Title: District Attorney for the Northern District v. Superior Court Department
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12508
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: May 21, 2019

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12508 
 
DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT  vs.  
SUPERIOR COURT DEPARTMENT. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     November 8, 2018. - May 21, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lowy, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Clerk of Court.  Practice, Criminal, Exhibits, Preservation of 
evidence. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on September 6, 2017. 
 
 
The case was reported by Lowy, J. 
 
 
 
Jessica Langsam, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
petitioner. 
 
Daniel P. Sullivan, Special Assistant Attorney General, for 
the respondent. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  This case stems from three postconviction orders, 
issued by three different Superior Court judges on the same 
preprinted form, requiring that exhibits in the clerk's office 
of the Superior Court in Middlesex County (clerk's office) be 
transferred to local police departments.  The exhibits at issue 
2 
 
 
are two firearms, live ammunition, a spent projectile and 
casing, other spent casings, a BB gun, and a baby carriage.  The 
district attorney for the northern district petitioned a single 
justice of this court pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, seeking to 
vacate the orders and to require that all exhibits that had been 
transferred to police departments be returned to the clerk's 
office.  The single justice reserved and reported the case to 
the full court. 
 
The issue before us is whether the clerk's office or the 
police departments are responsible for retaining the exhibits in 
these three separate criminal trials, each of which resulted in 
conviction.  We conclude that the exhibit-transfer orders in two 
of the cases should be affirmed, and the order in the third case 
affirmed in part and remanded in part. 
 
The broader issue is how to allocate responsibility for 
retaining and preserving exhibits after criminal trials to 
maintain the integrity of those exhibits.  The importance of 
properly storing exhibits cannot be overstated.  Without exhibit 
preservation, innocent people convicted of crimes may linger in 
prison for decades because they are unable to perform forensic 
tests through existing or emerging technologies.  And with 
respect to those guilty of criminal offenses whose convictions 
are overturned or for whom the jury were unable to reach a 
3 
 
 
verdict, the loss of exhibits or the compromising of the chain 
of custody might prevent reprosecution. 
 
With the limitations discussed infra, courts, and 
particularly clerks' offices, have a statutory duty to secure, 
preserve, and retrieve exhibits admitted in criminal cases that 
result in conviction.  Unfortunately, most of the court houses 
in this Commonwealth lack the facilities and trained staff to 
meet their statutory responsibility.  Clerks' offices do the 
best they can with the resources and facilities provided, but 
what is needed is a state of the art facility staffed by trained 
professionals with appropriate organizational and retrieval 
capability and with climate control to preserve adequately 
forensic and scientific evidence.  The need to preserve 
adequately these exhibits presents the three branches of 
government with a grave challenge that raises questions about 
the fair administration of justice.  There is a shared 
responsibility among the branches of government to solve this 
problem.  No branch is capable of solving it alone. 
 
Background.  Rigoberto Escobar, Matthew Thomas, and Timothy 
Berry were each tried and convicted of various crimes in the 
Superior Court in Middlesex County.1  In Escobar's trial, the 
                     
 
1 Rigoberto Escobar was convicted of murder, carrying a 
firearm without a license, possessing a loaded sawed-off 
shotgun, and discharging a firearm within 500 feet of a 
building.  Matthew Thomas was convicted of armed assault with 
4 
 
 
Commonwealth introduced in evidence a .40 caliber firearm.  On 
the same day that Escobar was found guilty, the judge signed a 
form order returning the firearm to the Everett police 
department.2  The Commonwealth moved twice for reconsideration, 
asking the judge to order that the firearm be retained and 
stored by the clerk's office.  After a hearing on each motion, 
the judge denied the motions in a written decision and ordered 
that the firearm remain at the Everett police department. 
 
In Thomas's trial, the Commonwealth offered in evidence a 
BB gun and a baby carriage.  After Thomas's conviction, the 
clerk's office submitted to the judge a form order to transfer 
the BB gun and baby carriage to the Lowell police department.  
The Commonwealth filed a motion requesting that the judge order 
the clerk's office to retain the exhibits.  After a hearing, the 
judge denied the motion in a written decision and ordered that 
                     
intent to rob and assault and battery by means of a dangerous 
weapon.  Timothy Berry was convicted of home invasion, 
kidnapping, assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, 
carrying a firearm without a license, possessing a firearm 
without a firearm identification card, and impersonating a 
police officer.  All but one of Berry's convictions included a 
habitual offender penalty enhancement. 
 
 
2 The form orders in all three cases are entitled, "Order to 
Return Exhibits."  A judge selects what is being returned from a 
list:  "controlled substances"; "firearms, ammunition, currency, 
or other contraband"; or "other exhibits."  There is space to 
denote the police department responsible for taking custody of 
the evidence, if applicable.  There also is space for the judge 
to write the "reasons for ordering return of exhibits." 
5 
 
 
the exhibits be returned to the Lowell police department.  The 
judge also signed the form order.  The Commonwealth then filed a 
motion for reconsideration, which the judge denied in an order 
written on the face of the motion. 
 
Finally, in Berry's trial, the Commonwealth offered in 
evidence a .45 caliber handgun, live ammunition, a spent 
projectile and casing, and other spent casings.  The clerk's 
office asked the judge to sign a form order returning the 
exhibits to the Lowell police department, and the Commonwealth 
filed a motion requesting that the exhibits remain in the 
clerk's office.  Without issuing a written decision and after a 
hearing, the judge denied the Commonwealth's motion and signed 
the form order. 
 
Discussion.  1.  A hodgepodge of statutes and rules governs 
the retention in Superior Court cases of nondocumentary exhibits 
such as those at issue here.3  This framework makes clerks' 
offices responsible for exhibits unless a judge orders 
otherwise.  Rule 14 of the Rules of the Superior Court (1976) 
requires clerks to retain "[e]xhibits other than hospital 
                     
 
3 Other statutes and rules are limited to court papers.  See 
G. L. c. 221, § 14 ("care and custody" of "records, books and 
papers"); S.J.C. Rule 1:06 (10), as appearing in 411 Mass. 1313 
(1991) (retention of "docket, files, and . . . extended and full 
extended records"); S.J.C. Rule 1:11, as appearing in 480 Mass. 
1322 (2018) (retention of "case records"). 
 
6 
 
 
records" for a certain period of time.  And according to the 
Massachusetts Rules of Appellate Procedure,4 after an appeal is 
commenced the clerk is responsible for maintaining the record, 
including exhibits, and for transmitting exhibits to appellate 
courts upon request.5  See Mass. R. A. P. 8 (a), as appearing in 
481 Mass. 1611 (2019) (record includes "documents and exhibits 
on file"); Mass. R. A. P. 9 (a) (1), as appearing in 481 Mass. 
1615 (2019) ("clerk shall . . . ensure that all exhibits are 
properly numbered and labeled" and "shall maintain the file 
until the final disposition of the appeal, unless otherwise 
ordered by a judge"); Mass. R. A. P. 9 (b), as appearing in 481 
Mass. 1615 ("lower court . . . shall not transmit any exhibit to 
the appellate court unless pursuant to an order of the appellate 
court or a justice thereof"). 
 
Most importantly, the evidence preservation statute, G. L. 
c. 278A, § 16 (a), requires governmental entities "in possession 
of evidence or biological material" related to the investigation 
of a crime of which someone was convicted to "retain such 
                     
 
4 The latest amendments to the Massachusetts Rules of 
Appellate Procedure did not go into effect until March 2019, 
after the exhibit-transfer orders here were issued.  But because 
we aim in this opinion to resolve future disputes about exhibit 
retention, we think it prudent to analyze the relevant rules and 
statutes as they currently exist. 
 
 
5 The Commonwealth's motions for reconsideration were denied 
after Escobar and Thomas appealed.  In contrast, there were no 
rulings on the exhibit-transfer issue after Berry appealed. 
7 
 
 
evidence or biological material for the period of time that a 
person remains in the custody of the commonwealth or under 
parole or probation supervision in connection with that 
crime . . . .  Each governmental entity shall retain all such 
evidence or biological material in a manner that is reasonably 
designed to preserve the evidence and biological material and to 
prevent its destruction or deterioration."6,7  This retention 
requirement applies to clerks' offices once an exhibit is 
admitted in evidence, at which point the evidence is in the 
clerk's possession.  See G. L. c. 278A, § 1 (defining 
"[g]overnmental entity" as "an official body of the 
                     
 
6 General Laws c. 278A, § 16 (a), states:  "Any governmental 
entity that is in possession of evidence or biological material 
that is collected for its potential evidentiary value during the 
investigation of a crime, the prosecution of which results in a 
conviction, shall retain such evidence or biological material 
for the period of time that a person remains in the custody of 
the commonwealth or under parole or probation supervision in 
connection with that crime, without regard to whether the 
evidence or biological material was introduced at trial.  Each 
governmental entity shall retain all such evidence or biological 
material in a manner that is reasonably designed to preserve the 
evidence and biological material and to prevent its destruction 
or deterioration.  The evidence or biological material need not 
be preserved if it is to be returned to a third party or if it 
is of such a size, bulk or physical character as to render 
retention impracticable." 
 
