Title: William C. Harper v. Charles A. Coats III and Ginger K. Coats
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1050145
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: January 18, 2008

Rel: 01/18/2008
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
____________________
1050145
____________________
William C. Harper
v.
Charles A. Coats III and Ginger K. Coats
Appeal from Monroe Circuit Court 
(CV-03-70)
PARKER, Justice.
I. Background
The issue in this dispute concerning the public or
private nature of streets in a subdivision located outside a
municipality is whether the recording of the plat for the
subdivision, 
which 
properly identified the streets in
1050145
2
question, constituted a dedication of those streets to the
public.  We hold that it did, and we affirm.
Sun Ridge Valley Road and Blue Ridge Drive run through
and next to the Blue Ridge subdivision, located in Monroe
County, outside the city limits of Monroeville.   William C.
Harper created the subdivision by recording a plat in the
Monroe County Probate Court.  The complaint alleges that the
plat was recorded in February 1991. 
 Charles A. Coats III and Ginger K. Coats own property
outside the subdivision, abutting both Sun Ridge Valley Road
and Blue Ridge Drive.  William Harper claims that the roads
are not for public use and has erected a fence to prevent the
Coatses from using the roads for ingress and egress to their
property.  There is also a dispute regarding whether the
Monroe County Water Board can serve the Coatses' property from
the water line that currently serves the Blue Ridge
subdivision.  However, for reasons stated later in this
opinion, that issue has been waived, and we do not decide it.
The Coatses filed this action in the Monroe Circuit
Court.  The crux of the dispute is whether the recording of
the subdivision plat, which appropriately signified the
1050145
3
dimensions and locations of Sun Ridge Valley Road and Blue
Ridge Drive, constituted a completed dedication of those roads
to the public.  The trial court entered a summary judgment in
favor of the Coatses, declaring that the roads are public
roads and that the water line serving the subdivision is a
public utility and can be used to provide water to the
Coatses' property.  Harper appealed.  We affirm. 
II. Standard of Review
"[O]n appeal a summary judgment carries no presumption of
correctness," Hornsby v. Session, 703 So. 2d 932, 938 (Ala.
1997). "'In reviewing the disposition of a motion for summary
judgment, we utilize the same standard as that of the trial
court in determining whether the evidence before the court
made out a genuine issue of material fact' and whether the
movant was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Ex
parte General Motors Corp., 769 So. 2d 903, 906 (Ala.  1999)
(quoting Bussey v. John Deere Co., 531 So. 2d 860, 862 (Ala.
1988)). "Our review is further subject to the caveat that this
Court must review the record in a light most favorable to the
nonmovant and must resolve all reasonable doubts against the
1050145
4
movant." Hobson v.  American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 690 So. 2d
341, 344 (Ala. 1997).
The parties have presented no factual disputes; instead,
their 
arguments 
are 
based 
entirely 
on 
statutory
interpretation.
III. Issues and Legal Analysis
A. Are the Roads Public Roads?
The subdividing of land into lots for a residential
community is governed by Ala. Code 1975, §§ 35-2-50 through
-62. Section 35-2-50 requires persons wishing to subdivide
their land into lots to have the land surveyed and then draw
a plat or map indicating the length and bearings of the
boundaries of each lot.  In addition, the plat or map must
"give the bearings, length, width and name of each street."
It is undisputed that Harper complied fully with this Code
section in creating the Blue Ridge subdivision.  Alabama Code
1975, § 35-2-51(b), provides that "[t]he acknowledgment and
recording of such plat or map shall be held to be a conveyance
in fee simple of such portion of the premises platted as are
marked or noted on such plat or map as donated or granted to
the public," and the areas indicated as streets on the map
1050145
5
"shall be held in trust for the uses and purposes intended or
set forth in such plat or map." 
The question, therefore, is whether Sun Ridge Valley Road
and Blue Ridge Drive were "donated or granted to the public"
by the recordation of the subdivision plat.  If so, under the
provisions of § 35-2-51(b), the recording of the plat
constituted a "conveyance in fee simple" to the public, and
Harper has no right to prevent the Coatses, or any other
member of the public, from using the roads.  If not, however,
the roads are for the private use of Harper and the owners of
property in the subdivision.  As owners of property outside
the subdivision, the Coatses would have no legal right to use
the roads to access their property, unless by some claim of
adverse possession or prescriptive easement, and no such claim
has been raised or argued in this case. 
A road can be made public in one of three ways: "'"1) by
a regular proceeding for that purpose; 2) by a dedication of
the road by the owner of the land it crosses, with acceptance
by the proper authorities; or 3)  the way is generally used by
the public for twenty years."'" Arnett v. City of Mobile, 449
So. 2d 1222, 1224 (Ala. 1984)(quoting Sam Raine Constr. Co. v.
1050145
6
Lakeview Estates, Inc., 407 So. 2d 542, 544 (Ala. 1981),
quoting in turn Powell v. Hopkins, 288 Ala. 466, 472, 262 So.
2d 289, 294 (1972)).  There is no question that these roads
have not been used by the public for over 20 years, although
the record indicates that the public has enjoyed unrestricted
use of them for several years.  There has also not been a
regular proceeding for the purpose of establishing the roads
as public roads.  For these roads to be public roads, then, it
must be shown that there has been a dedication of the roads,
with the requisite acceptance by the proper authorities.
 The Coatses point to this Court's holding Gaston v.
Ames, 514 So. 2d 877 (Ala. 1987), as providing the applicable
rule for this case.  In Gaston, the Court was dealing with a
dispute similar to the one here.  The plaintiffs were seeking
to enjoin John Ames from maintaining a locked gate in front of
a road used by the plaintiffs to access property in a
subdivision and were seeking a declaration that the road was
a public road.  The subdivision had been properly created by
Bruce Pardue and his wife.  Although some of the lots had been
sold, the Pardues retained a large portion of the subdivision
and used it for agricultural purposes. None of the subdivided
1050145
7
land was ever developed by any of the purchasers of the lots,
including the plaintiffs.  Ames subsequently purchased the
remaining subdivision property and restricted access to a road
indicated on the plat by means of a locked gate.  The trial
court found that the gate could be maintained because the
subdivision was not viable.  This Court reversed the trial
court's judgment, finding as follows:
"Pardue complied with the statutory requirements for
the establishment of the subdivision. He first
prepared the plats, pursuant to  § 35-2-50, Code of
Alabama (1975), and recorded the plats in the
Probate Office, pursuant to § 35-2-51(a), Code of
Alabama (1975). Having met those two requirements,
he is deemed to have made a conveyance in fee simple
of all areas granted or dedicated to the public. §
35-2-51(b), Code of Alabama (1975). '[S]ubstantial
compliance 
with 
the 
statutory 
requirements
constitutes a valid dedication to the public of all
streets, alleys, and other public places.' Johnson
v. Morris, 362 So. 2d 209, 210 (Ala. 1978).  Cottage
Hill Land Corp. v. City of Mobile, 443 So. 2d 1201,
1203 (Ala. 1983).
"After there has been a proper dedication to the
public, that dedication is irrevocable and it cannot
be altered or withdrawn except by statutory vacation
proceedings. Booth v. Montrose Cemetery Ass'n, 387
So. 2d 774 (Ala. 1980); Smith v. City of Opelika,
165 Ala. 630, 51 So. 821 (1910)."
514 So. 2d at 879.
Here, it is undisputed that Harper met those same
statutory demands. Like Pardue, he prepared the plat for the
1050145
8
subdivision, pursuant to § 35-2-50(b), Ala. Code 1975, and
recorded it pursuant to § 35-2-51(a), Ala. Code 1975.  Thus,
the Coatses argue, Gaston demands the same result: Like
Pardue, Harper should be "deemed to have made a conveyance in
fee simple of all areas granted or dedicated to the public,"
which cannot now be revoked. 514 So. 2d at 879. 
Harper responds that other cases from this Court have
narrowed 
that 
general 
rule 
established 
by 
Gaston.
Specifically, he argues that Cottage Hill Land Corp. v. City
of Mobile, 443 So. 2d 1201 (Ala. 1983), and CRW, Inc. v. Twin
Lake Property Owners Association, Inc., 521 So. 2d 939 (Ala.
1988), expressly hold that recordation of a plat, standing
alone, does not constitute a completed dedication of the
streets on the plat to the public and that acceptance by the
proper governmental authority is also required.  Harper thus
contends that because the Coatses failed to show any
acceptance of the purported dedication by the appropriate
governmental authority in addition to recordation, the Coatses
should not have prevailed on their summary-judgment motion. 
We disagree.  A closer look at the two cases Harper
relies on reveals that they are distinguishable from the
1050145
In fact, the statement was dismissed as dictum in a
1
subsequent decision by this Court. See Blair v. Fullmer, 583
So. 2d 1307, 1309 (Ala. 1991) ("The language in Cottage Hill
stating that acceptance is required is dictum in any event
...."). 
9
present case.  We acknowledge that this Court in Cottage Hill
did state that
 "[u]nder early Alabama statutory authority, streets
indicated on a recorded and acknowledged plat were
considered to be dedicated to the public use without
awaiting acceptance or use by the public. See Code
1907, § 6030; Manning v. House, 211 Ala. 570, 573,
100 So. 772, 774 (1924). This is no longer true,
however. See Code 1975, § 11-52-32(b)."
443 So. 2d at 1203.  However, that statement is at most
dictum, because acceptance was not truly at issue in Cottage
Hill.   The actual issue in that case was whether a valid
1
dedication is revocable if the road is never subsequently
completed.  The disputed land was a thoroughfare expressly
reserved by the city before the subdivision was approved, thus
making acceptance by the city clear.  However, even if we
consider this Court's statement in Cottage Hill regarding
acceptance as more than mere dictum, it still does not stand
entirely for the proposition Harper uses it for.  Two points
are important to note. The first is that the early statutory
authority mentioned in Cottage Hill -- Ala. Code 1907, § 6030
1050145
Alabama Code 1907, § 6030, provided: "The acknowledgment
2
and recording of such plat or map shall be held in law and in
equity to be a conveyance in fee simple of such portion of the
premises platted as are marked or noted on such plat or map as
donated or granted to the public ...."). Alabama Code 1975, §
35-2-51(b), provides: "The acknowledgment and recording of
such plat or map shall be held to be a conveyance in fee
simple of such portion of the premises platted as are marked
or noted on such plat or map as donated or granted to the
public ....").
Because neither party has raised the issue whether this
3
provision applies to property outside the city limits of a
municipality but within its police jurisdiction, we do not
address that issue in this case.
10
-- contains essentially the same language as Ala. Code 1975,
§ 35-2-51.  In addition, the Code section cited as changing
2
the general rule under the "early statutory authority," Ala.
Code 
1975, 
§ 
11-52-32(b), 
is 
limited 
to 
municipal
corporations.  That Code section is found in Subtitle 2 of
Title 11 of the Code of Alabama entitled "Provisions
Applicable to Municipal Corporations Only."  Because the Blue
Ridge subdivision is outside the city limits of Monroeville,
that provision has no effect here.3
Harper also cites CRW, Inc. v. Twin Lake Property Owners
Association, Inc., supra, asserting that the facts in that
case "are the same as the facts of this case." Harper's brief,
at 5.  In CRW, CRW was constructing a subdivision next to an
1050145
11
existing subdivision, Twin Lakes.  It began constructing a
road that was to connect to the only road that ran through the
Twin Lakes subdivision, and it advised potential purchasers of
lots in the new subdivision to enter the new neighborhood
through the Twin Lakes subdivision.  In holding that the road
in the Twin Lakes subdivision was a private road, the Court
stated: "We do not agree that recordation, standing alone,
constitutes a dedication." 521 So. 2d at 941. 
However, the facts here are not the same as those in CRW;
CRW is readily distinguishable.  The Twin Lakes subdivision
was accessible by only one road, and at the entrance to that
road were signs stating "Twin Lakes/Private Property/No
Trespassing/Members 
Only" 
and 
"No 
Trespassing/Private
Property/Members Only." 521 So. 2d at 940.  The City of Moody
expressly allowed the streets of the Twin Lakes subdivision to
remain private when it annexed the area, and it was agreed
that the roads were not the city's responsibility unless they
were subsequently deeded to the city. 521 So. 2d at 940.  The
county also disavowed ownership and responsibility for the
streets in the Twin Lakes subdivision. 521 So. 2d at 940.  Far
from being a case where the streets were dedicated to the
1050145
12
public but never accepted by the proper authorities, the Twin
Lakes Property Owners Association expressly and repeatedly
refused dedication of the road to the public.  Furthermore,
the Twin Lakes subdivision was also in the city limits of a
municipality, and the Court again relied on Ala. Code 1975, §
11-52-32(b), in affirming the trial court's judgment finding
the road to be a private road.
More applicable here is Blair v. Fullmer, 583 So. 2d 1307
(Ala. 1991), which follows the general rule laid down in
Gaston.  In Blair, a lot owner was seeking a declaration that
a road indicated on the subdivision plat was a public road,
even though the road apparently had never been completed.  No
acceptance by any authority beyond recordation of the
subdivision plat was shown.  In Blair, the Court acknowledged
Cottage Hill and CRW, but it distinguished those cases from
the facts presented there by noting that, unlike the
subdivisions in those cases, the subdivision in Blair was
outside the city limits. 583 So. 2d at 1310.  In response to
the contention that other provisions of the Alabama Code
require acceptance by county authorities similar to the
municipal acceptance noted in those cases, the Court concluded
1050145
Harper never raises for our review the provisions of the
4
Alabama Code applicable to counties. 
13
that those sections "do not repeal the specific provision of
§ 35-2-51(b) by virtue of which recordation of a plat
constitutes a dedication of the roads therein with no
requirement of acceptance by any county governing authority."
583 So. 2d  at 1312.  
4
Further support for the conclusion that any acceptance
requirement is limited to streets within municipalities can be
found in Ala. Code 1975, § 35-2-52, which states:
"It shall be the duty of every probate judge in
this state to decline to receive for record in his
office any map or plat upon which any lands lying
within the corporate limits or police jurisdiction
of any city of this state having a population of
more than 10,000 inhabitants are platted or mapped
as streets, alleys or other public ways, unless such
map or plat shall have noted thereon the approval of
the governing body or city engineer of such city."
No similar provision exists for plats or maps outside
"the corporate limits or police jurisdiction of any city of
this state ...." Id.  The canon of statutory construction that
"expressio unius est exclusio alterius" -- the expression of
one thing implies the exclusion of the other -- dictates that
the acceptance requirement of § 35-2-52 is expressly stated to
apply to maps or plats of property within the corporate limits
1050145
Because neither party has alleged that the Blue Ridge
5
subdivision is within the police jurisdiction of the city, we
will treat this case as though the subdivision is outside the
police jurisdiction as well as outside the municipal limits.
14
or police jurisdiction of a municipality of this State; the
requirement does not apply to plats or maps of property
outside the corporate limits or police jurisdiction of any
municipality of this State.   See Ex parte Cove Props., Inc.,
5
796 So. 2d 331, 334 (Ala. 2000)("Expressio unius est exclusio
alterius. The express inclusion of the words 'in front of
their respective riparian lands' excludes an interpretation
that a riparian landowner has a right to erect a pier in front
of the riparian lands of another."). 
Harper attempts to limit the holding of Blair by
referencing the following statement in that opinion:
"It is certainly the case that a city or county must
accept such a dedication (perhaps by the general
public's use of the roads) before there arises a
duty on the governing body to maintain the roads,
and it may be that those two cases require an
acceptance by a public body before the general
public can be given the right to use the roads." 
583 So. 2d at 1311(emphasis added). However, this statement
was dictum, and the actual holding of Blair was that under §
35-2-51(b) "recordation of a plat constitutes dedication of
the roads therein." 583 So. 2d at 1312.  To the extent Blair
1050145
15
left open the door for the possibility that acceptance by a
county governing body is required for dedication of a street
in a subdivision outside the municipal limits or police
jurisdiction of a city, we now close that door.  By completing
the plat of the subdivision in compliance with the statutory
requirements of Ala. Code 1975, § 35-2-50, and recording it
pursuant to § 35-2-51, Harper dedicated Sun Ridge Valley Road
and Blue Ridge Drive to the public. No acceptance of those
roads by any governmental entity beyond recordation of that
plat is necessary for those roads to be dedicated for public
use.  The Coatses, as members of the general public, are
entitled to use those roads without any interference. 
B. Is the Water Line Public or Private?
The other issue on appeal, whether the water line
adjoining Sun Ridge Valley Road and Blue Ridge Drive is public
or private, is mentioned only in passing in the parties'
briefs.  Harper states: "[C]learly, a question of fact has
been presented by [Harper] through his response to [the
Coatses'] Request for Admission, wherein [Harper] aver[s] that
[he is] the owner[] of said water line[]." Harper's brief, at
7.  Harper provides no legal authority or argument for the
1050145
16
proposition that the water line belonged to him despite his
admission that the Monroeville Water Board uses the water line
to service the subdivision.  It is not the duty of this Court
to make arguments or perform the legal research to supplement
an inadequate brief. Dykes v. Lane Trucking, Inc., 652 So. 2d
248, 251 (Ala. 1994)("We have unequivocally stated that it is
not the function of this Court to do a party's legal research
or to make and address legal arguments for a party based on
undelineated general propositions not supported by sufficient
authority or argument.").  The issue  whether the water line
is Harper's private property is therefore not properly before
this Court. Pardue v. Potter, 632 So. 2d 470, 473 (Ala. 1994)
("Issues not argued in the appellant's brief are waived.").
IV. Conclusion. 
We need not decide whether the cases cited by Harper
require, in addition to recordation of the subdivision plat,
acceptance by the proper authorities for a road to be a public
road within a municipality.  The subdivision here was outside
the city limits; therefore, the rule adopted by this Court in
Blair controls.  Roads in a subdivision located outside the
city limits or police jurisdiction of a municipality are
1050145
17
deemed dedicated to the public by way of proper recordation of
a plat, with no requirement of acceptance by any county
governing authority.  Thus, there is no genuine issue of
material fact.  It is undisputed that Harper recorded the plat
with the streets properly marked off.  This, in and of itself,
was a "valid dedication to the public" of the streets marked
in the plat. 
The judgment of the trial court is therefore affirmed. 
AFFIRMED.
Cobb, C.J., and See, Woodall, and Smith, JJ., concur.