Title: Ex parte Richard Talbott et al.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1140596
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: September 30, 2015

Rel:09/30/2015
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2015
____________________
1140596
____________________
Ex parte Richard Talbott et al.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Azin Agah
v.
Amber Bartlett et al.)
(Mobile Circuit Court, CV-11-901689)
BOLIN, Justice.
Richard Talbott, Stephen Ballard, and Dusty Layton
petition for a writ of mandamus directing the Mobile Circuit
1140596
Court to vacate its January 28, 2015, order denying their 
motion to dismiss Azin Agah's claims against them and to enter
a dismissal in their favor.  
Facts and Procedural History
Before 2010, Agah was employed at the University of South
Alabama (hereinafter "USA") as a professor engaged in
scientific research.  Agah's position was a tenure-track
professorship.  On February 26, 2010, USA's vice president for
Health Sciences, Ronald Franks, notified Agah that she would
not be reappointed to her professorship because of alleged
research misconduct.  
On July 28, 2011, Agah sued Amber Bartlett and Julio
Turrens.  Bartlett was a student of Agah's, and she reported
her concerns regarding Agah's research to Turrens, who is a
professor and associate dean at USA.   Agah sought
compensatory and punitive damages against the defendants for
the alleged theft and conversion of her computerized
electronic-research data and the alleged theft and conversion
of her animal-research logbook and intentional interference
with a contractual property right arising out of the
termination of her employment by USA.  Agah also sued "R.T.,
2
1140596
W.B.D., R.F., whose names are known and unknown to the
Plaintiff, but are those individuals, corporations, or other
entities that played a role in the theft of the Plaintiff's
electronic computer data files and animal research logbook,
the defamation of the Plaintiff's character, and the
intentional interference with the Plaintiff's property right
of employment."  The caption of Agah's complaint provided that
the identities of R.T., W.B.D., and R.F. would be "added when
ascertained."  Other than referring to the initialed parties
in the caption and the description of the initialed parties
above, Agah's complaint refers only to Bartlett and Turrens as
defendants from whom she is seeking relief.
In response to interrogatories propounded by Bartlett and
Turrens, Agah stated that she planned to call as witnesses 
Richard Talbott, William Brad Davis, and Ronald Franks, among
others.  On December 12, 2012, Agah was deposed, and in her
deposition she identified "R.T." as Richard Talbott, "W.B.D."
as William Brad Davis, and "R.F." as Ronald Franks.  She
acknowledged that these were the same individuals to whom she
referred in her original complaint.  Talbott, Davis, and
3
1140596
Franks are all USA employees who were involved in the review
of Agah's alleged research misconduct.  
On March 21, 2013, Agah filed an amended complaint.  In
the 
amended 
complaint, 
she 
identified 
the 
initialed 
defendants
as Talbott, Davis, and Franks.  For the first time, Agah named
USA as a defendant, along with Stephen Ballard, Dusty Layton, 
and Susan LeDoux, in their individual capacities.  Ballard,
Layton, and LeDoux are USA employees.  Agah also sued "A, B,
and C, whose names are known and unknown to the Plaintiff at
this time, but will be added when ascertained." 
In her amended complaint, Agah asserted claims (1)
seeking a judgment declaring that USA had failed to comply
with Agah's express and implied tenure-track employment
contract; (2) asserting a claim of tortious interference with
contractual relations in that all 
the defendants had knowledge
of Agah's tenure-track employment contract and, as 
a proximate
cause of the defendants' interference, her contract was not
renewed; (3) alleging tortious violations of her procedural
and substantive due-process rights arising out of the failure
of USA and the defendants who were USA employees to comply
with USA's employee handbook and certain federal regulations
4
1140596
regarding research being conducted pursuant to a federal
grant; (4) alleging suppression arising out of the alleged
suppression by certain defendants' (Franks, Talbott, Turrens,
Davis, LeDoux, Layton, and Ballard) of her right to counsel
and of material facts regarding compliance with federal
regulations; (5) alleging defamation arising out of false
information disseminated by the defendants about Agah; (6)
alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress arising
out of the defendants' actions that caused her tenure-track
employment contract to be terminated; (7) alleging negligent
infliction of emotional distress arising out of certain of 
the defendants' failure to review her work in compliance with
the 
USA employee handbook and certain federal regulations; 
(8)
alleging abuse of process arising out of certain of the
defendants' failure to comply with the USA employee handbook
and federal regulations; (9) alleging conversion and detinue
arising out of the taking of her animal-research logbook from
her office at USA; and (10) alleging invasion of privacy
arising out of obtaining her animal-research logbook without
her permission.  She requested a judgment of $10,000,000, an
order appointing a special master to conduct a fair and
5
1140596
impartial investigation into the allegations against her of
research misconduct, and an order requiring the return of her
animal-research logbook undamaged.
USA filed a motion to dismiss Agah's claims against it,
arguing immunity from civil actions under § 14, Const. Of Ala.
1901.  The trial court denied the motion, and USA filed a
petition for a writ of mandamus with this Court.  We granted
USA's petition and ordered the trial court to dismiss USA from
Agah's action.  Ex parte University of South Alabama, [Ms.
1140440, May 29, 2015]     So. 3d     (Ala. 2015).   Davis,
Franks, and LeDoux filed motions to dismiss, which are still
pending in the trial court.  
The petitioners (Talbott, Ballard, and Layton) each filed
a motion to dismiss.  Each argued, among other things, that,
with the exception of the conversion and detinue claim, Agah's
remaining claims accrued in February 2010 when her employment
was terminated, that Agah's amended complaint did not relate
back to the original complaint, and that the remaining claims
asserted in the amended complaint were time-barred.  They also
argued that they were entitled to immunity with respect to
Agah's claims alleging tortious interference with contractual
6
1140596
rights, tortious violations of her procedural and substantive
due-process rights, and conversion and detinue, because, they
argued, they were sued in their individual capacity and lacked
the authority to grant Agah her requested injunctive relief. 
The petitioners attached deposition testimony and other
evidence in support of their motions.  On July 11, 2013, Agah
filed a response to the petitioners' motions.
Following a hearing, the trial court denied all three
motions on January 28, 2015.  The trial court stayed the
proceedings pending mandamus review.  The petitioners timely
filed their petition on March 11, 2015.  
Standard of Review
"'"A 
writ 
of 
mandamus 
is 
an
extraordinary remedy, and it 'will be
issued only when there is: 1) a clear legal
right in the petitioner to the order
sought; 2) an imperative duty upon the
respondent to perform, accompanied by a
refusal to do so; 3) the lack of another
adequate remedy; and 4) properly invoked
jurisdiction of the court.'"'
"Ex parte Monsanto Co., 862 So. 2d 595, 604 (Ala. 
2003)(quoting Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173, 176
(Ala. 2000), quoting in turn Ex parte United Serv.
Stations, Inc., 628 So. 2d 501, 503 (Ala. 1993)). A
writ of mandamus is the proper means by which to
seek review of a denial of a motion to dismiss filed
by a party originally listed as a fictitiously named
defendant 'when "the undisputed evidence shows that
7
1140596
the plaintiff failed to act with due diligence in
identifying the fictitiously named defendant as the
party the plaintiff intended to sue."' Ex parte
Chemical Lime of Alabama, Inc., 916 So. 2d 594, 596-
97 (Ala. 2005) (quoting Ex parte Snow, 764 So. 2d
531, 537 (Ala. 1999)) ...."
Ex parte Nationwide Ins. Co., 991 So. 2d 1287, 1289-90 (Ala.
2008).  Likewise, mandamus review is available where the
petitioner asserts immunity.  Ex parte Alabama 
Peace 
Officers'
Standards & Training Comm'n, 34 So. 3d 1248 (Ala. 2009).
Discussion
The first question presented is whether the trial court
exceeded its discretion in denying the petitioners' motions,
in essence determining that Agah's substitution of  Talbott,
Ballard, and Layton for the fictitiously named defendants in
the amended complaint of March 21, 2013, relates back to the
filing of the original complaint of July 28, 2011.  This Court
has previously stated that Rule 9(h) and Rule 15(c)(4), Ala.
R. Civ. P., "'allow a plaintiff to avoid the bar of a statute
of limitations by fictitiously naming defendants for which
actual parties can later be substituted.'"  Ex parte Chemical
Lime of Alabama, Inc., 916 So. 2d 594, 597 (Ala. 2005)(quoting
Fulmer v. Clark Equip. Co., 654 So. 2d 45, 46 (Ala. 1995)).
Rule 9(h), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides:
8
1140596
"When a party is ignorant of the name of an opposing
party and so alleges in the party's pleading, the
opposing party may be designated by any name, and
when that party's true name is discovered, the
process and all pleadings and proceedings in the
action may be amended by substituting the true
name."
Rule 15(c)(4), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides that "[a]n amendment
of a pleading relates back to the date of the original
pleading when ... relation back is permitted by principles
applicable to fictitious party practice pursuant 
to 
Rule 9(h),
Ala. R. Civ. P."
To avoid the bar of a statute of limitations when a
plaintiff amends a complaint to identify a fictitiously named
defendant in the original complaint, the plaintiff
"(1) must state a cause of action against the party
named fictitiously in the body of the original
complaint and (2) must be ignorant of the identity
of the fictitiously named party, in the sense of
having no knowledge at the time of the filing that
the later-named party was in fact the party intended
to be sued.  Columbia Eng'g Int'l, Ltd. v. Espey,
429 So. 2d 955 (Ala. 1983)."
Crawford v. Sundback, 678 So. 2d 1057, 1059 (Ala. 1996).  This
Court has also stated that the original complaint must
adequately describe the fictitiously named defendant and the
stated claim against that defendant.   Fulmer, 654 So. 2d at
46.
9
1140596
For a plaintiff to be deemed ignorant of the identity of
a fictitiously named defendant, the plaintiff must have
exercised due diligence to identify the party intended to be
sued:
"A plaintiff is ignorant of the identity of a
fictitiously named defendant when, after exercising
due diligence to ascertain the identity of the party
intended to be sued, he lacks knowledge at the time
of the filing of the complaint of facts indicating
to him that the substituted party was the party
intended to be sued. Likewise, to invoke the
relation-back principle of Rule 15(c), a plaintiff,
after filing suit, must proceed in a reasonably
diligent manner to determine the true identity of a
fictitiously named defendant and to amend his
complaint accordingly."
Ex parte FMC Corp., 599 So. 2d 592, 593–94 (Ala. 1992). The
test for determining whether a plaintiff exercised due
diligence to obtain the identity of a fictitiously named
defendant is "whether the plaintiff knew, or should have
known, or was on notice, that the substituted defendants were
in fact the parties described fictitiously." Davis v. Mims,
510 So. 2d 227, 229 (Ala. 1987).
Agah's employment was terminated on February 26, 2010. 
She filed her original complaint on July 28, 2011.  She listed
"R.T." as a defendant and described the party as an individual
or entity "that played a role in the theft of [Agah's]
10
1140596
electronic computer data files and animal research logbook,
the defamation of [Agah's] character, and the intentional
interference with [Agah's] property 
right 
of employment."  The
substance of Agah's original complaint is that Bartlett and
Turrens converted her animal-research logbook, defamed her,
and caused her to lose her employment with USA.  In her
deposition on December 12, 2012, Agah identified "R.T." as
Talbott.   On March 21, 2013, Agah filed an amended complaint
in which she substituted Talbott for "R.T." and named Ballard
and Layton as defendants.  
Agah failed to adequately describe a fictitiously named
defendant such that it would have related to Ballard or Layton
as there were no initials that correlated to their names and
no 
"generic" 
fictitious-defendant 
names 
listed 
in 
the 
original
complaint.  "A complaint stating a claim against a
fictitiously 
named 
defendant 
must 
contain 
sufficient
specificity to put that defendant on notice of the plaintiff's
claim if it were to read the complaint."  Ex parte
International Refining & Mfg. Co., 972 So. 2d 784, 789 (Ala.
2007).  Agah included three very specific sets of initials in
the caption of her complaint.  During her deposition on
11
1140596
December 21, 2012, Agah stated that the "R.T." in her original
complaint was Talbott.  The original complaint does not set
forth any claim in the body of the complaint against the
initialed defendants.   "Merely naming the fictitious party in
the style and/or body of the complaint is insufficient; the
complaint must describe the actions that form the basis of the
cause of action against the fictitiously named defendant."  Ex
parte International Refining, 972 So. 2d  at 789.  This Court
in International Refining held that the plaintiffs had 
provided specific factual assertions relating to only one
claim against the fictitiously 
named 
defendants, and the Court
dismissed the rest of the plaintiffs' claims against those
defendants, 
finding 
that 
a 
general 
statement 
that
"[r]eferences to 'defendants' in this complaint will be
understood to include fictitious party defendants" was
inadequate to put them on notice of the claims against them. 
972 So. 2d at 790-91.
Agah has not shown that she was ignorant of the true
identities of the parties intended to be sued in the sense of
having no knowledge of the parties' identities at the time the
original complaint was filed, nor has she shown due diligence
12
1140596
in attempting to discover the identities the fictitiously
named parties or in promptly amending her complaint once she
had discovered their identities.  The petitioners were all 
employees of USA directly involved in the proceedings arising
out of Agah's alleged misconduct that eventually led to the
termination of 
her 
employment.  Agah even referenced Talbott's
initials in her original complaint.  Agah filed her amended
complaint over a year after the statute of limitations had run
on all but one of her claims and 19 months after her original
complaint was filed.  
"The purpose of [Rule 9(h)] is, in effect, to
counteract 
the 
relatively 
short 
statute 
of
limitations for tort, negligence, and wrongful death
claims in this State. The rule applies when a
plaintiff knows he has been injured by someone and
the plaintiff can describe that person or entity
(i.e., 'the manufacturer of the valves that injured
the plaintiff'), but the plaintiff is ignorant of
the specific name of the person or entity. It is an
emergency action that allows the plaintiff to hold
a spot for the unidentified party with a fictitious
name. The only additional requirement is that the
plaintiff state the cause of action against the
fictitiously named defendants within the body of the
complaint. Columbia Eng'g Int'l, Ltd. v. Espey, 429
So. 2d 955, 958-59 (Ala. 1983). If the plaintiff
diligently pursues the identity and substitutes the
name of the fictitiously named defendant, see Rule
9(h) and Bowen [v. Cummings, 517 So. 2d 617 (Ala.
1987)], then the plaintiff can substitute the newly
discovered 
name 
for 
the 
fictitiously 
named
defendant. Because the fictitious name serves as a
13
1140596
placeholder for the party, [Ala.] R. Civ. P. 15(c)
allows the substituted name to relate back to the
date of the original complaint. In that way, the
plaintiff 
effectively 
tolls 
the 
statute 
of
limitations."
Toomey v. Foxboro Co., 528 So. 2d 302, 307 (Ala. 1988)(Adams,
J., dissenting).
In Ex parte Ismail, 78 So. 3d 399 (Ala. 2011), the
plaintiff was allegedly injured while a patient at Highlands
Medical Center. The patient had knowledge, based on medical
records in his possession before filing the complaint, that
Dr. Younus Ismail had been one of two treating physicians. 78
So. 3d at 407. Nevertheless, the patient did not attempt to
substitute Dr. Ismail for a fictitiously named party until
more than two years after the limitations period on his cause
of action had expired. 78 So. 3d at 403. Thus, the issue in
that case was not one of identity but, rather, the extent of
the involvement of the physician, whose identity was known,
with the patient. Essentially, in other words, the plaintiff
was improperly, 78 So. 3d at 408, attempting to use Rule 9(h)
to gain "additional time beyond the statutorily prescribed
period within which to formulate causes of action." Columbia
Eng'g Int'l, Ltd. v. Espey, 429 So. 2d 955, 959 (Ala. 1983).
14
1140596
In Crawford v. Sundback, supra, the plaintiffs were
employed at a chemical plant; they sued following an explosion
of a tank at the chemical facility.  The plaintiffs named
fictitious defendants.  They later sought to amend their
complaint to substitute coworkers at the facility as
defendants.  The coworkers filed summary-judgment motions
seeking dismissal from the action. This Court held that the
plaintiffs were not ignorant of the identity of the coworkers
as defendants and, thus, that the subsequent amendment adding
the coworkers did not relate back to date of original
complaint for statute-of-limitations purposes.  
"In support of their motions for summary
judgment, the defendants gave affidavits stating
that before the accident they had known the four
workers as co-employees and that the four workers
had known them as co-employees, in some instances
for many years. The defendants asserted that the
plaintiffs could have found them by routine
discovery, for example, by asking in interrogatories
to the co-employee defendants originally named in
the plaintiffs' complaints the true identities of
the parties named fictitiously. Attached to the
motions for summary judgment were copies of
petitions to obtain and perpetuate evidence, filed
in December 1989 by the plaintiffs pursuant to Rule
27, Ala.R.Civ.P., and an affidavit by an attorney
for some of the defendants, who stated that on
February 7, 1990, he attended an inspection of the
3M plant pursuant to those petitions. Thus, the
defendants showed that the plaintiffs had begun
discovery shortly after the fatal incident.
15
1140596
"The plaintiffs argue that they were diligent
and 
that 
the 
defendants' 
allegations 
were
insufficient to shift the burden to them to produce
substantial evidence of their diligence. However, we
conclude 
that 
the 
defendants' 
motions 
were
sufficient to shift the burden. The motion asserted
the statute of limitations as a defense; this motion
appeared on its face to have merit, because some of
the substitutions of these defendants were made
almost two years after the date when the statutory
period of limitations ordinarily would have run, and
some substitutions were made more than two years
after that date. Moreover, the motions went further,
asserting that the plaintiffs knew when they filed
their complaints, or with due diligence could have
discovered by that time, that these defendants were
the parties named fictitiously in the complaints.
These assertions were supported by affidavits of the
defendants, three of whom stated that before the
accident Rains [one of the plaintiffs] had known
them and had known their responsibilities. The
defendants argued that simple discovery, such as
interrogatories to the co-employee defendants who
were named in the original complaints, would have
disclosed their identities. They established that
the plaintiffs began conducting discovery within six
months after the incident, but claimed not to have
learned of these defendants' alleged culpability
until almost four years after the incident, or
later.
"In response, the plaintiffs made no showing as
to why Rains's familiarity with three of the
defendants did not lead to earlier substitution at
least as to those three, or as to how the alleged
failure to discover earlier these defendants'
alleged culpability occurred in spite of due
diligence. 
The 
plaintiffs 
simply 
presented 
a
conclusory affidavit of one of their attorneys,
stating that these defendants' culpability had only
recently come to light in depositions, and stating:
'At all times during my involvement with these
16
1140596
cases, I exercised due diligence to discover any and
all parties legally responsible for the injuries and
deaths suffered in the explosion.'  This was not
sufficient to present substantial evidence in
response to the defendants' showings."
678 So. 2d at 1060-61.
In 
the 
present 
case, 
Agah's 
claims 
against 
the
petitioners in her amended complaint, with the exclusion of
the conversion and detinue claim, are barred by the applicable
two-year statute of limitations.  The claims asserted in the
amended complaint do not relate back to the original complaint
under Rule 9(h) and Rule 15(c)(4), Ala. R. Civ. P.
We now turn to Agah's conversion and detinue claim.  The
statute of limitations for "detention or conversion of
personal property" is six years. § 6-2-34(3), Ala. Code 1975. 
To establish conversion, a plaintiff must show a wrongful
taking or a wrongful detention or interference or an illegal
use or misuse of his or her property.  Ex parte Anderson, 867
So. 2d 1125 (Ala. 2003).  "To be entitled to the right of
recovery for conversion, plaintiff must have general or
special title to the property in question, and the possession
or immediate right of possession; and the party complained
against must have wrongfully exerted some act of dominion over
17
1140596
such property inconsistent with and destructive of the title
of the party plaintiff."  Hamilton v. Hamilton, 255 Ala. 284,
289, 51 So. 2d 13, 18 (1951).  "[T]he very gist of detinue is
the wrongful detention by the defendant of the plaintiff's
personal property."  Ray v. Blackwell, 521 So. 2d  44, 45
(Ala. Civ. App. 1988).  
The petitioners argue that they are immune from suit
based on § 14. In reviewing the grant or denial of a motion to
dismiss, the question "'is whether, when the allegations of
the complaint are viewed most strongly in the pleader's favor,
it appears that the pleader could prove any set of
circumstances that would entitle [him] to relief.'"  Ex parte
Alabama Dep't of Youth Servs., 880 So. 2d 393, 398 (Ala.
2003)(quoting Nance v. Matthews, 622 So. 2d 297, 299 (Ala.
1993)).  In the present case, the trial court had before it,
in addition to the pleadings, deposition testimony and other
documents.  Ex parte Jefferson Cnty. Dep't of Human Res., 63
So. 3d 621 (Ala. 2010)(treating a motion to dismiss based on
immunity as a summary-judgment motion where the trial court
had before it and considered matters outside the pleadings). 
18
1140596
Article 1, § 14, of the Alabama Constitution, provides
that "the State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in
any court of law or equity."  This Court has recognized: 
"'The wall of immunity erected by § 14 is nearly
impregnable,' Patterson [v. Gladwin Corp., 835 So.
2d 137, 142 (Ala. 2002),] and bars
"(1) claims against the State,
"(2) claims against a State agency,
"(3) claims against a state official
or employee sued in his official capacity
as an agent for the State, and
"(4) claims against a state official
or 
employee 
sued 
in 
his 
individual
capacity."
Ex parte Davis, 930 So. 2d 497, 500 (Ala. 2005) (footnotes
omitted). "The State's immunity bars suits for relief by way
of mandamus or injunction, no less than suits for any other
remedy." Taylor v. Troy State Univ., 437 So. 2d 472, 474 (Ala.
1983).
The fourth category of claims set out in the statement
above from Davis refers to claims against State officials or
employees sued in their individual capacities that are, in
effect, claims against the State. Davis, 930 So. 2d at 500
("Whether immunity serves as a defense to an action against a
19
1140596
state officer or employee sued in his individual capacity
depends upon the degree to which the action involves a State
interest."); Phillips v. Thomas, 555 So. 2d 81, 83 (Ala. 1989)
("State officers and employees, in their official capacities
and individually, also are absolutely immune from suit when
the action is, in effect, one against the State.") .  "This
form of immunity is distinct from the discretionary or State-
agent immunity discussed in Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392
(Ala. 2000), which dealt with claims against State agents sued
in their personal, or individual, capacities, which were not,
in effect, claims against the State."  Ex parte Troy Univ.,
961 So. 2d 105, 108 (Ala. 2006).   State employees sued in
their individual capacities, however, enjoy only State-agent
immunity from suit.  Ex parte Tuscaloosa Cnty., 796 So. 2d
1100, 1106 (Ala. 2000). The law of State-agent immunity was
succinctly restated in Ex parte Cranman, supra, and that
restatement was adopted by a majority of this Court in Ex
parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173 (Ala. 2000).
Here, Agah's conversion and detinue claims involving the
animal-research logbook seek an order returning the logbook
and monetary damages for the time the logbook was out of her
20
1140596
possession when she needed it for her defense.  The
petitioners were sued only in their individual capacities. 
However, part of Agah's relief is in the form of return of the
property.  In Ex parte Moulton, 116 So. 3d 1119, 1142 (Ala.
2013),  this Court held that, to the extent the plaintiff
sought relief in the form of reinstatement to an employment
position from the defendants in their individual capacities,
"that claim is meaningless because the [defendants] can act on
behalf of [the state university] only in their official
capacities and are without the necessary authority to provide
the requested relief in their individual capacities."  Here, 
Agah's amended complaint refers only to Bartlett, Amy Boyd (a
witness), and Turrens with regard to the alleged conversion of
the animal-research logbook, none of whom are before us in
this petition.  Moreover, Agah's complaint alleges that the
logbook was her "personal and intellectual property," but in
her subsequent deposition Agah stated that the logbook
belonged to USA and that she was merely the custodian.  A
plaintiff's sworn deposition testimony overrides unsworn
allegations in a complaint.  See Osborn v. Johns, 468 So. 2d
103 (Ala. 1985)(holding that in a fraud action by a vendor
21
1140596
against a bank, the vendor's deposition testimony that he had
no basis for a claim against the bank showed an absence of any
genuine issue of material fact and entitled the bank to
judgment as a matter of law, where the vendor "essentially
relied on his initial pleadings" to oppose summary judgment). 
Because Agah did not sue the petitioners in their official
capacities, they could not provide her with the relief
requested, i.e., the return of the animal-research logbook
"taken" by USA students or employees, who were persons other
than the petitioners.  Additionally, Agah is seeking monetary
relief from the petitioners arising out of the taking of the
logbook.  The allegations in Agah's amended complaint concern
the removal of the logbook from Agah's "custody" by certain
USA students or employees, not the petitioners.  Also, any
claims brought against the petitioners in their individual
capacities seeking money damages are barred by State immunity
under § 14 where the claim is in effect one against the State. 
Ex parte Moulton, supra.         
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the petitioners have a clear
legal right to the dismissal of Agah's amended complaint
22
1140596
against them.  Agah's amended complaint did not relate back to 
her original complaint; thus, all of her claims against the
petitioners, with the exclusion of her conversion and detinue
claim, were barred by the statute of limitations.  Agah's
conversion and detinue claim against the petitioners in their
individual capacities seeks relief that the petitioners could
not provide.  Therefore, we grant the petition for a writ of
mandamus and direct the trial court to vacate its order
denying the petitioners' motion seeking dismissal of the
claims against them.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED. 
Shaw, Main, Wise, and Bryan, JJ., concur.
Parker and Murdock, JJ., concur in the result.
Moore, C.J., dissents.
Stuart, J., recuses herself.
23
1140596
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring in the result).
The claims of detinue and conversion in this case are
framed by the plaintiff, who is the "master of her
complaint," as claims against the petitioners personally, or
in their individual capacities.  If we were to treat these
claims as they are framed by the plaintiff, they would fail
on their merits rather than on the ground of immunity. 
Specifically, the ground on which they would fail on their
merits would be simply that the defendants have not breached
a duty owed to the plaintiff in their individual capacities. 
It is only in their official capacities that they owe any
duty or in which they have acted or could act.1
Ultimately, therefore, I believe that disposing of
claims framed like those in the present case as barred by the
A University of South Alabama ("USA") employee may have
1
physical possession of the logbook, but he or she has that
possession not in his or her individual capacity, but only as
an arm or conduit of USA; he or she has no personal authority
over the disposition of the logbook.  Likewise, a USA employee
may have physically removed the logbook from the plaintiff's
office, but the employee did so in accordance with the
instruction of a superior and as an arm of USA and, in so
doing, did not, in his or her individual capacity, breach a
duty owed to the plaintiff.
24
1140596
doctrine of sovereign immunity as if they were official-
capacity claims involves the use of a legal fiction.  But it
is a useful legal fiction.  Treating such claims as "in
effect against the State" allows the trial court to consider
dismissing them at an early stage in the litigation based on
a defense of immunity and, in turn, allows interlocutory
appellate review by mandamus of the trial court's decision in
this regard.  As a result, the use of this legal fiction may
be as efficacious a way as any to articulate a rule of
decision that protects the State's ability to act lawfully
through its employees and agents and to protect its contract
and property rights, without the time and cost of litigation
being imposed on those agents.  Compare Ex parte Dickson, 46
So. 3d 468, 474 (Ala. 2010): 
"In any event, a suit for injunctive relief
against a State official in his or her individual
capacity would be meaningless.  This is so, because
State officials act for and represent the State
only in their official capacities.  Consequently,
the members are not aided by [Ex parte] Cranman[,
792 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2000),] or its progeny."
25
1140596
(Some emphasis added.)  See also DeStafney v. University of
Alabama, 413 So. 2d 391, 394 (Ala. 1981) (quoting Milton v.
Espey, 356 So. 2d 1201, 1202-03 (Ala. 1978)):
"'There is no dispute that in employing Milton,
Espey was acting in his official capacity as an
agent of the University. Milton admits this. Espey
was merely the conduit through which the University
contracted with Milton. Thus, a suit seeking money
damages for breach of contract, although nominally
against Espey individually, comes within the
prohibition of Section 14 as a suit against the
State. Milton's contract was in fact with the
University of Alabama.'" 
26