Title: The Florida Bar v. Shelley Goldman Maurice
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC04-700
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: April 12, 2007

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC04-700 
____________ 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR,  
Complainant, 
 
vs. 
 
SHELLEY GOLDMAN MAURICE,  
Respondent. 
 
[April 12, 2007] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
We review a referee's report regarding alleged ethical breaches by Shelley 
Goldman Maurice.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.  We 
approve the referee’s findings of fact and conclusions as to guilt.  We disapprove 
the recommended discipline of a two-year suspension and impose in its stead a 
ninety-day suspension. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
 
The Florida Bar filed a one-count complaint against Maurice, alleging that 
Maurice engaged in unethical conduct in administering a probate estate.  Maurice 
admitted several of the factual allegations of the complaint, denied others, and 
denied violating any of the rules with which she was charged.  After a hearing, the 
referee filed his report with the Court.  The referee found that Maurice prepared a 
quitclaim deed for a client, Helen Spelker, in November 1998, which transferred 
ownership of her condominium to her son, Gerard Spelker, and her grandson, 
William Spelker, but reserved to Helen Spelker a life estate in the condominium.  
The quitclaim deed was duly recorded in the public record, making Gerard and 
William Spelker vested remaindermen.   
 
Several months later, in August 1999, Maurice prepared a new will for 
Helen Spelker.  The will purported to bequeath the condominium and the rest of 
her belongings to Gerard and William Spelker, and to William’s mother, Pamela 
Spelker, to be divided equally among them.  The will also required the heirs to sell 
the condominium to Arthur Oliveri (Oliveri), Helen Spelker’s neighbor and 
caretaker, for not less than $38,000.   
 
Helen Spelker died in April 2001, without revoking the quitclaim deed to the 
condominium.  The bulk of her estate was exempt or transferred upon her death, 
making the opening of an estate unnecessary.  The heirs hired Maurice to probate 
the estate and to handle the proper disposition of the property.  Without advising 
the heirs of the quitclaim deed making Gerard and William Spelker the full owners 
of the condominium upon Helen Spelker’s death or that no estate was necessary, 
Maurice opened formal estate proceedings.  Maurice’s judgment regarding the 
 
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necessity of an estate was clouded by her expressed concern for Helen Spelker’s 
caretakers.   
 
Maurice further advised the heirs that a trust should be created for William 
Spelker, who was a minor, so that proceeds from the sale of the condominium 
could be placed in trust.  The provision in the will requiring the heirs to establish a 
trust also named Maurice as trustee.  Maurice’s actions created a conflict of 
interest between herself and the heirs and delayed the sale of the condominium. 
 
 
The referee concluded that Maurice violated Rules Regulating the Florida 
Bar 4-1.1 (failing to provide competent representation to a client), 4-1.3 (failing to 
act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client), 4-1.4(a) 
(failing to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and to 
promptly comply with reasonable requests for information), 4-1.7(b) (representing 
a client when the lawyer’s exercise of independent professional judgment may be 
materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, to a third 
person, or the lawyer’s own interest), and 4-3.2 (failing to make reasonable efforts 
to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client).  These violations 
were alleged in the Bar’s complaint.  In addition, the referee found Maurice 
violated rule 4-8.4(a) (violating or attempting to violate the Rules of Professional 
Conduct).   
 
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The referee did not make any findings as to whether Maurice violated 
several rules with which she had been charged, specifically rules 4-1.4(b) (failing 
to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make 
informed decisions), 4-1.5(a) (entering into an agreement for, charging, or 
collecting an illegal, prohibited, or clearly excessive fee), 4-8.4(c) (engaging in 
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and 4-8.4(d) 
(engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice).  In effect, 
this is a finding that the Bar failed to present clear and convincing evidence that 
Maurice violated these rules. 
 
With regard to discipline, the referee found two aggravating factors:  (1) 
vulnerability of the victim and (2) substantial experience in the practice of law.  
The referee found the sole mitigating factor of absence of a prior disciplinary 
record.  The referee recommended a two-year suspension, proof of completion of 
continuing legal education (CLE) programs entitled Practicing with 
Professionalism, Basic Probate and Guardianship, and Ethics Seminar, and 
reimbursement of the Bar’s costs.   
 
Maurice challenges several of the referee’s factual findings, conclusions of 
guilt, and the recommendation of a two-year suspension.   
Factual Findings 
 
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Maurice takes issue with the referee’s finding that she opened probate 
proceedings when it was unnecessary to do so, that she misrepresented to the heirs 
the need to open probate proceedings, and that she caused a delay in the closing for 
the sale of the condominium owned by Gerard and William.  She argues that the 
Bar failed to prove intent and that the record fails to establish intent. 
 
The party contending that the referee’s findings of fact are erroneous carries 
the burden of demonstrating that there is no evidence in the record to support those 
findings.  Fla. Bar v. Carlon, 820 So. 2d 891, 898 (Fla. 2002).  Maurice testified 
that she prepared a quitclaim deed for Helen Spelker before she prepared Helen 
Spelker’s will.  The quitclaim deed, which was introduced into evidence, 
transferred ownership of the condominium to Gerard and William Spelker.  
 
Maurice testified that Helen Spelker wanted Gerard and William Spelker to 
have her condominium and did not want her other son or her daughter to have it or 
anything else.  The quitclaim deed was prepared and filed to transfer ownership of 
the condominium.  The quitclaim deed passed remainder interests in the 
condominium to Gerard and William Spelker when it was completed. 
 
When Helen Spelker died, her life estate ended and Gerard and William 
Spelker became full owners of the condominium.  Not only was there no need for 
the condominium to be passed through the estate, passing it through the estate was 
a nullity.  It was no longer Helen Spelker’s condominium to bequeath.  Because 
 
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Maurice prepared the quitclaim deed and knew the deed had been recorded and 
never changed before Helen Spelker’s death, she knew it was not an estate asset.   
 
Maurice’s justification for treating the condominium as an estate asset was 
that she wanted to ensure the disinherited children could not challenge Gerard and 
William Spelker’s ownership of the condominium.  Maurice testified as follows: 
The condominium went through the estate process for protection of 
creditors because we wanted to make sure that –– There were two 
family members that were rather irate that they had not been in the 
estate, so we were attempting to protect the condominium as 
homestead property. 
 
And then there was –– and the will directs that the 
condominium, except for real estate which is presently put in 
convenience the name of myself and my son, Eric Spelker and 
William Spelker, everything else would go by rights of survivorship.1 
 
And the bills for the estate which were to be paid out of the sale 
of the proceeds of the property. . .  (inaudible). 
 
So it was our duty to make sure that it went through the estate 
so it could be sold and protected from claims of creditors. 
 
 
It is clear that the referee did not accept this explanation.  A referee’s 
assessment of a witness’s credibility is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  Fla. Bar 
v. Charnock, 661 So. 2d 1207, 1209 (Fla. 1995).  
 
At least two other possible reasons exist for Maurice to open probate and 
treat the condominium as an estate asset–– (1) to earn fees as the estate’s 
administrator; or (2) to ensure that Oliveri would be given the right of first refusal 
to buy the condominium from the new owners, Gerard and William Spelker.  The 
                                          
 
 
1.  Eric is Gerard Spelker’s middle name. 
 
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referee did not find that Maurice opened probate to generate fees.  Nor did he find 
that Maurice violated rule 4-1.5(a) (prohibiting an attorney from entering into an 
agreement for, charging, or collecting an illegal, prohibited, or clearly excessive 
fee).  
 
The second possible motive, to ensure that Oliveri was given the right of 
first refusal, is supported by the findings.  The referee found that Maurice’s 
judgment about the need for an estate “was clouded by her expressed concern for 
Helen Spelker’s caretakers” and that her opening an estate placed her “in conflict 
with the heirs of the estate who sought her counsel after Helen Spelker passed.”  
He concluded her conduct had violated rule 4-1.7(b) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
representing a client when the lawyer’s exercise of independent professional 
judgment may be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another 
client, a third person, or by the lawyer’s own interest).  
 
Here, there were two possible inferences to be drawn about Maurice’s 
motives for opening an estate and including the condominium as an estate asset 
when she knew the condominium already belonged to Gerard and William Spelker.  
Either one would have resulted in the violation of at least one of the rules charged.  
The referee obviously rejected one inference, but found the other.  In addition, 
Maurice’s own testimony that she was trying to ensure that Oliveri was given the 
 
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opportunity to buy the condominium supports the referee’s conclusion that her 
desire conflicted with her duties toward the heirs under the will. 
 
We conclude that competent, substantial evidence supports the referee’s 
findings.   
Conclusions of Guilt 
 
Maurice also challenges the referee’s conclusions that she violated rules 4-
1.1 (competent representation) and 4-1.8 (representing a client with a conflict of 
interest).  “A referee’s findings of fact regarding guilt carry a presumption of 
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the 
record.”  Fla. Bar v. Brown, 905 So. 2d 76, 80 (Fla. 2005) (quoting Fla. Bar v. 
Wohl, 842 So. 2d 811, 814 (Fla. 2003)).  “Absent a showing that the referee’s 
findings are clearly erroneous or lacking in evidentiary support, this Court is 
precluded from reweighing the evidence and substituting its judgment for that of 
the referee.”  Fla. Bar v. Wohl, 842 So. 2d 811, 814 (Fla. 2003) (quoting Fla. Bar 
v. Sweeney, 730 So. 2d 1269, 1271 (Fla. 1998)).  
 
The referee found that Maurice violated rules 4-1.1, 4-1.3, 4-1.4(a), 4-1.7, 4-
3.2, and 4-8.4(a).  Significantly, Maurice was neither charged with violating nor 
did the referee conclude that she violated rule 4-1.8.  Maurice may have meant to 
contest the referee’s conclusion that she violated rule 4-1.7. 
 
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The evidence and factual findings support the referee’s conclusion that 
Maurice violated rules 4-1.1 and 4-1.7(b).  Maurice’s belief that the condominium 
could be treated as an estate asset although it had previously been deeded to Gerard 
and William Spelker is sufficient to establish a violation of rule 4-1.1.  See 
generally Fla. Bar v. Batista, 846 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 2003) (holding that an attorney 
violated the competence rule by failing to determine the probable outcome in his 
clients’ cases within a reasonable time and failing to communicate the 
unavailability of a result to his clients).  The referee found that probate proceedings 
were unnecessary, as most of Helen Spelker’s property was either exempt or 
transferred upon her death.  Maurice failed to explain this to the heirs.  Maurice 
opened an estate in an attempt to ensure that Oliveri was given the opportunity to 
purchase the condominium from Gerard and William Spelker.  She did not tell 
Pamela Spelker or her attorney that the ownership of the condominium had been 
transferred to Gerard and William in November 1998 and she did not provide a 
copy of the quitclaim deed she had prepared.  The referee found that Maurice’s 
judgment regarding the necessity of an estate was clouded by her expressed 
concern for Helen Spelker’s caretakers, one of whom was Oliveri.  These actions 
establish a violation of rule 4-1.7(b) in that her desire to ensure that Gerard and 
William Spelker gave Oliveri a chance to purchase the condominium conflicted 
with her duty to her clients, Helen Spelker’s heirs.   
 
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Maurice has failed to meet her burden of proving that the referee’s 
conclusions that she violated rules 4-1.1 and 4-1.7(b) are clearly erroneous or 
lacking in evidentiary support.  Accordingly, we approve the referee’s conclusions 
of guilt. 
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors 
 
Maurice argues that the referee failed to find several mitigating factors, 
including: (1) no prior disciplinary history;2 (2) Maurice is a self-starter who put 
herself through law school while working at a law firm and set up her own practice 
two years after law school; (3) the complaining party did not pay any money to 
Maurice and did not lose any during the course of Maurice’s representation; (4) she 
paid the Bar’s costs within two weeks of the referee’s decision; (5) she completed 
all required CLE credits during her reporting cycle and has never been in violation 
of the CLE requirements; (6) she has always taken more CLE than necessary; (7) 
she has conducted a seminar on real estate transactions; and (8) she is a 
chairperson and has been a chairperson of the local bar association’s real estate 
committee for the past four years.  According to Maurice, the referee also failed to 
consider the mitigating factor that Maurice made a timely good-faith effort to make 
restitution or to rectify the consequences and there was no monetary loss to the 
complaining parties. 
                                          
 
 
2.  Despite Maurice’s argument, the referee did find this mitigating factor. 
 
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The Bar asserts that there is no basis in standard 9.3 of the Florida Standards 
for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions for the additional mitigating factors that Maurice 
claims exist and that the referee correctly found that the only mitigating factor 
extant here is the fact that Maurice has no prior disciplinary record.   
 
A referee’s findings of mitigation and aggravation, like other factual 
findings, carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly 
erroneous or without support in the record.  Fla. Bar v. Arcia, 848 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 
2003).   
 
Some of the factors Maurice identifies could possibly relate to the mitigating 
factors identified in standard 9.3, as follows:  (1) the absence of a dishonest or 
selfish motive (the complaining party did not pay any money to Maurice and did 
not lose any during the course of Maurice’s representation); (2) a timely good-faith 
effort to make restitution or to rectify the consequences of misconduct (she paid 
the Bar’s costs within two weeks of the referee’s decision; she completed all 
required CLE credits during her reporting cycle and has never been in violation of 
the CLE requirements); or (3) character or reputation (Maurice is a self-starter who 
put herself through law school while working at a law firm and set up her own 
practice two years after law school; she has always taken more CLE than 
necessary; she has conducted a seminar on real estate transactions; and she is a 
 
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chairperson and has been a chairperson of the local bar association’s real estate 
committee for the past four years).   
 
Maurice does not expressly tie these facts to any of the mitigating factors.  
Even if these “facts” are interpreted as relating to the mitigating factors identified 
above, Maurice has failed to demonstrate that the referee’s failure to find that these 
mitigating factors applied in this case was clearly erroneous or without support in 
the record.  We therefore approve the referee’s findings regarding aggravating and 
mitigating factors. 
Recommended Sanction 
 
The referee recommended a two-year suspension, various courses of 
continuing legal education offered by the Bar, and payment of the Bar’s costs.  
Maurice argues that the recommendation of a two-year suspension is not supported 
by caselaw or the standards.  We agree and disapprove that recommendation.   
 
The Court’s scope of review in reviewing a referee’s recommendation of 
discipline is broader than that afforded to the referee’s findings of fact because it is 
ultimately the Court’s responsibility to order the appropriate sanction.  Fla. Bar v. 
Miller, 863 So. 2d 231, 235 (Fla. 2003); Fla. Bar v. Anderson, 538 So. 2d 852, 854 
(Fla. 1989); see also art. V,  ' 15, Fla. Const.  Generally, however, we will not 
second-guess the referee’s recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable 
basis in existing caselaw and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
 
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Sanctions.  Fla. Bar v. Brown, 905 So. 2d 76, 83-84 (Fla. 2005); Fla. Bar v. 
Temmer, 753 So. 2d  555, 558 (Fla. 1999). 
 
The referee cited no standards to support his recommendation of a 
suspension in this case, but some standards do apply.  See  Fla. Stds. Imposing 
Law. Sancs. 4.12 (suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knows or should know 
that he is dealing improperly with client property and causes injury or potential 
injury); 4.42 (suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knowingly fails to perform 
services for a client and causes injury or potential injury or when a lawyer engages 
in a pattern of neglect with respect to client matters and causes serious or 
potentially serious injury); 4.52 (suspension is appropriate when a lawyer engages 
in an area of practice in which the lawyer knowingly lacks competence, and causes 
injury or potential injury to a client); 4.62 (suspension is appropriate when a 
lawyer knowingly deceives a client and causes injury or potential injury). 
 
As the standards do not suggest the appropriate length of a suspension, the 
Court examines caselaw to determine whether the referee’s recommendation of a 
two-year suspension has a reasonable basis.  The referee did not cite to any cases 
in support of his recommendation.  The cases cited by the Bar in its brief, Florida 
Bar v. Cimbler, 840 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 2002); Florida Bar v. Jordan, 705 So. 2d 1387 
(Fla. 1998); and Florida Bar v. Theed, 246 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1971), support 
 
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suspension as the appropriate sanction, but also demonstrate that a two-year 
suspension is too harsh.   
 
In Cimbler, we suspended an attorney for one year, followed by three years’ 
probation, for neglecting to perform post-closing activities for a real estate 
transaction, failing to attend a hearing in a suit for specific performance, failing to 
notify his clients of their depositions, and other instances of neglect in three 
different cases.  The referee found three aggravating factors:  prior discipline for 
similar misconduct (ninety-day suspension and three years’ probation); multiple 
offenses; and indifference to restitution as to a specific client.  The referee found 
six mitigating factors:  timely and good-faith efforts to make restitution or to 
rectify the consequences of her misconduct; full and free disclosure in the 
disciplinary proceedings; reputation for good character; physical or mental 
disability; interim rehabilitation; and remorse. 
 
In Jordan, we suspended the attorney for one year for failing to file an 
amended complaint within the twenty-day deadline in a civil suit; failing to return 
numerous phone calls from his co-counsel and his client; failing to respond to a 
show cause order from the trial court as to why the suit should not be dismissed for 
lack of prosecution, which resulted in the suit’s dismissal; failing to advise his co-
counsel or his client of the suit’s dismissal; failing to seek reinstatement of the suit; 
and failing to advise his client to seek independent legal representation before 
 
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attempting to negotiate with her to privately settle any claim she might have had 
against him for legal malpractice.  The attorney had been previously disciplined 
four times, the fourth resulting in a ninety-one-day suspension.  The last three of 
the four prior discipline cases resulted from similar misconduct. 
 
In Theed, we suspended an attorney for one year for improperly handling the 
assets of an estate, including using estate funds for his own personal use; failing to 
administer the estate properly; failing to account to the parties whom he 
represented, ignoring their request for information, ignoring the request of their 
attorney, and failing to act properly in all respects as an attorney and executor.  The 
attorney had repaid the estate, before the imposition of discipline, for the estate 
funds he had used. 
 
The misconduct of the attorneys in these three cases was similar, but more 
egregious than Maurice’s.  Maurice has been a member of the Bar for over two 
decades and has no prior discipline.  Maurice’s actions resulted in the heirs and 
true owners of the condominium having to wait several months to obtain what was 
rightfully theirs, but she did not profit from it.3  Rather, she seems to have been 
motivated by a genuine but misguided desire to fulfill what she believed were 
Helen Spelker’s true wishes for the disposition of her property.  According to her 
                                          
 
 
3.  The Bar’s complaint alleged Maurice violated rule 4-1.5(a) (entering into 
an agreement for, charging, or collecting an illegal, prohibited, or clearly excessive 
fee), but the referee did not find a rule 4-1.5(a) violation. 
 
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brief, she has already reimbursed the Bar for its costs and has already taken the 
CLE courses recommended by the referee. 
 
Accordingly, based on the caselaw discussed above imposing one-year 
suspensions for more egregious misconduct of a repetitive nature, we conclude that 
the two-year suspension recommended by the referee is not reasonably supported 
by the caselaw.  We disapprove that recommendation and instead suspend Maurice 
for ninety days.  The other conditions recommended by the referee are approved.   
Conclusion 
Based on the foregoing, we approve the referee’s factual findings and 
conclusions as to guilt, but disapprove the referee’s recommended sanction of a 
two-year suspension.  We approve the other recommended conditions concerning 
continuing legal education and reimbursement of the Bar’s costs. 
Shelley Goldman Maurice is hereby suspended from the practice of law for 
ninety days.  The suspension will be effective thirty days from the filing of this 
opinion so that Maurice can close out her practice and protect the interests of 
existing clients.  If Maurice notifies this Court in writing that she is no longer 
practicing and does not need the thirty days to protect existing clients, this Court 
will enter an order making the suspension effective immediately.  Maurice shall 
accept no new business from the date this opinion is filed until her suspension is 
completed.   
 
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Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson Street, 
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from Shelley Goldman 
Maurice in the amount of $1,399.00, for which sum let execution issue. 
 
It is so ordered. 
WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur. 
LEWIS, C.J., concurs in result only. 
 
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS SUSPENSION. 
 
Original Proceeding - The Florida Bar 
 
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director and Kenneth L. Marvin, Director of 
Lawyer Regulation, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida, and Alan Anthony 
Pascal, Bar Counsel, The Florida Bar, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
 
for Complainant 
 
Shelley Goldman Maurice, pro se, Boynton Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent 
 
 
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