s murder, Gentry drove alone to another potential burial site outside of 
Andover that he and Robinson had selected, and Gentry dug a shallow grave. That 
evening, after receiving a text message from Robinson, Gentry picked up C.B. from the 
skating rink, took her to his sister's house, told C.B. that Robinson was on his way, and 
left to pick up Burnett at his apartment. A few minutes later, Gentry returned with 
Burnett to the house where C.B. was waiting.  
 
Burnett was surprised that the intended victim was a "pregnant girl," and he told 
Gentry he needed to smoke some crack cocaine to calm his nerves before carrying out the 
murder. So Gentry and Burnett left C.B. at the house and drove to a nearby Walgreens 
store where Gentry purchased several items, including ground coffee and a flashlight to 
8 
 
 
 
be used at the burial site. The two men then returned to Burnett's apartment where 
Burnett smoked crack. As they left the apartment, Burnett grabbed some latex gloves 
from a dresser drawer in the living room along with a cord used to attach electronics to a 
television. When Gentry and Burnett returned to the house where C.B. waited, C.B. had 
spoken with Robinson and realized he would not be meeting her. Gentry agreed to take 
C.B. back to the skating rink, but told her he would first take Burnett home.  
 
As Gentry, Burnett, and C.B. got into Gentry's car, C.B. attempted to sit in the 
back seat, but Burnett insisted she sit in the front. As Gentry drove toward the shallow 
grave he had dug in Andover, Burnett acted as though Burnett "was going to get dropped 
off" and pretended to give Gentry directions to his apartment.  
 
After Gentry turned onto a dirt road leading to the grave site, he reached into the 
back seat and tapped Burnett on the knee, signaling him it was time to kill C.B. When 
Burnett hesitated, Gentry tapped his knee a second time. Wearing latex gloves, Burnett 
then placed the cord over C.B.'s head and yanked it forcefully against her neck, placing 
his foot on the back of the passenger seat for additional leverage. C.B. struggled for 
approximately 2 minutes before her body went limp.  
 
Gentry stopped his car near the prepared grave, and the two men pulled C.B.'s 
body out of the car and laid it in the grass. Because C.B. continued to make "a snoring 
sound," Burnett placed plastic Walgreens bags over her head. Gentry and Burnett then 
placed C.B.'s body face down in the grave, covered her with dirt, and began the drive 
back to Wichita.  
 
However, Gentry missed a turn, and they ended up in Rose Hill. As they turned 
around, Gentry noticed that the cell phone C.B. had been using was on the passenger-side 
floor. Burnett picked up the phone, wiped it off, and threw it out the car window, 
9 
 
 
 
breaking the phone into pieces. After they returned to Wichita, Gentry dropped Burnett at 
his apartment but returned later that night to give Burnett $200 in cash and $150 worth of 
crack cocaine for Burnett's part in C.B.'s murder.  
 
Other corroborating evidence 
 
The State presented evidence at trial corroborating several key aspects of Gentry's 
testimony. C.B.'s friends, A.K. and M.D., testified that C.B. sent them text messages on 
the night of the murder informing them that she left the skating rink with Gentry, that she 
waited for Robinson at Gentry's apartment, and that Gentry would bring her back to the 
skating rink after he dropped off a friend. A.K. and M.D. attempted to call C.B. after her 
last message at 9:30 p.m. but the phone went to voice mail, indicating to them that C.B.'s 
phone either was turned off or the battery was dead. 
 
The State also presented testimony that C.B.'s body was discovered on June 15, 
2006, buried face down in a shallow grave near a field in Butler County. A Playstation 
cord was wrapped around her neck and two plastic Walgreens bags had been placed over 
her head. The medical examiner testified C.B. died from ligature strangulation and that 
the pressure marks on C.B.'s neck were consistent with being strangled from behind.  
 
Crime scene investigator Gregory Burge testified that during a search of Burnett's 
apartment, officers found a coaxial cable in the top drawer of a large dresser in the living 
room and latex gloves in the bedroom and bathroom. The cell phone C.B. used on the 
night she disappeared was found, broken, in a ditch on the side of Rose Hill Road.  
 
Detective Timothy Relph testified that in March 2008, Gentry showed Relph and 
Lieutenant Kenneth Landwehr the hole he and Burnett dug near the city golf course on 
10 
 
 
 
the day of the murder. Gentry also identified himself in a surveillance video taken on the 
night of the murder from the Walgreens store where Burnett and Gentry stopped.  
 
Finally, through investigator Dana Gouge, the State presented testimony analyzing 
the cell phone calls and messages made and received by Gentry, C.B., and Robinson on 
the day of C.B.'s murder. The records showed that Gentry and Robinson communicated 
with each other throughout the afternoon and evening, as did C.B. and Robinson. Further, 
both Gentry's and C.B.'s communications near the time of the murder were transmitted 
through cell phone towers near Andover.  
 
The jury found Burnett guilty as charged. Following the penalty phase of the trial, 
the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict regarding imposition of the death 
penalty. The sentencing court imposed a life sentence without the possibility of parole on 
the capital murder conviction and a consecutive aggravated presumptive prison sentence 
of 618 months on the aggravated kidnapping conviction.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Burnett's challenge to the jury verdict forms is not ripe for appellate review.  
 
In this direct appeal of his convictions and sentences, Burnett first challenges the 
jury verdict forms utilized in the trial's penalty phase, claiming the forms did not 
adequately protect his right to be free from double jeopardy as guaranteed by the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and interpreted by Sattazahn v. 
Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 123 S. Ct. 732, 154 L. Ed. 2d 588 (2003). Burnett concedes 
he did not object to the verdict forms at trial, but argues the forms are clearly erroneous 
because they did not allow the jury to express fact findings sufficient to constitute an 
acquittal on the death penalty.  
 
11 
 
 
 
When a party fails to object to the giving of a jury instruction that is then 
challenged on appeal, we apply a clearly erroneous standard of review. K.S.A. 22-
3414(3); State v. Martinez, 288 Kan. 443, 451, 204 P.3d 601 (2009). That standard 
applies equally to jury verdict forms. Unruh v. Purina Mills, 289 Kan. 1185, 1197-98, 
221 P.3d 1130 (2009). "An instruction is clearly erroneous only if the reviewing court is 
firmly convinced there is a real possibility the jury would have rendered a different 
verdict if the trial error had not occurred." Martinez, 288 Kan. at 451-52. 
 
To the extent resolution of this issue requires interpretation of the capital 
sentencing statutes or application of case law, our review is unlimited. See State v. 
Gracey, 288 Kan. 252, 257, 200 P.3d 1275 (2009) (interpretation of a sentencing statute 
is a question of law subject to unlimited review); NEA-Coffeyville v. USD No. 445, 268 
Kan. 384, 386, 996 P.2d 821 (2000) (interpretation of caselaw is subject to unlimited 
review). 
 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in part, that no 
person "shall . . . be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or 
limb." The United States Supreme Court has explained that  
 
"the language of the Double Jeopardy Clause protects against more than the actual 
imposition of two punishments for the same offense; by its terms, it protects a criminal 
defendant from being twice put in jeopardy for such punishment. See Price v. Georgia, 
398 U.S. 323[, 326, 90 S. Ct. 1757, 26 L. Ed. 2d 300] (1970). That is, the Double 
Jeopardy Clause 'prohibits merely punishing twice, or attempting a second time to punish 
criminally, for the same offense.' Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399[, 58 S. Ct. 
630, 82 L. Ed. 917] (1938) (emphasis added)." Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 396, 
115 S. Ct. 2199, 132 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1995). 
 
12 
 
 
 
As Burnett points out, the Fifth Amendment double jeopardy protection has been 
applied to the penalty phase of a capital trial. See Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 106-10. Here, in 
the penalty phase of the trial, the jury was given two verdict forms. The first form 
provided: 
 
 
"We the jury, impaneled and sworn, do upon our oath or affirmation, 
unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the following aggravating 
circumstances have been established by the evidence and do outweigh mitigating 
circumstances found to exist (the Presiding Juror shall place an X in the square in front of 
such aggravating circumstance(s))." 
 
The verdict form then listed the aggravating factors. The alternative verdict form 
provided:  "We, the jury, impaneled and sworn, do upon our oath or affirmation, state that 
we are unable to reach a unanimous verdict sentencing the defendant to death."  
 
The jury also was instructed as follows in Instruction No. 6:  
 
 
"If you find unanimously beyond a reasonable doubt that there are one or more 
aggravating circumstances and that they are not outweighed by any mitigating 
circumstances found to exist, then you shall impose a sentence of death. If you sentence 
the defendant to death, you must designate upon the appropriate verdict form with 
particularity the aggravating circumstances which you unanimously found beyond a 
reasonable doubt."  
 
 
Instruction No. 6 further provided: 
 
"[I]f one or more jurors is not persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that there are one or 
more aggravating circumstances and that they are not outweighed by any mitigating 
circumstances found to exist, then you should sign the appropriate alternative verdict 
13 
 
 
 
form indicating the jury is unable to reach a unanimous verdict sentencing the defendant 
to death."  
 
In this case, the jurors left the first verdict form blank and signed the second 
verdict form, indicating they were unable to reach a unanimous verdict. Burnett now 
argues that the verdict form violated his double jeopardy protection because: 
 
"Nowhere was the jury given the option to express unanimous agreement that death was 
not the proper verdict because the [S]tate had failed to prove the aggravators outweighed 
the mitigators. More importantly, the jury also did not have the option to find that the 
[S]tate had failed to prove an aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt." 
 
Burnett's appeal argument overlooks a fundamental aspect of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause—i.e., it prohibits "punishing twice, or attempting a second time to punish 
criminally" for the same offense. Witte, 515 U.S. at 396. Burnett has not been punished 
twice, nor has the State attempted to punish Burnett twice for the same offense. Thus, any 
consideration by this court of Burnett's double jeopardy argument is premature. 
 
Burnett fails to cite to any case in which a court has considered a double jeopardy 
issue before the defendant was punished twice for the same offense or the State at least 
attempted to punish the defendant twice for the same offense. Moreover, the only case 
cited by Burnett in his brief, Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, does not support 
our consideration of his double jeopardy claim at this juncture. There, the jury initially 
convicted the defendant of first-degree murder but became deadlocked during the penalty 
phase, and the trial court imposed a life sentence as required by statute. After the 
defendant's conviction was reversed on appeal, the State retried him and the jury 
convicted him of first-degree murder and returned a verdict imposing the death penalty.  
 
14 
 
 
 
Sattazahn appealed the death penalty verdict, arguing the verdict was barred by the 
Double Jeopardy Clause because the first jury acquitted him of the death penalty. But the 
United States Supreme Court disagreed, finding no double jeopardy violation because the 
first jury became deadlocked during the penalty phase and did not acquit the defendant. 
Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 106-10.  
 
Sattazahn raised the double jeopardy issue after he was retried and the jury 
returned a verdict imposing the death penalty on retrial. But we need not determine 
whether Sattazahn supports or undercuts Burnett's double jeopardy argument here 
because Burnett's conviction has not been overturned and he has not been retried. 
Moreover, the State has not even attempted to punish Burnett twice for the same offense. 
See Witte, 515 U.S. at 393-97 (defendant's double jeopardy claim was ripe even though 
defendant had been charged but not yet convicted in the second case because the present 
case constituted a second attempt to punish him criminally for drug offenses of which he 
had been previously convicted).  
 
Essentially, Burnett seeks an advisory opinion prohibiting the State from seeking 
the death penalty in some future case if his conviction and sentence in this case is ever 
overturned. We lack authority to render such an opinion as Burnett's claim is not ripe for 
appellate review. See State ex rel. Morrison v. Sebelius, 285 Kan. 875, 892, 179 P.3d 366 
(2008) ("To be ripe, issues must have taken shape and be concrete rather than 
hypothetical and abstract."). Thus, we reject Burnett's first claim of error.  
 
The prosecutor did not commit misconduct during closing argument. 
 
Burnett next argues that the prosecutor improperly suggested in closing argument 
that Burnett's mere presence in the car when Gentry kidnapped C.B. permitted the jury to 
find him guilty of aggravated kidnapping on a theory of aiding and abetting.  
15 
 
 
 
 
In reviewing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, we first determine whether 
the prosecutor's comments were outside the wide latitude allowed the prosecutor in 
discussing the evidence. If so, we then consider whether the improper comments 
constitute plain error; that is, whether the statements prejudiced the jury against the 
defendant and denied the defendant a fair trial. State v. McReynolds, 288 Kan. 318, 323, 
202 P.3d 658 (2009).  
 
When a prosecutor deliberately misstates the controlling law, he or she steps 
outside the considerable latitude given prosecutors. State v. Gunby, 282 Kan. 39, 63-64, 
144 P.3d 647 (2006). However, even a misstatement of the law does not require reversal 
if it does not constitute plain error. See 282 Kan. at 65 (finding prosecutor's misstatement 
regarding premeditation improper but not reversible). 
 
Burnett challenges the prosecutor's comment in closing argument: 
 
"Who took [C.B.]? Everett [Gentry] did. Everett picked her up, Everett drove the car. Ted 
Burnett sat in the back seat, so he aided and abetted the taking, the kidnapping. That's 
why the aid and abet instruction is in there, as well. He wasn't driving the car, someone 
else was the principle [sic] in that part of the act, in the taking of [C.B.]. That's why 
there's an aiding and abetting instruction that's a part of aggravated kidnapping."  
 
Burnett points out that this court has held that a defendant's mere presence in the 
vicinity of a crime or mere association with the principals that commit a crime is 
insufficient to establish guilt as an aider or abettor. See State v. Baker, 287 Kan. 345, 366, 
197 P.3d 421 (2008). He argues that when the prosecutor made the above comment, he 
effectively advised the jury that the defendant was guilty of kidnapping regardless of 
whether he was aware of or participated in the deception. 
 
16 
 
 
 
Burnett's argument is flawed in that it isolates the prosecutor's remark, ignoring 
the prosecutor's further argument and the instructions given to the jury regarding aiding 
and abetting. But we must consider the challenged statements in the context of the entire 
closing argument and in conjunction with the instructions given at trial. See Baker, 287 
Kan. at 366-68 (reviewing prosecutor's alleged misstatement of the law in context of 
entire closing argument and instructions given to jury).  
 
Just before the prosecutor made the statement to which Burnett now objects, he 
discussed the instructions given to the jury along with the evidence supporting the 
elements of the charges, including aggravated kidnapping. The prosecutor stated: 
 
 
"[Aggravated] kidnapping is the second count, aggravated kidnapping. We have 
to prove that the defendant took or confined [C.B.] by deception, force or threat. I'll tell 
you right now, there's no evidence of force or threat, that's just what the statute—how it 
reads. She was taken by deception, she thought she was going to see Ray. And then when 
she got in the car the second time, she thought she was going to be taken home after the 
friend was dropped off. She was deceived; otherwise, she wouldn't have gotten in the car. 
 
"That this was done with the intent to hold [C.B.], to inflict bodily injury upon 
her. Death. What more deadly injury can there be? That's why they picked her up. That's 
why they took her. That bodily harm was indeed inflicted upon [C.B.]. Again is there any 
doubt that bodily harm was inflicted upon this child?"  
 
"The acts occurred, again, on the dates alleged. And for good measure, again, we 
have the venue statute that's imposed in the instructions. There's one other thing, it's the 
aiding and abetting statute, it's also part of the [aggravated] kidnapping." (Emphasis 
added.) 
 
Thus, when the prosecutor referenced Burnett's presence in the car, he did so to 
explain the distinction between being a principal to a crime and aiding and abetting a 
crime. He did not suggest that Burnett only participated in the aggravated kidnapping by 
sitting in the car. Nor did the prosecutor suggest, as Burnett argues, that Burnett could be 
17 
 
 
 
convicted of aiding and abetting absent proof of knowledge of the deception that formed 
the basis for the charge of aggravated kidnapping. 
 
Further, at the close of evidence, the court properly instructed the jury regarding 
the elements of aggravated kidnapping and the principle of aiding and abetting. 
Additionally, we note that after deliberations began, the jury requested a definition of 
"aiding or abetting." The trial court conferred with both parties and provided the 
following agreed upon response:  
 
"Insofar as it pertains to instruct[ion] number 15, the elements instruction for count two, a 
person who either before or during its commission, intentionally aids or abets another to 
commit a crime, with the intent to promote or assist in its commission, is criminally 
responsible for the crime committed, regardless of the extent of the defendant's 
participation, if any, in the actual commission of the crime. I further answer that common 
words are given their common meaning."  
 
 
The court's response to the jury's inquiry was consistent with the law regarding 
aiding and abetting. See K.S.A. 21-3205(1) ("A person is criminally responsible for a 
crime committed by another if such person intentionally aids, abets, advises, hires, 
counsels or procures the other to commit the crime."); see also Baker, 287 Kan. at 366 (to 
establish guilt on the basis of aiding and abetting, the State must show that a defendant 
knowingly associated with the unlawful venture and participated in such a way as to 
indicate he or she was facilitating the success of the venture).  
 
Under these circumstances, we agree with the State that the prosecutor did not 
misstate, deliberately or otherwise, the law on aiding and abetting. Because we have 
determined the prosecutor committed no misconduct, we need not address the second 
step of the prosecutorial misconduct analysis, and we reject Burnett's second claim of 
error.  
18 
 
 
 
 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting two autopsy photographs. 
  
Next, Burnett contends that because the cause and manner of C.B.'s death were not 
disputed, the trial court abused its discretion by admitting multiple gruesome and 
repetitious photographs of C.B. Although Burnett objected at trial to the admission of 
several photographs, on appeal he challenges the admission of only two autopsy 
photographs, Exhibits 144 and 145.  
 
In considering the admission of photographic evidence, we must first determine 
whether the photos are relevant. And if, as here, the defendant argues the photographs 
were overly repetitious, gruesome, or inflammatory, we review the admission of the 
photographs for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Riojas, 288 Kan. 379, 387, 204 P.3d 
578 (2009).  
  
"Judicial discretion is abused if judicial action (1) is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, 
i.e., if no reasonable person would have taken the view adopted by the trial court; (2) is 
based on an error of law, i.e., if the discretion is guided by an erroneous legal conclusion; 
or (3) is based on an error of fact, i.e., if substantial competent evidence does not support 
a factual finding on which a prerequisite conclusion of law or the exercise of discretion is 
based." State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 550, 256 P.3d 801 (2011) (citing State v. Gonzalez, 
290 Kan. 747, 755-56, 234 P.3d 1 [2010]).  
 
The party asserting an abuse of discretion bears the burden of showing such an abuse of 
discretion. State v. Woodward, 288 Kan. 297, 299, 202 P.3d 15 (2009). 
  
 As noted, our first task is to determine whether the photographs are relevant. See 
Riojas, 288 Kan. at 387. Generally, all relevant evidence is admissible. K.S.A. 60-407(f). 
More specifically, we have established the following principles regarding the relevancy 
of photographs in a homicide case: 
19 
 
 
 
 
 
"'"Photographs depicting the extent, nature, and number of wounds inflicted are 
generally relevant in a murder case. [Citation omitted.] Photographs which are relevant 
and material in assisting the jury's understanding of medical testimony are admissible. 
Specifically, photographs which aid a pathologist in explaining the cause of death are 
admissible. [Citation omitted.] Photographs used to prove the manner of death and the 
violent nature of the crime are relevant and admissible. [Citation omitted.]"'" State v. 
Parker, 277 Kan. 838, 847, 89 P.3d 622 (2004) (quoting State v. Green, 274 Kan. 145, 
147, 48 P.3d 1276 [2002]). 
  
 
Additionally, because the State has the burden to prove every element of the crime 
charged, photographs used to prove the elements of the crime, including the fact and 
manner of death and the violent nature of the crime, are relevant even if the cause of 
death is not contested. Riojas, 288 Kan. at 387. Finally, while we have stated that the 
"'wholesale admission of similar grotesque and bloody photographs which add nothing 
new to the state's case' is improper," a photograph need not be excluded simply because it 
is gruesome. State v. Hernandez, 284 Kan. 74, 99, 159 P.3d 950, cert. denied 552 U.S. 
1025 (2007) (quoting State v. Clark, 218 Kan. 18, 24, 542 P.2d 291 [1975]). 
 
Here, we agree with the State that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
admitting Exhibits 144 and 145. The medical examiner, Dr. Mary Dudley, testified C.B. 
died from ligature strangulation. Dudley based her conclusion on the ligature found 
tightly wrapped around C.B.'s neck, the petechial hemorrhage in her eye, and the 
hemorrhaging in the strap muscles of her neck. Dudley identified Exhibit 144 as a 
photograph of C.B.'s eye and pointed out the petechial hemorrhage in the eye. Dudley 
then identified Exhibit 145 as a close-up of C.B.'s chin, neck, and chest region, and she 
pointed out the pressure abrasion from the ligature. Although gruesome, these 
photographs clearly were relevant and admissible to assist the medical examiner in 
explaining her testimony. Accordingly, we reject Burnett's third claim of error. 
20 
 
 
 
 
The district court's instructional error does not require reversal.  
 
Next, Burnett claims he is entitled to a new trial because before deliberations 
began, the trial court gave the jury an Allen instruction that included the phrase "[a]nother 
trial would be a burden on both sides." See Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 17 S. Ct. 
154, 41 L. Ed. 528 (1896). Burnett admits he did not object to this instruction, but argues 
the trial court clearly erred in giving the instruction in light of State v. Salts, 288 Kan. 
263, 200 P.3d 464 (2009). The State acknowledges that this court in Salts disapproved 
the same language challenged here. Nevertheless, the State argues the instruction was not 
clearly erroneous.  
 
When a party fails to object to the giving of a jury instruction, we apply a clearly 
erroneous standard of review. K.S.A. 22-3414(3); Martinez, 288 Kan. at 451. "An 
instruction is clearly erroneous only if the reviewing court is firmly convinced there is a 
real possibility the jury would have rendered a different verdict if the trial error had not 
occurred." 288 Kan. at 451-52. 
 
Because we have held that the phrase "[a]nother trial would be a burden on both 
sides" is both misleading and inaccurate, we conclude the district court erred in giving an 
instruction containing the challenged language in this case. See Salts, 288 Kan. at 266-67; 
State v. Page, 41 Kan. App. 2d 584, 586-87, 203 P.3d 1277 (2009). However, here, as in 
Salts, the court gave the erroneous instruction prior to jury deliberations, and Burnett 
failed to object to the instruction at trial. See Salts, 288 Kan. at 264-65. Accordingly, 
reversal is required only if we are firmly convinced there is a real possibility the jury 
would have rendered a different verdict had the instructional error not occurred. Salts, 
288 Kan. at 265-66.  
 
21 
 
 
 
Burnett urges us to find clear error because here, unlike in Salts, the defendant 
faced a capital murder charge. Burnett speculates that the jury was "likely to be very 
mindful of the increased litigation costs that go along with capital trials" and that the 
erroneous instruction "surely invoked concerns that a failure to reach a verdict would 
waste taxpayer money."  
 
As the State points out, Burnett fails to cite anything in the record to support his 
assertion that the verdict in this case was the product of the jury's concerns about wasting 
taxpayer money.  
 
Instead, the record demonstrates the jury heard several days of testimony and the 
trial court fully and properly instructed the jury on the State's burden of proof and the 
elements of each of the crimes charged. During deliberation, the jury sought and received 
clarification on two issues, neither of which indicated the jury was deadlocked or felt 
pressured to reach a verdict. 
 
Under these circumstances, we conclude it is highly unlikely the jury would have 
returned different verdicts had the instructional error not occurred. Thus, the Allen 
instruction was not clearly erroneous and reversal is not required.  
 
Burnett is not entitled to a new trial based on the cumulative effect of trial errors.  
 
Burnett contends that even if the above alleged errors are deemed harmless when 
viewed individually, the cumulative effect of trial errors deprived him of his right to a fair 
trial as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Section 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. The State contends the cumulative 
error doctrine is inapplicable because Burnett failed to establish multiple trial errors.  
 
22 
 
 
 
We agree with the State. We have found only one trial error—an instructional 
error that does not require reversal under the facts of the case. Accordingly, Burnett is not 
entitled to relief under the cumulative error doctrine. See State v. Dixon, 289 Kan. 46, 71, 
209 P.3d 675 (2009) (the cumulative error doctrine "does not apply if no error or only 
one error supports reversal").  
 
We have no jurisdiction to review Burnett's presumptive sentence. 
 
 
 
 
Finally, Burnett claims the sentencing court violated his Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights as interpreted by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 
2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000), and Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 127 S. Ct. 
856, 166 L. Ed. 2d 856 (2007), when it imposed an aggravated presumptive sentence for 
his kidnapping conviction without requiring that aggravating factors be charged in the 
complaint and proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Burnett acknowledges we 
rejected this argument in State v. Johnson, 286 Kan. 824, Syl. ¶ 5, 190 P.3d 207 (2008), 
but contends Johnson was wrongly decided.  
 
Because Burnett received a presumptive sentence, we have no jurisdiction to 
address his sentencing challenges. See K.S.A. 21-4721(c)(1); Johnson, 286 Kan. at 851-
52. Accordingly, we must dismiss this portion of Burnett's appeal. See 286 Kan. at 841 
(an appeal must be dismissed where the record demonstrates a lack of appellate 
jurisdiction).  
 
Burnett also claims the sentencing court violated his Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights as interpreted by Apprendi when it considered his criminal history 
score to impose the presumptive sentence without requiring that the facts of his prior 
convictions be charged in the complaint and proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Burnett acknowledges this issue is controlled by our decision in State v. Ivory, 273 Kan. 
23 
 
 
 
44, 41 P.3d 781 (2002), but he urges us to reconsider Ivory in light of Justice Thomas' 
concurring opinion in Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26-28, 125 S. Ct. 1254, 161 
L. Ed. 2d 205 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring). We reject Burnett's claims in light of our 
prior decisions reaffirming Ivory.  See, e.g., State v. Brinklow, 288 Kan. 39, 54-55, 200 
P.3d 1225 (2009). 
 
Affirmed in part and dismissed in part.