Title: Board of Trustees of Community College District No. 508 v. Coopers & Lybrand
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 94676
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: December 18, 2003

Docket No. 94676-Agenda 10-May 2003.
THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF COMMUNITY COLLEGE 
	
DISTRICT No. 508, County of Cook, Appellee, v. COOPERS &amp; 
	  							LYBRAND, Appellant.
Opinion filed December 18, 2003.
	
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:
	The Board of Trustees of Community College District No. 508
(Board) sued the accounting firms of Coopers &amp; Lybrand (Coopers) and
Arthur Andersen (Andersen). The Board sought more than $50 million in
compensatory damages, allegedly resulting from the failure of those firms
to discover and report to the Board inappropriate investments made by
Phillip R. Luhmann, the treasurer and chief financial officer of City
Colleges of Chicago (City Colleges). The Board sought damages in tort
from both Andersen and Coopers, jointly and severally, and also sought
damages resulting from breach of contract from both firms. Prior to trial,
Andersen settled with the Board and the Board filed an amended
complaint seeking relief against only Coopers. The jury found damages on
the tort claim in the amount of $23 million, reduced to $12.65 million
because of the Board's contributory fault. The jury also awarded damages
on the Board's contract claim. Both parties appealed.
	The appellate court affirmed. 333 Ill. App. 3d 225. We granted
Coopers' petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315), and the Board
seeks cross-relief (155 Ill. 2d R. 318). We granted the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants leave to file a brief as amicus curiae in
support of Coopers. 155 Ill. 2d R. 345. We now affirm in part and
reverse in part, and remand the cause to the trial court with directions.

I. BACKGROUND
	The Board is a body politic and corporate created under the Public
Community College Act (110 ILCS 805/1-1 et seq. (West 1994)). The
Board operates and manages the City Colleges of Chicago. City Colleges
is a public agency and its investment policies must comply with the Public
Funds Investment Act (Investment Act) (30 ILCS 235/1 et seq. (West
2002)). Accordingly, in 1988, 1990, and 1992, the Board adopted
resolutions authorizing its treasurer to invest City Colleges' funds only in
instruments permitted by the Investment Act. The resolutions provided that
the funds should be invested only in securities guaranteed as to payment
of principal and interest by the full faith and credit of the United States of
America. The securities were required to be of a type that would mature
or be redeemable before funds were needed, in the opinion of the
treasurer, to provide for the Board's expenditures. The investment policy
directed that securities should generally be purchased with the intent of
holding to maturity so as to minimize interest rate risk. Despite this clear
mandate, the treasurer, Luhmann, invested in securities not authorized by
the resolutions. Further, he repeatedly engaged in a practice known as
"pairing off" securities, buying a security and expecting to sell it for a profit
before he was required to pay for it.
	In February 1994, the Board chairman, Ron Gidwitz, learned that
Luhmann had violated the City Colleges' investment policy and declared
a "financial emergency." Luhmann was terminated, and the Board
instructed City Colleges to sell the securities that did not comport with the
investment policy as soon as prudently possible.
	In its original complaint, the Board alleged that during fiscal years
1991, 1992, and 1993, Luhmann invested in securities not authorized by
the Board's investment policy and in violation of the Investment Act.
Andersen audited City Colleges' financial statements for the fiscal years
1991 and 1992. Coopers audited the financial statements for fiscal year
1993. The complaint alleged that the failure of the auditors to identify and
report Luhmann's investment policy violations to the Board amounted to
a breach of each firm's duty to comply with generally accepted accounting
procedures. The Board claimed that if it had been informed of the
investment policy violations, it would have taken steps to respond and
avoided a dramatic decline in the value of the securities, claimed to be in
excess of $50 million and not discovered until 1994. Thus, the conduct of
both accounting firms was alleged to be the proximate cause of City
Colleges' financial losses, and the prayer for relief sought recovery against
both firms, jointly and severally.
	Although Luhmann's investment policy violations occurred throughout
the fiscal years in question, the investments resulting in the precipitous
losses were not made until both Andersen and Coopers had completed
their audits. Thus, the gravamen of the complaint was that if either auditing
firm had informed the Board that the securities in the City Colleges'
portfolio violated its investment policy, the Board would have ended those
investment practices. Hence, the later investments that ultimately resulted
in the claimed losses would not have occurred.
	Andersen and the Board settled prior to trial. The trial court found
the settlement to be in good faith. The Board filed an amended complaint,
deleting all references to Andersen and the 1991 and 1992 audits, but
identical in all other respects to the original complaint.
	Coopers asserted the affirmative defense of comparative fault.
However, prior to trial, the court ruled that pursuant to the "audit
interference" doctrine, only conduct by the Board affecting Coopers'
preparation of the audit could be considered. Thus, Coopers was not
permitted to argue that extensive evidence of the Board's oversight of
Luhmann's investment activities and its knowledge of possible violations
of investment policy supported a finding of contributory fault.
	At trial, Board chairman Ronald Gidwitz testified that Luhmann
furnished the Board with regular summaries of the current status of City
Colleges' investments at various times during the fiscal year. Five reports
were furnished during fiscal year 1993, showing the investments Luhmann
had made, including treasury, Government National Mortgage Association
(GNMA) Securities, and other agency mortgage-backed securities. The
reports reflected wide fluctuations in securities from quarter to quarter,
indicating that securities were not being held to maturity. No objection was
raised by the Board to this practice.
	Gidwitz admitted that he knew some mortgage-backed securities
were not being held to maturity. He testified that Luhmann told him he had
sold treasury bonds prior to maturity. He admitted making "mental notes"
of these matters, intending to discuss them with Luhmann, but he never
spoke with either Luhmann or Coopers about any investment
noncompliance.
	On October 9, 1993, shortly before the audit was concluded,
Luhmann told Coopers that there had been no significant change in the
investment portfolio since June 30, 1993. At another meeting, Luhmann
and City Colleges' acting controller, Michael Wagner, represented to the
auditors that there had been no significant events or transactions since the
fiscal year-end that should be considered for inclusion or disclosure in the
financial statements and that there were no significant new commitments
or contingencies since the end of the fiscal year. Despite these
representations, Luhmann testified at trial that City Colleges' portfolio
changed after June 1993, a fact confirmed by Coopers' expert witness,
Professor John McConnell.
	City Colleges also furnished Coopers with a representation letter
dated October 15, 1993, signed by Wagner, stating that City Colleges
was not aware of any "violations or possible violations of laws or
regulations whose effects should be considered for disclosure in the
financial statements or as a basis for recording a loss contingency" and that
"no matters or occurrences have come to our attention to the date of this
letter that would materially affect the financial statements and related
disclosure for the year ended June 30, 1993." Gary Seidelman, Coopers'
engagement partner, testified that Coopers delivered its audit report on
October 16, 1993, and that it would not have done so without the
representation letter in hand.
	The jury heard expert testimony regarding the financial losses caused
by Luhmann's investment practices. Dr. Lisette Cooper, the Board's
expert, attributed nearly $65 million in losses to Coopers' failure to
monitor compliance with the investment policy and to advise the Board of
the noncompliance. Coopers disputed that any losses resulted from its
failure to comply with applicable professional accounting standards.
However, Coopers' investment expert, Dr. John McConnell, concluded
that financial losses on securities purchased by Luhmann after June 30,
1993, but before Coopers finished its audit, amounted to approximately
$23 million.
	The jury returned a verdict for the Board, and both sides appealed,
asserting various grounds for relief. The appellate court affirmed judgment
on the verdict, rejecting Coopers' argument that the trial court erred in
applying the audit interference doctrine, and holding that Coopers was not
entitled to a setoff for the Andersen settlement. 333 Ill. App. 3d at 239,
241.
	The appellate court also rejected the Board's contentions that it was
entitled to a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the issue of
comparative fault and that the jury was improperly instructed on that issue.
333 Ill. App. 3d at 243. Those holdings are assigned as error in the
Board's application for cross-relief.

II. ANALYSIS
	Coopers asserts that it was improperly restricted in its ability to
present evidence of the Board's contributory negligence by the trial
court's application of the audit interference doctrine. Coopers argues that
the doctrine is inconsistent with principles of comparative fault. Whether
Illinois law limits the defense of contributory fault in cases against
accountants is a matter of first impression for this court. Since this issue
presents a question of law, our review is de novo. Woods v. Cole, 181 Ill. 2d 512, 516-17 (1998).
A. The Audit Interference Doctrine
	The audit interference doctrine was first adopted by a New York
court in National Surety Corp. v. Lybrand, 256 A.D. 226, 9 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1939). The court in National Surety held that the negligence of an
employer who hires an accountant to audit the business is a defense only
when it has contributed to the accountant's failure to perform his contract
and to report the truth. National Surety, 256 A.D. at 235, 9 N.Y.S.2d 
at 563. The audit interference doctrine as announced in National Surety
was applied in Illinois in Cereal Byproducts Co. v. Hall, 8 Ill. App. 2d
331 (1956). In Cereal Byproducts, the appellate court held that
contributory negligence could not be asserted by the auditor when there
was no evidence that the client interfered with the audit. Cereal
Byproducts, 8 Ill. App. 2d at 336.
	National Surety and Cereal Byproducts were decided long before
this court abolished the doctrine of contributory negligence as an absolute
bar to recovery and replaced it with comparative fault in Alvis v. Ribar,
85 Ill. 2d 1, 24-25 (1981). The comparative fault rule adopted in Alvis
was modified by statute in 1986 when the legislature provided for a
limitation on recovery in tort actions, as follows:
			"In all actions on account of bodily injury or death or physical
damage to property, based on negligence, or product liability
based on strict tort liability, the plaintiff shall be barred from
recovering damages if the trier of fact finds that the contributory
fault on the part of the plaintiff is more than 50% of the proximate
cause of the injury or damage for which recovery is sought. The
plaintiff shall not be barred from recovering damages if the trier
of fact finds that the contributory fault on the part of the plaintiff
is not more than 50% of the proximate cause of the injury or
damage for which recovery is sought, but any damages allowed
shall be diminished in the proportion to the amount of fault
attributable to the plaintiff." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par.
2-1116, codified at 735 ILCS 5/2-1116.(1)
	Since the 1986 version of statute, in effect at the time the Board's
cause of action accrued, was applicable only to "actions on account of
bodily injury or death or physical damage to property," it arguably was not
applicable to tort actions where recovery for economic loss is allowed,
including actions arising from negligent representations made by one who
is in the business of supplying information for the guidance of others in their
business transactions. See, e.g., Moorman Manufacturing Co. v.
National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69, 86 (1982) ("[t]ort theory is
appropriately suited for personal injury or property damage ***[;] [t]he
remedy for economic loss *** lies in contract"). Therefore, the "pure"
comparative fault rule announced in Alvis remained applicable to tort
actions for recovery of economic loss, such as accounting malpractice
actions. See, e.g., Congregation of the Passion, Holy Cross Province
v. Touche Ross &amp; Co., 159 Ill. 2d 137, 164 (1994) ("[t]ort law has
traditionally afforded an avenue of recovery for accountant malpractice").
	In 1992, the legislature added section 30.2 to the Illinois Public
Accounting Act (Accounting Act) (225 ILCS 450/30.2 (West 1994)) to
provide that the statutory comparative fault modifications apply to tort
actions against accountants. The 1992 version of section 30.2, in effect at
the time the Board's cause of action accrued, provided in relevant part:
			"Contributory Fault. Except in causes of action based on
actual fraud or intentional misrepresentation, the principles of
liability set forth in Sections 2-1116 and 2-1117 of the Code of
Civil Procedure shall apply to all claims for civil damages brought
against any person, partnership, corporation, or any other entity
certified, licensed, or practicing under this Act, or any of its
employees, partners, members, officers, or shareholders that are
alleged to result from acts, omissions, decisions, or other conduct
in connection with professional services." 225 ILCS 450/30.2
(West 1994), amended by Pub. Act 89-380, §5, eff. August
18, 1995.
	Coopers argues that the effect of section 30.2 is to treat economic
loss identically with personal injury or property damage. Thus, according
to Coopers, application of the audit interference doctrine would frustrate
the plain meaning of section 30.2 because not all contributory fault of a
plaintiff that is a proximate cause of an economic loss could be asserted
as a defense. Instead, only contributory fault that affected or interfered
with the audit could be considered. The appellate court rejected this
argument, holding that the Accounting Act and the Code do not clearly
express the intent to abrogate the audit interference doctrine, a part of
Illinois common law. 333 Ill. App. 3d at 240-41. We agree with the
appellate court that the trial court did not err in applying the doctrine.
	The audit interference doctrine clearly has a foundation in Illinois
common law. In Cereal Byproducts, the appellate court relied on
National Surety in rejecting a contributory negligence defense unrelated
to the negligence of accountants conducting an audit. Cereal Byproducts,
8 Ill. App. 2d at 336. Common law rights and remedies may, however,
be repealed by the legislature or modified by court decision. People v.
Gersch, 135 Ill. 2d 384, 395-97 (1990). It is well established that
legislation intended to abrogate the common law must be clearly and
plainly expressed. Maksimovic v. Tsogalis, 177 Ill. 2d 511, 518 (1997).
The Accounting Act contains no reference to the audit interference
doctrine, and we can discern no expression of legislative intent to abrogate
it. Further, while section 30.2 of the Accounting Act extends the effect of
the comparative fault statute to accounting malpractice actions, it does not
purport to define the types of conduct that can be considered as the
proximate cause of a claimed loss. Accordingly, we conclude that the
Accounting Act amendment has a neutral impact on the audit interference
doctrine.
	With regard to Coopers' argument that the audit interference doctrine
is inconsistent with principles of comparative fault, we note that courts in
other jurisdictions have reached conflicting conclusions regarding the
continued viability of the audit interference doctrine in the modern
comparative fault context. Ohio and Minnesota, modified comparative
fault jurisdictions, have rejected the audit interference doctrine as
inconsistent with the principles of comparative negligence. See Scioto
Memorial Hospital Ass'n v. Price Waterhouse, 74 Ohio St. 3d 474,
477, 659 N.E.2d 1268, 1272 (1996) (holding that the audit interference
doctrine was not needed after enactment of Ohio's comparative
negligence statute); Halla Nursery, Inc. v. Baumann-Furrie &amp; Co., 454 N.W.2d 905, 909 (Minn. 1990) (holding that the audit interference
doctrine is inconsistent with modified comparative negligence statute).
Conversely, other state courts have retained the audit interference
doctrine. See Stroud v. Arthur Andersen &amp; Co., 37 P.3d 783, 789
(Okla. 2001) (approving a trial court jury instruction allowing
consideration only of that negligence of the plaintiff interfering with the
accountant's rendition of professional services); Fullmer v. Wohlfeiler &amp;
Beck, 905 F.2d 1394, 1398 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that the plaintiff's
negligence in an accounting malpractice case is only a defense when the
plaintiff's conduct contributes to the accountant's failure to perform the
work or to furnish accurate accounting information); Steiner Corp. v.
Johnson &amp; Higgins of California, 135 F.3d 684, 689 (10th Cir. 1998)
(holding that the accountant should not be absolved of the duty undertaken
by him on his audit unless the plaintiff's negligence contributed to the
auditor's misstatement in his reports); Collins v. Esserman &amp; Pelter, 256 A.D.2d 754, 757, 681 N.Y.S.2d 399, 402 (1998) (holding that the
plaintiff's management negligence did not establish that the plaintiff's
conduct substantially impeded defendants' ability to complete the audit).
	We conclude that the holdings in Stroud, Fullmer, Steiner and
Collins are consonant with the general tort principles applicable to actions
against service providers and, in the accounting malpractice context,
consistent with the Restatement (Third) of Torts. As stated in the
Restatement (Third) of Torts:
			"[I]n a case involving negligent rendition of a service, *** a
factfinder does not consider any plaintiff's conduct that created
the condition the service was employed to remedy." Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability §7, Comment m, at
70 (2000).
	The partial concurrence and partial dissent argues that Illinois courts
do not follow the interpretation of the Restatement comment we have
made here. Yet, in Owens v. Stokoe, 115 Ill. 2d 177 (1986), a dental
malpractice case, this court clearly applied this reasoning. The trial court
allowed the jury to consider plaintiff's contributory fault in making dental
surgery necessary. This conduct consisted of failure to secure a second
opinion, poor dental hygiene, and the refusal to allow the dentist to take
X rays of his teeth. In reversing the judgement for defendant, we held:
		"In order to reduce the award of damages the negligence of the
plaintiff must have been a proximate cause of the injuries. Here,
paraesthesia was proximately caused by damage to the left
inferior alveolar nerve during surgery. Performance of the surgery
caused the injury. Obviously it was not the failure of the plaintiff
to obtain a second opinion, or his prior poor oral hygiene, or his
refusal, if true, to permit X rays to be taken of his teeth that
damaged the nerve. It is undisputed that the paraesthesia resulted
from the surgery, and it cannot be said that conduct of the
plaintiff prevented Stokoe from properly performing the surgery."
Owens, 115 Ill. 2d  at 183-84.
	Just as the patient's poor dental hygiene could not be asserted as a
defense to the negligent infliction of a surgical injury, a client's poor
business practices cannot be asserted as a defense to the auditor's
negligent failure to discover and report the client's noncompliance with
investment policy and legal requirements.
	This is not to say, however, that comparative fault may not be
asserted in the service provider context. Indeed, the jury found the Board
to be 45% responsible for the damages resulting from Coopers' failure to
perform the audit properly because of conduct occurring after the
expiration of the audit period.
	We determine that the application of the audit interference doctrine
in the accounting malpractice context is in accord with recognized
principles of comparative fault. Accordingly, a client's poor business
practices cannot be asserted as a defense to the auditor's negligent failure
to discover and report the client's noncompliance with investment policy
and legal requirements. We decline to follow the holdings of the Ohio and
Minnesota courts, and other courts reaching similar results, because we
conclude that those holdings are not compatible with the application of
general tort principles.
	The partial concurrence and partial dissent asserts that our analysis
does not represent the majority position nationwide. We do not set out the
holdings of all jurisdictions applying our reasoning in service provider
cases because an arithmetical comparison lends no force to our holding.
Nevertheless, we note that the Supreme Court of Nebraska has expressly
applied the National Surety holding in an accountant malpractice action.
Lincoln Grain, Inc. v. Coopers &amp; Lybrand, 216 Neb. 433, 441-42,
345 N.W.2d 300, 307 (1984). Further, the New Jersey Supreme Court
has recently stated that " 'when the duty of the professional encompasses
the protection of the client or patient from self-inflicted harm, the infliction
of that harm is not to be regarded as contributory negligence on the part
of the client.' " Aden v. Fortsh, 169 N.J. 64, 75, 776 A.2d 792, 798-99
(2001), quoting Conklin v. Hannoch Weisman, 145 N.J. 395, 412, 678 A.2d 1060, 1068 (1996). We agree with the New Jersey court because
its holding is entirely consistent with our holding in Owens. Thus,
accountants are held to the same standard as surgeons or any other
professional service providers.
	Coopers and its amicus further argue that the application of the audit
interference doctrine does not serve public policy because relieving the
client from responsibility for negligence not directly affecting the audit itself
minimizes the client's duty of care and encourages clients to take
unjustified risks despite their superior knowledge of those risks. They also
contend that if the fact finder were allowed to allocate responsibility for all
negligent conduct contributing to the ultimate loss, negligent behavior
would be deterred, and responsible and forthright cooperation with
auditors would be rewarded, thus providing auditors with incentives to
follow proper audit procedures. These arguments ignore, however, other
incentives more immediate and powerful to management than audits, such
as reputation, income, and other similar benefits resulting from competent
performance. There are also deterrents such as internal inquiry,
shareholder disapproval, civil lawsuits, state and federal regulations, and
investigations by independent agencies. Moreover, the audit interference
doctrine gives the auditor incentive to exercise more skepticism of the
client's statements, resulting in greater care by the client. We are not
persuaded that public policy considerations weigh against the invocation
in accounting malpractice actions of the general rule pertaining to
apportionment of fault. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the
appellate court correctly affirmed the trial court's application of the audit
interference doctrine.

B. The Board's Application for Cross-Relief
i. Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict
	The Board first contends that, as a matter of law, it cannot be found
comparatively negligent based on the evidence submitted to the jury. A
reviewing court must follow established standards when determining
whether a judgment notwithstanding the verdict is proper. Maple v.
Gustafson, 151 Ill. 2d 445, 453 (1992). A judgment notwithstanding the
verdict is properly entered only if all the evidence, when viewed in its
aspect most favorable to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors the
movant that no contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever stand.
Pedrick v. Peoria &amp; Eastern R.R. Co., 37 Ill. 2d 494, 510 (1967). In
ruling on a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a court does
not weigh the evidence, nor is it concerned with the credibility of the
witnesses; rather, it may only consider the evidence and any inferences
therefrom, in the light most favorable to the party resisting the motion.
Mizowek v. De Franco, 64 Ill. 2d 303, 309-10 (1976).
	The Board argues that, as a matter of law, for it to have "interfered"
with Coopers' audit, it must have in some way obstructed the
performance of the audit by actively misleading the auditor, knowingly
providing false information, committing fraud, or forging instruments. No
authority limiting interference to those types of conduct is cited. In
National Surety, the court set out hypothetical examples of audit
interference, as follows:
		"Thus, by way of illustration, if it were found that the members of
the firm of Halle &amp; Stieglitz had been negligent in connection with
the transfer of funds which occurred at about the time of each
audit and that such negligence contributed to the defendants'
false reports, it would be a defense to the action, for it could then
be said that the defendants' failure to perform their contracts was
attributable, in part, at least, to the negligent conduct of the firm."
National Surety, 256 A.D. at 236, 9 N.Y.S.2d  at 563.
	Here, the evidence established that on October 15, 1993, the Board
represented to Coopers, in a letter signed by the acting controller, Michael
Wagner, that there had been no "violations or possible violations of laws
or regulations whose effects should be considered for disclosure in the
financial statements or as a basis for recording a loss contingency" and that
"no matters or occurrences have come to our attention up to the date of
this letter that would materially affect the financial statements and related
disclosure for the year ended June 30, 1993, or although not affecting
such financial statements or disclosure, have caused or are likely to cause
any material change, adverse or otherwise, in the financial position or
results of operations of the City Colleges." The Board dismisses the
representation letter as mere boilerplate, drafted by the auditor in terms
most favorable to it. The letter, however, basically memorializes the verbal
representations made by Luhmann and Wagner in the meeting with
Coopers' auditors on October 9, 1993. Moreover, Gary Seidleman,
Coopers' engagement partner, testified that he delivered the audit report
on October 16, 1993 only because Coopers had received a signed
representation letter. Similar representations were made verbally by
Wagner and Luhmann in a meeting with Coopers' auditors on October 9,
1993. This is the type of contributory fault described in National Surety.
Thus, as a matter of law, we conclude that the Board could properly be
found comparatively negligent based on the evidence submitted to the jury.
	 The question of whether the false representations contributed to
Coopers' failure to identify and disclose violations of the Board's
investment policies is a factual question for the jury to decide. Blue v. St.
Clair Country Club, 7 Ill. 2d 359, 366 (1955). The evidence was
sufficient for the jury to conclude that Coopers relied on the truth of the
representations as a condition precedent to releasing its audit report.
Similarly, the jury could have concluded from the testimony regarding
Luhmann's investments after June 30, 1993 that the representations were
false and knowingly made. Even though the verbal and written
misrepresentations were not made until after the field audit work was
completed, the "financial emergency" described by Board chairman
Gidwitz was not discovered until February of 1994, more than three
months after the release of the audit report. The mischaracterization by the
Board as to its conduct and investment activity after June 30, 1993, could
have been, as Coopers argued, so misleading as to interfere with the audit.
Thus, the jury could have rationally concluded that the losses would have
been less extensive if discovered earlier.
	Based on our review of the record, we conclude that there was
sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude reasonably that the false
representations contributed to Coopers' failure to identify and disclose
violations of the Board's investment policies. Accordingly, the trial court
did not err in refusing to grant the Board a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict.

ii. Jury Instruction
	The Board also contends that the trial court improperly instructed the
jury. Supreme Court Rule 239(a) provides that "[w]henever IPI does not
contain an instruction on a subject on which the court determines that the
jury should be instructed, the instruction given in that subject should be
simple, brief, impartial, and free from argument." 177 Ill. 2d R. 239(a).
	The trial court, over the Board's objection, instructed the jury as
follows:
		"With respect to the Plaintiff's claim for professional negligence,
it was the duty of the Plaintiff before and at the time of the
occurrence to use ordinary care for the safety of its property. A
plaintiff is contributorily negligent, if, one, it fails to use ordinary
care for the safety of its property; two, its failure to use such
ordinary care is a proximate cause of the alleged injury; and,
three, affected Defendant's preparation of the audit."
	The appellate court found that the given instruction accurately states
the law in Illinois and is neither misleading nor argumentative, although the
court observed that it might have been worded differently. 333 Ill. App.
3d at 242. The Board argues that the given instruction distorted the audit
interference doctrine and prejudicially allowed the jury to consider
evidence of City Colleges' conduct unrelated to the audit.
	The first element of the given instruction sets out the duty of care. The
Board argues that the "property" suggested by the instruction is the
investment portfolio, not the audit. According to the Board, this
contradicts the audit interference doctrine because the client's care
respecting the conduct of its business may only be considered if it
contributes to the failure of the accountants to perform the audit. National
Surety, 256 A.D. at 236, 9 N.Y.S.2d  at 563. The second element of the
instruction requires that the failure of plaintiff to exercise ordinary care for
the safety of its property must be a proximate cause of the injury. The
Board claims that the appellate court correctly held that the "injury" is the
negligent performance of the audit. Yet, according to the Board, the
instruction allowed the jury, by implication, to consider the Board's
alleged lack of care for the safety of its portfolio (the treasurer's violations
of the investment policy) as a proximate cause of the failed audit (the
failure to detect and report the investment policy violations). The Board
contends that this is an internal inconsistency vitiating the audit interference
doctrine.
	The Board criticizes the language in the third element because the
verb "affected" does not convey the type of hindrance or restraint
connoted by such words as "prevented," "interfered" or "contributed."
The verb "affect" is defined as "to produce a material influence upon or
alteration in." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 35 (1986).
Although the Board criticizes the use of "affect" as a "toothless verb," we
believe it is broad enough and forceful enough to convey the concept
embodied in the audit interference doctrine.
	The Board contends that the trial court erred in refusing to give its
tendered instruction that properly described the application of the audit
interference doctrine. The Board's tendered instruction provided, in
pertinent part:
		"You can find that the Plaintiff was contributorily negligent only
if Plaintiff's negligence prevented or interfered with the proper
performance of Defendants' audits."
	We are unpersuaded by the Board's argument. Both instructions
comply with the requirement of Supreme Court Rule 239(a). Although, as
the appellate court noted, "the instruction might have been worded
differently in part" the given instruction nevertheless accurately stated the
law. 333 Ill. App. 3d at 242. The instruction sufficiently informed the jury
that, in order to constitute contributory negligence, plaintiff's conduct must
affect the audit. We hold, therefore, that the jury was properly instructed
on the issue of contributory negligence.
C. Setoff
	The appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling that Coopers was
not entitled to a setoff against the judgment in the amount of the Board's
settlement with Andersen, reasoning that the failed audits of each
defendant inflicted separate injury on City Colleges. 333 Ill. App. 3d at
238-39. The question of whether the trial court should have ordered a
setoff depends upon interpretation of the Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act
(Contribution Act) (740 ILCS 100/0.01 et seq. (West 1994)), and is
therefore subject to de novo review. Robidoux v. Oliphant, 201 Ill. 2d 324, 332 (2002).
	The legislature has provided a comprehensive scheme for the
allocation of responsibility for a plaintiff's damages among multiple alleged
tortfeasors. The Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act (740 ILCS 100/0.01
et seq. (West 1994)) contains three provisions applicable to this case: (1)
there is a right to contribution among two or more persons subject to
liability in tort arising out of the same injury, even though judgment has not
been entered against any or all of them (740 ILCS 100/2(a) (West
1994)); (2) the claim against the non-settling tortfeasors is reduced to the
greater either of the amount stated in the releasing instrument or the actual
consideration paid (740 ILCS 100/2(c) (West 1994)); and (3) a
tortfeasor who settles in good faith is discharged from all liability for
contribution to any other tortfeasor (740 ILCS 100/2(d) (West 1994)).
	We must first determine whether the harm inflicted by the failed audits
arose out of the same injury or indivisible harm. In Burke v. 12
Rothschild's Liquor Mart, Inc., 148 Ill. 2d 429, 438-39 (1992), we
affirmed the trial court's finding that two separate defendants were jointly
liable for an indivisible harm to the plaintiff. In Burke, the plaintiff suffered
from paraplegia as a result of two discrete injuries inflicted by the
defendants acting separately. We applied the rule in section 433A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, providing as follows:
			"(1) Damages for harm are to be apportioned among two or
more causes where
				(a) there are distinct harms, or
				(b) there is a reasonable basis for determining the
contribution of each cause to a single harm.
			(2) Damages for any other harm cannot be apportioned
among two or more causes." Restatement (Second) of Torts
§433A (1965).
	As the comment to subsection (2) explains:
			"Certain kinds of harm, by their very nature, are normally
incapable of any logical, reasonable, or practical division. *** By
far the greater number of personal injuries, and of harms to
tangible property, are *** single and indivisible. Where two or
more causes combine to produce such a single result, incapable
of division on any logical or reasonable basis, and each is a
substantial factor in bringing about the harm, the courts have
refused to make an arbitrary apportionment for its own sake, and
each of the causes is charged with responsibility for the entire
harm." Restatement (Second) of Torts §433A, Comment i, at
439-40 (1965).
	Applying this concept to the two defendants in Burke, we held that
in the absence of clear medical evidence establishing an exclusive cause
for the plaintiff's paraplegia, it could have been caused by either
defendant's conduct. Therefore, it was an indivisible harm, and the
defendants were jointly and severally liable. Burke, 148 Ill. 2d  at 439.
	The same reasoning applies with equal force in this case. The
Board's complaint alleged that the investments resulting in the precipitous
losses were not made until both Andersen and Coopers had completed
their audits. Thus, if either auditing firm had informed the Board that the
securities in the City Colleges' portfolio violated its investment policy, the
Board could have ended those investment practices and the later
investments that ultimately resulted in the claimed losses would not have
occurred. Since any of the audits should have discovered and reported the
continuing investment policy violations, it cannot be said that any one of
the three audit failures was the sole cause of that harm. It is therefore
irrelevant that the failed audits occurred at different times.
