Title: Tomasek v. Oregon Highway Com'n.
Citation: 196 Or. 120, 248 P.2d 703
Docket Number: N/A
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: September 24, 1952

Affirmed September 24, 1952.
*124 Ralph Wyckoff, Assistant Attorney General, of Salem, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were George Neuner, Attorney General, C.W. Enfield, Assistant Attorney General, and Fred A. Miller, Assistant Attorney General, all of Salem.
Brazier C. Small, of Salem, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
Before BRAND, Chief Justice, and HAY, ROSSMAN, LUSK, and TOOZE, Justices.
AFFIRMED.
TOOZE, J.
This is an action brought by Karel Tomasek, as plaintiff, against the state of Oregon, by and through Ben R. Chandler, Charles H. Reynolds, and M.K. McIver, constituting and acting as the Oregon State Highway Commission, as defendant, to recover the reasonable value of certain real property alleged to have been taken by defendant for public use. The action was tried to a jury, and a verdict in favor of plaintiff against defendant for the sum of $13,500 was returned. Judgment in favor of plaintiff was entered accordingly. Defendant appeals.
*125 On April 25, 1950, plaintiff filed in the circuit court for Marion county his amended complaint setting forth his cause of action as follows (formal parts omitted):
To this amended complaint defendant filed the following demurrer (omitting formal parts):
The trial court overruled the demurrer. This ruling by the trial court is the basis of defendant's first assignment of error on this appeal. In presenting its contention to the trial court, as well as in its brief in this court, defendant argued: (1) that the court lacked jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, on the ground that the state of Oregon is immune to suit except in those instances in which it has consented thereto; and (2) that the state of Oregon has not consented to the action at bar.
In overruling the demurrer the able trial judge accompanied the court's order with a memorandum opinion. We shall later have occasion to quote from that opinion.
To the amended complaint defendant filed the following answer (omitting formal parts):
*132 Plaintiff by his reply admits paragraphs I and II of defendant's further and separate answer, admits in paragraph III "that the waters of the Santiam river run with great force and violence during high water periods and that the damming or interfering with the natural flow of the river during said periods constricts the flow of said river, increases its velocity and may change the direction of the current; and the acts of defendant, as alleged in the Amended Complaint, did change the channel of said river", and denies all the remainder of the new matter contained in said answer.
Upon the conclusion of the trial and before the case was submitted to the jury, defendant moved the court for a directed verdict in its favor "upon the ground and for the reason that the facts proved are not sufficient to entitle plaintiff, as a matter of law, to recover." In denying the motion, the trial court stated:
The trial was concluded and the verdict in favor of plaintiff returned on March 16, 1951. On March 19, 1951, defendant filed in said court and cause its motion *133 for judgment notwithstanding verdict, assigning as grounds therefor the following:
Under date of March 23, 1951, there was made and entered of record in said court and action a judgment based upon the verdict of the jury in favor of plaintiff and against defendant in the sum of $13,500, and costs. At that time no action had been taken by the court upon defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict. Under date of May 21, 1951, the trial court signed an order reciting that, on May 11, 1951, the matter came on regularly before the court upon defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict, and concluding "IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that such motion be and the same hereby is overruled." This order was not filed until 3:14 p.m. on May 22, 1951. On May 22, 1951, at 9:54 a.m. of said day, defendant filed in said court and action its notice of appeal dated May 21, 1951.
We invite attention to this record because, on this appeal defendant sets forth as its assignment of error VIII the following:
In this connection, defendant contends that, having filed its notice of appeal in the morning of May 22, the trial court was ousted from further jurisdiction except such as might concern the settling and filing of the bill of exceptions, and that the court had no jurisdiction to enter the order which it did enter in the afternoon of May 22.
1, 2. We deem this assignment of error wholly without merit. The trial court denied the motion under date of May 21. That is the day it acted; not when the order was filed. As to the contention that the court did not rule upon defendant's motion for a directed verdict, it need only be said that the submission of the case to the jury was tantamount to overruling the motion, and, in any event, the order of May 21 would have that effect. It is observed that, in its ruling submitting the case to the jury and reserving to defendant leave to renew the motion in the form of a motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict in the event of an adverse verdict against defendant, the court did not state that such motion would be sustained. Its statement was: "In that event I will give further consideration to the motion." The order of May 21 shows that the court did give further consideration to the matter and, upon such consideration, denied the motion.
As authority for its position under this assignment of error, defendant cites the following cases: Wiedeman v. Campbell et al., 108 Or 55, 215 P 885; Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Spencer, 56 Or 250, 108 P 180; Carroll v. Grande Ronde Elec. Co., 49 Or 477, 90 P 903. It is unnecessary to discuss those decisions, *135 because they are not in point upon the record in the instant case.
3. Section 6-707, OCLA, as amended by ch. 149, Oregon Laws 1945, in part provides:
Under this statute, even though the trial court is of the opinion at the close of the case that a motion for a directed verdict ought to be granted and submits the case to the jury with leave to the moving party to move for judgment in his favor if the verdict is otherwise than as would have been directed, it does not follow that the court must sustain the motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict. Upon such motion, the court may give the matter further consideration and may act in accordance with its then opinion.
Inasmuch as defendant assigns as error the failure of the trial court to sustain its motion for a directed verdict, as well as its motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, it is necessary to discuss the evidence in the case in some detail. This discussion is also rendered essential because of the principal *136 contention in this case; viz., that the state is immune to this suit.
The evidence shows that the Santiam River is a mountain stream that rises in the Cascade mountains and, after leaving the foothills, flows in a general westerly direction across an extensive level area, finally emptying into the Willamette river. It is a turbulent stream, particularly in periods of high water. During the fall, winter, and spring months, and at more or less frequent intervals, it carried high flood waters. These waters spread out over a wide area on each side of its main channel. Because of the force of its waters, new channels are frequently cut, with an abandonment of old channels, and, therefore, its bed is not constant and fixed.
Between 1943 and 1945, the defendant, acting through its Highway Commission, relocated a segment of highway 99E (sometimes called the Pacific highway), running in a general northerly and southerly direction between the cities of Salem and Albany, and, as a part of such relocation, provided for the construction of a bridge across the Santiam river at a point northwest of Jefferson and southeast of Talbot, connecting Marion and Linn counties. The construction of this bridge at the point in question required a new grade and roadbed for said highway in its approaches to the bridge, extending for several hundred yards both immediately north and south of the bridge.
This new grade consisted of a rock and dirt fill that was raised to a substantial elevation above the natural contour of the land on both the north and south sides of the riverbed. Thousands of yards of gravel used in the construction of the grade and roadbed were taken from the bed of the river immediately east and *137 west and under the proposed location of the bridge, thus widening and deepening the channel of the river.
Construction of the bridge and its approaches was commenced in July, 1945, and was completed on or about October 1, 1947. In constructing the approach to the bridge proper from the north (as well as from the south), certain outlets were provided for the flow and escape of flood waters from the east to the west.
Prior to the road construction mentioned, flood waters of the Santiam river spread out over a wide area northerly and southerly of the river channel, and easterly and westerly of the place of such construction. The flow of these flood waters over said areas was even, and, by reason thereof, there was, during the time of such floods, no material increase in the velocity of the current of the main stream.
Prior to and on July 10, 1945, and at the time of trial, plaintiff was the owner of certain lands as described in paragraph II of the amended complaint. These lands are located in a general westerly direction from the highway bridge and, on their southwesterly side are bounded by the Santiam river. It is approximately one-half-mile downstream from the bridge to the nearest point on plaintiff's property. Defendant made some contention concerning the ownership of the property involved in this litigation; but that question was submitted to the jury, and there is substantial evidence in the record to support the verdict in that respect.
Prior to the construction of the highway grade and bridge, and in that vicinity, high waters ran across the extensive flood plain in a westerly direction. There were natural channels to handle this flow. The flow was unobstructed. This condition tended to neutralize the force of the current in the main river as it flowed *138 by and against plaintiff's property on the northerly bank of the river. As a result, natural erosion of the north bank was more or less slight and imperceptible.
Defendant in its construction of the grade, roadbed, and bridge closed approximately seventy per cent of the flood plain, blocking the natural channels and leaving only thirty per cent of the flood area open by outlets through and under the grade and bridge. The evidence discloses that, after construction was completed and during the periods of high waters, drift wood and other debris were caused to pile up against the easterly side and northerly end of the bridge structure, which, in effect, dammed up at least one of the outlets for the flow of flood waters. This debris was permitted to remain there.
This closing off of most of the flood plain, combined with the rock excavations from the bed of the river, had the effect of forcing larger volumes of water through the outlets and, more important, substantially increased the velocity and course of the current in the main river.
4. S. Sims, an experienced licensed engineer, formerly employed by the Oregon State Highway Department, made three surveys covering plaintiff's property; one in December, 1949; another in April, 1950; and the last in February, 1951. He, as a witness for plaintiff, testified that, between his first two surveys, erosion of plaintiff's land at the point where it was struck by the current of the river had progressed at the rate of 7/10 of an acre per month, and between his second and third surveys, at the rate of one-half an acre per month. This erosion naturally changed the course and channel of the main river from its original location to a place over and across the lands of plaintiff, and, of course, continued erosion will cause further *139 change of the course of the river and its encroachment upon the land of plaintiff. The evidence is almost conclusive that this erosion was and is not gradual and imperceptible, but, on the contrary, was and is abrupt, sudden, artificial, and proximately caused by the highway construction. Under such conditions, no boundaries are changed by reason of the change in the course of the river. 20 CJS, Counties, 766, § 15.
Sims also testified that the erosion on plaintiff's land extended back from the original bank of the river for a distance of approximately 400 feet, and that a total of 63 acres had been eroded. He also testified that this erosion was caused by the highway construction. On this, he was corroborated by other capable engineers. The land involved was deep, rich riverbottom land, adapted to the growing of mint, as well as other valuable crops, and there is testimony in the record that it had a reasonable market value of $350 to $400 per acre. The effect of the erosion was to wash away and remove all the surface soil of the land, leaving only a gravel bed and rendering it wholly worthless for farming purposes.
There is substantial evidence in the record to support every material allegation of plaintiff's amended complaint. Defendant offered the testimony of witnesses to the effect that the erosion of which plaintiff complains was due to natural causes over which it had no control, and not to any act on its part. However, by its verdict, the jury rejected this defense.
In instructing the jury, the trial court very carefully and correctly pointed out that before a verdict could be returned against defendant, it must appear from the evidence that whatever injury they might find plaintiff suffered was directly caused by the alleged acts of defendant.
*140 As hereinbefore stated, defendant moved for a directed verdict "upon the ground and for the reason that the facts proved are not sufficient to entitle plaintiff, as a matter of law, to recover." In passing on this matter, the trial judge denied the motion, but stated that there was a question in his mind as to liability.
5-7. The motion for a directed verdict embraced two propositions: (1) whether there was substantial evidence sufficient to take the case to the jury; and (2) whether, in any event, as a matter of law, based on claimed immunity, defendant was liable for damages. On the first point, the record discloses conflicting evidence of a substantial character, thus making it a jury question. It is hornbook law that where there is any substantial evidence to sustain the allegations of the complaint, a jury question is presented. In such circumstances this court is bound by the verdict of the jury.
We now turn to the main point involved in this controversy; i.e., whether or not defendant, under the facts of this case, is immune to this action.
8. The Oregon State Highway Commission is a quasi-public corporation, an agency of the state. It was created by the legislative assembly to carry out purely state functions; that is, the location, relocation, construction, maintenance, and repair of state highways and bridges. Title 100, OCLA.
The Highway Commission is vested with broad powers. It is specifically empowered to:
Tort liability of the Highway Commission is limited to a maximum sum of $500. § 100-115 (15), OCLA. As to its contract liability, § 8-702, OCLA, as amended by ch 3, Oregon Laws 1941, in part provides:
Section 100-114, OCLA, in part provides:
Section 100-116, OCLA, provides, in general, that, whenever in the judgment of the Commission it is necessary to acquire real property for any of the purposes provided in the act, the Commission is authorized *142 to agree with the owner or owners of any interest in real property or lands required with respect to the compensation to be paid therefor and the damages, if any; and if no such agreement is reached, then condemnation proceedings are authorized, the statute providing in detail how such proceedings should be conducted.
Article 1, § 18, Constitution of Oregon, provides:
9, 10. The power of eminent domain is inherent in the sovereign state and is founded upon the law of necessity. It does not depend for its existence upon a specific grant in the constitution of the state. However, this power may be limited by constitutional provision, and art. 1, § 18, Oregon Const., provides such a limitation. This limitation is in favor of the individual owner of property. It is a specific constitutional right and protection that cannot be taken away or destroyed by legislative act or legislative failure to act. It is a restriction placed by the constitution upon the state itself, and upon all of it agencies that derive from it their power of eminent domain, including the State Highway Commission.
Though the power of eminent domain is inherent in the state, it lies dormant until called into existence by express legislative authority, but this legislative authority is always subject to constitutional limitations. *143 State ex rel. v. Hawk et al., 105 Or 319, 208 P 709, 209 P 607.
12, 13. The constitutional right and protection given the owner of property by art. 1, § 18, Oregon Const., supra, is unquestionably self-executing. It is an absolute right, and, for its violation, the injured person may have his remedy in a common-law action in the absence of statutory provision therefor. This remedy should not be, nor is it, dependent upon legislative action. It is manifest that the legislature has no power to abrogate or deny a constitutional right, nor may a right that is constitutionally granted be taken away or rendered nugatory by failure of the legislature to act. Without doubt, a constitutional right may be, and frequently is, subjected to reasonable rules and regulations for the enforcement and protection thereof; but any such rules and regulations must not only be reasonable, but also must be for the enforcement and protection of the right, and not in denial thereof. Levene et ux. v. City of Salem, 191 Or 182, 229 P2d 255; Morrison v. Clackamas County, 141 Or 564, 18 P2d 814; State v. Fletcher, 168 Okla 538, 34 P2d 595; Commonwealth v. Plymouth Coal Co., 232 Pa 141, 81 Atl 148 (232 US 531, 34 S Ct 359, 58 L ed 713); Chick Springs Water Co. v. State Highway Department, 159 SC 481, 157 SE 842; 18 Am Jur, Eminent Domain, 635, § 7.
It is stated in 18 Am Jur, Eminent Domain, 635, § 7, as follows:
In Chick Springs Water Co. v. State Highway Department, supra, at page 501, the South Carolina Court said:
The facts in this South Carolina case were quite similar to those existent in the instant case, and the contentions urged there by the defendant State Highway *145 Department were substantially the same as those made by defendant in this proceeding.
In the case of Great Northern Ry. Co. v. State, 102 Wash 348, 173 P 40, 42, LRA 1918E, 987, the state was sued by the railroad company for injury to its property, resulting from the construction of a state highway. The highway was built upon a hillside, approximately parallel with, and from 125 to 175 feet above, plaintiff's railroad track. Because of the steepness of the bluff, it was necessary to blast out a shelf for the highway and to dump material on the hillside and railroad track below. This caused slides, obstructed the track, bent rails, damaged ties, poles, and wires, and delayed trains, for which the plaintiff claimed an expenditure of $16,715.53 and an estimated sum of $25,000 to protect against imminent danger of further damage from slides caused by deposits and impaired drainage. The state's demurrer to the complaint and its motion for judgment non obstante veredicto were overruled. A verdict was returned in favor of plaintiff for $7,391.34. Plaintiff appealed, and defendant cross-appealed. In ruling upon the contention of the state that it was not liable for the damages sustained by plaintiff, the Supreme Court of Washington said, at page 352:
14. In support of his right to maintain this action, plaintiff invites our attention to art. 1, § 10, Oregon Const., which in part provides:
This constitutional provision is not applicable to the case now before the court.
*147 The constitution having created the absolute right in the owner of property as against the state, such provision carried with it a waiver of immunity on the part of the state to actions prosecuted for damages for its violation.
15. It also is to be noted that under art. 1, § 18, the state is fully authorized to take private property for a public use without compensation therefor being first assessed and tendered. In other words, the assessment and tender of just compensation is not a condition precedent to a taking. The taking may occur and the amount of compensation be determined and paid later. Hence, it is not necessary for the state to proceed first by condemnation proceedings in order to perfect its right to take. If there is a taking by the state without compensation being first assessed and tendered, it manifestly would be absurd to attribute to the framers of the constitution an intention that the state might destroy the right and protection given the owner of property and evade the payment of just compensation, simply through the medium of failing or refusing to institute condemnation proceedings.
