Title: PEOPLE OF MI V CHARLES DUNBAR
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 116976
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: April 3, 2001

____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________ 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED APRIL 3, 2001  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v  
No. 116976  
CHARLES M. DUNBAR,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
PER CURIAM  
Faced with an adverse ruling that would have required a  
police officer to provide information that likely would have  
allowed the accused to determine the identity of the  
confidential informant in his case, the assistant prosecuting  
attorney moved to dismiss during the preliminary examination.  
At a second examination, a different judge ruled in the  
prosecution’s favor on the disputed point and bound the  
defendant over for trial.  The circuit court dismissed this  
 
criminal prosecution on the ground that the defendant was  
denied due process of law.  The Court of Appeals affirmed. We  
reverse. MCR 7.302(F)(1).  
I  
A confidential informant told a Muskegon police officer  
that the defendant possessed cocaine.1  Later that day, the  
officer found the defendant walking along a local street.  The  
officer approached the defendant, telling him to remove his  
hands from his pockets.  At first, the defendant removed only  
one hand.  Told to remove his other hand, the defendant did  
so, grasping plastic bags that later were found to contain  
drugs. The defendant was arrested and charged with two drug  
offenses.2  
A visiting judge convened a preliminary examination,3 at  
which the officer testified regarding the facts set forth  
1 This case has not been tried. 
These introductory 
facts, which we offer to explain the context of later rulings, 
are taken from the preliminary examination transcripts.  
2 The defendant is charged with possession of less than  
50 grams of cocaine with intent to deliver, and with 
possession of marijuana with intent to deliver. 
MCL  
333.7401(2)(a)(iv), (d)(iii); 
MSA 
14.15(7401)(2)(a)(iv), 
(d)(iii).  On the basis of a 1993 conviction for attempted 
delivery of less than 50 grams, the prosecuting attorney also 
gave notice that the defendant is subject to an enhanced 
sentence. MCL 769.10; MSA 28.1082.  
 On the date initially set for examination, the 
defendant asked for appointment of counsel, which led to an 
adjournment.
 On the date to which the examination was  
adjourned, the assigned judge was in another state.  Thus, the 
visiting judge presided.  
2  
3
 
 
above.  On cross-examination, as defense counsel asked the  
officer about the informant, the following occurred:  
Q. . . . On this particular day, on January 
27th, 
1999, 
[the 
day 
the 
officer 
arrested  
defendant] did you personally have contact with 
this person [the confidential informant]?  
A.  Yes I did.  
Q.  And what time did the informant indicate  
to you the information that he conveyed.  
[Assistant Prosecutor]: 
Your Honor, I’d  
object to that. 
Time isn’t relevant in this  
matter.
 There is case law that protects the 
confidentiality of a confidential informant by not 
requiring the specifics of time and location to be 
divulged.  And, again, if, obviously, the Defendant 
was charged with-
--with the actions that occurred  
when the CI was present, then that would become 
relevant, but that’s not the case at this point.  
The Court: 
Well, I find the contrary to be  
true.
 The proximity of the time that he was 
informed that we have an alleged felon running 
around here, I think, is important as to whether he 
acted fortuitously and propitiously at the time.  
[Assistant Prosecutor]: 
Your Honor, again, 
I’d ask the Court to allow me to supply case law, 
because, again, that could jeopardize . . .  
The Court: 
Let’s just go. 
Let’s just  
proceed.  
[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, I . . .  
[Assistant Prosecutor]: 
Your Honor, the  
People are moving to dismiss the case, then, your 
Honor, if you’re going to force our hand on that. 
We will move to dismiss.  
The Court: 
I’m not forcing your hand on  
anything.  
[Assistant Prosecutor]: Maybe I misunderstood 
the Court, then. Is the Court . . .  
3  
 
The Court: 
No. 
Im just saying there is a 
matter-
--Does he have probable cause to make contact 
with him-
--Proximity of time. That is an element.  
[Assistant Prosecutor]: He’s indicated it was  
that day, your Honor. I don’t think he has to get 
to within the hour.  
The Court: 
Well, he didn’t say that.[4]  We  
never got around to his answering that question.  
[Assistant Prosecutor]:  He did say on direct, 
your Honor.  
The Court: 
No. 
He never got around to 
answering [defense counsel’s] question. [Defense 
counsel] is interested in knowing, first, it was on 
that day what time that day, “How long before you 
made the arrest.” I think he has a right to know  
that.  
[Assistant Prosecutor]:  I am going to move to 
situation-
--I would ask the Court, your Honor, to 
dismiss the case, your Honor.
force this officer to do that. 
I am not going to 
The Court: Well . . . 
[Assistant Prosecutor]: 
Again, in this 
allow me to supply case law. 
This is a serious  
felon.
 We’ve also got a situation where a  
confidential informant could be jeopardized-
--their  
safety.
 Individuals that are involved in drug 
trade often, your Honor, will intimidate and even 
physically injure confidential informants. I would  
think it would be appropriate for the Court to at 
least look at our case law. 
I think it supports 
the position . . .  
The Court: Well, why don’t you come prepared 
with it.  
[Defense Counsel]: Well, your Honor, I guess 
in response, the Prosecutor . . .  
4 This was in error, as the officer had testified that he 
had spoken with the informant earlier in the day that he 
arrested the defendant.  
4  
 
 
 
 
  
[Assistant Prosecutor]:  Five minutes is all I  
need, your Honor.  
[Defense Counsel]: . . . the Prosecutor has 
indicated that-
--and I think the Court is aware that  
his particular information-
--and I don’t question 
that there is case law that suggests that there are 
limits on Defense’s ability to probe into who and 
where and when and what a confidential informant  
is.  My problem is is that that is the sole basis 
for the officer’s contact with Mr. Dunbar in this  
case, and if the Prosecutor, as the Court has just 
indicated, knowing that long ago, chooses not to 
disclose, then he certainly is free to dismiss, and 
we don’t object.  
[Assistant Prosecutor]: Judge, I’m asking for 
five minutes to supply the Court with the case law.  
The Court: I’m not interested. Dismiss it, 
then.  
[Assistant Prosecutor]: 
Your Honor, the  
People in this matter will move to dismiss.  
The Court: All right. Dismiss it and start  
it all over again.  
Later that day, the prosecuting attorney issued a new  
complaint and obtained a new warrant. Thirteen days later, a  
second preliminary examination was conducted by a different  
judge.5  
5 It is not clear how the case came to the courtroom of  
the second district judge. 
When the parties discussed the 
matter, the second judge offered to transfer the case back to 
the assigned judge. Defense counsel observed, however, that 
the assigned judge had not presided at the first examination, 
so the second examination would be conducted by a new judge in 
either event (apparently there was no thought of bringing back 
the visiting judge to hear this matter again).  In response to 
the offer to move the case back to the assigned judge, defense 
counsel said, “If we’re going to get a new judge, hopefully it 
shouldn’t matter which one.” 
Asked what he wanted to do, 
defense counsel replied, “Let’s go.” 
The matter was then  
heard by the second judge.  
5  
 
The second examination proceeded in nearly identical  
fashion to the point where defense counsel6 again asked when  
the officer had met with the confidential informant.  When the  
assistant prosecutor interposed the same objection, a similar  
argument ensued.  
The court eventually ruled that defense counsel could  
inquire whether the conversation had occurred within the  
preceding eight hours, but the court would not allow the  
questioning to be more specific than that.  At the conclusion  
of the preliminary examination, the defendant was bound over  
for trial.  
In circuit court, the defendant filed a motion to  
suppress and to quash. He argued that evidence taken at the  
time of the arrest should be suppressed because there was  
insufficient cause for the stop, that he should not have been  
bound 
over 
for 
trial 
because there was insufficient admissible  
evidence, and that the second examination, following the  
dismissal during the first, was a denial of due process.  
The circuit court granted the motion to quash, agreeing  
that the defendant had been denied due process. The court’s  
oral opinion is well summarized in its ensuing order:  
6 
 
At 
the 
second 
examination, 
the 
defendant 
was  
represented by a partner of the lawyer who represented him at 
the first. The assistant prosecuting attorney was also new. 
Both lawyers, however, were familiar with what had occurred at 
the first examination.  
6  
  
Defendant’s motion to quash the bindover is 
granted for the reason that the defendant’s United 
States Fourth [sic] Amendment right to due process 
of law was violated when the prosecutor dismissed 
the case during a preliminary examination and 
immediately reauthorized the same complaint causing 
the case to be assigned to a different judge. The  
court finds that the prosecutor did so to avoid an 
adverse ruling and did no further investigation. 
Further the court finds the prosecutor presented 
the same evidence at the second preliminary 
examination, this time obtaining a favorable  
result.  
The court finds the prosecutor’s actions to be 
inappropriate harassment or forum shopping pursuant 
to People v George, 114 Mich App 204; 318 NW2d 666 
(1982), lv den 414 Mich 931 (1982), and other, 
later, cases noted in the transcript of the 8/4/99 
hearing.  Therefore the case is dismissed and the  
defendant discharged.  
The prosecuting attorney appealed, but the Court of  
Appeals affirmed.7  
In the wake of that affirmance, the prosecuting attorney  
has applied to this Court for leave to appeal.  
II  
MCR 6.110 governs preliminary examinations.  Subrule (F)  
provides:  
If, after considering the evidence, the court 
determines that probable cause does not exist to 
believe either that an offense has been committed  
or that the defendant committed it, the court must 
discharge the defendant without prejudice to the 
prosecutor initiating a subsequent prosecution for 
the same offense. 
Except as provided in MCR  
7 
 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued May 9, 2000 
(Docket No. 221978).  
7  
 
 
 
8.111(C),[8] the subsequent preliminary examination 
must be held before the same judicial officer and 
the prosecutor must present additional evidence to 
support the charge.  
Plainly, MCR 6.110(F) is silent on the question whether  
it is permissible to conduct a subsequent preliminary  
examination where an initial examination has resulted in a  
dismissal that occurs before the district court makes a  
determination whether there is probable cause.9  
In the present case, the Court of Appeals noted the  
inapplicability of the rule, and then based its decision on  
principles drawn from its own prior decisions:  
In addition to the provisions of the court 
rule, 
subjecting 
a 
defendant 
to 
repeated 
preliminary examinations violates due process if 
the prosecutor attempts to harass the defendant or 
engage in judge-shopping.  People v Robbins, 223  
Mich App 355; 566 NW2d 49 (1997). 
Among the 
factors to be considered in determining whether a  
8  
If a judge is disqualified or for other good 
cause cannot undertake an assigned case, the chief 
judge may reassign it to another judge by a written 
order stating the reason. To the extent feasible, 
the alternate judge should be selected by lot.  The  
chief judge shall file the order with the trial 
court clerk and have the clerk notify the attorneys 
of record.  The chief judge may also designate a 
judge to act temporarily until a case is reassigned 
or during a temporary absence of a judge to whom a 
case has been assigned. [MCR 8.111(C).]  
9 Because the court rule does not address the situation  
at hand, the dissent’s claim that we are undermining the court 
rule by indirection is without merit.  However, concomitant  
with 
issuance 
of 
this 
opinion, 
we 
are 
opening 
an  
administrative 
file 
to consider whether to revise MCR 6.110(F) 
to include situations where a dismissal occurs during a 
preliminary examination.  
8  
  
 
 
due 
process 
violation 
has 
occurred 
are 
the  
reinstitution 
of 
charges 
without 
additional, 
noncumulative evidence not introduced at the first  
preliminary examination, the reinstitution of  
charges to harass, and judge-shopping to obtain a 
favorable ruling.  People v Vargo, 139 Mich App 
573, 578; 362 NW2d 840 (1984).  
In Robbins, the first preliminary examination went  
through to conclusion, with the magistrate ruling that the  
evidence 
was 
insufficient for a bindover.  Additional evidence  
was presented at a second examination, and the defendant was  
then bound over for trial.  On appeal, the Court of Appeals  
explained that MCR 6.110(F) allows a second preliminary  
examination if “additional” evidence—which need not be newly  
encourage a prosecutor to subject a defendant to 
discovered—is presented at the second examination.  The 
Robbins panel added: 
Our holding should not be construed to 
repeated preliminary examinations.  We reaffirm  
this Court’s holding that subjecting a defendant to 
repeated preliminary examinations violates due  
process if the prosecutor attempts to harass the 
defendant or engage in “judge-shopping.” People v  
Stafford, 168 Mich App 247, 251; 423 NW2d 634  
(1988);[10] People v Vargo, 139 Mich App 573, 578;  
10 
In 
Stafford, 
the defendant was charged with open murder 
and bound over on a charge of involuntary manslaughter. The  
prosecuting attorney moved the circuit court to remand the 
case to district court for further examination.  The motion  
was granted and, after the second examination, the defendant 
was bound over on a charge of second-degree murder. After a  
jury found her guilty of manslaughter, she appealed.  The  
Court of Appeals found the remand erroneous and further held 
that the evidence was insufficient for the second-degree 
murder bindover.  This Court agreed that it was error to bind 
the defendant over on the second-degree murder charge, and 
thus did not reach the question whether the remand had been 
proper. People v Stafford, 434 Mich 125, 132; 450 NW2d 559  
9  
 
 
362 NW2d 840 (1984).[11]  [223 Mich App 363.]  
Stating its reliance on those principles, the instant  
Court of Appeals panel reached the following conclusion  
regarding the case before us today:  
The circuit court did not clearly err in 
finding that defendant’s due process rights were 
violated in this case.  Where the prosecutor did 
not present any additional evidence, and did not 
cite any legal authority for his argument, he 
presented exactly the same case to two different 
judges.
 The circuit court could reasonably 
conclude 
that 
the 
prosecutor 
engaged 
in  
impermissible judge-shopping.  Id.; People v  
George, 114 Mich App 204; 318 NW2d 666 (1982).[12]  
(1990).  
11 The magistrate in Vargo dismissed the charge after a  
preliminary examination. 
The prosecutor issued a new  
complaint and reinstituted the charge.  Additional evidence  
was presented at the second examination, which took place 
before the same judge. The Court of Appeals found no denial 
of due process, saying that, “[w]hile the new evidence could 
have 
been 
introduced 
at the first preliminary examination, the 
failure to do so was more a product of neglect than a  
deliberate attempt to harass defendant.” 139 Mich App 578.  
12 The opening paragraph of George summarizes the case:  
When a trial judge has found no probable cause 
to hold a defendant for trial and the prosecutor 
has appealed that decision, may the prosecutor seek 
to dismiss the appeal and bring new charges against 
the defendant when he has discovered no new  
evidence?  We believe that, on the facts of this 
case, this procedure violates a defendant’s right 
to due process of law. 114 Mich App 206.  
The Court of Appeals said in George that a second preliminary 
examination was not double jeopardy, and did not violate 
principles of res judicata or collateral estoppel.  In finding 
a due process violation, however, the Court of Appeals 
observed that “these defendants were subjected to judge 
shopping.” 114 Mich App 211.  
10  
 
III  
The issue in this case is whether the circuit court erred  
in quashing the information on the legal ground that  
defendant’s due process rights were violated as a result of  
prosecutorial misconduct. 
Thus, this case presents a  
constitutional question which we review de novo.  People v  
Sierb, 456 Mich 519, 522; 581 NW2d 219 (1998).  
IV  
The circuit court and the Court of Appeals have premised  
their rulings on the assumption that the assistant prosecutor  
was 
engaged 
in 
impermissible judge-shopping.  A careful review  
of the record, however, does not support that conclusion.  The  
assistant prosecutor’s stated intent was to avoid divulging  
the identity of a confidential informant, lest the informant  
come to harm.  When the court overruled the prosecutor’s  
objection, the prosecutor had no choice but to dismiss the  
charges or to require the officer to provide information that  
likely would allow the defendant to determine the identity of  
the confidential informant.  Absent evidence of pretext, or an  
underlying contrary motive, nothing in the record suggests  
that the dismissal was designed to accomplish anything other  
than the prosecutor’s stated intent.  
We note that the prosecutor did not immediately seek to  
dismiss the case when the judge indicated that he thought  
defense counsel was entitled to have the police officer  
11  
specifically indicate when he had spoken to the confidential  
informant.  Faced with this preliminary ruling, the assistant  
prosecutor merely asked the court for a five-minute recess so  
he could locate authority in support of his position.  This  
does not suggest that the assistant prosecutor intended to  
engage in judge-shopping.  Moreover, the reaction of the judge  
to the assistant prosecutor’s statement that he would dismiss  
if he could not have five minutes to locate the authority,  
does not suggest that the judge believed the matter was being  
set up for judge-shopping to occur. 
Indeed, the judge  
specifically indicated that the prosecutor could dismiss the  
case and “start it all over again.” Finally, as the circuit  
judge recognized, there is no evidence that the assistant  
prosecutor knew the identity of the second judge. Given the  
fact that the visiting judge had visited with some regularity,  
it was by no means certain that a dismissal would result in  
the case being heard by a different judge.  
Accordingly, there is no record evidence to support the  
circuit court’s determination that the assistant prosecutor  
sought a dismissal of the charges in hope of obtaining a more  
favorable substantive result before a different judge.  Nor is  
there any reason to assume the assistant prosecutor, an  
officer of the court, was not telling the truth when he  
12  
 
  
explained his reasons for the dismissal.13 
Because the  
assistant prosecutor’s apparent objective was to prevent the  
disclosure 
of 
the 
confidential 
informant’s 
identity, 
the 
cases  
relied on by the circuit court and Court of Appeals do not  
support the decision to dismiss this prosecution. 
A  
prosecutor who seeks dismissal, under circumstances such as  
these, is simply not “judge-shopping.”14  
13 All licensed attorneys in Michigan are subject to the 
following provisions intended to ensure candor:  
(1) 
this 
state’s licensure of attorneys, MCL 600.901; MSA 
27A.901, provides that the members of the State Bar of 
Michigan are officers of the courts of this state, and in 
order to obtain a license to practice law one must prove to 
the satisfaction of the Board of Law Examiners that one is “a  
person of good moral character,” MCL 600.934(1); MSA  
27A.934(1), which is defined to mean “the propensity on the 
part of the person to serve the public in the licensed area in 
a fair, honest, and open manner,” MCL 338.41; MSA 18.1208(1);  
(2) the solemn oath, as prescribed by this Court pursuant 
to MCL 600.913; MSA 27A.913, taken by a lawyer before a 
Michigan judge upon admission to the bar, wherein the  
applicant solemnly swears never to mislead the judge or jury 
by any artifice or false statement of fact or law;  
(3) MRPC 3.3, which provides that “[a] lawyer shall not 
knowingly make a false statement of material fact or law to a 
tribunal”; and  
(4) MCR 9.103(A), which provides that a license to 
practice law “is a continuing proclamation by the Supreme 
Court that the holder is fit to be entrusted with professional 
and judicial matters and to aid in the administration of 
justice as an attorney and counselor and as an officer of the 
court.”  
Therefore, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we 
will accept a licensed attorney’s assertion to a court.  
14 The dissent, believing defendant’s due process rights 
were violated, would affirm a dismissal of all charges against  
13  
 
 
 
 
 
For these reasons, we reverse the judgments of the Court  
of Appeals and the circuit court, and reinstate the bindover  
decision of the district court.  We remand this case to  
circuit 
court 
for 
further proceedings, including a decision on  
the defendant’s motion to suppress.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and WEAVER, TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ.,  
concurred.  
defendant.  We question that this remedy would be appropriate 
even if we were persuaded that the assistant prosecutor had 
engaged in judge-shopping.  In such a situation, we likely 
would remand to the Court of Appeals to determine whether the 
proper remedy would be continuation of the original 
examination 
before 
the original judge, rather than a dismissal 
with prejudice, inasmuch as jeopardy had not attached.  
14  
___________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
No. 116976  
CHARLES M. DUNBAR,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
KELLY, J. (dissenting).  
I would affirm the decisions of both the Court of Appeals  
and the circuit court. The prosecution's initiation of a  
second preliminary examination, without introducing new  
evidence, violated defendant's due process right to a fair  
proceeding.  
A  
The prosecution brings an issue of first impression to  
this Court, although the Court of Appeals has addressed it  
  
 
 
  
 
 
several times.1 The prosecution filed a criminal action  
against defendant Dunbar a second time with no new evidence  
after having obtained dismissal of an identical action during  
the preliminary examination.  When presented with a similar  
factual situation, the Court of Appeals has held consistently  
that it constitutes judge-shopping in violation of the  
accused's right to due process.  
Among 
the 
factors 
to 
be 
considered 
in  
determining whether a due process violation has 
occurred are the reinstitution of charges without 
additional, noncumulative evidence not introduced 
at 
the 
first 
preliminary 
examination, 
the  
reinstitution of charges to harass and judge 
shopping to obtain a favorable ruling.[2]  
This case is factually similar to People v Walls, supra.  
In Walls, the prosecution wished to present a mother's  
testimony 
reciting 
statements 
that 
her 
three-year-old 
daughter  
had made to her. Id. at 693. At the first preliminary  
examination, 
the 
magistrate 
admitted 
the 
statements.  
However,  
the circuit judge, after ruling the statements inadmissible,  
granted 
defendant's 
motion to quash the testimony and remanded  
the case to the magistrate. Id.  
1  
People v George, 114 Mich App 204; 318 NW2d 666  
(1982); People v Walls, 117 Mich App 691; 324 NW2d 136 (1982);  
People v Vargo, 139 Mich App 573; 362 NW2d 840 (1984); People  
v Turmon, 128 Mich App 417; 340 NW2d 110 (1983); People v  
Starlard, 153 Mich App 151; 395 NW2d 41 (1986); People v  
Stafford, 168 Mich App 247; 423 NW2d 634 (1988).  
2  
Vargo, supra at 578, citing George, supra; Turmon,  
supra; and Walls, supra.  
2  
 
 
A 
second 
preliminary 
examination 
was 
held. 
The  
prosecution, apparently assessing that it would be unable to  
gain admission of the mother's testimony, secured a dismissal  
of the case. Id.  
It then refiled the same charges against the defendant.  
Id. at 694. A third preliminary examination was held, this  
time before a different magistrate who, notwithstanding the  
circuit 
judge's 
earlier 
ruling, 
admitted 
the 
hearsay  
statements. Id. A second circuit judge found a violation of  
due process. The Court of Appeals agreed:  
A clearer case of judge shopping does not come  
to mind. Rather than appeal the unfavorable  
evidentiary ruling, a remedy available to the 
prosecutor, MCL 770.12(1)(c); MSA 28.1109(1)(c) 
[see 1977 PA 34], the prosecutor here requested 
dismissal and started all over again. He thereby 
freed the proceedings of the unfavorable ruling. 
The issue of the tender-years exception to the 
hearsay rule could be reargued before a different 
judge with the chance that this new judge might be 
persuaded by the prosecutor's argument. [Id. at  
697.]  
Similarly, the prosecution in the instant case dismissed  
the case after the magistrate ruled against it on an  
evidentiary 
matter. 
When 
the 
magistrate 
denied 
the 
prosecution  
a recess to research case law supporting its position, it  
moved to dismiss, and the motion was granted.  
The prosecution immediately refiled the charges. At the  
second preliminary examination, another prosecuting attorney  
presented the same case and the same witness. Notably, he did  
3  
 
not come prepared with the case law his colleague needed  
during the first preliminary examination. In fact, he  
requested a short break during the proceedings to find the  
case law. This time, however, the magistrate ruled in his  
favor, admitting the testimony.  
Like the prosecutor in Walls, the prosecutor in this case  
"freed the proceedings of the unfavorable ruling," then  
reargued it before a new judge.  Walls, supra at 697. 
In  
granting defendant Dunbar's motion to quash the bindover, the  
circuit 
judge 
determined that "the prosecutor felt he couldn't  
do any worse" than at the first preliminary examination and  
"it was best to take his chances with . . . a different judge  
. . . ." Also, the magistrate found it persuasive that the  
prosecutor had not appeared with any new case law. "He was in  
the exactly the same spot, uttering almost the same words" as  
had the first prosecutor.  
The prosecution asserts that it was motivated by a desire  
to protect the identity of a confidential informant.  Although  
the end is laudable, without dispute, the prosecution was not  
entitled to judge-shop to accomplish it.  
If the prosecution assessed that dismissal of the case  
was necessary to protect the confidential informant, then  
refiling it was not a good option.  If its concern was simply  
that the evidentiary ruling was erroneous, it should have  
4  
 
 
taken an appeal from it.  A fair reading of the record  
supports the conclusion that what the prosecution hoped to do  
in refiling was to convince a different judge to rule in its  
favor.  
B  
I agree with the circuit court and the Court of Appeals  
that MCR 6.110(F) does not apply directly to this case.3 It  
states:  
If, after considering the evidence, the court 
determines that probable cause does not exist to 
believe either that an offense has been committed  
or that the defendant committed it, the court must 
discharge the defendant without prejudice to the 
prosecutor initiating a subsequent prosecution for 
the same offense. Except as provided in MCR  
8.111(C), the subsequent preliminary examination 
must be held before the same judicial officer and 
the prosecutor must present additional evidence to 
support the charge.  
In its decision here, the majority by indirection undermines  
MCR 6.110(F).  It invites a prosecutor who senses an imminent  
unfavorable ruling at a preliminary examination to avoid the  
requirements of MCR 6.110(F) merely by moving to dismiss.  
Having obtained a dismissal, the prosecutor can then refile  
the charges, draw a different judge, and present the same case  
without introducing new evidence.  
3  Unpublished opinion per curiam (Docket No. 221978), p 
2.  
5  
 
Conclusion  
The prosecution in this case engaged in judge-shopping,  
violating defendant's due process rights. The circuit judge  
properly granted defendant's motion to quash the bindover.  
CAVANAGH, J., concurred with KELLY, J.  
6