Title: Hale v. Larry Latham Auctioneers, Inc.
Citation: 607 So. 2d 154
Docket Number: 1910960
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: August 21, 1992

607 So. 2d 154 (1992)
Ronald E. HALE
v.
LARRY LATHAM AUCTIONEERS, INC., et al.
1910960.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
August 21, 1992.
Rehearing Denied October 23, 1992.
Ronald E. Hale, pro se.
Patrick H. Graves, Jr. and Stuart M. Maples of Bradley, Arant, Rose &amp; White, Huntsville, for appellees.
HOUSTON, Justice.
After a nonjury trial, the plaintiffs, Larry Latham Auctioneers, Inc., Fortune Media Communications, Inc., and Larry Latham, obtained a substantial judgment against the defendant, Ronald E. Hale. Hale appealed, raising two issues:
(1) Whether the trial court erred to reversal in permitting Hale's attorney to withdraw from the case approximately three weeks prior to the trial; and,
(2) Whether the trial court erred to reversal in denying Hale's pro se motion for a continuance.
Rule 1.16(b), Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct, provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
The comment to Rule 1.16(b) states that "[a] lawyer may withdraw if the client refuses to abide by the terms of an agreement relating to the representation, such as an agreement concerning fees or court costs or an agreement limiting the objectives of the representation." Whether to permit an attorney to withdraw from representing a client is a matter resting within the sound discretion of the trial court. Thomas v. Southeast Alabama Sickle Cell Ass'n, Inc., 581 So. 2d 845 (Ala.1991). In Steele v. Gill, 283 Ala. 364, 369, 217 So. 2d 75, 80 (1968), this Court, acknowledging that there is "no hard and fast rule" to be applied in determining whether a trial court has abused its discretion, wrote:
The record in the present case shows that Hale's attorney moved to withdraw immediately after a fee dispute had caused a substantial breakdown of his professional relationship with Hale. Both Hale and his attorney were allowed to argue their respective positions to the trial court. After carefully reviewing the record and the briefs, we agree with the trial court that the motion to withdraw was "based on reasonable and necessary grounds." Therefore, we cannot hold that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting Hale's attorney to withdraw.
The decision as to whether to grant a continuance also rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. Thomas v. Southeast Alabama Sickle Cell Ass'n, Inc., supra. The record with respect to this issue shows that the trial court granted Hale several continuances during the course of this litigation. The attorney whose withdrawal is at issue was the third attorney to represent Hale in this case. Even though Hale was aware on the day that his attorney was allowed to withdraw that the trial was scheduled to commence approximately three weeks later, he waited until the last working day before the scheduled trial date to move for a continuance. Hale stated in his motion that he needed additional time in which to hire another attorney; however, there is no evidence that Hale actually solicited the services of another attorney.[1] On the day of trial the court stated its reasons for denying the motion:
"Without going into this particular subject matter too deeply, [it is this Court's] judgment that Mr. Hale ... [has] at one time or another been represented by competent counsel in this matter. [Hale's former attorneys] are all believed by this Court to be competent counsel to carry on a suit of this particular *156 complexity. This Court is further of the firm judgment and opinion that at each critical juncture, or at some critical juncture in this lawsuit, Mr. Hale ... [has] behaved in such a manner as to cause this Court to both become concerned with whether or not a denial of a motion to continue the action, or whatever was occurring in the suit at that time, would cause a prejudice toward [him] such that it would not be good to go forward with the suit, and this Court believes that it has been lenient long enough.
The trial court further stated in its final order as follows:
(Emphasis in original.) Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot hold that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant Hale another continuance. See Thomas v. Southeast Alabama Sickle Cell Ass'n, Inc., supra.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and MADDOX, SHORES and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.
[1]  We note that a related case involving these parties was pending in Tennessee and that Hale was apparently represented in that case by an attorney licensed to practice law in Tennessee. There is no indication that Hale sought to have that attorney admitted in Alabama pro hac vice for the trial of this case. We further note that although Hale represented himself at the trial of this case, he did receive some guidance from his brother-in-law, a Tennessee resident trained in the law but not licensed to practice.