Title: Tri-Tech Corporation of America v. Americomp Services, Inc.
Citation: 2002 WI 88
Docket Number: 2000AP003195
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 3, 2002

2002 WI 88 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-3195 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Tri-Tech Corporation of America,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Americomp Services, Inc.,  
 
Defendant, 
James Schmidt,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2001 WI App 191 
Reported at:  247 Wis. 2d 317, 633 N.W.2d 683 
(Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 3, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 5, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit    
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha   
 
JUDGE: 
J. Mac Davis   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
CONCUR/DISSENT: 
WILCOX, J., concurs in part, dissents in part 
(opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Dayten P. Hanson, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Dayten P. 
Hanson. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief by Robert J. 
Welcenbach, Michael J. Widmann and Welecenbach & Widmann, 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Robert J. Welcenbach. 
 
 
2002 WI 88 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  00-3195  
(L.C. No. 
00 CV 479) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Tri-Tech Corporation of America,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Americomp Services, Inc.,  
 
          Defendant, 
 
James Schmidt,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 3, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Waukesha County Circuit 
Court, J. Mac Davis, Circuit Court Judge.    Reversed and cause 
remanded.     
 
¶1 
DIANE S. SYKES, J.    The issue in this case is 
whether the treble damages remedy of Wis. Stat. § 895.80 (1999-
2000)1 is available for civil theft by contractor under Wis. 
Stat. § 779.02(5), and if so, whether it requires proof of the 
                                                 
1 Unless otherwise noted, all further references to the 
Wisconsin Statutes will be to the 1999-2000 version of the 
statutes. 
No. 
00-3195   
 
2 
 
elements 
of 
the 
criminal 
offense 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 943.20(1)(b), including criminal intent.  We hold 
that it is, and it does. 
¶2 
By 
its 
terms, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 779.02(5) 
makes 
misappropriation of contractor trust funds punishable as a theft 
under Wis. Stat. § 943.20.  Wisconsin Statute § 895.80, which 
provides a civil treble damages remedy to victims of certain 
intentional property crimes, includes Wis. Stat. § 943.20 as one 
of the predicate criminal offenses for which the remedy is 
available.  The elements of criminal theft by contractor under 
Wis. 
Stat. §§ 943.20(1)(b) 
and 779.02(5) include specific 
criminal intent, to-wit, that the defendant knowingly retained 
possession of or used contractor trust funds without the owner's 
consent, contrary to his authority, and with intent to convert 
such funds for his own use or the use of another. 
¶3 Here, the circuit court granted summary judgment 
awarding treble damages to the plaintiff, and the court of 
appeals affirmed.  Because the plaintiff did not present prima 
facie evidence for summary judgment on the required elements of 
the cause of action, including specific criminal intent, we 
reverse.  
I 
¶4 
In the fall of 1999, the defendant Americomp Services, 
Inc. was hired by The Frantz Group to install a computer network 
at The Frantz Group's offices in Mequon.  Americomp in turn 
hired the plaintiff Tri-Tech Corporation of America to provide 
some of the necessary materials, supplies, and services for the 
No. 
00-3195   
 
3 
 
job.  The contract was performed, The Frantz Group paid 
Americomp, and Tri-Tech billed Americomp $27,807.95 for its work 
on the subcontract.  Americomp did not pay Tri-Tech's invoice, 
and Tri-Tech sued.  
¶5 
Americomp and James Schmidt, Americomp's president and 
sole shareholder, were named as defendants.  They filed an 
answer admitting that Tri-Tech had provided materials, supplies, 
and services for The Frantz Group computer network installation 
in the sum of $27,807.95.  They also admitted receipt and 
nonpayment of Tri-Tech's invoice, although they denied the 
allegations in the complaint regarding demand for and refusal of 
payment, as well as the specific allegations regarding Tri-
Tech's theft by contractor treble damages cause of action.   
¶6 
Tri-Tech moved for summary judgment, initially against 
Americomp only.  Americomp and Schmidt then filed an amended 
answer claiming a set off in the amount of $5,700.71.  The 
summary judgment motion was scheduled to be heard on June 19, 
2000. Three days before the hearing, on June 16, 2000, Americomp 
effectuated mail service of a brief in opposition to the motion, 
together with an affidavit from Schmidt.2  In the affidavit, 
Schmidt stated that The Frantz Group did not own the property 
where the computer network installation had been performed.  He 
also stated that the work did not constitute an "improvement" to 
                                                 
2 This was late under Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2), which requires 
affidavits in opposition to summary judgment to be served at 
least five days before the hearing. 
 
No. 
00-3195   
 
4 
 
the property, and denied that Americomp was a "prime contractor" 
within the meaning of the statute. 
¶7 
The circuit court granted summary judgment against 
Americomp 
on 
its 
contract 
liability, 
in 
the 
amount 
of 
$22,107.24, which took into account the set off.  Tri-Tech 
reserved its claims against Schmidt personally. 
¶8 
A few weeks after summary judgment on the contract 
claim was granted, Tri-Tech moved for summary judgment against 
Schmidt, 
seeking 
the 
treble 
damages 
remedy 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 895.80 in the amount of $83,423.85.3  In support of 
the 
motion, 
Tri-Tech 
submitted 
Schmidt's 
answers 
to 
interrogatories, in which Schmidt again denied that the money 
paid to Americomp by The Frantz Group was for "improvements," 
and also stated that The Frantz Group did not own the property 
where the work was performed.  However, among Schmidt's 
interrogatory answers was the following: 
The money received from The Frantz Group was placed 
into the business manager account at Port Washington 
State Bank.  Port Washington Statement [sic] Bank had 
an assignment of that receivable, and it also has a 
general business security agreement encumbering all of 
the 
assets of AmeriComp, 
including the 
accounts 
receivable. 
 ¶9 Schmidt did not serve or submit any new affidavits, 
discovery materials or a brief in response to the summary 
judgment motion.  He argued at the motion hearing that the 
treble damages cause of action under Wis. Stat. § 895.80 did not 
                                                 
3 The amount demanded constituted the original amount 
claimed by Tri-Tech——$27,807.95——trebled. 
No. 
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5 
 
apply, because the statute does not list Wis. Stat. § 779.02, 
the civil theft by contractor statute, as one of the predicate 
offenses that would trigger a cause of action under the statute.  
Alternatively, 
he 
argued 
that 
the 
statute 
requires 
an 
intentional violation, and there was a factual dispute on the 
issue of intent.  Finally, Schmidt argued that the work 
performed by Tri-Tech did not constitute an "improvement" as 
that term is defined in Chapter 779, because it did not provide 
a "permanent benefit" to the property. 
¶10  The lawyers for both sides made cursory reference to 
the Schmidt affidavit filed on the earlier motion, but did not 
argue any factual matters contained in the affidavit or 
otherwise base their arguments on it.  Rather, both sides 
focused on the legal issue of whether a violation of the civil 
theft by contractor statute was eligible for the treble damages 
remedy in the first place, and whether the computer network 
cabling constituted a permanent improvement to property for 
purposes of Wis. Stat. § 779.02(5). 
¶11 The Waukesha County Circuit Court, the Honorable J. 
Mac Davis, granted Tri-Tech's motion for summary judgment 
against Schmidt.  The court concluded that the treble damages 
remedy of Wis. Stat. § 895.80 was available, because that 
statute specifically encompassed the criminal theft statute, 
Wis. Stat. § 943.20, which in turn was "cross-referenced" in the 
civil theft by contractor statute, Wis. Stat. § 779.02(5).  The 
court also concluded that the computer network cabling was an 
"improvement" for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 779.02(5), because 
No. 
00-3195   
 
6 
 
"the parties concede it's computer cabling, it's run into the 
building, complete absence of any contrary evidence, the only 
reasonable conclusion is that this is similar to electrical 
wiring or other wiring. . . ."  Finally, the circuit court held 
that the "intentional requirement doesn't require an intention 
to commit a criminal act, just requires that the conduct be 
intentional."  The court granted the summary judgment against 
Schmidt in the amount of $70,055.02.4 
¶12 Schmidt appealed, reiterating the arguments he had 
made in the circuit court.  He also argued, for the first time, 
that The Frantz Group was not a property "owner" within the 
meaning of Wis. Stat. § 779.02(5). 
¶13  The court of appeals affirmed.  The court first 
concluded that the issue of whether The Frantz Group was a 
property "owner" had been waived.  The court noted that Schmidt 
had not filed any affidavits in response to the summary judgment 
motion against him, and said he was not entitled to rely upon 
his earlier affidavit already in the record from the summary 
judgment motion against Americomp.  Tri-Tech Corp. of America v. 
Americomp Services, Inc., 2001 WI App 191, ¶14, 247 Wis. 2d 317, 
633 N.W.2d 683.  The court also invoked the waiver rule that 
disallows arguments raised for the first time on appeal.  Id. at 
¶13.  
                                                 
