Title: John C. Hagen v. City of Milwaukee Employee's Retirement System Annuity and Pension Board
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2001AP003198
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 18, 2003

2003 WI 56 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-3198 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
John C. Hagen,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
City of Milwaukee Employee's Retirement System 
Annuity and Pension Board,  
 
Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  258 Wis. 2d 301, 653 N.W.2d 772 
(Ct. App. 2002-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 18, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 10, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Thomas P. Donegan   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Michael T. Sheedy and Michael T. Sheedy & Associates, Milwaukee, 
and oral argument by Michael T. Sheedy. 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was oral argument by 
Maurita Houren, assistant city attorney, with whom on the brief 
was Grant F. Langley, city attorney. 
 
 
2003 WI 56 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-3198  
(L.C. No. 
01 CV 3442) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
        : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
John C. Hagen,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
City of Milwaukee Employee's Retirement  
System Annuity and Pension Board,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 18, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DIANE S. SYKES, J. The 
question 
in 
this 
case 
is 
whether the circuit court can acquire personal jurisdiction over 
a defendant when the plaintiff does not serve the summons and 
complaint on the defendant, but, rather, mistakenly serves a 
nonparty in the same building, allegedly after having been 
directed to do so by a person in the defendant's office.  The 
answer is no. 
¶2  John Hagen filed a lawsuit against the City of 
Milwaukee Employes' Retirement System/Annuity and Pension Board 
(MERS) seeking certiorari review of its decision to terminate 
No. 
01-3198   
 
2 
 
his disability benefits.  Hagen's process server asserted in an 
affidavit that he attempted service of the summons and complaint 
at the MERS office in Milwaukee City Hall, but was told to go to 
the city clerk's office instead.  The city clerk's office issued 
a receipt for the summons and complaint. 
¶3  MERS is a separate political body from the City of 
Milwaukee and was never served with the summons and complaint.  
MERS filed an answer asserting lack of personal jurisdiction 
based 
on 
this 
defective 
service, 
but 
the 
defect 
went 
uncorrected.  MERS moved for summary judgment based on the 
absence of personal jurisdiction, and the circuit court granted 
the motion.  The court of appeals affirmed. 
¶4 
Personal jurisdiction over a body politic such as MERS 
may be obtained by service of the summons and complaint on an 
officer, director, or managing agent of the body politic, or 
substitute service on a "person who is apparently in charge of 
the office" of an officer, director, or managing agent of the 
body politic.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 801.02(1) and 801.11(4)(a)(7) 
and (b)(1999-2000).1  Service on a nonparty, even where it occurs 
erroneously in reliance on the mistaken direction of a person in 
the office of the defendant, does not constitute service on the 
defendant.  The motion for summary judgment based on the absence 
of personal jurisdiction was properly granted. 
I. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statues are to the 1999-
2000 version. 
No. 
01-3198   
 
3 
 
¶5 
For purposes of this review, the facts are taken from 
the complaint and affidavits submitted on the motion for summary 
judgment.  John Hagen worked as a laborer in the City of 
Milwaukee Department of Public Works for many years.  In 1989, 
he suffered an injury on the job.  He retired in 1990 on duty 
disability, 
subject 
to 
periodic 
medical 
examinations 
to 
determine his continued eligibility for disability benefits.  In 
2000, MERS terminated Hagen's disability benefits following a 
medical 
reexamination. 
Hagen 
appealed 
the 
decision 
administratively, and in March 2001, MERS affirmed its original 
decision. 
¶6 
On April 19, 2001, Hagen filed a summons and complaint 
in Milwaukee County Circuit Court seeking certiorari review of 
MERS' termination of his disability benefits.  MERS answered on 
June 7, 2001, asserting as an affirmative defense lack of 
personal jurisdiction based on Hagen's failure to serve MERS 
with an authenticated copy of the summons and complaint.  The 
answer also asserted the affirmative defense of failure to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted against "the City of 
Milwaukee, the party who was served in this matter."  Hagen did 
not further attempt to effectuate service on MERS, even though 
he had 41 days left in which to do so, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 
801.02(1). 
¶7  On September 10, 2001, MERS moved for summary judgment, 
again asserting the absence of personal jurisdiction due to 
failure of service.  MERS submitted an affidavit of Anne M. 
Bahr, its Secretary and Executive Director, asserting that she 
No. 
01-3198   
 
4 
 
is the officer designated to accept service of process on behalf 
of MERS, and that MERS had never been served with a summons and 
complaint.  MERS also filed an affidavit of Kathleen Marquardt, 
a staff assistant in the city clerk's office, asserting that the 
city clerk's office, located in Room 205 of City Hall, accepts 
service of process for the City of Milwaukee only, not for any 
other municipal entity. 
¶8  Hagen submitted an affidavit of process server Fred 
Meier, who asserted that on April 27, 2001, he went to Milwaukee 
City Hall to serve MERS.  Meier stated in his affidavit that 
when he went to the MERS office in City Hall Room 603, the 
person who greeted him told him that process "must be served at 
the city clerk's office."  Meier further stated that he 
proceeded to the city clerk's office where he was greeted by 
Kathy Marquardt, who "accepted the paper and also face stamped 
my return copy of the summons.  At no time did the city clerk's 
office state that this was not accepted by them." 
 ¶9  MERS filed a supplemental affidavit of Bahr describing 
the office procedure for acceptance of service of process and 
asserting that MERS' "front office personnel [have] no knowledge 
of ever referring anyone to the City Clerk's office for 
acceptance of service." 
¶10  The circuit court, the Honorable Thomas P. Donegan, 
granted the motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case.  
The court of appeals affirmed.  We accepted review and now 
affirm. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
No. 
01-3198   
 
5 
 
¶11 We review the circuit court's grant of summary 
judgment de novo, using the same methodology as the circuit 
court.  Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 315-17, 
401 N.W.2d 816 (1987).  Summary judgment is granted when it is 
clear that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law."  Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).  There are some facts in 
dispute regarding the precise circumstances surrounding the 
service of process on the city clerk's office.  Even accepting 
Hagen's version of the facts to be true, however, summary 
judgment dismissing the case is required as a matter of law.  
III. ANALYSIS 
¶12  A circuit court obtains personal jurisdiction over a 
defendant when the defendant is served with a summons in the 
manner prescribed by the statutes.  Heaston v. Austin, 47 Wis. 
2d 67, 70-71, 176 N.W.2d 309 (1970).  The plaintiff has the 
burden to prove compliance with statutory service requirements, 
that is, to establish that the defendant was properly served and 
is therefore subject to the court's jurisdiction.  Danielson v. 
Brody Seating Co., 71 Wis. 2d 424, 427-28, 238 N.W.2d 531 
(1976). 
¶13  Failure to obtain personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant by statutorily proper service of process is a 
fundamental defect fatal to the action, regardless of prejudice.  
Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 167 Wis. 2d 524, 
534-35, 481 N.W.2d 629 (1992).  "Even if defendant actually knew 
of the pendency of the action, this is not equivalent to 
No. 
01-3198   
 
6 
 
service."  Heaston, 47 Wis. 2d at 71.  "[W]hen a statute 
prescribes how service is to be made, the statute determines the 
matter."  Punke v. Brody, 17 Wis. 2d 9, 13, 115 N.W.2d 601 
(1962); see also Gangler v. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 110 Wis. 2d 
649, 329 N.W.2d 186 (1983).  Thus, the threshold question in a 
dispute over the adequacy of service is whether the statutory 
procedures have been met.  Keske v. Square D Co., 58 Wis. 2d 
307, 311-12, 206 N.W.2d 189 (1973). 
¶14 The general statutory requirements for commencement 
and service of a civil action are contained in Wis. Stat. § 
801.02(1): 
801.02  Commencement of action. (1)  A civil action in 
which a personal judgment is sought is commenced as to 
any defendant when a summons and a complaint naming 
the person as defendant are filed with the court, 
provided service of an authenticated copy of the 
summons and of the complaint is made upon the 
defendant under this chapter within 90 days after 
filing. 
Wis. Stat. § 801.02(1)(emphasis added)(applicable to certiorari 
complaints pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 801.02(5)).  Accordingly, 
Hagen had 90 days after filing his lawsuit to serve MERS with an 
authenticated copy of the summons and complaint.  
¶15  MERS is a political corporation.2  The specific 
statutory requirements for service of process for purposes of 
obtaining personal jurisdiction over political corporations are 
contained in Wis. Stat. § 801.11(4):   
                                                 
2 See Milwaukee City Charter § 36-09-6 ("The retirement 
system shall have all of the powers and privileges of a 
corporation, as enumerated in chs. 180 and 182, Wis. Stats."). 
No. 
01-3198   
 
7 
 
801.11 
Personal 
jurisdiction, 
manner 
of 
serving 
summons 
for. 
 
A 
court 
of 
this 
state 
having 
jurisdiction of the subject matter and grounds for 
personal jurisdiction as provided in s. 801.05 may 
exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant by 
service of a summons as follows: 
 . . . .  
(4) OTHER POLITICAL CORPORATIONS OR BODIES POLITIC. 
(a) Upon a political corporation or other body 
politic, by personally serving any of the specified 
officers, directors, or agents: 
 . . . .  
7. If against any other body politic, an officer, 
director, or managing agent thereof. 
(b) In lieu of delivering the copy of the summons to 
the person specified, the copy may be left in the 
office of such officer, director or managing agent 
with the person who is apparently in charge of the 
office. 
Wis. Stat. § 801.11(4)(a) and (b). 
¶16 MERS is a separate political body from the City of 
Milwaukee.3  Therefore, Hagen was required to serve an officer, 
director, or managing agent of MERS (not an officer, director, 
or managing agent of the City of Milwaukee) before the circuit 
court could exercise personal jurisdiction over MERS.  The 
statute allows for substitute service on "the person who is 
apparently in charge of the office" of an officer, director, or 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Milwaukee City Charter § 36-15-1 ("The general 
administration and responsibility for the proper operation of 
the retirement system and for making effective the provisions of 
this act are hereby vested in an annuity and pension board."). 
Boards and commissions that operate independently are subject to 
direct judicial proceedings as "bodies politic" within Wis. 
Stat. § 801.11(4)(a)(7). Watkins v. Milwaukee Cty. Civ. Serv. 
Comm'n, 88 Wis. 2d 411, 417-18, 276 N.W.2d 775 (1979). 
No. 
01-3198   
 
8 
 
managing agent of a political corporation or other body politic.  
Wis. Stat. § 801.11(4)(b).  The statute does not allow for 
substitute service on a separate and distinct nonparty political 
corporation. 
¶17 The statutory language governing service of process on 
business corporations generally parallels the language in Wis. 
Stat. § 801.11(4)(b) governing service of process on political 
corporations.  See Wis. Stat. § 801.11(5)(a).  Wisconsin Statute 
§ 801.11(5)(a), like its counterpart subsection (4)(b), allows 
substitute service on "the person who is apparently in charge of 
the office" of an officer, director, or managing agent of a 
corporate defendant.  Id.  We have interpreted this phrase to 
allow service on a person whom the process server reasonably 
believed, under the circumstances, to be in charge of the office 
of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporate 
defendant. 
¶18  In Keske, the process server went to the offices of 
the defendant company and asked to see an officer, director, or 
managing agent of the company.  Keske, 58 Wis. 2d at 309.  When 
told none was available, he asked to see the person in charge of 
the office.  Id.  The receptionist directed the process server 
to the company's director of industrial relations, who, although 
not in fact "in charge," nevertheless accepted service.  Id. at 
310.  We affirmed the circuit court's conclusion that it was 
"not unreasonable" under these circumstances for the process 
server to infer that the director of industrial relations was 
"apparently in charge" of the office of an "officer, director or 
No. 
01-3198   
 
9 
 
managing agent" of the company within the meaning of the 
statute.  Id. at 314-15. 
¶19 In Horrigan v. State Farm Insurance Co., 106 Wis. 2d 
675, 317 N.W.2d 474 (1982), the process server went to the 
office of the defendant insurance company and informed the 
receptionist that he had a summons to serve.  Id. at 678-79.  
The receptionist told the process server to "'take a seat' and 
that she would get someone to receive the papers."  Id. at 679.  
Soon after, a man appeared from the interior offices and entered 
the office waiting room.  Id. Assuming without further inquiry 
that this man was the person the receptionist had called for, 
the process server delivered the summons to him.  Id. 
¶20  We held in Horrigan that "the statute requires that 
the facts and circumstances surrounding the service must be such 
that a reasonable process server would conclude that he has 
served the person apparently in charge of the office of an 
officer, director or managing agent of the corporation to be 
served."  Id. at 677.  We concluded that the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the service in Horrigan established 
the process server's "reasonable belief" that the person he had 
served at the defendant insurance company was the person in 
charge, authorized to accept service.  Id. at 684. 
¶21  These cases stand for the proposition that personal 
jurisdiction over a corporate defendant may be acquired if the 
facts demonstrate that in effectuating substitute service on 
"the person who is apparently in charge of the office" of an 
officer, director, or managing agent of the defendant, the 
No. 
01-3198   
 
10 
 
process server reasonably but mistakenly serves a person who 
appears to be, but in fact is not, "in charge" of that office.  
These cases do not stand for the proposition that personal 
jurisdiction can be acquired by service on a separate and 
distinct nonparty, even where the nonparty service occurs by 
virtue of the misdirection of the process server by a person in 
the defendant's office. 
¶22 The court of appeals has twice refused to extend 
personal jurisdiction over defendants in cases in which service 
on the wrong entity is attributable to a process server who has 
been misdirected.  In Gomez v. Labor & Industry Review 
Commission, 153 Wis. 2d 686, 451 N.W.2d 475 (Ct. App. 1989), the 
plaintiff attempted to serve a summons and complaint seeking 
judicial review of a decision of the Labor and Industry Review 
Commission (LIRC) at the Watertown job services office of the 
Department of Industry, Labor, and Human Relations (DILHR).  Id. 
at 688.  The process server was directed to and did serve the 
summons and complaint in the Madison office of the worker’s 
compensation division of DILHR.  Id. at 688-89.  The court of 
appeals upheld the circuit court's dismissal of the case based 
on the failure to serve LIRC.  Id. at 687-88.  The court of 
appeals concluded that the process server "did not serve the 
papers on a person authorized to accept them; indeed, she did 
not even serve them on an employee of the commission, but on a 
receptionist in the office of a related, but very different, 
agency." Id. at 692.  
No. 
01-3198   
 
11 
 
¶23 The court of appeals reached a similar conclusion in 
Bar Code Resources v. Ameritech Information Systems, 229 Wis. 2d 
287, 599 N.W.2d 872 (Ct. App. 1999).  There, the contract 
between the parties specified that defendant Ameritech's agent 
for service of process was its vice-president and general 
counsel, located on the 23rd floor of its office building in 
Chicago.  Id. at 289-90.  The process server approached the 
security desk at the Ameritech building in Chicago and stated 
that he had a summons and complaint to serve on Ameritech.  Id. 
at 289.  The security manager, an employee of Illinois Bell, an 
Ameritech subsidiary, said he was authorized to accept service, 
and the process server served him.  Id. 
¶24  The court of appeals concluded that service on the 
Illinois Bell security manager, "a person not even in the employ 
of the targeted corporation," was insufficient to satisfy the 
statutory 
requirements 
for 
personal 
jurisdiction 
over the 
defendant Ameritech.  Id. at 294-95.  The court held that the 
place of service——the office of a corporate officer, director, 
or managing agent——was an objective element of the statute, not 
subject to inquiries about the process server's subjective 
reasonable belief.  Id. at 292.  The court concluded that the 
plaintiff had not established compliance with this objective 
requirement of the statute.  Id. at 294-95.  Service on a person 
"apparently in charge" of the wrong office is insufficient, even 
if it is based upon a process server's reasonable belief in the 
propriety of service. 
No. 
01-3198   
 
12 
 
¶25 Accordingly, while the statute allows for reasonable 
mistakes regarding the person "who is apparently in charge of 
the office" of an officer, director, or managing agent of the 
defendant, it does not allow for mistaken service on a person in 
the office of a nonparty to the litigation, regardless of 
whether the mistake could be considered reasonable.  Here, Hagen 
served 
neither 
the 
defendant 
MERS 
nor 
any 
of 
its 
representatives.  As in Gomez, the plaintiff here served a 
"related, but very different" governmental agency.  Hagen was 
placed on notice of the defective service by MERS' answer, but 
did not correct it, even though ample time remained in which to 
do so. 
¶26 
Hagen 
has 
not 
demonstrated 
compliance 
with 
the 
requirements of Wis. Stat. §§ 801.02(1) and 801.11(4).  The 
circuit court did not acquire personal jurisdiction over MERS, 
and therefore properly granted summary judgment dismissing the 
complaint.   
By the court.-The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
No. 
01-3198   
 
 
 
1