Title: Office of the Chief Medical Examiner v. Dover Behavioral Health System
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 483, 2008
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: June 30, 2009

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF MEDICAL 
§ 
EXAMINER, 
§ 
No. 483, 2008 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and 
v. 
 
§ 
for Kent County 
 
 
§ 
DOVER BEHAVIORAL HEALTH 
§ 
C.A. No. 08M-05-025 
SYSTEM, 
§ 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Defendant Below- 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
Submitted:  March 25, 2009 
Decided:  June 30, 2009 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
A. Ann Woolfolk, Esquire, (argued) of the Department of Justice; Wilmington, 
Delaware for appellant.   
 
 
Norman H. Brooks, Jr., Esquire, (argued) of Marks, O’Neill, O’Brien & Courtney, 
Wilmington, Delaware for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RIDGELY, Justice: 
 
2
Plaintiff-Appellant, the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (“OCME”), 
appeals from the Superior Court’s denial of its motion to compel Defendant-
Appellee Dover Behavioral Health System (“DBHS”) to comply with an 
administrative subpoena for records and documents pertaining to the death of 
Joseph Heverin.  The Superior Court held that the requested documents were 
protected by the peer review privilege.  OCME raises three arguments on appeal.  
First, it contends that the court erred by holding that the peer review privilege 
codified in 24 Del. C. § 1768 limited OCME’s subpoena authority under 29 Del. C. 
§ 4709.  Alternatively, OCME contends that the peer review privilege does not 
apply to the two records it seeks: (1) an investigative report that DBHS was 
required to, and did, provide to the Office of Health Facilities Licensing and 
Certification (“OHFLC”); and (2) an incident report given to the peer review 
committee.  We find no merit to OCME’s arguments and affirm. 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
While in the care and custody of DBHS, Joseph Heverin died on February 
25, 2008.  Heverin choked on food while eating lunch in the DBHS cafeteria and 
was transported to Kent General Hospital, where he was pronounced dead by the 
attending physician.  Judith Tobin, M.D., an assistant medical examiner (“AME”), 
performed an autopsy and issued a certificate of death the following day.1 
                                          
 
1 Heverin suffered from Huntington’s Chorea, which causes difficulty swallowing.  The death 
certificate listed this, along with “aspiration of food,” as leading to the cause of death: asphyxia.  
 
3
OCME began an investigation pursuant to 29 Del. C. § 4706, which requires 
OCME to investigate the cause and manner of death of any person who dies when 
unattended by a physician or in any suspicious or unusual manner.2  On February 
26, 2008, as part of its investigation, OCME requested from DBHS a copy of the 
incident report detailing the circumstances surrounding Heverin’s death.  DBHS 
denied the request.  The next day, Dr. Tobin issued an administrative subpoena 
pursuant to 29 Del. C. § 4709, which commanded DBHS to produce “all medical 
records and internal documents pertaining to Joseph Heverin.”  The same day, 
DBHS produced Heverin’s medical records, but did not include two reports that it 
created as a result of the incident.  Nor did DBHS include any internal documents 
arising from those reports which, DBHS maintained, were privileged. 
DBHS did produce a privilege log to OCME on the withheld reports.  Upon 
review of the log, OCME determined that it needed only two items from the list to 
complete its investigation.  Item one was a report prepared for OHFLC, which, like 
OCME, is a state agency within the Department of Health and Social Services (the 
“OHFLC Report”).  Item two was a report prepared at the time of Heverin’s death 
by a mental health technician employed by DBHS.3  That report was prepared at 
the direction of DBHS’s Director of Risk Management for DBHS’s peer review 
committee (the “Healthcare Peer Review Report”). 
                                          
 
2 29 Del. C. § 4706(a), (c). 
3 The technician was not a member of the peer review committee. 
 
4
After the assertion of privilege by DBHS, OCME filed in the Superior Court 
a motion to compel production of the OHFLC Report and the Healthcare Peer 
Review Report.  In response, DBHS claimed that the documents sought under the 
subpoena were protected by the peer review privilege and not subject to disclosure.  
The Superior Court denied OCME’s motion after a hearing, finding that “the 
reports sought fall squarely within the statutory peer review privilege.”4  This 
appeal followed. 
II. Discussion 
OCME contends that the peer review privilege created by 24 Del. C. § 1768 
does not limit the power of OCME pursuant to 29 Del. C. §§ 4706 and 4709 to 
obtain the investigative report provided to OHFLC and the incident report given to 
the DBHS peer review committee.  This issue focuses solely on the Superior 
Court’s interpretation of Section 1768, which is a legal issue we review de novo.5  
Not at issue is the authority of OCME to investigate Heverin’s death by 
interviewing witnesses with knowledge of the circumstances or the cause of 
Heverin’s death.6 
 
                                          
 
4 Office of the Chief Med. Exam’r v. Dover Behavioral Health Sys., Del. Super., No. 08M-05-
025, at 4 (Aug. 25, 2008) [hereinafter Superior Court Opinion]. 
5 See Ford Motor Co. v. Dir. of Revenue, 963 A.2d 115, 118 (Del. 2008); Pavulak v. State, 880 
A.2d 1044, 1045 (Del. 2005); Alfieri v. Marelli, 647 A.2d 52, 53 (Del 1994). 
6 At oral argument, counsel for OCME and DBHS agreed that OCME could subpoena witnesses 
—including the authors of the reports in question—and take their statements concerning the facts 
of the incident. 
 
5
A. 
OCME has broad power to investigate certain deaths. 
OCME is responsible for investigating the essential facts concerning the 
medical causes of death in a variety of situations, including when a person dies as a 
result of violence, by suicide, when unattended by a physician, or “in any 
suspicious or unusual manner….”7  In the course of such an investigation, the 
Chief Medical Examiner, the Assistant Medical Examiners, and the Deputy 
Medical Examiners “may administer oaths and affirmations and take affidavits and 
make examinations” as to any matter within the jurisdiction of their offices.  They 
also have the power to issue subpoenas.8  If OCME determines the cause of death 
within a reasonable medical certainty, it must prepare and file a written report 
“within thirty days after an investigation of such death.”9 
The authority of OCME to investigate is broad.  As the Superior Court 
recognized, “OCME seems to have carte blanche to label and investigate almost 
any death….”10  Here, OCME’s motion to compel states the reason for the 
investigation of Heverin’s death as a death “unattended by a physician.”  During 
the hearing, however, OCME argued that Heverin’s death could also be viewed as 
“suspicious” or “unusual.”  DBHS does not contest these points.  Accordingly, it is 
undisputed that OCME has the authority to investigate Heverin’s death. 
                                          
 
7 29 Del. C. § 4706(a), (c). 
8 29 Del. C. § 4709. 
9 29 Del. C. § 4707(a). 
10 Superior Court Opinion, supra note 4, at 3. 
 
6
B. 
The scope of the peer review privilege. 
In an effort to encourage the medical peer review process, the General 
Assembly has provided immunity to the members of certain boards of review.  
This immunity is conferred upon all medical personnel who participate in “peer 
review committees or organizations whose function is the review of medical 
records, medical care, and physicians’ work, with a view to the quality of care and 
utilization of … facilities.”11  Such persons “are immune from claim, suit, liability, 
damages, or any other recourse, civil or criminal, arising from any act, omission, 
proceeding, decision, or determination undertaken or performed, or from any 
recommendation made, so long as the person acted in good faith and without gross 
or wanton negligence in carrying out the responsibilities, authority, duties, powers, 
and privileges of the offices conferred by law upon them….”12  
Along with this immunity, the General Assembly has created a privilege for 
the records and proceedings of peer review committee meetings.  Section 1768(b) 
of Title 29 provides:  
Unless otherwise provided by this chapter, the records and 
proceedings of committees and organization described in subsection 
(a) of this section are confidential and may be used by those 
committees or organizations and the members thereof only in the 
exercise of the proper functions of the committee or organization.  
The records and proceedings are not public records and are not 
available for court subpoena, nor are they subject to discovery.  A 
                                          
 
11 24 Del. C. § 1768(a). 
12 Id. 
 
7
person in attendance at a meeting of any such committee or 
organization is not required to testify as to what transpired at the 
meeting.…13 
Delaware courts have recognized that the public policy behind the peer 
review privilege is to foster open and critical inspection of health care facilities 
procedures.  The privilege was enacted as part of a comprehensive revision of the 
laws which govern the practice of medicine to “provide for the establishment and 
enforcement of professional standards in the practice of medicine, and in 
furtherance thereof provides confidential protection for the records and 
proceedings of committees charged with professional standards, review and 
enforcement for those performing those functions.”14  It is in the public interest to 
ensure that health care providers’ critical analyses are not chilled by the fear of 
litigation over the analysis itself.15 
In Connolly v. Labowitz,16 the Superior Court explained that “[r]ecords 
include any paperwork, reports or compilation of date which are used exclusively 
by the committee.  Documents used exclusively by a peer review committee … are 
                                          
 
13 24 Del. C. § 1768(b). 
14 Hagadorn v. Davidson, 1990 WL 18274, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 12, 1990); see also 
Danklef v. Wilmington Med. Center, 429 A.2d 509, 513 (Del. Super. Ct. 1981); accord Delaware 
Medical Practices Act, 60 Del. Laws ch. 462. 
15 See Hagadorn, 1990 WL 18274, at *2; Dworkin v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 517 A.2d 302, 307 
(Del. Super. Ct. 1986). 
16 1984 WL 14132, at *1 (Del Super. Ct. Dec. 17, 1984).  In the absence of a decision by this 
Court, Connolly has become the definitive Delaware case on the peer review privilege.  See, e.g., 
Cain v. Villare, 2005 WL 2710854, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 19, 2005) (“Connolly…is 
instructive on the scope of the peer review statute.”); McBroom v. Graybeal, 2000 WL 1211142, 
at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 31, 2000); Riggs Nat’l Bank v. Boyd, 2000 WL 303308, at *6 (Del. 
Super. Ct. Feb. 23, 2000); Dworkin, 517 A.2d at 307 (relying on guidelines laid out in Connolly). 
 
8
privileged, and not discoverable.”17  But, the court also noted that the privilege is 
waived as to documents published to non-members.18  This proposition—that 
documents are only privileged insofar as they are used exclusively by the 
committee—has remained constant, even though the Superior Court has revisited 
the privilege over the last twenty-five years.19  We agree with this analysis, 
because Section 1768 expressly applies only to actual committee members.  
Accordingly, we adopt the Superior Court’s interpretation and expressly limit the 
privilege to paperwork, reports, or compilation of data that are used exclusively by 
peer review committees. 
C. 
The OHFLC Report is covered by the peer review privilege. 
OCME contends that Superior Court erred when it determined that the 
OHFLC Report was privileged under Section 1768.  OCME argues that the report 
was created at the direction of and provided to OHFLC, a state agency that surveys 
hospitals.  As a result, OCME argues, the report was not prepared for the exclusive 
use of the peer review committee, and thus, was not privileged. 
DBHS responds that in order to show waiver, the discoverer must show that 
the records were “used by or published to persons outside the specific review 
                                          
 
17 Connolly, 1984 WL 14132, at *1. 
18 Id.; see also Hagadorn, 1990 WL 18274, at *2; cf. DEL. R. EVID. 510 (stating that a privilege 
is waived if the holder “voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant part of 
the privileged matter.”). 
19 See, e.g., Cain, 2005 WL 2710854, at *2; McBroom, 2000 WL 1211142, at *1; Dworkin, 517 
A.2d at 307. 
 
9
organization.”20  The privilege may be waived if the record is “shown to or used by 
someone who is not a participant in the peer review process.”21  DBHS argues that 
OHFLC is itself a peer review organization.  Section 1768 defines those who are 
considered to be a peer review organization—and thus participants in the peer 
review process—as those whose “function is the review of medical records, 
medical care and physicians work, with a view to the quality of care and utilization 
of hospital … facilities.”22  We agree that OHFLC is a peer review organization. 
OHFLC is a state agency that, pursuant to federal law, manages complaints 
and incidents at federally-certified Medicare agencies.23  It investigates complaints 
and incidents at such facilities to determine “if a problem exists that could have a 
negative impact on the healthcare services provided [and] prevent the escalation of 
these problems into a more serious situation that would threaten the health, safety 
and welfare of the individual receiving service.”24  OHFLC prioritizes complaints, 
and may order an “off-site” investigation conducted by the agency if it determines 
an “on-site” investigation by the OHFLC is not warranted.25  If an agency fails to 
comply with an OHFLC-ordered investigation, it can lose its Medicare 
                                          
 
20 Connolly, 1984 WL 14132, at *1. 
21 Hagadorn, 1990 WL 18274, at *2. 
22 24 Del. C. § 1768(a) 
23 42 U.S.C. § 1395aa; 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.7, .10. 
24 42 C.F.R. § 488.7, .10; STATE OPERATIONS MANUAL § 5000.2, available at http://cms.hhs.gov/ 
manuals/downlods/som107c05.pdf. 
25 STATE OPERATIONS MANUAL § 5000.2. 
 
10
certification.26  DBHS is a federally-certified Medicare agency.  The OHFLC 
Report at issue here is an “off-site” investigation into Heverin’s death ordered by 
OHFLC. 
Because OHFLC’s “function is the review of medical records, medical care, 
and physicians’ work, with a view to quality of care and utilization of hospital … 
facilities[,]” we agree with the Superior Court’s conclusion that OHFLC is one of 
the “peer review committees or organizations” contemplated by Section 1768(a).  
Since OHFLC is a “participant in the peer review process,” DBHS’s disclosure of 
the report to that agency did not waive the privilege provided by Section 1768. 
D. 
The Healthcare Peer Review Report is covered by the peer review privilege. 
OCME contends that Superior Court erred in determining that the 
Healthcare Peer Review Report was privileged under Section 1768.  The 
Healthcare Peer Review Report was created by the mental health technician who 
escorted Heverin to the cafeteria on February 25, 2008.  It was prepared at the 
direction of DBHS’s Director of Risk Management exclusively for the peer review 
committee’s use.  OCME argues that no privilege applies, because the Healthcare 
Peer Review Report was merely furnished to the peer review committee.  It 
contends that Section 1768 does not treat records furnished to and records 
generated by the peer review committee equally.  This argument is without merit. 
                                          
 
26 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.7, .10. 
 
11
OCME relies upon the following emphasized phrases in Section 1768(b): 
Unless otherwise provided by this chapter, the records and 
proceedings of committees and organization described in subsection 
(a) of this section are confidential and may be used by those 
committees or organizations and the members thereof only in the 
exercise of the proper functions of the committee or organization.  The 
records and proceedings are not public records and are not available 
for court subpoena, nor are they subject to discovery.  A person in 
attendance at a meeting of any such committee or organization is not 
required to testify as to what transpired at the meeting.  A person 
certified to practice medicine, or a hospital, organization, or 
institution furnishing, in good faith and without gross or wanton 
negligence, information, data, reports, or records to such a committee 
or organization or a member thereof with respect to any patient 
examined or treated by a person certified to practice medicine or 
examined, treated, or confined in the hospital or institution is not, by 
reasons of furnishing such information data, reports, or records, 
liable in damages to any person or subject to any other recourse, civil 
or criminal. … 27 
OCME contends that the statute protects “the records and proceedings of 
committees,” and treats them differently from “information, data, reports, or 
records [furnished] to such a committee.”  OCME asserts that, although the records 
of the committee are not public and are not subject to subpoena or discovery, the 
information “furnished to” the committee is not expressly privileged, even though 
certain persons who supply that information may be immune from liability. 
OCME reads into Section 1768 a distinction that is not there.  A more 
natural interpretation of the statute is to read the phrase “the records and 
proceedings of committees” as encompassing information, data, reports, and 
                                          
 
27 24 Del. C. § 1768(b). 
 
12
records that are both furnished to and generated by the peer review committee.  
This interpretation is supported by the structure of the statute.  Subsection (a) 
addresses protection for committee members, while subsection (b) addresses 
protection for committee information.  The thrust of subsection (b) is to protect the 
records and proceedings of the committee from discovery, but that protection 
encompasses corollary protections.  Examples include protecting attendees from 
testifying as to what transpired at the meeting (including what evidence was 
introduced), establishing civil and criminal immunity for those furnishing 
information to the committee, and identifying certain instances when disclosure of 
such privileged information is permitted.   
Moreover, given the Superior Court’s consistent interpretation of Section 
1768, the General Assembly’s actions indicate that it intended to treat records 
furnished to and generated by the peer review committee the same way.  After the 
Superior Court decisions adopting this interpretation, the General Assembly re-
enacted Section 1768 without significant alterations to the statutory language relied 
on by the Superior Court in Riggs National Bank v. Boyd and McBroom v. 
Graybeal.28  Therefore, we can presume that the General Assembly was aware of 
these interpretations and adopted them when it re-enacted the statute.29 
                                          
 
28 See McBroom, 2000 WL 1211142, at *1; Riggs Nat’l Bank, 1998 WL 283384, at *1. 
29 It is a cardinal principal of statutory construction that the legislature is “presumed to be aware 
of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it 
re-enacts a statute without change.”  Allen v. Prime Computer, Inc., 540 A.2d 417, 420 (Del. 
 
13
E. 
OCME’s investigative power does not trump the statutory peer review 
privilege. 
OCME contends that Superior Court erred in determining that the peer 
review privilege defeats the power of OCME to receive copies of all of the records 
of DBHS pertinent to its investigation into Heverin’s death.  OCME argues that the 
language of Section 1768 unambiguously applies only where the records of a peer 
review committee are sought in connection with a public documents request or 
court subpoena or court-related discovery.  In this case, OCME asserts, none of 
those conditions are present because OCME is seeking production of the 
documents through an administrative subpoena. 
OCME contends that, although Delaware law is silent on the issue, courts of 
other jurisdictions have addressed whether there is a distinction between the use of 
privileged documents in civil litigation and the production of the same documents 
in response to an administrative subpoena.  Specifically, OCME points to Arnett v. 
Dal Cielo,30 a California Supreme Court decision, which states that “the term 
‘discovery’ … is to be given its well-established legal meaning of a formal 
exchange of evidentiary information between parties to a pending action, and that 
meaning does not include a subpoena issued, as here, by an administrative agency 
for purely investigative purposes.” 
                                                                                                                                        
1988) (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 382 n.66 
(1982); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1978)).  
30 923 P.2d 1, 13 (Cal. 1996). 
 
14
OCME’s reliance upon Arnett is misplaced, because the California and 
Delaware statutes are different.  Unlike the Delaware statute, the California statute 
only extends the peer review privilege to “discovery.”31  Arnett rested on the 
premise that where the legislature uses a term with an established legal meaning, it 
intended that legal meaning.  The court found that the legislature knew the 
meaning of the terms discovery and subpoena and knew how to exempt a class of 
evidence from both procedures.32  But, Delaware’s peer review privilege statute is 
far more expansive than California’s and indicates an intent to preserve the peer 
review privilege in most cases. 
OCME also points to Pennsylvania Protection & Advocacy, Inc. v. 
Houstoun,33 where the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
determined that an agency could obtain peer review-protected materials.34  That 
court’s decision, however, was based on its finding that the agency was a rights 
protection agency as defined under federal law, that a federal statute required that 
such agencies be given access to a defined category of records, and that the federal 
statute preempted “any state law that gives a healthcare facility the right to 
                                          
 
31 Compare 24 Del. C. § 1768 with CAL. EVID. CODE § 1157(a) (“Neither the proceedings nor the 
records of organized committees of medical ... staffs in hospitals, or of a peer review body ... 
having the responsibility of evaluation and improvement of the quality of care rendered in the 
hospital, ... shall be subject to discovery.”). 
32 Arnett, 923 P.2d at 11-13. 
33 228 F.3d 423, 425-26 (3rd Cir. 2000). 
34 See Protection and Advocacy for Mentally Ill Individuals Act (PAMII), Pub. L. No. 99-319, 
100 Stat. 478 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 10801-10905). 
 
15
withhold such records.”35  The court also noted that there was no conflict with the 
state law protecting certain peer review records because the Pennsylvania statute 
provided only that “[t]he proceedings and records of a review committee shall be 
held in confidence and shall not be subject to discovery or introduction into 
evidence in any civil action….”36  The court explained that, because the agency 
was acting as an advocate and in an investigative role, it did not seek to “discover” 
the materials or introduce them into evidence in the course of civil litigation.37 
Even if the Third Circuit’s decision had rested solely on its construction of 
Pennsylvania’s peer review privilege statute, Houstoun is inapposite because the 
Pennsylvania and Delaware statutes are different.38  Unlike the Pennsylvania 
statute, Section 1768 has no limiting “civil action” language.  While Section 
1768(b) provides that the records and proceedings of a peer review committee are 
not “subject to discovery,” it also provides more generally that they may be used 
“only in the exercise of the proper functions of the committee or organization.”39  
Moreover, also unlike the Pennsylvania statute, Section 1768 contains a provision 
expressly allowing federally-qualified rights protection agencies access to  
otherwise privileged peer review documents.40 
                                          
 
35 Houstoun, 228 F.3d at 428. 
36 63 PA. STAT. 425.4. 
37 Houstoun, 228 F.3d at 428. 
38 Compare 24 Del. C. § 1768 with 63 PA. STAT. 425.4. 
39 See 24 Del. C. § 1768. 
40 See 24 Del. C. § 1768 (“This section may not be construed to create a privilege or right to 
refuse to honor a subpoena issued by or on behalf of the Board of Medical Practice pursuant to 
 
16
The language and purpose of Section 1768 demonstrate that the legislature 
intended the peer review privilege to prevail over an OCME subpoena for the 
reports at issue here.  First, as noted above and as both parties conceded, the 
purpose of Section 1768 is to prevent the chilling effect caused by disclosing 
information used by medical review committees in accomplishing their tasks.  Of 
the two interpretations advanced in this appeal, only DBHS’s theory satisfies that 
purpose. 
Second, although OCME relies upon the phrase “court subpoena” in Section 
1768(b) as exempting by implication an administrative subpoena from the statute’s 
umbrella of protection, an exception should not be implied where the General 
Assembly has expressly provided for exceptions in the statute.41  The final 
sentence of Section 1768(b) contains an exception which states: “This section may 
not be construed to create a privilege or right to refuse to honor a subpoena issued 
by or on behalf of the Board of Medical Practice pursuant to § 1731A(d) of this 
title….”42  24 Del C. § 1731A(d) empowers the Executive Director of the Board of 
Medical Practice, in certain situations, to “by subpoena, compel the production of a 
list of the medical records reviewed during the peer review process, a list of the 
                                                                                                                                        
§ 1731A(d) of this title, nor may it be construed to limit access to records by rights-protection 
agencies whose access is authorized by federal law.”) 
41 See State v. Fletcher, --- A.2d ----, 2009 WL 1524937, at *3-5 (Del. May 27, 2009) (finding 
that only the General Assembly was empowered to expand the list of offenses that it had 
expressly declared cannot be expunged and declining to “do by judicial implication what the 
General Assembly itself has declined to do by express legislation.”). 
42 24 Del. C. § 1768(b). 
 
17
quality assurance indicators, and/or a list of other issues which were the basis for 
the peer review, quality assurance, or similar process.”43  This express exception 
for the Board demonstrates that the General Assembly knew how to carve out an 
exception for OCME if it chose to do so, and indicates that the General Assembly 
intended the protections of Section 1768 to encompass administrative subpoenas. 
We emphasize that the peer review privilege does not prevent OCME from 
performing its statutorily-mandated duty to investigate Heverin’s death.  OCME 
may question any person with knowledge of the circumstances or cause of 
Heverin’s death.  Pursuant to its broad investigative authority, OCME also may 
subpoena witnesses, administer oaths and affirmations, and take affidavits from 
witnesses as to the facts surrounding Heverin’s death.  However, records and 
proceedings of the peer review committee, including the actual reports and 
testimony provided to and used exclusively by the committee, are privileged under 
Section 1768. 
III. Conclusion 
The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
                                          
 
43 24 Del. C. § 1731A(d).  “The Board of Medical Practice has the sole authority in this State to 
issue certificates to practice medicine and is the State’s supervisory, regulatory, and disciplinary 
body for the practice of medicine.”  24 Del. C. § 1710(a).