4 The judgment is triple the damages of the original 
judgment against Americomp ($22,107.24), plus attorney's fees 
and costs ($3,311.00).   
No. 
00-3195   
 
7 
 
¶14 The court of appeals also held as a matter of law that 
computer network cabling constituted an improvement providing a 
permanent benefit to property within the meaning of Wis. Stat. 
§§ 779.01(2)(a) and 779.02(5).  Id. at ¶19. 
¶15 Finally, the court of appeals held that the treble 
damages remedy of Wis. Stat. § 895.80 was available for civil 
theft by contractor under Wis. Stat. § 779.02(5), because the 
latter statute makes violations punishable under the criminal 
theft 
statute, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 943.20, 
which 
in 
turn 
is 
specifically enumerated as one of the predicate offenses in the 
treble damages statute.  Id. at ¶¶24-27.  The court noted, 
however, that "there is a difference between criminal and civil 
theft by contractor.  The difference is that the criminal 
statute requires wrongful intent and the civil statute does 
not."  Id. at ¶27.   
¶16  Accordingly, the court of appeals held that proof of 
criminal intent is required in a treble damages action under 
Wis. Stat. § 895.80, although only to the civil burden of proof.  
Id. at ¶¶27-29.  In defining the criminal intent required, 
however, the court of appeals was not entirely consistent. 
¶17  On the one hand, the court of appeals approved the 
circuit court's characterization of the intent element as 
requiring only proof of general intent: "The trial court in our 
case put it nicely.  It said that the 'intentional requirement 
doesn't require an intention to commit a criminal act, just 
requires that the conduct be intentional.'  The trial court was 
correct."  Id. at ¶32.  On the other hand, the court of appeals 
No. 
00-3195   
 
8 
 
cited the criminal intent definitions found in State v. 
Blaisdell, 85 Wis. 2d 172, 176, 270 N.W.2d 69 (1978), and State 
v. Hess, 99 Wis. 2d 22, 28, 298 N.W.2d 11 (Ct. App. 1980), both 
of which set forth a requirement of specific criminal intent, 
that is, proof that the defendant retained contractor trust 
funds without the owner's consent, contrary to his authority, 
and with intent to convert those funds to his own use or the use 
of another.  Id. at ¶¶31-34. 
¶18  In any event, the court of appeals held that Tri-Tech 
had established a prima facie case on criminal intent, because a 
refusal to deliver contractor trust funds on demand is prima 
facie 
evidence 
of 
criminal 
intent 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 943.20(1)(b).  Id. at ¶¶35-36.  Because Schmidt had not 
submitted any affidavits in response to the motion, the court of 
appeals concluded that he had failed to join issue on the 
criminal intent element, and affirmed the summary judgment 
against him.  ¶¶37-38.  We accepted review. 
II 
¶19 This 
case 
requires 
us 
to 
interpret 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 895.80, 779.02 and 943.20, which is a question of law subject 
to de novo review.  Fuchsgruber v. Custom Accessories, Inc., 
2001 WI 81, ¶10, 244 Wis. 2d 758, 628 N.W.2d 833.  We must also 
decide whether summary judgment was appropriately granted, which 
we do independently, although benefiting from the lower courts' 
analyses.  Yanke v. Carson, 2000 WI 74, ¶10, 236 Wis. 2d 257, 
613 N.W.2d 102. 
No. 
00-3195   
 
9 
 
¶20 Wisconsin Statute § 895.80 was enacted in 1995 as part 
of the budget bill, and provides a treble damages remedy to 
victims of certain intentional property crimes, most of which 
involve some form of theft by fraud: 
Property damage or loss.  (1)  Any person who 
suffers damage or loss by reason of intentional 
conduct that occurs on or after November 1, 1995, and 
that is prohibited under s. 943.01, 943.20, 943.21, 
943.24, 
943.26, 
943.34, 
943.395, 
943.41, 
943.50, 
943.61, or 943.76 . . . . 
(2) The burden of proof in a civil action under 
sub. (1) is with the person who suffers damage or loss 
to prove his or her case by a preponderance of the 
credible evidence. 
(3) If the plaintiff prevails in a civil action 
under sub. (1), he or she may recover all of the 
following: 
 
(a) Treble damages 
 
(b) All costs of investigation and litigation 
that were reasonably incurred. 
(4) A person may bring a civil action under sub. 
(1) regardless of whether there has been a criminal 
action related to the loss or damage under sub. (1) 
and regardless of the outcome of any such criminal 
action. 
See 1995 Wis. Act 27, § 7223m. 
¶21  A statute creating a treble damages remedy is 
regarded as punitive rather than remedial, and is strictly 
construed.  John Mohr & Sons, Inc. v. Jahnke, 55 Wis. 2d 402, 
411, 198 N.W.2d 363 (1972).  The legislature's adoption of the 
lowest civil burden of proof——"preponderance of the credible 
evidence"——is a departure from the common law rule that 
intentional fraud cases are subject to the intermediate burden 
No. 
00-3195   
 
10 
 
of "clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence."  See Carlson & 
Erickson Builders, Inc. v. Lampert Yards, Inc., 190 Wis. 2d 650, 
529 N.W.2d 905 (1995); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 
299, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980); Kuehn v. Kuehn, 11 Wis. 2d 15, 30, 
104 N.W.2d 138 (1960).   
¶22 The statute lists only criminal offenses as the 
predicates for the treble damages remedy.  The civil theft by 
contractor 
statute, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 779.02(5), 
is 
nowhere 
mentioned.  However, as both the circuit court and court of 
appeals correctly noted, the civil theft by contractor statute 
provides that a misappropriation of contractor trust funds is 
punishable 
under 
the 
criminal 
theft 
statute, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 943.20, and criminal theft is one of the offenses enumerated 
in Wis. Stat. § 895.80. 
¶23  The civil theft by contractor statute provides that 
funds paid by a property owner to a contractor for improvements 
to the property constitute a trust for the benefit of those 
having claims due and owing for labor or materials on the 
contract: 
(5) THEFT BY CONTRACTORS. The proceeds of any 
mortgage on land paid to any prime contractor or any 
subcontractor for improvements upon the mortgaged 
premises, and all moneys paid to any prime contractor 
or subcontractor by 
any 
owner 
for improvements, 
constitute a trust fund only in the hands of the prime 
contractor or subcontractor to the amount of all 
claims due or to become due or owing from the prime 
contractor or subcontractor for labor and materials 
used for the improvements, until all the claims have 
been paid, and shall not be a trust fund in the hands 
of any other person. The use of any such moneys by any 
prime 
contractor or 
subcontractor 
for 
any 
other 
No. 
00-3195   
 
11 
 
purpose until all claims, except those which are the 
subject of a bona fide dispute and then only to the 
extent of the amount actually in dispute, have been 
paid 
in 
full 
or 
proportionally 
in 
cases 
of 
a 
deficiency, is theft by the prime contractor or 
subcontractor of moneys so misappropriated and is 
punishable under s. 943.20.  If the prime contractor 
or 
sub-contractor 
is 
a 
corporation, 
such 
misappropriation also shall be deemed theft by any 
officers, directors or agents of the corporation 
responsible for the misappropriation.  
Wis. Stat. § 779.02(5) (emphasis added). 
¶24  This statutory language makes clear that a misuse of 
contractor trust funds can form the basis of a prosecution for 
criminal theft by contractor under Wis. Stat. § 943.20.  Because 
Wis. Stat. § 943.20 is one of the offenses that qualifies for 
the treble damages remedy of Wis. Stat. § 895.80, we agree with 
the court of appeals' conclusion that treble damages are 
available for theft by contractor under Wis. Stat. § 779.02(5), 
provided, however, that the elements of both the civil and the 
criminal statutes are proven, albeit to the civil preponderance 
burden of proof.  Stated differently, the basis of liability for 
criminal theft by contractor is a violation of the trust fund 
provisions of Wis. Stat. § 779.02(5), plus the criminal intent 
required by Wis. Stat. § 943.20(1)(b).  See State v. Wolter, 85 
Wis. 2d 353, 362-63, 270 N.W.2d 230 (Ct. App. 1978) (the 
criminal theft statute is the conduit through which the civil 
theft by contractor statute becomes operative criminally, and 
the difference between the two is criminal intent). 
¶25 Wisconsin Statute § 943.20(1)(b) makes it a crime for a 
trustee to intentionally use, transfer, conceal, or retain trust 
No. 
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12 
 
