Title: Moore v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 49S04-1101-CR-24
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: June 28, 2011

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT  
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Suzy St. John 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gregory F. Zoeller 
 
 
 
Marion County Public Defender 
 
 
 
 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
Ruth Johnson 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Joby D. Jerrells 
Marion County Public Defender 
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Andrew Kobe 
Deputy Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court 
_________________________________ 
 
No. 49S04-1101-CR-24 
 
 
BRENDA MOORE, 
 
 
 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
 
v. 
 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
 
 
Appellee (Plaintiff below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court, No. 49F10-0812-CM-276934 
The Honorable Israel Cruz, Commissioner 
_________________________________ 
 
On Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A04-1001-CR-46 
_________________________________ 
 
June 28, 2011 
 
Dickson, Justice. 
 
Brenda Moore appeals her conviction of Public Intoxication, a class B misdemeanor.    
Her sentence was modest.1  A divided Court of Appeals panel reversed.  Moore v. State, 935 
N.E.2d 301 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).  We granted transfer and now affirm the conviction.   
 
 
Indiana Code § 7.1-5-1-3 states, "It is a Class B misdemeanor for a person to be in a pub-
lic place or a place of public resort in a state of intoxication caused by the person's use of alco-
                                                 
 
1 The trial court sentenced her to 180 days but suspended 174 days and gave her credit for three 
days served before trial.   
FILED
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
Jun 28 2011, 4:01 pm
 
2 
hol or a controlled substance (as defined in IC 35-48-1-9)" (emphasis added).  Established 
precedent has long recognized that a person in a vehicle stopped along a highway is in a public 
place for purposes of the public intoxication statute.  Miles v. State, 247 Ind. 423, 425, 216 
N.E.2d 847, 849 (1966).   
 
On appeal, the defendant notes the standard of review for a claim of insufficient evi-
dence, but she presents no argument asserting this claim.  She concedes that she was intoxicated 
in a public place under Indiana law but seeks reversal of her conviction alleging (1) that it "vi-
olates the spirit of the public intoxication statute, and the policy behind its enactment," Appel-
lant's Br. at 4, and (2) that punishing her for choosing to consume an alcoholic beverage violates 
her natural rights under the Indiana Constitution. 
 
The circumstances that preceded her arrest are not in dispute.  The defendant had con-
sumed two tall cans of beer at her sister's house on the evening of December 5, 2008.  A friend 
of the defendant's brother asked for a ride to visit a friend.  The defendant explained to him that 
she could not drive because she had been drinking but that he could drive her car if he had a li-
cense.  The brother's friend then drove the defendant's car with the defendant riding as a front 
seat passenger.  When an Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Officer pulled over the car because 
the license plate light was not working, the officer determined that the driver did not have a valid 
driver's license and that the defendant could not operate the vehicle because she was intoxicated.  
The car was stopped on a public roadway, East 13th Street in Indianapolis.  The officer observed 
that the defendant had red, glassy, bloodshot eyes and slurred speech; she needed to lean against 
the car for balance; and she admitted that she had been drinking that night.  She admitted, "I 
couldn't walk.  So I couldn't have driven."  Tr. at 19. 
 
1.  Conviction as Violating Public Policy 
 
 
The defendant's principal argument is that her conviction "violates the spirit of the public 
intoxication statute, and the policy behind its enactment" because she caused no harm or an-
noyance and "adhered to the popular public service motto 'Don't drink and drive.'"  Appellant's 
Br. at 4.  She favors a policy that would "encourage persons who find themselves intoxicated to 
ride in a vehicle to a private place without fear of being prosecuted for a crime."  Id. at 5. 
 
 
3 
 
Whether conduct proscribed by a criminal law should be excused under certain circums-
tances on grounds of public policy is a matter for legislative evaluation and statutory revision if 
appropriate.  The judicial function is to apply the laws as enacted by the legislature.  We decline 
the defendant's request to reverse her conviction on public policy grounds. 
 
2.  Conviction as Violating a Right to Consume Alcoholic Beverages 
 
 
The defendant argues that her conviction is a result of her exercising her "freedom of 
choice over which beverages to consume, even those containing alcohol."  Id. at 8.  She cites 
language from an early Indiana case that stated, "the right of liberty and pursuing happiness se-
cured by the [Indiana] constitution, embraces the right, in each . . . individual, of selecting what 
he will eat and drink, in short, his beverages, so far as he may be capable of producing them, or 
they may be within his reach, and that the legislature cannot take away that right by direct 
enactment."  Herman v. State, 8 Ind. 545, 558 (1855).2 
 
 
The defendant here, however, suffered no impingement of any alleged constitutional right 
to select which beverages to consume.  She was subject to the public intoxication statute because 
of her conduct after consumption, not due to her beverage selection.  The defendant's accounta-
bility under the public intoxication statute does not violate her personal liberty rights under the 
Indiana Constitution. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
Declining the defendant's invitations to constrain the application of the public intoxica-
tion statute on grounds of public policy and to find a violation of a constitutional right to con-
sume alcohol, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
 
Shepard, C.J., and Sullivan and David, JJ., concur.  Rucker, J., dissents with separate opinion. 
                                                 
 
2 The Court in Herman was applying the "pursuit of happiness" language from Article 1, Section 
1 of the Indiana Constitution, which provides in relevant part: "WE DECLARE, That all people are 
created equal; that they are endowed by their CREATOR with certain inalienable rights; that among these 
are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." 
RUCKER, J., dissenting. 
 
 
In affirming Moore’s conviction for public intoxication the majority relies primarily on 
this Court’s opinion in Miles v. State, 216 N.E.2d 847 (Ind. 1966).  In that case we declared that 
a person parked alongside a highway was in a public place for purposes of the public intoxication 
statute.  Id. at 849.  I would revisit Miles and declare that it was wrongly decided.  Predating 
Miles by several decades, this Court declared in State v. Sevier, 20 N.E. 245 (Ind. 1889) that 
“[t]he purpose of the [public intoxication statute] is to protect the public from the annoyance and 
deleterious effects which may and do occur because of the presence of persons who are in an 
intoxicated condition.”  Id. at 246-47.  It is difficult to perceive how this purpose is advanced by 
declaring that the inside of a closed vehicle traveling along a highway is a public place.  Writing 
for the Court of Appeals in Jones v. State, Judge Barnes points out: 
 
It also is difficult to perceive the public policy behind 
criminalizing riding in (as opposed to driving) a private vehicle in 
a state of intoxication.  In fact, perhaps the better public policy 
would be to encourage persons who find themselves intoxicated to 
ride in a vehicle to a private place without fear of being prosecuted 
for a crime. 
 
881 N.E.2d 1095, 1098 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (reversing conviction for public intoxication 
where defendant was sitting in a vehicle parked on private property).  I agree.  As this Court has 
declared “[g]iven the strong state and national interest of keeping persons who are intoxicated 
from operating motor vehicles, we think it sound policy to encourage sober drivers to get behind 
the wheel and not let their friends drive while drunk.”  Smith v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 790 N.E.2d 
460, 462 (Ind. 2003).  In this case Moore should not suffer a criminal penalty for taking the 
responsible action of allowing a sober friend to drive her car while she was too intoxicated to do 
so.  I would reverse Moore’s conviction.  Therefore I respectfully dissent.