Title: Paul Beasley Johnson V. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC90-743
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: July 24, 2000

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
  
____________
No. SC90743
____________
PAUL BEASLEY JOHNSON,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[July 13, 2000]
CORRECTED OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Paul Beasley Johnson, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals the circuit
court’s denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule
of Criminal Procedure 3.850.  We have jurisdiction.  Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. 
We affirm the circuit court’s denial.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Johnson was convicted in 1981of three counts of first-degree murder for the
murders of William Evans, Ray Beasley, and Theron Burnham.  The facts of this
case are set forth in detail in our opinion on Johnson’s second direct appeal.  See
Johnson v. State, 608 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1992).  Johnson also was convicted of
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kidnaping, arson, two counts of robbery, and two counts of attempted first-degree
murder.  The trial court sentenced Johnson to death for each of the three murder
convictions, and this Court affirmed the convictions and sentences.  Johnson v.
State, 438 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1983).  After a death warrant was signed in January
1986, Johnson petitioned this Court for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to challenge the trial court’s
allowing the jury to separate after it began deliberating Johnson’s guilt or innocence. 
This Court found reversible error in the court’s failure to keep a capital case jury
together during deliberations and granted Johnson a new trial.  Johnson v.
Wainwright, 498 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 1986).  Johnson’s retrial, which began in Polk
County in October 1987, ended in a mistrial based on juror misconduct. 
Subsequently, Johnson filed motions to disqualify the trial judge and change venue. 
These motions were granted, and Johnson was tried in Alachua County in April
1988.  Johnson was again convicted of three counts of first-degree murder and
sentenced to death.  This Court affirmed Johnson’s convictions and sentences. 
Johnson, 608 So. 2d at 6.
In August 1994, Johnson filed his initial postconviction motion under Florida
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.  The circuit court dismissed the initial motion
without prejudice to file a subsequent postconviction motion, and Johnson
1Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993).
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appealed the dismissal to this Court.
During the pendency of the appeal, Johnson filed an amended rule 3.850
motion.  The amended motion was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the circuit
court.  On August 29, 1995, this Court dismissed the pending notice of appeal and
directed the trial court to reinstate the amended rule 3.850 motion and proceed with
the hearing.  During this period, public records litigation pursuant to chapter 119,
Florida Statutes, was ongoing in the case.  On July 26, 1996, the circuit court found
that Johnson had received all of the public records to which he was entitled and
ordered Johnson to file an amended 3.850 motion by September 16, 1996.  Judge
Bentley, a successor judge, was assigned to the case.  Johnson filed his amended
3.850 motion, and while the motion was pending, Judge Bentley ordered that a
Huff1 hearing be held on January 9, 1997, to determine whether any of the claims in
the 3.850 motion required an evidentiary hearing and ordered that memoranda on
the issue be filed by December 27, 1996.
On December 26, 1996, Johnson filed a motion to hold the Huff proceedings
in abeyance.  Johnson claimed that records from the Hillsborough County state
attorney’s office that had not been provided to Johnson had been found at the
Attorney General’s office.  Johnson requested an opportunity to review the records
2Johnson raised the following claims in his amended rule 3.850 motion:  (1) records in the
possession of state agencies were withheld in violation of chapter 119, Florida Statutes, and the United
States and Florida Constitutions; (2) Johnson was denied a proper appeal due to omissions in the record;
(3) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury as to the cold, calculated, and premeditated aggravator;
(4) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury as to the aggravator of a previous conviction of a violent
felony; (5) sentencing was unreliable because the judge refused to find mitigation established by the record;
(6) the sentencing jury was misled by an argument that unconstitutionally diluted its sense of responsibility
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and to amend his 3.850 motion and that the public records issue be reopened.
The circuit court granted Johnson permission to issue a subpoena duces
tecum to Karen Cox, the records custodian for the Hillsborough County State
Attorney’s Office and to argue the merits of Johnson’s public records claim at the
January 9, 1997, hearing.  After the hearing, the circuit court granted Johnson an
additional twenty days in which to file documents detailing the new matters
discovered as a result of the newly discovered public records and a proposed
amended 3.850 motion.  On January 22, 1997, the circuit court issued a nonfinal
order summarily denying a portion of Johnson’s rule 3.850 motion that was filed in
September 1996 and stating that the remaining claims would be heard at an
evidentiary hearing to be held on March 3, 1997.
On January 28, 1997, Johnson filed a list detailing new matters allegedly
raised by the newly discovered public records.  Johnson also filed unsuccessful
motions for leave to conduct depositions and to disqualify Judge Bentley and a
proposed amended rule 3.850 motion.2
for sentencing; (7) the court erroneously instructed the jury that one single act supported two separate
aggravators; (8) Johnson received ineffective assistance of counsel in that counsel was rendered ineffective
by the State’s withholding of material and exculpatory evidence; (9) penalty phase jury instructions
improperly shifted the burden to Johnson to prove that death was inappropriate, and failure to object
rendered counsel ineffective; (10) Johnson was unconstitutionally denied his rights to an adequate mental
health evaluation; (11) Johnson received ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase because
counsel failed to adequately investigate and prepare additional mitigating evidence and failed to object to
the trial judge’s prejudicial comments; (12) newly discovered evidence establishes that Johnson’s
conviction and sentence are constitutionally unreliable; (13) ineffective assistance of counsel and the
prosecutor’s improper argument and comment rendered the conviction and sentence fundamentally unfair
and unreliable; (14) Johnson received ineffective assistance of counsel during voir dire in that trial counsel
was rendered ineffective by the trial court’s interference when it repeatedly interrupted trial counsel during
jury selection; (15) Johnson received ineffective assistance of counsel in that the jury was allowed to rely
upon improperly admitted evidence and trial counsel failed to adequately investigate and prepare a defense
or challenge the State’s case; (16) Johnson received ineffective assistance of counsel during voir dire in that
counsel was rendered ineffective by the trial court’s refusal to grant in camera voir dire and its refusal to
grant additional peremptory challenges; (17) Florida’s capital sentencing statute is unconstitutional because
it fails to prevent the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty and violates due process and
the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment; (18) an unconstitutional automatic aggravator
(underlying felony) was applied; (19) Johnson’s constitutional rights were violated when the prosecutor
impermissibly suggested to the jury that the law required that it recommend a sentence of death; (20) the
avoid arrest aggravating factor was improperly applied; (21) the State unconstitutionally used a jailhouse
informant to obtain statements from Johnson; (22) Johnson is innocent of the death sentence; (23) the
instruction relating to flight after commission of robbery, kidnapping, or arson is unconstitutionally vague
and overbroad; (24) rules prohibiting defense counsel from interviewing jurors to evaluate whether juror
misconduct existed are unconstitutional; (25) juror misconduct occurred in the guilt and penalty phases of
Johnson’s trial in violation of his constitutional rights; (26) Johnson received ineffective assistance of counsel
by trial counsel’s failure to adequately investigate, develop, and present evidence in support of a voluntary
intoxication defense; and (27) cumulative errors were not harmless.
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The circuit court issued an order on February 3, 1997, accepting Johnson’s
proposed amended rule 3.850 motion.  The circuit court found that Johnson had
not raised any entirely new claims in the amended rule 3.850 motion and adopted
the findings of its January 22, 1997, order regarding the claims that were summarily
3The circuit court ordered an evidentiary hearing as to claims 8, 10, 13, 15, 19, and 26.
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denied and those that would be the subject of the evidentiary hearing.3  The order
also stated that Johnson could use any of the newly discovered evidence in support
of the claims that would be the subject of the evidentiary hearing.  The circuit court
also gave Johnson an additional five days in which to submit a memorandum of any
new claims that were discovered as a result of public records discovered at the
Attorney General’s office.  On February 7, 1997, Johnson filed a motion requesting
sixty days to review those records.  The circuit court denied the motion and
ordered that Johnson be prepared to litigate his rule 3.850 motion at the evidentiary
hearing scheduled for March 3, 1997.
After the evidentiary hearing, the circuit court issued an order on March 19,
1997, summarily denying thirteen of Johnson’s twenty-seven claims.  State v.
Johnson, No. 81-0112A1 (Fla. 10th Cir. Ct. order filed Mar. 19, 1997).  After
setting forth analysis and record attachments, the court found the remaining
fourteen claims to be without merit.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
In this appeal, Johnson raises eight claims.  Johnson argues that:  (I) the
circuit court erred in denying Johnson an evidentiary hearing or additional discovery
concerning his public records request; (II) the circuit court erred in denying
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Johnson’s motion to disqualify Judge Bentley; (III) the circuit court erred in
denying Johnson’s claim that the State withheld material exculpatory evidence
rendering counsel ineffective at the guilt phase; (IV) the circuit court erred in
denying Johnson’s claim that counsel was ineffective at the penalty phase of
Johnson’s trial; (V) the circuit court erred in denying Johnson’s claim that his
constitutional rights were violated by counsel’s failure to obtain an adequate mental
health evaluation and failure to provide necessary background information to the
mental health consultants; (VI) the circuit court erred in summarily denying
Johnson’s claims; (VII) the circuit court erred in ruling that venue was appropriate
in Polk County for hearing Johnson’s rule 3.850 motion; and (VIII) the circuit court
erred in refusing to consider Johnson’s cumulative error claim.
Claim I.  Public Records
Johnson argues that the circuit court erred in declining to provide him
additional time to review the state attorney records that were discovered in the
Attorney General’s office.  Johnson also argues that public records are missing and
that the circuit court erred in refusing to conduct an evidentiary hearing concerning
the matter.
As to Johnson’s first claim, as illustrated in the procedural history set forth
above, Johnson had sufficient time to review the records discovered in the Attorney
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General’s office.  In its order the circuit court stated:
On July 22, 1996, Judge Robert L. Doyel found that the
defendant’s attorneys, members of the Office of the Capital Collateral
Representative (hereinafter “CCR”) had “received all of the public
records to which it is entitled” and ordered CCR to file the amended
rule 3.850 motion by September 16, 1996. . . .
On December 26, 1996, CCR filed a motion to hold
proceedings in abeyance because “[a]n inspection of the Attorney
General’s records has revealed that public records exist that have not
been provided to Mr. Johnson’s attorneys.”  The alleged records
originate from the Office of the State Attorney for the Thirteenth
Judicial Circuit.  On January 9, 1997, the court held a hearing on the
motion.  During the hearing, CCR represented that on December 16,
1996 (two months after the amended rule 3.850 motion was filed), an
investigator went to the Attorney General’s Office in Tampa to inspect
public records relating to the defendant.  During the search, CCR
discovered numerous original documents from the state attorney’s
office for the Thirteenth Circuit.  Both assistant state attorney Karen
Cox, who handles public records requests for the Thirteenth Circuit,
and Candace Sabella, the assistant attorney general assigned to the
defendant’s case, represented that they had no knowledge of the
records prior to December, 1996.
Although CCR’s delay in examining the records at the attorney
general’s office was inexcusable, this court permitted CCR to amend
the rule 3.850 motion based upon the newly discovered information. 
CCR filed an amended motion on January 28, 1997.  The amended
motion did not raise any new claims for relief, but made references to
the materials recently discovered.  This court accepted the amended
motion and allowed CCR to utilize the new material to support any of
the claims for relief.  An evidentiary hearing was held on March 3, 4
and 5, 1997.
State v. Johnson order at 3-4.  The circuit court concluded that the public records
issue had been litigated fully and denied further relief.
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Johnson cites to Ventura v. State, 673 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 1996), for the
proposition that the circuit court should have allowed Johnson sixty days to review
the newly discovered records.  In Ventura, however, the State had affirmatively
withheld the records being sought.  Id. at 481.  Here, there has been no showing
that the state attorney’s files were intentionally concealed.  Furthermore, the record
reflects that the Attorney General’s office had procedures for reviewing its files in
October 1995 and that its records were made available during the public records
hearings held in July 1996.  Notwithstanding Johnson’s delay in examining the files,
the circuit court permitted Johnson to raise any new claims discovered in these
records as late as February 8, 1997, and to use any evidence discovered in support
of his rule 3.850 claims at the March 3, 1997, evidentiary hearing.  Accordingly, we
find no abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s refusal to allow Johnson additional
time to review the records.
Similarly, Johnson’s claim that records are missing and that he was entitled
to an evidentiary hearing on the issue of public records is also without merit. 
Johnson argues that records obtained from the Hillsborough County state
attorney’s office are incomplete because records that "should and routinely exist"
had not been provided and because records contain references to interviews, but
no documents regarding these interviews were provided.  Johnson also argues that
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the testimony of Cox, the records custodian, was inadequate to ensure that all the
records had been provided because Cox had no personal knowledge of how the
records were searched.
The postconviction motion and the record conclusively show that the
defendant is entitled to no relief.  In Downs v. State, 740 So. 2d 506, 510 (Fla.
1999), the defendant argued that an evidentiary hearing should have been held
based on his allegation that a sheriff’s office file was relatively small and the fact
that the record custodian testified that he had no personal knowledge as to whether
each department within the sheriff’s office had complied with the disclosure
request.  Id.  This Court found that the fact that the records custodian did not
know whether all the documents requested were given to him for disclosure,
standing alone, did not mean that additional records existed.  Id. at 511.  This
Court also found that, considering the State's and sheriff's assertion that all records
had been provided and the absence of any colorable claim that records existed, the
motion for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of public records was properly
denied.  Id.
In accord with Downs, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Johnson an evidentiary hearing or additional discovery based on Johnson’s
bare allegations that additional records “should” exist.  The State and Cox
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indicated that all records had been provided.  Cox testified at the January 9, 1997,
hearing that while she did not physically check the records herself, she indicated
that the procedure used to check records was that a request would be made of the
records center.  Cox testified that this procedure was followed, and those parties
indicated that no additional records existed.  The fact that Cox did not physically
check the records herself does not raise a colorable claim that records exist.  Id. 
See also Mendyk v. State, 707 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 1997).  Accordingly, we find no
merit in this claim.
Claim II.  Disqualification of Judge Bentley
Johnson’s second claim is that the circuit court erred in denying his motion
to disqualify Judge Bentley.  This issue relates to Johnson’s third claim:  that the
State withheld material and exculpatory evidence from Johnson in the form of an
undisclosed agreement it had with a jailhouse informant, James Leon Smith, who
testified against Johnson at trial.  Johnson’s motion to disqualify asserted that
Judge Bentley sentenced Smith in connection with this agreement and did not
disclose this prior involvement in the case, giving rise to Johnson’s fear that he
would not receive a fair hearing.  Johnson’s motion also stated that the records
discovered at the Attorney General’s office contained documents pertaining to
Smith and that some of these records had been removed and replaced with blank
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pages numbered at the bottom.  Johnson further asserted that Judge Bentley
reviewed, in camera, records that were claimed exempt by the Attorney General’s
office and ruled they were exempt.  Johnson then stated that it was unclear whether
the documents claimed to be exempt from disclosure were the same documents
missing from Smith’s records and that, given Judge Bentley’s prior involvement in
the case as Smith’s sentencing judge, he feared that he would not receive a fair
hearing.  These allegations are insufficient to support a motion to disqualify.
In order to maintain a motion to disqualify, the motion must establish a well-
grounded fear on the part of the movant that he or she will not receive a fair
hearing.  See Quince v. State, 592 So. 2d 669, 670 (Fla. 1992).  In determining
whether a motion to disqualify is legally sufficient, this Court looks to see whether
the facts alleged would place a reasonably prudent person in fear of not receiving a
fair and impartial trial.  See Livingston v. State, 441 So. 2d 1083, 1087 (Fla. 1983).
Johnson’s allegations that Judge Bentley suspended Smith’s sentence and
held an in-camera review of records that may have pertained to Smith does not set
forth a well-grounded fear and fails to show the personal bias or prejudice on the
part of the trial judge necessary for disqualification.  See Tafero v. State, 403 So.
2d 355 (Fla. 1981).  In Scott v. State, 717 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1998), an affiant’s
sworn statement containing exculpatory information for the defendant was
4Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
5United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980). 
6Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). 
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presented to the court to support the defendant’s Brady4 claim.  The defendant
moved to disqualify the trial judge based on the fact that the judge had presided
over an unrelated trial of the affiant, had received correspondence from a jailer or
from the affiant in the prior matter, and had commented on the affiant’s sentence. 
Id. at 911.  This Court found that allegations of the judge’s prior involvement in the
affiant’s case did not set forth a well-grounded fear of prejudice.  Id.  Similarly, the
fact that Judge Bentley sentenced Smith, without more, does not reasonably
demonstrate any predisposition in the mind of Judge Bentley.  Circuit judges are
called upon to handle many cases, and absent some showing of bias, a motion to
disqualify that is based on a judge’s prior involvement in a witness’s case is
insufficient to support a motion to dismiss.  Thus, we find that this claim has no
merit.
Claim III
A. Henry,5 Giglio,6 and Brady Error
Johnson claims that the State withheld material and exculpatory evidence in
violation of Brady.  Johnson claims that the State withheld the fact that it used
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another jail inmate, James Leon Smith, to obtain information from Johnson in
violation of Henry and withheld the fact that it presented the false testimony of
Smith in violation of Giglio.
The basis of these claims rests on Smith’s recantation testimony, which was
presented during the rule 3.850 evidentiary hearing.  The circuit court found with
regard to Smith’s testimony as follows:
James Leon Smith’s [sic] testified at all three of the defendant’s
trials.  He was deposed in 1981 and 1987 and testified at a motion to
suppress [hearing] in 1981.  His testimony, from 1981 through 1988,
was substantially the same.  There were minor differences in his
testimony, which can be expected because Mr. Smith had to try to
recall events that occurred almost seven years ago.  Mr. Smith’s 1988
trial testimony is summarized below:
Mr. Smith met the defendant in the Polk County jail in
1981.  Between February and March of 1981, Mr. Smith
had several conversations with the defendant.  The
defendant admitted to three murders.  He said that he had
killed a cabdriver and burned the cab because his
fingerprints were in it, that he had shot Mr. Beasley and
stole $100.00, and that he had struggled with a deputy
and that the deputy was shot twice.
While in jail, Mr. Smith met with law enforcement officers
and told them that the defendant had made the
statements.  No one made any promises to Mr. Smith for
providing this information.  The only assistance he
received from the state came in the form of a letter written
by the prosecutor in 1981 to a judge considering a motion
to mitigate sentence.  The mitigation motion was granted
and the defendant’s sentence was reduced to one year of
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probation.  Mr. Smith testified because “it’s something
that had to be done.”  No one suggested that Mr. Smith
do anything but tell the truth.
On cross-examination, Mr. Smith provided the following
additional information:
There was nothing promised to him for coming forward
with information about the defendant.  Law enforcement
officers did not outright encourage him to go get more
information from the defendant.  While in the jail, Mr.
Smith read the defendant’s discovery materials to him
because the defendant told Mr. Smith that he could not
read.  During their conversations, the defendant told him
that he was pretty high when the murders occurred and
that he could not remember certain details.  The
defendant also stated that he had done so many drugs
that he lost control of himself and started flipping out.
On re-direct examination, Mr. Smith testified that the defendant
said that “he could play like he was crazy and they would send him to
the crazyhouse for a few years and that would be it.”
The court has reviewed the numerous transcripts that contain
Mr. Smith’s testimony.  In every court proceeding, Mr. Smith’s
testimony was essentially the same as that presented to the Alachua
County jury in 1988.
At the evidentiary hearing on March 4, 1997, James Leon Smith
testified that much of his previous testimony was untrue.  On direct
examination, Mr. Smith testified that Polk County Sheriff’s Office
Detective Wilkerson specifically told him what to ask the defendant. 
Mr. Smith also alleged that law enforcement told him to testify in court
that law enforcement had not instructed him to speak with the
defendant.  Law enforcement also allegedly promised Mr. Smith that
they would go speak to the judge and seek a reduction of his sentence,
but that he should not tell the jury about this promise.  According to
Mr. Smith, the defendant never stated that he would play crazy.  Mr.
Smith stated that he received most of the information that he originally
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testified about from either law enforcement or the defendant’s
discovery materials.
On cross-examination, Mr. Smith’s testimony became very
vague.  He admitted that the defendant may have actually admitted to
several of the crimes and provided some details about the crimes to
him.  However, in general Mr. Smith’s memory was not that accurate
as to where he received the information about the crimes.  He also
stated that he had suffered retribution, both in prison and in his
hometown, for his prior testimony incriminating the defendant.  Mr.
Smith could not explain why his testimony had been consistent in
numerous court proceedings and had suddenly changed.  He alluded
to the fact that he did not want someone to die because of his untrue
testimony.  However, Mr. Smith never came forward after the
defendant was originally convicted and sentenced to death in 1981.
In Armstrong v. State, 642 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 1799, 131 L. Ed. 2d 726 (1995), the Florida Supreme Court
reaffirmed the proposition that “[r]ecantation by a witness called on
behalf of the prosecution does not necessarily entitle a defendant to a
new trial.  Brown v. State, 381 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1118 (1981); Bell v. State, 90 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 1956).”  This
court must make two findings.  First, the court must determine
whether Mr. Smith’s recantation is true.  If so, the court then must
determine whether Mr. Smith’s new testimony would probably result
in a different verdict at a new trial. Glendening v. State, 604 So. 2d 839
(Fla. 2d DCA 1992). 
As to the first issue, the court finds that Mr. Smith’s testimony
is not credible.  In general, recanting testimony is “exceedingly
unreliable.”  Bell v. State, 90 So. 2d 704, 705 (Fla. 1956).  Numerous
factors indicate that James Smith’s recantation is likewise unreliable.
Lee Atkinson, the man who prosecuted the defendant in 1988,
testified at the evidentiary hearing.  After his appointment to the case in
1987, Mr. Atkinson prepared for the re-trial by reviewing the case file
and the 1981 trial transcripts, reading the Supreme Court opinion and
meeting with law enforcement.  He then arranged a meeting with James
Smith so that he could determine whether he wanted to use Mr. Smith
as a witness.  Mr. Atkinson testified that he told Mr. Smith that he
wanted him to tell the truth and to tell the jury about any deals or
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promises he may have received in exchange for his testimony.  The
prosecutor specifically told Mr. Smith that he did not need his
testimony to convict the defendant.  Mr. Atkinson then asked Mr.
Smith if his prior testimony was true.  Mr. Smith said that it was.
When asked about the defendant’s allegations that Mr. Smith was a
state agent and was promised specific assistance from law
enforcement for his testimony, Mr. Smith denied all the allegations and
reaffirmed that he was coming forward voluntarily.  Mr. Atkinson also
told Mr. Smith that he would not prosecute him for perjury if he said
that he lied in 1981, but that Mr. Smith had to tell him about it right
now.  Mr. Smith replied that everything he testified to was the truth. 
The prosecutor also stated that if it was within his power, he would
prosecute Mr. Smith for perjury if he came forward ten years later and
said that he had lied.  As it turned out, Mr. Smith did not wait the full
ten years before coming forward with a new story.
Looking to jury instruction 2.04 on the credibility of witnesses
as a framework for analysis:
(a)  Did James Smith seem to have an accurate memory?  On
direct examination, Mr. Smith appeared to be able to answer many of
CCR’s leading questions.  However, on cross-examination by the
state attorney, Mr. Smith’s memory faltered numerous times and he
had difficulties answering questions.  Many of his answers became
less and less specific and Mr. Smith appeared to have trouble
remembering certain details and events.
(b)  Was James Smith honest and straightforward in answering
the attorneys’ questions?  See, analysis under (a), above.
(c)  Did James Smith have some interest in how the case should
be decided or had any pressure or threat been used against James
Smith that affected the truth of his testimony?  As noted, Mr. Smith
testified that he had suffered because of his original testimony.
Apparently, it was well known in prison and on the street that he had
testified against the defendant.  By changing his story now, the state
argued that Mr. Smith would no longer be a snitch in the eyes of the
defendant’s friends and others.
(d)  Did James Smith at some other time make a statement that
is inconsistent with the testimony he gave in court?  As noted, Mr.
Smith gave at least six prior (and consistent with each other) sworn
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statements that are inconsistent with his testimony given at the
evidentiary hearing.
(e)  Was it proved that James Smith had been convicted of a
crime?  It was undisputed that Mr. Smith had been convicted at least
six times in the past.
Based upon the court’s experience, common sense and
personal observations of James Smith, the court is satisfied that his
new testimony is false.  Simply put, after listening to Mr. Smith,
watching his demeanor and analyzing his testimony, the court does not
believe his present testimony.  Mr. Smith’s testimony was consistent
throughout the defendant’s three trials, a period spanning over seven
years.  Mr. Smith never came forward with any allegations that his
testimony was untruthful until 16 years after his first meeting with the
defendant.
Even if the court were to accept Mr. Smith’s testimony as being
true, the court is confident that the verdict would not have been
different.  Evidence of the defendant’s guilt was overwhelming.  At
trial, the state presented eyewitness testimony, circumstantial evidence
and evidence of the defendant’s conduct which indicated the
defendant committed the crimes and that he was not insane at the time
of the offenses.  Furthermore, Lee Atkinson testified that the result of
the trial would have been the same had Mr. Smith never testified. This
allegation was not challenged by the defendant during the evidentiary
hearing. 
In conclusion, the court finds that the testimony of James Smith
presented at the evidentiary hearing is false.  Furthermore, even if the
court were to accept the testimony, the court finds that the result of
the trial would not have changed.  Therefore, there were no violations
of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Giglio v. United
States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).  There has been no competent evidence
presented of either prosecutorial misconduct or improper and
unconstitutional police practices.  Finally, there has been no showing
that trial counsel was ineffective in any way related to the testimony of
James Smith.
State v. Johnson order at 6-10 (citations omitted).
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Our review of the record demonstrates that the trial court’s finding that
Smith’s testimony was not believable is supported by competent substantial
evidence.  This Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on
issues of credibility.  See Demps v. State, 462 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 1984).  We
approve the trial court’s denial of this claim.  
B. Guilt-Phase Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Also within claim III, Johnson raises subclaims of ineffective assistance of
counsel at the guilt phase of Johnson’s trial.  Johnson claims that counsel was
ineffective by:  (1) improperly opening the door to Johnson's statement to fellow
inmate Smith that he would "act crazy"; (2) failing to introduce a voluntary
intoxication defense; (3) failing to ensure the entire record was complete; and (4)
failing to read the entire record.
Our review is guided by the elementary rule in respect to ineffective
assistance of counsel claims that the defendant must show that counsel’s
performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  There is “a strong presumption
that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance,” and the defendant bears the burden of proving that the representation
was unreasonable under the prevailing professional norms and that the challenged
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action was not strong strategy.  Id. at 688-89.
As to opening the door to Smith’s testimony, the circuit court concluded the
following:
(a)  The first claim is that counsel was ineffective in cross-
examining James Smith because counsel opened the door to the state
and allowed the introduction of damaging evidence.  The specific
complaint is that trial counsel asked Mr. Smith about several details of
a February 11, 1981, conversation that Mr. Smith had with the
defendant.  One portion of the conversation dealt with the fact that the
defendant told Mr. Smith that he had taken a large quantity of drugs
and that he was out of control during the crimes.  On re-direct, the
state asked Mr. Smith about the rest of the conversation and if the
defendant had made any comment about his intended defense.  Mr.
Smith then testified that the defendant told him that he could play like
he was crazy and they would send him to the crazyhouse for a few
years and that would be it.
At the evidentiary hearing, both Mr. Norgard and Mr. Shearer
testified that they knew what Mr. Smith’s testimony would be.  Both
attorneys further stated that there was a tactical reason for asking
about the February 11 statement.  The defense wanted to introduce
evidence of the defendant’s drug use to the jury.  During this particular
conversation with Mr. Smith, the defendant admitted to consuming a
large quantity of drugs.  Counsel believed that it was important for the
jury to hear this evidence, even if they also heard the defendant admit
that he would play crazy.  Mr. Norgard stated that the defense knew
Mr. Smith’s testimony was harmful to their case, and he and Mr.
Shearer made the decision to try to bring out whatever helpful portions
of Mr. Smith’s testimony that they could and then suffer through the
harmful portions.
Counsel has wide discretion in matters of trial strategy.  Mr.
Shearer had been through the defendant’s other two trials prior to the
1988 trial.  He knew the evidence and made an informed, tactical
decision about how to question Mr. Smith.  The court is satisfied that
the strategy, although ultimately unsuccessful, was reasonable and did
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not constitute deficient performance of counsel.
State v. Johnson order at 14.
The record reflects that attorney Norgard made a tactical decision to use
Smith’s testimony.  When questioned at the evidentiary hearing concerning the use
of Smith’s testimony at trial, attorney Norgard responded as follows:
Q.  What tactical choices or thinking did you engage in in
deciding how to go about bringing out what you wanted?
A.  Very simply put, we knew there were going to be negative
things coming out from Mr. Smith, regardless of what tactics we took
on cross-examination, that he was going to be saying some things
damaging to our case.  We knew that there were certain items of
evidence that he could testify to that would have been supportive of
the insanity defense.  We also knew that if we had gotten into those
statements, the one that everybody points to, the statement about I will
just fake that I’m crazy and be out in a few years, you know, we knew
that that would come out.
But in the contexts of this particular case, given that there was
already damaging testimony from Mr. Smith, we felt that eliciting 
favorable testimony outweighed the negative aspects of it, particularly
given there was some cloud of a question about his credibility that we
could argue to the jury as well in terms of the negative things, since he
was going to get some benefit and essentially bring out the positive
things and show that, you know, despite his leanings and his
incrimination to help the statements that, in fact, the truth was that Mr.
Johnson was insane.
Counsel’s strategic decisions will not be second-guessed on collateral attack. 
See Remeta v. Dugger, 622 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 1993).  We approve the circuit court’s
decision.
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As to counsel’s failure to present a voluntary intoxication defense, the circuit
court found:
Mr. Norgard testified at the evidentiary hearing that the defense
presented was insanity due to substantial drug use.  Part of the insanity
defense would necessarily focus upon the defendant’s drug
intoxication.  Thus, counsel decided that they did not need to present
a separate voluntary intoxication defense.  Mr. Norgard further
testified that, in his experience, juries do not like the intoxication
defense and that it was harder to sell to a jury than insanity, which is
also unpopular with juries.  Mr. Shearer testified that he believed they
could not effectively present both the insanity and intoxication
defense, as one defense may dilute the strength of the other.  Further,
he believed that the defense could present the insanity defense without
the defendant’s testimony, while the defendant might have to testify if
they presented the intoxication defense.
The court is satisfied that the tactical decision not to present a
defense of voluntary intoxication did not constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel.  Simply because the insanity defense did not
work, it does not mean that the theory of the defense was flawed. 
Furthermore, the court is convinced that a presentation of an
intoxication defense would not have changed the ultimate outcome of
the proceedings.
State v. Johnson order at 15.
Again we approve the circuit court’s decision.  The record reflects that
attorney Shearer, when questioned at the evidentiary hearing concerning his
decision not to present a voluntary intoxication defense, testified as follows: 
Q.  Let’s talk about your pursuit of a voluntary intoxication
defense.  I understand what you said would be that you have no notes
with which to definitively say what went into that; correct?
A.  Yes.
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Q.  You did however consider that possibility during your trial
preparation, didn’t you?
A.  Yes.
Q.  And in fact, there were factors that would have normally
come into your consideration, such as the fact that voluntary
intoxication might tend to water down the insanity defense that you, in
fact, were going to present?
A.  Yeah, I would say that’s true.
Q.  And that you could present some things in an insanity
defense without even confronting the possibility of the defendant
having testifying, but there would be a stronger chance of putting him
on the stand to try to carry off the voluntary intoxication defense?
A.  That is true too.
Q.  And that you probably would not have wanted Mr. Johnson
-- or in fact, had decided not to have Mr. Johnson testify in this
particular trial?
A.  That is true.
. . . .
Q.  You would have also considered the possibility or
probability, in your estimate, that intoxication would be more difficult
to convince the jury of, than the amphetamine-induced insanity that
you were going to go with?
A.  That’s largely -- that’s generally true . . . .
As previously stated in this opinion, counsel’s strategic decisions will not be
second-guessed on collateral attack.  Remeta; see also Wilson v. Wainwright, 474
So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 1985).
As to the issues involving the record on appeal, the circuit court found:
Claim II alleges that the defendant was denied a proper appeal
because portions of the record were missing.  The substantive
complaint is not properly raised in a motion for postconviction relief.
Additionally, the claim was raised on direct appeal and decided
adversely to the defendant.  See, State v. Johnson, 608 So. 2d 4
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(Fla.1992).
The defendant further complains that counsel was ineffective for
failing to ensure that a proper record was made.  The court allowed
collateral counsel the opportunity to explore the ineffective assistance
of counsel aspect of the claim at the evidentiary hearing. Trial counsel
Lawrence Shearer testified that he filed a motion to record all
proceedings.  He believed the motion was granted and that all
proceedings were recorded.  However, Mr. Shearer testified that he
had not read the entire transcript.  In any event, the court finds that the
defendant has not shown that any actions of counsel were deficient.
State v. Johnson order at 4.
The record reflects that attorney Shearer made a motion to record all of the
proceedings and testified at the evidentiary hearing that he did not remember a time
during Johnson's trial when the reporter was not taking something down that he
thought should have been.  Johnson has not shown that this conduct falls outside
the “wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
Because Johnson has failed to demonstrate a deficiency as to counsel’s
conduct, it is not necessary to address whether counsel’s conduct prejudiced
Johnson.  In view of the record and the testimony of Johnson’s attorneys, we agree
with the circuit court that Johnson failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance
fell below the Strickland standard.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691.
Claim IV.  Penalty-Phase Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Johnson claims he was denied effective assistance of counsel during the
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penalty phase of his trial because:  (1) counsel failed to perform an adequate
investigation in order to obtain necessary background information for mitigation;
(2) counsel failed to object to the improper doubling of an aggravator; and (3) 
counsel failed to object to improper closing argument.
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in the
penalty phase of a capital case the defendant must demonstrate that he or she
would have probably received a life sentence but for counsel’s errors.  See Hildwin
v. Dugger, 654 So. 2d 107, 109 (Fla. 1995).  The circuit court found with respect
to the first subclaim that:
Trial counsel presented competent evidence to support the only two
applicable statutory mitigating circumstances, extreme mental
disturbance and capacity to conform conduct impaired.  Trial counsel
also presented three family members to testify about the defendant’s
difficult childhood, his abandonment by his parents and his father’s
alcoholism. 
The defendant called several potential mitigation witnesses at the
evidentiary hearing.  The defendant also made the argument that trial
counsel should have called these same people during the 1988
proceeding.  The witnesses were Joan Soileau, the defendant’s ex-
girlfriend; Jane Cormier, the defendant’s mother; Joyce Kihs, the
defendant’s aunt and sister of Jane Cormier; and Steve Johnson, the
defendant’s brother.  The substance of the evidence presented was
that the defendant was a great person while he lived in California from
1976 to 1978.  He never did drugs or engaged in any violent behavior. 
Apparently he liked to cook and he helped his girlfriend and mother
clean their respective houses.
Trial counsel testified that he attempted to contact the
defendant’s mother.  The defendant provided an address and phone
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number, but neither were helpful in locating her.  Jane Cormier testified
that she had moved several times between 1978 and 1988, but that she
was available to testify.  There has been no evidence presented that
suggests that counsel’s failure to locate Ms. Cormier constituted
ineffective assistance.  If one’s own client cannot provide information
on how to locate his own mother, counsel cannot be faulted.  The
other proposed witnesses also had similar tales of relocating and
losing touch with the defendant once he returned to Florida in 1978.
As to the proffered evidence of Ms. Cormier and the other
potential mitigation witnesses, the court finds that “there is no
reasonable probability that the sentence would have been different
even if what was presented to this court had been presented during the
penalty phase of the defendant’s trial.”  Stewart v. State, 481 So. 2d
1210, 1212 (Fla. 1985).  Most of the witnesses’ knowledge of the
defendant came from seeing him for a period of two years while he
was in California.  What the effectiveness of such a narrow look into
the defendant’s character and personality would have been is
questionable at best.  In addition, evidence that the defendant could
conform his conduct and refrain from drug use during the California
years could have been harmful to some aspects of the case.  Having
decided that the proposed mitigation evidence would not have made
any difference on the outcome of the trial and sentence, counsel
cannot be ineffective for failing to present such evidence.
State v. Johnson order at 12-13.
We agree with the circuit court that Johnson has not shown any deficiency
on the part of counsel for failing to pursue additional testimony from Johnson’s
family members.  At the evidentiary hearing, attorney Shearer admitted that he
attempted to locate all of the people Johnson gave him information about.  In
addition, several of the potential witnesses testified that they had moved frequently
since their last contact with Johnson.  This is not a case in which counsel neglected
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to make any attempts to locate mitigation witnesses, and counsel’s actions were not
outside the broad range of reasonably competent performance of counsel.  See
Ferguson v. State, 593 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 1992).
Even if Johnson had made a showing that counsel’s actions in not presenting
the testimony of additional witnesses was deficient, Johnson did not demonstrate
that but for the lack of this testimony he would have received a life sentence.  The
trial judge found no mitigation and found aggravation for each of the murders as
follows:
Evans:  1) previous conviction of violent felony; 2)committed while
engaged in robbery, kidnapping, and arson; 3) committed for financial
gain; and 4) committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner;
Beasley:  1) previous conviction of violent felony; 2) committed during
a robbery; 3) committed for [pecuniary]  gain; and 4) committed in a
cold, calculated, and premeditated manner; and Burnham:  1) previous
conviction of a violent felony; 2) committed while fleeing after
committing a robbery; 3) committed to avoid or prevent a lawful
arrest; and 4) committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated
manner.
Johnson v. State, 608 So. 2d 4, 11 (Fla. 1992).
On direct appeal, this Court struck the “committed for pecuniary gain”
aggravator in the Beasley murder, but otherwise affirmed Johnson’s convictions
and sentences. Id.  Testimony from Johnson’s mother and ex-girlfriend that
Johnson was a good person, considered together with the aggravating
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circumstances surrounding these three murders, would not have changed the result.
Regarding the second subclaim that counsel was ineffective for failing to
object to the jury instruction regarding the improper doubling of an aggravator, the
circuit court correctly found that counsel objected to the improper instruction and
ensured that the court read the proper instruction.  As to the third subclaim, the
circuit court correctly found, after reviewing the closing argument, that while there
were several objectionable comments during closing arguments, the argument as a
whole was proper.  Our review of the record demonstrates that Johnson has failed
to demonstrate that counsel was ineffective at the penalty phase of Johnson’s trial.
Claim V.  Mental Health Evaluation
In this claim Johnson alleges that he was unconstitutionally denied his rights
under Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), by counsel’s failure to obtain an
adequate mental health evaluation.  Johnson also argues in this claim that counsel
was ineffective for failing to obtain the proper type of mental health experts and by
failing to provide the experts with information regarding Johnson’s background and
family history.  As discussed in this opinion in claim IV, Johnson has not shown
that counsel was deficient for failing to pursue additional testimony of Johnson’s
family.  As to the remaining issues, the circuit court found:
The primary allegation is that counsel failed to present evidence of
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organic brain damage to the jury.  A review of the record indicates that
the defendant was evaluated by three mental health experts, Doctors
McClane, Afield and Ainesworth.  All three men are psychiatrists.  The
doctors indicated that they had reviewed the case file, taken a medical
and life history from the defendant, and had reviewed some materials
furnished by defense counsel.  While the doctors disagreed as to
whether the defendant met the legal test for insanity, all three agreed
that the defendant suffered from a severe mental or emotional
disturbance due to amphetamine intoxication and that his ability to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired.
At the evidentiary hearing, Dr. Brad Fisher, a clinical forensic
psychologist, testified for the defendant.  Dr. Fisher evaluated the
defendant almost 15 years after the crimes occurred.  He met with the
defendant two times, reviewed the case file, school, prison and police
records of the defendant and met with the defendant’s mother and
brother.  Dr. Fisher testified that he did not disagree with the mental
health experts who testified at the 1988 trial.  He believes that the
defendant suffers from toxic psychosis and did so during the crimes. 
His opinion is that the defendant suffered from an extreme mental
disturbance and his ability to conform his conduct to the requirements
of law was substantially impaired.  The only difference in Dr. Fisher’s
diagnosis of the defendant is that he believes the defendant suffers
from organic brain damage due to extensive drug use.  None of the
prior mental health experts testified to any organic brain damage. 
The defendant argues that had trial counsel provided the mental
health experts with the same materials that CCR provided Dr. Fisher,
they would have either diagnosed organic brain damage or would have
recommended additional testing by a psychologist.  The court finds,
however, that even if the defendant did suffer from organic brain
damage and this evidence was presented to the judge and jury, the
result would not have changed.  The ultimate opinions of the doctors
on the defendant’s ability to conform his conduct are consistent and
were presented to the jury.  The defense presented three competent
mental health experts.  Based upon a review of the trial transcripts and
the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing, the court is confident
that Dr. Fisher’s finding of organic brain damage is not of such import
that it would have changed the jury’s verdict or recommendation. 
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There has been no showing that the attorneys’ conduct was ineffective
in hiring the experts or in the material furnished.  There also has been
no showing that the mental health experts were ineffective.  The
defendant seems to argue that because his expert reached a different
result that “res ipsa,” someone was ineffective.
State v. Johnson order at 11-12, (footnote omitted).
Ake requires that a defendant have access to a “competent psychiatrist who
will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and
presentation of the defense.”  470 U.S. at 83.  The experts who testified at the
evidentiary hearing agreed with the experts who testified for Johnson at his trial. 
The experts who testified at trial based their conclusions on interviews with
Johnson that included information of his family history, drug abuse, and past
psychotic episode.  No deficiency was shown in their examinations, nor has
Johnson shown any deficiency on the part of counsel in hiring or providing
information to these experts.  Johnson’s experts performed all the essential tasks
required by Ake, and Johnson has not shown any violation.  Accordingly, we find
no merit in this claim.
Claim VI.  Summary Denial of Claims
Johnson contends that the circuit court erred in summarily denying eighteen
7Johnson claims the circuit court summarily denied claims 1-4, 6, 7, 9, 12, 14, 16-19, 21, 23-25,
and 26.
8The court found the following claims were procedurally barred because they either could have
been raised on direct appeal or were raised on direct appeal and found to be without merit:  claims 4, 6,
14, 16, 17, 18, 23, and 24.  The trial court found the following claims to be a repeat of earlier claims and
summarily denied relief:  claims 12, 21, and 26.
9The circuit court found that the substantive portions of the following claims could have been raised
on direct appeal or were raised on direct appeal and found the portion of the claim regarding ineffective
assistance of counsel to be without merit: claims 2, 9, and 19.
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claims in his 3.850 motion.7  We find no error in the circuit court’s order.  The
court properly found eight of these claims to be procedurally barred because they
were raised or could have been raised on direct appeal, see Valle v. State, 705 So.
2d 1331, 1335 (Fla. 1997), and three to be duplicative of issues raised elsewhere in
the brief.8  Three claims were issues that should have been raised on direct appeal
but were recast as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  The circuit court
found that the substantive portion of these claims could have been raised on direct
appeal or were raised on direct appeal, and after setting forth analysis, the court
appropriately found the portion of the claim regarding ineffective assistance of
counsel to be without merit.9
Of those remaining, claims 1, 3, and 7 were not summarily denied but were
supported with record citation or analysis.  Additionally, claim 25 regarding jury
misconduct was properly found to be facially insufficient to warrant relief because
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Johnson failed to make any factual allegations that would support relief.  Judge
Bentley's order sets forth his rationale for rejecting Johnson's claims, which
conclusively shows that Johnson is not entitled to relief.  See Hoffman v. State, 571
So. 2d 449, 450 (Fla. 1990).
Claim VII.  Venue
Johnson claims that the circuit court erred in ruling that venue was
appropriate in Polk County for hearing Johnson’s rule 3.850 motion.  Rule 3.850
requires the initial filing of a motion under this rule in the court that entered
judgment.  However, the rule does not state that venue must remain in that court.  In
deciding whether a change of venue is proper a court considers whether the general
state of mind of the residents is so infected by knowledge of the case and
accompanying prejudice that jurors could not possibly put that information out of
their minds and try the case solely on the evidence presented.  See McCaskill v.
State, 344 So. 2d 1276 (Fla. 1977).  These same concerns are not raised on a rule
3.850 motion, in which there is no jury.  Johnson cites no support for his argument
and has not shown how the choice of venue prejudiced him.  Thus, this claim has
no merit.
Claim VIII.  Cumulative Error
Johnson alleges that the circuit court erred in refusing to consider his
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cumulative error claim.  All of Johnson's claims were either meritless or
procedurally barred; therefore, there was no cumulative effect to consider.  See
Melendez v. State, 718 So.2d 746, 749 (Fla. 1998).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of Johnson’s
amended rule 3.850 motion.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and HARDING and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
SHAW, ANSTEAD and PARIENTE, JJ., concur in result only.
QUINCE, J., recused.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Polk County,
E. Randolph Bentley, Senior Judge - Case No. CF81-01112A1
Gregory C. Smith, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel - Northern Region, Andrew
Thomas, Chief Assistant CCC and Heidi E. Brewer, Assistant CCC - Northern
Region, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellant
-34-
Robert A. Butterworth Attorney General, and Candance M. Sabella, Assistant
Attorney General, Tampa, Florida,
for Appellee