funds without the beneficiary's consent, contrary to the 
trustee's authority, and with intent to convert such funds to 
the trustee's own use or the use of another: 
943.20 Theft. (1) ACTS. Whoever does any of the 
following may be penalized as provided in sub. (3): 
(b) By virtue of his or her office, business or 
employment, or as trustee or bailee, having possession 
or custody of money or of a negotiable security, 
instrument, paper or other negotiable writing of 
another, intentionally uses, transfers, conceals, or 
retains 
possession 
of 
such 
money, 
security, 
instrument, paper or writing without the owner’s 
consent, contrary to his or her authority, and with 
intent to convert to his or her own use or to the use 
of any other person except the owner. A refusal to 
deliver 
any 
money 
or 
a 
negotiable 
security, 
instrument, paper or other negotiable writing, which 
is in his or her possession or custody by virtue of 
his or her office, business or employment, or as 
trustee or bailee, upon demand of the person entitled 
to receive it, or as required by law, is prima facie 
evidence of an intent to convert to his or her own use 
within the meaning of this paragraph. . . .  
(3) PENALTIES. Whoever violates sub. (1): 
 . . . . 
(c) If the value of the property exceeds $2,500, 
is guilty of a Class C felony. 
Wis. Stat. § 943.20(1)(b) and (3)(c) (emphasis added). 
¶26 The elements of the offense of criminal theft by 
contractor are: "(1) the defendant acted as a prime contractor; 
(2) the defendant received money for the improvement of land 
from the owner or a mortgagee; (3) the defendant intentionally 
used the money for purposes other than the payment of bona fide 
claims for labor or materials prior to the payment of such 
No. 
00-3195   
 
13 
 
claims; (4) the use was without the owner or mortgagee's 
consent, and contrary to the defendant's authority; (5) the 
defendant knew the use was without consent and contrary to his 
authority; and (6) the defendant used the money with the intent 
to convert it to his own use or the use of another."  Hess, 99 
Wis. 2d at 28 (emphasis added); see also Blaisdell, 85 Wis. 2d 
at 176. 
¶27  Schmidt argues that summary judgment was improper 
because of material factual disputes on several of the required 
elements of the claim, including the element of criminal intent, 
the matter of The Frantz Group's ownership of the property in 
question, and the issue of whether the computer network cabling 
was an "improvement."  We agree. 
A.  Intent. 
¶28  The criminal offense requires intent to defraud, but 
intent is almost always proven circumstantially, and "may be 
inferred from a defendant's conduct."  Blaisdell, 85 Wis. 2d at 
179.  Indeed, the statute itself sets forth one acceptable 
method of proof: a defendant's refusal to pay a claim upon 
demand to one entitled to be paid out of trust funds is prima 
facie evidence of the defendant's intent to convert the trust 
funds to his own use.  Wis. Stat. § 943.20(1)(b). 
¶29  However, while the intent element required for 
conviction of the criminal offense——and, more importantly here, 
for the treble damages remedy under Wis. Stat. § 895.80——may be 
inferred from circumstantial evidence, it is nevertheless a 
specific intent requirement, and it is the plaintiff's burden to 
No. 
00-3195   
 
14 
 
prove it.  Accordingly, the court of appeals' endorsement of the 
circuit court's legal conclusion that only general intent is 
required (the statute "just requires that the conduct be 
intentional") was clearly incorrect. 
¶30  Indeed, it is specific criminal intent that makes the 
civil offense punishable criminally: "some additional element of 
culpability, whether it be denominated as wrongful, criminal, 
fraudulent, felonious, or wrongfully fraudulent, must be shown 
to sustain a criminal conviction for theft by contractor."  
Hess, 99 Wis. 2d at 28-29 (explaining the language in Blaisdell 
that intent to defraud is required for the criminal offense).  
Accordingly, to sustain a cause of action for treble damages 
under Wis. Stat. § 895.80 for theft by contractor under Wis. 
Stat. § 943.20, the plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of 
the credible evidence, the elements of the criminal offense, 
including that the defendant knowingly retained, concealed, or 
used contractor trust funds without the owner's consent, 
contrary to his authority, and with intent to convert such funds 
to his own use or the use of another.5 
                                                 
5  We note that the issue of intent is generally not readily 
susceptible of determination on summary judgment.  "We have 
stated——'. . . the issue of . . . intent is not one that 
properly can be decided on a motion for summary judgment.  
Credibility of a person with respect to his subjective intent 
does not lend itself to be determined by affidavit.'"  Lecus v. 
American Mut. Ins. Co. of Boston, 81 Wis. 2d 183, 190, 260 
N.W.2d 241 (1977)(citing Doern v. Crawford, 30 Wis. 2d 206, 214, 
140 N.W.2d 193(1966)); see also Green Spring Farms v. Spring 
Green Farms Assoc. Ltd., 172 Wis. 2d 28, 41, 492 Wis. 2d 392 
(Ct. App. 1992).   
  
No. 
00-3195   
 
15 
 
¶31  Here, the answer and amended answer filed by Americomp 
and Schmidt specifically denied the allegations in the complaint 
pertaining to the treble damages cause of action, admitting only 
nonpayment of the invoice, for which summary judgment had 
earlier 
been 
granted 
against 
Americomp 
on 
its 
contract 
liability.  Issue had therefore been joined, and it was Tri-
Tech's obligation to demonstrate a prima facie case for summary 
judgment on all the elements of criminal theft by contractor——
including the requisite specific criminal intent element——before 
the burden would shift to Schmidt on summary judgment.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 802.08(2) and (3).  More specifically, Tri-Tech was 
required to establish, by way of admissions, affidavits, or some 
other evidentiary material, that Schmidt knowingly retained or 
used contractor trust funds, contrary to his authority, and with 
intent to convert such funds to his own use or the use of 
another.   
¶32  It did not do so.  Instead, it relied entirely on the 
pleadings, in which Schmidt had denied the allegations in the 
treble damages cause of action; the earlier judgment on the 
contract claim against Americomp, which was insufficient by 
itself to establish liability for the criminal offense and 
therefore the treble damages claim; and Schmidt's interrogatory 
answers, which did not contain factual admissions sufficient to 
establish a prima facie case on criminal intent, even by way of 
the evidentiary method specifically approved in the statute, 
that is, proof of refusal to pay contractor funds on demand of 
one entitled to receive them.  The interrogatories were silent 
No. 
00-3195   
 
16 
 
as to demand and refusal to pay, and Tri-Tech did not submit any 
affidavits or any other evidentiary material in support of its 
summary judgment motion.  That Schmidt's interrogatory answers 
admitted depositing the payment from The Frantz Group into a 
bank account encumbered by a security interest is insufficient 
by itself to establish a prima facie case of specific criminal 
intent. 
¶33  Accordingly, the court of appeals should not have 
construed Schmidt's failure to submit an affidavit in response 
to the summary judgment motion as a failure to join issue.  
Schmidt had joined issue in his answer and amended answer, and 
because Tri-Tech failed to establish a prima facie case on the 
element of specific intent necessary to sustain the treble 
damages claim, summary judgment should not have been granted.  
See Jones v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 80 Wis. 2d 321, 326-27, 259 
N.W.2d 70 (1977) (the failure of opponent of summary judgment to 
submit counter-affidavits does not entitle the movant to summary 
judgment if movant's submissions do not contain sufficient 
evidentiary facts to establish prima facie case); see also 
Walter Kassuba, Inc. v. Bauch, 38 Wis. 2d 648, 655-56, 158 
N.W.2d 387 (1968) (when supporting evidence is based upon 
ultimate facts and not evidentiary facts, the plaintiff has not 
made out a case for summary judgment). 
B. 
Ownership 
¶34 Tri-Tech was also required to establish a prima facie 
case that The Frantz Group was an "owner" of property within the 
meaning 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 779.02(5). 
Wisconsin 
Statute 
No. 
00-3195   
 
17 
 
§ 779.01(2)(c) defines "owner" for purposes of the construction 
lien law as "the owner of any interest in land who, personally 
or through an agent, enters into a contract, express or implied, 
for the improvement of the land." 
¶35  As noted above, Schmidt's answer and amended answer 
denied the allegations in the treble damages cause of action, 
and so issue was joined on all elements of the claim.  Again as 
noted above, the only item of evidentiary value submitted by 
Tri-Tech in support of its motion for summary judgment against 
Schmidt was Schmidt's interrogatory answers, in which he 
specifically stated that "The Frantz Group does not own this 
said property."  Schmidt's affidavit, submitted in opposition to 
the earlier summary judgment motion, also contained the same 
factual representation. 
¶36  The court of appeals held that Schmidt had waived the 
issue of whether The Frantz Group was an "owner" within the 
meaning of the statute because he did not submit any opposing 
affidavits in response to the summary judgment motion, contrary 
to Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2), and because he did not argue the 
ownership issue in the circuit court.  It is true that Schmidt 
did not submit any new affidavits in response to the summary 
judgment motion, although both parties mentioned the earlier 
Schmidt affidavit in their arguments.  We know of no requirement 
that an affidavit already of record must be filed a second time 
in order to be entitled to consideration. 
¶37  The waiver, if there was one, was in the failure to 
specifically argue the ownership issue in the circuit court.  We 
No. 
00-3195   
 
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note, however, that Tri-Tech did not establish a prima facie 
case on The Frantz Group's ownership of the property, as it was 
required to do.  Indeed, the only evidence in the record——
Schmidt's interrogatory answers and his earlier affidavit——
averred that The Frantz Group did not own the property. 
¶38  In any event, we have already concluded that summary 
judgment was improperly granted; accordingly, this case will be 
returned to the circuit court for further proceedings.  While 
Schmidt may have waived The Frantz Group's ownership of the 
property as an appellate issue by failing to argue it before the 
circuit court on the summary judgment motion, the waiver will 
have no consequence on remand. 
C.  Improvement 
¶39  Tri-Tech was also required to establish a prima facie 
case that the contract in question was for an "improvement" to 
land within the meaning of the statute. Wisconsin Statute 
§ 779.01(2)(a) 
defines 
"improvement" 
as 
"any 
building, 
structure, 
erection, 
fixture, 
demolition, 
alteration, 
excavation, filling, grading, tiling, planting, clearing or 
landscaping which is built, erected, made or done on or to land 
for its permanent benefit."  Citing Wisconsin Department of 
Revenue v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Products, Inc., 72 Wis. 2d 60, 
67-68, 240 N.W.2d 357 (1976), Schmidt argues that the summary 
judgment record fails to establish a prima facie case that the 
computer network cabling at issue in this case constituted an 
"improvement." 
No. 
00-3195   
 
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¶40  The A.O. Smith Harvestore case sets forth the test for 
determining whether particular articles of property constitute 
fixtures: "'. . . Whether articles of personal property are 
fixtures, i.e., real estate, is determined in this state, if not 
generally, by the following rules or tests: (1) Actual physical 
annexation to the real estate; (2) application or adaptation to 
the use or purpose to which the realty is devoted; and (3) an 
intention on the part of the person making the annexation to 
make a permanent accession to the freehold.'"  Id. at 67-68 
(citing Premonstratensian Fathers v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 46 
Wis. 2d 362, 367, 175 N.W.2d 237 (1970)).  The statutory 
definition of "improvement" for purposes of construction lien 
and trust fund rights requires a "permanent benefit" to the 
land.  We also stated in A.O. Smith Harvestore, 72 Wis. 2d at 
73, that "[w]here a tenant installs fixtures, there is a 
presumption that they are temporary and that he intends to 
remove them at the end of the lease period."   
¶41  The circuit court and the court of appeals construed 
the "improvements" issue as a question of law.  It can be, but 
usually is not, and is not in this case.  We stated in A.O. 
Smith Harvestore that "the application of [the test for 
fixtures] is normally a question of fact" but can become a 
question of law "when only one reasonable conclusion may be 
drawn from the evidence."  Id. at 68. 
¶42  We cannot address the question of whether only one 
reasonable conclusion can be drawn from the evidence, for the 
simple reason that there is no evidence in the record as to 
No. 
00-3195   
 
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whether the computer network cabling comprised an "actual 
physical annexation" to the property, was an "application or 
adaptation to the use or purpose" of the property, and was 
intended to be permanent.  In addition, Schmidt's interrogatory 
answers, which are of record, state as a matter of fact that The 
Frantz Group did not own the property in question, giving rise 
at least to an inference that its computer network was not 
intended to be permanent at that location.  Accordingly, for 
this additional reason, summary judgment was improperly granted.6 
¶43 In summary, we conclude that the treble damages remedy 
of Wis. Stat. § 895.80 is available for civil theft by 
contractor under Wis. Stat. § 779.02(5), by operation of Wis. 
Stat. § 943.20.  To sustain a cause of action for treble 
damages, however, the elements of both statutes, including the 
specific 
criminal 
intent 
element 
required 
by 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 943.20, must be proven.  Because Tri-Tech failed to establish 
a prima facie case on the element of specific criminal intent, 
                                                 
6 Schmidt argues that because Tri-Tech did not file any lien 
notice or construction lien, he was not on notice that this was 
a construction contract, requiring him to hold payments from the 
property owner in trust for the benefit of those with claims for 
labor and materials provided on the contract.  However, in 
Wisconsin Dairies Cooperative v. Citizens Bank & Trust, 160 Wis. 
2d 758, 776, 467 N.W.2d 124 (1991), we held that "neither the 
language of sec. 779.02(5), Stats., the legislative history, the 
policies behind the statute, nor our prior decisions support a 
conclusion that the legislature intended to terminate the trust 
fund if the subcontractor failed to preserve its lien rights.  
To the contrary, these factors demonstrate that the legislature 
intended to provide two independent and alternative remedies for 
protecting subcontractors——the construction lien provisions, 
see, e.g., sec. 779.01(3), and the trust fund statute."  
No. 
00-3195   
 
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and because there is a factual dispute about whether the 
computer network cabling is an "improvement" for purposes of 
Wis. Stat. § 779.02(5), summary judgment was improperly granted.  
We reverse the court of appeals and remand the case to the 
circuit court for further proceedings. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause remanded for proceedings consistent with 
this opinion.   
 
 
 
No.  00-3195.jpw 
 
1 
 
¶44 JON P. WILCOX, J.   (concurring in part, dissenting in 
part).  I agree with the court's determination on summary 
judgment in this case.  However, I disagree with the court's 
conclusion on the availability of treble damages.  Under the 
plain language of the statute, treble damages are not available 
for 
a 
civil 
action 
for 
theft 
by 
contractor 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 779.02(5) 
(1999-2000).7 
 
For 
that 
reason, 
I 
respectfully dissent. 
¶45 This case presents us with a question of statutory 
interpretation.  When we interpret a statute, our primary 
purpose is to discern the intent of the legislature.  Landis v. 
Physicians Ins. Co., 2001 WI 86, ¶14, 245 Wis. 2d 1, 628 N.W.2d 
893.  To determine this intent, we look first to the plain 
language of the statute.  Id.  If the statutory language is 
clear and unambiguous, we do not look beyond the statutory 
language to ascertain its meaning.  Id. 
¶46 The 
statutory 
language 
here 
is 
straightforward.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 895.80 states: 
(1) Any person who suffers damage or loss by 
reason of intentional conduct . . . that is prohibited 
under 
s. 943.01, 
943.20, 
943.21, 
943.24, 
943.26, 
943.34, 943.395, 943.41, 943.50 or 943.61, or by 
reason of intentional conduct . . . that is prohibited 
under s. 943.201, has a cause of action against the 
person who caused the damage or loss. 
. . . . 
                                                 
7 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version. 
No.  00-3195.jpw 
 
2 
 
(3) If the plaintiff prevails in a civil action 
under sub. (1), he or she may recover all of the 
following: 
(a) Treble damages. 
. . . . 
This provision clearly lists the statutory violations under 
which treble damages will be available.  The statute at issue 
here, Wis. Stat. § 779.02, as the majority points out, is 
clearly not among them.  Majority op. at ¶22. 
¶47 Under the rule of expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius, 
when 
the 
legislature 
specifically 
enumerates 
provisions 
in 
a 
statute, 
this 
court 
presumes 
that 
the 
legislature intended to exclude other non-included provisions.  
Georgina G. v. Terry M., 184 Wis. 2d 492, 512, 516 N.W.2d 678 
(1994).  When enacting a statute, the legislature is also 
presumed to act with knowledge of existing statutes.  H.F. v. 
T.F., 168 Wis. 2d 62, 69, 483 N.W.2d 803 (1992).  Therefore, we 
must infer that the legislature was aware of the cause of action 
for theft by contractor under Wis. Stat. § 779.02, and refused 
to include it in the treble damages statute. 
¶48 As the majority points out, the treble damages statute 
is punitive rather than remedial, and it must therefore be 
strictly construed.  Majority op. at ¶21 (citing John Mohr & 
Sons, Inc. v. Jahnke, 55 Wis. 2d 402, 411, 198 N.W.2d 363 
(1972)).  This further leads me to the conclusion that we cannot 
read a cause of action for treble damages into the statute where 
the legislature did not choose to include it.  Thus, I would 
conclude that the treble damages remedy is not available for a 
civil action for theft by contractor. 
No.  00-3195.jpw 
 
3 
 
¶49 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
 
No.  00-3195.jpw 
 
1