Title: Lowe v. Cunningham
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 032707
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: September 17, 2004

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
JAMES EDWARD LOWE 
 
v.  Record No. 032707   OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
                          September 17, 2004 
BARBARA E. CUNNINGHAM 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF LYNCHBURG 
J. Leyburn Mosby, Jr., Judge 
 
In this appeal of a judgment in a personal injury action, 
we consider whether the circuit court erred in denying the 
plaintiff's motion for a mistrial. 
The following facts are relevant to this appeal.  In August 
1998, James E. Lowe was operating a motor vehicle in the City of 
Lynchburg.  After Lowe stopped his vehicle at a "red light" at 
an intersection, his vehicle was struck from behind by another 
vehicle operated by Barbara E. Cunningham. 
Lowe filed a motion for judgment against Cunningham 
alleging that he was injured as a result of Cunningham's 
negligence.  At trial, Lowe presented evidence that he sustained 
injuries to his back, right knee, and a wrist as a result of the 
accident.  The evidence also showed that Lowe suffered from 
certain pre-existing conditions, including scoliosis of the 
spine and degenerative arthritis in his back and right knee.  
Lowe presented evidence of medical expenses allegedly related to 
the accident in the total amount of $11,314.75. 
 
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During cross-examination of Lowe, the following colloquy 
occurred between Lowe and Cunningham's counsel: 
Q. At the time of this accident, you were living with 
Laquesta Andrews, who is the mother of one of your 
children; is that right? 
 
A. 
Right. 
 
Q. 
In fact, that's where you went after the accident 
. . . to her home? 
 
A. 
Yes. 
 
Q. 
Is that right?  And you continued to live with 
her until you got into a little trouble with the 
law about not paying child support? 
 
 
Lowe did not answer this final question from Cunningham's 
counsel.  Lowe's counsel immediately objected to the question 
and asked the court for permission to make a motion outside the 
presence of the jury.  After the jury retired to the jury room, 
Lowe's counsel moved for a mistrial on the ground that 
Cunningham's counsel introduced "elements of [Lowe's] criminal 
record into a case when it's not relevant evidence." 
Cunningham's counsel responded that Lowe stated in his pre-
trial deposition that he had spent 90 days in jail for his 
failure to pay child support, and that Lowe had also complained 
that he suffered from injuries to his knee during that same time 
period.  Cunningham's counsel argued that his question was 
relevant to show the nature of Lowe's activities and limitations 
during the time he claimed to be suffering from his injuries. 
 
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The circuit court sustained Lowe's "objection to the child 
support issue" on the ground that "the prejudicial value of that 
outweighs any probative value."  The court denied Lowe's motion 
for a mistrial and instructed the jury to "disregard any 
information about child support or failure to pay." 
Throughout the trial, Cunningham contested the cause of 
Lowe's injuries.  She argued to the jury that his knee and back 
injuries resulted from his pre-existing conditions, rather than 
from the motor vehicle collision. 
After the jury returned a verdict in favor of Lowe and 
fixed his damages at $575, Lowe renewed his motion for a 
mistrial.  The court denied the motion and entered judgment in 
accordance with the jury verdict.  Lowe appeals. 
 
Lowe argues that the circuit court abused its discretion in 
denying his motion for a mistrial.  He observes that his record 
for failing to pay child support was not competent impeachment 
evidence because he was not convicted of a felony or a 
misdemeanor involving moral turpitude.  Lowe also asserts that 
his failure to pay child support was irrelevant to his personal 
injury claim, and that the deliberate injection of this issue 
into the case resulted in prejudice that could not be cured by a 
cautionary instruction. 
 
In response, Cunningham argues that the circuit court did 
not abuse its discretion in denying Lowe's mistrial motion.  She 
 
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notes that Lowe did not answer her counsel's question, which 
Cunningham asserts was intended to refute Lowe's claim 
concerning the extent of his damages.  Cunningham further 
observes that under this Court's jurisprudence, the jury is 
presumed to have followed the trial court's cautionary 
instruction.  Alternatively, Cunningham contends that any error 
caused by the denial of the mistrial motion was harmless, and 
that the record supports the jury verdict because there was 
"ample evidence" from which the jury could have concluded that 
Lowe's injuries resulted from his pre-existing conditions. 
 
We review a challenge to a trial court's denial of a 
mistrial motion in accordance with established principles.  The 
decision whether to grant a motion for a mistrial is a matter 
submitted to the trial court's sound discretion.  Clark v. 
Chapman, 238 Va. 655, 661, 385 S.E.2d 885, 888 (1989); State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Futrell, 209 Va. 266, 274, 163 
S.E.2d 181, 187 (1968); see Rose v. Jaques, 268 Va. 137, 157, 
597 S.E.2d 64, 76 (2004); Robertson v. Metro. Wash. Airport 
Auth., 249 Va. 72, 77, 452 S.E.2d 845, 847 (1995).  This broad 
discretionary power reflects in part the principle that a jury 
is presumed to have followed a timely and explicit cautionary 
instruction directing it to disregard an improper remark or 
question by counsel.  See Stump v. Doe, 250 Va. 57, 62, 458 
S.E.2d 279, 282 (1995); Hamer v. School Bd. of the City of 
 
5
Chesapeake, 240 Va. 66, 75, 393 S.E.2d 623, 628-29 (1990); Maxey 
v. Hubble, 238 Va. 607, 615-16, 385 S.E.2d 593, 597 (1989). 
The general rule in this Commonwealth is that absent a 
manifest probability of prejudice to an adverse party, a new 
trial is not required when a court sustains an objection to an 
improper remark or question by counsel and thereafter instructs 
the jury to disregard the remark or question.  Kitze v. 
Commonwealth, 246 Va. 283, 288, 435 S.E.2d 583, 585 (1993); 
Clark, 238 Va. at 661, 385 S.E.2d at 888; Carter v. Shoemaker, 
214 Va. 16, 17, 197 S.E.2d 181, 182 (1973); Norfolk S. Ry. Co. 
v. Harris, 190 Va. 966, 975, 59 S.E.2d 110, 114 (1950).  A 
different standard would place an undue burden on the trial 
courts that would impede the efficient administration of 
justice.  Kitze, 246 Va. at 288, 435 S.E.2d at 585; Saunders v. 
Commonwealth, 218 Va. 294, 303, 237 S.E.2d 150, 156 (1977); 
Washington & Old Dominion Ry. v. Ward, 119 Va. 334, 339, 89 S.E. 
140, 142 (1916). 
"Conversely, as an exception to the [general] rule, if the 
prejudicial effect of the impropriety cannot be removed by the 
instructions of the trial court, the [adverse party] is entitled 
to a new trial."  Kitze, 246 Va. at 288, 435 S.E.2d at 585 
(quoting Saunders, 218 Va. at 303, 237 S.E.2d at 156); see 
Harris, 190 Va. at 975, 59 S.E.2d at 114.  Thus, a court is 
required to grant a new trial, if requested, when the 
 
6
prejudicial effect of an improper remark or question is 
overwhelming, such that it cannot be cured by a cautionary 
instruction.  Hamer, 240 Va. at 75, 393 S.E.2d at 629; Maxey, 
238 Va. at 616, 385 S.E.2d at 597. 
The trial court's determination whether a statement or 
question of counsel is so inherently prejudicial that the 
prejudice cannot be cured by a cautionary instruction must be 
guided by a consideration of several factors.  These factors 
include the relevance and content of the improper reference, and 
whether the reference was deliberate or inadvertent in nature.  
The court also must consider the probable effect of the improper 
reference by counsel.  All these factors must be considered 
because not every irrelevant statement or question will result 
in prejudice to an opposing party.  See Virginia-Lincoln 
Furniture Corp. v. Southern Factories & Stores Corp., 162 Va. 
767, 781, 174 S.E. 848, 854 (1934).  To justify a new trial, the 
nature of counsel's improper reference must be "likely to 
inflame the passion or instill a prejudice in the minds of the 
jury."  Id.; see also Kitze, 246 Va. at 288, 435 S.E.2d at 585; 
Meade v. Belcher, 212 Va. 796, 799, 188 S.E.2d 211, 213 (1972). 
In the present case, counsel's question addressed matters 
that were irrelevant to the issue of Lowe's damages.  Lowe was 
not seeking damages for lost wages during the time that he was 
incarcerated after the accident.  In addition, Lowe's failure to 
 
7
pay child support did not result in either a felony conviction 
or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude and, therefore, could 
not be used to impeach his credibility.  See Godbolt v. Brawley, 
250 Va. 467, 472, 463 S.E.2d 657, 660 (1995); Great Coastal 
Express, Inc. v. Ellington, 230 Va. 142, 147, 334 S.E.2d 846, 
850 (1985); Lincoln v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 370, 374, 228 
S.E.2d 688, 691 (1976); Land v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 223, 226, 
176 S.E.2d 586, 588 (1970).  Thus, in the absence of any 
demonstrated probative value or proper purpose, the content of 
defense counsel's question served only to imply that Lowe had 
been in "trouble with the law" for failing to pay child support, 
and that he may have been incarcerated for that reason. 
We also observe that defense counsel's reference to these 
matters was deliberate, rather than inadvertent.  When counsel 
deliberately places irrelevant issues before a jury for an 
improper purpose, the likely necessity of granting a mistrial 
increases.  See Forsberg v. Harris, 238 Va. 442, 445, 384 S.E.2d 
90, 91 (1989); Davis v. Maynard, 215 Va. 407, 408, 211 S.E.2d  
32, 32-33 (1975). 
We conclude that defense counsel's deliberate and improper 
reference to Lowe's child support delinquency and "trouble with 
the law" was so inherently prejudicial to the jury's perception 
of his character and credibility that the effect of the 
impropriety could not be removed by the trial court's 
 
8
instruction.  This holding is necessarily specific to the facts 
of this case and does not signal a departure from the general 
principle that a jury is presumed to have followed a court's 
timely and explicit cautionary instruction.  Rather, our 
decision is required by the opprobrium that rightly attaches to 
the actions of parents who shirk their child support 
obligations.  The probable effect of deliberately placing Lowe's 
child support delinquency before the jury was to suggest that 
because he had failed to honor this most basic social and legal 
obligation, he should not be "rewarded" with a significant 
damage award. 
Our conclusion is not altered by the fact that the trial 
court did not require Lowe to answer the improper question, or 
by the fact that counsel did not persist in attempting to place 
that information into evidence before the jury.  While the 
presence of these factors could have caused Lowe greater 
prejudice, their absence does not negate the inherently 
prejudicial impact of defense counsel's question. 
Because we hold that defense counsel's question was 
inherently prejudicial, we do not reach the issue whether the 
jury could have arrived at the same verdict based on the 
disputed evidence concerning the cause of Lowe's injuries.  
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying Lowe's motion for a mistrial. 
 
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For these reasons, we will reverse the trial court's 
judgment and remand the case for a new trial limited to the 
issue of damages. 
Reversed and remanded. 
JUSTICE AGEE, with whom JUSTICE LACY and JUSTICE KINSER join, 
dissenting. 
 
The majority concludes that the “deliberate and improper 
reference to Lowe’s child support delinquency . . . was so 
inherently prejudicial to the jury’s perception of his character 
and credibility that the effect of the impropriety could not be 
removed by the trial court’s instruction.”  I disagree.  In my 
view, the trial court’s denial of Lowe’s request for a mistrial 
was properly within its sound discretion and in accord with our 
prior precedent.  The circumstances surrounding the improper 
question, combined with the trial court’s cautionary instruction, 
sufficiently negated any deemed prejudice.  Furthermore, counsel’s 
conduct in this case did not rise to the level of impropriety that 
we found objectionable in the cases cited by Lowe and the 
majority. 
Where counsel makes an improper statement and 
the court takes prompt action to remove it by 
appropriate instruction to the jury, it will 
ordinarily be presumed that the jury heeded the 
instruction and that no lasting harm was done. But 
where the prejudicial effect is so overwhelming 
that it cannot be removed by the court's 
instruction, the injured party, if he requests it, 
is entitled to a new trial.  The injured party's 
right to a new trial is especially strong where his 
 
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opponent has persisted in an objectionable course 
of conduct after the trial judge has expressed 
disapproval of it, sustained an objection to it, or 
instructed the jury to disregard it. In that 
situation, an appellate court will presume that the 
prejudicial effect of the improper conduct was too 
strong to be removed by further admonitions or jury 
instructions. 
 
Maxey v. Hubble, 238 Va. 607, 615-16, 385 S.E.2d 593, 597 (1989) 
(emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
Although not cited by the majority, Lowe relied extensively 
on this Court’s opinion in Payne v. Carroll, 250 Va. 336, 461 
S.E.2d 837 (1995).  In Payne, defense counsel asked the following 
question during cross-examination of the plaintiff: “Now, you, 
ma’am, have been convicted of a felony involving fraud, haven’t 
you?”  250 Va. at 338, 461 S.E.2d at 838.  The plaintiff responded 
affirmatively and her counsel objected on the basis “that the 
defense had no right to disclose the nature of the felony.”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The trial court denied the 
plaintiff’s motion to set aside the verdict and refused to grant a 
new trial.  We reversed the trial court and held that, “for 
purposes of impeachment, the fact of a prior conviction of a 
felony may be shown against a party-witness in a civil case, but 
that the name of the felony, other than perjury, and the details 
thereof may not be shown.”  Id. at 340, 461 S.E.2d at 839. 
 
