Title: Commonwealth v. Kozubal
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13092
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: October 15, 2021

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13092 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MAREK KOZUBAL. 
 
 
 
Norfolk.     May 3, 2021. - October 15, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Indecent Assault and Battery.  Jury and Jurors.  Constitutional 
Law, Jury.  Evidence, Inflammatory evidence, Hearsay, 
Admissions and confessions, Admission by silence, State of 
mind, Verbal completeness, Business record.  Practice, 
Criminal, Jury and jurors, Challenge to jurors, Argument by 
prosecutor, Instructions to jury.  Words, "Mandated 
reporter." 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on September 9, 2016. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Robert C. Cosgrove, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
David J. Nathanson for the defendant. 
 
Tracey A. Cusick, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  On July 1, 2019, the defendant, Marek Kozubal, 
was convicted by a Superior Court jury of various charges of 
2 
 
indecent assault and battery on a person under the age of 
fourteen by a mandated reporter, G. L. c. 265, § 13B 1/2, and 
indecent assault and battery on a person under the age of 
fourteen, G. L. c. 265, § 13B.  The defendant argues that (1) 
the judge abused his discretion in denying the defendant's 
peremptory challenge of a minority juror; (2) the judge 
improperly admitted text messages between the defendant and the 
victim; (3) the judge abused his discretion in admitting 
policies pertaining to child abuse and inappropriate sexual 
relations from the school's faculty handbook without admitting 
the entire handbook; (4) the prosecutor's closing argument 
improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant; and (5) 
the judge improperly instructed the jury on the definition of 
mandated reporter.  We affirm the defendant's convictions, with 
the exception of two counts where the jury found that the 
defendant was not acting in his official capacity as a mandated 
reporter when he committed the offenses.  We vacate and set 
aside the defendant's convictions under G. L. c. 265, § 13B 1/2, 
as to those two counts and remand to the Superior Court for 
entry of judgments of guilty of the lesser included offense of 
indecent assault and battery on a person under the age of 
fourteen, G. L. c. 265, § 13B. 
Background.  We recite the facts that the jury could have 
found, in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, see 
3 
 
Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979), 
reserving certain facts for our discussion of the issues. 
1.  Facts.  The thirty-nine year old defendant was 
convicted of indecently touching the thirteen year old victim on 
three separate occasions in 2016:  June 24, June 25, and July 6.  
The touching consisted of kissing, touching the victim's breasts 
over and under her clothing, and one touching of the victim's 
vulva area.  Tens of thousands of text messages were recovered 
forensically between the defendant and the victim, many of which 
had been deleted. 
 
In 2003, the defendant was hired as a faculty member and 
assistant to the director of a research-grade astronomical 
observatory at a private school for grades pre-kindergarten 
through twelve.  The observatory housed telescopes and was used 
by afterschool, community, and club programs.  The defendant's 
duties as a faculty member in 2003 included supporting 
technology for the observatory programs.  By 2016, the defendant 
was a part-time employee who worked in various afterschool 
programs, science programs, and outreach programs hosting 
visitors from other schools and scout troops.  Occasionally, the 
defendant was a substitute teacher in middle school classes, and 
he worked on the school's lower-school extracurricular 
activities.  The defendant also taught students during a summer 
camp at the school and instructed the amateur radio club, an 
4 
 
afterschool program held at the school that was open to 
students, faculty, and members of the community.  The assistant 
head of the school responsible for faculty and curriculum 
described the defendant as "a fellow teacher, a fellow faculty 
member at the school." 
 
The defendant met the victim and her father and stepmother 
in January 2016 at an adult education radio course held at the 
observatory.  They became friendly, and the victim's parents 
gave the defendant contact information for each of them.  The 
defendant began exchanging text messages with all three of them 
and entered into a polyamorous sexual relationship with the 
victim's stepmother that ended in June 2016.  The defendant also 
began exchanging text messages individually with the victim.  
Sometimes the defendant instructed the victim to delete text 
messages between them. 
 
On June 24, 2016, the victim was dropped off at the school 
to meet the defendant and prepare for a radio event that was to 
be held on June 25 and 26.  The defendant unlocked a classroom 
and kissed the victim.  The defendant told the victim he was 
"not supposed to do that," he could "get in big trouble," and 
not to tell anyone.  Later, in a stairway, the defendant kissed 
her again with his tongue and touched her breasts with his 
hands. 
5 
 
 
During the course of the event held at the school on June 
25 and 26, 2016, the defendant kissed the victim at least three 
times on her mouth, neck, and ears, and touched her breasts over 
and under her clothing.  One of the incidents took place in a 
room of the observatory that contained a refrigerator.  Again, 
the defendant told the victim that he could get in trouble for 
touching her.  They later exchanged text messages about the 
incident, referring to the "room with a fridge" and the events 
that had transpired there. 
 
The last incident occurred on July 6, 2016, when the 
defendant arranged to see the victim at her home.  The defendant 
sent the victim a text message about shaving in anticipation of 
kissing her.  When the defendant arrived, the father went out, 
leaving the victim and defendant alone.  They went to the 
basement, where the defendant kissed the victim's lips with his 
tongue, sucked her breasts, and lifted up his shirt and pressed 
his chest against her bare torso.  The defendant also touched 
the victim's vagina. 
The victim and the defendant walked to the park that 
evening, and the victim did not respond when her father tried to 
contact her.  When they returned, the victim's parents were 
angry.  After the  parents took away the victim's electronic 
devices, the victim's stepmother discovered text messages 
between the victim and the defendant about love; the stepmother 
6 
 
then questioned the victim about her relationship with the 
defendant.  On July 16, 2016, the victim disclosed to her 
parents that the defendant had kissed her, and on July 18, the 
victim's parents notified the police. 
 
