Title: Commonwealth v. Dawson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13213
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: August 24, 2022

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SJC-13213 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  KYLE DAWSON. 
 
 
 
Bristol.     March 7, 2022. - August 24, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Wanton or Reckless Conduct.  Retroactivity of 
Judicial Holding.  Grand Jury.  Evidence, Grand jury 
proceedings, Indictment.  Probable Cause.  Practice, 
Criminal, Grand jury proceedings, Indictment. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on August 27, 2018. 
 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Raffi N. Yessayan, J., and 
a conditional plea of guilty was accepted by Renee Dupuis, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Suzanne Renaud for the defendant. 
 
Shoshana E. Stern, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Anthony D. Gulluni, District Attorney, & John A. Wendel, 
Assistant District Attorney, for district attorney for the 
Hampden district & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
2 
 
GAZIANO, J.  On August 10, 2018, the defendant and his 
friend, Christopher Dunton, attempted to rob a taxicab driver in 
New Bedford.  After the cabdriver brought the men to the 
location they had requested, Dunton choked the cabdriver from 
behind while demanding money.  At the same time, the defendant 
pressed a knife to the cabdriver's side.  The cabdriver managed 
to escape from the vehicle, spun around wielding a previously 
concealed handgun, and shot and killed Dunton.  Based on these 
facts, a grand jury returned indictments charging the defendant 
with involuntary manslaughter for the death of his accomplice 
and other crimes. 
In this appeal from a conditional guilty plea, we consider 
whether an individual may be charged with involuntary 
manslaughter where the individual wantonly or recklessly commits 
a felony, and an accomplice is killed by the victim of that 
offense.  It has been well settled in our homicide jurisprudence 
for more than 150 years that the Commonwealth is precluded from 
charging a defendant with the crime of felony-murder for the 
death of an individual who is killed by someone resisting an 
underlying felony.  See Commonwealth v. Campbell, 7 Allen 541, 
547 (1863).  The defendant contends that the common-law 
limitation on homicide liability, set forth in Campbell, supra, 
extends to the crime of wanton or reckless involuntary 
manslaughter.  In the alternative, he maintains that the 
3 
Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence to the grand 
jury to support an indictment for involuntary manslaughter. 
For the following reasons, we conclude that Campbell and 
its progeny do not preclude an indictment for wanton or reckless 
involuntary manslaughter where the deceased is killed by someone 
resisting a felony.  We conclude as well that the evidence 
presented to the grand jury was sufficient to support the 
indictment.  Accordingly, we affirm the denial of the 
defendant's motion to dismiss.1 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Prior proceedings.  On September 27, 
2018, a grand jury returned indictments charging the defendant 
with involuntary manslaughter, armed assault with intent to rob, 
assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, and assault 
and battery.  The indictment charging involuntary manslaughter 
alleged that the defendant "did intentionally engage in conduct 
(an [a]rmed [a]ssault with intent to rob Albert Miguel, a cab 
driver) that was wanton and reckless and by his intentional 
conduct, created a high degree of likelihood that substantial 
harm would result to another person, and by such intentional 
participation in this conduct, caused the death of Christopher 
Dunton." 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the district 
attorneys for the Hampden, Cape and Islands, eastern, middle, 
Norfolk, northwestern, and Plymouth districts in support of the 
Commonwealth. 
4 
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment for 
involuntary manslaughter due to a lack of probable cause; he 
attached to the motion a transcript of the grand jury 
proceedings.  After a nonevidentiary hearing, a Superior Court 
judge denied the motion.  The defendant then entered a 
conditional guilty plea to the charge of involuntary 
manslaughter, preserving his right to appeal that charge on the 
ground of a lack of probable cause.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 12 
(b) (6), as appearing in 482 Mass. 1501 (2019); Commonwealth v. 
Gomez, 480 Mass. 240, 252 (2018).  He also pleaded guilty to the 
remaining charges.  The appeal was entered in the Appeals Court, 
and we granted the Commonwealth's application for direct 
appellate review. 
b.  The shooting.  The grand jury could have found the 
following.  On August 10, 2018, at around 1 A.M., Miguel, 
driving his taxicab, picked up the defendant and Dunton on 
Cottage Street in New Bedford.  Dunton sat behind Miguel in the 
rear passenger's seat on the driver's side; the defendant sat 
next to Dunton.  The two passengers asked to go to an address on 
Bentley Street in New Bedford. 
During the short ride, the defendant, Dunton, and Miguel 
discussed a recent New Bedford crime wave.  They "were talking 
about what's been happening in the city because the guy that 
just killed the guy on Cottage, the shooting on Grinnell and 
5 
Purchase.  There was also another guy shot in the back."  The 
three men reached a consensus that the "city's all fucked up."  
The conversation about issues with crime put Miguel at ease; he 
thought he generally noticed warning signs, but he did not 
detect any "red flags" from his passengers and believed that 
they were "being cool guys, just normal dudes." 
When they reached the stated destination, Miguel placed the 
taxicab in park and turned on the interior dome light.  He then 
informed the passengers that the fare was five dollars.  The 
defendant asked Miguel for change for a fifty dollar bill.  For 
his own safety, Miguel only carried twenty dollars when working 
a nighttime shift; he informed the defendant, "I only carry 
enough to break a [twenty] because this city's crazy and, you 
know, you know, cabdrivers get robbed all the time."  Miguel 
offered to drive the defendant and Dunton to a nearby gasoline 
station to get change.  He then heard the defendant shuffling 
his hand around in his pocket "like he was looking for money." 
Without warning, Dunton reached over the driver's seat and 
wrapped both arms around Miguel's neck in a choke hold.2  Miguel 
struggled to breathe.  Dunton shouted at him to turn off the 
interior light and hand over his money.  Brandishing a three-
inch tactical-style knife, the defendant also demanded money.  
 
 
2 The taxicab was not equipped with a partition dividing the 
driver's and passenger's compartments. 
6 
He pressed the blade against the right side of Miguel's body.  
Miguel reported, "[The defendant] actually only got me a little 
bit, but he was trying to puncture me . . . like he was trying 
to get me in the stomach."  Dunton then urged the defendant to 
"shank" Miguel, yelling, "[J]ust stab this fucking, nigga, you 
know, fucking kill him," and "[K]ill this motherfucker."  The 
two robbers "hyp[ed] each other up," exclaiming, "[W]e're going 
to do it." 
Miguel thought that he was going to die.  As he explained, 
"[W]e're bouncing all around [the taxicab] . . . and he [Dunton] 
got me and his friend [the defendant] is really trying to stab 
me."  Headlights from an oncoming vehicle then illuminated the 
taxicab, causing a moment of distraction.  Miguel seized the 
opportunity to attempt to get away from the robbers.  With one 
arm still around Miguel's throat, Dunton warned, "[D]on't move 
or I'll fucking kill you."  Miguel managed to break free from 
the choke hold, got out of the taxicab using his knee to open 
the door, spun around, and drew a previously concealed handgun 
from a holster.  He ordered the robbers to freeze.  The 
defendant left the taxicab, while Dunton continued to move 
around in the rear seat.  Fearing that Dunton was armed, and 
unable to see his hands, Miguel fired into the rear of the 
taxicab three times, hitting Dunton.  When Miguel fired the 
shots, the defendant was approximately five to eight feet away 
7 
from the vehicle.  He ran up the street and out of sight, and he 
was not present when emergency responders arrived a few minutes 
later. 
 
Miguel contacted his dispatcher by radio, telling him that 
he had been robbed and had shot someone, and that the dispatcher 
should summon help; he then called 911.  The call was received 
at 1:12 A.M.  Miguel told the responding officers that he had 
shot someone trying to rob him and asked them to help Dunton, 
who was lying on the ground, bleeding, and making a "noise."  
The officers observed a three-inch scratch on Miguel's side.  
Dunton was transported to a hospital, where he was pronounced 
dead at 1:48 A.M. 
 
When the defendant fled the taxicab, he left his cellular 
telephone behind.  While investigating the scene, police found 
the telephone; they subsequently learned its owner was the 
defendant, whom Miguel was able to identify from a photographic 
array.  The defendant was arrested a few days later. 
 
During questioning at the New Bedford police station, the 
defendant corroborated Miguel's account of the incident, other 
than maintaining that he only had pretended to have a knife.  
The defendant described the events by saying that he had planned 
to pay the fare if Miguel did not hand over the money that he 
and Dunton demanded, but once Dunton placed Miguel in a choke 
hold, "it escalated from there." 
8 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Liability for involuntary 
manslaughter.  At issue in this case is the existence of common-
law homicide liability for the death of an individual killed by 
someone resisting a felony.  See generally Commonwealth v. Duke, 
489 Mass. 649, 656-657 (2022), and cases cited. 
 
The defendant contends that the "clear" and "unambiguous" 
law that emerged from Campbell, 7 Allen at 546, is that an 
individual could not be held criminally liable for any homicide 
offense where a person resisting the individual's crime was the 
one who killed the decedent.  Accordingly, the defendant argues, 
the trial judge erred in denying his motion to dismiss, because 
Campbell, supra at 543-544, 546, "established that where, as 
here, the decedent is killed by an unaffiliated person resisting 
a crime, the defendant cannot be considered criminally 
responsible for the non-agent's action."  Under the defendant's 
reading, Campbell mandates that the "act causing death in a 
homicide case originate from the defendant or his or her agent -
- not a person resisting the criminality." 
 
In the Commonwealth's view, by contrast, the common-law 
restrictions on homicide liability addressed in Campbell, 7 
Allen at 546, apply only to the crimes addressed in that case, 
i.e., felony-murder and the since-abolished crime of unlawful 
9 
act (misdemeanor) manslaughter.3  Under this reasoning, Campbell 
and its progeny do not preclude an indictment for involuntary 
manslaughter brought under a theory of wanton or reckless 
conduct.  We agree.   A close examination of the court's 
decision in Campbell makes clear that the court did not 
specifically address wanton or reckless involuntary 
manslaughter, and nothing in the decision precludes the 
Commonwealth from bringing such charges. 
 
Because an understanding of the facts and the reasoning in 
Campbell is critical to our analysis, we first discuss the case 
in some detail. 
 
i.  The Campbell decision.4  Campbell's trial began in 
December of 1863 before the justices of the Supreme Judicial 
 
 
3 Unlawful act (misdemeanor) manslaughter was defined as an 
unlawful homicide, unintentionally caused during the commission 
of an unlawful act, malum in se, not amounting to a felony or 
likely to endanger life.  See Commonwealth v. Catalina, 407 
Mass. 779, 783-784 (1990), quoting Commonwealth v. Campbell, 352 
Mass. 387, 397 (1967); Commonwealth v. Lacasse, 365 Mass. 271, 
273 (1974).  An act is malum in se if it is done "wilfully or 
corruptly which causes injury to person or property."  Catalina, 
supra at 783 n.4. 
 
4 In 1863, the Federal government instituted a national 
draft requiring general conscription into the army but 
permitting a substitute payment of $300 in lieu of military 
service.  J. Tager, Boston Riots:  Three Centuries of Social 
Violence 134 (2001).  This wealth-based exemption "pronounced 
the poor as cannon fodder for the war machine," and exacerbated 
animosity between establishment Yankees and working-class Irish 
immigrants.  Id.  Sparked by an attempt to serve draft notices 
in an Irish neighborhood of Boston, a mob rushed a fortified 
armory on Cooper Street seeking arms to protect themselves from 
10 
Court.  Campbell, 7 Allen at 541.  The defendant was indicted on 
charges of "feloniously, wilfully and of [his] malice 
aforethought" killing and murdering William Currier by gunshot.  
At trial, the Attorney General alleged that the defendant had 
participated "in [a] riotous assembly" gathered in Boston to 
protest enforcement of the draft of men into the army to fight 
in the Civil War.  Id. at 542-543.  Evidence established that 
the defendant engaged in "riotous acts" at about 1 P.M., several 
hours before the fatal shooting.  Id. at 541-542.  A military 
force was called out to suppress the riot and was stationed 
inside an armory on Cooper Street.  Id. at 542.  During an 
attack on the armory, "the mob were fired upon by the soldiers, 
 
draft marshals.  Id. at 135-136.  Witnesses later testified that 
rioters rebuffed calls to disperse, showered soldiers with 
"stones and brickbats," while shouting slogans such as "Hurrah 
for Jeff Davis," and "We'll kill the damned Yankees."  The 
Cooper Street Riot:  Trial of James Campbell for Murder, Boston 
Daily Advertiser, Dec. 16, 1863 (Campbell Trial, First Day); The 
Cooper Street Riot:  Trial of James Campbell for Murder, Second 
Day, Boston Daily Advertiser, Dec. 17, 1863 (Campbell Trial, 
Second Day).  The two sides exchanged gunfire, and the soldiers 
responded by firing canister shot from a cannon into the crowd 
to prevent the armory from being overrun.  Campbell Trial, First 
Day, supra.  "The shot tore the door down almost entirely and 
battered a hole six feet across in the wall and stone work of 
the house opposite."  Campbell Trial, Second Day, supra.  
Repelled from the Cooper Street armory, the crowd continued to 
search for weapons by looting gun and hardware stores in Dock 
Square and Faneuil Market.  Tager, supra at 137-138.  Because 
many protesters were dragged away in the darkness, there was no 
verifiable record of the number who were killed or wounded.  Id. 
at 137.  Officially, eight people were confirmed to have been 
killed, including four children.  Id. 
11 
and the soldiers by the mob."  Id.  According to the indictment, 
at approximately 7 P.M., Currier was killed by a projectile that 
entered his "left side and [traveled] through [his] body."  The 
fatal shot was fired either by one of the rioters, with whom the 
defendant was acting in concert, or by a soldier within the 
armory.  Id. at 541. 
At the close of all the evidence, the Attorney General 
requested the justices to instruct the jury that, regardless of 
who fired the fatal shot, the defendant could be found guilty of 
murder or "at least" manslaughter.  Id. at 543.  Under the 
Commonwealth's theory, the defendant, as a participant in the 
riot, was liable for a death that was the result of the unlawful 
acts of the mob.  Id. at 541-542, 543.  That is, the 
Commonwealth claimed that "the [defendant] was a participator in 
an unlawful assembly and riot, during the progress of which the 
alleged homicide was committed, and that he [was] responsible 
for the homicidal act, having been engaged in the unlawful and 
criminal transactions during which it was committed."  Id. at 
542. 
The Campbell court examined whether this theory of 
vicarious liability had "any just foundation in the recognized 
principles of law by which criminal responsibility for the acts 
of others is regulated and governed."  Id. at 543.  The court 
concluded that the defendant was liable for any unlawful acts he 
12 
committed, or that were committed by his accomplices, that 
naturally or necessarily flowed from the criminal conduct.  Id. 
at 543-544.  See Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass. 805, 828-830 
(2017) (Gants, C.J., concurring), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 54 
(2018) (discussing Campbell's adoption of "agency theory" of 
accessory liability).  Criminal liability for the acts of others 
"is subject to the reasonable limitation that the particular act 
of one of a party for which his associates and confederates are 
to be held liable must be shown to have been done for the 
furtherance . . . of the common object and design for which they 
combined together."  Campbell, supra at 544. 
As to the defendant's liability for a fatal shot that had 
been fired by someone opposing the riot, the court stated that 
no person may be guilty of homicide "unless the act is either 
actually or constructively his, . . . committed by his own hand 
or someone acting in concert with him or in furtherance of a 
common object or purpose."  Id.  It followed that an individual 
was not responsible for an act committed by "a person who is his 
direct and immediate adversary, and who is, at the moment when 
the alleged criminal act is done, actually engaged in opposing 
and resisting him."5  Id. at 545.  Rejecting the Commonwealth's 
 
5 To illustrate the flaws in the Attorney General's "but 
for" theory of liability, the court considered several 
hypothetical scenarios.  For example, suppose the soldiers had 
fired the armory's cannon to repel the mob, and that the cannon 
13 
theory of vicarious liability, the court held that "[t]he jury 
will . . . be instructed that, unless they are satisfied beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the deceased was killed by means of a 
gun or other deadly weapon in the hands of [the defendant], or 
of one of the rioters with whom he was associated and acting, he 
is entitled to an acquittal."6  Id. at 547-548. 
Campbell is often cited as the seminal case on the issue of 
"liability for a death occurring during the commission of a 
felony (felony-murder liability)."  See Brown, 477 Mass. at 828 
(Gants, C.J., concurring).  See also Commonwealth v. Balliro, 
349 Mass. 505, 513 (1965), S.C. 370 Mass. 585 (1976) (noting 
that Campbell "appear[ed] to have become the leading case on the 
subject [of felony-murder liability] and has generally been 
followed in other jurisdictions").  See, e.g., State v. Branson, 
487 N.W. 2d 880, 882-883 (Minn. 1992) (Campbell offers "classic 
statement" of agency theory of felony-murder). 
 
burst due to an unknown defect, killing several soldiers in the 
immediate vicinity.  Campbell, 7 Allen at 545.  Or, suppose a 
soldier mishandled his musket and accidentally shot himself.  
"[I]t would hardly be contended that . . . the whole body of 
rioters could be legally responsible for criminal homicide, by 
reason of the lives that were thus destroyed."  Id.  Yet, in 
both scenarios, the taking of a human life would be, in certain 
respects, the result of the unlawful acts of the rioters.  Id.  
"[I]t would not have occurred but for the riot which furnished 
the cause and occasion of the use of the musket or cannon [by 
the soldiers]."  Id. 
 
 
6 The jury acquitted the defendant.  Campbell, 7 Allen at 
548. 
14 
As the defendant points out, the court in Campbell, 7 Allen 
at 544, stated that "[n]o person can be held guilty of homicide 
unless the act is either actually or constructively his," and 
the court concluded that "[i]f the homicide was the result of a 
shot fired by the soldiers or other persons in the armory, 
acting together in defence against the riotous assembly, the 
defendant cannot be held guilty of either murder or 
manslaughter," id. at 547.  The court also determined, however, 
that "there can be no valid reason for holding the defendant 
guilty of manslaughter only."  Id.  This gives rise to the 
question of the form or forms of manslaughter liability that the 
Campbell court prohibited where the deceased was killed by 
someone resisting a felony.  The Commonwealth and the defendant 
dispute whether the Campbell court's holding included the 
offense of wanton or reckless involuntary manslaughter.  To 
determine the breadth of the holding, we first examine the 
confines of the crime of manslaughter at that time, and the 
nature of the charges the Attorney General brought against 
Campbell. 
ii.  Manslaughter liability at the time of Campbell.  In 
the Nineteenth Century, involuntary manslaughter was divided 
into two categories.  See Coldiron, Historical Development of 
Manslaughter, 38 Ky. L.J. 527, 545, 550 (1950) (Coldiron).  The 
first category encompassed a death resulting from an unlawful 
15 
act not amounting to a felony.  A leading treatise, cited by the 
Campbell prosecutor, see 7 Allen at 546-547, described unlawful 
act manslaughter liability as follows:  "[W]here an involuntary 
killing happens in consequence of an unlawful act, it will be 
either murder or manslaughter according to the nature of the 
act . . . ; if it be in prosecution of a felonious intent, or in 
its consequences naturally tended to bloodshed, it will be 
murder; but if no more was intended than a mere civil trespass, 
it is manslaughter."  F. Wharton, Law of Homicide in the United 
States, at 36 (1855) (Wharton).  See, e.g, Commonwealth v. Fox, 
7 Gray 585, 589 (1856) (discussing manslaughter liability for 
assault and battery where blows inflicted on victim "hastened" 
her death, and there was no evidence of malice because defendant 
was unaware of victim's "weak and feeble condition").  In 
Massachusetts, unlawful act (misdemeanor) manslaughter 
subsequently was abolished, except for cases where the death 
occurred because of a battery.  See Commonwealth v. Catalina, 
407 Mass. 779, 783-784 (1990); Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 405 
Mass. 646, 658-659 (1989). 
As to the second category, when Campbell was decided, 
involuntary manslaughter also was defined as a death resulting 
from "gross" or "criminal" negligence.  See Wharton, supra 
at 149; Coldiron, supra at 548.  One example of a death "which 
arose from negligence or inattention" was where "a man lays 
16 
poison to kill rats, and another man takes it, and it kills him, 
if the poison was laid in such a manner and place as to be 
mistaken for food, it is, perhaps, manslaughter, if otherwise 
misadventure [accident] only."  Wharton, supra at 149, 151.  
Another example of criminal negligence amounting to manslaughter 
was "[t]he wilful neglect of a dangerous beast, known to be 
likely to cause harm, which escapes and kills an innocent 
person."  Coldiron, supra at 549.  See Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 
157 Mass. 551, 553 (1893) (it is "well established, that one who 
wantonly, or in a reckless or grossly negligent manner, [causes] 
the death of a human being, is guilty of manslaughter, although 
he did not contemplate such a result"); Commonwealth v. Pierce, 
138 Mass. 165, 175, 180 (1884) (evidence was sufficient to 
establish manslaughter based on physician's reckless or grossly 
negligent use of kerosene to treat patient). 
The defendant contends that the Campbell court's ruling 
encompassed the act of "recklessly" putting innocent victims in 
danger.  We agree with his observation that, as stated, the 
crime of wanton or reckless involuntary manslaughter existed, at 
least in nascent form, at that time.7  But the argument only goes 
 
7 Subsequently, in Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383, 
399-400 (1944), this court held that a conviction of involuntary 
manslaughter requires more than negligence or gross negligence.  
See Commonwealth v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 456 Mass. 826, 
832 (2010). 
17 
so far; Campbell was not a case of involuntary manslaughter 
based on wanton or reckless conduct, or indeed on any type of 
criminal negligence.  Rather, the theory of the prosecution was 
that the defendant was liable because he participated in an 
illegal "riotous assembly," and Currier's death by gunshot was 
the result of the unlawful acts of the mob.  Campbell, 7 Allen 
at 541-542, 543.  See Brown, 477 Mass. at 828-829 (Gants, C.J., 
concurring) (discussing Campbell's limitations on liability for 
death that occurred during commission of underlying felony); 
Commonwealth v. Tejeda, 473 Mass. 269, 273 (2015), S.C., 481 
Mass. 794 (2019) (same).  The Campbell court observed that the 
defendant could be held responsible for the actions of fellow 
rioters only if the killing was "in furtherance of a common 
[unlawful] object[ive]."  Campbell, supra at 544. 
The defendant cannot overcome the evident fact that 
Campbell did not address the crime that the defendant was 
convicted of committing -- wanton or reckless involuntary 
manslaughter.  Consequently, the decision in Campbell does not 
preclude an indictment for the crime of wanton or reckless 
involuntary manslaughter where the decedent is killed by someone 
resisting a felony. 
iii.  Whether prospective application is required.  We turn 
to the defendant's contention that imposing liability for 
18 
involuntary manslaughter in these circumstances announces a new 
common-law rule requiring prospective application. 
"Decisional law usually is retroactive" unless it creates a 
"new rule."  Commonwealth v. Breese, 389 Mass. 540, 541 (1983).  
"When a decision announces a new rule, however, the issue arises 
whether it will be applied only prospectively."  Id.  "[F]or a 
rule to be considered 'new,' it must establish a new principle 
of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which 
litigants may have relied . . . or by deciding an issue of first 
impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Ennis, 398 
Mass. 170, 173 (1986). 
The conclusion we reach today does not overrule Campbell.  
Moreover, our holding today clearly was foreshadowed in our 
prior cases.  For instance, in Tejeda, 473 Mass. at 270-271, as 
here, the defendant's accomplice was shot by the victim of a 
robbery.  The court reaffirmed the principle articulated in 
Campbell that "vicarious liability in felony-murder is limited 
to the acts resulting in death committed by a joint venturer."  
Id. at 273-274.  Responding to the Commonwealth's concern that 
the rejection of proximate cause liability created the "risk 
that no one will be punished for the death of a bystander 
mistakenly shot by an armed robbery victim or by a police 
officer," the court in Tejeda explained that this "does not mean 
19 
that the joint venturers will escape punishment."  Id. at 279.  
The death of a bystander might constitute manslaughter, the 
court noted, where the killing was committed under mitigating 
circumstances, or unintentionally but recklessly.  Id.  "In 
circumstances where a defendant committing an underlying felony 
engaged in reckless conduct that 'created a high degree of 
likelihood that substantial harm w[ould] result to another 
person,'" the court observed, "the Commonwealth might obtain an 
involuntary manslaughter conviction."  Id., quoting Model Jury 
Instructions on Homicide 74 (2013). 
A few years later, in Brown, 477 Mass. at 807, the court 
narrowed the scope of felony-murder and eliminated the theory of 
proof of criminal intent by constructive malice.  As a result, 
felony-murder was limited, prospectively, to its statutory role 
under G. L. c. 265, § 1, as an aggravating element of murder.  
Brown, supra.  In a concurring opinion, the late Chief Justice 
Gants noted that a participant in a felony resulting in a death, 
where the participant lacked the requisite intent for murder, 
would "be found guilty of involuntary manslaughter if he or she 
acted wantonly or recklessly."  Id. 832-833.  For example, an 
armed robber who accidentally discharged a fatal shot while 
vaulting over a counter "might be found guilty of involuntary 
manslaughter if the jury found that the death arose from [the] 
wanton or reckless conduct that created a high degree of 
20 
likelihood that substantial harm w[ould] result to another 
person."  Id. at 835. 
Although narrowing the scope of felony-murder, these 
decisions rested on the well-established foundation that, where 
the Commonwealth proceeds on a theory of felony-murder, a 
defendant is not entitled to an instruction on wanton or 
reckless involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense.  
See Commonwealth v. Donovan, 422 Mass. 349, 352 & n.4 (1996).  
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Evans, 390 Mass. 144, 151-152 (1983) 
(that defendant maintained that gun was accidentally discharged 
during robbery was of no consequence in prosecution for felony-
murder); Commonwealth v. LePage, 352 Mass. 403, 419 (1967) (in 
case of unintended death where there was no evidence from which 
jury could find that defendant was engaged in commission of 
crime other than felony when killing occurred, instruction on 
manslaughter was not required). 
Conversely, where the Commonwealth does not proceed on a 
theory of felony-murder, a defendant could be liable for wanton 
or reckless involuntary manslaughter.  See Donovan, 422 Mass. 
at 353.  For example, in Commonwealth v. Neves, 474 Mass. 355, 
368-369 (2016), the defendant argued that he was entitled to an 
instruction on involuntary manslaughter at his trial for felony-
murder because the shooting was accidental and outside the scope 
of the alleged armed robbery.  We concluded that the defendant 
21 
was not entitled to such an instruction.  Id. at 369-370.  
Reviewing the case pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, however, we 
determined that the judge should have considered whether 
involuntary manslaughter was a lesser included offense of murder 
on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or 
cruelty.  Id. at 370-371.  An instruction on wanton or reckless 
involuntary manslaughter "should have been given, because the 
jury reasonably could have concluded that the shooting was 
accidental, based on the defendant's statements to police that 
the gun discharged accidentally."  Id. at 371.  See Commonwealth 
v. Campbell, 352 Mass. 387, 397-398 (1967) (instruction on 
involuntary manslaughter was required where defendant committed 
misdemeanor by placing arm around victim's throat to quiet her, 
as circumstances were "consistent with a failure to regard the 
consequences of his action or an indifference to what the 
consequences of his action might have been"). 
In sum, because we have not announced a new common-law rule 
of involuntary manslaughter, the defendant is not entitled to 
application of our holding today that is prospective only. 
b.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  The defendant also argues 
that there was insufficient evidence to indict him for 
involuntary manslaughter, and therefore his motion to dismiss 
should have been allowed.  The defendant contends that the 
Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence to the grand 
22 
jury that his participation in the attempted armed robbery was 
conduct involving a high degree of likelihood that substantial 
harm to another would result.  He asserts that he was unaware of 
"the gravity of the danger," and that "a reasonable person also 
would not [have] appreciate[d] the danger."  The defendant 
recognizes that "some type of resistance might have been a 
natural consequence of the act of stabbing" the taxicab driver, 
but he contends that armed resistance with a firearm was not. 
In general, "the adequacy or competency of evidence before 
a grand jury is not a matter for judicial inquiry" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Clemmey, 447 Mass 121, 130 (2006).  A 
court will make an exception, however, where a defendant 
maintains that there was not sufficient evidence to establish 
the identity of the accused and to establish probable cause to 
arrest the accused for the crime charged.  See Commonwealth v. 
McCarthy, 385 Mass. 160, 163 (1982).  A reviewing court 
considers the evidence underlying a grand jury indictment in the 
light most favorable to the Commonwealth.  See Commonwealth v. 
Stirlacci, 483 Mass. 775, 780 (2020).  Whether the grand jury 
heard sufficient evidence to establish probable cause to indict 
is a question of law that we review de novo.  Commonwealth v. 
Long, 454 Mass. 542, 555 (2009), S.C., 476 Mass. 526 (2017). 
Involuntary manslaughter is "an unlawful homicide, 
unintentionally caused . . . by an act which constitutes such a 
23 
disregard of probable harmful consequences to another as to 
constitute wanton or reckless conduct."  Commonwealth v. Hardy, 
482 Mass. 416, 420-421 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Carter, 
481 Mass. 352, 364 (2019).  Wanton or reckless conduct "involves 
a high degree of likelihood that substantial harm will result to 
another" (citation omitted).  Hardy, supra at 421.  See 
Commonwealth v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 456 Mass. 826, 832 
(2010) ("act causing death must be undertaken in disregard of 
probable harm to others in circumstances where there is a high 
likelihood that such harm will result").  The requirements of a 
"high degree" of risk and the "substantial harm" that likely 
will result distinguish wanton or reckless conduct from the 
unreasonable risk of harm that constitutes ordinary or gross 
negligence.  See Commonwealth v. Carrillo, 483 Mass. 269, 275-
276 (2019).  "Whether conduct is wanton or reckless depends 
either on what the defendant knew or how a reasonable person 
would have acted knowing what the defendant knew."  Model Jury 
Instructions on Homicide 88-89 (2018), citing Commonwealth v. 
Earle, 458 Mass. 341, 347 n.9 (2010), and Commonwealth v. 
Welansky, 316 Mass. 383, 398 (1944). 
The defendant contends that the evidence presented to the 
grand jury did not establish that he knew, or reasonably should 
have known, that Miguel likely would defend himself with a 
handgun.  The Commonwealth, however, is not required to prove 
24 
that the defendant "intended the specific result of his or her 
conduct, . . . only that he or she intended to do the reckless 
act."  Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 456 Mass. at 832.  See 
Carrillo, 483 Mass. at 275 ("we focus on the conduct that caused 
the result, . . . not the resultant harm" [quotation and 
citation omitted]); Commonwealth v. Bouvier, 316 Mass. 489, 494 
(1944) ("one who wantonly or recklessly does an act that results 
in death of a human being is guilty of manslaughter although he 
did not contemplate such a result").  "What must be intended is 
the conduct, not the resulting harm."  Welansky, 316 Mass. 
at 398.  It is for this reason that "[t]he Massachusetts 
doctrine of involuntary manslaughter by wanton or reckless 
conduct has not required specific foreseeability of the manner 
of harm or death.  The major cases have never imposed proof of 
such specificity upon the Commonwealth, even though the 
circumstances . . . may make obvious the nature of danger to a 
potential victim."  Commonwealth v. Power, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 
398, 404-405 (2010).  See Commonwealth v. Crawford, 430 Mass. 
683, 691 (2000) (crime of involuntary manslaughter does not 
require proof of awareness of particular victim because 
"[w]antonness and recklessness are determined by the conduct 
involved, not the resulting harm"). 
This issue was addressed extensively in Commonwealth v. 
Levesque, 436 Mass. 443 (2002).  In that case, the court 
25 
determined that there was sufficient evidence to charge the 
defendants with involuntary manslaughter in connection with the 
death of six fire fighters.  Id. at 453.  The defendants 
unintentionally had started a fire in a warehouse where they 
were living by knocking over some candles, were cognizant of the 
danger posed by the rapid spread of the fire, and did not take 
adequate steps to report it to authorities.  Id.  The defendants 
asserted that they did not act wantonly or recklessly because it 
was unforeseeable that grievous harm would result to the 
responding fire fighters.  Id.  A Superior Court judge agreed, 
noting that "fire fighters ordinarily do not lose their lives in 
the course of fighting a fire and that even the fire fighters 
themselves failed to appreciate the gravity of the danger."  Id.  
Reversing the allowance of the defendants' motion to dismiss, 
this court held that the Commonwealth was not required to 
establish specific foreseeability in the manner of the deaths.  
Id.  The court observed that "an uncontrolled fire is inherently 
deadly to all who may come into contact with it, whether fire 
fighters or ordinary citizens.  The defendants are charged with 
this knowledge."  Id. 
Here, having carefully reviewed the grand jury minutes, we 
conclude that the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to 
establish that the defendant engaged in conduct that created a 
high degree of likelihood that substantial harm to another 
26 
person would result.  Among other things, there was testimony 
that the defendant and an accomplice attempted to rob a taxicab 
driver in the early morning hours; the defendant was on notice 
that the taxicab driver was aware of violence in the city that 
had been directed at taxicab drivers and had taken certain steps 
to protect himself; the defendant's accomplice choked the 
taxicab driver from behind with both arms, restricting his 
ability to breath; and the defendant held a knife against the 
driver's side, pressing the blade into his body.  The combined 
attack by both robbers against the victim of the robbery created 
an extremely dangerous situation -- the victim "bouncing" around 
the taxicab while being strangled and prodded with a knife.  
Thereafter, the defendant's accomplice several times urged the 
defendant to stab the driver and to "kill" him, and both robbers 
then exclaimed, "[W]e're going to do it." 
 
Based on this evidence, the grand jury could have found 
that the taxicab driver was placed in imminent danger of 
substantial bodily harm.  The same evidence was sufficient to 
establish that a reasonable person, in similar circumstances, 
would have recognized the reckless nature of his or her own 
conduct, and the risk of death or severe bodily harm inherent in 
such circumstances.  A reasonable person would have been aware 
of the grave danger to another created by an armed robbery by 
two assailants in the tight confines of a taxicab, where one was 
27 
choking the victim while the other held a knife against the 
victim's side.  And a reasonable person surely would have 
expected that a victim placed in a life-or-death situation would 
be likely to fight back in some manner in order to save his or 
her life. 
 
We emphasize that our holding should not be read to create 
a substitute to the crime of felony-murder labeled as something 
such as felony-manslaughter.  As discussed, the defendant's 
liability for involuntary manslaughter arises from his wanton or 
reckless conduct in the course of committing an armed robbery 
that created a high degree of likelihood that substantial harm 
to another would result.  His conduct is one example of the wide 
array of affirmative acts or omissions that we have determined 
are sufficient to support convictions of wanton or reckless 
involuntary manslaughter.  "These cases elucidate that, because 
wanton or reckless conduct requires a consideration of the 
likelihood of a result occurring, the inquiry is by its nature 
entirely fact-specific.  The circumstances of the situation 
dictate whether the conduct is or is not wanton or reckless."  
Commonwealth v. Carter, 474 Mass 624, 634 (2016).  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Colas, 486 Mass. 831, 840-841 (2021) (charge of 
wanton or reckless involuntary manslaughter was supported by 
evidence -- defendant's act of pointing firearm at rival on 
crowded street -- that "likely would provoke a deadly 
28 
response"); Commonwealth v. Michaud, 389 Mass. 491, 496 (1983) 
(sufficient evidence of recklessness from parents' failure 
adequately to feed infant or to seek medical care); Commonwealth 
v. Wallace, 346 Mass. 9, 12 (1963) (evidence was sufficient to 
warrant finding that defendant's handling of shotgun, which 
discharged and killed victim, was wanton or reckless). 
The mere commission or attempted commission of a felony 
resulting in a death does not, standing alone, constitute wanton 
or reckless involuntary manslaughter.  In Carrillo, 483 Mass. 
at 283, for example, we rejected the creation of a per se rule 
of liability for manslaughter for the crime of unlawful 
distribution of heroin.  We reasoned that "the transfer of 
heroin to a person addicted to heroin, without more, is [not] 
sufficient to support a finding of the required element of 
wanton or reckless conduct."  Id.  To support a charge of 
involuntary manslaughter, "[t]he Commonwealth must introduce 
evidence showing that, considering the totality of the 
particular circumstances, the defendant knew or should have 
known that his or her conduct created a high degree of 
likelihood of substantial harm, such as overdose or death."  Id. 
at 270.  In the context of the distribution of heroin, such 
evidence might include knowledge of unusually potent narcotics, 
or a specific victim's particular vulnerability.  Id. at 271.  
Likewise, in other contexts involving the commission or 
29 
attempted commission of a felony, the Commonwealth is required 
to prove that a defendant's conduct created a high degree of 
likelihood that substantial harm to another person would result. 
Given the facts presented to the grand jury in this case, 
and our jurisprudence defining wanton or reckless involuntary 
manslaughter, the judge properly denied the defendant's motion 
to dismiss.  Our decision in Campbell, 7 Allen at 547-548, did 
not limit the Commonwealth's ability to seek such charges, nor, 
by our decision today, have we expanded our definition of 
involuntary manslaughter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Order denying motion to  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  dismiss affirmed.