Title: Connell v. Kersey
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 001729
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: June 8, 2001

Present:  All the Justices 
 
JAMES G. CONNELL, III 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 001729 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
June 8, 2001 
ANDREW KERSEY 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Jane Marum Roush, Judge 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court 
properly sustained a demurrer to a petition for writ of 
mandamus.  The petitioner had sought to compel a Commonwealth’s 
Attorney to produce records related to an ongoing criminal 
investigation or prosecution, asserting that the records were 
subject to disclosure under The Virginia Freedom of Information 
Act, Code § 2.1-340, et seq. (FOIA). 
BACKGROUND 
The parties do not dispute the principal facts.  James G. 
Connell, III, a resident of Virginia and an attorney-at-law 
serving as an Assistant Public Defender in Fairfax County, 
represents Ahmed Jamal Shireh in a felony criminal case being 
prosecuted by Fairfax County Assistant Commonwealth’s Attorney 
Andrew Kersey.  Connell became aware that Kersey was in 
possession of one or more police reports containing criminal 
incident information regarding Shireh’s alleged crime. 
On April 17, 2000, Connell requested in a letter that 
Kersey “send [Connell] any and all personnel, arrest, 
investigative, reportable incidents, and noncriminal incident 
records, as defined by Code § 15.2-1722, as well as any other 
records containing criminal incident information, as defined in 
Code § 2.1-342.2” related to Shireh’s alleged crime.  (Emphasis 
added).  Copies of the letter were sent by certified mail and 
hand delivered to Kersey. 
Upon receipt of Connell’s letter, Kersey telephoned Connell 
and advised him that, in Kersey’s opinion, the records Connell 
sought were not subject to disclosure during an ongoing criminal 
investigation or prosecution.  According to Kersey, Connell 
conceded during the telephone conversation that he was unaware 
of any legal authority that supported his interpretation of the 
FOIA, but insisted that Code § 2.1-342.2 nonetheless required 
disclosure of the requested records.  Kersey disagreed and 
declined to provide the records. 
On April 28, 2000, Connell, through retained counsel, 
advised Kersey that, in Connell’s opinion, Kersey’s failure to 
“respond[] as required by the [FOIA]” was a violation of the 
FOIA, and again requested that Kersey forward “records relating 
to the case of Commonwealth v. Ahmed Shireh” to Connell in order 
“to dispose of this matter without litigation.”  (Emphasis 
added).  Connell indicated that if Kersey failed to produce the 
 
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requested records, Connell was prepared to file a petition for 
writ of mandamus to have the records produced and that he would 
seek “civil penalties against [Kersey] in [his] individual 
capacity.” 
On May 2, 2000, Kersey wrote a letter to Connell’s counsel 
again asserting that the records sought were not subject to 
disclosure under express exemptions within the FOIA.  Kersey 
further noted that Connell’s “threat to seek civil penalties 
against [Kersey] is unfortunate and inappropriate.”  Kersey 
indicated his belief that the proposed petition for writ of 
mandamus was “utterly meritless and unwarranted by law” and 
cautioned that he might seek sanctions against Connell’s counsel 
if he chose to proceed with the threatened litigation. 
On May 5, 2000, Connell’s counsel responded to Kersey’s May 
2, 2000 letter by again disputing Kersey’s interpretation of the 
FOIA.  Connell’s counsel contended that the FOIA required Kersey 
to produce “criminal incident information,” as requested by 
Connell.  (Emphasis added).  Connell’s counsel further contended 
in this letter that Kersey’s “continued refusal to provide the 
requested information . . . only aggravates your violation of 
the [FOIA’s] requirements and strengthens our claim for civil 
penalties.” 
On May 8, 2000, Kersey replied to the May 5, 2000 letter, 
indicating that he believed the request for “ ‘criminal incident 
 
3
information’ . . . represents a change from Mr. Connell’s 
original letter to me and both your [April 28, 2000] letter and 
proposed Petition for Writ of Mandamus which demand [records] 
that contain ‘criminal incident information.’ ”  Kersey conceded 
that Connell was entitled to request “criminal incident 
information,” but not to receive the original records from which 
the information was compiled.  In the letter, Kersey provided a 
summary of the criminal incident information related to the 
arrest and prosecution of Shireh. 
On May 9, 2000, Connell filed a petition for writ of 
mandamus seeking an order directing Kersey to produce “all 
documents” within his control containing criminal incident 
information relating to the arrest and prosecution of Shireh 
that were subject to disclosure pursuant to Code § 2.1-342.2.  
Connell also sought attorney’s fees and costs and requested that 
the trial court impose “a civil penalty of not less than $100 
nor more than $1,000” against Kersey.  In a supporting 
memorandum, Connell asserted that the FOIA required the 
Commonwealth’s Attorney to produce copies of the original 
records containing criminal incident information, and not merely 
a summary of these records.  Connell further asserted that the 
requested sanction was appropriate under Code § 2.1-346.1, which 
provides for civil penalties “against members of public bodies” 
for willful and knowing violations of the FOIA.  Connell 
 
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contended that among other evidence of Kersey’s willful and 
knowing violation of the FOIA was his failure to respond to 
Connell’s original request within the time and under the 
procedures required by Code § 2.1-342. 
On May 17, 2000, Kersey filed a demurrer to the petition 
for writ of mandamus with a supporting brief.1  Kersey again 
asserted that the records originally requested by Connell were 
exempt from disclosure under Code § 2.1-342.2, and that he had 
supplied criminal incident information sufficient to satisfy the 
requirements of that code section.  With respect to the 
allegations of his failure to comply with Code § 2.1-342 and the 
request for a civil penalty, Kersey noted that the provisions of 
the FOIA relied upon by Connell related to requests made to 
“public bodies.”  Kersey asserted that the Commonwealth’s 
Attorney was not a member of a “public body” subject to the 
provisions of the FOIA cited by Connell.  Kersey also filed an 
answer and grounds of defense to the petition for writ of 
mandamus. 
                     
1 Kersey also filed a plea in bar asserting that Connell’s 
request was made on behalf of Shireh, who was incarcerated in 
the Fairfax County Adult Detention Center.  Kersey contended 
that Code § 2.1-342.01(C) barred incarcerated persons from 
exercising the rights afforded by the FOIA.  The trial court 
overruled the plea in bar, and Kersey has not assigned cross-
error to that action.  Accordingly, we express no opinion on 
this issue. 
 
5
On May 19, 2000, the trial court heard argument from the 
parties on Kersey’s demurrer.  During that hearing, and in a 
responding brief filed that same day, Connell contended that the 
Commonwealth’s Attorney, “whose office operations are wholly 
supported by public funds,” is a “public body” as defined in 
Code § 2.1-341, and that Kersey, as an Assistant Commonwealth’s 
Attorney, is a member of that public body.  He further contended 
that Kersey’s failure to comply with the procedures of Code 
§ 2.1-342 constituted a waiver of any exemptions within the 
statute, that the exemptions asserted by Kersey were in any case 
not applicable to the records he had requested, and that the 
disclosure of criminal incident information in summary form was 
insufficient to satisfy the requirements of Code § 2.1-342.2.  
Citing Code § 2.1-342(D), Connell contended that the summary 
information provided by Kersey constituted a “new record” that 
could not be substituted for existing records unless Connell 
agreed to accept the summary. 
In a letter opinion dated May 23, 2000, the trial court 
first ruled that Connell was entitled to request “criminal 
incident information” pursuant to Code § 2.1-342.2.  The trial 
court further ruled that, as defined by the statute, “criminal 
incident information . . . is not synonymous with a ‘public 
record’ as defined in Code § 2.1-341.”  Thus, the trial court 
concluded that Kersey was not required to obtain Connell’s 
 
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agreement before supplying a summary, rather than original 
records, in response to a request under Code § 2.1-342.2. 
The trial court further ruled that the Commonwealth’s 
Attorney’s office was not a public body as defined by the FOIA.  
Accordingly, the trial court concluded that the procedural 
provisions of Code § 2.1-342 did not apply to Connell’s request, 
nor was Kersey subject to the penalty provisions of Code § 2.1-
346.1. 
Based upon these rulings, the trial court ruled that Kersey 
had complied with the requirements of Code § 2.1-342.2 by 
supplying Connell with criminal incident information in summary 
form within a reasonable time.  On July 10, 2000, the trial 
court entered an order incorporating by reference the reasoning 
of its letter opinion and sustaining Kersey’s demurrer to 
Connell’s petition for writ of mandamus.  By an order dated 
October 31, 2000, we awarded Connell this appeal. 
DISCUSSION 
Connell assigns error to the trial court’s determination 
that the Commonwealth’s Attorney is not a “public body” within 
the meaning of the FOIA and, thus, is not subject to the 
requirements of Code § 2.1-342.  Connell further assigns error 
to the trial court’s ruling that Code § 2.1-342.2 permits the 
Commonwealth’s Attorney to provide “criminal incident 
information” in summary form rather than through the production 
 
7
of the original records containing that information.  We will 
address these issues seriatim. 
The policy underlying the FOIA and its rules of 
construction are set forth in Code § 2.1-340.1: 
By enacting this chapter the General Assembly 
ensures the people of this Commonwealth ready access 
to records in the custody of public officials and free 
entry to meetings of public bodies wherein the 
business of the people is being conducted. 
 
