Title: State v. Lynch
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2011AP002680-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 13, 2016

2016 WI 66 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP2680-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Patrick J. Lynch, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION BY THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 359 Wis. 2d 482, 859 N.W.2d 125) 
(Ct. App. 2014 – Published) 
PDC No: 2015 WI App 2 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 13, 2016 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 12, 2015 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dodge 
 
JUDGE: 
Andrew P. Bissonette 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ROGGENSACK, C. J. concurs (Opinion filed). 
 
CONCURRED/DISSENTED: ABRAHAMSON, J. and BRADLEY, A. W., J. concur 
and dissent (Co-authored opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
PROSSER, J. dissents (Opinion filed). 
ZIEGLER, J. dissents (Opinion filed).    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Marguerite M. Moeller, assistant attorney general, 
with whom on the briefs was Brad D. Schimel, attorney general. 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief by Robert 
R. Henak, and the Henak Law Office, S.C., Milwaukee, WI, with 
whom on the brief was Christopher T. Van Wagner and Christopher 
T. Van Wagner S.C., Madison, WI.  Oral argument by Robert R. 
Henak.  
 
 
2016 WI 66
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2011AP2680-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2010CF365) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Patrick J. Lynch, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 13, 2016 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  As a result 
of a divided court, the law remains as the court of appeals has 
articulated it.1   
                                                 
1 While five Justices would reverse the decision of the 
court of appeals——in whole or in part——no more than three 
Justices 
can 
agree 
on 
the 
same 
rationale 
or 
result.  
Consequently, the law remains as the court of appeals has 
articulated it. First, Justice Gableman, joined by Chief Justice 
Roggensack and Justice R.G. Bradley, would overturn State v. 
Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d 600, 499 N.W.2d 719 (Ct. App. 1993) 
modified by State v. Green, 2002 WI 68, 253 Wis. 2d 356, 646 
N.W.2d 
298 
(hereinafter 
Shiffra/Green). 
Second, 
Justice 
Abrahamson 
and 
Justice 
A.W. 
Bradley 
would 
not 
overturn 
Shiffra/Green 
but 
would 
interpret 
Shiffra 
to 
allow 
for 
additional remedies, including release of the privileged records 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 146.82(2)(a)4. Third, Justice Prosser 
would not overturn Shiffra/Green, and though he would consider 
additional remedies, he would not permit a circuit court to 
compel release of the complainant's privileged records pursuant 
(continued) 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
2 
 
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals2 that affirmed the 
Dodge County Circuit Court's3 findings that (1) Patrick Lynch 
("Lynch"), the defendant, made an adequate showing for an in 
camera review of the complainant's privileged mental health 
treatment records and (2) the complainant's testimony must be 
excluded at trial because the complainant refused to disclose 
her privileged mental health treatment records. 
¶2 
This case requires us to reexamine State v. Shiffra, 
175 Wis. 2d 600, 499 N.W.2d 719 (Ct. App. 1993) modified by 
State v. Green, 2002 WI 68, 253 Wis. 2d 356, 646 N.W.2d 298 
(hereinafter Shiffra/Green). Shiffra/Green established a process 
                                                                                                                                                             
to Wis. Stat. § 146.82(2)(a)4. Finally, Justice Ziegler would 
not overturn Shiffra/Green and interprets Shiffra to allow for a 
single remedy (preclusion of the privilege-holder's testimony). 
In this case, "no [majority of] justices reach agreement to 
either affirm, reverse, or modify the decision of the court of 
appeals consistent with precedent. Consequently, the court of 
appeals decision remains the law of the case." State v. Johnson, 
2014 WI 16, ¶2, 353 Wis. 2d 119, 846 N.W.2d 1 (per curiam) 
(Johnson II) (citing Phillips v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 2010 WI 
131, ¶¶1-2, 329 Wis. 2d 639, 791 N.W.2d 190)). 
We note in passing that Justice Abrahamson and Justice A.W. 
Bradley attempt to divert attention from the merits of this 
important case. Lest we be incorrectly perceived as accepting 
their invitation to lose sight of the forest for the trees, here 
is the bottom line: "the court of appeals decision remains the 
law of the case." Johnson II, 353 Wis. 2d 119, ¶2 (per curiam). 
2 State v. Lynch, 2015 WI App 2, 359 Wis. 2d 482, 859 
N.W.2d 125. 
3 The Honorable Andrew P. Bissonnette presided. 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
3 
 
under which a criminal defendant in Wisconsin could obtain an in 
camera review of a person's privileged4 mental health treatment 
records. 
Under 
Shiffa/Green, 
a 
defendant 
can 
acquire 
a 
complainant's privileged mental health treatment records when he5 
demonstrates "a reasonable likelihood that the records contain 
relevant information necessary to a determination of guilt or 
innocence . . . ."6 Green, 253 Wis. 2d 356, ¶19. 
¶3 
In this case, Lynch filed a pretrial motion pursuant 
to Shiffra/Green, seeking an in camera inspection of "all 
psychiatric, psychological, counseling, therapy and clinical 
records" of the complainant for the treatment she received 
during the time period 1993-2011. The circuit court granted 
Lynch's motion for in camera review of the complainant's 
privileged mental health treatment records and ordered the 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin's privilege statute provides, "A patient has a 
privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person 
from disclosing confidential communications made or information 
obtained or disseminated for purposes of diagnosis or treatment 
of 
the 
patient's 
physical, 
mental, 
or 
emotional 
condition . . . ." Wis. Stat. § 905.04(2). 
5 Throughout this opinion, we use the pronoun "he" when 
referring to a defendant because the defendant, Lynch, is a 
male. 
6 State v. Green, 2002 WI 68, 253 Wis. 2d 356, 646 N.W.2d 
298, states the Shiffra/Green test as follows: "[T]he standard 
to obtain an in camera review requires a defendant to set forth, 
in good faith, a specific factual basis demonstrating a 
reasonable 
likelihood 
that 
the 
records 
contain 
relevant 
information necessary to a determination of guilt or innocence 
and is not merely cumulative to other evidence available to the 
defendant." Id., ¶19. 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
4 
 
complainant to sign a release of records. Further, the court 
informed the complainant that if she refused to turn over her 
privileged mental health treatment records, her testimony would 
be "barred at trial." The complainant refused to give up her 
privileged mental health treatment records "[u]nless and until" 
the circuit court's determination was reviewed by another court. 
As a result, the circuit court barred the complainant from 
testifying at trial. The State appealed, and the court of 
appeals 
affirmed 
the 
circuit 
court's 
order 
barring 
the 
complainant from testifying at trial. The State appealed. 
¶4 
The State makes three arguments on appeal. First, the 
State argues that we should overrule Shiffra/Green because it 
originates from a serious misinterpretation of Pennsylvania v. 
Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987). Second, the State argues that, if 
Shiffra/Green remains, we should clarify that witness preclusion 
(barring a complainant from testifying at trial) is not the only 
remedy available to the circuit court when a complainant refuses 
to waive her privilege. Third, the State argues that a circuit 
court should be able to use Wis. Stat. § 146.82(2)(a)4. (2013-
14)7 to require production of the privileged mental heath 
                                                 
7 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 146.82(2)(a)4. 
(2013-14) 
allows 
a 
patient's confidential health care records to be "released upon 
request without informed consent" "under a lawful order of a 
court of record." 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. Although the 
acts giving rise to the alleged crimes in this case date back 
many years, we cite to the most current version of the statutes 
as no pertinent changes have been made. 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
5 
 
treatment records even when the complainant refuses to consent 
to release. 
¶5 
Accordingly, three issues are presented for our 
review.8 The first is whether we should overrule Shiffra/Green. 
The second is whether witness preclusion is the only remedy 
available to the circuit court when a complainant refuses to 
waive her privilege. The third is whether a circuit court may 
use Wis. Stat. § 146.82(2)(a)4. to require production of the 
privileged mental heath treatment records when the complainant 
refuses to consent to release. 
¶6 
These issues, in particular the first and second 
issues, have divided this court for a number of years. See State 
v. Johnson, 2013 WI 59, 348 Wis. 2d 450, 832 N.W.2d 609 (per 
curiam) (Johnson I), reconsideration granted, 2014 WI 16, 353 
                                                 
8 The State's petition for review framed the three issues as 
follows: 
1. Do 
defendants 
have 
a 
constitutional 
right 
to 
disclosure of privately held privileged records? If 
they do, what is the basis for the constitutional 
right? 
2. After determining that Lynch had made the showing 
required by Shiffra/Green, could the circuit court 
have invoked Wis. Stat. § 146.82(2)(a)4. to obtain 
[the complainant's] records without her consent? 
3. Assuming a circuit court cannot obtain a witness's 
privileged records without her consent pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 146.82(2)(a)4., is witness preclusion 
always 
required 
when 
a 
defendant 
satisfies 
Shiffra/Green but the victim withholds consent to an 
in camera review of her privileged records? 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
6 
 
Wis. 2d 119, 846 N.W.2d 1 (per curiam) (Johnson II). These 
issues continue to divide this court.  
¶7 
Justice Gableman, joined by Chief Justice Roggensack 
and Justice R.G. Bradley, would overturn Shiffra/Green. Our 
reasoning is outlined in this lead opinion.9 Justice Abrahamson 
and Justice A.W. Bradley would not overturn Shiffra/Green but 
would interpret Shiffra to allow for additional remedies, 
including release of the privileged records pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 146.82(2)(a)4. Justice Prosser would not overturn 
Shiffra/Green, and though he would consider additional remedies, 
he would not permit a circuit court to compel release of the 
complainant's privileged records pursuant to § 146.82(2)(a)4. 
Finally, Justice Ziegler would not overturn Shiffra/Green and 
interprets Shiffra to allow for a single remedy (preclusion of 
the privilege-holder's testimony). 
¶8 
We conclude that Shiffra/Green improperly relied on 
Ritchie 
when 
it 
invented 
a 
right 
to 
access 
privileged 
information (specifically a complainant's privileged mental 
health treatment records) via a motion for in camera review. We 
                                                 
9 As noted previously, while five Justices would reverse the 
decision of the court of appeals——in whole or in part——no more 
than three Justices can agree on the same rationale or result. 
As a result, the law remains as the court of appeals has 
articulated it. See Johnson II, 353 Wis. 2d 119, ¶2 (per curiam) 
("Specifically, no [majority of] justices reach agreement to 
either affirm, reverse, or modify the decision of the court of 
appeals consistent with precedent. Consequently, the court of 
appeals decision remains the law of the case." (citing Phillips, 
329 Wis. 2d 639, ¶¶1-2)). 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
7 
 
further conclude that Shiffra/Green cannot be grounded in any 
other 
legal 
basis, 
specifically 
any 
other 
constitutional 
provision. We would, therefore, overrule Shiffra/Green and its 
progeny. Consequently, we need not address the second and third 
issues presented for review.10 
I. BACKGROUND 
¶9 
As a young child, the complainant was repeatedly 
sexually assaulted by her father. It was during this period of 
sexual 
abuse 
that 
the 
complainant 
sought 
mental 
health 
treatment. Her father was eventually charged and convicted of 
five counts of first-degree sexual assault of a child. 
¶10 In the case before us, the complainant alleges that 
during the same time her father was sexually assaulting her, she 
was also being sexually assaulted by another——the defendant, 
Lynch. At the time of the alleged sexual assaults, Lynch was a 
law enforcement officer and was "good friends" with the 
complainant's father. According to the complainant, Lynch 
sexually assaulted her on six or seven occasions in her father's 
home. The following excerpts taken from the complainant's 
testimony while she was being questioned by Lynch's attorney at 
his preliminary hearing reveal the nature of three of the 
alleged sexual assaults: 
                                                 
10 See, e.g., Hull v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 222 
Wis. 2d 627, 640 n.7, 586 N.W.2d 863 (1998) ("As a general rule, 
when our resolution of one issue disposes of a case, we will not 
address additional issues."). 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
8 
 
Q. The first time it happened –- let's talk about the 
first time it happened. You went into this bathroom 
that you agree was about three feet by five feet 
approximately. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And there is a toilet and sink in this small room. 
A. Right. 
Q. And what you recall is, what, you walked in the 
bathroom. Did you close the bathroom door? 
A. Yes, I was in there going to the bathroom. 
Q. Was your dad in the house at the time? 
A. Yes, he was. 
Q. And [Lynch] opened the door? 
A. And came in. 
Q. And were your slacks down at that point because you 
were going to the bathroom? 
A. I was pulling them up because I had just finished 
going to the bathroom. 
Q. And did he then take his clothes off? 
A. He then put me on the ground. 
. . . . 
Q. And did he take your clothes off? 
A. I had to pull my pants down. 
Q. Did he tell you to do that or did he do it? 
A. He told me to do it. 
. . . . 
Q. Did he take his trousers completely off to the best 
of your recollection? 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
9 
 
A. I remember him taking them down. I don't know if 
they came off completely 
Q. You stated that he placed his penis inside of your 
vagina, correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Did he ejaculate? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. I know this may be difficult, but approximately how 
long, in terms of time, was his penis inside of your 
vagina? 
A. Like five or ten minutes. 
Q. Did you cry out or scream for help, or did you cry 
out or scream in pain? 
A. No, because I was terrified. He was wearing a cop 
uniform and he had a gun and I was terrified of what 
he would do.  
Q. To your knowledge did you father know what was 
going on? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How do you know that your father knew what was 
going on? 
A. Because he was right outside the door when it was 
happening. 
. . . . 
Q. What do you remember happening on the second 
incident in the winter of 1990? 
A. I got called into the bathroom and he told me to 
take my pants off. That's when he started fondling me. 
Q. And did he, during that incident, take off his 
trousers? 
A. Yes. 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
10 
 
. . . . 
Q. [A]fter he started fondling you, did he place you 
again on the floor? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And how long did this incident happen going 
forward? 
A. It felt like hours, but it was probably 15, 20 
minutes. 
Q. Do you remember if he ejaculated during that time? 
A. I would believe so. At that time I -- you know, you 
don't think about anything else. I [was] trying to 
just block my mind and lay there. 
Q. That floor, was it a hard floor or was there a rug 
on it? 
A. Hard. 
Q. So like linoleum or something? 
A. Cold. 
. . . . 
Q. So what happened during th[e] [third] occasion? 
. . . . 
A. I got called down again and I -- 
Q. Why did you go? 
A. Because I felt like I had no choice. I was scared. 
I was a little girl. 
. . . . 
Q. Your dad called you down and then [Lynch] took over 
and -- 
A. And we went into the bathroom. At that time he made 
me sit on the toilet and perform oral sex on him. 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
11 
 
Q. Did he do -- did anything else occur? Did anything 
else occur during this time besides oral sex? 
A. After that he laid me down on the floor and stuck 
his penis into my vagina. 
Q. Were you crying during this incident? 
A. Yes. 
Q. The first incident were you crying? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Second incident were you crying? 
A. I had tears. 
Q. Third incident when [another person] was there you 
were crying? 
A. Yes, I had tears. I was afraid to make any noise or 
any sound. 
. . . . 
The testimony of the complainant reveals that the alleged sexual 
assaults 
included 
forced 
"fondling," 
"oral 
sex," 
and 
"intercourse." According to the complainant, all of the sexual 
assaults took place in a small bathroom (described in the above 
testimony) next to the kitchen. 
¶11 The complainant also testified that after her father's 
trial (which took place a few years after the alleged sexual 
abuse occurred), Lynch would show up where she worked. The 
following excerpt, again taken from the complainant's testimony 
at the defendant's preliminary hearing reveals the nature of the 
alleged stalking: 
Q. Tell us what you saw when you were working there 
during that time? What happened? 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
12 
 
A. The first time I saw him through the drive-thru and 
he did the same thing that he did at [another 
workplace], and he would stare me down and I walked 
away at that time. I was a supervisor, so I could exit 
and I didn't have to take transactions. So I would go 
in back by the vault. 
Q. Okay. How many times did that occur during the time 
that you were working there between May of 2007 and 
February of 2008 that he would go through –- that you 
could see the defendant at the drive-thru? 
A. At the drive-thru probably three times, four times. 
Q. Okay. Total four times? 
A. In the drive-thru. He did come into the lobby of 
the bank too. 
Q. Okay. Tell us about when he would come into the 
lobby of the bank what would happen. 
A. He would walk in and walk up to the table and kind 
of look at where I was at, and then wait for my teller 
line to be open, then approach mine. Then I would have 
one of the tellers come and take my spot and I would 
exit. 
Q. How many times do you recall that happening during 
the time that you were working there? 
A. Like three. 
Q. Okay. How do you know . . . that it just wasn't the 
line that was open for him to conduct business at your 
teller window? 
A. Because there was always more than one teller. I 
was just the one who filled in when the lines were 
long. And there would be other tellers open at that 
time when he would approach my window. 
Q. Okay. When this was occurring, how did you feel 
when you saw the defendant at [your workplace]? 
A. I was terrified. 
Q. Why is that? 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
13 
 
A. Because it put me back to when I was a little girl. 
I mean, I was afraid. He wore the same uniform that he 
did –- I mean, when he molested me, that he did when 
he came to [my workplace]. 
¶12 Many years after the alleged sexual assaults and 
stalking by Lynch took place, the State charged Lynch with three 
counts of first-degree sexual assault of a child11 and three 
counts of stalking12.13 
                                                 
11 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.02(1) provides, "Whoever has sexual 
contact or sexual intercourse with a person who has not attained 
the age of 13 years and causes great bodily harm to the person 
is guilty of a Class A felony." Sexual intercourse is defined as 
"vulvar penetration as well as cunnilingus, fellatio, or anal 
intercourse between persons or any other intrusion, however 
slight, of any part of a person's body or of any object into the 
genital or anal opening either by the defendant or upon the 
defendant's instruction. The emission of semen is not required." 
Wis. Stat. § 948.01(6). 
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 940.32(2) states, 
Whoever meets all of the following criteria is guilty 
of a Class I felony: 
(a) The actor intentionally engages in a course of 
conduct directed at a specific person that would cause 
a reasonable person under the same circumstances to 
suffer serious emotional distress or to fear bodily 
injury to or the death of himself or herself or a 
member of his or her family or household. 
(b) The actor knows or should know that at least one 
of the acts that constitutes the course of conduct 
will cause the specific person to suffer serious 
emotional distress or place the specific person in 
reasonable fear of bodily injury to or the death of 
himself or herself or a member of his or her family or 
household. 
(c) The actor's acts cause the specific person to 
suffer serious emotional distress or induce fear in 
the specific person of bodily injury to or the death 
(continued) 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
14 
 
¶13 Prior to trial, Lynch filed a Shiffra/Green motion, 
seeking 
to 
subpoena 
the 
complainant's 
"psychiatric, 
psychological, counseling, therapy and clinical records" from 
1993-2011 
for 
in 
camera 
review. 
Lynch 
claims 
that 
the 
complainant's treatment records will likely contain information 
related to his defense. More specifically, Lynch contends the 
records will show that (1) the complainant exhibits ongoing 
symptoms of post traumatic stress disorder, which he argues 
affects her memory; (2) the complainant did not report Lynch to 
any treatment providers as a child; and (3) the complainant has 
sociopathic personality disorder, a symptom of which is frequent 
lying. 
¶14 The circuit court granted Lynch's motion for in camera 
review of the complainant's privileged mental health treatment 
records. It ordered the complainant to disclose "the names and 
addresses of all of her treatment providers since January 1, 
1980." It then stated, "By treatment providers, the [c]ourt is 
talking about physicians, psychologists, psychiatrists, and 
other forms of therapists engaged in any form of counseling with 
[the complainant] up to the present time." (Emphasis added.) The 
court further ordered that if the complainant failed to release 
                                                                                                                                                             
of himself or herself or a member of his or her family 
or household. 
13 Only one of the three stalking charges arose out of 
Lynch's interactions with the complainant. The other two charges 
stem from Lynch's interactions with other women. 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
15 
 
these records to the court, it would, pursuant to the remedy 
contained in Shiffra/Green, bar her testimony at trial. 
¶15  The complainant refused to surrender her privileged 
mental health treatment records "[u]nless and until" the circuit 
court's determination was reviewed by another court. As a 
consequence, the court barred her from testifying against Lynch 
at trial. The State filed an appeal. 
¶16 The court of appeals affirmed. State v. Lynch, 2015 WI 
App 2, 359 Wis. 2d 482, 859 N.W.2d 125. The court of appeals 
agreed with the circuit court's finding that Lynch had met the 
showing required by Shiffra/Green.14 The court further agreed 
"with the circuit court that, under Shiffra[/Green], the only 
available remedy when a victim refuses to disclose records for 
an in camera review is the exclusion of the victim's testimony 
at trial." Id., ¶1. As a result, the court of appeals remanded 
for further proceedings. The State filed a petition for review 
to this court, and we granted the State's petition.15 
                                                 
14 The issue of whether Lynch made the requisite showing 
under Shiffra/Green is not at issue before this court because 
the State did not seek review of the court of appeals' 
conclusion that Lynch met the Shiffra/Green showing. 
15 The dissent repeatedly chastises the State for bringing 
the present claim before this court. See, e.g., Justice 
Ziegler's dissent, ¶189. The State's decision to appeal this 
case should not be harshly rebuked because the law in this case 
is anything but "settled." After five Justices could not reach a 
consensus in State v. Johnson, 2013 WI 59, 348 Wis. 2d 450, 832 
N.W.2d 609 (per curiam) (Johnson I) and Johnson II, the State 
was left with a messy predicament. As the State explained in its 
petition for review, it seeks some much needed clarity: 
(continued) 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
16 
 
II. DISCUSSION 
¶17 We begin by briefly discussing the difference between 
privilege and confidentiality, and the two statutes involved in 
this case: Wis. Stat. § 905.04 (privilege statute) and Wis. 
Stat. § 146.82 (confidentiality statute). We then explain why it 
was improper for the Shiffra/Green court to rely on Ritchie when 
it created a right to access privileged information via a motion 
for in camera review. Next, we discuss why Shiffra/Green's right 
to access privileged information via a motion for in camera 
review cannot be grounded in any other legal basis, specifically 
any other constitutional provision. We note that even if there 
were a right, that right would need to be balanced against 
§ 905.04, the privilege statute. We would analogize this case, 
which involves access to information, to situations involving 
the presentation of evidence at trial. A series of opinions from 
the Supreme Court of the United States instruct that when a 
defendant seeks to present evidence at trial and is barred by 
statute from doing so, a court may strike down the statute only 
when it is arbitrary or disproportionate to the purpose the 
statute is designed to serve. Here, the privilege statute is 
neither arbitrary nor disproportionate to the purpose it was 
                                                                                                                                                             
To this day, [] this court has never issued a 
precedential 
decision 
addressing——other 
than 
in 
passing——the state's arguments for why Shiffra rests 
on 
shaky 
constitutional 
ground 
and 
should 
be 
overruled. This case affords the court the opportunity 
to have all seven justices weigh in on this extremely 
important constitutional question. 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
17 
 
designed to serve. Finally, we end by discussing a few ways 
defendants can meaningfully present a defense without having 
access to a complainant's privileged mental health treatment 
records. 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶18 This case requires us to interpret and apply the 
United States Constitution and the Wisconsin Constitution as 
well 
as 
various 
statutes. 
"The 
interpretation 
of 
a 
constitutional provision is a question of law that we review de 
novo." Appling v. Walker, 2014 WI 96, ¶17, 358 Wis. 2d 132, 853 
N.W.2d 888. "The interpretation and application of a statute 
present questions of law that this court reviews de novo while 
benefitting from the analyses of the court of appeals and 
circuit court." State v. Alger, 2015 WI 3, ¶21, 360 Wis. 2d 193, 
858 N.W.2d 346. 
B. PRIVILEGE AND CONFIDENTIALITY 
¶19 Two statutes, one relating to privilege and one 
relating to confidentiality, are relevant to the present case. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 905.04 protects a person's information by 
making that information privileged: "A patient has a privilege 
to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other from disclosing 
confidential communications made or information obtained or 
disseminated for purpose of diagnosis or treatment . . . ." In 
contrast, Wis. Stat. § 146.82 protects information by making it 
confidential: "All patient health care records shall remain 
confidential." We must be mindful of the difference between 
privileged information and confidential information: 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
18 
 
Although 
they 
are 
separate 
concepts, 
the 
terms 
privilege and confidentiality are often confused. 
Privilege is an exception to the general rule that the 
public 
has 
a 
right 
to 
every 
man's 
evidence. 
Confidentiality is an ethic that protects the client 
from unauthorized disclosure of information about the 
client by the therapist . . . . The presence of 
confidentiality alone is not enough to support a 
privilege. Refusal by a professional to testify in the 
absence of a privilege may result in a charge of 
contempt of court against the professional, while a 
breach of confidentiality may be the subject of a tort 
action. Confidentiality, therefore, is a professional 
duty to refrain from speaking about certain matters, 
while privilege is a relief from the duty to speak in 
court proceedings. 
Catharina J.H. Dubbelday, Comment, The Psychotherapist-Client 
Testimonial Privilege: Defining the Professional Involved, 34 
Emory L.J. 777, 780-81 (1985) (quotation marks and footnotes 
omitted). 
 
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS IMPROPERLY RELIED ON RITCHIE WHEN IT 
INVENTED A RIGHT TO ACCESS PRIVILEGED INFORMATION VIA A MOTION 
FOR IN CAMERA REVIEW. 
¶20 Since much of this case revolves around the Supreme 
Court of the United State's decision in Ritchie, we begin by 
reviewing its facts and holding. We then discuss the court of 
appeals' treatment of Ritchie in the two cases leading up to 
Shiffra as well as Shiffra. 
 
1. The Original In Camera Review Case: Pennsylvania v. Ritchie. 
¶21 In Ritchie, the Supreme Court addressed whether and to 
what extent a state's interest in the confidentiality of its 
investigative files concerning child abuse must yield to a 
criminal defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 
Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 42-43. In that case, Pennsylvania created 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
19 
 
"a protective service agency charged with investigating cases of 
suspected mistreatment and neglect."16 Id. at 43 (emphasis 
added). The defendant was charged with "rape, involuntary 
deviant sexual intercourse, incest, and the corruption of a 
minor." Id. The alleged victim of those charges was the 
defendant's thirteen-year-old daughter. Id. The daughter claimed 
that she had been assaulted by the defendant two or three times 
per week over a four year period. Id. After reporting the 
incidents to the police, the case was referred to the protective 
agency. Id. 
¶22 Prior to trial, the defendant served the protective 
agency with a subpoena; he sought access to the agency's records 
concerning his daughter. Id. The protective agency refused to 
turn over the records, claiming that the records were protected 
from disclosure under Pennsylvania law. Id. The relevant 
Pennsylvania statute provided, 
reports made pursuant to this act including but not 
limited to report summaries of child abuse . . . and 
written reports . . . as well as any other information 
obtained, reports written or photographs or x-rays 
taken concerning alleged instances of child abuse in 
the possession of the department, a county children 
and youth social service agency or a child protective 
service shall be confidential and shall only be made 
available to: 
. . . . 
(5) A court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to a 
court order. 
                                                 
16 The protective agency was called "Children and Youth 
Services" ("CYS"). 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
20 
 
Id. at n.2 (first two alterations in original) (emphasis added); 
see also id. at 43-44. To summarize, the statute required that 
all reports and information obtained in the course of a 
protective agency's investigation be kept confidential unless a 
court ordered disclosure. 
¶23 The defendant in Ritchie argued that he was entitled 
to the confidential information because it might contain the 
names of favorable witnesses as well as exculpatory information. 
See id. at 55. Moreover, he claimed that the protective agency's 
refusal to disclose the confidential information violated his 
constitutional rights, specifically his Sixth Amendment rights 
to Confrontation and Compulsory Process and his Fourteenth 
Amendment right to Due Process. See id. at 51-52, 55-56, 57-58. 
The Court rejected the defendant's arguments under the Sixth 
Amendment 
and 
instead 
addressed 
his 
arguments 
under 
the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 56 ("[B]ecause our Fourteenth 
Amendment precedents addressing the fundamental fairness of 
trials establish a clear framework for review, we adopt a due 
process analysis for purposes of this case."). 
¶24 In conducting its due process analysis, the Court 
relied exclusively on Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the 
case 
that 
first 
established 
a 
prosecutor's 
disclosure 
obligation, and cases that clarify Brady. Indeed, the first 
sentence of the Court's due process analysis reads, "It is 
well[-]settled that the government has the obligation to turn 
over evidence in its possession that is both favorable to the 
accused and material to guilt or punishment." Id. at 57 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
21 
 
(emphasis added). The Court then cited to Brady and United 
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), a case that clarified 
Brady's reach. Id. In fact, the only law cited in the Court's 
due process analysis stems directly from Brady. Id. at 57-58. 
¶25 Brady requires, as a prerequisite to disclosure, that 
the information sought by the defendant be (1) in the 
prosecutor's possession and (2) both favorable to the accused 
and material to guilt or punishment. 373 U.S. at 87; see also 
Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 57. The Ritchie Court readily concluded 
that the first Brady requirement——that the information be in the 
prosecutor's possession——was met, so it dove straight into the 
second requirement——that the information be favorable to the 
accused and material to guilt or punishment. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 
at 57. It is clear the Ritchie Court assumed that Brady's 
disclosure requirement applied to a state agency involved in 
investigating the allegations as part of the prosecutorial state 
function because the Court made quick-work of that requirement. 
In contrast, the Court grappled with Brady's materiality 
requirement: 
At this stage, of course, it is impossible to say 
whether any information in the [protective agency's] 
records may be relevant to [the defendant's] claim of 
innocence, because neither the prosecution nor defense 
counsel have seen the information, and the trial judge 
acknowledged that he had not reviewed the full file. 
The Commonwealth, however, argues that no materiality 
inquiry is required, because a statute renders the 
contents 
of 
the 
file 
[confidential]. 
Requiring 
disclosure here, it is argued, would override the 
Commonwealth's compelling interest in confidentiality 
on the mere speculation that the file "might" have 
been useful to the defense. 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
22 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
¶26 In considering how Brady's materiality standard should 
apply to speculative, protected information, the Court balanced 
the defendant's interest in the information against the State's 
interest in protecting the information: 
Although we recognize that the public interest in 
protecting this type of sensitive information is 
strong, we do not agree that this interest necessarily 
prevents disclosure in all circumstances. This is not 
a case where a state statute grants [the protective 
agency] the absolute authority to shield its files 
from all eyes. Rather, the [state] law provides that 
the 
information 
shall 
be 
disclosed 
in 
certain 
circumstances, including when [the protective agency] 
is directed to do so by court order. Given that the 
[state] Legislature contemplated some use of [the 
protective agency's] records in judicial proceedings, 
we cannot conclude that the statute prevents all 
disclosure in criminal prosecutions. In the absence of 
any 
apparent 
state 
policy 
to 
the 
contrary, 
we 
therefore have no reason to believe that relevant 
information would not be disclosed when a court of 
competent jurisdiction determines that the information 
is "material" to the defense of the accused. 
Id. at 57-58 (emphases added) (citation omitted). Accordingly, 
the Ritchie Court held that the defendant was entitled to have 
the protective agency's investigative file reviewed in camera, 
remarking that if the files "contain[ed] information that 
probably would have changed the outcome of his trial," then 
"[the defendant] must be given a new trial." Id. at 58. Thus, 
the point of the in camera review was to determine whether the 
files met Brady's second requirement——materiality. 
¶27 In sum, there are two key takeaway points from 
Ritchie. First, Ritchie involved a state statute that made the 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
23 
 
protective agency's investigative files confidential. But the 
statute specifically allowed for disclosure per a court order. 
The Court leaned heavily on this fact in reaching its 
conclusion, commenting, "the [state] law provides that the 
information 
shall 
be 
disclosed 
in 
certain 
circumstances, 
including when [the agency] is directed to do so by court 
order." Id. at 57-58. 
¶28 Second, the protective agency, the entity holding the 
records, was responsible for "investigating cases of suspected 
mistreatment and neglect," including the allegations made 
against the defendant in that case. Id. 42-43. The Ritchie Court 
considered the "investigative" status of the protective agency 
important because it cited exclusively to Brady and post-Brady 
cases, which require the prosecutor to turn over files in his or 
her possession. The Ritchie Court's actions (summarily skipping 
over this requirement) demonstrate that the protective agency 
met Brady's possession requirement because the protective agency 
performed state investigative and prosecutorial functions. 
¶29 And this conclusion makes sense. Since Brady, the 
Court has held that the prosecutor's Brady obligation extends to 
"others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including 
the police."  See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) 
("[T]he individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any 
favorable 
evidence 
known 
to 
the 
others 
acting 
on 
the 
government's 
behalf 
in 
the 
case, 
including 
the 
police." 
(emphasis added)); Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999) 
("In order to comply with Brady, therefore, 'the individual 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
24 
 
prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known 
to the others acting on the government's behalf in this case, 
including the police.'" (citing Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437)). In 
Ritchie, the state statute charged the relevant protective 
agency with "investigating cases of suspected mistreatment and 
neglect." 480 U.S. at 43. There, in particular, the defendant's 
case was "referred" to the protective agency. Id. In short, it 
made sense for the Supreme Court to rely on Brady and post-Brady 
cases in Ritchie because the protective agency was charged with 
investigating the allegations and was, therefore, acting on the 
prosecution's behalf. As a result, any material it had was 
constructively within the possession of the prosecution. 
 
2. Our Court of Appeals Gradual Expansion of Ritchie: In the 
Interest of K.K.C., State v. S.H., and State v. Shiffra. 
¶30 Nearly one year after the Supreme Court of the United 
States decided Ritchie, our court of appeals took up In the 
Interest of K.K.C., 143 Wis. 2d 508, 422 N.W.2d 142 (Ct. App. 
1988). The court reached the following conclusion regarding 
Ritchie:  
[The defendant] contends that if the trial judge in 
his criminal case does not review the agency's files, 
he will be denied his constitutional rights to 
confrontation, compulsory process, and due process. 
Ritchie holds that a criminal defendant is entitled to 
an in camera review by the trial court of confidential 
records 
if 
those 
records 
are 
material 
to 
the 
defendant's defense. 
[The defendant] has not moved the trial court in his 
criminal case to make an in camera review of the 
agency records. If he does so, Ritchie, supra, 
establishes that he is entitled to such a review by 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
25 
 
the trial court, provided he makes a preliminary 
showing  that the files contain evidence material to 
his defense. 
In the Interest of K.K.C., 143 Wis. 2d 508, 511, 422 N.W.2d 142 
(Ct. App. 1988) (citations omitted). That's the court's entire 
Ritchie analysis. 
¶31 The statute in K.K.C., Wis. Stat. § 48.78(2)(a), 
provided, "No agency may make available for inspection or 
disclose the contents of any record kept or information received 
about any individual in its care or legal custody, except as 
provided [under other subsections] or by order of the court." 
Id. at 509-10. Similar to the statute in Ritchie, § 48.78(2)(a) 
carved out a court order exception. However, unlike in Ritchie, 
it is unclear whether the County Department of Social Services 
was "investigating" or "acting on the government's behalf" by 
assisting the prosecution. 
¶32 Two years later, the court of appeals decided State v. 
S.H., 159 Wis. 2d 730, 465 N.W.2d 238 (Ct. App. 1990). There, 
the court once again interpreted Ritchie, this time broadly 
expanding Ritchie's reach. In S.H., the State charged the 
defendant with twelve counts of first-degree sexual assault. 
State v. S.H., 159 Wis. 2d 730, 733, 465 N.W.2d 238 (Ct. App. 
1990). The alleged victims of those charges were the defendant's 
three children. Id. Prior to trial, the defendant sought a court 
order directing the children's counseling center (Directions 
Counseling Center) to provide him with copies of the children's 
treatment records. Id. at 734. The counseling center refused to 
release the records after the children's guardian ad litem 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
26 
 
claimed the psychologist-patient privilege (Wis. Stat. § 905.04) 
on behalf of the children. Id. The court of appeals, citing 
Ritchie and K.K.C., concluded that "if a defendant makes a 
preliminary showing that the records contain evidence material 
to his defense, he is entitled to an in camera review by the 
trial court of those records." Id. at 738. Here is the court of 
appeals' analysis and application of Ritchie: 
[Ritchie] controls S.H.'s constitutional right to 
compel 
disclosure 
of 
confidential 
records. 
That 
[C]ourt conducted a due process analysis and concluded 
that the defendant was entitled to an in camera review 
by the trial court of confidential records. In 
Ritchie, the Court struck a balance between the 
protection 
of 
confidential 
information 
and 
the 
defendant's 
interest 
in 
obtaining 
exculpatory 
information. The Court recognized that an in camera 
review 
denied 
the 
defendant 
the 
benefit 
of 
an 
"advocate's eye." However, such review adequately 
protected the defendant's rights while protecting the 
confidentiality of the records. Accordingly, if a 
defendant makes a preliminary showing that the records 
contain evidence material to his defense, he is 
entitled to an in camera review by the trial court of 
those records. 
Id. at 737-38 (citations omitted). The court of appeals left out 
some of Ritchie's crucial features. 
¶33 For example, unlike in Ritchie and K.K.C., where the 
records sought were confidential, the records sought in S.H. 
were privileged under Wis. Stat. § 905.04. Moreover, unlike the 
statutes in Ritchie and K.K.C., § 905.04 does not contain an 
exception allowing for release by court order. 
¶34 Additionally, 
in 
S.H., 
a 
private 
mental 
health 
facility, Directions Counseling Center, held the privileged 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
27 
 
records. Id. at 733-34. Unlike the protective agency in Ritchie, 
no facts in the court of appeals' opinion would suggest that 
Directions Counseling Center was involved in "investigating" the 
sexual assault allegations or was in any way acting on behalf of 
the prosecutor. In reaching its conclusion, the court of appeals 
failed 
to 
take 
notice 
of 
these 
important 
distinguishing 
features. Instead, the court incorrectly interpreted Ritchie to 
mean "that the defendant was entitled to an in camera review by 
the trial court of confidential records." Id. at 737-38. 
¶35 Almost three years later, the court of appeals 
considered State v. Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d 600, 499 N.W.2d 719 
(Ct. App. 1993). In Shiffra, the state charged the defendant 
with second-degree sexual assault. 175 Wis. 2d at 602. Prior to 
trial, 
the 
defendant 
moved 
for 
an 
order 
requiring 
the 
complainant to reveal to the defendant her "psychiatric history, 
psychiatric records, and to execute an authorization to release 
medical information from any doctors, hospitals or counselors 
seen by [the complainant] . . . ." Id. at 603. The State opposed 
the 
motion, 
arguing 
that 
the 
complainant's 
records 
were 
privileged under Wis. Stat. § 905.04. Despite the State's 
argument that "th[e] case d[id] not fall within the ambit of 
Ritchie because [the complainant's] records [were] not in the 
possession of the prosecution or any other state agency," the 
court concluded,  
We are bound by Wisconsin precedent, which clearly 
makes Ritchie applicable to cases in which the 
information sought by the defense is protected by 
statute and is not in the possession of the state. See 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
28 
 
K.K.C., 143 Wis. 2d at 511, 422 N.W.2d at 144 
(information 
sought 
was 
confidential); 
S.H., 
159 
Wis. 2d at 736, 465 N.W.2d at 240-41 (information 
sought was protected under sec. 905.04, Stats., and 
was in the possession of a private counseling center). 
According to these cases, Shiffra is entitled to an in 
camera inspection if he meets the burden of making a 
preliminary showing of materiality. The State contends 
that S.H. and K.K.C. are not binding because their 
relevant language is dicta. We do not agree. Both 
cases unequivocally adopted Ritchie as the law in 
Wisconsin even when the records are not in the state's 
possession. 
Id. at 606-07. 
¶36 To say the court of appeals took some liberties 
interpreting and applying Ritchie would be an understatement. 
Over the course of three cases, K.K.C., S.H., and Shiffra, the 
court of appeals swept into Ritchie's reach privileged records 
held by entities completely removed from the investigative 
criminal 
process. 
Ritchie——a 
case 
concerning 
confidential 
records (subject to numerous exceptions) held by the very agency 
charged with investigating the offense and therefore soundly 
rooted in Brady——never should have been stretched to cover 
privileged 
records 
held 
by 
agencies 
far 
removed 
from 
investigative and prosecutorial functions. As a result, we 
conclude that the court of appeals improperly relied on Ritchie 
when it created a right to access privileged information that is 
not in the prosecutor's hands via a motion for in camera review. 
3. This Court's Adoption of Shiffra. 
¶37 This court appears to have first "adopted" the court 
of appeals' Shiffra test in State v. Solberg, 211 Wis. 2d 372, 
564 N.W.2d 775 (1997). We use the term "adopted" loosely because 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
29 
 
the Solberg court simply parroted Shiffra's test and then cited 
Shiffra: 
Whether the court of appeals had the authority to 
examine E.H's records is dependent on whether the 
circuit court appropriately conducted an in camera 
inspection of the records. If the circuit court had 
the authority to review the privileged records, then 
the court of appeals also had the authority to do so. 
A circuit court should conduct an in camera review of 
privileged medical records when the defendant makes "a 
preliminary showing that the sought-after evidence is 
material to his or her defense," and the privilege 
holder consents to review of those records. 
State v. Solberg, 211 Wis. 2d 372, ¶16, 564 N.W.2d 775 (1997) 
(footnote omitted) (quoting Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d at 605). The 
Solberg court's singular string of reasoning for such a rule was 
its "belie[f] that giving the defendant an opportunity to have 
the circuit court conduct an in camera review of the privileged 
records, while still allowing the patient to preclude review, 
addresse[d] both the interests of the defendant and the 
patient." Id., ¶23. In essence, Shiffra seemed fair enough to 
the Solberg court. 
¶38 We also considered Shiffra in State v. Rizzo, 2002 WI 
20, 250 Wis. 2d 407, 640 N.W.2d 93. Similar to the court in 
Solberg, the Rizzo court applied Shiffra without any analysis of 
Shiffra or its foundation. Here is the Rizzo court's application 
of Shiffra: 
We do no adopt Rizzo's position because it would 
eviscerate the procedure for in camera review set 
forth 
in 
Shiffra, 
which 
protects 
a 
victim's 
confidential records. In effect, Rizzo's position 
would provide that the defendant must receive full 
access to the victim's treatment records in every case 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
30 
 
in order to effectively cross-examine an expert who 
treated the victim. That is in stark contrast to the 
in camera procedure under Shiffra, which specifically 
balanced the victim's interest in confidentiality 
against the constitutional rights of the defendant. 
State v. Rizzo, 2002 WI 20, ¶53, 250 Wis. 2d 407, 640 N.W.2d 93 
(citing Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d at 609-10). 
¶39 Finally, in State v. Green, this court modified 
Shiffra's standard for obtaining an in camera review. The Green 
court's consideration of whether Shiffra was good law is as 
follows: 
The State contends that the holding in [Shiffra] was 
in error because it relied on [Ritchie]. The State 
argues that Ritchie was distinguishable and therefore 
inapplicable because it involved a situation, unlike 
here, where the records were in the government's 
possession. The Shiffra court, however, specifically 
rejected this argument, concluding that it was bound 
by Wisconsin precedent, which clearly made Ritchie 
applicable in cases where the information sought by 
the defense is not in the possession of the state. 
Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d at 606-07, 499 N.W.2d 719 (citing 
State v. S.H., 159 Wis. 2d 730, 736, 465 N.W.2d 238 
(Ct. App. 1990), and In re K.K.C., 143 Wis. 2d 508, 
511, 422 N.W.2d 142 (Ct. App. 1988)). This court 
recognized the validity of Shiffra in [Solberg] and 
[Rizzo]. We will not depart from this precedent. 
Green, 253 Wis. 2d 356, ¶21 n.4.17 To put it bluntly, Shiffra 
                                                 
17 The dissent repeatedly uses this footnote in Green to 
proclaim that we have expressly declined to overrule Shiffra. 
See Justice Ziegler's dissent, ¶190; see also Justice Prosser's 
dissent, ¶167. In reality, this footnote shows that courts have 
continued to blindly adhere to poorly reasoned cases solely 
because they have felt compelled to do so. Any one of these 
courts along the way could have at least attempted to address 
the State and answer the question of whether a defendant has a 
constitutional right to access privileged information, and if 
so, what the basis of that right is. None did. We cannot 
continue to pass the buck. We must roll up our sleeves and dig 
(continued) 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
31 
 
kept the balancing test invented by the court of appeals in S.H. 
and K.K.C. because it felt "bound by precedent," and this court 
kept Shiffra because Solberg and Rizzo appeared to apply it. 
This is the untenable foundation upon which Shiffra was built 
and now rests. We will not rubber stamp the Shiffra test solely 
because 
it 
has 
been 
inexplicably 
applied.18 
                                                                                                                                                             
into the law. Interpreting the Constitution is, after all, the 
ultimate responsibility of this court. See Powell v. McCormack, 
395 U.S. 486, 521 (1969). 
18 The dissent relies on Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, 
LLC, 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015) for the proposition 
that "an argument that we got something wrong——even a good 
argument to that effect——cannot by itself justify scrapping 
settled precedent." Justice Ziegler's dissent, ¶208. Kimble is a 
statutory interpretation case. Accordingly, in Kimble, the 
Supreme Court of the United States discussed stare decisis in 
the context of statutory interpretation: 
What is more, stare decisis carries enhanced force 
when a decision . . . interprets a statute. Then, 
unlike in a constitutional case, critics of our ruling 
can take their objections across the street, and 
Congress can correct any mistake it sees. . . . All of 
interpretive decisions, in whatever way reasoned, 
effectively become part of the statutory scheme, 
subject (just like the rest) to congressional changes. 
Absent special justification, they are balls tossed 
into Congress's court, for acceptance or not as that 
branch elects. 
Kimble v. Marvel Entm't, LLC, 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 
(2015) (emphasis added).  
 
Even Kimble's "general" discussion of the law speaks to 
stare decisis in the context of statutory interpretation, as it 
cites to Justice Brandeis's dissent in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & 
Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393 (1932). Burnet explains, 
Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in 
most matters it is more important that the applicable 
(continued) 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
32 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
rule of law be settled than that it be settled right. 
This is commonly true even where the error is a matter 
of serious concern, provided correction can be had by 
legislation. But in cases involving the Federal 
Constitution, where correction through legislative 
action is practically impossible, this court has often 
overruled its earlier decisions. The court bows to the 
lessons 
of 
experience 
and 
the 
force 
of 
better 
reasoning . . . . 
Id., 285 U.S. at 406-08 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (citations 
omitted).  
It is important to recognize the distinction between 
statutory interpretation and constitutional interpretation. As 
noted by the Supreme Court, "unlike in a constitutional case," 
critics of a statutory interpretation case can take their 
objections to the Legislature, and it can then can "correct any 
mistake it sees." Id. (emphasis added); see also Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 954-55 (1992) 
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) 
("Erroneous decisions in [] constitutional cases are uniquely 
durable, because correction through legislative action, save for 
constitutional amendment, is impossible. It is therefore our 
duty to reconsider constitutional interpretations that depart 
from a proper understanding of the Constitution." (quotation 
marks and citations omitted)). In declaring that a defendant has 
a constitutional right in this case, the dissenters remove the 
issue from public discussion and legislative action. See 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2625 (2015) 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("By deciding this question under 
the Constitution, the Court removes it from the realm of 
democratic decision. There will be consequences to shutting down 
the political process on an issue of such profound public 
significance. Closing debates tends to close minds."). 
Moreover, the Supreme Court of the United States has 
overruled precedent when the precedential case was "badly 
reasoned." See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) 
([W]hen governing decisions are unworkable or badly reasoned, 
'this court has never felt constrained to follow precedent.'" 
(citing Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944) (emphasis 
added))); Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 348 (2009) ("The 
doctrine of stare decisis is of course 'essential to the respect 
accorded to the judgments of the Court and to the stability of 
the law,' but it does not compel us to follow a past decision 
(continued) 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
33 
 
We therefore undertake to consider whether there is any legal 
basis in which Shiffra can properly be grounded.19 
 
D. NEITHER THE SIXTH AMENDMENT NOR THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
GUARANTEE A DEFENDANT THE RIGHT TO ACCESS PRIVILEGED INFORMATION 
VIA A MOTION FOR IN CAMERA REVIEW. 
¶40 We turn now to discuss whether there is any other 
legal 
basis 
for 
creating 
a 
right 
to 
access 
privileged 
                                                                                                                                                             
when its rationale no longer withstands 'careful analysis.'" 
(emphasis added) (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 
(2003)); Gant, 556 U.S. at 353 (Scalia, J., concurring) 
("Justice Alito insists that the Court must demand a good reason 
for abandoning prior precedent. That is true enough, but its 
seems to me ample reason that the precedent was badly reasoned 
and 
produces 
erroneous 
(in 
this 
case 
unconstitutional) 
results."); 
Montejo 
v. 
Louisiana, 
556 
U.S. 
778, 
792-73 
(commenting that "[b]eyond workability, the relevant factors in 
deciding whether to adhere to the principle of stare decisis 
include the antiquity of the precedent, the reliance interests 
at stake, and of course whether the decision was well reasoned," 
and noting that the precedential opinion there was "only two 
decades old" so "eliminating it would not upset expectations") 
(emphasis added)); see Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 
558 U.S. 310, 378 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) ("When 
considering whether to reexamine a prior erroneous holding, we 
must balance the importance of having constitutional questions 
decided against the importance of having them decided right."). 
19 In case this point has not been made abundantly clear in 
the 
15 
pages 
detailing 
the 
countless 
inadequacies 
of 
Shiffra/Green, Shiffra/Green was wrongly decided, is unsound in 
principle, and should, therefore, be overruled. See Johnson 
Controls, Inc. v. Emp'rs Ins. of Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶¶98-99, 
264 
Wis. 2d 60, 
665 
N.W.2d 257 
(overruling 
precedent 
and 
outlining a series of concerns a court should consider when 
overturning prior case law, including "whether the prior case 
was correctly decided," and "whether the prior decision is 
unsound in principle"); see also id., ¶100 ("We do more damage 
to the rule of law by obstinately refusing to admit errors, 
thereby perpetuating injustice, than by overturning an erroneous 
decision."). 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
34 
 
information via a motion for in camera review. An analysis of 
other cases tackling this topic reveals that defendants have 
consistently argued that three constitutional provisions——the 
Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause and Compulsory Process 
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause——give 
rise to a right to access privileged information via a motion 
for in camera review. See, e.g., Indiana v. Fromme, 949 N.E.2d 
789, 795 (Ind. 2011). Each provision will be discussed in turn 
below. 
1. The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. 
¶41 The United States Constitution provides, "In all 
criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to 
be confronted with witnesses against him . . . ." U.S. Const. 
amend. VI.20 The Supreme Court of the United States has 
explained, "The Confrontation Clause provides two types of 
protections for a criminal defendant: the right physically to 
face those who testify against him, and the right to conduct 
cross-examination. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 51 (plurality opinion).21 
¶42 A plurality of the Supreme Court has specifically 
considered——and rejected——the argument that "by denying [a 
                                                 
20 The Wisconsin Constitution provides, "In all criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to meet 
witnesses face to face . . . ." Wis. Const. art. I, § 7. 
21 Justice Powell's discussion of the Confrontation Clause 
in Ritchie garnered a plurality of the Court. 480 U.S. at 42. 
Justice Powell's discussion of the Compulsory Process Clause and 
the Due Process Clause garnered a majority of the Court. Id. 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
35 
 
defendant] access to the information necessary to prepare his 
defense, the trial court interfered with [a defendant's] right 
of cross-examination." Id. In Ritchie, the Court commented on 
the limited nature of a defendant's right to cross-examination: 
"The ability to question adverse witnesses, however, does not 
include the power to require the pretrial disclosure of any and 
all 
information 
that 
might 
be 
useful 
in 
contradicting 
unfavorable testimony." Id. at 53. Moreover, the Court went on 
to add, "If we were to accept this broad interpretation . . . , 
the effect would be to transform the Confrontation Clause into a 
constitutionally compelled rule of pretrial discovery. Nothing 
in the case law supports such a view. The opinions of this Court 
show that the right to confrontation is a trial right . . . ." 
Id. at 52 (first emphasis added). Thus, the right to cross 
examine witnesses is satisfied when "defense counsel receives 
wide latitude at trial to question witnesses." Id. at 53 n.9 
("[T]he Confrontation Clause only protects a defendant's trial 
rights[; it] does not compel the pretrial production of 
information that might be useful in preparing for trial."). 
¶43 Similar to the defendant in Ritchie, Lynch's argument 
would be that the court interfered with his ability to most 
effectively cross examine the complainant by denying him access 
to the complainant's privileged mental health treatment records. 
A plurality of the Supreme Court has already rejected this 
argument, and we reject this argument now. Lynch's right to 
cross examination will be satisfied so long as he has the 
opportunity to cross examine the complainant at trial. 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
36 
 
2. The Sixth Amendment's Compulsory Process Clause. 
¶44 The United States Constitution provides, "In all 
criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to 
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor." 
U.S. Const. amend. VI.22 The Supreme Court of the United States 
has explained that the Compulsory Process Clause grants a 
defendant the "right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to 
compel their attendance, if necessary . . . ." Washington v. 
Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967); see also Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 56 
(majority opinion) ("Our cases establish, at a minimum, that 
criminal 
defendants 
have 
the 
right 
to 
the 
government's 
assistance in compelling the attendance of favorable witnesses 
at trial and the right to put before a jury evidence that might 
influence the determination of guilt." (emphasis added)). 
¶45 In State v. Schaefer, 2008 WI 25, 308 Wis. 2d 279, 746 
N.W.2d 457, we analyzed the Ritchie Court's treatment of the 
Compulsory Process Clause, specifically taking notice of the 
Supreme Court's "reluctan[ce] to establish an unconditional 
discovery right under the Sixth Amendment." Id., ¶66. In 
Ritchie, the Court reiterated that it "has never squarely held 
that the Compulsory Process Clause guarantees the right to 
discover the identity of witnesses, or to require the government 
to produce exculpatory evidence." Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 56 
                                                 
22 The Wisconsin Constitution provides, "In all criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have 
compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his 
behalf . . . ." Wis. Const. art. I, § 7. 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
37 
 
(emphasis omitted). Consequently, the Court chose to forego a 
Sixth Amendment analysis and instead opted for a Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process analysis. Id. It explained, "Although we 
conclude that compulsory process provides no greater protections 
in this area than those afforded by due process, we need not 
decide today whether and how the guarantees of the Compulsory 
Process Clause differ from those of the Fourteenth Amendment." 
Id. In Schaefer, we interpreted the Court's statement in Ritchie 
to mean that "unless due process required defense access to 
specific evidence, the Compulsory Process Clause cannot provide 
substitute 
authority 
for 
such 
access." 
Schaefer, 
308 
Wis. 2d 279, ¶66. Following the Supreme Court's lead, we move on 
to consider whether the Due Process Clause guarantees a 
defendant the right to access privileged information via a 
motion for in camera review.23 
                                                 
23 For a discussion on the interplay between the Compulsory 
Process Clause and the Due Process Clause, see Stacey Kime, 
Note, Can A Right Be Less Than The Sum Of Its Parts? How The 
Conflation Of Compulsory Process and Due Process Guarantees 
Diminished Criminal Defendants Rights, 48 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1501 
(2011) and Sanjay Chhablani, Disentangling The Sixth Amendment, 
U. Pa. J. Const. L. 487, 523-29 (2009). Both law review articles 
advocate for a separation of the two constitutional provisions: 
"The rights under the Compulsory Process Clause provide the 
structure for a fair trial . . . while the Due Process Clause 
governs the fairness of the trial itself . . . ." Stacey Kime, 
Note, Can A Right Be Less Than The Sum Of Its Parts? How The 
Conflation Of Compulsory Process and Due Process Guarantees 
Diminished Criminal Defendants Rights, 48 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 
1501, 1524 (2011); see also Sanjay Chhablani, Disentangling The 
Sixth Amendment, U. Pa. J. Const. L. 487, 527-28 (2009) 
("[W]hile the Compulsory Process Clause gives defendants the 
right to the issuance of subpoenas for compelling a witness's 
attendance in court, once that witness shows up, it is the Due 
(continued) 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
38 
 
3. The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 
¶46 The United States Constitution provides, "No State 
shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law . . . ." U.S. Const. amend. XIV.24 Due 
Process 
requires 
that 
criminal 
prosecutions 
comport 
with 
"prevailing notions of fundamental fairness." California v. 
Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984). Fundamental fairness 
necessitates that "criminal defendants be afforded a meaningful 
opportunity to present a complete defense." Id. However, the 
right to present a complete defense has never been interpreted 
to include a general right to access (or discover) information 
in a criminal case. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has 
consistently recognized that "there is no general constitutional 
right to discovery in a criminal case . . . ." Ritchie, 480 U.S. 
at 59-60 (quoting Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 
(1977)). 
¶47 We 
too 
have 
held 
that 
there 
is 
no 
general 
constitutional right to access information in criminal cases. 
See State v. Miller, 35 Wis. 2d 454, 151 N.W.2d 157 (1967); see 
also Britton v. State, 44 Wis. 2d 109, 170 N.W.2d 785 (1969) 
                                                                                                                                                             
Process Clause that addresses whether the witness will be 
allowed to testify."). 
24 The Wisconsin Constitution provides, "All people are born 
equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights; 
among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness;  to 
secure these rights, governments are instituted, deriving their 
just powers from the consent of the governed." Wis. Const. art. 
I, § 1. 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
39 
 
("Discovery has been left to rule-making power and has not been 
deemed a constitutional issue."). Accordingly, a defendant is 
entitled to access information only to the extent outlined in 
Wis. Stat. § 971.23, our criminal discovery statute. Schaefer, 
398 
Wis. 2d 279, 
¶77 
n.17 
("[T]he 
scope 
of 
discoverable 
materials is set out in statute and compliance with the statute 
will be enforced by the court."); see also Miller, 35 Wis. 2d at 
474 ("[I]t has been held that unless introduced by appropriate 
legislation, the doctrine of discovery is a complete and utter 
stranger to criminal procedure." (quoting 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law 
§ 955(1), p. 787)).25 
¶48 Of course, "[s]tatutory discovery is conceptually 
distinct from the prosecution's constitutionally-mandated duty 
to disclose exculpatory evidence" under Brady. 9 Wis. Prac., 
Criminal Practice & Procedure § 22:1 (2d ed.); see also Miller, 
                                                 
25 Of course, the Supreme Court of the United States could 
decide to create a due process right to access privileged 
information, in which case, we would naturally follow the 
Supreme Court's directive. To date, the Supreme Court has not 
recognized a due process right to access privileged information. 
See California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 486 (explaining that 
the Court has allowed some access to information when a 
prosecutor uses his or her "sovereign powers" to "hamper" a 
defendant's trial, but purposely leaving open the question of 
whether "the Due Process Clause . . . guarantee[s] criminal 
defendants 
access 
to 
exculpatory 
evidence 
beyond 
the 
government's possession" (emphasis added)); see also People v. 
Hammon, 938 P.2d 986 (Cal. 1997) ("We do not, however, see an 
adequate justification for taking such a long step in a 
direction the United States Supreme Court has not gone."). 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
40 
 
35 Wis. 2d at 474-78; Britton, 44 Wis. 2d at 117-18; Schaefer, 
308 Wis. 2d 279, ¶¶22-23. In Britton, we explained, 
A distinction must be made between "disclosure" and 
"discovery." Discovery emphasizes the right of the 
defense to obtain access to evidence necessary to 
prepare its own case, while disclosure concerns itself 
with the duty of the prosecution to make available to 
the accused evidence and testimony which, as a minimum 
standard, 
is 
exculpatory 
based 
on 
constitutional 
standards of due process. Discovery has been left to 
rule-making 
power 
and 
has 
not 
been 
deemed 
a 
constitutional issue. On the other hand, disclosure, 
or the failure to disclose, is a constitutional issue 
to be decided on a case by case basis . . . . 
Britton, 44 Wis. 2d at 117-18 (emphasis added). 
¶49 A 
prosecutor's 
constitutionally-mandated 
duty 
to 
disclose arises out of the Supreme Court of the United State's 
decision in 
Brady. In 
Brady, the Court held that "the 
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an 
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is 
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the 
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." 373 U.S. at 87 
(emphasis added). The Court reasoned, "A prosecution that 
withholds evidence on demand of an accused which, if made 
available, would tend to exculpate him or reduce the penalty 
helps shape a trial that bears heavily on the defendant. That 
casts the prosecutor in the role of an architect of a proceeding 
that does not comport with standards of justice . . . ." Id. at 
87-88 (emphasis added). Stated otherwise, a defendant is treated 
unfairly when a prosecutor hides favorable evidence from a 
defendant. 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
41 
 
¶50 The 
Supreme 
Court 
of 
the 
United 
States 
has 
consistently limited Brady's disclosure requirement to the 
prosecutor and to others acting on the prosecutor's behalf. See 
Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437 ("[T]he individual prosecutor has a duty 
to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on 
the government's behalf in the case, including the police." 
(emphasis added)); Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281 ("In order to 
comply with Brady, therefore, 'the individual prosecutor has a 
duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to others acting 
on the government's behalf in this case, including the police.'" 
(citing Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437)). For example, in Pitonyak v. 
Stephens, 732 F.3d 525 (5th Cir. 2013), the Fifth Circuit, 
recognizing Brady's limitation, held that the prosecution's 
Brady requirement did not extend to "a jail counselor" because 
the counselor was "not involved in investigating or preparing 
the case against [the defendant]." Id. at 531, 533. 
¶51 And in Illinois v. C.J., 652 N.E.2d 315 (Ill. 1995), 
the Supreme Court of Illinois held that "where [the Division of 
Child Family Services] acts at the behest of and in tandem with 
the State's Attorney, with the intent and purpose of assisting 
the prosecutorial effort, DCFS functions as an agent of the 
prosecution," and is therefore subject to Brady's disclosure 
requirement. Id. at 318. However, because "there was no evidence 
to support the conclusion that the DCFS investigator [there] 
functioned, intentionally or otherwise, as an aid in the 
prosecution of the case," the prosecutor's Brady requirement did 
not extend to that particular DCFS agent. Id. 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
42 
 
¶52 For comparison, in Commonwealth v. Bing Sial Liang, 
747 N.E.2d 112 (Mass. 2001), the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts held that a victim advocate's notes fell within 
the prosecutor's Brady requirement because "[a]dvocates are 
included in the statute's definition of 'prosecutor' and 
generally are employees of the prosecution." Id. at 116. The 
Court went on to say, "advocates are paid by the various 
district attorney[s'] offices [and] work closely with the 
prosecutors developing cases.' Clearly the Legislature views 
advocates as part of the prosecution team." Id. (alterations in 
original) (citations omitted). 
¶53 Notably, both the Seventh and Eighth Circuits have 
rejected defendants' attempts to subpoena treatment records in 
preparation for trial despite the defendants' assertions that 
withholding the information would deprive them of a fair trial. 
United States v. Hach, 162 F.3d 937 (7th Cir. 1998); United 
States v. Skorniak, 59 F.3d 750 (8th Cir. 1995). In Hach, the 
defendant sought a witness's "medical and psychiatric records 
for purposes of conducting an in camera review, and ultimately 
to release them to him for use in cross-examination." 162 F.3d 
at 946. In denying the defendant's request, the Seventh Circuit 
noted, 
[The defendant's] attempt to bootstrap onto Ritchie 
suffers from a grave[] problem——the evidence is not 
and never was in the government's possession. As the 
Eighth Circuit noted in United States v. Skorniak, a 
failure to show that the records a defendant seeks are 
in the government's possession is fatal to the 
defendant's claim. . . . [I]f the documents are not in 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
43 
 
the government's possession, there can be no "state 
action" and consequently, no violation of [the] 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
Id. at 947 (emphasis added). Simply, because the records were 
not held by the prosecutor or an entity acting on behalf of the 
prosecutor, the defendant was not entitled to disclosure of the 
records. 
¶54 To summarize, a defendant has a right to present a 
meaningful defense, but this right is not limitless. It does not 
include a constitutional right to access privileged information 
via a motion for in camera review. Discovery is purely 
statutory; 
accordingly, 
a 
defendant's 
right 
to 
obtain 
information is to be found in Wis. Stat. § 971.23. In contrast, 
a defendant has a constitutional right, under Brady, to material 
information but only when that information is held by the 
prosecutor, including others acting on the prosecutor's behalf. 
Outside of the prosecution's limited disclosure requirement, 
there 
is 
no 
constitutional 
right 
to 
access 
information. 
Weatherford, 
429 
U.S. 
at 
559 
("There 
is 
no 
general 
constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady 
did not create one."). 
¶55 Here, there is nothing to show that the complainant's 
private mental health facility was acting on behalf of the 
prosecutor. 
Unlike 
in 
Ritchie 
and 
Bing 
Sial 
Ling, 
the 
complainant's mental health facility was not statutorily created 
for the purpose of "investigating" crime. Additionally, there 
are no facts in the record that would indicate that the facility 
was acting on behalf of or in tandem with the prosecutor. 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
44 
 
Consequently, this case does not implicate Brady. In sum, Lynch 
has no right to access the complainant's privileged treatment 
information via a motion for in camera review because there is 
no constitutional right to access information and because the 
information does not fall under Brady's limited disclosure 
obligation.26 
 
E. EVEN IF THERE WERE A RIGHT TO ACCESS PRIVILEGED INFORMATION 
VIA A MOTION FOR IN CAMERA REVIEW, THAT RIGHT WOULD NEED TO BE 
BALANCED AGAINST WIS. STAT. § 905.04, THE PRIVILEGE STATUTE. 
¶56 We have concluded that a defendant has no Sixth or 
Fourteenth Amendment right to access privileged information via 
a motion for in camera review. However, even if there were such 
a right, that right would still need to be balanced against Wis. 
Stat. § 905.04, the privilege statute. We would analogize this 
case, which involves access to information, to cases involving 
the presentation of evidence at trial. We do so because even if 
a defendant cannot gain pre-trial access to information, the 
defendant may still seek to present evidence (in the form of the 
complainant's testimony) at trial. See Goldsmith v. State, 651 
A.2d 866, 874 (Md. 1995) (distinguishing between a defendant's 
                                                 
26 Other states have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., 
Indiana v. Fromme, 949 N.E.2d 789 (Ind. 2011); People v. Hammon, 
938 P.2d 986 (Cal. 1997); Dill v. People, 927 P.2d 1315 (Colo. 
1996); State v. Percy, 548 A.2d 408 (Vt. 1988); Commonwealth v. 
Wilson, 602 A.2d 1290 (Pa. 1992); United States v. Shrader, 716 
F.Supp 2d 464 (S.D. W. Va. 2010); New Jersey v. E.P., 559 A.2d 
447 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (holding that the defendant 
had no right to in camera review of information protected by 
attorney-client privilege). 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
45 
 
right of access to information during pre-trial discovery and a 
defendant's right at trial to present a defense). 
¶57 The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized 
"the right of the defendant to present evidence." Taylor v. 
Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 409 (1988) (emphasis added). In 
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967), the Court stated,  
The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to 
compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain 
terms the right to present a defense, the right to 
present the defendant's version of the facts as well 
as the prosecution's to the jury so it may decide 
where the truth lies. Just as an accused has the right 
to confront the prosecution's witnesses for the 
purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the 
right to present his own witnesses to establish a 
defense. This right is a fundamental element of due 
process of law. 
Id. at 19. However, the Court has also recognized that a 
defendant "does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony 
that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under 
standard rules of evidence." Taylor, 484 U.S. at 410 (emphasis 
added). Accordingly, a defendant's right to present evidence 
must be balanced against other considerations. See Rock v. 
Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55-56 (1987) ("Of course, the right to 
present relevant testimony is not without limitation. The right 
'may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate 
interests in the criminal trial process.'" (quoting Chambers v. 
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973)). 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
46 
 
¶58 Over a series of cases,27 the Supreme Court has 
developed a test for determining when a defendant's right to 
present evidence is violated: "[T]he exclusion of defense 
evidence abridge[s] an accused's right to present a defense 
'where the restriction is arbitrary or disproportionate to the 
purposes' 
[it 
is] 
designed 
to 
serve, 
and 
the 
evidence 
implicate[s] a sufficiently weighty interest of the accused." 
Harris v. Thompson, 698 F.3d 609, 626 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Scheffer, 
523 U.S. 303, 308-09 (1998) (quoting Rock, 483 U.S. at 56)). 
¶59 For instance, in Washington v. Texas, the Court struck 
down a state statute that barred the introduction of an alleged 
accomplice's 
testimony. 
In 
declaring 
the 
statute 
unconstitutional, 
the 
Court 
called 
the 
rule 
"arbitrary," 
                                                 
27 See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22-23 (1967) 
(striking down an "arbitrary" law that disqualified an alleged 
accomplice from testifying on the behalf of the defendant); 
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 296 n.8, 302 (1973) 
(striking 
down 
a 
"archaic, 
irrational, 
and 
potentially 
destructive" common-law rule that prevented the defendant from 
impeaching his own witness); Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55, 
61 (1987) (applying the arbitrary and disproportionate test, and 
striking down a "per se" rule that excluded the defendant's 
hypnotically refreshed testimony because the rule "arbitrarily" 
excluded material evidence and because the State had not 
"justified 
the 
exclusion 
of 
all 
of 
[the] 
defendant's 
testimony"); Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 414-16 (1988) 
(applying the arbitrary and disproportionate test, and upholding 
the trial judge's determination that the appropriate sanction 
for the defendant's discovery violation was to exclude the 
witness's testimony); Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 
330-31 (2006) (applying the arbitrary and disproportionate test, 
and striking down the State's rule barring third-party guilt 
evidence). 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
47 
 
specifically commenting that "[t]he rule disqualifying an 
alleged accomplice from testifying on behalf of the defendant 
cannot even be defended on the ground that it rationally sets 
apart a group of persons who are particularly likely to commit 
perjury." Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. at 22 (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, the Court held that the statute "arbitrarily denied 
[the defendant] the right to put on the stand a witness who was 
physically and mentally capable of testifying to events that he 
had personally observed, and whose testimony would have been 
relevant and material to the defense." Id. at 23 (emphasis 
added). In a footnote, the Court was careful to clarify that 
"[n]othing in [its] opinion should be construed as disapproving 
testimonial 
privileges, . . . which 
are 
based 
on 
entirely 
different considerations . . . ." Id. at 23 n.21. 
¶60 Chambers v. Mississippi serves as another example. In 
Chambers, the Court analyzed Mississippi's common-law rule that 
"a party may not impeach his own witness." 410 U.S. at 295. The 
Court evaluated the basis for such a rule: "The rule rests on 
the presumption——without regard to the circumstances of the 
particular case——that a party who calls a witness 'vouches for 
his credibility.'" Id. at 295 (citation omitted). As part of its 
analysis, the Court remarked that the rule had been condemned by 
other 
sources 
as 
"archaic, 
irrational, 
and 
potentially 
destructive of the truth-gathering process." Id. at 296 n.8. 
Moreover, the Court took notice of the fact that "Mississippi 
ha[d] not sought to defend the rule or explain its rationale. 
Nor ha[d] it contended that its rule should override the 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
48 
 
accused's right of confrontation." Id. at 297. As a result, the 
Court concluded that the State's rule denied the defendant an 
opportunity to present a complete defense. Id. at 302-03. 
¶61 To 
summarize, 
the 
"mere 
invocation" 
of 
a 
constitutional 
right 
"cannot 
automatically 
and 
invariably 
outweigh countervailing public interests." Taylor, 484 U.S. at 
414. Thus, a defendant's right to present a meaningful defense 
is violated only when a rule or statute infringes upon a 
"weighty interest of the accused" and is "arbitrary" or 
"disproportionate to the purpose[] [it is] designed to serve." 
Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006) (quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 308). 
¶62 Here, Wis. Stat. § 905.04, the privilege statute, is 
neither arbitrary nor disproportionate to the purpose it is 
designed to serve. We have stressed that the "public policy 
underpinning the privilege is to encourage patients to freely 
and candidly discuss medical concerns with their physicians by 
ensuring that those concerns will not unnecessarily be disclosed 
to a third person." Steinberg v. Jensen, 194 Wis. 2d 439, 459, 
534 N.W.2d 361 (1995).28 
                                                 
28 One court has noted, 
The rationale for the psychologist-client privilege 
was cogently stated in an Advisory Committee Note to 
Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 504: 
Among physicians, the psychiatrist has a special need 
to maintain confidentiality. His capacity to help his 
patients 
is 
completely 
dependent 
upon 
their 
willingness and ability to talk freely. This makes it 
(continued) 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
49 
 
¶63 Additionally, the Supreme Court of the United States 
has recognized a federal psychotherapist privilege. Jaffee v. 
Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 (1996). Throughout its opinion adopting 
the privilege, the Court strongly emphasized the importance of 
such a privilege: 
Effective psychotherapy, by contrast, depends upon an 
atmosphere of confidence and trust in which the 
patient is willing to make a frank and complete 
disclose of facts, emotions, memories, and fears. 
Because of the sensitive nature of the problems for 
which individuals consult psychotherapists, disclosure 
of confidential communications made during counseling 
sessions may cause embarrassment or disgrace. For this 
reason, the mere possibility of disclosure may impede 
development of the confidential relationship necessary 
for successful treatment. 
Id. at 10 (emphasis added). Moreover, the Court stressed, 
                                                                                                                                                             
difficult if not impossible for him to function 
without 
being 
able 
to 
assure 
his 
patients 
confidentiality and, indeed, privileged communication. 
Where 
there 
may 
be 
exceptions 
to 
this 
general 
rule . . . , 
there 
is 
wide 
agreement 
that 
confidentiality is a sine qua non for successful 
psychiatric treatment. The relationship may well be 
likened to that of the priest-penitent or the lawyer-
client. Psychiatrists not only explore the very depths 
of their patient's conscious, but their unconscious 
feelings 
and 
attitudes 
as 
well. 
Therapeutic 
effectiveness necessitates going beyond a patient's 
awareness and, in order to do this, it must be 
possible to communicate freely. A threat to secrecy 
blocks successful treatment. 
Commonwealth v. Kyle, 533 A.2d 120, 126 (Pa. Super Ct. 1987) 
(alterations in original) (quoting Report No. 45, Group for the 
Advancement 
of 
Psychiatry 
92 
(1960), 
quoted 
in 
Advisory 
Committee's Notes to Proposed Rules, 56 F.R.D. at 242); see also 
Commonwealth v. Wilson, 602 A.2d 1290, 1295 (Pa. 1992) (citing 
Kyle and approving of its holding). 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
50 
 
Making the promise of confidentiality contingent upon 
a trial judge's later evaluation of the relative 
importance of the patient's interest in privacy and 
the evidentiary need for disclosure would eviscerate 
the effectiveness of the privilege. As we explained in 
[another case], if the purpose of the privilege is to 
be served, the participants in the confidential 
conversation "must be able to predict with some degree 
of certainty whether particular discussions will be 
protected. An uncertain privilege, or one which 
purports to be certain but results in widely varying 
applications by the courts, is little better than no 
privilege at all." 
Id. at 17-18 (emphasis added) (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United 
States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981)). In short, Wis. Stat. 
§ 905.04, the privilege statute, serves the crucial purpose of 
ensuring that individuals——especially individuals who may be 
suffering as a result of a traumatic experience, like sexual 
assault——can freely and openly communicate with and be treated 
by their mental health provider. See United States v. Shrader, 
716 F. Supp. 2d 464, 473 (S.D. W. Va. 2010) ("[F]or [this 
victim] and other alleged stalking victims to have to choose 
whether to obtain counseling knowing that their alleged stalkers 
can subpoena the records thereof would be no choice at all. This 
chilling effect is precisely what the Supreme Court foresaw and 
explicitly rejected in Jaffee.").29 Accordingly, § 905.04, the 
                                                 
29 See also State v. Percy, 548 A.2d 408, 415 (Vt. 1988) 
("We are particularly solicitous of the need of a victim of a 
sexual assault to seek and receive mental health counseling 
without fear that her statements will end up in the public 
record . . . . We are unwilling to require the victim to forego 
counseling or risk disclosure absent the most compelling 
justification——none has been asserted here."). 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
51 
 
privilege statute, is not arbitrary or disproportionate to the 
purpose it was designed to serve. 
 
F. THE SIMPLE REMEDY IF THE PEOPLE OF WISCONSIN WANT A BALANCING 
TEST: HAVE THE LEGISLATURE AMEND WIS. STAT. § 905.04 TO INCLUDE 
AN EXCEPTION. 
¶64 Over the years, the Legislature has amended Wis. Stat. 
§ 905.04, 
the 
privilege 
statute, 
numerous 
times, 
so 
the 
Legislature can, if it wants, amend § 905.04 to include a 
Shiffra/Green-like 
balancing 
test. 
Thus, 
should 
our 
interpretation and application of § 905.04 and the Constitution 
represent an "undesired result, the legislature may rectify the 
situation" by amending § 905.04 to include a Shiffra/Green-like 
balancing test as an exception to the general privilege rule. 
Hamilton v. Hamilton, 2003 WI 50, ¶49, 261 Wis. 2d 458, 661 
N.W.2d 832. 
¶65 For example, Iowa's privilege statute contains a 
Shiffra/Green-like exception to its general privilege rule. Iowa 
Code § 622.10(4) states, 
a. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, 
the confidentiality privilege under this section shall 
be absolute with regard to a criminal action and this 
section shall not be construed to authorize or require 
the 
disclosure 
of 
any 
privileged 
records 
to 
a 
defendant in a criminal action unless either of the 
following occur: 
 
(1) The privilege holder voluntarily waives the 
confidentiality privilege 
 
(2)(a) The defendant seeking access to privileged 
records 
under 
this 
section 
files 
a 
motion 
demonstrating in good faith a reasonable probability 
that the information sought is likely to contain 
exculpatory information that is not available from any 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
52 
 
other source and for which there is a compelling need 
for the defendant to present a defense in the case. 
Such a motion shall be filed not later than forty days 
after arraignment under seal of the court. Failure of 
the defendant to timely file such a motion constitutes 
a waiver of the right to seek access to privileged 
records under this section, but the court, for good 
cause shown, may grant relief from such a waiver. 
 
(b) Upon a showing of reasonable probability that 
the privileged records sought may likely contain 
exculpatory information that is not available from any 
other source, the court shall conduct an in camera 
review 
of 
such 
records 
to 
determine 
whether 
exculpatory information is contained in such records. 
 
(c) If exculpatory information is contained in 
such records, the court shall balance the need to 
disclose such information against the privacy interest 
of the privilege holder. 
 
(d) Upon the court's determination, in writing, 
that the privileged information sought is exculpatory 
and 
that 
there 
is 
a 
compelling 
need 
for 
such 
information that outweighs the privacy interest of the 
privilege holder, the court shall issue an order 
allowing the disclosure of only those portions of the 
records that contain the exculpatory information. The 
court's 
order 
shall 
also 
prohibit 
any 
further 
dissemination of the information to any person, other 
than the defendant, the defendants' attorney, and the 
prosecutor, unless otherwise authorized by the court. 
b. Privileged information obtained by any means other 
than as provided in paragraph "a" shall not be 
admissible in any criminal action. 
In simpler terms, Iowa allows a defendant to make a motion 
"demonstrating in good faith a reasonable probability that the 
information sought is likely to contain exculpatory information 
that is not available from any other source and for which there 
is a compelling need for the defendant to present a defense in 
the case." Iowa Code § 622.10(4)(2)(a). If the defendant meets 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
53 
 
the requisite showing, "the court shall conduct an in camera 
review 
of 
such 
records 
to 
determine 
whether 
exculpatory 
information 
is 
contained 
in 
such 
records." 
Iowa 
Code 
§ 622.10(4)(2)(b). Should the in camera review of the records 
reveal exculpatory information, the court must next "balance the 
need to disclose such information against the privacy interest 
of the privilege holder." Iowa Code § 622.10(4)(2)(c). If "there 
is a compelling need for such information that outweighs the 
privacy interest of the privilege holder," then the court must 
"issue an order allowing the disclosure of only those portions 
of the records that contain the exculpatory information." Iowa 
Code § 622.10(4)(2)(d).  
¶66 In short, even though there is no constitutional basis 
for Shiffra/Green, the Legislature could, if it wanted to, give 
a defendant access to privileged information by following Iowa's 
lead and amending Wisconsin's privilege statute.30 See Bostco LLC 
v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 2013 WI 78, ¶61, 350 
Wis. 2d 554, 835 N.W.2d 160 ("When a statute [does not] to 
address a particular situation, the remedy for the omission does 
not lie with the courts. It lies with the legislature."). 
G. THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT A MEANINGFUL DEFENSE. 
¶67 Before we conclude, we note that defendants will 
certainly have an opportunity to present a meaningful defense 
                                                 
30 In addition to Iowa, Kentucky and Massachusetts have some 
type of exception that would allow a court to conduct an in 
camera review of a person's privileged mental health treatment 
records. See Ky. R. Evid. 506(d)(2); Mass. R. Evid. 503(d)(8). 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
54 
 
without having access to privileged information via a motion for 
in camera review.  
¶68 First, all defendants are presumed innocent until 
proven guilty. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 483 (1978) 
("The principle that there is a presumption of innocence in 
favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and 
elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the 
administration of our criminal law." (quoting Coffin v. United 
States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895)).  
¶69 Second, all defendants have the right to physically 
confront and cross-examine witnesses as well as have the right 
to compel the attendance of witnesses at trial. See Ritchie, 480 
U.S. at 51; Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. at 19.  
¶70 Third, the prosecutor and those acting on behalf of 
the 
prosecution 
have 
a 
constitutionally-mandated 
duty 
to 
disclose to the defendant exculpatory evidence under Brady. See 
Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. 
¶71 Fourth, a defendant could call other witnesses and 
have 
them 
testify 
about 
the 
complainant's 
character 
for 
truthfulness. See Wis. Stat. § 906.08 ("Except as provided in s. 
972.11(2), the credibility of a witness may be attacked or 
supported by evidence in the form of reputation or opinion, but 
subject to the following limitations: (a) The evidence may refer 
only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. . . . "). 
¶72 Finally, 
Wisconsin 
and 
many 
other 
states 
have 
mandatory reporting laws. See Wis. Stat. § 48.981(2). These laws 
mandate that certain persons who have contact with a child 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
55 
 
report abuse. Id. For example, § 48.981(2m)(c)-(d), requires a 
"health care provider who provides any health care services to a 
child" or a "person who obtains information about a child who is 
receiving or has received health care services from a health 
care provider" to "report as required . . . if he or she has any 
reason to suspect . . . [t]hat the child, because of his or her 
age or immaturity, was or is incapable of understanding the 
nature or consequences of sexual intercourse or sexual contact." 
A defendant could ask a treatment provider who would have been 
subject to the mandatory reporting requirement if he or she ever 
reported the defendant to the authorities. In short, defendants, 
including Lynch, have many other means by which to cast doubt on 
a complainant's allegations and the State's case, thereby 
affording defendants the opportunity to present a meaningful 
defense.31 
                                                 
31 It is true that there are occasions when a defendant is 
wrongfully accused of committing a crime, including a sexual 
assault, and we realize that this is an emotionally appealing 
argument that favors the dissent's position. This kind of 
emotional appeal is heightened when members of this court use 
inflammatory rhetoric. 
Regardless, we expect the criminal justice system to 
function as it is supposed to by weeding out occasions of false 
accusations. This is why we have an abundance of constitutional 
safeguards, such as the presumption of innocence, the right to 
confront and cross examine witnesses, and the Brady requirement. 
We have never before allowed the hypothetical idea that someone 
might be wrongfully accused to obliterate our rules of evidence 
(for example, hearsay) or our other privileges (for example, the 
lawyer-client privilege). See Kyle, 533 A.2d at 131 n.15 ("We 
note parenthetically that permitting in camera review of 
information 
protected 
by 
the 
absolute 
privilege 
between 
psychologist and client could possibly render other absolute 
(continued) 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
56 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
privileges subject to the same limitation."). Simply put, we do 
not toss out our constitution, our rules, or our statutes solely 
because a defendant might be wrongly accused; rather, we rely on 
our criminal justice system and its adversarial process to 
remove erroneous cases, including erroneous sexual assault 
cases. 
In cases like this one, neither the prosecutor nor the 
defendant has access to a complainant's privileged mental health 
treatment records. Accordingly, "[T]he privilege does not 
unfairly place the defense in a disadvantageous position; like 
the defense, the prosecution does not have access to the 
[privileged] file and, thus, cannot use the information to make 
its case." Kyle, 533 A.2d at 130; see State v. Maday, 179 
Wis. 2d 346, 
370-71, 
507 
N.W.2d 365 
(Ct. 
App. 
1993) 
("A 
defendant who is prevented from presenting testimony from an 
examining expert when the state is able to present such 
testimony is deprived of a level playing field. '[A] State may 
not legitimately assert an interest in maintenance of a 
strategic advantage over the defense, if the result of that 
advantage is to cast a pall on the accuracy of the verdict 
obtained.'" (emphasis added) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 79) (1985))). Indeed, if the 
prosecution had access, it may need to disclose the records 
pursuant to Brady. 
Brady is the reason Lynch already has access to some of the 
complainant's mental health treatment records. Prior to the 
complainant's 
father's 
trial, 
the 
complainant 
waived 
her 
privilege, which allowed the State to obtain certain mental 
health treatment records to prosecute her father. In the present 
case, the State turned over all of the mental health treatment 
records it had in its possession from when it prosecuted the 
complainant's father. 
Let us be clear: in this case, we do nothing more than 
decline to create a constitutional right. We leave the question 
of whether a Shiffra/Green-like exception to the privilege 
statute is right for Wisconsin to the Legislature, which may, if 
so inclined, create an exception to the statute it has amended 
numerous times. Similarly, we leave the question of whether 
there is a constitutional right to access privileged information 
to the Supreme Court of the United States, which may, if so 
inclined, declare that a constitutional right to this type of 
information exists. 
No. 
2011AP2680-CR   
 
57 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
¶73 To briefly summarize, we conclude that Lynch has no 
right to access privileged information via a motion for in 
camera review. Simply put, no constitutional provision affords 
him such a right. Moreover, even if Lynch had a right, his right 
would not automatically trump the privilege statute. Rather, his 
right would need to be balanced against the privilege statute. 
The Supreme Court of the United State's balancing test for 
presentation of evidence cases instructs us to consider whether 
the statute at hand is arbitrary or disproportionate to the 
purpose it is designed to serve. Here, the privilege statute is 
neither arbitrary nor disproportionate as it protects the free 
flow of open and honest communication between a patient and his 
or 
her 
physician. 
For 
these 
reasons, 
we 
would 
overrule 
Shiffra/Green and its progeny. 
By the Court.—As a result of a divided court, the law 
remains as the court of appeals has articulated it. 
 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶74 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J.   (concurring).  The 
writing of Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson and Justice Ann Walsh 
Bradley 
herein 
causes 
concern 
because 
it 
diminishes 
the 
significant and sensitive issues for which review was granted; 
attempts to demean the writings of other justices rather than 
addressing legal reasoning they employ; and may evidence a 
pattern of joint writing that is bottomed in a desire to injure 
rather than to inform.   
¶75 In this review, the court is faced with deciding 
competing legal issues:  Lynch's alleged constitutional right to 
obtain the complainant's mental health treatment records to 
defend against charges of sexual assault; the complainant's 
privilege to withhold confidential mental health treatment 
records; 
precedent 
that 
would 
bar 
the 
complainant 
from 
testifying against Lynch if she does not waive the privilege she 
holds in regard to her mental health treatment records; and 
whether that precedent should be followed or modified.  Justice 
David Prosser, Justice Annette Ziegler and Justice Michael 
Gableman have addressed these complex issues in various ways. 
¶76 Justice 
Abrahamson 
and 
Justice 
A.W. 
Bradley 
characterize their writings as "the Twilight Zone" and "the 
court's 
imaginative 
zone." 
 
This 
defamatory 
labeling 
of 
colleagues' writings does not address the legal issues the 
parties asked us to review.  However, it is the type of comment 
that the press will seize upon and report over and over again.  
Justice Abrahamson and Justice A.W. Bradley know what the press 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.pdr 
 
2 
 
will do.  They even cite to the 1959 television program to aid 
the press in reporting their comments.   
¶77 More importantly however, Justice Abrahamson's and 
Justice A.W. Bradley's 
defamatory labeling of colleagues' 
writings demonstrates a lack of respect for the very serious 
constitutional and sensitive personal issues presented by the 
parties who sought our review:  a woman who claims repeated 
sexual assault at the hands of Lynch and Lynch's claim that he 
cannot adequately defend against her allegations without her 
mental health treatment records.   
¶78 None of the issues before us has anything to do with 
the Twilight Zone or any other zone.  Rather, they are 
significant and complex issues that the court has repeatedly 
struggled to address.  See State v. Johnson, 2013 WI 59, 348 
Wis. 2d 450, 832 N.W.2d 609 (per curiam); State v. Johnson, 2014 
WI 16, 353 Wis. 2d 119, 846 N.W.2d 1 (per curiam) (opinion on 
reconsideration).   
¶79 And finally, Justice Abrahamson's and Justice A. W. 
Bradley's combined writing herein may evince a pattern, wherein 
they combine to mount personal attacks on colleagues, rather 
than attacking reasoning other justices employ when deciding 
issues presented to the court for review.  See St. Croix Cty. v. 
Michael D., 2016 WI 35, ¶53, 368 Wis. 2d 170, __ N.W.2d __ 
(Roggensack, C.J., concurring).  Because transparency is helpful 
to the reader, I write separately and also join the lead 
opinion.   
 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.ssa & awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶80 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON 
& 
ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, 
JJ.   (concurring in part, dissenting in part).  The petitioner, 
State of Wisconsin, seeks review of a court of appeals' decision 
that affirmed the circuit court's determinations:  (1) that the 
defendant made a sufficient showing entitling him to an in 
camera review of the complainant's privileged mental health 
treatment records; and (2) that the exclusive remedy for refusal 
to disclose those records is witness preclusion. 
¶81 We would affirm that part of the court of appeals' 
decision that concluded, adhering to State v. Shiffra, 175 
Wis. 2d 600, 499 N.W.2d 719 (Ct. App. 1993), and State v. Green, 
2002 WI 68, 253 Wis. 2d 356, 646 N.W.2d 298, that the defendant 
made a sufficient showing entitling him to an in camera review 
of the complainant's privileged mental health records.  
¶82 However, we would reverse that part of the court of 
appeals' 
decision 
that 
concluded 
that 
exclusion 
of 
the 
complainant's testimony is the only available remedy when the 
complainant refuses to disclose the requested privileged mental 
health treatment records. 
¶83 In discussing these issues, we focus on the "lead 
opinion" of Justice Michael J. Gableman (joined by two other 
justices) even though it does not represent the views of a 
majority of the justices.  Indeed, Justice Gableman's opinion 
disagrees with the mandate (the result) stated in his opinion.  
The mandate affirms the court of appeals, and a majority of the 
court would affirm, at least in part, the decision of the court 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.ssa & awb 
 
2 
 
of appeals.  Contrary to the mandate, Justice Gableman's 
analysis and conclusion would reverse the decision of the court 
of appeals. 
¶84 The implications of mislabeling Justice Gableman's 
three justice opinion as a "lead opinion" will be discussed 
further below. 
¶85 For the reasons set forth, we concur in part, dissent 
in part, and write separately in an effort to explain what the 
court does (and does not do) in this case.   
I 
¶86 In this case we are asked to consider whether a 
defendant upon a sufficient showing can obtain disclosure of a 
witness's mental health records when it is necessary for his or 
her defense via a motion for in camera review.  This is not a 
new question unaddressed by Wisconsin precedent. 
¶87 In State v. Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d 600, 605, 499 
N.W.2d 719 (Ct. App. 1993), the court of appeals determined that 
a defendant is entitled to an in camera review of mental health 
treatment records once the defendant makes a preliminary showing 
that the sought-after evidence is material to his or her 
defense.  This court adopted Shiffra, with some modification, in 
State v. Green, 2002 WI 68, 253 Wis. 2d 356, 646 N.W.2d 298.1   
                                                 
1 Green clarified that for an in camera review the defendant 
must make a preliminary showing that there is "a reasonable 
likelihood 
that 
the 
records 
contain 
relevant 
information 
necessary to a determination of guilt or innocence and is not 
merely cumulative to other evidence available to the defendant."  
State v. Green, 2002 WI 68, ¶34, 253 Wis. 2d 356, 646 
N.W.2d 298. 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.ssa & awb 
 
3 
 
¶88 Wisconsin courts have relied on Shiffra for decades.  
See, e.g., Johnson v. Rogers Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 2005 WI 114, 
¶¶72-73, 283 Wis. 2d 384, 700 N.W.2d 27; State v. Allen, 2004 WI 
106, ¶31, 274 Wis. 2d 568, 682 N.W.2d 433; State v. Solberg, 211 
Wis. 2d 372, 
386-87, 
564 
N.W.2d 775 
(1997). 
 
Given 
that 
reliance, extra weight must be accorded to the principle of 
stare decisis (stand by things decided). 
¶89 Yet, Justice Gableman's opinion would overrule this 
long-standing precedent.2  The lengthy discussion of why Justice 
Gableman's opinion would overrule Shiffra relegates Wisconsin's 
jurisprudence on stare decisis to a footnote.  This doctrine is 
a necessary part of any analysis that attempts to justify 
overruling a case that has been relied on for decades and cited 
approximately 90 times by state courts (including Wisconsin 
courts).  
¶90 Further, the premise of Justice Gableman's opinion 
that there is no constitutional right to access information in 
criminal 
cases 
is 
a 
flawed 
overgeneralization. 
 
Justice 
Gableman's op., ¶¶47, 55.  It serves as a spring board enabling 
Justice Gableman's opinion to reach an erroneous conclusion that 
there is no constitutional basis for allowing a defendant access 
to a complainant's mental health records. 
¶91 Finally, Justice Gableman's opinion ignores a canon of 
statutory construction, requiring statutes addressing the same 
                                                 
2 Only three justices voted to overrule the Shiffra/Green 
procedure.  Because we are unable to reach a consensus, the 
decision of the court of appeals stands.  
No.  2011AP2680-CR.ssa & awb 
 
4 
 
subject to be interpreted such that both statutes are operative.  
Rather than reading the statutes to give legal effect to both, 
Justice 
Gableman's 
opinion's 
analysis 
considers 
only 
one 
statute, 
allowing 
it 
to 
reach 
its 
conclusion 
that 
the 
Shiffra/Green procedure "cannot be grounded in any other legal 
basis."  Justice Gableman's op., ¶8.   
¶92 Contrary to Justice Gableman's opinion, neither we nor 
a majority of the court would discard our long-standing 
precedent 
so 
easily. 
 
The 
Shiffra/Green 
procedure 
is 
a 
reasonable answer to the difficult issue of how to balance 
multiple competing interests.  Although we concur believing that 
Shiffra should be upheld, we yet again caution that Shiffra's 
remedies are not limited to witness preclusion.  Accordingly, we 
respectfully dissent in part.    
II 
¶93 Absent from Justice Gableman's opinion is an analysis 
of Wisconsin's jurisprudence on stare decisis.  Instead, its 
discussion of stare decisis focuses on quotations from the 
United States Supreme Court.  Justice Gableman's op., ¶39 n.18.  
However, this court has provided more detailed guidance on how 
stare decisis applies in our state.  It has repeatedly explained 
that the principle requires "special justification" to overrule 
past decisions.  See, e.g., State v. Luedtke, 2015 WI 42, ¶40, 
362 Wis. 2d 1, 863 N.W.2d 592; State v. Young, 2006 WI 98, ¶51, 
294 Wis. 2d 1, 717 N.W.2d 729; Bartholomew v. Wis. Patients 
Comp. Fund, 2006 WI 91, ¶32, 293 Wis. 2d 38, 717 N.W.2d 216. 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.ssa & awb 
 
5 
 
¶94 We have indicated that the reasons for departing from 
stare decisis typically include:  "changes or developments in 
the law that undermine the rationale behind a decision"; "the 
need to make a decision correspond to newly ascertained facts"; 
"a showing that a decision has become detrimental to coherence 
and consistency in the law"; "a showing that a decision is 
unsound in principle"; and "a showing that a decision is 
unworkable in practice."  Young, 294 Wis. 2d 1, ¶51 n.16 (citing 
Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Emp'rs. Ins., 2003 WI 108, ¶¶98-99, 
264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257).   
¶95 The body of Justice Gableman's opinion does not point 
to any of these reasons for departing from stare decisis, rather 
it explains that it would overrule Shiffra because Shiffra 
relied on Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987), a case 
involving distinguishable circumstances.  Justice Gableman's 
opinion asserts that Ritchie is an "untenable foundation" for 
Shiffra's procedure and "never should have been stretched to 
cover privileged records held by agencies far removed from 
investigative and prosecutorial functions."  Justice Gableman's 
op., ¶¶36, 39.  In a footnote, it adds that Shiffra is unsound 
in principle.  Id., ¶39 n.19. 
¶96  We cannot agree that the Shiffra court's decision to 
extend United States Supreme Court precedent to a somewhat 
analogous situation is "untenable" or "unsound."  As detailed in 
Justice Ziegler's "dissent" and discussed in Justice Prosser's 
"dissent," Ritchie does not foreclose its application to a 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.ssa & awb 
 
6 
 
broader set of circumstances.  Justice Ziegler's "dissent," 
¶¶28-33; Justice Prosser's "dissent," ¶¶7-8.   
¶97 This point is underscored by the fact that Shiffra's 
approach was not unique.  Several courts have extended Ritchie's 
holding to mental health records kept by private entities.  See, 
e.g., State v. Kelly, 545 A.2d 1048, 1056 (Conn. 1988); Burns v. 
State, 968 A.2d 1012, 1024 (Del. 2009); People v. Bean, 560 
N.E.2d 258, 273 (Ill. 1990); Commonwealth v. Barroso, 122 
S.W.3d 554, 564 (Ky. 2003); Cox v. State, 849 So. 2d 1257, ¶53 
(Miss. 2003); State v. Cressey, 628 A.2d 696, 703-04 (N.H. 
1993); State v. Rehkop, 908 A.2d 488, 495-96 (Vt. 2006); Gale v. 
State, 792 P.2d 570, 581 (Wyo. 1990). 
¶98 Given that Wisconsin courts have relied on Shiffra for 
decades, extra weight must be accorded to the principle of stare 
decisis.  The factual distinctions between Ritchie and Shiffra 
fall short of its special justification requirement. 
¶99 Perhaps Justice Gableman's opinion omits an analysis 
of Wisconsin's jurisprudence on stare decisis because it would 
inexorably lead to a different conclusion.  In essence, Justice 
Gableman's opinion is anchored to the belief that Shiffra was 
wrongly decided. 
¶100 Stare decisis has been heralded as a cornerstone of 
this state's jurisprudence since our earliest days of statehood.  
In 1859 the Wisconsin Supreme Court declared:  "Stare decisis is 
the motto of courts of justice."  Ableman v. Booth, 11 
Wis. (*498) 517, (*522) 541 (1859). 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.ssa & awb 
 
7 
 
¶101 The doctrine requires fidelity to the rule of law.  
Because Shiffra is well-established precedent, the question is 
not who has the better argument today but "whether today's 
["lead opinion"] has come forward with the type of extraordinary 
showing that this court has historically demanded before 
overruling one of its precedents."  Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 
808, 848 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).  The answer is 
clear:  it has not. 
¶102 Nothing 
of 
legal 
consequence 
has 
changed 
since 
Shiffra.  The only change has been in the composition of the 
court.  
III 
¶103 Justice 
Gableman's 
opinion 
also 
errs 
by 
making 
overgeneralized statements about a defendant's right to access 
information in order to claim that there is no constitutional 
basis for allowing a defendant access to mental health treatment 
records.  It broadly provides that there is no constitutional 
right to access information in criminal cases.  Justice 
Gableman's op., ¶¶47, 55.  Further, it claims that "a defendant 
is entitled to access information only to the extent outlined in 
Wis. Stat. § 971.23, our criminal discovery statute."  Justice 
Gableman's op., ¶47; see also Justice Gableman's op., ¶54 
("Discovery is purely statutory"). 
¶104 These statements overlook past precedent discussing 
criminal defendants' due process rights.  In State v. Maday, the 
court held that "pretrial discovery is a fundamental due process 
right." Maday, 179 Wis. 2d 346, 354, 507 N.W.2d 365 (Ct. App. 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.ssa & awb 
 
8 
 
1993).  That case considered whether a defendant could require a 
victim to undergo a pretrial psychological evaluation when the 
state gives notice that it intends to introduce evidence 
generated by an exam of the victim by its own experts.3  The 
court answered this question in the affirmative.  It explained 
that due process accords a defendant the opportunity to give 
relevant evidence at trial and a defendant could not do so 
without having the opportunity to first discover it.4   
¶105 This court quoted Maday with approval in State v. 
Schaefer, 2008 WI 25, 308 Wis. 2d 279, 746 N.W.2d 457.  Schaefer 
agreed that "[p]roviding a defendant with meaningful pretrial 
discovery underwrites the interest of the state in guaranteeing 
that the quest for the truth will happen during a fair trial."5 
                                                 
3 State v. Maday, 179 Wis. 2d 346, 349, 507 N.W.2d 365 (Ct. 
App. 1993). 
4 Maday, 179 Wis. 2d at 357.   
5 State v. Schaefer, 2008 WI 25, ¶23, 308 Wis. 2d 279, 746 
N.W.2d 457 (quoting Maday, 179 Wis. 2d at 354-55) (emphasis 
omitted). 
Curiously, Justice Gableman's opinion cites Schaefer as a 
basis for its statement that "a defendant is entitled to access 
information only to the extent outlined in Wis. Stat. § 971.23."  
Justice Gableman's op., ¶47.  However, the comments in Schaefer 
referenced by Justice Gableman's opinion were made in the 
context of discussing whether there is a right to discovery 
prior to a preliminary examination.  Because the constitutional 
right 
to 
compulsory 
process 
applies 
to 
trials 
and 
not 
preliminary 
examinations, 
it 
determined 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.23(1) (requiring the prosecution to provide discovery 
materials within a reasonable time before trial) and Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.31(5)(b) 
(barring 
discovery 
motions 
at 
preliminary 
examinations and prior to the filing of an information) 
governed.   
No.  2011AP2680-CR.ssa & awb 
 
9 
 
¶106 Similar 
sentiments 
were 
expressed 
in 
State 
v. 
Migliorino, 170 Wis. 2d 576, N.W.2d 678 (Ct. App. 1992).  In 
that case the defendant had been charged with trespass to a 
medical facility, which required a showing that the entry 
"tend[ed] to create or provoke a breach of the peace."6  The 
defendant sought the identities of the patients present when she 
entered the facility in order to dispute that element of the 
charge.  Thus, the issue before the court was whether a 
defendant had the right to discover the identity of the 
patients. 
¶107 The court observed that the compulsory process right, 
is "in plain terms the right to present a defense."7  That right, 
in turn, "is fundamental to due process."8  Accordingly, it 
explained that "[t]he concomitant issue of access to the 
identity of witnesses, as to whom the compulsory-process right 
would apply, is generally analyzed against the framework of 
'fundamental fairness' guaranteed by due process."9  Observing 
that "[i]t would be a bizarre rule indeed that gave defendants a 
compulsory-process right to call witnesses but which also 
withheld from them the ability to discover the identity of those 
witnesses," the Migliorino court determined that at the very 
                                                 
6 Migliorino, 170 Wis. 2d at 592.   
7 Migliorino, 170 Wis. 2d at 586 (quoting Washington v. 
Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967)).   
8 Migliorino, 170 Wis. 2d at 586.   
9 Migliorino, 170 Wis. 2d at 586.   
No.  2011AP2680-CR.ssa & awb 
 
10 
 
least, the defendant was entitled to an in camera hearing to 
determine whether any of the patients present had knowledge of 
the "circumstances" of the defendant's entry.10   
¶108 To be clear, this court has observed the "general 
rule" that there is no "broad right of discovery" in criminal 
cases.  State v. Miller, 35 Wis. 2d 454, 474, 151 N.W.2d 157 
(1967) (emphasis added).  However, a general rule against broad 
discovery does not preclude the possibility of scenarios where 
defendants are entitled to information.  As Maday and Migliorino 
demonstrate, 
due 
process 
can 
require 
limited 
access 
to 
information in certain circumstances.  Accordingly, Justice 
Gableman's opinion's premise that there is no constitutional 
right to access information in criminal cases, is a flawed 
overgeneralization.  Justice Gableman's op., ¶¶47, 55. 
IV 
¶109 In 
addition 
to 
making 
overgeneralizations 
which 
overlook 
Wisconsin 
precedent, 
Justice 
Gableman's 
opinion's 
analysis ignores a canon of statutory construction.  It is well-
established that statutes addressing the same subject should be 
read in pari materia, such that both statutes are operative.  
Kolupar v. Wilde Pontiac Cadillac, Inc., 2007 WI 98, ¶28, 303 
Wis. 2d 258, 735 N.W.2d 93. 
¶110 Yet, although Justice Gableman's opinion recognizes 
that there are two related statutes at issue in this case——Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 146.82, 
which 
makes 
patient 
health 
care 
records 
                                                 
10 Migliorino, 170 Wis. 2d at 586, 595. 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.ssa & awb 
 
11 
 
confidential, and Wis. Stat. § 905.04, which accords a patient 
the 
privilege 
of 
refusing 
to 
disclose 
such 
confidential 
information——its analysis considers only the statute creating 
the privilege.  Justice Gableman's op., ¶¶19, 56-63. 
¶111 Our precedent is clear that these two statutes must be 
interpreted together.  We have explained that the principle of 
in pari materia applies because together the statutes "represent 
a collective statement as to the reach and limits of the 
confidentiality and privilege which attach to [health care] 
records or communications."  State v. Denis L.R., 2005 WI 110, 
¶57 n.21, 283 Wis. 2d 358, 699 N.W.2d 154 (quoting State v. 
Allen, 200 Wis. 2d 301, 309, 546 N.W.2d 517 (Ct. App. 1996)); 
see also Johnson v. Rogers Mem'l Hosp., 283 Wis. 2d 384, ¶36; 
Justice Prosser's "dissent," ¶12. 
¶112 Although Wis. Stat. § 905.04 does not include an 
exception to the privilege permitting access to mental health 
records when they are necessary for a defense, such an exception 
can be found in the confidentiality statute.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 146.82(2)(a)4. provides that patient health care records shall 
be released "[u]nder a lawful order of a court of record."  
Nowhere does Justice Gableman's opinion discuss this language or 
how it should be interpreted alongside the privilege statute so 
that it still has meaning.  Without such an analysis, Justice 
Gableman's opinion is incomplete. 
V 
¶113 Contrary to Justice Gableman's opinion, we would not 
overrule Shiffra.  There are strong interests implicated when a 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.ssa & awb 
 
12 
 
defendant seeks a witness's mental health treatment records.  
For defendants, it is the interest in being able to present a 
complete defense.  See Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 
324 (2006) (quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) 
("Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth 
Amendment 
or 
in 
the 
Compulsory 
Process 
or 
Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution 
guarantees criminal defendants 'a meaningful opportunity to 
present 
a 
complete 
defense.'")); 
State 
v. 
Behnke, 
203 
Wis. 2d 43, 56, 553 N.W.2d 265 (Ct. App. 1996) ("[T]he Due 
Process Clause guarantees the defendant a right to a trial based 
on truth seeking which can only be accomplished by allowing him 
or her to present a complete defense."). 
¶114 At the same time, patients have an interest in keeping 
their mental health treatment records private.  Due to the 
sensitive nature of the problems for which patients seek mental 
health treatment, "disclosure of confidential communications 
made during counseling session may cause embarrassment or 
disgrace."  Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996).  
Accordingly, the physician-patient privilege in Wis. Stat. 
§ 905.04 was created "to encourage patients to freely and 
candidly discuss medical concerns with their physicians by 
ensuring that those concerns will not unnecessarily be disclosed 
to a third person."  Steinberg v. Jensen, 194 Wis. 2d 439, 459, 
534 N.W.2d 361 (1995). 
¶115 The Shiffra procedure takes both of these interests 
into account and prescribes a reasonable balance.  Solberg, 211 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.ssa & awb 
 
13 
 
Wis. 2d at 387 ("Such a procedure strikes an appropriate balance 
between the defendant's due process right to be given a 
meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense and the 
policy 
interests 
underlying 
the 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 904.05(2) 
privilege."). 
¶116 It is consistent with the approach taken by a majority 
of state courts. 11  They "have held that a criminal defendant, 
upon a preliminary showing that the records likely contain 
exculpatory evidence, is entitled to some form of pretrial 
discovery of a prosecution witness's mental health treatment 
records that would otherwise be subject to an 'absolute' 
privilege."  Barroso, 122 S.W.3d at 561. In camera judicial 
review of a victim's privileged records "currently represents 
the most common method of balancing statutory privileges against 
the defendant's trial rights."  State v. Pratt, 669 A.2d 562, 
                                                 
11 See e.g., D.P. v. State, 850 So. 2d 370, 373 (Ala. Crim. 
App. 2002); State v. Slimskey, 779 A.2d 723, 732 (Conn. 2001); 
Burns v. State, 968 A.2d 1012, 1024 (Del. 2009); Lucas v. State, 
555 S.E.2d 440, 446 (Ga. 2001); People v. Bean, 560 N.E.2d 258, 
273 (Ill. 1990); State v. Thompson, 836 N.W.2d 470, 486 (Iowa 
2013); Commonwealth v. Barroso, 122 S.W.3d 554, 564 (Ky. 2003); 
State v. Johnson, 102 A.3d 295, 297 (Md. 2014); State v. Hummel, 
483 N.W.2d 68, 72 (Minn. 1992); Cox v. State, 849 So. 2d 1257, 
1272 (Miss. 2003); State v. Duffy, 6 P.3d 453, 458 (Mont. 2000); 
State v. Gagne, 612 A.2d 899, 901 (N.H. 1992); Kinsella v. 
Kinsella, 696 A.2d 556, 570 (N.J. 1997); State v. Gonzales, 912 
P.2d 297, 302 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996); People v. Viera, 133 
A.D.3d 622, 623 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015); State v. Burnham, 58 
A.3d 889, 
898 
(R.I. 
2013); 
State 
v. 
Middlebrooks, 
840 
S.W.2d 317, 333 (Tenn. 1992), superseded on other grounds by 
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-392; State v. Cramer, 44 P.3d 690, 695-
96 (Utah 2002); State v. Barbera, 872 A.2d 309, 313 (Vt. 2005); 
Gale v. State, 792 P.2d 570, 581 (Wyo. 1990). 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.ssa & awb 
 
14 
 
571 (Conn. 1995).  We see no reason to depart from our precedent 
and end this practice in Wisconsin. 
¶117 Because we would not overrule the 
Shiffra/Green 
procedure, we turn to the question left unaddressed by Justice 
Gableman's opinion:  is witness preclusion the only remedy 
available to the circuit court when a complainant refuses to 
waive the physician-patient privilege? 
¶118 We have addressed this issue before.  When this court 
granted the motion for reconsideration in State v. Johnson, we 
wrote separately to explain that witness preclusion was not the 
only remedy intended by the Shiffra court.  2014 WI 16, ¶19, 353 
Wis. 2d 119, 846 N.W.2d 1 (Ann Walsh Bradley, J., concurring in 
part, dissenting in part, joined by Abrahamson, C.J.) ("The 
court in Shiffra expressly contemplated that a variety of 
sanctions may be appropriate depending on the circumstances."). 
¶119 In Shiffra, the court determined that it was not a 
misuse of the circuit court's discretion to suppress the 
victim's testimony as a sanction for her refusal to release the 
records.  175 Wis. 2d at 612.  Nowhere did it limit the remedies 
available to witness preclusion.  Rather, its language made 
clear that it was discussing the facts of the case before it: 
The only issue remaining is whether the trial court 
misused its discretion when it suppressed Pamela's 
testimony as a sanction for her refusal to release the 
records. In this situation, no other sanction would be 
appropriate. The court did not have the authority to 
hold Pamela in contempt because she is not obligated 
to disclose her psychiatric records. An adjournment in 
this case would be of no benefit because the sought-
after evidence would still be unavailable. Under the 
circumstances, the only method of protecting Shiffra's 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.ssa & awb 
 
15 
 
right to a fair trial was to suppress Pamela's 
testimony if she refused to disclose her records.' 
Id. (emphasis added). 
¶120 The author of Shiffra later clarified that the case 
did not require suppression.  State v. Johnson, No. 2011AP2864-
CRAC, unpublished slip op., ¶¶23-28 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 18, 
2012) (Brown, C.J., dissenting).  He proposed an alternative 
remedy, whereby "if an alleged victim refuses to release medical 
or counseling records to the court for in camera inspection, the 
court 
may 
compel 
release 
anyway, 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat.§ 146.82(2)(a)4."  Id., ¶24.  Acknowledging that Wis. Stat. 
§ 146.82 
generally 
will 
not 
trump 
the 
physician-patient 
privilege, he explained that where the privilege is trumped by 
constitutional 
concerns, 
a 
court 
may 
utilize 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 146.82(2)(a)(4) in order to conduct an in camera review.  Id., 
¶25. 
¶121 We would adopt this approach.  It harmonizes the two 
statutes addressing mental health treatment records and accounts 
for defendants' right to present a complete defense.  Further, 
it alleviates the state's concern that the Shiffra procedure 
allows witnesses to thwart prosecution.  By giving the court the 
power to review some mental health treatment records in camera 
when a defendant has established a constitutional right to that 
review, Judge Brown's remedy leaves the balancing of the 
competing interests in the hands of the court.   
¶122 As Judge Brown observed, "[t]he courts are especially 
equipped for this task.  Indeed, it is what judges do."  
Johnson, No. 2011AP2864-CRAC, ¶27.  We agree. 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.ssa & awb 
 
16 
 
VI 
¶123 In closing, we turn to the implications of mislabeling 
Justice Gableman's three-justice opinion as a "lead opinion."  
Rather than sow the seeds of confusion by issuing our opinions 
seriatim with Justice Gableman's opinion occupying the "lead" 
role, we should hew to our two-year-old precedent in Johnson, 
353 Wis. 2d 119, ¶1 (on reconsideration).  In Johnson, we 
addressed almost identical factual and legal issues, and issued 
a per curiam opinion stating that because the court was 
deadlocked, "the court of appeals decision must be affirmed."12   
¶124 Reading Justice Gableman's writing, designated as the 
"lead" opinion, and reading Justice Prosser's and Justice 
Ziegler's writings, self-designated (and so dubbed by Justice 
Gableman) as "dissenting" opinions makes us feel like we've 
stepped into "the Twilight Zone."13  As Justices Prosser and 
Ziegler explain, they are dissenting because they disagree with 
Justice Gableman's writing; they are not dissenting from the 
court's bottom line, which affirms the decision of the court of 
appeals.  
¶125 All appearances to the contrary, the mandate (the 
result) in this case is "the decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed."  Justice Gableman's opinion, referred to as the "lead 
                                                 
12 State v. Johnson, 2014 WI 16, ¶1, 353 Wis. 2d 119, 846 
N.W.2d 1 (on reconsideration).   
13 CBS, The Twilight Zone (1959).   
No.  2011AP2680-CR.ssa & awb 
 
17 
 
opinion," disagrees with this result and is in reality a 
dissent.14   
¶126 Three separate writings (Justice Ziegler's, Justice 
Prosser's, and ours) concur (at least in part) in the result and 
with the decision of the court of appeals.  But for some 
unstated reason, both Justice Prosser's and Justice Ziegler's 
writings are labeled (and referred to in the "lead opinion") as 
"dissents."15  
¶127 By failing to acknowledge the real positions of the 
justices, we are, in the words of Rod Serling, the creator of 
The 
Twilight 
Zone, 
"traveling 
through 
another 
dimension . . . into a . . . land whose [only] boundaries are 
that of imagination."   
¶128 In this zone of the court's imagination, Justice 
Gableman's opinion (which represents the views of two other 
justices, Patience Drake Roggensack and Rebecca G. Bradley) is 
the "lead opinion," even though these three justices disagree 
with the mandate, which leaves "the law . . . as the court of 
appeals has articulated it" intact.   
¶129 The court of appeals in this case followed Shiffra and 
Green.16  Justice Gableman's "lead opinion," however, would 
overturn Shiffra and Green.     
                                                 
14 Compare Justice Gableman's opinion, n.1.   
15 See Justice Gableman's opinion, ¶¶16 n.15, 39 n.17 & 18, 
72 n.31.    
16 See State v. Lynch, 2015 WI App 2, ¶¶8, 44-45, 359 
Wis. 2d 482, 859 N.W.2d 125.     
No.  2011AP2680-CR.ssa & awb 
 
18 
 
¶130 Normally, we have a word for opinions that do not 
garner the votes of a majority of the participating justices and 
disagree with the mandate of the court:  We call them 
"dissents."  For some unstated reason, Justice Gableman does not 
label his writing either a dissent or a concurrence, thus 
masking its true nature.   
¶131 Likewise, 
in 
the 
court's 
imaginative 
zone, 
the 
opinions of Justices Prosser and Ziegler are "dissents."  Yet 
they agree with the outcome of this case and would affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals, which followed Shiffra and 
Green.  We would also affirm the part of the decision of the 
court of appeals that followed Shiffra and Green as well, 
although we would reverse the part of the decision of the court 
of appeals that held that witness preclusion is the sole remedy 
available under Shiffra and Green.17    
¶132 Outside this imaginative zone, we have a word for 
opinions that do not garner the votes of a majority but agree 
with the mandate of the court:  We call them "concurrences."   
¶133 For some unstated reason, this label is not applied to 
Justice Prosser's and Justice Ziegler's writings.   
¶134 As Justice Ziegler writes, acknowledging the absurdity 
of labelling her writing as a "dissent" when she agrees with the 
result of this case:  "Hence, although I write in dissent, I 
dissent from the lead opinion; I agree with the functional 
outcome of this case."18   
                                                 
17 See supra ¶42. 
18 Justice Ziegler's "dissent," ¶47 n.14.   
No.  2011AP2680-CR.ssa & awb 
 
19 
 
¶135 The "functional outcome of this case" is that we 
affirm the court of appeals.  In fact, that is the outcome our 
precedent requires when, as happened just two years ago in an 
almost identical factual situation raising the same legal 
issues, the court deadlocked: "the court of appeals decision 
must be affirmed."  See Johnson, 353 Wis. 2d 119, ¶1.   
¶136 In Johnson, the court (sitting with just five members) 
initially issued a per curiam opinion holding that, under 
varying rationales, (1) a circuit court may not require a victim 
to produce privately held, privileged mental health records for 
in camera review; and (2) the victim may testify even if he or 
she does not produce privately held, privileged mental health 
records for in camera review.  State v. Johnson, 2013 WI 59, 
¶¶5-7, 348 Wis. 2d 450, 832 N.W.2d 609.   
¶137 Subsequently, however, as we stated previously, the 
court granted reconsideration and modified the prior per curiam, 
asserting that "[v]ery simply stated, the court of appeals is 
affirmed because no three justices[, a majority on a five member 
court,] conclude either (1) that under Shiffra, the victim must 
produce the records if she is to testify, or (2) that under 
Green, the victim need not produce the records in order to 
testify."  Johnson, 353 Wis. 2d 119, ¶3 (on reconsideration).  
"As a result, since a majority of the court has not reached 
consensus under precedent so as to decide the issue presented 
and the court is deadlocked, the decision of the court of 
appeals must be affirmed."  Johnson, 353 Wis. 2d 119, ¶13 (on 
reconsideration).   
No.  2011AP2680-CR.ssa & awb 
 
20 
 
¶138 This case raises the same issues as Johnson, only this 
time with a seven-member court.  Following Johnson as precedent, 
we should issue a per curiam opinion affirming the court of 
appeals.  Any justice could, if the justice wished, write 
separately.  The justices' separate writings would appear as 
concurrences or dissents in order of seniority, as is our usual 
practice.    
¶139 But rather than hew to our precedent in Johnson, the 
court sows the seeds of confusion and issues our opinions 
seriatim with Justice Gableman's opinion (a dissenting opinion 
issued without any label) being called the "lead opinion."   
¶140 The proliferation of separate writings (as in this 
case) and "lead opinions" is emblematic of the court's work this 
"term" (September 2015 to June 2016).       
¶141 Although we have not done a statistical analysis, our 
perception is that few of the court's decisions this term have 
been unanimous without any separate writings,19 and several, 
including this case, have begun with "lead opinions."  See, 
e.g., Singh v. Kemper, 2016 WI 67, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___ (lead op. of Ann Walsh Bradley, J., joined by 
Abrahamson, J.); Lands' End, Inc. v. City of Dodgeville, 2016 WI 
64, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ____ N.W.2d ____ (lead op. of Abrahamson, 
J., joined by Ann Walsh Bradley, J., and Gableman, J.); Coyne v. 
Walker, 2016 WI 38, 368 Wis. 2d 444, 879 N.W.2d 520 (lead op. of 
                                                 
19 See, 
e.g., 
State 
v. 
Tourville, 
2016 
WI 
17, 
367 
Wis. 2d 285, 876 N.W.2d 735 (unanimously affirming the court of 
appeals).   
No.  2011AP2680-CR.ssa & awb 
 
21 
 
Gableman, J. with Abrahamson, J., Ann Walsh Bradley, J., and 
Prosser, J., each concurring separately); State v. Smith, 2016 
WI 23, 367 Wis. 2d 483, 878 N.W.2d 135 (lead op. of Roggensack, 
C.J., joined by Prosser, J., and Gableman, J.); United Food & 
Comm. Workers Union, Local 1473 v. Hormel Foods Corp., 2016 WI 
13, 367 Wis. 2d 131, 876 N.W.2d 99 (lead op. of Abrahamson, J., 
joined by Ann Walsh Bradley, J.); Hoffer Props., LLC v. DOT, 
2016 WI 5, 366 Wis. 2d 372, 874 N.W.2d 533 (lead op. of 
Gableman, J., joined by Roggensack, C.J., and Ziegler, J.).   
¶142 The phrase "lead opinion" is not, as far as we are 
aware, defined in our Internal Operating Procedures or elsewhere 
in the case law.  Our Internal Operating Procedures (IOPs) refer 
to "lead opinions," but only in stating that if, during the 
process of circulating and revising opinions, "the opinion 
originally circulated as the majority opinion does not garner 
the vote of a majority of the court, it shall be referred to in 
separate writings as the 'lead opinion.'"  Wis. S. Ct. IOP 
II.G.4.20   
¶143 Prior to this case, we would have said that a lead 
opinion is one that states (and agrees with) the mandate of a 
majority of the justices, but represents the reasoning of less 
than a majority of the participating justices.  So, for example, 
in a case with six justices participating, if three justices 
join one opinion affirming the decision of the court of appeals, 
two justices join a different opinion affirming the decision of 
                                                 
20 Our internal operating procedures are contained in volume 
6 of the Wisconsin Statutes.   
No.  2011AP2680-CR.ssa & awb 
 
22 
 
the court of appeals, and one justice dissents, there is a 
single mandate——the decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed——but no majority opinion.  See Hoffer, 366 Wis. 2d 372.  
Rather, one of the opinions affirming the decision of the court 
of appeals will be the lead opinion.     
¶144 This case, however, unnecessarily complicates our 
understanding of what is a "lead opinion."  Now, an opinion that 
disagrees with the mandate and argues for an outcome with which 
a majority of the court disagrees can be designated a "lead 
opinion."   
¶145 The absence of an agreed-upon definition for "lead 
opinion" has the potential to cause confusion among the bench, 
the bar, and the public.  Also, the precedential effect (or lack 
thereof) of a "lead opinion" is uncertain.  Are lead opinions in 
this court comparable to plurality opinions in the United States 
Supreme Court?21  Apparently, the court of appeals considers a 
plurality decision of this court persuasive but does not always 
consider it binding.  See, e.g., State v. King, 205 Wis. 2d 81, 
                                                 
21 See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) 
("When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale 
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the 
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by 
those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest 
grounds . . . .'") (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 
n.15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).   
For discussions by this court of the precedential effect of 
plurality opinions in the United States Supreme Court, see, for 
example, State v. Griep, 2015 WI 40, ¶36, 361 Wis. 2d 657, 863 
N.W.2d 567; 
State 
v. 
Deadwiller, 
2013 
WI 
75, 
¶30, 
350 
Wis. 2d 138, 834 N.W.2d 362.   
No.  2011AP2680-CR.ssa & awb 
 
23 
 
88-89, 555 N.W.2d 189 (Ct. App. 1996) (citing State v. Dowe, 120 
Wis. 2d 192, 194, 352 N.W.2d 660 (1984)).  
¶146 We would avoid the unnecessary confusion caused by 
Justice Gableman's dissenting "lead" opinion, and issue a simple 
per curiam opinion stating, as we did in Johnson, that "the 
court of appeals decision must be affirmed."22  Each justice 
could attach his or her separate writing to this per curiam 
explaining how she or he would decide the case.  This procedure 
would avoid the confusion inherent in conferring, for some 
unstated reason, "lead opinion" status on Justice Gableman's 
dissenting opinion.   
¶147 In closing, we note another way in which this case is 
emblematic of the court's work during this term.   
¶148 Despite one of the lightest (if not the lightest) case 
loads ever in modern times and the adoption (by a divided court) 
of a new procedure for circulating and mandating opinions on 
September 25, 2014 (ostensibly designed to avoid the June 
"crush"), around 40 percent of our decisions (including the case 
before us) will be completed and released in June and July.23   
This is true even though the court no longer discusses draft 
                                                 
22 Johnson, 353 Wis. 2d 119, ¶1.   
23 All of the justices' work on opinions is completed on or 
before June 30.  Because the number of mandates is limited each 
week, several opinions finished by June 30 are released in July.   
No.  2011AP2680-CR.ssa & awb 
 
24 
 
opinions in conference unless a majority of justices vote to do 
so.24 
¶149 In sum, failing to issue a per curiam opinion here 
raises the potential for significant confusion over the outcome 
of this case, the implication of our decision for future cases, 
and the definition of "lead opinion," a term that has seen 
increasing use of late.  These issues should be approached by 
the court and the justices in a descriptive, analytical, and 
historical 
manner, 
free 
from 
divisiveness 
or 
offensive 
posturing, personal attacks, and false accusations.  
¶150 Engaging in or responding to such personal attacks and 
accusations neither sheds light on the inquiry before us nor 
promotes public trust and confidence in the court.  
¶151 For the reasons set forth, we concur in part, dissent 
in part, and write separately to address institutional concerns. 
 
                                                 
24 The court's procedures for circulating and mandating 
opinions have been written about before.  See, e.g., State v. 
Gonzalez, 2014 WI 124, ¶¶25-40, 359 Wis. 2d 1, 856 N.W.2d 580 
(Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) (setting forth the procedure in 
full).  Others have noted the light case load this term.  See 
Alan Ball, Justice Abrahamson's Concerns Over the Docket – An 
Update, 
SCOWstats 
(Mar. 
20, 
2016), 
http://www.scowstats.com/2016/03/20/justice-abrahamsons-
concerns-over-the-docket-an-update/.  
No.  2011AP2680-CR.dtp 
 
1 
 
 
¶152 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).  The principal 
issue on review is whether the decisions in State v. Shiffra, 
175 Wis. 2d 600, 499 N.W.2d 719 (Ct. App. 1993), and State v. 
Green, 2002 WI 68, 253 Wis. 2d 356, 646 N.W.2d 298 (2002), 
should be overruled.  Although the lead opinion by Justice 
Michael J. Gableman makes a number of compelling arguments about 
the foundation and lineage of Shiffra and Green, as well as 
their effect on Wisconsin law, I am ultimately persuaded that 
the better course for this court is to address the concerns 
arising from these opinions rather than to strike them down and 
start over.  In my view, overruling the opinions is more likely 
to intensify controversy than to resolve it, as overruling would 
seriously undermine a number of prior decisions and would invite 
a host of new theories to protect criminal defendants at trial. 
I 
¶153 Because 
of 
divisions 
within 
the 
court, 
Justice 
Gableman was assigned the responsibility of writing a lead 
opinion.  Two justices1 have joined him in the following 
conclusions: 
Shiffra/Green improperly relied on [Pennsylvania v. 
Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987),] when it invented a right 
to 
access 
privileged 
information 
(specifically 
a 
complainant's 
privileged 
mental 
health 
treatment 
records) via a motion for in camera review.  We 
further conclude that Shiffra/Green cannot be grounded 
in any other legal basis, specifically any other 
constitutional provision. 
                                                 
1 Chief Justice Patience Drake Roggensack and Justice 
Rebecca G. Bradley. 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.dtp 
 
2 
 
Lead op., ¶8.  I dissent from these conclusions, which would 
provide a basis for overruling Shiffra and Green and would 
concomitantly reverse the decision of the court of appeals.2 
¶154 I read Justice Gableman's opinion as making the 
following observations about the Ritchie case: 
(1) Defendant 
Ritchie 
sought 
materials 
from 
the 
"investigative files" of Children and Youth Services 
(CYS), "a protective service agency charged with 
investigating cases of suspected mistreatment and 
neglect."  Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 43.  The victim in 
Ritchie was referred to CYS by police. 
(2) The Pennsylvania statute pertaining to CYS provided 
that "all reports and other information obtained in 
the course of a CYS investigation" were "confidential, 
subject to 11 specific exceptions."  Id.  One of these 
exceptions was release "pursuant to a court order."  
In other words, courts were specifically authorized by 
                                                 
2 Two other justices, Shirley S. Abrahamson and Ann Walsh 
Bradley, would reverse the decision of the court of appeals in 
part for a wholly different reason.  Like Justice Annette 
Kingsland Ziegler and the writer, Justices Abrahamson and Ann 
Walsh Bradley would not overrule Shiffra and Green.  Justices 
Abrahamson and Ann Walsh Bradley's concurrence/dissent, ¶2.  
They would, however, reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals in part to permit a circuit court to compel release of 
the records pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 146.82(2)(a)4. when a 
complainant refuses to release records to the court for an in 
camera review.  Id., ¶¶42-43.  I dissent from this specific 
remedy proposed by the two justices.  In essence, then, I vote 
to affirm the decision of the court of appeals with the caveat 
explained in ¶30 & n.6, infra, of this dissent. 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.dtp 
 
3 
 
statute 
to 
release 
confidential 
information 
in 
appropriate circumstances. 
(3) The Supreme Court relied exclusively on Brady v. 
Maryland, 
373 
U.S. 
83 
(1963), 
the 
case 
that 
articulated a prosecution disclosure obligation, and 
cases that clarify Brady, to support its decision.  
The first sentence of the Court's due process analysis 
reads: "It is well settled that the government has the 
obligation to turn over evidence in its possession 
that is both favorable to the accused and material to 
guilt or punishment."  Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 57 
(emphasis added). 
(4) The CYS was a government agency, acting on the 
Commonwealth's 
behalf, 
and 
its 
records 
were 
constructively in the possession of the prosecutor. 
¶155 The lead opinion contrasts these factors with the 
facts in Shiffra: 
(1) The defendant sought the complainant's psychiatric 
records from private health care providers.  The State 
did not engage any of those providers for the 
complainant. 
(2) The prosecutor did not possess any private records and 
was not required to provide them to the defendant 
under Brady or Wis. Stat. § 971.23.  In fact, the 
Shiffra court did not cite Brady in its opinion. 
(3) The complainant's refusal to release her records was 
grounded 
on 
a 
privilege 
statute, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.dtp 
 
4 
 
§ 905.04(2), which included no provision for a court 
order. 
¶156 The differences between the facts in Ritchie and the 
facts in Shiffra are admittedly striking.  The question is 
whether they are constitutionally determinative.  I do not 
believe they are. 
A 
¶157 It is important to understand the dynamics in Ritchie.  
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had relied on the Sixth 
Amendment's Confrontation Clause for its decision to give the 
defendant access to the entire CYS file related to the 
complainant.  The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania did not rely on 
Brady at all.3  It said: 
The purpose of [the Confrontation Clause] is to 
provide 
an 
accused 
with 
an 
effective 
means 
of 
                                                 
3 A dissenting member of the court provided additional 
factual insights about the case: 
We do not deal with exculpatory material which 
the defendant has requested and which is in the 
possession of the Commonwealth.  Although the Act 
authorizes disclosure of child protective service 
agency 
files 
to 
law 
enforcement 
officials 
investigating cases of child abuse, 11 P.S. § 2215(9) 
and (10), there is no indication that any law 
enforcement officials ever had access to the CWS files 
in question.  Moreover, it is clear from the record 
that the prosecution did not have any information from 
the CWS records in its possession nor did the 
Commonwealth use CWS records in any way to prosecute 
appellee. 
Commonwealth v. Ritchie, 502 A.2d 148, 157-58 (Pa. 1985) 
(Larsen, J., dissenting), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 480 U.S. 
39 (1987). 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.dtp 
 
5 
 
challenging the evidence against him by testing the 
recollection and probing the conscience of an adverse 
witness. . . .  
. . . . 
. . . "The search for truth" and the quest for 
"every man's evidence" so plainly the basis of the 
Sixth 
Amendment . . . are 
as 
applicable 
to 
any 
material as to prior statements.  When materials 
gathered become an arrow of inculpation, the person 
inculpated has a fundamental constitutional right to 
examine the provenance of the arrow and he who aims 
it.  Otherwise, the Sixth Amendment can be diluted to 
mean that one may face his accusers or the substance 
of the accusation, except when the accuser is shielded 
by legislative enactment. 
Commonwealth v. Ritchie, 502 A.2d 148, 152-53 (Pa. 1985), aff'd 
in part, rev'd in part, 480 U.S. 39 (1987). 
¶158 Four members of the Ritchie Court——Justice Powell 
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, and Justice 
O'Connor——rejected reliance on the Confrontation Clause of the 
Sixth Amendment.  A majority of the Court instead recast the 
facts and relied on Brady and a due process analysis.  Justice 
Blackmun, who was part of the majority, and Justices Brennan and 
Marshall, in dissent, would have recognized a Sixth Amendment 
Confrontation Clause right to the records sought.  Justices 
Stevens and Scalia dissented in Ritchie solely on the ground 
that the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case.  They did 
not weigh in on the central dispute. 
¶159 In 
sum, 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
majority 
in 
Ritchie 
emphasized the "investigative" function of a government agency 
to bring the case within Brady principles and avoid a much 
broader holding by the Court.  The Court did not absolutely slam 
the door against a Compulsory Process Clause claim or even a due 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.dtp 
 
6 
 
process claim in a case with other facts.  This puts the Ritchie 
decision in a different light. 
B 
¶160 The lead opinion draws a sharp distinction between 
privilege and confidentiality, emphasizing that Wis. Stat. 
§ 905.04 is a privilege statute with no provisions authorizing a 
court to order release of records, in contrast to the 
Pennsylvania statute governing the CYS agency, which did. 
¶161 There is no dispute that the Ritchie Court pointed to 
the fact that 11 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 2215(a)(5) (Purdon Supp. 1986) 
provided for release of confidential records pursuant to a court 
order.  480 U.S. at 43-44.  However, the Court also made 
reference to privilege: 
CYS refused to comply with the subpoena, claiming that 
the 
records 
were 
privileged 
under 
Pennsylvania 
law. . . .  
. . . . 
. . . The 
Commonwealth . . . argues 
that 
no 
materiality inquiry is required, because a statute 
renders 
the 
contents 
of 
the 
file 
privileged.  
Requiring 
disclosure 
here, 
it 
is 
argued, 
would 
override the Commonwealth's compelling interest in 
confidentiality on the mere speculation that the file 
"might" have been useful to the defense. 
Although we recognize that the public interest in 
protecting this type of sensitive information is 
strong, we do not agree that this interest necessarily 
prevents disclosure in all circumstances. 
Id. at 43, 57 (emphasis added).  The Court added a footnote: "We 
express no opinion on whether the result in this case would have 
been different if the statute had protected the CYS files from 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.dtp 
 
7 
 
disclosure to anyone, including law-enforcement and judicial 
personnel."  Id. at 57 n.14. 
¶162 The Ritchie Court would have been in a tougher 
situation if Ritchie had sought information from a sexual 
assault counselor, see id. at 57 (characterizing 42 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. § 5945.1(b) (1982) as an "unqualified statutory privilege 
for 
communications 
between 
sexual 
assault 
counselors 
and 
victims"), or from a licensed psychologist, see 42 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. § 5944 (1982) ("No person who has been licensed . . . to 
practice psychology shall be, without the written consent of his 
client, examined in any civil or criminal matter as to any 
information acquired in the course of his professional services 
in behalf of such client.").  I suspect the result would have 
been the same.4 
¶163 What is important to the present case is that Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 905.04——the 
"Physician-patient, 
registered 
nurse-
patient, 
chiropractor-patient, 
psychologist-patient, 
social 
worker-patient, 
marriage 
and 
family 
therapist-patient, 
podiatrist-patient and professional counselor-patient privilege" 
statute——has 10 statutory exceptions, including the "Abused or 
neglected child" exception, and that the statute must be read 
and construed in pari materia with Wis. Stat. § 48.981 and Wis. 
                                                 
4 As Justice Powell explained in his opinion for the Court 
in Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188 (1982): "[D]ue Process is 
flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the 
particular situation demands."  456 U.S. at 200 (alteration in 
original) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 
(1972)). 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.dtp 
 
8 
 
Stat. § 146.82(2) inasmuch as some fact situations will be 
covered by more than one statute.  Lynch already has some of the 
Complainant's mental health records as a result of the State's 
prosecution of the Complainant's father. Thus, the privilege at 
issue in this case is not inviolate. 
C 
¶164 Implicit in the lead opinion's conclusion that we 
should overrule Shiffra/Green is complete confidence in the 
defendant's 
right 
to 
vigorously 
cross-examine 
a 
victim/complainant at trial. 
¶165 The Court in Ritchie was not impressed with this 
remedy.  As the Court explained, Ritchie's daughter was the main 
witness against him at trial: "In an attempt to rebut her 
testimony, defense counsel cross-examined the girl at length, 
questioning her on all aspects of the alleged attacks and her 
reasons for not reporting the incidents sooner.  Except for 
routine 
evidentiary 
rulings, 
the 
trial 
judge 
placed 
no 
limitation on the scope of cross-examination."  Ritchie, 480 
U.S. at 44-45. 
¶166 The fact that Ritchie was afforded ample opportunity 
to cross-examine his daughter did not stop the Court from ruling 
in Ritchie's favor.  In fact, no Justice voted to block 
Ritchie's access to his daughter's records. 
¶167 In short, the lead opinion's comparison of Ritchie and 
Shiffra does not persuade me that Shiffra was so off track that 
it must be overruled.  As Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson, Justice 
Ann Walsh Bradley, and Justice Annette Kingsland Ziegler 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.dtp 
 
9 
 
persuasively point out in their separate writings, this court 
has embraced Shiffra and Green, and courts in many other states 
have extended Ritchie to cover records held by private health 
care providers. 
II 
¶168 I also disagree with the lead opinion's conclusion 
that "Shiffra/Green cannot be grounded in any other legal basis, 
specifically any other constitutional provision."  Lead op., ¶8.  
If I didn't know better, I might think that the lead opinion was 
tying to reverse the court's declining caseload with a single 
provocative sentence. 
¶169 There are additional bases to justify breaching a 
privilege or other evidentiary limitation in exceptional cases.  
Three examples immediately come to mind. 
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT PRIVILEGE 
¶170 In Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957), the 
Supreme Court discussed the government's  privilege to withhold 
an informer's identity.  The Court explained that the privilege 
"recognizes the obligation of citizens to communicate their 
knowledge of the commission of crimes to law enforcement 
officials and, by preserving their anonymity, encourages them to 
perform that obligation."  Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 59.  However, a 
"limitation on the applicability of the privilege arises from 
the fundamental requirements of fairness": 
Where the disclosure of an informer's identity, or of 
the contents of his communication, is relevant and 
helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential 
to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must 
give way.  In these situations the trial court may 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.dtp 
 
10 
 
require disclosure and, if the Government withholds 
the information, dismiss the action. 
Id. at 60-61 (footnote omitted). 
¶171 In McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967), the Court 
identified the basis for the Roviaro ruling: namely, "the 
exercise of [the Court's] power to formulate evidentiary rules 
for federal criminal cases."  386 U.S. at 312.  As this court 
explained in State v. Nellessen, 2014 WI 84, 360 Wis. 2d 493, 
849 N.W.2d 654, Wis. Stat. § 905.10(1) "codified this privilege 
for informers, which was first recognized in the seminal" 
Roviaro 
decision. 
 
360 
Wis. 2d 493, 
¶15. 
 
Wisconsin's 
codification did not come until more than 15 years after the 
Roviaro decision. 
THE RAPE SHIELD LAW 
¶172 Similar to other exceptions to various privileges, in 
State v. Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d 633, 456 N.W.2d 325 (1990), this 
court held the rape shield statute, Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2) 
(1985-86),5 unconstitutional as applied, to the extent it 
                                                 
5 The statute provided as follows: 
(2)(a) In this subsection, "sexual conduct" means 
any conduct or behavior relating to sexual activities 
of the complaining witness, including but not limited 
to prior experience of sexual intercourse or sexual 
contact, use of contraceptives, living arrangement and 
life-style. 
(b) If the defendant is accused of a crime under 
s. 940.225, any evidence concerning the complaining 
witness's prior sexual conduct or opinions of the 
witness's prior sexual conduct and reputation as to 
prior sexual conduct shall not be admitted into 
evidence during the course of the hearing or trial, 
nor shall any reference to such conduct be made in the 
(continued) 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.dtp 
 
11 
 
infringed 
on 
a 
defendant's 
constitutional 
rights. 
 
The 
defendant, Pulizzano, sought to present evidence that her 
alleged victim "had been the victim of a prior sexual assault 
which involved acts similar to those alleged[ly]" performed by 
Pulizzano.  Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d at 642-43.  To assess 
Pulizzano's claim, the court described a "constitutional right 
to present evidence . . . grounded in the confrontation and 
compulsory process clauses of Article I, Section 7 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution and the Sixth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution."  Id. at 645 (first citing Washington v. 
Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-19 (1967); then citing Pointer v. Texas, 
380 U.S. 400, 403-06 (1965)). 
¶173 Based on those constitutional protections, this court 
concluded that under certain circumstances "evidence of a 
complainant's prior sexual conduct may be so relevant and 
probative 
that 
the 
defendant's 
right 
to 
present 
it 
is 
                                                                                                                                                             
presence of the jury, except the following, subject to 
s. 971.31(11): 
1. Evidence of the complaining witness's past 
conduct with the defendant. 
2. Evidence of specific instances of sexual 
conduct showing the source or origin of semen, 
pregnancy or disease, for use in determining the 
degree of sexual assault or the extent of injury 
suffered. 
3. Evidence of prior untruthful allegations of 
sexual assault made by the complaining witness. 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 972.11(2) 
(1985-86). 
 
The 
statute 
remains 
substantially similar in the current codification. 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.dtp 
 
12 
 
constitutionally protected.  Section 972.11, Stats., as applied, 
may in a given case impermissibly infringe upon a defendant's 
rights to confrontation and compulsory process."  Id. at 647-48 
(first citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294-303 
(1973); then citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-18 
(1974)).  If a defendant "establish[es] a constitutional right 
to present otherwise excluded evidence," then "the circuit court 
must then determine whether the State's interests in excluding 
the evidence are so compelling that they nonetheless overcome 
the defendant's right to present it."  Id. at 656-57.  During 
the balancing, "the state's interests are to be closely examined 
and weighed against the force of the defendant's right to 
present the evidence."  Id. at 657. 
THERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE 
¶174 In Johnson v. Rogers Memorial Hospital, Inc., 2005 WI 
114, 283 Wis. 2d 384, 700 N.W.2d 27, the court established an 
exception to the therapist-patient privilege in a third-party 
negligence claim against a therapist whose treatment allegedly 
resulted in implanting false memories of child abuse against a 
woman's father.  The court described the exception as "a public 
policy exception" based on the premise that "no utility can be 
derived from protecting careless or inappropriate therapists and 
their practices."  Johnson, 283 Wis. 2d 384, ¶¶63, 65. 
¶175 A 
brief 
review 
of 
existing 
exceptions 
to 
the 
confidential 
informant 
privilege, 
rape 
shield 
law, 
and 
therapist-patient privilege demonstrates that the Shiffra/Green 
framework is not the only context in which courts endeavor to 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.dtp 
 
13 
 
strike a balance between defendants' constitutional rights and 
the 
policies 
underlying 
various 
evidentiary 
limitations.  
Professor Edward J. Imwinkelried has explained in general terms 
the nature of the balance that courts strike: 
In criminal cases, the [Supreme] Court has 
rendered exclusionary rules of evidence such as 
privileges qualified or conditional by developing a 
balancing test to determine whether the accused's 
constitutional right to present evidence surmounts the 
exclusionary rule. . . .  [T]he factors in and the 
nature of the balancing test employed in applying the 
constitutional right are essentially the same as those 
that 
a 
judge 
utilizes 
to 
determine 
whether 
a 
litigant's need for privileged information overrides a 
qualified 
privilege. 
 
The 
existence 
of 
this 
constitutional 
right 
transforms 
even 
purportedly 
absolute privileges into qualified or conditional 
ones. 
Edward J. Imwinkelried, The New Wigmore: A Treatise on Evidence 
§ 11.3, at 1261 (2002).  "[T]he vast majority of contemporary 
lower courts assume that the accused's constitutional right 
applies to evidentiary privileges and that if the excluded 
evidence is reliable and material enough, the right can override 
a privilege."  Id. § 11.4.1, at 1295. 
¶176 Overruling Shiffra and Green would needlessly cast 
doubt on Pulizzano, Johnson, and other precedent in which 
statutory schemes that reasonably promote privacy nevertheless 
give way to weightier constitutional concerns.  Furthermore, if 
Shiffra and Green were overruled, creative counsel would soon 
find other sources for the authority to order release of 
privileged psychological and medical records, where necessary, 
and these sources might well prove far more problematic than 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.dtp 
 
14 
 
Shiffra, which has provided a constructive approach to balancing 
interests. 
III 
¶177 In my view, the lead opinion is being driven by 
certain foundational concerns related to Shiffra/Green. 
¶178 First, Shiffra/Green appears to open the door to 
pretrial discovery beyond the sensible limitations in Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.23. 
¶179 Second, Shiffra/Green breaches an important statutory 
privilege and other such breaches are likely to follow. 
¶180 Third, Shiffra/Green embodies two extremes.  The 
complainant may prevent the State from prosecuting a criminal 
case by insisting on withholding records that the court 
concludes are necessary for the defendant's defense.  However, 
the complainant must surrender her privacy in confidential 
communications if she releases her private psychological records 
as a condition for prosecuting her assailant. 
¶181 These are very legitimate concerns.  However, rather 
than overruling Shiffra and Green, the court would be better 
served by focusing on and trying to address each of these 
concerns 
by 
further 
refining 
and 
improving 
the 
existing 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.dtp 
 
15 
 
Shiffra/Green framework.  This will necessarily include the 
consideration of additional remedies.6 
¶182 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
 
                                                 
6 Already, the Shiffra/Green framework contemplates the 
circuit court placing limitations on the release of privileged 
mental health care records, as we indicated in Green when noting 
that "[w]e have confidence in . . . circuit courts [conducting 
an in camera review] to . . . make a proper determination as to 
whether disclosure of the information is necessary based on the 
competing interests involved in such cases."  State v. Green, 
2002 WI 68, ¶35, 253 Wis. 2d 356, 646 N.W.2d 298.  Even "[w]hen 
consent is given, the judge scrutinizes the records to determine 
whether disclosure is warranted."  7 Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin 
Practice Series § 511.2, at 389-90 (3d ed. 2008). 
In my view, the court should explore reasonable remedies 
between the extremes stated in ¶29, supra, so that barring 
testimony by the nonconsenting witness is not the sole remedy in 
all cases.  See Blinka § 511.2, at 392.  For example, Professor 
Blinka has suggested that 
[a]nother remedy may be to permit the witness to 
testify but allow the defense to cross-examine about 
his or her refusal to divulge records requested by the 
court.  The defense should also be permitted to argue 
that the witness's nondisclosure creates a reasonable 
doubt based on credibility concerns. 
Id. 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.akz 
 
1 
 
 
¶183 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (dissenting).  This 
case presents the court with a thorny issue: how must a circuit 
court proceed when a criminal defendant contends there exists 
exculpatory evidence in the hands of a private party, the 
evidence consists of statutorily-privileged medical records, and 
the alleged victim and subject of the medical records refuses to 
waive her privilege as to the evidence at issue?  
¶184 More concretely: defendant Patrick Lynch ("Lynch") 
faces charges that he sexually assaulted the complainant in the 
1990s.  State v. Lynch, 2015 WI App 2, ¶2, 359 Wis. 2d 482, 859 
N.W.2d 125.  Lynch filed a motion requesting that the circuit 
court1 review in camera the complainant's medical treatment 
records dating back to the time of the alleged abuse.  Id., ¶5.  
According to the court of appeals below, he "submitted a 
detailed 
offer 
of 
proof 
in 
support 
of 
his 
motion . . . offer[ing] factual assertions and documents to 
support his theory that [the complainant's] treatment records 
contain 
probative, 
noncumulative 
evidence 
bearing 
on 
the 
reliability of [the complainant's] allegations against Lynch."  
Id., ¶11.  Upon review, the circuit court concluded that there 
was "a reasonable likelihood that [the complainant's] treatment 
records contained probative, noncumulative evidence helpful to 
Lynch's defense."  Id., ¶5.  Specifically, the court determined  
                                                 
1 The Honorable Andrew P. Bissonnette presided. 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.akz 
 
2 
 
that there was a reasonable likelihood that [the 
complainant's] 
records 
contain 
information 
highly 
damaging to [the complainant's] credibility because 
there is a reasonable likelihood that the records 
[would] reveal  
(1) that [the complainant] exhibits 
ongoing 
symptoms 
associated 
with 
[Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder] that affect her 
ability to recall and describe pertinent 
events, and  
(2) that [the complainant] failed to 
report Lynch to treatment providers, at 
least as a child.  
Id., ¶13.  The complainant refused, as was her statutory 
prerogative, to provide the circuit court with access to her 
privileged treatment records.  Id., ¶6.  At this point, it would 
seem to an onlooker, the parties were at an impasse. 
¶185 Such a state of affairs presents courts with the 
complicated task of ensuring the administration of justice 
considering all of the interests involved.  Lynch, for example——
presumed innocent until proven guilty by the State, State v. 
Johnson, 11 Wis. 2d 130, 144, 104 N.W.2d 379 (Dieterich, J., 
dissenting)——faces the possibility of being convicted as a sex 
offender who may, among other things, serve decades in prison, 
and he has a constitutional right to due process of law.  See 
U.S. Const. amend. XIV.  Conversely, the State has, among other 
things, an interest in pursuing its prosecution and protecting 
the public from criminals, yet must comply with the statutory 
and other rights and privileges established for the benefit of 
victims of crime.  The complainant, however, could have, among 
other things, an interest in maintaining the privacy of sought-
No.  2011AP2680-CR.akz 
 
3 
 
after medical records.  How to manage the conflicting rights and 
interests of all concerned? 
¶186 Fortunately, this is not the first time the Wisconsin 
judiciary has grappled with this problem.  For over two decades, 
its 
solution 
could 
be 
found 
in 
State 
v. 
Shiffra, 
175 
Wis. 2d 600, 499 N.W.2d 719 (Ct. App. 1993), modified, State v. 
Green, 2002 WI 68, 253 Wis. 2d 356, 646 N.W.2d 298.  As will be 
explained in detail below, Shiffra has set forth a framework 
which considers the interests of all involved, carefully 
balancing 
the 
various 
demands 
in 
an 
attempt 
to 
achieve 
substantial justice in a manner that upholds both the federal 
constitution and the laws of our state.  Put differently, the 
Shiffra solution "attempt[s] to strike a balance between the 
witness's right to privacy, which is embodied in the health care 
provider privileges, and the truth-seeking function of our 
courts, which is rooted in the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment."  State v. Behnke, 203 Wis. 2d 43, 56, 553 
N.W.2d 265 (Ct. App. 1996) (citation omitted).  Shiffra is 
indeed longstanding precedent.  
¶187 About ten years after Shiffra, in Green, we examined 
and refined the Shiffra framework.  In Green we described the 
nature of the preliminary showing that a criminal defendant must 
make in order to obtain in camera review of a privilege-holder's 
privileged records:  
[A] defendant [must] set forth, in good faith, a 
specific factual basis demonstrating a reasonable 
likelihood 
that 
the 
records 
contain 
relevant 
information necessary to a determination of guilt or 
innocence and . . . not merely cumulative to other 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.akz 
 
4 
 
evidence 
available 
to 
the 
defendant. 
. . . [I]nformation 
will 
be 
"necessary 
to 
a 
determination of guilt or innocence" if it "tends to 
create a reasonable doubt that might not otherwise 
exist."  
Green, 253 Wis. 2d 356, ¶34 (citation omitted).  To date, 
Shiffra and Green remain the settled law in Wisconsin on the 
approach taken by courts and litigants when criminal defendants 
wish to obtain access to privately-held, privileged medical 
records.  
¶188 The circuit court below dutifully worked through the 
Shiffra-Green framework and applied the traditional sanction 
which included two results: (1) the court did not violate the 
complainant's privilege by reviewing her privileged records; and 
(2) the court issued an order excluding the complainant's 
testimony at trial.  Lynch, 359 Wis. 2d 482, ¶¶6, 45-46.  The 
court of appeals below confirmed that the circuit court had 
correctly applied applicable precedent.  See id., ¶1.  The State 
now appeals, directing the brunt of its arguments, not against 
the reasoning of the circuit court or the court of appeals, but 
against the soundness of Shiffra and Green. 
¶189 Some background is appropriate.  Over the years, the 
State has made it clear that it disagrees with the Shiffra-Green 
line of cases.  Time after time, the State has attempted to 
convince this court to overturn Shiffra; it has also voiced its 
displeasure with that case in the court of appeals.  See, e.g., 
State v. Speese, 199 Wis. 2d 597, 610 n.12, 545 N.W.2d 510 
(1996) ("The State . . . urges the court to overturn Shiffra."); 
Behnke, 203 Wis. 2d at 55 (discussing "the State's complaint in 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.akz 
 
5 
 
its brief that it does not like Shiffra."); Green, 253 
Wis. 2d 356, ¶21 n.4 ("The State contends that the holding in 
[Shiffra] was in error . . . ."); State v. Johnson, 2013 WI 59, 
348 Wis. 2d 450, 832 N.W.2d 609 (per curiam), reconsideration 
granted, 2014 WI 16, 353 Wis. 2d 119, 846 N.W.2d 1 (per curiam) 
(examining, at State's request, whether Shiffra should be 
overruled).  
¶190 For its part, the court of appeals has attempted to 
alleviate the State's concerns by explaining that the State 
"misconstrues the reasoning of . . . Shiffra."  Behnke, 203 
Wis. 2d at 55.  And for our part, we have expressly declined to 
overturn Shiffra, noting that we have recognized its validity in 
past cases.  Green, 253 Wis. 2d 356, ¶21 n.4 (citing State v. 
Solberg, 211 Wis. 2d 372, 386-87, 564 N.W.2d 775 (1997); State 
v. Rizzo, 2002 WI 20, ¶53, 250 Wis. 2d 407, 640 N.W.2d 93)).  
¶191 Johnson, decided a few years ago, represents the 
State's most recent attempt in its campaign against Shiffra; the 
State was again unsuccessful.  See Johnson, 353 Wis. 2d 119, ¶3 
(per curiam) ("[W]e do not herein overturn or modify any 
precedent.").  Unbowed and apparently embracing the legal maxim 
fiat justitia ruat caelum,2 the State again argues that Shiffra 
should be overruled.  The State again fails to convince this 
court to adopt its proposed course of action. 
¶192 The Shiffra-Green line of cases, while not perfect, 
has provided a reasoned and reasonable approach to these 
                                                 
2 "Let justice be done, though the heavens fall."  
No.  2011AP2680-CR.akz 
 
6 
 
difficult questions.  Under principles of stare decisis, I would 
not overthrow these well-established cases without "special 
justification," Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Employers Ins. of 
Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶94, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257 
(citation 
omitted), 
and 
none 
has 
yet 
been 
provided.  
Unfortunately, some of my colleagues do not agree; I therefore 
write separately. 
¶193 I conclude that this court should not abandon the 
Shiffra-Green framework and would therefore affirm the decision 
of the court of appeals. 
I.  THE SHIFFRA-GREEN FRAMEWORK 
¶194 Under Wis. Stat. § 905.04(2), "A patient has a 
privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person 
from disclosing confidential communications made or information 
obtained or disseminated for purposes of diagnosis or treatment 
of the patient's physical, mental or emotional condition, among 
the patient" and certain specified individuals, such as the 
patient's physician or counselor.  Wis. Stat. § 905.04(2).  
¶195 When, as here, a defendant wishes to obtain access to 
privileged, privately-held counseling records, the Shiffra-Green 
framework requires that he "undertake a reasonable investigation 
into the victim's background and counseling through other means 
first before the records will be made available."  Green, 253 
Wis. 2d 356, ¶33.  Thus "[a] motion for seeking discovery for 
such privileged documents should be the last step in a 
defendant's pretrial discovery."  Id., ¶35.  When requesting 
access to privileged records, the defendant must make "a fact-
No.  2011AP2680-CR.akz 
 
7 
 
specific 
evidentiary 
showing, 
describing 
as 
precisely 
as 
possible the information sought from the records and how it is 
relevant to and supports his or her particular defense."  Id., 
¶33.  More specifically, the defendant must "set forth, in good 
faith, a specific factual basis demonstrating a reasonable 
likelihood 
that 
the 
records 
contain 
relevant 
information 
necessary to a determination of guilt or innocence and . . . not 
merely cumulative to other evidence available to the defendant."  
Id., ¶34.  Evidence "necessary to a determination of guilt or 
innocence" is evidence that "tends to create a reasonable doubt 
that might not otherwise exist."  Id. (citation omitted).  This 
is not by any means intended to be a trivial burden; "mere 
speculation or conjecture" is insufficient.  See id., ¶33.  
Additionally, "[a] good faith request will often require support 
through motion and affidavit from the defendant."  Id., ¶35. 
¶196 If the circuit court determines that the defendant has 
met his burden, it reviews the records at issue in camera, 
unless the privilege-holder——in cases such as this one, also the 
alleged victim——refuses to authorize review.  See Shiffra, 175 
Wis. 2d at 612; Lynch, 359 Wis. 2d 482, ¶¶5-6.  "If the victim 
does not consent, there is no in camera review and the victim is 
barred from testifying."  Johnson v. Rogers Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 
2005 WI 114, ¶73, 283 Wis. 2d 384, 700 N.W.2d 27 (plurality 
opinion) (citing Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d at 612).  If the alleged 
victim does consent, however, the court reviews the records in 
camera 
to 
ascertain 
whether 
they 
contain 
"any 
relevant 
information that is 'material' to the defense of the accused."  
No.  2011AP2680-CR.akz 
 
8 
 
Solberg, 211 Wis. 2d at 386 (citation omitted).  The standard 
applied by the court during its in camera review is even more 
demanding than the initial burden that must be met by the 
defendant to obtain that review.  See Green, 253 Wis. 2d 356, 
¶31. 
¶197 If the records at issue do not contain information 
meeting the standard just described, no information is released 
to the defendant.  Solberg, 211 Wis. 2d at 387.  If the records 
do contain relevant information material to the defense of the 
accused, the information is disclosed to the defendant, unless 
the alleged victim refuses to authorize disclosure.  Id. at 386-
87.3  
¶198 The 
Shiffra-Green 
framework, 
which 
"giv[es] 
the 
defendant an opportunity to have the circuit court conduct an 
[in camera] review of the privileged records, while still 
allowing the patient to preclude that review, addresses both the 
interests of the defendant and the patient."  Id. at 387 
(citation omitted).  "Under the due process clause, criminal 
defendants must be given a meaningful opportunity to present a 
complete defense."  Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d at 605 (citation 
omitted).  On the other hand, "[t]he public policy underpinning 
                                                 
3 Of course, if any information is released, the court still 
retains 
"reasonable 
control 
over 
the 
mode 
and 
order 
of 
interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence" at trial.  Wis. 
Stat. § 906.11.  The court has the duty to exercise this control 
in order to "[m]ake the interrogation and presentation effective 
for 
the 
ascertainment 
of 
the 
truth[;] 
[a]void 
needless 
consumption of time[; and] [p]rotect witnesses from harassment 
or undue embarrassment."  Id. 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.akz 
 
9 
 
the [Wis. Stat. § 905.04] privilege is to encourage patients to 
freely 
and 
candidly 
discuss 
medical 
concerns 
with 
their 
physicians 
by 
ensuring 
that 
those 
concerns 
will 
not 
unnecessarily be disclosed to a third person."  Solberg, 211 
Wis. 2d at 387 (citation omitted).  Thus, there is a quadruple-
layer of protection in place for privilege-holders: a privilege-
holder's consent to disclosure is required at two stages (prior 
to in camera review and after in camera review), the defendant 
must make the challenging Green showing before he is granted in 
camera review of privileged records, and the circuit court 
applies an even stricter standard to its in camera review of 
those records before determining whether any evidence should be 
disclosed to the defendant. 
¶199 The existing procedure "strikes an appropriate balance 
between the defendant's due process right to be given a 
meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense and the 
policy 
interests 
underlying 
the 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ [905.04(2)] 
privilege."  Id.  First, fishing expeditions by the defense are 
prohibited.  Green, 253 Wis. 2d 356, ¶33.  Second, if the 
privilege holder does not wish to disclose the records, they 
will not be disclosed.  See Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d at 612.  Third, 
should a circuit court conclude that a defendant makes a Green 
preliminary showing for an in camera review, and should the 
privilege-holder refuse to allow the court to conduct that 
review, a defendant's right to a fair trial is safeguarded by 
barring the privilege-holder's testimony at trial.  Id.  After 
all, the defendant has by that time "demonstrat[ed] a reasonable 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.akz 
 
10 
 
likelihood 
that 
the 
[privilege-holder's] 
records 
contain 
relevant information necessary to a determination of guilt or 
innocence and . . . not merely cumulative to other evidence 
available to the defendant."  Green, 253 Wis. 2d 356, ¶34 
(emphases added).  "Under the circumstances," preclusion of the 
privilege-holder's testimony is warranted as "the only method of 
protecting [the defendant's] right to a fair trial."  Shiffra, 
175 Wis. 2d at 612. 
¶200 Regrettably, there are occasions when defendants are 
wrongfully accused of committing a sexual assault.  In those 
instances, the alleged victim would be the most likely to refuse 
access to those records, particularly if exculpatory information 
exists within those records.  Unfortunately, the lead opinion 
falls short of contemplating this scenario when it bars access 
to an alleged victim's privileged, privately-held records no 
matter the circumstances.  Simply stated, the procedure outlined 
by the lead opinion forecloses any opportunity to rebut the 
allegations through the use of an alleged victim's records, even 
when the defendant meets the high standard required by Green.4  
                                                 
4 In cases such as this one where the defendant has met the 
significant hurdles established in the Green standard and the 
privilege-holder refuses to consent to in camera review, the 
lead 
opinion 
has 
nonetheless 
concluded 
that 
otherwise 
accessible, 
potentially 
exculpatory 
evidence 
has 
constitutionally been placed outside of the reach of the 
defendant.  The lead opinion dismisses our concern over the 
potential violation of the defendant's constitutional rights, 
tacitly characterizing it as an emotional appeal.  If the 
constitutional right to present a defense has emotional appeal, 
it is because I feel strongly that our constitutional rights 
ought to be protected.  The lead opinion's assurances that 
somehow the criminal justice system otherwise prevents wrongful 
(continued) 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.akz 
 
11 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
convictions, in the absence of the Shiffra-Green framework, ring 
hollow.  
The lead opinion concludes that meaningful constitutional 
protections are afforded to a defendant, because a defendant has 
certain general safeguards, such as a presumption of innocence 
and the right to an adversarial process.  The lead opinion 
concludes 
that 
these 
protections 
alone 
avert 
erroneous 
convictions, but these protections alone do not directly address 
the need for a defendant to access privileged, privately-held 
records in order, for example, to present a meaningful defense 
or adequately cross-examine——fundamental to the adversarial 
process.  True, the presumption of innocence is a safeguard, in 
the same way that providing defendants with a trial in the first 
place is a safeguard: necessary, important, but ultimately not 
germane to the specific concern in these types of cases: a 
privilege-holder's refusal to consent to in camera review of 
privileged, privately-held records reasonably likely to contain 
relevant information necessary to a determination of the 
defendant's guilt or innocence and not merely cumulative to 
other evidence available to the defendant.  State v. Green, 2002 
WI 68, ¶19, 253 Wis. 2d 356, 646 N.W.2d 298   
The lead opinion urges trust in our adversary legal system, 
but 
our 
"adversary 
legal 
system . . . depends 
upon 
the 
availability of relevant evidence," Nixon v. Administrator of 
General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 477 (1977), to say nothing of 
the availability of "information necessary to a determination of 
guilt or innocence and . . . not merely cumulative to other 
evidence available to the defendant."  Green, 253 Wis. 2d 356, 
¶34.  I acknowledge the grave importance of ensuring the privacy 
of the records at issue in this case.  At the same time, when 
evidence 
potentially 
so 
relevant 
to 
the 
question 
of 
a 
defendant's guilt is placed out of the defendant's reach, there 
is legitimate cause for concern.  We do expect juries to reach 
valid results, but they are unable to do so when they are only 
presented with the evidence favorable to one side of a 
prosecution.  This is what causes individuals to lose, not gain, 
faith in the criminal justice system. 
Additionally, the lead opinion explains that because in 
cases such as the current one the prosecution does not have 
access to a complainant's privileged mental health care records 
either, defendants are not placed in a disadvantageous position 
vis-à-vis the State.  But Wisconsin case law has already 
addressed this argument:  
(continued) 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.akz 
 
12 
 
Is it so clear that this procedure is preferable to the one that 
has been in place for over two decades?  I think not.  
¶201 The 
Shiffra-Green 
framework 
provides 
a 
workable 
solution to a difficult problem.  Perhaps suggesting its 
intrinsic equity, the framework forces every party involved——the 
defendant, the privilege-holder, the State——to shoulder a burden 
of some kind.  The defendant must meet the required evidentiary 
                                                                                                                                                             
In those situations when the State does not have 
access to the records because the witness has asserted 
a health care provider privilege, . . . the State 
believes that the requirement for an in camera review 
set out in Ritchie should not apply. . . .  [The 
State] sees no potential unfairness in such situations 
because neither the State nor the defendant can use 
the records.  The playing field is kept completely 
level.  
The State, however, misconstrues the reasoning of 
Ritchie and Shiffra.  These decisions are not about 
keeping a level playing field between the State and 
the defendant.  Rather, these decisions attempt to 
strike a balance between the witness's right to 
privacy, which is embodied in the health care provider 
privileges, and the truth-seeking function of our 
courts, which is rooted in the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  
State v. Behnke, 203 Wis. 2d 43, 55-56, 553 N.W.2d 265 (Ct. App. 
1996) (citation omitted). 
Finally, the lead opinion refers to the State's obligation 
under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and to the 
possibility that future legislative or judicial developments 
will provide a new justification for use of the Shiffra-Green 
framework.  Again, these considerations do not address the 
pressing concern in this case: a privilege-holder's refusal to 
consent to in camera review of currently-privileged, privately-
held records reasonably likely to contain relevant information 
necessary to a determination of the defendant's guilt or 
innocence and not merely cumulative to other evidence available 
to the defendant.  Green, 253 Wis. 2d 356, ¶19. 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.akz 
 
13 
 
showings, is never allowed his own review of the records at 
issue prior to final disclosure, and may nevertheless lose 
access to the records if the privilege-holder does not consent 
to disclosure.  The privilege-holder must choose between limited 
disclosure of privileged evidence which is reasonably likely to 
contain relevant, non-cumulative information necessary to a 
determination 
of 
the 
defendant's 
guilt 
or 
innocence 
and 
preclusion of her testimony at trial.  Finally, the State faces 
the possibility that its prosecution will be "hampered by a 
witness who strives to maintain privacy."  Behnke, 203 Wis. 2d 
at 55.   
¶202 The State has lodged understandable complaints against 
the effect the Shiffra-Green framework has on the prosecution of 
its cases.  
We . . . acknowledge that the "costs" of the 
health 
care 
provider 
privileges 
are 
principally 
shifted to the State.  In a few circumstances, the 
State may have to completely forgo a case when one of 
its witnesses refuses to turn over the information.  
Nonetheless, the Due Process Clause guarantees the 
defendant a right to a trial based on truth seeking 
which can only be accomplished by allowing him or her 
to present a complete defense.  The Due Process Clause 
thus prevents the State from shifting the costs 
associated with the health care provider privileges to 
criminal defendants. . . .  
The State also complains about the practical 
effects of the Shiffra decision on its ability to 
prosecute a case.  It believes that forcing the State 
to pressure its witness into releasing the information 
or forgoing this witness's testimony is not fair.  The 
State asserts that it should not be forced to make its 
witness reveal private information.  And a witness, 
most likely the accuser, should not be forced to 
disclose private and personal information to have the 
defendant brought to justice.  
No.  2011AP2680-CR.akz 
 
14 
 
These complaints, however, were addressed in 
Shiffra, and the remedy set out in that case is still 
valid.  Before the defendant is allowed access to 
these records and the witness's privacy is sacrificed, 
and before the State is faced with the decision of 
whether it can forgo the witness and still make its 
case, the records must pass through a private and 
confidential review in the trial court's chambers.  We 
have complete confidence in this state's trial judges 
to accurately and fairly balance the witness's right 
to privacy and the defendant's right to a trial where 
every piece of evidence material to determining the 
truth will be considered.  The State overestimates the 
burden that Shiffra places on it and its witnesses. 
Behnke, 203 Wis. 2d at 56-57 (citations omitted).  
¶203 The Behnke court's discussion provides a window into 
the State's view of the matter.  The State again asks this court 
to abandon the Shiffra-Green framework by overturning Shiffra or 
by modifying Shiffra's holding to allow for remedies other than 
preclusion of the privilege-holder's testimony.  Certain of my 
colleagues would grant the State's request.  I would not and 
will now discuss why the court should not now abandon the 
Shiffra-Green framework. 
 
II.  THIS COURT SHOULD NOT ABANDON THE SHIFFRA-GREEN FRAMEWORK. 
 
A.  This Court Should Not Overrule Shiffra. 
¶204 The State and the lead opinion would upend over two 
decades of precedent by overruling Shiffra, despite the fact 
that this court has already explicitly refused to do so.  Green, 
253 Wis. 2d 356, ¶21 n.4.5  What has changed since Green?:  
                                                 
5 To put the time period during which Wisconsin courts have 
relied on Shiffra in perspective, I note that Shiffra was 
decided the same year as Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.akz 
 
15 
 
Nothing that has any bearing on the legal questions in this 
case.  What should now cause us to uproot decades of precedent?  
Such unpredictability on the part of this court is inimical to 
the rule of law.  Johnson Controls, 264 Wis. 2d 60, ¶94 
("[R]espect for prior decisions is fundamental to the rule of 
law.").  When our law "is open to revision in every case, 
'deciding cases becomes a mere exercise of judicial will, with 
arbitrary and unpredictable results.'"  Id. (citation omitted).  
Although often repeated, it is appropriate to again set out the 
important rationales for stare decisis:   
[1] the desirability that the law furnish a clear 
guide for conduct of individuals, to enable them to 
plan their affairs with assurance against untoward 
surprise; [2] the importance of furthering fair and 
expeditious adjudication by eliminating the need to 
relitigate every relevant proposition in every case; 
and [3] the necessity of maintaining public faith in 
the judiciary as a source of impersonal and reasoned 
judgments. 
Id., 
¶95 
(citation 
omitted). 
 
Stare 
decisis 
"promotes 
evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal 
principles . . . and contributes to the actual and perceived 
integrity of the judicial process."  Id. (citation omitted).  
Twice now in the past few years this court has wrestled with the 
problem at issue in this case and created confusion in the lower 
courts.  Johnson, 348 Wis. 2d 450 (per curiam), reconsideration 
granted, 353 Wis. 2d 119 (per curiam).  All the more reason to 
follow precedent today. 
¶205 "[S]pecial justification is required to overturn prior 
decisions," and "[t]he reasons for rejecting any established 
rule of law must always be weighed against" the rationales 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.akz 
 
16 
 
underlying stare decisis.  Johnson Controls, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 
¶¶95-96.  When considering overturning prior case law, this 
court may examine a series of concerns: (1) whether there have 
been "changes or developments in the law [which] have undermined 
the rationale behind a decision"; (2) whether there is "a need 
to make a decision correspond to newly ascertained facts"; (3) 
whether there has been "a showing that the precedent has become 
detrimental to coherence and consistency in the law"; (4) 
"whether the prior decision is unsound in principle"; (5) 
"whether [the prior decision] is unworkable in practice"; (6) 
"whether reliance interests are implicated"; (7) "whether the 
prior case was correctly decided"; and (8) "whether it has 
produced a settled body of law."  Id., ¶¶98-99 (citations 
omitted).  
¶206 Most, if not all, of these considerations counsel 
against overturning Shiffra and Green.  But the State and the 
lead opinion share the same fundamental complaint with regard to 
the 
Shiffra-Green 
framework: 
they 
believe 
that 
Shiffra 
improperly interpreted and applied the case upon which it 
principally relied, Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987).  
Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d at 603.  In Ritchie the Supreme Court 
relied on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and other case law for 
its conclusion that the trial court in that case was required to 
review in camera confidential records in the hands of a state 
protective service agency in order to determine whether the 
records contained information that "probably would have changed 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.akz 
 
17 
 
the outcome" of a criminal defendant's trial.  Ritchie, 480 U.S. 
at 43, 57-58.  
¶207 Specifically, the lead opinion argues that Shiffra 
represents an unwarranted application of Ritchie, because: (1) 
Shiffra involved privileged records, whereas Ritchie involved 
confidential records; (2) Wis. Stat. § 905.04(2) contains no 
exception allowing for release by court order, whereas the 
statute at issue in Ritchie did contain such an exception; and 
(3) the records in Shiffra were held by a private entity, 
whereas the records in Ritchie were held by a state protective 
service agency "charged with investigating cases of suspected 
mistreatment and neglect."  Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 43.  This last 
distinction is essentially echoed by the State.  
¶208 Before turning to these objections, let us assume for 
a moment that the State and the lead opinion are correct that 
Shiffra was wrong to premise its holding on Ritchie.  
Respecting stare decisis means sticking to some 
wrong decisions.  The doctrine rests on the idea, as 
Justice Brandeis famously wrote, that it is usually 
"more important that the applicable rule of law be 
settled than that it be settled right."  Indeed, stare 
decisis has consequence only to the extent it sustains 
incorrect decisions; correct judgments have no need 
for that principle to prop them up.  Accordingly, an 
argument that we got something wrong——even a good 
argument to that effect——cannot by itself justify 
scrapping settled precedent.  Or otherwise said, it is 
not alone sufficient that we would decide a case 
differently now than we did then.  To reverse course, 
we require as well what we have termed a "special 
justification"——over and above the belief "that the 
precedent was wrongly decided." 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.akz 
 
18 
 
Kimble v. Marvel Entm't, LLC, 576 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 
2409  (2015) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).6  In 2002 the 
                                                 
6 The lead opinion's suggestion that this statement of law 
is inapplicable in a constitutional case is not correct.  In the 
section of Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 576 U.S. ___, 
135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015), cited above, the Supreme Court discussed 
stare decisis in general terms and in fact cited Payne v. 
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827-28 (1991), a constitutional case, 
in the first paragraph of that section.  Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 
2409 (citation omitted).  The Court also discussed stare decisis 
in the context of decisions interpreting statutes.  This latter 
discussion is the one quoted by the lead opinion.  See id.  
For example, in Dickerson v. United States, the Supreme 
Court considered legislation bearing on Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436 (1966), and considered whether it should overrule that 
case. Dickerson, 530 U.S. 428, 431-32 (2000).  The Court 
concluded: "We hold that Miranda, being a constitutional 
decision of this Court, may not be in effect overruled by an Act 
of Congress, and we decline to overrule Miranda ourselves."  Id. 
at 432. A portion of the Dickerson Court's discussion of stare 
decisis is informative for purposes of this case: 
 
Whether or not we would agree with Miranda's 
reasoning and its resulting rule, were we addressing 
the issue in the first instance, the principles of 
stare decisis weigh heavily against overruling it now.  
See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 304, 
100 S. Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980) (Burger, C.J., 
concurring in judgment) ("The meaning of Miranda has 
become reasonably clear and law enforcement practices 
have adjusted to its strictures; I would neither 
overrule Miranda, disparage it, nor extend it at this 
late date.").  While "'stare decisis is not an 
inexorable 
command,'" 
particularly 
when 
we 
are 
interpreting the Constitution, "even in constitutional 
cases, the doctrine carries such persuasive force that 
we have always required a departure from precedent to 
be supported by some 'special justification.'"   
We do not think there is such justification for 
overruling Miranda.   
Id. at 443 (some citations omitted) (emphasis added).  
(continued) 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.akz 
 
19 
 
Green court understood that fact.  Green, 253 Wis. 2d 356, ¶21 
n.4 ("[T]his court [has] recognized the validity of Shiffra in 
State v. Solberg, 211 Wis. 2d 372, 386-87, 564 N.W.2d 775 
(1997), and in State v. Rizzo, 2002 WI 20, ¶53, 250 Wis. 2d 407, 
640 N.W.2d 93.  We will not depart from this precedent.").  
¶209 Thus, although the State and the lead opinion have 
undeniably identified distinctions between Shiffra and Ritchie, 
the relevant question is whether these distinctions warrant 
upheaval of a "settled body of law."7  Johnson Controls, 264 
Wis. 2d 60, ¶99; see Daniel D. Blinka, The Shiffra Procedures: 
Production of a Witness's Privileged Health Care Records, 7 Wis. 
Prac., 
Wis. 
Evidence 
§ 511.2 
(discussing 
"the 
Shiffra 
doctrine"); see also Wisconsin District Attorneys Association, 
Wisconsin Prosecutor's Domestic Abuse Reference Book, ch. 13 (2d 
ed. 2012) ("Discovery of Medical Records of Victims and 
Witnesses: Shiffra-Green and Related Cases").  
¶210 Turning to the merits of the objections raised:  Was 
Shiffra 
"unsound 
in 
principle"? 
 
Johnson 
Controls, 
264 
Wis. 2d 60, ¶99.  That is, was it wrong to extend the reasoning 
                                                                                                                                                             
Shiffra-Green has striking similarities to the development 
of Miranda.  Both developed out of underlying constitutional 
principles rather than the words of the constitution itself.  
Given the above precedent, consider the words "Shiffra-Green" in 
place of "Miranda" in the above quotation to analyze whether 
stare decisis applies in the case at issue.  
7 For instance, the Shiffra court itself recognized that it 
was using Ritchie's postconviction analysis in a pretrial 
context, and thus already was not simply engaged in a 
straightforward application of that case.  See State v. Shiffra, 
175 Wis. 2d 600, 606-09, 499 N.W.2d 719 (Ct. App. 1993). 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.akz 
 
20 
 
in Ritchie to privately-held records?  Nationwide, the jury is 
still out on that question: 
Since 
the 
due 
process 
obligation 
of 
the 
prosecution under Brady extends only to evidence 
within its control, an issue left open in Ritchie is 
whether a subpoena . . . directed to a private party 
or an unrelated governmental agency carries similar 
constitutional protection.  Many lower courts, in 
dealing with records similar to those involved in 
Ritchie, have ordered the same type of in camera 
review as required there without regard to whether the 
records were sought from a related state agency or a 
private hospital. 
Wayne R. LaFave et al., 6 Criminal Procedure § 24.3(f) & n.207 
(4th ed. 2015) (collecting cases); Burns v. State, 968 A.2d 
1012, 1024–25 & n.41 (Del. 2009) (same).  Additionally, at least 
one state court has allowed access to the type of information at 
issue on constitutional grounds unrelated to the Due Process 
Clause, which is why the lead opinion undertakes the Herculean 
task of negating any other constitutional basis for Shiffra in 
order to demonstrate that Shiffra is indeed "unsound in 
principle."  See Commonwealth v. Barroso, 122 S.W.3d 554, 561 
(Ky. 2003) ("[W]e conclude that the Compulsory Process Clause 
affords a criminal defendant the right to obtain and present 
exculpatory evidence, including impeachment evidence, in the 
possession of a third party that would otherwise be subject to 
the psychotherapist-patient privilege.").  One might think that 
the unsettled nature of the question across the country would 
counsel restraint when considering upsetting the settled case 
law on the question in Wisconsin, pending further guidance from 
the Supreme Court on the issue.  But the State and the lead 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.akz 
 
21 
 
opinion are confident that the Shiffra and Green courts got it 
so wrong that drastic action is needed.  
¶211 The lead opinion's distinctions between Ritchie and 
Shiffra do not inescapably lead to the conclusion that Shiffra 
must be overruled.  For example, the lead opinion makes much of 
the fact that the statute at issue in Ritchie contained an 
exception allowing an agency to disclose records at issue to a 
"court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to a court order."  
Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 44.  It is true that Wis. Stat. § 905.04 
does not contain such an exception.  But neither is the statute 
one that grants a private party "the absolute authority to 
shield its files from all eyes."  Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 57.  In 
fact, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 905.04 
currently 
contains 
about 
11 
exceptions.  Wis. Stat. § 905.04(4) ("Exceptions").8  The state 
statute which the Ritchie court cited as an example of an 
"unqualified 
statutory 
privilege" 
contained 
no 
exceptions.  
Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 57 (citing 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5945.1(b)). 
¶212 In a footnote, the Ritchie court "express[ed] no 
opinion on whether the result in this case would have been 
different if the statute had protected the [protective service 
agency's] files from disclosure to anyone, including law-
enforcement and judicial personnel."  Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 57 
n.14.  Wisconsin Stat. § 905.04 allows disclosure to both law-
enforcement and judicial personnel.  See, e.g. Wis. Stat. 
                                                 
8 Coincidentally, the statute at issue in Ritchie also 
contained 11 exceptions.  Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 
43 (1987). 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.akz 
 
22 
 
§ 905.04(4)(d) ("There is no privilege in trials for homicide 
when the disclosure relates directly to the facts or immediate 
circumstances of the homicide."); Wis. Stat. § 905.04(4)(e)2m. 
("There is no privilege for information contained in a report of 
child abuse or neglect that is provided under s. 48.981(3).").  
And even if the statute did not allow such disclosure, the 
Ritchie 
court 
"express[ed] 
no 
opinion" 
on 
the 
potential 
distinction.  Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 57 n.14.  This hardly 
supports a conclusion that Shiffra was "unsound in principle" in 
extending Ritchie's principles to the facts at issue in that 
case.9 
¶213 Second, 
the 
lead 
opinion's 
confidentiality-vs.-
privilege distinction is not one that was emphasized by the 
Ritchie court.  And it is far from clear that the Ritchie 
court's analysis would have been any different had the statute 
at issue been a privilege statute.  See, e.g., Ritchie, 480 U.S. 
at 43 ("[The protective service agency] refused to comply with 
the subpoena, claiming that the records were privileged under 
Pennsylvania law."); id. at 52 (plurality opinion) (stating that 
a statute in a prior case rendered information presumptively 
confidential, then referring to that statute as creating a 
                                                 
9 It bears repeating here that Shiffra and Green do not 
create a statutory exception to a privilege where one does not 
exist.  The cases do not create blanket authorization for in 
camera review of privileged materials.  Instead, should the 
proper showing be made, and should a privilege-holder refuse to 
consent to in camera review, the privilege-holder is barred from 
testimony at trial and her privilege remains intact.  See 
Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d at 612. 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.akz 
 
23 
 
statutory privilege); id. at 57 ("The Commonwealth, however, 
argues that no materiality inquiry is required, because a 
statute renders the contents of the file privileged.").  And 
indeed, we are not the only jurisdiction that has failed to give 
the distinction dispositive weight.  Burns, 968 A.2d at 1024.  
The lead opinion's purported distinction does not rise to the 
level of a "special justification" warranting the elimination of 
20 years of Wisconsin case law.  
¶214 Finally, reading the lead opinion, one almost comes 
away with the conclusion that Shiffra relied directly on Brady 
rather than on Ritchie.10  Nowhere does the Ritchie court state, 
as the lead opinion hesitantly admits, that the fact that the 
protective 
service 
agency 
in 
that 
case 
was 
tasked 
with 
investigating "cases of suspected [child] mistreatment and 
neglect" thereby made it an arm of the prosecution.  Indeed, the 
Supreme Court cases cited by the lead opinion for its reasoning 
on this point were not published until years after Ritchie, and 
thus were not in the contemplation of the Ritchie court.  The 
lead opinion's interpretation of Ritchie may "make[] sense" in 
retrospect, but it does not banish all doubt that the Ritchie 
court might have had broader principles in mind at the time it 
decided its opinion.  
                                                 
10 In fact, during the Ritchie court's discussion of whether 
the criminal defendant in that case was "entitled to have the 
[protective service agency] file reviewed by the trial court to 
determine whether it contains information that probably would 
have changed the outcome of his trial," the court cited Brady 
exactly one time.  Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 57. 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.akz 
 
24 
 
¶215 To be sure, Ritchie relied on principles taken from 
Brady.  Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 57; see District Attorney's Office 
for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 61 (2009) 
("The Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on the prosecutorial 
duty to disclose exculpatory evidence recognized in Pennsylvania 
v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987), and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 
83 (1963).").  But it is not evident that that necessarily 
forecloses 
application 
of 
Ritchie 
to 
a 
broader 
set 
of 
circumstances.  See, e.g., Burns, 968 A.2d at 1024-25 ("Although 
Ritchie involved the disclosure of records in the possession of 
the State, nothing in the Ritchie Court's holding or analysis 
limits its application to records held by the State. . . .  From 
the standpoint of the privilege holder it is immaterial whether 
the holder's therapy records are in the possession of a private 
party or the State.  In either circumstance, the privilege 
holder has the identical interest in non-disclosure."); cf. 
State v. Cressey, 628 A.2d 696, 703 (N.H. 1993) (citing State v. 
Gagne, 612 A.2d 899 (N.H. 1992)) ("Gagne did not distinguish 
between the privileged records of a State agency and the 
privileged records of a private organization.  The rationale in 
Gagne, balancing the rights of a criminal defendant against the 
interests and benefits of confidentiality, applies equally in 
both cases.  A record is no less privileged simply because it 
belongs to a State agency.  Likewise, a defendant's rights are 
no less worthy of protection simply because he seeks information 
maintained by a non-public entity."). 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.akz 
 
25 
 
¶216 Our court of appeals——in one of the numerous cases the 
lead opinion would abrogate today——has rejected the notion that 
Ritchie and Shiffra are about "keeping a level playing field 
between the State and the defendant."  Behnke, 203 Wis. 2d at 
55-56.  Instead, "these decisions attempt to strike a balance 
between the witness's right to privacy, which is embodied in the 
health care provider privileges, and the truth-seeking function 
of our courts, which is rooted in the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment."  Id.  Although the lead opinion reads 
Ritchie as a more-or-less clear-cut application of Brady, I am 
not convinced that this is the only reasonable reading of the 
Ritchie court's brief and enigmatic analysis, such that Shiffra 
must be overruled.  See Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 57-58.11  The 
question is less about which position is correct, and more about 
whether 
the 
mere 
possibility 
of 
error 
justifies 
such 
a 
monumental shift in Wisconsin law.  See Johnson Controls, 264 
Wis. 2d 60, ¶¶94-96. 
                                                 
11 Other 
jurisdictions 
appear 
to 
be 
in 
accord 
with 
Wisconsin's current approach.  See Clifford F. Fishman, Defense 
Access to a Prosecution Witness's Psychotherapy or Counseling 
Records, 86 Or. L. Rev. 1, 18 (2007) ("Where a defendant has 
established 
a 
constitutional 
right 
to 
the 
disclosure 
of 
privileged information, but the statutory privilege is absolute 
on its face, some courts have held that the witness retains the 
privilege: a court cannot disclose unless the witness waives the 
privilege.  Absent such a waiver, if the defendant adequately 
demonstrates the need for an in camera review or disclosure of 
the records, the witness is precluded from testifying.  If he or 
she has already testified, his or her testimony is stricken from 
the record.  States following this approach include Connecticut, 
Michigan, Nebraska, New Mexico, Wisconsin, and South Dakota" 
(footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).). 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.akz 
 
26 
 
B.  This Court Should Not Modify Shiffra. 
¶217 If Shiffra is not overturned, the State asks this 
court to modify Shiffra to allow for alternative remedies when a 
defendant makes the showing required by Green and the privilege-
holder refuses to allow the circuit court to conduct an in 
camera review of the privilege-holder's records.  Certain of the 
justices on this court agree with the State's suggestion.  I am 
not yet convinced that we should modify Shiffra. 
¶218 To be clear, when the Shiffra court stated that 
"[u]nder the circumstances, the only method of protecting 
Shiffra's right to a fair trial was to suppress [the privilege-
holder's] testimony if she refused to disclose her records," it 
meant that no other method is available in these types of  
cases——"[i]n 
this 
situation, 
no 
other 
sanction 
would 
be 
appropriate."  Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d at 612.12  As a preliminary 
                                                 
12 The court of appeals below correctly explained:  
[W]e agree with the circuit court that we are bound by 
plain language in Shiffra that forecloses alternative 
remedies. 
 . . .  
Shiffra's use of "In this situation" and "Under the 
circumstances," 
read 
in 
context, 
is 
plainly 
a 
reference to the "situation" or "circumstance" in 
which a defendant makes the required showing and the 
victim refuses to authorize release of the records for 
an in camera review.  There is nothing in Shiffra 
suggesting that the use of this language was meant to 
restrict the holding to some unspecified subset of 
situations or circumstances in which a defendant makes 
the required showing and the victim refuses to release 
records.  
(continued) 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.akz 
 
27 
 
matter, the discussion in Shiffra thus essentially disposes of 
the State's arguments that there are other remedies available, 
namely: (1) use of an exception in a statute not at issue, Wis. 
Stat. § 146.82(2)(a)4., to compel production of privileged 
records; and (2) use of a case-by-case balancing test to 
determine whether a privilege-holder should be allowed to 
testify even after refusing to disclose privileged records. 
¶219 More specifically, the State's first proposed solution 
is plainly nothing more than wishful thinking.  The State would 
bypass the privilege-holder's refusal to allow in camera  
review——as is the privilege-holder's right under Wis. Stat. 
§ 905.04(2)——by using an exception to Wis. Stat. § 146.82, 
"Confidentiality of patient health care records." Section 
146.82(2)(a)4. allows access to patient healthcare records 
rendered confidential by that statute "without informed consent" 
                                                                                                                                                             
State v. Lynch, 2015 WI App 2, ¶¶42-43, 359 Wis. 2d 482, 859 
N.W.2d 125. 
I recognize that Shiffra's author has voiced, in an 
unpublished dissent, his disagreement with this interpretation 
of Shiffra.  State v. Johnson, No. 2011AP2864-CRAC, unpublished 
slip op., ¶24 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2012), aff'g as modified 
by 2013 WI 59, 348 Wis. 2d 450, 832 N.W.2d 609.  Ignoring other 
problems with reliance on this type of post-decision "judicial 
history," I note that two other judges joined the Shiffra 
opinion and may have had a different view of the case.  I also 
note that both the majority in the unpublished Johnson case and 
the court of appeals below disagree with the Johnson dissent's 
reading of Shiffra.  See Johnson, unpublished slip op., ¶¶16-18; 
Lynch, 359 Wis. 2d 482, ¶¶42-43.  I agree with these five judges 
that Shiffra's language does not admit of any alternative 
remedies. 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.akz 
 
28 
 
pursuant 
to 
"a 
lawful 
order 
of 
a 
court 
of 
record."  
§ 146.82(2)(a)4. 
¶220 It would seem to go without saying that an exception 
in one statute ordinarily does not operate as an exception in 
another statute.  Wisconsin Stat. § 146.82 currently contains 
almost two dozen exceptions.  Wis. Stat. § 146.82(2).  Should 
all of them operate as exceptions to Wis. Stat. § 905.04(2)?  
Such an outcome could only be achieved by legislating words into 
the statutory text. 
¶221 The fact that Wis. Stat. § 905.04(2) and Wis. Stat. 
§ 146.82 may be in pari materia does not alter the analysis.  
"[S]tatutes which are in pari materia are to be read together 
and harmonized where that is possible."  State v. Walker, 75 
Wis. 2d 93, 102, 248 N.W.2d 410 (1977) (citation omitted); see 
also In pari materia, Black's Law Dictionary 911 (10th ed. 2014) 
("It is a canon of construction that statutes that are in pari 
materia may be construed together, so that inconsistencies in 
one statute may be resolved by looking at another statute on the 
same subject.").  But there is nothing to harmonize here; the 
two statutes are consistent with each other.  There might be 
legitimate reasons for the existence of a judicial-order 
exception in one statute but not the other.  See, e.g., State v. 
Denis L. R., 2005 WI 110, ¶57 n.21, 283 Wis. 2d 358, 699 
N.W.2d 154 (Wis. Stat. § 905.04 and Wis. Stat. § 146.82 "must be 
read together in pari materia to avoid any conflicts" (emphasis 
added).).  Further, there is no ambiguity to resolve in Wis. 
Stat. § 905.04(2) for purposes of this case that would require 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.akz 
 
29 
 
reference to Wis. Stat. § 146.82; Wisconsin Stat. § 905.04(2) is 
clear in its effect.  We cannot ignore the plain language of the 
privilege statute and create an exception where none exists 
simply to reach a desired result.  That is why, under the 
Shiffra-Green framework, if the privilege-holder does not 
consent to review of her records, those records are not 
reviewed——even if a defendant makes a Green showing.13 
¶222 The State's second proposed remedy is for courts to 
"balance," 
in 
each 
individual 
case, 
"the 
defendant's 
constitutional rights against the witness's right to privacy in 
her privileged records" and against the State's interests.  Put 
differently, the State argues that after a defendant makes a 
Green showing and the privilege-holder refuses to consent to 
review of her records, courts should conduct a balancing 
                                                 
13 At one point in its brief the State characterizes use of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 146.82(2)(a)4. 
as 
a 
"graft[ing]" 
of 
a 
"constitutional exception" to Wis. Stat. § 905.04.  The State 
seems to be arguing that § 905.04 would be unconstitutional as 
applied in certain cases because it does not contain an 
exception allowing the defendant access to privileged records.  
One of the benefits of the Shiffra-Green framework is that 
it alleviates concerns about the protection of the defendant's 
constitutional rights without requiring consideration of the 
potential invalidation of Wis. Stat. § 905.04.  Cf. Ayotte v. 
Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 328 (2006) 
("Generally speaking, when confronting a constitutional flaw in 
a statute, we try to limit the solution to the problem. . . . 
[W]e try not to nullify more of a legislature's work than is 
necessary, for we know that '[a] ruling of unconstitutionality 
frustrates the intent of the elected representatives of the 
people'" (citation omitted).); Shelby County, Ala. v. Holder, 
570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) ("Striking down an 
Act of Congress 'is the gravest and most delicate duty that this 
Court is called on to perform'" (citation omitted).). 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.akz 
 
30 
 
analysis in order to determine whether the privilege-holder may 
nonetheless testify.  The problem with this suggestion is that 
this 
balancing 
is 
already 
built 
into 
the 
Shiffra-Green 
framework.  To be clear, the defendant is not entitled to a 
fishing expedition of the alleged victim's privileged records.  
In each case, in order to establish any claim to privileged 
records, a defendant must "set forth, in good faith, a specific 
factual basis demonstrating a reasonable likelihood that the 
records 
contain 
relevant 
information 
necessary 
to 
a 
determination 
of 
guilt 
or 
innocence 
and . . . not 
merely 
cumulative to other evidence available to the defendant."  
Green, 253 Wis. 2d 356, ¶34.  The interests of a defendant who 
has made this showing are weightier than the interests of a 
defendant who has not made this showing, and sufficiently 
weighty to require preclusion of a privilege-holder's testimony, 
should the privilege-holder not consent to release of the 
records.  Further weighing is unnecessary and inappropriate.  
See Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d at 608-09 (analogizing the defendant's 
initial burden to "cases in which a defendant seeks disclosure 
of a government informant's identity," and stating, "[b]oth 
situations require us to balance the defendant's constitutional 
right to a fair trial against the state's interest in protecting 
its citizens by upholding a statutorily created privilege.").  
¶223 From all that has already been said, it is easy to see 
why neither of the State's proposals provide an adequate remedy.  
The first solution ignores the privilege-holder's statutory 
right. 
 
The 
second 
solution 
ignores 
the 
defendant's 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.akz 
 
31 
 
constitutional right.  Both thus upset the careful balance 
struck by Shiffra and Green.  See Solberg, 211 Wis. 2d at 387. 
III.  THE DISPOSITION OF THIS CASE 
¶224 The amalgam of opinions in this case is potentially 
confusing. 
 
In 
Johnson, 
348 
Wis. 2d 450 
(per 
curiam), 
reconsideration granted, 353 Wis. 2d 119 (per curiam), a similar 
jumble of opinions required this court to grant a motion for 
reconsideration to clarify its earlier opinion.  See id.  
Therefore, before I conclude, I wish to discuss briefly the 
disposition of this case in order to provide guidance to the 
litigants below so that the parties need not file, as they did 
in Johnson, a motion in order to obtain clarification of the 
effect of the court's decision.  Simply stated, the parties in 
this case are in the same position as the parties in Johnson: 
the decision of the court of appeals remains the law of the 
case. 
¶225 More specifically, Justice Gableman, Chief Justice 
Roggensack, and Justice Rebecca Bradley would overrule Shiffra 
and Green and reverse the decision of the court of appeals.  
But, because these three justices do not command a majority of 
the court, Shiffra and Green are not overruled. 
¶226 Justice Ann Walsh Bradley and Justice Abrahamson would 
modify the Shiffra-Green framework and reverse the decision of 
the court of appeals.  But because these two justices do not  
No.  2011AP2680-CR.akz 
 
32 
 
command a majority of the court, the Shiffra-Green framework is 
not modified.14 
¶227 Although these five justices would all reverse the 
decision of the court of appeals, no majority agrees on a 
rationale for doing so.  As no precedent is changed by the 
opinions of these five justices, reversal of the court of 
appeals would run contrary to existing precedent, namely Shiffra 
and Green.  See Johnson, 353 Wis. 2d 119, ¶5 (per curiam) ("The 
                                                 
14 To be clear, adhering to Shiffra and Green means adhering 
to the single remedy established in that line of cases: 
preclusion 
of 
the 
privilege-holder's 
testimony 
under 
the 
circumstances specified in those cases.  As we made clear in our 
opinion granting the motion for reconsideration in Johnson, the 
privilege-holder's "decision to produce and the consequence of 
whether testimony is allowed cannot be separated."  State v. 
Johnson, 2014 WI 16, ¶5, 353 Wis. 2d 119, 846 N.W.2d 1 (per 
curiam).  By permitting additional remedies, Justice Ann Walsh 
Bradley and Justice Abrahamson would, like the members of the 
lead opinion, overrule Shiffra (albeit on grounds separate from 
those relied upon by the members of the lead opinion) and 
reverse the decision of the court of appeals below.  
Although Justice Ann Walsh Bradley and Justice Abrahamson 
agree with the court of appeals that Lynch made the Green 
showing entitling him to in camera review of the complainant's 
privileged mental health records, that part of the decision of 
the court of appeals is not disputed, is not currently before 
this court, and is not analyzed in the lead opinion.  Instead, 
this court is addressing whether the Shiffra-Green framework 
should be overruled.  
The court of appeals below applied the Shiffra-Green 
framework as established in our case law, including the single 
remedy provided for under that framework.  See Lynch, 359 
Wis. 2d 482, ¶¶39, 42.  Justice Ann Walsh Bradley and Justice 
Abrahamson would depart from that court's straightforward 
application of Shiffra and Green.  Thus, regardless of their own 
descriptions of their opinion, Justice Ann Walsh Bradley and 
Justice Abrahamson would simply reverse the decision of the 
court of appeals. 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.akz 
 
33 
 
prior per curiam was incorrect to convey that a majority could 
be reached by separating whether the medical records must be 
produced from whether the victim may testify because such a 
separation would produce new criteria that a majority of the 
court has not authorized."). 
¶228 Finally, Justice Prosser and I would today reaffirm 
Shiffra, Green, and the Shiffra-Green framework and would affirm 
the decision of the court of appeals.  But as two justices, we 
do not command a majority of the court. 
¶229 Nevertheless, "no [four] justices reach agreement to 
either affirm, reverse, or modify the decision of the court of 
appeals consistent with precedent.  Consequently, the court of 
appeals decision remains the law of the case."  Johnson, 353 
Wis. 2d 119, ¶2 (per curiam).  In other words, the law in 
Wisconsin remains as it was before the appeal to this court 
occurred.  This case should not be read to overturn or modify 
any existing law, including Shiffra and Green.15 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶230 We should tread lightly in this complex area of the 
law, upsetting precedent only when compelled to do so by some 
"special justification."  This court, myself included, can and 
does overrule precedent when appropriate.  Ultimately, however, 
it is simply not evident that Shiffra is so unsound in principle 
as to require this court to overturn it and its progeny.  The 
lead opinion wanders far beyond the confines of the briefing and 
                                                 
15 Hence, although I write in dissent, I dissent from the 
lead opinion; I agree with the functional outcome of this case. 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.akz 
 
34 
 
argument in this case, discarding the Shiffra-Green framework 
despite 
incomplete 
knowledge 
of 
the 
many 
applicable 
constitutional considerations.  The potential for error here 
(the same type of error which the State and lead opinion allege 
occurred in Shiffra) is substantial.  The fractured nature of 
today's opinion, and of the opinion in Johnson, 348 Wis. 2d 450 
(per curiam), demonstrate, at the very least, the doubtfulness 
of whether Shiffra is in fact so incoherent as to justify its 
rejection.  When there is this much turmoil regarding the 
vitality or not of a line of cases, it may well be advisable to 
err on the side of caution.  Johnson Controls, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 
¶94 ("A court's decision to depart from precedent is not to be 
made casually.  It must be explained carefully and fully to 
insure that the court is not acting in an arbitrary or 
capricious manner.  A court should not depart from precedent 
without sufficient justification.").  "Circuit courts and 
counsel have functioned well using the Shiffra/Green analysis 
for many years . . . ." Johnson, 353 Wis. 2d 119, ¶12 (per 
curiam). 
¶231 This court is more than simply the sum of its current 
members.  It is an institution that endures long after any one 
individual 
justice 
leaves 
the 
bench. 
 
The 
public 
needs 
certainty——a 
stable 
rule 
of 
law——not 
what 
amounts 
to 
a 
collection of several law review articles by the members of this 
court.  The lead opinion may, in time, be proven correct by the 
Supreme Court of the United States.  Or, this court may be 
compelled to revisit the Shiffra doctrine on the basis of future 
No.  2011AP2680-CR.akz 
 
35 
 
developments in related case law.  But the State and the lead 
opinion have not today provided the "special justification" 
required to decide that we were wrong, in Green, to hew to the 
Shiffra line of cases.  Green, 253 Wis. 2d 356, ¶21 n.4. 
¶232 I conclude that this court should not abandon the 
Shiffra-Green framework and would therefore affirm the decision 
of the court of appeals.16 
¶233 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
 
                                                 
16 The parties do not dispute whether the circuit court and 
the court of appeals were correct in concluding that Lynch met 
the Green showing for in camera review of the files at issue.  
Without briefing, I do not address the question.  However, I 
emphasize again that the Green showing is not meant to be 
perfunctory.  See Green, 253 Wis. 2d 356, ¶¶33-35.   
No.  2011AP2680-CR.akz 
 
 
 
1