Title: New Castle County Department of Land Use et al. v. University of Delaware
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 96, 2003
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: February 2, 2004

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
NEW CASTLE COUNTY 
§ 
DEPARTMENT OF LAND USE and § 
NEW CASTLE COUNTY BOARD § 
OF ASSESSMENT REVIEW,  
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellees Below,  
 
§ 
No. 96, 2003 
 
Appellants.  
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
Court Below: Superior Court 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware, in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
and for New Castle County 
UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE, 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
C.A. No. 02A-03-001 
 
Appellants Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Submitted: December 9, 2003 
Decided:    February   2, 2004 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, BERGER, STEELE and JACOBS, 
Justices, and HARTNETT, Justice (Retired),1 constituting the Court en 
Banc. 
 
Upon appeal from Superior Court.  AFFIRMED.  
 
Michael P. Kelly, A. Richard Winchester, and Katharine L. Mayer, Esquires, 
of McCarter & English, LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Mary Ann Kelly, 
Assistant County Attorney, New Castle, Delaware, for Appellees Below, 
Appellants. 
 
William E. Manning, Richard A. Forsten, and James D. Taylor, Jr., Esquires, 
of Klett Rooney Lieber & Schorling, Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellants 
Below, Appellee. 
 
JACOBS, Justice 
                                                 
1 Sitting by designation pursuant to DEL. CONST. Art. IV, § 38 and DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit.29, § 5610(q)(2)(2001) and DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 2, 4. 
 
2
The New Castle County Board of Assessment Review (the “Board”) 
and the New Castle County Department of Land Use (collectively, the 
“County”) appeal from an order of the Superior Court reversing a decision 
by the Board upholding a property tax assessment on approximately 725 
square feet of space located in the Trabant Student Center at the University 
of Delaware.  For several years the University has leased that space to 
Wilmington Savings Fund Society (“WSFS”) for use as a small branch that 
provides banking services and also furnishes a multi-purpose student 
identification card that serves as both a “MAC” and a debit card for on and 
off-campus purchases.  
The sole issue presented on this appeal is whether that leased space is 
exempt from property taxation on the ground that its use is for a “school 
purpose” within the meaning of 9 Del.C. § 8105.  That statute exempts from 
taxation “[p]roperty belonging to…any college or school and used for 
educational or school purposes….”
2  
                                                 
2 The identical issue is also raised under a parallel provision (§ 14.06.101 (2002)) of the 
New Castle County Code.  Because the language of the County ordinance is nearly 
identical to that of the state statute (except that the ordinance contains other language that 
is not relevant here), the Superior Court disposed of the appeal through analysis of the 
state statute only.  We do likewise.  
 
 
3
For the reasons next discussed, we hold that the leased space is being 
used for a “school purpose” within the contemplation of § 8105, and is tax 
exempt.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court. 
 
 
 
 
Facts 
The Student Center, which was built in 1996, is located on West Main 
Street in Newark, Delaware, on property that is owned by the University of 
Delaware.  The Student Center houses numerous uses and activities relating 
to the University and to student life in addition to that small WSFS bank 
branch.  Those uses and activities include offices for administration and 
student activities, a branch of the University bookstore, a movie 
theatre/lecture hall, a box office, multiple dining facilities (including the 
University’s Hotel and Restaurant Management training restaurant and 
various for-profit “fast food” establishments), a for-profit travel agency and 
a study lounge.  Similar services provided by third party vendors are offered 
in other facilities located throughout the University campus. 
The presence of WSFS at the Student Center was a result of the 
University issuing a Request for Proposals, which solicited proposals from 
banks to provide a card that would (1) serve as a traditional student 
identification card, (2) permit students to access MAC machines, and (3) 
enable students to use it as a debit card both on and off-campus.  WSFS was 
 
4
the only bank that responded to the Request for Proposals.3  Thereafter, the 
University and WSFS formalized their relationship in a Banking Partnership 
Agreement into which those parties entered on June 15, 1998. 
The combination ID/MAC/debit card that is issued by WSFS is a 
critical component of that Banking Partnership arrangement.  It is intended 
to eliminate the need for students to carry two cards and also to afford most, 
if not all, area merchants the opportunity to accept the University’s card.  
The card aids the University’s students by providing a safe and easy way to 
manage their money while at the same time avoiding the need for students to 
carry l
arge amounts of cash or to keep cash in their dormitory rooms.  The 
bank branch also benefits the University, because WSFS is required to offer 
accounts to University employees without any service fee for direct deposit 
of paychecks.  The services offered by the WSFS branch are one part of a 
larger array of other services that for years the University has provided to its 
                                                 
3 The University suggests, and the County does not dispute, that the reason for the poor 
response to the Request for Proposals was that students are not a bank’s preferred 
customer.  A banking relationship with approximately 11,500 students brings with it 
certain risks and costs.  College students typically have very small (or no) incomes, 
maintain small bank balances, and have a disproportionate number of overdraws on their 
accounts, all resulting in small margins for the bank serving that market.  Moreover, 
because college students do not seek loans from WSFS, that bank (and any similarly 
situated bank) will not reap the interest income that it might otherwise earn at a 
traditional branch.  Indeed, several banks were unwilling to establish a branch on the 
University campus because student accounts were viewed as not profitable. 
 
5
students, including food, travel, insurance, books and supplies, health 
services, apparel, telecommunications and entertainment. 
The WSFS branch at the Student Center is used almost exclusively by 
University Students, faculty and employees.  Although the University 
charges WSFS a nominal rent for the leased space, that nominal rent is 
designed solely to defray costs, and does not generate a “profit” for the 
University.  Initially, the University provided WSFS with only 341 square 
feet of space at no rent.  But, the services provided by WSFS proved to be so 
popular that WSFS requested, and the University agreed to lease to WSFS, 
an additional 385 square feet of space, for a nominal rent of $12 per square 
foot to defray maintenance, utilities, security, custodial services and 
insurance.  The County’s assessor agreed that that rent was less than half the 
market rent WSFS might otherwise pay.  If spread across the entire 726 
square feet of leased space, that rent averages out to $6.36 per square foot, 
which does not fully cover the University’s costs.  WSFS has informed the 
University that it is not profiting from the bank branch either.4 
At the time that the WSFS branch began operations at the Student 
Center, the County did not seek to tax the leased space.  Nor had the County 
                                                 
4 Even if there were net revenue, WSFS would be forced to share that revenue with the 
University under the Banking Partnership Agreement. 
 
 
6
ever sought to tax the branch bank that was located in the University’s 
previous student center.  In January 2001, however, the County abandoned 
its policy of exempting property owned and used by institutions of higher 
education, and for the first time sought to tax the 726 square feet of space 
under lease to WSFS at the Student Center.  As noted, the Board of 
Assessment determined that that space was not exempt from taxation and 
upheld the assessment.  The University appealed to the Superior Court, 
which reversed the Board’s determination in a Memorandum Opinion.5  The 
County then appealed the Superior Court’s reversing order to this Court. 
The Issue Presented, The 
Parties’ Contentions, And 
The Standard of Review 
This appeal presents a single issue, which is whether the space under 
lease to WSFS at the University’s Student Center is being used for a “school 
purpose” within the meaning of 9 Del. C. § 8105.  That statute pertinently 
provides that: 
Property belonging to…any college or 
school and used for educational or 
school purposes, except as otherwise 
provided, shall not be liable to 
taxation and assessment for public 
purposes by any county or other 
political subdivision of this State. 
                                                 
5 University of Delaware v. New Castle County Department of Land Use, et al., C.A. No. 
02A-03-001 (Del. Super., January 30, 2003) (“Opinion”). 
 
7
The Superior Court held that in upholding the tax assessment, the 
Board had erred by failing to accord separate meanings to the terms 
“educational” and “school” purposes.  The University did not (and does not) 
contend that the WSFS bank branch is being used for “educational” 
purposes.  Accordingly, the focus of the dispute was -- and is -- over 
whether the space leased to WSFS is being used for “school,” as opposed to 
“educational,” purposes.  The Superior Court held that it was, reasoning as 
follows: 
Here, the character of the property 
leased by the University to  [WSFS] 
for banking services demonstrates a 
University 
community 
need 
that 
fulfills a “school” purpose.  The Court 
finds that by locating a banking 
facility within the Student Center, the 
University has met an objective not 
that remote from the Burris6 Court’s 
emphasis 
of 
“convenience” 
and 
“efficient administration relative to 
student learning and the daily living 
of all members of the University 
community;  
this is particularly true 
since one “purpose” of an institute of 
higher education is to provide a safe 
and efficient means for its students to 
attend classes and otherwise enrich 
themselves, as well as to provide for 
the appropriate “convenience” of 
those associated with the University.  
And if the nearest bank were, 
                                                 
6 Referring to Burris v. Tower Hill School Ass’n, 179 A. 397 (Del. Super. 1935). 
 
8
hypothetically, many miles distant 
from the University, there would 
indisputably be a heightened and 
important convenience to all members 
of the University community for 
banking services to be available at the 
University…. 
**** 
When one thinks of a “school” as 
encompassing the body of students, 
faculty, administrators and employees 
which constitute the institution’s 
makeup, it is not illogical to view 
“enhanced levels of banking service” 
directed at those persons as serving a 
“school” purpose; this is to be 
contrasted with the term “education,” 
which, as noted above, is more 
directed to the actual process of 
learning itself.7 
**** 
When section 8105 is considered as a 
whole, with separate effect given to 
“educational” and “school” purposes, 
“school 
purposes” 
means 
the 
promotion 
of 
the 
legitimate 
convenience of some or all members 
of the University community….8 
 
On appeal, the County advances a plethora of arguments to support its 
position that in finding the leased space exempt from taxation, the Superior 
Court committed reversible error.  Those arguments are fairly reducible to 
three basic claims. 
                                                 
7 Opinion, at 23. 
8 Id. at 25. 
 
9
The County’s first claim is that by adopting a criterion of 
“convenience,” the Superior Court failed to give effect to the plain meaning 
of the term “school purpose” found in § 8105.  That phrase (the County 
argues) plainly means a purpose that has as its intended object, end or aim, 
the pursuit or dissemination of knowledge by students and teachers.  
Because the furnishing of banking and related services by the University 
does not have as its aim the pursuit or dissemination of knowledge, the 
WSFS space is not being used for a “school purpose.”  Unless the trial 
court’s ruling is reversed, the County urges, the result will be to “open the 
floodgates” and potentially render tax exempt all property owned by schools 
and universities, regardless of how remote that property’s use may be from 
the pursuit or dissemination of knowledge. 
The County’s second claim is that that even if the term “school 
purpose” has no plain meaning, the Superior Court arrived at the wrong 
result by committing two fundamental errors of statutory construction.  The 
first claimed error of construction is that the court misread the case law that 
interprets § 8105, and its statutory phrase “educational or school purposes,” 
as expressing essentially a single standard.  Alternatively (the County urges), 
even if “school purposes” is properly viewed as a separate and distinct 
standard, the court misapplied it by ignoring the rule of construction that 
 
10
requires a narrow interpretation of statutes creating exemptions from 
taxation, with any doubts being resolved in favor of the public and against 
the claimed exemption. 
The County’s third claim is that the Superior Court, sitting as a 
tribunal reviewing a decision of the Board, failed to apply the proper 
standard of review, under which the Board’s decision is prima facie correct, 
with the appellant having the burden to show that the Board acted “contrary 
to law, fraudulently, arbitrarily or capriciously.”9 
All three contentions involve a purely legal question.  The County’s 
first two arguments advance, in different forms, the position that the 
Superior Court erred as a matter of law in construing the applicable tax 
exemption statute.  The County’s third argument -- that the Superior Court 
was required to accord deference to the Board’s decision unless the decision 
is “contrary to law,” -- poses the same legal issue, i.e., whether the Superior 
Court (and the Board) erroneously interpreted the statute.  The construction 
of statutes is a purely legal determination that the Superior Court and this 
Court review de novo.10 
We first address each of the County’s three claims of error, and 
conclude that they lack merit.  Because the issue presented here is one of 
                                                 
9 The quoted language is found in 9 Del. C. § 8312, upon which the County relies. 
10 Arnold v. Society for Savings Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1287 n.30 (Del. 1994). 
 
11
first impression, we then turn to, and evaluate independently, the Superior 
Court’s interpretation of the statutory term “school purpose,” to afford 
guidance in future cases. 
 
 
The “Plain Meaning” Argument 
As noted, the County first argues that the Superior Court erroneously 
failed to accord the statutory term “school purpose” its plain meaning. The 
issue underlying that argument, i.e., what is the meaning of the phrase 
“school purpose,” is one of first impression.  Although the Superior Court 
observed that there is no legislative history for the Court to rely upon, there 
is historical background that, although modest, aids this Court’s own 
analysis. 
The present § 8105 is the successor to a statute that was first enacted 
in 1796, and amended from time to time thereafter.  Its first appearance was 
in Vol. 2, Laws of Delaware, Ch. XCVIII, p. 1247, which provided: 
 
That all real and personal property in this state,  not 
 
 
belonging to this state, or to the United States, or to 
any  church,  county,  religious society or parish, or 
to any college,  or to  any county  school,  or  to any 
corporation   for  charitable  uses,   shall  be  valued 
agreeably to the  directions of  this act, and  shall be 
chargeable  according  to  such   valuation  with  the  
 
public assessment…. 
 
12
Thus, as originally enacted, the statute exempted from taxation any 
property belonging to any “college…or…county school,” without any 
limitation upon how the property could be used. 
In 1893, the statute was amended (in pertinent part) to read:
 
 
All real  and  personal property not belonging to this 
 
 
State, or the United  States, or   any  county,  church, 
 
 
religious society, college or school, or to any corpor- 
 
 
ation for  charitable  uses,  shall be  liable to taxation 
 
 
and assessment for public purposes….11  
 
Thus, the 1893 statute exempted from taxation “property…belonging 
to …any…college or school,” again without limiting how that property 
could be used.12 
 
In 1909, however, the General Assembly again amended the statute to 
limit, for the first time, the permissible uses of property owned by any 
college or school, for that property to qualify as tax exempt.  The 1909 
amendment modified the 1983 statute to add to the phrase “belonging 
to…any…college or school…” the language  “and used for educational or 
school purposes…”13  The result of that amendment was to qualify as tax 
exempt, property that was owned by any college or school and that was used 
                                                 
11 Revised Code of The State of Delaware, as published in 1893, Chap. XI, Sec. 1. 
12 Because the 1893 statute provided that “all…property…not belonging 
to…any…college or school…” would be taxable, it follows, a fortiori  from the converse 
of that negative expression, that all property belonging to any college or school would not 
be taxable. 
13 25 Del. Laws, Chap. 36, Sec. 1  (1909) (italics added). 
 
13
for educational or school purposes.  That phraseology (“educational or 
school purposes”) has survived in this form from 1909 to the present, and is 
found in the current § 8105. 
 
The issue is what uses the General Assembly contemplated by its 
choice of the term “school purposes.”  The statute does not answer that 
question, because it leaves that term undefined.  Moreover, the phrase 
“educational or school purposes” has been construed only once, almost 
seventy years ago, by the Superior Court in Burris v. Tower Hill School 
Association,14 and even there the court did not separately construe the term 
“school purpose” (as distinguished from “educational purpose”).  In these 
circumstances, the Superior Court determined that it must analyze § 8105 
according to its own terms.  That conclusion was correct, because undefined 
words in a statute must be given their ordinary, common meaning.15 
 
In its effort to fathom the meaning of the statutory term “school 
purposes,” the Superior Court next determined that by including the word 
“school” in the phrase “used for educational or school purposes,” the 
General Assembly must have intended that “school purposes” would have a 
meaning different from “educational purposes.”  That conclusion, although 
vigorously disputed by the County, is supported by the legisl
ative history 
                                                 
14 178 A.2d 397 (Del. Super. 1935). 
15 Oceanport Indus., Inc. v. Wilmington Stevedores, Inc., 636 A.2d 892, 900 (Del. 1994). 
 
