Title: In the Matter of the Investigation of Burglary & Theft
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: January 21, 2020

In the Matter of the Investigation of Burglary & Theft Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary Police took a DNA sample from blue gloves discarded near the scene of a March 2015 burglary, and the sample was uploaded into CODIS. J.P. was later convicted of an unrelated felony, and a routine sample of his DNA was mailed to the Forensics Office. The Forensics Office confirmed a preliminary match between the DNA sample found on the blue gloves and J.P.’s routine offender sample. The notification requested that the local officials submit a follow-up sample to prove the match. As a result of that request, the State applied for J.P.’s investigative detention under Rule 3:5A-1 to obtain a new DNA sample. The court denied the motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the State had not shown that the physical characteristics sought could not otherwise practicably be obtained. At issue before the New Jersey Supreme Court was whether, under Rule 3:5A-1 and Rule 3:5A-4(d), the State should have been permitted to obtain a follow-up buccal swab from J.P. so as to be able to prove in court a preliminary match between his DNA and a DNA specimen taken from the scene of the unsolved burglary. The Supreme Court held that in light of the federal and state requirements to obtain a follow-up sample, the State has shown that the physical characteristics sought in this case could not practicably be obtained by any means other than investigative detention pursuant to Rule 3:5A-1. The Court therefore reversed the Appellate Division. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUSThis syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized. In the Matter of the Investigation of Burglary and Theft (A-61-18) (082243)Argued October 23, 2019 -- Decided January 21, 2020SOLOMON, J., writing for the Court. The Court considers whether, under Rule 3:5A-1 and Rule 3:5A-4(d), the State should be permitted to obtain a follow-up buccal swab from J.P. so as to be able to prove in court a preliminary match between his DNA and a DNA specimen taken from the scene of an unsolved burglary. The Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) database operates on both the national and state levels. The National DNA Index System (NDIS) is administered by the FBI. In New Jersey, the state system is managed by the State Police Office of Forensic Sciences (Forensics Office). Operational and/or procedural issues not addressed by federal statute are determined by the FBI as administrator of the NDIS. Significantly, state and local law enforcement agencies may be excluded from using CODIS if they fail to uphold its quality assurance procedures and standards. For DNA samples routinely taken upon arrest, the Forensics Office permits submission by mail rather than by hand-delivery. If an offender sample is matched to a sample in CODIS, the Forensics Office informs law enforcement of the need for a legally obtained sample from the offender that documents the chain of custody through hand- delivery. Only then -- with the results of this follow-up analysis supported by a chain of custody -- will the State’s proof of the CODIS match withstand scrutiny in court. In this case, police took a DNA sample from blue gloves discarded near the scene of a March 2015 burglary, and the sample was uploaded into CODIS. J.P. was later convicted of an unrelated felony, and a routine sample of his DNA was mailed to the Forensics Office. The Forensics Office confirmed a preliminary match between the DNA sample found on the blue gloves and J.P.’s routine offender sample. The notification requested that the local officials submit a follow-up sample to prove the match. As a result of that request, the State applied for J.P.’s investigative detention under Rule 3:5A-1 to obtain a new DNA sample. The court denied the motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the State had not shown that the physical characteristics sought cannot otherwise practicably be obtained. The Appellate Division 1 suggested in dicta that the State could obtain a new sample by arresting J.P. for the 2015 burglary. The Court granted the State’s motion for leave to appeal. 237 N.J. 170 (2019).HELD: In light of the federal and state requirements to obtain a follow-up sample, the State has shown that the physical characteristics sought in this case cannot practicably be obtained by any means other than investigative detention pursuant to Rule 3:5A-1. The Court therefore reverses the judgment of the Appellate Division.1. Rule 3:5A permits temporary investigative detentions under certain circumstances and establishes procedural requirements for such detentions. Specifically, Rule 3:5A-1 provides that a judge of the Superior Court may authorize the temporary detention of a person “for the purpose of obtaining evidence of that person’s physical characteristics” under certain circumstances. And, as relevant here, Rule 3:5A-4 provides that such an order “shall be issued only if” the State’s application persuades the court of four things. The parties agree that the first three prongs of Rule 3:5A-4 are satisfied in this case and disagree only regarding Rule 3:5A-4(d). (pp. 10-11)2. Rule 3:5A-4(d) asks whether “the physical characteristics sought cannot otherwise practicably be obtained.” The rule essentially requires a court to make two determinations: (1) whether “the physical characteristics sought” can be obtained through other means; and (2) whether that can be done “practicably.” The facts of this case illustrate the significance of the second inquiry. The Forensics Office cannot comply with federal requirements or advance its investigation, see R. 3:5A-4(c), by retesting stored samples that have been mailed. The NDIS expressly requires a follow-up sample supported by chain of custody -- without regard to any record of chain of custody for the initial sample. Furthermore, practical limitations make it appropriate for law enforcement agencies to submit by mail rather than by hand-delivery the approximately 15,000 routine offender samples received by the Forensics Office each year. J.P.’s counsel has conceded that, if J.P. is charged, counsel will challenge the preliminary match as unreliable based on chain of custody. The specter of such evidentiary challenges is another reason why it would not be appropriate to foreclose the State from obtaining new DNA samples under circumstances like these. (pp. 12-14)3. The Appellate Division suggested that probable cause exists to arrest J.P. for the 2015 burglary and that the State could obtain a new buccal swab upon J.P.’s arrest. Since arrest is a greater intrusion than a buccal swab, it is not an alternative to Rule 3:5A-1. Rule 3:5A-4’s fourth prong is designed to protect against unwarranted intrusions, not encourage a greater intrusion than is necessary. (p. 14) REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings.CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE SOLOMON’S opinion. 2 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 61 September Term 2018 082243 In the Matter of the Investigation of Burglary and Theft. On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Argued Decided October 23, 2019 January 21, 2020 Shiraz Deen, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant State of New Jersey (Bradley D. Billhimer, Ocean County Prosecutor, attorney; Samuel Marzarella, Chief Appellate attorney, of counsel, and Shiraz Deen and on the briefs). Brian P. Keenan, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent J.P. (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Brian P. Keenan, of counsel and on the briefs). Lila B. Leonard, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Lila B. Leonard, of counsel and on the briefs). JUSTICE SOLOMON delivered the opinion of the Court. Rule 3:5A-1 allows a Superior Court judge to order temporary detentionto obtain evidence of a person’s physical characteristics under certaincircumstances. Rule 3:5A-4(d) mandates that such an order issue only if “the 1 physical characteristics sought cannot otherwise practicably be obtained .” Inthis case, a DNA specimen was taken from the scene of an unsolved burglaryand the DNA profile was uploaded to the Combined DNA Index System(CODIS) database. When J.P. was arrested for an unrelated offense, a DNAsample was taken from him and uploaded to CODIS. An analysis of the twoDNA samples revealed a match. We must determine whether, under Rule3:5A-1 and Rule 3:5A-4(d), the State should be permitted to obtain a follow-upbuccal swab from J.P. so as to be able to prove the preliminary match in court. The trial court denied the State’s Rule 3:5A-1 motion to obtain a newsample of respondent J.P.’s DNA on the ground that the evidence could beotherwise obtained. The Appellate Division affirmed that determination. Inlight of the federal and state requirements to obtain a follow-up sample, wehold that the State has shown that the physical characteristics sought cannotpracticably be obtained by any means other than investigative detentionpursuant to Rule 3:5A-1. We therefore reverse the judgment of the AppellateDivision. I. To provide context for the events of this case and the parties’ arguments,we begin by reviewing the relevant federal and state procedures andrequirements concerning DNA collection and recordation. 2 Established by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)under the DNA Identification Act of 1994, CODIS uses a software program anddatabase to match DNA profiles of offenders to profiles of DNA found on crimescene evidence. 34 U.S.C. § 12592(a), (b)(3); National DNA Index System(NDIS) Operational Procedures Manual (NDIS Manual), 54-56 (Version 8:Effective May 1, 2019), https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/ndis-operational-procedures-manual.pdf. CODIS operates on both the national and state levels:The National DNA Index System (NDIS) is administered by the FBI, and the StateDNA Index System (SDIS) is administered by states participating in the CODISprogram. NDIS Manual at 4; see also A.A. ex rel. B.A. v. Attorney Gen. of N.J., 189 N.J. 128, 132-33 (2007) (discussing collection of DNA samples andsubmission to CODIS). In New Jersey, the SDIS is managed by the CODIS unitunder the New Jersey State Police Office of Forensic Sciences (Forensics Office).N.J. State Police, DNA Laboratory, https://www.njsp.org/division/investigations/dna-lab.shtml (last visited Dec. 9, 2019). “Operational and/or procedural issues not addressed by the [DNAIdentification Act] . . . are determined by the FBI as administrator of the [NDIS].”NDIS Manual at 4. “The responsibilities of the FBI and the NDIS participants areexplained in the NDIS Operational Procedures.” Id. at 6. Significantly, state andlocal law enforcement agencies may be excluded from using CODIS if they fail to 3 uphold its quality assurance procedures and standards. 34 U.S.C. § 12592(b) to(c). New Jersey law imposes additional requirements on the collection andpreservation of DNA samples. Under the DNA Database and Databank Act of1994 (DNA Act), N.J.S.A. 53:1-20.17 to -20.38, certain offenders must provideDNA samples to be stored by the Forensics Office in a state DNA databank. N.J.S.A. 53:1-20.20(a) to (h). The DNA Act further provides that “[n]othing inthis act shall . . . limit or preclude collection of DNA samples as authorized bycourt order or in accordance with any other law.” N.J.S.A. 53:1-20.20(i)(emphasis added). For routine offender samples -- those routinely taken upon arrest, forexample, which generally are not expected to be offered as evidence at trial -- thereis usually no need to assure evidentiary admissibility by establishing a chain ofcustody. As a result, the Forensics Office permits local law enforcement to submitroutine offender samples by mail rather than by hand-delivery. Memorandumfrom Joseph R. Petersack, Chief Forensic Scientist, N.J. State Police Office ofForensic Scis., and Janet Flagman, Deputy Attorney Gen., Office of the AttorneyGen. CODIS Compliance Unit, on Collecting DNA Samples -- Offender SamplesVersus Reference/Person of Interest Samples 1-2 (June 6, 2013) (explaining thatunlike follow-up offender samples, which “require strict chain of custody for 4 future court purposes and should be hand-delivered to” the Forensics Office by thelaw enforcement agency collecting the sample, routine offender samples “aresubmitted through the [U.S.] mail and have no chain of custody”); see also State v.Gathers, 234 N.J. 208, 218 (2018) (“[D]ue to chain-of-custody problems, manyDNA collection kit profiles are not considered evidence. According to the State,even after a CODIS hit, the State usually applies for a confirmatory buccal swab toestablish the chain of custody.”). When the Forensics Office receives a DNA sample, it analyzes the sample tocreate a DNA profile and then forwards that profile to the FBI to be uploaded toCODIS. N.J.S.A. 53:1-20.21. The DNA profile may be used for, among otherthings, “law enforcement identification purposes; . . . administrative and qualitycontrol purposes; . . . [and] judicial proceedings, by order of the court, if otherwiseadmissible.” N.J.S.A. 53:1-20.21(a), (e), (f). If CODIS identifies significant similarity between the DNA profiles ofan offender sample and of a sample found on crime scene evidence, and if anNDIS DNA casework analyst reviews those samples and confirms there is amatch, the NDIS sends an “investigative hit notification” to appropriate stateauthorities, like the Forensics Office. NDIS Manual at 58-59. Although this“concludes the NDIS Offender Match confirmation process, it is not the end ofthe collaboration.” Id. at 59. The NDIS then discloses to the Forensics Office 5 personally identifiable information about the offender whose DNA profilematched the DNA profile on crime scene evidence, id. at 59, 63-64, and theForensics Office informs the relevant law enforcement agency “of the need fora legally obtained sample from the offender that documents the chain ofcustody[,]” so that the Forensics Office “can then perform DNA analysis onthe newly obtained known biological sample,” id. at 59. Only then -- with theresults of this follow-up analysis supported by a chain of custody -- will theState’s proof of the CODIS match withstand scrutiny in court. II. A. Against that backdrop, we turn to the facts of the case as revealed by thetrial court record of the State’s Rule 3:5A-1 motion to obtain a new sample ofJ.P.’s DNA. In March 2015, Lakewood police responded to an alarm at a church. Awitness informed officers that she heard glass shatter and then saw a man runthrough her yard and toss blue gloves into a trash can in front of her home.Officers found the blue gloves, and the Ocean County Sheriff’s Departmentsubmitted a DNA sample from the gloves to the Forensics Office, which, inturn, took steps to have that sample’s DNA profile uploaded to CODIS. 6 At some point between March 2015 and December 2018, J.P. wasconvicted of an unrelated felony. Local law enforcement took a routinesample of J.P.’s DNA pursuant to the DNA Act and mailed that sample to theForensics Office. After analyzing the sample to create a profile, the ForensicsOffice stored the sample in the state DNA databank and forwarded the profileto the FBI to be uploaded to CODIS. In February 2018, the Forensics Office sent an “investigative hitnotification” to the Lakewood Police Department, confirming a preliminarymatch between the DNA sample found on the blue gloves and J.P.’s routineoffender sample. The notification cautioned, however, that only a “possibleinvestigative lead” had been confirmed and requested that local officials again“submit a buccal swab reference sample to the laboratory for comparison tothe evidentiary DNA profiles.” J.P. was arrested again in April 2018 for a parole violation, after whichhe was compelled to submit to another routine DNA sample. Once more, thatsample was mailed to the Forensics Office, the DNA profile was uploaded toCODIS, and the sample was stored in the state DNA databank. J.P. is currently incarcerated but has not been charged or arrested inconnection with the March 2015 church burglary. 7 B. As a result of the Forensics Office’s “investigative hit notification” andrequest for a follow-up sample to prove the preliminary match, the Stateapplied for J.P.’s investigative detention under Rule 3:5A-1 to obtain a newDNA sample. The State argued that the “physical characteristics soughtcannot otherwise practicably be obtained,” R. 3:5A-4(d), even though the Statehad access to J.P.’s past samples. The court denied the State’s motion, and the Appellate Divisionaffirmed, holding that the State had not shown that the physical characteristicssought cannot otherwise practicably be obtained. The Appellate Divisionsuggested in dicta that the State could obtain a new sample by arresting J.P. forthe March 2015 church burglary. We granted the State’s motion for leave to appeal. 237 N.J. 170 (2019). III. The State argues that because J.P.’s offender samples were mailed ratherthan hand-delivered to the Forensics Office, they have a flawed chain ofcustody and cannot be used to advance the investigation. The State asserts thatit must obtain a new DNA sample from J.P. not only to comply with CODISrequirements but also to eliminate the risk that the preliminary match may beinadmissible at trial. Because that can be accomplished only by hand- 8 delivering a new sample to the Forensics Office, the State contends that Rule3:5A-4(d)’s requirements have been met here. The State emphasizes that thedifficulty presented in this case cannot be remedied by requiring hand -deliveryof all routine offender DNA samples because it would be unfeasible for locallaw enforcement to hand-deliver the approximately 15,000 samples taken eachyear. The State adds that the redundancy in the CODIS procedures created bythe need for a follow-up sample not only assures the admissibility of Stateevidence but also serves to protect suspects like J.P. against wrongful arrest. J.P. claims that the chain-of-custody problem arises not from therequirements of CODIS but from the State’s choice to mail rather than hand -deliver his initial offender samples to the Forensics Office. He acknowledgesthat, absent proof of chain of custody, he would challenge the preliminaryCODIS match at trial if charged with the church burglary. J.P. neverthelessargues that the Court should affirm “because the State failed to satisfy therequirements of Rule 3:5A-4.” J.P. also relies on Gathers and other guidancepertinent to post-arrest investigations. IV. A. We begin by noting that J.P.’s reliance on Gathers is misplaced. Theguidelines and procedures applicable when the State seeks to use non- 9 testimonial identification procedures to further post-arrest investigations arenot relevant in this pre-arrest context. This case is instead subject to therequirements of Rule 3:5A, which enables the State to use such procedures tofurther pre-arrest investigations. Rule 3:5A was adopted in response to State v. Hall, where the Statesought to compel a suspect to participate in a pre-arrest lineup. See 93 N.J. 552, 555-57 (1983). We held in that case “that there is jurisdictional authoritythat empowers the Superior Court to issue process to compel a suspect tosubmit to an investigative detention” and called upon the Criminal PracticeCommittee “to study the issue of investigative detentions and recommend rulesto be implemented in this jurisdiction.” Id. at 568. Rule 3:5A, adopted in July1984, permits temporary investigative detentions under certain circumstancesand establishes procedural requirements for such detentions. Specifically, Rule 3:5A-1 provides that, before the “filing of a formalcriminal charge against a person, an order authorizing the temporary detentionof that person and compelling that person to submit to non-testimonialidentification procedures for the purpose of obtaining evidence of that person’sphysical characteristics may be issued by a judge of the Superior Court.” And,as relevant here, Rule 3:5A-4 provides that such an order “shall be issued only 10 if” the application from the Office of the Attorney General or CountyProsecutor persuades the court that: (a) a crime has been committed and is under active investigation, and (b) there is a reasonable and well-grounded basis from which to believe that the person sought may have committed the crime, and (c) the results of the physical characteristics obtained during the detention will significantly advance the investigation and determine whether or not the individual probably committed the crime, and (d) the physical characteristics sought cannot otherwise practicably be obtained.The parties agree that the first three prongs of Rule 3:5A-4 are satisfied in thiscase and disagree only regarding Rule 3:5A-4(d).1 Thus, the issue hinges onwhether the sample sought here can be practicably obtained, within themeaning of the Rule 3:5A-4(d), in another manner. We review the meaning of a court rule de novo, guided by the standardprinciples of statutory construction. State v. Robinson, 229 N.J. 44, 66-67(2017). We begin with the rule’s plain language, giving the words their1 The parties agree that on this record the State met its burden under subsection (b), and the Court further determines that probable cause was established. 11 ordinary meaning. Wiese v. Dedhia, 188 N.J. 587, 592 (2006). Here, weinterpret subsection (d) as a matter of first impression. V. Again, Rule 3:5A-4(d) asks whether “the physical characteristics soughtcannot otherwise practicably be obtained.” The rule essentially requires acourt to make two determinations: (1) whether “the physical characteristicssought” can be obtained through other means; and (2) whether that can be done“practicably.” If something is “practicable,” it is “reasonably capable of beingaccomplished; feasible.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1291 (9th ed. 2009)(emphases added). The first inquiry under subsection (d) requires anassessment of possibility; the second demands a more nuanced, holisticevaluation. The facts of this case illustrate the significance of the secondinquiry. First, J.P.’s routine offender sample was submitted to the ForensicsOffice by mail. That sample matched the DNA sample from the churchburglary, and, as explained above, the NDIS considers the preliminary CODISmatch confirmed. Nevertheless, to conclusively establish that the samples arefrom the same source, the NDIS requires that the Forensics Office obtain afollow-up DNA sample with a documented chain of custody to be compared tothe DNA sample on the evidence -- the blue gloves. Accordingly, the 12 Forensics Office cannot comply with federal requirements or advance itsinvestigation, see R. 3:5A-4(c), by recalling and retesting stored samples thathave been mailed. Therefore, without resort to investigative detention toobtain a follow-up DNA sample with a confirmed chain of custody andevidentiary value, “the physical characteristics sought cannot . . . practicablybe obtained.” R. 3:5A-4(d). Contrary to J.P.’s contention that this need was created by the State’sfailure to maintain chain of custody for the earlier samples, the NDISexpressly requires that the Forensics Office obtain a follow-up samplesupported by chain of custody -- without regard to any record of chain ofcustody for the initial sample. NDIS Manual at 59 (stating that the ForensicsOffice “shall inform” the relevant enforcement agency “of the need for alegally obtained sample from the offender that documents the chain ofcustody[,]” so that the Forensics Office “can then perform DNA analysis onthe newly obtained known biological sample” (emphases added)).Furthermore, practical limitations make it appropriate for law enforcementagencies to submit by mail rather than by hand-delivery the approximately15,000 routine offender samples received by the Forensics Office each year. Although J.P. argues that there is no need to satisfy the NDIS with anadditional sample because the State can use the earlier samples to establish the 13 preliminary CODIS match at trial, J.P.’s counsel has conceded that, if J.P. ischarged, counsel will challenge the preliminary match as unreliable based onchain of custody. Counsel admits he will make that challenge even though henow opposes the State’s effort to obtain a sample that would either yield areliable match or ensure J.P. is not arrested in error. The specter of suchevidentiary challenges is another reason why it would not be appropriate toforeclose the State from obtaining new DNA samples under circumstances likethese. Finally, the Appellate Division, relying on the preliminary DNA match,suggested that probable cause exists to arrest J.P. and the State could obtain anew buccal swab upon J.P.’s arrest. Since arrest is a greater intrusion than abuccal swab, it is not an alternative to Rule 3:5A-1. Indeed, resort toalternatives more intrusive than investigative detention turns on its head Rule3:5A-4’s fourth prong, which is designed to protect against unwarrantedintrusions, not encourage a greater intrusion than is necessary. In short, a sample with an established chain of custody is required toproceed with this investigation. In light of the circumstances of this case andthe legal requirements for DNA sample collection, such a sample “cannototherwise practicably be obtained” without investigative detention. It wouldbe overly burdensome on the State to require that all routine DNA samples be 14 hand-delivered to the Forensics Office -- a reality anticipated in the NDISrequirements themselves. And it would likewise be unduly burdensome todemand the State arrest a defendant to obtain a sample that may, in fact,exonerate him. Accordingly, we determine that the State has satisfied all fourrequirements of Rule 3:5A-4. VI. For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the Appellate Divisionis reversed and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with thisopinion. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE SOLOMON’S opinion. 15