Title: State v. Fleetwood
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S41311
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: December 29, 2000

FILED: DECEMBER 29, 2000 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,
	Respondent on Review,
	v.
JERRY LEE FLEETWOOD,
	Petitioner on Review.
(CC CR92167; CA A77709; SC S41311)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted March 9, 1995.  Resubmitted June 11,
1998.
	Ingrid A. MacFarlane, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued
the cause for petitioner on review.  With her on the briefs were
Sally L. Avera, Public Defender, and Louis R. Miles, Deputy
Public Defender.
	Rives Kistler, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the
cause for respondent on review.  With him on the briefs were
Theodore R. Kulongoski, Attorney General, Virginia L. Linder,
Solicitor General, and Janie M. Burcart, Assistant Attorney
General.
	David E. Groom, Salem, filed a brief for amicus curiae
Oregon Criminal Defense Lawyers Association.  With him on the
brief was David G. Terry, Roseburg.
	Thomas M. Christ, Portland, filed a brief for amicus curiae
ACLU Foundation of Oregon, Inc.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
and Durham, Justices.**
	DURHAM, J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The order
of the circuit court is affirmed, and the case is remanded to the
circuit court for further proceedings.
	 *Appeal from Wasco County Circuit Court. John V. Kelly, Judge.  127 Or App 558, 872 P2d 998 (1994).
	**Kulongoski, Leeson, and Riggs, JJ., did not participate in
the consideration or decision of this case.  Unis, J., retired
June 30, 1996, and did not participate in the decision of this
case.  Fadeley, J., retired January 31, 1998, and did not
participate in the decision of this case.  Graber, J., resigned
March 31, 1998, and did not participate in the decision of this
case.  
	DURHAM, J.
	Defendant seeks review of a decision of the Court of
Appeals that reversed the trial court's order suppressing
evidence obtained through police use of an electronic listening
device.  State v. Fleetwood, 127 Or App 558, 872 P2d 998 (1994). (1) 
Defendant argues that Oregon law did not authorize the police to
intercept and record the communications involved here and that,
as a consequence, Oregon statutes required the trial court to
suppress the evidence of those communications.  We quote below
the statutes that pertain to that argument.  Defendant also
argues that the police conduct here was a search or seizure that
required a warrant, and that the trial court correctly suppressed
the evidence of the oral communications obtained by the police to
protect his rights under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon
Constitution. (2)  For the reasons discussed below, we reverse the
decision of the Court of Appeals.
	The relevant facts are undisputed.  Reineccius was a
police informant who had provided reliable information to the
police on several occasions.  On May 27, 1992, Reineccius told
Eiseland, a detective with the Wasco County Sheriff's Office,
that defendant had agreed to sell marijuana to Reineccius.  On
May 28, 1992, Eiseland equipped Reineccius with a hidden radio
transmitter known as a body wire.  At no time did the state
obtain an ex parte order from a court authorizing the police to
intercept communications or obtain conversations by means of the
body wire.
	Reineccius drove to defendant's home.  Eiseland
followed in a car with a radio receiver.  The radio receiver
permitted Eiseland to listen to and tape record any conversations
or other sounds that the body wire on Reineccius could detect. 
Eiseland turned on his radio receiver as Reineccius approached
defendant's front door.  Defendant admitted Reineccius to the
home.  Eiseland listened to and recorded conversations inside
defendant's home between Reineccius and defendant, and between
defendant and his mother.  Eiseland also listened to and recorded
defendant's side of a telephone call that he placed from his home
to another person.  
	Defendant and Reineccius then left defendant's home in
Reineccius's car.  Eiseland followed them.  Reineccius' car
stopped on a public street.  A juvenile female approached the
car, held a conversation with defendant, and sold marijuana to
him.  Eiseland listened to and recorded the conversation between
defendant and the juvenile female.  Defendant then gave the
marijuana to Reineccius.  Police arrested defendant and charged
him with delivery of a controlled substance.  ORS 475.992.
	Defendant moved to suppress the evidence of all
communications obtained through use of the body wire.  Defendant
contended that the police obtained all the evidence in violation
of statutes governing the use of a body wire, particularly ORS
133.721 et seq. and ORS 165.540, and that Article I, section 9,
of the Oregon Constitution required them to obtain a warrant
before obtaining evidence through use of a body wire. (3)  The trial
court held that the police obtained the body wire evidence in
conformance with ORS 165.540(5)(a)(B).  However, the court
concluded that the use of the body wire was a search under
Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution.  Because the
police conducted the search without a warrant and no exception to
the warrant requirement applied, the court concluded that the
search violated Article I, section 9, and, accordingly, granted
defendant's motion to suppress.	
		The state appealed the order granting the motion to
suppress.  See ORS 138.060(3) (authorizing state to appeal from
pretrial order suppressing evidence).  The Court of Appeals
reversed and remanded, citing State v. Bass, 126 Or App 303, 868
P2d 761 (1994).  Bass held that, under ORS 165.540(5)(a)(B), the
police may tape record a conversation intercepted by a body wire,
without first obtaining authorization under a court order, if
they have probable cause to believe that a party to the
conversation with a police informant is about to commit a felony
drug crime.  The Bass court also rejected the defendant's
constitutional arguments.  Id. at 307.
	Defendant argues that compliance by police with ORS
165.540 relieves them of criminal liability for unlawfully
obtaining a conversation, but does not render evidence of the
conversation obtained under that statute admissible in court. 
Defendant contends that the pertinent statutes obligate the
police to obtain an ex parte order authorizing interception of
the communications at issue here.  Defendant concludes that the
failure of the police to secure a court order in this case
renders evidence derived from the interception subject to
suppression.
	The trial court's order suppressed evidence of
communications obtained through police use of the body wire.   
That evidence consists of Eiseland's testimony about the
conversations and statements that he heard through the radio
receiver that he tuned to the body wire and the tape recordings
that Eiseland made of those conversations and statements.  As we
will discuss below, the conversations occurred between defendant
and four persons:  Reineccius, defendant's mother, the juvenile
female, and an unidentified person to whom defendant spoke by
telephone.  This appeal concerns only the correctness of the
order suppressing the body wire evidence described above. (4)  
	The issues of the authority of the police in this
context, and the admissibility of evidence obtained through
police use of a body wire, require us to discern the
legislature's intention in enacting the pertinent statutes.  We
approach that task by examining the text and context of those
statutes.  If those sources unambiguously disclose the
legislature's intent, then our inquiry is at an end.  PGE v.
Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-11, 859 P2d 1143
(1993).  More specifically, with respect to the present case, if
our statutory construction demonstrates that the conduct of the
police exceeded their authority, and that Oregon statutes specify
the consequence of the unauthorized conduct, we need not address
defendant's constitutional arguments.  Logic, not mere editorial
taste, compels that approach.  This court routinely analyzes the
legality of the acts of an official exercising delegated
authority by first examining ordinary rules of law, including the
scope and limits of an official's legal authority, before 
addressing any constitutional issue.  See State v. Lowry, 295 Or
337, 343, 667 P2d 996 (1983) (stating principle).
	We turn to the pertinent statutes. (5)  We begin by
considering two statutes that authorize the courts to issue ex
parte orders authorizing police interception of certain wire,
electronic, or oral communications by the police.  The first
statute is ORS 133.724, which provides in part:
		"(1) An ex parte order for the interception of
wire, electronic or oral communications may be issued
by any circuit court judge upon written application
made upon oath or affirmation of the individual who is
the district attorney or a deputy district attorney
authorized by the district attorney for the county in
which the order is sought.  The application shall
include:
		"* * * * *
		"(c) A statement demonstrating that there is
probable cause to believe that an individual is
committing, has committed or is about to commit, a
particular felony of murder, kidnapping, arson,
robbery, bribery, extortion or other crime dangerous to
life and punishable as a felony, or a crime punishable
as a felony under ORS 475.992 or 475.995, or any
conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes;
		"* * * * *
		"(3) Upon examination of such application and
evidence the judge may enter an ex parte order, as
requested or as modified, authorizing or approving
interception of wire, electronic or oral communications
within the state if the judge determines on the basis
of the facts submitted by the applicant that:
		"(a) There is probable cause for belief that an
individual is committing, has committed or is about to
commit a particular crime described in subsection
(1)(c) of this section * * *." (6)
	The second pertinent statute is ORS 133.726, which
provides in part: 
		"(1) An ex parte order for the obtaining of any
conversation in any county of this state under ORS
165.540 (5)(a) may be issued by any judge as defined in
ORS 133.525 upon written application made upon oath or
affirmation of the district attorney or a deputy
district attorney authorized by the district attorney
for the county in which the order is sought or upon the
oath or affirmation of any peace officer. The
application shall include:
	"* * * * *
 		"(b) A statement demonstrating that there is
reasonable cause to believe that a person whose
conversation is to be obtained is engaged in committing
or has committed a particular felony and that the
obtaining of the conversation will yield evidence
thereof; and
		"* * * * *
		"(3) Upon examination of the application and
evidence, the judge may enter an ex parte order, as
requested or as modified, authorizing or approving
obtaining of conversations within the state if the
judge determines on the basis of the facts submitted by
the applicant that:
		"(a) There is reasonable cause to believe that a
person is engaged in committing or has committed a
particular felony."
	We also consider a third statute, ORS 165.540, which
provides in part:
		"(1) Except as otherwise provided in ORS 133.724
or subsections (2) to (7) of this section, no person
shall:	 
		"(a) Obtain or attempt to obtain the whole or any
part of a telecommunication or a radio communication to
which such person is not a participant, by means of any
device, contrivance, machine or apparatus, whether
electrical, mechanical, manual or otherwise, unless
consent is given by at least one participant.
		"* * * * *
		"(c) Obtain or attempt to obtain the whole or any
part of a conversation by means of any device,
contrivance, machine or apparatus, whether electrical,
mechanical, manual or otherwise, if all participants in
the conversation are not specifically informed that
their conversation is being obtained.
		"* * * * *
		"(5)(a) The prohibitions in subsection (1)(c) of
this section do not apply:
		"(A) When a law enforcement officer obtains a
conversation between the officer or someone under the
officer's direct supervision pursuant to a court order
under ORS 133.726, providing the person who obtains or
records the conversation does not intentionally fail to
record and preserve the conversation in its entirety.
		"(B) When a law enforcement officer obtains a
conversation between the officer, or someone under the
direct supervision of the officer, and a person who the
officer has probable cause to believe has committed, is
engaged in committing or is about to commit a crime
punishable as a felony under ORS 475.992 or 475.995 or
the circumstances at the time the conversation is
obtained are of such exigency that it would be
unreasonable to obtain the court order under ORS
133.726, providing the person who obtains or records
the conversation does not intentionally fail to record
and preserve the conversation in its entirety.
		"* * * * *
		"(9) Violation of subsection (1) of this section 
* * * is a Class A Misdemeanor." (7)
		We determine the legislature's intention in enacting
the foregoing statutes by construing their words together, taking
care not to insert what the legislature has omitted or to omit
what the legislature has inserted.  State v. Castrejon, 317 Or
202, 206, 856 P2d 616 (1993) (quoting ORS 174.010).  ORS 165.540
provides a useful starting point in that endeavor.  Any evidence
of a wire or oral communication that the state intercepts in
violation of ORS 165.540 is inadmissible whether or not the
interception might have satisfied other pertinent statutes.  ORS
41.910(1). (8)  Thus, we begin by examining whether police
intercepted any wire or oral communication in violation of ORS
165.540.
	1.  Defendant's telephone call.
	We first consider the body wire evidence of defendant's
statements that he uttered into the telephone during the
telephone call from his home.
	ORS 165.540(1)(a) addresses the obtaining or the
attempt to obtain, by means of a device, of the whole or any part
of a "telecommunication."  ORS 165.540(1)(c) addresses the
obtaining or the attempt to obtain, by means of a device, of the
whole or any part of a "conversation."  We first inquire whether
defendant's utterances into the telephone constituted a
"conversation" or a "telecommunication."
	ORS 165.535(1) provides that a "conversation" consists
of an "oral communication which is not a telecommunication."  ORS
133.721(7) defines "oral communication" to mean
	"any oral communication, other than a wire
communication uttered by a person exhibiting an
expectation that such communication is not subject to
interception under circumstances justifying such
expectation."
