Title: Emerson v. Hillsborough County
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC19-1250, SC19-1343
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: February 25, 2021

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC19-1250 
____________ 
 
ROBERT EMERSON, et al., 
Appellants. 
 
vs. 
 
HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA, etc., et al., 
Appellees. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC19-1343 
____________ 
 
STACY WHITE, 
Appellant. 
 
vs. 
 
HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA, etc., et al., 
Appellees. 
 
February 25, 2021 
 
CANADY, C.J. 
 
In these consolidated cases we consider the constitutional validity of an 
amendment to the Hillsborough County Charter that was adopted in an initiative 
election.  Through that charter amendment the voters approved both a 
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transportation surtax and elaborate directives for allocating the tax proceeds.  But 
the spending directives are unconstitutional in that they conflict with a state law 
that gives the county commission the authority to allocate such funds.  Because it 
cannot reasonably be said that the voters would have approved the tax without the 
accompanying spending plan, we must strike the charter amendment in its entirety. 
I. Background 
The charter amendment enacted a one percent transportation sales surtax 
coupled with various provisions governing the distribution and use of the proceeds 
of the tax.  Subsequently, the Hillsborough County Commission entered an 
interlocal agreement “deem[ing] appropriate” the allocation of funds provided for 
in the charter amendment.  The commission then authorized the issuance of bonds 
to be funded by a portion of the proceeds of the surtax.  We have for review a 
judgment of the circuit court validating the bonds.  See art. V, § 3(b)(2), Fla. Const.  
And we have accepted pass-through jurisdiction—based on the Second District 
Court of Appeal’s certification that the case involved issues of great public 
importance requiring immediate resolution by this Court—of a judgment of the 
circuit court in a declaratory judgment action brought by opponents of the charter 
amendment, which upheld the surtax levy but invalidated portions of the charter 
amendment governing the use and distribution of surtax proceeds.  See id. art. V, 
§ 3(b)(5). 
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The circuit court based its invalidation of portions of the charter amendment 
on a conflict between the amendment and section 212.055(1), Florida Statutes 
(2018), the statute authorizing enactment of the local transportation surtax by 
referendum, which specifically grants the county commission discretion 
concerning the application of surtax proceeds within the statutory framework.  
Although the circuit court invalidated significant portions of the charter 
amendment related to the allocation and use of tax proceeds, it nonetheless upheld 
the validity of the surtax and certain other elements of the amendment, reasoning 
that the surtax and the other provisions it found valid could properly be severed 
from the invalid portions. 
Contending that the trial court erred in its decision to sever the surtax and 
other provisions of the amendment from those parts of the amendment that it 
determined to be unconstitutional, the Appellants seek reversal of both trial court 
judgments.  Hillsborough County and Appellees/Cross-Appellants contend that the 
trial court should have upheld the charter amendment in its entirety, arguing in the 
alternative that the portions of the amendment severed and upheld by the trial 
court—most importantly, the surtax levy—should not be disturbed. 
We conclude that the charter amendment transgresses the authority reserved 
to the county commission by the surtax statute and that no portion of the 
amendment could properly be severed.  Therefore, we reverse the declaratory 
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judgment to the extent that it upholds any portion of the charter amendment, and 
we reverse the bond validation judgment, which necessarily falls with the 
invalidation of the surtax. 
II. The Surtax Statute 
Section 212.055(1)(a) authorizes charter counties to “levy a discretionary 
sales surtax, subject to approval by a majority vote of the electorate of the county 
or by a charter amendment approved by a majority vote of the electorate of the 
county.”  The discretionary surtax may be levied at a rate “up to 1 percent,” 
§ 212.055(1)(b), and any “proposal to adopt a discretionary sales tax . . . must be 
approved in a referendum held at a general election,” § 212.055(1)(c)1.  Of crucial 
importance to the issues presented in this case is the provision of section 
212.055(1)(d) that the “[p]roceeds from the surtax shall be applied to as many or 
as few of the uses enumerated” specifically in the statute “in whatever combination 
the county commission deems appropriate.”  (Emphasis added.)  A wide range of 
permitted transportation related uses are set forth in subsections 1 through 4 of 
section 212.055(1)(d). 
The statutory provisions related to the surtax must be viewed against the 
backdrop of the specific recognition in the Florida Constitution of the Legislature’s 
authority over taxation in the state.  Article VII, section 1, subsection (a) of the 
Florida Constitution provides that “[n]o tax shall be levied except in pursuance of 
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law,” that “[n]o state ad valorem taxes shall be levied on real estate or tangible 
personal property,” and that “[a]ll other forms of taxation shall be preempted to the 
state except as provided by general law.”  Moreover, counties shall “be authorized 
by law to levy ad valorem taxes and may be authorized by law to levy other taxes, 
. . . except ad valorem taxes on intangible personal property and taxes prohibited 
by [the] constitution.”  Art. VII, § 9(a), Fla. Const.  So it is clear that the 
Legislature has plenary authority regarding the surtax. 
III. The Charter Amendment 
The “surtax for transportation improvements” amendment to the 
Hillsborough County Charter at issue here—codified as article 11 of the charter—
was adopted in a referendum conducted in the 2018 general election based on a 
citizens’ initiative proposal.  See Hillsborough County, Fla., Revised Charter art. 
XI (2018).  Article 11 contains a detailed scheme for managing the distribution and 
use of the proceeds of the one percent sales surtax.  Id.  As stated in article 11’s 
purpose section, the “purpose of the surtax” is identified as funding a variety of 
categories of “transportation improvements throughout Hillsborough County.”  Id. 
§ 11.01.  In connection with this broadly stated purpose, article 11 states that “[t]he 
proceeds of the surtax shall be distributed and disbursed in compliance with 
[section 212.055(1), Florida Statutes,] and in accordance with the provisions of . . . 
article 11.”  Id.  
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The provision establishing the levy of the surtax specifies that all proceeds 
of the tax “shall be expended only as permitted by this article 11, [section 
212.055(1), Florida Statutes], and in accordance with the purpose set forth” in the 
amendment.  Id. § 11.02.  The surtax, which had an effective date of January 1, 
2019, “shall remain in effect for a period of thirty (30) years.”  Id. § 11.03. 
Article 11 contains an elaborate scheme with provisions governing the 
distribution to various entities of surtax proceeds, provisions governing the use by 
those entities of the funds distributed, and provisions establishing and empowering 
an independent oversight commission (IOC).  The proceeds of the tax are 
designated for distribution in three “portions”—the general purpose portion, the 
transit restricted portion, and the planning and development portion.  See id. 
§ 11.05.  Under the distribution formula, 54% of the tax proceeds—the general 
purpose portion—are to be “distributed to the [c]ounty and each [m]unicipality in 
accordance with their relative populations” pursuant to a statutory formula set forth 
in section 218.62, Florida Statutes (2018), to be expended “in accordance with” 
article 11.  Id. § 11.05(1).   
The transit restricted portion consists of 45% of the proceeds, which are 
designated for distribution to the Hillsborough Area Regional Transit Authority 
(HART) to “be expended by HART in accordance with” article 11.  Id. § 11.05(2).  
Finally, one percent of the proceeds are designated for the planning and 
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development portion, which is to be distributed to “the metropolitan planning 
organization [MPO] . . . whose jurisdiction includes Hillsborough County,” and 
“shall be expended by the MPO on planning and development purposes” to assist 
the other entities receiving funds and the IOC “in carrying out the purpose set 
forth” in the purpose section of article 11.  Id. § 11.05(3).   
Each agency receiving proceeds is required to submit an annual agency 
“Project Plan” governing its use of proceeds, which must be approved by the IOC.  
Id. § 11.06.  Detailed provisions establish the specific transportation-related uses to 
which the general purpose portion and the transit restricted portion of the proceeds 
are to be devoted.  See id. §§ 11.07-11.08.  The specific details governing use of 
the proceeds are of no moment to the issues presented in this case. 
The IOC is established to provide “independent oversight of the distribution 
and expenditure” of the proceeds of the surtax.  Id. § 11.10.  The IOC is given the 
duty to review an annual audit provided for by article 11 and to “make findings” 
concerning compliance “with the terms of” article 11, including a determination of 
whether the proceeds “have been distributed as provided” in the article, and 
whether the proceeds “have been expended in compliance with applicable state 
law, [the] Article, and any additional requirements that [a receiving entity] may 
have lawfully adopted.”  Id. § 11.10(1).  In addition, the IOC may, by a two-thirds 
majority vote, direct the suspension of proceeds (other than any portion of such 
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proceeds “encumbered by bond indebtedness”) if it determines “that an [a]gency 
has failed to comply with any term or condition of . . . article 11” and the 
noncompliance remains uncorrected for a specified period.  Id. § 11.09.  
Two additional provisions of article 11 are related to arguments presented in 
this case.  One provision specifically addresses the issue of severability, and the 
other recognizes the supremacy of state law.  The severability provision is as 
follows: 
To the extent that any mandated expenditure category set forth in 
[s]ection 11.07 or 11.08 is deemed by a court of competent 
jurisdiction to be an impermissible use of [s]urtax [p]roceeds, the 
funds allocated to such impermissible use shall be expended by the 
applicable [a]gency on any project to improve public transportation 
permitted by [section 212.055(1), Florida Statutes,] and this Article. 
 
Id. § 11.11(2).  The provision of article 11 regarding state law supremacy states, 
“article 11 shall at all times be interpreted in a manner consistent with the laws of 
Florida, and in the event of any conflict between the provisions of this article 11 
and the laws of Florida, the laws of Florida shall prevail.”  Id. § 11.11(3).   
The issue of severability is also addressed in a separate provision adopted 
when the Hillsborough County Charter was initially enacted.  That provision states, 
“It is the intent of the electorate in adopting this Charter that if any section, 
subsection, sentence, clause, term or word of this Charter is held invalid, the 
remainder of the Charter shall not be affected.”  Id. § 9.05.  
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IV. The Arguments 
The opponents of article 11 contend that the circuit court erred in severing 
the surtax provision and certain other provisions of article 11 from the portions it 
declared unconstitutional.  According to the opponents, the purpose of the surtax 
was to fund the transportation plan in accordance with the distribution formula and 
use restrictions.  According to the opponents, once crucial elements of the structure 
established by article 11—including the distribution formula—were recognized to 
violate the authority of the Hillsborough County Commission to decide how surtax 
proceeds should be spent, the fundamental design of article 11 was vitiated, and it 
therefore must be judged unconstitutional in its entirety. 
The proponents of article 11 argue that no inconsistency exists between 
article 11 and the requirements of the surtax statute and that the circuit court 
therefore erred in declaring any portion of article 11 unconstitutional.  They 
contend that article 11 merely supplements the requirements of the statute rather 
than contradicting them.  To resolve any inconsistency between the charter 
amendment and the surtax statute, they also rely on provisions of article 11 that 
refer to compliance with state law as well as the supremacy clause contained in 
article 11.  They argue that these provisions allow any unconstitutional elements to 
be read out of article 11, leaving the rest of the article undisturbed.  And they 
contend that any such inconsistency is cured by the county commission’s approval 
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of the interlocal agreement deeming the allocation of funds under article 11 to be 
appropriate.  The proponents of article 11 also argue that the challenged provisions 
of article 11 are justified by a statutory provision that authorizes charter limitations 
on the broad general legislative powers granted to the county commissions of 
charter counties. 
The proponents of article 11 further contend that even if portions of the 
measure are unconstitutional, the trial court’s severability analysis was correct, and 
the validity of the surtax and the other portions of article 11 severed and preserved 
by the circuit court should therefore be upheld.  In brief, they contend that 
severance was appropriate because the primary purpose of article 11 was to 
provide funding to meet the needs for transportation infrastructure in Hillsborough 
County and that purpose can be carried out even without the portions of article 11 
invalidated by the circuit court.  They also contend that the specific severability 
clause in article 11, as well as the general severability clause in the county charter, 
require preservation of the tax levy. 
V. The Constitutional Violation 
Our constitution provides that “[c]ounties operating under county charters 
shall have all powers of local self-government not inconsistent with general law” 
and that “[t]he governing body of a county operating under a charter may enact 
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county ordinances not inconsistent with general law.”  Art. VIII, § 1(g), Fla. Const.  
As we said in State v. Sarasota County, 549 So. 2d 659, 660 (Fla. 1989): 
A charter provision or ordinance of a charter county will be 
unconstitutional under article VIII, section 1(g) of the Florida 
Constitution, if it is “inconsistent with general law.”  We have 
consistently construed this phrase to mean “contradictory in the sense 
of legislative provisions which cannot coexist.”  Laborers’ Int’l Union 
of North America, Local 478 v. Burroughs, 541 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 
1989); State ex. rel. Dade County v. Brautigam, 224 So. 2d 688, 692 
(Fla. 1969). 
 
A local ordinance or charter provision that interferes with the operation of a statute 
“cannot coexist” with that statute.  In brief, the Florida Constitution prohibits any 
charter county from supplanting or overriding state law through either an ordinance 
or a charter provision. 
 
Core provisions of article 11 directly clash with the surtax statute’s 
assignment to county commissions of authority to direct the application of surtax 
revenues to various permitted uses.  Under the statute, “[p]roceeds from the surtax 
shall be applied to as many or as few of the uses enumerated” specifically in the 
statute “in whatever combination the county commission deems appropriate.”  
§ 212.055(1)(d), Fla. Stat.  Most saliently, this statutory provision is inconsistent 
with the provisions in sections 11.05, 11.06, 11.07, 11.08, 11.09 and 11.10 of 
article 11, which together establish a detailed scheme governing and enforcing the 
distribution and use of surtax proceeds.  These provisions of article 11 “cannot 
coexist” with section 212.055(1)(d).  All these provisions of the article fly in the 
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face of the commission’s statutory authority.  Because the charter provisions are 
“inconsistent with general law,” they are unconstitutional.  Art. VIII, § 1(g), Fla. 
Const.   
The situation here is not one in which “the county simply chose to legislate 
in an area where the Legislature chose to remain silent.”  Phantom of Brevard, Inc. 
v. Brevard Cnty., 3 So. 3d 309, 315 (Fla. 2008).  Nor is it a situation in which the 
charter merely adopted “additional standards . . . without being in conflict with the 
minimum statutory requirements established by the Legislature.”  Sarasota All. for 
Fair Elections, Inc. v. Browning, 28 So. 3d 880, 888 (Fla. 2010).  Likewise, this is 
not a charter amendment that is invalid in a particular application but valid in other 
applications.  See D’Agastino v. City of Miami, 220 So. 3d 410 (Fla. 2017). 
The offending charter provisions do not merely supplement or complement 
the statute.  And they cannot sometimes be validly applied.  If given effect, these 
provisions of article 11 would supplant the authority of the county commission 
established by the statute.  And none of our decisions uphold any such 
displacement by a charter provision of county commission authority specifically 
conferred by statute.1  
 
1.  Sarasota All. for Fair Elections, Inc. v. Browning, 28 So. 3d 880 (Fla. 
2010), is not to the contrary.  It appears that a charter provision in question there 
provided for “voter-imposed restrictions on the Sarasota County Board of 
Commissioners not permitted by the statute.”  Id. at 893 (Polston, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part).  But the majority opinion did not address the conflict 
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The Legislature could have allowed the proceeds of the surtax to be 
allocated based on provisions of a charter amendment, just as it allowed the surtax 
to be adopted by charter amendment.  But that is not the choice the Legislature 
made in the surtax statute.  Our constitution does not allow the displacement of the 
choice the Legislature made in the statute. 
Contrary to the contention of the proponents, neither article 11’s provision 
recognizing the supremacy of state law nor its repeated references to compliance 
with the surtax statute can be flourished like a magic wand to conjure away the 
conflict between article 11 and the statute.  The magic does not work. 
It is not reasonable to read article 11 provisions such as section 11.01—
which requires that “proceeds of the surtax . . . be distributed and disbursed in 
compliance with [section 212.055(1), Florida Statutes,] and in accordance with the 
provisions of . . . article 11”—as obliterating provisions of article 11 that compose 
the greater part of its text.  (Emphasis added.)  Section 11.01 as well as other 
similar provisions of article 11 plainly contemplate that the distribution and 
disbursement of surtax tax revenues “in compliance with” the statute can be 
accomplished at the same time that distribution and disbursement is made “in 
accordance with” article 11.  There is no hint in this provision that anything in 
 
with county commission authority and in fact concluded that any dispute over the 
relevant charter provision had been rendered moot by subsequent legislation. 
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article 11 would be required to yield to a conflicting provision of state law.  On the 
contrary, given the mandate in article 11 to comply with the provisions of both the 
statute and the charter, section 11.01 and other similar provisions must be 
understood to presume the harmonious operation of the surtax statute and the 
provisions of article 11 governing the allocation and use of surtax proceeds.  
Rather than the interpretation advanced by the proponents of article 11, it is most 
reasonable to understand the references to the surtax statute in section 11.01 and 
elsewhere in article 11 as designed to ensure that funds only be applied to uses 
within the scope of the uses enumerated in the statute.  See § 212.055(1)(d)1.–4., 
Fla. Stat.  
The proponents of article 11 get no more traction with their argument based 
on the supremacy clause found in section 11.11(3), which provides that article 11 
“shall at all times be interpreted in a manner consistent with the laws of Florida” 
and that “in the event of any conflict” “the laws of Florida shall prevail.”  To the 
extent that this provision recognizes that state law prevails over any conflicting 
provision of article 11, it constitutes nothing more than a meaningless truism.  To 
the extent that the provision establishes a rule of interpretation, it is simply a 
restatement of the presumption of validity, which requires that ambiguities in a text 
be resolved in favor of a reasonable reading that avoids a determination of 
invalidity.  See State v. Fuchs, 769 So. 2d 1006, 1008 (Fla. 2000) (“It is well 
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established that, where reasonably possible, a statute will be interpreted in a 
manner that resolves all doubts in favor of its constitutionality.”); State v. Lick, 390 
So. 2d 52, 53 (Fla. 1980) (“[W]here the statute is reasonably susceptible of two 
interpretations, one of which would render it invalid and the other valid, we must 
adopt the constitutional construction.”); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, 
Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 66 (2012) (“An interpretation that 
validates outweighs one that invalidates (ut res magis valeat quam pereat).”).  This 
is a rule of interpretation—not, as the proponents of article 11 would have it, a rule 
of revision.  And as a rule of interpretation, it cannot justify the wholesale excision 
of the bulk of article 11. 
We reject the argument that the Hillsborough County Commission could 
cure the constitutional infirmity in article 11 by entering the interlocal agreement 
“deem[ing] appropriate” the allocation of funds mandated by article 11.  The 
attempt by way of the interlocal agreement to ratify and cure an unconstitutional 
measure is as ineffectual as the unconstitutional measure itself.  A county 
commission cannot legalize a measure that is “inconsistent with general law.”  To 
approve such a course of action would be in derogation of the constitutional 
authority of the Legislature.  It would incentivize the manipulation and coercion of 
the exercise of county commission authority by way of an unconstitutional charter 
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provision.  That would make a mockery of the surtax statute.  Notwithstanding the 
interlocal agreement, the taint of unconstitutionality remains. 
We are also unpersuaded by the argument offered by proponents of article 
11 based on the statutory provision that authorizes charter limitations on the broad 
general legislative powers granted to county commissions.  This provision is found 
in section 125.86, Florida Statutes (2019), a statute establishing general legislative 
powers of the county commissions in charter counties.  After enumerating a 
number of powers, the statute provides that the legislative powers of county 
commissions extend to “[a]ll other powers of local self-government not 
inconsistent with general law as recognized by the Constitution and laws of the 
state and which have not been limited by the county charter.”  § 125.86(8).  This 
merely recognizes that a charter provision may limit the exercise by a county 
commission of unenumerated “powers of local self-government not inconsistent 
with general law.”  But the power of the county commission at issue here—that is, 
the power to allocate the proceeds of the surtax—does not fall within the scope of 
such unenumerated “powers of local self-government.”  Rather, it is a specific 
power conferred directly on the county commission, as distinct from the county, in 
a statute that authorizes the enactment of the surtax—but not the allocation of 
funds—by charter amendment.  Nothing supports the conclusion that the general 
provisions of section 125.86 defeat the specific provisions of the surtax statute.  
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Article 11’s elaborate scheme to control the distribution and use of surtax 
proceeds cannot be reconciled with the authority granted to the county commission 
by section 212.055(1)(d).  All of the arguments offered to avoid this conclusion are 
unavailing.  The constitutional violation is manifest. 
VI. The Non-Severability of the Tax Levy 
We come now to the question of whether the trial court correctly determined 
that the one percent sales surtax should be severed and preserved.  On this point, 
we conclude that the trial court’s conclusion cannot be sustained. 
Our Court long ago laid out the basic principles governing severability 
analysis in the context of unconstitutional statutory provisions: 
The rule is well established that the unconstitutionality of a 
portion of a statute will not necessarily condemn the entire act.  When 
a part of a statute is declared unconstitutional the remainder of the act 
will be permitted to stand provided: (1) the unconstitutional 
provisions can be separated from the remaining valid provisions, (2) 
the legislative purpose expressed in the valid provisions can be 
accomplished independently of those which are void, (3) the good and 
the bad features are not so inseparable in substance that it can be said 
that the Legislature would have passed the one without the other and, 
(4) an act complete in itself remains after the invalid provisions are 
stricken. 
 
Cramp v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction of Orange Cnty., 137 So. 2d 828, 830 (Fla. 1962).  
In brief, “[t]he question is whether the taint of an illegal provision has infected the 
entire enactment, requiring the whole unit to fail.”  Schmitt v. State, 590 So. 2d 
404, 414 (Fla. 1991). 
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In employing the Cramp factors, we have recognized the cardinal principle 
of severability analysis:  “The severability of a statutory provision is determined by 
its relation to the overall legislative intent of the statute of which it is a part, and 
whether the statute, less the invalid provisions, can still accomplish this intent.”  
E. Air Lines, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 455 So. 2d 311, 317 (Fla. 1984) (emphasis 
added).  In Ray v. Mortham, 742 So. 2d 1276, 1283 (Fla. 1999), we applied the 
Cramp severability analysis to a constitutional amendment adopted through the 
citizen initiative process, concluding that the valid portion of the amendment (term 
limits for state officials) could be severed from the invalid portion (term limits for 
federal legislators) because they were “functionally independent.”  The same 
framework for determining severability can appropriately be used in this case. 
Here, the opponents of article 11 readily meet the “burden . . . placed on the 
challenging party” to establish that the measure is not severable.  Ray, 742 So. 2d 
at 1281.  The portions of article 11 that violate the authority of the county 
commission under the surtax statute are not “functionally independent” from the 
portion of article 11 imposing the sales surtax.  It is clear that a surtax can be 
applied without provisions like the offending provisions of article 11 and that “an 
act complete in itself,” Cramp, 137 So. 2d at 830, would remain after excision of 
the offending provisions.  But it is equally clear that “the legislative purpose 
expressed in the valid provisions” cannot “be accomplished independently of those 
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which are void” and that the valid and invalid elements of article 11 are therefore 
“so inseparable in substance” that it cannot be said that the voters would have 
adopted “the one without the other.”  Id. 
Article 11 manifests a dual purpose to impose a surtax and to require that the 
proceeds of the surtax be distributed and used in accordance with the elaborate and 
detailed scheme established in the article.  One element of that dual purpose cannot 
reasonably be divorced from the other.  The unconstitutional provisions of article 
11 therefore are not merely ancillary to the surtax but are integral to the overall 
purpose of the surtax initiative.  The tax and the distribution scheme form an 
interlocking plan.  They are functionally dependent.  The purpose of the voters in 
levying a tax that is designed to be distributed and used in a specified manner—
with elaborate provisions to implement and enforce that design—is thwarted if the 
tax is levied but the provisions approved by the voters governing the distribution 
and use of the tax are set aside.  The voters supported taxing with controls on 
spending the proceeds of the tax.  They should not be saddled with the taxing 
without having the benefit of the controls.  Given the functional dependence of the 
valid and the invalid provisions, the “taint of [the] illegal provision[s] has infected 
the entire enactment.”  Schmitt, 590 So. 2d at 414.  So the whole of article 11 is 
invalid. 
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We reject the argument presented by proponents of article 11 based on the 
severability provisions in section 11.11(2) of article 11 and in section 9.05 of the 
general provisions of the county charter.  Neither provision is applicable to the 
issue presented here. 
It is plain from the terms of section 11.11 that it deals only with defects 
arising from the “mandated expenditure categor[ies]” in article 11 which result in 
“an impermissible use of [s]urtax proceeds.”  It simply provides for funds to be 
redirected from an impermissible use—as determined by a judicial judgment—to a 
permissible use.  But the problem here cannot be cured by simply allowing 
receiving entities to redirect funds to permissible uses.  Indeed, although labeled as 
a severability provision, section 11.11 is not structured as a typical severability 
clause.  It does not in any manner address the provisions governing the allocation 
of proceeds to different entities and the directives regarding the three “portions” of 
the proceeds.  The issue here is not “an impermissible use of surtax proceeds” but 
an impermissible shift of authority to determine how funds will be allocated to 
various entities and among permissible uses.  Section 11.11 simply has nothing to 
say about a defect arising from provisions authorizing such a shift in the authority 
to allocate funds. 
Section 9.05 speaks to the “intent of the electorate” at the time the charter—
with its many disparate elements—was first adopted.  It does not reflect the intent 
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of the electorate in subsequently adopting the integrated provisions of article 11.  
Indeed, the intent of the electorate with respect to the severability of article 11 is 
expressed by the specific, narrow—and inapposite—terms of section 11.11.  
Section 9.05 therefore has no bearing on the severability issue here. 
VII. Conclusion 
Core provisions of article 11 are inconsistent with the surtax statute.  
Because those invalid provisions and the remaining provisions of the article form 
an interlocking plan, article 11 is unconstitutional in its entirety.  The bond 
validation judgment is reversed, and the declaratory judgment is reversed to the 
extent that it upheld the validity of any portion of article 11. 
 
It is so ordered. 
POLSTON, LAWSON, and MUÑIZ, JJ., concur. 
LABARGA, J., dissents with an opinion. 
COURIEL and GROSSHANS, JJ., did not participate. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
LABARGA, J., dissenting. 
This Court’s jurisprudence on bond validation has properly established a 
reluctance to overturn the will of the voters in a home rule charter county unless 
absolutely necessary, and then, only to the extent necessary.  See Phantom of 
Brevard, Inc. v. Brevard Cnty., 3 So. 3d 309, 314 (Fla. 2008); Telli v. Broward 
County, 94 So. 3d 504, 513 (Fla. 2012); D’Agastino v. City of Miami, 220 So. 3d 
-22- 
410, 427 (Fla. 2017).  To that end, our precedent has set a high bar for declining 
severability.  See Ray v. Mortham, 742 So. 2d 1276, 1281 (Fla. 1999); see also City 
of Kissimmee v. Fla. Retail Fed’n, Inc., 915 So. 2d 205, 209 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) 
(calling on appellate courts to “indulge every reasonable presumption in favor of 
an ordinance’s constitutionality.”). 
A presumption of constitutionality should be the starting point for this 
Court’s analysis.  Citizens for Responsible Growth v. City of St. Pete Beach, 940 
So. 2d 1144, 1146 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (stating that courts must, “if possible, 
interpret the amendment as constitutional”); see also Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513 
(recognizing courts cannot infringe on “the ability of counties to govern 
themselves as that broad authority has been granted to them by home rule power 
through the Florida Constitution”). 
Here, as noted by the circuit court, a majority of voters in Hillsborough 
County expressed their desire to improve their transportation assets at the ballot 
box by approving this amendment to their charter.  The majority, however, 
concludes that “[c]ore provisions of article 11 are inconsistent with the surtax 
statute.  Because those invalid provisions and the remaining provisions of the 
article form an interlocking plan, article 11 is unconstitutional in its entirety.”  
Majority op. at 21.  The majority reasons that because the valid and invalid 
elements of article 11 are “so inseparable in substance, it cannot be said that the 
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voters would have adopted ‘the one without the other.’ ”  Majority op. at 19.  I 
disagree. 
The amendment presented to the voters, despite the invalidation of 
significant portions of its provisions, still adequately defined its primary purpose: 
to provide funding for transportation infrastructure.  A majority of voters in 
Hillsborough County understood it as such and expressed their desire to support it. 
In addition, the majority’s focus of casting doubt on whether article 11 
would have passed without the stricken provisions is a test more akin to what this 
Court rejected in Ray v. Mortham.  In Ray, this Court rejected an argument that the 
challenger of a citizens-initiated constitutional amendment “need only cast doubt 
on whether the amendment would have passed” and that unless the sponsor of the 
amendment “can ‘prove’ that the voters would have adopted the amendment,” it 
must be stricken.  742 So. 2d at 1281.  Concluding that the proffered test “would 
be an inappropriate burden to place on” the party defending an enactment adopted 
through the citizens’ initiative process, this Court confirmed that the burden should 
be on the challenger seeking to invalidate the popular will of the voters.  Id.  The 
majority’s analysis therefore goes against “the purpose underlying severability—to 
preserve the constitutionality of enactments where it is possible to do so.”  Id. 
-24- 
Given our jurisprudence to “indulge every reasonable presumption in favor 
of an ordinance’s constitutionality,” City of Kissimmee, 915 So. 2d at 209, and the 
high bar we have set for declining severability, I respectfully dissent. 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Hillsborough County – Bond 
Validations  
Rex Martin Barbas, Judge - Case No. 292019CA001382A001HC 
 
And Certified Judgments of Trial Courts in and for Hillsborough County –  
Rex Martin Barbas, Judge - Case No. 292019CA001382A001HC – An 
Appeal from the District Court of Appeal – Second District, Case No. 2D19-2740 
 
Howard C. Coker and Chelsea R. Harris of Coker Law, Jacksonville, Florida; and 
Derek T. Ho and Collin R. White of Kellogg, Hansen, Todd, Figel & Frederick, 
P.L.L.C., Washington, District of Columbia, 
 
 
for Appellant Robert Emerson 
 
Chris W. Altenbernd of Banker Lopez Gassler P.A., Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant Stacy White 
 
Raoul G. Cantero, David P. Draigh, W. Dylan Fay, and Zachary Dickens of White 
& Case LLP, Miami, Florida; and Benjamin H. Hill, Robert A. Shimberg, and J. 
Logan Murphy of Hill Ward & Henderson, P.A., Tampa, Florida, 
 
for Appellees Tyler Hudson, Keep Hillsborough Moving, Inc., and All for 
Transportation 
 
Alan S. Zimmet, Nikki C. Day, and Elizabeth W. Neiberger of Bryant Miller 
Olive, P.A., Tampa, Florida; George S. LeMieux, Kenneth B. Bell, and Lauren 
Vickroy Purdy of Gunster, Yoakley & Stewart, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, Florida; and 
David Harvey, Office of the City Attorney, Tampa, Florida, 
 
for Appellees Hillsborough County, Hillsborough County Metropolitan 
Planning Organization, and City of Tampa 
 
-25- 
Harry M. Cohen, Legal Counsel, Hillsborough County Clerk of the Circuit Court, 
Tampa, Florida, 
 
for Appellee Hillsborough County Clerk of the Circuit Court 
 
Kenneth W. Buchman, City Attorney, Plant City, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee City of Plant City 
 
David L. Smith, Robert E. Johnson, and Julia C. Mandell of GrayRobinson, P.A., 
Tampa, Florida, and Kristie Hatcher-Bolin of GrayRobinson, P.A., Lakeland, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee Hillsborough Transit Authority 
 
Andrew H. Warren, State Attorney, and Ada Carmona, Assistant State Attorney,  
Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Tampa, Florida,  
 
for Appellee State of Florida 
 
Daniel J. Woodring of the Woodring Law Firm, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
for Amicus Curiae Associated Industries of Florida 
 
Daniel Bell, General Counsel, and W. Jordan Jones, Staff Attorney, House 
Judiciary Committee, Tallahassee, Florida; and Jeremiah Hawkes, General 
Counsel, and Ashley Istler, Deputy General Counsel, The Florida Senate, 
Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
for Amici Curiae Florida House of Representatives and Florida Senate 
 
Diane G. DeWolf and Katherine E. Giddings of Akerman LLP, Tallahassee, 
Florida, and Marilyn Mullen Healy of Akerman LLP, Tampa, Florida, 
 
for Amici Curiae the Greater Tampa Chamber of Commerce, the Tampa Bay 
Partnership, and the Tampa Hillsborough Economic Development 
Corporation