Title: Timothy Joel Thomas v. Laura Wells, as guardian ad litem and next friend of M.A., a minor
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1150119
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: November 3, 2017

rel:  November 3, 2017
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2017-2018
____________________
1150118
____________________
Timothy Joel Thomas
v.
Randell Heard and Donna Heard
Appeal from Geneva Circuit Court
(CV-14-900015)
____________________
1150119
____________________
Timothy Joel Thomas
v.
Laura Wells, as guardian ad litem and next friend of M.A., a
minor
Appeal from Geneva Circuit Court
(CV-13-900145)
On Return to Remand
PER CURIAM.
Timothy Joel Thomas appealed from judgments entered in
favor of Randell Heard and Donna Heard and in favor of Laura
Wells, as guardian ad litem and next friend of M.A., a minor. 
The Heards and Wells had separately sued Thomas alleging
negligence and wantonness and seeking to recover damages for
injuries the Heards and M.A. had suffered as the result of an
automobile accident.  A jury returned verdicts in favor of
Randell Heard, awarding compensatory damages of $850,000 and
punitive damages of $750,000; in favor of Donna Heard,
awarding 
compensatory 
damages 
of 
$450,000 
and 
punitive 
damages
of $750,000; and in favor of Wells, awarding compensatory
damages of $500,000 and punitive damages of $500,000.  The
trial court entered judgments on the jury's verdicts.  Thomas
argued that the jury's punitive-damages awards were excessive
under the guideposts set out by the United States Supreme
Court in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559
(1996), and the factors set out by this Court in Hammond v.
City of Gadsden, 493 So. 2d 1374 (Ala. 1986), and Green Oil
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1150118, 1150119
Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218 (Ala. 1989), and requested a
remittitur.  The trial court denied Thomas's request for a
remittitur without explaining its reasoning for doing so.
On appeal, this Court affirmed the judgments as to the
compensatory-damages awards but remanded the cases with
instructions for the trial court to enter orders in compliance
with Hammond, 493 So. 2d at 1379 ("[I]t is not only
appropriate, but indeed our duty, to require the trial courts
to reflect in the record the reasons for interfering with a
jury verdict, or refusing to do so, on grounds of
excessiveness of the [punitive] damages.").  See Thomas v.
Heard, [Ms. 1150118, March 24, 2017] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala.
2017).  Pursuant to our instructions, the trial court, on May
24, 2017, after conducting a Hammond/Green Oil hearing,
entered identical orders in both cases reaffirming the
punitive-damages awards.  The trial court made its return to
this Court.  The only issue now before this Court is whether
the 
punitive-damages 
awards 
are, 
as 
Thomas contends,
excessive.  For the reasons given, we conclude that they are
not.
Standard of Review
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1150118, 1150119
This Court reviews de novo an award of punitive damages. 
National Ins. Ass'n v. Sockwell, 829 So. 2d 111, 135 (Ala.
2002).
Discussion
In reviewing a punitive-damages award, we apply the
factors outlined in Green Oil, supra, and Hammond, supra,
within the guideposts set out in Gore, supra, as restated in
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538
U.S. 408 (2003).
The 
Gore 
guideposts 
are: 
"(1) 
the 
degree 
of
reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct; (2) the
disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the
plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the
difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury
and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable
cases."  State Farm, 538 U.S. at 418 (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at
575). The Hammond/Green Oil factors are:
"'(1) the reprehensibility of [the defendant's]
conduct; 
(2) 
the 
relationship 
of 
the
punitive-damages award to the harm that actually
occurred, or is likely to occur, from [the
defendant's] conduct; (3) [the defendant's] profit
from 
[his] 
misconduct; 
(4) 
[the 
defendant's]
financial position; (5) the cost to [the plaintiff]
of the litigation; (6) whether [the defendant] has
4
1150118, 1150119
been subject to criminal sanctions for similar
conduct; and (7) other civil actions [the defendant]
has been involved in arising out of similar
conduct.'"
Ross v. Rosen–Rager, 67 So. 3d 29, 41–42 (Ala. 2010) (quoting
Shiv–Ram, Inc. v. McCaleb, 892 So. 2d 299, 317 (Ala.
2003)(paraphrasing the Hammond/Green Oil factors)).
In the present case, the trial court stated in its orders
denying Thomas's motion for a remittitur: 
"The parties agreed that there were basically
three Hammond issues that applied to this case and
one was not in dispute.  The parties agreed that the
difference between compensatory and punitive damages
awarded 
by 
the 
jury 
was 
not 
a 
significant
difference, and therefore, this factor is an
indicator that the punitive damage[s] award was
reasonable.
"The two issues counsel focused on in oral
argument were:
"1) The degree of reprehensibility of
the defendant's conduct.
"2) The financial position of the
defendant."
The trial court considered all the Gore and Hammond/Green Oil
factors but determined that only three were applicable. 
Thomas has not disputed this aspect of the trial court's
orders.  In making his argument that the punitive-damages
awards should be remitted, Thomas addresses only the factors
5
1150118, 1150119
concerning the degree of reprehensibility of his conduct and
his financial position.  Accordingly, we will limit our
analysis to the factors identified by the trial court as
applicable in determining whether the awards of punitive
damages were reasonable; nevertheless, our conclusion that no
remittitur is warranted is ultimately based upon a review of
all the relevant factors.  See CNH America, LLC v. Ligon
Capital, LLC, 160 So. 3d 1195, 1211 (Ala. 2013)(setting forth
analysis concerning only those Gore and Hammond/Green Oil
factors addressed by the appellant).
First, this Court has recognized that the degree of
reprehensibility of a defendant's conduct "is the single most
important factor in the remittitur analysis."  
Pensacola Motor
Sales, Inc. v. Daphne Auto., LLC, 155 So. 3d 930, 949 (Ala.
2013)(citing BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,
576 (1996)).  The trial court determined that Thomas's conduct
was "extremely reprehensible" because of his voluntary
intoxication.  As noted in our opinion on original submission,
there is a presumption under Alabama law that a person will
not consciously do something that will cause himself or
herself harm.  See Ex parte Essary, 992 So. 2d 5, 12 (Ala.
6
1150118, 1150119
2007)(citing Griffin Lumber Co. v. Harper, 252 Ala. 93, 95, 39
So. 2d 399, 401 (1949)).  However, this self-preservation
presumption may be rebutted by, among other things, evidence
indicating that the actor did not have possession of his or
her normal faculties such that he or she did not appreciate
the danger the actor's actions posed to himself or herself. 
Id.  In the present case, clear and convincing evidence was
presented 
that 
indicated 
that 
Thomas 
was 
voluntarily
intoxicated to the point that he could not appreciate the
danger his actions posed to himself; the self-preservation
presumption in favor of Thomas was rebutted by the clear and
convincing evidence of Thomas's voluntary intoxication
presented by the Heards and Wells.1  Thomas drove his vehicle,
with a minor as a passenger, while he was voluntarily
intoxicated to the point that he could not appreciate the
1Thomas disagrees with this interpretation of the
evidence.  Essentially, Thomas is simply reasserting his
argument on original submission that the Heards and Wells
failed to present clear and convincing evidence that his
conduct was wanton.  Those arguments were considered and
addressed on original submission and present nothing new for
our consideration at this point in the proceedings.  Other
than arguing that there is no clear and convincing evidence of
his wantonness, Thomas has presented no argument challenging
the trial court's conclusion that his conduct was extremely
reprehensible.
7
1150118, 1150119
danger to which this activity exposed him and all those around
him.  This conduct resulted in serious injuries to Thomas and
three other people.  
Thomas's conduct evinces indifference and
a reckless disregard for the health and safety of others.  See
Gore, 
517 
U.S. 
at 
576 
(noting, 
in 
considering 
the
reprehensibility factor, that the defendant's conduct in that
case "evinced no indifference to or reckless disregard for the
health and safety of others").  Accordingly, the trial court
properly found that Thomas's conduct was reprehensible; this
factor weighs against remittitur of the punitive-damages
awards.
Next, we note that the trial court determined that the
ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages awarded in
these cases weighs against remittitur.  We agree.  Concerning
this factor, this Court stated in Shiv-Ram, Inc. v. McCaleb,
892 So. 2d 299, 317 (Ala. 2003):
"Under [BMW of North America, Inc. v.] Gore, 517
U.S. [559,] 575, 116 S. Ct. 1589 [(1996)], and
[State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.]
Campbell, 538 U.S. [408,] 419, 123 S. Ct. [1513,]
1521 [(2003)], we presume that [the plaintiff] has
been 
made 
whole 
for 
injuries 
by 
the
compensatory-damages award, but we do not consider
that the ratio between the punitive-damages award
and the compensatory-damages award of slightly less
than three to one is unreasonable. See AutoZone[,
8
1150118, 1150119
Inc. v. Leonard], 812 So. 2d [1179,] 1187 [(Ala.
2001)], approving a ratio of punitive damages to
compensatory damages of 3.7:1, despite the fact that
all of the $75,000 compensatory-damages award in
excess of $3,000 necessarily related to mental
anguish. ... Subsequently, in Campbell, the United
States Supreme Court observed that, based on prior
caselaw, in practice few awards exceeding to a
significant degree a single-digit ratio between
punitive and compensatory damages would satisfy due
process and acknowledged that in both Gore and
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499
U.S. 1, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 113 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1991), it
had approved a 4:1 ratio."
In the present case, the jury awarded Randell $850,000 in
compensatory damages and $750,000 in punitive damages; the
ratio of punitive to compensatory damages for Randell is
0.88:1.  The jury awarded Donna $450,000 in compensatory
damages and $750,000 in punitive damages; the ratio of
punitive to compensatory damages for Donna is 1.67:1.  The
jury awarded Wells $500,000 in compensatory damages and
$500,000 in punitive damages; the ratio of punitive to
compensatory damages for Wells is 1:1.  Accordingly, we find
the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages to be
reasonable for all three plaintiffs.
Lastly, the trial court determined that "the financial
condition of [Thomas] was not a factor that diminished the
appropriateness of the punitive damages awarded."  After this
9
1150118, 1150119
Court remanded the cases for the trial court to enter orders
consistent with Hammond, Thomas filed a motion for a
remittitur.  Thomas attached to his motion his own affidavit,
but the affidavit was not signed by Thomas or notarized. 
Thomas's unsigned affidavit states that Thomas is currently
unemployed, that he has not been employed since the accident,
that he has no current source of income, no assets, and no
money in his checking account, and that he is unable to
satisfy any portion of the judgments entered against him.  The
Heards filed a motion to strike Thomas's affidavit on the
basis that Thomas had failed to sign the affidavit.
In its orders on remand denying Thomas's motion for a
remittitur, the trial court refused to consider not only the
unsigned affidavit, but also all testimony offered by Thomas. 
The trial court held that Thomas "was not a credible witness." 
(Emphasis in original.)  The trial court further stated:
"In oral argument before this court [Thomas's]
counsel made the statement that [Thomas's] affidavit
can be considered by the court as evidence in the
case and proof of [Thomas's] financial condition,
and verification was not needed. Plaintiffs urged
[Thomas's] affidavit to be struck as not timely
filed; however, it really doesn’t matter. If the
witness on the affidavit is found not to be a
credible witness by the court, then verification of
that information would be necessary to convince the
10
1150118, 1150119
court that the contents are true. Such was not
provided, and, therefore, since [Thomas] is not
credible, the court finds no evidence of [Thomas's]
true financial condition, and, thus, concludes that
the financial condition of [Thomas] was not a factor
that diminished the appropriateness of the punitive
damages awarded."
We note that the trial court did not strike Thomas's
affidavit, as the Heards requested.  Instead, the trial court
simply found that Thomas was not a credible witness and that
his testimony, in any form, was not credible.  In Cameron v.
State, 508 So. 2d 304, 306 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987), the Court
of Criminal Appeals stated that a trial court's finding that
a witness "was not a credible witness" 
"is binding on the court which 'can neither pass
judgment on the possible truthfulness or falsity of
testimony, ... nor on the credibility of witnesses.'
Collins v. State, 412 So. 2d 845, 846 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1982) (citations omitted). 'When there is no
showing to the contrary, the presumption is always
in favor of correct action on the part of the trial
judge.' Ballard v. State, 236 Ala. 541, 542, 184 So.
260 (1938)."
Thomas makes no argument in his brief before this Court
concerning the trial court's finding that he was not a
credible witness.  Instead, ignoring that portion of the trial
court's orders, Thomas simply asserts that he offered
testimony concerning his financial position.  Because Thomas
11
1150118, 1150119
has not challenged the trial court's finding that he was not
a credible witness, we will not consider this testimony.  We
further note, although not argued by Thomas, that the trial
court did not err in refusing to give any weight to Thomas's
unsworn affidavit testimony.  In State Home 
Builders Licensure
Board v. Stephens, 756 So. 2d 878, 879 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998),
the Court of Civil Appeals noted that an affidavit unsigned by
the affiant "does not constitute admissible evidence."
Accordingly, there is essentially no evidence indicating
Thomas's financial position.  As a result, this factor weighs
neither in favor of nor against a finding that the punitive-
damages awards were excessive.
Conclusion
Having considered the trial court's remand orders in
light of the Gore and Hammond/Green Oil factors, we conclude
that no remittitur is needed and that the punitive-damages
awards returned by the jury are appropriate and do not
infringe upon Thomas's due-process rights.
1150118 -- AFFIRMED.
1150119 -- AFFIRMED.
Parker, Main, and Wise, JJ., concur.
12
1150118, 1150119
Shaw and Bryan, JJ., concur in the result.
Stuart, C.J., and Bolin, Murdock, and Sellers, JJ.,
dissent.
13
1150118, 1150119
MURDOCK, Justice (dissenting).
I dissent for the same reasons I dissented from the
opinion issued on March 24, 2017, remanding these cases for
the 
trial 
court 
to 
revisit 
the 
remittitur 
issue. 
Specifically, I did not think then that there was sufficient
evidence to allow a jury to find that wantonness on the part
of Timothy Joel Thomas had been "clearly and convincingly"
established.  The orders of the trial court on remand do not
address the several deficiencies in the evidence of 
wantonness
that I pointed out in my special writing to the March 24,
2017, opinion.
14