Title: S. A. M. v. Meister
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2014AP001283
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: April 7, 2016

2016 WI 22 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2014AP1283 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In re the marriage of:  Nancy M. Meister and  
Jay E. Meister: 
 
S. A. M., A. L. M., O. M. M. and J. E. M., 
minors, by their guardian ad litem, Jennifer 
Weber, 
          Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
Nancy M. Meister, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 361 Wis. 2d 286, 862 N.W.2d 619) 
(Ct. App. 2015 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 7, 2016 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 6, 2015 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Jefferson 
 
JUDGE: 
William F. Hue 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J. concurs 
ZIEGLER, J., joined by GABLEMAN, J. concur 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: BRADLEY, R. G., J. did not participate    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the 
appellants-petitioners, there were briefs by 
Jennifer Weber and Zick & Weber Law Offices, LLP, Johnson Creek, 
and oral argument by Jennifer Weber.  
 
 
For the respondent, there was a brief by Andrew R. Griggs, 
Neuberger, Griggs, Sweet & Smith, LLP, Watertown, and oral 
argument by Andrew R. Griggs. 
 
 
 
 
2016 WI 22
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2014AP1283   
(L.C. No. 
2011FA335) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the marriage of:  Nancy M. Meister and 
Jay E. Meister: 
 
 
 
S.A.M., A.L.M., O.M.M. and J.E.M., minors, by 
their guardian ad litem, Jennifer Weber, 
 
          Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Nancy M. Meister, 
 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
APR 7, 2016 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals affirming a circuit 
court order denying a grandmother's motion for visitation 
rights.1 
                                                 
1 S.A.M. v. Meister, No. 2014AP1283, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2015). 
No. 
  2014AP1283 
2 
 
¶2 
The 
case 
requires 
us 
to 
interpret 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 767.43(1) (2013-14),2 which allows certain categories of 
individuals to petition for the right to visit children——usually 
following the dissolution of a marriage.  Under the statute, a 
"grandparent, greatgrandparent, stepparent or person who has 
maintained a relationship similar to a parent-child relationship 
with the child" may file a motion for visitation rights.  We 
must 
determine 
whether 
the 
"parent-child 
relationship" 
requirement applies only to the "person" category listed in the 
statute, 
or 
whether 
it 
applies 
to 
a 
"grandparent, 
greatgrandparent, [and] stepparent" as well. 
¶3 
The case arose after Carol Meister filed a motion for 
the right to visit her four grandchildren in the wake of her son 
Jay Meister's divorce from Nancy Meister.3  A family court 
commissioner for the Jefferson County Circuit Court initially 
granted the motion, but the circuit court denied the motion on 
de novo review.  Reading Wis. Stat. § 767.43(1) as requiring 
every petitioner under this subsection to demonstrate a parent-
child relationship with the child, the circuit court concluded 
that Carol's supportive relationship with the children did not 
elevate her to a parent-like role in their lives. 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 Given that Carol, Jay, and Nancy share a surname, we will 
refer to them by first name throughout the opinion. 
No. 
  2014AP1283 
3 
 
¶4 
The Meister children appealed, and the court of 
appeals affirmed, citing its decision in Rogers v. Rogers, 2007 
WI App 50, 300 Wis. 2d 532, 731 N.W.2d 347, as controlling.  In 
Rogers, the court of appeals stated that grandparents filing a 
motion under Wis. Stat. § 767.43(1) must prove "a parent-like 
relationship" with the child in order to secure visitation 
rights.  Rogers, 300 Wis. 2d 532, ¶11. 
¶5 
Before this court, the Meister children argue that the 
court of appeals misinterpreted Wis. Stat. § 767.43(1) in 
Rogers.  They assert that the phrase "who has maintained a 
relationship similar to a parent-child relationship with the 
child" applies only to a person other than a grandparent, 
greatgrandparent, or stepparent filing a motion for visitation 
under 
the 
subsection. 
 
Nancy 
counters 
that 
reading 
the 
subsection to allow courts to grant visitation rights to 
grandparents, greatgrandparents, and stepparents based solely on 
a best interest of the child determination would intrude on 
parents' fundamental due process rights to direct the care, 
custody, and control of their children. 
¶6 
We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 767.43(1) does not 
require a grandparent, greatgrandparent, or stepparent who files 
a motion for visitation rights under this subsection to prove 
that he or she "has maintained a relationship similar to a 
parent-child relationship with the child."  Rather, the parent-
child relationship element applies only to a "person" seeking 
visitation rights who is not a grandparent, greatgrandparent, or 
stepparent.  Additionally, we conclude that the legislature's 
No. 
  2014AP1283 
4 
 
decision 
to 
allow 
courts 
to 
grant 
visitation 
rights 
to 
grandparents, greatgrandparents, and stepparents when visitation 
is in the best interest of the child does not unconstitutionally 
infringe on parents' constitutional rights because any best 
interest determination must give special weight to a fit 
parent's 
decisions 
regarding 
the 
child's 
best 
interest.  
Consequently, the decision of the court of appeals is reversed. 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶7 
Nancy and Jay Meister married in February 2002.  They 
were divorced in Jefferson County Circuit Court in February 
2013.  Nancy and Jay are parents of four minor children: S.A.M., 
A.L.M., O.M.M., and J.E.M. 
¶8 
By 
the 
terms 
of 
their 
divorce 
judgment 
and 
incorporated marital settlement agreement, Nancy and Jay agreed 
to joint legal custody of their children.  Nancy received 
impasse-breaking authority and primary physical placement, while 
Jay received regular weekday and weekend placement.  In addition 
to the weekly plan, Nancy and Jay agreed to an extensive 
placement 
schedule 
for 
holidays, 
special 
occasions, 
and 
vacations.  The agreement included an approximately equal 
division of major holidays between Nancy and Jay each year; 
Nancy and Jay switch between various holidays in even and odd 
years.  The plan also guaranteed a week of exclusive time with 
the children for each parent during the summer. 
¶9 
In July 2013 the children's paternal grandmother, 
Carol Meister, filed a motion asking that the court establish 
visitation rights for her under Wis. Stat. § 767.43(1) on the 
No. 
  2014AP1283 
5 
 
basis of her grandparent relationship with the children.  Her 
motion indicated that she decided to file the petition in 
response 
to 
changes 
Nancy 
had 
made 
to 
Carol's 
informal 
visitation with them.4  Carol sought six visits per year, the 
right to arrange visits with Jay and Nancy using an online 
family scheduling portal, and the right to regular phone calls 
with the children. 
¶10 After holding a hearing on the motion, a family court 
commissioner5 issued an order in November 2013 granting Carol's 
motion for visitation.  The commissioner read Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.43(1) 
as 
"requir[ing] 
that 
the 
grandparent 
have 
a 
relationship similar to a parent-child relationship" in order to 
secure visitation rights.  However, the commissioner found that 
a relationship similar to a parent-child relationship existed 
between Carol and her grandchildren, and he granted Carol one 
week of placement at her home in Ohio each summer, four three-
day placements in Wisconsin throughout the year, and access to 
the online portal to arrange her visits with Nancy and Jay.6 
                                                 
4 For example, after filing her July 2013 motion for 
visitation rights, Carol wrote an October 2013 letter to the 
family court commissioner alleging that Nancy objected to 
Carol's presence at the children's elementary school when Carol 
attempted to see the children at a September 2013 event that was 
open to the public. 
5 Michael D. Onheiber, Family Court Commissioner. 
6 The family court commissioner's order granting Carol's 
motion 
used 
the 
terms 
"placement" 
and 
"visitation" 
interchangeably.  Recent decisions by the court of appeals have 
examined the extent to which the Wisconsin Statutes contemplate 
a consequential difference between placement and visitation.  
(continued) 
No. 
  2014AP1283 
6 
 
¶11 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 767.17, Nancy requested that 
the circuit court review the commissioner's order.  On review, 
the circuit court7 conducted a hearing to expand the record 
regarding Carol's relationship with her grandchildren.  Carol 
traveled from Ohio to Wisconsin to testify at the hearing.  
Appearing without an attorney, she engaged in an extended 
conversation with the circuit court regarding her relationship 
with the children. 
¶12 Over the course of her testimony, Carol described the 
supportive role she played in her grandchildren's lives.  She 
began by explaining how, drawing on her own experience as a 
teacher, she tutored them in various subjects during a vacation 
to Florida in 2012 and during the children's spring break in 
2013.  As she continued, she mentioned that she frequently 
purchased food and clothing for them when they visited her in 
Ohio and when she visited them in Wisconsin.  She emphasized 
that, even when she was physically distant from the children, 
she played an important consultative role for them and for their 
father, helping the children with homework by phone and 
providing Jay with general parenting advice.  The children 
                                                                                                                                                             
See Rick v. Opichka, 2010 WI App 23, 323 Wis. 2d 510, 780 
N.W.2d 159; 
Lubinski 
v. 
Lubinski, 
2008 
WI 
App 
151, 
314 
Wis. 2d 395, 761 N.W.2d 676.  Because the parties in this case 
have not argued that the order improperly differentiated between 
placement and visitation, this opinion makes no comment on the 
extent of any difference between the two. 
7 William F. Hue, Judge. 
No. 
  2014AP1283 
7 
 
called her "frequently, almost daily sometimes," when staying 
with their father. 
¶13 Given that Carol appeared pro se and that the 
children's guardian ad litem——who supported the commissioner's 
order——was unable to attend the hearing, the circuit court 
helped to guide Carol's testimony by asking multiple questions 
about whether Carol had ever lived with the children.  The 
questions focused on determining whether Carol's was the type of 
case in which "the parents [had] . . . relinquish[ed] their 
parental duties to the grandparent for some prolonged period of 
time and . . . the grandparent then [was] acting as the parent."  
After hearing Carol's testimony, the circuit court expressed 
concern about taking the "extraordinary step" of concluding that 
a parent-child relationship sufficient for visitation existed 
where a grandmother had such a "staggered" relationship with the 
grandchildren.  But, reluctant to reverse the commissioner 
without hearing from an attorney advocating in favor of Carol's 
visitation motion, the circuit court decided to schedule a 
second hearing so that the children's guardian ad litem could 
attend. 
¶14 At the second hearing in January 2014, the guardian ad 
litem argued that, although Carol may not be a primary parent, 
she nevertheless had a relationship with the children similar to 
that of a parent who lived out of state.  Arguing that "[t]he 
statute does not require [Carol] to elevate to the status of 
primary parent," the guardian ad litem observed that "if Mr. 
Meister relocated to the State of Ohio and had that same 
No. 
  2014AP1283 
8 
 
relationship that his mother [had] . . . with the children, he's 
still a parent." 
¶15 After taking the matter under consideration, the 
circuit court issued a May 2014 order denying Carol's motion.  
An accompanying memorandum decision explained that the court 
concluded that Carol was "ineligible for an award of grandparent 
visitation" because she "did not have a relationship similar to 
a parent-child relationship" with her grandchildren. 
¶16 The children, by their guardian ad litem, appealed the 
circuit court's denial of their grandmother's motion.8  Before 
the court of appeals, the children argued that "the circuit 
court applied the wrong legal standard when it required that the 
grandmother, in order to be eligible to receive visitation 
rights, show that she had a relationship similar to a parent-
child 
relationship 
with 
them." 
 
S.A.M. 
v. 
Meister, 
No. 
2014AP1283, unpublished slip op., ¶12 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 5, 
2015). 
¶17 Relying on its previous interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.43(1) 
in 
Rogers 
v. 
Rogers, 
2007 
WI 
App 
50, 
300 
                                                 
8 As noted above, Carol Meister filed the motion for 
visitation under Wis. Stat. § 767.43(1).  She acted pro se.  The 
grandchildren were represented on the motion by the guardian ad 
litem who had represented them from the beginning of the 
divorce.  When Nancy Meister sought de novo review in circuit 
court and prevailed, the guardian ad litem appealed to the court 
of appeals on behalf of the children.  The guardian ad litem 
also sought review in this court on their behalf. 
Standing has not been an issue in this case, and we do not 
see any prudential reason to make it an issue in this opinion. 
No. 
  2014AP1283 
9 
 
Wis. 2d 532, 731 N.W.2d 347, the court of appeals disagreed with 
the children.  Meister, unpublished slip op., ¶15.  In Rogers, 
the court of appeals stated that Wis. Stat. § 767.245 (now 
§ 767.43(1)9) requires, among other things, that "grandparents 
must have a parent-like relationship with the child" in order to 
qualify for visitation rights.  Rogers, 300 Wis. 2d 532, ¶11.  
The court of appeals in the present case treated that language 
from Rogers as "a clear declaration that any person seeking 
visitation rights under Wis. Stat. § 767.43(1) must first show 
that he or she has a relationship similar to a parent-child 
relationship in order to establish that he or she is eligible to 
receive visitation rights."  Meister, unpublished slip op., ¶15 
(emphasis added).  "[B]ound by that declaration" from Rogers, 
id. (citing Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 190, 560 N.W.2d 246 
(1997)), the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
conclusion that Carol had not demonstrated that she maintained a 
relationship with the children similar to a parent-child 
relationship, id., ¶¶21-22. 
¶18 The court of appeals issued its decision on February 
5, 2015.  Shortly afterward, on February 25, 2015, Carol passed 
                                                 
9 Rogers v. Rogers, 2007 WI App 50, 300 Wis. 2d 532, 731 
N.W.2d 347, refers to Wis. Stat. § 767.245, the statute in 
effect at the time the visitation petition was filed.  In 2006 
the legislature renumbered Wis. Stat. § 767.245 as Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.43.  2005 Wis. Act. 443, § 101.   
No. 
  2014AP1283 
10 
 
away.10  The children filed a petition for review on March 2, 
2015, which we granted on June 12, 2015. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶19 This 
case 
requires 
us 
to 
interpret 
Wisconsin's 
grandparent 
visitation 
statute. 
 
"The 
interpretation 
and 
application of a statute are questions of law that we review 
                                                 
10 After the court became aware of Carol's passing, we 
ordered the parties to submit briefs addressing whether the case 
should proceed despite Carol's death.  "Ordinarily, this court, 
like courts in general, will not consider a question the answer 
to which cannot have any practical effect upon an existing 
controversy."  State ex rel. La Crosse Tribune v. Circuit Court 
for La Crosse Cty., 115 Wis. 2d 220, 228, 340 N.W.2d 460 (1983). 
Both Nancy and the Meister children argue that this case 
qualifies for an exception to the general mootness rule.  We 
agree.  This court may decide an otherwise moot issue if the 
issue 
(1) is of great public importance; (2) occurs so 
frequently that a definitive decision is necessary to 
guide circuit courts; (3) is likely to arise again and 
a decision of the court would alleviate uncertainty; 
or (4) will likely be repeated, but evades appellate 
review because the appellate review process cannot be 
completed or even undertaken in time to have a 
practical effect on the parties. 
State v. Morford, 2004 WI 5, ¶7, 268 Wis. 2d 300, 674 
N.W.2d 349; see also La Crosse Tribune, 115 Wis. 2d at 229.  
Because the interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 767.43(1) applies to 
every visitation petition by a grandparent, greatgrandparent, or 
stepparent under this subsection, we conclude that this case 
presents a question of great public importance that will occur 
frequently in the future.  Given the disjuncture between the 
plain language of § 767.43(1) and the Rogers court's treatment 
of that language, a decision from this court resolves any 
uncertainty as to this particular facet of the statute's 
interpretation. 
No. 
  2014AP1283 
11 
 
independently, 'but benefiting from the analyses of the court of 
appeals and the circuit court.'"  Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. 
Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶14, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581 (quoting 
Marder v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 2005 WI 159, 
¶19, 286 Wis. 2d 252, 706 N.W.2d 110). 
III.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Interpreting Wis. Stat. § 767.43(1) 
¶20 We begin our analysis by interpreting Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.43(1). 
 
When 
interpreting 
statutes, 
this 
court 
consistently begins with the statutory language.  State ex rel. 
Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  "Statutory language is given its 
common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or 
specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or 
special definitional meaning."  Id. 
¶21 "Context is important to meaning.  So, too, is the 
structure of the statute in which the operative language 
appears."  Id., ¶46.  Consequently, "statutory language is 
interpreted in the context in which it is used; not in isolation 
but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of 
surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to 
avoid absurd or unreasonable results."  Id.  "It is certainly 
not inconsistent with the plain-meaning rule to consider the 
intrinsic context in which statutory language is used; a plain-
meaning 
interpretation 
cannot 
contravene 
a 
textually 
or 
contextually manifest statutory purpose."  Id., ¶49.  A review 
of the statutory history——meaning "previously enacted and 
No. 
  2014AP1283 
12 
 
repealed statutory provisions"——also can play a helpful role in 
the contextual analysis of a statute's language.  Id., ¶52 n.9.  
Analysis of unambiguous statutory text does not require the 
court to resort to extrinsic sources of meaning such as 
legislative history, "although legislative history is sometimes 
consulted to confirm or verify a plain-meaning interpretation."  
Id., ¶51. 
¶22 Applying this interpretive methodology, we conclude 
that the phrase "who has maintained a relationship similar to a 
parent-child relationship with the child" applies only to an 
otherwise undefined "person" who petitions for visitation rights 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 767.43(1), 
not 
to 
a 
grandparent, 
greatgrandparent, 
or 
stepparent. 
 
A 
grandparent, 
greatgrandparent, or stepparent need not prove a parent-child 
relationship to succeed on a petition for visitation.  By this 
we mean that "maintain[ing] a relationship similar to a parent-
child relationship with the child" is not the sine qua non of a 
visitation petition by a grandparent, greatgrandparent, or 
stepparent under § 767.43(1).  It is, however, the sine qua non 
for a petitioner who is not a grandparent, greatgrandparent, or 
stepparent under § 767.43(1). 
¶23 We acknowledge that subsection (1) is not wholly 
unambiguous.  In other words, reasonable people have read it in 
different 
ways. 
 
Nonetheless, 
we 
confidently 
reach 
the 
conclusion stated above after reviewing the arguments pro and 
con, carefully examining the language of Wis. Stat. § 767.43(1), 
and then reviewing that language in context with surrounding 
No. 
  2014AP1283 
13 
 
language and with the statute's history.  A brief review of the 
statute's legislative history confirms our interpretation. 
¶24 In its current form, the relevant portion of Wis. 
Stat. § 767.43(1) reads as follows: 
[U]pon petition by a grandparent, greatgrandparent, 
stepparent or person who has maintained a relationship 
similar to a parent-child relationship with the child, 
the court may grant reasonable visitation rights to 
that person if the parents have notice of the hearing 
and if the court determines that visitation is in the 
best interest of the child.11 
¶25 The Meister children argue that the court of appeals 
incorrectly applied § 767.43(1) in Rogers, 300 Wis. 2d 532,.  
When discussing the grandparent visitation statute in Rogers, 
the court of appeals made the following declaration: 
The grandparents correctly state that Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.245 requires that three conditions must be 
satisfied before a circuit court may grant visitation: 
(1) the 
grandparents 
must 
have 
a 
parent-like 
relationship with the child, (2) the parents must have 
notice 
of 
the 
hearing, 
and 
(3) the 
court 
must 
determine that grandparent visitation is in the 
child's best interest. 
Rogers, 300 Wis. 2d 532, ¶11.  The court did not support this 
statement with an exercise of formal statutory interpretation.  
It simply agreed with the grandparents in the case, whom the 
                                                 
11 Subsection (1)'s use of the phrase "that person" to refer 
back to any person who files a visitation motion under Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 767.43(1) 
contributes 
to 
the 
ambiguity 
of 
the 
subsection.  However, we view use of that phrase as unfortunate 
drafting rather than an indication of legislative intent because 
of the plethora of other writings by drafters that reveal and 
explain the language of the subsection. 
No. 
  2014AP1283 
14 
 
circuit court found to have had a parent-like relationship with 
the grandchildren.12  Elsewhere in the opinion, the court of 
appeals cited Holtzman v. Knott, 193 Wis. 2d 649, 658, 533 
N.W.2d 419 (1995), which used the same language in a visitation 
case that did not apply that statute. 
¶26 Implicitly, 
under 
Rogers, 
any 
person——whether 
a 
grandparent, greatgrandparent, stepparent, or person having a 
different relationship with the child——must prove the existence 
of a parent-like relationship with the child in order to secure 
visitation rights under Wis. Stat. § 767.43(1).  This would 
likely place an extremely heavy burden on grandparents who 
reside any significant distance from the children.  It would 
disqualify grandparents who because of geography or other 
factors 
have 
been 
prevented 
from 
developing 
a 
close 
relationship. 
¶27 According to the Meister children, the phrase "who has 
maintained a relationship similar to a parent-child relationship 
with the child" should apply only to a "person" other than a 
                                                 
12 The 
grandparents' 
brief 
in 
Rogers 
made 
a 
similar 
statement of the law without providing additional explanation: 
Section 767.245(1), Wisconsin Statutes, provides 
that a grandparent, among others, can petition the 
court for visitation rights where that grandparent has 
maintained a relationship similar to a parent-child 
relationship and the court may grant reasonable 
visitation rights to that person if the parents have 
notice of the hearing and if the court determines that 
the visitation was in the best interests of the child. 
 
No. 
  2014AP1283 
15 
 
grandparent, greatgrandparent, or stepparent seeking visitation 
rights under Wis. Stat. § 767.43(1).  They argue in their 
principal brief that "what the statute seems to ask for is that 
persons who are not grandparents or stepparents prove up a 
relationship similar to the one grandparents and stepparents 
already enjoy by virtue of their biological or legal connection 
to the child."  To evaluate the Meister children's challenge to 
the 
Rogers 
court's 
language, 
we 
conduct 
an 
independent 
assessment of § 767.43(1). 
¶28 The Meister children's focus on relationships has an 
intuitive appeal.  Wisconsin Stat. § 767.43(1) applies to 
grandparents of a child of a married or formerly married couple.  
This means that these grandparents and greatgrandparents have a 
direct family tie to one of the parents of the child.  A 
stepparent, under this subsection, is or was married to one of 
the parents of the child.  On the other hand, the "person" 
category is undefined so that it is hard to anticipate the 
nature of the relationship that the "person" has to the child.  
The "person" could be a sister or brother, but it could also be 
an aunt or uncle, cousin, former foster parent, neighbor, or 
friend. 
 
Requiring 
proof 
of 
a 
significant 
supportive 
relationship from persons in this undefined category makes good 
policy sense.  Requiring the same proof from a grandparent is 
unnatural, and it would clearly make a successful petition for 
visitation much more difficult for some grandparents than for 
others. 
No. 
  2014AP1283 
16 
 
¶29 Our interpretation of the statutory language begins 
with an examination of its syntax.  The Meister children urge us 
to apply the last-antecedent canon of statutory construction, 
under which "qualifying or limiting clauses in a statute are to 
be referred to the next preceding antecedent, unless the context 
or plain meaning dictates otherwise."  Vandervelde v. City of 
Green 
Lake, 
72 
Wis. 2d 210, 
215, 
240 
N.W.2d 
399 
(1976) 
(concluding that a statute's minimum population requirement 
affected towns but not cities where statute applied to "any city 
or village or any town having a population of more than 7,500"); 
see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law 144 
(2012) ("A pronoun, relative pronoun, or demonstrative adjective 
generally 
refers 
to 
the 
nearest 
reasonable 
antecedent." 
(emphasis omitted)); 2A Norman J. Singer & Shambie Singer, 
Statutes and Statutory Construction § 47:33, at 494-97 (7th ed. 
2014) ("Referential and qualifying words and phrases, where no 
contrary intention appears, refer solely to the last antecedent.  
The last antecedent is 'the last word, phrase, or clause that 
can be made an antecedent without impairing the meaning of the 
sentence.'" (footnote omitted)).13 
                                                 
13 Black's Law Dictionary provides a similar definition: "An 
interpretive 
principle 
by 
which 
a 
court 
determines 
that 
qualifying words or phrases modify the words or phrases 
immediately preceding them and not words of phrases more remote, 
unless the extension is necessary from the context or the spirit 
of the entire writing."  Rule of the Last Antecedent, Black's 
Law Dictionary 1532-33 (10th ed. 2014).  As an example, Black's 
explains that, "in the phrase Texas courts, New Mexico courts, 
and New York courts in the federal system, the words in the 
federal system might be held to modify only New York courts and 
(continued) 
No. 
  2014AP1283 
17 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
not Texas courts or New Mexico courts."  Id. 
In his critique of the canons of interpretation, Karl 
Llewellyn 
presented 
the 
rule 
as 
two 
competing 
canons: 
"Qualifying or limiting words or clauses are to be referred to 
the next preceding antecedent," but "[n]ot when evident sense 
and meaning require a different construction."  Karl N. 
Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the 
Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 Vand. 
L. Rev. 395, 405 (1950). 
More recently, Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner examined the 
rule's application in their book Reading Law.  See Scalia & 
Garner 144-46.  Their discussion included contemporary and 
historic examples of the rule's use at the Supreme Court of the 
United States.  Id. (first citing Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 
20, 27-28 (2003); then citing Sim's Lessee v. Irvine, 3 U.S. (3. 
Dall.) 425, 444 n.* (1799)).  For a more recent example of the 
Supreme Court's application of the canon, in which the Court 
quoted from Black's and from Reading Law, see the Court's 
decision on March 1, 2016 in Lockhart v. United States, 136 S. 
Ct. 958 (2016). 
In addition to the Vandervelde case cited in the text 
above, this court also has periodically applied the last-
antecedent rule when interpreting statutes.  See, e.g., Fuller 
v. 
Spieker, 
265 
Wis. 
601, 
603-05, 
62 
N.W.2d 713 
(1954) 
(interpreting county ordinance to place time limit on mandatory 
but not discretionary leave for deputy sheriff where time limit 
language followed mandatory leave requirement); Serv. Inv. Co. 
v. Dorst, 232 Wis. 574, 576-78, 288 N.W. 169 (1939) (applying 
context exception where comma evinced intent for clause to 
modify all preceding clauses in list, rather than only the 
immediately preceding clause); cf. Stoker v. Milwaukee Cty., 
2014 WI 130, ¶¶23-24, 359 Wis. 2d 347, 857 N.W.2d 102 (declining 
to apply last-antecedent canon in order to avoid absurd result). 
Finally, the Legislative Reference Bureau's Wisconsin Bill 
Drafting Manual 2015-2016 (2014) (Bill Drafting Manual) suggests 
drafting with the last antecedent canon in mind.  A section 
providing guidance with regard to word choice and phrasing 
encourages drafters to "modify only the words that you intend to 
modify."  Bill Drafting Manual § 2.01(17m)(a), at 39.  It 
explains that the phrase "'licensees may hunt moose, deer, or 
ducks that are not on the endangered species list' is 
ambiguous." 
 
Id. 
 
After 
suggesting 
alternative 
sentence 
(continued) 
No. 
  2014AP1283 
18 
 
¶30 Here, interpreting Wis. Stat. § 767.43(1) requires us 
to determine whether the pronoun "who" in the qualifying clause 
applies only to a "person" or also applies to grandparents, 
greatgrandparents, and stepparents.  The list "grandparent, 
greatgrandparent, stepparent or person" immediately precedes the 
limiting clause "who has maintained a relationship similar to a 
parent-child relationship with the child."  Applying the last-
antecedent rule to the list limits "who" to the final item in 
the list——"person."  Consequently, reading § 767.43(1) according 
to the last-antecedent canon supports the interpretation that a 
person seeking visitation rights under the subsection needs to 
prove that he or she has a parent-child relationship with the 
child only if the person is not a grandparent, greatgrandparent, 
or stepparent.  We think this is the more natural reading of the 
phrase. 
¶31 Next, we expand the analysis of Wis. Stat. § 767.43 to 
consider 
subsection 
(1) 
in 
context 
with 
subsection 
(3).  
Subsection (3) reads as follows: 
(3) Special Grandparent Visitation Provision.  
The court may grant visitation rights, with respect to 
a child, to a grandparent of the child if the child's 
parents have notice of the hearing and the court 
determines all of the following: 
                                                                                                                                                             
constructions that would avoid ambiguity, the manual cites state 
and federal cases in Wisconsin that interpreted statutes with 
unclear modifiers.  Id. § 2.01(17m)(b)-(d), at 40.  First among 
the cited cases is Vandervelde, which the manual cites for the 
proposition that "qualifying or limiting words in a statute 
generally 
refer 
to 
the 
nearest 
antecedent 
only." 
 
