Title: State v. Kywanda F.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1994AP001866-FT
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: April 10, 1996

No. 94-1866-FT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
 
 
 
No.  94-1866-FT 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN             :                IN SUPREME COURT 
                                                                   
 
 
In the Interest of Kywanda F., 
A Person Under the Age of 18: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
 
v. 
 
Kywanda F., 
 
 
Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
FILED 
 
 APR 10, 1996 
 
 
 Marilyn L. Graves 
  
Clerk of Supreme Court 
  
Madison, WI  
                                                                 
  
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded with directions. 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The State seeks review of a decision 
of the court of appeals
1 reversing both a dispositional order and 
a post-dispositional order of the Rock County Circuit Court, James 
E. Welker, Judge.  The primary issue before this court is whether 
the circuit court lost competency to accept Kywanda's admission 
when it failed to inform her of the statutory right to judicial 
                     
     
1  State v. Kywanda F., No. 94-1866-FT, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 1994). 
 
No. 94-1866-FT 
 
 
 
2 
substitution.  We conclude that a court's failure to inform a 
juvenile of the right to judicial substitution does not affect its 
competency and warrants reversal only if the juvenile suffers 
actual prejudice.  Because the factual record in this case is 
insufficient for this court to determine whether Kywanda suffered 
prejudice, we reverse the court of appeals and remand to the 
circuit court to hold an evidentiary hearing within the framework 
of State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986).  We 
also remand for the circuit court to hear evidence and make a 
determination as to whether Kywanda's plea was knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily entered applying the Bangert 
analysis. 
 
The facts for purposes of this appeal are undisputed.  The 
State filed a delinquency petition alleging that Kywanda carried a 
concealed weapon contrary to Wis. Stat. § 941.23 (1993-94)
2 and 
engaged in disorderly conduct while armed contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§§ 947.01 and 939.63(1)(a).  Kywanda initially denied the 
allegations in the petition, but later entered an admission to the 
concealed weapon allegation pursuant to a plea agreement. 
 
Prior to accepting her admission, the juvenile court engaged 
in a brief colloquy with Kywanda, advising her of the elements of 
the offense and informing her that by her admission she was giving 
up her right to a trial by jury.  Based on this colloquy, the 
                     
     
2  All future statutory references are to the 1993-94 volume 
unless otherwise indicated. 
 
No. 94-1866-FT 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
3 
court found that her admission was "freely, voluntarily, and 
intelligently made" and that she understood "the rights that [she] 
waived by the entry of this plea."  After a dispositional hearing, 
the court ordered Kywanda's legal custody transferred to the 
Department of Health and Social Services for a period of one year 
and placed her in a secure juvenile correctional facility. 
 
Kywanda subsequently filed a post-disposition motion to 
withdraw her admission.  As grounds for withdrawal she alleged 
that her admission was not knowing and voluntary under the 
totality of the circumstances because the trial court failed to 
inform her of her rights under Wis. Stat. § 48.243,
3 her right to 
judicial substitution pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 48.30(2),
4 and the 
                     
     
3  According to Wis. Stat. § 48.30, at the commencement of 
the plea hearing the child must be advised of his or her rights as 
specified in § 48.243, which include: 
 
 
 
(c) The right to remain silent . . .  
 
 
 
(d) The right to confront and cross-examine those appearing 
 
against them; 
 
 
(e) The right to counsel; 
 
 
(f) The right to present and subpoena witnesses; 
 
 
(g) The right to jury trial; and 
  
(h) 
The 
right 
to 
have 
the 
allegations 
of 
the 
petition 
proved . . . beyond a reasonable doubt. 
     
4  Wisconsin Stat. § 48.30(2) states in relevant part: 
 
At the commencement of the hearing under this section the 
child . . . shall be informed that a request for a jury 
trial or for a substitution of judge under s. 48.29 must 
be made before the end of the plea hearing or be 
 
No. 94-1866-FT 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
4 
possible dispositional consequences of her plea pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 48.30(8)(a).
5 
 
The circuit court then held a hearing on the motion.  Neither 
Kywanda nor the State presented witnesses in support of their 
positions.  After hearing arguments from both sides, the court 
denied the motion, finding that Kywanda was aware of the potential 
disposition resulting from her plea.  However, it made no specific 
finding whether Kywanda knew of her rights under § 48.243 or the 
right to substitution. 
 
The court of appeals reversed both the circuit court's 
dispositional order and the post-dispositional order which denied 
Kywanda's motion to withdraw her plea.  Although not argued by 
either party, the court of appeals concluded that compliance with 
(..continued) 
waived . . . . 
 
Wis. Stat. § 48.29 states in relevant part: 
 
[T]he child . . . either before or during the plea hearing, 
may file a written request with the clerk of the court 
or other person acting as the clerk for a substitution 
of the judge assigned to the proceeding. . . . 
     
5  Wisconsin Stat. § 48.30(8)(a) states: 
 
[B]efore accepting an admission or plea of no contest of the 
alleged facts in a petition or citation, the court 
shall: 
 
 
(a) 
Address 
the 
parties 
present 
including 
the 
child 
personally and determine that the plea or admission is 
made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the 
acts alleged in the petition or citation and the 
potential dispositions.  [Emphasis added.] 
 
No. 94-1866-FT 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
5 
§ 48.29 is jurisdictional and that the circuit court's failure to 
inform Kywanda of her substitution right deprived it of competence 
to proceed.  State v. Kywanda F., No. 94-1866-FT, unpublished slip 
op. at 2, 8 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 1994).  The court therefore 
deemed it unnecessary to address the question of whether Kywanda's 
admission was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
6  Id. at 8. 
 
I. 
 
We first address the issue raised by the decision of the 
court of appeals of whether a circuit court loses competency to 
act if it fails to inform a juvenile alleged to be delinquent of 
her statutory right to judicial substitution pursuant to §§ 
48.29(1) and 48.30(2).  This presents a question of law.  We 
therefore 
review 
this 
question 
without 
deference 
to 
the 
determinations of the lower courts.  See Michael J.L. v. State [In 
Interest of Michael J.L.], 174 Wis. 2d 131, 136, 496 N.W.2d 758 
(Ct. App. 1993). 
                     
     
6  Kywanda also challenged the dispositional order on the 
grounds that the evidence was insufficient to support the circuit 
court's findings that Kywanda is "a danger to the public" and "in 
need of restrictive custodial treatment."  The State argued that 
these issues were moot in light of the fact that Kywanda had been 
discharged from restrictive custody.  The court of appeals 
concluded that the determination of Kywanda's delinquency status 
was not mooted by her discharge from restrictive custody.  
Kywanda, supra note 1 at 4-5.  It did not address the merits of 
the issue, however, because it later concluded that the circuit 
court lost competency to proceed by not informing Kywanda of her 
right to judicial substitution.  Id. at 5-8.  Kywanda has not 
raised this issue before this court and we therefore do not 
address it further. 
 
No. 94-1866-FT 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
6 
 
The court of appeals determined that compliance with § 48.29 
is "jurisdictional."  Kywanda, slip op. at 8.  This court has 
previously emphasized that a circuit court has subject matter 
jurisdiction, conferred by our state constitution, to consider and 
determine any type of action.  Green County Dep't of Human Servs. 
v. H.N. [In Interest of B.J.N.], 162 Wis. 2d 635, 469 N.W.2d 845 
(1991).  As a result, the failure to comply with a particular 
statutory mandate may only prevent it from adjudicating the 
specific case before it.  Id. at 656.  This is more properly 
referred to as a court's competency to act or proceed.  Id.; 
Michael J.L., 174 Wis. 2d at 137. 
 
The court of appeals treats as mandatory the language of 
§ 48.30(2) that a juvenile "shall be advised" of the right to 
substitution. 
 
It 
concludes 
that 
the 
failure 
to 
comply 
automatically results in the loss of competency.  We agree that 
the term "shall" is presumed to be mandatory when it appears in a 
statute.  Wagner v. State Medical Examining Bd., 181 Wis. 2d 633, 
643, 511 N.W.2d 874 (1994).  However, the mandatory nature of the 
statute does not necessarily mean that noncompliance requires the 
loss of competence.  We interpret § 48.30(2) as requiring the 
court to advise the juvenile of the right to substitution but, at 
the same time, leaving the determination of whether the error is 
reversible to the courts.  See E.B. v. State [In Matter of E.B.], 
111 Wis. 2d 175, 188, 330 N.W.2d 584 (1983). 
 
No. 94-1866-FT 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
7 
 
Neither the court of appeals nor Kywanda has identified any 
cases, other than those interpreting statutory time limits, that 
have held that the failure to comply with a mandatory statutory 
requirement results in the court losing competency in a juvenile 
case.  In B.J.N., this court concluded that a circuit court's 
failure to observe certain time provisions in ch. 48 causes the 
circuit court to lose its competence to proceed and requires the 
dismissal of a delinquency petition.  B.J.N., 162 Wis. 2d at 657. 
In general, other courts have also interpreted various time limits 
in ch. 48 to be mandatory.  B.J.N., 162 Wis. 2d at 654 & n.15; 
Shawn B.N. v. State [In Interest of Shawn B.N.], 173 Wis. 2d 343, 
353, 497 N.W.2d 141 (Ct. App. 1992). 
 
Courts holding that noncompliance with ch. 48 time limits 
results in the loss of the court's competency to proceed have 
relied on legislative history to support such a result.  See, 
e.g., T.H. v. LaCrosse County [In Interest of R.H.], 147 Wis. 2d 
22, 27-31, 433 N.W.2d 16 (Ct. App. 1988), aff'd per curiam by an 
equally divided court, 150 Wis. 2d 432, 441 N.W.2d 233 (1989).  
The legislature in 1977 substantially revised ch. 48 to establish 
time limitations in order to protect a child's constitutional due 
process rights.  B.J.N., 162 Wis. 2d at 646; R.H., 147 Wis. 2d at 
27-31.  "The legislative history of the Children's Code shows that 
the legislature considers that strict time limits between critical 
stages within the adjudication process are necessary to protect 
 
No. 94-1866-FT 
 
 
 
8 
 
 
8 
the due process rights of children and parents."  Id. at 33.  The 
same history also indicates that the legislature intended the time 
limits to be mandatory, with noncompliance resulting in the court 
losing competency to proceed.  Id. at 31-35.    
 
Kywanda argues that the circuit court's failure to inform an 
alleged delinquent child of the right to judicial substitution is 
analogous to a violation of the mandatory time limits.  She 
asserts that they both deprive the court of its competency to 
proceed.  The court of appeals agreed, reasoning that the 
statutory right to substitution was intended to protect a 
juvenile's due process right to a fair trial by an impartial 
judge.   
 
However, unlike the legislative history surrounding the time 
limits in ch. 48, neither Kywanda nor the court of appeals in its 
decision cites any legislative history to support the argument 
that the legislature intended that noncompliance with §§ 48.29(1) 
and 48.30(2) would result in the court losing competence to 
proceed.  Our own review reveals none either.  Kywanda's analogy 
to time limit cases fails because the loss of competency in these 
cases was premised on legislative history supporting such a result 
and no such legislative history exists here. 
 
The court of appeals' determination that the circuit court's 
failure to inform Kywanda of the right to substitution mandates a 
loss of competence based on a violation of her due process rights 
 
No. 94-1866-FT 
 
 
 
9 
 
 
9 
also fails.  A person's right to be tried by an impartial judge is 
part of the fundamental right to a fair trial guaranteed by the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.  State v. Hollingsworth, 160 Wis. 2d 883, 893, 467 
N.W.2d 555 (Ct. App. 1991).  However, as the Supreme Court has 
recognized within the context of judicial recusal, "not all 
questions of judicial qualification . . .  involve constitutional 
validity."  Aetna Life Ins. v. LaVoie, 475 U.S. 813, 820 (1986), 
quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927).  In fact, "most 
matters relating to judicial disqualification do not rise to a 
constitutional level."  LaVoie, 475 U.S. at 820, quoting FTC v. 
Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 702 (1948).  The adoption of 
recusal statutes that permit disqualification for bias or 
prejudice is not a sufficient basis for imposing a constitutional 
requirement under the Due Process Clause.  LaVoie, 475 U.S. at 
820. 
 
Like recusal statutes, the right to judicial substitution 
under § 48.29 is not sufficient by itself to trigger due process 
concerns.  The legislature as a matter of policy deemed it 
important to give juveniles the right to judicial substitution.  
The Supreme Court has held that "matters of kinship, personal 
bias, state policy, remoteness of interest, would seem generally 
to be matters merely of legislative discretion." LaVoie, 475 U.S. 
at 820 (emphasis added), quoting Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523. 
 
No. 94-1866-FT 
 
 
 
10 
 
 
10 
 
LaVoie recognized that only in the most extreme cases would 
disqualification based on general allegations of prejudice or bias 
be constitutionally required.  LaVoie, 475 U.S at 821.  LaVoie 
also reaffirmed that the Due Process Clause may sometimes bar 
judges who have no actual bias in order to satisfy the "appearance 
of justice."  Id. at 825, quoting In re Murchinson, 349 U.S. 133, 
136 (1955).  Here, not only has Kywanda failed to allege actual 
bias, she has failed to allege even an appearance of bias.  
Therefore, we disagree that her due process rights were violated. 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that the court of appeals erred in 
holding that the circuit court's failure to inform Kywanda of her 
right to judicial substitution results in a loss of its competency 
to proceed.  We reverse that portion of the decision and the court 
of appeals' reversal of the dispositional order. 
 
II. 
 
We next address the proper remedy available when the circuit 
court fails to inform the juvenile of his or her right to 
substitution. 
 
The 
State 
argues 
that 
a 
circuit 
court's 
noncompliance with the requirements of § 48.30(2) should be 
considered harmless error unless the party establishes actual 
prejudice resulting from the error.  We agree.  In the case of the 
right to substitution, we conclude that actual prejudice is shown 
if it is established that the juvenile was not told of the right 
and did not know of that right.  See Burnett County Dep't of 
 
No. 94-1866-FT 
 
 
 
11 
 
 
11 
Social Services v. Kimberly M.W. [In Interest of Robert D.], 181 
Wis. 2d 887, 891-92, 512 N.W.2d 227 (Ct. App. 1994), citing M.W. 
v. Monroe County Dep't of Human Servs. [In re Termination of 
Parental Rights to M.A.M.], 116 Wis. 2d 432, 342 N.W.2d 410 
(1984).  Therefore, the prejudice suffered by the juvenile in such 
an instance is the loss of the opportunity to exercise the right 
to substitution due to the lack of knowledge of that right.  
 
In Robert D., the court of appeals considered a similar 
question involving whether a circuit court's failure to advise a 
biological mother of her statutory right to request a judicial 
substitution under Wis. Stat. § 48.422 required reversal of the 
termination of parental rights order.  The court concluded that a 
circuit court's failure to advise the parents of their rights to 
judicial substitution does not constitute reversible error absent 
prejudice to the parents.  Robert D., 181 Wis. 2d at 890-92, 
citing M.A.M., 116 Wis. 2d at 439. 
 
Upon considering the issue of prejudice, the Robert D. court 
engaged in a Bangert analysis to determine whether the trial court 
committed reversible error in not informing the parents of their 
right to judicial substitution.  Robert D., 181 Wis. 2d at 892, 
citing Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274.  Similarly, we agree with the 
court of appeals in Robert D. that a Bangert analysis provides the 
appropriate framework to determine whether a circuit court commits 
 
No. 94-1866-FT 
 
 
 
12 
 
 
12 
reversible error upon failing to inform a juvenile of his or her 
statutory right to substitution.   
 
Under a Bangert analysis, a juvenile must first make a prima 
facie showing that the court violated its mandatory statutory 
duties and allege that he or she in fact did not know of the 
information that the court was statutorily required to provide.  
Robert D., 181 Wis. 2d at 892, citing Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274. 
 If the juvenile makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to 
the State to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the 
juvenile knew of the statutory right and therefore was not 
prejudiced.  See Robert D., 181 Wis. 2d at 892.  The State may 
then utilize any evidence to substantiate that the juvenile knew 
of the right.  This may include evidence in the entire record and 
evidence outside of the record, such as examining the juvenile or 
the juvenile's counsel.  Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 275.  If the 
juvenile makes a prima facie case and the State fails to meet its 
burden to demonstrate otherwise, dismissal is required. 
 
Applying the Bangert analysis to this case, we must first 
examine the record to determine whether Kywanda made a prima facie 
showing that the trial court failed to advise her of her right to 
substitution pursuant to § 48.29 and § 48.30(2).  Whether a 
defendant has made such a showing under a Bangert analysis is a 
question of law which appellate courts review without deference to 
 
No. 94-1866-FT 
 
 
 
13 
 
 
13 
lower courts.  See State v. Issa, 186 Wis. 2d 199, 205, 519 N.W.2d 
741 (Ct. App. 1994). 
 
Kywanda's counsel in his post-disposition motion for a 
hearing alleged that "the court failed to inform the child of her 
right[] . . . to 
request 
substitution 
of 
judge 
before 
the 
conclusion of the plea hearing."  At the hearing, counsel did not 
specifically argue that the court failed to inform her of her 
right to substitution.  However, because the State concedes on 
review  that the record does not show that Kywanda was advised of 
her right to substitution, we need not further address this 
issue.
7 
 
Next, Kywanda must allege that she in fact did not know of 
her right to judicial substitution in order to establish a prima 
facie case.  Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274.  These allegations were 
made by Kywanda's attorney in his motion for a post-disposition 
hearing.  Kywanda did not testify at the hearing and the issue was 
not otherwise addressed. 
                     
     
7  We note that the State's concession was due in large part 
to the inadequacy of the record in this case.  During oral 
argument to this court, the State represented that the practice in 
Rock County is that the court commissioner calls together all the 
juveniles who are scheduled to have hearings on that particular 
day, reads them the required portions of § 48.30, and then 
proceeds to take their pleas or otherwise deals with the cases on 
an individual basis.  This initial hearing where the juveniles are 
apparently informed of their rights is not recorded.  We strongly 
recommend that any court using this procedure in the future should 
require the recording of such proceedings to afford appellate 
courts the opportunity for meaningful review. 
 
No. 94-1866-FT 
 
 
 
14 
 
 
14 
 
The State argues that in order to make a prima facie showing, 
the juvenile must make more than a mere assertion that he or she 
did not know of the right to substitution.  Further, the State 
urges that such an allegation should be sworn to by the juvenile 
in the form of an affidavit.  However, Bangert and its progeny 
only require that a defendant allege that he or she did not know 
of the right.  Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274.  Further, while we 
agree with the State that it is the better practice that such 
allegations be sworn to by the juvenile in an affidavit, we 
conclude that allegations made by a juvenile's attorney in a 
motion sufficiently raises the factual issue of the juvenile's 
knowledge. 
 
When a prima facie showing is made, as here, the burden 
shifts to the State to show by any evidence inside or outside of 
the record that Kywanda knew of her right to judicial substitution 
and therefore was not prejudiced.  Robert D., 181 Wis. 2d at 892; 
Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274.  Kywanda argues that the State either 
failed or declined to offer any evidence to rebut her allegations 
despite notice and a fair opportunity to contest Kywanda's claim 
at the post-disposition hearing.  We disagree with Kywanda's 
characterization of that hearing. 
 
The circuit court's "notice of hearing" gives no indication 
that the hearing was to proceed within the framework of a Bangert 
analysis.  It is true that among the many items referenced, 
 
No. 94-1866-FT 
 
 
 
15 
 
 
15 
Kywanda made a reference to Bangert in her written motion in 
support of post-disposition relief and at the motion hearing.  
However, the matter failed to follow a Bangert analysis.  Neither 
the State nor Kywanda presented any testimony.  The circuit court 
made no mention that it intended to utilize a Bangert analysis in 
addressing the issues presented. 
 
Further, the only finding made by the trial court that could 
be related to Kywanda's right to substitution was, "I think that 
she was aware of all of these rights . . . ."  The State argued in 
its brief that this broad statement constituted a finding as a 
matter of historical fact that Kywanda was aware of her right to 
substitution under § 48.29(1).  However, in oral argument, the 
State conceded that such a finding has no basis in the record 
before this court.  Because the record is devoid of any findings 
of fact supported by evidence regarding whether Kywanda knew of 
her right to substitution, this court is unable to determine 
whether Kywanda was prejudiced. 
 
In sum, we reverse the court of appeals' decision holding 
that the circuit court lost competency when it failed to inform 
Kywanda of her right to substitution.  We conclude that such error 
is reversible only upon a showing of actual prejudice and that the 
record is insufficient to make such a determination.  Accordingly, 
we remand to the circuit court for an evidentiary hearing within 
the context of a Bangert analysis. 
 
No. 94-1866-FT 
 
 
 
16 
 
 
16 
 
III.   
 
Kywanda requests that in the event that this court reverses 
the court of appeals on the competency issue, we should remand the 
case to the court of appeals so that it may consider whether she 
was entitled to withdraw her plea of admission.  The court of 
appeals did not address this argument because it concluded that 
the competency issue was dispositive.  The State counters that 
because Kywanda raised the issue in the court of appeals and could 
have done so here in a cross petition but did not, the issue 
should be deemed waived.  The State relies on State v. Johnson, 
153 Wis. 2d 121, 124, 449 N.W.2d 845 (1990) and Michael S. 
Heffernan, Appellate Practice and Procedure in Wisconsin § 23.5 
(2d ed. 1995) in support of its waiver argument.  We reject both 
positions. 
 
After the parties submitted their briefs, Kywanda filed a 
motion to allow supplemental briefing on the plea withdrawal 
issue.  Although we denied the motion, we did so on the grounds 
that the issue related only to the nature of a possible remand.  
Because we have already concluded that a remand to the circuit 
court is necessary and the plea withdrawal issue was adequately 
addressed during oral arguments to this court, we decline to deem 
it waived.   
The issue of whether a plea was knowingly, 
intelligently, 
and 
voluntarily 
entered 
is 
a 
question 
of 
constitutional fact.  Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 283.  Although we 
 
No. 94-1866-FT 
 
 
 
17 
 
 
17 
review constitutional questions independently of the lower courts' 
conclusions, we will not upset the circuit court's findings of 
evidentiary or historical facts unless they are contrary to the 
great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence.  Id. at 283-
84, citing State v. Woods, 117 Wis. 2d 701, 715, 345 N.W.2d 457 
(1984). 
 
Kywanda's motion to withdraw her plea alleged that her plea 
was 
not 
knowing 
and 
voluntary 
"under 
the 
totality 
of 
circumstances."  As previously discussed, in order to make a prima 
facie case for plea withdrawal, a juvenile must first show that 
the plea was accepted without the circuit court's conformance with 
mandatory procedures.  Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274.  Kywanda 
argued that the circuit court failed to advise her of her rights 
under § 48.243, her right to judicial substitution, and the 
possible dispositional consequences of her admission.  In support, 
Kywanda's counsel referred the court to her plea hearing. 
 
Our review of the plea hearing record indicates that the 
court failed to advise Kywanda of all of her rights under § 48.243 
and the potential consequences of her plea.  Further, as discussed 
above, the State conceded that the record does not show that 
Kywanda was advised of her right to substitution because the 
relevant proceedings were not recorded.  Because Kywanda also 
alleged that she did not know of these rights or the potential 
 
No. 94-1866-FT 
 
 
 
18 
 
 
18 
consequences of her admission, we conclude that she made a prima 
facie showing under Bangert. 
 
Although our review of the record indicates that Kywanda made 
a prima facie showing under Bangert, we also recognize that the 
trial court did not make such a determination.  As previously 
discussed, the post-disposition hearing failed to follow a Bangert 
analysis.  Because the hearing did not proceed within the context 
of a Bangert analysis and the factual record before us is 
inadequate, we cannot make a determination whether Kywanda's plea 
was 
knowing 
and 
voluntary 
"under 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances."  Therefore, we also remand the plea withdrawal 
issue to the circuit court for its determination applying a 
Bangert analysis.  
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and cause remanded to the circuit court with directions. 
 
No. 94-1866-FT 
 
 
 
 
 
19 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
94-1866-FT 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
In the Interest of Kywanda F., 
 
 
 
A Person under the Age of 18: 
 
 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
 
 
Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
Kywanda F., 
 
 
 
 
Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
____________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
Reported at:  190 Wis. 2d 472, 528 N.W.2d 93  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1994) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNPUBLISHED 
 
                                                              
 
Opinion Filed:  
April 10, 1996 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
October 31, 1995 
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Rock 
 
JUDGE: 
EDWIN C. DAHLBERG 
 
                                                              
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: 
 
                                                              
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For the petitioner-respondent-petitioner the cause 
was argued by Gregory Posner-Weber, assistant attorney general, 
with whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
For the respondent-appellant there was a brief and oral 
argument by William E. Schmaal, assistant state public defender.