Title: Commonwealth v. Ayala
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-10776
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: December 6, 2018

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SJC-10776 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  PHILLIP AYALA. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     September 12, 2018. - December 6, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Evidence, Identification, Ballistician's certificate, 
Medical record.  Identification.  Mental Health.  Practice, 
Criminal, Disclosure of evidence in possession of Federal 
authorities, Assistance of counsel, Capital case, 
Instructions to jury.  Due Process, Disclosure of evidence. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on July 10, 2007. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Peter A. Velis, J., and a 
motion for a new trial, filed on February 10, 2011, was heard by 
C. Jeffrey Kinder, J. 
 
 
 
Myles D. Jacobson & Michael J. Fellows for the defendant. 
 
David L. Sheppard-Brick, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  A jury convicted the defendant, Phillip Ayala, 
of murder in the first degree on the theory of deliberate 
2 
 
 
premeditation for the killing of Clive Ramkissoon.1  The 
defendant raises three core issues on appeal.  First, he argues 
that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his 
convictions.  Second, he argues that his due process rights 
under the United States Constitution and the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights were violated by (i) the Commonwealth's 
failure to obtain and turn over discovery related to the sole 
defense witness's status as a confidential Federal informant, 
and (ii) the trial judge's decisions declining to compel several 
law enforcement officers to testify to the defense witness's 
status as a confidential Federal informant.  Third, he argues 
that his trial counsel was ineffective for (i) failing to retain 
and call an expert witness on the accuracy of eyewitness 
identifications, (ii) failing to retain and call an expert 
witness on ballistics evidence to testify about muzzle flashes, 
and (iii) failing to admit further evidence of the mental health 
issues and drug use of a percipient witness for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
For the reasons stated below, we conclude that there has 
been no reversible error.  After a thorough review of the 
record, we also find no reason to exercise our authority under 
                                                          
 
 
1 The jury also convicted the defendant of the related 
charges of unlawful possession of a firearm without a license 
and unlawful possession of ammunition without a firearm 
identification card. 
3 
 
 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to grant a new trial or to reduce or set 
aside the verdict of murder in the first degree.  We therefore 
affirm the defendant's convictions and the denial of the 
defendant's motion for a new trial. 
 
Background.  We summarize the facts that the jury could 
have found, reserving certain details for discussion of the 
legal issues. 
 
In the early morning of June 10, 2007, Robert Perez and his 
friend, Clive Ramkissoon, attended a house party held on the 
second floor of a house in Springfield.  Upon arriving just 
before 2 A.M., Perez and Ramkissoon encountered a bouncer on the 
first floor at the bottom of the stairwell that led to the 
second floor.  The first-floor bouncer was posted there to 
search guests before letting them upstairs to the party.  After 
being searched, the two men went upstairs to the party.  As 
there were not yet many people at the party, Perez returned to 
the first floor and began speaking with the first-floor bouncer 
in the entryway of the stairwell. 
 
Shortly thereafter, as Perez was speaking with the first-
floor bouncer, the defendant arrived at the party.  As she had 
done with Perez and Ramkissoon, the bouncer attempted to pat 
frisk the defendant before allowing him to enter.  The defendant 
refused.  After a brief argument related to the search, the 
defendant aggressively pushed past the bouncer and climbed the 
4 
 
 
stairs to the second floor.  A second bouncer intercepted the 
defendant on the stairs and prevented him from entering the 
party without having first been pat frisked.  The defendant 
argued with the bouncer and, after yelling and screaming at him, 
was escorted out of the house.  As the defendant was descending 
the staircase to leave, and just steps away from Perez, the 
defendant threatened to "come back" and "light th[e] place up."2  
After leaving the house briefly, the defendant returned and 
kicked in the first-floor door.3 
Throughout this interaction inside the house, Perez had an 
opportunity to observe the defendant closely for several 
minutes.4  Concerned by the defendant's threats and behavior, 
Perez returned upstairs to find Ramkissoon.  The two men walked 
onto the second-floor porch to "assess the situation" and saw 
the defendant pacing back and forth on the street in front of 
the house.  Rather than leave with the defendant still outside, 
given his recent threat to "light th[e] place up," Perez and 
                                                          
 
2 At trial, a witness who had attended the party testified 
that the defendant was upset because he felt that hosting a 
party at the house was disrespectful to his niece, who had 
recently been killed at a nearby location. 
 
3 The door was kicked in with such force that police were 
later able to take a footprint impression from the door and 
confirm that it matched the defendant's shoe. 
 
 
4 Robert Perez's account of the defendant's actions was 
substantially corroborated at trial by the testimony of the 
first-floor bouncer. 
5 
 
 
Ramkissoon decided to wait on the porch for a few minutes.  
After the defendant moved out of sight, Perez, Ramkissoon, and a 
female friend decided to leave the party. 
After leaving the house, Ramkissoon and the woman began 
walking across the road, while Perez, who had stopped to tie his 
shoe, trailed slightly behind.  As they were crossing the road, 
the woman stopped in the middle of the road directly in front of 
the house and began dancing.  Perez walked over to where the 
woman was dancing while Ramkissoon kept moving down the road, to 
the left of the house, toward the area where his vehicle was 
parked.  As Perez approached the woman to guide her out of the 
way of oncoming traffic, he heard a gunshot and saw a muzzle 
flash appear near a street light located on the sidewalk in 
front of a property adjacent to the house.5  Perez saw the 
defendant holding a firearm and testified that he was able to 
identify the shooter as the defendant because the muzzle flash 
from the gun illuminated the shooter's face.  He then turned and 
ran away from the shooting as several more gunshots rang out.  
Perez, who had previously served in the United States Army, 
testified that he heard between five and seven shots, which he 
                                                          
 
 
5 Perez testified that he saw the muzzle flash came from 
"the sidewalk area under the light," but later noted that he 
could not be certain whether the street light was on at the time 
of the shooting. 
6 
 
 
recognized as .22 caliber bullets based on his military 
experience. 
Perez soon circled back to where Ramkissoon's vehicle was 
parked and discovered Ramkissoon face down on the street.  Perez 
performed rescue breathing on Ramkissoon and telephoned the 
police.  Police officers arrived at the scene by approximately 
3 A.M. It was later determined that Ramkissoon died from 
multiple gunshot wounds.6  Perez was soon brought to the 
Springfield police station, where he gave a statement recounting 
the events of that morning.  At the station, Perez identified 
the defendant from a set of photographs shown to him by police, 
stating that he recognized the defendant's photograph as the 
"same person who [he] had seen in the stairwell not wanting to 
be pat frisked by the bouncer there, and then firing the gun 
outside in the street at [the victim]." 
The reliability of Perez's identification was vigorously 
challenged by defense counsel on cross-examination.  The defense 
confronted Perez on his ability to accurately identify the 
                                                          
 
 
6 The police recovered five spent shell casings from the 
scene of the shooting.  The medical examiner also recovered two 
spent projectiles from Ramkissoon's body.  At trial, a police 
officer with special knowledge of ballistics testified that he 
performed a microscopic examination of the shell casings and the 
spent projectiles.  Based on the examination, he concluded that 
all five casings came from a .22 caliber gun.  He further 
concluded that both projectiles extracted from Ramkissoon's body 
came from the same weapon.  The police never located the gun 
that was used to kill Ramkissoon. 
7 
 
 
shooter under the lighting conditions at the time of the 
shooting, his recollection of certain events that morning, and 
the discrepancies between Perez's statement to police on the 
morning of the shooting and his trial testimony regarding the 
defendant's height and clothing.  Additionally, the defense 
presented evidence showing that Perez suffered from bipolar 
disorder and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), the latter 
being a result of his military service.7  Specifically, evidence 
showed that he sought psychiatric counselling and used marijuana 
to cope with the effects of his diagnoses.8  There was no 
evidence, however, that Perez was either suffering the effects 
of these diagnoses or under the influence of marijuana at the 
time of the shooting. 
Following the close of the Commonwealth's case-in-chief, 
the defense called a sole witness, N.F.,9 who was the disc jockey 
at the party.  N.F. testified that she knew the defendant and 
looked up to him, and had seen him multiple times that morning.  
                                                          
 
 
7 The trial judge ordered Perez to undergo a competency 
examination by an independent doctor to determine whether these 
diagnoses would have an impact on his ability to testify.  
Following the examination, Perez was declared competent to 
testify. 
 
 
8 We discuss the importance of Perez's mental health 
struggles and drug use to this case in more detail, infra. 
 
 
9 Because the records concerning the witness's identity are 
subject to an order of impoundment, we use the pseudonym "N.F." 
to refer to her. 
8 
 
 
N.F. also testified that at one point, she was on the second-
floor porch and saw the defendant emotional and upset outside 
after he had been kicked out of the house.  She and others 
attempted to comfort the defendant and suggested that he go 
home.  She testified to then witnessing the defendant leave the 
party and drive away.  N.F. was adamant that the defendant left 
approximately thirty to forty-five minutes before the shooting, 
stating that he was "gone a long time before [the shooting] even 
went down."  In response to further questioning on her certainty 
that the defendant was not at the scene at the time of the 
shooting, she testified, "He was not there.  Put my kids on it."  
Although she did not witness the shooting, she testified that 
she observed a red Taurus motor vehicle "skidding off" from the 
scene immediately after the shooting. 
The jury eventually returned guilty verdicts on all three 
charges, and the defendant was subsequently sentenced to life in 
prison without the possibility of parole.  The defendant now 
appeals. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  On appeal, 
the defendant argues that the Commonwealth failed to present 
sufficient evidence proving that he was the shooter.  In 
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we apply the familiar 
Latimore standard.  See Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 
677-678 (1979).  We consider whether, after viewing the evidence 
9 
 
 
in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, any rational 
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 
crimes beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id.  The evidence may be 
direct or circumstantial, and we draw all reasonable inferences 
in favor of the Commonwealth.  Commonwealth v. Rakes, 478 Mass. 
22, 32 (2017).  A conviction cannot stand, however, if it is 
based entirely on conjecture or speculation.  Id. 
 
At trial, the Commonwealth primarily relied on the 
eyewitness testimony of Perez to prove that the defendant was 
the shooter.  The defendant argues, however, that this testimony 
cannot be used to support his convictions because the jury were 
incapable of assessing its reliability.  The defendant's 
challenge centers on Perez's testimony that he was able to 
identify the defendant as the shooter because the muzzle flash 
from the gun "illuminated" the defendant's face.  The defendant 
argues that because the illuminating capability of a muzzle 
flash is not within the ordinary, common experience of a 
reasonable juror, the jury could not have found that the 
evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt, without speculation, 
that the defendant was the shooter. 
 
 Even assuming, as the defendant argues, that ordinary 
jurors are unfamiliar with the illuminating capability of muzzle 
flashes, there was independent evidence that would permit a 
rational juror to reasonably infer that the crime scene was 
10 
 
 
sufficiently illuminated at the time of the shooting to provide 
Perez with the opportunity to identify the defendant as the 
shooter. 
 
Evidence at trial established that the shooting took place 
near a street light located on the sidewalk in front of the 
property adjacent to the house.10  A police officer testified 
that the street lights near the location of the shooting and the 
exterior lights on a nearby building were illuminated when he 
arrived at the crime scene at approximately 4:30 A.M.11  Although 
there was no evidence whether the specific street light near 
where the shooter was standing was on at the time of the 
shooting, a juror could reasonably have inferred that if the 
street lights in the area were on at 4:30 A.M., they would have 
also been on at the time of the shooting earlier in the 
morning.12  Even if an ordinary, rational juror is unfamiliar 
                                                          
 
 
10 The police recovered five spent shell casings from the 
scene of the shooting.  Each casing was located near the street 
light in front of the property adjacent to the house that Perez 
identified as the light under which the shooter was standing.  
The shell casings were located to the right of the street light.  
A police officer testified that, generally, shell casings 
discharged from a handgun eject to the right of the gun, 
indicating that the shooter was standing even closer to the 
street light than where the shell casings landed. 
 
 
11 The officer further testified that on arriving at the 
scene, he observed that "[t]he street was illuminated." 
 
 
12 This inference is further supported by the fact that 
Perez recognized the defendant while he was outside on the 
11 
 
 
with muzzle flashes, they are undoubtedly familiar with the 
illuminating capability of street lights.  This common knowledge 
would have allowed a rational juror to conclude that Perez had 
an adequate opportunity to identify the defendant as the 
shooter.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Stewart, 450 Mass. 25, 28, 33 
(2007) (evidence sufficient to prove defendant was shooter 
based, in part, on eyewitness seeing defendant shoot while 
standing in front of street light). 
 
In addition to the presence of the street light, the jury 
received other evidence that would have allowed them to assess 
the reliability of Perez's identification.  For example, the 
jury heard testimony that Perez had observed the defendant for 
several minutes earlier in the morning while he was in the 
stairwell.  They also heard testimony that Perez recognized the 
defendant walking on the street from the second-floor porch 
after the defendant was kicked out of the party.  Additionally, 
evidence showed that Perez successfully identified the defendant 
from a photographic array at the police station after the 
shooting.  This evidence would further have provided a rational 
juror with an adequate basis to assess the reliability of 
Perez's identification of the defendant at the time of the 
shooting.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Richardson, 469 Mass. 248, 249-
                                                          
 
street and Perez was on the second-floor porch earlier in the 
morning. 
12 
 
 
251 & n.3, 255 (2014) (evidence sufficient where eyewitness 
identified defendant fleeing from police from over 200 feet 
away, selected defendant's photograph from photographic array at 
police station, and had seen defendant on two prior occasions). 
 
The Commonwealth also presented circumstantial evidence 
linking the defendant to the shooting.  For example, prior to 
the shooting, the defendant arrived at the party and refused to 
be searched.  He was visibly upset that there was a party taking 
place at the house, and after being kicked out, he threatened to 
come back to the party and "light th[e] place up."  Soon after, 
he returned and kicked in the first-floor door with such force 
that he left a footprint on the door.  Additionally, the 
defendant was seen pacing around on the street in front of the 
house just a few minutes before Perez and Ramkissoon left the 
party and the shooting took place.  From this evidence, the jury 
could have reasonably inferred that the defendant did not want 
to be searched on the morning of June 10 because he was carrying 
a gun, that he was still near the house when the shooting 
occurred, and that his anger about the party motivated him to 
shoot Ramkissoon as he crossed the street.  This evidence, when 
taken together, "formed a mosaic of evidence such that the jury 
could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant 
was the shooter" (quotation and citation omitted).  Commonwealth 
v. Jones, 477 Mass. 307, 317 (2017).  Cf. id. at 316-318 
13 
 
 
(sufficient evidence that defendant was shooter where evidence 
linking him to shooting was that he generally matched 
description of person seen fleeing crime scene, he was at park 
where crime occurred that day, he grew up in area and regularly 
visited park, and he lied to police about his whereabouts that 
day). 
 
We therefore conclude that the evidence, when viewed in the 
light most favorable to the Commonwealth and taken together with 
the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, was sufficient to 
support the jury's verdict that defendant was the one who shot 
and killed the victim.  See Latimore, 378 Mass. at 677-678. 
 
2.  Dual sovereignty.  The defendant also argues that his 
due process rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights were violated by (i) the Commonwealth's 
failure to obtain and turn over discovery related to the sole 
defense witness's status as a confidential informant, and (ii) 
the judge's decisions declining to compel various State and 
Federal law enforcement officers to testify to the defense 
witness's status as a confidential informant.  Because we 
conclude that the informant records and sought-after testimony 
were not in the possession or control of the Commonwealth and 
that the Commonwealth did not have the burden to secure the 
Federal government's cooperation with regard to the disclosure 
14 
 
 
of this information, the judge did not abuse his discretion in 
denying and quashing the defendant's various motions and 
subpoenas. 
 
a.  Relevant facts.  Shortly before the trial was 
originally scheduled to begin in July 2008, the Commonwealth 
informed defense counsel that it had recently learned that a 
witness likely to be called by the defense, N.F., was a 
confidential informant for a Federal gang task force operating 
in Springfield.13  As a result of this new information, the trial 
was continued several times until over one year later in August 
2009. 
 
The Commonwealth's disclosure resulted in multiple motions 
by the defendant to obtain Federal records detailing N.F.'s 
status as a confidential informant (informant records) and to 
compel the testimony of Federal agents regarding the same 
through State court proceedings.14  The defendant argued that the 
                                                          
 
 
13 The task force included several State police officers who 
were deputized as "Special Federal Officers" for the purposes of 
participating in the task force. 
 
 
14 The defendant filed a motion for the production of 
exculpatory evidence related to N.F.'s status as an informant.  
The Commonwealth opposed the motion, arguing that it did not 
have possession or control of the requested information.  The 
motion judge agreed with the Commonwealth and denied the 
defendant's motion to the extent that it requested that the 
Commonwealth produce records that were not in the Commonwealth's 
possession or control.  The motion judge further suggested that 
the defendant attempt to subpoena the Federal authorities for 
that purpose. 
15 
 
 
information was material to his defense because it was necessary 
to demonstrate N.F.'s credibility as a witness, which the 
defendant contended was exculpatory information.  At various 
times, the defendant was informed that a successful pursuit of 
this information would require that he comply with the procedure 
set forth by Federal regulations.  The federally mandated 
procedure required the defendant to submit a written request for 
information describing the informant records and the subject 
matter of the testimony sought.  Federal authorities would then 
review the sought-after information for privilege, 
confidentiality, and the likelihood that its disclosure would 
compromise ongoing investigations.  After this review, the 
Federal authorities would report back to the defendant and 
either disclose the requested information or explain why it was 
continuing to be withheld.  Despite being made aware of the 
Federal procedure, the defendant refused to comply and continued 
                                                          
 
 
 
The defendant next filed a motion to examine N.F.'s records  
pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 17 (a) (2), 378 Mass. 885 (1979). 
The motion judge allowed the defendant's motion under rule 17, 
and summonses to various Federal agencies were issued.  The 
Federal government then filed a motion to quash the summonses 
sent to Federal authorities.  The motion judge allowed the 
motion to quash, concluding that the defendant was instead 
required to follow the established Federal regulations to obtain 
records from a Federal agency.  The defendant eventually 
petitioned for relief to a single justice of this court, which 
was denied.  The defendant's subsequent appeal to the full court 
was also denied.  Ayala v. Commonwealth, 454 Mass. 1015, 1015 
(2009). 
16 
 
 
to unsuccessfully request that the trial court judge compel 
Federal authorities to disclose this information. 
 
During the time period of the continuance, and while 
engaging in the pursuit of the federally held information, the 
defense had the opportunity to depose N.F.  At her deposition, 
N.F. testified to her status as a confidential informant for the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), including the nature of 
her work and compensation.  She also testified to her 
observations on the morning of the shooting, which supported the 
defendant's theory that he was not present at the scene at the 
time of the shooting.  Specifically, N.F. testified that she 
witnessed the defendant driving away from the scene before the 
shooting took place, and instead implicated another individual 
whom she witnessed fleeing the scene.  The deposition also 
revealed that N.F. had telephoned a Federal agent on or about 
the morning of the shooting and described what had occurred. 
 
On the eve of trial, the defendant filed a motion to 
dismiss the case based on the Commonwealth's failure to turn 
over N.F.'s informant records.  The motion was eventually 
denied.  The defendant then sought once again to compel the 
testimony of a member of the Federal gang task force, but the 
subpoena was quashed.  Subpoenas for several other law 
enforcement officers and an assistant United States attorney 
were similarly quashed.  After these subpoenas had been quashed 
17 
 
 
and the trial was set to begin, at the suggestion of the trial 
judge, the defendant finally submitted a request to Federal 
authorities for the informant records in compliance with the 
governing Federal regulations described above.  Redacted copies 
of these records were disclosed to the defendant a few days 
later, before the defense had rested its case.  These records 
effectively confirmed N.F's status as a confidential Federal 
informant and included a summary of a statement made by N.F. to 
a Federal law enforcement officer regarding the shooting.  The 
Federal government also authorized two law enforcement officers 
to testify on a limited basis. 
 
b.  Analysis.  The due process clauses of the Federal 
Constitution and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights require 
that the Commonwealth disclose material, exculpatory evidence to 
the defendant.15  Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs. v. Attorney 
Gen., 480 Mass. 700, 731 (2018).  See Brady v. Maryland, 373 
U.S. 83, 87 (1963); Commonwealth v. Donahue, 396 Mass. 590, 596 
                                                          
 
 
15 For the purposes of our analysis, we assume, without in 
any way deciding, that the information that would confirm N.F.'s 
status as an informant falls within the scope of what is 
considered exculpatory information.  See Commonwealth v. 
Williams, 455 Mass. 706, 714 n.6 (2010) ("[E]xculpatory is not a 
technical term meaning alibi or other complete proof of 
innocence, but simply imports evidence which tends to negate the 
guilt of the accused . . . or, stated affirmatively, supporting 
the innocence of the defendant" [quotations omitted]); 
Commonwealth v. Pisa, 372 Mass. 590, 595 (1977), cert. denied, 
434 U.S. 869 (1977). 
18 
 
 
(1986).  This obligation, however, is "limited to that 
[information] in the possession of the prosecutor or police" 
(citation omitted).  Donahue, supra ("The prosecutor cannot be 
said to suppress that which is not in his possession or subject 
to his control"). 
 
The information related to N.F.'s status as a confidential 
informant was not in the Commonwealth's possession or control, 
but rather was in the possession and control of the Federal 
government.  There is no contention, nor is there any evidence, 
that any member of the Federal government or the Federal gang 
task force assisted in the investigation or prosecution of the 
defendant's case.  The records held by the task force therefore 
cannot be said to have been in the possession or control of the 
Commonwealth.  See Commonwealth v. Beal, 429 Mass. 530, 532 
(1999).  The Commonwealth was therefore under no obligation to 
turn over this information.  See id. ("The prosecutor's duty 
does not extend beyond information held by agents of the 
prosecution team"); Donahue, 396 Mass. at 596-597. 
 
Although we do not charge the Commonwealth with the 
obligation to disclose exculpatory information that it does not 
possess or control, we have recognized that issues of Federal 
and State sovereignty have the potential to prejudice a 
defendant being prosecuted in State court by stymying his or her 
ability to obtain exculpatory information held by Federal 
19 
 
 
authorities.  Donahue, 396 Mass. at 598.  See Commonwealth v. 
Liebman, 379 Mass. 671, 674 (1980), S.C., 388 Mass. 483 (1983).  
Accordingly, under certain circumstances we will require the 
Commonwealth to bear the burden of securing the cooperation of 
the Federal government with regard to the disclosure of 
exculpatory information.  Donahue, supra.  See Commonwealth v. 
Lykus, 451 Mass. 310, 327 (2008); Liebman, supra at 675.  
Imposing this burden serves to guard against any potential 
unfairness to a defendant that may arise due to the presence of 
two sovereigns.  See Lykus, supra at 328; Liebman, supra at 674. 
 
A determination whether the Commonwealth bears this burden 
requires us to apply the four-factor analysis set forth in 
Donahue, 396 Mass. at 599.  We evaluate "[(i)] the potential 
unfairness to the defendant; [(ii)] the defendant's lack of 
access to the evidence; [(iii)] the burden on the prosecutor of 
obtaining the evidence; and [(iv)] the degree of cooperation 
between State and Federal authorities, both in general and in 
the particular case."  Id.  Applying the above analysis to this 
case, we conclude that each factor weighs against imposing the 
burden on the Commonwealth to secure the release of information 
related to N.F.'s status as a confidential Federal informant. 
 
