Title: State v. Snider
Citation: 406 So. 2d 209
Docket Number: 81-KA-0089
State: Louisiana
Issuer: Louisiana Supreme Court
Date: November 16, 1981

406 So. 2d 209 (1981) STATE of Louisiana v. Gregory K. SNIDER. No. 81-KA-0089. Supreme Court of Louisiana. November 16, 1981. Rehearing Denied December 14, 1981. *210 William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Paul J. Carmouche, Dist. Atty., Sonia D. Peters, Dale G. Cox, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-appellee. Robert T. Talley, Covington, for defendant-appellant. DOUCET, Justice Ad Hoc.[*] The bill of information in this matter charged the Defendant with the illegal discharge of a weapon, as set forth in La.R.S. 14:94. On October 15, 1980 he pled guilty to the charge and was sentenced to serve two years imprisonment at hard labor. Defendant now appeals on the basis of five assignments of error which are all argued. Defendant, Gregory K. Snider, was charged by bill of information with the illegal discharge of a weapon, a violation of La. R.S. 14:94. On October 15, 1980, he pled guilty to the charge. Thereafter, the court sentenced him to serve the maximum penalty, two (2) years imprisonment at hard labor. On the night of March 4, 1980, Gregory Snider and William Gullion went on a drunken shooting spree, indiscriminately firing weapons from an automobile. A security guard at Atlas Refinery was fired at in his pick-up truck as were some of the buildings. There were several reports of residential firings and eyewitness accounts and identifications. The pair stopped at a 7-11 store where they went in waving guns, generally creating terror. On the morning of March 5, 1980, Gullion turned himself in for the shooting spree and gave an inculpatory statement implicating Snider in the incident. From this information the police prepared a photographic line-up for the witnesses who identified the two men as the perpetrators. Snider and Gullion were arrested and initially charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (La. R.S. 14:95.1), and illegal discharge of a weapon (La. R.S. 14:94). Gullion pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon on June 6, 1980 and was sentenced to eight years at hard labor, suspended. The judge placed Gullion on probation for five years conditioned on the Defendant successfully completing the Odyssey House program. Since, in 1974, Gullion had been convicted of aggravated robbery in Texas his sentence was ordered served consecutively to any sentence that Texas required him to serve as a parole violator. On October 15, 1981, Snider pled guilty to the illegal discharge of a weapon pursuant to a plea bargain whereby the State dismissed the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. He had previously been convicted of the unlawful distribution of a controlled dangerous substance in Illinois for which he had already completed probation to his suspended sentence. The *211 judge, in the instant case, sentenced Snider to two years imprisonment at hard labor. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBERS 1 AND 5: The requirements of La. C.Cr.P. Article 894.1 are: After hearing the argument of counsel and extensively questioning both counsel concerning the facts of the case and the Defendant as to whether the facts as recited were correct and concerning any mitigating circumstances the Defendant might have to offer in his own behalf, the trial court concluded. In support of these conclusions, the trial court found specifically that: Accordingly, the trial court imposed a maximum sentence of two years imprisonment. The court also specified that defendant would serve his sentence at hard labor. The court obviously made an effort to consider both aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The facts of this case speak strongly for themselves; defendant engaged in a wild, drunken shooting spree that endangered numerous persons. He shot at a pick-up truck at a refinery. Any stray shots at the refinery could have caused a catastrophe, but Defendant obviously had no regard for the possible consequences of his actions. In addition, Defendant terrorized the personnel and patrons of a 7-11 Store, again without regard for the consequences. Further, Defendant received considerable benefit from the state's dropping of the much more serious charge under R.S. 14:95.1 (possession of a firearm by a convicted felon). The sentence imposed was the maximum allowable, however, on the record in this case the sentence is not imposed in an arbitrary manner and is not excessive. The sentence is not grossly disproportionate to Defendant's conduct nor is it a clear abuse of the trial courts broad sentencing discretion. State v. Bonanno, 384 So. 2d 355 (La. 1980); Therefore, the sentence is affirmed. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER 2: This argument by Defendant is in reality one of excessive sentencing which was dealt with in Assignment of Error Numbers 1 and 5. There is ample evidence to support the trial court's imposition of a maximum penalty for the crime charged. Further, there is no evidence to support Defendant's argument that he was a minor participant. The record establishes that he not only fired a weapon but drove the vehicle for the escapade. In addition, he was identified, according to the post conviction statement, as one of the persons who fired a weapon at the 7-11 Store. This assignment lacks merit. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER 3: Defendant argues that there are discrepancies in the state's brief in that reference is made both to Defendant "firing in the air" and "in the direction of nearby residences." Whatever the reason for the discrepancy, the statement of the district attorney filed herein verified that bullets were recovered from various homes. These bullets were identified by the crime lab to have been fired from the guns of two defendants. Witnesses gave statements to the police and identified both men as firing weapons. The transcript of the sentencing reflects that the judge did question the defendant and his attorney extensively about the incident and the defendant's criminal record. The judge also gave the defendant a chance to add anything to the testimony but the defendant declined. Sentencing is based on hearsay testimony. All written documents, pre-sentence reports, prior criminal history, etc., constitute hearsay evidence. The holding by the United States Supreme Court in Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 69 S. Ct. 1079, 93 L. Ed. 1337 (1949); rejects Defendant's arguments, saying that a Defendant had no constitutional right to an adversarial sentencing proceeding in which he could cross examine persons who had supplied such information to the court. The Defendant had a chance to cure any real defects at his sentencing. As there are enough facts stated that support his sentence, this assignment lacks merit. As stated in the sentencing transcript, the Defendant had a prior conviction for unlawful distribution of controlled dangerous substances. It is not contended that this conviction was for anything other than a felony. Hence, under La. C.Cr.P. Article 893 A, the Defendant is not eligible for a suspended sentence and probation. The Defendant argues the disparity between his sentence and the other principal's sentence. Defendant's sentencing must be looked at independently. Since there is evidence to support the maximum of two years at hard labor there is no merit to this argument. For the reasons assigned, both conviction and sentencing are affirmed. [*] Judges Thomas J. Kliebert and Robert J. Klees of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, participated in this decision as Associate Justices Ad Hoc joined by Chief Justice Dixon and Justices Calogero, Dennis, and Watson.