Title: P. v. Bunyard
Citation: 45 Cal. 4th 836
Docket Number: S023421
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: February 23, 2009

Filed 2/23/09 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S023421 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
 
JERRY THOMAS BUNYARD, 
) 
 
) 
San Joaquin County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 31016 
 ___________________________________ ) 
 
Defendant Jerry Thomas Bunyard was convicted by jury of the first degree 
murders (Pen. Code, § 187)1 of his wife Elaine Bunyard and of Elaine’s full-term, 
healthy fetus.  The jury also found true one special-circumstance allegation: that 
defendant had committed multiple murders (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)).  Defendant was 
sentenced to death. 
We affirmed defendant’s judgment of guilt for first degree murder and 
upheld the special circumstance finding, but we reversed the penalty judgment 
because the trial court had improperly given the so-called Briggs Instruction 
informing the jury that the Governor is empowered to commute a sentence of life 
imprisonment without possibility of parole, an error we first identified in People v. 
Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136, 150-159.  (People v. Bunyard (1988) 45 Cal.3d 
1200, 1242-1245 (Bunyard).)  The prosecution elected to retry the penalty phase, 
                                              
1  
All statutory references are to this code unless otherwise indicated. 
 
1
and the jury again returned a verdict of death.  The trial court sentenced defendant 
to death.  This appeal is automatic (§ 1239, subd. (b).)  We affirm the judgment. 
I. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts of the crime, quoted from our previous opinion (Bunyard, supra, 
45 Cal.3d at pp. 1200-1203), are as follows:  On November 1, 1979, Elaine, a 
pregnant woman ready to give birth any day, was discovered dead in the garage of 
her home by her seven-year-old daughter, Tanya.  Medical testimony at trial 
established that Elaine had died from a massive shotgun wound to the head, and 
that her full-term fetus had suffocated moments later from the resulting lack of 
oxygen.  The evidence was uncontroverted that Elaine was killed by Earlin 
Popham, a childhood friend of defendant.  Popham testified at trial that he was 
hired by defendant to kill Elaine.2  In summary, Popham’s testimony was as 
follows: 
Earlin Popham, also known as Earlin Laudeman, was a drifter, small-time 
criminal, and frequent drug user who had known defendant since grade school. 
Around October 1979, two or three weeks before the murders, Popham learned 
that defendant wanted to see him, and he met with defendant at the Bunyard home. 
Defendant advised Popham that he had a job for Popham:  assisting with a 
building project in Patterson.  Popham accepted the job and began living at the 
Bunyard residence intermittently.  
During this time, Popham and defendant began to discuss defendant’s 
marital situation, and defendant asked Popham if he would kill Elaine for a fee. 
Defendant gave numerous reasons for his request:  Elaine was pregnant by another 
                                              
2  
Prior to trial, Popham pleaded guilty to the first degree murder of Elaine, 
and testified for the People in exchange for a prison sentence of 25 years to life. 
 
2
man; he had offered Elaine $50,000 in settlement for a divorce, but she had 
refused; in a contested divorce Elaine would take everything defendant had; and 
that he wanted to be with or marry his new girlfriend, Sarah Pender, who was 
wealthy or had a wealthy father.  Defendant offered to pay Popham $1,000 within 
a week after the killing, followed by payment of additional money when defendant 
received the proceeds of an insurance policy.  Defendant additionally offered to 
employ Popham as a caretaker of his ranch after Elaine’s murder, and told Popham 
that he would be welcome to move to Arkansas with defendant, defendant’s father, 
and defendant’s girlfriend Sarah Pender. 
While at first Popham declined defendant’s offer, when defendant persisted 
Popham, being sympathetic to defendant’s situation and in need of money, 
eventually agreed to kill Elaine, knowing she was pregnant.  This agreement was 
reached about one week before the murders occurred. 
Popham testified that defendant’s plan was to make the murder look like a 
suicide.  Popham was to knock Elaine out in the kitchen, drag her into the garage 
where defendant had hidden his pump shotgun, and then stage a “shooting” 
suicide.  Defendant believed this plan would be successful due to Elaine’s “mental 
problems” during her pregnancy.  Additionally, defendant told his father Clarence, 
who lived next door, to go fishing and not be at home during the week when 
defendant was asking Popham to carry out the murder plan.  The date was left up 
to Popham, but defendant repeatedly asked Popham if today would be the day, 
including October 31, the day before the murders. 
Finally, on the morning of November 1, when defendant asked if Popham 
would carry out the plan that day, Popham replied “probably.”  Waiting until after 
defendant and Tanya left the house, Popham walked up behind Elaine while she 
was in the kitchen washing dishes and struck her repeatedly on the head with 
frying pans to knock her out.  He then dragged her while unconscious to the 
 
3
garage, placed her in a chair, propped defendant’s shotgun under Elaine’s chin, 
and pulled the trigger, blowing off half her head and face.  Realizing that a trail of 
blood from the kitchen to the garage, and signs of a struggle in the kitchen — 
including two shattered pans — would not look like a suicide, Popham decided to 
make it appear to be a robbery by knocking over some furniture, and taking $5 
from Elaine’s purse. 
Popham then drove to the construction project where defendant was 
working, and talked with defendant in hushed tones for a few minutes.  He 
informed defendant that “it was done,” and that he would meet him in town at the 
A & W at noon.  That meeting was held at the appointed time and place, with 
Popham telling defendant that Elaine had been killed but that “it ain’t going to 
look like a suicide.”  When Popham said he needed some money, defendant 
withdrew $175 from his bank and gave $125 to Popham. Popham told defendant 
that he would call defendant within a week regarding further payments.  Two days 
after the murder, Popham tried to contact defendant by calling the house of 
defendant’s father, Clarence Bunyard, who informed Popham that his son was at 
his (defendant’s) home.  Popham then reached defendant by phone at his own 
home.  Although defendant asked Popham to call him at his father’s house later 
that night, Popham did not call again.  Telephone records at trial confirmed that a 
short call had been placed from a residence in San Jose, where Popham was 
staying, to defendant’s home two days after the murders. 
Other witnesses at trial, including defendant, testified that on the afternoon 
of November 1 — the date of the murders — defendant went to the Tracton Bar 
after work and drank heavily.  Thereafter, defendant visited Sarah Pender, arriving 
at her home around 6:40 p.m., in an intoxicated condition.  There, he was advised 
by both his mother and Sarah Pender of the death of his wife. 
 