Under the first Donahue factor, we discern no unfairness to 
the defendant as a result of not receiving this information.  
Cf. Donahue, 396 Mass. at 599-600.  As a threshold matter, we 
20 
 
 
note that N.F.'s status as an informant was not withheld or 
otherwise hidden from the defendant in any way.  The 
Commonwealth disclosed her status to the defendant, and defense 
counsel had the opportunity to depose N.F. to uncover the full 
nature of her relationship with the FBI.  The defendant sought 
the informant records and corroborative testimony from Federal 
officers, however, for the sole purpose of establishing N.F.'s 
credibility as a witness in front of the jury.  At trial, the 
judge permitted the defendant to admit N.F.'s status in evidence 
through her testimony.  That status was not in any way 
contested.  The judge ruled that he would not permit any 
additional evidence -- whether through documents or additional 
testimony -- detailing her work as an informant that would 
amount to vouching for her credibility.  See United States v. 
Piva, 870 F.2d 753, 760 (1st Cir. 1989) (noting 
inappropriateness of use of government officials to vouch for 
credibility of their informants because evaluation of 
informant's credibility is up to jury).  On direct examination, 
N.F. testified that she was indeed an informant and that she had 
worked as an informant for approximately two years and had been 
paid by Federal authorities on multiple occasions.  N.F. also 
testified extensively about her observations on the morning of 
the shooting and forcefully denied any involvement by the 
defendant in the shooting.  Accordingly, the information the 
21 
 
 
defense sought to use to establish N.F.'s status as an informant 
was cumulative of her uncontested testimony on this issue. The 
cumulative nature of the information was confirmed on the last 
day of trial when a redacted copy of N.F.'s informant records 
was produced to the defendant.  The information contained in the 
unredacted portions of the records, at most, confirmed N.F.'s 
status as an informant and revealed a summary of the statement 
that she gave to a Federal agent concerning the shooting.  This 
information was fully developed during N.F.'s deposition and at 
trial.  Additionally, the officers whose testimony the defendant 
sought to compel were only authorized to testify on a limited 
basis and were not permitted to disclose the identities of 
confidential informants.  The only arguably new information 
contained in the disclosed records included a reference to a 
separate individual, whom she named, as the shooter.  This 
individual's alleged presence at the scene of the crime, 
however, was disclosed to the defense over one year earlier when 
the Commonwealth disclosed to the defendant that N.F. was an 
informant.  The potential involvement of a third party in the 
shooting was also revealed by N.F. during her deposition.  
Despite this knowledge, defense counsel chose not to question 
N.F. about this individual's involvement during direct 
examination.  The remaining portions of the records were 
redacted pursuant to Federal guidelines.  To the extent that the 
22 
 
 
defendant argues that he was entitled to the disclosure of the 
unredacted portions of the file, he is mistaken.  The defendant 
has not produced any evidence that the redacted portions of the 
file contained any relevant, let alone exculpatory, information.  
See Commonwealth v. Healy, 438 Mass. 672, 679 (2003) ("To 
prevail on a claim that the prosecution failed to disclose 
exculpatory evidence, the defendant must first prove that the 
evidence was, in fact, exculpatory").  The defendant was 
therefore not prejudiced by his inability to obtain this 
information before trial.  See Commonwealth v. Vieira, 401 Mass. 
828, 838 (1988) (no prejudice where substance of withheld 
evidence was cumulative of information already known to 
defendant). 
 
On appeal, the defendant also argues that he was prejudiced 
by the failure to have this information at trial because it was 
needed to rehabilitate N.F.'s credibility after she contradicted 
her own testimony with regard to how long she was an informant.  
Specifically, after testifying on direct examination that she 
was an informant for at least two years and had been paid by the 
Federal government on multiple occasions, she testified on 
cross-examination that she had only been paid once.16  This 
                                                          
 
 
16 The defendant argued that the change in her testimony was 
the result of intimidation on the part of the Federal government 
and moved for a mistrial on that basis.  The motion was denied.  
There was no evidence that Federal officers intimidated N.F. 
23 
 
 
contradiction did not put her status as a confidential informant 
in doubt, however, just the length of time that she was an 
informant and on how many occasions she was paid by Federal 
authorities -- both issues tangential to the case.  We do not 
believe that the defendant's access to the Federal records and 
testimony on N.F.'s informant status was therefore necessary to 
rehabilitate her credibility for these purposes, and instead may 
have presented other problems for the defense.  Indeed, 
admitting additional evidence on the length of time that she was 
an informant after her testimony on cross-examination concluded 
may very well have further undermined her credibility.  The 
fairness concerns present in other cases involving issues of 
dual sovereignty are therefore not present here.  See, e.g., 
Donahue, 396 Mass. at 599-600. 
                                                          
 
into lying or otherwise changing her testimony at trial.  The 
only evidence presented was that N.F. was told that a Federal 
officer was upset with her participation in the defendant's 
case, that she would not be paid again until after the trial 
ended, and that she was not to detail her payments or the 
information that she had given Federal officers in the past.  
This is not sufficient to show that she was intimidated into 
altering her testimony.  Indeed, the defendant's theory of 
intimidation is belied by the fact that the purported 
intimidation allegedly occurred before N.F. testified in the 
case.  Had she been intimidated as the defendant argues, one 
would not have expected her to testify to being an informant for 
approximately two years and receiving payments as she did on 
direct examination.  Accordingly, this theory does not support 
the defendant's contention that he was prejudiced by the failure 
to obtain the federally held information of N.F.'s status as an 
informant. 
24 
 
 
 
The second Donahue factor considers the defendant's lack of 
access to the sought-after evidence.  Here, we conclude that 
this factor weighs heavily against imposing the burden on the 
Commonwealth to secure the disclosure of this information.  The 
defendant was given an opportunity to depose N.F prior to trial.  
The record makes clear that the defendant also had ample time 
and opportunity to obtain the informant records and the 
substance of the sought-after testimony well before trial.  
Approximately eleven months before trial took place, the 
defendant was advised that obtaining this information from 
Federal authorities would require that he pursue it in 
accordance with Federal regulations.  Indeed, he was reminded of 
the federally mandated procedure described several times, 
including by this court.  See Ayala v. Commonwealth, 454 Mass. 
1015, 1015 n.2 (2009) (noting that defendant "may have other 
means at his disposal to obtain the information he seeks.  The 
Federal agencies have indicated that they would consider a 
request submitted by the defendant pursuant to [Federal 
regulations]").  See also United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 
340 U.S. 462, 468 (1951) (upholding Federal regulation 
restricting ability of Federal authorities to disclose 
subpoenaed information).  He did not, however, avail himself of 
the opportunity to obtain this information through the Federal 
procedure.  Instead, he engaged in a year-long campaign to 
25 
 
 
compel this information through State proceedings.  The 
defendant had a full and fair opportunity to retrieve this 
evidence months before trial, but chose not to.  Indeed, when he 
finally did comply with the Federal procedures at the start of 
the trial, he received a redacted copy of N.F.'s informant 
records and a notice authorizing the testimony of two Federal 
officers a few days later. 
 
The third Donahue factor requires us to evaluate the burden 
on the prosecutor in obtaining the withheld information.  Under 
this factor, we consider whether the prosecutor has a means of 
access to the information held by Federal authorities that the 
defendant does not.  See Donahue, 396 Mass. at 600.  Here, the 
prosecutor would have been required to comply with the Federal 
procedure as well.17  This case is therefore distinguishable from 
cases where the burden on the prosecution to retrieve the 
withheld information was minimal compared to the defendant.  See 
id. (noting that while exculpatory information could not be 
obtained by defendant, it "may well have been available to the 
prosecutor on request").  There is no evidence in this case that 
a request from the Commonwealth, rather than from the defendant, 
would have precipitated the disclosure of the evidence.  In 
                                                          
 
 
17 During argument before the start of trial, defense 
counsel conceded that the prosecutor in this case "ha[d] done 
whatever she could to procure evidence that is of exculpatory 
nature." 
26 
 
 
fact, the record reveals the opposite.  In response to discovery 
requests issued by the defendant that sought to determine 
whether other individuals at the party were also Federal 
informants, the prosecutor submitted requests for information 
related to these individuals in compliance with the Federal 
regulations.  Rather than disclose this information, the FBI 
curtly informed the prosecutor that it "decline[d] either to 
confirm or deny whether [an individual] is or was an informant 
for the FBI."  The burden on the prosecution was thus comparable 
to that on the defendant. 
 
The fourth and final Donahue factor considers the degree of 
cooperation between State and Federal authorities, both in 
general and in the particular case.  Where the cooperation 
between the two sovereigns is particularly strong, such as in a 
joint investigation of a defendant, we have determined that 
fairness dictates that the burden of securing the disclosure of 
the information held by Federal authorities falls squarely on 
the Commonwealth.  See Lykus, 451 Mass. at 328.  Here, however, 
there is no evidence of any cooperation between State and 
Federal authorities in the investigation or prosecution of the 
defendant's case.  Although there was evidence that several 
Springfield police officers were deputized as Federal officers 
for the purposes of operating within the Federal gang task 
force, there was nothing to suggest that these officers played 
27 
 
 
any role in the defendant's case.  Because this case did not 
fall within the umbrella of matters under investigation by the 
task force, it cannot be said that the FBI "functioned as [an] 
agent[]" of the Commonwealth in this case.  Donahue, 396 Mass. 
at 599. 
 
After weighing these factors, we conclude that the 
Commonwealth was not required to bear the burden of securing the 
release of the information concerning N.F.'s status as an 
informant from Federal authorities.  The defendant was not 
prejudiced by the nondisclosure, the defendant had ample 
opportunity to depose the informant and retrieve this 
information on his own, the Commonwealth would have been 
required to follow the same Federal procedures as the defendant 
to access the information, and the Federal government played no 
role in the investigation or prosecution of the defendant's 
case.  See Lykus, 451 Mass. at 328; Donahue, 396 Mass. at 598; 
Liebman, 379 Mass. at 675.  The trial judge therefore did not 
abuse his discretion in declining to require the Commonwealth to 
secure N.F.'s informant records from Federal authorities and in 
declining to compel the testimony of Federal law enforcement 
officers. 
 
3.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  Following his 
convictions, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial, 
arguing that his trial counsel had been ineffective.  The motion 
28 
 
 
advanced a litany of errors alleged to have been made by trial 
counsel.  Relevant to this appeal, the motion judge, who was not 
the trial judge, allowed an evidentiary hearing on trial 
counsel's failure to retain and call experts on eyewitness 
identification and ballistics.  The motion judge did not allow 
an evidentiary hearing, however, on trial counsel's failure to 
notice the absence of Perez's psychological records that were 
subject to disclosure after finding that the defendant had not 
raised a substantial issue warranting further hearing.  
Following the evidentiary hearing, the motion judge denied the 
defendant's motion for a new trial. 
 
On appeal, the defendant argues that the motion judge erred 
in denying his motion with respect to his arguments that his 
trial counsel was ineffective for (i) failing to retain and call 
an expert witness on the accuracy of eyewitness identifications, 
(ii) failing to retain and call an expert witness on ballistics 
evidence to testify about muzzle flashes, and (iii) failing to 
notice the absence of medical records that provided further 
insight into Perez's mental health issues and drug use. 
 
Because the defendant was convicted of murder in the first 
degree, we do not evaluate his ineffective assistance claim 
under the traditional standard set forth in Commonwealth v. 
29 
 
 
Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974).18  See Commonwealth v. Seino, 
479 Mass. 463, 472 (2018); Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 478 Mass. 
189, 192-193 (2017).  Instead, we apply the more favorable 
standard of G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and review his claim to 
determine whether there was a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  Seino, supra.  Under this review, we 
first ask whether defense counsel committed an error in the 
course of the trial.  Id.  If there was an error, we ask whether 
it was likely to have influenced the jury's conclusion.  Id. at 
472-473. 
 
Where the claimed ineffectiveness is the result of a 
strategic or tactical decision of trial counsel, the decision 
must have been "manifestly unreasonable" to be considered an 
error.  Kolenovic, 478 Mass. at 193.  Commonwealth v. Holland, 
476 Mass. 801, 812 (2017).  A determination on whether a 
decision is manifestly unreasonable requires an evaluation of 
the "decision at the time it was made" (citation omitted).  
Holland, supra.  Only strategic and tactical decisions "which 
lawyers of ordinary training and skill in criminal law would not 
                                                          
 
 
18 Under Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96–97 
(1974), the standard is whether an attorney's performance fell 
"measurably below that which might be expected from an ordinary 
fallible lawyer" and, if so, whether such ineffectiveness has 
"likely deprived the defendant of an otherwise available, 
substantial ground" of defense. 
30 
 
 
consider competent are manifestly unreasonable" (citation 
omitted).  Id. 
 
We conclude that any errors by the defendant's trial 
counsel did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage 
of justice.  The defendant's motion for a new trial was 
therefore properly denied.  We address each of the defendant's 
arguments in turn. 
 
a.  Eyewitness identification expert.  The defendant's 
motion for a new trial relied heavily on trial counsel's failure 
to obtain evidence from an expert on eyewitness identification.  
Had an expert been called, the defendant argues, the jury would 
have heard evidence on the variables that affect eyewitness 
identifications and would have had "further reason to doubt the 
reliability of Perez's identification."  Specifically, the 
defendant claims that an eyewitness identification expert would 
have testified to the theory of "transference," which suggests 
that Perez identified the defendant as the shooter only because 
of his earlier observations of the defendant during his 
altercation with the bouncers.  Additionally, the defendant 
contends that the expert would have testified to "the negative 
effects on accuracy of heightened stress and post-identification 
feedback," the "weak correlation of confidence to accuracy" of 
the identification, and the "chance of error by a single 
eyewitness." 
31 
 
 
 
The decision to call, or not to call, an expert witness 
fits squarely within the realm of strategic or tactical 
decisions.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Facella, 478 Mass. 393, 
413 (2017) (decision not to call psychiatric expert reasonable 
strategic decision); Commonwealth v. Hensley, 454 Mass. 721, 739 
(2009) (decision not to call expert strategic).  Accordingly, we 
evaluate whether the decision was "manifestly unreasonable" at 
the time it was made.19  Holland, 476 Mass. at 812. 
 
We cannot say that trial counsel's decision not to call an 
expert on eyewitness identification was manifestly unreasonable 
when it was made.  At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel 
testified that at the time of trial, he believed that N.F's 
testimony that the defendant was not at the scene at the time of 
the shooting, the inconsistencies of Perez's eyewitness account, 
                                                          
 
 
19 The defendant contends on appeal that the motion judge 
incorrectly found that the failure to call an expert was a 
strategic decision.  The defendant's trial counsel offered 
contradictory testimony on this point at the evidentiary 
hearing.  In his affidavit, and on direct examination, trial 
counsel claimed that the failure to call an expert was not a 
strategic decision.  Trial counsel testified that, rather, he 
simply never considered whether to call one.  On cross-
examination, however, he testified that he made the 
determination that an identification expert was not relevant to 
the case.  Given this conflicting testimony, we see no reason to 
disturb the motion judge's conclusion that not calling an expert 
on eyewitness identification was a part of the larger strategic 
decision to focus the defense on the testimony of N.F. and the 
cross-examination of Perez.  Commonwealth v. Perkins, 450 Mass. 
834, 845 (2008) ("[W]e defer to [the motion] judge's assessment 
of the credibility of witnesses at the hearing on the new trial 
motion" [citation omitted]). 
32 
 
 
and Perez's mental health struggles would be sufficient to 
challenge the reliability of Perez's identification.  To that 
end, trial counsel attacked Perez's identification of the 
defendant as the shooter, both on cross-examination and during 
closing argument.  On cross-examination, trial counsel 
confronted Perez on his ability to accurately identify the 
shooter under the lighting conditions at the time of the 
shooting, his recollection of certain events that morning, and 
the discrepancies between Perez's statement to police on the 
morning of the shooting and his trial testimony regarding the 
defendant's height and clothing worn.  Additionally, the defense 
presented evidence that Perez suffered from PTSD as a result of 
his military service and bipolar disorder.  Specifically, trial 
counsel introduced evidence that Perez had sought counselling 
for his mental health struggles approximately 161 times over an 
eight-year period and that he began taking medication for these 
issues a few months after the shooting.  Finally, during closing 
argument, trial counsel argued that Perez's identification was 
unreliable.  He argued that in light of Perez's mental health 
struggles, the "collective experience" of the jurors could lead 
them to conclude that "those are difficult illnesses and they 
may impact his ability to see and conceptualize what was 
actually happening."  He also argued that Perez had made a 
mistaken identification. 
33 
 
 
 
The reliability of Perez's identification was vigorously 
challenged through this strategy.20  Cf. Commonwealth v. Watson, 
455 Mass. 246, 257-259 (2009) (decision not to seek funds for 
expert on eyewitness identification not manifestly unreasonable 
where reliability of identification challenged on cross-
examination and in closing argument).  Accordingly, we cannot 
say that trial counsel's decision not to call an expert on 
eyewitness identification was one that "lawyers of ordinary 
training and skill in criminal law would not consider competent" 
(citation omitted).  Holland, 476 Mass. at 812.  See 
Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 471 Mass. 664, 674 (2015), S.C., 478 
Mass. 189 (2017) ("[R]easonableness does not demand 
                                                          
 
 
20 We also note that, as the motion judge concluded, at the 
time of trial in 2009, the retention of experts on eyewitness 
identification was not as prevalent as it is today.  See 
Commonwealth v. Holland, 476 Mass. 801, 812 (2017) ("[We] make 
every effort . . . to eliminate the distorting effects of 
hindsight" in evaluating whether decision is manifestly 
unreasonable [quotation and citation omitted]).  Indeed, trial 
counsel testified that he had never retained an expert on 
eyewitness identification, despite having decades of experience 
as an attorney and having tried over forty murder cases.  At the 
time of trial, counsel had the benefit of neither the Report and 
Recommendations of the Supreme Judicial Court Study Group on 
Eyewitness Evidence (July 25, 2013) nor our decision in 
Commonwealth v. Gomes, 470 Mass. 352, 354, 363-364 (2015), that 
highlighted the preference for expert testimony or, in the 
absence of such testimony, specific jury instructions regarding 
the reliability of eyewitness identifications.  Finally, Perez 
clearly identified the defendant correctly as the person who 
threatened to come back and "light" the party "up" when he was 
removed.  The primary issue of identification related to the 
transference theory. 
34 
 
 
perfection. . . .  Nor is reasonableness informed by what 
hindsight may reveal as a superior or better strategy").  
Accordingly, the decision was not manifestly unreasonable at the 
time it was made. 
 
b.  Ballistics expert.  The defendant also argues that his 
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call a ballistics 
expert who would testify that a muzzle flash fired from a 
semiautomatic handgun was unlikely to provide sufficient 
illumination to allow an individual to adequately see the face 
of the shooter.  We need not decide whether the decision not to 
call a ballistics expert was a manifestly unreasonable one 
because, even assuming that it was, we conclude that it was not 
likely to have influenced the jury's conclusion.  See Seino, 479 
Mass. at 472-473. 
 
As we discussed in depth supra, there was a significant 
amount of independent evidence establishing that the crime scene 
was illuminated at the time of the shooting.  For example, a 
police officer testified that the street lights near the 
location of the shooting and the exterior lights on a nearby 
building were illuminated when he arrived at the crime scene at 
approximately 4:30 A.M. -- only approximately one and one-half 
to two hours after the shooting occurred.  Additionally, the 
jury heard evidence that suggested the area in front of the home 
was illuminated enough to permit N.F. and Perez to independently 
35 
 
 
identify the defendant from the porch on the second floor while 
the defendant was standing on the street outside.  Even assuming 
that an expert would have testified that Perez was unlikely to 
have been able to see the shooter solely from the muzzle flash, 
the jury were not likely to have been influenced by this 
testimony in light of the other evidence that the crime scene 
was lit at the time of the shooting.  Accordingly, we conclude 
that any error in failing to call a ballistics expert did not 
create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
 
c.  Evidence of mental health struggles and drug use.  
Finally, the defendant argues that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to notice that certain psychological 
records detailing Perez's history of mental health struggles and 
drug use mistakenly had been withheld despite a court order 
compelling their disclosure.  Without these records, the 
defendant argues, trial counsel was unable to explore the full 
extent of how Perez's mental health and drug use could have 
affected his "ability to accurately perceive and identify the 
shooter."  The motion judge denied the defendant's motion for a 
new trial without conducting an evidentiary hearing on this 
argument.  He concluded that because these issues were 
sufficiently before the jury, the additional records would not 
have "added to the information already at [trial counsel's] 
disposal and used in cross-examination at trial."  We agree. 
36 
 
 
 
As discussed supra, Perez's PTSD and bipolar disorder 
diagnoses were both brought out on cross-examination at trial.  
Specifically, Perez testified that he had been diagnosed with 
PTSD and bipolar disorder, that he received counselling and 
medication to treat the diagnoses, and that he had had a 
counselling session on the day after the murder.  He further 
testified that over the period of approximately eight years 
following his discharge from the military, he had sought 
counselling for his PTSD 161 times and that he suffered from 
"night terror[s]" and sleeplessness as a result of his PTSD.21  
Additionally, he testified that he used marijuana to cope with 
the effects of his PTSD diagnosis. 
 
Notably, there was no evidence -- either introduced at 
trial or contained within the missing records -- that suggests 
that Perez's mental health struggles or drug use affected his 
ability to perceive the defendant on the morning of the 
shooting.  For example, a defense expert's proffered testimony 
                                                          
 
 
21 At the evidentiary hearing on the defendant's motion for 
a new trial, trial counsel testified that, at the time of the 
trial, he believed it would have been a poor tactical choice to 
"attack" Perez in front of the jury, given that Perez was a 
veteran suffering from posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD).  
Therefore, it is unlikely that trial counsel would have used the 
information in the missing records to further attack Perez's 
ability to perceive the shooter due to his PTSD diagnosis even 
if counsel had them.  See Commonwealth v. Duran, 435 Mass. 97, 
106 (2001) (rejecting claim that counsel was ineffective for 
failing to "attempt to use every conceivable method" to impeach 
sympathetic witness). 
37 
 
 
only acknowledged that Perez's mental health struggles "had the 
potential to and may have interfered with Mr. Perez's abilities 
to accurately perceive or recollect the [shooting]."  Trial 
counsel argued this point specifically during closing, stating 
that Perez's diagnoses "are difficult illnesses and they may 
impact his ability to see and conceptualize what was actually 
happening."  Additionally, although the missing records 
suggested that Perez was more dependent on marijuana than his 
testimony let on, there was no evidence that he was under the 
influence of marijuana on the morning of the shooting.  The 
defendant's proffered expert on this point would not have 
materially added to the defense, as he was prepared only to 
testify that individuals have a reduced ability to accurately 
perceive reality and recall past events while under the 
influence of mind-altering substances.  Because the substance of 
the missing records and proffered expert testimony was already 
presented to the jury, any error on the part of trial counsel in 
failing to notice the missing records was not likely to 
influence the jury's conclusion.  See Commonwealth v. Williams, 
453 Mass. 203, 212-213 (2009) (rejecting ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim based on counsel's failure to introduce records 
where substance of records was already before the jury).  The 
motion judge therefore did not err in denying the defendant's 
motion for a new trial. 
38 
 
 
 
4.  Review under G. L. c. 278, §33E.  After a thorough 
review of the record, we find no reason to exercise our 
authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to grant a new trial or to 
reduce or set aside the verdict of murder in the first degree.  
Pursuant to this duty, however, we deem it necessary to address 
one of the arguments raised by the defendant during the motion 
for a new trial, but not raised on appeal. 
 
In his motion for a new trial, the defendant argued that 
his trial counsel's failure to request an "honest but mistaken 
identification" jury instruction constituted ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  This instruction arose from our decision 
in Commonwealth v. Pressley, 390 Mass. 617, 620 (1983), wherein 
we declared that "[f]airness to a defendant compels the trial 
judge to give an instruction on the possibility of an honest but 
mistaken identification" where identification was "crucial to 
the Commonwealth's case."  We held that this instruction must be 
given "when the facts permit it and when the defendant requests 
it."  Id.  Here, the facts permitted such an instruction.  The 
defendant did not, however, request it.  We therefore review to 
determine if this error produced a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  Commonwealth v. Penn, 472 Mass. 610, 
625-626 (2015).  We conclude that it did not. 
 
As the motion judge concluded, the trial judge described 
various factors that the jury should consider in assessing the 
39 
 
 
identification evidence and "made clear that the jurors must be 
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the accuracy of the 
identification of [the defendant] before they could convict 
him."  Moreover, the defendant's trial counsel specifically 
argued mistaken identification in closing and cross-examined 
Perez on his ability to accurately perceive the shooter.  
Accordingly, "we are substantially confident that, if the error 
had not been made, the jury verdict would have been the same" 
(citation omitted).  Penn, 472 Mass. at 626.  Cf. id. at 625-626 
(no likelihood of substantial miscarriage of justice where 
honest mistake was focus of defendant's cross-examination of 
eyewitness and closing argument).  We therefore conclude that 
trial counsel's failure to request the "honest but mistaken 
identification" instruction did not create a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
 
Conclusion.  For these reasons, we affirm the defendant's 
convictions and the denial of the defendant's motion for a new 
trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.