Title: Associated Bank N.A. v. Collier
Citation: 2014 WI 62
Docket Number: 2011AP002597
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 15, 2014

2014 WI 62 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP2597   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Associated Bank N.A., 
          Plaintiff, 
SB1 Waukesha County, LLC, 
          Co-Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Jack W. Collier, Deborah L. Collier, Greenbrier  
Developers, LLC, Executive Realty Partnership 
LP, Gerald  
Franklin, Kenneth Whaley, ISB Community Bank and 
United  
States of America, 
          Defendants, 
Decade Properties, Inc., 
          Intervening  
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 345 Wis. 2d 397, 824 N.W.2d 928 
(Ct. App. 2012 – Unpublished)    
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 15, 2014   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 11, 2013   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha   
 
JUDGE: 
Donald J. Hassin Jr.   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., BRADLEY, J., dissent. (Opinion 
filed.)   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: PROSSER, J., did not participate.    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the intervening defendant-appellant-petitioner, there 
were briefs by Roy L. Prange, Valerie L. Bailey-Rihn, and 
Quarles & Brady LLP, Madison, and oral argument by Valerie L. 
Baily Rihn.   
 
 
 
2 
For the co-plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief by John 
M. Van Lieshout, Joseph W. Voiland, and Reinhart Boerner Van 
Deuren S.C., Milwaukee; and Neal H. Levin and Freeborn & Peters 
LLP, Chicago, and oral argument by Neal H. Levin. 
 
 
2014 WI 62
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2011AP2597 
(L.C. No. 
2009CV4938) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Associated Bank N.A., 
 
          Plaintiff, 
 
SB1 Waukesha County, LLC, 
 
          Co-Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Jack W. Collier, Deborah L. Collier, Greenbrier 
Developers, LLC, Executive Realty Partnership 
LP, Gerald Franklin, Kenneth Whaley, ISB 
Community Bank and United States of America, 
 
          Defendants, 
 
Decade Properties, Inc., 
 
          Intervening Defendant-Appellant- 
          Petitioner. 
FILED 
 
JUL 15, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Modified in 
part and as modified, affirmed. 
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals1 affirming the 
                                                 
1 Associated 
Bank 
N.A. 
v. 
Collier, 
No. 
2011AP2597, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2012).  
No. 
2011AP2597   
 
2 
 
circuit court's2 denial of summary judgment, grant of a motion to 
turn over property to the receiver, and denial of a motion for 
reconsideration.  The review concerns the collection efforts of 
two judgment creditors of defendant Jack Collier, SB1 Waukesha 
County, LLC and Decade Properties, Inc., the latter being owned 
by Collier's business associate, Jeffrey Keierleber.   
¶2 
Decade argues that when it served Collier with an 
order to appear at supplemental proceedings, it perfected a 
"common law creditor's lien" on all of Collier's personal 
property.  According to Decade, its lien preserves the property 
for Decade's benefit, thereby precluding SB1 from pursuing 
collection from it.  SB1 argues that even though Decade served 
Collier with an order to appear at supplemental proceedings 
before SB1 did so, Decade has no lien on Collier's personal 
property because Decade's judgment was not docketed before its 
service of the order to appear.  SB1 reasons that a judgment 
must be capable of execution before there is the potential for a 
common law lien on personal property and undocketed judgments 
cannot obtain an execution.   
¶3 
We conclude that supplemental proceedings under ch. 
816 are a discovery tool in aid of judgment collection.  
Decade's 
serving 
Collier 
with 
an 
order 
to 
appear 
for 
supplemental proceedings did not give rise to a blanket lien on 
all of Collier's personal property that prevented SB1 from 
                                                 
2 The Honorable Donald J. Hassin, Jr. of Waukesha County 
presided.  
No. 
2011AP2597   
 
3 
 
pursuing collection.  A judgment creditor obtains an interest in 
a judgment debtor's identified, non-exempt personal property 
superior to other unsecured creditors when it dockets its money 
judgment, identifies specific personal property and levies that 
property.  Levying may be accomplished by at least three 
different means:  (1) by executing against specific personal 
property with the assistance of a sheriff; (2) by serving the 
garnishee defendant in a garnishment action to seize specific 
property in the hands of the garnishee defendant; or (3) by 
obtaining an order to apply specific personal property to the 
satisfaction of the judgment, which a creditor may do with the 
assistance of a supplemental receiver.  Wis. Stat. § 815.05(6) 
(2011-12);3 Wis. Stat. § 812.01; Wis. Stat. § 816.08.  
¶4 
Here, SB1 was the first judgment creditor with a 
docketed money judgment to levy specific, non-exempt personal 
property of Collier.  It did so by obtaining a court order to 
turn over specifically identified property to its receiver.  
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals that 
concluded that SB1 has priority over Decade in regard to the 
specific personal property SB1 identified and levied.  However, 
insofar as the decision of the court of appeals can be read to 
recognize a blanket lien in favor of SB1 that prevents other 
creditors from pursuing collection from Collier's personal 
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2011AP2597   
 
4 
 
property, we modify that decision because no blanket lien 
exists.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶5 
This case concerns SB1's attempt to satisfy the 
portion of a default judgment against Collier that it purchased 
from Associated Bank, N.A.  The relevant portion of the judgment4 
relates to Collier's default on a $7.2 million promissory note 
in favor of Associated, which Collier secured with a personal 
guarantee and a mortgage on a Brookfield property.   
¶6 
After purchasing a portion of Associated's docketed 
money judgment against Collier, SB1 obtained an order for 
Collier to appear at supplemental proceedings.  Despite repeated 
attempts to serve Collier in Wisconsin and Florida, where 
Collier had a second home, SB1 was unsuccessful and the order 
expired.   
¶7 
Shortly after SB1 obtained an order for Collier to 
appear, Keierleber, the owner of Decade, sued Collier.  The 
court of appeals succinctly summarized the litigation as 
follows: 
 
In short order, Keierleber commenced six lawsuits 
on 
behalf 
of 
Keierleber, 
Keierleber-owned, 
and 
Keierleber- and Collier-owned Wisconsin and Florida 
entities, Decade among them. Each complaint sought 
enforcement of a claimed loan right and money judgment 
against Collier or against two business entities of 
which Keierleber and Collier each owned a fifty-
                                                 
4 The judgment also related to Collier's default on a $1.8 
million promissory note, which he secured with his interest in 
Clearwater Bay Investors, LLC.  This debt is not part of the 
proceedings before us. 
No. 
2011AP2597   
 
5 
 
percent interest. While still unserved with SB1's 
order to appear, Collier accepted service of these six 
complaints. The parties involved in the six new 
actions executed stipulations agreeing to judgment 
amounts in each of them.  
Associated Bank N.A. v. Collier, No. 2011AP2597, unpublished 
slip op., at ¶4 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2012).   
¶8 
Of these six lawsuits, the present case concerns only 
the 
$654,646.83 
judgment 
Decade 
obtained 
against 
Collier 
personally.  Decade tried to docket this judgment with the 
Waukesha County Clerk of Court by sending the judgment, a $5.00 
docketing fee and a receipt for docketing to the circuit court, 
where the judgment was to be signed and forwarded to the clerk 
with the docketing fee and receipt.  However, even though 
Decade's attorneys received the receipt dated October 26, 2010, 
the clerk did not enter the judgment in the judgment and lien 
docket.  Instead, on June 29, 2011, after the error was 
discovered, the clerk docketed Decade's judgment.   
¶9 
On November 16, 2010, Decade served Collier with an 
order to appear for supplemental proceedings, which Decade's 
attorney conducted on November 22, 2010.  In its brief, Decade 
explained that it took these actions after learning about SB1's 
collection efforts in order to "protect its interest by first 
obtaining a judgment and then a superior Creditor's/Receivers 
Lien against Collier's personal property."  It does not appear 
from the record that Decade took any additional steps to seize 
any of Collier's personal property to satisfy its judgment.  
¶10 Having been unsuccessful in serving Collier before the 
initial order expired, SB1 subsequently obtained a second order 
No. 
2011AP2597   
 
6 
 
for Collier to appear for supplemental proceedings.  SB1 also 
moved the circuit court to appoint a supplemental receiver.   
¶11 On April 2, 2011, at Collier's Florida residence, SB1 
finally obtained service of the order to appear for supplemental 
proceedings and its motion to appoint a receiver.  On April 18, 
2011, Collier failed to appear at the scheduled supplemental 
proceedings and the supplemental commissioner issued an order to 
show cause why Collier should not be held in contempt of court.  
The commissioner also appointed Douglas Mann as supplemental 
receiver.   
¶12 On June 9, 2011, the day before the return date of the 
order to show cause, Collier initiated a state insolvency 
proceeding in Florida.  SB1 moved to enjoin the insolvency 
proceeding on the grounds that SB1 had a receiver's lien on 
Collier's personal property, which was perfected.  Decade 
intervened and objected to imposition of an injunction.  The 
Florida insolvency proceeding was enjoined and Collier was found 
in contempt of court for failing to appear at SB1's supplemental 
proceedings. 
¶13 On July 29, 2011, SB1 moved for court approval of the 
sale of Collier's personal property located in Brookfield, 
Wisconsin, which had a fair market value of $63,925.  SB1 also 
moved to order Collier to turn over certain shares of stock, 
rights to unasserted counterclaims and affirmative defenses in 
Waukesha County cases, and all partnership interests in and 
profits from an entity called AWI Limited Partnership.   
No. 
2011AP2597   
 
7 
 
¶14 Decade intervened and opposed SB1's motions.  Decade 
moved for summary judgment on the grounds that it had a superior 
lien on all of Collier's personal property.  It argued that 
according to our decision in Mann v. Bankruptcy Estate of Badger 
Lines, Inc., 224 Wis. 2d 646, 590 N.W.2d 270 (1999), all that is 
necessary to perfect a common law lien that prevents SB1 from 
pursuing collection is service on Collier of an order to appear 
at a supplemental proceeding.  
¶15 SB1 responded that Decade could not have had a lien on 
Collier's personal property when it served Collier with a notice 
to appear at supplemental proceedings because Decade's judgment 
had not been entered in the judgment and lien docket.   
¶16 Decade contended that the failure to enter the 
judgment in the judgment and lien docket did not affect the 
validity of its lien.5  At a hearing before the circuit court, 
Decade's attorney argued that "the key issue is that execution 
and the ability to execute [are] separate from the ability to 
institute supplementary proceedings because you don't need to 
have [an un]satisfied execution in order to proceed with a 
compelling order to appear before a court commissioner."  In 
other words, Decade's position was that a judgment creditor can 
obtain a common law lien even if its judgment is not docketed or 
executable because the ability to execute and a judgment 
creditor's lien are not tethered.  
                                                 
