Title: Mitchell v. Richmond
Citation: 754 So. 2d 627
Docket Number: 1980998
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: December 17, 1999

754 So. 2d 627 (1999)
Robert W. MITCHELL
v.
William RICHMOND and Richmond &amp; Associates, Architects.
1980998.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
December 17, 1999.
James G. Curenton, Jr., Fairhope, for appellant.
Jonathan B. Head of Stone, Granade &amp; Crosby, P.C., Bay Minette, for appellees.
COOK, Justice.
Robert W. Mitchell sued William Richmond and Richmond &amp; Associates, Architects, alleging architectural malpractice. The trial court entered a summary judgment for the defendants. Mitchell appealed. We affirm.
*628 Mitchell alleged in his complaint that the defendants had designed a house for him and had otherwise provided architectural services for the construction of that house, in Fairhope, in 1979. Mitchell contends that in late July or early August 1997, he discovered that his home had started to settle or sink because of major design problems, including, but not limited to, design problems relating to the foundation of the house; he alleged that these problems proximately caused substantial damage. Mitchell made claims based on theories of breach of contract and negligence.
The defendants moved for a summary judgment. In support of their summary-judgment motion, the defendant William Richmond filed an affidavit, which stated:
Mitchell presented no evidence by way of affidavit or otherwise in response to the defendants' summary-judgment motion or to Richmond's affidavit.
Rule 56, Ala. R. Civ. P., sets forth a two-tiered standard for determining whether to enter a summary judgment. In order to enter a summary judgment, the trial court must determine 1) that there is no genuine issue of material fact and 2) that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In determining whether a summary judgment was properly entered, the reviewing court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmovant. See Turner v. Systems Fuel, Inc., 475 So. 2d 539, 541 (Ala.1985); Ryan v. Charles Townsend Ford, Inc., 409 So. 2d 784 (Ala.1981). Rule 56 is read in conjunction with the "substantial evidence rule" (§ 12-21-12, Ala.Code 1975), for actions filed after June 11, 1987. See Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So. 2d 794, 797-98 (Ala.1989). In order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff must present "substantial evidence," i.e., "evidence of such weight and quality that fairminded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved." West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989).
When a party moving for a summary judgment makes a prima facie showing that no genuine issue of material fact *629 exists, as the defendants did in the present case, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to present "substantial evidence" supporting his position and creating a genuine issue of material fact. Bean v. Craig, 557 So. 2d 1249, 1252 (Ala.1990).
Mitchell's complaint states breach-of-contract and negligence causes of action. Those causes of action accrue based upon different factual occurrences. The statutory limitations period for suing on a breach-of-contract cause of action is six years, if the contract is not under seal. § 6-2-34, Ala.Code 1975. Any claim made concerning the quality of the services provided under the contract must be a warranty claim. Alabama cases hold that a breach-of-warranty cause of action against a contractor or architect accrues upon the completion of the building in regard to which the contractor or architect's work was done. Stephens v. Creel, 429 So. 2d 278 (Ala.1983); City of Birmingham v. Cochrane Roofing &amp; Metal Co., 547 So. 2d 1159 (Ala.1989). Richmond's statement in his affidavit that Mitchell's house was substantially complete and was inhabited on, or shortly after, March 6, 1979, is not controverted. Thus, we conclude that the claim alleging breach of contract is timebarred. § 6-2-34.
Act No. 94-138, Ala. Acts 1994, imposed a new 2-year statute of limitations and a new 13-year statute of repose on all causes of action in tort or contract against architects or engineers. The Act is codified at §§ 6-5-220 to 6-5-228, Ala.Code 1975, and its provisions apply to causes of action accruing on or after February 25, 1994. § 6-5-223. The plaintiff Mitchell argues that any action against an engineer or architect, no matter how old or stale, was renewed with the passage of that 1994 statute. He claims that his causes of action had not accrued by February 25, 1994, and that, therefore, by the provisions of § 6-5-223, that date is "deemed" to be the date of "substantial completion," for purposes of determining the date the 13-year period provided for in § 6-5-221(a) began to run; thus, he argues, his action was timely filed. However, Mitchell's interpretation of the statute does not follow the stated intent of the Legislature:
§ 6-5-225 (third paragraph). Mitchell's action was not timely filed, because § 6-5-222 provides that "no relief can be granted for any cause of action which accrued, and any right of action is barred which would have accrued, more than thirteen years after the substantial completion of construction of such improvement." In addition, *630 § 6-5-223 provides that "substantial completion of construction of the improvement on or to real estate shall be deemed to be February 25, 1994, but [this article, § 6-5-220 to228] shall not revive any cause of action barred under existing law." Finally, § 6-5-224 states:
The defendants' summary judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
HOOPER, C.J., and MADDOX, HOUSTON, LYONS, BROWN, JOHNSTONE, and ENGLAND, JJ., concur.