Title: Frawley v. Police Comm’r of Cambridge
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11903, SJC-11903
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: March 4, 2016

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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SJC-11903 
 
JOSEPH F. FRAWLEY, JR.  vs.  POLICE COMMISSIONER OF CAMBRIDGE. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     November 5, 2015. - March 4, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Lenk, 
& Hines, JJ. 
 
 
 
Firearms.  Police, Firearms, Retirement.  Public Employment, 
Police.  Declaratory Relief.  Practice, Civil, Summary 
judgment, Injunctive relief, Relief in the nature of 
certiorari. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
November 13, 2012.  
 
 
The case was heard by Douglas H. Wilkins, J., on motions 
for summary judgment.  
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Samuel A. Aylesworth, Assistant City Solicitor, for the 
defendant. 
 
James F. Lamond (Dennis M. Coyne with him) for the 
plaintiff. 
 
 
 
SPINA, J.  When Joseph F. Frawley, Jr., retired on March 4, 
2004, from his position as a sergeant with the Cambridge police 
2 
 
department (department), the police commissioner for the city of 
Cambridge (city) issued him a "retired officer identification 
card" (ID card) that had no expiration date.  On December 22, 
2011, Frawley applied for the issuance of a replacement ID card 
because the one in his possession had broken.  The successor 
police commissioner (commissioner) denied the application, 
stating that Frawley "ha[d] not met the standard set by the 
Department."  On November 28, 2012, Frawley filed an amended 
complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief in the Superior 
Court.  He sought a declaration that the commissioner had 
breached his duty under 501 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 13.00 (2008) 
(regulations), which set forth the standards for identification 
cards for retired law enforcement officers, by refusing to issue 
Frawley a replacement ID card.  The ID card, together with a so-
called "Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act Training and 
Certification Card" (training certification card), allows the 
holder to carry a concealed firearm in accordance with the 
provisions of the Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act of 2004 
(LEOSA), Pub. L. No. 108-277, 118 Stat. 865 (2004), codified 
insofar as relevant here at 18 U.S.C. § 926C (2012).  See 501 
Code Mass. Regs. § 13.04(2)(a).  After determining that Frawley 
had standing to seek declaratory relief, a judge allowed 
Frawley's motion for summary judgment, declaring that he was 
entitled to receive a replacement ID card because he had retired 
3 
 
"in good standing."  Id. at §§ 13.02, 13.03.  The commissioner 
appealed, and we transferred the case to this court on our own 
motion.  We affirm, but for reasons different from those 
articulated by the judge.   
 
1.  Statutory and regulatory framework.  On July 22, 2004, 
Congress enacted LEOSA, which permits a "qualified retired law 
enforcement officer" who possesses the requisite State-issued 
identification to "carry a concealed firearm that has been 
shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce," 
subject to certain enumerated restrictions.  18 U.S.C. § 926C.  
Several years later, on January 11, 2008, the Massachusetts 
Executive Office of Public Safety and Security promulgated 
"rules and regulations governing the standards for 
identification cards for retired law enforcement officers to 
comply with the provisions of [LEOSA]."1  501 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 13.01.  Pursuant to these regulations, "[t]he chief law 
enforcement officer for a law enforcement agency shall issue an 
identification card to a qualified retired law enforcement 
                     
 
1 The regulations promulgated in 2008 were amended on 
August 16, 2013.  See 501 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 13.00 (2013).  
Because the application of Joseph F. Frawley, Jr., for a 
replacement "retired officer identification card" (ID card) was 
denied by the police commissioner for the city of Cambridge 
(commissioner) in February, 2012, our decision is based on the 
regulations as they existed in 2008.  See 501 Code Mass. Regs. 
§§ 13.00 (2008).  We note that the amendments are not relevant 
to the contested issues in this appeal.  
 
4 
 
officer, who retired from that law enforcement agency" (emphasis 
added).  Id. at § 13.03.  A "qualified retired law enforcement 
officer" is an individual who, among other things, "retired in 
good standing from service with a law enforcement agency as a 
law enforcement officer, other than for reasons of mental 
instability."2,3  Id. at § 13.02.  The regulations do not define 
what it means to have retired "in good standing."   
                     
 
2 In addition, a "qualified retired law enforcement officer" 
is an individual who (1) "before such retirement, was authorized 
by law to engage in or supervise the prevention, detection, 
investigation, or prosecution of, or the incarceration of any 
person for, any violation of law, and had statutory powers of 
arrest"; (2) "before such retirement, was regularly employed as 
a law enforcement officer for an aggregate of [fifteen] years or 
more" or "retired from service with such agency after completing 
any applicable probationary period of such service due to a 
service-connected disability"; (3) "has a nonrefundable right to 
benefits under the retirement plan of the agency"; (4) "is not 
under the influence of alcohol or another intoxicating or 
hallucinatory drug or substance"; and (5) "is not prohibited by 
Federal law from receiving a firearm."  501 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 13.02.  Because the commissioner has not alleged in this 
appeal that Frawley failed to satisfy any of these additional 
criteria, we do not discuss them further.   
 
