Title: Ex parte Alabama Department of Revenue.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1190826
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: October 30, 2020

Rel: October 30, 2020
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2020-2021
____________________
1190826
____________________
Ex parte Alabama Department of Revenue
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: State of Alabama, Department of Revenue
v.
Greenetrack, Inc.)
(Greene Circuit Court, CV-19-900056)
BOLIN, Justice.
The Alabama Department of Revenue petitions this Court
for a writ of mandamus ordering Judge Eddie Hardaway to recuse
1190826
himself from an appeal challenging a decision of the Alabama
Tax Tribunal in favor of Greenetrack, Inc.  We grant the
petition and issue the writ.
Facts and Procedural History
In 2009, the Alabama Department of Revenue determined
that Greenetrack owed $75 million in sales taxes and consumer-
use taxes for its electronic-bingo activities for the period
from January 1, 2004, through December 31, 2008.  On June 11,
2011, Greenetrack filed a notice of appeal from the tax
assessments in the Greene Circuit Court.  See § 40-2A-7(b)(5),
Ala. Code 1975.  The case was styled as Alabama Department of
Revenue v. Greenetrack, Inc., was docketed as case no. CV-
2011-000015, and was assigned to Judge Hardaway.  It appears
from the materials before us that the case was consolidated
with Greenetrack, Inc. v. Tim Russell, in his official
capacity as the Commissioner of Revenue for the Alabama
Department of Revenue, case no. CV-2009-900048, an action
filed by Greenetrack challenging certificates of lien for
taxes filed by the Alabama Department of Revenue.  On October
16, 2013, the Alabama Department of Revenue moved for Judge
Hardaway to recuse himself in both cases, arguing that recusal
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was required because Judge Hardaway had recused himself two
months earlier from another case on a related matter involving
these same parties, styled as State of Alabama v. Greenetrack,
case no. CV-2011-900030.  The Alabama Department of Revenue
noted that Judge Hardaway, in his notice of recusal and
request for assignment of a judge in State of Alabama v.
Greenetrack, case no.  CV-2011-900030, stated in the section
entitled "reason for recusal": 
"[The State] ask[s] that I recuse because I presided
over State of Alabama v. [825 Electronic Gambling
Devices, CV-2010-20,1] in which the Supreme Court
removed me from said case because of several orders
I entered in the case."
On October 17, 2013, Greenetrack responded, arguing that
evidence that Judge Hardaway had been removed in one case
(case no. CV-2010-20) and had recused himself in another
involving the same parties did not satisfy the burden of the
1After this Court had entered over a four-day period three
emergency orders vacating three separate orders of the trial
court before ultimately dismissing the appeals in State of
Alabama v. 825 Electronic Gambling Devices (No. 1091340, July
1, 2010) and State of Alabama v. 825 Electronic Gambling
Devices et al. (No. 1091342, July 1, 2010), a case seeking the
forfeiture of 825 electronic-gaming machines, this Court
removed Judge Hardaway from presiding over the underlying
case. Even though a properly supported motion seeking his
recusal had not been heard in the trial court, this Court
determined that the removal of Judge Hardaway was necessary to
preserve the appearance of justice and fairness.
3
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Alabama Department of Revenue to  prove that his recusal was
necessary.  Judge Hardaway, however, rejected Greenetrack's
argument and on July 5, 2014, entered orders recusing himself
from case no. CV-2011-000015 and case no. CV-2009-900048.  In
the orders, Judge Hardaway provided that, after considering
the submitted motions and the law, he was recusing himself "to
avoid any appearance of bias or impropriety." 
Alabama Department of Revenue v. Greenetrack, case no.
CV-2011-000015, was then assigned to Judge D. Al Crowson. 
Before the case was litigated, Greenetrack exercised its 
right
to pursue its challenge to the tax assessments with the
Alabama Tax Tribunal, see § 40-2A-7(b)(5), Ala. Code 1975. 
The Greene Circuit Court dismissed the action.  On August 29,
2019, the Alabama Tax Tribunal entered a judgment in favor of
Greenetrack.
On September 27, 2019, the Alabama Department of Revenue
filed a notice of appeal and complaint in the Greene Circuit
Court, seeking reversal of the Alabama Tax Tribunal's final
order2 and affirmation of the Alabama Department of Revenue's
assessments against Greenetrack for $75 million in 
sales taxes
2Greenetrack, Inc., Taxpayer v. State of Alabama, Dep't
of Revenue, case no. S. 11-422-JP, August 29, 2019.
