Title: Barron v. Kolenda
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13284
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: March 7, 2023

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13284 
 
LOUISE BARRON & others1  vs.  DANIEL L. KOLENDA2 & another.3 
 
 
 
Worcester.     November 2, 2022. – March 7, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, 
& Wendlandt, JJ. 
 
 
Open Meeting Law.  Municipal Corporations, Open meetings, 
Selectmen, Governmental immunity.  Constitutional Law, 
Right to assemble, Right to petition government, Freedom of 
speech and press.  Governmental Immunity.  Massachusetts 
Civil Rights Act.  Civil Rights, Availability of remedy, 
Immunity of public official.  Declaratory Relief. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
April 3, 2020. 
 
The case was heard by Shannon Frison, J., on a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
Ginny Sinkel Kremer for the plaintiffs. 
John J. Davis for the defendants. 
 
1 Jack Barron and Arthur St. Andre. 
 
2 Individually and as a member of the board of selectmen of 
Southborough. 
 
3 Town of Southborough. 
2 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
John Foskett for Massachusetts Association of School 
Committees. 
Ruth A. Bourquin for American Civil Liberties Union of 
Massachusetts, Inc. 
Maura E. O'Keefe, Town Counsel, & Rosemary Crowley for 
Massachusetts Municipal Lawyers Association. 
Frank J. Bailey, Selena Fitanides, & John C. La Liberte for 
PioneerLegal, LLC. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  After objecting to open meeting law violations 
and other municipal actions in a public comment session at a 
meeting of the board of selectmen of Southborough (board), the 
plaintiff Louise Barron was accused of violating the board's 
"public participation at public meetings" policy (public comment 
policy or civility code) and eventually threatened with physical 
removal from the meeting.  Thereafter, she and two other 
plaintiffs brought State constitutional challenges to the 
policy, claiming in particular that she had exercised her 
constitutionally protected right under art. 19 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights "to assemble, speak in a 
peaceable manner, and petition her town leaders for redress." 
In the plaintiffs' request for declaratory relief, seeking 
to have the public comment policy declared unconstitutional, 
they also used terminology associated with free speech claims 
brought under art. 16 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights, as amended by art. 77 of the Amendments to the 
Constitution, and the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, although they voluntarily withdrew their First 
3 
 
Amendment and other Federal claims, eliminating the Federal 
constitutional basis that had justified removal of the case from 
State to Federal court.  Finally, Barron claims that the threat 
to remove her from the meeting for exercising her State 
constitutional rights violated the Massachusetts Civil Rights 
Act (MCRA), G. L. c. 12, §§ 11H-11I. 
For the reasons set forth infra, we conclude that the 
public comment policy of the town of Southborough (town) 
violates rights protected by art. 19 and, to the extent it is 
argued, art. 16.  Under both arts. 19 and 16, such civility 
restraints on the content of speech at a public comment session 
in a public meeting are forbidden.  Although civility, of 
course, is to be encouraged, it cannot be required regarding the 
content of what may be said in a public comment session of a 
governmental meeting without violating both provisions of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, which provide for a robust 
protection of public criticism of governmental action and 
officials.  What can be required is that the public comment 
session be conducted in an "orderly and peaceable" manner, 
including designating when public comment shall be allowed in 
the governmental meeting, the time limits for each person 
speaking, and rules preventing speakers from disrupting others, 
and removing those speakers if they do.  We have concluded that 
such time, place, and manner restrictions do not violate either 
4 
 
the right to assembly under art. 19 or the right to free speech 
under art. 16.  See Desrosiers v. Governor, 486 Mass. 369, 390-
391 (2020), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 83 (2021) (permitting time, 
place, and manner restrictions under art. 19); Mendoza v. 
Licensing Bd. of Fall River, 444 Mass. 188, 197-198 (2005) 
(discussing time, place, and manner restrictions under art. 16). 
Furthermore, when Barron alleged that the chair threatened 
to have her physically removed from a public comment session of 
a public meeting after she criticized town officials about 
undisputed violations of the open meeting laws, she properly 
alleged that he threatened to interfere with her exercise of 
State constitutional rights protected by arts. 16 and 19 in 
violation of the MCRA.  There is also no qualified immunity, as 
there is a clearly established State constitutional right under 
arts. 16 and 19 to object (and even to do so vigorously) to the 
violation of the law by government officials in a public comment 
session of a public meeting.  We therefore reverse the Superior 
Court judgment entered in favor of board member Daniel L. 
Kolenda.  We also direct the Superior Court to enter a judgment 
declaring the town's public comment policy unconstitutional in 
violation of arts. 19 and 16.4 
 
4 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the 
Massachusetts Association of School Committees; American Civil 
Liberties Union of Massachusetts, Inc.; Massachusetts Municipal 
Lawyers Association; and PioneerLegal, LLC. 
5 
 
 
Background.  1.  Public meeting.  We draw the facts from 
the plaintiffs' complaint, while also considering the board's 
public comment policy and the video recording of the board's 
December 4, 2018 meeting, both of which were included in the 
record and considered by the judge below.  See Mullins v. 
Corcoran, 488 Mass. 275, 281 (2021), quoting Schaer v. Brandeis 
Univ., 432 Mass. 474, 477 (2000) ("In deciding [a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings], all facts pleaded by the nonmoving 
party must be accepted as true. . . .  We also may rely on 
'matters of public record, orders, items appearing in the record 
of the case, and exhibits attached to the complaint'"); 
Rosenberg v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 487 Mass. 403, 408 (2021) (in 
reviewing motion to dismiss, we may consider extrinsic documents 
plaintiff relied on in framing complaint). 
Barron is a town resident and a longtime participant in 
local government.  The board consists of five elected members.  
Kolenda was a longtime member of the board.  The board is 
subject to "the Massachusetts open meeting law, G. L. c. 30A, 
§§ 18 and 20 (a), which generally requires public bodies to make 
their meetings, including 'deliberations,' open to the public."  
Boelter v. Selectmen of Wayland, 479 Mass. 233, 234 (2018).  The 
board's public comment policy outlines the public comment 
portion of its meetings where town residents may address the 
6 
 
board.5  In 2018, the Attorney General determined that the board 
had committed dozens of open meeting law violations and ordered 
 
5 The public comment policy states in full: 
 
"The [board of selectmen] recognizes the importance of 
active public participation at all public meetings, at the 
discretion of the [c]hair, on items on the official agenda 
as well as items not on the official agenda.  All comments 
from the public should be directed to or through the 
[c]hair once the speaker is recognized, and all parties 
(including members of the presiding [b]oard) act in a 
professional and courteous manner when either addressing 
the [b]oard, or in responding to the public.  Once 
recognized by the [c]hair, all persons addressing the 
[b]oard shall state their name and address prior to 
speaking.  It is the role of the [c]hair to set time 
limitations and maintain order during public meetings, as 
it is important that the [b]oard allow themselves enough 
time to conduct their official town business. 
 
"If included on the meeting agenda by the [c]hair, 
'[p]ublic [c]omment' is a time when town residents can 
bring matters before the [b]oard that are not on the 
official agenda.  Comments should be short and to the 
point, with the [c]hair ultimately responsible to control 
the time available to individual speakers.  Except in 
unusual circumstances, any matter presented under '[p]ublic 
[c]omment' will not be debated or acted upon by the [b]oard 
at the time it is presented. 
 
"All remarks and dialogue in public meetings must be 
respectful and courteous, free of rude, personal or 
slanderous remarks.  Inappropriate language and/or shouting 
will not be tolerated.  Furthermore, no person may offer 
comment without permission of the [c]hair, and all persons 
shall, at the request of the [c]hair, be silent.  No person 
shall disrupt the proceedings of a meeting. 
 
"Finally, while it true that State law provides that the 
[c]hair may order a disruptive person to withdraw from a 
meeting (and, if the person does not withdraw, the [c]hair 
may authorize a constable or other officer to remove the 
person from the meeting), it is the position of the [board] 
that no meeting should ever come to that point." 
7 
 
each member of the board to attend in-person open meeting law 
training. 
 
Barron attended the board's meeting on December 4, 2018, 
where Kolenda was acting as the chair.  The board members 
discussed a number of topics, including the town budget, which, 
if approved, would result in increased real estate taxes for 
town residents.  The board also discussed the possibility of 
elevating the town administrator to the position of town 
manager.  The board also briefly addressed the open meeting law 
violations.  During the discussion on this point, Kolenda stated 
that the board is "a group of volunteers," and further 
characterized its members as "public servants" who "do their 
best." 
 
After approximately two and one-half hours of business, 
Kolenda announced that the board would be moving to public 
comment.  Kolenda then stated, paraphrasing from the public 
comment policy: 
"And before we go to public comment, just a reminder for 
anyone who wants to make public comment.  It's a time when 
town residents can bring matters before the board of 
selectmen that are not on the official agenda.  We do have 
these posted for all boards and committees.  Comments 
should be short and to the point and remarks must be 
respectful and courteous, free of rude, personal, or 
slanderous remarks, and the guidelines go on for a couple 
of pages, but if anyone has any questions on that feel free 
to ask us.  If not, public comment please." 
 
Barron then approached the podium holding a sign that stated 
"Stop Spending" on one side and "Stop Breaking Open Meeting Law" 
8 
 
on the other.  Barron began her comments by critiquing the 
proposed budget increases, opining that the town "ha[d] been 
spending like drunken sailors" and was "in trouble."  She argued 
for a moratorium on hiring and inquired about the benefits of 
hiring a town manager as opposed to a town administrator.  
Kolenda responded that questions would not be answered as the 
board was "not going to have a back and forth discussion during 
public comment."  Barron began moving to her next topic of 
concern but another board member responded to her question, 
indicating that the issue of a town manager would be considered 
by a committee and "ha[d] nothing to do with [the] upcoming town 
meeting." 
 
After the board member's response, Barron began to critique 
the board for its open meeting law violations.  Barron and 
Kolenda then had the following exchange: 
Barron:  "And the next thing I want to say is you said that 
you were just merely volunteers, and I appreciate that, but 
you've still broken the law with open meeting law, and that 
is not the best you can do.  And . . . when you say that 
. . . this is the best we could do, I know it's not easy to 
be volunteers in town but breaking the law is breaking the 
law and --" 
 
Kolenda:  "So ma'am if you want to slander town officials 
who are doing their very best -–" 
 
Barron:  "I'm not slandering." 
 
Kolenda:  "-- then then we're gonna go ahead and stop the 
public comment session now and go into recess." 
 
9 
 
When Kolenda said the word "now," Barron interjected and, 
simultaneously to Kolenda saying, "go into recess," Barron 
stated, "Look, you need to stop being a Hitler."  Barron 
continued:  "You're a Hitler.  I can say what I want."  After 
Barron's second reference to Hitler, Kolenda said:  "Alright, we 
are moving into recess.  Thank you." 
The audio recording on the public broadcast then stopped.  
A message on the screen stated, "The Board of Selectmen is 
taking a brief recess and will return shortly," but the video 
recording continued to show the board members for approximately 
thirteen seconds. 
 
Kolenda turned off his microphone, stood up, and began 
pointing in Barron's direction, repeatedly yelling at her, 
"You're disgusting!"  Kolenda told Barron that he would have her 
"escorted out" of the meeting if she did not leave.  Concerned 
that Kolenda would follow through with his threat, Barron left 
the meeting. 
 
2.  Procedural history.  In April 2020, Barron, her 
husband, and a third resident of the town filed a complaint in 
the Superior Court alleging both Federal and State causes of 
action relating to the board's December 4, 2018 meeting.  The 
defendants removed the case to Federal court, but it was 
remanded to the Superior Court after the plaintiffs withdrew the 
Federal claims.  The plaintiffs' amended complaint sought a 
10 
 
judgment declaring that a portion of the policy was 
unconstitutional under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights 
to the extent that the policy disallows criticism of the board 
members and their decisions.  They also sought relief against 
Kolenda in his individual capacity under the MCRA, G. L. c. 12, 
§§ 11H-11I, for violation of art. 19.6  Article 19 is the only 
provision of the Declaration of Rights that is expressly 
referenced in the complaint, although the request for 
declaratory relief is more open-ended and uses the terminology 
associated with free speech claims. 
 
Prior to discovery, the defendants filed a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings.  The motion was allowed as to all 
counts, and the plaintiffs appealed.  We transferred the case 
here on our own motion. 
Discussion.  In the instant case, we are confronted with a 
State, not a Federal, constitutional challenge.  It is also a 
 
6 The plaintiffs also brought an MCRA claim against Kolenda 
in his official capacity; MCRA claims against two other board 
members in their official and individual capacities; and claims 
against the board members for violating the open meeting law.  
Barron individually brought several common-law claims against 
Kolenda.  The judge dismissed all of Barron's and the 
plaintiffs' claims.  On appeal, the plaintiffs challenge only 
the dismissals of their claim for a declaratory judgment and the 
MCRA claim against Kolenda.  The plaintiffs do not argue against 
the dismissal of the MCRA claim against Kolenda in his official 
capacity.  Consequently, we do not review the dismissal of the 
other claims.  See Lyons v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 490 
Mass. 560, 593 n.42 (2022) (claims not argued in brief are 
waived). 
11 
 
challenge expressly premised on art. 19, a provision that has 
not been the focus of much attention in recent case law, despite 
its illustrious past.  Notably, this provision has served an 
important, independent purpose for much of the history of 
Massachusetts government, as there was no free speech provision 
in the original Declaration of Rights.  In fact, such a 
provision was not added to the Massachusetts Constitution until 
1948, when it was amended to include express free speech 
protections.  See art. 16 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights, as amended by art. 77 of the Amendments to the 
Constitution. 
As the text of art. 19, which was drafted by John Adams 
with some assistance from his cousin Samuel Adams,7 along with 
its illuminating constitutional history, is directly applicable 
and dispositive of the claims here, we focus on art. 19 first.  
Because the request for declaratory relief is more open-ended 
and uses the terminology associated with art. 16 and First 
Amendment claims, we address art. 16 as well. 
1.  Standard of review.  "We review the allowance of a 
motion for judgment on the pleadings de novo."  Mullins, 488 
Mass. at 281.  We accept as true "all facts pleaded by the 
 
7 The Adams cousins were two of the three members of the 
subcommittee at the constitutional convention charged with 
drafting the Massachusetts Constitution.  See S.E. Morison, 
History of the Constitution of Massachusetts 20 (1917). 
12 
 
nonmoving party" and "draw every reasonable inference in [that 
party's] favor" to determine whether the "factual allegations 
plausibly suggest[]" that the nonmoving party is entitled to 
relief.  Id., quoting UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Aliberti, 483 
Mass. 396, 405 (2019).  This standard applies to our review of 
the allowance of the motion for judgment on the pleadings with 
regard to the claim of a violation of the MCRA.  Our review of 
the request for a declaratory judgment, however, differs.  The 
plaintiffs seek a declaration that the town's public comment 
policy is unconstitutional.  We review this as a facial 
challenge based on the uncontested language of the policy 
itself.  This presents a question of law for the court requiring 
de novo review.  See Commonwealth v. McGhee, 472 Mass. 405, 412 
(2015) (facial challenge to statute "present[s] questions of law 
that we review de novo"). 
2.  Article 19.  The text of art. 19 provides:  "The people 
have a right, in an orderly and peaceable manner, to assemble to 
consult upon the common good; give instructions to their 
representatives, and to request of the legislative body, by the 
way of addresses, petitions, or remonstrances, redress of the 
wrongs done them, and of the grievances they suffer."  As 
written, this provision expressly envisions a politically active 
and engaged, even aggrieved and angry, populace. 
13 
 
The text of art. 19 thus encompasses the plaintiffs' 
complaint here.  Barron assembled with others at the public 
comment session of the board meeting to request redress of the 
wrongs they claimed had been done to them and the grievances 
they claimed to have suffered by town official actions, 
including the town's noncompliance with the open meeting law. 
The text of this provision has also not been interpreted to 
be limited to State representatives or legislative bodies, 
despite some wording to that effect, but rather has been 
interpreted to be directed at the people's interaction with 
government officials more generally, including in particular 
town officials.  See Kobrin v. Gastfriend, 443 Mass. 327, 333 
(2005) (statutory right to petition is coextensive with art. 19 
and applies where "a party seeks some redress from the 
government"); MacKeen v. Canton, 379 Mass. 514, 521-522 (1980) 
(evaluating whether town meeting procedures were consistent with 
art. 19); Fuller v. Mayor of Medford, 224 Mass. 176, 178 (1916) 
(right to assemble under art. 19 "enable[s] the [town] voters to 
have full and free discussion and consultation upon the merits 
of candidates for public office and of measures proposed in the 
public interests"). 
The provision also has a distinct, identifiable history and 
a close connection to public participation in town government 
that is uniquely informative in this case.  As more fully 
14 
 
explained infra, art. 19 reflects the lessons and the spirit of 
the American Revolution.  The assembly provision arose out of 
fierce opposition to governmental authority, and it was designed 
to protect such opposition, even if it was rude, personal, and 
disrespectful to public figures, as the colonists eventually 
were to the king and his representatives in Massachusetts. 
Our interpretation of the text, history, and purpose of 
art. 19 is further informed by the words and actions of Samuel 
and John Adams, who not only theorized and commented upon the 
right, but were historic actors well versed in its application 
during the revolutionary period, particularly in the towns.  
Both Adams cousins emphasized in their correspondence and their 
actions the importance of the right to assemble.  See Bowie, The 
Constitutional Right of Self-Government, 130 Yale L.J. 1652, 
1727-1728 (2021).  Samuel Adams wielded it to great effect in 
his attempt to "procure a Redress of Grievances" when the 
British governor of the colony attempted to exercise control 
over assemblies after the Boston Massacre.  Id. at 1680, quoting 
Report of the Committee to Prepare an Answer to Thomas 
Hutchinson's Speech (July 31, 1770), in 47 Journals of the House 
of Representatives of Massachusetts 1770-1771, at 63, 69 (1978). 
More philosophically, John Adams explained that the right 
of assembly was a most important principle and institution of 
self-government, as it allowed "[every] Man, high and low . . . 
15 
 
[to speak his senti]ments of public Affairs."  Bowie, supra at 
1708, quoting Letter from John Adams to Edmé Jacques Genet (May 
28, 1780), in 9 Papers of John Adams 350, 353 (G.L. Lint et al. 
eds., 1996).  Town inhabitants, he wrote, "are invested with 
. . . the right to assemble, whenever they are summoned by their 
selectmen, in their town halls, there to deliberate upon the 
public affairs of the town."  Letter from John Adams to the Abbé 
de Mably (1782), in 5 Works of John Adams 492, 495 (C.F. Adams 
ed. 1851).  "The consequences" of the right of assembly, in 
Adams's words, were that "the inhabitants . . . acquired . . . 
the habit of discussing, of deliberating, and of judging of 
public affairs," and thus, "it was in these assemblies of towns 
. . . that the sentiments of the people were formed . . . and 
their resolutions were taken from the beginning to the end of 
the disputes . . . with Great Britain."  Id.  Alexis de 
Tocqueville made a similar point in Democracy in America:  
"Town-meetings are to liberty what primary schools are to 
science; they bring it within the people's reach, they teach men 
how to use and how to enjoy it."  1 A. de Tocqueville, Democracy 
in America 55 (H. Reeve trans. 1862). 
 
Our own case law interpreting art. 19 confirms Adams's 
insights regarding the critical role of the right of assembly in 
the towns in cultivating the spirit and practice of self-
16 
 
government.  As Justice Rugg wrote in Wheelock v. Lowell, 196 
Mass. 220, 227 (1907): 
"It is hard to overestimate the historic significance and 
patriotic influence of the public meetings held in all the 
towns of Massachusetts before and during the Revolution.  
No small part of the capacity for honest and efficient 
local government manifested by the people of this 
Commonwealth has been due to the training of citizens in 
the form of the town meeting.  The jealous care to preserve 
the means for exercising the right of assembling for 
discussion of public topics . . . demonstrates that a vital 
appreciation of the importance of the opportunity to 
exercise the right still survives." 
 
From the beginning, our cases have also emphasized that 
"the fullest and freest discussion" seems to be "sanctioned and 
encouraged by the admirable passage in the constitution," 
Commonwealth v. Porter, 1 Gray 476, 478, 480 (1854), so long as 
the right is exercised in "an orderly and peaceable manner," id. 
at 478.  In fact, the drafters of art. 19 tracked the language 
of the Pennsylvania Constitution but with the specific addition 
of the clause providing that such assembly shall be done "in an 
orderly and peaceable manner."  Bowie, 130 Yale L.J. at 1707. 
Further clarifying the type of limitations that ensure an 
"orderly and peaceable" assembly, our more recent case law has 
drawn on well-understood First Amendment principles and provided 
for reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.  As we 
stated: 
"States may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, 
place, or manner of protected speech and assembly 'provided 
the restrictions "are justified without reference to the 
content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly 
17 
 
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and 
that they leave open ample alternative channels for 
communication of the information."'" 
 
Desrosiers, 486 Mass. at 390-391, quoting Boston v. Back Bay 
Cultural Ass'n, 418 Mass. 175, 178-179 (1994). 
3.  The application of art. 19 to the civility code.  The 
question then becomes whether the enforcement of the town's 
civility code passes muster under art. 19.  The code provides: 
"All remarks and dialogue in public meetings must be 
respectful and courteous, free of rude, personal, or 
slanderous remarks.  Inappropriate language and/or shouting 
will not be tolerated.  Furthermore, no person may offer 
comment without permission of the [c]hair, and all persons 
shall, at the request of the [c]hair, be silent.  No person 
shall disrupt the proceedings of a meeting." 
 
As explained supra, the text, history, and case law 
surrounding art. 19 provide for the "fullest and freest" 
discussion of public matters, including protection of fierce 
criticism of governmental action and actors, so long as that 
criticism is done in a peaceable and orderly manner and is 
consistent with time, place, and manner restrictions.  Porter, 1 
Gray at 478.  See Desrosiers, 486 Mass. at 390-391.  "Peaceable 
and orderly" is not the same as "respectful and courteous."  
There was nothing respectful or courteous about the public 
assemblies of the revolutionary period.  There was also much 
that was rude and personal, especially when it was directed at 
18 
 
the representatives of the king and the king himself.8  See 
Bowie, 130 Yale L.J. at 1677 ("in London, a columnist called 
Boston's town meetings a 'declaration of war' and criticized 
Boston's leaders for 'working up the populace to such a frenzy 
of rage'"). 
Here, the town expressly provided a place for public 
comment:  the meeting of the board.  The town also set the time, 
after the conclusion of the regular meeting, as was the town's 
right.  Barron presented her grievances at the established time 
and place.9  The town nonetheless then sought to control the 
content of the public comment, which directly implicates and 
restricts the exercise of the art. 19 right of the people to 
request "redress of the wrongs done them, and of the grievances 
 
8 The policy's prohibition on slander raises a different set 
of questions that we need not resolve here.  In Commonwealth v. 
Surridge, 265 Mass. 425, 427 (1929), this court expressly carved 
out slander from protection under art. 19.  However, at least 
under First Amendment principles, slander directed at public 
officials requires actual malice.  See Edwards v. Commonwealth, 
477 Mass. 254, 263 (2017), S.C., 488 Mass. 555 (2021), citing 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-280 (1964). 
 
9 A manner regulation restricts the way in which a speaker 
communicates, i.e., the medium of communication or aspects of 
that medium like the size of signs or the volume of audio.  See 
Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 656 (1984) (plurality 
opinion) (manner regulations include "size and color 
limitations" on photographs, "decibel level restrictions," and 
"size and height limitations on outdoor signs"); Back Bay 
Cultural Ass'n, 418 Mass. at 183 (ban on "forms of 
entertainment" that "create the type of noise the city 
legitimately seeks to eliminate" would be permissible).  We are 
not presented with disputed manner restrictions in the instant 
case. 
19 
 
they suffer."10  The content sought to be prohibited -– 
discourteous, rude, disrespectful, or personal speech about 
government officials and governmental actions -- is clearly 
protected by art. 19, and thus the prohibition is impermissible.  
In sum, the town's civility code is contradicted by the letter 
and purpose of art. 19.11 
 
10 This is not a case in which the public meeting was 
limited to a particular item or items.  Although that would be 
content based, in order to function efficiently, towns must be 
able to hold public meetings limited to a particular subject 
without violating art. 19, so long as the town provides other 
opportunities to exercise this right, as it did in the instant 
case.  Cf. Madison Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin 
Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 175 n.8 (1976) 
("Plainly, public bodies may confine their meetings to specified 
subject matter and may hold nonpublic sessions to transact 
business"). 
 
11 Given the detailed and emphatic text, history, and case 
law, there is no reason to conclude that the State 
constitutional right protected by art. 19 would be any less 
protective than the right of assembly protected by the First 
Amendment.  Throughout most of its history, the right of 
assembly clause in the First Amendment, although not interpreted 
as being "identical" to the right of free speech, has not been 
given much independent significance.  See National Ass'n for the 
Advancement of Colored People v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 
U.S. 886, 911-912 (1982); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 
(1945) (rights to freedom of speech, assembly, and press, 
"though not identical, are inseparable").  See also Blackhawk, 
Lobbying and the Petition Clause, 68 Stan. L. Rev. 1131 (2016); 
Bowie, 130 Yale L.J. at 1655; El-Haj, The Neglected Right of 
Assembly, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 543 (2009); Inazu, The Forgotten 
Freedom of Assembly, 84 Tul. L. Rev. 565, 570 (2010).  Although 
the Supreme Court's more recent decision in Duryea v. Guarneri, 
564 U.S. 379, 394 (2011), somewhat reinvigorated the provision, 
Blackhawk, supra at 1181, the vigor of art. 19 is unquestionable 
as reflected in its text, history, and case law.  Indeed, the 
clear thrust of that text, history, and case law interpreting 
art. 19 compels the conclusion that the town's civility code is 
unconstitutional. 
20 
 
4.  Article 16.  Assuming that the request for declaratory 
relief also includes a claim based on art. 16, as well as art. 
19, we also conclude that art. 16 is violated. 
In their request for declaratory relief, the plaintiffs 
state: 
"The [c]ourt should declare that the [d]efendants may not 
regulate protected speech during any time period designated 
for speech by the public based on the content of the 
message of the speaker, the view point of the speaker, or 
their desire to avoid criticism, ensure 'proper decorum', 
or avoid 'personal' or derogatory or even defamatory 
statements, unless such regulation is the least restrictive 
means necessary to achieve a compelling government 
interest." 
 
Our cases interpreting art. 16 clearly support this request 
for relief.  They also do so without any need to survey, as the 
parties do, the contested Federal case law distinguishing 
limited and designated public forums and the different standards 
of review applicable to these forums under the First Amendment.  
As this court expressly stated in Walker v. Georgetown Hous. 
Auth., 424 Mass. 671, 675 (1997):  "We need not decide whether 
we would find the [United States] Supreme Court's public, 
nonpublic, and limited public forum classifications instructive 
in resolving free speech rights under our Declaration of Rights" 
in the instant case.  Indeed, "we need not enter that fray 
because, under our Declaration of Rights, the applicable 
standard for content-based restrictions on political speech is 
clearly strict scrutiny."  Commonwealth v. Lucas, 472 Mass. 387, 
21 
 
397 (2015).  See Massachusetts Coalition for the Homeless v. 
Fall River, 486 Mass. 437, 441-442 (2020) (holding that strict 
scrutiny applies to content-based regulation of protected 
speech); Bachrach v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 382 Mass. 
268, 276 (1981) ("As a substantial restriction of political 
expression and association . . . the legislation at bar should 
attract 'strict scrutiny'").12 
There is no question that this civility code is directed at 
political speech, as it regulates speech in a public comment 
session of a meeting of the board, and that it is content based, 
as it requires us to examine what was said.  See Opinion of the 
Justices, 436 Mass. 1201, 1206 (2002) ("if the applicability of 
 
12 As we apply strict scrutiny here, the protection provided 
by the State Constitution is at least as great if not greater 
than the protection provided by the First Amendment for content-
based governmental restrictions.  As noted supra, we are not 
confronted with a public meeting limited to a particular item or 
items.  We recognize that even though a public meeting limited 
to a particular purpose may require a content-based restriction 
on comments, government must be able to hold such meetings to 
function efficiently.  Whether the government's right to hold 
such meetings satisfies strict scrutiny or some lesser standard 
under art. 16, we need not decide.  Cf. Rowe v. Cocoa, 358 F.3d 
800, 803 (11th Cir. 2004) ("There is a significant governmental 
interest in conducting orderly, efficient meetings of public 
bodies," which may be done via "confin[ing] their meetings to 
specified subject matter"); White v. Norwalk, 900 F.2d 1421, 
1425 (9th Cir. 1990) ("the Council does not violate the first 
amendment when it restricts public speakers to the subject at 
hand"); Smith vs. Middletown, U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 3:09-CV-1431 
(D. Conn. Sept. 1, 2011), aff'd sub nom. Smith v. Santangelo, 
518 Fed. Appx. 16 (2d Cir. 2013) ("The restriction of public 
comment to items on the agenda is also reasonable because it 
. . . facilitate[s] the official business of the Council"). 
22 
 
the bill's requirements can only be determined by reviewing the 
contents of the proposed expression, the bill is a content-based 
regulation of speech").  As such, it must withstand strict 
scrutiny, which means it must be "both 'necessary to serve a 
compelling [S]tate interest and . . . narrowly drawn to achieve 
that end.'"  Lucas, 472 Mass. at 398, quoting Opinion of the 
Justices, supra.  It is neither.  Although civility can and 
should be encouraged in political discourse, it cannot be 
required.  In this country, we have never concluded that there 
is a compelling need to mandate that political discourse with 
those with whom we strongly disagree be courteous and 
respectful.  Rather, we have concluded that political speech 
must remain "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."  Van Liew v. 
Stansfield, 474 Mass. 31, 39 (2016), quoting New York Times Co. 
v. Sullivan, 374 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).  This civility code is 
also drafted with an extraordinarily broad brush.  It is 
certainly not narrowly tailored. 
Finally, the policy's requirement that the speech directed 
at government officials "be respectful and courteous, [and] free 
of rude . . . remarks" appears to cross the line into viewpoint 
discrimination:  allowing lavish praise but disallowing harsh 
criticism of government officials.13  As the Supreme Court has 
 
13 At the same time, as between members of the public taking 
opposite positions, a requirement that the comments be 
respectful and courteous appears not to be viewpoint based, but 
23 
 
explained, "[w]hen the government targets not subject matter, 
but particular views taken by speakers on a subject, the 
violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant."  
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 
829 (1995).  See Shurtleff v. Boston, 142 S. Ct. 1583, 1587 
(2022) ("When the government encourages diverse expression -- 
say, by creating a forum for debate -- the [right to free 
speech] prevents it from discriminating against speakers based 
on their viewpoint").  Although we have not been required to 
precisely define what constitutes viewpoint discrimination in 
our case law, art. 16, like the First Amendment, certainly does 
not permit viewpoint discrimination.  See Roman v. Trustees of 
Tufts College, 461 Mass. 707, 716-717 (2012); Opinion of the 
Justices, 430 Mass. 1205, 1209 (2000).14 
A provision "that public officials [can] be praised but not 
condemned" is "the essence of viewpoint discrimination."  Matal 
v. Tam, 582 U.S. 218, 249 (2017) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
Speech that politely praises public officials or their actions 
is allowed by the policy, but speech that rudely or 
 
rather only content based.  An example would be if a town 
official told both sides debating a tax increase to fully 
express their views but to do so courteously.  Although still 
impermissible, because it is content based, the restriction 
would not be viewpoint based. 
 
14 The same is true for art. 19. 
24 
 
disrespectfully criticizes public officials or their actions is 
not.  This constitutes viewpoint discrimination. 
In sum, this civility code is unconstitutional under art. 
16 as well as art. 19. 
5.  Overbreadth, vagueness, and permissible restrictions.  
In the instant case, we have not been asked, nor should we 
attempt on our own, to separate the unconstitutional from the 
constitutional aspects of the town's civility code.  We conclude 
that it is so overbroad, so vague, and so subject to 
manipulation on its face that it is not salvageable or 
severable.  See Massachusetts Coalition for the Homeless, 486 
Mass. at 447 (statute declared facially invalid under art. 16 in 
its entirety because we discerned an "unacceptable risk of a 
chilling effect"); Lucas, 472 Mass. at 404 (statute declared 
unconstitutional in its entirely because "even under a narrow 
construction, there is a genuine risk that the operation of 
[statute] will cast an unacceptable chill on core political 
speech"). 
This is not to say that restrictions cannot be imposed on 
public comment sessions consistent with arts. 16 and 19.  
Reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions could include 
designating when and where a public comment session may occur, 
how long it might last, the time limits for each person speaking 
25 
 
during the public comment session, and rules preventing speakers 
from disrupting others and removing those who do. 
6.  MCRA claim.  We also have no difficulty concluding that 
the dismissal of the MCRA claim should be reversed.  Taking the 
facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, Kolenda 
"interfere[d]" with Barron's clearly established constitutional 
right under arts. 19 and 16 via "threats, intimidation or 
coercion."  G. L. c. 12, § 11H.  As such, there was a violation 
of the MCRA and no qualified immunity. 
"To establish a claim under the [MCRA], 'a plaintiff must 
prove that (1) the exercise or enjoyment of some constitutional 
or statutory right; (2) has been interfered with, or attempted 
to be interfered with; and (3) such interference was by threats, 
intimidation, or coercion.'"  Glovsky v. Roche Bros. Supermkts., 
Inc., 469 Mass. 752, 762 (2014), quoting Currier v. National Bd. 
of Med. Examiners, 462 Mass. 1, 12 (2012).  In the instant case, 
the video recording shows that, first, Barron complained about 
the open meeting law violations; then, Kolenda accused her of 
slander and said, "[W]e're gonna go ahead and stop the public 
comment session now"; next, Barron said, "[Y]ou need to stop 
being a Hitler"; and finally, Kolenda ended the meeting and the 
audio stopped.  Subsequently, Kolenda stood up and started 
yelling and aggressively pointing at Barron.  The plaintiffs' 
complaint alleges that Kolenda shouted, "You're disgusting," and 
26 
 
threatened to have her "escorted out" of the meeting.  The video 
recording does not show Barron after the end of the audio 
portion. 
Taking the facts, including the video recording, in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiffs, Barron exercised her 
constitutional right under arts. 19 and 16 to address the 
meeting of the board and complain about the open meeting law 
violations.  Her comparison between Kolenda and Hitler was, at 
least in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, simply 
hyperbole, describing Kolenda as behaving in a dictatorial 
manner, that is, domineering or authoritarian.  Although a 
comparison to Hitler is certainly rude and insulting, it is 
still speech protected by art. 16.15 
 
15 We note that personally insulting comments may rise to 
the level of fighting words, that is, "face-to-face personal 
insults that are so personally abusive that they are plainly 
likely to provoke a violent reaction and cause a breach of the 
peace," which are not protected speech.  O'Brien v. Borowski, 
461 Mass. 415, 423 (2012).  See also Cohen v. California, 403 
U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (fighting words are "personally abusive 
epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as 
a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke 
violent reaction").  We have also explained that "the fighting 
words exception [to free speech] is 'an extremely narrow one.'"  
O'Brien, supra, quoting Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 212 
(3d Cir. 2003).  We further emphasize that elected officials are 
expected to be able to respond to insulting comments about their 
job performance without violence.  See Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 
475 Mass. 554, 562 (2016) ("personal insults and allegations 
concerning [selectman's] alleged criminal past" were 
"constitutionally protected political speech" because "central 
thrust is criticism of him as a selectman").  Although not 
presented in the instant case, we recognize that fighting words 
from one public speaker may trigger a disturbance from another 
27 
 
In addition, the plaintiffs' allegations plausibly suggest 
that Barron's rights were interfered with via threats, 
intimidation, or coercion.  Kolenda's response is not fully 
captured by the video recording, but, accepting the plaintiffs' 
account as true, Kolenda told Barron to stop speaking, started 
screaming at her, and threatened to have her removed from the 
meeting in response to her protected speech.  If this is proved 
at trial, she could establish a violation of the MCRA.  See 
Batchelder v. Allied Stores Corp., 393 Mass. 819, 823 (1985) 
("sufficient intimidation or coercion" where "security officer 
ordered [plaintiff] to stop soliciting and distributing his 
political handbills"); Sarvis v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust 
Co., 47 Mass. App. Ct. 86, 93 (1999) (third element of MCRA 
satisfied where "defendants attempted to interfere with the 
plaintiffs' right to a summary process hearing by threatening 
them with arrest and then bringing about their arrests"). 
On the facts alleged, Kolenda is also not entitled to 
qualified immunity.  As we have explained:  "[G]overnment 
officials performing discretionary functions, generally are 
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their 
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
 
member of the public, which may require action by government 
officials. 
28 
 
known."  LaChance v. Commissioner of Correction, 463 Mass. 767, 
777 (2012), S.C., 475 Mass. 757 (2016), quoting Rodriques v. 
Furtado, 410 Mass. 878, 882 (1991).  More specifically, "[a] 
right is only clearly established if, at the time of the alleged 
violation, 'the contours of the right allegedly violated [were] 
sufficiently definite so that a reasonable official would 
appreciate that the conduct in question was unlawful.'"  
LaChance, supra, quoting Longval v. Commissioner of Correction, 
448 Mass. 412, 419 (2007).  Nevertheless, "it is not necessary 
for the courts to have previously considered a particular 
situation identical to the one faced by the government 
official."  Caron v. Silvia, 32 Mass. App. Ct. 271, 273 (1992).  
"It is enough, rather, that there existed case law sufficient to 
clearly establish that, if a court were presented with such a 
situation, the court would find that the plaintiff's rights were 
violated."  Id., quoting Hall v. Ochs, 817 F.2d 920, 925 (1st 
Cir. 1987).  In the instant case, the contours of the rights are 
sufficiently clear, and a reasonable public official would 
understand that his response to the exercise of those rights was 
unlawful. 
As discussed supra, the "full and free" discussion in town 
meetings protected by art. 19 has a long and distinguished 
history in Massachusetts.  Fuller, 224 Mass. at 178.  It is also 
well established that restrictions on the content of political 
29 
 
speech must be "necessary to serve a compelling [S]tate interest 
and . . . narrowly drawn to achieve that end" to satisfy the 
requirements of art. 16, Opinion of the Justices, 436 Mass. at 
1206, and that viewpoint discrimination is absolutely 
prohibited, Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829. 
At a public comment session in a meeting of the board, a 
resident of the town thus clearly has the right to accurately 
complain about violations of law committed by town officials and 
object to other town actions, including its spending practices, 
and to express her views vehemently, critically, and personally 
to the government officials involved.  Such a right is clearly 
protected by art. 19 as well as art. 16 for the reasons 
discussed supra.  When a government official responds to a 
resident's exercise of those rights by accusing her of 
slandering the board, screaming at her, and threatening her 
physical removal, it should be clear to him that his conduct is 
unlawful.  Thus, there is no basis for qualified immunity. 
Conclusion.  The order of judgment on the pleadings is 
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion, including entry of a judgment 
declaring that the town's public comment policy is 
unconstitutional. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.