Title: State v. McCraw
Citation: 284 P.2d 670, 59 N.M. 348
Docket Number: 5891
State: new-mexico
Issuer: new-mexico Supreme Court
Date: May 31, 1955

284 P.2d 670 (1955) 59 N.M. 348 STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jack P. McCRAW, Defendant-Appellant. No. 5891. Supreme Court of New Mexico. May 31, 1955. W.S. Martin, Jr., Lovington, for appellant. Richard H. Robinson, Atty. Gen., Fred M. Standley, Asst. Atty. Gen., J.H. Burttram, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. McGHEE, Justice. On June 11, 1953, the appellant was convicted of the crime of breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony and was sentenced to serve not less than two and one-half years, nor more than three years in the penitentiary. On July 22, 1953, an information charging him with having been convicted of four felonies in other states previous to his conviction in Lea county was filed. Thereafter, on June 17, 1954, an amended information was filed charging the conviction of appellant on four felony charges in other states, which, had they been committed in New Mexico, would have been felonies here. Following the filing of the amended information the appellant filed his motion to quash it on various grounds. The motion was denied and after a verdict of guilty on all counts was found, the original sentence was vacated and the appellant was sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary for life, in accordance with the provisions of § 41-16-3, 1953 Compilation; this appeal followed. Only two points are relied upon for reversal here: First, that the provisions of our Habitual Criminal Act, §§ 41-16-1 through 41-16-4, 1953 Compilation, do not apply to this appellant because of his claim the District Judge and District Attorney knew of his prior convictions at the time he was first sentenced; and, second, the failure to charge him as an habitual criminal when the prior convictions were known to the court and district attorney constituted a waiver of the right of the state to so charge him. It is stipulated the District Attorney knew of the former convictions at the time *671 of the original trial, but there is nothing in the record to indicate the trial judge knew of them and the state challenges the statement as to the latter. The applicable sections of our statutes read: The case of Smalley v. People, 1935, 96 Colo. 361, 43 P.2d 385, supports the contention of appellant, but the state which originally enacted the habitual act in the United States, New York, holds squarely to the contrary. It was held in Dodd v. Martin, 1928, 248 N.Y. 394, 162 N.E. 293, the provisions of the act were mandatory, even though the sentencing judge and the district attorney knew of the previous convictions at the time of the original sentence, and that mandamus was proper to compel an unwilling judge to sentence the defendant under the provisions of the act. Although mandamus was not involved, it has been held in other states having the habitual criminal act that knowledge of the district attorney, and even of the judge, does not bar a prosecution under the act, the setting aside of a former sentence and the imposition of a new one, in the following cases: Graham v. West Virginia, 1912, 224 U.S. 616, 32 S. Ct. 583, 56 L. Ed. 917; affirming State v. Graham, 1911, 68 W. Va. 248, 69 S.E. 1010, 40 L.R.A.,N.S., 924; Cross v. State, 1928, 96 Fla. 768, 119 So. 380; Macomber v. State, 1947, 181 Or. 208, *672 180 P.2d 793; Commonwealth ex rel. Foster v. Ashe, 1941, 146 Pa.Super. 482, 23 A.2d 245. The Macomber opinion contains a masterful analysis of all the cases on the point here involved and one interested will there find the answers given by the courts, except in Colorado, to the contention here made. We agree with the holdings of the majority of the courts passing upon these statutes that their terms are mandatory and that a district attorney or judge, or both, may not nullify the statutes by ignoring them. In order to secure a conviction before a jury it was necessary to prove previous felony convictions in Alabama and North Carolina, and, in addition, the fact that the appellant was the person so convicted. The securing of such proof and arranging for it to be presented in New Mexico at one time likely required considerable time and, no doubt, was the reason for the delay. The sentence imposed on the habitual criminal information will be affirmed, and it is so ordered. COMPTON, C.J., and LUJAN, SADLER and KIKER, JJ., concur.