Title: William Van Poyck V. State Of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC04-696
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: May 19, 2005

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC04-696 
____________ 
 
WILLIAM VAN POYCK,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[May 19, 2005] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
William Van Poyck appeals an order of the circuit court summarily denying 
a motion for postconviction DNA testing under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 
3.853.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the reasons that 
follow, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of Van Poyck’s motion for 
postconviction DNA testing. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The facts of Van Poyck’s crimes were previously detailed by this Court on 
direct appeal as follows: 
The record establishes that on June 24, 1987, corrections 
officers Steven Turner and Fred Griffis transported James O’Brien, a 
 
 
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state prison inmate, in a van from Glades Correctional Institute to a 
dermatologist’s office for an examination.  Griffis, who was not 
armed, drove the van while Turner watched O’Brien, who was 
secured in a caged area behind Griffis.  After Griffis pulled the van 
into an alley behind the doctor’s office, Turner looked down for his 
paperwork.  Upon looking up, he saw a person, whom he later 
identified as Van Poyck, aiming a pistol at his head.  Van Poyck 
ordered Turner to exit the van.  At the same time, Frank Valdez, an 
accomplice of Van Poyck’s, went to the driver’s side of the van.  
Turner testified that Van Poyck took his gun, ordered him to get under 
the van, and kicked him while he was attempting to comply with Van 
Poyck’s order.  He testified that, while under the van, he saw Griffis 
exit the van; he noticed another person forcing Griffis to the back of 
the van; and, while noticing two sets of feet in close proximity to the 
rear of the van, he heard a series of shots and saw Griffis fall to the 
ground.  Turner further stated that Van Poyck had stopped kicking 
him when the gunfire started, but noted that he did not know where 
Van Poyck was at the time of the shooting.  Griffis was shot three 
times, once in the head and twice in the chest.  Expert testimony 
indicated that the shot to the head was fired with the barrel of the gun 
placed against Griffis’ head and that each of the wounds would have 
been fatal.  It was also determined that the murder weapon was a 
Hungarian Interarms nine millimeter semiautomatic pistol. 
 
After Griffis was shot, Turner was forced to get up from under 
the van and look for the keys.  Upon realizing that Turner did not have 
them, Valdez fired numerous shots at a padlock on the van in an 
attempt to free O’Brien.  One of the shots ricocheted off of the van 
and struck Turner, causing him minor injuries.  Turner testified that at 
around this time Van Poyck aimed the Hungarian Interarms 
semiautomatic nine millimeter pistol at him and pulled the trigger. . . . 
 
 
. . . . 
 
Van Poyck, testifying in his own behalf, denied that he shot 
Griffis and stated that, while kicking Turner, he heard the gunshots 
and saw Griffis fall to the ground.  He did, however, acknowledge that 
he planned the operation and recruited Valdez to assist him in his 
plan.  Additionally, he stated that they took three guns with them. 
 
Van Poyck v. State, 564 So. 2d 1066, 1067-68 (Fla. 1990) (Van Poyck I).  Van 
Poyck was convicted of first-degree murder, six counts of attempted manslaughter, 
 
 
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armed robbery with a firearm, aiding in an attempted escape, and aggravated 
assault.  See id. at 1068.  Regarding the first-degree murder conviction, the jury 
found Van Poyck guilty of both first-degree premeditated murder and first-degree 
felony murder on a bifurcated verdict form, and recommended the death penalty by 
a vote of eleven to one.  See id.  The trial court followed the jury’s 
recommendation and imposed the death penalty for the first-degree murder 
conviction.  See id.    
On direct appeal, we concluded that there was insufficient evidence to 
support Van Poyck’s conviction for first-degree premeditated murder because the 
State’s evidence was conflicting as to Van Poyck’s location at the time of the 
murder.  See id. at 1069.  We concluded, however, that there was sufficient 
evidence to support the first-degree felony murder conviction.  See id.  We also 
held that the death sentence was a proportional punishment because the record 
established that Van Poyck was a major participant in the felony murder and that 
he acted with reckless indifference to human life since he knew that lethal force 
could be used during the commission of the felony.  See id. at 1070-71.  Thus, we 
affirmed Van Poyck’s convictions and sentences.    
In his initial postconviction motion, Van Poyck raised numerous claims, 
including that counsel was ineffective during the guilt phase for failing to present 
additional direct evidence, such as DNA tests, regarding the identity of the 
 
 
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triggerman.  See Van Poyck v. State, 694 So. 2d 686, 696-97 (Fla. 1997) (Van 
Poyck II).  We affirmed the circuit court’s order denying relief on this claim.  See 
id. at 697.  Subsequently, this Court denied Van Poyck’s petition for habeas corpus 
relief, rejecting arguments that (1) Van Poyck was wrongfully forced to exhaust his 
peremptory challenges, (2) appellate counsel was ineffective on direct appeal, and 
(3) Van Poyck was convicted of criminal offenses that did not exist as a matter of 
law.  See Van Poyck v. Singletary, 715 So. 2d 930 (Fla. 1998); see also Van Poyck 
v. Singletary, 728 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1998) (denying habeas corpus petition in 
unpublished order); Van Poyck v. Crosby, 860 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 2003) (denying 
habeas corpus petition in unpublished order), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 974 (2004).  
The United States Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of Van Poyck’s petition for 
habeas corpus relief, concluding that (1) counsel was not ineffective during the 
penalty phase, (2) the trial court did not err in denying Van Poyck a continuance 
between the guilt and penalty phases, (3) counsel was not ineffective during the 
appellate proceedings, and (4) Van Poyck’s sentence was not based on an invalid 
aggravating factor.  See Van Poyck v. Fla. Dep’t of Corrections, 290 F.3d 1318 
(11th Cir. 2002) (Van Poyck III).      
Thereafter, Van Poyck filed a motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.853 seeking DNA testing of all of the clothing worn by Van Poyck 
and Valdez at the time the murder occurred.  Van Poyck alleged that the DNA 
 
 
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testing could establish that Valdez and not Van Poyck was the triggerman.  Van 
Poyck further alleged that this evidence would mitigate his death sentence because 
the sentence was based on the mistaken belief that Van Poyck was the triggerman.  
In the alternative, Van Poyck asserted that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing 
on the issue.  The State opposed the motion, asserting that there is no reasonable 
probability that the identity of the triggerman would mitigate Van Poyck’s 
sentence.  The trial court summarily denied Van Poyck’s motion seeking DNA 
testing, finding that “pursuant to exhibits contained in the court file which are 
incorporated herein as reference that there is no reasonable possibility that any 
DNA testing will result in exoneration or in a mitigated sentence.”  Van Poyck 
appeals the trial court’s order summarily denying his rule 3.853 motion.     
ANALYSIS 
Rule 3.853 sets forth the procedures for obtaining DNA testing under section 
925.11, Florida Statutes (2004).  The rule provides that a petition for 
postconviction DNA testing must include, among other things, “a statement that 
the movant is innocent and how the DNA testing requested by the motion will 
exonerate the movant of the crime for which the movant was sentenced, or a 
statement how the DNA testing will mitigate the sentence received by the movant 
for that crime.”  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.853(b)(3).  The burden is on the movant to 
“demonstrate the nexus between the potential results of DNA testing on each piece 
 
 
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of evidence and the issues in the case.”  Hitchcock v. State, 866 So. 2d 23, 27 (Fla. 
2004).  Rule 3.853 requires the court to make the following findings when ruling 
on a motion seeking postconviction DNA testing: 
(A)  Whether it has been shown that physical evidence that may 
contain DNA still exists. 
(B)  Whether the results of DNA testing of that physical 
evidence likely would be admissible at trial and whether there exists 
reliable proof to establish that the evidence containing the tested DNA 
is authentic and would be admissible at a future hearing. 
(C)  Whether there is reasonable probability that the movant 
would have been acquitted or would have received a lesser sentence if 
the DNA evidence had been admitted at trial. 
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.853(c)(5) (emphasis supplied).   
 
In this case, the pleading requirements of rule 3.853 have been satisfied.  
The issue before the Court is whether DNA evidence establishing that Van Poyck 
was not the triggerman creates a reasonable probability that Van Poyck would have 
received a lesser sentence.1   
 
During the penalty phase, the State argued in closing that the evidence 
supported a finding that Van Poyck was the triggerman, but even if the jurors were 
to find otherwise, they could still recommend the death penalty if they concluded 
that Van Poyck played a major role in the felony murder and that he acted with 
                                        
1.  Although not controlling on the issue before the Court, we note that prior 
to trial, defense counsel moved for a continuance in order to allow the defense to 
have the clothing worn by Van Poyck and Valdez tested using DNA testing 
procedures.  Despite the fact that the trial court granted the continuance so that 
DNA testing could be conducted, the clothing was never tested.  
  
