Title: Arthur Barnhill, III v. State Of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC06-275
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: October 25, 2007

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC06-275 
____________ 
 
ARTHUR BARNHILL, III,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC06-1803 
____________ 
 
ARTHUR BARNHILL, III,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
JAMES R. MCDONOUGH, etc.,  
Respondent. 
 
[October 25, 2007] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Arthur Barnhill, III appeals an order of the circuit court denying his motion 
to vacate his conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death filed under 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  He also petitions this Court for a writ 
of habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  For 
the reasons that follow we affirm the trial court’s order denying postconviction 
relief and deny the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On direct appeal, this Court summarized the facts in this case as follows: 
 
Arthur Barnhill, III, (Barnhill) was raised by his grandparents 
after his mother essentially abandoned him and his father was 
imprisoned.  When he was 20 years of age, Barnhill=s grandparents 
asked him to leave the house because Barnhill did not follow their 
rules.  He went to live with the family of his friend, Michael Jackson, 
a codefendant in this case.  He lived with the Jacksons for 
approximately two weeks before he was asked to leave their home as 
well.  Barnhill decided to go to New York, where his girlfriend lived.  
To get there, Barnhill planned to steal a car and money from Earl 
Gallipeau, who was 84 years old.  Gallipeau was a lawn service 
customer of Barnhill=s grandfather.  Barnhill and Gallipeau met when 
Barnhill did lawn work for his grandfather at Gallipeau=s house. 
On Sunday, August 6, 1995, Barnhill and Michael Jackson 
walked to Gallipeau=s house to steal Gallipeau=s car.  They entered the 
house through the garage and waited in the kitchen for approximately 
two hours.  Gallipeau was in another room watching television.  
According to Michael Jackson, it was not until they were in 
Gallipeau=s kitchen that Barnhill revealed his plan to kill Gallipeau 
before taking the car.  At that point, Jackson abandoned the enterprise 
and left.  At least one witness saw Michael Jackson walking alone in 
Gallipeau=s neighborhood away from Gallipeau=s house. 
When Gallipeau got up from watching television and went into 
the kitchen, Barnhill ambushed him and attempted to strangle him.  
When the attempt failed, Barnhill got a towel to use as a ligature 
around Gallipeau=s neck.  The second attempt was unsuccessful, so 
Barnhill removed Gallipeau=s belt from around his waist and wrapped 
it around Gallipeau=s neck four times, breaking Gallipeau=s neck and 
killing him.  Barnhill then dragged Gallipeau through the house to a 
back bedroom and left him there. 
 
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Barnhill took Gallipeau=s money, wallet, keys, and car, and 
eventually met Jelani Jackson, Michael Jackson=s brother.  Barnhill 
and Jelani Jackson drove to New York and Barnhill went to his 
girlfriend=s apartment.  Shortly thereafter, New York police located 
Gallipeau=s vehicle, found Barnhill, and arrested him on an old 
warrant.   
Barnhill told police that he was at Gallipeau=s house with Jelani 
Jackson, but that Jelani Jackson actually killed Gallipeau and he only 
held Gallipeau=s hands down to help.  This, Barnhill indicated, 
explained the presence of Gallipeau=s blood on his shirt.  Barnhill filed 
a motion to suppress his statement to police and evidence obtained 
during his arrest, which the trial court denied.  Within ten days after 
the suppression hearing, defense counsel requested a competency 
hearing for Barnhill.  After counsel requested the competency hearing, 
he filed a motion to disqualify the trial judge based on certain 
comments made at the suppression hearing.  The trial judge denied the 
motion to disqualify.  Barnhill thereafter entered pleas of no contest to 
first-degree murder, burglary of a dwelling while armed, armed 
robbery, and grand theft.  The trial court made a finding of guilt as to 
each charge.1 
Barnhill v. State, 834 So. 2d 836, 840-41 (Fla. 2002). 
 
 
The case proceeded to the penalty phase where both aggravating and 
mitigating evidence was presented.  The jury recommended death by a vote of nine 
to three.  After a Spencer2 hearing, the trial court sentenced Barnhill to death.  On 
direct appeal, Barnhill raised seven issues.  In affirming the conviction and 
sentence, this Court rejected all the arguments raised.  
                                          
 
1.  The facts and evidence are sufficient to demonstrate first-degree murder 
and Barnhill=s participation as a principal. 
 
2.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
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Barnhill filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court 
which was denied.  See Barnhill v. Florida, 539 U.S. 917 (2003).  Barnhill filed a 
motion to vacate judgments of conviction and sentences on December 1, 2003, 
pursuant to Florida Rule Criminal Procedure 3.851.  The motion was amended on 
February 16, 2004, and June 8, 2004.  An evidentiary hearing was held on May 19 
and 20, 2005.  The witnesses at the hearing included Barnhill’s trial attorneys 
Arthur Haft and second chair, Timothy Caudill; Delores Barnhill (Barnhill’s 
grandmother); Arthur Barnhill, Jr. (Barnhill’s father); Andrew Gruler (social 
worker); Dr. Bard Fisher (clinical forensic psychologist); Dr. Harry McClaren 
(clinical forensic psychologist); and Dr. Jeffrey Danziger (psychiatrist).  The trial 
court denied the motion on January 12, 2006.  Barnhill has appealed the denial to 
this Court, raising ten claims, and he has also filed a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus, raising one claim.   
ANALYSIS 
Rule 3.851 Claims 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims  
 
Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), this Court held that for ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims to be successful, two requirements must be satisfied: (1) the 
claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the lawyer that are shown to 
 
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be outside the broad range of reasonably competent performance under prevailing 
professional standards, and (2) the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further 
be demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the proceeding 
that confidence in the outcome is undermined.  See Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 
So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986).  
 
As to the first prong, the defendant must establish that “counsel made errors 
so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; see also Cherry 
v. State, 659 So. 2d 1069, 1072 (Fla. 1995).  For the second prong, the reviewing 
court must determine whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for the 
deficiency, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  See Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 695; see also Valle v. State, 705 So. 2d 1331, 1333 (Fla. 1997).  
“Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or 
death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the 
result unreliable.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.   
 
A court considering a claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel need not make 
a specific ruling on the performance component of the test when it is clear that the 
prejudice component is not satisfied.  See Maxwell, 490 So. 2d at 932.  
Additionally, where this Court previously has rejected a substantive claim on the 
 
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merits, counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to make a meritless 
argument.  See Melendez v. State, 612 So. 2d 1366, 1369 (Fla. 1992).   
 
Generally, this Court’s standard of review following a denial of a 
postconviction claim where the trial court has conducted an evidentiary hearing 
affords deference to the trial court’s factual findings.  See McLin v. State, 827 So. 
2d 948, 954 n.4 (Fla. 2002).  “As long as the trial court’s findings are supported by 
competent substantial evidence, ‘this Court will not substitute its judgment for that 
of the trial court on questions of fact, likewise of the credibility of the witnesses as 
well as the weight to be given to the evidence by the trial court.’”  Blanco v. State, 
702 So. 2d 1250, 1252 (Fla. 1997) (quoting Demps v. State, 462 So. 2d 1074, 1075 
(Fla. 1984)).  However, the circuit court’s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.  
See Sochor v. State, 883 So. 2d 766, 771-72 (Fla. 2004). 
 
Additionally, there is a strong presumption that trial counsel’s performance 
was not ineffective.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.  A fair assessment of attorney 
performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of 
hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to 
evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.  See id. at 689; see 
also Rivera v. Dugger, 629 So. 2d 105, 107 (Fla. 1993).  The defendant carries the 
burden to “overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged 
action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 
 
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(quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).  In Occhicone v. State, 
768 So. 2d 1037, 1048 (Fla. 2000), this Court held that “strategic decisions do not 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been 
considered and rejected and counsel’s decision was reasonable under the norms of 
professional conduct.” 
Failure to File Motion to Withdraw Plea  
Barnhill first alleges trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing 
to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea that was entered, over counsel’s 
objections, at the start of the guilt phase of his trial.  Barnhill asserts counsel’s 
query regarding his competency to proceed after the entry of plea coupled with the 
court-ordered competency evaluations should have led to a formal motion to 
withdraw the plea.  Conversely, the State argues Barnhill failed to allege that he 
wished to withdraw his plea or that counsel prevented him from withdrawing his 
plea.  Additionally, the State argues Barnhill failed to allege that the plea was not 
voluntary or that he was incompetent at the time.   
Barnhill pled guilty over counsel’s objection at the start of the guilt phase on 
October 14, 1998, and the trial court conducted a full plea colloquy addressing the 
voluntariness of the plea.  The next day trial counsel, Arthur Haft, advised the 
court that he noticed a drastic change in Barnhill’s behavior and questioned 
Barnhill’s competency to proceed when Barnhill told them he wanted the death 
 
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penalty.  Haft informed the court Barnhill wore a suit to court every day except this 
day and he noticed the change before the plea was entered which may have 
resulted in the plea being an emotional decision.  The trial court inquired of 
Barnhill on his choice to plead and request for the death penalty.  Barnhill 
indicated he was able to understand the proceeding, he was sound of mind and able 
to act in his own interest.     
Second chair trial counsel, Timothy Caudill, requested that the doctors 
evaluate Barnhill to determine if he was competent at the time he entered the plea.  
The trial court inquired of counsel if he felt Barnhill was competent at the time of 
plea to which Caudill responded, “Yes sir, I did.”  The request was denied.  The 
guilt-phase jury was released and the trial court ordered two experts to examine 
Barnhill.  Dr. Danziger, one of the court-ordered experts, submitted a report that 
competency was no longer an issue and the court declared Barnhill competent.  
Subsequently, a jury was selected for a penalty phase. 
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim involving a guilty plea is 
determined by the same deficient performance prong as Strickland while the 
second prong involves the defendant demonstrating “a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel’s errors, the defendant would not have pleaded guilty and would 
have insisted on going to trial.”  Grosvenor v. State, 874 So. 2d 1176, 1179 (Fla. 
2004) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)).  This Court has found 
 
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strategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative 
courses of action have been considered and rejected and counsel’s decision was 
reasonable under the norms of professional conduct.  See Robinson v. State, 913 
So. 2d 514, 524 (Fla. 2005); Brown v. State, 894 So. 2d 137, 147 (Fla. 2004). 
The record reflects counsel was not deficient by failing to file a motion to 
withdraw the guilty plea.  Both trial attorneys testified at the evidentiary hearing on 
this issue.  When counsel noticed Barnhill’s changed mental state, they 
immediately advised the court and medical assistance was provided.  Haft testified 
on direct and cross-examination that Barnhill never indicated to him that he wanted 
to withdraw the plea.  Haft testified that Caudill’s notes reflect that Caudill may 
have spoken to Barnhill about withdrawing the plea.   However, Haft could not 
remember Barnhill wanting to withdraw his plea.  Haft testified that there were 
discussions regarding withdrawing the plea and whether or not withdrawal would 
be viewed as “jerking the court around.”  Haft said the decision was made not to 
withdraw the plea but to use it as a mitigating factor.   
Caudill testified that after viewing his notes it was apparent that Barnhill 
initially wanted to withdraw the plea.  However, when he spoke with Barnhill 
about the ramifications of doing so, Barnhill indicated he understood it was not the 
best thing for him to do.  Caudill also testified on cross-examination that he did not 
recall any further discussion on the issue after the meeting where the decision was 
 
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made not to withdraw the plea.  Both attorneys testified that after consultation with 
the defendant, a strategic decision was made not to withdraw the plea.     
In addition, Dr. Fisher and Dr. Danziger testified at the evidentiary hearing 
regarding Barnhill’s mental state at the time of and after the plea.  Dr. Fisher 
testified that Barnhill suffered a brief reactive psychosis as a response to specific 
stressors.  Specifically, Dr. Fisher testified and agreed with Dr. Danziger’s report 
that Barnhill’s reaction was due to the impact of the guilty plea in this case.  Dr. 
Fisher also testified that Barnhill suffered from prior depression brought on by the 
events in his life prior to his arrest.  Dr. Danziger testified that he saw Barnhill for 
the first time three days after entry of the plea.  He testified Barnhill was alert, 
fully oriented, and his mood was good; he diagnosed him with a brief reactive 
psychosis which was being resolved.  Dr. Danziger also said that at the time of the 
plea, Barnhill was not suffering from a psychotic disorder but the psychotic 
disorder developed after the plea.   
The trial court found that no formal finding of incompetency was made and 
that ultimately Barnhill had been found to suffer from a “brief reactive psychosis,” 
a temporary psychotic episode triggered by extreme stress.  Based on the experts’ 
testimony and that of counsel, the trial court further found that Barnhill was acting 
normal on the day of the plea and there was no reasonable belief that he was 
incompetent at the time that he entered the plea.  Barnhill has failed to show any 
 
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deficient performance on counsel’s part.  Barnhill discussed the issue with his 
attorney, and a reasonable strategic decision was made to forego withdrawing the 
plea.  There is competent, substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s finding 
that counsel was not deficient.  
Because deficient performance has not been demonstrated, we need not 
examine the prejudice prong of  Strickland.  Ineffective assistance of counsel has 
not been demonstrated, and the trial court properly denied relief on this issue.   
Motion to Disqualify 
Barnhill argues counsel rendered ineffective assistance by filing and arguing 
a legally insufficient motion to disqualify the trial judge.  Barnhill asserts that this 
Court’s ruling on direct appeal finding the motion legally insufficient, in essence, 
found trial counsel ineffective as a matter of law.  He further asserts that counsel’s 
verbal renewal of the motion at the start of the penalty phase instead of a current, 
written, and more legally sufficient motion and affidavit was further evidence of 
ineffective assistance.  Barnhill alleged in the motion to disqualify that he had a 
well grounded fear that the judge would not be fair and impartial because of the 
judge’s finding that Barnhill was untruthful when he testified that he was living 
with his girlfriend.  The motion to disqualify the trial judge was denied by the trial 
court and raised as an issue on direct appeal.  See Barnhill, 834 So. 2d at 842-43.  
This Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the motion was technically 
 
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insufficient because the supporting affidavit made by Barnhill did not state the 
specific facts which led him to believe he would not receive a fair trial.   
 
Barnhill has failed to show that counsel’s performance in filing the motion 
to disqualify, which was ultimately found to be legally insufficient, was ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  As argued extensively on direct appeal, even if counsel had 
filed an amended legally sufficient motion, the allegations contained within did not 
warrant disqualification.  The statement attributable to the judge would not have 
led a reasonable person to believe he or she would not receive a fair trial.  A mere 
“subjective fear of bias will not be legally sufficient; rather, the fear must be 
objectively reasonable.”  Arbelaez v. State, 898 So. 2d 25, 41 (Fla. 2005).  The 
statement was made in the context of ruling on the motion to suppress and thus the 
motion to disqualify was legally insufficient in that respect.  Therefore, counsel 
was not deficient because the motion was based on that allegation.  Accordingly, 
Barnhill has failed to show ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Voir Dire 
Barnhill also argues trial counsel’s questioning during voir dire was 
ineffective, deficient, unreasonable, and constituted ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  Barnhill argues Haft’s questioning was rambling, disjointed and 
nonsensical, and confused the jury.  Furthermore, he contends that Haft skipped 
over and abandoned the opportunity and duty to question jurors Robinson and 
 
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Lowe and that this failure undermined confidence in the outcome of the penalty 
phase.  Conversely, the State argues Barnhill failed to allege prejudice or any bias 
by the jurors who actually served.  
 
Barnhill’s claim that counsel ineffectively handled voir dire because his 
questioning was rambling, disjointed, and confused the jury was raised on direct 
appeal in two claims.  See Barnhill, 834 So. 2d at 843-47.  On direct appeal, this 
Court found there was competent evidence in the record to support the trial court’s 
decision to excuse at least two jurors for cause, and we denied relief on the claims.  
Id. at 846.  Additionally, this Court addressed Barnhill’s issue from voir dire that 
the trial court unreasonably limited defense counsel’s voir dire and unreasonably 
limited and restricted trial counsel by repeatedly interrupting, chastising, and 
threatening to replace counsel.  This Court found that the trial court did not 
unreasonably limit counsel’s voir dire but simply tried to help defense counsel 
focus more precisely on the questions he was asking.  Additionally, this Court 
found that the trial court’s interruptions were outside the hearing of the jury and 
were intended to make counsel’s questions clearer. 
 
Haft testified at the evidentiary hearing that he did not remember the 
specifics of the discussion during the trial court’s interruptions.  However, he 
remembered the side bar because the trial court believed his questions were not 
helpful.  Haft further testified that he thought there was a reason but he could not 
 
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exactly remember his thought process in terms of why he did not return to juror 
Robinson.  As to juror Lowe, Haft said that he did not recall the reason he did not 
question the juror after the trial court’s query regarding predispositions about the 
death penalty. 
 
While in hindsight counsel reflects his questioning could have been done 
differently, this Court found and the record supports the finding that counsel was 
competent in his questioning during voir dire.  Barnhill asserts conclusory 
allegations that the outcome of the trial would have been different if counsel’s 
questioning had been done differently.  Barnhill has not alleged, much less 
demonstrated, that any of the jurors who sat were prejudiced as a result of any 
action or inaction by counsel.  This Court has repeatedly held “conclusory 
allegations are insufficient to warrant relief” on an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim.  Wright v. State, 857 So. 2d 861, 877 (Fla. 2003).  Moreover, a review of 
the record reveals venirepersons Robinson and Lowe were never selected for the 
jury or even as alternates.  Barnhill has failed to allege or demonstrate prejudice 
based on counsel’s voir dire questioning; therefore, he has failed to demonstrate 
that counsel was ineffective.  
Mitigating Evidence 
Barnhill further argues trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance through 
inadequate preparation, investigation, and presentation of mitigating evidence.  He 
 
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contends trial counsel failed to interview Barnhill’s father and present him as a 
penalty-phase witness.  Additionally, Barnhill asserts trial counsel failed to visit 
certain family members in New York and limited Barnhill’s social history to the 
mother’s component of the family history.  The State contends trial counsel had 
legitimate, strategic reasons for not calling certain witnesses, in particular the 
father, and that the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing was cumulative to 
the mitigation presented at the penalty phase.    
 
During the penalty phase, trial counsel presented thirteen mitigation 
witnesses, including Barnhill’s paternal grandmother, aunts, cousins, school 
friends, Dr. Eisenstein, and Dr. Gutman.  The lay witnesses essentially testified 
concerning the defendant’s childhood of abuse, neglect, and abandonment, 
difficulty in school, and his limited contact with his father.   See Barnhill, 834 So. 
2d at 841.  Dr. Eisenstein testified that Barnhill suffers from ADHD, is learning 
disabled, and may have frontal lobe impairment.  He also said that Barnhill was not 
antisocial.  Dr. Gutman testified at the penalty phase concerning psychological 
testing he performed on the defendant.  While he disagreed with Dr. Eisenstein’s 
finding of a frontal lobe impairment, he did agree that the testing results from the 
MMPI left open to interpretation whether such an impairment existed.  Based on 
the testimony of these witnesses, the trial court considered and found a number of 
mitigating circumstances, including, but not limited to, the facts that Barnhill 
 
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suffers from a learning disability, has frontal lobe impairment, suffers from 
psychiatric disorders, had a difficult childhood, and grew up in an environment 
where the mother favored the daughters.  The court also considered and weighed 
the facts that Barnhill was neglected by his mother, was a poor student, suffered 
shock and embarrassment when his father was arrested and given a lengthy prison 
sentence, and was raised essentially by his grandparents.     
Trial counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that he spoke with Barnhill 
about his family and made tactical decisions concerning which family members 
would make good mitigating witnesses.  Haft also testified that he and Caudill did 
not have any confidence in what the mother might say; they had a difficult time 
contacting her at first, and it seemed Barnhill’s sisters, who were hostile to 
Barnhill, ran that household.  Counsel testified that both Barnhill and other people 
informed them about the sisters’ hostility; Barnhill did not want them to contact his 
sisters.     
Counsel further testified that they discussed with Barnhill his father, who 
was in prison.  The discussion focused on whether or not the father should be used 
as a witness during the penalty phase.  Counsel testified they went through the 
father’s court files to see what crimes he was charged with and sentenced for 
before making a decision.  In the final analysis, it was decided that there were other 
family members to present whose reputation and veracity would not be an issue.  
 
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They had available as witnesses the mother’s sister, maternal grandmother, a 
maternal aunt, maternal uncle, and paternal grandparents.  Thus, counsel made a 
strategic decision that testimony from Barnhill’s father would not advance their 
theory of the case. 
Barnhill’s father testified at the evidentiary hearing that he only learned 
about his son’s charges through communication with his mother, Barnhill’s 
grandmother, and through the prison’s law library.  He said he was never contacted 
by defense counsel’s office during his son’s trial, and he would have been willing 
to testify on his son’s behalf.  Barnhill’s father testified concerning his times in 
prison; his treatment of women, including his son’s mother; and his belief that he 
was not the defendant’s father.  He also testified he was physically abusive to 
Barnhill.   
Andrew Gruler, a clinical social worker, testified at the evidentiary hearing.  
He constructed a genogram, family tree, for Barnhill which showed no contact 
between Barnhill and his sisters and, in fact, revealed broken lines between 
Barnhill and his father, mother, and sisters.  Gruler testified he gathered various 
accounts from several of Barnhill’s family members which revealed he had a hard 
life.  Gruler’s testimony corroborated the testimony of family members presented 
at the penalty phase and in particular corroborated the testimony from Deloris 
Barnhill, who testified at both the penalty phase and the 3.851 evidentiary hearing.   
 
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  Dr. Fisher, a clinical forensic psychologist, testified at the evidentiary 
hearing concerning the mitigation presented at the penalty phase.  Dr. Fisher 
indicated that he reviewed the testing done by Dr. Riebsame and Dr. McClaren.  
Dr. Riebsame examined Barnhill during the original proceedings but did not testify 
at the penalty phase. 3  Dr. McClaren was the State’s expert witness at the penalty 
phase.  Dr. Fisher testified that Barnhill suffered from depression as a result of all 
the stressors in his life but did not believe he was psychotic.  Essentially, Dr. 
Fisher testified there were numerous mitigators in Barnhill’s life presented at the 
evidentiary hearing that were consistent with a conduct disorder, a prerequisite to a 
diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder.   
Dr. McClaren, a clinical and forensic psychologist, and Dr. Danziger, a 
psychiatrist, testified for the State at the evidentiary hearing.  Dr. McClaren 
testified that Barnhill suffered from a depressive disorder and he also has an 
antisocial disorder.  He indicated the diagnosis is evident from Barnhill’s life 
history of setting fires, fighting, and stealing.  This diagnosis is consistent with Dr. 
Fisher’s diagnosis as well as Dr. Riebsame’s.   
                                          
 
 
3.  Trial counsel made a strategic decision not to use Dr. Riebsame at the 
penalty phase because he diagnosed Barnhill with antisocial disorder, which was 
contrary to the defense’s mitigation theory of trying to show Barnhill was abused 
and neglected but had redeeming qualities.  Moreover, during an interview with 
Dr. Riebsame, Barnhill revealed a different version of the murder that made him 
seem more culpable.   
 
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Although additional witnesses were presented at the evidentiary hearing, the 
record supports the court’s findings that counsel adequately investigated and 
prepared mitigating evidence for the penalty phase.  During the penalty phase, the 
defense presented a number of witnesses who testified about Barnhill’s social 
history.  While counsel chose not to call the mother and sisters as witnesses after 
investigation and discussion with the defendant, the facts of his childhood were 
nonetheless presented through other family members and friends.    Nothing of a 
significant difference was presented at the evidentiary hearing; the testimony that 
was presented is cumulative to and corroborates the evidence that was presented at 
the penalty phase.  Even with the mental health testimony, the testimony at the 
evidentiary hearing was consistent in finding that Barnhill suffers from antisocial 
personality disorder.  However, counsel’s decision to use Dr. Eisenstein and not 
Dr. Riebsame at the penalty phase resulted in the presentation of a mental health 
picture by the defense that did not include testimony concerning antisocial 
personality disorder. 
The fact that there were other witnesses available who could have testified 
concerning Barnhill’s upbringing and his mental health does not demonstrate that 
counsel was ineffective in choosing the theory and strategy that was presented at 
the penalty phase.  Barnhill simply has not demonstrated a substantial deficiency 
 
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on the part of counsel that has undermined our confidence in the penalty phase 
proceeding.  We, therefore, affirm the trial court’s denial of relief on this issue. 
Closing Arguments 
Barnhill contends trial counsel was ineffective because his closing argument 
indicated counsel’s own doubts or distaste for the case, and this was prejudicial 
and deprived Barnhill of a fair trial.  The State argues trial counsel’s closing 
argument was not deficient and Barnhill’s assertions to the contrary are based on 
taking the argument out of context.  Additionally, the State contends Barnhill 
cannot show prejudice from the closing argument because the four aggravating 
circumstances proven in this case would result in a sentence of death even with a 
perfect closing argument. 
 
Defense counsel Haft testified at the evidentiary hearing that he had no 
distaste for Barnhill, and that there was nothing in this crime that would affect his 
allegiance to his client.  Haft said that his statement that the jury might feel anger 
after seeing such a tragic death was made to establish some credibility with the 
jury.  He said that acknowledgement of the gravity of first-degree murder is one 
way of establishing some credibility.  He did not want the twelve people who were 
casting votes for life or death of the perpetrator to feel his arguments in the penalty 
phase were devaluing the gravity of the murder.   Haft further testified he was 
urging the jury to keep their emotions out of the deliberations, and decide the case 
 
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by giving proper weight to the various aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  
Haft testified he was trying his best to get them to recommend life.    
 
In denying relief on this claim, the court found the excerpts cited from 
counsel’s arguments were taken out of context and must be read with the 
surrounding arguments, that is, the argument must be read as a whole.  We agree 
and affirm the trial court’s determination that trial counsel adequately explained his 
strategy for arguing the case in the manner that he did.  That strategy was a 
reasonable one given the fact that this was a brutal murder and robbery of an 
eighty-four-year-old man in his home.  
 
Barnhill has not demonstrated that counsel’s performance was deficient, and 
therefore, we need not determine the prejudice prong.  See Strickland.   
Interviewing Jurors 
Barnhill argues that rule 4-3.5(d)(4) of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar 
and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.575 violate his constitutional right of 
equal protection and deny him adequate assistance of counsel in pursuing his 
postconviction remedies.  The State argues this issue is procedurally barred 
because it was not raised on direct appeal.  The State also argues that Barnhill fails 
to identify a specific incident of juror misconduct.  We deny relief on this issue 
consistent with our prior decisions which have found that rule 4-3.5(d)(4) and rule 
3.575, which collectively restrict an attorney’s ability to interview jurors after trial, 
 
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do not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights.  See Power v. State, 886 So. 2d 
952, 957 (Fla. 2004); Sweet v. Moore, 822 So. 2d 1269, 1274 (Fla. 2002); Johnson 
v. State, 804 So. 2d 1218, 1225 (Fla. 2001).  
Execution by Lethal Injection 
Barnhill argues lethal injection is cruel and unusual punishment in violation 
of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.  This Court has upheld the 
constitutionality of lethal injection in Florida after a full evidentiary hearing in 
Sims v. State, 754 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 2000).  Subsequently, the Court rejected similar 
challenges to both the lethal injection statute and the execution protocol.  Diaz v. 
State, 945 So. 2d 1136, 1144-45 (Fla.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 850 (2006); Rolling 
v. State, 944 So. 2d 176, 179 (Fla.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 466 (2006); Rutherford 
v. State, 926 So. 2d 1100, 1113-14 (Fla.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1160 (2006); Hill 
v. State, 921 So. 2d 579, 582-83 (Fla.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1219 (2006). 
However, because there is ongoing litigation concerning Florida’s lethal 
injection protocol as a result of the execution of Angel Diaz, we deny Barnhill 
relief on this claim without prejudice to pursue any available remedies he may 
have in the appropriate trial court. 
Jury Instructions 
Barnhill argues the asserted jury instructions were in violation of the Fifth, 
Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments by diminishing the jury’s 
 
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responsibility, shifting the burden of proof to Barnhill, and were premised on 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad aggravators.  Additionally, Barnhill argues 
counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not litigating and preserving these 
issues.  We deny relief because this Court has repeatedly held the standard jury 
instructions fully advise the jury of the importance of its role, correctly state the 
law, and do not denigrate the role of the jury.4  See Miller v. State, 926 So. 2d 
1243, 1257 (Fla. 2006) (rejecting the claim that the jury instructions dilute the 
jury’s sense of responsibility); Rodriguez v. State, 919 So. 2d 1252, 1280 (Fla. 
2005) (rejecting the claim that the standard jury instructions impermissibly shift 
the burden to the defendant to prove that death is not the appropriate sentence); 
Card v. State, 803 So. 2d 613, 628 (Fla. 2001) (finding the decision in Caldwell v. 
Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), not applicable in Florida); Brown v. State, 721 
So. 2d 274, 283 (Fla. 1998) (finding the standard jury instructions fully advise the 
jury of the importance of its role, correctly state the law, and do not denigrate the 
role of the jury); San Martin v. State, 705 So. 2d 1337, 1350 n.5 (Fla. 1997) 
(concluding that the weighing provisions of Florida’s death penalty statute and the 
                                          
 
 
4.  Because we are denying relief on the merits of this claim, counsel cannot 
be ineffective for failing to object to jury instructions which this Court has upheld 
against the constitutional challenges being asserted here.  See, e.g., Thomas v. 
State, 838 So. 2d 535, 541 (Fla. 2003). 
 
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accompanying jury instructions do not unconstitutionally shift the burden of 
proof).5  
Cumulative Errors 
Barnhill argues the repeated instances of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
flawed jury instructions, and an unconstitutional process cumulatively deprived 
him of a fundamentally fair trial.  Because all of the allegations of individual legal 
error are without merit, a cumulative error argument based upon these errors must 
also fail.  The instances of ineffective assistance of counsel, flawed jury 
instructions, and unconstitutional process as alleged by Barnhill are without merit.  
See Griffin v. State, 866 So. 2d 1, 22 (Fla. 2003) (holding that a cumulative error 
claim must fail where individual claims of error alleged are either procedurally 
barred or without merit).6  
Habeas Corpus Claim 
Incompetency at Time of Execution 
Barnhill concedes that his claim involving competency to be executed is not 
ripe for review as he has not yet been found incompetent and a death warrant has 
                                          
 
 
5.  Barnhill litigated the issue concerning the jury instructions on the 
aggravating circumstances on his direct appeal and cannot relitigate the issue on 
postconviction.  See Barnhill, 834 So. 2d at 849-51. 
 
 
6.  Barnhill also makes an argument concerning the constitutionality of 
Florida’s capital sentencing scheme relying on Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 
(2002).  Because we have consistently denied relief on such claims, we do not 
address the issue any further.  
 
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not been signed.  He contends that he is only raising this issue for preservation 
purposes.  This Court has repeatedly found that no relief is warranted on similar 
claims.  See State v. Coney, 845 So. 2d 120, 137 n.19 (Fla. 2003) (rejecting the 
defendant’s claim that he is insane to be executed where he acknowledged that 
claim was not yet ripe and was being raised only for preservation purposes); Jones 
v. State, 845 So. 2d 55, 74 (Fla. 2003) (finding claim that defendant may be insane 
to be executed “not ripe for review” where defendant was not yet found 
incompetent and death warrant not yet been signed; noting that defendant made 
claim “simply to preserve it for review in the federal court system”); Hall v. 
Moore, 792 So. 2d 447, 450 (Fla. 2001) (stating that it is premature for a 
death-sentenced individual to present a claim of incompetency or insanity, with 
regard to his execution, if a death warrant has not been signed). 
Thus, Barnhill’s claim on this issue is denied.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Barnhill’s 
motion for postconviction relief and deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus. 
It is so ordered. 
 
LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and 
BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
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Two Cases: 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Seminole County,  
Kenneth R. Lester, Jr., Judge - Case No. 95-2932-CFA 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 
 
Bill Jennings, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Robert T. Strain, Assistant 
CCRC – Middle Region, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Barbara C. Davis, 
Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent