Title: Drummond Co., Inc. v. Boshell
Citation: 641 So. 2d 1240
Docket Number: 1930036
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: May 6, 1994

641 So. 2d 1240 (1994)
DRUMMOND COMPANY, INC.
v.
Thomas BOSHELL and Bobbie Jean Boshell.
1930036.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
May 6, 1994.
*1241 Richard E. Fikes of Tweedy, Jackson, and Beech, Jasper, for appellant.
James C. King and John E. Warren of Wilson &amp; King, Jasper, Deborah Alley Smith and Rhonda Pitts Chambers of Rives &amp; Peterson, Birmingham, for appellees.
*1242 PER CURIAM.
Thomas Boshell and his wife, Bobbie Jean Boshell, own their residence, where they have lived since 1960. In 1985, Drummond Company, Inc., erected a transformer on the property next to the Boshells' property in order to supply electricity to a mining operation that Drummond Company was conducting. In 1990, the Boshells sued Drummond Company, alleging that over a period of time the noise from the transformer had increased to an intolerable level and that the transformer emits noise at such a level that it interferes with the Boshells' peaceful use and enjoyment of their property. The Boshells alleged private nuisance, trespass, and negligent and/or wanton placement of the transformer next to their residence. A jury returned a verdict in favor of the Boshells, assessing compensatory damages of $300,000. The court denied Drummond Company's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial. Drummond Company appeals from the judgment based on the verdict.
Drummond Company first argues that the trial court erred in refusing to give its requested jury charge regarding nuisance. The trial court instructed the jury on nuisance as follows:
Where the trial court's oral charge adequately covers the law stated in the requested charge, the court may properly refuse to give the requested charge. Bateh v. Brown, 293 Ala. 704, 310 So. 2d 186 (1975); Rule 51, A.R.Civ.P. The trial court's instruction regarding nuisance was a correct statement of law; see Alabama Pattern Jury Instructions: Civil 31.50. Therefore, the trial court did not err in refusing to give Drummond Company's requested charge.
Drummond Company also argues that the trial court erred in overruling its objection to certain comments made by the Boshells' counsel during closing arguments and that the trial court erred in refusing to grant Drummond Company's motion for a mistrial on the ground of improper argument. Specifically, Drummond Company argues that comments made by the Boshells' counsel refer to the wealth of Drummond Company. Those comments are:
After reviewing those comments, we conclude that the comments do not refer to the wealth of the parties. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in overruling Drummond Company's objection to those comments and in denying Drummond Company's motion for a mistrial.
Drummond Company next argues that the trial court erred in allowing Thomas Boshell's *1243 treating physician, Dr. Gregory Flippo, to testify as an expert witness. Drummond Company asserts that Dr. Flippo had no personal knowledge of the noise level of the transformer, of the distance between the transformer and the Boshells' residence, or of the conditions for which the Boshells claimed injury. Drummond Company also asserts that Dr. Flippo offered no facts upon which his opinions were based and that Dr. Flippo's opinions were not based on a proper predicate and were speculative.
An expert witness may give opinion testimony based upon his own knowledge of the facts, stating the facts and then his opinion, or based upon facts in evidence that are assumed in a hypothetical question, but where the expert lacks personal knowledge of facts involved in a case, the expert may not give his opinion unless those facts have been properly hypothesized before the expert witness. Star Freight, Inc. v. Sheffield, 587 So. 2d 946 (Ala.1991), quoting Alabama Power Co. v. Robinson, 447 So. 2d 148, 152-53 (Ala.1983).
C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence, § 110.01(1) (4th ed. 1991).
Dr. Flippo testified that he first treated Thomas Boshell in February 1989 for chronic lung disease. Dr. Flippo further testified in the following colloquy:
Reviewing Dr. Flippo's testimony, we conclude that Dr. Flippo's opinion regarding the effect of the transformer noise upon Mr. Boshell's medical problems was based on personal knowledge of the history of Mr. Boshell's medical problems and upon statements related to Dr. Flippo by Mr. Boshell. See, C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence, § 110.01(1) (4th ed. 1991). The trial court did not err in allowing Dr. Flippo to testify as an expert witness.
Drummond Company further argues that it was prejudiced by statements made by a member of the venire during voir dire examination of prospective jurors and that the trial court erred, therefore, in refusing to grant Drummond Company's motion for a new trial. During the voir dire examination, the following colloquy transpired when a prospective juror was questioned about his knowledge of transformers:
Drummond Company objected to the response of this prospective juror and moved for a mistrial; after a lengthy discussion on that motion, which was held out of the presence of the jury, the trial court denied the motion for mistrial. "The proper inquiry on a motion for a new trial based on improper or nonexistent responses to voir dire questions is whether the response, or the lack of response, resulted in probable prejudice to the movant." Union Mortgage Co. v. Barlow, 595 So. 2d 1335, 1342 (Ala.1992), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. 301, 121 L. Ed. 2d 224 (1992).
Reviewing the prospective juror's response, we cannot say that Drummond Company was probably prejudiced. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in refusing to grant Drummond Company a new trial on this ground.
Drummond Company's final argument is that the trial court erred in refusing to grant its motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was excessive and the result of bias, passion, or prejudice on the part of the jury. After carefully reviewing the record, however, we conclude that the jury's verdict is clearly supported by the evidence. The Boshells presented evidence that they both suffer from the noise emitted by the transformer, and there was evidence that the Boshells have suffered mentally. Moreover, Mr. Boshell testified that, in his opinion, the Boshells' property had been worth $50,000, but that because of the noise emitted by the transformer, he did not think he could sell the property. Based on the evidence, we conclude that the jury award was not excessive.
The trial court's judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and MADDOX, SHORES, STEAGALL and INGRAM, JJ., concur.