Title: State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Baldwin
Citation: 470 So. 2d 1230
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: May 10, 1985

470 So. 2d 1230 (1985)
STATE FARM AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation
v.
David A. BALDWIN and Denise Baldwin.
84-41-CER.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
May 10, 1985.
Joel W. Ramsey of Ramsey &amp; Baxley, Dothan, for appellant.
Robert H. Brogden of Brogden &amp; Quattlebaum, Ozark, for appellee.
MADDOX, Justice.
This case involves a certified question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
The facts, as stipulated to by the parties and adopted by the Eleventh Circuit, are as follows:
"The Baldwins have three vehicles insured with the plaintiff, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance company (`State Farm'). Each vehicle has uninsured motorist coverage in the amount of $10,000. The Baldwins have demanded of State Farm uninsured motorist coverage totaling $30,000.
"The contract clause concerning uninsured motorist coverage in the Baldwins' insurance policy with State Farm provides: `[State Farm] will pay damages for bodily injury an insured is legally entitled to collect from the owner or driver of an uninsured motor vehicle. The bodily injury must be caused by accident arising out of the operation, maintenance or use of an uninsured motor vehicle.' This clause is apparently patterned after language in the Alabama Uninsured Motorist Act. Section 32-7-23 of this act requires insurers to offer their customers a certain amount of coverage for damages caused by the actions of uninsured vehicle owners and operators. The section states in relevant part:
Code 1975, § 32-7-23 [emphasis added in the parties' stipulation].
State Farm appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which found, as follows:
Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit stayed further proceedings in the appeal and certified the following question for determination by this Court:
This appears to be a case of first impression not only in Alabama but in the entire country. Both parties have cited authority from this and other jurisdictions generally *1232 dealing with the interpretation of uninsured motorist provisions similar to the one before us, but all of those cases are distinguishable, factually or otherwise, from the present case. Nevertheless, we find two Alabama cases cited by the Baldwins, Higgins v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 291 Ala. 462, 282 So. 2d 301 (1973), and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Griffin, 51 Ala.App. 426, 286 So. 2d 302 (1973), which apparently was relied upon by the United States District Court, to be most helpful in our decision.
In Higgins, supra, a minor plaintiff was injured in a one-vehicle accident while being transported as a student/passenger in an uninsured Jefferson County school bus. She sought to recover damages for her injuries under the uninsured motorist provision of her father's automobile liability policy. That provision contained an exclusion expressly denying coverage if the uninsured vehicle causing the claimant's injuries was "an automobile which [was] owned by the United States of America, Canada, a state, a political subdivision of any such government or any agency of any of the foregoing." In determining that this exclusion did not prevent plaintiff's recovery against her father's insurer this Court stated:
"In 11 Am.Jur.Trials, § 6, p. 86, it is stated:
"Couch on Insurance, Second Edition, Vol. 12, § 45.625, p. 571 states:
291 Ala. at 465, 466; 282 So. 2d  at 303-305.
The language of Higgins clearly shows this Court's belief that the obvious legislative purpose behind the uninsured motorist act was to protect those financially and ethically responsible enough to obtain automobile liability insurance from injuries caused by those not so responsible. Griffin, supra, 51 Ala.App. at 430, 286 So. 2d  at 305. In other words, this Court recognizes, as did the legislature in enacting § 32-7-23, that one who wishes to protect himself against the negligence of an uninsured driver should be able to contract with an insurer and, by paying an appropriate premium, receive such coverage. It is for this reason that the legislature made uninsured motorist coverage mandatory in every automobile policy issued in this state, unless such coverage is rejected by the insured, and it was this legislative mandate that moved insurers, such as State Farm, to promulgate uninsured motorist provisions, like the present one, almost tracking the language of § 32-7-23. Higgins, supra, 291 Ala. at 465, 282 So. 2d  at 303.
If an insured chooses not to reject the protection afforded by the uninsured motorist statute and suffers a loss at the hands of an uninsured motorist, it is not necessary, as a condition precedent to his recovering in a direct action against his insurer, that he first secure judgment against the uninsured motorist. Griffin, supra, 51 Ala.App. at 430, 286 So. 2d  at 306. Instead, he need only prove that he is "legally entitled to recover damages" against the uninsured motorist, within the meaning of § 32-7-23. In defining this term, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals has stated:
Griffin, supra, 51 Ala.App. at 431, 286 So. 2d  at 306.
The reasoning expressed by the Court of Civil Appeals in Griffin was later adopted by this Court in Quick v. State Farm Automobile Insurance Co., 429 So. 2d 1033, 1034 (Ala.1983).
State Farm contends that, as noted in Griffin, it may assert not only those defenses arising from its policy with the *1234 Baldwins but also those substantive defenses available to White and the United States Government, the operator and the owner of the uninsured vehicle in question. State Farm argues that one of these substantive defenses is the immunity afforded by the Feres doctrine, which provides that no cause of action arises against the United States Government or its employees for injuries incurred by a member of the military arising out of and/or in the course of his active military service. Feres, supra. Because the Feres doctrine precludes any cause of action in such situations, and because Baldwin was on duty at the time of his injury, State Farm asserts that Baldwin was never "legally entitled to recover damages" against either White or the Government, within the meaning of § 32-7-23, and, therefore, is not entitled to recover in a direct action against it.
While State Farm is technically correct, that the Feres doctrine is a defense available to it under the holding of Griffin, supra, this Court must decide if the legislative policy of the uninsured motorist statute would allow State Farm to assert that defense and deny the otherwise valid claim of the Baldwins. Using the previous decisions of this Court and construing the intent of the legislature in adopting the uninsured motorist statute, we hold that the Feres doctrine is inapplicable.
As this Court stated in Higgins, the purpose of § 32-7-23 is to "provide coverage." Considering our decision in Higgins, holding that insurers cannot expressly exclude from uninsured motorist coverage injuries resulting from collisions with government vehicles, it would be completely anomalous to hold that insurers may enforce the same exclusion, by implication, because of an anomaly of statutory construction created by the interaction of the Feres doctrine and § 37-7-23.
Thus, it is this Court's opinion that, because the undisputed facts are that Baldwin was injured as a proximate result of White's negligent operation of an uninsured vehicle, it is in keeping with the intent of the uninsured motorist statute and with our principles of statutory construction to hold that the Baldwins are "legally entitled to recover damages" against White and the Government, within the meaning of § 32-7-23, regardless of the fact that David Baldwin is otherwise prohibited from such recovery by the Feres doctrine. Therefore, they are entitled to recover under their policy with State Farm.
CERTIFIED QUESTION ANSWERED.
FAULKNER, JONES, ALMON, SHORES, EMBRY, BEATTY and ADAMS, JJ., concur.
TORBERT, C.J., recused.