Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Walter W. Stern, III
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2020AP000201-D
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: November 23, 2021

2021 WI 84 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2020AP201-D 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings  
Against Walter W. Stern, III, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant, 
     v. 
Walter W. Stern, III, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST STERN 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
November 23, 2021   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Per Curiam. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
      
 
 
 
 
2021 WI 84
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2020AP201-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Walter W. Stern, III,  
Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Walter W. Stern, III, 
 
          Respondent. 
FILED 
 
NOV 23, 2021 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review a report filed by Referee Jean 
A. DiMotto, recommending the court suspend Attorney Walter W. 
Stern, III's license to practice law for a period of 45 days for 
three counts of professional misconduct.  No appeal has been filed 
so we consider this matter pursuant to Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 
22.17(2).1  
                                                 
1 SCR 22.17(2) provides: 
No. 
2020AP201-D   
 
2 
 
¶2 
We approve and adopt the referee's findings of fact and 
conclusions of law.  We conclude that the seriousness of Attorney 
Stern's misconduct warrants a 60-day license suspension and we 
impose the full costs of this proceeding on Attorney Stern.  The 
OLR did not seek restitution in this matter and no restitution is 
ordered. 
¶3 
Attorney Stern has been licensed to practice law in 
Wisconsin since 1974 and has been the subject of five previous 
disciplinary proceedings.  In August of 1988, the Board of 
Attorneys Professional Responsibility (BAPR), the predecessor to 
the OLR, imposed a private reprimand on Attorney Stern for 
professional misconduct consisting of communicating on the subject 
of the representation with a party he knew to be represented by a 
lawyer without the consent of that lawyer.   
¶4 
In September of 1992, BAPR publicly reprimanded Attorney 
Stern for professional misconduct consisting of advancing a 
factual position without a basis; failing to maintain the respect 
due courts of justice and judicial officers; violating the 
Attorney's Oath; and engaging in offensive personality.  Public 
Reprimand of Walter W. Stern, III, No. 1992-11 (electronic copy 
                                                 
If no appeal is filed timely, the supreme court 
shall review the referee's report; adopt, reject or 
modify the referee's findings and conclusions or remand 
the matter to the referee for additional findings; and 
determine and impose appropriate discipline.  The court, 
on its own motion, may order the parties to file briefs 
in the matter. 
No. 
2020AP201-D   
 
3 
 
available 
at 
https://compendium.wicourts.gov/app/raw/000305.html).   
¶5 
In November of 1993, Attorney Stern consented to a 
private reprimand for professional misconduct consisting of 
failing to pay a third-party lien from settlement proceeds after 
receiving notice of the lien.  BAPR Private Reprimand, No. 1993-25 
(electronic 
copy 
available 
at 
https://compendium. 
wicourts.gov/app/raw/000111.html).  
¶6 
In March of 2008, Attorney Stern consented to a private 
reprimand for professional misconduct consisting of committing 
criminal 
acts 
that 
reflected 
adversely 
on 
his 
honesty, 
trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer.  The discipline was a 
result of Attorney Stern pleading no contest to a second and third 
offense of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence.  
OLR Private Reprimand, No. 2008-08.   
¶7 
In 2013, Attorney Stern's license was suspended for two 
years for professional misconduct consisting of engaging in 
conduct resulting in his federal criminal conviction for 
conspiring to commit money laundering.  In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Stern, 2013 WI 46, 347 Wis. 2d 552, 830 
N.W.2d 674.  Two months later, his conviction was reversed by the 
United States Circuit Court for the Seventh Circuit.  He was 
released from prison and pled guilty to misdemeanor contempt of 
court.  Attorney Stern's license to practice law was reinstated on 
February 4, 2016.  In re Reinstatement of Stern, 2016 WI 6, 366 
Wis. 2d 431, 847 N.W.2d 93. 
No. 
2020AP201-D   
 
