Title: Moseley v. First Community Bank
Citation: 649 So. 2d 1274
Docket Number: 1930790
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: October 21, 1994

649 So. 2d 1274 (1994)
William E. MOSELEY and Loretta Moseley,
v.
FIRST COMMUNITY BANK.
1930790.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
October 21, 1994.
Lamar C. Johnson of Gilmore Law Office, Grove Hill, for appellants.
S.J. Laurie, Chatom, for appellee.
RICHARD L. JONES, Retired Justice.
The debtors, William E. Moseley and Loretta Moseley, appeal from a summary judgment for the creditor, First Community Bank ("the Bank"), in the Moseleys' action seeking injunctive relief against the Bank's attempted foreclosure on a mortgage covering the Moseleys' real property. We affirm.
In 1987 and 1989, the Moseleys executed promissory notes to the Bank totalling approximately $270,000. These notes were secured by mortgages on four pieces of real property owned by the Moseleys.
In 1990, William Moseley filed for and was granted protection under Title 11, Chapter 13, of the United States Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy plan approved for Moseley by the bankruptcy judge set out specific terms for the consolidation, reduction, and repayment of the debts owed the Bank by the Moseleys. When the Moseleys failed to comply with the repayment terms, the Bank began foreclosure proceedings.
The Moseleys sued to enjoin the foreclosure. Subsequently, they and the Bank entered into a "stipulation and agreement," which contained new repayment provisions, and the trial court, on July 26, 1993, entered a judgment, which adopted the agreement. Among other things, the agreement required the Moseleys to pay the Bank $15,000 "no later than August 31, 1993." On August 31, the Moseleys sent $15,000 to the Bank by *1275 certified mail; the Bank received the payment on September 3. The Bank then filed a motion for relief from the trial court's order on the grounds that the Moseleys had not paid the taxes on the real property and had failed to pay the $15,000 "no later than August 31."
The trial court conducted a hearing on the Bank's motion on October 5, 1993, and entered a judgment on the motion on January 31, 1994. The Moseleys appealed from the January 31 order; however, this Court remanded the cause to the trial court because "the claims for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief [had] not been adjudicated." The trial court entered a final judgment in the cause in compliance with this Court's order, and the appeal was then submitted to this Court.
The final judgment on which this appeal is based expressly provides that it is supplemented by the trial court's order of January 31, 1994. The pertinent portions of the January order and the final judgment entered on remand read as follows:
The sole allegation of error raised on appeal is that the trial court erred in holding that the Moseleys failed to meet the August 31, 1993, deadline for paying $15,000 to the Bank. While these parties share a long and convoluted history of financial dealings, the alleged default in payment that gave rise to the issue here presented occurred when the debtors failed to comply with the literal terms of the parties' stipulation and agreement that had been adopted by the trial court as its judgment in the Moseleys' underlying action to enjoin foreclosure.
The Moseleys ask this Court to hold that compliance with payment deadlines is to be determined according to the "mailbox rule" that applies to other types of deadlines. In support of their argument, the Moseleys make three points:
1. A "mailbox rule" applies in contract law in determining time of offer and acceptance. *1276 In J.R. Watkins Co. v. Hill, 214 Ala. 507, 508, 108 So. 244 (1926), the Court held, "When a contract is made or [an] unqualified proposal [is] accepted by the letter of the promisor, it is complete and takes effect the moment the same is deposited and duly posted in the post office." In accord is 17 Am. Jur.2d Contracts § 48 (1964).
2. Rule 25, Ala.R.App.P., allows filings in the appellate court to "be accomplished by mail" and provides that papers sent to an appellate court by "certified, registered, or express mail of the United States Postal Service" are "deemed filed on the day of mailing."
3. Ala.Code 1975, § 40-1-45(a)(1), provides that a tax return is deemed "filed" on the date shown by the postmark.
The Moseleys argue that the trial court's ruling that their $15,000 payment was untimely should be reversed because, they say, "there is sufficient legal precedent to extend the `mailbox rule' rationale to [this] fact situation."
The Bank counters by quoting from Am. Jur.2d and C.J.S.:
(Emphasis added.)
(Emphasis added.)
Although we find no recent cases dealing with this specific issue, we note that an older, but analogous, Alabama case has never been overruled. In Williams &amp; Smart v. Carpenter &amp; Co., 36 Ala. 9 (1860), the defendants mailed a payment on a promissory note to the plaintiffs. The Williams Court held:
36 Ala. at 12 (citations omitted).
An analogous principle in Alabama law is found in Title 7 of the Alabama Code of 1975, Article 3, dealing with "Commercial Paper." Section 7-3-504 governs the method of "presentment" of commercial paper; it provides:
Apart from the indirect legal authority in favor of the Bank, there is also the undisputed fact that, on July 26, 1994, the Moseleys were given approximately five weeks' notice of the August 31, 1994, due date for the $15,000 payment. Further, the record does not suggest any prior agreements between these parties that would have allowed the Moseleys to justifiably rely on the mail as a proper method of getting their payments to the Bank.
The trial court properly entered the Bank's summary judgment. We affirm.
This opinion was prepared by retired Justice RICHARD L. JONES, sitting as a Justice of this Court pursuant to § 12-18-10(e), Ala.Code 1975, and it is hereby adopted as that of the Court.
AFFIRMED.
MADDOX, SHORES, HOUSTON, STEAGALL and INGRAM, JJ., concur.