5 The parties seem to agree that the failure to enter 
Decade's judgment in the judgment and lien docket was due to a 
clerk's error. 
No. 
2011AP2597   
 
8 
 
¶17 The 
circuit 
court 
rejected 
Decade's 
argument, 
reasoning that "if the underpinning for the proceeding fails[,] 
the proceeding itself necessarily fails."  In denying Decade's 
motion for reconsideration, the court reiterated that its 
position was that "you can't pursue collection unless you have 
an executable judgment. . . . [H]ow can you go forward and 
compel somebody to appear at a supplementary where you don't 
have a judgment that you can collect on[?]"   
¶18 Accordingly, the circuit court concluded that SB1's 
interest in Collier's personal property was superior to that of 
Decade's, holding that "[a]ll actions, proceedings, liens or 
other orders relative to Decade's un-docketed judgment prior to 
June 29, 2011 that would otherwise [a]ffect or limit SB1's 
supplemental proceedings or attempt to execute upon the judgment 
are held for naught."  The circuit court then granted SB1's 
motions and approved the sale of Collier's personal property.  
The court also vested the supplemental receiver with Collier's 
rights in the property identified in SB1's motion for turnover. 
¶19 Decade appealed and the court of appeals affirmed the 
orders of the circuit court.  The court of appeals concluded 
that service of an order to appear at supplemental proceedings 
"does not . . . present an alternative to a properly docketed 
judgment."  The court also concluded that the circuit court's 
refusal to exercise the court's equitable power in favor of 
Decade was within its discretion, noting that "the record 
suggests that Collier evaded service from SB1 for months and 
that Decade's six lawsuits were filed as a dilatory tactic."   
No. 
2011AP2597   
 
9 
 
¶20 Decade seeks review before us, making the same 
arguments it made to the circuit court and the court of appeals.  
We affirm the decision of the court of appeals to the extent 
that it recognized SB1's priority to the property SB1 levied.  
We also affirm its conclusion that an undocketed judgment cannot 
obtain an execution.  We modify the decision of the court of 
appeals insofar as it could be read to recognize a blanket lien 
giving any one unsecured judgment creditor the exclusive right 
to pursue collection from all of a debtor's personal property, 
simply due to service of an order to appear for supplemental 
proceedings.6 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶21 Decade asks us to uphold what it asserts is a judgment 
creditor's lien on all of Collier's personal property.  Whether 
a lien exists and the effect of an alleged lien against third 
parties are questions of law that we review independently of the 
court of appeals.  See McIntyre v. Cox, 68 Wis. 2d 597, 602, 229 
                                                 
6 In explaining its refusal to separate execution and 
supplemental proceedings, the court of appeals held that 
"[w]ithout a creditor's lien, there is no right to pursue 
collection under § 816.03."  Associated Bank, No. 2011AP2597, 
unpublished slip op., ¶16.  This statement may simply express 
the same uneasiness we have with allowing a creditor to 
circumvent statutory execution processes.  Lest our affirmation 
of the decision of the court of appeals be construed to 
recognize a blanket lien that gives an unsecured judgment 
creditor the exclusive right to pursue collection from all of 
the judgment debtor's personal property, we clarify that no such 
blanket lien exists or is necessary to pursue collection from a 
judgment debtor. 
No. 
2011AP2597   
 
10 
 
N.W.2d 613 (1975); Yorgan v. Durkin, 2006 WI 60, ¶55, 290 
Wis. 2d 671, 715 N.W.2d 160 (Roggensack, J., dissenting).   
¶22 Decade also asks us to review the circuit court's 
refusal to exercise its equitable powers, for which we employ an 
erroneous exercise of discretion standard.  J.L. Phillips & 
Assocs. v. E & H Plastic Corp., 217 Wis. 2d 348, 365, 577 N.W.2d 
13 (1998).  An erroneous exercise of discretion occurs when the 
circuit court fails to exercise discretion, the facts fail to 
support the court's decision or the circuit court applies the 
wrong legal standard.  Id. at 364-65. 
B.  General Debtor/Creditor Principles 
¶23 By entering a judgment in the judgment and lien 
docket, a judgment creditor obtains a ten-year statutory lien on 
real property of the debtor located in the county in which the 
judgment was docketed.  Wis. Stat. § 806.15(1).  However, 
entering a judgment in the judgment and lien docket does not 
create a statutory lien on the debtor's personal property.  
Instead, a judgment creditor obtains an unsecured, inchoate 
interest with regard to the debtor's personal property, tangible 
and intangible, against which to levy.  As such, a judgment 
creditor will typically "have to take further steps to enforce 
the judgment."  Robert A. Pasch, 12 Wisconsin Practice Series:  
Wisconsin 
Collection 
Law 
§ 14:1, 
at 
286 
(2d 
ed. 
2006).  
Execution, garnishment and turnover orders applying property in 
satisfaction of a judgment are all methods of levying the 
judgment debtor's personal property.  
No. 
2011AP2597   
 
11 
 
1.  Levy  
¶24 Wisconsin statutes provide several different methods 
by which to levy, but each "require[s] reachable, non-exempt, 
assets of the debtor."  Pasch, supra, § 14:1, at 287.  One 
method used to judicially enforce money judgments is execution.  
Black's Law Dictionary 650 (9th ed. 2009); see Wis. Stat. 
§ 815.02 ("A judgment which requires the payment of money or the 
delivery of property may be enforced in those respects by 
execution.").  For instance, a judgment creditor can execute on 
specific, 
non-exempt 
personal 
property 
of 
the 
debtor 
by 
obtaining an order to have the sheriff seize the property.  Wis. 
Stat. § 815.05(6).   
¶25 If a judgment creditor locates specific, non-exempt 
personal property belonging to the debtor or owed to the debtor 
in the control of a third party, the judgment creditor may be 
able to levy that property through garnishment.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 812.01.  Garnishment is entirely statutory.7  Therefore, "[i]n 
the absence of specific statutory authorization, garnishment 
does not lie."  Moskowitz v. Mark, 41 Wis. 2d 87, 91, 163 N.W.2d 
175 (1968).  
                                                 
7 Garnishment actions vary in type and requirements.  For 
example, under certain circumstances, a garnishment action may 
be commenced prior to judgment.  See Wis. Stat. § 812.02; Wis. 
Stat. § 812.05.  In addition, the filing of a garnishment action 
does not assure that other creditors do not have a superior 
claim to the property the garnishee holds.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 812.11(5). 
No. 
2011AP2597   
 
12 
 
¶26 Finally, a creditor may levy specific, non-exempt 
personal property by obtaining a court order to apply that 
property in satisfaction of the judgment.  Wis. Stat. § 816.08.  
A supplemental receiver may obtain such a turnover order on a 
creditor's behalf.  Id.; Candee v. Egan, 84 Wis. 2d 348, 361, 
267 N.W.2d 890 (1978) ("A receiver in aid of execution is 
authorized to collect those assets revealed by the examination 
of the debtor, take possession of them, apply them to the 
satisfaction of the judgment, and return the excess to the 
judgment debtor.").   
¶27 Because each of these statutory collection procedures 
requires a creditor to identify specific, non-exempt property of 
the debtor to levy, judgment collection can be cumbersome and 
expensive if the details of a debtor's property are not known to 
the judgment creditor.  Supplemental proceedings provide a 
mechanism by which to obtain information in aid of judgment 
collection. 
2.  Supplemental proceedings 
¶28 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
ch. 
816 
is 
entitled 
"Remedies 
Supplementary to Execution."  Supplementary proceedings are a 
"form of discovery . . . used where the judgment creditor is 
uncertain of the nature, location, extent, and amount of the 
debtor's property."  Pasch, supra, § 16:1, at 318.  Wisconsin 
Stat. ch. 816 vests a supplemental court commissioner with 
certain powers to aid in enforcement of the judgment against the 
judgment debtor's property.  For instance, a supplemental court 
commissioner can compel a judgment debtor who has been served 
No. 
2011AP2597   
 
13 
 
with an order in compliance with Wis. Stat. § 816.035 to appear 
to answer questions concerning his or her property.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 816.03.  If it appears that there is danger of a judgment 
debtor leaving the state or if the judgment debtor has property 
he or she unjustly refuses to apply to the judgment, the 
commissioner may require the debtor to give a bond and refrain 
from disposing of property not exempt from execution.  Wis. 
Stat. § 816.07.  If supplemental proceedings reveal non-exempt 
personal property, a court commissioner or judge may order that 
the property be applied toward the judgment, sometimes through 
the use of a supplemental receiver, rather than having a sheriff 
seize the property.  Wis. Stat. § 816.04; Wis. Stat. § 816.08.   
3.  Liens 
¶29 No statute grants a judgment creditor a lien on the 
judgment debtor's personal property simply by docketing the 
judgment.  However, in Badger Lines, we mentioned a lien that 
had as one of its underpinnings a docketed money judgment.  
There, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit certified the following question that arose in a dispute 
in federal bankruptcy court:  "Does Wisconsin law require that a 
lien 
obtained 
by 
a 
judgment 
creditor 
who 
institutes 
supplementary 
proceedings 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 816.04 
be 
perfected, and if so, how is the lien to be perfected?"  Badger 
Lines, 224 Wis. 2d at 649 n.2.  When we decided Badger Lines, we 
assumed, as did the certified question, that the judgment 
creditor had a lien, and we answered that "a creditor's lien is 
valid and superior against other creditors at the time the 
No. 
2011AP2597   
 
14 
 
creditor serves the debtor with a summons to appear at the 
supplementary proceeding under Wis. Stat. § 816.03(1)(b)."  Id. 
at 649.  We now take a closer look at when a lien may arise and 
to which personal property such a lien may attach. 
¶30 Kellogg v. Coller, 47 Wis. 649, 3 N.W. 433 (1879), 
involved two judgment creditors who sought to employ Wis. Stat. 
§ 3030 and Wis. Stat. § 3031 (1878) when the executions of their 
individual judgments were returned unsatisfied.  Id. at 657.  To 
some extent, Kellogg's discussion is helpful to determining when 
a judgment creditor may obtain a lien.  There, we explained: 
 
In several summary proceedings supplementary to 
executions 
against 
the 
same 
debtor, 
returned 
unsatisfied 
(R. 
S., 
secs. 
3028-3038),——such 
a 
proceeding being a substitute for a creditor's bill,——
the creditor who first commences his proceeding and 
obtains service of process upon the debtor, and 
prosecutes the proceeding with proper diligence to the 
appointment of a receiver, obtains a prior lien upon 
the assets of the debtor. 
Id. at 649 (emphasis added).  This passage appears to be the 
source of the common law receiver's lien discussed in Candee, 
which we cited in Badger Lines, and Badger Lines itself.  Badger 
Lines, 224 Wis. 2d at 654.   
¶31 However, Kellogg says nothing about a blanket judgment 
creditor's lien on all of the judgment debtor's personal 
property.  In addition, it is somewhat problematic to argue too 
strongly from cases as old as Kellogg because the statutes they 
employ differ from current legislative enactments, and the ever 
developing body of case law and code can shade what at the 
moment of decision once seemed so clear.  
No. 
2011AP2597   
 
15 
 
¶32 Furthermore, there is a "diversity of opinion as to 
[the] real character" of judgment creditor's liens relating to 
execution that dates back much farther than Candee.  For 
instance, in Bank of Commerce v. Elliott, 109 Wis. 648, 660-61, 
85 N.W. 417 (1901), we examined the rights of a judgment 
creditor who had initiated a garnishment action.  In attempting 
to ascertain the creditor's rights in relation to a bankruptcy 
trustee, we noted: 
The courts have uniformly said . . . that the 
service of a garnishee process is an equitable levy 
upon the property of the debtor in the hands of the 
garnishee, and that the interest thereby obtained in 
such property is at least in the nature of an 
equitable lien, and has been commonly called a lien.  
In many cases it has been called a lien without 
qualification, in others an equitable lien, and in 
some a mere inchoate or incipient lien,——the mere 
commencement of proceedings to obtain a lien in 
fact. . . . Some . . . authorities are to the effect 
that a garnishee levy creates a specific lien.  Others 
are directly to the contrary. 
Id. at 660-61 (emphasis added).  As we have explained, 
garnishment creates a lien due to the seizure of the debtor's 
property that is in the hands of the garnishee defendant.  
Morawetz v. Sun Ins. Office, 96 Wis. 175, 178, 71 N.W. 109 
(1897) ("[G]arnishment is a seizure in the hands of the 
garnishee by notice to him, creating an effectual lien upon the 
garnished property to satisfy whatever judgment"). 
¶33 The judgment creditors in both Kellogg and Bank of 
Commerce levied the debtor's property in order to affix common 
law liens——Kellogg by attempted execution that was returned 
No. 
2011AP2597   
 
16 
 
unsatisfied and then securing the appointment of a receiver, who 
applied the debtor's personal property to the judgment debt, and 
Bank of Commerce by prosecuting a garnishment action, wherein 
the specific personal property in the hands of a third party was 
levied.  Kellogg, 47 Wis. at 656; Bank of Commerce, 109 Wis. at 
661. 
The 
conclusion 
that 
a 
judgment 
creditor 
who 
first 
identifies and levies specific, non-exempt personal property of 
a judgment debtor has a superior interest in regard to other 
judgment creditors who have taken no such actions in regard to 
the 
identified 
property 
is 
consistent 
with 
our 
earlier 
decisions.8   
¶34 For example, in Alexander v. Wald, 231 Wis. 550, 286 
N.W. 6 (1939), we examined the rights of a supplemental receiver 
vis-a-vie a bankruptcy trustee.  Id. at 551.  We held that the 
receiver, who had discovered and executed on intangible personal 
property consisting of a real estate mortgage, a chattel 
mortgage, and certain personal property that the debtor had 
fraudulently conveyed, had an interest superior to that of the 
bankruptcy trustee with respect to that property because the 
receiver had been appointed and levied more than four months 
before commencement of the bankruptcy.  Id.   
                                                 
8 It should be noted that when two judgment creditors with 
docketed money judgments each attempt to levy identified, non-
exempt personal property, or when a perfected secured party's 
rights are at issue, further analysis may be necessary to 
determine relative priorities. 
No. 
2011AP2597   
 
17 
 
¶35 In Holton v. Burton, 78 Wis. 321, 47 N.W. 624 (1890),9 
we reached a consistent result.  Holton concerned a judgment 
creditor who had initiated supplemental proceedings, but had not 
levied any specific property.  An assignment for the benefit of 
creditors was made after supplemental proceedings were begun, 
but before a supplemental receiver was appointed.  Id. at 322.  
We reasoned that the judgment creditor did not have a superior 
interest, but instead had to take a pro rata share of the 
debtor's personal property in the insolvency proceeding because 
the judgment creditor had not timely levied specific personal 
property to avoid the effect of the insolvency proceedings.  Id. 
at 327-28.   
¶36 It is reasonable to conclude that the results in 
Alexander and Holton, where judgment creditors were in disputes 
with insolvency trustees, were at least partially due to the 
different steps the judgment creditors took and the timing of 
those steps.  When the judgment creditor exercised rights to the 
debtor's property by timely levying specific property well in 
advance of the insolvency proceedings, the creditor prevailed.  
When the creditor did nothing more than initiate supplemental 
proceedings prior to an insolvency proceeding, the creditor did 
not prevail.  Stated otherwise, a judgment creditor obtained a 
superior interest in identified personal property of a judgment 
debtor that could defeat the claim of a trustee in insolvency or 
                                                 
9 While the reasoning in Holton v. Burton, 78 Wis. 321, 47 
N.W. 624 (1890), is interesting, I note that the statutes then 
employed have been changed significantly.   
No. 
2011AP2597   
 
18 
 
bankruptcy proceedings when the judgment creditor or a receiver 
acting on the judgment creditor's behalf levied that property 
before the trustee obtained an interest in the property.10  
¶37 At first glance, Kellogg may appear to cast doubt on 
this interpretation.  In Kellogg, two judgment creditors, who 
had executions returned unsatisfied, initiated supplemental 
proceedings and obtained appointments of two supplemental 
receivers.11 
 
The 
first 
judgment 
creditor 
to 
initiate 
supplemental proceedings was second to properly serve the debtor 
with an order to appear for supplemental proceedings because of 
a technical problem with its first service.  Kellogg, 47 Wis. at 
651-52.  By the time the first judgment creditor properly served 
the debtor, the second judgment creditor had served the debtor 
and the debtor had assigned his property to the second judgment 
creditor's receiver in aid of execution of the second creditor's 
                                                 
10 Early New York cases are particularly persuasive because 
Wisconsin adopted its supplemental proceeding statutes from New 
York.  Robert S. Moss, Supplementary Proceedings in Wisconsin, 
23 Marq. L. Rev. 49, 51 (1939).  These cases also support our 
interpretation.  While the New York and Wisconsin supplemental 
proceeding statutes were still comparable, the New York rule was 
"to give the creditor a lien on the debtor's equitable assets 
which was [an] 'inchoate' [lien] at the time the examination 
order was served."  See Isadore H. Cohen, Collection of Money 
Judgments in New York:  Supplementary Proceedings, 35 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1007, 1015-17 (1935) (citing Edmonstone v. McLoud, 16 N.Y. 
543 (N.Y. 1858); Lynch v. Johnson, 48 N.Y. 27 (N.Y. 1871)). 
11 We 
ultimately 
held 
that 
"where 
different 
judgment 
creditors are prosecuting supplementary proceedings against the 
same debtor at the same time," only one receiver should be 
appointed.  Kellogg v. Coller, 47 Wis. 649, 657, 3 N.W. 433 
(1879). 
No. 
2011AP2597   
 
19 
 
judgment.  Id.  Despite the assignment, we concluded that "under 
all of the circumstances of the case, [the second creditor's] 
proceeding [wa]s inoperative to give [the second creditor] a 
prior lien."  Id. at 657.   
¶38 Read in light of its facts, Kellogg established the 
judgment creditor for whose benefit a supplemental receiver must 
act, i.e., which judgment creditor had priority to money that 
the 
supplemental 
receiver 
recovered, 
regardless 
of 
which 
creditor had the receiver appointed.  Under Kellogg, the first 
judgment creditor who made a "bona fide attempt to serve" an 
order to appear for supplemental proceedings and also prosecuted 
"with proper diligence" to the appointment of a supplemental 
receiver had priority to assets the supplemental receiver 
recovered, 
even 
if 
the 
receiver 
was 
appointed 
in 
the 
supplemental proceedings of a different judgment creditor.  Id. 
at 656-57.12  The equities of the underlying facts also may have 
impacted our decision in Kellogg because the second judgment 
creditor and her attorney "had actual notice that [Kellogg] had 
previously 
commenced 
[supplemental 
proceedings]" 
when 
she 
instituted her proceeding.  Id. at 652. 
¶39 However, it is significant that two judgment creditors 
remained free to pursue collection on their docketed judgments 
                                                 
12 See also Alexander v. Wald, 231 Wis. 550, 552, 286 N.W. 6 
(1939) ("bankruptcy proceedings had not displaced the lien 
acquired by the receiver upon his appointment"); Cohen, supra 
note 10, at 1016 (in New York, it was only upon appointment of a 
receiver that a creditor's interest "ripen[ed] into a full 
lien").   
No. 
2011AP2597   
 
20 
 
at the same time.  Id. at 658 ("different [supplemental] 
proceedings may be pending at the same time, the only 
restriction upon a junior proceeding being that creditors 
prosecuting prior proceedings shall be notified of the pendency 
thereof, and that but one receiver shall be appointed. . . . the 
plaintiff in the junior proceeding should be allowed to proceed 
. . . without regard to priorities").  
¶40 Furthermore, our conclusion that a superior judgment 
creditor's interest in specific personal property may arise when 
that property is seized has been the statutory directive of the 
legislature since at least 1864.  As we explained so long ago in 
Knox v. Webster, 18 Wis. 426 (*406) (1864), when interpreting a 
prior statute, "'[p]ersonal property shall be bound from the 
time of its seizure on execution.'  Before seizure there is no 
lien[;] . . . [t]he lien takes effect from the date of the levy 
and by virtue thereof."  Id. at 429-30 (*409) (internal citation 
omitted).  In this regard, the current statute states the same 
legal principle:  "Personal property shall be bound from the 
time it is seized."  Wis. Stat. § 815.19(1).  Accordingly, 
seizure, often referred to as levying, of personal property is 
necessary to create a lien in favor of an unsecured judgment 
creditor.   
¶41 Having explained the common law foundation and the 
statutory foundation for when a judgment creditor's lien may 
No. 
2011AP2597   
 
21 
 
arise in identified personal property,13 we briefly return to 
Badger Lines.  Badger Lines arose in a priority contest between 
a judgment creditor, Emerald Industrial Leasing Corporation, and 
a trustee in bankruptcy.  Badger Lines, 224 Wis. 2d at 649-50.  
A trustee in bankruptcy has, by federal statute, all the rights 
of a judgment creditor.  11 U.S.C. § 544(a).  A supplemental 
receiver had been appointed to administer Badger Lines' property 
for the benefit of Emerald before the case made its way to us.  
Prior to the appointment of the receiver, Emerald also had 
docketed its judgment.  Badger Lines, 224 Wis. 2d at 649-50.  
And subsequent to said docketing, Emerald served an order 
directing 
Badger 
to 
appear 
for 
a 
ch. 
816 
supplemental 
proceeding.  Id. at 650.   
¶42 Docketing 
a 
creditor's 
judgment 
is 
a 
condition 
precedent to establishing the priority of a judgment creditor's 
interest because a judgment must be docketed before an execution 
against the property of a judgment debtor can issue.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 815.05(1g)(a)6. (requiring that an execution shall state, 
"[t]he time of entry in the judgment and lien docket in the 
county to which the execution is issued").  Furthermore, a 
judgment creditor must levy specifically identified personal 
                                                 
13 See In re Badger Lines, Inc., 140 F.3d 691, 694-95 (7th 
Cir. 1998) (finding that Kellogg's omission of a perfection 
requirement is "too thin a reed on which to rest [an] important 
[priority] determination, especially in light of the significant 
changes which have occurred in debtor/creditor law in the 120 
years since" that decision).   
No. 
2011AP2597   
 
22 
 
property of the debtor before a lien can arise in that property.  
Knox, 18 Wis. 2d at 429-30; Wis. Stat. § 815.19(1).   
¶43 In Badger Lines, the trustee in bankruptcy attempted 
to declare Emerald's interest a preference, whereby he could 
place Emerald's money judgment among all of the other unsecured 
creditors' claims.  Badger Lines, 224 Wis. 2d at 650-51.  Of 
course, Emerald had no interest in sharing the assets it had 
uncovered with other creditors.  However, if Emerald's lien was 
created within 90 days of filing the bankruptcy, it would be 
held to be an avoidable preference and Emerald would lose to the 
trustee.  Id. at 651.  Therefore, instead of focusing on the 
creation of its lien, Emerald shifted the court's focus to 
"perfection" of its lien.  Emerald did so because if perfection 
occurred more than 90 days before the filing of the bankruptcy, 
Emerald could possibly prevail.   
¶44 In Badger Lines, we did not have a full record that 
displayed all the issues that we might have considered; 
therefore, it differed significantly from the case now before 
us.14  Badger Lines' statement that the date of service on Badger 
                                                 
14 At least one commentator seemed to view the Badger Lines 
as a departure from older case law, noting that:   
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, In re Badger Lines, Inc., 
224 Wis. 2d 646, 590 N.W.2d 270 (1999), held that 
service upon the debtor of an order to appear at a 
supplemental examination under Chapter 816 establishes 
at the time of service a lien in favor of the creditor 
without requiring the creditor to take additional 
steps to perfect the lien . . . The court rejected 
arguments 
that, 
to 
avoid 
a 
secret 
lien, 
some 
additional action should be required of a judgment 
creditor.  The court also rejected arguments that the 
No. 
2011AP2597   
 
23 
 
Lines of the order to appear for supplemental proceedings was 
the date of "perfection" must be limited to the context in which 
it arose.  That context did not include an assertion that common 
law liens do not require "perfection," but rather, liens arise 
in specifically identified, non-exempt personal property when 
that property is levied.   
¶45 Accordingly, it must be recognized that service of an 
order to appear for supplemental proceedings will not create an 
interest that is superior to the interest of a docketed judgment 
creditor who has levied specific personal property of the 
debtor.  Merely serving an order to appear for supplemental 
proceedings also will not create a common law lien on the 
debtor's personal property nor will it give a judgment creditor 
an interest superior to that of a secured creditor who has 
                                                                                                                                                             
lien should not arise until a supplemental receiver is 
appointed or the court issues a turnover order as to 
the debtor's assets; the court held that the lien 
arises at an earlier stage, when the judgment debtor 
is served with the order to appear at the supplemental 
examination.  See Holton v. Burton, 78 Wis. 321, 47 
N.W. 624 (1890).   
Robert A. Pasch, 12 Wisconsin Practice Series:  Wisconsin 
Collection Law § 16:13, at 330-31 (2d ed. 2006).  Pasch also 
noted the breadth of the decision, explaining that the case 
"references the lien as a 'receiver's lien,' [but] . . . appears 
to have broader application to the lien of a judgment creditor 
pursuing supplemental proceedings."  Id. at 331.   
No. 
2011AP2597   
 
24 
 
timely proceeded according to the directives of Wis. Stat. ch. 
409.15  
4.  Statutory collection procedures 
¶46 To conclude, as Decade asserts, that simply serving a 
judgment debtor with an order to appear at supplemental 
proceedings gives a judgment creditor the exclusive right to 
pursue collection from all of the debtor's personal property 
would improperly "impinge on the purview of the legislature" by 
eviscerating its statutory scheme for judgment collection.  See 
Crown Castle USA, Inc. v. Orion Constr. Group, LLC, 2012 WI 29, 
¶17, 339 Wis. 2d 252, 811 N.W.2d 332 (refusing to find an 
implied right to compel a third party to appear at supplemental 
proceedings because Wis. Stat. ch. 816 did not provide for one).  
¶47 For example, if a judgment creditor were able to 
encumber all of a judgment debtor's personal property simply by 
                                                 
15 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
ch. 
409 
governs 
voluntarily 
given 
security interests, rather than creditors' rights represented by 
a judgment.  Wis. Stat. § 409.109(4)(i) (chapter does not apply 
to "assignment of a right represented by a judgment, other than 
a judgment taken on a right to payment that was collateral").  
Under this system of secured transactions, a creditor obtains a 
security interest in property the debtor has assigned as 
collateral 
that 
is 
enforceable 
against 
the 
debtor 
when 
"attachment" occurs pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 409.203.  The 
creditor's security interest is valid against the claims of 
other creditors when it perfects that interest by meeting "all 
of the applicable requirements for perfection in ss. 409.310 to 
409.316." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 409.308. 
 
These 
"applicable 
requirements" vary depending on the type of collateral, but the 
general rule is that "a financing statement must be filed to 
perfect all security interests."  § 409.310(1).  See Attorney's 
Title Guaranty Fund, Inc. v. Town Bank, 2014 WI 63, __ Wis. 2d 
__, __ N.W.2d __. 
No. 
2011AP2597   
 
25 
 
serving an order to appear for supplemental proceedings, 
alternate statutory processes such as execution, ch. 815, and 
garnishment, ch. 812, and turnover orders would be nearly 
useless for collection of money judgments.  A judgment creditor 
who does nothing more than initiate supplemental proceedings 
could stop another judgment creditor who has located specific, 
non-exempt personal property from having the sheriff seize the 
asset under a valid execution order.  Similarly, a judgment 
creditor who discovered a judgment debtor's bank account could 
be prevented from garnishing that account once an order to 
appear for supplemental proceedings was served.  And since state 
law determines priority in bankruptcy, a judgment creditor who 
does nothing more than serve a debtor with an order to appear at 
supplemental proceedings outside of the bankruptcy preference 
period could thereby defeat the claim of a bankruptcy trustee 
(and the unsecured creditors he or she represents) to all of the 
debtor's personal property.  If those results were to occur, 
they would directly contradict the legislature's directive that 
"[p]ersonal property shall be bound from the time it is seized."  
Wis. Stat. § 815.19(1).   
¶48 Moreover, by granting the judgment creditor with a 
docketed judgment who first levies on non-exempt personal 
property a superior interest in that property, "[t]he law justly 
rewards the diligent creditor who by his timely efforts succeeds 
in discovering assets of the debtor which are inequitably 
withheld from his creditors."  John W. Smith, The Equitable 
Remedies of Creditors § 235, at 243 (Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 
No. 
2011AP2597   
 
26 
 
1899).  Rather than encouraging diligence, the kind of blanket 
lien Decade asks us to recognize would remove incentives for a 
judgment creditor to locate and levy a debtor's personal 
property.  The facts of this case aptly demonstrate some of the 
problems this would present.  
5.  Article 9 secured transactions 
¶49 A blanket lien on a judgment debtor's personal 
property also would frustrate the legislature's goal of a 
uniform 
system 
of 
secured 
transactions. 
 
The 
Wisconsin 
Legislature adopted the Uniform Commercial Code in 1965 in order 
to 
"simplify, 
clarify, 
and 
modernize 
the 
law 
governing 
commercial transactions."  Wis. Stat. § 401.103(1)(a).  
¶50 Chapter 409 governs secured transactions and works 
toward these stated goals by prescribing the steps a party must 
take to obtain and perfect a security interest in personal 
property.16  Wis. Stat. § 409.203; Wis. Stat. § 409.301 et. seq.; 
see generally Smith & Spidahl Enters., Inc. v. Lee, 206 Wis. 2d 
663, 673, 557 N.W.2d 865 (Ct. App. 1996) ("Fashioning equitable 
solutions to mitigate the hardship of [statutory] requirements 
on particular creditors undermines [the system's] purpose. . . . 
[R]elaxing [statutory] requirements does not . . . justify the 
                                                 
16 Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code is contained in 
Wis. Stat. ch. 409.  Nat'l Operating, L.P. v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. 
of N.Y., 2001 WI 87, ¶31, 244 Wis. 2d 839, 630 N.W.2d 116 
("Wisconsin has adopted each section of the U.C.C. relevant to 
this case.  This includes all of Article 9, which is embodied in 
Chapter 409 of the Wisconsin Statutes.  Chapter 409 does not 
vary in any material respect from the uniform law."). 
No. 
2011AP2597   
 
27 
 
uncertainty and inconsistency that would result from such an 
approach."). 
¶51 Article 9 does not apply to the present case.  Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 409.109(4)(i). 
 
Judgment 
creditors 
are 
unsecured 
creditors with regard to a debtor's personal property.  Still, 
the impact of a blanket lien on the statutory scheme for secured 
transactions provides additional understanding of the conflicts 
that such a lien would create.  We explain in more detail the 
implications a blanket lien would have on lending, paying 
particular attention to Wis. Stat. ch. 409 in Attorney's Title 
Guaranty Fund v. Town Bank, 2014 WI 63, ¶¶30-36, __ Wis. 2d __, 
__ N.W.2d __, released today. 
¶52 And finally, we conclude that if a judgment creditor 
were to have a blanket lien on all the personal property of a 
judgment debtor that precludes other creditors from pursuing 
collection, that is a policy choice better left to the 
legislature than to the courts.  Compare Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 
§ 708.110(d) (providing for a lien on non-exempt personal 
property for one year from service of notice to appear at 
supplemental 
proceedings); 
735 
ILCS 
5/2-1402(m) 
(judgment 
No. 
2011AP2597   
 
28 
 
"becomes a lien" on non-exempt personal property when citation 
from the clerk is served).17   
C.  Application 
¶53 Decade contends that because it served an order to 
appear for supplemental proceedings, it has a blanket lien on 
all of Collier's non-exempt personal property.  However, Decade 
does not explain how it acquired this lien.  Instead, it skips 
that step in the analysis and discusses perfection of its lien.   
¶54 SB1 asserts that "neither Decade nor Keierleber had 
any interest in actually recovering money from Collier."  This 
view is supported by "the record[, which] suggests that Collier 
                                                 
17 Wisconsin is not the first state to face problems 
regarding the idea of a common law lien arising out of 
supplemental proceedings.  Illinois courts were split on whether 
the issuance of a "citation to discover assets," a procedure 
akin to supplemental examination, created a lien, until the 
legislature expressly provided for the creation of a lien.  
Prior v. Farm Bureau Oil Co., 176 B.R. 485, 492 (Bankr. S.D. 
Ill. 1995); see Francis Edward Stepnowski, Less Than Perfected:  
Uncertainty in Illinois Judgment Lien Law, 13 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 
33, 41 (1992) (before the legislature provided for the lien, 
Illinois case law created uncertainty, "whereas today's business 
climate requires bright-line rules to determine priority among 
creditors").  The New York legislature similarly provided for a 
lien upon "secur[ing of] an order for delivery of, payment of, 
or appointment of a receiver of, a debt owed to the judgment 
debtor or an interest of the judgment debtor in personal 
property" in order "to avoid the confusion of . . . former law."  
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5202 (Consol. 2013) and Advisory Committee Notes 
subd. (b); see Cohen, supra note 10, at 1015-17.  Finally, the 
California legislature has provided for a lien on personal 
property that is compatible with Article 9.  See Cal. Civ. Proc. 
Code 
§ 697.510(a) 
(providing 
judgment 
creditors 
with 
the 
equivalent of a security interest in a debtor's personal 
property when the creditor files notice of a judgment in the 
state's central filing system).  
No. 
2011AP2597   
 
29 
 
evaded service from SB1 for months and that Decade's six 
lawsuits were filed as a dilatory tactic."  Associated Bank, No. 
2011AP2597, unpublished slip op., at ¶18.  Should we adopt 
Decade's position, we would be affirming Decade's ability to 
shelter Collier's assets from SB1 and other creditors.  SB1 
asserts that if Decade's contention were correct, by serving 
Collier with an order to appear, Decade could prevent other 
creditors from executing on Collier's personal property while 
Decade itself took no steps to apply Collier's property in 
satisfaction of Decade's judgment.  Therefore, as long as Decade 
continued to take no action to collect, Collier would remain in 
possession of his personal property, flouting the "noble 
proposition that debtors ought to pay."  David Gray Carlson, 
Critique of Money Judgment (Part Two:  Liens on New York 
Personal Property), 83 St. John's L. Rev. 43, 44 (2009).  
¶55 SB1's argument has a lot of merit.  SB1 has not only 
docketed its money judgment and served Collier with an order to 
appear for supplemental proceedings, SB1 also obtained a 
turnover order through a receiver for Collier's identified 
personal property thereby levying that property.  Accordingly, 
SB1 has a lien on that levied property that is superior to other 
unsecured judgment creditors.   
¶56 In addition, we conclude that Decade does not have the 
exclusive right to pursue collection from Collier's personal 
property simply by serving him with a notice to appear at 
supplemental proceedings because Decade had not docketed its 
No. 
2011AP2597   
 
30 
 
judgment and proceeded in its collection efforts sufficient to 
acquire a lien on any of Collier's personal property.   
¶57 Before 
concluding, 
we 
briefly 
address 
Decade's 
contention that the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion when it refused to give Decade priority over SB1 in 
regard to Collier's personal property.  Decade contends that the 
circuit court should have employed its equitable powers and held 
its judgment was docketed because the failure in docketing was 
due to the error of the clerk.  Again, we disagree. 
¶58 First, if Decade suffered any damages due to the 
clerk's error, the legislature has provided a statutory remedy 
for that error in Wis. Stat. § 806.10(3).  Second, the circuit 
court balanced Decade's lawsuits and supplemental proceeding 
with Collier's apparent evasion of service of SB1's order to 
appear and concluded that Decade's failure to docket should not 
be accorded an equitable remedy.  Third, we agree with the court 
of appeals that serving an order to appear for supplemental 
proceedings is not the equivalent of docketing a money judgment.  
"In a race-notice jurisdiction such as Wisconsin, prompt 
docketing of judgments is needed to establish the proper 
priority of claims."  S. Milwaukee Sav. Bank v. Barrett, 2000 WI 
48, ¶40, 234 Wis. 2d 733, 611 N.W.2d 448.  Fourth, a properly 
docketed judgment is required to obtain a statutory lien on real 
property.  Wis. Stat. § 806.15; Builder's Lumber Co. v. Stuart, 
6 Wis. 2d 356, 364, 94 N.W.2d 630 (1959).  No less should be 
required for personal property.  Accordingly, we conclude that 
No. 
2011AP2597   
 
31 
 
the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion 
when it refused to grant Decade equitable relief.  
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶59 We conclude that supplemental proceedings under ch. 
816 are a discovery tool in aid of judgment collection.  
Decade's 
serving 
Collier 
with 
an 
order 
to 
appear 
for 
supplemental proceedings did not give rise to a blanket lien on 
all of Collier's personal property that prevented SB1 from 
pursuing collection.  A judgment creditor obtains an interest in 
a judgment debtor's identified, non-exempt personal property 
superior to other unsecured creditors when it dockets its money 
judgment, identifies specific personal property and levies that 
property.  Levying may be accomplished by at least three 
different means:  (1) by executing against specific personal 
property with the assistance of a sheriff; (2) by serving the 
garnishee defendant in a garnishment action to seize specific 
property in the hands of the garnishee defendant; or (3) by 
obtaining an order to apply specific personal property to the 
satisfaction of the judgment, which a creditor may do with the 
assistance of a supplemental receiver.  Wis. Stat. § 815.05(6); 
Wis. Stat. § 812.01; Wis. Stat. § 816.08.   
¶60 Here, SB1 was the first judgment creditor with a 
docketed money judgment to levy specific, non-exempt personal 
property of Collier.  It did so by obtaining a court order to 
turn over specifically identified property to its receiver.  
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals that 
concluded that SB1 has priority over Decade in regard to the 
No. 
2011AP2597   
 
32 
 
specific personal property SB1 identified and levied.  However, 
insofar as the decision of the court of appeals can be read to 
recognize a blanket lien in favor of SB1 that prevents other 
creditors from pursuing collection from Collier's personal 
property, we modify that decision because no blanket lien 
exists.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
modified and as modified, affirmed. 
¶61 DAVID T. PROSSER, J., did not participate. 
 
 
No.  2011AP2597.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶62 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   (dissenting). 
 
The 
majority opinion reaches its erroneous conclusion today by 
operating in its own imaginary world, divorced from reality.   
¶63 In the real world, our courts have recognized for the 
last 150 years a judgment creditor's common-law equitable lien, 
superior to other creditors, created by service of notice of a 
supplementary proceeding upon a judgment debtor on the debtor's 
non-exempt personal property.  In the real world, creditors and 
debtors have relied upon this judgment creditor's common-law 
equitable lien.  In the real world, the parties in the instant 
case dispute the applicability of this common-law equitable lien 
to the undisputed facts. 
¶64 In the world of the majority opinion, a judgment 
creditor's common-law equitable lien and the issues raised by 
the parties simply have not existed and will not exist in the 
future.1 
                                                 
1 According to the majority opinion, a lien on a judgment 
debtor's non-exempt personal property turns on the judgment 
creditor's "levying" on non-exempt personal property after 
identifying the property and docketing the judgment.  Majority 
op., ¶3. 
Docketing the judgment is mentioned in only one place in 
chapter 815, entitled "Execution":  Section 815.05(1g)(a)6. 
provides that the execution "shall intelligibly refer to the 
judgment stating," inter alia, "the time of entry in the 
judgment and lien docket in the county to which the execution is 
issued."   
With regard to execution, Wis. Stat. § 806.06(4) provides 
that "[n]o execution shall issue until the judgment is perfected 
or until the expiration of the time for perfection." (emphasis 
added).  A judgment is perfected "by the taxation of costs and 
the insertion of the amount thereof in the judgment."  Wis. 
Stat. § 806.06(1)(c).  Perfection does not relate to docketing. 
No.  2011AP2597.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶65 The issue in this case as presented by the parties is 
whether Decade Property obtained a common-law equitable lien on 
Jack Collier's personal property superior to SB1's interest when 
Decade Property, the judgment creditor, served Collier, the 
judgment debtor, with an order to appear at a supplemental 
examination but the clerk of circuit court failed to docket the 
judgment.2  
¶66 SB1 asserts a superior common-law equitable lien on 
Jack Collier's non-exempt personal property even though SB1 
served Collier notice of the supplementary proceeding after 
Decade Property served Collier, but SB1's judgment was docketed 
before Decade Property's judgment was docketed.  The circuit 
court and court of appeals agreed with SB1. 
¶67 Rather than address the issue of how a judgment 
creditor obtains a common-law equitable lien, the majority 
opinion 
broadly 
and 
surprisingly 
holds 
that 
supplemental 
                                                                                                                                                             
Furthermore, Wis. Stat. § 815.04(1)(a) permits execution to 
issue "within 5 years of the rendition of the judgment.  
Section 806.06(1)(a) provides that "[a] judgment is rendered by 
the court when it is signed by the judge or by the clerk at the 
judge's written direction" (emphasis added). 
The circuit court and court of appeals do not always use 
the words "perfecting" a judgment, "entering" a judgment, and 
"docketing" a judgment as these words are used in the statutes. 
2 The Petition for Review states the issue as follows:  "Is 
a creditor's right to obtain a common law Creditor's/Receiver's 
Lien against a judgment debtor's personal property conditioned 
upon docketing the judgment in the Judgment and Lien Docket 
under Wis. Stat. § 806.10(1)?"  
The circuit court concluded, and the court of appeals 
affirmed, that docketing the judgment was a prerequisite for a 
common-law creditor's lien.  See majority op., ¶19. 
No.  2011AP2597.ssa 
 
3 
 
proceedings do not give rise to any lien whatsoever on any of 
the debtor's personal property.  "[S]upplemental proceedings 
under ch. 816 are a discovery tool in aid of judgment 
collection." Majority op., ¶3.  "Supplementary proceedings 
provide a mechanism by which to obtain information in aid of 
judgment collection."  Majority op., ¶27.   
¶68 According to the majority opinion, a judgment creditor 
obtains an interest in a judgment debtor's identified non-exempt 
personal property superior to other unsecured creditors when the 
judgment creditor (1) dockets its money judgment, (2) identifies 
specific, non-exempt personal property, and (3) "levies" (by at 
least one of three enumerated means) the specific non-exempt 
personal property it has identified.  Majority op. ¶¶3, 23, 33.   
¶69 The 
long-recognized 
judgment 
creditor's 
equitable 
common-law lien arising from supplementary proceedings simply 
does not exist in the world created by the majority opinion.  
Yet in the real world, creditors and debtors have long relied on 
the court's recognition of the common-law equitable lien.3  In 
writing the common-law creditor's lien out of Wisconsin legal 
history, the majority opinion mischaracterizes or ignores 
existing case law. 
¶70 To put the majority opinion's rewriting of history and 
case law in proper perspective, I first review the law regarding 
the judgment creditor's common-law equitable lien arising on a 
                                                 
3 See Attorney's Title Guaranty Fund v. Town Bank, 2014 WI 
63, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___N.W.2d ___ (a judgment creditor acted 
under the assumption that a common-law equitable lien existed on 
the judgment debtor's property).   
No.  2011AP2597.ssa 
 
4 
 
debtor's 
personal 
non-exempt 
property 
in 
supplementary 
proceedings.  I then discuss our most recent case, In re Badger 
Lines, Inc., 224 Wis. 2d 646, 590 N.W.2d 270 (1999), a case that 
the majority opinion in effect overrules without confronting the 
doctrine of stare decisis.  
¶71 Before I tackle these two issues, I enumerate a few 
other flaws in the majority opinion (not necessarily in order of 
significance), but I do not address each in great detail.     
¶72 First, the majority opinion is confused and confusing 
as it describes its holding in different ways in different parts 
of the opinion.  Compare majority op., ¶¶3, 20, 33, 42, 45, 47, 
48, 52, 60.   
¶73 Second, the majority opinion entangles the law on 
liens on real property and personal property.  See majority op., 
¶58; 
Associated 
Bank 
N.A. 
v. 
Collier, 
No. 
2011AP2597, 
unpublished slip op., ¶14 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2012).  
¶74 Third, "levying" is the important concept in the 
majority opinion, yet it is undefined.  According to the 
majority opinion, a lien on a judgment debtor's non-exempt 
personal property turns on the judgment creditor's "levying" on 
the non-exempt personal property.  Majority op., ¶3.   
¶75 Yet service of notice of a supplementary proceeding 
has been characterized by the court as an "equitable levy."  
Supplementary proceeding on the debtor "operates as an equitable 
levy, and creates a lien in equity upon the effects of the 
judgment debtor, and every species of property belonging to [the 
debtor] may be reached and applied to the satisfaction of his 
No.  2011AP2597.ssa 
 
5 
 
debts."  Bragg v. Gaynor, 85 Wis. 468, 486, 55 N.W. 919 (1893) 
(emphasis added).4  See also In re Milburn, 59 Wis. 24, 34, 17 
N.W. 965 (1883) (service of the notice of the supplementary 
proceeding "operates as an equitable levy and creates a lien in 
equity . . . ").   
¶76 Without 
discussion 
or 
explanation, 
the 
majority 
opinion ignores case law describing service of notice of a 
supplementary proceeding as an  "equitable levy." 
¶77 Fourth, the majority opinion appears to conflict with 
various statutes.  Contrary to the majority opinion, a judgment 
creditor need not always docket the judgment to obtain a lien 
and priority on non-exempt personal property of the debtor.5  
¶78 For 
example, 
a 
judgment 
creditor 
may, 
without 
docketing the judgment, obtain a lien on a debtor's property by 
use of garnishment.  On service of the garnishment complaint, 
the garnishment lien has priority.  Wis. Stat. § 812.18.6  A 
garnishee is liable as to debts due "or to become due" at the 
time of service of the garnishment summons and complaint.7    
                                                 
4 See also Candee v. Egan, 84 Wis. 2d 348, 360, 267 
N.W.2d 890 (1978) (service of notice of the supplementary 
proceeding serves as an equitable levy on the unknown property 
of the debtor "to preserve the debtor's nonexempt property for 
the benefit of the specific judgment creditors . . . ."). 
5 Liens may be perfected in many different ways.  The manner 
in which a lien is perfected depends on both the type of lien 
asserted, e.g., a judgment lien, a statutory lien, an equitable 
lien, and the type of property against which the lien is 
asserted, e.g., real or personal. 
6 See also Robert A. Pasch, 12 Wisconsin Practice Series:  
Wisconsin Collection Law § 17:15, at 349 (2d ed. 2006). 
7 Wis. Stat. § 812.18. 
No.  2011AP2597.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶79 The court has spoken of garnishment as an equitable 
levy upon the property of the debtor in the hands of the 
garnishee, just as it has spoken of service of notice of a 
supplementary proceeding as operating as an equitable levy.  
Bragg, 85 Wis. at 486. 
¶80 Fifth, the majority opinion voices concern about 
"blanket liens" over a debtor's non-exempt personal property.8  I 
agree that issues exist regarding the scope of a judgment 
creditor's common-law equitable lien on a debtor's non-exempt 
personal property, including a lien on after-acquired property.  
By eliminating the lien entirely, the majority opinion does not 
tackle the more nuanced issues involving the scope of the 
common-law equitable lien created by notice of supplementary 
proceedings, an issue raised by the parties in the instant case. 
¶81 Sixth, by subverting the longstanding rule on a 
judgment creditor's common-law equitable lien, the majority 
opinion 
ignores 
the 
policy 
of 
this 
court 
to 
promote 
predictability, 
efficiency, 
and 
uniformity 
in 
commercial 
transactions.  The majority opinion does not consider whether it 
should "sunburst" its opinion to maintain the predictability and 
efficiency of the law governing economic transactions.9 
                                                 
8 See majority op., ¶¶3, 20, 51, 52-55. 
9 The decision to apply a new rule of law only 
prospectively, or to "sunburst" the new rule of law, 
is driven by our attempt to alleviate the unsettling 
effects of a party justifiably relying on a contrary 
view of the law. [State ex rel. Buswell v. Tomah Area 
Sch. Dist., 2007 WI 71, ¶ 46, 301 Wis. 2d 178, 732 
N.W.2d 804]. Accordingly, in determining whether to 
apply a new rule of law prospectively instead of 
retrospectively, 
we 
consider 
three 
factors: 
(1) 
No.  2011AP2597.ssa 
 
7 
 
¶82 Accordingly, I dissent.  
I 
¶83 I begin by discussing the case law on a judgment 
creditor's 
common-law 
equitable 
lien 
in 
supplementary 
proceedings.   
¶84 Since the early days of statehood, our statutes and 
case law have recognized that when a judgment creditor properly 
serves notice upon a debtor of a supplementary proceeding to 
identify property to satisfy its judgment, the judgment creditor 
obtains a common-law equitable lien on the debtor's property.10  
¶85 The judgment creditor's common-law equitable lien has 
a long robust history in our state.  It can be traced to the 
                                                                                                                                                             
whether our holding establishes a new rule of law, 
either by overruling clear past precedent on which 
litigants may have relied, or by deciding an issue of 
first impression, the resolution of which was not 
clearly 
foreshadowed; 
(2) 
whether 
retroactive 
application would further or impede the operation of 
the new rule; and (3) whether retroactive application 
could produce substantial inequitable results. Id., 
¶47; 
see 
also 
[Kurtz 
v. 
City 
of 
Waukesha, 
91 
Wis. 2d 103, 109, 280 N.W.2d 757 (1979)]. 
Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co., 2012 WI 26, ¶45, 339 
Wis. 2d 125, 810 N.W.2d 465 (footnote omitted). 
10 See, e.g., Kellogg v. Coller, 47 Wis. 649, 656 (1879); In 
re Milburn, 49 Wis. 24, 17 N.W. 965 (1883); Bragg v. Gaynor, 85 
Wis. 468, 486, 55 N.W. 919 (1893); In re Badger Lines, Inc., 224 
Wis. 2d 646, 654 (citing Candee, 84 Wis. 2d at 360). 
Wisconsin creditors and debtors, including both parties in 
the instant case, point to the judgment creditor's common-law 
equitable lien on a debtor's property created by a subpoena or 
notice to appear at a supplementary hearing.  See Brief of 
Intervening Defendant-Appellant at 31-39; Brief of the Co-
Plaintiff-Respondent at 16.  
No.  2011AP2597.ssa 
 
8 
 
creditor's bill in equity.  In 1856 the Wisconsin legislature 
adopted the precursor to chapter 816 of the Wisconsin Statute 
governing 
supplementary 
proceedings11 
"with 
the 
intent 
to 
substitute supplementary proceedings for the relief formerly 
obtainable in equity by a creditor's bill."12  The supplementary 
proceedings are the "statutory equivalent of a creditor's bill 
in equity at common law and follow essentially the same rules of 
law."13   
¶86 The court has routinely used the common-law principles 
of the creditor's bill in equity to interpret the supplementary 
proceedings statutes.  A supplementary proceeding, the court 
declared, "is a substitute for a creditor's bill in equity, and 
is governed by the same rules of law in respect to the rights 
and priorities of parties affected by the proceeding which 
control the equitable action. . . . [T]he creditor who, after 
filing his bill, obtained the first service of the subpoena upon 
the judgment debtor, thereby obtained a prior lien upon the 
equitable assets of such debtor."14 
                                                 
11 Ch. 120, §§ 200-213, Laws of 1856. 
12 Robert S. Moss, Supplementary Proceedings in Wisconsin, 
23 Marq. L. Rev. 49, 49 (1939).  Moss urged clarification of the 
principles and practices governing supplementary proceedings.  
23 Marq. L. Rev. at 58.   
13 In re Badger Lines, Inc., 224 Wis. 2d 646, 654, 590 
N.W.2d 270 (1999).   
If a lien existed at common law, the mere existence of 
other lien statutes does not abrogate the common-law lien.  
Moynihan Associates, Inc. v. Hanisch, 56 Wis. 2d 185, 190, 201 
N.W.2d 534 (1972). 
14 Kellogg v. Coller, 47 Wis. 649, 655-56 (1879). 
No.  2011AP2597.ssa 
 
9 
 
¶87 The creditor's bill in equity existed as a remedy at 
equity for creditors when no remedy at law existed.15  The 
creditor's bill in equity arose to address the problem of 
judgment creditors of debtors who had died.  At common law, the 
debtor's property at death no longer belonged to the debtor for 
purposes of execution; the property instead belonged to the 
debtor's heirs and assigns.16  The creditor's bill in equity 
allowed the creditor to reach the assets of the deceased debtor 
by providing a separate action for the creditor against the 
estate, heirs, or assigns of the deceased debtor. 
¶88 Additionally, the creditor's bill in equity provided 
an equitable remedy if a judgment debtor concealed assets from 
the debtor and the sheriff was forced to return with an 
execution unsatisfied, leaving the creditor with no remedy at 
law to satisfy his or her judgment.17 
                                                 
15 Robert S. Moss, Supplementary Proceedings in Wisconsin, 
23 Marq. L. Rev. 49, 50 (1939). 
For an extensive discussion of the creditor's bill in 
equity, 
see 
C.C. 
Langdell, 
A 
Brief 
Survey 
of 
Equity 
Jurisdiction, Part VI, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 99 (1890).   
16 At common law, when the debtor died, the creditor was 
unable to execute on the debtor's property.  Langdell, supra 
note 15, at 119. 
17 As in the creditor's bill, an appeal was made to the 
conscience of the defendant to discover upon oath 
whether he had property covered up or concealed beyond 
the reach of an execution, so in this proceeding, the 
judgment debtor is required to state, under oath, 
whether he has not property somewhere concealed, which 
should be applied in payment of his debts. 
In re Remington, 7 Wis. 541, 548 (1858). 
No.  2011AP2597.ssa 
 
10 
 
¶89 The common-law lien functioned as an "equitable levy" 
precisely because the property could not be levied on at law.18  
The majority opinion gets it backwards when it rules that 
service 
of 
notice 
of 
a 
supplementary 
proceeding 
cannot 
constitute a lien and that a judgment creditor must levy on the 
property in order to establish a lien and priority.19  Rather, 
the purpose of the supplementary proceeding was to allow a 
judgment creditor to obtain a superior lien, without meeting the 
statutory requirements of execution or other levy at law. 
¶90 Our longstanding case law teaches that a judgment 
creditor's 
service 
of 
notice 
upon 
the 
debtor 
of 
the 
supplementary proceeding creates a judgment creditor's lien 
against the non-exempt personal property of the debtor.  "[T]he 
filing of the bill and a bona fide attempt to serve the subpoena 
give the complainant priority of right to the equitable assets 
of the judgment debtor . . . ."20   
¶91 The rule that a lien superior to other creditors is 
created from the time of the judgment creditor's service of 
                                                 
18 Langdell, supra note 15, at 109-118). 
19 Majority op., ¶3. 
20 Kellogg v. Coller, 47 Wis. 649, 655, 3 N.W. 433 (1879). 
No.  2011AP2597.ssa 
 
11 
 
notice of the supplementary proceeding upon the debtor has been 
continuously reiterated and reinforced by this court.21   
¶92 In In re Milburn, 59 Wis. 24, 34, 17 N.W. 965 (1883), 
the court stated that the service of the notice of the 
supplementary proceeding "operates as an equitable levy, and 
creates a lien in equity upon the effects of the judgment 
debtor":  
As 
in 
a 
creditor's 
bill, 
so 
in 
supplementary 
proceedings:  the commencement of them by the service 
of process or notice operates as an equitable levy, 
and creates a lien in equity upon the effects of the 
judgment debtor, and every piece of property belonging 
to him may be reached and applied to the satisfaction 
of his debts. 
¶93 The Milburn holding is echoed in later cases.  In 
Bragg, 85 Wis. at 486, the court cited Milburn and reiterated 
that 
service 
of 
process 
or 
notice 
of 
the 
supplementary 
proceeding serves as an equitable levy on all a judgment 
debtor's property and creates a lien in equity on the judgment 
debtor's property: 
When commenced by service of process or notice, [the 
supplementary proceeding] operates as an equitable 
levy, and creates a lien in equity upon the effects of 
the judgment debtor, and every species of property 
belonging to him may be reached and applied to the 
satisfaction of his debts. 
                                                 
21 The majority opinion at ¶40 relies on Knox v. Webster, 18 
Wis. 426 (1864), for the rule that "[p]ersonal property shall be 
bound from the time of its seizure on execution."  This 
declarative statement is true, but it does not mean that seizure 
is always necessary to create a lien.  The Knox case dealt with 
two creditors who attempted to seize the same property.  The 
court held that executions should be levied according to the 
order in which the sheriff received the executions. 
No.  2011AP2597.ssa 
 
12 
 
¶94 Kellogg v. Coller, 47 Wis. 649, 3 N.W. 433 (1879), is 
also 
instructive. 
 
The 
majority 
opinion 
cites 
Kellogg 
approvingly but views the case as establishing the rule that a 
lien's perfection requires "the appointment of a receiver, who 
then applied the debtor's specified personal property to the 
judgment debt."  Majority op., ¶33.22   
¶95 The majority opinion's commentary on 
Kellogg is 
contrary to the facts and reasoning of Kellogg. 
¶96 In Kellogg, two judgment creditors attempted to 
satisfy their judgments against a debtor.  The first creditor, 
Kellogg, obtained an order of a supplementary proceeding and 
served the order upon the debtor.  Due to a scrivener's error, 
the affidavit of the sheriff was defective and service of notice 
of the supplementary proceeding was not completed.  Thus, 
Kellogg did not appoint a receiver, secure a turnover order, or 
identify specific property of the debtor.   
¶97 The second creditor, Coller, instituted supplementary 
proceedings against the debtor and served the debtor with notice 
of the proceeding.  The debtor appeared and disclosed a life 
insurance 
policy. 
 
Subsequently, 
the 
court 
commissioner 
appointed a receiver for the assets of the debtor identified at 
the hearing.  The debtor then assigned all his non-exempt 
personal property to the receiver. 
                                                 
22 The summary set forth in the majority opinion at ¶33 does 
not appear in the text of Kellogg v. Coller, 47 Wis. 649, 656, 3 
N.W. 433 (1879).  
No.  2011AP2597.ssa 
 
13 
 
¶98 The first creditor had a receiver appointed after the 
second creditor's receiver took possession of the property of 
the debtor. 
¶99 The first creditor completed none of the majority 
opinion's requirements for obtaining priority on the debtor's 
property: no statutory levy, no execution, no receiver, no 
specification or identification of property before the second 
creditor acted.  The second creditor in Kellogg completed all of 
the majority opinion's requirements for obtaining priority on 
the debtor's property prior to the first creditor: she had 
identified specific property; a receiver had been appointed and 
turnover required; and the debtor's property was properly 
executed against. 
¶100 If the majority opinion's interpretation of Kellogg 
were correct, that a creditor cannot obtain a lien on the 
debtor's personal property by mere service of notice of a 
supplementary proceeding, the first creditor should have lost.     
¶101 Yet in Kellogg, the first creditor won.  The Kellogg 
court explicitly rejected the reasoning the majority opinion 
adopts in the present case.  The Kellogg court stated: 
As in a creditor's suit the filing of the bill and a 
bona fide attempt to serve the subpoena give [the 
first creditor] priority of right to the equitable 
assets 
of 
the 
judgment 
debtor, 
so, 
under 
the 
circumstances of this case, the bona fide attempt to 
serve the order issued by the commissioner at the 
instance of [the first creditor] must be held to 
confer upon them like priority of right over [the 
second creditor], although the order obtained by her 
was served before service of [the first creditor's] 
order was perfected. 
Kellogg, 47 Wis. at 656 (emphasis added).   
No.  2011AP2597.ssa 
 
14 
 
¶102 In other words, the Kellogg court gave priority over 
the debtor's personal property to the first creditor, based on 
the first creditor's bona fide attempt to serve the debtor in 
the supplementary proceeding. It determined that the second 
creditor's "proceeding is inoperative to give her a prior lien 
on the equitable assets of the judgment debtor."  Kellogg, 47 
Wis. at 657.   
¶103 The longstanding rule that the perfection of the 
creditor's lien depends on "first service of the subpoena upon 
the judgment debtor" was applied in Kellogg to "give the 
complainant priority of right to the equitable assets of the 
judgment debtor."  Kellogg, 47 Wis. at 656.   
 
¶104 Kellogg stands in direct contradiction of the majority 
opinion's assertion that "service of an order to appear for 
supplemental proceedings will not create an interest that is 
superior to the interest of a docketed judgment creditor who has 
levied specific personal property of the debtor."  Majority op., 
¶48.  Under Kellogg, service of notice of supplementary 
proceedings creates a superior interest in a judgment debtor's 
property. 
 
¶105 The court has interpreted Kellogg as I do.  In Candee 
v. Egan, 84 Wis. 2d 348, 360, 267 N.W.2d 890 (1978), the court, 
citing Kellogg, reiterated that "[a] judgment creditor who first 
begins supplementary proceedings against a particular judgment 
debtor obtains an equitable lien upon the debtor's nonexempt 
No.  2011AP2597.ssa 
 
15 
 
property that is prior to the equitable lien of a judgment 
creditor who commences a supplementary proceeding thereafter."23   
¶106 The same rule of law was confirmed in In re Badger 
Lines, Inc., 224 Wis. 2d 646, 590 N.W.2d 270 (1999).  The court 
stated that it is service of notice of the supplementary 
proceeding upon the debtor by which a judgment creditor perfects 
a common-law equitable lien on the non-exempt personal property 
of the debtor.  Badger Lines, 224 Wis. 2d at 658. 
¶107 I now examine Badger Lines. 
II 
 
¶108 The majority opinion contorts and distorts Badger 
Lines to reach its result, changing the baseline rule that 
Badger Lines reiterated and upon which debtors and creditors 
have relied.   
¶109 The question in Badger Lines was presented to this 
court by the federal Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals as a 
question of state law necessary to resolve a federal bankruptcy 
case.24  The following is a rough timeline of the events in 
Badger Lines: 
                                                 
23 Citing Candee, 84 Wis. 2d at 360, and Alexander v. Wald, 
231 Wis. 550, 286 N.W. 6 (1939), Robert Pasch writes: "[A] 
judgment creditor who first begins a supplementary proceeding 
against a debtor obtains an equitable lien on the debtor's non-
exempt property that is senior to any judgment creditor who 
subsequently commences a supplementary proceeding."  Pasch, 
supra note 6, § 16:13, at 329.  See also Pasch, supra note 6, 
§ 17:15, at 349. 
24 See Matter of Badger Lines, Inc., 140 F.3d 691 (7th Cir. 
1998) (certifying a question of Wisconsin state law for 
resolution by the Wisconsin Supreme Court). 
No.  2011AP2597.ssa 
 
16 
 
• October 18, 1991: A judgment of $82,120.26 was entered 
in favor of Emerald Industrial Leasing Corporation 
against Badger Lines, Inc. for services rendered and 
unpaid. 
• October 21, 1991: Emerald Industrial's judgment was 
docketed. 
• October 30, 1991: Emerald Industrial served Badger 
Lines with an order directing it to appear at a 
supplementary hearing pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 816.03 
and enjoining Badger Lines from transferring its 
assets. 
• December 17, 1991: The court commissioner appointed a 
supplementary 
receiver 
on 
behalf 
of 
Emerald 
Industrial; issued a "turnover" order that instructed 
Badger Lines to turn over its assets; and enjoined 
Badger Lines from transferring its assets. 
• February 11, 1992: Badger Lines filed for Chapter 7 
bankruptcy in the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern 
District of Wisconsin. 
• March 1992: The receiver filed a proof of claim in 
bankruptcy asserting a receiver's lien on behalf of 
the Emerald Industrial. 
• April 1995: The Chapter 7 trustee issued a final 
report distributing the remaining assets of Badger 
Lines; the receiver and Emerald Industrial were 
treated as unsecured creditors. 
No.  2011AP2597.ssa 
 
17 
 
 
¶110 The 
federal 
bankruptcy 
and 
district 
courts 
had 
determined that Emerald Industrial had a common-law equitable 
lien on the debtor's property.25  Thus, the federal court asked: 
"Does Wisconsin law require that a lien obtained by a judgment 
creditor who institutes supplementary proceedings under Wis. 
Stat. § 816.04 be perfected, and if so, how is the lien to be 
perfected?"26 
¶111 The key dispute in the case was whether any additional 
action besides notice to the debtor was required to perfect 
Emerald Industrial's common-law equitable lien on Badger Lines' 
assets.  Emerald Industrial argued that perfection of its lien 
on Badger Lines' assets occurred upon service of notice to 
Badger Lines of the supplementary proceeding.  The bankruptcy 
trustee argued, however, that perfection of the lien was 
accomplished either by the appointment of a receiver or the 
issuance of a turnover order.27   
¶112 If Emerald Industrial were correct and service of 
notice of the supplementary proceeding provided perfection of 
the lien, then it would have priority over other creditors.  If 
the bankruptcy trustee were correct and Emerald Industrial 
                                                 
25 See In re Badger Lines, Inc., 199 B.R. 934, 937-38 
(Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1996) (recognizing the existence of the lien 
created by supplementary proceedings); In re Badger Lines, Inc., 
1996 WL 33364962 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 14, 1996) (treating the common-
law lien as already in existence and ruling only on the question 
of perfection of the lien). 
26 Matter of Badger Lines, Inc., 140 F.3d 691, 699 (7th Cir. 
1998). 
27 In re Badger Lines, 224 Wis. 2d 646, 652, 590 N.W.2d 270 
(1999). 
No.  2011AP2597.ssa 
 
18 
 
needed to take steps in addition to service of notice, then 
Emerald Industrial's lien would have been perfected within the 
90-day preference period in bankruptcy and could be avoided. 
¶113 When Badger Lines was served with notice of the 
supplementary proceeding, the judgment creditor did not know  
what property Badger Lines held.  The "specific personal 
property" of Badger Lines was not identified until December 17, 
1991, when the turnover order was issued.   
¶114 Nevertheless, the Badger Lines court held that Emerald 
Industrial obtained and perfected an equitable lien on October 
30, 1991, the date of its service of notice of the supplementary 
proceedings. 
¶115 The 
Badger 
Lines 
court 
explicitly 
rejected 
the 
bankruptcy trustee's argument that appointment of a receiver or 
a turnover order were necessary to perfect a judgment creditor's 
common-law equitable lien on the defendant's property: 
[R]equiring an additional step beyond service in order 
to obtain a superior lien removes any incentive for 
negotiation and settlement between the creditor and 
the debtor. . . . . Such imposed protraction benefits 
no one, wastes the parties' time and money, and 
burdens 
the 
courts 
with 
potentially 
unnecessary 
hearings and proceedings. 
Badger Lines, 224 Wis. 2d at 660.28 
¶116 Badger Lines concluded that nothing in addition to 
service of notice to the debtor of a supplementary hearing was 
required to perfect Emerald Industrial's common-law equitable 
lien over Badger Lines' personal property:  "Wisconsin law does 
                                                 
28 Id. at 660. 
No.  2011AP2597.ssa 
 
19 
 
not require a creditor to take additional steps to perfect a 
receiver's lien beyond service on the debtor."29   
¶117 Although the majority opinion frequently cites to 
Attorney Pasch's treatise on collection law in Wisconsin,30 the 
majority opinion conveniently fails to reveal that Attorney 
Pasch disagrees with the majority opinion's characterization of 
Badger Lines.  Pasch explains Badger Lines as I do: 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, In re Badger Lines, Inc., 
224 Wis.2d 646, 590 N.W.2d 270 (1999), held that 
service upon the debtor of an order to appear at a 
supplemental examination under Chapter 816 establishes 
at the time of service a lien in favor of the creditor 
without requiring the creditor to take additional 
steps to perfect the lien. The court determined that a 
creditor who initiates a supplemental proceeding in 
Chapter 816 must not do anything more than serve the 
debtor with notice to appear at the supplemental 
examination so as to obtain a superior lien that 
cannot be overcome by another creditor. The court 
rejected arguments that, to avoid a secret lien, some 
additional action should be required of a judgment 
creditor. The court also rejected arguments that the 
lien should not arise until a supplemental receiver is 
appointed or the court issues a turnover order as to 
the debtor's assets; the court held that the lien 
arises at an earlier stage, when the judgment debtor 
is served with the order to appear at the supplemental 
examination. See Holton v. Burton, 78 Wis. 321, 47 
N.W. 624 (1890). Although the Badger Lines case 
references the lien as a "receiver's lien," the 
decision appears to have broader application to the 
lien of a judgment creditor pursuing supplemental 
proceedings. 
Pasch, supra note 6, § 16:13 at 330-31 (emphasis added).  
                                                 
29 Id. at 661 (emphasis added). 
30 See, e.g., majority op., ¶¶24, 28.  
No.  2011AP2597.ssa 
 
20 
 
¶118 Unlike Pasch, the majority opinion resurrects and 
adopts the losing party's argument in Badger Lines, while 
professing to follow the holding of Badger Lines.31   
¶119 Thus, the majority opinion blithely overturns Badger 
Lines 
and 
150 
years 
of 
Wisconsin 
jurisprudence, 
leaving 
creditors and debtors unsure of their rights.  I cannot join 
such an undertaking. 
¶120 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent. 
¶121 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
 
 
                                                 
31 The majority opinion asserts that in Badger Lines, the 
court held that "liens arise in specifically identified, non-
exempt 
personal 
property 
when 
that 
property 
is 
levied."  
Majority op., ¶44.  This is flatly wrong.  In Badger Lines, the 
creditor Emerald Industrial had no knowledge of Badger's assets 
at the time it served notice upon Badger of the supplementary 
proceeding, 
but 
it 
nonetheless 
perfected 
its 
lien.  
Additionally, the Badger Lines court specifically refused to 
comment on the issue of levy (to the extent that "levy" means 
possession of the property).  Badger Lines, 224 Wis. 2d at 658 
n.5. 
No.  2011AP2597.ssa 
 
1