Title: People v. Villalobos
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 88323
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: September 21, 2000

Docket No. 88323-Agenda 16-May 2000.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 								SAMUEL VILLALOBOS, Appellant.
Opinion filed September 21, 2000.
	JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:
	At issue in this appeal is whether the defendant, Samuel
Villalobos, invoked his fifth amendment right to counsel pursuant
to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966), by filing a form at a bond hearing that stated
defendant would not participate in "any questioning, identification
process or other procedures on any case or matter" without his
counsel present. The appellate court concluded that he did not. No.
1-96-1139 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We
allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R.
315) and now affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

BACKGROUND
	On November 13, 1994, Ronnie Johnson was shot and killed.
The evidence at defendant's trial for Johnson's murder established
that at 3:30 a.m. on November 13, defendant and four friends
drove south on the Dan Ryan Expressway, with defendant in the
front passenger seat of the car. The car encountered a white
Cadillac, driven by Johnson. Although the testimony is conflicting,
it appears that Johnson increased his speed, and defendant told the
driver of his car to accelerate and follow Johnson. Defendant then
leaned out of the car and fired nine shots at Johnson's car. One
bullet entered the left side of Johnson's head and killed him.
Roughly 45 minutes after this shooting, defendant and his friends
were arrested for possession of cannabis and drinking on a public
way-an offense unrelated to Johnson's killing.
	On November 14, 1994, defendant appeared at a bond hearing
on the possession of cannabis charge. At the bond hearing,
defendant signed a form entitled "Appearance, Notice of
Representation and Demand for Preliminary Hearing/Trial"
(hereinafter, appearance form). In addition to documenting both
the assistant public defender's and defendant's demand for a
preliminary hearing and trial, the appearance form contained a
section stating: "BE ADVISED, the under-signed defendant serves
this NOTICE OF REPRESENTATION on the State, its agents and
on all law enforcement officers barring the defendant's
participation, without the presence of his/her counsel, in any
questioning, identification process or other procedures on any case
or matter whatsoever." Defendant did not post bond and proceeded
to Cook County jail.
	On November 16, 1994, pursuant to a writ, two Chicago
police officers removed defendant from jail and brought him to
police headquarters in order to question him relative to Johnson's
death. After being advised of his Miranda rights and waiving them
in writing, defendant provided a written statement in the presence
of an assistant State's Attorney and a police officer, in which he
confessed to the shooting. Defendant was subsequently arrested
and charged with Johnson's murder.
	Defendant moved to suppress his statement prior to the
murder trial. In his motion to suppress, defendant argued that by
signing and filing(1) the appearance form, which attempted to bar
his participation in any questioning on any case or matter, he
provided notice to the prosecution that he did not wish to speak to
any law enforcement personnel without the assistance of counsel.
The assistant public defender who represented defendant at his
bond hearing on the cannabis charge testified at defendant's
motion to suppress that the appearance form was a "standard
form" that she prepared for every defendant whom she
represented.
	The circuit court denied defendant's motion to suppress,
finding that the additional language on the appearance form
regarding defendant's unwillingness to speak with law
enforcement personnel in "any case" was "surplusage" and bound
law enforcement personnel only on the cannabis offense. The
inculpatory statement was subsequently introduced at defendant's
bench trial for the murder of Ronnie Johnson. The circuit court
found defendant guilty.
	Defendant appealed his conviction on the ground that the
denial of his motion to suppress constituted error. He argued that,
by signing and filing the appearance form during his bond hearing
on the cannabis charge, he invoked his fifth amendment right to
counsel pursuant to Miranda. Police officers violated that right
when they subsequently questioned him on an unrelated offense
without his counsel being present. The appellate court affirmed
defendant's conviction. Quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178, 115 L. Ed. 2d 158, 169, 111 S. Ct. 2204, 2209 (1991),
the appellate court stated that "in order to invoke the Miranda
interest, there must be 'at a minimum, some statement that can
reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the
assistance of an attorney in dealing with custodial interrogation by
the police. Requesting the assistance of an attorney at a bail
hearing does not bear that construction.' " (Emphasis in original.) 
No. 1-96-1139 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule
23).
	Defendant appeals the appellate court's determination that the
motion to suppress was properly denied because defendant failed
to invoke his fifth amendment right to counsel pursuant to
Miranda.
 
ANALYSIS 
	In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966), the United States Supreme Court required that
certain procedural safeguards be provided to a suspect before
custodial interrogation. Miranda, 384 U.S.  at 444, 16 L. Ed. 2d  at
706-07, 86 S. Ct.  at 1612 ("[b]y custodial interrogation, we mean
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person
has been taken into custody"). Although not enumerated in the
Constitution, the Supreme Court found these safeguards necessary
in order to protect the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination under the fifth amendment. Davis v. United States,
512 U.S. 452, 457, 129 L. Ed. 2d 362, 370, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2354
(1994), quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444, 41 L. Ed. 2d 182, 193, 94 S. Ct. 2357, 2364 (1974). Specifically, the Court
required that a person in custody be advised of certain rights,
including the right to remain silent and the right to an attorney,
prior to any interrogation by law enforcement. Miranda, 384 U.S. 
at 444, 16 L. Ed. 2d  at 706-07, 86 S. Ct.  at 1612. Edwards v.
Arizona further expanded Miranda and held that once a person
invokes his right to counsel during custodial interrogation, he "is
not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel
has been made available to him, unless the accused himself
initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with
the police." Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378, 386, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 1885 (1981).
	 The single issue presented in this appeal is whether defendant
invoked his Miranda right to counsel when, at a bond hearing, the
defendant signed a notice of appearance form which included a
statement that the defendant would not participate in any future
questioning on any matter without his attorney present. There is no
dispute that defendant was in custody while at his bond hearing.
There is also no dispute that defendant was not subject to
interrogation at that time. Nevertheless, defendant argues that he
effectively invoked his Miranda right to counsel by filing the
appearance form at his bond hearing. Therefore, defendant argues
his Miranda right to counsel may be invoked prior to custodial
interrogation.
	The United States Supreme Court has not directly answered
the issue before this court. However, the Court has strongly
suggested that a defendant cannot anticipatorily invoke his
Miranda right to counsel at a preliminary hearing. In McNeil, the
defendant argued that an invocation of his sixth amendment right
to counsel acted as an additional invocation of his Miranda right
to counsel. McNeil, 501 U.S.  at 174, 115 L. Ed. 2d  at 166, 11 S. Ct.  at 2207. In holding that a sixth amendment invocation does not
operate as a Miranda invocation of the right to counsel, the
Supreme Court stated in a footnote:
		"We have in fact never held that a person can invoke his
Miranda rights anticipatorily, in a context other than
'custodial interrogation'-which a preliminary hearing will
not always, or even usually, involve [citations]. If the
Miranda right to counsel can be invoked at a preliminary
hearing, it could be argued, there is no logical reason why
it could not be invoked by a letter prior to arrest, or indeed
even prior to identification as a suspect. Most rights must
be asserted when the government seeks to take the action
they protect against. The fact that we have allowed the
Miranda right to counsel, once asserted, to be effective
with respect to future custodial interrogation does not
necessarily mean that we will allow it to be asserted
initially outside the context of custodial interrogation,
with similar future effect." McNeil, 501 U.S.  at 182
n.3,115 L. Ed. 2d  at 171 n.3, 111 S. Ct.  at 2211 n.3.
See also Edwards, 451 U.S.  at 485-86, 68 L. Ed. 2d  at 387, 101 S. Ct.  at 1885 ("[t]he Fifth Amendment right identified in Miranda
is the right to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation.
Absent such interrogation, there would have been no infringement
of the right that Edwards invoked and there would be no occasion
to determine whether there had been a valid waiver"); Rhode
Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297, 308, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1689 (1980) (holding that one's Miranda interests are
in place when he is subjected to "express questioning or its
functional equivalent").
	Subsequent to McNeil, this court indicated that a suspect's
Miranda right to counsel does not exist at his arraignment. In
People v. Kidd, we held that invocation of the sixth amendment
right to counsel does not invoke a defendant's Miranda right to
counsel. People v. Kidd, 147 Ill. 2d 510, 532 (1992). In so holding,
we specifically stated that "although defendant's sixth amendment
right to counsel attached when private attorney Earl Washington
represented defendant at his arraignment *** on the unrelated
murder and arson charges, defendant's fifth amendment right to
counsel pursuant to Miranda clearly did not arise at that point."
People v. Kidd, 147 Ill. 2d  at 532.
	In addition to our own precedent, a majority of state courts
have relied on the language in McNeil to hold that one cannot
anticipatorily invoke the right to counsel prior to custodial
interrogation. Sauerheber v. State, 698 N.E.2d 796, 802 (Ind.
1998) ("[McNeil] strongly suggests that the rights under Miranda
and Edwards do not extend to permit anticipatory requests for
counsel to preclude waiver at the time interrogation begins"); Sapp
v. State, 690 So. 2d 581, 584-85 (Fla. 1997); People v. Avila, 75 Cal. App. 4th 416, ___, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 320, 324 (1999); State v.
Warness, 77 Wash. App. 636, 641, 893 P.2d 665, 668 (1995)
("The need for Miranda protection does not exist except in a
custodial interrogation situation. The right cannot be invoked
before it exists"); see also State v. Stewart, 113 Wash. 2d 462,
477-78, 780 P.2d 844, 853 (1989), quoting State v. Sparklin, 296
Or. 85, 89, 672 P.2d 1182, 1185 (1983) (prior to the Supreme
Court decision in McNeil, the Washington Supreme Court held
that a defendant's invocation of his sixth amendment right to
counsel does not act to invoke his Miranda right to counsel,
because " '[a]t arraignment defendant is not confronted with an
atmosphere of coercion, nor does anyone seek to gain admissions
from him' ").
	The facts in both Sapp and Avila are strikingly similar to the
facts in the case at bar. In Sapp, the Supreme Court of Florida held
that a defendant does not invoke his Miranda right to counsel by
signing a "claim of rights" form. Sapp, 690 So. 2d  at 585. While
in jail pursuant to a robbery arrest, the defendant signed and later
filed a "claim of rights" form, which stated that the defendant
asserted his right to refrain from making any statements regarding
offenses with which he was or was not charged without his
attorney present. Subsequently, police questioned the defendant
about an unrelated offense, after the defendant was informed of
and waived his Miranda rights. The defendant later argued that the
"claim of rights" form effectively invoked his Miranda right to
counsel, and his statement should have been suppressed. Sapp, 690 So. 2d  at 583. The Supreme Court of Florida held that the "claim
of rights" form did not act as an effective invocation of the
defendant's Miranda right to counsel because the defendant was
not subject to custodial interrogation when he attempted to invoke
his Miranda right. Sapp, 690 So. 2d  at 585. Rather, the court
found that "Miranda's safeguards were intended to protect the
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by countering
the compulsion that inheres in custodial interrogation." (Emphasis
omitted.) Sapp, 690 So. 2d  at 585.
	Additionally, the California appellate court held that a
defendant does not invoke his Miranda right to counsel when his
assistant public defender files a form attempting to assert the
defendant's fifth, sixth and fourteenth amendment rights. Avila, 75
Cal. App. 4th at ___, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d  at 325. The defendant in
Avila was arrested for a shooting and, at his arraignment, defense
counsel filed a form stating that the defendant invoked his fifth,
sixth and fourteenth amendment rights. Law enforcement officers
later interviewed the defendant regarding an unrelated offense,
after the defendant was advised of and waived his Miranda rights.
During this interview, the defendant admitted to the crime. Avila,
75 Cal. App. 4th at ___, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d  at 322. The California
appellate court rejected defendant's argument that his confession
should be suppressed because it was taken in violation of his
Miranda right to counsel. Avila, 75 Cal. App. 4th at ___, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d  at 323. In doing so, the court found that the defendant,
though in custody, was neither facing nor fearing interrogation at
his arraignment. Avila, 75 Cal. App. 4th at ___, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
at 325. The court noted that "[a]llowing an anticipatory invocation
of the Miranda right to counsel would extend an accused's
privilege against self-incrimination far beyond the intent of
Miranda and its progeny." Avila, 75 Cal. App. 4th at ___, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d  at 325.
	Relying on McNeil, an overwhelming number of federal
courts have also held that a defendant cannot invoke his Miranda
rights outside the context of custodial interrogation. United States
v. Grimes, 142 F.3d 1342, 1348 (11th Cir. 1998); United States v.
LaGrone, 43 F.3d 332, 338 (7th Cir. 1994) ("there are certain
'windows of opportunity' in which a defendant must assert his
Miranda right to counsel. A defendant must clearly invoke his
right to counsel from each constitutional source, at a time when
the right is available"); United States v. Thompson, 35 F.3d 100,
104 (2d Cir. 1994) ("[the defendant's] filing of the [notice of
appearance] did not occur in the context of custodial
interrogation"); Alston v. Redman, 34 F.3d 1237, 1244 (3d Cir.
1994) ("[b]ecause the presence of both a custodial setting and
official interrogation is required to trigger the Miranda right-to-counsel prophylactic, absent one or the other, Miranda is not
implicated" (emphasis omitted)); United States v. Wright, 962 F.2d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 1992) ("[t]o extend Miranda-Edwards
protection as [the defendant] urges would, on the other hand, make
it virtually impossible for any defendant charged with one crime
ever to be questioned about unrelated criminal activity, if, the first
time in court on the first offense charged, he asked for counsel to
be present at future interviews. This would not serve the
prophylactic purposes of Miranda"); United States v. Cooper, 85 F. Supp. 2d 1, 23 (D.D.C. 2000) ("[t]he footnote [in McNeil]
strongly suggests, although not definitively, that a request for
counsel under Miranda must be made within the custodial context
and not at arraignment or other such proceedings"); United States
v. Barnett, 814 F. Supp. 1449, 1454 (D. Alaska 1992) (finding that
a request for counsel at a grand jury proceeding does not constitute
an invocation of the right to counsel under Miranda-Edwards
because the court "assume[s] that the dicta in McNeil accurately
predicts that the United States Supreme Court will hold that an
accused cannot invoke his Fifth Amendment right to counsel until
he is taken into custody, and prior to interrogation, warned of
those rights").
	For example, in Grimes, the defendant was arrested and
charged with writing worthless checks. The defendant signed a
"claim of rights" form which attempted to invoke both his fifth
and sixth amendment right to counsel. The form was placed in the
court file and copies were served on both the State's Attorney and
police department. The defendant later made incriminating
statements regarding a separate offense to an undercover agent and
to a friend who was assisting law enforcement investigators. The
defendant argued that he invoked his Miranda right to counsel by
signing the "claim of rights" form and, therefore, his incriminating
statements should have been suppressed. Grimes, 142 F.3d  at
1345-48. The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, finding that "Miranda
rights may be invoked only during custodial interrogation or when
interrogation is imminent" and thus held that the "claim of rights"
form did not invoke the defendant's Miranda rights. Grimes, 142 F.3d  at 1348.
	We agree with the reasoning of these federal and state cases.
It is not surprising that virtually every Supreme Court opinion
involving Miranda has used the phrase "custodial interrogation."
It is custodial interrogation with which Miranda was concerned.
It is the right to an attorney during custodial interrogation that
Miranda and its progeny protects. That right does not exist outside
the context of custodial interrogation. One cannot invoke a right
that does not yet exist. While in court on a bond hearing, a
defendant is not subject to interrogation, and the need for Miranda
is not yet present. The Supreme Court stated in Innis that "[t]he
concern of the Court in Miranda was that the 'interrogation
environment' created by the interplay of interrogation and custody
would 'subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner' and
thereby undermine the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination." (Emphasis added.) Innis, 446 U.S.  at 299, 64 L. Ed. 2d  at 306, 100 S. Ct.  at 1688 (1980), quoting Miranda, 384 U.S.  at 457-58, 16 L. Ed. 2d  at 714, 86 S. Ct.  at 1619. See also
Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297, 110 L. Ed. 2d 243, 251, 110 S. Ct. 2394, 2397 (1990) ("[i]t is the premise of Miranda that the
danger of coercion results from the interaction of custody and
official interrogation"). Absent the interplay of custody and
interrogation, an individual's privilege against self-incrimination
is not threatened. 
