Title: Jason J. Cramer v. Wisconsin Court of Appeals
Citation: 2000 WI 86
Docket Number: 1999AP001089-OA
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 7, 2000

2000 WI 86 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-1089-OA 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
In Matter of Application of Prison Litigation 
Reform Act in State ex rel. Jason J. Cramer 
v. David H. Schwarz: 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Jason J. Cramer,  
 
Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Wisconsin Court of Appeals,  
 
Respondent.  
 
 
ORIGINAL ACTION 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 7, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
February 9, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins dissent. 
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the petitioner there were briefs by Joseph N. 
Ehmann, Brian C. Findley and William J. Tyroler, assistant state 
public defenders and oral argument by Brian C. Findley. 
 
 
For the respondent the cause was argued by Corey 
F. Finkelmeyer, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general, and David C. Rice, 
assistant attorney general. 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed and there was 
oral argument by Eric J. Callisto, assistant attorney general, 
for the State of Wisconsin. 
 
 
2000 WI 86 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 99-1089-OA  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In Matter of Application of Prison  
Litigation Reform Act in State ex rel. 
Jason J. Cramer v. David H. Schwarz: 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Jason J.  
Cramer,  
 
          Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Court of Appeals,  
 
          Respondent. 
________________________________________________________________ 
ORIGINAL ACTION for declaratory judgment.  Declaration of 
rights; relief denied. 
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is an original action to 
determine whether the Wisconsin Prisoner Litigation Reform Act 
(PLRA), created by 1997 Wis. Act 133,1 applies to persons seeking 
certiorari review of probation revocation.  Jason J. Cramer 
(Cramer) pursued certiorari review of a decision of the Division 
of Hearings and Appeals.  He filed a complete petition 81 days 
after the division revoked his probation on a withheld sentence. 
 The Circuit Court for Dane County, Stuart A. Schwartz, Judge, 
dismissed the petition, finding that Cramer had not complied 
                     
1 The PLRA took effect on September 1, 1998.  
FILED 
 
JUL 7, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 99-1089-OA  
 
 
2 
with the 45-day filing deadline that Wis. Stat. § 893.735(2) 
(1997-98)2 imposes upon persons subject to the PLRA. 
¶2 
The applicability of the PLRA depends upon whether the 
prospective litigant is a prisoner.  Cramer maintains he is not 
a prisoner within the meaning of the PLRA, and he asks that his 
petition be reinstated under the six-month deadline for filing 
common-law writs of certiorari. 
 
¶3 
The 
issue 
is 
whether 
a 
person 
challenging 
the 
revocation of probation on a withheld sentence is a "prisoner" 
who must satisfy PLRA filing requirements.  We hold that a 
petitioner who pursues relief from a probation revocation by a 
writ of certiorari is a prisoner subject to the PLRA.  Writs of 
certiorari that seek to overturn a revocation of probation are 
civil actions and are not analogous to criminal appeals that 
challenge a judgment of conviction or sentence.  We conclude 
that Cramer's writ of certiorari therefore should have been 
filed within the 45-day deadline established by Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.735(2).  We therefore deny his petition for declaratory 
relief. 
 
¶4 
The State of Wisconsin has filed a nonparty brief in 
this case asking the court to determine whether the PLRA applies 
to prisoners confined outside the state.  We decline to address 
that issue here for two reasons.  First, Cramer was not housed 
in an out-of-state facility.  We conclude that a decision of 
                     
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1997-98 volumes unless indicated otherwise. 
No. 99-1089-OA  
 
 
3 
this far-reaching impact is better postponed for a different 
case, in which the factual circumstances are more compelling and 
all parties have briefed the matter.3  Second, the court of 
appeals recently examined the issue in two cases.4  We hesitate 
to disturb those decisions absent a direct appeal to this court. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
¶5 
The record before the court is sparse because this 
case comes to us as an original action.  Consequently, we derive 
the operative facts from the stipulation entered by the parties 
and from the decisions and orders issued below.5  
¶6 
On April 8, 1998, Cramer was convicted in Dane County 
Circuit Court of Physical Abuse of a Child, Battery, Bail 
Jumping, and Disorderly Conduct.  The court withheld the 
sentences on these convictions and placed Cramer on probation 
for concurrent three-year terms.  
 
¶7 
On April 20, 12 days after these convictions, Cramer 
was arrested on new charges.  Probation revocation proceedings 
were initiated, and the final revocation hearing was held before 
                     
3 The Respondent in this case, the Wisconsin Court of 
Appeals, chose not to address the issue because the question was 
pending before the court in another case.  
4 State ex rel. Frohwirth v. Wisconsin Parole Comm'n, 2000 
WI App 139, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___; State ex rel. 
Speener v. Gudmanson, 2000 WI App 78, 234 Wis. 2d 461, 610 
N.W.2d 136.  Both cases hold that the PLRA does not apply to 
out-of-state prisoners. 
5 The parties incorporated the decisions and orders from the 
previous proceedings by reference into their stipulation of 
facts.  
No. 99-1089-OA  
 
 
4 
an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on August 31.  The ALJ issued 
a decision on September 9, revoking Cramer's probation on all 
counts.  Cramer qualified for, and was represented by, counsel 
from the Office of the State Public Defender at the revocation 
hearing and at subsequent proceedings.  
 
¶8 
Cramer pursued an administrative appeal before the 
Division of Hearings and Appeals.  On September 28 the division 
sustained the order of revocation.   
¶9 
On November 10 Cramer filed a petition for writ of 
certiorari with the Dane County Clerk of Circuit Court, seeking 
review of the order of revocation.  The office of the clerk 
refused to accept the petition because it did not meet statutory 
and procedural filing requirements.6  The clerk returned the 
filing to Cramer's public defender on November 13, indicating 
that the petition lacked the paperwork required by the PLRA.  
The public defender received this notification by mail on 
November 17.  One month later, on December 18, Cramer's public 
defender resubmitted the petition with the necessary PLRA 
documentation.   
                     
