Title: State of New Jersey v. Thomahl S. Cook
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-66-02
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: May 10, 2004

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). The victim, fifteen-year-old Katrina Suhan, was found dead on Sunday, February 15, 1998, having been brutally beaten. Her body was found in a wooded lot behind a bowling alley in Old Bridge. She last had been seen around 12:30 a.m., Saturday, February 14, 1998, walking home alone from a South Amboy roller-skating rink where she had been skating with friends Friday night. Law enforcement officials learned of Cook s possible link to the victim on February 16, 1998, through an acquaintance of defendant, who reported to the police her suspicion of Cook s involvement in the publicized murder. Cook had been known to go the roller rink and had been seen interacting with the Suhan there in the past. Cook had told his girlfriend, who was to be away for the weekend, that he was going to the rink with a friend Friday night. The day after the killing, Cook had cuts on one hand and swollen knuckles, and one arm appeared to be injured. After hearing of the suspicions about Cook s involvement the day after the body was found, the police arrested Cook that evening on the basis of two outstanding municipal warrants and took him to police headquarters in Somerville for questioning about the murder. Cook was interrogated during four sessions with the investigating authorities between 9:50 p.m. on February 16, 1998, and 8:00 p.m. on February 18, 1998, at times by one interrogator and at times by two. The third session was a polygraph examination. Before each session, the officers advised Cook of his Miranda rights and he agreed to speak to them. On February 18, 1998, around mid-day, an attorney from the Office of the Public Defender called the Middlesex County Prosecutor, whose detectives were involved in the interrogations. In response to questions from the attorney, the Prosecutor told him he did not think Cook was represented by the Public Defender because the municipal charges he was being held on during questioning were only disorderly persons offenses and that at that point he was not intending to charge Cook with the murder of Katrina Suhan. The Prosecutor agreed to call the Public Defender if he decided to charge defendant with the murder. The information Cook gave his questioners about his activities and location during the evening of the murder varied from session to session, and ranged from exculpatory at the outset to increasingly inculpatory. At certain points in the questioning, Cook became emotional and his responses were extremely delayed. Ultimately, Cook confessed that he had killed Katrina Suhan after she had rejected his sexual advances. Although recording equipment was available during the interrogation, it was not used. According to the officers, during the nine-hour period of questioning on February 18, 1998, Cook was given meal, cigarette, and beverage breaks. They acknowledged that a statement normally would be taped; however, due to Cook s emotional state, the disjointed nature of his responses to questions, and repeated recanting or changing of his story, the officers decided it would be better to make a written report of the interrogation than to attempt an electronic recording. Cook was indicted for purposeful or knowing murder, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C: 11-3(a)(1) and 3(a)(2). Prior to trial the court considered motions regarding evidence to be presented. The court denied Cook s motion to introduce evidence of a local murder with some similarities to Katrina Suhan s that occurred a year later, while Cook was incarcerated. After a Miranda hearing, the court ruled that the State could introduce at trial the statements Cook made during the three non-polygraph interrogation sessions. (The State did not seek to use the polygraph results.) The court found that Cook had received the required Miranda warnings, had understood them, and had knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights. The court concluded that Cook had made his statements voluntarily. The jury convicted Cook of purposeful and knowing murder. He was sentenced to a term of sixty years of incarceration with a lengthy period of parole ineligibility. Cook appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed his conviction in an unpublished opinion, but remanded to the trial court to correct an error in the sentence imposed. In affirming, the Appellate Division held that Cook s statements were admissible because the failure to record a suspect s statement electronically does not in and of itself constitute a violation of due process, but is a factor to be weighed in assessing the reliability of the statement. Also, the panel held that Cook s rights had not been violated by the failure of the prosecutor to inform him that a public defender had called while he was being questioned, noting that no attorney-client relationship existed at the time of the call. Finally, the court concluded the trial court had not erred in refusing to admit evidence of the later murder. The Supreme Court granted Cook s petition for certification. HELD : The statements Thomahl Cook made during questioning by police were properly admitted into evidence at his murder trial. Electronic recordation of a custodial interrogation is not required as a matter of due process under the New Jersey Constitution. Pursuant to the Supreme Court s supervisory authority over the criminal justice system, the Court will establish a committee to examine and make recommendations on the use of electronic audio and video recording of custodial interrogations. 1. There was no attorney-client relationship between Cook and the public defender at the time the public defender asked the prosecutor about defendant, so the authorities had no duty to inform him of the contact and there was no violation of Cook s privilege against self-incrimination. (pp. 16-20). 2.Only two state supreme courts have held that custodial interrogations must be recorded electronically, one as a matter of due process under the Alaska Constitution, the other, under the Supreme Court of Minnesota s supervisory powers over the criminal justice process. Two other states have enacted legislation requiring electronic recording of interrogations. There are perceived to be both benefits and drawbacks to recording custodial statements. Among the benefits are a more accurate picture of the circumstances surrounding the statement, an objective record of the statement, the enhanced ability of the trier of fact to assess credibility and weigh evidence, and a curtailed opportunity to make false allegations against police. Cited drawbacks to an absolute requirement of recording include the reluctance of some suspects to speak candidly on camera and the expense of equipment, transcription, and modifications to facilities. (pp. 20-30). 3. The imposition of a rule precluding the admissibility of a confession solely because it was not recorded electronically would have significant consequences. The interests of suspects and law enforcement must be balanced, and there is no uniformity in view or practice in how electronic recording procedures are or should be implemented. Because of the fair-minded disagreement in this area, the failure of the police to record Cook s statements electronically did not deprive him of due process and render his statements inadmissible. (pp. 31-33). 4. Recording custodial interrogations electronically would benefit those involved in the criminal justice process by addressing concerns in the areas of reliability and trustworthiness of confessions. Entities in the executive and legislative branches of government are exploring the subject of electronic recording of statements and interrogations. The judiciary is responsible for the proper administration of criminal justice, and it is time for the Supreme Court to evaluate fully the protections electronic recordation provides criminal defendants and the State. The Court will establish a committee to study and make recommendations on the use of electronic recordation of custodial interrogations. (pp. 33-36). 5. The factors considered by the trial court at the suppression hearing and the standards applied by the court in evaluating Cook s condition support the court s conclusion that Cook has not shown that he was subject to substantial psychological pressure warranting suppression of his statements. In addition, the State met its burden of producing sufficient evidence to corroborate Cook s confession for purposes of letting the jury decide the confession s reliability. The verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. (pp.37-42). 6. There was no clear error of judgment or manifest denial of justice in the trial court s determination to bar Cook from introducing exculpatory evidence of a similar murder committed while Cook was incarcerated. (pp. 42-46). Judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED. JUSTICE LONG has filed a separate dissenting opinion in which she states her view that pursuant to the Court s supervisory authority, the Court should declare now that all criminal interrogations must be recorded electronically, where feasible, when the interrogation takes place at police headquarters or another place of detention. She would leave to a committee only a charge to make recommendations regarding the details and specifics of electronic recording. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES VERNIERO, ZAZZALI, and WALLACE join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA s opinion. JUSTICE LONG has filed a separate dissenting opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN did not participate. v. THOMAHL S. COOK, Defendant-Appellant. Argued November 5, 2003 Decided May 10, 2004 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Marcia H. Blum, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney). Paul H. Heinzel, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Peter C. Harvey, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney). Leslie Stolbof Sinemus argued the cause for amicus curiae, Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey. Marcia N. Levy, Steven A. Drizin, a member of the Illinois bar, and Barry C. Scheck, a Member of the New York and California bars, submitted a brief on behalf of amici curiae Northwestern University School of Law s Center on Wrongful Convictions, Innocence Project at Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law and Rutgers University Law School Innocence Project for Justice (Ms. Levy, attorney; Ms. Levy, Mr. Drizin and Mr. Scheck, on the brief). JUSTICE LaVECCHIA delivered the opinion of the Court. Defendant Thomahl Cook appeals his conviction for the purposeful and knowing murder of Katrina Suhan. He asserts various arguments contending that his statements to investigating law enforcement officers improperly were admitted into evidence. Among them, defendant urges us to find that state due process requirements impose on police officers a duty to record electronically an accused s statements made during a custodial interrogation, and that the failure to record requires suppression of his incriminatory statements. Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in refusing to admit evidence that suggested the guilt of an unidentified third party and that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. We find no reversible error and, therefore, affirm the judgment of conviction entered against him. In respect of the assertion that custodial interrogations must be recorded electronically, we decline to expand the due process requirements of the New Jersey Constitution to encompass a duty that the police record electronically a custodial interrogation, and note specifically the absence of any legislative action to support such a requirement. That said, we conclude that, as part of our supervisory authority over the criminal justice system, we will establish a committee to examine and make recommendations on the use of electronic audio and video recording of custodial interrogations. The committee shall seek input from the competing interests of law enforcement, at the State and local levels, and the public defender and the criminal defense bar. In sum, we conclude that it would be inappropriate to impose sweeping changes in law enforcement practices of the sort advanced by defendant without notice and without permitting thorough consideration of the policy and financial implications of those changes. The Appellate Division affirmed defendant s conviction in an unpublished opinion, remanding only for correction of a sentencing error. See footnote 4 In respect of the prosecutor s memorandum expanding the record, the court observed that n o attorney-client relationship had come into existence at the time the public defender telephoned the prosecutor. Accordingly, the court concluded that there had been no violation of Reed, supra, in the prosecutor s handling of the public defender s inquiry. The panel further held that the failure of law enforcement to record a suspect s statement by electronic means is a factor to be weighed when determining the statement s reliability, but standing alone does not present a violation of defendant s due process rights. Finally, the Appellate Division concluded that the trial court did not err in prohibiting defendant from presenting evidence in respect of the Noga murder. We granted defendant s petition for certification, 175 N.J. 548 (2003). . . . The defendant was a high school graduate. There was no indication that he was unwilling to speak, nor that he was excessively tired. The interrogation, although lengthy, it was all during the general work day, and there was no indication that he was sleep deprived, or that he was in any way physically or mentally abused. He was given breaks, had one meal and refused another. Although he was emotionally distraught, his will was not overborne. The emotional distress seems more related to the horrible things he was admitting than to anything else. The trial court applied the correct standards and amply explained its application of those standards when evaluating defendant s condition while he was interrogated. We agree with the trial court s conclusion, affirmed by the Appellate Division, that defendant has not shown that he was subject to substantial psychological pressure warranting suppression of his statements. We see no reason to add to the evaluation of the trial court, and therefore reject the argument advanced by defendant. Defendant also contends that his confession should have been excluded because it is uncorroborated, and that his motion for judgment of acquittal should have been granted. When the State seeks to introduce a confession into evidence, some corroboration is required as a matter of law but if there is such corroboration, [it is for] the jury [to] resolve arguments and speculation about its weight and sufficiency. State v. Di Frisco, 118 N.J. 253, 271-72 (1990), cert. denied, DiFrisco v. New Jersey, 537 U.S. 1220, 123 S. Ct. 1323, 154 L. Ed. 2d 1076. Commentators have noted that New Jersey's requirements are narrow with respect to the quantum of evidence required to establish corroboration of a confession offered by the State for the truth of its contents. 7 J. Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence, 2071, at 515 n.3 (Chadbourn rev. 1978) (citing Lucas, supra, 30 N.J. 37; State v. Johnson, 31 N.J. 489 (1960)), quoted in DiFrisco, supra, 118 N.J. at 273. Under that standard the State . . . must produce only independent proof of facts and circumstances which strengthen or bolster the confession and tend to generate a belief in its trustworthiness. Lucas, supra, 30 N.J. at 56. . . . Or, in other words, [a]ll elements of the offense must be established by independent evidence or corroborated admissions, but one available mode of corroboration is for independent evidence to bolster the confession itself and thereby prove the offense through the statements of the accused. [State v. Mancine, supra, 124 N.J. at 251 (quoting DiFrisco, supra, 118 N.J. at 273 (quoting Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 156, 75 S. Ct. 194, 199, 99 L. Ed. 2d 192, 200-01 (1954))).] Our corroboration standard requires that the trial court determine whether there is any legal evidence, apart from the confession of facts and circumstances, from which the jury might draw an inference that the confession is trustworthy. Lucas, supra, 30 N.J. at 62. The corroboration requirement has both legal and factual components. As a matter of law, the trial court initially must determine whether the State has presented independent corroborative evidence of the trustworthiness of the confession. If the State presents some corroboration, DiFrisco, supra, 118 N.J. at 271, the confession is submitted to the fact finder to resolve arguments and speculation about its weight and sufficiency. Id. at 272 (internal quotation marks omitted). As noted by the Appellate Division, the State met its burden, producing more than sufficient evidence to corroborate the substance of defendant s confession for purposes of sending the question of its reliability to the jury for determination. The State s witnesses testified about where Suhan s body was discovered and the injuries she suffered, which information corresponded to defendant s statements about his presence at the body s location and what he observed, specifically his reference to the red thing nearby the pile he saw there, and his description of the manner in which he attacked Suhan. Furthermore, multiple witnesses testified about defendant s expressed desire to go to the roller rink on the night of the crime, and one observed injuries to defendant s right hand the day after the murder occurred. We conclude that the State presented the corroboration required under Lucas and DiFrisco, and that the trial court properly let the jury resolve how much weight the confession should be given. Moreover, it was for the jury to evaluate the strength of that evidence, weighed against the State s failure to demonstrate definitively how defendant got to South Amboy. And, although sketchy, there was evidence that defendant could drive (notwithstanding his lack of a driver s license), and that there was adequate time for him to have gotten from Somerville to South Amboy. Thus, although defendant never argued at trial that the jury s conviction was against the weight of the evidence, not having moved for a new trial on this ground in a timely manner, see Rule 2:10-1, defendant has not proven that the guilty verdict was a manifest denial of justice. We reject defendant s separate argument that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. III. Defendant also argues that he was denied a fair trial because he was prevented from making a presentation to the jury concerning evidence of a similar murder, committed while defendant was incarcerated, that would have presented the prospect of third-party guilt. A defendant is entitled to introduce evidence that another person committed the crime or crimes of which the defendant is charged. State v. Jiminez, 175 N.J. 475, 486 (2003). Often a defendant attempts to place responsibility for the crime on a specific third party. See State v. Koedatich, 112 N.J. 225, 297-312 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1017, 109 S. Ct. 813, 102 L. Ed. 2d 803 (1989). A corollary is the situation presented here in which a defendant seeks to introduce similar other-crimes evidence defensively. State v. Garfole, 76 N.J. 445, 453 (1978) (Garfole I). The standard for introducing defensive other-crimes evidence is lower than the standard imposed on the State when such evidence is used incriminitorily [because] when the defendant is offering that proof exculpatorily, prejudice to the defendant is no longer a factor, and simple relevance to guilt or innocence should suffice as the standard of admissibility. Id. at 452-53. Even if defensive other-crimes evidence passes the simple relevancy test, however, a court must still consider whether its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk that its admission will either (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of . . . confusing the issues or of misleading the jury. Id. at 455-56 (quoting former Evid. R. 4). See footnote 7 Thus, a trial court must analyze the proffered defensive other-crimes evidence pursuant to N.J.R.E. 403. In Garfole I, we characterized the trial court s determination on the admissibility of defensive other-crimes evidence as highly discretionary, depending as it does on the weighing and balancing of the various Rule 403 factors. Id. at 457. Accord State v. Bull, 268 N.J. Super. 504, 511-13 (App. Div. 1993) (holding that, under highly discretionary standard, trial court s refusal to admit portion of defensive other crimes evidence at most was harmless error). Garfole I is instructive. In that case the defendant was charged in relation to five incidents involving the molestation of minors. The State dismissed the charges against the defendant concerning all but one of the episodes, and the defendant was convicted on all charges arising from that remaining episode. The defendant attempted to offer evidence of the four episodes for which all charges against him were dismissed, hoping to establish that the similarity of the conduct in each of the five episodes led to the conclusion that one person was responsible for all of them and that defendant was not that person because he had an alibi for all but two of the occasions involved. Id. at 448. The trial court rejected the defendant s proffer, and we remanded for a determination concerning whether the proffered evidence satisfied our modified relevancy analysis. Id. at 457. On remand, the trial court found that the probative value of the defendant s proffer was substantially outweighed by the likelihood that the jury would be confused and misled because defendant s evidence would result in a series of mini-trials as to defendant s guilt on charges for which he was not being