Title: Lowe's Home Centers, LLC v. City of Delavan
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2019AP001987
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: February 16, 2023

2023 WI 8 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2019AP1987 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Lowe's Home Centers, LLC, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
City of Delavan, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS  
Reported at 400 Wis. 2d 542, 970 N.W.2d 568 
 (2022 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 16, 2023   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 28, 2022   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Walworth   
 
JUDGE: 
Daniel Steven Johnson   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the 
Court, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK, DALLET, HAGEDORN, and 
KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a 
concurring opinion, in which ROGGENSACK, J., joined.   
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Thomas R. Wilhelmy, Daniel P. Deveny and Fredrikson & 
Byron, P.A., Minneapolis. There was an oral argument by Daniel 
P. Deveny.  
 
For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Lori 
M. 
Lubinksy, 
Danielle 
Baudhuin 
Tierney, 
and 
Axley 
Brynelson, LLP, Madison. There was an oral argument by Danielle 
Baudhuin Tierney.  
 
 
2 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Jason P. Gehring, 
Dustin 
T. 
Woehl, 
and 
Kasdorf, 
Lewis 
& 
Swietlick, 
S.C., 
Milwaukee, on behalf of the Village of Plover, Wisconsin.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Misha Tseytlin, Kevin 
M. LeRoy, and Troutman, Pepper, Hamilton, Sanders LLP, Chicago, 
on behalf of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of 
America.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Scott E. Rosenow and 
the WMC Litigation Center, Madison, on behalf of Wisconsin 
Manufacturers and Commerce, Inc.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Amy R. Seibel, Claire 
Silverman, and Seibel Law Offices, LLC, Mequon, and the League 
of Wisconsin Municipalities, Monona, on behalf of the League of 
Wisconsin Municipalities. There was an oral argument by Amy R. 
Seibel.  
 
 
 
 
2023 WI 8 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2019AP1987 
(L.C. No. 
2016CV589 & 2017CV432) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Lowe's Home Centers, LLC, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
City of Delavan, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 16, 2023 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the 
Court, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK, DALLET, HAGEDORN, and 
KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a 
concurring opinion, in which ROGGENSACK, J., joined.  
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, Lowe's Home 
Centers, LLC, seeks review of an unpublished per curiam decision 
of 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
affirming 
the 
circuit 
court's 
determination that the City of Delavan's assessments of Lowe's' 
No. 
2019AP1987   
 
2 
 
property for the 2016 and 2017 tax years were not excessive.1  
Lowe's contends that the City's assessments should not have 
received a presumption of correctness and that the assessments 
improperly excluded comparable properties for the sole reason 
that those properties were unoccupied. 
¶2 
Specifically, 
Lowe's 
contends 
that 
the 
City's 
assessments 
should 
not 
have 
received 
a 
presumption 
of 
correctness because, it argues, they were conducted in violation 
of the dictates of the Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual (the 
Manual).  Further, it asserts that the vacant big-box retail 
locations it presented to the circuit court are comparable to 
the subject property and thus should have been considered in the 
City's assessments.   
¶3 
The City argues to the contrary, contending that the 
presumption of correctness was appropriately afforded to its 
assessments.  It additionally asserts that the unoccupied 
properties Lowe's presented as comparable properties were 
properly excluded from the analysis.   
¶4 
We determine that the assessments in this case were 
properly afforded a presumption of correctness.  Pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 70.49(2) (2019-20),2 the presumption attaches upon 
                                                 
1 Lowe's Home Centers, LLC v. City of Delavan, No. 
2019AP1987, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. July 28, 2021) 
(per curiam) (affirming the order of the circuit court for 
Walworth County, Daniel Steven Johnson, Judge). 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2019-20 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2019AP1987   
 
3 
 
the 
filing 
of 
the 
assessment 
along 
with 
the 
assessor's 
affidavit. 
¶5 
We further determine that Lowe's failed to demonstrate 
that the City's assessments were excessive.  Giving deference to 
the circuit court's factual findings, including its credibility 
determinations, 
we 
conclude 
that 
Lowe's 
did 
not 
provide 
significant 
contrary 
evidence 
sufficient 
to 
overcome 
the 
presumption of correctness.   
¶6 
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
I 
¶7 
Lowe's is the owner of property in the City of 
Delavan.  The property consists of 14.525 acres on which sits a 
134,574-square-foot Lowe's Home Improvement store.  Construction 
on the building was completed in 2005, and Lowe's has occupied 
the building since that time.   
¶8 
In 2013, the City assessor conducted a revaluation of 
the property, and arrived at an assessed value of $8,922,300.  
No changes were made to this value for purposes of the 2016 and 
2017 assessments. 
¶9 
Lowe's challenged the City's assessments for 2016 and 
2017.  It sought a waiver of its hearing before the City's Board 
of Review and the Board granted the waiver, thereby disallowing 
No. 
2019AP1987   
 
4 
 
the claim.3  After its claim was disallowed, Lowe's filed this 
action under Wis. Stat. § 74.37(3)(d),4 asserting that the 
assessments of its property for the 2016 and 2017 tax years were 
excessive and seeking to recover the excess amount it believed 
it had paid. 
¶10 The circuit court held a three-day bench trial on the 
matter.  At trial, City Assessor Luke Mack testified, as did the 
City's expert appraiser Scott Chapko.  Lowe's offered testimony 
from two experts, Michael MaRous and Brett Harrington.5   
¶11 Mack testified regarding the method he employed for 
valuing the property for 2016 and 2017.  He described those 
assessments as "maintenance" assessments, which means that the 
property was not subject to a full revaluation.6  Mack further 
                                                 
3 See Wis. Stat. § 70.47(8m) ("The board may, at the request 
of the taxpayer or assessor, or at its own discretion, waive the 
hearing 
of 
an 
objection . . . . 
 
For 
purposes 
of 
this 
subsection, if the board waives the hearing, the waiver 
disallows the taxpayer's claim on excessive assessment under s. 
74.37(3) 
and, 
notwithstanding 
the 
time 
period 
under 
s. 
74.37(3)(d), the taxpayer has 60 days from the notice of the 
hearing waiver in which to commence an action under s. 
74.37(3)(d)."). 
4 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 74.37(3)(d), "[i]f the taxation 
district or county disallows the claim, the claimant may 
commence an action in circuit court to recover the amount of the 
claim not allowed." 
5 The circuit court's decision did not focus on Harrington's 
testimony.  Accordingly, although we briefly describe the 
testimony of the other witnesses, we do not recount that of 
Harrington. 
6 See Wis. Stat. § 70.05(5)(b) ("Each taxation district 
shall assess property at full value at least once in every 5-
year period."). 
No. 
2019AP1987   
 
5 
 
testified that the prior assessment of the property, completed 
in 2013, was done using the cost approach,7 that replacement 
costs were based on "Marshall and Swift cost data,"8 and that 
market adjustments were applied for depreciation and additional 
obsolescence.  He also compared the assessments to recent 
revaluations in other communities. 
¶12 Lowe's' expert, MaRous, testified that the property 
should have been valued at a much lower level than the City had 
offered.  In MaRous's opinion, the subject property had a fair 
market value of $4.6 million——just over half of the City's 
assessed value.   
¶13 To arrive at this valuation, MaRous used the sales 
comparison approach.  In doing so, he compared the Lowe's 
property to six other recently-sold properties that he had 
determined  to be "comparable" to the Lowe's property.   
¶14 Three of the six comparable sites MaRous identified 
(what MaRous termed sales one, three, and six) were former 
American TV locations.  Two of these sites were sold to 
Steinhafel's furniture and one was sold and converted into a go-
                                                 
7 The "cost approach" to valuation "seeks to measure the 
cost to replace the property."  Adams Outdoor Advert., Ltd. v. 
City of Madison, 2006 WI 104, ¶35, 294 Wis. 2d 441, 717 
N.W.2d 803. 
8 Marshall and Swift "publishes materials used by appraisers 
and state and local taxing authorities."  Marshall & Swift v. BS 
& A Software, 871 F. Supp. 952, 954 (W.D. Mich. 1994).  The 
Marshall 
and 
Swift 
handbook 
has 
been 
described 
as 
a 
"standardized publication in the field of real estate."  In Re 
Thompson, 18 B.R. 67, 69 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982).  
No. 
2019AP1987   
 
6 
 
kart racing track, bar, and restaurant.  All three were in 
receivership9 when they were sold. 
¶15 MaRous's comparable sale number two was a former K-
Mart store that, by MaRous's testimony, had been vacant and 
marketed for "2 to 3 years" prior to being sold.  Comparable 
sale number four was a former Lowe's store in Brown Deer.  The 
property had been built in 2006 and vacated by Lowe's just five 
years later.  It sat vacant for two years before being purchased 
by Walmart in 2013.  MaRous further advanced that the "exposure 
time," or the length of time it takes a property to sell on the 
open market, for properties similar to the subject property in 
the same geographical area is two to three years. 
¶16 Finally, MaRous offered comparable sale number five, a 
vacant former Target store.  This property was "vacant before 
the purchase for about four years."  It was ultimately purchased 
by a developer who "broke it up into two [lots] . . . because 
that's where the demand was." 
¶17 The City countered Lowe's' expert with its own expert, 
Scott Chapko.  Chapko valued the property at $9.2 million, 
slightly higher than the assessed value.  Like MaRous, he 
arrived at this valuation using the sales comparison approach, 
although Chapko used different properties as comparables than 
MaRous used.   
¶18 Chapko testified that he did not think it was 
appropriate to use "dark" stores or "distressed" properties to 
                                                 
9 See Wis. Stat. ch. 128. 
No. 
2019AP1987   
 
7 
 
compare to the occupied Lowe's property.10  Accordingly, Chapko 
did not use any such properties in his analysis.  All of 
Chapko's submitted comparable sales were occupied at the time of 
sale and had market-rate leases in place.  None was sold under 
"duress," 
such 
as 
a 
bankruptcy 
or 
foreclosure. 
 
Chapko 
additionally testified that the exposure time for a property 
like the subject property is in the "overall range of 2 to 18 
months." 
¶19 The 
circuit 
court 
ultimately 
upheld 
the 
City's 
assessments.  Specifically, it determined that "the evidence 
presented by Lowe's in this case is significantly less credible 
than that presented by the City when it comes to a proper value 
to be attached to this real estate for the years 2016 and 2017."  
In discussing MaRous's appraisal, the circuit court discounted 
                                                 
10 The Manual discourages the use of "dark" and "distressed" 
properties "as comparable sales unless the subject property is 
similarly dark or distressed."  1 Wisconsin Property Assessment 
Manual 9-12 (2016).  Pursuant to the Manual, "[a] vacant store 
is considered dark when it is vacant beyond the normal time 
period for that commercial real estate marketplace and can vary 
from one municipality to another."  Id.  As such, "vacant" and 
"dark" are not synonyms.  For further discussion on the 
distinction between "vacant" and "dark," see infra, ¶¶45-46.  
The Manual does not specifically define "distressed," but it 
counsels 
that 
"[a] 
recent 
court 
case 
stated 
distressed 
properties are not seen as meaningfully comparable to operating 
properties."  1 Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual 9-12 
(citing Bonstores Realty One, LLC v. City of Wauwatosa, 2013 WI 
App 131, ¶¶21, 22, 34, 35, 351 Wis. 2d 439, 839 N.W.2d 893). 
All references to the Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual 
are to the 2016 version unless otherwise indicated. 
    
No. 
2019AP1987   
 
8 
 
MaRous's claimed comparables two and five in that they "were 
both vacant beyond the 2-3 year window that Mr. MaRous 
apparently identifies as the normal exposure time for the 
Delavan area," classifying those properties as "dark" for this 
reason.  It further explained:   
In that these two properties are dark they have a 
major deficiency when compared with the Lowe's store 
in question.  Further, the fact that they were 
considered comparable sales at all is in apparent 
direct conflict with the [principles] outlined in the 
Manual 
stating 
not 
to 
use 
dark 
properties 
in 
performing an appraisal unless the subject property is 
also dark. 
¶20 The circuit court also found unpersuasive MaRous's 
reliance on what it considered "distressed" properties.  It 
observed: 
[H]alf of the comparable sales used by Mr. MaRous were 
in receivership.  The Court might be able to overlook 
one comparable sale in receivership or under possible 
duress as an outlier if it was able to put that 
outlier in the context of five other properties 
without significant flaws, not in receivership, with 
similar adjusted values.  However, the Court cannot do 
so here because of the number of properties in 
receivership 
and 
the 
flaws 
of 
the 
other 
non-
receivership comparable sales. 
¶21 Due to the "significant deficiencies" in MaRous's 
appraisal, the circuit court concluded that Lowe's had not 
provided significant contrary evidence that the City's valuation 
was excessive.  Accordingly, it denied Lowe's' request for a 
refund of excessive taxes. 
¶22 Lowe's appealed and the court of appeals affirmed the 
circuit court's decision.  Lowe's Home Centers, LLC v. City of 
No. 
2019AP1987   
 
9 
 
Delavan, No. 2019AP1987, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. 
July 28, 2021) (per curiam).  Emphasizing that the circuit court 
"is the ultimate arbiter of credibility," the court of appeals 
concluded that "Lowe's has not overcome the presumption of 
correctness that attached to the City's assessments and that the 
record supports the circuit court's determinations in this 
case."  Id., ¶¶43, 48.  Lowe's petitioned for this court's 
review. 
II 
¶23 We are called upon to review the court of appeals' 
determination on an excessive assessment claim brought pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 74.37(3)(d).  An action filed pursuant to 
§ 74.37 seeks a trial before the circuit court, and is distinct 
from a certiorari action.11  Metro. Assocs. v. City of Milwaukee, 
2018 WI 4, ¶23, 379 Wis. 2d 141, 905 N.W.2d 784.  Accordingly, 
                                                 
11 Certiorari is a mechanism by which a court may test the 
validity 
of 
a 
decision 
rendered 
by 
a 
municipality, 
administrative agency, or other quasi-judicial tribunal.  State 
ex rel. Anderson v. Town of Newbold, 2021 WI 6, ¶11, 395 
Wis. 2d 351, 954 N.W.2d 323.  Such a proceeding is "limited to 
the record before the board and addresses only whether the 
board's actions were:  (1) within its jurisdiction; (2) 
according to law; (3) arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable and 
represented its will and not its judgment; and (4) supported by 
evidence such that the board might reasonably make the order or 
determination in question."  State ex rel. City of Waukesha v. 
City of Waukesha Bd. of Rev., 2021 WI 89, ¶19, 399 Wis. 2d 696, 
967 N.W.2d 460.  In contrast, an excessive assessment action 
under Wis. Stat. § 74.37 is not confined to the record before 
the board and new evidence may be presented.  Trailwood 
Ventures, LLC v. Village of Kronenwetter, 2009 WI App 18, ¶7, 
315 Wis. 2d 791, 762 N.W.2d 841. 
No. 
2019AP1987   
 
10 
 
we review the circuit court's determination, not that of the 
assessor or Board of Review.  Id. 
¶24 In our review, we must interpret and apply Wis. Stat. 
§§ 70.32 and 70.49 to determine whether the appraisals at issue 
followed the statutory directives.  Statutory interpretation and 
application 
present 
questions 
of 
law 
that 
we 
review 
independently of the determinations rendered by the circuit 
court and court of appeals.  Id., ¶24. 
¶25 Factual findings made by the circuit court will not be 
disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous.  Id., ¶25.  A 
finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is against the great 
weight and clear preponderance of the evidence.  Id., ¶62.  It 
is within the province of the factfinder to make determinations 
of the weight and credibility of evidence.  Id., ¶25. 
III 
¶26 We 
begin 
by 
setting 
forth 
the 
principles 
and 
methodology that guide property tax assessment in Wisconsin.  
Subsequently, we discuss the presumption of correctness to which 
an assessment is entitled.  Finally, we address the City's 
assessments of Lowe's' property. 
A 
¶27 Valuation of real estate for tax assessment purposes 
is governed by Wis. Stat. § 70.32.  State ex rel. Collison v. 
City of Milwaukee Bd. of Rev., 2021 WI 48, ¶23, 397 Wis. 2d 246, 
960 N.W.2d 1.  Pursuant to § 70.32(1), property shall be valued 
"in the manner specified in the Wisconsin property assessment 
manual."  Subsection (1) further sets forth a hierarchical 
No. 
2019AP1987   
 
11 
 
valuation methodology for arriving at a property's fair market 
value.12  See State ex rel. Markarian v. City of Cudahy, 45 
Wis. 2d 683, 685-86, 173 N.W.2d 627 (1970).  
¶28 Wisconsin Stat. § 70.32(1) lists three sources of 
information that inform tax assessments.  The order in which 
these sources are listed is indicative of the quality of 
information each source provides.  Collison, 397 Wis. 2d 246, 
¶24.  This methodology has been described as providing three 
"tiers" of analysis.  Metro. Assocs., 379 Wis. 2d 141, ¶31. 
¶29 An arm's-length sale of the subject property is the 
best information of a property's fair market value, and is thus 
the first source of information to which an assessor should look 
in conducting an assessment.  Collison, 397 Wis. 2d 246, ¶25.  
Examination of a recent arm's-length sale is known as a tier 1 
analysis.  Id.  If the property has not been recently sold, then 
the appraiser moves to a tier 2 analysis, examining recent 
                                                 
12 In full, Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1) provides: 
Real property shall be valued by the assessor in the 
manner specified in the Wisconsin property assessment 
manual provided under s. 73.03(2a) from actual view or 
from the best information that the assessor can 
practicably obtain, at the full value which could 
ordinarily be obtained therefor at private sale.  In 
determining the value, the assessor shall consider 
recent arm's-length sales of the property to be 
assessed if according to professionally acceptable 
appraisal practices those sales conform to recent 
arm's-length sales of reasonably comparable property; 
recent arm's-length sales of reasonably comparable 
property; 
and 
all 
factors 
that, 
according 
to 
professionally acceptable appraisal practices, affect 
the value of the property to be assessed. 
No. 
2019AP1987   
 
12 
 
arm's-length sales of reasonably comparable properties (the 
"sales comparison" approach).  Id.  It is this tier 2 analysis 
that is before us in this case. 
¶30 Finally, when both tier 1 and tier 2 are unavailable, 
an assessor moves to tier 3, under which the assessor may 
consider all the factors collectively that have a bearing on the 
value of the property.  Id., ¶26.  These factors include cost, 
depreciation, replacement value, income, industrial conditions, 
location and occupancy, sales of like property, book value, 
amount of insurance carried, value asserted in a prospectus, and 
appraisals produced by the owner.  Id.; State ex rel. Mitchell 
Aero, Inc. v. Bd. of Rev. of City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 268, 
278, 246 N.W.2d 521 (1976).   
¶31 Property owners who are dissatisfied with the assessed 
value of their property may file an objection to the assessment 
with the municipal board of review.  Wis. Stat. § 70.47(7);  
State ex rel. Nudo Holdings, LLC v. Bd. of Rev. for City of 
Kenosha, 2022 WI 17, ¶9, 401 Wis. 2d 27, 972 N.W.2d 544.  The 
board of review is a quasi-judicial body that hears evidence and 
decides whether the assessor's valuation is correct.  State ex 
rel. City of Waukesha v. City of Waukesha Bd. of Rev., 2021 WI 
89, ¶16, 399 Wis. 2d 696, 967 N.W.2d 460.  It is not an 
assessing body.  Id.  If a property owner remains dissatisfied 
after the board's decision, the property owner may appeal the 
No. 
2019AP1987   
 
13 
 
board's decision through one of three statutory avenues.13  Id., 
¶17.  As relevant here, Lowe's brought an excessive assessment 
action under Wis. Stat. § 74.37.  
B 
¶32 With this background in hand, we next clarify the 
operation of the presumption of correctness to which assessments 
are entitled.  As a starting point to the examination of a 
property owner's challenge to a tax assessment pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 74.37, the assessor's valuation is presumed to be 
correct. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 70.49(2); 
Metro. 
Assocs., 
379 
Wis. 2d 141, ¶50.  Such a presumption may be rebutted if the 
assessor did not correctly apply the Manual and Wisconsin 
statutes or if a challenger presents significant contrary 
evidence.  Metro. Assocs., 379 Wis. 2d 141, ¶50; Allright 
Props., Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 2009 WI App 46, ¶12, 317 
Wis. 2d 228, 767 N.W.2d 567. 
¶33 However, Lowe's contends that the assessments in this 
case are not entitled to the presumption of correctness.  
Pointing to this court's statement that "[n]o presumption of 
correctness may be accorded to an assessment that does not apply 
the principles in the Property Assessment Manual," Walgreen Co. 
v. City of Madison, 2008 WI 80, ¶17, 311 Wis. 2d 158, 752 
                                                 
13 The three options for property owners who wish to appeal 
a board decision are:  (1) certiorari review pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 70.47(13), (2) a written complaint with the Department 
of Revenue to revalue the property under Wis. Stat. § 70.85, and 
(3) an excessive assessment action pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 74.37.  City of Waukesha, 399 Wis. 2d 696, ¶17. 
No. 
2019AP1987   
 
14 
 
N.W.2d 687, Lowe's asserts that because the assessments here 
deviated from the Manual (an assertion which we will address 
below), the presumption does not attach in the first instance. 
¶34 Lowe's 
misapprehends 
the 
application 
of 
the 
presumption.  Its argument is incorrect as a matter of both 
statutory law and logic. 
¶35 The statutory basis for the presumption, Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.49(2), provides: 
The value of all real and personal property entered 
into the assessment roll to which such affidavit is 
attached by the assessor shall, in all actions and 
proceedings involving such values, be presumptive 
evidence that all such properties have been justly and 
equitably assessed in proper relationship to each 
other. 
For our purposes, the key passage from the statute sets forth 
that the assessment becomes "presumptive evidence" when it is 
"entered 
into 
the 
assessment 
roll" 
and 
includes 
"such 
affidavit . . . attached by the assessor."  § 70.49(2).  The 
plain 
language 
of 
this 
provision 
thus 
compels 
only 
one 
conclusion:  that the presumption of correctness attaches at the 
filing of the assessment by the assessor along with the required 
affidavit.  See State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 
2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (setting forth 
that statutory interpretation begins with the language of the 
statute, and if the meaning is plain, "we ordinarily stop the 
inquiry").  
¶36 Further, 
Lowe's' 
proffered 
analysis 
suffers 
from 
backward logic.  Rather than apply the presumption and then 
No. 
2019AP1987   
 
15 
 
determine 
if 
significant 
contrary 
evidence 
overcomes 
the 
presumption, Lowe's would have us endorse an analysis that would 
first examine the evidence and make a determination as to 
whether the assessment complied with the Manual and only then 
determine whether the presumption applies.   
¶37 This is not how a presumption works.  If an assessment 
is conducted contrary to the dictates of the Manual, this does 
not merely mean that the presumption does not initially attach.  
If, in the context of a Wis. Stat. § 74.37 action, the failure 
to follow the Manual results in an excessive assessment, then 
the presumption is overcome and the assessment must be set 
aside.  
¶38 We acknowledge that this court's cases have indicated 
that "[n]o presumption of correctness may be accorded to an 
assessment that does not apply the principles in the Property 
Assessment Manual."  See Walgreen Co., 311 Wis. 2d 158, ¶17; 
Adams Outdoor Advert., Ltd. v. City of Madison, 2006 WI 104, 
¶56, 294 Wis. 2d 441, 717 N.W.2d 803.  However, Walgreen Co. did 
not cite Wis. Stat. § 70.49(2) and thus provides no insight into 
its application.  Although § 70.49(2) was cited in Adams Outdoor 
Advertising, it was referenced only for the premise that the 
court "must give presumptive weight to the City's assessment."  
Adams Outdoor Advert., 294 Wis. 2d 441, ¶25.  Given the plain 
language of § 70.49(2), we take the court's statements in 
Walgreen Co. and Adams Outdoor Advertising to mean not that the 
presumption does not initially attach to an assessment that does 
not follow the Manual's directives, but that the presumption is 
No. 
2019AP1987   
 
16 
 
overcome in such a situation.  Indeed, it is apparent from the 
plain text of § 70.49(2) that the presumption attaches when the 
assessment is filed along with the proper affidavit. 
¶39 We thus conclude that the assessments in this case 
were properly afforded a presumption of correctness.  Pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 70.49(2), the presumption attaches upon the 
filing of the assessment along with the assessor's affidavit. 
C 
¶40 Having established that the presumption of correctness 
attaches to the assessments, we turn next to address whether 
Lowe's presented significant contrary evidence sufficient to 
overcome the presumption and demonstrate that the City's 
assessments were excessive. 
¶41 Although Lowe's conceded at oral argument that "all 
the [proposed comparable] stores were vacant at the time they 
sold," it contends that the assessor deviated from the Manual by 
categorically excluding "vacant" and "dark" stores from a tier 2 
sales comparison analysis.  It further contends that it 
presented significant contrary evidence sufficient to overcome 
the presumption in the form of MaRous's appraisal. 
¶42 In evaluating Lowe's' arguments, we examine first the 
relevant portions of the Manual.  This case revolves around the 
question of what constitutes a "comparable" property in the 
context of a tier 2 sales comparison analysis.  The sales 
comparison approach is "based on the premise that similar 
properties will sell for similar prices on the open market."  1 
Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual 7-24.   
No. 
2019AP1987   
 
17 
 
¶43 The Manual "does not leave the determination of 
whether properties are reasonably comparable wholly to the 
discretion of an appraiser."  Regency W. Apartments LLC v. City 
of Racine, 2016 WI 99, ¶61, 372 Wis. 2d 282, 888 N.W.2d 611.  
Accordingly, it provides some guidance as to how assessors are 
to 
evaluate 
whether 
property 
is 
indeed 
"comparable."  
Specifically, the Manual states:  "Comparable sales refer to 
properties that are similar to the subject property in age, 
condition, use, type of construction, location, design, physical 
features and economic characteristics."  1 Wisconsin Property 
Assessment Manual 7-24.  "The more similar the sold property is 
to the subject, the more reliable is the sale price as an 
indicator of the value of the subject property."  Id. 
¶44 Providing further specific guidance in the valuation 
of commercial properties through the sales comparison approach, 
the Manual states that "[w]hen valuing properties, the assessor 
should choose comparable sales exhibiting a similar highest and 
best use and similar placement in the commercial real estate 
marketplace."  Id. at 9-12.  The Manual additionally sets forth 
language that is critical to the issue presented in this case 
regarding 
the 
use 
of 
"vacant" 
and 
"dark" 
properties 
in 
commercial valuation: 
The assessor should avoid using sales of improved 
properties that are vacant ("dark") or distressed as 
comparable sales unless the subject property is 
similarly dark or distressed.  A vacant store is 
considered dark when it is vacant beyond the normal 
time 
period 
for 
that 
commercial 
real 
estate 
marketplace and can vary from one municipality to 
No. 
2019AP1987   
 
18 
 
another.  A recent court case stated distressed 
properties are not seen as meaningfully comparable to 
operating properties. 
Id. (citing Bonstores Realty One, LLC v. City of Wauwatosa, 2013 
WI App 131, ¶¶21, 22, 34, 35, 351 Wis. 2d 439, 839 N.W.2d 893). 
¶45 Before continuing in our analysis, we take a brief 
detour to discuss the terminology that we employ.  Some 
confusion has arisen due to inconsistent usage of the terms 
"vacant" and "dark."  Although the court of appeals in this case 
seemingly used the terms interchangeably, they have different 
meanings.   
¶46 We acknowledge that the Manual may not be a model of 
clarity on the subject, but its language does indicate that 
"vacant" and "dark" are not synonymous.  The Manual states that 
"[a] vacant store is considered dark when it is vacant beyond 
the 
normal 
time 
period 
for 
that 
commercial 
real 
estate 
marketplace and can vary from one municipality to another."  Id.  
Thus, "dark," as used by the Manual, is a subset of "vacant."  
In other words, all dark stores are vacant, but not all vacant 
stores are dark. 
¶47 After this brief detour, we return to the parties' 
arguments.  Lowe's' main argument before this court is that the 
circuit court erred in rejecting MaRous's proffered "comparable" 
properties for purposes of a tier 2 sales comparison analysis.  
Specifically, it contends that the property's vacancy status 
should not be considered, and that the property must be valued 
with respect to the owner's fee simple interest only.  To 
No. 
2019AP1987   
 
19 
 
support this argument, Lowe's looks to Walgreen Co., 311 
Wis. 2d 158. 
¶48 In Walgreen Co., the business at issue, Walgreens, 
operated pursuant to a business model under which it would 
contract with a real estate developer to construct properties at 
Walgreens' direction.  Id., ¶6.  In return, Walgreens leased the 
properties 
from 
the 
developer 
at 
above-market 
rates 
to 
compensate for the developer's costs.  Id.   
¶49 When assessing property values, the City of Madison 
appraised the "leased fee interest," i.e., it considered the 
actual above-market contract rents in its analysis.  Id., ¶10.  
In contrast, Walgreens advanced an appraisal that "appraised the 
fee simple interest in the two properties without consideration 
of the lease."  Id.  The court addressed the issue of "whether a 
property tax assessment of retail property leased at above 
market rent values should be based on market rents (as Walgreens 
argue[d]) or if such assessments should be based on the above 
market rent terms of Walgreens' actual leases (as the City 
argue[d])."  Id., ¶2.   
¶50 This court agreed with Walgreens.  It determined, 
"consistent with the nationally recognized principle that '[a] 
lease never increases the market value of real property rights 
to 
the 
fee 
simple 
estate,'" 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 70.32(1) 
"proscribes assessing real property in excess of market value."  
Id., ¶3.  The Walgreen Co. court also concluded that "an income 
approach assessment of a leased retail property's fair market 
value of the fee simple interest [must] be based on market lease 
No. 
2019AP1987   
 
20 
 
rates, not actual contract rates, as long as encumbrances to the 
property do not cause its leased fee value to fall below a 
market rate value."  Id. 
¶51 Lowe's argues that consideration of the occupancy 
status of a store in a valuation necessarily means that the 
value of the business is being taken into account rather than 
just the fee simple value of the land.  It highlights the 
Walgreen Co. court's statement that "the valuation of the fair 
market value of property for purposes of property taxes is by 
its nature different from business, or income tax assessment."  
Id., ¶65.  "[A]n assessor's task is to value the real estate, 
not the business concern which may be using the property."  Id. 
(quoting Waste Mgmt. of Wis., Inc. v. Kenosha Cnty. Bd. of Rev., 
184 Wis. 2d 541, 565, 516 N.W.2d 695 (1994)).  Pointing to 
language in Walgreen Co. indicating that "a property assessor's 
task is to identify the market value of a fee simple interest," 
id., ¶20, Lowe's argues that consideration of vacancy status 
takes the assessor outside of these confines.   
¶52 Walgreen Co. does not compel the outcome Lowe's seeks, 
and its holding is not as broad as Lowe's claims.  The court in 
Walgreen Co. made a narrow determination regarding how above-
market rent is to be treated for tax assessment purposes.  As 
the City here argues, Walgreen Co. does not stand for the 
blanket proposition that occupancy or vacancy has no role to 
play in valuation.   
¶53 Lowe's' argument misses the mark when it advances that 
accounting for the vacant nature of a store necessarily values 
No. 
2019AP1987   
 
21 
 
the business concern and not just the fee simple interest in the 
land.  Many factors inform the value of land, including the 
land's viability to house a business.  Saying that land is 
suitable for a successful business, or that the land has a track 
record of housing a successful business, and assigning a value 
to that fact is not the same as valuing the business itself.  
Generally, a site that can sustain a business is more valuable 
than one that cannot.14  See also 1 Wisconsin Property Assessment 
                                                 
14 This conclusion is echoed by a position paper published 
by the International Association of Assessing Officers (IAAO), 
an organization whose standards are incorporated into the 
Manual.  See 1 Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual 1-3 
("Whether or not the IAAO Standards appear in the [Manual], the 
most current version in effect on January 1 of a given 
assessment year is incorporated by reference in the manual."); 
State ex rel. Collison v. City of Milwaukee Bd. of Rev., 2021 WI 
48, ¶41, 397 Wis. 2d 246, 960 N.W.2d 1.   
The IAAO states: 
If the subject property is occupied, that fact 
supports the premise that there is demand for the use 
for which the property was originally designed.  
Highest and best use is likely for the continued use 
of the property in its current use. 
 . . .  
For retail properties, value is affected by size, age, 
condition, access, traffic counts, proximity to major 
employment centers, the concentration of surrounding 
properties, population size, and household purchasing 
power, to name just a few considerations.  The 
competitive advantage of a property determines its 
relative position within the market.  A property that 
has significant advantages over other properties of 
the same use because of location, demographics, and 
economic forces will command a higher price and rent.  
Int'l Ass'n of Assessing Officers, Commercial Big-Box Retail:  A 
Guide to Market-Based Valuation at 16 (Sept. 2017). 
No. 
2019AP1987   
 
22 
 
Manual 7-24 ("Comparable sales refer to properties that are 
similar to the subject property in age, condition, use, type of 
construction, location, design, physical features and economic 
characteristics.") (emphasis added); id. at 7-1 ("[T]he assessor 
must not consider only the physical attributes of the land and 
improvements but the intangible benefits that are associated 
with them."). 
¶54 Further, a dark property is more likely to have 
characteristics that would make it less valuable than a property 
that was on the market for a shorter period of time.  For 
example, if a building has been unoccupied for a long period of 
time, it is more likely to be in some kind of disrepair and in 
turn more likely to require significant investment to make it 
usable again.    
¶55 The assessments in this case were consistent with the 
above provisions of the Manual and thus the circuit court was 
not obligated to reject the assessments.  The circuit court 
determined that multiple properties on which Lowe's relied were 
not just vacant, but were dark.  As to the dark properties on 
which Lowe's relies, the Manual counsels against using such 
properties as comparables to properties that are not similarly 
dark.  Specifically, the Manual states:  "The assessor should 
avoid using sales of improved properties that are vacant 
('dark') or distressed as comparable sales unless the subject 
property is similarly dark or distressed."  Id. at 9-12.   
¶56 Further buttressing the application of this directive 
is the court of appeals' decision in Bonstores Realty One, LLC 
No. 
2019AP1987   
 
23 
 
v. City of Wauwatosa, 351 Wis. 2d 439, ¶¶20-22.  In Bonstores, 
the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's determination 
that an expert's opinion was unreliable because the opinion 
disregarded differences in the vacancy status of proffered 
comparable properties.  Id., ¶22.  Here, the circuit court's 
decision was similar to and consistent with that in Bonstores. 
¶57 The Manual's directive that assessors "should avoid" 
use of vacant and dark properties in assessing occupied 
properties is consistent with general principles of real estate 
assessment.  Specifically, real estate must be valued at its 
highest and best use.  Collison, 397 Wis. 2d 246, ¶37.  The 
highest and best use of a store in an area that is conducive to 
business (and is in fact operating as a business) is different 
from the highest and best use of a property that contains a 
failed big-box store.  Lowe's' argument treats these different 
things alike, which is not the "apples to apples" comparison 
contemplated in a tier 2 analysis.  See Bonstores, 351 
Wis. 2d 439, ¶21. 
¶58 In examining the distressed "comparable properties" in 
receivership on which Lowe's relies, Lowe's fares no better.  
Again, the Manual counsels against the use of such properties as 
comparable, and with good reason.  See 1 Wisconsin Property 
Assessment Manual 9-12.  A property in receivership is often 
sold under vastly different economic conditions and subject to 
vastly different incentives from a property that is not in 
receivership.   
No. 
2019AP1987   
 
24 
 
¶59 To explain, "[a] Wis. Stat. ch. 128 receivership 
provides a way to liquidate the assets of a business debtor in 
an orderly and controlled manner."  Kristin K. Beilke et al., 
Collections and Bankruptcy in Wisconsin § 2.16 (3d ed. 2022).  
"The object and purpose of assignment law is to afford an equal 
distribution of the assignor's estate to all creditors in 
proportion to their claims."  Linton v. Schmidt, 88 Wis. 2d 183, 
198, 277 N.W.2d 136 (1979).   
¶60 This court has stated that the assignee, or receiver, 
is "the trustee for both the debtor and the creditors; with the 
duty to administer the trust property so as to pay the 
creditors, as far as possible, their just claims, and then to 
account to the debtor for the surplus."  Id.  However, the 
receiver is "bound to look primarily to the interests of the 
creditors." 
 
Id. 
 
Given 
this 
responsibility, 
differing 
incentives come into play and a sale of receivership property 
may not reflect the same price as a similar property not in 
receivership would receive on the open market.  For example, a 
receiver may be motivated to sell the property more quickly so 
as to secure timely payment of creditors and avoid the building 
falling into disrepair. 
¶61 Receivership can thus result in a "distressed" sale.  
Although the mere fact of a receivership does not automatically 
affect a property's market value, a claim that a distressed 
property is comparable to an operating one should be subjected 
to a court's keen scrutiny.  The circuit court was therefore not 
No. 
2019AP1987   
 
25 
 
obligated to accept MaRous's analysis that was based on an 
equivalency between distressed and operating properties. 
¶62 Given the above analysis and the circuit court's 
evaluation of the evidence presented, Lowe's' contention that it 
presented significant contrary evidence sufficient to overcome 
the presumption of correctness in this case is ultimately 
unpersuasive.  In evaluating comparable properties two and five, 
the former K-Mart and Target stores, the circuit court made a 
factual determination that both of these properties were "vacant 
beyond the 2-3 year window that Mr. MaRous apparently identifies 
as the normal exposure time for the Delevan area."  Accordingly, 
it concluded that these properties were "dark" and determined 
that neither of these stores was comparable to the subject 
property.  It observed that "[b]oth of these stores appear to 
fall within the category of 'dark' properties based on the 
extensive period of time during which they stood empty and were 
unable to be sold" given that they were "on the market for sale 
for a period of time beyond the normal exposure time needed to 
obtain market value."  Thus, the circuit court concluded that 
these properties "have a major deficiency when compared with the 
Lowe's store in question."  This "deficiency" was, in the 
circuit court's view, "significant," and "call[ed] into question 
the value of [MaRous's] appraisal as a whole." 
¶63 Likewise, with regard to the distressed properties 
under receivership (comparables one, three, and six, the former 
American TV properties), the circuit court similarly made a 
factual determination, reaching the "inescapable conclusion" 
No. 
2019AP1987   
 
26 
 
that "American TV was going out of business, subject to a 
receivership, and needed to liquidate their assets."  Under such 
conditions, the circuit court determined that these properties 
were not comparable to the subject property as MaRous advanced. 
¶64 Lowe's contends that MaRous "exercised exceptional 
diligence in investigating the circumstances surrounding each 
sale" of properties in receivership, asserting that "each of the 
properties were sufficiently exposed to the market with high 
demand from numerous potential buyers, and that each of the 
consummated sales was an arm's length transaction reflecting 
full fee simple market value."  However, after evaluating the 
evidence, the circuit court determined that MaRous's analysis 
was deficient.   
¶65 The circuit court observed that "there is no testimony 
that any of [the distressed properties] were put on the 
traditional real estate market for sale for the normal exposure 
time before they were placed as an asset into a receivership."  
Without an explanation from MaRous, the circuit court stated 
that it "simply does not know whether the amount obtained on the 
traditional non-receivership open market would have been the 
same or different if no receivership was in place and Mr. MaRous 
did not adequately explain why the receivership itself doesn't 
matter or is irrelevant as it relates to that concern."  The 
circuit court further did not accept MaRous's valuation because 
of the sheer amount of weight his analysis placed on the 
distressed sales:   
No. 
2019AP1987   
 
27 
 
The Court might be able to overlook one comparable 
sale in receivership or under possible duress as an 
outlier if it was able to put that outlier in the 
context of five other properties without significant 
flaws, not in receivership, with similar adjusted 
values.  However, the Court cannot do so here because 
of the number of properties in receivership and the 
flaws of the other non-receivership comparable sales. 
¶66 In contrast, the comparable properties presented by 
the City's appraiser, Chapko, were not dark or distressed.15    
Instead, all of these properties were occupied at the time of 
sale.  Additionally, Chapko testified that there was no duress 
involved in any of the sales, none were bank-owned or in 
bankruptcy, and all were exposed to the open market for a 
sufficient period of time.  
¶67 Although it recognized that "Chapko's analysis also 
has flaws," such as his "less than ideal" use of multi-tenant 
shopping centers, the circuit court found that Chapko made 
adjustments that "are reasonable, sufficient, and credible" to 
account for differences in the comparable properties and the 
                                                 
15 These properties were all occupied and included Shopko 
stores in Madison, Monona, and West Bend; a multi-tenant big-box 
building in Grand Chute; a big-box building in Milwaukee divided 
into two units, one leased to Pick 'n Save and the other to 
Kohl's; a multi-tenant shopping center in Racine anchored by 
Hobby Lobby, DSW, Bed Bath & Beyond, and T.J. Maxx; and a Mills 
Fleet Farm store in Hudson. 
Chapko did not use all of the same properties as 
comparables for his 2017 appraisal as he used for the 2016 
appraisal, instead updating the 2017 appraisal with two new 
sales that occurred in 2016 and discarding the two oldest sales 
from the 2016 appraisal.  This list reflects the properties used 
in both the 2016 and 2017 appraisals without differentiating 
between the two. 
No. 
2019AP1987   
 
28 
 
subject property.  Foremost in the circuit court's determination 
of the credibility of the dueling appraisals was the experts' 
differing 
methodologies 
and 
specifically 
their 
differing 
reliance on dark and distressed properties:  "Maybe most 
importantly, [Chapko] did not use any properties, much less half 
of his properties that were subject to a receivership or could 
otherwise be argued as being distressed.  Nor did he use any 
'dark' properties."  Thus, the circuit court found "[Chapko's] 
opinion credible under the circumstances." 
¶68 It is in the province of the circuit court as the 
trier of fact to make determinations of the weight and 
credibility of evidence.  Metro. Assocs., 379 Wis. 2d 141, ¶61; 
Lessor v. Wangelin, 221 Wis. 2d 659, 665, 586 N.W.2d 1 (Ct. App. 
1998) ("When the trial court acts as the finder of fact, it is 
the ultimate arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses and of 
the weight to be given to each witness's testimony.").  On 
review, such a determination will only be overturned if it is 
clearly erroneous.  Metro. Assocs., 379 Wis. 2d 141, ¶62.  Here, 
the circuit court made a determination that "the evidence 
presented by Lowe's in this case is significantly less credible 
than that presented by the City when it comes to a proper value 
to be attached to this real estate for the years 2016 and 2017."   
¶69 On this record, we cannot conclude that the circuit 
court's 
factual 
findings, 
including 
its 
credibility 
determinations, were clearly erroneous.  The circuit court 
examined MaRous's conclusions and methodology and ultimately 
determined that the City's proffered testimony and proposed 
No. 
2019AP1987   
 
29 
 
valuation were more credible.  Such a determination was not 
"against the great weight and clear preponderance of the 
evidence."  See id.  Rather, the circuit court's determination 
has support in the record as explained above. 
¶70 We emphasize that our determination is based on the 
facts and circumstances presented to the circuit court, and the 
circuit court's evaluation of those facts and circumstances.  At 
oral argument before this court, the parties agreed that the 
Manual does not create a categorical bright-line rule against 
the use of vacant properties in the assessment of occupied 
properties.  Indeed, counsel for the City advanced:  "I don't 
think there is this bright-line categorical exclusion" and 
"[t]here is no bright-line rule that says vacant properties 
cannot be used."   
¶71 Consistent with the parties' agreement, we do not read 
the Manual to strictly prohibit the use of vacant properties as 
comparable to occupied properties.  The language of "should 
avoid" is not mandatory.  Cf. Village of Elm Grove v. Brefka, 
2013 WI 54, ¶23, 348 Wis. 2d 282, 832 N.W.2d 121 (explaining 
that the word "shall" is presumed mandatory).  We acknowledge 
that the Manual does not provide specific guidance on when a 
vacant, dark, or distressed property may be meaningfully 
comparable to an occupied property.  However, we take the 
"should avoid" language to mean that the comparability of vacant 
properties to occupied properties exists along a continuum 
depending upon how long the property has been vacant as compared 
to the normal exposure time for a property of that type in the 
No. 
2019AP1987   
 
30 
 
same geographic area.  We emphasize that the Manual urges 
assessors to use caution in utilizing such comparables, as the 
economics underlying a vacancy may be indicative of a meaningful 
difference in the circumstances of the properties.   
¶72 Accordingly, we determine that Lowe's failed to 
demonstrate that the City's assessments were excessive.  Giving 
deference to the circuit court's factual findings, including its 
credibility determinations, we conclude that Lowe's did not 
provide significant contrary evidence sufficient to overcome the 
presumption of correctness.   
IV 
¶73 In sum, we determine that the assessments in this case 
were properly afforded a presumption of correctness.  Pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 70.49(2), the presumption attaches upon the 
filing of the assessment along with the assessor's affidavit.   
¶74 We further determine that Lowe's failed to demonstrate 
that the City's assessments were excessive.  Giving deference to 
the circuit court's factual findings, including its credibility 
determinations, 
we 
conclude 
that 
Lowe's 
did 
not 
provide 
significant 
contrary 
evidence 
sufficient 
to 
overcome 
the 
presumption of correctness.   
¶75 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2019AP1987.rgb 
 
1 
 
 
¶76 REBECCA 
GRASSL 
BRADLEY, 
J.   (concurring). 
 
The 
circuit court properly afforded the City of Delavan's 2016 and 
2017 property assessments a presumption of correctness under 
Wis. Stat. § 70.49(2), and Lowe's did not demonstrate the City's 
assessments 
were 
excessive 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 74.37.  
Accordingly, the court correctly affirms the decision of the 
court of appeals.  I write separately because the majority melds 
the circuit court's conclusions of law and findings of fact into 
nothing more than a credibility determination to which it 
accords deference.  The standard of review instead demands 
independent review of circuit courts' conclusions of law in 
cases concerning property tax assessments. 
¶77 In 
challenging 
the 
City 
of 
Delavan's 
property 
assessments, Lowe's submitted an alternative tier-2 sales-
comparison assessment conducted by Michael MaRous.  That 
assessment identified six properties MaRous deemed comparable to 
the Lowe's store in Delavan.  The circuit court rejected 
MaRous's assessment, determining none of the properties were 
comparable to the subject property.  Of the six, the court 
deemed 
three 
distressed, 
two 
dark, 
and 
one 
generally 
noncomparable to the subject property.  The court ultimately 
concluded Lowe's did not present "significant contrary evidence" 
to overcome the presumption of correctness afforded the City's 
assessment.   
¶78 The 
majority 
characterizes 
the 
circuit 
court's 
conclusion as a "credibility determination."  Majority op., ¶5.  
No.  2019AP1987.rgb 
 
2 
 
As a result, the majority gives the circuit court's conclusion 
blanket deference.  The majority's characterization is incorrect 
and its deference therefore misplaced.  The circuit court's 
conclusion that Lowe's did not overcome the presumption of 
correctness is grounded in law, rather than a fact-bound 
credibility determination.  To reach that conclusion, the court 
deemed the properties in MaRous's assessment to be dark, 
distressed, or generally noncomparable.  Whether a property is 
dark, distressed, or generally noncomparable presents a question 
of law subject to independent review, and the circuit court's 
conclusions of law are not entitled to deference on appeal.  If 
appellate courts defer to circuit courts' legal conclusions in 
property tax assessment cases, taxpayers will lose any avenue 
for meaningful appeal. 
¶79 "When the question on appeal is whether a statutory 
concept embraces a particular set of factual circumstances, the 
reviewing court is generally presented with a mixed question of 
fact and law."  Pabst Brewing Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 125 
Wis. 2d 437, 444, 373 N.W.2d 680 (Ct. App. 1985) (citing 
Nottelson 
v. 
DILHR, 94 Wis.2d 
106, 
115–16, 
287 N.W.2d 763 
(1980)); see also Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps. Loc. 
1901 v. Brown Cnty., 146 Wis. 2d 728, 739–40, 432 N.W.2d 571 
(1988).  Questions of fact address "who did what, when or where, 
how or why."  U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n ex rel. CWCapital Asset Mgmt. 
LLC v. Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 538 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 960, 966 
(2018).  Questions of law ask whether the facts found satisfy 
the relevant legal standard.  Id.  We "uphold a circuit court's 
No.  2019AP1987.rgb 
 
3 
 
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous," but 
independently review questions of law.  Langlade County v. 
D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶¶24–25, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277; 
see also Stern v. Thompson & Coates, Ltd., 185 Wis. 2d 220, 236, 
517 N.W.2d 658 (1994) (explaining when reviewing mixed questions 
this court will not upset findings of fact unless they are 
clearly 
erroneous 
but 
will 
review 
conclusions 
of 
law 
independently).  
¶80 Property assessment cases like this one typically 
involve competing valuations accompanied by testimony of the 
assessors in support of their own.  "Where there is conflicting 
testimony 
the 
fact 
finder 
is 
the 
ultimate 
arbiter 
of 
credibility," and this court will therefore defer to the circuit 
court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  
Adams Outdoor Advert., Ltd. v. City of Madison, 2006 WI 104, 
¶27, 294 Wis. 2d 441, 717 N.W.2d 803.  Whether property 
valuations comport with the law, however, is a question of law, 
not fact.  Wisconsin Statute § 70.32(1) provides that "[r]eal 
property shall be valued by the assessor in the manner specified 
in the Wisconsin property assessment manual. . . ."  Whether the 
city complied with Wis. Stat. § 70.32 "in making its assessment 
is a question of statutory interpretation that we review de 
novo."  Adams Outdoor Advert., Ltd., 294 Wis. 2d 441, ¶26.  
Appellate courts "independently review whether a valuation 
complied with the statutes and the Wisconsin Property Assessment 
Manual."  Bonstores Realty One, LLC v. City of Wauwatosa, 2013 
WI App 131, ¶6, 351 Wis. 2d 439, 839 N.W.2d 893.  Accordingly, 
No.  2019AP1987.rgb 
 
4 
 
whether an assessor properly deemed a property "dark" within the 
meaning of the Manual presents a mixed question of fact and law.   
¶81 To decide whether a property is dark, a circuit court 
must make findings of fact regarding how long properties similar 
to the subject property typically sit vacant and how long the 
assessed property had been vacant.  1 Wisconsin Property 
Assessment Manual 9-12 (2016).  After making such findings, the 
court must determine whether the property has sat vacant beyond 
the period of time similar properties remained vacant.  Id.  If 
it has, the relevant property is dark and therefore not likely 
to be comparable to the subject property.  See id.  Because 
factual findings underlie the legal determination of whether a 
property is "dark," the question is neither purely legal nor 
purely factual.  It presents a mixed question of fact and law. 
¶82 How 
long 
the 
assessed 
property 
and 
comparable 
properties have sat vacant are questions of fact because they 
address what has happened.  We therefore reverse those findings 
only if clearly erroneous.  Whether the period of vacancy for 
the assessed property renders it "dark" presents a question of 
law because it entails application of the law to the facts 
surrounding the vacancy of comparable properties compared with 
the vacancy of the assessed property.  In this case, applying 
the law to the facts yielded an obvious answer.  The circuit 
court needed to decide only whether four years, the length of 
time two comparable properties in MaRous's assessment sat 
vacant, is longer than three years, the length of time 
properties similar to the assessed property typically sit 
No.  2019AP1987.rgb 
 
5 
 
vacant.  However simple that analysis might be in this case, it 
should be reviewed independently.   
¶83 The majority defers to the circuit court's conclusion 
that certain properties used by MaRous are dark, even though 
that conclusion involves the application of law to the facts.  
Majority op., ¶¶68–69.  While having no effect on the outcome of 
this case——the circuit court was correct that four years is 
longer than three years——such unfettered deference may deprive a 
taxpayer of the opportunity for meaningful appeal in a closer or 
more complex case. 
¶84 A more complex case is bound to arise.  According to 
the Manual, comparable properties are those "similar to the 
subject property in age, condition, use, type of construction, 
location, 
design, 
physical 
features 
and 
economic 
characteristics."  1 Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual 7-24 
(2016).  Even in this relatively straightforward case, the 
circuit court deemed one of the properties on which MaRous 
relied 
(a 
former 
Lowe's 
store 
in 
Brown 
Deer) 
generally 
noncomparable.  To reach that conclusion, the circuit court 
analyzed that store's sale price, financial condition, and 
contracts with the City of Brown Deer.  In doing so, the circuit 
court found "financial abnormalities," based on which it deemed 
the store generally noncomparable with the subject property.   
Similar to deciding whether a property is dark, determining 
whether a property is generally noncomparable presents a 
question of law entailing the application of law to the facts.  
Such questions of law may be more challenging than deeming a 
No.  2019AP1987.rgb 
 
6 
 
property dark.  Appellate courts must not defer to circuit 
courts' determinations on such questions.  
¶85 Given the rigor of general-comparability analyses, 
circuit courts might err in performing them.  Nevertheless, the 
majority 
gives 
the 
circuit 
court's 
general-comparability 
analysis deference, misconstruing its conclusions of law to be 
findings of fact.  In cases like this, appellate courts must 
review such questions of law independently.  If the power to tax 
is the power to destroy,1 taxpayers must have access to 
meaningful appeal when challenging property tax assessments.   
¶86 I am authorized to state that Justice PATIENCE DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK joins this concurrence. 
 
 
                                                 
1 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819). 
No.  2019AP1987.rgb 
 
 
 
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