Title: STATE v FUGAR
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13337
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: September 22, 1976

No. 13337 I N THE SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 19 76 THE STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs - DENNIS F U G E R , Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Jack Green, Judge presiding Counsel. of Record : For Appellant: Curtis C. Cook argued, Hamilton, Montana For Respondent : Hon. Robert TJ. l~loodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Douglas Harkin, County Attorney, Hamilton, Montana Margaret A. Tonon argued, Deputy County Attorney, Hamilton, Montana Submitted: August 30, 1976 Decided: SEP 2 2 1976 Filed : $EP 2 . j 3 7 6 M r . J u s t i c e Wesley Castles delivered the Opinion of the Court. 1975 On May 2 3 , / ~ e n n i s Fuger was charged by Information i n Ravalli County with aggravated assault i n violation of section 94-5-202(1) ( a ) , R.C.M. 1947. After t r i a l by jury i n December 1975, he was found g u i l t y and sentenced t o ten years i n prison with a l l of it suspended except s i x months i n the Ravalli County j a i l . He appeals. Appellant presents three issues f o r review: 1) Did the s t a t e produce s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o enable the jury t o find t h a t the victim w a s placed i n "substantial r i s k 2) Did the evidence show a s a matter of l a w t h a t defendant's use of force against the victim was j u s t i f i e d as defense of another? Resolution of these two issues w i l l determine the r e s u l t of t h i s appeal. Appellant's t h i r d issue, whether a new t r i a l should have been granted or the judgment modified t o find him g u i l t y of only simple a s s a u l t , lacks merit i n view of our ruling on the f i r s t issue. The Information charged t h a t Fuger: "* * * purposely o r knowingly caused serious bodily injury t o DAVE DANIELS by kicking md beating the said DAVE DANIELS about the face and upper portion of the body * * *." This charge arose from a f i g h t occurring on the evening of April 26, 1975. Fuger and h i s cousin Ron Snell were riding in one pickup and Dave Daniels (the victim) and Diane Snell (Ron ~ n e l l ' s ex-wife) were riding i n another pickup. The two vehicles met on a narrow road and stopped. The f i g h t quickly followed. Fuger t e s t i f i e d t h a t Daniels knocked him unconscious and when he came t o he saw Daniels s i t t i n g on Ron Snell and heard Snell y e l l f o r help: "Dennis! He has got a knife!" Fuger said he kicked Daniels t o protect Snell from the knife. This version of the f i g h t was supported by the testimony of Ron Snell. Daniels, however, t e s t i f i e d t h a t he voluntarily gave up t h e knife before he was h i t o r kicked. Fuger contends the evidence was i n s u f f i c i e n t t o show Daniels faced a "substantial r i s k of death" a s required f o r a conviction f o r aggravated a s s a u l t . Section 94-5-202(1)(a), R.C.M. 1947, provides t h a t aggravated assault may be committed by causing "serious bodily injury t o another .I1 "Serious bodily injury" is defined by section 94-2-101(54), R.C.M. 1947, as "bodily injury which creates a substantial r i s k of death." Daniels was f i r s t treated i n the emergency room a t Daly Hospital i n Hamilton by D r . Robert Palmer and l a t e r transported t o Missoula f o r further examination and treatment. Appellant bases h i s argument on D r . Palmer's testimony t h a t - i n retrospect - Daniels was not i n "substantial r i s k of death" a t any time. Appellant concludes t h a t t h i s testimony precluded the jury from finding t o the contrary and therefore the g u i l t y verdict f o r aggravated assault was not supported by the evidence. However, D r . Palmer a l s o t e s t i f i e d on r e d i r e c t examination: "Q. D r . Palmer, j u s t one question; was it your opinion a t the time when you examined him t h a t due t o the nature of h i s i n j u r i e s he was i n a potentially dangerous s i t u a t i o n and was a t t h a t time facing a sub- s t a n t i a l r i s k of death? A. Yes, 1 think he was." The l e g i s l a t u r e has not defined "substantial r i s k of death", but it obviously means something more than "Bodily injury" which section 94-2-101(5), R.C.M. 1947, defines a s "physical pain, i l l n e s s o r any impairment of physical condition and includes mental i l l n e s s o r impairment . I 1 Injury which creates a "sub- s t a n t i a l r i s k of death" i s graver and more serious, and whether or not it has been established by the evidence is generally a question of f a c t t o be determined by the jury. Testimony a t t r i a l showed t h a t when Daniels w a s admitted t o the emergency room i n Hamilton he was i n a semi-conscious s t a t e with extensive bruises and swelling around the face. Further examination showed Daniels suffered a broken nose and a fractured palate. D r . Palmer a l s o t e s t i f i e d Daniels was transferred t o Missoula because t h e f a c i l i t i e s a t Hamilton were not equipped " t o handle seriously injured o r gravely injured head-type cases." N o serious complications i n f a c t developed a s a r e s u l t of Daniels' i n j u r i e s . However, the t e s t of "substantial r i s k of death" i s not whether t h e victim l i v e s o r . d i e s . People v. Martinez, Colo., 540 P.2d 1091, 1093. The evidence was s u f f i c i e n t t o enable the jury t o find t h a t Daniels' i n j u r i e s created a "substantial r i s k of death" . Appellant's second issue is whether h i s use of force against Daniels was j u s t i f i e d as defense of another. Section 94-3-102, R.C.M. 1947, s t a t e s : "A person is j u s t i f i e d i n the use of force o r t h r e a t t o use force against another when and t o the extent t h a t he reasonably believes t h a t such conduct is necessary t o defend himself o r another against such o t h e r ' s imminent use of unlawful force. However, he is j u s t i f i e d i n the use of force l i k e l y t o cause death o r serious bodily harm only i f he reasonably believes t h a t such force is necessary t o prevent imminent death o r serious bodily harm t o himself o r another, o r t o prevent the commission of a f o r c i b l e felony ." It i s undisputed t h a t Daniels was s i t t i n g on Ron Snell and holding a knife when Snell yelled f o r help. Appellant further t e s t i f i e d he thought Snell was i n great danger of being stabbed and he kicked Daniels only because he was afraid t o use h i s bare hands against the knife. A s pointed out previously, however, Daniels t e s t i f i e d he voluntarily surrendered the knife before he was kicked. Also, Snell t e s t i f i e d that Fuger kicked Daniels again a f t e r the fight was over and Daniels was lying i n the snow unable t o defend himself. The annotator's note t o section 94- 3-102, R.C.M. 1947, Montana Criminal Code, 1973, Annotated, Montana Criminal Law Commission, Prof. William F.Crowley, p. 127, states: ' I * * * The clause 'when and t o the extent he reasonably believes' pertains t o the proper occasion for the use of force which i s a question of fact for the jury. 'Is necessary to defend himself or another' refers t o the proper amount of force which may be used and remain justified---again a question t o be determined by the jury. * * * '' A s there was a conflict in the evidence, the issue of s e l f - defense was properly before the jury as the t r i e r of fact and Daniels' testimony, i f believed, was sufficient t o support the verdict. The judgment i s affirmed.