 
3 When 501 Code Mass. Regs. § 13.02 was amended in 2013, see 
note 1, supra, the phrase "other than for reasons of mental 
instability" was removed.  In its place, new language was added 
to the regulation which states that a "qualified retired law 
enforcement officer" is an individual who "has not been 
officially found by a qualified medical professional employed by 
the [law enforcement] agency to be unqualified for reasons 
relating to mental health" or "has not entered into an agreement 
with the [law enforcement] agency . . . in which that individual 
acknowledges he or she is not qualified . . . for reasons 
relating to mental health . . . ."  501 Code Mass. Regs. § 13.02 
(2013).   
5 
 
 
The department is a "law enforcement agency" within the 
meaning of 501 Code Mass. Regs. § 13.02.  The commissioner is 
its "chief law enforcement officer" under the provisions of 
§ 2.52.010 of the Cambridge Code of Ordinances (Ordinances).  
See 501 Code Mass. Regs. § 13.02; Ordinances § 2.52.010 (1990).  
The authority of the commissioner includes the power to 
"organize and administer the Department," Ordinances 
§ 2.52.030(A) (1989), and to "make suitable regulations 
governing the Department and the officers thereof, subject to 
the approval of the City Manager."  Ordinances § 2.52.010.  
Pursuant to this authority, the commissioner issued "Policy and 
Procedures No. 151" (Policy 151), entitled "Police 
Identification Card Program," on August 6, 2011.  Its stated 
purpose is "to describe how [the] department will go about 
issuing police identification cards to sworn members of the 
Cambridge Police Department, as well as to those members of the 
department who retire from the Cambridge Police Department."  
Policy 151 § I.  The procedures pertaining to retired police 
officers state that "[t]he department will issue one police 
identification card to sworn members of the department who have 
separated from service from the Cambridge Police Department and 
qualified to receive said identification card, identifying said 
members as . . . retired police."  Policy 151 § IV(F).  A 
retired police officer is qualified to receive an ID card where, 
6 
 
among other criteria, the officer "[s]eparated in good standing, 
meaning that such officer was not charged with or suspected of 
criminal activity at the time of retirement or separation from 
the department, nor was he/she under investigation or facing 
disciplinary action for an ethical violation of departmental 
rules, or for any act of dishonesty."  Policy 151 § IV(F)(1)(a).   
 
2.  Factual and procedural background.  The department 
hired Frawley on October 14, 1980.  He worked as a full-time 
patrol officer until April 1, 1990, when he was promoted to the 
rank of sergeant.  Frawley served in that position until 
March 4, 2004, the effective date of his retirement.  His tenure 
with the department was not entirely without incident.   
 
Commencing on February 6, 2001, Frawley was suspended 
without pay for five days for insubordination toward a superior 
officer.  Subsequently, on November 19, 2003, Frawley, the city, 
and the Cambridge Police Superior Officers Association (union) 
entered into a written memorandum of agreement (agreement) in 
which they resolved several employment disputes.  Among other 
matters, Frawley agreed to accept a fifteen-day unpaid 
suspension in partial resolution of disciplinary charges that 
the city had brought against him in April, 2002.  These charges 
followed a department investigation which concluded that on 
several occasions when Frawley had reported that he was out on 
sick leave, he actually was conducting private business 
7 
 
activities and lying about his location on the days in question.  
As to the remaining disciplinary charges from April, 2002, which 
pertained to Frawley's failure to be truthful during a grievance 
hearing, the parties agreed to hold them open, but the city 
would take no further action unless Frawley was suspended for 
five or more days in the future, at which point the city could 
revive the charges.  The agreement did not include any admission 
of culpability by Frawley, did not mention his eligibility for 
retirement, and did not limit Frawley's ability to exercise 
police powers or to possess a firearm after the service of his 
fifteen-day suspension.  Once he served his suspension, Frawley 
returned to unrestricted duties as a police sergeant and 
continued to work in that capacity until he retired.   
 
At around the time of Frawley's retirement, the Cambridge 
city council adopted a resolution "expressing its appreciation 
to Joseph F. Frawley, Jr., for his twenty-nine [sic] years of 
dedicated service to the citizens and to the City of Cambridge 
and wish[ing] him much happiness in his retirement."  The 
commissioner's predecessor then issued Frawley an ID card,4 even 
though the department was in the midst of investigating a 
citizen complaint that had been filed against Frawley on 
                     
 
4 The record does not indicate the exact date when the 
commissioner's predecessor issued Frawley an ID card.  According 
to Frawley, it was "[u]pon, or shortly after" his retirement on 
March 4, 2004.   
8 
 
September 29, 2003.  The citizen alleged that, approximately one 
year earlier, Frawley had abused his power and made a false 
arrest in connection with a purported breaking and entering in 
the nighttime at an apartment building.  The citizen had been 
employed by Frawley at some unspecified time in the past, and he 
believed that his arrest was related to this prior employment.  
An investigation by an internal affairs division of the 
department ensued.  Following a review of the circumstances 
surrounding the incident, it was determined that the arrest was 
proper and not connected to any past relationship between 
Frawley and the citizen.  In December, 2004, the department 
cleared Frawley of the alleged wrongdoing.  During the portion 
of the investigation that occurred prior to Frawley's 
retirement, Frawley's law enforcement duties and 
responsibilities were not restricted in any manner.   
 
On December 22, 2011, Frawley applied for the issuance of a 
replacement ID card because the one in his possession had 
broken.  He attested on his application that, among other 
factors, he "separated from service with the department in good 
standing as a police officer, meaning that [he] was not charged 
with or suspected of criminal activity at the time of 
separation, nor was [he] under investigation or facing 
disciplinary action for an ethical violation of departmental 
rules, or for any act of dishonesty."  See Policy 151 
9 
 
§ IV(F)(1)(a).  Following a professional standards review, 
Frawley's application was deemed "not recommended."  By letter 
dated February 6, 2012, the commissioner informed Frawley that 
the department would not be issuing him a replacement ID card 
because Frawley had not met "the standard set by the 
Department."   
 
In his amended complaint, Frawley sought a declaration that 
the commissioner had breached his legal duty under 501 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 13.03 to issue Frawley an ID card based on his 
status as a "qualified retired law enforcement officer."  
Frawley claimed that he had been "materially disadvantaged" by 
the commissioner's denial of his application.  In his answer to 
the amended complaint, the commissioner denied that Frawley had 
retired from the department in good standing and should be 
deemed a "qualified retired law enforcement officer" within the 
meaning of 501 Code Mass. Regs. § 13.02.  The commissioner also 
raised several affirmative defenses, including lack of standing 
to bring an action for declaratory judgment.   
 
Frawley subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment.  
The commissioner filed a cross motion for summary judgment, 
together with an affidavit explaining his rationale for denying 
Frawley's application for a replacement ID card.  The 
commissioner stated in his affidavit that, at the time of 
Frawley's retirement, "open charges remained relating to 
10 
 
[Frawley's] fail[ure] to tell the truth during a [department] 
investigation," and Frawley was "under investigation for a claim 
made by a member of the public that [he] had engaged in a false 
arrest."  The commissioner also pointed out that Frawley had 
been suspended for insubordination toward a superior officer, 
and for misconduct arising from his abuse of sick leave.  
Finally, the commissioner stated that after giving the matter 
serious consideration, he exercised his discretion as 
commissioner, based on his knowledge of Frawley's history with 
the department, and concluded that Frawley would not be issued a 
replacement ID card.   
 
By decision dated September 22, 2014, the judge allowed 
Frawley's motion for summary judgment and declared that he was 
entitled to receive a replacement ID card from the commissioner 
in accordance with the regulations.  The judge concluded that 
where Frawley had alleged that the commissioner violated his 
duty under 501 Code Mass. Regs. § 13.03, and where, as a 
consequence, Frawley was denied the benefits conferred under 
LEOSA, Frawley had standing to seek declaratory relief.  The 
judge further concluded that Frawley had retired in good 
standing as a matter of "historical fact," and that the 
commissioner did not have the power to reconsider his 
predecessor's decision.  The present appeal ensued.   
11 
 
 
3.  Complaint for declaratory judgment.  The commissioner 
contends that the judge erred in concluding that Frawley had 
standing to bring a cause of action for declaratory relief 
predicated on the commissioner's failure to issue him a 
replacement ID card in accordance with the mandate of 501 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 13.03.  The commissioner maintains that the 
regulations do not permit, either expressly or by implication, a 
private cause of action to compel the chief law enforcement 
officer for a law enforcement agency to issue an ID card.  
Further, he continues, the enabling statute on which the 
regulations are based, G. L. c. 140, § 131 (r), does not suggest 
any legislative intent to create an enforceable right.  We 
conclude that a complaint for declaratory judgment is not the 
appropriate means to challenge a chief law enforcement officer's 
decision to deny the issuance of an ID card.  Rather, the proper 
avenue for relief is a civil action in the nature of certiorari 
pursuant to G. L. c. 249, § 4.   
 
It is undisputed that the regulations do not provide, in 
express terms, a private right of action for an aggrieved party 
to challenge the denial of an ID card.  Contrast, e.g., 118 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 14.03(5) (2005) (individual wanting to challenge 
decision by executive director of Disabled Persons Protection 
Commission regarding personal data may seek judicial review 
pursuant to G. L. c. 214, § 3B); 961 Code Mass. Regs. § 4.03(5) 
12 
 
(1993) (aggrieved party may obtain judicial review of denial of 
permit to conduct raffle or bazaar by filing petition for review 
in District Court).  The inquiry therefore becomes whether a 
private right of action can be inferred from the regulations.  
We conclude that it cannot.   
 
In Loffredo v. Center for Addictive Behaviors, 426 Mass. 
541, 546 (1998), this court held that "a private cause of action 
cannot be inferred solely from an agency regulation."  See 
Sullivan v. Chief Justice for Admin. & Mgt. of the Trial Court, 
448 Mass. 15, 38 (2006) (regulations governing asbestos removal 
did not provide right of action to enforce compliance with 
mandates); Hudson v. Commissioner of Correction, 46 Mass. App. 
Ct. 538, 548 n.18 (1999), S.C., 431 Mass. 1 (2000) (violation of 
health regulations applicable to correctional facilities did not 
create private right of action for affected inmates).  As we 
explained in Loffredo, "a judicial inference of a private cause 
of action solely from an agency regulation requires a twofold 
stretch:  the judiciary infers a cause of action not to 
supplement a statute enacted by the Legislature, but to 
supplement a rule enacted by the executive, which itself 
supplements the statute."  Loffredo, supra at 545.  By 
"inferring a private cause of action from an agency regulation 
alone, we run the risk of joining with the executive to revise 
13 
 
and go substantially beyond the will of the Legislature."  Id. 
at 546.   
 
General Laws c. 140, § 131 (r), and 18 U.S.C. § 926C are 
the enabling statutes pursuant to which the Secretary of the 
Executive Office of Public Safety and Security promulgated the 
regulations governing ID cards for qualified retired law 
enforcement officers.  See 501 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 13.00.  
Section 131 governs licenses to carry firearms, and subsection 
(r) authorizes the Secretary to promulgate regulations to carry 
out the purposes of § 131.  Neither § 131, in general, nor 
subsection (r), in particular, addresses ID cards, either 
explicitly or implicitly.  Section 131 does, however, include a 
private right of action for a party aggrieved by the denial of a 
license to carry a firearm.  It states that "[a]ny applicant or 
holder aggrieved by a denial, revocation or suspension of a 
license [to carry] . . . may . . . file a petition to obtain 
judicial review in the district court having jurisdiction in the 
city or town wherein the applicant filed for, or was issued, 
such license."  G. L. c. 140, § 131 (f).  A license to carry a 
firearm is substantively different from an ID card.  Nothing in 
§ 131 suggests that the Legislature intended to confer a private 
right of action on a retired law enforcement officer who has 
been denied an ID card.  Similarly, at least one Federal court 
has held that Congress did not intend, either explicitly or 
14 
 
implicitly, to create a private cause of action under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 926C for retired law enforcement officers who have been denied 
a State-issued photographic identification.  See Johnson v. New 
York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 709 F. Supp. 2d 178, 
183-186 (N.D.N.Y. 2010).  On the basis of both State and Federal 
law, we conclude that Frawley cannot assert a private cause of 
action to compel the commissioner to issue him a replacement ID 
card.   
 
Apparently recognizing the absence of a private right of 
action, Frawley proceeded by filing a complaint for declaratory 
and injunctive relief.  The purpose of the declaratory judgment 
statute, G. L. c. 231A, is "to remove, and to afford relief 
from, uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, duties, 
status and other legal relations."  G. L. c. 231A, § 9.  Among 
other controversies to which the declaratory judgment procedure 
is appropriate, it may be used to resolve disputes concerning 
the interpretation of an administrative regulation.  See G. L. 
c. 231A, § 2; Ciszewski v. Industrial Acc. Bd., 367 Mass. 135, 
140 (1975).  Generally speaking, however, "a party may not seek 
declaratory relief to effect an 'end run' around the absence of 
a private right of action where the Legislature intended to 
foreclose certain remedies."  Service Employees Int'l Union, 
Local 509 v. Department of Mental Health, 469 Mass. 323, 336 
15 
 
(2014) (SEIU).5  See Boston Med. Ctr. Corp. v. Secretary of the 
Executive Office of Health & Human Servs., 463 Mass. 447, 470-
471 (2012) (provider of medical care could not seek declaratory 
judgment as to reasonableness of rate determinations absent 
private right of action).  Not only has the Legislature 
foreclosed a private right of action with respect to the denial 
of an ID card, but, more fundamentally, the nature of the 
dispute here is not one that is appropriate for declaratory 
judgment.6   
                     
 
5 In Service Employees Int'l Union, Local 509 v. Department 
of Mental Health, 469 Mass. 323, 335-336 (2014) (SEIU), this 
court concluded that the plaintiff had standing to seek a 
declaratory judgment under G. L. c. 231A, even though the 
Massachusetts privatization statute, G. L. c. 7, §§ 52-55 
(Pacheco Law), did not contain a private right of action, 
because the absence of declaratory relief would prevent the 
Pacheco Law from being administered properly and thus would 
contravene the Legislature's intent.  We noted in SEIU that our 
determination that declaratory judgment was the appropriate 
remedy "should be understood as limited to the circumstances 
presented" in that case.  Id. at 337 n.12.  In contrast, we 
continued, the proper vehicle for relief when challenging a 
decision by the Auditor of the Commonwealth, who is statutorily 
authorized to review all privatization contracts for compliance 
with the Pacheco Law, is an action in the nature of certiorari 
pursuant to G. L. c. 249, § 4.  Id.  As will be discussed infra, 
a certiorari action also is the proper vehicle to challenge a 
decision denying an ID card to a retired law enforcement 
officer.   
 
 
6 In this appeal, Frawley has argued that he has standing to 
seek declaratory relief because the commissioner violated a 
legal duty owed to Frawley by refusing to issue a replacement ID 
card, and because Frawley has alleged an injury -- the inability 
lawfully to carry a concealed firearm across State lines 
pursuant to Federal law -- that is within the area of concern of 
501 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 13.00.  See Enos v. Secretary of Envtl. 
16 
 
 
"[A] complaint for declaratory relief is an appropriate way 
of testing the validity of regulations or the propriety of 
practices involving violations of rights, which are consistent 
and repeated in nature."  Nelson v. Commissioner of Correction, 
390 Mass. 379, 388 n.12 (1983), citing G. L. c. 231A, § 2.  
However, we have said that declaratory judgment is not "an 
appropriate remedy where the validity of an adjudication . . . 
in an individual case is being challenged.  There relief in the 
nature of certiorari is to be sought."  Diatchenko v. District 
Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 471 Mass. 12, 30 (2015), quoting 
Averett v. Commissioner of Correction, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 280, 
287 (1988), S.C., Averett, petitioner, 404 Mass. 28 (1989) 
(action for declaratory relief not appropriate form of judicial 
review of parole board decision denying initial parole to 
juvenile homicide offender).  See SEIU, 469 Mass. at 337 n.12.  
See also Grady v. Commissioner of Correction, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 
126, 131, 135-136 (2013) (inmate appeal challenging Department 
of Correction determination in official disciplinary proceeding 
governed by certiorari statute).   
                                                                  
Affairs, 432 Mass. 132, 135 (2000).  We need not analyze whether 
Frawley has standing to maintain his action because such 
analysis presupposes that Frawley's complaint for declaratory 
judgment is the proper vehicle for challenging the 
commissioner's decision.  In light of our conclusion that it is 
not, the matter whether Frawley has standing is immaterial.   
17 
 
 
In his amended complaint, Frawley states that the parties 
have a genuine dispute over the commissioner's legal obligation 
under 501 Code Mass. Regs. § 13.03 to issue Frawley a 
replacement ID card.7  Although Frawley appears to characterize 
his action to fit within the scope of G. L. c. 231A, we do not 
agree with his description of the nature of the controversy.  
The meaning of § 13.03, and the right conferred thereunder, is 
not uncertain or ambiguous such that it requires judicial 
interpretation.  The duty of the commissioner is clear.  Once an 
individual satisfies the criteria set forth in 501 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 13.02 for being deemed a "qualified retired law 
enforcement officer," the commissioner "shall issue" an ID card.  
Conversely, the commissioner has no legal obligation under the 
regulations to issue an ID card to an individual who is not a 
"qualified retired law enforcement officer."  The dispute 
between the parties is not about the meaning or scope of the 
commissioner's obligation under § 13.03, but, more accurately, 
whether the commissioner's decision to deny Frawley's 
application for a replacement ID card was improper.  Given the 
substance of Frawley's complaint, and the absence of a private 
right of action under the regulations or enabling legislation, 
                     
 
7 Although Frawley refers in his amended complaint to 501 
Code Mass. Regs. § 13.04, it is § 13.03 that governs the 
issuance of an ID card to a qualified retired law enforcement 
officer.   
18 
 
the appropriate avenue of relief for Frawley was a civil action 
in the nature of certiorari pursuant to G. L. c. 249, § 4.   
 
The purpose of a civil action in the nature of certiorari 
is "to relieve aggrieved parties from the injustice arising from 
errors of law committed in proceedings affecting their 
justiciable rights when no other means of relief are open."  
Figgs v. Boston Hous. Auth., 469 Mass. 354, 361 (2014), quoting 
Swan v. Justices of the Superior Court, 222 Mass. 542, 544 
(1916).  See G. L. c. 249, § 4.  "Certiorari also has been 
described as 'a limited procedure reserved for correction of 
substantial errors of law apparent on the record created before 
a judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal.'"  Figgs, supra, quoting 
School Comm. of Hudson v. Board of Educ., 448 Mass. 565, 575-576 
(2007).  See Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth. v. Auditor of the 
Commonwealth, 430 Mass. 783, 790-791 (2000); Gloucester v. Civil 
Serv. Comm'n, 408 Mass. 292, 297 (1990).  "To obtain certiorari 
review of an administrative decision, the following three 
elements must be present:  (1) a judicial or quasi judicial 
proceeding, (2) from which there is no other reasonably adequate 
remedy, and (3) a substantial injury or injustice arising from 
the proceeding under review."  Indeck v. Clients' Sec. Bd., 450 
Mass. 379, 385 (2008).  See Boston Edison Co. v. Selectmen of 
Concord, 355 Mass. 79, 83 (1968).  We conclude that the 
19 
 
commissioner's decision satisfies the necessary elements for 
certiorari review.   
 
As to the first element of the Indeck test, when assessing 
whether a proceeding is quasi judicial, "we have looked to the 
form of the proceeding . . . and the extent to which that 
proceeding resembles judicial action."  Hoffer v. Board of 
Registration in Med., 461 Mass. 451, 457 (2012).  Here, Frawley 
completed an application for a replacement ID card in which he 
attested that he satisfied the necessary criteria to be deemed a 
"qualified retired law enforcement officer."  Then, a 
"professional standards review" was conducted.  Based on the 
results of that investigation, the commissioner determined that 
Frawley had not met "the standard set by the Department" and, 
therefore, was not entitled to receive a replacement ID card.  
This was not a legislative or regulatory proceeding, 
characterized by interested persons advocating or disapproving a 
proposed policy to be implemented by a local licensing board.  
See id.  See also School Comm. of Hudson, 448 Mass. at 576; 
Pronghorn, Inc. v. Licensing Bd. of Peabody, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 
70, 72-73 (1982).  Rather, notwithstanding the absence of an 
adjudicatory hearing, Frawley was required to attest to certain 
facts, the department conducted an investigation into the 
veracity of those facts, and the commissioner made an 
individualized determination concerning Frawley's entitlement to 
20 
 
a replacement ID card.  This proceeding, conducted under the 
framework of the regulations, was quasi judicial.  See, e.g., 
Roslindale Motor Sales, Inc. v. Police Comm'r of Boston, 405 
Mass. 79, 83-84 (1989) (statute giving police commissioner 
authority to grant licenses to sell used motor vehicles 
conferred quasi judicial authority on commissioner to determine 
facts and decide each application).   
 
With respect to the second element of the Indeck test, 
absent a civil action in the nature of certiorari, there is no 
other remedy available to Frawley, as we have discussed, supra.  
Finally, the commissioner's denial of a replacement ID card 
constitutes a substantial injury or injustice.  See Indeck, 450 
Mass. at 385.  "The injury requirement has been interpreted as 
requiring (1) a justiciable injury, (2) that is particular to 
the plaintiff[] rather than common to the public or a segment 
thereof, and (3) that is more than 'hypothetical.'"  Hoffer, 461 
Mass. at 457 n.8, quoting Fiske v. Selectmen of Hopkinton, 354 
Mass. 269, 271 (1968).  The ID card, together with a training 
certification card, would allow Frawley to carry a concealed 
firearm across State lines in accordance with the provisions of 
LEOSA.  See 501 Code Mass. Regs. § 13.04(2)(a).  See also 18 
U.S.C. § 926C.  By denying Frawley a replacement ID card, the 
commissioner has rendered him ineligible to exercise this 
21 
 
Federal right.  Such injury is sufficient to satisfy the third 
element of the Indeck test.   
 
Our conclusion that a civil action in the nature of 
certiorari is the appropriate avenue of relief for Frawley is 
consistent with the relief that is afforded to an individual who 
is denied a license to carry firearms under G. L. c. 140, § 131.  
Judicial review of a firearms licensing decision is available 
first by way of "a petition to obtain judicial review in the 
district court," G. L. c. 140, § 131 (f), and then "by way of an 
action in the nature of certiorari pursuant to G. L. c. 249, 
§ 4."  Firearms Records Bur. v. Simkin, 466 Mass. 168, 179-180 
(2013).  See Chardin v. Police Comm'r of Boston, 465 Mass. 314, 
317, cert. denied sub nom. Chardin v. Davis, 134 S. Ct. 525 
(2013).  "On certiorari review, the Superior Court's role is to 
examine the record of the District Court and to 'correct 
substantial errors of law apparent on the record adversely 
affecting material rights.'"  Simkin, supra at 180, quoting 
Cambridge Hous. Auth. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 
586, 587 (1979).  Although a license to carry a firearm is 
substantively different from an ID card, both are components of 
a licensing scheme that allows a qualified retired law 
enforcement officer to carry a firearm in Massachusetts and 
across State lines.  See G. L. c. 140, § 131; 501 Code Mass. 
Regs. §§ 13.00.  See also 18 U.S.C. § 926C.  It is appropriate 
22 
 
that the denial of an ID card be subject to the same form of 
judicial review as the denial of a license to carry.  See 
Bermant v. Selectmen of Belchertown, 425 Mass. 400, 404 (1997) 
("a civil action in the nature of certiorari is the sole relief 
available to a party aggrieved by a discretionary decision of a 
local licensing authority").   
 
Having ascertained the proper form of judicial review of 
the commissioner's decision, we now consider the separate matter 
of the standard of review to be applied to such decision.  See 
Diatchenko, 471 Mass. at 31.  "It is well established that 'the 
standard of review [under G. L. c. 249, § 4,] may vary according 
to the nature of the action for which review is sought.'"  
Figgs, 469 Mass. at 361, quoting Garrity v. Conservation Comm'n 
of Hingham, 462 Mass. 779, 792 (2012).  We have yet to decide 
the appropriate standard of review of a police commissioner's 
decision to deny the issuance of an ID card to a retired law 
enforcement officer.  Although the commissioner "shall issue" an 
ID card where an applicant has satisfied the enumerated criteria 
for being deemed a "qualified retired law enforcement officer," 
501 Code Mass. Regs. § 13.03, whether in fact an applicant has 
satisfied such criteria is a discretionary decision.  We 
recognize that the majority of the criteria are objective.  See 
note 2, supra.  Significantly, however, the commissioner must 
determine whether the applicant retired "in good standing."  501 
23 
 
Code Mass. Regs. § 13.02.  Because the commissioner may use his 
judgment in making this determination, his decision will be 
construed as an exercise of administrative discretion.  A 
reviewing court will examine whether the commissioner's decision 
was arbitrary and capricious such that it constituted an abuse 
of his discretion.  See Diatchenko, supra (abuse of discretion 
standard appropriate to review decision whether to grant parole 
to particular juvenile homicide offender); Garrity, supra; 
Forsyth Sch. for Dental Hygienists v. Board of Registration in 
Dentistry, 404 Mass. 211, 217 (1989).   
 