 
7 General Laws c. 278A, § 16 (a), supersedes Rule 14 of the 
Rules of the Superior Court (1976) to the extent that that rule 
allows exhibits to be destroyed after conviction.  See Hermanson 
v. Szafarowicz, 457 Mass. 39, 45 (2010) ("Where there is . . . 
an irreconcilable conflict between a court rule and a statute, 
the statute supersedes the rule"). 
8 
 
 
commonwealth, or of a county, city or town within the 
commonwealth").8 
 
The evidence preservation statute is part of a legislative 
initiative "to remedy the injustice of wrongful convictions of 
factually innocent persons by allowing access to analyses of 
biological material with newer forensic and scientific 
techniques."  Commonwealth v. Williams, 481 Mass. 799, 804 
(2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Wade, 467 Mass. 496, 504 (2014), 
S.C., 475 Mass. 54 (2016).  Maintaining the integrity of 
exhibits is essential to this purpose.  If exhibits are not 
preserved, then defendants will be unable to uncover potentially 
exculpatory forensic evidence.  See G. L. c. 278A, § 2 (motions 
"for forensic or scientific analysis").  That being said, the 
retention requirement is not absolute:  "The evidence or 
biological material need not be preserved if it is . . . of such 
                     
 
8 As required by G. L. c. 278A, § 16 (b), the Department of 
State Police has "promulgate[d] regulations governing the 
retention and preservation of evidence or biological material by 
any governmental entity."  See 515 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 7.00 
(2018).  See also Massachusetts Chapter 278A Working Group, Best 
Practices Manual for Evidence Collection, Handling, Storage, and 
Retention in Massachusetts (June 2015), https://www.public 
counsel.net/pc/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2014/09/Best-Practices 
-Manual-for-Evidence-Collection-Handling-Storage-and-Retention 
-in-Massachusetts-FINAL-VERSION-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GHC 
-JVLC].  We do not address the enforceability of 515 Code Mass. 
Regs. §§ 7.00 as they relate to the Trial Court, but we see no 
reason why, absent court order, clerks' offices should not 
comply with these regulations. 
 
9 
 
 
a size, bulk or physical character as to render retention 
impracticable."  G. L. c. 278A, § 16 (a). 
 
With these statutes and rules in mind, we conclude that 
Superior Court clerks' offices are responsible for maintaining 
exhibits posttrial unless a clerk's office satisfies a judge 
that there is good cause to believe retention would be 
impracticable.9  Impracticability includes, but is not limited 
to, whether transfer is necessary for exhibit preservation.  If 
there is good cause to believe retention in a clerk's office 
would be impracticable, then a judge may order the exhibits 
transferred. 
 
A clerk's office may seek to satisfy the good cause 
standard by proffer or affidavit, and the judge need not conduct 
an evidentiary hearing.  In ruling on a motion to transfer 
exhibits, a judge must provide a short statement of factual 
                     
 
9 Policies of the Trial Court and of the clerk's office of 
the Superior Court in Middlesex County (clerk's office) 
recognize that clerks are responsible for exhibits unless 
retention is impracticable.  According to the Trial Court's 
exhibit retention policy in criminal cases, revised November 28, 
2016, a clerk "may return an exhibit to the party who offered it 
into evidence if post-trial retention of that exhibit within the 
courthouse is impracticable."  And according to a memorandum 
from the clerk's office to assistant clerks dated June 8, 2017, 
that is in the record (clerk's office memorandum or memorandum), 
after a guilty verdict, exhibits other than controlled 
substances, firearms, ammunition, and currency should be stored 
in the clerk's office "[u]nless they are impracticable to store, 
and [the clerk's office] seek[s] permission to return the 
item(s)." 
10 
 
 
findings and reasons for granting or denying the motion.  The 
findings and rationale may be dictated orally as part of the 
record.  See Brangan v. Commonwealth, 477 Mass. 691, 693-694 
(2017). 
The good cause standard need not be satisfied in two 
situations.  First, the standard does not apply where exhibits 
are transferred by agreement, including pursuant to motions for 
the return of evidence.10  See G. L. c. 278A, § 16 (a) (evidence 
need not be preserved "if it is to be returned to a third 
party"); Rule 14 of the Rules of the Superior Court (clerks need 
not retain for specified length of time exhibits that are 
"sooner delivered to the parties or counsel to whom they . . . 
belong or by whom they were . . . introduced").  And second, the 
standard does not apply where exhibits are transferred pursuant 
to statute.11 
 
Where the good cause standard does apply, it applies to all 
exhibits that are not covered specifically by statute, including 
                     
 
10 We do not address situations in which a third party 
requests the return of an exhibit that the clerk seeks to 
retain. 
 
 
11 For example, certain items are automatically transferred 
to the State police after conviction.  See G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (e) (firearms and various other weapons possessed 
unlawfully); G. L. c. 269, § 10A (silencers); G. L. c. 269, 
§§ 11B, 11C (firearms with removed identification numbers); 
G. L. c. 269, § 12B (BB guns); G. L. c. 269, § 12D (c) (rifles 
and shotguns carried on public ways).  See also G. L. c. 276, 
§ 3 (requiring police to return recovered stolen property). 
11 
 
 
certain firearms and ammunition.  This means, contrary to the 
clerk's office's current policy, that a clerk's office must 
satisfy the good cause standard each time it wishes to transfer 
a firearm or ammunition not covered by statute.  A memorandum 
from the clerk's office to assistant clerks dated June 8, 2017, 
that is in the record (clerk's office memorandum or memorandum) 
states that, "due to space limitations and public safety issues, 
long term firearms storage at Middlesex Superior Court is highly 
impracticable."  Accordingly, the clerk's office's policy is to 
return all firearms and ammunition to the Commonwealth after 
criminal trials.  This firearms policy is purportedly bolstered 
by the rationale behind various statutes, see note 11, supra, 
that require the transfer of particular firearms to the State 
police after conviction. 
 
Although the clerk's office memorandum is correct to 
recognize an impracticability standard that accounts for space 
limitations and safety concerns, we decline to establish a 
blanket rule that all firearms are impracticable to store.  
Unless transferred by agreement or pursuant to statute, firearms 
must be kept in clerks' offices absent good cause to believe 
12 
 
 
that storage of the particular firearm at issue is 
impracticable.12,13 
 
2.  The decision whether to grant a motion to transfer 
exhibits is left to a judge's sound discretion.  Cf. Canavan's 
Case, 432 Mass. 304, 312 (2000) (in context of expert testimony, 
"applying an abuse of discretion standard on appellate review 
will allow trial judges the needed discretion to conduct the 
inherently fact-intensive and flexible . . . analysis").  "An 
abuse of discretion occurs only where the judge makes '"a clear 
error of judgment in weighing" the factors relevant to the 
decision . . . , such that the decision falls outside the range 
of reasonable alternatives.'"  Commonwealth v. Keown, 478 Mass. 
232, 242 (2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1038 (2018), quoting 
L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014).  After 
examining the record, which is entirely documentary, we conclude 
that the orders in Berry's and Escobar's cases should be 
                     
 
12 Later in the opinion, we rely on the clerk's office 
memorandum in affirming partially the exhibit-transfer orders 
here.  The clerk's office may not rely solely on this memorandum 
if it seeks to transfer similar exhibits in the future.  Rather, 
it must provide evidence that storage remains impracticable at 
the time of the proposed transfer. 
 
 
13 We have concerns that pragmatically it does not make 
sense to store firearms over the long term in a clerk's office.  
Nonetheless, the relevant statutes and rules demonstrate that 
the clerk's office may be required to maintain possession of 
firearms absent good cause shown, agreement, or statutory 
authorization. 
13 
 
 
affirmed, and that the order in Thomas's case should be affirmed 
in part and remanded in part.  On remand, the judge in Thomas's 
case should apply the standard for exhibit-transfer orders we 
announce today. 
 
Although the reasoning of the three judges does not comport 
entirely with the good cause standard we have articulated, the 
record supports their decisions with respect to the BB gun, 
firearms, and ammunition at issue.  See Clair v. Clair, 464 
Mass. 205, 214 (2013) ("appellate court may affirm a correct 
result based on reasons that are different from those 
articulated by the judge below").  According to the clerk's 
office memorandum, which appears to have been before all three 
judges, the clerk's office is "out of secure storage space" and 
does "not have the capacity to expand the secure vault," which 
holds "controlled substances, firearms, ammunition and currency 
admitted into evidence."  The memorandum also explains that, 
"[u]nlike evidence officers and troopers, [c]lerks are not 
trained in the proper handling of firearms and ammunition."  
This information provides good cause to believe it would be 
impracticable at this time to store in the clerk's office the 
two firearms, live ammunition, spent projectile and casings, and 
BB gun at issue here.14  The decisions in Berry's and Escobar's 
                     
 
14 Thomas and Berry were tried in Lowell.  Escobar was tried 
in Woburn.  The clerk's office memorandum refers only to the 
14 
 
 
cases are therefore affirmed, as is the decision in Thomas's 
case as it pertains to the BB gun. 
However, the judge in Thomas's case also ordered that a 
baby carriage be transferred.  Nothing in the record suggests 
that there is insufficient space in the clerk's office for this 
item.  The clerk's office memorandum speaks to a lack of space 
only in the secure vault, and suggests that items other than 
controlled substances, firearms, ammunition, and currency are 
not stored in that vault.  The memorandum mentions other 
"evidence rooms and vaults," but does not address how many of 
these rooms exist, what is stored in them, or whether they are 
full. 
Admittedly, the letter to Trial Court employees that 
accompanied the November 2016 revisions to the Trial Court's 
exhibit retention policy stated that clerks' offices are not 
built for long-term storage:  "The revised policy reflects the 
position that the Trial Court and its [c]lerks' offices are not 
intended to be . . . long-term evidence repositories nor are 
they physically suited or equipped to assume that role."  
However, this broad statement is insufficient to satisfy the 
                     
"Middlesex Superior Courthouse and the Office of the Middlesex 
Superior Court Clerk," and therefore might not apply to both the 
Lowell and Woburn court houses.  Although this is not fatal to 
the good cause showing here, it is best practice for clerks' 
offices to reference all court houses where evidence could be 
stored. 
15 
 
 
good cause standard with respect to the baby carriage.  We 
remand for further findings. 
 
3.  The standard we announce today does not resolve the 
vexing issue of the safe storage and preservation of exhibits 
admitted in evidence in criminal trials, as mandated by G. L. 
c. 278A, § 16 (a).  A case-by-case approach to exhibit 
preservation is inefficient and is more likely than a 
comprehensive solution to result in exhibits being compromised.  
Moreover, in the long term, the clerk's office may not simply 
rely on lack of staff training or inadequate space to avoid its 
obligation to store and preserve exhibits. 
 
We recognize our superintendence responsibility to ensure 
that exhibits retained in clerks' offices are secure, preserved, 
and capable of retrieval in a manner that maintains the chain of 
custody.  To that end, we can improve staff training and work 
with the Division of Capital Asset Management and Maintenance to 
identify capital improvements within the court houses in this 
Commonwealth, thereby enhancing the courts' capacity to maintain 
exhibits safely.  However, we cannot solve this problem alone.  
Improving the storage capacity of various clerks' offices is not 
the most efficient long-term solution, and all capital 
improvements rest with the executive branch.  Moreover, we 
cannot order the Legislature to appropriate funds for a state of 
16 
 
 
the art storage facility, nor can we order the executive branch 
to build one. 
 
Sometimes the most routine tasks occurring well beyond the 
piercing eye of the public nonetheless require the most energy 
and insight of dedicated public officials.  The orderly storage 
of deoxyribonucleic acid deposited on clothing or ballistics 
evidence obtained from a firearm utilized as a murder weapon may 
be pivotal in avoiding the conviction of the innocent or the 
acquittal of the guilty.  There is an urgent need for 
cooperation and compromise between and among the branches of 
government.  At issue is not merely the integrity of exhibits. 
It is the integrity of our criminal justice system, the bedrock 
of which is fairness, that is at stake. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the orders in Berry's and 
Escobar's cases are affirmed and the order in Thomas's case is 
affirmed in part and remanded in part. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.