Title: O'Connor v. Tice
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 091941
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 13, 2011

Present:  All the Justices 
 
JAMES P. O’CONNOR, ET AL. 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 091941 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
 
 
     January 13, 2011 
JAMES C. TICE 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY 
E. Preston Grissom, Jr., Judge 
 
In this appeal of a judgment entered in favor of the 
plaintiff in a malicious prosecution action, we consider 
whether the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s 
verdict.  In doing so, we focus on whether the defendants 
initiated a criminal prosecution against the plaintiff without 
probable cause. 
BACKGROUND 
 
In 2006, James P. O’Connor and Vickie L. O’Connor, 
through their closely-held limited liability company Viocon 
Enterprises, LLC (collectively “the O’Connors”), purchased a 
commercial building in Lottsburg.  In April of that year, the 
O’Connors began renovating the building in anticipation of 
opening a restaurant and housing Mr. O’Connor’s surveying 
business.  Following two unsuccessful attempts to hire a 
suitable painter, the O’Connors hired James C. Tice’s 
business, T & N Painting, to paint the exterior of their 
building for $6,872.   
 
After receiving a one-third advance of $2,290.67, Tice 
was supposed to start work on June 5, 2006.  However, because 
of rain, Tice and his crew did not begin working until June 6, 
2006.  It rained off and on during the time they were on the 
job.  At one point, the flat roof on the right side of the 
building sustained storm damage.  Because Tice and his crew 
had to stand on that roof to paint a portion of the second 
story of the building, repairs to the roof prevented them from 
working for a few days.  When the repairs to the roof were 
complete, Tice’s employees resumed their work and placed down 
“walk boards,” drop cloths and tarps, and wore soft-soled 
tennis shoes while working from the roof.  According to Tice, 
the roof was in “perfect shape” the last time they worked on 
the building.   
 
On June 19, 2006, Mrs. O’Connor discovered “gouges and 
footprints in the new roof.”  The next day, Mr. O’Connor 
called Tice and left a message for him to stop work 
immediately and not to come back to the job because Tice had 
damaged the roof.  A few days later, when Tice and Mr. 
O’Connor talked on the telephone, Tice denied Mr. O’Connor’s 
accusation that he had damaged the roof.  In an effort to 
“calm [Mr. O’Connor] down,” Tice proposed that since he had 
performed more than one-third of the work, he would keep his 
advance and they would “part amicably.”  According to Tice, 
 
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Mr. O’Connor replied “fine” and hung up.  The O’Connors 
testified that they did not agree to those terms.  According 
to them, Tice denied damaging the roof and told Mr. O’Connor 
that he was keeping his deposit and quitting the job. 
 
Due to weather and roof repair delays, Tice and his crew 
were only able to work on the building for five days in a two-
week span.  During that time, Tice bought materials for the 
job, including paint remover, sanding pads, and primer.  Tice 
and his crew used these materials to strip, sand, and prime 
the building for painting.  In total, Tice estimated that he 
completed 75% of the “prep work,” which was 60-65% of the 
entire job.  Mrs. O’Connor, on the other hand, testified that 
Tice completed roughly 20% of the job.  And Mr. O’Connor 
testified that Tice only finished about 5% of the job.  
 
On September 29, 2006, the O’Connors filed a warrant in 
debt against Tice in the Lancaster County General District 
Court seeking to recover their deposit and money for damage 
done to the roof.  The O’Connors, however, listed the wrong 
address for Tice on the warrant in debt.  When the case 
subsequently was dismissed for no service, the presiding judge 
recommended that the O’Connors go to the Lancaster County 
Sheriff’s Office to obtain Tice’s correct address.  The 
O’Connors went there and were told that because their building 
was located in Northumberland County they should go to the 
 
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Northumberland County Sheriff’s Office to obtain Tice’s 
address.  
 
At the Northumberland County Sheriff’s Office, the 
O’Connors asked to “speak to someone about serving a warrant 
in debt or getting an address.”  They were introduced to 
Sheriff’s Deputy Anthony Darby.  The O’Connors gave Darby 
their “whole packet,” which included Tice’s written estimate, 
photographs of the work done, the warrant in debt, a timeline 
of their recollection of the work performed each day, and 
Tice’s business card.  The O’Connors explained that they had 
paid Tice a partial amount for an unfinished job, but they 
never discussed with Darby that Tice had completed a portion 
of that job.  Based on the information presented to him, Darby 
told the O’Connors that it looked like Tice may have committed 
construction fraud.  Darby then told them that he would find 
Tice’s correct address and that if they wished to pursue a 
criminal prosecution for construction fraud they needed to 
send a certified letter to Tice demanding return of the 
deposit within 15 days of receipt as required by the 
construction fraud statute.  See Code § 18.2-200.1. 
 
On October 19, 2006, the O’Connors sent the “15-day 
letter” to Tice, informing him that they attempted to serve a 
warrant in debt against him, but were unsuccessful because the 
address they had for him did not exist. The letter further 
 
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demanded that he return the $2,290.67 deposit and pay an 
additional $1000 for roof damage and $55 for court costs.  The 
letter then provided, “If we do not receive the debt of 
$3,345.67 within 15 days of this letter we will file a 
criminal complaint for construction fraud in Northumberland 
County.” 
 
Upon receiving the letter, Tice took it to his attorney, 
Paul Christian Stamm, Jr.  Stamm called Mr. O’Connor and 
informed him that Tice had received the letter.  Stamm gave 
Mr. O’Connor Tice’s correct address and told him that Tice 
could be served with a warrant in debt at that address or at 
Stamm’s office.  Stamm then sent a letter to the O’Connors on 
November 3, 2006, which also informed them of Tice’s correct 
address and explained that a warrant in debt could be served 
at that address or at Stamm’s office.  In the letter, Stamm 
wrote, “[i]t appears to me that this is a civil matter and not 
a criminal matter.” 
 
The O’Connors turned over their certified letter, the 
mail receipt, and their materials to Darby at the end of the 
15-day period without telling Darby of Mr. Connor’s phone 
conversation with Stamm or about Stamm’s letter.  Darby, who 
testified that he would not have sought criminal charges 
against Tice if the O’Connors had not come back to him after 
the 15-day period, took their information to then-
 
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Commonwealth’s Attorney R. Michael McKenney to see if there 
was enough information to obtain a warrant.  McKenney 
concluded that the information presented to him constituted 
probable cause to believe that Tice had committed construction 
fraud. 
 
Darby then presented to the magistrate the information 
the O’Connors had provided him.  On November 21, 2006, the 
magistrate issued a warrant for Tice’s arrest, charging him 
with construction fraud in violation of Code § 18.2-200.1.  
Tice was arrested the next day.   
 
On January 22, 2007, a preliminary hearing on the 
criminal warrant was held in the Northumberland County General 
District Court.  At the end of the Commonwealth’s case-in-
chief, Tice’s counsel moved to strike the evidence.  The judge 
granted the motion and dismissed the case for lack of probable 
cause.  
 
On January 23, 2008, Tice filed in the Circuit Court of 
Northumberland County a malicious prosecution action against 
the O’Connors and Darby.  Darby settled with Tice prior to 
trial and was dismissed from the case.   
 
The case proceeded to trial against the O’Connors with 
the jury returning a verdict for Tice in the amount of 
 
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$200,000 in compensatory damages.1  Thereafter, the O’Connors 
made a motion for judgment notwithstanding the jury’s verdict 
on the grounds that as a matter of law they had probable cause 
to believe that Tice committed construction fraud, and 
additionally that there was insufficient evidence that they 
initiated the prosecution of Tice.  Following a hearing, the 
circuit court denied the motion, finding that the facts with 
respect to these issues were in dispute and were therefore 
questions for the jury.  We awarded the O’Connors this appeal. 
DISCUSSION 
 
Malicious prosecution actions arising from criminal 
proceedings are not favored in Virginia and the requirements 
for maintaining such actions are more stringent than those 
applied to other tort cases.  Reilly v. Shepherd, 273 Va. 728, 
733, 643 S.E.2d 216, 218 (2007); Ayyildiz v. Kidd, 220 Va. 
1080, 1082, 266 S.E.2d 108, 110 (1980); Lee v. Southland 
Corp., 219 Va. 23, 26, 244 S.E.2d 756, 758 (1978).  The reason 
for this disfavor is that criminal prosecutions are essential 
for maintaining an orderly society and people should not be 
discouraged from bringing such actions out of fear of 
subsequent civil proceedings against them.  Reilly, 273 Va. at 
                     
1 The O’Connors made a post-trial motion pursuant to Code 
§ 8.01-35.1 for the circuit court to reduce the jury’s verdict 
by $15,000, the amount for which Darby settled with Tice 
before trial.  The court granted this motion and entered 
judgment against the O’Connors in the amount of $185,000. 
 
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733, 643 S.E.2d at 218-19; Ayyildiz, 220 Va. at 1082-83, 266 
S.E.2d at 110-11;  Lee, 219 Va. at 26, 244 S.E.2d at 758.   
 
To prevail in a malicious prosecution action, Tice had to 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the prosecution 
was (1) malicious, (2) instituted by or with the cooperation 
of the O’Connors, (3) without probable cause, and (4) 
terminated in a manner not unfavorable to him.  Reilly, 273 
Va. at 732, 643 S.E.2d at 218; Baker v. Elmendorf, 271 Va. 
474, 476, 628 S.E.2d 358, 359 (2006).  The first and fourth of 
these elements are not at issue in this appeal.  Rather, the 
O’Connors contend that the evidence was insufficient as a 
matter of law for the jury to find that probable cause to 
believe that Tice committed construction fraud did not exist 
at the time the criminal warrant was issued.  The O’Connors 
further contend that the evidence was insufficient as a matter 
of law for the jury to find that the O’Connors initiated the 
prosecution of Tice.  As a threshold matter, we will address 
this latter contention first.  
 
The O’Connors assert that they merely assisted and 
cooperated with law enforcement in the investigation of Tice 
for construction fraud.  They maintain that it was Darby who 
first “raised the specter” of construction fraud, it was Darby 
who advised them to write the 15-day letter to Tice, and it 
was Darby who after receiving the 15-day letter return receipt 
 
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took control of the criminal prosecution by seeking the advice 
of McKenney and obtaining the issuance of the criminal 
warrant.  The O’Connors assert that their only involvement was 
reporting suspected wrongdoing and appearing as witnesses at 
Tice’s preliminary hearing.  They argue that this type of 
involvement cannot constitute “initiating” a criminal 
prosecution as a matter of law.   
 
Tice acknowledges that Darby may have “initially raised 
the specter of a criminal charge for construction fraud 
against Tice,” but the O’Connors were the ones who executed 
the 15-day letter containing a clear warning that they would 
file “a criminal complaint for construction fraud” if Tice 
failed to comply.  Tice points out that after the 15-day 
period had expired, the O’Connors, despite having Tice’s 
correct address to serve a warrant in debt, decided instead to 
turn over their information to Darby with the understanding he 
would seek criminal charges against Tice.  Moreover, Darby 
testified that he would not have sought criminal charges 
against Tice if the O’Connors had not come back to him after 
the 15-day period.  Tice argues that these circumstances 
clearly show that the O’Connors initiated the prosecution of 
Tice.  We agree.  
 
By writing the 15-day letter, warning Tice of criminal 
consequences should he fail to pay them the money they had 
 
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sought by their warrant in debt, the O’Connors clearly availed 
themselves of a criminal process in order to collect a civil 
debt.  See Lee, 219 Va. at 27, 244 S.E.2d at 759 (“The 
institution of a criminal prosecution not for the purpose of 
bringing an offender to justice, but for the primary purpose 
of using it as a means to collect a debt, is for an improper 
purpose and therefore malicious.”)  We find no merit to the 
O’Connors’ contention that they were “merely” cooperating in a 
criminal investigation.  They unmistakably authorized Darby to 
proceed criminally against Tice, providing him with all the 
information used to obtain the issuance of the criminal 
warrant.  We therefore hold that the evidence was sufficient 
for the jury to find that the O’Connors initiated the 
prosecution of Tice. 
 
Turning now to the issue of probable cause, in the 
context of a malicious prosecution action, probable cause is 
defined as knowledge of such facts and circumstances to raise 
the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on those facts and 
circumstances, that the plaintiff is guilty of the crime of 
which he is suspected.  Reilly, 273 Va. at 733, 643 S.E.2d at 
219; Commissary Concepts Mgmt. Corp. v. Mziguir, 267 Va. 586, 
589-90, 594 S.E.2d 915, 917 (2004); Stanley v. Webber, 260 Va. 
90, 95-96, 531 S.E.2d 311, 314 (2000).  Whether probable cause 
existed is determined at the time the defendant took the 
 
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action initiating the criminal charges.  Reilly, 273 Va. at 
733, 643 S.E.2d at 219; Mziguir, 267 Va. at 590, 594 S.E.2d at 
917; Stanley, 260 Va. at 96, 531 S.E.2d at 314-15.  When the 
facts relating to the question of probable cause are in 
dispute, the issue is one of fact to be resolved by the trier 
of fact.  Stanley, 260 Va. at 96, 531 S.E.2d at 315; Lee, 219 
Va. at 27, 244 S.E.2d at 759; Brodie v. Huck, 187 Va. 485, 
488, 47 S.E.2d 310, 312 (1948). 
 
To be guilty of construction fraud, the defendant must 
have the intent to defraud at the time the advance of money is 
received.  See Bottoms v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. ___, ___, ___ 
S.E.2d ___, ___ (2011) (this day decided).  As evidence of 
probable cause to believe that Tice committed construction 
fraud as a matter of law, the O’Connors point to “three 
separate law enforcement officials” – McKenney, the 
magistrate, and Elizabeth A. Trible, the Assistant 
Commonwealth Attorney assigned to prosecute the case – who 
independently concluded that probable cause existed.  
Additionally, since McKenney made the decision to prosecute 
Tice, and Darby, acting on the advice of McKenney, obtained 
the issuance of the criminal warrant, the O’Connors argue that 
this Court must find that probable cause to initiate the 
prosecution existed as a matter of law.  
 
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The determinations of probable cause by McKenney and the 
magistrate were based exclusively on the information Darby 
received from the O’Connors.2  In attempting to rely on these 
determinations as evidence of probable cause as a matter of 
law, the O’Connors seem to suggest an “advice of counsel 
defense.”  That defense is not applicable in this case since 
the O’Connors only spoke to Darby, and McKenney was not acting 
as the O’Connors’ attorney when he made his determination of 
probable cause.  Even if the defense were available, it would 
not have been established in this case as a matter of law.   
 
We have said the following about the advice of counsel 
defense in malicious prosecution actions: 
“[W]hen a defendant, in initiating a prosecution, 
acts in good faith upon the advice of reputable 
counsel, after a full disclosure of all material 
facts, he has probable cause to support his action. 
Probable cause serves as a complete defense to an 
action for malicious prosecution, even if the advice 
given by the attorney is wrong.  The defendant must 
prove that he sought advice of counsel with an 
honest purpose of being informed of the law, that he 
made a full, correct and honest disclosure of all 
material facts known to him or which he should 
reasonably have known, and that he acted in good 
faith guided by the advice given by counsel.  This 
                     
2 We will not consider the O’Connors’ attempt to rely on 
the determinations made by Trible.  The jury was properly 
instructed that it “shall consider the facts and circumstances 
as they appeared to the defendants at the time the criminal 
proceedings were instituted by the issuance of the criminal 
warrant.”  Thus, any determinations following the issuance of 
the warrant were not relevant to whether the O’Connors had 
probable cause to believe that Tice committed construction 
fraud.   
 
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defense usually presents a jury question unless 
reasonable minds cannot differ that advice of 
counsel has been established.” 
 
Andrews v. Ring, 266 Va. 311, 322, 585 S.E.2d 780, 786 (2003) 
(quoting Pallas v. Zaharopoulos, 219 Va. 751, 755, 250 S.E.2d 
357, 359-60 (1979)) (emphasis added).  Here, the O’Connors 
never informed Darby that they had been in contact with Tice’s 
attorney prior to the issuance of the criminal warrant and 
that this attorney had suggested to them that the dispute was 
civil in nature.  The O’Connors also never discussed with 
Darby that Tice had completed a portion of the job.  Thus, we 
cannot say that the O’Connors would have established an advice 
of counsel defense as a matter of law because reasonable minds 
could differ on whether they “made a full, correct and honest 
disclosure of all material facts.” 
 
Having concluded that the O’Connors initiated the 
criminal prosecution of Tice, the issue remains whether the 
O’Connors had probable cause to initiate the prosecution.  
Unlike the cases relied upon by the O’Connors on brief, the 
evidence in the present case was in dispute as to whether the 
O’Connors had probable cause to believe that Tice committed 
construction fraud.  See Bill Edwards Oldsmobile, Inc. v. 
Carey, 219 Va. 90, 99, 244 S.E.2d 767, 773 (1978); American 
Ry. Express Co. v. Stephens, 148 Va. 1, 17-19, 138 S.E. 496, 
501-02 (1927).  Tice testified that since the parties could 
 
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not agree on who damaged the O’Connors’ roof, and because Tice 
had performed more than one-third of the work on the contract, 
Mr. O’Connor agreed with Tice’s proposal to keep his deposit 
and leave the job.  Conversely, the O’Connors testified that 
Tice quit the job after performing very little of the work.   
 
The jury could reasonably infer from this conflicting 
testimony that Tice intended to fulfill his contract 
obligations and that the “knowledge of such facts and 
circumstances” by the O’Connors did not “raise the belief in a 
reasonable mind” that Tice defrauded them.  We therefore hold 
that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that the 
O’Connors did not have probable cause to believe that Tice 
committed construction fraud. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For these reasons, we hold that the evidence was 
sufficient to support the jury’s determination that the 
O’Connors initiated a criminal prosecution against Tice 
without probable cause.  Accordingly, the judgment of the 
circuit court will be affirmed.  
Affirmed. 
 
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