Title: People v. Lopez
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S261747
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: April 7, 2022

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
PEDRO LOPEZ, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S261747 
 
Fifth Appellate District 
F076295 
 
Tulare County Superior Court 
VCF325028TT 
 
 
April 7, 2022 
 
Justice Kruger authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, 
Groban, Jenkins, and Miller* concurred. 
 
 
* 
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate 
District, Division Two, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
S261747 
 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
Defendant Pedro Lopez was convicted of conspiracy to 
commit home invasion robbery in violation of Penal Code section 
182, the general conspiracy statute.  The question in this case 
concerns the appropriate sentence for the crime.  Section 182 
provides that if two or more persons conspire to commit a felony, 
“they shall be punishable in the same manner and to the same 
extent as is provided for the punishment of that felony.”  (Pen. 
Code, § 182, subd. (a).)  This means that a person convicted of 
conspiring to commit home invasion robbery ordinarily faces 
three, six, or nine years in prison, just as if that person had been 
found guilty of a completed home invasion robbery.  (Id., § 213, 
subd. (a)(1)(A).)  But the trial court in this case instead 
sentenced Lopez to an indeterminate term of 15 years to life 
under Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (b)(4) (section 
186.22(b)(4)).  That provision prescribes indeterminate life 
terms for specified felonies, including “home invasion robbery, 
in violation of subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1) of subdivision 
(a) of Section 213” (§ 186.22(b)(4)(B)), when those felonies are 
found to be gang-related. 
We granted review to consider whether Lopez was 
properly sentenced to an indeterminate life term under section 
186.22(b)(4), even though Lopez was convicted of the crime of 
conspiracy and not completed home invasion robbery.  The 
Court of Appeal answered yes.  It understood the conspiracy 
statute and this court’s decision in People v. Athar (2005) 36 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
2 
Cal.4th 396 (Athar) to instruct that in a felony conspiracy case, 
a trial court ordinarily must apply all sentence enhancements 
or alternate penalties that would have applied to the completed 
offense.  Because section 186.22(b)(4) does not contain an 
express statement forbidding an indeterminate life term for a 
conspiracy conviction, the Court of Appeal concluded Lopez’s life 
sentence was proper. 
We reach a different conclusion.  Neither the conspiracy 
statute nor decision in Athar requires an express statement 
forbidding imposition of sentence enhancements, alternate 
penalties, or other additional punishment to conspiracy 
convictions.  It is enough if the relevant statutes reflect a 
discernable intent to reserve the additional punishment for 
completed crimes.  Here, although section 186.22(b)(4) does not 
say so expressly, the most natural reading of the provision 
reflects such an intent.  Because Lopez was convicted of 
conspiracy to commit home invasion robbery and not the 
completed crime, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal 
and remand Lopez’s case for resentencing. 
I. 
In 2015, law enforcement agencies investigated the 
activities of Norteño criminal street gang members in Tulare 
County.  As part of the investigation, authorities conducted live 
surveillance of certain high-ranking gang members and tapped 
their telephones.  On August 24 and 25, agents were watching 
and listening as several of these gang members planned two 
back-to-back home invasion robberies to take place in Visalia.  
Lopez, a member of a Norteño subset in Fresno County, agreed 
by phone and text message to help recruit for and participate in 
these robberies.   
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
3 
In preparation, Lopez and other gang members procured 
cars, weapons, and other equipment; scoped out the locations 
they intended to target; and planned a coordinated attack.  On 
the night of August 25, the group divided into two cars and set 
out toward the targeted homes.  One gang leader texted another, 
“ ‘ “We in motion.  I’ll update you soon.” ’ ”  Moments later, the 
police intervened.  Police arrested five individuals, including 
Lopez.   
A jury found Lopez guilty of two counts of conspiracy to 
commit home invasion robbery1 (Pen. Code, §§ 182, subd. (a)(1) 
[traditional conspiracy], 211 [robbery], 213, subd. (a)(1)(A) 
[punishment for home invasion robbery]), criminal street gang 
conspiracy to commit home invasion robbery (id., § 182.5 
[criminal street gang conspiracy]), and attempted home 
invasion robbery (id., §§ 664 [attempt], 211, 213, subd. 
(a)(1)(A)).  The jury also found all of these crimes to be gang-
related within the meaning of Penal Code section 186.22, 
subdivision (b)(1) and section 186.22(b)(4).2  The court sentenced 
 
1 
The term “home invasion robbery” is a commonly used 
shorthand for a first degree robbery offense in which the 
defendant, “voluntarily acting in concert with two or more other 
persons, commits the robbery within an inhabited dwelling house” 
or other habitation.  (Pen. Code, § 213, subd. (a)(1)(A); see 
§ 186.22(b)(4)(B).)  Though the crime is perhaps more accurately 
described as “robbery in concert in a home” (People v. Jones (2012) 
54 Cal.4th 350, 367 (conc. opn. of Werdegar, J.)), we use the more 
common shorthand, as it is the term used in section 
186.22(b)(4)(B), the sentencing provision at issue in this case. 
2 
We are likewise using “gang-related” as a shorthand for the 
showing required by statute:  namely, that the defendant has 
committed the current felony “for the benefit of, at the direction of, 
 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
4 
Lopez to an indeterminate term of 35 years to life for conspiracy 
to commit home invasion robbery, consecutive to a determinate 
term of 19 years for attempted home invasion robbery.  The 
sentence for the conspiracy conviction consisted of 15 years to 
life 
as 
a 
so-called 
alternate 
penalty 
under 
section 
186.22(b)(4)(B), doubled for a prior strike, with an additional 
five years for a prior serious felony conviction under Penal Code 
section 667, subdivision (a).  All other counts and enhancements 
were stayed or ordered to be served concurrently.   
Lopez appealed.  The appeal was partially successful:  The 
Court of Appeal reversed the second count of conspiracy for 
insufficient evidence.  But Lopez was unsuccessful in his efforts 
to persuade the Court of Appeal that the trial court erred in 
sentencing him to an indeterminate life term on his conspiracy 
conviction under section 186.22(b)(4).  The Court of Appeal 
agreed with Lopez that the language in that provision 
unambiguously applies to only the enumerated offenses, which 
do not include conspiracy.  But it understood this court’s 
decision in Athar, supra, 36 Cal.4th 396 to mean it must 
“presume any intent to exclude conspiracy liability from the 
purview of section 186.22, subdivision (b)(4)(B) would be 
expressly stated therein, which it is not.”  (People v. Lopez (2020) 
46 Cal.App.5th 505, 529.)  The court thus upheld Lopez’s 
indeterminate life term on the conspiracy count.   
We granted review.   
 
