Title: Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Gangwish
Citation: 630 S.W.2d 66
Docket Number: N/A
State: Kentucky
Issuer: Kentucky Supreme Court
Date: March 30, 1982

630 S.W.2d 66 (1982) KENTUCKY BAR ASSOCIATION, Complainant, v. Richard J. GANGWISH, II, Respondent. Supreme Court of Kentucky. March 30, 1982. Leslie G. Whitmer, Director, Kentucky Bar Assn., Frankfort, for complainant. Richard J. Gangwish, II, pro se. This is a disciplinary action in which the Board of Governors of the Kentucky Bar Association found respondent guilty of violating SCR 3.135 and recommended that he be publicly reprimanded. We have reviewed the record and find the facts to be as follows. Respondent caused an advertisement of legal services to be published in a church bulletin. The advertisement in part stated, "Wills $15 with this ad." The Kentucky Bar Association wrote to the respondent advising him that advertisements of special discounts or the use of discount coupons was not permitted under SCR 3.135. Respondent replied by letter that he would, in the future, comply with the provisions of SCR 3.135. Thereafter respondent authorized or caused the publication of an advertisement in a brochure of the Northern Kentucky Chamber of Commerce that respondent's law firm would provide for a period of four months a twenty-per cent (20%) discount to members of the Chamber on the cost of legal services. Respondent's law firm is a member of the Chamber. This brochure was distributed to 727 member firms in the northern Kentucky area with approximately 1100 assignee members of the Chamber who would be entitled to the services. We find that such widespread dissemination is in fact advertisement as contemplated in SCR 3.135. A copy of the advertisement was not forwarded to the Kentucky Bar Association as provided in SCR 3.135. Respondent argues that his advertisement constitutes speech protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution, and relies on Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 384, 97 S. Ct. 2691, 2709, 53 L. Ed. 2d 810 (1977). There the issue before the Supreme Court was a narrow one, whether lawyers may constitutionally advertise the prices at which certain routine services will be performed. The court stated 433 U.S. at p. 372, 373, 97 S.Ct. at p. 2703, 53 L.Ed.2d at p. 828, 829: And further its holding 433 U.S. on p. 383, 384, 97 S.Ct. on p. 2708, 2709, 53 L.Ed.2d on p. 835, 836: In a recent opinion, In re R. M. J., ___ U.S. ___, 102 S. Ct. 929, 71 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1982), the court reexamined Bates in the context of advertising not expressly permitted in the ethical rules of the Supreme Court of Missouri. The advertisements at issue included information that the lawyer was licensed in Missouri and Illinois in large capital letters a statement that the lawyer was "Admitted to Practice Before the United States Supreme Court" and included a listing of areas of practice that deviated from the language prescribed by the rules. The court held that this advertisement was protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States in that it was not misleading. The court stated: It is apparent that advertising as to fees is limited to fees charged for certain routine services and that misleading advertising can be prohibited. We are of the opinion that advertising "20% discount on legal services" is not advertising of fees for routine legal services and is misleading in every respect. We conclude that this advertising is a violation of SCR 3.135, is not protected by the First Amendment, and we adopt the Board of Governors' recommendation that respondent be publicly reprimanded. In passing we note that In re R.M.J. answers respondent's complaint that the present rules do not permit advertising as to the jurisdictions in which a lawyer practices. In re R.M.J. permits such advertising on the theory that it is not misleading. The respondent is found guilty of the charges and is hereby publicly reprimanded. The costs of this action are assessed against the respondent. *68 PALMORE, C.J., and CLAYTON, STEPHENS, STEPHENSON and STERNBERG, JJ., concur. AKER, J., dissents. AKER, Justice, dissenting. A reading of the record convinces me that Respondent's behavior in this matter can be attributed to inadvertence or shortsightedness. Under these circumstances I feel that the court should have assessed a penalty no more severe than a private reprimand.