Title: State v. Hinkle
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2017AP001416-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: November 12, 2019

2019 WI 96 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2017AP1416-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Matthew C. Hinkle, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 384 Wis. 2d 612,921 N.W.2d 219 
PDC No:2018 WI App 67 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
November 12, 2019 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 4, 2019 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Fond du Lac 
 
JUDGE: 
Robert J. Wirtz 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
DALLET, J. dissents, joined by A.W. BRADLEY, J. 
(opinion filed) 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: HAGEDORN, J. did not participate.       
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Christina Starner, Green Bay. There was an oral 
argument by Christina Starner. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Aaron R. O’Neil, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral 
argument by Aaron R. O’Neil. 
 
 
 
2019 WI 96
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2017AP1416-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2015CF418) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Matthew C. Hinkle, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
NOV 12, 2019 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   We review whether Fond du 
Lac County Circuit Court1 properly exercised adult-court criminal 
jurisdiction over then-16-year-old Matthew C. Hinkle based on 
Milwaukee County Circuit Court's prior decision to waive Hinkle 
from juvenile court to adult court.2  Our decision turns on the 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Robert J. Wirtz presided. 
2 We commonly use the terms "juvenile court" and "adult 
court" in these cases for ease of reference and understanding.  
As the court of appeals decision points out, Wisconsin does not 
have "juvenile courts" or "adult courts."  We have circuit 
courts with general jurisdiction over all matters civil and 
criminal.  We refer to a court as a "juvenile court" because the 
cases heard there involve juveniles being adjudicated under the 
(continued) 
No. 
2017AP1416-CR   
 
2 
 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1) and how its text 
prescribes the practice commonly referenced by those handling 
juvenile cases as "once waived, always waived."3   
¶2 
Hinkle contends Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1) confines the 
"once waived, always waived" rule to each individual county—
meaning Hinkle could be waived into adult court only if another 
Fond du Lac County Circuit Court previously waived him.  He 
argues Fond du Lac improperly relied on Milwaukee's waiver and, 
as a result, the Fond du Lac County Circuit Court lacked 
competency4 to handle his case. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Juvenile Justice Code.  We use the term "adult court" to 
identify when a juvenile will be transferred from a court 
handling juvenile matters (a.k.a. "juvenile court") to a court 
where a juvenile will be prosecuted as an adult under the 
criminal law (a.k.a. "adult court").  The terms do not 
differentiate between types of courts but instead signify 
whether a juvenile's case will be determined by the laws 
applicable to juveniles under Wis. Stat. ch. 938 or whether the 
juvenile will be prosecuted as an adult and subject to the 
criminal code under Wis. Stat. chs. 939-951.  See State v. 
Hinkle, 2018 WI App 67, ¶1 n.2, 384 Wis. 2d 612, 921 N.W.2d 219 
(quoting and citing State v. Schroeder, 224 Wis. 2d 706, 719-20, 
593 N.W.2d 76 (Ct. App. 1999)). 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
4 The 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
confers 
subject 
matter 
jurisdiction on circuit courts over "all matters civil and 
criminal."  Wis. Const. art. VII, § 8.  "Accordingly, a circuit 
court is never without subject matter jurisdiction."  City of 
Eau Claire v. Booth, 2016 WI 65, ¶12, 370 Wis. 2d 595, 882 
N.W.2d 738 (quoted source omitted).  Competency is a distinct 
concept: 
(continued) 
No. 
2017AP1416-CR   
 
3 
 
¶3 
The State disagrees with Hinkle's restrictive view of 
Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1).  The State argues the statute's text 
does not impose a county-specific restriction; instead, the 
State construes the statute to give circuit courts across 
Wisconsin 
original 
adult-court 
jurisdiction 
over 
crimes 
committed by juveniles who have been previously waived into 
adult court when those prior proceedings are still pending or 
when the prior proceedings resulted in conviction.  Both the 
circuit court and the court of appeals agreed with the State.  
We do as well. 
¶4 
We hold Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1) conferred exclusive 
original adult jurisdiction over Hinkle based on Milwaukee 
County Circuit Court's prior waiver.  The text of the statute 
does not impose a county-specific limitation on the rule 
commonly referred to as "once waived, always waived."  The Fond 
du Lac County Circuit Court properly relied on Milwaukee's 
waiver to move Hinkle from Fond du Lac's juvenile jurisdiction 
to Fond du Lac's adult jurisdiction.  Accordingly, the Fond du 
Lac County Circuit Court possessed competency to hear Hinkle's 
                                                                                                                                                             
Noncompliance with statutory mandates affects a court's 
competency and "a court's 'competency,' as the term is 
understood in Wisconsin, is not jurisdictional at all, but 
instead, is defined as 'the power of a court to exercise 
its subject matter jurisdiction' in a particular case." 
City of Eau Claire, 2016 WI 65, ¶7, 370 Wis. 2d 595 (quoting 
State v. 
Smith, 2005 WI 104, ¶18, 283 Wis. 2d 57, 699 
N.W.2d 508). 
No. 
2017AP1416-CR   
 
4 
 
case under the criminal code applicable to adults.  We affirm 
the decision of the court of appeals. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶5 
In July 2015, then-16-year-old Hinkle approached a 
stopped car in Milwaukee County, reached into the driver's 
window, shut off the car, took the keys, and ordered the driver 
out of the car.  Hinkle then took the car and drove it to Fond 
du Lac.  Fond du Lac Police Officer Ben Hardgrove saw the car 
parked at a gas station and pulled up behind it to block its 
egress.  Hardgrove saw four people in the car, including Hinkle, 
who was in the driver's seat.  Hardgrove ordered the occupants 
to "show their hands."  Hinkle ignored the officer's command and 
started ramming the car he was driving into Hardgrove's squad 
car and a second car parked near him in an attempt to escape.  
At the same time, the other passengers exited the car.  Hinkle 
eventually cleared enough space to get past Hardgrove's squad 
car and fled the gas station at a high rate of speed. 
¶6 
Fond du Lac police pursued Hinkle, who led them on a 
high-speed chase through residential areas.  Police reported 
Hinkle driving between 60-100 mph on his way out of town and 
reaching 120 mph when he drove back into town.  Hinkle's car 
came to a stop only after he crashed into an SUV.  Instead of 
stopping as the police ordered him to do, Hinkle then fled on 
foot.  The police chased Hinkle down with the help of a canine 
officer and arrested him. 
¶7 
The State pursued charges against Hinkle in the 
circuit courts of both Milwaukee County and Fond du Lac County.  
No. 
2017AP1416-CR   
 
