Title: Bennie Demps v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC00-1118
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: June 5, 2000

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
  
____________
Nos. SC00-1118 & SC00-1179
____________
BENNIE DEMPS,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
____________________
BENNIE DEMPS,
Petitioner,
vs.
JEB BUSH, etc., et al.,
Respondents.
[June 5, 2000]
CORRECTED OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Bennie Demps, under his fourth warrant of death, appeals an order of the trial
court denying his fourth motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of
1  Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).  See Anderson v. State, 267 So. 2d 8, 10 (Fla.
1972).
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Criminal Procedure 3.850 and also seeks mandamus relief.  We have jurisdiction. 
Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  We affirm the denial of the rule 3.850 motion, and we
deny the petition for writ of mandamus.
The present crime involves the stabbing death of an inmate “snitch.”  When
the murder took place, Bennie Demps already was serving two consecutive life
sentences and a twenty-year sentence for two other first-degree murders and an
attempted murder (he had locked three people in the trunk of a car and shot
repeatedly into the trunk).  His death sentences for those murders had been reduced
to life pursuant to Furman.1  The facts of the present crime are set forth in this
Court’s opinion on direct appeal:
On September 6, 1976, personnel at the Florida
State Prison discovered inmate Alfred Sturgis in a cell,
bleeding profusely from stab wounds.  He was rushed first
to the hospital at Union Correctional Institute, then to the
state prison at Lake Butler.  Due to inadequate facilities at
both institutions, Sturgis was taken to Shands Teaching
Hospital in Gainesville, where he died soon after arrival.
A grand jury indicted inmates Bennie Demps,
James Jackson and Harry Mungin for the murder of Alfred
Sturgis.  In the course of preliminary depositions, defense
counsel learned that while en route to the hospital, Sturgis
told correctional officer A. V. Rhoden that appellant,
Jackson and Mungin had committed the knifing.  Rhoden
later reduced the statement to writing and included it in a
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report filed with R. K. Griffis, a Department of
Corrections investigator.  After defense requests to
produce the written document, the state informed the court
that Mr. Griffis had misplaced Rhoden’s statement.  In a
pretrial hearing the court refused to dismiss the indictment
based on the state’s failure to produce Rhoden’s report.
At trial Mr. Rhoden explained to the jury what
Sturgis had told him in the ambulance:
. . . .
Q  Did he say anything else?
A  Yes, sir, he said:
“You have to get Mungin
and Demps, they held me and
Jackson stabbed me.”
I asked him, “Which
Jackson?”
And he said:  “Toothless
Jackson.”
. . . .
Another witness for the prosecution, fellow inmate Larry
Hathaway, testified that while walking past Harry
Mungin’s cell on the afternoon of the murder, Mungin told
him to go downstairs and stay there, because Mungin
“was fixing to get rid of a snitch.”  He followed Mungin’s
suggestion but returned a short while later, at which time
he noticed a struggle going on in the cell in which Sturgis
was later found.  Mungin was standing in the door of the
cell; inside, Hathaway could see appellant holding Sturgis
down on the bed while Jackson struck him with
downward thrusts.  Upon seeing this, Hathaway quickly
left the scene.
Demps v. State, 395 So. 2d 501, 503-04 (Fla. 1981).  Demps was convicted of first-
degree murder for his role in the crime and was sentenced to death based inter alia
2  Codefendants Jackson and Mungin were convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced
to life imprisonment (the jury recommended death for Jackson and life for Mungin).  Unlike Demps,
neither Jackson nor Mungin had been convicted of prior murders.
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on the fact that he had committed two prior first-degree murders.2  We affirmed. 
See id. at 506.
The subsequent procedural history is set forth in this Court’s opinion
addressing Demps’ third rule 3.850 motion:
After the governor signed a death warrant, Demps
filed a rule 3.850 motion for postconviction relief, which
the trial court denied without an evidentiary hearing.  This
Court remanded for an evidentiary hearing.  Demps v.
State, 416 So.2d  (Fla. 1982).  The trial court held a
hearing and again denied relief.  We affirmed.  Demps v.
State, 462 So.2d 1074 (Fla. 1984).  Pursuant to a second
death warrant, Demps petitioned this Court for a writ of
habeas corpus, which we denied.  Demps v. Dugger, 514
So.2d 1092 (Fla. 1987).  We also affirmed the trial court’s
summary denial of Demps’ second motion for rule 3.850
relief.  Demps v. State, 515 So.2d 196 (Fla. 1987).  When
Governor Martinez signed a third death warrant in April
1990, Demps filed the current petition for writ of habeas
corpus in this Court.  This Court granted a stay of
execution and Demps filed his third rule 3.850 motion in
the trial court, which the court summarily denied.  Demps
now appeals that denial of 3.850 relief and seeks relief
under his pending habeas petition.
Demps v. Dugger, 714 So. 2d 365, 366-67 (Fla. 1998) (footnotes omitted).  We
affirmed the denial of his third rule 3.850 motion and denied his second habeas
3  Demps also sought relief in federal court.  See, e.g.,  Demps v. Dugger, 874 F.2d 1385
(11th Cir. 1989) (affirming denial of habeas relief); Demps v. Wainwright, 805 F.2d 1426 (11th Cir.
1986) (affirming denial of habeas relief).
4  Based on this date of discovery, the Sewell  memo falls within the one-year time limit of
the rule.  See, e.g., Mills v. State, 684 So. 2d 801, 804-05 (Fla. 1996) (“Mills must show . . . that the
motion was filed within one year of the discovery of evidence upon which avoidance of the time limit
was based.”).
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petition.  See id. at 368.3
Demps on July 2, 1999, filed his fourth (i.e., the present) rule 3.850 motion in
circuit court, raising a single main issue.  He claimed that he recently (on July 3-5,
1998 4) discovered a memorandum dated September 7, 1976, written by Chief
Prison Inspector and Investigator Cecil Sewell and addressed to Louie Wainwright,
then Secretary of the Department of Corrections.  The memorandum reads in full:
Inspector Griffis notified this office of the death of Inmate
Alfred Sturgis, B/M, #033044, sentenced to life from
Brevard County for escape and murder, 2nd degree. 
Received in our system 1-14-72.  Inmate Sturgis’ DOB
was 1-12-53.
Subject was housed on “W” wing at FSP, and was
stabbed in the chest with a home-made knife
approximately 10" long.  Inmate Sturgis was sent to UCI
outpatient clinic and then to Shands Teaching Hospital,
Gainesville.  Dr. J. Isaacs, Shands, pronounced him dead
at approximately 7:30 p.m., September 6, 1976.
The stabbing occurred at approximately 4:30 p.m.,
September 6, 1976, and before Sturgis died, he named
James Jackson, B/M, #029667, as his assailant.
5  Demps frames the issues as follows:  (1) fundamental denial of due process; (2) denial of
due process, prejudicial withholding of exculpatory material, and State’s failure to comply with
absolute discovery obligation; (3) evidentiary hearing granted, scheduled, and continued; (4) denial
of equal protection; (5) denial of fundamental constitutional protections and procedural due process
raised to a substantive level; (6) prosecutorial misconduct, denial of due process, equal protection and
summary granting of evidentiary hearing; (7) the trial court’s denial of a stay and the total disregard
of Demps’ procedural and substantive rights under Florida law in deference to the executive’s
scheduled execution date violate Demps’ state and federal constitutional rights.
6  Demps claims that the Governor failed to follow the proper statutory procedure when he
set the execution date for 6:00 p.m., June 7, 2000.
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The State Attorney’s office has been notified and an
autopsy has been ordered.  The family has also been
notified.  Inspector Griffis is investigating and will send a
complete report when finalized.
Demps claimed that this memo proves he is innocent.  The trial court on May 12,
2000, held a hearing to determine if an evidentiary hearing was warranted on this
claim and gave the parties until May 18 to supplement the record.  The trial court
then denied Demps’ fourth rule 3.850 motion.  Demps appeals, raising several
issues.5  He also has filed in this Court a petition for a writ of mandamus, raising a
single issue.6 
The trial court below concluded as follows in its order denying the present
rule 3.850 motion:
10.  For the purposes of this Order, the Court
accepts, without finding, that the memorandum is newly
discovered.  Furthermore, the Court finds that it is
possible that the memorandum could have been
introduced at trial for impeachment purposes.  The issue
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before this Court is whether it is probable that the
memorandum, had Defendant discovered it by trial, would
produce an acquittal on retrial.  See Jones v. State, 709
So. 2d 512, 521 (Fla. 1998) (citing Jones v. State, 591 So.
2d 911, 915 (Fla. 1991)).
11.  The Court finds that the memorandum is of
little impeachment value as to A.V. Rhoden because it is
not clear from what source Sewell derives his assertion
that Sturgis named Jackson as his “assailant.”  It is also
not clear why the word “assailant” was used.  It could be
that it was used only to refer to the person who actually
stabbed Sturgis.  Furthermore, the use of the word
“assailant” by the memorandum’s author is not
inconsistent with Rhoden’s trial testimony . . . that Sturgis
said “You have to get Mungin and Demps, they held me
and Jackson stabbed me.”  Consequently, the possibility
that the memorandum would produce an acquittal on
retrial is minimal.  A minimal possibility does not meet the
standard enunciated in Jones and does not provide a basis
for this Court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the
motion before it.
12.  In addition, the Court finds that if the
memorandum had impeachment value as to Rhoden, the
availability of prior consistent statements as well as the
excited utterances made by Sturgis to both Wilson,
Raulerson and possibly others as well as the apparent
availability of eye-witness testimony of Hathaway would
rebut the impeachment value of the memorandum.
13.  Defendant argues that pre-trial possession of
the memorandum would have altered the Defendants’
joint defense strategy and caused Defendant to use a
different strategy.  The Court finds this assertion is not
justified because of the substantial corroborative and
eyewitness testimony available to the state.
. . . .
15.  Defendant argues that the memorandum
constitutes exculpatory material subject to disclosure by
7  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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the State and that he was prejudiced by its suppression. 
For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that,
assuming the memorandum was not disclosed to
Defendant, the memorandum could not reasonably be
taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to
undermine confidence in the verdict.  See Way v. State,
No. SC78640 (Fla. April 20, 2000); Thompson v. State,
Nos. SC87481, SC88321 (Fla. April 13, 2000); State v.
Riechmann, Nos. SC98564, SC93236 (Fla. March 24,
2000).
Our review of the record shows that the trial court properly applied the law
governing this issue and properly concluded that the record affirmatively
demonstrates no entitlement to relief whether the issue is addressed as a newly
discovered evidence claim or a Brady7 claim.
Finally, Demps claims that the Sewell memorandum proves that his death
sentence is disproportionate and that the trial court erred in ruling otherwise.  We
disagree.  The trial court addressed this issue and ruled as follows:
14.  Defendant argues his death sentence was
disproportionate to the life sentences imposed upon the
co-defendants.  The Court finds that this issue is
procedurally barred.  The Florida Supreme Court
determined the issue of proportionality on direct appeal,
Demps v. State, 395 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1981), and nothing
in Defendant’s alleged newly-discovered evidence calls
into question the previous determination of the relative
culpability of Defendant versus his co-defendants.
8  See Philip J. Padovano, Florida Appellate Practice 147 (2nd ed. 1997).
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A trial court’s ruling on a pure question of law is subject to de novo review.8  Our
review of the record shows that the trial court properly applied the law governing
this issue.  We find no error.
We find Demps’ remaining rule 3.850 claims and his petition for mandamus
relief to be without merit.  We affirm the trial court’s order denying Demps’ fourth
rule 3.850 motion, and we deny the petition for writ of mandamus.
It is so ordered.
HARDING, C.J., and SHAW, WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS and
QUINCE, JJ., concur.
NO MOTION FOR REHEARING WILL BE ALLOWED.
Two Cases:
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Bradford County,
Robert Cates, Judge - Case No. 77-116-CFA
and an Original Proceeding - Writ of Mandamus
Bill Salmon and George F. Schaefer, Gainesville, Florida,
for Appellant/Petitioner
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Curtis M. French, Assistant Attorney
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General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellee/Respondents