Title: Commonwealth v. Winquist
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12005
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: June 14, 2016

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SJC-12005 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JAMES S. WINQUIST. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     March 8, 2016. - June 14, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Joint Enterprise.  Evidence, Hearsay, Common criminal 
enterprise, Joint venturer, Statement of codefendant.  
Practice, Criminal, Hearsay. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on September 28, 2007. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Richard J. Chin, J. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
Leslie W. O'Brien for the defendant. 
 
Mary E. Lee, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
SPINA, J.  On May 9, 2005, the badly decomposed bodies of 
two homeless men, subsequently identified as William Chrapan and 
David Lyon, were discovered inside an abandoned ammunition 
bunker located in Bare Cove Park in Hingham.  The cause of death 
2 
 
 
for each man was blunt force trauma and "semi-sharp" injuries to 
the head.  In addition, Chrapan was missing his right hand, 
which was found two months later by two men walking their dogs 
in Bridgewater.  The defendant, James S. Winquist, was indicted 
by a grand jury on September 28, 2007, on two counts of murder, 
G. L. c. 265, § 1.  Following a jury trial in the Superior Court 
in September, 2012, he was convicted of two counts of murder in 
the second degree.  The defendant was sentenced to concurrent 
terms of life in prison.  On appeal, he argued that (1) two out-
of-court statements made by Eric Snow,1 a purported joint 
venturer in the murders, were erroneously admitted against the 
defendant under the joint venture exception to the hearsay rule;2 
(2) the trial judge erred in denying his midtrial request for a 
hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978); (3) 
the prosecutor's closing argument was improper; and (4) a key 
witness was incompetent to testify.  The Appeals Court affirmed 
the judgments.  Commonwealth v. Winquist, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 695, 
                     
 
1 Approximately six months before the start of the 
defendant's trial, Eric Snow, who also was charged with two 
counts of murder, committed suicide in jail.  This fact was not 
introduced in evidence at the defendant's trial. 
 
 
2 "Under the joint venture exception to the hearsay rule, 
'[o]ut-of-court statements by joint criminal venturers are 
admissible against the others if the statements are made during 
the pendency of the criminal enterprise and in furtherance of 
it.'"  Commonwealth v. Hardy, 431 Mass. 387, 393 (2000), S.C., 
464 Mass. 660, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 248 (2013), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Clarke, 418 Mass. 207, 218 (1994).  See Mass. G. 
Evid. § 801(d)(2)(E) & notes (2015). 
3 
 
 
696 (2015).  We granted the defendant's application for further 
appellate review, limited to the issue of the admissibility of 
Snow's out-of-court statements.  As to that issue, we conclude 
that the statements properly were admitted.3 
 
1.  Background.  The facts as they could have been found by 
the jury are set forth in the decision of the Appeals Court.  
See id. at 696-699.  We reiterate the pertinent details. 
 
Snow and the defendant were members of the "Brotherhood of 
Blood" (Brotherhood), a small neo-Nazi group of friends that 
"look[ed] out for each other" and shared "white pride beliefs."  
One day in April, 2005, the defendant, his girl friend, Snow, 
and Kelly Burgess, a woman with whom Snow and the defendant were 
friends, were walking in Bare Cove Park when they encountered 
Chrapan and Lyon.  When Burgess offered them some money to buy 
coffee, Snow slapped the money from her hand and made 
disparaging comments about the two homeless men. 
 
A day or two later, at around 11 P.M., Snow asked Burgess 
to drive him and the defendant down the street.  She gave them a 
ride to a grocery store parking lot that was across the street 
from Bare Cove Park, and Snow asked her to return thirty minutes 
later to pick them up.  Within a few minutes of Burgess's return 
to the parking lot, Snow and the defendant emerged from Bare 
                     
 
3 With regard to the other issues raised by the defendant 
before the Appeals Court, the decision of the Appeals Court is 
final and binding. 
4 
 
 
Cove Park and got into Burgess's motor vehicle.  She drove them 
back to the defendant's house, where they all went downstairs to 
the basement. 
 
Burgess saw that Snow was covered in blood, and the 
defendant had blood on the bottom of his pants and boots.  Each 
man was carrying a baseball bat; bloody spikes protruded from 
the bat in Snow's hands.  Snow and the defendant changed 
clothes, putting their bloody clothes and the bats in a bag on 
the floor.  Snow told the defendant to "get rid of them," and 
the defendant responded that he would.  Burgess asked Snow what 
he was talking about, and he replied that it was none of her 
business.  Shortly thereafter, right before Snow and Burgess 
left the house, Burgess heard Snow tell the defendant that he 
(the defendant) had "made his bones."  Among members of the 
Brotherhood, this expression referred to "killing somebody, 
putting in work that would prove you were worthy" of membership 
in the group.  Burgess proceeded to drive Snow to his mother's 
house in Bridgewater, behind which Snow buried a bag containing 
a human hand.  Then, they parted company.  Several weeks later, 
the defendant telephoned Burgess and told her that two bodies 
had been found in Bare Cove Park. 
 
In December, 2006, Snow, who was then in prison serving an 
unrelated sentence, wrote a letter to the defendant expressing 
his concern that Burgess, whom he referred to as "Bigfoot," was 
5 
 
 
plotting against them, and stating that "she obviously knows way 
too much and needs to be taken under soil."4  Snow also stated 
that Burgess was "the type of individual that sold her own kids 
out for crack," and that "hopefully we'll get lucky and they'll 
just die on their own."  On April 26, 2007, Snow wrote another 
letter to the defendant on the occasion of the second 
anniversary of the murders.  In this letter, Snow wrote, "You 
made your bones while the rest smoked them."  Suspecting that 
certain of their friends wanted "to see [them] go down for 
eternity" and were planning to tell the police about the 
murders, Snow also wrote, "[W]e know who the real threats are 
and what needs to become of them."  He provided the defendant 
with the address of Burgess and her roommate, Jack Amaral, on 
East Main Street in Brockton, and he instructed the defendant to 
"make sure you take out [Amaral's son] as well." 
 
One evening in June, 2007, the defendant drove to the 
address provided by Snow.  Amaral observed the defendant parking  
his vehicle and opening its trunk, in which he saw a white, 
five-gallon bucket.  Amaral ran down the stairs from his third-
floor apartment, and as the defendant, who had nothing in his 
hands, started to climb up the stairs, Amaral confronted him.  
                     
 
4 This letter and many others were discovered on September 
6, 2007, during a search of the defendant's bedroom at his 
parents' home in Weymouth.  The defendant had been arrested the 
prior month. 
6 
 
 
The defendant told Amaral that Snow had sent him there to burn 
down the house because Snow had concerns about Burgess.  The 
defendant also told Amaral that he could not go through with it 
because Amaral's son was in the apartment. 
 
At trial, the theory of the defense was that although the 
defendant had accompanied Snow to Bare Cove Park and was present 
when Snow purportedly killed Chrapan and Lyon, he did not 
participate in the murders.  To counter this defense, the 
Commonwealth sought to introduce, among other evidence, the two 
statements made by Snow that the defendant had "made his bones."  
The Commonwealth sought to admit one of these statements through 
the testimony of Burgess, and the other by way of the April 26, 
2007, letter from Snow to the defendant.  The defendant 
objected.  The judge ruled that the statements were admissible 
because they were made during a joint venture as part of an 
ongoing effort to conceal the crime.  After being instructed on 
murder in the first degree on theories of extreme atrocity or 
cruelty and deliberate premeditation, murder in the second 
degree, and joint venture liability, the jury convicted the 
defendant of two counts of murder in the second degree. 
 
2.  Admission of Snow's statement in April 26, 2007, 
letter.  The defendant first challenges the admission of Snow's 
statement in his April 26, 2007, letter to the defendant that he 
(the defendant) had "made [his] bones."  In the defendant's 
7 
 
 
view, the judge erred in admitting this statement because it was 
not made during a cooperative effort to murder Chrapan and Lyon, 
or soon thereafter.  We conclude that, in the circumstances of 
this case, even though the letter was written nearly two years 
after the murders, the joint venture remained ongoing, and, 
therefore, the challenged statement was properly admitted.5 
 
"Out-of-court statements by joint venturers are admissible 
against the others if the statements are made during the 
pendency of the criminal enterprise and in furtherance of it."6  
Commonwealth v. Carriere, 470 Mass. 1, 8 (2014), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Burton, 450 Mass. 55, 63 (2007).  See 
Commonwealth v. Bongarzone, 390 Mass. 326, 340 (1983).  See also 
Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(2)(E) & notes (2015).  The admissibility 
of such statements is premised on a belief that common interests 
and activities among coventurers during a criminal enterprise 
tend to ensure the reliability of their statements to one 
another.  See Commonwealth v. White, 370 Mass. 703, 712 (1976).  
In essence, "the statement of each joint venturer is equivalent 
to a statement by the defendant."  Commonwealth v. Stewart, 454 
                     
 
5 "[T]he question whether an out-of-court statement 
satisfies an exception to the hearsay rule is one for the judge 
alone."  Commonwealth v. Bright, 463 Mass. 421, 428 (2012). 
 
 
6 Generally speaking, the statements of joint venturers are 
the type of remarks that are deemed nontestimonial under 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004).  See 
Commonwealth v. Carriere, 470 Mass. 1, 8-9 (2014); Commonwealth 
v. Burton, 450 Mass. 55, 63-64 (2007). 
8 
 
 
Mass. 527, 535 (2009).  "Before statements by coventurers may be 
admitted, the Commonwealth first must establish the existence of 
the joint venture (and the defendant's involvement in it) by a 
preponderance of the evidence, independent of the out-of-court 
statements."  Carriere, supra.  See Commonwealth v. Cruz, 430 
Mass. 838, 844 (2000).  "If the judge is satisfied that the 
Commonwealth has met this burden, the statement may be admitted, 
and the jury are instructed that they may consider the 
statements only if they find that a joint venture existed 
independent of the statements, and that the statements were made 
in furtherance of that venture."7  Carriere, supra, and cases 
cited. 
 
"A joint venture is established by proof that two or more 
individuals 'knowingly participated in the commission of the 
crime charged . . . with the intent required for that offense.'"  
Commonwealth v. Bright, 463 Mass. 421, 435 (2012), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449, 466 (2009).  "[W]e view 
the evidence presented to support the existence of a joint 
venture 'in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,' 
recognizing also that the venture 'may be proved by 
circumstantial evidence.'"  Bright, supra, quoting Commonwealth 
v. Braley, 449 Mass. 316, 320 (2007), and cases cited.  A  
                     
 
7 The judge in this case properly instructed the jury 
regarding the consideration of statements made by purported 
joint venturers. 
9 
 
 
judge's determination as to the existence and scope of a joint 
venture is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.  See 
Commonwealth v. Angiulo, 415 Mass. 502, 520 (1993). 
 
As an initial matter, we conclude that the judge here did 
not abuse his discretion in determining that the Commonwealth 
had established, by a preponderance of the evidence, a joint 
venture between Snow and the defendant to murder Chrapan and 
Lyon.  Snow had made disparaging comments about two homeless men 
when he and the defendant first encountered them in Bare Cove 
Park.  A day or two later, Snow asked Burgess to drive him and 
the defendant to the vicinity of Bare Cove Park late at night, 
and then return for them in thirty minutes.  When Burgess picked 
them up, Snow and the defendant had blood on their clothes and 
they were carrying baseball bats, one of which had bloody spikes 
protruding from its surface.  Snow told the defendant to get rid 
of these items, and the defendant said that he would.  Snow 
proceeded to bury behind his mother's house a bag containing a 
human hand.  Several weeks later, the badly decomposed bodies of 
two men, one of whom was missing a hand, were found in an 
abandoned ammunition bunker in Bare Cove Park.  The defendant 
telephoned Burgess and informed her of the discovery.  Based on 
the entirety of this evidence, the Commonwealth satisfied its 
burden of proof as to the existence of a joint venture.  The 
question then becomes whether the out-of-court statement made by 
10 
 
 
Snow in his April 26, 2007, letter exceeded the scope of the 
joint venture. 
 
It is well established that the joint venture exception to 
the hearsay rule does not apply to statements made after the 
joint venture has ended.  See Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 408 
Mass. 533, 543 (1990) (criminal enterprise ended when joint 
venturer apprehended).  See also Stewart, 454 Mass. at 537.  "At 
that point, the joint venturers no longer share the commonality 
of interests which is some assurance that their statements are 
reliable."  Colon-Cruz, supra.  See Bongarzone, 390 Mass. at 
340.  However, "[s]tatements made in an effort to conceal a 
crime, made after the crime has been completed, may be 
admissible under the joint venture exception because the joint 
venture [remains] ongoing, with a purpose to ensure that the 
joint venture itself remains concealed."  Carriere, 470 Mass. at 
11.  See Commonwealth v. Freeman, 430 Mass. 111, 117 (1999) 
(statements made subsequent to crime when coventurers are 
attempting to evade arrest are admissible); Colon-Cruz, supra at 
545 (where joint venturers attempted to conceal evidence of 
crime and to avoid detection and detention, interests "still 
were closely bound together, tending to ensure the reliability 
of their statements").  In essence, the inquiry to determine 
whether a statement was made during the pendency of a criminal 
enterprise and in furtherance of it "focuses not on whether the 
11 
 
 
crime has been completed, but on whether a joint venture was 
continuing."  Stewart, supra, citing Braley, 449 Mass. at 322.  
"Absent clear indication that the venture [has] ended, it is 
reasonable to infer that concealment of the venture [is] 
ongoing."  Stewart, supra. 
 
Generally speaking, as the defendant points out, our 
appellate courts thus far have deemed admissible statements made 
by joint venturers during the so-called concealment phase of 
their criminal enterprise when such phase is relatively close in 
time to the commission of the crime.  See, e.g., Bright, 463 
Mass. at 425, 436-437 (statements made "in the days following 
the shooting" regarding efforts to conceal crime were 
admissible); Angiulo, 415 Mass. at 506-507, 518-520 (statements 
made approximately three weeks after murder urging associates to 
keep silent deemed admissible where joint venture not yet 
terminated when statements made); Commonwealth v. Ali, 43 Mass. 
App. Ct. 549, 562 (1997) (statements made "during the four days 
following the crime" supported inference that joint criminal 
enterprise had not ended and were admissible).  Cf. Commonwealth 
v. Rankins, 429 Mass. 470, 474 (1999) (letter written by 
coconspirator to defendant approximately three months after 
conspiracy began but two years before murder committed was 
admissible).  However, as we have pointed out, the relevant 
consideration is not whether the statements of a joint venturer 
12 
 
 
were made close in time to the commission of a crime, but 
whether the joint venture remained ongoing at the time the 
statements were made. 
 
Here, notwithstanding the fact that nearly two years had 
elapsed between the commission of the murders and Snow's 
statement to the defendant in his April 26, 2007, letter that 
the defendant had "made [his] bones," the two men remained 
actively engaged in an effort to conceal their involvement in 
the crimes and thereby evade arrest.  In his December, 2006, 
letter to the defendant, Snow expressed his concerns that 
Burgess knew too much, was plotting against them, and "need[ed] 
to be" buried.  In his subsequent letter to the defendant in 
April, 2007, Snow provided Burgess's address and gave the 
defendant instructions to burn down her house.  A month or two 
later, the defendant went to Burgess's home and told her 
roommate why he was there, although the defendant ultimately 
decided that he was unable to commit the act of arson.  Based on 
these circumstances, we conclude that there was sufficient 
evidence to support the judge's determination that the joint 
venture remained ongoing at the time Snow wrote to the defendant 
that he (the defendant) had "made [his] bones."  Although it was 
made a significant period of time after the murders of Chrapan 
and Lyon, this statement was not outside the scope of the joint 
13 
 
 
venture.  Accordingly, the judge did not abuse his discretion in 
admitting Snow's statement. 
 
Relying on Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 
(1949), and Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957), the 
defendant urges this court not to broaden the scope of 
admissibility of out-of-court statements made by joint venturers 
during the concealment phase of a criminal enterprise.  
Acknowledging that the framers of the United States Constitution 
intended to "afford the States flexibility in their development 
of hearsay law," Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004), 
the defendant nonetheless asserts that under Federal law, 
statements made during the concealment phase of a criminal 
enterprise are not admissible because, among other reasons, 
permitting such statements would improperly expand a narrow 
exception to the hearsay rule.  In the defendant's view, the 
inference of reliability loses whatever force it may have when 
it is stretched to include, years after the completion of a 
crime, "desperate attempts to cover up after the crime begins to 
come to light."  Grunewald, supra at 403. 
 
In Krulewitch, a case alleging conspiracy to transport a 
woman across State lines for the purpose of prostitution, the 
United States Supreme Court concluded that a hearsay statement 
attributed to one purported coconspirator was not admissible 
against another where the alleged conspiracy, if it ever 
14 
 
 
existed, had ended and the coconspirators had been arrested 
before the hearsay statement was made.  Krulewitch, 336 U.S. at 
441-443.  The government argued for the admissibility of the 
hearsay statement "as one in furtherance of a continuing 
subsidiary phase of the conspiracy," namely concealment in order 
to prevent detection, conviction, and punishment.  Id. at 443.  
The Court was not persuaded to expand its narrow exception to 
the hearsay rule for statements made in furtherance of a charged 
conspiracy, declining to hold admissible "a declaration, not 
made in furtherance of the alleged criminal transportation 
conspiracy charged, but made in furtherance of an alleged 
implied but uncharged conspiracy aimed at preventing detection 
and punishment."  Id. at 443-444.  See Lutwak v. United States, 
344 U.S. 604, 617-618 (1953).  To the extent that the Supreme 
Court held that the hearsay statement was not admissible because 
it was not made pursuant to and in furtherance of the objectives 
of the charged conspiracy, Krulewitch is not inconsistent with 
our conclusions in the present case. 
 
The defendant's reliance on Grunewald is similarly 
misplaced.  In that case, three petitioners were convicted of 
conspiracy to defraud the United States with regard to certain 
tax matters.  Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 393.  One of the questions 
before the Court was whether the prosecution was barred by the 
applicable three-year statute of limitations.  Id. at 396.  The 
15 
 
 
Court declined to adopt the government's theory that an 
agreement to conceal a conspiracy after the accomplishment of 
its criminal purpose can be deemed part of the conspiracy and, 
therefore, can extend its duration for purposes of the statute 
of limitations.  Id. at 398-399, 402, 406.  Sanctioning such a 
theory, the Court reasoned, "would for all practical purposes 
wipe out the statute of limitations in conspiracy cases, as well 
as extend indefinitely the time within which hearsay 
declarations will bind co-conspirators."  Id. at 402.  The Court 
distinguished between "acts of concealment done in furtherance 
of the main criminal objectives of the conspiracy," which are 
necessary for its successful accomplishment, and "acts of 
concealment done after these central objectives have been 
attained, for the purpose only of covering up after the crime" 
(emphasis in original).  Id. at 405. 
 
Here, the challenged statement in Snow's letter dated April 
26, 2007, was not made after his criminal enterprise with the 
defendant had been accomplished.  Rather, the statement was part 
and parcel of their ongoing joint venture to murder Chrapan and 
Lyon, to conceal their involvement in the crimes, and to avoid 
detection and arrest by eliminating a potential witness who knew 
too much about their activities.  The concern expressed by the 
Supreme Court in Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 402, that expanding the 
life of a conspiracy effectively would eliminate the statute of 
16 
 
 
limitations in conspiracy cases, has no bearing on the present 
case given that there is no statute of limitations in a murder 
case.  See G. L. c. 277, § 63 ("An indictment for murder may be 
found at any time after the death of the person alleged to have 
been murdered"); Commonwealth v. Dixon, 458 Mass. 446, 455 n.21 
(2010) ("The Legislature has declined to enact a statute of 
limitations for murder").  Cf. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 80-
83 (1970) (plurality opinion) (policy considerations pertaining 
to hearsay exception in Federal conspiracy trials that preclude 
out-of-court statements made when conspirators are engaged in 
nothing more than concealment of criminal enterprise have no 
bearing on State prosecution for substantive offense of murder). 
 
That said, this court is cognizant of the fact that the 
commonality of interests among joint venturers may change over 
an extended period of time, potentially diminishing the 
reliability of their statements.  We caution that our decision 
today should not be interpreted as simply extending indefinitely 
the time within which the out-of-court statements of joint 
venturers may be admissible against each other.  A trial judge 
must give careful consideration to whether such statements 
actually were made "both during the pendency of the cooperative 
effort and in furtherance of its goal."  Colon-Cruz, 408 Mass. 
at 543, quoting White, 370 Mass. at 708-709.  This requires a 
fact-intensive analysis.  Here, the judge did not err in 
17 
 
 
determining that the specific facts concerning the joint venture 
between Snow and the defendant warranted the admission of Snow's 
statement that the defendant had "made [his] bones," expressed 
nearly two years after the commission of the murders. 
 
3.  Admission of Burgess's testimony.  The defendant also 
challenges the admission of Burgess's testimony that she heard 
Snow tell the defendant in the immediate aftermath of the 
murders that he (the defendant) had "made his bones."  In the 
defendant's view, this statement was not made in furtherance of 
an ongoing joint venture, and the judge's conclusion to the 
contrary was based on speculation.  The defendant also contends 
that Snow's statement was not admissible because it was made in 
Burgess's presence, potentially revealing the crimes to an 
uninvolved third party.  We disagree with the defendant's 
arguments. 
 
Snow's statement to the defendant was made right after the 
men returned to the defendant's home from Bare Cove Park and 
prepared to dispose of their bloody clothes and weapons.  The 
judge reasonably could infer that Snow made the statement to 
praise the defendant for his participation in the murders, to 
reinforce the men's trust in and loyalty to each other, and to 
encourage the defendant's active participation in the 
concealment phase of their criminal enterprise.  See Stewart, 
454 Mass. at 537 (judge can infer existence of ongoing joint 
18 
 
 
venture in absence of clear indication that venture had ended).  
See also Burton, 450 Mass. at 62-64 (testimony regarding 
conversation that took place immediately after murder when joint 
venturers still were together, discussing what had happened, and 
when murder weapon was hidden in effort to evade detection 
deemed admissible); Colon-Cruz, 408 Mass. at 544-545 
(declarations made after shooting deemed admissible where joint 
venture had not terminated given that coventurers "were 
attempting actively to conceal evidence of the shooting and to 
avoid detection and detention").  That being the case, the judge 
properly determined that Snow's statement was made in 
furtherance of his joint venture with the defendant and, 
therefore, was admissible. 
 
We have said that the "'[c]onfessions or admissions of 
conspirators or joint venturers' to strangers or third parties 
unsympathetic to the goals of the venture 'are not admissible 
. . . as vicarious statements of the other members of the 
conspiracy or joint venture.'"  Bright, 463 Mass. at 433 n.16, 
quoting Bongarzone, 390 Mass. at 340 n.11.  Here, Snow did not 
confess anything or make any admissions to Burgess.  Rather, he 
congratulated the defendant on his participation in the murders, 
and Burgess overheard their conversation.  Furthermore, Burgess 
was not a stranger who was unsympathetic to the goals of the 
joint venture.  To the contrary, Burgess was friendly with Snow 
19 
 
 
and the defendant, she drove them to and from Bare Cove Park, 
and she spent time with them in the defendant's basement as they 
prepared to get rid of incriminating evidence.  Burgess also 
assisted, perhaps unwittingly, in the disposal of Chrapan's 
severed hand.  The mere presence of third parties does not make 
the joint venture exception to the hearsay rule inapplicable.  
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wood, 469 Mass. 266, 278-281 (2014) 
(statements made by joint venturer to girl friend on night of 
murder and several days later deemed admissible); Braley, 449 
Mass. at 319-320 (once joint venture established, statements 
made by coventurer to girl friend in aftermath of shooting 
deemed admissible against defendant). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.