Title: Jones v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 131385
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: October 31, 2014

PRESENT: All the Justices 
 
DONTE LAMAR JONES 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 131385 
JUSTICE CLEO E. POWELL 
 
 
 
October 31, 2014 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF YORK COUNTY 
Richard Y. Atlee, Jr., Judge 
 
 
This appeal arises from a motion to vacate his sentence 
filed by Donte Lamar Jones (“Jones”) twelve years after he pled 
guilty to capital murder in exchange for a sentence of life 
without the possibility of parole.  Jones argues that the 
Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in Miller v. 
Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012), applies retroactively to his 
case.  Miller held that the Eighth Amendment forbids a 
sentencing scheme that mandates life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole for juvenile offenders without affording 
the decision maker the opportunity to consider mitigating 
circumstances.  Id. at 2460.  Therefore, Jones contends that he 
is entitled to a new sentencing proceeding because he was 
seventeen years old when he committed the murder. 
 
We hold that because the trial court has the ability under 
Code § 19.2-303 to suspend part or all of the life sentence 
imposed for a Class 1 felony conviction, the sentencing scheme 
applicable to Jones’ conviction was not a mandatory life without 
the possibility of parole scheme.  Therefore, even if Miller 
 
2 
applied retroactively, it would not apply to the Virginia 
sentencing statutes relevant here.  Thus, the circuit court 
lacked jurisdiction to grant Jones’ motion. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
 
In 2000, Jones was charged with capital murder, five counts 
of use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, two counts of 
abduction, armed robbery, malicious wounding, and wearing a mask 
in a prohibited place for his role in an armed robbery at a 
convenience store in which a store clerk was murdered.  He was 
seventeen years old at the time. On June 5, 2001, Jones agreed 
to plead guilty to all charges in exchange for being sentenced 
to life without the possibility of parole on the capital murder 
charge.  In so doing, he also “waive[d] any and all rights of 
appeal with regard to any substantive or procedural issue 
involved in this prosecution.”  He was immediately sentenced to 
life for the capital murder conviction.  Because there was no 
agreement as to the sentence for the remaining charges, a 
presentence report was prepared for the other charges, and a 
sentencing hearing was set for a later date.  Jones was 
ultimately sentenced to life plus 68 years on the remaining 
charges. 
 
On June 5, 2013, Jones, proceeding pro se, filed a motion 
to vacate his sentence relying upon the Supreme Court’s decision 
 
3 
in Miller.  He argued that Virginia’s mandatory sentencing 
scheme for capital murder, as applied to juveniles, is 
unconstitutional because it does not consider mitigating 
factors.  Jones also argued that Code §§ 18.2-31 and -10 are 
unconstitutional because they do not allow for any other 
sentence for a juvenile charged with capital murder other than 
mandatory life without the possibility of parole.  Finally, he 
argued that Rawls v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 213, 683 S.E.2d 544 
(2009), allows a circuit court to set aside a void or unlawful 
sentence at any time and that his sentence is void ab initio 
because it is in excess of what is legal and should be vacated.  
Alternatively, Jones asserted that pursuant to Code § 19.2-303, 
a circuit court may suspend all or part of a sentence at any 
time.  Jones asked the circuit court to so do. 
 
On June 13, 2013, the circuit court denied Jones’ motion 
without a hearing because “there [was] nothing new in mitigation 
of the offense.”  This appeal follows. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
 
In its 2012 decision in Miller, the Supreme Court held that 
sentencing schemes that “mandate life without parole for those 
under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes” such as 
Alabama’s Code § 15-22-501 and Arkansas’ Code § 5-4-104(e)(1)(A) 
                     
 
1 The Supreme Court in Miller referred to the murder and 
capital murder provisions of the Alabama Code that provided for 
 
4 
at issue in that case, “violate[] the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’”  132 S.Ct. at 
2460.  Jones argues that Miller applies retroactively to his 
case because he received a mandatory minimum sentence of life 
without the possibility of parole and, therefore, under Miller, 
he is entitled to a new sentencing proceeding in which 
individualized sentencing factors are considered.  We disagree. 
 
Jones was sentenced in 2001 and, therefore, the circuit 
court would only have jurisdiction to grant his motion to vacate 
his sentence if his original sentencing order was void ab 
initio.  Amin v. County of Henrico, 286 Va. 231, 235, 749 S.E.2d 
169, 171 (2013) (holding that “Rule 1:1, which limits the 
jurisdiction of a court to twenty-one days after entry of the 
final order, does not apply to an order which is void ab 
initio.”). 
 
At the time that Jones murdered a convenience store clerk 
during a robbery, a person who was over the age of sixteen and 
convicted of capital murder, a Class 1 felony, could be punished 
by death or “imprisonment for life.”  Code § 18.2-10 (Cum. Supp. 
2000).  He now argues that his sentence is invalid because 
                                                                  
“punishment of life without parole, “ Ala. Code §§ 13A-5-40(9), 
13A-6-2(c), which are cross-referenced in Ala. Code § 15-22-50, 
discussed in the present opinion. 
 
 
5 
Virginia’s sentencing scheme is mandatory and therefore is 
unconstitutional. 
 
To decide whether Jones’ sentence is void, we must first 
determine whether Virginia’s sentencing scheme for capital 
murder imposed a mandatory minimum sentence of life without the 
possibility of parole.  We conclude that it did not because the 
trial judge had the authority under Code § 19.2-303 to suspend 
the sentence.  In 2000, the relevant portion of Code § 19.2-303 
provided, as it does now, that “[a]fter conviction, whether with 
or without jury, the court may suspend imposition of sentence or 
suspend the sentence in whole or part.”  Nothing restricted its 
application to a certain type of sentence.  Unlike the statutes 
in Alabama and Arkansas found unconstitutional in Miller, there 
was no language limiting the power of the court to suspend a 
portion of the sentence. 
 
Only where the General Assembly has prescribed a mandatory 
minimum sentence imposing an inflexible penalty has it “divested 
trial judges of all discretion respecting punishment.”  In re: 
Commonwealth, 229 Va. 159, 163, 326 S.E.2d 695, 697 (1985).2  The 
                     
 
2 See Code §§ 18.2-36.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 2000) (imposing a one 
year mandatory minimum sentence for a person convicted of 
aggravated involuntary manslaughter); 18.2-51.1 (Cum. Supp. 
2000) (establishing mandatory minimum penalties for maliciously 
wounding a law enforcement officer or firefighter); 18.2-57 
(Cum. Supp. 2000) (setting mandatory minimum sentences for 
certain types of assaults and batteries); 18.2-121 (Cum. Supp. 
2000) (imposing a mandatory minimum sentence of one year for a 
 
6 
absence of the phrase “mandatory minimum” in Code § 18.2-10 
underscores the flexibility afforded a trial court in sentencing 
pursuant to this statute. 
 
Indeed, in 2004, the General Assembly codified this 
principle in Code § 18.2-12.1, which states that “‘[m]andatory 
minimum’ wherever it appears in this Code means, for purposes of 
imposing punishment upon a person convicted of a crime, that the 
court shall impose the entire term of confinement, the full 
amount of the fine and the complete requirement of community 
service prescribed by law.  The court shall not suspend in full 
or in part any punishment described as mandatory minimum 
punishment.”  See 2004 Acts ch. 461.  This action codified the 
settled interpretation of the phrase “mandatory minimum.” 
 
Nothing about the punishment for a Class 1 felony requires 
a mandatory minimum sentence under Virginia law.  Cf., Ala. Code 
                                                                  
person convicted of entering another’s property with the intent 
to cause damage because of the owner’s or occupant’s “race, 
religious conviction, color or national origin”); 18.2-154 (1996 
Repl. Vol.) (requiring a mandatory minimum sentence for shooting 
a firearm at certain types of vehicles); 18.2-248 (Cum. Supp. 
2000) (mandating mandatory minimum sentences for certain 
repeated drug distribution offenses); 18.2-270 (Cum. Supp. 2000) 
(levying mandatory minimum sentences for repeated driving while 
intoxicated convictions); 18.2-308.2:2 (Cum. Supp. 2000) 
(enacting mandatory minimum sentences for those who thwart the 
criminal background check for firearms in order to provide the 
firearms to those who may not legally possess firearms); and 
46.2-341.28 (1998 Repl. Vol.) (setting a mandatory minimum 
sentence for a conviction for driving a commercial motor vehicle 
while intoxicated). 
 
 
7 
§ 15-22-50 (“The court shall have no power to suspend the 
execution of sentence imposed upon any person who has been found 
guilty and whose punishment is fixed at death or imprisonment in 
the penitentiary for more than 15 years.”); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-
4-104(e)(1)(A) (“The court shall not suspend imposition of 
sentence as to a term of imprisonment nor place the defendant on 
probation for [capital murder].”).3  Code § 19.2-303 applies to 
Virginia’s capital sentencing scheme, granting judges the 
authority to suspend part or all of the offender’s sentence at 
the trial court’s discretion. 
 
Thus, when the trial court sentenced Jones, it had the 
authority to suspend part or all of Jones’ life sentence.  Code 
§ 19.2-303 (2000 Repl. Vol.).  Indeed, Jones recognized that a 
circuit court continues to have the authority to suspend part or 
all of a sentence pursuant to Code § 19.2-303, as he asked the 
circuit court to so do in his motion to vacate.4  Moreover, his 
                     
 
3 It is telling that the General Assembly has subsequently 
amended certain statutes to include a mandatory minimum sentence 
of life for certain crimes.  See Code § 18.2-61(B)(2)(2012) 
(prescribing a mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment 
for certain types of rape).  The General Assembly could have  
amended Code § 18.2-10 in a similar fashion.  The fact that it 
did not underscores the point that Code § 18.2-10 does not 
impose a mandatory minimum sentence. 
 
 
4 Jones’ request, however, was not timely as Jones had 
already been transferred to the Department of Corrections at the 
time of his request.  Code § 19.2-303 (stating “If a person has 
been sentenced for a felony to the Department of Corrections but 
has not actually been transferred to a receiving unit of the 
 
8 
conviction and sentencing order acknowledged the authority of 
the trial court to suspend a portion of his sentence for capital 
murder, as it specifically stated that he was sentenced to life 
and no portion of that sentence was suspended. 
 
Because a Class 1 felony does not impose a mandatory 
minimum sentence under Virginia law, the circuit court had, at 
the time it sentenced Jones, the authority to suspend part or 
all of his life sentence.  Therefore, Miller is not applicable 
to the statute at issue here because one convicted of capital 
murder does not receive a mandatory sentence of life without the 
possibility of parole.5 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
We hold that because a Class 1 felony does not impose a 
mandatory minimum sentence under Virginia law, Miller is not 
applicable even if it is to be applied retroactively.  Thus, 
Jones’ sentence was not void ab initio, and the trial court had 
no jurisdiction to grant the motion.  Therefore, we find no 
reversible error in the trial court’s denial of Jones’ motion to 
                                                                  
Department, the court which heard the case, if it appears 
compatible with the public interest and there are circumstances 
in mitigation of the offense, may, at any time before the person 
is transferred to the Department, suspend or otherwise modify 
the unserved portion of such a sentence.”). 
 
 
5 Because Virginia’s capital punishment sentencing scheme 
does not include a mandatory minimum sentence, Miller could 
never apply in Virginia and, therefore, we need not address 
Jones’ other arguments as to the retroactivity of Miller. 
 
9 
vacate his sentence and will affirm the trial court’s judgment 
denying the motion. 
Affirmed.