Title: Green for Wisconsin v. State of Wisconsin Elections Board
Citation: 2007 WI 45
Docket Number: 2006AP002452-OA
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: April 25, 2007

2007 WI 45 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2006AP2452-OA 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Green for Wisconsin and Mark Green, 
          Petitioners, 
     v. 
State of Wisconsin Elections Board and Kevin J. 
Kennedy, in his official capacity as Executive 
Director of the State of Wisconsin Elections 
Board, 
          Respondents. 
OPINION FILED: 
April 25, 2007  
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
   
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
   
 
COUNTY: 
   
 
JUDGE: 
   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
Crooks, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
Prosser, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2007 WI 45
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This order is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The 
final version will appear in the 
bound volume of the official 
reports.   
 
 
 
No.  2006AP2452-OA 
 
 
Green for Wisconsin and Mark Green, 
 
          Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
State of Wisconsin Elections Board and Kevin J. 
Kennedy , in his official capacity as Executive 
Director of the State of Wisconsin Elections 
Board, 
 
          Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 25, 2007 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Court entered the following order on this date: 
 
 
The parties have agreed that this case may be dismissed, 
with prejudice, without costs, and without further notice to any 
party. 
IT IS ORDERED that the original action is dismissed, with 
prejudice and without costs to any party.  
 
 
No.  2006AP2452-OA.npc 
 
2 
 
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (concurring).  While I concur 
in the order dismissing this matter, based on the unopposed 
motion of the petitioners, I write in order to respond to the 
lengthy concurrence of Justice David T. Prosser. 
¶2 
Several years ago, Grant County Circuit Court Judge 
Richard W. Orton, a distinguished trial judge, ordered summary 
judgment in a case.  In doing so, he characterized the 
plaintiffs' case as "hogwash, pure hogwash."  That phrase aptly 
fits those portions of the concurrence of Justice Prosser where 
he denigrates the actions of members of this court.  The 
following unfair and inaccurate phrases are used in his 
concurrence: the court "used every imaginable pretext to avoid 
making a decision" (¶16); the "court did not care" (¶17); was 
"indifferent" to the facts of the case (¶23); was "overwhelmed 
by the difficulty of the facts and issues" and "threw up its 
hands" (¶28). 
¶3 
The fact is that this court spent many, many hours 
working on the petition asking to commence an original action, 
as well as on the various submissions of the petitioners, the 
respondents, and the amicus.  The October 31, 2006 order of this 
court accurately sets forth the extensive efforts that were made 
to try to get this matter into an appropriate posture, so that a 
decision could be made as to whether to grant the petition, and 
thus, take this case invoking our original jurisdiction.  We 
did, of course, ultimately take the case once there were no 
factual disputes.  This court grants petitions for original 
jurisdiction "'with the greatest reluctance . . . especially 
No.  2006AP2452-OA.npc 
 
3 
 
where questions of fact are involved . . . .'"  Petition of 
Heil, 230 Wis. 428, 436, 284 N.W. 42 (1939) (citing State ex 
rel. Hartung v. City of Milwaukee, 102 Wis. 509, 78 N. W. 756 
(1899)). 
¶4 
The March 12, 2007 order of this court came in 
response to the changes brought about by the legislature and the 
governor in eliminating the State Elections Board and the State 
Ethics Board, and in creating a new Government Accountability 
Board.  That new board has the authority to review, and, by its 
action or inaction, to affirm or nullify decisions by the two 
boards that were eliminated.  See 2007 Wis. Act 1, § 209(2)(e).  
The settlement of this case came shortly after we issued that 
order, asking the parties whether oral argument should be 
scheduled despite the changes, or whether it was prudent to wait 
until the new Government Accountability Board had an opportunity 
to act or decline to act.   
¶5 
Much is made in the concurrence of Justice Prosser 
about how this court was once a "great court," and how we no 
longer fit that description.  Justice Prosser's concurrence, 
¶¶16, 37.  In order to be a "great court," I believe that the 
members of such a court must be persons who care deeply about 
truth, justice, and fairness.  I have great respect for my 
colleagues on the Wisconsin Supreme Court, but it is for others, 
not for us, to judge whether we continue to be a "great court."  
What I observed in the handling of this case by my colleagues 
convinced me that each of them cared deeply about truth, 
justice, and fairness for the parties.  To denigrate, now, their 
No.  2006AP2452-OA.npc 
 
4 
 
actions is wrong and I must, therefore, respond to such unfair 
and inaccurate characterizations of the court and its actions in 
this case.  Accordingly, I respectfully concur. 
 
 
No.  2006AP2452-OA.dtp 
5 
 
 
¶6 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring).  The petitioners, 
Green for Wisconsin and Mark Green, move this court for an order 
to dismiss their original action.  Their motion is based upon a 
Stipulation of the parties to settle the case.  The petitioners' 
motion was filed by an assistant attorney general representing 
the respondents, which underscores the settlement agreement.  In 
view of the settlement, I reluctantly concur in the Order to 
dismiss the action.  Nonetheless, because this case always 
warranted the court's urgent attention, I believe additional 
comment is necessary. 
I 
¶7 
There have been many notable cases in the history of 
this court.  By all accounts, one of the most significant was 
The Attorney General ex rel. Bashford v. Barstow, 4 Wis. 567 
(1856).  See Joseph A. Ranney, Trusting Nothing to Providence 
84-88 (1999); John Bradley Winslow, The Story of a Great Court 
96-107 (1912).  The case involved a disputed election for 
governor in which the court in essence removed a governor from 
office. 
¶8 
In 1855 Governor William A. Barstow ran for re-
election.  Although his party dominated Wisconsin politics, 
Barstow had apparently antagonized many voters, and he ran well 
behind the rest of the ticket.  The election was very close and 
remained unresolved for weeks.  On December 17, 1855, the last 
day allowed by law, the state board of canvassers certified 
Barstow's reelection by 157 votes.  Winslow, supra, at 97. 
No.  2006AP2452-OA.dtp 
6 
 
¶9 
Barstow's opponent, Coles Bashford, claimed fraud.  He 
asserted that slow returns from Chippewa, Waupaca, and several 
other northern counties contained fictitious precincts and 
manufactured votes.  Winslow, supra, at 97, 101.  Bashford moved 
to file a writ of quo warranto in the supreme court, challenging 
Barstow's election and his right to hold the office of governor.  
Winslow, supra, at 99. 
¶10 The newly elected attorney general took control of the 
quo warranto so that a member of Barstow's party could manage 
the action.  Eventually, however, he stepped aside.  Winslow, 
supra, at 99, 101. 
¶11 Barstow vigorously opposed the court's jurisdiction to 
hear the case.  Winslow, supra, at 102.  When the court decided 
otherwise, Barstow refused to file a substantive answer, thereby 
permitting a default judgment.  Barstow's attorneys withdrew 
after delivering a communication from Barstow threatening to 
resist any removal order from the court "with all the force 
vested in this department."  Winslow, supra, at 104-05.1 
¶12 The court was not deterred.  Rather than enter a 
default against Barstow, however, it required Bashford to make 
his proofs and demonstrate his title to office.  He did.  
                                                 
1 As Justice Winslow later wrote: "This was plainly a threat 
of armed resistance in case the Court proceeded to seat 
Bashford.  Especially significant was the threat in view of the 
fact that arms were known to have been stored in the state house 
for use in case of an emergency."  John Bradley Winslow, The 
Story of a Great Court 105 (1912).  Joseph Ranney adds: 
"Tensions ran high.  Militia units from areas supporting Barstow 
came to Madison for his inauguration and stayed to fight for him 
if necessary."  Joseph A. Ranney, Trusting Nothing to Providence 
84 (1999). 
No.  2006AP2452-OA.dtp 
7 
 
Winslow, supra, at 106.  Once the "irregularities and fraudulent 
returns 
were 
amply 
proven," 
the 
court 
entered 
judgment.  
Winslow, supra, at 106.  Several days before judgment, Barstow 
resigned, transferring the office to the lieutenant governor who 
promptly honored the court's order.  Winslow, supra, at 107. 
¶13 In explaining the court's jurisdiction to decide this 
"political case," Chief Justice Edward Whiton observed that the 
court "is the mere instrument provided by the constitution to 
ascertain and enforce [Bashford's and Barstow's] rights as fixed 
by that instrument.  Its office is the same as in all 
controversies between party and party; not to create rights, but 
to ascertain and enforce them."  Ranney, supra, at 85 (quoting 
Bashford, 4 Wis. at 659). 
¶14 Throughout the proceedings, the court was united.  
Justice Abram D. Smith, a member of Barstow's party, wrote on 
every important issue before the court.  Future Chief Justice 
Edward G. Ryan, also a member of Barstow's party, played a 
leading role in arguing and proving Bashford's case.  Ranney, 
supra, at 84; Winslow, supra, at 99. 
¶15 The 
case 
of 
Bashford 
v. 
Barstow, 
according 
to 
historian Joseph A. Ranney, "conclusively established [the 
Supreme Court's] role as the final interpreter of the law."  
Ranney, supra, at 84.  It also assured the integrity of the 
electoral process.  It thus represented a pivotal moment in 
Wisconsin legal history. 
II 
¶16 Bashford v. Barstow was decided more than a century-
and-a-half ago.  We live now in different times.  If there is 
No.  2006AP2452-OA.dtp 
8 
 
ever a sequel to Justice Winslow's The Story of a Great Court, 
the Green case will not be included.  In the midst and aftermath 
of an important gubernatorial election, this court did nothing 
to ascertain and enforce rights, or to assure the integrity of 
the electoral process.  Instead, it used every imaginable 
pretext to avoid making a decision. 
¶17 Some citizens believe that petitioner Green and his 
committee were campaign violators, even though the Elections 
Board 
deprived 
them 
of 
the 
opportunity 
to 
use 
lawfully 
collected, publicly reported political contributions in Green's 
campaign.  Other citizens believe that Green was the victim of 
an abuse of government power.  No matter how one sees it, 
history will show that this court did not care. 
¶18 From the outset, Green contended that he and his 
committee had complied in every respect with existing state and 
federal law.  The Elections Board now stipulates that: 
[W]hen 
Green 
for 
Wisconsin . . . converted 
the 
disputed funds from Petitioner Mark Green's federal 
campaign committee to his state campaign committee on 
January 25, 2005, it complied with: (1) previous Board 
determinations with respect to similar matters; (2) 
ElBd 1.39, as written and interpreted at the time; and 
(3) instructions provided by the Board's staff. 
¶19 What more is there to say?  When the parties also 
"acknowledge that the Board's position in this litigation was 
based on the Board's current interpretation of the relevant 
statutes," the parties acknowledge an irrelevancy.  (Emphasis 
added.) 
¶20 This court recognized in Elections Board v. Wisconsin 
Manufacturers 
& Commerce, 227 Wis. 2d 650, 597 N.W.2d 721 
No.  2006AP2452-OA.dtp 
9 
 
(1999), that retroactive rulemaking——at least in the area of 
speech——is a violation of due process of law.  This court said: 
"Because we assume that [persons are] free to steer between 
lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person 
of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what 
is prohibited, so that he [or she] may act accordingly."  Id. at 
676-77 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 
(1972)).  "Such notice is a basic requirement of due process."  
Id. (citing Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108). 
¶21 The court went on: "Because First Amendment freedoms 
need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the 
area only with narrow specificity."  Id. at 677 (quoting Buckley 
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 41 n.48 (1976)). 
¶22 When Justice Department attorneys were called upon to 
defend the Elections Board's rules and "order," they were not 
content with trying to defend retroactive rulemaking.  They 
publicly and repeatedly accused Green of violating federal law, 
a position that directly contradicted the Elections Board's 
formal interpretation of federal law.2  This astounding and 
                                                 
