Title: Commonwealth v. Chism
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11939
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: January 4, 2017

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-11939 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  PHILIP CHISM & others.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 7, 2016. - January 4, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Botsford, Hines, Gaziano, & Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Impoundment.  Fair Trial.  Evidence, Videotape.  Public Records.  
Constitutional Law, Impoundment order, Fair trial.  
Practice, Criminal, Impoundment order, Motion to suppress, 
Record, Fair trial.  Uniform Rules on Impoundment 
Procedure. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on February 6, 2015. 
 
 
The case was heard by Duffly, J. 
 
 
 
Jonathan M. Albano (Emma D. Hall with him) for Boston Globe 
Media Partners, LLC. 
 
Patrick Levin, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
the defendant. 
 
Zachary C. Kleinsasser, for Eagle Tribune Publishing 
Company, Inc., was present but did not argue. 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  The issue on appeal is whether a Superior 
Court judge committed an error of law or abused his discretion 
                                                          
 
 
1 Boston Globe Media Partners, LLC, and Eagle Tribune 
Publishing Company, Inc., interveners. 
2 
 
 
in denying a defendant's motion to impound a video recording and 
transcript of a police interview with the defendant that was the 
subject of a motion to suppress and that was subsequently 
suppressed.  We conclude that the judge applied the correct 
legal standard in deciding that motion.  We also conclude that, 
where the judge considered both the presumption of public access 
to judicial records and the defendant's right to a trial decided 
by a fair and impartial jury, and where he subsequently forbade 
the duplication of the video recording and transcript, the judge 
did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion. 
 
Background.  In the early evening of October 22, 2013, the 
defendant's mother informed the Danvers police department that 
the defendant, who was fourteen years old at the time, was 
missing.  Shortly after midnight on October 23, a Danvers police 
officer located the defendant walking on a road in Topsfield and 
transported him to the Topsfield police station, where the 
backpack he had been carrying was inventoried and he was briefly 
questioned by the police.  The defendant was then transported to 
the Danvers police station, where, in the presence of his 
mother, he was interviewed at approximately 2:30 A.M. by a State 
trooper and a Danvers police sergeant.  The entire interview was 
video recorded.  During this interview, the defendant admitted 
that he had killed Colleen Ritzer (victim), a teacher at Danvers 
3 
 
 
High School, and described the killing and the removal of her 
body from the school bathroom where she was killed. 
 
A grand jury returned indictments in November, 2013, 
charging the defendant, among other crimes, with murder in the 
first degree.  In December, 2014, the defendant filed a motion 
to suppress the statements he made at the Topsfield and Danvers 
police stations, claiming, among other grounds, that the 
defendant did not knowingly and intelligently waive the Miranda 
rights and that the statements were not made voluntarily.  On 
January 5, 2015, the defendant filed a motion to impound "the 
contents of the videotaped interrogation of the juvenile and the 
transcript of that interview, should either or both be entered 
into evidence as exhibits in the course of the hearing on the 
motion to suppress."  The third-party interveners, Boston Globe 
Media Partners, LLC (publisher of the Boston Globe), and Eagle 
Tribune Publishing Company (publisher of the Salem News and the 
Eagle Tribune), opposed the motion to impound. 
 
After two of the four days of hearings on the motion to 
suppress, the judge heard argument on the motion to impound on 
January 20 and 21, 2015.  At this time, the videotape recording 
of the defendant's interview at the Danvers police station had 
been admitted in evidence at the suppression hearing and the 
transcript of that interview had been marked for identification, 
but the recording had not been played in open court and neither 
4 
 
 
the recording nor the transcript had been made publicly 
available.  The judge orally denied the motion to impound from 
the bench, and issued a written memorandum of decision and order 
on January 23, 2015. 
 
