Title: Commonwealth v. Molina
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12022
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: February 7, 2017

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12022 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JOSUE MOLINA. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     October 6, 2016. - February 7, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & 
Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Obscenity, Child pornography, Dissemination of matter harmful to 
minor.  Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, 
Confrontation of witnesses.  Search and Seizure, Warrant, 
Computer.  Evidence, Information stored on computer, 
Intent.  Subpoena.  Intent.  Practice, Criminal, Subpoena, 
Restitution, Confrontation of witnesses.  Restitution. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on August 27, 2012. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by 
Mitchell H. Kaplan, J.; the cases were heard by Brian A. Davis, 
J., and a motion for restitution was considered by him. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Ethan C. Stiles for the defendant. 
 
Ryan E. Ferch, Assistant Attorney General (Nancy Ruthstein, 
Assistant Attorney General, also present) for the Commonwealth. 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
BOTSFORD, J.  The defendant, Josue Molina, appeals from his 
child pornography convictions under G. L. c. 272, §§ 29B and 
29C, on three grounds.  First, he argues that the search warrant 
for the apartment in which he was living was overbroad as to 
places and things to be searched.  We disagree, concluding that 
the search warrant was appropriately particularized.  Second, 
the defendant challenges the validity of the administrative 
subpoena that issued under G. L. c. 271, § 17B, for Internet 
service records; he argues that the subpoena, to be 
constitutional, could only be issued based on a showing of 
probable cause.  We similarly reject this argument.  Finally, 
the defendant argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove that 
he had the lascivious intent necessary to support a conviction 
under G. L. c. 272, § 29B (§ 29B).  Although we agree with the 
defendant that lascivious intent is required to be proved with 
respect to every type of conduct proscribed by § 29B, we 
conclude that this requirement was met in this case.  We affirm 
the defendant's convictions. 
 
The Commonwealth cross-appeals, arguing that it is entitled 
to a restitution hearing in this case, and that the victim for 
whom the Commonwealth seeks restitution is not required as a 
matter of law to appear and testify in order to protect the 
defendant's constitutional right of confrontation.  We agree, 
and remand for the requested restitution hearing. 
3 
 
 
 
 
1.  Background.1  a.  File-sharing.  The dissemination of 
child pornography is facilitated by free "peer-to-peer" file-
sharing programs, which allow users to directly connect to other 
users' computers in order to search and download files shared by 
other users.  See United States v. McLellan, 792 F.3d 200, 205 
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 494 (2015).  Ares is one 
such file-sharing program, freely available to the general 
public for download.  Ares requires users to accept a license 
agreement explaining that any files stored in the program's 
default download location, called "My Shared Folder," are 
accessible to other users.  Users may move downloaded files out 
of this default folder and save them elsewhere, beyond the reach 
of other Ares users. 
 
Another version of the Ares program, known as Roundup Ares, 
is available only to law enforcement.  By conducting searches 
using Roundup Ares of terms commonly associated with child 
pornography, a law enforcement investigator can generate the 
                     
 
1 This background section is based on the testimony of the 
witnesses at the jury-waived trial in this case.  Although not 
explicitly credited in the judge's oral findings at the end of 
the trial, the testimony we summarize was uncontroverted, and it 
is not challenged by the defendant on appeal.  With respect to 
Internet file-sharing and the Ares program in particular, the 
search warrant application at issue in this case had attached to 
it a printed explanation entitled "Peer to Peer (P2P) File 
Sharing & the Ares Network" that provided information consistent 
with the trial testimony summarized here.  The warrant 
application with attachments was admitted without objection as 
an exhibit at trial. 
4 
 
 
 
Internet protocol (IP) addresses2 of program users sharing 
suspected files of child pornography.  Every computer file has a 
unique identifier known as a "secure hash algorithm" (hash 
value).  Composed of thirty-two characters, hash values are like 
"digital fingerprints" allowing law enforcement agencies to 
recognize files previously identified as child pornography.  See 
Commonwealth v. Martinez, 476 Mass.    ,     & n.1 (2017). 
 
b.  Facts.  On March 12, 2012, State police Trooper Michael 
Murphy conducted a search for child pornography by accessing the 
Roundup Ares program.  His search indicated that a computer 
associated with the IP address 108.49.7.93 might then be sharing 
                     
 
2 An Internet protocol (IP) address is a string of numbers 
identifying a point of network entry to the Internet, at a 
specific date and time, to enable the routing of Internet 
traffic.  See Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, Glossary of 
Terms, http://www.iana.org/glossary [https://perma.cc/S55N-
Z9MB]; United States v. Kearney, 672 F.3d 81, 84 n.1, 89-90 & 
n.6 (1st Cir. 2012).  An IP address does not "identify an exact 
physical location, only an electronic destination on the 
Internet."  Mackey, Schoen, & Cohn, Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, Unreliable Informants:  IP Addresses, Digital Tips 
and Police Raids 5 & nn.4-6 (Sept. 2016), available at 
https://www.eff.org/files/ 
2016/09/22/2016.09.20_final_formatted_ip_address_white_paper_ 
0.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y42U-C5TG] (EFF, Unreliable Informants).  
It is possible to link an IP address to a particular physical 
location at a particular point in time through information 
supplied by an Internet service provider (ISP), because when a 
subscriber purchases Internet service from an ISP, the ISP 
assigns a unique IP address to the subscriber at a particular 
physical address supplied by the subscriber.  See Commonwealth 
v. Martinez, 476 Mass.    ,     (2017); Commonwealth v. Anthony, 
451 Mass. 59, 62 & n.3 (2008).  See also United States v. 
McLellan, 792 F.3d 200, 213-214 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. 
Ct. 494 (2015). 
5 
 
 
 
child pornography files.  By connecting directly to that 
computer, Murphy was able to view a list of the files in its 
shared folder.  Among the listed file titles, Murphy recognized 
terms commonly associated with child pornography and proceeded 
to download two complete video files.  He viewed both and 
determined that they depicted child pornography, specifically, 
nude prepubescent females engaged in sexual conduct. 
 
In order to identify the account holder associated with the 
IP address, at Murphy's request, the district attorney for the 
Essex district sent an administrative subpoena to Verizon 
Internet Services, Inc. (Verizon), pursuant to G. L. c. 271, 
§ 17B.  Verizon responded, indicating that IP address 
108.49.7.93 was associated with a subscriber named "Hermes 
Delcid" at a certain address in Revere (apartment).  Murphy then 
referred the investigation to the cyber crime division in the 
office of the Attorney General. 
 
