Title: State v. Robert W. Sweat
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1995AP001975-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: April 18, 1997

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
95-1975-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Robert W. Sweat, 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEAL 
Reported at:  202 Wis. 2d 366, 550 N.W.2d 709 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1996) 
 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
April 18, 1997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
January 10, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Wood 
 
JUDGE: 
John V. Finn 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
Bradley, J., dissents (opinion filed) 
 
 
Abrahamson, C.J. joins. 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner the cause 
was argued by Maureen McGlynn Flanagan, assistant attorney 
general with whom on the briefs were Thomas J. Fallon, assistant 
attorney general, and James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by 
Leon S. Schmidt, Jr. And Schmidt, Grace & Duncan, Wisconsin 
Rapids and oral argument by Leon S. Schmidt, Jr. 
 
 
 
No. 95-1975-CR 
 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 95-1975-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
  
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
 
v. 
 
Robert W. Sweat, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
APR 18, 1997 
 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.    Reversed. 
¶1 
DONALD W. STEINMETZ, J.    The issue presented in this 
case 
is 
whether 
in 
restitution 
proceedings, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.20(14)(b)1 allows a defendant to assert a civil rather than 
criminal statute of limitations, and its related civil tolling 
and discovery rules, to bar individual crime victims' claims for 
restitution.  The Wood County Circuit Court, the Honorable John 
V. Finn, presiding, answered "no" and denied the defendant's 
claim that the civil statute of limitations and its related 
tolling principles applied to limit restitution. The court 
ordered the defendant, Robert W. Sweat, to pay a total of 
$364,597.23 in restitution to some 23 victims of his criminal 
                     
1 Wis. Stat. § 973.20(14)(b) states in relevant part that 
"[t]he defendant [ordered to pay restitution] may assert any 
defense that he or she could raise in a civil action for the 
loss sought to be compensated."  
 
 
No. 95-1975-CR 
 
 
2 
racketeering scheme.  Reversing the circuit court's order of 
restitution, the court of appeals found that the civil statute 
of limitations applies to restitution proceedings.  State v. 
Sweat, 202 Wis. 2d 366, 550 N.W.2d 709 (Ct. App. 1996).   
¶2 
Based on our reading of Wis. Stat. § 973.20(14)(b) in 
conjunction with the rest of § 973.20, and considering the 
purposes of the restitution statute, we hold that the same 
statute of limitations that applies in the underlying criminal 
proceedings, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 939.74,
2 
including 
its 
tolling 
provisions, also applies in the related restitution proceedings. 
 We therefore reverse the court of appeals' decision.  
¶3 
The defendant, Sweat, was charged with one count of 
racketeering, Wis. Stat. § 946.83(3), based on four or more acts 
of securities fraud in violation of Wis. Stat. § 551.41(2)
3 which 
were charged as separate counts of the complaint.  The defendant 
entered 
a 
negotiated 
no-contest 
plea 
to 
a 
single 
count 
information charging him with racketeering.   
¶4 
By his plea, the defendant admitted that, between 
August 6, 1986, and December 6, 1988, as president of Sweat 
Insurance, Inc., he intentionally and feloniously, in connection 
                     
2 Wisconsin Statutes § 939.74 provides in relevant part:  
"Time limitations on prosecutions.  (1) . . . prosecution for a 
felony must be commenced within 6 years . . . after the 
commission thereof. . . . (3) In computing the time limited by 
this section, the time during which the actor was not publicly a 
resident within this state . . . shall not be included." 
3 Wis. Stat. § 551.41(2) provides that it is unlawful "[t]o 
make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state 
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, 
in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not 
misleading. . . ." 
 
 
No. 95-1975-CR 
 
 
3 
with the offer, sale or purchase of securities, participated in 
the corporate enterprise through a pattern of racketeering by 
committing acts of securities fraud in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 551.41(2) on at least three occasions.  In each instance, the 
defendant failed to inform named investors of material facts 
that:  (1) he had been convicted of theft by fraud in 1983 for 
conversion of insurance premiums; (2) his intermediary-agent's 
license had been suspended for 340 days as a result of that 
conviction; and (3) he had declared bankruptcy in 1983 and had 
all debts discharged. 
¶5 
The defendant urges this court to affirm the court of 
appeals' decision.  He argues that Wis. Stat. § 973.20 is 
unambiguous on its face, and should therefore be interpreted 
based on the plain meaning of its terms.  Sweat asserts that 
"any defense available in a civil action" means just that—any 
defense. Even when considering the statute in its entirety, 
Sweat argues that it is unambiguous because statutes of 
limitation are substantive defenses and therefore cannot be 
waived for purposes of restitution proceedings.  Finally, Sweat 
argues that the court of appeals' interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.20(14)(b) is not inconsistent with other provisions of 
§ 973.20.  We disagree with the defendant on all facets of his 
argument.
4      
                     
4 We do acknowledge, however, that statutes of limitation 
are, indeed, substantive defenses.  See Modica v. Verhulst, 195 
Wis. 2d 633, 644, 536 N.W.2d 466 (Ct. App. 1995), citing 
Betthauser v. Medical Protective Co., 172 Wis. 2d 141, 493 N.W.2d 
40 (1992).  This fact does not affect our analysis. 
 
