Title: J.M. v. C.G.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13295
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: July 19, 2023

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
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SJC-13295 
 
J.M.  vs.  C.G. (and two consolidated cases1). 
 
 
 
Berkshire.     December 7, 2022. - July 19, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Paternity.  Parentage.  Parent and Child, Custody.  Practice, 
Civil, Intervention, Dismissal.  Jurisdiction, Probate 
Court, Paternity proceeding, Equitable.  Probate Court, 
Jurisdiction, Paternity proceeding.  Statute, Construction.  
Due Process of Law, Paternity.  Evidence, Paternity. 
 
 
 
Complaint filed in the Berkshire Division of the Probate 
and Family Court Department on August 14, 2020. 
 
A motion to intervene was heard by Richard A. Simons, J. 
 
Complaints filed in the Berkshire Division of the Probate 
and Family Court Department on January 21 and March 17, 2021. 
 
A hearing on the preliminary showing required to pursue an 
adjudication of paternity was had before Richard A. Simons, J., 
and entry of judgments of dismissal were ordered by him. 
 
After consolidation, the Supreme Judicial Court on its own 
initiative transferred the cases from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
1 M.H. vs. C.G. & another; and M.H. vs. C.G. 
2 
 
Buffy D. Lord (Brigid M. Hennessey & Jennifer M. Breen also 
present) for M.H. 
Dennis M. LaRochelle for J.M. 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
Christina L. Paradiso & Krista M. Ellis for Community Legal 
Aid & others. 
C. Thomas Brown, Patrick T. Roath, & Sara A. Bellin for 
Susan Frelich Appleton & others. 
Maura Healey, Attorney General, & Helle Sachse, Assistant 
Attorney General, for the Attorney General. 
Patience Crozier & Mary L. Bonauto for GLBTQ Legal 
Advocates & Defenders. 
Anna Richardson for Veterans Legal Services. 
 
 
BUDD, C.J.  In these cases, M.H., the putative biological 
father of a child (Amelia),2 filed suit to establish paternity 
more than four years after another man, J.M., had executed a 
voluntary acknowledgement of parentage (VAP).  Because M.H. is 
time barred from challenging the VAP and is unable to meet the 
requirements to proceed in equity, we affirm the order of the 
Probate and Family Court judge denying his motion to intervene 
in an action brought by J.M., the legal father, against C.G., 
the mother, seeking legal custody and expanded parenting time, 
and we also affirm the judgments dismissing two other actions 
brought by M.H.3 
 
2 A pseudonym. 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by Community 
Legal Aid, Greater Boston Legal Services, Northeast Legal 
Services, De Novo Center for Justice and Healing, and 
Massachusetts Law Reform Institute; professors of constitutional 
and family law; the Attorney General; and GLBTQ Legal Advocates 
& Defenders; and the amicus letter submitted by Veterans Legal 
Services. 
3 
 
Statutory framework for establishing parentage.  General 
Laws c. 209C (c. 209C) was enacted to ensure that "[c]hildren 
born to parents who are not married to each other [receive] the 
same rights and protections of the law as all other children."  
G. L. c. 209C, § 1.  To that end, the statute provides a 
mechanism for determining parentage of nonmarital children by 
way of either a VAP or a court adjudication.4  G. L. c. 209C, 
§ 2. 
A VAP must be executed jointly by the birth parent and a 
putative parent, notarized, and filed with the registrar of 
vital records and statistics or the court.  G. L. c. 209C, 
§ 11 (a).  It is effective as of the date it is signed and has 
the "same force and effect as a judgment of [parentage]."  Id.  
Importantly, the subsection provides for a one-year statute of 
repose; that is, any challenge to a VAP must be brought within 
one year of its being signed.  Id.  Moreover, challenges are 
limited to allegations of fraud, duress, or material mistake of 
fact.  Id. 
Chapter 209C also allows for parentage to be adjudicated by 
a judge by way of a bench trial where a plaintiff must establish 
parentage by clear and convincing evidence.  G. L. c. 209C, 
 
4 General Laws c. 209C also provides for court-ordered child 
support, visitation, and custody rights with respect to such 
children.  G. L. c. 209C, § 2.  See Smith v. McDonald, 458 Mass. 
540, 544 (2010). 
4 
 
§§ 5 (a), 7, 8.  In addition to a putative parent, others 
authorized to bring a complaint to establish parentage under 
c. 209C include the birth mother, the child, a guardian, or the 
Commonwealth if the child is receiving any type of public 
assistance.5  G. L. c. 209C, § 5 (a). 
Where c. 209C is not available as a vehicle for 
establishing parentage, the Probate and Family Court may do so 
pursuant to its general equity jurisdiction.  See C.C. v. A.B., 
406 Mass. 679, 689-690 (1990).  See also G. L. c. 215, § 6 
(granting general equity jurisdiction to Probate and Family 
Court).  However, as discussed in more detail infra, to proceed 
under common law where a child's parentage already has been 
determined, a plaintiff must first demonstrate a substantial 
relationship between the putative parent and the child.  C.C., 
supra at 689. 
Background and procedural posture.  We recite the facts as 
found by the Probate and Family Court judge, reserving some 
details for later discussion. 
The mother gave birth to Amelia in February 2013.  At the 
time she was born, no father was listed on her birth 
certificate.  The mother and Amelia lived with different people 
 
5 As discussed further infra, such a complaint may not be 
brought pursuant to c. 209C if the birth mother is married at 
the time the child is born and the putative parent is not the 
mother's spouse.  G. L. c. 209C, § 5 (a). 
5 
 
during the first few months of Amelia's life.  When Amelia was 
eight months old, she and the mother moved in with J.M., a 
former boyfriend with whom the mother had been coparenting 
another child prior to Amelia's birth.  Although J.M. was not 
Amelia's biological father, he treated her in the same way as he 
did his biological child.  Even after the mother moved in, 
months later, with a new partner, J.M. continued to parent 
Amelia, seeing her nearly every day and taking an active role in 
her medical care and education.  Approximately three years 
later, in November 2016, the mother and J.M. agreed to formalize 
the arrangement by executing a VAP under c. 209C to establish 
him as Amelia's legal father. 
In August 2020, after a disagreement with the mother, J.M. 
brought an action seeking legal custody and expanded parenting 
time.6  Thereafter, M.H. sought to intervene in the action, 
alleging that he is Amelia's putative biological father and 
seeking to "secure his parental rights under the law." 
To demonstrate that he had standing to intervene in that 
action, M.H. filed complaints both in equity and under c. 209C 
 
6 J.M. brought the complaint after his relationship with the 
mother had become strained, in part, because he had told Amelia 
that he was not her biological father, after which the mother 
threatened to reduce his time with Amelia. 
 
6 
 
to establish his paternity of Amelia.7  After a two-day, 
consolidated evidentiary hearing, the judge dismissed both 
complaints and denied the motion to intervene.  M.H. timely 
appealed, and we transferred the consolidated appeal to this 
court on our own motion. 
Discussion.  M.H. maintains that, as Amelia's putative 
biological father, his c. 209C complaint should have been 
allowed to proceed notwithstanding the fact that the one-year 
time limit for challenging the VAP had lapsed.  M.H. further 
argues that his claim in equity was dismissed improperly 
because, although one normally must demonstrate a substantial 
parent-child relationship to move forward with a common-law 
parentage claim, it is unnecessary for him to do so in the 
circumstances of this case. 
1.  Action to establish parentage under G. L. c. 209C.  
M.H.'s action pursuant to c. 209C was dismissed because a VAP 
executed four years prior named another as the legal father.  
M.H. argues on appeal that the language of G. L. c. 209C, 
§ 5 (a), allows his suit regardless of the preexisting VAP.  In 
 
7 M.H. filed two separate complaints.  He states that, in 
January 2021, he initially attempted to file a c. 209C complaint 
but instead filed a complaint in equity at the court's request.  
Then, in March 2021, he filed a second complaint, under c. 209C.  
At a status conference later that month, the probate judge 
indicated that he would rule only on the complaint in equity, 
having concluded that the VAP precluded M.H. from proceeding 
pursuant to c. 209C. 
7 
 
the alternative, he argues that the VAP is invalid and that his 
due process rights were violated because he did not receive 
notice of the VAP in order to challenge it in a timely manner. 
a.  Statutory interpretation.  The defendant contends that 
G. L. c. 209C, § 5 (a), expressly allows him, as the putative 
biological father, to bring a complaint to establish parentage 
and that the section specifies that the only circumstance in 
which the suit would be barred is if the child's birth occurred 
during the mother's marriage or within 300 days of its 
termination.  As the mother never has been married, M.H. argues 
that his c. 209C complaint should have been allowed to go 
forward notwithstanding the preexisting VAP. 
When interpreting a statute, "we construe the various 
provisions of a statute in harmony with one another, recognizing 
that the Legislature did not intend internal contradiction."  
DiFiore v. American Airlines, Inc., 454 Mass. 486, 491 (2009), 
citing Locator Servs. Group, Ltd. v. Treasurer & Receiver Gen., 
443 Mass. 837, 859 (2005).  Our ultimate goal is to effectuate 
the intent of the Legislature.  See Curtatone v. Barstool 
Sports, Inc., 487 Mass. 655, 658 (2021). 
Here, M.H. fails to consider c. 209C in toto.  See 
Commonwealth v. Fleury, 489 Mass. 421, 429 (2022), quoting Chin 
v. Merriot, 470 Mass. 527, 532 (2015) ("[a] statute must be 
interpreted 'as a whole'; it is improper to confine 
8 
 
interpretation to the single section to be construed").  As 
discussed supra, G. L. c. 209C, § 11 (a), specifies that any 
"challenge" to a VAP must be brought within "one year" of its 
execution.  By arguing that his statutory right to pursue a c. 
209C complaint under § 5 (a) is not affected by this time limit, 
M.H. renders it inoperable, thus violating a fundamental rule of 
statutory interpretation.  See Casa Loma, Inc. v. Alcoholic 
Beverages Control Comm'n, 377 Mass. 231, 234 (1979) ("It is a 
common tenet of statutory construction that, wherever possible, 
no provision of a legislative enactment should be treated as 
superfluous"). 
Additionally, M.H.'s narrow reading of the statute 
nullifies the purpose of VAPs in particular and c. 209C as a 
whole.  See Adoption of Daphne, 484 Mass. 421, 424 (2020), 
quoting Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard 
College, 445 Mass. 745, 749 (2006) ("Courts must ascertain the 
intent of a statute from all its parts and from the subject 
matter to which it relates, and must interpret the statute so as 
to render the legislation effective, consonant with sound reason 
and common sense"). 
As discussed supra, c. 209C is meant to ensure that 
nonmarital children receive the same rights and protections as 
those born to parents married to one another.  G. L. c. 209C, 
§ 1.  To that end, § 11 (a)'s one-year cutoff for challenging a 
9 
 
VAP provides stability and permanency with regard to the 
parentage of nonmarital children.8  See Paternity of Cheryl, 434 
Mass. 23, 30 (2001), citing G. L. c. 209C, § 11 ("There is a 
compelling public interest in the finality of paternity 
judgments"). 
Without the time limit, parentage established by way of a 
VAP would be open to challenge indefinitely, depriving the child 
of the stability that c. 209C is meant to provide.  See C.C., 
406 Mass. at 691 ("Without regard to the outcome of a paternity 
case, even the very trial of such a case might place great 
strain on a unitary family").  See also Lowery v. Klemm, 446 
Mass. 572, 578-579 (2006) ("we will not adopt a construction of 
a statute that creates 'absurd or unreasonable' consequences" 
[citation omitted]). 
The VAP that establishes J.M. as Amelia's legal father was 
executed in November 2016.  M.H.'s c. 209C complaint filed in 
March 2021, then, is over three years too late.9 
 
8 In this way, the time limit functions as a statute of 
repose, which creates a right to be immune from challenge after 
a certain period of time has elapsed from a specified event.  
See, e.g., Bridgwood v. A.J. Wood Constr., Inc., 480 Mass. 349, 
352 (2018) ("A statute of repose eliminates a cause of action at 
a specified time" and "provid[es] a 'substantive right to be 
free from liability after a given period of time has elapsed 
from a defined event'" [citation omitted]). 
 
9 M.H. also contends that the VAP is binding only on the 
mother and legal father and therefore cannot be considered res 
judicata against him.  This argument is misplaced.  M.H. is not 
10 
 
b.  Validity of the VAP.  M.H. additionally argues that 
because the VAP was signed with the knowledge that J.M. is not 
Amelia's biological father, it is invalid, implying that the 
time limit is not applicable.  See D.H. v. R.R., 461 Mass. 756, 
763-764 (2012) (where VAP does not become effective as matter of 
law, there is no time limit on challenges to its validity); 
Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Servs., 435 Mass. 536, 556 
(2002) (VAP invalid where estate of deceased individual executed 
acknowledgment).  We disagree. 
M.H. maintains that "it would be a miscarriage of justice" 
to treat VAPs executed in the absence of biological ties as 
equal to those based thereon.  To the contrary, we long have 
recognized that "families take many different forms" and that 
thus "a genetic connection between parent and child can no 
longer be the exclusive basis for imposing the rights or duties 
of parenthood" (quotation and citation omitted).  Adoption of a 
Minor, 471 Mass. 373, 378 n.8 (2015).  "Nothing in the language 
of G. L. c. 209C expressly limits its applicability to parentage 
claims based on asserted biological ties."  Partanen v. 
Gallagher, 475 Mass. 632, 638 (2016).  And we specifically have 
held that an individual may establish parentage under c. 209C 
 
precluded from challenging the VAP because the issue has been 
decided or because he was not a signatory to it.  Rather, his 
claim fails because he missed the deadline for bringing it. 
11 
 
and execute VAPs without a biological connection to a child.  
See id. at 639. 
Thus, M.H. is mistaken on the law.  To the extent he 
challenges the VAP on the basis of fraud, as explained supra, 
his claim is time barred. 
c.  Due process claim.  M.H. also maintains that he has 
been deprived of "notice and an opportunity to be heard at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."  See Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).  It is true that "fathers of 
[nonmarital] children have certain [due process rights] to 
maintain a relationship with those children."  C.C., 406 Mass. 
at 685, citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-652 
(1972).  However, claiming that one's due process rights have 
been violated does not make it so. 
We previously have held that where, as here, a plaintiff 
has a cause of action at common law (discussed in more detail 
infra), he is not without an opportunity to be heard on his 
claim to establish paternity.  C.C., 406 Mass. at 691.  Thus, we 
again decline to address the constitutionality of c. 209C.  See 
Commonwealth v. Paasche, 391 Mass. 18, 21 (1984) ("We do not 
decide constitutional questions unless they must necessarily be 
reached"). 
2.  Common-law action to establish parentage.  As mentioned 
supra, where a plaintiff seeks to challenge parentage that 
12 
 
already has been established, the putative parent must proceed 
under common law pursuant to the court's equity jurisdiction.  
C.C., 406 Mass. at 682.  To do so, he or she must demonstrate a 
substantial parent-child relationship by clear and convincing 
evidence.  Id. at 689-691. 
M.H. argues that the judge improperly applied the 
substantial parent-child relationship standard to his common-law 
paternity complaint.  In the alternative, M.H. contends that if 
he is subject to the substantial relationship standard, the 
judge erred in finding that he failed to sustain his burden.  We 
discern no error. 
a.  Applicability of the substantial parent-child 
relationship standard.  Where a child's parentage already has 
been established legally, the substantial relationship test is a 
necessary balancing test accounting for the fact that a new 
parentage suit disrupts a family and a child's life and 
potentially will result in the displacement of one legal parent 
with another person.  See C.C., 406 Mass. at 690-691.  See also 
M.J.C. v. D.J., 410 Mass. 389, 393 (1991) (recognizing 
"significant intrusion of a full-fledged paternity action").  
Where a person alleging to be the biological parent of a child 
can meet this threshold, however, that "developed parent-child 
relationship" acquires its own significant protection, and the 
intrusion on the relationship between the child and the existing 
13 
 
legal parent is "greatly decreased" -- the putative biological 
parent already having been a significant part of the child's 
life.  C.C., supra at 691.  In other words, "[t]he existence or 
nonexistence of a substantial relationship between the putative 
[parent] and child is relevant in evaluating both the rights of 
the parent and the best interests of the child."  Id. at 690, 
quoting R.R.K. v. S.G.P., 400 Mass. 12, 21 (1987) (Liacos, J., 
concurring).  See R.F. v. S.D., 55 Mass. App. Ct. 708, 711 
(2002). 
Here, M.H.'s contention that the substantial relationship 
test should not apply, because the mother and legal father do 
not live together as a "traditional family unit" and thus have 
"nothing to protect," is a serious misreading of our case law.  
Although we previously have discussed the potential disruption 
to marital families, see, e.g., M.J.C., 410 Mass. at 389; C.C., 
406 Mass. at 690; R.F., 55 Mass. App. Ct. at 708-709, the same 
logic requiring a showing of a substantial parent-child 
relationship applies equally where a child's parentage has been 
determined by a VAP, see G. L. c. 209C, § 1; Smith v. McDonald, 
458 Mass. 540, 546 (2010) ("the legal equality of nonmarital 
children pursuant to G. L. c. 209C, § 1, dictates the same rule 
apply for children in comparable circumstances").  In both 
cases, "[w]here the putative father can come forward with clear 
and convincing evidence of a substantial parent-child 
14 
 
relationship, the interest in protecting a family, which by 
necessary implication has already suffered interference, is 
greatly decreased."  M.J.C., supra at 393. 
Although we have recognized "another" important interest in 
the "traditional" family unit, protecting the best interests of 
the child is the primary purpose of the substantial parent-child 
relationship requirement.  See C.C., 406 Mass. at 690.  A 
child's interest is served by stable and supportive families of 
all types.  See Partanen, 475 Mass. at 642; Adoption of a Minor, 
471 Mass. at 378 n.8; Hunter v. Rose, 463 Mass. 488, 491, 493 
(2012) ("a child's welfare is promoted by ensuring that she has 
two parents to provide, inter alia, financial and emotional 
support," although parents were separated).10  By contrast, we 
have recognized that uncertainty and repetitious litigation over 
parentage, particularly where a family unit is in place, is not 
conducive to a child's best interests.  See Adoption of Willow, 
433 Mass. 636, 647 (2001).  Where, as here, Amelia has known 
J.M. to be her father since she could speak, Amelia spends more 
than one-half of her time with him, and he has taken an active 
role in every part of Amelia's life, there undoubtedly is 
something to protect regardless of the marital status of her 
 
10 The probate judge made direct findings that Amelia "has 
known [J.M.] as her father" and "has consistently known that 
[J.M.] is her other caretaking parent," with whom she "spends 
over half of her time residing." 
15 
 
parents.11  The probate judge properly required M.H. to first 
demonstrate a substantial parent-child relationship before 
proceeding with his suit. 
b.  Application of the substantial parent-child 
relationship standard.  Finally, M.H. claims that the probate 
judge erred in concluding that he had not demonstrated a 
substantial parent-child relationship with Amelia.  As M.H. 
acknowledges, the existence of a substantial parent-child 
relationship is a fact-based inquiry.  C.C., 406 Mass. at 690.  
"A judge has broad discretion to consider any factor," and 
"[a]bsent clear error, we will not substitute our weighing of 
the evidence for that of a trial judge who had the opportunity 
to observe the witnesses and form conclusions about their 
credibility."  A.H. v. M.P., 447 Mass. 828, 838 (2006).  See 
Smith v. Jones, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 400, 404 (2007) ("As in other 
 
11 M.H. also argues that he should not be required to 
demonstrate a substantial parent-child relationship because the 
mother in this case prevented him from forming one and "kept 
[him] in the dark about [Amelia's] paternity until August 2020."  
See C.C. v. A.B., 406 Mass. 679, 690 n.10 (1990); R.F. v. S.D., 
55 Mass. App. Ct. 708, 712 (2002).  This argument is without 
merit where the probate judge found that M.H. had ample reason 
to suspect his biological paternity as early as Amelia's 
conception, the mother updated M.H. as other potential 
biological fathers were ruled out, and the mother facilitated 
M.H.'s spending time with Amelia throughout her childhood.  Cf. 
M.J.C. v. D.J., 410 Mass. 389, 394-395 (1991).  Although M.H. 
claimed that he did not know he had a right to establish his 
paternity of Amelia, this lack of knowledge cannot be ascribed 
to the mother. 
16 
 
contexts where cases center on the best interests of the child, 
we will not disturb the judge's findings or substitute our 
judgment for that of the trial judge absent clear error"). 
Here, after an evidentiary hearing, the judge found that 
M.H. and Amelia had a relationship that included spending time 
together at family gatherings and holidays, in addition to 
M.H.'s having provided occasional transportation or caretaking 
help.  However, the judge also found that M.H. "was not 
routinely involved in [Amelia's] health, education or welfare" 
and "did not support her financially or emotionally as a parent 
does."  Thus, notwithstanding the fact that M.H. and Amelia 
enjoyed a positive and caring relationship, the judge ultimately 
determined that M.H. failed to demonstrate a substantial parent-
child relationship. 
On appeal, M.H. does not contest any of the judge's 
findings.  As we see no clear error on the part of the judge, we 
leave intact his conclusion that M.H. did not meet his 
preliminary burden to pursue his common-law action to establish 
parentage. 
Conclusion.  We affirm the order denying M.H.'s motion to 
intervene and the judgments dismissing his complaints. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.