Title: Van, Sr., et ux., v. Schmidt
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC11-1467
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: September 4, 2013

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC11-1467 
____________ 
 
CHARLES VAN, SR., et ux., 
Petitioners, 
 
vs. 
 
DANIEL SCHMIDT, 
Respondent. 
 
[September 4, 2013] 
 
PARIENTE, J. 
This case concerns the proper standard of review and the appropriate remedy 
when an appellate court reviews a trial court’s order granting a new trial on the 
ground that the jury verdict was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, 
where the trial court’s order was premised, at least in part, on an error of law.  In 
this case, the trial court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial based on the 
manifest weight of the evidence.  The trial court’s order, however, was premised, 
at least in part, on an error of law—specifically, that the jury could not reject the 
uncontroverted testimony of the experts.  On appeal, in reviewing the trial court’s 
order, the First District Court of Appeal did not give deference to the trial court’s 
 
- 2 - 
erroneous conclusion of law.  Schmidt v. Van, 65 So. 3d 1105, 1107-08 (Fla. 1st 
DCA 2011). 
In Kuebler v. Ferris, 65 So. 3d 1154, 1158-59 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011), the 
Fourth District Court of Appeal expressly disagreed with the First District’s 
approach in Schmidt, emphasizing the “very limited authority of the appellate 
court in reviewing the broad discretion granted to the trial court,” even where the 
trial court’s grant of a new trial is premised, at least in part, on an error of law.  
Because of this express and direct conflict between the standard of review applied 
in Schmidt and Kuebler, we have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. 
We resolve this conflict by holding—consistent with the appellate standard 
of review generally applied to all trial court orders—that an appellate court 
properly applies a de novo standard of review to a trial court’s conclusions of law 
in an order granting a new trial based on the manifest weight of the evidence, 
giving no deference to the trial court’s legal conclusions.  Therefore, we approve 
the reasoning of Schmidt to the extent that the First District’s analysis was 
consistent with this holding, and we disapprove Kuebler to the extent that the 
Fourth District interpreted this Court’s decisions in E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. 
Farnes, 697 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1997), and Brown v. Estate of Stuckey, 749 So. 2d 
490 (Fla. 1999), to require deference to a trial court’s conclusions of law, even 
where the trial court’s order was premised, at least in part, on an error of law. 
 
- 3 - 
However, although a trial court’s conclusions of law are not entitled to 
deference, its findings of facts and determinations of credibility are still entitled to 
deference because of the trial court’s superior vantage point of having been present 
during the entire trial.  In this case, after correctly affording no deference to the 
trial court’s erroneous conclusion of law in Schmidt, the First District in its 
analysis then misapplied the standards set forth by this Court in E.R. Squibb & 
Sons and Stuckey by failing to defer to the trial court’s findings of fact and 
determinations of credibility and to recognize the trial court’s role in evaluating a 
motion for new trial.  Instead, in reversing the trial court’s order, the First District 
incorrectly focused on whether competent, substantial evidence supported the 
jury’s verdict and reweighed the evidence in the trial court’s stead.  We therefore 
also have jurisdiction in this case based on the First District’s misapplication of our 
precedent.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.; see also State v. McMahon, 94 So. 3d 
468, 471 n.2 (Fla. 2012) (recognizing misapplication as a basis for conflict 
jurisdiction). 
Although we conclude that the First District was correct in reversing the trial 
court’s order, we quash the First District’s decision because we conclude that 
reinstatement of the jury verdict was not the proper remedy in this case.  Instead, 
when an appellate court has determined that a trial court’s grant of a new trial is 
premised, at least in part, on an error of law, the inquiry then becomes whether the 
 
- 4 - 
trial court would have granted a new trial but for the error of law.  Because we are 
unable to ascertain from a review of the record in this case whether the trial court 
would have reached the same result but for the error of law, the proper remedy is to 
return the case to the trial court for reconsideration of its order granting a new trial 
in light of the correct legal principles set forth in this opinion—specifically, that 
the jury could properly reject the experts’ uncontroverted testimony, provided that 
the jury’s rejection of the uncontroverted expert testimony was premised on some 
reasonable basis in the evidence. 
FACTS AND BACKGROUND 
Charles Van, Sr., and his wife sued Daniel J. Schmidt, seeking recovery for 
injuries allegedly sustained in an October 2007 automobile collision, in which 
Schmidt rear-ended Van’s vehicle while intoxicated.  Van asserted that as a result 
of the rear-end collision, he sustained injuries that included neck pain, resulting in 
a cervical spinal fusion surgery (surgery on the cervical vertebrae in the neck) in 
2009.  Liability was not contested; instead, Schmidt’s defense was that the 
automobile accident was not the cause of Van’s injuries.  In contesting causation, 
Schmidt contended that the accident was a minor one, which caused minimal 
damage to both vehicles.  Schmidt also pointed to Van’s medical history, which 
included preexisting back pain and spinal degeneration, a prior cervical spinal 
 
- 5 - 
fusion surgery in 1991, and a prior car accident in 1998.  Finally, Schmidt called 
into question Van’s credibility. 
All of the medical experts who testified at trial, including the defense expert 
witness, agreed that the 2007 automobile collision was, at least in part, the cause of 
Van’s neck injury.  The Vans introduced a videotaped deposition of the first 
expert, Dr. Zhou, a pain specialist.  Dr. Zhou stated that Van first came into the 
clinic in August 2008 complaining of neck and lower back pain.  Dr. Zhou did not 
anticipate that Van will ever be pain-free.  In Dr. Zhou’s opinion, Van’s neck and 
lower back pain, as well as the 2009 cervical spinal fusion surgery, were a result of 
the 2007 accident.  Dr. Zhou stated that the back pain was a result of the accident 
because Van did not have back pain before the accident.1
 
The second expert, Dr. Feussner, a neurologist, started seeing Van in 
December 2007 and referred him to Dr. Scott, the neurosurgeon who performed 
the 2009 cervical spinal fusion surgery after the accident.  When Van provided his 
prior medical history to Dr. Feussner, he did not mention the prior cervical spinal 
fusion surgery in 1991 or the 1998 car accident.  According to Dr. Feussner, there 
is not necessarily a correlation between the amount of damage to a vehicle and to 
an occupant.  Dr. Feussner testified that it was his medical opinion that Van 
 
                                         
 
1.  To the contrary, the evidence reflected that Van had actually reported 
lower back pain in September 2007—shortly before the accident—and in July 
2006. 
 
- 6 - 
suffered a permanent injury to his neck that was directly related to and caused by 
the October 2007 accident.  Even with a preexisting problem such as degeneration, 
which Van had, trauma suffered during a rear-end collision can accelerate or 
aggravate the problem.  In contrast to his conclusion with respect to Van’s neck 
injury, Dr. Feussner testified that it was difficult to correlate the lower back pain 
with the accident because Van had complained of lower back pain prior to the 
accident, including just seventeen days before. 
 
The third expert, Dr. Scott, was the neurosurgeon who performed the 
cervical spinal fusion surgery on Van in 2009.  Dr. Scott testified that it is normal 
for people to develop spinal degeneration as they age, and smoking is a risk factor.  
Van, who was fifty-six years old at the time of the accident, was a life-long 
smoker.  Such degenerative changes can exist without accompanying pain or 
symptoms, but trauma from an accident can trigger symptoms.  Dr. Scott was 
aware that Van was in an automobile accident in 1998, in which he sustained 
abdominal injuries and, in the following month, complained of back and neck pain.  
However, there were no medical records indicating that Van had neck problems for 
the six years prior to the October 2007 accident at issue.  In Dr. Scott’s opinion, it 
was the October 2007 accident that caused Van’s current neck problems and his 
need for surgery.  While the likelihood of a serious injury increases with the 
violence of an automobile accident, Dr. Scott could not say with any certainty that 
 
- 7 - 
a low-speed accident cannot cause a neurological injury or that a high-speed 
accident is necessarily going to cause one. 
Although Dr. Scott stated that Van did not disclose degenerative arthritis or 
prior surgeries on the patient intake form, Dr. Scott explained that the intake form 
can be overwhelming and that patients sometimes forget to include things.  Finally, 
Dr. Scott stated that he had instructed Van that he did not need to wear a surgical 
collar, which Van wore during one of the days of trial.  However, Dr. Scott 
testified that people sometimes end up wearing a collar for external support 
because of muscle atrophy and explained that Van has significant muscle atrophy 
at the surgical site and still uses the collar for comfort. 
 
The defense presented Dr. Trimble as an expert witness.  Dr. Trimble 
testified that he saw Van for a compulsory medical examination about four months 
after Van’s 2009 cervical spinal fusion surgery.  On the MRIs and x-rays, Dr. 
Trimble observed degeneration, which is a long-standing wear and tear that does 
not happen quickly but rather over the course of years.  The amount of 
degeneration was more than Dr. Trimble would expect for a man of Van’s age, but 
that degeneration can be aggravated or exacerbated by trauma. 
With respect to Van’s neck pain, Dr. Trimble’s expert medical opinion was 
that Van became symptomatic as a result of the October 2007 motor vehicle 
accident and sustained permanent impairment as it related to the cervical spine.  
 
- 8 - 
Although Van had neck problems and surgery in 1991, Dr. Trimble’s opinion as to 
causation was based on the fact that he did not see records indicating that Van was 
complaining of neck pain immediately predating the 2007 car accident, as well as 
based on Van’s statements about whether he had previously experienced neck pain.  
With respect to the lower back pain, however, Dr. Trimble testified that Van’s 
lower back injury predated the car accident because Van had been complaining of 
lower back pain just prior to the car accident. 
In addition to the expert testimony presented, testimony was also provided 
by Van, his wife, and their daughter.  Van’s wife testified that she saw her husband 
about an hour and a half after the accident, and he was having pain at that time in 
his back, neck, and right hip.  She drove him to the emergency room.  The Vans’ 
daughter testified that when her mother called her after the accident, her father was 
“complaining” and her mother “took him and had him checked.”  The emergency 
room records from the day of the car accident reflected that Van was complaining 
of neck, back, and hip pain. 
Van, his wife, and their daughter all testified that before the 2007 accident, 
Van was able to engage in various activities in which he is no longer able to 
engage, including carpentry, mechanic work, yard work, playing games with and 
chasing grandchildren, swimming, barbequing, walking the dogs, and going to the 
movies.  Since the 2007 accident, Van was no longer able to travel to see his 
 
- 9 - 
grandchildren and had problems sitting for extended periods of time.  Van and his 
daughter testified that Van’s preexisting emphysema and chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease (COPD) did not impair his ability to engage in these activities 
before the accident.  When questioned, Van stated that he was diagnosed with 
emphysema in the early 1970s and had not been able to work (his last job was in 
1976), but he was previously able to enjoy his hobbies because he knew his limits.  
However, since the 2007 accident, he had been in constant pain. 
Van also testified that he began smoking when he was very young.  He was 
in an automobile accident in 1998, but did not recall complaining about his neck 
following that accident.  Before the 2007 car accident with defendant Schmidt, 
Van had problems with his lower back, but the accident made the pain worse.  Van 
stated that he had problems with his neck before the cervical spinal fusion surgery 
in 1991, but did not have ongoing neck problems after that surgery.  Van described 
the impact from the 2007 accident as a “hard hit,” which caused serious damage to 
his vehicle.  Van testified that he does not go to the doctor for every ailment or 
pain. 
In contesting causation, Schmidt argued that the accident was a minor one.  
Specifically, he relied on photographs depicting minimal damage, as well as the 
fact that the damage to Van’s vehicle was only $800 and that it had not been 
repaired but his wife continued to drive it.  Schmidt further relied on Van’s 
 
- 10 - 
medical history, which included that Van was taking pain medication for back pain 
at the time of the accident, that he had a prior cervical spinal fusion surgery in 
1991, that there was a previous car accident in 1998, in which Van was ejected 
from the vehicle, that Van had spinal degenerative disease and emphysema, and 
that Van was a long-time smoker, which could cause degeneration of the spine.  
Schmidt also called into question Van’s credibility in asserting a lack of neck pain 
in the sixteen years prior to the October 2007 automobile accident, asserting that 
Van was not completely honest in his patient questionnaires and did not like to go 
to the doctor, and the fact that the doctors’ assessment of causation as to the neck 
pain was based on the lack of medical records concerning neck pain and Van’s 
self-reporting that he did not have any neck pain prior to the accident. 
 
Upon the conclusion of the three-day trial, the jury returned a verdict finding 
that Van had not suffered injury as a result of the 2007 automobile collision, by 
answering “NO” to the question of whether “the negligence on the part of 
defendant, DANIEL J. SCHMIDT, [was] the legal cause of damage to plaintiff, 
CHARLES VAN, SR.”  The Vans filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial 
court granted on the basis that the verdict was contrary to the manifest weight of 
the evidence. 
In its order granting a new trial, the trial court found that  
[t]he determination of causation in this case is not one that could be 
made by a lay observer, such as a bullet or knife wound.  In this case, 
 
- 11 - 
expert testimony was necessary for the jury to determine whether or 
not the rear-end collision had any causal relationship to [Van’s] spinal 
fusion. 
The trial court then reviewed the evidence it found relevant to the issue of 
causation, including the fact that Van underwent cervical spinal fusion surgery in 
1991 but had recovered, and the testimony of the medical experts that Van suffered 
injury as a result of the automobile collision.2
 
While the degree of damage to the vehicles in the 2007 
collision may be circumstantial evidence of lack of causation, there 
was no expert testimony from which non-experts could reasonably 
draw that conclusion.  None of the doctors testified that the degree of 
damage to the vehicles was a factor in his opinion as to causation.  
There was no expert testimony regarding accident reconstruction or 
how such factors as speed, force, angles, strength of materials, or 
other such technical matters might affect causation of the injury 
complained of.  No reasonable juror would conclude “no causation” in 
the absence of such expert testimony in light of the opinions of the 
three doctors. 
  The trial court stated that it had 
weighed and considered the defense’s evidence and arguments, which included the 
minimal damage to the vehicles, Van’s failure to advise the medical experts during 
initial visits of his prior surgery, and the preexisting degeneration of his cervical 
spine.  The trial court found as follows with respect to the defense’s evidence: 
 
While the Court acknowledges that [Van] was a “poor 
historian” by failing to initially report the earlier surgery to the 
doctors, it is clear that each doctor knew of the prior surgery before 
forming his opinion and before giving his testimony. . . .  Each said 
that, in large part, his opinion was based on the absence of complaints 
                                         
 
2.  Although four medical experts were presented at trial, the trial court 
mentioned only Dr. Feussner, Dr. Scott, and Dr. Trimble in its order. 
 