 
 
or in association with a criminal street gang.”  (Pen. Code, 
§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1).) 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
5 
II. 
The crime of conspiracy “ ‘is an inchoate offense, the 
essence of which is an agreement to commit an unlawful act.’ ”  
(People v. Johnson (2013) 57 Cal.4th 250, 258 (Johnson).)  Much 
as with other inchoate offenses, the law imposes liability even 
when agreement never comes to fruition and the agreed-to 
unlawful act never occurs.  To complete the crime of conspiracy, 
one of the conspirators must commit an overt act in furtherance 
of the agreement.  But because “ ‘it is the agreement, not the 
overt act, which is punishable[,] . . . the overt act need not 
amount to a criminal attempt and it need not be criminal in 
itself.’ ”  (Id. at p. 259.) 
When California’s general conspiracy statute was enacted 
in 1872, conspiracy was a misdemeanor punishable by 
imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year, or by a 
fine not exceeding $1,000, or both.  (1872 Pen. Code, § 182.)  In 
1919, the Legislature amended the statute to provide that, if two 
or more persons conspire to commit a felony, “they shall be 
punishable in the same manner and to the same extent as in 
this code provided for the punishment of the commission of the 
said felony . . . .”  (Pen. Code, former § 182, as amended by Stats. 
1919, ch. 125, § 1, p. 171.)  This sanctions clause remains largely 
unchanged today.  (Pen. Code, § 182, subd. (a) [“punishable in 
the same manner and to the same extent as is provided for the 
punishment of that felony”].)3 
 
3  
This language applies to conspiracy to commit any felony, 
other than crimes against certain high-ranking officials (see 
§ 182(a)(6)), which are instead punishable by imprisonment for 
five, seven, or nine years.  
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
6 
At the time the Legislature enacted the language, its 
application was relatively straightforward.  But over the course 
of the following century, the Legislature and voters enacted a 
number of sentence enhancements and alternative sentencing 
schemes that have raised new questions about the operation of 
the general instructions in section 182 for the punishment of 
conspiracy. 
All parties before us agree that under Penal Code section 
182, subdivision (a) (section 182(a)), a person who conspires to 
commit a felony is ordinarily subject to the same base term of 
imprisonment as a person who completes that target offense.  
Here, for example, the parties agree that, absent the gang 
enhancement, Lopez would be subject to imprisonment for a 
term of three, six, or nine years for his conspiracy conviction — 
the same term of imprisonment prescribed for home invasion 
robbery.  (Pen. Code, § 213, subd. (a)(1)(A).)   
The question in this case concerns the punishment for 
conspiracy to commit offenses that, if completed, would be 
subject to additional or more severe punishment based on 
additional findings concerning the manner or circumstances in 
which the crime is committed.  Such punishment may be 
provided in provisions creating sentence enhancements or, as 
relevant here, alternate penalties.  For simplicity’s sake, we 
have sometimes referred to these types of statutes as “special 
penal provision[s].”4  (Athar, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 402.)  The 
 
4  
As we have previously explained, a sentence enhancement 
adds “ ‘an additional term of imprisonment to the base term,’ ” 
while an alternate penalty like section 186.22(b)(4) “ ‘provides for 
an alternate sentence when it is proven that the underlying offense 
 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
7 
question is, in short, “to what extent a court can attach a special 
penal provision” like section 186.22(b)(4) “to conspiracy rather 
than to the underlying crime itself.”  (Athar, at p. 402.) 
We have seen similar questions before.  Because our 
precedent is central to the parties’ dispute here, we describe the 
opinions in some depth. 
In People v. Hernandez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 835 (Hernandez), 
we considered the prescribed punishment for the crime of 
conspiracy to commit murder.  The defendant in that case had 
been convicted of both murder and conspiracy to commit 
murder, and the jury had found true a special circumstance 
allegation that both the murder and conspiracy to commit 
murder had been committed for financial gain.  (Id. at p. 864.)5  
Based on that true finding, the defendant was sentenced to life 
without possibility of parole on the conspiracy conviction.  We 
vacated the sentence, concluding that the special penal 
provision at issue — the special circumstance authorizing the 
life without parole sentence — applied only to convictions for the 
completed crime, not to convictions for conspiracy to commit 
murder.  (Hernandez, at p. 878.) 
We began our inquiry by laying out the relevant statutory 
background.  In addition to the basic sentencing directive that 
 
has been committed for the benefit of, or in association with, a 
criminal street gang.’ ”  (People v. Jones (2009) 47 Cal.4th 566, 
576.)  Both types of provisions differ from substantive offenses in 
that they do not “ ‘define or set forth elements of a new crime.’ ”  
(Ibid.) 
5 
In a separate part of the opinion, we vacated the defendant’s 
death sentence on the murder count because of significant errors 
at the penalty phase of the trial.  
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
8 
conspiracy shall be punished in the same manner and to the 
same extent as the target felony, the conspiracy statute specifies 
that when two or more persons conspire to commit murder, “the 
punishment shall be that prescribed for murder in the first 
degree.”  (§ 182(a).)  Penal Code section 190, subdivision (a), 
enacted as part of the 1978 death penalty initiative (Prop. 7, as 
approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1978)), outlined three 
possible punishments for first degree murder:  death, life in 
prison without parole, or 25 years to life in prison.  The two most 
severe punishments — death or life without parole — could be 
imposed only if one or more special circumstances had been 
found true, including the financial gain special circumstance in 
Penal Code section 190.2.  We concluded that these punishments 
could not be applied to a conviction of conspiracy to commit 
murder, as opposed to the completed crime, notwithstanding the 
presence of special circumstances. 
The question, as we described it, was “[w]hether the 
special circumstances in [Penal Code] section 190.2 apply to the 
crime of conspiracy to murder,” which depended on the 
legislative intent underlying the 1978 ballot initiative.  
(Hernandez, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 865.)  Looking first to the 
text, we found nothing to suggest that voters intended for the 
death-qualifying special circumstances to apply to the crime of 
conspiracy to commit murder, or, for that matter, to any other 
crime other than murder itself.  (Id. at pp. 866–867.)  On the 
contrary, we noted, “[S]ubdivision (a) of [Penal Code] section 
190.1 states:  ‘If the trier of fact finds the defendant guilty of first 
degree murder, it shall at the same time determine the truth of 
all special circumstances charged,’ ” which strongly implied that 
the “special circumstances may be charged and found true only 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
9 
as to the crime of murder.”  (Hernandez, at p. 866.)  We similarly 
found nothing in the ballot materials to suggest voters intended 
the special circumstances and their attendant penalties of death 
or life without possibility of parole to apply to conspiracy to 
commit murder, as opposed to the completed crime.  (Ibid.)   
We found further support for our conclusion in the canon 
of constitutional avoidance.  In 1978, we explained, it was 
unclear whether the federal Constitution permitted imposing 
the death penalty for crimes that did not take human life.  (See 
Coker v. Georgia (1977) 433 U.S. 584 [invalidating death 
sentence for rape of an adult victim]; Eberheart v. Georgia (1977) 
433 U.S. 917 [invalidating death sentence for aggravated 
kidnapping].)  We presumed that the electorate intended to 
avoid significant questions about the constitutionality of the 
new California death penalty law by restricting capital 
punishment to the completed crime of first degree murder, 
rather than authorizing the death penalty for failed conspiracies 
that did not result in the taking of life.  (Hernandez, supra, 30 
Cal.4th at p. 867.)   
We next considered the practical implications of 
interpreting the special circumstances statute to apply to 
conspiracy.  We explained that at the time the voters enacted 
the 1978 death penalty initiative, the penalty for most forms of 
attempted willful and premeditated murder was five, six, or 
seven years (although a legislative amendment increasing the 
punishment to five, seven, or nine years was set to go into effect 
on Jan. 1, 1979).  (Hernandez, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 867–868, 
citing Pen. Code, former § 664, subd. (1), as amended by Stats. 
1978, ch. 579, § 27, p. 1986; Stats. 1978, ch. 1166, § 2, p. 3771.)  
We acknowledged that conspiracy is generally punished more 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
10 
severely than attempt:  while conspiracy is punishable to the 
same extent as the completed crime (§ 182(a)), attempt is 
generally punishable for one-half the term of the imprisonment 
prescribed for the completed crime (Pen. Code, § 664, subd. (a)).  
But we considered it “unlikely the voters intended to allow the 
death penalty for a conspiracy to murder, which requires only a 
conspirator’s overt act in furtherance of the murderous plot 
([id., ]§ 184), at a time when the maximum punishment for 
attempted willful and premeditated murder, which requires a 
direct, though ineffectual, premeditated murderous act 
([id., ]§ 21a), was five, seven, or nine years in prison.”  
(Hernandez, at p. 868.)  This large discrepancy between the 
punishment for conspiracy and attempt supported our 
conclusion that the special circumstances in Penal Code section 
190.2 do not apply to conspiracy to commit murder.  (Hernandez, 
at p. 868.) 
Finally, our opinion in Hernandez alluded to the rule of 
lenity.  That rule, we explained, states “that when ‘two 
reasonable interpretations of the same provision stand in 
relative equipoise, i.e., . . . resolution of the statute’s ambiguities 
in a convincing manner is impracticable,’ we construe the 
provision most favorably to the defendant.”  (Hernandez, supra, 
30 Cal.4th at p. 869.)  We found that the 1978 death penalty law 
“is most plausibly construed as not authorizing the charging of 
special circumstances for the crime of conspiracy to commit 
murder,” such that there was no need to rely on the rule of 
lenity.  (Ibid.)  But we went on to note that “even if such a 
construction were no more plausible than the alternative, the 
rule of lenity would add decisive weight in favor of that 
construction.”  (Id. at pp. 869–870.) 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
11 
We returned to the issue of conspiracy sentencing two 
years later in Athar, supra, 36 Cal.4th 396.  In Athar, a jury 
convicted the defendant under section 182(a) of conspiring to 
conduct money laundering transactions, in violation of Penal 
Code section 186.10, subdivision (a).  Defendants’ coconspirators 
were convicted of violating section 186.10, subdivision (a), based 
on completed transactions.  The jury determined the value of the 
transactions was in excess of $2.5 million, which carried a four-
year enhancement.  (Pen. Code, § 186.10, subd. (c)(1)(D).)  The 
defendant argued that the four-year enhancement should apply 
only to convictions for the completed money laundering offense, 
not to his conspiracy conviction.  We disagreed. 
