Title: Commonwealth v. McWilliams
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11900
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: February 12, 2016

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-11900 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ROBERT McWILLIAMS. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     October 8, 2015. - February 12, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 
& Hines, JJ. 
 
 
 
Robbery.  Attempt.  Constitutional Law, Assistance of counsel.  
Practice, Criminal, Assistance of counsel, Motion to 
suppress, Admissions and confessions, Discovery, 
Defendant's decision not to testify, Prior conviction.  
Evidence, Admissions and confessions, Prior conviction, 
Identification.  Identification. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on October 25, 2011.  
 
 
The cases were tried before Elizabeth M. Fahey, J., and 
motions for a required finding of not guilty, for a new trial, 
and for postconviction discovery, filed on March 13, 2014, were 
considered by her.  
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Timothy St. Lawrence for the defendant. 
 
Crystal L. Lyons, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
2 
 
 
SPINA, J.  In this case, we address the question left open 
in Commonwealth v. Fortunato, 466 Mass. 500, 509 (2013):  
whether voluntary, unsolicited statements that are not the 
product of police questioning, made more than six hours after 
arrest, must be suppressed under the safe harbor rule 
established in Commonwealth v. Rosario, 422 Mass. 48, 56-57 
(1996).  Robert McWilliams, the defendant, was convicted of 
robbery while armed and masked, occurring on July 7, 2011; and 
of attempted robbery, occurring on July 26, 2011.  On appeal, he 
argues that the judge erred by (1) denying his motion for a 
required finding of not guilty; (2) denying (without a hearing) 
his motion for a new trial, in which he asserted several claims 
of ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) denying his motion 
for postconviction discovery.  For the following reasons we 
affirm the judge's rulings.   
 
1.  Background.  The jury could have found the following 
facts.  On July 7, 2011, a bank located in the Kendall Square 
area of Cambridge was robbed at gunpoint of $2,614.   
 
Prior to the robbery, Edward Grigoryants, an employee of a 
business located at One Broadway, the same building as the bank, 
was taking a smoking break around midday in the designated 
smoking area located in front of the bank.  He noticed a tall 
African-American man wearing a "doo rag" on his head, leaning 
against a column near the smoking section.  The man had broad 
3 
 
shoulders and short hair and was carrying a small black pouch.  
Grigoryants identified this man as the defendant in court.  
After two to three minutes, Grigoryants went back inside.   
 
At 1:23 P.M., the bank's surveillance cameras show the 
defendant entering the bank.  At the time, a customer, Marie 
Saint-Surin, the bank's assistant manager, and Kaltoum El 
Hafidi, a teller, were in the bank.  The defendant was masked at 
the time, but El Hafidi still could see his eyes and part of his 
mouth and nose.  The defendant approached the teller window.  He 
pointed a "big black gun" at El Hafidi and said that he was 
sorry to scare her and that he was not going to hurt her, and 
demanded she give him the money.  El Hafidi complied.  Once the 
defendant received the money, he left the bank through the 
automated teller machine (ATM) room and removed his mask.  
Before the defendant left the bank, El Hafidi was able to 
observe that the defendant had a shaved head.  The bank's 
surveillance camera showed the defendant leaving at 1:24 P.M.  
When he left the bank, the defendant turned right, heading in 
the direction of Third Street.  A parking garage is located 
around the corner from Third Street, which is less than a one-
minute walk from the bank.  The garage also is accessible 
through One Broadway.  Once the defendant left, Saint-Surin 
notified the police, who arrived within approximately five 
minutes.  El Hafidi described the defendant as a tall, African-
4 
 
American man who was "not too fat but a little skinny."  He was 
wearing "sports clothes" including a "beige white" long-sleeve 
T-shirt.  He was carrying a "big black gun" and a black bag.  
The customer also described the defendant as a tall man wearing 
a long-sleeve shirt and nylon wind pants carrying a black or 
navy bag.  Saint-Surin described the defendant as an African-
American man wearing a white top and pants with a white stripe 
on both sides.   
 
On July 26, 2011, Grigoryants was taking another smoking 
break in the same area around midday.  While he was smoking, 
Grigoryants recognized a man walking by him as the man who 
robbed the bank on July 7.  The individual had the same body 
build, broad shoulders, and height; however, his hairstyle was 
different.  He had dreadlocks as opposed to the short hair 
observed on July 7, and the dreadlocks appeared to be a wig.  
The defendant was carrying a small black pouch that was similar 
to the one the robber carried on July 7.  Grigoryants followed 
the man a short distance and used his cellular telephone to take 
a photograph of the man's back.   
 
Grigoryants went into the bank and showed the photograph to 
Michelle Garris, the teller-manager.  He asked whether she 
recognized the individual in the photograph.  Grigoryants told 
Garris that he believed that the man was the person who had 
robbed the bank on July 7.  Because Garris had not been working 
5 
 
on the day of the robbery, she showed the photograph to El 
Hafidi.  Grigoryants asked El Hafidi if the man in the 
photograph was the same man who robbed the bank on July 7.  At 
first, El Hafidi was unsure the photograph depicted the same man 
because the man in the photograph had hair and a beard and was 
wearing sunglasses.  Grigoryants told El Hafidi and Garris that 
the individual in the photograph was currently outside the bank.  
They were in the lunch room and from there they were able to see 
outside the bank.  At that time, El Hafidi saw the man walk by 
the front of the bank.  She entered the main part of the branch 
to get a better view.  The defendant was then sitting at a table 
about twenty-five feet away from the bank, facing the bank.  El 
Hafidi recognized him because of his race, his build, his gait, 
and how he was dressed.  Once she recognized the defendant, she 
said, "Oh my god, it's him."  She called to Saint-Surin and told 
her that someone had seen the person who had robbed them outside 
the bank.  Saint-Surin looked out the window but became 
frightened and only looked at him sidewise.  She was afraid to 
look at his face.  She knew it was the same person from July 7 
because he was wearing the same type of outfit and had the same 
gait.  Garris telephoned the Cambridge police.   
 
The police were given a description of the individual and 
told how he was believed to have committed a bank robbery 
earlier that month.  On receiving a dispatch, Officers Eric 
6 
 
Derman and Marlin Rivera proceeded to the scene, arriving within 
three minutes of Garris's telephone call to the police.  Once 
they arrived, they observed the defendant and determined that he 
fit the description they had been given.  Officer Derman 
approached the defendant from the front while Officer Rivera 
approached him from behind.  He observed the defendant holding a 
black nylon "draw-string type" bag and saw an outline of what 
appeared to be a handle of a gun.  After the defendant was 
handcuffed, Derman determined that the defendant's dreadlocks 
were a wig.  The black bag that the defendant was holding 
contained a plastic handgun and a beard and mustache "disguise."  
At the time of his arrest, the defendant was wearing a white or 
light gray long-sleeve T-shirt, running pants with a white 
stripe down the side, and sunglasses.  The gun was later 
determined to be a pellet gun.  Detective Jack Crowley arrived 
on the scene after the defendant was handcuffed.  Detective 
Crowley observed the defendant to be about six feet, two inches 
tall.  He spoke with El Hafidi and asked her whether the person 
she saw outside the bank was the person who had robbed the bank 
on July 7.  She said that she was "positively certain" that it 
was the person who had robbed her.   
 
At the police station, Crowley conducted an interview with 
the defendant.  The defendant claimed that he had been sitting 
outside the bank that day to get some fresh air.  Sometime 
7 
 
later, after the interview ended, the defendant asked the 
booking officer if he could talk to Crowley because he needed a 
favor.  The defendant asked Crowley to get his backpack that was 
locked to his bicycle.  He said his eyeglasses were in the 
backpack, and he needed them to see.  He told Crowley that the 
bicycle was at the entrance of a parking garage located in the 
same building as the bank, and that the key was with his other 
belongings in the police station.  When Crowley went to retrieve 
the eyeglasses, he noticed that the garage had a surveillance 
camera.  He made arrangements with the garage's property 
management company to obtain a copy of the surveillance video 
recording from July 7.  The recording showed the defendant 
leaving the garage on July 7, two to three minutes after the 
bank robbery.   
 
2.  Motion for a required finding of not guilty -- 
attempted robbery.  The defendant argues that the Commonwealth 
presented insufficient evidence to show an overt act that was 
near enough to completing the robbery to be punishable as an 
attempt and, therefore, his motion for a required finding of not 
guilty should have been allowed.  We disagree.   
 
When reviewing a motion for a required finding of not 
guilty, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth.  Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 
(1979).  We must consider whether "any rational trier of fact 
8 
 
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt."  Id. at 677, quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 
U.S. 307, 318-319 (1979).   
 
This court has interpreted the law of attempt for over one 
hundred years; however, the case law interpreting the language 
of G. L. c. 274, § 6, the general attempt statute, is not 
extensive.  The statute requires "a showing that the defendant, 
after preparing to commit the crime, has undertaken overt acts 
[with specific intent] toward fulfilling the crime that 'come 
near enough to the accomplishment of the substantive offence to 
be punishable.'"  Commonwealth v. Bell, 455 Mass. 408, 412 
(2009), quoting Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 177 Mass. 267, 271 
(1901).  In order for a defendant to be guilty of attempt, the 
distance between his or her actions and the completed crime must 
be "relatively short" and "narrow."  Bell, supra at 415, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Hamel, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 250, 258 (2001).   
 
There are two categories of attempt.  Bell, 455 Mass. at 
412-413, quoting Peaslee, 177 Mass. at 271-272.  The first and 
most obvious form of attempt occurs when a person performs the 
last act required to complete a crime, but for some 
unanticipated reason, his or her efforts are thwarted, whether 
by bad aim or a mistake in judgment.  Bell, supra at 412-413, 
quoting Peaslee, supra at 271.  The second, and more complicated 
category, occurs when a person is still in preparatory mode and 
9 
 
has not committed the last act necessary to achieve the crime.  
Bell, supra at 413, quoting Peaslee, supra at 271-272.  "That an 
overt act although coupled with an intent to commit the crime 
commonly is not punishable if further acts are contemplated as 
needful, is expressed in the familiar rule that preparation is 
not an attempt."  Peaslee, supra at 272.  However, certain 
preparations may be enough to support a conviction of attempt.  
"It is a question of degree.  If the preparation comes very near 
to the accomplishment of the act, the intent to complete it 
renders the crime so probable that the act will be a [crime] 
although there is still a locus penitentiae[1] in the need of a 
further exertion of the will to complete the crime. . . .  [T]he 
degree of proximity . . . may vary with circumstances . . . ."  
Id.  Certain factors must be considered when determining whether 
acts constitute mere preparations or are enough to establish the 
crime of attempt.  Bell, supra at 414.  These factors include 
the gravity of the crime, the uncertainty of the result, and the 
seriousness of harm that is likely to result.  Bell, supra at 
414, citing Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 170 Mass. 18, 22 (1897).   
 
In this case, we are dealing with the second category of 
attempt.  Here, the defendant was still at the preparatory stage 
and had not yet performed the last act necessary to commit the 
 
1 Locus penitentiae is an opportunity for changing one's 
mind or undoing what has been done.  See Black's Law Dictionary 
1083 (10th ed. 2004).   
                     
10 
 
crime of armed robbery.  The defendant argues that he still had 
much to do before an armed robbery could be completed and that, 
although the evidence indicated he was prepared to rob the bank, 
it did not rise to the level of an overt act that puts him near 
the commission of a crime.  We conclude that the evidence was 
sufficient to convict the defendant of attempted robbery.   
 
The defendant was seen sitting twenty-five feet away from 
the bank he had robbed three weeks earlier.  He was close enough 
to the bank that Saint-Surin and El Hafidi were able to identify 
him as the man who had robbed the bank on July 7.  Seated just 
outside the bank, the defendant had the then-present ability to 
walk into the bank and rob it.  His intention to rob the bank 
was supported by strong evidence.  He was wearing the same 
clothing as he did on July 7, a long-sleeve white or light-
colored shirt and running pants, during the midday hours in the 
scorching July heat.  He had disguised himself by donning a wig.  
The black bag the defendant was holding, a bag that was similar 
to the one used in the robbery three weeks prior, contained a 
mustache and beard as well as a pellet gun.  He was in close 
proximity to the bank and it could be inferred from these facts 
that he had the present intent to commit an armed robbery.  The 
only actions left for the defendant to do before actually 
robbing the bank were to put on the beard and mustache, walk 
into the bank and up to the counter and demand money.  The 
11 
 
evidence supports findings that the defendant had the present 
intention to rob the same bank he had robbed earlier that month, 
that he made preparations to do so, and that he had taken steps 
which put him in close proximity to completing the substantive 
crime.  He had undertaken overt acts which, although not the 
final act in a necessary sequence, were so close to the 
commission of the crime that a reasonable jury could conclude 
that it was virtually certain that he would have robbed the bank 
a second time had Grigoryants not recognized him and alerted 
bank personnel who then summoned police.  See Peaslee, 177 Mass. 
at 271-272.   
 
Reference to the factors articulated in Kennedy, 170 Mass. 
at 22, supports our decision.  The first factor, seriousness of 
the crime, is readily satisfied.  Armed robbery is a felony 
punishable up to life in prison.  The second factor, uncertainty 
as to whether the defendant was going to complete the crime, was 
low.  The defendant had in his possession all the necessary 
materials to rob the bank, he had robbed the same bank three 
weeks before, and when he was apprehended he was sitting in 
front of the bank in the same area where he had been standing 
immediately prior to the robbery on July 7.  The third factor, 
the seriousness of the harm that would have been done had the 
defendant completed the crime, was substantial.  The defendant 
was armed with a pellet gun that could cause serious injury to a 
12 
 
person if fired.  The trial judge's decision to deny the motion 
for a required finding of not guilty was correct.   
 
3.  Ineffective assistance of counsel -- motion to suppress 
statements.  The defendant argues that the judge erred in 
denying his motion for a new trial, which alleged that trial 
counsel had been ineffective for failing to file a motion to 
suppress statements the defendant made to police more than six 
hours after his arrest, in violation of the safe harbor rule 
established in Rosario, 422 Mass. at 56-57.  Further, the 
defendant argues that the bicycle and the surveillance video 
recording from the garage were fruits of those statements, and 
trial counsel should have moved to suppress them as well.  It is 
undisputed that the defendant's statements were made more than 
six hours after his arrest and that they had been volunteered.  
We turn to the question left open in Fortunato, 466 Mass. at 
509:  whether volunteered, unsolicited statements made six hours 
after arrest and before presentment require suppression.  We 
conclude that they do not.   
 