- 12 - 
regarding [Van’s] cervical spine prior to the 2007 collision.  No 
reasonable juror, when considering [Van’s] credibility, would 
conclude that he would have chosen to not report cervical pain for 
sixteen (16) years prior to the 2007 collision in order to fabricate 
causation in that collision.  His credibility had little, if any, weight on 
the issue of causation in light of the uncontroverted opinions of the 
three informed and credible doctors. 
 
. . .  [The three doctors] all agreed that [Van’s] injury and 
resulting surgery was caused, at least in part, as a result of the 2007 
collision.  No reasonable juror would conclude that degeneration, to 
the exclusion of the collision, was the cause of [Van’s] injury in light 
of the testimony of the three doctors. 
The trial court concluded that the verdict of no causation was contrary to the 
manifest weight of the evidence and accordingly granted the motion for new trial. 
On appeal, the First District concluded that the trial court abused its 
discretion in granting the motion for new trial.  Schmidt, 65 So. 3d at 1109-10.  
The First District began its analysis by quoting the highly deferential standard of 
review set forth by this Court in Stuckey: 
A trial court’s decision to grant a new trial on the grounds that 
the verdict is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion.  Brown v. Estate of Stuckey, 749 So. 
2d 490 (Fla. 1999).  In [Stuckey]
When reviewing the order granting a new trial, an 
appellate court must recognize the broad discretionary 
authority of the trial judge and apply a reasonableness 
test to determine whether the trial judge committed an 
abuse of discretion.  If an appellate court determines that 
reasonable persons could differ as to the propriety of the 
action taken by the trial court, there can be no finding of 
an abuse of discretion. 
, the Florida Supreme Court 
explained the highly deferential standard of review an appellate court 
must apply when reviewing an order granting a new trial: 
 
- 13 - 
Id.
Schmidt, 65 So. 3d at 1107.  The First District stated, however, that a reviewing 
court may find an abuse of discretion “in two circumstances: (1) where the 
evidence in the record does not support the trial court’s determination; or (2) where 
the trial court’s determination rests on an incorrect conclusion of law.”  Id. at 1108 
(citing Jordan v. Brown, 855 So. 2d 231, 234 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Corbett v. 
Wilson, 48 So. 3d 131, 133 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010)). 
 at 497-98. 
The First District concluded that in this case, “the trial court’s determination 
that the jury verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence was premised 
on an erroneous conclusion of law.”  Id.  Specifically, the First District pointed to 
the trial court’s ruling that “based on the evidence introduced through the 
testimony of the expert witnesses relative to causation, the jury could not 
determine that the 2007 accident caused no injury to Mr. Van, despite conflicting 
lay testimony and evidence introduced at trial.”  Id. 
The First District explained that this was error because “[i]t is well-
established that a jury may reject any testimony, including testimony of experts.”  
Id.  The First District observed that the standard jury instruction given to the jury 
in this case provided that the jury may accept or reject expert witness testimony, or 
give it the weight that the jury thinks it deserves.  Id. (citing Fla. Std. Jury Instr. 
(Civ.) 601.2(b)).  The First District recognized that the jury’s rejection of expert 
 
- 14 - 
testimony must be premised on some reasonable basis in the evidence, but stated 
that “[l]ay testimony or evidence which conflicts with the expert testimony, as well 
as conflicting testimony by the plaintiff may provide a reasonable basis for 
rejecting expert testimony.”  Id. (citing Wald v. Grainger, 64 So. 3d 1201, 1205-06 
(Fla. 2011)). 
The First District reasoned that “[t]he expert testimony in this case 
conflicted with much of the lay testimony presented to the jury.  In such cases, 
where expert testimony conflicts with lay testimony, the trial court should defer to 
the jury to weigh the evidence.”  Id. (citing Easkold v. Rhodes, 614 So. 2d 495 
(Fla. 1993)).  The First District then reviewed the evidence presented in this case: 
Here, in addition to the medical experts, the jury heard 
testimony from several witnesses, including the plaintiffs, Mr. and 
Mrs. Van.  Evidence and testimony introduced at trial portrayed the 
accident as a mere fender-bender.  The jury examined photographs 
depicting the damage to the Vans’ vehicle, which was described by 
Mr. Van as a crack or scrape on the back bumper.  Mr. Van further 
testified that the total damage to his vehicle was estimated to be 
approximately $800 . . . . 
Other testimony offered at trial demonstrated that Mr. Van had 
an extensive medical history, which included a prior surgery, another 
automobile accident, and several significant medical diagnoses.  Mr. 
Van testified that he had undergone a prior cervical spinal fusion 
surgery in 1991.  Mr. Van testified that he had been in an automobile 
accident in 1998, in which he was ejected from the vehicle.  Mr. Van 
testified that he had a back sprain shortly before the 2007 accident.  In 
addition, medical records were introduced at trial revealing that Mr. 
Van had visited a hospital in 2006, complaining of severe lower back 
pain; that Mr. Van had visited the hospital less than a month before 
the 2007 accident, complaining of the same symptoms; and that he 
 
- 15 - 
was taking the pain medication, Lortab, at the time of the 2007 
accident. 
Through the testimony of the medical experts, the jury heard 
that Mr. Van had pre-existing degeneration of his cervical spine.  On 
cross-examination, Mr. Van revealed a number of other medical 
conditions affecting his overall health. . . . 
Testimony introduced at trial also demonstrated inconsistencies 
in Mr. Van’s story on material issues in the case, placing his 
credibility into question.  Despite Mr. Van’s testimony regarding his 
extensive medical history and pre-existing medical conditions, and 
that he had not been employed since the 1970’s [sic], he nonetheless 
testified that before the 2007 automobile accident he was able to work 
around the house, do carpentry work or mechanic work, and swim, 
run, and play with his grandkids.  Mr. Van testified that after the 2007 
accident, he was unable to engage in these activities. 
When Mr. Van sought medical treatment following the 2007 
accident, he failed to disclose to the treating physician that he had 
undergone a prior cervical spinal fusion surgery or that he had been 
involved in an earlier automobile accident.  Mr. Van disclosed the 
prior cervical spinal fusion surgery only upon inquiry by his 
neurosurgeon . . . .  During trial, the jury observed Mr. Van wearing a 
neck brace.  During the cross-examination of Mr. Van’s 
neurosurgeon, the physician testified that there was no medical 
necessity for Mr. Van to be wearing the neck brace.  In light of this 
testimony, the jury was entitled to judge Mr. Van’s credibility and 
accept or reject his testimony on all issues. 
Id. at 1109.  The First District concluded as follows: 
Based on the evidence and testimony introduced at trial and the 
instructions presented to it, the jury could properly reject the 
testimony of the medical experts who opined that Mr. Van’s injuries 
were caused at least in part by the automobile accident and conclude 
that Mr. Van suffered no injury as a result of the 2007 accident.  By 
failing to recognize the jury’s prerogative to reject the expert 
testimony on causation, particularly in light of the lay testimony 
which conflicted with the expert testimony, the trial court erred in 
concluding that the manifest weight of the evidence was contrary to 
the jury verdict.  See Easkold v. Rhodes, 614 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 1993).  
 
- 16 - 
Accordingly, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in 
granting the motion for new trial. 
Id. at 1109-10.  The First District therefore reversed and remanded for the trial 
court to enter a judgment on the jury verdict.  Id. at 1110. 
ANALYSIS 
 
The issue in this case is whether the First District’s review of the trial court’s 
order granting a new trial was contrary to the standards set forth by this Court.  
This issue presents a pure question of law, and our review is de novo.  Bosem v. 
Musa Holdings, Inc., 46 So. 3d 42, 44 (Fla. 2010) (“Because this is a pure question 
of law, our standard of review is de novo.”). 
We begin by reviewing the general applicable law pertaining to orders 
granting a new trial.  Then, we discuss the conflict cases and the standard of review 
that applies when the trial court’s order is premised, at least in part, on an error of 
law.  Finally, we address the proper remedy in this case. 
I.  General Law Regarding Orders Granting a New Trial 
“A trial judge may order a new trial on the grounds that the verdict is 
inadequate or excessive, against the manifest weight of the evidence, or both.”  
Stuckey, 749 So. 2d at 498.  “Regardless of whether a new trial was ordered 
because the verdict was excessive or inadequate or was contrary to the manifest 
weight of the evidence,” the appellate court applies the reasonableness test—if an 
appellate court determines that reasonable persons could differ as to the propriety 
 
- 17 - 
of the action taken by the trial court, there can be no finding of an abuse of 
discretion.  Id. 
Orders granting a new trial are required to state the specific grounds for 
granting a new trial: 
Order Granting to Specify Grounds.  All orders granting a new trial 
shall specify the specific grounds therefor.  If such an order is 
appealed and does not state the specific grounds, the appellate court 
shall relinquish its jurisdiction to the trial court for entry of an order 
specifying the grounds for granting the new trial. 
Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.530(f).  This Court has explained the reason for requiring that the 
trial court’s order include specific grounds and findings: 
Certainly a trial court is in a better position than an appellate 
court to pass on the ultimate correctness of a jury’s verdict, but 
superior vantage point does not give a trial judge unbridled discretion 
to order a new trial.  Consequently, to facilitate intelligent appellate 
review of such orders the reasons which produced the need for the 
new trial must be set forth in the order. 
Wackenhut Corp. v. Canty, 359 So. 2d 430, 434 (Fla. 1978) (citation omitted).  
The Court has explained the function of the trial court in evaluating a motion for a 
new trial on the ground that the verdict was contrary to the manifest weight of the 
evidence as follows: 
Clearly, it is a jury function to evaluate the credibility of any 
given witness.  Moreover, the trial judge should refrain from acting as 
an additional juror.  Nevertheless, the trial judge can and should grant 
a new trial if the manifest weight of the evidence is contrary to the 
verdict.  In making this decision, the trial judge must necessarily 
consider the credibility of the witnesses along with the weight of all of 
the other evidence. 
 
- 18 - 
E.R. Squibb & Sons, 697 So. 2d at 826 (quoting Smith v. Brown, 525 So. 2d 868, 
870 (Fla. 1988)).  This Court later summarized the extent of the trial court’s 
discretion in ruling on a motion for new trial: 
[T]his Court has repeatedly held that the trial judge has broad 
discretion in ruling on a motion for a new trial on the grounds that the 
verdict is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.  A trial 
judge has the responsibility to draw “on his [or her] talents, his [or 
her] knowledge, and his [or her] experience to keep the search for the 
truth in a proper channel,” and the trial judge should always grant a 
motion for a new trial when “the jury has been deceived as to the 
force and credibility of the evidence or has been influenced by 
considerations outside the record.”  Cloud[ v. Fallis]
Stuckey, 749 So. 2d at 497 (some alterations in original). 
, 110 So. 2d 
[669,] 673 [(Fla. 1959)].  The trial judge’s discretion permits the grant 
of a new trial although it is not “clear, obvious, and indisputable that 
the jury was wrong.”  When a trial judge grants the motion for a new 
trial, he or she must articulate the reasons for the new trial in the 
order. 
 
Once the trial court fulfills its functions in evaluating the motion for a new 
trial, this Court has emphasized that the highly deferential abuse of discretion 
standard applies on appellate review, because of the trial court’s favored vantage 
point.  E.R. Squibb & Sons, 697 So. 2d at 826.  “The mere showing that there was 
evidence in the record to support the jury verdict does not demonstrate an abuse of 
discretion.”  Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Smith, 525 So. 2d at 870).  Rather, 
“the reasonableness test” applies to determine whether the trial court abused its 
discretion: “If reasonable [persons] could differ as to the propriety of the action 
taken by the trial court, then the action is not unreasonable and there can be no 
 
- 19 - 
finding of an abuse of discretion.”  Id. at 826-27 (bracketed alteration in original) 
(quoting Smith, 525 So. 2d at 869-70). 
In E.R. Squibb & Sons, this Court reviewed a decision in which the district 
court reversed the trial court’s grant of a new trial on the basis that “[t]rial court 
judges do not have the discretion to substitute their judgment for that of the jury in 
regard to the conflicting testimony of expert medical witnesses.”  E.R. Squibb & 
Sons, 697 So. 2d at 826 (quoting Farnes v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 667 So. 2d 
1004, 1005 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)).  This Court quashed the district court’s decision 
and explained that although it is “a jury function to evaluate the credibility of any 
given witness,” the trial judge “can and should grant a new trial if the manifest 
weight of the evidence is contrary to the verdict.”  Id. (quoting Smith, 525 So. 2d 
at 870). 
In Stuckey, 749 So. 2d at 494, this Court reviewed a district court decision in 
which the district court reversed the grant of a new trial because it was not clear, 
obvious, and indisputable that the jury was wrong.  This Court reversed the district 
court, holding that the district court’s statement of law was contrary to this Court’s 
prior decisions that afford a trial court broad discretion in ruling on a motion for a 
new trial.  The Court further stated that “the quoted principle originated in a district 
court of appeal decision applying the substantial, competent evidence standard that 
was issued prior to this Court’s rejection of that standard in Cloud.”  Id. 
 
- 20 - 
(discussing Cloud, 110 So. 2d 669).  The Court explained that prior to its decision 
in Cloud, Florida appellate courts applied two standards when reviewing an order 
for a new trial based on the verdict being contrary to the manifest weight of the 
evidence: (1) the competent, substantial evidence standard, under which trial courts 
were directed to grant a motion for new trial only when the verdict was not 
supported by competent, substantial evidence; or (2) the broad discretion doctrine, 
under which trial courts were credited with having a superior vantage point at trial 
and given the responsibility of determining if the verdict was unjust.  Id. at 494-95.  
The Court stated that its decision in Cloud resolved the conflict by adopting the 
broad discretion doctrine and rejecting the competent, substantial evidence 
doctrine.  Id. at 495.  The Court then set forth the proper standards to be applied by 
the appellate court: 
When reviewing the order granting a new trial, an appellate 
court must recognize the broad discretionary authority of the trial 
judge and apply the reasonableness test to determine whether the trial 
judge committed an abuse of discretion.  If an appellate court 
determines that reasonable persons could differ as to the propriety of 
the action taken by the trial court, there can be no finding of an abuse 
of discretion.  The fact that there may be substantial, competent 
evidence in the record to support the jury verdict does not necessarily 
demonstrate that the trial judge abused his or her discretion
Id. at 497-98 (emphasis added).  The Court reviewed the record in Stuckey, 
concluding that “the trial judge acted within his broad discretion in granting the 
motion for a new trial” and “while reasonable persons might differ, . . . the action 
. 
 
- 21 - 
of the trial judge was not unreasonable and the grant of a new trial should have 
been affirmed.”  Id. at 498-99. 
II.  Orders Premised, At Least in Part, on an Error of Law 
 
The first conflict issue presented concerns the proper standard to be applied 
by an appellate court when reviewing an order granting a new trial on the ground 
that the verdict was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, where the trial 
court’s order was premised, at least in part, on an error of law.  We conclude that 
the First District in Schmidt correctly held that the same deference is not required 
where the basis for reversal is a legal one and that the Fourth District in Kuebler 
erred to the extent that it held that a reviewing court is required to afford deference 
to a trial court’s legal conclusions, even where the trial court’s order was premised, 
at least in part, on an error of law. 
The First District in this case held that a trial court commits reversible error 
“in determining that the manifest weight of the evidence was contrary to the 
verdict and granting a new trial in two circumstances: (1) where the evidence in the 
record does not support the trial court’s determination; or (2) where the trial court’s 
determination rests on an incorrect conclusion of law.”  Schmidt, 65 So. 3d at 
1107-08 (citing Jordan, 855 So. 2d at 234; Corbett, 48 So. 3d at 133).  In setting 
forth this holding, the First District relied on the reasoning of the Fifth District in 
 
- 22 - 
Corbett and a prior decision of the First District in Jordan.  We now briefly discuss 
those cases. 
   
In Corbett, 48 So. 3d at 133, the Fifth District reversed the trial court’s grant 
of a new trial on the basis that the trial court’s determination rested on an error of 
law.  In that case, the plaintiffs brought suit for personal injuries allegedly resulting 
from a car accident.  Id. at 132.  The jury found that the defendant was the legal 
cause of the injuries, but found against the plaintiffs on the issue of permanency 
and gave no award for pain and suffering.  Id.  The trial court granted the 
plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial, first determining that “a jury verdict adverse to a 
plaintiff on the issue of personal injury cannot be sustained unless there is expert 
testimony that contradicts the plaintiff’s expert opinion.”  Id. at 133.  The trial 
court further found that the defendant failed to produce any admissible evidence to 
contradict the expert testimony presented.  Id.  The plaintiffs’ expert testified at 
trial that the injured party had suffered permanent accident-related post-traumatic 
stress disorder as a result of the accident, and the defendant’s counsel impeached 
the expert with prior inconsistent deposition testimony.  Id.  The trial court ruled 
that the jury’s verdict was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence because 
the defendant could not use the impeachment testimony as substantive evidence, 
the deposition testimony could not qualify as rebutting expert testimony, and the 
jury was not permitted to disregard unrebutted expert testimony.  Id. 
 
- 23 - 
The Fifth District held that “the case law relied upon by the trial court to 
exclude [the] prior inconsistent testimony is no longer good law.”  Id.  The Fifth 
District held that the trial court made another legal error, which is similar to the 
error at issue in the case currently before this Court: “The trial court also 
incorrectly concluded that expert testimony unrebutted by other expert testimony 
cannot be rejected by the jury.  The jury is free to weigh the credibility of an expert 
witness, just as any other witness, and to reject such testimony, even if 
uncontradicted.”  Id. at 134.  Because the legal premises on which the trial court 
found the verdict to be contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence were 
erroneous, the Fifth District reversed and remanded for reinstatement of the jury 
verdict.  Id. at 133-34.  The First District in Schmidt followed the Corbett 
rationale, reversing the grant of a new trial because the trial court’s ruling “was 
premised on an erroneous conclusion of law.”  Schmidt, 65 So. 3d at 1108. 
The First District in Schmidt also relied on its prior decision in Jordan, 855 
So. 2d at 234, in which it had applied a less deferential standard of review and 
reversed the grant of a new trial based on the manifest weight of the evidence 
because there was no evidence in the record to support the trial court’s order.  At 
the conclusion of the trial in Jordan, the jury returned a verdict finding that the 
plaintiff had not suffered an injury as a result of falling when the defendants’ dog 
aggressively jumped on her, and the trial court granted a new trial on the ground 
 
- 24 - 
that the jury’s verdict was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.  Id. at 
232-33.  The trial court’s determination “was based solely on the trial court’s 
findings,” that “ ‘[t]here was uncontroverted testimony that plaintiff was injured 
and incurred medical bills as a result of the fall’ and, further, although there was 
substantial controversy over the extent of her injuries, that there was ‘none over the 
fact that she was permanently injured as a result of the dog’s conduct.’ ”  Id. at 
233-34.  The district court found no record support for this determination because 
“whether [the plaintiff] had been injured in the fall and the extent of her injuries 
were hotly contested, contrary to the findings of the trial court’s order. . . .  The 
[defendants’] impeachment of [the plaintiff’s] testimony was legally sufficient to 
place her credibility in question.  As a result, the jury was entitled to judge her 
credibility and accept or reject her testimony on all issues.”  Id. at 234 (emphasis 
added).  The Jordan court therefore concluded: 
In reviewing an order granting new trial we are dependent on 
the trial court to articulate reasons supporting its order.  For the 
reasons explained above, we conclude that the trial court’s finding 
that there was no controversy over the fact that [the plaintiff] was 
permanently injured has no support in the record and is clearly 
erroneous.  Further, because it is clear from the record that the issue of 
whether plaintiff was injured in the fall was highly controverted, the 
trial court’s finding that “[t]here was uncontroverted testimony that 
plaintiff was injured” is similarly clearly erroneous.  Accordingly, we 
find that the trial court abused its discretion under the Stuckey test. 
 
- 25 - 
Id. (citation omitted).3
In contrast, in Kuebler, 65 So. 3d at 1158, the Fourth District expressly 
rejected the rationale used by the First District in both Jordan and Schmidt.  In 
Kuebler, after a jury determined that an automobile accident was not a legal cause 
of injury to the plaintiff, the trial court granted a motion for new trial, concluding 
that while evidence of permanency of the plaintiff’s injury was hotly contested, all 
of the evidence showed at least some injury.  Id. at 1154-55.  In its order, the trial 
court agreed with the plaintiff that “the undisputed testimony of the witnesses, 
expert and lay, established that the Plaintiff had suffered some injury” and that “the 
evidence at trial established at the very least that the Plaintiff suffered a neck 
sprain as a result of the accident.”  Id. at 1156.  The defendant appealed, claiming 
that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the motion because there was 
some evidence that the plaintiff suffered no injury at all.  Id. at 1155. 
 
                                         
 
3.  In a subsequent case, the First District later reversed the grant of a new 
trial on the same basis.  See Ring Power Corp. v. Rosier, 67 So. 3d 1115, 1118-19 
(Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (“The trial court abuses its discretion in granting a new trial 
where there is no record support for the reasons stated in its order.  Here, the order 
granting a new trial focused on the ‘unrebutted’ testimony of Rosier’s expert . . . .  
The record does not support the trial court’s finding that the expert’s testimony on 
this issue was unrebutted; rather, the record reflects that the issue . . . was highly 
controverted at trial. . . .  [W]e reverse the order granting a new trial and remand 
with directions that the jury’s verdict be reinstated and judgment be entered in 
favor of Ring Power.” (footnote and citation omitted)).  This Court granted review 
of Ring Power, see Rosier v. Ring Power Corp., 83 So. 3d 709 (Fla. 2012), but the 
case was later voluntarily dismissed, see Rosier v. Ring Power Corp., 91 So. 3d 
132 (Fla. 2012). 
 
- 26 - 
 
After first setting forth the deferential standard of review from Stuckey, the 
Fourth District observed that “[d]espite this deferential standard, some courts have 
held that a trial court may abuse its discretion by granting a new trial where the 
articulated reasons set forth in the order have no basis in the record or are based on 
incorrect conclusions of law,” citing Jordan and the First District’s decision in 
Schmidt.  Kuebler, 65 So. 3d at 1157 (emphasis added) (citing Schmidt, 65 So. 3d 
1105; Jordan, 855 So. 2d 231). 
The facts of Kuebler are similar to those of Schmidt—even though all of the 
medical experts, including the defense expert, testified to a neck injury from the 
accident, the lay evidence and impeachment of the plaintiff’s credibility permitted 
an inference to the contrary.  See id. at 1158.  The plaintiff in Kuebler was 
impeached on inconsistencies in her statements and her failure to accurately report 
her medical history to the testifying chiropractor.  Id.  In addition, circumstantial 
evidence supported an inference that the plaintiff suffered no injury: 
The week prior to the accident she had back pain severe enough that 
she saw her physician immediately.  Not only would that suggest a 
prior cause for her continuing issues, it also suggests that when [the 
plaintiff] was in pain, she sought medical treatment.  That [the 
plaintiff] did not seek treatment for a month also would support a 
finding of no injury from the accident.  The limited damage to the 
plaintiff’s car, together with the defendant’s description of the 
accident as a “tap” was also relevant evidence to the issue of whether 
the plaintiff was injured. 
 
- 27 - 
Id.  Nevertheless, despite evidence supporting the inference of no injury, the 
Fourth District affirmed the trial court’s grant of a new trial because reasonable 
persons could differ as to the propriety of the trial court’s decision: 
Because there is no record basis to show that the evidence was 
“undisputed” that an injury occurred, and the trial court did not 
consider the credibility of the plaintiff in its assessment, we could find 
that the trial court abused its discretion, just as the courts did in 
Schmidt and Jordan.  It is most likely the result we would prefer, as 
the trial court should defer to the jury on issues of the weight to be 
given to expert testimony.  Nevertheless, [Stuckey] teaches that the 
trial judge may grant a new trial although it is not “clear, obvious, and 
indisputable that the jury was wrong.”  [Stuckey
Id. at 1158-59. 
] further explains the 
very limited authority of the appellate court in reviewing the broad 
discretion granted to the trial court, and we think reasonable persons 
could differ as to the propriety of the action by the trial court, 
particularly where the defense counsel in closing argument admitted 
that the accident caused at least some injury.  We therefore must 
affirm the trial court’s order of a new trial. 
Judge Damoorgian dissented, disagreeing with the majority that a reversal 
would run afoul of Stuckey: “A trial judge’s discretion is not unfettered.  Where 
the trial judge’s premise for granting a new trial was based on an incorrect 
conclusion of law, or where the evidence in the record does not support the trial 
court’s determination, there is an abuse of discretion.”  Id. at 1159-60 
(Damoorgian, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).  He concluded: “The majority 
concedes that there was no record basis to support the trial court’s conclusion that 
the evidence was ‘undisputed’ that an injury occurred.  In fact, there was 
 
- 28 - 
conflicting evidence on the issue of whether the plaintiff suffered any injury from 
the accident.”  Id. at 1160. 
We conclude that to the extent the Fourth District in Kuebler interpreted 
E.R. Squibb & Sons and Stuckey to require deference to a trial court’s conclusions 
of law, even when the trial court’s order was premised, at least in part, on an error 
of law, the Fourth District took our decisions in those cases too far.  We agree with 
the First District in Schmidt, the Fifth District in Corbett, and Judge Damoorgian’s 
dissent in Kuebler to the extent that those opinions reasoned that the same 
deference is not required where the basis for reversal is a legal one.  As the Second 
District has explained: 
A trial court has broad discretion when deciding whether to override a 
jury’s verdict on the ground that it is contrary to the manifest weight 
of the evidence.  But “the closer an issue comes to being purely legal 
in nature, the less discretion a trial court enjoys in ruling on a new 
trial motion.”  This discretion is significantly reduced when the 
motion concerns a purely legal question
Tri-Pak Mach., Inc. v. Hartshorn, 644 So. 2d 118, 119-20 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) 
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).  We conclude that a trial 
court’s conclusions of law in an order granting a new trial are not entitled to 
deference because the trial court’s superior vantage point is not implicated.  In 
other words, a reviewing court can determine the legal issue just as well as the trial 
.  This is so because an error 
involving a purely legal question can be as accurately reviewed from 
an appellate record as from the trial judge’s bench.  The trial judge 
does not have a “superior vantage point” for review of legal errors, as 
compared to other trial errors. 
 
- 29 - 
court.  However, the trial court’s findings of fact and determinations of credibility 
are still entitled to the same deference as in orders that are not premised, at least in 
part, on an error of law, because of the trial court’s superior vantage point of 
having been present during the entire trial. 
III.  Misapplication of E.R. Squibb & Sons and Stuckey 
Having resolved the first conflict issue by concluding—consistent with the 
standard of review generally applied to all trial court orders—that a trial court’s 
conclusions of law are not entitled to deference, but that the trial court’s findings of 
fact and determinations of credibility are still entitled to deference, we now turn to 
the second conflict issue.  Despite correctly identifying the legal error in the trial 
court’s order, the First District in Schmidt then misapplied our precedent in E.R. 
Squibb & Sons and Stuckey by simply disagreeing with the trial court’s assessment 
of the facts and weighing of the evidence and proceeding to analyze whether 
competent, substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict.  Although the Fourth 
District in Kuebler erred with respect to the level of deference that applies on 
review when the trial court’s grant of a new trial is premised, at least in part, on an 
error of law, the Fourth District correctly recognized that statements made by the 
First District in Schmidt appeared to contradict the applicable standard as set forth 
by this Court: 
Some of the language in these cases seems to contradict the 
holding of [Stuckey] that the appellate court should defer to the 
 
- 30 - 
discretion of the trial court in granting a new trial, even where there is 
competent substantial evidence to support the jury verdict.  In both 
Jordan and Schmidt the court seems to have concluded that because 
competent substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict, which the 
trial court disregarded, the trial court abused its discretion.  We think 
this runs afoul of the admonition in Brown v. Estate of Stuckey that 
“[t]he fact that there may be substantial, competent evidence in the 
record to support the jury verdict does not necessarily demonstrate 
that the trial judge abused his or her discretion.”  Id.
Kuebler, 65 So. 3d at 1158. 
 at 498. 
 
Based on our precedent, once the First District identified the error of law 
made by the trial court in granting a new trial, the First District was not at liberty to 
then reweigh the evidence presented in the case to decide whether the jury reached 
a result supported by the evidence.  In other words, although an appellate court 
reviews the trial court’s conclusions of law de novo, the district court does not 
have carte blanche to reweigh the evidence in the trial court’s stead.  Simply put, 
although the legal conclusions are not entitled to deference, the trial court’s 
findings of fact and determinations of credibility are still entitled to the same 
deference as in other trial court orders, and the trial court’s role in evaluating a 
motion for new trial is the same.  By disregarding these principles and instead 
reweighing the evidence and evaluating credibility after identifying the legal error, 
the First District in Schmidt misapplied this Court’s decisions in E.R. Squibb & 
Sons and Stuckey. 
 
- 31 - 
The First District in Schmidt correctly recognized that the trial court’s 
conclusion of law was in error because “[i]t is well-established that a jury may 
reject any testimony, including testimony of experts.”  Schmidt, 65 So. 3d at 1108.  
However, the First District erred when it then held that “[t]he expert testimony in 
this case conflicted with much of the lay testimony presented to the jury.  In such 
cases, where expert testimony conflicts with lay testimony, the trial court should 
defer to the jury to weigh the evidence.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
This Court has previously rejected similar reasoning in E.R. Squibb & Sons, 
where we quashed a district court’s decision that held that “it is for the jury to 
resolve and weigh the conflicting testimony.  Trial court judges do not have the 
discretion to substitute their judgment for that of the jury.”  697 So. 2d at 826 
(quoting Farnes, 667 So. 2d at 1005).  Rather, this Court held that although it is “a 
jury function to evaluate the credibility of any given witness,” the trial judge “can 
and should grant a new trial if the manifest weight of the evidence is contrary to 
the verdict.  In making this decision, the trial judge must necessarily consider the 
credibility of the witnesses along with the weight of all of the other evidence.”  Id. 
(quoting Smith, 525 So. 2d at 870). 
The First District also extensively reviewed the lay evidence and credibility 
issues that the jury could have relied on in rejecting the expert testimony.  Schmidt, 
65 So. 3d at 1109-10.  The First District concluded: 
 
- 32 - 
Based on the evidence and testimony introduced at trial and the 
instructions presented to it, the jury could properly reject the 
testimony of the medical experts who opined that Mr. Van’s injuries 
were caused at least in part by the automobile accident and conclude 
that Mr. Van suffered no injury as a result of the 2007 accident.  By 
failing to recognize the jury’s prerogative to reject the expert 
testimony on causation, particularly in light of the lay testimony 
which conflicted with the expert testimony, the trial court erred in 
concluding that the manifest weight of the evidence was contrary to 
the jury verdict. 
Id.  The First District’s focus in its reasoning was on the jury’s decision and the 
evidence supporting it, rather than the propriety of the trial court’s decision to 
grant a new trial.  In other words, in reversing the trial court’s grant of a new trial, 
the First District focused on whether the evidence supported the jury’s verdict, 
which is at odds with this Court’s rejection of the competent, substantial evidence 
standard in Stuckey, 749 So. 2d at 495. 
Accordingly, we again emphasize the following with respect to a trial 
court’s order granting a new trial based on the manifest weight of the evidence: (1) 
a reviewing appellate court may not focus on whether the jury verdict was 
supported by competent, substantial evidence, but rather on whether “reasonable 
persons could differ as to the propriety of the action taken,” Stuckey, 749 So. 2d at 
497; and (2) a trial court is not required to defer to the jury’s weighing of 
conflicting testimony in considering the motion.  Rather, in making its decision, 
the trial court “must necessarily consider the credibility of the witnesses along with 
the weight of all of the other evidence.  The trial judge should only intervene when 
 
- 33 - 
the manifest weight of the evidence dictates such action.”  Id. at 497 (citation 
omitted) (quoting Smith, 525 So. 2d at 870).  In other words, it is the trial court’s 
responsibility—not the district court’s—to weigh the evidence, consider the 
credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether the jury “has reached an unjust 
decision on the facts.”  Id. at 495. 
IV.  The Proper Remedy 
Having resolved the two conflict issues presented in this case, we turn to the 
final issue presented—the proper analysis and remedy to be applied by an appellate 
court when it determines that a trial court’s order granting a new trial was 
premised, at least in part, on an error of law.4
In the context of a trial court’s grant of a new trial based on the manifest 
weight of the evidence, where the decision is premised, at least in part, on an error 
of law, the proper remedy to be applied requires further analysis than simply 
reinstating the jury’s verdict.  After concluding that a trial court’s grant of a new 
trial based on the manifest weight of the evidence was at least partly premised on a 
  Although the First District in 
Schmidt properly reversed the trial court’s order in this case, we do not agree with 
the First District that the proper remedy is to remand for the trial court to enter 
judgment on the jury verdict. 
                                         
 
4.  It is important to note that not every trial court order containing an error 
of law will fall in this category; rather, the decision must be premised, at least in 
part, on the error of law. 
 
- 34 - 
legal error, the appellate inquiry then becomes whether the trial court would have 
granted a new trial but for the error of law.  If the appellate court cannot determine 
whether the trial court would have granted a new trial but for the error of law, as in 
this case, then the proper remedy is to remand the case to the trial court for 
reconsideration in light of the correct legal principles.  On the other hand, if the 
only way that the trial court could have reached the result of granting a new trial 
was based on the legal error, then the appellate court could properly reverse the 
trial court’s order and remand for reinstatement of the jury’s verdict. 
After reviewing the trial court’s order and the record in this case, we cannot 
determine whether the trial court would have granted a new trial but for the error of 
law in its order.  Our “review of the record shows that although there was an 
evidentiary basis for the jury verdict, there [would also be] extensive evidentiary 
support for” a trial court’s grant of a new trial on the basis that the verdict was 
contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.  E.R. Squibb & Sons, 697 So. 2d 
at 827. 
 
