Title: Lank v. Moyed
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 251, 2006
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: October 12, 2006

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
MICHELLE LANK, 
 
§ 
 
 
§ 
No. 251, 2006      
 
Plaintiff Below, 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court of  
 
 
§ 
the State of Delaware in and for 
              v. 
 
§ 
New Castle County 
 
 
§ 
MYRA MOYED, 
§ 
C. A. No. 04C-01-209 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Defendant Below, 
§ 
 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
 
 
Submitted: September 6, 2006 
 
 
Decided: 
October 12, 2006 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, and BERGER and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
 
Upon Appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Beverly L. Bove and Vincent J. X. Hedrick, II, Esquires, of Beverly L. 
Bove, Attorney at Law, Wilmington, Delaware; for Appellant. 
 
 
Colin M. Shalk and Thomas P. Leff, Esquires, of Casarino, Christman & 
Shalk, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware; for Appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JACOBS, Justice: 
Appellant, Michele Lank (“Lank”), appeals from an order of the Superior 
Court, granting the motion of appellee, Myra Moyed (“Moyed”), for summary 
judgment.  The Superior Court held that Lank’s wrongful death and survival claims 
were subject to the “per person” limit of the applicable liability insurance policy, 
and that by tendering the “per person” limit to Lank, the insurer had discharged its 
contractual duties.  Lank claims that the Superior Court committed three errors:  
(1) holding that Moyed’s policy of insurance provided single limits coverage 
encompassing Lank’s claims for both wrongful death and for survivorship; (2) 
finding that the applicable policy language was unambiguous; and (3) holding that 
the single limits policy provision is compatible with public policy.  Because in our 
view the Superior Court committed no legal error and the relevant record supports 
its conclusion, we affirm. 
FACTS 
On February 24, 2003 Lank’s husband, David Lank, was driving in the 400 
block of Lea Boulevard near Channing Road in Wilmington, Delaware, when he 
was struck head-on by a vehicle operated by Moyed.  Both drivers were taken to 
Christiana Hospital, where David Lank died two days later without having 
regained consciousness. 
 
2
Lank filed an individual wrongful death action against Moyed under 
Delaware’s Wrongful Death Act.1  By stipulation of the parties, Lank amended the 
complaint to add a survivorship claim, in her capacity as personal representative of 
her husband’s estate, to recover compensation for pain and suffering from the date 
of the accident until he died.  
 
At the time of the accident, Moyed was insured by State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”).  The State Farm policy provided 
liability coverage limits of $100,000 “per person” and up to $300,000 for two or 
more persons per accident.  The relevant policy language provides: 
The amount of bodily injury liability coverage is shown on the 
declarations page under “Limits of Liability - Coverage A - Bodily 
Injury, Each Person, Each Accident.” Under “Each Person” is the 
amount of coverage for all damages due to bodily injury to one 
person.  “Bodily injury to one person” includes all injury and damages 
to others resulting from this bodily injury.  Under “Each Accident” is 
the total amount of coverage, subject to the amount shown under 
“Each Person”, for all damages due to bodily injury to two or more 
persons in the same accident.2    
 
The parties stipulated that Lank’s recovery would be limited to the coverage made 
available under the terms of the State Farm policy.     
Moyed moved for summary judgment, claiming that Lank’s recovery on the 
wrongful death claim and the survival action should be limited to the policy 
                                                 
1 10 Del. C. § 3724 (1999).  
 
2 App. to Appellant’s Opening Br. at A-19. 
 
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coverage provided for bodily injury to one person, i.e., $100,000.  Lank opposed 
the motion, arguing that:  (1) the policy language should not be given effect 
because it is “convoluted and confusing;” (2) under Delaware law, wrongful death 
and survivorship claims are distinct causes of action and therefore should be 
treated as separate claims for insurance coverage purposes; and (3) adopting the 
single limits policy provision would violate the public policy and legislative intent 
underlying the wrongful death and survival statutes.  The Superior Court rejected 
Lank’s arguments and granted summary judgment to Moyed.  Lank appeals from 
that grant of summary judgment to this Court.  
On appeal of a grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment the scope 
of review is de novo.  Moreover, “[t]he interpretation of insurance contracts 
involves legal questions and thus the standard of review is de novo.  A grant of 
summary judgment cannot be sustained unless there is no genuine issue of material 
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 3 
ANALYSIS 
Lank first claims that the Superior Court’s decision is contrary to the 
Delaware case law treating wrongful death and survival claims.  Lank relies 
                                                 
3 Emmons v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 697 A.2d 742, 774-75 (Del. 1997).  
 
 
4
heavily on Rosenthalis v. Doctors for Emergency Service.4  In our view, Lank’s 
reliance on Rosenthalis is misplaced. 
Rosenthalis is inapplicable to this case, because the result there was reached 
under a different standard mandated by statute.  In Rosenthalis, the Superior Court 
held that although “[the wrongful death and survival] claims arise from the same 
incident . . . that fact does not [justify] . . . combining them into a single claim,”5 
and that “both claimants should be protected rather than having their recovery 
limited.”6  Relying on this language, Lank argues that her claims do not fall within 
the single limits of the “per person” coverage.  Lank’s argument overlooks the fact 
that the Rosenthalis court analyzed the wrongful death and survival claims under 
the Delaware Insurance Guaranty Association (“DIGA”) Act,7 which the Superior 
Court found to be controlling.  Under the DIGA Act, separate coverage was 
                                                 
4 2004 Del. Super. LEXIS 92 (Mar. 31, 2004). 
 
5 Id. at *10.  
 
6 Id. at *12.  
 
7 In Rosenthalis, a single incident of medical negligence left four plaintiffs—a patient who died, 
his widow and two children—with two causes of action, a survival claim and a wrongful death 
claim against defendant healthcare providers.  The deceased’s treating physician was formerly 
insured by PHICO Insurance Company (“PHICO”). When PHICO became insolvent, Delaware 
Insurance Guaranty Association assumed its obligations pursuant to the Delaware Insurance 
Guaranty Association Act. 
 
 
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statutorily required for each “covered claim.”8  Because the DIGA Act is not 
applicable to this case, Rosenthalis also is inapplicable. 
 
The issue of whether the “per person” limit applies when survival and 
wrongful death claims arise out of the injury and death of one person, has not been 
addressed by the Delaware courts directly.  Some jurisdictions have rejected  
separate recoveries against an insurance policy for wrongful death and survival 
claims.9  Cases from those jurisdictions have interpreted the policy language in a 
manner that persuades us that the survival and wrongful death claims in this case 
are subject to the single “per person” limit in the State Farm policy. 
 
Lank contends that the Superior Court erred as a matter of law because State 
Farm’s policy language is ambiguous and, therefore, should not have been given 
force and effect.  Lank relies on Emmons v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co.10 
where the policy language was held to be ambiguous, because the policy did not 
“contain language that restricts the right of recovery to the ‘per person’ limit when 
                                                 
82004 Del. Super. LEXIS 92 at *3. 
 
9 See, e.g., Vassiliu v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 839 A.2d 863, 868 (N.J. 2004) (holding that 
survival and wrongful death actions are “derivative of and dependent on the decedent’s injuries, 
including an unfortunate death, and are thus subject to a single per person limit under a policy of 
insurance”); McKinney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 722 N.E.2d 1125, 1127-29 (Ill. 1999) (finding that 
the limitation of liability clause in the policy was not ambiguous and clearly limited all plaintiff’s 
survival and wrongful-death claims arising out of the insured’s death to a single [per person] 
limit); Estate of Springer v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 3847, at *6 (Aug. 6, 
1993) (holding that the “per person limit of $100,000 would apply to both the wrongful death 
and the survivorship claims if only one person had been injured in the accident.”). 
 
10 697 A.2d 742 (Del. 1997). 
 
 
6
only one person has suffered actual bodily injury.”11  Lank overlooks the 
distinction between Emmons and this case.  In Emmons, this Court found the 
coverage language ambiguous, because the policy at issue there did not clearly 
provide that all claims were limited by the “per person” policy limits.  Moyed’s 
State Farm Policy, however, clearly so provides.   
 
Lank has not advanced a convincing reason why State Farm’s policy 
language should be deemed ambiguous.  The relevant policy language states that 
“[u]nder each person is the amount of coverage for all damages due to bodily 
injury to one person.”  The provision goes on to state that “[b]odily injury to one 
person includes all injury and damages to others resulting from this bodily injury.”  
In our view, that language is unambiguous:  it clearly states that the per person 
limit of liability applies to “all injury and damages” that arise out of a single 
individual person’s bodily injury.  “[I]f the relevant contract language is clear and 
unambiguous, courts must give the language its plain meaning.”12  The Court 
“should not distort language [of an insurance policy] to reach a desired result.”13  
 
Lank alternatively claims that, “if the contract in such a setting is 
ambiguous, the principle of contra proferentem dictates that the contract be 
                                                 
11 Id. at 746.  
 
12 Phillips Home Builders v. Travelers Ins. Co., 700 A.2d 127, 129 (Del. 1997). 
 
13 Hall v. Burger, 660 N.E.2d 1328, 1331 (Ill. 1996). 
 
 
7
construed against the drafter,”14 in this case State Farm, which drafted the language 
being interpreted.  But, “[the principle of contra proferentem] is not applicable . . . 
unless there is some ambiguity in the policy language. . . .”  Thus, “if the language 
is clear and unambiguous a Delaware court will not destroy or twist the words 
under the guise of construing them.”15  Here, as noted above, because the State 
Farm policy language is unambiguous, the principle of contra proferentem is not 
applicable.  
 
Lank’s third and final claim is that the Superior Court’s interpretation of the 
single limits policy provision would frustrate and contravene the underlying 
legislative purpose and intent of the wrongful death and survival statutes.  Lank 
correctly points out that wrongful death and survivorship claims are distinct causes 
of action under Delaware law.16  That said, neither the Wrongful Death statute nor 
the Survivorship statute prohibits a policy of insurance from limiting the total 
amount of coverage available for either or both claims.17  Even if insurance 
coverage for wrongful death and survivorship claims were contractually capped at 
a specific amount, that would not deprive a claimant of either cause of action.   
                                                 
14 Emmons, 697 A.2d at 745. See also, Steigler v. Insurance Co. of North America, 384 A.2d 
398, 400 (Del. 1978); Novellino v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 216 A.2d 420, 422 (Del. 
1966). 
 
15 Hallowell v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 443 A.2d 925, 926 (Del. 1982). 
 
16 Magee v. Rose, 405 A.2d 143, 146 (Del. 1979). 
 
17 See 10 Del. C. § 3724 (1999); 10 Del. C. §§ 3701 and 3722(a) (1999).  
 
 
8
 
Finally, Lank claims the single limits policy provision violates public policy.  
However, Lank cites no case where a “single limits” policy provision was found to 
violate public policy.  On the contrary, after exploring the “historical public policy 
background on both wrongful death and survivorship actions,” we conclude that it 
is “both sound and fair to limit awards of [these two claims] to true pecuniary 
damages.”18   
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Superior Court is 
AFFIRMED.  
                                                 
18 See Victor E. Schwartz and Cary Silverman, Hedonic Damages: The Rapidly Bubbling 
Cauldron, 69 BROOKLYN LAW REV. 1037, 1057-60 (2004).