ORS 133.721(10) defines "wire communication" to mean
	"any communication made in whole or in part through the
use of facilities for the transmission of
communications by aid of wire, cable or other like
connection between the point of origin and the point of
reception * * *."
	Defendant's utterance of words into the telephone was a
"wire communication" under ORS 133.721(10), because his
statements constituted a communication "made in whole or in part
through the use of facilities for the transmission of
communications by aid of wire, cable or other like connection   
* * *."  Nothing in the record indicates that defendant expected
that anyone was intercepting his telephone call through the use
of a device.  ORS 133.721(7) excludes the kind of wire
communication shown here from the statutory definition of "oral
communication."  Consequently, defendant's telephone call did not
constitute a "conversation" under ORS 165.535(1).
	ORS 165.535(4) defines "telecommunication" in part to
mean the 
	"transmission of * * * sounds of all kinds by aid of
wire, cable or similar connection between the points of
origin and reception of such transmission * * *." 
A person's utterance of words into a telephone during a telephone
call is an instance of transmitting the person's words by wire
between the point of origin and the point of reception. 
Consequently, defendant's act of speaking into the telephone was
a "telecommunication" within the meaning of ORS 165.535(4).
	ORS 165.540(1)(a) prohibits any person from obtaining
or attempting to obtain "the whole or any part of a
telecommunication * * * to which such person is not a
participant" by means of a device, "unless consent is given by at
least one participant."  Neither Reineccius nor Eiseland was a
participant in defendant's telecommunication, and neither
defendant nor the other participant in the telephone call
consented to the state's obtaining defendant's statements during
the call by the body wire device.  We conclude from the foregoing
that the state's conduct in obtaining evidence, by means of a
device, of defendant's utterances into his telephone did not
comply with ORS 165.540(1)(a). (9)
	ORS 41.910(1)(a) prohibits admission of evidence of any
wire or oral communication "intercepted" in violation of ORS
165.540.  ORS 133.721(5) defines "intercept" to mean "the
acquisition, by listening or recording, of the contents of any
wire, electronic or oral communication through the use of any
electronic, mechanical or other device."  The state's act of
using a body wire to listen to and record the contents of
defendant's statements during the telephone call was an
"interception" of a wire communication within the definition in
ORS 133.721(5).  ORS 41.910(1)(a) rendered that evidence
inadmissible in this case.  The trial court's order suppressing
the body wire evidence of defendant's statements intercepted
during the telephone call was correct.   
	As already noted, the state obtained evidence, by body
wire, of defendant's face-to-face conversations with his mother
and the juvenile female.  Each of those communications was a
"conversation" under the definition stated in ORS 165.535(1).  We
turn to the question whether obtaining those conversations
violated ORS 165.540(1)(c).
	The state acknowledges that no one informed all
participants in those conversations that the state would be
obtaining the conversations.  See ORS 165.540(1)(c) (providing
that all participants must be informed specifically that their
conversation is being obtained).  However, the state, relying on
ORS 165.540(5)(a)(B), argues that the prohibition in ORS
165.540(1)(c) does not apply "[w]hen a law enforcement officer
obtains a conversation between the officer, or someone under the
direct supervision of the officer, and a person who the officer
has probable cause to believe" is engaged in a drug felony.  
	ORS 165.540(5)(a)(B) requires that the conversations
occur "between" two identified persons, specifically, between
Reineccius and a person whom Eiseland had probable cause to
believe was involved in a drug felony.  Webster's Third New Int'l
Dictionary, 209 (unabridged ed 1993), defining the word "between"
as "involving the reciprocal action of : involving as
participants : jointly engaging * * * : shared by * * *."  The
term "between," in this context, connotes a communication shared
reciprocally by the two identified persons as participants
jointly engaged in conversation.  See also ORS 165.535(1)
(defining "conversation" as oral communication "between" two or
more persons).  
		In obtaining defendant's conversations with his mother
and the juvenile female by means of a device, the state did not
satisfy ORS 165.540(5)(a)(B). (10)  Defendant's conversations did
not amount to the transmission of an oral communication, ORS
165.535(1), shared reciprocally with Reineccius as a participant
jointly engaged in conversation.  ORS 165.540(5)(a)(B) does not
apply to a conversation between a suspected drug felon (here,
defendant) and another person that the law enforcement officer or
the officer's agent can overhear, by means of a listening device,
unless the officer or the agent shares reciprocally in the
communication as a participant jointly engaged in conversation. 
Because the state's action here did not satisfy ORS
165.540(5)(a)(B), the prohibition in ORS 165.540(1)(c) remains
applicable to the obtaining of defendant's conversations with his
mother and with the juvenile female. 
	The only remaining question is whether the state's
violation of ORS 165.540(1)(c) in the foregoing instances amounts
to the interception of oral communications within the meaning of
ORS 41.910(1)(a).  The definitions of "intercept" and "oral
communication" provided in ORS 133.721(5) and (7) apply to ORS
41.910(1).  Those definitions demonstrate that the state's
conduct in obtaining defendant's conversations with his mother
and the juvenile female constituted interceptions of oral
communications under ORS 41.910(1)(a).  Because those
interceptions violated ORS 165.540(1)(c), ORS 41.910(1)(a)
renders the body wire evidence of those oral communications
inadmissible.  The trial court's order suppressing that evidence
was correct.	
	3.  Defendant's conversations with Reineccius.
	We next address the admissibility of the state's body
wire evidence of defendant's conversations with Reineccius.  The
state argues that it complied with ORS 165.540(5)(a)(B) in
obtaining those conversations and that no statute obligates the
state to secure a court order authorizing use of a body wire if
it complies with that statute.  Defendant argues that the state
must obtain a court order under ORS 133.724 under these
circumstances.   
	The parties' arguments require us to construe ORS
133.724, 133.726, and 165.540(5)(a)(B) together.  ORS 133.724(1)
authorizes a circuit court judge, upon a proper application, to
issue an ex parte order that authorizes "the interception of
wire, electronic or oral communications * * *."  In State v.
Pottle, 296 Or 274, 284, 677 P2d 1 (1984), this court addressed
the lawfulness of an ex parte order under ORS 133.724 that
authorized police to wiretap telephone calls.  The court gave the
following explanation of the function of the ex parte order under
that statute:
		"'The order serves the same function as a
conventional search warrant by indicating judicial
authority for the search, acting as the formal record
of judicial action, establishing the limits of the
search, instructing the officers on the scope of their
authority and discretion, and providing the basis for
determining the legality of the execution of the
search.'  J. Carr, The Law of Electronic Surveillance,
§ 4.07, 194-95."
Id. at 284. 
	This court determined that, under the legislature's
scheme that permits electronic surveillance, the ex parte order
is the source of authority that allows police to invade the
privacy of citizens' telephone communications:
	"The order is the document that allows the police to
invade the privacy of all people who use the telephone
wire during the authorized period of interception, and
limits that invasion."
Id. at 288.  The court concluded that, because
	"the order authorizing this wiretap did not conform to
the statutory requirements, these conversations were
intercepted unlawfully, and the conversations and all
evidence derived therefrom must be suppressed.  ORS
133.735."
Id. at 290 (footnote omitted).	
	Pottle involved the wiretapping of telephone calls, not
the obtaining by body wire and tape recorder of conversations, as
in this case.  Pottle is significant, however, because, in that
case, this court determined that the circuit court's ex parte
order, issued under ORS 133.724, is the document that authorizes
police to invade the privacy of telephone callers to gather
evidence of crime.  
	The Pottle court's conclusion regarding police
authority to intercept telephone calls pursuant to court order
applies with equal force to the interception of oral
communications.  ORS 133.724 permits the court to authorize the
police, through an ex parte order, to intercept oral
communications of the kind involved here.  Defendant's
conversations with Reineccius were "oral communications" within
the definition provided in ORS 133.721(7).  The state's use of
the body wire to obtain those oral communications falls within
the definition of "intercept" provided in ORS 133.721(5).  The
state possessed all the information necessary to demonstrate, in
an application for an ex parte order under ORS 133.724(1)(c),
that 
	"there is probable cause to believe that an individual
[i.e., defendant] is committing, has committed or is
about to commit, * * * a crime punishable as a felony
under ORS 475.992 or 475.995 * * *."  
Applying Pottle in this context, we conclude that ORS 133.724
provides for judicial authorization, through a court order, of
exactly the kind of electronic surveillance of oral
communications that occurred in this case.
	ORS 133.724 applies to the interception of all oral
communications for which the state can make the requisite showing
of probable cause.  ORS 133.726 also creates a procedure for
issuance of a court order approving the obtaining of
conversations by police, but confines that procedure to the
obtaining of a conversation "under ORS 165.540(5)(a)."  ORS
165.540(5)(a) states three circumstances in which "[t]he
prohibitions in [ORS 165.540(1)(c)] do not apply * * *."  Reading
ORS 133.726 and 165.540(5)(a) together, it is clear that a court
order under ORS 133.726 relieves the criminal prohibition that
otherwise might apply under ORS 165.540(10(c) to the obtaining of
a conversation by police without the consent of all participants. 
However, ORS 133.726 does not change the scope or applicability
of ORS 133.724, and the court order procedure provided in that
statute, as the source of police authority to intercept oral
communications.  Moreover, ORS 133.726 does not purport to
authorize the police to obtain a conversation by use of a device
without a court order for any purpose.
	The state acknowledges, and we agree, that the probable
cause provision in ORS 165.540(5)(a)(B) identifies one
circumstance that relieves a law enforcement officer of the
criminal prohibition in ORS 165.540(1)(c).  The state also
contends that the court should interpret the probable cause
provision in ORS 165.540(5)(a)(B) to create an additional legal
consequence, i.e., to authorize law enforcement officers to
obtain conversations without the necessity of securing
authorization through a court order issued under ORS 133.724.  
	We conclude that ORS 165.540(5)(a)(B) does not go as
far as the state suggests.  ORS 165.540(5)(a) identifies only one
legislative objective for the enactment of that subsection:  the
identification of three factual scenarios in which the criminal
prohibition stated in ORS 165.540(1)(c) "do[es] not apply."  ORS
165.540(5)(a) does not refer, directly or indirectly, to ORS
133.724.  The legislature cited ORS 133.724 in the opening clause
of ORS 165.540(1), but that provision establishes only that
compliance with ORS 133.724 renders ineffective the criminal
prohibitions provided in ORS 165.540(1).  Nothing in ORS 165.540
plausibly suggests that, in adopting the exceptions to criminal
liability in ORS 165.540(5)(a), the legislature intended in
addition to modify the scope or applicability of ORS 133.724 to
the interception by law enforcement officers of oral
communications by means of a device.  The state's argument, if
accepted, would eliminate the detailed process for securing a
court order authorizing electronic interception of oral
communications under ORS 133.724.  ORS 165.540(5)(a)(B) contains
no wording that supports such a broad exception.  This court
could create the additional legal consequence for which the state
advocates only by adding words to ORS 165.540(5)(a) that the
legislature did not include.  ORS 174.010 does not permit us to
do that.  See Castrejon, 317 Or at 206 (quoting legislative
proscription in ORS 174.010 against inserting words that
legislature has omitted).
	The state relies for its position in part on State v.
Lissy, 304 Or 455, 747 P2d 345 (1987).  Defendant argues that
Lissy is distinguishable on its facts and, in any event, was
wrongly decided.  We agree that Lissy is distinguishable.
	In Lissy, the court separately analyzed the
interception by police, without a court order, of telephone
conversations with the consent of one party and the obtaining by
police of face-to-face conversations with a court order.  The
court explored the legislative history that applied to the
statutes regulating electronic interception of telephone calls. 
Id. at 463-67.  The court concluded that the legislature in 1955
had prohibited the wiretapping of telephone calls, but had
excepted from that prohibition the interception of calls either
with a court order or with the consent of at least one
participant.  Id. at 464.  The court decided that numerous
revisions of the pertinent electronic surveillance statutes over
the years had left intact the legislature's original 1955 policy
choice not to restrict the taping or recording of telephone calls
with one party's consent.  Id. at 466.  The court held that the
conduct of the police in listening to telephone conversations
with one person's consent "was not in violation of state
statute."  Id. at 467.  The court also concluded that a federal
statute did not impose more stringent requirements for securing a
court order to obtain face-to-face conversations than did ORS
133.726 (1983) and, as a result, the police, in obtaining
conversations, were not required to comply with ORS 133.724 in
order to satisfy the federal statute. (11)  Id. at 467-68.
	The legislature did not enact the probable cause
provision in ORS 165.540(5)(a)(B) until 1989, two years after
this court decided Lissy.  See Oregon Laws 1989, ch 1078, § 1
(amending ORS 165.540(5)(a)(B)).  Therefore, Lissy did not
purport to interpret that statute.  The interception that the
police carried out without a court order in Lissy concerned
telephone calls, not face-to-face conversations.  The court's
analysis in Lissy of the unique legislative history of Oregon's
laws regulating the interception of telephone calls sheds no
light on the necessity under current law of a court order to
authorize interception of face-to-face oral communications.  The
court's resolution of the federal law compliance issue in Lissy
did not require a discussion of this court's interpretation of
ORS 133.724 in Pottle.  As a result, we decline the state's
invitation to extend the rationale of Lissy to a subject that
that case did not address, i.e., police authority to intercept
face-to-face oral communications without a court order.
	We conclude that where, as here, ORS 133.724 permits
the court to authorize the police to secure evidence by
intercepting oral communications pursuant to an ex parte court
order, the police must conduct their electronic interception
activities pursuant to such an order.  No statute entitles the
police to elect to employ electronic surveillance to obtain
evidence without a court order under circumstances, such as those
presented here, in which ORS 133.724 clearly applies.
	The state obtained the body wire evidence of
defendant's conversations with Reineccius without first obtaining
an ex parte court order under ORS 133.724.  No exception to the
requirement that the police obtain an order applied.  Thus, the
trial court did not err in ordering suppression of the body wire
evidence of defendant's conversations with Reineccius.  ORS
133.735(1).
	The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
order of the circuit court is affirmed, and the case is remanded
to the circuit court for further proceedings.



1. 	The court ordered reargument in this case and a
companion case, State v. Cleveland, ____ Or ____, ____ P3d ____
(2000) (decided this date), in light of the approval by the
voters in 1996 of an initiative, known as Measure 40 (1996), that
amended the law of search and seizure under the Oregon
Constitution.  In Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 327 Or 250, 959 P2d 49
(1998), the Court determined that
	"because Measure 40 was not adopted in compliance with
Article XVII, section 1 [, of the Oregon Constitution,
prohibiting adoption of multiple constitutional
amendments in a single initiative measure], we hold
that it is void in its entirety."  
Id. at 285 (footnote omitted).  Consequently, Measure 40 has no
effect on the decision in this case.
		Moreover, the court expresses no opinion in this case
on the potential retroactive applicability and constitutionality
of Senate Bill 936 (effective June 12, 1997).  Or Laws 1997, ch
313.  Those issues are pending before the court in another
proceeding.  State v. Fugate, 154 Or App 643, 963 P2d 686 (1998),
mod and adhd to on reconsideration 156 Or App 609, 969 P2d 395
(1998), rev allowed, 328 Or 275, 977 P2d 1173 (1999) (argued
October 14, 1999).  Section 38 of Senate Bill 936 enacted a
retroactive statute regarding the exclusion of evidence in a
criminal action.  The state advances no argument that Senate Bill
936 (1997) requires reversal of the trial court's order
suppressing evidence in this case.

2. 	Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution,
provides:
		"No law shall violate the right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure; and
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause,
supported by oath, or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or
thing to be seized."

3. 	Defendant also argued that the use of the body wire was
a search that violated his reasonable expectation of privacy
under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution.  However, defendant did not renew his
federal constitutional arguments in his appeal to the Court of
Appeals or in his petition for review to this court.

4. 	Under ORS 133.735, evidence derived from the
interception and recording of oral communications in violation of
ORS 133.724 is subject to suppression.  The state may have
evidence against defendant derived from oral communications
obtained in violation of ORS 133.724.  The state also may have
evidence derived from witnesses such as Reineccius, Eiseland,
defendant's mother, or the juvenile female about what those
witnesses saw or heard personally without aid of the body wire
and not in violation of ORS 133.274.  On remand, the trial court
may be called on to decide in the first instance whether any of
the testimony of those witnesses, or any other evidence, is
subject to suppression under ORS 133.735 as evidence derived from
unlawfully obtained evidence.

5. 	We address the current version of the statutes. 
Although the legislature has amended some statutory provisions
since the time of defendant's arrest, none of those amendments
affects our analysis here.

6. 	ORS 133.721 provides in part:
		"As used in ORS 41.910, 133.724 * * and this
section, unless the context requires otherwise:
		"* * * * *
		"(5) 'Intercept' means the acquisition, by
listening or recording, of the contents of any wire,
electronic or oral communication through the use of any
electronic, mechanical or other device.
		"* * * * *
		"(7) 'Oral communication' means any oral
communication, other than a wire communication uttered
by a person exhibiting an expectation that such
communication is not subject to interception under
circumstances justifying such expectation.
		"* * * * *
		"(10) 'Wire communication' means any communication
made in whole or in part through the use of facilities
for the transmission of communications by the aid of
wire, cable or other like connection between the point
of origin and the point of reception, whether furnished
or operated by a public utility or privately owned or
leased."
	ORS 133.735 (1) provides:
		"Any aggrieved person in any trial, hearing or
proceeding in or before any court, department, officer,
agency, regulatory body or other authority of the
state, or a political subdivision thereof, may move to
suppress the contents of any wire, electronic or oral
communication intercepted under ORS 133.724 or evidence
derived therefrom, on the grounds that:
		"(a) The communication was unlawfully intercepted;
		"(b) The order of authorization or approval under
which it was intercepted is insufficient on its face;
or
		"(c) The interception was not made in conformity
with the order of authorization or approval." 

7. 	ORS 165.535 provides in part:
		"As used in ORS 41.910 * * * 133.724, [and]
165.540 * * *:
		"(1) 'Conversation' means the transmission between
two or more persons of an oral communication which is
not a telecommunication or a radio communication.
		"* * * * *
		"(4) 'Telecommunication' means the transmission of
writing, signs, signals, pictures and sounds of all
kinds by aid of wire, cable or other similar connection
between the points of origin and reception of such
transmission, including all instrumentalities,
facilities, equipment and services (including, among
other things, the receipt, forwarding and delivering of
communications) incidental to such transmission."
	ORS 133.736 provides in part:
		"(1) Any aggrieved person, as defined in ORS
133.721, in any trial, hearing or proceeding in or
before any court, department, officer, agency,
regulatory body or other authority of the state, or a
political subdivision thereof, may move to suppress
under ORS 41.910 recordings of any conversation
obtained under ORS 165.540(5)(a), or the testimony of
any individual not a party thereto regarding any
conversation obtained under ORS 165.540(5)(a).
		"* * * * *
		"(4) As used in this section, 'conversation' has
the meaning provided in ORS 165.535."

8. 	ORS 41.910(1) provides in part:
		"Evidence of the contents of any wire or oral
communication intercepted:
		"(a) In violation of ORS 165.540 shall not be
admissible in any court of this state, except as
evidence of unlawful interception.
		"* * * * *
		"(2) Evidence made inadmissible under this section
due to noncompliance by a law enforcement officer with
the conditions of ORS 165.540(5)(a) shall only be
inadmissible under this section pursuant to a motion to
suppress under ORS 133.736."

9. 	The introductory clause in ORS 165.540(1) indicates
that several exceptions apply to that statute, i.e., it applies
"[e]xcept as otherwise provided in ORS 133.724 or subsections (2)
to (7) of this section * * *."  We have examined those exceptions
and conclude that none applies here.

10. 	The trial court found that, through the body wire,
Eiseland was able to overhear "defendant's conversation with his
mother in the home; and after defendant and Mr. Reineccius left
the home, defendant's conversation with the person from whom he
bought marijuana for Mr. Reineccius."  The court's latter finding
refers to defendant's conversation with the juvenile female.

11. 	In rejecting the defendant's argument that the police
had not complied with federal law in obtaining conversations, the
Lissy court determined that ORS 165.540(5)(a) and 133.726
contained "a stricter, not less restrictive, standard" than
federal law and concluded that the state's evidence of
conversations "was not suppressible for the reasons argued by
defendant."  304 Or at 468 (emphasis added).