Title: Roderick White v. State of Arkansas
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: CR03-750
State: Arkansas
Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court
Date: February 10, 2005

ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT No. CR 03-750 NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION RODERICK WHITE APPELLANT v. STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE Opinion Delivered February 10, 2005 APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HOWARD COUNTY, NO. CR 2001-45, HONORABLE CHARLES A. YEARGAN, JUDGE AFFIRMED PER CURIAM Appellant was convicted of aggravated robbery and sentenced to forty years' imprisonment. The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed. White v. State, CA CR 02-110 (Ark. App. Jan. 29, 2003). Appellant then filed a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37 and a motion for the addition of newly discovered evidence to be included with his petition. In his petition, appellant made the following claims: (1) counsel was ineffective as both appointed counsel and standby counsel; (2) the information charging appellant with aggravated robbery was defective; (3) his arrest was pretextual; (4) the trial court erred by admitting various items of evidence; (5) prosecutorial misconduct; and (6) the trial court erred in allowing unsubstantiated evidence to sustain appellant's conviction. Appellant attempts to bring claims two through six within the ambit of Rule 37 by presenting them as claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied appellant's petition and motion without a hearing. From that order comes this appeal. Appellant now claims that the trial court erred in denying relief without holding a hearing. Under Rule 37.3(a), the trial court has discretion to deny relief without first holding a hearing. Where the trial court concludes, without a hearing, that the petitioner is not entitled to relief, Rule 37.3(a) requires that the trial court make written findings specifying the parts of the record that form the basis of the court's decision. E.g., Carter v. State, 342 Ark. 535, 538, 29 S.W.3d 716, 718 (2000). If the trial court fails to make such findings, it is reversible error, unless the record before this court conclusively shows that the petition is without merit. See id. Here, the trial court did not err in denying appellant's petition without a hearing because his petition is without merit. With regard to the trial court's denial of relief, appellant claims that the court erred by ruling on appellant's petition without receiving a response from the State. According to appellant, the State's failure to respond to his petition amounted to a default judgement. Moreover, appellant claims that because of the State's failure to respond, he was denied his right to file a reply brief. Rule 37.2(f) provides that within twenty days after service of a petition under the rule, the State may file a response. Because there is no requirement that the State file a response, we find no merit to appellant's claim, and affirm the ruling below. The Supreme Court enunciated the standard for assessing the effectiveness of counsel in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984): A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires a showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. Id. at 687. Thus, a defendant must first show that counsel's performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness," id. at 688, and second, that the errors "actually had an adverse effect on the defense." Id. at 693. In reviewing a denial of relief under Rule 37, we must indulge in a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the range of reasonable professional assistance. Noel v. State, 342 Ark. 35, 38, 26 S.W.3d 123, 125 (2000). To rebut this presumption, appellant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt in that the decision reached would have been different absent the errors. Id. A reasonable probability is one that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. Id. Ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be established by a mere showing of error by counsel or by revealing that counsel's failure to object prevented an issue from being addressed on appeal. Thomas v. State, 330 Ark. 442, 448, 954 S.W.2d 255, 258 (1997) (citing Huls v. State, 301 Ark. 572, 785 S.W.2d 467 (1990)). We must consider the totality of the evidence before the factfinder, and we will not reverse the denial of postconviction relief unless the lower court's findings are clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Noel, supra. LaJeana Jones was appointed to represent appellant. However, on the day of trial, at appellant's insistence, the trial court found that he had waived his right to counsel, and granted his request to proceed pro se. Jones was appointed as standby counsel, and appellant went on to represent himself at trial. Appellant now claims that Jones was ineffective for failing to file various pretrial motions and for failing to assist him at trial as standby counsel. According to appellant, counsel's failure to act was the result of an alleged conflict of interest. In denying relief on this point, the trial court made no findings as to counsel's ineffectiveness for the period of time prior to trial or as to the issue of an alleged conflict of interest. The court simply held that relief should be denied because appellant requested and was granted permission to act as his own attorney. According to the trial court, a person who acts as his own attorney should not be permitted to file for Rule 37 relief. Although the trial court failed to make findings on all of appellant's ineffectiveness claims, it is not reversible error because the record before us conclusively shows that the petition is without merit. Appellant's claims are purely conclusory, and allegations that are unsupported by facts do not provide a basis for either an evidentiary hearing or postconviction relief. Nance v. State, 339 Ark. 192, 195, 4 S.W.3d 501, 503 (1999). Moreover, prejudice will be presumed from a conflict of interest only when the defendant demonstrates that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected counsel's performance. Strickland, supra; Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980). Appellant has made no such showing. We therefore affirm the trial court's denial of relief. As for appellant's claim that as standby counsel, Jones failed to assist him at trial, we find no merit. An accused is entitled to represent himself provided that he knowingly and intelligently forgoes his right to counsel, and is able and willing to abide by the rules of procedure and courtroom protocol. Gilbert v. State, 282 Ark. 504, 505-06, 669 S.W.2d 454, 456 (1984) (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975)). However, the right of self-representation carries with it the responsibility for one's own mistakes. Gilbert, 282 Ark. at 506, 669 S.W.2d at 456. A defendant who elects to represent himself cannot later complain that the quality of his own defense amounted to a denial of effective assistance of counsel. Id. (citing McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984); Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 fn46). We note that appellant did make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel, and chose to proceed pro se. However, as for his claim on appeal, appellant has not made the requisite showing under Strickland that is required for postconviction relief. To succeed on a claim of ineffectiveness, appellant must show both deficient performance and prejudice. To simply state that a conflict existed that caused counsel's ineffectiveness is not sufficient. The same applies to appellant's claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to inform him of issues that should have been raised on appeal. Appellant has to show that he would have succeeded on appeal had the issues been raised. Without a showing of prejudice, we cannot grant relief. Appellant goes on to argue that the trial court erred in denying his motion for the addition of newly discovered evidence in support of his Rule 37 petition. According to appellant, this newly discovered evidence is Daryl Pryor's recantation of his testimony implicating appellant in the robbery. However, a claim of newly discovered evidence is not cognizable under Rule 37 as it constitutes a direct attack on the judgment. See Cigainero v. State, 321 Ark. 533, 535, 906 S.W.2d 282, 284 (1995). Accordingly, we affirm the denial of relief. As for appellant's challenges to the sufficiency of the information, the legality of his arrest, the trial court's admission of certain evidence, the conduct of the prosecutor, and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, we find no merit. The trial court held that these claims are not cognizable in Rule 37 proceedings, and denied relief. On appeal, appellant asserts these points; however, he does not offer anything other than bare allegations. To simply include these claims as grounds for relief with no facts or case law to support them, amounts to nothing more than a list of conclusory allegations that are not grounds for postconviction relief. Nance, supra. Moreover, it is not sufficient to state that each of these claims is "interlocked" with claims of ineffective assistance in order to raise them in postconviction proceedings. To succeed on such claims, appellant must satisfy the test set forth in Strickland, supra. Without such a showing, these claims are simply an attempt by appellant to argue points that should have been raised below and on direct appeal. See Camargo v. State, 346 Ark. 118, 123, 55 S.W.3d 255, 259 (2001). We hold that the trial court did not err in denying postconviction relief without first holding a hearing, as there is no merit to any of appellant's claims. Affirmed.