Title: Mansfield v. Bernabei
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 111314
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: June 7, 2012

Present:  All the Justices 
 
JAMES M. MANSFIELD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     OPINION BY 
v.     Record No. 111314             JUSTICE S. BERNARD GOODWYN 
 
    June 7, 2012 
LYNNE BERNABEI, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
R. Terrence Ney, Judge 
In this appeal, we consider whether the circuit court 
erred in ruling that the doctrine of absolute judicial 
privilege may apply to communications made before the filing of 
an action. 
Material Facts and Proceedings 
 
Michael A. Ford served as the building manager at Horizon 
House, a residential condominium in Arlington, Virginia.  After 
his termination from that employment, Ford filed a complaint 
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) against 
the three corporate employers vested with the authority to fire 
him, Horizon House Condominium Unit Homeowners Association, 
Zalco Realty, Inc., and MDV Maintenance, Inc.  The EEOC issued 
a probable cause determination that two of these employers 
discriminated against Ford on the basis of his race in 
violation of federal law. 
James M. Mansfield served as counsel to Horizon House.  He 
was involved in the process of hiring Ford and allegedly, among 
other actions that interfered with Ford’s employment, wrote a 
 
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letter containing defamatory statements about Ford to the 
Horizon House board. 
 
Ford, acting by and through Bernabei & Wachtel, PLLC, sent 
a demand letter and a draft complaint marked “Draft – For 
Settlement Purposes Only” to numerous individuals and entities.  
Mansfield was one of the defendants named in the draft 
complaint.  The demand letter concluded:  “Please contact me 
with a response to this settlement proposal by the close of 
business on December 17, 2008.  If we do not receive a response 
from you by that time, Mr. Ford will have no choice but to 
initiate formal legal action.” 
Approximately one week later, Ford filed a complaint, 
substantially similar to the draft complaint, in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia 
against several defendants, including Mansfield.1  
Mansfield subsequently filed a complaint in the Circuit 
Court of Fairfax County against Lynne Bernabei, Emily Brittain 
Read, Bernabei & Wachtel, PLLC, and Ford (collectively “the 
                     
1 All defendants in the federal action except Mansfield 
were dismissed from the case by agreed order.  Ford v. Zalco 
Realty, Inc., 708 F. Supp.2d 558, 560 (E.D. Va. 2010).  The 
district court granted summary judgment for Mansfield, but it 
declined to award attorneys’ and expert witnesses’ fees because 
Ford “acted in good faith in filing suit” and “the case was not 
frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.”  Id. at 560, 
563. 
 
3 
defendants”) alleging that he was defamed by statements made 
about him in the draft complaint.  
The defendants filed demurrers, claiming the allegations 
made in the draft complaint, sent before the lawsuit was filed, 
were nevertheless privileged.  Mansfield claimed there was no 
privilege because there was no pending judicial proceeding when 
the draft complaint was communicated. 
The circuit court sustained the demurrers.  It ruled that 
absolute or judicial privilege applied to the communications in 
the draft complaint that were published only to interested 
parties in good faith for the purpose of attempting to settle 
the underlying dispute preliminary to a proposed judicial 
proceeding.  Mansfield timely filed a notice of appeal and we 
granted an appeal on the following assignments of error: 
1.  The trial court erred by ignoring the 
mandates of Penick and its progeny, establishing the 
concrete element that a communication must be part of 
a judicial proceeding to be considered absolutely 
privileged. 
 
2.  The trial court erred by failing [sic] by 
ignoring the important Penick public policy 
ramifications.2 
 
 
 
 
                     
2 We do not address whether the circuit court properly 
applied absolute privilege to the facts of this case, because 
the assignments of error only pertain to whether the doctrine 
may apply to statements communicated before litigation is 
initiated. 
 
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Analysis 
 
Mansfield argues that the circuit court erred in 
sustaining the demurrers because this Court established a 
concrete limit on absolute privilege in Penick v. Ratcliffe, 
149 Va. 618, 140 S.E. 664 (1927), and its progeny.  Mansfield 
asserts that if a communication is not part of a judicial 
proceeding or process and relevant to that judicial proceeding 
or process, the communication is not protected by absolute 
judicial privilege.  He claims that this Court has declined to 
extend the privilege beyond a judicial environment, and that a 
draft complaint sent prior to the actual filing of an action 
fails to satisfy the prerequisites necessary for the privilege 
to be applicable.  
 
The defendants respond that absolute privilege should 
attach to communications if they are relevant and pertinent to 
the subject matter of litigation that is in good faith and 
under serious contemplation.  They argue that Penick does not 
address the instant circumstance and this Court has never 
expressly found absolute privilege inapplicable to pre-filing 
circulation of a draft complaint.  The defendants urge 
application of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which they 
claim provides immunity for certain communications before 
filing as well as safeguards against abuse of such 
communications.  We agree. 
 
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This Court applies well-settled principles in reviewing 
the circuit court’s decision to sustain the demurrers: 
“The purpose of a demurrer is to determine whether a 
motion for judgment states a cause of action upon 
which the requested relief may be granted.  A 
demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of facts alleged 
in pleadings, not the strength of proof.  
Accordingly, we accept as true all properly pled 
facts and all inferences fairly drawn from those 
facts. Because the decision whether to grant a 
demurrer involves issues of law, we review the 
circuit court's judgment de novo.”  
Dunn, McCormack & MacPherson v. Connolly, 281 Va. 553, 557, 708 
S.E.2d 867, 869 (2011) (quoting Abi-Najm v. Concord Condo., 
LLC, 280 Va. 350, 356-57, 699 S.E.2d 483, 486-87 (2010)).  In 
ruling on the demurrers, this Court considers not only the 
pleadings, but also the documents attached thereto.  E.g., 
Caudill v. County of Dinwiddie, 259 Va. 785, 788, 529 S.E.2d 
313, 314 (2000). 
Only a partial version of Ford’s settlement draft 
complaint, omitting reference to the EEOC action, was attached 
to Mansfield’s defamation complaint; Ford’s federal complaint 
was not attached thereto.  However, Mansfield stipulated to the 
circuit court’s consideration of the federal complaint and the 
demand letter in ruling upon the demurrers.  “A court in ruling 
upon a demurrer may consider documents not mentioned in the 
challenged pleading when the parties so stipulate.”  Flippo v. 
F & L Land Co., 241 Va. 15, 17, 400 S.E.2d 156, 156 (1991). 
 
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In Penick, this Court applied the doctrine of absolute 
privilege to a petition, filed by voters, alleging bribery and 
other illegal acts by a judge of elections.  149 Va. at 621-27, 
637-38, 140 S.E. at 665-67, 670.  The petition was dismissed 
and the judge of elections filed a libel action against the 
voters on the basis of the petition’s contents.  Id. at 622-26, 
140 S.E. at 665-67.  On appeal from a verdict in favor of the 
judge, this Court reversed, holding that absolute privilege 
barred the libel action.  Id. at 637-38, 140 S.E. at 670.  The 
election contest was a judicial proceeding and the allegations 
of the petition were material, relevant and pertinent to the 
relief sought; therefore, the allegations were privileged.  Id. 
at 635, 140 S.E. at 669.  In so holding, this Court noted that 
the public interest and the ends of justice are best served in 
allowing counsel to freely advocate for their clients.  Id. at 
632, 140 S.E. at 668. 
In the Commonwealth, “[i]t is well settled that ‘words 
spoken or written in a judicial proceeding that are relevant 
and pertinent to the matter under inquiry are absolutely 
privileged’” against actions on the basis of defamation.  
Donohoe Constr. Co. v. Mt. Vernon Assocs., 235 Va. 531, 537, 
369 S.E.2d 857, 860 (1988) (quoting Darnell v. Davis, 190 Va. 
701, 707, 58 S.E.2d 68, 70 (1950)); see also Penick, 149 Va. at 
 
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627, 140 S.E. at 667.3  For absolute judicial privilege to 
attach, the communications at issue must be “material, relevant 
or pertinent” to the issues of the judicial proceeding.  See, 
e.g., Penick, 149 Va. at 635, 140 S.E. at 669. 
This Court articulated the broad rule of absolute 
privilege in Penick but has not limited its application to 
trials, reasoning that the privilege “includ[es] within its 
scope all proceedings of a judicial nature . . . .”  Id. at 
628, 140 S.E. at 667 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  In Donohoe Construction, this Court accordingly 
concluded that the filing of a mechanic’s lien was a judicial 
proceeding to which absolute privilege applied.  235 Va. at 
538-39, 369 S.E.2d at 861 (noting that perfection and 
enforcement of a lien are “inseparable”).  Absolute judicial 
privilege clearly extends outside the courtroom.  See, e.g., 
Watt v. McKelvie, 219 Va. 645, 651, 248 S.E.2d 826, 829 (1978) 
(protecting third party statements republished by another 
during a deposition).  However, this Court has not yet 
                     
