Title: LYKINS ENTERPRISES, INC,; FUEL STOP REAL ESTATE, A/K/A FUEL STOPS REAL ESTATE COMPANY, ET AL. V. MAXINE S. FELIX
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2006-SC-000142-DG, 2006-SC-000624-DG
State: Kentucky
Issuer: Kentucky Supreme Court
Date: November 21, 2007

IMPORTANT NOTICE NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER, UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS, RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT . OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE ACTION . 6;*)UyrrUtr (~Vurf of ~irufurhv 2006-SC-000142-DG AND 2006-SC-000624-DG RENDERED : NOVEMBER 21, 2007 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE ABRAMSON REVERSING AND REMANDING C LYKINS ENTERPRISES, INC . ; FUEL STOP REAL ESTATE COMPANY, A/KA/ FUEL STOPS REAL ESTATE COMPANY, DAVID O . LYKINS ; FUEL STOPS, INC. ; AND WILLIAM T . ESHAM APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES ON REVIEW AND CROSS-REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS V. CASE NUMBER 2004-CA-001305-MR MASON CIRCUIT COURT NO . 97-CI-00289 MAXINE S . FELIX APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT This dispute over an option to purchase commercial real estate in Aberdeen, Ohio spawned litigation first in Kentucky and then in Ohio . When the Ohio case failed to progress, all parties sought relief from the Kentucky court which subsequently granted summary judgment to the optionee, Appellant David Lykins . On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, sua sponge invoking forum non conveniens and concluding that the Mason Circuit Court erred in not deferring to the Ohio court. Having determined that forum non conveniens was incorrectly applied and that Lykins was indeed entitled to summary judgment, albeit on different grounds, we reverse and reinstate the Mason Circuit Court judgment . RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In the late summer of 1988, Florida residents Maxine Felix and her husband, H . Lee Felix (now deceased) leased an approximately ten-acre parcel in Brown County, Ohio to David Lykins Enterprises, Inc . (DLE), a Kentucky corporation solely owned by David Lykins . Lykins operates his business from his hometown of Maysville, Kentucky, which is just across the Ohio River from Aberdeen, Ohio, where the leased premises are located . The realty included a building which had once been used as a truck stop, but which had lain vacant for some six or seven years . The parties contemplated that Lykins would refurbish the building and operate a new truck stop . To that end, the lease provided that DLE could assign its interest to Fuel Stops, Inc . (FSI), the entity which would actually operate the business . FSI is an Ohio corporation owned by Lykins and William Esham . The parties' plans went forward, with Lykins dealing primarily with the Felixes' son-in-law, Terry Teegarden, an Ohio resident who through a power of attorney was helping manage the Aberdeen property . DLE assigned the lease to FSI, and in February 1989 Lykins, on behalf of FSI, duly exercised an option to extend the lease's term for an additional eight years, from the initial expiration date of August 31, 1989, to August 31, 1997 . FSI repaired and added to the existing building ultimately investing, according to Lykins, more than $300,000, and eventually opening a Citgo truck stop . The lease provided DLE (and its assignee FSI) an option to purchase the premises for $200,000 . Pursuant to paragraph 16 of the lease, [i]n order to exercise its option to purchase under this paragraph, Lessee shall notify Lessor of Lessee's intention to purchase not less than thirty days prior to expiration of the initial term, or thirty days prior to expiration of the extension term of the Agreement . The closing of such purchase shall be on a business weekday prior to the expiration of the current Agreement term, but not less than thirty days after notice given by Lessee unto Lessor of such closing date . Paragraph 21 of the lease specified the manner in which notices were to be given : All notices, consents, waivers, and other communications shall be sent to the parties at their respective addresses below, subject to prior receipt of notice of change of address, and shall be effective when deposited in the United States mail, postage prepaid, return receipt requested . All such communications shall be effective when so mailed, or when personally delivered to either member of Lessor or to any officer or manager of Lessee . In reliance upon this purchase option, during the fall of 1996, less than a year before the lease's August 31, 1997, expiration, Lykins attempted to negotiate a sale of the premises to Mid-Ohio Petroleum Company. He enlisted another entity, Fuel Stops Real Estate Company (FSREC), an Ohio General Partnership of which he and Esham were the only partners, to conduct the transaction . They contemplated a transfer of the realty from the Felixes to FSREC and from FSREC to Mid-Ohio, and transfer of purchase money from Mid-Ohio to FSREC and then from FSREC to the Felixes . The Felixes were amenable to this transaction, approved the assignment of the purchase option for sale purposes to FSREC, and executed a deed transferring the premises to the partnership . Closing was initially scheduled for November 1996, but apparently last-minute questions about access to the property caused a postponement . The closing was rescheduled for January 1997, but by then Mid-Ohio had reconsidered and the deal fell through . When Mid-Ohio failed to perform, FSREC likewise did not go forward . Soon thereafter, in February 1997, Lykins told Teegarden and Susan Brammer, the attorney who was to have represented the Felixes at the closing, that he still intended to purchase the property, but would require more time to arrange financing . There the matter stood until August 8, 1997, less than thirty days before the lease was to expire . On that day Lykins, as president of FSREC, mailed a letter to Brammer and a copy to Teegarden in which he stated that he "would like to close on the Felix property in Aberdeen, Ohio this week, or no later than August 18." Deeming the purchase option to have lapsed, the Felixes refused to sell . Mr . Felix subsequently died and, on December 1, 1997, his widow brought suit against DLE in Mason Circuit Court for a declaration that DLE had not timely exercised the purchase option, that the lease had since expired, and that DLE occupied the premises solely on a month-to-month tenancy. She later amended her complaint to include FSI and FSREC . Three days after Felix instituted her Kentucky action, Lykins, DLE, FSI, and FSREC filed an action against Felix in the Brown County Ohio Court of Common Pleas, seeking specific performance of the purchase option . By order entered March 11, 1998, the Mason Circuit Court deferred to the Ohio Court and granted Lykins's motion to stay the Kentucky proceeding . The Kentucky action then lay dormant for nearly five years, until, at the behest of both parties, it was restored to the active docket by order entered February 24, 2003 . Following a lengthy stipulation of facts, the matter was submitted on cross-motions for summary judgment, Felix seeking the declarations noted above and Lykins counter-claiming for specific performance and damages allegedly stemming from the Felixes' refusal to perform . By judgment entered June 17, 2004, the Mason Circuit Court ruled that Lykins had properly exercised the purchase option and ordered Felix to provide Lykins with a deed to the property in accordance with the terms of the lease . The court reserved judgment on Lykins's damages claims, but made its resolution of the option issue a final and appealable order pursuant to CR 54 .02 . Felix appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Lykins's purported exercise of the option did not satisfy the notice and timeliness provisions of the lease . Concerned that Ohio has a far greater interest in this dispute than Kentucky does, the Court of Appeals, in a two-to-one decision, invoked the doctrine of forum non conveniens and essentially ruled that the Mason Circuit Court had abused its discretion by exercising jurisdiction in a matter it should have left to the courts of Ohio . Without reaching the merits of the parties' dispute, the Court of Appeals vacated Lykins's summary judgment and remanded with instructions that Felix's declaratory judgment action be dismissed . Both parties have moved for review of that ruling . Lykins maintains that the Court of Appeals' sua sponte invocation of forum non conveniens exceeded that Court's authority to address issues not raised by the parties, and further maintains that, even if authorized, the Court of Appeals' application of the forum non conveniens doctrine was incorrect . We agree with this latter contention and so must reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals . Ordinarily a reversal in these circumstances would require that the matter be remanded to the Court of Appeals for that Court to address in the first instance the merits of Felix's appeal . Felix's cross-appeal, however, challenges the propriety of the trial court's summary judgment, and at oral argument before this Court both parties indicated their willingness to have this matter, which has been pending for nearly ten years, finally resolved without the additional delay a remand to the Court of Appeals would entail . Having reviewed the trial court's ruling, therefore, as well as the parties' briefs before the Court of Appeals and this Court, we also agree with Lykins that summary judgment in his favor was appropriate to avoid the substantial forfeiture which would occur upon strict enforcement of the parties' lease . Accordingly, we reverse the Opinion of the Court of Appeals, and remand to the Mason Circuit Court for reinstatement of its June 17, 2004, Judgment . ANALYSIS Forum Non Conveniens Did Not Require Dismissal of the Kentucky Action We begin by noting that the Mason Circuit Court is a proper forum for this litigation . As a court of general jurisdiction, the circuit court has subject-matter jurisdiction over contract disputes such as this purchase option matter . As for personal jurisdiction, it stems both from the parties' consent as well as Lykins's and DLE's Kentucky residence and their execution of the subject lease in Kentucky . KRS 454.210 . The parties' consent