Title: In re Cameron W. et al.
Citation: 2010 ME 101
Docket Number: Was-10-75
State: Maine
Issuer: Maine Supreme Court
Date: October 14, 2010

In re Cameron W. et al. Annotate this Case Download PDF MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Decision: 2010 ME 101 Docket: Was-10-75 Submitted On Briefs: September 23, 2010 Decided: October 14, 2010 Panel: Reporter of Decisions SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, and JABAR, JJ. IN RE CAMERON W. et al. PER CURIAM [¶1] The mother of Cameron W. and Dante H. and the father of Dante H. appeal from judgments of the District Court (Machias, Romei, J.) finding, pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4035 (2009), that the children were in circumstances of jeopardy. The case had commenced when two-week-old Dante H. was discovered to have significant bruising on his abdomen and upper body. We address the parents several arguments in turn. [¶2] First, the record does not indicate that the court shifted to the parents the burden to prove that each parent had not caused Dante s injuries, rather than placing the burden on the Department to prove the cause of the injuries. See In re Scott S., 2001 ME 114, ¶ 14, 775 A.2d 1144, 1149 (stating that the Department bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, the elements necessary to justify issuance of a jeopardy order). The evidence indicates that Dante s injuries occurred while the child was in the mother s and father s 2 exclusive care and control. With such evidence in the record, the Department s inability to produce evidence showing, and the absence of a court finding as to, the identity of the actual perpetrator of Dante s injuries does not preclude the court s finding of jeopardy. See, e.g., In re Kafia M., 1999 ME 195, ¶ 14, 742 A.2d 919, 925 (affirming termination of the parents parental rights even though there was still no explanation for how the injuries came about, whether they were inflicted by [the father, the mother], one of the children living in the household, or some other person ). When the evidence demonstrates that an infant was injured while in the mother s and father s exclusive care and control, the court could reasonably infer that one or both parents were responsible for the child s injuries. [¶3] Second, contrary to the mother s contention, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying her motion for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law, because the court s judgment contained adequate findings to support the result and to permit effective appellate review. See Sargent v. Braun, 2006 ME 96, ¶ 5, 902 A.2d 839, 840-41; Dargie v. Dargie, 2001 ME 127, ¶¶ 2-3, 778 A.2d 353, 355. [¶4] Finally, the court s findings of jeopardy were supported by competent evidence in the record. See In re Adrian D., 2004 ME 144, ¶¶ 14-15, 861 A.2d 1286, 1290-91.1 1 The father asserted for the first time in his reply brief on appeal that the court s judgment finding jeopardy as to Dante should be dismissed because it was entered more than 120 days from the filing of the child protection petition, without a showing of good cause, in violation of 22 M.R.S. § 4035(4-A) (2009). 3 The entry is: Judgments affirmed. Attorney for the mother: Jeffrey W. Davidson, Esq. 86 Court Street Machias, Maine 04654 Attorney for the father: Sophie L. Spurr, Esq. PO Box 334 Blue Hill, Maine 04614 Attorneys for the Maine Department of Health and Human Services: Janet T. Mills, Attorney General Nora Sosnoff, Asst. Atty. Gen. Office of the Attorney General 6 State House Station Augusta, Maine 04333-0006 Machias District Court docket numbers PC-2009-2, PC-2009-4 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY Even if this issue had been timely raised and preserved, see In re Anthony R., 2010 ME 4, ¶ 8, 987 A.2d 532, 534; M.R. App. P. 9(c) ( Any reply brief . . . must be strictly confined to replying to new matter raised in an appellee s brief.), section 4035(4-A) does not provide for the dismissal of a jeopardy order as a remedy for an order entered after the 120-day period.