Title: Texas Pacific Oil Company v. AD Jones Estate, Inc.
Citation: 431 P.2d 490, 78 N.M. 348
Docket Number: 8299
State: new-mexico
Issuer: new-mexico Supreme Court
Date: September 1, 1967

431 P.2d 490 (1967) 78 N.M. 348 TEXAS PACIFIC OIL COMPANY, a Division of Joseph E. Seagram &amp; Sons, Inc., a corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. A.D. JONES ESTATE, INC., a corporation, Defendant-Appellant. No. 8299. Supreme Court of New Mexico. September 1, 1967. Norton &amp; Ingraham, Lovington, for appellant. John F. Russell, Roswell, for appellee. CHAVEZ, Chief Justice. Injunctive relief was sought in the trial court by plaintiff-appellee Texas Pacific Oil Company, to restrain defendant-appellant A.D. Jones Estate, Inc., from interfering with the commencement of drilling operations. A temporary restraining order and order to show cause were issued against appellant upon ex parte application of appellee. After a full trial of the issues, the trial court entered a "temporary injunction," from which appellant appeals. Appellee filed a complaint alleging it had a right to enter upon and commence drilling a well on certain land, the surface of which was owned by appellant ranching corporation, under a state patent which was subject to certain existing rights and easements. One such right was the reserving to the State of New Mexico of the oil and gas and other minerals, together with the right of the State to authorize persons to prospect for, mine, produce and remove said minerals. Appellee alleged in its complaint that its right to be on the land was derived from an oil and gas lease issued by the State to Vickers Petroleum Company, Inc. Appellee further alleged that it had notified appellant of its intention to drill a well, started making preparations to do so, when appellant notified appellee not to enter upon said lands for the construction of a road or well site. Appellee asked the trial court for an immediate temporary restraining order preventing further "interference" by appellant. After notice by a preliminary or temporary injunction and, after final hearing, a permanent injunction followed. Appellee furnished a bond in the amount of $1,000 and the district court of Lea County issued an ex parte temporary restraining order and order to show cause. After a full hearing on the issues, the trial court entered an order providing: By a motion to dismiss, we are first called upon to decide whether the order appealed from is appealable. The arguments presented in the supporting and opposing briefs to the motion are essentially similar to the arguments made under point I of appellant's brief in chief and appellee's answer brief. Therefore, the motion to dismiss and point I will be considered together. Appellant's point I is: In support thereof appellant cites Rio Arriba County Board of Education v. Martinez, 74 N.M. 674, 397 P.2d 471. The pertinent portion of Supreme Court Rule 5(2) (§ 21-2-1 (5) (2), N.M.S.A., 1953 Comp.) is: Insofar as the motion to dismiss and point I of the appeal are concerned, the question is whether the order entered by the trial court was one which practically disposed of the merits of the action. An examination of the briefs filed in this case reveals that both appellee and appellant consider Rio Arriba County Board of Education v. Martinez, supra, to be decisive. In that case this court held a "temporary restraining order" to be appealable under Supreme Court Rule 5(2), where the order was, to all intents and purposes, final and one which practically disposed of the merits of the action, leaving nothing further to be litigated. The reason for the decision in that case was because the court found that, while the order was denominated a "temporary restraining order," its effect, after our decision in State ex rel. State Board v. Montoya, 73 N.M. 162, 386 P.2d 252, was to permanently restrain the county board of education. Some of the factors which apparently aided the court in arriving at its decision are stated as follows: Further, in Rio Arriba County Board of Education v. Martinez, supra, in distinguishing Griffin v. Jones, 25 N.M. 603, 186 P. 119, in which a motion to dismiss an appeal *492 from a temporary injunction was granted, this court stated: Thus, the test that appears to have been established in Rio Arriba County Board of Education v. Martinez, supra, is whether the parties to the suit contemplated further proceedings. Application of this test to the situation in the instant case reveals that both appellee and appellant, as well as the trial judge, apparently contemplated further proceedings. The complaint filed by appellee indicates he contemplated further proceedings. It also appears that appellant and the trial judge contemplated further proceedings, because of the following statements made in court: Based on the foregoing, we do not believe the temporary injunction from which this appeal was taken is appealable. The appeal will be dismissed. It is so ordered. NOBLE and COMPTON, JJ., concur.