3 The privilege is based in part upon the existence of the 
safeguards offered by the judicial process.  Elder v. Holland, 
208 Va. 15, 21, 155 S.E.2d 369, 374 (1967) (“ ‘[I]n strictly 
judicial proceedings the potential harm . . . is somewhat 
mitigated by the formal requirements such as notice and 
hearing, the comprehensive control exercised by the trial judge 
whose action is reviewable on appeal, and the availability of 
retarding influences such as false swearing and perjury 
prosecutions.’ ” (quoting Rainier’s Dairies v. Raritan Valley 
Farms, Inc., 117 A.2d 889, 894 (N.J. 1955)). 
 
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addressed the precise issue in this case, when a complaint 
containing allegedly defamatory statements is drafted and 
circulated before the filing of an action.  
We have considered application of absolute judicial 
privilege to communications tangentially related to potential 
litigation.  In Lindeman v. Lesnick, 268 Va. 532, 535, 604 
S.E.2d 55, 57 (2004), this Court addressed defamatory 
statements made by a physician to a patient, Lindeman, about 
another doctor, Lesnick, in regard to treatment Lindeman 
received pursuant to a workers’ compensation award.  Lindeman 
shared the written statements with his attorney, who 
inadvertently forwarded them to counsel for the insurance 
company of Lindeman’s employer, who distributed them to the 
employer.  Id.  The employer provided the statements to 
Lesnick, who thereafter filed a defamation action.  Id. 
The Court noted that an ongoing award for workers’ 
compensation medical benefits did not constitute a pending 
proceeding and that no claim was pending before the Workers’ 
Compensation Commission.  Id. at 538, 604 S.E.2d at 58-59.  
While stating that “we have extended the application of the 
absolute privilege well beyond the actual courtroom,” this 
Court declined to extend the privilege to “mere potential 
litigation” to avoid “permit[ting] defamatory communications to 
be made with impunity merely upon an assertion that litigation 
 
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might be subsequently initiated.”  Id. at 537-38, 604 S.E.2d at 
58. 
Numerous factors distinguish the current case from 
Lindeman.  The communication at issue in Lindeman was published 
through apparent inadvertence and the claim Lindeman sought to 
bring was with respect to his workers’ compensation benefits; 
it did not contemplate Lesnick as a party.  Id. at 534-36, 604 
S.E.2d at 56-57.  The statements regarding Lesnick were not a 
part of attempted settlement negotiations, as was the draft 
complaint in the present case, and there was no indication that 
the allegedly defamatory statements were eventually alleged and 
relevant in a judicial proceeding.  See id. 
The defendants argue that the circuit court properly 
recognized the value in unrestricted settlement negotiations 
and the Commonwealth’s long-expressed public policy preference 
of encouraging settlement, which supports application of 
absolute privilege in this case.  Mansfield responds that 
Penick and our later decisions considered the value in 
encouraging settlement, but recognized the greater importance 
of preventing abuse in the litigation process. 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 586 provides: 
An attorney at law is absolutely privileged to 
publish defamatory matter concerning another in 
communications preliminary to a proposed judicial 
proceeding, or in the institution of, or during the 
course and as a part of, a judicial proceeding in 
 
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which he participates as counsel, if it has some 
relation to the proceeding. 
Restatement § 587 likewise states: 
A party to a private litigation or a private 
prosecutor or defendant in a criminal prosecution is 
absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter 
concerning another in communications preliminary to a 
proposed judicial proceeding, or in the institution 
of or during the course and as a part of, a judicial 
proceeding in which he participates, if the matter 
has some relation to the proceeding. 
 
The comments to these sections are furthermore 
instructive, emphasizing the limitation of the protections 
afforded to pre-litigation communications: 
As to communications preliminary to a proposed 
judicial proceeding the rule stated in this Section 
applies only when the communication has some relation 
to a proceeding that is contemplated in good faith 
and under serious consideration.  The bare 
possibility that the proceeding might be instituted 
is not to be used as a cloak to provide immunity for 
defamation when the possibility is not seriously 
considered. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 586 cmt. e., 587 cmt. e. 
Numerous jurisdictions apply an approach in accord with 
the Restatement, holding that absolute privilege may bar 
defamation claims on the basis of pre-filing, litigation-
related communications.  See, e.g., Rogers v. Luttrell, 144 
S.W.3d 841, 843-44 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting General Elec. 
Co. v. Sargent & Lundy, 916 F.2d 1119, 1127 (6th Cir. 1990)); 
Rickenbacker v. Coffey, 405 S.E.2d 585, 587-88 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1991); Crowell v. Herring, 392 S.E.2d 464, 467 (S.C. Ct. App. 
 
11 
1990); Collins v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., 566 S.E.2d 595, 600-01 
(W. Va. 2002).  The Fourth Circuit likewise applied absolute 
privilege in a case involving a pre-filing letter, finding it 
“probable that Virginia would follow the lead of the 
Restatement [(First)] of Torts, § 587 (1938).”4  West v. 
Marjorie’s Gifts, Inc., 529 F.2d 518, 518 (4th Cir. 1975) 
(unpublished). 
The importance of encouraging compromise and settlement is 
unquestioned in our jurisprudence.  See, e.g., Snyder-Falkinham 
v. Stockburger, 249 Va. 376, 381, 457 S.E.2d 36, 39 (1995) 
(“ ‘The law favors compromise and settlement of disputed 
claims.’ ” (quoting Bangor-Punta Operations, Inc. v. Atlantic 
Leasing, Ltd., 215 Va. 180, 183, 207 S.E.2d 858, 860 (1974))); 
Eggleston v. Crump, 150 Va. 414, 418-19, 143 S.E. 688, 689 
(1928) (citing Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Mosby, 93 Va. 93, 
100, 24 S.E. 916, 918 (1896); Zane’s Devisees v. Zane, 20 Va. 
(6 Munf.) 406, 412 (1819)).  It is elementary that the 
settlement of claims is facilitated through free and open 
communication regarding the issues between parties and their 
attorneys, as well as between opposing counsel.  See, e.g., 
Donohoe Constr., 235 Va. at 537, 369 S.E.2d at 860 (“ ‘[T]he 
public interest is best served when individuals who participate 
                     
4 This section of the Restatement (First) is substantially 
similar to § 587 of the Restatement (Second), quoted above. 
 
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in law suits are allowed to conduct the proceeding with freedom 
to speak fully on the issues relating to the controversy.’ ” 
(quoting Watt, 219 Va. at 651, 248 S.E.2d at 829); see also  
Messina v. Fontana, 260 F. Supp.2d 173, 179 (D. D.C. 2003) 
(“Private and amicable resolution of disputes is to be 
encouraged, not discouraged, as would happen if every lawyer's 
letter could provoke a defamation suit.”). 
The Restatement approach facilitates the legitimate 
investigation and settlement of claims.  The countervailing 
legitimate concern we expressed in Lindeman, that extension of 
absolute privilege to pre-filing communications may prompt 
defamatory statements without meaningful restraint,5 is 
addressed by the Restatement requirements that the proposed 
judicial proceeding must be “contemplated in good faith and 
under serious consideration,” and the communication must relate 
to that anticipated proceeding.  The concern may be further 
alleviated by limiting the absolute privilege to disclosures 
made to persons with an interest in the proposed proceeding.  
Thus, regarding the applicability of absolute privilege to 
communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding, 
this Court adopts the rule expressed in the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts §§ 586, 587 as well as the additional 
requirement that the disclosure be made only to interested 
 
13 
persons.  See, e.g., Gardner v. Senior Living Sys., Inc., 731 
N.E.2d 350, 357 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000); Harris, 355 S.E.2d at 
843. 
For absolute privilege to attach, the communication must 
be “material, relevant or pertinent” to the judicial process.  
See, e.g., Penick, 149 Va. at 635, 140 S.E. at 669.  Applying 
this requirement to communications preliminary to proposed 
judicial proceedings requires a reviewing court to examine 
whether:  (1) the statement was made preliminary to a proposed 
proceeding; (2) the statement was related to a proceeding 
contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration, and 
(3) the communication was disclosed to interested persons. 
In this case, Ford’s draft complaint containing the 
allegedly defamatory statements about Mansfield was marked “For 
Settlement Purposes Only.”  The demand letter accompanying the 
draft complaint stated that if a response was not received, 
Ford would “initiate a formal legal action” against the 
potential defendants to whom the letter and complaint were 
addressed.  Ford did, in fact, file a substantially similar 
complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia approximately one week after sending the 
draft complaint and demand letter.  Thus, we hold that the 
circuit court did not err in finding that absolute privilege 
                                                                 
5 268 Va. at 538, 604 S.E.2d at 58. 
 
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attached to the draft complaint.  Accordingly, for the reasons 
stated, we will affirm the judgment of the circuit court. 
Affirmed.