Title: NOR PLAINS RESOURCE COUNCIL v BRD
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 14215
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: April 9, 1979

No. 14215 I N THE S U P R E M E COUIZT O F THE S T A T E OF MONTANA 1978 NOF?EEF!N PLAINS RESOURCE COUNCIL AND NOIiTHEEW CHEYENNE TRIBE, I N C . , Petitioners and Respondents, -VS- BQARD O F NATURAL RESOURCES AND C O N S E F W i T I O N , et al., Respondents and Appllants. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the First Jdicial D i s t r i c t , Honorable Gordon R. Bennett, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: W. H. Bellingham argued, Billings, Pbntana John L. Peterson argued, Butte, PJbntana Richard Andriolo argued, Bozeman, I4mta.m Wurice F. Hennessey argued, Butte, lbntana C. W. Leaphart, Jr., Helena, Pbntana N e i l S. Keefer, Billings, Fbntana John W. Ross, Butte, PJbntana For Respondents : Leo C. Graybill, Jr. argued and G r e g o r y W a r n e r argued, G r e a t Falls, Pbntana For Amicus Curiae: Benjamin W. Hilley argued, Great Falls, Pbntana D. Patrick ?&Kittrick, Great Falls, Pbntana Sulsanitted: October 24, 1978 5 + & = Decided: : 193 Filed : -- - , . q , '3 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Pursuant t o t h e Montana Major F a c i l i t y S i t i n g A c t , s e c t i o n 70-801 e t seq., R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 75-20-101 e t seq. MCA ( h e r e i n a f t e r "Siting Act") , t h e Board of Natural Resources and Conservation ( h e r e i n a f t e r "Board of Natural Resources"), on J u l y 22, 1976, granted t o t h e Montana Power Company, Puget Sound Power and Light Company, Portland General E l e c t r i c Company, t h e Washington Water Power Com- pany, and P a c i f i c Power and Light Company ( h e r e i n a f t e r " U t i l i t i e s " ) , a c e r t i f i c a t e of environmental compatability and public need f o r t h e construction of t h e f a c i l i t y known as C o l s t r i p Units 3 and 4. Respondents and cross-appellants appealed t h i s decision t o t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l District Court, L e w i s and Clark County, under the provisions of t h e Montana Administrative Procedure Act, section 82-4201 e t seq., R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 2-4-101 e t seq. MCA ( h e r e i n a f t e r "MAPA"). The D i s t r i c t Court reversed and remanded t h e matter t o t h e Board of Natural Resources f o r rehearing. From t h i s order both appellants/cross-respondents and respon- dents/cross-appellants appeal t o t h i s Court. The two ap- peals have been consolidated f o r hearing and decision. To properly i n d i c a t e t h e monumental proportions t h i s m a t t e r has taken, w e believe it i s necessary t o s e t f o r t h i t s background i n some d e t a i l a s was done by t h e Board of Natural Resources i n i t s findings of f a c t , conclusions of l a w , opinion, decision, order and recommendations. This a l s o w i l l help t o illuminate t h e i s s u e s on appeal and place t h i s controversy i s perspective. Pursuant t o t h e t e r m s of t h e S i t i n g Act, on June 6, 1973, t h e U t i l i t i e s f i l e d with t h e Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation ( h e r e i n a f t e r "Department of Natural Resources") an a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a c e r t i f i c a t e of environmental c o m p a t i b i l i t y and p u b l i c need f o r t h e proposed C o l s t r i p Units 3 and 4. F i l e d contemporaneously was a p e t i t i o n f o r waiver of t i m e requirements a s set f o r t h i n s e c t i o n 70-806, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 75-20-211 MCA, and a f i l i n g f e e of $1,232,930. The U t i l i t i e s a l s o f i l e d with t h e Department of Natural Resources t h e i r environmental a n a l y s i s of t h e proposed p r o j e c t and r e l a t e d f a c i l i t i e s e n t i t l e d " C o l s t r i p Generation and Transmission Project." This environmental a n a l y s i s w a s dated November 1973 and w a s prepared by t h e environmental systems department of Westing- house E l e c t r i c Corporation. The Department of Natural Resources, pursuant t o sec- t i o n s 70-807 and 70-816, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n s 75-20-216 and 75-20-503 MCA, of t h e S i t i n g Act, conducted an extensive study over a period of 600 days of t h e a p p l i c a t i o n and issued i t s d r a f t environmental impact statement i n November 1974, recommending a g a i n s t t h e g r a n t i n g of t h e a p p l i c a t i o n . Subsequent t o i s s u i n g t h e d r a f t environmental impact s t a t e - ment, t h e Department of Natural Resources conducted a series of p u b l i c meetings t o g a i n i n p u t from t h e p u b l i c regarding t h e proposed p r o j e c t and t h e a n a l y s i s thereof contained i n t h e d r a f t environmental impact statement. On o r about January 2 1 , 1975, t h e Department of Natural Resources re- leased i t s f i n a l environmental impact statement on t h e proposed p r o j e c t containing i t s recommendations a g a i n s t g r a n t i n g t h e a p p l i c a t i o n and transmitted t h e same t o t h e Board of Natural Resources. The Board of Natural Resources, on r e c e i p t of t h e recommendations from t h e Department of Natural Resources and a f t e r due and d e l i b e r a t e consideration, issued an o r d e r dated January 2 4 , 1975. I n i t s order t h e Board of Natural Resources deemed t h a t t h e matter before it, i.e., t h e a p p l i - c a t i o n f o r a c e r t i f i c a t e of environmental c o m p a t i b i l i t y and p u b l i c need f o r t h e proposed C o l s t r i p Units 3 and 4 , would be considered a contested c a s e a s defined i n M A P A , s e c t i o n 82-4201 e t seq., R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 2-4-101 e t seq. MCA. Subsequent t o i s s u i n g t h i s o r d e r , t h e Board of Natural Resources issued o r d e r s on February 7, 1975 and February 1 4 , 1975, p e r t a i n i n g t o m a t t e r s of procedure t o be followed, p a r t i c u l a r l y r e f e r r i n g t o t h e methods of discovery and determining t h e burden of proof. The Board of Natural Resources f u r t h e r ordered t h a t t h e hearing would commence on March 10, 1975, a t Bozeman, Mon- tana. Notice of t h e time and place of t h e hearing was given t o a l l p a r t i e s and published i n d a i l y newspapers throughout Montana t o inform t h e public. O n March 1 0 , 1975, t h e hear- i n g began, a t which time motions w e r e presented t o t h e Board of Natural Resources by t h e opponents of t h e a p p l i c a t i o n t o continue t h e hearing u n t i l May 13, 1975, t o a f f o r d t h e p a r t i e s time t o complete discovery procedures. Also, objec- t i o n s w e r e made t o a member of t h e Board of Natural Re- sources serving a s hearings examiner. On ~ p r i l 17, 1975, t h e Board of Natural Resources continued t h e hearing u n t i l A p r i l 21, 1975, and on A p r i l 1 0 , 1975, Carl M. ~ a v i s was appointed by t h e Board a s hearings examiner t o p r e s i d e over t h e p u b l i c hearing phase of t h e proceedings. Following a p r e t r i a l conference with t h e p a r t i e s , t h e hearings examiner, by order dated A p r i l 15, 1975, d i r e c t e d t h e proceedings t o reconvene on A p r i l 21, 1975, a t ~ e l e n a , Montana. By letter dated A p r i l 10, 1975, t h e d i r e c t o r of t h e Department of Health and Environmental Sciences ( h e r e i n a f t e r " ~ e p a r t m e n t of Health") n o t i f i e d t h e Board of Natural Re- sources t h a t t h e Department of Health c e r t i f i e d t h a t t h e proposed f a c i l i t y w i l l n o t v i o l a t e s t a t e and f e d e r a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d water q u a l i t y standards. I t d i d n o t c e r t i f y t h a t t h e proposed f a c i l i t y w i l l n o t v i o l a t e s t a t e and f e d e r a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d a i r q u a l i t y s t a n d a r d s and implementa- t i o n p l a n s . O n A p r i l 18, 1975, t h e Northern P l a i n s Resource Council f i l e d Cause No. 38934 i n t h e District Court of L e w i s and Clark County. A w r i t of p r o h i b i t i o n was served upon t h e Board of Natural Resources and t h e h e a r i n g s examiner, d i r e c t - i n g them t o d e s i s t and r e f r a i n from any f u r t h e r proceedings u n t i l f u r t h e r o r d e r of t h e c o u r t and f u r t h e r d i r e c t e d them t o appear i n c o u r t on A p r i l 22, 1975. Following t h e hearing t h e c o u r t , on A p r i l 29, 1975, quashed t h e w r i t of p r o h i b i - t i o n , thereby allowing t h e hearing t o continue. The c o u r t f u r t h e r ordered t h e Board of Health and Environmental Sci- ences ( h e r e i n a f t e r "Board of Health") t o hold a h e a r i n g t o determine whether t h e c e r t i f i c a t e r e q u i r e d by s e c t i o n 70- 810(1) ( h ) , R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 75-20-301(i) (h) MCA, should be i s s u e d . The hearing was reconvened i n Helena on May 5, 1975. Motions by t h e opponents f o r f u r t h e r continuances were presented and g r a n t e d by t h e h e a r i n g s examiner, continuing t h e hearings u n t i l May 20, 1975. On May 9, 1975, t h e Northern Cheyenne ~ r i b e , I n c . , f i l e d a n a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a w r i t of p r o h i b i t i o n i n t h e is- t r i c t Court of Lewis and Clark County, Cause No. 39000. This m a t t e r was heard by t h e c o u r t on May 19, 1975, and judgment was entered on t h e same d a t e dismissing t h e a p p l i - cation. The public hearing before t h e Board of Natural Re- sources formally began on May 20, 1975, and continued u n t i l June 5, 1975, a t which t i m e t h e hearing before t h e Board of Health was commenced with Carl M. Davis serving as hearings examiner. The hearing before t h e Board of Health consumed a t o t a l of 53 hearing days and concluded on September 15, 1975 with 53 witnesses having t e s t i f i e d . A f t e r studying t h e testimony and e x h i b i t s , and t h e f i n d i n g s of f a c t submitted by t h e p a r t i e s , t h e Board of Health heard o r a l arguments by counsel, v i s i t e d t h e site of t h e proposed f a c i l i t i e s and rendered i t s d e c i s i o n on November 21, 1975, i s s u i n g i t s c o n d i t i o n a l c e r t i f i c a t i o n , pursuant t o s e c t i o n 70-810(1)(h), R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 75-20-301(1)(h) MCA, of t h e S i t i n g Act. On J u l y 23, 1975, a t t h e conclusion of U t i l i t i e s ' case- in-chief i n t h e Board of Health hearing, t h e opponents t o t h e a p p l i c a t i o n moved t o dismiss t h e U t i l i t i e s ' proceedings f o r c e r t i f i c a t i o n , together with a motion t o continue f u r - t h e r hearings u n t i l t h e Board of Health r u l e d upon t h e motions. The motion t o continue t h e Board of Health hearing was denied on J u l y 24, 1975. The opponents t o t h e applica- t i o n f i l e d i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Cause No. 39228, an a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a w r i t of pro- h i b i t i o n o r mandate commanding t h e Board of Health and t h e hearings examiner t o cease and r e f r a i n from f u r t h e r pro- ceedings u n t i l f u r t h e r order of t h e c o u r t o r t o show cause t o t h e c o u r t why t h e Board of Health should n o t be perma- n e n t l y r e s t r a i n e d from f u r t h e r proceedings u n t i l t h e ~ o a r d had r u l e d upon opponents' motion t o dismiss. O n J u l y 25, 1975, t h i s Court granted t h e U t i l i t i e s ' a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a w r i t of supervisory c o n t r o l and d i r e c t e d t h e ~ i s t r i c t Court t o e i t h e r withdraw i t s w r i t of prohibi- t i o n o r , i n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e , t o appear before t h e Supreme Court on J u l y 28, 1975. O n J u l y 28, 1975, t h i s Court heard t h e m a t t e r , and a t t h e conclusion of t h e hearing d i r e c t e d t h a t t h e w r i t of p r o h i b i t i o n be set a s i d e and t h a t t h e hearings proceed. The hearings examiner f o r t h e Board of Natural Re- sources issued an order dated December 1 0 , 1975, recovening t h e Board of Natural Resources' hearing on January 19, 1976, a t Helena. I n a d d i t i o n he s e t f o r t h c e r t a i n procedures t o be followed by a l l p a r t i e s t o t h e proceedings regarding t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n of d i r e c t testimony and cross-examination. Notice of t h e time and p l a c e of t h e hearing was served on a l l p a r t i e s and published i n d a i l y newspapers throughout t h e s t a t e t o inform t h e public. The Department of Natural Resources and t h e Northern P l a i n s Resource Council f i l e d motions with t h e Board of Natural Resources, moving t h e Board t o terminate i t s hearing on t h e b a s i s t h a t t h e Board of Health had n o t c e r t i f i e d , o r had m i s c e r t i f i e d , t h a t t h e proposed C o l s t r i p Units 3 and 4 would m e e t a p p l i c a b l e a i r and water q u a l i t y standards. After a hearing, t h e motion was denied. The reconvened hearing commenced on January 19, 1976, and was concluded on March 30, 1976. A t o t a l of 255 w i t - nesses t e s t i f i e d , including 132 p u b l i c witnesses. The t r a n s c r i p t of t h e proceedings i n both t h e Board of Health hearing and t h e Board of Natural Resources hearing, con- s i s t i n g of approximately 17,000 pages, including copies of t h e e x h i b i t s received i n t o evidence, w e r e served upon each member of t h e Board of Natural Resources together with t h e p a r t i e s ' proposed f i n d i n g s of f a c t . he Board of Natural Resources v i s i t e d and inspected t h e proposed f a c i l i t i e s on two occasions. After due and timely n o t i c e being served and published, it heard o r a l arguments on May 19 and 20, 1976, by a l l p a r t i e s who were p r e s e n t and d e s i r e d t o p r e s e n t arguments. The Board of Natural Resources having inspected t h e site, read t h e record of t h e proceedings and t h e proposed f i n d i n g s of f a c t of t h e p a r t i e s , and heard t h e arguments of counsel and p u b l i c p a r t i e s , and having duly considered t h e same and being f u l l y advised i n t h e premises, announced i n a r e g u l a r l y scheduled and noticed meeting on June 24, 1976, t h a t it w a s ready t o a c t upon t h e a p p l i c a t i o n . A motion t o approve t h e a p p l i c a t i o n t o c o n s t r u c t C o l s t r i p Units 3 and 4 and a s s o c i a t e d f a c i l i t i e s and t o g r a n t a p p l i c a n t s a c e r t i - f i c a t e of environmental compatibility and p u b l i c need, s u b j e c t t o c e r t a i n s t a t e d conditions, was seconded and c a r r i e d with f o u r members voting i n favor of t h e motion and t h r e e members voting a g a i n s t t h e motion. A majority of t h e Board having approved granting t h e a p p l i c a t i o n , t h e Board made i t s f i n d i n g s of f a c t and conclu- s i o n s of l a w , together with i t s d e c i s i o n , opinion, order and recommendations. It granted t h e c e r t i f i c a t e of environ- mental compatibility and p u b l i c need t o t h e u t i l i t i e s on J u l y 22, 1976. ~espondents/cross-appellants appealed t o t h e ~ i s t r i c t Court of L e w i s and Clark County, which reversed and remanded t h e matter t o t h e Board of Natural Resources, ~ p p e a l t o t h i s Court from t h e D i s t r i c t Court's opinion i s taken by a l l p a r t i e s . Before discussing t h e many individual i s s u e s i n t h i s case, t h e r e a r e s e v e r a l o t h e r matters which r e q u i r e emphasis by t h i s Court. Section 82-4216(7), R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 2-4-704 MCA, enacted i n 1971 a s a p a r t of MAPA, e s t a b l i s h e s t h e standards of j u d i c i a l review of contested agency decisions. The foregoing subsection commences by s t a t i n g t h a t t h e c o u r t s h a l l not s u b s t i t u t e i t s judgment f o r t h a t of t h e agency a s t o t h e weight of t h e evidence on questions of f a c t . I t continues by providing t h a t t h e c o u r t may reverse o r modify t h e agency decision i f s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s of t h e appealing p a r t y have been prejudiced because t h e administrative find- ings, inferences, conclusions, o r decisions a r e : (a) i n v i o l a t i o n of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l o r s t a t u t o r y provisions; (b) i n excess of t h e s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y of t h e agency; ( c ) made upon unlawful procedure; (d) a f f e c t e d by o t h e r e r r o r of law; (e) c l e a r l y erroneous i n view of t h e r e l i a b l e , probative and s u b s t a n t i a l evidence on t h e whole record; ( f ) a r b i t r a r y o r capricious o r characterized by abuse of d i s c r e t i o n o r c l e a r l y unwarranted exercise of d i s c r e t i o n ; o r (g) because findings of f a c t , upon i s s u e s e s s e n t i a l t o t h e decision, were not made although requested. I t i s c l e a r from t h i s s t a t u t e t h a t t h e burden r e s t i n g upon an appealing p a r t y t o a ~ i s t r i c t Court from an agency decision i s a s u b s t a n t i a l one. This Court r e c e n t l y set f o r t h t h r e e b a s i c p r i n c i p l e s underlying s e c t i o n 82-4216 which a D i s t r i c t Court must consider i n determining what t h e scope of review of an administrative decision should be: (1) t h a t limited judi- c i a l review of administrative decisions strengthens t h e administrative process by encouraging t h e f u l l presentation of evidence a t t h e i n i t i a l administrative hearing; ( 2 ) j u d i c i a l economy r e q u i r e s c o u r t r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e e x p e r t i s e of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e agencies i n t h e f i e l d of t h e i r responsi- b i l i t y ; and ( 3 ) l i m i t e d j u d i c i a l review i s necessary t o determine t h a t a f a i r procedure was used, t h a t q u e s t i o n s of l a w w e r e properly decided, and t h a t t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e body was supported by s u b s t a n t i a l evidence. v i t a - ~ i c h Dairy, I n c . v. Department of Business Regulation (1976), 170 Mont. 341, 553 P.2d 980. A r e c e n t United S t a t e s Supreme Court d e c i s i o n has a g r e a t d e a l t o say on t h e s u b j e c t of j u d i c i a l review of agency d e c i s i o n s . The Court expresses i t s views on t h e p r a c t i c e of some f e d e r a l judges i n p l a c i n g themselves i n t h e p l a c e of t h e agency i n making t h e d e c i s i o n , r a t h e r than following t h e c o r r e c t course and s e t t i n g a s i d e agency d e c i - s i o n s only f o r s u b s t a n t i a l procedural o r s u b s t a n t i v e reasons as mandated by s t a t u t e . I n Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (1978), 435 U.S. 519, 98 S.Ct. 1197, 55 L Ed 2d 460, t h e Supreme Court unanimously reversed a d e c i s i o n of t h e Court o f Appeals f o r t h e D i s t r i c t of Columbia C i r c u i t which had overturned t h e Atomic Energy Commission's d e c i s i o n t o g r a n t Vermont Yankee a l i c e n s e t o o p e r a t e a nuclear power p l a n t . The Court of Appeals r u l e d t h a t t h e rule-making proce- dures of t h e AEC w e r e inadequate d e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t t h e agency had employed a l l t h e procedures required by t h e Federal Administrative Procedure A c t and more. The Supreme Court concluded t h a t t h e Court of Appeals had s e r i o u s l y misapplied s t a t u t o r y and d e c i s i o n a l law cautioning reviewing c o u r t s a g a i n s t e n g r a f t i n g t h e i r own n o t i o n s of proper pro- cedures upon agencies e n t r u s t e d w i t h s u b s t a n t i v e f u n c t i o n s by Congress, 435 U.S. a t 525, and t h a t " [ a l b s e n t c o n s t i t u - t i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t s o r extremely compelling circumstances t h e ' a d m i n i s t r a t i v e agencies "should be f r e e t o f a s h i o n t h e i r own r u l e s of procedure and t o pursue methods of i n q u i r y capable of p e r m i t t i n g them t o discharge t h e i r multitudinous d u t i e s . " ' . . ." Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. a t 543. I n cautioning t h e lower c o u r t t o judge a n agency deci- s i o n by t h e a p p r o p r i a t e standards of review, t h e Supreme Court noted t h a t t h e lower c o u r t should " n o t s t r a y beyond t h e j u d i c i a l province t o explore t h e procedural format o r t o impose upon t h e agency i t s own notion of which procedures are ' b e s t ' o r most l i k e l y t o f u r t h e r some vague, undefined p u b l i c good." 435 U.S. a t 549. The c o u r t l e f t l i t t l e doubt i n s t a t i n g : ". . . t h e r o l e of a c o u r t i n reviewing t h e s u f f i c i e n c y of an agency's c o n s i d e r a t i o n of environmental f a c t o r s i s a l i m i t e d one. l i m i t e d both by t h e t i m e a t which t h e d e c i s i o n was made and by t h e s t a t u t e mandating review. "'Neither t h e s t a t u t e -- nor i t s l e g i s l a t i v e h i s - t o r y contemplates -- t h a t a c o u r t should s u b s t i - t u t e i t s judgment f o r t h a t of t h e agency a s t o -- ---- - - t h e environmental consequences of i t s a c t i o n s . ' - - - - - [ C i t a t i o n omitted.]" Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. a t 555. (Emphasis s u p p l i e d . ) A s t o nuclear energy, t h e Court pointed o u t t h a t Con- g r e s s had made a choice t o a t l e a s t t r y nuclear energy, e s t a b l i s h i n g a reasonable review process i n which c o u r t s a r e t o p l a y only a l i m i t e d r o l e . " . . .The fundamental p o l i c y q u e s t i o n s a p p r o p r i a t e l y resolved i n Congress and i n t h e state l e g i s l a t u r e s a r e not s u b j e c t t o reexamination i n t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s under t h e g u i s e of j u d i c i a l r e v i e w of agency a c t i o n . . ." 435 U.S. a t 558. The Court concluded with t h e s t r o n g language: ". . . It i s t o i n s u r e a f u l l y informed and well-considered d e c i s i o n , n o t n e c e s s a r i l y a d e c i s i o n t h e judges of t h e Court of Appeals o r of t h i s Court would have reached had they been members of t h e decisionmaking u n i t of t h e agency. Administrative d e c i s i o n s should be set a s i d e i n t h i s c o n t e x t , a s i n every o t h e r , o n l y f o r s u b s t a n t i a l procedural o r s u b s t a n t i v e reasons a s mandated by s t a t u t e , Consolo v. FMC, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966), n o t simply because t h e c o u r t is unhappy with t h e r e s u l t reached . . ." 435 U.S. a t 558. Because s o many of t h e i s s u e s i n t h i s case involve t h e f i n d i n g s of a t l e a s t one board below, w e review b r i e f l y what t h i s Court has s t a t e d regarding t h e r u l e s of c o n s t r u c t i o n a p p l i e d t o f i n d i n g s of f a c t . I n Ballenger v. Tillman (1958), 133 Mont. 369, 324 P.2d 1045, t h i s Court s t a t e d t h a t u l t i m a t e f a c t s , as d i s t i n g u i s h e d from e v i d e n t i a r y ones, a r e t h e f i n d i n g s a t r i a l c o u r t should make. Findings a r e t o r e c e i v e such a c o n s t r u c t i o n as w i l l uphold, r a t h e r than d e f e a t , t h e judgment. This Court quoted with approval a C a l i f o r n i a c a s e t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t t h e r e i s no e r r o r i n t h e f a i l u r e of a t r i a l c o u r t t o make a n express f i n d i n g upon a n i s s u e i f it was i m p l i c i t i n t h e f i n d i n g s made, and t h a t t h e r e i s no n e c e s s i t y t o negate c o n t r a d i c t o r y a l l e g a t i o n s . Ballenger was quoted w i t h approval i n Erickson v. F i s h e r (1976), 170 Mont. 491, 554 P.2d 1336, where t h e Court r e j e c t e d a proposed f i n d i n g of f a c t o f f e r e d by t h e a p p e l l a n t because it was merely a n e v i d e n t i a r y f a c t a s d i s t i n g u i s h e d from a n u l t i m a t e f a c t . I t has been s t a t e d another way t h a t f i n d i n g s a r e s u f f i - c i e n t i f they d i s p o s e of m a t e r i a l i s s u e s . 76 Am J u r 2d, T r i a l , 51259; 89 C.J.S. T r i a l , 5626. This i s a p p l i c a b l e t o c o u r t t r i a l s , and i t i s obvious t h a t stricter r u l e s should n o t be imposed upon a d m i n i s t r a t i v e agencies. This record c o n t a i n s some 17,000 pages of t r a n s c r i p t ; hundreds of e x h i b i t s , including a monumental "environmental a n a l y s i s " ; and hundreds of proposed f i n d i n g s of f a c t and conclusions of law. The findings of f a c t and conclusions of law of t h e Board of Health are 23 pages long, and those of t h e Board of Natural Resources run 46 pages. Approximately 300 pages of b r i e f s were submitted. Many of the questions involved r e q u i r e f i r s t impression decisions a s t o t h e re- quirements of t h e M A P A and of t h e S i t i n g A c t . Due t o t h e many i s s u e s presented, t h e i r complexity, and t h e voluminous pages of t r a n s c r i p t , w e f i n d it impractical t o set f o r t h t h e e n t i r e statement of f a c t s i n a s i n g l e portion of t h i s opinion. Further necessary and appropriate f a c t s w i l l be discussed with each i s s u e . The i s s u e s presented t o t h i s Court, as agreed t o by t h e p a r t i e s and addressed by t h e D i s t r i c t Court, a r e : 1. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court's r u l i n g t h a t prohibi- t i o n of cross-examination of agency witnesses v i o l a t e d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l standards, s t a t u t e s , and regulations, was e r r o r ? 2. Whether t h e Board of Health proceedings, record, t r a n s c r i p t , e x h i b i t s , findings, conclusions and orders i n t h e Board of Natural Resources record i s s u b j e c t t o review? 3. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court erred i n requiring t h e Board of Health t o consider s t a t e o r f e d e r a l implementation plans i n reaching c e r t i f i c a t i o n pursuant t o s e c t i o n 70- 810 (1) (h) , R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 75-20-301 (1) (h) M C A ? 4 . Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n requiring t h e Board of Health t o make findings and conclusions a s t o whether c e r t a i n a i r and w a t e r q u a l i t y standards would be complied with, and whether t h e f a c i l i t i e s would have a major impact on ground water q u a l i t y ? 5. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court erred i n requiring t h e Board of Natural Resources t o consider and make adequate f i n d i n g s of f a c t and conclusions of law w i t h r e s p e c t t o whether t h e f a c i l i t i e s w i l l r e s u l t i n t h e minimum adverse environmental impact? 6. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s r u l i n g t h a t t h e Board of Health i s r e q u i r e d t o c e r t i f y without c o n d i t i o n , compli- ance w i t h a i r and water q u a l i t y s t a n d a r d s and s t a t e imple- mentation p l a n s , was e r r o r ? 7. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court p r o p e r l y r u l e d t h a t t h e Board of Natural Resources be r e q u i r e d t o consider and make adequate f i n d i n g s a s t o t h e s i t i n g and l o c a t i o n of t h e transmission c o r r i d o r f o r t h e 430 m i l e s o f transmission l i n e s ? 8. Whether t h e District Court e r r e d i n holding t h a t t h e r e was n o t s u b s t a n t i a l c r e d i b l e evidence t o support t h e Board of Natural Resources' f i n d i n g s , conclusions, and d e c i s i o n t h a t t h e proposed f a c i l i t y r e p r e s e n t s t h e minimum adverse environmental impact? 9. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court p r o p e r l y accepted and r u l e d t h a t p a r t i e s t o t h e p e t i t i o n w e r e adequately served? 10. Whether t h e Board of N a t u r a l Resources p r o p e r l y denied a motion t o deny t h e a p p l i c a t i o n based on t h e Board of H e a l t h ' s m i s c e r t i f i c a t i o n o r n o n c e r t i f i c a t i o n of t h e a i r and water q u a l i t y m a t t e r s r e q u i r e d under s e c t i o n 7 0 - 8 1 0 ( 1 ) ( h ) , R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 75-20-301(2) (h) M C A ? 11. Whether t h e Board of Natural ~ e s o u r c e s ' r e f u s a l t o consider t h e minimum adverse environmental impact as t o r e q u i r i n g more e f f i c i e n t technology f o r t h e removal of SO2 and t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s opinion a f f i r m i n g t h a t r e f u s a l i s e r r o r under t h e S i t i n g Act? 12. Whether t h e r e f u s a l of t h e Board of ~ a t u r a l Re- sources t o allow i t s members t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o review f i n d i n g s of f a c t and conclusions of law p r i o r t o adoption, and t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s affirming t h a t d e c i s i o n , was a r - b i t r a r y and c a p r i c i o u s on t h e p a r t of t h e agency and a d e p r i v a t i o n of p e t i t i o n e r s ' c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s t o due process and a f u l l and f a i r hearing before t h e Board? The f i r s t i s s u e t o be addressed i s I s s u e No. 9--whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court properly accepted and r u l e d t h a t p a r t i e s t o t h e p e t i t i o n w e r e adequately served. W e b e l i e v e t h a t it d i d . While t h e D i s t r i c t Court d i d not make a s p e c i f i c r u l i n g a s t o t h e e f f e c t u a t i o n of proper s e r v i c e on a l l p a r t i e s , it s u r e l y i s c l e a r l y implied by i t s various pre- t r i a l o r d e r s and by i t s f i n a l order reversing and remanding. Surely n e i t h e r t h e U t i l i t i e s nor t h e agency a p p e l l a n t s / cross-respondents have any standing t o complain about s e r - v i c e i n t h i s matter. Any complaint they might have had was waived by agreeing t o t h e d e l i n e a t i o n of i s s u e s which w e r e f i n a l i z e d by t h e D i s t r i c t Court's order of February 27, 1977. I t i s contended by t h e Union and REA, appellants/ cross-respondents, t h a t they a r e each " p a r t i e s of record" f o r t h e purposes of s e c t i o n 82-4216 ( 2 ) (a) , R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 2-4-702 MCA, of t h e MAPA, and thereby e n t i t l e d t o i n d i v i d u a l s e r v i c e of a copy of t h e p e t i t i o n of review. W e f i n d t h a t t h e Union and REA w e r e not indispensable p a r t i e s under t h e circumstances e n t i t l e d t o i n d i v i d u a l s e r v i c e of a copy of t h e p e t i t i o n of review. Compare, C i s s e l l v. Colorado S t a t e Bd. of Assessment App. (Colo. 1977), 564 P.2d 1 2 4 , and L i f e of t h e Land v. Land U s e Comn. (1977), 58 Haw. 292, 568 P.2d 1189. They were j o i n t l y represented by counsel and t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Brotherhood of E l e c t r i c a l Workers, an a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a n t i n t h e agency proceeding w a s a c t u a l l y served with a copy of t h e p e t i t i o n f o r review. Had t h e s e appel- lants/cross-respondents communicated with one another, they would have had a c t u a l knowledge of t h e p e t i t i o n , i f they d i d n o t have such knowledge from t h e i r counsel o r t h e newspapers. W e do n o t f e e l t h a t j u d i c i a l review of t h e Board's a c t i o n should be thwarted by a p a r t y n o t p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n a proceeding, even though it had knowledge of it, and l a t e r allowed t o complain t h a t t h e c o u r t had no j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e matter. The motion of t h e Union and REA t o dismiss t h i s proceeding i s hereby denied. I s s u e No. 2 w i l l be considered next. This i s s u e could more properly be phrased by asking whether t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e Board of Health was a f i n a l d e c i s i o n under t h e provi- s i o n s of s e c t i o n 82-4216, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 2-4-702 MCA, of t h e M A P A , and, i f s o , whether an appeal of such o r d e r i s mandatory o r permissive. O n pages 16 and 17 of i t s o r d e r , t h e D i s t r i c t Court held t h a t t h e granting of t h e Board of Health c e r t i f i c a t i o n should properly be viewed as a "preliminary, procedural o r intermediate agency a c t i o n " which i s n o t reviewable because review of t h e f i n a l agency a c t i o n ( i . e . , t h a t of t h e Board of Natural Resources) provides n o t only an adequate remedy b u t t h e only necessary remedy." The D i s t r i c t Court held t h a t t h e Board of Health c e r t i f i c a t i o n had no l e g a l e f f e c t whatsoever u n t i l and u n l e s s t h e Board of Natural Resources granted i t s c e r t i f i c a t i o n under s e c t i o n 70-804, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n s 75-20-201 and 75-20-203 MCA. The c o u r t con- cluded t h a t t h e Board of Health d e c i s i o n could not be ap- pealed u n t i l t h e Board of Natural Resources granted a f i n a l c e r t i f i c a t e of environmental compatibility. S e c t i o n 82-4216, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 2-4-702 MCA, provides: " (1) ( a ) A person who has exhausted a l l adminis- t r a t i v e remedies a v a i l a b l e w i t h i n t h e agency and who i s aggrieved by a f i n a l d e c i s i o n i n a c o n t e s t e d c a s e i s e n t i t l e d t o j u d i c i a l review under t h i s p a r t . This s e c t i o n does n o t l i m i t u t i l i z a t i o n of o r t h e scope of j u d i c i a l review a v a i l a b l e under o t h e r means of review, r e d r e s s , r e l i e f , o r t r i a l d e novo provided by s t a t u t e . A preliminary, procedural, o r i n t e r m e d i a t e agency a c t i o n o r r u l i n g i s immediately review- a b l e i f review of t h e f i n a l agency d e c i s i o n would n o t provide a n adequate remedy." The i s s u e t h e n i s whether o r n o t t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e Board of Health d a t e d November 21, 1975, c e r t i f y i n g t h a t C o l s t r i p U n i t s 3 and 4 would n o t v i o l a t e s t a t e and f e d e r a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d s t a n d a r d s and implementation p l a n s , w a s a f i n a l d e c i s i o n under t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h e M A P A and, accordingly, should have been appealed t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court by t h e p e t i t i o n e r s a t t h a t t i m e . S e c t i o n 70-810 (1) (h) , R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 75-20- 3 0 1 ( l ) ( h ) MCA, provides t h a t t h e Board of Natural Resources may n o t g r a n t a c e r t i f i c a t e u n t i l it determines t h a t t h e a u t h o r i z e d s t a t e a i r and w a t e r q u a l i t y agencies have certi- f i e d t h a t t h e proposed f a c i l i t y w i l l n o t v i o l a t e s t a t e and f e d e r a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d standards and implementation p l a n s . There i s no q u e s t i o n t h a t t h e Board of Health i s t h e duly a u t h o r i z e d s t a t e a i r and w a t e r q u a l i t y agency i n t h i s c a s e . S e c t i o n 70-810, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 75-20-301 MCA, f u r t h e r provides t h a t judgments of t h e a u t h o r i z e d a i r and water q u a l i t y agencies " a r e conclusive" on a l l q u e s t i o n s r e l a t i n g t o t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n of s t a t e and f e d e r a l a i r and water q u a l i t y standards. The Board of Natural Resources had no a u t h o r i t y t o review t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e Board of Health under any circumstances. Accordingly, t h e Board o f Health order w a s n o t a preliminary o r i n t e r l o c u t o r y order. I t was f i n a l f o r a l l purposes. Thus, an appeal should have been made by p e t i t i o n e r s a t t h a t time. The f a c t t h a t t h e Board of Health's c e r t i f i c a t i o n was n o t t h e f i n a l order i n p o i n t of t i m e i n t h e proceedings i s n o t conclusive on t h e question of a p p e a l a b i l i t y . " . . . For purposes of j u d i c i a l review t h e f i n a l i t y of an agency order depends upon t h e nature of t h e order r a t h e r than i t s chro- nology i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e whole of t h e agency proceedings. . ." Goodman v. Public Service Commission, (D.C. C i r . 