Title: Merchants Company v. Hutchinson
Citation: 199 So. 2d 813
Docket Number: 44462
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: July 10, 1967

199 So. 2d 813 (1967) The MERCHANTS COMPANY and Milton T. Johnson v. Dewey L. HUTCHINSON. No. 44462. Supreme Court of Mississippi. June 12, 1967. Suggestion of Error Overruled July 10, 1967. *814 Dudley W. Conner, Hattiesburg, for appellant. George Grubbs, Mendenhall, Kervin &amp; McIntosh, Collins, for appellee. M.M. Roberts, Hattiesburg, for intervenor. ROBERTSON, Justice: This is the second appearance of this case before this Court. The first trial resulted in a $100,000 jury verdict in favor of the Plaintiff, Dewey L. Hutchinson, and against the Defendants, The Merchants Company and Milton T. Johnson. Because of erroneous instructions granted, the judgment of the trial court was reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. The second trial resulted in a $125,000 jury verdict for the plaintiff. The judgment provided that $14,575.42 of this amount would be paid to the intervenor, Great American Insurance Company, to reimburse it for medical expenses and workman's compensation paid to the plaintiff. Appellants appeal from this judgment. The accident happened about 9:15 a.m. on December 10, 1962, at the intersection of U.S. Highway 49 and a gravel road known as Sunset Road. At the point of the intersection, Highway No. 49 runs generally in a north-south direction, and Sunset Road runs generally in a southeast-northwest direction. The appellee and two fellow employees of Willmut Gas and Oil Company were on their way from Magee to Collins to repair a gas meter. They were riding in a pick-up truck owned by Willmut and driven by Haley Roberts. They were proceeding south on U.S. Highway 49 when the truck owned by Appellant, The Merchants Company, and driven by Appellant, Johnson, north on Highway 49, attempted to turn left and cross the south-bound traffic lane of Highway 49 and enter Sunset Road. The collision occurred slightly west of the paved highway and the appellee was seriously and permanently injured. An excellent and detailed statement of facts is contained in the opinion of this Court written by Justice Inzer, on the first appearance of this case here, which opinion is recorded in 186 So. 2d 760 (Miss. 1966). We deem it unnecessary to restate those facts. *815 The appellants have assigned many errors, but we feel that only the following merit discussion: It should be noted at the outset that Honorable M.M. Roberts was attorney only for the insurer, Great American Insurance Company. The appellee was represented by three other highly competent and experienced attorneys. As the insurance carrier of Willmut Gas and Oil Company, Great American intervened in the suit brought by appellee against appellants. Mississippi Law is clear and unambiguous on the procedure to be followed by the employer or its insurer in intervening or joining in the cause of action. It is equally clear and unambiguous in setting forth the mandatory distribution to be made of any amount recovered. Section 6998-36, Mississippi Code of 1942 Annotated, provides: In spite of the fact that the application of any amount recovered by the employee against a third party is specifically covered and clearly outlined in the statute, the attorney for the intervenor attached as an exhibit to his petition and discussed at great length before the jury an "Agreement with Assignment" which disclosed that a $100,000 judgment was entered on May 29, 1965, on the first trial in favor of the appellee and against the appellants. This Agreement *816 with Assignment was then admitted in evidence as a full exhibit to the appellee's testimony. It was entirely unnecessary and uncalled-for for the intervenor to repeatedly bring to the attention of the jury the $100,000 judgment against the defendants rendered on the first trial of this case. It was highly prejudicial to the appellants and error on the part of the trial court to admit such evidence. This Court has stated on numerous occasions that as a general rule the result of a former trial or the opinion and mandate of the appellate court are not proper evidence in the retrial of a cause of action. This rule was again stated in 1966 in the case of Miller Transporters, Ltd. v. Espey et al., 187 So. 2d 876 (Miss. 1966). In Gulf, Mobile &amp; Northern R. Co. v. Weldy, 195 Miss. 345, 14 So. 2d 340 (1943), in reversing a judgment for the plaintiff, this Court said: There are many points of similarity between Weldy and the case at bar, even to the argument of appellee that the ground of objection was not stated. This Court in Weldy specifically ruled out that argument where the reason for the objection was obvious. Counsel for the intervenor was allowed to cross-examine Appellee Hutchinson even though it was obvious that appellee's and intervenor's interest in making common battle against appellants was the same. Intervenor used his cross-examination to bolster the appellee's cause and to repeatedly bring to the attention of the jury testimony favorable to the appellee. This was error on the part of the trial court. It was unnecessary, improper and erroneous for the trial court to allow counsel for the intervenor to introduce as a full exhibit the complete Workmen's Compensation Commission file on the appellee's claim for compensation. The trial court granted the intervenor the following instruction to the jury: It is hard to understand how the trial judge and the attorney for the intervenor could again fall into the error of submitting this question to the jury with past decisions of this Court repeatedly analyzing and interpreting Section 6998-36, supra, before them. In Richardson v. United States F. &amp; G. Co., 233 Miss. 375, 378, 102 So. 2d 368 (1958), this Court, in beginning its opinion, stated the question involved thusly: The opinion then goes on to decide the question in no uncertain terms: In Whitten v. Land, 188 So. 2d 246, 250, (Miss. 1966), this Court, in ruling on a similar instruction said: There was no question for the jury to decide with reference to reimbursement of the intervenor of amounts paid the appellee. It was a matter of law and mandatory on the court alone to provide in its judgment for the distribution of any verdict rendered in strict accordance with Section 6998-36, supra. It was error for the court to grant the quoted instruction for the intervenor. This case was unusual in still another aspect of the trial. The arguments of counsel to the jury were recorded. The attorney for the intervenor said, among other things: That argument to the jury by counsel for the intervenor was prejudicial error. All that was necessary for the intervenor to do was to let the court know how much had been expended by the insurance carrier, either by a petition to intervene or by a petition to join in the cause of action; thenceforth, Mississippi Law mandatorily provided for the distribution of any verdict rendered. Section 6998-36, supra. The appellant's case was prejudiced by the actions of the intervenor as heretofore pointed out. We believe, however, that these errors affected the amount of the damages only. These errors influenced the jury and caused them to return an excessive and exorbitant verdict. We find that the judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial unless the appellee, within 15 days from the date the judgment of this Court becomes final, remits $50,000 of the $125,000 judgment. If this remittitur is made, the judgment is affirmed for $75,000; otherwise, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. Affirmed with remittitur; otherwise reversed and remanded. ETHRIDGE, C.J., and JONES, BRADY and INZER, JJ., concur.