Title: State v. Kirby
Citation: 160 S.E.2d 24, 273 N.C. 306
Docket Number: 166
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: March 20, 1968

160 S.E.2d 24 (1968) 273 N.C. 306 STATE of North Carolina v. George KIRBY. No. 166. Supreme Court of North Carolina. March 20, 1968. *26 Atty. Gen. T. W. Bruton and Asst. Atty. Gen. Bernard A. Harrell for the State. Joseph B. Chambliss, Clinton, for defendant. BRANCH, Justice. Defendant assigns as error the court's question to witness Woodrow Carr: "Speaking of the three wounds, how did they compare with each other?" The presiding judge is entirely justified in propounding competent questions to a witness in order to clarify what a witness has said or to develop some relevant fact which has been overlooked. However, care must be exercised to avoid indirect expression of opinion on the facts, and it is improper for the trial judge to ask questions which are reasonably calculated to impeach or discredit the witness or his testimony. State v. Kimrey, 236 N.C. 313, 72 S.E.2d 677. Testimony describing wounds found on a deceased is competent as showing the violence of the transactions. State v. Artis, 227 N.C. 371, 42 S.E.2d 409. This rule is particularly applicable here, since defendant by his plea of self-defense raises the question of whether excessive force was used. Further, since the evidence is relevant, it will not be excluded because it might excite prejudice against defendant. State v. Green, 251 N.C. 40, 110 S.E.2d 609. Defendant argues in his brief that the answer to the question propounded by the court is circumstantial evidence and thus erroneous. Conceding, arguendo, that the evidence is circumstantial, the mere fact that it is circumstantial does not render it inadmissible. *27 "Circumstantial evidence, which is evidence of facts from which other matters may be fairly and sensibly deduced, is competent and is highly satisfactory in matters of gravest moment." 2 Strong, N.C. Index 2d, Criminal Law, § 41, p. 546. The single question asked by the trial judge concerned a relevant fact which had apparently been overlooked. He did not cross-examine the witness, nor did the question tend to express an opinion as to the facts of the case. Defendant's plea of self-defense, coupled with the compelling evidence that defendant inflicted the wound causing deceased's death, further dissipates any possibility of prejudicial error arising from the question. This assignment of error is overruled. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in its instruction to the jury with respect to defendant's plea of self-defense in general and specifically as related to the crime of manslaughter. In the case of State v. Fowler, 250 N.C. 595, 108 S.E.2d 892, this Court stated: See also State v. Francis, 252 N.C. 57, 112 S.E.2d 756. In this connection defendant relies on three assignments of error. By his Assignment of Error No. 4 defendant attacks the trial judge's instruction in that "the court required the jury to consider upon the question of self-defense as to whether or not the defendant used excessive force in his defense when the question before the jury, as to self-defense, was whether or not he had reasonable cause to believe and did believe that such force was necessary to protect himself from impending danger or great bodily harm." The judge in this portion of the charge, inter alia, instructed the jury: Defendant contends by Assignment of Error No. 5 that the court erred "in that the court has charged the jury to decide whether or not the defendant used excessive force while in defense of his life when the question before the jury was whether or not the defendant had, under all the circumstances, reasonable cause to believe and did believe that the force he used was necessary to protect himself from impending danger or great bodily harm." Within the portion of the charge here assigned as error the trial court charged: The court then charged that if the jury should answer these questions in the affirmative, it would be their duty to acquit defendant. Defendant by Assignment of Error No. 6 contends that the court erred in that "included in this portion of the charge as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant of manslaughter is a requirement placed upon the defendant to show, under his plea of self-defense that he used no more force than he believed to be reasonably necessary to repel the assault when the question before the jury was not the force used but whether or not he had, under all the circumstances, reasonable cause to believe and did believe that such force was necessary to protect himself from impending danger or great bodily harm." Here the court charged: The judge then charged: "Then I charge you, that the killing of the deceased, Harvey McPhail, would be excusable homicide and if you so find to your satisfaction, it would be your duty to render a verdict of not guilty in the case." In each of the assignments of error the court properly and in substantial compliance with recognized principles of law instructed the jury as to actual or apparent necessity for defendant to act in self-defense, and as to whether defendant used only such force as was necessary, or reasonably appeared to him to be necessary, at the time of the killing to save himself from death or great bodily harm. In the case of State v. Howard, 222 N.C. 291, 22 S.E.2d 917, the trial judge read to the jury a statute in regard to punishment and cautioned the jury that punishment was not to be considered by them as bearing on defendant's guilt or innocence. Defendant excepted and appealed. In considering this exception, this Court said: Here, the trial court charged the applicable principles of law correctly, fairly presented the evidence and contentions of defendant and the State, and properly applied the law to the substantive features of the case. Defendant has failed to show any prejudicial error. No error.