Title: Commonwealth v. Honsch
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12420
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: January 30, 2024

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-12420 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ROBERT L. HONSCH. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     October 6, 2023. - January 30, 2024. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, & Wendlandt, JJ.1 
 
 
Homicide.  Evidence, Consciousness of guilt, Identity, Prior 
misconduct, Subsequent misconduct, Relevancy and 
materiality, Inflammatory evidence, Photograph, 
Fingerprints, Expert opinion, Qualification of expert 
witness, Third-party culprit, Voluntariness of statement, 
Hearsay.  Constitutional Law, Confrontation of witnesses.  
Witness, Expert.  Jury and Jurors.  Practice, Criminal, 
Capital case, Confrontation of witnesses, Assistance of 
counsel, Voluntariness of statement, Transcript of 
evidence, Hearsay, Redaction, Argument by prosecutor, 
Instructions to jury, Jury and jurors, Conduct of juror. 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on September 11, 2014. 
 
The case was tried before Constance M. Sweeney, J. 
 
 
Neil L. Fishman for the defendant. 
Travis H. Lynch, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
 
1 Justice Cypher participated in the deliberation on this 
case prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
LOWY, J.  In 1995, the bodies of the defendant's wife and 
daughter were found in secluded locations in Massachusetts and 
Connecticut, respectively.  More than twenty years later, the 
defendant was convicted in Massachusetts of murder in the first 
degree for the killing of his wife. 
In this direct appeal from his conviction, the defendant 
contends that (1) there was insufficient evidence to establish 
identity and deliberate premeditation; (2) the evidence of his 
daughter's murder was erroneously allowed in evidence; (3) the 
testimony of two latent print examiners was erroneously and 
unconstitutionally allowed in evidence; and (4) the defendant 
was unfairly precluded from demonstrating that there was a 
potential third-party culprit and that police failed to 
adequately investigate such a possibility.  The defendant lastly 
asks us to exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to 
order a new trial or direct the entry of a verdict of a lesser 
degree of guilt.  We conclude that there was no reversible error 
with respect to any issue raised by the defendant and, after 
plenary review, no cause to exercise our powers under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E.  We therefore affirm the defendant's conviction. 
1.  Background.  We recite the facts a rational jury could 
have found, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the Commonwealth, reserving certain details for our analysis of 
the issues. 
3 
 
a.  The discovery of Marcia's and Elizabeth's bodies.2  On 
September 28, 1995, police officers discovered a female body 
behind a strip mall in New Britain, Connecticut.  Police 
identified this body in 2014 as that of Elizabeth.  Her body was 
inside two overlapping garbage bags, and both it and the garbage 
bags were wrapped in two overlapping sleeping bags.  The cause 
of death was later found to be a gunshot wound to the head, 
resulting from a medium to large caliber bullet, and Elizabeth 
had likely been killed only a few hours before her body was 
discovered. 
On October 6, 1995, an individual camping in Tolland State 
Forest in Tolland discovered a different female body near the 
campsite's dump station.  Police identified this body in 2014 as 
that of Marcia.  The body was about nine feet down an embankment 
from a wooden guardrail.  One of the vertical portions of the 
guardrail had fresh damage from a projectile strike, and there 
was a large pool of blood in the paved area near the guardrail.  
Investigators recovered several items near the body, including a 
discharged .45 caliber cartridge casing, a blue and green towel 
with three holes in it, and an empty package of cigarettes.  
Based on the guardrail damage, the discharged casing found at 
the crime scene, and a bullet jacket discovered during the 
 
2 As the defendant, Marcia, and Elizabeth share a last name, 
we refer to Marcia and Elizabeth by their first names. 
4 
 
autopsy of the body, there was evidence of at least two 
gunshots, and possibly three, fired at Marcia.  The 
decomposition of Marcia's body indicated that Marcia died 
between September 22, 1995, and October 2, 1995.  The cause of 
death was a gunshot wound to the head, likely resulting from a 
medium to large caliber bullet. 
b.  The defendant's consciousness of guilt.  In September 
1995, the defendant was living with his wife, Marcia, and his 
teenage daughter, Elizabeth, in Brewster, New York.  The 
defendant and his wife were previously separated, but they had 
recently reunited. 
In late September 1995, the defendant visited one of 
Marcia's daughters from a previous marriage.  The defendant 
would not make eye contact with her and appeared disheveled and 
stressed.  He told the daughter that he had been given job 
offers in several countries, including England and Australia.  
Later during that visit, the defendant explained to the daughter 
that Marcia and Elizabeth had already moved to Australia.  The 
defendant also visited Marcia's son-in-law -- married to another 
one of Marcia's daughters from the previous marriage -– at 
around the same time.  The defendant told the son-in-law that he 
was moving to Australia and did not respond when the son-in-law 
inquired whether Marcia and Elizabeth knew about the planned 
move. 
5 
 
The defendant never applied for an Australian visa or 
visited Australia.  Instead, on November 24, 1995, the defendant 
moved to Africa.  He traveled throughout several countries in 
Africa for approximately four years and moved back to the United 
States during the summer of 1999.  Shortly thereafter, in 2000, 
he remarried and changed his surname to his new wife's surname.  
He and his new wife lived in various States before ultimately 
settling down in Ohio. 
Another one of Marcia's daughters discovered the 
defendant's location and, in November 2013, telephoned the 
defendant.  The defendant stated during this conversation that 
Marcia left him in Australia for another man, and Elizabeth 
stayed with them. 
In 2014, a relative of Marcia and Elizabeth filed a missing 
person's report for Marcia and Elizabeth with the New York State 
police.  The officer working on the report connected the two 
unknown female bodies from 1995 to Marcia's and Elizabeth's 
disappearance during the same time frame.  Marcia's and 
Elizabeth's family thereafter confirmed the identity of each 
victim:  Elizabeth (Connecticut) and Marcia (Massachusetts). 
Soon after Marcia and Elizabeth were identified, a 
Massachusetts State police trooper, along with officers from 
other jurisdictions, visited the defendant in Ohio.  The State 
police trooper asked if the defendant would speak with him and a 
6 
 
