Title: White v. State
Citation: 559 So. 2d 1097
Docket Number: 71679
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: March 15, 1990

559 So. 2d 1097 (1990)
Jerry WHITE, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 71679.

Supreme Court of Florida.
March 15, 1990.
Rehearing Denied May 24, 1990.
*1098 Larry Helm Spalding, Capital Collateral Representative, and Billy H. Nolas and Carlo Obligato, Staff Attys., Office of the Capital Collateral Representative, Tallahassee, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Richard B. Martell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee.
PER CURIAM.
Jerry White, under sentence of death, appeals the denial of postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. We affirm.
White was convicted of robbing a small grocery store and shooting to death a customer. The court imposed life imprisonment for the armed robbery conviction and, following the jury's recommendation, death for the murder conviction. The convictions and sentences were affirmed on appeal. White v. State, 446 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 1984). Subsequent to the signing of the death warrant, White filed a rule 3.850 motion and application for stay of execution. The stay was granted and the motion denied following an evidentiary hearing. This appeal followed. White raises seven issues: 1) ineffectiveness of counsel, 2) diminished jury role, 3) exclusion of black jurors, 4) exclusion of jurors opposed to capital punishment, 5) withholding of evidence, 6) insufficient finding of intent to kill, and 7) death by electrocution is cruel and unusual. We limit our discussion to the first issue; the others were either addressed on direct appeal or are without merit.
White asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective in three ways. First, he says the lawyer should have presented, or at least considered, the defense of voluntary intoxication in light of the extensive evidence that White was drunk at the time of the crimes. He says that many witnesses commented on White's drunken state, and that a blood alcohol level taken at the hospital several hours after the crime was nearly double the legal limit under the state's DUI statute. Had such a defense been presented, White claims, the jury may have found that he lacked the intent required for robbery or the premeditation necessary for first-degree murder. Second, he asserts that trial counsel should not have allowed him to take the stand in his own defense. Third, he claims that his lawyer's performance was generally ineffective for the following reasons: trial counsel was drunk or on drugs during the trial, the jury laughed at him, two newspapers commented on his incompetence, he was grossly unprepared, he failed to object at critical points, he failed to interview friends and family and present mitigating evidence at sentencing.
The standard for determining whether counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal was set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984):
We do not believe that counsel's performance requires reversal under this standard.
According to trial counsel's testimony at the evidentiary hearing, he rejected intoxication as a defense because it was inconsistent with the deliberateness of White's actions during the shootings. The court agreed with this view in its findings of fact:
The finding that the intoxication defense would have been incompatible with the deliberateness of White's actions is borne out by the evidence: White took a loaded gun into the store; the victims both were shot in the back of the head; White took the money from the store; he ran to his car steadily after the shootings and drove away capably; he had a change of clothes ready in the car and was able to change and discard his old clothes; he was able to dispose of the murder weapon in such a way that it has never been found. The prosecutor testified that White's own testimony was inconsistent with an intoxication defense and that trying to present this defense in tandem with White's theory of self-defense would have been like "riding two horses." The fact that counsel did not prevent White from testifying can hardly be termed a deficiency; White exercised his basic right to testify in his own behalf.
We also find insufficient evidence to support White's claim that representation was incompetent because counsel was intoxicated during the course of the trial. The trial court properly concluded that based upon the evidence
While counsel did state that he was experiencing health problems at the time of trial, this fact alone does not render his performance ineffective.
The defense lawyer's failure to object to testimony concerning Alexander's medical condition was addressed on appeal. *1100 See White, 446 So. 2d  at 1034 ("we do not find this error to be of the magnitude that would have prevented the jury from reaching a fair and impartial verdict"). Although counsel failed to voice appropriate objections at several other points in the proceeding, few trials proceed without any such error and "[i]t is almost always possible to imagine a more thorough job being done than was actually done." Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 972, 107 S. Ct. 474, 93 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1986). We note also that the defense called five witnesses at the penalty phase, and that White's claims of ineffectiveness based on counsel's unconventional courtroom actions can be attributed to trial strategy and courtroom style, as noted by the court below:
We conclude that White's claim of ineffective counsel fails under Strickland.
We affirm the decision of the trial court.
It is so ordered.
EHRLICH, C.J., and OVERTON, McDONALD, SHAW and GRIMES, JJ., concur.
BARKETT, J., dissents with an opinion, in which KOGAN, J., concurs.
BARKETT, Judge, dissenting.
I cannot concur in the majority's conclusion that appellant received a fair trial with effective assistance of counsel.
KOGAN, J., concurs.