4
Testimony at trial established that Elaine had been murdered.  Suicide was 
ruled out because Elaine’s arms were too short to have put the barrel of the 
shotgun under her chin and still have pulled the trigger, and Popham’s fingerprints 
were found on the shotgun.  The physician who examined Elaine two days before 
her death stated that the fetus she was carrying had a fetal heartbeat of 140, was 
due between November 1 and 7, and was normal. The pathologist testified that the 
fetus was a normal, healthy term infant which weighed eight pounds, two ounces, 
was in proper position for delivery, and would have been born any day. 
On November 2, 1979, one day after the murders, news of Elaine’s 
“suicide” became public.  Randy Johnson immediately contacted police 
authorities.  He testified that, although not acquainted with Popham, he (Johnson) 
had also been asked repeatedly by defendant to kill Elaine.  Johnson testified that 
early in his five-year friendship with defendant, defendant had asked him 5 to 10 
times to kill Elaine and Tanya, then later Elaine alone; that defendant made 20 
such requests during the first year of their friendship and even raised the offer 
from $1,000 to $5,000 to $10,000, but Johnson always declined.  Later, when 
Johnson moved in with the Bunyards in the spring of 1979, receiving room and 
board in return for help with the ranch, the offers continued.  Even after Johnson 
left the Bunyard residence, the offers continued, for a fee as high as $20,000, but 
Johnson never acquiesced.  Although Johnson never apprised Elaine of her danger, 
he did mention it to the police prior to the actual murders, as well as to both his 
sister, Deanna Johnson, and his half brother. 
Defendant testified on his own behalf at the guilt phase but did not 
challenge Popham’s testimony that he (Popham) had murdered Elaine and her full-
term fetus.  Defendant presented an alibi defense and denied any involvement in 
the murders.  Although defendant also denied desiring to divorce his wife, he 
admitted to striking her on occasion and to carrying on an affair with Sarah 
 
5
Pender, who he testified was his mistress.  The defense at trial consisted primarily 
of an attack on the credibility of Johnson and Popham; defense counsel argued that 
Popham was lying to save himself from receiving the death penalty.  Defendant 
denied ever soliciting either Johnson or Popham to kill anyone.  Defendant further 
testified that he could think of no reason why Popham killed his wife. 
At the penalty phase, the prosecution submitted its case on the basis of the 
guilt phase evidence.  The defense presented one witness, Nathan Eli, who had 
been sentenced to death twice, 20 years earlier, but had been released from prison 
and was then employed as an office manager in a San Francisco law firm.  The 
thrust of his testimony was that ‘lifers’ make good prisoners.  Defendant was 
sentenced to death.  [End of quotation from prior opinion.] 
As noted, we reversed the penalty phase because of Ramos error.  
(Bunyard, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 1242-1245.)  The People elected to retry him.  
At the penalty phase retrial, Popham testified as to his and defendant’s role in the 
murders, as he had during the guilt phase of the first trial.  Randy Johnson was 
deemed unavailable to testify for reasons explained below, and his testimony from 
the first trial about defendant’s attempt to solicit him to murder Elaine was read to 
the jury.  Other evidence was introduced about the murders.  The prosecution also 
introduced testimony that defendant had engaged in a number of acts of domestic 
violence against Elaine and against his first wife, Glenna Day. 
Defendant’s primary defense was to contest his guilt for the murders.  
Defendant himself testified to deny any involvement and also to describe his 
military service, which included a tour of duty in Vietnam.  Two men who were in 
San Joaquin County Jail at the time Popham was in jail for the murders testified 
that Popham had told them he had stolen drugs from a friend and killed his 
pregnant wife, without mentioning defendant’s solicitation of the murders.   
 
6
On cross-examination of defendant and on rebuttal, the prosecution brought 
to light that defendant had had a checkered career in the military, including four 
AWOL’s and three summary court martials.  Also in rebuttal, the prosecution 
produced other evidence intended to show defendant had in fact committed the 
murders of which he had been convicted.  Sergeant Harold Johnsen of the San 
Joaquin County Sheriff’s Office testified that defendant had originally denied that 
he met Popham at the construction site where defendant was working on the day 
of the murders or that he had withdrawn money from his bank account for 
Popham.  He further testified that defendant admitted to both those things during 
an interrogation a week later, although he claimed the money was for construction 
work Popham had done the previous weekend. 
II. 
DISCUSSION 
A. Excusal for Cause of Prospective Juror C.B. 
Defendant contends that Prospective Juror C.B. was improperly excused for 
cause during voir dire.  We disagree. 
During voir dire, C.B. made clear her general support for the death penalty.  
However, she stated that she would have difficulty serving on the penalty phase 
jury because she had not been part of the jury that had found defendant guilty.  In 
her colloquy with the judge she stated:  “what happens if the other 12 people made 
a mistake and he is innocent.  See, that’s my problem with this whole situation.  If 
I had listened to him and found the gentleman guilty, then that’s a whole different 
circumstance[].”  After explaining her general support for the death penalty, C.B. 
reiterated her difficulty with being a juror in this particular case.  “I’m going to be 
honest with you.  I could do it, but I don’t want to be on this jury.  I didn’t find this 
man guilty, and I don’t want to be sentencing him to life without parole.  What 
happens if he’s innocent . . . . that’s what bothers me . . . . I can’t sit in judgment 
 
7
of someone that . . . .”  At this point, the court interrupted her and solicited from 
her the statement that she “could perform” her function as a juror.   
The court then allowed the prosecutor and defense counsel to question 
C.B..  In response to defense counsel’s inquiry as to whether she could serve on 
the jury, C.B. stated: “Of course, I’ll be able — I may be blond[e], but I’m not that 
stupid.  Yeah, I could be capable of that.  But I’m telling you up front it bothers 
me that I wasn’t on the first jury, okay.” 
The prosecutor moved to challenge for cause, which defense counsel 
opposed.  The trial court granted the motion.  In response to defense counsel’s 
argument that C.B. had said “she could function when the Court asked her if she 
could function,” the trial court responded: “I have some real doubts about that.  
She appears to be very hesitant, very unsure, very positive as a matter of fact that 
she could not.  And, she’s trying to say, I believe, or give the correct responses so 
that she is not looked upon as, like she says, a dumb blond[e].” 
Defendant argues the trial court erred in excusing C.B. for cause.  The 
relevant legal principles are well settled: “In Wainwright v. Witt [(1985)] 469 U.S. 
412, the United States Supreme Court set forth the proper procedures for choosing 
jurors in capital cases.  That case ‘requires a trial court to determine “whether the 
juror’s views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties 
as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.”  [Citation.]  “Under 
Witt, therefore, our duty is to ‘examine the context surrounding [the juror’s] 
exclusion to determine whether the trial court’s decision that [the juror’s] beliefs 
would “substantially impair the performance of [the juror’s] duties . . .”  was fairly 
supported by the record.’ ”  [Citations.]  [¶]  In many cases, a prospective juror’s 
responses to questions on voir dire will be halting, equivocal, or even conflicting.  
Given the juror’s probable unfamiliarity with the complexity of the law, coupled 
with the stress and anxiety of being a prospective juror in a capital case, such 
 
8
equivocation should be expected.  Under such circumstances, we defer to the trial 
court’s evaluation of a prospective juror’s state of mind, and such evaluation is 
binding on appellate courts.’ ”  (People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 696 
(Roldan).) 
Defendant contends that Prospective Juror C.B.’s reservation about serving 
on the jury, properly understood, was the reservation that she would have to 
sentence someone to death notwithstanding the fact that she had some lingering 
doubt about his innocence, and that the court should have made clear that lingering 
doubt was properly considered at the penalty phase.  But the record reveals that 
C.B. had a more fundamental objection to the proceeding: she made clear her 
discomfort at not having been on the jury that found defendant guilty and in 
expressing that discomfort, she did not focus on the imposition of the death 
penalty but stated that “I didn’t find this man guilty, and I don’t want to be 
sentencing him to life without parole.”  The fact that she expressed a reluctance to 
serve on a penalty phase jury even if that jury sentenced the defendant to life 
without parole indicates not a concern with whether lingering doubt could justify a 
refusal to vote for the death penalty, but rather an objection to participating in any 
kind of sentencing decision when she had not served on the jury that determined 
defendant’s guilt. 
Defendant also argues that C.B. should not have been excused for cause 
because she, at several points, affirmed her ability and willingness to serve on the 
penalty phase jury.  It is true that the mere expression by a prospective juror that 
he or she anticipates that a juror’s duties will be difficult is not by itself grounds 
for discharging a juror.  (People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 530.)  On the 
other hand, C.B. expressed great reluctance in undertaking her duties under the 
particular circumstance, and such reluctance, “taken into account with the juror’s 
hesitancy, vocal inflection, and demeanor, can justify a trial court’s conclusion 
 
9
regarding the juror's mental state that the juror’s views would ‘ “prevent or 
substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his 
instructions and his oath.” ’ ”  (Roldan, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 697.)  The trial 
court made a determination, based on his judgment about C.B.’s credibility and 
demeanor, that her attitude toward serving on the penalty phase jury without 
having determined defendant’s guilt would in fact substantially impair the 
performance of her duty as a juror in the present case.  Under these circumstances, 
we defer to the trial court’s determination.  (Roldan, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 696.) 
Defendant further contends that C.B. should not have been disqualified 
because she expressed support for the death penalty.  There is no dispute that C.B. 
was death qualified in the conventional sense.  The reason for her exclusion was 
not her lack of support for the death penalty but, as discussed, her resistance 
toward serving on a penalty phase jury when she had not determined guilt.  As 
explained above, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that her 
attitude disabled her from serving on this particular jury. 
B. Admission of Randy Johnson’s Prior Testimony Due to 
Unavailability 
Randy Johnson, who corroborated the testimony of Earlin Popham by 
testifying that defendant had solicited him several times to kill Elaine Bunyard, 
was determined by the trial court to be unavailable to testify at the second penalty 
phase trial, and therefore his testimony from the first trial was read to the jury.  
Defendant claims the trial court erred in determining that Johnson was unavailable 
and in admitting his earlier testimony, thereby violating state statutory law and his 
right to confront witnesses under the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  This claim has two parts: (1) the trial court with the prosecution’s 
support erred in releasing Johnson on his own recognizance and, but for the error, 
Johnson would have been available to testify; (2) the prosecution was 
 
10
insufficiently diligent in trying to locate Johnson when he failed to appear.  We 
disagree there was error or lack of diligence. 
The facts are these:  As explained, Johnson testified during the first trial 
that defendant asked him on several occasions to kill Elaine Bunyard but Johnson 
refused.  The prosecution intended to call Johnson as a witness at the penalty 
phase retrial, ostensibly for two reasons: (1) to corroborate Popham’s testimony 
that defendant desired his wife’s murder and would pay others to carry that out, 
thereby negating any lingering doubt about defendant’s guilt that the second 
penalty phase jury might have; and (2) to establish that defendant committed an 
unadjudicated crime involving force or violence pursuant to section 190.3, factor 
(b), i.e., the attempted solicitation of Johnson to commit murder. 
On October 15, 1990, approximately one month before the retrial was to 
commence, a bench warrant issued for Johnson’s arrest after he had failed to 
appear in response to the People’s subpoena.  On October 22, 1990, the prosecutor 
filed a declaration in support of a motion to require Johnson to enter into a written 
undertaking to appear in court pursuant to section 1332.  He stated in the 
declaration that the written undertaking was necessary because of Johnson’s 
failure to respond to the subpoena or contact the prosecution.  On that same day, 
the trial court signed a warrant for Johnson’s arrest, allowing him to be released 
only if he posted a $10,000 bond.  Jury selection proceedings began on November 
15, 1990.  On December 13, Johnson was arrested on the October 22 warrant.  On 
December 17, 1990, Johnson appeared for a hearing.  During the hearing, the 
prosecutor reminded the court of its October 22 arrest warrant and the setting of 
bail at $10,000.  Before the hearing, the trial court asked defendant’s counsel to 
leave the courtroom, and counsel left after objecting to not being allowed to be 
 
11
present.  The trial court also ordered the prosecution to provide counsel with 
Johnson’s current rap sheet, which showed an extensive criminal history.3 
Johnson told the court that he had not looked at the subpoena and had not 
contacted the prosecutor.  The prosecutor informed the court that Johnson was in 
custody on the bench warrant in defendant’s case but that otherwise there was no 
reason to hold him in custody.  The court asked a sheriff’s officer, Sergeant 
Johnsen, if he was satisfied that he would be able to contact Johnson on a 
moment’s notice or as needed and Sergeant Johnsen said that he was.  The court 
released Johnson on his own recognizance, requiring him to call Sergeant Johnsen 
every Wednesday, and making clear that if he failed to do so, Johnson would 
violate the conditions of his release and be subject to immediate arrest, whereupon 
he would be kept in custody until defendant’s trial was completed.  Johnson was 
ordered to return to court on January 23, 1991 at 10:00 a.m.  Johnson orally agreed 
to these conditions and signed a written agreement that he would return on the date 
specified. 
The next day, defense counsel informed the court that the State of 
Washington had issued a warrant for Johnson’s arrest.  The prosecutor stated that 
he had not been aware of that bench warrant until after the previous day’s hearing.  
He explained that he had contacted Washington authorities and discovered that 
Johnson had served time in Washington on a misdemeanor offense but had not yet 
made restitution, and that the warrant was not for an extraditable offense.  The 
prosecutor acknowledged that at the time Johnson was served a subpoena to 
                                              
3  
At oral argument, counsel suggested that the prosecution had not been 
forthcoming in informing the trial court about Johnson’s prior criminal history 
within California.  The record indicates the contrary, that both the trial court and 
trial counsel were informed of that history. 
 
