Title: P. v. King
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S085942
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: January 10, 2002

1
Filed 1/10/02 (This opinion should follow the companion case of P. v. Bunn, also filed 1/10/02.)
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE,
)
)
Plaintiff and Appellant,
)
)
S085942
v.
)
)
Ct.App. 3 C030038
PHILLIP R. KING,
)
)
Placer County
Defendant and Respondent.
)
Super. Ct. No. A40718
__________________________________ )
Both People v. Bunn (Jan. 10, 2002, S086128) __ Cal.4th __ (Bunn), and
this case involve successive versions of a law increasing the time for prosecuting
sex crimes against minors, and allowing the refiling of accusatory pleadings
previously dismissed as time-barred by the courts.  (Pen. Code, § 803, subd. (g)
(section 803(g)).)1  These two companion cases address the circumstances under
which such a refiling provision supplants final judgments, and thus invades the
judicial power in violation of the separation of powers clause of the California
Constitution (art. III, § 3).  In analyzing that issue, we find persuasive for
California purposes the federal separation of powers principles recently explained
in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. (1995) 514 U.S. 211 (Plaut).
Consistent with Plaut, we held in Bunn, supra, __ Cal.4th __, that
separation of powers principles preclude retroactive application of refiling
                                                
1 
All further unlabeled statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
legislation in cases where the prior judgment of dismissal was entered or finally
upheld before the legislation took effect.  However, as explained in both Plaut,
supra, 514 U.S. 211, and Bunn, supra, __ Cal.4th __, the finality of any court
proceeding is properly subject to legislative conditions and limits which were
already in effect when the last judicial act in the case became conclusive.
Hence, Bunn found no constitutional bar against use of a refiling provision
that was already in effect when the prior dismissal in that case was finally upheld
at the appellate level.  We identified no separation of powers problem in Bunn
itself, because the reinstituted complaint satisfied refiling conditions in existence
under section 803(g) — and therefore incorporated into the prior dismissal itself
— when that dismissal was ultimately affirmed on appeal.
The present case involves a materially distinct set of circumstances.  The
refiling at issue here is authorized, if at all, only under refiling requirements that
first appeared in the statute after the prior judgment of dismissal was finally
upheld.  Application of these later-adopted refiling provisions would retroactively
reopen the case and divest the judgment of the finality it had achieved under the
law in existence at the time.  We therefore find a separation of powers violation
here under the test adopted in Bunn, supra, __Cal.4th __.
I.  PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In a complaint filed in Placer County Municipal Court on May 25, 1995,
Phillip R. King (defendant)2 was charged with four counts of lewd conduct
committed upon an underage child between September 1, 1971, and June 30, 1973
(the 1995 complaint).  (§ 288, subd. (a).)  Because the statute of limitations
                                                
2 
We spell defendant’s first name as it has appeared on his pleadings and
briefs throughout this case — “Phillip.”  Both the Court of Appeal and the People
have used a slightly different formulation.
3
otherwise applicable to these charges had long since expired (see §§ 800, 801), the
People relied on the supplemental limitations period available in child molestation
prosecutions under section 803(g), effective January 1, 1994.  (Stats. 1993, ch.
390, § 1, p. 2226.)  Consistent with section 803(g), the 1995 complaint alleged,
among other things, that it was filed within one year of the time the victim first
reported the crimes to law enforcement officials on June 10, 1994.  (See Bunn,
supra, __ Cal.4th __, __ [pp. 3-4].)
Defendant successfully demurred to the 1995 complaint, and the magistrate
dismissed the case.  The People’s subsequent motion to reinstate the 1995
complaint was denied by the superior court.  The latter ruling was affirmed on
appeal.  Finding no clear legislative evidence to the contrary, the Court of Appeal
held that the one-year limitations period in section 803(g) was not intended to
retroactively revive actions otherwise time-barred before the statute took effect in
1994.  The court also assumed a contrary view would raise ex post facto concerns.
We granted review on December 11, 1996.  However, on April 24, 1997, review
was dismissed.  We will refer to proceedings based on the 1995 complaint as
King I.
The Legislature has amended section 803(g) twice since its enactment —
both before and after the proceedings in King I were complete.  First, a 1996
amendment took effect January 1, 1997, and was still in effect in April 1997, when
we dismissed review in King I.  (Stats. 1996, ch. 130, § 1 (the 1996 version or
law).)  Responding to the statutory analysis contained in King I, and other similar
appellate decisions, the 1996 law included new language that expressly
“revive[d]” molestation prosecutions even where the limitations period in section
800 or 801 had expired before section 803(g) was enacted.  (Former
§ 803(g)(3)(A) & (B)(i) (1996 version).)  With respect to cases brought and
dismissed under section 803(g) before such clarifying changes were made, the
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1996 version gave prosecutors an additional six-month period — from January 1
until June 30, 1997 — to refile such actions, assuming other requirements were
met.  (Former § 803(g)(3)(B)(ii) (1996 version); see Bunn, supra, __ Cal.4th __,
__ [pp. 10-11].)  We will refer to the latter feature as the 1996 refiling provision.
Second, after review had been dismissed in King I, urgency legislation was
enacted amending section 803(g) effective June 30, 1997, the same day the six-
month period in the 1996 refiling provision expired by its own terms.  (Stats.
1997, ch. 29, § 1 (the 1997 version or law).)  The 1997 law did not affect language
added by the 1996 version concerning the circumstances under which the one-year
limitations period revived otherwise time-barred claims.  Rather, as pertinent here,
the 1997 law gave prosecutors even more time to refile actions dismissed under
prior versions of the statute.  (§ 803(g)(3)(A)(iv) & (B)(i)-(iii).)  The latter feature
— which we will refer to as the 1997 refiling provision — allowed refiling no
later than 180 days after a final California or United States Supreme Court
decision determined that retroactive application of section 803(g) was
constitutional.  In August 1999, more than two years after the 1997 refiling
provision became effective, we rendered such a decision in People v. Frazer
(1999) 21 Cal.4th 737 (Frazer).  (See Bunn, supra, __ Cal.4th __, __ [pp. 11-12].)
Shortly after the 1997 law took effect, the People proceeded to reinstate this
action in municipal court.  Specifically, on July 2, 1997, the People filed a new
complaint charging defendant in the present case with the same four counts of
lewd conduct previously dismissed in King I (the 1997 or refiled complaint).  The
refiled complaint was amended on October 20, 1997.  That amendment made
technical changes clarifying the People’s reliance on section 803(g)(3)(A)(iv) —
the refiling provision of the 1997 law.
Defendant demurred arguing, among other things, that the 1997 version of
section 803(g) violated separation of powers principles insofar as it permitted the
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refiling of previously dismissed counts, and thereby voided the judgment in
King I.  The magistrate sustained the demurrer, and dismissed the case.  The
superior court denied the People’s motion to reinstate the 1997 complaint.
On appeal by the People, the court accepted defendant’s renewed separation
of powers claim, and affirmed the ruling below.  On the one hand, the Court of
Appeal opined that section 803(g)’s refiling provisions were an unconstitutional
attempt by the Legislature to review and repudiate the specific reasoning and
result of King I and similar cases.  On the other hand, the Court of Appeal
suggested that under no circumstances can legislation limit or restrict the finality
of court judgments by specifying that they may be reopened.  While passing
reference was made to Plaut, supra, 514 U.S. 211, the Court of Appeal relied
primarily on People v. Lynch (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 313 (Lynch), which precluded
application, on separation of powers grounds, of the 1997 refiling provision under
circumstances similar to those presented here.
We granted the People’s petition for review.  As in Bunn, supra, __ Cal.4th
__, the sole question is the constitutionality of section 803(g)’s refiling provisions
under the separation of powers doctrine in article III, section 3 of the state
Constitution.
II.  DISCUSSION
Here, as below, the People claim there is no separation of powers violation
because the Legislature has not itself performed the core deliberative function of
the judicial branch.  According to the People, nothing in section 803(g)’s refiling
provisions shows that lawmakers believed King I and similar cases were wrongly
decided under the law as it then existed.  The People also observe that section
803(g) does not dictate the manner in which courts should adjudicate refiled
counts.  The People insist that the 1997 refiling provision used here simply creates
a more uniform statute of limitations, and ensures molesters are prosecuted even
6
where they obtained a dismissal before the statute’s retroactivity was clarified in
1996, or before its constitutionality was upheld in Frazer, supra, 21 Cal.4th 737.
For reasons we explain, and guided by today’s decision in Bunn, supra, __
Cal.4th __, we reject the People’s conclusion that the Court of Appeal erred in
disallowing the instant refiled complaint on separation of powers grounds.
However, we do not accept the reasoning proffered by either the People or the
Court of Appeal.  We agree with the People that the challenged statute does not
seek to review the substance of court decisions or to control the outcome of
judicial proceedings (id. at p. __, fn. 15 [pp. 30-31, fn. 15]), but we disagree that
the statute thus necessarily survives separation of powers scrutiny.  Unlike the
Court of Appeal, we do not believe that legislation can never authorize the
reopening of a judgment or the reinstatement of a dismissed action.  Rather, as
made clear in Bunn at pages __ [pp. 29-30], legislation permitting a judgment to
be reopened may apply if, but only to the extent that, such legislation was already
in effect when the prior judgment was entered or finally upheld.
In Bunn, supra, __ Cal.4th __, __ [pp. 15-19], we reviewed the manner in
which separation of powers principles generally protect the judicial branch from
encroachment by the Legislature.  In particular, the state Constitution establishes
an independent judiciary whose core function is to resolve disputes among specific
parties by decisions that are final to the extent set forth under then-existing law.
The Legislature makes the laws to be interpreted and applied by the judiciary,
including the existence and nature of any criminal statute of limitations and any
retroactive changes thereto.  However, with respect to laws passed after the
judicial branch has completed its review in a particular matter, the Legislature
“cannot ‘readjudicat[e]’ or otherwise ‘disregard’ judgments that are already
‘final.’ ”  (Id. at p. __ [p. 19].)
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As discussed more fully in Bunn, supra, __ Cal.4th __, __ [pp. 19-26], the
high court’s decision in Plaut, supra, 514 U.S. 211, helps determine the
constitutionality of section 803(g)’s refiling provisions under the foregoing
principles.  Plaut invalidated congressional legislation which retroactively
increased a civil statute of limitations, and which directed federal courts to
reinstate actions that had been dismissed as time-barred before the law took effect.
(Id. at pp. 214-215, 217-218, 240.)  Relying on the federal separation of powers
doctrine, Plaut held that judgments cannot be deprived of their “finality” through
statutory conditions not in effect when the judicial branch gave its “last word” in
the particular case.  (Id. at p. 227.)  Plaut recognized that final judgments are
entitled to such protection notwithstanding the legal or policy basis on which
Congress has sought to retroactively reopen the proceedings.  (Id. at pp. 228, 230.)
On the other hand, Plaut acknowledged that the “finality” of a judgment is
subject to any conditions and limitations which the legislative branch has already
imposed.  Hence, separation of powers principles are not offended by the
application of reopening provisions that were already in effect when the matter
was previously determined.  (Plaut, supra, 514 U.S. 211, 234.)
In Bunn, supra, __ Cal.4th __, __ [pp. 26-27], we found that Plaut, supra,
514 U.S. 211, is consistent with California law, and is persuasive in determining
when the state separation of powers clause prohibits statutory changes in the law
of judgment finality.  Accordingly, Bunn adopted the following rule for purposes
of resolving such state constitutional claims:
“[A] refiling provision like section 803(g) cannot be retroactively applied to
subvert judgments that became final before the provision took effect, and before
the law of finality changed.  This ban applies even where lawmakers have acted
for ‘the very best of reasons’ (Plaut, supra, 514 U.S. 211, 228, italics omitted),
and whether or not legislative disagreement with the ‘legal rule’ underlying the
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judgment has been expressed (id. at p. 230).  By the same token, a judgment is not
final for separation of powers purposes, and reopening of the case can occur,
under the specific terms of refiling legislation already in effect when the judicial
branch completed its review and ultimately decided the case.  Such nonretroactive
limitations on judgment finality are constitutionally allowed.”  (Bunn, supra, __
Cal.4th __, __ [pp. 29-30].)
Bunn also described the manner in which this rule applies under specific
circumstances.  For example, in May 1997, when the prior judgment became final
in Bunn, the 1996 version of section 803(g) was in effect, including its
requirement that actions previously dismissed under the statute could be refiled if
refiling occurred no later than June 30, 1997.  (See former § 803(g)(3)(B)(ii)
(1996 version).)  The People met this deadline and satisfied the 1996 law in all
other respects when they resubmitted the complaint in Bunn, supra, __ Cal.4th __.
Hence, no separation of powers violation occurred.  (Id. at p. __ [pp. 32-33].)
However, Bunn distinguished the situation in which “the prior dismissal
was entered or finally upheld when one version of section 803(g) was in effect
(e.g., the 1996 refiling provision), but the reinstituted complaint complies only
with a later version (e.g., the 1997 refiling provision) which became effective after
the prior dismissal was entered or finally upheld.  In that circumstance, use of the
later law constitutes an impermissible retroactive attack on a judgment
constitutionally subject to reopening only under the earlier law.”  (Bunn, supra, __
Cal.4th __, __ [pp. 31-32].)
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Such is the case here.  The judgment in King I became final in the
separation of powers sense in April 1997, when this court dismissed review.  At
that time, the six-month refiling period contained in the 1996 version of section
803(g) was in effect.  Indeed, because the 1996 refiling provision was operative
until June 30, 1997, the People had more than two months to invoke it against
defendant.  However, it was not until July 2, 1997 — a few days after the 1996
refiling provision expired and the 1997 law took effect — that charges were
refiled and the instant prosecution began.
For reasons we have explained, however, the 1997 refiling provision cannot
be retroactively applied in this case to allow the refiling of charges that had been
dismissed, at both the trial and appellate levels, before the 1997 provision became
effective.  It follows that the refiling at issue here was constitutionally invalid.
Our conclusion, if not our reasoning, conforms with that of the appellate
court in this case.  Of course, the Court of Appeal did not have the benefit of
Bunn, supra, __ Cal.4th __, or fully anticipate Bunn’s analysis in this regard.
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal reached the correct result in refusing to order
reinstatement of the refiled complaint on separation of powers grounds.  The
court’s reliance on Lynch, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th 313, also was not misplaced.
(Bunn, supra, __ Cal.4th __, __ fn. 17 [pp. 33-34, fn. 17].)
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III.  DISPOSITION
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.
BAXTER, J.
WE CONCUR:
GEORGE, C.J.
KENNARD, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
CHIN, J.
BROWN, J.
MORENO, J.
11
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion People v. King
__________________________________________________________________________________
Unpublished Opinion XXX NP opn. filed 1/6/00 – 3d Dist.
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________________________________
Opinion No. S085942
Date Filed: January 10, 2002
__________________________________________________________________________________
Court: Superior
County: Placer
Judge: Robert P. McElhany, Temporary Judge*
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Appellant:
Daniel E. Lungren and Bill Lockyer, Attorneys General, George Williamson and David P. Druliner, Chief
Assistant Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson, Assistant Attorney General, W. Scott Thorpe and Janet
Gaard, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for  Respondent:
Scott Concklin, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Respondent.
*Pursuant to California Constitution, article VI, section 21.
12
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Janet Gaard
Deputy Attorney General
1300 I Street, Suite 125
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550
(916) 324-5284
Scott Concklin
2205 Hilltop Drive, No. PMB-116
Redding, CA  96002
(530) 243-8510