Connecticut law enforcement officer, and the defendant invited 
them both into his house.  The defendant told the State trooper 
that he had not seen Marcia or Elizabeth since 1995 and had 
moved to Africa some point after seeing Marcia and Elizabeth for 
the last time.  Other than that, he claimed to have no memory as 
to what occurred in 1995. 
Following this conversation, the State trooper took the 
defendant to the Wayne County sheriff's office in Ohio, provided 
the defendant with Miranda warnings, and again interviewed the 
defendant.  The defendant continued to claim that he had no 
memory of what occurred in 1995.  The defendant did admit, 
however, that the two sleeping bags found at Elizabeth's crime 
scene were his. 
c.  Forensic evidence.  Following the defendant's 
interviews, law enforcement obtained additional analyses of 
evidence from both Marcia's and Elizabeth's crime scenes.  The 
defendant's deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) profile was found to be 
consistent with the DNA profile from sperm cells detected inside 
Marcia's body.  Additionally, the defendant was not able to be 
excluded as the source of the hair taken from Elizabeth's crime 
scene, but he was excluded as a possible contributor to a 
mixture of DNA recovered from Elizabeth's fingernail scrapings, 
the sperm obtained from her underwear, and three DNA profiles 
obtained from the garbage bags covering Elizabeth.  Lastly, two 
7 
 
latent print examiners, Sarah K. Pivovar and Christopher M. 
Dolan, opined that three palm prints on the garbage bags 
covering Elizabeth originated from the defendant. 
d.  The defendant's conviction and sentencing.  The 
defendant was ultimately indicted in Massachusetts in connection 
with Marcia's death.  There was no indictment in Massachusetts 
in connection with the killing of Elizabeth, whose body was 
found out of State.  On June 12, 2017, following a jury trial, 
the defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree in 
connection with Marcia's death, based on the theory of 
deliberate premeditation.  He was sentenced to life without the 
possibility of parole. 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  At the 
close of the Commonwealth's case, the defendant moved for a 
required finding of not guilty, arguing that the evidence was 
insufficient to support a conviction of murder in the first 
degree.  The trial judge denied the motion as to the murder 
charge under a theory of deliberate premeditation.3  The 
defendant now reasserts the argument on appeal that the evidence 
presented by the Commonwealth was insufficient (i) to prove his 
 
3 The trial judge granted the defendant's motion as to the 
murder charge based on the theory of extreme atrocity or 
cruelty. 
8 
 
identity as Marcia's killer and (ii) to prove he killed Marcia 
with deliberate premeditation. 
When we review the denial of a motion for a required 
finding of not guilty, we "consider whether, after viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, any 
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."  Commonwealth v. 
MacCormack, 491 Mass. 848, 854 (2023).  The jury may primarily 
or entirely rely on circumstantial evidence, and "the reasonable 
inferences drawn from such evidence 'need not be necessary or 
inescapable,' only 'reasonable and possible.'"  Id., quoting 
Commonwealth v. Lao, 443 Mass. 770, 779 (2005), S.C., 450 Mass. 
215 (2007) and 460 Mass. 12 (2011).  A jury cannot convict based 
on "the piling of inference upon inference or on conjecture and 
speculation," however.  MacCormack, supra. 
In sum, we decide whether the evidence in its entirety was 
sufficient such that any rational jury could have found that the 
defendant was the perpetrator of the crime and committed the 
crime with deliberate premeditation.  If the Commonwealth met 
this burden of production, then the evidence was properly 
admitted to the jury to make a fact-finding decision; we will 
not second guess the jury's ultimate conclusion.  See 
Commonwealth v. Lake, 410 Mass. 47, 51 (1991) ("It is not the 
role of this court to second guess a jury on determinations of 
9 
 
fact").  Here, we conclude that the Commonwealth met its burden 
and thus decline to overturn the jury's findings. 
i.  Identity.  The Commonwealth presented four categories 
of evidence demonstrating that the defendant was the perpetrator 
of Marcia's murder.  First, there was evidence that the 
defendant had the opportunity to commit the crime.  The 
defendant's sperm was found inside Marcia's body, and a jury 
could reasonably infer that the defendant was with Marcia at 
around the time of the murder. 
Second, there was evidence, albeit limited evidence, tying 
the defendant to the crime scene.  The defendant was familiar 
with the campsite in which Marcia's body was found, considering 
he had camped in that specific State forest previously and had 
camped in the general area many times prior.  There was also a 
cigarette package found near the victim's body that the police 
traced back to upstate New York.  The defendant had smoked 
cigarettes at the time of the murder and lived in New York. 
Third, there was the evidence of Elizabeth's murder.  As 
explained infra, a jury could permissibly infer based on the 
circumstances of both murders that (i) the same perpetrator 
killed both Elizabeth and Marcia, (ii) the defendant was the 
perpetrator of Elizabeth's murder, and therefore (iii) the 
defendant was the perpetrator of Marcia's murder. 
10 
 
Fourth, there was substantial evidence of consciousness of 
guilt.  The defendant lied to Elizabeth's and Marcia's relatives 
about his wife's and daughter's whereabouts:  first, in 1995, he 
stated that Elizabeth and Marcia had moved to Australia; and, 
second, in 2013, the defendant stated that Elizabeth and Marcia 
had left him after they all moved to Australia.  Yet, there were 
no records of Elizabeth, Marcia, or the defendant ever having 
moved to Australia, and the defendant later admitted that he 
moved to Africa, not Australia.  A jury could infer that the 
defendant made these false statements to conceal that the 
victims were missing.  See Commonwealth v. Cassidy, 470 Mass. 
201, 217 (2014) ("Evidence of . . . concealment, false 
statements to police, destruction or concealment of evidence, 
. . . or similar conduct generally is admissible as some 
evidence of consciousness of guilt"). 
The defendant also fled to Africa soon after the crime, and 
then changed his surname shortly after returning to the United 
States.  A jury could infer that "a person who flees or hides 
after a criminal act has been committed does so because he feels 
guilt concerning that act."  Commonwealth v. Toney, 385 Mass. 
575, 584 (1982).  See Cassidy, 470 Mass. at 217 ("Evidence of 
flight . . . generally is admissible as some evidence of 
consciousness of guilt").  Lastly, a jury could find that the 
defendant lied to police in 2014 when he claimed memory loss.  
11 
 
See Cassidy, supra; Commonwealth v. Porter, 384 Mass. 647, 653 
(1981) ("Such intentionally false and misleading statements by 
the defendant [to police] could have been found to indicate a 
consciousness of guilt on his part"). 
The defendant correctly contends that "[b]y itself, 
evidence of actions suggesting consciousness of guilt is not 
sufficient to convict a defendant."  See Commonwealth v. Morris, 
465 Mass. 733, 738 (2013).  But the consciousness of guilt 
evidence, together with reasonable and possible inferences based 
on the other three categories of evidence, "no one of which 
alone would be enough to convict the defendant, combine to form 
a fabric of proof that was sufficient to warrant the jury's 
finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the 
person who killed the victim[]."  Commonwealth v. Cordle, 404 
Mass. 733, 741 (1989), S.C., 412 Mass. 172 (1992), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Rojas, 388 Mass. 626, 630 (1983). 
ii.  Deliberate premeditation.  The defendant also argues 
that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that 
he killed Marcia with deliberate premeditation.  We disagree. 
"To establish that a defendant acted with deliberate 
premeditation, the Commonwealth must show that 'the plan to kill 
was formed after deliberation and reflection.'"  Commonwealth v. 
Tejada, 484 Mass. 1, 6, cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 441 (2020), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Johnson, 435 Mass. 113, 118-119 (2001), 
12 
 
S.C., 486 Mass. 51 (2020).  "No particular length of time of 
reflection is required to find deliberate premeditation; a 
decision to kill may be formed in a few seconds."  Commonwealth 
v. Whitaker, 460 Mass. 409, 419 (2011).  A jury may infer 
deliberate premeditation "from the nature and extent of a 
victim's injuries, the duration of the attack, the number of 
blows, and the use of various weapons."  Id. 
Here, there was evidence that the defendant shot Marcia 
through a towel.4  While the Commonwealth argues a jury could 
infer that the defendant used the towel to muffle the sound of 
the gunshot, the defendant argues such an inference is 
speculative.  Regardless of how the towel was used, the 
important point is that the defendant chose to use the towel for 
some role in the killing, thereby demonstrating at least a 
moment of planning and reflection.  Moreover, the defendant shot 
at Marcia at least twice, possibly three times, including a 
fatal gunshot to her head.  "[T]he jury could have inferred in 
these circumstances that the multiple shots fired at the victim 
were evidence of deliberate premeditation, even if only one shot 
killed the victim."  Commonwealth v. Coleman, 434 Mass. 165, 168 
(2001).  See Commonwealth v. Good, 409 Mass. 612, 618 (1991) 
 
4 The towel with three holes in it tested positive for lead 
on one of the holes and showed visible smoky residue on two of 
them, as well as unburned gunpowder disks on the third. 
13 
 
(sufficient evidence to support finding of deliberate 
premeditation where "[t]hree bullets were fired" and "all struck 
the victim in vital areas, including the back of the head"). 
b.  Evidence of Elizabeth's murder.  Evidence of 
Elizabeth's murder was vital to the Commonwealth's case against 
the defendant for Marcia's murder.  The defendant argues that 
evidence of Elizabeth's murder was improperly admitted and thus 
urges us to reverse his conviction.  We review the trial judge's 
decision allowing the Commonwealth to introduce this evidence 
for an abuse of discretion.  See Commonwealth v. Peno, 485 Mass. 
378, 386 (2020). 
Uncharged conduct is admissible only if it passes a two-
pronged inquiry.  Peno, 485 Mass. at 386.  "First, the evidence 
must be relevant to something other than the defendant's 
propensity to commit the charged offense."  Id.  "Second, if the 
evidence is relevant, its prejudicial effect must not outweigh 
its probative value."  Id.  The trial judge did not abuse her 
discretion in determining that evidence of Elizabeth's murder 
satisfies these two criteria. 
i.  Nonpropensity purpose.  "It is long established that 
evidence of uncharged criminal acts or other misbehavior is not 
admissible to show a defendant's bad character or propensity to 
commit the charged crime . . . ."  Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 448 
Mass. 122, 128 (2006).  Such evidence may nonetheless "'be 
14 
 
admissible for another purpose,' such as to prove 'motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 
absence of mistake, or lack of accident.'"  Peno, 485 Mass. at 
385, quoting Mass. G. Evid. § 404(b)(2) (2020).  Here, the trial 
judge found that the evidence of Elizabeth's murder was relevant 
to establish the identity of the perpetrator of Marcia's murder.  
We agree. 
 
We generally categorize admissible evidence of other acts 
of the defendant that are probative of identity as "modus 
operandi" evidence.  Commonwealth v. Veiovis, 477 Mass. 472, 483 
(2017).  Modus operandi evidence requires "a uniqueness of 
technique, a distinctiveness, or a particularly distinguishing 
pattern of conduct common to the current and former incidents."  
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 417 Mass. 830, 836 (1994), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Brusgulis, 406 Mass. 501, 506 (1990).  "It is 
not enough that there is some 'general, although less than 
unique or distinct, similarity between the incidents.'"  
Jackson, supra, quoting Brusgulis, supra at 507.  Rather, it 
must be "so unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature."  
Jackson, supra, quoting Cordle, 404 Mass. at 747 (Liacos, J., 
dissenting). 
Such evidence is relevant to prove identity because where 
the prior or subsequent crime and the charged crime have the 
same unique signatures, it is highly likely that both crimes 
15 
 
were perpetrated by the same individual.  See Commonwealth v. 
Magri, 462 Mass. 360, 364 n.6 (2012), quoting Black's Law 
Dictionary 1095 (9th ed. 2009) ("'Modus operandi' refers to 'a 
pattern of criminal behavior so distinctive that investigators 
attribute it to the work of the same person'").  Thus, if the 
Commonwealth can prove that a defendant committed the prior or 
subsequent crime with a unique signature, the logical inference 
is that the charged crime with the same unique signature was 
also committed by the defendant. 
But modus operandi evidence is not the only type of 
admissible identity-based evidence.  See Veiovis, 477 Mass. at 
483.  "[E]vidence may be admissible to prove a defendant's 
identity, absent such similarity, when the evidence is 
ultimately relevant because the evidence makes it more likely 
than it would be without the evidence that the defendant is the 
individual responsible for the crime."  Id. at 491 (Lowy, J., 
dissenting). 
For example, in addition to two crimes sharing a unique 
technique or pattern of conduct, the totality of the 
circumstances of the prior or subsequent crime and charged crime 
can indicate that the crimes were perpetrated by the same 
individual.  As with modus operandi evidence, the Commonwealth 
may then argue that if a defendant committed the prior or 
16 
 
subsequent crime, the logical inference is that such a defendant 
also committed the charged crime. 
The circumstances must strongly suggest that the two crimes 
are related and were perpetrated by the same individual.  Where 
the totality of the circumstances only slightly suggests this to 
be the case, "the risk is great that a jury will view the 
similar act as evidence of bad character or propensity rather 
than of identity."  Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 251 
(2014).  Thus, the Commonwealth must demonstrate that the 
possibility is quite remote that mere coincidence could explain 
the unique set of circumstances underlying the two crimes.  Cf. 
United States v. Miller, 959 F.2d 1535, 1539-1540 (11th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 942 (1992) ("similarities between the two 
transactions provide strong evidence that the supplier in both 
transactions was the same person," because "the possibility is 
quite remote that [the buyer] had two different suppliers, both 
named 'Louis,' and both operating from a location approximately 
equidistant from [the buyer's] mother's house"); United States 
v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127, 135 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 
U.S. 979 (1974) ("the remoteness of the possibility that so many 
infants in the care and custody of defendant would suffer 
cyanotic episodes and respiratory difficulties if they were not 
induced by the defendant's wrongdoing . . . would prove the 
identity of defendant as the wrongdoer"). 
17 
 
