Title: Che B. Carter v. State of Indiana
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 49S04-0903-PC-102
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: July 1, 2010

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
Susan K. Carpenter 
Public Defender of Indiana 
James T. Acklin 
Deputy Public Defender 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Gregory F. Zoeller 
Attorney General of Indiana 
Ellen H. Meilaender 
Deputy Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
No. 49S04–0903–PC–102 
CHE B. CARTER, 
Appellant (Petitioner below), 
v. 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
Appellee (Respondent below). 
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court, No. 49G04–9006–PC–76589 
The Honorable Patricia J. Gifford, Judge 
The Honorable Steven J. Rubick, Magistrate 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A04–0807–PC–444 
July 1, 2010 
Shepard, Chief Justice. 
Che B. Carter has sought post-conviction relief, contending that appellate counsel was 
deficient for failing to challenge a jury instruction on attempted murder.  The post-conviction 
FILED
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
Jul 01 2010, 2:23 pm
 
2 
court was likely wrong in concluding that Carter‘s lawyer performed within the range of 
reasonableness when she omitted this issue, on which there was considerable flux at the time.  
Nevertheless, it seems apparent that Carter did not suffer sufficient prejudice to warrant setting 
aside the verdict. 
Facts and Procedural History 
This is the twentieth year since Carter committed his crimes, and this is his fourth appeal.  
On June 20, 1990, Carter went to the home of the victim, who had filed a small claims case 
against his mother. Carter remained on the victim‘s porch while they discussed the case, then he 
broke open the storm door and began strangling the victim with his hands.  He also held her 
down and struck her with a tire iron.  Carter pulled the victim to the front door and shouted for 
his associate Mitchell to come into the house.  Carter held the victim down and choked her while 
Mitchell began to rape her.  Carter removed several rings from the victim‘s fingers while 
Mitchell was raping her. Before losing consciousness, the victim saw the men taking a stereo 
speaker and one of the men told the other to make sure she was dead so she could not identify 
them.1 
After a joint jury trial with his codefendant, Carter was convicted on counts of burglary, 
robbery, rape, and attempted murder and sentenced for a total of ninety years.2  Appellate 
                                                 
1 The victim‘s testimony was that one of her attackers said to the other, ―[M]ake sure she‘s dead before 
we leave because she can identify us.‖  (Tr. at 262.)  At the time of trial, the victim did not remember the 
two defendants saying this.  (Tr. at 315–16.)  She did, however, remember telling this to police officers.  
(Tr. at 262.)  The first person she spoke to after the attack, testified she told him that one of her attackers 
said, ―[M]ake sure the bitch is dead before we leave.‖  (Tr. at 388–90.)  The first officer she spoke to 
testified she told him she heard ―[D]on‘t leave until she is dead.‖  (Tr. at 410–11.) 
2 Carter was also charged with confinement, but the jury found him not guilty. (Ex. A at 91, 154–55.) 
 
3 
counsel Belle Choate filed Carter‘s Brief of Appellant on March 26, 1992.  She raised four 
issues.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions but remanded for re-sentencing after 
finding, sua sponte, that the enhancements of the robbery and burglary convictions violated 
double jeopardy.  Carter v. State, No. 49A02–9108–CR–361, slip op. at 6 (Ind. Ct. App. July 16, 
1992) (Carter I) (also found at Ex. B at 6). 
After this and a second successful appeal, Carter‘s sentence was ultimately reduced to 
sixty years.  Carter v. State, No 49A05–0408–CR–436 (Ind. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2005) (Carter II) 
(remanding to comply with Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004)); Carter v. State, No. 
A02–0508–PC–774 (Ind. Ct. App. July 24, 2006) (Carter III) (affirming 60-year sentence); (App. 
at 26–27, 37–40). 
On November 13, 2006, Carter filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief, 
claiming ineffective assistance of his appellate counsel for failure to argue that the instructions 
on attempted murder did not sufficiently inform the jury that one must intend to commit murder 
while taking a substantial step toward committing that crime. 
The post-conviction court denied the petition, finding that Carter had not ―overcome the 
strongest presumption of adequate assistance by appellate counsel.‖  (App. at 161–66.)  The 
post-conviction court noted that the law on attempted murder instructions was in flux at the time 
Choate wrote her brief and that multiple decisions sanctioning instructions like the challenged 
instruction Number 19 were ―still in effect both when [Carter] was convicted and when his 
appellate brief was filed.‖  (App. at 165.)  Finally, the post-conviction court reasoned that ―the 
choice made by Ms. Choate not to raise the issue was reasonable when that choice was made.‖  
(App. at 165–66 (citations omitted).) 
A divided Court of Appeals reversed the post-conviction court.  Carter v. State, 898 
N.E.2d 315 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (Brown, J., dissenting).  We granted transfer.  Id. (Transfer 
Granted March 5, 2009). 
 