and DLE's Mason County headquarters make that county a lawful venue for a matter arising from DLE's contract . KRS 452.450 . Further, as Judge Miller's dissenting opinion for the Court of Appeals points out, the pendency of Lykins's Ohio action did not in any way divest the Mason Circuit Court of its authority to proceed with Felix's declaratory judgment action : The pendency of an action in the courts of one state or country is not a bar- to the institution of another action between the same parties and for the same cause of action in a court of another state or country, nor is it the duty of the court in which the latter action is brought to stay the same pending a determination of the earlier action, even though the court in which the earlier action is brought has jurisdiction sufficient to dispose of the entire controversy . Nevertheless, sometimes stated as a matter of comity, not of right, it is usual for the court in which the later action is brought to stay proceedings under such circumstances until the earlier action is determined . Brooks Erection Company v . William R. Montgomery & Associates, Inc . , 576 S .W.2d 273, 275 (Ky . App . 1979) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) . Because the Mason Circuit Court action preceded Lykins's Brown County, Ohio suit, the rule that a concomitant foreign action does not preclude pursuit of a local action applies here with even greater force. Although the Mason Circuit Court is thus a lawful forum, we agree with the Court of Appeals' majority that Ohio's interest in resolving disputes concerning Ohio realty is significantly greater than Kentucky's interest in overseeing this Kentucky-made lease . It was entirely appropriate, therefore, in 1998, for the Mason Circuit Court to defer to the Ohio proceeding . We do not agree, however, that the same deference was required five years later when the parties, faced with what promised to be lengthy, ongoing delays in the Ohio proceeding, jointly approached the Kentucky court and requested that the litigation resume . The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the circuit court's exercise of its jurisdiction was barred by the doctrine of forum non conveniens . As the parties here correctly note, the doctrine of forum non conveniens is an exception to the general rule that "a court is duty bound to hear cases within its vested jurisdiction ." Roos v . Kentucky Education Association , 580 S.W.2d 508, 509 (Ky.App. 1979) . The doctrine permits a court properly vested with jurisdiction and venue nevertheless to decline jurisdiction where an alternative forum exists and where the private interests of the litigants or the public interests of the tribunal would be better served by proceeding in the alternative forum . The litigants' private interests include the relative availability of witnesses and other proof as well as all other matters that "make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive ." Beaven v. McAnulty, 980 S.W.2d 284, 286 (Ky. 1998) (quoting Gulf Oil Corp . v . Gilbert , 330 U .S . 501, 67 S.Ct . 839, 91 L . Ed . 2d 1055 (1947)) . Relevant public interest factors include administrative difficulties of courts with congested dockets ; the burden of jury duty on people of a community having no connection with the litigation ; the desirability of holding a trial near those most affected by it ; and the appropriateness of proceeding in the court most familiar with the governing law . Gulf Oil Corp . , 330 U .S . at 508-09, 67 S .Ct . at 843, 91 L. Ed . 2d 1055 . Unless the balance of these factors strongly favors the alternative forum, "the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed ." Id . at 508, 843 . "Whether an action should be entertained or dismissed under this rule depends largely on the particular facts and on the discretion of the trial court." Carter v . Netherton, 302 S .W.2d 382, 384 (Ky . 1957) . The trial court's decision will be upheld on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion . Williams v. Williams, 611 S.W .2d 807 (Ky.App . 1981) . The trial court did not abuse its discretion in this case . Aside from the fact that both parties chose the Kentucky forum in 2003 when they jointly approached the Mason Circuit Court and sought a resumption of the stayed Kentucky litigation, the parties' private interests are equally well-served in Kentucky. Litigation in Mason County will not be much more or less convenient than litigation across the river in Brown County, Ohio . The Court of Appeals was concerned, however, with the public interest furthered by allowing the Ohio courts to apply Ohio law to a dispute over Ohio realty. Although we by no means intend to minimize the importance of that interest,, the circumstances of this case--the unusually long delay the parties had already encountered and the promise, apparently, that the delay would continue indefinitely, the fact that the dispute involved a Kentucky-executed option contract rather than title to realty directly, and the fact that both parties, Kentucky resident Lykins as well as I`elix, were willing to proceed in Kentucky-made it reasonable, and thus not an abuse of discretion, for the Mason Circuit Court to exercise its jurisdiction notwithstanding Ohio's substantial interest in the litigation . The Kentucky courts, after all, can apply Ohio law if need be, and though it may not assert jurisdiction directly over Ohio realty, the Mason Circuit Court may apply its in personam jurisdiction over the parties to compel performance of the lease, including transfer of the realty if that is what the law requires . Becker v. Decker, 76 S.W.2d 255 (Ky.App . 1979) . The Kentucky court, therefore, is capable of giving complete relief. Under these circumstances, it was not an abuse of discretion for the Mason Circuit Court to entertain the parties' dispute and the Court of Appeals erred by ruling otherwise . Under Ohio Law, Lykins Is entitled to Exercise the Purchase Option We must then turn to Felixs cross-appeal which challenges the propriety of the circuit court's summary judgment . The circuit court, as noted above, ruled that Lykins had duly exercised the purchase option and was entitled to specific performance of the resulting sales agreement . Felix contends that Lykins did not comply with the provision for exercising the option, and thus the trial court erred by ordering her to transfer the Aberdeen property . The Court of Appeals did not reach this issue, and so may be deemed to have decided it adversely to Felix . Commonwealth of Kentucky Transportation Cabinet v. Taub,, 766 S .W .2d 49 (Ky . 1988). Felix's timely cross-motion for discretionary review challenges that adverse result and has thus preserved the issue for our consideration. Id . We could in these circumstances, and generally would, remand to the Court of Appeals to permit that Court to address an issue it declined to reach initially, but given the unusually long pendency of this case and the fact that the issue has been well briefed, both here and before the Court of Appeals, we shall honor all parties' request that we not remand but finally decide the merits of their decade-old dispute . As a preliminary matter, we reject Felix's contention that the Mason Circuit Court was collaterally estopped from granting Lykins summary judgment . The contention rests on the fact that on May 26, 1999, the Brown County, Ohio, court denied Lykins's motion for summary judgment because there were outstanding issues of material fact . Felix maintains that the Kentucky court was thus barred from considering a similar motion . We disagree . Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, "bars a party from re= litigating any issue actually litigated and finally decided in an earlier action." Buis v . Elliott , 142 S .W.3d 137,140 (Ky . 2004) (emphasis added, citing Yeoman v. Commonwealth Health Policy, Board , 3 S.W .2d 459 (Ky . 1998)) . The denial of a summary judgment motion is not a final ruling, Roman Catholic Bishop of Louisville v. Burden , 168 S .W.3d 414 (Ky.App . 2004), and so does not implicate the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel . Here, Lykins's new motion was presented to the circuit court some four years after the Ohio court's initial ruling and on the basis of newly and extensively stipulated facts . The Mason Circuit Court was not barred from considering Lykins's summary judgment motion . As another preliminary matter, we must decide whether Kentucky or Ohio law applies to the parties' contract dispute .' As the parties correctly note, in matters "bearing upon the execution, interpretation and validity of a contract," the test for choice of law is "which state has the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties ." Breeding v . Massachusetts Indemnity and Life Insurance Company , 633 S.W.2d 717, 719 (Ky . 1982) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) . Under prior law, contracts were generally governed by the law of the place where made or ' The lease does not contain a choice of law provision . However, paragraph 17 entitled "Default" allows the lessor upon lessee's default to exercise "all . . . remedies allowed under Ohio law." The same paragraph allows interest on past due rent at the rate of 12% per annum "or at the maximum rate allowed by Ohio law, if less . . . ." 10 where performed . There was a well-established exception, however, in cases where the property or thing to which the contract relates has a fixed situs, as is true of real estate . In that case . . . all matters concerning the title to and disposition of real estate are to be governed by the lex loci rei staae, and not by the lex loci contractus . New Domain Oil & Gas Company v . McKinney , 188 Ky . 183, 221 S.W . 245, 248 (1920) . Section 189 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971), moreover, although incorporating the more modern "significant relationship" test, similarly provides that The validity of a contract for the transfer of an interest in land and the rights created thereby are determined, in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties, by the local law of the state where the land is situated unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship . . . to the transaction and the parties Lykins contends that Kentucky has the most significant relationship since he is a Kentucky resident, he executed the lease in Kentucky, and he apparently dealt with Felix and her agents (including Kentucky attorney, Brammer) primarily from his Kentucky office . We agree with Felix, however, that, in light of the long recognized significance of state control over its realty, Ohio's relationship to this transaction trumps Kentucky's . The lease, although partially executed in Kentucky, contemplated an Ohio corporation's operation of a business on the leased premises in Ohio, and the present dispute concerns the sale of the Ohio premises to an Ohio partnership, one of whose partners is an Ohio resident . Ohio clearly has the more significant relationship with this transaction, and accordingly that state's substantive law must apply . Although Ohio's substantive law controls, procedural matters such as summary judgment standards are governed by the law of the forum . Ley v. Simmons , 249 S .W .2d 808 (Ky . 1952) ; Travelers Insurance Company v . Mahon, 273 Ky. 691, 117 &W .2d 909 (1938) . In Kentucky, summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. CR 56.03 . The court must construe the record favorably to the nonmovant and should deny the motion unless it appears virtually impossible for the nonmovant to prevail . Steelvest, Inc . v.- Scans eel Service Center, Inc ., 807 S .W.2d 476 (Ky . 1991) . Our review is without deference to the trial court's application of this rule, essentially a de novo standard . Goldsmith v. Allied Building Components, Inc ., 833 S.W.2d 378 (Ky . 1992) . Here, the parties have stipulated the pertinent facts-and their dispute concerns whether, given those facts, Lykins was entitled as a matter of law to enforce the option . Felix contends that under Ohio law Lykins's failure to comply strictly with the lease provisions requiring written and timely notice of his intent to exercise the option resulted in the option's lapse . Lykins responds by contending: (1) that the lease did not require written notice and that he gave adequate oral notice ; (2) that even if written notice was required, his signing a letter acknowledging assignment of the option from FSI to FSREC in anticipation of the hoped-for sale to Mid-Ohio Petroleum was sufficient written notice ; (3) that even if he did not give the written notice the lease called for, Felix's son-in-law, Teegarden, waived the lease's written notice requirement ; and (4) that even if he did not fully comply with the lease's notice provisions, he substantially complied and equity ought to excuse his minor default. We shall consider LyWns's contentions in turn . 1 2 Ohio courts construe contracts so as to give effect to the parties' intentions as those intentions are evidenced by the contractual language . Kern v . Clear Creek Oil Company , 778 N .E.2d 115, 118 (Ohio App . 2002) (citing Skivolocki v . E . Ohio Gas Company , 313 N .E.2d 374 (Ohio 1974)) . Ohio courts "give the language of the instrument its plain and ordinary meaning unless some other meaning is evidenced within the document." Id . at 119 (citing Alexander v. Buckeye Pipe Line Company , 374 N .E.2d 146 (Ohio 1978)) . A condition precedent under Ohio law is a contractual requirement "that an act must take place before a duty of performance of a promise arises . If the condition is not fulfilled, the parties are excused from performing ." Id . at 119 (citing Troha v. Troha , 663 N .E.2d 1319 (Ohio App . 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted)) . Accordingly, "the general rule is that, where an offer prescribes the place, time, or manner of acceptance, those terms must be strictly complied with by the offeree." Ritchie v. Cordra , 461 N .E.2d 325, 328 (Ohio App . 1983) . Whether a particular contractual provision is a condition precedent is a question of the parties' intent, which is to be determined from the language of the provision itself as well as from the language of the entire agreement and its subject matter . Kern v . Clear Creek Oil Company, supra . Considering the parties' lease in light of these rules, we agree with Felix that written notice at least thirty days prior to expiration of the lease was a condition precedent to Lykins's exercise of the purchase option . As noted above, paragraph 16 of the lease requires notice "of Lessee's intention to purchase not less than thirty days prior to expiration . . . of the extension term of the Agreement." That paragraph further requires closing within the lease term, "but not less than thirty days after notice given by Lessee unto Lessor of such closing date." Although, as Lykins notes, paragraph 16 1 3 does not specify written notice of acceptance or closing date, paragraph 21 requires that all notices under the lease "shall be sent to the parties at their respective addresses" or "personally delivered to either member of Lessor or to any officer or manager of Lessee." The plain and ordinary meanings of "sending" by mail or "delivering" by hand clearly evidence an intent that the mandated notices be in writing . Thus, we reject Lykins's contention that his allegedly numerous expressions to Teegarden and Felix's attorney, Brammer, of his desire and intent to purchase the leased premises amounted to an oral exercise of the purchase option . We