To show that counsel was ineffective, a defendant must 
first show that "there has been serious incompetency, 
inefficiency, or inattention of counsel" and behavior that falls 
"measurably below that which might be expected from an ordinary 
fallible lawyer."  Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 
(1974).  If the defendant is successful in proving the first 
13 
 
prong, he then must show that counsel's omission "has likely 
deprived the defendant of an otherwise available, substantial 
ground of defence."  Id.   
 
Rule 7 (a) (1) of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, as appearing in 442 Mass. 1506 (2004), requires the 
prompt presentment of an arrestee before a court.2  The purpose 
of the rule is to discourage unlawful detentions, unlawfully 
obtained statements, and improper police pressure.  Commonwealth 
v. Powell, 468 Mass. 272, 276-277 (2014).  The rule essentially 
codified the existing case law.  Rosario, supra at 51.  Our case 
law requires that an arrestee be brought before a judge as soon 
as reasonably possible.  Commonwealth v. Hodgkins, 401 Mass. 
871, 876 (1988), and cases cited.  Before Rosario, the 
unreasonableness of a delay was determined on a case-by-case 
basis in light of all the circumstances.  Powell, supra at 277.  
Commonwealth v. Perito, 417 Mass. 674, 680 (1994), and cases 
cited.  This case-by-case approach continued, without 
suppression of any evidence by reason of undue delay in 
presentment, until Rosario.  Powell, supra at 278, citing 
Rosario, 422 Mass. at 52.   
 
In Rosario, this court announced a bright line rule 
 
2 Rule 7 (a) (1) of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, as appearing in 442 Mass. 1506 (2004), states:  "A 
defendant who has been arrested shall be brought before a court 
if then in session, and if not, at its next session."   
                     
14 
 
stating, "[a]n otherwise admissible statement is not to be 
excluded on the ground of unreasonable delay in arraignment, if 
the statement is made within six hours of the arrest (day or 
night), or if (at any time) the defendant made an informed and 
voluntary written or recorded waiver of his right to be 
arraigned without unreasonable delay."  Rosario, 422 Mass. at 
56.  Exceptions may apply in the rare case of a natural disaster 
or emergency.  Powell, 468 Mass. at 276.  Rosario, supra at 56-
57.  The six-hour rule has several goals.  First, it serves to 
provide clarity and consistency to police officers, judges, 
prosecutors, and defense counsel as to the "right of the police 
to question" an arrestee as well as the "standard for 
suppressing statements" made due to an unreasonable delay before 
arraignment.  See Commonwealth v. Morganti, 455 Mass. 388, 399 
(2009), S.C., 467 Mass. 96, cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 356 (2014), 
quoting Rosario, supra at 53.  Second, the rule is "intended to 
facilitate a criminal defendant's right to counsel, to ensure 
that a defendant receives a prompt statement by a judge or 
magistrate of the charges against him, and to prevent unlawful 
detention."  Fortunato, 466 Mass. at 506.  Third, it is a 
"prophylaxis against dilatory police conduct," seeking to 
prevent unlawful detentions and improper police pressure.  
Commonwealth v. Siny Van Tran, 460 Mass. 535, 561 (2011).  See 
Powell, supra at 279 ("A bright-line rule . . . achieves the 
15 
 
goal of limiting the coercive effect of lengthy arraignment 
delays"); Commonwealth v. Santana, 465 Mass. 270, 287 (2013).  
"[T]he principal mischief that the Rosario rule was adopted to 
prevent [was] the coercive influence of intentional delays of 
arraignment to prolong custodial interrogation of unwilling and 
uncounseled arrestees."  Siny Van Tran, supra at 563.   
 
Unlike in Rosario and Fortunato, the defendant's statements 
in this case were not in response to police questioning.  Unlike 
in Fortunato, the defendant and Detective Crowley did not have a 
conversation about the robbery after the safe harbor period 
expired.  See Fortunato, 466 Mass. at 502-503.  The conversation 
here consisted solely of the defendant's volunteered, 
unsolicited request of Crowley that Crowley retrieve his 
eyeglasses.  The fact that Crowley followed the defendant's 
directions to locate his bicycle and, in the process, noticed 
that there were security cameras at the garage was not a product 
of questioning about any crime.  "[T]he mere passage of six 
hours," absent any direct or indirect efforts by the police to 
prompt the defendant to speak about the robbery or engage him in 
conversation likely to lead to the subject of the robbery, does 
not violate the safe harbor rule.  See Commonwealth v. Perez, 
577 Pa. 360, 372 (2004).  Furthermore, in one of the rare 
instances where this court found an exception to the Rosario 
six-hour rule, we determined that Rosario did not apply to 
16 
 
defendants arrested outside of Massachusetts because the 
"spirit" of Rosario was not violated.  Morganti, 455 Mass. at 
399-400 (interrogating officer flew from Massachusetts to 
California).  The "spirit" of Rosario is to prevent police 
officers desirous of obtaining a confession from purposefully 
delaying a defendant's arraignment.  Morganti, supra.  As in 
Morganti, the spirit of Rosario was not violated in this case.  
Crowley did not engage in conduct that could be characterized as 
a subterfuge intended to thwart the spirit of Rosario.   
 
The goal of Rosario's safe harbor rule will not be 
furthered by automatic suppression of volunteered, unsolicited 
statements made by this defendant after the expiration of the 
six-hour safe harbor rule.  The exclusionary rule was created to 
give protection to arrestees from the potentially coercive 
environment resulting from police questioning.  See Commonwealth 
v. Duncan, 514 Pa. 395, 404 (1987), overruled by Perez, supra at 
367-368, 372.  Here, there was no police misconduct that 
offended a policy the exclusionary rule was meant to safeguard.  
Instead, suppression would only hinder legitimate information 
gathering.  We conclude that a motion to suppress the statements 
and the fruits thereof would not have succeeded and, therefore, 
trial counsel was not ineffective.  Commonwealth v. Comita, 441 
Mass. 86, 91 (2004).   
 
4.  Motion for postconviction discovery.  The defendant 
17 
 
argues that his request for all records relating to his booking 
and detention at the Cambridge police department would likely 
uncover evidence that would warrant granting him a new trial, 
and that therefore it was error to deny his motion for 
postconviction discovery.  We disagree.  "Where affidavits filed 
by the moving party . . . establish a prima facie case for 
relief, the judge . . . may authorize such discovery as is 
deemed appropriate."  Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (c) (4), as appearing 
in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001).  Because we have determined that 
volunteered, unsolicited statements made after the Rosario six-
hour rule has expired are admissible, the defendant has not 
established a prima facie case for relief.   
 
5.  Ineffective assistance of counsel -- identification.  
The defendant argues that the judge erred in denying his motion 
for a new trial, which alleged that counsel was ineffective for 
failing to file a motion to suppress the identification 
evidence.3  He contends that El Hafidi's pretrial identifications 
were made in circumstances "especially suggestive," Commonwealth 
v. Jones, 423 Mass. 99, 109 (1996), "so as to give rise to a 
very substantial likelihood of a mistaken identification."  
 
3 The defendant argues that trial counsel should have moved 
to suppress the following identifications:  (1) Kaltoum El 
Hafidi's identification of the defendant based on the cellular 
telephone photograph; (2) El Hafidi's identification of the 
defendant sitting outside the bank on July 26, 2011; (3) El 
Hafidi's identification given to Detective Jack Crowley; and (4) 
El Hafidi's in-court identification of the defendant.   
                     
18 
 
Commonwealth v. Moon, 380 Mass. 751, 758 (1980).  He also argues 
that her in-court identification was tainted by her suggestive 
pretrial identifications.   
 
The defendant argues that El Hafidi's pretrial 
identifications, which did not involve the police, should be 
suppressed under common-law principles of fairness articulated 
in Jones, supra at 108-109.  Jones explains that "[c]ommon law 
principles of fairness dictate that an unreliable identification 
arising from the especially suggestive circumstances [that did 
not involve State action] should not be admitted."  Id. at 109.  
The court did not define the term "especially suggestive."  We 
recently have said that, where a judge finds an identification 
to be especially suggestive, a judge must "weigh[] the probative 
value of the identification against the danger of unfair 
prejudice, and determin[e] whether the latter substantially 
outweighs the former."  Commonwealth v. Johnson, 473 Mass.     
(2016).  The "ultimate measure," id. at    , in the analysis 
always will be "reliability."  Id. at    .  We also said that 
the especially suggestive standard "need not be set so high" as 
the unnecessarily suggestive standard applicable to out-of-court 
identification procedures conducted by the police because an 
unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure requires 
suppression, whereas one that is especially suggestive "simply 
triggers a reliability analysis."  Id. at    . 
19 
 
 
To trigger a reliability analysis, "the circumstances 
surrounding the identification need only be so suggestive that 
there is a substantial risk that they influenced the witness's 
identification of the defendant, inflated his or her level of 
certainty in the identification, or altered his or her memory of 
the circumstances of the operative event.  Where the independent 
source of an identification is slim, this level of 
suggestiveness may be sufficient to support a finding of 
inadmissibility; where the independent source is substantial, a 
greater level of suggestiveness would be needed to support a 
finding that the danger of unfair prejudice substantially 
outweighs the probative value of the identification."  Id. 
at    .   
 
The defendant first contends that El Hafidi's 
identification of the defendant from the cellular telephone 
photograph was highly suggestive because Grigoryants asked her 
whether the photograph depicted the robber.4  There is no 
 
4 The defendant cites Commonwealth v. Day, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 
242 (1997), to bolster his argument that Edward Grigoryants's 
photograph was unnecessarily suggestive.  In Day, two 
eyewitnesses were waiting in a room at the police station, 
alone, with a flyer that bore an image of the defendant's face 
and said that the defendant had been in an altercation at a bar, 
the same incident that occasioned the witnesses to go to the 
police station.  Id. at 244.  The witnesses subsequently 
identified the defendant's photograph from an array with six 
photographs.  Id. at 244, 249.  The Appeals Court held that the 
out-of-court identifications should have been suppressed.  Id. 
at 250.  These identifications were far more suggestive than El 
                     
20 
 
evidence that Grigoryants did anything to pressure El Hafidi to 
confirm his suspicion.  Witnesses often are shown an individual 
at a showup who matches a description of a suspect.  
Commonwealth v. Watson, 455 Mass. 246, 252-253 (2009), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Phillips, 452 Mass. 617, 628 (2008).  Showups 
are disfavored because they are "inherently suggestive."  
However, it is only when showups conducted by the police are 
"unnecessarily suggestive" that the resulting identification 
must be suppressed.  Phillips, supra at 627, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Martin, 447 Mass. 274, 279 (2006).  El Hafidi's 
identification of the photograph was made in circumstances 
comparable to a permissible showup conducted by a police 
officer.  Had the showup been conducted by a police officer, it 
would not have been deemed unnecessarily suggestive.  If the 
identification procedure was not "unnecessarily suggestive," see 
Johnson, 473 Mass. at    , had it been conducted by the police, 
it could not have been "especially suggestive" because it was 
conducted by a third party, as here.  See id. at    .  Moreover, 
there was "good reason" to do it in the circumstances.  See 
Martin, supra at 282-283.  It was important to ascertain whether 
the defendant was the robber from July 7 while he was just 
outside the bank, so the police could be summoned if he were.   
Hafidi's identifications, and we add that there was some, though 
minimal, government involvement in Day.   
                                                                  
21 
 
 
The record also supports a finding that El Hafidi relied 
solely on her experience from July 7, when she was only a few 
feet from the individual who robbed her, to identify the 
defendant.  When Grigoryants showed her the photograph, which 
depicted the defendant from behind, she expressed doubt that he 
was the July 7 robber because the man depicted in the photograph 
had a hairstyle different from the July 7 robber.  She did not 
identify the defendant as the man in the photograph at that 
time.  Whatever suggestiveness Grigoryants may have imparted was 
not so high that the danger of unfair prejudice outweighed the 
probative value of her identification, where that identification 
was substantially grounded in El Hafidi's experience with the 
robber on July 7.  It was not until she saw the defendant 
walking and ultimately sitting outside the bank, and drawing 
upon the observations of his gait, build, and race, which she 
had made during the July 7 robbery, that she was sure that he 
was the same man who robbed her on July 7.   
 
Additionally, the defendant does not argue that El Hafidi's 
description of him or the robber has changed over time, or that 
she previously had failed to identify the defendant -- factors 
we have said may be relevant when determining whether an 
identification is reliable in the totality of the circumstances.  
See Johnson, 473 Mass. at    .  El Hafidi consistently had 
described the defendant as the robber and even questioned the 
22 
 
photograph that Grigoryants showed her because she remembered 
the robber as having had shorter hair than the man in the 
photograph.  There is no reason to consider El Hafidi's 
identifications to be unreliable so as to warrant suppression 
under Jones.   
 
The defendant next contends that El Hafidi's identification 
of the defendant outside the bank was especially suggestive 
because the defendant was not under restraint and El Hafidi was 
in a predicament of either identifying the defendant as the 
robber or risking being robbed again.  Further, the defendant 
argues that this identification was especially suggestive 
because it occurred at the same place and same time of day, 
while he was wearing similar clothing.  The defendant's argument 
has no merit.  The defendant controlled the circumstances in 
which he was identified.  It was not scripted or orchestrated by 
anyone other than the defendant.  Although he was exhibiting the 
same modus operandi as did the robber on July 7, this does not 
make the circumstances especially suggestive.  The defendant was 
sitting, facing the bank and staring directly into it.  El 
Hafidi, drawing from her experience on July 7, identified the 
defendant not only based on his clothing but also by his gait, 
build, and race -- features that she had ample time to observe 
on July 7.  The identification was reliable.   
 
There is no merit to the defendant's claim that El Hafidi's 
23 
 
viewing the police draw their weapons on the defendant 
reinforced her previous suggestive identifications.  More 
compelling facts were presented in Commonwealth v. Walker, 421 
Mass. 90 (1995).  In that case the witness was working at a 
donut shop where she was robbed.  Id. at 92.  She telephoned the 
police and gave a description of the man who had robbed her.  
Id. at 92-93.  About two weeks later, the same witness was 
working at another branch of the donut shop and a coworker 
called from the front of the store asking her to look at a 
customer.  Id. at 93.  When the witness did so, she saw the 
individual who she believed had robbed her two weeks before.  
Id.  She telephoned the police, and when they arrived, she 
described the customer, who had left the store.  Id.  The police 
apprehended the defendant at a nearby subway station and brought 
him to the donut shop where the witness was working.  Id.  He 
was positioned outside the shop, in handcuffs, next to a police 
officer and a police vehicle.  Id.  The witness identified him 
as the robber.  Id.  The court held that the identification was 
not unnecessarily suggestive.  Id. at 94-95.  In the present 
case, the police did not bring the defendant to El Hafidi.  She 
was inside the bank while the defendant was being arrested, and 
when the police asked her if it was the same individual, she 
said yes.  This identification was not unnecessarily suggestive.  
She had already identified the defendant based on her experience 
24 
 
of being robbed three weeks earlier and merely repeated her 
identification to the police.   
 
Finally, the defendant argues that El Hafidi's in-court 
identification was tainted by inadmissible out-of-court 
identifications.  As we have concluded above, her out-of-court 
identifications were reliable.  Her identification to the police 
in response to their question whether the defendant was the 
person who had robbed her on July 7 was not made under 
conditions that were unnecessarily suggestive.  It follows that 
her in-court identifications were not tainted.  See Commonwealth 
v. Collins, 470 Mass. 255, 262 (2014).  Because a motion to 
suppress likely would not have been successful, the defendant 
has failed to show that counsel was ineffective in the 
constitutional sense.5  Comita, 441 Mass. at 91.   
 
5 We note that trial counsel was successful in requesting 
eyewitness identification jury instructions that were more 
favorable than the typical jury instructions given at the time. 
See Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 378 Mass. 296, 310-311 (1979) 
(Appendix), S.C., 419 Mass. 1006 (1995) (setting forth model 
jury instruction for eyewitness identification).  The defendant 
requested jury instructions from New Jersey.  The New Jersey 
model instructions on eyewitness identification were published 
in July, 2012, one month before the trial in this case 
commenced.  See Commonwealth v. Gomes, 470 Mass. 352, 357 n.10 
(2015).  These instructions were drafted pursuant to the 
landmark decision in State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208 (2011), 
and they were pertinent to this court’s decision and proposed 
model jury instruction in Gomes, supra.  Subsequent to our 
decision in that case, we approved and recommended the use of 
the final Model Eyewitness Identification Instruction, which 
replaced the provisional instruction in the appendix of Gomes, 
supra at 379-388, and which is very similar to the model jury 
                     
25 
 
 
Finally, the defendant has not shown that even if El 
Hafidi's identifications should have been suppressed, there was 
a reasonable possibility that the verdict would have been 
different.  See Commonwealth v. Pena, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 201, 205 
(1991).  There was other powerful evidence from which the jury 
could have convicted the defendant, including videotapes and 
photographs from the bank's surveillance camera and the parking 
garage camera from July 7, which depicted the robbery and the 
defendant, as well as the photograph that Grigoryants took with 
his cellular telephone.  There was testimony from witnesses to 
the July 7 robbery who gave similar descriptions of the robber.  
There was evidence of the similarities in the defendant's 
actions, dress, transportation, and items on his person on both 
July 7 and July 26.   
 
6.  Ineffective assistance of counsel -- right to testify.  
The defendant argues that the judge erred in denying his motion 
instruction in New Jersey.  See Model Jury Instructions on 
Eyewitness Identification, 473 Mass. 1051 (2015); New Jersey 
Model Jury Instruction on Eyewitness Identification (rev. July 
19, 2012), available at https://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/ 
pressrel/2012/jury_instruction.pdf [http://perma.cc/PYR6-9FWF].  
The jury were instructed on the dangers of eyewitness 
identification and factors to consider when deciding what weight 
to give to identification testimony.  The defendant, three years 
before our decision in Gomes, had the benefit of jury 
instructions that went well beyond the jury instructions typical 
of the time.  See Gomes, supra at 357 (stating provisional jury 
instruction modeled after New Jersey model instruction "was 
considerably longer and more detailed than the Rodriguez 
instruction").   
                                                                  
26 
 
for a new trial because his trial counsel erroneously advised 
him that if he testified at trial, five prior convictions, 
including of two larcenies involving motor vehicles, two charges 
of knowingly receiving a stolen motor vehicle, and one charge of 
unlawful possession of a firearm, could be used to impeach him.  
The defendant argues that he chose not to testify because of 
trial counsel's incorrect advice, and therefore his waiver of 
his right to testify was invalid.  The Commonwealth argues that 
the record contradicts the defendant's assertions.  We agree 
with the Commonwealth.   
 
In anticipation of the Commonwealth's resting the next day, 
the trial judge addressed the defendant's motion in limine to 
exclude evidence of the defendant's prior convictions.  The 
judge was inclined to admit the evidence because she believed 
that the five prior convictions at issue were not time-barred 
under G. L. c. 233, § 21.  Defense counsel agreed with the trial 
judge.  The judge provisionally determined the prior convictions 
were not time-barred but asked both attorneys to do more 
research and stated that they would take up the issue the next 
day.  The next day, when the judge addressed the issue again, 
the Commonwealth told the judge that it may be a "moot point" 
and deferred to defense counsel.  Defense counsel agreed, 
explaining that he spoke with his client the night before and 
that he did not expect his client to testify.   
27 
 
 
We begin by stating that the five prior convictions 
pertinent to this case were all time-barred under G. L. c. 233, 
§ 21.  Because trial counsel agreed with the trial judge in her 
misinterpretation of G. L. c. 233, § 21, the defendant argues 
that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because he 
relied on the misinterpretation in deciding whether to testify.  
Although counsel misinterpreted G. L. c. 233, § 21, the 
defendant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
"that, but for his counsel's erroneous advice concerning the 
admissibility of his [prior convictions], he would have 
testified in his own defense."  Commonwealth v. Freeman, 29 
Mass. App. Ct. 635, 642 (1990).   
 
"The right to testify on one's own behalf . . . is 
fundamental."  Commonwealth v. Smith, 459 Mass. 538, 550 (2011), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Degro, 432 Mass. 319, 335 (2000).  In 
his motion for a new trial, the defendant submitted an affidavit 
explaining that on the evening after the motion in limine was 
discussed, trial counsel visited the defendant and told him that 
if he testified, he could be impeached with his prior 
convictions.  The defendant claims that if the prior convictions 
were not introduced he would have testified at trial.  If he had 
testified, the defendant would have testified that he did not 
rob the bank on July 7, 2011, and explained why the person on 
the surveillance tapes was not him, and that he did plan to rob 
28 
 
the bank on July 26, 2011, but "lost [his] nerve."  Trial 
counsel did not file an affidavit.  "It is not enough to say 
that counsel had discouraged him from testifying."  Commonwealth 
v. Lucien, 440 Mass. 658, 671 (2004).  "[A] motion judge may 
reject a defendant's self-serving affidavit as not credible."  
Commonwealth v. Colon, 439 Mass. 519, 530 (2003), citing 
Commonwealth v. Grant, 426 Mass. 667, 673 (1998), S.C., 440 
Mass. 1001 (2003).  See Commonwealth v. Smith, 456 Mass. 476, 
481 (2010).   
 
Based on the record, the defendant's credibility is called 
into question.  Before the motion in limine was discussed, 
defense counsel told the judge that the defendant was most 
likely not going to testify.  This decision was made before the 
provisional ruling to admit the prior convictions for 
impeachment.  When the issue was revisited the next morning, 
defense counsel explained that the discussion was moot because 
the defendant would not be testifying.  The record suggests that 
in deciding not to testify the defendant did not rely on trial 
counsel's advice regarding prior convictions.  Furthermore, it 
is highly unlikely that the defendant would have testified 
because doing so would have sacrificed his defense to the July 7 
robbery in an effort to obtain a not guilty verdict on the July 
26 attempted robbery charge.  The defendant's affidavit said he 
would have testified that he was planning to rob the bank on 
29 
 
July 26 but lost his nerve.  If he had testified to this, it 
would have damaged his case theory because admitting to the fact 
that he intended to rob the bank on July 26 would have lead the 
jury to believe that he was predisposed to robbing a bank.  This 
would have undermined his mistaken identity defense to the July 
7 robbery.  We conclude that the defendant has failed to show 
that his decision not to testify was based on incorrect advice 
from counsel.   
 
The defendant further argues that the judge erred in 
denying the defendant's motion for a new trial without an 
evidentiary hearing.  We disagree.  "The decision whether to 
hold an evidentiary hearing is committed to the discretion of 
the motion judge, and we review that decision for an abuse of 
discretion."  Commonwealth v. Denis, 442 Mass. 617, 628 (2004).  
See Commonwealth v. Stewart, 383 Mass. 253, 257 (1981).  If no 
"substantial issue" is raised by the motion or the affidavits 
submitted, the judge has the discretion to decide postconviction 
motions without an evidentiary hearing.  See Denis, supra, 
quoting Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (c) (3), as appearing in 435 Mass. 
1501 (2001).  When considering whether a motion for a new trial 
warrants an evidentiary hearing, the judge must look to the 
"seriousness of the issue itself and the adequacy of the 
defendant's showing on that issue must be considered."  Denis, 
supra.  See Stewart, supra at 257-258.  In this case, the 
30 
 
defendant filed a motion for a new trial and submitted an 
affidavit written by the defendant, police reports, a motion to 
change counsel, and a motion in limine to exclude evidence of 
the defendant's prior convictions.  The motion and supporting 
materials do not need to prove the issues raised; however, "they 
must at least contain sufficient credible information to cast 
doubt on the issue."  Denis, supra at 629.  The record does not 
contain facts that would require an evidentiary hearing by the 
judge.  Where the motion judge was also the trial judge she "may 
use [her] 'knowledge and evaluation of the evidence at trial in 
determining whether to decide the motion for a new trial without 
an evidentiary hearing.'"  Commonwealth v. Riley, 467 Mass. 799, 
826 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Wallis, 440 Mass. 589, 596 
(2003).  The motion judge properly determined that an 
evidentiary hearing was not warranted.   
 
7.  Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the 
defendant's convictions of armed robbery and attempted robbery 
and the orders denying his motions for a required finding of not 
guilty, for a new trial, and for postconviction discovery.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.