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and consumer-use taxes for its electronic-bingo activities
from January 1, 2004, through December 31, 2008.  See §
40-2B-2(m)(2), Ala. Code 1975.3  The case was styled as State
of Alabama, Department of Revenue v. Greenetrack, Inc., was
docketed as case no. CV-2019-900056, and was assigned to Judge
Hardaway.
On October 11, 2019, the Alabama Department of Revenue
filed a motion asking Judge Hardaway to recuse himself.  In
its motion, the Alabama Department of Revenue argued that
Judge Hardaway had recused himself "to avoid any appearance of
bias or impropriety" in case no. CV-2011-000015, a challenge
to the same tax assessments that are at issue in this case;
had recused himself in case no. CV-2009-900048; and had
recused himself in 2013 in case no. CV-2011-900030, a third
case between the parties involving the seizure of gambling
devices.  The Alabama Department of Revenue reasoned that,
because the reasons for recusal in the earlier cases remained,
Judge Hardaway should recuse himself in the underlying case. 
3Section 40-2B-2(m)(2) provides:  "[T]he Department of
Revenue may appeal to circuit court from a final or other
appealable order issued by the Alabama Tax Tribunal by filing
a notice of appeal with the appropriate circuit court within
30 days from the date the final or other appealable order was
entered."
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On March 23, 2020, Greenetrack filed its response, making the
same arguments it made in its response to the motion to recuse
filed in case no. CV-2011-000015.  Specifically, Greenetrack
argued: 
"[Judge Hardaway's] recusal or disqualification in
... prior cases with very limited issues presented
in them does not require recusal in the instant case
related solely to the Department of Revenue's appeal
from a final tax assessment held void by the Alabama
Tax Tribunal."   
On April 8, 2020, the Alabama Department of Revenue filed its
reply, arguing that Judge Hardaway had properly recused
himself from hearing case no. CV-2011-000015, "to avoid any
appearance of bias or impropriety," and that he should do so
in this case.  The Alabama Department of Revenue maintained
that, although the underlying action  is an appeal filed by
the Alabama Department of Revenue, the case constitutes
continued litigation of case no. CV-2011-00015.  The Alabama
Department of Revenue reasoned that, even though the
underlying case has a different case number, Judge Hardaway's
recusal is required because, it said, the substantive issues
remain the same, the parties remain the same, the tax
assessments remain the same, and the reasons supporting
recusal remain the same as those presented in case no. CV-
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2011-000015.  The Alabama Department of Revenue urged: 
"Nothing has changed save for the passage of time, a trip to
the Tax Tribunal, and a new case number."  Additionally, the
Alabama Department of Revenue insisted: 
"[T]he State has never before, nor does it argue
now, that the Court should recuse itself from any
case involving it or Greenetrack, when presented as
a single party.  Instead, it was the combination of
both parties and their consequent interactions with
the Court that provided the impetus for the Court's
previous recusal and removal."
On April 15, 2020, the circuit court conducted a hearing on
the motion to recuse.4  On May 31, 2020, the circuit court
denied the Alabama Department of Revenue's motion to recuse
without providing any specific rationale or reasoning in its
order, stating: "The cases and authorities relied upon by the
Alabama Department of Revenue do not support recusal under the
facts and circumstances of this case." On July 10, 2020, the
Alabama Department of Revenue petitioned this Court for a writ
of mandamus directing Judge Hardaway to recuse himself.
Standard of Review
"A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy,
and it 'will be issued only when there is: 1) a
clear legal right in the petitioner to the order
4A transcript of the hearing is not included in the
materials submitted to this Court.
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sought; 2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to
perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; 3) the
lack of another adequate remedy; and 4) properly
invoked jurisdiction of the court.'"
Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173, 176 (Ala. 2000)(quoting Ex
parte United Serv. Stations, Inc., 628 So. 2d 501, 503 (Ala.
1993)).
"A mandamus petition is a proper method by which
to seek review of a trial court's denial of a motion
to recuse. Ex parte City of Dothan Pers. Bd., 831
So. 2d 1, 5 (Ala. 2002); Ex parte Cotton, 638 So. 2d
870, 872 (Ala. 1994), abrogated on other grounds, Ex
parte Crawford, 686 So. 2d 196 (Ala. 1996). A trial
judge's ruling on a motion to recuse is reviewed to
determine whether the judge exceeded his or her
discretion. See Borders v. City of Huntsville, 875
So. 2d 1168, 1176 (Ala. 2003).  The necessity for
recusal is evaluated by the 'totality of the facts'
and circumstances in each case.  Dothan Pers. Bd.,
831 So. 2d at 2. The test is whether '"facts are
shown which make it reasonable for members of the
public or a party, or counsel opposed to question
the impartiality of the judge."'  In re Sheffield,
465 
So. 