12
appear as a material witness in the present case, he was in county jail, and that his 
rap sheet indicated that he had a number of previous arrests.  Notwithstanding this 
new information, the trial court reaffirmed its order releasing Johnson on his own 
recognizance subject to the conditions described above.  Defendant objected to the 
order.4 
Johnson returned to court on January 23, 1991, and was ordered to return 
again on February 6.  He returned on February 6 and was ordered to return on 
February 19. 
Johnson did not return on February 19.  The prosecutor stated that Johnson 
had shown up late for a February 11 interview and had not shown up for an 
interview scheduled for February 18.  The prosecutor also stated that Sergeant 
Johnsen’s attempts to locate Johnson had been unsuccessful.   
On March 1, 1991, the trial court held a hearing on whether Johnson was 
unavailable for testimony.  Sergeant Johnsen and another sheriff’s officer testified 
about various efforts to locate Johnson, which will be described at greater length 
below.  Defendant asked the court to exclude Johnson’s prior testimony on the 
ground that the People had failed to exercise due diligence in locating him.  At 
defendant’s request, the court allowed Johnson’s FBI and CII rap sheets to become 
part of the record.  The FBI rap sheet showed that Johnson had substantial contacts 
with Oregon and Washington and defendant noted that the police had made no 
efforts to look for him there.  Notwithstanding that fact, the trial court found 
                                              
4  
Defendant argues without elaboration that the exclusion of trial counsel 
from the hearing that resulted in Johnson’s release violated his right to due 
process.  Assuming without deciding that there was such a violation, it was 
rendered harmless beyond a reasonable doubt when trial counsel was able to 
address the court the following day and to produce new evidence to support his 
position that Johnson should not be released, and when the trial court reaffirmed 
its decision after considering such argument and evidence. 
 
13
Johnson unavailable and on March 5, 1991, Johnson’s testimony from the first 
trial was read to the jury. 
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting Johnson’s 
testimony.  To evaluate this claim we review basic principles: “The confrontation 
clauses of both the federal and state Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant 
the right to confront the prosecution’s witnesses.  (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. 
Const. art. I, § 15.)  That right is not absolute, however.  An exception exists when 
a witness is unavailable and, at a previous court proceeding against the same 
defendant, has given testimony that was subject to cross-examination.  Under 
federal constitutional law, such testimony is admissible if the prosecution shows it 
made ‘a good-faith effort’ to obtain the presence of the witness at trial.”  (People 
v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 892 (Cromer); see also Crawford v. Washington 
(2004) 541 U.S. 36, 53-54.) 
“In California, the exception to the confrontation right for prior recorded 
testimony is codified in [Evidence Code] section 1291, subdivision (a), which 
provides: ‘Evidence of former testimony is not made inadmissible by the hearsay 
rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness and: [¶] . . . . [¶] (2) The party 
against whom the former testimony is offered was a party to the action or 
proceeding in which the testimony was given and had the right and opportunity to 
cross-examine the declarant with an interest and motive similar to that which he 
has at the hearing.’ A witness is unavailable if ‘[a]bsent from the hearing and the 
proponent of his or her statement has exercised reasonable diligence but has been 
unable to procure his or her attendance by the court’s process.’  ([Evid. Code,] 
§ 240, subd. (a)(5).) Although section 240 refers to ‘reasonable diligence,’ this 
court has often described the evaluation as one involving ‘due diligence.’ ”  
(Cromer, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 898.) 
 
14
As noted, defendant contends the trial court erred in releasing Johnson on 
his own recognizance, a release that was supported by the People, and 
consequently erred in concluding he was unavailable to testify.  As we have 
recognized, when the trial court errs in releasing a material witness from custody, 
which results in the witness becoming unavailable for testimony, and the 
prosecution supports that release, the prosecution may be held to have not 
exercised reasonable diligence.  (People v. Louis (1986) 42 Cal.3d 969, 993 
(Louis).)5 
The decision to detain in custody a material witness involves weighing 
important competing rights.  “Article I, section 10 of the California Constitution 
guarantees ‘[w]itnesses may not be unreasonably detained.’  This constitutional 
protection is balanced against ‘ “[t]he duty [of all citizens] to disclose knowledge 
of [a] crime . . . .” ’  [Citation.]  This duty is considered to be ‘ “so vital that one 
known to be an innocent may be detained, in the absence of bail, as a material 
witness. [Citations.]” ’  (Ibid.)  [¶]  To enforce this duty, section 1332 allows for 
the incarceration of a person determined to be a material witness to secure his or 
her presence at trial.  Section 1332 states, ‘(a) [W]hen the court is satisfied, by 
proof on oath, that there is good cause to believe that any material witness for the 
prosecution or defense, whether the witness is an adult or a minor, will not appear 
and testify unless security is required, at any proceeding in connection with any 
                                              
5  
It could be argued that the erroneous release of a witness on his or her own 
recognizance is really not a failure of prosecutorial diligence but more accurately 
trial court error.  This would be especially true if the trial court granted the release 
notwithstanding the prosecutor’s opposition.  But even if so characterized, it 
would make no difference for confrontation clause purposes whether the error that 
led to a material witness being unavailable was attributable to the court or to the 
prosecution — in either case such error, if proven to be prejudicial, could result in 
a reversal of a judgment against a defendant. 
 
15
criminal prosecution . . . the court may order the witness to enter into a written 
undertaking to the effect that he or she will appear and testify at the time and place 
ordered by the court or that he or she will forfeit an amount the court deems 
proper.  [¶]  (b) If the witness required to enter into an undertaking to appear and 
testify, either with or without sureties, refuses compliance with the order for that 
purpose, the court may commit the witness, if an adult, to the custody of the 
sheriff . . . until the witness complies or is legally discharged.’ ”  (In re D.W. 
(2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 491, 497-498.) 
“ ‘The unique posture of the material witness’ requires special attention to 
ensure that the procedures leading to the incarceration of a witness are fair and 
comply with ‘procedural safeguards allowing the interests of the witness to be 
heard in conjunction with the interests of the state.’ ”  (In re D.W., supra, 123 
Cal.App.4th at p. 498.)  The unjustified deprivation of a material witness’s liberty 
is a violation of the due process clause of the federal and state Constitutions.  
(Ibid.; see also In re Francisco M. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1061, 1071-1072 
(Francisco M.).) 
The threshold question is the standard of review that should be employed to 
determine whether there has been reasonable diligence when a material witness 
has been released on his or her own recognizance and then becomes unavailable.  
We have held that “appellate courts should independently review a trial court’s 
determination that the prosecution’s failed efforts to locate an absent witness are 
sufficient to justify an exception to the defendant’s constitutionally guaranteed 
right of confrontation at trial.”  (Cromer, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 901.)  The 
question is whether we should employ the same independent review standard to 
determine whether releasing a material witness on his or her own recognizance 
constitutes a failure of reasonable diligence. 
 
16
In Cromer, in deciding that independent review rather than abuse of 
discretion was the proper standard, we relied on (1) the importance of the right at 
stake, i.e., the Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses (Cromer, supra, 24 
Cal.4th at pp. 896-897); (2) the fact that the determination of reasonable diligence 
“requires application of an objective, constitutionally based legal test” to certain 
facts (id. at p. 900); and (3) the fact that the trial court does not have a first 
person vantage point with respect to the prosecutor’s efforts to find the witness, 
but is in essentially the same position as an appellate court in applying the 
objective test (id. at p. 901).  Thus, although the reviewing court will defer to the 
trial court’s determination of the historical facts of what the prosecution did to 
locate an absent witness, it will independently review whether those efforts 
amount to reasonable diligence sufficient to sustain a finding of unavailability.  
(Id. at pp. 900-901.) 
In the present situation, in which we are reviewing essentially the trial 
court’s own decision to release a witness on his own recognizance, albeit with the 
prosecution’s consent and even urging, the circumstances are markedly different.  
First, whereas in the case of the prosecution’s efforts to obtain the testimony of an 
absent witness, the defendant’s constitutional right of confrontation is the sole 
constitutional right at stake, the decision to keep a material witness in custody 
involves balancing that right against the substantial due process right of the 
witness, who has not been charged with a crime, to not be unreasonably 
incarcerated.  Second, whereas an appellate court is more or less in the same 
position as a trial court in judging whether the prosecution’s efforts to obtain an 
absent witness are sufficient, the trial court is in a better position than an appellate 
court to ascertain whether and to what extent a witness is a flight risk, and the 
appropriate measures to reduce that risk.  This determination involves in part an 
observation of the witness’s credibility and demeanor that the trial court is 
 
17
uniquely in a position to make.  Therefore, although we conduct independent 
review in the sense that we independently apply an “objective, constitutionally 
based legal test” to certain facts (Cromer, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 900), we also 
give due deference to the trial court’s determination of a witness’s flight risk, and 
will second-guess that determination only when it is clear from the record that it 
was objectively unreasonable. 
In the present case, we conclude the trial court made a reasonable 
determination that Randy Johnson would appear to testify, and the prosecution’s 
support for the trial court’s decision did not constitute a lack of reasonable 
diligence.  After he was arrested for ignoring the subpoena, the court had Johnson 
agree orally and in writing to return on a specified date, and to keep in weekly 
contact with Sergeant Johnsen until that date, with the understanding that he 
would be rearrested and placed in custody if he failed to maintain that weekly 
contact.  The court made a credibility determination that Johnson would return to 
testify, and Johnson did in fact comply within the reporting requirements for 
almost two months. 
In arguing in support of his position, defendant cites Louis, supra, 42 
Cal.3d 969.  We agree that a comparison of this case to Louis is useful ― although 
we draw a different conclusion — and will therefore render a somewhat detailed 
account of that case.  In Louis, the court considered the validity of a guilty verdict 
in a capital trial.  The defendant and four codefendants were tried for several 
robberies and the murder of a gas station attendant.  During the defendant’s 
preliminary hearing, Gregory Tolbert, who was living in an apartment with the 
sister of one of the codefendants, testified to overhearing a conversation in the 
apartment among the defendant and the codefendants that the gas station attendant, 
who had witnessed one of their previous crimes, would have to be killed.  (Id. at 
p. 976.)  After the murder, according to Tolbert’s testimony, the defendant told a 
 
18
codefendant that he “took out” the attendant.  (Id. at p. 977.)  At the preliminary 
hearing, some substantial questions about Tolbert’s credibility emerged, including 
inconsistent and incriminating statements, as well as an extensive criminal record 
and the use of a number of aliases.  (Ibid.)   
Tolbert also testified in a separate trial of the codefendants, and they were 
convicted of the robbery charges, but the jury found one of the codefendants not 
guilty of the murder charges and was unable to reach a verdict about the other 
codefendants.  (Louis, supra, 42 Cal.3d. at pp. 977-978.)  Tolbert was in custody 
on felony charges, and in order to induce him to testify at the first trial of the 
codefendants, the prosecution had arranged for Tolbert to be released on his own 
recognizance over the weekend with an unnamed friend at an undisclosed location 
before appearing for sentencing.  (Ibid.)  Tolbert promptly disappeared. 
The retrial of the codefendants for noncapital murder and the trial of the 
defendant for capital murder were consolidated and conducted before two separate 
juries.  (Louis, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 978.)  Tolbert was deemed unavailable and 
his preliminary hearing testimony was admitted in the defendant’s trial over his 
objection and the prior trial testimony was admitted against the defendant and 
codefendants.  (Id. at pp. 978, 981.)  Tolbert’s testimony at the previous trial did 
not include the statement made at the defendant’s preliminary hearing that the 
defendant had said he “ ‘took [ ] out’ ” the attendant.  (Id. at p. 977.)  Other than 
Tolbert’s testimony on that point, the case against the defendant and the 
codefendants was the same, and was quite weak.  (Id. at pp. 981-982.)  The 
defendant was convicted of first degree murder with special circumstances and 
was sentenced to death.  Two of the codefendants were acquitted on the murder 
charge and the jury was unable to reach a verdict as to the third, whereupon the 
trial court declared a mistrial and dismissed the information against that 
codefendant with prejudice.  (Ibid.) 
 
19
The Louis court held that the People had been insufficiently diligent in 
compelling Tolbert to testify at trial.  (Louis, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 991-993.)  
Characterizing Tolbert’s testimony as the most important testimony in the 
defendant’s case, this court concluded that the diligence required of the prosecutor 
“was particularly high.  Defendant was to go on trial for his life; Tolbert was a 
critical prosecution witness, and was known to be both unreliable and of suspect 
credibility — the very type of witness that requires, but is likely not to appear to 
submit to, cross-examination before a jury.”  (Id. at p. 991.)  In coming to the 
conclusion that the prosecution had failed to exercise reasonable diligence, the 
Louis court emphasized that at the time the prosecutor arranged to have Tolbert 
released on his own recognizance, he was in custody on felony charges, and was 
released as part of a deal in exchange for Tolbert’s testimony in the codefendants’ 
first trial.  (Id. at pp. 991-992.)  Indeed, the People conceded that allowing Tolbert 
to be released prior to his sentencing was risky, but that the risk was worth taking 
in exchange for his testimony at the earlier trial.  As we concluded, the argument 
that Tolbert’s release was needed to secure this testimony at the first codefendants’ 
trial “is immaterial.  The purpose of the due diligence requirement is to ensure that 
the prosecution has made all reasonable efforts to procure the presence of the 
witness before the defendant is denied the opportunity to confront him.  [Citation.]  
Whether reasonable or not in view of some other purpose, the agreement neither 
was intended, nor did it operate, to prevent Tolbert’s absence from defendant’s 
trial.”  (Id. at p. 992, italics omitted.) 
 
The present case is distinguishable from Louis in several respects.  
Although Johnson, like Tolbert, had an extensive criminal history, Johnson, unlike 
Tolbert, had no current charges pending against him, other than a nonextraditable 
failure to pay restitution in Washington, and therefore did not represent an 
imminent flight risk.  In Louis, the court made clear that by releasing Tolbert for 
 
20
the weekend despite his known flight risk and the upcoming sentencing, the 
prosecution had subordinated the goal of producing him at defendant’s trial to the 
goal of having him testify at the codefendants’ trial, and that the fulfillment of this 
latter goal could not justify the lack of reasonable diligence in meeting the former.  
In the present case, Johnson’s release on his own recognizance was not undertaken 
in subordination to some other prosecutorial objective, but was an attempt to 
balance Johnson’s liberty interests with defendant’s right to confrontation.   
Moreover, in Louis, Tolbert was being held on another charge, and because 
he was being released for a weekend before being sentenced, his liberty interest in 
being released was relatively minor.  Johnson’s liberty interest was considerably 
greater.  He was being held on no other charge, and the trial court was aware that 
Johnson’s required testimony was at least five weeks (and what proved to be two 
months) in the future.  In light of the fact that Johnson did not represent an 
imminent flight risk, we cannot say the trial court acted unreasonably under the 
circumstances in having Johnson sign a written undertaking to appear, and to take 
steps to ensure that Johnson remained in contact with the court and available, nor 
that the prosecution’s support for these measures constituted a lack of reasonable 
diligence.  Those measures worked for at least seven weeks — Johnson twice 
reported as he was supposed to and maintained weekly contact with Sergeant 
Johnsen.   
This case is also in contrast to Francisco M., supra, 86 Cal.App.4th 1061, 
cited by defendant, in which two juvenile material witnesses were detained and in 
which the Court of Appeal remanded the case to determine whether continuing 
detention was proper.6  Even assuming that the detention in that case ultimately 
                                              
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
6  
In Francisco M., the court offered several factors to be considered in 
determining whether or not to detain a material witness.  These factors included: 
 
21
was deemed lawful, it was based in large part on the witnesses’ avowed 
noncooperation — statements that they would not testify and would seek to evade 
a subpoena.  (Id. at pp. 1067-1069.)  In the present case, Johnson promised to 
cooperate, credibly in the view of the trial court.  Although a trial court’s 
credibility determination that a material witness will appear will not be accorded 
unlimited deference by an appellate court, and a prosecutor’s support for a 
decision to release a witness who poses a substantial flight risk is a significant 
factor to be considered in evaluating whether the prosecutor has exercised due 
diligence, in this case the trial court’s determination was reasonable. 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
(1) the seriousness of the criminal charges; (2) the importance of the witness’s 
testimony; (3) the length of the proposed detention; (4) evidence relevant to 
whether the witness will appear, including employment, residence and other 
community ties; (5) the age and maturity of the witness; (6) the harm to the 
witness’s family from incarceration; (7) the witness’s financial resources; (8) the 
likelihood of continuances that will prolong the prosecution; and (9) whether steps 
short of incarceration are feasible.  (Francisco M., supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at pp. 
1076-1078.) 
 
Defendant argues that most of these factors favored keeping Johnson in 
prison, specifically the seriousness of the criminal charges, the importance of 
Johnson’s testimony, Johnson’s lack of community ties and history of ignoring 
subpoenas, and the lack of harm to Johnson’s family.  While the Francisco M. 
factors are no doubt useful guidelines for the exercise of the trial court’s discretion 
whether or not to detain a material witness, or an appellate court’s decision 
whether witnesses should continue to be detained, that case does not suggest that 
the counting of these factors is a useful means of determining retrospectively 
whether a trial court abused its discretion in failing to detain a material witness.  
As discussed, we believe that, in light of the length of the detention and the fact 
that the witness had no strong incentive to flee, the trial court’s decision was 
reasonable.  
 
22
Defendant also argues that the court was not required to keep Johnson in 
custody but could have imposed (and the prosecution should have urged the court 
to impose) on Johnson a written undertaking with security, pursuant to section 
1332, subdivision (a), in other words to release the witness on bail, in order to 
ensure his appearance at trial.  Defendant did not raise this argument at trial and it 
is therefore forfeited on appeal.  (See People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 
414.)  Although defendant’s trial counsel objected to Johnson’s “OR release,” he 
never raised the alternative of requiring a written undertaking with security.  
Without raising the issue at trial, we have no way of knowing whether imposing 
such conditions on Johnson was a feasible alternative to detention on the one hand 
and OR release on the other. 
Defendant also contends that once Johnson failed to appear, the prosecution 
was insufficiently diligent in finding him.  As noted, we independently review the 
trial court’s determination that the prosecution has been reasonably diligent in 
finding an absent witness.  (Cromer, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 901.) 
The record reveals that two sheriff’s officers testified that they made 
numerous attempts to locate Johnson, including: repeatedly checking Johnson’s 
last known address, and areas he was known to frequent; putting out a BOLO 
(“be-on-the-lookout-for”) bulletin for Johnson; attempting to contact Johnson’s 
brother and sister, who also lived in the county; checking the jails and hospitals of 
San Joaquin County and the jails of six neighboring counties; repeatedly over a 
week’s time checking the east end of Stockton and other locations where they had 
information he was likely to be, and checking with Johnson’s known associates.  
Officers also testified that they learned on the evening of February 19 that several 
days earlier Johnson had taken, perhaps stolen, a car and had used it to flee from 
the minimart where he had stolen a beer, and was now attempting to avoid the 
police. 
 
23
Defendant made at trial and makes again on appeal the argument that the 
police did not attempt to look for Johnson out of state, in Oregon or Washington, 
where according to his rap sheets he had been convicted of various crimes.  But 
there was nothing to indicate he had fled to those states; indeed, given that there 
was a warrant for his arrest in Washington, his flight to that state was not 
particularly likely. 
Our review of the case law shows that in those cases in which courts have 
not found adequate diligence, the efforts of the prosecutor or defense counsel have 
been perfunctory or obviously negligent.  (See, e.g., People v. Sanders (1995) 11 
Cal.4th 475, 524 [belated effort to find witness consisted of a single phone call to 
her former work number and several visits to her former address]; People v. Avila 
(2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 163, 169-170 [waiting until the first day of trial to locate a 
witness at her last known residence without efforts to keep track of her, despite 
knowing she was a flight risk]; People v. Pitts (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1547, 1556-
1557 [despite witness’s criminal record and drug use, investigator confined search 
for witness in the criminal justice system to a single county and did not search by 
witness’s known aliases].)  On the other hand, diligence has been found when the 
prosecution’s efforts are timely, reasonably extensive and carried out over a 
reasonable period.  (See, e.g., People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1297 
[frequent stops at witness’s last known residence over a one-week period, 
contacting neighbors, employer, and relatives]; People v. Diaz (2002) 95 
Cal.App.4th 695, 706-707 [numerous attempts to find witness defeated by 
witness’s determined effort to avoid testifying]; People v. Wise (1994) 25 
Cal.App.4th 339, 344 [checking several addresses where witness might be found, 
as well as local jail, hospital, and coroner].)  The People’s efforts in the present 
case decidedly resemble the extensive efforts made in the latter group of cases.  
We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that the 
 
24
prosecution had been reasonably diligent in attempting to locate Johnson, that the 
trial court properly deemed him to be unavailable, and that his testimony from the 
first trial was properly admitted. 
C. Admission of Testimony of Domestic Violence 
Defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence of domestic 
violence he inflicted on Elaine and on his former wife, Glenna Day.  He contends 
that the admitting this evidence was both state law error, because the evidence was 
outside the scope of section 190.3, factor (b) or any other statutory aggravating 
factor, and violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
because it permitted the judgment of death to be imposed based on conduct that 
does not warrant such a harsh penalty.  We conclude these claims are without 
merit.   
Before trial, the prosecution gave notice of its intent to introduce evidence 
that defendant had committed several violent acts against Elaine and Glenna Day.  
Defense counsel objected, but the trial court ruled the evidence admissible under 
section 190.3, factor (b), “[t]he presence or absence of criminal activity by the 
defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the 
express or implied threat to use force or violence.”  At trial, Elaine’s daughter, 
Tanya, testified that Elaine and defendant fought a great deal, that defendant 
would slap Elaine and that he once threw a plate at her during dinner that missed 
her.  More than once, during Elaine’s pregnancy, defendant put his hands on 
Elaine’s throat and pushed her into a wall.  Defendant grabbed Elaine’s shoulders 
and pushed her into a wall when she came home late and had not fixed defendant’s 
dinner.  Earlin Popham and Randy Johnson (the latter through the introduction of 
his former testimony) testified they saw defendant strike Elaine several times. 
 
25
Defendant, in response to questions by the prosecution, testified that he had 
“probably” slapped his first wife, Glenna Day, and that he hit her and that he 
might have grabbed her by the neck and shoved her against a wall.  He also 
admitted hitting Elaine on several occasions.  The prosecution highlighted these 
incidents in its closing argument. 
Section 190.3, factor (b) pertains to violent criminal activity other than the 
crimes for which a capital defendant is on trial.  (People v. Osband (1996) 13 
Cal.4th 622, 716.)  Its purpose is to “ ‘show the defendant’s propensity for 
violence’ ” (People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 426), which is pertinent to 
determining a capital defendant’s individual moral culpability.  Its language 
regarding “express or implied threat[s] to use force or violence” (§ 190.3, 
factor (b)) has a “ ‘ “common-sense core of meaning’ ” ” that requires no further 
elucidation in the jury instructions.  (People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 
922.) 
As defendant concedes, section 190.3, factor (b) applies to misdemeanor 
violent activity as well as felony activity.  (See People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 
29, 71 [interpreting identically worded provision in 1977 death penalty statute].)  
Nonetheless, defendant argues that incidents such as hitting or throwing plates are 
too trivial to be included in a penalty phase determination, and must be out of the 
scope of what was intended by factor (b).  We disagree.  Even assuming that factor 
(b) can be interpreted to exclude certain violent activity as too minor to be within 
the scope of the evidence to be considered by a jury in arriving at a penalty phase 
judgment, the present activity would not qualify as part of that exception.  The 
testimony demonstrated a course of conduct of domestic violence that defendant 
engaged in against both his former wives.  The seriousness of each of the acts, i.e., 
their potential injurious effect, varied, but the course of conduct taken as a whole 
was relevant to showing “ ‘defendant’s propensity for violence’ ” (People v. 
 
26
Avena, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 426), rendering such evidence admissible under 
factor (b).    The proper weighing of such evidence, of course, was for the jury to 
decide.  We therefore conclude neither state law nor constitutional error was 
committed.7 
                                              
7  
Defendant cites two federal cases tried under the federal death penalty 
statute in which evidence of violent activity was excluded at the penalty phase of 
the trial for being too minor.  (U.S. v. Gilbert (D. Mass. 2000) 120 F.Supp.2d 147; 
U.S. v. Friend (E.D.Va. 2000) 92 F.Supp.2d 534.)  These cases are 
distinguishable.  Under the federal death penalty statute, a defendant can only be 
sentenced to death for first degree murder if one of the statutorily enumerated 
aggravating factors is found by the jury to be present beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and the jury concludes, considering both statutory and nonstatutory aggravating 
factors, that these outweigh the mitigating factors.  (Friend, supra, 92 F.Supp.2d at 
p. 537; 18 U.S.C. § 3593(d) & (e).)  A nonstatutory aggravating factor is one that 
fits within the catchall provision, 18 United States Code section 3593(a)(2), 
permitting consideration of “ ‘relevant information’ . . . that may tend to make the 
death penalty more appropriate.”  (Gilbert, supra, 120 F.Supp.2d at p. 150.)  Both 
Gilbert and Friend involved in part the question of whether certain pieces of 
evidence introduced during the penalty phase under the rubric of nonstatutory 
aggravating factors were sufficiently relevant to be considered by a penalty phase 
jury.  In Gilbert, the prosecution attempted to introduce evidence of an incident 
that defendant, a former nurse, had scalded a mentally retarded boy in a hot bath, 
and that she had assaulted her husband with a large kitchen knife.  The court 
excluded the evidence because there were substantial questions as to its reliability 
and because the incidents were not of sufficient gravity, and therefore the 
heightened Eighth Amendment standard for introducing penalty phase evidence 
had not been met.  (Gilbert, supra, 120 F.Supp.2d at p. 153.)  In Friend, the court 
concluded that one of the nonstatutory aggravating factors, that defendant 
conspired with his brother to kill a potential witness to a murder, should be 
stricken, when the only evidence to support that factor was an overheard 
discussion and no evidence the defendant followed through with an overt act.  
(Friend, supra, 92 F.Supp.2d at pp. 544-545.) 
 
In the present case, the domestic violence evidence was related to a specific 
factor under the California statutory scheme.  Furthermore, unlike the federal 
cases, the domestic violence that defendant inflicted on multiple occasions on both 
his former spouses was material and reliable evidence of a propensity for violence 
that was relevant to the jury’s penalty phase determination. 
 
27
D. Jury Instructions Regarding Aggravating and Mitigating 
Circumstances 
Defendant contends that his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and 
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process were violated because he was 
sentenced to death without the jury being instructed that it had to find beyond a 
reasonable doubt the presence of at least one aggravating factor, and beyond a 
reasonable doubt that aggravating factors substantially outweighed the mitigating 
factors.  His argument is based upon the line of United States Supreme Court cases 
generally requiring that sentencing findings increasing the maximum level of 
punishment be made by a jury.  (See Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 
270; United States v. Booker (2005) 543 U.S. 220; Blakely v. Washington (2004) 
542 U.S. 296; Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584; and Apprendi v. New Jersey 
(2000) 530 U.S. 466.)  We have repeatedly rejected that contention (see, e.g., 
People v. Romero (2008) 44 Cal.4th 386, 429) and defendant advances no 
persuasive argument for reconsidering our conclusion.   
Defendant also claims the trial court committed reversible error under the 
Fourteenth Amendment and other unspecified constitutional provisions by 
refusing a defense instruction that would have instructed the jury there was no 
requirement that jurors unanimously agree on mitigating circumstances and that 
jurors should individually weigh and consider such circumstances.  We have held 
that such instruction is unnecessary and that the standard instruction, which was 
delivered in the present case, was constitutionally sufficient.  (People v. Weaver 
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 988.)  Plaintiff also contends the trial court erred in 
refusing an instruction that the jury was not required to find a mitigating 
circumstance true beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the 
evidence in order to consider it at the penalty phase.  This argument too has been 
 
28
rejected.  (People v. Bonillas (1989) 48 Cal.3d 757, 789-790.)  We decline to 
reconsider either issue. 
E. 
Double Counting of Johnson’s Testimony  
Defendant claims that Johnson’s testimony that defendant had solicited him 
to murder Elaine was used to support two aggravating factors: both section 190.3, 
factor (a), the circumstances of the crime and factor (b), prior violent criminal 
activity.  He contends that such double counting amounts to reversible error, 
violating statutory law, section 190.3, and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the United States Constitution.  We disagree any such error occurred here. 
Factors (a) and (b) of section 190.3 refer to distinct, nonoverlapping 
categories, the former to the circumstances of the present crime that has made the 
defendant eligible for the death penalty, the latter to other violent criminal activity. 
(People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 76.)  We have suggested that improper 
prosecutorial argument that invited the jury to consider the same evidence in 
support of both factors could lead the jury to overemphasize the importance of that 
evidence, resulting in penalty phase error.  (Ibid.) 
There was no such improper prosecutorial argument in the present case.  
The prosecutor only used the Johnson testimony in connection with one 
aggravating factor, section 190.3, factor (b), to prove that defendant had engaged 
in an unadjudicated violent criminal act in attempting to solicit Johnson to kill 
Elaine.  The prosecutor did not mention the Johnson testimony in connection with 
factor (a).  
It is true that the prosecution argued to the second penalty phase jury, 
which had not participated in the guilt phase of the trial, that Johnson’s testimony 
should negate any lingering doubt that defendant did in fact commit the murders 
of which another jury had convicted him.  But section 190.3, factor (a) is 
concerned with those circumstances that make a murder especially aggravated, 
 
29
and therefore make a defendant more culpable and deserving of the ultimate 
penalty.  (See People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1052-1053.)  While the 
prosecutor in the present case did use the Johnson testimony to confirm that 
defendant has committed the murders, he did not suggest defendant’s unsuccessful 
solicitation of Johnson to murder Elaine made her murder more aggravated under 
factor (a).  Therefore,  such dual use of the Johnson testimony did not amount to 
double counting of that testimony to support two separate aggravating factors. 
F. Various Constitutional Challenges to the Death Penalty Statute.   
Defendant contends that the death penalty statute, as construed by this court 
and applied at defendant’s trial, is unconstitutional in a number of respects.  First, 
defendant contends that the special circumstances that render a defendant eligible 
for the death penalty are so numerous and so broadly interpreted that they do not 
sufficiently narrow the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty in 
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution.  We have rejected that argument on a number of occasions (see, e.g., 
People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1215, 1278) and continue to do so here. 
Defendant argues that section 190.3, factor (a), as construed by this court, is 
overbroad and vague, in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution.  In support of the argument, he 
cites instances in which prosecutors in different cases have argued that seemingly 
contradictory circumstances of the crime were aggravating, for example that 
defendant struck many blows inflicting multiple wounds, and that defendant killed 
the victim with a single execution-style wound.  As we stated in People v. Jenkins, 
supra, 22 Cal.4th at page 1053:  “The ability of prosecutors in a broad range of 
cases to rely upon apparently contrary circumstances of crimes in various cases 
does not establish that a jury in a particular case acted arbitrarily and capriciously. 
 
30
As with the factor of the defendant’s age, the adversary process permits the 
defense, as well as the prosecution, to urge the significance of the facts of the 
charged crime.  Defendant fails to persuade us that these circumstances deprive 
him of due process of law.”  (Italics omitted.) 
Defendant also makes a number of claims similar to those rejected above in 
connection with the claims of erroneous jury instructions. We continue to reject 
the contention that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution require that the jury find unanimously beyond a reasonable doubt the 
existence of at least one aggravating factor, or that the aggravating factors 
outweigh the mitigating factors, or that death is the appropriate penalty.  (People v. 
Ward (2005) 36 Cal.4th 186, 221.)  Neither proof beyond a reasonable doubt nor 
jury unanimity as to the existence of particular sentencing facts are required.  
(Ibid.)  This conclusion is not altered by the United States Supreme Court’s 
decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, supra, 530 U.S. 466, and its progeny.  (Ward, 
supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 221.)  Nor, as defendant argues, is a preponderance-of-the-
evidence burden of proof required at the penalty phase in the event we reject a 
beyond-a reasonable-doubt burden of proof.  “ ‘Unlike the guilt determination, 
“the sentencing function is inherently moral and normative, not factual” [citation] 
and, hence, not susceptible to a burden-of-proof quantification.’ ”  (People v. 
Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 589 (Manriquez).)  Nor does the death penalty 
statute violate Evidence Code section 520 by failing to place the burden of proof 
on the party prosecuting the crime or wrongdoing, nor is any constitutional 
provision violated by the lack of an explicit instruction that there is no burden of 
proof.  (People v. Dunkle, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 939.)  Nor do the Sixth, Eighth, 
or Fourteenth Amendments require written findings or other specific findings by 
the jury regarding the aggravating factors.  (Manriquez, supra, 37 Cal.4th at 
 
31
p. 590.)  Nor does the Eighth Amendment require intercase proportionality review.  
(Manriquez, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 590.) 
Moreover, although the jury in this case was properly instructed that any 
unadjudicated criminal activity may not be used as an aggravating factor unless a 
juror is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant is guilty of such 
activity, the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution do not require that jurors agree unanimously on each instance of such 
activity.  (People v. Ward, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 221-222.)  Apprendi and its 
progeny do not alter that conclusion.  (Ward, supra, 36 Cal.4th at pp. 221-222.) 
The Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments are not violated by 
the use of the adjectives “extreme” and “substantial” in connection with section 
190.3, factors (d) and (g).  (Manriquez, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 590.)  There is no 
constitutional requirement that the court instruct the jury which factors are 
aggravating and which mitigating.  (People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 32, 41.)  
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require that 
capital and noncapital defendants be subject to the same sentencing procedures or 
that capital defendants be afforded the same disparate sentencing review as 
noncapital defendants under the determinate sentencing law, because the two 
categories of defendants are not similarly situated.  (Manriquez, supra, 37 Cal.4th 
at p. 590.)  Nor does international law require the elimination of capital 
punishment in California.  (Ibid.) 
 
32
 
33
 
III. 
DISPOSITION 
The judgment is affirmed. 
MORENO, J. 
WE CONCUR: GEORGE, C. J. 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Bunyard 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S023421 
Date Filed: February 23, 2009 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Joaquin 
Judge: William R. Giffen 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
George L. Schraer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Mary Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen, Jane N. Kirkland and Robert 
Nash, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
George L. Schraer 
5173 Waring Road, #247 
San Diego, CA  92120 
(619) 582-6047 
 
Robert Nash 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street, Suite 125 
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550 
(916) 324-5244