also reject Lykins's contention that the aborted Mid-Ohio Petroleum transaction satisfied the condition precedent . An option, of course, is simply an offer to contract made irrevocable for the, duration of the option period . Ritchie v. Cordray, supra . The optionee "exercises" the option by accepting the offer during that period in the manner the option specifies . Id. At no point leading up to the attempted sale to Mid-Ohio did Lykins unconditionally accept Felix's offer to sell so as to bind himself (or FSREC) to purchase . As he concedes, he did not provide express written notice of an unconditional acceptance . At most, in anticipation of the proposed sale to Mid-Ohio, he signed a letter assigning the purchase option to FSREC. The parties apparently anticipated, however, that FSREC would perform only if Mid-Ohio performed first . When Mid-Ohio backed out of the transaction, FSREC also withdrew, confirming the parties' understanding that FSREC's exercise of the option had been conditioned upon Mid-Ohio's performance . When that condition failed, so did FSREC's exercise of the option . Soon after the Mid-Ohio deal fell through, Lykins orally assured both Teegarden and Brammer that he still desired and intended to purchase the leased premises . He 1 4 contends that these oral assurances amounted to an exercise of the option because Teegarden had waived the leases written notice requirement . This contention also is of no avail . First, quite apart from the writing requirement, Lykins's assurances that he still wanted to buy the property were admittedly conditioned upon his obtaining financing for the purchase. Again, therefore, they could not constitute a binding, unconditional acceptance of Felix's offer . They would not, therefore, qualify as even oral exercises of the option . We are not persuaded, moreover, that Teegarden waived the written notice requirement . In the first place, it is unclear that Teegarden was authorized to waive contract provisions . See 3 Am ..fur 2d Agency § 88 (noting that even the authority to make a contract for the principal does not "authorize an agent to waive its, conditions.") In any event, paragraph 21 of the lease requires that all "waivers" be communicated in writing in the same manner as "notices." Lykins does not contend that Teegarden waived the writing requirement in this manner. He contends, rather, that Teegarden permitted Lykins to sublet a portion of the premises without giving the required written notice, and also that Teegarden deviated from the lease terms by moving a mobile home onto the premises without providing written notice to Lykins . As Lykins correctly notes, Ohio law recognizes that an offeror may waive strict compliance with the offer's conditions of acceptance . Ritchie v. Cordray, supra . Under Ohio law, however, a waiver is the "voluntary relinquishment of a known right." State ex rel . Ryan v. State Teachers Retirement System, 643 N.E .2d 1122, 1127 (Ohio 1994), and though waiver may be implied by a course of conduct that is inconsistent with the known right, Finkbeiner v . Lut , 337 N .E.2d 655 (Ohio App . 1975), the implication must be clear that the right was known and the relinquishment intended . State ex rel . Ryan v. 1 5 State Teachers Retirement S m, supra; State ex rel . Madden v. Windham Exempted Village School District Board of Education, 537 N.E .2d 646 (Ohio 1989) (dkM Allenbaugh v . City of Canton, 28 N .E .2d 354 (Ohio 1940)) . In the course of the parties' dealing in this case, when DLE assigned the lease to FSI, when FSI exercised the option to extend the lease term, and, at Brammer's insistence, when FSI assigned the purchase option to FSREC prior to the attempted sale to Mid-Ohio, written notice was duly provided to Felix. Therefore, Teegarden's isolated deviations from the lease's written notice provision particularly in light of the lease's requirement that waivers be in writing, do not establish a course of dealing inconsistent with the lease and do not dearly imply a voluntary relinquishment of the written notice requirement . Because there was no waiver of the requirement that notice of acceptance be in writing, LyMnIs oral assurances after the failure of the Mid-Ohio Petroleum deal that he still intended to purchase the property would not have satisfied the lease even if he had not conditioned his assurances on his obtaining financing . ~Cf. Kern v . Clear Creek Oil Company, sum (holding that verbal notice did not excuse failure to comply with lease's written notice requirement) . By its terms, the purchase option required closing during the lease term, i.e. by August 31, 1997, and written notice of acceptance and written notice of the closing at least thirty days prior to that, i.e., by August 1, 1997 . As we have noted, neither Lykins's oral declarations that he intended to buy the property, nor the unsuccessful deal with Mid-Ohio Petroleum established Lykins's exercise of the option . His August 8, 1997, letter to Brammer and Teegarden, in which he proposed that the parties close on the Aberdeen, Ohio property no later that August 18, 1997, also failed because it came too late, either as an exercise of the option or as notice of a closing . Felix is correct 1 6 that by August 8, 1997, the option had lapsed and under the strict terms of the lease she was no longer obliged to sell the property at the option price . If the lease is to be strictly enforced, then the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment for Lykins and ordered Felix to perform under the terms of the option . Lykins contends, however, that the lease ought not to be strictly enforced because strict enforcement would work an inequitable forfeiture of his substantial investment in the leased premises. We agree . As the Supreme Court of Arizona has recently discussed, while the general rule is that option contracts will be strictly enforced, for over eighty years courts have recognized that in certain circumstances equitable relief is potentially available to an optionee who failed to timely or properly exercise an option to renew a lease or to purchase leased property . Andrews v . Blake, 69 P .3d 7 (Ariz . 2003) (gitIM "Circumstances Excusing Lessee's Failure to Give Timely Notice of Exercise of Option to Renew or Extend lease," 27 ALR 4t" 266 (1984)) . Virtually all courts permit relief where the optionee's failure is due to incapacity, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, undue influence, mistake, estoppel, or the lessor's waiver of its contract rights, and where the optionee's delay in exercising the option was short, the delay did not prejudice the lessor/optionor, and the lessee/optionee would suffer a forfeiture or other substantial hardship if equitable relief is not granted . Andrews v. Blake, supra . Courts across the country have split, however, over whether equitable relief may be available where the optionee's failure to abide by the lease was due to mere negligence . Id. at 69 P .3d 15-16 (collecting cases) . Although Ohio's case law in this area is not extensive, three cases provide guidance . In Ahmed v . -Scott, 418 N .E .2d 406 (Ohio App . 1979), the Ohio Court of 1 7 Appeals upheld the denial of equitable relief to lessees who had failed to exercise in a timely manner an option to extend their lease of restaurant premises. The Court observed that timely notice was a condition precedent to exercise of the option and then explained that [t]he record reveals that the lessees were careless in failing to give written notice of their exercise of an option to renew the lease at least 90 days before the expiration of the term and, therefore, have no right to any aid from equitable principles to support a claim for renewal of the lease . Equity will not relieve a lessee of the consequences of his failure to give written notice of renewal of the lease within the time required by the provisions of the lease when the failure resulted from the negligence of the lessee unaccompanied by fraud, mistake, accident or surprise and unaffected by the conduct of the lessor. 418 N .E .2d at 410-11 . Although the lessees in Ahmed had apparently undertaken some minor remodeling of the leased premises, there was no claim in that case that substantial improvements were being forfeited . Less than a, year later, the Court of Appeals was again asked to consider the availability of equitable relief to a lessee who had missed the deadline for exercising an option to renew a commercial lease . In ~1ard v . Washington Distributors, Inc ., 425 mistaken belief concerning the date its renewal notice was due and as a result was a month late exercising the reneW option for premises in which there remained some $72,000.00 of unamortized improvements . Characterizing the clerical error and N .E.2d 420 (Ohio App . 1980), the lessee, through a clerical error, had operated under a resulting confusion about the renewal date as an "honest mistake," the Court reversed the trial court's denial of equitable relief and explained that [e]quity will relieve a lessee from the consequences of a failure to give notice at the time, or in the form and manner, required as a condition precedent to the renewal of a lease, 1 8 where such a failure results from accident, fraud, surprise or honest mistake, and has not prejudiced the lessor ; and, there are other special circumstances which have been held to warrant a court of equity to grant relief from the consequences of the lessee's failure to notify the lessor within the stipulated time or in the specific form or manner prescribed . Even when there is an absence of an honest mistake by the lessee, where the lessee has made valuable improvements to the leased premises, the lessee should not be denied equitable relief from his own neglect or inadvertence if a forfeiture of such improvements would result provided, there is no prejudice -to the landlord . 425 N .E.2d at 423-24 (citations omitted) . Finally, in Kern v. Clear creek Oil company, supra , successors to an oil-and-gas lease failed to give notice of the succession to the oil company in the form and manner required by the lease . That failure, the court held, precluded a purported termination of the lease . Equity afforded no relief, the Court ruled, citing with approval the passage quoted above from Ahmed v . Scott to the effect that equity will not relieve a party from his own negligence absent an additional factor such as fraud, mistake, accident, or surprise . None of the Ahmed factors was present in Kern, nor was there any allegation that the lessors would incur a substantial loss . In light of these case, 4 appears. that Ohio Courts would not, as a general rule, allow equitable relief from the negligent failure of an optionee to comply with the option's time and manner requirements, but where the negligence is coupled with one of the Ahmed factors (tending to excuse the optionee's default) or with a substantial forfeiture, as was the case ire Ward v . Washington Distributors, Inc . , ,(tending to make default unconscionable), then equitable relief may be available notwithstanding the optionee's negligence . Other pertinent factors, in any case, would include the length of the 1 9 optionee's delay, and the prejudice to the optionor stemming from that delay . Here, Lykins has offered no reason for his default other than his failure to arrange financing for the purchase in time to comply with the option . His negligence does not bar equitable relief, however, because there is apparently no dispute that he invested approximately $300,000 in the property, converting an old, abandoned truck stop into a modern, going concern . Avoiding the forfeiture of that investment is an adequate reason under Ward v. Washington Distributors, Inc., s equitable remedy . That remedy is appropriate, moreover, because Lykins's delay in exercising the option was only about seven days and during that time Felix did not change her position in reliance on LyMns7s failure to act or otherwise suffer any prejudice . Cf. Paterakis v. Estate of Tuma, 584 N .E.2d 61 (Ohio App . 1990) (holding that equitable relief was not available because the optionee's delay had been lengthy and had prejudiced the optionor) . Thus, although our reasoning differs somewhat from the trial court, we agree with that court that summary judgment for Lykins was appropriate . CONCLUSION In sum, we agree with Lykins that the Court of Appeals misapplied the doctrine of forum non conveniens when it vacated the trial court's summary judgment and ordered dismissal of Felix's complaint . Although the Court of Appeals based its ruling on the important public policy of comity with the courts of our sister states, in the unusual circumstances of this case, the trial count did not abuse its (discretion by exercising jurisdiction over a matter affecting the ownership of Ohio realty . We also agree with Lykins that his belated exercise of the option to purchase leased premises in Aberdeen, Ohio must be upheld, notwithstanding his seven-day tardiness . The forfeiture that 20 [a, to apply an would otherwise result from strictly applying the purchase option's time provisions would not comport with Ohio case law disapproving such forfeitures . Accordingly, we reverse the October 14, 2005, Opinion of the Court of Appeals and remand this matter to the Mason Circuit Court for reinstatement of its June 17, 2004 Summary Judgment . All sitting . L.ambert, C.J., Cunningham, Noble, Schroder, Scott, JJ ., concur . Minton, J., concurs by separate opinion . COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEE : Richard M. Sullivan Jennifer Fust-Rutherford Conliffe, Sandmann & Sullivan PLLC 2000 Waterfront Plaza 325 West Main Street Louisville, KY 40202 Edward S . Monohan N. Jeffrey Blankenship Monohan & Blankenship 7711 Ewing Blvd ., Suite 100 Florence, KY 41042 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT : ,;vuyrrmr (~vurf of rufurhV 2006-SC-000142-DG AND 2006-SC-000624-DG RENDERED : NOVEMBER 21, 2007 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED LYKINS ENTERPRISES, INC . ; FUEL STOP REAL ESTATE COMPANY, A/K/A FUEL STOPS REAL ESTATE COMPANY, DAVID O. LYKINS ; FUEL STOPS, INC. ; AND WILLIAM T . ESHAM APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELANTS ON REVIEW AND CROSS-REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS V . CASE NUMBER 2004-CA-001305-MR MASON CIRCUIT COURT NO . 97-CI-00289 MAXINE S . FELIX APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT CONCURRING OPINION BY JUSTICE MINTON I concur with the majority but write separately to emphasize my belief that the Court of Appeals lacked the authority to invoke the doctrine of forum non conveniens on its own motion . The convenience of a particular venue or forum, which lies at the heart of the forum non conveniens doctrine, is a privilege of a defendant ; and a defendant is free to waive that privilege . See Fritsch v . Caudill , 146 S.W.3d 926, 927 (Ky . 2004) (holding that venue "may be conferred by waiver") ; Leroy v . Great Western United Corp . , 443 U.S . 173, 180, 99 S.Ct . 2710, 2715, 61 L.Ed.2d 464 (1979) (holding that venue "is primarily a matter of choosing a convenient forum" and that venue is a privilege that may be waived) . Thus, the defendant chooses whether to move for dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds ; and a court, especially an appellate court, errs when it usurps that privilege by declaring, without the defendant's prompting, a forum to be inconvenient See VSL Corp . v . Dunes Hotels and Casinos, Inc .,, 519 N .E.2d 617 (N.Y . 1988) (citing New York court rule) .