Title: State v. Kelly R. Ferguson
Citation: 2009 WI 50
Docket Number: 2007AP002095-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 16, 2009

2009 WI 50 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2007AP2095-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Kelly R. Ferguson, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 308 Wis. 2d 397, 746 N.W.2d 606 
(Ct. App. 2008-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 16, 2009   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 16, 2008   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Marathon   
 
JUDGE: 
Gregory B. Huber   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
BRADLEY, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J. and CROOKS, J., join the 
concurrence. 
 
CROOKS, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J. and BRADLEY, J., join Part II 
of the concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Maura F.J. Whelan, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by Jefren E. 
Olsen, assistant state public defender, Madison, and oral 
argument was by Jefren E. Olsen. 
 
 
 
 
2009 WI 50
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2007AP2095-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2006CF233) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Kelly R. Ferguson, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 16, 2009 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   We review a decision 
of the court of appeals,1 which reversed the circuit court's 
judgment2 convicting Kelly R. Ferguson (Ferguson) of misdemeanor 
obstructing an officer pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1) (2005-
06).3  The issue presented is whether the facts of this case 
required the circuit court to instruct the jury that in order 
                                                 
1 State v. Ferguson, No. 2007AP2095-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2008). 
2 The Honorable Gregory B. Huber, Marathon County Circuit 
Court, presided. 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version unless otherwise noted.   
No. 
2007AP2095-CR   
 
2 
 
for Ferguson to have violated § 946.41(1), the entry of 
Ferguson's home to arrest her for disorderly conduct was 
accompanied by exigent circumstances.  Ferguson contends that 
because the police entered her home without a warrant and the 
jury was not instructed on exigent circumstances, there was no 
basis for the jury to find that the police acted with "lawful 
authority," as § 946.41(1) requires.  We conclude that, even 
though a jury instruction on exigent circumstances could have 
been given under the evidence presented to the jury, because 
Ferguson struggled with the officers outside of her home when 
she was in lawful custody of the police, the instruction given 
accurately set out the law for the officers' actions at that 
time.  Therefore, if omitting an instruction on exigent 
circumstances was error, it was harmless error.  Accordingly, we 
reverse the decision of the court of appeals and affirm the 
circuit court's judgment of conviction.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
On December 29, 2005, at around 4:30 in the morning, 
Wausau police responded to a report of an attempted break-in at 
a residence.  When the police arrived, they spoke with the 
person who had telephoned, a tenant of the apartment building's 
lower floor, who complained that the upstairs tenant, Ferguson, 
had pounded on his door and threatened to evict him.  The lower 
tenant explained that Ferguson was not the landlord and had no 
authority to evict him. 
¶3 
Following this interaction, the officers proceeded to 
Ferguson's apartment.  They knocked on the door and Ferguson 
No. 
2007AP2095-CR   
 
3 
 
answered.  They asked Ferguson if she had been downstairs 
earlier.  The officers testified that she said "no," and then 
became belligerent, yelling and swearing at the officers.  They 
said that while Ferguson was yelling, her nephew, also a 
resident of Ferguson's apartment, attempted to grab her arm and 
calm her down.  The officers testified that Ferguson shoved her 
nephew at this point and that she directed profanities at him 
and told him to pack up his things and move out.  Ferguson 
disputes this.   
¶4 
Until 
this 
time, 
the 
officers 
were 
outside 
of 
Ferguson's apartment, while Ferguson and her nephew were inside 
of the apartment.  However, following Ferguson's agitated 
conduct toward her nephew, the officers entered the apartment 
without 
a 
warrant 
and 
arrested 
Ferguson 
for 
misdemeanor 
disorderly conduct pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 947.01.4  When the 
officers handcuffed Ferguson, she tried to pull her arm away, 
but was unable to do so.  Ferguson was also resistive as the 
police attempted to get her socks on, and she continued to yell 
and scream. 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 947.01 states:  
Whoever, in a public or private place, engages in 
violent, 
abusive, 
indecent, 
profane, 
boisterous, 
unreasonably loud or otherwise disorderly conduct 
under circumstances in which the conduct tends to 
cause or provoke a disturbance is guilty of a Class B 
misdemeanor. 
No. 
2007AP2095-CR   
 
4 
 
¶5 
The officers then escorted Ferguson out of her 
apartment.  According to trial testimony, she continued to 
resist: 
Q Was she cooperative with you going down the stairs? 
A No.  She would do shoulder shifts back and forth to 
try to either break free, then she was what we call 
dead weight tactics, where an individual goes limp, 
and then you have to struggle more to hold them up 
and so forth.  This creates a danger for the 
individual and us, especially when they are going 
down a flight of stairs. 
 
There was a point halfway through the stairs where 
she picked her legs up, kind of up in front of her, 
and started almost a bicycle motion with her feet, 
flailing her feet around. 
Q How were her arms?  Were they flailing about also? 
A They [were] handcuffed, and we were holding them.  
I said there wasn't much she could do with her 
arms.  Mostly it was an upper torso shift back and 
forth. 
 
. . . . 
[W]hile she was kicking with her legs, I either got 
kicked with her foot or knee in the thigh.  It was 
kind of like a charlie horse feeling as we 
continued down the stairs.  Eventually we got her 
to the bottom of the stairs safely without anyone 
else getting injured. 
Q During the taking her down the stairs, how would 
you characterize the defendant's demeanor, again 
using the one to ten level of volume? 
A It was the same, ten. 
Q Upon getting her to the bottom of the stairs, what 
then did you do? 
A We escorted her to the car.  The stairs are at the 
back of the residence.  We picked the closest car, 
No. 
2007AP2095-CR   
 
5 
 
which happened to be in front by her driveway as we 
were parked across the street.  We escorted her on 
the pavement along the driveway, and at the front 
of the house where the sidewalk and boulevard is, 
that's where [the] squad was parked, and we got her 
to the squad there. 
 
. . . . 
Q When you were taking her to that squad, what was 
the state of her pants? 
A Well, we were kind of rushing her to the car 
because she was yelling and so forth.  Her pants 
began to fall down, I suspect because of all the 
kicking she was doing.  As we got to the rear of 
the squad, I still had her, ahold of her with one 
arm and began to try to pull up her trousers with 
my left hand, and she counteracted my efforts by 
kicking more to actually kick the pants off. 
Ferguson was charged with disorderly conduct, obstructing an 
officer and two counts of battery by a prisoner.5   
¶6 
At trial, Ferguson requested that the circuit court 
use the following jury instruction for the "lawful authority" 
element of the obstruction charge: 
Police officers act with lawful authority if 
their acts are conducted in accordance with the law.  
In this case, it is alleged that while the police were 
investigating a complaint made against the defendant 
Kelly Ferguson by her downstairs neighbors and she got 
so loud and abusive toward the officers that they 
found it necessary to arrest her at her home. 
The police lack authority to make an arrest of a 
person in the person's home without a warrant unless 
exigent circumstances exist that require the arrest to 
take place immediately. 
                                                 
5 The two counts of battery by a prisoner are based on 
events that took place while Ferguson was confined in the 
Marathon County Jail, and do not relate to our discussion here. 
No. 
2007AP2095-CR   
 
6 
 
In this case, the police did not have an arrest 
warrant. 
Exigent circumstances which justify a warrantless 
arrest inside the person's home, fall into four 
categories: 
A. 
The police were in hot pursuit of the 
defendant at the time of her arrest inside her home. 
B. 
The police had reason to believe evidence 
would 
be 
destroyed 
unless 
they 
made 
an 
arrest 
immediately[.] 
C. 
The defendant was likely to flee. 
D. 
The defendant was an immediate threat to the 
safety of others. 
If none of these circumstances [existed], the 
arrest was made without lawful authority[.] 
The circuit court rejected Ferguson's proposed jury instruction, 
and instead instructed the jury as follows: 
Police officers act with lawful authority if their 
acts are conducted in accordance with the law.  In 
this case, it is alleged that the officers were 
responding to and investigating a citizen complaint.  
During the course of doing so, the officers arrested 
the defendant. 
An 
arrest 
is 
lawful 
when 
the 
officer 
has 
reasonable grounds to believe that the person is 
committing, has committed, or is about to commit a 
crime.  An officer making an arrest may only use the 
amount of force reasonably necessary to take the 
person into custody. 
Having been read these instructions, the jury convicted Ferguson 
of disorderly conduct and obstruction. 
¶7 
The court of appeals reversed Ferguson's conviction 
for 
obstruction. 
 
State 
v. 
Ferguson, 
No. 
2007AP2095-CR, 
unpublished slip op., ¶11 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2008).  It 
No. 
2007AP2095-CR   
 
7 
 
held that the jury instruction given by the circuit court for 
the lawful authority element of obstruction was an incorrect 
statement of the law.  Id.  Because Ferguson was arrested inside 
of her home without a warrant, the court of appeals focused only 
on Ferguson's conduct within her home and held that the police 
could be acting with lawful authority only if Ferguson's arrest 
was accompanied by "exigent circumstances."  Id.  Because the 
jury was not instructed on exigent circumstances, the court of 
appeals concluded that "it is not possible in this case to say 
that Ferguson was obstructing the officers while they acted with 
lawful authority."  Id. (emphasis in original).  The court of 
appeals reversed Ferguson's conviction and remanded the case for 
a new trial.  Id. 
¶8 
We granted review and now reverse the court of 
appeals. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶9 
"[A] circuit court has broad discretion in deciding 
whether to give a particular jury instruction."  State v. Fonte, 
2005 WI 77, ¶9, 281 Wis. 2d 654, 698 N.W.2d 594.  A circuit 
court properly exercises its discretion when it fully and fairly 
informs the jury of the law that applies to the charges for 
which a defendant is tried.  Id.  Whether a jury instruction 
fully and fairly informs the jury of the law applicable to the 
charges being tried is a question of law that we review 
independently.  Id. (citing State v. Groth, 2002 WI App 299, ¶8, 
258 Wis. 2d 889, 655 N.W.2d 163).  If the jury instruction given 
No. 
2007AP2095-CR   
 
8 
 
was not an accurate statement of the applicable law, then the 
circuit 
court 
has 
erroneously 
exercised 
its 
discretion.  
Peplinski v. Fobe's Roofing, Inc., 193 Wis. 2d 6, 23-24, 531 
N.W.2d 597 (1995).  We review whether it is "clear beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the 
defendant guilty absent the [instructional] error" as a question 
of law.  State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶46, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 
N.W.2d 189. 
B. 
The Parties' Contentions 
¶10 Ferguson challenges her conviction for obstruction, a 
violation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 946.41(1). 
 
Section 
946.41(1) 
provides:  "Whoever knowingly resists or obstructs an officer 
while such officer is doing any act in an official capacity and 
with lawful authority, is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor."   
¶11 The parties do not dispute that Ferguson was arrested 
inside of her home following a warrantless entry by police, and 
that the police had probable cause to arrest.  Additionally, 
Ferguson does not dispute that the jury was properly instructed 
on all of the elements of obstruction other than "lawful 
authority."   
¶12 The State argues that the officers acted in accordance 
with 
the 
law 
because 
they 
complied 
with 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 968.07(1)(d), which states:  "A law enforcement officer may 
arrest a person when:  . . . [t]here are reasonable grounds to 
believe that the person is committing or has committed a crime."  
The State also argues that as long as police conduct is 
substantially in accordance with the law, the police act with 
No. 
2007AP2095-CR   
 
9 
 
"lawful authority."  The State asserts that it is conceded that 
the police had probable cause to arrest; therefore, the arrest 
was lawful even though it was accomplished without a warrant and 
in Ferguson's home.  The State also contends that exigent 
circumstances permitted the officers' entry into Ferguson's 
home. 
¶13 By contrast, Ferguson contends that the State's 
interpretation of "lawful authority" has no support in the law.  
She asserts that her constitutional rights were violated by the 
police's entry of her home without a warrant.  She also asserts 
that no exigent circumstances were present that could justify 
the unconstitutional entry, but even if the jury could have 
found that exigent circumstances were present, the jury was not 
instructed properly to make such a finding.  
C. 
"Lawful Authority" 
¶14 A central question before us is whether the jury 
instruction given accurately conveyed the meaning of "lawful 
authority" under Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1) as applied to the facts 
of this case.  Lawful authority describes whether the officer's 
actions are conducted in accordance with the law.  State v. 
Young, 2006 WI 98, ¶76, 294 Wis. 2d 1, 717 N.W.2d 729; State v. 
Annina, 2006 WI App 202, ¶17, 296 Wis. 2d 599, 723 N.W.2d 708.   
¶15 It is black letter law that a constitutional violation 
is an unlawful act.  See, e.g., Segura v. United States, 468 
U.S. 796, 829 (1984) (referring to Fourth Amendment violations 
as illegal conduct); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 
465 U.S. 89, 146 (1984) (concluding that acts that violate the 
No. 
2007AP2095-CR   
 
10 
 
Constitution are illegal); City of Milwaukee v. Kilgore, 193 
Wis. 2d 168, 189, 532 N.W.2d 690 (1995) (noting that a use of 
police power in violation of constitutional due process is 
unlawful); State v. Smith, 131 Wis. 2d 220, 235, 388 N.W.2d 601 
(1986) (stating that an arrest in violation of the state or 
federal Constitutions is unlawful).   
¶16 Accordingly, 
we 
reject 
the 
State's 
broad 
interpretation of lawful authority because "lawful authority," 
as that term is used in Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1), requires that 
police conduct be in compliance with both the federal and state 
Constitutions, in addition to any applicable statutes.  Smith, 
131 Wis. 2d at 235.  Therefore, we determine whether principles 
of constitutional law relating to the officers' interactions 
with Ferguson required the circuit court to instruct the jury 
differently. 
¶17 An arrest is a seizure invoking protections afforded 
under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 
Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution.6  Generally, 
                                                 
6 We generally have interpreted Article I, Section 11 to 
provide the same constitutional guarantees as the Supreme Court 
has accorded through its interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.  
State v. Arias, 2008 WI 84, ¶20, 311 Wis. 2d 358, 752 N.W.2d 
748.  On only one occasion in our development of Article I, 
Section 11 jurisprudence have we required a showing different 
from that required by the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence.  We did so in regard to our development of a good 
faith exception under Article I, Section 11.  State v. Eason, 
2001 WI 98, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625 (creating two 
additional requirements under Article I, Section 11 for law 
enforcement before according a good faith exception to their 
reliance on a defective no-knock search warrant).  Eason has no 
application here.   
No. 
2007AP2095-CR   
 
11 
 
if the police have probable cause to make an arrest, they do not 
need a warrant.  United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 417-23 
(1976); West v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 390, 398, 246 N.W.2d 675 
(1976).  However, when the police must enter a home to arrest, 
if they have not obtained a warrant in advance, the entry and 
arrest are presumptively unlawful.  Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 
573, 586 (1980); State v. Roberson, 2006 WI 80, ¶31 n.12, 292 
Wis. 2d 280, 717 N.W.2d 111; State v. Hughes, 2000 WI 24, ¶17, 
233 Wis. 2d 280, 607 N.W.2d 621.  This presumption is based on 
"the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has 
been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the 
Republic."  Payton, 445 U.S. at 601.  "Indeed, '[i]t is 
axiomatic that the physical entry of the home is the chief evil 
against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.'"  
State v. Richter, 2000 WI 58, ¶28, 235 Wis. 2d 524, 612 N.W.2d 
29 (quoting Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748 (1984)). 
¶18 A warrantless arrest executed inside of a home may be 
presumptively 
unlawful 
because 
the 
home 
entry 
itself 
is 
presumptively unlawful.  See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 
471, 484 (1963) (concluding that based on the facts of that 
case, the arrest that followed an unlawful entry was unlawful).  
Acts subsequent to an unlawful entry, but while the police are 
inside of the home, also are presumptively unlawful because of 
the warrantless entry itself.  New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 
20 (1990) (reasoning that because police conduct subsequent to 
an unlawful entry and prior to exit of the home was unlawful, "a 
No. 
2007AP2095-CR   
 
12 
 
warrantless entry will lead to the suppression of any evidence 
found, or statements taken, inside the home"). 
¶19 However, 
not 
all 
warrantless 
home 
entries 
are 
unlawful.  Payton merely states a presumption to which there are 
exceptions.  For example, a home entry, though unaccompanied by 
a warrant, is lawful if "exigent circumstances" are present.  
Payton, 445 U.S. at 586-89; Richter, 235 Wis. 2d 524, ¶28 
(concluding that the Fourth Amendment is not an absolute 
prohibition to a warrantless home entry); Smith, 131 Wis. 2d at 
228 (concluding that exigent circumstances coupled with probable 
cause to arrest are sufficient to justify a home-based arrest 
conducted without a warrant).  Exigent circumstances exist when 
"it would be unreasonable and contrary to public policy to bar 
law enforcement officers at the door."  Richter, 235 Wis. 2d 
524, ¶28; see also Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-300 
(1967). 
¶20 The United States Supreme Court has recognized that 
exigent circumstances may be present in a number of different 
situations.  See, e.g.,  Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 
(1978) 
(concluding 
that 
an 
ongoing 
fire 
was 
an 
exigent 
circumstance); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 
(1976) (holding that police in hot pursuit of a fleeing felon 
was an exigent circumstance); Hayden, 387 U.S. at 298-99 (same); 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966) (concluding 
that 
imminent 
destruction 
of 
evidence 
was 
an 
exigent 
circumstance).  As we have explained:
No. 
2007AP2095-CR   
 
13 
 
here are four well-recognized categories of exigent 
circumstances that have been held to authorize a law 
enforcement officer's warrantless entry into a home:  
1) hot pursuit of a suspect, 2) a threat to the safety 
of a suspect or others, 3) a risk that evidence will 
be destroyed, and 4) a likelihood that the suspect 
will flee. 
Richter, 235 Wis. 2d 524, ¶29 (citing Smith, 131 Wis. 2d at 
229).  The State bears the burden of proving that a warrantless 
home entry is justified by exigent circumstances.  Id. 
¶21 The exclusionary rule, which, if applied to unlawful 
police conduct, results in suppression of evidence obtained as a 
result of a constitutional violation, was developed in part to 
foster compliance with the Fourth Amendment's concern for the 
sanctity of the home.  United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474 
(1980).  Suppression is the usual remedy for a Fourth Amendment 
violation.  Id.   
¶22 The 
arrest 
and 
subsequent 
prosecution 
are 
not 
themselves invalidated, even though the initial entry may have 
been unlawful, so long as there was probable cause for the 
arrest.  Id.  As the United States Supreme Court explained in 
Crews: 
[A defendant] cannot claim immunity from prosecution 
simply 
because 
his 
appearance 
in 
court 
was 
precipitated by an unlawful arrest.  An illegal 
arrest, without more, has never been viewed as a bar 
to subsequent prosecution, nor as a defense to a valid 
conviction. 
Id. (further citations omitted). 
¶23 However, Ferguson is not moving for suppression of any 
evidence, nor does she challenge her conviction for disorderly 
conduct.  She challenges her conviction for obstruction because 
No. 
2007AP2095-CR   
 
14 
 
a substantive element of obstruction is whether the police were 
acting pursuant to their "lawful authority," as Wis. Stat. 
§ 946.41(1) requires.  Ferguson focuses her attention solely on 
police conduct within her home, which she asserts was unlawful 
because the police entered without a warrant.  The State 
counters that the police were lawfully within her home because 
they entered due to the exigent circumstance of a threat to the 
safety of her nephew.   
¶24 One of the officers testified as follows regarding the 
situation observed just outside Ferguson's door immediately 
prior to their warrantless home entry to arrest her: 
When I was up at the door, next to [Ferguson], she was 
just waving her hands, pointing at me.  I smelled an 
odor 
of 
intoxicants 
from——what 
I 
believe 
were 
intoxicants, based on my experience.  Again, because 
she didn't seem to respond to my request to calm down, 
within or after the first couple minutes or a minute 
or so [the other officer] stepped up to see if he 
could calm her down. 
The other officer testified that immediately prior to entry: 
I don't recall if she picked up a phone book or a 
telephone or something.  But then the young gentleman 
we identified as her nephew . . . was coming behind 
her.  He was saying Auntie, Auntie, and he went to 
grab her and bring her back a little bit, to compose 
her, I believe, and that's when she pushed him out of 
the way and started swearing and yelling at him, 
telling him to pack his F'ing stuff and he can move 
out, too. 
. . . . 
[B]ased on our encounter with her and her conduct and 
how she treated [her nephew] and pushed him, even in 
our presence, I determined it wouldn't be a good idea 
to just leave the situation and go back to the [police 
No. 
2007AP2095-CR   
 
15 
 
department].  I determined I was going to arrest her 
for disorderly conduct, at least so she can sober up 
for the night in the jail and not cause [her nephew] 
any harm after we leave.   
¶25 The State argues that clearly exigent circumstances 
were present that justified their warrantless entry.  However, 
the extent to which law enforcement is permitted to rely on 
exigent circumstances for a warrantless entry of a home has a 
relationship to the seriousness of the offense.  As the United 
States Supreme Court explained in Welsh, where "the underlying 
offense for which there is probable cause to arrest is 
relatively minor," courts should be very hesitant to find 
exigent circumstances.  Welsh, 466 U.S. at 750.  That is, 
"[w]hen the government's interest is only to arrest for a minor 
offense, . . . the government usually should be allowed to make 
such arrest[] only with a warrant issued upon probable cause by 
a neutral and detached magistrate."  Id.  The rationale for this 
holding is that the general presumption that police conduct 
No. 
2007AP2095-CR   
 
16 
 
accompanied by probable cause is reasonable is lessened when the 
underlying offense is minor.7  Id. at 750. 
¶26 We acknowledge the distinction recognized in Welsh, 
and note that this distinction causes us to address State v. 
Mikkelson, 2002 WI App 152, 256 Wis. 2d 132, 647 N.W.2d 421.  In 
Mikkelson, the court of appeals interpreted Welsh and Santana to 
impose a bright -line rule that police are justified in making a 
warrantless entry into a home only where the legislature had 
labeled the underlying offense as a felony.  Mikkelson, 256 
Wis. 2d 132, ¶17.  Because the underlying offense in Mikkelson 
was a misdemeanor, the court of appeals held that any exigent 
circumstances present were insufficient to justify the police's 
warrantless entry into Mikkelson's home.  Id. 
¶27 Our review of the reasoning of Mikkelson, as compared 
with that of Welsh and Santana, causes us to overrule Mikkelson 
and to adopt Justice Prosser's concurrence in State v. Sanders, 
                                                 
7 Justice Bradley attempts to show that Welsh v. Wisconsin, 
466 U.S. 740 (1984), is contrary to the position that the 
majority of the court takes with regard to our discussion of the 
officers' entry into Ferguson's home.  Justice Bradley's 
concurrence, ¶51 n.2.  However, Welsh does not support the 
position she takes.  In Welsh, the officers did not know whether 
Welsh had a prior OMVWI such that the OMVWI on which the 
officers were proceeding would have been a subsequent, and 
therefore jailable, offense.  Welsh, 466 U.S. at 746 n.6 
(explaining that "the police conducting the warrantless entry of 
his home did not know that the petitioner had ever been charged 
with, or much less convicted of, a prior violation for driving 
while intoxicated").  In the case now before us, the officers 
had objective facts upon which a reasonable officer could 
conclude that Ferguson was guilty of criminal disorderly 
conduct, a jailable offense.  Wis. Stat. § 947.01. 
No. 
2007AP2095-CR   
 
17 
 
2008 WI 85, 311 Wis. 2d 257, 752 N.W.2d 713.  As Justice Prosser 
noted, Welsh and Santana did not create a bright-line rule 
requiring the underlying offense to be labeled a felony in order 
for exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless home entry.8  
Id., ¶71 (Prosser, J., concurring).  Instead, Welsh held that 
the gravity of the underlying offense is "an important factor to 
be considered when determining whether any exigency exists," 
Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753, and that where the underlying offense is 
"a 
noncriminal, 
civil 
forfeiture 
offense 
for 
which 
no 
imprisonment is possible," exigent circumstances will rarely, if 
ever, be present, id. at 754.   
¶28 Welsh does not create a felony/misdemeanor distinction 
for finding exigent circumstances, contrary to the holding in 
Mikkelson.  Instead, in determining the extent to which the 
underlying offense may support a finding of exigency, "the 
                                                 
8 Ferguson asserts that State v. Mikkelson, 2002 WI App 152, 
256 Wis. 2d 132, 647 N.W.2d 421, need not be discussed here, 
since its rule arguably applies only to the exigent circumstance 
of "hot pursuit," and the potentially applicable exigent 
circumstance in this case would be "a threat to the safety of a 
suspect or others."   See State v. Richter, 2000 WI 58, ¶29, 235 
Wis. 2d 524, 612 N.W.2d 29.  We disagree.  Mikkelson based its 
felony/misdemeanor distinction on the United States Supreme 
Court's decisions in both Welsh and United States v. Santana, 
427 U.S. 38 (1976).  While Santana was a "hot pursuit" case, 
Santana, 427 U.S. at 42-43, Welsh dealt with the exigent 
circumstance present when there is a risk that evidence will be 
destroyed, Welsh, 466 U.S. at 754.  See Richter, 235 Wis. 2d. 
524, ¶29.  As a result, because of its reliance on Welsh, 
Mikkelson is not necessarily limited to "hot pursuit," and 
arguably may be read to apply its felony/misdemeanor distinction 
to all types of exigent circumstances.  Therefore, though 
Ferguson has not expressly relied on Mikkelson here, it is 
nevertheless appropriate for us to address it in this case. 
No. 
2007AP2095-CR   
 
18 
 
critical factor . . . is . . . 'the penalty that may attach.'"  
Sanders, 311 Wis. 2d 257, ¶81 (Prosser, J., concurring) (quoting 
Welsh, 466 U.S. at 754 n.14).  We reach this conclusion since 
the penalty imposed for an offense "'provide[s] the clearest and 
most consistent indication of the State's interest in arresting 
individuals suspected of committing that offense.'"  Id. 
(quoting Welsh, 466 U.S. at 754 n.14). 
¶29 Accordingly, 
courts, 
in 
evaluating 
whether 
a 
warrantless entry is justified by exigent circumstances, should 
consider whether the underlying offense is a jailable or 
nonjailable offense, rather than whether the legislature has 
labeled that offense a felony or a misdemeanor.  To hold 
otherwise would allow "the perpetrator of a serious misdemeanor 
offense, for which jail time is a penalty, to avoid immediate 
arrest merely because of the label ('felony' or 'misdemeanor') 
chosen by the legislature."  Id., ¶93 (citation omitted).  Such 
a result is not mandated by Welsh.   
¶30 Our interpretation of Welsh is supported by the United 
States Supreme Court's explanation of Welsh in Illinois v. 
McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 335-36 (2001), where it explained that 
"Welsh drew a distinction between jailable and nonjailable 
No. 
2007AP2095-CR   
 
19 
 
offenses, 
not 
between 
felony 
and 
misdemeanor 
offenses."9  
Sanders, 311 Wis. 2d 257, ¶83 (Prosser, J., concurring) (citing 
McArthur, 531 U.S. at 335-36).  Furthermore, many other 
jurisdictions 
have 
interpreted 
Welsh 
consistent 
with 
our 
interpretation here.  See, e.g., People v. Lavoyne M., 270 Cal. 
Rptr. 394, 395-96 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (rejecting a proposed 
distinction between 
misdemeanors and felonies); Mendez v. 
People, 986 P.2d 275, 283 (Colo. 1999) (holding that exigent 
circumstances can justify a warrantless entry even though the 
underlying offense is a misdemeanor); Dyer v. State, 680 So. 2d 
612, 613 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that misdemeanor 
possession of marijuana was a much more serious offense than the 
civil forfeiture offense in Welsh, and weighed in favor of 
exigency); Threatt v. State, 524 S.E.2d 276, 280 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1999) (noting that the gravity of the underlying offense, not 
the label the legislature has given it, is the appropriate focus 
of inquiry); State v. Legg, 633 N.W.2d 763, 769-70, 773 (Iowa 
2001) (noting that the distinction in Welsh is based on the 
penalty that attaches to the offense); State v. Paul, 548 N.W.2d 
260, 267-68 (Minn. 1996) (noting that the distinction in Welsh 
                                                 
9 Justice Bradley characterizes our overruling of Mikkelson 
as "an unbridled exercise of power."  Justice Bradley's 
concurrence, ¶47.  Her phraseology is really code words for not 
wanting the majority of the court to comply with the directive 
of the United States Supreme Court by overruling a published 
Wisconsin case that has incorrectly interpreted a United States 
Supreme Court case.  We conclude that due to the law-declaring 
function of this court, it is our responsibility to overrule 
Mikkelson's incorrect interpretation.  
No. 
2007AP2095-CR   
 
20 
 
is based not on the offense's label, but on whether the offense 
"is classified as a criminal offense for which imprisonment is 
possible") (emphasis in original); City of Kirksville v. Guffey, 
740 S.W.2d 227, 228-29 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that 
misdemeanor drunk driving justified a finding of exigency); 
State v. Nikola, 821 A.2d 110, 117-18 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2003) (noting that Welsh distinguished between jailable and 
nonjailable offenses, not misdemeanors and felonies); People v. 
Odenweller, 527 N.Y.S.2d 127, 129-30 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) 
(holding that misdemeanor drunk driving justified a finding of 
exigency); Beaver v. State, 106 S.W.3d 243, 248-49 (Tex. App. 
2003) (noting that Welsh distinguished between jailable and 
nonjailable offenses, not misdemeanors and felonies); Cherry v. 
Commonwealth, 605 S.E.2d 297, 306-07 (Va. Ct. App. 2004) (same); 
Rideout v. State, 122 P.3d 201, 210 (Wyo. 2005) ("[T]he 
distinction drawn by the Court in Welsh between minor offenses 
that do not justify a warrantless entry into a residence and 
those offenses that do is predicated upon whether the subject 
offense carries a potential jail term.").  Accordingly, because 
the disorderly conduct with which Ferguson was charged was a 
jailable offense, the jury could have been permitted to decide 
whether exigent circumstances justified the police's warrantless 
entry into her home.10  
                                                 
10 We acknowledge the valid concern of the concurrences that 
the distinction between a jailable offense and a non-jailable 
offense may not provide a bright line for law enforcement 
officers under all possible circumstances.  Justice Bradley's 
concurrence, ¶54; Justice Crooks' concurrence, ¶78.  However, 
the distinction between a misdemeanor and a felony also does not 
No. 
2007AP2095-CR   
 
21 
 
D. 
Jury Instruction 
¶31 Because 
"lawful 
authority" 
is 
an 
element 
of 
obstruction under Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1), if the jury was not 
properly instructed on the meaning of "lawful authority," given 
the facts presented to the jury, the circuit court erred.  See 
Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶23 ("[J]ury instructions that have the 
effect of relieving the State of its burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt every element of the offense charged are 
unconstitutional under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.").  
¶32 Ferguson engaged in a course of conduct wherein she 
struggled with the officers, both inside and outside of her 
home, which the jury could have found obstructed the police.  
Inside her home, Ferguson resisted the officers when they 
attempted to put her in handcuffs, and she was uncooperative 
when they tried to put on her socks.  The parties seem to agree 
that if the jury found that this conduct violated Wis. Stat. 
§ 946.41(1), the police must have had exigent circumstances in 
order for them to be acting with lawful authority at that time.  
¶33 The 
parties 
also 
agree 
that 
the 
only 
exigent 
circumstance the jury could have found at the time the police 
entered Ferguson's home would have been that Ferguson was a 
threat to the safety of her nephew.  See Richter, 235 Wis. 2d 
524, ¶29.  In that regard, Ferguson, who had been drinking, 
                                                                                                                                                             
provide a bright line for officers considering whether to enter 
a person's home without a warrant under all circumstances, and 
that distinction is not supported by United States Supreme Court 
precedent.    
No. 
2007AP2095-CR   
 
22 
 
became abusive toward her nephew when he attempted to take her 
arm to calm her.  This occurred immediately preceding the 
officers' entry into her home.  If the jury needed to find that 
this exigent circumstance existed in order to find that the 
police acted with lawful authority, no instruction was provided 
to alert the jury of this concern.  If that instruction had been 
necessary, failure to give it would have been error, subject to 
a harmless error analysis.  Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶37.   
¶34 However, when Ferguson was removed from her home, she 
continued to struggle with the officers.  She used "dead weight 
tactics," going limp as the officers attempted to move her, and 
she flailed her legs going down the stairs.  She kicked at least 
one of the officers.  In addition, she was resistive as the 
officers placed her in the squad car, and flailed her legs 
again, kicking her pants off.  
¶35 In 
regard 
to 
actions 
that 
occurred 
outside 
of 
Ferguson's apartment, the question becomes whether the police 
were acting with lawful authority as they escorted her down the 
apartment building stairway and placed her inside the squad car. 
We conclude that the jury must have decided that the police were 
acting with lawful authority.  In so concluding, we rely on the 
reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Harris.  
¶36 In Harris, the police had probable cause to arrest 
Harris for the murder of Thelma Staton.  They went to Harris' 
home and entered with the plan to arrest him; however, they did 
not obtain a warrant prior to doing so.  Harris, 495 U.S. at 15.  
No. 
2007AP2095-CR   
 
23 
 
Once inside Harris' home, they read him his Miranda warnings,11 
and according to the officers, he confessed to the murder.  Id. 
at 16.  Subsequent to his arrest, Harris was taken to the 
station house and again read his Miranda warnings.  Id.  At the 
station house, he signed a confession to the murder.  Id.  The 
trial court suppressed the in-home confession as violative of 
Payton because police had entered Harris' home to arrest him 
without a warrant, but concluded that the station house 
confession was admissible.  Id.  After the appellate division 
affirmed, the New York Court of Appeals reversed, concluding 
that the station house confession should have been suppressed as 
well.  Id.  Before the Supreme Court, the state did not contest 
the suppression of the in-home confession; it contested only the 
suppression of the station house confession.  Id.   
¶37 The Supreme Court overruled the suppression of the 
station house confession, reasoning that nothing in Payton 
"suggests that an arrest in a home without a warrant but with 
probable cause somehow renders unlawful continued custody of the 
suspect once he is removed from the house."  Id. at 18.  The 
Court went on to explain that a warrantless arrest based on 
probable cause also did not require the police to release Harris 
and then immediately re-arrest him once they had removed him 
from his home in order to make his transportation to the station 
house lawful.  Id.   
                                                 
11 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
No. 
2007AP2095-CR   
 
24 
 
¶38 The Supreme Court explained that the lawfulness of 
police custody of Harris differed from cases such as Taylor v. 
Alabama, 457 U.S. 687 (1982), Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 
(1979) and Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), because in 
each of those cases the entry was without a warrant and the 
police also lacked probable cause to arrest.  Harris, 495 U.S. 
at 18-19.  Because the police had probable cause to arrest 
Harris, the statement given at the station house was given while 
Harris was in lawful custody.  
¶39 The reasoning and conclusions of Harris are applicable 
to Ferguson's struggles while the police were escorting her down 
the apartment stairs and placing her into the squad car.  This 
is so because the police had probable cause to arrest Ferguson 
for disorderly conduct so that she was lawfully in their 
custody.  Once Ferguson was removed from her house, the police 
were not required to re-arrest her for disorderly conduct in 
order to make her continued custody lawful.  Therefore, her 
continuing struggles outside of her home occurred when the 
police were lawfully transporting her to the station house.   
¶40 Our conclusion in this regard is supported by other 
courts that have considered the issue of whether continued 
custody subsequent to an arrest based on probable cause is 
lawful, even though the defendant was not arrested in a lawful 
manner.  See United States v. Hudson, 405 F.3d 425, 439 (6th 
Cir. 2005) ("[Harris] emphasized that although the manner of the 
defendant's arrest was unconstitutional, his continued custody——
supported by probable cause——was not unlawful and he could not 
No. 
2007AP2095-CR   
 
25 
 
claim 'immunity from prosecution because his person was the 
fruit of an illegal arrest.'"); United States v. Villa-
Velazquez, 282 F.3d 553, 556 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that, 
because law enforcement officers had probable cause to arrest 
the defendant, "the evidence obtained during the time that [the 
defendant] was in lawful custody" should not be suppressed 
because of "the earlier unlawful entry into his residence"); 
Torres v. State, 619 A.2d 566, 569 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) 
("Once the suspect is outside the protected premises, . . . the 
initially invalid restraint ripens into valid restraint."); 
Roberson, 287 Wis. 2d 403, ¶16 (noting that "the Harris court 
distinguished Payton as protecting the home itself, not the 
defendant's person, and, as a result, Harris' confession made 
outside of the home was admissible").   
¶41 As 
we 
noted 
above, 
although 
the 
jury 
was 
not 
instructed about exigent circumstances, it did receive an 
instruction on lawful authority.  The circuit court instructed:   
Police officers act with lawful authority if their 
acts are conducted in accordance with the law.  In 
this case, it is alleged that the officers were 
responding to and investigating a citizen complaint.  
During the course of doing so, the officers arrested 
the defendant. 
An arrest is lawful when the officer has reasonable 
grounds to believe that the person is committing, has 
committed, or is about to commit a crime.  An officer 
making an arrest may only use the amount of force 
reasonably necessary to take the person into custody. 
¶42 The jury necessarily found that there were reasonable 
grounds to believe Ferguson was committing or had committed a 
No. 
2007AP2095-CR   
 
26 
 
crime because it convicted Ferguson of obstruction.  In order to 
do so, the jury also had to find that the officers acted 
pursuant to their lawful authority.  That is, under the 
instruction given, the jury must have found that the officers 
acted pursuant to their lawful authority if it found that the 
officers had reasonable grounds to believe that Ferguson was 
committing or had committed a crime.  Because the jury convicted 
Ferguson, it found this fact.  Drabek v. Sabley, 31 Wis. 2d 184, 
188, 142 N.W.2d 798 (1966) (noting that a jury impliedly finds 
underlying facts if those facts are necessary to the ultimate 
fact of guilt or innocence).   
¶43 The jury instruction here was a correct statement of 
the 
law 
for 
police 
actions 
outside 
of 
Ferguson's 
home.  
Therefore, although one may argue that the jury instruction was 
incomplete because it did not instruct on exigent circumstances, 
it did instruct relative to the actions of the police in 
arresting Ferguson once they were outside of her home where she 
continued her resistive course of conduct.   
¶44 It is true that a jury instruction that is incomplete, 
but is in all other respects a correct statement of the law, may 
be erroneous.  See State v. Perkins, 2001 WI 46, ¶43, 243 
Wis. 2d 
141, 
626 
N.W.2d 
762 
(concluding 
that 
the 
jury 
instruction was erroneous because it failed to adequately define 
the element of "threat" for the offense of intentional threat to 
a judge); see also Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579-80 (1986) 
(explaining that a jury instruction was erroneous because, while 
it did instruct the jury on the "malice" element of the charged 
No. 
2007AP2095-CR   
 
27 
 
offense, it erroneously shifted the burden of proof).  However, 
here any incompleteness in the instruction did not fail to 
define lawful authority.   
¶45 Based on the test set forth in Harvey, we conclude 
that 
if 
the 
failure 
to 
instruct 
the 
jury 
on 
exigent 
circumstances was error, it was harmless.  Under Harris, the 
police were acting with lawful authority in continuing their 
arrest of Ferguson as they escorted her down the apartment 
building stairway and placed her in the squad car.  Ferguson did 
not discontinue her resistive conduct when police removed her 
from her home.  As a result, we can conclude that if the jury 
had been instructed on exigent circumstances as well as the 
instruction given, it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the jury would have convicted Ferguson of obstruction.  Harvey, 
254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶48.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶46 We conclude that, even though a jury instruction on 
exigent circumstances could have been given under the evidence 
presented to the jury, because Ferguson struggled with the 
officers outside of her home when she was in lawful custody of 
the police, the instruction given accurately set out the law for 
the officers' actions at that time.  Therefore, if omitting an 
instruction on exigent circumstances was error, it was harmless 
error.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and affirm the circuit court's judgment of conviction.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
No.  2007AP2095-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶47 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  The majority 
exhibits an unbridled exercise of power.  What I mean by that 
phrase is that the majority ignores the normal restraints of an 
appellate court such as following precedent and letting the 
parties frame and argue the issues.  Instead, it unnecessarily 
reaches out to overrule a prior decision that even the State 
acknowledges "was never raised" previously and "is not part of 
this case."  Why does the majority do this?  Because it can. 
¶48 I write separately because I cannot join the majority 
in overruling State v. Mikkelson, 2002 WI App 152, 256 
Wis. 2d 132, 647 N.W.2d 421.  As enunciated in the concurrence 
of Justice Crooks, not only is it unwarranted but the test the 
majority adopts in its stead is unworkable.  Although I agree 
with the result of the majority, that the court of appeals 
should be reversed and the conviction affirmed, I do so based on 
a different rationale.  Accordingly, I respectfully concur.1   
I 
¶49 In Mikkelson, the court of appeals determined that hot 
pursuit of a fleeing misdemeanant was not by itself sufficient 
to justify a warrantless home entry.  Id., ¶17.  The holding in 
Mikkelson is not at issue here given that hot pursuit is not an 
issue in this case.  
¶50 Ferguson has never relied on Mikkelson and has never 
argued that the officers' home entry was unlawful because 
disorderly conduct is a misdemeanor.  Instead, Ferguson has 
                                                 
1 In 
addition, 
I 
join 
Part 
II 
of 
Justice 
Crooks' 
concurrence. 
No.  2007AP2095-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
consistently asserted that the home entry was lawful only if she 
posed a threat to the safety of herself or her nephew, and it 
was necessary for the jury to decide whether that exigent 
circumstance was present.     
¶51 Neither party cited Mikkelson at the circuit court or 
at the court of appeals.  Further, both parties agree that it is 
not necessary for this court to address Mikkelson in order to 
resolve this appeal.  Ferguson argues that Mikkelson is 
irrelevant because its holding is limited to hot pursuit, and 
this case involves a different exigency.  At oral argument, the 
State 
agreed 
that 
Mikkelson 
need 
not 
be 
addressed: 
"If 
Ferguson's conviction is affirmed, as [defense] counsel points 
out, the Mikkelson/Sanders2 issue was never raised and therefore 
it is not part of the case."  
¶52 The State is correct.  The majority's discussion of 
Mikkelson is a wholly unnecessary detour, and only after 
reaching out to overrule the case does the majority return to 
the real issue presented——whether the jury instruction that was 
actually given was erroneous. 
¶53 What makes the majority's overreach even worse is that 
it does not deal with some trifling, penny-ante issue.  Rather, 
it dilutes the protections guaranteed to all of us by the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
                                                 
2 State v. Sanders, 2008 WI 85, 311 Wis. 2d 257, 752 
N.W.2d 713. 
No.  2007AP2095-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
 
II 
¶54 I agree wholeheartedly with Justice Crooks' prediction 
that the majority's new test for exigent circumstances——whether 
the offense is jailable——is unworkable.  His concurrence 
expresses doubt "that a law enforcement officer will easily be 
able to determine, perhaps in the middle of the night, and 
certainly without the knowledge of what offense the prosecuting 
authority will ultimately decide to charge, whether the offense 
involved 'is a jailable or nonjailable offense.'"  Justice 
Crooks' concurrence, ¶79.   
¶55 This very case demonstrates the difficulties presented 
by the majority's approach.  The majority concludes that 
"because the disorderly conduct with which Ferguson was charged 
was a jailable offense, the jury could have been permitted to 
decide whether exigent circumstances justified the police's 
warrantless entry into her home."  Majority op., ¶30.   
¶56 In this case, however, it is not at all clear that the 
officers were arresting Ferguson for a jailable offense.  The 
majority miscites the record when it states that City of Wausau 
police officers entered Ferguson's apartment to arrest her "for 
misdemeanor disorderly conduct pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 947.01."  
See majority op., ¶4.  In fact, Officer Taylor, who made the 
decision to arrest, testified that he decided to take Ferguson 
into custody in order to let her sober up and calm down: 
I determined it wouldn't be a good idea to just leave 
the situation and go back to the P.D.  I determined 
that I was going to arrest her for disorderly conduct, 
No.  2007AP2095-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
at least so she can sober up for the night in the jail 
and not cause [her nephew] any harm after we leave.   
It is unclear whether at the time of the arrest for disorderly 
conduct, Officer Taylor intended for Ferguson to be charged with 
a crime or any offense at all.   
¶57 If charged, it just as easily could have been for a 
civil forfeiture rather than a misdemeanor, but for Ferguson's 
post-arrest conduct.  The Wausau Ordinances provide that the 
penalty for disorderly conduct is "a forfeiture of not less than 
ten dollars nor more than two hundred dollars for each offense."  
Wausau Municipal Code §§ 1.01.110, 9.04.010.  Under the Marathon 
County Ordinances, the penalty for first offense disorderly 
conduct is "not less than $5.00 nor more than $500.00."  
Marathon County Ordinances § 25.04; see also id. §§ 9.01, 9.15.  
Neither the city nor the county ordinance provides that 
disorderly conduct is a jailable offense. 
¶58 I predict, along with Justice Crooks, that law 
enforcement will labor under the uncertainty of the majority's 
newly contrived test.  As city police officers step over the 
threshold to arrest for disorderly conduct, how are they to know 
if conduct will subsequently be charged as a jailable or 
nonjailable offense?3  When officers have to act in the middle of 
                                                 
3 The United States Supreme Court grappled with a similar 
concern in Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 746 n.6 (1984): 
The petitioner was charged with a criminal misdemeanor 
because this was his second . . . citation [for what 
would otherwise be a civil forfeiture] in the previous 
five years.  Although the petitioner was subject to a 
criminal charge, the police conducting the warrantless 
entry of his home did not know that the petitioner had 
ever been charged with, or much less convicted of, a 
No.  2007AP2095-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
the night under split-second circumstances, how can we expect 
them to make these nuanced decisions?  I conclude that the test 
is unworkable.    
III 
¶59 After taking a detour to change Wisconsin law and 
decide issues that are wholly irrelevant to this case, the 
majority finally returns to the real question presented——whether 
the jury instruction properly described the law.  See majority 
op., ¶¶31-45.  It undertakes a contorted analysis, relying on 
language from New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990).   
¶60 Yet, Harris is a very different case from the one 
presented here.  In that case, pursuant to a "departmental 
policy" of arresting suspects at home but without a warrant, 
officers unlawfully entered Harris's home to arrest him for 
murder.  Id. at 15-16; see also id. at 25 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting).  They interviewed him inside the home, and Harris 
confessed.  Id. at 16.  The officers then transported him to the 
police station where he confessed again.  Id.  The question was 
whether the stationhouse confession should be suppressed because 
it was the product of an illegal arrest.  The Supreme Court 
concluded that the stationhouse confession to murder was not 
itself the product of an illegal arrest and therefore need not 
                                                                                                                                                             
prior violation for driving while intoxicated.  It 
must be assumed, therefore, that at the time of the 
arrest the police were acting as if they were 
investigating 
and 
eventually 
arresting 
for 
a 
nonjailable traffic offense that constituted only a 
civil violation under the applicable state law. 
No.  2007AP2095-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
be suppressed.  Id. at 19.  Here, however, Ferguson is not 
seeking to suppress any evidence.    
¶61 The Harris opinion is not without controversy.  It is 
viewed under certain fact situations as creating powerful 
incentives for officers to ignore Fourth Amendment protections.  
Not all courts have clamored to embrace its holding.  For 
instance, when Harris was remanded by the Supreme Court to the 
New York Court of Appeals, the New York court refused to 
conclude that the stationhouse confession was admissible.  See 
People v. Harris, 570 N.E. 2d 1051 (N.Y. 1991).  Rather, the New 
York court determined that "the Supreme Court's rule does not 
adequately protect the search and seizure rights of citizens of 
New York," and that even if the confession was admissible under 
federal standards, the New York State Constitution required its 
suppression.  Id. at 1052-53. 
¶62 Ferguson claims that the error here is that the 
circuit court failed to give the correct jury instruction.  One 
element of obstruction is that the police were acting with 
"lawful authority."  Wis. Stat. § 946.41.  Ferguson asserts that 
the court should have instructed the jury on the law of exigent 
circumstances so it could determine whether the State proved 
that element.  She has consistently argued that if the entry and 
therefore arrest for disorderly conduct were unlawful, then she 
could not be prosecuted for obstruction.  
¶63 I conclude, however, that even if the entry and arrest 
for disorderly conduct were unlawful, the obstructing was 
sufficiently separate in time and location from any potentially 
No.  2007AP2095-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
unlawful conduct by the police.  See State v. Annina, 2006 WI 
App 202, ¶11, 296 Wis. 2d 599, 723 N.W.2d 708 (citing with 
approval United States v. Bailey, 691 F.2d 1009, 1017-18 (11th 
Cir. 1982)) ("[T]he police may legally arrest a defendant for a 
new, distinct crime, even if the new crime is in response to 
police misconduct and causally connected thereto."). 
¶64 The obstruction for which Ferguson was charged was a 
distinct crime from the disorderly conduct charge, and was based 
on 
distinct 
conduct 
that 
occurred 
outside 
of 
her 
home.  
Admittedly during the course of the trial there was some 
reference to her resistance in the home.4  What is clear, 
however, is that the obstruction that occurred outside the home 
was paramount. 
¶65 Officers Taylor and Cihlar, who made the initial and 
allegedly unlawful arrest, testified that they escorted Ferguson 
out of her apartment and into a waiting squad car.  At that 
point, the officers testified that she actively and aggressively 
resisted their attempts to bring her into custody. 
                                                 
4 Specifically, Officer Taylor testified, "[I] grabbed onto 
her arm.  As she turned around, at this point I think it was her 
right arm, and she tried to shake it loose, but she couldn't."  
Additionally, the officers testified that she was slow and 
"picky" about which socks she wanted to wear.  Unfortunately, 
neither the court nor the attorneys sought to clarify whether 
these minor references also served to support the factual basis 
of the obstruction charge.  The real focus of the testimony 
establishing obstruction, however, was the testimony about the 
aggravated conduct that occurred while she was outside the 
apartment.     
 
No.  2007AP2095-CR.awb 
 
8 
 
¶66 Officer Taylor testified that she physically resisted 
when they escorted her down the exterior staircase of the 
apartment building:  
Q: Was she cooperative with you going down the stairs? 
A: No.  She would do shoulder shifts back and forth to 
try to either break free, then she was what we call 
dead weight tactics, where an individual goes limp and 
then you have to struggle more to hold them up and so 
forth.  This creates a danger for the individual and 
us, especially when they are going down a flight of 
stairs.  
There was a point halfway through the stairs where she 
picked her legs up, kind of up in front of her, and 
started almost a bicycle motion with her feet, 
flailing her feet around. 
. . . . 
She was flailing around, using dead weight tactics, 
and part of the way, while she was kicking with her 
legs, I either got kicked with her foot or knee in the 
thigh.  It was kind of like a charlie horse feeling as 
we continued down the stairs.  Eventually we got her 
to the bottom of the stairs safely without anyone else 
getting injured.  
¶67 He 
also 
testified 
that 
Ferguson 
obstructed 
the 
officers when they tried to place her in the squad car: 
[W]e were kind of rushing her to the car because she 
was yelling and so forth.  Her pants began to fall 
down, I suspect because of all the kicking she was 
doing.  As we got to the rear of the squad, I still 
had her, ahold of her with one arm and began to try to 
pull up her trousers with my left hand, and she 
counteracted my efforts by kicking more to actually 
kick the pants off.  She yelled, "Look at this.  
Wausau PD is stripping me down on the street," and 
said something like she is going to tell everything, 
we stripped her down.  I just opened the door at that 
point and put her in the car. 
No.  2007AP2095-CR.awb 
 
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Officer Ciphar testified that she had been kicking, twisting 
around, and yelling, and by the time they arrived at the squad 
car, her pants were at her ankles.  He testified that they 
"tried numerous times to have her pants up and keep them up, but 
she seemed determined to resist that, and so we had her seated 
in the squad as she was."   
¶68 Additionally, Officer Taylor testified that Ferguson 
continued to resist once she had been placed in the squad car.  
He testified that at one point, she freed herself from her 
handcuffs.  Further: 
[I was approximately 90 feet away from the squad car, 
and from that distance] I could hear thumping in the 
back of the squad, which is familiar to me as someone 
kicking the back of the cage, or the inner door area, 
as well as her yelling.  That got my attention. 
¶69 This conduct bears no relation to the purportedly 
unlawful entry for disorderly conduct.  After the arrest, and 
after she was transported outside by the officers, Ferguson 
obstructed the officers by kicking, using dead weight tactics, 
and removing her clothing.  This obstruction was a new and 
distinct crime.  Under these facts, even if the initial arrest 
for disorderly conduct was unlawful, that cannot immunize 
Ferguson for prosecution for the second, separate crime.     
¶70 The jury instruction for obstructing an officer given 
by the circuit court advised that officers act with "lawful 
authority" when they have probable cause to believe that a crime 
is, has been, or is about to be committed.  Ferguson argues that 
the circuit court erred by failing to give a jury instruction 
defining 
"lawful 
authority" 
in 
the 
context 
of 
exigent 
No.  2007AP2095-CR.awb 
 
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circumstances which could make lawful the officers' warrantless 
entry for disorderly conduct.  I conclude that the circuit court 
gave the proper instruction.   
¶71 Here, the crime of obstructing an officer is a new and 
distinct crime.  Additionally, both the conduct underlying the 
obstruction charge and the location of where the obstructing 
conduct occurred support the conclusion that the obstruction is 
separate from the warrantless entry of the apartment for 
disorderly conduct.  Accordingly, I respectfully concur.   
 
¶72 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and Justice N. PATRICK CROOKS join this concurrence. 
 
 
No.  2007AP2095-CR.npc 
 
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¶73 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (concurring).   
I 
¶74 Since I am convinced that the majority opinion is 
correct that "if the failure to instruct the jury on exigent 
circumstances was error, it was harmless," majority op., ¶45, 
see also ¶1, I join that part of the opinion and respectfully 
concur. 
¶75 The appropriate test for harmless error is set forth 
in State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶¶49-52, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 
N.W.2d 189, which recognizes that constitutional instructional 
error is subject to application of the harmless error analysis 
articulated in Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 15 (1999). 
¶76 In Neder, the United States Supreme Court set forth 
the test as follows:  "Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt 
that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty 
absent the error?"  Id. at 18.  I am satisfied that under the 
harmless error analysis, if there was instructional error here, 
it was harmless for the reasons outlined in the majority 
opinion. 
II 
¶77 Since this case can be, and has been, resolved by the 
majority on the basis of harmless error, there is no need 
whatsoever for the majority to reach out unnecessarily and 
overrule State v. Mikkelson, 2002 WI App 152, 256 Wis. 2d 132, 
647 N.W.2d 421.  Majority op., ¶27.  What is even more difficult 
to understand is why this is being done when the majority 
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acknowledges that Ferguson is not even relying on Mikkelson.  
Majority op., ¶27 n.8. 
¶78 The majority doesn't stop with overruling Mikkelson, 
but rather proceeds to decide that a warrantless entry into a 
person's home should be evaluated on the basis of whether the 
law enforcement officers are dealing with an offense that is "a 
jailable or nonjailable offense."  Majority op., ¶29. 
¶79 I sincerely doubt that a law enforcement officer will 
easily be able to determine, perhaps in the middle of the night, 
and certainly without the knowledge of what offense the 
prosecuting authority will ultimately decide to charge, whether 
the offense involved "is a jailable or nonjailable offense." 
¶80 Knowing that in many communities charging decisions 
involve a choice between a criminal offense or an ordinance 
violation——e.g., possession of marijuana——this new test appears 
to be totally unworkable.  It offers the police officers on the 
front line almost no real guidance in deciding whether a 
warrantless entry into someone's home will ultimately be 
justified. 
¶81 All of this unnecessary reaching out by the majority 
is without sufficient recognition of the protections for persons 
and property embodied in the Fourth Amendment to the United 
State Constitution and in Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  The new test adopted by the majority doesn't 
involve a seizure on the street or in an automobile, but rather 
a seizure of a person after entry into the person's home without 
a warrant.  As Justice Antonin Scalia has rightly pointed out, 
No.  2007AP2095-CR.npc 
 
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"'At the very core' of the Fourth Amendment 'stands the right of 
a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from 
unreasonable governmental intrusion.'  With few exceptions, the 
question whether a warrantless search of a home is reasonable 
and hence constitutional must be answered no."  Kyllo v. United 
States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (quoting Silverman v. United 
States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961), and citing Illinois v. 
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990); Payton v. New York, 445 
U.S. 573, 586 (1980)). 
¶82 For the reasons stated, I respectfully concur. 
¶83 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON, and Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY join Part II of this 
concurrence. 
 
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