Title: Lenard James Philmore v. State Of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC04-1036
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: May 25, 2006

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC04-1036 
____________ 
 
LENARD JAMES PHILMORE,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC05-250 
____________ 
 
 
LENARD JAMES PHILMORE,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
JAMES R. MCDONOUGH, etc.,  
Respondent. 
 
[June 15, 2006] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
In 2002, this Court affirmed Lenard James Philmore’s sentence of death.  
See Philmore v. State, 820 So. 2d 919 (Fla. 2002).  Philmore now appeals an order 
 
 
- 2 -
of the circuit court denying a motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and petitions the Court for a writ of habeas corpus.  
We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  For the reasons 
explained in this opinion, we affirm the trial court’s order and deny the petition for 
a writ of habeas corpus. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Philmore was convicted of first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit 
robbery with a deadly weapon, carjacking with a deadly weapon, kidnapping, 
robbery with a deadly weapon, and third-degree grand theft based upon the events 
surrounding the 1997 abduction and murder of Kazue Perron.  The facts of this 
case are fully set forth in this Court’s opinion on direct appeal.  See Philmore, 820 
at 923-25.  Briefly stated, on November 14, 1997, Philmore and codefendant 
Anthony Spann devised a plan to rob a bank to obtain money to travel to New 
York.  See id. at 923.  Spann told Philmore that to facilitate this robbery they 
would need to steal a getaway vehicle and kill the driver of the vehicle they stole.  
See id.     
They ultimately spotted Perron driving a gold Lexus in a residential 
community, and the two followed her. 
At approximately 1 p.m., Perron entered the driveway of a 
friend with whom she intended to run errands.  Upon entering the 
driveway, Spann told Philmore to “get her.”  Philmore approached the 
driver’s side of the vehicle and asked Perron if he could use her 
phone.   Perron stated that she did not live there, and Philmore took 
 
 
- 3 -
out his gun and told Perron to “scoot over.”   Philmore drove Perron’s 
car, with Spann following in his Subaru. . . .    
 
. . . . 
Philmore and Spann passed a side road in an isolated area in 
western Martin County, and Spann flashed his lights, indicating that 
they turn around and head down the road.  Philmore chose the place to 
stop.  Philmore ordered Perron out of the vehicle and ordered her to 
walk towards high vegetation containing maiden cane, which is a tall 
brush. . . .  Philmore then shot her once in the head.  Philmore picked 
up Perron’s body and disposed of it in the maiden cane.  Spann did 
not assist in disposing of the body. 
Id. at 924. 
 
Philmore and Spann drove the two vehicles to Indiantown, where Philmore 
entered the bank and took approximately $1100 that a teller was counting.  After 
robbing the bank, Philmore and Spann returned to the Lexus, which they had 
parked a short distance from the bank, and concealed the Subaru.  See id.  After a 
high-speed chase on Interstate 95, the two were apprehended hiding in an orange 
grove.  See id. at 925.   
From November 15 through November 26, Philmore gave 
several statements to the police in which he ultimately confessed that 
he robbed the bank and abducted and shot Perron.  On November 21, 
Philmore led the police to Perron’s body, which was found in the 
maiden cane.  Philmore was charged in a six-count indictment, and 
the jury found Philmore guilty on all counts. 
 
Id. (footnote omitted).  
 
During the penalty phase, several witnesses who were the victims of 
previous crimes committed by Philmore testified for the State.  Perron’s husband, 
Jean Claude Perron, and Perron’s friend, Chandra Bill, also testified, describing 
 
 
- 4 -
their relationships with Perron and discussing Perron’s positive impact on the lives 
of others.     
In mitigation, Philmore’s family members testified that he was both the 
victim and witness of physical and mental abuse by his father, that he witnessed 
the murder of his niece when he was thirteen years old and subsequently started 
drinking, and that he suffered a number of injuries to his head.  These witnesses 
also testified about Philmore’s relationship with codefendant Spann.  In an attempt 
to establish statutory mitigation factors, Philmore also presented the expert 
testimony of Dr. Frank Wood and Dr. Robert Berland.  In rebuttal, the State 
presented the testimony of Dr. Gregory Landrum and Dr. Helen Mayberg.      
The jury recommended the death penalty by a vote of twelve to zero.  See 
Philmore, 820 So. 2d at 925.  After weighing the aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances, the trial court followed the jury’s recommendation and sentenced 
Philmore to death.1  
                                          
 
 
1.  The trial court found five aggravating circumstances: (1) Philmore was 
previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or 
threat of violence to the person; (2) the capital felony was committed while 
Philmore was engaged in the commission of a kidnapping; (3) the capital felony 
was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest; (4) the 
capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain; and (5) the capital felony was 
committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of 
moral or legal justification.  See id.  The trial court found no statutory mitigation 
but found the following nonstatutory mitigation: (1) Philmore was both the victim 
and witness of physical and verbal abuse by an alcoholic father; (2) Philmore has a 
history of extensive drug and alcohol abuse; (3) Philmore suffered severe 
 
 
- 5 -
Philmore raised eleven issues on direct appeal.2  The Court denied without 
prejudice Philmore’s claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel 
related to his preindictment statements to law enforcement officers regarding 
Perron’s abduction and murder.  See id. at 928-29.  The Court rejected all of 
Philmore’s other arguments as either unpreserved or meritless and affirmed 
Philmore’s convictions and sentence of death.  See id. at 940. 
Philmore filed a timely motion for postconviction relief under rule 3.851, in 
which he raised multiple claims.  The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing at 
which Philmore presented testimony on his claims that trial counsel was ineffective 
                                                                                                                                        
emotional trauma and subsequent posttraumatic stress; (4) Philmore was molested 
or raped, or both, at a young age; (5) Philmore was classified as severely 
emotionally handicapped; (6) Philmore has exhibited the ability to form close 
loving relationships; (7) Philmore cooperated with the State; and (8) Philmore has 
expressed remorse for causing the death of Perron.  See id. at 925-26. 
 
 
2.  These issues were:  (1) the trial court erred in failing to suppress 
Philmore’s statements to law enforcement officers; (2) the trial court erred in 
allowing the State to exercise a peremptory challenge against prospective juror 
Tajuana Holt; (3) the trial court erred in denying Philmore’s motion to exclude a 
photograph depicting Perron; (4) the State made improper arguments throughout 
the guilt phase; (5) the State made improper arguments throughout the penalty 
phase; (6) the trial court erred in compelling a mental health examination of 
Philmore by the State’s expert witness, and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 
3.202 is unconstitutional; (7) the trial court erred in finding the “cold, calculated, 
and premeditated” aggravator; (8) the trial court erred in finding the “avoid arrest” 
aggravator; (9) the trial court erred in rejecting the “under the influence of extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance” statutory mitigator; (10) the trial court erred in 
rejecting the “substantial domination of another” statutory mitigator; and (11) the 
trial court erred in rejecting the “impairment of capacity to appreciate the 
criminality of conduct” statutory mitigator.  See id. at 926 n.11. 
 
 
 
- 6 -
during jury selection, during the penalty phase, and in conceding Philmore’s guilt 
and that preindictment counsel provided ineffective assistance by allowing 
Philmore to give multiple statements to police.  
Thomas Garland, Philmore’s lead trial counsel, who conducted voir dire and 
was primarily responsible for the penalty phase, testified regarding his recollection 
of his actions during trial preparation and trial.3  Dr. Michael Maher, an expert in 
forensic psychiatry, examined Philmore before trial and participated in a pretrial 
deposition, but was never called to testify at trial.  Dr. Maher testified at the 
hearing that had he been called at trial he would have testified that Philmore 
suffers from organic brain injury and that at the time of the murder Philmore was 
operating under extreme mental or emotional disturbance, and that his capacity to 
appreciate the criminality of his conduct was substantially impaired.  John 
Hetherington, the assistant public defender who represented Philmore prior to his 
indictment on the kidnapping and murder charges, testified regarding his 
recollection of the events that led to Philmore’s confession that he shot Perron.  
Lastly, Philmore’s mother testified about her conversations with Hetherington 
during his representation of Philmore.   
The trial court issued a comprehensive order denying relief, and Philmore 
                                          
 
 
3.  Chip Bauer, who was appointed as second chair and was primarily 
responsible for the guilt phase, did not testify at the hearing. 
 
 
- 7 -
appeals, raising four issues for this Court’s review.4  Philmore also petitions for a 
writ of habeas corpus, raising six claims for relief.5         
ANALYSIS 
A. 
MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF 
On appeal, Philmore asserts that the trial court erred in denying several of 
his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.  Because the trial court denied these 
claims after holding an evidentiary hearing, the Court defers to the trial court’s 
factual findings to the extent that they are supported by competent, substantial 
evidence, but reviews de novo the application of the law to those facts.  See 
                                          
 
 
4.  These issues are: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying Philmore’s 
claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the State’s use of a 
peremptory strike to remove juror Holt; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying 
Philmore’s claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel prior to his 
arrest for the murder of Perron; (3) whether the trial court erred in denying 
Philmore’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase for 
failing to present evidence that Philmore suffered from organic brain damage; and 
(4) whether the trial court erred in denying Philmore’s claim that trial counsel was 
ineffective during the guilt phase for conceding Philmore’s guilt. 
 
 
5.  These claims are:  (1) Philmore’s death sentence is invalid because the 
trial court ignored expert testimony that, if considered, would have established 
statutory mitigation; (2) Philmore’s death sentence is unconstitutional under 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 
(2002); (3) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to prosecutorial 
misconduct and appellate counsel was ineffective to the extent that appellate 
counsel failed to litigate the cumulative effect of this misconduct; (4) the 
instructions to the jury unconstitutionally diluted the jury’s role in sentencing; (5) 
cumulative procedural and substantive errors deprived Philmore of a fair trial; and 
(6) Philmore’s Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment will 
be violated because he may be incompetent at the time of execution.        
 
 
- 8 -
Stephens v. State, 748 So. 2d 1028, 1031-32 (Fla. 1999). 
To obtain relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel Philmore 
must establish  
deficient performance and prejudice, as set forth in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  See  Rutherford v. State, 727 So. 
2d 216, 218 (Fla. 1998).  As to the first prong, deficient performance, 
a defendant must establish conduct on the part of counsel that is 
outside the broad range of competent performance under prevailing 
professional standards.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.  Second, as to 
the prejudice prong, the deficient performance must be shown to have 
so affected the fairness and reliability of the proceedings that 
confidence in the outcome is undermined.  See id. at 694; Rutherford, 
727 So. 2d at 220. 
Gore v. State, 846 So. 2d 461, 467 (Fla. 2003) (parallel citations omitted).  
“[W]hen a defendant fails to make a showing as to one prong, it is not necessary to 
delve into whether he has made a showing as to the other prong.”  Waterhouse v. 
State, 792 So. 2d 1176, 1182 (Fla. 2001).  Further, as the United States Supreme 
Court explained in Strickland, 
[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly 
deferential. . . .  A fair assessment of attorney performance requires 
that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of 
hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged 
conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the 
time.  Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a 
court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls 
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance . . . .  
466 U.S. at 689.  We address each of Philmore’s issues on appeal below. 
1. 
Ineffective Assistance of Preindictment Counsel 
 
 
- 9 -
In his motion, Philmore asserted that preindictment representation by 
attorney John Hetherington was ineffective assistance of counsel for several 
reasons:  (1) Hetherington failed to investigate Philmore’s case before advising 
Philmore to give incriminating statements to police; (2) Hetherington allowed 
Philmore to give incriminating statements to police after Hetherington knew 
Philmore would implicate himself in Perron’s murder; (3) Hetherington was not 
present when Philmore gave statements to police; and (4) Hetherington failed to 
secure a plea agreement prior to allowing Philmore to give statements to police.  
The trial court addressed this claim in a comprehensive order that included ten 
pages of detailed findings.  We commend the trial court for conducting a thorough, 
well-reasoned analysis of this claim and conclude that the trial court’s 
determination that Hetherington’s actions were informed, strategic choices is 
supported by competent, substantial evidence.6   
At the hearing, Hetherington testified at length regarding his decisions 
during his representation of Philmore.  Although Hetherington could not recall 
exactly when in the sequence of Philmore’s confessions he learned of specific 
                                          
 
 
6.  Because we conclude that Philmore has failed to establish that he 
received ineffective assistance of counsel during police questioning, we decline to 
address the State’s argument that Philmore’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel for 
the murder had not attached at this time.  Cf. Smith v. Rogerson, 171 F.3d 569, 572 
(8th Cir. 1999) (declining to consider exactly when the defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel “came into play” because the merits of the 
defendant’s arguments showed that he had not met the Strickland test).                
 
 
- 10 -
pieces of information, Hetherington consistently testified that his advice to 
Philmore to cooperate was based on Philmore’s statements, first that Philmore was 
not involved in the abduction and then that Philmore was not the shooter.  
Hetherington also testified that while he views information given by defendants 
with some skepticism, he believed Philmore because Hetherington had information 
that Spann was wanted for other murders.  After it became apparent that Philmore 
had lied about his lack of involvement in the abduction, Hetherington admonished 
Philmore about telling Hetherington the truth.  Hetherington believed that Philmore 
understood the importance of being honest and would no longer be untruthful.   
Hetherington also advised Philmore not to speak with law enforcement 
officers or submit to polygraph examinations if Philmore was not being candid 
about his role in Perron’s murder.  Philmore nonetheless chose to make statements 
to law enforcement officers.  Philmore presented no evidence to rebut 
Hetherington’s testimony that Philmore wanted to speak to law enforcement 
officers even after counsel advised him of the risk.   
Moreover, Philmore’s first statement to police after Hetherington began  
representing him was consistent with what Philmore had told Hetherington—that 
he was not involved in Perron’s abduction or murder.  It was Philmore’s 
spontaneous statement prior to the first polygraph examination that exposed his  
deceit.  The trial court found that even if Hetherington had been present at this 
 
 
- 11 -
time, Hetherington could not have stopped Philmore from admitting that he was 
present during the abduction.7  Hetherington testified that after Philmore’s first 
confession about his involvement in the abduction, Hetherington had to reevaluate 
his strategy.  Hetherington stated that he believed that if Philmore was not the 
shooter, Philmore’s best chance to avoid the death penalty was to present Philmore 
as a cooperating nonshooter who played a minor role in the felony murder.  Once 
Philmore admitted he was the shooter, Hetherington believed that Philmore had 
nothing to lose by making additional statements to law enforcement officers.    
In sum, the evidence presented at the hearing supports the trial court’s 
finding that “Mr. Hetherington’s actions . . . were informed, strategic choices, 
based on the information that Mr. Hetherington had at the time, which were 
substantially influenced by the Defendant’s own statements and wishes, which 
seemed reasonable in consideration of all the facts and circumstances known to 
Mr. Hetherington at the time each statement was made.”  Accordingly, Philmore 
has failed to establish that Hetherington provided ineffective assistance of counsel.  
See Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1048 (Fla. 2000) (“[S]trategic decisions 
do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been 
considered and rejected and counsel’s decision was reasonable under the norms of 
professional conduct.”).      
                                          
 
 
7.  Philmore told police that he was involved in abducting Perron but that he 
had no knowledge about what happened to her.    
 
 
- 12 -
2. 
Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel During Jury Selection  
Philmore next asserts that the trial court erred in denying his claim that trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the State’s use of a peremptory 
strike to remove juror Holt, an African-American female.  Specifically, Philmore 
argues that trial counsel failed to adequately challenge the State’s proffered reason 
for the strike as pretextual.   
In making this argument, Philmore appears to be seeking review of the 
validity of the strike.  This substantive issue was raised and addressed on direct 
appeal and is therefore procedurally barred.  See Kimbrough v. State, 886 So. 2d 
965, 983 (Fla. 2004) (concluding that to the extent the defendant seeks review of 
the substantive issue underlying his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the 
claim is procedurally barred because it could have been raised on direct appeal).    
To the extent Philmore contends that trial counsel was ineffective, we  
conclude that Philmore cannot establish prejudice.  On direct appeal, Philmore 
argued that “the trial court erred in granting the State’s peremptory challenge 
regarding prospective juror Tajuana Holt, because the State’s reason for excusing 
her was pretextual and she was in fact stricken because of her race.”  Philmore, 820 
So. 2d at 929.  We first concluded that the claim had been waived because 
“although Philmore objected at the time the State sought to exercise a peremptory 
strike of Holt, he failed to renew his objection prior to the jury being sworn.”  Id. at 
 
 
- 13 -
930.  However, we also addressed the merits of Philmore’s claim and determined 
that “it has no merit because the State has advanced a facially race-neutral non-
pretextual reason for peremptorily challenging Holt.”  Id.  Therefore, any alleged 
deficiency in counsel’s performance in challenging the State’s strike of juror Holt 
did not “so affect[] the fairness and reliability of the proceedings that confidence in 
the outcome is undermined.”  Gore, 846 So. 2d at 467.  The trial court correctly 
denied this claim for relief. 
3. 
Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel During the Penalty Phase 
In his next issue on appeal, Philmore asserts that the trial court erred in 
rejecting his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present Dr. 
Maher to explain the presence of organic brain damage in support of the statutory 
mitigator that Philmore suffered from extreme mental or emotional disturbance.  
This Court has recognized that “the obligation to investigate and prepare for the 
penalty portion of a capital case cannot be overstated.”  State v. Lewis, 838 So. 2d 
1102, 1113 (Fla. 2002).  “[A]n attorney has a strict duty to conduct a reasonable 
investigation of a defendant’s background for possible mitigating evidence.”  
Ragsdale v. State, 798 So. 2d 713, 716 (Fla. 2001) (alteration in original) (quoting 
State v. Riechmann, 777 So. 2d 342, 350 (Fla. 2000)); see also Wiggins v. Smith, 
539 U.S. 510, 522-23 (2003) (“[The] principal concern in deciding whether 
[counsel] exercised ‘reasonable professional judgmen[t]’ is not whether counsel 
 
 
- 14 -
should have presented a mitigation case.  Rather, [the] focus [is] on whether the 
investigation supporting counsel’s decision not to introduce mitigating 
evidence . . . was itself reasonable.”).  However, when evaluating claims that 
counsel was ineffective for failing to present mitigating evidence, the defendant 
has the burden of showing that counsel’s ineffectiveness “deprived the defendant 
of a reliable penalty phase proceeding.”  Rutherford v. State, 727 So. 2d 216, 223 
(Fla. 1998). 
 
In denying this claim, the trial court ruled that Philmore “failed to overcome 
the presumption that his attorney’s actions under the circumstances were sound 
strategy” and “failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced.”  In reaching this 
conclusion, the trial court found that Dr. Maher’s opinions were inconsistent with 
the trial testimony of defense experts Dr. Wood and Dr. Berland.  Specifically, the 
trial court found that Dr. Maher’s opinion that Philmore’s organic brain injury was 
in the frontal lobe was inconsistent with Dr. Wood’s testimony at trial that the area 
of the abnormality was to the back left side of Philmore’s brain.  The trial court 
also found that Dr. Maher’s testimony that he did not believe that Philmore was 
under the substantial domination of another would have undermined Dr. Berland’s 
testimony that Philmore was under the substantial domination of codefendant 
Spann.     
Philmore asserts that because Dr. Berland’s conclusions had already been 
 
 
- 15 -
impeached by the State, the prospect of conflicting expert testimony by Drs. 
Berland and Maher on the substantial domination mitigator did not justify the 
decision not to call Dr. Maher.  Even if Dr. Maher would have been more 
successful at establishing statutory mitigation than Dr. Berland, the standard for 
assessing ineffective assistance claims “is not how present counsel would have 
proceeded, in hindsight, but rather whether” the defendant has established both 
deficient performance and prejudice under Strickland.  Brown v. State, 846 So. 2d 
1114, 1121 (Fla. 2003) (quoting Cherry v. State, 659 So. 2d 1069, 1073 (Fla. 
1995)).  Moreover, Philmore’s presentation of a conflicting expert opinion would 
have further undermined the defense’s credibility.  Trial counsel “cannot be 
deemed ineffective for not presenting . . . conflicting opinions.”  Jones v. State, 
855 So. 2d 611, 618 (Fla. 2003).    
Philmore also asserts that the trial court’s finding that Garland made a 
tactical decision not to call Dr. Maher is not supported by the record.  Garland 
testified that he decided not to call Dr. Maher at trial after reviewing Dr. Maher’s 
report and deposition and speaking to Dr. Maher several times.  Although Garland 
did not explain with specificity his reasons for not utilizing Dr. Maher, Garland 
clearly considered this alternative and rejected it.  We conclude that the trial court 
did not err in finding that Philmore failed to establish that Garland’s decision not to 
call Dr. Maher to testify was deficient performance.   
 