Id. 
§ 2.01(17m)(d), at 40. 
No. 
  2014AP1283 
19 
 
(a) The child is a nonmarital child whose 
parents have not subsequently married each other. 
(b) Except 
as 
provided 
in 
sub. (4), 
the 
paternity of the child has been determined under the 
laws of this state or another jurisdiction if the 
grandparent filing the petition is a parent of the 
child's father. 
(c) The child has not been adopted. 
(d) The 
grandparent 
has 
maintained 
a 
relationship with the child or has attempted to 
maintain a relationship with the child but has been 
prevented from doing so by a parent who has legal 
custody of the child. 
(e) The grandparent is not likely to act in a 
manner that is contrary to decisions that are made by 
a parent who has legal custody of the child and that 
are related to the child's physical, emotional, 
educational or spiritual welfare. 
(f) The visitation is in the best interest of 
the child. 
(Capitalization omitted; emphasis added.)  
¶32 The legislature explicitly included a relationship 
requirement for grandparents in subsection (3) but declined to 
do so in subsection (1).  Under subsection (3), a court may 
grant visitation rights only if it determines, among other 
things, that "[t]he grandparent has maintained a relationship 
with the child or has attempted to maintain a relationship with 
the 
child 
but 
has 
been 
prevented 
from 
doing 
so."  
§ 767.43(3)(d).  Reading subsection (1) as requiring proof of a 
"parent-child relationship" would place a heavier burden on 
grandparents of marital children than subsection (3)'s mere 
"relationship" 
requirement 
for 
grandparents 
of 
non-marital 
children——despite the absence of the type of clear requirement 
No. 
  2014AP1283 
20 
 
that appears in subsection (3).  This suggests that the Rogers 
interpretation of subsection (1) was not correct. 
¶33 A review of the statutory history of Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.43(1) further indicates that the legislature did not 
intend 
to 
require 
grandparents 
to 
prove 
a 
parent-child 
relationship with the child when petitioning for visitation.  An 
earlier version of the grandparent visitation statute provided: 
The 
court 
may 
grant 
reasonable 
visitation 
privileges to a grandparent or greatgrandparent of any 
minor 
child 
upon 
the 
grandparent's 
or 
greatgrandparent's petition to the court with notice 
to the parties if the court determines that it is in 
the best interests and welfare of the child and issue 
any necessary order to enforce the same. 
Wis. Stat. § 767.245(4) (1985-86).  Under this version of the 
statute, only a grandparent or greatgrandparent could petition 
for visitation rights——there was no provision for stepparents or 
other persons——and a grandparent or greatgrandparent petitioner 
did not need to prove the existence of any kind of relationship 
with the child. 
¶34 In 1988 the legislature passed 1987 Wis. Act. 355.  
Section 38 of Act 355 amended the visitation statute to bring it 
closer to its current form.  As amended, the statute read: 
Upon petition by a grandparent, greatgrandparent, 
stepparent or person who has maintained a relationship 
similar to a parent-child relationship with the child, 
the court may grant reasonable visitation rights to 
that person if the parents have notice of the hearing 
and if the court determines that visitation is in the 
best interest of the child. 
Wis. Stat. § 767.245(1) (1987-88).  An inline note, authored by 
the Legislative Council, accompanied section 38 of Act 355 and 
No. 
  2014AP1283 
21 
 
explained that the amendment "[e]xtend[ed] the current law 
permitting the court, upon petition, to grant visitation rights 
to a grandparent or greatgrandparent to: (1) a stepparent; and 
(2) any person who has maintained a relationship similar to a 
parent-child relationship with the child." 
¶35 Taken together, the change to the language of the 
statute and the Legislative Council note provide compelling 
evidence that the legislature intended that the phrase "who has 
maintained a relationship similar to a parent-child relationship 
with the child" should apply only to a "person" petitioning for 
visitation under the statute.  Rather than placing more 
stringent requirements on grandparents and greatgrandparents 
filing motions under the statute, the legislature actually 
expanded the categories of people who might petition for 
visitation in any particular case by allowing stepparents and 
other persons to do so.  The Legislative Council note then 
confirmed the expansive nature of the changes, making clear that 
the phrase "who has maintained a relationship similar to a 
parent-child relationship with the child" attaches only to a 
"person" petitioning for visitation rights while placing no such 
condition on petitions by grandparents, greatgrandparents, and 
stepparents. 
¶36 This characterization of Wis. Stat. § 767.43(1) and 
the accompanying Legislative Council note is consistent with 
this court's previous discussions of the statute's history, 
which have focused on the legislature's gradual expansion of 
visitation rights.  In Holtzman, the court quoted the same note 
No. 
  2014AP1283 
22 
 
and indicated that "[t]he major change in 1988, as explained by 
the Legislative Council's Special Committee notes, was to extend 
the current law."  Holtzman, 193 Wis. 2d at 672 (internal 
quotation mark omitted).  Similarly, our discussion in Sporleder 
v. Hermes, 162 Wis. 2d 1002, 471 N.W.2d 202 (1991), overruled on 
other 
grounds 
by 
Holtzman, 
193 
Wis. 2d 659, 
implicitly 
associated the parent-child relationship requirement only with a 
"person" petitioning for visitation when noting that Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.43(1) had been "amended to include a 'person who has 
maintained a relationship similar to a parent-child relationship 
with the child,' as persons who may petition for visitation 
rights."  Sporleder, 162 Wis. 2d at 1016. 
¶37 Nothing in Act 355's legislative history contradicts 
our reading of § 767.43(1).  A review of the Act's drafting file 
indicates that the language at issue remained consistent with 
its present form throughout the drafting and amendment process.  
Additionally, an Analysis by the Legislative Reference Bureau——
originally appended to a draft at the beginning of the 
legislation but later replaced by the Legislative Council notes 
already 
discussed——confirms 
our 
understanding 
of 
the 
legislature's intended change: 
Under 
current 
law . . . the 
court 
may 
provide 
visitation 
privileges 
to 
a 
grandparent 
or 
greatgrandparent if that is in the child's best 
interest.  Under this bill, the current law permitting 
visitation by grandparents and greatgrandparents is 
extended to apply to stepparents, persons who have 
maintained a relationship similar to a parent-child 
relationship 
with 
the 
child 
and, 
under 
certain 
circumstances, any other person. 
No. 
  2014AP1283 
23 
 
Drafting File for 1987 Wis. Act. 355, 
Analysis by 
the 
Legislative Reference Bureau of 1987 A.B. 205, Legislative 
Reference Bureau, Madison, Wis.  Although this analysis did not 
appear with the final Act, it nevertheless indicates that——
throughout the drafting process——the phrase "who has maintained 
a relationship similar to a parent-child relationship with the 
child" attached only to a person other than a grandparent, 
greatgrandparent, or stepparent. 
¶38 Collectively, these aspects of the context and history 
of Wis. Stat. § 767.43(1) support our reading of its language: 
the phrase "who has maintained a relationship similar to a 
parent-child relationship with the child" applies to a "person" 
seeking visitation but not to a grandparent, greatgrandparent, 
or stepparent. 
¶39 We 
now 
evaluate 
the 
implications 
of 
this 
interpretation for parents' constitutional rights to direct the 
care, custody, and control of their children. 
B.  Wis. Stat. § 767.43(1) Does Not Unconstitutionally Infringe 
on Parents' Due Process Rights 
¶40 In her brief and at oral argument, Nancy argued that 
interpreting 
the 
statute 
not 
to 
require 
grandparents, 
greatgrandparents, and stepparents to prove a parent-child 
relationship when seeking visitation would unconstitutionally 
interfere with parents' rights to raise their children.  Citing 
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), she suggests that "[i]n 
order to respect the constitutionally protected liberty interest 
parents have, there must be a larger barrier to usurping 
No. 
  2014AP1283 
24 
 
parents' control than notice of hearing and a best interest 
inquiry."  We conclude that the court of appeals appropriately 
addressed and resolved this contention in Roger D.H. v. Virginia 
O., 2002 WI App 35, 250 Wis. 2d 747, 641 N.W.2d 440. 
¶41 In Troxel, the Supreme Court of the United States 
reaffirmed that the "Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make 
decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their 
children."  Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66.  The case involved a State 
of Washington statute, which provided, "Any person may petition 
the court for visitation rights at any time including, but not 
limited to, custody proceedings.  The court may order visitation 
rights for any person when visitation may serve the best 
interest of the child whether or not there has been any change 
of circumstances."  Id. at 61 (quoting Wash. Rev. Code 
§ 26.10.160(3) (1994)).  Under that statute, the children's 
paternal grandparents sought an extensive visitation order 
following their son's death, but the children's mother opposed 
the 
request, 
favoring 
short, 
monthly 
visits 
with 
the 
grandparents.  Id. at 60-61.  A state trial court had entered a 
visitation order after concluding that visitation with the 
grandparents would be in the children's best interest.  Id. at 
61-62. 
¶42 A Plurality of the Supreme Court stopped short of 
holding the statute facially unconstitutional but did conclude 
that, 
as 
applied 
by 
the 
Washington 
court, 
the 
statute 
unconstitutionally interfered with the mother's rights to define 
No. 
  2014AP1283 
25 
 
the care, custody, and control of her children.  Id. at 67, 73 
(plurality opinion).  The Plurality explained the important role 
that parents play in defining the best interests of their 
children: 
 
The problem here is not that the Washington 
Superior Court intervened, but that when it did so, it 
gave no special weight at all to [the mother's] 
determination of her daughters' best interests. . . .  
In effect, the judge placed on [the mother], the fit 
custodial parent, the burden of 
disproving 
that 
visitation would be in the best interest of her 
daughters. 
Id. at 69.  In limiting its determination to an as applied 
analysis, the Plurality commented, "Because much state-court 
adjudication in this context occurs on a case-by-case basis, we 
would be hesitant to hold that specific nonparental visitation 
statutes violate the Due Process Clause as a per se matter."  
Id. at 73. 
¶43 Shortly after the Court decided Troxel, Wisconsin's 
court of appeals considered a facial challenge to Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.43(1) in Roger D.H.  A child's mother sought to vacate a 
court-approved stipulation granting visitation rights to the 
child's paternal grandmother.  Roger D.H., 250 Wis. 2d 747, ¶¶4-
5.  She asserted that "Wis. Stat. § 767.245 is facially 
unconstitutional under Troxel because the statute does not 
require that courts give presumptive weight to a fit parent's 
decision regarding non-parental visitation."  Id., ¶13. 
¶44 The court of appeals rejected the facial challenge: 
 
We glean from Troxel two propositions relevant to 
the issue before us.  First, due process requires that 
No. 
  2014AP1283 
26 
 
courts apply a presumption that a fit parent's 
decision regarding non-parental visitation is in the 
best interest of the child.  Second, a state court may 
read this requirement into a non-parental visitation 
statute, even when the statute is silent on the topic. 
 
Accordingly, we hold that when applying Wis. 
Stat. § 767.245(3), circuit courts must apply the 
presumption that a fit parent's decision regarding 
grandparent visitation is in the best interest of the 
child.  At the same time, we observe that this is only 
a presumption and the circuit court is still obligated 
to make its own assessment of the best interest of the 
child.  What the Due Process Clause does not tolerate 
is a court giving no "special weight" to a fit 
parent's 
determination, 
but 
instead 
basing 
its 
decision on "mere disagreement" with the parent. 
Id., ¶¶18-19 (citation omitted). 
¶45 Although Roger D.H. involved the statute now codified 
at Wis. Stat. § 767.43(3), we conclude that the court of 
appeals' reasoning is equally appropriate with regard Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.43(1).  As under subsection (3), a court may grant 
visitation under subsection (1) only if the court determines 
that doing so would be in the child's best interest.  The 
Supreme Court indicated in Troxel that any examination of a 
child's best interest must give special weight to a fit parent's 
own best interest determination.  Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69-70 
("The decisional framework employed by the Superior Court 
directly contravened the traditional presumption that a fit 
parent will act in the best interest of his or her child.  In 
that respect, the court's presumption failed to provide any 
protection for [the mother's] fundamental constitutional right 
to 
make 
decisions 
concerning 
the 
rearing 
of 
her 
own 
daughters.").  Troxel's presumption in favor of a fit parent's 
No. 
  2014AP1283 
27 
 
determination 
would 
apply 
to 
a 
court's 
evaluation 
of 
a 
§ 767.43(1) visitation petition as a part of the best interest 
analysis——and the presumption would apply regardless of whether 
the petitioner proved a parent-child relationship with the 
child. 
¶46 Thus, our holding——that the phrase "who has maintained 
a relationship similar to a parent-child relationship with the 
child" does not apply to a grandparent, greatgrandparent, or 
stepparent petitioning for visitation rights under § 767.43(1)——
does not conflict with parental constitutional rights as set 
forth in Troxel.  Whenever someone brings a visitation petition 
under § 767.43(1)——whether the petitioner is a grandparent, 
greatgrandparent, stepparent, or other person——Troxel requires 
that the deciding court give special weight to a fit parent's 
opinions regarding the child's best interest as part of any best 
interest determination. 
¶47 We think it important to note that while our decision 
eliminates 
one 
unintended 
impediment 
for 
grandparents, 
greatgrandparents, and stepparents who seek visitation rights 
under Wis. Stat. § 767.43(1), it does not guarantee that they 
will 
prevail. 
 
The 
court 
must 
not 
only 
consider 
the 
constitutional rights of the parents but also decide, in its 
sound discretion, whether the facts and circumstances of the 
case warrant granting, modifying, or denying a visitation 
petition in the best interest of the child. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
No. 
  2014AP1283 
28 
 
¶48 Examining Wis. Stat. § 767.43(1) in its present form, 
it is clear that the legislature has gradually expanded the 
number of persons who may petition for visitation rights.  The 
current statute allows grandparents, greatgrandparents, and 
stepparents to petition for visitation rights, and it allows 
other persons to seek visitation as well, so long as they have 
"maintained 
a 
relationship 
similar 
to 
a 
parent-child 
relationship with the child."  Given the legislature's history 
of expanding visitation rights and the fact that any court 
considering 
a 
child's 
best 
interests 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 767.43(1) must give special weight to fit parents' best 
interest 
determinations, 
we 
conclude 
that 
a 
grandparent, 
greatgrandparent, or stepparent need not prove a parent-child 
relationship in order to secure visitation rights under that 
subsection. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
¶49 REBECCA G. BRADLEY, J., did not participate. 
 
 
No.  2014AP1283.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶50 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (concurring).  This is a 
statutory interpretation case.  The statute at issue is Wis. 
Stat. § 767.43(1).  Wisconsin Stat. § 767.43(1) provides that a 
"grandparent, greatgrandparent, stepparent or person who has 
maintained 
a 
relationship 
similar 
to 
a 
parent-child 
relationship" may petition the court to seek visitation rights 
to the child; the court may grant visitation if visitation is in 
the child's best interests.  
 
¶51 In the instant case, Carol Meister, the paternal 
grandmother of four minor children, S.A.M., A.L.M., O.M.M., and 
J.E.M., filed a motion in the children's parents' divorce action 
to establish visitation with the children.   
¶52 The circuit court denied the grandmother's  motion for 
visitation, concluding that the grandmother failed to show a 
"relationship 
similar 
to 
a 
parent-child 
relationship" 
as 
required under the court of appeals' interpretation of Wis. 
Stat. § 767.43(1) in Rogers v. Rogers, 2007 WI App 50, ¶11, 300 
Wis. 2d 532, 731 N.W.2d 347.   
¶53 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
order in an unpublished decision.  It too relied on the Rogers 
v. Rogers case.1  The majority opinion disagrees with the court 
of appeals' interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 767.43(1).    
¶54 I write separately to make two points.   
 
¶55 I.  First, although I happen to agree with this 
court's interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 767.43(1), I conclude 
                                                 
1 S.A.M. v. Meister, No. 2014AP1283, unpublished slip op., 
¶¶13-14 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2015).   
No.  2014AP1283.ssa 
 
2 
 
that this court violates the plain language of § 767.43(1) by 
deciding the instant case.2   
¶56 Wisconsin Stat. § 767.43(1), entitled "Petition, who 
may file" provides (with added emphasis):  
Except as provided in subs. (1m) and (2m), upon 
petition 
by 
a 
grandparent, 
greatgrandparent, 
stepparent or person who has maintained a relationship 
similar to a parent-child relationship with the child, 
the court may grant reasonable visitation rights to 
that person if the parents have notice of the hearing 
and if the court determines that visitation is in the 
best interest of the child.   
¶57 The grandmother did not appeal the circuit court's 
denial of visitation or pursue the review in this court.  The 
guardian ad litem (and the children whom the guardian ad litem 
represents) pursued the appeal and review.   
¶58 Under 
the 
plain 
text 
of 
the 
statute, 
only 
a 
grandparent (or other named individual not relevant in the 
instant case) may seek visitation with a child and a court may 
grant visitation only to these identified persons.  
¶59 Neither the guardian ad litem nor the children argue 
that they fall within the ambit of Wis. Stat. § 767.43(1).  Thus 
the right parties are not before the court.  Accordingly, this 
court does not have any statutory or other basis to consider the 
petition for review filed by a person not identified in the 
                                                 
2 Members of the court do not always agree about the 
methodology to be used in interpreting statutes.  See, e.g., 
Justice Ziegler's concurrence, ¶80 (concluding ¶23 of the 
majority opinion is unnecessary because Wis. Stat. § 767.43(1) 
is unambiguous); see also Anderson v. Aul, 2015 WI 19, 361 
Wis. 2d 63, 862 N.W.2d 304.   
No.  2014AP1283.ssa 
 
3 
 
statute as having the power to seek visitation with the 
children.3        
¶60 II.  Second, I am concerned that the statutory 
interpretation 
set 
forth 
in 
the 
instant 
case 
puts 
the 
constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 767.43(3) in doubt.   
¶61 The burden that Wis. Stat. § 767.43(3) imposes on a 
grandparent seeking visitation rights to children born to 
unmarried parents is significantly greater than the burden 
§ 767.43(1) imposes on a grandparent seeking visitation rights 
to children born to a married couple.   
                                                 
3 This issue might be framed as a question of "standing," 
see majority op., ¶16 n.8, but it is easier to frame and analyze 
the issue as one of statutory interpretation, namely whether the 
children and guardian ad litem may initiate and pursue the 
proceeding under the statute.  The concept of standing has 
numerous dimensions.  Standing and statutory interpretation are 
distinct and should not be conflated.  See Foley-Ciccantelli v. 
Bishop's Grove Condo Ass'n, Inc., 2011 WI 36, ¶¶5, 54, 333 
Wis. 2d 402, 797 N.W.2d 789 ("There is no single longstanding or 
uniform test to determine standing in the case law. . . . The 
essence of the question of standing . . . is . . . whether the 
injured interest of the party whose standing is challenged falls 
within the ambit of the statute or constitutional provision 
involved."); see also William A. Fletcher, The Structure of 
Standing, 98 Yale L.J. 221, 236 (1988) ("'When a plaintiff seeks 
standing on the basis that an interest is protected by statute, 
the question whether that interest is legally protected for 
standing purposes is the same as the question whether plaintiff 
(assuming his or her factual allegations are true) has a claim 
on the merits.'") (quoting Stephen G. Breyer & Richard B. 
Stewart, Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy: Problems, 
Text, and Cases 1094 (2d ed. 1985) (footnote omitted)); 
Wisconsin's Envt'l Decade, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Wis., 69 
Wis. 2d 1, 11, 230 N.W.2d 243 (1975) (describing cases resolved 
"on the notion that the statute relied upon by the person 
seeking review did not give legal recognition to the interest 
asserted" as "rest[ing] upon statutory interpretation rather 
than the law of standing itself.").            
No.  2014AP1283.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶62 Statutory classifications based on the child being a 
nonmarital child are subjected to a heightened level of 
scrutiny.4  A statutory classification based on the status of a 
child as a nonmarital child will be struck down under the Equal 
Protection Clause if the "classification is justified by no 
legitimate state interest, compelling or otherwise."5             
¶63 For the reasons set forth, I write separately.   
I 
¶64 Wisconsin Stat. § 767.43(1), entitled "Petition, who 
may file," states (in relevant part):  "[U]pon petition by a 
grandparent, greatgrandparent, stepparent or person who has 
maintained a relationship similar to a parent-child relationship 
with the child, the court may grant reasonable visitation rights 
to that person if the parents have notice of the hearing and if 
the court determines that visitation is in the best interests of 
the child."  
¶65 In 
the 
instant 
case, 
the 
children's 
paternal 
grandmother, Carol, filed a motion seeking visitation with the 
children.  The grandmother represented herself in the visitation 
proceedings.   
¶66 The children's guardian ad litem agreed with the 
grandmother that visitation was in the children's best interest.  
The circuit court noted that the guardian ad litem "took the 
                                                 
4 Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 7 (1983). 
5 Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175-76 
(1972). 
No.  2014AP1283.ssa 
 
5 
 
laboring oar" in a hearing regarding the grandmother's motion 
for visitation.   
¶67 The grandmother did not, however, appeal from the 
circuit court's order denying her motion for visitation.  Nor 
was the grandmother a party in this court.6  See majority op., 
¶18 n.10.   
¶68 The instant case poses a question raised at oral 
argument but not addressed by the court or the parties' briefs: 
May an individual other than a "grandparent, greatgrandparent, 
stepparent, or person who has maintained a relationship similar 
to a parent-child relationship with the child" initiate and 
pursue an appeal or a review of the circuit court's order 
denying 
visitation 
to 
a 
grandparent 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 767.43(1)?  Simply and more specifically stated, may a 
guardian ad litem for minor children initiate and pursue a 
proceeding in an appellate court regarding a circuit court's 
order denying a grandparent's petition for visitation? 
¶69 Given the statutory limitations on who may bring a 
petition for visitation and to whom a court may grant 
visitation, I conclude that the guardian ad litem cannot 
                                                 
6 Indeed, the grandmother passed away before the petition 
for review was filed in this court.  The grandmother's death was 
brought to the court's attention by a letter.  Contrary to the 
practices and procedures of this court, one justice and a 
commissioner, without a vote of the court, unilaterally ordered 
supplemental briefing regarding whether the case was moot.  The 
issue in the present case is not one of mootness.  The issue is 
whether an appeal or review initiated and pursued by a guardian 
ad litem representing the children falls within the purview of 
Wis. Stat. § 767.43(1).  See majority op., ¶16 n.8. 
No.  2014AP1283.ssa 
 
6 
 
initiate and pursue proceedings in an appellate court seeking 
review of a circuit court's order denying a grandparent's 
petition for visitation.   
¶70 The children and their guardian ad litem are not 
within the ambit of Wis. Stat. § 767.43(1).  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 767.43(1) 
limits 
the 
right 
to 
petition 
the 
court 
for 
visitation to identified individuals; the statute does not 
identify children or their guardian ad litem as petitioners.  
The right parties are not before the court.     
II 
¶71 Given this court's interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.43(1), I question whether the statutory interpretation set 
forth in the instant case puts the constitutionality of Wis. 
Stat. § 767.43(3) in doubt.   
 
¶72 Wisconsin Stat. § 767.43(1), entitled "Petition, who 
may file," provides (with added emphasis):  
Except as provided in subs. (1m) and (2m), upon 
petition 
by 
a 
grandparent, 
greatgrandparent, 
stepparent or person who has maintained a relationship 
similar to a parent-child relationship with the child, 
the court may grant reasonable visitation rights to 
that person if the parents have notice of the hearing 
and if the court determines that visitation is in the 
best interest of the child.  
¶73 The court interprets Wis. Stat. § 767.43(1) to mean 
that a grandparent need not demonstrate a relationship with the 
child to be granted visitation.7  In other words, Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.43(1), as interpreted in the instant case, allows a 
                                                 
7 See majority op., ¶6.   
No.  2014AP1283.ssa 
 
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"grandparent" to obtain visitation based solely on the best 
interests of the child.8   
¶74 In contrast, Wis. Stat. § 767.43(3), entitled "Special 
grandparent visitation provision," requires a grandparent of a 
child born to unmarried parents to demonstrate a relationship 
with the child or efforts to maintain such a relationship.   
¶75 Wisconsin Stat. § 767.43(3) provides:  
The court may grant reasonable visitation rights, with 
respect to a child, to a grandparent of a child if the 
child's parents have notice of the hearing and the 
court determines all of the following:  
(a) The child is a nonmarital child whose parents have 
not subsequently married each other. 
(b) Except as provided in sub. (4), the paternity of 
the child has been determined under the laws of 
this 
state 
or 
another 
jurisdiction 
if 
the 
grandparent filing the petition is a parent of 
the child's father. 
(c) The child has not been adopted. 
(d) The grandparent has maintained a relationship 
with the child or has attempted to maintain a 
relationship 
with 
the 
child 
but 
has 
been 
prevented from doing so by a parent who has legal 
custody of the child. 
(e) The grandparent is not likely to act in a manner 
that is contrary to decisions that are made by a 
parent who has legal custody of the child and 
that 
are 
related 
to 
the 
child's 
physical, 
emotional, educational or spiritual welfare. 
(f) The visitation is in the best interest of the 
child.9 
                                                 
8 See majority op., ¶6.   
No.  2014AP1283.ssa 
 
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¶76 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 767.43(3), 
the 
"[s]pecial 
grandparent visitation provision" pertaining to a nonmarital 
child, allows a grandparent to obtain visitation if the 
grandparent demonstrates, among other things, that (1) "[t]he 
grandparent has maintained a relationship with the child or has 
attempted to maintain a relationship with the child but has been 
prevented from doing so by a parent who has legal custody of the 
child;" (2) "[t]he grandparent is not likely to act in a manner 
that is contrary to decisions that are made by a parent who has 
legal custody of the child and that are related to the child's 
physical, emotional, educational, or spiritual welfare;" and (3) 
visitation is in the best interest of the child. 
 
¶77 Statutory classifications based on the child being a 
nonmarital child are subjected to a heightened level of 
scrutiny.10  A statutory classification based on the status of a 
child as a nonmarital child will be struck down under the Equal 
Protection Clause if the "classification is justified by no 
legitimate state interest, compelling or otherwise."11   
 
¶78 What legitimate state interest is served by Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.43(3) 
imposing 
a 
substantially 
higher 
burden 
on 
a 
grandparent seeking visitation based solely on the child's 
parents' marital status?     
                                                                                                                                                             
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 767.43(3) applies to a grandparent 
requesting visitation whenever sub. (a) to (c) apply to the 
child.  See Wis. Stat. § 767.43(2m). 
10 Pickett, 462 U.S. at 7. 
11 Weber, 406 U.S. at 175-76. 
No.  2014AP1283.ssa 
 
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¶79 For the reasons set forth, I concur and write 
separately. 
 
 
No.  2014AP1283.akz 
 
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¶80 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring).  I join 
all but ¶23 of the opinion of the court.  In my view, the plain 
text of Wis. Stat. § 767.43(1) is unambiguous.  The court's 
further analysis of § 767.43(1) simply confirms that the obvious 
interpretation of the statute is the correct one.  See, e.g., 
Hirschhorn v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2012 WI 20, ¶¶34-36, 338 
Wis. 2d 761, 809 N.W.2d 529 (using canons of construction to 
confirm, but not displace, the plain meaning of an unambiguous 
term); Anderson v. Aul, 2015 WI 19, ¶¶111, 114, 361 Wis. 2d 63, 
862 N.W.2d 304 (Ziegler, J., concurring) (analysis of statutory 
history and consideration of absurd results can be used to 
confirm an unambiguous statute's plain meaning); Noffke ex rel. 
Swenson v. Bakke, 2009 WI 10, ¶18, 315 Wis. 2d 350, 760 
N.W.2d 156 (noting that reliance on a dictionary does not render 
a word or phrase ambiguous).1 
¶81 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
¶82 I am authorized to state that Justice MICHAEL J. 
GABLEMAN joins this opinion. 
 
                                                 
1 I write this footnote to briefly confirm that the 
methodology 
applied 
by 
Justice 
Prosser 
comports 
with 
longstanding precedent as stated in State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110. 
No.  2014AP1283.akz 
 
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