	In support of the argument that his Miranda rights had
attached at his bond hearing, defendant cites to United States v.
Kelsey, 951 F.2d 1196 (10th Cir. 1991), and North Carolina v.
Torres, 330 N.C. 517, 412 S.E.2d 20 (1992). Defendant's reliance
on these decisions is misplaced, as both cases are factually
inapposite.
	Unlike the matter at bar, both Kelsey and Torres involved
situations where the defendant's interrogation was imminent when
he or she requested counsel. In Kelsey, the defendant, after being
searched and arrested, was essentially told by police officers that
he would be questioned. Similarly, in Torres, the defendant was
taken to the sheriff's department and placed in a conference room
to await interrogation. In addition, we note that, subsequent to
Kelsey, the Tenth Circuit has indicated that it will not permit
anticipatory invocations of the Miranda right to counsel. See
United States v. Bautista, 145 F.3d 1140, 1151 (10th Cir. 1998)
("[w]e do not suggest that a person can invoke his Miranda rights
anticipatorily in any situation, i.e., in a context other than custodial
interrogation, as the Court cautioned in McNeil"), citing McNeil,
501 U.S.  at 182 n.3, 115 L. Ed. 2d  at 171 n.3, 111 S. Ct.  at 2211
n.3.
	Interrogation was not imminent in the case at bar. Defendant
was in court on an unrelated crime when he attempted to invoke
his Miranda right to counsel. There was no suggestion that
defendant would be questioned on the crime with which he was
charged or any other crime subsequent to his bond hearing. In fact,
defendant's interrogation regarding the Johnson murder occurred
two days after his bond hearing.
	The defendant points out that under Edwards and Arizona v.
Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 100 L. Ed. 2d 704, 108 S. Ct. 2093
(1988), once a suspect invokes his right to counsel pursuant to
Miranda, he may not be interrogated again regarding any offense
unless he initiates the conversation. McNeil, 501 U.S.  at 175, 177,
115 L. Ed. 2d  at 166, 168, 111 S. Ct.  at 2207, 2208 (stating that
the Miranda right to counsel is not offense specific). Therefore,
the defendant further notes, if an accused invokes his Miranda
right to counsel when in custody for one offense, law enforcement
personnel cannot question him on that offense or any unrelated
offense without counsel present. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S.  at
677-78, 100 L. Ed. 2d  at 711, 108 S. Ct.  at 2096; People v.
Perkins, 248 Ill. App. 3d 762, 770 (1993). However, the suspect
must invoke the right to counsel during custodial interrogation or
when custodial interrogation was imminent. 
	Defendant also argues that he should be allowed to assert his
Miranda rights at a bond hearing because "[i]f a defendant
remains in continuous custody *** the only verifiable assertion of
his Fifth Amendment right to counsel is one made before a judge."
According to defendant, unless the Miranda right to counsel is
asserted in open court in the presence of a judge, "the only
witnesses to a request for counsel would be the very officers
whose objective it is to obtain a statement." We disagree. If we
were to accept defendant's argument, we would have to require a
judge to be present every time a suspect receives Miranda
warnings. Although Miranda and its progeny demand certain
procedural safeguards to uphold a person's fifth amendment right
against compulsory incrimination, no case has required that an
independent third party be present to attest that a suspect was
advised of or waived his Miranda rights. See, e.g., McNeil, 501 U.S.  at 180, 115 L. Ed. 2d  at 170, 111 S. Ct.  at 2210 ("[i]f a
suspect does not wish to communicate with the police except
through an attorney, he can simply tell them that when they give
him the Miranda warnings"). We decline to add that additional
layer to the Miranda prophylaxis today.
	Stretching Miranda to allow anticipatory invocations of the
right to counsel would extend Miranda far beyond its boundaries
and upset the very balance that Miranda sought to protect-the
balance between effective law enforcement and protection of
individual rights. In order to invoke the Miranda right to counsel,
an individual must be both in custody and subject to interrogation
or under imminent threat of interrogation. In the case at bar,
defendant was not subject to interrogation at the bond hearing. We
therefore hold that defendant could not effectively invoke his
Miranda right to counsel at the bond hearing. Defendant's motion
to suppress was correctly denied.
	We note that the State moved to strike portions of defendant's
reply brief. We ordered that motion taken with the case and now
deny it.

CONCLUSION


	For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
appellate court.


Affirmed.
	Today's majority opinion erroneously holds that police may
interrogate a criminal suspect in their custody without an attorney
present, even after that suspect has clearly and unambiguously
requested the assistance of an attorney in dealing with custodial
interrogation. I therefore dissent.
 
FACTS
	On November 13, 1994, defendant was arrested for drinking
on a public way and for felony possession of cannabis. During
defendant's initial court appearance, defendant's attorney filed her
appearance form. This form was signed by defendant, and
contained the following notice: "BE ADVISED, the undersigned
defendant serves this NOTICE OF REPRESENTATION on the
State, it's [sic] agents and on all law enforcement officers barring
the defendant's participation, without the presence of his/her
counsel, in any questioning, identification process or other
procedures on any case or matter whatsoever." Defendant did not
post bond and remained in custody.
	Just three days later, and while still in continuous custody, on
November 16, 1994, two Chicago police officers questioned
defendant regarding the shooting death of Ronnie Johnson.
Defendant's counsel was not present during this interrogation.
During the course of this questioning, defendant confessed to the
shooting. Defendant was subsequently charged with Johnson's
murder.
	Before trial, defendant moved to suppress his statement given
to police. In the motion to suppress, defendant argued that police
violated his fifth amendment right to counsel by questioning him
without his counsel being present even after defendant had
requested the assistance of counsel in dealing with custodial
interrogation. The trial court denied defendant's motion, however,
finding that the request for counsel was merely "surplusage"
attached to counsel's appearance form, and was not binding upon
the State except in relation to the original drinking and cannabis
charges.
	At defendant's subsequent murder trial, the statement was
admitted into evidence against defendant. The circuit court found
defendant guilty of first degree murder and sentenced him to 60
years in prison.
	Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in
refusing to suppress his statement. The appellate court affirmed,
but for different reasons. Whereas the trial court had found fault
with the manner in which defendant attempted to invoke his fifth
amendment right to counsel, the appellate court found fault with
defendant's choice of forum. The appellate court reasoned that a
proper invocation of a defendant's fifth amendment right to
counsel requires " 'at a minimum, some statement that can
reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the
assistance of an attorney in dealing with custodial interrogation by
the police. Requesting the assistance of an attorney at a bail
hearing does not bear that construction.' " (Emphasis in original.)
No. 1-96-1139 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule
23), quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178, 115 L. Ed. 2d 158, 169, 111 S. Ct. 2204, 2209 (1991). Accordingly, the
appellate court held that defendant's fifth amendment right to
counsel had not been violated.
	The majority today adopts the reasoning of the appellate court,
but also goes one step further. In addition to holding that a
defendant cannot invoke his fifth amendment right to counsel
during his initial court appearance, the majority also holds that a
defendant does not even have such a right until custodial
interrogation begins. Slip op. at 9.

DISCUSSION


	Both the appellate court and the majority today base their
holdings in large part upon the United States Supreme Court's
opinion in McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 115 L. Ed. 2d 158,
111 S. Ct. 2204 (1991). Because the majority misreads McNeil, a
thorough examination of the facts of that case is required.
	McNeil was arrested for an armed robbery committed in West
Allis, Wisconsin. Shortly after his arrest, police advised McNeil
of his Miranda rights and sought to question him. McNeil refused
to answer questions, but did not request an attorney. The police
promptly ended the interview.
	Some time later, McNeil appeared in court for a bail hearing.
He was represented at that hearing by an attorney from the
Wisconsin public defender's office. McNeil did not post bail and
remained in custody. Later that same evening, two detectives
questioned McNeil in jail. During that and subsequent interviews,
and after being informed of his Miranda rights, McNeil gave
statements admitting involvement in the Caledonia crimes.
	Before trial, McNeil moved to suppress his confession.
According to McNeil, his courtroom appearance with an attorney
for the West Allis crime constituted an invocation of the Miranda
right to counsel, and any subsequent waiver of that right during
police-initiated questioning regarding any offense was invalid. The
trial court denied the motion, and McNeil was convicted of second
degree murder, attempted first degree murder, and armed robbery.
	The Supreme Court held that the police questioning of
McNeil was proper. First, the Court accepted that defendant's
sixth amendment right to counsel had attached and been invoked
with respect to the West Allis armed robbery at the time McNeil
confessed to the Caledonia crimes. The sixth amendment right to
counsel, however, is offense specific. Accordingly, because
defendant had not yet invoked his sixth amendment right to
counsel with respect to the Caledonia crimes, that right posed no
bar to the admission of McNeil's confession.
	The Supreme Court recognized, however, that McNeil was
relying upon a the right to counsel which the United States
Supreme Court had held to be implicit in the fifth amendment's
guarantee that "[n]o person *** shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself." U.S. Const., amend. V. See
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 705, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1611 (1966). In contrast to the sixth amendment right
to counsel, the right to counsel secured by the fifth amendment is
not offense specific. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378, 101 S. Ct. 1880 (1981). Accordingly, once a suspect
asserts the fifth amendment right to counsel for one offense, a
defendant may not be approached for questioning regarding any
offense unless counsel is present. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 100 L. Ed. 2d 704, 108 S. Ct. 2093 (1988).
	Despite its recognition of the broader scope of the fifth
amendment right to counsel, however, the McNeil Court held that
police had not violated this right because McNeil had never
invoked it. The court noted that McNeil's only expression of a
desire for the assistance of counsel had been his appearance with
counsel at his bail hearing. This was not enough, the Supreme
Court explained, because invocation of the fifth amendment right
to counsel, "requires, at a minimum, some statement that can
reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the
assistance of an attorney in dealing with custodial interrogation by
the police. Requesting the assistance of an attorney at a bail
hearing does not bear that construction." (Emphasis in original.)
McNeil, 501 U.S.  at 178, 115 L. Ed. 2d  at 169, 111 S. Ct.  at 2209.
	What is clear from the Supreme Court's opinion in McNeil is
that the Court's analysis focused not upon the time or place when
the defendant made his request for assistance of counsel, but upon
the type of assistance of counsel which the defendant requested. In
McNeil, the defendant had, at best, expressed a desire for the
assistance of counsel at a bail hearing. In the case at bar, however,
defendant clearly and unequivocally expressed "a desire for the
assistance of an attorney in dealing with custodial interrogation by
the police." McNeil, 501 U.S.  at 178, 115 L. Ed. 2d  at 169, 111 S. Ct.  at 2209. Accordingly, McNeil does not defeat defendant's
claim in this case.
	The majority further relies upon dicta in a footnote from the
McNeil opinion. That footnote, in its entirety stated:
			"The dissent predicts that the result in this case will
routinely be circumvented when, '[i]n future preliminary
hearings, competent counsel ... make sure that they, or
their clients, make a statement on the record' invoking the
Miranda right to counsel. [Citation.] We have in fact
never held that a person can invoke his Miranda rights
anticipatorily, in a context other than 'custodial
interrogation'-which a preliminary hearing will not
always, or even usually, involve [citations]. If the
Miranda right to counsel can be invoked at a preliminary
hearing, it could be argued, there is no logical reason why
it could not be invoked by a letter prior to arrest, or indeed
even prior to identification as a suspect. Most rights must
be asserted when the government seeks to take the action
they protect against. The fact that we have allowed the
Miranda right to counsel, once asserted, to be effective
with respect to future custodial interrogation does not
necessarily mean that we will allow it to be asserted
initially outside the context of custodial interrogation,
with similar future effect. Assuming, however, that an
assertion at arraignment would be effective, and would be
routinely made, the mere fact that adherence to the
principle of our decisions will not have substantial
consequences is no reason to abandon that principle. It
would remain intolerable that a person in custody who
had expressed no objection to being questioned would be
unapproachable." McNeil, 501 U.S.  at 182 n.3, 115 L. Ed. 2d  at 171 n.3, 111 S. Ct.  at 2211 n.3.
Based largely upon this footnote and upon decisions of other
courts relying on this footnote, the majority holds that the fifth
amendment right to counsel cannot be invoked until custodial
interrogation has begun or is imminent.
	The majority's reliance on the McNeil footnote is misplaced
for several reasons. First, as the majority candidly admits, the
United States Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of
whether a defendant may invoke the sixth amendment right to
counsel before interrogation begins or is "imminent" (whatever
that means). Second, the footnote is clearly dicta. The Supreme
Court's McNeil opinion was based entirely upon the fact that
defendant had never invoked his fifth amendment right to counsel.
As such, the time and place of any such invocation was never at
issue. Third, the footnote does not state, even in dicta, that a
defendant cannot invoke his fifth amendment right to counsel
under the facts of this case. Rather, the footnote merely noted the
existence of the issue without deciding it. Finally, the footnote was
written in response to a dissent which was joined by three Justices.
Thus, while precisely zero of Justices on the McNeil Court
explicitly argued that the fifth amendment right to counsel could
not be invoked in the manner which the defendant in this case
claims to have employed, three justices of that court expressly
argued that the fifth amendment right could be invoked in this
fashion. McNeil, 501 U.S.  at 184, 115 L. Ed. 2d  at 172, 111 S. Ct. 
at 2212 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall and Blackmun,
JJ.). Accordingly, the majority's prediction of how the United
States Supreme Court would rule on this issue is pure speculation.
	From a purely policy perspective, the rule announced by the
majority is a bad one. After today, police arresting a suspect will
no longer have any reason to inform a suspect of his Miranda
rights until immediately before they initiate questioning. Indeed,
under the rationale of the majority, police may now freely
interrogate a suspect who states "I refuse to answer questions
without a lawyer" as the police are applying the handcuffs, as long
as the police wait until later to ask any questions. In such a
scenario, the suspect's request for counsel would have been made
at a time when interrogation was not imminent. Accordingly, the
majority would hold that such a suspect had no fifth amendment
right to invoke. Such a result is clearly inconsistent with the values
which the Miranda decision was meant to protect.
	The majority's concern, borrowed from the McNeil footnote,
that a person could invoke the fifth amendment right to counsel
even before arrest, is directed at a straw man.(2) The defendant in
this case did not attempt to invoke his right to counsel by letter
prior to arrest. On the contrary, defendant was in continuous police
custody from the time he requested an attorney to assist him
during interrogation until the time when the interrogation took
place. In any event, giving effect to the defendant's clear and
unambiguous request for counsel under the facts of this case
would not require this court to expand the right to the extremes
supposed by the majority. Rather, this court should rule that the
fifth amendment right to counsel attaches and may be invoked by
a defendant at any time after he is taken into custody. This rule
would strike a proper balance between the recognition of a
suspect's right to be free from compelled self-incrimination and
the interests of law enforcement in obtaining evidence. This court
should further hold that the State was bound in this case to honor
defendant's request not to be questioned without his attorney
present, and that police questioning in spite of this request violated
defendant's constitutional rights under the fifth amendment.
Accordingly, the trial court erred when it denied defendant's
motion to suppress his confession. Defendant is entitled to a new
trial.
	Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
1.      1The appearance form, although signed by defendant and dated, was
not file stamped by the clerk of the court. The assistant public defender
testified at defendant's motion to suppress hearing that she "filed" the
appearance form by placing it "on the bench" in front of the presiding
judge during defendant's bond hearing.

2.     2The majority's additional concern, that acceptance of defendant's
rule would require the presence of a judge every time a suspect receives
Miranda warnings, is specious. Defendant did not argue that Miranda
rights may only be waived in front of a judge. Rather, the defendant
correctly points out that the rule now adopted by the majority deprives
defendants of the single most effective means of insuring that their fifth
amendment rights are respected, namely, invocation of those rights in
open court.