 
No. 95-1975-CR 
 
 
4 
¶6 
Resolution of the issue presented in this case 
requires the interpretation of at least two related statutes, 
Wis. Stat. § 939.74(3), providing the statute of limitations in 
criminal prosecutions, and Wis. Stat. § 973.20,
5 the restitution 
                     
5 Wisconsin Statutes § 973.20 states in relevant part: 
 Restitution.  (1) When imposing sentence or ordering 
probation for any crime, the court in addition to any 
other penalty authorized by law, shall order the 
defendant to make full or partial restitution under 
this section to any victim of the crime . . . unless 
the court finds substantial reason not to do so and 
states the reason on the record. . . .  After the 
termination of probation or parole . . . restitution 
ordered under this section is enforceable in the same 
manner as a judgment in a civil action by the victim 
named in the order to receive restitution or enforced 
under ch. 785. . . .   
(8) Restitution ordered under this section does 
not limit or impair the right of a victim to sue and 
recover damages from the defendant in a civil action. 
 The facts that restitution was required or paid are 
not admissible as evidence in a civil action and have 
no legal effect on the merits of a civil action. . . . 
 The court trying the civil action shall hold a 
separate hearing to determine the validity and amount 
of any setoff asserted by the defendant. . . .  
(13)(a) The court, in determining whether to 
order 
restitution 
and 
the amount 
thereof, 
shall 
consider all of the following:   
1. The amount of loss suffered by any victim as a 
result of the crime.   
2. The financial resources of the defendant. . . 
.  
5. Any other factors which the court deems 
appropriate. . . .   
(14) At any hearing under sub. (13), all of the 
following apply:   
(a) 
The 
burden 
of 
demonstrating 
by 
the 
preponderance of the evidence the amount of loss 
sustained by a victim as a result of the crime is on 
the victim. . . . 
(b) 
The 
burden 
of 
demonstrating, 
by 
the 
preponderance of the evidence, the financial resources 
of the defendant . . . is on the defendant.  The 
defendant may assert any defense that he or she could 
raise in a civil action for the loss sought to be 
compensated. . . . 
 
 
No. 95-1975-CR 
 
 
5 
statute.  The interpretation of a statute is a question of law 
which this court reviews independently, without deference to the 
lower courts.  State v. Sher, 149 Wis. 2d 1, 8, 437 N.W.2d 878 
(1989). This court uses a two-step process for interpreting 
statutes:   
 
The ultimate goal of statutory interpretation is to 
ascertain the intent of the legislature.  The first 
step of this process is to look at the language of the 
statute.  If the plain meaning of the statute is 
clear, a court need not look to rules of statutory 
construction or other extrinsic aids.  Instead, a 
court should simply apply the clear meaning of the 
statute to the facts before it.  If, however, the 
statute is ambiguous, this court must look beyond the 
statute’s language and examine the scope, history, 
context, subject matter, and purpose of the statute.   
UFE Inc. v. LIRC, 201 Wis. 2d 274, 281-82, 548 N.W.2d 57 
(1996).  (citations omitted.)   
¶7 
According to this court in UFE Inc., the first step is 
to determine whether a statute is ambiguous.  “[A] statutory 
provision is ambiguous if reasonable minds could differ as to 
its 
meaning.” 
UFE 
Inc., 
201 
Wis. 
2d 
at 
283, 
quoting 
Harnischfeger Corp. v. LIRC, 196 Wis. 2d 650, 662, 539 N.W.2d 98 
(1995).  Ambiguity can be found in the words of the statutory 
provision itself, or by the words of the provision as they 
interact with and relate to other provisions in the statute and 
                                                                  
(d) All parties interested in the matter shall 
have an opportunity to be heard, personally or through 
counsel, to present evidence and to cross-examine 
witnesses called by other parties.  The court . . . 
shall conduct the proceeding so as to do substantial 
justice between the parties according to the rules of 
substantive law and may waive the rules of practice, 
procedure, pleading or evidence, except provisions 
relating 
to 
privileged 
communications 
. 
. 
. 
.  
Discovery is not available except for good cause 
shown. 
 
 
No. 95-1975-CR 
 
 
6 
to other statutes.  In re Custody of D.M.M., 137 Wis. 2d 375, 
386, 404 N.W.2d 530 (1987).   
¶8 
When construing a statutory provision, the entire 
section 
and 
related 
sections 
of 
the 
statute 
should 
be 
considered.  Id.  See also, White Hen Pantry v. Buttke, 98 Wis. 
2d 119, 122, 295 N.W.2d 763 (Ct. App. 1980), rev'd on other 
grounds, citing Omernik v. State, 64 Wis. 2d  6, 12, 218 N.W.2d 
734 (1974).  In determining the meaning of a single word or a 
single phrase in a statute, it is necessary to view it in light 
of the entire statute.  Buttke, 98 Wis. 2d at 122 (citation 
omitted).  
¶9 
Seizing on one sentence, indeed one word, of Wis. 
Stat. § 973.20(14)(b), in isolation, the court of appeals 
literally drew the successive conclusions that civil statutes of 
limitation apply in restitution proceedings and that civil 
tolling statutes and judge-made civil discovery rules must be 
applied to the disposition of restitution claims.  The word is 
"any" in Wis. Stat. § 973.20(14)(b), and the court of appeals 
claimed that it is an unambiguous term, so no further analysis 
need be done.   
¶10 The 
court 
of 
appeals' 
error 
was 
in 
its 
characterization of Wis. Stat. § 973.20(14)(b) as unambiguous.  
This characterization is possible only if one looks exclusively 
at the word "any," while ignoring the remainder of Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.20(14)(b) itself, Wis. Stat. § 973.20 as a whole, and 
related statutes, particularly Wis. Stat. § 939.74.  Ambiguity 
in a statute can be created by the interaction of two separate 
statutes, as well as by the interaction of words and structure 
 
 
No. 95-1975-CR 
 
 
7 
of a single statute. In re Custody of D.M.M., 137 Wis. 2d 375, 
386.  
¶11 The statutory provision at issue in this case is Wis. 
Stat. § 973.20(14)(b), which provides in relevant part that 
“[t]he defendant may assert any defense that he or she could 
raise in a civil action for the loss sought to be compensated.” 
 When read alone, this provision appears to be clear and 
unambiguous.  However, when read in conjunction with the 
remainder of the statute, the provision at issue becomes 
ambiguous.  As the State explains in its brief, the word “any” 
on its own is unequivocal, but the term “any defense” as used in 
the 
statute 
is 
neither 
self-defining 
nor 
defined. 
 
The 
legislative history of the statute and the placement of the 
provision at issue indicate that "any defense" is applicable 
only toward the defense of the amount of the loss at issue, and 
therefore does not include "any defense" imaginable.  Further, 
other language in § 973.20(14) authorizes the court to waive 
rules of “practice, procedure, pleading or evidence” in a 
restitution hearing.  Wis. Stat. § 973.20(14)(d).  Additionally, 
although the language in other provisions of § 973.20 makes it 
clear that restitution hearings are not to be conducted like a 
civil trial, the language in Wis. Stat. § (14)(b) purports to 
allow a defendant to rely on any defense available in a civil 
action.  We conclude that the statutory provision at issue in 
this case, Wis. Stat. § 973.20(14)(b), is ambiguous.  
¶12 Because the language of the statute is ambiguous when 
construed in light of the statute as a whole, this court looks 
to the “scope, history, context, subject matter, and purpose of 
 
 
No. 95-1975-CR 
 
 
8 
the statute.”  UFE Inc., 201 Wis. 2d at 282.  When we examine 
the scope, history, context, subject matter, and purpose of the 
statute, this court concludes that the entire subject matter of 
the restitution statute goes to establishing the amount of the 
loss sought to be compensated.  Defenses to liability are not 
relevant once restitution is available to crime victims. 
¶13 There is no explanation in the legislative drafting 
record 
of 
the 
phrase 
"any 
defense" 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.20(14)(b).  However, the origins of this phrase and its 
placement within Wis. Stat. § 973.20 combine to show that the 
legislature intended "any defense" to mean only defenses as to 
the amount of restitution, and not defenses to liability for 
restitutionary payments or acts. 
¶14 The 
requirement 
that 
convicted 
criminals 
pay 
restitution to their victims was first mandated by Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.09 (1979-80).  In 1987, Wis. Stat. § 973.20 was created to 
set restitution requirements, and Wis. Stat. § 973.09 was 
amended to require conformance with the new statute.  Subsection 
(14)(b) of Wis. Stat. § 973.20 has not been changed since the 
statute was first enacted. 
¶15 
The judicial council notes for Wis. Stat. § 973.20 
indicate that subsection (13)(a) was patterned on 18 USC 3664(a) 
and is similar to former Wis. Stat. §  973.09(1m). Subsections 
(14)(a) to (c) are patterned on 18 USC 3664(d) and the former 
Wis. Stat. § 973.09(lm)(a). 
¶16 Subsection (13)(a) lays out the factors a court may 
consider and the findings a court may make before ordering 
restitution. 
 
When 
a 
defendant 
fails 
to 
offer 
evidence 
 
 
No. 95-1975-CR 
 
 
9 
concerning his or her ability to pay, the court may order 
restitution without making detailed findings on the factors in 
subsection (13)(a)l through 4, because the defendant's inability 
to pay the claimed restitution is not an issue before the court. 
 State v. Szarkowitz, 157 Wis. 2d 740, 749, 460 N.W.2d 819 (Ct. 
App. 1990).  Subsections (14)(a) and (b) describe the standard 
and burden of proof with regard to those "ability to pay" 
factors. 
  
¶17 The 
drafting 
committee 
based 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.20(14)(a)-(c) on 18 USC 3664(d)(1985): 
Any dispute as to the proper amount or type of 
restitution shall be resolved by the court by the 
preponderance 
of 
the 
evidence. 
 
The 
burden 
of 
demonstrating the amount of the loss sustained by a 
victim as a result of the offense shall be on the 
attorney 
for 
the 
Government. 
 
The 
burden 
of 
demonstrating the financial resources of the defendant 
and the financial needs of the defendant and such 
defendant's dependents shall be an the defendant.  The 
burden of demonstrating such other matters as the 
court deems appropriate shall be upon the party 
designated by the court as justice requires.  This 
subsection of the federal statute places the burden of 
proving the defendant's financial condition on the 
defendant.  This subsection does not address the 
defendant's liability for restitution. 
18 USC 3664(d) is four sentences long.  The first sentence of 18 
USC 3664(d) sets the standard of proof for determining the 
proper amount of restitution.  The final three sentences of 18 
USC 3664(d) allocate the burdens of proof.  These three 
sentences directly correlate to subsections (14)(a), (14)(b), 
and (14)(c) of Wis. Stat. § 973.20. For example, the second 
sentence of the federal statute establishes the victim's burden 
to prove financial loss.  Likewise, subsection (14)(a) of Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.20 
establishes 
the 
victim's 
burden 
to 
prove 
financial loss.  The third sentence of the federal statute 
 
 
No. 95-1975-CR 
 
 
10
establishes the defendant's burden to prove his financial 
resources and needs.  Similarly, subsection (14)(b) of Wis. 
Stat. § 973.20 establishes the defendant's burden to prove his 
financial resources and needs.6  It is in this subsection, 
(14)(b), that the legislature has placed the phrase "[t]he 
defendant may assert any defense that he or she could raise in a 
civil action for the loss sought to be compensated."   
¶18 18 USC 3664(d) relates only to the determination of 
the amount of restitution and not to a determination of 
liability for restitution.  Wis. Stat. § 973.20(14)(a)-(c) very 
closely follows the form and content of that statute. 
¶19 In addition to basing Wis. Stat. § 973.20(14)(b) on 18 
USC 3664(d), the legislature also relied on part of Wisconsin's 
former restitution statute, Wis.  Stat. 973.09(lm)(a). The 
phrase "[the defendant] may assert any defense that he or she 
could raise in a civil action for the loss sought to be 
compensated," was taken directly from former Wis. Stat. § 
973.09(lm)(a).  A review of the legislative history for this 
particular 
sentence 
from 
prior Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.09(lm)(a) 
reveals that this sentence was first introduced into the earlier 
restitution statute in 1981.  The drafting record demonstrates 
that except for one minor wording change, this sentence was not 
changed from the original draft to the final publication of Wis. 
                     
6 The final sentence of 18 USC 3664(d) states that the 
burden of proving other appropriate matters shall be determined 
by the court.  Likewise, Wis. Stat. § 973.20(14)(c) states that 
the burden of proving other appropriate matters shall be 
determined by the court. 
 
 
No. 95-1975-CR 
 
 
11
Stat. § 973.09(lm)(a) in Chapter 352 of the Laws of 1981.7  Wis. 
Stat. § 973.09(1m)(a) (1981-82) reads: 
In determining the amount and method of payment of 
restitution, the court shall consider the financial 
resources and future ability of the probationer to 
pay.  The court may provide for payment of restitution 
to the victim up to but not in excess of the pecuniary 
loss caused by the offense.  The probationer may 
assert any defense that he or she could raise in a 
civil action for the loss sought to be compensated.  
If the court also orders payment of fines, related 
payments under s. 973.05 and costs under s. 973.06, it 
shall set the amount of fines, related payments and 
costs in conjunction with the amount of restitution 
and issue a single order, signed by the judge, 
covering all payments required as a condition of 
probation.  If the costs for legal representation by a 
private attorney appointed under s. 977.08 are not 
established at the time of issuance of the order, the 
court may revise the order to include those costs at a 
later time.  The court shall consider the interest of 
the victim in receiving restitution when determining 
whether to order payment of costs. 
 
¶20 In Wis. Stat. § 973.09(lm)(a), the sentences leading 
up 
to 
the 
"any 
defenses" 
sentence 
relate 
only 
to 
the 
determination of the amount of restitution.  Wis. Stat. § 
973.09(1m)(a), like 18 USC 3664(d), thus focuses on the amount 
of 
restitution 
and 
not 
on 
post-conviction 
liability 
for 
restitution. 
¶21 Aside from the legislative history, there are numerous 
other factors that suggest that the criminal statute of 
limitations, not a civil statute of limitations, is appropriate 
in a restitution hearing.  The statute at issue applies in all 
restitution hearings.  A restitution hearing in a criminal 
proceeding is part of the criminal sentencing process, and 
                     
7  The only change was that the phrase "is entitled to" was 
replaced by the word  "may" in one of the earlier drafts of the 
statute.   
 
 
No. 95-1975-CR 
 
 
12
serves the goals of the criminal justice system.  See State v. 
Pope, 107 Wis. 2d 726, 729, 321 N.W.2d 359 (Ct. App. 1982).  
Restitution serves a dual purpose, making the victim whole and 
rehabilitating the defendant.  Id.   In State v. Dugan, 193 Wis. 
2d 610, 534 N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1995), the court of appeals 
noted that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that 
the primary purpose of restitution is not to punish the 
defendant, but to compensate the victim.  Id. at 623, citing 
United States v. Salcedo-Lopez, 907 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 1990).  
¶22 Further, under Wis. Stat. § 973.20 (1), (8), and 
(13)(a)1, the policy of restitution is to benefit “any victim” 
of a crime the defendant has committed.  Despite this statutory 
directive, if the civil statute of limitations is to apply in 
cases such as this one, then not all of the victims of the 
charged crimes will be given the opportunity to be made whole.   
¶23 Apparently conflicting provisions of law should be 
construed so as to harmonize them and thus give effect to the 
leading idea behind the law.  State v. Schaller, 70 Wis. 2d 107, 
110, 223 N.W.2d 416 (1975).  If a statute is capable of being 
construed in different ways, that construction which works 
absurd or unreasonable results should be avoided.  Buttke, 98 
Wis. 2d at 123-24.  In a case involving restitution, it would be 
absurd and unreasonable for some of the victims of the charged 
offense to recover, while other victims may not recover despite 
the 
criminal 
conviction. 
 
Consequently, 
the 
statute 
of 
limitations which may properly be asserted as a defense to a 
victim’s claim for restitution should be the same statute of 
limitations which applies to criminal prosecution as a whole, 
 
 
No. 95-1975-CR 
 
 
13
Wis. Stat. § 939.74, including its tolling provisions.  This is 
consistent with the overall purpose of the statute.  
¶24 The natural reading of Wis. Stat. § 973.20 in harmony 
with Wis. Stat. § 939.74, the applicable criminal statute of 
limitations, is that the same statute of limitations applies to 
the restitution proceedings as to the rest of the criminal 
action.  This reading comports with the recognized dual purpose 
of restitution of 1) rehabilitating a defendant and 2) making 
all victims of his or her crimes whole to the extent reasonably 
possible.  This interpretation is consistent with the state 
being the movant on behalf of the victims.  The state is 
entitled to the criminal statute of limitations in enforcing 
restitution.  The statute of limitations applies to the state 
and not to the victims of crimes because it is the state, and 
not the victims, which files criminal actions against the 
defendant.
8  The State brought the action against the defendant 
in a timely manner, and has therefore met the statute of 
limitations.9   
¶25 To rule otherwise and allow the civil statute of 
limitations to apply in restitution proceedings would lead to 
unfair results that are not in keeping with one of the goals of 
restitution to make all victims of a crime whole.  See Wis. 
                     
8 We note, however, that "[t]he burden of demonstrating . . 
. the amount of loss sustained by a victim as a result of the 
crime considered at sentencing is on the victim."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.20(14)(a). 
9 See generally State ex rel. Globe Steel Tubes Co. v. 
Lyons, 183 Wis. 107, 121, 197 N.W. 578 (1924)(statutes of 
limitation do not run against the state unless expressly so 
provided).  
 
