Title: McFadden v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC97737
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: April 14, 2020

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
VINCENT McFADDEN, 
     ) 
     ) 
Appellant, 
     ) 
     ) 
v. 
     ) 
No. SC97737 
     ) 
STATE OF MISSOURI 
     ) 
     ) 
Respondent. 
     ) 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ST. LOUIS COUNTY 
The Honorable David Lee Vincent III, Judge 
Vincent McFadden appeals the circuit court’s judgment overruling his Rule 29.15 
motion for postconviction relief from his death sentence for the first-degree murder of 
Todd Franklin (“Victim”).  He claims the circuit court committed multiple errors 
affecting the guilt, penalty, and postconviction relief phases of his case.  McFadden 
asserts, among other claims, that the circuit court erred in failing to find defense counsel 
ineffective for: (1) calling Michael Douglas (“Codefendant”) to testify during trial, 
(2) failing to present evidence of Victim’s bad character during the penalty phase, and
(3) failing to object to the State’s introduction of letters exchanged between McFadden
and Codefendant.  Because the circuit court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are 
not clearly erroneous, the judgment denying postconviction relief is affirmed. 
Opinion issued April 14, 2020
2 
 
Background 
 
McFadden was charged with first-degree murder and armed criminal action.  The 
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict,1 demonstrated that Victim and 
his friend, Mark Silas, were walking in Pine Lawn when they encountered McFadden and 
Codefendant.  McFadden and Codefendant asked Victim if he had a gun; Victim 
responded that he did not.  Codefendant then pulled out a gun and fired a shot, and 
Victim and Silas ran across the street to Victim’s neighbor’s yard.  McFadden and 
Codefendant followed.   
 
Codefendant then shot Victim twice, and Victim fell to the ground.  McFadden 
took the gun from Codefendant, walked toward Victim, kicked him, and uttered 
derogatory phrases.  McFadden then shot Victim three times.  McFadden and 
Codefendant ran away, and the neighbor called 911.  Victim was alive during each of the 
five shots, but he eventually died at the scene from the wounds.   
 
An investigation ensued, during which a cigar with McFadden’s thumbprint was 
found at the end of the neighbor’s driveway, near Victim’s body.  During an interview 
shortly after the shooting, Silas identified McFadden as one of the shooters.  The 
neighbor, as well as individuals at the neighbor’s house on the day of the shooting, 
identified McFadden from a photograph lineup as the second shooter.  McFadden was 
arrested 10 months later.  
                                              
1 State v. Taylor, 134 S.W.3d 21, 24 (Mo. banc 2004).   
3 
 
 
During trial, the defense called Codefendant as a witness.  Codefendant testified 
he had previously stated that he and his brother – and not McFadden – had shot and killed 
Victim.  Codefendant testified that these previous statements were lies and that 
McFadden was the second shooter.  The jury found McFadden guilty of first-degree 
murder and armed criminal action.   
 
During the penalty phase, the State presented evidence that: McFadden had prior 
convictions; he killed his girlfriend’s sister, Leslie Addison; he attempted to prevent his 
girlfriend, Eva Addison, from identifying him as her sister’s murderer; and he was in 
possession of 17 bags of crack cocaine at the time he was arrested.   
 
In mitigation, five members of McFadden’s family, McFadden’s friend, and a 
St. Louis juvenile officer testified regarding McFadden’s childhood and the environment 
in which he grew up.  The defense also called Dr. Wanda Draper, a human development 
expert, who testified McFadden had developed a “severe disorganized attachment” 
disorder because he lacked a reliable parental figure during his childhood.  She further 
testified McFadden’s environment partially caused his violent behavior. 
 
The jury found five statutory aggravators – four serious assaultive convictions and 
depravity of mind – and it recommended a sentence of death.  The circuit court sentenced 
McFadden accordingly, imposing the death penalty for first-degree murder and life 
imprisonment for armed criminal action.  This Court affirmed the convictions and 
sentences on direct appeal.  State v. McFadden, 369 S.W.3d 727, 755 (Mo. banc 2012).2  
                                              
2 This Court initially reversed McFadden’s convictions on direct appeal, State v. McFadden, 216 
S.W.3d 673, 678 (Mo. banc 2007), and the case was retried.   
4 
 
McFadden filed an amended Rule 29.15 motion for postconviction relief, and the circuit 
court held an evidentiary hearing.  The circuit court entered judgment denying 
McFadden’s claims.  McFadden appeals.3 
Standard of Review 
 
A circuit court’s judgment denying postconviction relief will be affirmed unless its 
findings and conclusions are clearly erroneous.  Rule 29.15(k); Meiners v. State, 540 
S.W.3d 832, 836 (Mo. banc 2018).  Findings and conclusions are clearly erroneous only 
when “this Court is left with a definite and firm impression that a mistake has been 
made.”  Mallow v. State, 439 S.W.3d 764, 768 (Mo. banc 2014). 
 
To obtain postconviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 
movant must satisfy the two-prong Strickland standard.  Anderson v. State, 564 S.W.3d 
592, 600 (Mo. banc 2018) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).  
A movant must first demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient.  Id.  
Performance is deficient if it fails to rise to the level of skill and diligence that would be 
demonstrated by a reasonably competent attorney under similar circumstances.  Id.    
A movant must then prove he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance.  
Id. at 601.  Prejudice occurs when “there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”  
                                              
3 This Court has jurisdiction because McFadden received a death sentence.  Mo. Const. art. V, 
sec. 10.  Many of the arguments now raised are similar to those McFadden asserted on direct 
appeal and in McFadden v. State, 553 S.W.3d 289, 312 (Mo. banc 2018), McFadden’s appeal of 
the denial of postconviction relief from his conviction and death sentence for the first-degree 
murder of Leslie Addison.  Portions of those opinions are incorporated without further 
attribution. 
5 
 
Id.  Reasonable probability requires “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 
the outcome.”  Tisius v. State, 519 S.W.3d 413, 420 (Mo. banc 2017).  In death penalty 
cases, “a defendant must show with reasonable probability that the jury, balancing all the 
circumstances, would not have awarded the death penalty.”  Id.   
Analysis 
I. Alleged Guilt Phase Errors 
A. The Decision to Call Codefendant to Testify 
 
McFadden argues his counsel were ineffective in calling Codefendant to testify 
because, prior to his testimony at trial, Codefendant’s plea counsel told McFadden’s 
counsel that Codefendant would never testify contrary to his guilty plea that he and 
McFadden shot Victim.4  Despite this information, counsel called Codefendant, who 
testified he and McFadden shot Victim.  McFadden alleges counsel were ineffective for 
calling Codefendant to testify because (1) Codefendant’s testimony was harmful to the 
defense’s case, especially in light of Silas’ testimony that he did not see McFadden shoot 
Victim, and (2) by calling Codefendant to testify, counsel effectively conceded 
McFadden’s guilt.   
Although counsel were aware that Codefendant might testify McFadden was the 
second shooter – testimony that would be harmful to the defense’s case – counsel 
recognized that Codefendant’s testimony to that effect could be impeached with his prior 
inconsistent statements that Codefendant’s brother – and not McFadden – was the second 
                                              
4 The same two counsel represented McFadden in both trials for the murder of Victim.  
6 
 
shooter.  McFadden argues Silas’ testimony sufficiently established that McFadden did 
not shoot victim, eliminating any need to call Codefendant.  But Silas’ testimony about 
this issue was unclear at best.  Silas testified at trial that he was walking in Pine Lawn 
with Victim when they encountered McFadden and Codefendant.  The remainder of 
much of Silas’ testimony consisted of claims of lack of memory.  At various points, he 
testified that he did not know if someone was shot and that he simply heard shots and ran.  
In a recorded statement to police on the day of the incident, Silas reported McFadden was 
the second shooter.  After the jury heard this recording, Silas testified he fabricated this 
statement in an effort to leave the police station.  Accordingly, the record reflects Silas’ 
inconsistent and wavering testimony did not establish that McFadden did not shoot 
victim.   
At the postconviction hearing, counsel testified they believed calling Codefendant 
would aid McFadden’s case, as his testimony was the only way for the jury to hear the 
theory that Codefendant’s brother may have been the second shooter.  Indeed, counsel 
elicited other helpful statements from Codefendant, including testimony that Codefendant 
entered a plea and did not receive the maximum sentence even though the State was 
seeking the death penalty for McFadden’s role in the same murder.  As counsel made an 
informed, strategic decision to call Codefendant as a witness, the circuit court did not 
clearly err in finding counsel’s decision reasonable.  Johnson v. State, 333 S.W.3d 459, 
467 (Mo. banc 2011).   
 
McFadden also argues that, by calling Codefendant to testify, counsel violated his 
right to maintain his innocence by effectively conceding guilt.  But this claim is not 
7 
 
preserved, as it was not raised in his Rule 29.15 motion.  Shockley v. State, 579 S.W.3d 
881, 899 (Mo. banc 2019).  As “there is no plain error review in appeals from 
postconviction judgments for claims that were not presented in the post-conviction 
motion,” this Court cannot address this claim.  Id. 
B.  Failure to Impeach Codefendant with His Rule 24.035 Motion 
 
McFadden argues the circuit court clearly erred in failing to find counsel 
ineffective for not using Codefendant’s pro se Rule 24.035 motion to impeach 
Codefendant’s testimony.  In that motion, Codefendant asserted he was not present when 
Victim was shot.   
Although the circuit court took judicial notice of Codefendant’s Rule 24.035 
motion, postconviction counsel failed to ask counsel for an explanation why they did not 
impeach Codefendant with the motion.  It is presumed that counsel’s decision not to 
impeach a witness is a matter of trial strategy.  Barton v. State, 432 S.W.3d 741, 750 
(Mo. banc 2014).  Accordingly, McFadden “failed to provide the motion court with any 
basis for concluding that counsel did not have a strategic purpose.”  Helmig v. State, 42 
S.W.3d 658, 676 (Mo. App. 2001).   
 
Further, as the circuit court found, it was reasonable for counsel not to question 
Codefendant about the motion, as the motion’s substance did not support the defense’s 
strategy.  The defense sought to prove McFadden’s innocence through evidence that 
Codefendant and his brother killed Victim.  A statement by Codefendant that 
Codefendant was not involved in the shooting would be inconsistent with the defense’s 
position.  Although McFadden may be correct that it would have been reasonable strategy 
8 
 
for counsel to impeach Codefendant using the motion, “[i]t is not ineffective assistance of 
counsel to pursue one reasonable trial strategy to the exclusion of another reasonable trial 
strategy.”  Anderson v. State, 196 S.W.3d 28, 33 (Mo. banc 2006).   
Because McFadden has failed to overcome the presumption that counsel’s 
decision not to impeach Codefendant was reasonable trial strategy, the circuit court did 
not clearly err in denying this claim. 
C. Failure to Object to the State’s Introduction of Letters  
Exchanged between McFadden and Codefendant 
 
 
McFadden argues that the circuit court clearly erred in failing to find counsel 
ineffective for not objecting to the admission of letters that McFadden and Codefendant 
exchanged while both individuals were in jail.  McFadden asserts the letters written by 
Codefendant were inadmissible as hearsay and irrelevant evidence.  Further, McFadden 
claims the letters he wrote were inadmissible as irrelevant.  
 
Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered as “evidence to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted.”  State v. Reed, 282 S.W.3d 835, 837 (Mo. banc 2009).  Generally, 
hearsay is excluded because “the out-of-court statement is not subject to cross-
examination, is not offered under oath, and the fact-finder is not able to judge the 
declarant’s demeanor and credibility as a witness.”  State v. Link, 25 S.W.3d 136, 145 
(Mo. banc 2000).  When a declarant testifies live and under oath, “the dangers of hearsay 
are largely non-existent.”  State v. Forrest, 183 S.W.3d 218, 224 (Mo. banc 2006).  For 
this reason, prejudice cannot be found from the admission of hearsay evidence if the 
9 
 
declarant “was also a witness at trial, testified on the same matter, and was subject to 
cross-examination.”  State v. Tindle, 395 S.W.3d 56, 63 (Mo. App. 2013).   
 
When the circuit court admitted the letters into evidence, it expressly ruled the 
letters could not be read to the jury unless Codefendant testified.  Codefendant later 
testified, during which he admitted exchanging letters with McFadden.  Because 
Codefendant testified at trial regarding the letters and was subject to cross-examination 
on the matter, McFadden was not prejudiced by the admission of the letters written by 
Codefendant.   
 
McFadden also asserts both sets of letters were inadmissible because they were 
irrelevant.  To be admissible, evidence must be both logically and legally relevant.  State 
v. Anderson, 306 S.W.3d 529, 538 (Mo. banc 2010).  Evidence is logically relevant when 
it “tends to make the existence of a material fact more or less probable.”  Id.  Evidence is 
legally relevant when its probative value outweighs its costs, such as “unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, waste of time, or 
cumulativeness.”  Id.  The State asserts the letters were admitted to establish that 
McFadden was attempting to persuade Codefendant to conceal McFadden’s involvement 
in the shooting, showing McFadden’s consciousness of guilt.  For example, one of 
McFadden’s letters asked Codefendant to “[j]ust hold fast,” and one of Codefendant’s 
letters stated, “[T]ell your lawyer to put me on the stand because I know you wasn’t there 
and I’m willing to testify on your behalf.”  The letters showed McFadden was 
communicating with Codefendant, making more probable the State’s argument that 
McFadden persuaded Codefendant to cover up McFadden’s involvement in the shooting. 
10 
 
 
McFadden further argues the phrases in the letters suggesting gang affiliation – 
such as “Love-N-Loyalty;” “Love is love. Loyalty is royalty;” and “Yung Hood” – 
caused unfair prejudice.  But these phrases are vague in nature and not so prejudicial as to 
outweigh the letters’ probative value.  See State v. Davidson, 242 S.W.3d 409, 415 (Mo. 
App. 2007) (“Where, as here, there is no reference to any specific criminal act committed 
either by the defendant or by any gang to which the defendant might belong, admission of 
such a vague reference . . . does not support a claim of reversible error.”).  Accordingly, 
any objection by counsel regarding the relevance of the letters would have been meritless.   
Because McFadden has failed to prove that counsel’s failure to object to the 
admission of the letters resulted in prejudice, the circuit court did not clearly err in 
denying these claims. 
D. Failure to Object to the State’s Introduction of  
Identification and Fingerprint Evidence 
 
McFadden argues the circuit court clearly erred in failing to find counsel 
ineffective for not objecting to the State’s introduction of evidence demonstrating 
(1) Silas identified McFadden using a photograph on the wall at the police station and 
(2) fingerprints on a cigar wrapper found at the crime scene matched “on file” 
fingerprints belonging to McFadden.  McFadden argues this evidence was inadmissible 
because it created the inference he had a criminal record or was in trouble with the police.  
“[P]roof of the commission of separate and distinct crimes is not admissible, unless such 
proof has some legitimate tendency to directly establish the defendant’s guilt of the 
charge for which he is on trial.”  State v. Shilkett, 204 S.W.2d 920, 922-23 (Mo. 1947).   
11 
 
1.  Failure to Object to Identification Evidence 
At trial, the State played Silas’ recorded statement to police, in which he identified 
McFadden by using the photograph from the police station wall.  A police officer and 
detective also testified Silas used the photograph to identify McFadden.  These references 
to the photograph were not made to indicate McFadden had committed prior bad acts or 
uncharged crimes.  There were no references to the photograph as a “wanted” photograph 
and no explanation was provided for the photograph’s presence.  There was no evidence 
linking McFadden’s photograph to other crimes he may or may not have committed.  See 
State v. Carr, 50 S.W.3d 848, 857 (Mo. App. 2001) (requiring defendant, who alleged the 
State’s use of the term “mug shots” and reference to photographs on file with the police 
department indicated prior criminal activity, to demonstrate photographs maintained by 
the police department were solely of persons who committed prior crimes, or that the 
average juror believes same, to satisfy burden of involvement in prior criminal activity); 
Nunn v. State, 755 S.W.2d 269, 272 (Mo. App. 1988) (finding an officer testifying he saw 
defendant’s photograph at roll call was not suggestion that defendant had a criminal 
record when there was no actual evidence of other crimes).   
Even if the references to the photograph on the wall demonstrated McFadden 
committed prior crimes, “otherwise inadmissible evidence may be admitted . . . if it tends 
to establish . . . the identity of the person charged with commission of the crime on trial.”  
State v. Primm, 347 S.W.3d 66, 70 (Mo. banc 2011).  Because the references to the 
photograph were for the purpose of identification, there would have been no merit to an 
objection to the admission of this evidence.  See Clay, 975 S.W.2d at 135.  The circuit 
12 
 
court did not clearly err in failing to find counsel were ineffective for not objecting to the 
State’s presentation of evidence that Silas identified McFadden in a photograph on the 
wall at the police station. 
2. Failure to Object to the Match of On-file Fingerprints  
A fingerprint examiner obtained a fingerprint from a cigar wrapper found near 
Victim’s body.  The examiner testified that, after a comparison to prints on file in the 
Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS), he determined it was a match to 
McFadden’s fingerprints.  “Fingerprint cards, in and of themselves, do not constitute 
evidence of a prior crime.”  State v. Morrow, 968 S.W.2d 100, 111 (Mo. banc 1998).  
This Court finds the on-file fingerprints in this case to be analogous.  The examiner’s 
testimony was neutral.  He did not testify that McFadden’s fingerprints on file were 
obtained pursuant to an arrest, conviction of a crime, or negative interaction with law 
enforcement.  The examiner merely testified about the procedure used.   
Because the evidence of the on-file fingerprint was referenced in the context of 
explaining the procedure for the match and did not, absent something more, raise an 
inference of prior criminal activity, there would have been no merit to the objection.  The 
circuit court did not clearly err in failing to find counsel ineffective for not objecting to 
evidence that the fingerprint found at the murder scene matched one of McFadden’s 
on-file fingerprints. 
 
 
 
13 
 
II. Alleged Penalty Phase Errors  
A. Failure to Introduce Certain Evidence Regarding Victim’s Bad Character 
 
During the penalty phase, the State offered testimony by Victim’s mother, 
girlfriend, and sister, all of whom portrayed Victim as an upstanding individual.  
McFadden argues the circuit court clearly erred in failing to find counsel ineffective for 
not presenting certain evidence to rebut this portrayal of Victim.  As a result of the 
absence of certain rebuttal evidence, McFadden claims the jury believed him to be more 
deserving of the death penalty.  Specifically, McFadden argues counsel should have 
obtained and introduced a copy of Victim’s guilty plea to the felony of second-degree 
drug trafficking.  He further argues counsel should have called Tanesia Kirkman-Clark to 
testify. 
1.  Victim’s Guilty Plea Court Record 
At the postconviction evidentiary hearing, McFadden submitted a certified court 
record, which indicated that Victim had pleaded guilty to second-degree drug trafficking 
for possessing six or more grams of cocaine base.  Although introduction of this record 
would have rebutted the evidence of Victim’s good character by demonstrating his 
involvement with drugs, counsel were not ineffective for failing to present evidence that 
was cumulative to other evidence presented at trial.  Forrest, 290 S.W.3d at 709.  During 
trial, counsel presented evidence that Victim possessed cocaine at the time of his death 
and further emphasized this point during closing argument.  During the cross-
examinations of Victim’s mother and girlfriend, counsel elicited that both witnesses were 
unaware of Victim’s involvement with drugs.   
14 
 
Although evidence that Victim possessed cocaine is not the equivalent of evidence 
of a second-degree drug trafficking conviction, McFadden has failed to prove there is a 
reasonable probability that the jury – which heard evidence regarding Victim’s history of 
cocaine possession – would not have recommended the death penalty had Victim’s 
conviction record been admitted into evidence.  For this reason, the circuit court did not 
clearly err in denying McFadden’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim for counsel’s 
failure to present evidence of the guilty plea court record.   
2. Kirkman-Clark’s Testimony 
 
McFadden next argues the circuit court clearly erred in failing to determine 
counsel were ineffective by not calling Kirkman-Clark to testify.  To prevail on a claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to call a witness during the penalty phase 
of trial, a movant must establish, among other requirements, that “the witness could be 
located through reasonable investigation.”  Barton, 432 S.W.3d at 757.  McFadden 
argues Gennetten v. State, 96 S.W.3d 143, 148 (Mo. App. 2003), in which the court held 
counsel ineffective for failing to locate and present an expert witness who would have 
presented a viable defense for movant, is analogous.  But Gennetten can be distinguished 
on its facts, as counsel in that case did not attempt to contact or locate the witness at all.  
Id. at 151.  Here, counsel testified they attempted to contact and locate Kirkman-Clark 
but were unsuccessful.  As McFadden did not prove that Kirkman-Clark could have been 
located through reasonable investigation, he failed to demonstrate counsel were deficient 
in their attempt to locate Kirkman-Clark.   
15 
 
 
Even if Kirkman-Clark could have been located through reasonable investigation, 
McFadden has failed to demonstrate he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to call her as 
a witness.  Because McFadden is arguing counsel were ineffective in failing to call a 
witness during the penalty phase, “a ‘viable defense’ is one in which there is a reasonable 
probability that the additional mitigating evidence those witnesses would have provided 
would have outweighed the aggravating evidence presented by the prosecutor resulting in 
the jury voting against the death penalty.”  Deck, 381 S.W.3d at 346.     
McFadden asserts Kirkman-Clark would have rebutted evidence of Victim’s good 
character through her testimony that Victim dealt drugs, carried a gun, and was involved 
in a drive-by shooting.  In her deposition, Kirkman-Clark testified that Victim sold drugs, 
which she learned by witnessing him receive a phone call and observing another 
individual waiting for him.  As these facts alone do not establish that Victim was selling 
drugs, Kirkman-Clark’s testimony to that effect would have been an inadmissible, 
speculative conclusion.  See State v. Boyd, 706 S.W.2d 461, 465 (Mo. App. 1986) (“[T]he 
general rule provides that a lay witness must be restricted to statements of fact, not 
opinions or conclusions.”).  Kirkman-Clark further testified she had heard Victim was 
involved in a drive-by shooting of her mother’s house.  As Kirkman-Clark recognized 
during her deposition, this testimony would have been inadmissible hearsay.  See Tisius, 
519 S.W.3d at 422.  Accordingly, testimony by Kirkman-Clark that Victim was a drug 
dealer and was involved in a drive-by shooting would have been inadmissible, and 
counsel is not ineffective for not presenting inadmissible evidence.  Id.   
16 
 
McFadden has failed to establish the remainder of Kirkman-Clark’s testimony 
would have produced a viable defense.  Although she testified Victim carried a gun, she 
later stated the gun was only for protection.  Her testimony actually could have 
negatively impacted McFadden’s defense, as she repeatedly emphasized Victim’s good 
character, maintaining that he “was nice,” “respectable” and “liked to . . . make people 
laugh.”  As Kirkman-Clark’s testimony would have had only minimal probative value in 
demonstrating Victim’s violent tendencies and bad character, the circuit court did not 
clearly err in determining there was not a reasonable probability that McFadden would 
not have received a death sentence had she testified.  
B. Failure to Call Additional Expert and Lay Witnesses in Mitigation 
 
McFadden argues the circuit court clearly erred in failing to find counsel 
ineffective for not calling four additional lay witnesses and two additional expert 
witnesses.   
 
When representing a defendant in a death penalty case, “trial counsel has an 
obligation to investigate and discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence.”  
Davis v. State, 486 S.W.3d 898, 906 (Mo. banc 2016).  Such mitigating evidence may 
include “medical history, educational history, employment and training history, family 
and social history, prior adult and juvenile correctional experience, and religious and 
cultural influences.”  Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003).  At the same time, the 
duty to investigate does not require counsel “to scour the globe on the off-chance 
something will turn up; reasonably diligent counsel may draw a line when they have good 
17 
 
reason to think further investigation would be a waste.”  Strong, 263 S.W.3d at 652 
(quoting Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383 (2005)).   
At the postconviction hearing, counsel testified the defense’s mitigation theory 
was that McFadden grew up in a bad neighborhood with a home environment that lacked 
guidance and support.  During the penalty phase at trial, counsel called seven lay 
witnesses, each of whom emphasized the difficulties McFadden experienced growing up 
in Pine Lawn.  Two of McFadden’s aunts and an uncle testified he was a smaller-sized 
child who was bullied by other children at school and in the neighborhood.  McFadden’s 
father testified that, when McFadden was around seven years old, he often had bruises, 
black eyes, and scratches.  McFadden’s grandmother testified that he did not have a 
consistent home and stayed with various family members.  Lynette Hood, a friend of 
McFadden’s who lived in Pine Lawn, testified that Pine Lawn is a violent neighborhood 
and that she often heard gunshots.  She stated McFadden was shot in the leg, which led to 
a decline of his mental health and wellbeing.  A St. Louis juvenile officer testified that 
Pine Lawn is a “violent,” “depressed,” and “difficult place” to live.  He further stated 
McFadden did not have adequate structure in his home life.  Counsel also called an expert 
witness, Dr. Draper, who testified regarding the effect of McFadden’s home and 
community life on his development.    
1.  Failure to Call Additional Lay Witnesses 
 
McFadden now claims counsel should have called four additional lay witnesses 
who lived in Pine Lawn: Kirkman-Clark, Elwyn Walls, Sean Nichols, and Willabea 
Blackburn.  At the postconviction hearing, they testified that Pine Lawn culture consists 
18 
 
of gangs, drugs, and violence.  This testimony would have been cumulative to the 
testimony of the seven lay witnesses and Dr. Draper.  “Counsel is not ineffective for not 
presenting cumulative evidence.”  Deck, 381 S.W.3d at 351.  Further, these witnesses 
would have been subject to potentially damaging cross-examination regarding 
McFadden’s gang involvement and responsibility in creating the violent culture.  
Accordingly, McFadden failed to demonstrate that, had the additional witnesses been 
called to testify, their testimonies would have outweighed the potentially aggravating 
evidence elicited by the State.  For these reasons, the circuit court did not clearly err in 
failing to find counsel ineffective for not calling these additional lay witnesses. 
2.  Failure to Call Dr. White 
McFadden also claims counsel were ineffective in failing to call Dr. Norman 
White, or another sociologist with similar expertise, to testify regarding how the cultural 
environment in which McFadden grew up impacted his development.  McFadden also 
argues counsel were ineffective in failing to provide Dr. Draper with Dr. White’s report. 
  Postconviction counsel asked Dr. White to study Pine Lawn to gain an 
understanding of McFadden’s life as an adolescent in the 1980s and 1990s.  Dr. White 
reviewed Dr. Draper’s report, watched a video compilation of interviews addressing life 
in Pine Lawn, read Pine Lawn newspaper clippings, and interviewed Pine Lawn 
residents.   
 
 Although Dr. White’s testimony would have further supported the defense’s 
mitigation theory, Dr. White was unable to opine how growing up in Pine Lawn actually 
impacted McFadden’s decision to murder Victim.  Because the defense presented ample 
19 
 
evidence of the Pine Lawn culture and its effects on McFadden’s childhood and 
development – including testimony by another expert, Dr. Draper – additional expert 
testimony on this topic would have been of limited assistance.  See Deck, 381 S.W.3d at 
351. 
As for McFadden’s claim that counsel were ineffective in failing to provide 
Dr. Draper with Dr. White’s report, counsel testified at the postconviction hearing that 
Dr. Draper never indicated she needed additional information to inform her opinion.  
Further, the record indicates that, even if Dr. Draper had reviewed Dr. White’s report 
prior to testifying at trial, her testimony would not have substantively changed.   At trial, 
Dr. Draper testified the violent environment in which McFadden lived impaired his 
ability to make decisions.  Similarly, at the postconviction hearing, Dr. Draper testified 
the environmental factors identified by Dr. White, such as crime and violence in the 
community, had an adverse effect on McFadden’s development.  Dr. Draper’s opinion 
that McFadden used his free will to kill multiple people did not change after reviewing 
Dr. White’s report.  Because McFadden failed to demonstrate that introduction of 
Dr. White’s findings into evidence – either through Dr. White’s own testimony or 
through furnishing his report to Dr. Draper – would have produced a viable defense, the 
circuit court did not clearly err in failing to find counsel ineffective for not introducing 
Dr. White’s findings into evidence.  
3. Failure to Call Dr. Gelbort 
 
McFadden similarly argues the circuit court clearly erred in failing to find counsel 
ineffective in not calling Dr. Gelbort, or a similarly qualified neurological expert, to 
20 
 
testify regarding McFadden’s mental capacity.  McFadden argues Dr. Gelbort’s 
testimony should have been presented to support a pretrial motion or, alternatively, to 
support the defense’s argument during the penalty phase that the jury was required to find 
McFadden was mentally at least 18 years old before sentencing him to death.  
To the extent McFadden argues a mental age of younger than 18 entitles him to be 
treated as a juvenile for sentencing purposes and precludes imposition of the death 
penalty, despite that he was 23 years old at the time he committed the murder, this Court 
has rejected that argument.  See Tisius, 519 S.W.3d at 430-31.  Tisius held that even 
though the United States Supreme Court “recognized the potential for a defendant’s 
mental age to differ from his or her biological age,” it “nonetheless, implemented a bright 
line rule as to the minority age for imposition of the death penalty” and “trial counsel 
were not ineffective for failing to object on grounds that [the defendant’s] mental age 
prohibited imposition of the death penalty.”  Id. at 431.  Accordingly, even if counsel had 
called Dr. Gelbort to testify regarding McFadden’s mental capacity, his testimony could 
not have affected McFadden’s death penalty eligibility, as McFadden incorrectly 
suggests.  
 
To the extent McFadden argues counsel were unreasonable in deciding not to call 
Dr. Gelbort as an expert during the penalty phase, his claim also fails.  In 2004, counsel 
asked Dr. Gelbort to conduct a neuropsychological evaluation of McFadden.  Dr. Gelbort 
testified the results indicated McFadden had brain abnormalities affecting his ability to 
solve problems, make decisions, and excel academically.   
21 
 
Dr. Gelbort testified in the first trial involving the murder of Victim as well as the 
trial involving the murder of Leslie.  According to counsel, Dr. Gelbort’s testimony was 
not particularly helpful in those cases, as he had “extremely bad” demeanor on the 
witness stand and lost credibility with the jury.  Further, Dr. Gelbort was unable to testify 
that McFadden’s brain abnormalities caused him to kill Victim, and, in both cases, the 
juries recommended death.  Counsel testified they made a strategic decision not to call 
Dr. Gelbort as an expert again, concluding the negative impact of Dr. Gelbort’s poor 
demeanor outweighed any potential benefit of his testimony.  Instead, counsel chose to 
call Dr. Draper as well as lay witnesses to testify regarding the effect of Pine Lawn 
culture on McFadden’s development.  Such “strategic choices made after thorough 
investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible opinions are virtually 
unchallengeable.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.  Counsel reasonably chose not to pursue a 
strategy that had failed in prior trials, Baumruck v. State, 364 S.W.3d 518, 536 (Mo. banc 
2012), and instead chose “to pursue one reasonable trial strategy to the exclusion of 
another.”  Davis, 486 S.W.3d at 912.  For these reasons, the circuit court did not clearly 
err in failing to find counsel ineffective for not calling Dr. Gelbort as a witness.  
C. Failure to Present Brain Scan Evidence 
 
McFadden argues counsel were ineffective in failing to order a PET (positron 
emission tomography) scan of his brain and in failing to call Dr. Ruben Gur, a clinical 
psychologist, to testify about the scan’s results.   
 
At the postconviction hearing, counsel testified McFadden underwent an MRI 
scan, which came back normal.  Dr. David Preston, a medical doctor working with 
22 
 
counsel at the time, then recommended ordering a PET scan.  Counsel testified they 
considered arranging a PET scan but were unaware of any experts who forensically 
interpreted the scans, as the medical community at that time was opposed to the use of 
PET scans in criminal cases.  Even if counsel had identified a place to have a PET scan 
performed, counsel testified they were hesitant to order the scan due to the concern that it 
was impossible to do so without the State knowing, and any “normal” result could be 
used against McFadden.  These concerns were valid reasons to avoid pursuing the scan.  
See Forrest, 290 S.W.3d at 709 (holding counsel was not ineffective for failing to obtain 
a PET scan based on fears that the scan would not be “ex parte and under seal” and 
potentially would “provide[] harmful information that would undermine other mitigating 
evidence”).   
 
Further, the record indicates any potential benefit obtained from conducting a PET 
scan would have been negligible.  During the postconviction hearing, Dr. Gur testified 
regarding a PET scan he performed on McFadden years after the murder.  According to 
Dr. Gur, the scan showed abnormalities indicating McFadden likely had difficulty 
controlling an emotional response when “challenged or threatened.”  But during cross-
examination, Dr. Gur conceded that the abnormalities in McFadden’s scan were not 
necessarily related to his decisions to kill others and that not all individuals with similar 
abnormalities are murderers.  As this Court stated in Zink v. State, 278 S.W.3d 170, 182 
(Mo. banc 2009), “the mitigating value of the PET scan evidence is limited because . . . 
there is no generally accepted scientific link between [a movant’s] brain abnormalities 
and his diagnosed personality disorders.”  
23 
 
  
As counsel’s time and resources are limited, “if there is a strategy that does not 
look promising, he may choose not to expend his limited resources to that end.”  Id. at 
181.  Here, counsel balanced the potential risks of ordering a PET scan with the minimal 
potential benefits, and the circuit court did not clearly err in finding counsel’s decision 
not to order the scan reasonable.   
D. Failure to Present Evidence Rebutting that McFadden Previously Committed Assaults 
McFadden argues the circuit court clearly erred in failing to find counsel 
ineffective for not rebutting aggravation evidence, which showed that McFadden was 
previously convicted of two counts each of first-degree assault and armed criminal action 
for attacking Daryl Bryant and Jermaine Burns.   Specifically, McFadden asserts counsel 
should have: (1) called Butch Johnson, an investigator with the public defender’s office, 
to testify; (2) presented evidence of Bryant’s medical records; and (3) presented evidence 
of Codefendant’s affidavit.   
1. Failure to Call Johnson 
McFadden argues Johnson should have been called to rebut police report 
statements regarding how the assaults occurred.  Occupants of a van in which Bryant and 
Burns were passengers told police that McFadden shot at them while standing at the front 
of the van.  But Johnson testified at his deposition that the location of the bullets 
indicated the shooter stood at the back of the van.  Importantly, Johnson’s testimony 
regarding the location of the shooter would not have established that McFadden was not 
the shooter.  Further, his concessions during cross-examination undermined his 
conclusion that the shooter stood at the rear of the van, as Johnson agreed at least one of 
24 
 
the two bullets found could not have been fired from the van’s rear.  The circuit court 
concluded Johnson was not qualified to give opinions regarding the evidence in the 
assault case because “[h]is observations, conclusions, and opinions were based on 
personal speculation rather than physical evidence.”  This Court “defers to the motion 
court’s superior opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses.” Barton, 432 S.W.3d at 
760.  As there is not a reasonable probability that Johnson’s testimony would have 
provided McFadden with a viable defense, the circuit court did not clearly err in failing to 
find counsel ineffective in not calling Johnson to testify.   
2. Failure to Present Evidence of Bryant’s Medical Records 
McFadden also argues counsel were ineffective for failing to present evidence of 
Bryant’s medical records to undermine any conclusion that Bryant suffered serious 
physical injury as a result of the assault.  But there was no question the wound was 
substantial and required hospital treatment.  The medical records confirmed that Bryant 
received a prescription for “severe” pain and that he was discharged with crutches.  
Further, an injury need not be serious to constitute felony assault.  Even if the medical 
records supported the conclusion that the injury was not severe, introducing them into 
evidence would not have impacted the jury’s finding that McFadden was convicted of 
two counts of felony assault.  See State v. Kinder, 942 S.W.2d 313, 332 (Mo. banc 1996) 
(“[F]or purposes of evaluating a statutory aggravator, the determination of whether a 
prior conviction is a serious assault is a matter of law for the court, and the jury only 
finds as a matter of fact that a prior conviction actually occurred.”).  For these reasons, 
25 
 
the circuit court did not clearly err in failing to find counsel ineffective for not presenting 
evidence of Bryant’s medical records. 
3. Failure to Present Evidence of Codefendant’s Affidavit 
McFadden asserts counsel should have presented evidence of Codefendant’s 
affidavit, in which Codefendant indicated that his brother – and not McFadden – 
assaulted Bryant and Burns.  At the evidentiary hearing, counsel testified they were 
concerned the jury would view this evidence unfavorably, as the jury heard and rejected 
similar evidence during the guilt phase.  According to counsel, such evidence would have 
actually been aggravating because “[i]t makes it look like Vincent McFadden just blames 
everything on someone else.”   
Counsel testified that, as a matter of strategy, they wanted to limit evidence of the 
prior assault convictions, as the State could have put on even more prejudicial and 
inflammatory evidence to support the convictions. The circuit court did not clearly err in 
finding counsel used reasonable trial strategy in deciding not to present evidence of 
Codefendant’s affidavit.   
E. Failure to Present Additional Evidence to Impeach Eva Addison’s Testimony 
McFadden argues the circuit court clearly erred in failing to find counsel 
ineffective in the penalty phase for not calling several additional lay witnesses and failing 
to present photographs and measurements of the crime scene to impeach Eva Addison’s 
testimony that she saw McFadden kill her sister, Leslie Addison.  Eva testified that, 
before McFadden killed Leslie, McFadden confronted Eva and argued with Leslie at 
Maggie Jones’ house.  McFadden left in a vehicle, and Leslie walked away from Jones’ 
26 
 
house because she was scared.  Eva testified she eventually observed McFadden get out 
of the vehicle, approach Leslie, and shoot her.  Eva then ran back to Jones’ house. 
 “Ordinarily, the failure to call a witness will not support an ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim because the choice of witnesses is presumptively a matter of trial 
strategy.”  Tisius, 519 S.W.3d at 427.  This presumption applies to counsel’s decision not 
to impeach a witness.  Barton, 432 S.W.3d at 750.  “A trial strategy decision may only 
serve as a basis for ineffective counsel if the decision is unreasonable.”  McLaughlin v. 
State, 378 S.W.3d 328, 337 (Mo. banc 2012).  As McFadden is again claiming counsel 
were ineffective in failing to call certain witnesses during the penalty phase, “a ‘viable 
defense’ is one in which there is a reasonable probability that the additional mitigating 
evidence those witnesses would have provided would have outweighed the aggravating 
evidence presented by the prosecutor resulting in the jury voting against the death 
penalty.”  Deck, 381 S.W.3d at 346.  “[S]trategic choices made after thorough 
investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.” 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. 
1.  Failure to Call Jones  
If called, Jones would have testified that she did not hear the Addisons and 
McFadden fighting on the night Leslie was murdered and that Eva did not tell her they 
had been fighting.  McFadden argues this would have impeached Eva’s claim that she 
fought with McFadden outside the house the night Leslie was murdered. 
Counsel testified they made the strategic decision not to call Jones at this trial 
because whether Eva and McFadden fought the night of Leslie’s murder was not a key 
27 
 
issue in this case.  Further, Jones’ testimony was only marginally persuasive because she 
admitted she was in her bedroom the entire evening watching television, making it 
possible that she would not have heard the fighting.  Jones’ testimony could have actually 
bolstered other aspects of Eva’s testimony, as Jones testified that the night Leslie was 
murdered she spoke with Eva, who told her she had seen McFadden shoot Leslie multiple 
times.  As Jones’s testimony would have actually supported Eva’s testimony that 
McFadden killed Leslie, McFadden has failed to demonstrate her testimony would have 
produced a viable defense.  See Deck, 381 S.W.3d at 346. 
2. Failure to Call Jackson  
McFadden also contends counsel were ineffective in failing to call his friend, 
Arnell “Smoke” Jackson.  At a deposition, Jackson testified he was riding in a car near 
Jones’ home before Leslie was killed.  When he saw McFadden leave Jones’ home, he 
followed McFadden and never saw him get out of the car or shoot Leslie.  But Jackson 
stopped following McFadden after the car McFadden was in turned the other way, and 
Jackson conceded he did not know what actions McFadden took after this point.  
As counsel concluded, Jackson “didn’t have anything helpful to say,” as his 
testimony would not have undermined Eva’s testimony that McFadden shot Leslie.  On 
the contrary, Jackson’s testimony would have corroborated Eva’s testimony by placing 
McFadden at the crime scene.  Further, Jackson would have been especially vulnerable to 
impeachment based on his lengthy criminal record – including murder – as well as his 
friendship with McFadden and admission he tried to persuade McFadden to leave Jones’ 
house because McFadden was wanted for Victim’s murder.  The circuit court did not 
28 
 
clearly err in finding defense counsel used a reasonable trial strategy in deciding not to 
call Jackson as a witness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. 
3. Failure to Call Walsh  
Margaret Walsh is the technician who performed blood analysis testing on the 
clothing McFadden was wearing when he was arrested for Leslie’s murder.  McFadden 
claims Walsh’s failure to find blood on his clothes, when Leslie was shot at close range, 
weakens Eva’s testimony that he shot Leslie.  But McFadden was not arrested until two 
days after the shooting, and Walsh admitted she did not know whether the items she 
tested were actually worn by McFadden at the time of Leslie’s murder.  Counsel testified 
at the postconviction hearing that, after considering the limited impeachment value, they 
decided against calling Walsh as a witness.  The circuit court did not clearly err in finding 
defense counsel used a reasonable trial strategy in not calling Walsh, absent a showing 
McFadden was wearing the same clothes at the time of shooting or had not washed 
them.5 
                                              
5 McFadden cites Black v. State, 151 S.W.3d 49, 56 (Mo. banc 2004), for the proposition that 
counsel can be found ineffective for failing to impeach witnesses with their prior inconsistent 
statements about the circumstances surrounding the crime when the defendant’s mental state 
“was the key issue in contention between the parties” and the prior inconsistent statements 
“related directly to the central issue of whether [the defendant] acted with deliberation or in a fit 
of rage or out of self-defense.”  In such circumstances, there is a reasonable probability this 
would have affected the outcome of the trial because, if believed, the testimony would have 
negated an element of the crime for which the defendant was convicted.  Id. at 58.  Unlike in 
Black, McFadden fails to identify prior inconsistent statements Eva made and with which she 
could have been impeached, nor would the impeaching testimony of these three uncalled 
witnesses have related “directly to the central issue.”  Rather, and again unlike in Black, counsel 
made a strategic decision not to call additional lay witnesses after weighing their impeachment 
value against the damaging cross-examination to which they would have been subjected. 
 
29 
 
4. Failure to Present Evidence of Lighting and Distance 
 
McFadden argues counsel were ineffective for failing to present additional 
evidence of the lighting at the murder scene and the distance between where Eva reported 
she was standing and the location where the shooting occurred.    
Officer Jeff Hunnius, a crime scene investigator, took photographs of the scene the 
night of the murder.  On cross-examination, he testified that there were no streetlights on 
the side of the street where the shooting occurred and that he had to use the camera’s 
flash when taking photographs.  Counsel also elicited that the distance from the stop sign 
to the intersection where the shooting occurred was 75 feet, meaning Eva’s location in 
the bushes would have been even farther away.  Similarly, during cross-examination of a 
neighbor who heard the shooting, counsel elicited testimony that the neighbor could not 
tell there was a body on the ground because it was too dark.  The neighbor further 
confirmed there were no streetlights where the shooting occurred.   
McFadden now argues counsel should have introduced additional photographs and 
measurements to further undercut and impeach Eva’s claim she could see the murder 
from the bushes.  In support, at the postconviction hearing, McFadden presented the 
deposition testimony of Johnson, who took photographs of the area and concluded the 
lighting was bad.  But this testimony would have had little, if any, probative value, as 
these photographs were taken in daylight 10 years after the murder, and Johnson was 
unable to testify the lighting and other aspects of the scene had not changed.  Further, 
counsel testified they went to the scene of the murder several times, observed the 
lighting, and determined Eva would have been capable of observing the shooting.  As 
30 
 
counsel made a strategic decision not to present additional evidence of the murder scene 
after a thorough investigation of the pertinent facts, the circuit court did not clearly err in 
finding counsel utilized a reasonable trial strategy.  Zink, 278 S.W.3d at 178.   
F. Failure to Object to Arguments 
McFadden argues counsel were ineffective for failing to object to certain penalty 
phase arguments made by the State.  Specifically, McFadden contends counsel should 
have objected to arguments that: (1) McFadden would have killed Eva except he was 
arrested; (2) in an earlier time, the Victim’s and Addison families would have been given 
the opportunity for personal retribution, but, instead, McFadden received a fair trial; 
(3) the jury should think of the terror that Victim, Victim’s mother, Leslie, and Eva felt; 
(4) McFadden believes in the death penalty; and (5) the jury should hold, hug, and love 
Victim and Leslie, but “don’t let them down.”   
1.  Statement that McFadden Would Have Killed Eva 
In the State’s closing argument in the penalty phase, the State argued: “He 
threatens to kill Eva.  That’s aggravating: you’re going to kill a witness because she 
witnesses you killing her sister.  He wants to kill her.  He just didn’t get a chance to kill 
her because he got caught in St. Charles.” McFadden argues this statement was 
speculative argument that misled the jury.  But “[a] prosecutor is allowed to argue the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence during closing arguments.”  
State v. Brown, 337 S.W.3d 12, 14 (Mo. banc 2011).  The evidence suggested McFadden 
threatened Eva.  Specifically, Eva testified McFadden said he would kill her if she 
continued to claim McFadden killed Leslie.  As the State’s assertion was not outside the 
31 
 
evidence and was a reasonable inference drawn from the evidence, any objection would 
have been meritless, and counsel were not ineffective for failing to object. 
2. Statement Involving Personal Retribution 
In the State’s rebuttal closing argument, it argued:  
Now, ladies and gentlemen, we live in a civilized society.  But there was a 
time when civil society wasn’t so civilized and we would have given the 
[Victim’s family] and the Addison family an opportunity for retribution. 
We would have let them hunt him down like he deserves.  But we 
don’t live in that society.  We gave him a fair trial.  We put on evidence.  He 
had a right to a lawyer, a jury of his peers. 
 
McFadden argues these statements lessened the jury’s sense of responsibility for 
imposing death.  But taken as a whole, the State’s argument explained that due process 
rights for defendants have overtaken a previously uncivilized form of retribution.  As this 
Court held in McFadden’s direct appeal, “the State did not comment that the victim’s 
family deserved retribution in the form of demanding the death penalty” but instead 
“explained that as members of a civilized society we engage in preserving the due 
process rights of a defendant and ensuring a fair trial; we do not seek retribution.”  
McFadden, 369 S.W.3d at 751.  Again, any objection to this argument would have been 
meritless, as the prosecutor’s statement did not lessen the jury’s sense of responsibility 
for imposing death.  Counsel were not ineffective for failing to object to this statement.   
3. Three Additional Statements 
In the State’s rebuttal closing argument, the State made the following three 
statements to which McFadden now alleges counsel were ineffective for failing to object:  
32 
 
First: “Think of the terror that Leslie went through.  Think of the terror that 
[Victim] went through.  Think of the terror that [Victim’s wife], when she came home, 
went through.  Think of the terror that Eva went through when she watched her sister get 
killed.  Think of that.” 
Second: 
That day, those days, those two days in Pine Lawn, there was one juror that 
was there.  And he was the foreman.  He didn’t have any evidence, any rule 
of law.  There was no trial. 
[McFadden], at that time, decided the death penalty was appropriate.  
Because, ladies and gentlemen, if there’s one person that believes in the death 
penalty in this courtroom, it’s [McFadden]. 
 
Third: “Ladies and gentlemen, I leave you with [Victim] and Leslie Addison.  
Hold them.  Hug them.  Tell them you love them.  But most of all, ladies and gentlemen, 
don’t let them down.” 
As to each of these statements, McFadden alleges the State argued facts outside 
the record and injected passion, prejudice, caprice, and emotion, prejudicing the jury.  
But the State argued inferences from evidence presented in this case.  Brown, 337 S.W.3d 
at 14.  The circumstances present in this case involved emotionally charged facts.  
“Arguments likely to inflame and excite prejudices of the jury are not improper if they 
help the jury understand and appreciate evidence that is likely to cause an emotional 
response.”  State v. Rhodes, 988 S.W.2d 521, 528 (Mo. banc 1999).  For this reason, 
counsel were not ineffective for failing to object to these statements. 
33 
 
As each of these statements made during the penalty phase was proper, the circuit 
court did not clearly err in failing to find counsel ineffective for not objecting to these 
statements. 
 
 III. Alleged Errors in the Postconviction Relief Phase 
A.  Overruling Motions to Compel Codefendant to Answer Deposition Questions 
 
Codefendant appeared for a deposition and invoked the Fifth Amendment as to all 
questions asked by counsel.  Counsel filed a motion to compel answers to the deposition 
questions, which the circuit court overruled on the ground that answering the questions 
would violate Codefendant’s Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself.  
McFadden also filed a renewed motion to compel before the evidentiary hearing, which 
the circuit court overruled.  McFadden now argues the circuit court clearly erred in 
overruling the motions to compel Codefendant to answer deposition questions and, in 
doing so, denied McFadden the opportunity to adequately prepare for the Rule 29.15 
evidentiary hearing. 
 
Under the protections of the Fifth Amendment, an individual cannot be compelled 
“to provide testimonial evidence against himself which may then be used to prosecute 
him.”  State v. Sanders, 842 S.W.2d 170, 173 (Mo. App. 1992).  When an answer to a 
posed question would place the witness in “real danger of further incrimination,” the 
witness can validly exercise the privilege.  Id.    
McFadden claims the Fifth Amendment privilege did not apply here because 
Codefendant had already pleaded guilty to killing Victim.  McFadden is correct that “a 
knowing and voluntary guilty plea waives the protection against compelled 
34 
 
self-incrimination as the witness can no longer be incriminated by his testimony about 
said crime,” id., but McFadden fails to prove he was prejudiced by the circuit court’s 
overruling of his motion to compel.  Although McFadden indicates what topics would 
have been covered during Codefendant’s deposition,6 he does not identify how 
Codefendant’s answers to questions concerning these topics would have supported any of 
his claims.  Indeed, it is unclear how Codefendant’s answers to these questions would 
have impacted McFadden’s claims at all, as several of the deposition topics were 
established by other testimony in the record.7  As McFadden has failed to meet his 
burden establishing prejudice, Goodwin v. State, 191 S.W.3d 20, 26 (Mo. banc 2006), the 
circuit court did not clearly err in overruling the motions to compel.   
B. Denying McFadden’s Requests to Attend the Rule 29.05 Evidentiary 
Hearing and to Disqualify the Prosecutor 
 
 
In an amended motion, McFadden requested to be present at the postconviction 
evidentiary hearing, and the circuit court initially ordered that McFadden be present.  The 
State filed a motion to recall the writ, emphasizing that McFadden had been convicted of 
murdering two individuals and that he had been sentenced to death for both murders.  At 
                                              
6 McFadden asserts the following topics would have been covered during Codefendant’s 
deposition: (1) Codefendant’s guilty plea of murder for killing Victim and 20-year prison 
sentence; (2) Codefendant’s deposition by phone years earlier during which he refused to be 
sworn; (3) McFadden’s letter that was delivered to Codefendant at the jail; (4) Codefendant’s 
Rule 24.035 motion; (5) Codefendant’s letter written years earlier to McFadden’s attorneys; 
(6) information regarding perjury charges; (7) Codefendant’s discussion with prosecutors before 
his testimony in the retrial of this case; and (8) the presence of Roderick Jones and “Little Tony” 
when Victim was shot.   
7 For example, the record indicates: Codefendant pleaded guilty to murdering Victim, he refused 
to be sworn during a previous deposition by trial counsel, he wrote a letter to trial counsel, and 
he filed a Rule 24.035 motion.   
35 
 
the hearing on the motion, the State asserted McFadden had previously assaulted a 
department of corrections guard and St. Louis County jail guard.  Postconviction counsel 
opposed the motion and informed the circuit court she had no knowledge of McFadden 
assaulting the guards.  The State filed a supplement to its motion to recall the writ, 
conceding there were no records of McFadden’s involvement in assaultive incidents with 
guards at either the jail or department of corrections.  The supplement also stated that the 
department of corrections’ records indicated that McFadden physically assaulted another 
inmate and that McFadden had “multiple conduct violations.”  The circuit court sustained 
the State’s motion to recall the writ and ordered that McFadden’s testimony be submitted 
by deposition.   
 
Postconviction counsel then moved to disqualify the St. Louis County prosecutor’s 
office, arguing the State’s representations that McFadden had assaulted the guards were 
made for the purpose of prejudicing the circuit court against McFadden.  After a hearing, 
the circuit court overruled the motion.  McFadden now argues the circuit court clearly 
erred in ordering the writ recalled and in overruling the motion to disqualify the 
prosecutor’s office.   
 
“Even when a hearing is granted, not all rights guaranteed to a criminal defendant 
at trial are extended to the Rule 29.15 hearing.”  Edwards v. State, 200 S.W.3d 500, 515 
(Mo. banc 2006).  Because a Rule 29.15 motion is a civil proceeding, neither the rule nor 
the constitution guarantees a movant the right to be present.  State v. Basile, 942 S.W.2d 
342, 362 (Mo. banc 1997); see also Rule 29.15(i) (“At any hearing ordered by the court 
the movant need not be present.”).   McFadden argues the United States Supreme Court’s 
36 
 
recognition of the right to effective assistance of postconviction counsel indicates that he 
must be allowed to attend his hearing to ensure effective assistance.  See Martinez v. 
Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012).  But this argument is without merit, as “[t]here is no right to 
effective assistance of counsel at a Rule 29.15 hearing.”  Edwards, 200 S.W.3d at 515; 
see also Barton v. State, 486 S.W.3d 332, 336 (Mo. banc 2016) (“[N]either this Court nor 
the federal courts have held that this Sixth Amendment right [to counsel] extends to the 
post-conviction process.”).  Because McFadden had no right to attend the hearing, the 
circuit court did not clearly err in sustaining the State’s motion to recall the writ ordering 
McFadden’s attendance at the hearing. 
 
As for McFadden’s claim that the circuit court clearly erred in overruling the 
motion to disqualify the prosecutor’s office, disqualification of a prosecutor is 
appropriate when a conflict of interest prohibits the attorney’s participation in the 
underlying case.  State v. Lemasters, 456 S.W.3d 416, 420 (Mo. banc 2015).  A 
prosecutor’s office “must be disqualified if a reasonable person with knowledge of the 
facts would find an appearance of impropriety and doubt the fairness” of the process.  Id. 
at 423.  During the hearings, the prosecuting attorneys indicated their belief that 
McFadden had a history of assaulting jail and prison guards was derived from 
information received from the St. Louis County jail.  Further, in their supplement to the 
motion, the prosecuting attorneys corrected their earlier statements that McFadden had a 
history of assaulting jail and prison guards.  For these reasons, the record indicates the 
prosecutor’s office was impartial and had no conflict of interest in McFadden’s case.  
37 
 
There was no appearance of impropriety.  The circuit court did not clearly err in 
overruling McFadden’s motion to disqualify the prosecutor’s office.  
C.  Memoranda of Law Claims 
 
More than four years after filing the amended motion, postconviction counsel filed 
a memorandum titled “Memorandum Asserting Ineffective Assistance of Counsel for 
Failure to Investigate and Adduce Evidence of Movant’s Brain Deficiencies During the 
Guilt Phase.”  In the memorandum, postconviction counsel recognized the two claims 
regarding Dr. Gur and Dr. Gelbort in the amended motion applied only to the penalty 
phase but requested those claims also apply to the guilt phase.  In response, the State filed 
a motion to dismiss, asserting the claims alleged in the memorandum were barred 
because they were not raised in the amended motion.  The circuit court sustained the 
State’s motion to dismiss, finding the claims untimely.  Several months later, McFadden 
filed a letter complaining postconviction counsel failed to include these claims in his 
Rule 29.15 amended motion. 
McFadden now asserts two arguments regarding the claims asserted in the 
memorandum.  First, McFadden argues the circuit court clearly erred in treating the 
claims as untimely.  Next, McFadden argues the circuit court clearly erred in failing to 
find that postconviction counsel abandoned him when postconviction counsel did not 
include the memorandum claims in the amended motion. 
1.  Failure to Find the Claims Timely  
To the extent McFadden argues the Rule 29.15 time limits are unconstitutional, 
“unreasonably short,” and should be reconsidered by this Court, this claim has been 
38 
 
waived, as McFadden failed to make this claim before the circuit court.  See White v. 
State, 939 S.W.2d 887, 904 (Mo. banc 1997) (“Since the issue was never raised in the 
post-conviction proceeding, error by that court, plain, clear, or otherwise, is not 
discernable.”).   
To the extent McFadden asserts this Court’s rules required the circuit court to find 
the claims timely, his argument also fails.  Rule 29.15 provides that a postconviction 
relief motion shall be filed within 90 days after the date the mandate of the appellate 
court issues.  The rule also provides a specific timeframe for filing an amended motion.  
See Rule 29.15(g).  It is “a time-worn and oft-rejected charge that the mandatory time 
limits established by Rule 29.15 are unconstitutional.”  State v. Ervin, 835 S.W.2d 905, 
929 (Mo. banc 1992).  Such time limitations are reasonable and constitutional because 
“[t]hey serve the legitimate end of avoiding delay in the processing of prisoners[’] claims 
and prevent the litigation of stale claims.”  Day v. State, 770 S.W.2d 692, 695 (Mo. banc 
1989).  McFadden attempted to amend his claim more than four years after 
postconviction counsel timely filed the amended motion – long after the deadlines 
provided in Rule 29.15.  Accordingly, the circuit court did not clearly err in finding the 
added claims were untimely pursuant to Rule 29.15.   
2. Failure to Find Postconviction Counsel Abandoned McFadden 
 
McFadden next argues the circuit court clearly erred in failing to find 
postconviction counsel abandoned him by not asserting in the amended motion that the 
claims regarding Dr. Gur and Dr. Gelbort should apply to the guilt phase.   
39 
 
In general, an abandonment claim is limited to two circumstances, when “(1) post-
conviction counsel takes no action on movant’s behalf with respect to filing an amended 
motion” or “(2) when post-conviction counsel is aware of the need to file an amended 
post-conviction relief motion and fails to do so in a timely manner.”  Barton, 486 S.W.3d 
at 338.  This Court reviews claims of abandonment carefully “to ensure that the true 
claim is abandonment and not a substitute for an impermissible claim of ineffective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel.”  Eastburn v. State, 400 S.W.3d 770, 774 (Mo. 
banc 2013).  If a movant claims ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel, such 
claims are “categorically unreviewable.”  Id. 
Because postconviction counsel timely filed an amended Rule 29.15 motion, 
McFadden’s assertion that postconviction counsel failed to include additional claims is 
“more appropriately characterized as a claim of ineffective assistance of post-conviction 
counsel.”  Id.  As this Court has made clear abandonment does not encompass perceived 
ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel, id., the circuit court did not clearly err in 
failing to find abandonment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40 
 
Conclusion 
The circuit court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are not clearly 
erroneous.  The judgment denying McFadden postconviction relief is affirmed. 
 
 
______________________________ 
Mary R. Russell, Judge 
 
 
All concur.