1972), 467 F.2d 375, 377, c i t i n g Federal Power Comm'n v. Metro- p o l i t a n Edison Co. (1938), 304 U.S. 375, 384, 58 S.Ct. 963, 82 L.ed. 1408. Goodman involved a hearing before t h e Washington, D.C. Public Service Commission concerning a p e t i t i o n f o r a r a t e increase. The hearing was b i f u r c a t e d i n t o two "phases." I n i t s Phase I o r d e r , t h e PSC e s t a b l i s h e d t h e f a i r r a t e of r e t u r n a t 7.1 percent. The Power Company w a s then ordered t o submit proposed schedules t o i n c r e a s e i t s revenue accord- ingly. The PSC Phase I1 order was an order e f f e c t u a t i n g t h e above d i r e c t i v e by approving a schedule of r a t e s . Goodman appealed from t h e Phase I order and n o t t h e Phase I1 o r d e r . The f e d e r a l d i s t r i c t c o u r t dismissed t h e appeal holding t h a t t h e Phase I o r d e r was n o t a f i n a l order o r d e c i s i o n and t h a t Goodman w a s n o t a f f e c t e d u n t i l e n t r y of t h e Phase I1 o r d e r . The C i r c u i t Court of Appeals reversed, holding t h a t t h e Phase I order was a f i n a l order: ". . . Its f i n a l c h a r a c t e r i s i n no sense a f f e c t e d by t h e need f o r t h e later Phase I1 o r d e r a l l o c a t i n g t h e i n c r e a s e among t h e s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t c a t e g o r i e s of customers. The in- c r e a s e i n r a t e s , and t h e f i n d i n g s of t h e Com- mission upon t h e b a s i s of which t h e i n c r e a s e was allowed, w e r e i n no way l e f t f o r f u r t h e r d e c i s i o n by t h e Phase I1 order. "While it i s t r u e t h a t i n our case t h e r e was something else f o r t h e Commission t o do, t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e over-all i n c r e a s e [Phase I ] was n o t conditioned upon anything y e t t o be resolved by t h e l a t e r order authorizing t a r i f f schedules. What remained t o be done w a s n o t concerned with t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e i n c r e a s e i n rates which had been granted--the a c t i o n of t h e Commission which M r . Goodman took t o c o u r t . That a c t i o n ' w a s expected t o and d i d have l e g a l consequences' which were n o t modified nor intended t o be modi- f i e d by t h e Phase I1 order which followed. [Citing cases.]" Goodman, 467 F.2d a t 377-78. A s with t h e PSC Phase I order i n Goodman, t h e Board of Health's c e r t i f i c a t i o n w a s n o t conditioned upon anything y e t t o be resolved by t h e l a t e r order of t h e Board of Natural Resources. The remaining a d m i n i s t r a t i v e procedures were n o t concerned with a i r and water q u a l i t y c e r t i f i c a t i o n . The Board of Health order i n t h i s regard w3.d f i n a l and conclu- s i v e . The Board of Health's a c t i o n "was expected t o and d i d have l e g a l consequences" which were n e i t h e r modified nor intended t o be modified by t h e l a t e r order of t h e Board of Natural Resources. The Board of Health's order of November 2 1 , 1975, marks t h e consummation of t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e process within t h a t p a r t i c u l a r agency. The Board of Health's d e c i s i o n was f i n a l f o r purposes of j u d i c i a l review and should have been appealed a t t h a t t i m e . "The p r i n c i p l e of f i n a l i t y i n a d m i n i s t r a t i v e law i s not, however, governed by t h e adminis- t r a t i v e agency's c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of i t s ac- t i o n , b u t r a t h e r by a r e a l i s t i c assessment of t h e nature and e f f e c t of t h e order sought t o be reviewed. Hence, ' a f i n a l order need n o t neces- s a r i l y be t h e very l a s t o r d e r ' i n an agency pro- ceeding, b u t r a t h e r , i s f i n a l f o r purposes of j u d i c i a l review when it 'impose[s] an o b l i g a t i o n , d e n [ i e s ] a r i g h t , o r f i x [ e s ] some l e g a l r e l a t i o n - s h i p a s a consummation of t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e process.' . . ." F i d e l i t y Television, Inc. v. F.C.C. (D.C. C i r . 1974), 502 F.2d 443, 448. W e f i n d t h a t t h e Board of Health's o r d e r of November 2 1 , 1975, was f i n a l on t h a t d a t e . An appeal from t h a t order had t o be f i l e d w i t h i n t h i r t y days t h e r e a f t e r pursuant t o t h e t e r m s of t h e MAPA. N o appeal was timely f i l e d and, t h e r e f o r e , t h e D i s t r i c t Court was without j u r i s d i c t i o n t o review t h e order. The D i s t r i c t Court i s reversed accordingly. I n view of t h e f a c t t h a t t h i s Court has r u l e d t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court w a s without j u r i s d i c t i o n t o review t h e Board of H e a l t h ' s o r d e r dated November 2 1 , 1975, t h e following i s s u e s become moot and need n o t nor can be decided by us: I s s u e No. 3 involving t h e alleged f a i l u r e of t h e Board of Health t o consider s t a t e and f e d e r a l implementation plans; I s s u e No. 4 concerning t h e requirement t h a t t h e Board of Health make a d d i t i o n a l findings and conclusions concerning c e r t a i n a i r and water standards; and I s s u e No. 6 which r a i s e d t h e question of t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e c o n d i t i o n a l c e r t i f i c a t e issued by t h e Board of Health. I s s u e Nos. 10, 1 1 and 12 involve i s s u e s wherein respon- dents/cross-appellants contend t h e District Court e r r e d . I s s u e No. 10 questions t h e d e n i a l by t h e Board of Natural Resources and t h e concurrence of t h e D i s t r i c t Court of respondents/cross-appellants' motion t o deny t h e appli- c a t i o n because of f a u l t y c e r t i f i c a t i o n by t h e Board of Health. W e f i n d t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court properly concurred i n t h e d e n i a l of t h e motion. On January 7 and 8 , 1976, respondents/cross-apellants f i l e d motions t o terminate t h e proceedings before t h e Board of Natural Resources on t h e grounds of t h e a l l e g e d i n v a l i d i t y of t h e c e r t i f i c a t i o n of t h e f a c i l i t y by t h e Board of ~ e a l t h . The Board of Natural Resources denied t h e motions. Under t h e provisions of s e c t i o n 70-810 (1) (h) , R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 70-20-301(2)(h) MCA, of t h e S i t i n g A c t , t h e Board of Health i s required t o c e r t i f y t o t h e Board of Natural Resources ". . . t h a t t h e proposed f a c i l i t y w i l l n o t v i o l a t e s t a t e and f e d e r a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d standards and imple- mentation plans . . ." This was done by t h e Board of Health on November 2 1 , 1975. The g r a n t was c a l l e d a "conditional c e r t i f i c a t e , " b u t t h a t q u a l i f i c a t i o n has no s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r t h e purposes of t h i s i s s u e . The above s e c t i o n of t h e S i t i n g Act provides f u r t h e r t h a t t h e judgments of t h e Board of Health ". . . a r e conclusive on a l l questions r e l a t e d t o t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n of s t a t e and f e d e r a l a i r and water q u a l i t y standards." (Emphasis added.) Therefore, from a s t a t u t o r y standpoint alone, t h e Board of Natural Resources had no choice b u t t o look upon t h e c e r t i f i c a t i o n by t h e Board of Health a s "conclusive" and deny t h e motions of respondents/ cross-appellants. There i s a n even more compelling reason why t h e Board of Natural Resources was j u s t i f i e d i n denying t h e motions. The c e r t i f i c a t i o n and o r d e r of t h e Board of Health was dated November 2 1 , 1975. W e held under I s s u e No. 2 t h a t such c e r t i f i c a t i o n and order was a " f i n a l d e c i s i o n i n a contested case" and s u b j e c t t o mandatory j u d i c i a l review w i t h i n t h i r t y days a f t e r i t s i s s u e . The motions of respondents/cross- a p p e l l a n t s were n o t f i l e d u n t i l January 7 and 8, 1976, well beyond t h e thirty-day period f o r j u d i c i a l review, thus making t h e c e r t i f i c a t i o n and order of t h e Board of Health doubly "conclusive" n o t only upon t h e Board of Natural Resources b u t a l s o upon t h e D i s t r i c t Court. The remedy a v a i l a b l e t o respondents/cross-appellants on t h i s i s s u e of c e r t i f i c a t i o n by t h e Board of Health w a s t o i n s t i t u t e judi- c i a l review within t h e s t a t u t o r y thirty-day period. I s s u e No. 1 1 concerns t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s upholding t h e r e f u s a l of t h e Board of Natural Resources t o r e q u i r e more e f f i c i e n t technology f o r t h e removal of SO2 a t t h e f a c i l i t y i n considering minimum adverse environmental i m - pact. This i s s u e s o l e l y involves questions of f a c t thoroughly reviewed by t h e Board of Natural Resources before making i t s f i n d i n g s , conclusions and orders. I n t h e i r b r i e f s both appellants/cross-respondents and respondents/cross-appellants argue about highly t e c h n i c a l matters, which more properly should be presented before t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e agencies. W e b e l i e v e t h e D i s t r i c t Court decided t h e matter properly, and i t s reasons were adequately s t a t e d a t pages 34 and 35 of i t s opinion: ". . . The disagreement seems t o a r i s e over t h e a s s e r t i o n by a p p l i c a n t s t h a t BACT can be equated t o t h e h i g h e s t s t a t e of t h e a r t o r t o minimum adverse environmental impact. P e t i t i o n e r s i n s i s t t h e l a t t e r sets a higher standard t h a t BACT and t h a t t h e evidence here shows t h e p o l l u t i o n re- moval equipment proposed does n o t m e e t t h a t stan- dard. I n m y opinion, t h e BACT, o r NSPS and PSD, standards a r e empirical and q u a n t i f i a b l e and a r e set o u t s p e c i f i c a l l y i n t h e EPA r e g u l a t i o n s . These should be determined by t h e Department of Health, a s t h a t department attempted t o do here. On t h e o t h e r hand, t h e determination as t o whether various a s p e c t s of t h e proposed f a c i l i t y w i l l provide minimum adverse environmental i m - p a c t ( o r r e p r e s e n t t h e h i g h e s t s t a t e of t h e a r t ) i s a judgmental matter, r e q u i r i n g comparison, t h e weighing of s e v e r a l f a c t o r s and t h e balancing of pros and cons. This i s t h e business of t h e Board of Natural Resources. ( I n t h i s case, Find- i n g of Fact #79 of t h e Board of Natural Resources sets f o r t h some, o r a l l of t h e f a c t o r s considered.) Here t h e p e t i t i o n e r s argue t h a t t h e evidence pro- vided by t h e witness Brink shows c l e a r l y t h a t t h e h i g h e s t s t a t e of t h e a r t would provide 90% removal of SO2. The a p p l i c a n t p o i n t s o u t t h a t Brink's technology a p p l i e s t o a high s u l f u r c o a l i n s t a l l a t i o n with an open loop s e t t l i n g system. The proposed f a c i l i t y takes advantage of low s u l - phur c o a l and a closed loop system t h a t would ' t r a d e o f f ' higher s u l f u r emission (purportedly w i t h i n NSPS and PSO standards) f o r minimization of water p o l l u t i o n . Thus, t h e type of p o l l u t i o n c o n t r o l equipment proposed by t h e a p p l i c a n t s approved by t h e Board of Natural Resources may con- t r i b u t e t o a t o t a l system t h a t provides minimum adverse environmental impact. Such an express conclusion a s applied t o t h e p o l l u t i o n c o n t r o l equipment would have been h e l p f u l ; b u t it can be f a i r l y implied from t h e f i n d i n g s of both Boards. I t can c e r t a i n l y be deemed t o come under t h e a l l - encompassing statement i n Finding of F a c t #3 and Conclusion of Law #4 of t h e BNR c e r t i f i c a t i o n . I t seems t o m e t h e conclusion on t h i s p a r t i c u l a r as- p e c t of t h e c a s e has been adequately s t a t e d and t h a t it is n o t ' c l e a r l y erroneous', although it would have benefited from more s u b s t a n t i a l fac- t u a l f i n d i n g s t o support i t . " The D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s holding on t h i s i s s u e was n o t i n e r r o r . I s s u e No. 1 2 r a i s e s t h e p o i n t a s t o whether t h e r e f u s a l by t h e Board of Natural Resources t o allow members t o review f i n d i n g s and conclusions p r i o r t o adoption was a d e p r i v a t i o n of respondents/cross-appellants' r i g h t s t o due process and a f u l l and f a i r hearing before t h e Board of Natural Resources. W e f i n d no such deprivation. A review of t h e D i s t r i c t Court opinion i n d i c a t e s t h a t it a c t u a l l y d i d n o t make any r u l i n g on t h i s p o i n t . And, a review of t h e record a l s o i n d i c a t e s t h a t respondents/cross- a p p e l l a n t s d i d n o t r a i s e t h i s i s s u e i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court. Therefore, it cannot be r a i s e d f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e on appeal t o t h i s Court. W e have repeatedly held t h a t we w i l l n o t consider questions of claimed e r r o r n o t previously r a i s e d o r presented t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t . Hayes v. J.M.S. Const. (1978), Mont. , 579 P.2d 1225, 35 St.Rep. 722; Mont. Ass'n - of Underwriters v. S t a t e , Etc. (1977), - Mont. - , 563 P.2d 577, 34 St-Rep. 297; Kearns v. McIntyre Const. Co. (1977) Mont. , 567 P.2d 433, 34 St.Rep. 703. W e p o i n t o u t , however, t h a t i n our opinion t h e r e was no d e p r i v a t i o n of r i g h t s o r even u n f a i r p r a c t i c e s i n t h e adop- t i o n of f i n d i n g s and conclusions by t h e Board of Natural Resources. A reading of t h e e n t i r e separate volume of t r a n s c r i p t regarding procedural matters before t h e Board of Natural Resources dated J u l y 22, 1976, c l e a r l y demonstrates t h i s . The record i n d i c a t e s t h a t p r i o r t o t h e meeting of t h e Board of Natural Resources i n June 1976, each board member prepared h i s own set of findings and conclusions, a f t e r which a vote was taken a t t h e June 1976 meeting "as t o which r o u t e they would choose." Following t h e vote, t h e hearings examiner was requested by t h e Board t o prepare findings of t h e majority, which had voted t o approve t h e application. O n J u l y 8, 1976, two weeks p r i o r t o t h e f i n a l meeting of July 22, 1976, a l e t t e r was s e n t t o each board member with a copy of t h e hearings examiner's proposed findings of f a c t , conclusions of l a w , opinion, decision, order and recom- mendations. The hearings examiner requested t h a t he be n o t i f i e d of any changes any member wanted made. The hear- i n g s examiner noted t h a t t h e r e w e r e some changes t o be made such a s s p e l l i n g and typographical e r r o r s , and some provi- s i o n s were changed. These findings and conclusions w e r e adopted by t h e Board of Natural Resources simultaneously with t h e granting of t h e c e r t i f i c a t e of environmental com- p a t i b i l i t y and public need. Under t h e s e circumstances t h e Board of Natural Resources' a c t i o n could not be held t o be a r b i t r a r y and capricious, o r a deprivation of respondents/ cross-appellants' c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s t o due process and a f u l l and f a i r hearing. Issue No. 5 involves t h e D i s t r i c t Court's requirement t h a t t h e Board of Natural Resources make a d d i t i o n a l findings and conclusions regarding t h e use of ~ o s e b u d coal versus McKay c o a l and t h e mine-mouth versus load-center generation q u e s t i o n . The D i s t r i c t Court admits t h e r e was ample testi- mony on both p o i n t s b u t i n s i s t s t h e s t a t u t o r y f i n d i n g s and conclusions t h a t t h e f a c i l i t i e s w i l l m e e t t h e "minimum adverse environmental impact" t e s t of t h e S i t i n g Act, a s r e q u i r e d by s e c t i o n 70-810(l) ( c ) , R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 75-20-301(2) ( c ) MCA, must be accompanied by a " p r e c i s e and e x p l i c i t statement of t h e underlying f a c t s supporting t h e f i n d i n g s " a s provided under t h e t e r m s of t h e I~APA, s e c t i o n 82-4213, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 2-4-623 MCA. W e agree. I n connection w i t h t h e Rosebud v e r s u s McKay c o a l p o i n t i n t h i s i s s u e , t h e D i s t r i c t Court h e l d t h a t t h e Board of Natural Resources d i d n o t make adequate f i n d i n g s of f a c t and conclusions of l a w regarding whether t h e u s e of only Rosebud c o a l , without t h e u s e of any McKay c o a l , r e p r e s e n t e d t h e minimum environmental impact. The testimony i n d i c a t e s t h e r e a r e e x t e n s i v e McKay c o a l d e p o s i t s i n t h e same a r e a a s t h e Rosebud c o a l d e p o s i t s . The use of one c o a l seam t o t h e e x c l u s i o n of t h e o t h e r could, of course, r e s u l t i n an i n - creased e f f e c t of t h e impact of s t r i p mining and reclamation. The l a c k o f any s p e c i f i c f i n d i n g s i n t h i s d i s p u t e d f a c t u a l a r e a , d i r e c t l y a f f e c t i n g t h e environmental impact of t h e f a c i l i t y , w a s e r r o r on t h e p a r t of t h e Board of Natural Resources. The D i s t r i c t Court p r o p e r l y h e l d t h a t a c o n c i s e and e x p l i c i t statement of t h e underlying f i n d i n g s of f a c t w a s necessary t o support t h e u l t i m a t e conclusion. gardi ding t h e second p o i n t i n t h i s i s s u e , t h e ~ i s t r i c t Court h e l d t h a t t h e Board of Natural Resources be r e q u i r e d t o make adequate f i n d i n g s of f a c t and conclusions of law w i t h r e g a r d to: " (b) Whether mine-mouth g e n e r a t i o n as opposed t o l o a d c e n t e r g e n e r a t i o n r e p r e s e n t s minimum environmental impact, and t h e reasons t h e r e f o r , including consider- a t i o n s as t o r e l a t i v e energy e f f i c i e n c y and t h e r e l a - t i v e impact o f e l e c t r i c a l transmission v e r s u s c o a l haulage, b o t h a s r e q u i r e d by S e c t i o n 70-810(l) ( c ) . " AppelLantd/cross-respondents maintain t h a t only u l t i - mate f a c t u a l conclusions need be drawn by t h e Board of Natural Resources and underlying supporting f i n d i n g s of f a c t are n o t required. Such a p o s i t i o n i s c o n t r a r y t o t h e re- quirements of MAPA. S e c t i o n 82-4213, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 2-4-623 MCA. The i s s u e i s p r i m a r i l y one of whether c l e a r - c u t a l t e r - n a t i v e s i n t h e evidence need be considered i n t h e f i n d i n g s by t h e Board of N a t u r a l Resources i n reaching t h e s t a t u t o r y conclusion t h a t t h e f a c i l i t i e s w i l l m e e t t h e minimum adverse environmental impact. The Board of N a t u r a l Resources made no f i n d i n g s , f o r example, a s t o whether t h e economic d e t r i - ment, i f any, i n t e r m s of d e p r e c i a t e d land v a l u e s and e f f e c t on b u s i n e s s and commerce, caused by t h e t a k i n g of 430 m i l e s of double right-of-way a c r o s s t h e S t a t e of Montana v e r s u s t h e u t i l i z a t i o n of e x i s t i n g r a i l r o a d right-of-way s a t i s f i e d t h e minimum impact test. The D i s t r i c t Court r u l i n g t h a t t h e Board of Natural Resources be r e q u i r e d t o make f i n d i n g s a s t o t h e " n a t u r e and economics of t h e v a r i o u s a l t e r n a t i v e s , " a s set f o r t h i n s e c t i o n 7 0 - 8 1 0 ( 1 ) ( c ) , R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 75-20-301(2)(c) MCA, was proper and i n accordance w i t h a p p l i c a b l e law. I s s u e N o . 7 q u e s t i o n s t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s requirement t h a t t h e Board of N a t u r a l Resources make a d d i t i o n a l f i n d i n g s a s t o t h e s i t i n g and t h e l o c a t i o n of t h e transmission l i n e c o r r i d o r . The D i s t r i c t Court h e l d t h a t t h e Board of Natural Resources made inadequate f i n d i n g s a s t o t h e environmental criteria and the identification and designation of the transmission line corridor as required by the I I I A P A in section 82-4313, R.C.M. 1947, now section 2-4-623 MCA. The transmission line, as a part of the facilities, calls for the location of approximately 430 miles of right- of-way for two 500 k.v. transmission lines from Colstrip to the western boundary of the state. The District Court held that the Board of Natural Resources was required to "clearly designate a transmission line corridor, make findings of fact as to why the Board preferred the chosen corridor to the alternative corridors, and conclusions of law as to what state and local legal requirements must be met, and whether they have in fact been met, in accordance with Section 70-810(1)(f)." We concur. Appellants/cross-respondents point out the apparent inconsistency of the District Court's opinion wherein the court refused to consider the lack of findings as to the environmental impact of the alternative corridor segments, and its final ruling set forth above. Although the opinion could be clearer in this regard, it is apparent that the District Court rejected respondents/cross-appellants' argu- ment on the issue of minimum adverse environmental impact as to the alternative corridors. However, the District Court refused to affirm the granting of a certificate by the Board of Natural Resources, without some actual identification of the corridors subject to approval. With respect to the transmission facilities, appellants/ cross-respondents' Exhibit 92 sets forth a number of alter- native segments which, in combination, could make up possibly five or six different routings, rather than 54 alternative routes as suggested by appellants/cross-respondents. ~ l s o , respondents/cross-appellants submitted proposed f i n d i n g s on t h e p r e f e r a b i l i t y of a l t e r n a t i v e c o r r i d o r s , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e use of e x i s t i n g r a i l r o a d r i g h t of way over t h e r o u t e s --- proposed by appellants/cross-respondents. BNR Proposed Findings N.P.R.C. #13-16, 32, 34-36, 66-69, 104-105, 108, 115. DNRC #814-820. The f i n d i n g s of f a c t touching on t h i s i s s u e were con- clusory i n nature and presented no b a s i s o r underlying supporting f a c t s f o r t h e conclusion reached. See Board of Natural Resources Finding of Fact No. 48. Furthermore, i n a subsequent finding, No. 74, t h e Board of Natural Resources found t h a t f u r t h e r meteorological d a t a w a s necessary f o r a determination of a f i n a l s e l e c t i o n of -- t h e "proposed c o r r i d o r . " (Emphasis supplied.) The conclusions of law go no f u r t h e r than t o make a r e f e r e n c e i n one of t h e conditions t o a "proposed corridor." Board of Natural Resources Conclusion of Law No. 1 2 (L) ( 3 ) . A s s t a t e d by t h e D i s t r i c t Court, t h e p e r t i n e n t f i n d i n g s of f a c t and conclusions of law with r e s p e c t t o t h e trans- mission f a c i l i t i e s are t o t a l l y conclusory i n n a t u r e with r e s p e c t t o t h e i r l o c a t i o n . Furthermore, they f a i l t o a c t u a l l y reach t h e conclusion t h a t a transmission r o u t e has been located. This i s , of course, t h e fundamental purpose of t h e e n t i r e agency process. Section 82-4213, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 2-4-623 MCA, provides i n p a r t : ". . . Each conclu- s i o n of law s h a l l be supported by a u t h o r i t y o r by a reasoned opinion. " ~ppellants/cross-respondents a l l u d e t o c i t a t i o n s of t h e record t o s a t i s f y t h e e s s e n t i a l fact-finding o b l i g a t i o n of t h e Board of Natural Resources with r e s p e c t t o t h e require- ment t h a t t h e l o c a t i o n conform t o s t a t e and l o c a l laws and r e g u l a t i o n s ( s e c t i o n 70-810 (1) ( f ) R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 75-20-301(2) (b) MCA). The District Court c o r r e c t l y held t h a t t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of t h e laws determined t o be com- p l i e d w i t h was necessary t o support Conclusion of Law No. 8. The ~ i s t r i c t Court i n t h i s i n s t a n c e could n o t s u b s t i t u t e i t s judgment f o r t h e agency i n t h e absence of any d e f i n i t i v e d e c i s i o n by t h e agency. ~ppellants/cross-respondents' c o n t e n t i o n t h a t r e f e r e n c e s i n t h e f i n d i n g s t o t h e f a c t t h a t t h e transmission l i n e s would be l o c a t e d t o avoid population c e n t e r s a s much a s p o s s i b l e , without even a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of what population c e n t e r s w e r e involved, t h e e f f e c t of t h e impact, o r t h e corresponding b e n e f i t s , i f any, does n o t s a t i s f y t h e f a c t - f i n d i n g o b l i g a t i o n of t h e Board of Natural Resources. F i n a l l y , subsequent approval of a segment of c e n t e r l i n e has no bearing on t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e Board of Natural Resources w i t h r e s p e c t t o l o c a t i o n of a c o r r i d o r . The f a c t t h a t members of t h e Board of Natural Resources may subse- q u e n t l y i d e n t i f y a c e n t e r l i n e l o c a t i o n does n o t a i d t h e incompleteness of t h e Board of N a t u r a l Resources' determina- t i o n w i t h r e g a r d t o a c o r r i d o r l o c a t i o n . The District Court p r o p e r l y found t h a t something more t h a n conclusory f i n d i n g s of f a c t o r conclusions of law was necessary t o meet t h e requirements of t h e S i t i n g Act w i t h r e s p e c t t o l o c a t i o n of transmission l i n e f a c i l i t i e s , espe- c i a l l y of t h e magnitude sought by appellants/cross-respondents. W e now t u r n t o I s s u e No. 8 concerning t h e District C o u r t ' s f i n d i n g a s t o whether t h e r e was s u b s t a n t i a l c r e d i b l e evidence t o support t h e Board of Natural ~ e s o u r c e s ' f i n d i n g s , conclusions and d e c i s i o n t h a t t h e proposed f a c i l i t y repre- s e n t s t h e minimum adverse environmental impact, The p a r t i e s i n t h i s matter phrased t h i s i s s u e a s t o whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n holding t h e r e w a s n o t s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o support a f i n d i n g of minimum adverse environmental impact. A c a r e f u l reading of t h e D i s t r i c t Court opinion i n d i c a t e s t h a t such a statement of t h e i s s u e i s n o t c o r r e c t . The D i s t r i c t Court i n i t s d e c i s i o n on t h i s i s s u e set f o r t h nine d i f f e r e n t headings. The D i s t r i c t Court on a l l t h e headings except possibly number 8 r u l e d i n favor of t h e u t i l i t i e s . I t found t h e r e was s u b s t a n t i a l c r e d i b l e evidence t o support t h e Board of Natural Resources' f i n d i n g s , conclusions and d e c i s i o n t h a t t h e proposed f a c i l i t y repre- s e n t s t h e minimum adverse environmental impact. Concerning number 8 t h e D i s t r i c t Court held t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l evi- dence b u t then beclouds t h e i s s u e by adding, almost paren- t h e t i c a l l y , t h a t t h e Board of Natural Resources d i d n o t support i t s u l t i m a t e conclusion with any f i n d i n g s a s t o underlying f a c t s . W e f i n d t h a t t h e language concerning supporting u l t i m a t e f a c t s i s surplusage a s f a r a s t h i s i s s u e i s concerned. W e agree with t h e D i s t r i c t Court and f i n d t h a t t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l c r e d i b l e evidence i n t h e record t o support t h e Board of Natural Resources' f i n d i n g s , conclu- s i o n s and d e c i s i o n t h a t t h e proposed f a c i l i t y r e p r e s e n t s t h e minimum adverse environmental impact. The f i n a l i s s u e f o r t h i s Court t o decide and probably t h e most far-reaching with regard t o a d m i n i s t r a t i v e law i n t h i s s t a t e , i s I s s u e No. 1--whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n holding t h a t t h e Board of Natural Resources must provide respondents/cross-appellants t h e opportunity t o cross- examine witnesses of t h e Department of Health and t h e Depart- ment of Natural Resources i n t h e hearings before each ~ o a r d . The ~ i s t r i c t Court i n i t s d e c i s i o n and order held t h a t t h e hearings examiner e r r e d i n r u l i n g t h a t p a r t i e s opposing t h e u t i l i t i e s ' a p p l i c a t i o n could n o t cross-examine witnesses c a l l e d by o t h e r p a r t y opponents i n both t h e Board of Health and Board of Natural Resources hearings. W e disagree. To f u l l y comprehend t h e n a t u r e and reason f o r t h e r u l i n g , we examine t h e background of t h e proceedings p r i o r t o t h e r u l i n g . A f t e r reading t h e record and t h e b r i e f s i n t h i s c a s e , t h e p o s i t i o n of t h e main p a r t i e s i n t h e two hearings becomes obvious e a r l y . On t h e one s i d e were t h e proponents con- s i s t i n g of t h e u t i l i t i e s a s applicants. O n t h e o t h e r s i d e were t h e opponents t o t h e a p p l i c a t i o n c o n s i s t i n g of Northern P l a i n s Resource Council, Northern Cheyenne Tribe, Inc., t h e Department of Natural Resources and t h e Department of Health. Each of t h e above opponents was represented by s e p a r a t e counsel. With i n t e r e s t w e note t h a t when it came t i m e t o submit t o t h e Board of Health proposed f i n d i n g s of f a c t and conclusions of law, as well a s comments on t h e u t i l i t i e s ' proposed f i n d i n g s of f a c t and conclusions of l a w and f i n a l memoranda, t h e f o u r main opponents submitted j o i n t plead- ings--not s e p a r a t e ones, each pleading being signed by t h e four s e p a r a t e counsel representing each main opponent. I n f a c t , t h e t i t l e of each pleading designates t h e four p a r t i e s a s "opponents" t o t h e a p p l i c a t i o n . Any attempt t o c a s t doubt upon t h e d i v i s i o n of p a r t i e s i n t o d i s t i n c t proponents and opponents, a s t h e D i s t r i c t Court attempted t o do i n i t s opinion and order of March 3 , 1978, i s without,merit. N o one involved i n t h e proceedings expected an e a r l y conclusion, y e t it soon became apparent t h a t t h e proceedings could l a s t f o r months unless s t e p s w e r e taken t o shorten t h e hearings, For example, t h e f i r s t witnesses c a l l e d averaged over f i v e days of testimony each, including extensive cross- examination by attorneys f o r t h e four main opponents t o t h e application. Extended discussions among t h e attorneys and t h e hearings examiner ensued i n an e f f o r t t o break t h e impasse. The apprehension of t h e hearings examiner became more noticeable a s t h e proceedings progressed. Thus, e a r l y i n t h e hearings he noted t h a t t h e Board of Health proceedings w e r e i n t h e second week and the second witness was s t i l l on t h e stand. A t t h e beginning of t h e second month of hearings, four witnesses had n o t y e t been completed. F i n a l l y , t h e hearings examiner ruled t h a t a l l witnesses would t h e r e a f t e r present t h e i r testimony i n writing, and t h a t t h e opponents t o any witness would have s i x hours of cross-examination t i m e , divided among them a s they might agree. The hearings examiner f u r t h e r reserved the r i g h t t o permit a d d i t i o n a l cross-examination i f it was material and i f without it prejudice might occur. A l i m i t a t i o n was a l s o placed upon r e d i r e c t and recross examinations. Approximately a month l a t e r , and a f t e r t h e u t i l i t i e s had r e s t e d t h e i r case-in-chief, objections were made by t h e opponents t o not being allowed t o cross-examine witnesses c a l l e d by other opponents. A t t h a t time, t h e hearings examiner ruled t h a t no p a r t y opposing t h e application would be allowed t o cross-examine witnesses presented by any o t h e r p a r t y opponent. However, t h e r e was a t l e a s t one exception t o t h e r u l e expressed a t t h e t i m e , and followed t h e r e a f t e r , i n t h a t counsel f o r Northern P l a i n s Resource Council was allowed t o cross-examine Department of Health witnesses a s t o t h e water aspects of t h e case because t h e Department had indicated t h a t it could c e r t i f y t h a t t h e p r o j e c t would meet a l l applicable state and f e d e r a l water standards. With t h i s p o s i t i o n , Northern P l a i n s d i d not agree. The comments of t h e hearings examiner on t h i s s u b j e c t a r e most illuminating, including h i s comments a s t o who opposed t h e application. I n response t o a question a s t o whether o r not t h e c h a i r had ruled t h a t t h e Northern P l a i n s Resource Council could not cross-examine a Department of Natural Resources' witness, the hearings examiner s t a t e d : "HEARINGS EXAMINER: That's c o r r e c t , except on matters pertaining t o water. I t ' s m y understanding a t t h e o u t s e t of t h i s thing, w e l i n e up on two s i d e s , proponents and opponents. NOW, t h e r e was some conversation t h a t you weren't l i n e d up t h a t way, b u t t h e c h a i r , t h e Hearings Examiner, has observed throughout these proceedings t h a t a l l t h e attorneys from t h e opponents' s i d e have been i n and o u t of t h e conference room, sharing exhi- b i t s , passing notes, conferring between examina- t i o n s , and i f t h e r e ' s a question one f o r g o t t o ask, he confers and t h e next guy asks it, and I ' v e never heard of a proceeding where you take t h e s i d e of an opponent t o an a p p l i c a t i o n and you cross-examine t h e other opponent's witnesses." Could t h e hearings examiner have made it any c l e a r e r a s t o t h e d i v i s i o n of t h e p a r t i e s ? W e think not. J u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h e r u l e was s t a t e d by t h e hearings examiner a s follows: "HEARINGS EXAMINER: . . . It seems t o m e t h a t t h e only person who has t h e r i g h t t o cross-examine i s t h e person who i s on t h e opposite s i d e . I think t h a t ' s t h e function of cross-examination. I f it weren't t h a t way, t h i s new r u l e w e made could be very nicely abused. I n other words, t h e Appli- c a n t s take two hours on cross-examination, t h e o t h e r p a r t i e s , on t h e other s i d e , we go back on t h e merry-go-round we've been on. You'll have an adequate opportunity t o put i n your c l i e n t ' s case i n f u l l , with a s many witnesses a s you choose, and s t a t e your p o s i t i o n very firmly, and t h e y ' l l have a r i g h t t o cross-examine your witnesses. I d o n ' t contemplate granting t h e DNR t h e r i g h t t o cross-examine your witnesses when t h e y ' r e - not i n an adverse p o s i t i o n t o them. That's not -- -- cross-examination. It can be c a l l e d c r o s s , b u t it can, i n e f f e c t , be r e d i r e c t , unless t h e r e ' s some p a r t i c u l a r i s s u e t h a t you want t o p u t on ------ t h e record, t h a t you have o p p o s i t e i s s u e a s f a r --- a s g r a n t i n g t h i s a p p l i c a t i o n i s concernedx-then, - I t h i n k y o u ' d b e o a t h a t could l e g a l l y - - - - - be c a l l e d c r o s s , b u t j u s t t o encumber t h e record - and say, ' I want t o cross-examine t h i s w i t n e s s , ' and then go ahead and t r y t o support t h e w i t n e s s , I see where t h e r e could be a g r e a t d e a l of abuse and u n f a i r n e s s i n t h a t . " (Emphasis added.) The hearings examiner i n t h e foregoing q u o t a t i o n l e f t t h e door a t l e a s t p a r t i a l l y open a s t o opponents cross- examining o t h e r opponents' w i t n e s s e s when an "opposite i s s u e " was involved, and he f u r t h e r expounded upon t h i s l a t e r . H i s answer t o a q u e s t i o n as t o whether he would permit cross-examination by a n opponent of another opponent's w i t n e s s i f they f i r s t s t a t e d t h e a r e a s i n which they d i s - agreed was t h a t h e would n o t say t h a t he would permit it b u t he would l i s t e n and see whether t h e r e was indeed a v a l i d i s s u e . I t should be noted t h a t t h e r e a f t e r opponents' counsel r a r e l y requested f u r t h e r permission t o cross-examine w i t - n e s s e s c a l l e d by o t h e r opponents. I n no c a s e i s it apparent t h a t counsel ever informed t h e h e a r i n g s examiner t h a t they w e r e opposed t o a c e r t a i n w i t n e s s ' testimony upon any p a r t i - c u l a r s u b j e c t , nor d i d they ever r e q u e s t permission t o cross-examine a n opponent's witness on any p a r t i c u l a r sub- j e c t . I n s t e a d , t h e i r o b j e c t i o n s were g e n e r a l only, based mainly on MAPA and t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n . I f t h e f l o o d g a t e s had been opened by t h e hearings examiner i n allowing unlimited cross-examination, it could have r e s u l t e d i n a n avalanche of testimony, making t h e p r e s e n t 17,000 page t r a n s c r i p t look l i k e a summary o r con- densation. P u b l i c w i t n e s s e s by t h e dozens turned o u t t o t e s t i f y both a g a i n s t and i n favor of t h e u n i t s . Under s e c t i o n 70-808(1) ( c ) , R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 75-20- 361 (1) (c) MCA, of t h e S i t i n g Act, "any o t h e r i n t e r e s t e d person" i s a p a r t y t o t h e proceeding although he waives h i s r i g h t under subsection ( 2 ) i f he does n o t p a r t i c i p a t e o r a l l y a t t h e hearing. Any of t h e s e " p a r t i e s " who t e s t i f i e d a t t h e hearing might w e l l have i n s i s t e d upon t h e i r r i g h t a s a p a r t y t o t h e proceeding t o cross-examine a l l t h e witnesses, some- thing t h a t was n o t l o s t upon t h e hearings examiner a s re- vealed i n h i s various comments. W e f i n d t h e hearings examiner was l i t e r a l l y forced t o i n s t i t u t e a r u l i n g r e s t r i c t - i n g t h e examination of witnesses, and t h i s he d i d with f a i r n e s s and dispatch. I n s p i t e of t h e background of t h e hearings and t h e n e c e s s i t y t o r e s t r i c t examination of witnesses, t h e D i s t r i c t Court held t h a t a t l e a s t t h e opponent-petitioners below had t h e a b s o l u t e r i g h t t o "cross-examine" witnesses c a l l e d by o t h e r opponents, Department of Health and Department of Natural Resources. Having provided t h e background, our a t t e n t i o n i s next d i r e c t e d t o t h e s t a t u t e s and case law. Section 70-809(1), R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 75-20- 222(3) MCA, of t h e S i t i n g Act provides i n p a r t : ". . . t h e contested case procedures of t h e Montana Administrative Procedure Act [82-401 t o 82-42251 s h a l l apply t o t h e hearing, except t h a t n e i t h e r common l a w nor s t a t u t o r y r u l e s of evi- dence need apply, b u t t h e board may make r u l e s designed t o exclude r e p e t i t i v e , redundant o r i r r e l e v a n t testimony." Section 82-4210, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n s 2-4-612(2) and 2-4-612(5) MCA, of t h e MAPA provides: " (1) Except a s otherwise provided by s t a t u t e re- l a t i n g d i r e c t l y t o an agency, agencies s h a l l be bound by common law and s t a t u t o r y r u l e s of evi- dence. . . " ( 3 ) A p a r t y s h a l l have t h e r i g h t t o conduct cross-examinations required ----- f o r a f u l l and t r u e d i s c l o s u r e of f a c t s , including t h e r i g h t t o cross-examine t h e author of any document prepared by o r on behalf of o r f o r t h e use of t h e agency and o f f e r e d i n evidence." (Emphasis added.) I t should be noted t h a t s e c t i o n 556(d) of t h e Federal Administrative Procedure A c t (5 U.S.C.A. 8556 (d) ) i s almost i d e n t i c a l t o t h e f i r s t p a r t of subsection (3) above i n providing t h a t "A p a r t y i s e n t i t l e d t o . . . conduct such cross-examination a s may be required f o r a f u l l and t r u e d i s c l o s u r e of t h e f a c t s . " The provision f o r cross-examination of t h e authors of agency documents o f f e r e d i n evidence found i n t h e latter p a r t of s e c t i o n 82-4210(3) i s n o t found i n t h e Federal Adminstrative Procedure Act nor i n t h e Model S t a t e Adminis- t r a t i v e Procedure Act. Rather, t h e provision was f i r s t proposed i n Montana i n 1959 i n a proposed Administrative Procedure Act which t h e Montana L e g i s l a t u r e d i d n o t pass. (Senate B i l l 179.) Subsequently, t h e M A P A passed i n 1971 preserved t h i s language. Both proposals w e r e made a t times when t h e c o u r t s w e r e concerned with t h e u n f a i r n e s s t h a t would b e f a l l claimants f o r r i g h t s o r p r i v i l e g e s from govern- mental agencies i f t h e claimants d i d n o t have t h e oppor- t u n i t y t o challenge t h e f a c t u a l b a s i s of c r i t i c a l r e p o r t s prepared f o r t h e agencies. Greene v. McElroy (1959), 360 U.S. 474, 79 S . C t . 1400, 3 L Ed 2d 1377; Cedar Rapids S t e e l Transp. v. Iowa S t a t e Corn. Comm'n (Iowa 1968), 160 N.W.2d 825; Application of Plainfield-Water Co. (1953), 1 1 N.J. 382, 94 A . 2 d 673. W e f i n d t h a t t h e i n c l u s i o n of t h e fore- going provision i n our s t a t u t e regarding t h e r i g h t t o cross- examine t h e author of agency documents was merely a safe- guard t o make c e r t a i n t h a t t h e e x i s t i n g c a s e law w a s recog- nized by s t a t u t e . Its i n c l u s i o n does n o t broaden t h e scope of t h e remainder of t h e s t a t u t e , and it should n o t be con- s t r u e d as a s e p a r a t e e n t i t y b u t r a t h e r w i t h t h e s t a t u t e as a whole. Although t h e LAPA does n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y d e f i n e cross- examination, r e s o r t i n t h i s regard can b e made t o s e c t i o n 93-1901-4, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 26-1-101(1) MCA, which provides i n p a r t : " D i r e c t and cross-examination d e f i n e d . The examination of a w i t n e s s by t h e p a r t y producing him i s denominated t h e d i r e c t examination; t h e examination of t h e same witness, upon t h e same m a t t e r , by t h e adverse p a r t y , t h e cross-examina- -- t i o n . . ." (Emphasis added.) I t i s obvious t h a t t h e t e r m "adverse p a r t y " was n o t included i n t h e s t a t u t e f o r any o t h e r r e a s o n b u t t o narrow t h e scope of cross-examination t o t h e adverse p a r t y . The Montana Supreme Court, l i k e t h e c o u r t s of o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s and t h e t e x t s , i n enunciating t h e g e n e r a l r u l e t h a t cross-examination i s a matter of r i g h t , l i m i t s such cross-examination t o w i t n e s s e s of t h e opposing p a r t y o r adverse p a r t y . McGonigle v. P r u d e n t i a l I n s . Co. of America (1935), 100 Mont. 203, 46 P.2d 687; Goldberg v . Kelly (1970), 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L Ed 2d 287; 98 C.J.S. Witnesses S368; 8 1 Am J u r 2d, Witnesses, 8464. The r i g h t t o cross-examination i s s u b j e c t t o another l i m i t a t i o n . The l a t i t u d e of such examination is l a r g e l y w i t h i n t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e t r i a l c o u r t , w i t h which t h e reviewing c o u r t w i l l n o t i n t e r f e r e u n l e s s t h e r e has been a m a n i f e s t abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . McGonigle v . P r u d e n t i a l I n s . Co. of America, supra; S t a t e v. Carns (1959), 136 Mont. 126, 345 P.2d 735. I n t h i s connection, s e c t i o n 82-4211(2), R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 2-4-611(2) MCA, provides t h a t hearings examiners s h a l l be authorized t o " r e g u l a t e t h e course of hearings." The Federal Administrative Procedure Act i s almost i d e n t i c a l t o t h e Montana provision i n pro- viding t h a t t h e presiding p a r t y may " r e g u l a t e t h e course of t h e hearing." 5 U.S.C.A. S556(c) ( 5 ) . W e f i n d i n view of t h e s t a t u t e s and c a s e law t h a t t h e r e i s r e a l l y no d i s t i n c t i o n between a c o u r t t r i a l and a con- t e s t e d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e proceeding i n s o f a r a s t h e r u l e s a p p l i - c a b l e t o cross-examination and t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e c o u r t o r hearings examiner a r e concerned. Should t h e r e be one r u l e f o r c i v i l c a s e s and another r u l e f o r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e proceedings? W e think not. I t would be d i f f i c u l t t o f i n d a c a s e more i n p o i n t than National N u t r i t i o n a l Foods Assln v. Food & Drug Admin. (2nd C i r . 19741, 504 F.2d 761, c e r t . denied 4 2 0 U.S. 946. Be- cause National N u t r i t i o n a l i s s o c l o s e t o t h i s case, more space w i l l be devoted t o it than o r d i n a r i l y done. The c a s e involved t h e review of two f i n a l r e g u l a t i o n s of t h e United S t a t e s Food & Drug Administration (FDA). During t h e presen- t a t i o n of t h e FDA's case, a l l p a r t i e s were permitted l i b e r a l cross-examination pursuant t o t h e hearings examiner's pre- t r i a l order which provided f o r cross-examination by any p a r t i c i p a n t d e s i r i n g t o do so. The Court of Appeals, Judge Friendly w r i t i n g f o r t h e c o u r t , wryly noted t h a t s o l i b e r a l a r u l e n o t unexpectedly had i t s c o s t . A f t e r the opposition t o t h e F D A began t o o f f e r its evidence, almost 18 months a f t e r t h e hearing commenced, t h e hearings examiner decided t o l i m i t t h e r i g h t s of p a r t i c i p a n t s t o cross-examine t h e witnesses c a l l e d by o t h e r p a r t i c i p a n t s . I n an o r d e r t h e hearings examiner divided t h e 2 a r t i e s i n t o two categories--just a s was done i n t h i s case--with t h e F D A on one s i d e and a l l o t h e r p a r t i c i p a n t s on t h e other. I f any p a r t i c i p a n t wished t o cross-examine t h e witness of another p a r t i c i p a n t , he was t o serve a n o t i c e of i n t e n t i o n t o do so. The n o t i c e had t o s t a t e t h a t t h e w r i t t e n d i r e c t testimony of t h e witness was adverse t o t h e i n t e r e s t of t h e p a r t i c i p a n t , make s p e c i f i c reference t o t h e portion of t h e testimony considered t o be adverse, and s t a t e t h e reasons t h e r e f o r . The hearings examiner would then determine whether t o g r a n t permission t o cross-examine i n h i s d i s c r e t i o n . The decision of t h e Court of Appeals approved t h e l i m i t a t i o n on cross-examination of c o p a r t i c i p a n t s ' witnesses where no adversity e x i s t e d between them; however, t h e c o u r t d i d f i n d t h a t i n t h e case of one p a r t i c u l a r l y important witness c a l l e d by t h e American Medical Association ( D r . S e b r e l l ) , t h e hearings examiner had i n c o r r e c t l y determined t h a t no adversity e x i s t e d between t h e AMA and t h e National Health Federation. Accordingly, t h e c o u r t remanded t h e case t o t h e F D A f o r t h e limited purpose of permitting reasonable cross-examination of D r . S e b r e l l by t h e N H F o r counsel of some o t h e r s i m i l a r l y i n t e r e s t e d p a r t i c i p a n t . I t appears t h a t t h e hearings examiner had made h i s r u l i n g t h a t D r . S e b r e l l could not be cross-examined by t h e N H F even though it was explained t o him a t t h e time t h a t t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e N H F and AMA were opposite r a t h e r than i d e n t i c a l . I n commenting upon t h i s a d v e r s i t y , t h e c o u r t noted s p e c i f i c a l l y t h a t t h e two organizations c l e a r l y d i d n o t have "common i n t e r e s t s " and t h a t t h e N H F was substan- t i a l l y a s adverse t o t h e AMA a s it was t o t h e FDA. Judge Friendly predicated t h e r u l i n g upon subsection (d) of 5556 of t h e Federal ~ d m i n i s t r a t i v e Procedure Act which provides, almost i d e n t i c a l l y t o s e c t i o n 82-4210(3) I R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 2-4-612(5) MCA, t h a t a p a r t y i s e n t i t l e d t o conduct such cross-examination a s may be required f o r a f u l l and t r u e d i s c l o s u r e of t h e f a c t s . The court pointed o u t t h a t t h e foregoing provision does not confer a r i g h t of so-called "unlimited" cross-examination and t h a t presiding o f f i c e r s w i l l have t o make t h e necessary i n i t i a l determination where t h e cross-examination i s pressed t o unreasonable lengths. The c o u r t f u r t h e r recognized t h a t a hearings examiner must be allowed, indeed encouraged, t o take s t e p s t o avoid r e p e t i t i o u s o r aimless cross-examination, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n a proceeding which has become so gargantuan a s t h e one before it. O f more than passing i n t e r e s t i s t h e c o u r t ' s t e r s e comment on t h e p o i n t which most t r i a l lawyers have learned through sad experience--that e a r l y dreams of confounding experts by cross-examination usually are dreams indeed. The c o u r t wonders how much more t h e r e would have been f o r t h e agency t o l e a r n b u t t h a t D r . S e b r e l l was no ordinary witness and i n f a c t played a key p a r t i n t h e preparation of t h e regulation. One of t h e most cogent statements by Judge Friendly i n National N u t r i t i o n a l i s t h e following: ". . . I n t h e absence of a showing of prejudice, p a r t i c i p a n t s with common i n t e r e s t s should be grouped by t h e hearing examiner, and p a r t i c i - pants i n a group should not be permitted t o cross-examine witnesses c a l l e d by o t h e r members of t h e group." 504 F.2d a t 795. W e can i d e n t i f y t h e s i t u a t i o n involving D r . S e b r e l l , t h e key witness involved i n National N u t r i t i o n a l , with t h e s i t u a t i o n i n t h i s case where Northern P l a i n s Resource Coun- c i l w a s opposed t o t h e Department of Health on water i s s u e s . I n t h a t case t h e matter was remanded f o r cross-examination of D r . S e b r e l l ; i n t h i s case Northern P l a i n s Resource Coun- c i l was allowed t o cross-examine t h e Department of Health witnesses because of t h e adversity of i n t e r e s t . I t i s t r u e t h a t i n t h i s case t h e procedure was n o t a s s t r u c t u r e d a s i n National Nutritional. O n t h e o t h e r hand, on a t l e a s t two occasions t h e hearings examiner here pointed o u t t o counsel t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of opening cross-examination i n t h e event of a v a l i d adverse issue. H e d i d i n f a c t allow cross-examination on t h e water i s s u e s , where an adverse p o s i t i o n existed. This should have been proof enough t h a t , upon a proper showing of adversity, f u r t h e r cross-examina- t i o n would be allowed. Furthermore, none of t h e counsel f o r the opposing p a r t i e s , other than on water i s s u e s , ever pointed o u t i n what r e s p e c t h i s c l i e n t was i n opposition t o another opponent. O n t h e contrary a l l t h a t was ever done was t o interpose general objections, and when given t h e s p e c i f i c opportunity t o explain t h e s u b j e c t s where adversity e x i s t e d , opposing counsel d i d not do so. The f e d e r a l c o u r t s have i n many instances upheld r u l i n g s i n administrative proceedings which denied completely cross- examination. Thus i n Fried v. United S t a t e s (S.D. N.Y. 1963), 212 F.Supp. 886, p l a i n t i f f s alleged d e n i a l of due process of l a w because t h e hearings examiner c u r t a i l e d completely t h e i r r i g h t t o cross-examine an allegedly c r u c i a l witness b u t t h e c o u r t upheld t h e r u l i n g i n view of t h e cumulative nature of t h e witness' testimony. And i n ~ m e r i - can Public Gas Ass'n v. Federal Power Cornm'n. (D.C. cir. 1974), 498 F.2d 718, a l l d a t a upon which t h e commission r e l i e d was tendered t o t h e p e t i t i o n e r s f o r comment, c r i t i - cism and f o r t h e submittal of rebutting material. ~ e t i - t i o n e r s complained t h a t they were denied t h e r i g h t t o test through cross-examination t h e underlying bases f o r t h e sub- mitted d a t a but t h e c o u r t r e j e c t e d t h e claim i n holding t h a t under t h e Federal Administrative Procedure Act, cross- examination i s not always a r i g h t and t h a t t h e p e t i t i o n e r s had f a i l e d t o demonstrate t h a t cross-examination w a s r e - quired f o r a " f u l l and t r u e d i s c l o s u r e of t h e f a c t s " under t h e Act. The purposes of cross-examination have been s t a t e d a s follows: "The o f f i c e of cross-examination i s t o test t h e t r u t h of statements of a witness made on d i r e c t examination. Cross-examination serves a s a safeguard t o combat u n r e l i a b l e testimony, pro- viding a means f o r d i s c r e d i t i n g a witness' t e s t i - mony, and i s i n t h e nature of an a t t a c k on h i s t r u t h o r accuracy. . . The o b j e c t of cross- examination, therefore, i s t o weaken o r disprove t h e case of one's adversary, and break down h i s testimony i n c h i e f , test t h e r e c o l l e c t i o n , vera- c i t y , accuracy, honesty, and b i a s o r prejudice of t h e witness, h i s source of information, h i s motives, i n t e r e s t , and memory, and e x h i b i t t h e improbabilities of h i s testimony." 98 C.J.S. Witnesses 5372, pp. 125-26. Certainly examination by t h e opponents of other oppo- nents' witnesses would hardly meet t h e t r u e objectives of cross-examination including t h e main one, t o test t h e t r u t h of t h e witness' statements. A s revealed by t h e record, with t h e exception of t h e water aspects of t h e case, t h e four main opposing p a r t i e s were united i n opposing t h e applica- t i o n . H o w examination of each o t h e r ' s witnesses could be termed "cross-examination" under t h e circumstances i s d i f f i - c u l t t o understand. I n f a c t , any such i n t e r r o g a t i o n would r e a l l y have amounted t o nothing more than d i r e c t o r r e d i r e c t examination because t h e s o l e a i m and purpose would have been t o b o l s t e r and support t h e testimony already produced on t h e d i r e c t examination. The D i s t r i c t Court took t h e p o s i t i o n t h a t s e c t i o n 82- 4210(3), R.C.M. 1947, now section 2-4-612(5) MCA, imposes a mandatory r i g h t i n a l l p a r t i e s t o conduct "cross-examination" of a l l witnesses including t h e r i g h t t o "cross-examine" t h e author of a l l agency documents. W e f i n d t h a t t o construe t h e s t a t u t e so l i t e r a l l y , without considering i n t h e l e a s t o t h e r s t a t u t e s and case law, i s t o ignore t h e e n t i r e scheme of t h e M A P A . The District Court ordered t h e Board upon rehearing t o provide opponents an opportunity t o cross-examine agency witnesses. This would involve approximately 30 witnesses who a r e s c a t t e r e d throughout t h e United S t a t e s and t h e world. The c o s t involved, not only i n money b u t a l s o i n t i m e , would be staggering. W e have a s e r i o u s doubt, a s a p r a c t i c a l matter, i f t h e main hearings are any c r i t e r i a (and w e believe they a r e ) , t h a t t h e procedure could be accom- plished, i f a t a l l , i n less than s i x months o r more. Judge Friendly i n National N u t r i t i o n a l , supra, points o u t t h a t t h e reviewing c o u r t should n o t remand when t h e outcome would c l e a r l y be only a r e p e t i t i o n of t h e o r i g i n a l decision. There must be, a s he s t a t e s i n t h e main t e x t , "a s i g n i f i c a n t probability" t h a t t h e proceeding f o r which t h e case was remanded would cause t h e agency t o a l t e r i t s orig- i n a l decision, o r a need t o c r e a t e a b e t t e r record f o r a p p e l l a t e review of t h e findings. 504 F.2d a t 798. W e f i n d t h a t no s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s of respondents/ cross-appellants have been prejudiced. The hearings ex- aminer's decision o r procedure was n o t erroneous o r i n any manner a v i o l a t i o n of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l o r s t a t u t o r y provisions. W e do, however, wish t o emphasize t h a t t h i s case i s unique i n both i t s length and complexity. While w e have held t h a t t h e hearings examiner d i d not err on t h i s cross- examination i s s u e , t h e procedures followed i n the hearings should not be used as a model f o r f u t u r e hearings before various s t a t e boards and agencies. W e suggest, absent general procedural r u l e s f o r t h e conduct of hearings adopted by a board o r agency pursuant t o t h e provisions of t h e MAPA, t h a t p r i o r t o any hearing, a s t a t e board o r agency should i s s u e an order s e t t i n g t h e procedural guidelines t o be followed r a t h e r than delegating t h e e n t i r e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t h e r e f o r t o t h e hearings examiner. I n summary w e hold t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court's opinion should be affirmed on Issue Nos. 5, 7 , 8, 9 , 10, 1 1 and 1 2 , reversed on i s s u e s 1 and 2 , with i s s u e s 3 , 4 and 6 being rendered moot. The opinion of t h e D i s t r i c t Court i s affirmed and reversed t o t h e e x t e n t set f o r t h herein. The decision of t h e Board of Natural Resources t o g r a n t t o appellants/cross- respondents a c e r t i f i c a t e of environmental compatibility and public need i s hereby suspended pending compliance with t h i s order. This cause i s hereby remanded t o t h e Board of Natural Resources t o cure c e r t a i n procedural d e f e c t s found by t h e D i s t r i c t Court and concurred i n by us with t h e order and d i r e c t i o n t h a t t h e Board of Natural Resources do t h e following: (1) Make adequate findings of f a c t and conclusions of law with regard to: (a) whether using Rosebud coal and n o t McKay c o a l represents minimum environmental impact, and the reasons t h e r e f o r , and (b) whether mine-mouth generation a s opposed t o load- c e n t e r generation represents minimum environmental impact and t h e reasons t h e r e f o r , including considerations a s t o r e l a t i v e energy e f f i c i e n c y and t h e r e l a t i v e impact of elec- t r i c a l transmission v e r s u s c o a l haulage, a s r e q u i r e d by s e c t i o n 70-810(l) (c) , R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 75-20-301 (2) (c) MCA. (2) Make adequate f i n d i n g s of f a c t and conclusions of law w i t h regard t o : ( a ) c l e a r l y d e s i g n a t i n g a transmission l i n e c o r r i d o r ; (b) why t h e Board of Natural Resources p r e f e r s t h e chosen c o r r i d o r t o t h e a l t e r n a t i v e c o r r i d o r s ; and (c) what s t a t e and l o c a l l e g a l requirements must be m e t , and whether i n f a c t they have been m e t a s r e q u i r e d by s e c t i o n 7 0 - 8 1 0 ( l ) ( f ) , R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 75-20-201 (2) ( f ) MCA. Such f i n d i n g s of f a c t and conclusions of law s h a l l be propounded and e n t e r e d by t h e Board of N a t u r a l Resources, served on t h e p a r t i e s h e r e t o , and r e t u r n e d t o us f o r review and approval w i t h i n 90 days from t h e d a t e hereof. W e concur: . Gulbrandson, D i s t r i c t f o r M r . Chief Jus- Hon. B. W. Thomas, ~ i s t r i c t Judge, s i t t i n g f o r M r . J u s t i c e Judge, s i t t i n g f o r M r . J u s t i c e 1 Sheehy M r . J u s t i c e Daniel J. Shea concurs i n p a r t and d i s s e n t s i n p a r t and w i l l f i l e a n opinion l a t e r . Justice Daniel J. Shea dissenting: There are many factors concerning this opinion which bother me deeply, but the speed with which it is suddenly being sent down and the last paragraph of the opinion are something that I must presently confine my remarks to--due to a lack of time. Just today I learned that the opinion was going down--today. Only yesterday one of the members of our Court, at the expense of the State, chartered a plane to take the opinion to each of the district judgdso that their signatures could be obtained. The politics behind the urgency of putting this opinion down in this fashion are not something that any Court should be proud of. I know approximately a month to a month and a or half ago the Governor andlone or more of his agents talked to a member of this Court involved in this case, and expressed concern about the political bind in which the Governor was being placdbecause of the passage or threatened passage of the new bill on Colstrip 3 and 4. I can only say that this Court member was not me. The obvious intent was that it would sure be nice if this Court could somehow get the Governor off the hot seat by speeding up our decision. I am not suggesting that those involved intimated at all how our decision should go - It is common knowledge that the countdown has started for the Governor to either veto or sign the legislation con- cerning Colstrip 3 and 4. Undoubtedly, putting our opinion down today will help considerably in helping the Governor reach the "right" political decision. To me this entire process is shocking. Now for a few brief comments on the final paragraph of the majority opinion--for which there is no foundation in law. The paragraph states: "Such findings of fact and conclusions of law shall be propounded and entered by the Board of Natural Resources, served on the parties hereto, and returned to us for review and approval within 90 days from the date hereof." Where in the law, may I ask, does it give this Court the power to exercise continuing jurisdiction over governmental agencies once we have remanded the case to them for further determinations? And where in the law do we have the authority, without an appropriate petition, after the governmental agency has acted, to completely bypass the Administrative Procedure Act and the District Court, in the event one or more of the aggrieved parties would have chosen to file a petition for review in the District Court? There is nothing in the Administrative Procedure Act which authorizes this Court to tell any agency how soon it may act after a remand from this Court. There is nothing that I know of in any of the remaining statutes or case law of this State to justify such a result. Once this Court has acted on an appeal and remanded a case, either to a District Court, or to an administrative agency, we lose jurisdiction. We cannot sit here like a king with strings still attached to the parties and directing them like puppets to comply with our orders. Here we have told the agency to act and get the results back to us within ninety days. This is judicial usurpation at its worst. Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea dissenting: There are many factors concerning this opinion which bother me deeply, but because of the speed with which it was sent down, I have not had time to formulate a dissent. For this reason I must confine my comments at this point to the final paragraph of the majority opinion--for which there is no foundation in law. The paragraph states: "Such findings of fact and conclusions of law shall be propounded and entered by the Board of Natural Resources, served on the parties hereto, and returned to us for review and approval within 90 days from the date hereof." Where in the law, may I ask, does it give this Court the power to exercise continuing jurisdiction over governmental agencies once we have remanded the case to them for further determinations? And where in the law do we have the authority without an appropri- ate petition, after the governmental agency has acted, to completely bypass the Administrative Procedure Act and the District Court, in the event one or more of the aggrieved parties would have chosen to file a petition for review in the District Court? There is nothing in the Administrative Procedure Act which authorizes this Court to tell any agency how soon it may act after a remand from this Court. There is nothing that I know of in any of the remaining statutes or case law of this State to justify such a result. Once this Court has acted on an appeal and remanded a case, either to a District Court, or to an administrative agency, we lose jurisdiction. We cannot sit here like a king with strings still attached to the parties and directing them like puppets to comply with our orders. Here we have told the agency to act and get the results back to us within ninety days. This is judicial usurpation at its worst. # '