The case of Commonwealth v. Gray, 465 Mass. 330, cert. 
denied, 571 U.S. 1014 (2013), demonstrates the type of unusual 
category of circumstances where this rule is applicable.  There, 
the defendant was charged in connection with three discrete 
attacks:  (i) the killing of one of his uncles, (ii) the assault 
and battery of another uncle, and (iii) the killing of the 
defendant's stepfather.  Id. at 331.  The defendant was 
convicted of the two crimes against his uncles, but the jury 
were unable to reach a verdict with respect to the charge 
involving the defendant's stepfather.  Id.  On appeal, the 
defendant argued that the trial on the one assault charge should 
have been severed from the trial on the two murder indictments.  
Id. at 334.  We disagreed with the defendant, holding that 
joinder was proper.  Id. at 337.  As part of this analysis, we 
determined that "the similarities between the [assault] and the 
shootings were sufficiently distinctive" that they each would 
have been admissible at the other's respective, separate trial 
to prove identity.  Id. 
The technique used in all three assaults involved attacking 
the victims in their houses with a gun while the victims were 
likely kneeling.  Gray, 465 Mass. at 336.  Each technique was 
similar to the others, but not unusually distinctive.  Cf. 
Brusgulis, 406 Mass. at 507 ("The features that are common to 
the incidents are common to numerous assaults on women . . .").  
18 
 
Nonetheless, the circumstances surrounding the technique were 
sufficiently similar to be probative of identity:  "[t]he 
attacks occurred within a thirty-day period," and "[e]ach 
involved an attack on an older male member of the defendant's 
family whom the defendant believed had molested him as a child."  
Gray, supra. 
The possibility that these three attacks were not 
perpetrated by the same individual -- considering that there was 
a similar method used, the attacks occurred within a short 
period of time, and the victims were all relatives of the 
defendant -- was quite remote.  Accordingly, we determined that 
each crime would have been admissible to prove identity for the 
other crimes not just due to the general similarity of the 
technique used, but because these additional circumstances 
strongly suggested that the attacks were related.  Gray, 465 
Mass. at 336-337. 
The circumstances of this case are analogous to those in 
Gray:  the two crimes involved family members who were attacked 
within a short time frame and in similar circumstances.  That 
is, a mother and daughter were murdered within the same week, 
both killed by gunshot wounds to the head and from medium to 
large caliber bullets.  Their bodies were left without 
identification, in hidden areas, and in different States from 
each other and from New York, where they were both living at the 
19 
 
time.  The crime scenes in which their bodies were found were 
both camping-related:  Marcia was found at a campground, and 
Elizabeth was found within two sleeping bags.  While the 
possibility exists that it was mere coincidence for a mother and 
daughter to be murdered within such a short time frame and in 
such similar circumstances, that possibility is quite remote.  
Accordingly, evidence of Elizabeth's murder, while not enough 
alone to survive a motion for a required finding of not guilty, 
was relevant to prove that the same perpetrator killed both 
Elizabeth and Marcia. 
For the Commonwealth to argue that this perpetrator was the 
defendant, specifically, the Commonwealth was required to show 
that the jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant 
committed Elizabeth's murder by a preponderance of the evidence.  
See Commonwealth v. Rosenthal, 432 Mass. 124, 126-127 (2000), 
citing Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 689 (1988).  
The Commonwealth met this burden:  the defendant's palm prints 
were found on the garbage bags in which Elizabeth's body was 
found, the defendant's hair was found in the same garbage bags, 
the defendant admitted that the sleeping bags in which 
Elizabeth's body was found were his, there was substantial 
consciousness of guilt evidence that related to Marcia and 
20 
 
Elizabeth, and there was the fact that Marcia was also killed.5  
There was sufficient evidence such that the jury could conclude 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant killed 
Elizabeth. 
Accordingly, the trial judge did not abuse her discretion 
in concluding that evidence showing that the defendant killed 
Elizabeth was relevant for the nonpropensity purpose of 
establishing the defendant's identity as Marcia's killer. 
 
5 We recognize that using Marcia's murder to find 
Elizabeth's murder to be admissible, only then to use 
Elizabeth's murder to find that there was sufficient evidence 
for a jury to find that the defendant committed Marcia's murder 
(see supra), at first glance, appears to be circular reasoning.  
But these are discrete legal inquiries, and our law envisions 
this form of reasoning.  To have held that evidence of 
Elizabeth's murder was admissible, the trial judge must have 
"examine[d] all the evidence in the case," which included 
Marcia's murder.  See Commonwealth v. Meola, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 
303, 308 n.13 (2019), quoting Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 690.  To 
determine that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to 
convict the defendant of murdering Marcia, we must consider "the 
evidence in its entirety," which includes evidence of 
Elizabeth's murder (citation omitted).  See Commonwealth v. 
Mauricio, 477 Mass. 588, 597 (2017).  The reasoning in each 
legal analysis is thus proper.  See United States v. Young, 65 
F. Supp. 2d 370, 373 n.8 (E.D. Va. 1999), citing Huddleston, 
supra at 691 ("To be sure, there is no way for a jury to 
conclude that the government's theory of [the uncharged crime] 
is true, and therefore relevant to their theory of [the charged 
crime], without concluding that the government's theory of [the 
charged crime] is correct -- which is, of course, exactly what 
the government seeks to prove in the first place.  Nonetheless, 
Huddleston contemplates precisely this form of reasoning, and 
sensibly so because the jury will [themselves] consider the 
entire record in deciding the weight and effect of the evidence 
concerning [the uncharged crime]"). 
21 
 
ii.  Undue prejudice.  Even if evidence is offered for a 
nonpropensity purpose, the evidence may still be inadmissible 
"if its probative value is outweighed by the risk of unfair 
prejudice to the defendant."  Crayton, 470 Mass. at 249.  At the 
outset, the trial judge "consistently provided limiting 
instructions at the time each witness testified and provided 
another instruction during the final charge," and we "presume 
that such instructions [were] understood by the jury and 
render[ed] any potentially prejudicial evidence harmless" 
(citation omitted).  See Commonwealth v. Samia, 492 Mass. 135, 
151 (2023). 
The defendant's principal argument is that the evidence of 
Elizabeth's murder was unfairly prejudicial because it 
"overwhelmed" the Commonwealth's case.  See Dwyer, 448 Mass. at 
128-129.  But the evidence of Elizabeth's murder was highly 
probative of the identity of the perpetrator of the charged 
crime, and the evidence therefore went to the heart of the 
Commonwealth's case.  In light of the probativeness of the 
evidence and the trial judge's limiting instructions, we 
conclude that the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in 
allowing the Commonwealth to introduce evidence of Elizabeth's 
murder at trial.  See Commonwealth v. Dorazio, 472 Mass. 535, 
542 (2015) (prior bad act evidence admissible where trial judge 
"conclude[d] that the relevant and probative value of the 
22 
 
evidence . . . was very high and that the potential for undue 
prejudice could be minimized by a limiting instruction"). 
The defendant further contends that certain photographs of 
Elizabeth6 were inflammatory and, therefore, even further unduly 
prejudicial.  We do note that the photographs at issue were 
photographs relevant to an uncharged crime and thus had two 
layers of prejudice:  the "inherent[] prejudic[e]" of an 
uncharged crime (citation omitted), Crayton, 470 Mass. at 249 
n.27, and the inflammatory nature of gruesome photographs. 
Nonetheless, it is rare for this court to conclude that a 
trial judge abused his or her discretion by admitting relevant 
photographs of crime scenes and homicide victims.  See 
Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 457 Mass. 773, 803 (2010), cert. 
denied, 563 U.S. 990 (2011), quoting Commonwealth v. DeSouza, 
428 Mass. 667, 670 (1999) ("This court has almost never ruled 
that it was error to admit photographs of crime scenes and 
homicide victims").  "That the photographs may be gruesome or 
have an inflammatory effect on the jury does not render them 
inadmissible so long as they possess evidentiary value on a 
material matter."  Commonwealth v. Reyes, 483 Mass. 65, 74 
(2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Olsen, 452 Mass. 284, 294 
(2008).  Contrast Commonwealth v. Walters, 485 Mass. 271, 282-
 
6 At oral argument, the defendant specifically referenced 
exhibit nos. 51, 70, 82, 83, 84, and 85. 
23 
 
283 (2020) (photograph of victim's "bulging left eye, after the 
body had been decomposing for six days," was inadmissible 
because it "was likely to be particularly inflammatory and had 
little probative value"). 
Here, the photographs at issue were probative of a material 
and central issue in the Commonwealth's case -- that Elizabeth 
was killed in the same manner as Marcia (i.e., with a gunshot 
wound to the head) and that the crime scenes were similar (i.e., 
the bodies were left in concealed locations and in camping-
related circumstances), which was probative of the identity of 
the perpetrator.  Accordingly, the two layers of prejudice did 
not outweigh the highly probative nature of these photographs. 
The trial judge thus did not abuse her discretion in 
allowing the Commonwealth to introduce evidence that the 
defendant committed Elizabeth's murder, to show that Marcia's 
and Elizabeth's murders were perpetrated by the same individual 
and that the perpetrator of both crimes was the defendant. 
c.  Latent print evidence.  After a pretrial, 
nonevidentiary hearing, the trial judge denied the defendant's 
motion to exclude testimony of two latent print examiners.  The 
defendant on appeal reiterates that the experts' testimony 
should have been excluded and further argues that the trial 
judge erred by declining to hold an evidentiary hearing prior to 
making her determination.  In addition, the defendant argues 
24 
 
that the testimony of one of the latent print examiners violated 
his constitutional right to confront witnesses against him and 
that both latent print examiners' testimony was improperly 
couched in the language of certainty.  We address each of the 
defendant's arguments in turn, concluding that there was no 
reversible error. 
i.  Motion to exclude.  A party seeking to offer expert 
testimony regarding scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge must first "establish a sufficient foundation for a 
judge to determine whether the expert's opinion satisfies 
gatekeeper reliability."  Commonwealth v. Davis, 487 Mass. 448, 
453 (2021), S.C., 491 Mass. 1011 (2023).  See Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 104(a) (2023).  In particular, a trial judge should only 
exclude expert testimony "[i]f the process or theory underlying 
[an] . . . expert's opinion lacks reliability."  Davis, supra, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Patterson, 445 Mass. 626, 639 (2005).  
We review the trial judge's gatekeeper determination for an 
abuse of discretion.  Davis, supra at 455. 
Here, the two latent print examiners used the ACE-V7 
methodology, a methodology we have held to be reliable.  See 
Commonwealth v. Joyner, 467 Mass. 176, 181 (2014) ("expert 
[latent print] testimony based on the ACE-V methodology 
 
7 ACE-V stands for "analysis, comparison, evaluation, and 
verification." 
25 
 
continues to be admissible"); Commonwealth v. Gambora, 457 Mass. 
715, 724-725 (2010) (although 2009 National Academy of Sciences 
report "raises a number of questions about the reliability of 
certain aspects of the ACE-V methodology and expert testimony 
based on it," report "does not conclude that [latent print] 
evidence is so unreliable that courts should no longer admit 
it").  As reliability of the methodology has already been 
established in our courts, the trial judge properly took 
judicial notice of the methodology's reliability.  See Davis, 
487 Mass. at 454-455. 
The Commonwealth not only must show that the methodology is 
reliable, but also must show that the particular application of 
that process is reliable.  See Patterson, 445 Mass. at 648, 654-
655 (application of ACE-V methodology found to be reliable for 
single latent print impressions, but not for simultaneous 
impressions).  But, here, the experts were testifying to the 
same type of ACE-V analysis at issue in our precedent and 
offered the analysis for the same purpose, namely, to establish 
that individual latent impressions likely match the defendant's 
prints.  There was also no factual dispute that the 
Commonwealth's experts were qualified, that the experts followed 
the ACE-V methodology, or that the quality of the latent prints 
26 
 
was sufficient to permit an opinion.8  Accordingly, the 
application of the ACE-V methodology was reliable, and no 
evidentiary hearing was required.  See Commonwealth v. Pytou 
Heang, 458 Mass. 827, 845 (2011); Commonwealth v. Shanley, 455 
Mass. 752, 763 n.15 (2010). 
In essence, the defendant's argument is that the latent 
print examiners' testimony should have been excluded because the 
experts were exposed to biasing contextual information prior to 
their analyses.  However, when determining gatekeeper 
reliability as a preliminary question of fact, see Mass. G. 
Evid. § 104(a), "[t]he judge does not . . . determine whether to 
credit the expert's ultimate opinion; this is a matter of weight 
for the jury to decide," Commonwealth v. Hinds, 487 Mass. 212, 
218 (2021).  The defendant's argument was, therefore, more 
 
8 The defendant argues on appeal that the testimony of both 
experts was unreliable because neither examiner was certified 
and the latent prints were unsuitable for comparison, but the 
defendant did not dispute these two facts before the trial 
judge.  "As the grounds for objection on this issue that were 
raised on appeal differ from the objection made at trial, the 
standard of review that applies to this claim is whether there 
was a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice."  
Commonwealth v. Almeida, 479 Mass. 562, 568 (2018).  Both 
examiners worked for accredited laboratories, completed 
extensive training, and underwent periodic proficiency testing.  
Additionally, an independent latent print examiner from the 
Connecticut State forensic laboratory testified that the latent 
prints were suitable for comparison, and the defendant presented 
no evidence suggesting otherwise.  The defendant, therefore, 
cannot show a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice 
based on these unpreserved objections. 
27 
 
appropriately addressed at trial when arguing against the weight 
of the evidence.  See Commonwealth v. Gaynor, 443 Mass. 245, 266 
(2005) ("The judge did not abuse his discretion in ruling that 
the [DNA] test results were sufficiently reliable to be put 
before the jury and that the questions raised by the defendant 
[as to how certain conditions may have affected the accuracy and 
reliability of test results] were more appropriately addressed 
to the weight of the evidence").  The trial judge thus did not 
abuse her discretion in allowing, without an evidentiary 
hearing, the Commonwealth's experts to testify. 
ii.  Confrontation of witnesses.  The defendant next argues 
that his rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights to confront witnesses against him were violated due to 
Pivovar's testimony as to the verification step of ACE-V.  We 
have explained that "judges must use caution in allowing 
testimony regarding the verification step in ACE-V analysis, as 
'verifying' suggests that a nontestifying expert concurs with 
the testifying expert's conclusion," which would be improper.  
Commonwealth v. Fulgiam, 477 Mass. 20, 46, cert. denied, 583 
U.S. 923 (2017).  There is nonetheless no constitutional error 
where an expert "testified as to the ACE-V process, wherein 
verification or review by another [latent print] analyst is a 
step in the process, and did not testify as to the second 
28 
 
analyst's independent conclusions."  See id.  Compare 
Commonwealth v. Chappell, 473 Mass. 191, 202 (2015) (no 
constitutional violation where testifying analyst never "at any 
time described any part of [nontestifying analyst's] DNA 
analysis or [nontestifying analyst's] testing results, opinions, 
or conclusions"), with Whitaker, 460 Mass. at 421-422 (violation 
of right of confrontation where analyst "testified that, as part 
of the verification stage of fingerprint examination, [other 
nontestifying analysts] each compared the latent palm print 
. . . with the known palm print of the defendant and concurred 
with [testifying analyst's] opinion"). 
Here, one of the latent print examiners, Pivovar, testified 
that the last step of ACE-V is "verification," which "is where 
somebody else reviews my work."  Pivovar thus defined the 
verification step in terms of a "review" and notably did not 
describe any part of the other reviewer's analysis, results, 
opinions, or conclusions.  In other words, there was no evidence 
whether the other reviewer verified or disagreed with Pivovar's 
findings.  We accordingly find no error. 
iii.  Degree of certainty.  Lastly, the defendant argues 
that the two latent print examiners testified as to their 
conclusions with a degree of certainty that we have prohibited.  
After expressing our concern about the ACE-V methodology in 
Gambora, we explained that "[t]estimony to the effect that a 
29 
 
latent print matches, or is 'individualized' to, a known print, 
if it is to be offered, should be presented as an opinion, not a 
fact, and opinions expressing absolute certainty about, or the 
infallibility of, an 'individualization' of a print should be 
avoided."  Gambora, 457 Mass. at 729 n.22.  By the time of the 
trial in this case, we had further explained that latent print 
examiners "must clearly frame their findings in the form of an 
opinion to avoid improper testimony."9  Fulgiam, 477 Mass. at 44. 
 
The Commonwealth here presented two latent print analysts 
as experts, Dolan and Pivovar.  Dolan testified multiple times 
that it was his "scientific opinion" that there were three 
latent prints that were "identified to" the palms of the 
defendant.  The term "scientific" to describe his opinion 
"arguably verged on suggesting that the ACE-V process is more 
 
9 We have since provided further clarification on this issue 
in Commonwealth v. Robertson, 489 Mass. 226, 238, cert. denied, 
143 S. Ct. 498 (2022).  We explained there that "an expert 
testifying to a fingerprint match must state expressly that the 
match constitutes the expert's opinion based on the expert's 
education, training, and experience" and that it was the 
prosecutor's burden to ensure the expert does so.  Id.  That is, 
 
"If an expert witness does not clarify that his or her 
fingerprint testimony is an opinion, then the prosecutor 
must elicit this clarification even if the defendant does 
not object.  For instance, the prosecutor may clarify that 
a subjective opinion is being sought and then ask whether 
the witness has an opinion 'to a reasonable degree of 
fingerprint analysis certainty.'" 
 
Id.  Robertson was decided after the defendant's trial, however, 
and was not made retroactive.  See id. 
30 
 
scientific than warranted," Commonwealth v. Armstrong, 492 Mass. 
341, 355 (2023), and there was one instance in which Dolan 
testified without using the term "opinion."  We nonetheless 
conclude that there was no error because, "viewed as a whole," 
his testimony was largely expressed in terms of an "opinion" and 
his testimony did not claim that the ACE-V process was 
infallible or absolutely certain.  See id. at 355-356. 
On the other hand, Pivovar testified that she 
(i) "identified [a palm print from one of the garbage bags and 
the print of the defendant's left palm] as originating from the 
same source"; (ii) "identif[ied] [another latent print] and the 
right palm print of [the defendant] as being the same, they 
originated from the same source"; and (iii) "identif[ied] the 
[third latent print] as originating from the same source as the 
right palm of [the defendant] that [she] compared it to."10  
Pivovar did not frame her testimony in terms of an "opinion" and 
expressed the identification of the defendant with certainty.  
This was error.  See Fulgiam, 477 Mass. at 45. 
 
10 The Commonwealth argued that Pivovar's testimony was 
expressed as an opinion because, prior to her three conclusions, 
the prosecutor had asked Pivovar for her "opinion."  But we have 
stated that the experts themselves "must clearly frame their 
findings in the form of an opinion."  Fulgiam, 477 Mass. at 44.  
Thus, we focus on the expert's testimony, not the prosecutor's 
questions, in this analysis. 
31 
 
The defendant did not preserve this issue through his 
motion in limine to exclude Pivovar's testimony "because the 
motion did not give the judge an opportunity to rule on the 
propriety of how the [latent print] expert would testify," nor 
did he object to the form of Pivovar's testimony at trial.  See 
Commonwealth v. Robertson, 489 Mass. 226, 239, cert. denied, 143 
S. Ct. 498 (2022).  Accordingly, we review this error for a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  Id. 
We conclude that Pivovar's testimony expressing her 
findings with certainty did not likely influence the jury's 
conclusion.  See Commonwealth v. Hobbs, 482 Mass. 538, 556 
(2019) (no substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice 
where erroneously admitted evidence did not likely influence 
jury's conclusion).  We note that defense counsel countered the 
notion that individualization under the ACE-V methodology is 
infallible by cross-examining Pivovar on the subjectivity of 
latent print analysis, the fact that two prints are never 
identical, and a recent incident in which the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation erroneously identified a suspect based on an 
incorrect latent print analysis.  See Fulgiam, 477 Mass. at 45 
(no substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice because, in 
part, "portions of the analyst's testimony implicitly suggested 
the fallibility of fingerprint analysis").  The defendant also 
presented an expert detailing the risks of cognitive bias in 
32 
 
latent print analysis.11  See Armstrong, 492 Mass. at 357 
(defendant's own expert helped counter misconception that 
individualization is infallible). 
Additionally, the Commonwealth's other latent print 
examiner, Dolan, testified as to the same findings as Pivovar.  
If Pivovar's testimony had been properly framed as an opinion, 
there still would have been strong evidence that the prints 
found at Elizabeth's crime scene originated from the defendant.  
Thus, even though we determine that Pivovar's testimony was 
erroneously presented as fact, the error did not create a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Fulgiam, 477 Mass. at 45 (no substantial likelihood of 
miscarriage of justice where Commonwealth's evidence was 
otherwise strong). 
d.  Third-party culprit and inadequate police investigation 
evidence.  The defendant argues that he was improperly precluded 
from introducing evidence that a "suspicious" man was seen 
driving a blue Buick Skylark behind the strip mall where 
 
11 The defendant's expert explained that "[t]he human mind, 
the brain is not a camera" and "[w]e always ignore and interpret 
and pay attention to certain things and not other things."  The 
expert testified that, as a result, "when [experts] get 
contextual information, even if it's irrelevant, it clouds a 
judgment" and "[i]t contaminates the mental processes."  
Specifically, as applicable to this case, the expert testified 
that when latent print examiners receive irrelevant context, "it 
will affect their observation and interpretation." 
33 
 
Elizabeth's body was found on the night that her body was found.  
The defendant specifically contends that he should have been 
allowed to question certain Massachusetts law enforcement 
officers about this fact both to introduce evidence of a third-
party culprit and to advance his theory that Massachusetts law 
enforcement failed to adequately investigate the possibility of 
this third-party culprit (i.e., a Bowden defense).  See 
Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 485-486 (1980). 
Prior to admitting Bowden evidence, a trial judge should 
conduct a voir dire hearing to determine (1) "whether the third-
party culprit information had been furnished to the police" and 
(2) "whether its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice."  Commonwealth v. Acevedo, 492 
Mass. 381, 391 (2023), quoting Commonwealth v. Steadman, 489 
Mass. 372, 385 (2022).  The decision to exclude such evidence is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  Commonwealth v. Martinez, 
487 Mass. 265, 270 (2021). 
The trial judge here conducted voir dire of multiple 
officers, and the information regarding a blue Buick Skylark had 
been furnished to Massachusetts law enforcement, albeit not in 
its entirety until 2014.  Regardless, there was little probative 
value to this evidence. 
The probative nature of Bowden evidence is based on the 
inference that "evidence at trial may be inadequate or 
34 
 
unreliable because the police failed to conduct the scientific 
tests or to pursue leads that a reasonable police investigation 
would have conducted or investigated, and these tests or 
investigation reasonably may have led to significant evidence of 
the defendant's guilt or innocence."  Commonwealth v. Silva-
Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 801 (2009).  The defendant sought to 
introduce that a "suspicious" man was driving near the crime 
scene.  Aside from the man's proximity to the crime scene, 
however, there were no other connections linking this unknown 
man to the crime.  The argument that this man was involved in 
Elizabeth's murder was thus "no more than speculation and 
conjecture."  See Martinez, 487 Mass. at 271.  Accordingly, 
"even if the jury were to believe that police had failed to 
pursue certain avenues of investigation effectively, . . . this 
failure would only weakly have suggested that a third party had 
committed the crime," and "it was unlikely that the shortfalls 
of the investigation suggested by the proffered evidence 'could 
raise a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt in the 
minds of the jurors.'"  See Commonwealth v. Scott, 470 Mass. 
320, 331-332 (2014).12 
 
12 Further, the defendant did introduce evidence that 
Connecticut law enforcement -- the officers responsible for 
determining the perpetrator of Elizabeth's murder -- did not 
investigate the records they obtained from the Connecticut 
department of motor vehicles listing thousands of blue Buick 
Skylark owners.  The defendant was, therefore, able to argue his 
35 
 
In light of the foregoing, the trial judge did not abuse 
her discretion in excluding this Bowden evidence after weighing 
the limited or nonexistent probative value of the evidence 
against the risk of unfair prejudice to the Commonwealth. 
Lastly, the defendant was not precluded from presenting 
third-party culprit evidence as to the "suspicious" man in the 
blue Buick Skylark, because the defendant never requested to do 
so.  Defense counsel expressly stated at trial that he intended 
to introduce this evidence solely to demonstrate that the police 
failed to investigate and not to demonstrate that a third party 
was culpable.  Where a defendant never attempted to introduce 
evidence and, therefore, a trial judge never precluded such 
evidence, the trial judge could not have abused her discretion.  
See Commonwealth v. Feliciano, 442 Mass. 728, 737 (2004).13 
 
Bowden defense to some extent.  See Scott, 470 Mass. at 332 
("Also relevant to our analysis is the fact that the judge did 
allow the defendant to pursue a number of lines of questioning 
and argument in support of a Bowden defense"). 
 
13 Nothing in our review pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, 
suggests that defense counsel's failure to pursue this strategy 
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.  As explained 
supra, the argument that this man was involved in Elizabeth's 
murder was speculative.  Accordingly, any attempt to introduce 
this evidence for the purpose of proving that a third-party 
culprit committed Elizabeth's murder would have been futile.  
See Commonwealth v. Heywood, 484 Mass. 43, 49 (2020), citing 
Commonwealth v. Carroll, 439 Mass. 547, 557 (2003) ("failure to 
pursue futile tactic does not constitute ineffective assistance 
of counsel"); Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. at 801 (third-party 
culprit evidence "cannot be too remote or speculative" [citation 
omitted]). 
36 
 
e.  Review pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  In addition to 
his other arguments, the defendant asks us to consider several 
issues in our G. L. c. 278, § 33E, review.  We address each 
issue, as well as an issue raised by the Commonwealth, infra.  
In short, neither the issues identified by the parties nor our 
independent review causes us to reduce the verdict of murder in 
the first degree or to order a new trial. 
i.  Motion to suppress.  The defendant suggests defense 
counsel was manifestly unreasonable in failing to seek 
suppression of the defendant's statements to police.  However, 
there is no indication that the defendant was in custody during 
his first conversation with police, which would have required 
Miranda warnings, nor is there any indication on the trial 
record that the defendant made his statements involuntarily.  A 
motion to suppress thus would have been futile, and defense 
counsel was not manifestly unreasonable in declining to file 
such a motion.  See Gambora, 457 Mass. at 731 n.24. 
ii.  Interview transcript redaction.  In a pretrial motion, 
the defendant requested that certain excerpts from the 
transcript of his interview with police be redacted.  In 
particular, the defendant argued that police statements opining 
as to the defendant's guilt were inadmissible hearsay.  Indeed, 
"[e]xtrajudicial accusatory statements made in the presence of a 
defendant, which he has unequivocally denied, are hearsay and 
37 
 
inadmissible as evidence of guilt in the Commonwealth's case-in-
chief" (footnotes omitted).  Commonwealth v. Womack, 457 Mass. 
268, 272 (2010).  But almost all the excerpts that the defendant 
requested be redacted due to this issue were redacted.  
Accusations and responses that were left in the transcript were 
admissible because the defendant "respond[ed] to incriminating 
accusations made of him in an equivocal, evasive or irresponsive 
way inconsistent with his innocence."  Commonwealth v. Machado, 
339 Mass. 713, 715-716 (1959), abrogated on other grounds by 
Commonwealth v. Forde, 392 Mass. 453 (1984). 
iii.  Evidence of arson.  The defendant filed pretrial 
motions to admit evidence that two individuals set fire to a 
Ford Explorer in Tolland on September 30, 1995.  The trial judge 
denied both motions.  The defendant intended to use this 
evidence to show that there was a third-party culprit and that 
police failed to adequately investigate this possibility.  But 
the only evidence connecting Marcia's death to the arson was the 
fact that this other crime occurred in the same town and on or 
around the same day that Marcia was murdered.  The defense 
theory that the arson was connected with Marcia's murder was 
thus entirely speculative, as there was no "other information 
that potentially linked [the two individuals] to the crime" or 
even the specific crime scene.  See Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. at 
801.  We thus find no error. 
38 
 
iv.  Commonwealth's closing argument.  During the 
Commonwealth's closing argument, the prosecutor referred to the 
fact that only one person was seen during the jury's viewing of 
the campground crime scene to support his argument that Tolland 
State Forest is remote.  The defendant objected to this 
statement following the prosecutor's closing argument.  We agree 
with the defendant that this reference was improper because "the 
view itself is not evidence in a strict sense."  See 
Commonwealth v. Brea, 488 Mass. 150, 168 (2021).  We nonetheless 
conclude that no prejudice occurred because the remark was 
minor, considering that there was other evidence that Tolland 
State Forest was remote, and because the judge provided an 
effective curative instruction.  See Commonwealth v. Hammond, 
477 Mass. 499, 507 (2017). 
The prosecutor also made a remark during closing that 
suggested the defendant considered his daughter "trash" because 
he put her body in a garbage bag.  The prosecutor's remark was 
improper, as it did not pertain to whether the defendant was 
guilty but rather attempted to play on the jury's sympathy and 
emotions.  See Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 478 Mass. 189, 201 
(2017).  However, here, too, we conclude that there was no 
prejudice:  it was one isolated remark, it was "unlikely that 
the prosecutor's argument had an inflammatory effect on the jury 
beyond that which naturally would result from the evidence 
39 
 
presented [that showed the circumstances in which the body was 
left]," and the trial judge gave proper instructions that 
closing arguments are not evidence and that the jury must not in 
any way be influenced by sympathy, emotion, or prejudice.  See 
id. at 201-202, quoting Commonwealth v. Bois, 476 Mass. 15, 35 
(2016). 
v.  Jury instructions.  The defendant made the following 
objections to jury instructions at the charge conference, all of 
which were overruled:  (i) the definition of deliberate 
premeditation did not include the phrase "cool reflection"; 
(ii) the instruction for deliberate premeditation did not 
include that consciousness of guilt evidence may not be a factor 
considered; and (iii) there was no Bowden instruction.  There 
was no error.  See Commonwealth v. Felix, 476 Mass. 750, 761 
(2017) (no error where deliberate premeditation instruction 
excluded phrase "cool reflection"); Commonwealth v. Durand, 475 
Mass. 657, 674 (2016), cert. denied, 583 U.S. 896 (2017) ("a 
judge is not required to instruct on the claimed inadequacy of a 
police investigation" [citation omitted]); Commonwealth v. 
Dagenais, 437 Mass. 832, 844 (2002) ("where a judge gives 
correct instructions on consciousness of guilt and correct 
instructions on deliberate premeditation, there is no need to 
further instruct the jury as to limitations on the use of 
40 
 
consciousness of guilt with respect to the issue of 
premeditation"). 
The defendant also objected to the third-prong malice 
instruction in the jury instruction on murder in the second 
degree.  Regardless of whether there was an error, the defendant 
was not found guilty of murder in the second degree, so there 
was no prejudice.  See Reyes, 483 Mass. at 78. 
Lastly, although there was no instruction that the jury 
must disregard the defendant's statements to police unless the 
jurors found that the defendant made the statements voluntarily, 
such an instruction was not required here.  See Commonwealth v. 
Gallett, 481 Mass. 662, 686 (2019) (instruction regarding 
voluntariness of statement not required where defendant does not 
put forward "substantial evidence" of involuntariness). 
vi.  Sleeping juror.  Although not raised by the defendant, 
the Commonwealth notes that the trial judge received a report 
that a juror slept through the testimony of defense's expert.  
"A judicial observation that a juror is asleep, or a judge's 
receipt of reliable information to that effect, requires prompt 
judicial intervention . . . ."  Commonwealth v. Alleyne, 474 
Mass. 771, 778 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Beneche, 458 
Mass. 61, 78 (2010).  The judge must determine whether the 
report of a juror sleeping is reliable, and if it is, the judge 
"must take further steps to determine the appropriate 
41 
 
intervention."  Commonwealth v. Villalobos, 478 Mass. 1007, 
1007-1008 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. McGhee, 470 Mass. 638, 
644 (2015).  The trial judge has "substantial discretion" in 
determining the appropriate intervention, and the defendant 
bears the burden of showing "that the judge's response to 
information about a sleeping juror was 'arbitrary or 
unreasonable.'"  Villalobos, supra at 1008, quoting McGhee, 
supra. 
Here, two court officers stated that a juror looked like 
she was "dead asleep through virtually all of [the defendant's 
expert's] testimony."  Defense counsel first responded to this 
report by stating that his co-counsel thought that the same 
juror was asleep at some point, but that the juror "picked up 
her head" when defense counsel looked over to the juror.  Then, 
later, defense counsel stated that they did not "think [they 
could] discuss it any further," implying that they did not 
believe it was a real or substantial issue.  Defense counsel 
also agreed that no other intervention was necessary and that 
the "juror [did] not need to be excused for any reason."  
Considering that the evidence was tentative whether the juror 
was indeed sleeping and that defense counsel agreed that no 
further intervention was necessary, the trial judge did not act 
arbitrarily or unreasonably.  See Alleyne, 474 Mass. at 778. 
42 
 
vii.  Our independent review.  Lastly, we have otherwise 
reviewed the entire record and find no basis to set aside the 
verdict of murder in the first degree or to order a new trial 
pursuant to our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
Judgment affirmed.