tried. State v. Garfole, 80 N.J. 350, 352 (1979) (Garfole II). We agreed with the trial court s conclusions and affirmed. Ibid. In this matter, during a pre-trial Rule 104 hearing, defendant sought to present evidence of the murder of Nancy Noga, a young, Caucasian female, about the same age as Katrina Suhan who, like Katrina, had brown eyes and long brown hair. Noga s body was found in January 1999, in an area approximately one mile from where Suhan s body was found. Both victims encountered their assailants while walking home at night. Noga s death also was caused by a blunt trauma to her head. Because the Noga investigation was ongoing, the Court s review included in camera review of certain information. Similar to Garfole I, defendant sought to establish that an unknown third person committed both murders, which if true, would raise a reasonable doubt concerning defendant s guilt because he was incarcerated at the time of Noga s murder. The trial court found that the Noga murder met the simple relevance requirements of Garfole I for introducing defensive other-crimes evidence because of the superficial similarity of the victims, who were close in age and body-type. However, the trial court also determined that the probative value of the proffered evidence was minimal. Specifically, although Katrina s assailant had a sexual motive, there was no evidence of any sexual motive in the Noga killing. Also, Suhan appears to have been abducted by her assailant in a vehicle and taken to the area where her body was found. In contrast, there was no evidence that Noga was abducted -- Noga s body was found near where she was last seen. The trial court found nothing distinctive to tie the two [crimes] together in any manner to indicate that they were the work of the same person. Finally, the trial court observed that it would have to hold a mini-trial of sorts on serial killers and homicidal pathology to link the two crimes, an exercise that the court determined would have tremendous potential for confusing and misleading the jury. On balance, the court determined that those countervailing factors substantially outweighed the minimal probative value of the proffer and excluded the evidence. We accord substantial deference to the trial court s highly discretionary determination. Garfole I, supra, 76 N.J. 457; see generally State v. Morton, 155 N.J. 383, 454 (1998) (citing Koedatich, supra, 112 N.J. at 313 (affirming trial court s N.J.R.E. 403 ruling that was not a clear error of judgment and did not result in manifest denial of justice )). The Appellate Division aptly described the trial court s analysis as comprehensive and thoughtful. Cook, supra, slip op. at 16. As in Garfole, on review of a full record and the application of the correct test for admissibility, we find no clear error of judgment or manifest denial of justice. We affirm the trial court s denial of defendant s asserted evidence of third-party guilt. IV. The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES VERNIERO, ZAZZALI, and WALLACE join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA s opinion. JUSTICE LONG filed a separate dissenting opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN did not participate. v. THOMAHL S. COOK, Defendant-Appellant. JUSTICE LONG, dissenting. Although recognizing our supervisory power over courts, as well as our overarching interest in the integrity of the criminal interrogation process, the majority opinion falls short of what I view as necessary definitive action. I would take the lead of the Minnesota Supreme Court and declare today, pursuant to our supervisory authority, that all criminal interrogations must be recorded electronically, where feasible, when the interrogation occurs at police headquarters or at another place of detention. State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. 1994). In the final analysis, a determination of the admissibility of a defendant s statement in a criminal proceeding is a purely judicial function. Why we should suffer, for one more day, the funneling of the reality of an interrogation through the lenses of partisans, with the concomitant frailty of language and recollection, when a true recording could be made, is simply beyond me. The recording requirement would provide courts with the best evidence against which to evaluate a defendant s challenge to the admission of an inculpatory statement. At the same time, it would enhance public confidence in law enforcement and insulate police officers from wrongful assaults on their integrity. That electronic recording would place courts in the very best position to properly assess the admissibility of a confession simply cannot be doubted. Moreover, as the majority has acknowledged, the sky is falling arguments advanced by the State are belied by the reality that police agencies throughout the nation have undertaken electronic recording with no dire consequences. I have no difficulty with the majority s notion of establishing a committee to study the issue further. However, it is my opinion that that committee should be charged with recommending the details and specifics of electronic recording and filling in the interstices of a procedure that we, in the first instance, should have mandated. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. THOMAHL S. COOK, Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED May 10, 2004 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice LaVecchia CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY DISSENTING OPINION BY Justice Long