5 
 
Because Hinkle was 16 years old, the State filed delinquency 
petitions.  See Wis. Stat. § 938.12(1) ("IN GENERAL.  The court 
[acting under ch. 938] has exclusive jurisdiction, except as 
provided in ss. 938.17, 938.18, and 938.183, over any juvenile 
10 years of age or older who is alleged to be delinquent.").  
The delinquency petition filed in Milwaukee contained two 
counts.5  The delinquency petition filed in Fond du Lac contained 
14 counts.6  In addition, the State filed a criminal complaint in 
Fond du Lac charging Hinkle as an adult with four counts:  one 
count of attempting to flee and three counts of hit and run.  
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 346.04(3), 
343.31(3)(d)1, 
346.67(1), 
346.74(5)(a), and 939.50(3)(i).  Hinkle was charged as an adult 
on these four traffic counts pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 938.17, 
which 
gives 
"courts 
of 
criminal 
and 
civil 
jurisdiction" 
"exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings against juveniles 16 
years of age or older" for these violations.   
¶8 
The State also filed petitions under Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.18 in both Milwaukee and Fond du Lac, requesting that 
                                                 
5 The two counts were:  (1) robbery use of force, and (2) 
take and operate a motor vehicle without the owner's consent.  
See Wis. Stat. §§ 943.32(1)(a) and 943.23(2). 
6 The 14 counts included:  seven counts of second-degree 
recklessly endangering safety; one count of take and operate a 
motor vehicle without the owner's consent; three counts of 
obstructing a police officer; and three counts of criminal 
damage 
to 
property. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 941.30(2), 
939.50(3)(g)&(h), 
943.23(2), 
946.41(1), 
939.51(3)(a), 
and 
943.01(1). 
No. 
2017AP1416-CR   
 
6 
 
Hinkle be waived from juvenile court to adult court.7  The 
Milwaukee County Circuit Court held a waiver hearing and granted 
the State's waiver petition.8  The State then filed a criminal 
complaint in Milwaukee County Circuit Court charging Hinkle as 
an adult with:  (1) robbery with use of force and (2) take and 
                                                 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 938.18 sets forth the conditions under 
which a party or the court can request that a juvenile "14 or 
older" be waived from juvenile to adult court: 
Jurisdiction for criminal proceedings for juveniles 14 or 
older; waiver hearing. 
(1) WAIVER OF JUVENILE COURT JURISDICTION; CONDITION 
FOR. Subject to s. 938.183, a petition requesting the 
court to waive its jurisdiction under this chapter may 
be filed if the juvenile meets any of the following 
conditions: 
(a) The juvenile is alleged to have violated s. 
940.03, 940.06, 940.225 (1) or (2), 940.305, 940.31, 
943.10 (2), 943.32 (2), 943.87 or 961.41 (1) on or 
after the juvenile's 14th birthday. 
(b) The juvenile is alleged to have committed a 
violation on or after the juvenile's 14th birthday at 
the request of or for the benefit of a criminal gang, 
as defined in s. 939.22 (9), that would constitute a 
felony under chs. 939 to 948 or 961 if committed by an 
adult. 
(c) The juvenile is alleged to have violated any state 
criminal law on or after the juvenile's 15th birthday. 
8 At a waiver hearing, the circuit court first determines 
whether 
the 
matter 
has 
prosecutive 
merit. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 938.18(4).  If the circuit court finds prosecutive merit, both 
the district attorney and the juvenile have the opportunity to 
present testimony and cross-examine witnesses.  § 938.18(3) & 
(4). After considering the testimony and any other relevant 
evidence in the record, the circuit court decides whether the 
criteria for waiver in § 938.18(5) have been met.  
No. 
2017AP1416-CR   
 
7 
 
operate a vehicle without owner's consent.  See Wis. Stat. 
§§ 943.32(1)(a) and 943.23(2). 
¶9 
While the Milwaukee case was pending, the Fond du Lac 
County Circuit Court considered the State's waiver petition.  
Hinkle wanted to contest the waiver in Fond du Lac, and be 
adjudicated as a juvenile.  However, everyone, including 
Hinkle's lawyer, agreed that the rule regularly referred to as 
"once waived, always waived" applied.  The circuit court and the 
parties interpreted Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1) to require the Fond 
du Lac County Circuit Court to waive Hinkle because the 
Milwaukee County Circuit Court had previously done so.  The Fond 
du 
Lac 
County 
Circuit 
Court 
ruled 
that, 
pursuant 
to  
§ 938.183(1), Hinkle must be prosecuted as an adult. 
¶10 The State filed an amended Information in Fond du Lac 
County Circuit Court, now charging Hinkle as an adult for all 18 
counts——the four traffic counts from the original criminal 
complaint, plus the 14 counts from the delinquency petition.  
Hinkle accepted the plea bargain offered by the State, pled no 
contest to six counts, and entered an Alford plea on one count;9 
the remaining 11 counts were dismissed and read-in.10  The 
                                                 
9 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
10   A read-in charge is any crime "that is uncharged 
or that is dismissed as part of a plea agreement, that 
the defendant agrees to be considered by the court at 
the time of sentencing and that the court considers at 
the time of sentencing the defendant for the crime for 
which 
the 
defendant 
was 
convicted." 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.20(1g)(b). 
Similar 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.20(1g)(b), we have defined read-in charges as 
(continued) 
No. 
2017AP1416-CR   
 
8 
 
circuit court imposed a total sentence of six years of initial 
confinement and three years of extended supervision to be 
followed by two years of probation.11 
¶11 Hinkle then filed a postconviction motion in Fond du 
Lac County Circuit Court seeking to vacate his convictions, 
withdraw his pleas, and transfer the 14 counts back to juvenile 
court jurisdiction.  Hinkle argued that Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1) 
did not give Fond du Lac Circuit Court competency to proceed 
over the 14 juvenile counts because the "once waived, always 
waived" rule should be county-specific.  In other words, Hinkle 
argued that for Fond du Lac County Circuit Court to waive Hinkle 
without a waiver hearing, the statute required a prior waiver by 
a Fond du Lac County Circuit Court.  Hinkle contended the 
statutory language limits a circuit court's reliance on previous 
juvenile court waivers to the specific county in which the prior 
waiver occurred.  Accordingly, Hinkle asserted Fond du Lac 
County improperly relied on Milwaukee County's waiver, never 
                                                                                                                                                             
"charges [that] are expected to be considered in 
sentencing, 
with 
the 
understanding 
that 
read-in 
charges could increase the sentence up to the maximum 
that the defendant could receive for the conviction in 
exchange for the promise not to prosecute those 
additional offenses."  
State v. Sulla, 2016 WI 46, ¶33, 369 Wis. 2d 225, 880 N.W.2d 659 
(quoting State v. Frey, 2012 WI 99, ¶68, 343 Wis. 2d 358, 817 
N.W.2d 436) (footnotes omitted). 
11 Hinkle also entered into a plea bargain in the Milwaukee 
County case:  he pled to one charge and the second was 
dismissed. 
No. 
2017AP1416-CR   
 
9 
 
acquired adult-court jurisdiction over Hinkle, and, as a result, 
lacked competency to preside over Hinkle's case in adult court.  
¶12 The Fond du Lac County Circuit Court rejected Hinkle's 
interpretation and denied the motion, reasoning: 
I think the essence of the argument here is that 
Mr. Hinkle couldn't be transferred to adult court in 
Fond du Lac based on the waiver -- his waiver from 
juvenile 
court 
in 
Milwaukee 
to 
adult 
court 
in 
Milwaukee and, then, the subsequent violation in Fond 
du Lac County, which was then waived into adult court.  
And the statute . . . 938.183 [says] " . . . courts of 
criminal jurisdiction have exclusive jurisdiction over 
all of the following: 
A juvenile who is alleged to have violated any 
state criminal law if the juvenile has been convicted 
of 
a 
previous 
violation 
following 
waiver 
of 
jurisdiction under" some statute sections, basically 
juvenile court sections, "by the court assigned to 
exercise jurisdiction under this chapter," 938, the 
juvenile justice code.  And it says "by the court 
assigned to exercise jurisdiction" under the chapter.  
It doesn't indicate, specifically, that it has to be 
in the same county.  And there are a multitude of 
courts which vary; based on time, and year, and place; 
who are assigned.  You know, judges get an assignment 
to a particular duty, whether it's for a year or for a 
short period of time.  Right now I'm assigned to 
intake, which includes juvenile matters.  And, so, as 
I read the statute, if a person has been waived -- 
convicted 
of 
a 
violation 
following 
waiver 
of 
jurisdiction by a court -- by the court assigned to 
exercise 
jurisdiction 
under 
the 
chapter, 
that's 
sufficient.  It doesn't have to be in the particular 
same county, because that isn't what the statute says.  
The 
court 
assigned 
to 
exercise 
juvenile 
court 
jurisdiction can be, by lack of limitation, any 
particular court there is assigned to juvenile court 
jurisdiction. 
Mr. Hinkle was waived into adult court and 
convicted in adult court and, given that waiver and 
that transfer into adult court in Milwaukee . . . it 
No. 
2017AP1416-CR   
 
10 
 
was acceptable . . . for the court here with criminal 
court jurisdiction to have jurisdiction over him. 
¶13 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
order denying Hinkle's postconviction motion and agreed with the 
circuit court's interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1).  The 
court of appeals interpreted § 938.183(1)(b) to give a circuit 
court hearing criminal cases "exclusive original jurisdiction 
over" a juvenile when three conditions apply:   
 (1)  the juvenile is presently alleged to have committed 
a criminal violation; 
 (2)  a juvenile court has waived its jurisdiction over 
the juvenile for a previous violation; and  
 (3) 
either 
that 
previous 
violation 
resulted 
in 
a 
conviction or the criminal proceedings remain pending. 
State v. Hinkle, 2018 WI App 67, ¶21, 384 Wis. 2d 612, 921 
N.W.2d 219.  Hinkle filed a petition for review of the court of 
appeals decision, which this court granted. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶14 This case involves the interpretation and application 
of Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1), "which is a question of law we 
review independently, although we benefit from the decisions by 
the court of appeals and circuit court."  See State v. Talley, 
2017 WI 21, ¶24, 373 Wis. 2d 610, 891 N.W.2d 390.  "We 
independently review questions of subject matter jurisdiction 
and competency."  City of Eau Claire v. Booth, 2016 WI 65, ¶6, 
370 Wis. 2d 595, 882 N.W.2d 738. 
 
No. 
2017AP1416-CR   
 
11 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶15 The dispute centers on the text of Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.183(1), which provides: 
Original 
adult 
court 
jurisdiction 
for 
criminal 
proceedings. 
(1)  JUVENILES UNDER ADULT COURT JURISDICTION. 
Notwithstanding ss. 938.12 (1) and 938.18, courts of 
criminal 
jurisdiction 
have 
exclusive 
original 
jurisdiction over all of the following: 
(a) A juvenile who has been adjudicated 
delinquent and who is alleged to have violated s. 
940.20 (1) or 946.43 while placed in a juvenile 
correctional 
facility, 
a 
juvenile 
detention 
facility, or a secured residential care center 
for 
children 
and 
youth 
or 
who 
has 
been 
adjudicated delinquent and who is alleged to have 
committed a violation of s. 940.20 (2m). 
(am) A juvenile who is alleged to have 
attempted or committed a violation of s. 940.01 
or to have committed a violation of s. 940.02 or 
940.05 on or after the juvenile's 10th birthday. 
(ar) A juvenile specified in par. (a) or 
(am) 
who 
is 
alleged 
to 
have 
attempted 
or 
committed a violation of any state criminal law 
in addition to the violation alleged under par. 
(a) or (am) if the violation alleged under this 
paragraph and the violation alleged under par. 
(a) or (am) may be joined under s. 971.12 (1). 
(b) A juvenile who is alleged to have 
violated any state criminal law if the juvenile 
has been convicted of a previous violation 
following waiver of jurisdiction under s. 48.18, 
1993 stats., or s. 938.18 by the court assigned 
to exercise jurisdiction under this chapter and 
ch. 48 or if the court assigned to exercise 
jurisdiction under this chapter and ch. 48 has 
waived its jurisdiction over the juvenile for a 
previous violation and criminal proceedings on 
that previous violation are still pending. 
No. 
2017AP1416-CR   
 
12 
 
(c) A juvenile who is alleged to have 
violated any state criminal law if the juvenile 
has been convicted of a previous violation over 
which the court of criminal jurisdiction had 
original jurisdiction under this section or if 
proceedings on a previous violation over which 
the court of criminal jurisdiction has original 
jurisdiction 
under 
this 
section 
are 
still 
pending. 
(Emphasis 
added.) 
 
The 
underscored 
text 
underlies 
the 
disagreement in this case. 
¶16 The 
parties 
agree 
that 
"courts 
of 
criminal 
jurisdiction" means Wisconsin's circuit courts hearing criminal 
cases where defendants are prosecuted as adults.  Likewise, the 
parties agree that "the court assigned to exercise jurisdiction 
under this chapter and ch. 48" means circuit courts hearing 
juvenile matters where juveniles may be adjudicated delinquent 
under the Juvenile Justice Code.  The dispute is whether "the 
court assigned to exercise jurisdiction" i.e., the juvenile 
court waiving jurisdiction, means only the specific circuit 
court where the juvenile was waived.  That is, does the 
statutory language confine previous waivers to specific counties 
so that a previous waiver under Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1)(b) in 
Milwaukee County Circuit Court confers exclusive original 
jurisdiction only on the courts of criminal jurisdiction in 
Milwaukee County. 
¶17 When interpreting a statute, we start with the 
language of the statute, and if the meaning of the text is 
plain, we need go no further.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit 
Court, 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  
No. 
2017AP1416-CR   
 
13 
 
"Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted 
meaning, except that technical or specially-defined words or 
phrases are given their technical or special definitional 
meaning."  Id.  In determining the meaning of the text, context 
and the statute's structure are important so that the words are 
not viewed in isolation, but are considered together with 
"closely-related" statutes.  Id., ¶46.  The goal is to interpret 
the statute in a reasonable way, which avoids "absurd or 
unreasonable results."  Id. 
¶18 We also attempt "to give reasonable effect to every 
word, in order to avoid surplusage," id., and apply the 
fundamental canon of statutory construction that "[n]othing is 
to be added to what the text states or reasonably implies[.]"  
Antonin 
Scalia 
& 
Bryan 
A. 
Garner, 
Reading 
Law: 
The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 93 (2012); see also Dawson v. Town 
of Jackson, 2011 WI 77, ¶42, 336 Wis. 2d 318, 801 N.W.2d 316 
("We decline to read into the statute words the legislature did 
not see fit to write.").  "[R]ather, we interpret the words the 
legislature actually enacted into law."  State v. Fitzgerald, 
2019 WI 69, ¶30, 387 Wis. 2d 384, 929 N.W.2d 165. 
¶19 We start, then, with the language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.183(1) to see whether the meaning of the text is plain.  
Subsection (1) assigns "exclusive original jurisdiction" to 
"courts of criminal jurisdiction" over juveniles in five 
distinctly described circumstances as set forth in paragraphs 
(a), (am), (ar), (b), and (c).  Both of these phrases have 
common, ordinary, and well-known meanings.  "Exclusive original 
No. 
2017AP1416-CR   
 
14 
 
jurisdiction" limits where the case can begin.  "Courts of 
criminal jurisdiction" means courts that have jurisdiction to 
hear criminal cases.  The Wisconsin Constitution specifically 
bestows circuit courts with "jurisdiction in all matters civil 
and criminal."  Wis. Const. art. VII, § 8.12  Consistent with the 
constitution, 
the 
legislature 
recognizes 
Wisconsin 
circuit 
courts as courts of criminal jurisdiction in Wis. Stat. 
§ 753.03.13  This court and our court of appeals have done so as 
                                                 
12 Article VII, Section 8 provides:  
Except as otherwise provided by law, the circuit court 
shall have original jurisdiction in all matters civil 
and criminal within this state and such appellate 
jurisdiction in the circuit as the legislature may 
prescribe by law. The circuit court may issue all 
writs necessary in aid of its jurisdiction. 
13 Wisconsin Stat. § 753.03 provides: 
JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURTS. The circuit courts 
have the general jurisdiction prescribed for them by 
article VII of the constitution and have power to 
issue all writs, process and commissions provided in 
article VII of the constitution or by the statutes, or 
which may be necessary to the due execution of the 
powers vested in them. The circuit courts have power 
to 
hear 
and 
determine, 
within 
their 
respective 
circuits, 
all 
civil 
and 
criminal 
actions 
and 
proceedings unless exclusive jurisdiction is given to 
some other court; and they have all the powers, 
according to the usages of courts of law and equity, 
necessary to the full and complete jurisdiction of the 
causes 
and 
parties 
and 
the 
full 
and 
complete 
administration of justice, and to carry into effect 
their judgments, orders and other determinations, 
subject to review by the court of appeals or the 
supreme court as provided by law.  The courts and the 
judges thereof have power to award all such writs, 
(continued) 
No. 
2017AP1416-CR   
 
15 
 
well.  City of Eau Claire, 370 Wis. 2d 595, ¶7; State v. 
Spanbauer, 108 Wis. 2d 548, 552, 322 N.W.2d 511 (Ct. App. 1982) 
(recognizing "the circuit courts of this state are given 
exclusive jurisdiction over all criminal matters").  All of 
Wisconsin's circuit courts, therefore, are courts of criminal 
jurisdiction. 
¶20 The statute contains only two qualifiers within the 
text assigning "courts of criminal jurisdiction" "exclusive 
original jurisdiction" over certain juveniles.  The first is the 
"notwithstanding" 
clause 
at 
the 
start 
of 
the 
sentence:  
"Notwithstanding 
ss. 
938.12(1) 
and 
938.18[.]" 
 
The 
two 
referenced statutes concern general juvenile jurisdiction under 
ch. 938, and the process for requesting waiver of general 
juvenile jurisdiction.  Wisconsin Stat. § 938.12(1) assigns 
"exclusive jurisdiction" to juvenile courts handling delinquency 
petitions.  Wisconsin Stat. § 938.18 provides the petition 
waiver and waiver hearing process, which may result in a 
decision to move a juvenile from juvenile court adjudication to 
adult court prosecution.  The "notwithstanding" qualifier tells 
us that even though juvenile courts handling delinquency 
petitions have exclusive jurisdiction over juveniles under 
§ 938.12(1), and even though a process exists to waive juveniles 
into adult court, the legislature assigned our criminal circuit 
                                                                                                                                                             
process 
and 
commissions, 
throughout 
the 
state, 
returnable in the proper county. 
No. 
2017AP1416-CR   
 
16 
 
courts exclusive original adult jurisdiction over juvenile 
offenders in certain circumstances. 
¶21 The second qualification for "courts of criminal 
jurisdiction" to have "exclusive original jurisdiction" over 
juveniles appears as described in the five paragraphs within 
Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1).  Each paragraph describes a type of 
juvenile who will be subject to adult court jurisdiction in the 
criminal court. 
¶22 Paragraph (b) applies to Hinkle and confers criminal 
court jurisdiction over "[a] juvenile who is alleged to have 
violated any state criminal law":  (1) "if the juvenile has been 
convicted 
of 
a 
previous 
violation 
following 
waiver 
of 
jurisdiction under . . . s. 938.18 by the court assigned to 
exercise jurisdiction under this chapter and ch. 48," or (2) "if 
the court assigned to exercise jurisdiction under this chapter 
and ch. 48 has waived its jurisdiction over the juvenile for a 
previous violation and criminal proceedings on that previous 
violation are still pending."  Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1)(b). 
¶23 Hinkle interprets Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1)(b) as 
mandating 
automatic 
adult-court 
original 
jurisdiction 
only 
within the county in which a previous waiver occurred.  In all 
other counties, the State would be required to request a waiver.  
In other words, Hinkle thinks only the criminal court in the 
specific county where the juvenile was waived can exercise adult 
jurisdiction over the juvenile based on the previous waiver.  
Because the waiving court was Milwaukee County, Hinkle argues 
§ 938.183(1)(b) should not apply to his Fond du Lac case.  
No. 
2017AP1416-CR   
 
17 
 
Instead, he believes the Fond du Lac County Circuit Court 
presiding over his 14-count delinquency petition should have 
conducted its own waiver hearing to determine whether to waive 
him into adult court or keep him in Fond du Lac's juvenile court 
system. 
¶24 The 
statutory 
text 
does 
not 
support 
Hinkle's 
interpretation, which would require reading Hinkle's county-
based restriction into the text.   It is a cardinal "maxim[] of 
statutory construction . . . that courts should not add words to 
a statute to give it a certain meaning."  Fitzgerald, 387 
Wis. 2d 384, ¶30 (quoting Fond du Lac Cty. v. Town of Rosendale, 
149 Wis. 2d 326, 334, 440 N.W.2d 818 (Ct. App. 1989)).  Neither 
the statute's reference to "courts of criminal jurisdiction" nor 
its reference to "the court assigned to exercise jurisdiction 
under this chapter" refer to individual counties.  If the 
legislature wanted to confine either "courts of criminal 
jurisdiction" or "the court assigned to exercise jurisdiction" 
to circuit courts within a particular county, it could have 
easily done so.  The legislature could have limited adult court 
jurisdiction to "the particular county" or "the specific county" 
or "the individual county" where the juvenile had previously 
been waived.  The legislature, however, did not, and "[w]e will 
not read into the statute a limitation the plain language does 
not evidence."  Dane Cty. v. LIRC, 2009 WI 9, ¶33, 315 
Wis. 2d 293, 759 N.W.2d 571; Fitzgerald, 387 Wis. 2d 384, ¶30 
("We do not read words into a statute regardless of how 
persuasive the source may be; rather, we interpret the words the 
No. 
2017AP1416-CR   
 
18 
 
legislature actually enacted into law."); see also Scalia & 
Garner, Reading Law at 93 ("Nothing is to be added to what the 
text states or reasonably implies"); Iselin v. United States, 
270 U.S. 245, 251 (1926) ("To supply omissions transcends the 
judicial function."). 
¶25 Examining the context and structure of ch. 938 further 
defeats Hinkle's proposed county-by-county constriction of Wis. 
Stat. § 938.183(1)'s adult jurisdiction.  Most of the provisions 
within ch. 938 address juvenile courts, and particular processes 
relating to their operation.  Subchapter III, Wis. Stat. 
§§ 938.12-938.185, 
however, 
addresses 
jurisdiction 
in 
particular.  The examples Hinkle posits about the use of "the 
court" as juxtaposed with "any court" in the non-jurisdictional 
portions of ch. 938 are not helpful in assessing the context and 
structure informing the interpretation of the jurisdictional 
section. 
¶26 The legislature's use of the plural term "courts" as 
the place of exclusive original jurisdiction when a juvenile has 
been waived by the juvenile court shows the legislature did not 
limit this exclusive original jurisdiction to a specific county, 
but instead included all criminal courts across the state.  The 
specific definition the legislature provided in Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.02(2m) 
for 
the 
term 
"court" 
also 
supports 
this 
interpretation.  It provides: 
"Court," when used without further qualification, 
means the court assigned to exercise jurisdiction 
under this chapter and ch. 48 or, when used with 
reference to a juvenile who is subject to s. 938.183, 
No. 
2017AP1416-CR   
 
19 
 
a court of criminal jurisdiction or, when used with 
reference to a juvenile who is subject to s. 938.17 
(2), a municipal court. 
Accordingly, "the court assigned to exercise jurisdiction" under 
ch. 938 means all the circuit courts across the state hearing 
juvenile 
matters——unless 
"further 
qualifi[ed]" 
because 
all 
juvenile courts exercise jurisdiction under ch. 938.  The 
definition does not interpose a county-specific qualifier on the 
term "court", but instead contemplates the legislature could 
"further qualif[y]" "the court" beyond this general definition.  
The legislature chose not to further qualify "the court" in Wis. 
Stat. § 938.183(1)(b) with any county-based limitation. 
¶27 In 
addition, 
definitional 
paragraph 
(2m) 
further 
identifies "court" in "s. 938.183" specifically as "a court of 
criminal jurisdiction."  (Emphasis added.)  The generality of 
this reference further evidences that the legislature did not 
restrict the application of Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1) on a county-
by-county basis. 
¶28 Hinkle also relies on the purpose expressed by the 
legislature in Wis. Stat. § 938.01(2)(c):  "[t]o provide an 
individualized assessment of each alleged and adjudicated 
delinquent juvenile" and in § 938.01(2)(f) "[t]o respond to a 
juvenile offender's needs for care and treatment, consistent 
with the prevention of delinquency, each juvenile's best 
interest and protection of the public, by allowing the court to 
utilize the most effective dispositional option" as support for 
his county-specific interpretation.  He argues that a smaller 
community like Fond du Lac might be better suited to provide 
No. 
2017AP1416-CR   
 
20 
 
individualized treatment for a juvenile than Milwaukee, and 
therefore Fond du Lac should not be bound by a Milwaukee waiver.  
While different counties across Wisconsin may handle juvenile 
waivers differently, that possibility cannot alter or supplement 
the plain language of the statute, which endows courts of 
criminal jurisdiction with exclusive original jurisdiction over 
a juvenile who has been waived by the juvenile court.  Even 
textually-expressed purpose "cannot be used to contradict text 
or to supplement it" but instead, "[p]urpose sheds light only on 
deciding which of various textually permissible meanings should 
be adopted."  Scalia & Garner, Reading Law at 57.  The textual 
absence of the sort of county-based qualifier Hinkle would have 
us read into the statute——"what a text chooses not to do——are as 
much a part of its 'purpose' as its affirmative" expressions.  
Id.  Respect for what the legislature omitted from the statutory 
text requires us "to reject the replacement or supplementation 
of text with purpose" and we do so here.  Id. at 57-58. 
¶29 As with any statute, we interpret the text of Wis. 
Stat. § 938.183(1) to mean what it says.  The text plainly 
assigns exclusive original jurisdiction to courts of criminal 
jurisdiction over juveniles who fall under any of § 938.183(1)'s 
five paragraphs.  Paragraph (1)(b) places a juvenile under adult 
court jurisdiction when the juvenile is "alleged to have 
violated any state criminal law" either (1) after a previous 
conviction following a waiver by the juvenile court; or (2) when 
the juvenile court waived its jurisdiction on a violation where 
criminal 
proceedings 
are 
still 
pending. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
No. 
2017AP1416-CR   
 
21 
 
§ 938.183(1)(b).  Hinkle met the requisites under para. (1)(b) 
because the juvenile court in Milwaukee waived its jurisdiction 
over Hinkle in favor of adult criminal court jurisdiction, and 
the Milwaukee criminal proceeding was still pending when Hinkle 
appeared before the Fond du Lac County Circuit Court on the 14-
count delinquency petition. 
¶30 We hold the text of the statute does not limit the 
adult court jurisdiction prescribed in Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1) 
to the individual juvenile court in the specific county where a 
juvenile was previously waived.  Whenever a juvenile court 
exercising jurisdiction under ch. 938 (or ch. 48) has previously 
waived a juvenile——who is alleged to be in violation of any 
state law and that juvenile is either convicted or the criminal 
proceeding is still pending——courts of criminal jurisdiction 
anywhere in Wisconsin have exclusive original jurisdiction.  The 
waiver by the juvenile court means that any pending or future 
violations by that juvenile must begin in adult criminal court 
pursuant to the exclusive original jurisdiction assigned to 
courts of criminal jurisdiction under Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1).  
Once waived, always waived.14 
                                                 
14 Although the statutes say any pending or new criminal 
matters against a waived juvenile must always begin under adult 
criminal jurisdiction, Wis. Stat. § 970.032 provides two ways in 
which a juvenile may be returned to juvenile court jurisdiction.  
See Wis. Stat. § 970.032(1) (permitting the criminal court to 
return a juvenile to the juvenile system when no probable cause 
exists); and Wis. Stat. § 970.032(2) (allowing the criminal 
court that finds probable cause to transfer the juvenile back to 
juvenile jurisdiction under a reverse waiver analysis); see also 
State v. Kleser, 2010 WI 88, ¶128, 328 Wis. 2d 42, 786 
(continued) 
No. 
2017AP1416-CR   
 
22 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶31 We hold Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1) conferred exclusive 
original adult criminal jurisdiction over Hinkle based on 
Milwaukee County Circuit Court's prior waiver.  The text of the 
statute does not impose a county-specific limitation for the 
"once waived, always waived" rule.  The Fond du Lac County 
Circuit Court properly relied on Milwaukee's waiver to move 
Hinkle from Fond du Lac's juvenile jurisdiction to Fond du Lac's 
adult jurisdiction.  Accordingly, the Fond du Lac County Circuit 
Court had competency to handle Hinkle's case prosecuting him as 
                                                                                                                                                             
N.W.2d 144. 
While the phrase "once waived, always waived" does not 
appear in the statute, it is routinely used by attorneys and 
judges in the juvenile justice system in reference to the 
statute we interpret in this case.  The Juvenile Judicial 
Benchbook uses "once waived always waived" in two places, 
cautioning circuit courts that the "Judge should point out the 
'once waived always waived' provision of Juv Justice Code" so in 
an uncontested waiver situation, the juvenile's decision to not 
contest 
the 
waiver 
petition 
is 
"knowing, 
voluntary 
and 
intelligent."  WISCONSIN JUDICIAL BENCHBOOK: JUVENILE, JV 5-9 & 
JV 5-18 (2019) (JV 5-18 same as JV 5-9, except refers to "new 
Juv Justice Code").  We use the phrase "once waived, always 
waived" as a convenient shorthand reference to the rule plainly 
expressed in the statutory text and nothing more. 
No. 
2017AP1416-CR   
 
23 
 
an adult under the criminal code.  We affirm the decision of the 
court of appeals.15 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
¶32 BRIAN HAGEDORN, J. did not participate. 
 
 
                                                 
15 Hinkle also maintains that his trial lawyer gave him 
ineffective assistance by failing to argue that Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.183(1) should be interpreted to have a county-specific 
waiver limitation.  To prove his lawyer was ineffective, Hinkle 
must show both that his lawyer acted deficiently and that the 
deficient performance prejudiced him.  See Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. Sholar, 2018 WI 
53, ¶32, 381 Wis. 2d 560, 912 N.W.2d 89.  Hinkle cannot prove 
ineffective assistance because a trial lawyer's failure to raise 
a 
nonmeritorious 
issue 
"does 
not 
constitute 
deficient 
performance." See State v. Sanders, 2018 WI 51, ¶54, 381 
Wis. 2d 522, 912 N.W.2d 16 ("[F]ailure to bring a meritless 
motion does not constitute deficient performance."). 
Finally, the State asks us to hold that Hinkle forfeited 
his claims because he did not contemporaneously object to adult 
court jurisdiction or because he resolved the case by entering 
pleas.  It is not necessary for us to address the State's 
forfeiture argument, and we decline to do so.  See Water Well 
Sols. Serv. Grp., Inc. v. Consol. Ins. Co., 2016 WI 54, ¶33 
n.18, 369 Wis. 2d 607, 881 N.W.2d 285 (cases should be decided 
on the narrowest possible grounds). 
No.  2017AP1416-CR.rfd 
 
1 
 
 
¶33 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   (dissenting).  The majority 
opinion interprets Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1)(b) in violation of 
the very canons of statutory construction it purports to follow 
and 
substitutes 
a 
one-size-fits-all 
approach 
to 
juvenile 
justice.  I read the language of § 938.183(1)(b) within the 
rules of statutory construction:  in relation to the language of 
surrounding and closely-related statutes and in accordance with 
the Juvenile Justice Code's textually explicit purpose to 
individually assess each juvenile based on their needs and the 
availability of resources.1  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.01(2).  
Accordingly, I dissent.   
¶34 The 
parties 
dispute 
the 
meaning 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 938.183(1) which provides, in relevant part, that "courts of 
criminal jurisdiction" have exclusive original jurisdiction over 
"[a] juvenile who is alleged to have violated any state criminal 
law . . . if the court assigned to exercise jurisdiction under 
this chapter and [Wis. Stat.] ch. 48 has waived its jurisdiction 
over the juvenile for a previous violation and criminal 
proceedings on that previous violation are still pending."  
§ 938.183(1)(b) (emphasis added.)  The parties agree that 
"courts of criminal jurisdiction" are circuit courts hearing 
criminal cases where defendants are prosecuted as adults.  See 
majority op., ¶16.  The dispute in this case lies in the meaning 
of "the court assigned to exercise jurisdiction" that has waived 
                                                 
1 I, like the majority, will use the term "Juvenile Justice 
Code" to refer to Wis. Stat. ch. 938.   
No.  2017AP1416-CR.rfd 
 
2 
 
its jurisdiction over the juvenile for a previous violation.  Is 
"the court" equivalent to "a" or "any" juvenile court in any 
county statewide?  Or is "the court" the juvenile court in the 
same county where the new charges are filed?  In other words, in 
the context of this case, does § 938.183(1)(b) confer exclusive 
original jurisdiction over Hinkle on any circuit court hearing 
criminal cases of adult defendants, or only on those courts in 
Milwaukee County, where juvenile jurisdiction over Hinkle was 
waived?   
¶35 The majority concludes that "the court" is equivalent 
to "a" or "any" juvenile court in any county statewide, and 
bases its opinion on what it deems a common "practice" or "rule" 
of "once waived, always waived."  See majority op., ¶¶1-2, 4, 9, 
11, 30-31 & n.14.  This "practice" provides little support for 
the 
majority's 
plain 
meaning 
analysis 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 938.183(1)(b), 
as 
it 
appears 
nowhere 
in 
the 
statutory 
language.  Instead, it derives from a recommendation made by a 
legislative study committee that may not have been taken into 
consideration by the legislature.  See Juvenile Justice Study 
Committee, Juvenile Justice:  A Wisconsin Blueprint for Change 
14-15 (Jan. 1995); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, 
Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 369, 376 (2012) 
(describing the "false notion" that committee reports are a 
worthwhile aid in statutory construction because "they are 
drafted by committee staff and are not voted on (and rarely even 
read) by the committee members, much less by the full house.")  
The only authority that the majority cites for the proposition 
No.  2017AP1416-CR.rfd 
 
3 
 
that "once waived, always waived" is "routinely used by 
attorneys and judges in the juvenile justice system" is the 
Juvenile Judicial Benchbook.  Majority op., ¶30 n.14.  The 
Benchbook alone is not independent legal authority and it 
provides no statute or case as authority for this "practice."2  
See 
Hefty 
v. 
Strickhouser, 
2008 
WI 
96, 
¶33 
n.11, 
312 
Wis. 2d 530, 752 N.W.2d 820 (recognizing that the Benchbook "is 
not intended to stand as independent legal authority for any 
proposition of law.").3    
¶36 Moreover, although the majority declares Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.183(1)(b)'s meaning to be plain, or unambiguous, its 
reliance on an extrinsic source to determine the statute's 
meaning indicates otherwise.  As we recently reaffirmed:  "[W]e 
confine our analysis of unambiguous laws to their text."  
Milwaukee Dist. Council 48 v. Milwaukee Cty., 2019 WI 24, ¶18, 
385 Wis. 2d 748, 924 N.W.2d 153; see also Town of Rib Mountain 
v. Marathon Cty., 2019 WI 50, ¶9, 386 Wis. 2d 632, 926 N.W.2d 
731 ("'Where statutory language is unambiguous, there is no need 
to 
consult 
extrinsic 
sources 
of 
interpretation, 
such 
as 
legislative 
history.'" 
(quoted 
source 
omitted)). 
 
If 
§ 938.183(1)(b)'s meaning is truly unambiguous, the majority 
                                                 
2 It is noteworthy that the two sections of the Juvenile 
Justice Benchbook cited by the majority are the only portions of 
JV5: Waiver to Adult Court/Reverse Waiver where the citation is 
"Recommendation" rather than a statute or case. 
3 The 
first 
page 
of 
the 
Juvenile 
Justice 
Benchbook 
admonishes:  "[t]he Wisconsin Judicial Benchbooks are not 
intended to be cited as independent legal authority." 
No.  2017AP1416-CR.rfd 
 
4 
 
would not need to focus on sources outside of the statutory 
language to determine its meaning.  I recognize that the 
language of § 938.183(1)(b) is ambiguous because it reasonably 
gives rise to two different, competing meanings, as advocated 
for by the parties in this case.  See State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶47, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
681 N.W.2d 110. 
¶37 In analyzing the statutory language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.183(1)(b), I rely not on a common "practice" appropriated 
from the recommendation of a legislative study committee, but on 
the seminal case of Kalal, which instructs this court to begin a 
statutory interpretation analysis with the statute's plain 
language.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45.  The statutory language 
is then examined "not in isolation but as part of a whole; in 
relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related 
statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable 
results."  Id., ¶46.  Lastly, I look to the purpose or scope of 
the statute, which "may be readily apparent from its plain 
language . . . ."  Id., ¶49.   
¶38 My interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1)(b) is 
informed by the two considerations ignored by the majority:  the 
context of § 938.183(1)(b) in relation to surrounding and 
closely-related statutes and explicit statements of legislative 
purpose expressed in the Juvenile Justice Code.  In statutes 
that surround or are closely-related to § 938.183(1)(b), the 
legislature differentiates between "the court" in a particular 
county and "a court" or "any court" in any county, which 
No.  2017AP1416-CR.rfd 
 
5 
 
demonstrates that these terms convey different meanings.  "When 
the legislature uses different terms in a statute——particularly 
in the same section——we presume it intended the terms to have 
distinct meanings."  Johnson v. City of Edgerton, 207 Wis. 2d 
343, 351, 558 N.W.2d 653 (Ct. App. 1996).  For example, Wis. 
Stat. § 938.35(1) requires "[t]he court" to enter a judgment 
setting forth "the court's" finding and disposition in the 
proceeding, 
and 
§ 938.35(1)(b) 
allows 
that 
record 
to 
be 
admissible "[i]n a proceeding in any court assigned to exercise 
jurisdiction under this chapter and ch. 48."  (Emphasis added.)  
"The 
court," 
the 
juvenile 
court 
entering 
judgment 
in 
a 
particular county, is thus distinct from any juvenile court in 
any county where the record is admissible.  
¶39 Similarly, in the context of records, Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.396(2g)(gm) provides that upon request of "any court 
assigned to exercise jurisdiction . . . the court assigned 
to exercise jurisdiction . . . shall open for inspection . . . 
its records . . . ."  (Emphasis added.)  Here the legislature 
distinguishes "any court," any juvenile court in any county, 
from "the court" in the county that is the custodian of 
the records.  Likewise, in § 938.396(2m)(b)1., the legislature 
contrasts "the court" assigned to exercise jurisdiction under 
the Juvenile Justice Code with "any other court" assigned to 
exercise jurisdiction under the chapter.4  (Emphasis added.)  The 
                                                 
4 Further examples include Wis. Stat. §§ 938.028(3), 938.341 
and 938.37(1), all of which refer broadly to "a court" to 
encompass any juvenile court. 
No.  2017AP1416-CR.rfd 
 
6 
 
legislature chose to use the term "the court" in Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.183(1)(b), thereby giving it a meaning distinct from "any" 
or "a" court. 
¶40 The majority claims that because Wis. Stat. § 938.183 
addresses jurisdiction, other sections unrelated to jurisdiction 
are "not helpful" in assessing context and structure.  Majority 
op., ¶25.5  The majority cites to no authority for this novel 
proposition that limits this court's review of statutory 
context.  Instead, the majority looks to a section unrelated to 
jurisdiction which defines the word "court" "when used without 
further qualification" as "the court assigned to exercise 
jurisdiction 
under 
this 
chapter . . . ." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 938.02(2m) (emphasis added).  In this case, our task is to 
resolve the meaning of "court" when it is qualified by the word 
"the" in the context of § 938.183(1)(b).  Simply applying the 
definition of "court" in § 938.02(2m) begs the question of which 
court is "the court assigned to exercise jurisdiction" under 
§ 938.183(1)(b).   
¶41 Finally, 
I 
read 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 938.183(1)(b) 
in 
accordance with the Juvenile Justice Code's textually explicit 
purpose, which requires a circuit court to individually assess 
                                                 
5 The majority overlooks a statute related to jurisdiction 
where "courts," "the court," and "a court" are juxtaposed:  Wis. 
Stat. § 938.17.  Section 938.17 gives "courts of criminal and 
civil 
jurisdiction" 
exclusive 
jurisdiction 
in 
proceedings 
against juveniles for specific vehicle violations.  (Emphasis 
added.)  The statute subsequently refers to a juvenile being 
charged in "a court of criminal or civil jurisdiction" and in a 
successive subsection refers to "the court."  (Emphasis added.)   
No.  2017AP1416-CR.rfd 
 
7 
 
each juvenile based on their needs and the availability of 
resources. 
 
The 
Juvenile 
Justice 
Code 
characterizes 
the 
following 
as 
"important 
purposes": 
 
"provid[ing] 
an 
individualized assessment of each alleged and adjudicated 
delinquent juvenile" and "respond[ing] to a juvenile offender's 
needs for care and treatment, consistent with the prevention of 
delinquency, each juvenile's best interest and protection of the 
public, by allowing the court to utilize the most effective 
dispositional option."  Wis. Stat. §§ 938.01(2)(c) and (f).  
Wisconsin Stat. § 938.18(5)(c) further requires each court 
evaluating waiver to adult court to consider "[t]he adequacy and 
suitability of facilities, services and procedures available for 
treatment of the juvenile and protection of the public within 
the juvenile justice system."  As the majority acknowledges, 
this explicit textual purpose "sheds light . . . on deciding 
which of various textually permissible meanings should be 
adopted."  Majority op., ¶28.  The meaning adopted by the 
majority contradicts the explicit purpose of the Juvenile 
Justice Code and prevents a circuit court from making the 
statutorily required individualized assessment of what is in the 
"best interests" of the juvenile and the public in light of 
available resources.  See §§ 938.18(5) and (6).     
¶42 I 
conclude 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 938.183(1)(b) 
is 
ambiguous because it is "capable of being understood by 
reasonably well-informed persons in two or more senses."  Kalal, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶47.  I adopt Hinkle's interpretation because 
he reads the language of § 938.183(1)(b) within the rules of 
No.  2017AP1416-CR.rfd 
 
8 
 
statutory construction:  in relation to the context of the 
Juvenile Justice Code and its textually expressed purpose.  See 
Student Ass'n of Univ. of Wisconsin-Milwaukee v. Baum, 74 
Wis. 2d 283, 294-95, 246 N.W.2d 622 (1976) (explaining "the 
purpose of the whole act is to be sought and is favored over a 
construction which will defeat the manifest object of the 
act.").   
¶43 A Milwaukee County Circuit Court's waiver of juvenile 
jurisdiction over Hinkle does not confer exclusive original 
jurisdiction on a Fond du Lac County Circuit Court hearing 
criminal cases of adult defendants.  Therefore, I would remand 
the case to the Fond du Lac County Circuit Court to allow Hinkle 
to withdraw his plea and to vacate the Fond du Lac County order 
waiving juvenile court jurisdiction. 
¶44 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.  
¶45 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
 
No.  2017AP1416-CR.rfd 
 
 
 
1