 
 
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reckless indifference to human life.  Therefore, the State’s theory that the death 
penalty was appropriate was not based primarily on Van Poyck’s triggerman 
status.  Similarly, the trial court did not rely on Van Poyck’s triggerman status in 
imposing the death penalty.  The trial court found that the death penalty was an 
appropriate sentence because the mitigating evidence2 presented was insufficient to 
outweigh the aggravating circumstances.3  See Van Poyck I, 564 So. 2d at 1068-
69.  None of the aggravating circumstances found by the trial court were based on 
Van Poyck’s triggerman status.   
In fact, the only indication that the trial court even considered Van Poyck’s 
triggerman status is a passage in the trial court’s order in which the court stated 
that the “State clearly presented competent and substantial evidence as to the crime 
of first degree felony murder and or first degree premeditated murder and in reality 
                                        
2.  During the penalty phase, defense counsel presented four witnesses in 
mitigation who testified that (1) Van Poyck’s father was frequently away from 
home and that his mother had passed away when Van Poyck was young; (2) for a 
period of time Van Poyck lived with a housekeeper who appeared to be strange 
and unstable; (3) Van Poyck’s siblings had juvenile records; (4) Van Poyck was 
remorseful for his actions; and (5) Van Poyck was helpful to other prison inmates.  
See Van Poyck I, 564 So. 2d at 1068.  Van Poyck also testified during the penalty 
phase, accepting responsibility for the fact that Officer Griffis was killed and 
expressing remorse for his actions.  See id.  
3.  The trial court found the following four aggravating circumstances: (1) 
that the crime was committed while Van Poyck was under a sentence of 
imprisonment; (2) that the crime was committed for the purpose of effecting an 
escape from custody; (3) that Van Poyck knowingly created a great risk of death to 
many persons; and (4) that Van Poyck was previously convicted of another felony 
involving the use or threat of violence.  See Van Poyck I, 564 So. 2d at 1068. 
 
 
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presented competent evidence that Mr. Van Poyck may have in fact been the 
individual who pulled the trigger and shot Fred Griffis.” (Emphasis supplied.)  
This statement demonstrates only that the trial court was uncertain whether Van 
Poyck shot and killed Officer Griffis, rather than a conclusion that Van Poyck was 
the triggerman.  Despite this uncertainty, the trial court found that “[b]y all 
evidence Mr. Van Poyck was a major participant” in the felony murder.         
The United States Court of Appeals’ analysis of Van Poyck’s petition for 
habeas corpus relief is also instructive.  In reviewing Van Poyck’s ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim, the circuit court addressed whether there was a 
reasonable probability that evidence establishing that Van Poyck was not the 
triggerman would have affected the trial court’s imposition of the death penalty.  
See Van Poyck III, 290 F.3d at 1325-26.  The circuit court concluded that upon 
considering the trial court’s uncertainty whether Van Poyck was the triggerman 
and the prosecutor’s closing arguments during the penalty phase, there was “no 
reasonable probability that, if Counsel had presented the additional evidence that 
[Van Poyck] was not the triggerman, the outcome of the sentencing phase would 
have been different.”  Id. at 1326.   
Further, this Court did not rely on Van Poyck’s triggerman status in 
affirming his death sentence on direct appeal.  This Court stated that “[a]lthough 
the record does not establish that Van Poyck was the triggerman, it does establish 
 
 
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that he was the instigator and the primary participant in this crime.”  Van Poyck I, 
564 So. 2d at 1070.  The Court concluded that the death sentence was a 
proportional punishment “[s]ince there is no question that Van Poyck played the 
major role in this felony murder and that he knew lethal force could be used.”  Id. 
at 1070-71.  In reaching this conclusion, we observed that the death penalty is 
appropriate even when the defendant is not the triggerman if the defendant is a 
major participant in the felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life.  
See id. at 1070.  Evidence establishing that Van Poyck was not the triggerman 
would not change the fact that he played a major role in the felony murder and that 
he acted with reckless indifference to human life.  
 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that there is no reasonable probability 
that Van Poyck would have received a lesser sentence had DNA evidence 
establishing that he was not the triggerman been presented at trial.  We do not hold, 
as Justice Anstead asserts, that it makes no difference in the capital sentencing 
process which of two codefendants actually committed the killing.  Rather, we 
determine only that under the circumstances of this case involving a murder of a 
prison guard in a brutal armed attack planned by Van Poyck and carried out with 
Valdez, DNA evidence indicating that Van Poyck was not the triggerman would 
not have created a reasonable probability of a lesser sentence, which is the standard 
for ordering DNA testing under rule 3.853(c)(5)(C).  Accordingly, we affirm the 
 
 
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circuit court’s order summarily denying Van Poyck’s motion for postconviction 
DNA testing. 
 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., 
concur. 
ANSTEAD, J., dissents with an opinion. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
ANSTEAD, J., dissenting. 
 
Today’s ruling tells us that for purposes of assessing culpability between 
codefendants, it makes no difference who the actual triggerman was.  I cannot 
accept that proposition generally, or as it is applied in this case.  I respectfully 
dissent from the majority’s determination that the proper identification of the 
triggerman in a homicide by shooting could have no bearing on the proper penalty 
to be imposed.   
 
Common sense and our death penalty jurisprudence tell us that there is a vast 
difference in the importance of the defendant being the triggerman in a shooting 
death for purposes of evaluating the defendant’s guilt (where it is not essential), 
compared with an assessment of a defendant’s culpability for purposes of 
 
 
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evaluating whether he should receive the death penalty.4  For example, in our 
initial review in this case, this Court found that the evidence was insufficient to 
prove that the defendant was the triggerman and guilty of premeditated murder, but 
the evidence was nevertheless sufficient to sustain a conviction for felony-murder.  
Van Poyck v. State, 564 So. 2d 1066, 1069 (Fla. 1990). 
 
We need only examine the trial record in this case to see explicit proof that 
the identity of the triggerman was both important and at issue in the jury’s 
assessment of the appropriate penalty for Van Poyck.  In this case, the prosecutor 
expressly argued to the jury during the penalty phase: “So again, it is important 
who the triggerman is.  There is no doubt about it.  It’s important to your 
deliberations, okay.”  Subsequent to those statements the prosecutor told the jury: 
“So ladies and gentlemen, even though he says he was not the triggerman, I submit 
the evidence shows that he was, because the only eyewitness we have that actually 
saw the guns well enough to identify is Officer Turner.  He is the one left alive 
                                        
 
4.  While there are numerous decisions from this Court standing for the 
proposition that the identity of the triggerman is critical in an assessment of the 
appropriate penalty, none illustrates the point better than Justice Grimes’ separate 
opinion in Zerquera v. State, 549 So. 2d 189, 193 (Fla. 1989), where he expressed 
disagreement with the majority’s remand for a new trial on guilt, while agreeing 
that a new penalty phase was necessary “[b]ecause the question of who did the 
actual shooting directly bears on whether Zerquera should receive the death 
penalty.”  549 So. 2d at 193 (Grimes, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).  
  
 
 
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here to tell you who had what gun.”5  Thus, there can be no doubt that the 
prosecution, in seeking the death penalty, asserted to the jury first, that it was 
important in their deliberations on the penalty to determine who the triggerman 
was, and, second, in this case, the evidence supported a determination that the 
defendant was the triggerman.  The jury, of course, after this argument, returned 
with a recommendation for death.6   
 
On the face of this record how can we possibly now conclude that the 
identification of the triggerman is irrelevant to the determination of whether 
the death penalty should be imposed? The prosecutor has already answered 
that question for us.  The majority has chosen to deal with a hypothetical 
situation: could the death penalty be imposed on a non-triggerman, rather 
than dealing with the actual situation presented here where the State sought 
the death penalty, asserting as grounds that the defendant was the 
triggerman, and the jury returned with a vote for the death penalty.   
                                        
 
5.  In addition, the trial court stated in its sentencing order: 
 
The Court further finds that the State clearly presented 
competent and substantial evidence as to the crime of first degree 
felony murder and or first degree pre-meditated murder and in reality 
presented competent evidence that Mr. Van Poyck may have in fact 
been the individual who pulled the trigger and shot Fred Griffis. 
 
 
6.  This, of course, is the same jury that we determined was in error in 
finding the defendant guilty of premeditated murder. 
 
 
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Not much is being asked in this case, only that some evidence be re-
examined to allow modern science and technology to inform us as to whether we 
can be more informed about who actually did the killing.  The Legislature has 
authorized exploration of this new evidence if it could have an impact on the 
assessment of the penalty to be imposed for the crime.  Surely, if it was available, 
the judge, the jury and this Court would all have wanted to consider this evidence 
at the time this case was tried so we could have greater confidence in our decision-
making as to the defendant’s culpability and our decision for life or death.   
 
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Palm Beach County,  
 
Richard I. Wennet, Judge - Case Nos. 87CF006736 A02 and 88CF011116 A02 
 
Mark E. Olive, Tallahassee, Florida and Jeffrey O. Davis of Quarles and Brady, 
LLP, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Celia A. Terenzio, 
Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee