Title: RONALD WHEELER V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2008-SC-000050-MR
State: Kentucky
Issuer: Kentucky Supreme Court
Date: May 21, 2009

IMPORTANT NOTICE NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER, UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS, RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT . OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE ACTION . RONALD WHEELER ,;vuyrrmr (~vurf of 2008-SC-000050-MR RENDERED : MAY 21, 2009 U ON APPEAL FROM JESSAMINE CIRCUIT COURT V. HONORABLE C . HUNTER DAUGHERTY, JUDGE NO . 07-CR-00130 COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT AFFIRMING On November 9, 2007, Appellant, Ronald Wheeler, was found guilty by a Jessamine Circuit Court jury of robbery in the first-degree and of being a persistent felony offender in the second-degree . For these crimes, Appellant was sentenced to twenty (20) years imprisonment. Appellant now appeals his conviction as a matter of right. Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b) . I. BACKGROUND Near the end of the work day on January 15, 2007, an unidentified male robbed the Nicholasville Medicine Shoppe pharmacy . The individual - described as a tall, thin man in a ski mask, gloves, and black "hoodie" sweatshirt - entered the store brandishing a gun and demanded methadone from the pharmacy employees . ) As one of the employees hid and another fled, the remaining employees surrendered a number of methadone pills. The unknown perpetrator fled the scene after the exchange . By all accounts, the robbery was brief and there were no injuries . During January of 2007, Appellant was unemployed, on parole, and completing a drug treatment class. He resided at his mother's home in Nicholasville, a little more than a quarter-mile from the Medicine Shoppe . Though he was nearing the end of his relationship with his girlfriend, Jamie Culver, they spoke daily by phone and saw each other several times a week. Ms. Culver had been with Appellant for almost five years and she was the mother of his daughter . On January 15, 2007, Appellant testified that he was at home most of the day until he had to leave for a drug treatment class at about 5:45 pm . Appellant indicated that, while on his way, it occurred to him that the class might have been cancelled due to the Martin Luther King Jr . holiday and that he did not feel like going anyway . So Appellant returned home, telling his mother that class was cancelled though he was unsure as to this . In late January, Culver was surprised to find Appellant counting out roughly $2,500 in cash on his bed. When she asked where he got it, he jokingly replied, "I made a transaction," but then admitted that he 1 A pharmacist, two pharmacy technicians, and a home health consultant were present. had merely been saving more money . Yet, Culver remained concerned because she had never seen Appellant with this much money at a given time in their relationship. Also alarming her was the fact that, in spite of his legal circumstances, Appellant was taking drugs. At this point, Culver began suspecting that Appellant had committed the Medicine Shoppe robbery. After talking to a friend about her suspicions, she called Detective Kevin Grimes of the Nicholasville Police Department and reported that she believed Appellant was involved in the January 15th robbery of the Medicine Shoppe pharmacy . Though this report resulted in no arrest, it was not the last time Culver would contact Detective Grimes . Less than two months later, at 9:04 a.m. on March 8, 2007, the Nicholasville Medicine Shoppe was robbed again under similar circumstances. This time, however, the robber was not wearing a ski mask but instead a red, "flag-colored" bandana concealing his face from the nose downward . As before, the robber held the employees at gunpoint and demanded a large quantity of methadone, oxycontin, and a sum of cash . The suspect escaped on foot and no one was injured. The same four employees were present and again described the robber as a tall, thin man wearing gloves and a red hoodie sweatshirt . However, this time the employees noted that the individual had dark eyes and pronounced eyebrows . At trial, Appellant testified that, on the morning of March 8, 2007, he had arrived home from his cousin's house at approximately 4:15 and 3 fallen asleep. Appellant awoke around 8:00 am and noticed that Culver was repeatedly calling his home phone, but he did not feel like talking to her. Instead, Appellant claimed that he decided to go to a local gas station for coffee, cigarettes, and a newspaper . Upon returning home between 8:30 am and 8:45 am, Appellant stated that an acquaintance came to his door at about 9:10 am.2 After talking with him for a few minutes inside Appellant's home, the man pulled out a bag of prescription narcotics and a red bandana from under his shirt, asking Appellant to keep them for him. Appellant claimed the man agreed to let him keep some of the pills in exchange for their safekeeping and that the man left Appellant's home ten to fifteen minutes later. After the encounter with the unnamed acquaintance, Appellant finally answered Culver's phone calls at about 9:45 am. He told her that he had spent the night at his cousin's house and had just returned home . Culver asked Appellant for some money, to which he agreed, but told her that she had to come get it from him at his house . While waiting for Culver to arrive, Appellant testified that he noticed that police were going door to door in his neighborhood . Fearing a parole violation, Appellant immediately hid the drugs in his attic and refused to answer the door when police came to his home . Just before going to Appellant's home, Culver happened to see a brief clip of the Medicine Shoppe robbery on a local Lexington news 2 Appellant refused to name this individual at trial, citing his fear of the man's reprisal . station that was captured from surveillance video footage. She immediately recognized the physical attributes of the suspect as that of Appellant but continued to Appellant's home. Culver arrived at about 10 :45 am and Appellant gave her approximately $45.00. While inside Appellant's home, Culver received a call from the person who drove her to Appellant's home, informing her that a number of police were in the area . Before leaving, Culver relayed a warning to Appellant and told him that he should hide whatever drugs he had. Appellant then showed her two methadone pills that had been in his pocket and, after nervously pacing the hall, went into his attic to better hide the drugs in a corner behind some insulation . After Culver left, Appellant's parole officer called to set up a home visit but Appellant told the parole officer that he was still at work . The officer agreed to postpone the visit until later that evening. Appellant then received another call, this time from Culver explaining to Appellant that she had just spoken with Detective Grimes and that he was seeking information about the Medicine Shoppe robbery from earlier that morning . Culver told Detective Grimes that Appellant had been at work all morning . Upon hearing of Culver's conversation with Grimes, Appellant became alarmed and called his parole officer back to confirm that the home visit was unrelated to the robberies. The officer claimed to have no knowledge of the robberies. However, later that evening and without Appellant's knowledge, Culver resolved to call Detective Grimes back in order to confess to her 5 suspicions about Appellant's involvement in the Medicine Shoppe robberies . Culver told Grimes that she was, in fact, all but certain that Appellant had robbed the pharmacy that morning. After providing Grimes with the information, the Nicholasville Police Department obtained a search warrant for Appellant's home . Shortly after midnight on March 9, 2007, the police department executed the warrant. Upon searching the home, they found in the attic a large quantity of methadone and oxycontin pills in a brown bag.3 In addition, the police recovered a red, flag-colored bandana from the laundry room, matching eyewitnesses' description as the same worn by the March 8th robber. Thereafter, Appellant was arrested, taken into custody, and jailed, where he tested positive for methadone and marijuana. Appellant was subsequently indicted by a Jessamine County grand jury on two (2) counts of first-degree robbery for both the January 15th and March 8th robberies of the Nicholasville Medicine Shoppe as well as for being a second-degree persistent felony offender. At the conclusion of his trial, Appellant was convicted for the March 8th robbery but was acquitted of the January 15th robbery. After also finding Appellant guilty of being a second-degree persistent felony offender, the jury imposed an enhanced sentence of twenty (20) years imprisonment . In addition, 3 The pills turned out to match those stolen from the Medicine Shoppe . 4 Appellant was also indicted on an additional count of first-degree robbery for the robbery of the Simms Drug Store in Wilmore, Kentucky . That count was later severed for trial purposes . 6 Appellant was sentenced to a consecutive term of six (6) months for contempt because he refused to name the man who allegedly gave him the stolen drugs . On appeal, Appellant raises two principal allegations of error in the underlying trial: 1) that the Commonwealth did not provide Appellant certain exculpatory and impeachment information prior to trial; and 2) that the Commonwealth forced Appellant to characterize eyewitness testimony as "lies." For the reasons that follow, we are unpersuaded by Appellant's arguments and, therefore, affirm his conviction . II. ANALYSIS A. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Denying Appellant's Motion For A Mistrial Because He Was Not Deprived Of A Fair Trial. Appellant argues that his conviction should be reversed because the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial, thereby depriving him of a fair trial pursuant to Brady v . Maryland , 373 U.S . 83 (1963) . We decline to reverse Appellant's conviction for reasons that the trial court did not abuse its discretion . At the beginning of the second day of trial, Appellant moved the trial court for a mistrial, claiming that the Commonwealth had failed to provide Appellant with certain exculpatory and impeachment information. Appellant first argued that he had not received from the Commonwealth alleged exculpatory information indicating that a non- testifying eyewitness failed to identify Appellant in a subsequent photo array. Appellant discovered this fact in his cross-examination of 7 Detective Grimes . Appellant, however, admitted to having received from the Commonwealth a police report containing the name of this eyewitness as well as a notation that the police intended to present the witness with an in-station line-up for identification purposes . Nonetheless, Appellant argued that the Commonwealth should have provided the results of that line-up to Appellant so that he could have investigated the quality of the witness prior to trial. In response, the Commonwealth argued that the relevance of the non-testifying eyewitness was minimal, that no contemporaneous objection was made at trial, that the Commonwealth had provided Appellant with sufficient information to conduct his own discovery, and that, in any event, Appellant was able to effectively cross-examine Detective Grimes on the subject . Additionally, Appellant argued that he had not received from the Commonwealth certain impeachment information indicating Culver's receipt of a $500 .00 police reward . Appellant first discovered this fact during the Commonwealth's direct-examination of Culver at trial . Appellant argued that the Commonwealth should have provided this information to Appellant prior to trial so that he could have obtained and studied the local news footage on which Culver based her motivation to turn Appellant in . 5 However, the Commonwealth claimed that they also 5 Culver testified at trial during the Commonwealth's case-in-chief that she had seen a clip of the pharmacy surveillance video through a local news program the morning of March 8th, presumably in a brief segment reporting that the Medicine Shoppe pharmacy had been robbed again. Culver stated 8 had no knowledge of the reward until such information was inadvertently elicited during Culver's direct-examination .6 Additionally, the Commonwealth argued that Appellant waived his objection by not objecting contemporaneously and that, in any event, Appellant had ample opportunity to cross-examine and impeach Culver on the subject. Upon hearing Appellant's motion and the Commonwealth's response, the trial court denied Appellant's motion for a mistrial, concluding that Appellant had sufficient information about the non testifying eyewitness prior to trial to conduct discovery and that his cross-examination already elucidated that information for the jury. In addition, the trial court found that Appellant had a sufficient opportunity to impeach Culver's receipt of the reward for a proper jury determination of her credibility and that any additional discovery on the matter would have been cumulative . We have held that the "question of whether there was a Brad violation and whether because of it . . . a mistrial was necessary is . . . that she had not seen a promise ofa reward in that news footage or otherwise and that her decision to turn in Appellant later that same day was, therefore, not motivated by the eventual reward in any way. Detective Grimes also testified during the Commonwealth's case-in-chief that he had no knowledge of the police department authorizing an advertised reward for the Medicine Shoppe robberies through "Crime Stoppers," news agencies, or otherwise, but rather that it was often department policy to reward successful tips . 6 Appellant claims the Commonwealth, therefore, knew of the reward payment prior to trial (i .e ., he knew to ask) . An examination of the record, however, shows that Culver freely admitted the fact of the reward during a series of routine questions by the Prosecutor designed to demonstrate that Culver was a witness without bias or motivation to turn in Appellant, before or after the fact . addressed to the judgment and discretion of the trial court." Carter v. Commonwealth , 782 S.W.2d 597, 601 (Ky . 1989) (overruled on other grounds by Norton v. Commonwealth , 37 S.W.3d 750, 753 (Ky. 2001)) . A mistrial, however, will only be granted "for very plain and obvious causes." Commonwealth v. Scott, 12 S.W.3d 682, 685 (Ky. 2000) (citing Glover v. McMackin , 950 F.2d 1236, 1240 (6th Cir. 1991)) . The test for whether a trial court has abused its discretion is "whether the trial judge's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles ." Commonwealth v . English, 993 S.W .2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999) . In this instance, whether the trial court abused its discretion depends on whether it offended the dictates of Bradv and its progeny in denying Appellant's motion for a mistrial . Generally, Bradv stands for the idea that the government cannot suppress evidence "favorable to the accused" that is "material to either guilt or punishment" without offending due process. Sanders v. Commonwealth , 89 S.W.3d 380, 385 (Ky. 2002) (overruled on other grounds by Leonard v. Commonwealth , --- S.W.3d ----, 2009 WL 160422 (Ky. Jan . 22, 2009)) (citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 87)) . Significantly, we have summarized the prosecutor's constitutional duty under Brady as follows : As a general rule "[t]here is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case and Bradv did not create one . . . ." Weatherford v. Bursey , 429 U.S . 545, 559 (1977) . Rather, Bradv concerns those cases in which the government possesses information that the defense does not and the 10 government's failure to disclose the information deprives the defendant of a fair trial. Therefore, reversal is required only where "there is a `reasonable probability' that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different . A reasonable probability is the probability sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome ." United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) . Moreover, Brady only applies to "the discovery, after trial, of information which had been known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense." United States v. A urs, 427 U.S . 97, 103 (1976) . Bowling v. Commonwealth , 80 S.W.3d 405, 410 (Ky. 2002) . More recently, we noted that the government's duty to disclose material information under Brady "is applicable regardless of whether or not there has been a request by the accused, and the duty to disclose encompasses impeachment as well as other exculpatory evidence." Commonwealth v. Bussell, 226 S.W.3d 96, 100 (Ky . 2007) (citin Agurs, 427 U.S. at 107; Bale , 473 U.S . at 676)) . First, as to the eyewitness' misidentification, Bradv is inapplicable . Brady can only apply to information that was unknown to the defense. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103 . Here, the record shows that the Commonwealth furnished Appellant a police report naming the nontestifying eyewitness and stating that the police were later to present her an in-station line-up for identification purposes . In Bowling, we found that the defense's general knowledge of exculpatory information was a sufficient degree of disclosure where they could have easily obtained further details "without the Commonwealth's assistance or permission ."7 Bowling, 80 S.W .3d at 410 . Accordingly, Appellant had sufficient information to conduct his own discovery on the subject and, therefore, it was disclosed for purposes of Brady. Secondly, as to the reward information, the record indicates that it remained undisclosed until elicited during the Commonwealth's direct examination of Culver . The Commonwealth's contention that they, too, were unaware of the reward is without merit because "evidence `known only to police investigators' is imputed to the prosecutor. Strickler v. Greene , 527 U.S. 263, 280-281 (1999) (quoting Kyles v . Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 438 (1999)) . Appellant's claim, therefore, turns on whether the information was material . "[R]eversal is required only where `there is a `reasonable probability' that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is the probability sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome.' See Bowling, 80 S.W.3d at 410 (quoting Ba limey, 473 U.S . at 682 (1985)) . As we are bound to measure the effect of undisclosed Bradv information against a "probability sufficient to undermine the confidence 7 In addressing a similar Brady allegation in Bowling, 80 S.W.3d at 410, we remarked : [Appellant] . . . knew that [the Commonwealth's witness] had been convicted in federal court and cross-examined him about the disposition of the charges. The defense, as conceded in [Appellant's] brief, could have-without the Commonwealth's assistance or permission-obtained the transcript of the federal sentencing hearing. Thus, in the case at bar, there could have been no Brady violation in connection with the federal charges against [the Commonwealth's witness], because the information in question does not fall within the Brady rule . 12 in the outcome" of Appellant's trial, we cannot say that had the information been disclosed to Appellant, it would have resulted in his acquittal. Bagle , 473 U.S . at 682 . Appellant argues that the reward information was material because, without it, he also could not know whether the news footage advertised a reward and, consequently, whether the footage induced Culver to accuse him in her statement to Grimes . However, any additional information gleaned from the news footage would have merely been cumulative in nature. The record demonstrates that Appellant was able to bring to light, for ajury determination, all that was known to the Commonwealth - either actually or constructively - and unknown to the defense concerning the reward . Appellant was allowed a full opportunity to cross-examine and impeach Culver on the fact that she was paid a reward by the Nicholasville Police Department after her statement to Detective Grimes . Moreover, Appellant elicited testimony from Culver that she was unemployed at the time of the statement, raising for the jury the issue of whether her statement was motivated by financial need . Therefore, to have also shown that the news footage may have induced Culver to implicate Appellant could have only been to impeach her credibility further, as the trial court found.8 And while the reward information was favorable to Appellant and should have been disclosed, 8 It was never established at trial whether a reward payment was ever authorized for advertisement, as Grimes testified that an advertised reward must be authorized by the Nicholasville Police Department and that, in this case, he had no knowledge of any such authorization . 1 3 its cumulative effect was such that there was no "reasonable probability" that the jury would have acquitted Appellant. did not abuse its discretion in overruling Appellant's motion for a mistrial . As a result, Appellant was not deprived a fair trial . B. The Improper Cross-Examination of Appellant Did Not Deny His Right to Fair Trial Because It Constituted Harmless Error. because the Commonwealth, on cross-examination, improperly sought to elicit testimony from Appellant as to why the Commonwealth's witnesses would allegedly offer false testimony against him. Although we agree such questioning was improper, we decline to reverse Appellant's conviction for reasons that the error was harmless . explain why the four Medicine Shoppe employees would intentionally fabricate their testimony against him. The substance of the testimony is as follows: Thus, in finding no Brady violations, we hold that the trial court Appellant next argues that his conviction should be reversed In cross-examining Appellant at trial, the Prosecutor asked him to Prosecutor : I want you to tell the ladies and gentlemen of the jury why these four women - do you know any of them? Wheeler: No. Prosecutor : Have you had any dealings with them, ever had any problems with them? Wheeler: No. Prosecutor : I want you to explain to the ladies and gentlemen of the jury why these four women would come in and lie on you. 14 Defense Counsel : Your Honor, I object because that calls for speculation. Court: Overruled . Wheeler: I feel that they, they don't, they just, they're more or less thinking that it was me . They don't know for sure it was me . They just, they're wanting to find someone, you know, guilty for it . They're just, the way they came in the courtroom yesterday to me felt like they were, they just had a grudge . I know what you're going to say off that but it just felt like to me they were out to get somebody, don't matter who it is. Prosecutor : So you think the jury ought to consider those four ladies on a mission to pin this on you whether you're guilty or not? Wheeler: Rephrase that for me . I'm sorry. Prosecutor : You think they're on just a mission just to convict somebody . Wheeler: Yeah . Prosecutor : It doesn't matter who . Wheeler: I'm not going to say they are but it kind of to me, the way they walked in this courtroom yesterday, I mean it kind of felt like, not all four of them but maybe a couple of them, felt like they were just on a mission. Prosecutor : Would that even include the pharmacist who honestly told the police "I intentionally didn't look in his eyes. I didn't want to," and she refused to try to pick somebody out of the lineup and yet she came in here yesterday and told them she thinks you're the man? Wheeler: How would that be though, if she, like you said, stated that she didn't look at my eyes and what not, and then she comes in here and says that "I think he is it." To me, it feels like she just wants to agree with the rest of her co-workers. Prosecutor : Um, hmm. But you have no explanation for why they would come in here and lie other than they just want to convict somebody . 15 Wheeler: That's the only thing I can come up with . In Moss v. Commonwealth , 949 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. 1997), we have found the aforementioned type of questioning as constituting improper cross-examination. There, we held that "[a] witness should not be required to characterize the testimony of another witness. . .as lying" because "[s]uch a characterization places the witness in such an unflattering light as to potentially undermine his entire testimony." Id. at 583 (emphasis added) . Rather than using such "blunt force" to illustrate inconsistencies in testimony, "[c]ounsel should be sufficiently articulate to show the jury where the testimony of the witnesses differ." Id. Moreover, as a general principle, "[n]either expert nor lay witnesses may testify that another witness or a defendant is lying or faking," as "[t]hat determination is within the exclusive province of the jury." Id. (quoting State v. James, 557 A.2d 471, 473 (R.I . 1989)) . Here, therefore, it was error for the Prosecutor to engage in this line of questioning.9 The Commonwealth contends that Appellant failed to preserve this issue for appeal by insufficiently specifying the grounds for his objection . See Craig v. Dean, 741 S.W.2d 655, 657 (Ky. 1987) ("If a party chooses to state grounds in the absence of a request from the court, he is bound thereby.") . However, we are unpersuaded as a review of the trial record clearly indicates that Appellant objected to the line of questioning on the 9 We do not accept Appellee's invitation to revisit our holding in Moss , as the facts of the present case do not compel it . 16 grounds that it encouraged Appellant to speculate about another witness' testimony. As we held in Moss, 949 S.W.2d at 582, "[a] witness's opinion about the truth of the testimony of another witness is not permitted ." (quoting James, 557 A.2d at 473) . Although the Commonwealth would have us rule that the grounds specified in an objection be exact, we have previously held that specific objections need only be "sufficiently related to the proper ground."lo Claycomb v. Howard , 493 S.W.2d 714, 717 (Ky. 1973) ; see also KRE 103(a)(1) . To require such a precise objection would transform a rule designed to "assist the trial judge, give opposing counsel a chance to correct defects, and enlighten the appeals court" into an unnecessary stumbling block towards ajust result. Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, § 1 .10[4] [b], p . 38 (4th ed. 2003) . Here, Appellant's objection for speculation was sufficiently related to the rule set forth in Moss . According to the transcript, the objection came immediately after the Prosecutor asked Appellant "to explain to the ladies and gentlemen of the jury why these four women would come in and lie on you." We believe both the grounds andjustification for the objection advanced by Appellant were sufficient . to Appellee argues that, in order to preserve error, Appellant should have articulated the grounds as improperly commenting on the credibility of the Prosecution's witnesses . 1 7 Thus, because Appellant properly preserved his claim of error, we review for harmless error pursuant to RCr 9 .24 . 11 An error is not prejudicial and, therefore, harmless unless "the error itself had a substantial influence [on the verdict]" Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S . 750, 764-765 (1946) . The inquiry turns on the evidence of the "whole case," and is thus inherently case-by-case in nature . Commonwealth . v. McIntosh, 646 S.W.2d 43, 45 (Ky. 1983) . Here, upon review of the record, we cannot say that there is any reasonable possibility that the verdict would have been different had the Prosecutor not engaged in this line of questioning. The Commonwealth offered substantial evidence which, taken together, supports Appellant's conviction disregarding the error, including, but not limited to: a surveillance tape from the pharmacy on March 8, 2007, showing an individual robbing the pharmacy at gun point; the eyewitness testimony of the four employees in the pharmacy on March 8, 2007, identifying Appellant in both a concealed photo array and in person ; a bag of pills found in Appellant's home attic, matching those (methadone and oxycontin) stolen from the pharmacy on March 8, 2007; a red, "flag-colored" bandana found in Appellant's laundry, 11 RCr 9 .24 states : "No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence and nor error or defect in any ruling or order, or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict or for vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order unless it appears to the court that the denial of such relief would be inconsistent with substantial justice . The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding that does not affect the substantial rights of the parties." 18 matching eyewitnesses' description as the same worn by the March 8, 2007 suspect; the testimony of Appellant's mother, confirming that he owned hoodie sweatshirts of various colors and a red, "flag-colored" bandana; Appellant's alleged confession to one of his cellmates the day of his arrest, corroborating many details of the March 8, 2007, robbery; 12 the testimony of Appellant's ex-girlfriend, placing Appellant in his home after the robbery on March 8, 2007, and in possession of methadone pills that were hid in his attic; and numerous sale invoices, showing that the pharmacy had purchased the exact types of pills stolen in the time span in which the robbery occurred. In response to the Commonwealth's evidence, Appellant's sole defense was that another unnamed man had committed the robbery and had given him the drugs for safekeeping. This defense was without any independent support throughout trial and rested on his bare testimony. Likewise, Appellant's whereabouts between approximately 4:15 and 9:30 am on the morning of March 8th were never demonstrated by evidence other than his testimony. Appellant admitted to the jury that he had been in possession of the stolen drugs, that he was an addict, that he had a prior felony conviction, and that the unnamed man who had given 12 Appellant was jailed on charges of robbery on March 9th, 2007 . There, Appellant allegedly told Richard Darringer, one of the cellmates, that Appellant had been charged with robbing a pharmacy and: that it had been "easy;" that he wore a "rebel flag bandana and a red hoodie," the latter of which he hid in his mother's closet ; that he used a gun that he later hid "in his mother's Barbie collection;" that he obtained oxycontin and methadone in the robbery; that he immediately consumed 1-15 of the pills ; and that he then hid the rest of the stolen drugs in a crawl space in his home . The red hoodie and gun were never found by police in Appellant's home. 19 him the drugs had the same hair color, weight, and height as he did at the time . As such, we find the aforementioned error harmless when compared to the substantial evidence weighing against Appellant . 13 Accordingly, because the error did not affect Appellant's substantial rights and did not substantially influence the verdict, we are compelled under RCr 9 .24 to disregard the error as harmless . sentence and conviction . All sitting . All concur . III . CONCLUSION Therefore, for the above stated reasons, we hereby affirm Appellant's 13 Nevertheless, Appellant argues that, pursuant to Jude v . Commonwealth , No . 2007-CA-000773-MR, 2008 WL 4367857 (Ky . App . Sept. 26, 2008), we should not find the error harmless . In Jude , the Court of Appeals did, indeed, encounter a rare case where a preserved claim of improper questioning led to reversal . However, in predicating reversal on this error, the Court of Appeals in Jude went on to explain that the underlying evidence of Appellant Jude's conviction "turned on the credibility of the witnesses . . . leaving the trial to a `he said/ she said' between the witnesses." Id . at 3 (emphasis added) . Such is not the case here . The Commonwealth presented other forms and sources of evidence to the jury that was persuasive apart from the credibility of the four Medicine Shoppe employees vis-a-vis Appellant, such as : the bag of pills found in Appellant's home attic ; the bandana found in Appellant's laundry ; the surveillance tape ; the detailed confession to Appellant's cellmate ; and the testimony of Culver . All of this evidence, in a way that was not present in Jude , worked together to corroborate eyewitness testimony that there was a specific robbery and that Appellant committed that robbery . 20 Jack Conway Attorney General COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Kathleen Kallaher Schmidt Appeals Branch Manager Department of Public Advocacy 100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 301 Frankfort, KY 40601-1109 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: Joshua D . Farley Assistant Attorney General Attorney Genreal's Office Office of Criminal Appeals 1024 Capital Center Drive Frankfort, KY 40601-8204