The record reflects that all of the experts agreed that the 2007 automobile 
collision was, at least in part, the cause of Van’s neck injury and resulting surgery.  
Further, the medical experts also agreed that there is not necessarily a correlation 
between the severity of damage to a vehicle and the injuries sustained by an 
 
- 35 - 
occupant.  The trial court in this case specifically found three of the doctors—Dr. 
Feussner, Dr. Scott, and Dr. Trimble—to be “informed and credible.” 
 
Van’s extensive medical history included emphysema, a prior neck surgery 
in 1991, an automobile accident in 1998 in which he suffered abdominal injury, a 
back sprain shortly before the 2007 accident and pain medicine he was taking 
around the time of the accident, and a hospital visit in 2006 complaining of severe 
back pain.  However, the majority of the prior medical history was unrelated to 
Van’s neck.  Although it was clear that Van suffered from lower back pain and was 
in poor health prior to the accident, this did not necessarily weigh against a finding 
that Van suffered a neck injury as a result of the car accident.  In fact, most of the 
experts were unable to connect Van’s post-accident lower back pain to the 2007 
crash because of his preexisting back pain.  However, they unanimously agreed 
that Van’s post-accident neck pain was directly related to the car accident.  The 
experts also testified that although Van suffered from spinal degeneration, which is 
a normal part of the aging process, trauma can accelerate or exacerbate such 
degeneration. 
 
With respect to the “demonstrated inconsistencies in Mr. Van’s story on 
material issues in the case, placing his credibility into question,” Schmidt, 65 So. 
3d at 1109, which were relied upon by the First District, Van explained that 
although he had not been employed since the 1970s, he was able to enjoy his 
 
- 36 - 
hobbies and be active before the 2007 car accident because he knew his limits 
relating to emphysema.  Regarding Van’s failure to initially disclose his prior neck 
surgery and other medical history to his treating physicians, Dr. Scott testified that 
the intake forms, which can be six to eight pages long, can be overwhelming and 
that patients frequently forget to include things.  Finally, regarding the surgical 
collar that Van wore during one of the days of trial, although Dr. Scott testified that 
it was not medically necessary, he explained that Van still used the collar for 
comfort and that Van has significant muscle atrophy in his neck.  Dr. Scott further 
explained that sometimes people do end up wearing a collar for external support 
because of muscle atrophy. 
We are unable to ascertain from this review of the record whether the trial 
court would have reached the same result had it focused on the evidence and 
considered the credibility of witnesses, rather than focusing on whether a 
reasonable jury could reject the expert testimony.  A grant of a new trial on the 
basis of the manifest weight of the evidence is heavily dependent on the trial 
court’s superior vantage point of having been present during the entire trial.  
Because the trial court’s order in this case was premised, at least in part, on an 
error of law, we decline to apply the “tipsy coachman” doctrine to uphold the trial 
 
- 37 - 
court’s order.5  Rather, when trial courts have made errors of law in reaching 
findings in other contexts, appellate courts have remanded to trial courts for 
reconsideration of findings in light of the proper standard.6
Accordingly, under the circumstances of this case and on this record, we 
conclude that the proper remedy is for this case to be returned to the trial court for 
reconsideration of its order in light of the correct legal principles. 
 
CONCLUSION 
We conclude that the First District in Schmidt reached the correct result with 
respect to reversing the trial court’s grant of a new trial in this case because the 
trial court’s order was premised, at least in part, on an erroneous conclusion of law.  
We therefore disapprove the Fourth District’s decision in Kuebler to the extent the 
                                         
 
5.  Robertson v. State, 829 So. 2d 901, 906 (Fla. 2002) (“[T]he ‘tipsy 
coachman’ doctrine[] allows an appellate court to affirm a trial court that ‘reaches 
the right result, but for the wrong reasons’ so long as ‘there is any basis which 
would support the judgment in the record.’ ” (quoting Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. 
Radio Station WQBA, 731 So. 2d 638, 644 (Fla. 1999))). 
 
6.  See, e.g., Ultimate Makeover Salon & Spa, Inc. v. DiFrancesco, 41 So. 
3d 335, 338 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (“[T]he trial court’s order suggests that the court 
based its decision on the mistaken belief that it could not award section 448.08 
attorney’s fees to defendants because they prevailed on a statute of limitations 
defense rather than on the merits.  This was an incorrect standard that stymied the 
court’s exercise of discretion.  We therefore reverse the order denying attorney’s 
fees to defendants and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.”); Thompson v. Douds, 852 So. 2d 299, 305 (Fla. 2d 
DCA 2003) (“Usually when a trial court applies the incorrect legal standard, we 
reverse and remand for a new hearing at which the trial court must reconsider its 
decision in light of the proper legal standard.”). 
 
- 38 - 
Fourth District interpreted our decisions in E.R. Squibb & Sons and Stuckey to 
require deference to a trial court’s conclusions of law, even when a trial court’s 
order is premised, at least in part, on an error of law.  Instead, consistent with the 
standard of review generally applied to all trial court orders, an appellate court 
properly applies a de novo standard of review to a trial court’s conclusions of law 
in an order granting a new trial based on the manifest weight of the evidence, 
giving no deference to the trial court’s legal conclusions.  However, although a 
trial court’s conclusions of law are not entitled to deference, its findings of facts 
and credibility determinations are still entitled to deference because of the trial 
court’s superior vantage point of having been present during the entire trial.  By 
failing to give deference to the trial court’s findings of fact and credibility and to 
recognize the trial court’s role in evaluating a motion for new trial in its review of 
the trial court’s order, the First District misapplied the directions of this Court in 
E.R. Squibb & Sons and Stuckey. 
We ultimately quash the First District’s decision because we conclude that 
reinstatement of the jury verdict is not the proper remedy in this case.  Instead, 
because we are unable to ascertain from a review of the record whether the trial 
court would have reached the same result without the error of law, we remand this 
case to the First District with directions that the case be returned to the trial court 
for reconsideration of its order in light of the correct legal principles. 
 
- 39 - 
It is so ordered. 
 
QUINCE, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
POLSTON, C.J., and LEWIS and CANADY, JJ., concur in result. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions  
 
First District – Case No. 1D10-4206  
 
(Alachua County)  
  
T. Bradley McRae of McRae & McRae, Lake City, Florida; and Edwin B. 
Browning, Jr. and George T. Reeves of Davis, Schnitker, Reeves & Browning, 
P.A., Madison, Florida,  
 
for Petitioners  
 
Richard A. Sherman, Sr. and James W. Sherman of Law Offices of Richard A. 
Sherman, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, Florida; and Sonya Wesner of Law Offices of 
Patricia E. Garagozlo, Jacksonville, Florida,  
 
for Respondent