Title: Baldwin v. McConnell
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 061050
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 20, 2007

Present:  All the Justices 
 
ROBERT BALDWIN 
 
v.  Record No. 061050      OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
April 20, 2007 
JAMES L. MCCONNELL 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHESAPEAKE 
Randall D. Smith, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court 
abused its discretion in ordering remittitur of a jury award 
of compensatory and punitive damages. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
 
For approximately twenty years, Robert Alexander Baldwin 
("Baldwin") and James L. McConnell ("McConnell") were both 
employed at General Electric Company ("GE").  GE had a "zero 
tolerance" policy which provided that any violent behavior at 
the work place would result in termination of employment.  
While employed at GE, a physical altercation occurred between 
McConnell and Baldwin.  This incident resulted in both 
parties' employment being terminated under the "zero 
tolerance" policy.  Each party blamed the other party for 
causing the altercation.  McConnell sued Baldwin, seeking 
compensatory and punitive damages for assault and battery.1  
                     
1 The motion for judgment included other claims and 
included "General Electric Energy" and "General Electric 
Company" as defendants.  The only parties and claims relevant 
to this appeal are the allegations of McConnell against 
Baldwin and Baldwin against McConnell, each seeking 
compensatory and punitive damages for assault and battery. 
 
2
Baldwin filed a counterclaim for assault and battery, seeking 
to recover $100,000 in compensatory damages and $350,000 in 
punitive damages. 
 
At trial, Baldwin testified that while McConnell and he 
were in a meeting with other co-workers and a "shop manager," 
McConnell stated that Baldwin "need[ed] a piss test."  Co-
workers "chuckl[ed]" and "laugh[ed]" at the comment.  Baldwin 
felt that McConnell's statements at the meeting had 
"insinuate[d] in front of [his] co-workers and manager that 
[Baldwin was] using illegal controlled substances."  Baldwin 
also testified that he was "embarrassed" because McConnell 
"humiliate[d him] in front of management as well as [his] co-
workers." 
 
The next day, McConnell made a similar comment to 
Baldwin.  Baldwin responded, "if anybody needs a piss test 
around here, it's you."  Baldwin then decided to leave for the 
day.  McConnell asked Baldwin to come over to him, but Baldwin 
walked out the door.  After exiting the building, Baldwin 
turned around and came back towards the exit door.  "[T]he 
instant that [Baldwin] stepped in front of the door," 
McConnell put his hands on Baldwin's chest and slammed Baldwin 
to the concrete sidewalk, causing Baldwin's cap and safety 
glasses to go "flying."  Baldwin hit his head on the concrete, 
and his "tailbone" hit the ground.  Consequently, Baldwin 
 
3
suffered a "knot" on his head and soreness to both his head 
and tailbone.  Baldwin also testified that he was humiliated 
knowing that his co-workers saw him get knocked down.  More 
specifically, Baldwin felt "it [was] an insult to [his] 
dignity." 
 
Additionally, Baldwin testified that McConnell had "hurt 
[his] family" because he had been the "sole provider" for the 
family and that he had lost his job because of the altercation 
with McConnell.  During cross-examination, McConnell testified 
that he owned stock in GE worth approximately $343,506.29. 
 
The jury denied recovery to McConnell; however, on 
Baldwin's counterclaim, the jury awarded $240,000 in 
compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages.  
Because the compensatory damages award was above Baldwin's ad 
damnum of $100,000, the trial court, without objection, 
reduced the compensatory damages award to $100,000.  On a 
motion for remittitur, the trial court found that "the jury's 
verdict shock[ed] the conscience of the [c]ourt," evidenced 
that "the jury misconceived or misconstrued the facts or the 
law," and that the "award [was] so out of proportion to the 
injuries" that "their verdict was not the product of a fair 
and impartial decision."  The trial court further reduced the 
compensatory damages award to $1,000, and the punitive damages 
award to $10,000. 
 
4
Baldwin filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.  
We granted Baldwin's petition for appeal on three assignments 
of error: 
1. The Trial Court abused its discretion when it failed 
to consider evidence relevant to a reasoned 
evaluation of the damages. 
 
2. The Trial Court abused its discretion when it failed 
to determine if the jury award was reasonably related 
to the damages disclosed by the evidence. 
 
3. The Trial Court acted improperly in remitting the 
punitive damages awarded by the jury. 
 
II. ANALYSIS 
A.  Compensatory Damages 
 
With regard to remittitur of compensatory damages, we 
stated in Shepard v. Capitol Foundry of Va., Inc., 262 Va. 
715, 720-21, 554 S.E.2d 72, 75 (2001) (quotations and 
citations omitted), that: 
When a verdict is challenged on the basis of 
alleged excessiveness, a trial court is 
compelled to set it aside if the amount awarded 
is so great as to shock the conscience of the 
court and to create the impression that the 
jury has been motivated by passion, corruption 
or prejudice, or has misconceived or 
misconstrued the facts or the law, or if the 
award is so out of proportion to the injuries 
suffered as to suggest that it is not the 
product of a fair and impartial decision.  
Setting aside a verdict as excessive . . . is 
an exercise of the inherent discretion of the 
trial court and, on appeal, the standard of 
review is whether the trial court abused its 
discretion. 
 
 
5
Determining whether a trial court abused its discretion in 
ordering remittitur of compensatory damages involves two 
steps:  
First, we must find in the record not only the 
trial court's conclusion that the verdict was 
excessive, but also an explanation 
demonstrating that the court, in reaching its 
conclusion, considered factors in evidence 
relevant to a reasoned evaluation of the 
damages.  Second, we must ascertain whether the 
amount of recovery after remittitur bears a 
reasonable relation to the damages disclosed by 
the evidence. 
 
Both of these steps require an evaluation 
of the evidence relevant to the issue of 
damages. In making that evaluation, the trial 
court, as well as this Court, is required to 
consider the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the party that received the jury 
verdict. 
 
Id. at 721, 554 S.E.2d at 75 (quotations and citations 
omitted). 
 
In this case, the jury awarded Baldwin $240,000 in 
compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages.  The 
trial court ultimately reduced Baldwin's damages to $1,000 in 
compensatory damages and $10,000 in punitive damages.  In 
remitting the jury's award, the trial court did not 
distinguish between the type of damages and the trial court's 
explanation did not demonstrate that it considered the 
evidence in the light most favorable to Baldwin. 
Instruction number 31 instructed the jury as follows: 
 
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If you find your verdict in favor of 
McConnell, Baldwin or both, then in determining 
the damages to which they may be entitled you 
may consider any of the following that you 
believe by the greater weight of the evidence 
was caused by an assault and battery:  Any 
shame, humiliation, embarrassment or indignity 
to feelings that he suffered. 
 
You may also consider in awarding damages 
the insulting character of the injury, the 
reason for the injury and any other 
circumstances which make the injury more 
serious, if any of these things are shown by 
the evidence. 
 
Your verdict shall be for such sum as will 
fairly and fully compensate the parties for the 
damages sustained as a result of the assault 
and battery. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  The instruction, which was given without 
objection and became the law of the case, permitted the jury 
to consider "[a]ny shame, humiliation, embarrassment or 
indignity" that Baldwin suffered as a result of McConnell's 
assault and battery.  The instruction's broad language also 
permitted the jury to consider "the insulting character of the 
injury, the reason for the injury and any other circumstances 
which make the injury more serious.  (Emphasis added.)  
However, in remitting the jury's verdict for compensatory 
damages, the trial court did not address the humiliation 
Baldwin suffered, the insulting character of the injury or 
"other circumstances which make the injury more serious." 
 
We hold that the trial court abused its discretion in not 
complying with the first step of the analysis required in 
 
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Shepard, namely an analysis of the damages awarded by the jury 
upon consideration of the evidence in the light most favorable 
to Baldwin.  Additionally, the trial court failed to 
"ascertain whether the amount of recovery after remittitur 
bears a reasonable relation to the damages disclosed by the 
evidence" as required by the second step of the Shepard 
analysis.  262 Va. at 721, 554 S.E.2d at 75 (quotation 
omitted); see also Smithey v. Sinclair Refining Co., 203 Va. 
142, 146, 122 S.E.2d 872, 875 (1961) ("In a case where the 
verdict of a jury is attacked on the ground that it is 
excessive, . . . [i]f the verdict merely appears to be large 
and more than the trial judge would have awarded had [he] been 
a member of the jury, it ought not to be disturbed."). 
B. Punitive Damages 
 
While we review remittitur of compensatory damage awards 
utilizing "abuse of discretion" as the standard of review, we 
review the remittitur of punitive damage awards de novo upon 
independent review of the record. 
 
The jury was instructed in pertinent part: 
 
If you find that the plaintiff and or 
defendant Baldwin is entitled to be compensated 
for his damages, and if you further believe by 
the greater weight of the evidence that the 
other party acted with actual malice toward the 
opposing party or acted under circumstances 
amounting to a willful and wanton disregard of 
the parties' rights, then you may also award 
punitive damages to punish that party for his 
 
8
actions and to serve as an example to prevent 
others from acting in a similar way. 
 
With regard to remittitur of a jury award of punitive damages, 
we stated in Poulston v. Rock, 251 Va. 254, 263, 467 S.E.2d 
479, 484 (1996) (quotation omitted), that 
in reviewing the order of a trial court 
imposing or refusing to impose a remittitur of 
punitive damages in a defamation action, we 
shall make an independent examination of the 
entire record to determine whether the trial 
court acted properly. In doing so, we will give 
substantial weight to the trial court's action 
and affirm it, unless, from our view of the 
record, the trial court acted improperly. 
 
Additionally, we stated: 
 
Review of the amount of punitive damages 
includes consideration of reasonableness 
between the damages sustained and the amount of 
the award and the measurement of punishment 
required, whether the award will amount to a 
double recovery, the proportionality between 
the compensatory and punitive damages, and the 
ability of the defendant to pay. 
 
Id. (citations omitted).  While Poulston involved punitive 
damages in the context of defamation, the analysis applied in 
Poulston extends beyond defamation actions. 
 
Other states confirm this analytical approach.  For 
example, in Management Computer Servs. v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie 
& Co., 557 N.W.2d 67, 70 (Wis. 1996), the Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin addressed claims of breach of contract, conversion, 
and unjust enrichment, and the award of punitive damages.  The 
court considered whether the trial court correctly ordered a 
 
9
new trial on punitive damages unless the prevailing party 
accepted reduction in the award from $1.75 million to $50,000.  
Id. at 74-75, 80.  With regard to remittitur, the Supreme 
Court of Wisconsin stated that the trial court "set forth 
conclusory reasons for reducing the jury's punitive damages 
award" and did not "analyze the evidence or set forth its 
reasons for ordering remittitur with particularity."  Id. at 
81.  Therefore, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed "the 
entire record ab initio to determine whether the jury's award 
[wa]s excessive, and if it [wa]s, what amount of punitive 
damages [wa]s reasonable."  Id.  Furthermore, it stated  
in determining whether an award of punitive 
damages is excessive, courts should consider 
the grievousness of the acts, the degree of 
malicious intent, whether the award bears a 
reasonable relationship to the award of 
compensatory damages, the potential damage that 
might have been caused by the acts, the ratio 
of the award to civil or criminal penalties 
that could be imposed for comparable 
misconduct, and the wealth of the wrongdoer. 
. . . 
 
 
In addition, a reviewing court must 
consider the reasonableness of punitive damages 
on a case-by-case basis, considering the 
relevant circumstances in each particular case. 
 
Id. at 82. 
 
In the case at bar, the trial court's explanation for 
granting McConnell's motion for remittitur did not distinguish 
between compensatory and punitive damages.  "The general rule 
is that there is no fixed standard for the measure of 
 
10
exemplary or punitive damages and the amount of the award is 
largely a matter within the discretion of the jury."  Worrie 
v. Boze, 198 Va. 533, 544, 95 S.E.2d 192, 201 (1956).  Philip 
Morris Inc. v. Emerson, 235 Va. 380, 414-15, 368 S.E.2d 268, 
287 (1988).  Furthermore, as we explained in Poulston, 
judicial review of the amount of punitive damages upon motion 
for remittitur requires: 
1. consideration of reasonableness between the damages 
sustained and the amount of the award,  
 
2. the measurement of punishment required, 
 
3. whether the award will amount to a double recovery,  
 
4. the proportionality between the compensatory and 
punitive damages, and 
 
5. the ability of the defendant to pay. 
 
Poulston, 251 Va. at 263, 467 S.E.2d at 484. 
 
The jury awarded $240,000 in compensatory damages.  But 
for the ad damnum clause, the amount would not have been 
reduced to $100,000 before remittitur.  We will consider the 
jury's punitive damages award in light of the original award 
of $240,000. 
There was ample evidence of actual malice and willful and 
wanton behavior on the part of McConnell.  Additionally, with 
regard to the punishment required for such behavior and 
consideration of the deterrent effect upon others who may act 
 
11
in similar fashion, we cannot say that the jury award is 
excessive. 
The award of punitive damages according to the jury 
instructions was based upon malice and willful and wanton 
conduct while the compensatory award was based upon actual 
injury sustained as well as "shame, humiliation, embarrassment 
or indignity to feelings."  According to instructions to the 
jury, the compensatory damages were also based upon "the 
insulting character of the injury, the reason for the injury 
and any other circumstances which made the injury more 
serious."  Given the clear determination of the basis for each 
award and the ample evidence supporting each award, our 
independent review of the record does not suggest double 
recovery in this case. 
The relationship between the award of $240,000 in 
compensatory and $100,000 in punitive damages is not 
unreasonable or strikingly out of proportion.  We note that 
the punitive damage award approved in Poulston was two and 
one-half times (250%) the compensatory award while here the 
punitive damage award is less than one-half (41%) of the 
jury's compensatory award.2 
                     
2 See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 
127 S.Ct. 1057, 1061-62 (2007) (suggesting that punitive 
damages two, three or four times the size of the compensatory 
damage award accord with "longstanding historical practice" 
and that punitive damages which multiply the compensatory 
 
12
McConnell's financial condition is relevant on the issue 
of punitive damages and was properly considered by the jury.  
Hamilton Dev. Co. v. Broad Rock Club, 248 Va. 40, 44, 445 
S.E.2d 140, 143 (1994).  The jury was permitted to consider 
the value of McConnell's stock, an indication of his ability 
to pay, in determining the amount of the punitive damages. 
In this case, our independent review of the punitive 
damages award leads us to conclude that the award should not 
have been set aside.3  Poulston, 251 Va. at 263, 467 S.E.2d at 
484.  We cannot say that a punitive damages award of $100,000 
shocks the conscience of the Court or is otherwise 
inappropriate in light of McConnell's egregious conduct.  
Accordingly, we hold that the jury's award of $100,000 in 
punitive damages was not excessive as a matter of law. 
III. CONCLUSION 
                                                                
award by "single digits" are more likely to comport with due 
process than higher punitive awards), citing State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003). 
3 We acknowledge that many courts analyze punitive damages 
awards and remittitur based on due process concerns because 
"punitive damages are quasi-criminal punishment."  Pacific 
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 54 (1991).  See 
Philip Morris USA, ___ U.S. at ___, 127 S.Ct. at 1061-62; 
State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425; BMW of North America, Inc. v. 
Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575-85 (1996).  In this case, however, 
there has been no challenge to the award of punitive damages 
based upon denial of due process.  See generally Schneckloth 
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 235-36 and nn. 16-17 (1973).  See 
also Nusbaum v. Berlin, 273 Va. 385, 406, 641 S.E.2d 494, 505 
(2007) (appellate review of due process arguments waived by 
failure to raise the constitutional issue below); Westvaco 
 
13
 
Because the trial court did not conduct the analysis 
required by Shepard for remittitur of an award of compensatory 
damages, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion.  
Upon a de novo review of the record using the analysis 
required by Poulston for remittitur of an award of punitive 
damages, we hold that the trial court erred in remitting the 
punitive damage award.  Accordingly, we will reverse the 
judgment of the trial court, reinstate the jury verdict as 
reduced to the ad damnum clause of plaintiff's pleading, in 
the amount of $100,000 as to compensatory damages and $100,000 
as to punitive damages, and enter final judgment for Baldwin. 
Reversed and final judgment. 
                                                                
Corp. v. Columbia Gas of Virginia, Inc., 230 Va. 451, 459, 339 
S.E.2d 170, 174 (1986) (same).