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Assistance of Appellate Counsel 
When evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we apply the two-part test 
articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  See Helton v. State, 907 N.E.2d 
1020, 1023 (Ind. 2009).  Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims fall into three 
categories: (1) denial of access to an appeal; (2) waiver of issues; and (3) failure to present issues 
well.  Bieghler v. State, 690 N.E.2d 188, 193–95 (Ind. 1997) (citing Lissa Griffin, The Right to 
Effective Assistance of Appellate Counsel, 97 W. Va. L.Rev. 1, 21–22 (1994)).  Carter‘s claim 
fits the second category. 
To prevail on a claim about appellate counsel‘s failure to raise an issue, the first prong of 
the Strickland test requires Carter to show from the information available in the trial record or 
otherwise known to appellate counsel that appellate counsel failed to present a significant and 
obvious issue and that this failure cannot be explained by any reasonable strategy.  Ben-Yisrayl 
v. State, 738 N.E.2d 253, 260–61 (Ind. 2000) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).  We ―consider 
the totality of an attorney‘s performance to determine whether the client received constitutionally 
adequate assistance.‖  Bieghler, 690 N.E.2d at 194. 
In Bieghler, this Court approved the two-part test used by the Seventh Circuit to evaluate 
these claims: (1) whether the unraised issues are significant and obvious from the face of the 
record and (2) whether the unraised issues are ―clearly stronger‖ than the raised issues.  Id. 
(quoting Gray v. Greer, 800 F.2d 644, 646 (7th Cir. 1986)).  We have also said that ―to prevail 
on a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, ‗a defendant must show from the 
information available in the trial record or otherwise known to appellate counsel that appellate 
counsel failed to present a significant and obvious issue and that this failure cannot be explained 
by any reasonable strategy.‘‖  Timberlake v. State, 753 N.E.2d 591, 606 (Ind. 2001) (quoting 
Ben-Yisrayl, 738 N.E.2d at 260–61). 
 
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The current proceeding has focused on appellate counsel‘s failure to challenge instruction 
Number 19, which told the jury that murder could be ―knowing or intentional‖ and that 
attempted murder required proof of a knowing step toward a ―knowing and intentional killing,‖ 
as follows: 
The crime of attempt is defined by statute as follows: 
A person attempts to commit a crime when, acting with the 
culpability required for the commission of the crime, he engages in 
conduct that constitutes a substantial step toward the commission 
of the crime.  An attempt to commit a crime is a felony or 
misdemeanor of the same class as the crime attempted. However, 
an attempt to commit murder is a class A felony. 
The crime of murder is defined by statute as the knowing or 
intentional killing of another human being. 
To convict the defendant the State must have proved each 
of the following elements: 
 
The defendants Che B. Carter and Wayne Mitchell 
1. Knowingly 
2. Engaged in conduct by striking [the victim] on or about her head by 
means of a deadly weapon, that is a tire tool and strangling her neck 
rendering her unconscious. 
3. That the conduct was a substantial step toward the commission of the 
crime of murder: that is the knowing and intentional killing of another 
human being. 
If the State failed to prove each of these elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, you should find the Defendant not guilty. 
If the State did prove each of these elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant guilty of the crime 
of attempt murder, a class A felony. 
(Ex. A at 112.) 
 
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Carter‘s claim is that his lawyer should have appealed on grounds that this instruction 
violated Spradlin v. State, 569 N.E.2d 948 (Ind. 1991).  In Spradlin we held that attempted 
murder instructions ―must inform the jury that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant, with intent to kill the victim, engaged in conduct which was a substantial step 
toward such killing.‖  Id. at 950.  The attempted murder instruction in Spradlin read: 
To convict the defendants, the State must have proved each of the 
following elements: 
The defendants 
1. knowingly or intentionally 
2. strike, stab and cut the body of Robert Grubbs 
3. that the conduct was a substantial step toward the commission of 
the crime of murder. 
Id. at 950–51.  In reversing, we noted, ―Nowhere in the instructions is there a requirement that 
the State prove that the Spradlins, at the time that they struck, stabbed, and cut the victims, 
intended to kill such victims.‖  Spradlin, 569 N.E.2d at 951.  In evaluating the jury instruction, 
we cited Smith v. State, 459 N.E.2d 355 (Ind. 1984), and Zickefoose v. State, 270 Ind. 618, 388 
N.E.2d 507 (1979). 
However, the Court observed in Arthur v. State, 663 N.E.2d 529, 531 (Ind. 1996), that 
―some confusion remained‖ over the reach of Spradlin until we decided Taylor v. State, 616 
N.E.2d 748 (Ind. 1993)—after the Court of Appeals issued its opinion affirming Carter‘s 
convictions. 
Still, the fact that ―the state of the law . . . was not settled until after [the] direct appeal 
had been decided . . . is not dispositive of whether the [unraised] issue was significant, obvious, 
and clearly stronger than the issues counsel presented on direct appeal.  Fisher v. State, 810 
N.E.2d 674, 677–78 (Ind. 2004). 
 
7 
While examination of the several issues Choate raised as compared to the one she did not 
might prove illuminating, assessing the likelihood of prejudice appears more productive.  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (―If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground 
of lack of sufficient prejudice, . . . that course should be followed.‖)  We therefore assume for 
sake of argument Carter‘s contention that Choate should have argued that the attempted murder 
instruction was defective. 
While the instruction that attempted murder required a knowing step toward an 
intentional killing was substandard, it is apparent that the jury was told what the law required.  
During closing argument, both Carter and the State argued to the jury that the State was required 
to prove intent to kill in order to convict Carter of attempted murder.  (Ex. F at 9–10, 33–39.) 
The prosecutor declared during argument that the State had to prove each defendant 
―intended to kill‖ the victim and pointed to evidence that the prosecutor believed demonstrated 
this intent with regard to the attempted murder charge.  (Ex. F. at 8–10.)  He went on to point to 
the acts of hitting the victim in the head with a tire iron and strangling her as acts that were 
substantial steps toward killing the victim but that ―simply failed‖ to achieve that result and that 
―additional evidence‖ of their ―intent‖ was the statement, made by one of them, that they had to 
kill the victim and could not let her live because she could identify them and their failure to seek 
any medical help for her.  (Ex. F. at 9–10.)  Most significantly, he told the jury that to convict the 
defendants of attempted murder, the State had ―to prove that each man, either aiding, abetting, or 
directly as a principal intended—committed some act, intended to kill her‖ and it was only for 
some reason not of their own doing that they failed to achieve that objective.  (Ex. F at 8–9.) 
After repeating that the defendants‘ ―main intent‖ was to murder the victim, the 
prosecutor acknowledged that the jury might conclude that if this was true, the defendants could 
not logically have intended to confine the victim.  (Ex. F at 11.)  The prosecutor said he ―might 
agree‖ with that reasoning and that if the jury wanted to ―drop‖ the confinement charge on that 
basis, that was ―fine.‖  (Ex. F at 11.) 
 
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Defense counsel also argued that the State had to prove that Carter intended to kill the 
victim and that the evidence did not support a conclusion that he acted with that intent because, 
although Carter could have killed the victim, he did not do so.  (Ex. F at 33–39.) 
As the jury commenced its deliberations, therefore, it had before it these explanations 
about intent, an instruction that Carter‘s knowing actions must have constituted a substantial step 
towards an intentional killing, and the evidence described above.  We conclude that there was 
insufficient prejudice flowing from Choate‘s performance to warrant relief. 
Conclusion 
We affirm the post-conviction court. 
Dickson, Sullivan, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur.