Title: Hudson v. Jenkins
Citation: 288 N.W.2d 566
Docket Number: 63392
State: Iowa
Issuer: Iowa Supreme Court
Date: February 20, 1980

288 N.W.2d 566 (1980) John D. HUDSON, Plaintiff, v. James D. JENKINS, Judge of the Eighth Judicial District, Defendant. No. 63392. Supreme Court of Iowa. February 20, 1980. *567 John A. McClintock and David L. Brown of Hansen, McClintock &amp; Riley, Des Moines, for plaintiff. Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., and Jeanine Freeman, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant. Considered by REYNOLDSON, C. J., and REES, HARRIS, McGIVERIN and LARSON, JJ. LARSON, Justice. This plaintiff, a lawyer, challenges a contempt citation arising out of his alleged violation of an order entered by the defendant judge. We hold that the actions of the plaintiff did not constitute contempt and therefore sustain the writ of certiorari. The confrontation involved here began with plaintiff's representation of Allen Dean Kempf in connection with a bank robbery case in federal district court. As a result of that involvement, Hudson became aware of Kempf's prior entry of a guilty plea to state charges arising out of the same incident. Hudson had not been involved in those proceedings, but discussed the matter with Kempf's trial counsel, Charles Pettit. He was advised that there were serious questions as to the adequacy of the proceedings transferring Kempf from juvenile to adult court and as to the guilty plea, which had been entered against the advice of counsel. Kempf's age, sixteen, and his limited mental capacity, together with other information gleaned by Hudson from Kempf's prior counsel, apparently prompted Hudson to recommend an appeal from the sentence imposed by Judge Jenkins. Kempf wrote to Hudson to request that he represent him in the appeal and sent a request to the defendant judge that Hudson be appointed at county expense. The request for appointment of counsel was heard by Judge Jenkins, who raised the *568 issue of whether Kempf really desired to appeal in view of the fact he had pled to a reduced charge and ran a risk of increased punishment if convicted of the original charge. He also evidenced some concern about the cost to the county in the event the appeal was taken by Hudson on a court-appointed basis. The application for appointment was not resisted by the county attorney's office. The judge decided to appoint a "disinterested" person to discuss the matter of the appeal with Kempf, as shown by the record set out below. Because we must assess the effect of the colloquy, it is necessary to set it out at some length. Despite this development, the appeal was prosecuted and resulted in a reversal. State v. Kempf, 282 N.W.2d 704 (Iowa 1979). Hudson now challenges the contempt matter through a certiorari action asserting that the judge acted illegally and without jurisdiction. In substance, he claims that there could be no contempt because the "order" of the court pertained only to his application for court appointment, not to the appeal itself. Further, he contends that even if it could be construed to order a delay in filing notice of appeal it would be unenforceable as an impermissible interference with Kempf's right of appeal. Acts constituting contempt are set out in section 665.2, The Code, as follows: The trial court's summary order does not specify in what manner the actions of the plaintiff were contemptuous. In this respect, we should point out that in summary contempt matters such as this it is required that the judge recite in his order the specific facts constituting the contempt. § 665.9; see also Fed.R.Crim.P. 42(a). The purpose of such requirement is not to give notice to the alleged contemnor, or to frame the issues to be tried, but solely to permit an appellate court to review the judge's action. See United States v. Marshall, 451 F.2d 372, 377 (9th Cir. 1971). In the absence of equivalent specificity by the trial judge here, we view the provisions of our contempt law in light of the facts set out in the record. Subsections 4, 5 and 6 of section 665.2 are made inapplicable *571 by their terms. "Contemptuous or insolent behavior toward such court" in subsection 1 has been applied when the manner of conduct itself was contemptuous, such as hitting, threatening, yelling or impugning the court's motives. See, e. g., Newby v. District Court, 259 Iowa 1330, 147 N.W.2d 886 (1967); Bisignano v. Municipal Court, 237 Iowa 895, 23 N.W.2d 523 (1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 818, 67 S. Ct. 674, 91 L. Ed. 1270 (1947); Harding v. McCullough, 236 Iowa 556, 19 N.W.2d 613 (1945); Russell v. French, 67 Iowa 102, 24 N.W. 741 (1885). There was no such conduct in this case. Was this plaintiff's action, however, a "willful disturbance calculated to interrupt the due course of [the court's] official proceedings" or "[i]llegal resistance to [an] order or process made or issued by it," as set out in subparagraphs 2 and 3? We believe it was neither. In the case of In re Criminal Contempt of McConnell, 370 U.S. 230, 82 S. Ct. 1288, 8 L. Ed. 2d 434 (1962), the Supreme Court discussed the meaning and application of a federal contempt statute based upon "misbehavior" resulting in "obstruction" of the proceedings. McConnell, a lawyer, persisted in asking questions he deemed necessary as foundation for an offer of proof, despite the judge's order to stop. Faced with a choice of having an insufficient record on review or proceeding in violation of the court's order, McConnell decided to take his chances with the latter. "Obstruction" under the federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 401(1), and "interruption" under our statute, section 665.2(2), were treated by the Court as synonymous terms as evident from this language: McConnell, 370 U.S. at 234, 82 S. Ct. at 1291, 8 L. Ed. 2d at 437 (emphasis added). There is no evidence in the instant case that filing the notice of appeal "interrupted" the proceedings within the meaning of our contempt statute. It would, of course, divest the trial court of jurisdiction of the criminal matter, and it is possible that the trial court perceived this to be an interruption of the proceedings. However, because the appointment of appellate counsel is collateral to the criminal prosecution, trial court jurisdiction over that issue was not divested by perfection of the appeal. Kempf, 282 N.W.2d at 711. Moreover, if we were to rule that Hudson acted contemptuously merely because his actions divested the court of jurisdiction, the filing of every notice of appeal could expose the attorney to a contempt citation. Since there was no evidence of actual interruption to provide a basis for contempt under section 665.2(2), the issue narrows to whether the acts involved amount to an "[i]llegal resistance to any order or process made or issued by" the court under section 665.2(3). The ruling by the trial court in this case did not clearly prohibit what was done. It was entered following a hearing on the application for court appointment and purported only to postpone decision on that matter. Defendant does not challenge this assessment of the ruling but argues that an order delaying the appeal was implicit in the decision to continue the matter of the appointment application. He contends that plaintiff, as an attorney, should have so interpreted the order and should have abided by the terms implicit in it. In other words, he contends the plaintiff violated the spirit of the order, if not its terms. However, it is doubtful whether there was any order in existence at the time the notice of appeal was filed; the judge had merely indicated he was going to appoint an investigator and said "the application [for court appointment] is to be acted upon next week when whoever I have appointed to investigate [has] determine[d] what the actual wishes of Mr. Kempf are." In addition, even if we were to assume there was an order, it was not so clear and unambiguous *572 in its terms that a contempt charge could be based upon it. In Lynch v. Uhlenhopp, 248 Iowa 68, 78 N.W.2d 491 (1956), this court recognized the general principle that "judgment[s] must be definite and certain" and observed: 248 Iowa at 72, 78 N.W.2d at 494. This is in accord with the general rule, stated as follows: 17 Am.Jur.2d Contempt § 52, at 54-55 (1964) (footnotes omitted). The Supreme Court has also noted the requirement of specificity in a court's order: International Longshoremen's Association v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Association, 389 U.S. 64, 76, 88 S. Ct. 201, 208, 19 L. Ed. 2d 236, 245 (1967). In this case Hudson's acts violated no terms of the "order" unless we read them into it by implication. We cannot, however, supply by interpretation constraints which are not expressed in it, especially when the result is to apply powers of the court as formidable as contempt. A lawyer must have considerable latitude in these circumstances to protect the rights of his client. The Supreme Court has recognized this balancing of interests: This plaintiff contends that even if the order was clear and otherwise valid, it could not be enforced because that would be an unconstitutional interference with his client's right of appeal. Because of our disposition of this matter on the grounds discussed, we need not address that issue. We note, however, that we have serious doubts about the propriety of such order even if, as the defendant judge contends, it was entered for the laudable purpose of protecting the rights of a criminal defendant.[1] We conclude that the acts of this plaintiff did not amount to contempt; to the contrary, we believe his strenuous representation of his client in the face of these consequences is commendable. The writ of certiorari is sustained. WRIT SUSTAINED. [1] The defendant argues that this investigation was advisable because Kempf had been anxious to get the case over with and might not want to have it reinstated. We have held, however, that even when a defendant expresses reluctance to file an appeal, a lawyer is nevertheless under a duty to pursue it if it reasonably appears that the defendant is incapable of making an intelligent decision on the question. That is the situation in this case. See State v. Aumann, 265 N.W.2d 316, 319 (Iowa 1978).