 
- 16 -
Even if Garland’s decision not to call Dr. Maher to testify could be 
considered deficient performance, this failure did not “deprive[] the defendant of a 
reliable penalty phase proceeding.”  Rutherford, 727 So. 2d at 223.  Garland 
presented two experts and several lay witnesses to establish mitigation.  Our 
confidence in the outcome of the penalty phase is not undermined by the absence 
of Dr. Maher’s testimony even though the State had some success impeaching Dr. 
Berland’s testimony.  Further, given the impeachment of Dr. Berland and Dr. 
Wood, it is likely that the State would also have had some success in contradicting 
Dr. Maher’s conclusions.  Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of this 
claim for relief.  
4. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Conceding Philmore’s Guilt  
In Philmore’s final issue on appeal, he asserts that the trial court erred in 
denying his claim that trial counsel was ineffective during the guilt phase for 
conceding Philmore’s guilt of the conspiracy to commit robbery, carjacking, 
kidnapping, and robbery charges, and to the lesser included offense of second-
degree murder.  The trial court found that the concessions were a reasonable trial 
tactic and that Philmore consented to this strategy.   
The only evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing on this issue was the 
testimony of Garland.  He stated that because Philmore had already confessed to 
the murder and been sentenced to life imprisonment in another case, the strategy 
 
 
- 17 -
was to save Philmore’s life.  Although Garland could not remember the details of 
the discussions he and Chip Bauer had with Philmore about this strategy, Garland 
recalled Philmore being aware of and consenting to this strategy.  Accordingly, 
there is competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that 
Philmore consented. 
Contrary to Philmore’s assertion, this case is not like Nixon v. State, 857 So. 
2d 172 (Fla. 2003), rev’d, Florida v. Nixon, 125 S. Ct. 551 (2004), on remand 31 
Fla. L. Weekly S245 (Fla. April 20, 2006).  In Nixon, this Court concluded that no 
competent, substantial evidence existed to support the trial court’s finding that 
Nixon consented to trial counsel’s strategy of conceding guilt because trial counsel 
testified that Nixon did nothing when trial counsel discussed this strategy with him.  
See 857 So. 2d at 176.  In this case, Garland testified that Philmore expressly 
consented to the strategy to concede his guilt.  Moreover, this Court’s requirement 
in Nixon that a defendant must affirmatively and explicitly agree to a strategy to 
concede guilt was overruled by Florida v. Nixon, 125 S. Ct. 551, 563 (2004), in 
which the United States Supreme Court held:    
When counsel informs the defendant of the strategy counsel believes 
to be in the defendant’s best interest and the defendant is 
unresponsive, counsel’s strategic choice is not impeded by any 
blanket rule demanding the defendant’s explicit consent. Instead, if 
counsel’s strategy, given the evidence bearing on the defendant’s 
guilt, satisfies the Strickland standard, that is the end of the matter; no 
tenable claim of ineffective assistance would remain. 
 
 
- 18 -
Accordingly, Philmore’s reliance on this Court’s 2003 decision in Nixon to support 
his claim of ineffective assistance is without merit.  We affirm the trial court’s 
denial of relief on this claim.                   
B.  PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
1. 
Trial Court’s Failure to Consider Expert Testimony  
 
In Philmore’s first claim for habeas relief, he argues that the trial court erred 
in failing to consider Dr. Wood’s testimony in support of the mitigating factor that 
Philmore suffered from an extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time of 
the offense.  A trial court’s rejection of mitigating circumstances is an issue that is 
properly raised on direct appeal.  Cf. White v. State, 729 So. 2d 909, 911 n.4 (Fla. 
1999) (concluding that the postconviction court properly rejected as procedurally 
barred the claim that the trial court applied an improper standard in rejecting 
mental health mitigation).  In fact, Philmore argued on direct appeal that the trial 
court erred in rejecting the statutory mitigator that Philmore suffered from an  
extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the murder.  This Court 
concluded that the trial court’s rejection of this mitigating circumstance was 
supported by competent, substantial evidence.  See Philmore, 820 So. 2d at 937.  
Philmore’s claim that the trial court erred in failing to consider Dr. Wood’s 
testimony in support of this mitigation is procedurally barred.  Cf. Griffin v. State, 
866 So. 2d 1, 18 (Fla. 2003) (concluding that the defendant’s claim that the trial 
 
 
- 19 -
court’s sentencing order failed to consider and weigh unrefuted mitigating 
evidence presented at trial was procedurally barred because it could have been 
raised on direct appeal); Cherry v. Moore, 829 So. 2d 873, 876 (Fla. 2002) 
(concluding that defendant’s claim that the trial court did not consider a psychiatric 
report in evaluating mitigation was procedurally barred because it was raised on 
direct appeal).    
To the extent that Philmore attempts to raise this issue as an ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel claim, we deny relief.  Philmore’s assertion that 
appellate counsel was ineffective for not arguing that the trial court erred in failing 
to consider Dr. Wood’s testimony in relation to this mitigation is merely an 
additional argument in support of the claim previously raised on direct appeal.  We 
addressed in detail Philmore’s claim that the trial court erred in rejecting the 
statutory mitigator that Philmore suffered from an extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance at the time of the murder, and noted the “trial court’s thorough 
consideration” of the issue.  Philmore, 820 So. 2d at 937.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that Philmore’s ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim is 
without merit.   
 
2. 
Constitutionality of Florida’s Death Penalty Statute 
Philmore next argues that Florida’s death penalty statute is unconstitutional 
as applied to him under Apprendi v.  New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Ring v. 
 
 
- 20 -
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  However, Philmore states that he is raising this 
issue only to preserve it for possible federal review.  Further, this Court has held 
that Ring does not apply retroactively.  See Johnson v. State, 904 So. 2d 400, 412 
(Fla. 2005).   
To the extent that Philmore attempts to raise this issue as an ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel claim, we deny relief.  “If a legal issue ‘would in all 
probability have been found to be without merit’ had counsel raised the issue on 
direct appeal, the failure of appellate counsel to raise the meritless issue will not 
render appellate counsel’s performance ineffective.”  Rutherford, 774 So. 2d at 643 
(quoting Williamson v. Dugger, 651 So. 2d 84, 86 (Fla. 1994)).  First, at the time 
the Court issued its decision in Philmore’s direct appeal, Ring had not been 
decided.  Second, this Court has rejected claims under Ring in direct appeals where 
the trial judge has found the aggravating factor of a previous conviction of a 
violent felony based on either prior or contemporaneous felony convictions.  See, 
e.g., Duest v. State, 855 So. 2d 33, 49 (Fla. 2003); Caballero v. State, 851 So. 2d 
655, 663-64 (Fla. 2003).  In this case, one of the aggravating circumstances found 
by the trial court was that Philmore was previously convicted of another capital 
felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence.  In addition, the jury 
unanimously recommended the death sentence.  Cf. Anderson v. State, 863 So. 2d 
169, 189 (Fla. 2003) (rejecting a Ring claim on direct appeal where the jury 
 
 
- 21 -
recommended the death sentence by a unanimous vote and one of the aggravating 
circumstances found by the trial judge was that the defendant had been convicted 
of a prior violent felony for the contemporaneous conviction of attempted murder). 
Accordingly, Philmore’s claim is without merit.  Appellate counsel was not 
ineffective for failing to raise this issue on direct appeal.     
3. 
Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel 
Philmore next argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to 
the following comments by the prosecutor:  (1) references to “how lucky” an 
unknown woman was when Philmore and Spann were unable to attack her; (2) 
references to the personal opinions of the investigators; (3) the stereotyping of 
Philmore as wearing a “white tank top” and “gold necklaces” and referring to 
Philmore’s gun as “the great equalizer”; (4) attempted personalization of the 
prosecution as a joint effort between law enforcement and the community; (5) 
assertion that the prosecution was being presented by “their state attorney”; (6) 
remarks about Philmore’s brain damage being in “the murder center of the brain . . 
. or kidnapping center of the brain”; (7) references to the polygraph examinations; 
and (8) statements that the only expert testimony that the jury should accept 
regarding the brain imaging were the witnesses participating “on behalf of the 
people of the State of Florida” with “no interest other than an interest in making 
sure that the science . . . is properly represented to the public.”  This claim of 
 
 
- 22 -
ineffective assistance of trial counsel is not appropriately raised in a petition for 
writ of habeas corpus.  See Reed v. State, 875 So. 2d 415, 439-40 (Fla. 2004) (“To 
the extent that Reed claims his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of 
counsel, this issue is improperly raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus.”).  
Accordingly, we decline to address this issue.    
To the extent that Philmore asserts that appellate counsel was ineffective for 
failing to sufficiently argue this issue on direct appeal, we deny relief.  Appellate 
counsel raised this precise issue on direct appeal, pointing to all the prosecutorial 
comments Philmore now contends were improper.  We concluded that even when 
considered cumulatively, neither the alleged guilt phase errors nor the alleged 
penalty phase errors rose to the level of fundamental error.  See Philmore, 820 So. 
2d at 932. 
4. 
Jury Instructions 
 
Philmore’s fourth claim for habeas relief is that the jury was 
unconstitutionally instructed that its role was advisory.  This claim should have 
been presented on direct appeal and is therefore procedurally barred.  See Dufour 
v. State, 905 So. 2d 42, 67 (Fla. 2005) (“[A] claim of error regarding the 
instructions given by the trial court should have been presented on direct appeal 
and is not cognizable through collateral attack.”).  Further, as we reiterated in 
Dufour, this claim is meritless.  See id. (“This Court has repeatedly determined that 
 
 
- 23 -
challenges to ‘the standard jury instructions that refer to the jury as advisory and 
that refer to the jury’s verdict as a recommendation violate Caldwell v. Mississippi, 
472 U.S. 320, 105 S. Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985)’ are without merit.”) 
(quoting Card v. State, 803 So. 2d 613, 628 (Fla. 2001)); see also Globe v. State, 
877 So. 2d 663, 673 (Fla. 2004) (rejecting the defendant’s argument on direct 
appeal that “the trial court erred by instructing the jury that it was giving an 
‘advisory sentence,’ in violation of” Caldwell and Ring). We thus deny this claim 
for relief.  
5. 
Cumulative Effect of Trial Errors 
Philmore argues that the cumulative effect of the trial errors deprived him of 
a fundamentally fair trial.  Because we have concluded that Philmore’s other 
claims are without merit or are procedurally barred, we further conclude that 
Philmore was not deprived of a fundamentally fair trial.  See Melendez v. State, 
718 So. 2d 746, 749 (Fla. 1998) (concluding that where claims were either 
meritless or procedurally barred there was no cumulative effect to consider).   
6.   
Competency at the Time of Execution 
In his final habeas claim, Philmore asserts that his Eighth Amendment rights 
will be violated because he may be incompetent at the time of execution.  Philmore 
acknowledges that a claim of incompetency to be executed cannot be asserted until 
a death warrant has been issued because the claim is not ripe, and that a defendant 
 
 
- 24 -
must submit this claim in accordance with section 922.07, Florida Statutes (2005).  
Philmore raises this claim solely to preserve the issue for federal review.  We 
therefore deny this claim for relief.  See Griffin, 866 So. 2d at 22-23 (“While 
Griffin is under a death sentence, no death warrant has been signed and his 
execution is not imminent. Thus, the issue of Griffin’s sanity for execution is not 
ripe . . . .”).   
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the trial court’s denial of 
Philmore’s motion for postconviction relief and deny Philmore’s petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus. 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and 
BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
Two Cases: 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Martin County,  
Cynthia Angelos, Judge - Case No. 97-1672CFA 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 
 
John W. Jennings, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, James V. Viggiano, Jr. and 
Richard E. Kiley, Assistant CCR Counsel Middle Region, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
 
 
- 25 -
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida and Leslie T. 
Campbell, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent