Title: Short Pump Town Center v. Hahn
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 010456
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: November 2, 2001

Present: Carrico, C.J., Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser,and 
Lemons, JJ., and Poff, S.J. 
 
SHORT PUMP TOWN CENTER COMMUNITY 
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, ET AL. 
 
v.  Record No. 010456  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   November 2, 2001 
ARLIE A. HAHN, JR., ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY 
Randall G. Johnson, Judge Designate 
 
In this action, the circuit court invalidated a bond 
issuance approved by the Short Pump Community Development 
Authority (“CDA”) for the purpose of financing certain 
infrastructure improvements in conjunction with the 
development of a retail shopping mall to be known as the 
Short Pump Town Center (“the Center”).  Because we conclude 
that the CDA is not an entity authorized to bring this bond 
validation action under the Public Finance Act of 1991, 
Code §§ 15.2-2600 through –2663, we will vacate the 
judgment of the circuit court and dismiss the action. 
FACTS AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS 
 
The Center is a proposed “[h]igh-end, upscale” 
pedestrian shopping mall that, according to its plans, will 
contain more than 1.1 million square feet and will be 
anchored by four major department stores.  It is to be 
located on approximately 147 acres of real estate in 
Henrico County and developed by Short Pump Town Center LLC 
(“the Developer”).  The Center’s location is approximately 
five miles “straight-line distance” from the Regency Square 
Mall, also situated in Henrico County. 
In July 2000, the owners of the 147 acres petitioned 
the Henrico County Board of Supervisors (the “Board”), 
pursuant to the provisions of Article 6 of the Virginia 
Water and Waste Authorities Act (“WWAA”), Code §§ 15.2-5100 
through –5158, to create the CDA.  The stated purpose of 
the petition was to seek financing and the construction of 
certain infrastructure improvements to facilitate the 
development of the Center. 
Upon considering the petition, the Board passed a 
resolution creating the CDA “as a body corporate and 
politic” for the purpose of “financing, constructing and 
developing, and owning and maintaining if necessary, 
certain improvements in connection with the development” of 
the Center.  Those improvements, as listed in the petition, 
are the extension of a sewer trunk line and water main 
line, storm water management facilities, a left turn lane 
and traffic signal on roads abutting the CDA, a ring road 
around the Center, entrance roads, lighting, landscaping, a 
plaza, parking, excavation related to the improvements, 
 
2
soft costs, and contingencies.1  In its resolution, the 
Board declared that the creation of the CDA “will benefit 
the citizens of the County by promoting increased 
employment opportunities, a strengthened economic base and 
increased tax revenues and additional retail opportunities 
not currently available in the local area” and that the 
development “will have limited requirements” for the 
services of Henrico County. 
 
On October 20, 2000, the CDA authorized the issuance 
of special assessment bonds to finance the requested 
infrastructure improvements.  In the same resolution, the 
CDA agreed to enter into two other agreements with regard 
to issuing the bonds and providing financial incentives to 
the Developer.  One agreement was a Memorandum of 
Understanding between the CDA, the Developer, the 
landowners, and the Board.  The second was an Economic 
Development Agreement between the Economic Development 
Authority of Henrico County (EDA),2 the Board, the CDA, and 
                     
1 In the past, commercial developers in Henrico County 
were required by county zoning ordinances to provide, at 
their own expense, the parking, lighting, landscaping, 
entrance roads, sidewalks, and pedestrian areas that were 
associated with a development. 
 
2 Pursuant to Code § 15.2-4903(C), the name of the 
industrial development authority in Henrico County is the 
Economic Development Authority of Henrico County. 
 