The judge recognized that the exhibits the defendant moved 
to impound, having been entered in evidence at the suppression 
hearing, are judicial records.  Quoting Commonwealth v. George 
W. Prescott Publ. Co., 463 Mass. 258, 262 (2012), and The 
Republican Co. v. Appeals Court, 442 Mass. 218, 222 (2004), he 
noted that judicial records "are presumptively available to the 
public" under the "common-law right of access to judicial 
records."  The judge declared that the public's right to 
understand his decision on the defendant's motion to suppress 
statements, a decision he had not yet made, "is of 
constitutional dimension."  Because the voluntariness of the 
statements was at issue and the defendant's statements "are 
probative concerning the issue of voluntariness," the judge 
found that his decision "will inevitably involve an in-depth 
discussion of the statements the defendant seeks to suppress."2  
The judge declared: 
                                                          
 
 
2 In his findings of fact and rulings of law on the 
defendant's motion to suppress, issued in March, 2015, the judge 
stated that he had "assiduously reviewed the video [recording] 
of the defendant's statement on numerous occasions."  The judge 
allowed the motion in part and denied it in part.  He allowed 
5 
 
 
"[I]f the motion to impound were allowed, the court would 
be left with two unsatisfactory options:  the court could 
hear argument on the important issue of whether the 
Commonwealth has met its burden of proving voluntariness 
beyond a reasonable doubt at side-bar and impound the 
record of that portion of the argument; alternatively, the 
court would be forced to speak in such cryptic terms that 
it would impair a robust discussion and leave the public 
distrustful of the process." 
 
The judge also predicted that, regardless of his ruling on the 
motion to suppress (and, implicitly, his ruling on the motion to 
impound), the substance of the defendant's recorded statements 
during the videotaped interview would likely become public prior 
to empanelment.3 
 
The judge recognized that release of the video recording 
and transcript "necessarily involves divulging inflammatory 
content" and would make the selection of a fair and impartial 
jury "more challenging."  However, the judge found that, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
that part of the motion that sought to suppress the defendant's 
statements at the Danvers police station. 
 
 
3 In fact, some of the admissions made by the defendant 
during the recorded interview at the Danvers police station were 
already public at the time of the judge's ruling.  In January, 
2014, a State trooper executed an affidavit in support of a 
warrant to search a cellular telephone that purportedly belonged 
to the defendant.  In that affidavit, the trooper stated that, 
during the interview, the defendant admitted to the murder of 
the victim, claimed that he struck her once and cut her twice, 
denied sexually assaulting her, said that he destroyed his 
cellular telephone and hers to prevent the police from using the 
telephones to track his location, and declared that he threw 
both telephones into a wooded area, whose location he 
identified.  There is nothing in the record to suggest that this 
affidavit was impounded.  A staff writer with the Salem News 
indicated in an article dated April 8, 2014, that she had read 
the affidavit. 
6 
 
 
"[g]iven the size of the community, there is no concern that 
pretrial publicity, even if pervasive, would inevitably lead to 
a tainted jury or an unfair trial."  He added that he was 
"confident" that an indifferent jury could be selected, and that 
he was "equipped to ensure [that] the defendant's . . . right to 
a fair trial [under the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution] is preserved and [to] minimize any prejudicial 
impact on the defendant." 
 
The judge granted the defendant's motion to stay the order 
and barred release of the videotape and transcript to allow time 
for the defendant to appeal.  On January 26, 2015, the defendant 
applied for interlocutory relief from a single justice of the 
Appeals Court pursuant to Rule 12 of the Uniform Rules of 
Impoundment Procedure, seeking review of the judge's denial of 
the motion to impound, claiming that the judge "abused his 
discretion and committed an error of law in concluding that 
'good cause' does not exist for the requested impoundment."   
See The Boston Herald, Inc. v. Sharpe, 432 Mass. 593, 601-603 
(2000) (Sharpe) (setting forth procedure for appealing under 
Uniform Rules of Impoundment Procedure to Appeals Court and 
Supreme Judicial Court).  On February 5, the single justice 
denied the defendant's request for interlocutory relief, 
concluding that the judge did not abuse his discretion and 
"carefully balanced the defendant's interest in a fair trial and 
7 
 
 
the public's common-law and Constitutional right to access court 
proceedings."  The single justice also extended the duration of 
the stay to February 6. 
 
On that date, the defendant filed a petition for relief 
under G. L. c. 211, § 3, asking a single justice of the Supreme 
Judicial Court for Suffolk County to reverse the order of the 
single justice of the Appeals Court, again claiming that the 
judge abused his discretion and committed an error of law in 
concluding that there was not "good cause" for the requested 
impoundment.  In July, 2015, the single justice allowed the 
petition for relief, concluding that neither the single justice 
of the Appeals Court nor the motion judge "appear[ed] to have 
considered the appropriate factors in balancing the 
[defendant's] right to a fair trial before an impartial jury 
under the Sixth Amendment . . . and the [interveners'] rights of 
access, either under the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution or at common law."  The single justice therefore 
vacated the denial of the motion to impound and remanded the 
matter to the Superior Court for reconsideration in light of 
"the appropriate factors."  See Sharpe, 432 Mass. at 602 (focus 
of single justice's review of petition filed pursuant to 
impoundment rules "should be on whether the single justice of 
the Appeals Court erred, [but] the resolution of the inquiry 
8 
 
 
might require [looking] indirectly at the underlying order of 
the judge"). 
 
The single justice of the county court essentially 
concluded that the single justice of the Appeals Court and the 
motion judge committed two legal errors.  First, she concluded 
they erred by applying the First Amendment strict scrutiny 
standard applicable to the closing of a court room to the public 
rather than the good cause standard applicable to the 
impoundment of court records.  Second, she concluded that they 
erred by failing to consider "whether the documents sought to be 
impounded were indeed public records, subject to a presumptive 
common[-]law right of access."  She declared that "[b]ecause the 
documents have been suppressed, there is scant, if any, basis to 
conclude that there is any public right of access to them."  The 
single justice quoted the assertion in United States v. McVeigh, 
119 F.3d 806, 813 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub nom. Dallas 
Morning News v. United States, 522 U.S. 1142 (1998), that "the 
right of access to suppression hearings and accompanying motions 
does not extend to the evidence actually ruled inadmissible in 
such a hearing."  
She also concluded that, apart from these 
legal errors, the single justice and the motion judge abused 
their discretion by not properly weighing the qualified public 
right of access to the video recording and transcript "against 
the 'paramount' right of the [defendant] to a fair trial before 
9 
 
 
an impartial jury."  Regarding the risk of prejudicial pretrial 
publicity, she declared that release of a transcript of the 
almost two-hour confession, "even without release of the even 
more inflammatory [video recording]," posed "a high risk" of 
creating "deep and bitter prejudice throughout the community."  
The single justice also stated that, because of the risk of 
publication and comment on the Internet and social media, 
release of the defendant's statement would result in "global" 
exposure to "such a spectacle." 
 
The single justice directed that, on remand, a judge of the 
Superior Court should consider whether the defendant's right to 
a fair trial "could be achieved if the statements were released, 
or whether the extent of potential prejudice to the jury pool 
would preclude the [defendant] from obtaining a fair trial."  
The interveners appealed from the single justice's decision to 
the full court.  As a consequence of the appeal, the matter was 
not remanded and, during the pendency of this appeal, the 
defendant was convicted by a Superior Court jury of murder in 
the first degree and other charges. 
 
Discussion.  Before commencing our review of the decision 
of the single justice of the county court, it is important to 
recognize with some precision the issue before us, given the 
context of this appeal.  On January 26, 2015, the same date that 
the defendant sought interlocutory review of the judge's denial 
10 
 
 
of the motion to impound by the single justice of the Appeals 
Court, the defendant moved in the Superior Court for an order 
prohibiting the duplication of the video recording and 
transcript of the Danvers police station interview.  The judge 
allowed the motion without hearing, noting that, if the order 
denying impoundment were no longer stayed, he would promptly 
schedule a hearing on the issue of duplication.  Because that 
order was stayed and later vacated, no such hearing has been 
held on the issue of duplication, and the judge's order 
forbidding duplication remains in effect.  The interveners have 
not appealed from that order.  Therefore, the issue before us is 
solely whether the public may come to the Superior Court clerk's 
office in Essex County to see and hear the videotaped recording 
and read the transcript, not whether the public may make a copy 
of the recording or the transcript so that they may be viewed 
outside the clerk's office. 
 
Moreover, because this is an appeal from the decision of 
the single justice of the county court under G. L. c. 211, § 3, 
we must decide whether the single justice committed an error of 
law or abused her discretion in concluding that the single 
justice of the Appeals Court committed an error of law and 
abused his discretion in affirming the judge's denial of the 
motion to impound.  See Sharpe, 432 Mass. at 602; Department of 
Mental Retardation v. Kendrew, 418 Mass. 50, 53 (1994).  We 
11 
 
 
begin with the determination by the single justice of the county 
court that the single justice of the Appeals Court and the 
motion judge erred regarding the legal standard to apply to a 
motion to impound under these circumstances.  We consider later 
the determination that they committed an abuse of discretion in 
weighing the appropriate factors. 
 
1.  Legal standard.  Under the First Amendment, the public 
has the right to attend a pretrial hearing regarding a motion to 
suppress unless the party seeking closure of the hearing to the 
public satisfies the four-part strict scrutiny test articulated 
in Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984):  "[1] the party 
seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding interest 
that is likely to be prejudiced, [2] the closure must be no 
broader than necessary to protect that interest, [3] the trial 
court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the 
proceeding, and [4] it must make findings adequate to support 
the closure."  See Commonwealth v. Jones, 472 Mass. 707, 723 
(2015) (rape shield hearing may not be closed to public unless 
Waller test is met).  Here, no party sought closure of the 
motion to suppress hearing.  Therefore, once the videotaped 
recording of the defendant's interview at the Danvers police 
station was admitted in evidence, if any party had sought to 
play the recording in open court so that it could be seen and 
heard by the judge or a witness, all those present in the court 
12 
 
 
room would have seen and heard the interview.  But no party 
sought to play the recording in open court; the judge instead 
carefully reviewed outside the court room the recording and the 
accompanying transcript in reaching his decision regarding the 
motion to suppress. 
 
A recording admitted in evidence as an exhibit at a motion 
to suppress hearing, and a transcript of that recording marked 
for identification, are judicial records.  See New England 
Internet Café, LLC v. Clerk of the Superior Court for Criminal 
Business in Suffolk County, 462 Mass. 76, 82-83 (2012) (judicial 
records include "transcripts [and] evidence").  We have long 
recognized a common-law presumption of public access to judicial 
records.  See Commonwealth v. Pon, 469 Mass. 296, 311 (2014); 
Commonwealth v. Winfield, 464 Mass. 672, 678 (2013).  See also 
Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978) 
("courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect 
and copy public records and documents, including judicial 
records and documents").  The presumption of public access 
encourages openness, transparency, and an informed public while 
discouraging misconduct, bias, and dishonesty, all of which 
enhances public confidence in the judicial system.  Winfield, 
supra, quoting Sharpe, 432 Mass. at 606 ("This presumption of 
public access to judicial records allows the public and the 
media to develop a full understanding of a judicial proceeding 
13 
 
 
so that they may 'keep a watchful eye' on the judicial system");  
The Republican Co., 442 Mass. at 222. 
 
But a defendant also is entitled to a fair trial, and a 
judge must protect against the risk that pretrial publicity will 
be so pervasive and prejudicial that it poses an unacceptable 
risk of preventing the selection of a fair and impartial jury or 
of influencing the verdict, especially where the pretrial 
publicity would reveal information that will not be admitted in 
evidence at trial.  See Sharpe, 432 Mass. at 608-609; Newspapers 
of New England, Inc. v. Clerk-Magistrate of the Ware Div. of the 
Dist. Court Dep't, 403 Mass. 628, 632 (1988), cert. denied, 490 
U.S. 1066 (1989).  See also Commonwealth v. Toolan, 460 Mass. 
452, 462–463 (2011).  "When the rights of the accused and those 
of the public come irreconcilably into conflict, the accused's 
Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial must . . . take precedence 
over the public's First Amendment right of access to pretrial 
proceedings."  Sharpe, 432 Mass. at 609 n.28, quoting In re 
Globe Newspaper Co., 729 F.2d 47, 53 (1st Cir. 1984).  However, 
we also recognize that "pretrial publicity -- even pervasive, 
adverse publicity -- does not inevitably lead to an unfair 
trial."  See Toolan, 460 Mass. at 463, quoting Skilling v. 
United States, 561 U.S. 358, 384 (2010). 
 
We balance the competing interests of public access and the 
right to a fair trial by making the common-law presumption of 
14 
 
 
public access rebuttable for "good cause shown."  See Winfield, 
464 Mass. at 678, quoting Globe Newspaper Co., petitioner, 461 
Mass. 113, 120 (2011).  The Uniform Rules on Impoundment 
Procedure apply to all "public case records that are filed in 
civil and criminal proceedings in each Department of the Trial 
Court."  Rule 1(a).  Under Rule 7(b), "[i]n determining good 
cause, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including, 
but not limited to, (i) the nature of the parties and the 
controversy, (ii) the type of information and the privacy 
interests involved, (iii) the extent of community interest, (iv) 
constitutional rights, and (v) the reason(s) for the request."  
See Sharpe, 432 Mass. at 608 ("In balancing the public's right 
to inspect documents against a defendant's rights guaranteed by 
the Sixth Amendment to a fair trial, a court may consider . . . 
whether the information has already been disclosed, the nature 
of the documents under impoundment, or whether there are 
alternatives to withholding public access, such as a change of 
venue").4 
 
The judge here correctly recognized that the video 
recording of the defendant's interview at the Danvers police 
station and the transcript of that interview became judicial 
                                                          
 
 
4 An order of impoundment "may be entered only upon a 
written finding of good cause," and "shall specify the duration 
of the order."  Rule 8 of the Uniform Rules on Impoundment 
Procedure. 
15 
 
 
records once the recording was admitted in evidence at the 
suppression hearing and the transcript was marked for 
identification.  The judge also correctly recognized that, in 
evaluating whether good cause for impoundment had been shown, it 
was appropriate to consider that the public was entitled to 
evaluate his decision regarding the motion to suppress and the 
police conduct at issue in the motion, and that the content of 
the defendant's interrogation would be important to any such 
evaluation.  The judge also correctly recognized that one of the 
grounds raised by the defendant in the motion to suppress was 
that the statements at the Danvers police station were made 
involuntarily, and that the videotape recording of the interview 
would be probative on this issue because it would reveal not 
only what the defendant said but also the conduct and demeanor 
of the defendant and his interrogators. 
 
We do not agree with the single justice of the county 
court's conclusion that the judge incorrectly applied the 
constitutional test appropriate to the closure of a court room 
to the motion to impound the video recording.5  We recognize that 
                                                          
 
 
5 Nor do we agree with the single justice of the county 
court that the Superior Court judge concluded that there was a 
First Amendment right of access to an impoundment hearing.  The 
judge did not need to reach this issue because there was no 
motion to close that hearing to the public and that 
constitutional issue was not relevant to whether there was good 
cause to impound the exhibits at issue. 
 
16 
 
 
the judge stated that he denied the defendant's motion to 
impound "[a]fter balancing the defendant's Sixth Amendment right 
to a fair trial with the public's First Amendment right to view 
the criminal proceedings," which, if considered in isolation, 
would suggest that he applied a strict scrutiny test to the 
defendant's motion.  But, after examining the totality of his 
decision, we are persuaded that he applied the good cause test, 
not the strict scrutiny test.  In making both his oral and 
written ruling on the motion to impound, the judge began by 
quoting the good cause standard in Rule 7(b) of the Uniform 
Rules on Impoundment Procedure.  We also note that, in the 
appeals to both single justices, the defendant appeared to 
acknowledge that the judge had applied the good cause standard, 
because he contended that the judge had abused his discretion in 
applying the good cause standard.6 
                                                          
 
 
6 Because all parties acknowledge that good cause is the 
appropriate standard to apply to a motion to impound judicial 
records, we need not here decide whether the presumption of 
public access to the judicial records at issue is a 
constitutional, as well as a common-law, right.  Compare Matter 
of N.Y. Times Co., 828 F.2d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. 
denied, 485 U.S. 977 (1988) (qualified First Amendment right of 
access extends to written documents submitted in connection with 
judicial proceedings for which there is right of access), with 
United States v. Corbitt, 879 F.2d 224, 237 (7th Cir. 1989) 
(document is subject to right of access under First Amendment 
only where judge considers whether "the document has 
historically been available to the public, and whether public 
access would promote the proper functioning of the government 
17 
 
 
 
Nor do we agree with the suggestion of the single justice 
of the county court, citing McVeigh, 119 F.3d at 813, that the 
video recording and transcript were not judicial records and 
therefore not presumptively public because they would be 
inadmissible in evidence at trial if the motion to suppress were 
granted, as it later was with respect to the defendant's 
interview at the Danvers police station.  We agree that evidence 
does not become a judicial record simply because a defendant 
seeks to suppress that evidence.  See United States v. Gurney, 
558 F.2d 1202, 1210 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom. Miami 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
agency producing or considering the document").  It suffices 
that we recognize that, even if access to judicial records were 
within the rubric of the constitutional right to a public trial, 
that would not necessarily mean that the appropriate standard to 
apply to a motion to impound was the four-part strict scrutiny 
test articulated in Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984), 
that must be applied when a party seeks closure of the courtroom 
to the public.  See Commonwealth v. Pon, 469 Mass. 296, 311 
(2014) ("We conclude that the records of closed criminal cases 
resulting in these particular dispositions are not subject to a 
First Amendment presumption of access, and therefore that the 
sealing of a record under G. L. c. 276, § 100C, need not survive 
strict scrutiny").  Our constitutional jurisprudence recognizes 
that context matters in the standard to be applied to safeguard 
a constitutional right.  The Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution protects "[t]he right of the people to be 
secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and 
seizures," but we apply a probable cause standard to the search 
of a person and a reasonable articulable suspicion standard to 
the temporary seizure of a person during a police stop.  See 
Commonwealth v. Cavitt, 460 Mass. 617, 626 (2011); Commonwealth 
v. Bostock, 450 Mass. 616, 619 (2008). 
18 
 
 
Herald Publ. Co. v. Krentzman, 435 U.S. 968 (1978) ("The press 
has no right of access to exhibits produced under subpoena and 
not yet admitted into evidence, hence not yet in the public 
domain").  Therefore, where a defendant seeks to suppress a 
diary found during the search of his home based on the absence 
of probable cause, the diary does not become a judicial record 
simply because its suppression is the subject of the motion.  
But where a defendant's statements are the subject of the 
suppression motion and a recording of those statements is 
admitted in evidence at the suppression hearing because it is 
relevant to the issue whether the motion should be allowed, the 
fact that the recording might be suppressed and therefore be 
inadmissible at trial does not change the fact that it was 
admitted in evidence at the suppression hearing and thereby 
became a judicial record.  To be sure, the fact that the 
recording might be inadmissible at trial is a relevant factor to 
consider in deciding whether it should be impounded for good 
cause shown, because of the risk that widespread publicity 
regarding the inadmissible recording might taint the prospective 
jury pool and put at risk the defendant's right to a trial 
decided by a fair and impartial jury.  But, where a recording is 
admitted at trial in a pretrial suppression hearing, its 
ultimate inadmissibility at trial does not remove it from the 
category of a judicial record.  Nor was it inappropriate for the 
19 
 
 
judge to rule on the motion to impound before the judge had 
ruled on the motion to suppress because, once the video 
recording was admitted in evidence at the suppression hearing, 
it became a judicial record that was presumptively public unless 
impounded. 
 
Increasingly, perhaps spurred by the recognition of the 
"many benefits that flow from recording of interrogations," 
Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. 423, 441 (2004), and 
our directive that "a defendant whose interrogation has not been 
reliably preserved by means of a complete electronic recording 
should be entitled, on request, to a cautionary instruction 
concerning the use of such evidence," id. at 447, an increasing 
number of police departments in the Commonwealth are video 
recording police interrogations of suspects.  See National 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Custodial Interrogation 
Recording Compendium By State:  Massachusetts (January 13, 
2016), https://www.nacdl.org/usmap/crim/30262/48121/d# 
[https://perma.cc/Y8GR-B85H].  As a result, we have seen an 
increasing number of cases where the evidentiary hearing on the 
motion to suppress a defendant's statements consists of nothing 
more than the Commonwealth offering in evidence the waiver of 
rights forms, the video recording of the interrogation, and a 
transcript of the interrogation, which the judge then reviews in 
deciding whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived 
20 
 
 
his or her rights and whether the statements were made 
involuntarily.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hoyt, 461 Mass. 143, 
148 (2011) (at evidentiary hearing on motion to suppress, judge 
"considered only documentary evidence:  the Miranda waiver form, 
the interrogation video recording, and the transcript of the 
interrogation").  If the video recording were not a judicial 
record, the public would have no way in these cases apart from 
the judge's memorandum of decision to evaluate the judge's 
decision to suppress. 
 
2.  Abuse of discretion.  Having concluded that the judge 
did not commit legal error in considering the defendant's motion 
to impound under the good cause standard applicable to 
presumptively public judicial records, we now turn to the 
defendant's claim that the judge abused his discretion in 
applying that standard.  "[A] judge's discretionary decision 
constitutes an abuse of discretion where we conclude the judge 
made 'a clear error of judgment in weighing' the factors 
relevant to the decision, . . . such that the decision falls 
outside the range of reasonable alternatives."  L.L. v. 
Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014), quoting Picciotto 
v. Continental Cas. Co., 512 F.3d 9, 15 (1st Cir. 2008). 
 
The judge was cognizant of the risk that he might suppress 
the statements made during the video recorded interview at issue 
in the motion to impound, that release of the video recording 
21 
 
 
and the transcript "necessarily involves divulging inflammatory 
content," and that such disclosure "will mean that the selection 
of a fair and impartial jury will be more challenging."  But he 
also recognized that the substance of the interview, at least in 
part, would be disclosed during the attorneys' oral argument 
regarding the motion to suppress and in his decision regarding 
that motion because the voluntariness of the statements was at 
issue and the defendant's statements "are probative concerning 
the issue of voluntariness."  Therefore, even if the video 
recording and transcript were impounded, the public was likely 
to learn many of the details of the defendant's statements in 
the impounded recording, including his admission to having 
killed the victim.  See Sharpe, 432 Mass. at 608 (in balancing 
public's right to inspect judicial records and defendant's right 
to fair trial, judge may consider "whether the information has 
already been disclosed").7 
 
The judge also recognized that careful individual voir dire 
of the venire and explicit jury instructions would be needed to 
ensure the selection of a fair and impartial jury, and that, if 
such a jury could not reasonably be selected in Essex County, he 
                                                          
 
 
7 As noted earlier, see note 3, supra, details regarding the 
content of the defendant's statement to police during his 
interview at the Danvers police station were also included in 
the search warrant affidavit of a State trooper that had not 
been impounded.  The record does not reflect whether the judge 
was aware of this judicial record. 
22 
 
 
had the discretion to order a change of venue.  Knowing this, 
the judge declared that, "[g]iven the size of the community, 
there is no concern that pretrial publicity, even if pervasive, 
would inevitably lead to a tainted jury pool or an unfair 
trial."  We recognize that "[p]ublicity concerning the 
proceedings at a pretrial hearing . . . could influence public 
opinion against a defendant and inform potential jurors of 
inculpatory information wholly inadmissible at the actual 
trial."  Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 14 
(1986), quoting Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 378 
(1979).  But we give substantial deference to the conclusion of 
an experienced trial judge who is familiar with the case and the 
pretrial publicity that has surrounded it regarding the 
likelihood that revelation of a defendant's confession to the 
police, even a confession that might be suppressed and therefore 
inadmissible in evidence at trial, would so taint the jury 
venire as to unfairly burden the defendant's right to a fair 
trial.  See Commonwealth v. McCowen, 458 Mass. 461, 476 (2010) 
("we give careful attention to the evaluation of the trial 
judge, especially one who, as here, presides in the county where 
the crime occurred and is familiar with the nature and 
pervasiveness of the pretrial publicity"); Commonwealth v. 
Clemente, 452 Mass. 295, 325 (2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1181 
(2009) ("we have granted trial judges 'wide discretion' in 
23 
 
 
dealing with publicity that might have a prejudicial effect on 
jurors" [citation omitted]). 
 
The question whether the judge abused his discretion in 
denying the motion to impound would have been closer had the 
judge not allowed the defendant's motion to prohibit duplication 
of the video recording.  We recognize that, when the judge 
denied the motion to impound, he did not impose this 
prohibition; the prohibition against copying was ordered sixteen 
days after the oral denial of the motion to impound, in response 
to the defendant's motion seeking such an order.  As a result, 
had the denial stood alone and not been stayed, a member of the 
public or the media might have obtained access to the video 
recording for both inspection and copying.8 
                                                          
 
 
8 Under the new Uniform Rules on Public Access to Court 
Records, Trial Court Rule XIV (2016), "[a]ny member of the 
public may submit to the Clerk at a courthouse a request to 
access a court record."  Rule 2(b).  "Access" is defined as "the 
ability to inspect and obtain a copy of a court record."  Rule 
1(e).  A "court record" includes court papers, documents, 
exhibits, and recordings that are "made, entered, filed, and/or 
maintained by the Clerk in connection with a case or 
proceeding."  Id.  A clerk, with leave of court, "may allow the 
public to view and photograph non-documentary exhibits, except 
where such access would pose a threat of deterioration, 
contamination, or destruction of the exhibits."  Rule 2(e).  
Even though these Uniform Rules did not become effective until 
November 1, 2016, we understand that they reflect current 
practice regarding the inspection and copying of court records.  
See Memorandum from the Trial Court Comm. on Pub. Access to 
Court Records to Persons Interested in the Proposed Trial Court 
Rule XIV Uniform Rules on Access to Court Records (March 30, 
2016), http://www.mass.gov/courts/docs/sjc/invitations-to-
24 
 
 
 
We also recognize that the danger of prejudicial pretrial 
publicity is substantially greater where a defendant's pretrial 
interrogation can be seen and heard on public and social media 
in an already highly publicized case, especially where that 
interrogation is suppressed and would not otherwise be seen and 
heard by the jury, and where the defendant admits during that 
interrogation to killing the victim.  See Rideau v. Louisiana, 
373 U.S. 723, 726 (1963) ("it was a denial of due process of law 
to refuse the request for a change of venue, after the people of 
Calcasieu Parish had been exposed repeatedly and in depth to the 
spectacle of [the defendant] personally confessing in detail to 
the crimes for which he was later to be charged").  Media 
reports describing the interrogation or even quoting the 
transcript of the interrogation pose a considerable but lesser 
danger.  See United States v. Mohamed, 546 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 
1302 (M.D. Fla. 2008) (forbidding duplication of video recording 
of traffic stop admitted in evidence at motion to suppress 
because "release and broadcast of [video recordings] may have 
more of an inflammatory impact on the viewing public than a mere 
recounting of the testimony and evidence presented at the 
suppression hearing"); In re NBC Universal, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 
2d 49, 58 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (forbidding duplication of video 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
comment/proposed-public-access-rules-comparison-document.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6TCF-S7JR]. 
25 
 
 
recording admitted in evidence at motion to disqualify defense 
counsel because "[t]elevision indubitably has a much greater 
potential impact on jurors than print media"). 
 
However, by the time the denial of the motion to impound 
reached the appellate courts, the judge had issued the order 
prohibiting the duplication of the video recording and 
transcript, and the appellate review for abuse of discretion 
should properly have considered whether the denial of the motion 
to impound was an abuse of discretion in light of the subsequent 
order to prohibit duplication.  We conclude here that the judge, 
having subsequently ordered that the video recording could not 
be duplicated, did not abuse his discretion in denying the 
motion to impound.9 
 
We note that what the judge ultimately did here was 
comparable to what he had the authority to do if one of the 
parties had chosen to play the video recording in open court at 
the suppression hearing.  In such a circumstance, a judge has 
                                                          
 
 
9 Because the public presumptively has access to a judicial 
record, and because that access generally means that the 
judicial record may be inspected and copied, an order 
prohibiting the duplication of a judicial record is a variant of 
an order of impoundment, which requires a showing of good cause, 
albeit a good cause showing consistent with the lesser intrusion 
on public access.  The practical consequence of such an order is 
that it requires a clerk's office to identify a third category 
of judicial records -- a public record that is not impounded, 
but may not be duplicated -- beyond the two categories with 
which it is more familiar:  (1) a public record that may be 
inspected and copied, and (2) an impounded record that must be 
kept separate and unavailable for public inspection. 
26 
 
 
the authority under Supreme Judicial Court Rule 1:19, as 
appearing in 461 Mass. 1301 (2012), governing electronic access 
to the courts, to order that the news media not electronically 
record that part of the hearing "if it appears that such 
coverage will create a substantial likelihood of harm to any 
person or other serious harmful consequence."  Where this 
authority is invoked to prohibit the news media from recording a 
video recording played in open court at a suppression hearing, 
the news media may report on the substance of the statements 
made in the recording but will be unable to disseminate the 
recording itself. 
 
Conclusion.  The case is remanded to the single justice of 
the county court, with instructions to vacate the prior order 
that set aside the Superior Court judge's denial of the motion 
to impound, and to issue an order affirming the denial by the 
single justice of the Appeals Court of the defendant's request 
for interlocutory appellate relief.  In short, the motion 
judge's denial of the motion to impound is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.