Title: Coughlin v. City of Topeka
Citation: 206 Kan. 552, 480 P.2d 91
Docket Number: 46,183
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: January 23, 1971

206 Kan. 552 (1971)
480 P.2d 91
E.J. and PATTY COUGHLIN, WALTER E. and VERA DeBOARD, RAY D. EWERS, G.W. HALLIDAY, VINCENT C. JR. and HARRIETT HALPIN, DR. JAMES E. and NORITA HASSELLE, MAURICE E. and JOAN HOCHARD, KATHERINE LUND, DR. WILLIAM and MARY JANE NICE, LOUISE L. O'NEIL, LYLE E. and HELEN T. PEARSON and DR. WILLIAM S. and ELEANOR E. SIMPSON, Appellees,
v.
THE CITY OF TOPEKA, a Municipal Corporation, the MAYOR and BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF TOPEKA, KANSAS and JACK C. McCARTER, Appellants.
No. 46,183

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed January 23, 1971.
Robert Ochs, of Topeka, argued the cause and Charles S. Fisher, Jr., James E. Benfer and Bruce C. Harrington, Assistant City Attorney, all of Topeka, were with him on the brief for appellants.
John E. Wilkinson, of Topeka, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FROMME, J.:
The city governing body of Topeka rezoned a portion of one block of a residential area lying south of Eighth street and between Buchanan street on the east and Lincoln street on the west to accommodate construction of a medical office facility which could eventually take care of fourteen doctors.
A group of homeowners near the area brought an action under K.S.A. 12-712 to test the reasonableness of the rezoning ordinance. The district court after hearing the evidence found the action of the governing body of the city and the ordinance to be unreasonable and entered an order enjoining the city from publishing and enforcing the ordinance.
The city and the developer have appealed.
The rules of law which govern this type of proceeding have been *553 set forth and discussed in many of our recent decisions including Bodine v. City of Overland Park, 198 Kan. 371, 424 P.2d 513; Arkenberg v. City of Topeka, 197 Kan. 731, 421 P.2d 213; Keeney v. City of Overland Park, 203 Kan. 389, 454 P.2d 456 and Waterstradt v. Board of Commissioners, 203 Kan. 317, 454 P.2d 445.)
In Bodine and Keeney it was pointed out that in determining reasonableness the trial court may not substitute its judgment for that of the governing body and should not declare the action of the governing body unreasonable unless clearly compelled to do so by the evidence. The presumption exists that the governing body acted reasonably, and it is incumbent upon those attacking its action to show the unreasonableness thereof.
In Bodine and Arkenberg it was declared that a comprehensive zoning plan prepared and recommended by the planning commission, as contemplated in K.S.A. 1965 Supp. 12-708, does not obligate the governing body of the city to zone property in accordance with the plan.
In Arkenberg and Waterstradt it was held that zoning is not to be based upon a plebiscite of the neighbors, although their interests are to be considered, for the final decision of the governing body should be governed by a basic consideration of the benefit or harm involved to the community at large.
In determining reasonableness or lack of it in zoning cases our court has indicated that action which is capricious, arbitrary or oppressive is unreasonable in the sense that term is used in K.S.A. 12-712. When the action of the city governing body in rezoning an established residential area is taken without regard to the benefit or harm involved to the community at large and is so wide of the mark as to be outside the realm of fair debate the action of the governing body and the ordinance are unreasonable.
At the trial the homeowners introduced the testimony of Leland R. Edmonds, associate professor of planning at Kansas State University. He has impressive credentials in the field of city and area planning. He testified extensively concerning this neighborhood, the comprehensive land use plan of the city recommended by the planning commission and the five year neighborhood analysis of this area. There was testimony from various homeowners which indicated that, although the houses in the area were from 40 to 60 years old, several of the homes had been purchased during the *554 past seven years at substantial prices (from $25,000 to $32,500) for residential purposes.
The district court made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
"CONCLUSION OF LAW
We have studied the record before us and are convinced the court's findings are adequately supported by a preponderance of the evidence. We are further convinced that these findings compel the court's conclusion that the action of the governing body of the city of Topeka in rezoning this small residential area was unreasonable.
None of the city commissioners testified at the trial. The only testimony in support of the rezoning was by Robert Lee who is a real estate broker engaged in the appraisal and investment business in the city of Topeka. His testimony was largely directed toward establishing that the rezoning was justified because it would result in permitting the highest and best use of this residential area. "Highest and best use" is only one of the criteria to be considered. If this were the only criteria no residential district could withstand an attempt to rezone for commercial purposes.
In addition to medical office facilities, "E" multiple zoning permits the following additional uses: radio broadcasting studios; banks; savings and loan businesses; business or commercial schools; dancing or music academies; office buildings; insurance offices; psychiatric, surgical and diagnostic clinics and analytical research and testing laboratories.
*557 The appellants contend the court erroneously assumed that the city was bound by the comprehensive land use plan recommended by the planning commission. Such a plan does not obligate or bind the city. (See Bodine v. City of Overland Park, supra, and Arkenberg v. City of Topeka, supra.)
A city is not unalterably bound by a comprehensive land use plan. This is true whether the plan is merely recommended to the city or adopted by ordinance. The city must be free to deviate from such a plan when the essential nature of a neighborhood changes substantially. (See Arkenberg v. City of Topeka, supra.) It is inherent in the purpose and philosophy behind zoning regulations that the governing body remain free to act in the best interests of the community at large. However, a planning commission does act in an advisory capacity to the city governing body, and their recommendations on a comprehensive land use plan as well as their disapproval of zoning changes are entitled to some weight and consideration by the city governing body. As we read and interpret the trial court's findings and its memorandum opinion it did not assume that the city was unalterably bound by the comprehensive land use plan or by the planning commission's disapproval in this zoning change.
The appellants further complain of the trial court's finding 19 that the ordinance would constitute "spot zoning".
"Spot zoning" is a descriptive term rather than a legal term and spot zoning as such is not necessarily invalid. Its validity depends upon the facts and circumstances appearing in each case. (Bucholz v. City of Omaha, 174 Nebr. 862, 120 N.W.2d 270.) "Spot zoning" generally refers to the singling out of a small parcel of land for use classified differently from the surrounding area, primarily for the benefit of the owner of the property so zoned and to the detriment of the area and other owners therein. In such a case the zoning may be declared unreasonable and invalid.
In 8 McQuillin Mun. Corp. (3rd Ed.), Zoning, § 25.83 it is said:
In Cassel v. City of Baltimore, 195 Md. 348, 73 A.2d 486 it was stated:
Considering the relevant findings of fact made by the trial court we believe that the proposed ordinance would have devoted a portion of one block in this residential area to a use inconsistent with the use to which the rest of the district is restricted and would have constituted not only spot zoning but also arbitrary and unreasonable spot zoning.
Some question has been raised concerning the testimony of a witness who testified concerning the ownership and occupancy of three of the houses located in this general area. Assuming without deciding that this testimony was hearsay and should not have been admitted we cannot say prejudicial error was committed in view of the other evidence in the record supporting the trial court's conclusions. It does not affirmatively appear to have prejudicially affected the substantial rights of the appellants. (See K.S.A. 60-2105.)
Judgment is affirmed.
SCHROEDER, J., not participating.