Title: Jermaine Lebron v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC02-1956
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: January 13, 2005

Supreme Court of Florida 
____________ 
No. SC02-1956 
____________ 
JERMAINE LEBRON, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
[January 13, 2005] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
Jermaine Lebron appeals a circuit court judgment imposing the sentence of 
death upon resentencing.  We have jurisdiction.  See Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  
For the reasons set forth herein, we again vacate Lebron’s sentence of death and 
remand to the circuit court for a new penalty phase trial. 
BACKGROUND AND FACTS 
In 1998, Lebron was found guilty of the first-degree felony murder and 
robbery with a firearm of Larry Neal Oliver, Jr., and sentenced to death.  On 
August 30, 2001, this Court affirmed Lebron’s convictions, but vacated the death 
sentence and remanded the case for a new penalty phase.  See Lebron v. State, 799 
 
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So. 2d 997, 1001 (Fla. 2001) (“Lebron I”).  The facts giving rise to Lebron’s 
convictions and sentence were explained in this Court’s initial review as follows: 
Appellant, Jermaine Lebron (“Lebron”) was arrested in New 
York City for the murder of Larry Neal Oliver. . . . [Lebron’s] first 
trial resulted in a mistrial, based upon the trial court’s finding of a jury 
deadlock. 
. . . During [the] second trial, it was established that Lebron was 
a major participant in the robbery and murder of the victim (who 
worked with one of Lebron’s acquaintances, Danny Summers).  
Indeed, all of the eyewitnesses testified that it was Lebron (nicknamed 
“Bugsy”) who had directed the events both before and after the 
victim’s death, and who, using a sawed-off shotgun (which he called 
“Betsy”), had fatally shot the victim. 
According to eyewitnesses, the victim had been lured to a house 
in Osceola County (the “Gardenia house”) where Lebron and several 
others were staying after Lebron offered to sell the victim some 
“spinners” for his truck.  Shortly after the victim arrived at the home, 
Lebron called to him to come toward the back bedrooms.  As the 
victim entered the hallway leading to the bedrooms, he was forced to 
lie face down, and was shot at short range in the back of the head.  
Eyewitnesses testified that, after the victim was shot, Lebron was 
smiling and laughing, yelling, “I did it. I did it,” and describing how it 
felt to kill the victim, and what it looked like.  Money, checks, and a 
credit card were taken from the victim, and stereo equipment was 
stripped from his truck.  Lebron directed others present at the time to 
burn the victim’s identification papers, to dispose of the victim’s 
body, and to clean up the area where the victim had been shot. 
Over the next several days, Lebron and some of the others used 
the victim’s credit card, pawned his stereo equipment, and cashed his 
checks.  An attempt was also made to burn the victim’s truck.  During 
this time, Lebron admitted to his former girlfriend, Danita Sullivan, 
that he had shot a man, that “he had killed someone.”  He also told his 
current girlfriend, Christina Charbonier, that he had killed a man for 
his truck.  Shortly thereafter, Lebron left for New York City, the place 
where “Legz Diamond,” a topless juice bar owned by his mother, was 
located. 
The victim’s body was later discovered in a rural area near the 
Walt Disney World property. . . . 
 
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. . . . 
After Lebron left for New York, the others having knowledge 
of the event reported the murder to law enforcement officers.  All of 
the witnesses claimed that they had followed Lebron’s directions 
throughout the unfolding events because Lebron had threatened them, 
and they were afraid that he might do to one of them what he had 
done to Oliver. 
Lebron I, 799 So. 2d at 1001-02. 
This case has taken a somewhat unusual and complex twist because, 
notwithstanding the only available above-outlined evidence, the first guilt phase 
jury made a special finding as to the felony murder conviction that Oliver was 
killed by a person other than Lebron, and that Lebron did not have a firearm in his 
personal possession at the time the murder occurred.  See Lebron I, 799 So. 2d at 
1020 n.19.  With regard to the robbery conviction, the jury made a special finding 
that Lebron did possess a firearm during the commission of the robbery. 
This Court vacated Lebron’s original sentence for two reasons,1 only one of 
which is pertinent to the instant appeal.  We determined that the trial court had 
“erred in concluding, contrary to the jury’s express findings, that ‘the evidence 
established beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant murdered Larry Neal 
Oliver, Jr.’”  Id. at 1021.  The Court approved the analysis of the trial court as 
required by Edmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), and Tison v. Arizona, 481 
                                        
1.  The trial court’s erroneous finding of the “commission while on 
probation” aggravator, which was not a part of Florida law at the time of the crime, 
was the other basis for vacating Lebron’s sentence.  See id. at 1020. 
 
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U.S. 137 (1987), to determine whether Lebron was eligible for the death penalty 
based on his degree of participation in the murders, and determined that it 
“correctly analyzed Lebron’s relative culpability, as compared to the other known 
participants.”  Id. at 1020.  We determined, however, that notwithstanding the only 
evidence presented, the sentence imposed could not be premised “upon a finding 
that Lebron was himself the shooter, since this would be contrary to the jury’s 
special verdi
cts.”  Id. at 1021. 
Lebron’s new penalty phase proceeding commenced on May 12, 2002, in 
Osceola County.  At the close of the penalty phase, the jury recommended a 
sentence of death by a majority of seven to five.  A Spencer2 hearing was 
conducted on June 19, 2002, and on August 15, 2002, the trial court sentenced 
Lebron to death, finding two aggravators, no statutory mitigators, and several 
nonstatutory mitigators. 
This appeal followed. 
ANALYSIS 
Prior to commencing the analysis, we pause to acknowledge the unique 
factual posture of the case before us, which generates unusual problems.  The guilt 
phase jury determined that Lebron was guilty of felony murder, that he possessed a 
gun to rob Larry Neal Oliver, but that he did not possess a gun at the time of the 
                                        
 
2.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
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murder, and that Oliver was actually shot by someone other than Lebron.  With 
direct evidence such as that presented here, seldom does this Court review capital 
cases in which the guilt phase produces such specific, and seemingly inconsistent, 
verdicts. 
That said, neither this Court nor the trial court can alter the original jury’s 
findings with regard to the guilt issues.  To the contrary, the judiciary’s 
constitutionally mandated role in this context is to ensure that Lebron’s sentence is 
not erroneously premised on facts and findings that would contravene the original 
jury’s guilt determination.  Bearing this in mind, we determine that Lebron’s claim 
pertaining to the admissibility of certain testimony concerning a separate, unrelated 
case, the Nasser case, requires a new penalty phase proceeding.  To ensure that the 
circuit court has proper guidance on resentencing, we will also address the scope 
and nature of the testimony and evidence that may be admitted during the new 
penalty phase. 
PRIOR VIOLENT FELONY AGGRAVATOR 
To establish the prior violent felony aggravator, the State relied in part on 
Lebron’s convictions for robbing and kidnapping Roger Nasser.  Lebron had 
initially been convicted of attempted first-degree murder, robbery with a firearm, 
and kidnapping in the Nasser matter, but these convictions were reversed on appeal 
because of juror misconduct.  Upon retrial, the jury returned special verdicts 
 
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finding that Lebron had committed only an assault but with a firearm (a lesser 
included offense of attempted first-degree murder, but not a recognized basis for an 
aggravating factor), robbery (instead of robbery with a firearm) and kidnapping 
with intent to commit a felony (again without a firearm).  See Lebron I, 799 So. 2d 
at 1004 n.3. 
During Lebron’s resentencing proceeding, the trial court admitted over 
defense counsel’s objection the testimony of Officer Schroeder of the Kissimmee 
Police Department regarding the Nasser case.  Schroeder testified that Nasser 
reported being confronted by two males, one black and the other white, in an 
apartment where he had gone to discuss giving money to Stacy Kirk, a friend of 
Lebron’s.  According to Nasser’s police statement, the black male possessed a 
shotgun, and the white male possessed a stun gun.  Schroeder relayed that Nasser 
informed police that his attackers blindfolded him, loaded him into a car, and drove 
him to an orange grove in Osceola county, at which time the black male forced him 
to his knees, placed the shotgun to his head, and said, “Tell the Lord Bugsy says 
‘hi’.”  According to Schroeder, Nasser reported that the man pulled the trigger but 
the gun misfired, affording Nasser the opportunity to escape into the orange grove.  
Schroeder testified that Nasser subsequently identified those involved as Stacy 
Kirk, Howard Kendall, and “Bugsy,” a name connected to Lebron.  Schroeder also 
 
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testified that Nasser disappeared prior to trial for that offense and apparently has 
been unavailable. 
In general, it is proper to admit evidence regarding prior violent felony 
convictions to provide the sentencing jury the context of the crime.  As this Court 
has recognized:
 
[I]t is appropriate in the penalty phase of a capital trial to introduce 
testimony concerning the details of any prior felony conviction 
involving the use or threat of violence to the person rather than the 
bare admission of the conviction.  Testimony concerning the events 
which resulted in the conviction assists the jury in evaluating the 
character of the defendant and the circumstances of the crime so that 
the jury can make an informed recommendation as to the appropriate 
sentence. 
Rhodes v. State, 547 So. 2d 1201, 1204 (Fla. 1989); see also Jones v. State, 748 
So. 2d 1012, 1026 (Fla. 1999) (permitting the admission of hearsay testimony from 
a police officer regarding defendant’s past murder conviction).  However, the State 
may not introduce testimony or evidence pertaining to prior violent felony 
convictions that is irrelevant, violates the defendant’s confrontation rights, or 
where the probative value of the evidence is far outweighed by prejudicial effect.  
See Rhodes, 547 So. 2d at 1205; see also § 90.403, Fla. Stat. (2002) (“Relevant 
evidence is inadmissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice . . . .”) 
In this case, the probative value of the evidence pertaining to Lebron’s 
possession and use of a gun during the robbery and kidnapping of Roger Nasser 
 
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was far outweighed by prejudicial effect.  While the jury found that Lebron 
possessed a gun at the time of Nasser’s assault,3 simple assault is only a 
misdemeanor crime, see § 784.011(2), Fla. Stat. (2002), and cannot serve as a basis 
for the prior violent felony aggravator.  See Carpenter v. State, 785 So. 2d 1182, 
1205 (Fla. 2001).  In determining that Lebron was guilty of robbery and 
kidnapping without a firearm, the Nasser jury effectively acquitted him of the 
possession or use of a gun during the commission of those felonies.  Therefore, 
evidence of the firearm should not have been introduced in the instant matter for 
the purpose of establishing the prior violent felony aggravator because the jury 
found no firearm associated with such crimes.  In drawing this conclusion, we also 
note that the State did not seek to admit Officer Schroeder’s testimony as similar 
crime evidence under the rule established in Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654, 663 
(Fla. 1959).  Moreover, we reject any attempt to justify admitting evidence of 
Lebron’s possession and use of a gun during the assault on Nasser as inextricably 
intertwined with the kidnapping and robbery convictions. 
The prejudice resulting from the erroneous admission of this evidence is 
only underscored by the strong, striking parallel between the offense described 
against Nasser and that committed in the instant matter.  Nasser described being 
                                        
3.  The State does not contend, and there is no basis in the record to 
determine, that the jury’s special finding regarding Lebron’s possession and use of 
a gun enhanced the simple assault misdemeanor conviction.  Lebron was not found 
guilty of aggravated assault.  
 
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forced to the ground and having a shotgun placed to his head.  It would have defied 
natural human impulse for a jury hearing that description to draw any other 
conclusion than that Lebron committed essentially the same act against Oliver.  
However, such a conclusion contravenes the original jury’s special findings in the 
instant matter, and therefore comprised an improper basis for the jury’s sentencing 
recommendation. 
Given the highly prejudicial nature of the testimony offered by Officer 
Schroeder, we determine that the State cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the trial court’s error in admitting evidence pertaining to Lebron’s possession 
and use of a gun during the Nasser incident did not contribute to the jury’s death 
recommendation in the instant matter.  See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 
1135 (Fla. 1986).  On this basis, we must vacate Lebron’s death sentence, and 
remand for a new penalty phase. 
EVIDENCE UPON RESENTENCING 
Though we need not address any other claim of error for the purpose of 
disposing with the instant matter, we will address the scope and nature of evidence 
that may be admitted in the new penalty phase proceeding.  We reaffirm the 
determination made in our initial review of this case, that “[u]pon remand, the trial 
court . . . may assess the defendant’s relative culpability in light of the facts, 
established by the record, that Lebron was an orchestrator of and major participant 
 
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in the felonies charged, and that no other known participant was proven to be the 
shooter.”  Lebron I, 799 So. 2d at 1021.  We have never suggested that the 
evidence be “changed” or “falsified.”  However, we do instruct that in conducting 
that assessment, the trial court must exclude any and all evidence and testimony 
which specifically names Lebron as the individual who actually shot Larry Neal 
Oliver.   
It is axiomatic that the trial court has broad discretion in determining the 
admissibility of evidence in penalty phase proceedings.  See, e.g., Perry v. State, 
801 So. 2d 78, 89-90 (Fla. 2001); Hildwin v. State, 531 So. 2d 124, 127 (Fla. 
1988), aff’d, 490 U.S. 638 (1989).  Moreover, this Court has determined that, upon 
resentencing, the trial court may allow the jury to hear probative evidence to aid it 
in understanding the facts of the case so that it may render an appropriate advisory 
sentence.  See Bonifay v. State, 680 So. 2d 413, 419 (Fla. 1996); Teffeteller v. 
State, 495 So. 2d 744, 745 (Fla. 1986).  The trial court may not, however, admit 
evidence that simply relitigates the issue of the defendant’s guilt, see Teffeteller, 
495 So. 2d at 745, or evidence that fails the test balancing probative value against 
the danger of unfair prejudice.  See § 90.403, Fla. Stat. (2002); Mendyk v. State, 
545 So. 2d 846, 849 (Fla. 1989).  This is particularly true where the evidence 
advanced is directly and precisely to the contrary of a specific factual finding by a 
prior jury. 
 
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Applying those rules to the evidence submitted during the proceeding below, 
evidence that may be submitted again during the new penalty phase, we determine 
that it would be error for the trial court to admit those portions of the hearsay 
testimony of Detective Lang in which he specifically relayed that Lebron had 
admitting to firing the shots which caused the death of the victim.  Detective Lang 
could certainly testify that Lebron had requested several witnesses to provide an 
alibi for him for the night of the murder, and that no other known participant was 
proven to be the shooter.  He simply could not testify that the investigation proved 
that Lebron shot the victim, that eyewitnesses reported seeing Lebron commit the 
actual shooting, or that Lebron, himself, admitted to actually firing the death shots. 
The State could certainly recall Charissa Wilburn, or sponsor other 
witnesses, to provide testimony regarding the events that occurred the night of 
Oliver’s murder.  Such testimony can focus on Lebron’s possession of the shotgun 
during the events leading up to the murder, his role in luring Oliver to the murder 
scene, his statements in the car prior to arriving at the Gardenia house, his 
beckoning the victim toward the back bedrooms, his voice being heard in the 
hallway ordering the victim to the ground, the sounds of weapon discharge, his 
agitated or excited state after the murder occurred,4 his ordering the others to clean 
                                        
4.  Of course, our determination today would preclude admission of 
testimony that Lebron exclaimed, “I did it.  I did it,” after the murders, or described 
what it felt like or looked like to slay the victim. 
 
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up the crime scene and dispose of the body, and his role in possessing and 
disposing of the victim’s property.  Again, however, the trial court must exclude 
any evidence or testimony that specifically states that Lebron was seen actually 
shooting the victim, that others heard that it was Lebron who shot the victim, or 
that Lebron admitted that he was the shooter. 
So that we may be abundantly clear, our determination today does not, as the 
State contends, require the change, alteration, modification, or falsification of any 
witness testimony.  We are simply mandating that the trial court fulfill its capacity 
as the guardian of the constitutional rights accorded every criminal defendant in 
this state.  A jury has already considered whether Lebron actually personally shot 
Oliver, and determined that he did not.  The State may not submit to a new penalty 
phase jury that Lebron actually committed the specific act for which he was 
acquitted. 
The witnesses need not change their versions of events.  All that is required 
for the trial court to fulfill its duty is to foreclose lines of questioning, summaries, 
or approaches designed to elicit testimony that Lebron was the shooter, require the 
State to tailor questions regarding the events on the night of the murder and 
subsequent investigation carefully, and ensure that the parties inform the witnesses 
of the scope of proscribed testimony to avoid any confusion that may produce even 
an unintended slip of prohibited facts.  The trial court must also ensure that the 
 
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State’s opening and closing arguments are not based on excluded evidence.  
Despite the State’s protestations, the exclusion of evidence in this manner to 
protect a defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial, as with most rules 
concerning the exclusion of certain evidence otherwise probative, is not a novel or 
extreme measure.  To the contrary, it is precisely what our constitution, state laws, 
and rules of evidence require. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, we vacate Lebron’s death sentence and remand the 
case to the circuit court for a new penalty phase proceeding consistent with the 
dictates of this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, C.J., and ANSTEAD, LEWIS, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur. 
QUINCE, J., dissents with an opinion. 
WELLS, J., recused. 
 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
QUINCE, J., dissenting. 
 
I dissent from the majority’s determination that the trial court committed 
reversible error in the penalty phase proceedings by permitting Officer Schroeder 
to testify about the facts surrounding Lebron’s convictions for assault with a 
firearm, robbery, and kidnapping with intent to commit a felony in the Nasser case.  
 
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I do not agree that the probative value of the evidence from the Nasser case is 
outweighed by its prejudicial effect.  I believe, for several reasons, that the trial 
court properly admitted this evidence as part of the prior violent felony aggravating 
circumstance.   
First, the evidence presented to the jury regarding the details of the Nasser 
case as relayed by Officer Schroeder comprised only thirteen pages of the 1047- 
page penalty phase record.  It was not a feature of the presentation of evidence 
during this penalty phase.  Similarly, the prosecutor’s discussion of the Nasser case 
covers less than one page of a nearly thirty-page closing argument.   
Second, the two incidents are not sufficiently similar to have created the 
prejudicial effect which the majority concludes it does.  In the Nasser case, 
Jermaine Lebron, Howard Kendall, and Stacy Kirk threatened Nasser with both a 
stun gun and a shotgun while in an apartment.  Lebron and Kendall blindfolded 
Nasser, loaded him into a car, and drove him into an orange grove where Lebron 
then unsuccessfully attempted to shoot him as retribution for allegedly attempting 
to rape a female friend.  When the gun misfired, Nasser escaped into the orange 
grove.  In the instant case, Oliver voluntarily followed Lebron and his cohorts back 
to their house under the guise of looking at some spinner rims for his truck.  Once 
there, he was called to come to a bedroom and then shot in the hallway.  The 
victim was robbed of his personal possessions (money, checks and a credit card) 
 
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and stereo equipment was taken out of his truck.  Orders were given to dispose of 
the victim’s body.  These two criminal episodes, which appear to result from 
different motivations, are sufficiently dissimilar, even with the information 
concerning the possession of the firearms, so that the probative value of the 
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect. 
 
Third, the majority states, “[W]e reject any attempt to justify admitting 
evidence of Lebron’s possession and use of a gun during the assault on Nasser as 
inextricably intertwined with the kidnapping and robbery convictions.”  Majority 
op. at 8.  However, the jury in the Nasser case found that Lebron possessed a gun 
at the time of the assault, a crime committed contemporaneously with both the 
robbery and the kidnapping.  These crimes are inextricably intertwined.   
Fourth, this Court has repeatedly held that “[w]hether a crime constitutes a 
prior violent felony is determined by the surrounding facts and circumstances of 
the prior crime.  See Gore v. State, 706 So. 2d 1328, 1333 (Fla. 1997).”  Anderson 
v. State, 841 So. 2d 390, 407 (Fla. ), cert denied, 124 S. Ct. 408 (2003).  By 
holding that the trial judge erred in admitting the surrounding facts and 
circumstances in the Nasser case, we are effectively ignoring a long line of cases 
permitting this type of evidence.  See Gore, 706 So. 2d at 1333; Anderson, 841 So. 
2d at 407; Spann v. State, 857 So. 2d 845, 855 (Fla. 2003); Rose v. State, 787 So. 
2d 786, 800 (Fla. 2001); Lockhart v. State, 655 So. 2d 69, 72 (Fla. 1995).   
 
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Lastly, “[d]uring penalty proceedings, it is appropriate to introduce details of 
a prior violent felony conviction in the form of hearsay testimony so long as the 
defendant has a fair opportunity to rebut.”  Bowles v. State, 804 So. 2d 1173, 1184 
(Fla. 2001).  In the instant case, the defense not only cross-examined Officer 
Schroeder but also had the ability to rebut the hearsay testimony of Officer 
Schroeder with the testimony of the other witnesses who were present when the 
assault, robbery, and kidnapping of Nasser occurred (i.e., Jermaine Lebron, Stacy 
Kirk, and Howard Kendall).   
For these reasons, I dissent. 
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Osceola County,  
Belvin Perry, Jr., Judge - Case No. CR96-2147 
 
Robert A. Norgard, Bartow, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Douglas T. Squire and 
Barbara C. Davis, Assistant Attorney’s General, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee