Title: Commonwealth v. Cassino
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11684
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: April 8, 2016

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SJC-11684 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ADAM CASSINO. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     December 11, 2015. - April 8, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Cordy, Botsford, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Search and Seizure, Clothing, Warrant, Probable 
cause.  Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Probable 
cause.  Probable Cause.  Deoxyribonucleic Acid.  Mental 
Impairment.  Jury and Jurors.  Practice, Criminal, Capital 
case, Motion to suppress, Instructions to jury, Voir dire, 
Jury and jurors. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on November 15, 2011. 
 
 
Pretrial motions to suppress evidence were heard by Charles 
J. Hely, J., and the case was tried before Garry V. Inge, J. 
 
 
 
Azi Safar for the defendant. 
 
Zachary Hillman, Assistant District Attorney (Ian 
Polumbaum, Assistant District Attorney, with him) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
HINES, J.  In August, 2011, a sixty-five year old woman was 
found dead in her apartment in the South Boston section of 
Boston.  She was the victim of blunt force trauma caused by a 
2 
 
baseball bat.  The defendant, Adam Cassino, was indicted for the 
crime and a jury convicted him of murder in the first degree on 
theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or 
cruelty.  On appeal, the defendant claims (1) error in the 
denial of his three motions to suppress evidence stemming from a 
claimed illegal search of his clothing and shoes that were 
stored in a secured area while he was civilly committed pursuant 
to G. L. c. 123, § 35; (2) error in the presentation of 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) results; (3) error in the failure to 
give a diminished capacity instruction; and (4) abuse of 
discretion in the judge's juror bias determination.  We affirm 
the order denying the defendant's motions to suppress as well as 
the defendant's convictions, and we discern no basis to exercise 
our authority pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
1.  Motion to suppress.  a. Background.  After the 
discovery of the victim's body on August 27, 2011, the police 
investigation soon focused on the defendant, the victim's 
neighbor, as a possible suspect.  The investigation led police 
to the Massachusetts Alcohol and Substance Abuse Center (center) 
where the defendant had resided since August 24, 2011, after 
being civilly committed for drug treatment under G. L. c. 123, 
§ 35.  On August 29, 2011, two days after the discovery of the 
body, two Boston police detectives went to the center to 
interview the defendant.  While there, the detectives viewed the 
3 
 
defendant's clothing and shoes and observed reddish brown stains 
on the shoes.  On August 31, 2011, police applied for and 
obtained a warrant seeking the authority to search and seize the 
clothing and shoes.  The affidavit submitted in support of the 
warrant application referenced the reddish brown stains.  Later 
that same day, police seized the items from the center pursuant 
to the warrant. 
 
On September 8, 2011, police submitted applications for two 
additional search warrants, one pertaining to the apartment 
where the defendant stayed on August 23, 2011, the night before 
he was apprehended for the G. L. c. 123, § 35, civil commitment 
and the other for the defendant's primary residence.  The 
affidavits accompanying both applications cited the forensic 
evidence obtained from the defendant's shoes, including that DNA 
samples from the reddish brown stains matched the known DNA 
profile of the victim. 
 
The defendant filed three motions to suppress, claiming, on 
State and Federal constitutional grounds, that the viewing of 
his clothing and shoes at the center was an illegal, warrantless 
search and that the three subsequent search warrants for the 
shoes and the two residences, based on that illegal "search," 
lacked probable cause.  As background for the analysis of this 
issue, we summarize the relevant facts from the affidavit 
submitted in support of the warrant application dated August 31, 
4 
 
2011, and from the undisputed testimony adduced at the hearing 
on the motion to suppress. 
 
The last known contact with the victim occurred Monday 
evening, August 22, 2011, and the last outgoing call from her 
cellular telephone was the next afternoon.  Police estimated 
that the murder occurred sometime between Monday and Tuesday 
evenings.  During a search of the victim's apartment, police 
seized an empty bottle of Clonazepam that was issued to the 
victim on August 11, 2011, and initially contained ninety pills.  
Police believed, based on witness interviews,1 that the victim 
had been having ongoing problems with the defendant and that he 
had stolen her prescription medication and other belongings in 
the past.  A neighbor reported that the defendant stole 
prescription medicine from her that Monday.  The defendant told 
police that he met with the victim that Monday evening to 
discuss buying pills.  He stated that he would have purchased 
some, but he did not have any money. 
 
