Title: Commonwealth v. Robertson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 071419
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 18, 2008

PRESENT:  All the Justices  
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
v.  Record No. 071419                      OPINION BY 
JUSTICE S. BERNARD GOODWYN 
CHRISTOPHER SHAWN ROBERTSON 
      April 18, 2008 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In this case, we consider the standard to be applied in 
determining whether a search is reasonable under the 
protective sweep and exigent circumstances exceptions to the 
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement for search of a person’s 
home. 
 
Christopher Shawn Robertson (“Robertson”) was charged 
with violating Code § 18.2-308.2, possessing a firearm after 
having been declared delinquent while a juvenile over the age 
of fourteen for a crime that would have been a felony if 
committed as an adult.  He was also charged with discharging a 
firearm within city limits, in violation of Danville City Code 
§ 40.3.  Robertson filed a motion to suppress in the Circuit 
Court of the City of Danville.  He contested the search of his 
home and sought to suppress the admission into evidence of a 
shotgun found in his home and photographs depicting spent 
shotgun shells found near the shotgun and holes in the ceiling 
of his home.  The court denied the motion to suppress and 
convicted Robertson on both charges. 
 
 
 
 
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Robertson appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the Court 
of Appeals, in a published opinion, reversed the circuit 
court’s judgment on the motion to suppress.  Robertson v. 
Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 787, 645 S.E.2d 332 (2007).  The 
Commonwealth appeals. 
FACTS 
On the afternoon of August 24, 2005, Robertson and his 
live-in girlfriend Tiffany Cobbs (“Cobbs”) returned from 
Robertson’s grandfather’s house after Robertson had, according 
to Cobbs, consumed at least “a fifth” of alcohol.  The couple 
began arguing about their infant son who died in January 2005.  
After a lengthy argument, Robertson threatened to kill 
himself.  Upon hearing this threat, Cobbs walked out of the 
house and called an emergency operator, “911.”  While she was 
speaking to the 911 operator, Cobbs heard two gunshots fired 
in the house.  As directed by the 911 operator, Cobbs remained 
outside and waited for the police officers to arrive.  
Responding to the 911 call, Officer Ernest Thompson 
(“Officer Thompson”) of the City of Danville Police 
Department, arrived on the scene at approximately 1:00 a.m. on 
August 25.  Upon arrival, Officer Thompson interviewed Cobbs.  
Cobbs relayed to Officer Thompson that Robertson was alone in 
the house.  Numerous members of the Danville Police 
 
 
 
 
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Department, including special weapons and tactics (“SWAT”) 
team members, surrounded the residence.  An extended 
confrontation with Robertson ensued. 
A thirty-five minute videotape of that confrontation was 
placed into evidence at trial.  The tape shows Robertson, 
visibly intoxicated and emotional, cursing at the officers 
from an open front window, breaking glass panes from the 
window, and repeatedly denying he had killed his son.  
Robertson claimed to have a shotgun in the house and admitted 
to firing the shotgun; however, no shots were fired while the 
police were present.  The confrontation ended when police 
officers subdued Robertson with a “Taser” electric stun weapon 
as he was sitting on the windowsill with his legs hanging out 
of the window.  After being stunned by the Taser, Robertson 
fell to the ground outside of his residence where he was 
placed into police custody. 
After being apprehended, Robertson told the officers, as 
had Cobbs, there “[a]in’t nobody else in the house.”*  No one 
asked Cobbs or Robertson for permission to enter their home, 
and neither of them voluntarily consented to the police 
entering the dwelling.  However, after Robertson was in 
 
* During the bench trial, the Commonwealth’s attorney 
conceded that Robertson was the only occupant at the time of 
the confrontation with police. 
 
 
 
 
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custody, police officers broke through the barricaded front 
door and entered the residence.  Once inside the residence, 
officers seized a shotgun and took photographs.  The shotgun 
and photographs were the subject of the motion to suppress.  
During the hearing on the motion to suppress, Officer 
Thompson confirmed that the SWAT team was on the scene, and 
went inside the house to secure the premises, after 
Robertson’s arrest, as “part of the procedures we do.”  There 
was no testimony that any of the police officers had any 
belief or suspicion that anyone remained in the house 
following Robertson’s arrest.  
ANALYSIS 
 
The Commonwealth asserts that the Court of Appeals erred 
by holding that the police officers’ entry into Robertson’s 
home violated Robertson’s Fourth Amendment rights.  The 
Commonwealth also argues that the Court of Appeals did not 
apply the appropriate appellate standard of review. 
A defendant’s claim that evidence was seized in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment presents a mixed question of law and 
fact that an appellate court must review de novo on appeal.  
Cost v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 246, 250, 657 S.E.2d 505, 507 
(2008); Murphy v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 568, 573, 570 S.E.2d 
836, 838 (2002); see Bolden v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 465, 470, 
 
 
 
 
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561 S.E.2d 701, 704 (2002); McCain v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 
483, 489, 545 S.E.2d 541, 545 (2001); see also Ornelas v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 690, 691, 699 (1996).  In making such 
a determination, an appellate court must give deference to the 
factual findings of the circuit court and give due weight to 
the inferences drawn from those factual findings; however, the 
appellate court must determine independently whether the 
manner in which the evidence was obtained meets the 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Bolden, 263 Va. at 470, 
561 S.E.2d at 704; McCain, 261 Va. at 490, 545 S.E.2d at 545; 
Bass v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 470, 475, 525 S.E.2d 921, 924 
(2000); see Commonwealth v. Redmond, 264 Va. 321, 327, 568 
S.E.2d 695, 698 (2002).  The defendant has the burden to show 
that, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the Commonwealth, the circuit court’s denial of his 
suppression motion was reversible error.  Bolden, 263 Va. at 
470, 561 S.E.2d at 704; McCain, 261 Va. at 490, 545 S.E.2d at 
545; Fore v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1007, 1010, 265 S.E.2d 729, 
731 (1980). 
 
Seizures of personal property from a private dwelling are 
generally considered unreasonable within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment unless accomplished pursuant to a judicial 
warrant.  United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983); 
 
 
 
 
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Robinson v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 26, 34, 639 S.E.2d 217, 221 
(2007).  There is an exception to this general rule when 
exigent circumstances exist.  Verez v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 
405, 410, 337 S.E.2d 749, 752 (1985).  Also, police officers 
are allowed to conduct a search of the immediate area to 
assure officer safety in the course of making an arrest.  
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 337 (1990).  This is known as 
a “protective sweep.”  Id.  Exigent circumstances and 
protective sweeps constitute separate and distinct exceptions 
to the general rule.  The Commonwealth claims that the Court 
of Appeals erred in failing to find either of those exceptions 
applicable in this case.  
 
The Fourth Amendment permits the police to conduct a 
limited protective sweep in conjunction with an in-home arrest 
when the searching officer possesses a reasonable belief, 
based on specific and articulable facts, that the area to be 
swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the 
arrest scene.  Buie, 494 U.S. at 337; see Megel v. 
Commonwealth, 262 Va. 531, 536 (2001).  The rationale for the 
protective sweep exception is that a dangerous person could be 
hiding in the home and attack the officer.  Buie, 494 U.S. at 
333.   
 
 
 
 
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In this case, Robertson was arrested outside of his home.  
Given the information provided to the police by Robertson and 
Cobbs, and the officers’ observations during their extended 
standoff with Robertson, once Robertson was arrested, there 
were no articulable facts to indicate that Robertson’s home 
harbored anyone posing a danger to the individuals present at 
the arrest scene.  The protective sweep exception is not 
applicable in this instance where the officers broke through 
the barricaded door of Robertson’s home, after apprehending 
Robertson.  The Court of Appeals, therefore, did not err in 
ruling that the protective sweep exception does not apply in 
this case. 
The Commonwealth also claims that the Court of Appeals 
erred in failing to conclude that there were exigent 
circumstances justifying the police officers’ entrance into 
Robertson’s home.  This Court has recognized factors that are 
relevant in determining if this exception is applicable: 
(1) [T]he degree of urgency involved and the time 
required to get a warrant; (2) the officers’ 
reasonable belief that contraband is about to be 
removed or destroyed; (3) the possibility of danger 
to others, including police officers left to guard 
the site; (4) information that the possessors of 
the contraband are aware that the police may be on 
their trail; (5) whether the offense is serious, or 
involves violence; (6) whether officers reasonably 
believe the suspects are armed; (7) whether there 
is, at the time of entry, a clear showing of 
probable cause; (8) whether the officers have a 
 
 
 
 
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strong reason to believe the suspects are actually 
present in the premises; (9) the likelihood of 
escape if the suspects are not swiftly apprehended; 
and (10) the suspects’ recent entry into the 
premises after hot pursuit. 
 
Robinson, 273 Va. at 41-42, 639 S.E.2d at 226; Verez, 230 Va. 
at 410-11, 337 S.E.2d at 753.  
Here, the officers entered Robertson’s home after 
Robertson had been apprehended.  Robertson and Cobbs had 
informed the police officers that there was no one else in the 
home, and perhaps more importantly, the officers’ observations 
during their extensive surveillance of the premises for an 
extended period of time, indicated that there was no one 
present in the home after Robertson’s arrest.  Further, there 
was no reason to believe that contraband was about to be 
removed or destroyed, little danger to anyone left to guard 
the site, no likelihood of any suspect escaping, and no hot 
pursuit.  Thus, there is no evidence of an exigency that 
justifies the officers’ breaking through the barricaded door 
of Robertson’s home without obtaining a warrant.  The Court of 
Appeals, therefore, did not err in holding the exigent 
circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant 
requirement inapplicable.  The officers’ search of Robertson’s 
home was in violation of Robertson’s rights under the Fourth 
 
 
 
 
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Amendment.  Additionally, the Court of Appeals correctly 
applied the proper standard of review. 
 
For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
is affirmed. 
Affirmed.