Title: Holland v. Lutz
Citation: 194 Kan. 712, 401 P.2d 1015
Docket Number: 44,010
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: May 15, 1965

194 Kan. 712 (1965)
401 P.2d 1015
O.L. HOLLAND, Appellee,
v.
BUFORD J. LUTZ and NORMAN E. GAAR, Appellants.
No. 44,010

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed May 15, 1965.
Kenith R. Howard, Jr., of Mission, was on the briefs for the appellants.
W.C. Jones, of Olathe, was on the briefs for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FONTRON, J.:
This is an appeal from an order overruling the defendants' demurrer to the plaintiff's petition. The demurrer set forth two grounds: (1) That the petition fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and (2) misjoinder of causes of action. However, the defendants (appellants) now rely solely on the first ground of their demurrer and, in this opinion, we shall confine ourselves to that point.
*713 In substance, the petition alleges that the defendants, Buford J. Lutz and Norman E. Gaar, were, respectively, the duly elected, qualified and acting mayor and police judge of the city of Westwood, Kansas; that about November 21, 1962, Mayor Lutz signed the following complaint against the plaintiff:
and that thereafter Judge Gaar issued a warrant for plaintiff's arrest which, omitting formal parts, is as follows:
The petition further alleges that plaintiff was arrested and placed in custody pursuant to the warrant, and entered into a $250.00 cash recognizance bond, which the city still holds; that upon a hearing, Gaar, as police judge, entered judgment against plaintiff for $198.00 and $1.00 costs; that this judgment was appealed to the district court of Johnson county, Kansas, where the proceedings against plaintiff were quashed on the grounds that the police court of Westwood had no jurisdiction to render the judgment, and that the *714 purported cause of action was civil in nature and enforceable only in a court of competent jurisdiction; that thereafter the city of Westwood took an appeal to the Supreme Court of Kansas, which is pending; and that plaintiff was forced to employ counsel to represent him in all three courts.
It is alleged further that the acts of defendants were unlawful and unjustified in that (1) the police court had no jurisdiction of either the subject matter or the person; (2) that the allegations contained in the complaint and warrant did not violate any ordinance of Westwood; (3) that none of the proceedings in either complaint or warrant charged a public offense; and (4) that the judgment entered against the plaintiff was a departure from the criminal proceedings instituted against him.
The petition concludes with allegations that the arrest was circulated extensively in Johnson county and published in newspapers by reason of which the plaintiff's reputation was injured; that the defendants acted maliciously with a design to injure plaintiff, well knowing that the complaint failed to state a crime, and that the court was without jurisdiction; that plaintiff has been damaged in the sum of $10,000.00, and is entitled to exemplary damages of $25,000.00.
To complete the picture, we should point out that our opinion in the case of City of Westwood v. Holland, 193 Kan. 375, 394 P.2d 56, heard by this court after the present case was filed, sustained the lower court's judgment quashing the proceedings.
The gist of plaintiff's alleged cause of action is that he was unlawfully restrained of his liberty by the actions of the two defendants. Whether this be denominated false imprisonment or false arrest is immaterial, for it is said that false arrest and false imprisonment as causes of action are indistinguishable. Both consist of the illegal restraint of one person's liberty by the act of another person. (22 Am. Jur., False Imprisonment, §§ 2, 3, pp. 353, 354.) Accordingly, the same legal principles are applicable to both torts regardless of how the cause of action may be termed.
In disposing of this case, we shall consider the liability of each defendant separately; first, that of Judge Gaar, and next, that of Mayor Lutz. At this point, however, we pause to note that malice is not a material element of false arrest or imprisonment. The motive with which a restraint of liberty is accomplished, be it evil or good, is irrelevant to the question of whether or not an unlawful arrest has been established. The existence of actual malice is *715 of consequence only as it may afford the basis for punitive damages. In Garnier v. Squires, 62 Kan. 321, 62 Pac. 1005, this court said:
See also Comer v. Knowles, 17 Kan. 436; 22 Am. Jur., False Imprisonment, §§ 22-27, pp. 368-370; 35 C.J.S., False Imprisonment, § 7, pp. 629-631.
Proceeding to the merits, we may state it is a general, if not, indeed, the universal, rule that where a person acts in a judicial capacity he has immunity from liability for false arrest or imprisonment, so long as he acts within the scope of his jurisdiction. (22 Am. Jur., False Imprisonment, § 52, p. 390.) This rule is expressed in 35 C.J.S., False Imprisonment, § 44a, p. 705, in this wise:
This was early declared to be the law in Kansas. In Clark v. Spicer, 6 Kan. 440, it was held:
The rationale of this doctrine is not difficult to comprehend. It is to society's interest that judicial officers be free to exercise their best independent judgment, and to act in accordance with their own convictions without fear of personal consequences. In Brown v. Larimer, 132 Kan. 81, 294 Pac. 906, it was said:
The rules granting immunity to judicial officers for official acts performed within the scope of their jurisdictions generally apply, not only to judges of courts of general jurisdiction, but to those of limited jurisdiction as well, including city magistrates. (Reilly v. United States Fidelity &amp; Guaranty Co., 15 F.2d 314; Shampagne v. Keplinger, 78 Mont. 114, 252 Pac. 803; Broom v. Douglass, et al., 175 Ala. 268, 57 So. 860.) This subject was discussed in Brown v. Larimer, supra, where the court had this to say:
An exception to the doctrine of judicial immunity exists where the officer acts in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. (Brown v. Larimer, supra; 35 C.J.S., False Imprisonment, § 44d, p. 707.) Although this exception is well established, its application to a given set of facts is often difficult to determine and the basic question we must decide in this case, so far as Judge Gaar is concerned, is whether or not, in issuing the warrant upon the mayor's complaint, the judge was acting within or wholly without his jurisdiction.
It is true that in City of Westwood v. Holland, supra, we held, in essence, that the complaint on which the warrant was issued did not allege a criminal offense cognizable by the police judge. But this does not dispose of the problem presented here. The complaint in the Westwood case purported to be drawn under the provisions of G.S. 1949, 15-507 and 15-508. Section 15-507 concerns the giving of bonds and recognizances in third-class cities. Section 15-508 reads as follows:
*717 The city contended in Westwood that the legislature's use of the word "prosecute" authorized the type action which was instituted by the mayor's complaint. This contention was rejected by this court, where we said:
But we did not in Westwood decide that the police judge lacked jurisdiction to entertain an action to collect on a forfeited recognizance given under 15-508. As to this, we said:
We are aware of no constitutional infirmity which might be said to inhere in G.S. 1949, 15-508. In State v. Keener, 78 Kan. 649, 97 Pac. 860, it was said that the legislative power to organize police courts and provide for police judges is derived from article 2, section 1, of the Constitution which grants to the house of representatives and senate all legislative power of the state, including the power to provide for the organization and government of cities, and that the manner in which that power should be exercised rests in the discretion of the legislature.
In City of Marysville v. Cities Service Oil Co., 133 Kan. 692, 3 P.2d 1060, this court said:
The legislature has provided for the election of a police judge by a third-class city such as Westwood (G.S. 1949, 15-201), and has granted him jurisdiction to hear and determine offenses against city ordinances. (G.S. 1949, 15-503.) No reason has been suggested why the legislature might not also clothe the police judge with authority to hear cases for the collection of recognizances which have been forfeited in police court.
In our view, Judge Gaar had jurisdiction over the subject matter set out in the complaint, although his attempt to exercise his jurisdiction by means of criminal process was an erroneous procedure. However, we do not consider his error of judgment in such regard as characterizing his action as one clearly beyond or without his *718 jurisdiction. As bearing on this point, the language of the United States Supreme Court in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 335, 20 L. Ed. 646, is peculiarly appropriate:
In Grove v. Van Duyn, 44 N.J. Law 654, 43 Am. Rep. 412, the liability of a justice of the peace for false imprisonment was at issue, and on this subject, the court said:
That Judge Gaar may have come to a wrong conclusion as to the manner in which and the extent to which his jurisdiction should be exercised under G.S. 1949, 15-508 does not make his determination any less a judicial act. Hindsight is usually much clearer than foresight and it is hardly to be expected that city magistrates, many of whom may be unfamiliar with, or unschooled in, the intricacies, technicalities and niceties of the criminal law and its procedures, will always come up with correct decisions.
It is our conclusion that under the doctrine of judicial immunity, the plaintiff's petition fails to state a cause of action against the defendant Gaar.
We turn now to the defendant Lutz, who signed the complaint on which the warrant was issued.
Although there is not complete unanimity among the authorities, the general rules appears to be that a person who merely signs a complaint on which an arrest is made is not liable for a false arrest. This rule is stated in 22 Am. Jur., False Imprisonment, § 33, p. 375, as follows:
The majority rule finds support in decisions from many jurisdictions, although we need cite but a few. In Smith v. Clark et al, 37 Utah 116, 106 Pac. 653, the Supreme Court of Utah, after citing cases from Minnesota, Michigan, Wisconsin, Massachusetts and New Jersey, said:
In a much later case, Aiken v. Shell Oil Co. et al and Huey, 219 Or. 523, 348 P.2d 51, the court quotes approvingly from Smith v. Clark et al, supra, and in following the majority rule states:
Kansas has long adhered to the majority rule. In Gillett v. Thiebold, 9 Kan. 427, the situation was this: Thiebold had been arrested and committed to jail pursuant to an order of arrest issued in a civil action on an insufficient affidavit signed by Gillett. After being released on a writ of habeas corpus, Thiebold promptly sued Gillett for false imprisonment. In its opinion, the court said that the action of the justice of the peace, in examining the facts set out in the affidavit and in issuing the warrant thereon, was a judicial act, and held:
A similar situation came before this court in Wagstaff v. Schippel, 27 Kan. 450, where a complaining witness was sued for false imprisonment. The complaint appeared to be defective, but the *720 court held that it was sufficient to invite the examination and consideration of the justice and that under such circumstances an action of false imprisonment would not lie.
In a later case, Lemmon v. King, 95 Kan. 524, 148 Pac. 750, under facts somewhat different from those presented here, the court used language indicating approval of the rule:
Our decision in Hammargren v. Montgomery Ward &amp; Co., 172 Kan. 484, 241 P.2d 1192, does not conflict with the general rule or with previous decisions of this court. In Hammargren, the defendants had called the police who took plaintiffs to the police station where they were questioned and released. No written complaint was signed and no warrant issued. The unlawful arrest was alleged to have been made at the direction of the defendants and the court held there was sufficient evidence of instigation on their part to sustain a verdict against them. The petition in the instant case alleges only that Lutz signed the complaint; there are no allegations that he either requested, instigated or directed the plaintiff's arrest.
The general rule followed by this and other courts appeals to us as a salutary one. The right of private citizens to resort freely to their courts for redress of wrongs is fundamental to our system of society, and its exercise is to be encouraged, not hampered. The New York court, speaking in Marks v. Townsend et al., 97 N.Y. 590, put the matter plainly when it said:
We do not intend, by any means, to intimate that a complainant may with impunity knowingly prefer false charges or otherwise act with malice and without probable cause. In 22 Am. Jur., False Imprisonment, § 33, p. 376, it is said:
*721 Our own court pointed this out in Wagstaff v. Schippel, supra, in these words:
And in Marks v. Townsend et al., supra, it is said that:
But the plaintiff in the present case does not allege a cause of action for malicious prosecution. He plainly predicates his right to recover on a false arrest. As we have heretofore said, malice is not involved in false arrest; its presence does not make a lawful arrest unlawful, nor does its absence make an unlawful arrest lawful.
It is our conclusion that the plaintiff's petition fails to state a cause of action against the defendant Lutz, as well as against the defendant Gaar, and that the demurrer should have been sustained as to both of them.
The judgment of the court below is reversed and the case is remanded with instructions to sustain the defendants' demurrer.