Title: Aden v. Estate of Hathaway
Citation: 427 P.2d 333
Docket Number: 22272
State: Colorado
Issuer: Colorado Supreme Court
Date: April 3, 1967

427 P.2d 333 (1967) Paul B. ADEN and Luise L. Aden, Plaintiffs in Error, v. ESTATE of Walter E. HATHAWAY, Deceased, and Kathryn E. Hathaway, Executrix, Defendants in Error. No. 22272. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. April 3, 1967. Rehearing Denied May 29, 1967. Gerald A. Kay, Denver, for plaintiffs in error. Rodden, Cooper, Woods &amp; Mitchell, and Clyde J. Cooper, Jr., Denver, for defendants in error. MOORE, Chief Justice. Plaintiffs in error, hereinafter referred to as the Adens, were the lessees of real estate commonly known and described in the written lease as 2625 East Third Avenue in Denver, Colorado. It actually consisted of an area which had a 35 foot frontage on East Third Avenue. The lessor was Walter E. Hathaway, now deceased. The lease contained, inter alia, the following provision: The lessor was also the owner of a substantially larger tract of land which was adjacent to the property leased to the Adens. Negotiations entered into between Flank Oil Company and Hathaway resulted in a written agreement between them that the Company would buy the entire tract including the 35 foot frontage area facing on East Third Ave., and that Hathaway would sell the entire tract to the Company for a *334 stipulated sum. This agreement contained the following pertinent proviso: The Adens were requested to waive their right of "first privilege" to purchase the smaller tract under lease to them. This they refused to do, and the "agreement" between Flank Oil Company and Hathaway became a nullity because its very existence depended upon a waiver by the Adens which was not secured. The Adens thereafter sought to compel a sale to them of the leased property by the successors to the interests of Hathaway (he having died), and they offered to pay a "pro rata" per square foot price using as a measure the price agreed upon for the larger tract in the contract between Flank Oil Company and Hathaway. The Adens brought the demand for "specific performance" under the provisions of C.R.S. 1963, XXX-XX-XX to XXX-XX-XX. It is the position of counsel for the Adens that when Hathaway entered into the contract with Flank Oil Company covering the large tract of ground, including therein the leased property, he thereby irrevocably indicated a "wish" and a "willingness" to sell the smaller included tract under lease to them, and that the law then permits them to demand the sale to them of the smaller tract on a pro rata basis. This argument is made notwithstanding the proviso in the Flank Oil Company contract which expressly required a waiver from the Adens. It is urged that we should compel specific performance even though there is nothing whatever in the record to indicate that Hathaway had at any time expressed a "wish" or a "willingness" to dispose of the premises leased to the Adens as a separate parcel of land. His expressed intent was to sell in one package a very much larger tract of ground and the contract which expresses this intent, in itself, precludes the conclusion that Hathaway had any intention to sell the smaller tract in a transaction other than as an included portion of the contract for the whole tract. The trial court refused to order specific performance and dismissed the petition filed by the Adens at the conclusion of the evidence offered by them. The most recent decision bearing upon the question presented by the record appears to be Guaclides v. Kruse, 67 N.J. Super. 348, 170 A.2d 488, in which we find the following pertinent language: We are satisfied that the conclusion reached in Guaclides v. Kruse, supra, represents the great weight of authority in this country. We adopt the rule announced in that case. The judgment is affirmed. HODGES, J., not participating.