Title: STATE ex rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION v. ZANNOTTI
Citation: 2014 OK 25
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: April 8, 2014

STATE ex rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION v. ZANNOTTI Annotate this Case STATE ex rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION v. ZANNOTTI 2014 OK 25 Case Number: SCBD-6019 Decided: 04/08/2014 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL. STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION, Complainant, v. MARK ANDREW ZANNOTTI, Respondent. ORIGINAL PROCEEDING FOR ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE ¶0 The Oklahoma Bar Association filed a complaint against Respondent alleging violations of Rule 8.4(b) of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct (ORPC), 5 O.S.2011, ch. 1, app. 3-A, and Rule 1.3 of the Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings (RGDP), 5 O.S.2011, ch. 1, app. 1-A. The basis of the complaint was respondent's nolo contendere plea to domestic assault and malicious injury to property and a protective order entered against him. The parties stipulated to the facts and agreed to a recommended discipline of public censure and probation. The Professional Responsibility Tribunal found that Respondent had violated the ORPC and RGDP as alleged and recommended a public censure and probation until January 20, 2015. RESPONDENT SUSPENDED; MOTION TO ASSESS COSTS DENIED. Loraine Dillinder Farabow, Assistant General Counsel, Oklahoma Bar Association, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Complainant. Charles F. Alden, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Respondent. TAYLOR, J. ¶1 The Oklahoma Bar Association (OBA) filed a complaint against attorney Mark Andrew Zannotti (Respondent). The OBA alleges Respondent violated Rule 8.4(b)1 of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct (ORPC), 5 O.S.2011, ch. 1, app. 3-A, and Rule 1.32 of the Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings (RGDP), 5 O.S.2011, ch. 1, app. 1-A, and that he should be disciplined. The parties entered into stipulations of facts, including that Respondent pled nolo contendere to charges of domestic violence and destruction of another's property and is under a protective order, and recommended a public reprimand with a period of probation. The Professional Responsibility Tribunal (PRT) held a hearing and filed a report finding that Respondent had violated the ORPC and RGDP and recommending that Respondent should be disciplined by public reprimand with probation. ¶2 The first issue before this Court is whether Respondent violated the ORPC's and the RGDP's rules governing attorneys' conduct. If so, the second issue is what discipline should be imposed on Respondent. We find that Respondent has violated the ORPC's and the RGDP's rules governing attorney conduct. We determine the proper discipline to be suspension from the practice of law for two years if Respondent successfully completes the requirements of the order deferring the sentence and judgment, subject to reconsideration if the judgment and sentencing are accelerated. I. REVIEW OF PRT PROCEEDING AND RECORD ¶3 This Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over bar disciplinary matters. Rule 1.1, RGDP. This Court's review of the proceeding before the PRT is de novo. State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Donnelly, 1992 OK 164, ¶ 11, 848 P.2d 543 , 545. In our de novo review, we examine the record and assess the weight and credibility of the evidence. Id. This Court is not bound by the parties' admissions, the parties' stipulations, or the PRT's findings of facts and misconduct or recommendations of discipline. Id. ¶4 The record includes the parties' stipulations, a transcript of the PRT hearing, and documentary evidence. Factual stipulations that are consistent with the record are adopted by this Court; to the extent the stipulations are inconsistent with the record, they are rejected. See State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Chapman, 2005 OK 16, ¶¶ 11-12, 114 P.3d 414 , 416. Here, the stipulated facts present an incomplete account of the facts and of Respondent's misconduct. II. BACKGROUND FACTS ¶5 On November 9, 2009, J.D. retained Respondent as her attorney in her divorce proceeding. On October 3, 2010, J.D. and Respondent began a sexual dating relationship although both were married and Respondent was still representing J.D. On November 3, 2010, Respondent filed an application to withdraw as J.D.'s attorney; the application was granted on November 4, 2010. The couple dated off and on until November 4, 2011. ¶6 The following undisputed testimony was presented at the trial in State v. Zannotti, No. CM-2012-3988 (D.Ct. Tulsa County Jan. 28, 2013). On or before October 26, 2011, while J.D. was away on a business trip and then on her way home, Respondent sent J.D. text messages which show that Respondent was in a needy, jealous state of mind; and J.D. responded to several, but not all, of the text messages.3 J.D. and Respondent agreed to meet at her house because Respondent was "wanting to get back together." Respondent let himself into J.D.'s house through an unlocked back door as she had instructed him. When J.D. arrived home and to her surprise, her garage door was open with Respondent's car parked inside. Even though they were not dating at the time, Respondent opened J.D.'s car door and kissed her. Then Respondent reached inside the car, grabbed her phone, smashed it in the driveway, and said, "You don't need this. You just need to pay attention to me." ¶7 J.D. and Respondent went into the kitchen where an argument began. When Respondent went into the backyard, J.D. got in her car and attempted to leave. Respondent came into the garage, pulled the keys out of the car, and pulled J.D. out of the car and into the kitchen. After J.D. saw Respondent's phone on the counter, she encouraged Respondent to smash his phone like he had smashed her phone. When Respondent went outside with his phone, J.D. grabbed a cordless phone and ran upstairs to the bathroom. ¶8 Respondent came up the stairs and into the bathroom, pulled J.D. into the bedroom, and pushed her onto the bed. J.D. started screaming for Respondent to leave which upset him even more. Respondent then lifted J.D. up by her shoulders, threw her into the bedroom wall and head-butted her in the face, causing a gash across her nose and giving her two black eyes. ¶9 J.D. convinced Respondent to let her go downstairs to get some ice for her nose, and Respondent followed her into the kitchen. Respondent pushed J.D. back upstairs where he ordered her to undress and where he undressed.4 Respondent ordered J.D. to lie down on the bed, got atop her, and put his hands around her neck tightly several times. During this time, Respondent asked her if she loved him and would marry him. In an attempt to pacify Respondent, J.D. replied, "Yes." Respondent also asked J.D. for the last name of her male friend and said that he was going to kill him. Finally, Respondent began to calm down, and J.D. was able to kick him off the bed. Respondent stood up and asked J.D. if she wanted him to leave. She grabbed her dress, put it back on, and answered, "yeah." While Respondent was dressing, J.D. ran down the stairs, ran out the front door to a neighbor's house, and called 911. ¶10 After the police arrived and questioned J.D., she went to a friend's house to stay. J.D. was out of town the next few days. When she returned home, J.D. filed for a protective order. The district attorney filed charges against Respondent for misdemeanor domestic abuse assault and battery,5 and malicious injury to property.6 ¶11 On August 8, 2012, a criminal information was filed. Respondent was charged in Count I of the Information as follows: MARK ANDREW ZANNOTTI, on or about 10/26/2011, in Tulsa County, State of Oklahoma and within the jurisdiction of this Court, did commit the crime of DOMESTIC ASSAULT & BATTERY, a Misdemeanor, by unlawfully, willfully and wrongfully, commit an assault and battery upon the person of one [J.D.], a person with whom the defendant was in a dating relationship, by then and there pushing and shoving her and striking her about the face with force and violence and with the unlawful intent to do her corporal hurt and bodily injury . . . . Count II charged that Respondent "unlawfully, willfully, maliciously and wrongfully" injured and defaced J.D.'s phone by "taking the phone and breaking it with the deliberate and malicious and wrongful intent to injure property of said owner."7 Respondent pled nolo contendere to the criminal charges. ¶12 J.D. testified in the criminal proceeding that, since the incident, she had not stayed alone at night in her house, was seeing a counselor, was taking medication to calm her, and was frightened of running into Respondent.8 She testified that he had never before exhibited violent behavior, and she would not have expected such behavior from him. The judge deferred the sentencing for two years, stating: "When the prosecutor is recommending situations where they want probation in the amount -- in the amount of one year, I get exactly the same punishment by extending it and -- not punishment, but safety of the -- of the community and punishment, by extending it. And the only way I can do that is with a deferred sentence."9 ¶13 At the hearing before the PRT, OBA counsel asked Respondent the following question: And her proffer to the Court regarding the factual basis for the plea was that the State's evidence would show that on October 26, 2011, that the Defendant, while at the home of the victim, [J.D.] - - I'm going to skip through the address - - that he grabbed her arm, pushed her, head-butted her in the face and threw her down, and that the Court added, and allegedly grabbed her phone earlier, threw it in the driveway, breaking it and having it skid into the yard. Is that also true? And then the Court asked you, "Is that the evidence you're telling me that I should accept as true although you're not admitting to any part of it?" Respondent answered: "Yes." Then OBA counsel asked: "And was that, in fact, what you entered the plea to?" Respondent again answered: "Yes." Respondent stated that he had put his hands on J.D. inappropriately but that he had not done everything she said he did without elaborating.10 ¶14 Respondent testified that J.D. convinced him that "maybe it would work." He further testified that "she wanted me to come over on the 26th after I picked her up from the airport a couple of weeks before. . . ." The text messages do not support Respondent's testimony that it was J.D. who wanted to continue the relationship. The text messages, see Appendix A, show that Respondent was the one insisting on he and J.D. meeting on October 26. ¶15 Respondent has paid for the cell phone, started counseling even before the criminal charges were filed, and has cooperated with the OBA in its investigation. He states that he is embarrassed by his behavior, understands how he has hurt people, understands that he has brought disrepute upon the legal profession, and is sure he will never act in the same way again. ¶16 The parties stipulated to the following mitigation: Respondent has practiced for nineteen years without discipline by this Court, he has cooperated with the OBA's investigation, he has complied with the terms of the deferment order, his conduct was not related to his practice of law, and he has made full restitution. The witnesses that testified in his behalf, including his counselor, think he is fit to practice law and would not have anticipated Respondent's behavior on October 26, 2011.11 III. VIOLATIONS OF THE ORPC AND THE RGDP ¶17 The OBA alleges and the Respondent admits that he violated Rule 8.4(b) of the ORPC and Rule 1.3 of the RGDP. A lawyer's violent acts in the form of domestic abuse demonstrate a lawyer's unfitness to practice law. See Rule 8.4, cmt. 2, ORPC. The facts underlying the conviction are the facts in the disciplinary proceeding. Rule 7.2, RGDP. Respondent's acts show a disregard for the laws that he has sworn to uphold and for the rules governing lawyers' conduct. The characterization of Respondent's conduct as criminal, civil, or neither matters not. State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Livshee, 1994 OK 12, ¶ 8, 870 P.2d 770 , 774. "The misconduct clearly does not comport with accepted professional standards because it is likely to undermine public confidence in and perception of the legal profession as a community of law-abiding practitioners." Id. ¶18 The evidence shows that Respondent violated Rule 1.8(j) of the ORPC, as well as Rule 8.4(b) of the ORPC and Rule 1.3 of the RGDP. Rule 1.8(j) prohibits a lawyer from beginning a sexual relationship with a client. Even though Respondent withdrew his representation of J.D. in her divorce proceeding shortly after beginning a sexual relationship with her, he nonetheless violated Rule 1.8(j). However, the OBA did not allege facts in the complaint in support of a violation of Rule 1.8(j). Due process considerations limit this Court's exercise of power to discipline Respondent for a violation of Rule 1.8(j). If this were the only rule the Respondent had violated, we would be compelled to dismiss the complaint. But it is not. And while we cannot consider Respondent's violation of Rule 1.8(j) in determining whether Respondent violated the ORPC, we may consider this violation, as we consider other factors presented by the evidence, in determining the appropriate discipline. IV. DISCIPLINE ¶19 The evidence does not support the parties' stipulations to the mitigation that Respondent's misconduct did not relate to his practice of law and that he has made full restitution. First, Respondent was in a position of trust when he started the sexual relationship with J.D. that led to his acts of domestic violence. Certainly taking advantage of a client going through a divorce and heaping violence upon that now former client relates to his practice of law. Second, there is no evidence that Respondent paid for J.D.'s medical and counseling expenses resulting from the physical and psychological injuries as a result of the domestic violence inflicted upon her. Further, Respondent can do nothing to rectify the psychological damage he inflicted on J.D. Respondent's testimony regarding the events of October 26, 2011, to portray J.D. as the needy party in the relationship and himself in a more favorable light, shows that Respondent has not accepted responsibility for his actions and undermines the testimony of his remorse. ¶20 Next we turn to the issue of the manner in which this bar matter came to this Court. But for the district court clerk's failure to comply with Rule 7.2 of the RGDP by filing the order deferring sentencing and judgment with the Chief Justice,12 this disciplinary process would have been initiated within a short time after his plea (instead of six months later), and the Respondent would have been suspended from the practice of law soon thereafter. Rule 7.3, RGDP. Rule 7.2 allows, but does not require, the OBA to forward this documentation to the Chief Justice when it receives it, and, in this case, the OBA did not do so. Rather, the OBA filed this disciplinary proceeding under Rule 6 of the RGDP. The OBA was previously warned about taking advantage of a court clerk's failure to comply with Rule 7.2 in State ex rel. Casey, 2012 OK 93, 295 P.3d 1096 (Kauger, J. concurring in part/dissenting in part); State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Conrady, 2012 OK 29, 275 P.3d 133 (Kauger, J. concurring specially). ¶21 Because neither the district clerk nor the OBA filed the order deferring the judgment and sentence in the criminal case with the Chief Justice pursuant to Rule 7.2 of the RGDP, we cannot follow the Rule 7 procedures. However, our discipline would be uneven if this Court ignores Rule 7 and allows a lawyer to escape suspension merely because a district court clerk failed to follow Rule 7.2. Further, it would be inconsistent for this Court to impose discipline of a suspension under Rule 7 for criminal acts showing an unfitness to practice law but not do so when the proceeding is filed under Rule 6. This Court will not allow the OBA to circumvent Rule 7's mandates by bringing this proceeding under Rule 6 rather than filing the documents from the criminal proceeding with the Chief Justice. Under Rule 7.3, an immediate interim suspension is mandated as part of the discipline to protect the public and the integrity of the judicial system and the reputation of the bar. ¶22 In this regard and because the OBA's failed to take heed after the warnings in Casey and in Conrady, it has become necessary to take more assertive measures in addressing the problem of the OBA electing to file what should be a Rule 7 proceeding under Rule 6. In order to remedy this problem, the OBA is directed, in all future cases, to furnish certified copies of documents listed in Rule 7.2 to the Chief Justice within five days of receiving such documents. ¶23 In support of their request for public reprimand, the OBA and Respondent cite to State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Corrales, 2012 OK 64, 280 P.3d 968 (pled to three counts of assault and battery; did not involve a client or former client); State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Murdock, 2010 OK 32, 236 P.3d 107 (entered Alford plea to the misdemeanor charge of Outraging Public Decency, in violation of 21 O.S.2001 § 22; did not involve a client or former client); State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Garrett, 2005 OK 91, 127 P.3d 600 (pled guilty to misdemeanor battery; no client or former client involved); State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Foster, 2000 OK 4, 995 P.2d 1138 (feloniously touching a minor with intent to commit felony of procuring obscene and indecent photographs); State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Sopher, 1993 OK 55, 852 P.2d 707 (unwelcome sexual advances toward client and client's mother). One of the purposes of discipline is to deter like misconduct in the practicing bar. State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Golden, 2008 OK 39, ¶ 11, 201 P.3d 862 , 864. It is obvious from Respondent's misconduct that the cases relied on by Respondent in his quest for public censure did not serve to deter Respondent. ¶24 As incidents of domestic and intimate partner abuse rise and become the focus of legislation, see 21 O.S.2011, § 644(C), and public attention,13 it becomes more incumbent on this Court to protect the public by sending a message to other lawyers that this misconduct is considered a serious breach of a lawyer's ethical duty and will not be tolerated. The trial judge thought it necessary to keep Respondent in the criminal system for a full two years for the safety of the public. Consistent with the trial judge's logic, anything less than a two-year suspension from the practice of law does not protect the public, nor would anything less than a two-year suspension protect the integrity of the judicial system and the reputation of the bar. V. CONCLUSION ¶25 Respondent violated Rule 8.4(b) of the ORPC and Rule 1.3 of the RGDP, and his actions show a lack of fitness to practice law and have brought disrepute to the judicial system and the legal profession. Respondent stands suspended from the practice of law for two years; however, if Respondent's judgment and sentencing is accelerated, this Court may reconsider the discipline imposed today. The OBA is directed to immediately notify this Court of any motion to or order accelerating the judgment and sentence. ¶26 The OBA filed an application for costs pursuant to Rule 6.16 of the RGDP in the amount of $718.68. Because this proceeding was not brought under the proper rule, the motion for costs is denied. RESPONDENT SUSPENDED; MOTION TO ASSESS COSTS DENIED. Concur: Reif, V.C.J., and Kauger, Taylor, Combs, and Gurich, JJ. Concur in Part, Dissent in Part: Colbert, C.J., and Watt, J. Dissent: Winchester and Edmondson, JJ. FOOT