. . . . 
 
This chapter shall be liberally construed to 
promote an increased awareness by all persons of 
governmental activities and afford every opportunity 
to citizens to witness the operations of government.  
Any exception or exemption from applicability shall be 
narrowly construed in order that no thing which should 
be public may be hidden from any person. 
 
. . . . 
 
All public bodies and public officials shall make 
reasonable efforts to reach an agreement with a 
requester concerning the production of the records 
requested. 
 
In considering the application of the FOIA in various 
circumstances, we have not heretofore been called upon to 
determine whether constitutional officers, such as a 
Commonwealth’s Attorney, are “public bodies” within the meaning 
of the FOIA.  See, e.g., Tull v. Brown, 255 Va. 177, 181, 494 
S.E.2d 855, 857 (1998) (sheriff’s contention that his office was 
not a “public body” was rendered moot by his stipulation that he 
was a “public official”).  Contrary to Connell’s contention made 
 
8
on brief and during oral argument of this appeal, Tull does not 
stand for the principle that public officials, such as 
constitutional officers, are “public bodies” for purposes of 
applying the FOIA. 
In addition to any “legislative body” and various specified 
governmental entities, Code § 2.1-341 defines a “Public body” as 
“any authority . . . or agency of the Commonwealth or of any 
political subdivision of the Commonwealth . . . supported wholly 
or principally by public funds.”  Connell contends that a 
Commonwealth’s Attorney, whose office is clearly supported by 
public funds, is both an “authority” and an “agency” of the 
Commonwealth and of the locality in which he or she is elected.  
We disagree. 
As used in the FOIA, the terms “authority” and “agency” 
clearly refer to entities to which responsibility to conduct the 
business of the people is delegated by legislative or executive 
action.  By contrast, a Commonwealth’s Attorney derives his or 
her authority from the Constitution.  Va. Const. art. VII, § 4.  
A Commonwealth’s Attorney, like a sheriff or other 
constitutional officer, is undoubtedly a public official, Tull, 
255 Va. at 183, 494 S.E.2d 858, but the FOIA distinguishes 
between “public officials” and “public bodies” in several 
instances.  Indeed, Code § 2.1-340.1 refers to “public body or 
public official,” clearly indicating that the terms are not 
 
9
synonymous.  Essentially, a public body conducts “meetings” 
involving the business of the public, whereas a public official 
may or may not conduct such public meetings.  See, e.g., Code 
§ 2.1-342.01; Code § 2.1-343.  A Commonwealth’s Attorney, in the 
prosecution of a criminal offense, is not conducting a public 
meeting; it is the trial related to that offense that is open to 
the public. 
Moreover, Code § 2.1-342.2(A) includes an express provision 
that the term “Law-enforcement official,” as used in that code 
section, “includes the attorneys for the Commonwealth.”  If the 
legislature had intended for Commonwealth’s Attorneys, and their 
offices, to be treated as public bodies under the general 
definitions in Code § 2.1-341, this express inclusion of 
Commonwealth’s Attorneys in Code § 2.1-342.2(A) would have been 
unnecessary. 
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in 
concluding that a Commonwealth’s Attorney is not a “public body” 
within the meaning of the FOIA.2  Thus, Connell’s request for 
                     
2 We permitted The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the 
Press and the Virginia Coalition for Open Government to file a 
brief as amici curiae in support of Connell.  On brief, the 
amici assert that their “interest here is in preserving public 
access to government documents . . . [which] permits the public 
to learn how their tax dollars are spent, to benefit from 
information in government custody, and to hold government 
officials accountable for their work.”  We share the concern 
expressed by the amici, and note that, contrary to the view 
 
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criminal incident information pursuant to Code § 2.1-342.2 was 
not subject to the procedures and time limits prescribed by Code 
§ 2.1-342, which by its express terms relates only to requests 
made under the FOIA to “public bodies.” 
We turn now to the remaining issue whether Code § 2.1-342.2 
permits the Commonwealth’s Attorney to provide criminal incident 
information to the requester in summary form rather than to 
provide the original records containing that information.  
Connell contends that because he specifically relied upon both 
Code § 2.1-342.2(B) and Code § 2.1-342.2(G) in making his 
request, he was entitled to the original records and not merely 
the summary of these records that he received from Kersey.  We 
disagree. 
Code § 2.1-342.2(A) defines “Criminal incident information” 
to mean “a general description of the criminal activity 
reported, the date and general location the alleged crime was 
committed, the identity of the investigating officer, and a 
                                                                  
stated in their brief, the trial court did not rule that 
constitutional officers and other public officials were wholly 
exempt from the provisions of the FOIA.  The trial court’s 
ruling was limited to the application of the FOIA to 
Commonwealth’s Attorneys under the circumstances of this case.  
Similarly, our holding should not be interpreted as placing any 
restriction on the application of the FOIA to public officials 
and their offices beyond the narrow focus of this opinion as it 
relates to FOIA requests made to a Commonwealth’s Attorney for 
records related to ongoing criminal investigations or 
prosecutions. 
 
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general description of any injuries suffered or property damaged 
or stolen.”  (Emphasis added).  In addition, as previously noted 
this statute provides that the term “Law-enforcement official” 
includes a Commonwealth’s Attorney.  Subsection (B) provides 
that law-enforcement officials, such as the Commonwealth’s 
Attorney, “shall make available upon request criminal incident 
information relating to felony offenses” subject to the 
limitation that this information may be withheld where its 
release is likely to jeopardize or hamper certain legitimate 
interests regarding the ongoing investigation or prosecution of 
a particular case.  The following subsections of Code § 2.1-
342.2 address more specific data, information, or reports and, 
in some instances, mandate the release of certain information, 
prohibit the release of other information, and make the release 
of still other information discretionary.  See Code § 2.1-
342.2(C)-(F). 
Subsection (G) provides that “[r]ecords kept by law-
enforcement agencies as required by § 15.2-1722 shall be subject 
to the provisions” of the FOIA with certain specified exceptions 
not pertinent to our present analysis.  Code § 15.2-1722 
requires “the sheriff or chief of police of every locality” to 
maintain certain records “necessary for the efficient operation 
of a law-enforcement agency.”  The statute makes the failure of 
a sheriff or chief of police to maintain these records a 
 
12
misdemeanor offense and places the duty to enforce this code 
section on “the attorney for the Commonwealth.” 
Significantly, both subsection (G) of Code § 2.1-342.2 and 
Code § 15.2-1722 specifically refer to law-enforcement 
“agencies” and not law-enforcement “official[s],” the term found 
in Code § 2.1-342.2(A).  Because the General Assembly 
specifically included a Commonwealth’s Attorney within the 
definition of law-enforcement official, we are of opinion that 
it did not intend to include a Commonwealth’s Attorney within 
the provisions of subsection (G).  In this context, there is no 
merit to Connell’s generalized assertion that a Commonwealth’s 
Attorney comes within the term “law-enforcement agencies” 
because he or she is an agent of the Commonwealth for purposes 
of a request for information under the FOIA.  Thus, Code § 2.1-
342.2(B) controls our analysis, and we are of opinion that the 
disclosure of a summary of the original records is consistent 
with the requirement that the Commonwealth’s Attorney provide 
the requester with a general description of the criminal 
activity reported therein including the date and general 
location the alleged crime was committed, the identity of the 
investigating officer, and a general description of any injuries 
suffered or property damaged or stolen. 
Accordingly, we hold that Code § 2.1-342.2 does not require 
a Commonwealth’s Attorney’s office or other law enforcement 
 
13
official to release actual records relating to a criminal 
incident, but only to provide a summary of the information 
available from the specified records subject to any mandatory or 
discretionary exemptions provided for in the statute.  Thus, the 
trial court did not err in ruling that Kersey’s provision of 
summary criminal incident information within a reasonable amount 
of time satisfied the requirements of the FOIA with respect to 
Connell’s request. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we hold that the trial court did not err 
in sustaining Kersey’s demurrer to Connell’s petition for writ 
of mandamus.  Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court will 
be affirmed. 
Affirmed. 
 
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