Title: New Jersey v. Wint
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: December 12, 2018

New Jersey v. Wint Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary Law enforcement officers arrested defendant Laurie Wint on a New Jersey murder charge and brought him to the Camden County Prosecutor’s Office for questioning. Wint invoked his right to counsel after receiving Miranda warnings, and the interrogation ceased. Immediately afterwards, two detectives from Pennsylvania investigating an unrelated murder in Bucks County entered the interrogation room to question Wint. After receiving his rights for the second time, Wint again requested the presence of counsel, ending the interrogation. Wint remained in continuous pre-indictment custody in Camden County when, six months later, he was transported to Bucks County. There, Pennsylvania detectives again administered Miranda warnings but did not provide counsel as Wint had earlier requested. This time, Wint waived his rights and allegedly incriminated himself in the New Jersey murder. The trial court denied Wint’s motion to suppress his incriminating remarks believing that Wint reinitiated communication with the Pennsylvania detectives. With the admission of Wint’s incriminating statements at trial, a jury convicted Wint of passion/provocation manslaughter and other related offenses. The issues this case presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's consideration centered on whether Pennsylvania detectives violated Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), by attempting to question defendant in Camden and later questioning him in Pennsylvania after he earlier requested counsel. The Court also considered the exceptions to the rule requiring the suppression of any statement secured during a subsequent custodial interrogation after a defendant requests counsel: whether (1) counsel was provided during the questioning, (2) defendant initiated the communication, or (3) a break in custody occurred. The Court concluded the Pennsylvania detectives violated Edwards by attempting to question Wint in Camden after his earlier request for counsel, and Wint did not initiate the interrogation that occurred in Bucks County. The giving of repeated Miranda warnings did not cure the Edwards violation. Pre-indictment, pretrial detainment did not qualify as a break in custody under Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (2010), and none of the exceptions set forth in Edwards applied here. Edwards required suppression of Wint’s incriminating statement concerning the shooting in Camden; the admission of that statement was not harmless error. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUSThis syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized. State v. Laurie Wint (A-28/29-17) (079660)Argued September 26, 2018 -- Decided December 12, 2018ALBIN, J., writing for the Court. The Court considers whether Pennsylvania detectives violated Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), by attempting to question defendant Laurie Wint in Camden and later questioning him in Pennsylvania after he earlier requested counsel. The Court also considers the exceptions to the rule requiring the suppression of any statement secured during a subsequent custodial interrogation after a defendant requests counsel: whether (1) counsel was provided during the questioning, (2) defendant initiated the communication, or (3) a break in custody occurred. See Edwards, 451 U.S. 477 ; Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (2010). In Edwards, the United States Supreme Court held that when an accused invokes his right to have counsel present during a custodial interrogation, questioning must cease unless the accused initiates further communication or conversation. 451 U.S. at 484-85. The Edwards doctrine, which bars continuing an interrogation after a request for counsel, applies even if a different law enforcement agency seeks to question the accused about an unrelated crime, Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 , 686-88 (1988), but does not apply “when a suspect who initially requested counsel is reinterrogated after a break in custody that is of sufficient duration to dissipate its coercive effects.” Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 109. In this case, officers arrested defendant Laurie Wint on a New Jersey murder charge and brought him to the Camden County Prosecutor’s Office for questioning. Wint invoked his right to counsel after receiving Miranda warnings, and the interrogation ceased. Immediately afterwards, two detectives from Pennsylvania investigating an unrelated murder in Bucks County entered the interrogation room to question Wint. Wint again requested the presence of counsel, ending the interrogation. When Wint left the room, the detectives wished him good luck and stated, “[W]hen we get you back to Bucks County we can talk about this again.” Wint responded, “[Y]eah, I’ll talk to you when we get back to Bucks County.” Wint remained in continuous pre-indictment custody in Camden County when, six months later, he was transported to Bucks County. There, Pennsylvania detectives again administered Miranda warnings but did not provide counsel as Wint had earlier requested. This time, Wint waived his rights and allegedly said: “In June 2011 I committed a murder in Camden.” He was charged in a Camden County indictment with murder and other offenses. 1 Wint moved to suppress the statement he allegedly made in Bucks County. The trial court determined that Wint’s admission would be admissible at trial. The court found that Wint had waived his Miranda rights before making the incriminating statement. The court also concluded that, by saying “that he would speak to them when back in Pennsylvania,” Wint reinitiated the conversation with the Pennsylvania detectives in Camden. Additionally, the court maintained that the six-month gap between defendant’s invocation of his right to counsel and the interrogation was “a substantial lapse in time to warrant his questioning about the Camden homicide.” The jury acquitted Wint of murder but found him guilty of the lesser-included offense of passion/provocation manslaughter and the other charged offenses. The Appellate Division remanded for reconsideration of the suppression issue. The panel held that the Pennsylvania detectives violated Edwards by attempting to interrogate Wint in New Jersey and that Wint did not initiate the third interrogation in Bucks County. The panel, however, determined that the trial court must engage in an attenuation analysis and also decide whether the six months between Wint’s requests for counsel and the questioning in Bucks County constituted a “break in custody” within the purview of Shatzer. The Court granted Wint’s petition for certification, 231 N.J. 564 (2017), and the State’s cross-petition, 231 N.J. 546 (2017).HELD: The Pennsylvania detectives violated Edwards by attempting to question Wint in Camden after his earlier request for counsel, and Wint did not initiate the interrogation that occurred in Bucks County. The giving of repeated Miranda warnings did not cure the Edwards violation. Wint remained in continuous pre-indictment custody for six months before the questioning in Bucks County. Pre-indictment, pretrial detainment does not qualify as a break in custody under Shatzer, and none of the exceptions set forth in Edwards apply here. Edwards requires suppression of Wint’s incriminating statement concerning the shooting in Camden. The admission of that statement was not harmless error.1. In Miranda v. Arizona, the United States Supreme Court imposed the requirement that before questioning a suspect during a custodial interrogation, the police must provide warnings, 384 U.S. 436 , 479 (1966), and “[i]f the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.” Id. at 474. In Edwards, the Court held that “when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights.” 451 U.S. at 484. In Arizona v. Roberson, the Court made clear that once a suspect requests the presence of counsel during an interrogation relating to one investigation, neither the same nor another law enforcement agency may initiate a second interrogation, even one relating to a different investigation, without providing the suspect with the counsel he earlier requested. 