Title: State v. David A. Dearborn
Citation: 2010 WI 84
Docket Number: 2007AP001894-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 15, 2010

2010 WI 84 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2007AP1894-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
David A. Dearborn, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2008 WI App 131 
Reported at: 313 Wis. 2d 767, 758 N.W.2d 463 
(Ct. App. 2008-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 15, 2010   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 13, 2010   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Grant   
 
JUDGE: 
George S. Curry   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Eileen A. Hirsch, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant the cause was argued by Michael 
J. Losse, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
2010 WI 84
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2007AP1894CR  
(L.C. No. 
2006CM116) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
David A. Dearborn, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 15, 2010 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of 
Supreme Court  
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals1 affirming the circuit 
court's judgment of conviction against David A. Dearborn.2  
                                                 
1 State v. Dearborn, 2008 WI App 131, 313 Wis. 2d 767, 758 
N.W.2d 463. 
2 Dearborn 
was 
convicted 
of 
assaulting 
or 
otherwise 
obstructing, or resisting a conservation warden in violation of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 29.951 
(2005-06), 
and 
for 
possession 
of 
tetrahydrocannabinols 
(THC) 
in 
violation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 961.41(3g)(e) (2005-06).  All subsequent references to the 
Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2005-06 version unless otherwise 
indicated. 
No. 
2007AP1894CR   
 
2 
 
Dearborn asserts that the circuit court erred in denying his 
motion to suppress evidence obtained from a search of the 
passenger compartment of his locked vehicle, a search that 
occurred after he was placed under arrest and secured in the 
back of a squad car. 
¶2 
Dearborn maintains, and the State concedes, that in 
the wake of the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Arizona 
v. Gant, 556 U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009), the search of 
Dearborn's truck violated his constitutional right to be secure 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.  The main question 
in this case is whether the exclusionary rule should be applied 
to 
remedy 
the constitutional violation, or alternatively, 
whether the good faith exception should preclude application of 
the exclusionary rule and the evidence's consequent suppression.3 
¶3 
Prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
Gant, this court made clear in State v. Fry, 131 Wis. 2d 153, 
388 N.W.2d 565 (1986), and its progeny that the type of search 
conducted of Dearborn's truck following his arrest was lawful.  
However, we now accept Gant's interpretation of the United 
States Constitution and adopt its holding as the proper 
                                                 
3 The parties also briefed and argued the question of 
whether Dearborn's constitutional right to a unanimous jury 
verdict was violated because the jury instruction given at trial 
for § 29.951 did not require the jury to unanimously determine 
that he assaulted a warden, resisted a warden, or obstructed a 
warden. We decline to separately address this question and 
affirm the decision and reasoning of the court of appeals.  
State v. Dearborn, 2008 WI App 131, ¶¶12-42, 313 Wis. 2d 767, 
758 N.W.2d 463. 
No. 
2007AP1894CR   
 
3 
 
interpretation 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution's 
protection 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.  Thus, the search of 
Dearborn's truck violated his constitutional rights.   
¶4 
However, we decline to apply the remedy of exclusion 
for the constitutional violation.  We hold that the good faith 
exception precludes application of the exclusionary rule where 
officers conduct a search in objectively reasonable reliance 
upon clear and settled Wisconsin precedent that is later deemed 
unconstitutional 
by 
the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court.  
Accordingly, 
we 
affirm 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
and 
uphold 
Dearborn's conviction. 
I. BACKGROUND 
¶5  On April 9, 2006, State Department of Natural Resources 
conservation warden Martin Stone was on his regular patrol, 
checking fishing license compliance in various locations in 
Richland County.  The warden stopped at the Port Andrews boat 
landing to get a better look at the fishermen who were below a 
nearby bridge.  David A. Dearborn had been sitting in his truck 
at the boat landing, but left soon after the warden arrived in 
his squad car.  Dearborn then drove close to the warden's squad 
car, slowed down, and made an obscene gesture while glaring 
angrily at the warden.  Concerned about his safety, the warden 
ran Dearborn's license plate and learned that Dearborn's license 
had been revoked for operating while intoxicated. 
¶6  The warden then pursued Dearborn and pulled him over.  
Dearborn immediately exited his vehicle and walked toward the 
warden.  The warden instructed Dearborn to get back in his 
No. 
2007AP1894CR   
 
4 
 
truck, but Dearborn instead shut the door and locked his 
vehicle.  The warden spoke with Dearborn and verified his 
identity.  Dispatch confirmed that Dearborn was driving with a 
revoked license, and the warden told Dearborn he was placing him 
under arrest.  
¶7  Dearborn became mad and refused to submit to arrest.  
As the warden tried to arrest him, Dearborn resisted by pushing 
and kicking.  When the warden tried to subdue Dearborn with 
pepper spray, Dearborn waved a jacket in front of himself to 
deflect the spray.   Dearborn then ran to a nearby house, picked 
up rocks, and started to wind up as if to throw them.  The 
warden drew his gun in response, which persuaded Dearborn to put 
the rocks down.  Even so, Dearborn kept resisting.  He ran to 
the door of the nearby home and began yelling and shaking the 
doorknob.  After the warden's additional attempt to arrest 
Dearborn was met with more kicking and punching, the warden 
again used pepper spray and was finally able to secure Dearborn 
until backup arrived.  
¶8  Once backup arrived, Dearborn was placed under arrest 
and secured in handcuffs in the back of a squad car.  The warden 
and a state trooper then unlocked and searched Dearborn's truck.  
Inside the passenger compartment, they found a small wooden 
container known as a "dugout" that contained a small amount of 
marijuana and a small metal pipe that smelled like burnt 
marijuana. 
¶9  On April 11, 2006, a criminal complaint was filed in 
the Grant County Circuit Court, George S. Curry, Judge.  
No. 
2007AP1894CR   
 
5 
 
Dearborn was charged with resisting a conservation warden, 
possession of THC, and possession of drug paraphernalia.  
Dearborn filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence 
obtained through the search of his vehicle on the grounds that 
the search was unconstitutional, but the circuit court denied 
the motion.  A jury found Dearborn guilty of resisting a 
conservation warden and possession of THC, but not guilty of 
possession of drug paraphernalia. 
¶10 Dearborn appealed.4  The court of appeals "assume[d] 
without deciding" that the issue was not preserved because 
Dearborn did not move at trial to suppress the evidence of the 
search on the grounds that it was not a valid search incident to 
arrest.  Dearborn, 313 Wis. 2d 767, ¶¶43-44.  But the court 
agreed to hear the issue because it was a question of law, was 
briefed by the parties, and was of sufficient public interest to 
merit a decision.5  Id. 
¶11 The 
court 
of appeals rejected Dearborn's claim, 
relying heavily on State v. Littlejohn, 2008 WI App 45, 307 
Wis. 2d 477, 747 N.W.2d 712 (pet. review granted).  In that 
case, which this court also is deciding today, the court of 
                                                 
4 On the issue of the required unanimity in a jury verdict 
(see supra note 3), the court of appeals held that Wis. Stat. § 
29.951 defines one crime with multiple modes of commission 
(assault, resist, or obstruct), rather than multiple crimes.  
Dearborn, 313 Wis. 2d 767, ¶42.  Therefore, for a guilty 
verdict, the jury was only required to find that the defendant 
committed the crime, not how he committed it.  Id. 
5 On review before this Court, the parties agree that this 
issue should be heard regardless of whether it was waived. 
No. 
2007AP1894CR   
 
6 
 
appeals rejected a nearly identical argument that a search of a 
locked vehicle after a defendant is under arrest and secured in 
a squad car violates the Fourth Amendment because the area 
searched is not in the "immediate control" of the suspect.  
Littlejohn, 307 Wis. 2d 477, ¶15; Dearborn, 313 Wis. 2d 767, 
¶46.  Thus, the court of appeals held that Dearborn's Fourth 
Amendment rights had not been violated, and that the search was 
proper. 
¶12  In his petition for review before this court, Dearborn 
noted that the United States Supreme Court agreed to address a 
nearly identical question.  We therefore held Dearborn's case 
and agreed to hear it following the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in Gant. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶13 The application of constitutional principles to a 
particular case is a question of constitutional fact.  State v. 
Pallone, 2000 WI 77, ¶26, 236 Wis. 2d 162, 613 N.W.2d 568.  We 
accept the circuit court's findings of fact unless they are 
clearly erroneous.  Id., ¶27.  The application of constitutional 
principles to those facts is a question of law that we review de 
novo.  Id. 
III. DISCUSSION 
¶14 The right to be secure against unreasonable searches 
and seizures is protected by both the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the 
No. 
2007AP1894CR   
 
7 
 
Wisconsin Constitution.6  State v. Sykes, 2005 WI 48, ¶13, 279 
Wis. 2d 742, 695 N.W.2d 277.  We have historically interpreted 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution's 
protections 
in 
this 
area 
identically to the protections under the Fourth Amendment as 
defined by the United States Supreme Court.7  State v. Kramer, 
2009 WI 14, ¶18, 315 Wis. 2d 414, 759 N.W.2d 598.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 968.11 also provides various restrictions on the scope 
of a search incident to a lawful arrest. 
¶15 When there has been an unlawful search, a common 
judicial remedy for the constitutional error is exclusion.  
State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98, ¶¶39-45, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 
N.W.2d 625.  That is, illegally obtained evidence will be 
suppressed as a consequence of the law enforcement officers' 
misconduct.  Id.  The policies underlying both exclusion and the 
                                                 
6 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants 
shall 
issue, 
but 
upon 
probable 
cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
The text of Article 1, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
is identical but for minor variances in capitalization and 
punctuation. 
7 The only exception to this consistent tradition of 
interpreting the Wisconsin and United States constitutions the 
same in this area is our addition of two requirements to 
application of the good faith exception when officers rely on 
defective no-knock search warrants.  See State v. Eason, 2001 WI 
98, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625. 
No. 
2007AP1894CR   
 
8 
 
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule will be discussed 
more fully below. 
¶16 The question before us is whether the good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule should apply when clear and 
settled precedent, reasonably relied upon by law enforcement, is 
subsequently overruled. 
¶17 We begin in Part A by discussing the implications of 
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Gant.  We conclude 
that the search of Dearborn's truck was lawful under clear and 
settled Wisconsin precedent before the Gant decision, and that 
the officers here reasonably relied on this law in conducting 
the search.  Yet, we do adopt the holding of Gant as the proper 
construction 
of 
Article 
1, 
Section 
11 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, and recognize that, in light of Gant, the search 
of Dearborn's truck was in fact unlawful. 
¶18 In Part B, we move to the proper remedy for this 
constitutional violation, focusing on the exclusionary rule and 
its tension with the retroactivity rule.  We ultimately decline 
to enforce the remedy of exclusion for the unlawful search of 
Dearborn's truck.  The principles underlying the exclusionary 
rule, and the good faith exception in particular, counsel that 
suppression of this evidence would have no deterrent effect and 
would therefore be unjustified. 
A. Wisconsin Law and Arizona v. Gant 
¶19 The parties agree that under Arizona v. Gant, the 
search here violated Dearborn's constitutional right to be free 
from unreasonable searches and seizures.  The parties disagree, 
No. 
2007AP1894CR   
 
9 
 
however, with the state of Wisconsin law pre-Gant.  Dearborn 
argues that the search here was unlawful under Wisconsin law as 
it existed before Gant, while the State maintains that the 
search was conducted in reliance on settled Wisconsin precedent.  
A brief history of the case law in this area will put the 
dispute in context. 
¶20 In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), the 
United States Supreme Court established the basic analysis 
underlying a search incident to arrest.  It explained: 
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the 
arresting officer to search the person arrested in 
order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek 
to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape.  
Otherwise, 
the 
officer's 
safety 
might 
well 
be 
endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated.  In 
addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting 
officer to search for and seize any evidence on the 
arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment 
or destruction.  And the area into which an arrestee 
might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary 
items must, of course, be governed by a like rule.  A 
gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is 
arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer 
as one concealed in the clothing of the person 
arrested.  There is ample justification, therefore, 
for a search of the arrestee's person and the area 
"within his immediate control"——construing that phrase 
to mean the area from within which he might gain 
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. 
Id. at 762-63.  Thus, the principle was established that 
officers may search the area an arrestee might be able to reach—
—an area "within his immediate control"——in the course of an 
arrest. 
¶21 In 1981, the United States Supreme Court examined 
whether the passenger compartment of an automobile was subject 
No. 
2007AP1894CR   
 
10 
 
to a search when the occupant is placed under lawful arrest.  
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 455 (1981).  The court noted 
the difficulty of determining the area within the immediate 
control of the arrestee and expressed a desire to establish a 
clear principle that law enforcement officers could rely on.  
Id. at 460.  The court thus held "that when a policeman has made 
a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he 
may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the 
passenger compartment of that automobile."  Id.  The court went 
on to say that any containers in the passenger compartment could 
also, by logical extension, be searched as incident to a lawful 
arrest.  Id. at 460-61. 
¶22 Justice Brennan wrote a dissent in Belton that 
chastised the court for choosing a bright-line rule that failed 
to reflect the underlying policy justifications in Chimel.  Id. 
at 463-64 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  He noted that Chimel 
pointed to the danger that the arrestee could reach weapons or 
contraband, and that this danger was eliminated following a 
lawful arrest.  Id. at 466.  The Court, Justice Brennan argued, 
had adopted the fiction "that the interior of a car is always 
within the immediate control of an arrestee who has recently 
been in the car."  Id. 
¶23 Following the Supreme Court's decision in Belton, 
state and federal courts around the country took the general, 
"bright-line" principle announced in Belton to mean that actual 
accessibility 
was 
no 
longer 
needed; 
rather, 
passenger 
compartments were searchable as long as the arrestee was at the 
No. 
2007AP1894CR   
 
11 
 
scene.  See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1718 ("[O]ur opinion [in Belton] 
has been widely understood to allow a vehicle search incident to 
the arrest of a recent occupant even if there is no possibility 
the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle at the time of the 
search.").8  Wisconsin, like nearly every other jurisdiction to 
address the question, likewise understood Belton to adopt a 
bright-line rule allowing the search of passenger compartments, 
even if the arrestee did not have access to the passenger 
compartment at that time. 
¶24 In State v. Fry, this court addressed the question of 
"whether the search of the locked glove compartment of the 
defendant's automobile after his arrest . . . was justified as a 
search incident to an arrest."  131 Wis. 2d at 156.  In Fry, we 
read Belton as "deciding that the interior of an automobile 'is 
an area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a 
weapon or evidentiary item,' even when the defendant is not in 
the automobile during the search."  Id. at 167 (citations 
omitted) (quoting Belton, 453 U.S. at 460).  Relying on Belton, 
we concluded that the search did not violate Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.11, the Wisconsin Constitution, or the United States 
Constitution because the officers "limited the search to the 
                                                 
8 See also United States v. Davis, 598 F.3d 1259, 1262 (11th 
Cir. 2010) ("We, like most other courts, had read Belton to mean 
that police could search a vehicle incident to a recent 
occupant's arrest regardless of the occupant's actual control 
over the passenger compartment."); United States v. McCane, 573 
F.3d 1037, 1041 (10th Cir. 2009) ("Tenth Circuit precedent 
anteceding Gant was not an exception" to the generally accepted 
reading of Belton.). 
No. 
2007AP1894CR   
 
12 
 
passenger compartment of [the defendant's] automobile, which 
Belton holds is within the acceptable area of a search incident 
to 
arrest." 
 
Id. 
at 
170. 
 
We 
explicitly 
adopted 
our 
understanding of Belton as the proper interpretation of the 
Wisconsin Constitution in order to keep the federal and state 
constitutional protections consistent.  Id. at 174-76.  We also 
described Belton as a reasonable and workable bright-line rule 
that would provide clear direction for the police.  Id.  We 
construed Belton to hold that all closed containers in an 
automobile, whether locked or unlocked, may be searched incident 
to a lawful arrest while the defendant is at the arrest scene.9  
Id. at 178-80. 
¶25 After Fry, the law in Wisconsin was clear: following a 
lawful arrest, police may search the contents of an automobile 
while the defendant is at the scene without running afoul of 
Wis. Stat. § 986.11, Article 1, Section 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution, or the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, whether or not the area searched was actually 
accessible to the arrestee.  Subsequent Wisconsin cases were 
consistent in their reliance on Fry's articulation of the Belton 
rule.  See Pallone, 236 Wis. 2d 162, ¶35 (explaining that under 
Belton and Fry, police may search a vehicle incident to arrest 
even though the defendants lacked the ability to access the 
                                                 
9 The dissent in Fry would have given greater protections 
under Wis. Stat. § 986.11 and the Wisconsin Constitution; it 
rejected what it called the "Belton rule."  State v. Fry, 131 
Wis. 2d 153, 186-88, 388 N.W.2d 565 (1986) (Bablitch, J., 
dissenting). 
No. 
2007AP1894CR   
 
13 
 
interior of the vehicle due to their arrest); State v. Murdock, 
155 
Wis. 2d 217, 
231-34, 
455 
N.W.2d 618 
(1990) 
(same); 
Littlejohn, 307 Wis. 2d 477, ¶¶8-11 (same). 
¶26 In Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009), the United 
States Supreme Court rejected the prevailing interpretation of 
Belton——the interpretation we adopted in Fry.  A "broad reading" 
of Belton, the Court explained, would "untether the rule from 
the justifications underlying the Chimel exception."  Id. at 
1719.  Thus, the Court held "that the Chimel rationale 
authorizes police to search a vehicle incident to a recent 
occupant's arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within 
reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of 
the search."  Id.  The Court went beyond Chimel and further held 
"that circumstances unique to the vehicle context justify a 
search [of an otherwise inaccessible vehicle] incident to a 
lawful arrest when it is 'reasonable to believe evidence 
relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.'"  
Id. 
¶27 Gant, then, is a clear break from Fry and its progeny.  
Consistent with our prior practice of keeping Wisconsin and 
federal constitutional law in this area in step, we hereby adopt 
the reasoning in Gant as the proper reading of Article 1, 
Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution (protecting against 
unreasonable searches and seizures).  Fry and any decisions 
relying 
on 
Fry's 
interpretation 
of 
the 
Belton 
rule 
are 
overruled. 
 
Under 
both 
the 
Wisconsin 
and 
United 
States 
Constitutions, the Chimel rationale authorizes a vehicular 
No. 
2007AP1894CR   
 
14 
 
search only if the person arrested is unsecured and within 
reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of 
the search.  However, a search incident to a lawful arrest may 
be justified when it is "reasonable to believe evidence relevant 
to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle."  Gant, 
129 S. Ct. at 1719 (citing Thornton v. United States, 541 
U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)). 
¶28 In this case, Dearborn locked the door to his truck 
and was in custody at the time the officers performed the search 
of his truck incident to his arrest.  Under Fry and Pallone, the 
search the officers conducted on Dearborn's truck was clearly 
lawful.  The officers therefore acted in objectively reasonable 
reliance on clear and settled Wisconsin Supreme Court precedent. 
¶29 However, after Gant, as both parties recognize, we now 
know that the search of Dearborn's truck was a violation of 
Dearborn's constitutional rights.  This is so because Dearborn 
was secured and therefore unable to reach the passenger 
compartment of his vehicle at the time of the search.  Moreover, 
Dearborn's search cannot be upheld under Gant on the grounds 
that relevant evidence might be found in the truck, because the 
warden could not have reasonably expected to find evidence in 
the vehicle regarding Dearborn's revoked license. 
B. The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule 
¶30 Dearborn argues that because the search here was 
unlawful, the evidence obtained as a result of the illegal 
search should be suppressed under the exclusionary rule.  The 
State asserts that because the officers relied in good faith on 
No. 
2007AP1894CR   
 
15 
 
Wisconsin law as it stood at the time of the search, the good 
faith exception to the exclusionary rule should apply.  This 
case, then, concerns the tension between two principles. 
¶31 The first principle is the retroactivity rule, which 
states that newly declared constitutional rules must apply "to 
all similar cases pending on direct review."  Griffith v. 
Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322-23 (1987); see also United States v. 
Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 562 (1982) (holding that a decision of 
the Supreme Court "construing the Fourth Amendment is to be 
applied retroactively to all convictions that were not yet final 
at the time the decision was rendered").  This rule accords with 
"basic norms of constitutional adjudication" and contains "no 
exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a 'clear 
break' with the past."  Griffith, 479 U.S. at 322, 328 (1987). 
¶32 Applying the retroactivity rule here means that even 
though the search the officers conducted in this case was done 
in accordance with the law as declared at the time of the 
search, we are still required to hold that the search of 
Dearborn's truck was unconstitutional.  In other words, the 
retroactivity rule means that Dearborn gets the benefit of the 
Gant holding because his case was not yet final.10 
                                                 
10 Chief Justice Abrahamson argues that Griffith compels 
application of exclusion here.  See dissent, ¶¶67-73.  The 
United States Supreme Court disagrees with her.  See Illinois v. 
Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 369-70 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); 
infra ¶¶40-42. 
No. 
2007AP1894CR   
 
16 
 
¶33 The second competing principle at work here is the 
application 
of 
the 
proper 
remedy 
for 
the 
constitutional 
violation——specifically, the exclusionary rule and the good 
faith exception to the exclusionary rule.  Broadly defined, the 
exclusionary rule is not applied when the officers conducting an 
illegal search "acted in the objectively reasonable belief that 
their conduct did not violate the Fourth Amendment."  United 
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918 (1984). 
¶34 This 
court 
is 
not 
the 
first 
to 
attempt 
a 
reconciliation of these two principles.  Numerous cases have 
been filed around the country in the wake of Gant raising 
precisely this same question.  The results have been mixed.  
Some courts have determined that the remedy of exclusion should 
be applied in all cases where the retroactivity rule applies,11 
while 
other 
courts 
agree 
with 
our 
conclusion 
that 
the 
exclusionary rule should not apply where the officers relied in 
good faith on clear and settled law that was only subsequently 
changed.12 
                                                                                                                                                             
The Chief Justice fails to appreciate the difference 
between a constitutional violation and a remedy for that 
violation.  See dissent, ¶67 n.2.  The retroactivity rule 
requires that we apply the newly announced rule to Dearborn——
this means we must conclude that the search of his vehicle was 
unlawful.  This is a distinct question, however, from whether 
the remedy of exclusion is warranted.    
11 See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 578 F.3d 1130 (9th 
Cir. 2009); State v. McCarty, 229 P.3d 1041 (Colo. 2010). 
12 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 598 F.3d 1259 (11th 
Cir. 2010); United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037 (10th Cir. 
2009); State v. Baker, 229 P.3d 650 (Utah 2010). 
No. 
2007AP1894CR   
 
17 
 
¶35 We begin first with the exclusionary rule.  The 
exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy, not a right, 
and its application is restricted to cases where its remedial 
objectives will best be served.  Herring v. United States, 129 
S. Ct. 695, 700 (2009); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10-11 
(1995).  That means that just because a Fourth Amendment 
violation has occurred does not mean the exclusionary rule 
applies.13  Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 700.  Rather, exclusion is the 
last resort.  Id.  The application of the exclusionary rule 
should focus on its efficacy in deterring future Fourth 
Amendment violations.  Id.  Moreover, marginal deterrence is not 
enough to justify exclusion; "the benefits of deterrence must 
outweigh the costs."  Id. 
¶36 In Herring, decided just last year, the United States 
Supreme Court reaffirmed Leon's holding that the exclusionary 
rule should not apply when the police act in good faith, or in 
"objectively reasonable reliance" on a subsequently invalidated 
search warrant.  Id. at 701.  The Court clarified when the 
exclusionary rule should apply: 
To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must 
be 
sufficiently 
deliberate 
that 
exclusion 
can 
meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that 
such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice 
                                                 
13 Much of Chief Justice Abrahamson's dissent rests on her 
fundamental disagreement with this most basic principle.  She 
laments, for example, that our opinion "leaves an acknowledged 
constitutional violation unremedied."  See, e.g., dissent, 
¶¶54, 66.  That is true; but it is true whenever the remedy of 
exclusion is held to be inappropriate.  Her quarrel is with the 
law, not with our reasoning. 
No. 
2007AP1894CR   
 
18 
 
system.  As laid out in our cases, the exclusionary 
rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly 
negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring 
or systemic negligence. 
Id. at 702.  The test of whether the officers' reliance was 
reasonable is an objective one, querying "'whether a reasonably 
well trained officer would have known that the search was 
illegal' in light of 'all of the circumstances.'"  Id. at 703 
(quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23). 
¶37 This court adopted the good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule in State v. Ward, 2000 WI 3, 231 Wis. 2d 723, 
604 N.W.2d 517 (applying the exception to objectively reasonable 
reliance on settled law subsequently overruled), and affirmed 
the principles of Leon in Eason, 245 Wis. 2d 206 (applying the 
exception to objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant 
subsequently invalidated).  Citing Leon, Eason held that the 
exclusionary rule 
cannot deter objectively reasonable law 
enforcement activity, and therefore it should not apply in those 
circumstances.14  Id., ¶73. 
¶38 In sum, the exclusionary rule should be applied as a 
remedy to deter police misconduct and most appropriately when 
the deterrent benefits outweigh the substantial costs to the 
                                                 
14 Chief Justice Abrahamson has never liked the good-faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule.  See State v. Ward, 2000 WI 
3, ¶¶64-91, 231 Wis. 2d 723, 604 N.W.2d 517 (Abrahamson, C.J., 
dissenting); 
State 
v. 
Eason, 
2001 
WI 
98, 
¶¶76-100, 
245 
Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting). 
She obviously prefers the law as it stood in 1923 following 
this court's decision in State v. Hoyer, 180 Wis. 407, 193 
N.W. 89 (1923).  Dissent, ¶¶80-82.  That decision, however, does 
not reflect the current state of the law. 
No. 
2007AP1894CR   
 
19 
 
truth-seeking and law enforcement objectives of the criminal 
justice system. 
¶39 The exclusionary rule's tension with the retroactivity 
rule that lies at the heart of this case has already been 
addressed by both the United States Supreme Court and this 
court. 
¶40 In Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987), the 
Illinois Supreme Court had ruled that a statute authorizing 
warrantless 
administrative 
searches 
violated 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment.  Id. at 345-46.  The court also suppressed evidence 
seized during a search conducted under the later-invalidated 
statute.  Id. at 346.  The United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to determine whether the good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule should preclude suppression where the officers 
acted in objectively reasonable reliance upon the statute.  Id. 
at 342. 
¶41 The United States Supreme Court began its analysis by 
pointing to the "prime purpose" of the exclusionary rule: 
deterrence of unlawful police conduct.  Id. at 347 (quoting 
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974)).  It noted 
that the exclusionary rule is a judicial remedy, not a 
constitutional right of the aggrieved party.  Id.  The Court 
said that applying the exclusionary rule when the police 
officers acted in objectively reasonable reliance on a statute 
would have virtually no deterrent effect.  Id. at 349-50.  It 
would make no sense, the Court explained, to punish the officers 
for the legislature's error.  Id. at 350.  Because the officers' 
No. 
2007AP1894CR   
 
20 
 
reliance on binding law was objectively reasonable and in good 
faith, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule 
applied.  Id. at 358-60. 
¶42 Krull was a close case, with four members of the 
United States Supreme Court dissenting.  Id. at 361.  The 
dissent argued that the result in this case was directly at odds 
with the retroactivity rule announced in Griffith.  Id. at 368 
(O'Connor, 
J., 
dissenting). 
 
By 
failing 
to 
apply 
the 
exclusionary rule, "no effective remedy is to be provided in the 
very 
case 
in 
which 
the 
statute 
at 
issue 
was 
held 
unconstitutional." 
 
Id. 
 
Though 
recognizing 
that 
the 
exclusionary rule is a remedy not always available when Fourth 
Amendment rights are violated, "the failure to apply the 
exclusionary rule in the very case in which a state statute is 
held to have violated the Fourth Amendment destroys all 
incentive on the part of individual criminal defendants to 
litigate the violation of their Fourth Amendment rights."  Id. 
at 369.  Such a precedent, the dissent maintained, will chill 
the development of Fourth Amendment principles.15  Id. 
¶43 Ten years ago, the Wisconsin Supreme Court relied on 
Krull for nearly the same proposition at issue in this case.  In 
Ward, 231 Wis. 2d 723, this court allowed the admission of 
evidence obtained by officers acting in good faith reliance on 
                                                 
15  Krull was decided just three years after the delineation 
of the good faith exception announced in Leon, and the same year 
as the Court's resolution of the retroactivity issues in 
Griffith. 
No. 
2007AP1894CR   
 
21 
 
clear case law that was subsequently changed by the United 
States Supreme Court.  Id., ¶3.16  We concluded as follows: 
"[B]ecause the officers relied, in objective good faith, upon 
the pronouncements of this court we hold that exclusion of the 
evidence would serve no remedial objective and, therefore, the 
evidence seized at the Ward residence should be admitted."17  
Id., ¶63.  The dissent in Ward raised issues similar to those 
raised by the dissent in Krull and argued by Dearborn in this 
case.  It noted, "The majority opinion applies to any published 
decision of the court of appeals or this court authorizing a 
search when the decision is later declared unconstitutional."  
Id., ¶88 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting).  The dissent also 
questioned how this decision would affect the incentives for an 
accused to challenge a search explicitly authorized by law.  Id. 
                                                 
16 The clear case law relied on by the police in Ward was 
this court's decision in State v. Richards, 201 Wis. 2d 845, 549 
N.W.2d 218 (1996), which held that no-knock entries are always 
permitted when police execute a search warrant for felonious 
drug delivery.  Ward, 231 Wis. 2d 723, ¶40.  After the search 
warrant was executed and Ward pled no contest, but before Ward 
was sentenced, the United States Supreme Court overruled 
Richards in Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997).  See 
Ward, 231 Wis. 2d 723, ¶16. 
17 The North Dakota Supreme Court reached the same result in 
State v. Herrick, 588 N.W.2d 847 (N.D. 1999). 
No. 
2007AP1894CR   
 
22 
 
¶44 We can find no principled way to distinguish Krull or 
Ward from this case.18  Both this court and the United States 
Supreme Court have determined that the retroactivity rule does 
not bar application of the good faith exception in situations 
where police act in objectively reasonable reliance on settled 
(albeit subsequently overruled) law.  As we have already 
explained, the officers were following the clear and settled 
precedent of this court; this is exactly what officers should 
do.  Application of the exclusionary rule would have absolutely 
no deterrent effect on officer misconduct, while at the same 
time coming with the cost of allowing evidence of wrongdoing to 
be excluded.  In short, under Krull and Ward, it is clear that 
applying the exclusionary rule would be an inappropriate remedy 
for the constitutional violations here. 
¶45 We 
are 
not 
unmindful 
of 
the 
impact 
of 
the 
retroactivity doctrine.  As the dissents in Krull and Ward 
recognized, the real cost to not applying the exclusionary rule 
when the law has been changed is that litigants may have less 
incentive to challenge potentially unconstitutional searches.  
See Krull, 480 U.S. at 369 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Ward, 231 
                                                 
18 Chief Justice Abrahamson asserts that she can distinguish 
these cases, but we can find no discernible principle emerging 
from her writing.  See dissent, ¶96.  Her argument appears to 
boil down to attempts at factual distinctions without a 
difference.  Ward in particular is a mirror image of this case.  
But it does not uphold Chief Justice Abrahamson's vision for the 
exclusionary rule, and thus, it appears she will not abide by 
its rule. 
No. 
2007AP1894CR   
 
23 
 
Wis. 2d 723, ¶88 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting).  But these 
concerns are misplaced for at least three reasons. 
¶46 First, under our holding today, the exclusionary rule 
is inappropriate only when the officer reasonably relies on 
clear and settled precedent.  Our holding does not affect the 
vast majority of cases where neither this court nor the United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
have 
spoken 
with 
specificity 
in 
a 
particular fact situation.  The only litigants who will be 
disincentivized are the relatively small number of defendants 
who choose to challenge searches that have already clearly and 
unequivocally been held lawful.  The vast majority of cases, 
particularly in the fact-intensive Fourth Amendment context, 
will not fall into this category.  Moreover, we suspect that 
litigants 
are 
already 
hesitant 
to 
challenge 
well-settled 
precedent; such challenges are usually time-consuming and not 
worth the effort.  Additionally, litigants will often feel like 
the facts of their case are slightly different and not squarely 
under the authority of settled case law.  Even Dearborn in this 
case alleges that the search of his truck was unconstitutional 
under Wisconsin law before Gant, an assertion we reject for the 
reasons noted above. 
¶47 Second, criminal defendants will still want to do 
whatever they can to increase their chances for success.  It 
seems unlikely that convicted defendants will give up a fight to 
secure their freedom merely because the possibility of a 
material change in their conviction is low, or maybe after this 
case, somewhat lower. 
No. 
2007AP1894CR   
 
24 
 
¶48 Finally, criminal defendants are represented by a 
dedicated group of public defenders and private attorneys who 
genuinely care about the development of the law.  Time and time 
again we have seen criminal defense attorneys take cases to this 
court, often without pay, in order to effect a particular change 
in the law.  We doubt that our holding in this case will change 
this practice. 
¶49 In sum, we are persuaded that the benefits of applying 
the exclusionary rule in this case are exceedingly low.  The 
deterrent effect on officer misconduct, which is the most 
important factor in our analysis, would be nonexistent.  For 
this reason, we conclude that the good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule should preclude the suppression of the 
illegally obtained evidence in this case because the officers 
reasonably relied on clear and settled Wisconsin Supreme Court 
precedent in carrying out the search. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶50 Prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
Gant, this court made clear in State v. Fry and its progeny that 
the type of search conducted of Dearborn's truck following his 
arrest was lawful.  However, we now accept Gant's interpretation 
of the United States Constitution and adopt its holding as the 
proper interpretation of the Wisconsin Constitution's protection 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.  Thus, the search of 
Dearborn's truck violated his constitutional rights. 
¶51 However, we decline to apply the remedy of exclusion 
for the constitutional violation.  We hold that the good faith 
No. 
2007AP1894CR   
 
25 
 
exception precludes application of the exclusionary rule where 
officers conduct a search in objectively reasonable reliance 
upon clear and settled Wisconsin precedent that is later deemed 
unconstitutional 
by 
the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court.  
Accordingly, 
we 
affirm 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
and 
uphold 
Dearborn's conviction. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No.  2007AP1894-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶52 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  I agree 
that under Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009), the search 
of the defendant's vehicle in this case violated the Fourth 
Amendment.  I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the 
evidence obtained as a result of this unconstitutional search 
may nevertheless be admitted against the defendant under the 
doctrine of "good faith." 
¶53 This case presents a real tension in the law and 
requires looking closely at the reasoning behind the two 
competing 
doctrines, the "retroactivity rule" of criminal 
procedure and the doctrine of "good faith" reliance under the 
Fourth Amendment.1  I do not pretend the resolution of the 
tension is easy, but in my view, the majority has looked 
carefully at only one side of the dilemma and in so doing has 
reached the wrong result.  
¶54 The majority disobeys controlling precedent, leaves an 
acknowledged constitutional violation unremedied, allows the law 
to provide different results for similarly situated defendants, 
and establishes a serious imbalance in how future Fourth 
Amendment issues will be brought to the courts and resolved.  
Given the slight weight afforded these consequences by the 
majority, it is no wonder the majority fails to weigh the costs 
to judicial integrity and the integrity of judicial process, 
                                                 
1 "Good 
faith" 
may 
also 
arise 
under 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution's 
protection 
against 
unreasonable 
search 
and 
seizures.  See State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 
N.W.2d 625. 
No.  2007AP1894-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
values which our court has protected through the exclusionary 
rule for over 80 years.  
¶55 Because I weigh these negative consequences more 
heavily than the majority has done, and because I decline to 
view judicial integrity as a dead letter, I dissent.   
¶56 My discussion proceeds in four steps: 
¶57 First, 
the 
majority 
effectively 
disregards 
the 
controlling rule of retroactivity under Griffith v. Kentucky, 
479 U.S. 314 (1987), leaving unremedied a violation of a 
defendant's constitutional rights and establishing a system of 
inequitable adjudication for criminal defendants in the position 
of the defendant here.   
¶58 Second, I address the continuing value of judicial 
integrity and its importance in deciding the present case.  The 
majority does not assess the weight of judicial integrity in 
resolving the present case.   
¶59 Third, I address the imbalance which I (and others) 
anticipate the majority's decision will create in how future 
cases determining Fourth Amendment boundaries will be raised and 
resolved.  The majority acknowledges but understates these 
consequences, which will likely reach well beyond the particular 
set of cases to be decided under Arizona v. Gant.   
¶60 Fourth, I distinguish the cases which the majority 
asserts cannot be distinguished and which the majority seems to 
argue control the outcome here.   
¶61 Make no mistake.  The majority's result is not 
dictated by precedent but runs against it.  The court has to 
No.  2007AP1894-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
make a choice in the present case: to permit or to suppress 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence in court.  The majority 
acknowledges that its decision in this case comes down to 
weighing the costs and benefits.  See majority op., ¶¶38, 44.  
In my view, the majority has bypassed key precedent and 
miscalculated the costs and benefits that drive its decision. 
I 
¶62 The 
majority's 
result 
admits 
a 
constitutional 
violation but declines to provide a remedy.  In so doing, it 
tolerates a situation in this and future cases in which one 
defendant receives protection for a constitutional right while 
other defendants, by virtue of luck or timing, are denied the 
same protection for the same right.   
¶63 The majority asserts that "the real cost" of admitting 
the unlawfully gained evidence in this case and others like it 
is "that litigants may have less incentive to challenge 
potentially unconstitutional searches."  Majority op., ¶45.  In 
other words, from the majority's point of view, the principal if 
not the only problem with admitting the evidence here is that it 
will come at some cost to the process of future law development.  
I disagree and further discuss this issue in part III below.  
However, before moving to that rather lawyerly discussion, I 
note that there are at least two more obvious and more direct 
"costs" that the majority has not tallied among the detriments 
of its decision. 
¶64 First, the majority concludes that the defendant's 
Fourth Amendment rights were violated but declines to provide a 
No.  2007AP1894-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
remedy for that violation.  Majority op., ¶¶50-51.  The majority 
apparently does not count leaving unremedied a violation of a 
defendant's constitutional rights as a negative impact or cost 
of today's decision.  I do, and so does the United States 
Supreme Court. 
¶65 In Arizona v. Gant, where the defendant's rights were 
similarly violated, the United States Supreme Court noted that 
police misapprehension of the constitution in searches incident 
to arrest "does not establish the sort of reliance interest that 
could outweigh the countervailing interest that all individuals 
share in having their constitutional rights fully protected."  
129 S. Ct. at 1723.   
¶66 Second, 
today's 
decision 
effectively 
allows 
for 
selective protection of constitutional rights.  Under the 
majority's decision, an exclusionary remedy vindicates the 
constitutional right of the one defendant lucky enough to reach 
the United States Supreme Court (here, the defendant in Arizona 
v. Gant).  Yet other defendants, such as the defendant in the 
present case, who had the same right violated in the same way 
are 
denied 
the 
very 
same 
relief. 
 
The 
protection 
of 
constitutional rights should not fall to the luck of the draw.   
¶67 The United States Supreme Court ruled in Griffith v. 
Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987), that this differential 
No.  2007AP1894-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
treatment "violates basic norms of constitutional adjudication."2  
To 
guard 
against 
such 
a 
violation, 
the 
Griffith 
court 
established a clear-cut retroactivity rule, holding——as the 
majority acknowledges——that a newly declared constitutional rule 
must apply to "all similar cases pending on direct review."  479 
U.S. at 322-23.  The Griffith court took a harsh stance on 
exceptions 
to 
this 
retroactivity 
principle, 
declining 
to 
recognize an "exception for cases in which the new rule 
constitutes a 'clear break' with the past" and instead holding 
that "a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to 
be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending 
on direct review or not yet final . . . ."  479 U.S. at 328 
(emphasis added). 
¶68 By making an exception to the retroactivity rule for 
"good faith," the majority's decision flatly violates Griffith. 
¶69 The reasons for enforcing this "retroactivity rule" 
implicate fundamental values of judicial process and our legal 
                                                 
2 The majority opinion quotes this language from Griffith, 
but carefully eliminates the word "violates."  Majority op., 
¶31.  Inscrutably, the majority first acknowledges that "the 
retroactivity rule means that Dearborn gets the benefit of the 
Gant holding," majority op., ¶32, but then does not give 
Dearborn that benefit.  
See also United States. v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537 (1982). 
Preceding Griffith, the Johnson court held that, "subject to 
[certain] exceptions . . . , a decision of [the Supreme Court] 
construing the Fourth Amendment is to be applied retroactively 
to all convictions that were not yet final at the time the 
decision was rendered." 457 U.S. at 562.  The United States 
Supreme Court did not acknowledge good faith as one such 
exception.  
No.  2007AP1894-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
system:  Courts should not render advisory opinions, and 
similarly situated defendants should be treated alike.   
¶70 Griffith emphasized, first, that if courts announce 
their "best understanding" of constitutional principles but then 
choose not to apply those principles to the resolution of 
pending cases, "the Court's assertion of power to disregard 
current law . . . is quite simply an assertion that our 
constitutional function is not one of adjudication but in effect 
of legislation."    
[F]ailure to apply a newly declared constitutional 
rule to criminal cases pending on direct review 
violates 
basic 
norms 
of 
constitutional 
adjudication . . . . [T]he nature of judicial review 
requires that we adjudicate specific cases, and each 
case usually becomes the vehicle for announcement of a 
new rule.  But after we have decided a new rule in the 
case 
selected, 
the integrity of judicial review 
requires that we apply that rule to all similar cases 
pending on direct review.  Justice Harlan observed: 
"If we do not resolve all cases before us on direct 
review in light of our best understanding of governing 
constitutional principles, it is difficult to see why 
we should so adjudicate any case at all . . . . In 
truth, the Court's assertion of power to disregard 
current law in adjudicating cases before us that have 
not already run the full course of appellate review, 
is quite simply an assertion that our constitutional 
function is not one of adjudication but in effect of 
legislation." 
Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322-23 (1987) (internal 
citations omitted). 
¶71 The 
second 
fundamental 
reason 
for 
applying 
the 
retroactivity rule, as Griffith explained, is to avoid the 
"actual inequity" of "fishing one case from the stream" while 
No.  2007AP1894-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
allowing other defendants to "flow by unaffected" by the proper 
interpretation of the constitution:.   
[W]e 
fulfill 
our 
judicial 
responsibility 
by 
instructing the lower courts to apply the new rule 
retroactively to cases not yet final.  Thus, it is the 
nature of judicial review that precludes us from 
"[s]imply 
fishing 
one 
case 
from 
the 
stream 
of 
appellate 
review, 
using 
it 
as 
a 
vehicle 
for 
pronouncing new constitutional standards, and then 
permitting a stream of similar cases subsequently to 
flow by unaffected by that new rule." 
 
. . . . 
[S]elective application of new rules violates the 
principle of treating similarly situated defendants 
the same. . . . [T]he problem with not applying new 
rules to cases pending on direct review is "the actual 
inequity that results when the Court chooses which of 
many similarly situated defendants should be the 
chance beneficiary" of a new rule. 
Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 323 (1987) (internal 
citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
¶72 The majority thus disregards a direct holding of the 
United States Supreme Court by applying a "good faith" exception 
to the retroactivity rule.3  In so doing, the majority flouts the 
                                                 
3 Not surprisingly, in choosing not to follow the Griffith 
holding, the majority gives short shrift to that case.  See 
majority op., ¶¶31, 42.  Rather than provide reasons why the 
obligatory and categorically stated retroactivity rule does not 
apply here, the majority instead offers reasons why the good 
faith exception to the exclusionary rule should apply.   
No.  2007AP1894-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
rationale for retroactivity, permitting in the present case the 
"actual inequity" against which the retroactivity rule protects.   
¶73 The majority's reasoning is driven by the exclusionary 
rule and focuses on potential deterrence of police misconduct.  
See majority op., ¶¶35-38.  This reasoning provides no real 
answer to the reasons why the United States Supreme Court has 
made the retroactivity rule the law of the land.  Acknowledging 
that the exclusionary rule is considered a remedy, rather than a 
right, still provides no basis either for courts to dole out the 
remedy inequitably or to pronounce the boundaries of the Fourth 
Amendment right in an advisory fashion.  Griffith applies to 
"rule[s] for the conduct of criminal prosecutions," 479 U.S. at 
328.  The majority gives no reason the exclusionary rule should 
be treated differently. 
II 
¶74 The majority does not evaluate the costs to judicial 
integrity in this case, thus placing no weight on judicial 
integrity.  I cannot agree with this omission.  I continue to 
                                                                                                                                                             
The majority's election not to follow the clear rule of 
Griffith may be startling, since by its own terms, Griffith is 
binding on "all cases, state or federal," while the majority 
acknowledges that application of the exclusionary rule is a 
matter of judicial policy, that is, a remedy that turns on a 
balancing of costs and benefits and that this court may decide 
is either warranted or not in a case.  See majority op., ¶¶35-
38; see also State v. Ward, 2000 WI 3, ¶48, 231 Wis. 2d 723, 604 
N.W.2d 517 ("Whether the purpose of the exclusionary rule is 
solely remedial or also a matter of judicial integrity, the 
Supreme Court has made clear that for Fourth Amendment purposes 
'the policies behind the exclusionary rule are not absolute.  
Rather, they must be evaluated in light of competing policies.'" 
(quoted source omitted)). 
No.  2007AP1894-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
value judicial integrity, as do a long line of prior and 
continuing cases evaluating the exclusionary rule.  Moreover, I 
believe that judicial integrity is a concept that encompasses 
something more significant than simply prognosticating the 
likely effects of court decisions on future police behavior.  
The majority has made two key mistakes regarding judicial 
integrity. 
¶75  First, while the majority acknowledges that proper 
resolution of this case requires squaring the retroactivity rule 
with the exclusionary rule, the majority does not assess the 
costs to judicial integrity and the judicial process, which the 
retroactivity rule protects.  In my view, these costs to 
judicial integrity are no less weighty than the deterrence 
rationale, which the majority treats as the only required 
analysis.     
¶76 As explained above, the "judicial integrity" values 
protected by the Griffith retroactivity rule are not merely 
another phraseology for Fourth Amendment deterrence.  Rather, 
the retroactivity rule protects "basic norms of constitutional 
adjudication," curtails the "assertion that our constitutional 
function is . . . in effect [one] of legislation," preserves 
"the nature of judicial review" and guards against "actual 
inequity."  Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. at 322-23 (see supra 
¶¶16-19).  The majority's decision that retroactivity will not 
apply comes at a cost to these judicial values.  The Gant 
No.  2007AP1894-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
decision is not given effect and this defendant is denied a 
remedy when others similarly situated receive one.4  
¶77 Thus when the majority fails to factor judicial 
integrity into its resolution of the present case, it continues 
to view the tension in this case only from the perspective of 
the body of law which it prefers regarding the exclusionary 
rule.  The majority thereby does not actually resolve "the 
tension between two principles," which it acknowledges and which 
the majority admits can be resolved in more than one way.5   
¶78 Second, 
the 
majority 
has 
not 
acknowledged 
the 
traditional role of judicial integrity in exclusionary rule 
analysis.  Wisconsin courts have long recognized, and continue 
to recognize, that suppression is necessary in some cases "to 
preserve the integrity of the judicial process," even in cases 
where no reasonable fault can be attributed to law enforcement 
officers. 
 
