Title: State v. Richey
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2021AP000142-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: December 9, 2022

2022 WI 106 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2021AP142-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Charles W. Richey, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 401 Wis. 2d 195, 973 N.W.2d 18 
(2022 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 9, 2022   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 6, 2022   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Marathon   
 
JUDGE: 
Gregory J. Strasser   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, and KAROFSKY, 
JJ., joined. ROGGENSACK, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in 
which ZIEGLER, C.J., and HAGEDORN, J., joined.   
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Vicki Zick and Zick Legal, LLC, Johnson Creek. There 
was an oral argument by Vicki Zick.  
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Nicholas S. DeSantis, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an 
oral argument by Nicholas S. DeSantis, assistant attorney 
general.  
 
 
2022 WI 106 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2021AP142-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2018CF0510) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Charles W. Richey, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
FILED 
 
DEC 9, 2022 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, and KAROFSKY, 
JJ., joined. ROGGENSACK, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in 
which ZIEGLER, C.J., and HAGEDORN, J., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded.   
 
¶1 
REBECCA 
FRANK 
DALLET, 
J.,   The 
Fourth 
Amendment 
requires a police officer to have particularized reasonable 
suspicion that a crime or non-criminal traffic violation took 
place before performing a traffic stop.   Here, a stop based on 
the generic description of a Harley-Davidson motorcycle recently 
seen driving erratically in the area fell short of that 
threshold.  We therefore reverse the court of appeals' decision.     
No. 
2021AP142-CR   
 
2 
 
I 
 
¶2 
Officer Alexis Meier was on patrol in the Village of 
Weston at 10:59 PM on a Saturday night in late April.  Over the 
radio, she heard a report that a sheriff's deputy was 
investigating a disabled motorcycle at a nearby intersection.  
After just fifteen seconds, the deputy cleared that stop without 
explanation.  Five minutes later, at 11:04 PM, that same 
sheriff's deputy told nearby officers to be on the lookout for a 
Harley-Davidson motorcycle driving erratically and speeding 
north on Alderson Street (near the intersection with Jelenik 
Avenue)——approximately a mile away from the location he had 
given for the disabled motorcycle.  The sheriff's deputy did not 
give any additional details about either the motorcycle or its 
driver.  Officer Meier later said that she believed that the 
motorcycle the deputy saw on Alderson Street was fleeing police.      
 
¶3 
Five minutes after the deputy's report, at 11:09 PM, 
Officer Meier spotted a motorcycle driving east on Schofield 
Avenue a little more than a block west of the intersection with 
Alderson Street——about a half-mile from the reported location of 
the speeding Harley.  Traffic was light at that time of night.  
Additionally, Officer Meier had seen relatively few motorcycles 
out that early in the year and none around the time of the 
No. 
2021AP142-CR   
 
3 
 
deputy's report.1  Meier looked up the registration, which showed 
that it was a Harley-Davidson registered to Richey.  She 
followed the Harley-Davidson for several blocks, but did not see 
any erratic driving, speeding, or other traffic violations.  
Meier nevertheless performed a traffic stop, suspecting that 
this Harley-Davidson was the one seen driving erratically on 
Alderson Street five minutes earlier.   
 
¶4 
After the stop, Officer Meier learned that Richey was 
the driver and developed evidence supporting an arrest for his 
eighth operating while intoxicated (OWI) offense.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)6. (2017-18).2  Richey moved to suppress 
that evidence, arguing that the stop violated the Fourth 
Amendment because it was not supported by reasonable suspicion.   
 
¶5 
At the suppression hearing, Officer Meier testified to 
the facts described above and marked the location of the 
relevant events on a printout from Google Maps.  The circuit 
                                                 
1 Officer Meier's testimony at the suppression hearing was 
somewhat inconsistent on this point.  Although she repeatedly 
testified that she had not "observed any motorcycles around 
th[e] time" of the sheriff's deputy's report, she also said at 
one point that she did not notice other motorcycles on the road 
during her shift, which began at 6:00 PM.  She later clarified, 
however, that she only started looking for motorcycles after 
receiving the deputy's report and did not recall if other 
motorcycles were out that day.  The circuit court did not make a 
finding 
of 
fact 
about 
whether 
Officer 
Meier 
saw 
other 
motorcycles during her shift.   
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version. 
No. 
2021AP142-CR   
 
4 
 
court3 received that map into evidence, but the copy contained in 
the record is faded, and would not be easily readable in this 
opinion.  To aid the reader, we instead include a map we 
reproduced from that one.  As with the map Officer Meier marked, 
ours labels the location of the relevant events as follows:  The 
word "disabled" shows where the sheriff's deputy investigated 
the disabled motorcycle at 10:59 PM; the north-pointing arrow 
and letter "D" marks the spot and direction of travel of the 
Harley-Davidson the sheriff's deputy saw driving erratically and 
at high speed at 11:04 PM; "A" identifies the place where Meier 
first saw Richey's Harley-Davidson at 11:09 PM; and "S" 
signifies the location of the stop moments later. 
                                                 
3 The Honorable Gregory J. Strasser of the Marathon County 
Circuit Court presided. 
No. 
2021AP142-CR   
 
5 
 
¶6 
The circuit court denied Richey's suppression motion, 
concluding that Officer Meier had reasonable suspicion to stop 
Richey.  In doing so, the circuit court relied in large part on 
the fact that Richey's motorcycle was a Harley-Davidson, that 
Richey was driving in the same general area as the reported 
erratic driver five minutes after the deputy's report, and the 
officer's testimony that there were relatively few motorcycles 
on the road that early in the year and at that time of night.  
The court of appeals affirmed on substantially similar grounds.  
See State v. Richey, 2021AP142-CR, unpublished slip op., at ¶¶7-
9 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2022).   
No. 
2021AP142-CR   
 
6 
 
II 
¶7 
Whether officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct a 
traffic stop is a legal question that we review de novo, 
accepting the circuit court's findings of fact unless they are 
clearly erroneous.  See State v. Genous, 2021 WI 50, ¶10, 397 
Wis. 2d 293, 961 N.W.2d 41.   
III 
¶8 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures."  
Investigative stops, including traffic stops, are seizures and 
must therefore comply with the Fourth Amendment.  See State v. 
Floyd, 2017 WI 78, ¶20, 377 Wis. 2d 394, 898 N.W.2d 560.   
¶9 
To conduct an investigative stop, the police must have 
"reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is 
afoot."  Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000); see also 
State v. Houghton, 2015 WI 79, ¶30, 364 Wis. 2d 234, 868 
N.W.2d 143 (explaining that traffic stops can also be based on 
reasonable suspicion of a non-criminal traffic violation).  
Reasonable suspicion must be founded on concrete, particularized 
facts warranting suspicion of a specific individual, not 
"'inchoate and unparticularized suspicion[s] or hunch[es].'"  
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 
(1968)).  We assess reasonable suspicion in light of the 
totality of the circumstances.  See United States v. Cortez, 449 
U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981).  Thus, we look at the "whole picture" 
No. 
2021AP142-CR   
 
7 
 
to determine whether the officer had reasonable suspicion, not 
each fact in isolation.  Id. at 417.   
 
¶10 The 
whole 
picture 
here 
includes 
the 
following 
information known to Officer Meier before she stopped Richey's 
motorcycle:  
 A Harley-Davidson was driving erratically and speeding 
north on Alderson Street towards Schofield Avenue five 
minutes earlier.   
 Meier first saw Richey's motorcycle driving east on 
Schofield Avenue a little more than a block west of the 
intersection with Alderson Street——about a half-mile from 
the reported location of the speeding Harley. 
 Richey's motorcycle was a Harley-Davidson and was the only 
motorcycle she saw around the time of the deputy's report.   
 Meier followed Richey for several blocks but did not 
observe any speeding, erratic driving, or other traffic 
violations.   
 Traffic was light that night, and Meier had seen relatively 
few motorcycles out that early in the year.   
It is undisputed that the only reason Officer Meier pulled 
Richey over is she suspected he was the erratic driver the 
deputy saw five minutes earlier.  The question is whether that 
suspicion was reasonable.   
 
