Title: Knight v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 557, 2005
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: June 28, 2006

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JONATHAN KNIGHT, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 557, 2005 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for Kent County 
§  Cr.A. No. VK99-01-0503-07 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: April 24, 2006 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: June 28, 2006 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 28th day of June 2006, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
brief filed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 26(c), his attorney’s motion to 
withdraw, and the State’s response thereto, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Jonathan Knight, was found by the 
Superior Court to have committed a violation of probation (“VOP”) in 
connection with a previous sentence for Rape in the Fourth Degree.1  He was 
sentenced on the VOP to six years of Level V incarceration, to be suspended 
                                          
 
1 The record reflects that this was Knight’s seventh VOP in connection with that 
sentence. 
 
2
after two years for decreasing levels of probation.  This is Knight’s direct 
appeal of the VOP. 
 
(2) 
Knight’s counsel has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw 
pursuant to Rule 26(c).  The standard and scope of review applicable to the 
consideration of a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under 
Rule 26(c) is twofold: (a) the Court must be satisfied that defense counsel 
has made a conscientious examination of the record and the law for claims 
that arguably could support the appeal; and (b) the Court must conduct its 
own review of the record and determine whether the appeal is so totally 
devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that it can be decided without 
an adversary presentation.2 
 
(3) 
Knight’s counsel asserts that, based upon a careful and 
complete examination of the record, there are no arguably appealable issues.  
By letter, Knight’s counsel informed Knight of the provisions of Rule 26(c) 
and provided him with a copy of the motion to withdraw, the accompanying 
brief and the complete trial transcript.  Knight also was informed of his right 
to supplement his attorney’s presentation.  Knight responded with a brief 
that raises four issues for this Court’s consideration.  The State has 
                                          
 
2 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 
U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
 
3
responded to the position taken by Knight’s counsel as well as the issues 
raised by Knight and has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment. 
 
(4) 
The transcript of the VOP hearing reflects the following.  
Probation Officer Jill Green testified that, at about 8:00 p.m. on September 
19, 2005, she observed Knight get into a white Ford Ranger at the State 
Service Center in Georgetown, Delaware, where Knight was attending a 
class for sex offenders.  Knight’s girlfriend was the driver and a minor child 
was sitting in the front seat of the vehicle.  Knight, who was serving the 
probationary portion of his rape sentence at the time of the incident, was not 
permitted to have contact with minor children as a condition of his 
probation.  A second probation officer testified that Knight had a marijuana 
pipe in his pocket at the time of the incident and later tested positive for 
marijuana and cocaine.  Knight testified that he did not get into the Ranger.  
Knight’s friend, who was also attending the class, testified that Knight did 
not get into the Ranger and that he drove Knight home after the class was 
over.   
 
(5) 
Knight raises four issues for this Court’s consideration.  He 
claims that: a) Probation Officer Green lied at the VOP hearing; b) his due 
process rights were violated; c) the VOP sentence was too harsh; and d) he 
and a friend of his have been harassed by Probation & Parole. 
 
4
 
(6) 
Knight’s first claim is that Probation Officer Green lied at the 
VOP hearing.  It is the responsibility of the trial judge, sitting as the trier of 
fact, to assess the credibility of the witnesses at a VOP hearing.3  In this 
case, the trial judge found the testimony of Probation Officer Green to be 
more credible than that of Knight and his friend.  On that basis, the trial 
judge concluded that Knight had violated the condition of his probation 
prohibiting him from having contact with minor children.  The record 
reflects no evidence of any error or abuse of discretion on the part of the trial 
judge in making that finding.  Therefore, Knight’s first claim is without 
merit.     
 
(7) 
Knight’s second claim is that his due process rights were 
violated because the procedures enumerated in Superior Court Criminal Rule 
32.1 were not followed.4  Because no objection regarding a due process 
violation was made at the hearing, either by Knight or his counsel, that claim 
is reviewed for plain error.5  The record does not reflect any error that 
jeopardized the fairness and integrity of the VOP hearing.  To the contrary, 
                                          
 
3 Quarles v. State, 696 A.2d 1334, 1340 (Del. 1997). 
4 Rule 32.1 provides that the probationer shall receive: written notice of the alleged 
violation; disclosure of the evidence against him; an opportunity to appear and present 
evidence in his own behalf; the opportunity to question adverse witnesses; and notice of 
the right to retain counsel. 
5 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986) (Under the plain error standard 
of review, the error complained of must be so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to 
jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process). 
 
5
Knight was represented by counsel.  Knight’s counsel had secured a witness 
to appear on Knight’s behalf and questioned the State’s witnesses.  There is 
no indication that Knight or his counsel were unaware of the alleged 
violations or that they were unprepared to address them.  Therefore, 
Knight’s second claim of a due process violation is without merit. 
 
(8) 
Knight’s third claim is that his sentence is too harsh.  Under 
Delaware law, appellate review of sentences is extremely limited.6  Where 
the sentence falls within the statutory limits, appellate review is limited to 
whether the sentence was imposed on the basis of demonstrably false 
information or information lacking minimal indicia of reliability, or whether 
the sentencing judge relied upon impermissible factors or exhibited a closed 
mind.7  None of those considerations are extant in Knight’s case.  The record 
reflects that this was Knight’s seventh VOP since he was sentenced in 1999.  
The Superior Court credited Knight with two years of Level V time when it 
sentenced him.  There is no evidence suggesting that Knight’s sentence 
exceeded the permissible limit.  In the absence of any evidence of error or 
abuse of discretion on the part of the Superior Court, this claim is without 
merit.  
                                          
 
6 Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d 839, 842 (Del. 1992). 
7 Id. at 842-43. 
 
6
 
(9) 
Knight, finally, claims that he and a friend have been harassed 
by Probation & Parole.  Knight offers no factual support for this conclusory 
allegation.  Therefore, it is without merit. 
 
(10) This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded 
that Knight’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably 
appealable issue.  We also are satisfied that Knight’s counsel has made a 
conscientious effort to examine the record and has properly determined that 
Knight could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  
The motion to withdraw is moot. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice