Title: VanBuren v. Grubb
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 120348
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: November 1, 2012

Present:  All the Justices 
 
ANGELA VANBUREN 
 
  
   OPINION BY 
v.    Record No. 120348 
   JUSTICE LEROY F. MILLETTE, JR. 
 
 
               November 1, 2012 
STEPHEN A. GRUBB 
 
UPON A QUESTION OF LAW CERTIFIED BY THE  
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
 
On March 1, 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit entered an order of certification requesting 
that we exercise our jurisdiction pursuant to Article VI, 
Section 1 of the Constitution of Virginia and Rule 5:40, and 
answer the following question: 
Does Virginia law recognize a common law tort claim 
of wrongful discharge in violation of established 
public policy against an individual who was not the 
plaintiff's actual employer, such as a supervisor or 
manager, but who participated in the wrongful firing 
of the plaintiff? 
 
In an order dated April 19, 2012, we accepted the 
certified question, and, for the reasons stated herein, we 
now restate the question pursuant to our authority under 
Rule 5:40(d) and answer in the affirmative. 
BACKGROUND 
A.  Factual History 
Because this case arises from the granting of a motion to 
dismiss by the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Virginia, we must take the factual allegations in 
Angela VanBuren's complaint as true "for the purposes of 
 
2 
framing an answer that is responsive to the needs of the 
[Fourth Circuit]."  Wyatt v. McDermott, 283 Va. 685, 689, 725 
S.E.2d 555, 556 (2012) (citing Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 
118 (1990)).  Accordingly, the facts presented herein are those 
alleged in VanBuren's complaint. 
 
VanBuren was employed as a nurse by Virginia Highlands 
Orthopedic Spine Center, LLC, from December 2003 to March 2008.  
Soon after she joined Virginia Highlands, VanBuren was 
subjected to sexual harassment by her supervisor, Virginia 
Highland's owner Dr. Stephen Grubb.  He would "hug her, rub her 
back, waist, breast and other inappropriate areas, and attempt 
to kiss her."  Although VanBuren told Dr. Grubb that his sexual 
advances were "offensive" and "unwelcome[]," he continued to 
pursue her.  In May 2006, while the two were travelling for 
business, Dr. Grubb went to VanBuren's hotel room and "began 
rubbing her back, waist, breast and hair while stating that he 
loved her."  VanBuren broke free of his embrace and told him 
that "she was not going to have sex with him," that "he was a 
married man," and that "he needed to leave." 
 
Dr. Grubb's sexual harassment continued after VanBuren's 
marriage in 2007.  Dr. Grubb tried to "console" VanBuren 
regarding her subsequent marital problems.  His "consoling" 
entailed "encouraging [her] to leave her husband and then 
proceeding to hug, kiss, and grope her."  VanBuren "continued 
 
3 
to insist that [Dr. Grubb's] advice and sexual advances were 
unwelcomed and offensive." 
 
In March 2008, Dr. Grubb again suggested during a closed-
door meeting that VanBuren leave her husband so that she "could 
accept his love for what it was and what it could be."  A few 
days later, Dr. Grubb called VanBuren into his office and asked 
whether she planned to stay with her husband.  When she 
responded in the affirmative, he fired her.  He then offered 
her roughly a month's severance pay to remain silent about the 
sexual harassment.  Dr. Grubb gave no other explanation for 
terminating VanBuren's employment with Virginia Highlands. 
B.  
Procedural History 
 
In March 2010, VanBuren filed suit, asserting a claim for 
gender discrimination against Virginia Highlands under Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) 
and 2000e-3(a), and asserting a claim for wrongful discharge 
against Dr. Grubb and Virginia Highlands.  As to the latter 
claim, she alleged that she had been discharged from Virginia 
Highlands because she had refused to engage in criminal conduct 
– specifically, adultery in violation of Code § 18.2-365 and 
open and gross lewdness and lasciviousness in violation of Code 
§ 18.2-345.  Accordingly, she contended that her discharge 
violated public policy.  See Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 
229 Va. 534, 331 S.E.2d 797 (1985). 
 
4 
 
Both Dr. Grubb and Virginia Highlands moved to dismiss.  
The district court granted the motion as to Dr. Grubb, 
"conclud[ing] that, were the Virginia Supreme Court to directly 
address this issue, it would find that wrongful discharge 
claims by an employee are cognizable only against the employer 
and not against supervisors or co-employees in their individual 
capacity."  VanBuren then moved the district court to enter 
final judgment against Dr. Grubb so that she could appeal its 
decision.  The district court granted the motion, and VanBuren 
appealed to the Fourth Circuit.  After briefing and oral 
argument, the Fourth Circuit determined that it could not 
predict with confidence how this Court would rule as to whether 
a wrongful discharge claim is cognizable against an individual 
such as Dr. Grubb.  The Fourth Circuit accordingly certified 
the question to this Court, and we accepted. 
A certified question must be "determinative of the 
proceeding[s] in the certifying court."  Rule 5:40(c).  Upon 
examination of the certified question, we conclude that the 
question as posed encompasses a larger body of employees than 
is essential to produce a determinative answer in these 
proceedings.  We therefore exercise our discretion under Rule 
5:40(d) to restate the question as follows: 
Does Virginia law recognize a common law tort claim 
of wrongful discharge in violation of established 
public policy against an individual who was not the 
 
5 
plaintiff's actual employer but who was the actor in 
violation of public policy and who participated in 
the wrongful firing of the plaintiff, such as in the 
capacity of a supervisor or manager? 
 
DISCUSSION 
A. The Public Policy Exception to Employment-at-Will in the 
Commonwealth 
 
Virginia "strongly adheres to the employment-at-will 
doctrine," Lockhart v. Commonwealth Educ. Sys. Corp., 247 Va. 
98, 102, 439 S.E.2d 328, 330 (1994), that "when the intended 
duration of a contract for the rendition of services cannot be 
determined by fair inference from the terms of the contract, 
then either party is ordinarily at liberty to terminate the 
contract at will, upon giving the other party reasonable 
notice."  Miller v. SEVAMP, Inc., 234 Va. 462, 465, 362 S.E.2d 
915, 916-17 (1987). 
This rule, however, is not absolute.  In Bowman, 229 Va. 
at 540, 331 S.E.2d at 801, we held that a corporate employer 
could be held liable in tort for the discharge of two employees 
who were also shareholders of the corporation.  The corporation 
had discharged the employees because they had refused to vote 
their shares in accordance with the wishes of the corporation's 
board of directors.  Id. at 537-38, 331 S.E.2d at 799-800.  We 
observed that the corporation's coercion violated the public 
policy underlying former Code § 13.1-32 (now Code § 13.1-662), 
which grants each shareholder the right to cast one vote for 
 
6 
each share held.  Id. at 540, 331 S.E.2d at 801.  "Because the 
right conferred by statute is in furtherance of established 
public policy," we reasoned, "the employer may not lawfully use 
the threat of discharge of an at-will employee as a device to 
control the otherwise unfettered discretion of a shareholder to 
vote freely his or her stock in the corporation."  Id.  Thus, 
"applying a narrow exception to the employment-at-will rule," 
the Court held that "the [employees] ha[d] stated a cause of 
action in tort against the [corporation] and the named 
directors for improper discharge from employment."  Id. 
Since Bowman, the Court has considered several cases in 
which a public policy exception was asserted.  In each case, 
the Court has emphasized that the exception is "narrow":  
"termination of an employee in violation of the policy 
underlying any one [statute] does not automatically give rise 
to a common law cause of action for wrongful discharge."  Rowan 
v. Tractor Supply Co., 263 Va. 209, 213, 559 S.E.2d 709, 711 
(2002) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
VanBuren's claim falls under one such narrow exception 
previously recognized by the Court:  discharge based on the 
employee's refusal to engage in a criminal act.  Mitchem v. 
Counts, 259 Va. 179, 190, 523 S.E.2d 246, 252 (2000) (holding 
discharge based upon refusal to engage in fornication and lewd 
 
7 
and lascivious cohabitation to be against public policy).  
VanBuren similarly alleges that her discharge resulted from her 
refusal to engage in the criminal acts of adultery and lewd and 
lascivious cohabitation.  There is no question that VanBuren 
has stated a cognizable wrongful discharge claim against her 
employer, Virginia Highlands.  We now address the issue of 
whether she has done the same against Grubb, since the Court 
has never squarely addressed whether a wrongful discharge claim 
can be brought against an individual employee. 
B. Personal Liability of Employees for Wrongful Discharge 
Although we have not specifically addressed the personal 
liability of employees for wrongful discharge, we have twice 
allowed wrongful discharge claims to proceed against individual 
defendants who both committed the acts in violation of public 
policy and effected the termination.  In Bowman, we held that 
"the plaintiffs ha[d] stated a cause of action in tort against 
the Bank and the named directors for improper discharge from 
employment."  229 Va. at 540, 331 S.E.2d at 801 (emphasis 
added).  Nearly a decade later in Lockhart, we concluded that a 
wrongful discharge claim based on gender discrimination could 
go forward against both the plaintiff's former employer and her 
former supervisor.  247 Va. at 106, 439 S.E.2d at 332.  In one 
of the two actions reviewed in Lockhart, the corporate employer 
was a sole proprietorship and the president of the company, her 
 
8 
supervisor, allegedly engaged in activities comparable to the 
allegations in this case. 
While many jurisdictions have likewise permitted such 
actions without any explicit holding on the matter, several of 
our sister states have directly addressed the issue of 
individual liability for persons committing tortious acts in an 
employment setting.  See, e.g., Myers v. Alutiiq Int'l 
Solutions, LLC, 811 F.Supp.2d 261, 269 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding 
that the "D.C. Court of Appeals would allow claims against 
individual supervisors for wrongful discharge" because 
"individuals are liable for their own torts, even as agents 
acting on behalf of their employers"); Higgins v. Assmann 
Elecs., Inc., 173 P.3d 453, 458 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (holding 
that "[c]orporate officers are liable to those harmed by such 
officer[s]" when their "acts constitut[e] the wrongful 
termination" of an employee); Jasper v. H. Nizam, Inc., 764 
N.W.2d 751, 776 (Iowa 2009) (holding that an individual 
corporate officer can be held liable for wrongful discharge 
because the tort "does not impose liability for the discharge 
from employment, but the wrongful reasons motivating the 
discharge"); Ballinger v. Delaware River Port Auth., 800 A.2d 
97, 110 (N.J. 2002) (holding that "an individual who personally 
participates in the tort of wrongful discharge may be held 
individually liable" because "[a]n agent who does an act 
 
9 
otherwise a tort is not relieved from liability by the fact 
that he acted at the command of the principal or on account of 
the principal") (alteration in original) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted); Kamensky v. Roemer Inc., 1 Pa. D. 
& C. 4th 497, 499 (Pa. 1988) (holding that "an officer of the 
corporation who takes part in the commission of the tort by the 
corporation is personally liable therefor[]") (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted); Harless v. First Nat'l 
Bank in Fairmont, 289 S.E.2d 692, 698, 699 (W. Va. 1982) 
(holding that liability on the part of the employer "does not 
mean that another employee who has been the principal 
protagonist in obtaining the employee's discharge would not 
also be liable," because "an agent or employee can be held 
personally liable for his own torts against third parties").  
But see Miklosy v. Regents of Univ. of California, 188 P.3d 
629, 645 (Cal. 2008) (holding that the agency relationship 
shields employees from tort liability for wrongful discharge). 
We find Virginia's existing precedent permitting such 
suits to be consistent with the Court's established case law 
regarding agency relationships.  It has long been settled in 
Virginia that "employers and employees are deemed to be jointly 
liable and jointly suable for the employee's wrongful act."  
Thurston Metals & Supply Co. v. Taylor, 230 Va. 475, 483-84, 
339 S.E.2d 538, 543 (1986); see also Miller v. Quarles, 242 Va. 
 
10 
343, 347, 410 S.E.2d 639, 642 (1991) ("Both principal and agent 
are jointly liable to injured third parties for the agent's 
negligent performance of his common law duty of reasonable care 
under the circumstances."). 
Grubb argues that, as only the employer has the ability to 
effect a discharge, the liability must cease there.  We are not 
persuaded.  In a wrongful discharge case, the tortious act is 
not the discharge itself; rather, the discharge becomes 
tortious by virtue of the wrongful reasons behind it.  Jasper, 
764 N.W.2d at 776.  Where those tortious reasons arise from the 
unlawful actions of the actor effecting the discharge, he or 
she should share in liability.  Here, VanBuren was fired 
because she would not give in to Grubb's unlawful demands.  As 
Grubb was her supervisor and owner of the company, we conclude 
that, if her allegations are proven, he too should be subject 
to liability, just as he would be had he engaged in any other 
tortious conduct. 
Indeed, the recognition in Bowman of a tort of wrongful 
discharge for public policy reasons leads to this result.  
Limiting liability to the employer would follow a contract 
construct.  Wrongful discharge, however, is an action sounding 
in tort.  While there are components of a contractual 
relationship, wrongful discharge remains a tort and tort 
principles must apply. 
 
11 
The purpose of the wrongful discharge tort — namely, the 
deterrence of discharge in violation of public policy — is best 
served if individual employees in a position of power are held 
personally liable for their tortious conduct.  Employer-only 
liability would be insufficient to deter wrongful discharges, 
as this case clearly demonstrates.  In response to the suit, 
Grubb left Virginia Highlands, the medical practice he himself 
started, and joined another healthcare provider.  If the Court 
does not recognize individual liability in such cases, there 
may be nothing to prevent other business owners from following 
this model in an attempt to avoid liability. 
We recognize the concern that supervisors will be hesitant 
to rightfully discharge at-will employees for fear of suit.  We 
believe, however, that the extremely narrow nature of wrongful 
discharge actions, as discussed in Part A, supra, and the 
requirement that the defendant employees' personal actions be 
shown to have violated the relevant public policy, provides 
sufficient protection from the overuse of wrongful discharge 
claims. 
CONCLUSION 
For the aforementioned reasons, we conclude that Virginia 
recognizes a common law tort claim of wrongful discharge in 
violation of established public policy against an individual 
who was not the plaintiff's actual employer but who was the 
 
12 
actor in violation of public policy and who participated in the 
wrongful firing of the plaintiff, such as a supervisor or 
manager. 
 
Certified question, as restated, answered in the affirmative. 
 
 
CHIEF JUSTICE KINSER, with whom JUSTICE GOODWYN and JUSTICE 
McCLANAHAN join, dissenting. 
 
In this certified question case, the Court must resolve a 
question of first impression: Can the common law tort action 
for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy be brought 
against an individual who is not the employer of the discharged 
employee?  I conclude the question must be answered in the 
negative because, as the district court stated, "when the 
employee-employer relationship has been wrongfully terminated, 
liability to the wronged employee can only rest with the other 
party in that relationship, the employer."  VanBuren v. 
Virginia Highlands Orthopaedic Spine Ctr., LLC, 728 F.Supp.2d 
791, 794 (W.D. Va. 2010).  Thus, I respectfully dissent. 
As the majority recognizes, this Court has never addressed 
the question now before us.  Although both Bowman v. State Bank 
of Keysville, 229 Va. 534, 331 S.E.2d 797 (1985), and Lockhart 
v. Commonwealth Education Systems Corporation, 247 Va. 98, 439 
S.E.2d 328, (1994), included allegations against individual 
defendants who engaged in conduct in violation of public policy 
 
13 
but who were not the plaintiffs' employers, neither case 
involved a challenge to whether the tort of wrongful discharge 
could be maintained against those non-employer defendants.  
Thus, the decisions in those cases have no precedential value 
in addressing the precise issue presented now.  Virginia has no 
"existing precedent" allowing such actions.  
To answer the restated certified question, I begin by 
analyzing what constitutes a tort.*  "A 'tort' is any civil 
wrong or injury; a wrongful act (not involving a breach of 
contract) for which an action will lie."  Jewett v. Ware, 107 
Va. 802, 806, 60 S.E. 131, 132 (1908) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); accord Buchanan v. Doe, 246 Va. 67, 71-72, 431 S.E.2d 
289, 291-92 (1993); Glisson v. Loxley, 235 Va. 62, 67, 366 
S.E.2d 68, 71 (1988).  The term "tort" is defined as "a breach 
of a duty that the law imposes on persons who stand in a 
particular relation to one another."  Black's Law Dictionary 
1626 (9th ed. 2009).  It is well established that every tort 
action consists of three elements:  (1) the existence of a 
legal duty; (2) a breach of that duty; and (3) damages as a 
proximate result of the breach.  Kellermann v. McDonough, 278 
Va. 478, 487, 684 S.E.2d 786, 790 (2009); Marshall v. Winston, 
                     
* Whether Angela VanBuren stated a cognizable claim for 
wrongful discharge in violation of an established public policy 
against her employer is irrelevant to answering the restated 
certified question. 
 
14 
239 Va. 315, 318, 389 S.E.2d 902, 904 (1990); Trimyer v. 
Norfolk Tallow Co., 192 Va. 776, 780, 66 S.E.2d 441, 443 
(1951).  The threshold question in any tort action is whether 
the defendant owed a legal duty to the plaintiff.  Burns v. 
Johnson, 250 Va. 41, 44, 458 S.E.2d 448, 450 (1995). 
The common law tort of wrongful discharge has been 
understood from its inception as an exception to the common law 
employment-at-will doctrine.  Bowman, 229 Va. at 539-40, 331 
S.E.2d at 800-01.  That doctrine means that "when a contract 
calls for the rendition of services, but the period of its 
intended duration cannot be determined by a fair inference from 
its provisions, either party is ordinarily at liberty to 
terminate the contract at will upon giving reasonable notice of 
intention to terminate."  Id. at 535, 331 S.E.2d at 798 (citing 
Stonega Coal & Coke Co. v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 106 
Va. 223, 226, 55 S.E. 551, 552 (1906)).  In Bowman, however, we 
recognized an exception "to the strict application of the 
doctrine in favor of at-will employees who claim to have been 
discharged in violation of an established public policy."  Id. 
at 539, 331 S.E.2d at 801. 
In discussing the decision in Bowman, we later explained 
that the discharge there was tortious because "the employer had 
misused its freedom to terminate the services of at-will 
employees in order to subvert" the statutory policy granting 
 
15 
"each stockholder the unfettered right to cast one vote for 
each share of corporate stock held."  Miller v. SEVAMP, Inc., 
234 Va. 462, 467, 362 S.E.2d 915, 918 (1987) (emphasis added).  
We further stated that "Bowman recognized an exception to the 
employment-at-will doctrine limited to discharges which violate 
public policy."  Id. at 468, 362 S.E.2d at 918 (first emphasis 
added). 
Thus, an employer is free to terminate an at-will employee 
but may not do so for reasons that violate public policy.  The 
particular relationship from which this duty arises is that of 
employer and employee, and the legal duty imposed is to refrain 
from discharging an at-will employee for reasons that 
contravene public policy.  Only an employer can breach that 
duty because only an employer has the ability to hire and fire.  
There is no liability for wrongful discharge without a 
termination.  An individual manager or supervisor who carries 
out the wrongful discharge acts solely in a representative 
capacity for the employer, not in a personal capacity, because 
that individual stands outside the employer-employee 
relationship.  Such an individual, therefore, cannot be 
individually liable for that discharge.  Because the legal duty 
at issue in a claim for wrongful discharge does not flow from 
one employee to another employee, it is irrelevant if a manager 
 
16 
or supervisor also engaged in the conduct that violated public 
policy. 
I am not alone in my view that an individual employee 
cannot be liable for the tort of wrongful discharge.  Several 
states have reached the same conclusion.  For example, in 
Buckner v. Atlantic Plant Maintenance Co., 694 N.E.2d 565, 569 
(Ill. 1998), the Supreme Court of Illinois stated that, 
"[l]ogically speaking, only 'the employer' has the power to 
hire or fire an employee."  Although an employee must carry out 
that function for the employer, the court stated, "it is still 
the authority of the employer which is being exercised."  Id.  
Rejecting the "application of general principles of agency 
law," the court further explained: 
The plaintiff asserts that . . . an agent whose 
tortious conduct renders the principal liable is 
also liable for his own tortious acts. This 
general rule may not, however, be logically 
applied to the tort of retaliatory discharge. As 
explained above, the power to hire and fire 
employees is ultimately possessed only by the 
employer. Consequently, the tort of retaliatory 
discharge may be committed only by the employer.  
 
Id. at 570.  See generally Rebarchek v. Farmers Coop. Elevator 
& Mercantile Assoc., 35 P.3d 892, 903-04 (Kan. 2001) (quoting 
extensively from Buckner and adopting its holding). 
The Court of Appeals of Oregon took a similar approach in 
Schram v. Albertson's Inc., 934 P.2d 483 (Or. Ct. App. 1997).  
"[T]orts," the court stated, "are based on the violations of 
 
17 
duties owed by one party to another other than those created by 
contract."  Id. at 490. 
[T]he tort of wrongful discharge arises when an 
employer violates a duty imposed by an 
established public policy.  The employment 
relationship is a necessary element of the tort 
and establishes the duty of the employer on 
behalf of the employee not to violate an 
established public policy.  That relationship 
does not exist among fellow employees. 
 
Id. at 490-91 (citations omitted). 
While the court recognized that an employee can be liable 
for his/her own torts, the court reasoned that in 
"determin[ing] whether an employee has committed tortious 
conduct in a personal capacity, the elements of the alleged 
tort determine whether such a duty exists. . . . [T]he elements 
of the particular tort determine who is subjected to 
liability."  Id. at 491.  
In the case of the tort of wrongful discharge, 
only an employer can discharge an employee.  
When a supervisor acts to discharge an employee, 
he or she is acting solely in his or her 
representative capacity for the employer.  There 
is no duty owed by the supervisor in a personal 
capacity to the employee. 
 
Id. 
Similarly, in Physio GP, Inc. v. Naifeh, 306 S.W.3d 886 
(Tex. App. 2010), the Texas Court of Appeals rejected the 
application of agency principles.  The court recognized that 
"[t]he employment relationship is the source of the duty in 
 
18 
wrongful discharge torts" and that relationship "exists only 
between the employer and employee, not between two employees, 
even when one of those employees is a supervisor or even the 
owner."  Id. at 888. 
Only the employer has the power to hire and 
fire, and supervisors merely exercise that power 
on the employer's behalf.  Corporate employees 
cannot, in their personal capacity, wrongfully 
discharge an employee because they have no 
personal authority to fire an employee.   
 
Id. at 888-89 (citations omitted). 
Nevertheless, the majority answers the restated certified 
question affirmatively in a situation when the employee who 
engaged in the wrongful conduct was also the individual who 
participated in the termination on behalf of the employer.  In 
doing so, the majority focuses on the wrongful conduct rather 
than the wrongful discharge itself.  Indeed, the majority 
states that "[i]n a wrongful discharge case, the tortious act 
is not the discharge itself." 
In my view, this analysis overlooks the first element of 
the tort, the legal duty.†  That duty, as I have already 
                     
† In Jasper v. H. Nizam, Inc., 764 N.W.2d 751 (Iowa 2009), 
on which the majority relies, the court identified the 
following as the elements of the tort of wrongful discharge: 
(1)[E]xistence of a clearly defined public 
policy that protects employee activity; (2) the 
public policy would be jeopardized by the 
discharge from employment; (3) the employee 
engaged in the protected activity, and this 
conduct was the reason for the employee’s 
 
19 
explained, is to refrain from discharging an at-will employee 
for reasons that violate public policy.  An individual 
employee, no matter whether he/she is the owner, manager, 
supervisor, or director of the corporate employer, cannot 
breach that duty.  We must not forget that this certified 
question asks about the common law tort of wrongful discharge, 
not some other tort such as assault and battery or intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.  The elements of the tort at 
issue dictate who can be subjected to liability. 
Our cases holding corporate officers individually liable 
for their tortious conduct are not dispositive because they 
presuppose that a corporate officer is capable of committing 
the tort in question.  As the district court stated, "that is 
precisely the question with which the Court is concerned."  
VanBuren, 728 F.Supp.2d at 795.  For example, in Miller v. 
Quarles, 242 Va. 343, 410 S.E.2d 639 (1991), this Court held 
that a corporate principal and its agents were jointly liable 
"for the agent's negligent performance of his common-law duty 
of reasonable care" under the particular circumstances alleged.  
Id. at 347, 410 S.E.2d at 642.  There, the agent had a common 
law duty, which he breached, and the corporate principal was 
                                                                 
discharge; and (4) there was no overriding 
business justification for the termination. 
Id. at 761.  Like the majority's analysis, these elements 
mistakenly focus on the employee's "protected activity" rather 
than the employer's act of discharging the employee.  Id. 
 
20 
jointly liable under the theory of respondeat superior.  Id. at 
347-48, 410 S.E.2d at 642.  Likewise, in PTS Corp. v. Buckman, 
263 Va. 613, 561 S.E.2d 718 (2002), the statute at issue, Code 
§ 8.01-40(A), imposed liability upon "the person, firm, or 
corporation" using an individual's name without written consent 
for advertising or trade purposes.  Id. at 622, 561 S.E.2d at 
723.  For that reason, we held that the corporate officers, 
acting as agents of the corporate defendant, could be held 
liable for their conduct.  Id. 
These cases illustrate the basic principle that a 
corporate officer is liable for his/her tortious conduct when 
he/she, as an individual, has a legal duty to another 
individual who stands in a particular relationship to the 
corporate officer.  As stated previously, when determining 
whether an employee is liable in a personal capacity, the 
elements of the particular tort at issue must be examined.  
Those elements determine who is subjected to liability.  See 
Schram, 934 P.2d at 491.  The majority fails to account for 
both what a tort is as a general matter and what this 
particular tort is by completely ignoring the employer-employee 
relationship at issue, the duty that arises from that 
relationship, and how such duty can be breached.  In other 
words, the majority does not address the specific elements of 
the common law tort of wrongful discharge. 
 
21 
I do not sanction the alleged behavior of the defendant, 
Dr. Stephen A. Grubb, and I understand the consequences of the 
fact that VanBuren's employer was a Virginia limited liability 
company.  Those factors, however, do not justify expanding what 
has been until today a "narrow" exception to the employment-at-
will doctrine.  See Lockhart, 247 Va. at 104, 439 S.E.2d at 
331.  The majority cites policy reasons for the expansion of 
this narrow exception and states that "[e]mployer-only 
liability would be insufficient to deter wrongful discharges."  
Deterrence of wrongful discharges in violation of public policy 
is a laudable goal but cannot change the fact that an 
individual employee is incapable of committing the tort of 
wrongful discharge.  Moreover, such policy determinations are 
for the General Assembly, not this Court. 
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent and would answer 
the restated certified question in the negative.