2.  Procedure.  The defendant was arraigned in the Superior 
Court on eight indictments alleging aggravated indecent assault 
and battery on a child under fourteen by a mandated reporter, 
G. L. c. 265, § 13B 1/2.  The defendant unsuccessfully moved to 
dismiss on the ground that the grand jury heard insufficient 
evidence that the defendant was a mandated reporter. 
 
Prior to trial, the trial judge allowed the Commonwealth's 
motion to allow portions of the defendant's text conversations 
with the victim and denied the defendant's motion to exclude 
text messages.  The trial judge also allowed the defendant's 
motion for a ruling on the construction of the statute under 
which the defendant was charged, G. L. c. 265, § 13B 1/2, and 
its relationship to the mandated reporter statute with the 
notation, "the court agrees with the construction of the statute 
expressed by [the motion judge] in his memorandum of decision on 
the defendant's motion [to dismiss]." 
 
During jury selection, the judge denied defense counsel's 
peremptory challenge of juror no. 245.  The judge stated, "I 
noticed that that is a minority juror.  I think that's the 
second challenge of a minority juror.  So, I'm going to ask you 
7 
 
to justify your challenge, please."1  Defense counsel immediately 
responded:  "Your Honor, my concern is that this juror has 
indicated that he has children and nieces and nephews and that 
while in his experience young children, out of confusion, may 
make certain allegations that he could see as false, that his 
initial answer was children [twelve] and up don't have that kind 
of confusion.  And so, my concern is based on being a father and 
being an uncle and his sort of initial instinctual belief that 
children of that age wouldn't make false allegations." 
The judge found that the defendant's justification was 
pretextual and inadequate and seated the juror over the 
defendant's objection.  The defendant claimed at sentencing that 
the challenge of the juror was justified because the juror's 
questionnaire showed that he was applying to be a police 
officer.  However, he did not raise this objection during jury 
selection. 
 
At the conclusion of the trial, the judge instructed the 
jurors that a mandated reporter was "a person who is a public or 
private schoolteacher or a person paid to care for or work with 
a child in any public or private facility."  Verdict slips 
specified the conduct pertaining to each indictment; three 
 
1 Although the transcript attributes these remarks to 
defense counsel, the parties agree that this was an error and 
that the judge made the remarks. 
8 
 
indictments were for acts on July 6, 2016, two were for acts on 
June 24, 2016, and three were for acts on June 25, 2016.  Each 
verdict slip also included a special question:  whether the 
Commonwealth "proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant was acting in his professional capacity as a mandated 
reporter at the time of the indecent assault and battery on a 
child under fourteen."  The jury returned guilty verdicts on all 
indictments and answered the special question in the affirmative 
as to the indictments related to the incidents that occurred on 
June 24 and 25, 2016.  The jury answered the special question in 
the negative as to the indictments relating to the incidents 
that occurred at the victim's home on July 6, 2016.2 
 
The defendant was sentenced to State prison for concurrent 
terms of from ten years to ten years and one day for each of 
seven of the convictions, and to a consecutive three-year term 
of probation from and after his release on the eighth. 
Discussion.  1.  Denial of peremptory challenge of racial 
minority juror.  The defendant argues that the trial judge 
improperly denied his peremptory challenge of juror no. 245 
 
2 The first indictment stemming from the incidents that 
occurred on July 6, 2016, was reduced to indecent assault and 
battery on a person under the age of fourteen, G. L. c. 265, 
§ 13B, to allow the judge to sentence the defendant to probation 
from and after his release from prison.  As discussed infra, the 
other two indictments stemming from the incidents that occurred 
on July 6, 2016, also must be reduced pursuant to Commonwealth 
v. Gomes, 483 Mass. 123, 128-129 (2019). 
9 
 
because there was no prima facie showing of discrimination, the 
judge did not explicitly find that the defendant was a member of 
a discrete group, and defense counsel provided an adequate and 
genuine justification for the challenge.  The Commonwealth 
counters that the judge's finding that the justification for the 
challenge of juror no. 245 was pretextual and inadequate was 
within his discretion and supported by the record. 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights prohibit 
a party from exercising peremptory challenges on the basis of 
race, sex, or sexual orientation, among other groupings.  See 
Commonwealth v. Carter, 488 Mass. 191, 201 (2021); Commonwealth 
v. Henderson, 486 Mass. 296, 311 (2020); Commonwealth v. Lopes, 
478 Mass. 593, 597 (2018).  Striking even a single juror for a 
discriminatory purpose is prohibited.  See Snyder v. Louisiana, 
552 U.S. 472, 478 (2008); Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 485 Mass. 
491, 511 (2020); Commonwealth v. Issa, 466 Mass. 1, 9 (2013).  
The issue is not whether there is a pattern of improper 
challenges, but whether a single challenge is based 
impermissibly on a juror's membership in a protected group.  
Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 439 Mass. 460, 463 n.3 (2003).  The 
Commonwealth is equally entitled to "a representative jury, 
unimpaired by the improper exercise of peremptory challenges by 
the defense."  Commonwealth v. Prunty, 462 Mass. 295, 308 
10 
 
(2012), quoting Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 489 n.35 
(1979). 
A three-step burden shifting analysis is applied to 
determine whether a peremptory strike of a potential juror is 
proper.  See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 94-95 (1986); 
Soares, 377 Mass. at 489-491.  We presume that peremptory 
challenges are properly made.  Lopes, 478 Mass. at 598.  First, 
to rebut the presumption that the peremptory challenge is 
proper, the challenging party "'must make out a prima facie 
case' that it was impermissibly based on race or other protected 
status 'by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives 
rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.'"  Commonwealth 
v. Jackson, 486 Mass. 763, 768 (2021), quoting Johnson v. 
California, 545 U.S. 162, 168 (2005).  Second, if the 
challenging party makes out a prima facie case, "the burden 
shifts to the party exercising the challenge to provide a group-
neutral explanation for it" (quotations omitted).  Jackson, 
supra, quoting Sanchez, 485 Mass. at 493.  Third, "the judge 
must then determine whether the explanation is both adequate and 
genuine" (quotations omitted).  Jackson, supra, quoting Sanchez, 
supra. 
"An explanation is adequate if it is 'clear and reasonably 
specific,' 'personal to the juror and not based on the juror's 
group affiliation' (in this case race) . . . and related to the 
11 
 
