Title: GEORGE A . JARRELL V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2002-SC-000567-MR
State: Kentucky
Issuer: Kentucky Supreme Court
Date: October 10, 2003

IMPORTANTNOTICE NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION THIS OPINIONIS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THERULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOTBE CITED OR USED ASAUTHORITYINANYOTHER CASE INANY COURTOF THIS STATE. RENDERED : SEPTEMBER 18, 2003 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED ~u~rrrntr l~oixrf of ~ztfixx4 Affirming 2002-SC-0567-MR GEORGE A . JARRELL APPELLANT APPEAL FROM FLOYD CIRCUIT COURT V . HONORABLE DANNY P . CAUDILL, JUDGE CRIMINAL NO . 00-CR-00094 MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE ' Appellant, George Andrew Jarrell, was convicted in the Floyd Circuit Court of manslaughter in the first-degree . He was sentenced to a total of twenty years imprisonment and appeals to this Court as a matter of right . Finding no error, we affirm . Appellant was employed by Hytech Construction, a company owned by his brother, Arnold Jarrell . Arnold employed primarily family members, including Appellant's first cousin, B .J . On October 6, 2000, Appellant and B .J . were assisting with the construction of a home in the Daniels Creek area of Floyd County . Evidence showed that Appellant and B .J . had an argument that escalated into two separate physical altercations that day . During the second fight, B .J . broke Appellant's nose and knocked out a tooth . In an attempt to separate the two men, another one of Appellant's brothers, Ken Jarrell, offered to drive Appellant to another work site . After arriving at the second site, Appellant stated that he was going to go to his mother's house to clean up and then have his wife take him to the doctor . Appellant instead went to Ken's home and retrieved a shotgun . Appellant told Ken's wife that he intended to shoot some dogs that had been keeping him awake at night . Appellant returned to the Daniel's Creek site where B .J . was still working . He entered the house where B.J . and Ken were laying a hardwood floor and fired two fatal shots at B.J . Appellant thereafter left the site and was later apprehended by state troopers . A Floyd County Grand Jury indicted Appellant for murder. At trial, Appellant testified that he shot B.J . in self-defense because B.J . turned around with a nail gun in his hand . However, both the coroner and pathologist testified that B.J . was shot from behind, the first shot entering between his jaw and the left side of his neck . Ken Jarrell further stated that after the first shot, B.J . was lying on the ground, heavily bleeding and choking on his own blood . The second shot was fired at close range and entered in front of B .J .'s right ear . At the close of all the evidence, the jury was instructed on murder, first-degree manslaughter, second-degree manslaughter, and reckless homicide . The jury returned a verdict of guilty on first-degree manslaughter and recommended a twenty year sentence . Judgment was entered accordingly . I . Appellant first argues that the Commonwealth improperly attempted to define reasonable doubt during voir dire by stating to the jury : The next thing I want to talk to you about is you all understand that the Commonwealth is here because we believe that the evidence in this case will prove beyond a reasonable doubt that this defendant is guilty . We anticipate, at least to some extent, that the defense will probably dispute that . Does everyone understand that is why we have trials? If everyone agreed on everything that happened, we wouldn't have to come in here and do this . Does everyone understand that? As part of that, we expect that you may hear conflicting evidence, conflicting testimony in this case . Now, what you need to understand is that conflicting evidence, conflicting testimony by itself does not create reasonable doubt requiring an acquittal . Does everyone understand that? The trial court overruled Appellant's objection . In Commonwealth v. Callahan , Ky ., 675 S.W. 2d 391 (1984), this Court denounced any attempts by counsel to define reasonable doubt . See also Marsch v . Commonwealth , Ky., 743 S .W.2d 830 (1988) ; Commonwealth v . Goforth , Ky., 692 S .W.2d 803 (1985) . However, we further noted that counsel is not prohibited from "point[ing] out to the jury which evidence, or lack thereof, creates reasonable doubt . . . ." Id . at 393 . In this case, the Commonwealth's comments were not an impermissible attempt to convey the definition of reasonable doubt . See Simpson v . Commonwealth , Ky ., 759 S.W.2d 224 (1988) . II . Appellant alleges error in the admission of autopsy photographs which he contends were both overly gruesome and duplicative of the photographs taken at the crime scene . Appellant argues that since the defense was not contesting the manner of death, the pictures were irrelevant and unduly prejudicial . We disagree . We have consistently held that "relevant photographs are not inadmissible just because they are gruesome and the crime they depict is heinous." Comm onwealth v . Eldred , Ky., 906 S .W.2d 694 (1994), cert . denied , 516 U .S . 1154 (1994) . This applies to autopsy photographs as well, provided the autopsy did not materially alter the body . Hodge v. Commonwealth , Ky ., 17 S.W.3d 824 (2000), cert . denied , 531 U .S . 1018 (2000) ; Davis v. Commonwealth , Ky ., 967 S .W.2d 574 (1998) ; Clark v . Commonwealth , Ky., 833 S .W.2d 793 (1991) In response to the defense's objection, the Commonwealth pointed out that the autopsy photographs were relevant to show the exact location and diameter of the shot pattern, which had a direct bearing on the distance and velocity of the shots . The Commonwealth further argued that the photographs were relevant to rebut Appellant's self-defense claim, since the location and nature of the first wound directly refuted Appellant's claim that he fired a second shot out of fear . Interestingly, Appellant did not object to the admission of the crime scene photographs, which were unquestionably more gruesome since they depicted the victim covered with blood ; the autopsy photographs showed only the victim's face, which had been cleansed . In any event, the trial court properly ruled that the autopsy photographs were relevant and not of such a gruesome nature to prejudice the jury . Ill. Finally, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by striking the testimony of defense witness Donna Compton . The defense called Compton to testify concerning the victim's reputation for violence . At a bench conference prior to Compton testifying, defense counsel explained that he was not going to question Compton about a specific incident where the victim verbally threatened Compton, rather he only intended to ask her whether she was aware of the victim's reputation in the community for peace or violence and, if so, what it was . The following colloquy, in pertinent part, took place : Counsel : Did you know [B.J .] during his lifetime? Compton : Yes. Counsel : Were you aware of his reputation in the community for peace and violence? Compton : Yes . Counsel : And what was that reputation? Compton : Well, he was pretty wild . I had a run in with him. Trial Court : Stop . The question was did you know what - the question was did you know about his reputation for peacefulness . You can answer yes or no, and then ask what that was . There was no question about any personal involvement you may have had . Compton : O .K . Yes . Counsel : You were aware of his reputation? Compton : Yes . Counsel : What was that reputation? Compton : Well, he was . . Trial Court : Ma'am, let me explain so you can understand . Compton : Okay, yeah . Trial Court : He's not asking you about any connection you have with him other than what you know his general reputation in the community is . If you know, you can tell, but don't give us any specific information . We are not requiring or requesting that . Compton : O . K . Counsel : Was it good or bad? Compton : Bad . Very bad. During cross-examination by the Commonwealth, Compton stated that although she knew of the Jarrell family, she did not know any of them personally . When asked about her relationship to the Jarrell family, Compton responded, "Well, I just got subpoenaed here because of the problem that I had with the other guy." Following another admonition from the trial court not to refer to any specific incidents, the following transpired : Commonwealth : Ms . Compton, your opinion that you have expressed about [B .J .]'s reputation in the community is based on your personal experience and that bad encounter you had with him, isn't it? Compton : Well, no . Commonwealth : It's not? That doesn't affect your opinion? Compton : Oh, yes . On the Commonwealth's motion, the trial court at that point dismissed Compton and admonished the jury to disregard her testimony . Appellant's argument on appeal is two-fold . First, he argues that the trial court erred in striking Compton's testimony as to the victim's general reputation in the community. We agree. While the Commonwealth's questions during cross-examination obviously confused Compton, she clearly stated during direct that she was aware of B .J .'s reputation in the community and that it was "very bad ." The trial court erred in sustaining the Commonwealth's objection and striking Compton's testimony. However, due to the overwhelming evidence of guilt against Appellant, we conclude that the error was harmless . RCr 9.24 . Appellant also argues that Compton should have been permitted to testify about the specific encounter she had with the victim . Relying on Hager v . Commonwealth , Ky ., 41 S .W.3d 828 (2001), Appellant posits that since he was claiming self-defense, his state of mind at the time of the shooting was at issue and thus, Compton's testimony was relevant to establishing the basis for his fear of the victim . The law is well established that proper objections must be made known to the trial court if the defendant intends to preserve matters to be considered by reviewing courts . Bell v . Commonwealth , Ky ., 473 S.W . 2d 820, 821 (1971) . At trial, defense counsel specially stated that he only intended to ask Compton about the victim's general reputation in the community . At no time during the bench conference or during his direct examination of Compton did he raise any questions about Compton's verbal altercation with the victim . As such, the trial court did not have the opportunity, at least explicitly, to consider this issue . A "defendant cannot pursue one theory at the trial court level and another on the appellate review ." Commonwealth v . Duke , Ky., 750 S.W . 2d 432, 433 (1988) . Even if we were to conclude that the trial court implicitly ruled on the issue, we are unable to review any alleged error since Appellant failed to preserve Compton's testimony by avowal . Appellant is correct that a defendant can introduce evidence of a victim's violent acts or threats, even if made to others, to show the defendant had a justifiable fear of the victim at the time of their encounter . Commonwealth v . Baze , Ky., 965 S.W.2d 817 (1997), cert . denied , 523 U .S . 1083 (1998) ; Carnes v . Commonwealth , Ky., 453 S .W.2d 595 (1970) . However, the evidence must have some reasonable relationship to the defendant's claim of self-defense . Baze , supra at 825 ; see also 7 Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook , § 215, at 70. (3rd ed ., Michie 1993) . Logically, the crux of this determination must be whether the defendant was aware of the victim's alleged violent acts or threats, a question we simply cannot answer from the silent record . Indeed, even Appellant's counsel concedes that it is unclear whether Appellant had any knowledge of the incident between Compton and the victim . As we stated in Commonwealth v . Ferrell , Ky ., 17 S.W.3d 520, 523-524 (2000) : "[W]ithout an avowal to show what a witness would have said an appellate court has no basis for determining whether an error in excluding [her] proffered testimony was prejudicial." Counsel's version of the evidence is not enough . A reviewing court must have the words of the witness . Quotin Cain v . Commonwealth , Ky., 554 S.W.2d 369 (1977) . As such, without Compton's testimony, we cannot conclude that any error occurred . The judgment and conviction of the Floyd County Circuit Court are affirmed . All concur. COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT Linda Roberts Horsman Department of Public Advocacy 100 Fair Oaks Lane - Suite 302 Frankfort, KY 40601 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE A.B . Chandler III Attorney General Nyremma Shields Office of the Attorney General Assistant Attorney General Criminal Appellate Division 1024 Capital Center Drive Frankfort, KY 40601