2 The Elections Board's explanation of its emergency rule 
reads in part: 
The Elections Board finds that an emergency 
exists in the recent change in federal law that 
permits the transfer of the funds in a federal 
candidate 
campaign 
committee's 
account 
to 
the 
candidate's state campaign committee account . . . . 
In November, 2004, Congress amended the Federal 
Election Campaign Act . . . to permit the transfer of 
a federal candidate's campaign committee's funds to 
the candidate's state campaign committee, if state law 
permitted, and subject to the state law's requirements 
and restrictions. 
No.  2006AP2452-OA.dtp 
10 
 
disturbing position may be the reason why former Attorney 
General Peggy Lautenschlager's name is conspicuously missing 
from all the briefs Department attorneys filed in this case. 
¶23 To these hard facts the court has been indifferent.  
The extensive procedural history of this case is set out below. 
¶24 On October 9, 2006, Green filed a petition for an 
original action in this court. 
¶25 On October 11, 2006, this court responded promptly by 
issuing two orders.  One ordered the Elections Board to file a 
response by October 16, 2006.  The other ordered Green to secure 
and transfer to this court records from the Elections Board 
relating to its proceedings, its Emergency Rule of January 26, 
2005, and its September 6, 2006, "order," as well as all papers 
and transcripts from Green's unsuccessful effort to obtain an 
injunction against the Board's "order" in the Dane County 
Circuit Court (Case No. 2006CV3055). 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
Because of Congress' action in November, 2004, 
money which had not been available to a state 
committee under BICRA, and which might not have 
qualified for use for political purposes in a state 
campaign because of its source or because of other 
noncompliance with state law, could now be transferred 
to 
a 
state 
committee, 
if 
state 
law 
permitted.  
Wisconsin law, under the Board's current rule, E1Bd 
1.39 Wis. Adm. Code, allows for conversion of federal 
campaign committees, and their funds, to a state 
campaign committee without regard to the source of 
those 
funds 
and 
without 
regard 
to 
contribution 
limitations.  (Emphasis added.) 
 
No.  2006AP2452-OA.dtp 
11 
 
¶26 On 
October 
18, 
2006, 
this 
court 
ordered 
the 
petitioners and respondents to file answers to 11 questions by 
October 19, 2006.  See Appendix A. 
¶27 On October 31, 2006, the court issued a third order.  
2006 WI 120, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 723 N.W.2d 418.  The order stated 
that: 
 
The court has worked diligently to assess and 
determine the legal and factual issues presented by 
the parties and to reach a consensus on how to 
proceed; we have explored the difficult substantive 
and procedural issues in an attempt to bring order out 
of complex and confusing filings, all to no avail.  
(Emphasis added.) 
¶28 Seemingly overwhelmed by the difficulty of the facts 
and issues, the court threw up its hands and ordered the 
petitioners to file an amended petition "in the form of a 
complaint which, in numbered paragraph form, specifies the 
precise facts and legal theories upon which they rely."  The 
respondents were then ordered to answer the new "complaint."  
The order stated that the court would then submit these 
documents to a reserve judge who would determine "what factual 
issues are in dispute and whether they relate to the identified 
legal issues."  The court went on at length about the alleged 
jumble of disputed facts: 
 
This court has on two occasions issued orders 
asking the parties to clarify the facts upon which the 
court would have to resolve the matter and to identify 
disputed facts, if any.  It appears from the parties' 
submissions in response to those orders that there are 
truly contested issues of fact. 
 
The parties do not appear to agree on what facts 
are 
relevant, 
nor 
do 
they 
agree 
on 
the 
characterization 
of 
many 
facts. 
 
The 
parties' 
stipulation of facts was for the circuit court 
No.  2006AP2452-OA.dtp 
12 
 
proceeding and it does not cover all of the facts at 
issue here.  The respondent says the only relevant 
facts are the Elections Board's record in creating the 
emergency rule and issuing the September 6, 2006 
order.  Petitioners say that the court must also 
consider the history of the Elections Board's actions 
regarding previous "conversions" of federal campaign 
accounts to state campaign accounts.  Petitioners' 
"record" for purposes of an original action would 
apparently consist of the "record" transmitted by the 
Dane County Circuit Court from the earlier circuit 
court case, the Elections Board record, documents 
regarding 
the 
complaint 
filed 
with 
the 
Federal 
Election Commission, and "factual assertions offered 
by 
the 
parties." 
 
In 
response, 
although 
the 
respondent's filings have cited certain paragraphs in 
the petitioners' filings to which it takes exception, 
it has failed to identify clearly the specific factual 
allegations that it allegedly disputes.  The parties' 
seemingly inconsistent statements on the existence of 
disputed factual issues impinges upon this court's 
ability to evaluate at this point in time whether the 
case is of the type that should be resolved through 
the court's original jurisdiction, which is designed 
to resolve important legal questions but not to 
referee factual disputes. 
¶29 Three justices dissented from this order.  Justice Jon 
Wilcox wrote: "Further pleadings and factual development will 
not shed any more light on whether this court should decide to 
exercise its original jurisdiction. . . .  Further pleadings are 
unnecessary."  Green, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ¶¶2, 4 (Wilcox, J., 
dissenting).  
Justice Patience Roggensack wrote: "Neither 
further factual development nor further pleading is necessary 
for this court to decide whether to exercise its original 
jurisdiction. . . .  The . . . order unnecessarily delays making 
a decision on this issue until after the November 7, 2006 
election . . . ."  Id., ¶¶23, 24 (Roggensack, J., dissenting). 
No.  2006AP2452-OA.dtp 
13 
 
¶30 On November 8, 2006, the court issued an order 
appointing the Honorable William F. Eich to conduct the 
proceedings described in its October 31, 2006, order. 
¶31 On December 12, 2006, Judge Eich issued his report.  
He noted that petitioners' amended petition listed "thirty 
separate 
paragraphs" 
reciting 
facts. 
 
He 
stated 
that 
"Respondents admit each of the thirty factual allegations of the 
Amended Petition."  He stated that the parties agreed on the 
legal issues.  Then he declared: "The parties have agreed and 
represented that the material facts necessary to determination 
of the above issues are, as contained in the pleadings, matters 
of record and, in any event, are undisputed."  (Emphasis added.)  
See Appendix B. 
¶32 Six weeks later, on January 23, 2007, the court issued 
a fourth order, accepting original jurisdiction, setting a 
briefing schedule, and enumerating eight issues.  See Appendix 
C. 
¶33 On March 12, 2007, the court issued a fifth order, 
asking the parties whether it was "desirable and prudential to 
delay oral arguments in this matter until the [newly created] 
Government Accountability Board has acted."  See Appendix D.  
This order hinted at delaying argument until late 2007 or even 
2008. 
¶34 Four days later, the parties settled the case and 
filed a motion to dismiss. 
¶35 At no time did the court schedule oral argument. 
¶36 This procedural record speaks for itself.   
No.  2006AP2452-OA.dtp 
14 
 
¶37 If there is ever a sequel to The Story of a Great 
Court, this case will not be included.  But with many more cases 
like this one, there is not likely to be a sequel. 
 
 
No.  2006AP2452-OA.dtp 
15 
 
Appendix A-1 
No.  2006AP2452-OA.dtp 
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Appendix A-2 
No.  2006AP2452-OA.dtp 
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Appendix A-3 
No.  2006AP2452-OA.dtp 
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Appendix B-1 
No.  2006AP2452-OA.dtp 
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Appendix B-2 
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Appendix B-3 
No.  2006AP2452-OA.dtp 
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Appendix B-4 
No.  2006AP2452-OA.dtp 
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Appendix B-5 
No.  2006AP2452-OA.dtp 
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Appendix B-6 
No.  2006AP2452-OA.dtp 
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Appendix C-1 
No.  2006AP2452-OA.dtp 
25 
 
Appendix C-2 
No.  2006AP2452-OA.dtp 
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Appendix C-3 
No.  2006AP2452-OA.dtp 
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Appendix C-4 
No.  2006AP2452-OA.dtp 
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Appendix D-1 
No.  2006AP2452-OA.dtp 
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Appendix D-2 
No.  2006AP2452-OA.dtp 
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