State 
v. 
Hess, 
2010 
WI 
82, 
¶¶64-67, 
70, 
___Wis. 2d ___, ___N.W.2d ___; see also State v. Artic, 2010 WI 
83, ¶65, ___Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___; State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 
127, ¶79, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 899 ("aside from deterring 
police misconduct, there is another fundamental reason for 
excluding the evidence under circumstances present here, the 
                                                 
4 As the majority acknowledges, different jurisdictions have 
already divided in their resolutions of the tension between the 
retroactivity rule and the "good faith" exception to the 
exclusionary rule.  The result is that defendants in Wisconsin 
will be denied a remedy available in other jurisdictions. 
5 See majority op., ¶30, ¶34 (acknowledging that other 
courts have reached divided results in resolving the tension 
between the retroactivity rule and the exclusionary rule). 
No.  2007AP1894-CR.ssa 
 
11 
 
preservation of judicial integrity"); State v. Ward, 2000 WI 3, 
¶49, 231 Wis. 2d 723, 604 N.W.2d 517 ("we do not believe 
that . . . judicial integrity is sullied by admission of the 
evidence").6 
¶79 Thus the majority is squarely at odds with the past 
and present holdings of this court when it simply ignores this 
additional analysis relevant to exclusionary rule analysis.  In 
my view, each case requires an examination to determine whether 
judicial integrity is merely another aspect of deterrence, as 
may have been true in the exclusionary rule cases cited by the 
majority,7 or whether the integrity of judicial values and 
judicial processes provides a separate and valid reason for 
excluding unlawfully-obtained evidence, given the stakes raised 
in the particular case.   
¶80  The 
majority 
apparently 
forgets 
that 
Wisconsin 
adopted the exclusionary rule to effectuate Article 1, Section 
11 of the Wisconsin Constitution long before Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
                                                 
6 Other authorities have also traditionally treated judicial 
integrity as a rationale that is distinct and separate from 
deterrence: 
"The 
deterrence 
of 
unreasonable 
searches 
and 
seizures is a major purpose of the exclusionary rule. . . . But 
the rule serves other purposes as well.  There is for example, 
 . . . 'the imperative of judicial integrity,' namely, that the 
courts do not become 'accomplices in willful disobedience of a 
Constitution they are sworn to uphold.'"  Black's Law Dictionary 
(8th ed. 2004), exclusionary rule (quoting Wayne R. LaFave & 
Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 3.1, at 107 (2d ed. 
1992)). 
7 See State v. Hess, 2010 WI 82, ¶65, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___ ("These cases [Herring] and [Evans] simply refused to 
exclude evidence based on judicial integrity in the specific 
facts of those cases."). 
No.  2007AP1894-CR.ssa 
 
12 
 
U.S. 643 (1961), made the federal courts' interpretation of the 
exclusionary rule binding in state courts as a matter of federal 
law.  In 1923 this court decided State v. Hoyer, "a watershed in 
Wisconsin law."  State v. Orta, 2000 WI 4, ¶7, 231 Wis. 2d 782, 
786, 604 N.W.2d 543.  Hoyer adopted the exclusionary rule as the 
law of Wisconsin, for reasons that were in no way limited to 
deterrence.  The Hoyer court wrote: 
We see no reason in logic, justice, or in that innate 
sense of fair play, which lies at the foundation of 
such guaranties, why a court of justice, rejecting as 
abhorrent the idea of the use of evidence extorted by 
violation of a defendant's right to be secure in 
person and exempt from self-incrimination, though it 
may result in murder going unwhipt of justice, should 
yet approve of the use, in the same court of justice, 
by state officers, of that which has been obtained by 
other state officers through, and by a plain violation 
of constitutional guarantees of equal standing and 
value, though thereby possibly a violation of the 
prohibition law may go unpunished. 
Section 11, art. 1, Wis. Const., supra, is a pledge of 
the faith of the state government that the people of 
the state . . . shall be secure in their persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects 
against 
unreasonable 
search and seizure.  This security has vanished, and 
the pledge is violated by the state that guarantees 
it, when officers of state, acting under color of 
state given authority, search and seize unlawfully. 
The pledge of this provision and of section 8 are each 
violated when use is made of such evidence in one of 
its own courts by other of its officers.  That a 
proper result——that is, a conviction of one really 
guilty of an offense——may be thus reached is neither 
an excuse for, nor a condonation of, the use by the 
state of that which is so the result of its own 
violation of its own fundamental charter. Such a 
cynical indifference to the state's obligations should 
not be judicial policy. 
State v. Hoyer, 180 Wis. 407, 417, 193 N.W. 89 (1923). 
No.  2007AP1894-CR.ssa 
 
13 
 
 
¶81 The weight of Hoyer and its bearing on the emergence 
and rapid expansion of a good faith exception in Wisconsin was 
well articulated by Justice Prosser in his concurring opinion in 
State v. Orta, 2000 WI 4, ¶¶6-15, 231 Wis. 2d 782, 791, 604 
N.W.2d 543, 548, concluding that "[i]t may be possible to 
support a limited good faith exception to the exclusionary rule 
in a worthy case, with compelling facts, in which the court 
carefully articulates a rationale that squares with the storied 
Hoyer decision.  But not in Ward and not here."8  When this court 
last expanded the doctrine of "good faith" exceptions to the 
exclusionary 
rule 
in 
State 
v. 
Eason, 
2001 
WI 
98, 
245 
Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625, it discussed Hoyer at length and 
adopted a good faith exception bottomed on the Wisconsin 
                                                 
8 See also Ward, 231 Wis. 2d 723, ¶87 (Abrahamson, C.J., 
dissenting) ("[Hoyer] demonstrates this state's commitment to 
protecting the privacy of its citizens which this court should 
not rush to diminish.")  
No.  2007AP1894-CR.ssa 
 
14 
 
constitution, a rule that is more protective of individual 
rights than the rule applied by the federal courts.9   
¶82 Thus the majority falls short when it fails to analyze 
judicial integrity, an established rationale for suppressing 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence from use in Wisconsin 
courts.  The majority errs when it fails to take up the 
invitation to square its rationale with Hoyer or more generally 
                                                 
9 See also Eason, 245 Wis. 2d 206, ¶94 (Abrahamson, C.J., 
dissenting) ("I do not question the majority's conclusion that a 
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not alter 
officers' incentives to comply with the Fourth Amendment.  But 
what about the incentives for the other persons in the system? 
The majority is silent about the potential effects on issuing 
magistrates.  The majority is silent about the potential effects 
on prosecutors.  The majority is silent about the potential 
effects on public confidence in a justice system that not only 
allows constitutional violations to go unaddressed, but also 
uses the fruits of those constitutional violations to convict 
those whose constitutional rights have been violated.  Our 
justice system can do better. Our justice system has done better 
in the seventy-seven years since the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
first recognized the exclusionary rule."); id., ¶101 (Prosser, 
J., dissenting) ("Because the small gain that may come out of 
this sea change in our law does not outweigh the potential loss 
of liberty to our citizens, and because this case offers a 
feeble excuse to make such a far-reaching change, I respectfully 
dissent"). 
No.  2007AP1894-CR.ssa 
 
15 
 
with Wisconsin's independent case law governing the exclusionary 
rule and the role of judicial integrity in its application.10  
III 
¶83 Having first bypassed application of the retroactivity 
rule and the norms it protects, and then having dismissed the 
notion that judicial integrity has any weight in this case, the 
majority acknowledges and addresses only one "real cost"; 
namely, "that litigants may have less incentive to challenge 
potentially unconstitutional searches."  Majority op., ¶45. 
¶84 The majority understates the impact that allowing a 
"good faith" exception for reliance by police on judicial 
decisions will have on the continuing and meaningful role of 
courts in adjudicating Fourth Amendment cases and protecting the 
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures.  Having articulated deterrence as the primary if not 
exclusive rationale for the exclusionary rule, the majority then 
adopts an exception to the rule that dramatically undermines its 
deterrent effect. 
                                                 
10 See 
Ward, 
231 
Wis. 2d 723, 
¶58 
("[E]ven 
if 
our 
exclusionary rule were no more than a judicially created remedy, 
this Court would maintain the obligation to ensure that the 
remedy effectuates [state constitutional] rights." (quoting and 
adopting the statements of State v. Oakes, 598 A.2d 119, 121 
(Vt. 1991); id., ¶59 ("[I]t would be a sad irony for this court 
to exhort magistrates to act as something more than 'rubber 
stamps' when issuing warrants, and to then act as mere rubber 
stamps ourselves when interpreting our Wisconsin  Constitution.  
It is our responsibility to examine the State Constitution 
independently.  This duty exists even though our conclusions in 
a given case may not differ from those reached by the Supreme 
Court when it interprets the Fourth Amendment."). 
No.  2007AP1894-CR.ssa 
 