 
No. 95-1975-CR 
 
 
14
Stat. 
§ 973.20(1), 
(8), 
and 
(13)(a)1. 
 
For 
example, 
as 
previously mentioned, some of the victims of the charged offense 
will be allowed to recover, while others may not recover despite 
the criminal conviction.  Additionally, unjust results can be 
illustrated with the example of a battery where the civil 
statute of limitations is two years for an intentional tort10 and 
three years for an unintentional tort,11 but the criminal statute 
of limitations is six years pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 939.74.  If 
prosecution is not commenced until three and one-half years 
after the incident, the sentencing court would be precluded from 
ordering restitution under the court of appeals' decision 
because the defendant would be permitted to assert a shorter 
civil statute of limitations.       
¶26 The 
natural 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.20(14)(b) and (d), and the only one which most comports 
with Wis. Stat. § 973.20 as a whole and the legislative policies 
that restitution is intended to serve is that in a restitution 
proceeding, a defendant should be able to raise substantive 
defenses, 
such 
as 
mitigation, 
set-off, 
or 
accord 
and 
satisfaction, which go to the measure or amount of total 
restitution.  However, other civil defenses available in a civil 
action, such as contributory negligence, lack of jurisdiction, 
or lack of capacity to sue or be sued simply do not make sense 
in a restitution hearing.12  Neither does the application of a 
                     
10 Wis. Stat. § 893.57. 
11 Wis. Stat. § 893.54. 
12 For a list of several affirmative defenses to civil 
actions, see Wis. Stat. § 802.06(2).   
 
 
No. 95-1975-CR 
 
 
15
civil statute of limitations in a restitution proceeding after a 
defendant has been convicted of a criminal offense.  Both the 
legislative history and the goals of restitution support this 
result.  
¶27 The 
trial 
court 
is, 
with 
limited 
exceptions, 
authorized to "waive the rules of practice, procedure, pleading 
or evidence" in service of the goal of "conduct[ing] the 
proceeding so as to do substantial justice."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.20(14)(d). Technical or procedural defenses which might be 
proper in a civil proceeding may be asserted only to the extent 
that they are not inconsistent with the informal nature of a 
restitution proceeding and with the general policy goal of 
achieving "substantial justice."   
¶28 The prospect of a restitution proceeding distracted 
from 
the 
goal 
of 
doing 
"substantial 
justice" 
by 
the 
technicalities of civil tolling and discovery matters, as 
envisioned by the court of appeals, is simply at odds with the 
degree of responsibility a convicted felon like defendant is 
expected to embrace when he actively seeks probation and an 
order to pay restitution in lieu of a substantial prison 
sentence as defendant did.  The defendant has been convicted of 
intentionally 
violating 
a 
criminal 
racketeering 
statute 
resulting, in turn, in the bilking of his numerous victims of 
hundreds of thousands of dollars of their assets.  "Substantial 
justice" requires that each of his victims be entitled to share 
in whatever monetary restitution defendant can be required to 
provide.  The technicalities of civil tort proceedings and the 
rules of pleading, service of process, and tolling of causes of 
 
 
No. 95-1975-CR 
 
 
16
action which accompany them would fundamentally distract from, 
rather than serve to achieve, "substantial justice."   
¶29 Another indication that the phrase "any defenses" was 
intended to include only defenses relating to the amount of 
restitution and not those relating to liability for restitution 
is the location of this phrase in relation to the rest of the 
statute.  Under Wis. Stat. § 973.20(l), there is no process for 
determination of liability for restitution.13 An order for 
restitution upon conviction of a crime is at least directory: 
When imposing sentence or ordering probation for any 
crime, the court, in addition to any other penalty 
authorized by law, shall order the defendant to make 
full or partial restitution . . . unless the court 
finds substantial reasons not to do so and states the 
reason on the record.  
Wis. Stat. § 973.20(l).  See also, State v. Borst, 181 Wis. 2d 
118, 121-22, 510 N.W.2d 739 (Ct.  App. 1993)(holding that 
subsec. (1) imposes a mandatory duty on a circuit court to 
provide for restitution, and that a sentence not providing for 
restitution is illegal and subject to amendment to include 
restitution). Restitution is a part of the defendant's sentence. 
Significantly, the provision permitting a defendant to invoke 
"any defense" was not included in Wis. Stat. § 973.20(1), where 
liability for restitution is strictly established.  Read in this 
light, there is little or no risk that only some of the 
defendant's victims will be compensated under this statute. This 
                     
13 The only reference to liability in Wis. Stat. § 973.20 is 
the 
provision 
for 
apportionment 
of 
liability, 
and 
thus 
apportionment of the obligation for restitutionary payments, 
contained in Wis. Stat. § 973.20(7). 
 
 
No. 95-1975-CR 
 
 
17
construction thus harmonizes the "any defenses" segment with the 
purpose of the statute, which is to benefit "any victim."  
¶30 The sentence in Wis. Stat. § 973.20(14)(b) that allows 
the defendant to assert "any" civil defenses, was placed 
directly in the middle of these subsections relating to the 
amount of restitution.  This is an indication that the phrase 
"any defenses" in Wis. Stat. § 973.20(14)(b), is really a 
reference to defenses relating to the determination of the 
amount of loss to be compensated.   
¶31 Additionally, the phrase "any defense that he or she 
could raise in a civil action" as found in Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.20(14)(b) is immediately followed by the phrase "for the 
loss sought to be compensated."  This placement seems to clearly 
indicate that the "any defense" to which the statute refers 
means any defense to the amount of restitution ordered by the 
trial court, or "any defense. . .for the loss sought to be 
compensated."  Under this reading, the assertion that a 
defendant could submit the civil statute of limitations as a 
defense is ludicrous. Neither the placement of the phrase, the 
overall purpose of restitution, nor the directory, if not 
mandatory, nature of ordering restitution, indicate an intent to 
allow the defendant to raise, after conviction, civil defenses 
to liability for financial loss. 
¶32 This reasoning, in conjunction with the statutory 
purposes of Wis. Stat. § 973.20(14)(b), leads to the conclusion 
that "any defense" does not mean "all defenses available in a 
civil suit." Rather, it means "all defenses relating to the 
 
 
No. 95-1975-CR 
 
 
18
determination 
of 
the 
loss 
sought 
to 
be 
compensated 
by 
restitution." 
¶33 In this case, Wis. Stat. § 939.74 does not bar a claim 
for restitution on any claim occurring after April 1, 1983. 
Under Wis. Stat. § 939.74(1) a prosecution for a felony must 
ordinarily be commenced within six years.  Under Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.74(3), however, "the time during which the actor was not 
publicly a resident within this state . . . shall not be 
included" in the computation.  A restitution hearing governed by 
Wis. Stat. § 973.20 is plainly part of a criminal prosecution.  
In this case, the defendant testified that he left Wisconsin and 
moved to Texas on or about April 1, 1989, and that he had 
resided there continuously  since that time.  By operation of 
Wis. Stat. §939.74(3), therefore, the running of the statute of 
limitations for felonies committed by defendant prior to leaving 
Wisconsin was tolled on April 1, 1989, when he was no longer 
"publicly a resident within this state." See id.; see also Sher, 
149 Wis. 2d  at 9; State v. Whitman, 160 Wis. 2d 260, 266-67, 
466 N.W.2d 193 (Ct. App. 1991).   
¶34 In Whitman, the court stated:  "The statute of 
limitations will run as long as the residency in question is 
both public and within the state.  Absent these two conditions . 
. . the statute is tolled."  Id.  As the trial court correctly 
concluded, therefore, the relevant statute of limitations, Wis. 
Stat. § 939.74, does not bar a claim for restitution on any 
transaction occurring after April 1, 1983.  Because the 
restitution order is limited to claims arising within the 
applicable statute of limitations, the defendant's claim that 
 
 
No. 95-1975-CR 
 
 
19
some claims are barred because they arose more than six years 
before the complaint was filed and the warrant issued on June 
22, 1993, must be rejected.   
¶35 In sum, the statutory provision at issue, Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.20(14)(b), while unambiguous on its own, is ambiguous when 
viewed in light of the statute in its entirety.  Due to the 
ambiguity, this court must look to other factors including the 
purpose and policy behind the statute and the provision at issue 
in light of the whole statute to determine what the provision 
means.  Based on the legislative history and on purpose of the 
statute to both rehabilitate the defendant and to compensate any 
victim of the defendant’s crime,  the court of appeals’ 
interpretation of the statute is incorrect, for it allows a 
defendant in certain circumstances to be convicted of a crime 
such as fraud without having to make restitution to those most 
harmed by the crime.  Restitution is not just a punishment for 
the defendant; it is intended to make the victims of criminal 
acts whole.  It only makes sense that the same statute of 
limitations that applies in the underlying criminal proceeding, 
including its tolling provisions, should also apply in the 
restitution proceedings.   
¶36 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the court of 
appeals’ decision and hold that the same statute of limitations 
that applies in the underlying criminal proceedings, Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.74, including its tolling provisions, also applies in the 
restitution proceedings.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.   
 
 
No. 95-1975.AWB   
 
1 
¶37 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (Dissenting).    I dissent.  The 
question presented is whether the civil or the criminal statute 
of limitations applies in a restitution proceeding.  I conclude 
that whether considered alone or in conjunction with other 
statutory provisions, Wis. Stat. § 973.20(14)(b) unambiguously 
mandates 
application 
of 
the 
relevant 
civil 
statute 
of 
limitations to restitution proceedings. Accordingly, I would 
affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
¶38 The relevant statute, § 973.20(14)(b), provides that 
in a restitution hearing, a "defendant may assert any defense 
that he or she could raise in a civil action for the loss sought 
to be compensated."  This court must interpret § 973.20(14)(b) 
to determine whether the phrase "any defense that he or she 
could raise in a civil action" applies to a civil statute of 
limitations defense or to a criminal statute of limitations 
defense.  
¶39 When interpreting a statute, this court seeks to 
identify 
and 
effectuate 
the 
intent 
of 
the 
legislature.  
Stockbridge School Dist. v. DPI, 202 Wis. 2d 214, 219, 550 
N.W.2d 96 (1996).  We look first to the plain meaning of the 
statutory text.  If the meaning of the statutory text is 
unambiguous, we need not look further.  Id. at 220.  However, 
statutory language may be rendered ambiguous by the interaction 
between separate, related statutes, or by the interaction of 
words and structure of a single statute.  F.P.R. v. J.M., 137 
Wis. 2d 375, 386, 404 N.W.2d 530 (1987). 
 
 
No. 95-1975.AWB   
 
2 
¶40 I agree with the majority when it states that 
§ 973.20(14)(b) "[is] unambiguous on its own," and when read 
alone "appears to be clear and unambiguous."  Majority op. at 
19, 7.  There is no dispute that the statute of limitations is a 
defense in criminal and civil actions.  Thus, the statute of 
limitations meets the definition of "any defense."  The question 
is whether it is the civil statute of limitations or the 
criminal statute of limitations that can be raised as a defense 
in a civil action.  The answer is apparent.  Only the civil 
statute of limitations can be raised as a defense in a civil 
action; the criminal statute of limitations is not available as 
a 
defense 
in 
a 
civil 
action. 
 
The 
plain 
language 
of 
§ 973.20(14)(b) mandates application of the civil statute of 
limitations in restitution proceedings. 
¶41 I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the 
relevant language in § 973.20(14)(b) becomes ambiguous when 
considered in the context of the remainder of the statutory 
provision and other relevant statutes. The majority concludes 
that the relevant portion of § 973.20(14)(b) is ambiguous 
because: 1) the term "any defense" is neither self-defining nor 
defined; 2) the legislative history and placement of the 
provision indicate that "'any defense' is applicable only toward 
the defense of the amount of the loss at issue"; 3)  courts are 
statutorily authorized to waive rules of "practice, procedure, 
pleading or evidence" when conducting restitution proceedings; 
and 4) other language in § 973.20 makes "clear that restitution 
hearings are not to be conducted like a civil trial."  I find 
 
 
No. 95-1975.AWB   
 
3 
unpersuasive each of the bases for the majority's ambiguity 
determination. 
¶42 The 
majority's 
assertion 
that 
the 
phrase 
"'any 
defense' as used in the statute is neither self-defining nor 
defined" adds nothing to the analysis and is incorrect.  
Majority op. at 7.  Few, if any, words are "self-defining." The 
definition of "any" may be found in a dictionary, and a partial 
list of civil "defenses" is provided in § 802.02(3), which 
includes the statute of limitations.  We have repeatedly held 
that resorting to dictionary or statutory definitions is not a 
basis for determining that a statutory term is ambiguous.  
Girouard v. Circuit Court for Jackson County, 155 Wis. 2d 148, 
156, 454 N.W.2d 792 (1990); Smith v. City of Oak Creek, 139 Wis. 
2d 788, 798 n.6, 407 N.W.2d 901 (1987).  What does "any defense" 
mean in this context?  The term is further defined by the words 
following it:   "any defense" is a defense that a defendant 
"could raise in a civil action."  § 973.20(14)(b).  As I have 
already noted, a civil statute of limitations is such a defense, 
while a criminal statute of limitations is not. 
¶43 The majority asserts that the legislative history and 
the placement of the provision in question show that the "any 
defense" language is ambiguous and refers only to defenses to 
the amount of restitution.  The majority incorrectly uses 
legislative history to render the statute ambiguous.  This court 
has consistently stated that: 1) resort to legislative history 
is inappropriate in the absence of a finding of ambiguity; and 
2) legislative history cannot be used to render statutory 
 
 
No. 95-1975.AWB   
 
4 
language ambiguous.  See, e.g., Cynthia E. v. LaCrosse County 
Human Services Dep't., 172 Wis. 2d 218, 229, 493 N.W.2d 56 
(1992); State ex rel. Smith v. City of Oak Creek, 139 Wis. 2d 
788, 798, 407 N.W.2d 901 (1987); Aparacor, Inc. v. DILHR, 97 
Wis. 2d 399, 403, 293 N.W.2d 545 (1980).  While I find no basis 
for resorting to legislative history, I address briefly the 
majority's reliance on it for the proposition that a defendant 
in a restitution hearing may raise only those civil defenses 
that speak to amount of restitution. 
¶44 The majority notes that 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d) deals only 
with the amount of restitution, and reasons that because 
§ 973.20(14)(a)-(c) was patterned after the federal statute, the 
"any defense" language at issue in this case must also speak 
only to the amount of restitution.  Far from aiding the 
majority, the text of 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d) actually undermines 
the conclusion that the legislature intended "any defense" to 
mean only those defenses that affect the amount of a victim's 
loss.  Unlike § 973.20(14)(a)-(c), 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d) states 
that its provisions "do[] not address the defendant's liability 
for restitution."  Thus, by its express terms, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3664(d) deals only with the amount of restitution. 
¶45 In 
creating 
§ 973.20(14)(a)-(c), 
our 
legislature 
borrowed freely from 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d), yet refrained from 
including any of the federal statute's language that would limit 
a defendant to only those defenses relating to the amount of 
restitution.   Moreover, as the majority correctly notes, the 
legislature did not take the "any defense" language from 18 
 
 
No. 95-1975.AWB   
 
5 
U.S.C. § 3664(d); the language was already part of Wisconsin's 
then 
existing 
restitution 
statute. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.09(1m)(a) (1981-82). 
¶46 Thus, 
the 
legislative 
history 
shows 
that 
our 
legislature did not adopt the limiting language of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3664(d).  Instead, the legislature adopted language that the 
majority concedes "appears" to unambiguously allow a defendant 
to raise a civil statute of limitations in a restitution 
proceeding.  The majority nevertheless concludes that the 
legislative history endorses the majority's limitation on the 
phrase "any defense." 
¶47 Continuing 
its 
legislative 
history 
inquiry, 
the 
majority notes that the statutory predecessor to § 973.20(14) 
contained the same "any defense" language that the present 
restitution statute carries, and that each version of the 
statute places the "any defense" language after sentences 
dealing only with the amount of restitution.  According to the 
majority, the placement of the "any defense" provision: 
 
seems to clearly indicate that the "any defense" to 
which the statute refers means any defense to the 
amount of restitution ordered by the trial court, or 
"any defense . . . for the loss sought to be 
compensated." 
Majority op. at 17-18 (omission in the original). 
¶48 The majority's alternative interpretations of "any 
defense" are infirm because they necessitate a rewriting of the 
statute.  In order to reach its conclusion that "any defense" 
means "any defense to the amount of restitution ordered by the 
 
 
No. 95-1975.AWB   
 
6 
trial court," the majority must create statutory text out of 
whole cloth.  In order to reach the conclusion that "any 
defense" means "any defense . . . for the loss sought to be 
compensated," the majority must delete the important phrase 
"that he or she could raise in a civil action," the very 
statutory language at issue in this case.  Under either view, 
the majority rewrites the statute in order to give meaning to 
its placement argument. 
¶49 It is true that each version of the restitution 
statute has the "any defense" provision preceded by sentences 
dealing only with the amount, rather than the fact, of 
restitution liability.  However, in both the old and new 
versions of the statute, the legislature has refrained from so 
limiting the sentence containing the "any defense" language.  
The 
legislature 
could 
easily 
have 
provided 
that: 
"[t]he 
defendant may assert any civil defense that would reduce the 
amount of loss sought to be compensated."  Significantly, it did 
not. 
¶50 The 
majority 
next 
relies 
on 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.20(14)(d), which provides that a court "shall conduct the 
[restitution] proceeding so as to do substantial justice between 
the parties according to the rules of substantive law and may 
waive the rules of practice, procedure, pleading or evidence . . 
. ."  The majority derives from this language the following 
proposition: 
 
Technical or procedural defenses which might be proper 
in a civil proceeding may be asserted only to the 
extent that they are not inconsistent with the 
 
 
No. 95-1975.AWB   
 
7 
informal nature of a restitution proceeding and with 
the general policy goal of achieving "substantial 
justice." 
Majority op. at 15.  The majority implies that § 973.20(14)(b) 
is ambiguous because a literal reading of the provision would 
allow a "technical or procedural defense" like the civil statute 
of limitations to upset the informal nature of a restitution 
proceeding. 
¶51 A statute of limitations defense is not a "technical" 
or a "procedural" defense; it is substantive law.  See Modica v. 
Verhulst, 195 Wis. 2d 633, 644, 536 N.W.2d 466 (Ct. App. 1995), 
citing Betthauser v. Medical Protective Co., 172 Wis. 2d 141, 
493 N.W.2d 40 (1992). 
 
The limitation of actions is a right as well as a 
remedy, extinguishing the right on one side and 
creating a right on the other, which is as of high 
dignity as regards judicial remedies as any other 
right and it is a right which enjoys constitutional 
protection.  This court views statutes of limitation 
as substantive statutes 
because 
they 
create and 
destroy rights. 
Betthauser, 172 Wis. 2d at 149 (citations and emphasis 
omitted).  Section 973.20(14)(d) requires that the restitution 
proceedings be conducted "according to the rules of substantive 
law . . . ."  It does not authorize a court to waive substantive 
statutory rights, one of which is the civil statute of 
limitations set forth in § 893.51(1).  I therefore conclude that 
a court's authority under § 973.20(14)(d) to waive "the rules of 
practice, procedure, pleading or evidence" has no bearing on the 
issue of 
whether 
the 
civil 
or the 
criminal 
statute of 
limitations applies in a criminal restitution proceeding. 
 
 
No. 95-1975.AWB   
 
8 
¶52 I also reject the majority's invocation of the specter 
of 
a 
"restitution 
proceeding 
distracted 
. 
. 
. 
by 
the 
technicalities 
of 
civil 
tolling 
and 
discovery 
matters."  
Majority op. at 15-16.  The § 893.51(1) civil statute of 
limitations is no more difficult to apply than the criminal 
statute of limitations prescribed in Wis. Stat. § 939.74(1).  
Both "run" after six years.  The § 939.74(1) period is tolled 
during the time that a criminal defendant is "not publicly a 
resident within this state," while the § 893.51(1) period is 
tolled while a defendant is out of state and not subject to 
personal jurisdiction under Wis. Stat. § 801.05.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.19.  In addition, the restitution statute expressly 
provides that "[d]iscovery is not available except for good 
cause shown."  § 973.20(14)(d).  I therefore find the majority's 
concern with "distracting civil technicalities" more imaginary 
than real. 
¶53 The majority also contends that § 973.20(14)(b) is 
ambiguous because other provisions in § 973.20 make "clear that 
restitution hearings are not to be conducted like a civil 
trial."  Majority op. at 7.  I disagree with the majority's 
reading of § 973.20, because restitution proceedings do parallel 
civil 
proceedings 
in 
significant 
ways. 
 
For 
example, 
§ 973.20(5)(a) provides that a defendant may be required to pay 
"special damages . . . which could be recovered in a civil 
action against the defendant for his or her conduct in the 
commission 
of 
a 
crime . . . ." 
 
Also, 
the 
victim 
must 
demonstrate the amount of his or her loss by the preponderance 
 
 
No. 95-1975.AWB   
 
9 
of the evidence.  § 973.20(14)(a).  The same preponderance of 
the evidence burden is placed on the defendant for purposes of 
determining his or her financial wherewithal.  § 973.20(14)(b). 
 Furthermore, the State is not required to provide appointed 
counsel to indigent restitution defendants "unless the hearing 
is held at or prior to the sentencing proceeding, the defendant 
is incarcerated when the hearing is held or the court so 
orders."  Id.  The very provision at issue in this case, which 
allows a defendant to raise civil defenses in a restitution 
proceeding, anticipates that 
restitution hearings will be 
conducted in a quasi-civil manner. 
¶54 Finally, the majority concludes that a literal reading 
of 
§ 973.20(14)(b) 
would 
work 
an 
absurd 
result, 
because 
application of a civil statute of limitations would allow some 
crime victims to recover at least a portion of their pecuniary 
losses, while other victims' claims would be time-barred.  As 
the majority correctly notes, when the State seeks restitution, 
it does so on behalf of victims who would otherwise be required 
to bring a civil claim against the defendant.  Majority op. at 
13.  It is not absurd that the State, claiming pecuniary damages 
on behalf of crime victims, would be held to the same statute of 
limitations that the victims would encounter in a civil action 
seeking to recover the loss compensated in restitution.  Indeed, 
one might reasonably assert that it is the majority's reading of 
the statute that achieves an anomalous result, by reviving in a 
restitution proceeding the pecuniary claims of victims that 
would be time-barred in a civil action. 
 
 
No. 95-1975.AWB   
 
10
¶55 The majority states that it "only makes sense that the 
same statute of limitations that applies in the underlying 
criminal proceeding . . . should also apply in the restitution 
proceedings."  Majority op. at 20.  It advances the position 
that 
"substantial 
justice" 
requires 
that 
each 
victim 
be 
compensated.  Majority op. at 16.  In the absence of 
§ 973.20(14)(b), the majority's reasoning might be persuasive.  
However, in advancing this common sense and substantial justice 
approach, the majority  ignores the plain directive of the 
statute.  The language of § 973.20(14)(b) unambiguously calls 
for the application of the civil statute of limitations to 
restitution proceedings. 
¶56 In summary, because a criminal statute of limitations 
is not a "defense that [a defendant] could raise in a civil 
action," I conclude that § 973.20(14)(b) unambiguously requires 
the application of the relevant civil statute of limitations in 
a restitution proceeding.  As such, the defendant in this case 
is entitled to invoke the § 893.51(1) statute of limitations.  
Accordingly, I would affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals.   
¶57 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶58 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Shirley S. 
Abrahamson joins this opinion.