Title: Morris v. Atchison, T. & SF Rly. Co.
Citation: 198 Kan. 147, 422 P.2d 920
Docket Number: 44,617
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: January 21, 1967

198 Kan. 147 (1967)
422 P.2d 920
BRIAN KENT MORRIS, a minor, by Harold Morris, his father and next friend, Appellant,
v.
ATCHISON, TOPEKA &amp; SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, a corporation, Appellee.
No. 44,617

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed January 21, 1967.
C.K. Sayler, of Topeka, argued the cause and David H. Fisher, Donald Patterson, Jack L. Summers and Edwin D. Smith, all of Topeka, were with him on the brief for the appellant.
W.E. Treadway, of Topeka, argued the cause and C.J. Putt, J.B. Reeves and Roth A. Gatewood, all of Topeka, were with him on the brief for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PRICE, C.J.:
This was an action to recover for the loss of an arm and a leg when plaintiff was run over by a car of defendant railway company.
The trial court sustained defendant's motion for summary judgment on the ground that at the time and place in question plaintiff was a trespasser on the tracks of defendant and that there was no evidence whatsoever of any willful or wanton act on the part of defendant's employees which caused the injury.
Plaintiff has appealed from that ruling.
In rendering judgment the trial court filed a memorandum decision which states succinctly (1) rules applicable to consideration of a motion for summary judgment; (2) the facts as shown by affidavits, depositions, admissions and answers to interrogatories; (3) rules of law applicable to the facts shown, and (4) the reasons for the decision.
*148 Because all issues are thoroughly analyzed and discussed in the trial court's memorandum  we quote it in full:
"MEMORANDUM DECISION
"2. The affidavit of W.T. Richardson.
"3. The affidavit of C.A. Holcome with exhibit.
"DECISION OF THE COURT
"RATIONALE OF THE DECISION
"Dated this 28th day of December, 1965."
In this appeal plaintiff makes four contentions  three of which are argued together. They are that the trial court erred (1) in *159 holding that plaintiff was a trespasser on the tracks and that defendant's only duty to him was to refrain from willfully or wantonly injuring him; (2) in failing to hold that plaintiff was an invitee on defendant's premises because there was benefit to defendant in having plaintiff load hay into the barn that was to be used by defendant in feeding cattle shipped by it, and (3) in failing to find that the Anderson Cattle Company employees, of which plaintiff was one, had been on defendant's property sufficiently in the past so that defendant knew or should have known the boys and plaintiff were in the area of the hay barn and on defendant's premises sufficiently to become licensees and therefore entitled to due care.
It is argued the facts of record establish that plaintiff was on defendant's tracks by virtue of an express or implied invitation  and thus occupied the status of a business invitee or licensee and, therefore, defendant was under the duty to exercise reasonable and ordinary care for his safety. In support of this argument he refers to K.S.A. 66-234, which provides 
and to Kinney v. Atchison, Topeka &amp; S.F. Rly. Co., 193 Kan. 223, 392 P.2d 873, and Fleming v. Brown, 150 F.2d 801 (cited in the Kinney case), both of which discuss the application of the statute.
The facts of those cases, however, clearly distinguish them from the instant case. In the Kinney case a woman was injured as a result of slipping and falling on a slick spot on the floor of the public waiting room in the depot of defendant railway. In the Fleming case a boy was in a vehicle which was parked in a depot parking area. He was killed when a train jumped the track at the depot. In neither case was the injured party found to be a trespasser, and it was held that under the facts and circumstances the applicable degree of care under the statute and law was that of reasonable and ordinary care on the part of the railway company.
Further discussion of the mentioned contentions is unnecessary. Under the undisputed evidence it is clear that at the time and place in question plaintiff was a trespasser on the tracks of defendant. That being the case, the applicable degree of care owed by defendant was to refrain from willfully and wantonly injuring him, and the trial court was correct in so concluding.
*160 Finally, it is contended that even though plaintiff was a trespasser or licensee, the trial court erred in failing to find there was an issue of negligence to be tried  because defendant's negligence was "active" after plaintiff was on the premises and therefore its duty to him was that of due care.
This contention likewise is covered and answered in the decision of the trial court  and correctly so. This is not a situation where the presence of a licensee is known or reasonably could have been known  and notwithstanding, the owner of the premises thereafter is affirmatively and actively guilty of negligence causing injury.
Under the undisputed facts of this case the trial court reached a correct decision. No error has been shown. The judgment is affirmed.