16 
 
¶85 The Honorable Lynn Adelman, a United States District 
Judge for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, wisely reminds us 
that "[i]f we as a nation care about our Constitution, judges 
must continue to define and develop its guarantees . . . . It is 
the province of the judicial branch to say what the law is 
today, and it must continue to do so if that document is to have 
meaning tomorrow."11  However, judicial recognition of the good 
faith exception adopted by the majority will hamper the 
development of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence by eliminating the 
reason for defendants to bring constitutional challenges and by 
giving courts no occasion to clarify and articulate standards 
protective of Fourth Amendment rights.  
¶86 These concerns were articulated by Justice O'Connor in 
Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 369 (1987), who wrote:  
[T]he failure to apply the exclusionary rule in the 
very case in which a state statute is held to have 
violated the Fourth Amendment destroys all incentive 
on the part of individual criminal defendants to 
litigate the violation of their Fourth Amendment 
rights.  In my view, whatever "basic norms of 
constitutional adjudication" otherwise require, surely 
they mandate that a party appearing before the Court 
might conceivably benefit from a judgment in his 
favor. . . . [T]he inevitable result of the Court's 
decision to deny the realistic possibility of an 
effective remedy to a party challenging statutes not 
yet declared unconstitutional is that a chill will 
fall 
upon 
enforcement and development of Fourth 
Amendment principles . . . .12   
                                                 
11 Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Saying What the Law Is:  How 
Certain Legal Doctrines Impede the Development of Constitutional 
Law and What Courts Can Do About It, 2 Fed. Cts. L. Rev. 87, 98 
(2007). 
12 Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 369 (1987) (O'Connor, 
J., dissenting) (citing Griffith, 479 U.S. at 322). 
No.  2007AP1894-CR.ssa 
 
17 
 
¶87 However prescient Justice O'Connor's articulation of 
these concerns with regard to the constitutional challenge to 
statutes, the concerns are much greater in extending a "good 
faith" exception to deny any meaningful remedy when the case law 
is later determined to be incorrect and unconstitutional. 
¶88 The 
effect 
of 
the 
majority's 
new 
"good 
faith" 
exception will most likely be that courts will examine first 
whether the good faith exception applies, and if it does, will 
not determine whether a violation of the Fourth Amendment 
occurred.  As one commentator explained: 
Judicial recognition of a good faith exception to the 
fourth amendment exclusionary rule would be more than 
a simple refinement of remedy.  The exception would 
serve as a well camouflaged and subtle attack upon the 
values and substantive meaning of the amendment 
itself.  Courts rarely would articulate new search and 
seizure 
standards 
sensitive 
to 
fourth 
amendment 
interests because once a court found police good faith 
the constitutional determination would be irrelevant 
to the outcome of those very cases in which such 
articulation might take place. Insulated from the 
continuing pressure to decide new fourth amendment 
issues or dramatically review old ones, courts will 
lose the opportunity or incentive to set standards for 
future cases.  Consequently, the disincentive to 
review 
new 
fourth 
amendment 
issues 
will 
reduce 
significantly 
the 
exclusionary 
rule's 
ability 
to 
generally 
and 
systemically 
deter 
illegal 
police 
behavior. 
Stanley Ingber, Defending the Citadel: The Dangerous Attack of 
"Reasonable Good Faith", 36 Vand. L. Rev. 1511, 1579-80 (1983) 
(footnotes omitted). 
¶89 As another commentator explains, the extension of the 
Leon good faith rule has hampered the continuing articulation of 
a standard for probable cause.  "Knowing that it is unlikely 
No.  2007AP1894-CR.ssa 
 
18 
 
that resolution of the probable cause issue will affect the 
admissibility of the evidence in question, courts commonly 
bypass probable cause and proceed directly to good faith.  
Indeed, some courts have flipped the two concepts and address 
good faith first as a matter of course."13 
¶90 If the preliminary issue that the court addresses is 
whether a law enforcement officer was acting in good faith, 
"[w]hen a court finds the existence of such a [good faith] 
belief, 
the 
actual 
constitutionality 
of 
the 
officer’s 
behavior . . . becomes irrelevant" and the need to refine Fourth 
Amendment doctrine is eliminated.14  Thus, the unfortunate result 
of expanding the scope of the good faith exception is that 
courts that apply the exception will "tell us nothing about the 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment and often very little about 
                                                 
13 Adelman & Deitrich, supra note 11, at 89. 
For a persuasive and informal articulation of the problem 
see 
Orin 
Kerr, 
Good 
Faith 
Exception 
for 
Changing 
Law: 
Exclusionary 
Rule 
on 
Direct 
Appeal, 
http://volokh.com/2010/03/02/the-good-faith-exception-and-
changing-law-the-benefit-of-the-exclusionary-rule-on-direct-
appeal/ (last visited July 6, 2010).  Professor Kerr explains 
that one result of disincentivizing criminal defendants from 
bringing hard cases on issues with courts divided around the 
country would be the creation of systemic imbalance in the 
development of Fourth Amendment rules.  If Wisconsin adopts 
"clear and settled" precedent on a particular Fourth Amendment 
issue but other jurisdictions adopt different rules, the 
Wisconsin defendant has no reason to challenge the rule as 
unconstitutional because the State will simply be able to claim 
"good faith." 
14 Stanley Ingber, Defending the Citadel: The Dangerous 
Attack of "Reasonable Good Faith", 36 Vand. L. Rev. 1511, 1557 
(1983). 
No.  2007AP1894-CR.ssa 
 
19 
 
the requirements of the good faith doctrine, and constitutional 
law stagnates accordingly."  Adelman & Deitrich, 2 Fed. Cts. L. 
Rev. at 89. Indeed, if the good faith exception had been applied 
in Arizona v. Gant, that case almost certainly never would have 
been brought before the United States Supreme Court because the 
government could have claimed "good faith" reliance on Belton.  
The constitutional rule now articulated by Gant never would have 
been given effect. 
¶91 The majority asserts three reasons to disregard this 
problem of stagnation.  First, the majority claims that "the 
only litigants who will be disincentivized are the relatively 
small number of defendants who choose to challenge searches that 
have already clearly and unequivocally been held lawful."  
Majority op., ¶46.  By acknowledging that the good faith 
exception affects only a small number of defendants, the 
majority also implicitly admits that the costs of applying the 
exclusionary rule would be low.  Furthermore, the majority 
ignores the fact that this small group of litigants who are 
willing and in a position to challenge prevailing standards may 
be the most important group questioning whether the currently 
governing case law embodies a correct interpretation of the 
Fourth Amendment.  
¶92 Second, the majority asserts that "criminal defendants 
will still want to do whatever they can to increase their 
chances for success" and will continue to fight for their 
freedom despite the low probability of a material change in 
their conviction.  Majority op., ¶47.  That defendants may raise 
No.  2007AP1894-CR.ssa 
 
20 
 
and argue claims does not mean that the courts will decide the 
Fourth Amendment issue if they can avoid it by deciding the case 
under "good faith." 
¶93 Finally, the majority places its trust in a "dedicated 
group of public defenders and private attorneys who genuinely 
care about the development of the law" to continue to take cases 
to this court "in order to effect a particular change in the 
law."  Majority op., ¶48.  
¶94 The defendants' desire to fight for their freedom and 
the continuing efforts of dedicated lawyers do not address the 
issue of excusing the courts from articulating and developing 
Fourth Amendment law.  Even if constitutional issues are 
consistently raised before the courts, the courts will have no 
opportunity to address the Fourth Amendment protections if the 
issue is effectively insulated by a "good faith" exception.  
Defendants will bring cases, but where "good faith" applies, 
that doctrine will resolve the issue unless courts become 
willing to render what amount to advisory opinions on Fourth 
Amendment issues not needed to decide the case. 
IV 
¶95 Neither State v. Ward nor Illinois v. Krull discussed 
the tension presented in this case, and neither provides 
persuasive or controlling reasons why in the present case the 
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule should control 
instead of the normal application of the retroactivity rule.  
The briefs in Ward did not argue the tension between the 
No.  2007AP1894-CR.ssa 
 
21 
 
retroactivity rule and the exclusionary rule, and the opinion 
did not address it.15   
¶96 The majority asserts that it can find no reason to 
distinguish this case from the Ward and Krull cases.  There is a 
distinction.  In Ward as in Eason, the seminal cases in which 
Wisconsin has recognized a "good faith" exception, the officers 
acted pursuant to a search warrant.16  In Krull an Illinois 
statute specifically authorized the contested search without a 
warrant.17  The majority lumps together good faith reliance on 
statutes, warrants, and judicial decisions as "situations where 
police act in objectively reasonable reliance on settled (albeit 
subsequently overruled) law," and declines to distinguish among 
them.  Majority op., ¶44.  In my view, and under our established 
law, the different sources of authority that may justify a 
police search need not be necessarily treated alike.   
                                                 
15 The majority contends that "the dissent in Ward raised 
issues similar to those raised by the dissent in Krull" and 
argued in the present case.  The cited portion of the dissent 
raises the point that the "good faith" reliance applied in Ward 
may arise from "any published decision of the court of appeals 
or this court."  Neither the dissent nor the majority engaged 
the central issue in this case, which is not about what cases 
may give rise to "good faith" reliance but whether the "good 
faith" exception can trump the retroactivity rule for cases 
pending on direct appeal. 
16 State v. Ward, 2000 WI 3, ¶10, 231 Wis. 2d 723, 604 
N.W.2d 517; (police acted with a warrant authorizing a no-knock 
entry; the court ultimately determined that "the evidence is 
admissible under the Wisconsin Constitution because the officers 
relied upon a rule established by this court" and did not 
address reliance on the warrant, ¶63 n.8).  
17 See majority op., ¶41 (discussing Illinois v. Krull, 480 
U.S. 340, 345-46 (1987)). 
No.  2007AP1894-CR.ssa 
 
22 
 
¶97 Searches 
conducted pursuant to a warrant differ 
fundamentally from searches conducted without a warrant but 
pursuant to one of the narrowly drawn exceptions that allow 
police to conduct a search without a warrant.18  "Search warrants 
are an essential safeguard against government overreaching.  
They protect privacy in persons, houses, papers, and effects by 
requiring 
a 
neutral 
magistrate 
to 
make 
an 
independent 
determination . . . before authorizing a government search."  
State v. Ward, 231 Wis. 2d 723, ¶93 (Prosser, J., dissenting).   
¶98 There is a substantial difference between on the one 
hand recognizing "objective good faith" reliance where a neutral 
and detached judicial officer has reviewed facts submitted in an 
affidavit to determine whether the constitution permits a 
search, and on the other hand extending "objective good faith" 
reliance to legal judgments made by police officers without the 
judicial check of the warrant process.  "The point of the Fourth 
Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is 
not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual 
inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence.  Its 
protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn 
by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by 
the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of 
ferreting out crime."  Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 
                                                 
18 Whether the exceptions to the warrant requirement are 
actually "narrowly drawn" in practice or only in denomination is 
a slightly different and perhaps contested question.  See State 
v. Robinson, 2010 WI 80, ¶54, Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ 
(Bradley, J., dissenting). 
No.  2007AP1894-CR.ssa 
 
23 
 
13-14 (1948).  Thus the United States Supreme Court has never 
recognized the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule 
that the majority today extends "for reliance on prior holdings 
of its own from which it has subsequently departed, much less 
for reliance on the erroneous interpretations of its prior 
holdings by lower courts."19  
¶99 As the majority explains, the holding in Ward was not 
by itself limited to reliance on an issuance of a warrant.  See 
                                                 
19 See People v. McCarty, 229 P.3d 1041, 1044 (Colo. 2010): 
[T]he Court has created an exception for objective 
good-faith reliance on judicially-issued warrants, see 
Leon, 468 U.S. at 922, 104 S. Ct. 3405; Massachusetts 
v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 987-88, 104 S. Ct. 3424, 82 
L. Ed. 2d 737 (1984); see also Arizona v. Evans, 514 
U.S. 1, 16, 115 S. Ct. 1185, 131 L. Ed. 2d 34 (1995) 
(recognizing 
"a 
categorical 
exception 
to 
the 
exclusionary 
rule 
for 
clerical 
errors 
of 
court 
employees"); for certain kinds of Fourth Amendment 
violations in executing those warrants, see Hudson v. 
Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 165 L. 
Ed. 2d 56 (2006) (violation of knock and announce 
rule); and even for sufficiently attenuated reliance 
on withdrawn judicial warrants that remained in the 
system due to executive branch negligence, see Herring 
v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 695, 698, 
172 L. Ed. 2d 496 (2009).  It has similarly recognized 
an exception for objective good-faith reliance on 
legislation, subsequently held to be unconstitutional, 
designating particular conduct criminal, see Michigan 
v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 38, 99 S. Ct. 2627, 61 L. 
Ed. 2d 343 (1979), or excusing the warrant requirement 
for non-criminal, administrative investigations, see 
Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349-50, 107 S. Ct. 
1160, 94 L. Ed. 2d 364 (1987).  It has thus far not, 
however, recognized a good-faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule for reliance on prior holdings of 
its own from which it has subsequently departed, much 
less for reliance on the erroneous interpretations of 
its prior holdings by lower courts. 
No.  2007AP1894-CR.ssa 
 
24 
 
Ward, 231 Wis. 2d at 754, ¶62 ("law enforcement officers and 
magistrates must be allowed to reasonably rely upon the 
pronouncements of this court").  The Ward decision, however, 
also addressed the case before it, where a warrant was issued, 
and the court offered no discussion of the retroactivity rule.20   
¶100 As the majority acknowledges, application of the 
exclusionary rule turns on a balancing of costs and benefits, 
forcing an inquiry of whether it is "worth the price paid by the 
justice system" to permit use of the evidence unlawfully 
obtained.21  By contrast, the retroactivity rule is applied 
categorically, with "no exception for cases in which the new 
rule constitutes a 'clear break' with the past."  See majority 
op., ¶31 (quoting Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. at 328).  
Nothing about the evaluation of costs and benefits "in light of 
                                                 
20 Ward, 231 Wis. 2d 723, ¶49 ("In this case, we do not 
believe that excluding the evidence seized by the police will 
serve any remedial objective, or that judicial integrity is 
sullied by admission of the evidence") (emphasis added). 
21 See majority op., ¶36 (quoting Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 
702).   
As stated in Herring, the exclusionary rule balance 
generally turns on whether "exclusion can meaningfully deter" 
police misconduct and whether "such deterrence is worth the 
price paid by the justice system."  Herring did not address 
benefits 
of 
exclusion 
other 
than 
deterrence 
of 
police 
misconduct.  The majority follows the same approach in the 
present case.  Because this case presents a situation where the 
exclusionary 
rule 
must 
be 
overtly 
reconciled 
with 
the 
retroactivity rule, the necessary balancing turns on a broader 
set of considerations, drawn from both of the competing 
doctrines.   
No.  2007AP1894-CR.ssa 
 
25 
 
competing policies"22 in Ward necessarily controls the evaluation 
that the court must make in the present case.   
¶101 Moreover, 
the 
"objective 
reasonable 
reliance" 
on 
precedent trumpeted by the majority is far more credible and 
easier to administer in a case like Ward where police acted with 
warrant in hand than in a case like the present one where police 
acted without a warrant.23 
                                                 
22 Ward, 231 Wis. 2d 723, ¶48. 
23 The 
Seventh 
Circuit 
Court 
of 
Appeals 
has 
clearly 
distinguished between "good faith" reliance on a search warrant 
and 
"good 
faith" 
reliance 
on 
police 
understanding 
and 
application of court decisions: 
We decline to extend further the applicability of the 
good-faith exception to evidence seized during law 
enforcement searches conducted in naked reliance upon 
subsequently overruled case law——as distinguished from 
the subsequently invalidated statute at issue in 
Krull——absent magistrate approval by way of a search 
warrant.  Such expansion of the good-faith exception 
would 
have 
undesirable, 
unintended 
consequences, 
principal among them being an implicit invitation to 
officers in the field to engage in the tasks——better 
left to the judiciary and members of the bar more 
generally——of legal research and analysis.  
United States v. Real Property Located at 15324 County Highway 
E.,  332 F.3d 1070, 1076 (7th Cir. 2003). 
Explaining 
the 
importance of the distinction between 
judicial and police evaluation of facts at greater length in the 
context of a probable cause determination, the Western District 
of Michigan reasoned: 
The difficulties facing courts making probable cause 
determinations and interpreting case law, however, are 
small in comparison to those facing police officers.  
Officers are particularly poorly situated to determine 
whether the facts of a particular case establish 
probable cause to search because they lack "the 
detached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate."  Indeed, 
the "judgment of a law enforcement officer engaged in 
No.  2007AP1894-CR.ssa 
 
26 
 
¶102 The majority opens the door to a "good faith" 
exception in cases where police act on their own evaluation of 
the case law rather than in reliance on the evaluation of a 
neutral and detached magistrate.  This raises a range of 
problems not presented by previously adopted "good faith" 
reliance on a warrant or a statute.  Among them, the majority's 
standard of "objectively reasonable reliance upon clear and 
settled Wisconsin precedent" will raise an additional layer of 
judicial analysis probing the boundaries of what constitutes 
"objectively reasonable" and "clear and settled."  This further 
round of litigation a degree removed from the substantive 
question of whether a Fourth Amendment violation took place 
could be avoided by our simple reliance on the command of 
Griffith v. Kentucky.  We should hold that following the 
retroactivity rule, the constitutional right that was violated 
in the present case should be vindicated by the usual remedy of 
suppression. 
V 
¶103 As I have demonstrated, and as Griffith v. Kentucky 
teaches, the controlling constitutional rule of retroactivity 
requires that the violation of the defendant's constitutional 
                                                                                                                                                             
the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out 
crime" is considerably less reliable than that of a 
neutral court.  The expansions of the good-faith 
doctrine have shown that courts do not wish to entrust 
to the executive branch law enforcement the unilateral 
power to make probable cause determinations based on 
their own reading of case law.   
United States v. Peoples, 668 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1049 (W.D. Mich. 
2009). 
No.  2007AP1894-CR.ssa 
 
27 
 
rights in the present case be remedied in order to avoid actual 
inequity.  In resolving this case, the majority has ignored the 
fundamental importance of judicial integrity.  The majority 
misplaces 
its 
reliance 
on 
prior 
decisions 
that 
are 
not 
controlling in resolving the tension between the retroactivity 
rule and the exclusionary rule and thus resolving the present 
case.  Finally, the majority's acceptance of the good faith 
exception 
poses 
significant 
risks 
to 
the 
development 
of 
constitutional law in the state of Wisconsin.   
¶104 I would not adopt the majority opinion's "good faith" 
exception to the exclusionary rule.  I would apply the 
retroactivity rule of Griffith v. Kentucky to require that the 
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, as 
interpreted in Arizona v. Gant, should be suppressed in the 
present case.   
¶105 Accordingly, I dissent. 
¶106 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
No.  2007AP1894-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
1