Title: Cassidy v. Keystone Ins. Co.
Citation: 322 Pa. Super. 168, 469 A.2d 236
Docket Number: N/A
State: Pennsylvania
Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Date: December 9, 1983

322 Pa. Superior Ct. 168 (1983) 469 A.2d 236 John J. CASSIDY v. KEYSTONE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued March 2, 1983. Filed December 9, 1983. *169 Dean B. Stewart, Jr., Norristown, for appellant. Bernard V. Digiacomo, Norristown, for appellee. Before CERCONE, President Judge, and CAVANAUGH, and WIEAND, JJ. CERCONE, President Judge: Appellant, Keystone Insurance Company, takes this appeal from the lower court's denial of appellant's petition to strike the award of arbitrators, and the granting of appellee's petition to confirm said award and from the judgment entered thereon. Appellant argues, inter alia, that the court erred in granting appellee's earlier petition to appoint an arbitrator where that petition was not properly served upon appellant. We find appellant's argument to have merit and we hereby vacate judgment and reverse the order or the lower court confirming the award of arbitrators. On or around July 7, 1980, appellee, John Cassidy, was injured in an automobile accident in Dade County, Florida. The operator of the other vehicle involved in the accident fled the scene and is unknown. At the time of the accident, appellee was insured by appellant company. In due course, appellee retained counsel, and on March 18, 1981, counsel wrote a letter to appellant company, which, in relevant part, said: Appellant did not respond to this letter, whereupon, on May 22, 1981, appellee filed a petition for appointment of arbitrator. A copy of this petition was not served upon appellant in advance of the hearing on the matter. Nevertheless, the court granted appellee's petition and appointed an arbitrator in appellant's stead. Appellee, on that same day, sent appellant a certified letter advising appellant of the appointment and enclosing a copy of the petition and order.[1] Again, appellant did not respond. Thereafter, on June 3, 1981, one of the arbitrators sent a letter to both parties advising them of the date and time scheduled for the arbitration, the date being June 17, 1981. The next day, June 4, 1981, appellee sent appellant a letter in which appellee reiterated the date of the arbitration and listed the various medical bills which appellee intended to present. The morning of the arbitration hearing, counsel for appellant appeared and requested a continuance. This request was denied and the hearing proceeded, however counsel for appellant declined to participate. The arbitrators award was in favor of appellee. The next day, appellant filed a petition to strike the award of the arbitrators and to strike *171 the order of the court of May 22, 1981, in which the court appointed an arbitrator on appellee's petition. Appellant argued, then, as now, that the filing of the petition to appoint an arbitrator was procedurally defective because the petition was not properly served on appellant. We agree. A procedurally similar issue was decided by this Court in Keystone Wire &amp; Iron Works, Inc. v. Van Cor, Inc., 245 Pa.Superior Ct. 537, 369 A.2d 758 (1976). In Keystone Wire, we were asked to interpret an earlier version of the Uniform Arbitration Act.[2] Specifically, our attention was focused on sections 3 and 4 of the Act. Section 3 at that time provided: Section 4 of the same Act read: The facts in Keystone Wire were to very much like those in the case now before us. In Keystone Wire, the plaintiff filed a petition with the court alleging that it had notified counsel for the defendant of the former's appointment of an arbitrator but that defendant had refused to fulfill its contraction obligation to name an arbitrator and plaintiff asked the court to name one in defendant's stead. Plaintiff mailed a copy of the petition to defendant, and defendant argued to the court that such service was improper. The lower court denied defendant's objection. On appeal, plaintiff argued that because section 4 of the Act made no provision for service, plaintiff was free to adopt any method of service. We rejected the plaintiff's argument with these words: In a footnote in the Keystone case, we elaborated on the question of the type of service required in the rules of civil procedure. We quoted at length from Pa.R.C.P. 233, which, in relevant part, provided, then, as now, Regarding Rule 233, we wrote: Id., 245 Pa.Superior Ct. at 542 n. 4, 369 A.2d at 760 n. 4 (emphasis added) Thus, in Keystone Wire we ruled plaintiff's service upon defendant by regular mail of the petition to appoint an arbitrator to be defective to either provide notice to defendant or to obtain jurisdiction of the court over the person of defendant. Since the time of our decision in Keystone Wire, the legislature has repealed the old version of the Uniform Arbitration Act (1955) and has adopted a new statute, also called the Uniform Arbitration Act.[3] [hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1980]. While the language of the Act of 1980 is considerably revised, nonetheless, it is apparent that our holding in Keystone Wire vis-a-vis the rules of civil procedure is still viable. To compel an arbitration, the Act of 1980 provides: 42 Pa.C.S. § 7304(a) Where one party refuses to appoint an arbitrator, the Act of 1980 states: Id. at § 7305. Regarding service of the above applications, the Act mandates: Id. at § 7317. (emphasis added.) As we indicated in our prior discussion of Keystone Wire, the relevant rules of civil procedure read the same today as they did when we handed down our decision in Keystone Wire. Turning to the case sub judice, we note that not only did appellee fail to serve his petition by the sheriff but appellee did not even mail the petition to appellant until after the court made its ruling. It is therefore clear that appellee did not properly serve appellant with the petition to appoint an arbitrator. Accordingly, we vacate *176 judgment and reverse the order of the lower court appointing an arbitrator.[4] Judgment vacated and the order of the lower court appointing an arbitrator is reversed. [1] Appellant took an appeal from the order of the Court of Common Pleas granting appellee's petition to appoint an arbitrator. We found that appeal to be from an interlocutory order and accordingly the appeal was quashed. Cassidy v. Keystone Insurance Co., 297 Pa.Superior Ct. 421, 443 A.2d 1193 (1982). We also ruled that because the insurance policy in question made no mention of the Arbitration Act of 1927, the arbitrator in the instant case was at common law. Id., 297 Pa.Superior Ct. at 422 n. 1, 443 A.2d at 1193 n. 1. In view of this prior ruling of ours, we need not address anew appellant's present contention that the instant case is one of a common law arbitration. [2] Act of 1927, April 25, P.L. 381, No. 248, § 1 et seq.; 5 P.S. § 161 et seq. [3] The Act of 1980, October 5, P.L. 693, No. 142, § 501(a), 42 Pa.C.S. § 7301 et seq. [4] See 42 Pa.C.S. § 7341, which reads: The award of an arbitrator in a nonjudicial arbitration which is not subject to Subchapter A (relating to statutory arbitration) or a similar statute regulating nonjudicial arbitration proceedings is binding and may not be vacated or modified unless it is clearly shown that a party was denied a hearing or that fraud, misconduct, corruption or other irregularity caused the rendition of an unjust, inequitable or unconscionable award. See also 42 Pa.C.S. § 7314, which provides, in relevant part: (a) General Rule. (1) On application of a party, the court shall vacate an award where: (i) the court would vacate the award under Section 7341 (relating to common law arbitration) if this subchapter were not applicable;. . .