Title: Meyer v. Veolia Energy North America
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12606
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: May 8, 2019

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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-12606 
 
RICHARD MEYER  vs.  VEOLIA ENERGY NORTH AMERICA. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     January 10, 2019. - May 8, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Way, Public:  defect.  Municipal Corporations, Notice to 
municipality.  Notice, Action alleging injury caused by 
defect in public way.  Statute, Construction. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
February 17, 2015. 
 
 
The case was heard by Peter M. Lauriat, J., on a motion for 
summary judgment. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Kevin J. Powers (Andrew M. Fischer also present) for the 
plaintiff. 
 
Christopher R. Howe for the defendant. 
 
John Pagliaro & Martin J. Newhouse, for New England Legal 
Foundation, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  While riding his bicycle on Sudbury Street in 
Boston, the plaintiff, Richard Meyer, struck a utility cover 
2 
 
 
that was misaligned with the road surface and injured himself.  
Within thirty days of the incident he submitted notice of claim 
to the city of Boston (city) regarding his injury.  Thirty-one 
days after the incident, the city informed him that it would not 
pay Meyer's claim because the defendant, Veolia Energy North 
America (Veolia), was responsible for the defect that caused 
Meyer's injuries.  A few days later, Meyer gave notice to Veolia 
and subsequently brought suit against Veolia for negligence.  A 
judge of the Superior Court granted summary judgment to Veolia 
and dismissed Meyer's lawsuit.  He concluded that G. L. c. 84, 
§ 15 (§ 15 or road defect statute), provided the exclusive 
remedy for Meyer's claim against Veolia.  He further concluded 
that Veolia was entitled to notice within thirty days from the 
date of Meyer's injury under G. L. c. 84, § 18 (§ 18 or notice 
statute), but that Meyer had not provided that notice. 
 
We conclude that the decision below was erroneous.  The 
text of §§ 15 and 18, the legal and legislative history relevant 
to those statutes, the case law, and the practical realities of 
providing notice within thirty days all confirm that the road 
defect and notice statutes apply to governmental and quasi 
governmental actors responsible for the public duty of 
maintaining the public way, and not to a private party such as 
Veolia that has created a particular defect in the way.  
Sections 15 and 18 do not limit Veolia's common-law liability 
3 
 
 
under tort law.  Consequently, Veolia may be sued for its own 
negligence without providing thirty days' notice.  Accordingly, 
we reverse the grant of summary judgment for Veolia.1 
 
1.  Facts.  In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, we 
view the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to 
the nonmoving party.  See Graham v. Quincy Food Serv. Employees 
Ass'n, 407 Mass. 601, 603 (1990). 
 
On July 1, 2013, Meyer rode his bicycle on Sudbury Street, 
a public way in Boston.  Meyer's bicycle struck a circular 
utility cover one foot or less in diameter that was misaligned 
with the road surface.  Meyer's collision with the cover caused 
him to crash to the ground and suffer injuries.  The utility 
cover bore the words "TRIGEN-BOSTON."2 
 
On July 18, 2013, eighteen days after Meyer's injury, 
Meyer's counsel sent a notice of claim by certified mail to 
multiple city officials, including the mayor, the commissioner 
of public works, the clerk, and corporation counsel.  This claim 
alleged that as Meyer turned on his bicycle from Cambridge 
Street to Sudbury Street, he encountered a gap in the roadway 
due to improper paving around a utility cover, which created "a 
                     
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted in support of 
Veolia by the New England Legal Foundation. 
 
 
2 Veolia Energy North America (Veolia) represented that it 
purchased Trigen in 2007 and is its parent company. 
4 
 
 
hole that caught the bicycle wheel."  The claim further alleged 
that the defect was the result of the "negligent maintenance of 
the roadway owned, maintained and controlled by the city of 
Boston." 
 
On July 24, 2013, a claims officer in the city's law 
department sent a letter to Meyer's counsel requesting pictures 
of the defect's exact location and surrounding area.  The 
following day, July 25, Meyer's counsel sent a photograph and a 
renewed notice of claim by certified mail to the mayor, the 
commissioner of public works, the clerk, corporation counsel, 
and the executive director and two commissioners of the city's 
water and sewer commission (commission). 
 
On July 31, 2013, Meyer's counsel spoke with the claims 
officer.  During that conversation, counsel inquired as to who 
was responsible for the improperly maintained utility cover.  
The claims officer did not inform Meyer's counsel that the city 
planned to contend that responsibility belonged to Veolia, a 
private company, rather than to the city.  That same day, 
however, the claims officer sent a letter to Meyer's counsel 
denying the claim.  The letter stated:  "Our investigation 
indicates that the City of Boston is not responsible for your 
damages because the location of the defect is under the 
jurisdiction of Veolia Energy Co." 
5 
 
 
 
Meyer's counsel received this letter late in the day on 
August 1, 2013, thirty-one days after Meyer was injured.  On 
August 6, counsel sent a notice of claim to Veolia, informing 
Veolia that Meyer had received injuries from "a defect in the 
roadway caused by a utility cover . . . that had been improperly 
maintained." 
 
On February 17, 2015, Meyer filed a complaint alleging 
negligence by Veolia for a "defect in the roadway caused by an 
improperly and negligently installed and/or maintained utility 
cover or casting."  Meyer did not, however, bring suit against 
the city.  Veolia admitted that it owned and was responsible for 
maintaining the utility hole, utility cover, and surrounding 
pavement within thirty inches.  Veolia moved for summary 
judgment on the ground that the exclusive remedy for Meyer's 
claim was § 15, which permits recovery for personal injury or 
property damage due to "a defect or a want of repair . . . in or 
upon a way" from "the county, city, town or person by law 
obliged to repair the same."  It argued that Meyer had failed to 
give Veolia notice within thirty days, as required by § 18, and 
that such notice was a condition precedent to any recovery.  
Meyer argued, by contrast, that a private corporation such as 
Veolia was not a "person" within the meaning of §§ 15 and 18, 
nor was Veolia required to "keep . . . in repair" the street 
6 
 
 
where his injury occurred such that notice would be required 
under § 18. 
 
On May 31, 2017, the judge allowed Veolia's motion and 
entered judgment dismissing Meyer's action.  The judge concluded 
that § 15 "is the exclusive remedy for personal injuries caused 
by a defect in a public way" and that § 18 "mandates notice to 
both private and government entities of any defect that the 
party is obliged to repair."  The judge held that the city's 
municipal code placed responsibility for repairing the allegedly 
defective utility cover on Veolia.  He accordingly concluded 
that Veolia was obliged by law to repair the alleged defect for 
purposes of § 15 and thus that Veolia was also the party 
entitled to receive written notice within thirty days of the 
date of injury pursuant to § 18.  Because Meyer had notified 
Veolia one week after this deadline, the judge held that Meyer 
was barred from proceeding under § 15 and allowed Veolia's 
motion for summary judgment. 
 
Meyer appealed, and we transferred the case to this court 
on our own motion. 
 
2.  Discussion.  An appellate court reviewing a grant of 
summary judgment examines its allowance de novo and from the 
same record as the motion judge.  See Matthews v. Ocean Spray 
Cranberries, Inc., 426 Mass. 122, 123 n.1 (1997).  The standard 
of review is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most 
7 
 
 
favorable to the nonmoving party, the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law.  See Augat, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. 
Ins. Co., 410 Mass. 117, 120 (1991). 
 
a.  Construction of the road defect and notice statutes.  
"[Q]uestions of statutory construction are questions of law, to 
be reviewed de novo."  See Bridgewater State Univ. Found. v. 
Assessors of Bridgewater, 463 Mass. 154, 156 (2012).  We 
interpret a statute according to the intent of the Legislature, 
which we ascertain from all the statute's words, "construed by 
the ordinary and approved usage of the language" and "considered 
in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or 
imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be 
accomplished."  Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. President & Fellows of 
Harvard College, 445 Mass. 745, 749 (2006).  "Ordinarily, where 
the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, it is 
conclusive as to legislative intent.  That said, we will not 
adopt a literal construction of a statute if the consequences of 
doing so are absurd or unreasonable, such that it could not be 
what the Legislature intended" (quotation and citations 
omitted).  Cianci v. MacGrath, 481 Mass. 174, 178 (2019).  Our 
principal objective is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of 
the Legislature in a way that is consonant with "common sense 
and sound reason" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Curran, 
478 Mass. 630, 633-634 (2018). 
8 
 
 
 
Both § 15, the road defect statute, and § 18, the notice 
statute, are part of G. L. c. 84, entitled "Repair of Ways and 
Bridges."3  Section 1 announces the purpose of the chapter, using 
language that reflects its origins in the preindustrial era.  
The first sentence of § 1 states:  "Highways and town ways, 
including railroad crossings at grade with such highways and 
town ways, shall be kept in repair at the expense of the town in 
which they are situated, so that they may be reasonably safe and 
convenient for travelers, with their horses, teams, vehicles and 
carriages at all seasons."4 
 
The road defect statute imposes liability for personal 
injury or property damage by reason of a defect or want of 
repair in or upon a way.5  In relevant part, § 15 states: 
                     
 
3 The Tort Claims Act, G. L. c. 258, preserves the status 
and force of G. L. c. 84, thereby providing limited governmental 
liability for defects in ways.  See Gallant v. Worcester, 383 
Mass. 707, 711 (1981). 
 
 
4 The rest of G. L. c. 84, § 1, provides for cities and 
towns to submit requests for repair and reimbursement for the 
cost of repairs to the Commonwealth.  Neither reimbursement from 
the State nor the relative degree of liability of a city versus 
the State or Federal government is relevant to the instant case. 
 
5 "Our decisions have construed a 'defect,' for purposes of 
G. L. c. 84, [§ 15,] to be anything in the state or condition of 
the way that renders it unsafe or inconvenient for ordinary 
travel."  Gallant, 383 Mass. at 711.  Objects on the road 
surface creating obstructions to travel are defects.  Huff v. 
Holyoke, 386 Mass. 582, 585 (1982).  In particular, an 
improperly positioned maintenance hole cover may constitute a 
defect.  See Valade v. Consolidated Bldrs., Inc., 3 Mass. App. 
Ct. 519, 520 (1975). 
9 
 
 
"If a person sustains bodily injury or damage in his 
property by reason of a defect or a want of repair or a 
want of a sufficient railing in or upon a way, and such 
injury or damage might have been prevented, or such defect 
or want of repair or want of railing might have been 
remedied by reasonable care and diligence on the part of 
the county, city, town or person by law obliged to repair 
the same, he may, if such county, city, town or person had 
or, by the exercise of proper care and diligence, might 
have had reasonable notice of the defect or want of repair 
or want of a sufficient railing, recover damages therefor 
from such county, city, town or person; but he shall not 
recover from a county, city, town or local water and sewer 
commission more than one fifth of one per cent of its state 
valuation last preceding the commencement of the action nor 
more than [$5,000]; nor shall a county, city or town be 
liable for an injury or damage sustained upon a way laid 
out and established in the manner prescribed by statute 
until after an entry has been made for the purpose of 
constructing the way, or during the construction and 
repairing thereof, provided that the way shall have been 
closed, or other sufficient means taken to caution the 
public against entering thereon." 
 
 
The notice statute requires a person injured by a road 
defect within the meaning of § 15 to give notice as a condition 
precedent to the bringing of a legal action pursuant to that 
section.  In full, § 18 states: 
"A person so injured shall, within thirty days thereafter, 
give to the county, city, town or person by law obliged to 
keep said way in repair, notice of the name and place of 
residence of the person injured, and the time, place and 
cause of said injury or damage; and if the said county, 
city, town or person does not pay the amount thereof, he 
may recover the same in an action of tort if brought within 
three years after the date of such injury or damage.  Such 
notice shall not be invalid or insufficient solely by 
reason of any inaccuracy in stating the name or place of 
residence of the person injured, or the time, place or 
cause of the injury, if it is shown that there was no 
intention to mislead and that the party entitled to notice 
was not in fact misled thereby.  The words 'place of 
residence of the person injured,' as used in this and the 
10 
 
 
two following sections, shall include the street and 
number, if any, of his residence as well as the name of the 
city or town thereof.  Failure to give such notice for such 
injury or damage sustained by reason of snow or ice shall 
not be a defense under this section unless the defendant 
proves that he was prejudiced thereby." 
 
 
As mentioned, the language of a statute is conclusive as to 
legislative intent where it is unambiguous.  Cianci, 481 Mass. 
at 178.  Here, however, where governmental and nongovernmental 
parties are involved, and the party responsible for the 
particular defect and the party responsible for the roadway 
differ, application of the road defect statute is not perfectly 
clear.  In particular, where a private party is responsible for 
the particular defect but not the roadway, it is unclear whether 
such a party is covered by the statute. 
 
We conclude that the road defect statute, like the notice 
statute, is meant to apply to the public duty to maintain the 
roadway and does not apply to a private entity responsible for a 
particular defect in the road.  The Legislature did not intend 
to separate responsibility for the roadway from responsibility 
for the defect and provide liability to one and notice to the 
other.  The statutes are directed at governmental liability for 
roadways and the defects thereon.  Furthermore, where the 
Legislature included the word "persons," it did so for a very 
limited historical purpose:  to include private parties once 
responsible for entire roadways.  As will be explained infra, 
11 
 
 
this court, in an opinion authored by Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr., clarified this confusing point in Fisher v. 
Cushing, 134 Mass. 374 (1883).  In sum, the road defect and 
notice statutes provide for liability and notice to governmental 
and quasi governmental entities responsible for the roadways.  
Private parties are not covered by these statutes when they 
cause particular defects in public roadways; rather, they are 
subject to suits in tort.  This becomes evident with close 
examination of the statutory text, the legislative history of 
the statutes, and case law, as well as consideration of the 
practicalities of notice within thirty days. 
 
We begin with the statutory language.  Notably, both the 
liability and notice provisions refer to "the county, city, town 
or person by law obliged," but the words following that phrase 
differ.  Section 15, the road defect statute, allows for the 
recovery of damages from the entity "by law obliged to repair 
the same."  Section 18, the notice statute, requires notice to 
the entity "by law obliged to keep said way in repair."  The 
antecedent of "the same" in § 15 could be "a way" or "such 
defect."  Under the former interpretation, the liability imposed 
by § 15 and the notice required by § 18 concern the same entity; 
under the latter interpretation, potentially separate entities.  
Our default assumption, however, is that the Legislature intends 
words to have the same meaning when used in closely proximate 
12 
 
 
sections of a particular chapter.  See Insurance Rating Bd. v. 
Commissioner of Ins., 356 Mass. 184, 188–189 (1969) ("Where the 
Legislature uses the same words in several sections which 
concern the same subject matter, the words must be presumed to 
have been used with the same meaning in each section" [quotation 
and citation omitted]).  The word "repair" elsewhere in G. L. 
c. 84 also refers to performing repairs on a particular 
structure that a town is required to keep in repair.  See G. L. 
c. 84, § 22 ("If a town neglects to repair any way which it is 
obliged to keep in repair . . .").  "Repair" also refers to 
repairing "ways and bridges" in the title of c. 84.  See 
American Family Life Assur. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 388 
Mass. 468, 474, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 850 (1983) ("It is well 
established that, although the title of an act cannot control 
the plain provisions of the act, it may aid construction of 
ambiguous clauses"). 
 
The earliest version of the road defect statute, St. 1786, 
c. 81, § 7, authorized persons injured by "any defect, or want 
of necessary repair and amendment of any highway, causeway or 
bridge" to "recover of the county, town, the person or persons, 
who are by law obliged to keep the same highway, causeway, or 
bridge in repair" (emphasis added).  The truncation of this 
phrase to "the same" first occurred in St. 1850, c. 5, § 1, 
which stated that if a person is injured by "any defect or want 
13 
 
 
of repair, or of sufficient railing in or upon any highway, 
townway, causeway, or bridge, he may recover . . . of the 
county, town, or persons who are, by law obliged to repair the 
same" (emphasis added).  The legislative history demonstrates 
that the phrase "the same" refers to certain types of ways or 
other structures to be kept in repair.  It did not draw a 
distinction between responsibility for the way and 
responsibility for a particular defect in the way. 
 
The structure and purpose of § 18, the notice statute, also 
confirm this reading.  See New England Power Generators Ass'n v. 
Department of Envtl. Protection, 480 Mass. 398, 410 (2018) ("The 
court does not determine the plain meaning of a statute in 
isolation but rather in consideration of the surrounding text, 
structure, and purpose . . ." [quotations and citation 
omitted]).  Section 18 would not make sense if the party whose 
defect caused the injury was not the same as the one receiving 
the notice:  it also conditions the right to maintain an action 
on the refusal of the "said county, city, town or person" that 
received the notice to "pay the amount" of the plaintiff's 
damages.  It would be illogical to require a plaintiff to send a 
demand letter to a nonliable party (i.e., the party responsible 
for the way) as a condition precedent to bringing suit against a 
wholly different liable party (i.e., the party responsible for 
the defect).  See Curran, 478 Mass. at 633-634 (statutory 
14 
 
 
interpretation must conform to common sense).  Additionally, 
§ 18 states that notice shall not be invalid "solely by reason 
of any inaccuracy in stating the . . . place or cause of the 
injury, if it is shown that there was no intention to mislead 
and that the party entitled to notice was not in fact misled 
thereby."  If there was an obligation to give notice to the 
party who created the particular defect, as opposed to the party 
responsible for the way, this good faith exception would make 
little to no sense, because that good faith error would mean 
that notice would be adequate even when it was given to the 
incorrect party. 
 
Finally, reading the different provisions of G. L. c. 84 
together demonstrates that the obligation to keep a road in 
repair in § 1 and the liability for defects in a road in § 15 
are tightly connected and concern the same party.  See Gregory 
v. Inhabitants of Adams, 14 Gray 242, 246 (1860) ("These 
provisions, although contained in different statutes, yet having 
the same general object in view, should undoubtedly be construed 
in reference to each other.  The former prescribes the standard 
of duty imposed upon towns; the latter fixes the responsibility 
which will devolve upon them, if injury results from their 
failure to conform to the requirements of the law").  The notice 
15 
 
 
regarding the incident that created that liability likewise goes 
to this same party.6 
 
We emphasize that, in scenarios where multiple governmental 
or quasi governmental parties may have repair duties with 
respect to a particular way, assigning responsibility for the 
way may be difficult and notice should be provided to each 
party.  Wolf v. Boston Water & Sewer Comm'n, 408 Mass. 490 
(1990), exemplifies this issue.  In that case, a plaintiff was 
injured by the collapse of an asphalt patch placed by the 
commission on a Boston street.  Id. at 491.  The commission was 
a "political subdivision" of the Commonwealth.  Farrell v. 
Boston Water & Sewer Comm'n, 24 Mass. App. Ct. 583, 588 (1987).  
                     
 
6 This interconnection is particularly clear from the 
statute that created the notice requirement, "An Act . . . in 
relation to the repair of highways, and remedies for injuries 
sustained thereon."  St. 1877, c. 234.  Section 1 imposed the 
duty to repair ("Highways, town ways, streets, causeways and 
bridges shall be kept in repair at the expense of the town, city 
or place in which they are situated . . .").  Section 2 created 
liability for failure to fulfill that repair duty ("If a person 
receives or suffers bodily injury, or damage in his property, 
through a defect or want of repair, or of sufficient railing in 
or upon a highway, town way, causeway or bridge, which might 
have been remedied, or which damage or injury might have been 
prevented by reasonable care and diligence on the part of the 
county, town, place or persons by law obliged to repair the 
same, he may recover in the manner hereinafter provided, of the 
said county, town, place or persons, the amount of damage 
sustained thereby . . ." [emphasis added]).  Section 3 imposed 
the notice requirement on plaintiffs ("Any person injured in the 
manner set forth in the preceding section shall within thirty 
days thereafter give notice to the county, town, place or 
persons by law obliged to keep said highway, town way, causeway 
or bridge in repair . . ." [emphasis added]). 
16 
 
 
Under its enabling act, it was granted  "all . . . obligations 
of the city" with respect to sewer and water systems, defined as 
"all . . . lands, easements, rights in land . . . and any other 
property, real or personal, incidental to and included in such" 
systems.  Wolf, supra at 493, quoting St. 1977, c. 436, §§ 2, 5.  
It was also given the power "to enter onto any land within the 
city" to conduct "examinations" in the course of maintaining and 
repairing its systems, provided that the commission "restore 
such lands to the same condition."  Wolf, supra, quoting St. 
1977, c. 436, § 6 (g).  In other words, the commission had the 
power to excavate entire streets and the corresponding duty to 
"repair the roadway."  Wolf, supra.  It therefore had a public 
duty to maintain the way and was entitled to notice under the 
statute.  By contrast, a private company that lacked these 
powers would not have had the duty under § 15 with which we 
concluded the commission was vested.7 
                     
 
7 In Hurlburt v. Great Barrington, 300 Mass. 524, 528 
(1938), we stated that the "maintenance and the repair of 
sidewalks are not matters which may well be entrusted to two 
distinct municipal bodies."  There, we concluded that a town was 
relieved of road defect liability when the Legislature had given 
a "fire district, a quasi corporation, all matters connected 
with the construction, the maintenance and the repair of 
sidewalks situated within the limits of the district."  Id. at 
529.  This is in contrast to the facts in Wolf, where we 
concluded that the powers of the Boston water and sewer 
commission to excavate any streets within the city, provided 
that it made repairs, made it a party "obliged by law to repair 
the roadway," even though the city may also have remained 
obliged to repair the street.  Wolf v. Boston Water & Sewer 
17 
 
 
 
b.  The meaning of "person by law obliged to keep" the way 
"in repair" as clarified by the legislative history and case 
law.  Our interpretation of the road defect and notice statutes 
is clarified by the historical understanding of the meaning of 
"person" in the statutes.  Veolia argues that the plain language 
of the statutes applies equally to private and governmental 
entities.  By contrast, Meyer claims that the legislative and 
legal history of the statutes demonstrates that the Legislature 
intended "persons" to apply only to governmental actors, not 
private for-profit corporations such as Veolia.  Based on our 
review of this legal and legislative history, we conclude that 
that the statutes refer to the county, city, town, or person 
required to perform the public duty of maintaining the way and 
not to a private corporation that causes a defect in the way, 
even where the private entity has been authorized by a 
governmental entity to perform a particular function causing a 
defect in the way and the governmental entity seeks to transfer 
its responsibility for the defect to the private entity.  Such 
private entities may be sued in tort, as has been the case 
historically. 
                     
Comm'n, 408 Mass. 490, 493 (1990).  See Ram v. Charlton, 409 
Mass. 481, 486 (1991) (both town and Commonwealth parties 
obligated by law to keep State highway in repair).  Indeed, § 15 
expressly names sewer and water commissions as potentially 
liable parties. 
18 
 
 
 
Before 1786, the road defect statute only specified 
counties and towns as liable parties.  See The Book of the 
General Lawes and Libertyes Concerning the Inhabitants of the 
Massachusets 6-7 (1660); St. 1693-1694, c. 6, § 6.  The 1786 
"Act making provision for the repair and amendment of highways" 
first authorized a party injured by a road defect to bring a 
civil action for damages against "the county, town, the person, 
or persons, who are by law obliged to keep the same highway, 
causeway, or bridge in repair" (emphasis added).  St. 1786, 
c. 81, § 7.8  The 1786 statute did not, however, expressly define 
the term "persons."9 
                     
 
8 Statute 1786, c. 81, § 1, imposed a general repair duty on 
inhabitants of particular localities with respect to "highways, 
town-ways, causeways, and bridges."  In turn, St. 1786, c. 81, 
§ 7, imposed liability for defects in these same structures:  
"And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, that if 
any person shall lose a limb, break a bone, or receive any other 
injury in his person, or in his horse, team, or other property, 
through any defect, or want of necessary repair and amendment of 
any highway, causeway, or bridge; the person or persons injured 
thereby, shall and may recover of the county, town, the person, 
or persons, who are by law obliged to keep the same highway, 
causeway, or bridge in repair, in case they had reasonable 
notice of the defect, double the damages thereby sustained, by a 
special action of the case, before any Court proper to hear and 
determine the same." 
 
 
9 Consistent with the earlier statutes, a marginal note in 
the first printed edition of St. 1786, c. 81, § 7, summarized 
its provisions as "[d]amage happening through defects in ways or 
bridges, shall be made good by the county or town."  The 
Perpetual Laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 377 (1789).  
To the extent the 1786 Legislature viewed "persons" as 
encompassing corporate entities, they likely would have had in 
mind municipal corporations.  See Maier, The Debate over 
19 
 
 
In Fisher, 134 Mass. 374, authored by Justice Holmes, the 
court interpreted the road defect and notice statutes, and the 
meaning of the reference to "persons," in the course of 
reviewing the statutes' legislative and legal history.  As a 
noted scholar of legal history and the author of The Common Law 
(1881), Justice Holmes brought special knowledge and expertise 
to this interpretation.  The defendant in Fisher was sued for 
negligently maintaining a coal hole on a Boston sidewalk.  Id. 
at 374.10  Under the city ordinances, the owner was required to 
keep the coal hole and its covering "in good order at all times" 
and was liable to the city for any damages incurred by reason of 
the coal hole being "out of repair" or negligently covered.  
Revised Ordinances of the City of Boston 171-172 (1882).  The 
defendant claimed that he did not receive the thirty days' 
                     
Incorporations, in Massachusetts and the New Nation 76 (C. 
Wright ed., 1992) (of approximately one hundred incorporating 
acts passed by 1780s Legislature, two-thirds concerned local 
governmental bodies, with "only a handful" concerning what would 
later be considered business corporations). 
 
 
10 A coal hole was an underground vault covered by a hatch 
with a cover where coal used for heating purposes was kept for 
easy access.  See S.P. Adams, Home Fires:  How Americans Kept 
Warm in the Nineteenth Century 105-106 (2014).  Under the city 
ordinances then in force, construction of a coal hole in the 
sidewalk required a license from the superintendent of streets 
and had to be built to certain specifications.  Revised 
Ordinances of the City of Boston 171-172 (1882).  Negligence 
suits from pedestrians in public ways alleging that defendants 
had improperly covered their coal holes were common.  See, e.g., 
Gillis v. Cambridge Gas Light Co., 202 Mass. 222, 223 (1909); 
French v. Boston Coal Co., 195 Mass. 334, 335 (1907). 
20 
 
 
notice to which he was entitled under the notice statute and 
therefore that the action could not be maintained. 
The court rejected this argument:  "The sections imposing 
liability to an action, from the St. of 1786 down, have been 
part of a statutory scheme creating or regulating a public duty 
to keep the highways in repair.  The whole scope of that scheme 
shows that it is directed to the general public duty [to keep 
the way in repair], and that it has no reference to the common 
law liability for a nuisance."  Fisher, 134 Mass. at 374-375.  
More specifically, "[t]he obligation of the 'persons' is the 
same obligation as that of the counties or towns mentioned 
alternatively with them," that is, the duty to maintain the 
highway.  Id. at 375.  "But the obligation of the defendants 
cannot properly be called an obligation to repair the 
highway. . . .  It is a duty not to dig or maintain pits in the 
highway."  Id.  That duty, the court concluded, is different 
from the public duty to maintain the highway covered by the road 
defect statute.  The court therefore held that the defendants 
could be sued in tort for the nuisance they created with their 
coal hole. 
The court also went on to explain the meaning of "persons":  
"The mention of 'persons' in the statute, alongside of counties 
and towns obliged to repair, is easily explained.  The outline 
of our scheme was of ancient date and English origin.  In 
21 
 
 
England, while parishes were generally bound to repair highways 
and bridges, a person might be, ratione tenurae,[11] or otherwise. 
. . .  [W]e cannot say, and probably the Legislature of 1786 
could not have said, that there were no cases in the 
Commonwealth where persons other than counties or towns were 
bound to keep highways in repair. . . .  Even if there were not, 
it was a natural precaution to use the words."  Fisher, 134 
Mass. at 375-376. 
Consistent with the holding in Fisher, we frequently 
allowed tort suits to proceed against individuals or private 
companies that caused road defects, while applying the statutes 
to the municipal entities responsible for maintaining the ways 
themselves.12  Notably, in a case with comparable facts to the 
                     
 
11 "Ratione tenurae" is a Latin phrase meaning by reason of 
tenure.  Black's Law Dictionary 1454 (10th ed. 2014).  "One 
ground on which a private person may be held liable to repair a 
public footpath or other highway is 'ratione tenurae,' that is, 
that where a footpath runs through private land and the owner or 
occupier of that land has from time immemorial repaired the 
path, the person for the time being in possession must continue 
to repair the path."  Legal Memory, 73 Law J. 403, 409 (1932). 
 
 
12 For cases where private actors were sued directly in tort 
for injuries arising from defects they caused in a public way, 
see, e.g., Christman v. Shagoury Constr. Co., 349 Mass. 113, 115 
(1965) (construction company that contracted with town to 
install maintenance holes could be held liable in tort for road 
defect in area of road around maintenance hole); Scholl v. New 
England Power Serv. Co., 340 Mass. 267, 270 (1960) (electric 
company and subcontractor company could be held liable to 
plaintiff for injuries sustained when she fell into excavated 
hole made by subcontractor as part of resurfacing project for 
city); McGinley v. Edison Elec. Illuminating Co., 248 Mass. 583, 
22 
 
 
instant one, a plaintiff was injured by a protruding maintenance 
hole cover that the defendant electric company had laid "in [a] 
public way" in conformity with specifications imposed by the 
city.  Miller v. Edison Elec. Illuminating Co., 283 Mass. 517, 
521-522 (1933).  The company argued that the plaintiff's suit 
was barred because he did not provide notice pursuant to § 18.  
Id. at 522.  We rejected this argument:  relying on Fisher, we 
concluded that § 18's "requirement of notice is not applicable 
. . . in an action against private corporations or individuals."  
Id.  Accord Regan v. John J. Amara & Sons Co., 348 Mass. 734, 
737 (1965) (no notice required under § 18 in suit against 
defendant private contractor that acted negligently in failing 
to fill hole it made in public road while performing work for 
city); Seltzer v. Amesbury & Salisbury Gas Co., 188 Mass. 242, 
243–244 (1905) (no notice required under § 18 against defendant 
gas company for "digging a pit and leaving it insufficiently or 
                     
587 (1924) (defendant company liable for negligence after 
plaintiff fell into unguarded open maintenance hole); Rockwell 
v. McGovern, 202 Mass. 6, 10 (1909) (contractor whom city had 
hired to complete excavation project for transit system could be 
held liable to plaintiff who was injured when part of sidewalk 
collapsed); Seltzer v. Amesbury & Salisbury Gas Co., 188 Mass. 
242, 244 (1905) (defendant gas company could be held liable for 
injuries sustained by plaintiffs who fell into excavated trench 
that defendant failed to properly fill).  See also note 10, 
supra (citing cases involving private companies sued for 
negligent maintenance of coal holes on public ways). 
23 
 
 
improperly filled, thus creating an obstruction to public 
travel"). 
 
Finally, we emphasize that we have not allowed government 
entities to assign or delegate their public responsibilities 
under the road defect statute.  As we explained in Scholl v. New 
England Power Serv. Co., 340 Mass. 267, 270-271 (1960), the 
"liability of a municipality under G. L. c. 84, § 15, for an 
injury to a traveller sustained by reason of a defect in a way 
attaches," even though the plaintiff may also have a claim 
against a private party, because the "statutory obligation of 
the city to keep [a public way] safe and convenient for public 
use could not be delegated to" private companies contracted to 
do particular road repairs.  Accord Torphy v. Fall River, 188 
Mass. 310, 312 (1905) (despite hiring railroad company to 
reconstruct certain public streets, city "not deprived of this 
right of control [over the streets], nor relieved of its 
statutory duty" and could not "delegate this requirement" to 
"secure exemption from liability to those suffering injury"); 
Brooks v. Inhabitants of Somerville, 106 Mass. 271, 274 (1871) 
("not in the power of the town . . . to delegate the care of the 
streets to [private contractor hired to construct water system] 
as to relieve themselves from their general responsibility for 
their safety and convenience"); Merrill v. Inhabitants of 
Wilbraham, 11 Gray 154, 156 (1858) (town's authorization of 
24 
 
 
aqueduct company to excavate road "did not discharge the town 
from liability for an injury occasioned by reason thereof upon 
the highway"). 
We emphasize today that the court in Fisher and the long 
line of authority discussed supra correctly interpreted the 
meaning of the road defect statute.  In these decisions, the 
court recognized that this statute is directed at a public duty 
for maintaining the way, not at private actors causing 
particular defects in the way; the latter are subject to 
liability in tort.  The statutory exclusive remedy applies only 
to those entities that have a public duty to maintain the way, 
not to private parties causing particular defects. 
Unfortunately, there are also a limited number of cases 
that have confused or at least not clarified this distinction.  
We clarify the confusion in these cases today.  Much of it can 
be traced back to Dickie v. Boston & Albany R.R., 131 Mass. 516 
(1881).  There, we concluded that the statutes were applicable 
to a railroad corporation and not to the town where the railroad 
had been authorized by statute and the railroad's charter to 
keep an entire bridge in repair.  Thus, the town "was under no 
liability" to keep the bridge under repair "because other 
sufficient provision is made by law for its maintenance and 
repair."  Id. at 516.  In this context, we concluded that the 
"word 'persons' includes corporations, and applie[d] to the 
25 
 
 
defendant."  Id. at 517.13  A line of cases relying on Dickie, 
particularly a number involving railroads, applied the statutes 
to private parties, without addressing the specific statutes 
involved in Dickie that imposed liability on the railroad for 
the way.  See, e.g., Murphy v. Boston & Me. R.R., 332 Mass. 123, 
123 (1954) (railroad corporation entitled to notice under 
statute, where injury occurred on its train tracks crossing 
public road; citing Dickie, supra).  Such cases were the 
exception and not the rule.14  They nonetheless blurred the 
distinction between the public entities responsible for 
                     
 
13 Notably, in the late Nineteenth Century, a "railway 
company" was regarded as a "quasi public corporation."  Haupt v. 
Rogers, 170 Mass. 71, 78 (1898).  See 18 Am. Jur. 2d 
Corporations § 31 (2019) (defining "quasi-public corporation" as 
"private corporation that has been given certain powers of a 
public nature, such as the power of eminent domain, in order to 
enable it to discharge its duties for the public benefit").  The 
only private corporations that we have ever concluded were 
subject to the road defect statute were "quasi-public" railroad 
or street railway corporations. 
 
 
14 See, e.g., Bailey v. Boston, 116 Mass. 423, 423 (1875) 
("A city or town is not exempted from liability for a defect in 
a highway, because it is caused by misconduct or negligence in 
the construction or repair of a street railway"); Hawks v. 
Inhabitants of Northampton, 116 Mass. 420, 423 (1875) 
(concluding that despite "burden of certain partial repairs of 
the highway" placed on company by statute, town retained 
"general control . . . and with it the liability which has 
always existed for injuries occasioned by want of repair"); 
Middlesex R.R. v. Wakefield, 103 Mass. 261, 263 (1869) (right 
conferred by charters of street railway companies to use roads 
"does not give them the control of the highways. . . .  [T]hat 
control is placed, or, more properly speaking, remains, in the 
municipal authorities of the places in which any part of the 
street railway is laid"). 
26 
 
 
maintaining the way and private entities responsible for defects 
in the way but not the way itself. 
We added to that confusion in Ram v. Charlton, 409 Mass. 
481, 490, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 822 (1991), a case involving a 
suit against a town and the Commonwealth to recover damages for 
injuries sustained on a State highway that passed through the 
town, where we stated that "[b]oth private parties and 
governmental entities are entitled to notice within thirty days 
when a defect in a way under their control is alleged under 
G. L. c. 84, § 15."  The ultimate source of this statement was 
Dickie.  We should have been clearer that notice is only owed to 
the entity that has the public duty for maintaining the way, 
which in that case could have only been a governmental party.  
To the extent that this dictum suggested that G. L. c. 84, its 
notice requirements, and the exclusive remedy provision apply to 
private companies responsible for particular defects in the road 
-- a conclusion that would be inconsistent with Fisher and the 
other cases discussed supra -- that statement was in error.15 
                     
15 We accordingly overrule Sarrouf v. Boston, 94 Mass. App. 
Ct. 901, 901 (2019); Filepp v. Boston Gas Co., 85 Mass. App. Ct. 
901, 901 (2014); and Bartholomew v. Charter Communications, 
Inc., 84 Mass. App. Ct. 1104 (2013), in which the Appeals Court 
relied on Ram to hold that suits against private corporations 
based on defects that they created in public roads must be 
dismissed for failure to give notice to the companies under 
§ 18.  In these and other cases, the Appeals Court noted the 
inequity of the rule requiring notice for the particular defect.  
See Sarrouf, supra at 902 (court noted that motion judge found 
27 
 
 
c.  The practicalities of thirty days' notice.  Our 
interpretation that the statutes are directed at the 
governmental or quasi governmental entity or entities 
responsible for the public duty of maintaining the way as a 
whole, but not at private parties responsible for a particular 
defect in the way, recognizes the practical realities of the 
thirty-day notice provision and respects the Legislature's 
intent when it imposed this tight time constraint.  Notice 
within thirty days is a difficult time frame to meet.  The 
Legislature has nevertheless decided that this time frame is 
necessary to "safeguard public defendants against frivolous 
claims and excessive liability by allowing such defendants to 
investigate and remedy any defects expeditiously, and by 
allowing them to evaluate claims and to determine at an early 
stage whether liability could be imposed against them" 
                     
that plaintiff had engaged in "diligent, but unsuccessful search 
of city records" and was unable to identify Boston Gas Company 
as potentially responsible party); Filepp, supra at 901-902 
(after explaining that it was constrained by Wolf, and 
recognizing tight thirty-day deadline, court noted Legislature 
was appropriate body to consider making time frame longer).  See 
also Farrell v. Boston Water & Sewer Comm'n, 24 Mass. App. Ct. 
583, 587 n.9, 590-591 (1987) (although recognizing that "to 
require separate notice within thirty days from an injured party 
to the commission was unfair since such a person would naturally 
assume the entire sidewalk to be owned by the city, to which 
timely notice was given," court held that injured plaintiff 
could not bring action for alleged road defect under § 15 
against commission because she had not given notice to 
commission). 
28 
 
 
(citations omitted).  Ram, 409 Mass. at 490-491.  This notice 
requirement is reasonable so long as it applies only to those 
governmental or quasi governmental entities responsible for 
maintaining the way.  An entirely different set of problems 
arises if notice must be given to private parties responsible 
for particular defects in the way.16 
Identifying who is responsible for the way itself is 
practicable within thirty days.  This also allows and 
incentivizes the entity responsible for the way, and most 
knowledgeable of who is responsible for the defect, to correct 
the problem as quickly as possible.  See Ram, 409 Mass. at 490-
491.  The alternative reading -- that the notice statute instead 
requires notice to the private party responsible for the 
particular defect -- would impose an unrealistic deadline and 
create a trap for the unwary.  Identifying a private party 
responsible for a particular defect within that time frame is 
extremely difficult, especially without the full cooperation of 
the city, town, or other governmental or quasi governmental 
                     
 
16 This is also consistent with our recognition that 
applying the Tort Claims Act to a private limited liability 
company would not serve the purpose of that act, which is to 
"protect public funds."  Acevedo v. Musterfield Place, LLC, 479 
Mass. 705, 710 (2018).  See Gallant, 383 Mass. at 711 (road 
defect statute consistent with "purpose underlying the [T]ort 
[C]laims [A]ct, viz., to institute a rational scheme of 
governmental liability that is consistent with accepted tort 
principles and the reasonable expectations of the citizenry with 
respect to its government" [quotation and citation omitted]). 
29 
 
 
entity responsible for the way itself, which may have contracted 
the work causing the defect to many different entities.  
Municipal workers have competing responsibilities that make 
their immediate and continuous cooperation undependable.17  We 
discern no such intention. 
Moreover, the rest of G. L. c. 84 contains numerous 
accommodations intended to ensure that an injured person who 
strives in good faith to comply with the notice requirement is 
not barred from bringing a claim, indicating an over-all 
intention to provide leniency in the notice requirement.18 
                     
17 It may be particularly difficult to identify the 
corporate owner of a maintenance hole cover, as many older 
covers are "totally unidentified," and "[o]ne is left to 
conjecture their ownership and function."  M. Melnick, Manhole 
Covers 29 (1994).  Even where a cover does reveal some 
identifying information, an injured person would still be 
required to return to the scene of injury, search a cover and 
municipal records for identifying information, determine whether 
the corporation or a successor exists, and track down and serve 
the appropriate corporate entity within thirty days, a most 
difficult task in such a tight time frame. 
 
18 General Laws c. 84, § 18, provides that notice "shall not 
be invalid or insufficient" if the injured person inaccurately 
states "the name or place of residence of the person injured, or 
the time, place or cause of the injury, if it is shown that 
there was no intention to mislead and that the party entitled to 
notice was not in fact misled thereby." 
 
General Laws c. 84, § 19, entitled "Service of notice," 
requires that notice be in writing and specifies to whom notice 
must be given in the case of a county, city, town, or person.  
Making clear that its provisions are forgiving, § 19 provides 
that "[a]ny form" of written communication signed by the injured 
person, or by some person acting on his or her behalf, that 
includes "the information that the person was so injured, giving 
30 
 
 
In sum, the statutory language, the legislative and legal 
history, the case law, and the practicalities of the thirty-day 
notice provision all lead to the conclusion that, although the 
road defect statute provides the exclusive remedy against a 
governmental or quasi governmental entity responsible for 
maintaining a way, that statute and the accompanying notice 
statute were not meant to displace the common-law remedy against 
a private party responsible for a defect in the way.  Here, both 
G. L. c. 84, § 1, and the city's municipal code unambiguously 
place the obligation to maintain and repair the streets of 
Boston on the city.  See Boston Municipal Code § 11-6.1 (2010) 
(commissioner of public works will "have charge of and keep 
clean and in good condition and repair the streets").  Veolia's 
assumption of the "burden of certain partial repairs of the 
                     
the name and place of residence of the person injured and the 
time, place and cause of the injury or damage, shall be 
considered a sufficient notice."  Moreover, in an instance where 
"physical or mental incapacity" renders it "impossible for the 
person injured to give the notice within the time required, he 
may give it within thirty days after such capacity has been 
removed." 
 
 
General Laws c. 84, § 20, entitled "Omissions in notice; 
notice of insufficiency," offers amnesty to an injured person 
who has inaccurately stated the time, place, or cause of the 
injury.  Under this section, a defendant may "avail himself" of 
the insufficiency of the plaintiff's notice only if the 
recipient notifies the plaintiff in writing within five days of 
receipt that the defendant finds the plaintiff's notice 
inadequate and requests a written notice that conforms with the 
statutory requirements.  If the injured person complies, this 
revised notice "shall have the effect of the original notice." 
31 
 
 
highway" in connection with its limited occupation of a portion 
of the street does not transform it into the party obliged by 
law to maintain the entire street.  Hawks v. Inhabitants of 
Northampton, 116 Mass. 420, 423 (1875).  See Scholl, 340 Mass. 
at 272 (city "responsible because of failure to abate the defect 
by whomsoever created" and thus may be liable under road defect 
statute [quotation and citation omitted]); Snow v. Housatonic 
R.R., 8 Allen 441, 443 (1864) ("remedy which the [road defect] 
statute gives for such injuries against towns is only cumulative 
or additional to that which the party injured has at common law 
against the person by whose agency the obstruction or defect was 
caused or permitted to continue").  Veolia's repair obligations 
are "confined to the specific spot where the [utility cover] is 
. . . -- exists only by reason of the [cover], and not as part 
of a general duty to repair."  Fisher, 134 Mass. at 375.19  This 
case is comparable to the many other instances where courts have 
held private companies liable in tort for injuries caused by 
defects that they created in a public way, including for 
misaligned or otherwise defective maintenance hole covers.  See 
                     
 
19 Indeed, the city's municipal code specifically 
contemplates that liability will attach in the first instance to 
the city because it requires Veolia to indemnify the city 
"against all claims and demands of all persons for damages, 
costs, expenses or compensation for, on account of, or in any 
way growing out of, or the result of any surface defect 
occurring wholly or in part within the area described in [§] 11-
6.20."  Boston Municipal Code § 11-6.21 (1983). 
32 
 
 
Miller, 283 Mass. at 522.  See also note 12, supra (citing 
cases).  Accordingly, Meyer's failure to give notice to Veolia 
within thirty days of injury does not affect his ability to 
proceed against Veolia in a common-law negligence action. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the 
grant of summary judgment to Veolia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.