6 The Dane County Clerk of Circuit Court did not accept the 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari because:  (1) the caption 
included no case classification code number; (2) the petition 
included only the original set of papers, not the original and 
one set of copies for each defendant as required; (3) Cramer had 
not provided the "Prisoner's Petition/Affidavit Form;" (4) 
Cramer did not include a certification from the Department of 
Justice regarding the number of dismissals under Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.02(7)(d); (5) Cramer did not submit a certified copy of 
the prison trust fund account statement; and (6) Cramer did not 
provide a copy of his authorization to forward payments from the 
prison trust fund account to the clerk of court.  Had Cramer's 
petition been in order, it would have been timely. 
No. 99-1089-OA  
 
 
5 
¶10 The circuit court entered an order dismissing the 
action because Cramer had violated the statutory 45-day PLRA 
filing deadline.  Cramer did not argue, and the circuit court 
did not address, whether he was a prisoner within the meaning of 
the PLRA.  Rather, the court found that under Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.735(2), a statute created by the PLRA, "[a]n action 
seeking a remedy available by certiorari made on behalf of a 
prisoner is barred unless commenced within 45 days" of the date 
of the decision of the Division of Hearings and Appeals.  The 
court calculated that because the Division of Hearings and 
Appeals issued its determination on September 28, the 45-day 
period tolled on November 12.  The court reasoned that allowing 
Cramer to proceed in effect would grant prospective litigants a 
de facto extension by permitting them to file insufficient 
pleadings and to resubmit the required documentation later, as 
they "saw fit."   
 
¶11 On February 18, 1999, Cramer filed a motion for 
reconsideration, arguing in part that a litigant seeking review 
of probation revocation is not a prisoner under the PLRA, and 
therefore the 45-day time filing limit does not apply to him.  
The statutory definition of "prisoner" as it applies to the PLRA 
appears in Wis. Stat. § 801.02(7)(a)2 and excludes "[a] person 
bringing an action seeking relief from a judgment of conviction 
or a sentence of a court, including an action for an 
extraordinary writ or a supervisory writ seeking relief from a 
judgment of conviction or a sentence of a court."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.02(7)(a)2.c. 
No. 99-1089-OA  
 
 
6 
¶12 Cramer maintained that he satisfied the exception to 
the definition of "prisoner" because the revocation of his 
probation had the effect of returning him to the court for 
sentencing.  The court disagreed, finding that Cramer was not 
excluded from the definition because he was not seeking relief 
from a judgment of conviction or a sentence.  The court relied 
on State ex rel. Flowers v. H&SS, 81 Wis. 2d 376, 384, 260 
N.W.2d 727 (1978), to conclude that revocation proceedings 
cannot be analogized to a judgment of conviction or a sentence 
imposed by a court.  The court therefore held that Cramer was 
subject to PLRA filing requirements and on March 1, 1999, denied 
his motion to reconsider.  
 
¶13 Cramer filed a notice of appeal, seeking review of the 
dismissals of both his petition and the motion to reconsider.  
The court of appeals did not receive the filing fee that Wis. 
Stat. § 809.25(2) requires for filing a notice of appeal and on 
April 28 issued an order stating that the action would be 
dismissed if the fee were not received within five days.  Cramer 
asked the court of appeals to stay the order.  On May 6 the 
court granted the stay, in part because Cramer also had filed a 
petition to this court for an original action for declaratory 
judgment.  
¶14 The court of appeals previously had held that a 
revoked probationer seeking review by writ of habeas corpus must 
comply with the PLRA and pay filing fees.  State ex rel. Marth 
v. Smith, 224 Wis. 2d 578, 592 N.W.2d 307 (Ct. App. 1999) (per 
curiam).  The court suggested that under that precedent, Cramer 
No. 99-1089-OA  
 
 
7 
might be a prisoner required to satisfy PLRA filing procedures. 
 If Cramer were not a prisoner, however, a request for waiver of 
the filing fee would be handled like other fee waiver requests 
by non-prisoners, subject to the procedure established by Wis. 
Stat. § 814.29(1)(d)2 for indigent litigants.  
 
¶15 On May 13, 1999, while Cramer awaited this court's 
decision about his petition for original action, he was 
sentenced in Dane County Circuit Court.  He received eight 
months for the Bail Jumping charge and 90 days concurrent for 
the Disorderly Conduct charge.  Because Cramer had 199 days 
sentence credit and statutory good time, both of these sentences 
were deemed served.  He also was sentenced to 10 months, to run 
consecutive with the other sentences, for the Child Abuse 
charge, and another nine months, concurrent, for the Battery 
charge.  These latter two sentences, however, were stayed for 
acceptance and participation in a Treatment Alternative Program. 
 Cramer was accepted into the program on June 10 with an 
anticipated completion date of December 10, 1999. 
¶16 This court granted the petition for the original 
action on September 28, 1999, and assumed jurisdiction over the 
matter.  On October 5 the court of appeals placed Cramer's case 
on hold pending a decision by this court.  
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
¶17 This 
case 
presents 
an 
issue 
of 
statutory 
interpretation.  Statutory interpretation is a question of law 
that this court reviews independently.  State v. Bodoh, 226 
Wis. 2d 718, 724, 595 N.W.2d 330 (1999).  This court engages in 
No. 99-1089-OA  
 
 
8 
statutory construction to discern the intent of the legislature. 
 Kelley Co. v. Marquardt, 172 Wis. 2d 234, 247, 493 N.W.2d 68 
(1992).  Our duty to fulfill legislative intent ensures that we 
uphold the separation of powers by not substituting judicial 
policy views for the views of the legislature.  See State v. 
Sample, 215 Wis. 2d 487, 495, 573 N.W.2d 187 (1998).   
 
¶18 The process of statutory interpretation begins with 
the language of the statute.  Kelley Co., 172 Wis. 2d at 247.  
When a statute unambigiously expresses the intent of the 
legislature, 
we 
apply 
that 
meaning 
without 
resorting 
to 
extrinsic sources.  Reyes v. Greatway Ins. Co., 227 Wis. 2d 357, 
365, 597 N.W.2d 687 (1999).  If a statute is ambiguous, the 
reviewing court turns to the scope, history, context, and 
purpose of the statute.  Id. at 366-67.  A statute is ambiguous 
if reasonably well informed persons can understand it in more 
than one way.  Kryshak v. Strigel, 208 Wis. 2d 1, 8, 559 N.W.2d 
256 (1997).  This court attempts to resolve any ambiguities in a 
manner that advances the legislature's purpose in enacting the 
statute.  State v. Corey J.G., 215 Wis. 2d 395, 412, 572 N.W.2d 
845 (1998). 
ANALYSIS 
 
¶19 We begin by noting that the issue, whether Cramer is a 
prisoner subject to the PLRA, in all probability is moot because 
Cramer was scheduled to be discharged from his sentences on 
December 10, 1999.  Nonetheless, both Cramer and the Respondent, 
the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, ask the court to address the 
merits of the case.  We agree to do so here because the 
No. 99-1089-OA  
 
 
9 
situation in question is likely to occur with such frequency 
that a decision from this court will guide the circuit courts 
and alleviate uncertainty.  State v. Gray, 225 Wis. 2d 39, 66, 
590 N.W.2d 918 (1999).  
 
¶20 The PLRA establishes the procedural requirements that 
prisoners must satisfy when filing certain types of actions.  
The legislature has dispersed these requirements throughout a 
number of statutory sections that comprise the PLRA.  1997 Wis. 
Act 133.  Generally, the PLRA statutes impose conditions that 
curtail a prisoner's ability to initiate civil lawsuits.7 
                     
7 There are several ramifications if one is subject to the 
requirements 
of 
the 
PLRA. 
 
For 
instance, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 814.29(1m)(d) requires prisoners with money in their prison 
trust accounts to use those funds to satisfy the filing fee 
necessary to initiate a civil action.  See Spence v. Cooke, 222 
Wis. 2d 530, 534, 587 N.W.2d 904 (Ct. App. 1998).  By contrast, 
any person who is not a prisoner may commence an appeal under 
the provisions of Wis. Stat. § 814.29(1) without the payment of 
a filing fee if the person is found indigent.  See State ex rel. 
Speener, 2000 WI App 78 at ¶7.  Section 801.02(7)(d) provides 
that, absent imminent danger, a prisoner's action will be 
dismissed if the prisoner seeking a waiver of costs and fees has 
filed three previous frivolous or improper actions or appeals.  
State ex rel. Coleman v. Sullivan, 229 Wis. 2d 804, 601 N.W.2d 
335 (Ct. App. 1999).  If the court finds that a prisoner's 
challenge is frivolous or improper, the court may dismiss the 
action without requiring an answer.  Wis. Stat. § 802.05(3).  
Similarly, Wis. Stat. §§ 302.11(1q)(a), 302.43, and 807.15 
provide that if the court finds that a prisoner's action was 
malicious or filed to harass the opposing party, or that the 
prisoner testified falsely or submitted false evidence or 
information, then the court may order the Department of 
Corrections to extend the prisoner's mandatory release date or 
order the sheriff to forfeit the prisoner's good time.  In 
addition, the PLRA requires prisoners to exhaust administrative 
remedies before seeking judicial review.  See State ex rel. 
Ledford v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 228 Wis. 2d 768, 599 
N.W.2d 45 (Ct. App. 1999). 
No. 99-1089-OA  
 
 
10
¶21 Among 
these 
statutory 
provisions 
is 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.735(2), which provides that "[a]n action seeking a remedy 
available by certiorari made on behalf of a prisoner is barred 
unless commenced within 45 days after the cause of action 
accrues."  Cramer contends that he is not subject to this 45-day 
deadline because the PLRA does not apply to him.  He therefore 
maintains that his petition is governed by the six-month time 
limitation for filing common-law writs of certiorari.  See State 
ex rel. Czapiewski v. Milwaukee City Serv. Comm'n, 54 Wis. 2d 
535, 539, 196 N.W.2d 742 (1972); see also State ex rel. Johnson 
v. Cady, 50 Wis. 2d 540, 549-50, 185 N.W.2d 306 (1971) 
(petitioners seeking review of probation revocation have right 
to certiorari review). 
¶22 The PLRA applies only to those litigants who are 
prisoners 
under 
the 
definition 
set 
forth 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 801.02(7)(a)2:  
 
"Prisoner" means any person who is incarcerated, 
imprisoned or otherwise detained in a correctional 
institution or who is arrested or otherwise detained 
by a law enforcement officer.  "Prisoner" does not 
include any of the following: 
 
a. A person committed under ch. 980. 
 
b. A person bringing an action seeking relief from a 
judgment terminating parental rights. 
 
c. A person bringing an action seeking relief from a 
judgment of conviction or a sentence of a court, 
including an action for an extraordinary writ or a 
supervisory writ seeking relief from a judgment of 
conviction or a sentence of a court or an action under 
s. 809.30, 809.40, 973.19, or 974.06. 
 
No. 99-1089-OA  
 
 
11
d. A person bringing an action under s. 809.50 seeking 
relief from an order or judgment not appealable as of 
right that was entered in a proceeding under ch. 980 
or in a case specified under s. 809.30 or 809.40. 
 
e. A person who is not serving a sentence for the 
conviction of a crime but who is detained, admitted or 
committed under ch. 51 or 55 or s. 971.14(2) or (5). 
Cramer contends that he satisfies the exception articulated in 
Wis. Stat. § 801.02(7)(a)2.c because a probation revocation is 
equivalent to a judgment of conviction or a sentence. 
¶23 We must determine whether Cramer, a litigant seeking 
certiorari review of the revocation of probation on a withheld 
sentence, is a "prisoner" subject to the PLRA.  Cramer argues 
that he is bringing an action for extraordinary relief from a 
judgment of conviction or sentence.  Whether Cramer is a 
prisoner therefore hinges on whether a writ of certiorari 
challenging a probation revocation is the same as "relief from a 
judgment of conviction or a sentence of a court." 
¶24 We conclude that the words "relief from a judgment of 
conviction or a sentence of a court," as used in Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.02(7)(a)2.c, are unambigious.  The language of the statute 
reveals that the legislature did not intend to analogize 
probation revocation with a judgment of conviction or sentence. 
 Consequently, § 801.02(7)(a)2.c does not exclude Cramer from 
the definition of "prisoner," and he is subject to the filing 
requirements of the PLRA. 
¶25 The first step in statutory interpretation is to begin 
with the language of the statute itself.  Juneau County v. 
Courthouse Employees, 221 Wis. 2d 630, 641, 585 N.W.2d 587 
No. 99-1089-OA  
 
 
12
(1998). 
 
If 
the 
statutory 
language 
clearly 
reveals 
the 
legislative intent, it is our duty to apply that intent and not 
look beyond the plain meaning of the statute.  Kelley Co., 172 
Wis. 2d at 247.  Usually, if a statute is unambiguous, this 
court 
does 
not 
turn 
to 
extrinsic 
evidence 
to 
ascertain 
legislative intent.  Reyes, 227 Wis. 2d at 365. 
¶26 In this case, Cramer and the Wisconsin Court of 
Appeals 
both 
find 
the 
plain 
meaning 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 801.02(7)(a)2.c unambiguous.  We agree.  In enacting Wis. 
Stat. § 801.02(7)(a)2.a-e, the legislature plainly intended to 
shield certain enumerated litigants from PLRA requirements.  But 
§ 801.02(7)(a)2 does not list persons seeking certiorari relief 
from probation revocations among its enumerated exceptions to 
the definition of "prisoner."  If the legislature had intended 
to 
except 
persons 
challenging 
revocation 
by 
a 
writ 
of 
certiorari, it could have done so expressly.  See Meyer v. 
School Dist. of Colby, 226 Wis. 2d 704, 713, 595 N.W.2d 339 
(1999). 
 
¶27 It is a well established principle that probation 
revocation is a civil determination distinct from the underlying 
criminal proceeding that ends in a judgment of conviction and 
sentence.  State ex rel. Flowers, 81 Wis. 2d at 384; State ex 
rel. Marth, 224 Wis. 2d at 583.  After a defendant is convicted 
and sentenced, or placed on probation, the adversarial process 
has essentially concluded.  State v. Horn, 226 Wis. 2d 637, 650-
51, 594 N.W.2d 772 (1999).  Timely post-conviction motions and 
No. 99-1089-OA  
 
 
13
appeals attacking the judgment of conviction or the sentence 
reactivate the criminal proceeding. 
¶28 A petitioner challenging a probation revocation, by 
contrast, seeks relief from a proceeding distinct from the 
criminal process.  A probation revocation is the product of an 
administrative, 
civil 
proceeding 
that 
occurs 
after 
the 
adversarial criminal prosecution has ceased.  Id. at 650.  The 
mechanism for challenging a probation revocation is a writ of 
certiorari 
that 
asks 
a 
circuit 
court 
to 
review 
the 
administrative decision.  Id. at 652; State ex rel. Warren v. 
Schwarz, 211 Wis. 2d 710, 717, 566 N.W.2d 173 (1997).  The 
challenge does not intersect with the continuation of the 
criminal proceedings, and it does not undermine the decision of 
the circuit court that convicted or sentenced the defendant.  A 
revocation decision implicates wide-ranging, intangible factors 
that are irrelevant to the criminal prosecution.  State ex rel. 
Flowers, 81 Wis. 2d at 385.  A writ of certiorari seeking relief 
from the revocation of probation strikes at the correctness of 
the civil decision8 and does not constitute a collateral attack 
on the criminal conviction or the sentence.  These criminal 
determinations may be attacked in other ways. 
                     
8 Certiorari review of probation revocation consists of four 
inquiries: 
 
(1) 
whether 
the 
tribunal 
stayed 
within 
its 
jurisdiction; (2) whether it acted according to law; (3) whether 
its action was arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable and 
represented its will, not its judgment; and (4) whether the 
evidence was such that it might reasonably make the decision 
that it did.  State v. Horn, 226 Wis. 2d 637, 652, 594 N.W.2d 
772 (1999) (citing State ex rel. Warren v. Schwarz, 211 Wis. 2d 
710, 717, 566 N.W.2d 173 (1997)).  
No. 99-1089-OA  
 
 
14
¶29 Moreover, the consequences of a successful challenge 
of a judgment of conviction or sentence and the successful 
challenge of a probation revocation are patently different.  An 
appeal or writ seeking relief from a judgment of conviction or 
sentence implicates the core liberty interest of the defendant. 
 A successful challenge to a probation revocation, however, does 
not disturb the conviction or sentence; it only reinstates the 
probation initially imposed.  Id. at 385-86; see also State ex 
rel. 
Johnson, 
50 
Wis. 2d 
at 
547-48 
(recognizing 
that 
probationers legally are in custody although not confined in a 
penal institution).  Litigants seeking to overturn a probation 
revocation do not seek relief from the sentence.  Instead, they 
pursue a return to probation.   
¶30 The distinction that we draw between the original 
criminal prosecution and the subsequent civil action was 
recognized by the court of appeals in two per curiam decisions. 
 In State ex rel. Marth, 224 Wis. 2d 578, the court interpreted 
a pro se habeas petition as a petition for certiorari review of 
Marth's probation revocation.  Id. at 583.  Turning to a 
decision from the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the 
court explained that "[c]omplaints about denial of parole, 
revocation of parole, and the like, do not affect the validity 
of the criminal sentence, and this litigation therefore cannot 
be 
called 
a 
functional 
continuation 
of 
the 
criminal 
prosecution."  Id. at 582-83 (quoting Newlin v. Helman, 123 F.3d 
429 (7th Cir. 1997), rev'd, Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.2d 1025 (7th 
Cir. 2000)).  The court concluded that probation revocations are 
No. 99-1089-OA  
 
 
15
distinct from underlying criminal proceedings and therefore 
constitute an independent civil action.  Id. at 583. 
¶31 In State ex rel. Stinson v. Morgan, 226 Wis. 2d 100, 
593 N.W.2d 924 (Ct. App. 1999) (per curiam), the prisoner 
challenged the computation of his period of incarceration after 
his parole was revoked, claiming that he sought relief from a 
judgment of conviction or sentence of the court.  Id. at 102-03. 
 The court of appeals relied on Marth and made its decision on 
the substantive contours of the PLRA.  Id.  Like Marth, the 
Stinson court held that the litigant was a prisoner subject to 
PLRA requirements.  Noting that the computation of the period of 
incarceration was determined after parole had been revoked, the 
court concluded that the relief sought would not affect the 
validity of the criminal sentence, and it was not a continuation 
of the criminal prosecution.  Id. at 103-04.  Rather, it was a 
challenge to the implementation of a valid sentence. 
¶32 Equipped with an understanding of these distinctions, 
a reasonably well informed person would conclude that the 
revocation of probation is not synonymous with a judgment of 
conviction or sentence.  Were this court to read relief from 
"probation revocation" into the plain meaning of "relief from a 
judgment of conviction or a sentence," we would blur irrevocably 
the historical lines drawn between the two types of proceedings. 
 More significant, we would insert a broad exception into the 
statute that the legislature did not explicitly enact.  The 
decision to write an exception into a statute is best reserved 
No. 99-1089-OA  
 
 
16
for the legislature.  Motola v. LIRC, 219 Wis. 2d 588, 614, 580 
N.W.2d 297 (1998) (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting). 
¶33 We find that Wis. Stat. § 801.02(7)(a)2.c contemplates 
challenges to a conviction or sentence, not attacks on a 
subsequent civil determination, such as probation revocation.  
The legislature's decision to exclude persons seeking relief 
from a judgment of conviction or sentence preserves the 
appellate review process and grants prisoners otherwise subject 
to the limitations of the PLRA traditional access to the 
judicial system.  Analogizing a probation revocation to the 
judgment of conviction or a sentence of a court would exaggerate 
this legislative purpose by blending together the original 
criminal prosecution with a subsequent civil proceeding. 
¶34 In his brief to this court, Cramer argues that the two 
forms of relief are not distinguishable because by attempting to 
overturn the revocation, he sought to vacate the sentence and 
reinstate probation.  We disagree.  The purpose of Cramer's writ 
of certiorari was to challenge the revocation of his probation, 
the prerequisite to his sentence by the court.  Failure to 
challenge the revocation by writ of certiorari in a timely 
manner is similar to failure to file an appeal in a timely 
manner.  Relabeling the challenge as an attack on the sentence 
cannot resurrect what Cramer waived by his failure to meet 
statutory deadlines.  Before the passage of the PLRA, the right 
to challenge the revocation of probation by a writ of certiorari 
would have been extinguished at six months.  The legislature 
No. 99-1089-OA  
 
 
17
simply determined that the right to challenge by this writ 
should be exercised within 45 days. 
 