Multiple factors distinguish the case at bar from Payne and 
argue against classifying counsel’s statement in the present case 
 
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as so “overwhelming” that a finding that the trial court abused 
its discretion is warranted.  Among them: (1) the trial court 
sustained Lowe’s objection to defense counsel’s question, (2) Lowe 
did not answer the improper question, (3) the trial court promptly 
gave a cautionary instruction, (4) the improper question did not 
establish a conviction or that the subject matter related to a 
crime, and (5) there was no continuing course of conduct by 
defense counsel.  In my view, the ameliorative effect of these 
cumulative circumstances mitigated any prejudicial effect such 
that Lowe was not entitled to a mistrial. 
 
The cases cited by the majority can be readily distinguished 
from the case at bar, both factually and by the scope of the 
prejudicial statement at issue.  In Kitze v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 
283, 435 S.E.2d 583 (1993), we set aside a criminal conviction 
because the prosecutor, during his closing argument, improperly 
argued that a finding of insanity would result in the defendant 
going free.  246 Va. at 287-88, 435 S.E.2d at 584-85.  Unlike the 
present case, the trial court in Kitze overruled the defendant’s 
objection and did not give an immediate or directly related 
cautionary instruction.  Id. at 288, 435 S.E.2d at 585. 
 
In Hamer v. School Bd. of the City of Chesapeake, 240 Va. 66, 
393 S.E.2d 623 (1990), we reversed a trial court’s denial of a 
mistrial because “[c]ounsel’s persistence in a course of conduct 
which the court had disapproved and instructed the commissioners 
 
12
to exclude from their considerations . . . raised a presumption 
that ‘the prejudicial effect of the improper conduct was too 
strong to be removed by further admonitions.’ ”  Id. at 76, 393 
S.E.2d at 629.  Moreover, the trial court overruled objections to 
some of trial counsel’s prejudicial remarks.  By contrast, the 
inappropriate but unanswered question posed to Lowe did not 
reflect a continuing course of conduct and a prompt cautionary 
instruction was given. 
Likewise, in Maxey, it was also the attorney’s pernicious and 
persistent conduct, despite repeated admonition by the trial 
court, which required reversal of that court’s decision not to 
grant a mistrial.  We based that decision “upon the cumulative 
effect of plaintiff’s counsel’s repeated statements, [which] 
persisted . . . notwithstanding the trial court’s rulings.”  
Maxey, 238 Va. at 616, 385 S.E.2d at 597; see also Rinehart & 
Dennis Co. v. Brown, 137 Va. 670, 675-76, 120 S.E. 269, 271 (1923) 
(plaintiff’s counsel persisted in alluding to insurance in a tort 
case). 
According to the majority, the improper question posed by 
defense counsel in this case constituted an attempt to take 
advantage of the “opprobrium that rightly attaches to the actions 
of parents who shirk their child support obligations” by 
suggesting to the jury that such a miscreant ought not to be 
rewarded.  However, child support often involves a civil, not 
 
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criminal, matter and a question about “a little trouble with the 
law about not paying child support,” left unanswered, does not 
establish that Lowe was ever convicted of a crime.  Neither does 
it establish Lowe was ever, in fact, deficient in any child 
support due from him. 
There is one additional distinguishing characteristic of the 
case at bar; the plaintiff received a verdict in his favor.  Lowe 
argues that “[e]ven though the jury found for [him] on the issue 
of liability, the damage award did not even cover [his] emergency 
room visit and attendant bills.”  However, there was evidence 
before the jury that many of Lowe’s injuries resulted from 
preexisting conditions and Lowe has not shown how the unanswered 
question at issue in this case prejudiced the jury to such a 
degree that it did not make a fair award.  As the trial court 
stated in entering an order on the jury’s verdict, “[the award is] 
certainly within the evidence that the Court’s heard.” 
In my view, the mitigating factors discussed above placed the 
inappropriate conduct squarely within the presumption “that the 
jury heeded the [trial court’s] instruction and that no lasting 
harm was done.”  Maxey, 238 Va. at 615, 385 S.E.2d at 597.  This 
is particularly true in this case because a verdict was returned 
for the plaintiff and there is evidence in the record supporting 
the amount of the verdict.  For all these reasons, I do not find 
 
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the trial court abused its discretion in denying the mistrial 
motion and, therefore, I respectfully dissent.