2d 
350, 
355–56 
(Ala. 
1984)(quoting
Acromag–Viking v. Blalock, 420 So. 2d 60, 61 (Ala.
1982))."
Ex parte George, 962 So. 2d 789, 791 (Ala. 2006).
Discussion
The Alabama Department of Revenue contends that it has a
clear legal right to the recusal of Judge Hardaway from the
underlying case.  Specifically, the Alabama Department of
Revenue urges that Judge Hardaway exceeded his discretion in
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denying its motion to recuse because, it insists, a reasonable
person would question Judge Hardaway's impartiality in light
of his recusal in earlier challenges to the tax assessments at
issue in the underlying case, as well as his recusals in other
cases involving the same parties and this Court's removal of
Judge Hardaway in a case involving the same parties without
the issue of recusal having been heard in the circuit court.
"Canon 2(A)[, Canons of Judicial Ethics,] states:
"'A judge should respect and comply
with the law and should conduct himself at
all times in a manner that promotes public
confidence 
in 
the 
integrity 
and
impartiality of the judiciary.'
"Given the concept of promoting public confidence in
the system, Canon 3(C)(1)[, Canons of Judicial
Ethics,]  states that '[a] judge should disqualify
himself 
in 
a 
proceeding 
in 
which 
... 
his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned' by
members of the public, a party, or counsel.  See
Wallace [v. Wallace, 352 So. 2d 1376 (Ala. Civ. App.
1977)]; Acromag-Viking v. Blalock, 420 So. 2d 60
(Ala. 1982); affirmed on other grounds, 474 So. 2d
91 (Ala. 1985).  Nonetheless, recusal is not
required based on a 'mere accusation of bias
unsupported by substantial fact. Each case must
stand on its own.'  Wallace, supra at 1379; see
Acromag-Viking, supra; Ford v. Ford, 412 So. 2d 789
(Ala. Civ. App. 1982); Miller v. Miller, 385 So. 2d
54 (Ala. Civ. App.), cert. denied, 385 So. 2d 56
(Ala. 1980). ...  'For the law will not suppose a
possibility of bias or favor in a judge who is
already sworn to administer impartial justice and
whose 
authority 
greatly 
depends 
upon 
that
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presumption and idea.'  Fulton [v. Longshore], 156
Ala. [611,] 613, 46 So. [989,] 990 [(1908)]."
Ex parte Balogun, 516 So. 2d 606, 609 (Ala. 1987), abrogated
on other grounds, Ex parte Crawford, 686 So. 2d 196 (Ala.
1996).  Prejudice on the part of a judge is not presumed, see
Hartman v. Board of Trs. of Univ. of Alabama, 436 So. 2d 837,
841 (Ala. 1983), and substantial evidence must support a
finding that disqualification of a judge is required, see Ex
parte Melof, 553 So. 2d 554, 557 (Ala. 1989), abrogated on
other grounds, Ex parte Crawford, 686 So. 2d 196 (Ala. 1996). 
The test to be applied is: "'"'Would a person of ordinary
prudence in the judge's position knowing all the facts known
to the judge find that there is a reasonable basis for
questioning the judge's impartiality?'"'"  Ex parte Monsanto
Co., 862 So. 2d 595, 605 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Ex parte City of
Dothan Pers. Bd., 831 So. 2d 1, 6 (Ala. 2002), quoting in turn
Ex parte Duncan, 638 So. 2d 1332, 1334 (Ala. 1994)).
"'[A] judge's recusal in a prior case involving
a party is not alone sufficient for disqualification
in a later case involving that party.'  Communities
for Equity v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 459
F.3d 676, 699 (6th Cir. 2006)(summarizing the
holding in Person v. General Motors Corp., 730 F.
Supp. 516, 518-19 (W.D.N.Y. 1990)).  The party
moving for recusal of the trial judge must still
present substantial evidence showing that it is
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1190826
'"reasonable for members of the public or a party,
or counsel opposed to question the impartiality of
the judge."' Ex parte Duncan, 638 So. 2d [1332,]
1334 [(Ala. 1994)] (quoting Acromag-Viking v.
Blalock, 420 So. 2d 60, 61 (Ala. 1982))."
Ex parte Rogers, 218 So. 3d 859, 865-66 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016). 
When recusal is required, a judge may reassume jurisdiction
over a case only when the disqualification that led to his or
her recusal has been removed.  Ex parte George, 962 So. 2d at
792.  
According to the Alabama Department of Revenue, Judge
Hardaway's recusal in the underlying case is 
required because,
it says, the disqualification that led to his earlier recusals
and removal remain present.  The Alabama Department of Revenue
insists that nothing has changed that would obviate Judge
Hardaway's earlier disqualification; consequently, it reasons
that Judge Hardaway's impartiality over the underlying case
might reasonably be questioned.  In support of its contention,
the Alabama Department of Revenue directs this Court to Ex
parte Balogun, supra.
In Ex parte Balogun, after the parties' divorce case had
settled and certain documents that had been identified for
trial  (allegedly involving the husband, the Macon County Dog
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Track, and unethical conduct) had been turned over to law-
enforcement agencies and other parties, the former husband
moved to have the trial court return all the exhibits in the
divorce case.  When the former husband learned that the trial
judge was the one who had turned over the documents to law-
enforcement agencies, the former husband moved for the trial
judge to recuse himself from further proceedings in the
divorce case.  The former husband reasoned that the trial
judge's giving the documents to law-enforcement agencies was
an indication of bias.  The trial court denied the motion,
finding that the relinquishing  of the documents to law-
enforcement agencies did not show bias.  This Court agreed
that giving the documents to law-enforcement agencies did not
show bias on the trial judge's part but held that the trial
judge's recusals in two earlier cases and the reasons
supporting those recusals constituted substantial evidence
requiring the trial judge's recusal.  The two earlier cases
involved the Macon County Dog Track, and, when recusing
himself from those cases, the trial judge had reasoned that
his recusals were required because his impartiality might be
questioned.  The trial judge stated that he had expressed
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1190826
opinions regarding the legalization of dog racing in both a
legal and political context and that his views were known by
the public.  This Court held that the evidence of the trial
judge's two earlier recusals in cases involving the Macon
County Dog Track and the trial judge's reasons set forth for
those recusals demonstrated that "a person of ordinary
prudence could reasonably question [the trial judge's]
impartiality" and, thus, that the former husband had met his
burden of proof.  Ex parte Balogun, case no. 516 So. 2d at
610.
Greenetrack, on the other hand, contends that evidence of
Judge Hardaway's earlier recusals and removal and the reasons
set forth explaining his disqualifications leading to them do
not satisfy the Alabama Department of Revenue's burden of
proving that recusal is necessary.  According to Greenetrack,
Judge Hardaway's removal by this Court in State of Alabama v.
825 Electronic Gambling Devices, case no. CV-2010-20 (see note
1 supra), and his earlier recusals in the initial challenge to
the tax assessments, case no. CV-2011-000015, and a challenge
to the certificates of lien for taxes, case no. CV-2009-
900048, in and of themselves do not provide substantial
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evidence to question Judge Hardaway's impartiality in the
underlying case.  Greenetrack maintains that the underlying
case, in which the Alabama Department of Revenue appeals the
final order of the Alabama Tax Tribunal that voided the tax
assessments against it, constitutes a brand new case, and it
states that the Alabama Department of Revenue presented no
evidence indicating that Judge Hardaway "expressly or
impliedly [has] shown any bias for or prejudice against either
party, or has acted or failed to act in any manner that would
give the appearance of impropriety."  Ex parte Rogers, 218 So.
3d at 865. Greenetrack reasons that a reasonable, prudent
person could understand that the passage of time could
mitigate or completely alleviate the circumstances or
conditions that required Judge Hardaway to recuse himself or
be removed in the previous proceedings.  In support of its
contention, Greenetrack relies on Ex parte Rogers.  
In Ex parte Rogers, the former wife sought the recusal of
the trial judge in a postdivorce action based on the trial
judge's recusal in the divorce case.  In the postdivorce
action, as she did in the divorce action in which the trial
judge had recused himself, the former wife argued that the
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1190826
trial judge's impartiality could be questioned because the
former husband's father, an attorney and a potential witness,
practiced before the trial judge and the trial judge's
interactions with the former husband's father would place the
trial judge in an awkward position when reaching a decision. 
The trial judge denied the former wife's motion to recuse. 
The former wife then petitioned the Court of Civil Appeals for
a writ of mandamus directing the trial judge to recuse
himself.  In support of her request, the former wife urged
that application of the law set forth in Ex parte Balogun
required issuance of the writ.  The Court of Civil Appeals
disagreed, noting that, unlike the evidence in Ex parte
Balogun, the evidence did not establish that the trial judge
had made public comments regarding the former wife or the
former husband, nor did the evidence indicate that the trial
judge had "shown any bias for or against either party, or
[had] acted or failed to act in any manner that would give the
appearance of impropriety."  218 So. 3d at 865.  The Court of
Civil Appeals further observed that the trial judge in his
answer to the former wife's petition for a writ of mandamus
stated that, at that time, unlike when the divorce case was
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pending, the former husband's father rarely practiced before
the court and, consequently, the passage of time had removed
the earlier reason for recusal.  Accordingly, the Court of
Civil Appeals held that the former wife had not met her burden
of producing substantial evidence that a reasonable person
could question the trial judge's impartiality or that there
was an appearance of impropriety stemming from the trial
judge's recusal in the divorce case.
Although Ex parte Balogun and Ex parte Rogers are
instructive, this case is unique.  The State and Greenetrack
have a lengthy history of litigation before Judge Hardaway; 
Judge Hardaway has recused himself in several cases involving
these parties; in one case this Court ordered Judge Hardaway's
removal without the issue having been entertained in the
circuit court; and Judge Hardaway recused himself in
Greenetrack's initial challenge to the tax assessments filed
in the circuit court.  We are mindful that issues in some of
the earlier cases, such as the legality of electronic bingo
and the propriety of the seizure of gaming machines or illegal
gambling devices are not issues in the underlying case.  We
further recognize that the main issue presented in the
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underlying case is whether the Alabama Tax Tribunal properly
ruled that the  tax assessments were void, and we admit that
the passage of time and factual distinctions may have tempered
the reasons supporting the past recusals and removal. 
However, in light of the totality of the facts and
circumstances surrounding the past decisions of recusal and
removal and the litigiousness of the parties regarding past
recusal requests, a reasonable, prudent person might question
the impartiality of Judge Hardaway.  And, because nothing in
the materials before us indicates that the reasons for recusal
set forth in  case no. CV-2011-000015 and case no. CV-2009-
900048 do not remain, we agree with the Alabama Department of
Revenue that the reasons for recusal in the earlier cases
remain5 and that Judge Hardaway exceeded his discretion when
5We observe that neither Greenetrack nor Judge Hardaway
provides any evidence or offers any reason, other than the
passage of time, regarding why the reasons for recusal or
removal that existed in the other cases do not remain.  This
statement does not obviate the burden on the party requesting
recusal 
to 
present 
substantial 
evidence 
that 
it 
is
"'"reasonable for members of the public or a party, or counsel
opposed to question the impartiality of the judge."'" Ex parte
Rogers, 218 So. 3d at 865-66.  This observation should not be 
viewed as creating a burden-shifting process; rather, it is
simply an observation that, in this case, in light of the
contentiousness between these parties and the interactions
with the circuit court, the totality of the facts and
circumstances in earlier cases, and Judge Hardaway's earlier
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he refused to recuse himself in the underlying case. As we
stated in Ex parte Smith, 282 So. 3d 831, 841 (Ala. 2019):
"'"A fair and impartial judge is the cornerstone of the
integrity of the judicial system.  Even the appearance of
partiality [or bias] can erode the public's confidence in the
integrity of the judiciary."'" (Quoting State v. Moore, 988
So. 2d 597, 601 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007), quoting in turn In re
Judicial 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Laatsch, 
299 
Wis. 
2d
144, 150, 727 N.W.2d 488, 491 (Wis. 2007).)
Lastly, we decline the request of the Alabama Department
of Revenue in its petition to reassign this case.  This Court
has set forth well established procedures for a trial judge to
request reassignment of a case once a trial judge recuses
himself or herself or is disqualified, and the materials
before us indicate that Judge Hardaway, when having recused
himself in other cases, has followed those procedures;
therefore, the Alabama Department of Revenue has not
demonstrated a clear, legal right to relief in this regard. 
Conclusion
recusal in Greenetrack's initial challenge to the tax
assessments in the circuit court, nothing in the materials
before us indicates that the reasons for the earlier recusals
or removal no longer remain.
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The Alabama Department of Revenue has demonstrated a
clear, legal right to the recusal of Judge Hardaway in the
underlying case.  Accordingly, we grant its petition and
direct Judge Hardaway to recuse himself in the underlying
case.
PETITION GRANTED;  WRIT ISSUED.
Shaw, Wise, Bryan, Stewart, and Mitchell, JJ., concur.
Parker, C.J., and Sellers, J., concur in the result.
19