Title: McMILLEN v McKEE CO
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 12805
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: April 7, 1975

No. 12805 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F THE STATE OF M O N T A N A 1975 JOHN McMILLEN , Claimant and Respondent, A R T H U R G. McKEE and C O M P A N Y , Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Second J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable John B. McClernan, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Poore, McKenzie, Roth and Robinson, Butte, Montana James A. Robischon argued, and Donald C. Robinson argued, Butte, Montana For Respondent : Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Lon J. Maxwell, Assistant Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana Norman H. Grosfield, Special Assistant Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana Corette, Smith and Dean, Butte, Montana Kendrick Smith argued, Butte, Montana Submitted: March 4, 1975 M r . J u s t i c e Frank Haswell delivered the Opinion of the Court . Our o r i g i n a l opinion herein appearing i n 31 St.Rep. 1026, was subsequently withdrawn. A rehearing was granted limited t o t h i s question: "Does section 92-616, R.C.M. 1947, deny equal protection, of the laws t o t h e employer and defendant i n violation of Sec. 1 of t h e 14th Amendment t o the United States Con- s t i t u t i o n o r Sec. 17 ( s i c ) , A r t i c l e I1 of the Montana Constitution?" This c o n s t i t u t e s the complete opinion of t h i s Court on a l l issues of t h i s case following rehearing: This is a consolidated appeal by t h e employer and its insurer from two judgments of the d i s t r i c t court of Silver Bow County, awarding workmen's compensation benefits t o two injured employees i n companion cases. Claimants a r e John and Robert McMillen, employees of Arthur G. McKee & Company, a contractor engaged on a job of smelter i m - provement i n Anaconda, Montana, under a w r i t t e n contract. Defendant i s General Accident F i r e & Life Assurance Corporation, a private insurance company, t h e Plan I1 insurer of the McKee Company under the Montana workmen's Compensation Act. The ultimate i s s u e f o r review i s whether the employees were injured i n the course and scope of t h e i r employment so a s t o e n t i t l e them t o workmen's compensation benefits under t h e Montana Act. The Workmen's Compensation Division and the d i s t r i c t court held they were. W e affirm. The two McMillen brothers lived i n Butte and traveled each workday t o and from the Anaconda job s i t e where they had been em- ployed f o r about two years. Each was paid $4 per day t r a v e l allow- ance under the terms of a union contract providing i n material part: "* * * Travel pay o r subsistence s h a l l be f o r days worked. * * * The mileage and amount of t r a v e l pay o r subsistence s h a l l be a s follows: "zero t o 12-1/2 miles ----------------- none "Over 12-1/2 t o 25 miles -------------- $2.50 John McMillen purchased a used Dodge truck three days before the accident i n question. It had some 71,000 m i l e s on it a t t h e time of purchase, but John t e s t i f i e d he c a r e f u l l y checked the c a r before purchase and found it safe. O n Monday morning, July 2, 1973, the two McMillan brothers were seriously injured i n a single c a r accident while enroute t o work. Due t o some mechanical f a i l u r e of the Dodge truck, t h e r e a r wheels locked, the truck overturned, and both McMillens were injured. The accident occurred on the highway between Butte and Anaconda before they reached the job s i t e . The cause of t h e accident was something over which n e i t h e r the employees nor t h e employer had any control. Prior t o the day of the accident, both employees had been paid $4 per day f o r each day worked i n addition t o t h e i r wages. The amount paid was c a l l e d "the mileage and amount of t r a v e l pay o r subsistence". O n the itemized breakdown attached t o t h e i r checks, t h e r e is a column headed " ~ u b s . ~ r a v e l " i n which t h i s payment was entered. The employer did not deduct any taxes on t h i s t r a v e l pay, but each employee paid income taxes on the t r a v e l money. Neither employee received any t r a v e l pay on t h e day of the accident. The claims of each employee were heard by the Workmen's Compensation Division. The Division entered findings of f a c t , conclusions of law, and an order awarding compensation. The sub- stance of the Division holding was t h a t the t r a v e l allowance was paid a s an incentive "to g e t t h e men t o come on the job" and a benefit t o t h e employer; t h a t accordingly each suffered an acci- dental injury a r i s i n g out of and i n the course of h i s employment; and, t h a t each was e n t i t l e d t o benefits under the Montana Act in- cluding compensation, medical expense and attorney fees. O n appeal t o the d i s t r i c t court, the cases were heard on the the record before t h e Workmen's Compensation Division without additional evidence. The d i s t r i c t court adopted the findings of f a c t and conclusions of law of t h e Division and entered judgment affirming the Division award of benefits. The employer and insurer now appeal from the judgment of the d i s t r i c t court. The issue i s whether under the f a c t s and circumstances of I I t h i s case the two employees suffered accidental t n j u r i e s a r i s i n g out of and i n the course of" t h e i r employment within the meaning of ~ o n t a n a ' s Workmen's Compensation Act. Section 92-614, R.C.M. A review of some p r i o r decisions of t h i s Court on compensation I I coverage where an employee is injured going o r coming" t o and from the job furnishes the background f o r our determination. I n Griffin v. I n d u s t r i a l Accident Fund, 1 1 1 Mont. 110, 106 P. 2d 346, compensation was denied a foreman injured i n a f a l l on a c i t y sidewalk when returning home from work. The b a s i s of denial was t h a t t h e sidewalk was not used by the employer i n carrying on h i s business i n which t h e employee was employed and consequently the employee was injured only by an ordinary s t r e e t hazard common t o a l l pedestrians. I n Morgan v. I n d u s t r i a l Accident Board, 133 Mont. 254, 260, 321 P.2d 232, claimant, a union shop steward, was injured i n an automobile accident while traveling from Miles City t o Forsyth. I n denying compensation, t h i s Court pointed out t h a t a t t h e time of i n j u r y claimant was on union business and not within the scope of h i s employment. The Court l a i d down t h i s principle: "Under the p a r t i c u l a r circumstances, where the accident occurred i s irrelevant. I f claimant was injured within the scope of h i s employment, the f a c t t h a t he was injured ' a f t e r hours' and I off remises' i s incidental. Even i n ' s t r e e t risks', the scope, not t h e place of employment controls. I 1 Guarascio v. Industrial Accident Board, 140 Mont. 497, 501, 374 P.2d 84, granted compensation where an itinerant terrazzo t i l e worker residing i n Salt Lake City was k i l l e d i n an automobile accident enroute from Utah t o Butte, Montana t o aid i n construction of a hospital there. A t the time of the accident Guarascio was being paid a ,travel pay allowance based upon h i s hourly r a t e of pay multiplied by the number of hours necessary t o travel from Salt Lake City t o Butte, plus an allowance f o r subsistence and trans- portation costs. In Guarascio a f t e r finding "an informal, o r a l type of employ- ment", t h i s Court l a i d down the t e s t of compensability i n "going and coming1 cases i n terms of whether some reasonably immediate service t o the employer was involved: "1n the instant case, the decedent Guarascio was carrying on the business of h i s employer by transporting himself t o Butte, Montana, so that he could be on the job a s soon a s possible. Furthermore, the employer recognized the benefit t o it by virtue of the fact the decedent workman was t o receive monetary compensation f o r the time spent traveling t o the job. 11 In Morgan v. Ind. Acc.Bd., 133 Mont. 254, 321 P.2d 232, t h i s Court made the following observation: 11 I What i s the underlying principle? In cases where some reasonably immediate service t o the employer can be discerned the claim has been sustained. Where there has been no reasonably immediate service the claim has been denied. Such impresses us a s a funda- mental r u l e and guide f o r the l i b e r a l i t y t o which t h i s Court i s necessarily and properly committed and for which claimant's counsel so earnestly contend. [Citing authority]. Beyond t h i s each decision must be con- trolled by the particular facts and circumstances of the particular case. [Citin? authority]. Our opinion proceeds upon t h a t premise. h he record here substantiates the findings of the d i s t r i c t court, but we wish t o a ain s t a t e , a s w e F did i n the Morgan case, t h a t we do not intena t o establish any precedent * * *. Our decision i s limited t o the f a c t s i n the case now before us. 111 The employer and insurer contend that Guarascio i s dis- tinguishable on the basis that there the employee was paid hourly wages f o r h i s travel time i n addition t o subsistence and travel costs indicating t h a t the travel involved was f o r the benefit of h i s employer. They contend that the method of payment i s crucial t o determination of benefit t o the employer, which controls com- pensability. W e disagree. Although benefit t o the employer i s an important factor i n determining compensability, the payment of hourly wages for travel time i s not necessarily a universal condition precedent. In the instant case, the union contract singled out for special consideration a travel allowance and testimony a t the hearing indi- cated i t was paid as an incentive t o get men out on the job. This contractual fact supports the finding of the Division and the d i s t r i c t court that the travel allowance was for the benefit of the employer within previous holdings of t h i s Court. This is consistent with the majority rule i n the United States that a workman i s usually entitled t o compensation when injured during travel t o o r from h i s employment where he receives a specific allowance t o get t o and from h i s job. 1 Larsen, workmen's Compensa- tion Law, 5 16.20 e t seq. 1 Larsen, workmen's Compensation Law, 5 16.30, p. 4-112, summarizes the principle and its rationale: 11 However, i n the majority of cases involving a deliberate and substantial payment for the ex- pense of travel, o r the provision of an auto- mobile under the employee's control, the journey i s held t o be i n the course of employment. This result i s usually correct, because when the sub- ject of transportation i s singled out for special consideration it is normally because the trans- portation involves a considerable distance and therefore qualifies under the rule herein suggested: that employment should be deemed t o include travel when the travel i t s e l f i s a substantial part of the service performed. The sheer size of the journey i s frequently the principal fact supporting t h i s conclusion, as i n the successful cases involving t r i p s of eight m i l e s , 20 miles, 22 miles, 30 miles, 50 miles, 54 miles, 60 miles, 120 miles, and 130 miles. If The employer and insurer also argue that the union contract providing for a travel allowance is irrelevant t o compensability because the meaning of the phrase "arising out of and i n the course of employment" must be determined by the rules of statutory construction. They further contend that employers and employees can not contract themselves i n and out of coverage under the Workmen's Compensation Act by the terms of a union contract. This contention is specious, The statutory language can not be interpreted i n a vacuum. It must be interpreted i n the context of the facts of the particular case before the court. The union contract providing for travel allowance i s a fact. Payment of the travel allowance i s another f a c t , The purpose of payment t o provide an incentive t o get the employees on the job is a third fact. The benefit t o the employer i s a f i n a l fact. The statutory language i s simply applied t o these facts and the meaning determined. W e have considered a l l the cases, statutes and authorities cited by counsel. W e hold that the employees here were injured i n an accident "arising out of and i n the course of employment" and t h e i r injuries a r e therefore compensable. Our decision is limited t o the facts of the case before us. The employer and insurer also r a i s e the issue of the constitu- tionality of section 92-616, R.C.M. 1947, which provides, i n per- tinent part: "In the event the insurer denies the claim for compensation o r terminates compensation benefits, and the claim i s l a t e r adjudged compensable, by the division o r on appeal, the insurer s h a l l pay reasonable costs and attorneys' fees as established by the division * * *." The employer and insurer contend t h i s statute denies equal protection of the laws i n violation of the United States and Montana constitutions. Two specific violations are alleged: 1) Allowing costs and attorneys' fees t o successful claimants, but not t o successful insurers, . . 2) Requiring payment of costs and attorneys1 fees i f the successful claimant i s covered under Plans 2 or 3 (private insurance company and the s t a t e fund), but not i f he i s covered under Plan 1 (self -insurers). There i s ample authority supporting the constitutionality of Montana's Workmen's Compensation Act a s a valid exercise of the state's police power. Cunningham v . Northwestern Improvement Co., 4 4 Mont. 180, 119 P . 554. Here our concern is whether or not, in exercising that police power, the legislature has violated constitu- tional guarantees of equal protection of the laws. The argument that insurers should be able to recover attorneys' fees when they prevail, in order to satisfy equal protection provi- sions, is not supported by any discoverable authority. To the con- trary, the United States Supreme Court in Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway of Texas v . Cade, 233 U.S. 642, 34 S . C t . 678, 58 L.Ed. 1135, 1138;1139, held: I I If the classification is otherwise reasonable, the mere fact that attorney's fees are allowed to successful plaintiffs only, and not to successful defendants, does not render the statute repugnant to the 'equal protection' clause.* * * ' I * * *The outlay for an attorney's fee is a necessary consequence of the litigation, and since it must fall upon one party or the other, it is reasonable to impose it upon the party whose refusal to pay a just claim renders the litigation necessary. 1 1 That holding has remained unchanged for over sixty years and controls the federal constitutional question here. For the same reasons, we hold that there is no violation of the equal protection clause in Article 11, Section 4, Montana Constitution. The second argument raised under federal and state equal protection clauses arises from an improper construction of section 92-616, R . C . M . 1947. The employer and insurer argue that section 92-435, R . C . M . 1947, defining an "insurer", controls the applicability of section 92-616. They argue that these sections, when read together, unlawfully discriminate against Plan 2 and Plan 3 employers and insurers by requiring them to pay costs and attorneys' fees while exempting Plan 1 employers. This argument ignores the provisions of section 92-401, R . C . M . 1947, which provide that statutory definitions will control unless the context otherwise requires. The context here requires that section 92-616 covers employers and insurers under all three plans. This conclusion is compelled by a number of considerations. First, if a statute is capable of two constructions, it is the duty of this Court to give the statute that construction which will make it constitutional. School District No. 12 v . Pondera County, 89 Mont. 342, 297 P. 498; Parker v . County of Yellowstone, 140 Mont. 538, 374 P.2d 328. Second, in the context of the legislative act (Ch. 477, Laws of 19731, it is clear the legislature intended that the challenged provisions apply to all three compensation plans. That legislative enactment began with the words "Every insurer under any plan for the payment of workmen's compensation benefits * * * . I t (Emphasis supplied). The use of the word "insurer" throughout the remainder of the act (including what is codified as section 92-616) should be I I construed as referring to insurers under any plan" --- Plans 1, 2 or 3, as the context does not otherwise require. Employers are I1 their own insurers" under Plan 1 . Finally, section 92-838, R . C . M . 1947, requires that the provisions of the workmen ' s Compensation Act be liberally cons trued. The construction employed in this opinion is in accord with the spirit of that Act, providing the employee with compensation undimin- ished by the expenses of seeking legal remedies when he is wrongfully denied compensation benefits. The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Justice Mr. Justice Wesley Castles dissenting in part and concurring in part: I dissent as to what the majority calls the ultimate issue. The accident did not arise out of and in the course of employment. Whether it be travel allowance or subsistence or any other negotiated fringe benefit, does not make it in the course of employment as far as industrial accidents are concerned. I concur on the issue of constitutionality of section 92-616, R.C.M. 1947. ---dr2-;----------,----------- Justice.