particular case being tried. . . .  An explanation is genuine if 
it is in fact the reason for the exercise of the challenge.  The 
mere denial of an improper motive is inadequate to establish the 
genuineness of the explanation."  Maldonado, 439 Mass. at 464-
465.  Because a judge must find that both the genuineness and 
adequacy of the explanation are satisfied before allowing a 
peremptory challenge, a determination that either adequacy or 
genuineness is not met is sufficient to deny the challenge.  See 
Commonwealth v. LeClair, 429 Mass. 313, 323 (1999) (affirming 
disallowance of challenge where judge found explanation 
disingenuous). 
 
"We review the denial of a peremptory challenge for abuse 
of discretion."  Commonwealth v. Obi, 475 Mass. 541, 551 (2016).  
A decision resulting from "a clear error of judgment in weighing 
the factors relevant to the decision such that the decision 
falls outside the range of reasonable alternatives" is an abuse 
of discretion (quotations and citation omitted).  L.L. v. 
Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014).  Trial judges have 
considerable discretion in ruling on whether a permissible 
ground for the peremptory challenge has been shown, and 
reviewing courts will not disturb that ruling so long as it is 
supported by the record.  Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477 
(determinations of credibility and demeanor lie within trial 
judge's province); Commonwealth v. Oberle, 476 Mass. 539, 545 
12 
 
(2017); Obi, supra (reviewing court defers to trial judge's 
sound discretion rather than substitute its review of 
transcript); Maldonado, 439 Mass. at 466 (appellate courts 
"particularly ill-equipped to assess [explanation's] 
genuineness").  A defendant does not have an absolute right to a 
peremptory challenge.  Obi, supra at 550.  However, error in the 
denial of a defendant's peremptory challenge is reversable error 
without a showing of prejudice.  Commonwealth v. Hampton, 457 
Mass. 152, 164-165 (2010); Commonwealth v. Hyatt, 409 Mass. 689, 
691-692 (1991). 
We agree with the Commonwealth that the judge acted within 
his discretion in denying the defendant's peremptory challenge 
of juror no. 245.  The judge found the defense attorney's 
justification of her challenge "to be both pretextual and 
inadequate."  Defense counsel stated, "[M]y concern is that this 
juror has indicated that he has children and nieces and nephews 
and that while in his experience young children, out of 
confusion, may make certain allegations that he could see as 
false, that his initial answer was children [twelve] and up 
don't have that kind of confusion.  And so, my concern is that 
based on being a father and being an uncle and his sort of 
initial instinctual belief that children of that age wouldn't 
make false allegations, that is the reason." 
13 
 
The judge's finding that the challenge was pretextual and 
inadequate was supported by the record.  Although the challenged 
juror answered "no" to the question, "Do you think children 
sometimes make false accusations of sexual assault?" he 
clarified this response when the judge questioned him.  As a 
father of two and an uncle, juror no. 245 explained that he 
believed younger children could make false accusations of sexual 
assault based on extraneous information.  With respect to 
children twelve and older, however, juror no. 245 said that he 
would base his verdict on the evidence, explaining that children 
twelve and older "may [make false accusations] or they may not.  
It's just based off of the proof of what you have and all the 
information that comes up, and if there's any witness or what 
information that they're bringing up, you know, based off of 
what the story is and what's happening."  Thus, juror no. 245 
did not suggest that he believed children twelve and older would 
never make false accusations.  Accordingly, the judge was well 
within his discretion in finding that defense counsel's 
justification was not adequate or genuine. 
The challenge of juror no. 245 was the second peremptory 
challenge the defense attorney attempted to exercise on a Black 
juror.  Although the Commonwealth did not object to either 
14 
 
challenge, the judge inquired after making this observation.3  A 
judge has broad discretion to move to the second prong without 
having to decide whether the challenging party met the first 
prong.  See Commonwealth v. Robertson, 480 Mass. 383, 396 n.10 
(2018), quoting Lopes, 478 Mass. at 598.  Furthermore, "[a] 
judge may, of course, raise the issue of a Soares violation sua 
sponte."  Commonwealth v. Fritz, 472 Mass. 341, 348 (2015), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 450 Mass. 395, 406, cert. denied, 
555 U.S. 893 (2008).  Here, we view the judge's sua sponte 
 
3 During jury selection, the judge did not specify to which 
protected group juror no. 245 belonged and referred to him as a 
"minority" juror.  We previously have noted that this type of 
"unfocused" characterization can "confuse[] matters."  
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 486 Mass. 763, 772 (2021).  "The test 
in [Commonwealth v.] Soares[, 377 Mass. 461 (1979),] and Batson 
[v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986),] does not apply to challenges 
to members of all minority ethnic or racial groups lumped 
together, but instead applies to challenges to 'particular, 
defined groupings in the community.'"  Commonwealth v. Lopes, 
478 Mass. 593, 600 n.5 (2018), quoting Commonwealth v. Prunty, 
462 Mass. 295, 307 n.17 (2012). 
 
In this case, the record reveals that the particular group 
in question was Black jurors and that the judge understood this 
to be the case.  In discussing the defendant's motion for a stay 
after trial on July 8, the judge noted that juror no. 245 was "a 
second [B]lack juror.  He may have been a [B]lack Hispanic." 
 
Given this support from the record, we focus our analysis 
on the cognizable group of Black jurors.  We conclude that 
although the judge in this case did not make a finding on the 
record as to the challenged juror's race, he considered whether 
defense counsel's explanation was a pretext for discrimination 
against the discrete group of Black jurors, not only against 
"minority" jurors.  We emphasize, however, that trial judges 
should identify the cognizable group for the purpose of a Batson 
challenge on the record. 
15 
 
inquiry under the second prong as an implicit finding of a 
pattern of improper exclusion.  See Commonwealth v. Benoit, 452 
Mass. 212, 220-221 (2008).  We disagree with the defendant's 
argument that the Commonwealth's failure to object substantiates 
the defendant's claim.  We have "persistently urged, if not 
beseeched" judges to elicit group-neutral explanations 
regardless of whether the first prong of the inquiry has been 
satisfied.  Sanchez, 485 Mass. 515 (Lowy, J., concurring).  A 
judge may inquire into the basis of a peremptory challenge based 
on his or her own initiative and observations.  See Commonwealth 
v. Wood, 389 Mass. 552, 560-561 n.9 (1983). 
It also is significant that the defendant did not challenge 
two jurors with similar characteristics and responses to juror 
no. 245.  Both juror no. 31 and juror no. 53 answered "no" to 
the question, "Do you think children sometime make false 
accusations of sexual assault?"  The responses of those jurors 
about children making false allegations of sexual assault 
substantially were the same as juror no. 245's response, yet the 
defendant did not challenge them.  Juror no. 31, like juror no. 
245, also had two children.  Based on the totality of the 
relevant facts, it was reasonable for the judge to infer a 
discriminatory purpose.  See Sanchez, 485 Mass. at 511.  
Further, the judge was within his discretion in denying the 
16 
 
challenge after finding that defense counsel's justification was 
not adequate or genuine. 
2.  Admission of text messages between defendant and 
victim.  The defendant argues that admission of some text 
messages he exchanged with the victim was prejudicial error.  He 
does not contest authentication of the text messages, but 
instead argues that some specific text message exchanges were 
inadmissible hearsay.  Conversely, the Commonwealth argues that 
the admission of the text messages was proper under the hearsay 
exemption for statements by a party opponent, as well as to show 
the defendant's state of mind.  We agree with the Commonwealth. 
The Commonwealth moved to allow portions of the defendant's 
extensive text conversations with the victim.  Specifically, the 
Commonwealth sought to introduce all messages from June 24 to 
July 11, 2016, as well as messages discussing the defendant as a 
teacher or mandated reporter; discussing the defendant's request 
that the victim delete certain messages; discussing the 
defendant's getting in trouble for the relationship or telling 
the victim not to tell anyone about the relationship; involving 
flirting; and discussing the victim's age.  The defendant moved 
to exclude the text messages on hearsay and relevance grounds.  
The judge found the text messages from the defendant admissible 
as statements of a party opponent.  The judge found the text 
messages from the victim to be admissible under the doctrine of 
17 
 
verbal completeness to render the defendant's statements 
comprehensible, to show the relationship of the parties, and to 
show that some of the defendant's text messages were adoptive 
admissions. 
 
"The hearsay rule prohibits the admission only of out-of-
court assertions offered to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted."  Commonwealth v. Siny Van Tran, 460 Mass. 535, 550 
(2011), citing Mass. G. Evid. § 801(c) (2011).  If a statement 
is offered to show that the statement was made, and not to prove 
the facts asserted in it, it is not hearsay.  See id.  See also 
Commonwealth v. Fiore, 364 Mass. 819, 824 (1974), citing 
Wigmore, Evidence § 1766 (3d ed. 1940) (out-of-court utterances 
constitute hearsay only when offered "for a special purpose, 
namely, as assertions to evidence the truth of the matter 
asserted").  Additionally, "[a]n extrajudicial statement made by 
a party opponent is an exception to the rule against the 
introduction of hearsay, and is admissible unless subject to 
exclusion on other grounds."  Commonwealth v. Spencer, 465 Mass. 
32, 46 (2013).  See Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(2)(A) (2021).  The 
hearsay exemption of the party opponent encompasses any 
extrajudicial statement made by a party opponent, not just 
statements that are inculpatory or against the party's interest.  
Spencer, supra.  Finally, statements may be admissible under the 
hearsay exemption of adoptive admission.  See Commonwealth v. 
18 
 
Ferreira, 481 Mass. 641, 658 (2019); Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 801(d)(2)(B). 
First, the messages from the defendant to the victim, which 
included declarations of love and wanting to be with the victim, 
were not admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, and 
accordingly, such statements are not hearsay.  Messages between 
the defendant and the victim that recounted their sexual 
encounters were highly relevant at a trial for indecent assault 
and battery of a person under fourteen by a mandated reporter.  
See Commonwealth v. Gilman, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 752, 753, 757-758 
(2016).  The messages also were relevant to the defendant's 
profession and whether he was a mandated reporter.  In the text 
messages, the defendant referenced being a teacher and discussed 
his relationship with students. 
 
We agree with the motion judge that text messages sent from 
the defendant to the victim were admissible under the hearsay 
exemption for a party opponent's statements.  We also agree that 
the victim's messages were admitted properly to provide 
important context for the defendant's text messages.  See 
Commonwealth v. Barnett, 482 Mass. 632, 638 (2019) (accusatory 
text message to defendant properly admitted to provide necessary 
context to defendant's admissible statements). 
The defendant specifically challenges the admission of a 
deleted text message exchange spanning a period of seventeen 
19 
 
minutes on July 7, 2016.  The defendant contends that this 
exchange was improperly admitted as an adoptive admission.  "To 
prove that a statement was an adoptive admission on the basis 
that a defendant remained silent in the face of an accusation, 
the Commonwealth must establish that (1) the defendant heard and 
understood the statement; (2) the defendant had an opportunity 
to respond; and (3) the context was one in which an individual 
would have been expected to respond to an accusation of criminal 
conduct."  Ferreira, 481 Mass. at 658. 
In the text message exchange, the defendant adoptively 
admits to being in the basement at the victim's home the day 
before, on July 6, 2016.  The victim stated, "I've been thinking 
of last night in the basement," and the defendant responded, 
"Yeah it was a very good talk."  The victim then stated, "I was 
thinking about the more silent things in the basement."  The 
victim sent three more text messages, after which the defendant 
responded with a smiley face emoji.4 
This exchange of text messages was properly admitted as an 
adoptive admission.  It is obvious from the exchange that the 
 
4 "An emoji is 'any of various small images, symbols, or 
icons used in text fields in electronic communication (as in 
text messages, [electronic ]mail, and social media) to express 
the emotional attitude of the writer, convey information 
succinctly, communicate a message playfully without using words, 
etc.'"  Commonwealth v. Castano, 478 Mass. 75, 78 n.2 (2017), 
quoting Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/emoji [https://perma.cc/QUC5-SA8E]. 
20 
 
defendant "heard" and understood the statement and had an 
opportunity to respond.  See Ferreira, 481 Mass. at 658.  
Furthermore, in the context of the conversation, the defendant 
would have understood that the victim was referring to the 
sexual encounter that occurred in the basement and would have 
been expected to respond to it as an accusation of criminal 
conduct.  See id. 
We agree with the defendant that a conversation via text 
messages substantially is different from an in-person 
conversation, and recognize that "evidence of this nature," 
especially digital evidence, "must be approached with caution."  
Commonwealth v. Olszewski, 416 Mass. 707, 719 (1993).  We 
disagree, however, that the facts of this case are comparable to 
Ferreira, 481 Mass. at 658-659, where we concluded that hanging 
up the telephone after an accusation of criminal conduct was not 
an adoptive admission.  Here, it is apparent that the defendant 
received the message because he eventually responded to the 
victim with a smiley face emoji, albeit after she sent several 
more text messages.  Regardless of whether the defendant's text 
message was in response to the victim's message that she was 
"thinking about the more silent things in the basement," it was 
in no way a denial of the accusation of criminal conduct. 
Several other text message exchanges were admitted over the 
same objection.  The defendant argues that the following 
21 
 
messages were admitted improperly as adoptive admissions because 
the victim stated that some of the text messages in this 
exchange from the defendant "all came at once": 
The victim:  "I'm just remembering being alone with you the 
last few days 
 
"It really is awesome being with you like that 
 
"Even when we're not having nice things 
 
"It's just amazing being with you alone 
 
"Doesn't matter what we're doing" 
 
The defendant: "You can let your walls down." 
 
The victim:  "Yes 
 
"And so can you 
 
"Even tho we're listening for people we can still be 
ourselves." 
 
The defendant:  "Yeah 
 
"Hope you liked what you saw of me" 
 
The defendant argues that because the messages may have been 
delayed, it is difficult to tell to which statements the 
defendant was responding.  In the context of these messages, we 
disagree that any delay rendered the messages inadmissible.  
Regardless of whether the defendant's responses were delayed, he 
did not deny that he was alone with the victim in any of his 
responses. 
The defendant argues that the following exchange also was 
improperly admitted as an adoptive admission: 
22 
 
The victim:  "Actually thinking of when we were on the 
fifth floor yesterday and we went into a room with a fridge 
and I asked if you were getting food from it . . . and you 
said, 'No, I'm getting you.'  And then you pulled me inside 
against the table, and niced[5] me passionately" 
 
The defendant:  "You did it again." 
 
The defendant then instructed the victim to delete the text 
message.  Again, in the context of the conversation, the 
defendant's response of "[y]ou did it again" was not a denial of 
the criminal conduct the victim described in her message.  The 
same is true of his next statement instructing the victim to 
delete her message.  Given that the defendant previously had 
sent the victim text messages that he could "get in trouble" for 
his behavior toward her, the defendant's intent in telling the 
victim to delete the messages is clear. 
 
The defendant's text messages about showering and getting 
his things together also were admitted properly as statements of 
a party opponent.  In many of the text messages, the defendant 
encouraged the victim to communicate with him and exploited her 
feelings for him.  Such statements were relevant to the 
declarant's state of mind, and therefore were not hearsay.  See 
Commonwealth v. Qualls, 425 Mass. 163, 167 (1997).  His text 
messages remarking on the victim's beauty, asking her to dress 
up for him, requesting a "whole body shot," and stating, "Oh god 
 
5 The victim testified that this meant "kissed." 
23 
 
you're learning to become a better tease" were relevant to the 
nature of his relationship with the thirteen year old victim.  
The defendant's instructions to the victim to delete certain 
messages describing sexual encounters between them were 
admissible as statements of a party opponent. 
Even if admission of any of the isolated text messages to 
which the defendant objected were error, there was no prejudice 
to him given the cumulative nature of the evidence, including 
the admission of the many text messages between the defendant 
and the victim that the defendant does not contest. 
3.  Admission of school policies.  The defendant argues 
that the judge erred in admitting the school's written policies 
pertaining to child abuse and inappropriate sexual relations, 
absent the entire school faculty handbook.  Specifically, the 
defendant contends that the doctrine of verbal completeness 
required the judge to review the entire faculty handbook before 
admitting the policies pertaining to child abuse and 
inappropriate sexual relations.  At trial, the defendant argued 
that the school's policies were not business records and that 
"if this is a 200-page document or whatever it is -- What the 
Commonwealth is trying to elicit here is that the [d]efendant 
was aware of this.  And just giving it to the jury in this form, 
with just these provisions, is problematic in that respect."  
The Commonwealth counters that the judge did not abuse his 
24 
 
discretion in finding there was a sufficient foundation for the 
school policies to be admitted under the hearsay exception for 
business records. 
The business records hearsay exception provides that "a 
writing or record . . . made as a memorandum or record of any 
act, transaction, occurrence or event, shall not be inadmissible 
in any civil or criminal proceeding as evidence of the facts 
therein stated because it is transcribed or because it is 
hearsay or self-serving."  G. L. c. 233, § 78.  See Commonwealth 
v. Fulgiam, 477 Mass. 20, 39 (2017); Mass. G. Evid. § 803(6)(A).  
A record falls within the scope of the business records hearsay 
exception "if the judge finds that it was (1) made in good 
faith; (2) made in the regular course of business; (3) made 
before the action began; and (4) the regular course of business 
to make the record at or about the time of the transaction or 
occurrences recorded" (citation omitted).  Fulgiam, supra.  "If 
such findings are made, the record 'is presumed to be reliable 
and therefore admissible.'"  Id., quoting Wingate v. Emery Air 
Freight Corp., 385 Mass. 402, 406 (1982). 
At trial, the school's director of human resources 
testified that the policies had been part of the faculty 
handbook issued in 2013 and in effect until 2017.  Consequently, 
the judge found that the policies were admissible as business 
records.  We review the admission of the documents for abuse of 
25 
 
discretion.  See Commonwealth v. Denton, 477 Mass. 248, 250 
(2017).  That the policies were described as "excerpts" from the 
handbook did not subject them to the doctrine of verbal 
completeness.  We agree with the judge that the excerpts of the 
handbook were made in the regular course of business, before 
this action began.  Printing parts of preexisting documents 
without altering the text does not amount to creating a document 
for litigation.  See Commonwealth v. Andre, 484 Mass. 403, 410-
411 (2020) (record created by searching for and copying account 
information into new document permissible).  The evidence showed 
that the defendant was familiar with the policies because they 
were provided to all faculty members.  Furthermore, the 
defendant referred to the policies in his text messages with the 
victim. 
Although the defendant contends that the Commonwealth did 
not possess the full faculty handbook, he does not identify 
anything further in the handbook that was relevant to his 
defense.  Moreover, he did not make the handbook a part of the 
record, and he provides only speculation that the absence of the 
complete handbook made the policies that were admitted 
misleading.  We also note that, as the Commonwealth points out, 
before trial, the defendant did not move pursuant to Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 17, 378 Mass. 885 (1979), or otherwise attempt to 
obtain the school's complete faculty handbook.  Mere speculation 
26 
 
that the school policies about sexual contact were misleading, 
without more, is not a sufficient basis for us to conclude that 
the judge erred in admitting excerpts of the handbook.  
Accordingly, we conclude that the judge did not abuse his 
discretion in admitting the school's policies regarding child 
abuse and inappropriate sexual relations in evidence.6 
4.  Closing argument.  The defendant argues that the 
prosecutor's closing argument misrepresented testimony and 
improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant.  The 
Commonwealth argues that the prosecutor drew permissible 
inferences from the evidence, and that she appropriately 
responded to the defendant's closing argument.  The defendant 
did not object to the prosecutor's closing argument; therefore, 
we determine whether there was an error and, if so, whether the 
error created a substantial risk of miscarriage of justice.  
 
6 We also note that the defendant's suggestion that the 
judge should have reviewed the entire handbook is a 
misapplication of the doctrine of verbal completeness. "When a 
party introduces a portion of a statement or writing in evidence 
the doctrine of verbal completeness allows admission of other 
relevant portions of the same statement or writing which serve 
to 'clarify the context' of the admitted portion" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Carmona, 428 Mass. 268, 272 (1998).  
Even if the doctrine of verbal completeness were applicable, it 
would not require judicial review of the entire writing, rather 
it would require additional portions of the writing to be 
admitted where necessary to give context to the excerpted 
statements. 
27 
 
Commonwealth v. Miranda, 458 Mass. 100, 114 (2010), cert. 
denied, 565 U.S. 1013 (2011). 
First, the defendant argues that the prosecutor misstated 
evidence relating to testimony from the assistant head of the 
school where the defendant worked.  The prosecutor stated that 
the "[assistant head of school] said that the [d]efendant was 
acting in his capacity as a faculty member when the public came 
. . . into their facility, as a faculty member needed to be 
present to use those facilities."  The defendant argues that the 
witness never testified that a faculty member needed to be 
present to use the facilities, and that this evidence directly 
concerned an element of the crime.  We conclude that this 
statement was based in evidence and was a logical inference from 
the witness's testimony that the school held community programs 
staffed by the school's faculty.  See Commonwealth v. Lewis, 465 
Mass. 119, 129 (2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Kozec, 399 Mass. 
514, 516 (1987) (prosecutor's closing argument may be based on 
"inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence"). 
Next, the defendant argues that the prosecutor attempted to 
shift the burden of proof by underscoring the defendant's 
failure to testify.  An attempt to shift the burden of proof 
occurs when the prosecution suggests that the defendant has "an 
affirmative duty to bring forth evidence of his innocence" 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Witkowski, 487 Mass. 675, 
28 
 
686 (2021).  A prosecutor may respond and comment on the 
defense's argument and point to weaknesses in the argument so 
long as it focuses on the argument as a whole and not the 
defendant's failure to testify.  Id.  Prosecutors "may be 
critical of the tactics utilized by trial counsel in defending a 
case" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Rutherford, 476 Mass. 
639, 644 (2017). 
Here, the prosecutor did not suggest that the defendant had 
to demonstrate his innocence.  Rather, the prosecutor's argument 
responded to the defendant's closing argument while arguing for 
permissible inferences.  The defense argues the following 
phrases shifted the burden of proof to the defendant:  "the 
defense does not tell you [that the defendant was paid to work 
with children]" and the "[d]efendant says that he wasn't her 
teacher" (emphasis added).  All potentially erroneous phrases 
should be read in the context in which they were stated.  
Commonwealth v. Whitman, 453 Mass. 331, 347 (2009).  When viewed 
in the context of the record as a whole, the prosecutor's 
statements do not attempt to fault the defendant's lack of 
testimony.  Instead, the prosecutor pointed to the defendant's 
status as a teacher instead of a mere faculty member because he 
was paid to work with children.  The prosecutor's statements in 
closing argument did not seek to bring attention to the 
defendant's failure to testify, but rather to the basis of the 
29 
 
defense's argument that he was only a faculty member and not a 
teacher. 
The prosecutor's statement that the "[d]efendant says that 
he wasn't her teacher" was also a proper response to the 
defendant's closing argument.  Defense counsel described the 
defendant as a "tech guy" rather than a teacher and a mandated 
reporter by highlighting his specialized knowledge of the 
telescope and the lack of a specific job title.  Additionally, 
the defense drew from certain portions of the assistant head of 
school's testimony, which stated that the defendant operated 
within his capacity as a faculty member while working in the 
school, not as a teacher.  Accordingly, the prosecutor directly 
addressed the assistant head of school's testimony describing 
the defendant as "a fellow teacher."  We conclude that there was 
no error in the prosecutor's closing argument. 
5.  Jury instruction on mandated reporter.  The defendant 
argues that the judge's instruction to the jury that a mandated 
reporter is "a person who is a public or private schoolteacher 
or a person paid to care for or work with a child in any public 
or private facility" was improper.  Specifically, the judge 
instructed the jury: 
"[T]he Commonwealth must prove that at the time of the 
offense, the Defendant was a mandated reporter as defined 
by the laws of Massachusetts.  Now, the [L]egislature has 
designated any number of categories of mandated reporters 
in the statute, including, for example:  police officers, 
30 
 
foster parents, nurses, pediatrists.  But for purposes of 
this case, the relevant statutory categories are a person 
who is a public or private schoolteacher or a person paid 
to care for or work with a child in any public or private 
facility." 
 
In relevant part, G. L. c. 119, § 21, defines "mandated 
reporter" to include: 
"A person who is: . . . (ii) a public or private school 
teacher, educational administrator, guidance or family 
counselor, child care worker, person paid to care for or 
work with a child in any public or private facility, or 
home or program funded by the commonwealth or licensed 
under [G. L. c.] 15D that provides child care or 
residential services to children or that provides the 
services of child care resource and referral agencies, 
voucher management agencies or family child care systems or 
child care food programs, licensor of the department of 
early education and care or school attendance officer 
. . . ." 
 
The defendant argues that the jury instructions were incorrect 
because defining a mandated reporter as a "person paid to care 
for or work with a child in any public or private facility" 
truncates a portion of a statutory clause and leads to an 
erroneous construction of the statute.  The defendant contends 
that "any public or private facility" is modified by "funded by 
the commonwealth or licensed." 
 
We agree with the Commonwealth that the Legislature did not 
intend for "any public of private facility" to be modified by 
"funded by the commonwealth or licensed under [G. L. c.] 15D."  
A plain reading of the statute suggests that the phrase "funded 
by the commonwealth or licensed under [G. L. c.] 15D" modifies 
31 
 
only "home or program."  "[T]he general rule of statutory as 
well as grammatical construction is that a modifying clause is 
confined to the last antecedent unless there is something in the 
subject matter or dominant purpose which requires a different 
interpretation" (citation omitted).  Bednark v. Catania 
Hospitality Group Inc., 78 Mass. App. Ct. 806, 812 (2011).  We 
further agree with the Commonwealth that comma placement in the 
statute is some evidence of the Legislature's intent.  The 
placement of the comma between "person paid to care for or work 
with a child in any public or private facility" and "home or a 
program funded by the commonwealth or licensed under [G. L. 
c.] 15D" is evidence that the Legislature intended the modifying 
clause "funded by the commonwealth or licensed under [G. L. 
c.] 15D" to apply only to "home or program." 
 
In interpreting statutes, we seek to ascertain and 
effectuate the intent of the Legislature in a way consonant with 
sound reason and common sense.  See Commonwealth v. Gomes, 483 
Mass. 123, 127 (2019); Commonwealth v. Wassilie, 482 Mass. 562, 
573 (2019).  The purpose of mandated reporting is the protection 
of children.  See G. L. c. 119, § 1.  The definition of 
"mandated reporter" was added to G. L. c. 119, § 21, in 2008.  
St. 2008, c. 176, § 83.  To protect children, mandated reporting 
responsibilities are assigned to many categories of adults who 
are able to observe and detect signs of child abuse or neglect.  
32 
 
See G. L. c. 119, § 21; Matter of a Grand Jury Investigation, 
437 Mass. 340, 353 n.23 (2002).  To construe the statute the way 
the defendant argues would severely limit the class of adults 
overseeing children who are required to report signs of child 
abuse or neglect and thereby contravene the purpose of the 
statute:  to protect children.  The defendant's argument that 
the judge's construction of the statute would make employees of 
restaurants, video game stores, and amusement parks into 
mandated reporters is misguided.  These employees are not 
directly responsible for the care of children, unlike the class 
of mandated reporters defined by G. L. c. 119, § 21.  See Matter 
of a Grand Jury Investigation, supra ("The stringent reporting 
requirements and the protections the statute accords mandated 
reporters further the Legislature's intent to protect children 
from physical and emotional damage at the hands of the persons 
in whose care they are entrusted"). 
 
The defendant also argues that there was ambiguity 
regarding whether he was considered a "school teacher" for the 
purposes of the statute.  The defendant contends that even if 
the jury could have rationally concluded that the defendant was 
a "private school teacher," reversal is required because the 
judge erred in instructing the jury that they may also convict 
on the theory that a mandated reporter is a "person paid to care 
for or work with a child in any public or private facility."  
33 
 
The defendant argues that because the jurors were not asked to 
differentiate on the theory of guilt on their verdicts slips, 
the verdict could have rested on either theory. 
 
First, we address the defendant's claim that there was 
ambiguity regarding whether the defendant's job fell under one 
of the categories of mandated reporter defined in the statute.  
Although there is some question as to the defendant's job title 
at the time of the incident, the record is clear that the 
defendant worked at an afterschool program.  As part of this 
job, he worked with a radio club that was run by faculty, 
students, and an outside organization.  As an adult employee 
working at an afterschool program, there is no question the 
defendant was part of the class of adults who are able to 
observe and detect signs of child abuse or neglect.  See G. L. 
c. 119, § 21.  Based on these facts, as the judge instructed, 
the jury reasonably could have found that the defendant was "a 
person who is a public or private schoolteacher or a person paid 
to care for or work with a child in any public or private 
facility." 
Although it is unclear whether the jury found that the 
defendant was a teacher or an individual paid to care for or 
work with children, we disagree that the jury instruction caused 
reversible error.  In Commonwealth v. Vizcarrondo, 427 Mass. 
392, 392 (1998), S.C., 431 Mass. 360 (2000) and 447 Mass. 1017 
34 
 
(2006), the defendant was convicted of murder in the first 
degree by reason of extreme atrocity or cruelty.  There, we 
concluded that because "'the verdict is supportable on one 
ground, but not on another, and it is impossible to tell which 
ground the jury selected,' the verdict must be set aside."  Id. 
at 398, quoting Commonwealth v. DiRenzo, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 95, 
100-101 (1997).  The judge instructed the jury that malice, an 
element of murder, could be inferred where the defendant knew, 
or should have known, that there was a plain and strong 
likelihood that death or grievous bodily harm would follow from 
his act.  Vizcarrondo, supra at 395.  This instruction 
improperly permitted jurors to infer malice from conduct that 
"involves a high degree of likelihood that substantial harm will 
result to another."  Id. at 396, quoting Commonwealth v. Sires, 
413 Mass. 292, 303-304 n.14 (1992).  A conviction made on this 
ground is insufficient to support a conviction for murder based 
on the third prong of malice. 
 
Here, as discussed, the judge's instructions allowed the 
jury to find that the defendant was a mandated reporter if he 
was a private school teacher or if he was a person paid to care 
for or work with a child in any public or private facility.  
Vizcarrondo is not applicable to this case because the verdict 
was supportable on both grounds mentioned in the jury 
35 
 
instruction.  Both grounds were sufficient to find that the 
defendant was a mandated reporter. 
 
Finally, the defendant contends that the judge erred in 
asking the jury to decide whether the defendant was acting in 
his professional capacity in the form of a special jury question 
rather than through a standard jury instruction and in failing 
to define professional capacity.  In addition to listing the 
special question on the verdict slip, the judge instructed the 
jury that they would need to answer a special question if they 
"found the defendant guilty of indecent assault and battery on 
[sic] a mandated reporter."  The judge stated: 
"And the question is this: . . . has the Commonwealth also 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant was in 
his professional capacity as a mandated reporter at the 
time the indecent -- at the time of the indecent assault 
and battery on a child under [fourteen]?  Your answer to 
this question should be unanimous.  Consider all of the 
evidence and circumstances surrounding the incident and the 
reasonable inferences you draw from them in arriving at 
your answer." 
 
The special question combined with the judge's explanation of 
the special question appropriately required the jury to consider 
whether the defendant committed the offense while acting as a 
teacher or an individual paid to work with children. 
In Gomes, 483 Mass. at 127, the defendant was employed as a 
police officer and was, by statute, considered a mandated 
reporter.  However, when the defendant assaulted the victim, he 
was off duty wearing plain clothes.  Id.  We concluded that 
36 
 
"[u]nder the plain language of the statute, the Legislature thus 
restricted application of G. L. c. 265, § 13B 1/2 (b), only to 
those defendants who were mandated reporters 'at the time of 
commission' of the offense."  Id. at 128.  Cf. Garney v. 
Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement Sys., 469 Mass. 384, 394 
(2014) (concluding teacher's private possession of child 
pornography did not directly involve his position as teacher).  
In Gomes, we did not explicitly define "professional capacity."  
We conclude that it was similarly unnecessary for the judge in 
this case to define this term either in the special question or 
in the jury instructions.  It is implied that professional 
capacity specifically refers to the category of mandated 
reporter listed in the statute that is applicable to the 
defendant.  The question appropriately asked the jury to 
consider whether the defendant was acting in his capacity as a 
teacher or as an individual paid to work with children at the 
time of the incident or, like in Gomes, whether the defendant 
was "off duty."  See Gomes, supra. 
Unlike in Gomes, the record is clear that the defendant in 
this case was operating in his capacity as a mandated reporter 
during several of the charged incidents.  The incidents at issue 
occurred during a radio club event at the school on June 24, 
2016, and June 25, 2016.  The jury's finding that the defendant 
was acting in his professional capacity on the indictments 
37 
 
stemming from incidents that occurred on those days was amply 
supported by the record, as he assaulted the victim at the 
school where he was a faculty member.  Furthermore, those 
assaults took place during the school's amateur radio club's 
field day, which the defendant was coordinating.  Given this 
overwhelming evidence that the defendant was acting in his 
professional capacity, the judge's failure to instruct on and 
define "professional capacity" would not have influenced the 
jury's decision. 
Conclusion.  We affirm the defendant's convictions stemming 
from the incidents that occurred on June 24, 2016, and June 25, 
2016.  Pursuant to our ruling in Gomes, 483 Mass. at 130, we 
vacate and set aside the defendant's convictions under G. L. 
c. 265, § 13B 1/2, stemming from the incidents that occurred on 
July 6, 2016, where the jury found that the defendant was not 
acting in his official capacity as a mandated reporter when he 
committed the offenses.  As to those two counts, we remand to 
the Superior Court for entry of a judgment of guilty of the 
lesser included offense of indecent assault and battery on a 
person under the age of fourteen, G. L. c. 265, § 13B, and 
resentencing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.