	Moreover, the Board alleged in its original complaint that Andersen
and Coopers were jointly and severally liable for its economic losses.
Andersen settled in good faith, thereby extinguishing Coopers' right to
contribution. Consequently, if Coopers were not allowed a setoff in the
amount of the Andersen settlement, the statutory scheme would be
frustrated because Coopers could get neither contribution nor credit for
Andersen's payment in return for a discharge from liability on the
indivisible economic loss resulting from all of the failed audits.
	 The Board argues that the original complaint does not control
because it was amended after the settlement and before trial to refer only
to Coopers. We note, however, that the Andersen settlement agreement
contains the following language:
		"The settlement amount set forth herein, as between City
Colleges and Arthur Andersen, is not intended as full
compensation to City Colleges for all injuries and damages it
claims in the Lawsuit against all parties, but is a negotiated
settlement only for those injuries and damages that City Colleges
has claimed as against Arthur Andersen."
We conclude that the damages claimed against Andersen were exactly the
same as, and indivisible from, those claimed against Cooper. The evidence
adduced at trial established the entire amount of the claimed indivisible loss
alleged in the amended complaint. Therefore, we hold that the appellate
court erred when it concluded that the harm could be divided into
portions, separately attributable to each defendant. 333 Ill. App. 3d at
238. We further hold that Coopers is entitled to a setoff in the full amount
of the Andersen settlement and we direct the trial court to apply the setoff
on remand.

III. CONCLUSION
	For the reasons stated, we hold that the trial court correctly applied
the audit interference doctrine and adequately instructed the jury. The
issue of the Board's contributory negligence was properly submitted to the
jury since credible evidence of conduct contributing to or affecting the
failed Coopers audit was adduced. The appellate court is therefore
affirmed as to those issues. We reverse the appellate court, however, on
the issue of setoff and remand the cause to the trial court with directions
to credit Coopers with the full amount of the Andersen settlement against
the judgment.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part;
cause remanded with directions.
	I concur with the majority's finding that defendant is entitled to a
setoff against the judgment in the amount of plaintiff's settlement with
Arthur Andersen. I write separately because I conclude that the audit
interference doctrine is inconsistent with Illinois' system of comparative
fault. In addition, there is no reasonable basis on which to justify limiting
the comparative negligence defense for accountants but not for other
service providers. I would find admissible the defendant's offered
evidence of plaintiff's negligent conduct that was a proximate cause of the
alleged injury. Thus, I dissent from the majority's affirmance of the
application of the doctrine in this case.
	The majority concludes that section 30.2 of the Accounting Act does
not abrogate the common law audit interference doctrine. The majority
correctly notes that legislation abrogates the common law only if legislative
intent to do so is plainly expressed. Maksimovic v. Tsogalis, 177 Ill. 2d 511, 518 (1997). Whether or not legislative abrogation was effectuated
in this case, the courts also have the power to alter or replace judicially
created doctrines under rare appropriate circumstances. See Alvis v.
Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 21 (1981). We have explained: "When *** the
legislature has, for whatever reason, failed to act to remedy a gap in the
common law that results in injustice, it is the imperative duty of the court
to repair that injustice and reform the law to be responsive to the demands
of society." Alvis, 85 Ill. 2d  at 23-24. In Alvis, we acted on this duty by
abrogating the common law doctrine of contributory negligence and
replacing it with a pure form of comparative negligence. Alvis, 85 Ill. 2d 
at 25, 28. I would judicially abrogate the audit interference doctrine in the
present case because I conclude that our comparative fault system is
inconsistent with the doctrine and because its continued application causes
an unjust allocation of fault in accountant malpractice cases.
	The General Assembly has explained the purpose of our current
modified comparative fault system, first enacted in 1986: "The purpose of
this Section is to allocate the responsibility of bearing or paying damages
*** according to the proportionate fault of the persons who proximately
caused the damage." 735 ILCS 5/2-1116(a) (West 2002). The alleged
damage sought in this case was the economic loss suffered as a result of
"a series of illegal, inappropriate, and highly risky investments" made by
Luhmann, which violated plaintiff's investment policy. Pursuant to a
pretrial ruling, defendant was barred from offering evidence of plaintiff's
oversight of Luhmann's investment choices and its knowledge of his
violations of the investment policy because of the audit interference
doctrine.
	As explained by the majority, under the doctrine the defendant can
only offer evidence that the plaintiff's negligent conduct was a proximate
cause of the alleged injury if the plaintiff impeded the defendant's provision
of services. Slip op. at 9. The defendant's comparative negligence
affirmative defense is limited. This case serves as a perfect example of
how the continued application of the audit interference doctrine prevents
a complete evaluation of the relative proportion of fault of all parties for
the alleged injury. Plaintiff requested compensation for economic loss
while defendant was barred by the doctrine from showing the extent that
plaintiff's negligence proximately caused this economic loss. Applying the
doctrine is inconsistent with our comparative fault system because it
frustrates the very purpose comparative fault is intended to serve. See
Standard Chartered PLC v. Price Waterhouse, 190 Ariz. 6, 41, 945 P.2d 317, 352 (App. 1996) ("We find, however, that the rationale of
National Surety [establishing the doctrine] is incompatible with Arizona
law," because of its comparative fault system); Resolution Trust Corp.
v. Deloitte &amp; Touche, 818 F. Supp. 1406, 1408 (D. Colo. 1993)
(applying Colorado law) (continued application of the doctrine "would
effectively abrogate this clear statement by Colorado's legislature as to
how liability should be apportioned," when it adopted a comparative fault
system).
	The majority does not recognize that the audit interference doctrine
is inconsistent with comparative negligence. Instead, the majority asserts
that continued application of the audit interference doctrine is consistent
with "general tort principles" as applied in the context of service providers,
which bar allocation of fault to the plaintiff unless the plaintiff's negligence
impeded the defendant's provision of services. The majority provides
nothing more than a nonbinding comment from the Restatement of Torts
and a misinterpretation of a single dental malpractice case for its broad
assertion that the comparative fault defense is restricted not only for
accountants under the audit interference doctrine but also for all other
service providers. Slip op. at 8-9.
	Contrary to the majority's assertion, however, Illinois courts
consistently allow the typical, unrestricted comparative fault defense in
nonaccountant malpractice cases. In a medical malpractice case, the court
will give a comparative negligence instruction if the plaintiff patient's
negligence was prior to or was contemporaneous with the defendant
physician's negligence, for example by delaying the pursuit of treatment
despite symptoms. Malanowski v. Jabamoni, 332 Ill. App. 3d 8, 15
(2002). We explained in a dental malpractice case: "In order to reduce the
award of damages the negligence of the plaintiff must have been a
proximate cause of the injuries." Owens v. Stokoe, 115 Ill. 2d 177, 183
(1986). More recently we stated, "a patient's failure to exercise ordinary
care *** does not absolve the physician's negligence; it only absolves the
physician from damages caused by the patient's failure to exercise
ordinary care." McDonnell v. McPartlin, 192 Ill. 2d 505, 532 (2000);
see also Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 105.08 (2000). Illinois
case law similarly provides that comparative negligence can be a defense
in legal malpractice cases. See Nika v. Danz, 199 Ill. App. 3d 296, 311-12 (1990).
	The majority misconstrues Owens in an attempt to conjure a de facto
audit interference doctrine in the context of all service providers. In
Owens, plaintiff brought a dental malpractice claim against defendant
because, following oral surgery conducted by defendant, Owens suffered
from paraesthesia, a lack of sensation in the lower left portion of his face.
Owens, 115 Ill. 2d  at 180-81. Specifically, the paraesthesia was caused
by damage to the left inferior alveolar nerve that occurred during surgery.
Owens, 115 Ill. 2d  at 183. The jury reduced the award of $40,000 by
75% because of plaintiff's comparative fault; the appellate court reinstated
the full award, finding insufficient evidence of comparative negligence.
Owens, 115 Ill. 2d  at 179.
	The majority quotes the very section of the opinion that best
illustrates my position. Slip op. at 9. We affirmed the appellate court,
explaining:
		"In order to reduce the award of damages the negligence of
the plaintiff must have been a proximate cause of the
injuries. Here, paraesthesia was proximately caused by
damage to the left inferior alveolar nerve during surgery.
Performance of the surgery caused the injury. Obviously it was
not the failure of the plaintiff to obtain a second opinion, or his
prior poor oral hygiene, or his refusal, if true, to permit X rays to
be taken of his teeth that damaged the nerve. It is undisputed
that the paraesthesia resulted from the surgery, and it cannot be
said that conduct of the plaintiff prevented Stokoe from properly
performing the surgery." (Emphases added.) Owens, 115 Ill. 2d 
at 183-84.
Perhaps the majority interpreted the last sentence of this quote out of
context as showing that there is a sort of audit interference doctrine
applicable in dental malpractice cases. However, the first sentence of this
quote did not say, "In order to reduce the award of damages the
negligence of plaintiff must have impeded defendant's provision of
services." Instead, we were applying general comparative negligence
principles. As we explained in this quote, the sole proximate cause of
Owens's paraesthesia was damage to the nerve during surgery. Because
none of plaintiff's negligent conduct proximately caused the damage to the
nerve, evidence about this conduct should not have been considered by
the jury. Owens teaches us that in analyzing malpractice cases, courts must
carefully identify the injury for which the plaintiff seeks recovery and must
admit evidence only about negligent conduct that is a proximate cause of
that injury, whether by plaintiff or defendant.
	Thus, in nonaccountant malpractice cases, Illinois courts apply
comparative negligence principles, admitting evidence of negligent conduct
by plaintiff or defendant that proximately caused the alleged injury. The
comparative negligence affirmative defense is not limited to evidence that
plaintiff's negligent conduct impeded defendant's provision of services.
Given this fact, the audit interference doctrine should survive only if there
is a reasonable basis on which to distinguish accountants from other types
of service providers.
	The majority concludes that the application of the doctrine in
accountant malpractice cases is consistent with the analysis applied in
other types of malpractice cases (slip op. at 8), so it does not attempt to
distinguish accountants from other types of service providers. Similarly,
defendant's brief suggests reasons for holding accountants accountable
independent from a comparison to malpractice by other service providers.
I can think of nothing about the nature of the work done by an accountant
that merits greater restrictions on his or her potential affirmative defense.
In fact, the work of an accountant, though surely important, influences
property alone. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to reasonably argue
that purely financial loss is more egregious than the loss of life or liberty
that can accompany medical or legal malpractice cases so that restricting
only an accountant's affirmative defense is appropriate.
	In the present case, the injury for which plaintiff seeks recovery is,
according to the complaint, the economic loss suffered as a result of "a
series of illegal, inappropriate, and highly risky investments" made by
Luhmann, which violated plaintiff's investment policy. The complaint
further alleges that defendant proximately caused these damages through
the auditors' failure to report these violations by Luhmann. In effect,
plaintiff alleges that plaintiff could have avoided suffering economic loss if
defendant had not failed to report Luhmann's investment violations.
Defendant sought to admit evidence of plaintiff's comparative negligence,
specifically about plaintiff's knowledge of Luhmann's activities and its
failure to supervise those activities. Defendant alleges that plaintiff could
have avoided suffering that economic loss if plaintiff had properly
supervised or acted upon its knowledge of Luhmann's investment
violations.
	It is hard to imagine how plaintiff could reasonably argue that
defendant's failure to detect and report the violations was a proximate
cause of the claimed injury but that plaintiff's failure to supervise and act
upon its knowledge of the violations was not a proximate cause because
both involve an identical type of omission. If comparative negligence
principles applied, as they do in nonaccountant malpractice cases,
defendant's evidence would have been admitted. Nonetheless, this
negligent conduct by plaintiff did not impede defendant's audit, so it is not
the narrow type of evidence of comparative fault that the audit interference
doctrine allows to be admitted. The present case clearly illustrates the
conflict between the audit interference doctrine and principles of
comparative fault. Thus, I disagree with the majority's opposite
conclusion. Slip op. at 9.
	The majority mischaracterizes the evidence defendant sought to
admit. The majority attempts to analogize this case to Owens: "Just as the
patient's poor dental hygiene could not be asserted as a defense to the
negligent infliction of a surgical injury, a client's poor business practices
cannot be asserted as a defense to the auditor's negligent failure to
discover and report the client's noncompliance with investment policy and
legal requirements." Slip op. at 9. Defendant did not simply try to admit
evidence of any and all examples of "poor business practices." Defendant
offered evidence of a proximate cause of the alleged injury, in accord with
comparative fault principles. In contrast, the evidence the defendant
offered in Owens concerned conduct that was not a proximate cause of
the injury, so we concluded it should not have been considered by the
jury.
	In sum, evidence concerning a plaintiff's negligence that is a
proximate cause of the alleged injury generally is admissible under Illinois'
system of comparative fault, which is applied in nonaccountant malpractice
cases. I can think of no reason why an accountant's comparative
negligence affirmative defense should be more restricted than that of other
service providers. Thus, I would abrogate the audit interference doctrine
because it can bar the admission of evidence that the plaintiff's negligence
was a proximate cause of the alleged injury, as it did in the present case.
	The majority notes that jurisdictions are split about the viability of the
audit interference doctrine in light of subsequent adoption of comparative
fault schemes, accurately noting that Ohio and Minnesota have rejected
the doctrine because of comparative fault rules. Slip op. at 7-8; Scioto
Memorial Hospital Ass'n v. Price Waterhouse, 74 Ohio St. 3d 474,
477, 659 N.E.2d 1268, 1272 (1996); Halla Nursery, Inc. v. Baumann-Furrie &amp; Co., 454 N.W.2d 905, 909 (Minn. 1990). The majority fails to
note, however, that five additional states have explicitly rejected the
doctrine for this reason: Michigan (Capital Mortgage Corp. v. Coopers
&amp; Lybrand, 142 Mich. App. 531, 537, 369 N.W.2d 922, 925 (1985)),
Arkansas (Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Deloitte &amp; Touche, 834 F. Supp. 1129, 1146 (E.D. Ark. 1992) (applying Arkansas law)),
Arizona (Standard Chartered, 190 Ariz. at 42, 945 P.2d at 353),
Colorado (Resolution Trust, 818 F. Supp.  at 1408 (applying Colorado
law)), and Florida (Devco Premium Finance Co. v. North River
Insurance Co., 450 So. 2d 1216, 1220 (Fla. App. 1984). In addition, six
other jurisdictions have implicitly rejected the doctrine. Wegad v. Howard
Street Jewelers, Inc., 326 Md. 409, 417, 605 A.2d 123, 128 (1992);
American Trust &amp; Savings Bank v. United States Fidelity &amp;
Guaranty Co., 439 N.W.2d 188, 189-90 (Iowa 1989); Maduff
Mortgage Corp. v. Deloitte Haskins &amp; Sells, 98 Or. App. 497, 503,
779 P.2d 1083, 1087 (1989); H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J.
324, 350-51, 461 A.2d 138, 152 (1983); see also ESCA Corp. v.
KPMG Peat Marwick, 135 Wash. 2d 820, 828-30, 959 P.2d 651,
655-56 (1998); Comeau v. Rupp, 810 F. Supp. 1172, 1182 n.6 (D.
Kan. 1992). Thus, the majority's analysis, relying on four cases from three
jurisdictions, does not represent the majority position nationwide. Scioto
Memorial Hospital Ass'n, 74 Ohio St. 3d at 477, 659 N.E.2d  at 1272.
	In addition, the cases cited by the majority are based on a mistaken
principle. The Fullmer case, on which the majority heavily relies, explains
its continued application of the doctrine by stating: "We agree *** that
accountants are not to be rendered immune from the consequences of
their own negligence merely because those who employ them may have
conducted their own business negligently." (Emphasis added.) Fullmer v.
Wohlfeiler &amp; Beck, 905 F.2d 1394, 1398 (10th Cir. 1990). However,
rejection of the doctrine and application of comparative negligence would
not render accountants immune. Instead, the damages paid by the
accountant would not include the client's portion of fault in proximately
causing the total economic loss. See McDonnell, 192 Ill. 2d  at 532.
	Finally, I disagree with the majority's assertion that it is a better
policy to continue to apply the audit interference doctrine. Slip op. at 9.
As explained by the majority, the doctrine was established by the
National Surety case to soften the harshness of contributory negligence
rules, which completely barred recovery by the client if the client was at
all negligent. Slip op. at 5; see also Scioto Memorial Hospital Ass'n, 74
Ohio St. 3d at 476, 659 N.E.2d  at 1272. Such concern is unnecessary
under a comparative fault scheme because slight negligence by the client
will not act as a complete bar to recovery. We have abolished other
doctrines created in response to harsh consequences of the contributory
negligence rule in the wake of the adoption of our comparative fault
system. See, e.g., Alvis, 85 Ill. 2d  at 28 (eliminating the "last clear
chance" doctrine).
	By applying comparative negligence principles, neither the accountant
nor the client is absolved of fault because of the other's negligence, so
both parties have an incentive to use due care. Capital Mortgage, 142
Mich. App. at 537, 369 N.W.2d  at 925. While the majority cites "other
incentives" such as income and civil lawsuits as deterrents of a client's
negligent behavior (slip op. at 9), these incentives are diminished by
potentially allowing a client to recover damages for the entire economic
loss caused at least in part by its own negligence. The client should not be
able to recover damages it could have avoided itself through acting with
reasonable care. Devco Premium Finance, 450 So. 2d  at 1220. Even
if other incentives exist, considerations of fairness require damages to be
allocated according to the parties' degree of fault in causing the alleged
injury. 735 ILCS 5/2-1116(a) (West 2002). No argument by the majority
has persuaded me that this statement by the legislature of the purpose of
the comparative fault system is inappropriate in accountant malpractice
cases.
	For the reasons herein, I dissent from the majority's conclusion that
the audit interference doctrine is still in force in Illinois. I would abrogate
the audit interference doctrine, reverse the trial court's rulings about the
doctrine and the damages setoff, and remand the cause for a new trial.
	JUSTICE THOMAS joins in this partial concurrence and partial
dissent.
	 
1.  1We note that Public Act 897, §15, eff. March 9, 1995, rewrote section 21116 of
	the Code. However, Public Act 897 was subsequently held unconstitutional in its entirety in Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367 (1997). At this time there is a bill pending to repeal Public Act 897 and to reenact the prior statutory provisions in
	conformance with this court's decision in Best. See 93d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Bill 3533, 2003 Sess.