Title: People v. Hope
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 80753
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: October 29, 1998

People v. Hope (Ill. S.Ct.)
Docket No. 80753-Agenda 2-May 1998.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. EDGAR 
HOPE, Appellant.
Opinion filed October 29, 1998.
JUSTICE HARRISON delivered the opinion of the court:
On November 15, 1994, defendant, Edgar Hope, pleaded guilty in the circuit 
court of Cook County to the murder of Chicago Police Officer James Doyle, the 
attempted murder of Chicago Police Officer Robert Mantia, and armed violence 
against Kevin Page and Cynthia Houston in connection with a shooting on a 
Chicago Transit Authority bus on February 5, 1982. The trial court accepted 
defendant's guilty pleas and entered findings of guilt on two counts of murder, 
one count of attempted murder and two counts of armed violence. Ill. Rev. Stat. 
1979, ch. 38, pars. 8-4, 9-1(a)(1), (a)(2), 33A-2.
Defendant requested a jury for his capital sentencing hearing. The jury found 
defendant eligible for the death penalty based upon two statutory aggravating 
factors: (1) that defendant had murdered a peace officer in the course of 
performing his official duties (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(1)); 
and (2) that defendant had murdered two or more individuals (Ill. Rev. Stat. 
1981, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(3)). After considering the evidence in aggravation and 
mitigation, the jury found that there were no mitigating factors sufficient to 
preclude imposition of the death penalty. Accordingly, the trial court sentenced 
defendant to death. Defendant's death sentence has been stayed pending direct 
review by this court. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §4(b); 134 Ill. 2d Rs. 603, 
609(a).
This is the third appearance of this death penalty case before this court. 
See People v. Hope, 137 Ill. 2d 430 (1990); People v. Hope, 
147 Ill. 2d 315 (1992). The facts of the case are essentially as set forth in 
Hope, 137 Ill. 2d  at 441-42. In this appeal, defendant presents 11 
issues contesting the sentence imposed. The issue dispositive of this appeal 
concerns the conduct of the voir dire proceedings at defendant's 
capital sentencing hearing, specifically, the trial court's refusal to question 
the venirepersons on the issue of interracial crime bias. We find the trial 
court's refusal to have been reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm 
defendant's convictions but vacate defendant's sentence of death and remand for 
a new sentencing hearing.
Defendant is an African-American and his murder victim, Officer Doyle, was 
white. On the start of the second day of voir dire, defense counsel 
requested the trial court to propound the following question to the 
venirepersons: "Would you automatically vote for the death penalty with respect 
to [defendant] because he is a Black man who has admittedly killed a White 
police officer?" The trial court ruled that such a question was impermissible 
because it would run counter to instructions that state racism is to play no 
role in the conduct of a criminal trial. Defense counsel renewed his request for 
the proposed voir dire question on the interracial nature of this 
murder at numerous junctures of jury selection. In addition to citing Morgan 
v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 119 L. Ed. 2d 492, 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992), 
defense counsel explained that his request for a question on interracial crime 
bias was based on due process. Indeed, counsel so frequently repeated this 
request that, at one point, the trial court informed counsel that he need not 
state the question or his grounds for objection in depth because: "The Court 
rules as I have ruled under the previous 86, 85 jurors."
"[D]uring voir dire, the Constitution requires a trial judge to 
question venirepersons specifically regarding racial prejudice if 'special 
circumstances' exist that suggest a constitutionally significant likelihood that 
racial prejudice might infect a defendant's trial." People v. Peeples, 
155 Ill. 2d 422, 459 (1993). Such special circumstances exist where racial 
issues are " 'inextricably bound up with the conduct of the trial.' " 
Peeples, 155 Ill. 2d  at 459-60, quoting Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 596-97, 47 L. Ed. 2d 258, 264, 96 S. Ct. 1017, 1021 (1976). In 
general, that the defendant and victim are of different races does not in itself 
constitute a special circumstance. Peeples, 155 Ill. 2d  at 460. 
However, when a capital defendant is on trial for an interracial crime, the 
defendant is entitled at sentencing to have prospective jurors informed of the 
race of the victim and questioned about racial bias, but only if the defendant 
specifically requests such an inquiry. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 
36-37, 90 L. Ed. 2d 27, 37, 106 S. Ct. 1683, 1688 (1986); People v. 
Lear, 175 Ill. 2d 262, 270 (1997).
In Turner, Justice White stated:
After reviewing the record in the case at bar, we find that defendant has 
established that he was entitled to have the trial court question prospective 
jurors about interracial crime bias. At the time of defendant's capital 
sentencing hearing in 1995, both the United States Supreme Court, in 
Turner, and this court, in Peeples, 155 Ill. 2d  at 460-61, had 
determined that such inquiry was constitutionally mandated when requested under 
the circumstances present herein. Trial courts are bound to follow case 
precedent, and for that reason we find that the trial court's failure to do so 
here was error as a matter of law. See In re Dominique F., 204 Ill. 
App. 3d 271, 276 (1990), aff'd, 145 Ill. 2d 311 (1991); see also 
People v. Gillespie, 136 Ill. 2d 496, 502 (1990) (state courts are 
required to follow United States Supreme Court precedent where the result 
therein is mandated by the Constitution of the United States).
The State argues that defendant has waived this issue because he did not 
tender the question until eight prospective jurors, including two who were 
chosen to sit on the jury, had been voir dired. However, we agree with 
defendant that where the State failed to challenge the timeliness of defense 
counsel's proposed inquiry, it has waived the right to raise the issue on 
appeal. See People v. Holloway, 86 Ill. 2d 78, 91 (1981) (the principle 
that issues not raised in the trial court are generally waived on appeal applies 
to the State as well as to the defendant in a criminal case). The State's waiver 
of the issue aside, we are unconvinced that any tardiness on the part of defense 
counsel precluded inquiry into potential interracial crime bias. Any 
inconvenience in making the inquiry of the two previously selected jurors would 
have been minor, considering its "minimally intrusive" nature and the trial 
court's discretion to question the jurors collectively. See Turner, 476 U.S.  at 37, 90 L. Ed. 2d  at 37, 106 S. Ct.  at 1689.
Additionally, the State contends that waiver applies because defense counsel 
argued that the inquiry was mandated by Morgan v. Illinois, 
504 U.S. 719, 119 L. Ed. 2d 492, 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992), which does not require 
questioning on racial bias, rather than citing Turner. The State 
provides no support for its contention that defense counsel waived his client's 
constitutional right to a fair sentencing hearing by mistakenly citing a case 
not directly on point. It is required only that specific " 'issues' " 
be raised at trial and in a post-trial motion in order to give the trial court 
an opportunity to correct the error claimed. See People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988), quoting People v. Caballero, 102 Ill. 2d 23, 
31-32 (1984).
The State alternatively contends that the voir dire conducted by the 
trial court sufficiently covered the area of racial bias and therefore ensured 
that defendant would receive a fair sentencing hearing. It is true that the 
trial court retains discretion as to the form and number of questions on the 
subject of interracial crime bias. Turner, 476 U.S.  at 37, 90 L. Ed. 2d  
at 37, 106 S. Ct.  at 1688-89. However, our review of the record herein shows 
that admonishments as to bias based on race, color, religion and natural origin 
were only given to two of the four venires from which defendant's jury was 
selected. Indeed, 7 of the 12 jurors who signed defendant's death verdict were 
never admonished that race or color should play no role in their 
determinations.
Further, the trial court failed to inform the venirepersons at any time 
during jury selection that the victim in this case was white. The State urges 
that the fact four veniremen admitted to being biased against defendant based on 
his race attests to the adequacy of the trial court's general admonitions to 
"discover racial bias." However, we agree with defendant that inquiring into 
bias against defendant based on his race is not the same as inquiring into 
interracial crime bias. There is a difference between racial prejudice, which 
depends in no way on the race of the victim, and interracial crime bias. 
Therefore, where venirepersons are without knowledge that the offense was 
interracial, the general questions concerning the ability to be fair and 
impartial are ineffective in ferreting out any potential juror bias resulting 
from the victim being white and the accused being African-American. See 
State v. Horcey, 266 N.J. Super. 415, 422, 629 A.2d 1367, 1371 (1993) 
(Shebell, J., concurring).
