Title: Gene L. Olstad v. Microsoft Corporation
Citation: 2005 WI 121
Docket Number: 2003AP001086
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 13, 2005

2005 WI 121 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP1086 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Gene L. Olstad, Individually and on  
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,  
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Microsoft Corporation, a foreign  
corporation, and Does 1 through 100, inclusive,  
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 13, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 22, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Jeffrey A. Kremers   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ABRAHAMSON, C.J., and BRADLEY, J., did not 
participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant there were briefs by John F. 
Maloney and McNally, Maloney & Peterson, S.C., Milwaukee and Ben 
Barnow and Barnow and Associates, P.C., Chicago, IL, and oral 
argument by John F. Maloney. 
 
For the defendant-respondent there were briefs by W. Stuart 
Parsons, Jeffrey Morris, Brian D. Winters, Kelly H. Twigger, and 
Quarles & Brady LLP, Milwaukee; David B. Tulchin, Jeremy T. 
Kamras, Ryan C. Williams and Sullivan & Cromwell, LLP, New York, 
NY; Charles B. Casper and Montgomery, McCracken, Walker & Rhoads 
LLP, (of counsel), Philadelphia, PA; and Thomas W. Burt, Richard 
J. Wallis, Steven J. Aeschbacher (of counsel) and Microsoft 
Corporation, Redmond, WA, and oral argument by David B. Tulchin. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Stephen E. Meili, Peter 
C. Carstensen and Susan LaCava and Susan LaCava S.C., Madison, 
on behalf of the University of Wisconsin Law School Consumer Law 
 
 
2
Litigation 
Clinic, 
Professor 
Peter 
C. 
Carstensen 
of 
the 
University of Wisconsin Law School, and Susan LaCava, Esq. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by John J. Prentice, 
Andrew T. Phillips and Prentice & Phillips, LLP, Milwaukee; 
Richard M. Hagstrom and Zelle, Hofmann, Voelbel, Mason & Gette 
LLP, 
Minneapolis, 
MN, 
on 
behalf 
of 
Wisconsin 
Counties 
Association. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by H. Dale Peterson and 
Stroud, Willink & Howard, LLC, Madison; William L. Oemichen, 
Madison; Gary Bakke and Bakke Norman SC, New Richmond; on behalf 
of Wisconsin Farm Bureau Federation, Cooperative, Wisconsin 
Federation 
of 
Cooperatives 
and 
Wisconsin 
Agri-Service 
Association. 
 
An 
amicus 
curiae 
brief 
was 
filed 
by 
Gerald 
Thain, 
University of Wisconsin Law School, Madison, and James May, 
Washington College of Law/American University of Law School, 
Washington, D.C., on behalf of the American Antitrust Institute.  
 
An 
amicus 
curiae 
brief 
was 
filed 
by 
Peggy 
A. 
Lautenschlager, attorney general and Eric J. Wilson, assistant 
attorney general, on behalf of the Wisconsin Department of 
Justice, and oral argument by Eric J. Wilson. 
 
 
2005 WI 121 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP1086   
(L.C. No. 
00 CV 3042) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Gene L. Olstad, Individually and on  
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Microsoft Corporation, a foreign  
corporation, and Does 1 through 100,  
inclusive,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 13, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Milwaukee 
County, Jeffrey Kremers, Judge.   Reversed and cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   Gene L. Olstad (Olstad), suing 
individually and as class representative of all others similarly 
situated, appeals from a final order of the Circuit Court for 
Milwaukee County granting Microsoft Corporation's (Microsoft) 
motion for summary judgment and dismissing Olstad's action 
alleging 
that 
Microsoft 
employs 
monopolistic 
practices 
prohibited by Wis. Stat. § 133.03 (2001-02).1  The circuit court 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2001-02 edition unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 2003AP1086 
 
2 
 
dismissed Olstad's complaint because it found that Chapter 133 
of the Wisconsin Statutes applies only to intrastate commerce.  
We reverse the circuit court's order because we conclude that 
Wisconsin's antitrust statutes may reach interstate commerce if 
(1) actionable conduct, such as the formation of a combination 
or conspiracy, occurred within this state, even if its effects 
are felt primarily outside Wisconsin; or (2) the conduct 
complained of "substantially affects" the people of Wisconsin 
and has impacts in this state, even if the illegal activity 
resulting in those impacts occurred predominantly or exclusively 
outside this state. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶2 
Olstad,2 seeking to represent a class of Wisconsin 
consumers,3 alleges that Microsoft controls a "dominant and 
persistent share" of the market for Intel-compatible4 personal 
computer operating systems.  In 1985 Microsoft introduced its 
                                                 
2 There is a question whether Olstad is a proper class 
representative.  At oral argument, Olstad's counsel asserted 
that if this court reversed the circuit court's order, he would 
substitute a new class representative.  Because the circuit 
court 
ultimately 
dismissed 
Olstad's 
complaint, 
it 
never 
addressed the issue of whether to certify the class.  We need 
not reach the issue for the purposes of determining this appeal.   
3 Olstad asserts that the class consists of "all persons or 
entities in the State of Wisconsin who purchased for purposes 
other than re-sale or distribution during the last six years, 
Microsoft licensed Intel compatible PC operating systems."  The 
class does not include government entities.  Id. 
4 "Intel" is a brand of microprocessor commonly used in 
personal computers. 
No. 2003AP1086 
 
3 
 
"Windows" operating system.  In the following years, Microsoft 
released newer——and increasingly dominant——versions of Windows.  
Olstad alleges that Microsoft's Windows market share has "at 
times exceeded ninety-five percent."  
¶3 
Olstad claims that Microsoft's dominant market share 
acts as a barrier to entry for would-be competitors.  He alleges 
that Microsoft has created a continuously increasing feedback 
loop: that is, because "everyone" uses Windows, all new 
consumers must also buy Windows.  In Olstad's view, this 
feedback loop has become a vicious cycle for consumers.  He 
claims 
that 
Microsoft 
has 
engaged 
in 
various 
forms 
of 
anticompetitive conduct to maintain its monopoly, including 
actively discouraging competitors from "encroaching upon its 
operating system monopoly."  
¶4 
In 2000 a United States District Court in the District 
of Columbia accepted most of these arguments.  United States v. 
Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000) (final 
judgment); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 
(D.D.C. 2000) (conclusions of law); United States v. Microsoft 
Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (findings of fact).  
Olstad directs our attention to the District Court's findings 
for "the details of Microsoft's and its co-conspirators' 
conduct."  
¶5 
In its "conclusions of law," the District Court found 
that Microsoft's conduct violated the federal Sherman Act 
"sufficient to meet analogous elements of causes of action 
arising under the laws of each plaintiff state," one of which 
No. 2003AP1086 
 
4 
 
was Wisconsin.  Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 54.  Microsoft 
argued that "a plaintiff cannot succeed in an antitrust claim 
under the laws of . . . Wisconsin without proving an element 
that is not required under the Sherman Act, namely, intrastate 
impact."  Id. at 55.  The court rejected Microsoft's argument, 
concluding that even if a state like Wisconsin had such a 
requirement, "that element is manifestly proven by the facts 
presented here."  Id.  The court was "compel[led]" to the 
conclusion 
that 
"Microsoft's 
anticompetitive 
conduct 
has 
substantially 
hampered 
competition" 
in 
Wisconsin. 
 
