Title: State v. Jordan A. Denk
Citation: 2008 WI 130
Docket Number: 2006AP001744-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: December 30, 2008

2008 WI 130 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2006AP1744-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Jordan A. Denk, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 30, 2008   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 7, 2008   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Pepin   
 
JUDGE: 
Dane F. Morey and James J. Duvall   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs filed and 
oral argument by Lora B. Cerone, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by 
Michael J. Losse, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was J.B. Van Hollen. 
 
 
 
 
2008 WI 130
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2006AP1744-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2004CF31) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Jordan A. Denk, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 30, 2008 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
APPEAL from orders of the circuit court for Pepin County, 
Dane F. Morey, Judge, and James J. Duvall, Judge.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   This case is before the court 
on certification from the court of appeals pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (2005-06).1  The court of appeals certified 
the following question: whether the police may search the 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version unless otherwise indicated. 
The defendant appeals an order of the Circuit Court for 
Pepin County, Dane F. Morey, Judge, denying his motion to 
suppress.  He also appeals an order of the Circuit Court for 
Pepin County, James J. Duvall, Judge, denying his postconviction 
motion. 
No. 
2006AP1744-CR   
 
2 
 
personal belongings of a passenger that are found outside a 
motor vehicle incident to the arrest of the driver based on the 
reasoning in State v. Pallone, 2000 WI 77, 236 Wis. 2d 162, 613 
N.W.2d 568. 
¶2 
The defendant, Jordan A. Denk, asserts that the 
circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence 
uncovered during a warrantless search.  He maintains that the 
State failed to establish that the search fit into the search 
incident to arrest exception or any other established exception 
to the warrant requirement.  In addition, Denk argues that in 
the interest of justice he should be allowed to withdraw his 
plea.  He advances that because his plea was unknowing and 
involuntary, 
the 
circuit 
court 
erred 
by 
denying 
his 
postconviction motion to withdraw his no contest plea for 
possession of methamphetamine. 
¶3 
We determine that the warrantless search here was 
incident to the arrest and was supported by both of the 
historical rationales at the heart of that exception, namely the 
safety of the arresting officer and the need to discover and 
preserve evidence.  Thus, we conclude that based on the 
reasoning in State v. Pallone, under the circumstances of this 
case, the search of the eyeglass case was a permissible search 
incident to the arrest of the driver of the vehicle.   
¶4 
In addition, we determine that because Denk got the 
benefit of his plea bargain, he has failed to show by clear and 
convincing evidence that a manifest injustice would occur if he 
No. 
2006AP1744-CR   
 
3 
 
was not allowed to withdraw his plea.  Accordingly, we affirm 
the orders of the circuit court. 
I. 
 
¶5 
This case centers around the arrest of Jordan A. Denk 
for possession of narcotics and paraphernalia.  After the 
circuit court denied Denk's motion to suppress evidence seized 
in the search, Denk pleaded no contest to felony possession of 
methamphetamine.   
¶6 
On November 14, 2004, Denk was a passenger in a car 
driven by Christopher Pickering.  At approximately 11:01 p.m., 
the car was parked on the shoulder of a county road with the two 
occupants inside.  
¶7 
While alone on routine patrol, Officer Jeff Hahn of 
the Pepin police force noticed the parked vehicle.  He 
approached 
the 
car 
to 
ask 
whether 
the 
occupants 
needed 
assistance.  Pickering partially rolled down his window and 
stated that he had stopped to make a call on his cell phone.  
Officer Hahn returned to his squad car. 
¶8 
At that point, Officer Hahn noticed that the tag on 
the license plate was expired.  He ran a check and realized that 
the plates were registered to a different vehicle.  Officer Hahn 
approached the car for the second time.   
¶9 
After Pickering rolled the window down, Officer Hahn 
detected the strong odor of burning marijuana.  When asked about 
the odor, Pickering stated that he did not smoke marijuana.  
Denk stated that he had not smoked marijuana since he was 
released from a treatment facility earlier in the year.  
No. 
2006AP1744-CR   
 
4 
 
¶10 Officer Hahn asked Pickering if he could search the 
vehicle.  Pickering consented, and Officer Hahn asked both men 
to step out of the vehicle.  He directed Pickering to stand by 
the rear of the vehicle, and Denk stood directly next to the 
closed passenger-side door.  
¶11 Officer Hahn noticed that the pockets of Pickering's 
hooded sweatshirt were "bulging and heavy with some objects."  
He later testified that he was concerned about weapons because 
he "was about to look inside the vehicle and turn [his] back on 
both parties.  And [he] was suspicious as to what [Pickering] 
may have in there that could harm [him]."  Pickering stated that 
he had a Swiss army knife in his front pocket.  Officer Hahn 
asked Pickering if he could pat him down for safety, and 
Pickering became very quiet.  He stated, "I do have a problem 
with that."  He told Officer Hahn, "I don't like to be touched."  
¶12 When Pickering was asked to empty out his own pockets, 
he partially complied, but Officer Hahn felt that Pickering was 
picking and choosing what to produce.  As Officer Hahn was 
illuminating the pocket with his flashlight, he saw a glass pipe 
that he "believed to be drug paraphernalia in the pocket[.]"  
Officer 
Hahn 
again 
asked 
Pickering 
if 
he 
possessed 
any 
narcotics.  He testified that Pickering "became rigid.  He 
clenched his hands and, basically, took a posture that I thought 
he was either going to run or fight."  Finally, Pickering 
admitted that he had some "weed."   
¶13 Officer Hahn placed Pickering in handcuffs, told him 
that he was detained, and removed the remaining items from the 
No. 
2006AP1744-CR   
 
5 
 
sweatshirt pockets.  He found a baggie containing three 
individually-wrapped quantities of marijuana, a glass pipe, a 
small metal cylinder containing marijuana, and a small scale.   
¶14 Officer Hahn then walked to the passenger side of the 
car where Denk stood.  In response to Officer Hahn's question, 
Denk said that he did not possess any narcotics.  Officer Hahn 
noticed a hard black case lying on the ground just underneath 
the passenger door.  Denk stated that it was his eyeglass case.  
Officer Hahn asked Denk to retrieve the case,2 and Denk put it on 
top of the car.   
¶15 Upon opening the case, Officer Hahn found a glass 
methamphetamine pipe and some cleaning tools.  He placed Denk in 
handcuffs and searched his person, finding a baggie containing 
marijuana and a baggie containing a white, powdery residue which 
Denk later identified as methamphetamine.3   
¶16 Officer Hahn placed both Pickering and Denk in the 
back of his squad car and informed them that they were under 
arrest.  He proceeded to conduct a more thorough search of 
Denk's coat and found a silver pipe and a glass pipe, which he 
believed were used for smoking narcotics.   
                                                 
2 This fact is taken from the defendant's statement of the 
facts.  It is not clear from the record whether Officer Hahn 
asked Denk to place the case on the car, or whether Denk did so 
of his own initiative.   
3 It is not clear from the record whether the baggie 
containing methamphetamine was found in the eyeglass case or on 
Denk's person.   
No. 
2006AP1744-CR   
 
6 
 
¶17 Two days later, a criminal complaint was filed which 
charged Denk with four counts: (1) Class I felony possession of 
methamphetamine; (2) Class I felony possession of THC with 
intent to deliver; (3) misdemeanor possession of marijuana; and 
(4) misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia.  Officer 
Hahn's police report from the incident was attached to the 
complaint.   
¶18 Officer Hahn was the only witness at the preliminary 
hearing held on January 25, 2005.  He testified to the facts 
that were contained in his police report.  The circuit court 
found that "it's probable that one or more felonies have been 
committed and [Denk] probably committed it."  
¶19 On January 27, the district attorney filed the 
information, which modified the felony charges.  This time, Denk 
was charged with Class I felony possession of methamphetamine 
and an added charge, Class H felony possession of drug 
paraphernalia.  The added charge stated that Denk "did knowingly 
possess with primary intent to use, Methamphetamine pipe to 
convert Methamphetamine, contrary to sec. 961.575(3) Wis. 
Stats."  
¶20 Denk filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized 
during the search.  At the motion hearing, Officer Hahn again 
was the only witness and he largely reiterated his testimony 
from the preliminary hearing.  The court denied the motion and 
determined that: (1) Officer Hahn did not stop the vehicle 
because it was already stopped; (2) the car had the wrong 
license plate, giving Officer Hahn the authority to arrest the 
No. 
2006AP1744-CR   
 
7 
 
driver for violation of traffic laws; (3) Officer Hahn had the 
authority to search incident to arrest; (4) there was consent to 
search the vehicle; and (5) there was consent to search Denk's 
person.4  
¶21 Denk accepted the district attorney's offer of a plea 
agreement.  The offer required Denk to plead guilty or no 
contest to felony possession of methamphetamine.  In exchange, 
the State dismissed the felony methamphetamine paraphernalia 
charge and the misdemeanor charges for possession of marijuana 
and marijuana-related paraphernalia.  The State recommended that 
he serve six months in the county jail as a condition of 
probation.   
¶22 After determining, among other things, that Denk's 
plea was knowing and voluntary and that Denk was satisfied by 
his attorney's services, the court accepted Denk's no contest 
plea.  The court later withheld sentence and placed Denk on 
probation with five months in county jail as a condition of 
probation.   
¶23 On April 27, 2005, Denk filed a postconviction motion 
to withdraw his plea.  He stated that there was no factual basis 
for charging him with one felony count of possession of 
                                                 
4 It is unclear what the circuit court meant by this.  While 
Pickering could consent to a search of the vehicle, he could not 
consent to a search of his passenger.  See State v. Matejka, 
2001 WI 5, 241 Wis. 2d 52, 621 N.W.2d 891 (driver's consent to 
search of a car extended to passenger items in the car, but not 
to passengers).  Further, the record does not support a finding 
that Denk consented to the search.  Merely placing a container 
in view of an officer does not constitute consent to search it.  
No. 
2006AP1744-CR   
 
8 
 
methamphetamine paraphernalia under Wis. Stat. § 961.573(3).  He 
argued that he could not have been convicted of the charge, and 
thus, the district attorney's offer to drop the charge provided 
an illusory benefit.  As a result, he contended, the bargain was 
incapable of fulfillment and his plea was unknowing and 
involuntary.   
¶24 At the motion hearing, Denk's appellate counsel 
advanced that his methamphetamine pipe was intended for personal 
use.  She argued that Wis. Stat. § 961.573(3) applied to 
paraphernalia related to the manufacture of methamphetamine, and 
that the legislature did not intend for possession of a pipe for 
personal use to be a felony.  She asserted that Denk's pipe did 
not "convert" methamphetamine, as he was charged under the 
statute, and that the court should decide that there was no 
factual basis for the charge as a matter of law.   
¶25 Denk's attorney did not present any testimony or ask 
for an evidentiary hearing regarding the use of the pipe in 
question.  In fact, she did not present any evidence at all, 
aside from a letter from Denk's trial attorney outlining the 
terms of the plea agreement.  Further, she specifically stated 
that Denk was not contending that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to ask the court to dismiss the 
purportedly unfounded charge. 
¶26 The court denied Denk's motion, concluding that the 
State had fulfilled its promise to dismiss the felony.  The 
court noted that while it is likely that the State would not 
prevail on the paraphernalia charge, the State "had the right to 
No. 
2006AP1744-CR   
 
9 
 
try it and to argue a different purpose for the pipe other than 
simply ingesting" methamphetamine.  Further, the court stated: 
And that's assuming, for the sake of the argument, 
that a pipe for ingesting does not meet conversion.  
For example, if the pipe was used to convert the 
methamphetamine from one form into another form so 
that it could be used.  I mean that could have been 
the State's theory. 
The court concluded, "Whether the State could have proven that 
[the pipe was used to convert methamphetamine] at trial is 
something I can't decide.  I can't find that they cannot have 
done so."   
¶27 Based on the lack of evidence, the court stated, 
"Well, see, we're all speculating.  And that's the problem."  
Further, the court concluded, "[U]ntil we had some sort of an 
evidentiary hearing on that, I don't think I can make that 
finding.  Because what you're asking me to do is make a ruling, 
that, 
under 
these 
facts, 
that 
could 
not 
constitute 
convert[ion.]"  The court denied the postconviction motion.   
¶28 Denk appealed both the denial of the suppression 
motion and the determination of his postconviction motion.  The 
court of appeals certified the question to this court under Wis. 
Stat. § 809.61, and we accepted the certification. 
II. 
 
¶29 When we accept certification from the court of 
appeals, we acquire jurisdiction of the entire appeal.  We thus 
consider all issues raised before the court of appeals.  See 
Wis. Stat. §§ 808.05(2) and (Rule) 809.61; State v. Stoehr, 134 
Wis. 2d 66, 70, 396 N.W.2d 177 (1986).  This case presents two 
No. 
2006AP1744-CR   
 
10 
 
separate questions of constitutional fact, which we address in 
turn. 
¶30 The legality of a warrantless search is a question of 
constitutional fact.  State v. Sanders, 2008 WI 85, ¶25, __ 
Wis. 2d __, 752 N.W.2d 713.  When reviewing an order that denied 
a motion to suppress evidence uncovered during a warrantless 
search, this court will uphold the circuit court's findings of 
historical 
or 
evidentiary 
fact 
unless 
they 
are 
clearly 
erroneous. 
 
Id. 
 
However, 
we 
apply 
the 
principles 
of 
constitutional 
law 
to 
those 
facts 
independent 
of, 
but 
benefitting from, the analysis of the circuit court.  Id.  
¶31 Whether a plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered 
is also a question of constitutional fact.  State v. Dawson, 
2004 WI App 173, ¶7, 276 Wis. 2d 418, 688 N.W.2d 12.  A 
defendant is entitled to withdraw a no contest plea after being 
sentenced upon a showing of manifest injustice by clear and 
convincing evidence.  State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 311, 
548 N.W.2d 50 (1996).   
III. 
¶32 The court of appeals certified the following question:  
Whether the police may search the personal belongings of a 
passenger that are found outside a motor vehicle incident to the 
arrest of the driver based on the reasoning of State v. Pallone, 
2000 WI 77, 236 Wis. 2d 162, 613 N.W.2d 568.5  
                                                 
5 The court of appeals' certification also included the 
following: 
No. 
2006AP1744-CR   
 
11 
 
¶33 We note at the outset that Officer Hahn testified he 
did not place Pickering under arrest until after he had 
performed searches of the eyeglass case and Denk's clothing.  
This fact does not alter our analysis.  In State v. Sykes, 2005 
WI 48, ¶15, 279 Wis. 2d 742, 695 N.W.2d 277, we agreed with the 
United States Supreme Court that "where a 'formal arrest 
followed quickly on the heels of the challenged search of 
petitioner's person, we do not believe it particularly important 
that the search preceded the arrest rather than vice versa.'"  
(Quoting Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111 (1980)).  We 
concluded that a warrantless search "may be incident to a 
subsequent arrest if the officers have probable cause to arrest 
before the search."  Id. (internal quotations omitted).  
¶34 Here, there is no doubt that Officer Hahn had probable 
cause to arrest Pickering for possession of narcotics and 
paraphernalia prior to any searches of Denk's possessions.  With 
                                                                                                                                                             
[W]hat inquiry should be made when a passenger's 
personal belongings are found outside a motor vehicle?  
Must the circuit court make a factual finding as to 
how the passenger's property ended up outside the 
vehicle?  May the police officer draw an inference 
that Denk tossed the case from the car or that it fell 
out of the car, and was thus subject to search?  
Should the police officer draw an inference that the 
case fell out of Denk's pocket, and thus was not 
subject to search?  Because the State carries the 
burden, does the State's failure to show how the 
eyeglass case got out of the car require an inference 
that it was on Denk's person and then fell to the 
ground, thus resulting in suppression of the evidence? 
These questions are tangential to our inquiry, as discussed 
below in paragraphs 50-52.  
No. 
2006AP1744-CR   
 
12 
 
this in mind, we proceed to a discussion of the search incident 
to 
arrest 
exception 
to 
the 
warrant 
requirement 
and 
the 
application here of State v. Pallone. 
¶35 The Wisconsin Constitution6 and the United States 
Constitution7 both guarantee the right of persons to be secure 
from unreasonable searches and seizures.  This court has 
generally 
interpreted 
the 
protections 
against 
unreasonable 
search 
and 
seizure 
afforded 
by 
the 
state 
constitution 
coextensively with the protections afforded by the federal 
constitution.8  State v. Post, 2007 WI 60, ¶10 n.2, 301 
                                                 
6 Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects 
against 
unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched and the persons or things to 
be seized. 
7 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants 
shall 
issue, 
but 
upon 
probable 
cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
8 We have stated, however, that our state constitution may 
provide greater protections than the federal constitution.  
State v. Post, 2007 WI 60, ¶10 n.2, 301 Wis. 2d 1, 733 
N.W.2d 634;  State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98, ¶63, n.30, n.31, 245 
Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625.   
No. 
2006AP1744-CR   
 
13 
 
Wis. 2d 1, 733 N.W.2d 634; State v. Secrist, 224 Wis. 2d 201, 
208-09, 589 N.W.2d 387 (1999). 
¶36 Warrantless 
searches 
are 
presumed 
to 
be 
unconstitutional. 
 
Sanders, 
__ 
Wis. 2d __, 
¶27. 
 
Our 
jurisprudence 
has 
established 
several 
exceptions 
to 
this 
constitutional rule, based on a balance between the intrusion on 
the individual's Fourth Amendment interests and the government's 
promotion of its legitimate interests.  State v. Murdock, 155 
Wis. 2d 217, 227, 455 N.W.2d 618 (1990).  The State bears the 
burden to prove that a warrantless search falls under one of the 
established exceptions.  Sanders, __ Wis. 2d __, ¶27; Pallone, 
236 Wis. 2d 162, ¶29. 
¶37 Here, we are presented with yet another factual 
scenario involving a warrantless search.  The State advances 
several exceptions and argues that the search of Denk's eyeglass 
case fits under each one.  Because we decide this case on search 
incident to arrest, we need not address the State's remaining 
proffered exceptions.  We focus our inquiry on the certified 
question——whether under the circumstances here this was a valid 
search incident to Pickering's arrest.  
¶38 We discuss first the historical underpinnings of the 
search incident to arrest exception to determine whether this 
particular factual situation gives rise to a proper search 
incident to Pickering's arrest.  We then determine whether the 
reasoning in State v. Pallone, 236 Wis. 2d 162, applies to the 
facts of this case.   
No. 
2006AP1744-CR   
 
14 
 
¶39 During Prohibition, court decisions began to give 
police officers broad authority to conduct warrantless searches 
incident to lawful arrests.  See 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure; A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 7.1(a) (4th ed. 
2004); see also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 755-60 
(1969) (recounting the history of the search incident to arrest 
exception).  Often, police were permitted to search all areas 
considered to be in the possession or under the control of the 
arrestee.  LaFave, supra, § 7.1(a).  These warrantless searches 
could encompass entire homes and offices, including attics, 
desks, safes, file cabinets, and other personal effects.  Id.; 
see also United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 61 (1950) 
(granting police the right "to search the place where the arrest 
is made in order to find and seize things connected with the 
crime"), overruled by Chimel, 395 U.S. 752. 
¶40 This seemingly limitless authority was reigned in by 
the seminal case, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752.  Under 
Chimel, 
arresting 
officers 
are 
permitted 
to 
conduct 
a 
contemporaneous, limited search of both the arrestee's person 
and the area immediately surrounding the arrestee at the time of 
the arrest.  Id. at 762-63.  That is, under Chimel, officers are 
permitted to search any area close enough that the arrestee 
might reach a weapon or evidentiary item.  Id. at 763.   
¶41 The Supreme Court clarified that there were only two 
permissible justifications for warrantless searches incident to 
arrest.  First, Chimel permitted an officer to search for and 
remove any weapons in order to protect the officer's safety and 
No. 
2006AP1744-CR   
 
15 
 
to effectuate the arrest.  Id. at 762-63.  Second, Chimel 
permitted an officer to search for and seize evidence in order 
to prevent its concealment or destruction.  Id. at 763.  This 
court has adopted Chimel's dual justifications for search 
incident to arrest.  State v. Mordeszewski, 68 Wis. 2d 649, 658, 
229 N.W.2d 642 (1975).   
¶42 Since 
Chimel, however, courts have struggled to 
delineate the proper bounds of searches incident to arrest.  
Myron Moskovitz, A Rule in Search of a Reason, 2002 Wis. L. Rev. 
657, 681-96.  State and federal cases have chipped away at its 
original rationale.  See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 
(1981); State v. Murdock, 155 Wis. 2d 217, 455 N.W.2d 618 
(1990); State v. Fry, 131 Wis. 2d 153, 388 N.W.2d 565 (1986).  
These and similar cases prompted Justice Scalia to note that our 
jurisprudence seems to assume a "mythical arrestee possessed of 
the skill of Houdini and the strength of Hercules."  Thornton v. 
United States, 541 U.S. 615, 625-26 (Scalia, J. dissenting) 
(internal quotations omitted).  
¶43 Even though searches incident to arrest have been 
expanded beyond the restrictive contours of Chimel, our case law 
affirms that there is a limit.  Our most recent pronouncement 
regarding searches incident to arrest was in Sanders, __ 
Wis. 2d __.  In that case, we reaffirmed that when the 
justifications to search outlined in Chimel are no longer 
present, a warrantless search is unconstitutional.  We will not 
permit searches incident to arrest after the defendant has been 
No. 
2006AP1744-CR   
 
16 
 
handcuffed, placed in a squad car, and removed from the scene.  
Id., ¶52.  
¶44 In Sanders, the defendant was arrested in his home. 
Id., ¶¶13-14.  After the defendant had been escorted from the 
premises, an officer conducted a search of his bedroom.  Id., 
¶15.  During this search, the officer opened a container located 
under the defendant's bed and found contraband.  Id., ¶16.  We 
concluded that "[t]he purposes of the search incident to arrest 
[protecting the safety of the officers and preventing the 
destruction or concealment of evidence] were achieved by 
removing the defendant from his home."  Id., ¶56.  There was 
simply no justification for opening the container without first 
securing a warrant. 
¶45 Clearly, courts have struggled to determine the degree 
to which they can and should inquire about the reasonableness of 
the State's assertion that a search is justified based on 
officer safety and the preservation of evidence.9  While it is 
true that the State has occasionally imparted Houdini-like 
qualities on arrestees in order to fit questionable searches 
within the search incident to arrest exception, this is not such 
a case.  Here, the situation could reasonably have presented an 
actual danger——both to Officer Hahn and to the integrity of any 
yet-to-be-discovered evidence.  Under these facts, the situation 
                                                 
9 The United States Supreme Court is currently considering 
whether the State must prove that there was an actual threat to 
officer safety in order to justify a warrantless search incident 
to arrest.  See State v. Gant, 162 P. 3d 640 (Ariz. 2007), cert. 
accepted, __ U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 1443 (2008).  
No. 
2006AP1744-CR   
 
17 
 
implicates 
both 
of 
Chimel's 
original 
justifications 
for 
permitting a search incident to arrest.   
¶46 The United States Supreme Court has noted that "[t]he 
danger to the police officer [making a custodial arrest] flows 
from the fact of the arrest, and its attendant proximity, stress 
and uncertainty[.]"  United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 
234 n.5 (1973).  Moreover, "[s]ince fruits, instruments or other 
evidence of crime concealed on the person of the arrestee may be 
easily disposed of or destroyed, the arresting officer will 
often be justified in searching for such evidence without 
delay."  United States v. Robinson, 447 F.2d 1215, 1227 (D.C. 
Cir. 1971). 
¶47 In State v. Pallone, we determined that under some 
situations, an officer may conduct a warrantless search of 
passenger belongings even when the officer does not have 
probable cause to arrest the passenger.  236 Wis. 2d 162, ¶3.  
We stated: 
An occupant, no less than an arrestee, can pose a 
danger to officer safety, and a passenger, no less 
than an arrestee, can seize weapons or objects to 
assault an officer or effect an escape. 
Id., ¶47 (internal citations omitted). 
¶48 In that case, Pallone was a passenger in a truck.   
After the driver of the truck had been placed under arrest for 
possessing an open intoxicant, the officer approached the truck 
again.  Id., ¶9.  At that point, the officer testified, Pallone 
began to exhibit nervous and menacing behavior.  Pallone 
followed the officer by walking parallel to him on the opposite 
No. 
2006AP1744-CR   
 
18 
 
side of the truck.  Id.  Appearing nervous, Pallone put his 
hands on the duffel bag resting on the seat, and he commented 
that he wished to remove it from the truck.  Id., ¶10.  The 
officer later testified that Pallone's behavior made him suspect 
that the duffel bag contained something he "wasn't supposed to 
know about [] or see."  Id.   
¶49 Under those circumstances, we determined that "the 
danger to [the arresting officer] flowed from the proximity and 
uncertainty Pallone posed once [the driver] was under arrest."  
Id., ¶48.  Furthermore, it was not unlikely that evidence of the 
driver's crime could be concealed in Pallone's bag.  Id., ¶56.  
We upheld the search as a proper search incident to the driver's 
arrest, stating:  
Although Pallone himself was not under arrest, the 
search incident to arrest exception applies in this 
case, 
unlike 
in 
[other 
factually 
distinguishable 
cases], because the circumstances here gave rise to 
both of the two historical rationales at the heart of 
the exception, namely the safety of the arresting 
officer 
and 
the 
need 
to 
discover 
and 
preserve 
evidence. 
Id., ¶53.  We declined to "provide vehicle occupants with the 
incentive to sabotage an otherwise legal search by concealing 
weapons or evidence in areas that remain within an occupant's 
easy reach."  Id., ¶56.  
¶50 Denk urges the court to refrain from applying the 
rationale of Pallone to permit unwarranted searches of the 
personal belongings of an unarrested passenger that are not 
located within the passenger compartment.  He concedes that, had 
No. 
2006AP1744-CR   
 
19 
 
the case been loose in the passenger compartment of the car, 
Pallone would have authorized its search.  See id, ¶55.  
Further, he correctly notes that if the eyeglass case had been 
on his person instead of on the ground, it could not have been 
searched.  See United States v. De Ri, 332 U.S. 581, 586-87 
(1948).  He argues that the constitutionality of the search 
cannot be determined unless the original location of the 
eyeglass case is known. 
¶51 In this case, it is not known how the eyeglass case 
came to be on the ground, just underneath the passenger door.  
Plausibly, the case could have fallen from Denk's pocket when he 
exited the vehicle.  An equally plausible theory is that it fell 
out of the passenger compartment of the car.  A third 
possibility is that Denk could have intentionally placed the 
case on the ground.  Denk asserts that because it is the State's 
burden to prove that a warrantless search fits within an 
exception to the warrant requirement, the State must prove the 
original location of the eyeglass case.  Only then, he contends, 
can it be determined whether the search of the case was 
permissible as a search incident to Pickering's arrest.   
¶52 Determining the constitutionality of a warrantless 
search is a fact-intensive inquiry, and resolution of these 
questions has always turned on the specific facts of the case.  
See State v. Elam, 68 Wis. 2d 614, 621, 229 N.W.2d 664 (1975).  
The origin of the eyeglass case is not material to our analysis.  
Knowing the origin would not assist us in determining whether 
"the circumstances here gave rise to both of the two historical 
No. 
2006AP1744-CR   
 
20 
 
rationales at the heart of [Chimel], namely the safety of the 
arresting officer and the need to discover and preserve 
evidence."  See Pallone, 236 Wis. 2d 162, ¶53.  Instead, the 
relevant fact is the location of the case at the time when 
Officer Hahn first encountered it.  We must determine whether, 
under these facts and given that the case was on the ground just 
underneath the passenger door, Officer Hahn was permitted to 
search it incident to Pickering's arrest.    
¶53 Here, Officer Hahn was a lone officer involved in a 
late night custodial arrest involving two men.  When he 
approached the car, he was able to smell the strong odor of 
burning marijuana.  From that, he could reasonably infer that at 
least one of the men had recently been ingesting narcotics, 
which could impair his judgment about appropriate conduct.  
Further, despite the lingering odor, both men denied possessing 
any narcotics.  This could lead a reasonable officer to believe 
that at least one of the men was attempting to conceal illegal 
activity.   
¶54 In addition to the odor of burning marijuana, Officer 
Hahn determined that Pickering possessed a knife, several bags 
of marijuana, and paraphernalia tending to show an intent to 
distribute marijuana.  Moreover, Pickering became rigid and 
clenched his fists when asked if he would consent to a pat-down 
search.  Based on this, Officer Hahn thought that he was likely 
to attempt to flee or resist arrest.   
¶55 The fact of a custodial arrest often raises the 
possibility of harm to officers or evidence.  Robinson, 414 U.S. 
No. 
2006AP1744-CR   
 
21 
 
at 234 ("The danger to the police officer flows from the fact of 
the 
arrest, 
and 
its 
attendant 
proximity, 
stress 
and 
uncertainty[.]")  Pickering's behavior was sufficiently menacing 
and erratic to raise concern for officer safety and preservation 
of evidence.  Officer Hahn placed Pickering in handcuffs, but he 
did not yet secure Pickering in the back of his squad car.  
Instead, it appears that Pickering remained standing at the back 
of his vehicle.   
¶56 The record indicates that Officer Hahn was concerned 
about the possible threat posed by Denk as well.  In a situation 
where two men were alone in a car permeated with the smell of 
burning marijuana, it is reasonable for an officer to be 
concerned that Denk could attempt to assist Pickering, either by 
endangering the officer or by concealing evidence of his 
friend's crime.10   
¶57 Officer Hahn's suspicions were further aroused when he 
arrived at the passenger side of the car.  There, he noticed a 
hard, opaque container large enough to conceal a small weapon or 
further evidence related to the possession or distribution of 
narcotics.  The eyeglass case was positioned on the ground, just 
underneath the car and accessible from the passenger seat.  The 
                                                 
10 While Denk stated that the eyeglass case was his, Officer 
Hahn was not obligated to believe that it did not contain 
evidence relating to Pickering's subsequent arrest.  See 
Pallone, 2000 WI 77, ¶56, 236 Wis. 2d 162, 613 N.W.2d 568 
(declining to provide vehicle occupants with an incentive to 
sabotage an otherwise legal search by concealing evidence in 
passenger belongings). 
No. 
2006AP1744-CR   
 
22 
 
very presence of the container on the ground, in that spot, was 
suspicious.   
¶58 In Pallone, we stated that under some circumstances, 
passenger belongings can be subject to search incident to the 
arrest of the driver, and that the unarrested occupant may pose 
as 
much 
danger 
as 
the 
arrested 
driver. 
 
Pallone, 
236 
Wis. 2d 162, ¶¶55-56.  In that case, the suspicious container 
belonging to the unarrested occupant was in the passenger 
compartment of the car.  The search of Pallone's duffel bag was 
authorized because the officer had reason to believe that 
Pallone could pose a danger, and the bag was within his reach.    
¶59 Here, a fact-intensive inquiry reveals that it is 
reasonable for an officer to believe that Denk posed a danger to 
Officer 
Hahn's 
safety, 
either 
alone 
or 
in 
concert 
with 
Pickering.  The eyeglass case was easily within Denk's reach.  
It was next to his feet.  The case was capable of containing a 
small weapon, such as a knife or a razor blade.  Denk was not 
restrained in any way, so it would have been easy for him to 
reach down and grab the case, availing himself of a weapon 
hidden inside.  Further, Denk could have kicked the case under 
the car to Pickering, who was standing in close proximity 
directly behind the car.  As in Pallone, the danger to the 
arresting officer flowed from the proximity and uncertainty Denk 
posed once Pickering was under arrest. 
¶60 A fact-intensive inquiry also raises concerns about 
the preservation of evidence.  Based on the odor of burning 
marijuana, the individually-wrapped bags of marijuana, and the 
No. 
2006AP1744-CR   
 
23 
 
scale, Officer Hahn knew that both narcotics and paraphernalia 
had been present in the vehicle.  Narcotics or paraphernalia 
could be concealed in an opaque case such as this.  Given the 
suspicious location of the case just beneath the car door, it is 
reasonable to believe that Denk was attempting to discard 
evidence.  
¶61 We determine that the warrantless search here was 
incident to the arrest and was supported by both of the 
historical rationales at the heart of that exception, namely the 
safety of the arresting officer and the need to discover and 
preserve 
evidence. 
 
In 
this 
situation, 
Office 
Hahn 
was 
outnumbered at a late night arrest involving two men and knew 
that narcotics were present.  The proximity of the eyeglass case 
to the car, to Denk, and to Pickering, as well as its 
unexplained location at Denk's feet, raised questions about the 
danger Denk posed acting alone or in concert with Pickering.  
Thus, we conclude that based on the reasoning in State v. 
Pallone, the search of the eyeglass case was a permissible 
search incident to the arrest of the driver of the vehicle.   
¶62 Lest our discussion be misconstrued, we reiterate the 
bright-line rule that unarrested passengers cannot themselves be 
searched based solely on the arrest of the driver.11  In order to 
                                                 
11 See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303 (1999) (
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United 
States v. De Ri, 332 U.S. 581, 586-87 (1948) (concluding that 
probable cause to search a vehicle did not confer probable cause 
to search the person of an occupant).   
No. 
2006AP1744-CR   
 
24 
 
search the body of a passenger, the arresting officer must have 
individualized cause to justify the search.  For example, 
"protective 
frisks 
are 
justified 
when 
an 
officer 
has 
a 
reasonable suspicion that a suspect may be armed.  The 
reasonable suspicion must be based upon specific and articulable 
facts, which, taken together with any rational inferences that 
may be drawn from those facts, must establish that the intrusion 
was reasonable."  State v. McGill, 2000 WI 38, ¶22, 234 
Wis. 2d 560, 609 N.W.2d 795 (citations and quotations omitted). 
¶63 Having determined that the warrantless search of the 
eyeglass case fits within the exception for searches incident to 
arrest, 
it 
follows 
that 
the 
search 
of 
Denk 
was 
also 
constitutional.  Denk's admitted ownership of a case containing 
a methamphetamine pipe gave Officer Hahn probable cause to 
arrest Denk, and to search incident to that arrest.  See Kluck 
v. State, 37 Wis. 2d 378, 390-91, 155 N.W.2d 26 (1967).   
IV. 
¶64 After the circuit court properly denied Denk's motion 
to suppress the physical evidence obtained in the search, Denk 
entered 
a 
no 
contest 
plea 
to 
felony 
possession 
of 
methamphetamine.  He now asks this court to withdraw the plea on 
the basis that it was not entered knowingly or voluntarily.   
¶65 Citing 
several 
cases, 
Denk 
argues 
that 
a 
plea 
agreement that leads a defendant to believe that he has obtained 
a material advantage that cannot be legally obtained necessarily 
produces a plea that is neither knowing nor voluntary.  He 
asserts that he, his attorney, the prosecutor, and the judge 
No. 
2006AP1744-CR   
 
25 
 
were all under the misapprehension that he could have been 
convicted of felony possession of paraphernalia, the charge that 
was dismissed.  Denk argues that there was no factual basis for 
that charge.  He claims that because he could not have been 
convicted of that felony, the benefit of having it dropped was 
illusory, rendering his plea unknowing and involuntary.   
¶66 The 
charge 
at 
issue 
is 
possession 
of 
drug 
paraphernalia in violation of Wis. Stat. § 961.573(3).  The 
information states that Denk "did knowingly possess with primary 
intent 
to 
use, 
Methamphetamine 
pipe 
to 
convert 
Methamphetamine[.]"  As a part of the plea bargain, the 
prosecutor agreed to drop this charge.  
¶67 Denk asserts that there was no factual basis for 
charging him under Wis. Stat. § 961.573(3), which criminalizes 
the possession of drug paraphernalia as follows: 
No person may use, or possess with the primary intent 
to use, drug paraphernalia to manufacture, compound, 
convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, 
pack, repack, or store methamphetamine or a controlled 
substance analog of methamphetamine in violation of 
this chapter.  
Violation of this statute is a Class H felony with a maximum of 
six years in prison.  Wis. Stat. § 961.573(3)(b)1. 
¶68 Denk argues that the proper charge for possession of a 
methamphetamine pipe is not under sub (3), but rather under sub 
(1) of the statute: 
No person may use, or possess with the primary intent 
to use, 
drug 
paraphernalia to plant, propagate, 
cultivate, 
grow, 
harvest, 
manufacture, 
compound, 
convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, 
No. 
2006AP1744-CR   
 
26 
 
pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, 
inhale or otherwise introduce into the human body a 
controlled substance or controlled substance analog in 
violation of this chapter. 
Wis. Stat. § 961.573(1) (emphasis added).  Violation of this 
statute is a misdemeanor and carries a maximum penalty of a $500 
fine or imprisonment for not more than 30 days.  Id. 
¶69 Denk contends that § 961.573(3) does not criminalize 
possession of paraphernalia related to personal use.  He bases 
his argument on a comparison of the two statutes.  The words 
"inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce into the human 
body" are included in sub (1), but are omitted in sub (3).  From 
that, Denk concludes that sub (3) applies only to paraphernalia 
that can be used in the manufacture of controlled substances, 
whereas sub (1) applies to paraphernalia for personal use.  
Further, Denk claims that there is no evidence in the record 
that his pipe was intended for anything other than personal use.  
Relying on the "plain meaning" of the statute, he did not 
request an evidentiary hearing. 
¶70 Neither this court nor the court of appeals has 
previously 
interpreted 
the 
proper 
scope 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 961.573(3) in this context, and we need not do so today.  Our 
analysis instead focuses on whether Denk received the benefit of 
the bargain even if it is uncertain whether he could have been 
convicted of felony possession of paraphernalia.   
¶71 A defendant who seeks to withdraw a plea after 
sentencing has the burden to prove by clear and convincing 
evidence 
that 
a 
manifest 
injustice 
would 
result 
if 
the 
No. 
2006AP1744-CR   
 
27 
 
withdrawal 
were 
not 
permitted. 
 
State 
v. 
Bentley, 
201 
Wis. 2d 303, 311, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996).  A manifest injustice 
occurs 
when 
there 
are 
serious 
questions 
affecting 
the 
fundamental integrity of the plea which rendered it unknowing, 
involuntary, and unintelligently entered.  State v. Dawson, 2004 
WI App 173, ¶6, 276 Wis. 2d 418, 688 N.W.2d 12.   
¶72 When a prosecutor induces a plea based on a promise 
that is legally unenforceable, a manifest injustice occurs.  See 
id., ¶1 (concluding that the prosecutor's promise to reopen a 
felony conviction and reduce it to a lesser offense after the 
defendant successfully completed five years of probation was 
legally unenforceable because the prosecutor had no authority to 
amend judgments of conviction); State v. Woods, 173 Wis. 2d 129, 
496 N.W.2d 144 (Ct. App. 1992) (concluding that the court's 
promise that the defendant's sentence would run concurrently 
with a juvenile sentence he was already serving was legally 
unenforceable because the court lacked the authority to modify a 
juvenile sentence). 
¶73 Additionally, 
in 
some 
situations, 
a 
mistaken 
understanding of the law can result in manifest injustice.  
State 
v. 
Brown, 2004 WI App 179, 276 Wis. 2d 559, 687 
N.W.2d 543; see also State v. Riekkoff, 112 Wis. 2d 119, 332 
N.W.2d 744 (1983).  In Brown, a manifest injustice occurred when 
the defendant's plea resulted in the precise legal consequence 
he entered the plea to avoid.   
¶74 Brown was charged with various sex offenses related to 
minor children.  Brown, 276 Wis. 2d 559, ¶2.  The prosecutor 
No. 
2006AP1744-CR   
 
28 
 
stated that, in exchange for a no contest plea, he agreed to 
drop all charges that would require Brown to register as a sex 
offender or subject him to Chapter 980 civil confinement.  Id., 
¶2.  After the plea was entered, Brown learned that, in fact, he 
would be required to register as a sex offender and that he was 
subject to Chapter 980 civil confinement.  While acknowledging 
that "[n]ot every misunderstanding of the law by a defendant 
negates the knowing and voluntary nature of his plea," the court 
of appeals concluded that Brown's plea was unknowing and 
involuntary.  Brown, ¶¶11, 13. 
¶75 In each of those cases, the dispute involved the 
charge to which the defendant actually pled.  Likewise, in each 
of those cases, the consequence for which the defendant had 
bargained when he entered the plea to the charge was a legal 
impossibility.  However, the defendant failed to understand the 
inevitable consequences of his plea to that charge, thus 
rendering his plea to the charge unknowing and involuntary. 
¶76 In contrast, Denk did not plead to the charge in 
question, rather, his argument relates to his understanding of 
the charge that was dismissed.  Here, the bargain was that in 
exchange for a plea to a felony possession of methamphetamine 
charge, the State would dismiss the felony drug paraphernalia 
charge and two other misdemeanor charges.  And that is exactly 
what happened.  By entering into a plea agreement, Denk 
substantially minimized his exposure.   The maximum sentence for 
the three dismissed charges was six years incarceration for the 
No. 
2006AP1744-CR   
 
29 
 
felony, and six months and thirty days respectively for the two 
misdemeanors.   
¶77 The terms of the plea agreement further provided that 
the State would limit its request at sentencing to jail time 
rather than prison time for the charge to which he entered a 
plea.  And it did.  The maximum sentence of incarceration for 
felonious possession of methamphetamine was three years and six 
months.12   
¶78 Unlike the cases upon which Denk relies, this was not 
a plea based on an illusory promise, but rather it was a plea 
where the promise was realized.  At sentencing, Denk received 
the benefits of his bargain.  He avoided exposure to a 
substantial period of incarceration.  As agreed, the State 
dismissed the three charges and argued for a withheld sentence, 
three years probation, and six months in jail.  The judge 
sentenced consistent with the State's argument, except Denk 
received only five months in jail as a condition of probation.  
Thus, we determine that Denk failed to meet his burden of 
showing 
a 
manifest 
injustice, 
entitling 
him 
to 
a 
plea 
withdrawal.  
V. 
¶79 In sum, we determine that the warrantless search was 
incident to the arrest and was supported by both of the 
                                                 
12 The agreement also provided that although Denk's co-
defendant, Pickering, was "close to making a deal," Denk would 
testify for the State at Pickering's trial if the deal fell 
through.  The record reflects that Pickering did indeed enter a 
guilty plea. 
No. 
2006AP1744-CR   
 
30 
 
historical rationales at the heart of that exception, namely the 
safety of the arresting officer and the need to discover and 
preserve evidence.  Thus, we conclude that based on the 
reasoning in State v. Pallone, under the circumstances of this 
case, the search of the eyeglass case was a permissible search 
incident to the arrest of the driver of the vehicle.   
¶80 In addition, we determine that because Denk got the 
benefit of his plea bargain, he has failed to show by clear and 
convincing evidence that a manifest injustice would occur if he 
was not allowed to withdraw his plea.  Accordingly, we affirm 
the orders of the circuit court. 
By the Court.—The orders of the circuit court are affirmed. 
No. 
2006AP1744-CR   
 
 
 
1