Employing an abuse of discretion standard for reviewing the 
denial of an ID card is consistent with the standard of review 
under the license to carry statute.  General Laws c. 140, 
§ 131 (f), provides that a judge "may direct that a license be 
issued or reinstated . . . if [the judge] finds that there was 
no reasonable ground for denying, suspending or revoking such 
license and that the petitioner is not prohibited by law from 
possessing same" (emphasis added).  "To warrant a finding that a 
chief of police had no reasonable ground for refusing to issue a 
license [to carry firearms,] it must be shown that the refusal 
was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion."  Chief of 
Police of Shelburne v. Moyer, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 543, 546 (1983).  
See Simkin, 466 Mass. at 179.   
24 
 
 
When reviewing the commissioner's decision in this case, 
the inquiry is twofold.  First, it must be determined whether 
the commissioner erred in reopening Frawley's case, given that 
the prior police commissioner had issued Frawley an ID card.  
Second, it must be determined whether the commissioner abused 
his discretion in deciding that Frawley had not met "the 
standard set by the Department" and, therefore, was not entitled 
to a replacement ID card.  See 501 Code Mass. Regs. § 13.03.  A 
decision is arbitrary or capricious such that it constitutes an 
abuse of discretion where it "lacks any rational explanation 
that reasonable persons might support."  Doe v. Superintendent 
of Schs. of Stoughton, 437 Mass. 1, 6 (2002), quoting Fire Chief 
of E. Bridgewater v. Plymouth County Retirement Bd., 47 Mass. 
App. Ct. 66, 69 (1999).  See L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 
169, 185 n.27 (2014) (abuse of discretion occurs when there has 
been clear error of judgment in weighing relevant factors such 
that decision falls outside range of reasonable alternatives).  
"It is not the place of a reviewing court to substitute its own 
opinion" for that of the commissioner.  Doe, supra.   
 
Judicial review of the commissioner's decision proceeds 
under the same standard whether conducted by this court or 
remanded to the Superior Court for reconsideration.  The 
decision by a reviewing court is a ruling of law that does not 
require findings of fact, determinations of credibility, or the 
25 
 
application of administrative expertise.  See Doe, 437 Mass. at 
5-6 & n.6; Northboro Inn, LLC v. Treatment Plant Bd. of 
Westborough, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 670, 673-674 (2003).  Instead, 
the reviewing court simply must determine whether the 
commissioner, on the basis of the evidence before him, abused 
his discretion in a manner that adversely affected Frawley's 
material rights.  See Simkin, 466 Mass. at 179-180; Gloucester, 
408 Mass. at 297.  We stand in the same position as the judge 
below in making that determination.  Moreover, this court has 
concurrent jurisdiction with the Superior Court to entertain an 
action in the nature of certiorari under G. L. c. 249, § 4.  
That being the case, and in light of the limited review afforded 
a certiorari action, we proceed to decide the commissioner's 
appeal in the interests of judicial economy and efficiency.8  
                     
 
8 A civil action in the nature of certiorari "shall be 
commenced within sixty days next after the proceeding complained 
of."  G. L. c. 249, § 4.  Failure to do so is a "serious 
misstep" that is grounds for dismissal of the action.  See 
Bielawski v. Personnel Adm'r of the Div. of Personnel Admin., 
422 Mass. 459, 465 n.13 (1996); Pidge v. Superintendent, Mass. 
Correctional Inst., Cedar Junction, 32 Mass. App. Ct. 14, 17-18 
(1992), citing McLellan v. Commissioner of Correction, 29 Mass. 
App. Ct. 933, 935 (1990).  Here, the commissioner denied 
Frawley's application for a replacement ID card by letter dated 
February 6, 2012.  Frawley filed his original complaint on 
November 13, 2012.  If Frawley had sought review of the 
commissioner's decision by filing a civil action in the nature 
of certiorari, instead of by filing a complaint for declaratory 
and injunctive relief, his action would have been deemed 
untimely.  However, given that no appellate court heretofore had 
decided whether an aggrieved party could challenge the denial of 
an ID card, and, if so, what would be the proper avenue for 
26 
 
See, e.g., Murphy v. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst., 
Cedar Junction, 396 Mass. 830, 833 (1986) (treating complaint 
for declaratory and injunctive relief as action in nature of 
certiorari); McLellan v. Commissioner of Correction, 29 Mass. 
App. Ct. 933, 934 (1990) (same).   
 
4.  Entitlement to replacement ID card.  We begin by 
considering whether the commissioner erred in reopening 
Frawley's case.  Once Frawley submitted an application to obtain 
a replacement ID card, the commissioner was required to issue 
the card, provided that Frawley was a "qualified retired law 
enforcement officer," which meant that, among other things, he 
had retired "in good standing."  501 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 13.02, 
13.03.  The commissioner argues on appeal that it was not a 
"historical fact" that Frawley had satisfied this criterion.  
Therefore, the commissioner continues, he was compelled to 
reopen Frawley's case to ascertain whether, in fact, Frawley had 
retired in good standing.  We agree.   
 
The commissioner's predecessor issued Frawley an ID card at 
around the time of Frawley's retirement on March 4, 2004.  The 
regulations setting forth the standards for the issuance of an 
ID card were not promulgated until January 11, 2008.  501 Code 
                                                                  
relief, we decline to dismiss Frawley's appeal as untimely.  Our 
decision to ignore this procedural defect should be understood 
as limited to the unique circumstances presented in this case.  
Cf. Bielawski, supra.   
27 
 
Mass. Regs. § 13.01 (2008).  When the commissioner received 
Frawley's application for a replacement ID card in December, 
2011, he would not have known what criteria, if any, his 
predecessor had considered prior to giving Frawley his original 
ID card.  That being the case, the commissioner would have had 
no basis for knowing whether Frawley was a "qualified retired 
law enforcement officer" to whom the commissioner was obligated 
to issue a replacement ID card.  Contrary to Frawley's 
contention, the mere fact that Frawley obtained an ID card in 
2004 does not mean that he retired "in good standing," given the 
absence of articulated standards and criteria at that time for 
the issuance of an ID card.   
 
The commissioner is vested with the authority to "organize 
and administer the Department."  Ordinances § 2.52.030(A).  This 
authority encompasses the issuance of an ID card to a "qualified 
retired law enforcement officer."  To the extent that there was 
any question as to Frawley's classification as such, it was well 
within the commissioner's discretion to reexamine Frawley's 
status.  Cf. Soe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 252997 v. Sex 
Offender Registry Bd., 466 Mass. 381, 395 (2013), and cases 
cited ("An administrative agency, in the absence of statutory 
limitations, generally has the inherent authority to reconsider 
a decision or reopen a proceeding to prevent or mitigate a 
28 
 
miscarriage of justice").  We conclude that the commissioner did 
not err in reopening Frawley's case.   
 
We now consider whether the commissioner abused his 
discretion in deciding that Frawley had not met "the standard 
set by the Department" and, therefore, was not entitled to a 
replacement ID card.  As we have mentioned, when the Executive 
Office of Public Safety and Security promulgated the 
regulations, it did not define what it meant to retire "in good 
standing."  501 Code Mass. Regs. § 13.02.  Consequently, the 
commissioner described the meaning of this phrase when he issued 
Policy 151, in accordance with his authority under Ordinances 
§ 2.52.010.  Policy 151 § IV(F)(1)(a).  Given that Policy 151 
was issued four months before Frawley applied for a replacement 
ID card, the commissioner could use the definition therein to 
assess whether Frawley should be deemed a "qualified retired law 
enforcement officer."  There is no evidence that the Executive 
Office of Public Safety and Security intended to deny the city, 
or the commissioner acting in conformity with the Ordinances, 
the right to enact policies and procedures that would be 
consistent with the regulations.  A municipality enjoys 
"considerable latitude" in legislating on matters of local 
concern, including the authority and duties of its police 
department.  Bloom v. Worcester, 363 Mass. 136, 154 (1973).  See 
art. 89, § 6, of the Amendments to the Massachusetts 
29 
 
Constitution (Home Rule Amendment).  See also Ordinances 
c. 2.52.  We have said that there must be a "sharp conflict" 
between a local law and a State law before the local law will be 
invalidated.  Easthampton Sav. Bank v. Springfield, 470 Mass. 
284, 288-289 (2014), quoting Bloom, supra.  Here, the 
commissioner did not modify the regulations.  He merely 
described the department's procedures for issuing ID cards and 
explained an undefined criterion.  In so doing, the commissioner 
acted within his purview, and the description set forth in 
Policy 151 of what it means to retire "in good standing" 
governed the evaluation of Frawley's application.   
 
In his affidavit, the commissioner cited several reasons 
why Frawley did not meet "the standard set by the Department."  
First, the commissioner stated that Frawley, at the time of his 
retirement, was "under investigation for a claim made by a 
member of the public that [he] had engaged in a false arrest."  
Pursuant to Policy 151, a police officer has not retired "in 
good standing" where, at the time of retirement, the officer was 
"under investigation or facing disciplinary action for an 
ethical violation of departmental rules, or for any act of 
dishonesty."  Policy 151 § IV(F)(1)(a).  We acknowledge that the 
citizen complaint would appear to disqualify Frawley from 
receipt of a replacement ID card.  However, at the time the 
commissioner evaluated Frawley's application in 2012, he would 
30 
 
have known that the department had cleared Frawley of any 
purported wrongdoing with respect to the citizen complaint.  The 
commissioner could not ignore this information where it plainly 
removed an impediment to Frawley being deemed an officer who 
retired "in good standing."9   
 
Second, the commissioner stated that, at the time of 
Frawley's retirement, "open charges remained relating to 
[Frawley's] fail[ure] to tell the truth during a [department] 
investigation."  Pursuant to the November 19, 2003, agreement, 
however, the city agreed to take no action on such charges 
unless Frawley was suspended for five or more days in the 
future, at which point the city could revive the charges.  
During the remainder of Frawley's tenure with the department, 
the city did not revive the charges, and, on the effective date 
of Frawley's retirement, the charges effectively were closed 
because Frawley had not engaged in any conduct that would 
warrant a suspension.  That being the case, this matter did not 
disqualify Frawley from having retired "in good standing."  See 
Policy 151 § IV(F)(1)(a).   
 
Finally, the commissioner pointed out that Frawley had been 
suspended for insubordination toward a superior officer, and for 
                     
 
9 Had the commissioner been evaluating Frawley's application 
in March, 2004, he would have acted well within his discretion 
in refusing to issue an ID card given the ongoing investigation 
concerning the citizen complaint.   
31 
 
misconduct arising from his abuse of sick leave.  Neither of 
these incidents was pending "at the time of retirement."  Policy 
151 § IV(F)(1)(a).  As a consequence, they could not serve as a 
basis for the commissioner's determination that Frawley had not 
retired "in good standing."   
 
5.  Conclusion.  The commissioner abused his discretion in 
deciding that Frawley had not met "the standard set by the 
Department."  Accordingly, Frawley is entitled to receive a 
replacement ID card.  We vacate the declaratory judgment and 
remand the case to the Superior Court for entry of a judgment 
directing the commissioner to issue a replacement ID card to 
Frawley.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.