Title: Ernest Charles Downs v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC04-345
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: December 13, 2007

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC04-345 
____________ 
 
ERNEST CHARLES DOWNS, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[December 13, 2007] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
This case is before the Court upon review of an order denying 
postconviction relief in a capital murder proceeding.  We have jurisdiction.  See 
article V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  We affirm the trial court’s denial of a successive 
motion for postconviction relief filed by appellant, Ernest Charles Downs, in this 
1977 murder case. 
Initially, Downs takes issue with the trial court’s response to a question from 
the jury that convicted him of first-degree murder.  Downs asserts that his 
indictment for first-degree murder stated that he “unlawfully and from a 
premeditated design to effect the death of Forrest J. Harris, Jr., a human being, did 
kill the said Forrest J. Harris, Jr., by shooting him to death with a pistol, and in the 
course of committing said murder, carried a firearm or other deadly weapon, to-
wit: a pistol, contrary to sections 782.04 and 775.087, Florida Statutes.”  Downs 
then notes that, at the close of the guilt phase, the judge gave the jury a specific 
instruction on the use of a firearm1 and then explained the verdict form, which 
required the jury to decide if Downs was guilty of first, second, or third-degree 
murder or manslaughter, and also required them to find if he did or did not use a 
firearm.  During deliberations the jury asked the trial judge to answer a question:  
In regard to the question as to whether the defendant did or did not use 
a firearm, must the defendant be guilty of actually pulling the trigger, 
or is he guilty of using the firearm through association of being an 
accomplice in a murder of which a firearm was used? 
The record indicates that, once the jury gave the judge the question, the jury was 
excused and counsel for both parties remained to discuss the question.  The judge 
then asked to meet with counsel in chambers to discuss a proper way for 
responding to the jury.  After deliberating, the judge and the attorneys returned to 
                                          
 
 
1.  The judge instructed the jury as follows (Florida Standard Jury 
Instruction (Criminal) 2.17 (1976)): 
 
 
The punishment provided by law for the crime of murder is 
greater if, as is charged in this case, the defendant, during the 
commission of such crime, carries a firearm.  Should you find the 
defendant guilty of murder of any degree, it will be necessary for you 
to find in your verdict whether it has been proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant, during the commission of the crime, did use 
a firearm. 
 
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the courtroom and called for the jury to return.  At that point, the judge asked the 
jury if the question was in regards to the standard jury instruction on “felony 
aggravated by a weapon,” and the jury replied affirmatively.  Conferring at the 
bench, the State noted that the question had to do with the statutes that mandated 
an additional mandatory three-year sentence if a firearm is used in a felony, and the 
State suggested that the part of the verdict form referring to the carrying of a 
firearm and the mandatory three-year sentence be deleted.  The court clarified that 
the State meant the part about use or non-use of a firearm, and, thereafter, both 
attorneys, including defense counsel, agreed the trial court could so instruct the 
jury.  The judge then told the jury, 
As you recall, the verdict form has, as to count one, a number 
of choices, and then it says further, did the defendant use or not use a 
firearm.  We are asking at this time that you delete, “Did use a firearm 
or did not use a firearm.”  Just totally disregard that from your 
consideration at this point.  All you need to do is find a verdict as to 
count one, and your verdict as to that count, and as to count two and 
your verdict as to that count.   
 
Downs now argues that the judge should have answered the jury’s submitted 
question in the negative.  He submits that, by instructing the jury to disregard the 
finding as to the use of the handgun, the jury was essentially instructed to totally 
disregard whether or not Downs shot and killed Harris as charged in the 
indictment.  According to Downs, the trial judge’s instructions were a “fatal 
variance” that amounted to a constructive amendment of his murder indictment, 
 
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and that it relieved the State of its duty of proving all the elements of the offense 
and relieved the jury of its initial instruction to find Downs guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt of all the essential elements charged in the indictment.   
 
Downs presented this claim below as a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 
Rule 3.800 “Motion to Correct Defendant’s Death Sentence to Life, if Not Just 30 
Years for Conspiracy.”  In finding that Downs was not entitled to relief, the lower 
court first found that Downs’ sentence was not “illegal” as the term has been 
defined by this Court and thus he could not seek relief pursuant to rule 3.800.  The 
court also found that the claim could not be pursued under Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.850 because it would be both untimely and barred as an issue 
that should have been raised on direct appeal.   
 
We find no error in the trial court’s rejection of this claim.  First, Downs 
could not assert this claim under rule 3.800 since the rule plainly states that it is 
inapplicable in cases where the death sentence has been imposed.  See Fla. R. 
Crim. P. 3.800(b).  Second, as noted by the trial court, Downs faces a significant 
procedural bar under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, in that he has not 
properly established why this claim was not raised earlier, or why it could not have 
been raised on direct appeal.   
 
Regardless, as the State notes, this Court in Cox v. State, 819 So. 2d 705, 
715 (Fla. 2002), held that “[u]nder Florida law, ‘[a] party may not invite error and 
 
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then be heard to complain of that error on appeal.’ ”  Id. (quoting Pope v. State, 
441 So. 2d 1073, 1076 (Fla. 1983)).  As in Cox, the “error” Downs asserts was 
fully discussed by defense counsel, the state attorneys, and the trial judge before all 
parties agreed to deleting the firearm language. 
 
As to its merits, relief is still properly denied on this claim.  The deleted 
language from the verdict form concerned a sentencing enhancement provision 
provided in section 775.087, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1976), and did not constitute 
an essential element of first-degree murder.  In charging the jury, the judge stated:   
The defendant, Ernest Charles Downs, is charged with the crime of 
murder in the first degree in that on April 23, 1977, in the County of 
Duval, State of Florida, did unlawfully and from a premeditated 
design to effect the death of Forrest J. Harris, Jr., a human being, did 
kill the said Forrest J. Harris, Jr. by shooting him to death with a 
pistol, and in the course of committing said murder carried a firearm 
or other deadly weapon, to wit:  a pistol, contrary to Section 782.05 
[sic] and 775.087, Florida Statutes. 
 
Carrying a weapon in the course of committing the crime was not an essential 
element of first-degree murder.  Hence, the deletion of the sentence enhancement 
provisions of section 775.087 had no impact on the validity of the murder charge 
or conviction.  Given that the jury returned a guilty verdict on the charge of murder 
in the first degree after being instructed on all elements of that charge, Downs’ 
argument that the judge somehow removed an element of the crime from the jury’s 
consideration is without merit. 
 
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Downs also contends that his death sentence is invalid under the holding in 
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  However, this Court has held that Ring 
may not be applied retroactively in postconviction proceedings.  See Johnson v. 
State, 904 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 2005).  The remainder of the issues raised by Downs 
were not asserted in the trial court and, hence, may not be asserted here.  For all of 
the reasons set out above we affirm the trial court’s order denying postconviction 
relief. 
 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and 
BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County,  
John H. Skinner, Judge - Case No. 16-1977-CF-2874-AXXX 
 
Jefferson W. Morrow, Jacksonville, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Meredith Charbula, Assistant Attorney 
General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee