Title: People v. Virgil
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: s047867
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: June 30, 2011

1 
Filed 6/30/11 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S047867 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
LESTER WAYNE VIRGIL, 
)  
 
)  
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
)  
Super. Ct. No. YA016781 
 
____________________________________) 
 
 
A jury convicted defendant Lester Wayne Virgil of murdering 22-year-old 
Soy Sung Lao during a doughnut shop robbery.1  The jury also convicted 
defendant of two other robberies, both committed with a knife and one 
accompanied by an assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury, and 
found true a robbery/murder special circumstance.2  Because the penalty was set at 
death, this appeal is automatic.  We affirm the judgment. 
BACKGROUND 
I. 
Guilt Phase 
 
A. 
Robbery of Beatriz Addo 
 
On the morning of October 13, 1992, Beatriz Addo was working alone at 
the LaBargain Grocery, which she owned with her husband.  The store was 
                                              
1  
Penal Code sections 211 and 187, subdivision (a).  All statutory references 
are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated. 
2  
Sections 12022, subdivision (b), 245, subdivision (a)(1), and 190.2, 
subdivision (a)(17). 
2 
located in an alley near the intersection of Van Ness Avenue and West El Segundo 
Boulevard, in Gardena.  Sometime between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., Addo was 
talking with a neighbor when defendant rode up on a bicycle.  He parked outside, 
walked in, and asked if either woman wanted to buy the bike.  When they 
declined, he asked about a brand of shaving cream.  Although Addo said they did 
not carry the brand, defendant searched the store‟s shelves for it.  He then asked if 
Addo could give him a job.  Addo promised to check with her husband, and 
defendant wrote down the name “Robert William,” a telephone number, and the 
address “1202 Denker, Apt. #10.”  He left, and the visiting neighbor left soon 
thereafter.  
 
About five minutes later, Addo was alone.  Defendant returned and walked 
toward the display shelves.  Defendant then grabbed Addo from behind and 
pushed her toward the bathroom.  Addo felt something pricking her in the back.  
Defendant ordered her to sit on the toilet, but instead she knelt to pray.  Defendant 
left, closing the door behind him.  Addo heard the ring of the cash register 
opening.  After about 10 minutes of silence, Addo emerged to find the telephone 
line had been cut and the cash register left open.  Approximately $60 had been 
taken, along with an envelope containing $600 in rent money, which had been 
stored underneath the register.  Addo had small cuts and scratches on her back but 
did not require medical attention.  
 
Addo described the robber as a Black man of average weight, with short 
hair and two to three days‟ growth of beard.  He wore long dark pants and a black 
T-shirt.  In June 1993, Addo picked defendant‟s picture from a six-photo lineup, 
and in October 1993, she identified him in a live lineup.  She also identified him at 
both the preliminary hearing and trial.  
 
B. 
Robbery and Murder of Soy Sung Lao 
 
Around 3:40 in the afternoon on October 24, 1992, Los Angeles County 
Park Police Sergeant Donald Tiller and his partner went to the Donut King for 
coffee.  The small, family-owned shop was located in a strip mall near the 
3 
LaBargain Grocery.  While his partner waited in the patrol car, Tiller went inside 
and ordered from Soy Sung Lao, who was working behind the counter.  Ms. Lao 
was the only employee in the shop, and defendant the only customer.  Defendant 
sat at a table with a white styrofoam cup and an orange gym bag nearby.  Sergeant 
Tiller observed defendant during the three minutes he spoke with Ms. Lao at the 
counter.  It seemed unusual that defendant stared fixedly out the window and 
would not look in his direction.  In the sergeant‟s experience, people usually 
looked at him when he was in uniform.  Defendant was wearing a dark jacket, a 
dark “Malcolm X” cap, and dark jeans.  He appeared to be about six feet tall, 165 
to 170 pounds, with “kind of a straggly beard.”  
 
Lavette Gilmore worked at a hair salon in the same strip mall.  Around 3:30 
or 4:00 p.m. on October 24, 1992, she went to the doughnut shop and saw 
defendant sitting in the window with a small coffee cup and a bag.  He wore a cap 
and a black shirt with red on it and drew Gilmore‟s attention because he looked 
“rugged.”  He was thin and unkempt, with long hair.  He slouched and would not 
return Gilmore‟s gaze.  Gilmore stayed in the shop talking for 20 or 25 minutes.  
She and Sergeant Tiller left at the same time.  Gilmore expressed concern to Tiller 
that defendant looked “funny.”  
 
Debra Tomiyasu had an appointment at Gilmore‟s hair salon that afternoon.  
She left around 3:40 p.m. and walked into the Donut King.  She noticed an orange 
duffel bag and a black Malcolm X cap on one of the customer tables but saw no 
one in the shop.  Tomiyasu yelled out “hello” two or three times, to no response.  
A minute or two later, Deandre Harrison walked in.  The two waited a few 
minutes more, calling for service.  Harrison walked in and out of the shop‟s front 
door several times to trigger its buzzer.  They then heard a series of muffled, high-
pitched screams.  As the screams grew louder, defendant emerged from the back 
of the store and walked straight to the cash register, which was partially open.  He 
took the money inside, walked out the front door, and ran across the parking lot.  
A woman staggered out from the back of the store, covered in blood.  Still 
4 
screaming, she held a blood-soaked white cloth to her neck.  She took a few steps, 
then collapsed.  No one else emerged from the back.  No sounds indicated anyone 
else was in the store.  
 
Tomiyasu followed defendant and chased him across the parking lot, 
screaming for help.  Meanwhile, Harrison ran to another shop and called 911.  
After Tomiyasu lost sight of defendant, she also attempted to call the police, but 
they arrived before she had time to dial.  Other than defendant and the bleeding 
woman, Tomiyasu and Harrison saw no one else in the shop, and no one else left 
after defendant fled.   
 
Ella Ford was picking up dry cleaning at the strip mall when she heard a 
woman screaming from the Donut King.  She dismissed the screams as the sound 
of children playing.  Defendant ran out of the doughnut shop and almost knocked 
her down.  She noticed he was holding something close to his body in his left 
hand.  Ford turned away but looked back at defendant after someone yelled, “he 
stabbed her.”  She eventually lost sight of defendant as he ran down the street.  
 
Felipe Santoyo was working at a fish market in the strip mall when he 
heard the commotion.  A crying woman said, “she‟s bleeding.”  Santoyo ran to the 
doughnut shop, where several people had gathered.  He saw Lao, whom he knew, 
lying on the floor, “bleeding a lot.”  He went to her and placed some bags under 
her head “so she didn‟t feel on the floor.”  Santoyo was soon joined by Lavette 
Gilmore and Trina Simmons, who had run to the shop from Gilmore‟s salon when 
they learned of the stabbing.  Lao‟s eyes were open and she was asking for help.  
She managed to give her family‟s phone number before she lost consciousness.  
Santoyo left to call Lao‟s family.   
 
Gardena Police Officers Blane Schmidt and Jody Schnabl were the first 
authorities to arrive at the scene.  Paramedics arrived minutes later.  They 
transported Lao to a hospital, but her condition deteriorated rapidly in the 
ambulance and she never regained consciousness.  
5 
 
After the paramedics left, Officer Schmidt interviewed Simmons, Harrison, 
and Tomiyasu.  Tomiyasu described defendant as having a round face, dark skin, a 
“scraggly” beard and mustache, a “wild-like appearance to his eyes,” and dark 
smudges on his face.  His hair was very short, and he appeared to be in his late 
20‟s or early 30‟s.  Defendant looked like a homeless or transient person because 
he was very thin, with a drawn face and wild-eyed look.  He wore blue jeans, dark 
shoes, and a black T-shirt with an outline of Africa on the front.  Harrison also 
remembered that defendant wore blue jeans and a black T-shirt with Africa 
depicted in red, yellow, and green.  He was tall and thin, with medium-brown, 
dirty skin and a “rough, ruggish” beard and mustache.  Ella Ford gave a similar 
description.  She said defendant was a little over six feet tall, 150 pounds, with a 
full beard, and wearing jeans, tennis shoes, and a black T-shirt with “African 
colors.”  Twice that evening, the police asked Tomiyasu to view suspects they had 
detained, but she did not make a positive identification of either.  
 
At the crime scene, police officers found the cash register drawer open but 
with no bills in the tray.  A blood trail extended from the restroom to where Lao 
had fallen.  Behind the closed door of the restroom, a large blood pool was oozing 
into the drain.  Blood was smeared on the inside doorknob and doorjamb.  A 
knotted towel and a pair of women‟s shoes lay on the floor.  Police officers never 
discovered a murder weapon.  At one of the tables in the dining area, someone had 
left an open gym bag, a baseball cap, a styrofoam cup, and a pair of shoelaces.  
The gym bag contained several raffle tickets.  Defendant‟s latent palm print was 
lifted from the table.  Although other latent fingerprints were recovered, none 
could be matched to defendant.  
 
Lao was stabbed 30 times with a single-edged blade approximately five-
eighths of an inch wide and five to six inches long.  Her hands and arms showed 
multiple defensive wounds.  Two stab wounds pierced the rib cage and sliced 
completely through her liver, causing massive abdominal bleeding.  Another stab 
wound to the chest collapsed a lung.  Forensic evidence established that the 
6 
stabbing took place in the employee restroom.  The bathroom door was closed 
after the attack, but Lao managed to open it.  Bleeding from her many wounds, 
Lao moved toward the silent alarm button and collapsed nearby.  The many 
undisturbed blood pools and droplets in the hallway showed that Lao‟s attacker 
left the bathroom before she did.  
 
C. 
Robbery and Assault of Samuel Draper 
 
Samuel “Joe” Draper was a mechanic at the Southwest Bowl.  On October 
31, 1992, defendant appeared in the doorway of the mechanic shop and asked 
Draper for a dollar for bus fare.  Draper recognized defendant from the bowling 
alley, but they had never spoken before.  Draper gave him a dollar from his shirt 
pocket.  Defendant started to leave but then asked for another dollar.  Draper 
walked into the shop to retrieve a dollar from his wallet.  Defendant took the 
money and left.  He returned about five minutes later carrying a plastic shopping 
bag, which he asked Draper to keep for him.  When Draper turned to carry the bag 
inside, defendant grabbed him from behind and put a knife to his throat.  Draper 
tried to grab the knife, cutting his fingers on the blade.  Defendant said, “Get down 
and I won‟t hurt you.”  When Draper complied, defendant tied his hands and feet 
with an extension cord and belt and tied a dirty rag around Draper‟s mouth as a 
gag.  Defendant plucked the wallet from Draper‟s pocket, took out $40 to $50 in 
cash, and left, dropping the empty wallet.  
 
Minutes later, Draper managed to free himself.  He went inside the bowling 
alley and reported the incident.  Later, Draper spoke to two men who believed they 
had seen defendant living out of a van parked in a nearby alley.  Draper reported 
this information to the police and showed them the van, but defendant was not in 
the area.  Draper described defendant as six feet tall, of medium build, and with a 
mustache and goatee.  
 
While investigating the Draper robbery, Detective Jacques LaBerge learned 
that the suspect may have been the same person recently arrested for stealing a pie 
from a church bake sale.  Using that booking photograph of defendant, LaBerge 
7 
prepared a photographic lineup, which he showed to Draper.  Draper identified 
defendant as the person who had robbed him.  
 
D. 
Investigation 
 
During the investigation of Lao‟s murder, Sergeant Hernandes Lobo 
determined that the raffle tickets found in the gym bag were originally sold to Joe 
Vaouli in late September or early October of 1992.  Shortly afterward, they were 
stolen from Vaouli‟s car while he was visiting his friend Joe Draper at the 
Southwest Bowl.  Vaouli had reported the theft to the raffle‟s organizer but not to 
the police.  
 
In June 1993, the Gardena Police Department prepared and circulated a 
flier about the doughnut shop killing.  Along with information about the date and 
location of the crime, the flier displayed photographs of the gym bag and other 
items found at the scene, a description of the suspect, and a composite sketch 
prepared with Tomiyasu‟s assistance.  The flier was distributed to surrounding 
police agencies.  
 
Detective Richard Cohen thought the suspect in the flier resembled 
defendant, whom he had recently arrested for burglarizing a church.  In addition to 
noting this resemblance, Detective Cohen knew that defendant “had been hanging 
around the Southwest Bowl and possibly committing crimes there.”  Detectives 
Cohen and LaBerge met with Sergeant Lobo to share information about the 
possibly related crimes.  Afterward, Sergeant Lobo prepared a new mug shot 
lineup containing the photograph of defendant that had previously been shown to 
Draper.  
 
Tomiyasu and Harrison both identified defendant in the photo lineup.  
Beatriz Addo identified defendant as the person who had robbed her.  Sergeant 
Tiller did not make an immediate identification when shown the photographs but 
asked if he could see pictures of the men in profile.  Sergeant Lobo created a new 
group of profile photographs, and Tiller identified defendant.  A live lineup was 
8 
conducted at the sheriff‟s department on October 19, 1993.3  Tiller, Addo, 
Harrison and Draper all identified defendant.  Tomiyasu could not decide between 
defendant and another man in the lineup.  Although defendant looked like the 
robber, he had gained significant weight.  Tomiyasu asked to see another 
photographic lineup.  When one was prepared, she identified defendant as 
“definitely the man that I saw in the donut shop.” 
 
Lavette Gilmore said she could not distinguish between defendant and 
another man in Sergeant Lobo‟s first photographic lineup.  When shown the 
profile photographs shown to Sergeant Tiller, Gilmore identified defendant.  At 
the live lineup in October 1993, Gilmore identified a different suspect.  She later 
confessed to the police, however, that she had purposefully picked the wrong 
person because her husband had warned her not to get involved.  Gilmore later 
asked to see another photographic lineup.  On January 20, 1995, shortly before 
trial, she viewed another six photos and was “over a hundred percent sure” 
defendant was the man she had seen at the doughnut shop.  
 
Ella Ford avoided contact with the police for years because she was afraid 
of retaliation.  She did not attend the live lineup and refused to speak with the 
police about the incident until shortly before defendant‟s trial.  On January 6, 
1995, Ford finally met with the police and identified defendant from a 
photographic lineup.  
 
Defendant did not present any evidence in the guilt phase of trial, and the 
jury convicted him of all charges. 
II. 
Penalty Phase 
 
A. 
Prosecution Evidence 
 
 
1. 
Victim Impact 
 
Soy Sung Lao was 22 years old when she was murdered.  She was the 
youngest of six siblings in a close-knit family.  After their parents died in 1975 
                                              
3  
Defendant was in custody at the time on an unrelated offense.  
9 
and 1976, the siblings took care of each other.  In 1980, when Lao was 10 years 
old, they fled from a communist regime in Cambodia.  Sleeping in the forest and 
hiding from soldiers, they escaped first to Thailand, then came to the United 
States.  The family settled in San Diego.  
 
In 1987, Lao‟s sister Lynn Lao Ngov married and moved to Los Angeles to 
run the Gardena doughnut shop.  When she graduated high school, Lao moved 
nearby and enrolled in the University of Southern California.  Lao was a full-time 
college student majoring in international relations, scheduled to graduate in May 
1993.  Lao was very close to Ngov‟s two children.  
 
Ngov last saw Lao at the doughnut shop on the day of the murder.  She had 
left the shop around noon, while Lao worked on alone.  When someone phoned 
saying Lao had been stabbed, Ngov was shocked and drove straight to the 
doughnut shop.  She arrived just after the ambulance drove away.  Ngov still felt 
shocked and “numb” about the murder.  Two and a half years later, she still 
thought about her sister every day.  
 
 
2. 
Other Crimes 
 
On several occasions in October 1992, defendant rented a room at the 
Hilltop Motel, where Julio Montulfar and his wife Benita Rodriguez worked as 
nighttime caretakers.  The first time defendant checked in, he had about $300 cash.  
He did not have enough money to pay for his room on other nights, however, and 
borrowed money from Montulfar.  
 
Around 9:00 p.m. on October 29, 1992, five days after Lao‟s murder, 
defendant came into a room Benita Rodriguez was cleaning.  Defendant asked 
after Montulfar, and Rodriguez explained that he had gone to the store.  About 10 
or 15 minutes later, Rodriguez began cleaning another room.  When she emerged 
from the bathroom, defendant was standing near the bed holding a knife.  The door 
to the room was closed.  Defendant put a finger to his lips, motioning Rodriguez to 
be quiet.  At knifepoint, defendant took Rodriguez‟s rings and watch, then asked 
for the office key.  Rodriguez, who spoke little English, repeatedly told defendant, 
10 
“No money.”  She knelt at defendant‟s feet, imploring him not to kill her.  
Defendant tried to tie Rodriguez‟s hands behind her back using a shoelace, but she 
refused to cooperate.  He gestured for Rodriguez to remove her pants.  When she 
did not understand, defendant “got on all fours on top of the bed” and told her to 
imitate the position.  When Rodriguez refused, defendant repeatedly kicked her, 
stabbed her in the side, and tried to suffocate her.  He stabbed her a total of 20 
times in the face, arm, stomach, and leg.  Fearing for her life, Rodriguez screamed 
and tried to grab the knife blade, which was about five or six inches long.  She 
managed to take hold of the blade and break it off, seriously injuring her finger.  
Defendant fled.  Trailing blood, Rodriguez staggered to the office and told 
Montulfar defendant had stabbed her. 
 
Rodriguez underwent three surgeries to treat the injuries to her stomach and 
intestines.  She suffered persistent digestive problems and could eat only once a 
day.  The attack left her face disfigured.  Her left eye drooped partially closed, 
impairing her vision.  She had difficulty sleeping and was afraid to be alone.  
 
In addition to the attack on Benita Rodriguez, the jury learned that 
defendant had been convicted of burglary in 1983, in California, and again in 
1989, in Louisiana.  
 
B. 
Defense Evidence 
 
Defendant‟s older sister, Debra Virgil, testified about his upbringing.  
Defendant and his sister were raised by a teenage mother in Los Angeles.  
Defendant‟s father moved back to Louisiana before defendant‟s birth.  His mother 
waitressed and relied on welfare payments for support.  The family moved often 
and lived in small apartments.  They always had enough food and clothing, and 
their mother was always attentive to her children‟s educational needs.  When 
defendant and his sister were very young, their mother was convicted of 
manslaughter.  She was jailed for a brief period, during which the children stayed 
with their aunt.  Their mother drank excessively and sometimes disciplined 
defendant harshly, using her hand, a belt, or an extension cord.  The discipline 
11 
grew more severe as defendant got older; he became angry and resentful.  
Defendant‟s mother always had a reason for imposing discipline, but she never 
demonstrated affection.  
 
Another child, Dexter, was born when defendant was almost 12 years old.  
Dexter‟s father was also involved in defendant‟s life.  Loving and affectionate, he 
tried to teach the children positive values.  Nevertheless, defendant‟s grades began 
dropping in junior high school, and he ran away from home briefly when he was 
14 or 15.  He started working part-time jobs and dropped out of high school at age 
16 or 17.  Defendant had few friends outside his extended family.  In 1982, after 
he served a county jail sentence for stealing tools from a garage, defendant moved 
with his sister to Tallulah, Louisiana.  Defendant worked at different jobs, 
eventually entered the job corps, and started a romantic relationship with Annie 
Antoine.  
 
Antoine testified that she and defendant began living together in 
Shreveport, Louisiana, in 1987.  Antoine noticed changes in defendant‟s behavior 
when he started spending time with his cousin Chester, a cocaine user.  Defendant 
still worked but began staying out late at night.  In 1989, he was arrested and 
imprisoned for burglarizing a warehouse.  When paroled in May 1991, defendant 
moved in with Antoine and his sister Debra, who were living together in Los 
Angeles.  During this time, Antoine continued to notice changes in defendant‟s 
personality, and their relationship deteriorated.  After a few months, defendant 
moved to Las Vegas.  When Antoine joined him two weeks later, she noticed that 
he had lost a significant amount of weight and displayed mood swings.  Defendant 
stayed out all night, or for days at a time.  When Antoine accused him of having 
an affair, defendant admitted he was abusing cocaine.  Antoine eventually moved 
to live with a sister in Salt Lake City.  She then discovered she was pregnant with 
defendant‟s child.  
 
Antoine resumed contact with defendant when he was in jail.  Defendant 
took pride in his son, Nigel, and arranged for his family to help with the boy‟s 
12 
care.  Despite defendant‟s addiction to cocaine, Antoine believed he would be a 
good father.  He had never been violent toward her.  She was shocked to learn 
about the doughnut shop murder. 
DISCUSSION 
I. 
Guilt Phase Issues 
 
A. 
Defendant’s Absence from Court Proceedings   
 
Defendant claims that the occurrence of several bench conferences during 
jury selection and trial deprived him of his statutory (§ 1043) and constitutional 
rights to be personally present during critical stages of the trial.4  Defendant has 
not shown that his absence from these conferences “ „prejudiced his case or denied 
him a fair and impartial trial.‟ ”  (People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1080, 
quoting People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 309-310.)  We reject his claims 
as unduly speculative.  (See People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 742.) 
 
During voir dire, the trial court conducted all cause challenges at sidebar.  
Defendant did not object to this procedure, although defense counsel expressed a 
preference that challenges be conducted in open court.  He now complains of 12 
instances in which prospective jurors were questioned at sidebar about sensitive 
                                              
4  
With regard to this claim and virtually every other claim raised on appeal, 
defendant asserts that the error violated his rights to a fair trial and reliable penalty 
determination under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution and corresponding provisions of the California 
Constitution.  In most instances, defendant failed to make these constitutional 
arguments in the trial court.  Nevertheless, unless otherwise indicated, we consider 
the merits of these newly raised arguments because either (1) the appellate claim is 
of a kind that required no objection to preserve it, or (2) the claim invokes no facts 
or legal standards different from those before the trial court, but merely asserts that 
an error had the additional legal consequence of violating the Constitution.  (See 
People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 441, fn. 17.)  In those circumstances, 
defendant‟s new constitutional arguments are not forfeited on appeal. (Ibid.; see 
People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 433-439.)  Where rejection of a claim of 
error on the merits necessarily leads to a rejection of the newly asserted 
constitutional objection, no separate constitutional analysis is required and we 
have provided none.  (See Boyer, at p. 441, fn. 17.) 
13 
matters.  Some of these sidebar hearings resulted in the prospective juror‟s 
dismissal for cause or the denial of a cause challenge.  In four instances, sidebar 
questioning led to a prospective juror‟s excusal by stipulation.  Defendant also 
complains of 16 occasions when trial proceedings were conducted outside his 
presence.  Fourteen of these incidents were brief bench conferences held during 
the presentation of evidence or argument.  Once, outside the presence of the jury, 
defendant was removed from the courtroom so that witnesses Montulfar and 
Rodriguez could be brought into court and ordered to return the following day.  
Defendant was also removed from court during part of a posttrial hearing when the 
court identified by name the jurors who had spoken at a previous hearing.  
 
“ „A criminal defendant‟s right to be personally present at trial is 
guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal Constitution 
. . . .  [Citations.]  A defendant, however, “does not have a right to be present at 
every hearing held in the course of a trial.”  [Citation.]  A defendant‟s presence is 
required if it “bears a reasonable and substantial relation to his full opportunity to 
defend against the charges.”  [Citation.]  The defendant must show that any 
violation of this right resulted in prejudice or violated the defendant‟s right to a 
fair and impartial trial.  [Citation.]‟  (People v. Hines [(1997)] 15 Cal.4th [997,] 
1038-1039.)”  (People v. Lucero (2000) 23 Cal.4th 692, 716-717; see Kentucky v. 
Stincer (1987) 482 U.S. 730, 745; United States v. Gagnon (1985) 470 U.S. 522, 
526.)  The same analysis applies under article I, section 15 of the California 
Constitution.  (People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 433; People v. Waidla, 
supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 742.)  “The standard under sections 977 and 1043 is 
similar.  „ “[T]he accused is not entitled to be personally present during 
proceedings which bear no reasonable, substantial relation to his opportunity to 
14 
defend the charges against him . . . . [Citation.]”  [Citation.]‟  [Citations.]”  
(People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 855.) 5 
 
“On appeal, we apply the independent or de novo standard of review to a 
trial court‟s exclusion of a criminal defendant from pretrial and trial proceedings, 
either in whole or in part, „insofar as the trial court‟s decision entails a 
measurement of the facts against the law.‟  (People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th 
690, 741.)”  (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1230.)  After independent 
review, we find no error.  Defendant‟s constitutional right to be personally present 
was not violated. 
 
Defendant has not indicated how his presence at any of the various sidebar 
conferences during voir dire or trial bore a reasonably substantial relation to his 
opportunity to defend himself.  All of the bench conferences during trial 
concerned routine evidentiary or legal matters, and “we cannot conclude with 
respect to any one of them that [defendant‟s] personal presence either was 
necessary for an „opportunity for effective cross-examination,‟ for purposes of the 
Sixth Amendment‟s confrontation clause [citation]; or would have „contribute[d]‟ 
to the trial‟s „fairness‟ in any marginal way, for purposes of the Fourteenth 
Amendment‟s due process clause [citation]; or bore a „ “ „ “reasonably substantial 
relation to the fullness of his opportunity to defend,” ‟ ” ‟ for purposes of 
section 15 of article I of the California Constitution and also sections 977 and 
1043 of the Penal Code [citation].”  (People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 742, 
italics omitted.)  Defendant complains he should have been present at bench 
conferences when questions about his attorney‟s performance might have been 
raised, such as when the court sustained prosecutorial objections or overruled 
defense objections, when defense counsel agreed to limit his questioning to 
                                              
5  
We decline defendant‟s suggestion that we reexamine these established 
precedents based on what he finds to be the United States Supreme Court‟s 
increased reliance on common law in regard to an accused‟s right to be present at 
trial.  
15 
accommodate witnesses‟ schedules, and when defense counsel once asked to end 
the day early to attend to a personal matter.6  Defendant also asserts that he should 
have been present when the prosecutor was criticized for failing to provide 
discovery on some witnesses.7  In both cases, however, nothing suggests 
defendant‟s presence would have accomplished anything useful.  Defendant does 
not claim that discovery violations by the prosecutor infringed his rights or entitle 
him to a new trial.  Nor does he argue his attorney provided constitutionally 
ineffective representation.  Defendant observed his attorney‟s performance in 
court, and he does not claim to have been unaware of defense strategies discussed 
at sidebar.  Although counsel‟s sidebar arguments were not always successful, 
defendant has not identified any particular shortcoming that could have been 
grounds for a successful motion under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118. 
 
Nor has defendant shown that his presence would have affected the 
outcome of the for-cause juror challenges argued at sidebar.  (See People v. 
Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69, 89.)  With few exceptions, defendant simply 
describes the proceedings and does not explain how his presence would have made 
a difference.  In the examples he does discuss in detail, and which we consider 
below, we perceive no reasonable or substantial relation between defendant‟s 
absence from the proceedings and his ability to present a defense. 
 
During sidebar conferences, two prospective jurors reported being abused 
as children.  Defendant now contends his absence from these discussions was 
detrimental because he could have “provide[d] input to counsel regarding his 
assessment” of the effect of such abuse on the prospective jurors‟ views.  Neither 
of these prospective jurors was excused immediately, however, and in both 
                                              
6  
After the close of testimony in the penalty phase, defense counsel reported 
at sidebar that he had learned his mother-in-law had just died.  Counsel asked if 
they could finish the proceedings early so that he could join his wife.  
7  
Defense counsel complained the prosecution had not notified him that 
Montulfar would testify or provided notes of any interviews of this witness.  
16 
instances defendant and his attorney had an opportunity to discuss the information 
revealed at sidebar.  In discussions of sensitive issues such as a prospective juror‟s 
childhood abuse, “allowing the defendant to be present „could well undermine the 
confidence and cooperation‟ necessary” to encourage candor.  (People v. Ochoa, 
supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 435, quoting People v. Hovey (1988) 44 Cal.3d 543, 573.)   
 
Defendant complains of another sidebar that was requested by one of the 
sworn jurors during the selection of alternates.  This juror revealed at sidebar that 
he was familiar with the locations of the crimes and had talked with relatives about 
criminal activity in the area.  After he returned to his seat, the lawyers remained at 
the bench and immediately agreed the juror had to be excused from service.  In 
discussing how to fill the juror‟s seat, defense counsel requested that the court seat 
the first alternate juror but also give both sides an additional peremptory 
challenge.  The court agreed.  Defendant now complains that that this procedure 
was critically important and his absence deprived him of the “opportunity to 
provide . . . input to counsel.”  He raised no objection at the time, however, and 
even now fails to explain what useful “input” he could have given or what 
different procedure he might have urged.  At most, defendant‟s absence from this 
tactical discussion deprived him of “a mere „shadow‟ benefit” and does not 
amount to a constitutional or statutory violation.  (People v. Ochoa, supra, 26 
Cal.4th at p. 433; see Snyder v. Massachusetts (1934) 291 U.S. 97, 106-107 
[accused has no constitutional right to be present “when presence would be 
useless, or the benefit but a shadow”].) 
 
Finally, more than three years after briefing in this case had been 
completed, defendant filed a supplemental brief raising the new argument that the 
questioning of jurors at sidebar violated his federal constitutional right to a public 
trial.  In Presley v. Georgia (2010) __ U.S. __ [130 S.Ct. 721], the high court held 
that a criminal defendant‟s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial extends to jury 
selection.  (Presley, at p. 724.)  However, the court recognized that “there are 
exceptions to this general rule.  „[T]he right to an open trial may give way in 
17 
certain cases to other rights or interests, such as the defendant‟s right to a fair trial 
or the government‟s interest in inhibiting disclosure of sensitive information.‟  
(Waller[ v. Georgia (1984)] 467 U.S.[ 39,] 45.)”  (Presley, at p. 724.) 
 
Initially, we note that the claim is forfeited because defendant failed to 
object on this ground below.  “A defendant „may, by his own acts or acquiescence, 
waive his right [to a public trial] and thereby preclude any subsequent challenge 
by him of an order excluding the public.  Unlike the jury trial right which requires 
an express personal waiver [citation], the constitutional guarantee of a public trial 
may be waived by acquiescence of the defendant in an order of exclusion.‟  
[Citations.]”  (People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 813.) 
 
This late-raised argument claim also fails on the merits.  Not every sidebar 
conference rises to the level of a constitutional violation.  Trial courts retain broad 
power to control their courtrooms to maintain security, protect the defendant‟s 
interest in a fair trial, protect the privacy concerns of prospective jurors, and 
efficiently dispose of matters outside the hearing of jurors or testifying witnesses.  
(Alvarado v. Superior Court (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1121, 1150; People v. Esquibel 
(2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 539, 552.)  We have also held that even a partial or 
temporary exclusion of the public from certain proceedings, if justified, imposes 
no more than a de minimus restriction on the constitutional right to a public trial.  
(People v. Woodward (1992) 4 Cal.4th 376, 385-386; see also People v. Bui 
(2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 675, 683-687 [concluding Presley did not alter the “de 
minimis” exception recognized in Woodward].) 
 
Here, the courtroom was not closed.  Defendant has directed us to no case 
that holds sidebar conferences to discuss sensitive or potentially prejudicial 
matters are akin to a closure of the courtroom, violating state or federal 
constitutional public trial guarantees.  In Presley, the trial court had excluded all 
members of the public from the courtroom during voir dire, including one of the 
defendant‟s family members.  (Presley v. Georgia, supra, 130 S.Ct. at p. 722.)  
Defendant was present and the public was allowed, but the court questioned jurors 
18 
at sidebar about sensitive subjects bearing on potential cause challenges.  We 
agree that, as a general rule, the questioning of prospective jurors should be 
conducted in open court, with sidebar conferences reserved for particularly 
sensitive or prejudicial topics.  However, having reviewed the record, we are 
satisfied that the brief bench conferences during jury selection here imposed no 
more than a de minimus infringement of the public trial guarantee.  These brief 
episodes of questioning and argument at the bench did not deprive defendant of 
his right to a public trial. 
 
B. 
Cause Challenges   
 
Defendant claims the court erred in its rulings on challenges to three 
prospective alternate jurors for cause and improperly limited defense counsel‟s 
questioning of a fourth prospective juror.  We find no abuse of discretion. 
 
 
1. 
Denial of Defense Challenges 
 
 
 
a. 
Prospective Alternate Juror John B. 
 
During voir dire, the court questioned Prospective Alternate Juror John B. 
at the bench about disclosures in his questionnaire concerning child abuse.  After 
this topic was explored, defense counsel requested permission to ask John B. “one 
question.”  He then asked whether “a person who has committed cold-blooded, 
premeditated murder in the commission of a robbery has forfeited his right to live 
and should automatically get the death penalty regardless of his circumstances?”  
John B. disagreed with the word “automatically” and said he would not vote for 
death automatically.  He explained, however, that he could imagine circumstances 
when a murderer would forfeit the right to live, such as if the victim was murdered 
even when doing his or her best to cooperate.  When defense counsel asserted 
“that is precisely what the People are going to try to prove,” John B. admitted that, 
in that case, he would “lean very strongly” in favor of voting for death.  The court 
interrupted the juror and asked if the prosecutor had any questions.  In response to 
the prosecutor‟s questioning, John B. repeatedly stated that he would “weigh the 
circumstances” in deciding whether to impose the death penalty and would not 
19 
impose death automatically.  John B. stressed that he would always take the 
circumstances of the case into account.  He could vote for life imprisonment 
without parole, but he conceded that in certain circumstances, like the murder of a 
compliant victim, he would lean strongly toward the death penalty.  
 
Defense counsel interposed the beginning of a question:  “But if a person 
goes out of his way to take a robbery victim who is not resisting, and take them to 
another area and murder them by repeatedly stabbing them —.”  The court 
sustained an objection, and counsel rephrased the question.  Directing John B.‟s 
attention to a questionnaire response stating that a person who committed 
premeditated murder had “ „forfeited the right,‟ ” defense counsel asked whether a 
fact pattern of premeditated murder would cause John B. to “automatically vote 
for death.”  John B. responded, “I‟m going to object to the term „automatic.‟  I 
would lean much more heavily towards it.  But I mean, there are circumstances 
that would have to be weighed all the way around.”  
 
The next day, defendant moved to dismiss John B. for cause, arguing there 
was no reasonable possibility John B. would impose life imprisonment without 
parole under the facts of this case.  The court denied the challenge.  Having 
observed John B.‟s demeanor at sidebar, the court “found him to be very 
thoughtful in his answers, and . . . very credible.”  Although John B. said he would 
strongly lean toward death in certain cases, the court concluded this statement was 
not a sufficient basis for disqualification.  The court observed, “Yes, he‟s a strong 
pro-deather.  But he made it very, very clear that he would be willing to look at the 
circumstances, although his feelings on the subject matter are very strong.”  After 
his cause challenge was denied, defendant exercised a peremptory challenge to 
excuse John B. and exhausted all four peremptory challenges allotted for the 
selection of alternate jurors.  However, defense counsel did not express 
dissatisfaction with the jury as sworn. 
 
“As a general rule, a party may not complain on appeal of an allegedly 
erroneous denial of a challenge for cause because the party need not tolerate 
20 
having the prospective juror serve on the jury; a litigant retains the power to 
remove the juror by exercising a peremptory challenge.  Thus, to preserve this 
claim for appeal we require, first, that a litigant actually exercise a peremptory 
challenge and remove the prospective juror in question.  Next, the litigant must 
exhaust all of the peremptory challenges allotted by statute and hold none in 
reserve.  Finally, counsel . . . must express to the trial court dissatisfaction with the 
jury as presently constituted.”  (People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 186.)  
Defendant satisfied the first two of these requirements, but not the third.  We have 
declined to find claims forfeited under these circumstances in cases tried before 
1994, when the expression of dissatisfaction requirement was clarified in People v. 
Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 121, footnote 4 (see Mills, at pp. 186-187); 
however, defendant‟s trial was in 1995. 
 
Even if defendant‟s claim had been preserved, it would fail on the merits.  
Defendant first argues the court erred in limiting his attorney‟s questioning of John 
B.  In general, both parties are entitled to ask prospective jurors questions “that are 
specific enough to determine if those jurors harbor bias, as to some fact or 
circumstance shown by the trial evidence, that would cause them not to follow an 
instruction directing them to determine a penalty after considering aggravating and 
mitigating evidence.  [Citation.]”  (People v. Cash (2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, 720-
721.)  However, “[o]ur decisions have explained that death-qualification voir dire 
must avoid two extremes.  On the one hand, it must not be so abstract that it fails 
to identify those jurors whose death penalty views would prevent or substantially 
impair the performance of their duties as jurors in the case being tried.  On the 
other hand, it must not be so specific that it requires the prospective jurors to 
prejudge the penalty issue based on a summary of the mitigating and aggravating 
evidence likely to be presented.  [Citation.]  In deciding where to strike the 
balance in a particular case, trial courts have considerable discretion.  [Citations.]”  
(Id. at pp. 721-722.) 
21 
 
Defense counsel had ample opportunity to question John B. and did so at 
length.  This questioning was cut short on only one occasion, when the court 
sustained an objection to counsel‟s question whether John B. would impose the 
death penalty upon a person who had moved an unresisting robbery victim to 
another location and then repeatedly stabbed them.  This hypothetical question 
included several key facts about defendant‟s alleged crime:  (1) The murder was 
committed during a robbery; (2) the victim did not resist; (3) the victim was 
moved to another location; and (4) in that location, the victim was stabbed 
repeatedly and killed.  Given this specificity, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in concluding that the question improperly called for Prospective 
Alternate Juror John B. to prejudge the penalty determination based on evidence 
likely to be presented. 
 
Defendant next argues substantial evidence does not support the court‟s 
denial of his challenge of John B. for cause.  “A prospective juror may be 
challenged for cause based upon his or her views regarding capital punishment 
only if those views would „ “prevent or substantially impair” ‟ the performance of 
the juror‟s duties as defined by the court‟s instructions and the juror‟s oath.  
(Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424; People v. Crittenden[, supra,] 9 
Cal.4th [at p.] 121; People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 456.)”  (People v. 
Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 975.)  “If a juror‟s responses are conflicting 
or equivocal, the trial court‟s ruling is binding on us.  [Citations.]  If not, we will 
uphold the trial court if the ruling is fairly supported by substantial evidence in the 
record, giving deference to the trial court which had the opportunity to observe 
and listen to the juror.  [Citations.]”  (People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 651.) 
 
Substantial evidence supports the trial court‟s conclusion that John B. could 
remain impartial and apply the law despite his personal beliefs regarding the death 
penalty.  The trial court found John B.‟s responses to be thoughtful and credible, 
and we defer to this assessment.  (People v. Navarette (2003) 30 Cal.4th 458, 490; 
People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 122.)  John B. repeatedly averred that 
22 
he would not impose the death penalty automatically, but would consider all the 
relevant circumstances in making a decision.  Although he admitted he would lean 
toward death in the case of a robber who proceeded to murder a cooperative 
victim, he stressed that no particular penalty would be “automatic.”  In context, 
John B.‟s statements appear to convey his view that the premeditated murder of an 
unresisting victim presents, in the abstract, a collection of aggravating 
circumstances that tip the balance heavily in favor of death.  John B. did not rule 
out a different result, however, if mitigating circumstances were also taken into 
account. 
 
 
 
b. 
Prospective Alternate Juror Tracey S. 
 
Prospective Alternate Juror Tracey S. worked as a registered nurse with the 
Los Angeles County Sheriff‟s Department, treating inmates at the Men‟s Central 
Jail.  She came in contact with deputy sheriffs but none were her friends.  At 
sidebar, defense counsel disclosed that defendant remembered being treated by 
Tracey S. in the past.  Defendant had seen her talking to deputies and believed she 
dated deputies.  Defense counsel challenged Tracey S. for cause “out of an 
abundance of caution” and conceded the challenge was not based on “anything 
specific.”  Counsel explained that he would feel “uncomfortable” having Tracey S. 
as a juror given that she could encounter defendant at the jail during the trial and 
“we‟re trying to pretend he‟s not in custody.”  The court observed that Tracey S. 
would not have contact with defendant if she served as a juror “because she 
obviously wouldn‟t be going to work; she would be coming here.”  Nevertheless, 
the court asked if Tracey S. recognized anyone at counsel table, and she replied 
that she did not.  The court denied the challenge.  Immediately after this ruling, 
defense counsel declined to exercise a peremptory challenge against Tracey S. and 
expressly accepted the alternate jurors.  Tracey S. was sworn as an alternate and 
eventually sat as a regular juror.  
 
Defendant now claims the court erred in denying his challenge.  Assuming 
this claim was not waived by defense counsel‟s express acceptance of the alternate 
23 
jurors, it fails on the merits.  Tracey S. said she did not recognize anyone at the 
defense table.  Defense counsel could not identify any specific reason why Tracey 
S. could not serve as a fair and impartial juror.  He referred only to his discomfort, 
defendant‟s speculation, and counsel‟s conjecture that Tracey S.‟s job, which she 
would be away from during trial, might alert her to defendant‟s custodial status.  
These vague and speculative objections were not sufficient to support a dismissal 
for cause, and the trial court‟s denial of the challenge is supported by substantial 
evidence.  (See People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1035.) 
 
However, defendant insists that the challenge should have been granted 
because, almost a month later, Tracey S. did see defendant at the jail.  Jurors were 
excused from court for one day after the close of evidence in the guilt phase.  
Tracey S. went to work that day and saw defendant standing in line outside the 
jail‟s clinic with a group of inmates.  They did not speak.  Tracey S. walked by 
defendant, had no more contact with him, and did not try to find out more about 
him.  Thus, while she learned that defendant was in custody, she knew nothing 
else about him, and she did not remember having ever treated him.  Defense 
counsel asked Tracey S. several questions about the incident, and she repeatedly 
said it would not affect her ability to serve as a juror.  At the court‟s request, she 
also agreed not to mention the sighting to other jurors.  Counsel did not move to 
dismiss Tracey S. or make any attempt to show she was disqualified from serving 
as a juror.  “Plainly, if a defendant desires the trial court to fashion an appropriate 
remedy under these circumstances, the request must be timely to afford the 
opportunity to rule when the ruling will be meaningful.  [Citation.]”  (People v. 
Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1160.)  Because no objection was made below, to 
the extent defendant contends the court erred in failing to discharge Tracey S. 
from the jury, the claim has been forfeited.  (Ibid.; see also § 1089 [permitting 
discharge of a juror at any time “upon . . . good cause shown to the court” (italics 
added)].) 
24 
 
Even if the claim had been preserved, it would fail on the merits.  A juror 
may be discharged if, at any time before or after final submission of the case, the 
court upon good cause finds the juror “unable to perform his or her duty.”  
(§ 1089.)  We generally uphold a trial court‟s decision regarding discharge if there 
is any substantial evidence to support it, although, if a juror is discharged, her 
inability to perform as a juror “must „ “appear in the record as a demonstrable 
reality.” ‟  [Citation.]” (People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 843.)  The 
record does not support defendant‟s claim that Tracey S.‟s ability to serve was 
compromised because she saw him in custody.  Tracey S. immediately reported 
the incident to the court, repeatedly assured the court the incident would have no 
effect on her decisionmaking, and agreed to say nothing about it to other jurors.8 
 
 
2. 
Grant of Prosecution Challenge to Prospective Alternate 
 
 
Juror Janice S. 
 
In her questionnaire, Prospective Juror Janice S. wrote that she “really 
[didn‟t] believe in the death penalty,” but she thought she could set her beliefs 
aside and impose it if she thought it was appropriate.  During voir dire, however, 
Janice S. said that she did not believe she had the “right to say . . . somebody else 
should die.  I can‟t make that decision”  The court asked if Janice S. could think of 
a set of circumstances in which she could impose the death penalty for a person 
convicted of first degree murder committed in the course of a robbery.  Janice S. 
said she could not, although she had written on her questionnaire that she could do 
so.  Janice S. explained:  “[N]ow I‟m thinking.  I had time to think.  And no, I 
couldn‟t say — even if they did all that — that I still couldn‟t say that I could 
sentence this person to death.”  When the court asked again, “are you telling us . . . 
you can‟t see a set of circumstances where you could find yourself personally 
                                              
8  
Although the defense was “trying to pretend” that defendant was not in 
custody, few jurors would find it remarkable that a defendant facing the death 
penalty would be in custody during trial.  We note further that during the penalty 
phase defendant refused to wear civilian clothing.  Thus, his custody status was 
evident. 
25 
voting to put someone to death,” Janice S. answered, “Right.  I couldn‟t.  No, I 
could not.”  Later, the prosecutor challenged Janice S. for cause.  Defense counsel 
asked for an opportunity to attempt to rehabilitate her.  In the alternative, he 
opposed the challenge based on Janice S.‟s questionnaire responses expressing a 
willingness to set aside her beliefs and impose the death penalty if appropriate.  
The court sustained the challenge without allowing further inquiry.   
 
A prospective juror may be excluded for cause without compromising a 
defendant‟s right to trial by an impartial jury if the juror‟s views on capital 
punishment “would „prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties 
as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.‟ ”  (Wainwright v. Witt, 
supra, 469 U.S. at p. 424; see also People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 
1146.)  “A prospective juror is properly excluded if he or she is unable to 
conscientiously consider all of the sentencing alternatives, including the death 
penalty where appropriate.  [Citations.]”  (People v. Jones (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1229, 
1246.)  “Generally, the qualifications of jurors challenged for cause are matters 
within the wide discretion of the trial court, seldom disturbed on appeal. 
[Citations.]  There is no requirement that a prospective juror‟s bias against the 
death penalty be proven with unmistakable clarity.  [Citations.]  Rather, it is 
sufficient that the trial judge is left with the definite impression that a prospective 
juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law in the case before 
the juror.  [Citations.]  „On review, if the juror‟s statements are equivocal or 
conflicting, the trial court‟s determination of the juror‟s state of mind is binding.  
If there is no inconsistency, we will uphold the court‟s ruling if it is supported by 
substantial evidence.  [Citations.]‟  (People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 
357.)”  (Jones, at pp. 1246-1247.) 
 
The record amply supports the trial court‟s dismissal of Janice S. for cause.  
Although her questionnaire responses were somewhat ambiguous, Janice S. 
unequivocally stated at voir dire that she had considered the matter further and 
concluded she could not vote to impose the death penalty under any 
26 
circumstances.  This clear admission established that Janice S. could never impose 
the penalty sought by the prosecution in this capital case.  Accordingly, the trial 
court properly dismissed Janice S. because her views would have substantially 
impaired her ability to perform her duties as a juror. 
 
Defendant also claims the court violated his constitutional rights by 
refusing to allow defense counsel to question Janice S. further on her views about 
the death penalty.  Defendant speculates that further questioning might have 
shown that Janice S. could have set aside her strong views and fulfilled her duties 
as a capital juror.  However, as we have repeatedly stated, “[t]he court has 
discretion to refuse to allow defense counsel to question jurors for the purpose of 
rehabilitation if their „answers made their disqualification unmistakably clear . . . .‟  
(People v. Bittaker, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1085, citing People v. Nye (1969) 71 
Cal.2d 356, 364.)”  (People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 355; see also 
People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 823.)  We find no abuse of discretion.  
After reflection, Janice S. candidly admitted that she could not vote to impose the 
death penalty under any circumstances.  Her clearly stated views disqualified her 
from jury service. 
 
Defendant nevertheless insists the questioning of Janice S. was 
constitutionally inadequate under Morgan v. Illinois (1992) 504 U.S. 719.  Not so.  
Morgan simply held that general questions about a juror‟s ability to be fair and 
follow the law are not sufficient to detect those in the venire who would 
automatically vote for or against death.  (Id. at pp. 734-735.)  Questions about 
death penalty biases must be specific enough that they require potential jurors to 
consider whether they have such strong views about capital punishment that they 
could not follow the law.  (Id. at pp. 735-736.)  The trial court‟s questions directly 
involving the death penalty were sufficiently specific.  As the Supreme Court 
observed in Morgan, “such jurors — whether they be unalterably in favor of, or 
opposed to, the death penalty in every case — by definition are ones who cannot 
perform their duties in accordance with law . . . .”  (Id. at p. 735.) 
27 
 
 
3. 
Limited Questioning of Prospective Alternate Juror 
 
 
Duvall G. 
 
Finally, defendant claims the court erred in refusing to allow defense 
counsel to question Prospective Alternate Juror Duvall G.  Before jury selection, 
the court announced its intention to question the jurors itself but also allow each 
side one hour for the attorneys to “hone in on areas that they really believe are 
necessary.”  No objections were raised to this procedure.  Each prospective juror 
had completed a detailed, 36-page questionnaire, and the record reflects that the 
court questioned each juror individually.  After the court questioned Duvall G., 
defense counsel requested leave to ask “a couple” of questions.  The court 
declined, remarking that the attorneys were “both out of time.”  Defendant did not 
challenge Duvall G. for cause or exercise a peremptory challenge against him.  
Duvall G. was sworn as an alternate juror and substituted onto the jury during the 
guilt phase.  
 
In his questionnaire, Duvall G. revealed that he had been physically and 
mentally abused by his father.  When the court asked about this abuse at sidebar, 
Duvall G. explained that his mother had abandoned the family, leaving Duvall G. 
with his alcoholic father.  Duvall G. remarked on the experience:  “To me, it‟s no 
big deal.  I‟m here.  I work every day.  . . .  [¶]  I never had any psychological 
counseling.  So I guess I‟m just a regular kind of guy, you know.”  Duvall G. 
thought he could objectively weigh evidence about similar abuse, “because I never 
think about it.  It doesn‟t bother me.”  Asked if a person subjected to such abuse 
“can still make the right choices in life,” Duvall G. responded, “[of] course they 
can.”  He believed that if an abused person later made “wrong choices in life,” 
they would be accountable for such choices.  He explained:  “It‟s not like they‟re 
still being abused.  To me, it‟s not that deeply rooted . . . .  That‟s just my personal 
opinion.”  Despite this opinion, Duvall G. averred that he could consider evidence 
of abuse as a factor in causing a person to make bad decisions.   
28 
 
Duvall G. was arrested for joyriding and driving while intoxicated when he 
was 13 or 14 years old.  When the court asked about this experience, Duvall G. 
confirmed that he had been treated fairly by the criminal justice system.  He 
regretted the incident because he could have hurt someone.  
 
Duvall G.‟s questionnaire also mentioned that he had been the victim of a 
burglary and a robbery.  In response to the court‟s questions, Duvall G. disclosed 
that two men had robbed him at knifepoint eight or nine years earlier.  He did not 
contact the police because robberies happened “all the time” in that neighborhood, 
and he thought “it was, like, no big deal as long as I didn‟t get hurt.  That‟s what 
you pray for, not to get hurt.”  Also, he did not think the police could catch the 
robbers, who ran away on foot, “and they only got a couple dollars.”  Duvall G. 
did not try to find the culprits.  He affirmed that he could be fair in the present 
case even though it involved an allegation of robbery with a knife.  Duvall G. also 
stated in his questionnaire that he could find defendant not guilty if the evidence 
did not support the charges, and he commented, “Robbery is not murder.”  
 
In his questionnaire, Duvall G. agreed that it is important to know a 
person‟s life circumstances when deciding between the death penalty and life 
imprisonment, and he said he could follow an instruction directing him to consider 
these circumstances.  On voir dire by the court, Duvall G. affirmed that he could 
give fair and objective consideration to all the evidence bearing upon penalty, and 
he could personally impose either penalty depending on what the evidence 
showed.  
 
Defendant now contends the trial court‟s refusal to allow further 
questioning by defense counsel rendered the trial fundamentally unfair.  Because 
defendant did not challenge Duvall G. for cause, did not exercise a peremptory 
challenge against him, and expressly accepted the panel of alternate jurors sworn, 
he has forfeited any claim of error regarding Duvall G.‟s suitability as a juror.  
(People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 866; People v. Ramos, supra, 15 
Cal.4th at p. 1160.)  His argument also fails on the merits. 
29 
 
“The trial court . . . has a duty to restrict voir dire within reasonable bounds 
to expedite the trial.  [Citation.]”  (People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 536.)  
We review a trial court‟s limitations on voir dire for abuse of discretion.  (People 
v. Benavides, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 88; see Code Civ. Proc., § 223.)  No such 
abuse appears here.  The court thoroughly questioned Duvall G. on his background 
and relevant experiences and probed his ability to be a fair and impartial juror.  
Defense counsel never told the trial court what additional questions he sought to 
ask, what subjects needed to be explored further, or why the information elicited 
from Duvall G.‟s detailed questionnaire and the court‟s questioning was not 
sufficient to allow him to exercise his challenges intelligently.  Defendant did not 
ask the court to pose further questions.  As a result, defendant‟s argument that the 
time limits on attorney voir dire deprived him of an opportunity to establish that 
Duvall G. could not serve as a fair and impartial juror is purely speculative.  
(People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 693, disapproved on another ground in 
People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22.)  Duvall G.‟s responses in the 
questionnaire, and in court, consistently showed that he was qualified to serve as a 
juror.  Defendant had sufficient information from the questionnaire and in-court 
voir dire to exercise his challenges intelligently.  The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion by denying defense counsel‟s request to question this prospective juror 
further.  (See Roldan, at p. 694.) 
 
C. 
Admission of Victim Photographs   
 
During the guilt phase, the prosecution introduced People‟s exhibit No. 14, 
which held four mounted photographs of the murder victim, Soy Sung Lao.  The 
two photographs on the left depicted Lao in life, wearing a University of Southern 
California sweatshirt.  The two on the right were taken by the coroner during 
Lao‟s autopsy.  When the prosecutor used this exhibit in questioning Sergeant 
Tiller, Officer Schmidt, and Debra Tomiyasu, he left one of the autopsy photos 
partially uncovered, revealing only Lao‟s face.  The other autopsy photo was 
covered entirely.  Defendant did not object to the use of the exhibit with any of 
30 
these witnesses.  During the testimony of Ty Ngov, the victim‟s brother-in-law, 
defense counsel objected to a display of the partially covered coroner‟s 
photograph.  In response, the prosecutor covered the photograph entirely, leaving 
exposed only the photographs of Lao in life.  Defense counsel agreed to stipulate 
that Lao was the person shown in the covered photograph.  The exhibit remained 
in this condition, with both autopsy photos covered, when the prosecutor displayed 
it in questioning Lao‟s sister and a crime scene technician.  Defendant did not 
object to these displays of the partially covered exhibit.  During his examination of 
the forensic pathologist, the prosecutor uncovered the autopsy photos and, without 
objection, displayed the full exhibit to the jury.  In addition to marking the 
locations of Lao‟s stab wounds on a blank body chart, the pathologist circled some 
specific wounds on one of the autopsy photographs in the exhibit.   
 
Defendant now claims the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted 
People‟s exhibit No. 14 into evidence.  Although defense counsel did not object to 
the use of the exhibit with seven separate witnesses, he argued after the close of 
testimony in the guilt phase that the exhibit should be excluded from evidence 
because the juxtaposition of autopsy photos with pictures of the victim in life was 
more prejudicial than probative.  This objection should have been made during the 
pathologist‟s testimony, when all the photographs were unveiled for the jury, but it 
was not.  “Because defendant did not object at the time the photographs were used 
in questioning the witnesses, he failed to preserve the issue for appeal.  Although 
he later raised an objection, that objection was not sufficiently timely to preserve 
the issue.  The requirement that an objection to evidence be timely made is 
important because it „allows the court to remedy the situation before any prejudice 
accrues.‟  [Citation.]”  (People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 423-424.) 
 
Even if the claim had been preserved, the evidence was properly admitted.  
“The admission of photographs of a victim lies within the broad discretion of the 
trial court when a claim is made that they are unduly gruesome or inflammatory.  
[Citations.]  The court‟s exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal 
31 
unless the probative value of the photographs clearly is outweighed by their 
prejudicial effect.  [Citations.]”  (People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 133-
134.)  The photographs in the exhibit were relevant to corroborate eyewitness 
identifications of Lao and to illustrate expert forensic testimony.  Defendant does 
not contend the autopsy photographs were especially gruesome.  He objects that 
the juxtaposition of photos showing the victim in life and in death was unfairly 
prejudicial because this combination would likely evoke sympathy for the victim.  
“We have described the „prejudice‟ referred to in Evidence Code section 352 as 
characterizing evidence that uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against a 
party as an individual, while having only slight probative value with regard to the 
issues.  [Citation.]”  (Crittenden, at p. 134; see also Vorse v. Sarasy (1997) 53 
Cal.App.4th 998, 1008 [“Evidence is not prejudicial, as that term is used in a 
section 352 context, merely because it undermines the opponent‟s position or 
shores up that of the proponent”].)  Each photo was properly admitted.  All 
evidence is to be considered as a whole.  The mere fact that four properly admitted 
photographs were mounted on a single board does not approach the threshold for a 
section 352 exclusion.  After seven witnesses had been questioned about People‟s 
exhibit No. 14 without objection from the defense, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in admitting the exhibit itself into evidence. 
 
D. 
Testimony of Lavette Gilmore   
 
Defendant complains the trial court made several errors in regard to the 
testimony of Lavette Gilmore, the hair stylist who identified defendant as having 
been in the doughnut shop shortly before the murder.  We find no prejudicial error. 
 
 
1. 
Nonresponsive Testimony 
 
During direct examination, after Gilmore described the man she saw sitting 
alone at one of the doughnut shop tables, the prosecutor asked what drew her 
attention to this person.  She responded that he gave her a “funny feeling” and his 
sitting there “[j]ust didn‟t feel right.”  Defense counsel asked the court to strike the 
phrase “funny feeling” because Gilmore‟s “suspicions or feelings” were not 
32 
relevant.  The court overruled the objection and noted that Gilmore‟s remark 
“explain[ed] why she paid attention” to the man in the shop.  Gilmore also 
testified, without objection, that defendant‟s appearance drew her suspicion 
because “[h]e looked like he shouldn‟t have been there.  He looked rugged.”  He 
was thin, needed a haircut, and “didn‟t look clean at all.”  When the prosecutor 
asked Gilmore to identify defendant, in court, as the man she saw in the doughnut 
shop, she responded, “He looks so clean and nice now and healthy.”  She could 
not say he was the same person.  The prosecutor then questioned Gilmore about 
the 1993 photographic lineup in which she identified defendant‟s profile photo.  
Asked how she expressed her identification to the officer, Gilmore replied that she 
remembered the man‟s eyes, nose, cap, facial hair, and the way he tried to hide his 
face.  She explained that she focused her attention on the man in the shop because 
she “had a lot of money in [her] back pocket” from having worked a full day at the 
salon.  Defense counsel interrupted, objecting to testimony about money in 
Gilmore‟s pocket and her “inchoate fears.”  The court responded by directing the 
prosecutor to ask his next question.  Defense counsel did not request a ruling on 
his objection or move to strike Gilmore‟s testimony as nonresponsive.  
 
Defendant now claims the court erred in failing to strike Gilmore‟s 
testimony sua sponte because it was nonresponsive and more prejudicial than 
probative.  Specifically, defendant contends the testimony asked the jury to infer 
that he had a predisposition to commit robbery.  He also argues Gilmore‟s 
testimony was inadmissible as a lay opinion about whether the man she saw in the 
doughnut shop intended to commit a robbery. 
 
Defendant forfeited these claims by failing to obtain a ruling on his 
objection and failing to move that Gilmore‟s testimony be stricken.  “ „In the 
absence of an erroneous ruling on an objection or request that a nonresponsive 
answer be stricken and the jury instructed to disregard it, there is no error.‟  
(People v. Harris [(1989)] 47 Cal.3d [1047,] 1089.)”  (People v. Jackson (1996) 
13 Cal.4th 1164, 1214.)  Defense counsel‟s vague objection to what he 
33 
characterized as Gilmore‟s “inchoate fears” was not sufficient to preserve a claim 
of error for appeal.  “A nonresponsive answer is properly the subject of a motion 
to strike (Evid. Code, § 766), not an objection.”  (People v. Bell (2007) 40 Cal.4th 
582, 611, fn. 11.) 
 
In any event, defendant‟s claims fail on the merits.  Gilmore did not express 
an opinion about whether the man was a potential robber.  She gave no character 
evidence about defendant‟s propensity to act in a particular way.  She merely 
described her state of mind upon seeing a “rugged”-looking man sitting alone in 
the shop.  The testimony was relevant to show that she paid particular attention to 
the man and explain why she did so.  As to defendant‟s challenge under Evidence 
Code section 352, the evidence was not unduly prejudicial, meaning it did not 
“ „uniquely tend[] to evoke an emotional bias against the defendant as an 
individual‟ ” while having little bearing on disputed issues.  (People v. Karis 
(1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 638.)  “ „In applying section 352, “prejudicial” is not 
synonymous with “damaging.” ‟  [Citation.]”  (Ibid.)  The trial court did not err in 
permitting the testimony. 
 
 
2. 
Trial Testimony from Photographic Lineup 
 
After she identified defendant‟s profile in August 1993 from a photographic 
lineup, Gilmore was asked to attend a live lineup that October.  At trial, Gilmore 
explained that she did not identify defendant in the live lineup, even though she 
recognized him among the suspects, because she was frightened.  Because his 
appearance had changed so much by the time of trial, she also could not identify 
defendant in court as the man she saw in the doughnut shop.  
 
During Gilmore‟s direct examination, the prosecutor sought to reconstruct 
the live lineup by showing her photographs of that lineup.  Defense counsel 
objected to the questioning because Gilmore did not identify defendant at the live 
lineup.  When pressed to state the legal grounds for his objection, defense counsel 
argued that, given the passage of time, there was no foundation Gilmore had the 
ability to make an in-court identification from photographs of the lineup.  The 
34 
court overruled the objection, noting that counsel could explore the subject on 
cross-examination.  When questioning resumed, the prosecutor showed Gilmore 
three photographs from the live lineup.  She selected defendant‟s photograph and 
said it depicted the person she had recognized at the lineup but failed to identify.  
Defense counsel interrupted and asked that the record reflect that the exhibit 
shown to Gilmore also contained a large single photograph of defendant, mounted 
below two pictures of the live lineup.  He raised no objection to use of the exhibit, 
however. 
 
On appeal, defendant claims the ruling permitting this line of questioning 
abridged various constitutional rights, including his right to counsel.  No 
constitutional violation occurred.  Defendant was represented by counsel when the 
live lineup was conducted and, of course, at trial.  Moreover, there is no Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel at a photographic lineup.  (United States v. Ash 
(1973) 413 U.S. 300, 321.) 
 
Defendant also argues for the first time in his reply brief that the 
identification procedure violated due process because the photographic exhibit 
shown to Gilmore was overly suggestive.  The exhibit in question displayed two 
pictures of the live lineup and a third, of the same size, showing only defendant‟s 
head and shoulders.  Because counsel did not object or seek to prevent questioning 
on this exhibit on the ground that it was unduly suggestive, this claim is forfeited 
on appeal.  In any event, defendant has not established error.  “[F]or a witness 
identification procedure to violate the due process clauses, the state must, at the 
threshold, improperly suggest something to the witness — i.e., it must, wittingly 
or unwittingly, initiate an unduly suggestive procedure.”  (People v. Ochoa (1998) 
19 Cal.4th 353, 413.)  Defendant‟s complaint that the exhibit was unduly 
suggestive misses the point because the exhibit was not used as part of a “witness 
identification procedure.”  The prosecutor did not use the challenged exhibit to 
obtain an identification from Gilmore.  He did not ask her to identify which 
picture depicted the man she saw in the doughnut shop.  Rather, the prosecutor 
35 
asked Gilmore whether the photos showed the lineup she attended.  He then asked 
her to point out the man she had recognized but declined to identify.  For this 
purpose, it did not matter whether the exhibit displayed defendant prominently.  
The witness testified she had recognized defendant when she saw him in person.  
Her testimony reflected that, at trial, she remained able to identify the same man.  
There is no indication that her trial testimony was influenced by the additional 
photo of defendant mounted on the exhibit. 
 
 
3. 
Limitation of Cross-examination 
 
“ „[A] criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by 
showing that he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-
examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the 
witness, and thereby, “to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors . . . could 
appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.” ‟  
(Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 680, quoting Davis v. Alaska 
(1974) 415 U.S. 308, 318.)  However, not every restriction on a defendant‟s 
desired method of cross-examination is a constitutional violation.  Within the 
confines of the confrontation clause, the trial court retains wide latitude in 
restricting cross-examination that is repetitive, prejudicial, confusing of the issues, 
or of marginal relevance.  [Citations.]  California law is in accord.  [Citation.]  
Thus, unless the defendant can show that the prohibited cross-examination would 
have produced „a significantly different impression of [the witnesses‟] credibility‟ 
(Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 680), the trial court‟s exercise of its discretion 
in this regard does not violate the Sixth Amendment.  [Citation.]”  (People v. Frye 
(1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 946, disapproved on another ground in People v. Doolin, 
supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 421, fn. 22.) 
 
Defendant complains the court improperly restricted his cross-examination 
of Gilmore by sustaining objections to three areas of questioning.  There was no 
error. 
36 
 
Defense counsel began his cross-examination of Gilmore by challenging 
her intentional identification of the wrong person at the live lineup.  Counsel 
asked, without objection, “What if that man was convicted and was put in the gas 
chamber?”  Gilmore responded that she “wasn‟t thinking like that” at the time.  
After further probing, counsel asked whether Gilmore had “put down something 
that wasn‟t true in something as crucial as a capital murder case.”  The court 
sustained the prosecutor‟s objection that the question assumed Gilmore knew the 
proceedings would be prosecuted as a capital case.  This objection was well taken.  
Defendant was not even arraigned on the final charges until November 19, 1993, a 
month after the live lineup.  Gilmore testified she knew someone had been 
murdered, but there is no support for defendant‟s overly broad assertion that it is 
“common knowledge” that convicted murderers are subject to the death penalty in 
California.9  Indeed, if there were such common knowledge, the jurors would have 
held it too, and presumably could have weighed that factor in assessing Gilmore‟s 
credibility.  Defense counsel‟s point, although not properly presented, would 
nonetheless have been made. 
 
Next, defendant challenges rulings sustaining two objections to 
argumentative questions.  In probing Gilmore about her intentional 
misidentification at the live lineup, defense counsel asked how she would have felt 
if she had been the person who was wrongly identified.  The trial court sustained 
an objection to the question as argumentative.  This ruling was proper.  Gilmore‟s 
state of mind about how she would have felt to be misidentified was not relevant 
to any disputed issue in the trial or to her credibility as a witness.  The question 
was also cumulative, because Gilmore was asked many questions about the 
circumstances surrounding the misidentification and her lack of candor in making 
it.  Later, defense counsel questioned Gilmore about the description she gave to 
                                              
9  
Defendant points out that an August 1993 newspaper article stated that 
Lao‟s murderer “could” face the death penalty or life imprisonment without 
parole, but he concedes there is no evidence suggesting Gilmore read the article.  
37 
Officer Nick Pepper at the crime scene.  Counsel read a description and asked if 
Gilmore recalled describing the man in the doughnut shop as clean-shaven.  She 
responded, “No.  He wasn‟t no clean-shaved person [sic].”  Defense counsel 
prefaced his next question with the statement, “Yeah, I know, all these pictures 
you have looked at —,” and the prosecutor interrupted to object.  
 
The trial court properly sustained the objection because counsel‟s statement 
was clearly argumentative.  “An argumentative question is a speech to the jury 
masquerading as a question.  The questioner is not seeking to elicit relevant 
testimony.  Often it is apparent that the questioner does not even expect an 
answer.”  (People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344, 384.)  Counsel was not 
asking a question; he was telling the jury his own explanation for why Gilmore‟s 
description had changed.  The court‟s rulings sustaining objections to 
argumentative questions did not infringe defendant‟s constitutional rights.  
“ „[T]he Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-
examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to 
whatever extent, the defense might wish.‟  [Citation.]”  (Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 
supra, 475 U.S. at p. 679.) 
 
E. 
Testimony of Detective Richard Cohen   
 
Next defendant claims the trial court erred in allowing Detective Richard 
Cohen to testify why he considered defendant to be a suspect in Lao‟s murder. 
 
Detective Cohen was twice called to the witness stand.  He testified first 
about his interview of defendant in connection with the burglary of the St. Frances 
Xavier Cabrini Church.  Defendant told Detective Cohen he had sometimes been 
living near the Southwest Bowl.  Later, when Detective Jacques LaBerge was 
investigating the robbery of Samuel Draper at the Southwest Bowl, Cohen 
remembered that defendant lived near there as “a transient,” and he shared this 
information with LaBerge.  
 
Later in the trial, Detective Cohen was recalled to the stand to describe his 
meeting in June 1993 with LaBerge and Sergeant Lobo.  Cohen testified that he 
38 
saw a poster concerning a murder in Gardena and, based on the photograph and 
other information stated in the poster, Cohen thought he might have a lead on a 
possible suspect.  When the prosecutor asked whether Detective Cohen had 
developed “any sort of suspicions” after looking at the composite picture and 
learning the circumstances of the Gardena murder, defense counsel objected that 
the detective‟s state of mind was not relevant.  He argued that Cohen should not be 
allowed to give an opinion that the composite looked like defendant, or was 
similar to defendant‟s appearance when Cohen interviewed him after the church 
burglary.  The prosecutor explained that he was trying to establish how, despite 
initial delays, the investigation ultimately focused on defendant.  He expected 
Detective Cohen would testify both that the composite resembled defendant and 
that the circumstances of the crimes revealed “the same kind of MO.”  The court 
found that the evidence had probative value to explain how, after a long delay, law 
enforcement officers focused on defendant as a suspect.  The court agreed that 
Cohen‟s opinion as to whether the composite looked like defendant was irrelevant, 
but it allowed evidence showing Cohen‟s memory of defendant was triggered by 
similarities in the modus operandi of the crimes.  After this ruling, Detective 
Cohen testified, without objection, that he started to consider defendant a possible 
suspect in the Gardena murder because the composite “kind of resembled” what 
defendant looked like when Cohen interviewed him and because Cohen knew that 
defendant “had been hanging around the Southwest Bowl and possibly committing 
crimes there.”  
 
Defendant now complains this testimony was inadmissible as lay opinion.  
“A lay witness may testify to an opinion if it is rationally based on the witness‟s 
perception and if it is helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony.  (Evid. 
Code, § 800.)”  (People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 153.)  The challenged 
testimony was based on the detective‟s perceptions and was helpful for the jury to 
understand how Cohen came to suspect defendant was connected to the Gardena 
homicide.  It was important for the prosecution to establish how the investigation 
39 
suddenly came to focus on defendant eight months after the murder, with 
defendant jailed for much of this time for other crimes.  The testimony was not 
unduly prejudicial, and Tomiyasu had already testified about defendant‟s 
resemblance to the composite picture.  The jury was, of course, free to draw its 
own conclusion.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the 
testimony. 
 
F. 
Testimony of Ella Ford   
 
Next, defendant claims the trial court violated his rights to due process, the 
assistance of counsel, and a reliable penalty determination by admitting testimony 
about Ella Ford‟s photographic identification, made just a month before trial, and 
by permitting her to make an in-court identification. 
 
On the afternoon of Lao‟s murder, Officer Nick Pepper interviewed Ella 
Ford at the crime scene.  Ford described seeing a tall, dark-skinned, bearded male, 
wearing a black T-shirt that displayed the continent of Africa.  He was running 
through the parking lot, away from the Donut King.  Ford saw the man‟s face as 
he looked back toward the shop.  She did not mention seeing anything in his 
hands.  
 
On September 27, 1993, defendant requested that a live lineup be 
conducted pursuant to Evans v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 617 (Evans).  
The request did not specifically name Ford but, after listing certain names, called 
for the attendance of “any other witness who observed any suspect associated with 
the 10-24-92 homicide.”  The court granted the request, and several witnesses 
attended the live lineup on October 19, 1993.  When a law enforcement officer 
attempted to bring Ford to the lineup, however, she refused to go.  In her trial 
testimony, Ford explained she did not want to attend the lineup because she was 
afraid of possible retaliation if the person she had seen was affiliated with a gang. 
The police tried to contact her other times in the remainder of 1993 and 1994, but 
she remained reluctant to talk with them.  On January 6, 1995, Sergeant Lobo and 
the prosecutor visited Ford‟s house to interview her again about the homicide.  
40 
During this meeting, Sergeant Lobo showed Ford a lineup of six photographs.  
Before Ford viewed the photographs, Lobo presented her with a standardized form 
explaining that she was not obligated to identify anyone.  Lobo did not indicate 
that Ford should make an identification, nor did he suggest that the person she saw 
in the parking lot was included in the lineup.  Ford chose defendant‟s photograph.  
She wrote on the form that this photograph “ „look[ed] like the person [she] saw 
the day of the incident more so than anyone else in the six-pack file.‟ ”  Ford was 
“90 percent, not 100 percent” certain defendant‟s photograph was that of the 
person she saw.  She was “almost sure.”   
 
Defendant filed a pretrial motion to exclude evidence of this photographic 
identification, and any possible in-court identification by Ford, on the ground that 
Ford had not attended the Evans lineup.  He argued the defense should have been 
notified before the police sought a photographic identification from Ford.  If 
notice had been given, the defense could have requested that another live lineup be 
conducted, or could have been present when Ford viewed the photographs.  As a 
sanction, defense counsel asked the court to suppress evidence of Ford‟s 
identification from the photographic lineup.  He also asked that the court either 
suppress any in-court identification or hold an Evidence Code section 402 hearing 
to determine if Ford could make an identification independent of the photographs.  
Alternately, counsel asked the court to admonish the jury that the defense should 
have been notified before photographs were shown to Ford, and that they should 
consider the People‟s failure to give such notice in deciding the accuracy of the 
identification.  The prosecutor responded that law enforcement officers had made 
several unsuccessful attempts to contact Ford, who only recently agreed to speak 
with them.  He argued that the passage of time, Ford‟s reluctance to cooperate 
with the police, and inconsistencies between her statements were all proper 
subjects for cross-examination but not grounds for excluding the identifications.  
 
The court denied the motion, finding the officers had no obligation to 
contact defense counsel before showing Ford a photographic lineup.  Although 
41 
Ford was arguably included within the scope of the order for an Evans lineup, the 
court concluded that striking her identification would be too harsh a sanction.  It 
agreed, however, to modify the pattern jury instruction concerning eyewitness 
testimony.  As modified, the version of CALJIC No. 2.92 read to the jury stated 
that, among other factors, the jury could consider “[t]he failure of a witness to 
attend a live line-up” in assessing the accuracy of that witness‟s identification.  
Defendant now argues that “under the totality of the circumstances” the admission 
of Ford‟s identification testimony violated his rights to due process, the assistance 
of counsel, and a reliable penalty determination.  There was no constitutional 
violation. 
 
Defendant‟s complaints about the photographic identification lack merit.  
First, as noted, the absence of defense counsel at Sergeant Lobo‟s pretrial meeting 
with Ford is of no constitutional moment because the United States Supreme Court 
has long held that the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee a criminal defendant 
the right to counsel at a photographic lineup.  (United States v. Ash, supra, 413 
U.S. at p. 321.) 
 
Second, despite defendant‟s bare assertions to the contrary, there is no 
evidence that the identification process was so unreliable as to violate due process.  
“In order to determine whether the admission of identification evidence violates a 
defendant‟s right to due process of law, we consider (1) whether the identification 
procedure was unduly suggestive and unnecessary, and, if so, (2) whether the 
identification itself was nevertheless reliable under the totality of the 
circumstances, taking into account such factors as the opportunity of the witness to 
view the suspect at the time of the offense, the witness‟s degree of attention at the 
time of the offense, the accuracy of his or her prior description of the suspect, the 
level of certainty demonstrated at the time of the identification, and the lapse of 
time between the offense and the identification.  [Citations.]”  (People v. 
Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 989.)  If the answer to the first question is 
“no,” because we find that the challenged procedure was not unduly suggestive, 
42 
our inquiry into the due process claim ends.  (People v. Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th 
at p. 412.)  Defendant does not claim the photographic lineup or the circumstances 
of its presentation to Ford were unduly suggestive.  Instead, he focuses on 
discrepancies in Ford‟s statements to police at the crime scene, at the January 1995 
meeting, and at trial, and he argues these inconsistencies demonstrate that Ford‟s 
identification is unreliable.  The accuracy of Ford‟s identification was a question 
for the jury.  Inconsistencies in her descriptions of the man she saw, and in her 
accounts of her activities on the day of the murder, are matters affecting the 
weight of her eyewitness testimony, not its admissibility.  (People v. Williams 
(1973) 9 Cal.3d 24, 37, disapproved on another ground in People v. Cromer 
(2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 901, fn. 3.)  Because defendant has not shown that the 
identification procedures were impermissibly suggestive, his due process claim 
fails.  (People v. DeSantis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1198, 1222.) 
 
Finally, the Constitution does not require exclusion of eyewitness testimony 
as a sanction for a witness‟s failure to attend a lineup.  In Evans, supra, 11 Cal.3d 
at page 625, we held that “due process requires in an appropriate case that an 
accused, upon timely request therefor, be afforded a pretrial lineup in which 
witnesses to the alleged criminal conduct can participate.”  Defendant was given 
his pretrial lineup upon request.  Due process was satisfied.  Although defendant 
did not list Ford among the specific witnesses he wanted to attend the lineup, 
police officers notified her and tried to have her participate.  She refused to go and 
refused to have any contact with law enforcement about the case for almost two 
years.  Ford‟s existence as a witness was known from the crime scene police 
reports.  There is no indication the defense was prevented from contacting her.  
Indeed, there is no indication of any bad faith on the part of the police or the 
prosecution. 
 
Under these circumstances, the trial court had discretion to fashion a 
remedy short of excluding the witness‟s identification altogether.  Addressing a 
similar situation, the Court of Appeal in People v. Fernandez (1990) 219 
43 
Cal.App.3d 1379, 1384-1385, approved of an instruction that told the jury it could 
view “with caution” the testimony of an eyewitness who had failed to attend a live 
lineup.  The trial court fashioned a similar remedy here when it modified CALJIC 
No. 2.92.  This remedy was an appropriate exercise of the court‟s discretion.  The 
court did not err in admitting testimony about Ford‟s in-court and out-of-court 
identifications of defendant. 
 
G. 
Instructional Error Claims 
 
 
1. 
CALJIC Nos. 2.50, 2.50.1, and 2.50.2    
 
The jury heard about defendant‟s involvement in several uncharged petty 
crimes.  These included:  (1) the theft of raffle tickets from Joe Vaouli‟s car; (2) 
the theft of a pie from a church, which led to defendant‟s arrest and interview with 
Detective Cohen; (3) the possession and apparent use of rock cocaine outside the 
Hilltop Motel, which led officers to recognize defendant‟s clothing and gym bag 
from the homicide; and (4) the burglary of an automobile in Gardena nine days 
after Lao‟s murder, which led to defendant‟s arrest and the booking photos later 
shown to witnesses.  
 
Before trial, the prosecutor explained that he wanted to introduce evidence 
of these uncharged crimes to show when defendant was in custody and to trace the 
course of the investigation.  Defense counsel agreed that “all” of this evidence 
should be admitted because defendant‟s appearance and state of mind during this 
period were “relevant and in issue.”  Counsel further stated that he was agreeing to 
the admission of uncharged crimes evidence “for tactical reasons,” explaining, “I 
think the jury needs a complete picture of what Lester Virgil looked like at various 
times, to make a determination of guilt or innocence on the various charges.”  So 
long as no mention was made of defendant‟s custody in a state prison, defense 
counsel stated he had “no opposition to [the prosecutor] bringing out the various 
arrests for the offenses he‟s talking about, even though they are uncharged 
offenses.”  
44 
 
“Evidence that a defendant has committed crimes other than those currently 
charged is not admissible to prove that the defendant is a person of bad character 
or has a criminal disposition; but evidence of uncharged crimes is admissible to 
prove, among other things, the identity of the perpetrator of the charged crimes, 
the existence of a common design or plan, or the intent with which the perpetrator 
acted in the commission of the charged crimes.  [Citation.]  Evidence of uncharged 
crimes is admissible to prove identity, common design or plan, or intent only if the 
charged and uncharged crimes are sufficiently similar to support a rational 
inference of identity, common design or plan, or intent.”  (People v. Kipp (1998) 
18 Cal.4th 349, 369.) 
 
In light of his trial counsel‟s express consent, defendant does not claim the 
admission of uncharged crimes evidence was error in itself.  Instead, he takes issue 
with the court‟s instructions pursuant to CALJIC Nos. 2.50, 2.50.1, and 2.50.2 
regarding the standard of proof required for the uncharged crimes.10  Defense 
                                              
10  
The version of CALJIC 2.50 read to the jury stated:  “Evidence has been 
introduced for the purpose of showing that the defendant committed crimes other 
than that for which he is on trial.  Such evidence, if believed, was not received and 
may not be considered by you to prove that the defendant is a person of bad 
character or that he has a disposition to commit crimes.  Such evidence was 
received and may be considered by you only for the limited purpose of 
determining if it tends to show the identity of the person who committed the 
crime, if any, of which the defendant is accused.  For the limited purpose for 
which you may consider such evidence, you must weigh it in the same manner as 
you do all other evidence in the case.  You are not permitted to consider such 
evidence for any other purpose.” 
 
 
As read to the jury, the companion instructions stated:  “Within the 
meaning of the preceding instruction, such other crime or crimes purportedly 
committed by a defendant must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.  
You must not consider such evidence for any purpose unless you are satisfied that 
the particular defendant committed such other crime or crimes.  The prosecution 
has the burden of proving these facts by a preponderance of the evidence.”  
(CALJIC No. 2.50.1.)  “Preponderance of the evidence means evidence that has 
more convincing force and the greater probability of truth than that opposed to it.  
If the evidence is so evenly balanced that you are unable to find that the evidence 
45 
counsel objected that instruction with CALJIC No. 2.50 was misleading because 
no evidence had been presented that the crimes were committed based on a 
common plan or scheme.  When the court agreed there was no evidence presented 
of a common method or plan connecting the uncharged and charged offenses, 
defense counsel suggested that the instruction be modified so that it advised the 
jury it could use the uncharged misconduct evidence only to prove the identity of 
the person who committed the crimes.11   
In accordance with this suggestion, the trial court instructed the jury, 
pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.50, that evidence of defendant‟s uncharged misconduct 
could be considered “only for the limited purpose of determining if it tends to 
show: [¶] the identity of the person who committed the crime, if any, of which the 
defendant is accused.”  The court also instructed the jury, pursuant to CALJIC No. 
2.50.1, that “such other crime or crimes purportedly committed by a defendant 
must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.  You must not consider such 
evidence for any purpose unless you are satisfied that the particular  defendant 
committed such other crime or crimes. [¶] The prosecution has the burden of 
proving these facts by a preponderance of the evidence.”  Finally, pursuant to 
CALJIC No. 2.50.2, the court defined “preponderance of the evidence.”  
Defendant now complains these instructions were flawed because they 
“failed to convey the jury‟s need to find Mr. Virgil‟s guilt for the uncharged 
crimes beyond a reasonable doubt before those crimes could be used as an 
                                                                                                                                      
 
on either side of an issue preponderates, your finding on that issue must be against 
the party who had the burden of proving it.  You should consider all the evidence 
bearing upon every issue regardless of who produced it.”  (CALJIC No. 2.50.2.)  
11  
We note that, in order to prove identity by reliance on other crimes, the 
similarities between the charged and uncharged offenses must be so unusual and 
distinctive as to be like a signature.  (People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 403.)  
Defendant does not argue here that the offenses were insufficiently similar.  
Indeed, the defense had its own tactical reasons for permitting the admission of the 
uncharged crimes.  Accordingly, we do not address this consideration further. 
46 
inference in establishing his identity as the perpetrator of the charged 
offenses . . . .”  The premise of defendant‟s claim fails because “we have long held 
that „during the guilt trial evidence of other crimes may be proved by a 
preponderance of the evidence . . . .‟  [Citations.]  The „beyond a reasonable 
doubt‟ standard is applicable only to evidence of „other crimes‟ sought to be 
admitted as aggravating evidence at the penalty phase of trial.  [Citation.]”  
(People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 763, italics omitted; see also People v. 
Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 382 [concluding the “preponderance of the 
evidence standard adequately protects defendants”].) 
 
Despite our long adherence to this rule, defendant urges us to reconsider the 
standard of proof set forth in the uncharged conduct instructions because, he 
asserts, this court “has not adequately addressed the conflict between the 
circumstantial evidence instruction [CALJIC No. 2.01],” which requires proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt of each essential fact in the chain of circumstances 
necessary to establish guilt, and CALJIC No. 2.50, which permits consideration of 
uncharged crimes if they are proven by only a preponderance of the evidence.  We 
have explained before, however, that these different standards of proof are 
reconciled by the different purposes for which the evidence is used.  When 
evidence of uncharged misconduct is admitted for the purpose of establishing 
identity or intent, we have explained that the crimes are mere “evidentiary facts.”  
(People v. Medina, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 763.)  The jury cannot consider them at 
all unless they find them proven by a preponderance of the evidence.  “If the jury 
finds by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant committed the other 
crimes, the evidence is clearly relevant and may therefore be considered.  (Evid. 
Code, § 351; see Huddleston v. United States [(1988)] 485 U.S. [681,] 689.)”  
(People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 382.)  If the jury finds the facts 
sufficiently proven for consideration, it must still decide whether the facts are 
sufficient, taken with all the other evidence, to prove the defendant‟s guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  (People v. Medina, at p. 763; see also People v. Foster (2010) 
47 
50 Cal.4th 1301, 1347-1348 [no danger jury would use preponderance of evidence 
standard to decide elemental facts or issues because instructions on the People‟s 
burden and on circumstantial evidence make clear that ultimate facts must be 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.]) 
 
 
2. 
CALJIC No. 2.51  
 
Although he raised no objection below, defendant now complains the court 
prejudicially erred in giving CALJIC No. 2.51.  He contends this instruction, 
combined with the prosecutor‟s closing argument, withdrew from the jury‟s 
consideration an essential element of the crime of robbery and the robbery special 
circumstance allegation.  Defendant‟s failure to object to the instruction below, or 
the prosecutor‟s argument, forfeits the claim on appeal.  (People v. Hillhouse 
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 504; People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 259-260.)  
The claim also fails on the merits. 
 
CALJIC No. 2.51 advises that “[m]otive is not an element of the crime 
charged and need not be shown.”12  We have upheld this instruction as a proper 
statement of the law.  “Motive describes the reason a person chooses to commit a 
crime.  The reason, however, is different from a required mental state such as 
intent or malice.”  (People v. Hillhouse, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 504; see also 
People v. Cash, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 738.) 
 
Defendant contends the prosecutor‟s closing argument conflated motive 
with specific intent.  Based on this argument, defendant asserts, jurors could have 
misunderstood CALJIC No. 2.51 to mean that they did not have to find intent in 
order to convict him of robbery or the robbery special circumstance allegation.  
Having reviewed the prosecutor‟s argument, we are satisfied that no reasonable 
                                              
12  
The complete version of CALJIC No. 2.51 given to defendant‟s jury states:  
“Motive is not an element of the crime charged and need not be shown.  However, 
you may consider motive or lack of motive as a circumstance in this case.  
Presence of motive may tend to establish guilt.  Absence of motive may tend to 
establish innocence.  You will therefore give its presence or absence as the case 
may be the weight to which you find it to be entitled.”  
48 
juror would have confused “motive” with “intent” in the manner defendant 
envisions.  The prosecutor discussed the definition of robbery and explained all 
the required elements in detail, including the requirement that defendant acted 
with the specific intent to permanently deprive the owners of their property.  
Although the prosecutor later explained that the special circumstance of murder 
committed in the course of a robbery meant, essentially, “that the compelling 
motive [for the murder] in this case was robbery,” this discussion was distinct 
from his explanation of the required elements for robbery.  The prosecutor could 
properly argue that defendant‟s motive in murdering Lao was to complete a 
robbery, but nothing in this argument suggested that the jury could convict 
defendant of robbery or robbery-murder without finding he had a specific intent to 
steal.  By merely discussing motive, which was relevant to the robbery charges 
and the robbery-murder special circumstance allegation, the prosecutor did not 
conflate it with intent. 
 
Moreover, considered as a whole, the instructions made clear that the jury 
had to find specific intent in order to convict defendant of robbery or find the 
robbery-murder allegation true.  (CALJIC Nos. 3.31 [concurrence of act and 
specific intent]; 8.21 [first degree felony murder]; 8.83.1 [special circumstances—
sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to prove required mental state]; 9.40 
[robbery].)  In addition to the pattern instructions, the jury was also given two 
special instructions on specific intent requested by the defense.  The first stated, in 
part:  “To convict the defendant of felony murder in the commission of a robbery 
you must find that he had the intent to steal at or before the time of the application 
of the lethal force.”  The second special instruction stated, in part:  “To convict the 
defendant of robbery you must find that he had the specific intent to steal at or 
before the time of the application of force or violence, or the use of fear or 
intimidation.”  Considering these instructions, it is not reasonably likely the jury 
would have believed “motive” to be synonymous with “intent,” or relied on 
49 
CALJIC No. 2.51 to convict defendant of the robbery-related charges without 
finding the requisite mens rea.  (See People v. Cash, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 739.) 
 
 
3. 
Failure to Give CALJIC No. 2.22  
 
The court below did not give CALJIC No. 2.22, regarding how jurors are to 
weigh conflicting testimony.13  Defendant now claims the absence of this 
instruction violated his rights under the state and federal Constitutions to due 
process, a fair and impartial jury, and a reliable penalty determination. 
 
Although instruction with CALJIC No. 2.22 was not requested, we have 
held that the trial court is required to give it sua sponte when conflicting evidence 
has been presented.  (People v. Cleveland (2004) 32 Cal.4th 704, 751; People v. 
Rincon-Pineda (1975) 14 Cal.3d 864, 884-885.)  Defendant presented no evidence 
in the guilt phase; however, the jury heard conflicting testimony from various 
prosecution witnesses about the appearance and identity of Lao‟s murderer.  
Accordingly, as the Attorney General concedes, CALJIC No. 2.22 should have 
been given.  Under the circumstances of this case, however, the absence of this 
instruction was harmless. 
 
The same argument was made in People v. Snead (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 
1088, 1097, disapproved on another ground in People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 
50 Cal.4th 99, 181-182.  In that case, the Court of Appeal concluded the failure to 
give CALJIC No. 2.22 was harmless error because the jury had received sufficient 
guidance from other standard instructions.  (Snead, at p. 1097.)  Here, defendant‟s 
jury received the same instructions the jury received in Snead:  CALJIC No. 2.00, 
                                              
13  
CALJIC No. 2.22 states:  “You are not required to decide any issue of fact 
in accordance with the testimony of a number of witnesses, which does not 
convince you, as against the testimony of a lesser number or other evidence, which 
you find more convincing.  You may not disregard the testimony of the greater 
number of witnesses merely from caprice, whim or prejudice, or from a desire to 
favor one side against the other.  You must not decide an issue by the simple 
process of counting the number of witnesses [who have testified on the opposing 
sides].  The final test is not in the [relative] number of witnesses, but in the 
convincing force of the evidence.” 
50 
“Direct and Circumstantial Evidence — Inferences”; CALJIC No. 2.20, 
“Credibility of Witness”; CALJIC No. 2.21.1, “Discrepancies in Testimony”; 
CALJIC No. 2.21.2, “Witness Willfully False”; CALJIC No. 2.27, “Sufficiency of 
Testimony of One Witness”; and CALJIC No. 2.80, “Expert Testimony.”  (Snead, 
at p. 1097.)  Defendant‟s jury was also instructed with CALJIC No. 2.01, 
“Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence — Generally”; CALJIC No. 2.11, 
“Production of All Available Evidence Not Required”; CALJIC No. 2.13, “Prior 
Consistent or Inconsistent Statements as Evidence”; CALJIC No. 2.81, “Opinion 
Testimony of Lay Witness”; CALJIC No. 2.83, “Resolution of Conflicting Expert 
Testimony”; CALJIC No. 2.91, “Burden of Proving Identity Based Solely on 
Eyewitnesses”; and CALJIC No. 2.92, “Factors to Consider in Proving Identity by 
Eyewitness Testimony.”  Considering the instructions as a whole, we are satisfied 
the jury received ample guidance on how to evaluate conflicting testimony.  (See 
People v. Castillo (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1009, 1016.)  The prosecutor did not suggest 
that the jury should decide defendant‟s guilt by comparing the number of 
witnesses presented by each side, and there is no evidence the absence of CALJIC 
No. 2.22 hampered the jury‟s ability to evaluate the evidence.  Because it is not 
reasonably probable that the jury would have reached a different result had 
CALJIC No. 2.22 been given, the court‟s error in failing to give the instruction 
was harmless.  (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) 
 
H. 
Sufficiency of Evidence   
 
Defendant claims no substantial evidence supports his convictions for the 
robbery and murder of Soy Sung Lao, particularly with regard to his identity as the 
perpetrator of these crimes.  He also urges that insufficient evidence establishes he 
formed an intent to commit robbery before or at the time of the murder. 
 
“A reviewing court faced with such a claim determines „whether, after 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational 
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.‟  (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319, italics omitted; 
51 
see also People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.)  We examine the record to 
determine „whether it shows evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid 
value from which a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt.‟  [Citation.]  Further, „the appellate court presumes in support of 
the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the 
evidence.‟  [Citation.]  This standard applies whether direct or circumstantial 
evidence is involved.  „Although it is the jury‟s duty to acquit a defendant if it 
finds the circumstantial evidence susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one 
of which suggests guilt and the other innocence, it is the jury, not the appellate 
court that must be convinced of the defendant‟s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  
[Citation.]  “ „If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact‟s findings, 
the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be 
reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.‟ ” ‟  
[Citation.]”  (People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 139.) 
 
Substantial direct and circumstantial evidence established both that 
defendant was the person who murdered Lao and that he did so during the course 
of a robbery or attempted robbery.  (See People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 
34, 40-41.)  Sergeant Tiller and Lavette Gilmore saw defendant in the doughnut 
shop shortly before the murder.  Gilmore thought defendant was behaving 
suspiciously because he would not look at her.  Deandre Harrison and Debra 
Tomiyasu saw defendant emerge from the back of the store closely followed by 
Lao, who was screaming and bleeding profusely from many stab wounds.  No one 
else was in the store.  As Harrison and Tomiyasu watched, defendant walked 
straight to the cash register, took the money inside, and quickly left the store.  Ella 
Ford saw defendant running across the parking lot, while someone behind him 
yelled, “he stabbed her.”  Defendant was carrying some object close to his body.  
Although defendant criticizes inconsistencies in these accounts, the jury clearly 
found the eyewitness testimony credible.  We defer to this assessment.  (People v. 
Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.) 
52 
 
Defendant asserts that the prosecution presented no evidence that he formed 
an intent to steal the money in the register before or during the stabbing, and 
therefore the jury‟s true finding on the robbery-murder special circumstance 
allegation was based on mere speculation or conjecture.  We disagree.  The jury 
could have inferred that defendant planned to rob the doughnut shop from 
evidence that he waited at a back table, concealing his face from Gilmore, until the 
store was empty of other patrons.  The cash register was already partially open 
when defendant emerged from the back of the store, walked straight to it, and took 
the cash inside.  From these facts, the jury could infer that defendant planned to 
rob the store and the stabbing occurred after a robbery had been initiated.  
“ „[W]hen one kills another and takes substantial property from the victim, it is 
ordinarily reasonable to presume the killing was for purposes of robbery.‟  
[Citations.]”  (People v. Horning (2004) 34 Cal.4th 871, 903.)  The jury also heard 
evidence that defendant had committed several other property crimes in the 
immediate area, including the robberies of Beatriz Addo and of Samuel Draper, 
during which he threatened to harm the victims with a sharp object.  The jury was 
instructed that it could use evidence of these other crimes to prove intent.  (See 
Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b).)  Moreover, there was no evidence “suggesting, or 
requiring the jury to conclude, that defendant took . . . property merely to obtain a 
reminder or token of the incident [citation], to give a false impression about his 
actual motive for the murder, or in some other way to facilitate or conceal the 
killing [citation].  Nor was there substantial evidence of any motive for the murder 
apart from accomplishing the robbery.”  (People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 
554.)  The jury could reasonably conclude from the evidence that defendant killed 
Lao primarily and perhaps solely to facilitate the robbery. 
 
I. 
Certification of Appellate Record   
 
Defendant raises two claims of error concerning the trial court‟s 
certification of the record on appeal.  First, he claims the court erred in denying his 
request to settle the record with respect to a chalkboard diagram created by a blood 
53 
spatter expert during her testimony.  Second, he claims the court erred in including 
in the settled statement the trial court‟s own recollection of the circumstances 
surrounding the hardship excusal of 60 prospective jurors.  Defendant argues these 
errors deprived him of a complete and accurate record on appeal.  The record 
settling procedures were adequate and did not violate defendant‟s constitutional 
rights. 
 
“The record on appeal in a capital case „includes, but is not limited to, the 
following:  [¶]  (1) The normal and additional record prescribed in the rules 
adopted by the Judicial Council pertaining to an appeal taken by the defendant 
from a judgment of conviction.  [¶]  (2) A copy of any other paper or record on file 
or lodged with the superior or municipal court and a transcript of any other oral 
proceeding reported in the superior or municipal court pertaining to the trial of the 
cause.‟  (Pen. Code, § 190.7, subd. (a)(1), (2).)  „In any case in which a death 
sentence may be imposed, all proceedings conducted in the municipal and superior 
courts, including all conferences and proceedings, whether in open court, in 
conference in the courtroom, or in chambers, shall be conducted on the record 
with a court reporter present.‟  (Id., § 190.9, subd. (a)(1).)”  (Marks v. Superior 
Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 176, 192.)  When gaps occur in the record, rule 8.137 
(former rule 7) of the California Rules of Court provides a mechanism for creating 
a settled statement.  (Marks, at p. 192; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.346 
[providing for the use of settled statement procedures in criminal appeals] & 
8.619(d)(3) [providing for the use of settled statements in capital cases].) 
 
 
1. 
Chalkboard Diagram 
 
On September 26, 2002, defendant‟s appellate counsel filed a request to 
augment, correct, and settle the record on appeal.  Among several other items, 
defendant asked for a settlement of the chalkboard diagram created by Los 
Angeles Sheriff‟s Department Senior Criminalist Elizabeth Devine.  During her 
direct examination, Devine was asked how a criminalist can determine from its 
appearance the direction a blood droplet has traveled.  She requested and was 
54 
provided with a chalkboard, which she used to illustrate her testimony about the 
effect of gravity on blood droplets.  Because the diagram was drawn on a 
blackboard and was not admitted into evidence, it would have to be re-created by 
the witness for the record to be settled.  The prosecutor recalled only that the 
diagram consisted of “basic marks . . . to indicate blood spatter in a directional 
way.”  He suggested that defendant‟s appellate counsel consult with Devine 
because the drawing might have been “a standard demonstration that she does in 
these kinds of cases.”  Defendant‟s appellate counsel was not able to contact 
Devine.  However, Devine‟s former supervisor expressed the belief that Devine 
would not have created her chalkboard diagram spontaneously in court, but would 
have based it on materials that were likely preserved in her case file.   
 
The Attorney General opposed appellate counsel‟s request to settle the 
record with a re-creation of Senior Criminalist Devine‟s chalkboard diagram.  At a 
hearing on November 18, 2002, the trial court also expressed concern about 
allowing defendant‟s attorney to try to re-create the diagram from information in 
Devine‟s files because the files likely contained information not presented to the 
jury.  Counsel was merely guessing that Devine had in fact re-created something 
in her file, and the court itself had no memory of the diagram.  When counsel 
persisted in seeking a court order for access to Devine‟s files, the court refused, 
explaining the search would be futile:  “We are not talking about something that 
the jury was actually given in hand.  It was something drawn, they saw whatever 
was drawn on the board.”  Accordingly, defendant‟s request to settle the record on 
this point was denied.  
 
The trial court did not err in refusing to authorize defendant‟s appellate 
counsel to search an expert‟s files in hopes of finding a document resembling a 
diagram the expert drew on a chalkboard to illustrate and explain her testimony.  
No attempt was made to preserve the chalk drawing, which was by its nature 
ephemeral.  It was not marked, lodged, or admitted into evidence, nor was a 
photograph taken to preserve it.  Neither the attorneys nor the trial court could 
55 
recall exactly what the diagram looked like.  Assuming record settlement 
procedures can be used for demonstrative evidence, the diagram was not a proper 
subject for settlement of the record.14 
 
“The rules authorizing settlement, augmentation, and correction of the 
record on appeal concern documents „file[d] or lodged‟ in the superior court and 
transcripts of „oral proceedings‟ that occurred therein.  [Citations.]  These 
provisions—much like the entire network of rules governing matter properly 
included in the appellate record—are intended to ensure that the record transmitted 
to the reviewing court preserves and conforms to the proceedings actually 
undertaken in the trial court.  [Citations.]  The settlement, augmentation, and 
correction process does not allow parties to create proceedings, make records, or 
litigate issues which they neglected to pursue earlier.”  (People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 
4 Cal.4th 569, 585.)  Defendant‟s trial counsel took no steps to preserve the 
diagram Senior Criminalist Devine spontaneously drew during her testimony.  The 
settlement process does not permit defendant to create anew something that he 
neglected to make part of the record in the first place.  The trial court therefore did 
not abuse its discretion in denying appellate counsel‟s request to search for a 
similar diagram in the expert‟s files. 
 
 
2. 
Record of Hardship Excusals 
 
In an addendum to his original request to settle the record, defendant‟s 
appellate counsel also asked the court to clarify whether the discussion of jurors‟ 
hardship requests was reported or whether the record needed to be settled 
regarding the excusals.  In his first proposed settlement of the record, defendant 
noted that after prospective jurors completed hardship questionnaires, the trial 
court read the names of jurors whose hardship requests had been granted and those 
                                              
14  
We note that the Rules of Court refer to preparation of a settled statement 
when “oral proceedings cannot be transcribed.”  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 
8.346(a).)  We assume but do not hold that the settled statement procedures can be 
used in the case of demonstrative evidence. 
56 
of jurors from whom more information was sought.  Except for jurors who were 
questioned about their requests, the record included no discussion about 61 jurors 
who were excused for hardship based on their questionnaires alone, and the 
prosecutor did not recall how the court handled these hardship excusals.  In order 
to settle the record, defendant‟s appellate counsel requested the trial court‟s 
“assistance in detailing the procedures employed and the reasons for excusing the 
prospective jurors at issue.”   
 
At the November 18, 2002 hearing, defendant‟s appellate counsel asked for 
the court‟s input regarding the hardship excusal of 61 jurors.  Trial counsel had 
told him he believed a hearing had been conducted on the record before these 
jurors were excused.  The trial court stated, “I do have a recollection; and as far as 
the original hardships were concerned, both counsel stipulated that certain jurors 
could be excused; and it was done on the basis of their paid jury leave.”  Although 
the court was reluctant to attempt to recreate a record when neither side had 
objected to excusing the jurors, it agreed with appellate counsel‟s proposal to have 
both trial counsel review the 61 hardship questionnaires and try to recollect the 
reasons for their release.  
 
In his second revised proposed settled statement, appellate counsel reported 
that, although the prosecutor did not recall any details about the hardship excusals, 
defendant‟s trial counsel “recalled that the Court was „pretty liberal‟ in ruling on 
the hardship requests and the Court‟s primary concerns were whether (1) the 
prospective juror would be compensated adequately for jury service, (2) whether 
anyone was ill in the juror‟s family, or (3) whether the juror was a primary 
caretaker for another person.”  Defendant‟s trial counsel also believed a hearing 
had been held with a court reporter on the hardship requests.  
 
At the next court hearing, the trial court added its recollection “that each 
counsel did, indeed, see the questionnaires and . . . stipulated or agreed that these 
jurors would be excused . . . because they couldn‟t be away from work that long.”  
The court recalled that the financial hardship of serving on a long jury trial “was 
57 
the only aspect” of hardship discussed with the 60 prospective jurors who were 
excused at the outset of jury selection.  The court agreed to settle the record on this 
point as set forth in defendant‟s proposed statement.  Defendant‟s appellate 
counsel reminded the court of his request for the court reporter to review her notes 
to look for any reported proceedings concerning the excused jurors.  The court 
responded that the matter had been reviewed and the court reporter had “reported 
everything that was done before her.”   
 
Defendant now objects that the court exceeded its authority in settling the 
record when it reported that both counsel had stipulated to the hardship excusals.  
Defendant complains the court usurped the role of the parties in stating its own 
recollection about the procedure.  We disagree.  Although the trial court‟s duty is 
“ „to settle a proposed statement, not to make one‟ ” (Marks v. Superior Court, 
supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 195, quoting Stevens v. Superior Court (1958) 160 
Cal.App.2d 264, 269), we have observed that record settlement is to be based on 
“ „all available aids, including the judge’s own memory . . . .”  (Marks, at p. 196, 
quoting People v. Gzibowski (1982) 32 Cal.3d 580, 585, fn. 2, italics added.)  In 
this case, neither trial attorney could remember specific reasons why the 60 
prospective jurors were excused for hardship, and defendant‟s appellate counsel 
specifically asked the trial court to explain what had happened.  Defendant‟s first 
proposed settled statement expressly sought “the Court‟s assistance in detailing the 
procedures employed and the reasons for excusing the prospective jurors at issue.”  
At the November 18, 2002 hearing, defendant‟s appellate counsel asked again for 
the court‟s recollection about the hardship dismissals, and the court responded that 
both counsel had stipulated to them.  The court did not exceed its authority by 
describing its memory of the proceedings, at the specific request of counsel, to aid 
counsel in preparing a settled statement.  (See Marks, at p. 196.)  To the extent 
there was any error, it was invited by defendant‟s repeated requests for the court‟s 
input.  (People v. Williams (2008) 43 Cal.4th 584, 629.)  Furthermore, because 
defendant has presented nothing to suggest the court‟s recollection is untrue, any 
58 
error was harmless.  (See People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1170 
[defendant‟s burden to demonstrate prejudice].) 
 
Defendant also challenges the court‟s representation that all reported 
proceedings regarding hardship excusals had been transcribed.  Defendant asked 
the court to contact the court reporter about a possible missing transcript on 
December 12, 2002, and the court stated at the December 16, 2002 hearing that the 
reporter had been contacted and had verified her transcriptions were complete.  
Because only three days had elapsed between his request and the court‟s 
representation at the hearing, defendant speculates that the court had not, in fact, 
contacted the reporter, but was instead basing its representation on a discussion 
with the court‟s capital appeals coordinator.  Defendant did not make this serious 
accusation below, and thus the trial court had no opportunity to respond to it.  We 
will not conclude the trial court was disingenuous based on sheer surmise and at 
this late date, when defendant‟s appellate counsel could have established the 
source of the court‟s information by asking a simple question at the December 16 
hearing.  Defendant‟s trial counsel “believed” a hearing had been conducted, with 
a reporter, for hardship requests, but this memory could have applied to the second 
round of hardship dismissals, during which jurors who were not excused in the 
initial cut were questioned in greater detail about their reasons for seeking to be 
released from service.  These proceedings were transcribed and are included in the 
record on appeal.  
II. 
Penalty Phase Issues 
 
A. 
Stun Belt   
 
The trial court ordered defendant to wear an electronic security belt during 
the penalty phase of trial after he was caught hiding a staple in his mouth while 
being transported to court.  Defendant argues the imposition of this restraint 
violated his rights under the state and federal Constitutions and requires reversal of 
the penalty judgment.  We conclude the order was an appropriate exercise of the 
court‟s discretion. 
59 
 
On the morning of March 9, 1995, defendant was being held with two other 
“K-10” inmates15 in a small waiting room away from the main lockup area.  All 
three had waist chains with their hands shackled to their sides to prevent a full 
range of arm movement away from the body.  As she looked into the room from 
the hallway, Deputy Sheriff Dianna Norris saw defendant‟s hands “playing with” 
another inmate‟s handcuffs.  The two were facing each other, and defendant‟s 
hand moved like he was turning a key.  When he saw the deputy, defendant 
dropped his hands and backed up to the wall.  Deputy Norris noticed a short gray 
object in his hand.  Defendant said he had nothing in his hand, but the deputy saw 
him slip a silver object into his mouth.  When she asked what he had put in his 
mouth, defendant replied, “nothing” and stuck out his tongue.  As he walked 
toward the door, however, Deputy Norris saw defendant lean to the side and spit.  
She went back into the room and retrieved the object, which was a 1.25-inch-long, 
heavy-duty staple.  
 
Deputy Norris and Deputy Sheriff Thomas Harvey testified that the 
handcuffs these inmates were wearing have been successfully “picked” with 
foreign objects several times in the past, and the deputies had seen similar 
makeshift keys taken from other inmates.  It is easier to pick handcuffs worn by 
someone else, rather than your own.  Normally, the inmates would have spent 20 
to 30 minutes alone in the waiting room, and Deputy Norris would have taken 
each one to court separately, using a private elevator.  Norris transported the 
inmates without other deputies present, and she admitted she did not always check 
to make sure their handcuffs were locked.  
 
Before the hearing on this incident, the trial court discussed the possibility 
of imposing a heightened security measure such as shackling, increased bailiff 
personnel, or an electronic stun belt.  When defense counsel expressed concern 
                                              
15  
“K-10” referred to inmates who required “special handling” because they 
were dangerous, needed protection, or needed to be separated from the group for 
some other reason.  
60 
about the potential prejudice from visible shackles, the court observed that the stun 
belt might be the least intrusive measure available.  A bailiff explained how the 
device worked, and a belt was brought into the courtroom for the attorneys to 
examine.  After the hearing, defense counsel did not disagree that a heightened 
security measure would be justified, but he urged the court to use either increased 
courtroom bailiffs or leg shackles, rather than the stun belt.   
 
The trial court found that defendant‟s attempt to help another inmate 
escape, and thereby escape himself, warranted additional security measures.  
Because it concluded leg shackles would more likely be visible to the jury than a 
belt worn under the clothing,16 the court ordered defendant to wear the stun belt.  
Defendant now argues the need for increased security was not sufficiently 
demonstrated and the stun belt was not the least restrictive means of providing that 
security.  We conclude the order was well within the court‟s discretion. 
 
The “court has broad power to maintain courtroom security and orderly 
proceedings.”  (People v. Hayes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1211, 1269.)  On appeal, its 
decisions on these matters are reviewed for abuse of discretion.  (People v. Stevens 
(2009) 47 Cal.4th 625, 633.)  Under California law, “a defendant cannot be 
subjected to physical restraints of any kind in the courtroom while in the jury‟s 
presence, unless there is a showing of a manifest need for such restraints.”  
(People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 290-291.)  Similarly, the federal 
“Constitution forbids the use of visible shackles . . . unless that use is „justified by 
an essential state interest‟ — such as the interest in courtroom security — specific 
to the defendant on trial.”  (Deck v. Missouri (2005) 544 U.S. 622, 624, italics 
omitted.)  These principles also apply to the use of an electronic “stun belt,” even 
if the device is not visible to the jury.  (People v. Mar (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1201, 
1219.)  “In deciding whether restraints are justified, the trial court may „take into 
                                              
16  
Defendant was dressed in jail-issued clothing during the penalty phase.  He 
refused to wear civilian clothing despite his attorney‟s strong advice that he do so.  
61 
account the factors that courts have traditionally relied on in gauging potential 
security problems and the risk of escape at trial.‟  (Deck v. Missouri, at p. 629.)  
These factors include evidence establishing that a defendant poses a safety risk, a 
flight risk, or is likely to disrupt the proceedings or otherwise engage in 
nonconforming behavior.”  (People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 367.)  
Although the court need not hold a formal hearing before imposing restraints, “the 
record must show the court based its determination on facts, not rumor and 
innuendo.”  (People v. Stevens, at p. 633.) 
 
The testimony of Deputy Norris and Deputy Harvey established that 
defendant was a genuine escape risk.  He was seen using a makeshift key to 
unlock another inmate‟s handcuffs.  Defendant lied to Deputy Norris and then 
tried to hide and dispose of the “key.”  It was reasonable for the court to conclude 
from this evidence that defendant had been caught attempting to help another 
inmate escape, and possibly attempting to escape himself.  This conduct was 
sufficient to warrant increased security.  (See, e.g., People v. Gamache, supra, 48 
Cal.4th at pp. 369-370 [defendant found with a homemade handcuff key was a 
flight risk]; People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 95-97 [defendant who 
attempted to escape from holding cell and engaged in violent conduct was 
properly restrained].) 
 
Defendant also complains that the court failed to consider the potential 
physical harm and psychological impact of the stun belt when it rejected 
alternative security measures.  Generally, when physical restraints are called for, a 
trial court should impose “the least obtrusive or restrictive restraint” that will 
ensure effective security.  (People v. Mar, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1226.)  The trial 
court found that the stun belt was the least intrusive security measure available.  
The device was brought into court for examination, and a bailiff explained in 
detail the way it worked, the physical effects of its activation, and the protocol for 
treating someone who had been shocked.  Courtroom deputies had developed 
written guidelines, which counsel were given an opportunity to study, for when the 
62 
belt could be activated.  The court explained that the deputies were bound to stay 
within these guidelines and could be trusted to do so.  
 
In People v. Mar, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pages 1225-1230, we examined the 
potential psychological consequences of wearing a stun belt and the physical 
effects from electric shock in subjects with certain medical conditions.  Because 
our decision was the first to consider use of an electronic stun belt in California 
criminal trials, however, we expressly stated that our discussion was offered to 
provide guidance “in future trials.”  (Id. at p. 1225, italics added; see also id. at 
p. 1230.)  Defendant‟s trial occurred seven years before our decision in Mar.  The 
trial court was not required to foresee and discuss each of the concerns detailed in 
that opinion.  (People v. Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 530, 562; People v. Gamache, 
supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 367, fn. 7.)  Moreover, because defendant did not testify, 
some of the concerns about psychological impacts discussed in Mar are 
inapplicable. 
 
B. 
Exclusion of Defense Exhibits   
 
Defendant complains the exclusion and modification of certain defense 
exhibits deprived him of his constitutional right to have the jury consider all 
relevant mitigating evidence offered in the penalty phase of a capital trial.  We 
find no error. 
 
On direct examination, defense counsel showed Annie Antoine several 
baby pictures of Nigel, the child she had with defendant.  Antoine had sent 
defendant these photographs when he was in jail.  After Antoine‟s testimony, 
defense counsel sought to admit the photographs into evidence.  The prosecutor 
objected that the photos were cumulative and of questionable relevance because 
“[w]e know [defendant] has a child.  We‟ve seen him in court.”  He also objected 
to the writing Antoine had placed on the back of all of the pictures.  Defense 
counsel responded that the purpose of the writing was to show defendant and 
Antoine had communicated about the child, and he argued it would be unfair to 
exclude the photos after the prosecution had been allowed to display photos of the 
63 
victims.  The court agreed to admit some photographs but not “all nine of them,” 
and it expressed concern about the messages written on them.  After further 
discussion, defense counsel chose five photos, and these were admitted into 
evidence.  Defense counsel agreed to “opaque[] out” the writing on some of the 
exhibits but asked that the messages on others remain visible.  One photograph, 
which showed a diapered baby taking a step, was altered to cover up the message 
written on the back, “ „Check me out.  I‟m walking around.‟ ”  Messages on the 
other four photographs were left intact.17 
 
“The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer in a 
capital case not be precluded from considering any relevant mitigating evidence, 
that is, evidence regarding „any aspect of a defendant‟s character or record and any 
of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a 
sentence less than death.‟  [Citations.]  The constitutional mandate contemplates 
the introduction of a broad range of evidence mitigating imposition of the death 
penalty.  [Citations.]  . . .  [¶]  At the same time, however, the United States 
Supreme Court has made clear that the trial court retains the authority to exclude, 
as irrelevant, evidence that has no bearing on the defendant‟s character, prior 
record or the circumstances of the offense.  [Citations.]”  (People v. Frye, supra, 
18 Cal.4th at p. 1015; see also Skipper v. South Carolina (1986) 476 U.S. 1, 4-5; 
Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 604 & fn. 12.) 
 
Defendant complains all of the photographs should have been admitted to 
show that he and Antoine “were in regular and ongoing contact about Nigel,” but 
the photographs themselves do not demonstrate that any contact occurred over an 
                                              
17  
On the back of one photograph of Antoine and young Nigel was the 
message:  “The loves of your life, Wayne!  Annie Antoine-Virgil & your son 
Nigel Phillip Antoine.  About to go shopping & to the park.”  Antoine wrote on 
the back of another photo of the two of them, “To: Wayne, From: Your family, 
Ann & Nigel.  We love you!”  Also admitted were baby photographs of Nigel with 
his age written on the back.  One showing the baby at six months old included a 
comment on the child‟s expression. 
64 
extended period of time.  Although the pictures show Nigel at different ages, 
nothing in the record suggests Antoine sent them to defendant at different times.  
Antoine simply testified that she sent defendant the photos after she learned he 
was in prison.  
 
Evidence that defendant is loved by family members or others is admissible 
to show his good character.  (See People v. Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 456.)  
We need not decide here whether photos of defendant‟s child with notations 
written by someone else were admissible to prove this point.  The trial court, in 
exercising its discretion, allowed their admission.  By reducing the number of 
photographs from nine to five, the trial court did not violate defendant‟s 
constitutional rights to present relevant mitigating evidence to the jury.  Evidence 
Code section 352 permits the court to exclude mitigating evidence offered by the 
defendant if it is cumulative.  (People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 576.)  
Although capital defendants have a constitutional right to present relevant 
mitigating evidence to the jury, “the United States Supreme Court never has 
suggested that this right precludes the state from applying ordinary rules of 
evidence to determine whether such evidence is admissible.”  (People v. Smithey 
(1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 995.)  It was within the trial court‟s discretion to limit the 
number of photographs. 
 
Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in modifying one of the 
photographs to remove a comment intended to represent a statement by the infant 
Nigel.  “[R]elevance as it pertains to mitigation evidence is no different from the 
definition of relevance as the term is understood generally.  [Citation.]  
„ “Relevant mitigating evidence is evidence which tends logically to prove or 
disprove some fact or circumstance which a fact-finder could reasonably deem to 
have mitigating value. . . .” ‟  [Citations.]”  (People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at 
p. 1016.)  The comment attributed to the child was not relevant to any issue in the 
penalty phase of trial, and the court did not err in excluding it. 
65 
 
C. 
Victim Impact Evidence  
 
 
1. 
Murder Victim’s Life History   
 
Defendant contends the court infringed his constitutional rights by 
admitting evidence about details of Lao‟s life and allowing the prosecutor to argue 
that defendant‟s life was comparatively unworthy of sympathy. 
 
At the start of the penalty phase, defense counsel objected to victim impact 
testimony about Lao‟s childhood flight from Cambodia, her education in America, 
and other details that would “paint a live history of the victim.”  He argued that 
under Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808 and People v. Edwards (1991) 54 
Cal.3d 787, only evidence about the direct impact of the murder on the victim‟s 
family was relevant and admissible in a capital trial.  Counsel especially sought to 
avoid a prosecution argument that Lao had escaped the “killing fields” of 
Cambodia only to be murdered “in the killing fields of Gardena.”  The trial court 
disagreed that Lao‟s life history was entirely irrelevant, reasoning that it was 
important for the jury to have information about the victim‟s life to fully 
understand the impact of her loss on her family.  The court also ruled that the 
evidence was not unfairly prejudicial.  
 
Lao‟s sister, Lynn Ngov, was allowed to testify that the siblings left 
Cambodia to escape communism when Lao was 10 years old.  They lived in San 
Diego and then Los Angeles, where Lao attended college.  Lao was scheduled to 
graduate from the University of Southern California in May 1993.  Ngov testified 
that Lao was very close to Ngov‟s two children, and she still felt shocked and 
upset about the murder.   
 
In his closing argument, the prosecutor noted that Lao had fled from a place 
of political oppression and violence and had come to this country to improve her 
life.  She came here without her parents, borrowed money to attend school, and 
was taking advantage of all the opportunities the United States had to offer.  He 
concluded, “in this great land of opportunity, Soy Lao found her killing fields at 
the corner of El Segundo and Van Ness.  [¶]  And if Lester Virgil did something in 
66 
this case besides rob this young girl of her life and 12 dollars, he might just have 
done something wors[e].  He robbed her of her dreams.”  Defendant raised no 
objection to this argument. 
 
In Payne v. Tennessee, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 825, the United States 
Supreme Court held that victim impact evidence is not inadmissible per se because 
it “is simply another form or method of informing the sentencing authority about 
the specific harm caused by the crime in question . . . .”  We have held that 
evidence and argument about the specific harm caused by the defendant, including 
the impact on the family of the victim, is admissible as an aggravating 
circumstance under factor (a) of section 190.3.  (People v. Edwards, supra, 54 
Cal.3d at p. 835.)  Of course, such evidence must conform to established limits on 
emotional evidence and argument.  “ „[T]he jury must face its obligation soberly 
and rationally, and should not be given the impression that emotion may reign 
over reason.  [Citation.]  In each case, therefore, the trial court must strike a 
careful balance between the probative and the prejudicial.  [Citations.]  On the one 
hand, it should allow evidence and argument on emotional though relevant 
subjects that could provide legitimate reasons to sway the jury to show mercy or to 
impose the ultimate sanction.  On the other hand, irrelevant information or 
inflammatory rhetoric that diverts the jury‟s attention from its proper role or 
invites an irrational, purely subjective response should be curtailed.‟  [Citation.]”  
(Id. at p. 836.) 
 
The limited testimony and argument presented about Lao‟s life history 
remained well within these limits on permissible victim impact evidence.  We 
have recognized that the prosecution has some latitude in presenting evidence 
about the victim.  “ „[T]he State has a legitimate interest in counteracting the 
mitigating evidence which the defendant is entitled to put in, by reminding the 
sentencer that just as the murderer should be considered as an individual, so too 
the victim is an individual whose death represents a unique loss to society and in 
particular to his family.‟ ”  (Payne v. Tennessee, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 825, quoting 
67 
Booth v. Maryland (1987) 482 U.S. 496, 517 (dis. opn. by White, J.); see also 
People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 235.)  Ngov‟s description of the siblings‟ 
flight from Cambodia and Lao‟s pursuit of educational goals in America was 
relevant to show her closeness to Lao and, by extension, how Lao‟s murder had 
affected the family.  (See People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 444-445.)  
The testimony was not unduly emotional or inflammatory, and it was relatively 
brief.  The prosecutor‟s argument also stayed within appropriate boundaries and 
did not encourage an irrational or emotional response unrelated to the facts of the 
case.  Lao‟s background and aspirations were mentioned at the end of closing 
argument.  The discussion was brief and was relevant to convey the full impact of 
defendant‟s crime on Lao‟s family and the community.  (Id. at p. 444; People v. 
Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 916.)  The brief testimony and argument mentioning 
pertinent facts about Lao‟s life were not unduly prejudicial and did not violate 
defendant‟s constitutional rights.  
 
 
2. 
Rodriguez’s Victim Impact Testimony  
 
Defendant also argues the court erred in failing to limit victim impact 
evidence to the capital offense against Lao.  He claims his state and federal 
constitutional rights were violated by admission of testimony concerning the 
effects of his assault on Benita Rodriguez. 
 
Initially, we note that defense counsel‟s failure to object to the victim 
impact testimony from Rodriquez forfeits the claim on appeal.  (People v. Clark 
(1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 625-626; see People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 
186.)  In any event, we have repeatedly held that the admission of evidence about 
the impacts of a capital defendant‟s other violent criminal activity does not violate 
the state or federal Constitutions.  (E.g., People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 479; 
People v. Clark, at pp. 628-629; People v. Karis, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 641.)  The 
circumstances of uncharged violent crimes, including the impact on victims of 
those crimes, are made expressly admissible by section 190.3, factor (b).  (People 
v. Bramit (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1221, 1241.) 
68 
 
Defendant acknowledges our prior decisions but urges us to reconsider the 
issue based on opinions from other states.  (People v. Hope (1998) 184 Ill.2d 39, 
49-53 [702 N.E.2d 1282]; Sherman v. State (1998) 114 Nev. 998, 1012-1014 [965 
P.2d 903, 914]; State v. Nesbit (Tenn. 1998) 978 S.W.2d 872, 891, fn. 11.)  We 
recently considered these out-of-state cases and concluded they do not support a 
claim that the admission of victim impact evidence regarding prior crimes violates 
the federal Constitution.  (People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 618.)  Moreover, 
the cases upon which defendant relies “are not binding on this court, which has 
repeatedly held that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the admission of 
testimony by a defendant‟s prior victims concerning the impact of his violent 
crimes against them.  [Citations.]”  (Ibid.)  Because defendant offers no 
compelling reason to depart from our settled views, we conclude the trial court did 
not err in admitting evidence about the effects of defendant‟s assault on 
Rodriguez. 
 
D. 
Instructional Error Claims  
 
 
1. 
CALJIC No. 8.84.1  
 
At the conclusion of the penalty phase, the court gave CALJIC No. 8.84.1, 
which states, in pertinent part:  “You are now being instructed as to all of the law 
that applies to the penalty phase of the trial.  [¶]  You must determine what the 
facts are from the evidence received during the entire trial unless you are 
instructed otherwise.  You must accept and follow the law that I shall state to you.  
Disregard all other instructions given to you in other phases of this trial.”  The 
court also instructed the jury with CALJIC Nos. 8.85, listing factors for the jury‟s 
consideration in determining penalty, CALJIC Nos. 8.86 and 8.87, requiring proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt of a prior conviction or prior criminal activity offered 
in aggravation, and CALJIC No. 8.88, setting forth the concluding instructions for 
the penalty phase.  Contrary to the recommendation in the Use Note to CALJIC 
No. 8.84.1, the court did not reinstruct the jury with applicable evidentiary 
instructions from CALJIC Nos. 1.00 through 3.31, including the instruction 
69 
defining “reasonable doubt” (CALJIC No. 2.90).  Defendant cites these omissions 
as error. 
 
We have held that the failure to reinstruct on evidentiary principles at the 
penalty phase, combined with the reading of CALJIC No. 8.84.1, may constitute 
error.  (People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 535; People v. Carter (2003) 30 
Cal.4th 1166, 1220-1221.)  “[I]f a trial court instructs the jury at the penalty phase 
not to refer to instructions given at the guilt phase, it later must provide the jury 
with those instructions applicable to the evaluation of evidence at the penalty 
phase.  (People v. Moon [(2005)] 37 Cal.4th [1,] 37.)”  (Lewis, at p. 535.)  In 
addition, because the jury was instructed that defendant‟s prior criminal acts had 
to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt before they could be considered in 
aggravation, the court should have given CALJIC No. 2.90 defining “reasonable 
doubt.”  (See People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 489-490.)  However, the 
trial court‟s failure to reinstruct here was harmless because there is no reasonable 
possibility the error affected the verdict (People v. Gonzalez (2006) 38 Cal.4th 
932, 960-961) and it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (Chapman v. 
California (1967) 386 U.S. 18).  (See People v. Wilson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1, 28 
[the state “reasonable possibility” test is essentially the same as the federal 
“beyond a reasonable doubt” test for harmless error].) 
 
Defendant does not argue the jury might have been confused about how to 
consider penalty phase evidence by the absence of any particular evidentiary 
instruction.  Rather, he makes the more general claim that his penalty judgment 
must be reversed because the trial court failed to instruct the jury a second time on 
the presumption of innocence, the definition of reasonable doubt, and the 
prosecution‟s burden of proof.  We have repeatedly rejected the claim that the 
court must instruct on the presumption of innocence at the penalty phase of a 
capital trial.  (People v. Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 262; People v. Benson 
(1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 810.)  Likewise, the absence of a penalty phase instruction 
on the reasonable doubt standard, or any standard of proof regarding aggravating 
70 
and mitigating evidence, does not violate a capital defendant‟s constitutional 
rights.  (People v. Samuels (2005) 36 Cal.4th 96, 137; People v. Vieira (2005) 35 
Cal.4th 264, 301.)  “ „The federal Constitution does not require the jury to find 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecution proved each aggravating factor, 
that the circumstances in aggravation outweigh those in mitigation, or that death is 
the appropriate penalty.‟  [Citation.]  „ “Unlike the guilt determination, „the 
sentencing function is inherently moral and normative, not factual‟ [citation] and, 
hence, not susceptible to a burden-of-proof quantification.” ‟  [Citation.]”  (Vieira, 
at p. 301.)  We have also routinely rejected defendant‟s argument that the jury 
should have been instructed that the prosecution has the burden of persuasion to 
convince the jury that death was the appropriate penalty.  (Ibid.; see also People v. 
Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 498.)  No such instruction was required because 
“the prosecution has no burden of proof that death is the appropriate penalty, or 
that one or more aggravating factors or crimes exist, in order to obtain a judgment 
of death.  [Citations.]”  (People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 589.) 
 
Defendant‟s arguments to the contrary notwithstanding, we have 
consistently found that these conclusions are not altered by the United States 
Supreme Court‟s decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 
(Apprendi), Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584 (Ring), or Blakely v. Washington 
(2004) 542 U.S. 296 (Blakely).  (People v. Ward (2005) 36 Cal.4th 186, 221; 
People v. Samuels, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 137; People v. Morrison (2004) 34 
Cal.4th 698, 730-731; People v. Prieto , supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 262-263.)  In his 
reply brief, defendant now urges us to reconsider these positions in light of the 
high court‟s more recent pronouncements in Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 
U.S. 270 (Cunningham). 
 
Cunningham held that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime 
beyond the relevant statutory maximum, which under California‟s determinate 
sentencing law is the middle term, must be submitted to the jury and found true 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  (Cunningham, supra, 549 U.S. at pp. 288-289, 293.)  
71 
Cunningham‟s holding has no bearing on penalty phase determinations in 
California for the same reasons that the principles announced in Ring and 
Apprendi do not apply:  “ „[U]nder the California death penalty scheme, once the 
defendant has been convicted of first degree murder and one or more special 
circumstances has been found true beyond a reasonable doubt, death is no more 
than the prescribed statutory maximum for the offense; the only alternative is life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole.‟  (People v. Anderson[, supra,] 25 
Cal.4th [at pp.] 589-590, fn. 14.)  Thus, in the penalty phase, the jury merely 
weighs the factors enumerated in section 190.3 and determines „whether a 
defendant eligible for the death penalty should in fact receive that sentence.‟  
(Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 972.)  No single factor therefore 
determines which penalty — death or life without the possibility of parole — is 
appropriate.”  (People v. Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 263.)  Accordingly, the 
high court‟s decision in Cunningham has no apparent application to our state‟s 
capital sentencing scheme.  (People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1297.) 
 
 
2. 
Refusal of Defense Special Instructions  
 
The trial court refused to give three special instructions requested by the 
defense.  Defendant now claims this ruling violated various federal constitutional 
guarantees.  We conclude the ruling was an appropriate exercise of the court‟s 
discretion. 
 
Special Instruction No. 1 advised that the mitigating circumstances 
identified in CALJIC No. 8.85 were merely examples, that jurors could consider 
other mitigating facts related to the case or defendant, that any one mitigating 
factor could be sufficient to reject a death sentence, that mitigating factors need 
not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, that mitigation could be based on “any 
evidence . . . no matter how weak,” and that jurors could rely on “mercy, 
sympathy, and/or sentiment in deciding what weight to give each mitigating 
factor.”  Special Instruction No. 2 was entirely duplicative of Special Instruction 
No. 1.  It stated that jurors could reject the death penalty based on compassion or 
72 
sympathy alone, that mitigating factors need not be proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and that mitigating factors could be found based on “any evidence . . . no 
matter how weak.”   
 
These proposed instructions were largely duplicative of CALJIC No. 8.85, 
which was given.  CALJIC No. 8.85 is both a correct and an adequate explanation 
of how jurors should consider aggravating and mitigating factors.  (People v. 
Butler (2009) 46 Cal.4th 847, 875.)  Accordingly, the court has no obligation to 
“give pinpoint instructions regarding what mitigating evidence the jury may 
consider, or special instructions regarding mercy and compassion.  [Citations.]”  
(People v. Valencia (2008) 43 Cal.4th 268, 309-310; see also People v. Riggs 
(2008) 44 Cal.4th 248, 328-329.)  We have repeatedly held that instructions on the 
burden of proof are unnecessary in the penalty phase of a capital trial (People v. 
Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 417-418), and thus jurors need not be 
instructed that mitigating factors do not have to be proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  (People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 767.)  In addition, “[b]oth 
proposed instructions were argumentative in directing that „[a] juror may find that 
a mitigating circumstance exists if there is any evidence to support it no matter 
how weak the evidence is,‟ without a similar direction as to aggravating evidence.  
(See People v. Carter[, supra,] 30 Cal.4th [at p.] 1225.)”  (People v. Brasure 
(2008) 42 Cal.4th 1037, 1069-1070.) 
 
Special Instruction No. 8 dealt specifically with victim impact evidence.  It 
directed that such evidence could not be considered “to divert [jurors‟] attention 
from [their] proper role of deciding whether defendant should live or die,” and a 
death sentence could not be imposed based on an irrational or emotional response 
to such evidence.  The instruction further stated:  “On the other hand, evidence and 
argument on emotional though[] relevant subjects may provide legitimate reasons 
to sway the jury to show mercy.”  This proposed instruction was clearly 
argumentative because it invited the jury to draw inferences favorable only to one 
side.  (People v. Carter, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 1225.)  It told jurors they could not 
73 
base a decision to impose the death penalty on an emotional response to victim 
impact evidence but also told jurors they could rely on emotional evidence and 
argument “to show mercy” toward defendant.  In contrast, the jury was properly 
instructed by CALJIC No. 8.84.1 that both sides had a right to expect jurors to 
“consider all the evidence, follow the law, exercise [their] discretion 
conscientiously, and reach a just verdict.”  The court did not err in rejecting 
defendant‟s duplicative and argumentative proposed instruction. 
 
E. 
Response to Jury Question about Unanimity  
 
On the second day of penalty phase deliberations, the jury sent a note to the 
court asking, in relevant part:  “What happens if the jury is unable to reach a 
unanimous decision?”  The jury also asked whether the court would decide on a 
sentence and whether a sentence of life imprisonment without parole would be 
given automatically.  Defense counsel requested that the jury be given a verbatim 
reading of section 190.4, subdivision (b), which would instruct them that in the 
event they could not reach a unanimous verdict, the court would dismiss the jury 
and impanel a new jury to try the issue of penalty.  In the alternative, he requested 
an instruction telling the jury it had received all the law and the evidence and was 
not to speculate as to the consequences of their failure to agree.  As a third 
alternative, defense counsel asked the court to give CALJIC No. 17.40.18  The 
prosecutor objected that defendant‟s proposed instructions were inappropriate 
because the jury had not indicated it was deadlocked.  It had merely asked what 
would happen if it did deadlock.  
                                              
18  
CALJIC No. 17.40, which was given in the guilt phase of defendant‟s trial, 
states:  “The People and the defendant are entitled to the individual opinion of 
each juror.  [¶]  Each of you must consider the evidence for the purpose of 
reaching a verdict if you can do so.  Each of you must decide the case for yourself, 
but should do so only after discussing the evidence and instructions with the other 
jurors.  [¶]  Do not hesitate to change an opinion if you are convinced it is wrong.  
However, do not decide any question in a particular way because a majority of the 
jurors, or any of them, favor such a decision.  [¶]  Do not decide any issue in this 
case by chance, such as the drawing of lots or by any other chance determination.”  
74 
 
The trial court observed that almost exactly the same question was 
presented in People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 539, in which the jury asked, 
“ „What would be the action taken by the court in the event that the jury is unable 
to reach a unanimous decision?‟ ”  We approved of the court‟s response, which 
advised the jury not to consider or concern itself with this matter and told jurors to 
“ „make every effort to reach a unanimous decision if at all possible.‟ ”  (Ibid.)  
We further held that the Thomas court did not err by refusing to instruct the jury 
that their inability to reach a verdict would result in a retrial of the penalty phase 
and could not lead to a sentence of less than life without possibility of parole.  
(Ibid.)  Expressly relying on our decision in Thomas, the trial court here responded 
to the question from defendant‟s jury about the consequences of an inability to 
reach a unanimous verdict by instructing them:  “[T]hat subject is not for the jury 
to consider or to concern itself with.  You must make every effort to reach [a] 
unanimous decision if at all possible.”  Defendant now claims the court erred in 
refusing to instruct the jury on the consequences of a deadlock.  He also contends 
the instruction that the jury must reach a unanimous decision if possible was 
coercive under the circumstance.  These claims have no merit. 
 
We have repeatedly held, in cases presenting the same circumstances, that 
“ „[t]he trial court “is not required to „educate the jury on the legal consequences 
of a possible deadlock.‟ ” ‟  [Citations.]”  (People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 
287, 402; see People v. Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1193.)  Informing the 
jury about the possibility of retrial in the event of a deadlock is risky, because it 
has “the potential for unduly confusing and misguiding the jury in their proper role 
and function in the penalty determination process.  Penalty phase juries are 
presently instructed that their proper task is to decide between a sentence of death 
and life without the possibility of parole.  Any further instruction along the lines 
suggested herein could well serve to lessen or diminish that obligation in the 
jurors‟ eyes.  [Citations.]”  (People v. Belmontes (1988) 45 Cal.3d 744, 814, 
disapproved on another ground in People v. Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 421, 
75 
fn. 22.)  As we have emphasized, at the penalty stage, “[t]he proper focus of the 
jury‟s deliberations is which penalty to choose, and not whether to make the 
choice in the first place.”  (People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 746.)  The 
potential for mischief is especially acute when, as here, the jury‟s question comes 
early in their deliberations and there is no indication of an actual, as opposed to 
hypothetical, failure to agree.  “Especially in a case like this — in which it was not 
clear that there actually was any deadlock — an instruction informing the jury of 
the consequence of a deadlock „would have diminished the jurors‟ sense of duty to 
deliberate, and to be open to the ideas of fellow jurors.  The effect of a hung jury is 
irrelevant to the jury’s deliberation of any issue before it.‟  (People v. Rich (1988) 
45 Cal.3d 1036, 1115, italics added.)”  (Hughes, at p. 402.) 
 
For a contrary result, defendant relies on a statement taken out of context 
from our opinion in People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610.  In Wader, absent any 
note from the jury inquiring about the consequences of a failure to achieve 
unanimity, the defendant requested that the court give an instruction stating that 
the jury was not required to reach a verdict and that “ „[t]he possibility of a hung 
jury is an inevitable by-product of the requirement that a verdict must be 
unanimous.‟ ”  (Id. at p. 664.)  We found the trial court properly denied this 
request.  In reaching this conclusion, we said, “there is no duty to instruct a jury 
regarding its possible failure to reach a verdict in the absence of a request by the 
jury for an explanation.”  (Ibid.)  Defendant seizes on this statement as support for 
his argument that when there is a request by the jury for an explanation about the 
consequences of a failure to reach a unanimous verdict, the court has a duty to 
instruct on the point.  However, when viewed in context, the statement in Wader 
refutes, rather than supports, defendant‟s interpretation.  Referring to our 
established case law criticizing instructions that explain the possibility of retrial, 
we stated:  “We have previously rejected the proposition that when a jury asks the 
trial court what will happen if it fails to reach a penalty verdict, the court must 
explain to the jury the consequences of its failure to agree.  (People v. Morris 
76 
(1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 227.)  It follows that there is no duty to instruct a jury 
regarding its possible failure to reach a verdict in the absence of a request by the 
jury for an explanation.”  (Wader, at p. 664.)  In other words, there is no duty to 
instruct when the jury does not ask for an explanation because there is no duty to 
instruct even when the jury does ask.  (See also People v. Waidla, supra, 22 
Cal.4th at pp. 746-747 [although a trial court “may” instruct a deliberating jury on 
the consequences of its inability to reach a unanimous verdict, nothing in the 
federal Constitution requires it to do so].) 
 
Finally, it was not coercive to instruct the jury, in response to the note, 
“You must make every effort to reach [a] unanimous decision if at all possible.”  
Defendant likens this statement to various “dynamite” instructions we have 
disapproved in the past.  (See, e.g., People v. Gainer (1977) 19 Cal.3d 835, 852.)  
The comparison is inapt.  The trial court here simply reminded the jury of its duty 
to deliberate and try to reach a unanimous verdict if possible.  The instruction did 
not introduce extraneous factors into deliberations by admonishing minority jurors 
to reconsider their positions, or by pressuring jurors into reaching a decision 
quickly.  (See Gainer, at pp. 847-852.)19 
 
F. 
Refusal of Juror Misconduct Hearing  
 
Defendant challenges the trial court‟s failure to conduct an evidentiary 
hearing to investigate alleged jury misconduct.  He claims these errors violated 
section 1120 and deprived him of various constitutional rights.  Because there was 
no evidence that any misconduct occurred, we conclude the decision not to hold an 
evidentiary hearing was well within the court‟s discretion. 
 
Defendant‟s complaints concern Juror William M., a first-year law student 
who served as the foreperson during the guilt and penalty phases of trial.  William 
                                              
19  
Defendant also contends the instruction may have had a coercive effect in 
combination with alleged misconduct of the jury foreperson.  Because we have 
rejected defendant‟s claim of jury misconduct (see post, at pp. 76-79), the premise 
of this claim fails.  Nothing in the record supports defendant‟s speculation that the 
jury may have been coerced into returning a death verdict. 
77 
M. had completed one semester of law school when trial started, and he had not 
yet taken any criminal law courses.  During voir dire, William M. said he 
understood he could not consult law books or research death penalty law.  He also 
confirmed that he could follow the court‟s instructions on the law even if they 
conflicted with his legal training.  
 
On the morning of the third day of penalty phase deliberations, defense 
counsel went on record to express concern that William M. was serving as 
foreperson for the penalty phase, when he had previously filled this role in guilt 
phase deliberations.  Counsel was displeased that the jury had chosen a law 
student as foreperson, especially because counsel had seen William M. during a 
recent break “talking to various jurors, huddling with them, and he has had law 
books with him, studying law books during deliberations . . . .”  Counsel believed 
the jury‟s note of the previous day, asking about the consequences of a lack of 
unanimity, was “curiously framed . . . as if [the foreperson] had read the 1977 
[death penalty] law” and was “expressing independent knowledge of the law” to 
other jurors.  He expressed fear that some holdout jurors might be intimidated by 
William M. and not understand that they could communicate directly with the 
court about a deadlock.  The court responded that there was “absolutely no 
evidence” jurors felt coerced or intimidated by the foreperson; however, the court 
was concerned that defense counsel had seen the juror studying a law book.  
Defense counsel clarified that he did not know if it was a criminal law book, and 
he had no independent knowledge that the juror was researching criminal issues or 
communicating any legal knowledge to his fellow jurors.  
 
The court questioned William M. about defense counsel‟s accusations.  The 
juror said that he was still attending classes, but he had not studied or researched 
anything relating to criminal law or procedure.  The book he was reading during 
breaks was a property law textbook.  Nor had William M. talked with other jurors 
about criminal law.  He sent out the previous day‟s jury note “because the group as 
78 
a whole wanted these questions answered.”  Based on these responses, the court 
decided not to inquire further, and the jury resumed its deliberations.  
 
“ „When a trial court is aware of possible juror misconduct, the court “must 
„make whatever inquiry is reasonably necessary‟ ” to resolve the matter.‟  (People 
v. Hayes, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1255, italics omitted.)  Although courts should 
promptly investigate allegations of juror misconduct „to nip the problem in the 
bud‟  (People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 532), they have considerable 
discretion in determining how to conduct the investigation.”  (People v. Prieto, 
supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 274.)  “The decision whether to investigate the possibility 
of juror bias, incompetence, or misconduct — like the ultimate decision to retain 
or discharge a juror — rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.  
[Citation.]  The court does not abuse its discretion simply because it fails to 
investigate any and all new information obtained about a juror during trial.”  
(People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 343.) 
 
Here, the court considered the speculative concerns posed by counsel.  It 
directly questioned William M. and evaluated his responses.  The trial court did 
not abuse its “considerable discretion” in declining to hold a further evidentiary 
hearing.  Not every incident of potential misconduct requires further investigation.  
(People v. Cleveland (2001) 25 Cal.4th 466, 478.)  “[A] hearing is required only 
where the court possesses information which, if proven to be true, would 
constitute „good cause‟ to doubt a juror‟s ability to perform his duties and would 
justify his removal from the case.  [Citations.]”  (People v. Ray, supra, 13 Cal.4th 
at p. 343.)  The parties knew William M. was a first-year law student.  Neither side 
challenged him.  Consistent with his statements during voir dire, William M. 
affirmed that he had not studied or researched criminal law during the trial and had 
not talked with other jurors about these issues.  He was never forbidden to read a 
textbook on property law during court breaks, and defendant did not suggest this 
study of an unrelated area of law was improper.  Nor was any evidence presented 
supporting defense counsel‟s speculation that William M. may have done anything 
79 
improper or intimidated other jurors into believing they could not inform the court 
of a deadlock.  In short, there was nothing to indicate William M. had violated the 
court‟s instructions or committed misconduct of any kind.  Under these 
circumstances, the trial court properly declined to investigate defendant‟s 
unsubstantiated claims further. 
 
G. 
Limitation of Defense Argument  
 
Defendant claims the trial court violated his rights to a fair trial, a fair and 
impartial jury, and a reliable penalty determination by prohibiting defense counsel 
from comparing his case to more egregious murders prosecuted by the Los 
Angeles County District Attorney. 
 
To make the point that the decision to seek the death penalty is politically 
motivated, defense counsel wanted to argue that celebrities are rarely ever charged 
with special circumstances or given the death penalty.  Specifically, he wanted to 
compare defendant‟s case with the prosecutions of O.J. Simpson and the 
Menendez brothers, who escaped death sentences despite the brutality of their 
crimes, and other notorious cases.  Although it had misgivings, the trial court 
initially believed defendant was entitled to make such comparisons because 
section 190.3, factor (k) permits juries to consider any circumstance that might 
mitigate the gravity of the offense.  Later in the day, however, the court announced 
that it was reconsidering this order based on People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th 
408, People v. Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, and People v. Grant (1988) 45 Cal.3d 
829.  The following day, after further discussion, the court ruled that counsel 
would not be permitted to make any argument comparing the penalties sought or 
received in other cases.  Based on this court‟s precedents, the court found that 
penalties in other cases were necessarily irrelevant to the issues before defendant‟s 
jury.  However, it did not preclude defense counsel from arguing that the death 
penalty is imposed arbitrarily and capriciously, so long as he did not discuss the 
outcomes of specific cases. Counsel emphasized this point in his closing 
argument.  He argued that district attorneys‟ charging practices were arbitrary and 
80 
the death penalty was pursued only against “anonymous people, Blacks that kill 
non[-]Blacks, poor people, people that are not celebrities and[,] most[] 
importantly[,] people[] who don‟t have money, who can‟t afford four, five, six 
lawyers.”20  
 
“On numerous occasions, we have upheld a trial court‟s refusal „to allow 
defense counsel to compare the subject crime to other well-known murders‟ 
(People v. Hughes[, supra,] 27 Cal.4th [at p.] 400), or to note the penalty imposed 
in such cases (People v. Sakarias (2000) 22 Cal.4th 596, 640), while allowing 
argument that there „were other murderers worse than he‟ (People v. Benavides[, 
supra,] 35 Cal.4th [at p.] 110).  „[M]eaningful comparisons with other well-
publicized crimes cannot be made solely on the basis of the circumstances of the 
crime . . . without consideration of the other aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances.‟  [Citations.]”  (People v. Farley (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1053, 1130-
1131.)  To be relevant, a comparison to the celebrity prosecutions that did not 
result in imposition of the death penalty would have required a discussion of all 
the facts and circumstances of those other cases.  “We have held that when, as 
here, a factual comparison with other notorious crimes cannot be made without a 
time-consuming inclusion of all of the facts in mitigation and aggravation, the trial 
court can exercise its discretion to control the scope of oral argument by refusing 
to allow defense counsel to compare the subject crime to other murders.  
[Citations.]”  (People v. Benavides, at p. 110.) 
 
In People v. Benavides, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 109-110, the defendant 
wanted to compare his case with the well known atrocities committed by Charles 
Manson, the Boston Strangler, and others whom he would argue were more 
deserving of the death penalty.  We held the court acted within its discretion when 
it prevented the defense “from presenting specific facts about other notorious 
                                              
20  
The jury may well have understood this last statement as a reference to O.J. 
Simpson‟s criminal trial, which took place in Los Angeles shortly before 
defendant‟s trial. 
81 
murder cases where the death penalty was not imposed, but did not preclude him 
from arguing that there were other murderers worse than he.”  (Id. at p. 110.)  
Defendant sought to make essentially the same argument here.  As in Benavides, 
the trial court struck an appropriate balance by allowing defendant to argue that 
the death penalty is arbitrarily and unfairly imposed but prohibiting discussion of 
specific circumstances in other cases.  This ruling was not an abuse of discretion.  
(See also People v. Farley, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 1130-1131 [court properly 
precluded defense counsel from arguing the facts of other cases while still 
allowing him to argue “defendant‟s murders were not „the worst of the worst‟ ”].) 
 
Finally, defendant argues that even if the trial court‟s ruling was proper, 
defense counsel should have been permitted to argue the facts of other cases to 
rebut a reference in the prosecutor‟s closing argument.  In encouraging jurors to 
impose the death penalty as a just punishment for the murder of Soy SungLao, the 
prosecutor mentioned a famous incident in which a New York woman was killed 
near her home while neighbors ignored her cries for help.21  Because defendant 
did not object to this argument, his claim is forfeited on appeal.  In any event, the 
prosecutor‟s fleeting reference to a famous murder did not exceed the boundaries 
of the trial court‟s ruling.  The prosecutor simply mentioned the incident without 
discussing any details of the crime or the murderer‟s prosecution.  The court was 
not obligated to revisit the appropriate limits placed on defense counsel‟s 
argument based on this brief reference to a famous crime. 
 
H. 
Intracase Proportionality  
 
Defendant contends his death sentence is disproportionate to his personal 
culpability in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the federal Constitution and 
California law.  Although we have rejected the argument that intercase 
                                              
21  
The prosecutor argued:  “When Kitty Genovese‟s body was found 20 years 
ago in a dark alley in New York because people didn‟t care, it was because people 
thought that their civic duty comprised only the paying of taxes and the minding of 
their own business.  And when you look at the facts of a case like that, the only 
thing that it cries out for is death, the only thing it cries out for is justice.”  
82 
proportionality review is constitutionally required, “when a defendant requests 
intracase proportionality review, as defendant does here, we review the particular 
facts of the case to determine whether the death sentence is so disproportionate to 
the defendant‟s personal culpability as to violate the California Constitution‟s 
prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment.”  (People v. Wallace (2008) 44 
Cal.4th 1032, 1099.)  “To determine whether a sentence is cruel or unusual as 
applied to a particular defendant, a reviewing court must examine the 
circumstances of the offense, including its motive, the extent of the defendant‟s 
involvement in the crime, the manner in which the crime was committed, and the 
consequences of the defendant‟s acts.  The court must also consider the personal 
characteristics of the defendant, including age, prior criminality, and mental 
capabilities.  [Citation.]” (People v. Hines, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1078.)  “If the 
court concludes that the penalty imposed is „grossly disproportionate to the 
defendant‟s individual culpability‟ [citation], or, stated another way, that the 
punishment „ “ „shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human 
dignity‟ ” ‟ [citation], the court must invalidate the sentence as unconstitutional.”  
(Ibid.) 
 
Defendant‟s death sentence is not grossly disproportionate to his personal 
culpability; it does not “shock[] the conscience and offend[] fundamental notions 
of human dignity.”  (In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 424.)  Defendant, acting 
alone, overpowered and brutally stabbed a young woman 30 times in order to steal 
money from a small shop.  This murder occurred during a series of violent armed 
robberies.  Although some of his earlier crimes were less serious, defendant‟s 
increasing resort to violence could be inferred from the circumstances of the 
crimes against Addo, Lao, and Draper, and from the brutal, disfiguring attack on 
Benita Rodriguez only five days after the murder.  The jury could conclude from 
this evidence that defendant presented a significant, and increasing, danger to 
society.  (See id. at p. 425.)  Defendant also claims his death sentence was 
disproportionate to his culpability because he killed only one person and his 
83 
counsel was not allowed to compare his crime to notorious examples of multiple 
murderers.  However, “intracase proportionality review examines „ “ „whether [a] 
defendant’s death sentence is proportionate to his individual culpability, 
irrespective of the punishment imposed on others.‟  [Citation.]” ‟  [Citations.]  The 
guilt or culpability of codefendants or third parties does not affect that analysis.  
[Citations.]”  (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 441-442.) 
 
I. 
Constitutionality of Death Penalty Scheme  
 
Defendant contends the death penalty statutes, sections 190.2 and 190.3, 
violate the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal 
Constitution, and analogous provisions of the California Constitution, in numerous 
respects.  We have rejected each of these challenges in the past and now reaffirm 
our holdings. 
 
Section 190.2, which sets forth the circumstances in which a death sentence 
may be imposed, is not impermissibly broad on its face or as interpreted by this 
court.  (People v. Verdugo (2010) 50 Cal.4th 263, 304; People v. Farley, supra, 46 
Cal.4th at p. 1133.)  Nor does allowing a jury to find aggravation based on the 
“circumstances of the crime” under section 190.3, factor (a), result in an arbitrary 
and capricious imposition of the death penalty.  (People v. Williams, supra, 43 
Cal.4th at p. 648; People v. Cook (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1334, 1366; see also Tuilaepa 
v. California, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 976 [“The circumstances of the crime are a 
traditional subject for consideration by the sentencer, and an instruction to 
consider the circumstances is neither vague nor otherwise improper under our 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence”].) 
 
The restrictive adjectives “extreme” and “substantial” in section 190.3, 
factors (d) and (g) do not impermissibly limit the jury‟s consideration of 
mitigating factors in violation of the federal Constitution.  (People v. Maury, 
supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 439; People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 276.)  
Further, the trial court had no duty to instruct the jury that certain sentencing 
factors (§ 190.3,factors (d)-(h) & (j)) can only mitigate, and not aggravate, the 
84 
crime.  (People v. Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1430; People v. Brown (2004) 
33 Cal.4th 382, 402.) 
 
Neither the United States Constitution nor the California Constitution 
requires that the jury determine beyond a reasonable doubt “whether aggravating 
factors are true, whether circumstances in aggravation outweigh those in 
mitigation, or whether death is the appropriate penalty.”  (People v. Lomax, supra, 
49 Cal.4th at p. 594; People v. Leonard, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1429; People v. 
Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 589.)  Likewise, nothing in the federal 
Constitution required the jury to make written findings on the aggravating factors 
supporting its death verdict.  (People v. Williams, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 648; 
People v. Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 440; People v. Frierson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 
142, 178-180.)  The Supreme Court‟s decisions in Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466, 
Ring, supra, 536 U.S. 584, and Blakeley, supra, 542 U.S. 296 do not alter these 
conclusions.  (People v. Nelson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 198, 225-226; People v. 
Verdugo, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 304-305.)   Furthermore, nothing in the federal 
Constitution or the high court‟s decisions in Apprendi, Ring, or Blakeley requires 
that the jury return a unanimous verdict on aggravating factors.  (Lomax, at p. 594; 
Manriquez, at p. 590; People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 126.)  Nor are penalty 
phase jury instructions constitutionally deficient for failing to state that mitigating 
factors need not be found unanimously or by any particular standard of proof.  
(People v. Ervine (2009) 47 Cal.4th 745, 870; People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th 
at p. 897.)  Because the decision whether to sentence a defendant to death is 
essentially a normative one, we have held the prosecution bears no burden of 
persuasion in the penalty phase.  (People v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1136-
1137; People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 643.)  We decline defendant‟s 
invitation to revisit this conclusion.  Nor does the federal or state Constitution 
require an instruction explaining that there is no burden of proof in the penalty 
phase.  (People v. Farley, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1133.) 
85 
 
“The failure of California‟s death penalty law to require intercase 
proportionality does not violate the federal Constitution.  (Pulley v. Harris (1984) 
465 U.S. 37, 50-51; People v. Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 916, 970.)”  (People v. 
Verdugo, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 305.)  We decline defendant‟s invitation to 
reexamine our settled law on this point based on “ „evolving standards of 
decency.‟ ”  (Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 561 [125 S.Ct. 1183, 1190].)  
“Nor does the circumstance that intercase proportionality review is conducted in 
noncapital cases cause the death penalty statute to violate defendant‟s right to 
equal protection and due process.”  (People v. Farley, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 
1134.)  Defendant also claims that, even if the absence of certain protections does 
not render California‟s death penalty procedures unconstitutional, the availability 
of some of these protections to noncapital defendants denies equal protection to 
those facing the death penalty.  We have rejected this argument in the past (e.g., 
People v. Cook, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1367; People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 
686, 754) and continue to do so.  (People v. Lomax, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 594.)  
“[C]apital and noncapital defendants are not similarly situated and therefore may 
be treated differently without violating constitutional guarantees of equal 
protection of the laws or due process of law [citations] . . . .”  (People v. 
Manriquez, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 590.) 
 
Finally, this court has repeatedly held that California‟s death penalty 
scheme does not violate the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
or international law, including part III, article 7 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights.  (People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 538-539; 
People v. Butler, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 885.) 
 
J. 
Political Considerations  
 
Defendant asserts that political and economic pressures have biased 
California courts in favor of imposing the death penalty.  He claims this bias has 
led to arbitrary and capricious sentencing in violation of his rights under the Fifth, 
Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 
86 
article I, sections 1, 7, 9, 15, 16, 17, and 24 of the California Constitution.  We 
have previously considered and rejected this claim (People v. Kipp (2001) 26 
Cal.4th 1100, 1139-1141), and defendant does not persuade us to revisit our 
decision.  (See People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 406.) 
 
K. 
International Law  
 
Defendant claims that errors infringing his state and federal constitutional 
rights also amount to violations of international law.  For this reason, he argues the 
death sentence must be set aside.  We have repeatedly rejected this argument.  
(People v. Ward, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 222; People v. Brown, supra, 33 Cal.4th 
at pp. 403-404.)   “International law does not prohibit a sentence of death rendered 
in accordance with state and federal constitutional and statutory requirements.  
[Citations.]”  (People v. Hillhouse, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 511.)  In this case, “we 
need not consider whether a violation of state or federal constitutional law would 
also violate international law, „because defendant has failed to establish the 
premise that his trial involved violations of state and federal constitutional law 
. . . .‟  ([People v. Jenkins (2000)] 22 Cal.4th [900,] 1055.)”  (Hillhouse, at p. 511.) 
 
L. 
Cumulative Error  
 
Defendant argues the cumulative effect of guilt and penalty phase errors 
requires reversal of his death sentence.  Because defendant has not established that 
any prejudicial error occurred at either phase of his trial, this claim fails.  (See 
People v. Butler, supra, 46 Cal.4th 847, 885.) 
87 
 
DISPOSITION 
 
The judgment is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
WE CONCUR:   
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
BIGELOW, J.  * 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
* 
Presiding Justice, Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division 
Eight, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 
California Constitution.
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Virgil 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S047867 
Date Filed: June 30, 2011 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Steven C. Susukawa 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Manuel J. Baglanis, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Meredith L. Fahn for Defendant and 
Appellant. 
 
Bill Lockyer and Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson and Dane R. Gillette, Chief 
Assistant Attorneys General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Sharlene A. Honnaka, 
Erika D. Jackson and Michael C. Keller, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Manuel J. Baglanis 
P.O. Box 700035 
San Jose, CA  95170-0035 
(408) 446-3987 
 
Michael C. Keller 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 897-6973