 
3
the Developer.  Together these agreements provide that the 
CDA will issue bonds in an amount sufficient to pay a 
portion of the costs of the infrastructure improvements, 
not to exceed 22 million dollars; plus an amount sufficient 
to pay a portion of the costs of issuing the bonds, the 
costs of establishing a reserve fund, and the capitalized 
interest for a period not to exceed twelve months.  The 
bonds will be repaid in approximately five years by special 
assessments on the properties within the CDA district.3  The 
Developer is required to pay semi-annual installment 
payments on the special assessments to the Board, which 
will then pay those amounts to the CDA for debt service on 
the bonds.4
 
Pursuant to these two agreements, the Board will also 
make semi-annual appropriations to the EDA from the 
county’s tax revenues in amounts equal to the special 
assessments paid by the Developer.  These payments are 
financial incentives to facilitate the development of the 
Center; however, they are subject to appropriation by the 
                     
3 The special assessments are to secure payment of the 
bonds and are to be calculated “to correspond to the 
benefit each parcel receives from the improvements for 
which [the b]onds are issued.” 
 
4 The payments of annual installments to the CDA are 
subject to annual appropriation by the Board and do not 
constitute a general obligation of Henrico County. 
 
4
Board and are capped at the amount of incremental tax 
revenues generated by the properties in the CDA district.  
The EDA will, in turn, pay those same amounts to the 
Developer as reimbursement for the special assessments.  
However, if any special assessment remains unpaid when an 
incentive payment is to be made to the Developer, the EDA 
is required to pay that installment directly to the CDA for 
application to the debt service on the bonds.  Under this 
financing scheme, it is possible that the Developer would 
never have to pay a special assessment after paying the 
first one, but could instead allow incentive payments from 
the EDA to be used for that purpose.  The Developer will 
also receive reimbursement for the first special assessment 
approximately six months after the bonds are retired.  In 
other words, if sufficient incremental tax revenues are 
generated from the properties in the CDA district, the 
Developer will be fully reimbursed for the special 
assessments levied to retire the bonds. 
In November 2000, the CDA filed an action under 
Article 6 of the Public Finance Act, Code §§ 15.2-2650 
through –2658, seeking to validate the bond issuance and 
all proceedings, including the Memorandum of Understanding 
and Economic Development Agreement, taken in connection 
with the authorization and issuance of the bonds.  Two days 
 
5
later, The Taubman Limited Partnership filed a chancery 
suit against the Board, the CDA, and the EDA (collectively, 
the “Public Entities”), requesting declaratory judgment 
that the incentive payments to the Developer and the 
financing structure of the proposed bond issuance are 
unlawful and in violation of the Constitution of the United 
States and the Constitution of Virginia.5  Taubman also 
sought injunctive relief to prevent the Public Entities 
from taking any further action to finance or support 
improvements at the Center.6
                     
5 In the bill of complaint, The Taubman Limited 
Partnership alleged that it owned Regency Square Mall.  It 
subsequently moved the court to correct a misnomer, 
asserting that TRG-Regency Square Associates is the real 
party in interest and the owner of that mall.  The circuit 
court granted the motion and ordered that TRG-Regency 
Square Associates LLC be identified as the plaintiff in the 
chancery suit.  That order applied only to the chancery 
suit, and we find no similar order addressing the alleged 
misnomer in the law action, which is the case on appeal.  
However, in their response to Taubman’s motion, the Public 
Entities stated that they took no position on the addition 
of TRG-Regency Square Associates as a new party to the law 
action, although they objected to treating the motion as 
one for correction of a misnomer.  Subsequently, TRG-
Regency Square Associates LLC filed an amended grounds of 
defense in the law action.  For purposes of this appeal, we 
will refer to The Taubman Limited Partnership and TRG-
Regency Square Associates LLC as “Taubman.” 
 
6 Prior to filing its suit, Taubman had discussed plans 
with the City of Richmond to locate a nearly identical 
shopping facility within the city limits.  Taubman had also 
unsuccessfully sought similar financial assistance from 
Henrico County in 1997 to make improvements to Regency 
Square Mall. 
 
6
 
Taubman and three other taxpayers filed grounds of 
defense in the bond validation action:  Arlie A. Hahn, Jr., 
Bryan B. Gresham, Jr., and Robert Anderson (collectively, 
the “Taxpayers”).  At the same time, the CDA, along with 
the EDA and the Board (both of which had intervened as 
party plaintiffs in the bond validation action), moved to 
enjoin Taubman’s suit and to consolidate the two 
proceedings.  Taubman opposed consolidation and, in its 
chancery suit, moved the circuit court to stay the bond 
validation action.  The circuit court granted the motion to 
consolidate but denied the Public Entities’ motion to 
enjoin and Taubman’s motion to stay. 
Hahn and Taubman then moved the circuit court judge to 
disqualify himself from hearing the bond validation case 
since, as a taxpayer, property owner, and citizen of 
Henrico County, the judge was a party defendant to the 
action pursuant to Code §§ 15.2-2651 and -2652.  After 
hearing argument on the motions, the circuit court judge 
vacated the previous order consolidating the two 
proceedings and decided to continue presiding in Taubman’s 
suit.  The Chief Justice of this Court then designated 
another circuit court judge to preside in the bond 
validation action.  After the proceedings were severed, 
Taubman amended its grounds of defense in the bond 
 
7
validation action to include most, if not all, of the 
claims raised in its separate chancery suit.7
 
After hearing evidence in the action filed by the CDA, 
the circuit court, in a subsequent letter opinion, 
concluded that the infrastructure improvements to be 
financed by the proposed bond issuance do not satisfy the  
requirements of Code § 15.2-5158.  That provision requires, 
among other things, that the bond-financed infrastructure 
improvements be “necessary to meet the increased demands 
placed upon the locality as a result of development within 
the district.”  Code § 15.2-5158(A)(1).  Based on the 
evidence presented, the circuit court found that only the 
left turn lane and traffic signal meet this statutory 
requirement and that all other proposed infrastructure 
improvements are instead for the Developer’s benefit.  In 
an order incorporating its letter opinion, the circuit 
court ruled that the bond issuance proposed by the CDA to 
finance certain infrastructure improvements at the Center 
is invalid and contrary to law.8  The Public Entities appeal 
                     
7 Taubman acknowledges on brief that its suit is in 
abeyance pending this appeal. 
 
8 Despite its decision invalidating the bond issuance, 
the court concluded that the bonds serve a public purpose 
and that the financing arrangements and monetary incentives 
under the Memorandum of Understanding and the Economic 
Development Agreement do not violate Code § 15.2-4905. 
 
8
from that order, and Taubman and the Taxpayers have 
assigned cross-error. 
ANALYSIS 
 
Although there are several assignments of error and 
cross-error, one of Taubman’s assignments of cross-error 
raises a threshold, dispositive issue:  whether the CDA is 
an entity that is authorized to file an action under 
Article 6 of the Public Finance Act to validate its bonds 
issued pursuant to the provisions of the WWAA. 
 
Taubman first raised this question in a hearing before 
the circuit court on the Public Entities’ motion to 
consolidate the bond validation action and Taubman’s 
chancery suit.  Later, in its demurrer and motion to 
dismiss the bond validation action, along with its 
supporting memorandum, Taubman asserted that the CDA cannot 
initiate a bond validation action under the Public Finance 
Act.  In our review of the record, we do not find a 
specific ruling by the circuit court on Taubman’s demurrer 
and motion to dismiss.  However, the court implicitly 
overruled the demurrer when it stated in its letter opinion 
that this action was brought under the Public Finance Act 
 
9
and then proceeded to address the merits of the arguments 
concerning the validity of the bond issuance.9
 
In claiming that this action was improperly brought 
under the Public Finance Act, Taubman focuses on two 
provisions in Article 6 of that act, Code §§ 15.2-2650 and 
–2651.  The pertinent parts of those sections provide: 
 
 
The provisions of this article apply to all 
suits, actions and proceedings of whatever nature 
involving the validity of bonds of any locality or 
other political subdivision, agency or instrumentality 
of the Commonwealth . . . . 
 
Code § 15.2-2650. 
 
 
 
The governing body of any locality or other 
political subdivision, agency or instrumentality of 
the Commonwealth proposing to issue bonds may bring at 
any time a proceeding in any court of the county or 
city having general jurisdiction and in which the 
issuer is located to establish the validity of the 
bonds . . . . 
 
Code § 15.2-2651. 
 
 
Taubman contends that, under the provisions of these 
two statutes, only the specified entities, i.e., a 
“locality or other political subdivision, agency or 
instrumentality of the Commonwealth,” may commence a bond 
                     
9 On the first day of trial, the circuit court 
acknowledged that a demurrer had been filed, and counsel 
for the CDA and Taubman advised the court that they had 
agreed to submit the demurrer “on the papers” filed by 
them.  The Public Entities state in their reply brief that 
the circuit court treated this action as one brought under 
the Public Finance Act and that all proceedings conformed 
to the provisions of that act. 
 
10
validation action.  Continuing, Taubman argues that, unlike 
many authorities, the CDA is not statutorily denominated a 
“political subdivison” and thus cannot proceed under Code 
§ 15.2-2651.  Taubman also points out that the WWAA has its 
own mechanism, set forth in Code § 15.2-5126, for 
challenging the validity of the CDA’s bonds, and contends 
that that section provides the sole method for determining 
the validity of the bond issuance involved in this appeal. 
 
Disagreeing with Taubman’s argument, the Public 
Entities assert that the CDA is fundamentally similar to 
those authorities that have been designated “political 
subdivisions” by the General Assembly.  Thus, according to 
the Public Entities, the CDA does not have to be labeled a 
“political subdivision” in order to avail itself of the 
bond validation procedure established in the Public Finance 
Act.  Finally, they posit that Code § 15.2-5126 provides an 
additional method, but not the sole method, for challenging 
the issuance of bonds by a community development authority. 
 
We begin our analysis of this issue by comparing the 
designation given by the General Assembly to the 
authorities created in the WWAA with that afforded to 
authorities established in other statutory provisions.  In 
the WWAA, the term “ ‘[a]uthority’ means an authority 
created under the provisions of § 15.2-5102 or Article 6 
 
11
(§ 15.2-5152 et seq.).”  Code § 15.2-5101.  The authorities 
specified in Code § 15.2-5102 are created to provide water, 
sewer, sewage disposal, stormwater control, and refuse 
collection and disposal.  That section further states that 
“[t]he authority shall be a public body politic and 
corporate.”  Code § 15.2-5102.  Article 6 of the WWAA, Code 
§§ 15.2-5152 through –5158, deals only with community 
development authorities.  However, unlike Code § 15.2-5102, 
none of the provisions of Article 6 provides that a 
community development authority shall be a “body politic 
and corporate.”  Nor do those provisions classify a 
community development authority as a “political 
subdivision.”  This lack of such designation for a 
community development authority differentiates it not only 
from those authorities created in Code § 15.2-5102, but 
also from virtually every other authority in the 
Commonwealth.10  Indeed, our search of the Code revealed 
                     
10 See, e.g., Code § 5.1-153 (Metropolitan Washington 
Airports Authority created as a “public body corporate and 
politic”); Code § 10.1-1601 (Virginia Recreational 
Facilities Authority created as a “political subdivision”); 
Code § 15.2-4903(A) (industrial development authorities 
created as “political subdivision[s]”); Code § 15.2-5302 
(hospital authority shall be a “political subdivision”); 
Code § 15.2-5403 (electric authority shall be a “political 
subdivision . . . and a body politic and corporate”); Code 
§ 15.2-5604 (public recreational facilities authority shall 
be a “political subdivision”); Code § 15.2-5702 (park 
authority shall be a “body politic and corporate”); Code 
 
12
___________________ 
§ 15.2-5801 (Virginia Baseball Stadium Authority 
established as a “body corporate and politic” and as a 
“political subdivision”); Code § 15.2-5901 (Hampton Roads 
Sports Facilities Authority established as a “body 
corporate and politic” and as a “political subdivision”); 
Code § 15.2-6200 (Alleghany-Highlands Economic Development 
Authority created as a “body politic and corporate, a 
political subdivision”); Code § 15.2-6302 (Authorities for 
Development of Former Federal Areas created as “political 
subdivision[s]”); Code § 15.2-6402 (regional industrial 
facilities authorities created as “political 
subdivision[s]”); Code § 15.2-6500 (Tourist Train 
Development Authority created as a “body politic and 
corporate, a political subdivision”); Code § 22.1-163 
(Virginia Public School Authority created as a “public body 
corporate and an agency and instrumentality of the 
Commonwealth”); Code § 23-30.25 (Virginia College Building 
Authority created as a “public body corporate and as a 
political subdivision and an agency and instrumentality of 
the Commonwealth”); Code § 23-30.41(a) (Educational 
Facilities Authority, by reference to the “Virginia College 
Building Authority created by § 23-30.25,” created as a 
“public body corporate and as a political subdivision and 
an agency and instrumentality of the Commonwealth”); Code 
§ 23-50.16:3 (Virginia Commonwealth University Health 
System Authority created as a “public body corporate and as 
a political subdivision”); Code § 23-231.13 (Roanoke Higher 
Education Authority created as a “political subdivision”); 
Code § 36-4 (redevelopment and housing authorities created 
as “political subdivision[s]”); Code § 36-55.27 (Virginia 
Housing Development Authority is a “political 
subdivision”); Code § 62.1-200 (Virginia Resources 
Authority created as a “public body corporate and as a 
political subdivision”). 
Likewise, four authorities established by the General 
Assembly in statutory provisions effective October 1, 2001 
are all explicitly created as “political subdivision[s].”  
See Code § 2.2-2202(B)(Virginia Commercial Space Flight 
Authority); Code § 2.2-2219(B) (Innovative Technology 
Authority); Code § 2.2-2261 (Virginia Public Building 
Authority); Code § 2.2-2280(B) (Virginia Small Business 
Financing Authority). 
For purposes of this analysis, we do not consider 
those authorities without statutory authorization to issue 
bonds, although virtually all of those are also designated 
as political subdivisions and/or as public bodies corporate 
 
13
that a community development authority is one of only a few 
authorities for which such a designation is noticeably 
absent from the enabling legislation.11  Also significant is 
the fact that the General Assembly provided a method in 
Code § 15.2-5126 to challenge bonds issued by a community 
___________________ 
and politic.  See, e.g., Code § 15.2-5501 (Tourism 
Development Authority is a “political subdivision, a body 
politic and corporate”); Code § 15.2-6000 (Virginia 
Coalfield Economic Development Authority created as a “body 
politic and corporate, a political subdivision”); Code 
§ 15.2-6100 (Southside Virginia Development Authority 
created as a “body politic and corporate, a political 
subdivision”); Code § 33.1-426 (Virginia Coalfield 
Coalition Authority created as a “body corporate and as a 
political subdivision”); Code §§ 37.1-242 to –243 
(Behavioral Health Authorities are “public 
instrumentalit[ies],” “public bod[ies]” and “bod[ies] 
corporate and politic”); Code § 51.5-54(B) (Assistive 
Technology Loan Fund Authority created as a “public body 
corporate and as a political subdivision”); and the 
following authorities established by the General Assembly 
in statutory provisions effective October 1, 2001 and 
explicitly created as “political subdivision[s]”:  Code 
§ 2.2-2234(C) (Virginia Economic Development Partnership 
Authority); Code § 2.2-2248 (Virginia Information Providers 
Network Authority); Code § 2.2-2315(C) (Virginia Tourism 
Authority). 
 
11 In addition to community development authorities, 
other authorities not denominated as a “political 
subdivision” or as a “body politic and corporate” include 
jail authorities, Code §§ 53.1-95.2 through –95.24, and, 
effective July 1, 2002, the Northern Virginia 
Transportation Authority, Code §§ 15.2-4816 through –4828.  
However, the enabling legislation for jail authorities 
provides that each such authority “shall be deemed to be an 
instrumentality exercising public and essential 
governmental functions . . . .”  Code § 53.1-95.7.  
Similarly, Code § 15.2-4817 states that the Northern 
Virginia Transportation Authority “shall function as a 
public instrumentality.” 
 
14
development authority, but that it did not do so in the 
enabling legislation for all those authorities previously 
listed, supra note 11, except the Virginia Resources 
Authority.12
 
However, the Public Entities argue that the mere fact 
that a community development authority is not classified by 
the General Assembly as a “political subdivision” is not 
determinative.  Relying on County of York v. Peninsula 
Airport Commission, 235 Va. 477, 369 S.E.2d 665 (1988), 
they contend that the pertinent question is whether a 
community development authority enjoys the essential 
attributes of a political subdivision.  Using that 
analysis, the Public Entities assert that the CDA is a 
political subdivision because it possesses all the 
necessary powers, with the exception of the power of 
eminent domain. 
 
We are not persuaded by this argument and believe that 
Peninsula Airport and other similar cases are 
distinguishable.  The issue in Peninsula Airport was 
whether the Peninsula Airport Commission was a political 
subdivision within the meaning of Article X, § 6(a) of the 
                     
12 The Virginia Resources Authority does not actually 
have a separate method for determining the validity of its 
bonds.  Instead, Code § 62.1-208 provides that the 
Authority may bring an action under the Public Finance Act. 
 
15
Constitution of Virginia and former Code § 58-12(1), and 
thus exempt from taxation by York County.  Id. at 478-79, 
369 S.E.2d at 665.  Noting that the trial court had used 
the terms “municipal corporation” and “political 
subdivision” interchangeably and without objection by 
counsel, we reiterated that “municipal corporations are 
‘political subdivisions of the State.’”  Id. at 480, 369 
S.E.2d at 666 (quoting Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac 
R.R. Co. v. City of Richmond, 145 Va. 225, 238, 133 S.E. 
800, 803-04 (1926)).  However, since the converse is not 
necessarily true, the Court then considered whether the 
Commission was a municipal corporation.  In doing so, we 
listed the six attributes of a municipal corporation as 
previously enumerated in City of Richmond v. Richmond 
Metropolitan Authority, 210 Va. 645, 647, 172 S.E.2d 831, 
832 (1970)(citing Hampton Rds. Sanitation Dist. Comm’n v. 
Smith, 193 Va. 371, 376, 68 S.E.2d 497, 500 (1952)).  One 
of those attributes is “[c]reation as a body corporate and 
politic and as a political subdivision of the 
Commonwealth.”  Id.
 
Focusing on that attribute, York County argued that 
the Peninsula Airport Commission could not occupy the 
status of a municipal corporation because the legislative 
act creating the Commission did not expressly classify it 
 
16
as a political subdivision.  Peninsula Airport, 235 Va. at 
481, 369 S.E.2d at 667.  We rejected that argument because 
“[t]he original act provided that [the Commission] was to 
be an ‘independent body corporate[,]’ ” and the “enabling 
act, as amended, provided that ‘neither the Commonwealth 
nor any political subdivision thereof other than the 
[C]ommission shall be liable’ ” on any bonds issued by the 
Commission.  Id. (quoting Acts 1946, c. 22, § 8 and as 
amended, § 15) (emphasis deleted).  We then concluded that 
the Peninsula Airport Commission possessed the essential 
attributes of a municipal corporation.  Id.
 
This detailed examination of our decision in Peninsula 
Airport demonstrates two analytical points.  First, in 
determining whether that Commission was a political 
subdivision, the Court looked solely at the statutory 
language used in the Commission’s enabling legislation, not 
at the Commission’s attributes, an approach advanced by the 
Public Entities.  Second, the essential attributes, one of 
which was the fact that the Commission was created as a 
political subdivision, were relevant only to the inquiry 
whether the Commission was also a municipal corporation.  
This same analytical framework is evident in other cases.  
See, e.g., Carter v. Chesterfield Co. Health Comm’n, 259 
Va. 588, 590, 527 S.E.2d 783, 784 (2000) (stating that 
 
17
Chesterfield County Health Commission is a political 
subdivision13 and that such entities may be entitled to the 
status of a municipal corporation for purposes of immunity 
from tort liability; parties generally agreed that 
Commission was entitled to such status); Virginia Elec. & 
Power Co. v. Hampton Redev. & Housing Auth., 217 Va. 30, 
32-33, 225 S.E.2d 364, 367 (1976) (housing authority 
designated by statute as a political subdivision, one of 
the attributes of a municipal corporation); Richmond Metro. 
Auth., 210 Va. at 647-48, 172 S.E.2d at 832-33 (noting that 
Richmond Metropolitan Authority was created by statute as a 
“political subdivision and public body corporate and 
politic of the Commonwealth” and concluding that the 
Authority possessed attributes of a municipal corporation); 
Hampton Rds. Sanitation Dist., 193 Va. at 376-77, 68 S.E.2d 
at 500 (by statute, the Hampton Roads Sanitation District 
Commission was created as a body corporate and politic and 
each commission “shall constitute a political subdivision 
of the Commonwealth”; that attribute, along with other 
powers, made the Commission a municipal corporation). 
                     
13 Code § 15.2-5200 states that “a hospital or health 
center commission shall be created as a public body 
corporate . . . .” 
 
 
18
 
Thus, we conclude that we must confine our analysis of 
whether the CDA is a political subdivision to the language 
of the relevant enabling legislation.  Based on the 
analytical framework in our prior cases, that inquiry does 
not include consideration of the CDA’s attributes or 
whether it is similar to other authorities that are 
designated by the General Assembly as “political 
subdivisions.”  We also are persuaded by the fact that the 
General Assembly clearly knows how to denominate an 
authority as a “political subdivision” when it wishes to do 
so.  See supra note 11.  Thus, in the absence of any 
statutory designation of community development authorities 
as “political subdivisions,” we conclude that the CDA is 
not such an entity.14
 
The Public Entities have not asserted that the CDA is 
a locality, or an agency or instrumentality of the 
Commonwealth.  We also conclude that the CDA is not one of 
                     
14 We recognize that, in the resolution creating the 
CDA, the Board designated it as a “body corporate and 
politic.”  However, in light of the enabling legislation 
for community development authorities, we believe that the 
Board did not have any statutory power to do so.  “In 
Virginia the powers of boards of supervisors are fixed by 
statute and are limited to those conferred expressly or by 
necessary implication.”  Bd. of Supervisors v. Horne, 216 
Va. 113, 117, 215 S.E.2d 453, 455 (1975) (citing Gordon v. 
Bd. of Supervisors, 207 Va. 827, 832, 153 S.E.2d 270, 274 
(1967); Johnson v. Goochland County, 206 Va. 235, 237, 142 
S.E.2d 501, 502 (1965)). 
 
19
those other entities.  Cf. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 217 
Va. at 32-33, 225 S.E.2d at 367 (although housing authority 
denominated a political subdivision of the Commonwealth, 
such authority comes into existence only by local action 
and is thus purely local in nature and not a state agency).  
Since Article 6 of the Public Finance Act applies only to 
proceedings to validate bonds of “any locality or other 
political subdivision, agency or instrumentality of the 
Commonwealth,” Code § 15.2-2650, and since the General 
Assembly did not classify community development authorities 
as one of those entities, the CDA cannot utilize the 
procedure set forth in Code § 15.2-2651 to validate its 
bonds. 
 
We are, nonetheless, mindful of the broad language 
contained in the Public Finance Act.  Specifically, Code 
§ 15.2-2650 states that the provisions of Article 6 of that 
act “apply to all suits, actions and proceedings of 
whatever nature involving the validity of bonds of any 
locality or other political subdivision, agency or 
instrumentality of the Commonwealth,” (emphasis added), and 
pursuant to Code § 15.2-2651, such entities “may bring at 
any time a proceeding in any court . . . to establish the 
validity of the bonds.”  Code § 15.2-2650 also states that 
“[t]hese provisions supersede all other acts and statutes 
 
20
on the subject and are controlling in all cases, 
notwithstanding the provisions of any other law or charter 
to the contrary.”  Despite these all-embracing statements, 
the fact remains that the plain terms of Code §§ 15.2-2650 
and –2651 allow only a “locality or other political 
subdivision, agency or instrumentality of the Commonwealth” 
to bring a bond validation proceeding under Article 6 of 
the Public Finance Act. 
 
Furthermore, the WWAA contains equally broad language.  
Code § 15.2-5100 provides that the WWAA “shall constitute 
full and complete authority, without regard to the 
provisions of any other law for the doing of the acts 
herein authorized, and shall be liberally construed to 
effect the purposes of the [WWAA].”  Similarly, Code 
§ 15.2-5129 states that “[b]onds may be issued under the 
provisions of [the WWAA] without obtaining the approval or 
consent of any department, division, commission, board, 
bureau or agency of the Commonwealth, and without any other 
proceeding or the happening of any other condition or thing 
than those proceedings, conditions or things which are 
specifically required by [the WWAA].” 
 
We also note that Code § 15.2-2627 of the Public 
Finance Act is similar to Code § 15.2-5126 in the WWAA.  
Both sections provide that “any person in interest” may 
 
21
contest the validity of bonds for a period of 30 days after 
the date when the ordinance or resolution authorizing the 
bond issuance is filed in the circuit court.  However, 
while the Public Finance Act contains two discrete 
provisions through which the validity of certain bonds may 
be either challenged, see Code § 15.2-2627, or established, 
see Code § 15.2-2651, the WWAA provides only the method of 
challenging the validity of bonds issued by a community 
development authority, see Code § 15.2-5126, and that 
provision does not permit the community development 
authority itself to initiate a bond validation proceeding 
such as the present one.  A person in interest may contest, 
but not seek to establish, the validity of such bonds.  
Code § 15.2-5126.  However, the fact that only one method 
is available to determine the validity of bonds issued by a 
community development authority does not change our 
analysis.  Such matters are within the province of the 
General Assembly to decide. 
 
Moreover, as we emphasized earlier, the inclusion of 
Code § 15.2-5126 in the WWAA is singular among the Code’s 
various provisions establishing other authorities.  Our 
search of the Code revealed virtually no other authority 
for which a separate procedure to determine the validity of 
a bond issuance is included within the legislation 
 
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expressly pertaining to that authority.  Thus, the General 
Assembly obviously realizes when it needs to include such a 
procedure because a particular authority, in this case the 
CDA, cannot utilize Article 6 of the Public Finance Act to 
validate its bonds. 
 
This last observation is in accord with our decision 
in Mayor of Lexington v. Industrial Development Authority, 
221 Va. 865, 275 S.E.2d 888 (1981).  There, the appellant 
challenged the right of an industrial development authority 
to proceed under the Public Finance Act in effect at that 
time.  In rejecting the appellant’s argument, we concluded 
that “[w]hen the General Assembly made industrial 
development authorities political subdivisions of the 
Commonwealth, it thereby brought them within the purview of 
Code § 15.1-214,” (the predecessor to Code § 15.2-2651).  
Id. at 871, 275 S.E.2d at 891.  We believed it was apparent 
that the General Assembly did not provide a separate 
procedure for challenging or validating industrial 
development bonds in the Industrial Development and Revenue 
Bond Act itself because the language of former Code § 15.1-
214 clearly applied to all political subdivisions, and thus 
to industrial development authorities.  Id.  Based on the 
rationale in Mayor, it follows that, in the present case, 
the General Assembly included a procedure in the WWAA to 
 
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challenge bonds issued by a community development authority 
since that authority, not being a “locality or other 
political subdivision, agency or instrumentality of the 
Commonwealth,” Code § 15.2-2650, does not come within the 
purview of the Public Finance Act. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated, we conclude that the circuit 
court erred in allowing this action to proceed under the 
Public Finance Act.  This Court is fully aware of the fact 
that its decision today leaves unresolved the question 
whether the proposed bond issuance is valid.  We are also 
cognizant of the significant financial and economic 
interests at stake.  However, we cannot ignore the plain 
terms of the Public Finance Act and the enabling 
legislation for community development authorities simply to 
accommodate those interests or to conserve judicial 
resources.  Accordingly, we will vacate the circuit court’s 
decision invalidating the proposed bond issuance and 
dismiss this action.15
Vacated and dismissed. 
                     
15 In light of our decision, we do not address the 
remaining assignments of error and cross-error. 
 
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