14
discussed above, and it is also consistent with the presumption against 
construing words in a statute as surplusage if there is a reasonable 
construction that will give them meaning.16  The Superior Court’s finding 
that “educational purposes” and “school purposes” have distinct, separate 
meanings is also consistent with, and is buttressed by, the fact that the 
dictionary definitions of those two terms are different.  As that court noted, 
“education” is defined as: 
1:  the act or process of educating or being 
educated….2 a: a process or course of 
learning, instruction or training that educates 
or is intended to educate…. b:  a system of 
formal education as a whole…. 3: the 
product of an education17 
 
“School,” however, is defined differently as: 
 
1a (1): an organized body of scholars and 
teachers associated for the pursuit of and 
dissemination of knowledge (as in a 
particular advanced field) andconstituting a 
college….1b (1): the pupils or students 
attending a school….(2):  the members of a 
school including both faculty and students18 
 
                                                 
16 Id.;(“[W]ords in a statute should not be construed as surplusage if there is a reasonable 
construction which will give them meaning…and courts must ascribe a purpose to the use 
of statutory language, if reasonably possible.”); Norman A. Singer, Statutes and Statutory 
Construction, § 46.06, at 193 (Rev. 2000) (popularly known as “Sutherland Statutory 
Construction”) (“[L]ike [] [the presumption that the same words used twice in the same 
act have the same meaning], the courts do not construe different terms within a statute to 
embody the same meaning.”) 
17 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY at 723 (1961). 
18 Id. at 2031. 
 
15
Accordingly, the Superior Court concluded (as do we) that the term 
“education” focuses on the “act or process” of educating or learning, while 
the term “school” refers to the “organized body” of students, faculty, 
administrators, and employees who come together as a community to engage 
in the “act or process” of education. 
 
The County’s contrary argument also relies upon dictionary 
definitions as a tool of  “plain meaning” statutory construction.  The County, 
however, limits itself to the definitions of the terms “school” and “purpose,” 
and it then selectively combines those definitions to arrive at the opposite 
conclusion.  The dictionary definition of “purpose,” the County says, is:  
1 a : something that one sets before himself 
as an object to be attained: an end or aim to 
be kept in view, in any plan, measure, 
exertion, or operation….1 b : an object, 
effect, or result aimed at, intended or 
attained….19 
 
The primary definition of  “school,” the County then argues, is “an 
organized body of scholars and teachers associated for the pursuit and 
dissemination of knowledge.”20  Combining those two definitions, the 
County concludes that a “school purpose” must be one that has as its 
intended object, end or aim, the pursuit of or dissemination of knowledge by 
students and teachers.  The County argues that “[t]he Legislature surely did 
                                                 
19 WEBSTER’S  THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY at 1847 (1961). 
20 Id. at 723. 
 
16
not intend to confer tax exempt status upon a use (such as the Bank)… “that 
does not have as its intended aim or object [the] achievement of the 
University’s prime function: the teaching of students…”  Therefore (the 
County says), the Superior Court’s conclusion that the WSFS branch  --  
which “exists only to serve the ancillary commercial needs of the 
University’s constituencies and the public” --  is tax exempt, ignores the 
plain meaning of “school purpose” as used in § 8105.  
The County’s argument is flawed, not only because of its selective 
choice of dictionary definitions, but also and more fundamentally because it 
makes no effort to address the distinct meanings of “educational” and 
“school” and to give those different meanings functional effect.  The 
County’s analysis focuses on the definitions of the terms “school” and 
“purpose,” but ignores altogether the highly different definition of 
“educational.”  The County also ignores the primary thrust of the definition 
of “school,” which focuses upon the community of persons and roles that 
comprise an educational institution.  Instead, the County selects but one (but 
not the only) important activity in which that community is engaged: 
imparting and receiving knowledge.  The result of that result-oriented 
analysis is to conflate the two different terms “educational” and “school” 
into a single undifferentiated term: “educational.” 
 
17
In defense of its approach, the County urges that, unless rejected, the 
Superior Court’s statutory construction will open the floodgates and 
potentially exempt from taxation, all property owned by schools, colleges, 
and universities, even if that property is used in a manner that i
s unrelated to 
the objective of imparting and receiving knowledge.  Therefore, this Court 
must draw a bright line that proscribes all tax exemptions for school-owned 
property, except for property that is used to impart or receive knowledge. 
In our view, if any statutory interpretation would “open the 
floodgates” to results that, in the absence of a clear statutory mandate, could 
not rationally be attributed to the legislature, it is the construction advocated 
by the County.  As the Superior Court aptly noted in its Opinion: 
[I]f a small branch bank that provides 
admittedly 
“convenient” 
banking 
services to the University  community 
is  not to be exempt from property 
taxation in that it does not serve a 
“school purpose,” then what of the 
bank’s 
ATM 
machines 
situated 
around the campus?   Should the 
dining facilities, the travel office, the 
bookstore, 
and/or 
the 
movie 
theatre/lecture hall (all located within 
the Student Center) similarly be taxed 
as not furthering “school purposes?”  
What 
about 
space 
provided 
to 
telecommunications 
providers 
elsewhere on University property?  
Indeed, the County acknowledged at 
oral argument that University parking 
 
18
lots do serve “school purposes,” and 
should not be subject to property 
taxation. 
 
The Superior Court was not persuaded by the County’s argument, and 
neither are we.  In construing the statute, that court did not ignore the plain 
meaning of the term “school purpose,” nor did it err in refusing to accept the 
County’s argued-for plain meaning of that term.  As discussed elsewhere in 
this Opinion, the WSFS branch, like the rest of the University’s campus and 
its accompanying student services, contributes to the welfare, convenience 
and safety of the University community.  That property is, therefore, being 
used for a “school purpose,” and to the extent the County claims otherwise, 
its position lacks merit and is rejected. 
 
The Statutory Misconstruction Argument 
The County’s second argument, which comes in two parts, is that 
even if the statutory term “school purpose” has no plain meaning, the 
Superior Court accorded that term the wrong meaning, by committing two 
distinct errors of statutory construction. 
First, the County claims, the Superior Court misread the case law 
interpreting § 8105, which (the County says) construes the phrase 
“educational or school purposes” as articulating only one single standard.  
To say it differently, the County claims that the Superior Court’s conclusion 
 
19
that the terms “educational purpose” and “school purpose” had separate, 
distinct meanings, is erroneous. 
This claim merely restates, in the form of a primary argument, a 
proposition that the County previously advanced -- and that this Court 
rejected -- as a subsidiary argument in the “plain meaning” context.  This 
argument was rejected, because it would reduce the term “school purpose” 
to meaningless surplusage, and also would do violence to the presumption 
that the legislature intended to give meaning to each term used in the statute. 
 
The County insists, nonetheless, that the phrase “educational or school 
purposes” must be found to articulate a single standard, because that phrase 
was so construed in Burris v. Tower Hill School Association.  In that case, 
the County sought to tax a residence that was owned by Tower Hill School 
and used as a home for t
he school’s headmaster.  Tower Hill, which was 
(and is) entirely a day school, admitted that the residence, which was located 
one block from Tower Hill’s campus, was used for no other purpose.  Given 
those facts, the Burris court declined to exempt the property from taxation, 
finding that although the property benefited the headmaster (as his personal 
residence), it did not further any interest of the school.21   
                                                 
21 179 A. at 399 (stating that “the interest of [the] school…[is not]…furthered in any way 
by the use of the property.”) 
 
 
20
The County insists that because the Burris court did not explicitly 
distinguish between the words “educational” and “school,” it implicitly 
determined that the phrase “educational or school purpose” represents a 
single standard.  But the County’s conclusion does not follow from its 
premise.  In Burris, the court’s analysis and result did not turn on the 
distinction between “educational” and “school” purpose.  Nor was it 
necessary for the Burris court to consider any such distinction, because the 
school was advancing the blanket argument that the headmaster’s residence 
was being used for an “educational or school purpose,” without making any 
effort either to parse or differentiate the two terms, or to advocate a separate 
definition of “school purpose.”  
Indeed, Burris is more supportive of the University’s position than of 
the County’s.  In distinguishing cases relied upon by Tower Hill School on 
the ground that they involved colleges or boarding schools, the court stated:   
[The cited cases] have to do with 
colleges or boarding schools, and the  
rationale of the decisions is  the 
reasonable  necessity for  the  
acquisition  and  maintenance  of 
presidential 
and 
 
professorial  
residences in  close  proximity  to the  
student  body  
for  inspirational,  
supervisional 
 
or 
disciplinary   
purposes,   or  as  a   convenient place   
for  holding  meetings  and  social 
 
21
affairs 
in 
connection 
with 
the 
institution…. 
 
 
 
 
**** 
The considerations impelling the 
courts in the cases cited are entirely 
absent from the case before the court.  
Here the school is a day school.  The 
sole use of the property is as a 
residence for the headmaster.  All of 
the duties of the headmaster may be 
performed at the school, and it is not 
intimated that these duties are not, in 
fact, performed at the school…. 
 
….[T]here is  nothing to  indicate that 
the residence is used as an office for 
the head-master, or as a  necessary 
and  convenient place[to] interview[] 
prospective students or for conducting 
correspondence 
relating 
to 
the 
school.22 
 
 
The clear implication of this reasoning is that if Tower Hill were a 
college or a boarding school, the headmaster’s residence would not be 
taxable, even if the residence was not being used for any other purpose.  
That is significant, because the University of Delaware is a college that 
furnishes room and board to its students, most of whom live on campus.  
Because Tower Hill, unlike the University, was only a day school, the Burris 
court held that for the headmaster’s residence to be tax exempt, some 
                                                 
22 199 A. at 399. 
 
22
school-related activities had to be conducted there, but none were.  Burris 
does not aid the County’s position here. 
 
The County’s second, alternative argument is that even if the term 
“school purposes” denotes a distinct, separate standard, the court misapplied 
it by ignoring the rule of construction that requires a narrow interpretation of 
statutes that create exemptions from taxation, with any doubts being 
resolved in favor of the public and against the claimed exemption.  This 
argument also misses the mark, because it misapprehends the applicable rule 
of construction.  Although statutes creating tax exemptions are to be 
construed narrowly in the ordinary case, Burris itself recognizes that 
“[s]tatutes exempting from taxation property devoted to educational 
purposes are in general construed more liberally than other tax exempting 
statutes.”23 
 
In short, the Superior Court, did not misread the case law or apply 
erroneous principles of statutory construction in arriving at the result that it 
reached. 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 Burris, 179 A. at 399-400 (italics added). 
 
23
 
 
 
The Argument That The Court 
 
 
 
Did Not Give Proper Deference 
 
 
 
To The Board’s Determination 
 
The County’s final claim of error is that the Superior Court, sitting as 
a tribunal reviewing a decision of the New Castle County Board of 
Assessment Review, failed to accord proper deference to the Board’s 
expertise in the area of taxation, because the court reviewed the Board’s 
decision under an improper standard.  The correct standard, the County 
argues, is that the Board’s finding that the leased space is taxable, must be 
deemed to be prima facie correct, with the appellant having the burden to 
show that the Board acted contrary to law, fraudulently, arbitrarily or 
capriciously. 
The short answer is that administrative agencies and boards are 
afforded no such deference on questions of statutory construction.  As we 
have previously held:
 
Statutory interpretation is ultimately 
the responsibility of the courts. A 
reviewing court may accord due 
weight, but not defer, to an agency 
interpretation 
of 
a 
statute 
administered by it.  A reviewing court 
will not defer to such an interpretation 
as correct merely because it is rational 
or not clearly erroneous.24 
 
                                                 
24 Public Water Supply Co. v. DiPasquale, 735 A. 2d 378 (Del. 1999). 
 
24
 
Accordingly, the Superior Court committed no error by construing  
§ 8105 de novo. 
 
 
 
The Trial Court’s Construction  
Of The Term “School Purpose”  
 
Although we conclude that the Superior Court committed no legal 
error in its reasoning or result, the analysis cannot end here.  Because this 
important issue of statutory construction is of first impression, this Court’s 
institutional role, and the public need for guidance in future cases, requires 
us to proceed further and review de novo the Superior Court’s interpretation 
of the phrase “school purposes.”  We find that that court’s articulation, 
although not incorrect, is unduly narrow, and that the scope of the definition 
of “school purpose” must be enlarged to capture more fully the values that 
are embedded in that phrase. 
The Superior Court held that “school purposes” means “the promotion 
of the legitimate convenience of some or all members of the University 
community.”25  That activity, to be sure, is one element of a larger 
constellation of activities that may properly be described as “school 
purposes,” but the Superior Court’s formulation does not comprehend, or 
completely describe, the totality of those elements.  As used in the statute, 
the word “school” (as distinguished from “education”) is a generic term that 
                                                 
25 Opinion, at 25. 
 
25
describes a diversity of educational institutions, including (without 
attempting to be exhaustive) primary and secondary schools, universities and 
other post-secondary educational institutions.  Each of these institutions is 
devoted in a unique way to educating the students who attend it.  To 
accomplish that goal in present-day American society, those institutions are 
organized into communities that include (among their many members) 
students, faculty, administrative and s
upport staff, and providers of goods 
and services. 
In the case of the University of Delaware, most of whose students live 
on the campus full-time during the school year, those goods and services 
include (to name but a few) food, living quarters, books, parking facilities, 
medical facilities, and a security force.  They also include ATM and 
credit/debit cards to enable students, faculty and other members of the 
university community to purchase the goods and services they need to 
function in their respective roles within that community. 
Given the multidimensional complexity of the school “community” 
and the component constituencies and activities that characterize the diverse 
“schools” of almost every variety that exist in Delaware, a more 
comprehensive formulation of “school purpose” is needed than the one 
articulated by the Superior Court.  The reason is that furthering the 
 
26
“convenience” of the school community and its members is only one 
dimension of the ever-evolving array of activities in which schools and their 
constituencies legitimately engage to carry out their educational goals.  Two 
other critical dimensions are furthering the safety and the welfare of those 
communities. 
In our view, therefore, a more appropriate formulation of  “school 
purposes” is that the use of the school-owned property must contribute to the 
legitimate welfare, convenience, and/or safety of the school community or 
its members.  That formulation better captures the complex reality that the 
generic term “school purposes” is intended to denote.  At the same time, it 
draws a clearer line that will aid the taxing authorities and schools in 
distinguishing between uses of school-owned property that are properly tax 
exempt, and those that are not. 
Although this formulation may sweep more uses of school-owned 
property into the tax exempt category than it will exclude, that is not the 
result of any policy judgment by this Court.  Rather, it is the consequence of 
the language chosen by the General Assembly to designate which uses of 
school-owned property will be taxable, and which will not be.  It is for the 
General Assembly alone to make that determination, not the courts.  The 
only legitimate role of courts that are called upon to interpret an enactment 
 
27
by the General Assembly is to divine, and then effectuate as closely as 
possible, the legislative intent.  The formulation adopted here represents this 
Court’s best effort to carry out that role. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
For the reasons set forth, the judgment of the Superior Court is 
affirmed.