Title: The MacCabees v. Terry
Citation: 67 So. 2d 193
Docket Number: N/A
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: July 31, 1953

67 So. 2d 193 (1953)
THE MACCABEES
v.
TERRY.

Supreme Court of Florida, Division B.
July 31, 1953.
Rehearing Denied September 21, 1953.
Morehead, Forrest, Gotthardt &amp; Orr and F.E. Gotthardt, Miami, for petitioner.
Boyce F. Ezell, Jr., Miami, for respondent.
DREW, Justice.
A petition for constitutional certiorari has been filled in this Court to review an order of the Circuit Court of Dade County affirming a judgment against petitioner in the Civil Court of Record of Dade County on double indemnity provisions of a policy of insurance and awarding attorney's fees under Section 625.08, F.S.A., to beneficiary's counsel.
The bone of contention here as to the first point is that the Circuit Court of Dade County, in affirming the judgment of the Civil Court of Record of said county, "refused to recognize that the medical testimony *194 which was uncontradicted failed to show that the accused had met an accidental death in accordance with the provisions of the double indemnity agreement" and that, therefore, said Circuit Court had failed to proceed in accordance with the requirements of law.
The provisions of the insurance policy involved here are:
At the time of his death, the deceased was a carpenter by trade and had been engaged in such occupation for about 13 years. He was a vigorous man and had been in excellent health for many years. The testimony revealed that while he was not constantly engaged in "heavy and strenuous work" he frequently did such work in his trade. The undisputed evidence shows that death resulted from a ruptured aneurysm in the brain brought about by a strain.
There is little, if any, dispute as to the facts surrounding the injury. The deceased was engaged in replacing floor joists which had been broken as the result of a wall blowing over. Such work was not the usual work required of a carpenter and entailed working under the house in a very confined and cramped position and required a very strong man to utilize all his strength to get the new joists in position. In fact, the Negro helper assigned to help the deceased was picked because he was the strongest man on the job. What happened to the deceased is well summarized by the testimony of the Negro helper in the following questions and answers.
On the question of the cause of death, the following is the pertinent testimony of Dr. Richard E. Strain, respondent's witness, on cross-examination:
It is highly pertinent to emphasize that among the quoted provisions of the policy, supra, is one that, to paraphrase the expression, the association shall not be liable if death results directly or indirectly from physical or mental infirmity. Assuming, therefore, but not deciding, that the circumstances related above surrounding the injury constituted an accident within the policy provisions, we think the conclusion is inescapable that death resulted not solely and exclusively from such accident, but to say the very least, indirectly from a physical infirmity, viz.: an aneurysm. Infirm is defined by Webster as "not firm or sound physically" and he defines infirmity as "character or state of being infirm." The doctor's testimony establishes without question that an aneurysm is "a congenital weakness." This means exactly the same thing as "not firm or sound physically" and that is exactly what the policy provides the insurer shall not be liable for, if it causes death.
In 45 C.J.S., Insurance, § 938, page 1088, it is said:
Couch on Insurance, Vol. 5, page 4011, on the same subject, observes:
While there is some authority to the contrary, the great weight of authority (to *197 which we hereby subscribe) supports the conclusion reached by the two quotations immediately above. See Bates v. New York Life Ins. Co., D.C., 31 F. Supp. 813; Tucker v. New York Life Ins. Co., 107 Utah 478, 155 P.2d 173; Kirkwood v. London &amp; Lancashire Indemnity Co. of America, 14 La. App. 438, 131 So. 703; Smith v. Massachusetts Bonding &amp; Ins. Co., 207 App.Div. 682, 202 N.Y.S. 857; Stanton v. Travelers' Insurance Co., 83 Conn. 708, 78 A. 317, 34 L.R.A.,N.S., 445; National Masonic Accident Ass'n v. Shryock, 8 Cir., 73 F. 774; Hubbard v. Travelers Insurance Co., C.C., 98 F. 932; Illinois Commercial Mens Ass'n v. Parks, 7 Cir., 179 F. 794; Binder v. National Masonic Accident Ass'n, 127 Iowa 25, 102 N.W. 190; Howe v. National Life Ins. Co., 321 Mass. 283, 72 N.E.2d 425, 170 A.L.R. 1254; Towey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 27 Wash. 2d 829, 180 P.2d 815; Annotations on the subject found in 131 A.L.R. 251 and 117 A.L.R. 739; Cretney v. Woodmen Accident Co., 196 Wis. 29, 219 N.W. 448, 62 A.L.R. 675; Crowder v. General Accident, Fire &amp; Life Assurance Corp., 180 Va. 117, 21 S.E.2d 772; Herthel v. Time Insurance Co., 211 Wis. 208, 265 N.W. 575; Egan v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co., 223 Wis. 129, 269 N.W. 667, 107 A.L.R. 1107; Ryan v. Continental Casualty Co., 5 Cir., 47 F.2d 472.
Respondent strongly argues that Jones v. General Accident, Fire &amp; Life Assurance Corp., 118 Fla. 648, 159 So. 804, is controlling in this case and clearly supports the judgments below. The provisions of the policy involved in that case were so different from those involved in the policy now before us that the holding there can be of little benefit in deciding this case. Moreover, as stated in the opinion, the policy did not have the very provision upon which we primarily base this opinion. The court said in that case, 159 So. at page 807:
The judgment of the Civil Court of Record affirmed by the Circuit Court is hereby quashed.
ROBERTS, C.J., and THOMAS and HOBSON, JJ., concur.