16. To support an action for compensation or damages such as we have here, three things must concur and combine; viz., (1) there must be a taking of private property for a public use by (2) a state agency authorized to exercise the power of eminent domain, and (3) it must be property that is subject to be taken for a public use. Insofar as the problem now before the court is concerned, and as is so well pointed out in Chick Springs Water Co. v. State Highway Department, supra, it is immaterial whether the taking is directly by the state itself, or by one of its lawfully constituted agencies, such as a county, a school district, the State Fish and Game Commission, or the State Highway Department.
*148 In its brief defendant argues that, in bringing this action, plaintiff did not conform to established legal procedure, and that, if he had any remedy at all, he should have proceeded in mandamus to compel the State Highway Commission to prosecute condemnation proceedings as provided by statute. Defendant states as follows:
This contention is obviously based upon an erroneous premise; that is, that a distinction is to be drawn between the state itself and its agencies. As we have observed, no such distinction can be made under the situation presented in this case. In bringing the instant action, plaintiff did follow a well-established path. Morrison v. Clackamas County, 141 Or 564, 18 P2d 814.
In Morrison v. Clackamas County, supra, plaintiff brought action against the county to recover damages to his property caused by the acts of defendant upon the theory that the county had taken his property for a public use within the purview of the constitution. In its essential facts, that case is almost identical to the one at bar. There, according to the complaint, plaintiff's lands were eroded, the surface thereof being washed away and the land rendered valueless, by reason of a change in the current of the Sandy river because of certain acts of defendant in constructing a jetty in the stream for the purpose of protecting a bridge across the river. A demurrer to the complaint was sustained, and plaintiff appealed. In reversing the *149 case, this court, speaking through the late Justice HENRY J. BEAN, at page 567, said:
Commencing at page 568, the court further stated:
Also see Levene et ux. v. City of Salem, 191 Or 182, 229 P2d 255; Theiler v. Tillamook County, supra.
In Levene et ux. v. City of Salem, supra, Mr. Justice HAY, in writing the opinion of the court, at page 196, said:
In the instant case, defendant was fully empowered to relocate a segment of highway 99E and, in that connection, construct a new bridge across the Santiam river, with necessary approaches. The method of constructing the new grade, roadbed, and bridge was exclusively within its jurisdiction to determine. It is presumed that, in adopting the plans and specifications for this construction, defendant acted properly and in accordance with the necessities of the occasion as determined by it.
17, 18. At the scene of this construction the Santiam river is a navigable stream, and ownership of its bed lies in the state. It follows, therefore, that defendant acted within its rights (rights incident to ownership) when it excavated gravel from this riverbed for use in constructing its grade and roadbed. All of the acts performed as incidents to the work in question were lawful. All of them were for a public purpose. But the direct effect of this construction was a partial destruction of plaintiff's lands, it constituted a taking for a public purpose within the meaning of the constitution. It is the fact of taking, rather than the manner of taking, that is important. For this taking of his land, plaintiff is entitled to compensation.
19. Defendant contends that the judgment is improper because "there is no provision for any appropriation or conveyance to the State. The form of judgment may be proper for a tort claim but it is not in an inverse condemnation action. The omission of any provision for appropriation is extremely important and is also rather significant. * * * If the State of Oregon should pay the plaintiff $13,500.00, it is entitled to *152 something in return; and this the judgment makes no provision for."
In answer to this contention, it is sufficient to say that in a proceeding upon facts such as we have before us, it is not necessary that there be a conveyance to the state, nor that the judgment provide for appropriation by the state. It is true that the state is entitled to something in return for the payment it makes; but under the facts of this case, the state already has had that something. It has enjoyed the benefit of this taking of plaintiff's property by the construction of its highway in the manner it desired and deemed necessary. The contention of defendant is also fully answered by the decision of this court in Levene et ux. v. City of Salem, supra.
20. As authority for its position that the state is immune to this suit, no statute having been adopted by the legislature directly authorizing it, defendant invites our attention to art. IV, § 24, Const. of Oregon, which provides:
From what we have already said, it is clear that this constitutional provision has no application to the case now before us. This provision is simply a constitutional declaration of a well-recognized rule that the state can be sued in its own courts only with its consent. No one quarrels with that principle. But as we have before observed, the right guaranteed by art. 1, § 18, carries with it, of necessity, the consent of the state to be sued for its violation.
*153 Defendant invites our attention to the case of Federal Land Bank v. Schermerhorn, 155 Or 533, 64 P2d 1337. That was a suit to foreclose a mortgage. The state was made a party defendant because it had a lien upon the property which plaintiff sought to have established as inferior to its own lien. The attorney general filed a motion to quash service of summons and complaint on the state on the ground that it was immune to such suit, which motion was denied. The mortgage was foreclosed, and the decree adjudged that the lien of the state was inferior to the lien of plaintiff's mortgage. The state appealed. The issue was stated in this court as follows at page 534:
No statute having been adopted authorizing such a suit against the state, this court held that it was immune thereto. After quoting art. 1, § 10, and art. 1, § 18, of the constitution, Mr. Justice ROSSMAN, in writing the opinion of the court, said (p. 549):
The case of Platt v. Newberg cited by the court involved an action for damages against the city of Newberg for injuries sustained from a defective sidewalk. It was purely a tort action. The contention that the city was immune to tort liability was sustained. This court has consistently held to that principle in the absence of waiver of immunity by statutory or charter provision. But we are not here concerned with tort liability in the sense that that question has been considered in many prior decisions. In the Federal Land Bank case the only question at issue was as stated by the court and quoted supra. What we said there was not intended to, nor did it, imply that no remedy existed in the absence of statutory provision where there had been a taking of property for a public purpose within the meaning of art. 1, § 18. It is significant that, in the Federal Land Bank case, we neither cited nor in any way commented upon the decision in Morrison v. Clackamas County, supra. This is a recognition of the fact that the situations were entirely different.
21. After quoting from the Federal Land Bank case the portion above set forth, the trial judge, in his memorandum opinion respecting defendant's demurrer, spoke as follows:
We believe this interpretation to be correct.
Upon the claim that the state is immune to this suit, defendant also cites as authorities a large number of cases, in addition to those heretofore mentioned: Lucas v. Banfield et al., 180 Or 437, 177 P2d 244; State ex rel. v. Franklin, 163 Or 500, 98 P2d 724; Noonan v. City of Portland, 161 Or 213, 88 P2d 808; United Contracting Co. v. Duby, 134 Or 1, 292 P 309; Mohler et ux. v. Fish Commission, 129 Or 302, 276 P 691; Kurtz v. Southern Pacific Co., 80 Or 213, 155 P 367, 156 P 794; Keene v. Smith, 44 Or 525, 75 P 1065; Salem Mills Co. v. Lord, 42 Or 82, 69 P 1033, 70 P 832; Mosier v. Oregon Navigation Co., 39 Or. 256, 64 P 453, 21 Am &amp; Eng R R Cas 508; Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 US 349, 27 S Ct 526, 51 L ed 834.
For us to discuss these several decisions would unnecessarily prolong this opinion. Suffice it to say that each of them is readily distinguishable from the case at bar; in other words, those several holdings are not applicable to the facts present in the instant case.
22, 23. We note the further contention of defendant that the verdict of the jury was necessarily based upon mere surmise, speculation, conjecture, or suspicion and for that reason cannot stand. It is a well-established rule in this state that no recovery can be had where resort must be had to speculation or conjecture for the purpose of determining whether the damages resulted from the act of which complaint is made or from *156 some other cause. Becker v. Tillamook Bay Lumber Co., 194 Or 134, 240 P2d 237, 241; Allen et ux. v. McCormick, 193 Or 604, 612, 238 P2d 220; Spain v. Oregon Washington R. &amp; N. Co., 78 Or 355, 369, 153 P 470, 475, Ann Cas 1917E, 1104. However, there is substantial evidence in this case to the effect that the acts of defendant were the direct cause of the damages sustained by plaintiff. It was the exclusive province of the jury to weigh that evidence, and, by its verdict in favor of plaintiff, it decided the issue against defendant. There is no merit in this contention.
Other errors are assigned by defendant, including exceptions taken to the refusal of the trial court to give the jury certain requested instructions. We have carefully considered all the errors alleged, and, in particular, we have given attention to the requested instructions in the light of the issues and the instructions the court did give the jury. Some of the requested instructions were merely statements of abstract propositions of law, correct so far as they went, but wholly immaterial to a decision upon the facts in this case. Those that were material were fully covered by the court's own instructions. The jury was fully and correctly instructed upon all the material issues. We find no prejudicial error in the record.
The judgment is affirmed.