Title: MICHAELSON v WARDELL
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 14852
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: January 11, 1980

No. 14852 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1979 LARRY A. MICHAELSON and SYLVIA MICHAELSON, husband and wife, Plaintiffs and Respondents, VS . CALLIS WARDELL, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the First Judicial District, Honorable Gordon R. Bennett, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Small, Hatch and Doubeck, Helena, Montana For Respondents: Robert T. Cummins, Helena, Montana Jackson and Kelley, Helena, Montana Submitted on briefs: November 14, 1979 Decided: .jJ/,; 1 , - P 9 L - ,- - Filed: is: - - Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. his appeal is from a summary judgment in favor of the respondents who alleged they were entitled to a permanent easement over appellant's land by operation of law. ~ o t h parties filed motions for summary judgment. Pursuant to these motions, the District Court granted respondents an implied easement by reservation. Appellant filed a motion with the District Court to alter and amend a portion of its order. No action was taken on this motion, and appellant brought this appeal. Prior to 1969 appellant, as a principal stockholder of Cal-Mart Corp., was the owner of the land now owned by respondents. Also, prior to 1969, appellant built the house presently inhabited by respondents, and built and improved the access road presently in issue. This road traverses several hundred feet of appellant's property, enters respon- dents' property and becomes respondents' driveway. The road was built by appellant to serve the house on the property and also to serve part of appellant's fields. In 1969 appellant conveyed the property presently owned by respondents to James and Grace Fournier. The conveyances were made by warranty deed and contained no easements. The roadway across appellant's property was used by the ~ourniers to reach their property. Appellant also used this road to drive through the Fourniers' property to get to his fields. The Fourniers conveyed the property to Mr. and Mrs. Greenfield. In 1972 the Greenfields conveyed the property to the respondents. This deed did not contain an express easement. Although a p p e l l a n t had never given t h e respondents s p e c i f i c w r i t t e n o r o r a l permission t o use t h e access road, respondents used it continuously, with a p p e l l a n t ' s knowledge and cooperation from t h e t i m e they purchased t h e property. The access road was and s t i l l i s the only r e g u l a r l y used means of access t o respondents' house. Respondents used t h e road u n t i l March 1978. A t t h a t t i m e a p p e l l a n t removed a c a t t l e g u a r d a t t h e beginning of t h e access road on a p p e l l a n t ' s property and blocked t h e road with a concrete c u l v e r t . This was t h e f i r s t t i m e a p p e l l a n t had ever i n t e r f e r e d with respondents' o r t h e i r predecessors' use of t h e access road. Appellant's a c t i o n prompted respondents t o bring t h i s s u i t . The D i s t r i c t Court found t h a t respondents d i d n o t have an easement by p r e s c r i p t i o n because t h e use was permissive. The D i s t r i c t Court d i d f i n d , however, t h a t respondents have an implied easement by r e s e r v a t i o n pursuant t o s e c t i o n 70- 20-308, MCA. I t i s t h i s conclusion of law t h a t forms t h e only i s s u e f o r review by t h i s Court. Appellant contends t h e use of t h e roadway by respondents and t h e i r predecessors w a s e n t i r e l y with a p p e l l a n t ' s consent and permission and w a s i n t h e nature of a l i c e n s e , t h e r e f o r e , no easement of any kind would a r i s e with r e s p e c t t o t h e use of t h e road. W e disagree. The D i s t r i c t Court c o r r e c t l y found t h a t , while respondents do n o t have a p r e s c r i p t i v e easement, they have an implied easement by r e s e r v a t i o n over t h i s road. The c o n t r o l l i n g s t a t u t e i s s e c t i o n 70-20-308, MCA. I t reads: "Easements t o p a s s w i t h property. A t r a n s f e r of real property p a s s e s a l l easements a t t a c h e d t h e r e t o and c r e a t e s i n f a v o r thereof an easement t o u s e o t h e r real property of t h e person whose -- -- estate i s t r a n s f e r r e d i n t h e same manner and t o --- -- t h e s a m e e x t e n t as such p r o p e r t y was obviously -- -- and permanently used & t h e person whose e s t a t e i s t r a n s f e r r e d f o r t h e b e n e f i t thereof a t t h e - -- -- t i m e when t h e t r a n s f e r was agreed upon o r com- --- --- p l e t e d . " (Emphasis added. ) This s t a t u t e , i n p a r t , recites t h e common l a w p r i n c i p l e t h a t an easement is r e s e r v e d when t h e dominant tenement is conveyed and a s e r v i e n t tenement i s r e t a i n e d . Spaeth v. E m m e t t (1963), 142 Mont. 231, 383 P.2d 812, 816. This s t a t u t e , however, extends t h e common law and c r e a t e s a n easement, n o n e x i s t e n t p r i o r t o t h e conveyance, i n c a s e s where t h e p r o p e r t y i n q u e s t i o n was "obviously and permanently" used by t h e g r a n t o r f o r t h e b e n e f i t of what becomes t h e dominant estate. McPherson v . Monegan (1947), 120 Mont. 454, 187 P.2d 542, 545. I n McPherson w e upheld an implied easement of a road under s e c t i o n 70-20-308, MCA ( t h e n , 86865, Rev. Codes 1935), on f a c t s n o t d i s s i m i l a r t o t h o s e presented here. "The f a c t s i n t h i s c a s e d i s c l o s e an implied g r a n t of easement which passed w i t h t h e p r o p e r t y under o u r s t a t u t e (sec. 6865) and which a r o s e o u t of t h e f a c t t h a t M r s . Samson s o l d land bounded i n p a r t by a road which had t h e r e t o f o r e been contin- uously used by s a i d g r a n t o r a s a means of access t o s a i d land . . ." 187 P.2d a t 545. The f a c t s i n t h i s case, a s found by t h e District Court, r e v e a l such a n implied g r a n t of easement. Appellant w a s t h e owner i n common of h i s p r e s e n t p r o p e r t y and respondents' p r e s e n t property. Before s e l l i n g any of h i s property, a p p e l l a n t b u i l t t h e access road t o s e r v e t h e r e s i d e n c e now owned by respondents. That road w a s continuously used by respondents and their predecessors to serve the residence. The road was and still is the only means of access used by respondents and their predecessors. When appellant conveyed the property to the first grantees, the Fourniers, he created under the above statute a permanent easement for use of the roadway as an access to respondents' residence. The roadway is being used for the same benefit to respondents as it was to the original owner. The requirements of the statute were met, McPherson v. Monegan, supra; Spaeth v. Emmett, supra; Godfrey v. Pilon (1974), 165 Mont. 439, 529 P.2d 1372; and, there were no genuine issues as to any material fact. The District Court acted properly in ruling the respondents have an implied easement by reservation in the road crossing appellant's property and in granting respondents' motion for summary judgment. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. / L . kL724' Justice We concur: 3*&k4 Chief Justice