Title: Sundance Homes, Inc. v. County of DuPage
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 88763, 88764
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: February 16, 2001

Docket Nos. 88763, 88764 cons.-Agenda 21-September 2000.
SUNDANCE HOMES, INC., et al., Appellants, v. THE
								COUNTY OF DU PAGE et al., Appellees.
Opinion filed February 16, 2001.
	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON delivered the opinion of the
court:
	On March 23, 1995, this court rendered its opinion in
Northern Illinois Home Builders Ass'n v. County of Du Page, 165 Ill. 2d 25 (1995) (hereinafter referred to as NIHBA), holding
unconstitutional the first of two state enabling statutes, and
Du Page County ordinances enacted pursuant thereto, which,
respectively, authorized and imposed transportation impact fees on
new development. In the context of that case, this court stated,
"monies collected thereunder should be returned." NIHBA, 165 Ill. 2d  at 35-36, 50. The appellants in this case, fee payers who were
not parties in NIHBA, who waited more than five years after they
had paid the impact fees in question to file for a refund, and who
indeed filed almost a full year after NIHBA was decided, now
seek, by various procedural means legal and equitable, a refund of
fees they paid under the invalidated statute and ordinances.
Although there are several facets to the issue, their right to a
refund is the central question before the court. We set forth
hereafter facts necessary to an understanding of our disposition.
	In 1987, the Illinois legislature enacted former section
5-608(a) of the Illinois Highway Code (the enabling act) (Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1987, ch. 121, par. 5-608(a), repealed by Pub. Act 86-97, §2,
eff. July 26, 1989). The 1987 enabling act allowed counties with
populations between 400,000 and 1 million inhabitants to establish
transportation impact districts and collect transportation impact
fees from persons constructing new developments in those
districts.
	Pursuant to the enabling act, Du Page County passed several
ordinances creating transportation impact districts and providing
for the collection of road impact fees from builders (Du Page
County Ordinances ODT-016-88, ODT-021-89, ODT-21A-89,
ODT-021B-89). The plaintiff, Sundance Homes, Inc. (Sundance),
is a development company which constructs new residences in
Du Page County. Between November 22, 1988, and July 25, 1990,
the county collected road impact fees from the plaintiff and other
homebuilders. On July 26, 1989, the legislature repealed the
enabling act and passed the Road Improvement Impact Fee Law
(605 ILCS 5/5-901 et seq. (West 1992)). As a result of that
legislation, the county enacted a new ordinance effective July 25,
1990, authorizing the collection of road impact fees pursuant to
the new law. The instant case concerns only those impact fees
collected by the county prior to July 25, 1990.
	Between January 17, 1989, and July 25, 1990, plaintiff paid
a total of $63,580 in road impact fees to the county. The plaintiff
submitted each payment under protest. In 1988, the plaintiff and
several other homebuilders filed a lawsuit against the county in the
circuit court of Du Page County. Home Builders Ass'n of Greater
Chicago v. County of Du Page, No. 88-MR-683 (Circuit Court of
Du Page County). In that case, the plaintiff requested a declaration
that the enabling act and the Du Page County ordinances enacted
pursuant thereto were unconstitutional. The plaintiff also sought
the entry of an order requiring the county to refund all road impact
fees paid by the plaintiff and the other named homebuilders.
Although the plaintiff moved for judgment on the pleadings in that
case on June 15, 1990, no judgment was ever entered on the merits
and the case was voluntarily dismissed in November 1990.
	The constitutionality of the enabling act of 1987, and the
Du Page County implementing ordinances, was again attacked in
a separate lawsuit brought by different homebuilders in NIHBA.
As previously noted, on March 23, 1995, this court filed an
opinion in NIHBA, holding unconstitutional the enabling act of
1987, and the Du Page County implementing ordinances, and
stating that "the monies collected thereunder should be returned."
NIHBA, 165 Ill. 2d  at 35-36, 50. The appellants in the instant case
were not parties in NIHBA.
	Following this court's holding in NIHBA, the plaintiff
requested that the county return the $63,580 in road impact fees it
had paid between January 17, 1989, and July 25, 1990. The county
refused the plaintiff's request for a refund.
	Plaintiff filed the instant class action suit on February 8, 1996,
requesting that the county be ordered to return all of the road
impact fees paid between November 22, 1998, and July 25, 1990.
The plaintiff alleged that, during this period, the county had
collected an aggregate amount of $6,194,056.22 in impact fees
from the members of the class. As subsequently amended, the
plaintiff's complaint consisted of three counts. Count I was
entitled "mandamus" and sought an order requiring the county to
immediately return the impact fees paid by each class member.
Count II was entitled "declaratory judgment" and sought an order
declaring that the county was indebted to each class member in an
amount equal to the total road impact fees paid by that class
member. Count III was entitled "restitution, assumpsit, unjust
enrichment, and recovery of payment" and sought an order that the
county be required to deposit all of the collected road impact fees
into a common fund for the benefit of the members of the class.
	On July 10, 1996, the county filed a motion to dismiss
pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the
Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 1996)). In its motion, the county
argued that plaintiff's complaint was time-barred by section
13-205 of the Code, which imposes a five-year limitation period
on "all civil actions not otherwise provided for." 735 ILCS
5/13-205 (West 1996). The county argued that the plaintiff had
failed to file its complaint within five years from the date its cause
of action accrued, according to the county, the date it had actually
paid the road impact fees. Alternatively, the county argued that the
plaintiff's complaint should be barred under the doctrine of laches.
	In response to the motion, the plaintiff argued that its cause of
action did not accrue until this court filed its opinion in NIHBA on
March 23, 1995. The plaintiff contended that, prior to the ruling in
NIHBA, it had no right to a refund of the impact fees. The plaintiff
therefore concluded that the instant class action was a timely
attempt to "enforce" this court's ruling in NIHBA that the monies
collected pursuant to the invalidated ordinances "be returned." On
November 5, 1996, the trial court denied the county's motion to
dismiss.
	On March 4, 1997, the circuit court entered an order certifying
as a class "[a]ll persons or entities who paid impact fees to the
[County] and/or claim a refund pursuant to *** Ordinance Nos.
[ODT]-016-88; ODT-021-89; ODT-021A-89; and
ODT-021B-89 during the period of the effective enforcement of
said ordinance[s] which was from November 22, 1988, through
July 25, 1990, which ordinance[s] w[ere] declared to be
unconstitutional by the Illinois Supreme Court." The trial court
also identified as a subclass those homebuyers who were entitled
to a refund because their developer/builder had incorporated the
charge for the road impact fees into the purchase price of their
homes.
	On September 22, 1997, the plaintiff filed a motion for
summary judgment as to each count of its complaint. The plaintiff
argued that there existed no genuine issue as to the county's
obligation to return the road impact fees and as to the amount of
the refund due. The plaintiff therefore concluded that it was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. On November 24, 1997,
the trial court entered an order granting the motion for summary
judgment. The county filed a notice of appeal from that order, but
the appellate court dismissed the appeal. Sundance Homes, Inc. v.
County of Du Page, No. 2-97-1232 (February 6, 1998)
(unpublished order of dismissal).
	On March 13, 1998, the circuit court entered an order creating
a common fund for the benefit of the class and directing the
Du Page County treasurer to transfer $6,194,056.22 into the fund.
Also in March of 1998, the court-approved "Notice of Class
Action and Hearing on Attorneys' Fees" was sent to all
ascertainable members of the class by first class mail and was
published in certain newspapers. Accompanying the notice was a
copy of the plaintiff's petition for attorney fees. The notice advised
the class members that they could either register their claims for
a refund out of the common fund or "opt-out" of the class. By the
end of the registration period, class members representing claims
totaling $68,000 had chosen to "opt-out" of the class. Class and
subclass members representing claims totaling $2,406,745
registered to participate in the distribution of the common fund. Of
those claims, there were several dual registrations by homebuilders
and home buyers claiming a refund to the same $37,800 in impact
fees.
	On September 3, 1998, the circuit court entered various orders
providing that (1) the county had no standing to be heard on the
plaintiff's petition for attorney fees; (2) attorney fees would be
calculated based upon the entire common fund and not just the
claimed portion of the fund; (3) attorney fees would be paid from
the unclaimed portion of the fund; (4) an additional $37,800 would
be paid out of the unclaimed fund in order to satisfy all of the dual
claims; and (5) the class would receive prejudgment interest at a
rate of 5% from the date the action was filed.
	On June 8, 1998, Fifield Companies, Inc., Cambridge Homes,
Inc., Cambridge Properties, Lexington Homes, L.L.C., Prentiss
Properties Acquisition Partners, L.P., Kingsport Development,
Inc., Strategic Realty Advisors, Inc., Catellus Development
Corporation, Plitt Theatres, Inc., and Toys "R" Us, Inc.
(collectively referred to as the intervenors), filed motions pursuant
to section 2-804(a) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-804(a) (West
1998)) to intervene in the class action in order to challenge the
class certification and the plaintiff's petition for attorney fees.
Each of these entities had paid road impact fees under the
invalidated ordinances and were members of the class. Although
the circuit court did not rule on the motions to intervene, the
movants did participate in all aspects of the lawsuit after June 8,
1998.
	On November 4, 1998, the circuit court conducted a hearing
on the plaintiff's petition for attorney fees. At the hearing,
plaintiff's counsel presented a detailed summary of the legal
services performed on behalf of the class and the expenses
incurred in prosecuting the case. Plaintiff's counsel also provided
the testimony of two expert witnesses who had experience in class
action litigation. Both witnesses outlined the benefits and results
achieved for the class and concluded that an award of attorney fees
in an amount equal to one-third of the common fund would be
appropriate.
	On January 15, 1999, the circuit court entered an order
awarding 21.289% of the common fund as attorney fees. The
common fund, including prejudgment interest, totaled $7,045,720.
Applying the trial court's percentage award to the common fund
resulted in a fee award of $1.5 million.
	Also on January 15, 1999, the trial court entered a final
dispositional order, providing that (1) $2,737,672 (claims of
$2,406,745 plus prejudgment interest of $330,927) be paid out of
the common fund to satisfy all of the registered claims of the class;
(2) $1.5 million be paid out of the remaining unclaimed portion of
the common fund to satisfy the award of attorney fees; (3) $68,000
of the unclaimed portion of the common fund be returned to the
county to satisfy the potential claims of class members who had
"opted-out"; (4) $37,800 be paid out of the unclaimed portion of
the common fund to satisfy all of the dual claims made by
homebuilders and homeowners; (5) the remainder of the
unclaimed portion of the fund be returned to the county's general
fund subject to the county's reduction of its next real estate tax
levy on all county taxpayers by that amount; and (6) enforcement
of the order would be stayed pending an appeal.
	At the time the trial court entered its final dispositional order,
the intervenors renewed their request for a ruling on their still-pending motions to intervene. The intervenors sought a ruling on
their motions for the express purpose of protecting their rights and
interests in any appeal from the circuit court's judgment. Over the
objection of the attorney representing the class, the circuit court
granted the motions to intervene. The county did not object to the
intervenors' motions.
	Following entry of the circuit court's final dispositional order,
the county filed a timely notice of appeal.
	The appellate court reversed, rejecting plaintiff's assertion
that the instant litigation merely represents an attempt to "enforce"
this court's judgment in NIHBA, and holding both that the statute
of limitation set forth in section 13-205 of the Code barred this
action and that the doctrine of laches would have barred the action
in any event. No. 2-99-0125 (unpublished order under Rule 23).
	We subsequently allowed timely filed petitions for leave to
appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 315 (177 Ill. 2d R. 315),
and now affirm the judgment of the appellate court. We begin our
analysis with observations on the nature of time limitations
applicable to legal and equitable actions by way of statutes of
limitation and the equitable doctrine of laches, respectively,
focusing specifically on refund litigation.
	The purpose of a statute of limitation is to discourage the
presentation of stale claims and to encourage diligence in the
bringing of actions. Tom Olesker's Exciting World of Fashion, Inc.
v. Dun &amp; Bradstreet, Inc., 61 Ill. 2d 129, 137 (1975). Statutes of
limitation and repose represent society's recognition that
predictability and finality are desirable, indeed indispensable,
elements of the orderly administration of justice (Sepmeyer v.
Holman, 162 Ill. 2d 249, 256 (1994)) that must be balanced
against the right of every citizen to seek redress for a legally
recognized wrong. In achieving this accommodation of interests,
it is first necessary to determine when a given cause of action
"accrues," so as to commence the running of the relevant statutory
period.
	Courts of this state have held that a statute of limitation
begins to run when the party to be barred has the right to invoke
the aid of the court to enforce his remedy. Milnes v. Hunt, 311 Ill.
App. 3d 977, 980 (2000); Rohter v. Passarella, 246 Ill. App. 3d
860, 869 (1993). Stated another way, a limitation period begins
"when facts exist which authorize one party to maintain an action
against another." Davis v. Munie, 235 Ill. 620, 622 (1908); Bank
of Ravenswood v. City of Chicago, 307 Ill. App. 3d 161, 167
(1999). It has been accurately noted that a limitation period will
not await commencement until a plaintiff has assurance of the
success of an action. Weger v. Shell Oil Co., 966 F.2d 216, 219
(7th Cir. 1992) citing Nendza v. Board of Review of the
Department of Labor, 105 Ill. App. 3d 437, 442 (1982) (discovery
rule not applicable where a plaintiff waits to file suit or a claim
until he has some assurance he will be successful on the merits of
his claim).
	Although an impact fee is not a tax (see NIHBA, 165 Ill. 2d at
42), the similarities between payment of a tax, and payment of an
impact fee, are sufficient to render instructive tax cases addressing
the issue of accrual. One such example in the federal system is the
United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Dalm,
494 U.S. 596, 108 L. Ed. 2d 548, 110 S. Ct. 1361 (1990). In Dalm,
the Supreme Court held that a federal limitation period, applicable
to tax refund claims for overpayment, began to run when a
taxpayer tendered payment of a tax to the government, not when
the taxpayer discovered that the payment was erroneous. In so
holding, the Court noted:
		"The very purpose of statutes of limitations in the tax
context is to bar the assertion of a refund claim after a
certain period of time has passed, without regard to
whether the claim would otherwise be meritorious. That
a taxpayer does not learn until after the limitations period
has run that a tax was paid in error, and that he or she has
a ground upon which to claim a refund, does not operate
to lift the statutory bar." Dalm, 494 U.S.  at 609 n.7, 108 L. Ed. 2d  at 562 n.7, 110 S. Ct.  at 1369 n.7.
	Limitation provisions in our state revenue statutes indicate
that the time period for a claim runs from either the time a return
is filed or the time the tax is paid. Section 911(a) (1) of the Illinois
Income Tax Act (35 ILCS 5/911(a)(1) (West 1998)), for example,
provides as follows:
			"A claim for refund shall be filed not later than 3 years
after the date the return was filed (in the case of returns
required under Article 7 of this Act respecting any
amounts withheld as tax, not later than 3 years after the
15th day of the 4th month following the close of the
calendar year in which such withholding was made), or
one year after the date the tax was paid, whichever is the
later[.]"
As section 911(a)(1) indicates, and as other tax limitation statutes
discussed hereafter will show, our legislature intended, subject to
established equitable "principles" of tolling, such as the
appropriate application of the discovery rule, that the right to
request a refund commence and terminate on dates certain. The
date of accrual is generally the date that the tax is paid.
	Consistent with the need for certainty and finality, it is a
principle of long-standing in this state that once a statute of
limitation has expired, a defendant has a right to invoke the bar of
the limitation period as a defense to a cause of action. M.E.H. v.
L.H., 177 Ill. 2d 207, 214-15 (1997). As this court recently stated
in Clay v. Kuhl, 189 Ill. 2d 603, 609 (2000), "under Illinois law,
the barring of an action by a statute of limitation creates a ***
right in favor of the defendant, and the action cannot later be
revived." If, as this court stated in Clay, subsequent legislative
action cannot revive a cause of action already barred by a rule of
limitation, it would seem to follow that subsequent court decisions
cannot revive a civil cause of action not timely filed, at least in
those instances where a plaintiff was fully aware of the basis for
his claim, or should have been, he did not suffer from a legal
disability, and the facts do not demonstrate other recognized
grounds for equitable tolling.
	Federal decisions appear to sanction strict application of
statutes of limitation in the area of tax litigation, even where the
law has been altered by judicial decision. "[L]egal principles, even
when applied retroactively, do not apply to cases already closed."
Hernandez-Rodriguez v. Pasquarell, 118 F.3d 1034, 1042 (5th
Cir. 1997), citing Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749,
758, 131 L. Ed. 2d 820, 830, 115 S. Ct. 1745, 1751 (1995). The
Supreme Court in Hyde considered "tax examples" that presented
"different, remedial problems." Considering one such example, the
Court stated:
		"Suppose a State collects taxes under a taxing statute that
this Court later holds unconstitutional. Taxpayers then sue
for a refund of the unconstitutionally collected taxes.
Retroactive application of the Court's holding would
seem to entitle the taxpayers to a refund of taxes. But
what if a pre-existing, separate, independent rule of state
law, having nothing to do with retroactivity-a rule
containing certain procedural requirements for any refund
suit-nonetheless barred the taxpayers' refund suit?
[Citations.] Depending upon whether or not this
independent rule satisfied other provisions of the
Constitution, it could independently bar the taxpayers'
refund claim." Hyde, 514 U.S.  at 756, 131 L. Ed. 2d  at
828-29, 115 S. Ct.  at 1750. 
	In James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529,
535, 541-42, 544, 115 L. Ed. 2d 481, 488, 492-93, 111 S. Ct. 2439, 2443, 2446-48 (1991), a tax refund case, Justice Souter,
announcing the judgment of the Court, made clear that court
decisions cannot be applied retroactively to civil causes already
barred by statutes of limitation or res judicata. The Supreme Court
has repeatedly affirmed the notion that a statute of limitation may
bar a tax refund action, notwithstanding the Court's ruling that the
state's taxing statute is unconstitutional, and irrespective of the
Court's retroactive application of that ruling. See McKesson Corp.
v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages &amp; Tobacco, Department of
Business Regulation, 496 U.S. 18, 27, 45, 110 L. Ed. 2d 17, 29,
41, 110 S. Ct. 2238, 2245, 2254-55 (1990) (acknowledging that
statutes of limitation may be dispositive in such cases); Ward v.
Board of County Commissioners, 253 U.S. 17, 25, 64 L. Ed. 751,
759, 40 S. Ct. 419, 422 (1920) (recognizing refund claim could be
barred if there was "any valid local [limitations] law in force when
the claim was filed"). See also United States v. Estate of Donnelly,
397 U.S. 286, 296, 25 L. Ed. 2d 312, 319-20, 90 S. Ct. 1033, 1039
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring, noting that, at some point a
"transaction has acquired such a degree of finality that the rights
of the parties should be considered frozen. *** [I]n the civil area
that moment should be when the transaction is beyond challenge
either because the statute of limitations has run or the rights of the
parties have been fixed by litigation and have become res
judicata").
	 It would make no sense for the Court to consistently reaffirm
this principle if the cause of action for a refund did not begin to
run until the Court held a state taxing statute unconstitutional. A
statute of limitation would not be implicated. Clearly, the action
accrues when the tax is paid.
	Undoubtedly, statutes of limitation are valid procedural
restrictions which may be invoked to bar an otherwise meritorious
claim for a refund, even when that claim is based upon a tax
statute that has been held unconstitutional. We turn now from our
discussion of statutes of limitation to address the related equitable
doctrine of laches.
	This court has defined "laches" as "a neglect or omission to
assert a right, taken in conjunction with a lapse of time of more or
less duration, and other circumstances causing prejudice to an
adverse party, as will operate to bar relief in equity." Meyers v.
Kissner, 149 Ill. 2d 1, 12 (1992). For laches to apply, a plaintiff
must have knowledge of his right, yet fail to assert it in a timely
manner. Bremer v. Bremer, 411 Ill. 454, 468 (1952). Although
statutes of limitation, applicable in legal actions, are not directly
controlling in suits seeking equitable relief, courts ordinarily
follow statutes of limitation as convenient measures for
determining the length of time that ought to operate as a bar to an
equitable cause of action. Meyers, 149 Ill. 2d  at 12. However,
depending upon the particular circumstances before the court,
equitable relief may be refused although the time fixed by the
statute of limitations has not expired, or conversely, relief may be
granted even though the limitation period has long since elapsed.
Meyers, 149 Ill. 2d  at 12. 
	Thus, for better or worse, depending upon one's view of the
importance and continuing relevance of the law-equity dichotomy,
how we categorize various actions tends to control the limitation
schemes applied to them: generally, statutes of limitation apply to
actions at law; laches is the doctrine of limitation applied to
actions in equity. Obviously, the shrewd advocate, faced with a
limitation problem, will attempt to manipulate the outcome by
casting his action as one in equity in order to take advantage of the
amorphous quality of laches analysis.
	However, laches analysis is no longer mechanically applied
to all actions denominated equitable, particularly where such an
application would frustrate the intent of the legislature. For
example, although a constructive trust is considered to be an
equitable remedy imposed by a court to prevent "unjust
enrichment" (In re Liquidation of Security Casualty Co., 127 Ill. 2d 434, 447 (1989)), this court has held the five-year statute of
limitation of section 13-205 applicable to an action for
constructive trusts. Hagney v. Lopeman, 147 Ill. 2d 458, 462
(1992); Chicago Park District v. Kenroy, Inc., 78 Ill. 2d 555, 560-61 (1980). The same five-year statute of limitation has been
applied to an action seeking restitution of taxes erroneously paid,
based upon the same theory of "unjust enrichment," an action "at
law" (Burns Philp Food, Inc. v. Cavalea Continental Freight, Inc.,
135 F.3d 526, 527-28 (7th Cir. 1998), citing, inter alia, Partipilo
v. Hallman, 156 Ill. App. 3d 806 (1987)) governed by "principles
of equity" (Burns, 135 F.3d  at 528, citing Board of Highway
Commissioners v. City of Bloomington, 253 Ill. 164, 174 (1911)).
In so holding, the Burns court commented on the "decreasingly
important (and therefore increasingly hazy) line between law and
equity." Burns, 135 F.3d  at 528.
	While we need not comment on the propriety of that
observation, we do note the inclination of courts to circumscribe
the reach of equity in revenue cases and the apparent intent of our
legislature to impose shorter limitation periods, and thus greater
certainty, in the area of tax refund litigation. The federal
government, like Illinois, imposes detailed statutes of limitation on
tax refund claims. Section 6511(a) of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986 requires an aggrieved taxpayer to file any claim for refund
within three years from the time the tax return was filed or two
years from the time the tax was paid, whichever period expires
later. 26 U.S.C. §6511(a) (1994). We have previously referred to
the application of that statute in our discussion of Dalm. We note
that the same statute of limitation was at issue in United States v.
Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 136 L. Ed. 2d 818, 117 S. Ct. 849
(1997), wherein the taxpayers seeking a refund argued that the
statute was subject to equitable tolling for nonstatutory equitable
reasons. The Supreme Court concluded that Congress did not
intend the equitable tolling doctrine to apply beyond the provisions
of the statute. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Breyer
stated:
		"Tax law, after all, is not normally characterized by case-specific exceptions reflecting individualized equities.
			 The nature of the underlying subject matter-tax
collection-underscores the linguistic point. *** To read
an 'equitable tolling' exception into §6511 could create
serious administrative problems by forcing the IRS to
respond to, and perhaps litigate, large numbers of late
claims, accompanied by requests for 'equitable tolling'
which, upon close inspection, might turn out to lack
sufficient equitable justification. [Citation.] The nature
and potential magnitude of the administrative problem
suggest that Congress decided to pay the price of
occasional unfairness in individual cases (penalizing a
taxpayer whose claim is unavoidably delayed) in order to
maintain a more workable tax enforcement system. At the
least it tells us that Congress would likely have wanted to
decide explicitly whether, or just where and when, to
expand the statute's limitations periods, rather than
delegate to the courts a generalized power to do so
wherever a court concludes that equity so requires."
Brockamp, 519 U.S.  at 352-53, 136 L. Ed. 2d  at 823-24,
117 S. Ct.  at 852.
	Like section 1611(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, our own
state statutes of limitation, applicable to claims for tax refunds or
credits, generally apply a maximum three-year limitation to such
claims. See 35 ILCS 5/911(a) (1) (West 1998) (Illinois Income
Tax Act); 35 ILCS 105/21 (West 1998) (Use Tax Act); 35 ILCS
115/19 (West 1998) (Service Occupation Tax Act); 35 ILCS 120/6
(West 1998) (Retailers' Occupation Tax Act); 35 ILCS 610/6
(West 1998) (Messages Tax Act); 35 ILCS 615/6 (West 1998)
(Gas Revenue Tax Act); 35 ILCS 620/6 (West 1998) (Public
Utilities Revenue Act); 35 ILCS 630/10 (West 1998)
(Telecommunications Excise Tax Act). These statutes contain few,
if any, exceptions to their terms.
	The original 1987 enabling act for the collection of impact
fees contained no provisions specifically addressing refund claims
or procedures for challenging the collection of impact fees.
However, effective July 26, 1989, the legislature enacted the Road
Improvement Impact Fee Law and, with it, a very limited
provision pertaining specifically to the refund of unencumbered
impact fees and a separate "appeals process" apparently intended
to cover every other conceivable challenge to the collection of
impact fees. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 121, pars. 5-916, 5-917. The
former provision (now 605 ILCS 5/5-916 (West 1998)) provided
as follows:
			"All impact fees collected by a unit of local government
shall be refunded to the person who paid the fee or to that
person's successor in interest whenever the unit of local
government fails to encumber by contract impact fees
collected within 5 years of the date on which such impact
fees were due to be paid." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 121,
par. 5-916.
The statute requires that the person claiming a refund file "a
petition with the unit of local government imposing the impact fee,
seeking a refund within one year from the date that such fees were
required to be encumbered by contract." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch.
121, par. 5-916.
	Section 5-916 pertains only to refunds based upon the local
governmental entity's failure to encumber the fees by contract
within the five-year period. All other claims would appear to fall
under the umbrella of section 5-917, which contains no limitation
provision of its own. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 121, par. 5-917.
Neither section was in effect when the impact fees at issue in this
case were collected; however, section 5-918 of the Road
Improvement Impact Fee Law, a transition clause, does purport to
affect funds previously collected, stating, "Nothing in this Section
shall require the refund of impact fees previously collected ***
provided that such impact fees are encumbered as provided in
Section 5-916." 605 ILCS 5/5-918(c) (West 1998). Section 5-918
places the onus on counties to use or lose fees collected and
earmarked for road improvement under the prior enabling act and
implementing ordinances.
	With these observations and authorities in mind, we turn now
to the specific issues raised by the appellants (plaintiff and
intervenors) in this case, beginning with the appellants' suggestion
that they are entitled to "enforce" this court's judgment in NIHBA.
	A judgment has been traditionally defined as "a determination
by the court on the issues presented by the pleadings which
ascertains and fixes absolutely and finally the rights of the parties
in the lawsuit." (Emphasis added.) Towns v. Yellow Cab Co., 73 Ill. 2d 113, 119 (1978), citing 49 C.J.S. Judgments §5 (1947). 
Generally speaking, persons not parties are not affected by a
judgment (50 C.J.S. Judgments §538 (1997)), they are not bound
by it (Richards v. Jefferson County, Alabama, 517 U.S. 793, 798,
135 L. Ed. 2d 76, 83, 116 S. Ct. 1761, 1765-66 (1996)), and they
may not enforce it (50 C.J.S. Judgments §693 (1997)).
	As the county points out, the Code of Civil Procedure
provides the means by which additional parties may be joined in
a pending action (735 ILCS 5/2-404 (West 1998)), those
interested in the outcome may intervene (735 ILCS 5/2-408 (West
1998)), and a single party may represent a class of litigants (735
ILCS 5/2-801 et seq. (West 1998)). Plaintiff and intervenors are
obviously aware of those procedures: they have employed them.
Plaintiff was evidently aware that a basis existed for challenging
the constitutionality of the statute and ordinances at issue: it did so
in 1988, subsequently dismissing its action voluntarily. Although
appellants take issue with the appellate court's consideration of
that case as a matter not of record here, we note that a court of
review may take judicial notice of prior litigation. See In re Estate
of Gebis, 186 Ill. 2d 188, 196 (1999). The point is the plaintiff and
intervenors could have joined in the NIHBA case; they did not.
Notwithstanding their inaction, they might still have tasted the
fruit of the NIHBA ruling first-hand had they timely filed within
the statute of limitation applicable to them. James B. Beam
Distilling Co., 501 U.S.  at 542, 115 L. Ed. 2d  at 492-93, 111 S. Ct. 
at 2447. They did not.
	This court's statement in NIHBA regarding the return of
monies collected under the statute and ordinances evinced our
view of the proper disposition of funds as between the parties then
before the court, the parties over whom this court had jurisdiction.
We did not state, nor did we intend to imply, that our judgment
requires the County of Du Page to refund impact fees paid by
nonparties.
	Next, the appellants argue that their action was timely filed
because their right to a refund accrued, and a refund became
"recoverably certain" only upon this court's decision in NIHBA.
Appellants, variously, support their contention that a court
decision can "create" a cause of action with citations to People v.
Meyerowitz, 61 Ill. 2d 200 (1975), Kelly v. Chicago Park District,
409 Ill. 91, 98 (1951), People ex rel. Foreman v. Village of Round
Lake, 171 Ill. App. 3d 443, 456 (1988), Neely v. United States, 546 F.2d 1059, 1068 (3d Cir. 1976), and United States v. One 1961
Chevrolet Impala Sedan, 457 F.2d 1353, 1358 (5th Cir. 1972).
Although we believe the authorities we have heretofore cited are
sufficient to demonstrate the fallacy of appellants' reasoning, we
will briefly address appellants' authorities which merit comment.
	Appellants argue that Kelly supports their position insofar as
the Kelly court held that a statute of limitation did not begin to run
upon employees' salary claims, and indeed the cause of action on
same did not even accrue, until the employees established their
rights of employment through a separate mandamus action.
Assuming, without addressing, the continued vitality of the
holding in Kelly, we do not believe it applies to the facts and
circumstances of the present case. It is obviously not only
permissible, but desirable, to bring related claims at once in a
single action. Plaintiffs in NIHBA joined constitutional challenges
and refund claims in their successful lawsuit. On the basis of the
authorities we have previously discussed, we reject without further
comment the contention that Kelly controls in the context of fee or
tax refund litigation.
	Although we are always open to consideration of cases from
other jurisdictions in order that we might glean wisdom found
therein, and while federal court decisions interpreting a federal act
are actually binding upon our Illinois courts (Busch v. Graphic
Color Corp., 169 Ill. 2d 325, 335 (1996); Hilst v. General Motors
Corp., 305 Ill. App. 3d 792, 795 (1999)), we are not bound by
those decisions insofar as their applicability is argued on issues
relating solely to state law. Hanrahan v. Williams, 174 Ill. 2d 268,
277 (1996).
	With respect to the federal circuit court cases upon which
appellants rely, we acknowledge that they do indeed purport to
address accrual of an action; however, the significance that
appellants accord their analysis in this context is misplaced. The
decisions relate to the effect of subsequent changes in the
decisional law on prior criminal convictions and ancillary fines,
penalties and costs paid pursuant thereto, not collected taxes or
fees and claims for refunds; they deal with federal, not state,
statutes; and, although they couch their analyses in terms of
"accrual" of an action, in substance they invoke "discovery"
principles and involve retroactive application of the United States
Supreme Court's decisions in Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 19 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 697 (1968), and Grosso v. United
States, 390 U.S. 62, 19 L. Ed. 2d 906, 88 S. Ct. 709 (1968), which
were accorded "full" retroactivity in United States v. United States
Coin &amp; Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 724, 28 L. Ed. 2d 434, 441, 91 S. Ct. 1041, 1046 (1971), to causes which had already accrued. It
seems to us these circuit court cases unnecessarily pervert and
distort concepts of accrual in order to bring their facts squarely
within the realm of retroactive application.
	If the cause of action had not already accrued, it would seem
there would have been no need for the Neely court to state that the
statute of limitation was "suspended" until the date of the
Marchetti and Grosso decisions. Neely, 546 F.2d  at 1068.
Moreover, a closer reading of these cases reveals that the courts
were in fact applying a discovery rule (appropriately or not) to
already accrued causes, as evinced by the Neely court's statement
that "federal courts have sometimes postponed the running of the
limitations period in actions against the United States where the
claimant did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable diligence
could not learn, that a cause of action had accrued." (Emphasis
added.) Neely, 546 F.2d  at 1068.
	By application of the Neely and Chevrolet Impala analyses, a
cause of action would not accrue on a constitutional claim until the
first challenge succeeded, an event which could conceivably take
place decades after final judgment was entered. This absurd
analysis, which defies excepted notions of finality, is patently
contrary to the reasoning of numerous federal decisions previously
cited and is inconsistent with principles expressed in our own
statutory schemes. It seems clear to us that accrual was really not
the issue; the federal decisions upon which appellants rely were
apparently grounded upon a hybrid analysis merging elements of
the discovery rule and retroactive application of Marchetti and
Grosso. Whatever the federal circuit courts' views may have been
on those issues, we are not, as we have stated, bound by them. We
address here state questions in the context of a civil case.
	In Meyerowitz, also cited by appellants, this court considered
an issue similar to those presented in the federal cases appellants
have cited. Like Neely and Chevrolet Impala, Meyerowitz was a
criminal case; unlike those cases, this court unequivocally founded
its decision on principles of retroactive application. In Meyerowitz,
with Justices Underwood and Ryan dissenting, this court accorded
its decision in People v. McCabe, 49 Ill. 2d 338 (1971) "complete
retroactive application,"discussing and relying on the decisions in
Marchetti, Grosso, and United States Coin &amp; Currency.
Meyerowitz, 61 Ill. 2d  at 208-11. Based on the application of
McCabe, this court held that "money, having been received in
payment of fines imposed as an incident to judgments of
conviction, should be ordered refunded as an incident to the
vacation of the judgments under which it was ordered paid."
Meyerowitz, 61 Ill. 2d  at 213-14. Nothing was said in Meyerowitz
regarding the time that the defendants' actions accrued. The State
did not contend that the defendants' actions were untimely;
indeed, it acquiesced in the retroactive application of McCabe to
terminate the probation of defendant Meyerowitz and to vacate the
judgments of conviction of all the defendants, arguing only that
McCabe should not be given retroactive effect to the extent of
requiring refunds of fines paid as punishment for pre-McCabe
marijuana convictions. The State essentially conceded that the
actions could properly be brought by various procedural means.
Meyerowitz, 61 Ill. 2d  at 204-05. We also emphasize that the
decision of this court in Meyerowitz was grounded upon the
United States Supreme Court's decision in United States Coin &amp;
Currency, wherein Justice Harlan, writing for the majority,
differentiated between forfeitures and fines paid pursuant to
criminal convictions and the collection of taxes in a civil action.
United States Coin &amp; Currency, 401 U.S.  at 718, 28 L. Ed. 2d  at
437, 91 S. Ct.  at 1043.
	It is within our inherent power, as the highest court of this
state, to give a decision prospective or retroactive application.
Castaneda v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n, 132 Ill. 2d 304, 328
(1989). Analysis of that question in civil cases is governed by the
test set forth in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 30 L. Ed. 2d 296, 92 S. Ct. 349 (1971). Aleckson v. Village of Round Lake
Park, 176 Ill. 2d 82, 88 (1997). Different considerations apply in
criminal cases. See People v. Dean, 175 Ill. 2d 244, 252-53
(1997). We are concerned here, however, strictly with civil
application, and certainly in that context we may "declin[e] to give
[a] previous opinion retroactive effect, at least with respect to the
parties *** before the *** court." Aleckson, 176 Ill. 2d  at 86.
	In this case, our analysis does not even reach that point
because the statute of limitation applies and has elapsed. The
sound reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in James B.
Beam Distilling Co. expresses our view in this refund matter. As
Justice Souter stated in James B. Beam Distilling Co., without
objection from his colleagues, "retroactivity in civil cases must be
limited by the need for finality [citation omitted]; once suit is
barred by res judicata or by statutes of limitation or repose, a new
rule cannot reopen the door already closed." James B. Beam
Distilling Co., 501 U.S.  at 541, 115 L. Ed. 2d  at 492, 111 S. Ct.  at
2446. The door is closed in this instance.
	Section 13-205 of the Code of Civil Procedure sets forth a
catch-all statute of limitation for "all civil actions not otherwise
provided for." 735 ILCS 5/13-205 (West 1998). This court has
previously acknowledged the applicability of section 13-205 to tax
refund cases in which the claimants challenged a municipal sales
tax, stating that aggrieved "taxpayers cannot recover disputed
taxes if their suit is barred by the statute of limitations." Geary v.
Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc., 129 Ill. 2d 389, 407 (1989). Section
13-205 was actually applied to an action seeking refund of impact
fees in Raintree Homes, Inc. v. Village of Kildeer, 302 Ill. App. 3d
304, 307-08 (1999). Appellants acknowledge the holding of
Raintree, but point out that there was no indication in that case
whether the refund claim sounded in law or equity and no
argument or discussion as to which time-bar principle should
apply. We could make the same observation with respect to Ross
v. City of Geneva, 71 Ill. 2d 27 (1978), upon which appellants rely.
	In Ross, the plaintiff class prosecuted a refund action seeking
the return of fees collected, pursuant to ordinance, over a 13-year
period. The fees in Ross were initially hidden and not shown on
electric bills. See Ross v. City of Geneva, 43 Ill. App. 3d 976, 977-78 (1976). However, the ordinance imposing the surcharge was
"publicly debated, passed and published in the local newspapers."
Ross, 71 Ill. 2d  at 37 (Underwood, J., dissenting). In any event,
when the city first specified the nature of the fee, and identified it
as a separate charge on a bill, the representative plaintiff
immediately filed suit. In Ross, this court affirmed the judgment
of the appellate court, which had held that the claims were not
barred. Ross, 43 Ill. App. 3d at 985 (noting that plaintiff sought
"equitable relief" by way of "the imposition of a constructive trust
on, and the restitution of, funds collected without statutory
authority over a period of 13 years"). The appellate court held that
the statute of limitations did not apply to plaintiff's "equitable
claim." In Ross, this court did not discuss or decide whether legal
or equitable time-bar principles applied, apparently because
defendant raised only the applicability of laches. See Ross, 71 Ill. 2d  at 34. We note that this court's rather abbreviated analysis of
the laches issue in Ross might as easily accommodate application
of the discovery rule within the framework of a statute of
limitation analysis. In essence, the majority believed that the
plaintiff did not have all the relevant facts necessary for
recognizing and prosecuting his claim, and he was not remiss in
failing to acquire them. Therefore, the discovery rule would have
salvaged plaintiff's claim even under a statute of limitation
analysis.
	We are not, of course, confronted with similar facts in this
case. Appellants were well aware of the character of the fee they
were paying. The relevant facts were hardly "unknown and
inherently unknowable." See Clay, 189 Ill. 2d  at 612 (discussing
application of the discovery rule). Moreover, the legal basis for a
successful constitutional challenge of the statute was readily
ascertainable by reference to a well-established precedent: Pioneer
Trust &amp; Savings Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375,
380 (1961) (applying the "specific and uniquely attributable" test).
That a basis for constitutional challenge existed was readily
recognized by Sundance when it filed its action (subsequently
dismissed) in 1988. In short, the facts of Ross are not comparable
to those at issue in this case.
	Beyond that distinction, this court in Ross neither considered
nor decided which of the two time-bar principles should be
applied. That issue was decided, albeit incorrectly, by the appellate
court.
	In Ross, the appellate court appears to have rejected
applicability of the statute of limitation, in favor of a laches
analysis, at least in part because the plaintiff clothed his remedial
prayer in the guise of a request for imposition of a constructive
trust. As previously noted, this court has applied a statute of
limitation to an action for constructive trust. Hagney, 147 Ill. 2d 
at 462. Why should choice of legal nomenclature dictate the result
where the claim, no matter what we call it, is in essence simply a
claim for refund? The potential for arbitrary and manipulative
pleading in this area is obvious from a cursory examination of
Sundance's complaint, wherein theories which Sundance now
admits are both legal and equitable are advanced in an attempt to
obtain essentially the same relief, i.e., return of fees paid.
	In addition to counts I and II of plaintiff's complaint, which
sought a writ of mandamus and a declaratory judgment
respectively, count III of plaintiff's complaint in this case was
entitled "restitution, assumpsit, unjust enrichment, and recovery of
payments." These are the theories which Sundance now concedes
are "at law." It would appear, therefore, to the extent that such a
distinction retains significance-and under the facts and
circumstances of this refund action we find that it retains none-at
least some of the bases of plaintiff's action are ones "at law,"
subject to a statute of limitation.
	We deem refund actions such as the one before us "civil
actions," subject to the statute of limitation set forth in section
13-205 of the Code, irrespective of any artful pleading designed
to cloak the cause in the attire of equity. Claimants should not be
able to manipulate the result by the turn of a phrase, thereby
avoiding the relevant statute of limitation which we believe the
legislature meant to apply in this context.
	Although we believe that the plain and unequivocal language
of section 13-205 alone would render it applicable to appellants'
cause of action, we find further support for that view in the more
stringent statutes of limitation the legislature has seen fit to apply
to tax refund litigation. As we observed in McNamee v. Federated
Equipment &amp; Supply Co., 181 Ill. 2d 415 (1998), reference to
another statute by analogy is a common method of interpretation
and has been relied upon by this court on many occasions. In
McNamee, we quoted from a learned treatise on the subject:
			" 'On the basis of analogy the interpretation of a
doubtful statute may be influenced by language of other
statutes which are not specifically related, but which apply
to similar persons, things, or relationships. By referring to
other similar legislation, a court is able to learn the
purpose and course of legislation in general, and by
transposing the clear intent expressed in one or several
statutes to a similar statute of doubtful meaning, the court
not only is able to give effect to the probable intent of the
legislature, but also to establish a more uniform and
harmonious system of law.' 2B N. Singer, Sutherland on
Statutory Construction §53.03, at 233 (5th ed. 1992)."
McNamee, 181 Ill. 2d  at 424.
The question here, of course, is whether the legislature intended
the catch-all statute of limitation in section 13-205 to apply to a
fee refund action based upon the grounds stated in plaintiff's
complaint. In this respect, we note again the three-year statutes of
limitation contained in the Illinois income tax (35 ILCS
5/911(a)(1) (West 1998)), the use tax (35 ILCS 105/21 (West
1998)), the service occupation tax (35 ILCS 115/19 (West 1998)),
the retailer's occupation tax (35 ILCS 120/6 (West 1998)), the
messages tax (35 ILCS 610/6 (West 1998)), the gas revenue tax
(35 ILCS 615/6 (West 1998)), exactions on public utilities (35
ILCS 620/6 (West 1998)), and telecommunications excise taxes
(35 ILCS 630/10 (West 1998)), which seem to evince a legislative
intent to impose relatively short and certain limitation periods for
refund actions.
	Further support for this view can be found in the legislature's
recent enactment of the Local Government Taxpayers' Bill of
Rights (Pub. Act 91-920, eff. January 1, 2001). Although not
controlling in this case, section 65 of that enactment allows local
governments to impose statutes of limitation of four years or less
on actions for refund of "taxes, interest, or penalties paid in error."
We also note with interest the following provision:
		"No units of local government are required to refund or
credit any taxes voluntarily paid without written protest at
the time of payment in the event that a local government
tax is declared invalidly enacted or unconstitutional by a
court of competent jurisdiction." Pub. Act 91-920, §65,
eff. January 1, 2001.
This provision, which seems to take account of principles
espoused in cases such as S.A.S. Co. v. Kucharski, 53 Ill. 2d 139,
142 (1972) ("It is well settled that in the absence of fraud taxes
*** paid [voluntarily and not under duress] cannot be recovered,
even though they are illegal because laid under an unconstitutional
law, where there is no statute authorizing such recovery"), further
evinces the legislature's intent to restrict the circumstances under
which refund actions may be brought. Under this provision, those
taxpayers who do not protest payment or, presumably, who do and
subsequently waive their protest by failing to properly pursue their
claim to conclusion (City of Springfield v. Allphin, 74 Ill. 2d 117,
124-25, 127 (1978)) cannot recover.
	We believe the legislature intended that a uniform and
harmonious system of law apply to refund cases, and the
maintenance of two time-bar standards for simple refund cases is
inconsistent with that intent. Therefore, subject to the special
limitation period applicable to the limited refund action allowed
in section 5-916 of the Road Improvement Impact Fee Law (605
ILCS 5/5-916 (West 1998)), the five-year statute of limitation set
forth in section 13-205 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies to
refund actions in which the claimants essentially seek nothing
more than a return of money.
	We note two patently meritless arguments appellants
advanced to excuse their failure to file actions in a timely manner.
First, Sundance claims they would have risked the imposition of
sanctions pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 137 (155 Ill. 2d R. 137)
had they earlier filed an action challenging the constitutionality of
the 1987 enabling act. Sundance posits that the presumption of
constitutionality which a statute enjoys prohibited them from
challenging the statute. Additionally, Sundance argues that once
the appellate court in Northern Illinois Home Builders Ass'n v.
County of Du Page, 251 Ill. App. 3d 494 (1993), found the 1987
enabling act and the implementing ordinances constitutional, fee
payers were then prohibited by precedent from bringing a
constitutional challenge. This contention is baseless.
	The presumption of constitutionality a statute enjoys is a
feature of litigation over that very issue. In other words, it would
not be necessary to accord a statute the presumption in the absence
of litigation challenging the statute in question. The party
challenging the constitutionality of a statute, of course, bears the
burden of rebutting this presumption and clearly establishing a
constitutional violation. Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 187 Ill. 2d 341, 351 (1999). However, the presumption is obviously not a
prohibition against constitutional challenge. If it were, no statute
could ever be challenged without fear of sanctions.
	The preposterous nature of this proposition can be revealed by
reference to the language of Rule 137 itself. Here, "good faith" is
the operative term. Rule 137 allows for "good-faith argument for
the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law *** that it
is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation." 155 Ill. 2d R. 137. The purpose of Rule 137 is to
prevent abuse of the judicial process by penalizing claimants who
bring vexatious and harassing actions (Senese v. Climatemp, Inc.,
289 Ill. App. 3d 570, 581 (1997)), not to stifle good-faith
arguments for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law. Without such arguments, the law could not change and evolve
as indeed it must. Had the plaintiffs in NIHBA not made such an
argument, appellants would now have no argument at all.
Sundance cannot utilize Rule 137 as an excuse for its failure to
timely file.
	Finally, we address the intervenors argument that it is unfair
to apply a five-year statute of limitation under the circumstances
because "builders, even with knowledge that certain [impact] fees
are or may be illegal, are pressured into paying them in order to
conduct their business, because refusal to pay the fees will have
adverse consequences on the completion of the development."
According to the intervenors, it would be "nothing short of fool-hearty for a developer to initiate litigation of any sort *** if the
builder wants to complete the development." This is so,
intervenors submit, because through the course of development the
builder routinely needs various municipal approvals. Intervenors
suggest that builders are justified in assuming that municipalities
would retaliate, if refunds were sought, by stalling or denying
necessary approvals and permits.
	Ignoring for present purposes the troubling tone of
intervenors' rhetoric in this respect, much of which we have
chosen to omit because it is as unsubstantiated as it is vitriolic, we
must express our basic disagreement with the assumption that
local governmental officials, from the executive office to the local
building inspector, would likely conspire to penalize fee payers
who seek to assert their rights by filing actions challenging the
collection of impact fees. We reject this suggestion first, because
we believe it is as likely that officials, even those of questionable
character, would respect those who display a willingness to
aggressively assert their interests. Those who are to be reckoned
with are unlikely to be victimized. Beyond that observation, we
assume that public officials will properly perform their duties
(Moser v. Highway Commissioner, 114 Ill. App. 3d 137, 139
(1983)), at least in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
Moreover, the specter of retaliation, even if it embodies in some
instances regrettable elements of substance, cannot coalesce to
form the basis of a legal excuse for ignoring the statute of
limitation. Myriad litigants in diverse circumstances could use the
same excuse for failure to timely file actions. Who, for instance,
would ever risk suing the city or village in which he lives or does
business? The list of litigants who could assert this excuse might
be long indeed. Intervenors cite no authority supporting their
argument on this point. We are aware of none. We reject the
intervenors' argument.
	Based upon the foregoing authorities, and for all the reasons
stated above, we find the appellants' action barred by the five-year
statute of limitation set forth in section 13-205 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, and we thus affirm the judgment of the appellate
court.
Affirmed. 
	JUSTICE GARMAN took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN, specially concurring:
	I agree with the majority that the five-year limitations period
of section 13-205 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS
5/13-205 (West 1996)) applies to this case. However, I believe
that this result is best reached through a straightforward
application of long-settled legal principles.
	The majority opinion fails to do this. Rather, in the course of
its "observations" on time limitations in legal and equitable
actions, the majority opinion needlessly attacks well-established
distinctions between cases at law and in equity. Slip op. at 6-14.
The opinion also engages in an extended and unnecessary
discussion of when actions such as these accrue. Slip op. at 7-10,
15-23. Most disturbingly, the majority opinion also implies the
impropriety on the part of attorneys who invoke principles of
equity. Slip op. at 11, 20-21. These discussions are not necessary
to resolve this case.
	Accordingly, I concur in the judgment of the court, but not in
its opinion.
	Count III of plaintiff's complaint, as ultimately amended, pled
"restitution, assumpsit, unjust enrichment and recovery of
payment." This count describes an action at law governed by
principles of equity. Board of Highway Commissioners v. City of
Bloomington, 253 Ill. 164, 173-74 (1911). The controlling
principles are quite settled:
			"It is an elemental principle of law, applied in both law
and equity courts, that where one person has received
money or its equivalent, which belongs to another, under
such circumstances that in equity and good conscience he
ought not to retain it, recovery will be allowed.
[Citations.]
			In equity, the theory of recovery is predicated on the
imposition of a constructive trust, [citations] and at law,
on the basis of a quasi-contract, or contract implied in
law. [Citations.]" Board of Trustees of Police Pension
Fund v. Village of Glen Ellyn, 337 Ill. App. 183, 194-95
(1949).
See generally 1 D. Dobbs, Remedies §4.2(3), at 579-82, §4.3(2),
at 590-91 (2d ed. 1993). These theories of recovery are parallel.
"Both quasi-contract and constructive trust aim at restitution of
something that in good conscience belongs to the plaintiff." 1 D.
Dobbs, Remedies §4.3(2), at 590 (2d ed. 1993).
	It is equally established: "Where both a court of equity and a
court of law have concurrent jurisdiction, the bar of the statute of
limitations has been held to be as binding in equity as at law."
Dean v. Kellogg, 394 Ill. 495, 504 (1946); accord Rakstiene v.
Kroulaidis, 33 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 1072-73 (1975); 7 Ill. L. &amp; Prac.
Chancery §124, at 347 (1954). Specifically, courts have applied
the limitations bar of section 13-205 of the Code of Civil
Procedure and its predecessor provisions to constructive trust
cases sounding in equity (see, e.g., Hagney v. Lopeman, 147 Ill. 2d 458, 462 (1992), citing Chicago Park District v. Kenroy, Inc., 78 Ill. 2d 555, 560-61 (1980)), as well as to implied contract or
assumpsit actions at law (see, e.g., Rohter v. Passarella, 246 Ill.
App. 3d 860, 868 (1993); Partipilo v. Hallman, 156 Ill. App. 3d
806, 811 (1987); see Burns Philp Food, Inc. v. Cavalea
Continental Freight, Inc., 135 F.3d 526, 527-28 (7th Cir.
1998)(applying Illinois law)). Therefore, section 13-205 of the
Code applies here.
	Further, it is long settled when this type of action accrues, so
as to start the running of section 13-205 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. "Illinois case law firmly establishes that in such actions
the statute of limitations begins running when the payment is
made." Pennwalt Corp. v. Metropolitan Sanitary District of
Greater Chicago, 368 F. Supp. 972, 980 (N.D. Ill.
1973)(collecting cases); Rath v. City of Chicago, 207 Ill. App.
117, 121 (1917), quoting 2 A. Jacobs, Cooley on Taxation 1508
(3d ed. 1903). The present case is resolved based on settled law.
	However, the majority opinion proceeds to state what the
appellate court said in Rath via lengthy discussion of tax collection
cases. Slip op. at 7-10, 15-23. Also, the majority opinion, stressing
the need for certainty and finality, needlessly attacks the
applicability of the equitable defense of laches to tax collection
cases. Slip op. at 10-14. As the above-cited cases, particularly
Dean and Rath, show, the majority opinion's lengthy discussion
of tax cases, and especially the opinion's attack on equity
jurisprudence, are unnecessary to decide this case.
	Even more disturbing, the majority opinion needlessly
impugns the integrity of attorneys who invoke principles sounding
in equity. The majority opinion characterizes such attorneys as
"shrewd" advocates, who attempt to "manipulate the outcome" of
cases. Slip op. at 11. The majority opinion characterizes the
pleading of equitable principles as potentially "arbitrary and
manipulative." Slip op. at 20. The majority opinion exhorts:
"Claimants should not be able to manipulate the result by the turn
of a phrase, thereby avoiding the relevant statute of limitation
***." Slip op. at 21. Not only is such rhetoric unnecessary to
decide this case, it impugns the integrity of attorneys who do
nothing more than invoke principles of equity.
	"An action for money had and received will lie whenever one
person has received money which, in justice, belongs to another,
and which, in justice and right, should be returned." Wilson v.
Turner, 164 Ill. 398, 403 (1896). This court recognized that the
action " 'embraces a great variety of cases.' " Wilson, 164 Ill.  at
403, quoting Allen v. Stenger, 74 Ill. 119, 121 (1874).
	In providing for this action, Illinois courts long ago resolved
issues that the law-equity dichotomy presents. The majority
opinion's extended discussion and rhetoric does not add to that
accomplishment. I concur in the judgment.
	JUSTICE McMORROW joins in this special concurrence.