Title: New England Auto Max, Inc. v. Hanley
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13419
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: May 20, 2024

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-13419 
 
NEW ENGLAND AUTO MAX, INC., & others1  vs.  MICHAEL HANLEY2 
& others.3 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     February 5, 2024. - May 20, 2024. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Kafker, Wendlandt, & Dewar, JJ. 
 
 
Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.  
District Court, Jurisdiction, Appellate Division.  
Practice, Civil, Damages, Interlocutory appeal, Appellate 
Division:  appeal, Motion to dismiss.  Damages.  Statute, 
Construction. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on January 19, 2023. 
 
 
The case was heard by Georges, J. 
 
 
 
Mark A. Aronsson (William A. Raven also present) for the 
petitioners. 
 
Robert Richardson (Edward C. Cumbo also present) for 
Michael Hanley & another. 
 
 
1 New England AutoMax, Inc.; and Howard Wilner. 
 
 
2 Individually and on behalf of all others similarly 
situated. 
 
 
3 Christopher Trombley, individually and on behalf of all 
others similarly situated; and Quincy Division of the District 
Court Department, as a nominal party. 
2 
 
 
 
 
DEWAR, J.  A civil case may proceed to trial in the 
District Court or Boston Municipal Court only if there is no 
reasonable likelihood that recovery by the plaintiff will exceed 
$50,000, on penalty of dismissal without prejudice to refiling 
in the Superior Court.  G. L. c. 218, §§ 19, 19A (b).  The 
petitioners, who are defendants in the underlying civil action, 
unsuccessfully moved to dismiss that action for exceeding the 
$50,000 limit.4  They then petitioned this court for 
extraordinary relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3.  A single justice 
denied relief on the ground that the defendants had an alternate 
avenue of appellate relief, and we allowed the defendants' 
appeal from that decision to proceed.   
Today we conclude that the single justice did not err or 
abuse his discretion in denying relief to these defendants, but 
we exercise our discretion to decide the question of law they 
present.  We hold that, under G. L. c. 231, § 108, these 
defendants had a right to an interlocutory appeal to the 
Appellate Division of the District Court (Appellate Division) on 
the question of law they press before this court -- an alternate 
avenue of appellate review that would ordinarily preclude relief 
 
 
4 For ease of reference, we refer to the petitioners and 
respondents by their status as defendants and plaintiffs in the 
underlying action.  
3 
 
under G. L. c. 211, § 3.  We recognize, however, that the 
question of law the defendants raise relates to the 
administration of justice in our trial courts, and we exercise 
our general superintendence power to address it.  We conclude 
that the District Court judge erred in holding that G. L. 
c. 218, § 19A, constrains a court from looking beyond a 
plaintiff's initial statement of damages in assessing whether 
there is a reasonable likelihood that recovery by the plaintiff 
will exceed $50,000.  Rather, the statute requires the court to 
consider the nature of the action itself -- and thus the 
complaint then before the court.  We therefore remand the case 
to the county court for entry of an order vacating the denial of 
the defendants' motion to dismiss and remanding to the District 
Court for further proceedings consistent with today's opinion.  
 
1.  Background.  a.  Statutory scheme.  In 2004, the 
Legislature enacted the current versions of G. L. c. 218, §§ 19 
and 19A, to establish a Statewide "one trial" system for civil 
cases and simplify the allocation of cases between the Superior 
Court and the District and Boston Municipal Courts.  See 
St. 2004, c. 252, §§ 5, 6; Sperounes v. Farese, 449 Mass. 800, 
802-803 (2007).  General Laws c. 218, § 19, vests the District 
and Boston Municipal Courts with original jurisdiction over 
civil actions for money damages.  The statute further provides, 
however, that actions for money damages "may proceed" in these 
4 
 
courts rather than in Superior Court "only if there is no 
reasonable likelihood that recovery by the plaintiff will exceed 
[$50,000]."5  Id.  The statute specifies that, "[w]here multiple 
damages are allowed by law, the amount of single damages claimed 
shall control."  Id.   
 