Id.  
Accordingly, 
the 
court 
found 
that 
Microsoft 
violated 
Wis. Stat. § 133.03.  Id. at 56. 
¶6 
Microsoft appealed, and the United States Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed that part of the District 
Court's decision holding that Microsoft committed monopoly 
violations.  United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 
(D.C. Cir. 2001).  The court of appeals remanded the case for 
further findings on other issues.  See id. at 95. 
¶7 
Olstad alleges that as a result of Microsoft's 
anticompetitive 
conduct, 
Wisconsin 
consumers 
have 
paid 
artificially high prices for Microsoft products over the past 
six years.  He argued to the circuit court that Microsoft's 
conduct violated Wis. Stat. § 100.18 (prohibiting unfair trade 
practices) 
and 
Wis. Stat. § 133.03 
(prohibiting 
unlawful 
contracts and conspiracies). 
¶8 
Microsoft denied these allegations and moved for 
summary judgment.  Microsoft noted that it is a foreign 
No. 2003AP1086 
 
5 
 
corporation, not organized under the laws of Wisconsin, and its 
principal place of business is not in Wisconsin.  It is 
undisputed that most of the conduct complained of occurred 
outside Wisconsin and affected interstate commerce.  Microsoft 
argued that Wisconsin courts have consistently held that 
Wisconsin's antitrust law, Chapter 133, does not apply to 
conduct that primarily affects interstate commerce.  Microsoft 
also argued that Olstad failed to state a claim actionable under 
Wis. Stat. § 100.18. 
¶9 
The Milwaukee County Circuit Court, Jeffrey Kremers, 
Judge, 
granted 
Microsoft's 
motion 
and 
dismissed 
Olstad's 
complaint.  In an oral ruling, Judge Kremers held that 
plaintiffs like Olstad could not recover under Chapter 133 
because it does not extend to interstate commerce.  Judge 
Kremers relied on a line of cases beginning with Pulp Wood Co. 
v. Green Bay Paper & Fiber Co., 157 Wis. 604, 147 N.W. 1058 
(1914).   
¶10 Olstad appealed,5 and the court of appeals certified 
the following issue to this court: "Does Wisconsin's antitrust 
act, Wis. Stat. § 133.03, apply to interstate commerce affecting 
Wisconsin commerce?"  We accepted the certification. 
¶11 In this appeal we are not concerned with the truth or 
merit of Olstad's allegations.  The circuit court did not 
                                                 
5 Olstad decided not to pursue the circuit court's dismissal 
of his claim under Wis. Stat. § 100.18, because he did not brief 
that issue to this court.  Accordingly, we address only the 
issue certified by the court of appeals. 
No. 2003AP1086 
 
6 
 
address the substance of the claim that Microsoft violated 
Chapter 133.  The circuit court concluded that controlling 
precedent did not allow it to consider whether Chapter 133 had 
been violated because, as a threshold matter, the statute could 
not apply to the interstate conduct at issue.  Accordingly, we 
must decide whether the Wisconsin statute reaches interstate 
commerce.   
¶12 We review the circuit court's grant of summary 
judgment independently, applying the same methodology as the 
circuit court.  Smaxwell v. Bayard, 2004 WI 101, ¶12, 274 
Wis. 2d 278, 682 N.W.2d 923.  Summary judgment "shall be 
rendered 
if 
the 
pleadings, 
depositions, 
answers 
to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law."  Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).  We 
evaluate the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party, Olstad, and draw all reasonable inferences from the facts 
in his favor.  Garcia v. Mazda Motor of America, 2004 WI 93, ¶4 
n.3, 273 Wis. 2d 612, 682 N.W.2d 365.  If, as here, the salient 
facts are undisputed, our task is simply to apply the law to the 
undisputed facts.   
II. DISCUSSION 
¶13 We note at the outset that Microsoft concedes that a 
state may regulate interstate commerce in some circumstances.  
This point is well settled.  See, e.g., California v. ARC 
America Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101-02 (1989) (state laws may reach 
No. 2003AP1086 
 
7 
 
interstate commerce in indirect purchaser action); David Lamb, 
Avoiding Impotence: Rethinking the Standards for Applying State 
Antitrust Laws to Interstate Commerce, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1705, 
1721 
(2001) 
("[M]ost 
recent 
decisions 
have 
upheld 
state 
antitrust 
regulations 
despite 
their 
incidental 
impact 
on 
interstate commerce"); Herbert Hovenkamp, State Antitrust in the 
Federal Scheme, 58 Ind. L.J. 375, 386-87 (1983) ("applications 
of state antitrust laws to situations 'in or affecting' 
interstate commerce have rarely been condemned and nearly all 
cases that did condemn such applications were decided before 
1935, when judges had a much more restrictive view of the power 
of the states to regulate in interstate commerce").   
¶14 "[T]he most important point is that when a practice 
has sufficient effects within the state, that state has the 
power to apply its antitrust law . . . a state antitrust law of 
general application can virtually always be applied to a 
practice 
having 
sufficient 
effects 
within 
the 
state."  
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, ¶2403a (2d ed. 2000).  State law is 
precluded from regulating interstate commerce only if it "unduly 
burden[s]" interstate commerce.  Von Kalinowski, Antitrust Laws 
& Trade Regulation § 100.03 (2d ed. 2004).   
¶15 While conceding that Wisconsin may enact a statute 
reaching 
interstate 
commerce, 
Microsoft 
contends 
that our 
legislature has not done so.  We turn to Wisconsin's antitrust 
act, Wis. Stat. § 133.03, to determine whether Microsoft is 
correct. 
 
No. 2003AP1086 
 
8 
 
A. 
Statutory Analysis 
¶16 At issue is Wis. Stat. § 133.03, which provides: 
133.03 
Unlawful contracts; conspiracies. (1) 
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or 
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce is illegal.  Every person who makes any 
contract or engages in any combination or conspiracy 
in restraint of trade or commerce may be fined not 
more than $100,000 if a corporation, or, if any other 
person, may be fined not more than $50,000 or 
imprisoned for not more than 7 years and 6 months or 
both. 
(2) Every person who monopolizes, or attempts to 
monopolize, or combines or conspires with any other 
person or persons to monopolize any part of trade or 
commerce may be fined not more than $100,000 if a 
corporation, or, if any other person, may be fined not 
more than $50,000 or imprisoned for not more than 7 
years and 6 months or both. 
Wis. Stat. § 133.03.6   
¶17 This court reviews de novo the circuit court's 
construction of the statute.  State v. Lombard, 2004 WI 95, ¶17, 
273 Wis. 2d 538, 684 N.W.2d 103.   
¶18 Statutory interpretation begins with the language of 
the statute.  If the meaning of the statute is plain, we 
ordinarily stop the inquiry.  Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane 
County, 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  We 
assign the words in the statute their common, ordinary, and 
accepted meaning.  Id.  We also consider the context and 
structure of the statute.  Id., ¶46.  We interpret statutes to 
                                                 
6 The legislature revised this statute effective February 1, 
2003, to alter its penalty provisions.  The revision is not 
material to this appeal and we will not address it further.  See 
2001 Wis. Act 109. 
No. 2003AP1086 
 
9 
 
avoid absurd or unreasonable results and to give effect to every 
word in the text.  Id. 
¶19 Olstad argues that the plain language of the statute 
shows that it applies to interstate commerce because of the 
absence of any language expressly limiting the scope of the 
statute.  On its face, the statute refers to "every contract," 
"any contract," and "every person" without restricting its 
purview 
to 
Wisconsin 
contracts 
or 
persons 
in 
Wisconsin.  
Wis. Stat. § 133.03. 
¶20 Olstad also directs our attention to the context of 
the statute, namely, the expression of legislative intent in 
Wis. Stat. § 133.01: 
The intent of this chapter is to safeguard the 
public 
against 
the 
creation 
or 
perpetuation 
of 
monopolies and to foster and encourage competition by 
prohibiting 
unfair 
and 
discriminatory 
business 
practices which destroy or hamper competition.  It is 
the intent of the legislature that this chapter be 
interpreted in a manner which gives the most liberal 
construction to achieve the aim of competition.  It is 
the intent of the legislature to make competition the 
fundamental economic policy of this state and, to that 
end, state regulatory agencies shall regard the public 
interest as requiring the preservation and promotion 
of the maximum level of competition in any regulated 
industry consistent with the other public interest 
goals established by the legislature.   
Wis. Stat. § 133.01. 
¶21 Microsoft does not address the broad language of 
Wis. Stat. § 133.03.  Instead it relies on several cases that, 
it claims, interpret the statute's plain language to apply only 
to purely intrastate conduct.  Microsoft then quotes Zimmerman 
No. 2003AP1086 
 
10 
 
v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co., 38 Wis. 2d 626, 633-34, 157 
N.W.2d 648 (1968), to the effect that: 
It has often been said that once a construction has 
been given to a statute, the construction becomes part 
of the statute; and it is within the province of the 
legislature alone to change the law. 
. . .  Where a law passed by the legislature has 
been construed by the courts, legislative acquiescence 
in or refusal to pass a measure that would defeat the 
courts' construction is not an equivocal act.  The 
legislature is presumed to know that in absence of its 
changing the law, the construction put upon it by the 
courts will remain unchanged. 
Microsoft asserts that the judicial gloss this court has placed 
on the language of Wis. Stat. § 133.03 unambiguously shows that 
the statute can be applied only to purely intrastate commerce.   
¶22 The evidence to support Microsoft's argument begins 
with Pulp Wood.  This was also the case principally relied upon 
by the circuit court.  In Pulp Wood, the court evaluated an 
allegedly illegal contract made in Wisconsin involving a wood 
supply from Wisconsin, Minnesota, Michigan, and Canada.  Pulp 
Wood, 157 Wis. at 615.  The court stated: "The contract we think 
involved interstate commerce, and if so the federal statute is 
applicable and the case will be treated on that basis."  Id. at 
615.  However, the court noted that it observed "little 
difference" whether the state or federal statute or both 
applied.  Id. at 616.  It added that the state statute "is a 
copy of the federal statute, except that it applies to attempts 
No. 2003AP1086 
 
11 
 
to monopolize trade and commerce within the state . . . ."  Id. 
at 625.7 
¶23 Most of our cases since Pulp Wood have followed its 
bright line division between interstate commerce (governed by 
the federal statute) and intrastate commerce (governed by 
Chapter 133) without further analysis.  See, e.g., Pulp Wood Co. 
v. Green Bay Paper & Fiber Co., 168 Wis. 400, 404-05, 170 N.W. 
230 (1919) (Pulp Wood II) ("[T]he contract in question involved 
interstate commerce, and hence the federal statute is the 
statute to be applied to the case, although little, if any, 
difference is to be observed in the result in the present case 
whether the state or the federal statutes, or both, apply"); 
State v. Lewis & Leidersdorf Co., 201 Wis. 543, 549, 230 N.W. 
692 (1930) ("sec. 133.01 [has] application to intrastate as 
distinguished from interstate transactions"); Reese v. Assoc. 
Hosp. Serv., Inc., 45 Wis. 2d 526, 532, 173 N.W.2d 661 (1970) 
("Sec. 133.01 . . . has been held by this court to be a 
reenactment of the first two sections of the federal Sherman 
Antitrust Act, with application to intrastate as distinguished 
from interstate transactions"); John Mohr & Sons, Inc. v. 
                                                 
7 In its decision, the court did not declare the contract 
void.  It remanded the case to the circuit court for Brown 
County.  Pulp Wood Co. v. Green Bay Paper & Fiber Co., 157 
Wis. 604, 625, 147 N.W. 1058 (1914).  The case was tried to the 
court, which dismissed the complaint on the ground that the 
contract was void "because [the contract was] contrary to both 
the federal and state anti-trust statutes."  Pulp Wood Co. v. 
Green Bay Paper & Fiber Co., 168 Wis. 400, 402, 170 N.W. 230 
(1919). 
No. 2003AP1086 
 
12 
 
Jahnke, 55 Wis. 2d 402, 410, 198 N.W.2d 363 (1972) (same); Grams 
v. Boss, 97 Wis. 2d 332, 346, 294 N.W.2d 473 (1980) (same); 
Conley Publ'g Group v. Journal Communications, 2003 WI 119, ¶16, 
265 Wis. 2d 128, 665 N.W.2d 879 ("the scope of Chapter 133 is 
limited to intrastate transactions").  Microsoft emphasizes the 
importance of Grams and Conley Publishing because both were 
decided after a 1980 revision of Chapter 133. 
¶24 There are two notable exceptions to this line of 
cases.  In State v. Allied Chemical & Dye Corp., 9 Wis. 2d 290, 
101 N.W.2d 133 (1960), the court evaluated the circuit court's 
grant of summary judgment to three defendant corporations.  The 
court reversed, concluding that even though the acts at issue 
involved interstate commerce and none of the defendants owned, 
operated, or maintained "any manufacturing plant, sales or other 
office, warehouse, or stock of calcium chloride in the state of 
Wisconsin," Chapter 133 could apply.  Id. at 292, 296.  Without 
elaboration, the court held: 
 
1. 
There 
is 
no 
language 
in 
the 
federal 
enactments that pre-empts the field of regulation and 
enforcement 
in 
the 
federal 
government 
or 
that 
precludes 
the 
states 
from 
enacting 
effective 
legislation dealing with such unlawful practices. 
 
2. 
There is no conflict between the federal and 
state statutes. 
 
3. 
The Wisconsin statutes make no attempt to 
regulate or burden interstate commerce. 
Id. at 295.   
¶25 The Allied Chemical court also concluded that "The 
public interest and welfare of the people of Wisconsin are 
No. 2003AP1086 
 
13 
 
substantially affected if prices of a product are fixed or 
supplies thereof are restricted as the result of an illegal 
combination or conspiracy.  The people of Wisconsin are entitled 
to the advantages that flow from free competition . . . ."  Id.  
The briefs in Allied Chemical permit no doubt that our court was 
challenged by the Department of Justice to apply Wisconsin's 
antitrust statute to interstate commerce, and it did.8 
                                                 
8 In its brief, the State argued that even though the 
respondent corporations were "undoubtedly engaged in interstate 
commerce, they are subject to prosecution for violating the 
applicable Wisconsin Statutes by conspiring to fix and control 
the prices at which other defendants" in Milwaukee sold calcium 
chloride to Milwaukee County.  The State quoted Leader Theatre 
Corp. v. Randforce Amusement Corp., 58 N.Y.S.2d 304, 307 (1945): 
"It is now well established that states, under their police 
powers, can enact and implement legislation which affects 
interstate commerce, when such commerce has significant local 
consequences."  The State summed up: "While there is no denying 
that the respondents are engaged in interstate commerce and that 
all of the calcium chloride sold in Wisconsin is shipped in 
interstate commerce, significant and necessary parts of this 
conspiracy are alleged to have been carried out in [Wisconsin], 
concern this state and are within the jurisdiction of our 
courts."  
The three chemical companies answered: "After the calcium 
chloride leaves the producing point no employee or agent of the 
respondent 
handles 
or 
has 
any 
contact 
with 
it." 
 
The 
corporations continued: "A corporation engaged in interstate 
commerce may, of course, be subject to state antitrust laws for 
violations which occur in connection with transactions which are 
wholly intrastate."  (Emphasis added.)  
The focused argument by the parties in State v. Allied 
Chemical & Dye Corp., 9 Wis. 2d 290, 101 N.W.2d 133 (1960), put 
the court's decision in context. 
No. 2003AP1086 
 
14 
 
¶26 In State v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 31 Wis. 2d 699, 
144 N.W.2d 1 (1966), the court addressed the departure from 
Wisconsin of the Milwaukee Braves baseball club.  The State 
charged 
that 
major 
league 
baseball 
unlawfully 
practiced 
monopolistic conduct in violation of Chapter 133.  Id. at 702.  
Despite the interstate nature of major league baseball, the 
court appeared willing to apply Wisconsin's antitrust statute, 
noting: 
[Major League Baseball] terminated very substantial 
business activity in Wisconsin . . . .  On their face, 
these facts support a conclusion that there is a 
combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade and 
commerce, declared illegal by the first sentence of 
sec. 133.01, Stats., as well as a combination to 
monopolize trade, under the third sentence of the 
section. 
 
. . . .  
The state may, ordinarily, protect the interests 
of its people by enforcing its antitrust act against 
persons doing business in interstate commerce . . . . 
(citing Allied Chemical, 9 Wis. 2d at 295.   
Id. at 713-14, 721.9 
                                                 
9 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Nathan Heffernan wrote: 
It is well settled that a state may exercise its 
police powers through such devices as the antitrust 
laws even though an incidental benefit may be to local 
commerce, providing that the law or its operation do 
not 
discriminate 
against 
interstate 
commerce 
or 
disrupt 
its 
required 
uniformity. 
 
There 
is 
no 
intimation . . . that the Wisconsin antitrust laws are 
applied in a discriminatory manner.  It is equally 
clear that state antitrust laws can be enforced 
concurrently with, or in the absence of, federal 
regulation. 
No. 2003AP1086 
 
15 
 
¶27 The Milwaukee Braves court declined to enforce Chapter 
133 in part because of major league baseball's well-settled 
exception from the antitrust laws.  Id. at 725.  But all seven 
members of the court asserted that Chapter 133 could be applied 
to interstate commerce. 
¶28 Taking this authority into account, we conclude that 
Chapter 133 has been interpreted inconsistently.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 133.03 is ambiguous, in that reasonably well-informed 
observers have interpreted it in two different senses.  The 
language itself provides no express limit to the statute's 
scope, but this court ascribed a limit to the statute as 
recently as 2003.  Conley Publ'g, 265 Wis. 2d 128, ¶16.  To 
resolve this ambiguity, we turn to both intrinsic and extrinsic 
sources, including legislative history, to determine the intent 
of the legislature.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶¶43, 50. 
B. 
Legislative History 
¶29 The late nineteenth century saw the birth and growth 
of the earliest antitrust laws, a genesis that took place 
against a backdrop dominated by principles of dual federalism 
dating back to the Founding Era.  Cf. James May, Antitrust 
Practice and Procedure in the Formative Era: The Constitutional 
and Conceptual Reach of State Antitrust Law, 1880-1918, 135 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 495, 497-99, 518 (1987).  The Wisconsin Legislature 
enacted Wisconsin's antitrust act in 1893.  See ch. 219, Laws of 
                                                                                                                                                             
State v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 31 Wis. 2d 699, 739, 144 
N.W.2d 1 
(1966) 
(Heffernan, 
Hallows, 
and 
Beilfuss, 
JJ., 
dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
No. 2003AP1086 
 
16 
 
1893.  It did not act in a vacuum.  It was influenced by the 
constraining 
boundaries 
of 
federal 
commerce 
clause 
jurisprudence. 
¶30 Article I, Section 8, clause 3 of the federal 
constitution gives Congress the power "to regulate commerce with 
foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the 
Indian tribes."  U.S. Const., art. I § 8 cl.3.  The Supreme 
Court's early cases made clear that this "commerce clause" also 
has a negative or "dormant" form restricting the states' ability 
to regulate interstate commerce.  Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 
504 U.S. 298, 309 (1992) (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 
231-232, 239 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring) ("It would be in 
vain to deny the possibility of a clashing and collision between 
the measures of the two governments. . . .  [W]hen [a collision] 
does arise, the question must be decided how far the powers of 
Congress are adequate to put it down.")). 
¶31 Chief Justice Marshall shaped early conceptions of the 
role of the national government.  "If any one proposition could 
command the universal assent of mankind we might expect it would 
be this——that the government of the Union, though limited in its 
powers, is supreme within its sphere of action."  M'Culloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 405 (1819).  Marshall believed that the 
federal 
government 
could 
employ 
any 
means 
not 
expressly 
prohibited to it as long as it acted within the "sphere of its 
specified powers."  Id. at 384.  In so holding, the Court 
implied that the states, too, are sovereign within their spheres 
of influence. 
No. 2003AP1086 
 
17 
 
¶32 Marshall's concept of mutually exclusive spheres of 
influence dominated judicial analysis throughout most of the 
nineteenth century.  "It is unquestionably no easy task 
to . . . fix the precise point, in relation to every important 
article, where the paramount power of Congress terminates, and 
that of the State begins."  Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 46 U.S. 
504, 574 (1847) (Opinion of Taney, C.J.10). 
¶33 During the latter half of the nineteenth century, the 
concept of "spheres of influence" attained nearly impregnable 
status as black letter law.  "The general government, and the 
States, although both exist within the same territorial limits, 
are separate and distinct sovereignties, acting separately and 
independently of each other, within their respective spheres."  
The Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. 113, 124 (1870). 
¶34 Shortly before the passage of the federal Sherman Act, 
the Court pronounced that "no state has the right to lay a tax 
on interstate commerce in any form."  Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 
127 U.S. 640, 648 (1888).  The court believed that such a tax 
would be a "burden" on interstate commerce, regulation of which 
"belongs solely to congress."  Id.  To put it in Marshall's 
terms, the Court believed that interstate commerce fell within 
the "sphere" of federal power, to the total exclusion of state 
power.  M'Culloch, 17 U.S. at 384. 
                                                 
10 In 
Thurlow 
v. 
Massachusetts, 
46 
U.S. 
504 
(1847), 
popularly known as "The License Cases," the Court did not file a 
majority opinion; each Justice concurred separately. 
No. 2003AP1086 
 
18 
 
¶35 Antitrust law was born in this era of mutually 
exclusive sovereignties.  At least 13, and possibly as many as 
21, states acted before Congress passed the Sherman Act.  
Compare ARC America, 490 U.S. at 101 n.4, with May, supra at 
499.  Wisconsin was not one of these states. 
¶36 In 1890 Congress passed the Sherman Act.  It provided: 
(1) Every contract, combination in the form of 
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of 
trade or commerce among the several States, or with 
foreign 
nations, 
is 
hereby 
declared 
to 
be 
illegal. . . .  
(2) Every 
person 
who 
shall 
monopolize, 
or 
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any 
other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the 
trade or commerce among the several States, or with 
foreign 
nations, 
shall 
be 
deemed 
guilty 
of 
a 
misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be 
punished by fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, 
or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both 
said punishments, in the discretion of the court. 
. . . .  
(8) That 
the 
word 
"person," 
or 
"persons," 
wherever used in this act shall be deemed to include 
corporations 
and 
associations 
existing 
under 
or 
authorized by the laws of either the United States, 
the laws of any of the Territories, the laws of any 
State, or the laws of any foreign country. 
Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647 §§ 1-8, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000)).  
 
¶37 Although the passage of a federal statute so similar 
to then existing state laws——and so similar to the state laws 
passed 
shortly 
thereafter——raises 
the 
specter 
of 
federal 
preemption, the legislative history reveals that Congress did 
not intend to preempt state laws.  See Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law 
No. 2003AP1086 
 
19 
 
§ 2401a, at 290 (2d ed. 2000).  Rather, in accord with the 
dominating theory of the era, Congress intended the federal law 
to apply only to interstate cases while the state laws continued 
to apply to intrastate cases.  See id. 
 
¶38 The federal constitution is clearly "the supreme law 
of the land."  U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.  Therefore, a federal 
law regulating interstate commerce may preempt a state law on 
the same topic.  Federal preemption may occur through express 
preemption or implied preemption.  Gorton v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 
194 Wis. 2d 203, 215-16, 533 N.W.2d 746 (1995).  Congress may 
expressly preempt contradictory——or even coterminous——state laws 
in the text of the laws it passes.  In that event, the state 
laws must yield to the federal law.  Congress may also impliedly 
preempt state laws by completely occupying a given regulatory 
field.  Id.  However, if the preemption is only implied, courts 
typically require clear evidence of legislative intent to 
preempt.  Id. at 216.  In a similar vein, the United States 
Supreme Court has stated that there is a "strong presumption" 
against a finding of preemption.  Id. at 219 (citing Cipollone 
v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504, 523 (1992)). 
¶39 But Congress has neither expressly (in the language of 
the Sherman Act) nor impliedly attempted to preempt state 
antitrust laws.  See ARC America, 490 U.S. at 102 (citing Watson 
v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 403 (1941); Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 
U.S. 253, 259-60 (1937)).  Before the passage of the Sherman 
Act, its sponsor, Senator John Sherman of Ohio, stated: "Each 
state can and does prevent and control combinations within the 
No. 2003AP1086 
 
20 
 
limit of the state.  This we do not propose to interfere with."  
21 Cong. Rec. 2456, 2460.  In fact, "Congress has never 
expressed the least willingness to limit state antitrust by 
making federal antitrust 'occupy the field,' thus preempting 
state law.  The result is that federal and state policy often 
overlap and address precisely the same practices, often with 
inconsistent results."  Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, ¶216 (2d ed. 
2000). 
¶40 We 
discuss 
preemption 
only 
for 
the 
sake 
of 
completeness, as Microsoft has not argued that the Sherman Act 
preempts Wisconsin's antitrust laws.   
¶41 Three years after the passage of the Sherman Act, the 
Wisconsin Legislature enacted its own antitrust act.  See ch. 
219, Laws of 1893.  The 1893 law provided: 
(1) Every contract or combination in the nature 
of a trust or conspiracy in restraint of trade or 
commerce, is hereby declared illegal. 
(2) Every 
person 
who 
shall 
monopolize, 
or 
attempt to monopolize, or combine, or conspire with 
any other person or persons to monopolize any part of 
the trade or commerce in this state, shall be deemed 
guilty of violating the provisions of this act, and 
upon conviction thereof shall forfeit for each such 
violation not less than fifty dollars, nor more than 
three thousand dollars . . .  
. . . .  
(8) The word "person" or "persons," wherever 
used 
in 
this 
act, 
shall 
be 
deemed 
to 
include 
corporations, 
partnerships, 
individuals 
and 
associations existing under or authorized by the laws 
of the United States, the laws of any of the 
territories, the laws of this or any other state, or 
the laws of any foreign country. 
No. 2003AP1086 
 
21 
 
Ch. 219, Laws of 1893 (codified at Wis. Stat. § 1747e (1898)) 
(emphasis added). 
¶42 Comparison of the language and structure of the 
Sherman 
Act 
and 
Wisconsin's 
antitrust 
act 
reveals 
many 
similarities.  The pivotal language in the first two sections is 
nearly identical.  This has led courts and commentators to refer 
to that first incarnation of Wisconsin's antitrust act as the 
"Little 
Sherman 
Act." 
 
See, 
e.g., 
Conley 
Publ'g, 
265 
Wis. 2d 128, ¶18.   
¶43 The dawn of the twentieth century coincided with the 
heyday of the federal "trust-busters" led by President Theodore 
Roosevelt.  See Marc Winerman, The Origins of the FTC: 
Concentration, 
Cooperation, 
Control 
and 
Competition, 
71 
Antitrust L.J. 1, 16 (2003);11 see generally Edwin J. Hughes, The 
Left Side of Antitrust: What Fairness Means and Why It Matters, 
77 Marq. L. Rev. 265, 292 (1994).  The early twentieth century 
presidents implemented policies favoring broad application of 
the Sherman Act——and furthered the stratification of the state 
and federal antitrust laws.  See generally Hughes, 77 Marq. L. 
Rev. at 292 (noting that in 1912, Woodrow Wilson made attacks on 
trusts one of the centerpieces of his successful presidential 
campaign). 
                                                 
11 Roosevelt's predecessor, William McKinley, had initiated 
only three antitrust cases in four years of his presidency; 
Roosevelt initiated 45 cases during his eight years in office.  
Marc 
Winerman, 
The 
Origins 
of 
the 
FTC: 
Concentration, 
Cooperation, Control and Competition, 71 Antitrust L.J. 1, 16 
(2003). 
No. 2003AP1086 
 
22 
 
¶44 By 1914 antitrust regulation was "most prominent as a 
political issue."  Id.  This court's 1914 holding in Pulp Wood 
is best understood in light of the dominant conception of the 
time, fathered by Chief Justice Marshall, that the federal 
government and the various state governments existed in mutually 
exclusive spheres, with no overlap.  See M'Culloch, 17 U.S. at 
405.  As the Pulp Wood court expressed it: "The contract we 
think involved interstate commerce, and if so the federal 
statute is applicable and the case will be treated on that 
basis."  Pulp Wood, 157 Wis. at 615.  That determination 
reflected the outlook of the era, even though the disputed 
contract was made in Wisconsin and its effects were felt in 
Wisconsin. 
¶45 In 1921 the Wisconsin Legislature undertook the first 
significant revision to the 1893 act.  Ch. 458, Laws of 1921.  
The legislature chose to "amend and renumber" the first section 
of the statute.  Id.  The new section stated: 
Every contract or combination in the nature of a 
trust or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce 
is hereby 
declared 
illegal. 
 Every combination, 
conspiracy, 
trust, 
pool, 
agreement 
or 
contract 
intended to restrain or prevent competition in the 
supply or price of any article or commodity in general 
use in this state, to be produced or sold therein or 
constituting a subject of trade or commerce therein, 
or  . . . in any manner control the price of any such 
article 
or 
commodity . . . manufactured, 
mined, 
produced or sold in this state, or fix any standard or 
figure in which its price to the public shall be in 
any 
manner controlled 
or 
established, 
is 
hereby 
declared an illegal restraint of trade.  Every person, 
corporation, copartnership, trustee or association who 
shall  . . . monopolize or attempt to monopolize any 
No. 2003AP1086 
 
23 
 
part of the trade or commerce in this state shall 
forfeit for each offense not less than one hundred 
dollars nor more than five thousand dollars.  Any such 
person . . . shall also 
be liable 
to 
any person 
transacting or doing business in this state for all 
damages he may sustain by reason of the doing of 
anything forbidden by this section. 
Id. (emphasis added).  The amendment is notable not because it 
made major substantive changes to the law, but because of its 
repeated use of the phrase "in this state."12  The phrase had 
appeared once in the 1893 legislation that copied the Sherman 
Act.  The sentence from the Sherman Act, "Every person who 
shall . . . conspire . . . to monopolize any part of the trade 
or commerce among the several States," was changed in the 
Wisconsin 
legislation 
to 
read, 
"Every 
person 
who 
shall . . . conspire . . . to monopolize any part of the trade 
or commerce in this state."  Although, in hindsight, the 
language could have been interpreted to focus on the place where 
the effects of a conspiracy were felt as opposed to the place 
where the conspiracy was hatched, this does not appear to have 
been the initial interpretation.  Consequently, the addition of 
three more "in this state" phrases to the section was not 
inconsequential.  It must be noted, however, that the phrase "in 
this state" is linked to the word "sold," meaning that it could 
distinguish the manufacture or production of an article from its 
sale. 
                                                 
12 The Legislature also made minor changes to what is now 
Wis. Stat. § 133.03 in 1923, 1945, 1947, 1957, 1969, and 1975. 
No. 2003AP1086 
 
24 
 
¶46 As the twentieth century unfolded, this court formally 
adhered to Pulp Wood.  See, e.g., Pulp Wood II, 168 Wis. at 404-
05; Lewis & Leidersdorf Co., 201 Wis. at 549.  But the face of 
federalism was changing.  The line between Chief Justice 
Marshall's mutually exclusive spheres of influence began to 
blur, as noted by the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949), in which 
the Court recognized "broad power in the State to protect its 
inhabitants against perils to health or safety, fraudulent 
traders and highway hazards even by use of measures which bear 
adversely on interstate commerce."  Id. at 531-32 (citations 
omitted). 
¶47 By 
1978 
the 
erosion 
of 
Marshall's 
"spheres 
of 
influence" 
concept 
was 
complete. 
 
In 
Raymond 
Motor 
Transportation, Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978), the Court 
acknowledged 
that 
"state 
legislation, 
designed 
to 
serve 
legitimate state interests and applied without discrimination 
against interstate commerce, does not violate the Commerce 
Clause even though it affects commerce."  Id. at 440. 
¶48 The Rice Court characterized the process of evaluating 
a state law under the dormant commerce clause as one of 
"delicate adjustment" and announced a balancing test, believing 
that "no single conceptual approach identifies all of the 
factors that may bear upon a particular case."  Id.  at 440-41.  
The Court framed the inquiry as a balance between the state 
regulatory 
concern 
and 
the 
burden 
imposed 
on 
interstate 
commerce. 
No. 2003AP1086 
 
25 
 
¶49 The Court elaborated on the test courts should use to 
determine 
whether 
a 
state 
law 
unduly 
burdens 
interstate 
commerce: 
[T]he general rule that emerges can be phrased as 
follows: Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to 
effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its 
effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it 
will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such 
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the 
putative local benefits.  If a legitimate local 
purpose is found, then the question becomes one of 
degree.  And the extent of the burden that will be 
tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the 
local interest involved, and on whether it could be 
promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate 
activities.   
Id. at 441-42 (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 
142 (1970) (internal citations omitted). 
¶50 This "delicate" balancing test, expressing the Court's 
view of the commerce clause in 1978, is dramatically different 
from the rigid interpretation of the same clause in the late 
nineteenth century. 
¶51 In 
1980 
the 
Wisconsin 
Legislature 
repealed 
and 
recreated Chapter 133 of the statutes.  Ch. 209, Laws of 1979.  
As in 1893, it did not act in a vacuum.  When it recreated this 
chapter, the legislature acted in an entirely different era of 
commerce clause jurisprudence than at the time of the law's 
original passage. 
¶52 By 1980 the United States Supreme Court had clearly 
abandoned the notion that there might be a "precise point, in 
relation to every important article, where the paramount power 
of Congress terminates, and that of the State begins."  Thurlow, 
No. 2003AP1086 
 
26 
 
46 U.S. at 574.  That view had been replaced by the Court's new 
perception that states could burden interstate commerce unless 
the burden was "clearly excessive" in relation to the local 
benefits.  See Rice, 434 U.S. at 441-42. 
¶53 Conversely, the Supreme Court had approved federal 
legislation under the commerce clause that might, in an earlier 
era, have been considered regulation of intrastate commerce.  In 
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 
(1964), the Court's analysis was revealing: 
 
It is said that the operation of the motel here 
is of a purely local character.  But, assuming this to 
be true, "[i]f it is interstate commerce that feels 
the pinch, it does not matter how local the operation 
which applies the squeeze."  United States v. Women's 
Sportswear Mfrs. Assn., 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949).  As 
Chief Justice Stone put it in United States v. Darby 
[312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941)]: 
 
 
The power of Congress over interstate 
commerce is not confined to the regulation 
of commerce among the states.  It extends to 
those activities intrastate which so affect 
interstate commerce or the exercise of the 
power of Congress over it as to make 
regulation of them appropriate means to the 
attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise 
of the granted power of Congress to regulate 
interstate commerce.  See [M'Culloch] v. 
Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421. 
 
 
. . . .  
Thus the power of Congress to promote interstate 
commerce also includes the power to regulate the local 
incidents thereof, including local activities in both 
the States of origin and destination, which might have 
a 
substantial 
and 
harmful 
effect 
upon 
that 
commerce. . . .  
Id. at 258 (internal citation omitted). 
No. 2003AP1086 
 
27 
 
¶54 If a state were to confine itself to the regulation of 
what remained as purely intrastate commerce after Heart of 
Atlanta Motel, it would not be regulating much. 
¶55 Against this new backdrop, the legislature recreated 
Chapter 133.  Microsoft discounts the significance of the 1980 
legislation, arguing that the legislature "did not intend to 
alter the long-standing interpretation of the act."  After 
careful review, however, we think the 1980 action leaves little 
doubt of the legislature's intent to apply the Wisconsin 
antitrust statute to interstate commerce. 
¶56 First, 1979 Assembly Bill 831, which led to 1979 Act 
209, was introduced "by request of Attorney General Bronson C. 
La Follette."  Representative Mary Lou Munts, the principal 
Assembly author, had introduced a bill to repeal and recreate 
Chapter 133 in 1977.  See 1977 A.B. 685.  It proved to be very 
controversial and did not pass.  Her legislation was revised for 
the 1979 session with the help of the Wisconsin Department of 
Justice, and the new version was given the official imprimatur 
of the Attorney General.  In testimony on the 1979 bill, 
Representative Munts said: "I am very pleased to have been 
involved with the Justice Department in the Effort to revise 
Chapter 133, the Wisconsin Statute on Trusts and Monopolies.  We 
are indebted to the work of the Attorney General's office for 
the basic revision and to a number of attorneys with anti-trust 
experience for their suggestions for significant improvements in 
our current statutes."  Testimony of Mary Lou Munts dated 
No. 2003AP1086 
 
28 
 
October 8, 1979 (located in Legislative Council Files, Madison, 
Wisconsin). 
¶57 On October 3, 1979, Attorney General La Follette wrote 
the chair of the Assembly Commerce and Consumer Affairs 
Committee, Representative Marjorie (Midge) Miller.  He indicated 
that Assembly Bill 831 was a "comprehensive revision of Chapter 
133, Wisconsin's antitrust law."  He wrote that the "revision is 
the result of many hours of work by University of Wisconsin Law 
School faculty, members of the private bar, legislators, and 
members of the Department of Justice."  Letter to Representative 
Marjorie Miller from Attorney General Bronson C. La Follette 
dated October 3, 1979 (located in Legislative Council files, 
Madison, Wisconsin). 
¶58 Nineteen 
years 
before 
Assembly 
Bill 
831 
was 
introduced, 
the 
State 
argued 
its 
authority 
to 
regulate 
interstate commerce in the Allied Chemical case and won.  Three 
years before Assembly Bill 831 was introduced, the Wall Street 
Journal published a story on state antitrust enforcement.  It 
cited Wisconsin Assistant Attorney General Michael Zaleski to 
the effect that in 1975, Wisconsin's antitrust division won 29 
convictions against businesses, filed 32 consent decrees, and 
recovered almost $1 million.  Timothy D. Schellhardt, Antitrust 
Enforcement Stepped Up by States: Budgets, Staffs Grow, Wall St. 
J., Oct. 4, 1976.  Legislative files show that Zaleski played a 
key role in developing Assembly Bill 831.  One year before 
Assembly Bill 831 was introduced, the Wisconsin Department of 
Justice argued Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v. Rice, in 
No. 2003AP1086 
 
29 
 
the United States Supreme Court.  The case was argued by Albert 
Harriman, an assistant attorney general who helped write the 
State's brief in Allied Chemical.  As noted above, Rice is one 
of the key cases revitalizing state power to regulate interstate 
commerce. 
¶59 A few months before introduction of Assembly Bill 831, 
Attorney General La Follette spoke at the Antitrust Seminar of 
the National Association of Attorneys General and stated: "[I]t 
is now more likely that the wrath of state antitrust enforcement 
will be felt by violators than that of the federal government."  
Press Release, State of Wisconsin Department of Justice (May 18, 
1979) (on file at Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau).   
¶60 Because Assembly Bill 831 was so closely linked to the 
Wisconsin Department of Justice, it must have reflected the 
thinking of the Wisconsin Department of Justice that Chapter 133 
reached interstate commerce, for that was the interpretation the 
Department consistently gave to the statute after the Allied 
Chemical decision. 
¶61 Second, one of the major objectives of the 1980 
legislation was to "reverse" the holding in Illinois Brick Co. 
v. State of Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).  In Illinois Brick, 
the Supreme Court concluded that indirect purchasers harmed by 
antitrust violations could not recover under federal antitrust 
law. 
 
Assembly 
Bill 
831 
addressed 
this 
deficiency 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 133.18, which provides in part: "[A]ny person 
injured, 
directly 
or 
indirectly, 
by 
reason 
of 
anything 
prohibited by this chapter may sue therefor and shall recover 
No. 2003AP1086 
 
30 
 
threefold 
the 
damages 
sustained 
by 
the 
person . . . ."  
(Emphasis added.) 
¶62 In his letter to Representative Marjorie Miller of 
October 3, 1979, Attorney General La Follette wrote: 
 
An important new change would reverse the effect 
of the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in the Illinois 
Brick case on Wisconsin law.  The Court, in that case, 
ruled that only direct purchasers may recover damages 
for illegally price-fixed goods.  Thus, indirect 
purchasers -- such as state and local governments 
which 
purchase 
most 
of 
their 
supplies 
through 
wholesalers, retailers or other middlemen -- are left 
out in the cold when it comes to recovering for the 
illegally inflated prices they and their constituents 
must pay.  As only one example of how this adversely 
affects 
Wisconsin 
and 
its 
taxpayers, 
my 
office 
recently returned nearly a half million dollars to 
numerous Wisconsin schools, hospitals, municipalities, 
and counties from a settlement of an antitrust case 
against manufacturers of contract hardware.  Had the 
Illinois Brick decision been in effect in 1973, when 
this case was brought, we would not have been able to 
recover this money for Wisconsin taxpayers. 
Letter to Representative Marjorie Miller from Attorney General 
Bronson C. La Follette dated October 3, 1979 (located in 
Legislative Council files, Madison, Wisconsin). 
¶63 When the legislature permitted indirect purchasers to 
seek recovery for antitrust violations it certainly intended the 
statute to reach interstate commerce.  This result was discussed 
No. 2003AP1086 
 
31 
 
and upheld in ARC America.13  The Court's holding in ARC America 
reveals that at least under some circumstances, state antitrust 
statutes are expected to reach interstate commerce.14  It would 
be completely unrealistic to interpret Wis. Stat. § 133.18 as 
being limited to intrastate commerce. 
¶64 Third, 
turning 
directly 
to 
the 
text 
of 
the 
legislation, there is ample evidence of changes in prior law 
                                                 
13 In California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989), 
several states alleged violations of both federal and state 
antitrust law by an interstate monopoly of concrete block 
producers.  Id. at 97.  The parties settled the case, but the 
federal judge administering the settlement refused to allow 
indirect purchasers to have access to the settlement fund 
because he believed that federal law preempted the state 
antitrust statutes.  Id. at 99.  The Supreme Court held that the 
state "repealer" statutes were not preempted.  Id. at 101.   
14 Wisconsin's 
Department 
of 
Justice 
has 
certainly 
interpreted the law as enabling it to reach activities in 
interstate——and 
even 
international——commerce. 
 
See 
Press 
Release, 
Wisconsin 
Department 
of 
Justice, 
Doyle 
Announces 
Historic Settlements With Vitamin Companies; Six Manufacturers 
Agree to Pay More Than $335 Million (Oct. 10, 2000), available 
at www.doj.state.wi.us.  In the "vitamin cases," Wisconsin led 
23 states alleging that the six companies met in secret in 
locations "around the world" to fix vitamin prices, harming 
indirect purchasers.  Id.  The states alleged violations of 
"state and federal law."  Id.  The six companies involved are 
giants in international commerce, including BASF of Germany and 
Eisai Company of Japan.  Id.  Three of the companies were 
European and three were Japanese.  Id.  None was based in the 
United States, let alone Wisconsin.   
We recognize that the Department's conduct cannot, sua 
sponte, legitimize the underlying statute.  However, it is 
persuasive evidence that in practice, commercial parties tacitly 
agree that Wisconsin's law may apply to interstate——even 
international——commerce. 
No. 2003AP1086 
 
32 
 
requiring a new interpretation of the statute.  This evidence 
supports four significant principles. 
¶65 a. 
Chapter 133 was repealed and recreated, not 
simply amended.  In her testimony, Representative Munts stated: 
 
Wisconsin's current anti-trust laws rest on a 
foundation begun over eighty years ago and are overdue 
for a comprehensive revision. . . .  
 
Because the laws concerning anti-trust have been 
enacted in [ ] piecemeal fashion, conflicts have 
arisen in the interpretation and wording of the 
various sections. . . .  
AB 831 not only clarifies the scope and intent of 
Wisconsin's anti-trust laws, but also insures that the 
state's statutes are brought into line with federal 
statutes. . . . . 
. . . .  
AB 831 . . . broadens critical sections of the 
statutes [citing sections including section 133.03]. 
In 
conclusion, 
AB 
831 
will 
eliminate 
many 
ambiguities 
in 
the 
present 
statutes. 
 
More 
importantly, 
it 
will 
improve 
compatibility 
with 
federal anti-trust law, enhance state enforcement and 
insist on the preservation of a competitive climate in 
Wisconsin. . . .  
Testimony of Mary Lou Munts dated October 8, 1979 (located in 
Legislative Council files, Madison, Wisconsin) (emphasis added). 
 
¶66 In an October 5, 1979, memorandum to Representative 
Miller, a senior staff attorney for the Legislative Council, 
Russ Whitesel, wrote: "This Bill is a complete revision of the 
state anti-trust and monopoly law, Ch. 133 . . . ."  Wisconsin 
Legislative Council Staff Memorandum to Representative Midge 
Miller from Russ Whitesel, Senior Staff Attorney dated October 
No. 2003AP1086 
 
33 
 
5, 1979 (located in Wisconsin Legislative Council files, 
Madison, Wisconsin).  In testimony on October 8, 1979, a 
representative of Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce, Fred W. 
Shaffer, said "AB 831 does far more than revise existing 
Wisconsin law.  It changes it significantly."  Testimony of Fred 
W. Shaffer dated October 8, 1979 (located in Legislative Council 
files, Madison, Wisconsin). 
 
¶67 These statements contradict Microsoft's interpretation 
of the 1980 action and document a comprehensive revision of the 
law. 
¶68 b. 
The legislature created a very broad statement of 
legislative intent in a new section 133.01.  This declaration 
said in part: "It is the intent of the legislature that this 
chapter be interpreted in a manner which gives the most liberal 
construction to achieve the aim of competition."  
¶69 Wisconsin's 
Little 
Sherman 
Act 
did 
not 
have 
a 
declaration of intent in 1914 when this court decided the Pulp 
Wood case.  Moreover, section 133.01 [now § 133.03] was not 
covered by any legislative declaration of intent until revision 
of the whole chapter in 1980.  A previous statement of intent 
applied to only "ss. 133.17 [through] 133.185."  Thus, the 1980 
legislation 
not 
only 
added 
the 
phrase 
"most 
liberal 
construction," but also applied the legislative declaration to 
§ 133.03 for the first time. 
¶70 This court has often used legislative declarations as 
a valuable aid to our analysis.  See, e.g., LeMere v. LeMere, 
2003 WI 67, ¶15, 262 Wis. 2d 426, 663 N.W.2d 789; Wood v. City 
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of Madison, 2003 WI 24, ¶18, 260 Wis. 2d 71, 659 N.W.2d 31; 
Ocasio v. Froedtert Mem'l Lutheran Hosp., 2002 WI 89, ¶14, 254 
Wis. 2d 367, 646 N.W.2d 381.   
¶71 c. 
The Legislature deleted references to "in this 
state" in the Little Sherman Act portion of the chapter.  
Considering that Assembly Bill 831 came out of the Department of 
Justice and the elimination of the phrase "in this state" 
furthered the Department's views, a reasonable inference may be 
drawn that the elimination has significance.  Microsoft directs 
our attention to Emergency One, Inc. v. Waterous Co., 23 F. 
Supp. 2d 959, 963-64 (1998), in which a federal district court 
faced with the same question dismissed the repeated deletion of 
"in this state" as insignificant.  We disagree.  It is true 
enough that we have no document addressing the issue directly.  
Nonetheless, in interpreting the statute in context, we believe 
the deletion carries some weight.   
¶72 d. 
If we discount the prevailing atmosphere of 1893 
in an interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 133.03, we are left with an 
exceptionally broad statute that uses such phrases as "Every 
contract . . . or conspiracy," "Every person," "any contract," 
"any combination," and "Every person who . . . attempts to 
monopolize."  The text itself does not permit a limiting 
construction. 
¶73 Finally, 
we 
address 
the 
principle 
of 
statutory 
interpretation stated in Zimmerman that "once a construction has 
been given to a statute, the construction becomes part of the 
statute; and it is within the province of the legislature alone 
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to change the law."  Zimmerman, 38 Wis. 2d at 633.  In the 
Allied Chemical and Milwaukee Braves cases, this court gave a 
focused construction to the statute.  We think it is far more 
likely 
that 
in 
1980 
the 
legislature 
acquiesced 
in 
or 
strengthened the interpretation of Allied Chemical than that it 
revised the statute with the intent of undoing that decision. 
¶74 In short, we conclude that Chapter 133, particularly 
§ 133.03, applies to interstate commerce, at least in some 
circumstances.  Consistent with this holding, we withdraw the 
language from Conley Publishing that "the scope of Chapter 133 
is limited to intrastate transactions."  See Conley Publ'g, 265 
Wis. 2d 128, ¶16. 
¶75 The United States District Court in Milwaukee reached 
the same conclusion in the Emergency One case.  The court 
extensively analyzed the history and purpose of Chapter 133, and 
determined that it applies to interstate commerce under some 
circumstances.  23 F. Supp. 2d at 966-67.  Like this court, the 
Emergency One court was persuaded by the legislative history of 
the 1980 
revision, 
particularly the 
portion 
legislatively 
repealing Illinois Brick, as well as our holdings in Allied 
Chemical and Milwaukee Braves.  Emergency One, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 
966-67. 
¶76 In 1997 the Seventh Circuit considered an antitrust 
case involving an Alabama statute in which the defendants, 
manufacturers 
and 
wholesalers 
of 
prescription 
drugs, 
made 
similar arguments to those Microsoft makes in this case.  In re 
Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation, 123 F.3d 
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599, 612 (7th Cir. 1997).  The defendants cited several cases 
seemingly showing that "Alabama's antitrust statute is indeed 
limited to intrastate commerce."  Id. (citing Georgia Fruit 
Exchange v. Turnipseed, 62 So. 542, 546 (Ala. 1913) ("There 
being thus both a state and national law prohibiting unlawful 
combinations in restraint of trade——the one law relating to 
intrastate, the other to interstate, commerce . . . ")).15   
¶77 The Seventh Circuit rejected the defendant's argument.  
It stated:  
The cases on which the defendants rely . . . date 
from a period in which, interstate commerce being 
narrowly defined, and federal power to regulate such 
commerce being deemed exclusive, a state statute 
limited to intrastate commerce would have some, albeit 
a strictly limited, scope and could not have a greater 
scope no matter how much the state wanted it to.  The 
cases thus were not interpreting the statute; they 
were interpreting the Constitution as placing upper 
and lower bounds on the reach of the statute, and the 
Constitution has since been reinterpreted. 
Id. at 612-13. 
¶78 The Seventh Circuit added: "If the statute is limited 
today as it once was to commerce that is not within the 
regulatory power of Congress under the commerce clause, it is a 
dead letter because there are virtually no sales, in Alabama or 
anywhere else in the United States, that are intrastate in that 
sense."  Id. at 613.  We agree. 
                                                 
15 The Alabama court's statement is remarkably similar to 
the language in Pulp Wood: "The contract we think involved 
interstate commerce, and if so the federal statute is applicable 
and the case will be treated on that basis."  Pulp Wood, 157 
Wis. at 615. 
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¶79 The Seventh Circuit thus interpreted the Alabama 
statute to have evolved in response to changing interpretations 
of the federal constitution.16  In Wisconsin, the interpretation 
of our statute has changed not only because of evolution in 
constitutional theory, but also because the legislature acted to 
repeal and recreate Chapter 133 in 1980, with altered language.   
¶80 A number of state courts have construed statutes 
similar to Wisconsin's to reach interstate commerce.  See, e.g., 
C. Bennett Building Supplies, Inc. v. Jenn Air Corp., 759 S.W.2d 
883, 888 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Sterling Theatres Co., 
394 P.2d 226, 227 (Wash. 1964). 
¶81 We recognize that our holding implies that in some 
circumstances, a monopolist's conduct is actionable under either 
federal law, Wisconsin law, or both.  This concern is not unique 
to antitrust law.  Concerns about "double jeopardy" prosecutions 
date back to the adoption of the Bill of Rights.  U.S. Const., 
                                                 
16 We 
acknowledge 
that 
the 
Alabama 
Supreme 
Court 
subsequently interpreted the same statute differently.  Abbott 
Laboratories v. Durrett, 746 So. 2d 316, 337 n.5 (Ala. 1999).  
The Alabama court conducted an extensive review of the Supreme 
Court's commerce clause jurisprudence, as we have.  Id. at 330-
32.  It reached the same conclusion we have: that during the 
late nineteenth century, the theory of "dual sovereignty" or, as 
we have termed it, "mutually exclusive spheres" of power, was 
predominant.  Id.  However, the Alabama court adopted an 
originalist construction of the statute, giving great weight to 
the Alabama Legislature's intent at the time it enacted the 
Alabama statute.  Id. at 337 n.5.  Specifically, the Alabama 
court relied on the presence of the phrase "within this state" 
in the original act.  Id.  The case here is different because, 
as we have discussed, our legislature repealed and recreated our 
antitrust act, expressly deleting all references to "in this 
state," after our decision in Allied Chemical. 
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Amend. V ("nor shall any person be subject for the same offence 
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb").  As a general 
rule, a person is not unconstitutionally subject to double 
jeopardy when he is tried successively by different sovereigns 
for the same crime.  See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 
317 (1978).  This rule derives from the more general concept 
that the states and the federal government are separate 
sovereigns, each entitled to enforce its own laws.  Id. at 320. 
¶82 Duplicative prosecution is one thing; duplicative 
recovery is another.  "[I]t goes without saying that the courts 
can and should preclude double recovery by an individual."  
E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 297 (2002).   
¶83 In summary, we conclude that Chapter 133 may reach 
interstate commerce under some circumstances.   
C. 
When May Chapter 133 Reach Interstate Commerce? 
¶84 Having determined that Wisconsin's antitrust law may 
apply to interstate commerce under some circumstances, we are 
confronted with the question of what those circumstances are.   
¶85 A civil plaintiff filing an action under Wisconsin's 
antitrust act must allege that (1) actionable conduct, such as 
the formation of a combination or conspiracy, occurred within 
this state, even if its effects are felt primarily outside 
Wisconsin; or (2) the conduct complained of "substantially 
affects" the people of Wisconsin and has impacts in this state, 
even if the illegal activity resulting in those impacts occurred 
predominantly or exclusively outside this state.  Allied 
Chemical, 9 Wis. 2d at 295.  Operating with lesser standards 
No. 2003AP1086 
 
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would jeopardize the action, undermine the validity of our 
antitrust statute, and create the spectacle of Lilliputian 
harassment in Wisconsin courts.  Questions of provincialism, 
favoritism, and undue burden on interstate commerce should be 
determined by resort to contemporary federal commerce clause 
jurisprudence.  To say more is beyond the scope of this opinion. 
 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is reversed 
and the cause is remanded. 
¶86 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J., and ANN WALSH BRADLEY, 
J., did not participate. 
 
 
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