Title: In re Consolidated Objections to Tax Levies of School District No. 205
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 88267
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: October 26, 2000

Docket No. 88267-Agenda 20-May 2000.
In re CONSOLIDATED OBJECTIONS TO TAX LEVIES OF
SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 205, For the Years 1991 Through 1996
(People Who Care, Appellant, v. Tax Objectors, Appellees).
Opinion filed October 26, 2000.
	JUSTICE BILANDIC delivered the opinion of the court:
	This appeal arises from objections filed by tax objectors
challenging the real estate taxes levied by the board of education
of Rockford School District No. 205 (school district) to fund
equitable remedies ordered in separate federal litigation involving
school desegregation. The circuit court of Winnebago and Boone
Counties granted summary judgment in favor of the tax objectors
and held that the provisions of article IX of the Local
Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act
(Tort Immunity Act) (745 ILCS 10/9-101 et seq. (West 1998)) did
not authorize funding the equitable remedies in this case. When
the school district did not file an interlocutory appeal, People Who
Care, the plaintiff in the federal litigation, filed a petition to
intervene. The circuit court allowed the petition and certified
questions for appellate review. On interlocutory appeal, the
appellate court answered the certified questions and affirmed the
circuit court's ruling. 306 Ill. App. 3d 1104. We granted People
Who Care's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315. 
	This court granted leave to file amicus curiae briefs in support
of People Who Care. The Illinois Association of School Boards,
the Illinois Association of School Administrators, and the board of
education of the City of Chicago filed a joint brief, as did the
Chicago Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc.,
the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, and
the American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois. The Large Unit
District Association filed its own amicus brief.
	For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the
appellate court.
BACKGROUND
	In 1989, People Who Care filed a class action against the
school district in federal court, alleging that the school district had
engaged in a pattern of intentional segregation and discrimination
on a system-wide basis. In that action, People Who Care sought
equitable and declaratory relief, and specifically requested
injunctive relief. Prior to full adjudication on the merits, the
parties entered into two court-approved interim agreements, where
liability was not admitted. The first interim order modified a
reorganization plan adopted previously by the school district. The
second interim order was in the form of a preliminary injunction
pursuant to which the school district was directed to carry out a
detailed and comprehensive plan for system-wide changes in the
operation of its schools. In conjunction with the second interim
order, the federal court found that the school district was
authorized to use the Tort Immunity Act to fund the cost of the
remedial measures. This allowed the school district to levy
additional property taxes and issue bonds.
	In 1993, following a hearing, the magistrate judge issued a
report, recommending that the school district be held liable for
violating the constitutional rights of the minority student class.
The federal court in 1994 entered a declaratory judgment order
holding that the school district had unlawfully segregated and
discriminated against its students. The federal court also entered
a permanent injunction order against the school district, directing
it to eliminate all vestiges of discrimination against the African-American and Hispanic students. People Who Care v. Rockford
Board of Education School District #205, 851 F. Supp. 905 (N.D.
Ill. 1994).
	In 1996, the federal court entered a "Comprehensive Remedial
Order" (CRO), requiring the School District to implement and
fund detailed system-wide desegregation remedies including a
student assignment plan to desegregate schools, educational
programs to address discrimination, and long-term capital
improvements such as the renovation and construction of schools.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals modified certain portions of
the remedial requirements set forth in the CRO. People Who Care
v. Rockford Board of Education School District No. 205, 111 F.3d 528 (7th Cir. 1997). Throughout this time, beginning with the first
interim order, funds to implement remedial programs were raised
by real estate taxes levied and bonds issued under the Tort
Immunity Act. 
	Separate from the aforementioned federal class action, tax
objectors challenged the 1991 through 1996 real estate taxes levied
by the school district under the Tort Immunity Act to fund the
desegregation remedies in the federal class action. The school
district successfully had the cases removed to federal court. The
federal court ruled that the school district had the authority under
the Tort Immunity Act to levy taxes to pay for the desegregation
remedies. In re Application of the County Collector of the County
of Winnebago, Illinois, for Judgment &amp; Order of Sale for Taxes on
Lands &amp; Lots upon Which the General Taxes &amp;/or Special
Assessments for the Year[s] 1991, 1992 &amp; 1993 are Delinquent,
918 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. Ill. 1996). The Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed on jurisdictional grounds and remanded the
matter to the circuit court of Illinois. In re Application of County
Collector, 96 F.3d 890 (7th Cir. 1996).
	Upon remand from the federal court, the circuit court granted
summary judgment in favor of the tax objectors. The circuit court
determined that the Tort Immunity Act did not authorize the
school district to pay for remedial measures implemented under
the second interim order. The circuit court also determined that the
Tort Immunity Act did not authorize the school district to pay for
desegregation remedies ordered by the federal district court
subsequent to the liability determination.
	When the school district did not pursue an interlocutory
appeal from the circuit court's ruling, People Who Care was
granted leave to intervene. The circuit court then certified the
following questions of law for interlocutory appeal pursuant to
Supreme Court Rule 308 (155 Ill. 2d R. 308):
			"(a) Whether the Rockford School District (the
'District') was authorized by the Illinois Local
Government Employees Tort Immunity Act ('the Tort
Immunity Act') to levy taxes to fund remedies agreed to
by the District and/or ordered by the Federal Court in
People 	Who Care v. Rockford Board of Education 89 C
20168 ('the People Who Care case'):
			(i) in a 1991 consent decree;
			(ii) after the District was adjudicated guilty in 1994 and
enjoined generally to provide a comprehensive remedy;
and/or
			(iii) after a Comprehensive Remedial Order was entered
in 1996 and the District was expressly ordered by the
Federal Court to use the Tort Immunity Act levy to fund
the remedies (including FY 97 remedial programs and
Certificates of Participation)[.]
			(b) Whether the District was authorized by the Tort
Immunity Act to levy taxes to pay the debt service on
general obligation bonds issued to fund capital
improvement remedies agreed to by the District or
ordered by the Federal Court in the People Who Care
case[.]
			(c) Whether taxpayers are precluded from challenging
any of the aforesaid taxes under principles of res judicata
or collateral estoppel[.]"(1) 
	The appellate court initially denied People Who Care's
application for leave to appeal; however, this court issued a
supervisory order directing the appellate court to allow the appeal
and to answer the certified questions. The appellate court
answered certified questions "(a)" and "(b)" in the negative. The
appellate court declined to address certified question "(c)" and
found it waived because the parties did not brief that question. The
appellate court therefore affirmed the circuit court's rulings that
the use of the tax levies under the Tort Immunity Act to fund
remedies in the People Who Care case was not authorized.
ANALYSIS
	The issue before this court, as presented in the certified
questions, essentially is whether the school district is authorized
under the Tort Immunity Act to levy taxes to fund the cost of
complying with injunctive remedies. Because this issue involves
the interpretation of a statute, which is a question of law, we
conduct de novo review. Department of Public Aid ex rel. Davis
v. Brewer, 183 Ill. 2d 540, 554 (1998); Lucas v. Lakin, 175 Ill. 2d 166, 171 (1997).
	In construing the meaning of a statute, this court's primary
objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the
legislature. The language of the statute provides the best indication
of the legislature's intent. Department of Public Aid, 183 Ill. 2d  at
554. We will not depart from the plain language of the statute by
reading into it exceptions, limitations or conditions conflicting
with the express legislative intent. Barnett v. Zion Park District,
171 Ill. 2d 378, 389 (1996). Moreover, where the statutory
language is clear and unambiguous, it will be given effect without
resorting to other aids of construction. Gem Electronics of
Monmouth, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 183 Ill. 2d 470, 475
(1998). We also note that statutes imposing a tax are strictly
construed against the government and in favor of the taxpayer.
Gem Electronics, 183 Ill. 2d  at 475. Keeping these principles of
statutory construction in mind, we now examine the relevant
provisions of the Tort Immunity Act.
	Sections 9-107 and 9-102 (745 ILCS 10/9-107, 9-102 (West
1998)) are the two provisions of the Tort Immunity Act directly at
issue in this appeal. Both provisions fall under article IX of the
Tort Immunity Act, which is entitled "Payment of Claims and
Judgment." 745 ILCS 10/9-101 et seq. (West 1998). Section
9-107 authorizes a local public entity to levy taxes upon all
taxable property within its territory for purposes of section 9-102.
745 ILCS 10/9-107 (West 1998). Section 9-102 of the Tort
Immunity Act in turn empowers a local public entity "to pay any
tort judgment or settlement for compensatory damages for which
it *** is liable in the manner provided in this Article." 745 ILCS
10/9-102 (West 1998). It is evident from these provisions that
section 9-107 sets forth a tax-levy power and section 9-102
explains the circumstances for utilizing such a tax levy. The issue
here is whether section 9-102 provides authority for the school
district to levy taxes in this case under section 9-107.
	In addressing this issue, we must resolve whether the
injunctive remedies in this case constitute "compensatory
damages" within the meaning of section 9-102. The term
"compensatory damages" is not defined in section 9-102 or
anywhere else in the Tort Immunity Act. Accordingly, we rely on
the plain and ordinary meaning of the word. See In re Estate of
Callahan, 144 Ill. 2d 32, 43 (1991). We also apply a strict
construction of the term because it is included in a statute that
should be considered a taxing statute given the tax-levy provision
in section 9-107. See Canteen Corp. v. Department of Revenue,
123 Ill. 2d 95, 105 (1988).
	Compensatory damages are "[d]amages sufficient in amount
to indemnify the injured person for the loss suffered." Black's Law
Dictionary 394 (7th ed. 1999). Damages in turn are "[m]oney
claimed by, or ordered to be paid to, a person as compensation for
loss or injury ." Black's Law Dictionary 393 (7th ed.1999). In light
of these definitions, the plain meaning of the term "compensatory
damages" is a monetary award paid to a person as compensation
for loss or injury. We hold that the use of the term "compensatory
damages" in section 9-102 limits application of that provision to
the payment of monetary awards in tort judgments or settlements. 
	People Who Care argues that the term "compensatory
damages" is not limited to monetary awards but also includes the
costs of complying with injunctive remedies. An injunction,
however, is "[a] court order commanding or preventing an action."
Black's Law Dictionary 788 (7th ed. 1999). "Compensatory
damages" clearly differ from an injunction such that injunctive
remedies do not constitute "compensatory damages." Accordingly,
section 9-102 does not apply to the payment of costs of complying
with injunctive relief.
	In support of its argument, People Who Care asserts that this
court's decision in Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual
Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90 (1992), is controlling in determining
the definition of "compensatory damages" as used in section
9-102. We disagree.
	Outboard Marine involved a dispute between an insured and
its insurance company regarding the insurance company's duty to
defend the insured against underlying environmental
contamination actions brought by governmental agencies. The
issue before this court in Outboard Marine concerned the
construction of insurance policies, which required the insurance
company to defend "suits against the insured seeking damages."
The court therefore addressed whether the underlying actions
against the insured, which sought primarily equitable relief in the
form of mandatory injunctions and the costs of complying with the
mandatory injunctions, fell within the coverage afforded by the
policies so as to trigger a duty to defend.
	In construing the insurance policies' provision regarding
"damages," this court sought to determine the intent of the parties
as to the damages covered by the policies. The court noted that,
because the policies were comprehensive general liability
insurance policies, they were broad types of policies requiring the
insurer to assume a wide scope of risks. Outboard Marine, 154 Ill. 2d  at 115. In light of the broad nature of the policies, the court
then interpreted the term "damages," which the policies did not
define. The court examined Webster's definition of damages and
noted that it contained no distinction between legal compensatory
damages or the costs of complying with a mandatory injunction.
Outboard Marine, 154 Ill. 2d  at 115-16. Rather, damages includes
the money required to be expended in order to right a wrong.
Outboard Marine, 154 Ill. 2d  at 116. The court then determined
that, given the broad scope of the comprehensive general liability
policies and the dictionary definition of damages, the parties
intended the policies to cover liability for property damage
regardless of whether liability is equitable or legal in nature.
Outboard Marine, 154 Ill. 2d  at 117. Consequently, the policies
covered costs incurred in complying with injunctive remedies
because such costs constituted damages. Therefore, the court held
that, under the policies at issue, the underlying actions were suits
seeking damages so as to trigger the insurance company's duty to
defend the insured. Outboard Marine, 154 Ill. 2d  at 117.
	Our decision in Outboard Marine has no application to this
case. Unlike the issue in this case, it did not involve the
construction of a taxing statute or the application of the Tort
Immunity Act. Outboard Marine involved the interpretation of
insurance policies between contracting parties. Its discussion of
damages was in the context of broad insurance policies and with
respect to the policies' intended scope of coverage. Our
determination in Outboard Marine that the term "damages"
included the costs of complying with a mandatory injunction is
therefore not applicable to the interpretation of "compensatory
damages" contained in section 9-102 of the Tort Immunity Act.
Parenthetically, we note, however, that the court in Outboard
Marine acknowledged the difference between "compensatory
damages" and equitable relief by referring to "compensatory
damages" separately from the costs of complying with a
mandatory injunction. Outboard Marine, 154 Ill. 2d  at 115-17.
	We note that when construing a statute, a court also considers
each provision of the statute in connection with every other section
(Barnett, 171 Ill. 2d at 388-89), and the purposes to be achieved by
the law (In re Estate of Callahan, 144 Ill. 2d at 43). For this
reason, we examine section 2-101 of the Tort Immunity Act and
the purpose underlying the Tort Immunity Act in construing the
term "compensatory damages."
	Section 2-101, which is part of article II of the Tort Immunity
Act, states in pertinent part that "[n]othing in this Act affects the
right to obtain relief other than damages against a local public
entity or public employee." 745 ILCS 10/2-101 (West 1998). The
phrase "[n]othing in this Act" indicates that section 2-101 applies
to the entire Tort Immunity Act, and that it is not limited to the
sections contained in article II, which addresses the scope of
immunities. Consequently, section 2-101 provides guidance
regarding the relief that may be paid and funded through a tax levy
under article IX of the Tort Immunity Act. Moreover, section
2-101 recognizes the distinction between damages and other types
of relief. The phrase "relief other than damages" contained therein
refers to injunctive relief. See Romano v. Village of Glenview, 277
Ill. App. 3d 406, 410-11 (1995) (determining that, although the
injunction in that case may have required the expenditure of
money, injunctive relief did not constitute damages under the Tort
Immunity Act); Anderson v. Sutter, 119 Ill. App. 3d 1070, 1074-75
(1983) (determining that the Tort Immunity Act does not apply to
a suit for an injunction because injunctive relief constitutes relief
other than damages under section 2-101). This interpretation is
supported by the traditional distinction between damages remedies
and injunction remedies. See D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies §1.1 at
3, 7 (2d ed. 1993) (stating that the damages remedy is a money
remedy aimed at making good the plaintiff's losses, whereas the
injunction is a personal command to the defendant to act or to
avoid acting in a certain way); Restatement (Second) of Torts
§944, at 600 (1979) (noting the adequacy of damages test in
determining the appropriateness of an injunction as a remedy).
Accordingly, we construe section 2-101 as excluding injunctive
remedies from the requirements of the Tort Immunity Act.
	Our interpretation of section 2-101 as distinguishing between
damages and injunction is supported by the purpose for the
enactment of the Tort Immunity Act. In Molitor v. Kaneland
Community Unit District No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11 (1959), the court
addressed whether a school district should be immune from tort
liability to a plaintiff who sought monetary relief for negligently
inflicted personal injury arising from a school bus accident. In
resolving this issue, the court examined the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, which immunized a governmental unit from tort
liability and which had been extended to school districts. The
court noted that, under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, local
government units had immunity from the "payment of damage
claims." Molitor, 18 Ill. 2d  at 16. The court made the following
observations regarding sovereign immunity and its focus on the
payment of damages:
			"It is a basic concept underlying the whole law of torts
today that liability follows negligence, and that
individuals and corporations are responsible for the
negligence of their agents and employees acting in the
course of their employment. The doctrine of governmental
immunity runs directly counter to that basic concept.
What reasons, then, are so impelling as to allow a school
district, as a quasi-municipal corporation, to commit
wrongdoing without any responsibility to its victims,
while any individual or private corporation would be
called to task in court for such tortious conduct?
* * *
			*** [W]hen viewed in the light of the Illinois School
Code, which authorizes appropriations for 'transportation
purposes' *** [i]t seems to us that the payment of damage
claims incurred as an adjunct to transportation is as much
a 'transportation purpose' and therefore a proper
authorized purpose as are payments of other expenses
involved in operating school buses." (Emphasis added.)
Molitor, 18 Ill. 2d  at 20-23.
The court ultimately abolished the school district's immunity from
tort liability, which therefore could no longer shield the school
district from the plaintiff's negligence claim for monetary relief.
Molitor, 18 Ill. 2d  at 25.
	In 1965, the legislature responded to the Molitor decision by
enacting the Tort Immunity Act. 1965 Ill. Laws 2983. Evident
from the legislature's response to Molitor is that the purpose
behind the Tort Immunity Act is to subject local governmental
units to liability in tort on the same basis as private tortfeasors
with the exception for those immunities provided by the Act. See
Barnett, 171 Ill. 2d  at 386. Further evident from Molitor, which
focused on monetary awards, is that, at the time the legislature
adopted the Tort Immunity Act, issues of tort liability and tort
immunity arose in the context of remedies for damages and not
injunctive remedies. The Tort Immunity Act was therefore enacted
to deal with damages remedies. Thus, the purpose underlying the
Tort Immunity Act and its provisions as a whole reinforce our
construction of the term "compensatory damages" as excluding
injunctive remedies.
	People Who Care contends that legislative debates and recent
legislative actions demonstrate that the Tort Immunity Act applies
to injunctive relief. Although we need not resort to legislative
history to construe a statute whose meaning is plain, we note that
this history does not conflict with our interpretation of the Tort
Immunity Act. See Heck v. Central Illinois Light Co., 152 Ill. 2d 401, 405-06 (1992) (no rule of construction authorizes a court to
declare that the legislature did not mean what the plain language
of a statute imports.)
	In 1986, the legislature amended section 9-102 to insert the
term "compensatory damages." Pub. Act 84-1431, eff. November
25, 1986 (amending 745 ILCS 10/9-102 (West 1996). This
language was added shortly after the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeal's decision in Kolar v. County of Sangamon, 756 F.2d 564
(7th Cir. 1985), which held that punitive damages could be
recovered from the local county under section 9-102 of the Tort
Immunity Act. At the time of the Kolar decision, section 9-102
provided that "[a] local public entity is empowered and directed to
pay any tort judgment or settlement" (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 85,
par. 9-102).The Kolar court reasoned that the recovery of punitive
damages from the county was allowed because section 9-102
implicitly waived the county's immunity from punitive damage
awards by failing to distinguish between compensatory and
punitive damages. Kolar, 756 F.2d  at 567. After Kolar, the
legislature amended section 9-102 by inserting the term
"compensatory damages." The legislative debates indicate that the
legislature was concerned with eliminating the recovery of
punitive damages from a local public entity. 84th Ill. Gen. Assem.,
House Proceedings, June 30, 1986, at 28, 31. Nevertheless, there
is no indication in those legislative debates that the term
"compensatory damages" was added only to prevent liability for
punitive damages. Likewise, there is no indication in the debates
that "compensatory damages" was intended to include injunctive
remedies.
	More recently, there have been failed attempts to amend the
Tort Immunity Act to exclude specifically the levying of taxes by
a local public entity to fund the costs of complying with equitable
remedies or with an injunction. See 90th Ill. Gen. Assem., House
Bill 3212, 1998 Sess.; 90th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Bill 863, 1997
Sess.; 90th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Bill 562, 1997 Sess.; 89th Ill.
Gen. Assem., Senate Bill 649, 1996 Sess. People Who Care argue
that these failed attempts show that the legislature intended
"compensatory damages" to include the costs of complying with
an injunction. We disagree. The debates in the House regarding
House Bill 3212 provide some insight into the House's rejection
of that bill. See Legislative Synopsis and Digest, 90th Ill. Gen.
Assem., House Bill 3212, 1998 Sess. The following discussion
occurred in considering House Bill 3212:
			"Winters: '*** The House Bill 3212 deals with the Tort
Immunity Act and basically, we're trying to reign in the
judiciary where they're making demands on taxpayers
without referendum. This Bill will deal with school
districts and only with the lawsuits that deal with
equitable remedies. It does not affect the school district
and its defense of damage lawsuits. ***'
* * *
			Davis, M.: 'Representative Winters, there was a court
case in Rockford and a [federal] 	judge ruled that what
should happen?'
			***
			Davis, M.: '*** [I]f you pass this Bill, Representative
Winters, what you're doing is saying, "you don't want to
abide by the judge's decision["] ***.'
			Winters: 'That is incorrect. The school district ***
would still have to abide by the judge's order. They
simply would not have access to the Tort Immunity Fund
to do that.'
* * *
			Pugh: '*** I submit to you, once again, that the Tort
Immunity Fund is, was designed to be used for actual
damages.'
			 ***
			 '*** Not for equitable remedies.'
 * * *
			'... But the judge interprets the law and ***'
			***
			 '*** it is up to the judicial branch of government to
interpret the law. So, it is out of our hands ***.' " 90th Ill.
Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, April 1, 1998, at 233-34, 241-42.
These comments indicate that Representative Pugh opposed the
bill not because he believed that section 9-102 involved equitable
remedies, but because he would not go against the federal court
decision ordering such remedies and their funding under the Tort
Immunity Act. Such comments do not reveal any legislative intent
that section 9-102 applies to equitable remedies, including
injunction or the cost of complying with an injunction. The other
mentioned bills are of no assistance in ascertaining legislative
intent as espoused by People Who Care. See Maiter v. Chicago
Board of Education, 82 Ill. 2d 373, 385 (1980) (noting that the
failure of a legislative committee to act favorably on a proposed
bill should not be relied upon, in the absence of an indication as to
the reason for the failure, to ascertain legislative intent). House
Bill 863 received postponed consideration (90th Ill. Gen. Assem.,
House Proceedings, April 12, 1997, at 65, 74); Senate Bill 562
was referred to committee, where it remained dormant (Legislative
Synopsis and Digest, 90th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Bill 562, 1997
Sess.); and Senate Bill 649 was referred to committee and then
died in session without debate (Legislative Synopsis and Digest,
89th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Bill 649, 1996 Sess.).
	Finally, People Who Care rely on the policy statement
recently included as an amendment to section 9-107. Pub. Act
91-628, eff. January 1, 2000 (amending 745 ILCS 10/9-107 (West 
1998)). The policy statement provides:
			"(a) The General Assembly finds that the purpose of
this Section is to provide an extraordinary tax for funding
expenses relating to tort liability, insurance, and risk
management programs. Thus, the tax has been excluded
from various limitations otherwise applicable to tax
levies. Notwithstanding the extraordinary nature of the tax
authorized by this Section, however, it has become
apparent that some units of local government are using the
tax revenue to fund expenses more properly paid from
general operating funds. These uses of the revenue are
inconsistent with the limited purpose of the tax
authorization.
			Therefore, the General Assembly declares, as a matter
of policy, that (i) the use of the tax revenue authorized by
this Section for purposes not expressly authorized under
this Act is improper and (ii) the provisions of this Section
shall be strictly construed consistent with this declaration
and the Act's express purposes." 745 ILCS 10/9-107
(West Supp. 1999).
People Who Care insists that this policy statement shows a
legislative intent that any expense relating to tort liability,
including the expenditure of money for injunctive remedies,
should be funded under the Tort Immunity Act. We disagree. The
amendment does not broaden the tax-levy power set forth in
section 9-107. Rather, it states that the tax-levy power is to be
strictly construed and limited to proper purposes. Moreover,
although the House debates concerning the policy statement
indicate that it was not targeting the injunctive remedies at issue
in this case, those debates do not show that such injunctive
remedies were in fact considered included within the tax levy set
forth in section 9-107. 91st Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings,
May 26, 1999, at 3. 
	Having interpreted the relevant provisions of the Tort
Immunity Act, we now apply that interpretation to the tax levies
in this case. The remedies at issue clearly involve mandatory
injunctive relief and not compensatory damages awarded to the
plaintiffs. Because the injunctive relief ordered is not
compensatory damages under section 9-102, it cannot be funded
under section 9-107. Consequently, the Tort Immunity Act does
not authorize the levying of taxes to fund desegregation remedies
and to pay the debt service on general obligation bonds.
	Before concluding, we note People Who Care's argument that
public policy requires an interpretation of the Tort Immunity Act
that authorizes funding for injunctive remedies. It asserts that such
an interpretation avoids a disruption of government functions,
facilitates prompt vindication of citizen rights, avoids unnecessary
interference in state and local government by the federal court, and
avoids a waste of public funds. Although these public policy
concerns may be valid, they do not override the express legislative
intent as set forth in the language of the Tort Immunity Act.
CONCLUSION
	For the reasons stated, the Tort Immunity Act does not
authorize the school district to levy taxes to fund the injunctive
remedies at issue. We therefore agree with the appellate court that
certified questions (a) and (b) are answered in the negative.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.
Affirmed.
	The issue before the court in this case is whether article IX of
the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort
Immunity Act (Act) (745 ILCS 10/9-101 et seq. (West 1998))
authorizes the Rockford Board of Education School District No.
205 (school district) to levy taxes and to issue bonds to pay for
remedies that a federal court ordered in a school desegregation and
educational discrimination case. The majority holds that it does
not.
	I disagree. The majority misapprehends several fundamental
legal concepts pertaining to: (1) judicial remedies generally, and
(2) school desegregation remedies specifically. As a result, this
court thwarts the voluntary efforts of a local public entity to
remedy a grievous constitutional wrong, and invites direct federal
judicial intervention in the operation of a local public school
district. Accordingly, I dissent.
I. Judicial Remedies Generally

	Section 9-102 of the Act authorizes a local public entity, in
this case a school district (see 745 ILCS 10/1-206 (West 1998)),
"to pay any tort judgment or settlement for compensatory damages
for which it *** is liable in the manner provided in this Article."
745 ILCS 10/9-102 (West 1998). The majority interprets the term
"compensatory damages" in section 9-102 of the Act as excluding
the cost of complying with injunctive remedies. Invoking the
"plain language" rule of statutory interpretation (slip op. at 5), the
majority simply refers to a legal dictionary, compares the meaning
of "damages" to that of an "injunction," and states the obvious,
i.e., that the terms have different narrow and technical meanings.
The majority then reasons that section 9-102 "does not apply to
the payment of costs of complying with injunctive relief." Slip op.
at 6.
	The majority's "plain language" analysis fails. Initially, the
majority's reference to a legal dictionary in search of the "plain
and ordinary" meaning of these terms is not dispositive. While this
reference yields a rigid distinction between legal damages and
equitable relief, a reference to a general dictionary yields a
different result. Only eight years ago, this court noted the
fluid-and popularly understood-relationship between legal
damages and equitable relief. In Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty
Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90 (1992), this court broadly
interpreted the term "damages":
		"Webster's dictionary defines 'damages' as 'the estimated
reparation in money for detriment or injury sustained:
compensation or satisfaction imposed by law for a wrong
or injury caused by a violation of a legal right.'
(Webster's Third New International Dictionary 571
(1986).) This definition does not distinguish between
legal compensatory damages or the costs of complying
with a mandatory injunction. It merely indicates that
'damages' stands for the money required to be expended
in order to right a wrong. To the popular mind, to most
people, to ordinary laypersons, 'damages' connotes
money one must expend to remedy an injury for which he
or she is responsible, irrespective of whether that
expenditure is compelled by a court of law in the form of
compensatory damages or by a court of equity in the form
of compliance with mandatory injunctions." Outboard
Marine, 154 Ill. 2d  at 115-16.
	The majority now attempts to distinguish this court's proper
interpretation of compensatory damages in Outboard Marine from
the narrow and technical interpretation of the same term in this
case. The majority reasons that, unlike this case, Outboard Marine
was an insurance coverage case in an environmental cleanup
context. Slip op. at 7-8. This distinction fails to persuade me, as it
failed to persuade the federal district court in the school
desegregation class action. "What makes Outboard Marine
applicable to this case is its reliance on the plain and ordinary
definition of damages, which is based on a rule of construction
that it equally applicable in the statutory interpretation context.
The distinctions, while apparent, are of no difference." In re
Application of the County Collector, 918 F. Supp. 235, 241 n.8
(N.D. Ill. 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 96 F.3d 890 (7th Cir.
1996).
	This court has stated that it is reluctant to abandon or modify
a recent precedent. "The People and the bar of this State are
entitled to rely upon our decisions with assurance that they will not
be lightly overruled." Moehle v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 93 Ill. 2d 299, 304 (1982). Indeed, the federal district court in this litigation
relied upon this court's interpretation of compensatory damages in
Outboard Marine. In re Application of the County Collector, 918 F. Supp.  at 240-41. This court does a disservice to anyone who
looks to it for a definition of Illinois law when it finds different
meanings of "plain language" to reach different results in
particular cases.
	Reference to a dictionary aside, "common law meanings of
words and terms may be assumed to apply in statutes dealing with
new or different subject matter, to the extent that they appear
fitting and absent evidence indicating a contrary meaning."
Advincula v. United Blood Services, 176 Ill. 2d 1, 17 (1996), citing
2B N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction §50.03, at 103
(5th ed. 1992).
	The rigid distinction that the majority attempts to make
between legal damages and equitable relief fades against the
backdrop of fundamental common law principles. A court of
equity, which has obtained jurisdiction of a cause on any ground,
or for any purpose, will retain jurisdiction to administer complete
relief and do full justice in the case. The court will do this whether
the rights and remedies involved are "legal" or "equitable."
McLeod v. Lambdin, 22 Ill. 2d 232, 236 (1961)(describing
principle as "axiomatic"). Accordingly, to afford complete relief,
a court of equity may award damages as an adjunct to its equity
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Garden City Sand Co. v. Southern Fire
Brick &amp; Clay Co., 260 Ill. 231, 236-42 (1913)(party may be liable
for damages in equity); see generally 27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity
§§103 through 05, 252 (1996); 42 Am. Jur. 2d Injunctions §§271,
272 (2000); 30A C.J.S. Equity §§72 through 77 (1992); 21A Ill. L.
&amp; Prac. Injunctions §243 (1977). In other words, a court of equity
can issue an "injunction," i.e., the court can order the performance
of an act. See slip op. at 6, quoting Black's Law Dictionary 788
(7th ed. 1999). One such act can be the payment of a personal
judgment or the recovery of damages. See 27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity
§105, at 591 (1996).
	These principles indicate that "injunctive remedies" can
greatly resemble "damages." The majority's conclusion to the
contrary is inaccurate. Slip op. at 6.


II. School Desegregation Remedies


	After rigidly and narrowly interpreting the term
"compensatory damages" in section 9-102 of the Act, the majority
then concludes that the school desegregation remedies in the
federal class action "clearly involve mandatory injunctive relief
and not compensatory damages awarded to the plaintiffs." Slip op.
at 14. The majority overlooks settled federal law.
	A federal injunction can have a substantial ancillary effect on
the state treasury. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 278, 92 L. Ed. 2d 209, 227, 106 S. Ct. 2932, 2940 (1986). Federal courts have
ordered state officials to stop violating federal law by refraining
from doing particular activities, e.g., violating civil rights, or
specifically, discriminating in schools, "even if it would cost the
state some money." Robbins Resource Recovery Partners, L.P. v.
Edgar, 947 F. Supp. 1205, 1210 (N.D. Ill. 1996)(collecting cases).
	In the specific context of school desegregation remedies, I
agree with the federal district court's reasoning in this litigation:
			"The court also finds that the nature of the remedies
sought in the PWC [People Who Care] case are of the
type contemplated by the term 'damages' in the Tort
Immunity Act. While the PWC case may be characterized
generally as one of equity seeking mandatory injunctive
relief, it is unique in the type of relief it seeks. The
essence of the injury alleged in the PWC case is a denial
of an education for minority students comparable to that
afforded to white students in the district. The
commensurate relief sought is an education comparable to
that afforded to white students. What was lost was equal
education, what is sought is equal education. The People
Who Care plaintiffs do not seek purely some action on the
part of the school district to prevent future injury, or in
other words, the classic prospective relief associated with
injunctive actions. Rather, much of what the People Who
Care plaintiffs request in their lawsuit is compensation for
past wrongs, and for this type of past wrong, direct money
compensation to the class plaintiffs is not the appropriate
remedy. For the school district's stock in trade is
education. An equal educational opportunity was denied,
and that is what ultimately must be provided through
monies received by the tax levies.
			This notion finds support in Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 97 S. Ct. 2749, 53 L. Ed. 2d 745 (1977). While
addressing a different issue, the United States Supreme
Court discussed the nature of the relief sought in a school
desegregation lawsuit. [Citation.] *** [T]he Court also
recognized the compensatory nature of such relief. In that
regard, the Court stated that the fact that 'the programs are
also "compensatory" in nature does not change the fact
that they are part of a plan that operates prospectively to
bring about the delayed benefits of a unitary school
system.' Id. at 290, 97 S. Ct.  at 2762. (Emphasis in
original.)
			The court here considers this language from Milliken to
support its characterization of the relief sought in the
PWC case. Clearly, the relief requested has components
of both traditional injunctive and compensatory relief. It
is the significant compensatory aspects of the remedies
sought, however, that bring it within the ambit of the Tort
Immunity Act's tax levying provisions." In re Application
of the County Collector, 918 F. Supp.  at 242.
The majority misapprehends the nature of school desegregation
and educational discrimination remedies.
III. Consequences

	In the federal litigation, the school district voluntarily sought
to correct a grievous constitutional wrong and to pay for the
remedy. This court's flawed decision thwarts the school district's
voluntary efforts.
	Although this court has foiled the school district's voluntary
efforts, the federal district court has retained jurisdiction over the
federal class action. As the federal court of appeals has noted in
this litigation:
		"[I]n certain circumstances, federal courts may order
school districts to levy taxes, despite state law limitations
on their authority, where the taxes are necessary to
remedy constitutional violations. [Citation.] Federal law
is supreme, and where a particular remedy is required to
vindicate constitutional rights, a state cannot prevent a
local government from implementing that remedy." In re
Application of the County Collector, 96 F.3d 890, 904
(7th Cir. 1996).
Today's decision invites direct federal judicial intervention in the
operation of a local public school district.
CONCLUSION

	For all of the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the appellate
and circuit courts, and hold that the Act authorized the school
district to levy taxes to pay for the remedies ordered in the federal
class action. Accordingly, I dissent.
1.      1The issue presented in certified question (c) is not properly before
this court because it has not been briefed by the parties. See 155 Ill. 2d
Rs. 341(e)(7), (f).