As a member of that division, State police Trooper Daniel 
Herman conducted physical surveillance of the apartment, and 
observed outside the house a mailbox with five names on it, 
including Delcid's (and also including the defendant's).  Herman 
performed as well a check of registry of motor vehicles records, 
which confirmed that address as Delcid's apartment.  Based on 
this information, on April 2, 2012, State police Trooper Mark 
Walsh, also of the Attorney General's cyber crime division, 
6 
 
 
 
applied for and obtained a warrant to search the apartment and 
in particular for the following:  electronic devices containing 
evidence of child pornography; evidence of child pornography in 
any other format; evidence of use, control, ownership, or access 
to the Verizon Internet account of Delcid at that address; 
evidence of ownership, access, or control of the peer-to-peer 
network that was operating with IP address 108.49.7.93; evidence 
of custody or control of the apartment; and evidence of use, 
control, ownership, possession, or access to electronic devices 
at the apartment.  Walsh's supporting affidavit detailed his 
experience, summarized the investigation, and provided 
background information on peer-to-peer file sharing and the Ares 
file-sharing program.  See note 1, supra.  The search warrant 
authorized the search of the apartment described without naming 
any person to be searched. 
 
State police officers executed the search warrant on the 
morning of April 4, 2012; some officers proceeded into the 
apartment while others remained in the driveway.  Inside the 
apartment, the officers found Delcid, his wife, and a small 
child.  Forensic examiner Mark Scichilone3 "previewed" a computer 
located in the living room and belonging to Delcid, but excluded 
it from further search when his preliminary review yielded no 
                     
 
3 Mark Scichilone worked in the Attorney General's computer 
forensics laboratory. 
7 
 
 
 
files consistent with child pornography.  In a bedroom later 
identified as the defendant's, officers observed the Ares 
program operating on an open laptop computer.4  Scichilone 
photographed the computer screen, which showed downloads and 
uploads of child pornography files in progress from and to other 
computers. 
 
In the driveway, officers observed an idling motor vehicle 
with someone sitting in the front passenger seat.  State police 
Lieutenant Steven Fennessy approached the vehicle and spoke to 
its occupant, who was the defendant.  After being informed by 
Fennessy that he was not under arrest, the defendant stated that 
he lived in the apartment,5 that he owned a laptop computer 
located in his bedroom at the front of the apartment, and that 
he used the Ares program.  In response, Fennessy advised the 
defendant of the Miranda rights, and the defendant stated that 
he was willing to continue the conversation. 
 
At that point, Fennessy and the defendant moved to an 
unmarked police vehicle, where the defendant signed a Miranda 
                     
 
4 The laptop computer was sitting on top of a desktop 
computer and attached to an external hard drive, both of which 
were also seized. 
 
 
5 The defendant shared the apartment with several roommates 
including Hermes Delcid.  The record is unclear as to leasing 
arrangements for the unit or relationships among its occupants, 
but the parties stipulated that the defendant's bedroom was 
generally understood to be his own. 
8 
 
 
 
waiver form and the rest of the interview was recorded.  The 
defendant admitted to being interested in child pornography and 
to having downloaded about twenty such video recordings, and 
cited several search terms he had used.  He estimated that he 
had been downloading child pornography for about five years, and 
recalled having previously used another file-sharing program on 
the desktop computer in his room.  He further stated that he 
owned an external hard drive.  The defendant characterized child 
pornography as "when underage or any kids, they record it and 
it's like sex abuse basically;" he estimated the age of the 
girls depicted in recent downloads to be about nine.  He denied 
knowing any of the children depicted or having ever sexually 
abused any children.  The defendant was then arrested. 
 
The State police search team seized numerous electronic 
devices from the apartment, including the defendant's laptop and 
desktop computers and his external hard drive.6  The hard drive 
from the laptop computer contained the Ares program; a large 
majority of files downloaded through the file-sharing feature of 
the program contained terms associated with child pornography.  
Six files in the shared folder were confirmed to contain child 
                     
 
6 The return of the search warrant lists seventeen entries.  
Of these, eight entries appear to relate to computers or hard 
drives, five appear to relate to data storage (flash drives and 
compact discs), and four appear to relate to nonelectronic items 
(notes, receipts, and packaging). 
9 
 
 
 
pornography.  The laptop and desktop computers and the external 
hard drive revealed over one hundred files containing suspected 
child pornography.  An analyst employed by the Attorney General 
previewed a sample of the video recordings on each device; the 
samples contained child pornography.  The devices were also 
found to include one of the files Murphy had downloaded during 
his Roundup Ares surveillance on March 12, 2012, and remnants of 
the other. 
 
c.  Procedural history.  On August 27, 2012, a grand jury 
indicted the defendant on one count of possession of child 
pornography with the intent to disseminate in violation of 
§ 29B, one count of dissemination of child pornography in 
violation of § 29B, and three counts of possession of child 
pornography in violation of G. L. c. 272, § 29C.  The defendant 
filed a motion to suppress the electronic evidence seized from 
the apartment as well as his statements.  After a nonevidentiary 
hearing, a judge in the Superior Court (motion judge) denied the 
motion.  The defendant was tried jury-waived before a different 
Superior Court judge (trial judge) and was found guilty of all 
charges.  The Commonwealth moved for restitution for harm to a 
victim, but the trial judge denied the motion without a hearing 
and thereafter denied the Commonwealth's motion to reconsider.  
The defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from his 
10 
 
 
 
convictions, and the Commonwealth also filed a notice of appeal.7  
We granted the defendant's application for direct appellate 
review. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Overbreadth of the search.  The 
defendant argues that the search warrant was impermissibly 
overbroad, as to both places and "things" to be searched.  It is 
a given that under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights, probable cause, necessary for the issuance of a search 
warrant, requires a substantial basis for concluding that the 
items sought are related to the criminal activity under 
investigation, and that they reasonably may be expected to be 
located in the place to be searched at the time the search 
warrant issues.  Commonwealth v. Kaupp, 453 Mass. 102, 110 
(2009), and cases cited.  In addition, under the Fourth 
Amendment, warrants must "particularly describ[e] the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized," and art. 
14 requires warrants to be "accompanied with a special 
                     
7 The defendant argues that the Commonwealth filed its 
appeal one day late, and that the court therefore lacks 
jurisdiction to entertain it.  We agree with the Commonwealth 
that the docket entries are not entirely clear, but assuming the 
notice of appeal was filed one day late, we extend the time for 
filing the Commonwealth's notice of appeal by one day pursuant 
to Mass. R. A. P. 2, 365 Mass. 845 (1974), and Mass. R. A. P. 
14 (b), as amended, 378 Mass. 939 (1979), and therefore treat 
the Commonwealth's notice of appeal as timely filed. 
11 
 
 
 
designation of the persons or objects of search, arrest, or 
seizure."  See G. L. c. 276, § 2 (search warrants "shall 
particularly describe the property or articles to be searched 
for").  By defining and limiting the scope of the search, these 
constitutional and statutory particularity requirements prohibit 
general warrants amounting to "exploratory rummaging in a 
person's belongings."  Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 
467 (1971).  See Commonwealth v. Pope, 354 Mass. 625, 629 
(1968).  A warrant lacking the requisite particularity may thus 
be challenged as overbroad. 
 
In reviewing a finding of probable cause, the affidavit 
supporting the warrant should be interpreted "in a commonsense 
and realistic fashion," and "read as a whole, not parsed, 
severed, and subjected to hypercritical analysis" (citations 
omitted).  Kaupp, 453 Mass. at 111.  An inference drawn from the 
affidavit, "if not forbidden by some rule of law, need only be 
reasonable and possible; it need not be necessary or 
inescapable" (citation omitted).  Id.  A reviewing court gives 
considerable deference to a magistrate's determination of 
probable cause.  Commonwealth v. Anthony, 451 Mass. 59, 69 
(2008).  Because such a determination is a conclusion of law, 
however, we review it de novo.  Commonwealth v. Foster, 471 
Mass. 236, 242 (2015). 
12 
 
 
 
 
i.  Place to be searched.  The defendant argues that where, 
as here, the apartment was shared living space, a search warrant 
for the entire apartment was overbroad.  The Fourth Amendment 
"protects people, not places" against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967), but 
just the same, warrants authorize the searches of particular 
places, and do so properly wherever there is a sufficient nexus 
between the items sought and the place to be searched.  
Commonwealth v. McDermott, 448 Mass. 750, 768, cert. denied, 552 
U.S. 910 (2007).  That nexus may be based on the type of crime, 
the nature of the missing items, the extent of the suspect's 
opportunity for concealment, and normal inferences as to where a 
criminal would be likely to hide evidence of the crime.  Id.  
"[T]he degree of specificity required when describing the goods 
to be seized may necessarily vary according to the circumstances 
and type of items involved."  Commonwealth v. Freiberg, 405 
Mass. 282, 298 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 940 (1989). 
 
Here, the warrant established a sufficient nexus, 
articulated with adequate particularity.  The defendant argues 
that the police "knew next to nothing of the people and 
computing devices" inside the apartment to be searched.  His 
emphasis on people, however, is misguided where the warrant 
appropriately substantiated a connection between the apartment 
and the evidence of child pornography reasonably expected to be 
13 
 
 
 
located therein.  Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 556 & 
n.6 (1978) ("The critical element in a reasonable search is not 
that the owner of the property is suspected of crime but that 
there is reasonable cause to believe that the specific 'things' 
to be searched for and seized are located on the property to 
which entry is sought").  See Martinez, 476 Mass. at    ,    . 
 
It is true that the police were aware prior to the search 
that the Verizon subscriber was not the apartment's sole 
occupant:  there were five names on the apartment's mailbox.  
The search warrant, however, authorized a search of the location 
associated with the IP address, not a search of any single 
associated subscriber.  Although IP addresses alone can be 
unreliable indicators of location,8 they suffice when 
corroborated by the Internet service provider (ISP), as occurred 
here.  See United States v. Grant, 218 F.3d 72, 75 (1st Cir.), 
cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1025 (2000) (IP address corroborated by 
ISP supported probable cause).  That reliability may be further 
strengthened by police surveillance, which here confirmed the 
connection between the IP address and the physical location when 
officers observed the ISP subscriber's name on the apartment's 
                     
 
8 See United States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 527 & n.14 
(3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 905 (2011) 
(characterizing IP addresses as "fairly 'unique' identifiers," 
but cautioning that "there undoubtedly exists the possibility of 
mischief and mistake").  See EFF, Unreliable Informants, supra 
at 8-10. 
14 
 
 
 
mailbox.  See McLellan, 792 F.3d at 211 n.9, quoting United 
States v. Gillman, 432 Fed. Appx. 513, 515 (6th Cir. 2011) 
(finding sufficient nexus between illegality and defendant's 
apartment where "(1) child pornography was transferred to police 
from a specific IP address; (2) that IP address was registered 
to the defendant's residential address; and (3) the defendant 
actually lived at that address").9 
 
The search was indeed limited to the apartment.  Within the 
apartment, however, the search was limited not to areas under 
Delcid's exclusive control but rather to those associated with 
the IP address.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Dew, 443 Mass. 620, 626 
(2005) (search warrant for entire multifamily home not overbroad 
where defendant had access to all units).  Just as evidence 
could have been anywhere in an entire house to which the 
defendant had access in Dew, so here could computer devices 
using the monitored IP address be anywhere in the apartment.  
                     
 
9 Many Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals have held that a 
corroborated IP address provides sufficient probable cause for a 
search warrant of the associated physical address to issue.  See 
United States v. Chiaradio, 684 F.3d 265, 279 (1st Cir.), cert. 
denied, 133 S. Ct. 589 (2012); United States v. Renigar, 613 
F.3d 990, 991, 994 (10th Cir. 2010); Vosburgh, 602 F.3d at 526–
527; United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834, 843-844 (8th Cir. 
2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 915 (2010); United States v. 
Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1205-1206 (10th Cir. 2008); United 
States v. Pérez, 484 F.3d 735, 740 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 552 
U.S. 952 (2007); United States v. Wagers, 452 F.3d 534, 539 (6th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1032 (2006); United States v. Hay, 
231 F.3d 630, 635–636 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 
858 (2001). 
15 
 
 
 
Where the defendant's unlocked bedroom showed no indicia of 
separate ownership from the rest of the apartment, a search of 
that bedroom as part of the physical address associated with the 
IP address was proper. 
 
ii.  Things to be searched.  Molina further contends that 
the warrant was overbroad in allowing police to seize "all 
computing devices found in the apartment regardless to whom they 
belonged or where they may have been found."  The argument 
fails.  The information available to the police was that 
suspected child pornography was being sent and received through 
a computer device connected to IP address 108.49.7.93 and that 
that IP address was assigned to a subscriber at the apartment.  
As discussed above, the warrant properly permitted a search of 
the entire physical location associated with the target IP 
address for any evidence (computers and related items) of child 
pornography.  Because that evidence, in the form of electronic 
files, could be easily transferred between devices at the same 
location, police need not have limited the devices to be 
searched.  See McDermott, 448 Mass. at 770 (warrant seeking 
evidence of defendant's mental state not overbroad where police 
"did not have information that would allow them further to limit 
16 
 
 
 
the description of this category of items").10  Where evidence of 
child pornography could thus have existed on any or all 
electronic devices at the location associated with the target IP 
address, the seizure of over a dozen electronic devices found in 
the apartment did not exceed the warrant's scope. 
 
iii.  Minimization protocol.  Although we conclude that 
there was probable cause to justify the search of the apartment 
in this case, the execution of the search warrant must itself 
satisfy the "ultimate touchstone" of reasonableness.  See 
Commonwealth v. Entwistle, 463 Mass. 205, 213 (2012), cert. 
denied, 133 S. Ct. 945 (2013).  The defendant does not squarely 
                     
 
10 See also United States v. Ivers, 430 Fed. Appx. 573, 575 
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 337 (2011) (scope of 
warrant proper where, although police could have provided more 
specific description of items sought, they "had no way of 
knowing where the images were stored" [citation omitted]);  
United States v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 535 (1st Cir. 1999) 
(warrant limiting search of entire home to "[a]ny and all 
computer software and hardware, . . . computer disks, disk 
drives . . . [a]nd any and all visual depictions, in any format 
or media, of minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct" 
sufficiently particular because search and seizure of computer 
and all available disks was "narrowest definable [one] 
reasonably likely to obtain images"); United States v. Clark, 
524 F. Supp. 2d 896, 901 (W.D. Mich. 2006), aff'd, 257 Fed. 
Appx. 991 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 829 (2008) 
(warrant limiting search of entire home in which defendant 
rented room to "[c]hild pornography in any form including . . . 
computer printed images," and limiting search of computer hard 
drives and other storage media to "evidence . . . related to 
child pornography," was as specific as it could have been, given 
that defendant could have stored files containing child 
pornography almost anywhere on his computer or other storage 
media); United States v. Albert, 195 F. Supp. 2d 267, 276 (D. 
Mass. 2002) (similar). 
17 
 
 
 
challenge the scope or reasonableness of the search of his 
electronic devices or his digital files once police had seized 
the devices, nor does he suggest that police should be required 
to develop and implement a minimization protocol to govern the 
execution of any such digital search.  We note, moreover, that 
in this case the police and associated personnel conducting the 
search promptly, and commendably, screened and excluded at least 
Delcid's computer from further search or seizure; it also 
appears that when the seized electronic devices were seized 
thereafter, the personnel conducting the searches did so by 
searching for file names containing terms commonly associated 
with child pornography in order to preview only a limited sample 
of files consistent with those terms. 
On the record before us in this case, nothing indicates 
that execution of the search in this case was unreasonable.  
Nevertheless, the fact that the target apartment appeared to be 
the residence of multiple individuals11 is significant.  Where, 
as the search warrant return in this case indicates, multiple 
electronic devices that may well belong to multiple individuals 
are seized and searched, the reasonableness of the undertaking 
                     
11 The police knew from the surveillance they conducted 
before applying for the search warrant that the target apartment 
had a mailbox with five different names on it, and when the 
police entered the apartment, we infer that it was quite obvious 
that more than Delcid and his family were living there. 
18 
 
 
 
will be judged, at least in part, by whether the searches of 
those devices are conducted in a manner that seeks to limit the 
scope of the search as much as practicable in the particular 
circumstances.  In the future, we may consider whether to 
require, as some courts have, a digital search protocol that 
would affirmatively demonstrate "a high regard for rights of 
privacy and take all measures reasonable to avoid unnecessary 
intrusion."  Commonwealth v. Vitello, 367 Mass. 224, 262 (1975).  
Compare United States v. Galpin, 720 F.3d 436, 451 (2d Cir. 
2013) (declining to require "specific search protocols or 
minimization undertakings as basic predicates for upholding 
digital search warrants"), with United States v. Comprehensive 
Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1176–1177 (9th Cir. 2010) (en 
banc) (per curiam) (requiring minimization protocol). 
 
In the McDermott case, we explained that no advance 
approval was required for computer search methods because the 
magistrate issuing the warrant "likely does not have the 
technical expertise to assess the propriety of a particular 
forensic analysis."  McDermott, 448 Mass. at 776.  It is for 
precisely this reason, however, that additional guidance at the 
present time would be very useful concerning ways that those 
conducting digital searches can minimize intrusions into the 
private electronic files of individuals who may have no 
connection at all with the child pornography or other suspected 
19 
 
 
 
criminal activity being investigated.  Nearly a decade's worth 
of technological advancements have taken place since this court 
decided McDermott, and as was clear at oral argument in this 
case, we are concerned about the lack of protocols or formal 
guidelines for executing search warrants for digital evidence.  
Cf. Kerr, Executing Warrants for Digital Evidence:  The Case for 
Use Restrictions on Nonresponsive Data, 48 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 1, 
17-18 (2015) ("The best way to minimize the unwarranted 
intrusions upon privacy for computer searches is to impose use 
restrictions on the nonresponsive data revealed in the course of 
the search").  The Attorney General's existing digital evidence 
guide offers helpful parameters,12 and we invite the Attorney 
General to develop further guidance for the conduct of digital 
searches that could be made available to both State and local 
officers conducting digital searches. 
 
b.  Administrative subpoena.  Pursuant to G. L. c. 271, 
§ 17B (§ 17B), a district attorney may issue an administrative 
subpoena for the records of an ISP "whenever [he or she] has 
reasonable grounds to believe that [those records] are relevant 
and material to an ongoing criminal investigation."  This 
statute is to be read in conjunction with the Federal Stored 
                     
 
12 See Office of the Attorney General, Massachusetts Digital 
Evidence Guide (June 9, 2015), available at 
http://www.mass.gov/ago/docs/cybercrime/ma-digital-evidence-
guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9XJ-NAYC]. 
20 
 
 
 
Communications Act (SCA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711 (2012).  See 
G. L. c. 271, § 17B (permitting subpoenas "[e]xcept as otherwise 
prohibited under [18 U.S.C. § 2703]").  The SCA requires 
subpoenaed providers to disclose a subscriber's name, address, 
telephone connection records (including session times and 
durations), length and type of service, network address, and 
payment source.  18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2). 
 
The defendant challenges the validity of the administrative 
subpoena sent by the district attorney to Verizon in this case, 
arguing that it could only be sent if supported by probable 
cause, and that the § 17B standard requiring only a showing that 
the records sought are "relevant and material to an ongoing 
criminal investigation" was constitutionally insufficient.  
Accordingly, he claims, because the administrative subpoena was 
invalid, the invalidity applied as well to the search warrant 
because probable cause for it was supported in part by 
information obtained through this subpoena, requiring the 
reversal of his conviction. 
 
Assuming, without deciding, that the defendant has standing 
to challenge the administrative subpoena for Delcid's Verizon 
subscriber records, we reject the defendant's contention that 
the issuance of such a subpoena requires probable cause.  
Previous decisions of this court have reviewed and upheld the 
constitutional validity of the "relevant and material" standard 
21 
 
 
 
contained in § 17B, at least as applied to certain types of 
telephone records.  See Commonwealth v. Vinnie, 428 Mass. 161, 
178, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1007 (1998), adopting reasoning of 
Commonwealth v. Feodoroff, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 725, 729-730 
(1997).  Section 17B specifically prohibits disclosure of the 
contents of subscriber communications, including Internet 
browser history.  G. L. c. 271, § 17B.13  Here, however, the 
subscriber information reveals substantially less than the 
telephone records we have said permissibly could be subpoenaed.  
See Commonwealth v. Chamberlin, 473 Mass. 653, 658 (2016); 
Vinnie, supra.  At least on the facts of this case, we continue 
to think that for the limited scope of information obtained 
pursuant to § 17B, the requirements of art. 14 were satisfied by 
the statute's requirement that the requestor have reasonable 
grounds to believe the records are relevant and material to an 
ongoing criminal investigation. 
 
Because we have rejected the defendant's challenges to the 
search warrant -- the overbreadth challenge as well as the 
                     
 
13 Specifically, the relevant text of G. L. c. 271, § 17B, 
provides:  "No subpoena issued pursuant to this section shall 
demand records that disclose the content of electronic 
communications or subscriber account records disclosing internet 
locations which have been accessed including, but not limited 
to, websites, chat channels and newsgroups, but excluding 
servers used to initially access the internet.  No recipient of 
a subpoena issued pursuant to this section shall provide any 
such content or records accessed, in response to such subpoena." 
22 
 
 
 
challenge to the supporting information obtained through the 
§ 17B administrative warrant -- we affirm the motion judge's 
order denying the defendant's motion to suppress evidence 
obtained in the search of the apartment.14 
 
c.  G. L. c. 272, § 29B:  proof of lascivious intent 
requirement.  Molina contests the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting his conviction of possession of child pornography 
with the intent to disseminate under § 29B (b).  He argues that 
the Commonwealth failed to prove that he had the lascivious 
intent he claims is required to be proved as an element of the 
crime.  The Commonwealth responds that proof of lascivious 
intent is not necessary to convict a defendant of possession 
with intent to disseminate under § 29B (b), but that in any 
event there was proof of lascivious intent, and indeed proof of 
all the elements of the crime of possession with intent to 
disseminate.  We agree with Molina that lascivious intent must 
be proved to establish any violation of § 29B, including in 
particular possession of child pornography with intent to 
                     
 
14 For the same reason, we also affirm the motion judge's 
denial of the defendant's motion to suppress his statements to 
State police Lieutenant Steven Fennessy and other police 
officers as inadmissible fruit of the poisonous tree under Wong 
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486 (1963).  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Estabrook, 472 Mass. 852, 860-864 (2015) (only 
statements resulting from exploitation of illegally obtained 
evidence need be suppressed). 
23 
 
 
 
disseminate under § 29B (b), but we disagree that the evidence 
was insufficient to do so here. 
 
Section 29B has two subsections, the first of which, 
§ 29B (a), focuses on child pornography depicting child nudity, 
and the second of which, § 29B (b), addresses child pornography 
depicting children engaging in sexual conduct.  Each subsection 
punishes both acts of dissemination as well as possession with 
intent to disseminate.  Sections 29B (a) and (b) provide in 
relevant part as follows: 
"(a)  Whoever, with lascivious intent, disseminates any 
visual material that contains a representation or 
reproduction of any posture or exhibition in a state of 
nudity involving the use of a child who is under eighteen 
years of age, knowing the contents of such visual material 
or having sufficient facts in his possession to have 
knowledge of the contents thereof, or has in his possession 
any such visual material knowing the contents or having 
sufficient facts in his possession to have knowledge of the 
contents thereof, with the intent to disseminate the same, 
shall be punished . . . . 
 
"(b)  Whoever with lascivious intent disseminates any 
visual material that contains a representation or 
reproduction of any act that depicts, describes, or 
represents sexual conduct participated or engaged in by a 
child who is under eighteen years of age, knowing the 
contents of such visual material or having sufficient facts 
in his possession to have knowledge of the contents 
thereof, or whoever has in his possession any such visual 
material, with the intent to disseminate the same, shall be 
punished . . . ."  (Emphases added.) 
 
 
As used in § 29B, the term "lascivious intent" is defined 
in G. L. c. 272, § 31, to mean "a state of mind in which the 
sexual gratification or arousal of any person is an objective."  
24 
 
 
 
G. L. c. 272, § 31.15  The Commonwealth agrees with the defendant 
that both types of conduct proscribed by § 29B (a) and the 
actual dissemination proscribed by § 29B (b) require lascivious 
intent, but the Commonwealth disputes that the possession with 
the intent to disseminate prohibited by § 29B (b) does so.  In 
the Commonwealth's view, the lascivious intent required for 
                     
 
15 The full definition of "lascivious intent" in G. L. 
c. 272, § 31, is the following: 
 
"'Lascivious intent,' a state of mind in which the 
sexual gratification or arousal of any person is an 
objective.  For the purposes of prosecution under this 
chapter, proof of lascivious intent may include, but shall 
not be limited to, the following: 
 
 
"(1) whether the circumstances include sexual 
behavior, sexual relations, infamous conduct of a lustful 
or obscene nature, deviation from accepted customs and 
manners, or sexually oriented displays; 
 
 
"(2) whether the focal point of a visual depiction is 
the child's genitalia, pubic area, or breast area of a 
female child; 
 
 
"(3) whether the setting or pose of a visual depiction 
is generally associated with sexual activity; 
 
 
"(4) whether the child is depicted in an unnatural 
pose or inappropriate attire, considering the child's age; 
 
 
"(5) whether the depiction denotes sexual 
suggestiveness or a willingness to engage in sexual 
activity; 
 
 
"(6) whether the depiction is of a child engaging in 
or being engaged in sexual conduct, including, but not 
limited to, sexual intercourse, unnatural sexual 
intercourse, bestiality, masturbation, sado-masochistic 
behavior, or lewd exhibition of the genitals." 
25 
 
 
 
actual dissemination in the first "whoever" clause of § 29B (b) 
does not also modify the second "whoever" clause that describes 
possession with the intent to disseminate, with the result that, 
in contrast to § 29B (a), possession with the intent to 
disseminate under § 29B (b) does not require proof of lascivious 
intent to establish the crime.16 
 
We are not persuaded that such a distinction between the 
two subsections can properly rest on the presence of a second 
"whoever" in § 29B (b), and the absence of two commas.  In 
Commonwealth v. Dingle, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 274, 279 (2008), the 
Appeals Court, reviewing the legislative history of the statute, 
interpreted § 29B (a) and (b) as "describ[ing] different means 
of committing the same offense."  We agree, and based on the 
same legislative history, conclude that the lascivious intent 
requirement applies to all four means of violating the statute 
contained in the two subsections. 
                     
 
16 In particular, the Commonwealth asserts that, in 
§ 29B (a), the lascivious intent requirement is set off by 
commas and clearly modifies the entire subsection to reach both 
dissemination and possession with the intent to disseminate 
visual material depicting child nudity, but in § 29B (b), the 
absence of commas around the lascivious intent requirement and 
the presence of a second "whoever" indicates that the lascivious 
intent requirement was only intended to apply to dissemination 
of depictions of child sexual acts, and not to possession with 
the intent to disseminate this type of visual material. 
26 
 
 
 
 
Section 29B was originally enacted in 1977.  See St. 1977, 
c. 917, § 2.  In its original version, the statute did not have 
separate subsections, and provided in relevant part: 
 
"Whoever disseminates any visual material that 
contains a representation or reproduction of any posture or 
exhibition in a state of nudity or of any act that depicts, 
describes, or represents sexual conduct participated or 
engaged in by a child who is under eighteen years of age, 
knowing the contents of such visual material or having 
sufficient facts in his possession to have knowledge of the 
contents thereof, or whoever has in his possession any such 
visual material knowing the contents or having sufficient 
facts in his possession to have knowledge of the contents 
thereof, with the intent to disseminate the same, shall be 
punished . . . ."  (Emphases added.) 
 
Id.  As this quoted language indicates, the statute combined the 
four means of committing the crime -- dissemination of visual 
material depicting child nudity, dissemination of visual 
material depicting child sexual acts, and possession with the 
intent to disseminate both types of pornographic visual material 
-- in a single section, and there was no lascivious intent 
requirement for any of these means.  In 1988, this court struck 
down a statute closely related to § 29B, G. L. c. 272, § 29A,17 
as unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.  Commonwealth v. Oakes, 401 Mass. 
602, 603 (1988), vacated by 491 U.S. 576 (1989).  In response, 
                     
 
17 General Laws c. 272, § 29A, concerns the production of 
visual material depicting children in a state of nudity or 
engaged in sexual conduct, whereas § 29B relates to the 
dissemination of such material (or possession with the intent to 
disseminate). 
27 
 
 
 
the Attorney General presented to the Legislature proposed 
amendments to both §§ 29A and 29B that, among other things, 
separated each section into separate subsections, and added a 
lascivious intent requirement to § 29A (a) and also to § 29B (a) 
and (b).  See St. 1988, c. 226, §§ 1, 2.  It is clear from the 
submissions of the Attorney General that the goal was to correct 
the constitutional overbreadth infirmity that this court in 
Oakes found to invalidate § 29A by adding a lascivious intent 
requirement not only to what became § 29A (a), but also to 
§ 29B (a) and (b).  See Memorandum from Assistant Attorney 
General Lila Heideman to Sen. Paul Harold and Rep. James Brett 
(June 21, 1988) (on file with Committee on Criminal Justice) 
(Heideman memorandum).  See also Dingle, 73 Mass. App. Ct. at 
280-282.  The Legislature enacted the amendments proposed by the 
Attorney General with essentially no substantive changes.  See 
St. 1988, c. 226, § 2; Heideman memorandum, supra.  The 
Commonwealth makes much of the second "whoever" in § 29B (b) and 
the absence of the same in § 29B (a).  However, a second 
"whoever" existed in the originally enacted, single-section 
version of § 29B, before the addition of the lascivious intent 
requirement to it, and the legislative history contains nothing 
to indicate that the continued presence of a second "whoever" in 
§ 29B (b) but absence in § 29B (a) reflected an intentional 
decision to distinguish between the two subsections in order to 
28 
 
 
 
ensure that lascivious intent was not required for possession 
with the intent to disseminate child pornography depicting child 
sexual acts.  Rather, the legislative history suggests the 
opposite -- that is, as stated previously, an intent on the part 
of the drafters of the 1988 amendment to ensure that lascivious 
intent was an element of all aspects of § 29B (a) and (b).18  
Moreover, to construe § 29B (b) as imposing a proof of 
lascivious intent requirement in relation to the more serious 
and harmful act of actual dissemination, but not to the act of 
possession with the intent to disseminate, seems illogical.  See 
Flemings v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 431 Mass. 374, 
375-376 (2000).  In sum, we construe § 29B to require proof of 
lascivious intent with respect to all four means of committing 
the crime, including possession with the intent to disseminate 
visual material depicting a child engaged in a sexual act under 
§ 29B (b).19,20 
                     
18 This is in contrast to G. L. c. 272, § 29A, where the 
lascivious intent requirement applies solely to § 29A (a) (child 
nudity) but is not mentioned in § 29A (b) (child engaged in 
sexual act). 
 
 
19 We note, as the trial judge did, that both indictments 
charging the defendant with violating § 29B included a reference 
to lascivious intent -- that is, the indictment charging the 
defendant with dissemination of child pornography under 
§ 29B (a), as well as the separate one charging possession with 
the intent to disseminate under § 29B (b). 
 
29 
 
 
 
 
d.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  The defendant argues that 
there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions of 
dissemination of child pornography and possession of child 
pornography with the intent to disseminate under § 29B (a) and 
(b), respectively.  This argument fails.  For both of the § 29B 
charges, the disputed elements of the offenses boil down to 
whether there was sufficient evidence of (1) lascivious intent; 
and (2) dissemination or possession with the intent to 
disseminate.  Our review of the trial record persuades us that 
there was sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
each element of each § 29B charge. 
 
i.  Evidence of lascivious intent.  The evidence in this 
case showed that the defendant was downloading and uploading -- 
i.e., sharing -- files containing children "exhibit[ed] in a 
                                                                  
 
20 In Commonwealth v. LeBlanc, 475 Mass. 820, 822 (2016), we 
considered the significance of seven separate "whoever" clauses 
in G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a), a subsection of the statute 
prohibiting operation of a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of intoxicants.  The specific question in that case 
was whether language in the first "whoever" clause requiring 
proof that the defendant was operating on a "public way" should 
be understood also to apply the same "public way" requirement to 
each of the other "whoever" clauses; we concluded that the 
"public way" requirement did not apply to the other clauses.  
Id.  Section 29B (b) is very different in structure and subject 
matter from the statute at issue in the LeBlanc case.  It is 
also significant that in contrast to the history of § 29B (b), 
the legislative history of the statute in LeBlanc did not offer 
support for a construction that would apply a public way 
requirement to all the "whoever" clauses, and the statute made 
better sense if the public way requirement did not apply to all 
of the other "whoever" clauses. 
30 
 
 
 
state of nudity" who were "engaging in or being engaged in 
sexual conduct" that included one or more of the acts ("sexual 
intercourse, unnatural sexual intercourse, bestiality, 
masturbation, sado-masochistic behavior, or lewd exhibition of 
the genitals") described in the definition of "lascivious 
intent" set out in  G. L. c. 272, § 31.  See note 16, supra.  
Given that "lascivious intent" requires proof of "a state of 
mind in which the sexual gratification or arousal of any person 
is an objective" (emphasis added), id., we agree with the trial 
judge that the evidence permitted the reasonable inference that 
the defendant had his own sexual gratification as an objective 
in downloading and sharing depictions of children in various 
states of nudity engaged in sexual conduct, and that this 
permissible inference sufficed to permit the judge, as the fact 
finder, reasonably to find proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
lascivious intent in relation to both the dissemination charge 
under § 29B (a) (pornography depicting child nudity) and the 
possession with the intent to disseminate charge under § 29B (b) 
(pornography depicting a child engaged in sexual conduct). 
 
ii.  Evidence of dissemination and of possession with 
intent to disseminate.  The defendant argues that the evidence 
on dissemination showed only that he had failed to take any 
steps to change the default download folder from the "My Shared 
Folder" to one that was not shared with other Ares program 
31 
 
 
 
users, and that this evidence was insufficient to support a 
conviction for actual dissemination with lascivious intent.  The 
trial judge reasoned that the file-sharing program, displaying 
simultaneous downloads and uploads, and explicitly identified as 
such on the Ares program screen on the defendant's computer, 
provided sufficient evidence to prove the dissemination charge 
under § 29B (a).  We agree.  "When an individual consciously 
makes files available for others to take and those files are in 
fact taken, [knowing] distribution has occurred.  The fact that 
the defendant did not actively elect to transmit those files is 
irrelevant."  United States v. Chiaradio, 684 F.3d 265, 282 (1st 
Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 589 (2012). 
The same evidence reflecting the actual file-sharing 
activity on the defendant's computer also was sufficient to 
prove the charge of possession with the intent to disseminate:  
in order to disseminate these files containing child 
pornography, by definition the defendant first had to possess 
these files, and the file-sharing activity reflects an intent to 
disseminate. 
 
e.  Restitution.  The Commonwealth appeals with respect to 
the denial of its request for a hearing on its motion for 
restitution.  The trial judge based his denial of the request 
and related denial of the motion for reconsideration on the 
ground that a hearing on the motion was a necessary prerequisite 
32 
 
 
 
to the motion's allowance, and the defendant's right to due 
process required that, at such a hearing, the victim identified 
by the Commonwealth, referred to by the pseudonym "Vicky," 
appear and testify.  We disagree, and accordingly remand for a 
hearing at which the victim need not appear. 
 
The relevant background facts are these.  Following the 
judge's finding of the defendant to be guilty of all charges, 
the Commonwealth requested that as a component of his sentence, 
the defendant be required to make restitution to Vicky, a victim 
of some of the child pornography in the defendant's possession,21 
and requested a hearing to establish the amount of restitution.  
In support of its motion, the Commonwealth filed a memorandum 
accompanied by exhibits, including a sworn victim impact 
statement signed by Vicky, psychological evaluations, and an 
economic analysis of lost wages.  The judge agreed with the 
Commonwealth that Vicky qualified as a victim of the defendant's 
crimes who might be eligible for restitution, but declined to 
hold a restitution hearing because he found that to do so would 
require the victim's presence, and he wanted to spare her that 
                     
21 The Commonwealth states in its brief that "Vicky" is the 
pseudonym given to the child depicted in some of the defendant's 
computer files of child pornography.  The defendant does not 
dispute this statement.  The Commonwealth also states, again 
without dispute by the defendant, that Vicky does not live in 
the Commonwealth. 
33 
 
 
 
experience.22  The judge appeared to have concluded that this 
court's decision in Commonwealth v. Denehy, 466 Mass. 723, 740 
(2014), made Vicky's appearance mandatory.23 
 
A judge unquestionably has the power to order restitution 
as a condition of probation.  See Denehy, 466 Mass. at 737, and 
cases cited.  In a case where restitution is sought, if the 
defendant does not stipulate to the restitution amount, the 
judge should conduct an evidentiary hearing, at which the victim 
may testify regarding the amount of the loss.  Commonwealth v. 
Henry, 475 Mass. 117, 120 (2016).  A restitution hearing "need 
not be elaborate," but must be "reasonable and fair."  
Commonwealth v. Nawn, 394 Mass. 1, 7 (1985).  The opportunity to 
                     
 
22 Specifically, the judge stated:  "A restitution hearing 
is required; and where a restitution hearing is required, in 
circumstances like this, I'm not going to order restitution.  
I'm not doing it because I would not require Vicky to appear in 
this courtroom to testify."  His written denial of the motion 
noted, "Restitution would require a hearing at which 'Vicky' 
would be required to appear. . . .  The [c]ourt will not subject 
Vicky to that process."  Thereafter, in denying the 
Commonwealth's motion for reconsideration, the judge stated that 
he "remain[ed] persuaded that any restitution order in the 
present case would require an evidentiary hearing at which the 
[d]efendant would be entitled to cross-examine Vicky regarding 
her claimed damages." 
 
 
23 In Commonwealth v. Denehy, 466 Mass. 723, 740 (2014), we 
stated that with respect to restitution, "[t]he Commonwealth 
bears the burden of proving both a causal connection and the 
amount of the loss by a preponderance of the evidence. . . .  A 
'unilateral statement' from the victim or, as here, from the 
assistant district attorney about the amount owed may be 
insufficient to meet this burden" (citations omitted). 
34 
 
 
 
cross-examine witnesses is one, but by no means the only, 
measure of such fairness.  See Commonwealth v. Casanova, 65 
Mass. App. Ct. 750, 755-756 (2006) (hearsay, if reliable, is 
admissible to carry Commonwealth's burden at restitution 
hearing).  The hearing must be flexible in nature, and all 
reliable evidence should be considered.  See id. (restitution 
process "should be flexible enough to consider evidence 
including letters, affidavits, and other material that would not 
be admissible in an adversary criminal trial" [citation 
omitted]). 
 
An order to pay restitution forms part of a criminal 
sentence that includes probation, but a hearing on restitution 
shares some common features with a probation revocation 
proceeding.  See Casanova, 65 Mass. App. Ct. at 755-756.  In the 
probation revocation context, strict evidentiary rules are not 
imposed, see Commonwealth v. Durling, 407 Mass. 108, 114 (1990), 
and the same is true of restitution hearings.  See Casanova, 
supra at 755.  More relevant to the issue raised in the present 
case, however, is the point that in a probation revocation 
hearing, although a defendant has a presumptive right to call 
witnesses, that presumption may be overcome by countervailing 
interests.  See Commonwealth v. Hartfield, 474 Mass. 474, 481 
(2016).  In particular, in determining whether the 
countervailing interests overcome the presumption after 
35 
 
 
 
considering the totality of the circumstances, the judge 
conducting a restitution hearing should consider whether, based 
on an individualized assessment of the proposed witness, there 
is an unacceptable risk that the witness's physical, 
psychological, or emotional health would be significantly 
jeopardized if the witness were required to testify in court at 
the probation hearing.  See id. 
These same considerations are relevant to a restitution 
hearing, and they support the conclusion that in the restitution 
context a trial judge possesses the discretionary authority not 
to require a victim such as Vicky to appear as a witness, and 
specifically to preclude the defendant from calling her, if the 
judge were to find, based on the record before him, that the 
interest in insulating the victim from further trauma overcomes 
the defendant's presumptive right to call her.24  If a judge 
makes such a determination of unavailability, this does not 
require denial of a request for a hearing on a motion for 
restitution.  Nor does such a determination of unavailability 
mean that the defendant, after hearing, could not be ordered to 
make restitution payments on the victim's behalf.  "'[T]he right 
to confront adverse witnesses and the right to present a defense 
                     
 
24 Cf. Kearney, 672 F.3d at 99-101 (Federal child 
pornography prosecution; court affirmed trial judge's award of 
restitution to Vicky without requiring her appearance). 
36 
 
 
 
are distinct due process rights separately guaranteed to 
probationers' and should not be conflated."  See Hartfield, 474 
Mass. at 479, quoting Commonwealth v. Kelsey, 464 Mass. 315, 327 
n.12 (2013).  If there is "good cause" for the Commonwealth not 
to call a witness with personal knowledge to testify but to 
offer instead reliable hearsay or other evidence to establish 
the basis for its request for restitution, the requirements of 
due process are likely to be satisfied.  Cf. Durling, 407 Mass. 
at 115, 118-119 (because probationer's liberty interest is 
conditional, so too is probationer's right to confront 
witnesses, and that right can be denied for "good cause").  Cf. 
also Rule 7(b) of District/Municipal Courts Rules for Probation 
Violation Proceedings, Mass. Rules of Court, at 742 (Thomson 
Reuters 2016). 
 
We emphasize a point previously made:  a hearing on a 
request for restitution is necessary if the basis for the 
request or the amount of restitution to be ordered is in 
dispute.  This follows from the fact that the purpose of 
restitution is to compensate the injured party for losses 
incurred as a result of the defendant's criminal conduct.  See 
Commonwealth v. Rotonda, 434 Mass. 211, 221 (2001).  
Accordingly, the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant 
caused harm to the victim, and the payment of restitution is 
limited to the economic losses caused by the conduct of the 
37 
 
 
 
defendant and documented by the victim.  Id., citing G. L. 
c. 258B, § 3 (o).  See Nawn, 394 Mass. at 7-8 (amount must be 
subject to proof of economic loss).  The amount of restitution 
the victim has received in other cases may thus properly be 
considered in determining to what extent she has already been 
compensated for her losses.  See United States v. Gamble, 709 
F.3d 541, 553 (6th Cir. 2013).  Here, both the Commonwealth and 
the defendant requested a hearing on restitution.  The 
reliability of the Commonwealth's proffered hearsay evidence and 
restitution amount was disputed, and a hearing should have been 
held. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The judgments of convictions are affirmed.  
The denial of the Commonwealth's request for a hearing on its 
motion for restitution is vacated, and the case is remanded to 
the Superior Court for further proceedings, and specifically a 
restitution hearing, consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.