General Laws c. 218, § 19A, prescribes the procedures for 
implementing this nonjurisdictional $50,000 limit.  See 
Sperounes, 449 Mass. at 801.  Most relevant here, a plaintiff, 
upon commencing an action for money damages, must submit a 
statement of damages estimating the plaintiff's potential 
damages if the plaintiff prevails.  See G. L. c. 218, § 19A (a).  
The defendant is entitled to file a competing statement of 
damages with the defendant's answer.  Id.  The statute then sets 
forth the circumstances in which a judge may dismiss a 
plaintiff's action for failure to comply with the $50,000 limit, 
the details of which we reserve for our discussion below.   
If a judge does dismiss a plaintiff's action under this 
provision, the plaintiff may recommence the action in the 
appropriate court within thirty days, with the filing fee 
reduced by the amount the plaintiff initially paid.  G. L. 
c. 218, §§ 19A (b), (d).  A plaintiff may also appeal from the 
 
 
5 The statutory limit increased from $25,000 to $50,000 in 
2020 under the governing standing order.  See Supreme Judicial 
Court, Order Regarding Amount-in-Controversy Requirement Under 
G. L. c. 218, § 19, and G. L. c. 212, § 3 (July 17, 2019).  
5 
 
dismissal to a single justice of the Appeals Court, and the 
single justice's decision "shall be final."  G. L. c. 218, 
§ 19A (c).  The statute expressly forecloses "any post-judgment 
relief in any case" based on "[v]iolation of the requirements 
for proceeding in the district court or Boston municipal court 
departments."  G. L. c. 218, § 19A (b).  
 
b.  Prior proceedings.  The underlying action arises out of 
the plaintiffs' alleged employment at the automobile dealership 
business operated by the defendants, New England Auto Max, Inc., 
New England AutoMax, Inc., and Howard Wilner.  On June 14, 2022, 
plaintiff Michael Hanley filed a putative class action complaint 
in the District Court, alleging that the defendants unlawfully 
deducted employees' "regular pay" from their future earned 
commissions and bonuses in violation of G. L. c. 151, § 1, and 
G. L. c. 149, §§ 148 and 150.  Hanley, who alleged he had worked 
for the defendants' business from approximately 2015 to 2020, 
also brought the action on behalf of a proposed class of 
employees who had worked for the defendants for all or part of 
the three-year period preceding the filing of the complaint.  On 
behalf of himself and the class, he sought to recover damages 
under G. L. c. 149, § 150.  At the time of filing, Hanley 
submitted a statement of damages pursuant to G. L. c. 218, 
§ 19A, estimating that single damages for the claim brought on 
6 
 
his own behalf would amount to "more than $25,000," but were 
reasonably likely to be "less than $50,000."   
 
On September 7, 2022, the plaintiffs filed an ex parte 
motion seeking additional time to serve the defendants.  The 
following day, they filed an amended complaint, adding 
Christopher Trombley as a second named plaintiff and class 
representative.  Alleging that Trombley had worked for the 
defendants from 2008 through 2022, the complaint brought the 
same claims on behalf of Trombley as those set out in Hanley's 
initial complaint.  The plaintiffs then served the amended 
complaint following the District Court's grant of their motion 
for additional time to do so.  
 
In response, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss 
pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (10), as appearing in 450 
Mass. 1403 (2008), and G. L. c. 218, § 19A, arguing that the 
recovery of the plaintiffs and the putative class was reasonably 
likely to exceed the $50,000 damages threshold of G. L. c. 218, 
§ 19.  After receiving memoranda from the parties and conducting 
a hearing, a District Court judge denied the motion to dismiss.  
Declining to consider the amended complaint that had been filed 
on behalf of both Hanley and Trombley, as well as the proposed 
plaintiff class, the judge held that the statute directed the 
court to examine only the initial statement of damages filed by 
Hanley.  See G. L. c. 218, § 19A (b) (providing for dismissal 
7 
 
"[i]f it appears to the court from the statement of damages by 
the plaintiff that there is no reasonable likelihood that the 
estimated damages will be consistent with the civil money damage 
limits of the court").  And, observing that no class had yet 
been certified, the court found "no showing" that Hanley's 
"originally filed" statement of damages was "understated." 
 
On January 19, 2023, the defendants filed a petition under 
G. L. c. 211, § 3, seeking reversal of the District Court's 
interlocutory order denying their motion to dismiss.  A single 
justice denied the defendants' petition on the ground that the 
defendants had an adequate alternative remedy in the ordinary 
appellate process.  The defendants then filed a notice of appeal 
under S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001), and 
we allowed the appeal to proceed, noting our intent to consider 
the question whether relief under the first paragraph of G. L. 
c. 211, § 3, is available to defendants in these circumstances.   
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Availability of G. L. c. 211, § 3, 
relief.  The first paragraph of G. L. c. 211, § 3, confers on 
this court the power of "general superintendence of all courts 
of inferior jurisdiction to correct and prevent errors and 
abuses therein if no other remedy is expressly provided."  We 
have recognized that this "discretionary power of review" is 
"extraordinary and will be exercised only in the most 
exceptional circumstances" (quotations and citation omitted).  
8 
 
McMenimen v. Passatempo, 452 Mass. 178, 184 (2008).  "Parties 
seeking relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, must demonstrate 
both a violation of their substantive rights and the absence of 
another adequate or effective avenue of relief" (citation 
omitted).  Adjartey v. Central Div. of the Hous. Court Dep't, 
481 Mass. 830, 833 (2019).  "We review a decision of a single 
justice pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, for clear error of law or 
abuse of discretion."  Nicholas-Taylor v. Commonwealth, 490 
Mass. 552, 556 (2022).   
 
The defendants here contend that the single justice erred 
as a matter of law in concluding that they had an adequate 
alternative avenue of relief from the District Court judge's 
denial of their motion to dismiss.  They note that G. L. c. 218, 
§ 19A, permits a plaintiff to appeal to a single justice of the 
Appeals Court from a judge's dismissal of an action for 
exceeding the $50,000 limit, but provides no such remedy to a 
defendant upon denial of a Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (10) motion 
to dismiss on this ground.  And they dispute the plaintiffs' 
argument that an interlocutory appeal to the Appellate Division 
under G. L. c. 231, § 108, was available to them. 
Our understanding of these provisions follows from familiar 
principles of statutory interpretation.  We examine a statute 
"with the goal of interpreting the relevant statutory provisions 
to reflect and carry out the legislative intent behind them."  
9 
 
Zizza v. Zizza, 456 Mass. 401, 407 (2010).  We interpret the 
language of the statute "in accordance with its plain meaning, 
and if the language is clear and unambiguous, it is conclusive 
as to the intent of the legislature" (citation omitted).  
Rockland Trust Co. v. Langone, 477 Mass. 230, 232 (2017).  And, 
"[w]here two or more statutes relate to the same subject matter, 
they should be construed together so as to constitute a 
harmonious whole consistent with the legislative purpose" 
(citation omitted).  Sperounes, 449 Mass. at 804.   
 
We begin by acknowledging that, in the statutory provisions 
setting forth the procedures for implementing the $50,000 limit 
for cases that may proceed in the District and Boston Municipal 
Courts, the Legislature provided an avenue for appellate relief 
only to plaintiffs upon the grant of a motion to dismiss on this 
ground.  See G. L. c. 218, § 19A (c).  And the Legislature 
barred appellate recourse on this ground following final 
judgment.  See G. L. c. 218, § 19A (b) (violation of statute's 
requirements "shall not be grounds for any post-judgment relief 
in any case").  However, the Legislature also, in the very same 
2004 reforms, amended the long-standing avenue of appellate 
relief in the Appellate Division under G. L. c. 231, § 108.  See 
St. 2004, c. 252, § 15.      
 
General Laws c. 231, § 108, establishes the Appellate 
Division of the District and Boston Municipal Courts, "for the 
10 
 
rehearing of matters of law arising in civil cases, in claims of 
compensation of victims of violent crimes, and in civil motor 
vehicle infractions."  Following the Legislature's 2004 
amendments, the provision's third paragraph now provides that 
"[a]ny party to" a civil case in those courts, if "aggrieved by 
any ruling on a matter of law by a trial court justice, may as 
of right, appeal the ruling for determination by the appellate 
division pursuant to the applicable rules of court."  G. L. 
c. 231, § 108, third par.  Upon such an appeal, if the Appellate 
Division finds "prejudicial error in the ruling complained of, 
it may reverse, vacate or modify the same or order a new trial 
in whole or part; otherwise it shall dismiss [the] appeal."  Id.  
The Appellate Division may also award double costs if the appeal 
from "such ruling" appears to have been frivolous "or intended 
for delay."  Id.  The statute further provides that, if the 
appellant fails to prosecute the appeal seasonably, the 
Appellate Division "may order the cause to proceed as though no 
appeal had been filed."  Id.  We have not previously had 
occasion to interpret this provision as amended in 2004, beyond 
noting its existence as an avenue for appeal to the Appellate 
Division.  See Matter of G.P., 473 Mass. 112, 123 (2015).   
Prior to the 2004 amendments, G. L. c. 231, § 108, provided 
for appellate relief only via "reports" initiated by either a 
party or the trial court judge.  See G. L. c. 231, § 108, as 
11 
 
amended through St. 1997, c. 19, § 118.  The 2004 amendments 
repealed the prescribed procedures for "reports" upon a party's 
request, see id., and replaced those provisions with the "right" 
to "appeal" we consider today, see G. L. c. 231, § 108, third 
par.  The amended statute retains the provisions under which a 
trial court judge may elect to report a decision or 
interlocutory finding or order.  See id.   
Accepting the plain meaning of the statute's terms as we 
must, we conclude that the Legislature has provided a right to 
appeal to the Appellate Division to "[a]ny party" who is 
"aggrieved by any ruling on a matter of law by a trial court 
justice" in a civil case, regardless of whether the "ruling" is 
interlocutory.  G. L. c. 231, § 108, third par.  The 
Legislature's use of the word "any" in the phrase "any ruling" 
invites "a broad interpretation of the word."  Bank of N.Y. 
Mellon v. King, 485 Mass. 37, 46 (2020), quoting Ali v. Federal 
Bur. of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 219 (2008) ("[r]ead naturally, 
the word 'any' has an expansive meaning, that is, 'one or some 
indiscriminately of whatever kind'").   
And the provision includes no reference to entry of 
judgment or other similar terms the Legislature frequently uses 
to impose a finality requirement.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 231, 
§ 109 (appeals from decisions of Appellate Division permitted 
only after "final decision of the appellate division"); 
12 
 
G. L. c. 231, § 97 (appeals to Superior Court in civil cases 
permitted only from "the judgment of a district court").  
Indeed, for decades, G. L. c. 231, § 108, itself provided 
parties with a right to a "report" to the Appellate Division 
only once the case was "otherwise ripe for judgment."  See G. L. 
c. 231, § 108, as amended through St. 1933, c. 255, § 1; Pollack 
v. Kelly, 372 Mass. 469, 474-475 & n.3, 477 (1977) ("reject[ing] 
as premature" appeal from Appellate Division of interlocutory 
order and noting that party's report of interlocutory order to 
Appellate Division "was also premature").6  "We will not add 
words to a statute that the Legislature did not put there, 
either by inadvertent omission or by design."  Retirement Bd. of 
Somerville v. Buonomo, 467 Mass. 662, 671-672 (2014) (phrase 
"any member" in pension forfeiture statute not silently limited 
to members still in service).  We thus conclude that, under this 
provision as amended, an aggrieved party in a civil case has a 
 
6 The Legislature removed this language requiring that the 
case be ripe for judgment in 1975.  See St. 1975, c. 377, § 106 
(effective July 1, 1975).  The party's report at issue in 
Pollack appears to have occurred prior to the amendment's 
effective date, and Pollack does not mention the amendment.  See 
Pollack, 372 Mass. at 470, 475-477.  The Appellate Division 
continued to bar interlocutory reports by parties until the 2004 
amendments at issue here replaced the procedures for party-
initiated reports.  See, e.g., Jackson vs. Bumble Bee Seafoods, 
Inc., Mass. App. Div., No. 01-WAD-016 (Dist. Ct. Jan. 21, 2003), 
2003 Mass. App. Div. 6.  
13 
 
right to appeal from any ruling of law to the Appellate 
Division. 
Resisting the plain language of G. L. 231, § 108, the 
defendants note that the statute provides that such an appeal 
shall be "pursuant to the applicable rules of court," G. L. 
c. 231, § 108, third par., and argue that Rule 4 of the 
District/Municipal Courts Rules for Appellate Division Appeal 
(Dist./Mun. Cts. R. A. D. A.) barred them from appealing from 
this interlocutory order.  We do not agree.  The Legislature's 
direction that an aggrieved party may bring an appeal as of 
right "pursuant to the applicable rules of court," G. L. c. 231, 
§ 108, simply signifies that the applicable court rules govern 
the procedures by which a party appeals -- for example, under 
rule 4, requiring that a notice of appeal be filed within ten 
days of the ruling.  Moreover, while rule 4 does refer to the 
"entry of the judgment" in describing when to take an appeal, 
rule 3, concerning how to take an appeal, prescribes 
requirements for appealing from a broader array of court 
actions, including a "ruling."  See Dist./Mun. Cts. R. A. D. A. 
3(c)(3) (notice of appeal "shall contain . . . the judgment, 
ruling, finding, decision or part thereof being appealed"); 
Dist./Mun. Cts. R. A. D. A. 3(b) (prescribing procedures where 
"two or more persons are entitled to appeal from a judgment, 
ruling, finding or decision of a trial court").  We thus can 
14 
 
readily read these court rules in harmony with the statute.  See 
Golden v. General Bldrs. Supply LLC, 441 Mass. 652, 655 (2004) 
("Absent some incompatibility between a specific procedural rule 
and the provisions of the statute, we will apply and enforce 
both").7  
We acknowledge that our holding today runs contrary to our 
usual well-founded disfavor for interlocutory appeals.  "As a 
general rule, there is no right to appeal from an interlocutory 
order unless a statute or rule authorizes it," because "a party 
ought not to have the power to interrupt the progress of the 
litigation by piecemeal appeals that cause delay and often waste 
judicial effort" (citations omitted).  CP 200 State, LLC v. 
CIEE, Inc., 488 Mass. 847, 848 (2022).  Here, however, the 
Legislature has indeed authorized a limited right to appeal to 
the Appellate Division from "any ruling on a matter of law" in 
civil cases, albeit on penalty of double costs for appeals 
deemed "frivolous or intended for delay."  G. L. c. 231, § 108, 
 
 
7 We refer to the District and Boston Municipal Courts the 
question whether to revise Dist./Mun. Cts. R. A. D. A. 4 in 
light of our decision today.  We note that Rule 4 of the 
Massachusetts Rules of Appellate Procedure previously also 
referred solely to appeal from a "judgment" but was amended in 
2019 for consistency with rule 3.  See 2019 Reporters' Notes to 
Mass. R. A. P. 4 (a) (1), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1606 (2019).  
 
15 
 
third par.  We are not free to deviate from the Legislature's 
plain intent.  See Rockland Trust Co., 477 Mass. at 232.8 
 
 
While the appellate remedy under G. L. c. 231, § 108, is a 
limited one, it was available to the defendants here.  Their 
petition under G. L. c. 211, § 3, rested entirely upon a claim 
that the District Court judge erred as a matter of law in 
interpreting the proper bounds of the court's inquiry under 
G. L. c. 218, § 19A.  They therefore had a "right" to appeal 
from this interlocutory "ruling" to the Appellate Division under 
G. L. c. 231, § 108, third par.  Accordingly, the single justice 
did not commit an error of law or abuse his discretion in 
concluding that these defendants were not entitled to relief 
under the first paragraph of G. L. c. 211, § 3, because they had 
an available adequate alternative means for obtaining appellate 
relief.  See McMenimen, 452 Mass. at 184.   
 
In so holding, we underscore that an interlocutory appeal 
to the Appellate Division in a civil case under G. L. c. 231, 
§ 108, third par., is available only from a "ruling on a matter 
of law" and is therefore not available to a defendant asserting 
 
 
8 We note that interlocutory appeals pursuant to this 
provision will not travel beyond the Appellate Division of the 
District Court.  See G. L. c. 231, § 109 (providing for appeals 
from Appellate Division only following "final decision"); 
Pollack, 372 Mass. at 470-474 (emphasizing that usual 
presumptive bar on interlocutory appeals applies to appeals from 
decisions of Appellate Division).   
16 
 
a purely factual challenge.  Accordingly, such relief is not 
available to a defendant claiming solely factual error in a 
trial court judge's assessment whether recovery in an action is 
reasonably likely to exceed the $50,000 threshold under G. L. 
c. 218, §§ 19 and 19A.9  We express no view today regarding 
whether or when a defendant's claim of factual error in 
connection with the $50,000 threshold may warrant relief under 
the first paragraph of G. L. c. 211, § 3.  See McMenimen, 452 
Mass. at 184 (describing discretionary relief under first 
paragraph of G. L. c. 211, § 3, as "extraordinary" and "reserved 
for exceptional circumstances where a litigant demonstrates a 
substantial claim of violation of his or her substantive 
rights"). 
Notwithstanding our agreement with the single justice that 
these defendants did have an available avenue for appellate 
relief under G. L. c. 231, § 108, and were therefore not 
entitled to relief under the first paragraph of G. L. c. 211, 
§ 3, we recognize that the defendants have raised a question of 
law that "relates to the efficient administration of justice in 
the trial courts."  Sperounes, 449 Mass. at 802.  We therefore 
 
 
9 By contrast, in G. L. c. 218, § 19A (c), the Legislature 
included no such limitation on the scope of the issues a 
plaintiff may raise in an appeal to a single justice of the 
Appeals Court following dismissal of an action for exceeding the 
$50,000 limit. 
17 
 
elect to decide the question they raise under our power of 
general superintendence set forth in the second paragraph of 
G. L. c. 211, § 3.  See Rockland Trust Co., 477 Mass. at 231; 
Sperounes, supra. 
 
b.  Motion to dismiss.  The defendants argue that the 
District Court judge erred as a matter of law in holding that a 
judge is constrained to consider only a plaintiff's initial 
statement of damages -- to the exclusion, even, of the complaint 
-- in assessing whether "there is no reasonable likelihood that 
recovery by the plaintiff will exceed" $50,000.  G. L. c. 218, 
§ 19.  Reviewing this question of statutory interpretation de 
novo under our familiar principles, see Rockland Trust Co., 477 
Mass. at 232, we agree that the statute does not impose such a 
limitation on the trial court's assessment whether an action 
"may proceed" in the District Court or Boston Municipal Court 
under G. L. c. 218, § 19.   
 
As described, while the District and Boston Municipal 
Courts have jurisdiction over actions for money damages, such 
actions "may proceed" in those courts only if "there is no 
reasonable likelihood that recovery by the plaintiff will 
exceed" $50,000.  G. L. c. 218, § 19.  The Legislature set forth 
in G. L. c. 218, § 19A, the procedures by which to effectuate 
this limit.  A plaintiff's complaint in the District Court or 
Boston Municipal Court must be "accompanied by" a statement of 
18 
 
damages that "shall specify the facts on which the plaintiff 
then relies to determine money damages."  G. L. c. 218, 
§ 19A (a).  The statute then provides: 
"If it appears to the court from the statement of damages 
by the plaintiff that there is no reasonable likelihood 
that the estimated damages will be consistent with the 
civil money damage limits of the court, as set forth in 
section 19, the judge, after receiving written responses 
from the parties and after a hearing, if requested by any 
party, may dismiss the case without prejudice for failure 
to comply with the requirements of said section 19 
regarding the amount necessary for proceeding in the 
district court or Boston municipal court departments."   
 
G. L. c. 218, § 19A (b).  Interpreting this provision, the 
plaintiffs argue, as they successfully argued in the District 
Court, that a judge may look no further than the statement of 
damages in assessing whether an action exceeds the statutory 
$50,000 limit, based on the statute's instruction to judges that 
they may dismiss an action "[i]f it appears to the court from 
the statement of damages by the plaintiff" that the action 
exceeds the limit.   
Considering this phrase in the context of the statute as a 
whole as we must, see Sperounes, 449 Mass. at 804, we discern no 
intent on the part of the Legislature to restrict judges from 
looking beyond the four corners of the statement of damages.  
The plaintiffs' interpretation is untenable above all because 
the Legislature plainly intended the court to consider a 
plaintiff's complaint as well as the statement of damages.  The 
19 
 
$50,000 threshold in G. L. c. 218, § 19, is a limit on the 
"actions" for money damages that "may proceed" in these courts, 
and the court may dismiss an action under G. L. c. 218, § 19A, 
only if the court concludes that the "case . . . fail[s] to 
comply with the requirements of" § 19.  The statute thus 
requires considering the nature of a plaintiff's "action," which 
may be barred from proceeding in the District Court or Boston 
Municipal Court only if it seeks money damages that are 
"reasonabl[y] likel[y]" to exceed $ 50,000.  The requirement 
that a statement of damages "accompan[y]" a complaint, G. L. 
c. 218, § 19A (a), serves to aid the court's necessary 
assessment of the "action" itself and whether it exceeds the 
$50,000 threshold.  To confine the judge's review to the 
statement of damages itself would be to require the tail to wag 
the dog. 
Other aspects of the statute also make clear that the 
Legislature did not contemplate that a judge would be limited to 
considering the statement of damages alone.  As quoted above, 
the statute expressly contemplates that the judge will dismiss 
an action only after "receiving written responses from the 
parties."  G. L. c. 218, § 19A (b).  And, if the parties 
request, the court shall hold a hearing.  Id.  It would be 
illogical for the Legislature to invite the court to consider 
written responses from the parties, and possibly hold a hearing, 
20 
 
while precluding the court from considering the very complaint 
before the court.  See Sperounes, 449 Mass. at 807, quoting ROPT 
Ltd. Partnership v. Katin, 431 Mass. 601, 603 (2000) ("We 
interpret the statute so as not to 'produce an illogical 
result'").       
 
This conclusion is consonant with our past observations on 
how the statute operates.  In Sperounes, 449 Mass. at 801, we 
considered whether a judge has discretion to permit an action to 
proceed where the judge concludes that there is no reasonable 
likelihood the action will not exceed the statutory limit.  We 
concluded that the judge has no discretion to allow such an 
action to proceed over a party's timely objection, but that a 
judge could exercise discretion to permit the action to proceed 
if no party objects.  Id.  In so concluding, we held that a 
defendant must raise such an objection "at a minimum, in his 
answer," on penalty of waiving the objection, id. at 806 -- 
thus, of course, contemplating that the judge would consider the 
pleadings.  We further described factors a judge should consider 
in deciding whether to dismiss an action exceeding the statutory 
limit where no party objected, including "whether the matter 
would be more appropriate for a jury of twelve or jury of six," 
and "whether the action is similar in scope to those that fit 
within the [$50,0000] limitation."  Id. at 807.  These 
considerations likewise contemplate a broader inquiry than one 
21 
 
confined to the statement of damages, certainly comprising at 
least the complaint.  
 
We therefore conclude that the District Court judge erred 
in holding that the assessment of an action under G. L. c. 218, 
§ 19A (b), is confined to a plaintiff's statement of damages, 
and thus erred in declining to consider the plaintiffs' amended 
complaint in assessing whether there is a reasonable likelihood 
that the plaintiffs' recovery in this action will exceed 
$50,000.10  Accordingly, the case must be remanded for 
reassessment of whether the action may proceed in the District 
Court.    
 
3.  Conclusion.  For the reasons stated above, we discern 
no error or abuse of discretion in the single justice's 
conclusion that relief under the first paragraph of G. L. 
c. 211, § 3, was unavailable to the defendants in this case 
because they had an alternate avenue of appellate relief.  
 
10 We note that there is no dispute in this case that the 
amended complaint is the appropriate complaint for the court to 
consider, nor a dispute regarding the timeliness of the 
defendants' objection.  The amended complaint including both 
Hanley and Trombley as named plaintiffs was filed in the 
District Court prior to service of process on the defendants, 
who did not file their answer until after the denial of their 
motion to dismiss under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (10).  We have 
previously recognized that a defendant must raise an objection 
regarding the $50,000 limit "at a minimum, in [the] answer, and 
that the failure to raise an objection in a timely manner 
results in its waiver."  Sperounes, 449 Mass. at 806, citing 
M.G. Perlin & J.M. Connors, Civil Procedure in the Massachusetts 
District Court § 7.35A, at 88 (3d ed. Supp. 2007). 
22 
 
Choosing nevertheless to exercise our superintendence powers 
under the second paragraph of G. L. c. 211, § 3, we reverse the 
denial of the petition and remand the case to the county court 
for entry of an order vacating the order of the District Court 
denying the defendants' motion to dismiss and remanding to the 
District Court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.  
So ordered.