Title: State of Indiana ex rel. Indiana State Bar Assoc., et al v. Ludy Diaz
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 94S00-0312-MS-589
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: December 6, 2005

ATTORNEYS FOR RELATORS  
 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT  
Thomas R. Ruge 
 
 
 
Patrick F. O’Leary 
Todd A. Richardson  
 
 
Goshen, Indiana 
Suzanne L. Robinson 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
Stephen Carter 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
Gary Secrest 
Deputy Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR AMICUS CURIAE 
Karl L. Mulvany 
Nana Quay-Smith 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 94S00-0312-MS-589 
 
 
STATE OF INDIANA EX REL. INDIANA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION  
AND ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF INDIANA, 
                        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Relators, 
 
v. 
 
LUDY DIAZ, 
                         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Respondent. 
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition To Enjoin The Unauthorized Practice Of Law 
_________________________________ 
 
December 6, 2005 
 
Per Curiam. 
 
This is an original action brought by the Indiana State Bar Association and the 
Attorney General for the State of Indiana (together “Relators”) in the name of the State of 
Indiana pursuant to Indiana Admission and Discipline Rule 24.1   Relators seek an order 
enjoining Respondent, Ludovina Emila Diaz (“Diaz”), who does business under the name 
Ludy Diaz, from the unauthorized practice of law.  This Court has original and exclusive 
jurisdiction over matters involving the unauthorized practice of law.  See IND. CONST. art. 
7, § 4; Ind. Code § 33-24-1-2(b)(2) (2004).  The Court finds Diaz has engaged in acts 
constituting the unauthorized practice of law and concludes an injunction is appropriate 
and necessary.    
 
Procedural Background 
 
On December 1, 2003, Relators filed a verified petition to enjoin Diaz from the 
unauthorized practice of law (“Petition”). The Petition alleged Diaz engages in the 
unauthorized practice of law by:  (a) selecting and completing immigration forms for 
individuals seeking immigration assistance; (b) advising individuals on immigration 
matters; (c) giving advice that is legal in nature and exceeds filling in blanks on a legal 
document; (d) using the title “Notario” or “Notario Publico,” which is inherently 
misleading to Spanish speaking people; and (e) advertising and promoting her services 
without disclaiming she is not an attorney.  The Petition seeks to enjoin Diaz from:  (1) 
selecting immigration forms for individuals seeking immigration assistance; (2) advising 
individuals on immigration or other legal matters; (3) using the title “Notario” or 
“Notario Publico;” and (4) advertising, affirmatively self promoting, or calling to public 
attention her services without disclaiming she: (i) is not an attorney; (ii) cannot tell 
individuals what immigration forms they need; (iii) cannot tell individuals which 
immigration benefits they may be eligible for; and (iv) cannot give advice on how to 
complete an immigration form. 
 
                                             
 
1 Rule 24 states, in part:  “Original actions . . . to restrain or enjoin the unauthorized practice of law in this 
state may be brought in this court by the attorney general . . . the Indiana State Bar Association or any duly 
authorized committee thereof, without leave of court . . . .” 
 
2
Diaz filed a verified return denying most of the material allegations in the 
Petition.  This Court appointed the Honorable Jenny Pitts Manier, a judge of the St. 
Joseph Superior Court, as Commissioner to hear the evidence in this case and to provide 
the Court with detailed findings of fact.  Trial was held on September 13, 2004.  The 
Commissioner filed her findings of fact on October 6, 2004.  The Court then received 
briefs from the Relators and Diaz, as well as an amicus curiae brief from the Consulado 
de Mexico en Indianapolis in support of the Relators. 
 
A Brief Summary Of Immigration Law 
 
Various agencies and players.  As of March 1, 2003, the effective date of the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) was 
abolished and its functions were transferred to the Department of Homeland Security.  
Under the Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security is the Bureau of U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (“USCIS”), and under the Undersecretary of Border and 
Transportation Security are the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(“ICE”) and the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection.  See Richard D. Steel, Steel 
on Immigration Law, § 2:1 (2d ed. 2004) (available at Westlaw database “STEEL”).   
 
ICE assumed the enforcement jurisdiction and role of the former United States 
Customs Service and those functions of the former INS involved in investigations, 
detention, and removal.  See id. § 2:3.  The USCIS assumed many of the adjudicatory 
functions of the former INS, including such matters as visa petitions, applications for 
adjustment to permanent status, applications for waivers, and applications for asylum.  
See id. § 2:2.   
 
The Executive Office of Immigration Review is subject to the supervision of the 
Attorney General and is headed by a director who is responsible for supervising the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) and the Office of the Chief Immigration Judge.  
See id. § 2:5.  The BIA is the appellate body charged with the review of administrative 
adjudications under the Immigration and Nationality Act (the “Act”).  See id.  The Chief 
 
3
Immigration Judge is responsible for the supervision of immigration judges, who conduct 
exclusion and deportation hearings and other proceedings the Attorney General may 
assign them to conduct.  See id. § 2:8. 
 
Aliens seeking to remain in the United States.  Among the grounds an alien may 
assert to remain in the United States are:  (1) the alien has a relative who is a citizen or 
permanent resident of the United States (a “family-based” or “relative” petition), see 8 
U.S.C. § 1153(a) (2000); (2) the alien has employment skills needed in the U.S. (an 
“employment-based” petition), see 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b) (2000 & Supp. 2002); and (3) the 
alien has fled his or her country of citizenship due to the fear of political persecution (a 
petition for asylum), see 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2000 & Supp. 2002). 
 
In specifying the qualifying relationships for a family-based petition, the Act uses 
words of otherwise common meaning but which in this context are subject to significant 
statutory, judicial, and administrative definition and interpretation.  See Steel, supra, § 
5:1.  Most, but not all, relative petitions are filed on a Form I-130.  See id. § 5:32.   
 
The availability of visas to persons who qualify as relatives can be limited by 
several factors, including quotas.  See id. § 4:2.  When a quota applies, the alien is 
assigned a priority date, which establishes the person’s place in the waiting line.  See id. § 
4:17.  Monitoring one’s progress in the line is done through consulting the monthly Visa 
Bulletin issued by the Department of State.  See id. § 4:18.  Approval of a relative visa 
petition does not guarantee the beneficiary will receive permanent resident status.  The 
beneficiary still must apply for permanent residence through the USCIS and show he or 
she is not inadmissible to the United States.  See id. §§ 4:8 & 5:42.  Grounds for 
inadmissibility include convictions of certain crimes, fraud or misrepresentation of fact to 
obtain admission into the U.S., falsely claiming U.S. citizenship, entering as a stowaway, 
and having been previously ordered removed.  See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(2), (6) & (9) 
(West 1999 & Supp. 2005). 
 
 
4
“Adjustment of status” is a procedure by which certain aliens physically present 
in the United States can obtain permanent resident status without leaving the United 
States.  See Steel, supra, § 7:1.  Form I-485 is the basic application for adjustment of 
status.  See id. § 7:23.  In some cases, an application for adjustment of status may be filed 
concurrently with a visa petition, but in other cases, as when the applicable quota is not 
current, the visa petition must be filed first.  See id. § 7:24.  Some requirements for 
adjustment of status were temporarily suspended for certain aliens if the underlying 
qualifying application or petition was filed on or before April 30, 2001.  To take 
advantage of this provision, the alien must submit a Supplement A to the Form I-485 and, 
with some exceptions, pay a filing fee of $1,000.2  See id. §§ 7:9 & 23.      
   
The initial interview of an immigration client and the other parties involved is a 
crucial stage of the case and ascertaining all relevant facts is essential.  Adequate 
communication must be established, especially if the client does not speak English.  It is 
essential to ensure only true documentation is utilized and to advise the client of the 
consequences of using fraudulent documentation.  Many times a problem arises because a 
person lied or used false documentation when the truth or true documentation would have 
been sufficient.  See id. § 1:7. 
 
    
Non-attorney representation.  Federal law allows for limited non-attorney practice 
of immigration law in administrative proceedings.  See 8 C.F.R. § 292.1 (2005).  To 
qualify to practice as an “accredited representative,” an individual must first be affiliated 
with an organization recognized by the BIA as a “non-profit religious, charitable, social 
service, or similar organization” that charges individuals only nominal sums for 
assistance rendered and has at its disposal adequate knowledge, information, and 
experience.  8 C.F.R. § 292.2(a) (2005).  Second, the organization must petition on behalf 
of the individual, including in its application detailed information on the individual’s 
“experience and knowledge of immigration and naturalization law and procedure . . . .”  8 
C.F.R. § 292.2(d) (2005).  If the petition is approved, the individual is legally allowed to 
                                             
 
2 The forms discussed above and accompanying instructions are available on the USCIS website 
(http//uscis.gov).   
 
5
practice immigration law before the BIA (also called “the Board”) and/or various bureaus 
(“the Service”).  Such practitioners are subject to rules of professional conduct and 
discipline.  See 8 C.F.R. § 292.3 (2005). 
The “practice” of immigration law is defined as:  
the act or acts of any person appearing in any case, either in person or 
through the preparation or filing of any brief or other document, paper, 
application, or petition on behalf of another person or client before or with 
the Service, or any officer of the Service, or the Board.  
 
8 C.F.R. § 1.1(i) (2005). 
 
The practice of immigration law does not include merely helping someone fill in 
blank spaces on forms for nominal remuneration, as long as the person offering assistance 
does not hold himself or herself out as qualified in legal matters or in immigration or 
naturalization procedure.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1.1(k) (2005).  However, the selection of the 
proper form is a different matter:  
[The] selection by a visa consultant of a Form I-130 for a client’s use 
could constitute a legal judgment that the client and/or his alien relatives 
are not eligible to apply for any other immigration benefit(s). An accurate 
determination of such eligibility requires extensive knowledge of often 
complex immigration laws and their applicability to individual cases.  
 
 
. . . . 
 
By selecting a Form I-130 for a lay client, translating it, 
transcribing the responses, and then assisting in securing supporting 
documentation, a visa consultant implicitly suggests to a client that this is 
the form that will best satisfy the request of securing legal immigration 
status for his or her relatives.  
 
INS Gen. Couns. Op. No. 93-25, 1993 WL 1503972 (Apr. 20, 1993).  Non-lawyers who 
are not accredited representatives (and fail to qualify under other nonlawyer categories), 
but nevertheless practice immigration law, are in violation of federal rules.  See 8 C.F.R. 
§ 292.1 (2005).   
 
 
6
Findings Of Fact 
 
Although Diaz challenges a number of the Commissioner’s findings and offers 
different accounts of some events, the Court finds the Commissioner’s findings are 
supported by clear and convincing evidence and hereby adopts them.3  The 
Commissioner’s findings of fact (“Findings”) are summarized below. 
 
Diaz’s background and business generally.  Diaz was born in Puerto Rico and 
moved to Indiana when she was 14 or 15 years of age.  She is fluent in both English and 
Spanish.  Diaz graduated from high school in Indiana, after which she attended 
cosmetology school.  Diaz has been appointed and commissioned as a notary public by 
the State of Indiana, but she does not have a law degree and is not licensed to practice 
law in Indiana or any other jurisdiction in the United States.  Neither Diaz nor her 
business has ever been certified to represent persons before the INS, the USCIS, the ICE, 
or the BIA.  (See Findings 6-12.)  
 
Diaz does business as a sole proprietorship at offices located at 125 East Lincoln, 
Goshen, Indiana.  Diaz identified her occupation as “immigration counselor” on the 
federal income tax returns she filed for tax years 1996 through 2002.  After Relators filed 
their verified petition against Diaz, she identified her occupation as “translation services” 
on her 2003 federal income tax return.  Diaz has attended two seminars on immigration 
law. The first, a two-day immigration law seminar in Omaha, Nebraska, was put on by 
Catholic Charities, and the second, a one-day workshop on immigration law, was held in 
Chicago.  Diaz uses software from which she can generate immigration applications and 
other immigration forms. This software is updated periodically through a subscription 
service.  Diaz relies on this software to learn about changes in immigration law.  (See 
Findings 14, 20, 22.)  
 
                                             
 
3 The burden of proof in an action charging the unauthorized practice of law is not specified by rule.  See 
Admis. Disc. R. 24.  The burden of proof in attorney discipline cases and judicial discipline cases is clear 
and convincing evidence.  See Admis. Disc. R. 23, § 14(h); Admis. Disc. R. 25(VIII)(K)(6).  We need not 
decide today whether a standard lower than “clear and convincing” should apply in unauthorized practice 
of law cases because the evidence against Diaz satisfies the “clear and convincing” standard. 
 
7
Diaz has been in business for herself for about seven years. Prior to opening her 
business, Diaz worked for La Casa of Goshen (“La Casa”) from 1965 until 1978, and 
again from 1985 until 1995.  Diaz’s title while at La Casa was “immigration specialist.”  
(See Finding 19.)  La Casa is a social service agency operating in Elkhart County, 
Indiana, that is authorized to practice before the BIA and USCIS.  As a part of achieving 
accredited status, La Casa was required to have a resource library and attorney resources 
available to it.  (See Findings 106, 110-11.)  It does not appear that Diaz was ever 
certified as an “accredited representative” of La Casa to practice before the BIA and 
USCIS, see 8 C.F.R. §§ 292.1(a)(4), 292.2(d).  (See Diaz Dep. at 97-98, 152.) 
 
Diaz’s use of the titles “notary public” and “notario publico.”  The literal 
translation of the English words “notary public” are the Spanish words “notario publico.”  
As described in more detail below, the term “notario publico” or “notario,” as used in 
Mexico and other Latin American countries, however, indicates an official who is an 
experienced lawyer who has passed additional rigorous examinations.  (See Findings 180-
81.) 
 
The awning outside her office is imprinted with the following text: “Ludy Diaz, 
Notary Public.”  Her Notary Public commission hangs, framed, on the wall of her office.  
Prior to the filing of the Petition, Diaz used a business card advertising her business in 
Spanish. The business card used the designation “Notario Publico” twice and did not 
advise whether or not Diaz was a lawyer.  Diaz no longer uses the term “Notario Publico” 
on her business cards.  (See Findings 15-16, 190-91.)  
 
Prior to the filing of the Petition initiating this proceeding, Diaz had advertised 
her business in El Puente, a Spanish language publication in Elkhart County. This 
advertisement designated her as a “Notario Publico” providing “Servicios de 
Immigration” (immigration services).  The advertisement stated Diaz had 17 years of 
experience and warranted absolute confidentiality.  Diaz acknowledges the advertisement 
could have been used by her in the year 2002. The advertisement contains no disclaimer 
 
8
advising that Diaz is not an attorney.  Diaz ran a similar advertisement in 2001 in La 
Prensa, a Spanish language publication in Elkhart County.  (See Findings 188-89.) 
 
Diaz corrects persons whom she hears refer to her as an attorney by stating “I am 
not an attorney, I am a notary public,” but it is unclear whether this correction is made in 
English, Spanish, or both.  (See Finding 192.) 
 
The Neighborhood Christian Legal Clinic (“NCLC”) is a non-profit corporation 
offering pro bono legal representation and education to low-income inner city and Latino 
clients operating within the Indianapolis metropolitan area.  NCLC clients have 
experienced problems with notaries holding themselves out as “notarios” in the areas of 
immigration, real estate, and tax law.  The services these notaries provide are often 
deficient.  The Mexican Consul in Indianapolis has received numerous complaints from 
individuals who have been confused by persons using the term “notario publico.”   There 
is, however, no evidence the NCLC or the Mexican Consul in Indianapolis ever received 
a complaint or inquiry concerning Diaz.  (See Findings 186-87, 194-201.) 
 
The scope of immigration services provided by Diaz.  Diaz provides immigration 
services not only to Spanish speakers, but also to English speakers, non-Spanish speakers 
and other individuals who do not require translations or interpretations.  Diaz selects the 
immigration forms she believes are appropriate to address the particular need of the 
individual client.  Diaz’s immigration services have involved preparation of family-based 
immigration petitions, an occasional employment-based petition, at least one asylum 
appeal, and applications for becoming a naturalized U.S. citizen.  Diaz explains to her 
clients the process by which USCIS may waive certain conditions that would otherwise 
bar approval of an alien’s immigration application.  In some instances, Diaz has 
accompanied her clients to the immigration office.  (See Findings 133-37.) 
 
Diaz has advised clients on such issues as seeking citizenship for minor children, 
visa priority dates, the implications of being married for less than two years, the 
procedure to follow if one does not fall within any of the eight bases listed on form I-485 
 
9
for which an adjustment to status may be sought, status adjustment based on having a 
relative who becomes a U.S. citizen, and the process for completing employment-based 
immigration petitions.  (See Findings 150-54.) 
 
Diaz uses form letters, prepared by her, in connection with immigration cases.  
She writes letters for clients that attempt to serve as notices of appeal, motions to reopen 
cases closed or denied by the USCIS, requests for the withholding of deportation, and 
letters of explanation concerning previous deportations.  Diaz’s letters are generally in 
the nature of a “shot in the dark” or an appeal for mercy.   Diaz does not know the legal 
requirements for appealing an immigration decision or the circumstances under which an 
appeal may be granted. There is no evidence Diaz advises her clients of this fact.  Diaz 
does not know whether the contents of her letters will be helpful to her clients with their 
immigration matters.  Diaz does not know the circumstances under which a deportation 
will be withheld.  Diaz does not know how criminal convictions are treated by 
immigration officials.  (See Findings 138-46.) 
 
Diaz refers clients to attorneys when she feels she cannot handle their cases, when 
they must appear in court, or when immigration specifically states the client needs to be 
represented by an attorney.  (See Finding 168.) 
 
Diaz charges a fee for assisting and advising individuals regarding immigration 
matters. The fee for her services is based upon how many forms are used and whether or 
not any translation is required.  Diaz advises her clients as to what she expects the 
immigration filing fees to be.  After the applications are completed, Diaz tells clients how 
much money needs to be sent to the immigration office and that the client will need to get 
that amount in a cashiers check or money order.  Diaz does not maintain a separate trust 
account for money that is given to her by clients for the purpose of paying a filing fee, 
obtaining a money order or paying postal expenses.  Diaz keeps track of the money that 
flows in and out of her office by writing receipts.  (See Findings 156-63.) 
 
 
10
Diaz’s dealings with Anjelica Hernandez and Fructuoso Espinoza Rivera.   
Anjelica Hernandez (“Hernandez”) is a citizen of the United States who describes her 
ethnicity as Hispanic. She is fluent in both Spanish and English.  Hernandez married 
Fructuoso Espinoza Rivera (“Espinoza”) on March 25, 2000, and they have one child, 
born December 7, 2001.  Hernandez also has another child, born October 4, 1998, who is 
not Espinoza’s biological child, but who views Espinoza as a father.  (See Findings 40-
45.) 
 
Espinoza is a citizen of Mexico.  Espinoza attempted to enter the United States in 
early 1998 by falsely claiming U.S. citizenship using the birth certificate of another 
person who was in fact a citizen of the United States. Espinoza was subjected to 
expedited removal proceedings at that time, an administrative removal order was issued, 
and he was returned to Mexico.  Espinoza married Hernandez after a subsequent illegal 
entry into the United States.  At the time of the marriage, Hernandez was aware that 
Espinoza was residing in the United States illegally and that he had been previously 
deported or removed from the United States for attempting to enter the United States 
using the birth certificate of another person.  (See Findings 48-51.) 
 
Hernandez and Espinoza wished to secure legal U.S. resident status for Espinoza.  
Hernandez knew of Diaz because members of Hernandez’s family had previously hired 
Diaz to assist them with immigration matters and Hernandez had seen advertisements in a 
local Spanish-language newspaper advertising Diaz’s services.  Hernandez did not know 
what title, qualification or certification, if any, Diaz held, but she understood Diaz to be 
an immigration expert.  (See Findings 52-55, 94.)  Hernandez, therefore, scheduled an 
appointment for herself and Espinoza with Diaz in May 2000.  Hernandez was told to 
bring with her to the appointment a filing fee of $130 and the $100 fee Diaz would be 
charging for her services.  (See Findings 52-57.) 
 
At the appointment, Hernandez explained to Diaz that Espinoza was in the U.S. 
illegally, that they had just married, and that they were seeking to obtain residency status 
for Espinoza.  Diaz advised Hernandez and Espinoza that Diaz would fill out the 
 
11
appropriate application and send it to the INS.  Diaz spoke in English and in Spanish 
during the meeting.  Diaz asked if Espinoza had any other relatives who were U.S. 
citizens.  Diaz did not ask Hernandez or Espinoza about any other immigration filings 
they previously may have made.  Diaz did not ask whether Espinoza previously had been 
deported or removed from the United States and neither Hernandez nor Espinoza 
volunteered that information.  Diaz selected and prepared for Espinoza a Form I-130, 
Petition for Alien Relative.  In completing the Form I-130, Diaz asked about Espinoza’s 
work history.  Diaz advised Hernandez and Espinoza it would be better to indicate on the 
form that Espinoza was working as a seasonal worker for cash, rather than to 
acknowledge that he was working under someone else’s authorization or status. 
Hernandez and Espinoza were not advised in detail as to the significance of the form 
completed by Diaz, were not asked to review it, and were not provided with a copy of the 
completed form.  After Espinoza signed the form, Diaz advised Hernandez and Espinoza 
that she, Diaz, would finish the form and mail it to the INS.  Hernandez tendered to Diaz 
$130 for the filing fee and $100 for Diaz’s services, for which Hernandez was given a 
receipt.  (See Findings 61-70.) 
 
Hernandez later came to believe that a new program existed whereby illegal 
immigrants would be permitted to gain lawful residency status simply by paying a fine.4  
Hernandez contacted Diaz’s office for a second time, spoke with a young woman who 
advised Hernandez of the cost, told Hernandez to bring the filing fee with her, and 
scheduled an appointment for a date about thirty days later.  At this appointment, 
Hernandez explained to Diaz what she had heard about a new program and explicitly 
questioned Diaz as to whether Espinoza would be eligible for this benefit notwithstanding 
his earlier deportation.5  Diaz completed a Form I-485, Application to Register 
Permanent Resident or Adjust Status.  Diaz spoke to Hernandez in Spanish and English 
                                             
 
4This may have been the temporary suspension of some requirements for adjustment of status that applied 
to qualifying applications or petitions filed on or before April 30, 2001.  See Steel, supra, § 7:9.  
    
5 Diaz testified that neither Hernandez nor Espinoza told her about Espinoza’s deportation or his use of 
false documents.  The Commissioner found Hernandez’s testimony to be more credible.  (See Finding 71.)  
Even if Diaz’s version of events is correct, however, it would not change this Court’s conclusion that Diaz 
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.  
 
 
12
as she completed this form.  Diaz gave neither Hernandez nor Espinoza information as to 
the purpose of the Form I-485.  Hernandez, however, trusted Diaz and had the impression 
Diaz knew what she was doing.  Diaz did not give Hernandez or Espinoza a copy of the 
Form I-485 when they left the office.  Diaz did not ask them to review the form prior to 
having Espinoza execute it, or thereafter.  Diaz instructed Espinoza to sign the form, even 
though she had additional work to do to complete the form.   Hernandez did not know at 
that time that the answer to one question incorrectly indicated that Espinoza had never 
been deported or removed from the U.S.  Hernandez and Espinoza paid Diaz $200 for the 
services provided by Diaz in connection with the completion of the Form I-485.  (See 
Findings 72-79, 82.) 
 
Hernandez returned to Diaz’s office a few days later to pick up the completed 
Form I-485, which Hernandez mailed to the INS, with a check for $1,425, which she had 
been told by Diaz’s receptionist was the required filing fee.6  Hernandez mailed the Form 
I-485 herself, rather than having Diaz do so, because Hernandez and Espinoza believed 
Diaz was very busy and they did not want the processing of the application to be delayed.  
(See Findings 80-81.)  After Hernandez retrieved the Form I-485 and mailed it to INS, 
Hernandez had no expectation that Diaz was assisting Espinoza further with the I-485 
application.  (See Finding 95.) 
 
Espinoza and Hernandez attended an interview at the INS office in Indianapolis 
approximately six months after submitting the Form I-485.  They were advised to submit 
materials to verify Espinoza’s employment.  Hernandez sent to INS a copy of Espinoza’s 
pay stub without the assistance of Diaz.  Espinoza and Hernandez returned a second time 
to the Indianapolis INS office to inquire about the status of the I-485 application and to 
renew his work authorization.  They questioned Espinoza’s INS caseworker about the 
status of his I-485 application. The caseworker questioned them about Espinoza’s prior 
deportation.  Hernandez and Espinoza explained to the INS caseworker the details of the 
prior deportation and that they had advised Diaz expressly of the deportation.  Espinoza 
                                             
 
6 This apparently was intended to include a $1000 filing fee to accompany a Supplement A to Form I-485, 
a copy of which is included in Diaz’s file for Espinoza.  The Form I-485 Supplement A was signed on 
April 23, 2001.   
 
13
and Hernandez were separated and Hernandez was then told Espinoza had been detained 
and would be deported.  Diaz had not warned Hernandez or Espinoza that this might 
occur.  (See Findings 83-87.)  Espinoza has not seen his child since his deportation.  (See 
Finding 101.) 
 
After Espinoza was detained, Hernandez contacted Diaz but did not advise Diaz 
about Espinoza’s detention. Hernandez asked Diaz for copies of the documents 
completed by Diaz for Espinoza and told her they were seeking legal assistance due to 
the delay in processing Espinoza’s I-485 application.  Diaz advised Hernandez to just 
“send a letter” and that a lawyer “would charge a lot of money and it would not do any 
good.”   Hernandez  eventually obtained from Diaz a copy of the file Diaz maintained for 
the services she provided to Espinoza.  (See Findings 88-90.) 
 
Diaz did not recognize at the time she assisted Espinoza that his prior use of false 
documentation in connection with an immigration matter was a serious offense.  It would 
have been predictable to a person in the practice of immigration law that the filing of the 
Form I-485 for Espinoza would have lead to negative consequences for him.  (See 
Findings 98-100.) 
 
Services Diaz provided to other clients.  The record shows Diaz provided 
immigration services far beyond mere translation assistance and Diaz provided services 
in legal fields besides immigration.  (See Findings 120-32.)  We will briefly summarize 
those services here.  She completed immigration applications for individuals who do not 
speak the Spanish language.  (See Finding 120.)  She composed letters for clients to send 
to the USCIS seeking action on pending immigration matters.  (See Findings 121-22.)  
She composed letters for an applicant and the applicant’s father expressing the 
applicant’s remorse and the father’s apology for an offense committed by the applicant as 
a juvenile, even though a juvenile adjudication is not a conviction for immigration 
purposes.  (See Finding 123.)  She prepared a Notice of Appeal to the BIA following a 
decision to deny one of her clients an asylum application, issued checks to the U.S. 
Department of Justice in connection with this appeal, and composed a letter seeking the 
 
14
withholding of the deportation of the client.  (See Finding 124.)  She assisted a client, 
born in the United States, with an immigration application for his wife, who had entered 
the United States without permission, but did not advise the client about the 
consequences of his wife’s leaving the United States and trying to re-enter using false 
documents while her immigration petition was pending, resulting in the wife’s being 
apprehended at the border and returned to Mexico when she tried to do so.  (See Finding 
127.)  She completed a Form I-485, Petition for Adjustment of Status, for a client, 
indicating her current nonimmigrant status as “I-130 approved,” even though she had 
entered the United States as a stowaway.  (See Finding 125.)  She assisted a married 
couple in connection with the I-130 immigration petition filed on behalf of the wife, and 
later, when the parties separated and planned to divorce, composed a letter to 
immigration officials, executed by the husband and notarized by Diaz, requesting that 
processing of the I-130 petition be halted.  (See Finding 130.)  She drafted various forms 
of a contract between individuals for the purchase and sale of a mobile home, including a 
form or agreement written in Spanish.  (See Finding 124.)  She drafted an answer to a 
complaint for a client, which was filed in the Elkhart Superior Court.  (See Finding 123.)  
She drafted a single Last Will and Testament for two clients, which was not properly 
executed.  (See Finding 131.) 
 
The Unauthorized Practice Of Law 
 
This Court’s authority to set standards for and to supervise the practice of law 
emanates from the need to protect the public from those who are not properly licensed or 
otherwise qualified to act as attorneys.  See State ex rel. Disciplinary Comm’n v. Owen, 
486 N.E.2d 1012, 1014 (Ind. 1986).  The practice of law without a license is not a 
“victimless crime” because the legal interests of people assisted by those who are not 
qualified to act as attorneys can be irreparably damaged.  See State ex rel. Indiana State 
Bar Ass’n v. Miller, 770 N.E.2d 328, 331 (Ind. 2002) (Shepard, C.J., dissenting).  This is 
especially true in immigration cases, where the consequences of incompetent 
representation may be the lost opportunity for permanent residence, deportation, and 
perhaps even death for unsuccessful asylum seekers. 
 
15
 
It is the province of this Court to determine what acts constitute the practice of 
law.  See In re Mittower, 693 N.E.2d 555, 558 (Ind. 1998).  This Court has not attempted 
to provide a comprehensive definition of what constitutes the practice of law because the 
infinite variety of fact situations each must be judged according to its own specific 
circumstances.  See Miller v. Vance, 463 N.E.2d 250, 251 (Ind. 1984).  Although there 
may be a “twilight zone” between those acts that are and those that are not permissible 
for persons who are not lawyers, see State ex rel. Indiana State Bar Ass’n v. Indiana Real 
Estate Ass’n, 244 Ind. 214, 217, 191 N.E.2d 711, 715 (1963), it is clear the core element 
of practicing law is the giving of legal advice to a client.  See Owen, 486 N.E.2d at 1013.  
In fact, merely entering into such relationship constitutes the practice of law.  See id.  The 
practice of law includes making it one’s business to act for others in legal formalities, 
negotiations, or proceedings.  See Mittower, 693 N.E.2d at 558.  In addition, holding 
oneself out as an attorney by the use of misleading labels, such as “esquire,” when one is 
not licensed to practice law may constitute the unauthorized practice of law.  See id.
 
This Court has had occasion to address whether assisting persons in filling out 
documents with legal ramifications constitutes the practice of law. In State ex rel. Indiana 
State Bar Ass’n v. Indiana Real Estate Ass’n, the issue presented was whether licensed 
real estate brokers and salespersons were engaged in the unauthorized practice of law 
when they used form legal documents prepared by attorneys, selected which forms to be 
used, and inserted words within the printed forms in connection with the real estate 
transactions.  See 244 Ind. at 217, 191 N.E.2d at 713.  This Court stated: 
Generally, it can be said that the filling in of blanks in legal instruments, 
prepared by attorneys, which require only the use of common knowledge 
regarding the information to be inserted in said blanks, and general 
knowledge regarding the legal consequences involved, does not constitute 
the practice of law.  However, when the filling in of such blanks involves 
considerations of significant legal refinement, or the legal consequences of 
the act are of great significance to the parties involved, such practice may 
be restricted to members of the legal profession. 
 
244 Ind. at 220, 191 N.E.2d at 715.  The Court then assessed the potential for errors by 
nonlawyers and the practicalities of the situation: 
 
16
We are aware of the dire consequences which might, in isolated instances, 
result from the use of an improper form, by persons not skilled in law, but 
such speculative consequences cannot be made to outweigh the 
practicalities of the situation. 
 
 
. . . . It cannot be urged, with reason, that a lawyer must preside 
over every transaction where written legal forms must be selected and 
used by an agent acting for one of the parties.  Such a restriction would so 
paralyze business activities that very few transactions could be 
expeditiously consummated. . . .  The possibility of an occasional 
improvident act in the use of such forms may not, with reason, be made 
the basis for denying the right to perform the same act in a thousand 
instances where the public convenience and necessity would seem to 
require it.  Lawyers, themselves, on rare occasions have been known to 
make errors in the drafting of such forms. 
 
 
The legislature has . . . recognized that the real estate brokers and 
salesmen perform an approved function in our business society, and has 
established a procedure whereby their qualification is ascertained.  No 
issue has been raised as to the sufficiency of this examination.  By this 
method, the legislature has attempted to establish reasonable standards for 
the safeguard of the public in their real estate transactions.  We consider it 
expedient that we attempt a reconciliation of the overlapping services 
performed by the real estate brokers and members of the bar.  
 
244 Ind. at 221-22, 191 N.E.2d at 715-16.  The Court concluded the execution of deeds is 
restricted to attorneys but real estate brokers and salespersons may fill in the forms of 
other legal instruments prepared by attorneys, including listing agreements, offers to 
purchase, purchase agreements, and short form leases.  See 244 Ind. at 226, 191 N.E.2d at 
717. 
 
  
In Miller v. Vance, this Court considered whether the preparation of a mortgage 
instrument by a bank employee who was not an attorney constituted the unauthorized 
practice of law.  See 463 N.E.2d at 251.  This Court reasoned:  
The instant case . . . involves the lay employees of banks 
performing the routine service of filling in information on standard real 
estate mortgage forms.  This service is incidental to and directly connected 
with the bank’s regular business of making loans.  The bank employees 
here were involved in preparing documents for routine business 
transactions with which they were thoroughly familiar in the same manner 
in which real estate brokers were involved in preparing documents 
 
17
routinely associated with their real estate transactions.  While it is true that 
the preparation of mortgage instruments might be classified as the practice 
of law in some circumstances, that is not the case here.   
 
 
Id. at 252.  The Court, however, cautioned: 
 
We emphasize that there are certain limitations which apply to bank 
employees similar to those placed upon real estate brokers. . . .  The lay 
bank employee may not give advice or opinions as to the legal effects of 
the instruments he prepares or the legal rights of the parties.  The bank 
may not make any separate charge for the preparation of the mortgage 
instrument.  
 
Id. at 253. 
 
 
 
Thus, in both Indiana Real Estate and Miller, the Court permitted nonlawyers to 
fill out legal forms in situations in which the chance for legal error was low.  The forms 
were used in routine transactions in the course of the jobs for which the nonlawyers were 
trained in Miller and for which the nonlawyers were both trained and licensed in Indiana 
Real Estate, and the forms were prepared by lawyers for use in such transactions.    
  
Immigration And Other Services Provided By Diaz 
 
Diaz’s use of immigration forms is not analogous to the use of forms by non-
lawyers permitted by this Court in Indiana Real Estate and Miller.  Immigration services 
cannot be considered “routine transactions.”  Rather, each case is unique and the 
procedures can be complex.  The choice of a form and the information to include in its 
blanks can turn on subtle facts that may not be apparent to those without legal training.   
 
Moreover, Diaz’s immigration services went far beyond the use of forms.  She 
held herself out as providing immigration services.  She advised clients on many aspects 
of immigration law, she wrote letters, motions, and appeals to immigration officials on 
behalf of clients, and she accompanied clients to the immigration office.  Beyond 
immigration law, she ventured into drafting contracts, a pleading, and at least one will.  
In many cases, her understanding of the underlying law was incomplete, her advice or the 
documents she prepared were faulty, and her clients suffered. 
 
18
 
The Court also notes that Diaz promised absolute confidentiality to her clients.  
However, because she is not an attorney, the sensitive information her clients disclose to 
her regarding their immigration status and other matters is not protected by the attorney–
client privilege.  The fact that she promised such confidentiality further suggests she was 
holding herself out as a “notario,” rather than a “notary,” discussed in more detail below. 
 
The Court is cognizant of the unmet needs of immigrants, particularly those from 
Latin America, for aid with immigration problems and procedures.  Because of the high 
poverty rate of recent immigrants and the dearth of affordable legal counsel, an estimated 
fifty to eighty percent of all non-citizens have unmet legal needs.  See Anne E. Langford, 
Note, What’s In A Name?: Notarios In The United States And The Exploitation Of A 
Vulnerable Latino Immigrant Population, 7 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 115, 118 (2004).  
According to a study of the civil legal problems among low-income, foreign-born 
households, one in five Latino immigrants reported having sought help for a legal issue 
from a non-attorney immigration consultant, many of whom use the misleading title of 
“notario publico.”  See id. at 122.  The study noted a disproportionate use of “notarios” 
by those whose immigration status was most precarious, including undocumented 
immigrants and asylum-seekers.  See id. at 123.    
   
The answer to these unmet needs, however, is not permitting unqualified 
practitioners to provide inadequate services.  Incompetence in the complexities of 
immigration law can have disastrous results because filing the wrong document, missing 
a deadline, or misjudging the relief available to a client can mean the difference between 
legal status and deportation (which, for asylum seekers, may carry the risk of death if 
returned to their native lands).  See id.  Although some non-attorneys may provide 
competent and welcome services to immigrant communities, see id. at 125, without any 
licensing or oversight of non-attorney practice, clients must trust to luck when using such 
services.     
  
 
19
It was perhaps in response to the vast unmet legal needs of immigrants that 
federal law now allows for non-attorney “accredited representatives” associated with 
qualified non-profit organizations to practice immigration law before BIA and the 
Service.  See id. at 126; 8 C.F.R. § 292.2 (2005).  La Casa is such an organization.  But 
while accredited representatives are not lawyers, they are subject to qualification 
requirements based on their experience and knowledge of immigration and naturalization 
law and procedure, they are subject to federal rules of professional conduct and 
discipline, and the organization for which they work must have at its disposal adequate 
knowledge, information, and experience.  See 8 C.F.R. §§ 292.2 & 292.3 (2005).  
Although a state may not interfere with the federal government’s authority to permit non-
lawyers to practice before its agencies, a state “maintains control over the practice of law 
within its borders except to the limited extent necessary for the accomplishment of the 
federal objectives.”  Sperry v. Florida ex rel. Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379, 402 (1963).  This 
Court expresses no opinion on whether any of the services offered by La Casa or those 
who work for La Casa may exceed the scope of their federal authorization and thus 
constitute the unauthorized practice of law in Indiana.  The Court simply notes that Diaz 
does not offer services as an accredited representative under the auspices of a qualified 
non-profit organization.  Her clients enjoy none of the protections such an arrangement 
offers and she may claim none of the privileges.  Her practice of immigration law appears 
to be in violation of federal as well as state law.   
 
Diaz’s Use Of The Titles “Notary Public” And “Notario Publico” 
 
 
The requirements to become a notary public in Indiana are not stringent.  An 
applicant for a notary public commission must be at least eighteen years of age, a legal 
resident of Indiana, and must secure an official bond in the sum of five thousand dollars 
($5,000).  See Ind. Code § 33-42-2-1(a) & (e) (2004).  No specific education or training is 
required.  The notary public application, found on the website of Indiana’s Secretary of 
State, 
is 
just 
four 
pages 
long, 
including 
instructions. 
 
See 
http://www.in.gov/icpr/webfile/formsdiv/40889.pdf.  A notary’s powers consist primarily 
of certifying acknowledgments of deeds and other legal instruments, administering oaths, 
 
20
and certifying affidavits and depositions.  See I.C. § 33-42-2-5 (2004).  A notary public 
may charge no more than two dollars ($2) for each notarial act.  See I.C. § 33-42-8-1 
(2004). 
 
 
By contrast, in many Latin American countries “notarios publicos” are a select 
class of elite attorneys, subject to rigorous examinations, regulation, and codes of 
professional responsibility, who perform quasi-judicial and other functions, including 
certifying and authenticating legal acts that they witness.  See Langford, supra, at 116.  
Some notaries public in the United States have exploited Latinos’ expectations about 
their functions and legal knowledge, creating an illusion of expertise to mislead those 
who depend on them.  See id.  Plying on the implicit misrepresentation of their 
credentials, some notaries charge excessive amounts for services that should be free or 
nominal in cost, in some cases destroying immigrants’ ability to pay for legitimate legal 
assistance.  See id. at 124.  See also Milagros Cisneros, Legislative Development, H.B. 
2659: Notorious Notaries-How Arizona Is Curbing Notario Fraud In The Immigrant 
Community, 32 Ariz. St. L.J. 287 (2000); Alexandra M. Ashbrook, Note, The 
Unauthorized Practice Of Law In Immigration:  Examining The Propriety Of Non-
Lawyer Representation, 5 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 237 (1991).   
 
 
Indiana is not the first state to be confronted with the misleading use of “notary 
public” or “notario publico.”  See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Lugo-Rodriguez, 317 So.2d 721 
(Fla. 1975); McCarthy v. Panaccio, 49 Pa. D. & C.2d 501 (1969); Langford, supra; 
Cisneros, supra.  By 1999, eleven jurisdictions had enacted legislation specifically aimed 
a curbing this practice.  See Cisneros, supra, at 311.  On July 1, 2001, the following 
Indiana statute took effect:   
 
A person who: 
 
(1) is not an attorney in good standing admitted to practice law in Indiana;  
and 
 
(2) knowingly or intentionally: 
 
 
21
(A) advertises the person’s services in a language other than English; 
 
(B) represents in the advertisement that the person is a notary, notary 
public, notario, notario publico, or another designation that indicates in 
a language other than English that the person is a notary public;  and 
 
(C) fails to conspicuously state in the advertisement, both in English 
and in the language of the advertisement, that the person is not an 
attorney in good standing admitted to practice law in Indiana; 
 
commits a Class A misdemeanor.  
 
I.C. § 33-42-2-10 (2004) (formerly I.C. § 33-16-2-10 (Supp. 2001), added by P.L. 64-
2001, § 1).   
 
None of Diaz’s advertisements presented to the Commissioner contained the 
disclaimer required by the above statute.  At least one of Diaz’s advertisements could 
have been published after the effective date of the statute and thus would have been in 
violation of the statute.  The statute notwithstanding, however, this Court finds Diaz’s use 
of the title “Notary Public” or “Notario Publico” to be inherently misleading.  One of her 
business cards contained the title not once, but twice.  The title was prominently 
displayed after her name on the awning of her office.  She displays her notary certificate 
prominently in her office, akin to the manner one might display a diploma.  Although 
Diaz corrects people who refer to her as an attorney by telling them she is a notary public, 
not an attorney, there is no indication Diaz corrects any misperception those people might 
have about the authority that comes with that title in Indiana.  There is no indication that 
any substantial part of Diaz’s business involves legitimate services as a Notary Public, 
and the fees she charges for her services are far above those permitted for notarial acts.  
Under these circumstances, the Court concludes Diaz’s use of the titles “Notary Public” 
and “Notario Publico” in advertisements, on business cards, on her office wall, and on 
her awning constitutes the unauthorized practice of law.  See Mittower, 693 N.E.2d at 
558 (holding oneself out as an attorney by the use of misleading labels may constitute the 
unauthorized practice of law). 
 
 
22
Conclusion, Injunction And Other Relief 
 
The evidence clearly established that Diaz has engaged in the unauthorized 
practice of law.  This Court has jurisdiction to issue restraining orders and injunctions in 
cases involving the unauthorized practice of the law.  See IND. CONST. art. 7, § 4; I.C. § 
33-24-1-2(b)(2) (2004).    
 
The Court therefore enjoins Diaz from:   
 
(1) selecting immigration forms for individuals seeking immigration 
assistance;  
 
(2) advising individuals both on how to fill in the blanks on immigration 
forms specifically and on immigration or other legal matters generally;  
 
(3) using the title “Notario” or “Notario Publico”; 
 
(4) using the title “Notary” or “Notary Public”  in advertisements (including 
business cards and displays outside and within her office) without a conspicuous 
disclaimer, in both English and Spanish, that she is not an attorney admitted to 
practice law in any jurisdiction;   
 
(5) offering or providing any services to any client related to immigration 
without disclaiming, in English or Spanish (whichever is best understood by the 
client), that she: (a) is not an attorney; (b) cannot tell individuals what 
immigration forms they need; (c) cannot tell individuals which immigration 
benefits they may be eligible for; and (d) cannot give advice on how to complete 
an immigration form; 
 
(6) drafting wills, contracts, pleadings, or other legal documents for clients; 
and 
 
23
 
(7) permitting any person working for her to do any act in violation of this 
injunction.   
 
This injunction does not prevent Diaz from providing clients with translation and 
other services that do not constitute the unauthorized practice of law, as long as clients 
are advised of the limits of Diaz’s services consistent with the above injunction.    
 
The costs and expenses of the hearing before the Commissioner shall be borne by 
Diaz.  See Admis. Disc. R. 24. 
 
SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, SULLIVAN, BOEHM, and RUCKER, JJ., 
concur. 
 
24