¶11 Although we acknowledge that it is a close question, 
we hold that the stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion.  
To clear the reasonable-suspicion threshold, Officer Meier's 
suspicions had to be particularized; she needed concrete reasons 
No. 
2021AP142-CR   
 
8 
 
for believing that Richey's Harley-Davidson and the one seen 
five minutes earlier speeding north on Alderson Street were one 
and the same.  See Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418 (reasonable suspicion 
requires reason to believe "that the particular individual being 
stopped [wa]s engaged in wrongdoing").  But the sheriff's 
deputy's generic description of a Harley-Davidson gave her very 
little to work with.  See State v. Guzy, 139 Wis. 2d 663, 677, 
407 N.W.2d 548 (1987) (explaining that "the particularity of the 
description of the offender or the vehicle in which he fled" is 
a relevant part of the reasonable-suspicion analysis (quotation 
omitted)).  Except for the manufacturer, she knew nothing 
specific about the Harley the deputy saw——not the model, type,4 
size, or color, let alone a license plate number.  Nor did she 
know anything about the driver, what he or she was wearing, 
whether he or she wore a helmet, or even whether the driver 
appeared to be a man or a woman.  And although she followed 
Richey for several blocks before initiating the stop, there is 
no indication that she radioed the deputy during that time to 
ask for more details.   
 
¶12 The State nevertheless argues that Officer Meier's 
suspicions were particularized because Richey's motorcycle "fit 
a highly specific and particular description."  Namely, it was a 
Harley driving in the same general area as the deputy's report 
                                                 
4 At the suppression hearing, Officer Meier was asked 
whether the deputy "indicate[d] the type of Harley-Davidson, 
like, a Sportster, Road Glide, Softail, Touring big bike; 
anything like that?"  She responded "[n]o[t] that I recall, no."       
No. 
2021AP142-CR   
 
9 
 
late in the evening and at a time of year when relatively few 
motorcycles were on the roads.  These facts are part of the 
totality of the circumstances, but they are not enough to 
transform Officer Meier's hunch into particularized reasonable 
suspicion.  See Guzy, 139 Wis. 2d at 677 (stating that "the 
size" and "number of persons about in th[e] area" are relevant 
to determining reasonable suspicion (quotation omitted)).  For 
starters, the "highly specific" description of a Harley-Davidson 
could apply to a large number of vehicles.  See generally United 
States v. Street, 917 F.3d 586, 594 (7th Cir. 2019) ("Terry does 
not authorize broad dragnets . . . .  Without more, a 
description that applies to large numbers of people will not 
justify the seizure of a particular individual.").  After all, 
Wisconsin is the home of Harley-Davidson, and it is one of, if 
not the most popular manufacturers of motorcycles in Wisconsin.  
Although reasonable suspicion is a low bar, it is not so low 
that it allows the State to stop so many otherwise law-abiding 
citizens based on such a generic description.  See id.  
Additionally, although the circuit court found that it was "the 
beginning, very beginning, of [motorcycle] season," it also 
acknowledged that "[c]ertainly, people drive their bikes in 
April."   
¶13 That Richey's Harley was spotted close to the location 
of the deputy's call just five minutes later does not add much 
to the particularity of Officer Meier's suspicions either.  
Although proximity in time and place to a report of criminal 
activity can, under some circumstances, provide some of the 
No. 
2021AP142-CR   
 
10 
 
particularity that is otherwise lacking in a report of criminal 
activity, see State v. Nimmer, 2022 WI 47, ¶¶31-32, 402 
Wis. 2d 416, 
975 
N.W.2d 598, 
Richey's 
exact 
location 
and 
direction of travel raise more questions than they answer.  See 
Guzy, 139 Wis. 2d at 677 (identifying "the elapsed time since 
the crime occurred," "known or probable direction of . . . 
flight," and "observed activity by the particular person 
stopped" as factors in the totality of the circumstances 
(quotation omitted)).  Returning to the map above, the letter 
"D" marks where the deputy saw the erratic driver, and the arrow 
shows the direction of travel.  Although Richey was seen in that 
general area five minutes later, at the spot marked with the 
letter "A," we note that Richey was headed east on Schofield 
Avenue towards the intersection with Alderson Street at that 
time.  In other words, Richey was driving towards the reported 
location of the erratic and speeding driver when Officer Meier 
first saw him.  Given that Officer Meier thought the erratic 
driver was fleeing police that would be a strange choice.  
Additionally, counsel for both parties acknowledged at oral 
argument that the speed limits in the area were likely the 25 or 
30 mile-per-hour limits applicable to most city streets.  Even 
at normal speed, it would take only about a minute to travel 
from the location of the deputy's report to where the officer 
saw Richey, and a driver fleeing police at high speed could have 
gone much farther in the same amount of time.  Thus, in order 
for Richey to have been the subject of the deputy's report, he 
would have had to have driven north on Alderson Street at high 
No. 
2021AP142-CR   
 
11 
 
speed, ridden around the general area for several minutes, and 
eventually looped back in the direction he came from while now 
driving normally.  This unlikely sequence of events, when 
coupled with the deputy's generic description of a Harley-
Davidson headed north on Alderson Street, demonstrates that 
Officer Meier's suspicions were not sufficiently particular to 
Richey.  See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 998 F.2d 883, 884-85 
(10th Cir. 1993) (concluding that a description of a black 
Mercedes 
containing 
two 
African-American 
men 
was 
not 
particularized because officers had no additional details about 
the vehicle and stopped a black Mercedes "not traveling from the 
direction of" the report "on a street that, by the officers' own 
admission, could only be reached . . . by a circuitous route").   
¶14 Our conclusion that Officer Meier lacked reasonable 
suspicion is further illustrated by one of the cases on which 
the State principally relies, State v. Rissley, 2012 WI App 112, 
344 Wis. 2d 422, 824 N.W.2d 853.  In Rissley, a homeowner 
reported that a man driving a beige Chevrolet minivan confronted 
him in his driveway late at night.  See id., ¶¶2-3.  The 
homeowner immediately called police, describing both the van and 
its driver, and relaying details about the route it took as it 
drove away from his house.  See id., ¶3.  Police were 
dispatched, and saw a beige van along the route the homeowner 
described while he was still on the phone with the dispatcher.  
See id., ¶¶4-5.  Once police caught up with the driver, never 
having lost sight of him, they stopped the van.  See id., ¶5.  
The court of appeals held that the officer in Rissley had 
No. 
2021AP142-CR   
 
12 
 
reasonable suspicion, while also noting that "this is not a 
situation where a citizen simply reports the make and color of 
the car and the direction initially traveled and then loses 
sight of the vehicle so that the pursuing officer has to use 
some combination of logic and guesswork to locate the fleeing 
vehicle."  Id., ¶16.   
¶15 This 
case 
is 
more 
like 
the 
court 
of 
appeals' 
hypothetical in Rissley than it is like the facts of that case.  
Here, the sheriff's deputy reported a Harley-Davidson driving 
erratically north on Alderson Street at high speed and then lost 
sight of it.  And Officer Meier had to use a combination of 
logic and guesswork to locate that motorcycle.  The problem is 
that, unlike in Rissley, the deputy gave Officer Meier little on 
which to ground her logic.  She did not know anything about the 
motorcycle other than that it was a Harley-Davidson and she knew 
nothing about its driver.  And the timing and location at which 
Officer Meier first saw Richey did not fill those gaps, since 
these facts support only a tenuous inference that Richey was the 
motorcyclist Officer Meier was looking for.5  Accordingly, we 
hold that, in light of the totality of the circumstances, 
                                                 
5 Officer Meier called the sheriff's deputy after stopping 
Richey.  After he arrived on the scene, he confirmed that Richey 
was not the motorcyclist he saw earlier on Alderson Street.  
Because she did not know that at the time of the stop, however, 
it is not relevant to the reasonable-suspicion analysis.  See 
State v. Nimmer, 2022 WI 47, ¶26, 402 Wis. 2d 416, 975 
N.W.2d 598 ("We must 'consider everything observed by and known 
to the officer[]'" that performed the stop (quoting State v. 
Genous, 2021 WI 50, ¶10, 397 Wis. 2d 293, 961 N.W.2d 41)).   
No. 
2021AP142-CR   
 
13 
 
Officer Meier lacked reasonable suspicion to perform the stop.  
We therefore reverse the decision of the court of appeals and 
remand to the circuit court with instructions to vacate the 
judgment of conviction and to grant Richey's motion to suppress.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.      
 
No.  2021AP142-CR.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶16 PATIENCE 
DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK, 
J.   (dissenting).  
Reasonable suspicion is a common-sense test based on the 
totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time 
of the seizure.  Stated otherwise, "was the action of law 
enforcement 
officers 
reasonable 
under 
all 
the 
facts 
and 
circumstances present[.]"  State v. Guzy, 139 Wis. 2d 663, 679, 
407 N.W.2d 548 (1987).  Reasonable suspicion includes all 
factual circumstances and the reasonable inferences arising from 
those facts.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).  I conclude 
that the record before us fully supports reasonable suspicion to 
stop Charles W. Richey; and therefore, evidence of Richey's 
eighth 
Operating 
While 
Intoxicated 
(OWI) 
violation 
was 
admissible.  There is nothing in the record that allows us to 
conclude 
Officer 
Meier's 
inference 
that 
Richey 
was 
the 
motorcyclist her colleague warned of was unreasonable.  Because 
the majority opinion refuses to accept reasonable inferences 
from undisputed facts, it enables Richey to achieve suppression 
of evidence of drunk driving that was apparent after he was 
stopped.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶17 On April 28, 2018, at approximately 11:00 p.m., Deputy 
D'Acquisto of the Marathon County Sheriff's Office broadcast 
over police radio that there was a disabled motorcycle at the 
intersection of Business 51 and Schofield Avenue in the Village 
of Weston.  Deputy D'Acquisto cleared that report but almost 
immediately asked officers to check the area for a motorcycle 
that he observed driving erratically at a high rate of speed 
No.  2021AP142-CR.pdr 
 
2 
 
northbound on Alderson Street from Jelinek Avenue in the Village 
of Weston.  He described the motorcycle as a Harley-Davidson 
motorcycle.   
¶18 When Officer Meier received the report from Deputy 
D'Acquisto, she testified that she had "not observed any 
motorcycles" in her area, where the traffic "was very light."  
Shortly after hearing from Deputy D'Acquisto, she saw a 
motorcycle "in the same area as where Deputy D'Acquisto had 
stated he last saw the motocycle."  Officer Meier said the 
motorcycle "was within a half mile" of where Deputy D'Acquisto 
reported seeing the motorcycle.   
¶19 When Officer Meier observed the motorcycle, she "did a 
registration check showing that this motorcycle was indeed a 
Harley-Davidson motorcycle."  She performed the traffic stop "in 
the area of Schofield Avenue and Glad Street in the Village of 
Weston."  That stop occurred about five minutes after Deputy 
D'Acquisto radioed for officers to keep a lookout for a Harley-
Davidson motorcycle.  Richey's motorcycle was "the first one 
[Officer Meier] saw within that five-minute time period."  
¶20 Deputy Meier explained:  
I made the traffic stop due to the information in 
which Deputy D'Acquisto had broadcast regarding the 
Harley-Davidson traveling at a high rate of speed and 
driving erratically within the area, and due to the 
fact it was the only Harley-Davidson motorcycle which 
I had observed in the area.  Also . . . as well as the 
time of night being 11:00 p.m.  There was very light 
traffic at that time.   
The circuit court concluded that the undisputed facts and the 
reasonable inferences from those facts were sufficient to 
No.  2021AP142-CR.pdr 
 
3 
 
support reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop.  The court of 
appeals affirmed.  
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶21 Whether undisputed facts and the reasonable inferences 
from those facts are sufficient to conduct an investigative stop 
presents a question of law for our independent review.  State v. 
Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d 51, 54, 556 N.W.2d 681 (1996).  
B.  Reasonable Suspicion 
¶22 Traffic stops are seizures.  Therefore, they implicate 
the Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable seizures.  
In State v. Chambers, 55 Wis. 2d 289, 294, 198 N.W.2d 377 
(1972), we "adopted the position of the United States Supreme 
Court that a police officer may in appropriate circumstances 
temporarily stop an individual when, at the time of the stop, he 
or she possesses specific and articulable facts which would 
warrant a reasonable belief that criminal activity was afoot."  
Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d at 55.    
¶23 The question here is at what point does societal 
interest in investigating a reported law violation rise to the 
level of reasonably supporting an investigative stop.  Guzy, 139 
Wis. 2d at 676.  LaFave has identified six factors that we have 
concluded should be considered in assessing whether the facts 
and 
the 
reasonable 
inferences 
from 
those 
facts 
support 
reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop:   
(1) [T]he particularity of the description of the 
offender or the vehicle in which he fled; (2) the size 
of the area in which the offender might be found, as 
indicated by such facts as the elapsed time since the 
No.  2021AP142-CR.pdr 
 
4 
 
crime occurred; (3) the number of persons about in 
that area; (4) the known or probable direction of the 
offender's 
flight; 
(5) observed 
activity 
by 
the 
particular 
person 
stopped; 
and 
(6) knowledge 
or 
suspicion that the person or vehicle stopped has been 
involved in other criminality of the type presently 
under investigation.   
3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 9.3(d), at 461 (2d ed. 
1987).   
¶24 Here, Officer Meier clearly articulated that only five 
minutes before she saw Richey, she was asked to be on the 
lookout for a Harley-Davidson motorcycle that another officer 
had observed speeding and driving in a reckless manner.  When 
she saw Richey, she called in the license plate on his cycle and 
confirmed that his bike was a Harley-Davidson.  Her sighting was 
within the geographic area in which the speeding motorcyclist 
was seen.  In addition, she had seen no other motorcycles in 
that area and it was late at night when she stopped Richey.   
¶25 Furthermore, it was reasonable to infer that Richey 
was the driver of the Harley-Davidson another officer had 
reported as speeding and committing other traffic violations.  
Richey was present in the same area as the reported traffic 
violator; his presence was within five minutes of Deputy 
D'Acquisto's report and request that other officers be on the 
lookout for a Harley-Davidson motorcyclist.  It was late at 
night and Officer Meier had seen no other motorcycles.  April 
28, the date of the stop, also was too early in the season for 
many motorcyclists to be out.  It was possible that if Officer 
Meier did not act "immediately the opportunity for further 
investigation would be lost[.]"  Guzy, 139 Wis. 2d at 678.  "A 
No.  2021AP142-CR.pdr 
 
5 
 
minimal amount of facts may, under these circumstances, be given 
greater weight than if the opportunity to act in the future is 
not foreclosed."  Id.   
¶26 It also is important to our analysis to note that 
there is nothing in the record that causes the inference that 
Richey was the driver of the Harley-Davidson motorcycle that 
Deputy D'Acquisto had seen speeding five minutes earlier to be 
an unreasonable inference.  The majority opinion does not 
address why the brief period of time after the lookout was 
called and the defined location of the traffic violation that 
are part of the reasonable suspicion analysis, as LaFave and we 
required in Guzy, do not support reasonable suspicion.  Id. at 
677 (explaining "[w]e agree that these factors are helpful and 
conclude that these factors must be considered in reaching the 
required determination.").   
¶27 The facts are not in dispute and reasonable inferences 
from those facts support reasonable suspicion that it was Richey 
who was speeding and driving his motorcycle in a reckless 
fashion.1  Based on the officer's articulable facts, it was not 
unreasonable to stop Richey on that night.  Accordingly, I would 
affirm the court of appeals and I dissent from the majority 
opinion.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
                                                 
1 The majority opinion takes the extraordinary tact of 
recreating a map based on a poor one in the record and then 
testifying itself as to the map of the area that no witness 
testified to in court.  Majority op., ¶¶5, 13.    
No.  2021AP142-CR.pdr 
 
6 
 
¶28 Reasonable 
suspicion 
includes 
all 
factual 
circumstances and the reasonable inferences arising from those 
facts.  I conclude that the record before us fully supports 
reasonable suspicion to stop Richey; and therefore, evidence of 
Richey's eighth OWI violation was admissible.  There is nothing 
in the record that allows us to conclude Officer Meier's 
inference that Richey was the motorcyclist her colleague warned 
of was unreasonable.  Because the majority opinion refuses to 
accept reasonable inferences from undisputed facts, it enables 
Richey to achieve suppression of evidence of drunk driving that 
was apparent after he was stopped.  Accordingly, I respectfully 
dissent. 
¶29 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER and Justice BRIAN K. HAGEDORN join this 
dissent. 
No.  2021AP142-CR.pdr 
 
 
 
1