Here, as in Turner, "we find the risk that racial prejudice may have 
infected [defendant's] capital sentencing unacceptable in light of the ease with 
which that risk could have been minimized." Turner, 476 U.S.  at 36, 90 L. Ed. 2d  at 36, 106 S. Ct.  at 1688. The inadequacy of voir dire in 
this case therefore requires that defendant's death sentence be vacated. See 
Turner, 476 U.S.  at 37, 90 L. Ed. 2d  at 37, 106 S. Ct.  at 1689.
As noted, defendant raises other challenges to his capital sentencing hearing 
and to the constitutionality of the Illinois death penalty statute. Because we 
have concluded that defendant is entitled to a new sentencing hearing, we 
address one additional sentencing issue which is likely to recur on remand. See 
People v. Mulero, 176 Ill. 2d 444, 467 (1997).
Defendant contends that he was denied his right to a fair capital sentencing 
hearing where the State introduced in aggravation victim impact evidence 
relating to an offense other than the one for which he was being sentenced. At 
the first, or eligibility, stage of the sentencing hearing, evidence was 
presented as to the circumstances of defendant's participation in, and 
conviction for, the January 11, 1982, murder of Lloyd Wyckliffe at a McDonald's 
restaurant. This evidence was presented, in part, through the testimony of Alvin 
Thompson, who was shot by defendant that night while working with Wyckliffe as a 
security guard at the restaurant. At the second phase of the sentencing hearing, 
the State presented evidence in aggravation of, inter alia, defendant's 
criminal background, his assault on one of his attorneys in court, and his 
misconduct in prison. Additionally, the State called Lloyd Wyckliffe's widow, 
Vernita Wyckliffe, and recalled Alvin Thompson to testify as to the effects of 
the McDonald's shooting on them and their families.
In Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991), the United States Supreme Court reconsidered its holdings in 
Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 96 L. Ed. 2d 440, 107 S. Ct. 2529 
(1987), and South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 104 L. Ed. 2d 876, 
109 S. Ct. 2207 (1989), that the eighth amendment bars the admission of victim 
impact evidence during the penalty phase of a capital trial. That same year, in 
People v. Howard, 147 Ill. 2d 103 (1991), this court addressed a 
defendant's challenge to certain victim impact evidence introduced at the second 
stage of his capital sentencing hearing.
Specifically, the defendant in Howard complained of victim impact 
testimony elicited from three State's witnesses in connection with three other, 
unrelated offenses committed by the defendant. In deciding this issue, the 
Howard court intentionally chose not to consider the defendant's "more 
limited" contention that the information introduced "did not relate to the 
impact of the offense on the murder victim's survivors" (Howard, 147 
Ill. 2d at 156), but went on to adopt the United States Supreme Court's holding 
in Payne, stating:
However, Justice Freeman, in his special concurrence in Howard, 
disagreed with the majority's choice of that case as the vehicle to adopt 
Payne, precisely because the challenged victim impact statements, 
unlike those in Payne, involved statements of victims of the 
defendant's other crimes. Howard, 147 Ill. 2d  at 172-73 ( 
Freeman, J., specially concurring). "I would advocate a more prudent approach on 
so important an issue. This court's reconsideration of the admissibility of 
Payne-type victim impact statements is better left to a future time and 
case." Howard, 147 Ill. 2d  at 173 (Freeman, J., specially concurring). 
Indeed, only four months later, this court appeared to adopt the "more prudent 
approach" of Justice Freeman, stating: "While we acknowledge the shift brought 
about by Payne, it is not necessary for us to address every situation 
in which victim impact evidence might occur." People v. Johnson, 149 Ill. 2d 118, 153 (1992).
Shortly thereafter, in People v. Mitchell, 152 Ill. 2d 274 (1992), 
this court further cautioned that:
We now feel compelled to consider that question left unanswered in 
Howard: whether the State's introduction of victim impact evidence 
which does not "relate to the impact of the offense on the murder victim's 
survivors" (Howard, 147 Ill. 2d at 156) is so unduly prejudicial that 
it renders the capital sentencing hearing fundamentally unfair.(1)
The Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act (Act) (725 ILCS 120/1 et 
seq. (West 1994)) "provides for the right of victims of violent crimes, 
including the relatives of a deceased, to address the court regarding the impact 
of the criminal conduct upon their lives." Hope, 147 Ill. 2d  at 323. 
The statute further dictates that the court consider the victim impact 
statements, along with other appropriate factors, in determining the defendant's 
sentence. 725 ILCS 120/6(a) (West 1994); Hope, 147 Ill. 2d  at 323. 
Accordingly, victim impact evidence relating to the effects of this crime on 
Officer Doyle's family is admissible in the penalty phase of defendant's capital 
sentencing hearing. See Hope, 147 Ill. 2d  at 323-24. However, the 
statute does not contemplate, and we will not condone, an expansion of victim 
impact statements to include evidence from victims other than the victims of the 
offense on trial.
For purposes of the Act, the term "crime victim" means, inter alia, 
a single representative who may be the spouse, parent, child or sibling of a 
person killed as a result of a violent crime. 725 ILCS 120/3(a)(3) (West 1994). 
Section 6(a) of the Act states:
It is thus clear from the plain language of the statute that the type of 
evidence admissible is restricted to the impact on the "victim of the violent 
crime" being sentenced. 725 ILCS 120/6(a) (West 1994).
Nor is there any language in Payne which would suggest that victim 
impact evidence stemming from a defendant's other, unrelated crimes is 
admissible at his capital sentencing. The Court in Payne reasoned, in 
part, as follows:
Indeed, the Payne court defined "[v]ictim impact evidence" as 
"simply another form or method of informing the sentencing authority about the 
specific harm caused by the crime in question." (Emphasis added.) 
Payne, 501 U.S.  at 825, 115 L. Ed. 2d  at 735, 111 S. Ct.  at 2608. We 
therefore agree with defendant that Payne clearly contemplates that 
victim impact evidence will come only from a survivor of the murder for which 
the defendant is presently on trial, not from survivors of offenses collateral 
to the crime for which defendant is being tried. See People v. Pasch, 
152 Ill. 2d 133, 200 (1992) (Payne holds "that the eighth amendment 
does not prohibit a jury from considering, at the sentencing phase of a capital 
trial, evidence relating to a victim's personal characteristics and the 
emotional impact of the murder on the victim's family" 
(emphasis added)).
The standard for admissibility of evidence at the second stage of a capital 
sentencing hearing is relevance and reliability, and that evaluation is left to 
the sound discretion of the trial judge. People v. Hope, 168 Ill. 2d 1, 
41 (1995). Defendant does not contest the reliability of the victim impact 
evidence in question, and we have no doubt that the testimony given by Vernita 
Wyckliffe and Alvin Thompson was reliable, as they had firsthand knowledge of 
the effects of the McDonald's shooting on their families and they were available 
for cross-examination. See People v. Brown, 172 Ill. 2d 1, 50 (1996). 
However, the State contends that this victim impact evidence was relevant 
because it related to an offense constituting a statutory aggravating factor 
which the jury had found established defendant's eligibility for the death 
penalty. We disagree.
The finding of a statutory aggravating factor at the eligibility phase merely 
serves to limit the class of offenders for whom the death penalty may be 
imposed. People v. Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d 204, 250 (1996); People v. 
Brown, 169 Ill. 2d 132, 165 (1996). Further, this court has repeatedly 
recognized that the Illinois death penalty statute does not place special 
emphasis on any aggravating factor. Brown, 169 Ill. 2d  at 164; 
People v. Hampton, 149 Ill. 2d 71, 90 (1992). Therefore, contrary to 
the State's contention, the jury's determination of the appropriateness of the 
death penalty for Officer Doyle's murder would not be assisted by the 
introduction of victim impact evidence concerning the unrelated murder of Lloyd 
Wyckliffe. Rather, the Constitution requires that consideration be given to "the 
character and record of the individual offender" and "the circumstances of 
the particular offense" before a determination is made that death is 
the appropriate sentence. (Emphasis added.) Woodson v. North Carolina, 
428 U.S. 280, 304, 49 L. Ed. 2d 944, 961, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 2991 (1976); 
People v. Ward, 154 Ill. 2d 272, 340 (1992).
While the details of prior crimes are considered relevant aggravation because 
they illuminate the character and record of a capital defendant (see People 
v. Edgeston, 157 Ill. 2d 201, 235-37 (1993)), the unforeseen effects of 
those prior crimes on their victims are of no such assistance. Thus, evidence 
detailing defendant's participation in the prior McDonald's shooting was 
admissible at the second stage of his capital sentencing for Officer Doyle's 
murder, but victim impact statements regarding that offense are simply too 
attenuated to be relevant. Cf. People v. Williams, 161 Ill. 2d 1, 70 (1994) (while the testimony of witnesses concerning matters relating to 
the record and character of the defendant and the nature and circumstances of 
the offense are relevant to the decision to sentence a defendant to death, the 
opinions of witnesses regarding what sentence should be imposed are not 
relevant).
The State suggests, citing Payne, 501 U.S.  at 825, 115 L. Ed. 2d  at 
735, 111 S. Ct.  at 2608, that Vernita Wyckliffe's testimony would assist the 
jury in determining defendant's "moral culpability and blameworthiness" for her 
husband Lloyd's murder. However, what Mrs. Wyckliffe and her family have 
suffered due to their loss does not make defendant more morally blameworthy in 
the murder of Officer Doyle. It is clear from a close reading of Payne 
that the Court was examining how the "harm caused by the defendant as a result 
of the crime charged" was relevant to a determination of the 
defendant's "blameworthiness" in a capital sentencing decision. (Emphasis 
added.) Payne, 501 U.S.  at 819, 825, 115 L. Ed. 2d  at 731, 735, 111 S. Ct.  at 2605, 2608.
Thus, we conclude that while "evidence about the victim and about the impact 
of the murder on the victim's family is relevant to the jury's decision as to 
whether or not the death penalty should be imposed" (Payne, 501 U.S.  at 
827, 115 L. Ed. 2d  at 736, 111 S. Ct. at 2609), evidence about victims of other, 
unrelated offenses is irrelevant and therefore inadmissible. See People v. 
Harris, 182 Ill. 2d 114, 156 (1998) (information that is irrelevant is 
inadmissible at a capital sentencing hearing). As defendant states: "The jury's 
highly subjective decision whether to impose death should be unfettered by 
emotionally-charged victim impact evidence that concerns something as collateral 
as a prior offense for which the defendant is not being sentenced."
"It is of vital importance to society and to the defendant that any decision 
to impose the death penalty is, and appears to be, based upon reason rather than 
emotion." Williams, 161 Ill. 2d  at 77. We therefore find the improper 
admission of this irrelevant victim impact evidence deprived defendant of a fair 
capital sentencing hearing.
Accordingly, we affirm defendant's convictions but vacate defendant's death 
sentence and remand to the circuit court for a new capital sentencing hearing 
consistent with this opinion.
Convictions affirmed;
death sentence vacated;
cause remanded.
JUSTICE MILLER, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the State may not, on remand, 
present victim impact evidence regarding crimes other than one for which this 
capital defendant is now being sentenced. Victim impact evidence relating to 
other crimes committed by a defendant can be relevant and reliable, and, just 
like evidence of the circumstances of the defendant's other crimes, it should be 
admissible in aggravation here.
The majority relies on two main grounds in support of its decision to exclude 
victim impact evidence concerning the defendant's other crimes. First, the 
majority believes that the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act (725 ILCS 
120/1 through 9 (West 1994)) limits the range of admissible evidence to 
information relating to an offense on which the defendant is then being 
sentenced. Slip op. at 8 ("However, the statute does not contemplate, and we 
will not condone, an expansion of victim impact statements to include evidence 
from victims other than the victims of the offense on trial"). In support of 
this holding the majority quotes section 6(a) of the Act, which provides:
From this provision the majority infers that victim impact evidence, to be 
admissible, must relate to the particular crime or crimes on which the defendant 
is being sentenced. The inference is flawed, however, for the majority seriously 
misapprehends the scope and purpose of the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses 
Act.
Contrary to the majority's interpretation, the Act is not intended to alter 
or restrict the range of evidence that the State may introduce in aggravation; 
instead, the Act is designed to provide and enforce certain statutory and 
constitutional rights for victims and witnesses of violent crimes. 725 ILCS 
120/2 (West 1994). The ability of the prosecution to present evidence in 
aggravation, whether in capital cases (720 ILCS 5/9-1(e) (West 1994)) or in 
noncapital cases (730 ILCS 5/5-4-1(a)(4) (West 1994)), remains distinct from the 
rights of victims and witnesses of violent crimes to have a role in sentencing 
hearings, as provided by the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act. See 
People v. Willis, 184 Ill. App. 3d 1033, 1045-46 (1989); People v. 
Keyes, 175 Ill. App. 3d 1013, 1017 (1988); People v. Estrella, 170 
Ill. App. 3d 292, 295-96 (1988).
More specifically, section 6 of the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses 
Act, cited by the majority, applies when the victim, on his or her own 
initiative, wishes to address the sentencing court; section 6 does not purport 
to limit the evidence that the prosecution may otherwise introduce in 
aggravation. People v. Pavlovskis, 229 Ill. App. 3d 776, 782 (1992). 
The appellate court explained this distinction in People v. Wallace, 
170 Ill. App. 3d 329 (1988). Rejecting a defendant's argument that a victim 
impact statement was improperly introduced into evidence because it was not 
presented through the testimony of the victim of the offense, the 
Wallace court stated:
Eluding the majority is the important distinction between the rights enforced 
by the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act and the prosecution's separate 
authority to introduce evidence in aggravation. The majority's interpretation 
turns the statute on its head and threatens to severely limit the prosecution's 
ability to present relevant, reliable evidence in aggravation: the majority 
transforms what was designed to provide a benefit to victims and witnesses into 
a shield for their offenders. The ironic and unfortunate result of today's 
decision, with its crabbed interpretation of the Act, is "to make sentencing 
more burdensome on those who have already suffered the traumatic effects of 
violent crime," an outcome the legislature could not have intended.
I would also note that the majority's reliance on section 6 of the Rights of 
Crime Victims and Witnesses Act raises a potential conflict with a companion 
provision, section 9 of the Act. Section 9 provides, in pertinent part, "Nothing 
in this Act shall create a basis for vacating a conviction or a ground for 
appellate relief in any criminal case." 725 ILCS 120/9 (West 1994). I recognize 
that the majority bases its vacatur of the defendant's death sentence on an 
unrelated ground, the failure of the trial judge to question prospective jurors 
about racial bias. To the extent that the majority would also find reversible 
error under the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act, however, that result 
would seemingly run contrary to the limitation expressed in section 9 of the 
Act.
As additional support for today's decision, the majority refers to the United 
States Supreme Court's opinion in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991). In that case, however, the Court did not 
address the question raised in this appeal; language from Payne cited 
by the majority in support of the present holding simply reflects the matters at 
issue in that case, and not the Court's views on whether victim impact evidence 
relating to other offenses may also be introduced. I do not believe that 
Payne forecloses introduction of the evidence challenged here. Just as 
evidence of the circumstances of a defendant's other offenses is admissible in 
aggravation, so too should be victim impact testimony from the victims of those 
other crimes.
JUSTICE BILANDIC, also concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the State may not, on remand, 
present the victim impact testimony of Alvin Thompson and Vernita Wyckliffe. For 
the reasons expressed by my colleague, Justice Miller, I believe that the State 
should not be precluded from ever introducing victim impact evidence which 
relates to a crime other than the one for which the defendant is being 
sentenced. I do not believe, however, that all victim impact evidence 
relating to other crimes should automatically be admissible. Rather, given the 
nature of this type of evidence, the trial court should exercise its discretion 
to allow this type of evidence sparingly, making sure that the evidence is not 
too attenuated to be relevant to the sentencing decision in the instant case. 
See People v. Hope, 168 Ill. 2d 1, 41 (1995) (evaluation of relevance 
and reliability is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge). In this 
case, the challenged victim impact evidence related to a murder and an attempted 
murder committed by defendant less than one month prior to his commission of 
murder and attempted murder in this case. Under these circumstances, I would 
hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the 
introduction of victim impact evidence relating to these crimes.
Footnote:
1. Although defendant does not include in his claim of error 
the victim impact testimony presented by Alvin Thompson, the attempted murder 
victim in the McDonald's shooting, our discussion applies to all victim impact 
evidence relating to crimes other than those for which a capital defendant is 
being sentenced. See People v. Cortes, 181 Ill. 2d 249, 282 (1998) (a 
reviewing court need not ignore grave errors of law which the parties on appeal 
either overlook or decline to address).