¶35 We hold that a person seeking relief from a probation 
revocation by a writ of certiorari does not qualify for the 
exception 
to 
the 
definition 
of 
"prisoner" 
created 
by 
§ 801.02(7)(a)2.c for persons bringing actions for "relief from 
a 
judgment 
of 
conviction 
or 
sentence." 
 
Because 
the 
circumstances of Cramer's writ for certiorari review do not fall 
under this exception, he is a "prisoner" within the meaning of 
the PLRA. 
 
¶36 Having concluded that the Wis. Stat. § 801.02(7)(a)2.c 
is unambiguous, we next consider Cramer's contention that the 
legislative history nonetheless illustrates that the PLRA was 
intended primarily to address frivolous litigation about prison 
conditions. 
¶37 The well established tenets of the plain meaning rule 
preclude courts from resorting to legislative history to uncover 
ambiguities in a statute otherwise clear on its face.  Kelley 
Co., 172 Wis. 2d at 247.  No canon, however, prevents this court 
from examining legislative history "to reinforce and demonstrate 
that a statute plain on its face, when viewed historically, is 
indeed unambiguous."  State v. Martin, 162 Wis. 2d 883, 897 n.5, 
470 N.W.2d 900 (1991); see also Sample, 215 Wis. 2d at 508-09 
(Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).  We better fulfill our duty to 
effectuate 
legislative 
intent 
by 
verifying 
that 
our 
understanding of a statute conforms with its history. 
No. 99-1089-OA  
 
 
18
 
¶38 The inspiration for passage of the PLRA came from the 
federal PLRA, which seeks to curtail malicious and frivolous 
inmate lawsuits about prison conditions.  Draft #7, Aug. 9, 
1996, to 1997 AB 688.  The principal sponsor of 1997 Wis. Act 
133, Representative Robert G. Goetsch, issued a statement about 
the proposed bill, addressing the costs that "nuisance inmate 
lawsuits" generate for Wisconsin taxpayers.  The fiscal estimate 
similarly explained that the "bill aims to reduce frivolous 
prisoner lawsuits related to prison or jail conditions."  LRB 
4463/1, 1997 AB 688. 
 
¶39 Although litigation about prison conditions served as 
the original impetus for passage of 1997 Wis. Act 133, the final 
version of the bill illustrates that the legislature intended to 
address the costly problems caused by prisoner litigation more 
expansively than the federal law.  As passed, the PLRA does not 
exclusively 
target 
lawsuits 
about 
confinement 
conditions.  
"Confinement conditions" themselves are defined broadly:  Under 
Wis. Stat. § 801.02(7)(a)3, "'Prison or jail' conditions means 
any matter related to the conditions of confinement or to the 
effects of actions by government officers, employes or agents on 
the lives of prisoners" (emphasis added).  Similarly, Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.735, 
the 
provision 
establishing 
the 
45-day 
filing 
deadline, is not restricted to claims initiated to contest 
conditions, but rather to any action by a prisoner contesting a 
No. 99-1089-OA  
 
 
19
governmental decision.  As enacted, only four provisions of the 
PLRA expressly are limited to confinement lawsuits.9   
 
¶40 The history of the legislation also reveals that the 
PLRA was not designed exclusively to restrict frivolous lawsuits 
but rather to limit broadly prisoner litigation at taxpayers' 
expense.  In a letter addressing an early draft of 1997 AB 688, 
Joseph Ehmann, First Assistant State Public Defender, recognized 
that the Wisconsin legislation is more far-reaching than the 
federal PLRA:  "The federal statute is, I believe, limited to 
court actions arising from grievances relating to conditions of 
confinement.  Assembly Bill 688 contains no such limitation or 
any limiting language at all.  The bill applies to 'an action' 
(i.e. any action) brought by 'a prisoner.'"  Letter of Joseph 
Ehmann to Criminal Justice and Corrections Committee, Jan. 8, 
1998 p. 1. 
 
¶41 Revisions to the proposed bill indicate that the 
legislature intended to exclude certain types of actions from 
the reach of the PLRA to preserve a distinction between civil 
and criminal proceedings.  An early draft of 1997 AB 688 
provided: 
 
                     
9 These include:  (1) the requirement that prisoners first 
exhaust administrative remedies under Wis. Stat. § 801.02(7)(b); 
(2) a limitation restricting prisoner access to temporary 
injunctions under Wis. Stat. § 813.02(1)(c); (3) a similar 
provision addressing "[i]njunctive relief in prison condition 
cases" under Wis. Stat. § 813.40; and (4) a provision curtailing 
the ability of prisoners to be awarded costs under Wis. Stat. 
§ 814.25(2)(a). 
No. 99-1089-OA  
 
 
20
Review 
by 
common 
law 
writ 
of 
certiorari 
is 
a 
prisoner's exclusive remedy for doing any of the 
following: 
 
1. Challenging the validity of a decision relating to 
prisoner discipline, the revocation of probation or 
the denial or revocation of parole. 
 
2. 
Challenging 
the 
disposition 
of 
a 
complaint 
concerning prison or jail conditions, including a 
complaint concerning a program assignment, institution 
assignment or security classification, for which there 
is an adequate administrative remedy. 
Dec. 30, 1997 Draft of 1997 AB 688, § 13.  Public Defender 
Ehmann suggested that making certiorari review the exclusive 
remedy for challenging revocation conflicted with this court's 
precedent in State ex rel. Vanderbeke v. Endicott, 210 Wis. 2d 
502, 523, 563 N.W.2d 883 (1997), which held "that habeas corpus 
was 
a 
proper 
method 
for 
[a 
defendant] 
to 
use 
in 
challenging . . . probation revocation."  Assistant Attorney 
General Charles D. Hoornstra similarly recommended striking the 
language to "[a]void creating other difficulties with the 
criminal law, particularly in the area of habeas corpus."  
Letter of Charles D. Hoornstra to Hon. Robert Goetsch, Jan. 21, 
1998, p. 2.  The final version of the PLRA did not include this 
provision, indicating that the legislature was cautious about 
intruding into an area in which criminal defendants have the 
option of pursuing constitutional avenues.   
 
¶42 Most significant, the definition of "prisoner" itself 
underwent critical revisions during the genesis of the PLRA.  An 
early draft created no exceptions to the meaning of prisoner set 
forth in Wis. Stat. § 801.02(7)(a)2.  Dec. 30, 1997, Draft of 
No. 99-1089-OA  
 
 
21
1997 AB 688, § 13.  Assistant Attorney General Hoornstra 
proposed 
that 
an 
exception 
be added 
to 
read, 
in 
part: 
"'Prisoner' does not include . . . persons bringing an action 
seeking relief from a judgment of conviction, sentence of a 
court. . . . 
 Actions 
seeking 
relief 
from 
a 
judgment 
of 
conviction or sentence of a court include extraordinary writs 
and supervisory writs seeking relief from a judgment of 
conviction or sentence of a court."  Letter of Charles D. 
Hoornstra to Hon. Robert Goetsch, Jan. 21, 1998, p. 2.   
¶43 Hoornstra explained that the purpose of this addition 
was to "[a]ssure exclusion of the criminal appeals process" from 
the reach of the PLRA.  Id.  Hoornstra's motive for inserting 
the language about writs seeking relief from a "judgment of 
conviction or a sentence of a court" thus distinguishes between 
the original criminal proceeding, which is protected from the 
PLRA by the appellate process, and other civil actions, such as 
certiorari review of probation revocations, that fall under the 
PLRA.  
 
¶44 A January 28, 1998, draft of the legislation modified 
the definition of prisoner and excluded a "person bringing an 
action seeking relief from a judgment of conviction or a 
sentence of a court, including an action for an extraordinary 
writ or a supervisory writ."  Jan. 28, 1998, Draft of 1997 AB 
688, § 13.  The word "writ" in this version was not modified by 
"judgment of conviction or a sentence of a court."  But Assembly 
Amendment 1 to Assembly Substitute Amendment 1, offered on 
January 29 and adopted on February 11, added that modifying 
No. 99-1089-OA  
 
 
22
phrase.  The insertion of the phrase "judgment of conviction or 
sentence of a court" suggests that the legislature, like 
Hoornstra, sought to exclude from the PLRA only those litigants 
pursuing relief from the conviction or sentence. 
¶45 Taken together, the legislative history does not 
support Cramer's theory that a civil action for certiorari 
review of probation revocation is exempt from the requirements 
of the PLRA.  The extrinsic evidence reinforces our conclusion 
that Wis. Stat. § 801.02(7)(a)2.c, when viewed on its face and 
analyzed 
historically, 
unambiguously 
refers 
to 
criminal 
appellants seeking redress from convictions and sentences. 
¶46 Having 
examined 
the 
legislative 
history 
of 
the 
Wisconsin PLRA, we turn to Cramer's reliance on decisions from 
federal courts.  We do not find these decisions interpreting 
federal law controlling with respect to the Wisconsin PLRA.  
¶47 The federal decisions are distinguishable from the 
present case for two reasons.  First, in the federal system, a 
writ of habeas corpus is the usual mechanism for contesting 
revocations.  Federal courts generally agree that habeas corpus 
is a hybrid proceeding that uniquely blends both criminal and 
civil components.  Davis v. Fechtel, 150 F.3d 486, 488 (5th Cir. 
1998); McIntosh v. United States Parole Comm'n, 115 F.3d 809, 
811 (10th Cir. 1997); Blair-Bey v. Quick, 151 F.3d 1036, 1039 
(D.C. Cir. 1998).  The decisions upon which Cramer relies all 
turn on the fact that a habeas petition is not a "civil action." 
 Unlike 
civil 
actions, 
habeas 
proceedings 
attack 
the 
constitutionality of the underlying criminal prosecution.  They 
No. 99-1089-OA  
 
 
23
represent "an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of 
that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is 
to secure release from illegal custody."  McIntosh, 115 F.3d at 
811 (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973)).   
¶48 In Wisconsin, by contrast, a writ of certiorari is the 
common route for reviewing probation revocations, not a habeas 
writ.10  See State ex rel. Reddin v. Galster, 215 Wis. 2d 179, 
183-84, 572 N.W.2d 505 (Ct. App. 1997).  Writs of certiorari are 
civil actions that challenge the decision of an administrative 
body, not the circuit court.  See Horn, 226 Wis. 2d at 652.  The 
federal cases arising as habeas proceedings are not persuasive 
for this case.  Cramer's action is purely a civil one.  He did 
not appeal the original criminal proceeding, and he did not 
attack 
the 
legality 
of 
custody. 
 
Rather, 
Cramer 
sought 
reinstatement of probation.   
 
¶49 Second, the federal courts recognize that "[t]here is 
no evidence that Congress might have relied on a preexisting 
distinction 
between 
'criminal' 
and 
'civil' 
habeas 
corpus 
petitions when it enacted the PLRA."  Davis, 150 F.3d at 490 
(quoting Blair-Bey, 151 F.3d at 1040).  The legislative history 
of the Wisconsin PLRA, on the other hand, suggests that our 
legislature 
sculpted 
a 
distinction 
between 
writs 
seeking 
criminal and civil relief.  The decision to exclude from the 
                     
10 "[R]elief under habeas corpus will not be granted where 
other adequate remedies at law exist."  State ex rel. Reddin v. 
Galster, 215 Wis. 2d 179, 184, 572 N.W.2d 505 (Ct. App. 1997) 
(quoting State ex rel. Dowe v. Circuit Court for Waukesha 
County, 184 Wis. 2d 724, 729, 516 N.W.2d 714 (1994)). 
No. 99-1089-OA  
 
 
24
definition of "prisoner" persons pursuing relief from judgments 
of conviction or sentences was meant to preserve the traditional 
means to attack convictions and sentences but not to afford 
unlimited opportunity to challenge the validity of a civil 
proceeding.  Civil actions, like certiorari review, were not 
accommodated similarly in the drafting of the PLRA. 
 
¶50 Having concluded that Cramer is a prisoner subject to 
the filing requirements of the PLRA, we find that his petition 
for certiorari review was not timely filed under the 45-day 
deadline imposed by Wis. Stat. § 893.735(2).  
CONCLUSION 
¶51 We hold that a petitioner who seeks to overturn the 
revocation of probation by a writ of certiorari is a "prisoner" 
within the meaning set forth in Wis. Stat. § 801.02(7)(a)2 and 
therefore is governed by the provisions created by the PLRA.  A 
probation 
revocation 
is 
not 
analogous 
to 
a 
judgment 
of 
conviction or a sentence, and therefore a writ of certiorari 
challenging revocation is not subject to the exclusion created 
by Wis. Stat. § 801.02(7)(a)2.c.  We conclude that Cramer's writ 
of certiorari seeking review of the Division of Hearings and 
Appeals decision is subject to the 45-day deadline established 
by Wis. Stat. § 893.735(2).  We therefore deny his petition for 
declaratory relief.  We expressly do not address whether the 
PLRA applies to prisoners situated in out-of-state facilities. 
 
By the Court.—Rights declared and relief denied. 
 
No. 99-1089-OA  
 
 
25
 
 
99-1089-OA.awb 
 
1 
¶52 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (dissenting). The majority 
declares 
that 
litigants 
seeking 
to 
overturn 
a 
probation 
revocation are not really requesting relief from a sentence but 
rather are merely seeking a return to probation.  This is a 
distinction without a substantive difference.  Why do litigants 
want to return to probation?  The obvious answer is that they 
seek relief from a sentence.   
¶53 Yet, the majority elevates form over substance to deny 
the petitioner his right of access to the courts of this state. 
 Its rigid construction of probation revocations as civil 
proceedings subject to PLRA ignores the essence of such actions 
in the present context and also finds little support in the text 
or purpose of the statute.  Rather, these sources reveal that a 
petitioner challenging probation revocation via a writ of 
certiorari does not fall under the definition of "prisoner" set 
forth in Wis. Stat. § 801.02(7)(a)2 and therefore is not subject 
to PLRA's filing requirements. 
¶54 Wisconsin Stat. § 801.02(7)(a)2.c provides that for 
the purposes of PLRA a prisoner does not include "a person 
bringing . . . an action for an extraordinary writ or 
supervisory writ seeking relief from a judgment of conviction or 
a sentence of a court."  This statute unambiguously exempts from 
its ambit writs of certiorari challenging probation revocations. 
 Certiorari represents an extraordinary remedy, Tobler v. Door 
County, 158 Wis. 2d 19, 24, 461 N.W.2d 775 (1990), and 
challenges to probation revocation seek relief from the sentence 
that will be imposed upon a sustained revocation.   
99-1089-OA.awb 
 
2 
¶55 The majority unconvincingly endeavors to distinguish 
certiorari challenges to probation revocation by asserting that 
a petitioner instituting such a challenge does not seek relief 
from a sentence but rather seeks a reinstatement of probation.  
Majority op. at ¶29.  This is a formalistic distinction without 
a substantive difference.   
¶56 As a practical matter, the sole reason to challenge a 
probation revocation is to seek relief from the sentence 
resulting from that revocation.  A successful challenge to the 
revocation invalidates the sentence and restores probation.  In 
essence, a reinstatement of probation constitutes relief from 
the sentence that would be imposed upon a sustained revocation. 
 State v. Balgie, 76 Wis. 2d 206, 208-09, 251 N.W.2d 36 (1977). 
 Thus, the majority misses the mark in its attempt to create a 
palpable 
difference 
between 
the 
words 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 801.02(7)(a)2.c and probation revocation proceedings. 
¶57 Admittedly, by its nature a probation revocation is a 
civil proceeding.  State v. Horn, 226 Wis. 2d 637, 651, 594 
N.W.2d 772 (1999).   As a constitutional matter, it is not a 
stage of a criminal prosecution.  See State ex rel. Vanderbeke 
v. Endicott, 210 Wis. 2d 502, 513, 563 N.W.2d 883 (1997) (citing 
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973)).  However, the 
label attached to a revocation of probation is a matter of 
semantics in the present context and obscures the essence of the 
interests at stake. 
¶58 Probation revocations implicate a loss of liberty, and 
 thus a probationer is entitled to due process of the law before 
99-1089-OA.awb 
 
3 
probation may be revoked.  Vanderbeke, 210 Wis. 2d at 513-14.  
See also Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973).  A 
probationer's personal liberty "includes many of the core values 
of unqualified liberty and its termination inflicts a 'grievous 
loss' on the [probationer] and often on others.   Morrissey v. 
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972). 
¶59 The United States Supreme Court has recognized that 
notwithstanding the general line drawn between civil and 
criminal cases, when a "fundamental interest [is] at stake" the 
State must provide civil litigants access to its judicial 
processes without regard to a litigant's ability to comply with 
filing requirements.  See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 113 
(1996) (court fees).  Because a certiorari challenge to 
probation 
revocation 
implicates 
the 
fundamental 
right 
of 
personal liberty, due process is triggered.   
¶60 Denying a revoked probationer's access to the courts 
for failing to meet a narrow 45-day filing limit would be 
antithetical to the guarantees of due process.  It is doubtful 
that the legislature intended to foreclose the probationer's 
participation 
in 
the 
judicial 
process 
simply 
because 
a 
revocation is by nature a civil proceeding.    
¶61 Indeed, the civil/criminal distinction forged by the 
majority to support its application of PLRA to probation 
revocations 
becomes 
particularly 
tenuous 
when 
the 
other 
exceptions under Wis. Stat. § 801.02(7)(a)2 are examined.  See 
State v. Williams, 198 Wis. 2d 516, 527, 544 N.W.2d 406 (1996). 
  PLRA's reach does not extend to persons civilly committed 
99-1089-OA.awb 
 
4 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
chs. 
51, 
55, 
or 
980. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 801.02(7)(a)2.a, 2.e.  The statute also does not apply to a 
person challenging the termination of parental rights.  Wis. 
Stat. § 801.02(7)(a)2.b.   
¶62 Both the institutional commitment of persons and the 
termination of parental rights are by definition civil actions. 
Yet, the legislature sheltered these civil proceedings from the 
requirements of PLRA in likely recognition that the requirements 
may infringe upon the fundamental rights implicated by such 
proceedings.       
¶63 The majority's attempt to support the extension of 
PLRA 
to 
probation 
revocation 
challenges, 
which 
involve 
fundamental liberty interests, is therefore not compelling in 
light of the exemption of similar civil proceedings from the 
scope of PLRA.  To the extent that the majority fears excluding 
certiorari challenges to probation revocations "would blur 
irrevocably the historical lines drawn between" civil and 
criminal proceedings, the majority fails to reconcile the 
expressed legislative intent to exclude a number of civil 
actions from the ambit of PLRA.  Majority op. at ¶32.    
¶64 PLRA's underlying purpose supports the interpretation 
that 
its 
provisions 
do 
not 
govern 
probation 
revocation 
challenges.  As the majority concedes, the primary intent 
driving the passage of PLRA centered on deterring frivolous 
prisoner lawsuits relating to conditions of confinement because 
these civil lawsuits were considered a waste of time and money. 
 See Majority op. at ¶38.  Additionally, the legislature 
99-1089-OA.awb 
 
5 
intended to conform the Wisconsin PLRA to the federal PLRA 
provisions. See Background Commentary to 1997 SB 388, Draft #7, 
p. 2-3, August 9, 1996 (original bill).  
¶65 However, the majority claims that the Wisconsin PLRA 
expanded beyond the scope of the federal statute and was "not 
designed exclusively to restrict frivolous lawsuits, but rather 
to limit broadly prisoner litigation at taxpayers' expense."  
Majority op. at ¶40.  It is perplexing that the majority 
apparently 
considers challenges to 
restriction 
of liberty 
tantamount to frivolous lawsuits that impose a heavy tax burden 
on the constituents of the state.  Without justification, the 
majority raises fiscal and administrative convenience above the 
core liberty interests at issue in probation revocations.    
  
¶66 Several federal 
courts have 
determined 
that the 
federal PLRA does not encompass habeas revocation challenges.  
See Davis v. Fechtel, 150 F.3d 486, 490 (5th Cir. 1998); Blair-
Bey v. Quick, 151 F.3d 1036, 1039-40 (D.C. Cir. 1998); McIntosh 
v. United States Parole Comm'n, 115 F.3d 809, 811 (10th Cir. 
99-1089-OA.awb 
 
6 
1997).11  Although the state PLRA closely tracks the federal 
statute, the majority undertakes to distinguish these federal 
cases by emphasizing the label of the revocation challenge 
rather than examining the essence of the challenge. 
¶67 The majority dismisses the persuasive authority of the 
federal cases by maintaining that habeas corpus represents the 
"usual mechanism for contesting" revocations in federal court, 
while a writ of certiorari represents the "common route" in 
Wisconsin.  Majority op. at ¶¶47-48.  The majority offers no 
cogent explanation as to how these two extraordinary writs 
differ to any substantive degree when both are issued to 
challenge revocations.  This effort to create a stark disparity 
between the two writs is inconsistent with Wisconsin precedent 
recognizing that revocations may be reviewed via habeas corpus 
as well as through certiorari.  Vanderbeke, 210 Wis. 2d at 522-
23.    
¶68 Moreover, the majority's reliance earlier in its 
analysis on the per curiam decision in State ex rel. Marth v. 
                     
11 A significant number of federal courts hold that the 
federal PLRA does not apply to habeas corpus petitions in 
general.  See Davis v. Fechtel, 150 F.3d 486, 490 (5th Cir. 
1998); Blair-Bey v. Quick, 151 F.3d 1036, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1998); 
Kincade v. Sparkman, 117 F.3d 949, 951 (6th Cir. 1997); McIntosh 
v. United States Parole Comm'n, 115 F.3d 809, 811 (10th Cir. 
1997); United States v. Levi, 111 F.3d 955, 956  (D.C. Cir. 
1997); Anderson v. Singletary, 111 F.3d 801, 804-05 (11th Cir. 
1997); Naddi v. Hill, 106 F.3d 275, 277 (9th Cir. 1997); Santana 
v. United States, 98 F.3d 752, 755-56 (3d Cir. 1996); Martin v. 
United States, 96 F.3d 853, 855 (7th Cir. 1996); Reyes v. Keane, 
90 F.3d 676, 678 (2d Cir. 1996), overruled on other grounds, 
Lindh v. Murphy, 520 U.S. 320 (1997); Frazier v. Hesson, 40 
F. Supp. 2d 957, 967 (W.D. Tenn. 1999). 
99-1089-OA.awb 
 
7 
Smith, 224 Wis. 2d 578, 592 N.W.2d 307 (Ct. App. 1999), weakens 
its effort to separate state certiorari proceedings from federal 
habeas actions.  Marth involved a Wisconsin probationer who 
filed a habeas petition claiming errors in his probation 
revocation proceeding.  Id. at 581.   
¶69 In reaching the conclusion that PLRA requirements 
applied to the probationer's habeas petition because he was a 
prisoner within the meaning of the statute, the court of appeals 
relied primarily upon a federal habeas case that applied PLRA's 
provisions to a habeas parole revocation review.  See Newlin v. 
Helman, 123 F.3d 429 (7th Cir. 1997), overruled on other 
grounds, Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 1026 (7th Cir. 2000).  
Newlin represented the minority view that habeas corpus is 
strictly a civil proceeding, and the case was subject to oft-
cited criticism. See Davis, 150 F.3d at 489-90; Blair-Bey, 151 
F.3d at 1039.  By affirming the validity of Marth, majority op. 
at ¶30, the majority in turn implicitly validates Newlin.  
¶70 It is ironic that the majority dismisses federal 
habeas case law that contradicts its interpretation of PLRA by 
asserting the distinction between writs of habeas corpus and 
writs of certiorari.  Yet when, as in Newlin, such federal 
habeas law supports its statutory interpretation, the majority 
shelves the distinction between the two writs.  To validate a 
case that relies upon federal habeas law while simultaneously 
asserting that the federal habeas cases provide no persuasive 
99-1089-OA.awb 
 
8 
authority is inconsistent and undercuts the majority's legal 
analysis.12 
¶71 Although 
certiorari 
challenges 
to 
probation 
revocations are civil proceedings by definition, they implicate 
fundamental liberty interests.  A prisoner instituting a 
certiorari 
action 
is 
thus 
exempted 
from 
PLRA's 
filing 
requirements under the words of the statute and in accordance 
with its underlying purposes. Because the majority emphasizes 
formalism over substance to hold otherwise, I dissent.  
¶72 I am authorized to state that SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, 
CHIEF JUSTICE, joins this dissenting opinion. 
 
                     
12 It is also worth noting that the federal PLRA's 
definition of prisoner is more expansive than the one adopted by 
the Wisconsin legislature.  See 28 USC § 1915(h).  Yet the 
federal courts that have interpreted the definition have 
exempted parole revocation from the statute's requirements.  See 
Davis, 150 F.3d at 490; Blair-Bey, 151 F.3d at 1039-40; 
McIntosh, 115 F.3d at 811.   
Because the Wisconsin PLRA excludes a larger class of 
persons from the reach of PLRA's filing requirements, it is 
incongruous to conclude that the state statute provides more 
stringent filing requirements than does the federal statute.  
Rather, if the expansive definition of prisoner under the 
federal statute exempts challenges to probation revocations from 
statutory requirements, it is logical that a more limited 
definition of prisoner under the Wisconsin PLRA would thereby 
exclude probation revocation challenges.  
99-1089-OA.awb 
 
9 
 
 
99-1089-OA.awb 
 
1