Blood on the victim's hands and nails indicated that she 
struggled with, and possibly caused injury to, her attacker.  
                     
 
1 The affidavit does not state whether these interviews 
occurred before or after detectives spoke with the defendant and 
viewed his personal property at the Massachusetts Alcohol and 
Substance Abuse Center (center) on August 29, 2011.  The 
Commonwealth may rely on evidence obtained before or after an 
illegal search if it can show that the evidence was 
independently obtained.  Commonwealth v. Estabrook, 472 Mass. 
852, 868 n.26 (2015). 
5 
 
Moreover, the police asserted in the search warrant affidavit 
that "the damage to the victim coupled by the amount of blood 
throughout the scene showed an extreme force which would have 
made it very difficult for any person involved, or even present, 
to avoid a transfer of some blood evidence to either themselves 
or their clothing or footwear." 
 
The defendant's mother told police that the defendant was 
taken into custody for civil commitment on a warrant of 
apprehension on August 24, 2011, a process she started the day 
before because of the defendant's substance abuse.  The 
defendant arrived at the center with injuries to his hand and 
knee.   The inner perimeter security commander for the center 
testified that booking and admission procedures require that the 
clothing and shoes of a person committed under G. L. c. 123, 
§ 35, be taken and stored in a secure property storage area.  
Property is returned to its owner after discharge, or it is 
transferred to follow the owner to any future confinement. 
 
On August 29, 2011, two Boston police detectives 
interviewed the defendant at the center and requested to view 
the defendant's personal property.2  A sergeant retrieved the 
                     
 
2 The Commonwealth contests the motion judge's finding that 
the viewing occurred at the request of the detectives, asserting 
a lack of evidence to support this finding.  We are not 
persuaded that the finding is clearly erroneous because the 
affidavit supporting one of the September 8 warrant applications 
 
6 
 
property from the storage facility, opened the bag containing 
the defendant's clothing and shoes, and lifted the items out of 
the bag so that the detectives could view the items.  As noted, 
reddish brown stains were visible on the defendant's shoes. 
 
b.  Discussion.  "In reviewing a ruling on a motion to 
suppress, we accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact 
absent clear error 'but conduct an independent review of [his] 
ultimate findings and conclusions of law.'"  Commonwealth v. 
Craan, 469 Mass. 24, 26 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Scott, 
440 Mass. 642, 646 (2004).  We "make an independent 
determination of the correctness of the judge's application of 
constitutional principles."  Commonwealth v. Woods, 466 Mass. 
707, 717, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2855 (2014), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Mercado, 422 Mass. 367, 369 (1996). 
 
The judge denied the defendant's motions, concluding that 
the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
clothing and shoes when the officers first observed them at the 
center and that all three warrants were supported by probable 
cause.  On appeal, the defendant reprises his argument that the 
viewing of his personal items was a warrantless search that 
unlawfully infringed on his reasonable expectation of privacy 
and tainted the three warrant applications. 
                                                                  
stated that the detectives requested a view of the defendant's 
property. 
7 
 
 
"Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, under 
both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, subject only 
to 'a few specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions.'"  Commonwealth v. Gouse, 461 Mass. 787, 792 (2012), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Bostock, 450 Mass. 616, 624 (2008). 
The defendant bears the "burden of showing that a warrantless 
search or seizure occurred."  Commonwealth v. Bly, 448 Mass. 
473, 490 (2007), citing Commonwealth v. D'Onofrio, 396 Mass. 
711, 714-715 (1986).  "This question is analyzed under the 
familiar two-part query whether [the defendant] had a subjective 
expectation of privacy in the items seized, and if so, whether 
that expectation was reasonable objectively."  Bly, supra. 
 
The defendant asserts that he had a subjective expectation 
of privacy that society would deem reasonable because he 
surrendered his personal property with the expectation the 
property would be returned to him.  He asserts that the storage 
of his property in compliance with the center's policy created 
an involuntary bailment and the sergeant exceeded his authority 
by producing the items for viewing by detectives.  The 
Commonwealth counters that any expectation of privacy the 
defendant may have had was not reasonable, analogizing to 
Commonwealth v. Silva, 471 Mass. 610, 619-620 (2015), in which 
we considered whether a pretrial detainee who was on notice of 
8 
 
the facility's policy treating detainee and inmate clothing as 
contraband has a constitutionally protectable privacy interest 
in such clothing.  We held that there was not, because any 
expectation of privacy was not objectively reasonable under 
those circumstances.  Id.  Our decision in Silva is not 
dispositive, however, because the center had no policy treating 
the defendant's property as contraband.  The center's policy 
specifically distinguishes between street clothes, shoes, and 
contraband.3 
 
Although the defendant's challenge to the search warrant 
rests on the claim that the police viewing of his property was 
an illegal search, we bypass the issue because the legality of 
the search is not determinative of the propriety of the judge's 
order denying the motion to suppress.   The denial of the 
defendant's motions to suppress was proper under the principle 
that, "[e]ven though the exclusionary rule generally bars from 
admission evidence 'obtained during an illegal search as fruit 
of the poisonous tree, evidence initially discovered as a 
                     
 
3 Under the section titled, "Property for Commitments," 
which is applicable to the defendant's status as a person 
civilly committed pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 35, the policy 
states, "When a commitment is admitted into the institution, his 
street clothes (except shoes and/or contraband) will be 
inventoried, laundered, boxed and stored in the Property Room."  
The defendant in Commonwealth v. Silva, 471 Mass. 610, 615 n.14 
(2015), signed an intake form stating that his personal property 
would be treated as contraband.  Conversely, the intake records 
submitted in this case do not make any such reference. 
9 
 
consequence of an unlawful search may be admissible if later 
acquired independently by lawful means untainted by the initial 
illegality.'"  Commonwealth v. Estabrook, 472 Mass. 852, 865 
(2015), quoting Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 439 Mass. 616, 624 
(2003).  Accordingly, the evidence deriving from the defendant's 
shoes was admissible "as long as the affidavit in support of the 
application for a search warrant contains information sufficient 
to establish probable cause to [seize the defendant's shoes], 
apart from the observation of the [reddish brown stains]."  
Commonwealth v. Gray, 465 Mass. 330, 346, cert. denied, 134 S. 
Ct. 628 (2013), quoting DeJesus, supra at 625.   To establish 
probable cause, "[a]n affidavit must contain sufficient 
information for an issuing magistrate to determine that the 
items sought are related to the criminal activity under 
investigation, and that the items reasonably may be expected to 
be located in the place to be searched at the time the search 
warrant issues."  Commonwealth v. Almonte, 465 Mass. 224, 233 
(2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Wilson, 427 Mass. 336, 342 
(1998). 
 
The affidavit in support of the warrant to search and seize 
the defendant's shoes included the following information.  The 
defendant previously had stolen prescription medication from the 
victim.  He admitted to being with her during the period when 
the murder was estimated to have occurred.  He told police that 
10 
 
he wanted to buy her prescription medication at that time, but 
he did not have the money.  The defendant was apprehended for 
civil commitment to treat substance abuse issues no more than 
thirty-six hours after the murder was estimated to have 
occurred.  The crime scene indicated that the assailant likely 
would have injuries and blood evidence on his or her clothing 
and shoes.  The defendant's clothing and shoes were stored at 
the center.  The affidavit also linked the defendant to the 
victim during the estimated time of her murder, established a 
conflict between the two, and created a reasonable inference 
that the defendant may have brought some or all of the items he 
was wearing at the time of the murder into the center.  Thus, we 
conclude that the affidavit supporting the August 31 warrant 
application contained sufficient facts, traceable to sources 
independent of the reddish brown stains observed on August 29, 
to establish probable cause. 
 
Because a valid search warrant would have issued regardless 
of the inclusion of the reddish brown stains observed on the 
defendant's shoes, there was an independent source for the 
challenged evidence.  See Gray, 465 Mass. at 347.  On this 
basis, we affirm the denial of the defendant's motion to 
11 
 
suppress the shoes.4  The defendant's challenges to the other two 
warrants are premised on the same argument.  Although the 
defendant claims that the September 8 warrants impermissibly 
relied on evidence derived from the shoes, he does not argue 
that they otherwise lack probable cause.  Because we conclude 
that the shoes were lawfully seized, and thus, evidence deriving 
from them was properly included in the two affidavits dated 
September 8, we do not address those warrants except to note our 
agreement with the denial of the defendant's three motions to 
suppress. 
 
2.  Trial.  a.  Background.  We recite the facts as the 
jury could have found them, reserving other facts for later 
discussion.  On Saturday, August 27, 2011, the body of the 
victim was found by her daughter and the daughter's boy friend.  
On Tuesday afternoon, August 23, the victim left a voicemail 
message for her daughter.  Because the daughter could not 
contact her after that voicemail, she went to the victim's 
apartment on Friday and Saturday to check on her.  On Saturday, 
                     
 
4 We reject the defendant's argument that the independent 
source doctrine is not appropriate in this case because there 
was no mistake or inadvertence on the part of police.  The 
independent source doctrine balances the "interest of society in 
deterring unlawful police conduct and the public interest in 
having juries receive all probative evidence of a crime . . . by 
putting the police in the same, not a worse, position [than] 
they would have been in if no police error or misconduct had 
occurred."  Estabrook, 472 Mass. at 868 n.26, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Frodyma, 393 Mass. 438, 443 (1984). 
12 
 
the daughter's boy friend entered the apartment through a window 
in the rear of the house leading to the victim's bedroom. 
 
Once inside, he saw the apartment in disarray and with 
blood in several areas.  The victim's feet were sticking out 
from under a blanket on the couch.  He and the daughter 
telephoned 911.  They started cleaning up pipes used to smoke 
"crack" cocaine and needles that were in the apartment, but then 
realized it was a crime scene and placed those items on the 
counter. 
 
Boston police arrived to process the scene and canvass the 
neighborhood for information.  A criminalist observed that the 
assault had occurred in the main living area and that the body 
was later moved to the couch and covered with a blanket.  The 
victim had severe trauma to the head, and the police did not 
find anything in the apartment that was consistent with being 
the murder weapon.  Police found an empty pill bottle that was 
labeled as Clonazepan, filled on August 11, 2013, and has a 
brand name of Klonopin.  A v-neck T-shirt and gray cut-off 
shorts, both wet, were collected from the bathroom. 
 
The medical examiner who performed the autopsy determined 
the cause of death to be blunt impact injuries to the victim's 
head.  He concluded that a cylindrical, round object such as a 
baseball bat or pipe caused the injuries.  The autopsy revealed 
decomposition, which begins approximately thirty-six hours after 
13 
 
death, and mummification, which begins four to five days after 
death.  From that information, he estimated that death occurred 
more than thirty six hours before the body was found, by at 
least "several days."  The prosecutor argued that the defendant 
murdered the victim between late afternoon Tuesday and Wednesday 
morning. 
 
The victim sold prescription Klonopin pills, sometimes 
using the money to purchase "crack" cocaine.  The defendant 
lived across the street from the victim and had previously 
purchased drugs from her.  His mother testified that he had 
relapsed into taking drugs approximately one week before the 
victim's body was found.  Although she said that he agreed to go 
to a treatment facility for a "few" days, he would not agree to 
a longer period.  She threatened to have him civilly committed 
for treatment several times.  The defendant was accused of 
stealing prescription pills from a different woman who lived in 
the same building as the victim.  Following the neighbor's 
accusation, the defendant's mother kicked him out of the house 
and, on Tuesday afternoon, went to court to have him committed. 
 
The defendant was apprehended for commitment early on 
Wednesday morning.  Between the time that his mother kicked him 
out of the house and when he was apprehended, he stayed at the 
nearby house of his friend, Thomas Kinsella.  Kinsella's house 
14 
 
and the victim's apartment are connected by a staircase in the 
rear of both buildings. 
 
Kinsella and his sister, who was at Kinsella's house on 
Tuesday with her young daughter, testified that defendant was 
gone for approximately a three-hour period sometime after 2 or 
3 P.M.  Kinsella's sister testified that the defendant left the 
house wearing a white T-shirt and black mesh shorts and returned 
sweaty and wearing a black Boston team shirt and cargo shorts.  
Kinsella and his sister both testified that defendant said he 
had been helping a neighbor with yard work.  The neighbor 
testified that the defendant did not help him in the yard that 
day. 
 
After he returned, the defendant filled two plastic grocery 
bags and placed them outside the door to Kinsella's apartment.  
A neighbor testified that he saw the defendant's brother placing 
a plastic store bag in a trash receptacle in front of a 
convenience store, but he could not recall when that occurred.  
The defendant's brother testified that he only used the trash 
can for his family's home, not the one at the convenience store. 
 
Kinsella and his sister went to bed at approximately 
7:30 P.M.  The defendant was at Kinsella's house when they went 
to bed.  Kinsella's sister woke up at approximately 6:30 A.M. on 
Wednesday, and the defendant was in the living room with items 
from a doughnut shop for her and her daughter. 
15 
 
 
In addition to the seizure of the defendant's shoes 
discussed supra, police seized a baseball bat from Kinsella's 
home, which had one fingerprint on the grip and reddish brown 
stains.  Blood found on the grip, barrel, and butt of the bat 
was consistent with the victim's DNA profile.5  Handler DNA taken 
from the grip of the bat contained a mixture that was consistent 
with three DNA profiles:  the victim, the defendant, and 
Kinsella.6  When testing for handler DNA, the analyst swipes an 
entire area to determine if any nonvisible DNA may be collected 
from locations where an item is typically handled.  The tongue 
of the defendant's right shoe and the sole of the left shoe 
contained a mixture of DNA that was consistent with DNA profiles 
for the victim and the defendant.7  Kinsella was excluded as a 
possible contributor to the DNA found on the shoes. 
                     
 
5 An analyst testified that the statistical probability of a 
match in the general population to the blood found on the bat 
consistent with the victim's deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) profile 
was in the trillions to septillions. 
 
 
6 The analyst testified that the statistical probability of 
a match in the general population to the handler DNA found on 
the grip of the bat consistent with the defendant's DNA was in 
the millions and billions.  No statistics were provided for the 
handler DNA consistent with the victim or Kinsella. 
 
 
7 The analyst testified that the statistical probability of 
a match in the general population to the defendant's DNA found 
on the sole of the left shoe was one in four Caucasians, one in 
twenty African Americans, and one in five Southeastern 
Hispanics.  The analyst did not provide statistical 
probabilities for a match in the general population to the 
 
16 
 
 
The defendant, who did not testify or present witnesses, 
argued through cross-examination and closing that lack of motive 
and faulty police investigation created reasonable doubt.  He 
named Kinsella as the killer and argued that the defendant's DNA 
was on the baseball bat because he took the bat from Kinsella's 
niece the morning before he was committed and that Kinsella wore 
his shoes to commit the murder. 
 
b.  DNA evidence.  Relying on Commonwealth v. Mattei, 455 
Mass. 840, 855 (2010), in which we held that nonexclusion DNA 
results must be presented with statistics explaining the 
significance of that evidence, the defendant challenges the 
admission of evidence that the victim's blood was on his shoes 
because the DNA test results were not provided with statistics.  
Where the defendant did not object at trial and claims that 
counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve the issue, we 
review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, "to determine whether any 
                                                                  
defendant's DNA found on the tongue of the right shoe or the 
victim's DNA found on either shoe.  The parties agreed to enter 
the DNA report by the Boston police crime laboratory in the 
appellate record.  The conclusions contained in the report 
demonstrate that the statistical probability for a match in the 
general population to the victim's DNA on the sole of the left 
shoe is in the trillions and quintillions, and that the 
statistical probability for a match in the general population to 
the victim's DNA on the tongue of the right shoe is in the 
millions and billions.  The report also demonstrates that the 
statistical probability for a match in the general population to 
the defendant's DNA on the tongue of the right shoe is one in 
8.1 million Caucasians, one in 1.5 billion African-Americans, 
and one in 130,000 Southeastern Hispanics. 
17 
 
substantial conduct or omission by counsel 'was likely to have 
influenced the jury's conclusion.'"  Commonwealth v. Montez, 450 
Mass. 736, 754 (2008), quoting Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 
678, 682 (1992), S.C., 469 Mass. 447 (2014). 
 
The defendant's argument is unavailing.  The DNA report by 
the Boston police crime laboratory was provided to the defendant 
before trial.  The report stated that the statistical likelihood 
of a match in the general population to the victim's DNA profile 
taken from the defendant's shoes was in the millions to 
quintillions.  Where the statistics in this case, if admitted, 
would have demonstrated that the likelihood of another person 
besides the victim leaving the DNA on the defendant's shoes was 
less than one in one million, the evidence would have been 
damaging to the defendant.  Underlying our holding in Mattei was 
the concern that nonexclusion DNA results without statistics 
could mislead jurors into thinking that the results are 
conclusive when the DNA could have been left by "half the people 
in the world."  Mattei, 455 Mass. at 852, quoting Commonwealth 
v. Mattei, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 510, 522 (2008) (Rubin, J., 
dissenting).  Such a concern is not applicable to the facts of 
this case, where the statistics would have demonstrated the high 
probability that the DNA on the defendant's shoes belonged to 
the victim. 
18 
 
 
c.  Jury instruction on mental impairment.  The defendant 
argues that the judge committed reversible error by failing to 
instruct the jury that they could consider evidence of the 
defendant's consumption of drugs as it related to his ability to 
act with extreme atrocity or cruelty or with deliberate 
premeditation.  If requested, a defendant is entitled to such an 
instruction.  See Commonwealth v. Doucette, 391 Mass. 443, 455 
(1984), citing Commonwealth v. King, 374 Mass. 501, 508 (1978) 
(premeditation), and Commonwealth v. Perry, 385 Mass. 639, 648-
649 (1982), S.C., 424 Mass. 1019 (1997) (extreme atrocity or 
cruelty).  Additionally, a judge must instruct the jury that 
they could consider evidence of a defendant's mental impairment 
on the question of extreme atrocity or cruelty where evidence of 
such "mental impairment is significant and where it is a 
critical aspect of [his] defense."  Commonwealth v. Rutkowski, 
459 Mass. 794, 799 (2011). 
 
In this case, the defendant did not request such an 
instruction or specifically object to its omission.  The 
defendant requested a manslaughter instruction, and the 
Commonwealth objected, arguing that there was no specific 
evidence of drug or alcohol use that had any effect on the 
defendant's state of mind.  The defendant asserted that the 
relevant evidence was the Commonwealth's theory that the 
defendant "was in such a state of withdrawal that he was willing 
19 
 
and able and actually did . . . kill someone to get her 
prescription bottle of Klonopin."8  The judge denied the 
defendant's request, and the defendant objected.  The defendant 
concedes that this discussion was not sufficient to preserve the 
issue, and we review to determine if any error created a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
Commonwealth v. Smith, 449 Mass. 12, 19 (2007), citing 
Commonwealth v. Berry, 420 Mass. 95, 113 (1995). 
 
The omission of a mental impairment instruction in this 
case did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice.  First, mental impairment was not central to his 
defense where the defendant argued that someone else was the 
perpetrator.  See Commonwealth v. Sanna, 424 Mass. 92, 102 
(1997).  Also, there was nothing close to "significant" evidence 
of the defendant's mental impairment.  Contrast Rutkowski, 459 
Mass. at 798-799. 
 
Several witnesses testified about the defendant's behavior 
around the estimated time of the murder.  The defendant's mother 
and sister both testified that the defendant was "upset" on 
                     
 
8 Trial counsel argued that the "strongest" evidence of the 
defendant's mental impairment was the judicial determination on 
August 24, 2011, which occurred according to the Commonwealth's 
theory between one and twenty-four hours after the murder, that 
he was in a "state that was associated with drug intoxication 
and/or withdrawal."  The Commonwealth correctly asserted, 
however, that the judicial finding that led to the commitment is 
not in evidence. 
20 
 
Monday and Tuesday afternoons because he had been kicked out of 
the house.  Kinsella testified that the defendant was upset on 
Tuesday afternoon before the two- to three-hour period when he 
was unaccounted for and that he returned "more relaxed."  
Kinsella noted that the defendant had one and one-half Suboxone 
pills (a medication to treat opiate dependency) when he 
returned, but Kinsella had no knowledge about whether the 
defendant took the pills.  The police officers who apprehended 
the defendant for commitment on Wednesday morning testified that 
the defendant appeared "nervous" but cooperated after being told 
that he was being committed, and he asked questions relevant to 
the apprehension.  Significantly, no witness noted that the 
defendant appeared impaired or testified to any observations of 
the defendant's consumption of drugs or alcohol. 
 
Because any diminished capacity instruction would have been 
of minimal significance considering the lack of evidence 
demonstrating any mental impairment, we conclude that the 
failure to give such an instruction did not create a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.9  See Commonwealth v. 
Rosado, 434 Mass. 197, 207, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 963 (2001). 
                     
 
9 Moreover, it appears that the jury did consider the 
defendant's mental state in their deliberations.  The foreperson 
submitted the following question to the judge:  "When [the 
defendant] was admitted to the [center] what did his toxicology 
report read?"  The judge responded that the jury must reach a 
 
21 
 
 
d.  Juror bias.  During the afternoon break on the third 
day of trial testimony, an individual who had been watching the 
trial approached defense counsel and told him that he overheard 
two jurors discussing the trial during the morning break.  The 
judge conducted a voir dire, and the individual explained that 
he was at the court for a civil case scheduled for 2 P.M. and 
decided to sit in on this trial while he waited.  He said he was 
outside smoking during the morning break when he heard a female 
juror telling a male juror that "the witness was not credible" 
and the male respond, "nobody's paying attention to the case, 
and he probably guilty already."10  After he heard the two 
talking, the individual started eavesdropping by pretending that 
he was looking at a statue.  The individual told the judge that 
he had been falsely accused of murder in the early 1990s, and 
the conversation bothered him because he knew from his murder 
trial that jurors were not supposed to talk to each other about 
the case.  The individual provided conflicting testimony about 
the timing of his realization that the conversation was between 
two jurors. 
                                                                  
verdict based on the evidence before them and may not engage in 
speculation. 
 
 
10 Later in his voir dire testimony, the individual 
attributed the statement, "he's probably guilty already," to the 
female juror. 
22 
 
 
The judge conducted a voir dire of the two jurors in 
question.  The female juror, in seat three, testified that she 
did not remember speaking to anyone and did not remember making 
any statements about a witness's credibility or the guilt of the 
defendant.  The juror said that she did not "really know all the 
jurors so [she did not] speak to any of them" and did not know 
"who the black male is with beige pants."  Lastly, she told the 
judge that she could say with confidence that she did not make 
the statements attributed to her. 
 
The judge then conducted a voir dire of the male juror in 
seat nine.  The juror testified that he did speak with the 
female juror, and referred to her correctly by her first name, 
but said that they were discussing a case in Florida that was in 
the news at the time and did not discuss this case.  The juror 
stated that the only reference he may have made to this case was 
to say that he was keeping a clear mind. 
 
The judge discussed an option of making the female juror an 
undisclosed alternate, but instead determined that the juror was 
indifferent.  He found the two jurors to be credible and the 
individual to lack credibility, and he rejected defense 
counsel's argument that the testimony by the two jurors was 
contradictory.  Neither juror was chosen as an alternate. 
 
The defendant argues that the judge abused his discretion 
in finding the female juror to be impartial.  Because "[t]he 
23 
 
determination of a juror's impartiality 'is essentially one of 
credibility, and therefore largely one of demeanor,' . . . we 
give a trial judge's determination of impartiality great 
deference" (citations omitted).  Commonwealth v. McCowen, 458 
Mass. 461, 493 (2010).  Accordingly, we review questions of 
juror bias for "clear abuse of discretion or a showing that the 
judge's findings were clearly erroneous."  Commonwealth v. 
Torres, 437 Mass. 460, 469 (2002), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Amirault, 399 Mass. 617, 626 (1987), S.C., 404 Mass. 221 (1989). 
 
Specifically, the defendant argues that the female juror 
was intentionally dishonest and should have been excused.  We 
conclude that the judge did not abuse his discretion, as the 
testimony of the two jurors was not necessarily contradictory.  
Although the male juror testified that the two spoke, it is 
possible that the female juror did not recall the conversation 
because it was not concerning this case.  Moreover, we cannot 
say that the juror's statement that she did not know "who the 
black male is with beige pants" was dishonest as even the court 
officers first obtained the wrong juror based on that 
description, and the individual had to correct them so that the 
proper male juror was identified.  Our review demonstrates that 
the judge reasonably could have found the juror credible and, 
therefore, did not abuse his discretion. 
24 
 
 
3.  Relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have 
examined the record pursuant to our duty under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E, and we discern no basis on which to grant the defendant 
relief. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.