Title: Coley v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 11, 2005
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: October 18, 2005

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
LEROY COLEY,  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 11, 2005 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for Kent County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
)  Cr. ID. No. 9804018111 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  September 13, 2005 
Decided:  October 18, 2005 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, and JACOBS, Justices. 
O R D E R 
This 18th day of October 2005, it appears to the Court that: 
1. 
In this case we are asked to determine whether a driver of a vehicle 
can be removed from his vehicle and lawfully searched when a police officer, 
among other things,1 smells burnt marijuana emanating from a vehicle.  While an 
argument is made that this latter factor alone justifies a reasonable suspicion that 
the driver was armed and presently dangerous, the Court need not address that 
issue.  The officer here had authority to arrest the driver for a drug offense 
                                                 
1  
The officer also witnessed the driver of the vehicle, in the early morning hours with two 
passengers, behaving nervously upon seeing the police car.  The driver slowed his vehicle down 
25 miles per hour below the speed limit and made two abrupt lane changes.  Further, the  driver 
produced no identification when asked. 
 
2
pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 1904 because a person would have “reason to believe” or 
“probable cause” that a drug crime was committed.  Since the officer had probable 
cause to arrest the defendant, the search of the defendant immediately before his 
arrest can be upheld as a valid search incident to arrest.  
2. 
On April 24, 1998, Officer Berna, while driving on Route 13 in 
Dover, passed a vehicle driven by the defendant, Leroy Coley.  Berna noticed 
Coley and the two other occupants behaving nervously when they saw Berna’s 
police car.  Berna observed Coley slowing his vehicle to 25 miles per hour below 
the posted speed limit,2 and the occupants moving around in the vehicle.  After 
these observations, Berna himself slowed down and pulled behind Coley.   
3. 
While following Coley, Berna observed Coley make two abrupt lane 
changes without first determining if the lanes were clear.  Berna then decided to 
pull Coley over to issue a citation for improperly changing lanes. 
4. 
Berna, when approaching the vehicle, smelled an odor of burnt 
marijuana.  Berna asked Coley for his driver’s license.  Coley was unable to 
produce a license or any other form of identification.  Berna then asked Coley to 
step out of the vehicle, and performed a pat-down search of Coley.  Berna testified 
that he conducted the pat-down search because he feared that Coley was armed.  
                                                 
2  
Berna observed the car going approximately 20 miles per hour.  The posted speed limit 
was 45 miles per hour. 
 
3
During the pat-down search, a piece of crack cocaine fell from Coley’s pant leg.  
Berna then arrested Coley. 
5. 
Before trial, Coley moved to suppress the cocaine, claiming that it 
was seized during a search unsupported by probable cause to believe Coley was or 
had recently committed a crime.  The Superior Court judge denied the motion.  A 
jury then convicted Coley of possession with intent to deliver a narcotic, 
maintaining a vehicle for keeping controlled substances, and improperly changing 
lanes.  Coley appealed. 
 
6. 
A warrantless search, to be valid, must fall within a recognized 
exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.3  A search 
incident to an arrest is a recognized exception.4  The United States Supreme Court 
justified the search incident to arrest exception when it stated that “[a] custodial 
arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the 
Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest 
requires no additional justification … it is the fact of the lawful arrest which 
establishes the authority to search.”5  Generally, a search incident to an arrest 
follows the valid arrest.  This Court, however, following the United States 
                                                 
3   
See Ortiz v. State, 2004 Del. LEXIS 535 (Del. 2004). 
 
4  
See Id.  See also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
 
5  
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). 
 
 
4
Supreme Court6 stated, “where the arrest and search are nearly contemporaneous, 
the search may precede the arrest, so long as the police do not use the search to 
establish probable cause for the arrest.”7  
 
7. 
Here, it is undisputed that Berna arrested Coley immediately 
following the search or pat-down. The contemporaneity requirement, therefore, has 
been satisfied.  Berna believed he was conducting a Terry frisk for fear of his 
safety, but that has no bearing on the whether the search may be upheld as a search 
incident to arrest.  The United States Supreme Court  has stated:  
 
[T]he fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is 
 
hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the 
 
officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the 
 
circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.8  
 
Thus, the only issue remaining is whether, under the circumstances, Berna had 
probable cause to arrest Coley immediately before the search.9 
 
8. 
Under 11 Del. C. § 1904, a warrantless arrest by a police officer is 
lawful whenever the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be 
                                                 
6  
See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U. S. 98, 111 (1980). 
 
7  
Ortiz, 2004 Del. LEXIS 535 at *8 .  
 
8  
Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978). 
 
9  
Under 11 Del. C. § 1904(a)(1), an arrest by a peace officer without a warrant for a 
misdemeanor is lawful whenever the officer has reasonable ground to believe that the person to 
be arrested has committed a misdemeanor in the officer's presence.  The words “reasonable 
grounds to believe” have been construed to mean “probable cause.” See Norwood v. State, 813 
A.2d 1141 (Del. 2003). 
 
 
5
arrested has committed a felony or misdemeanor.  This Court has held that 
"'reasonable ground to believe' is . . . the legal equivalent of 'probable cause' and 
should be accorded the same meaning."10 The requisite analysis in determining the 
sufficiency of probable cause for a warrantless arrest is determined according to a 
"totality of the circumstances" test.11  In determining whether probable cause 
existed under the totality of the circumstances, this Court has stated: 
 
 
The validity of [a warrantless] arrest depends upon:  whether, at the 
 
moment the arrest was made, the officers had probable cause to  
make  it -- 
 
whether at that moment the facts and circumstances within their 
 
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information  
were 
 
sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that [the defendant] had 
 
committed or was committing an offense.12 
 
 
9. 
Applying these principles, Berna had probable cause to arrest Coley 
for a drug offense.  Some courts have found probable cause to arrest based on the 
mere “smell” of burnt marijuana emanating from a suspect’s vehicle.13  Here, 
however, the totality of the circumstances involved more than the mere “smell” of 
burnt marijuana.  In addition to smelling burnt marijuana, Berna witnessed Coley 
                                                 
10  
Thompson v. State, 539 A.2d 1052, 1055 (Del. 1988). 
 
11  
 Id. (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983)). 
 
12  
Id. 
 
13  
See People v. Chestnut, 351 N.Y.S.2d 26 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974), order aff’d on other 
grounds, 335 N.E.2d 865 (N.Y. 1975); Blake v. State, 772 So. 2d 1200 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000); 
Dixon v. State, 343 So. 2d 1345 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Sebastian v. State, 726 N.E.2d 827 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2000). 
 
6
and his passengers’ nervous behavior, Coley slowing his vehicle to 20 miles per 
hour below the posted speed limit, and Coley making two abrupt lane changes.  
Further, when asked for identification, Coley produced nothing.  These factors, 
taken together, would lead a prudent person to believe that a drug offense was 
being committed.  Therefore, the totality of the circumstances suggest that Berna 
had probable cause to believe that Coley was committing a crime and the search 
immediately before Coley’s arrest was, therefore, valid as a search incident to an 
arrest. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_/s/Myron T.Steele______________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice