Title: Lamont v. INDEPENDENT SCH. D. NO. 395 OF WATERVILLE
Citation: 154 N.W.2d 188
Docket Number: 40524
State: Minnesota
Issuer: Minnesota Supreme Court
Date: November 3, 1967

154 N.W.2d 188 (1967) Robert LAMONT, Respondent, v. INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 395 OF WATERVILLE, and Denver Miner, Appellants. No. 40524. Supreme Court of Minnesota. November 3, 1967. *190 Farrish, Zimmerman, Johnson &amp; Manahan, Mankato, for appellants. Heinen &amp; Christian, Le Center, H. G. Dressel, Waterville, for respondent. OTIS, Justice. This action arises out of a two-car collision. Plaintiff obtained a verdict of $20,000. The trial court found that the damages were excessive and appeared to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice. A new trial was ordered unless plaintiff agreed to a remittitur of $5,000, to which he thereupon consented. Defendants have appealed. The issues concern the propriety of counsel's argument to the jury and the sufficiency of the evidence to support an award for future medical expenses. 1. The collision occurred on December 5, 1963, at about 7:30 a. m., at the intersection of a graveled township road, on which defendant Miner was driving a school bus in an easterly direction, and a blacktop county road, on which plaintiff was driving his automobile in a northerly direction. Defendant entered a T-intersection, turning to his left without seeing plaintiff until the moment of collision. The highways were icy, but the terrain permitted defendant to see 160 feet to his right. He was obliged to yield the right-of-way as directed by a sign posted at the intersection. The impact occurred between the right front wheel of the bus and the left front of plaintiff's car. Under all of these circumstances, we have concluded the jury was justified in finding the defendants liable. With respect to the issue of liability the verdict will not be disturbed. 2. As a part of his closing argument, counsel for plaintiff characterized one of defendants' doctors in the following manner: Defendants' objection was sustained but their motion for a mistrial was denied. The court admonished the jury as follows: Thereafter plaintiff's counsel continued: The court sustained an objection and directed that the statement be disregarded. *191 Thereupon, plaintiff's counsel proceeded with the following argument: An objection was overruled, and plaintiff's counsel went on to say: He then asked the jury to award $29,200 for plaintiff's backache, stating: Counsel continued with this argument: An objection was sustained, and again the court admonished the jury as follows: Notwithstanding the court's prior ruling, at the conclusion of his argument plaintiff's counsel injected his own opinion concerning damages in the following manner: In the light of this record, we concur in the court's finding that the verdict resulted from passion and prejudice. Notwithstanding the remittitur, we hold that a new trial on the issue of damages is required. Plaintiff sustained no external injuries as a result of the collision. He was never hospitalized and lost only one full day of work except for time expended in visiting his doctor. His symptoms were largely subjective. The permanent injuries were limited to a 10- to 15-percent partial disability of his low back. His medical expenses were less than $400; he lost only about $260 in income; and his total out-of-pocket expenses, including damage to his automobile, amounted to only about $1,000. The plaintiff's closing argument was offensive in a number of respects. It was improper to characterize Dr. Meredith as a professional witness.[1] Likewise, we disapprove of counsel's gratuitous disclosure of the number of years he and his associates had practiced law and his firm's appraisal of the value of the litigation. These improprieties were compounded by counsel's inviting the jury to place itself *192 in the position of the plaintiff and by asking how much they would take to suffer the injuries which plaintiff sustained in the accident. This was accomplished by the thinly veiled use of a "hypothetical person" rather than by expressly referring to the jurors themselves.[2] Finally, both counsel and the court erred, as we hold, in permitting the jury to award damages for future medical expenses without any evidence as to what those expenses would be. Although we have permitted an award for loss of future earning capacity in situations where the jury is competent to assess the likelihood of plaintiff's diminished productivity,[3] we have not allowed future medical expenses without an estimate of what they might be. This is a matter which the jury cannot compute blindly without expert testimony. It cannot be left to their speculation.[4] Since the trial court itself found the verdict to be the result of passion or prejudice and the record amply supports that finding, we hold there must be a new trial on the issue of damages. Reversed and remanded for a new trial on the issue of damages. ROGOSHESKE, Justice (dissenting). Believing that a trial judge is in the best position to appraise the prejudicial effect of any improprieties which may occur during trial and that in this case an experienced judge did so by granting a substantial remittitur, I would affirm. SHERAN and FRANK T. GALLAGHER, JJ., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. [1] See, Patton v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co., 247 Minn. 368, 378, 77 N.W.2d 433, 440, 58 A.L.R. 2d 921 (dissenting opinion). [2] Colgan v. Raymond, 275 Minn. 219, 225, 146 N.W.2d 530, 534; Morrison v. Carpenter, 179 Mich. 207, 146 N.W. 106; Texas &amp; N. O. R. Co. v. Sturgeon, 142 Tex. 222, 177 S.W.2d 264; Russell v. Chicago, R. I. &amp; P. R. Co., 249 Iowa 664, 86 N.W.2d 843, 70 A.L.R.2d 927. [3] Mack v. McGrath, 276 Minn. 419, 422, 150 N.W.2d 681, 683. [4] Tully v. Mahoning Express Co., Inc., 161 Ohio St. 457, 119 N.E.2d 831, 45 A.L.R.2d 1144; Sawdey v. Schwenk, 2 Wis.2d 532, 87 N.W.2d 500, 69 A.L.R.2d 1256.