Title: Joffer v. Crusy's Power Brake & Supply, Inc.
Citation: 156 N.W.2d 189
Docket Number: 10451
State: south-dakota
Issuer: south-dakota Supreme Court
Date: February 19, 1968

156 N.W.2d 189 (1968) Robert JOFFER, Claimant and Appellant, v. CRUSY'S POWER BRAKE &amp; SUPPLY, INC., Employer, and Iowa Mutual Insurance Company, Insurer, Defendants and Respondents. No. 10451. Supreme Court of South Dakota. February 19, 1968. *190 Edwin C. Parliman, Sioux Falls, for claimant and appellant. Gene E. Pruitt, Willy, Pruitt &amp; Matthews, Sioux Falls, for defendants and respondents. BIEGELMEIER, Judge. Claimant employee filed a petition for hearing on his claim for an award under the South Dakota Workmen's Compensation Law. SDC 64. After a hearing, which was adjourned for taking a further deposition, the Industrial Commissioner denied an award. This appeal is from a Judgment of the circuit court affirming the Commissioner's action. Claimant began work the morning of December 20, 1965. Just before quitting time that day he was putting a spring back under a trailer. As he was bending over he testified he felt a sharp pain and cramp in his back. He went home but had difficulty sleeping and on returning the next morning he tried to work but told his foreman he had hurt his back and could not stand it anymore and went home. The Commissioner found as a fact and concluded claimant had failed to prove a permanent-partial disability attributable to the injury sustained December 20, 1965. His written opinion contained pertinent parts of the first (August 1966) deposition of the medical expert. It will be observed the questions, while leading and suggestive of an answer, were answered guardedly by the doctor. They were: The later November deposition included: The Commissioner's opinion (See Campbell v. City of Chamberlain, 78 S.D. 245, 253, 100 N.W.2d 707, 711, for similar references) stated the issues and disposition as: This was not the first time claimant had trouble with his back. In 1966 he was 43 years old and testified "it started when I was just a little kid. I jumped over a fence and I laid a week in bed. I was sick * * couldn't eat or anything". He was then treated by a doctor but had more or less continuous trouble with his back until 1955 at which time he was 32 years old. He related some of his various employers and the clinics and chiropractors consulted for treatments of his back. He quit almost every job he had because of his back until a 1955 operation to remove a disc. From 1956 to 1961 he gave the names of several employers, but worked for so many he was unable to remember all of them. He again consulted a doctor regarding his back in 1961 because of pain resulting from bending over to pick up a case of eggs. One employer let him go after an accident, another "fired" him after one or two days and still another after a caterpillar tractor rolled off the truck he was driving. The court has set forth guide lines in a series of opinions, including Edge v. City of Pierre, 59 S.D. 193, 239 N.W. 191; *192 Riccord v. John Burns Memorial Hospital, S.D., 141 N.W.2d 160; King v. Johnson Bros. Construction Company, S.D., 155 N.W.2d 183; Campbell v. City of Chamberlain, supra. They declare the claimant has the burden of proving all facts essential to compensation and if he fails to meet such burden of proof the Commissioner has the duty to deny compensation. The trial forum for ascertaining facts is the Commissioner and facts so found must be accepted by the reviewing court, unless so palpably erroneous on the record as to be unreasonable; such findings standing substantially upon the same plane as a jury verdict. Claimant's brief calls our attention to the Campbell opinion which states circumstances may justify the trier of fact in disregarding expert testimony, but uncontradicted and undisputed testimony of an expert dealing with a scientific issue should not be arbitrarily disregarded. On this premise he quotes and contends the doctor's answer to the last question asked him at the second deposition compels application of the Campbell opinion and a reversal by this court. That question and answer were: The doctor also testified: The Commissioner could consider the doctor's testimony in its entirety. Oviatt v. Oviatt Dairy, Inc., 80 S.D. 83, 94, 119 N.W.2d 649, 655. He passes on its weight and as the value of the expert's opinion is dependent on the facts upon which it is predicated, it is his province to give it the probative value that foundation supports. Oviatt v. Oviatt Dairy, Inc., supra. Where the findings are adverse to claimant, having the burden of proof, they cannot be disturbed on appeal excepting only where it appears in the record that claimant has established the existence thereof by such clear preponderance of evidence that it was unreasonable for the trier of fact to fail affirmatively to find such facts. Edge v. City of Pierre, 59 S.D. 193, 201, 239 N.W. 191, 194. Much of the doctor's testimony was based on assumed facts as to claimant's ability and willingness to work which, with his history of continued back trouble, accidents, changing of jobs and low earnings was such as to permit a conclusion that before the December 20, 1965 accident claimant had a "physical impairment of ten per cent of the whole man" which the doctor testified he had after the claimed accident. Even in that condition he was entitled to, as the Commissioner found and he was paid, the medical, hospital costs and compensation for the compensable injury suffered December 20, 1965 over the six months period for temporary-total disability. That situation is not in opposition to the Commissioner's decision on the permanent disability issue as he could well have concluded claimant had regained his former condition and denied the award for that reason. The quotations of testimony in the Commissioner's opinion indicate the parts he believed and upon which he rested his decision. The Oviatt opinion recognized the purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Law was to transfer from the worker to the employer, and then to the public, a greater portion of the economic loss due to industrial *193 accidents, that it is remedial in character and should be liberally construed. However, it does not permit the court under the scope of review mentioned to overturn the findings and denial of award on the record here presented. Affirmed. All the Judges concur.