486 U.S. at 677-78, 687-88. (pp. 20-25)2. In Maryland v. Shatzer, the Court announced a break-in- custody exception to the Edwards rule. 559 U.S. at 104-05. The Supreme Court held that Edwards did not mandate suppression of Shatzer’s incriminating statements because, after his first interrogation, 2 Shatzer experienced a break in Miranda custody by returning to the general prison population and because the second round of interrogations occurred more than two-and-a-half years later. Id. at 114, 116-17. The Court maintained that a break in custody means different things for pretrial detainees and prison inmates. Id. at 106-07, 112-14. The Court concluded that “an extension of Edwards is not justified . . . when a suspect who initially requested counsel is reinterrogated after a break in custody that is of sufficient duration to dissipate its coercive effects.” Id. at 109. In that circumstance, the fresh administration of Miranda warnings when the suspect is reinterrogated is “deemed sufficient” to protect his right to counsel. Ibid. A break in custody of fourteen days is sufficient “for the suspect to get reacclimated to his normal life, to consult with friends and counsel, and to shake off any residual coercive effects of his prior custody.” Id. at 110. (pp. 26-32)3. Here, approximately three minutes after they knew Wint had unequivocally requested counsel, the two Pennsylvania detectives entered the Camden County interrogation room to question Wint about the Pennsylvania murder charge. That was a clear violation of Edwards. The record does not support the trial court’s finding that Wint initiated a conversation with the Pennsylvania detectives in which Wint agreed to speak with them at some later time without counsel. Wint remained in continuous pre-indictment, pretrial custody in the Camden County jail when he was transported to a police station in Pennsylvania where the same detectives interrogated him again without providing him with counsel. Wint did not experience a break in custody within the intendment of Shatzer before he was interrogated without counsel in Pennsylvania, and therefore the Edwards presumption of involuntariness applies to the admission Wint made to the detectives. For break-in-custody purposes, Shatzer distinguished the very different worlds and circumstances of a pretrial detainee and a convicted inmate. When a pretrial detainee is released into the free world he experiences a break in custody. Id. at 110. As Shatzer explained, convicted inmates stand in a very different position because their world is prison. Id. at 113. Wint’s return to his pre- indictment, pretrial custody in the Camden County jail after two interrogations during which he invoked his right to counsel was not a return to normalcy. (pp. 32-39)4. Because the detectives initiated the interrogation and did not provide counsel to Wint, Edwards requires suppression of the incriminating statement made to the detectives concerning the shooting in Camden. The admission of Wint’s statement -- “I committed a murder in Camden” -- was not harmless error and was clearly capable of causing an unjust result. Wint is therefore entitled to a new trial in the homicide case. Because the erroneous admission of the statement was not relevant to Wint’s other convictions, those stand. At a new trial, the State may not admit as substantive evidence Wint’s statement. The Court does not address arguments about the prosecutor’s summation, and it rejects Wint’s argument that the trial court improperly dismissed two jurors. (pp. 39-42) REVERSED and REMANDED for a new trial.CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE ALBIN’s opinion. JUSTICES FERNANDEZ-VINA and SOLOMON did not participate. 3 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A-28/ 29 September Term 2017 079660 State of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent/Cross-Appellant, v. Laurie Wint, a/k/a Laurie A. Wint, Jr., Laurie Ainsworth Wint, Lance, Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Respondent. On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Argued Decided September 26, 2018 December 12, 2018Marcia Blum, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant/cross-respondent (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Marcia Blum, of counsel and on the briefs).Sarah Lichter, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent/cross-appellant (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Sarah Lichter, of counsel and on the briefs).Nicholas C. Harbist argued the cause for amicus curiae the Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (Blank Rome, attorneys; Nicholas C. Harbist, on the brief). 1 Alexander Shalom argued the cause for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation, attorneys; Alexander Shalom, Alexi Machek Velez, Edward Barocas and Jeanne LoCicero, on the brief). JUSTICE ALBIN delivered the opinion of the Court. In Edwards v. Arizona, the United States Supreme Court held that whenan accused invokes his right to have counsel present during a custodialinterrogation, questioning must cease unless the accused initiates furthercommunication or conversation. 451 U.S. 477 , 484-85 (1981). The Edwardsdoctrine, which bars continuing an interrogation after a request for counsel,applies even if a different law enforcement agency seeks to question theaccused about an unrelated crime, Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 , 686-88(1988), and even if the accused has consulted with an attorney, Minnick v.Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 , 153 (1990). The Edwards doctrine, however, doesnot apply “when a suspect who initially requested counsel is reinterrogatedafter a break in custody that is of sufficient duration to dissipate its coerciveeffects.” Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 , 109 (2010) (emphasis added). In this case, law enforcement officers arrested defendant Laurie Wint ona New Jersey murder charge and brought him to the Camden CountyProsecutor’s Office for questioning. Wint invoked his right to counsel after 2 receiving Miranda1 warnings, and the interrogation ceased. Immediatelyafterwards, two detectives from Pennsylvania investigating an unrelatedmurder in Bucks County entered the interrogation room to question Wint.After receiving his rights for the second time, Wint again requested thepresence of counsel, ending the interrogation. Wint remained in continuouspre-indictment custody in Camden County when, six months later, he wastransported to Bucks County. There, Pennsylvania detectives againadministered Miranda warnings but did not provide counsel as Wint had earlierrequested. This time, Wint waived his rights and allegedly incriminatedhimself in the New Jersey murder. The trial court denied Wint’s motion to suppress his incriminatingremarks believing that, for Edwards purposes, Wint reinitiated communicationwith the Pennsylvania detectives. The court also determined that the six-month lapse in time between interrogations satisfied the Shatzer “break-in-custody” requirement. With the admission of Wint’s incriminating statementsat trial, a jury convicted Wint of passion/provocation manslaughter and otherrelated offenses. The Appellate Division remanded to the trial court for reconsideration ofthe suppression issue. The panel held that the Pennsylvania detectives violated1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 3 Edwards by attempting to interrogate Wint just minutes after he had requestedcounsel from New Jersey law enforcement officers. The panel also found thatWint did not initiate the third interrogation in Bucks County. The panel,however, stopped short of suppressing Wint’s incriminating statements. Thepanel determined that the trial court must engage in an attenuation analysis andalso decide whether the six-month period between Wint’s requests for counseland the third round of questioning in Bucks County constituted a “break incustody” within the purview of Shatzer. We now reverse. We agree with the Appellate Division that thePennsylvania detectives violated Edwards by attempting to question Wint inCamden after his earlier request for counsel. We also agree that Wint did notinitiate the interrogation that occurred in Bucks County. That third and lastinterrogation proceeded without the presence of counsel despite Wint’s twoprevious requests for counsel. Here, the giving of repeated Miranda warningsdid not cure the Edwards violation. Wint remained in continuous pre-indictment custody for a period of sixmonths before the questioning in Bucks County. Therefore, no “break incustody” occurred within the intendment of Shatzer. The Supreme Court set abright line in Edwards and Shatzer: after a defendant requests counsel duringa custodial interrogation, any statement secured during a subsequent custodial 4 interrogation must be suppressed unless (1) counsel was provided during thequestioning, (2) defendant initiated the communication, or (3) a break incustody occurred. None of those exceptions apply here. We therefore partwith the panel’s decision to remand for an attenuation analysis and a break-in-custody analysis. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division andremand for a new trial on the charge of passion/provocation manslaughter atwhich the incriminating statements made by Wint in Pennsylvania will beinadmissible. I. A. On September 26, 2012, Wint was charged in a Camden Countyindictment with murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and (2); second-degreepossession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a); second-degree unlawful possession of a firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b); fourth-degreeresisting arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a); and second-degree certain persons not topossess weapons, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b). Wint moved to suppress a statement heallegedly made to Pennsylvania detectives in Bucks County. He claimed thatthe Pennsylvania detectives violated Edwards by initiating an interrogationdespite his earlier request for counsel in New Jersey. 5 A suppression hearing was conducted in the Camden County SuperiorCourt, Law Division. At the hearing, the State elicited testimony from threewitnesses: Investigator Lance Saunders of the Camden County Prosecutor’sOffice and two Pennsylvania detectives -- Detective John Bonargo of theWarminster Township Police Department and Detective Martin McDonough ofthe Bucks County District Attorney’s Office. The testimony focused on threeinterrogations of Wint while he remained in pre-indictment custody. Wint was charged on June 16, 2011 with the murder of Kevin Miller inthe city of Camden and on July 29, 2011 with the murder of Tyrone Newmanin Warminster Township, Pennsylvania. On July 31, 2011, Camden policeofficers arrested Wint and transported him to the Camden County Prosecutor’sOffice for questioning. Investigator Saunders began interrogating Wint while DetectivesBonargo and McDonough from Pennsylvania watched from an adjacent room.Investigator Saunders advised Wint of his Miranda rights, including his rightto the presence and appointment of counsel. Following a brief exchange, Wintresponded, “I think I should call my lawyer” and “I really don’t want to talk toanybody.” All questioning then ceased. After leaving the interrogation room, Investigator Saunders informedDetectives Bonargo and McDonough that Wint had invoked his right to 6 counsel. Nevertheless, approximately three minutes later, the twoPennsylvania detectives entered the interrogation room to question Wint abouttheir case. The detectives introduced themselves and, while acknowledgingthat Wint had chosen not to speak about the Camden case, asked whether hewould be willing to speak about the Bucks County investigation. Wintresponded he would if given a cigarette. However, after the detectives readhim his Miranda rights, Wint requested the presence of counsel: [McDonough]: Do you wish to speak to us without a lawyer being present? [Wint]: I want him to sit here while we talk. [McDonough]: I didn’t hear. Do you wish to speak to us without a lawyer being present? [Wint]: I want him to sit here while we talk. [McDonough]: You want a lawyer here with us? [Wint]: Yeah -- [McDonough]: Okay, so that, that won’t happen today because we don’t have a lawyer here with you -- [Wint]: Oh -- [McDonough]: But if you want one, that, that, that’s fine. [Wint]: Yeah. [McDonough]: You’re welcome to that. 7 [Wint]: Okay. [McDonough]: But, um, if you wanted to talk to us today then, then your answer here would be no? [Wint]: No. It would be no. [McDonough]: Or do you want to talk to us today? [Wint]: I wanna talk to ya’ll but I want a lawyer here present cause I don’t, I don’t -- [McDonough]: I got ya. I got ya. If that’s, that, if that’s your answer, that, that’s your answer. [Wint]: Yeah. So -- [McDonough]: So, you do not want to talk to us right now? [Wint]: Without a lawyer. In light of that dialogue, the Pennsylvania detectives stopped thequestioning and exited the room. When Wint left the room, the detectivesinitiated an unrecorded verbal exchange with him. The detectives wished himgood luck and stated, “[W]hen we get you back to Bucks County we can talkabout this again.” Wint responded, “[Y]eah, I’ll talk to you when we get backto Bucks County.” Several months later, the Pennsylvania detectives returned to Camden tosecure DNA samples from Wint, who was being held in the Camden Countyjail. In their encounter with Wint, the detectives informed him that they were 8 taking steps to transfer him to Bucks County where they would like to talk tohim. Wint reportedly responded, “I’ll talk to you when I get back to Bucks[County].” During neither of those informal conversations -- prompted by thedetectives -- did Wint indicate that he wished to speak without counsel present. On January 18, 2012, six months after Wint had invoked his right tocounsel in two separate interrogations, the Pennsylvania detectives transportedWint to the Warminster police station in Bucks County for processing on thePennsylvania murder charge. The booking process was audio recorded. Then,Wint was taken to a room with video- but not audio-recording capability.There, Detective McDonough advised Wint of his Miranda rights from thesame form he used six months earlier. Wint signed the form and this timewaived his rights. The detectives then questioned Wint about the circumstancessurrounding the death of Tyrone Newman in Warminster. DetectiveMcDonough penned a fifteen-page statement summarizing Wint’s first-personaccount of the events. In explaining the reason for his presence in Warminsterat the time of the Newman homicide, Wint allegedly said: “In June 2011 Icommitted a murder in Camden. About three weeks after the murder I saw mypicture on TV. J-Rock and I decided we needed to leave from Camden and goand stay in Warminster.” According to Detective McDonough, Wint reviewed 9 the fifteen-page statement, made some corrections in his own handwriting, andsigned the statement. The trial court determined that Wint’s admission that he committed amurder in Camden in June 2011 would be admissible at Wint’s upcoming trialon the Camden County charges. The court found that Wint had knowingly,intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights before making theincriminating statement. The court also concluded that, by saying “that hewould speak to them when back in Pennsylvania,” Wint reinitiated theconversation with the Pennsylvania detectives in Camden. In the court’s view,that remark opened a pathway for the detectives to interrogate Wint six monthslater in the Warminster police station. Additionally, applying Shatzer, thecourt maintained that the six-month gap between defendant’s invocation of hisright to counsel in Camden and the interrogation in Warminster was “asubstantial lapse in time to warrant his questioning about the Camdenhomicide.” B. At Wint’s jury trial, the State presented evidence of a deadlyconfrontation between Wint and Kevin Miller in Eutaw Park in Camden on theevening of June 8, 2011. The State argued that Wint purposely and without 10 justification shot and killed Miller. In contrast, Wint claimed that he acted inself-defense after being jumped by Miller and his cohorts. The State’s testimony revealed that on June 8, Miller went to hisgirlfriend’s home to celebrate her birthday only to learn that she was not therebut in the company of Wint with whom she formerly had an intimaterelationship. Miller, angered by this revelation, drove around Camden with afriend, Clifton Bailey, in search of his girlfriend and Wint. Miller and Baileyeventually met up with a friend at Eutaw Park. Miller entered the park whilehis two friends remained at the park’s entrance. When Bailey heard a gunshot,he raced inside the park and observed a person running from the scene. Hefound Miller seriously injured with a gunshot wound and took him to thehospital, where Miller died during surgery. The State presented no eyewitnesses to the shooting. The State,however, placed on the stand John Briggs -- Wint’s best friend -- who testifiedto the account that Wint gave him of the confrontation in the park. Accordingto that account, Miller, Bailey, and other individuals attempted to jump Wint.One person from Miller’s group reached for a gun at which point Wint pulledout a handgun he was carrying and fired in self-defense. Wint testified that he learned that Miller was looking for him and that hebelieved that Miller and Bailey were members of the Bloods street gang. He 11 admitted that he was armed with a gun for his self-protection although he hadno permit to carry the weapon. He stated that Miller and three others accostedhim in Eutaw Park. Three members of the group started punching him, and hefell to the ground. Then, Bailey pulled out a gun as another person from thegroup reached for a second gun. At that point, Wint drew his gun and, withoutaiming, pulled the trigger. Wint claimed that, at the time, he did not know thathe struck anyone, asserting, “I wasn’t trying to kill anyone. I was just tryingto save myself.” Wint then ran from the park and discarded the weapon. Hefled to Pennsylvania several weeks later, in part because he feared retaliationby the Bloods gang. To preemptively discredit that version of the shooting, the State earlierpresented both the medical examiner’s testimony that the deadly shot was firedat a downward angle and Detective McDonough’s testimony that Wintadmitted at the Warminster police station that he had “committed a murder” inCamden. Concerning the alleged admission, Wint explained, “I told[Detective McDonough] I did a shooting in Camden,” and that the detectivecharacterized it as a murder. The jury acquitted Wint of murder but found him guilty of the lesser-included offense of passion/provocation manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(b)(2),and the other charged offenses. The court sentenced Wint to an extended term 12 of fourteen years on the manslaughter conviction, subject to the No EarlyRelease Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2; a consecutive term of eight years with a five-year period of parole disqualification on the certain-persons conviction; and aconcurrent one-year term on the resisting-arrest conviction. The other firearmpossessory offenses were merged. The court ran the aggregate twenty-twoyear term, subject to a sixteen-year and eleven-month period of paroleineligibility, consecutive to the sentence Wint was serving in Pennsylvania. C. In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division primarily focused onWint’s argument that the trial court’s admission of Wint’s incriminatingstatement to the Pennsylvania detectives in Warminster violated hisconstitutional rights as articulated in the Edwards line of cases. In addressingthat issue, the panel made some preliminary findings: (1) “the Pennsylvaniadetectives had no right to initiate any interrogation of [Wint], only minutesafter he had invoked his right to counsel in the same interrogation room to theCamden detectives”; (2) their attempted interrogation of Wint in Camden wasconstitutionally prohibited in the absence of summoning counsel for Wint; and 13 (3) the detectives -- not Wint -- initiated the post-interrogation discussions inCamden and the later interrogation in the Warminster police station. 2 As the panel observed, “Shatzer recognized an important doctrinaldistinction between the interrogation of persons who are confined due to pastconvictions, as opposed to persons who are pretrial detainees,” citing Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 106-08. The panel acknowledged that, under Shatzer, a break incustody after an interrogation means one thing for convicted prison inmatesand another thing for pretrial detainees. For interrogated inmates, a break incustody is a release back to the general prison population, where “they returnto their accustomed surroundings and daily routine,” whereas for interrogatedpretrial detainees, a break in custody is a release from pretrial custody and areturn to a normal life in the free world, quoting Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 113. Despite the differences that Shatzer delineated between prison inmatesand pretrial detainees, the panel examined whether, for break-in-custodypurposes, the circumstances of an interrogated pretrial detainee who remains incustody for six months in a county jail is any different from that of aninterrogated convicted inmate who is released back into the general prisonpopulation. The panel questioned whether the ability of the Pennsylvania2 The panel rejected “the trial court’s mistaken finding” that Wint reinitiated discussions with the Pennsylvania detectives. 14 authorities to place coercive pressures or exert leverage on Wint, who wasconfined in a Camden jail, was any different than if he were a convictedinmate serving time in prison. Thus, the panel concluded that the record was“incomplete and inconclusive to enable the Shatzer 'break-in-custody’ analysisto be resolved definitively.” The panel also determined that the record was inadequate to analyzewhether the six-month gap in time before the Warminster interrogationdissipated the taint of the improper attempted interrogation in Camden atwhich defendant invoked his right to counsel. The panel looked to Michiganv. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975); State v. Maltese, 222 N.J. 525 (2015); andState v. Hartley, 103 N.J. 252 (1986), cases where courts conducted anattenuation analysis after the defendants invoked their right to remain silent,rather than the Edwards line of cases where defendants invoked their right toan attorney. The panel directed that, on remand, the trial court conduct anattenuation analysis and examine a non-exhaustive list of factors: the timebetween the interviews; the place of the interviews; whether adequate Mirandawarnings were given; the effect of any admissions made at the firstinterrogation on the second interrogation; and the “purpose and flagrancy” ofthe police misconduct, citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 , 604 (1975). Thepanel did “not subscribe to the extreme view that [Wint]’s invocation of his 15 Fifth Amendment rights . . . inexorably barred all law enforcement agents fromany jurisdiction from attempting to interview him about the crimes during hislengthy period of pretrial detention.” The panel instructed the trial court to decide, after conducting a break-in-custody and attenuation analysis, whether to suppress or admit Wint’sincriminating statement. The panel stated that if the court orders suppressionthen “[Wint]’s conviction must be vacated and a new trial shall proceed, atwhich the statement will be excluded.” The panel did not elaborate on whetherany potential new trial applied just to the manslaughter conviction or also tothe resisting-arrest and gun-possession convictions. Last, the panel rejected Wint’s contentions that the prosecutor deniedhim a fair trial by arguing in summation that “he should have waited for thepolice at the scene of the shooting if indeed his conduct was innocuous” andthat the trial court should have declared a mistrial after removing and replacingtwo deliberating jurors. We granted Wint’s petition for certification, 231 N.J. 564 (2017), andthe State’s cross-petition, 231 N.J. 546 (2017). 3 We also granted the motions3 We granted certification on three issues, only one of which we discuss at length in this opinion. The last two issues, which concern the prosecutor’s summation and the court’s replacement of two jurors, are discussed summarily at the conclusion of the opinion. We do not present the parties’ arguments on those issues. 16 of the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (ACLU) and theAssociation of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (ACDL) toparticipate as amici curiae. II. A. Wint contends that the Appellate Division failed to follow the commandsof Edwards and Shatzer by remanding to the trial court for a break-in-custodyand attenuation analysis. Wint asserts that he remained in continuous,uninterrupted pre-indictment custody from the time he repeatedly invoked hisright to counsel during separate interrogations by New Jersey andPennsylvania law enforcement authorities until he was questioned later inPennsylvania without counsel. Given the absence of a break in custody, Wintsubmits, Edwards barred his subsequent interrogation without counsel becausehe did not initiate a discussion with the Pennsylvania detectives. He reasonsthat the amount of time a suspect spends in pre-indictment custody does notconstitute a break in custody because the longer the period awaitingindictment, the greater the coercive pressure to cooperate without the counselhe earlier requested, citing Minnick, 498 U.S. at 153, and Roberson, 486 U.S. at 686. 17 Wint emphasizes that in erroneously requiring an attenuation analysis,the Appellate Division followed the line of Miranda cases involving asuspect’s invocation of his right to remain silent, such as Mosley, Maltese, andHartley. He notes that in the Edwards line of cases involving a suspect’sinvocation of his right to counsel, the Supreme Court suppresses statementselicited in the absence of counsel; no attenuation analysis is conducted. Amici ACLU and ACDL advance many of the same arguments as Wint.The ACLU contends that Shatzer’s break-in-custody rule applies tointerrogated convicted inmates who are returned to the general prisonpopulation for fourteen days or longer but not to interrogated suspects awaitingindictment who are returned to pretrial detention rather than released into thecommunity. According to the ACLU, Shatzer made very clear that pretrialdetention is different from post-conviction incarceration in an Edwardscontext. The ACDL argues that law enforcement would be given a perverseincentive if the longer a pre-indictment detainee is held in jail after invokinghis right to counsel, the easier it becomes to continue to question him withoutcounsel. Both the ACLU and ACDL point out New Jersey’s strong andindependent commitment to the privilege against self-incrimination, which iscodified in N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19 and N.J.R.E. 503, as well as our state-lawjurisprudence. 18 B. The State acknowledges that a defendant who is in pre-indictmentcustody and has invoked his right to counsel cannot be reinterrogated until anattorney is provided unless the defendant reinitiates contact with the police ora break in custody of at least fourteen days occurs. The State, however, assertsthat “[Wint] only conditionally invoked his right to counsel initially.”According to the State, Wint’s verbal exchanges with the Pennsylvaniadetectives indicated that Wint wanted an attorney present if the detectivesintended to take a statement from him in Camden but that “he would freelyspeak with [them] once he was transported back to Pennsylvania.” The Statetakes the position that Wint initiated contact with the Pennsylvania detectivesbecause “on two occasions over the course of three months, [he] told [those]detectives he would talk with them when he was brought to Pennsylvania.” The State, moreover, maintains that “a six-month break in Mirandacustody” occurred between the attempted interrogations in Camden, wheredefendant invoked his right to counsel, and the interrogation in Warminster,where defendant waived his rights and gave a voluntary statement. The Staterejects the proposition that “the Shatzer break-in-custody analysis applies onlyto prisoners who are serving a sentence upon conviction, and never to pre-trialdetainees.” 19 In the State’s view, the question posed by Shatzer is not whether Winthad the opportunity “to return to the normalcy of his pre-arrest life outside ofprison,” but rather whether Wint’s return to jail “following the initialinterrogation represented the same sort of 'return to normalcy’ experienced byShatzer after his initial interrogation” and return to the general prisonpopulation. The State answers that question by stressing that Wint was simplysubject to the ordinary restrictions of daily life in the county jail during his six-month detention and not to “the sort of coercive pressures inherent in'interrogative custody’ that Miranda and Edwards are meant to deflect,” citingShatzer, 559 U.S. at 113 n.8. Accordingly, the State contends that if Shatzer’sreturn to the general prison population after his interrogation constit uted abreak in custody, so too does Wint’s return to the county jail population. The State therefore asks this Court to reverse the Appellate Division’sremand for a break-in-custody and attenuation analysis and affirm Wint’sconvictions. III. A. One of the fundamental guarantees of the United States Constitution andour state law is that no person can be compelled to be a witness against himselfin a criminal case. See U.S. Const. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be 20 compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .”); 4 N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19 (“[E]very natural person has a right to refuse to disclosein an action or to a police officer or other official any matter that willincriminate him or expose him to a penalty or a forfeiture of his estate . . . .”);N.J.R.E. 503 (same as N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19). In the landmark case of Miranda v. Arizona, the United States SupremeCourt imposed safeguards to enable an individual to exercise meaningfully theright against self-incrimination when interrogated while in police custody. 384 U.S. 436 , 477 (1966). To counteract the inherent psychological pressures thatmight compel a person subject to a custodial interrogation “to speak where hewould not otherwise do so freely,” the Court mandated that the police advise asuspect of certain basic rights. Id. at 467, 479. Before questioning a suspectduring a custodial interrogation, the police must warn him that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. [Id. at 479 (emphasis added).]4 The Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination has been made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 , 8 (1964). 21 Miranda further instructed that “[i]f the individual states that he wants anattorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.” Id. at 474(emphasis added). An individual who requests counsel must be given “anopportunity to confer with the attorney and to have him present during anysubsequent questioning.” Ibid. (emphasis added). If the State fails to honor adefendant’s exercise of the right to counsel, including the right to appointedcounsel, “no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used againsthim.” Id. at 479. In Edwards v. Arizona, the Supreme Court took additional steps toensure that the right to counsel guaranteed in Miranda would not becircumvented. 451 U.S. 477 . Edwards held that “when an accused hasinvoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, avalid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that heresponded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has beenadvised of his rights.” Id. at 484. The Court further held that an accused, whohas “expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is notsubject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been madeavailable to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication,exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Id. at 484-85. 22 In that case, the police arrested Edwards on charges of murder, robbery,and burglary. Id. at 478. After initially waiving his Miranda rights andspeaking to the police at the stationhouse, Edwards said, “I want an attorneybefore making a deal,” at which point the questioning ceased. Id. at 479. Thenext morning, two detectives visited Edwards in the county jail and advisedhim again of his Miranda rights, including his right to counsel. Ibid. Thattime, Edwards waived his rights and confessed. Ibid. The Supreme Courtsuppressed the confession because Edwards requested counsel at the firstinterrogation and did not initiate the meeting the next day with the detectives,and because the detectives questioned him without making counsel available tohim at the second interrogation. Id. at 487. In Arizona v. Roberson, the Supreme Court elaborated on Edwards andmade clear that once a suspect requests the presence of counsel during aninterrogation relating to one investigation, neither the same nor another lawenforcement agency may initiate a second interrogation, even one relating to adifferent investigation, without providing the suspect with the counsel heearlier requested. 486 U.S. at 677-78, 687-88. In Roberson, the defendant wasarrested for burglary, advised of his Miranda rights, and told the arrestingofficer that he “wanted a lawyer before answering any questions.” Id. at 678.Three days later, a different officer, unaware that the defendant earlier 23 requested the assistance of counsel, interrogated the defendant about anotherburglary. Ibid. That time, despite being informed that he had the right tocounsel, the defendant made an incriminating statement. Ibid. The Supreme Court affirmed the suppression of the statement. Id. at688. The Court explained its rationale: “[T]he presumption raised by asuspect’s request for counsel -- that he considers himself unable to deal withthe pressures of custodial interrogation without legal assistance -- does notdisappear simply because the police have approached the suspect, still incustody, still without counsel, about a separate investigation.” Id. at 683.Moreover, when the suspect requests the presence of an attorney to deal withthe inherent pressures of his custodial status, “there is no reason to assume thata suspect’s state of mind is in any way investigation-specific.” Id. at 684. Theobligation is on the law enforcement officers seeking to reinterrogate a suspectto inquire whether he had earlier invoked the right to counsel. Id. at 687-88.Although nothing prevents a law enforcement agency from advising a suspectthat he is the subject of separate investigations, if the suspect has earlierrequested the assistance of counsel and not initiated discussions with theauthorities, he “can determine how to deal with the separate investigationswith counsel’s advice.” Id. at 687. 24 The Court in Roberson distinguished the bright line barring a subsequentinterrogation in a case where the suspect has invoked his right to counsel froma case where the suspect has merely decided to cut off questioning, as inMosley, 423 U.S. at 103-04. Roberson, 486 U.S. at 682-83. The request forcounsel, unlike the decision to remain silent, “raise[s] the presumption that[the suspect] is unable to proceed without a lawyer’s advice.” Id. at 683. Last,the Court reaffirmed the benefits of the “clear and unequivocal” guidelinesprovided by the Edwards rule: The police and prosecutors are given specificinstructions on how to conduct custodial interrogations and know that thefailure to follow those instructions will result in suppression of otherwise“trustworthy and highly probative evidence.” Id. at 681-82. Minnick v. Mississippi further fortified Miranda’s and Edwards’s focuson the importance of the actual presence of counsel at a custodial interrogationwhen a suspect invokes his right to counsel. 498 U.S. at 152-53. The Courtheld “that when counsel is requested, interrogation must cease, and officialsmay not reinitiate interrogation without counsel present, whether or not theaccused has consulted with his attorney.” Id. at 153. The Court stressed thatthe presence of counsel is not a mere procedural formality but a safeguard toensure that the “police interrogation conform[s] to the dictates of the [FifthAmendment]” and “that statements made in the government-established 25 atmosphere are not the product of compulsion.” Id. at 152 (second alterationin original) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466). Thus, the Court “decline[d] toremove protection from police-initiated questioning based on isolatedconsultations with counsel who is absent when the interrogation resumes.” Id.at 154. B. In Maryland v. Shatzer, the Supreme Court announced a break-in-custody exception to the Edwards rule, which presumes that, after a defendantinvokes his right to counsel, any statement taken during a subsequent custodialinterrogation without counsel is not voluntary. 559 U.S. at 104-05. Whatconstitutes a break in custody is hotly debated between the parties in thepresent case. The United States Supreme Court has never explicitly placed anytemporal limits on the Edwards rule when a statement is the product of apolice-initiated interrogation of a defendant who earlier invoked his right tocounsel and who remains in continuous pre-indictment, pretrial custody. Thequestion is whether, in the circumstances of the present case, Shatzer openedthe door to police-initiated questioning of a pre-indictment, pretrial detainee inthe absence of counsel. In Shatzer, a township police detective investigating allegations thatShatzer had sexually abused his son sought to interview Shatzer, who was 26 imprisoned in a state correctional institution on an unrelated offense. Id. at100-01. The detective read Shatzer his Miranda rights, and after a shortcolloquy, Shatzer declined to speak without an attorney, ending the interview.Id. at 101. Two-and-a-half years later, another detective from the same policedepartment, armed with more specific information, visited a correctionalinstitution to interview Shatzer. Ibid. The detective explained the allegationsto Shatzer, read him his Miranda rights, and secured a written waiver of thoserights. Ibid. During the interview, Shatzer made an incriminating statement.Id. at 101-02. At no point did Shatzer request to speak with an attorney. Id. at102. Five days later, the interrogating detective and another detective returnedto the correctional institution. Ibid. Shatzer again waived his Miranda rightsand made a further inculpatory statement, after which he requested counsel andthe interrogation ceased. Ibid. The Supreme Court held that Edwards did not mandate suppression ofShatzer’s incriminating statements because, after his first interrogation,Shatzer experienced a break in Miranda custody by returning to the generalprison population and because the second round of interrogations occurredmore than two-and-a-half years later. Id. at 114, 116-17. The Courtmaintained that a break in custody means different things for pretrial detaineesand prison inmates. Id. at 106-07, 112-14. 27 In the case of a suspect who is “arrested for a particular crime and isheld in uninterrupted pretrial custody while that crime is being activelyinvestigated[,] . . . he remains cut off from his normal life and companions,'thrust into’ and isolated in an 'unfamiliar,’ 'police-dominated atmosphere,’where his captors 'appear to control [his] fate.’” Id. at 106 (third alteration inoriginal) (first quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 456-57; then quoting Illinois v.Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 , 297 (1990)). That was the scenario faced by thedefendants in Edwards, Roberson, and Minnick because none of thosedefendants “regained a sense of control or normalcy after they were initiallytaken into custody for the crime under investigation.” Id. at 106-07. The“continued detention [of those defendants] rested with those controlling theirinterrogation, and [they] confronted the uncertainties of what final chargesthey would face, whether they would be convicted, and what sentence theywould receive.” Id. at 114 (emphasis added). The Shatzer Court explained, however, that when “a suspect has beenreleased from his pretrial custody and has returned to his normal life for sometime before the later attempted interrogation, there is little reason to think thathis change of heart regarding interrogation without counsel has been coerced. ”Id. at 107 (emphasis added). In that situation, the suspect “has no longer beenisolated. He has likely been able to seek advice from an attorney, family 28 members, and friends. And he knows from his earlier experience that he needonly demand counsel to bring the interrogation to a halt; and that investigativecustody does not last indefinitely.” Id. at 107-08 (footnote omitted). TheCourt concluded that “an extension of Edwards is not justified . . . when asuspect who initially requested counsel is reinterrogated after a break incustody that is of sufficient duration to dissipate its coercive effects.” Id. at109. In that circumstance, the fresh administration of Miranda warnings whenthe suspect is reinterrogated is “deemed sufficient” to protect his constitutionalright to counsel. Ibid. The Court applied this paradigm to Shatzer, a convicted inmate, who,after his initial interrogation at which he invoked his right to counsel, wasreturned to the general prison population where he remained for two-and-a-half years before detectives reinterrogated him. Id. at 112. The Courtultimately determined that Shatzer’s return to the general prison populationqualified as a break in custody. Id. at 117. It reached that conclusion because,in its view, “lawful imprisonment imposed upon conviction of a crime does notcreate the coercive pressures identified in Miranda.” Id. at 113 (emphasisadded). The Court gave the following rationale for considering a convictedinmate’s return to the general prison population a break in custody: Interrogated suspects who have previously been convicted of crime live in prison. When they are 29 released back into the general prison population, they return to their accustomed surroundings and daily routine -- they regain the degree of control they had over their lives prior to the interrogation. Sentenced prisoners, in contrast to the Miranda paradigm, are not isolated with their accusers. They live among other inmates, guards, and workers, and often can receive visitors and communicate with people on the outside by mail or telephone. Their detention, moreover, is relatively disconnected from their prior unwillingness to cooperate in an investigation. The former interrogator has no power to increase the duration of incarceration, which was determined at sentencing. [Id. at 113.] The Court adopted a bright-line rule for determining when a break incustody is of adequate length to overcome the Edwards presumption ofinvoluntariness attaching to a police-initiated reinterrogation of a suspect whoearlier has requested counsel. Id. at 109-10. A break in custody of fourteendays, the Court held, is sufficient “time for the suspect to get reacclimated tohis normal life, to consult with friends and counsel, and to shake off anyresidual coercive effects of his prior custody.” Id. at 110. Because Shatzer’sbreak in custody lasted two-and-a-half years, the incriminating statementsmade at his reinterrogation were admissible. Id. at 110, 117. Shatzer did not suggest that, for break-in-custody purposes, a convictedinmate returning to the general prison population is comparable to a pre- 30 indictment, pretrial detainee returning to his jail cell. See Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499 , 510 (2012) (noting that Shatzer “held that a break in custodymay occur while a suspect is serving a term in prison”). Indeed, in discussingthe coercive effects of custodial interrogation in the Miranda context, theCourt in Howes took pains to distinguish between convicted inmates on theone hand and pretrial detainees on the other. Id. at 511-12 (“[A] prisoner,unlike a person who has not been convicted and sentenced, knows that the lawenforcement officers who question him probably lack the authority to affectthe duration of his sentence.” (citing Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 103-14)). Some courts, but not all, have concluded that Shatzer expressed the“view that sentenced prisoners are distinct from pretrial detainees for purposesof [the Edwards] presumption of involuntariness.” United States v. Coles, 264 F. Supp. 3d 667, 683 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (holding that pretrial detainee “did notexperience a break in Miranda custody when he was returned to pretrialdetention for 35 days between interrogations”); Trotter v. United States, 121 A.3d 40, 48-49 (D.C. 2015) (holding that for Shatzer purposes five-monthperiod between interrogations did not constitute break in custody for pretrialdetainee). But see Commonwealth v. Champney, 161 A.3d 265, 284 (Pa.Super. Ct. 2017) (holding that “the nearly five-month break between [pretrial 31 detainee’s] invocation of his right to counsel and the prison interrogationremoved the Edwards presumption of involuntariness”). IV. We now apply the legal principles developed in the Edwards line ofcases to the facts before us. Wint faced separate murder charges in Camden County and BucksCounty when police officers arrested him and took him to the Camden CountyProsecutor’s Office for questioning. Wint was placed in an interrogationroom, where an investigator from the Camden County Prosecutor’s Officeproceeded to interview him as two Pennsylvania detectives watched from anadjacent room. After the investigator advised Wint of his Miranda rights, Winttold him, “I think I should call my lawyer” and “I really don’t want to talk toanybody.” (emphasis added). The investigator then stopped the interview. Despite having observed Wint invoke his right to counsel and havingbeen told about that invocation, the two Pennsylvania detectives entered theroom to question Wint about the Pennsylvania murder charge. That attempt bythe Pennsylvania detectives to interrogate Wint about their investigation,approximately three minutes after they knew he had unequivocally requestedcounsel, was a clear violation of Edwards. See Roberson, 486 U.S. at 677-78,687-88 (stating that when defendant requests counsel during interrogation by 32 one law enforcement agency, another law enforcement agency may not initiatesecond interrogation relating to another investigation); see also McNeil v.Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 , 177 (1991) (“The Edwards rule . . . is not offensespecific: Once a suspect invokes the Miranda right to counsel for interrogationregarding one offense, he may not be reapproached regarding any offenseunless counsel is present.” (citing Roberson, 486 U.S. at 675)). At that point,our constitutional jurisprudence required the detectives, as a precondition toany interrogation, to provide Wint with the attorney he requested. SeeRoberson, 486 U.S. at 687; see also State v. Wright, 97 N.J. 113, 126 (1984). After the Pennsylvania detectives advised Wint of his right to thepresence of a lawyer, Wint responded, “I want him to sit here while we talk.”Wint repeated five more times that he did not want to answer questionswithout a lawyer, and then the detectives ceased the interrogation. With twosets of interrogating officers, Wint made clear that he wanted to avail himselfof his constitutional right to counsel. The record does not support the trial court’s finding that Wint initiated aconversation with the Pennsylvania detectives in which Wint agreed to speakwith them at some later time without counsel. Like the Appellate Division, wecannot defer to factual findings that are not “supported by sufficient credibleevidence in the record” and therefore are clearly mistaken. State v. Elders, 33 192 N.J. 224, 243-44 (2007) (citation omitted); see also State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 381 (2017). Detective McDonough’s testimony at the motion hearing left no doubtthat the Pennsylvania detectives initiated a conversation with Wint as he leftthe interrogation room and stood in the hallway of the Camden CountyProsecutor’s Office. Undeterred, the detectives initiated a new colloquy bysaying, “[W]hen we get back to Bucks County we can talk about this again.”To that prompting, defendant responded, mimicking their words, “Yeah, I’lltalk to you when we get back to Bucks County.” A similar exchange occurredthree months later when the detectives visited Wint in the Camden County jailto secure a DNA sample. Again, according to Detective McDonough, thedetectives initiated the conversation by saying to Wint they would talk withhim after his transfer to Pennsylvania -- “when he got back to Bucks [County]”-- and Wint responded as he had earlier, “Yeah, I’ll talk to you when I get backto Bucks.” Based on the undisputed evidence before us, Wint did not“initiate[] further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police”to open the door to an interrogation without counsel. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485; see also State v. Alston, 204 N.J. 614, 620 (2011) (stating suspect must“initiate[] further communication sufficient to waive the right to counsel”(citing Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85)). 34 Wint remained in continuous pre-indictment, pretrial custody in theCamden County jail when he was transported to the Warminster police stationin Pennsylvania where the same detectives -- who had interrogated him sixmonths earlier when he had requested the presence of counsel -- interrogatedhim again without providing him with counsel. The detectives read Wint hisMiranda rights, which this time he waived, and Wint made an incriminatingadmission -- one that he disputed at trial -- concerning the Camden Countymurder charge. We conclude that Wint did not experience a break in custody within theintendment of Shatzer before he was interrogated without counsel inPennsylvania, and therefore the Edwards presumption of involuntarinessapplies to the admission Wint made to the detectives. For break-in-custodypurposes, Shatzer distinguished the very different worlds and circumstances ofa pretrial detainee and a convicted inmate. A pre-indictment, pretrial detainee’s status is conditional and of limitedduration. Changed circumstances may result in his release from pretrialdetention. Under the New Jersey Criminal Justice Reform Act, “[t]he eligibledefendant shall not remain detained in jail for more than 90 days, not countingexcludable time for reasonable delays . . . , prior to the return of anindictment.” N.J.S.A. 2A:162-22(a)(1)(a). As such, extended pre-indictment 35 detainment should be the exception, not the rule. Indictment triggers the onsetof the formal adversarial judicial process, which in turn entitles a defendant tothe assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 , 688-89 (1972), as well as Article I, Paragraph 10 of the New JerseyConstitution, State v. Sanchez, 129 N.J. 261, 274-78 (1992). “[A]fter thereturn of an indictment, prosecutors and their representatives should notinitiate conversations with an uncounselled defendant.” Id. at 277.5 Ifreturning a pre-indictment detainee to the county jail after he has requestedcounsel during an interrogation counted as a break in custody, then theprosecutor might have a perverse incentive to delay an indictment’s return toallow repeated attempts to interrogate a defendant every couple of weeks. During the pre-indictment period, a pretrial detainee remains in custodywhile his criminal charges are under investigation, and his interrogators appearto control his fate, including the final charges he might face and the sentencehe might receive if convicted. See Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 106, 114. During thistime, “he remains cut off from his normal life and companions, [and] 'thrustinto’ and isolated in an 'unfamiliar,’ 'police-dominated atmosphere.’” Id. at5 Sanchez also cites as authority for this proposition RPC 4.2, which generally bars a lawyer from communicating with a person the lawyer knows is represented by counsel. 129 N.J. at 277 (citing RPC 4.2 (1992) (amended 2003)). 36 106 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 456-57). When a pretrial detainee isreleased into the free world he experiences a break in custody. Id. at 110. Heis no longer “isolated,” he returns “to his normal life for some time before thelater attempted interrogation,” he is “able to seek advice from an attorney,family members, and friends,” and “he knows from his earlier experience thathe need only demand counsel to bring the interrogation to a halt.” Id. at 107-08; see also State v. Wessells, 209 N.J. 395, 413 (2012) (holding that nine daysin community was insufficient break in custody to dissipate coercive taint ofinitial interrogation). As Shatzer explained, convicted inmates stand in a very differentposition because their world is prison. After they are interrogated, “they arereleased back into the general prison population,” where “they return to theiraccustomed surroundings and daily routine,” and where “they regain thedegree of control they had over their lives prior to the interrogation.” 559 U.S. at 113. Unlike pretrial detainees, “[t]heir detention . . . is relativelydisconnected from their prior unwillingness to cooperate in an investigation.The former interrogator has no power to increase the duration of incarceration ,which was determined at sentencing.” Ibid. We now hold that pre-indictment, pretrial detainment does not qualify asa break in custody under Shatzer. Wint’s return to his pre-indictment, pretrial 37 custody in the Camden County jail after two interrogations during which heinvoked his right to counsel was not a return to normalcy. As the UnitedStates Supreme Court observed in Minnick, “the coercive pressures thataccompany custody . . . may increase as custody is prolonged.” 498 U.S. at 153. In the Camden County Prosecutor’s Office, in two separateinvestigations, Wint requested the presence of counsel not less than six times.As Justice Stevens observed in his concurring opinion in Shatzer, “[w]henpolice have not honored an earlier commitment to provide a detainee with alawyer, the detainee likely will 'understan[d] his (expressed) wishes to havebeen ignored’ and 'may well see further objection as futile and confession(true or not) as the only way to end his interrogation.’” 559 U.S. at 121-22(second alteration in original) (quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 ,472-73 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment)). Had the Pennsylvaniadetectives provided Wint with the presence of counsel earlier promised, theycould have attempted a new round of interrogation. Providing Wint with the counsel he requested also would have ensuredthe integrity of the interrogation process. See Minnick, 498 U.S. at 152 (citingMiranda, 384 U.S. at 466). The presence of a lawyer may have foreclosed adispute over the precise words spoken by Wint -- whether he said he“committed a murder” or “did a shooting.” A lawyer may have insisted on the 38 detective audio recording rather than handwriting Wint’s responses or mayhave corrected any error in the detective’s transcription. The benefit ofcounsel is not only to advise the suspect, but also to help guarantee that the“police interrogation conform[s] to the dictates of the [Fifth Amendment].”Ibid. (second alteration in original) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466). Because the detectives initiated the interrogation and did not providecounsel to Wint, Edwards requires suppression of the incriminating statementmade to the detectives concerning the shooting in Camden. We further holdthat the admission of Wint’s statement -- “I committed a murder in Camden” --was not harmless error and was clearly capable of causing an unjust result.See R. 2:10-2. “The test for determining whether an error is harmless 'iswhether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of mighthave contributed to the conviction.’” Sanchez, 129 N.J. at 278 (quotingChapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 23 (1967)). The State charged defendant with committing murder by purposely orknowingly shooting to death Kevin Miller. See N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and (2)(defining murder). No eyewitness testified to the confrontation that led toMiller’s death other than Wint. Wint claimed that he acted in self-defense,relying on the account he gave to his friend several days after the shooting andon his own testimony of how he was “jumped” by Miller and his cohorts. In 39 summation, the prosecutor stated that Wint’s admission was “very important,”and repeatedly argued that Wint’s words offered both “a glimpse into his mindand . . . a window into his soul” and a version of “what really happened.”Wint’s conviction of passion/provocation manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(b)(2), did not mitigate the damage inflicted on Wint’s self-defense claim.Because the erroneous admission of Wint’s statement was not harmless, Wintis entitled to a new trial in the homicide case. Because the erroneousadmission of the statement was not relevant to the certain-persons weaponspossession and resisting-arrest convictions, those convictions stand. In light of our determination that, as a matter of law, no break in custodyoccurred, the Appellate Division erred in remanding to the trial court on thatissue. Additionally, the Appellate Division erred in finding that an Edwardsviolation is subject to an attenuation analysis. The case law does not supportthat proposition. See Roberson, 486 U.S. at 681-82; see also Minnick, 498 U.S. at 159. Last, we need not address in this case whether the Edwardspresumption of involuntariness is “eternal” for pretrial detainees, who mayspend years confined awaiting trial in the custody of a county jail. In summary, at a new trial, the State may not admit as substantiveevidence Wint’s statement to the Pennsylvania detectives. See McNeil, 501 U.S. at 177 (stating that where police “initiate an encounter in the absence of 40 counsel (assuming there has been no break in custody), the suspect’sstatements are presumed involuntary and therefore inadmissible as substantiveevidence at trial”). V. We next dispose of two remaining issues. Because Wint must be retried on the charge of passion/provocationmanslaughter, we need not address whether the prosecutor crossed the line insummation by arguing that the jury draw an adverse inference from Wint’sflight. Although flight is in the case and is fair argument, we caution theprosecutor against using language that treads on Wint’s right against self-incrimination, such as stating, “Does he stay and talk to the police?” See N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19 (“[E]very natural person has a right to refuse to disclose. . . to a police officer or other official any matter that will incriminate him. . . .”); N.J.R.E. 503 (same). Last, we reject Wint’s argument that the trial court improperly dismissedtwo deliberating jurors and replaced them with alternates. One juror evidentlyknew a family member of the victim in the courtroom and mentioned that factto other jurors. The juror who made the observation and another juror towhom she related information expressed an inability to remain impartial.After conducting a voir dire of all the jurors, the court replaced those two 41 compromised jurors with alternates. We agree with the Appellate Divisionthat the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Wint’s motion for amistrial. VI. For the reasons expressed, we reverse the judgment of the AppellateDivision and remand for a new trial on passion/provocation manslaughter.6We affirm the judgments on the certain-persons weapons possession andresisting-arrest convictions. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE ALBIN’s opinion. JUSTICES FERNANDEZ- VINA and SOLOMON did not participate.6 We note that the conviction for possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose was merged into the passion/provocation manslaughter conviction and therefore, on retrial, may be revived. 42