Title: STATE v COOPER
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 12231
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: December 27, 1972

No. 12231 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1972 T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs - W A L T E R T H O M A S COOPER, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Fifteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable M, James Sorte, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Harrison, Loendorf and Poston, Helena, Montana. Jerome T. Loendorf argued, Helena, Montana. For Respondent : Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana. Jonathan B. Smith argued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana. James A. McCann, County Attorney, argued, Wolf Point, Montana. Submitted: September 25, 1972 M r . Justice Sene 3. Ualy delivered the Opinion of the Court. Defendant, Walter Thomas Cooper, was convicted of the crime of a s s a u l t i n the f i r s t degree i n the d i s t r i c t court of the f i f t e e n t h j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t , Roosevelt County. Following the verdict of g u i l t y , the county attorney f i l e d under section 94- $713, R.C.M. 1947, an information charging defendant with p r i o r felony convictions t o seek increased punishment beyond t h a t prescribed by section 94-601, R.C.M. 1947, (assault i n the f i r s t degree), of not l e s s than f i v e years nor more than twenty years. The procedural process s e t forth i n section 95-1506, R..C.M. 1947,Montana Code of Criminal Procedure, governing increased punishment was followed. Thereafter, defendant was sentenced under section 94-4713, R.C.M. 1947, t o an increased term of t h i r t y years i n the s t a t e prison. The judgment of the d i s t r i c t court was appealed t o t h i s Court. The conviction was affirmed. The increased sentence was s e t aside and the cause remanded t o Che d i s t r i c t courc f o r further proceedings and sentencing. The record did not contain competent evidence t o e s t a b l i s h the i d e n t i t y of defendant a s the person alleged by the s t a t e t o have been convicted of p r i o r crimes, so a s t o permit the court t o proceed under section 94-4713, R.C.13. 1947. S t a t e v. Walter Thomas Cooper, 158 Mont. 102, 489 P.2d 99, 28 St.Rep. 835, On November 4 , 1971, a f t e r the cause was returned t o the d i - s t r i c t court, the s t a t e again sought increased punishment of defendant a s a p r i o r convicted felon under section 94-4713, R.C.M. 1947. The s t a t e charged defendant by information with two prior cilnvictions (1) t h a t defendant was convicted d a s s a u l t with i n t e n t t o k i l l a t Quincy, California, on or about January 25, 1965, and (2) t h a t defendant was convicted of grand larceny a t Sidney, Montana, on or about November 15, 1967. Following t h i s proceeding, the d i s t r i c t court resentenced defendant t o t h i r t y years i n the Montana s t a t e prison. Defendant appeals from t h i s sentence and presents three issues f o r review: I. Whether the d i s t r i c t court erred i n admitting s t a t e ' s exhibit "J" i n evidence? 2. bfi~ether the d i s t r i c t court erred i.n admitting s t a t e ' s exhibit "K" i n evidence? 3. Whether there was s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o support the finding by the court of a prior conviction? s t a t e ' s exhibit "J" i s a l e t t e r t o the Roosevelt County Attorney from an investigator f o r the s h e r i f f of Plums County, California. The l e t t e r was signed by Leonard Mosely, Investiga- t o r , and was a l s o signed by Raynelle Slaten, Plumas County Clerk and ex-officio c l e r k of the superior court of t h a t county. The l e t t e r was impressed with the c l e r k ' s o f f i c i a l s e a l , The s t a t e has admitted t h a t the form of acknowledgment prescribed by the California s t a t u t e s was not complete. Exhibit "J" s t a t e s t h a t the investigator c e r t i f i e s t h a t the photographs attached t o the l e t t e r a r e those of Walter Thomas Cooper, who was found g u i l t y of v i o l a t i o n of Section 245 of the California Penal Code, assault with a deadly weapon. When s t a t e ' s exhibit "J" was offered i n t o evidence, defendant objected t h a t no attempt was made t o i d e n t i f y , authenticate o r prove it and t h a t exhibit "J" was merely hearsay, but the court admitted the exhibit over the objection. Defendant argues again i n t h i s appeal t h a t section 94-7209, R.GM. 1947, provides the r u l e s of evidence i n c i v i l actions a r e a l s o applicable t o the criminal code regarding the admissibility of s t a t e ' s exhibit "J". Defendant argues t h a t Nontana law divides writing i n t o two kinds, public and private. Sections 93-1001-1, 1001-2,1001-3, 3,C.M. 1947. He contends the s t a t e did not attempt t o comply with the law governing the admissibility of e i t h e r type of writing i n evidence. Further, t h a t because none of the requirements for proving a writing a s s e t f o r t h i n the above c i t e d s t a t u t e s were met, it was error f o r the d i s t r i c t court t o admit s t a t e ' s exhibit "J" without any proof. The second exhibit objected t o by defendant i s state's exhibit "K", which i s an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n record maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The s t a t e i n attempting t o Lay a foundation f o r the introduction i n t o evidence of t h i s exhibit, f i r s t called Richard Lee, an FBI agent, t o describe t h e process of obtaining an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n record. M r . Lee s t a t e d t h a t when a fingerprint card i s forwarded t o the FBI i t i s compared t o the fingerprint cards on f i l e and i f the fingerprints forwarded match any of those on f i l e then the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n record of the person whose p r i n t s were matched i.s returned t o the requesting party. The record reveals by way of testimony of the Roosevelt County Attorney and the Roosevelt County Sheriff t h a t neither individual knew who prepared the p a r t i c u l a r fingerprint card t h a t was mailed t o the FBI, although the Roosevelt County Attorney could t e s t i f y t h a t a fingerprint card was forwarded t o the FBI. Defendant strongly urges t h a t no evidence was introduced t o i d e n t i f y the fingerprints mailed t o the FBI a s those of defendant, Walter Thomas Cooper, Defendant s t a t e s t h a t no one was able t o t e s t i f y a s t o whose fingerprints were sent t o the !%I, and the County Attorney merely presumed they were ~ o o p e r ' s . Defendant c i t e s D e Gesualdo v. People, 147 Colo. 426, 364 P.2d 374, 86 kLR2d 1435, i n which the Colorado Supreme Court held t h a t assumptions cannot be indulged i n t h i s sensitive area of the law and pointed out t h a t i t s decisions consistently required s t r i c t proof. D e Gesualdo i s a similar case i n which the defendant was charged wj-th having been convicted of felonies on two p r i o r occasions, The only evidence t o identify the defendant with che person previously convicted was the testimony of an identi- f i c a t i o n bureau expert who t e s t i f i e d from an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n card i n h i s possession a s t o h i s comparison of fingerprints and the photograph on the card with fingerprints on f i l e i n the o f f i c e of the l o c a l s h e r i f f . The court held the evidence was i n s u f f i c i e n t t o support the p r i o r conviction charge because the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n card r e l i e d on a s a connecting l i n k was not introduced i n evidence, and no evidence was introduced t o identify the fingerprints i n the l o c a l s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e a s those of defendant. The s t a t e contends the l e g i s l a t u r e , i n adopting the Montana Code of Criminal Procedure i n 1967, T i t l e 95, R.C.M, 1947, granted i n section 95-1506 the discretion t o the court alone t o make the determination of whether the defendant t o be sentenced i-s g u i l t y of a p r i o r conviction a f t e r the issue of g u i l t has been decided i n a second prosecution. It further contends the sentencing procedure i s l e s s s t r i c t under the new Code, sections 95-2203 through 95-2205, R.C.M. 1947, which allows a court t o consider outside reports about the defendant when determining h i s sentence. Section 95-2206, R.C.M. 1947, i s offered t o show t h a t the t r i a l court i s given wide discretion i n the type o f sentence t o be imposed; and thus the s t a t e contends the r i g i d r u l e s of evidence r e q u i s i t e i n the t r i a l of the issue of g u i l t should not be imposed on the court a t the presentence hearing. The s t a t e c i t e s i n sup o r t Williams v. N e w York, 337 U.S. 241, <-p 69 S.Ct. 1079, 93 L ' e d 2d 1337. The misconception demonstrated i n t h i s case l i e s i n the I' assutnption t h a t the proceedings t o increase punishment" i s part of the sentencing procedure; it i s not and the s t a t u t e s under which we proceed a r e very c l e a r . The f a c t t h a t the judge I I makes the determination under the new procedure" code, section 95-1506, R.C.M. 1947, does not change the character of the proceedings from the procedural method prior t o the new c ~ d e when the matter was t r i e d t o the jury. When the s t a t e proceeds against a defendant and alleges a cri-me, i t must prove a l l the material allegations by competent evidence a s required by iaw beyond a reasonable doubt, and i f successful can impose the sentence assigned by s t a t u t e t o t h a t particular crime. I f the s t a t e e l e c t s t o allege further t h a t Che defendant i s a prior felon and seeks an increase i n or beyond t h a t sentence authorized by s t a t u t e for conviction of the prindpal crime, then the s t a t e must carry the additional burden of proving the allegation of the p r i o r offenses i n the same manner as the other material allegations, beyond a reasonable doubt, with competent evidence. I f the s t a t e i s successful, the court i s then authorized t o proceed under section 94-4713, R.C.M. 1947, and impose the increased sentence provided by t h a t s t a t u t e . A t t h i s point i n the criminal process when the t r i a l judge is authorized t o sentence under section 94-4713, R.C.M. 1947, he has a l l of the l a t i t u d e provided by the sentencing sections 95-2203 through 95-2205, R.C.M. 1947, and may consider outside reports, presentence investigation,et c e t e r a , t o inform the court a s t o the whole person as s e t f o r t h p a r t i c u l a r l y i n section 95-2204, R.C.M. 1947. I n t h i s cause there has been some comment concerning the exhibits t h a t were admitted by the d i s t r i c t court. W e w i l l proceed t o examine those c e r t i f i e d t o us by the t r i a l court. The objection t o exhibit "K", the FBI "rap" sheer, i s valid. The statement by the s t a t e t h a t fingerprint evidence f o r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n has been accepted by t h i s and other courts as proof of i d e n t i t y i s correct. However, the fingerprint method of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n requires an i n court showing t h a t the fingerprints r e l i e d upon f o r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n a r e i d e n t i c a l t o the known p r i n t s of defendant. This i s basically the holding i n D e Gesualdo. W e have exanlined exhibit "J" and taken together with proper1.y c e r t i f i e d documents from the same source (1) exhibit "F", tilinute entry of arraignment and plea of defendant; (2) exhibit "E", report of probation o f f i c e r s and judgment; (3) exhibit " G " , order suspending execution of sentence; and (4) exhibit "I", release on probation, we find the same ex-officio'clerk of court Raynelle Slaten, c e r t i f i e d by the judge of the superior court a s being such, and the documents "F", "En, "G" and "I" being i n due form of law and practice of the s t a t e of California, t o be the same person who signed and placed the affixed s e a l on exhibit "3". That the investigator f o r the s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e made the a t t e s t i n g statement rather than the ex-officio clerk i s a claimed technical e r r o r i n form. The business record kept by the s h e r i f f ' s department i s not a record o r f i l e of the c l e r k ' s o f f i c e , a s were the accompanying exhibits. ~ e f e n d a n t 's objection t o the introduction of exhibit "J" was t h a t it was merely hearsay. Instruments presented i n court a r e a l l secondhand o r out of court assertions, sworn or not, and an exception t o the hearsay r u l e i s established by the kind of document, i t s authenticity , the probability of fraud being practiced on the court and whether or not the genuineness of the offered document has been challenged. Authenticity f o r admissibility can be demonstrated by d i r e c t or circumstantial evidence and sufficiency of the evidence f o r foundation i s within the discretion of the t r i a l judge. A s discussed previously, the exhibits a l l being r e l a t e d and from the same source and considered together, they have the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of inherent trustworthiness s u f f i c i e n t t o move the t r i a l court t o grant admission. From these documents, the t r i a l court had substantial credible evidence upon which t o base a finding of commission and i d e n t i t y beyond a reasonable doubt i n r e l a t i o n t o the California conviction. W e therefore affirm t h i s finding and based thereon, the sentence of the t r i a l court is affirmed. We Concur: ................................ Associate Justices. Mr. Chief Justice James T. Harrison, deeming himself disqualified, took no part in this Opinion.