Title: ASHIKIAN v. STATE ex rel. OKLAHOMA HORSE RACING COMM.
Citation: 188 P.3d 148, 2008 OK 64
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: July 1, 2008

ASHIKIAN v. STATE ex rel. OKLAHOMA HORSE RACING COMM. Annotate this Case ASHIKIAN v. STATE ex rel. OKLAHOMA HORSE RACING COMM. 2008 OK 64 188 P.3d 148 Case Number: 103386 Decided: 07/01/2008 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA Cynthia Ashikian Plaintiff/Appellee v. State of Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Horse Racing Commission ex rel. Blue Ribbon Downs Board of Stewards Defendants/Appellants ON CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIV. IV ¶0 The State of Oklahoma seeks certiorari review of a Court of Civil Appeals' decision that affirms a district court's summary judgment for the plaintiff. John C. Garrett, trial judge, Sequoyah County District Court, held an order of the Blue Ribbons Downs Race Track Board of Stewards to be void for lack of jurisdiction. THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' DECISION IS VACATED AND THE TRIAL JUDGE'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART Neal Leader, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for Appellant Albert R. Matthews, Bonds & Matthews Law Firm, P.L.L.C., Muskogee, Oklahoma, for Appellee ¶1 The issue presented on certiorari is whether the Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) erred in affirming a trial judge's summary judgment for plaintiff/appellee, whose terms declare an order of the Blue Ribbon Downs Board of Stewards to be void for want of jurisdiction. We answer in the negative. I. THE ANATOMY OF LITIGATION ¶2 Cynthia Ashikian (Ashikian or trainer) trains and races horses for a living throughout the United States and Canada. In October, 2000 she was issued a license by the Oklahoma Horse Racing Commission (OHRC or Commission) and raced her horses at the Blue Ribbon Downs Race Track from 25 November through 10 December 2000. Her license expired by its own terms on 31 December of that year. ¶3 At the end of the season the race track claimed Ashikian owed $462.00 for stall rental. On 5 January 2001 the Board of Stewards (Stewards) for Blue Ribbon Downs sent her a letter apprising her of this unpaid liability.2 The debt was not paid, and on 18 March the Stewards sent Ashikian notice to appear at a hearing to determine if she was in violation of the track's financial responsibility rules. The notice was sent by certified mail to the Houston, Texas address she provided the OHRC in her license application. It was not forwarded to her.3 She failed to appear at the 18 April 2001 hearing. The Stewards' order, issued on her default, provides that she was "suspended/ineligible for licensing pending settlement of her financial obligation."4 ¶4 In April, 2001 Ashikian was granted a racing license by the Iowa Racing and Gaming Commission (IRGC). She raced her horses there from April through June that year. Several of her horses earned prize money. In early July she learned of the action taken against her in Oklahoma. She tendered the amount due and was restored to good standing with the OHRC. Pending settlement of this obligation, the Iowa Board of Stewards learned of the action taken against her in Oklahoma and ordered her to disgorge all monies won by her horses in Iowa.5 The Iowa Department of Inspections and Appeals affirmed this order. ¶5 In May, 2002 Ashikian sought an order from the District Court, Sequoyah County, declaring the Stewards' order to be void and awarding her an attorney's fee and costs. She urged (1) she did not receive notice of the hearing6 and (2) the Stewards' order was void for want of jurisdiction because (a) their jurisdiction over her matter had terminated and had not been timely extended and (b) they lacked authority to declare her to be "suspended/ineligible." The appellants (OHRC and the Stewards, represented by the Attorney General will be collectively referred to as appellants or state) responded by a motion to dismiss, urging Ashikian's claim was an impermissible collateral attack on an unappealed final order.7 The trial court denied this motion, and its ruling is not tendered for our review. Ashikian then filed a motion for summary judgment asserting the Stewards' order is void for want of jurisdiction. The trial judge granted trainer's motion and awarded her costs and an attorney's fee.8 COCA affirmed the decision. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶6 Summary process is a special pretrial procedural track pursued with the aid of acceptable probative substitutes.9 It is a search for undisputed material facts which, sans forensic combat, may be utilized in the judicial decision-making process.10 Summary relief is permissible where neither the material facts nor any inferences that may be drawn from uncontested facts are in dispute, and the law favors the movant's claim or liability-defeating defense.11 Only those evidentiary materials which eliminate from trial some or all fact issues on the merits of the claim or defense may afford legitimate support for nisi prius resort to summary process for a claim's total or partial adjudication.12 III. COCA'S RULING AND THE ISSUE TO BE DECIDED ON CERTIORARI ¶8 COCA affirmed the trial judge's summary judgment for Ashikian and ruled the Stewards' order was void for want of jurisdiction. This was so because although the Stewards had the authority to prohibit the trainer from obtaining a new license, its jurisdiction had expired for want of a timely extension by the Commission. COCA's decision was bottomed on the provisions of OHRC Rule 325:1-1-7 ¶9 The state disagrees with this interpretation of OHRC Rule 325:1-1-7. It also continues to urge that Ashikian's district-court challenge is an impermissible collateral attack on the Stewards' order. This is so because (1) she lodged neither a timely appeal nor a review proceeding for relief from the order IV. A. THE MATERIALS AVAILABLE FOR OUR REVIEW UPON A CHALLENGE TO THE AGENCY'S JURISDICTION ¶10 Absent a timely judicial review in accordance with the terms of the Administrative Procedures Act, ¶11 According to the state, nothing in the administrative record (the administrative equivalent of a district court's judgment roll) reveals a want of subject-matter jurisdiction by the Stewards. ¶12 Ashikian's petition before the district court asserts the Stewards' jurisdiction had not been extended prior to 10 January 2001. The exhibits submitted with her petition reveal that the race meeting ended on 10 December 2000 and the Stewards' order was issued on 18 April 2001. B. THE BOARD OF STEWARDS' AUTHORITY WAS NOT TIMELY EXTENDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF OHRC RULE 325:1-1-7, AND ITS ORDER WAS HENCE VOID FOR WANT OF SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION ¶13 Having settled those materials which are properly available for a reviewing court's cognizance when a jurisdictional challenge is brought, we turn next to COCA's ruling that the Stewards did not possess subject-matter jurisdiction over today's cause in accordance with the terms of OHRC Rule 325:1-1-7. We repeat that the sentence in controversy provides, "[i]n the event a dispute or controversy arises during a race meeting which is not settled within the Stewards' thirty-day jurisdiction, then the authority of the Stewards may be extended by authority of the Commission for the period necessary to resolve the matter, . . ." [emphasis ours] ¶14 The state urges the same rules that may be invoked for construction of statutes apply with equal force to administrative rules. ¶15 The argument calls for our construction of the Commission's administrative rule. Although the state is correct in its recitation of those legal rules that generally govern administrative-rule interpretation, its recapitulation of them is incomplete. We must give administrative rules, as well as statutes, a sensible construction, bearing in mind the evils intended to be avoided. ¶16 The issue is whether the terms of OHRC Rule 325:1-1-7 authorize that the Stewards' jurisdiction be revested in the absence of a timely extension. To adopt the state's interpretation of the text would mean the jurisdiction of the Stewards could, in essence, be extended indefinitely. An extension of jurisdiction conferred in perpetuity following a lapse of time is an unacceptable construction of the rule. It would lead to an absurd result for two reasons. First, to view the rule's terms so as to confer unlimited jurisdiction upon the Stewards contradicts their clearly circumscribed authority revealed in the preceding sentence. C. ATTORNEY'S FEE ALLOWANCE ¶17 Lastly, the trial judge's summary ruling for Ashikian which allowed her a reasonable attorney's fee lacks supporting authority.45 As a general rule, an attorney's fee is not recoverable by a prevailing party in the absence of a statute or an enforceable contract.46 Because we are aware of no authority for a counsel-fee allowance in a case like that before us today - and none has been cited to us - the award must be reversed. V. SUMMARY ¶18 The trainer's district-court challenge to the Stewards' order was not an impermissible collateral attack launched upon it. The OHRC failed timely to extend the Board of Stewards' authority to deal with unresolved race-meet matters in accordance with the terms of OHRC Rule 325:1-1-7. The Board's order was hence ineffective for want of power. The trial judge's allowance of an attorney's fee is unsupported by legal authority. ¶19 The Court of Civil Appeals' opinion is vacated, and the trial court's summary judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part. ¶20 WINCHESTER, C.J., EDMONDSON, V.C.J., HARGRAVE, OPALA, KAUGER AND COLBERT, JJ., CONCUR ¶21 WATT, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART ¶22 TAYLOR, J. DISSENTS ¶23 REIF, J., DISQUALIFIED FOOT