Title: Collado v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 157, 2011
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: December 22, 2011

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
EDUARDO COLLADO,  
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 157, 2011 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below—Superior Court  
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
Cr. ID No. 0709012801 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§   
 
Submitted: September 23, 2011 
 
Decided: 
December 22, 2011 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 22nd day of December 2011, upon consideration of the briefs on 
appeal and the Superior Court record, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The appellant, Eduardo Collado, has appealed the Superior 
Court’s March 21, 2011 denial of his motion for postconviction relief.  We 
have determined that there is no merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, we affirm 
the judgment of the Superior Court. 
(2) 
In September 2007, Collado was arrested and charged with 
having fatally stabbed his estranged girlfriend’s sister.  In November 2007, 
Collado was indicted on charges of Murder in the First Degree and 
2 
 
Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony 
(“PDWDCF”). 
(3) 
On June 10, 2008, Collado pled guilty to Murder in the Second 
Degree and PDWDCF.  As part of the plea agreement, the parties agreed to a 
thirty-year prison sentence.  The parties also requested a presentence 
investigation. 
(4) 
On September 12, 2008, the Superior Court sentenced Collado 
for Murder in the Second Degree to twenty-eight years at Level V, fifteen 
years mandatory, and for PDWDCF to twenty years at Level V, suspended 
after two years mandatory, for decreasing levels of supervision.  Collado did 
not appeal. 
(5) 
In August 2009, Collado filed a motion for postconviction relief 
under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61”).  Collado amended the 
postconviction motion in November 2009 and twice more in April 2010. 
(6) 
Collado’s motion as amended raised nine claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  Collado also alleged prosecutorial misconduct and 
involuntary guilty plea. 
(7) 
The record reflects that Collado’s claims for postconviction 
relief were thoroughly briefed in the Superior Court.  Collado’s defense 
counsel filed affidavits responding to the claims of ineffective assistance of 
3 
 
counsel as they unfolded, the State filed responses, and Collado filed a reply.  
The State also responded to Collado’s motion for appointment of counsel 
that was separately considered and denied by the Commissioner’s order of 
July 27, 2010. 
(8) 
On March 1, 2011, the Commissioner issued findings of fact 
and recommendations.  Based on the factual findings, the Commissioner 
recommended that Collado’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims were 
without merit, that the claim of prosecutorial misconduct was procedurally 
barred, and that Collado’s claim of involuntary guilty plea was belied by the 
record. 
(9) 
By order dated March 21, 2011, the Superior Court upon de 
novo review, adopted the Commissioner’s recommendations and denied 
Collado’s motion for postconviction relief.  On appeal from that order, 
Collado continues to claim ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial 
misconduct and involuntary guilty plea. 
(10) The Court has carefully considered Collado’s opening and reply 
briefs, the State’s answering brief, and the Superior Court record, including 
defense counsel’s affidavits responding to Collado’s allegations of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  The Court has concluded that the denial of 
Collado’s postconviction motion as thrice amended should be affirmed on 
4 
 
the basis of the Superior Court’s March 21, 2011 order adopting the 
Commissioner’s March 1, 2011 findings of fact and recommendations. 
(11) Contrary to Collado’s assertions on appeal, it appears from the 
record that Collado’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary.  A review of 
the plea colloquy transcript reveals that Collado was responsive, cooperative 
and admittedly well-aware of what he was doing.   
(12) In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, 
Collado is bound by the representations he made during the plea colloquy 
and on the guilty plea forms that he was satisfied with the representation 
provided by his counsel, and that no one had coerced him into entering the 
plea.1    Furthermore, Collado has presented no evidence, and the record 
does not reflect, that, but for his defense counsel’s alleged errors, he would 
not have pleaded guilty but would have insisted on proceeding to trial.2 
(13) Finally, in view of the agreed-upon sentence imposed by the 
Superior Court, the Court agrees that Collado cannot show that he was 
prejudiced by the prosecutor’s alleged “misconduct,” namely the 
misidentification of a photograph of the victim’s nieces.  As a result, 
                                          
 
1 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997). 
2 In the context of a guilty plea, a defendant has the burden of showing that, but for his 
counsel’s deficient performance, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have 
insisted on proceeding to trial.  Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53 (Del. 1988). 
5 
 
Collado’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct was properly denied as 
procedurally barred pursuant to Rule 61(i)(3) without exception.3  
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
Justice  
                                          
 
3 Under Rule 61(i)(3), any ground for relief that is not adjudicated in the proceedings 
leading to the judgment of conviction is barred unless the movant demonstrates “cause” 
for failure to assert the ground and “prejudice” stemming from the alleged grievance.  
Rule 61(i)(5) states in pertinent part that the procedural bar of Rule 61(i)(3) shall not 
apply “to a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a 
constitutional violation.”