4 
 
¶8 
On January 30, 2020, the OLR filed a complaint alleging 
that Attorney Stern committed three counts of professional 
misconduct involving his representation of two clients.  The OLR 
later amended its complaint to add a fourth count, alleging that 
Attorney Stern violated SCR 20:1.18(b) by having a discussion with 
a prospective client and thereafter by using or revealing to other 
parties information he learned in the consultation.  However, the 
OLR dismissed this fourth count on March 22, 2021.  
¶9 
In April 2021, Attorney Stern executed a no contest plea 
to the three remaining counts of misconduct alleged in the amended 
complaint and the parties executed a stipulation that added some 
additional context for the allegations.  The parties disputed the 
appropriate sanction.  The OLR recommended a 90-day license 
suspension and Attorney Stern sought a public reprimand. 
¶10 On August 6, 2021, the referee filed findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and a recommendation.  She accepted the 
parties' stipulation and Attorney Stern's no contest plea and, 
based on admissions in Attorney Stern's Answer to the Amended 
Complaint as well as the stipulation and no contest plea, she 
determined that there was clear, satisfactory, and convincing 
evidence that Attorney Stern violated the three counts of 
professional conduct, as alleged.  The referee recommended this 
court suspend Attorney Stern's license to practice law for 45 days 
and impose full costs upon him.   
¶11 We will affirm a referee's findings of fact unless they 
are clearly erroneous; conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.  
See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 2004 WI 14, 
No. 
2020AP201-D   
 
5 
 
¶5, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747.  This court is free to impose 
whatever discipline it deems appropriate, regardless of the 
referee's recommendation.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686. 
¶12 The first two counts of misconduct pertain to Attorney 
Stern's representation of F.J.  Attorney Stern first met with F.J. 
and F.J.'s mother (who had a power of attorney for F.J.) on 
February 11, 2016, shortly after his law license was reinstated 
following his 2013 license suspension.  F.J. was seeking legal 
representation in a pending child support action, a dog bite injury 
case, and regarding potential claims against a neighbor and the 
Wauwatosa Police Department.  As Attorney Stern was aware, F.J. 
suffers some cognitive challenges resulting from injuries he 
sustained when he was the victim of a serious beating several years 
ago. 
¶13 Daniel Storm, f/k/a Daniel Slaughter, an associate of 
Attorney Stern, also attended this meeting.  Daniel Storm had been 
working as an investigator for Attorney Stern for several months 
at the time of this meeting, including while Attorney Stern's law 
license was suspended.  The parties stipulated that Attorney Stern 
believed that F.J. had a prior, lengthy relationship with Daniel 
Storm, because Storm had posted bond for F.J. when F.J. was held 
in the county jail.  Attorney Stern also believed that F.J. and/or 
his mother acknowledged that they owed Storm $17,000 for work that 
Storm had performed on F.J.'s behalf. 
¶14 During that meeting, F.J. agreed to pay $4,000 in fees 
for representation in each of the child support and dog bite cases.  
No. 
2020AP201-D   
 
6 
 
At the meeting, Attorney Stern provided F.J. and his mother with 
a document entitled "Promissory Note With Payment on Demand" which 
stated that F.J. was to pay Attorney Stern $25,000 by February 29, 
2016 toward the child support and dog bite matters ($8,000) and 
for the work performed by Storm ($17,000).  Attorney Stern also 
asked F.J. and his mother to sign an "Irrevocable Assignment" which 
purported to give Attorney Stern the right to ask for $20,000 upon 
demand toward the Promissory Note.  
¶15 Critically, Attorney Stern did not notify F.J. in 
writing of the desirability of seeking independent counsel, give 
F.J. a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent 
counsel on the transaction, or obtain informed written consent 
from F.J. regarding the essential terms of the transaction and 
Attorney Stern's role in the transaction and whether Attorney Stern 
was representing F.J. in the transaction.   
¶16 F.J. and his mother signed the Promissory Note and the 
"Assignment" that day.  F.J. also signed a contingent fee agreement 
for his representation for potential claims against his neighbor, 
as well as a contingent fee agreement for his potential claims 
against the Wauwatosa Police Department. 
¶17 The OLR alleged, the parties stipulated, and the referee 
concluded that by having F.J. and his mother sign a promissory 
note and assignment for $25,000 without notifying them in writing 
of the desirability of seeking, and giving them a reasonable 
opportunity to seek, the advice of independent counsel, and without 
informing them and obtaining written consent from them about the 
essential terms of the transaction and Attorney Stern's role in 
No. 
2020AP201-D   
 
7 
 
the transaction including whether he was representing them in the 
transaction, Attorney Stern violated SCR 20:1.8(a).2 
¶18 On February 16, 2016, Attorney Stern appeared for F.J. 
in the child support, termination of parental rights and adoption 
case in Winnebago County Circuit Court and moved the court to 
appoint a guardian ad litem for F.J. to provide the court with 
information about F.J.'s competency.  Eventually, the court also 
approved a stipulation allowing Attorney Stern to expend $2,000 of 
funds retained in his trust account to hire Dr. Terry Bruett to 
conduct a psychological evaluation of F.J. 
¶19 There was a significant delay in paying Dr. Bruett for 
the services he provided.  Accordingly, the OLR alleged, the 
parties stipulated, and the referee concluded that, by failing to 
                                                 
2 SCR 20:1.8(a) provides: 
A 
lawyer 
shall 
not 
enter 
into 
a 
business 
transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an 
ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary 
interest adverse to a client unless: 
(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer 
acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the 
client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in 
writing in a manner that can be reasonably understood by 
the client; 
(2) the client is advised in writing of the 
desirability of seeking and is given a reasonable 
opportunity to seek the advice of independent legal 
counsel on the transaction; and  
(3) the client gives informed consent, in a writing 
signed by the client, to the essential terms of the 
transaction and the lawyer's role in the transaction, 
including whether the lawyer is representing the client 
in the transaction. 
No. 
2020AP201-D   
 
8 
 
promptly deliver $2,000 directly to Dr. Bruett from funds held in 
trust for services rendered by Dr. Bruett, Attorney Stern violated 
SCR 20:1.15(e)(l).3  It is not disputed that Dr. Bruett has since 
been paid in full. 
¶20 The third count of professional misconduct relates to 
Attorney Stern's actions in the matter of the Estate of T.T.  In 
April 2016, T.T. died while in custody at the Milwaukee County 
jail.  T.T. was survived by two adult sons, and other family 
members.  A Seattle law firm agreed to provide the family with 
legal guidance and subsequently contacted local Milwaukee counsel 
to assist them.  The family was advised to establish an estate for 
T.T. so the estate could pursue claims against Milwaukee County. 
¶21 Initially, T.R., was the family's main contact person 
and she offered to be the estate's representative.  Local counsel 
prepared the estate paperwork, including a Petition for Special 
Administration naming T.R. as Special Administrator of the T.T. 
Estate.  T.T.'s adult children both consented to this petition and 
T.R. was appointed Special Administrator.  On November 25, 2016, 
                                                 
3 SCR 20:1.15(e)(1) provides: 
Upon receiving funds or other property in which a 
client has an interest, or in which a lawyer has received 
notice that a 3rd party has an interest identified by a 
lien, court order, judgment, or contract, the lawyer 
shall promptly notify the client or 3rd party in writing.  
Except as stated in this rule or otherwise permitted by 
law or by agreement with the client, the lawyer shall 
promptly deliver to the client or 3rd party any funds or 
other property that the client or 3rd party is entitled 
to receive. 
No. 
2020AP201-D   
 
9 
 
T.R. signed a fee agreement to have the Seattle firm represent the 
estate in potential civil claims. 
¶22 Meanwhile, T.T.'s adult sons had elected to retain 
Attorney Stern.  On January 3, 2017, Attorney Stern wrote to the 
Seattle firm, advising them that T.T.'s adult son had retained 
Attorney Stern "to represent him and [T.T.'s] estate in proposed 
litigation against Milwaukee County and those responsible for this 
tragic event."  He received no reply.  On January 5, 2017, Attorney 
Stern wrote a similar letter to local Wisconsin counsel. 
¶23 On January 9, 2017, one of T.T.'s adult sons advised 
local counsel that he intended to have T.R. removed as Special 
Administrator.  On January 12, 2017, local counsel emailed Attorney 
Stern informing Attorney Stern that T.R. was still the Estate's 
Special Administrator, and that she had retained counsel. 
¶24 On January 12, 2017, Attorney Stern emailed T.R. 
directly, indicating that he intended to have her replaced as 
Special Administrator.  On January 14, 2017, Attorney Stern again 
emailed T.R. directly about the T.T. matter.   
¶25 The OLR alleged, the parties stipulated, and the referee 
concluded, that by communicating directly with T.R. concerning the 
T.T. matter, Attorney Stern violated SCR 20:4.2(a).4 
                                                 
4 SCR 20:4.2(a) provides: 
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not 
communicate about the subject of the representation with 
a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another 
lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent 
of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or 
a court order. 
No. 
2020AP201-D   
 
10 
 
¶26 Having accepted the stipulation and no contest plea, the 
primary issue for the referee was the appropriate sanction for 
Attorney Stern's admitted misconduct.  Again, Attorney Stern 
sought a public reprimand while the OLR sought a 90-day license 
suspension.  
¶27 As aggravating factors, the OLR pointed to Attorney 
Stern's prior disciplinary history,5 the multiple misconduct 
violations, and F.J.'s vulnerability.  The OLR acknowledged 
several mitigating factors including an absence of a dishonest 
motive, Attorney Stern's cooperation with the disciplinary 
process, and his remorse. 
¶28 In addition, the parties' stipulation indicates that 
Attorney Stern's associate, Daniel Storm, played a role in the 
F.J. matter.  Attorney Stern says that before the initial meeting 
with F.J., Storm had already prepared the documents to be given to 
F.J. and he insisted those documents were essential.  Attorney 
Stern explains that he added the handwritten notes to those 
documents (indicating that the Promissory Note would be replaced 
or followed by written retainer agreements) and this, in fact, was 
                                                 
5 Attorney Stern argues that the 2013 disciplinary matter was 
predicated on a criminal conviction that was subsequently reversed 
on appeal, so he maintains that "there should have been no license 
suspension."  The referee was not persuaded, noting correctly that 
Attorney Stern stipulated to that two-year license suspension and 
did 
not 
appeal 
the 
referee's 
report 
and 
recommendation.  
Additionally, the standards and burden of proof for lawyer 
misconduct are not synonymous with those required for a criminal 
conviction. 
No. 
2020AP201-D   
 
11 
 
done.  Attorney Stern never executed the Promissory Note and it 
was not enforced.  
¶29 In addition, when Attorney Stern indicated he would pay 
Dr. Bruett, Storm apparently "coaxed and influenced" Attorney 
Stern into allowing him to act as agent for the payment.  Attorney 
Stern gave Storm the $2,000 payment from his trust account but 
Storm made only two partial payments to Dr. Bruett totaling only 
60 percent of the amount owed to Dr. Bruett.  Attorney Stern later 
paid Dr. Bruett the balance from his personal funds. 
¶30 The referee acknowledged that Storm may have exercised 
a coercive influence on Attorney Stern, but emphasized that it was 
nonetheless Attorney Stern who impermissibly presented the 
Promissory Note and Irrevocable Assignment to F.J. and his mother 
for signature, without the required written explanations.6  
However, the referee noted a number of mitigating factors, stating:  
"Attorney Stern did ameliorate the situation by his handwritten 
note on the last page of the Promissory Note, and his declination 
to sign the Note."  In addition, Attorney Stern did follow through 
and provided F.J. with the appropriate documents for establishing 
their attorney-client relationship, and shortly after Attorney 
Stern's initial meeting with F.J., Attorney Stern asked the circuit 
court to appoint a guardian ad litem for F.J. and requested the 
                                                 
6 In his response brief, Attorney Stern states that "Daniel 
Storm . . . turned out to not only be untrustworthy, but 
dangerous."  The referee's report quotes at some length from the 
response brief, which expands on this assertion.  These assertions 
are not supported by record citations or specific findings made in 
this matter and we will not discuss them further.  
No. 
2020AP201-D   
 
12 
 
psychological evaluation that apparently helped resolve that case.  
The referee also considered it "strongly mitigating" that Attorney 
Stern provided pro bono representation to F.J. in several other 
matters and she acknowledged that "Attorney Stern has absolutely 
expressed his sincere remorse for his errors."   
¶31 However, the referee concluded that a public reprimand 
would be insufficient to impress upon Attorney Stern the 
seriousness of his misconduct.  The referee specifically noted 
that although his prior incidents of misconduct were somewhat 
remote in time, this is now the second time that Attorney Stern 
has been disciplined for communicating with a party he knew to be 
represented by a lawyer without the consent of the person's lawyer.   
¶32 Still, the referee was not persuaded that a 90-day 
suspension was necessary, explaining that the numerous mitigating 
factors dictated a shorter suspension.  The referee opined that 
the cases cited by the OLR in support of a 90-day suspension 
involved more serious misconduct than that committed by Attorney 
Stern.  See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Alfredson, 2019 WI 17, 385 Wis. 2d 565, 923 N.W.2d 869 (imposing 
90-day suspension for, inter alia, failing to hold client funds in 
trust, failing to promptly deliver funds, converting client funds, 
and failure to cooperate with the OLR); In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Brey, 171 Wis. 2d 65, 490 N.W.2d 15 (1992) 
(imposing 60-day suspension on district attorney with no prior 
discipline for meeting with a represented defendant in jail without 
his lawyer and discussing a plea deal with him then misrepresenting 
his conduct to the OLR); Public Reprimand of Stephen W. Carpenter, 
No. 
2020AP201-D   
 
13 
 
No. 
1992-9 
(electronic 
copy 
available 
at 
https://compendium.wicourts.gov/app/raw/ 
000303.html) (attorney met with inmate three times without 
counsel's consent).  On balance, the referee recommended this court 
suspend Attorney Stern's license to practice law for 45 days and 
that he be required to pay the full costs of this disciplinary 
proceeding. 
¶33 There is no showing that any of the referee's findings 
of fact, based on the parties' stipulation, are clearly erroneous, 
so we adopt them.  We also agree with the referee's legal 
conclusions that Attorney Stern violated the Supreme Court Rules 
noted above and that Attorney Stern's misconduct merits a license 
suspension.  The cases cited by Attorney Stern in support of his 
request for a public reprimand are not persuasive.  Several involve 
lawyers who had no previous discipline.  See In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Preloznik, 169 Wis. 2d 137, 485 N.W.2d 249 
(1992) (imposing public reprimand on attorney not previously 
disciplined who entered into a business transaction with a client 
with potentially differing interests without the client's 
consent); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Luther, 2017 WI 
98, 378 Wis. 2d 330, 903 N.W.2d 791 (imposing public reprimand on 
attorney with no previous discipline for her role in in a fee based 
debt settlement plan).   
¶34 With respect to the appropriate sanction, after careful 
consideration, we agree with the referee's reasoning, but while 
the referee recommended a 45-day license suspension, a 60-day 
license suspension is, generally, our minimum suspension length.  
No. 
2020AP201-D   
 
14 
 
We are not persuaded that we should diverge from this practice in 
this case.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Grady, 188 
Wis. 2d 98, 108–09, 523 N.W.2d 564 (1994); In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Gray, 2018 WI 39, ¶14, 381 Wis. 2d 56, 910 
N.W.2d 923.  This is Attorney Stern's sixth disciplinary 
proceeding and it is concerning that Attorney Stern committed the 
initial misconduct in the F.J. matter a mere week after his law 
license was reinstated.  We determine that a 60-day suspension is 
appropriate discipline.  As is our normal practice, we deem it 
appropriate to impose the full costs of this proceeding on Attorney 
Stern. 
¶35 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Walter W. Stern, III, 
to practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of 60 days, 
effective January 4, 2022. 
¶36 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Walter W. Stern, III, shall 
comply with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of 
an attorney whose license to practice law has been suspended. 
¶37 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all 
conditions of this order is required for reinstatement.  See 
SCR 22.29(4)(c). 
¶38 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no restitution is imposed 
upon Walter W. Stern, III, in this matter. 
¶39 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date of 
this order, Walter W. Stern, III, shall pay to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation the full costs of this proceeding, which are $5,515.41 
as of August 27, 2021. 
 
No. 
2020AP201-D   
 
 
 
1