As an initial matter, we explained that section 182(a), by 
its 
terms, 
is 
naturally 
read 
to 
incorporate 
sentence 
enhancements as well as the base term for the target offense.  
(Athar, supra, 36 Cal.4th at pp. 401–402; see id. at pp. 404–405.)  
But the inquiry did not end there; we acknowledged that our 
decision in Hernandez had not considered the matter resolved 
by section 182(a) standing alone, but instead looked to the 
statute governing special circumstances and ultimately 
concluded that statute was not meant to apply to conspiracy 
convictions.   
Our opinion in Athar distinguished the money laundering 
statute from the statute in Hernandez, explaining that the 
available interpretive tools pointed in the opposite direction 
from that case.  Among other things, we explained that the 
purpose of the amendment adding the enhancements was to 
more effectively deter and punish money laundering.  “Because 
the money laundering process typically involves more than one 
person, and often large criminal networks, it is reasonable for 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
12 
us to find that the enhancements . . . were intended to control 
large-scale laundering and the conspiracies that necessarily 
underlie the criminal operation.”  (Athar, supra, 36 Cal.4th at 
p. 404.)  We also distinguished the money laundering statute 
from Health and Safety Code section 11370.4, subdivision (a), 
which expressly provides for enhancements where a person has 
been “ ‘convicted of a violation of, or of a conspiracy to violate,’ ” 
certain drug trafficking offenses.  (Athar, at p. 405, italics 
added.)  We explained that the Legislature added the italicized 
language in a later amendment, possibly based on the belief that 
“it was necessary to amend the statute in order to apply the 
statutory 
enhancements 
to 
conspirators 
because 
those 
enhancements had been limited specifically to persons convicted 
of the target offense.”  (Ibid.)  We declined to place any weight 
on the absence of similar language in the money laundering 
statute, noting that the enhancement provision does not refer to 
individuals “ ‘convicted’ of” that statute, but instead refers to 
individuals “ ‘punished under’ ” that statute.  (Ibid.) 
Finally, we noted that unlike in Hernandez, our 
interpretation neither raised significant constitutional concerns 
nor resulted in any disparity between the punishment of 
conspiracy and attempt; indeed, our interpretation ensured that 
these two inchoate offenses would receive the same punishment.  
(Athar, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 404.) 
The parties disagree about the lessons to be learned from 
Athar, and Hernandez before it.  The Attorney General argues, 
and the Court of Appeal agreed, that Athar means that when an 
enhancement or alternate penalty would otherwise apply to a 
completed target offense, it must be applied to a conspiracy 
conviction unless the statute expressly directs otherwise.  So 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
13 
here, even though the Court of Appeal found that the alternate 
penalty in section 186.22(b)(4)(B) unambiguously applied to 
completed home invasion robbery and not conspiracy, it 
considered it dispositive that section 186.22(b)(4)(B) does not 
explicitly exclude conspiracy from its reach.  In Lopez’s view, 
this argument overreads Athar.  But if that is wrong, Lopez 
argues, then Athar is wrong, cannot be reconciled with 
Hernandez, and should be overruled. 
We agree with Lopez that Athar, properly understood, 
does not stand for the proposition for which the Attorney 
General and Court of Appeal have read it.  Athar does make 
clear that section 182(a)’s instruction that conspiracy to commit 
a felony is “punishable in the same manner and to the same 
extent as is provided for the punishment of that felony” means 
a conspiracy sentence can encompass not only the base term but 
also sentence enhancements.  (Athar, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 405 
[asserting that the meaning of § 182(a) is “plain” in this respect 
and “does not require additional legislative clarity”].)  But Athar 
makes equally clear that the sentencing inquiry does not begin 
and end with section 182(a); the terms of the enhancement or 
alternate penalty also matter.  Hernandez illustrated that point 
in giving effect to voters’ apparent intent to reserve the most 
serious punishments under the 1978 death penalty initiative for 
individuals convicted of completed murder; Athar then 
employed the same “statutory construction principles we 
addressed in Hernandez” to reach a different conclusion about 
Penal Code section 186.10 money laundering enhancements.  
(Athar, at p. 404.) 
Though the Attorney General suggests otherwise, we did 
not change our approach in People v. Ruiz (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1100 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
14 
(Ruiz).  In Ruiz we considered whether laboratory and drug 
program fees for persons convicted of certain enumerated drug 
crimes applied to persons convicted of conspiracy to commit one 
of those offenses.  Without expressly addressing whether the fee 
statutes at issue were properly understood to apply to 
conspiracy crimes, we instead focused on whether the fees 
constituted “punishment” within the meaning of section 182(a).  
Because the fees were meant as punishment, we held that the 
fees applied to a person convicted of conspiracy.  The Attorney 
General reads this as an implicit acknowledgment that section 
182(a) alone controls the inquiry, but we acknowledged no such 
thing.  We focused on section 182(a) because the application of 
section 182(a) was the only question put to us; no one disputed 
that the fee statutes, properly interpreted, were meant to apply 
to persons convicted of conspiracy as well as completed offenses.  
The same was not true in Hernandez or Athar, where we 
carefully considered the intended reach of the special penal 
provisions at issue, and the same is not true here. 
An approach that looks beyond the basic instructions in 
section 182(a) only makes sense, since the sentence in any given 
conspiracy case depends on both section 182(a) and the 
sentencing law or laws that specify the punishment for 
particular crimes.  Nothing in section 182(a) indicates that the 
general instructions it contains are designed to override all 
other applicable law.  (Cf., e.g., In re Greg F. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 
393, 406 [“When the Legislature intends for a statute to prevail 
over all contrary law, it typically signals this intent by using 
phrases 
like 
‘notwithstanding 
any 
other 
law’ 
or 
‘notwithstanding other provisions of law’ ”].)  And as Hernandez 
demonstrates, the Legislature and voters sometimes write 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
15 
enhancement statutes and other penal provisions that are 
aimed exclusively at increasing the punishment for completed 
offenses.  In such cases, the legislative body has determined that 
punishment should be added for the manner or circumstances 
in which an offense is completed, but that the same punishment 
should not be added for the manner or circumstances in which 
individuals conspire, but ultimately fail, to commit a particular 
target offense.  When legislators make such a determination, we 
give effect to their choices as providing more specific guidance 
than section 182(a) about whether a particular enhancement or 
other penal provision should be included as part of the 
punishment for the conspiracy offense.  (See, e.g., Lopez v. Sony 
Electronics, Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 627, 634.)  
Indeed, the Attorney General does not seriously dispute 
the point that a court must consider the terms of the special 
penal provision at issue before deciding whether the provision 
applies to a conspiracy conviction.  His argument is instead that, 
to override the general rule that section 182(a) embraces 
enhancements and other similar penalty provisions, the special 
penal provision must expressly so provide.  We are 
unpersuaded.  
We acknowledge there is some language in Athar that can 
be read to suggest an express statement rule of the kind the 
Attorney General advocates.  For example, Athar signals 
general agreement with a Court of Appeal opinion it describes 
as holding that the money laundering enhancement statute 
“requires the enhancement because it does not specifically 
prohibit it.”  (Athar, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 401.)  But in the end, 
neither the substantive analysis in Athar nor our prior decision 
in Hernandez supports this sort of rule.   
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
16 
For one thing, if an express statement were required to 
overcome the general rule of section 182(a) with respect to 
enhancements and alternate penalties, then Hernandez 
presumably would have come out differently.  After all, nothing 
in the 1978 death penalty statute expressly stated that the 
penalties for special circumstance murder are inapplicable in 
conspiracy cases.  The Attorney General argues Hernandez is 
distinguishable because it raised constitutional considerations 
not present here, concerning the imposition of the death penalty 
for a crime not involving the killing of another.  This is true but 
beside the point, since Hernandez was not a constitutional 
decision; 
Hernandez 
instead 
invoked 
constitutional 
considerations in an effort to understand the meaning of the 
statute.  Athar did not purport to overrule Hernandez in this 
respect, but likewise employed the usual tools of statutory 
interpretation to reach its conclusions about the intended reach 
of amount-based enhancements in money laundering cases.  
In any event, even looking beyond precedent, we see no 
sound reason why an express statement should be required in 
this context.  In cases concerning the presumption favoring 
retroactivity of ameliorative changes to the criminal law, we 
have said that case law “do[es] not ‘dictate to legislative drafters 
the forms in which laws must be written’ to express an intent to 
modify or limit the retroactive effect of an ameliorative change; 
rather, they require ‘that the Legislature demonstrate its 
intention with sufficient clarity that a reviewing court can 
discern and effectuate it.’ ”  (People v. Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 
646, 656–657.)  The same holds true here.  To instruct that 
enhancements or other additional penalties should not apply to 
individuals who conspire, but ultimately fail, to complete a 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
17 
particular crime, legislators need not express their intent in a 
particular form; the legislative body need only demonstrate its 
intent “ ‘with sufficient clarity that a reviewing court can 
discern and effectuate it.’ ”  (Id. at p. 657; see id. at p. 656.)  In 
other words, to answer the question in this case, we simply 
employ the usual tools of statutory interpretation without 
requiring an explicit statement of legislative intent to reserve 
additional punishment for individuals who have completed a 
crime, as opposed to those who have conspired to do so. 
To do otherwise would force courts to err on the side of 
more punishment unless a statute unambiguously forbids it.  
Such an approach might have the virtue of simplicity.  But it 
carries with it the greater vice of imposing more punishment — 
sometimes dramatically more — even when ordinary principles 
of statutory interpretation tell us that more punishment is not 
what the Legislature or voters intended.  The sounder approach 
is simply to read the special penal provision as we would any 
other statute, using ordinary tools of statutory construction to 
determine whether the legislative body intended for the penalty 
to apply to individuals convicted of conspiracy or instead 
intended to reserve added punishment for individuals convicted 
of completed crimes. 
III. 
With these principles in mind, we turn our attention to the 
alternate penalty provision in section 186.22(b)(4)(B).  The 
Legislature enacted Penal Code section 186.22 as part of the 
California Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act 
(STEP Act), a statute enacted “for the express purpose of 
eradicating criminal activity by street gangs.”  (People v. Loeun 
(1997) 17 Cal.4th 1, 4, citing Pen. Code, former § 186.21; see 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
18 
Stats. 1988, ch. 1242, § 1, pp. 4127–4129 [enacting Pen. Code, 
§ 186.22]; Stats. 1989, ch. 930, § 5.1, pp. 3253–3255 [reenacted 
in the Omnibus Motor Vehicle Theft Act of 1989].)6  The STEP 
Act created a new substantive offense of active participation “in 
a criminal street gang” (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (a)), as well 
as a sentence enhancement for felonies committed “for the 
benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal 
street gang” (id., § 186.22, subd. (b)(1)).  (See People v. Valencia 
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 818, 829.) 
Approximately a decade later, voters passed Proposition 
21, the Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act of 
1998, which amended section 186.22 in various respects.  
(Primary Elec. (Mar. 7, 2000).)  Proposition 21 created a new 
crime of gang conspiracy, which punishes “any person who 
actively participates in any criminal street gang . . . with 
knowledge that its members engage in or have engaged in a 
pattern of criminal gang activity . . . and who willfully promotes, 
furthers, assists, or benefits from any felonious criminal conduct 
by members of that gang.”  (Pen. Code, § 182.5.)  Proposition 21 
also amended the existing gang enhancement in section 186.22, 
subdivision (b)(1) to create a new tiered system of enhancements 
with five-year enhancements for individuals convicted of serious 
 
6  
The dismissal statutes were repealed and reenacted as Code 
of Civil Procedure section 583.110 et seq. in 1984 without 
substantive change.  (Stats. 1984, ch. 1705, § 4, p. 6176 [repealed]; 
Stats. 1984, ch. 1705, § 5, pp. 6176–6181 [reenacted].) 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
19 
felonies and 10-year enhancements for individuals convicted of 
violent felonies.  (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (b)(1).) 7 
Finally, as most relevant here, Proposition 21 created an 
alternate penalty provision prescribing indeterminate terms of 
life imprisonment for those who committed certain enumerated 
felonies 
under 
the 
same 
gang-related 
circumstances 
(§ 186.22(b)(4)).  The alternate penalty provision states that “[a] 
person who is convicted of a felony enumerated in this 
paragraph” that is found to be gang-related for the purposes of 
this section “shall, upon conviction of that felony, be sentenced 
to an indeterminate term of life,” with a specified minimum term 
of years depending on the felony.  (Ibid.)  One of those 
enumerated felonies is “home invasion robbery, in violation of 
 
7  
As currently written, Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision 
(b)(1), provides: 
 
“Except as provided in paragraphs (4) and (5), a person who 
is convicted of a felony committed for the benefit of, at the direction 
of, or in association with a criminal street gang, with the specific 
intent to promote, further, or assist in criminal conduct by gang 
members, shall, upon conviction of that felony, in addition and 
consecutive to the punishment prescribed for the felony or 
attempted felony of which the person has been convicted, be 
punished as follows: 
“(A) Except as provided in subparagraphs (B) and (C), the 
person shall be punished by an additional term of two, 
three, or four years at the court’s discretion. 
“(B) If the felony is a serious felony, as defined in subdivision 
(c) of Section 1192.7, the person shall be punished by an 
additional term of five years. 
“(C) If the felony is a violent felony, as defined in subdivision 
(c) of Section 667.5, the person shall be punished by an 
additional term of 10 years.” 
 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
20 
subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section 
213,” which section 186.22(b)(4) makes punishable by a 
minimum term of 15 years.  (§ 186.22(b)(4)(B).)8  Section 
186.22(b)(4)(B) makes no mention of conspiracy. 
Our inquiry into legislative intent begins, as always, with 
the statutory text.  The statute provides that the alternate 
penalties apply to a “person who is convicted of a felony 
enumerated in this paragraph,” “upon conviction of that felony.”  
(§ 186.22(b)(4), italics added.)  Lopez argues that because 
conspiracy is not “a felony enumerated in this paragraph,” the 
 
8 
Section 186.22(b)(4) provides: 
“A person who is convicted of a felony enumerated in this 
paragraph committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in 
association with a criminal street gang, with the specific intent to 
promote, further, or assist in criminal conduct by gang members, 
shall, upon conviction of that felony, be sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of life imprisonment with a minimum term of 
the indeterminate sentence calculated as the greater of: 
“(A) The term determined by the court pursuant to Section 
1170 for the underlying conviction, including any 
enhancement 
applicable 
under 
Chapter 
4.5 
(commencing with Section 1170) of Title 7 of Part 2, or 
any period prescribed by Section 3046, if the felony is any 
of the offenses enumerated in subparagraph (B) or (C) of 
this paragraph. 
“(B) Imprisonment in the state prison for 15 years, if the 
felony is a home invasion robbery, in violation of 
subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of 
Section 213; carjacking, as defined in Section 215; a 
felony violation of Section 246; or a violation of Section 
12022.55. 
“(C) Imprisonment in the state prison for seven years, if the 
felony is extortion, as defined in Section 519; or threats 
to victims and witnesses, as defined in Section 136.1.” 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
21 
alternate penalty provision does not apply to a conspiracy 
conviction.  The Court of Appeal agreed with Lopez that the 
statutory language of section 186.22(b)(4) is “unambiguous” in 
that it applies to individuals convicted of the enumerated 
crimes, and those crimes do not include conspiracy.  (People v. 
Lopez, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 529.)  We agree as well. 
Lopez argues this ought to be end of the story; when a 
special penal provision includes a list of criminal convictions to 
which it applies and that list does not include conspiracy, then 
the statute plainly excludes conspiracy convictions, and this 
plain meaning ought to control.  Lopez acknowledges, as he 
must, that Athar applied an enhancement to a conspiracy 
conviction even though the enhancement statute in question did 
not expressly refer to conspiracy.  But he argues that Athar is 
distinguishable because the statute in question imposed the 
enhancements on individuals “punished under” the money 
laundering statute, as opposed to individuals “convicted of” 
money laundering in violation of the statute.  (Athar, supra, 36 
Cal.4th at p. 401.)  Lopez argues this distinction is significant, 
because “[w]hile a person convicted of conspiracy to commit 
home invasion robbery might be arguably punished under 
[Penal Code] sections 211 and 213 . . . they have certainly not 
been convicted of that offense.”   
Lopez also acknowledges our decision in Ruiz, supra, 4 
Cal.5th at page 1105, discussed above, in which we concluded 
that certain laboratory and drug program fees for persons 
“convicted of” certain enumerated drug offenses are applicable 
to persons convicted of conspiracy to commit those offenses.  But 
Lopez contends that Ruiz, too, is distinguishable because it 
concerned a “direct consequence” of the target drug offense — no 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
22 
different in that respect from a provision imposing a base term 
of imprisonment from that offense — and not additional 
punishment dependent on other findings about the manner or 
circumstances in which the crime was committed.   
To resolve this case, we ultimately need not decide 
whether the use of the term “convicted of,” as opposed to 
“punished under,” necessarily signals an intent to limit the 
added punishment to the enumerated crimes of conviction.  Nor 
need we decide whether the answer varies depending on 
whether the added punishment is a “direct consequence” of the 
target offense or instead a consequence dependent on additional 
findings about the manner or circumstances in which the crime 
was committed.  That is because the statute we are considering 
here contains additional evidence of its intended reach.  The 
available evidence offers particular reason to believe that when 
voters authorized indeterminate life terms as alternate 
penalties for convictions of certain enumerated offenses found to 
be gang-related, they did not intend to sweep in conspiracy 
convictions as well. 
We begin by observing that voters did refer to conspiracy 
in other sections of Proposition 21.  Proposition 21, for example, 
imposes a five-year enhancement for conspiracy to commit 
certain gang-related crimes.  Specifically,  the sentence 
enhancements prescribed by section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1) 
apply “in addition and consecutive to the punishment prescribed 
for the felony or attempted felony of which the person has been 
convicted.”  (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (b)(1).)  The baseline 
enhancement is two, three, or four years, but the statute 
imposes a five-year enhancement when the felony is a “serious 
felony, as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 1192.7.”  (Id., 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
23 
subd. (b)(1)(B).)  And voters amended subdivision (c) of section 
1192.7 in Proposition 21 to expressly define the term “serious 
felony” to include not only completed offenses such as robbery, 
but also “any conspiracy to commit an offense described in this 
subdivision,” including robbery.  (Pen. Code, § 1192.7, former 
subd. (c)(42), italics added.)9  But while voters thus authorized 
a five-year enhancement for individuals convicted of conspiracy 
to commit a listed felony, they did not adopt any comparable 
provision with respect to the alternate life penalties prescribed 
in section 186.22(b)(4).  Under ordinary principles of statutory 
interpretation, we presume this was an intentional choice.  (See, 
e.g., In re Jennings (2004) 34 Cal.4th 254, 273 [“ ‘where a 
statute, with reference to one subject contains a given provision, 
the omission of such provision from a similar statute concerning 
a related subject is significant to show that a different legislative 
intent existed with reference to the different statutes’ ”].)   
Other provisions of Proposition 21 also expressly address 
conspiracy.  For instance, the substantive crime established by 
section 186.22, subdivision (a) punishes a person who “actively 
participates in a criminal street gang with knowledge that its 
members engage in, or have engaged in, a pattern of criminal 
 
9  
As we address in greater detail below (at pp. 25–26, post), 
prior to Proposition 21, subdivision (c) of Penal Code section 1192.7 
included only one specific type of conspiracy — “conspiracy to 
commit an offense described in paragraph (24) as it applies to 
Section 11370.4 of the Health and Safety Code where the 
defendant conspirator was substantially involved in the planning, 
direction, or financing of the underlying offense” (§ 1192.7, former 
subd. (c)(28), as amended by Stats. 1993, ch. 588, § 1, p. 2908). 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
24 
gang activity.”  (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (a).)10  The statutory 
definition of “ ‘pattern of criminal gang activity’ ” included “the 
commission of, attempted commission of, or solicitation of, 
sustained juvenile petition for, or conviction of” two or more 
enumerated offenses.  (Pen. Code, § 186.22, former subd. (e), as 
amended by Stats. 1997, ch. 500, § 2, p. 3126.)  In Proposition 
21, voters amended this provision to add conspiracy, such that 
a “ ‘pattern of criminal gang activity’ ” is now defined as 
including the “commission of, attempted commission of, 
conspiracy to commit, or solicitation of, sustained juvenile 
petition for, or conviction of” two or more enumerated offenses.  
(Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (e)(1), italics added.)  Finally, as 
noted, Proposition 21 created a new gang conspiracy offense in 
Penal Code section 182.5.  As we have previously explained, this 
gang conspiracy offense and Penal Code section 182 are “quite 
different provisions covering different kinds of conduct.”  
(Johnson, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 263.)  Rather than displace 
traditional conspiracy law as applied to gang-related offenses, 
such as the substantive crime of gang participation, section 
182.5 “provided prosecutors additional flexibility in charging a 
different kind of conspiracy.”  (Johnson, at p. 263.) 
In sum, Proposition 21 contains several provisions 
specifically addressing the law of conspiracy.  These provisions 
 
10  
Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (a) provides:  “A 
person who actively participates in a criminal street gang with 
knowledge that its members engage in, or have engaged in, a 
pattern of criminal gang activity, and who willfully promotes, 
furthers, or assists in felonious criminal conduct by members of 
that gang, shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail for 
a period not to exceed one year, or by imprisonment in the state 
prison for 16 months, or two or three years.” 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
25 
do not, however, include section 186.22(b)(4), which contains no 
mention of conspiracy at all.  The most natural reading of 
Proposition 21 is that voters intended for conspiracies to commit 
gang-related robberies to be punished by an additional five 
years of imprisonment — as the amendments to the serious 
felony provisions now provide — but did not believe that 
unlawful agreements to commit robberies and other enumerated 
crimes warranted an indeterminate life term under section 
186.22(b)(4). 
The Attorney General cautions against reading too much 
into the disparate mentions of conspiracy in Proposition 21.  He 
notes, among other things, that voters may have had 
independent reasons for adding conspiracy to commit a serious 
felony to the list of serious felonies in Penal Code section 1192.7, 
subdivision (c) — an amendment whose consequences were not 
limited to application of the new serious felony enhancements in 
Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1).  (See, e.g., Pen. 
Code, § 667, subd. (a)(1) [prescribing enhancement for prior 
serious felony]; id., subds. (b)–(f) [“Three Strikes” sentencing].)  
He observes that at the time Proposition 21 was passed, Penal 
Code section 1192.7, subdivision (c) did expressly list one 
particular conspiracy offense (“conspiracy to commit an offense 
described in paragraph (24) as it applies to Section 11370.4 of 
the Health and Safety Code where the defendant conspirator 
was substantially involved in the planning, direction, or 
financing of the underlying offense”) (Pen. Code, § 1192.7, 
former subd. (c)(28), as amended by Stats. 1993, ch. 588, § 1, 
p. 2908), and voters may have decided it was necessary to add 
conspiracy to the list to dispel any negative inferences that 
might have arisen because of this more specific reference. 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
26 
Perhaps so.  But then, by similar logic, voters should have 
added conspiracy to the list of crimes that will trigger an 
indeterminate life term under section 186.22(b)(4), in order to 
dispel any negative inferences that might have arisen because 
of Proposition 21’s other express references to conspiracy.  They 
did not.  Again, the most natural conclusion to draw is that 
voters intended for the five-year serious felony enhancement to 
apply to gang-related robbery conspiracies — and said so 
expressly — but did not intend impliedly to prescribe 
indeterminate life terms under section 186.22(b)(4) for 
conspiracies to commit home invasion robbery or other 
enumerated offenses. 
Practical considerations reinforce this conclusion.  The 
consequence of interpreting the statute otherwise would be to 
impose dramatically longer terms of imprisonment on 
individuals convicted not only of traditional conspiracy, as 
Lopez was in this case, but also of the new gang conspiracy crime 
created by Proposition 21, which reaches a wider range of 
conduct.  As we noted in Johnson, supra, 57 Cal.4th at page 262:  
Section 182.5 “embraces an active and knowing participant who 
merely benefits from the crime’s commission, even if he or she 
did not promote, further, or assist in the commission of that 
particular substantive offense.”  Under the Attorney General’s 
interpretation of section 186.22(b)(4), a person who willfully 
benefited from a home invasion robbery committed by other 
gang 
members 
would 
presumably 
be 
subject 
to 
an 
indeterminate life term, even though he or she never 
participated in the crime itself.  By contrast, the Attorney 
General concedes that a person who actively participated with 
other gang members in an attempted home invasion robbery 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
27 
would receive a sentence of no more than 10 years.11  Given the 
terms of Penal Code section 186.22, we consider it unlikely that 
voters intended this result. 
The legislative history of Proposition 21 contains nothing 
to suggest a different conclusion.  The voter information guide 
described the measure as designed to respond to increases in 
juvenile crime as well as gang-related crime.  The official 
summary prepared by the Attorney General stated that the 
initiative, among other things, “[i]ncreases punishment for 
gang-related felonies; death penalty for gang-related murder; 
indeterminate life sentences for home-invasion robbery, 
carjacking, witness intimidation and drive-by shootings; and 
creates crime of recruiting for gang activities; and authorizes 
wiretapping for gang activities.”  (Voter Information Guide, 
Primary Elec. (Mar. 7, 2000) Official Title and Summary of Prop. 
21, p. 44.)  Nothing in the materials indicates that the 
indeterminate life sentences prescribed by section 186.22(b)(4) 
were intended to apply to unlawful agreements to commit these 
crimes, even when the agreements never come to fruition. 
Though the voter information guide contains no direct evidence 
that voters meant for the alternate penalties in section 
 
11 
The Attorney General shows his math as follows:  “A gang-
related attempted home invasion robbery is punishable by up to 
either nine years ([Pen. Code,] §§ 186.22, subd. (b)(4)(B), 664 
[where target crime’s max punishment is life, punishment for 
attempt is five, seven, or nine years]) or nine years six months, 
based on half of the maximum term of nine years for attempted 
home invasion robbery (§§ 213, subd. (a)(1)(A), 664; [additional 
citations]) plus five years for the applicable gang enhancement 
for a serious felony (§§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(B), 1192.7, subd. 
(c)(19), (39)).”   
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
28 
186.22(b)(4) to apply only to completed offenses, it contains no 
evidence to the contrary either. 
The Attorney General argues that his interpretation of 
section 186.22(b)(4) is consistent with the overall purpose of the 
statute.  Specifically, he contends that the alternate penalties in 
section 186.22(b)(4) are designed to deter a particular form of 
concerted action — action in association with or for the benefit 
of a criminal street gang — so it would only make sense to apply 
the penalties to conspiracies to commit the enumerated crimes.  
The central difficulty with the argument is that Penal Code 
section 186.22 is not silent on the subject of gang-related 
conspiracies; 
it 
expressly 
addresses 
how 
gang-related 
conspiracies are to be prosecuted and how they are to be 
punished.  Simply because section 186.22(b)(4) shares some of 
the same crime-prevention aims as the law of conspiracy does 
not mean that the voters must have implicitly intended to 
punish conspiracies to commit home invasion robberies, 
carjackings, or other enumerated offenses with the same 
severity as the completed offenses.   
In short, the fairest reading of section 186.22(b)(4) evinces 
an intent to reserve the alternate penalties it prescribes for 
individuals convicted of the completed target offenses.  We are 
bound to give effect to that intent, though it may not be stated 
in express terms. 
This conclusion does not relieve conspirators of liability 
from their crimes.  Even without the alternate penalty provision 
in section 186.22(b)(4), the penalties for those crimes are often 
substantial.  As Lopez concedes, persons who conspire to commit 
gang-related home invasion robbery face up to nine years in 
prison (see Pen. Code, § 213, subd. (a)(1)(A)), with a serious 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
29 
felony enhancement of an additional five years (see id., 
§§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(B), 1192.7, subd. (c)(19), (42)), as well as 
any additional punishment that might be applicable by 
operation of other enhancement provisions.  The only question 
before us is whether the trial court erred in sentencing Lopez to 
the alternate penalty prescribed by section 186.22(b)(4).  
Because section 186.22(b)(4), fairly read, does not apply to 
conspiracy convictions, we conclude the superior court erred in 
sentencing Lopez to an indeterminate life term under that 
provision.12 
IV. 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal with 
instructions to remand for resentencing consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
 
 
 
12 
While this case was pending, the Legislature enacted 
Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) which amended 
Penal Code section 186.22 to change the requirements for 
proving a gang enhancement.  (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 3.)  
Although the changes are not directly relevant to the question 
before us, Lopez nonetheless asks us to consider how Assembly 
Bill No. 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) applies to his case.  We 
decline to address this question in the first instance, but instead 
leave the subject for consideration by the Court of Appeal on 
remand. 
PEOPLE v. LOPEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   KRUGER, J. 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
MILLER, J.* 
 
* 
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate 
District, Division Two, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Lopez 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 46 Cal.App.5th 505 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No.  S261747  
Date Filed:  April 7, 2022 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Tulare  
Judge:  Joseph A. Kalashian*  
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Benjamin Owens, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler 
and Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Michael P. 
Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Catherine Chatman, Julie A. 
Hokans, Rachelle A. Newcomb and Darren K. Indermill, Deputy 
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Retired judge of the Tulare Superior Court, assigned by the Chief 
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Benjamin Owens 
P.O. Box 64635 
Baton Rouge, LA 70896 
(707) 745-2092 
 
Darren K. Indermill 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
(916) 210-7689