Title: STATE v SCRIVANI HELEHAN
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13554
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: November 19, 1976

No. 13554 I N THE SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F MONTANA 19 76 THE STATE OF M O N T A N A , ACTING BY AND T H R O U G H THE DEPARTMENT O F H I G H W A Y S O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, KATHERINE SCRIVANI, e t a l , Defendant and Respondent. ORIGINAL PROCEEDING : Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Daniel J. Sullivan argued, Helena, Montana For Respondent : Stimatz and Engel, Butte, Montana Joseph C. Engel 1 1 1 argued, Butte, Montana Submitted: October 25, 1976 Decided : N O v 19 1976 M r . Chief J u s t i c e James T. Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. I n t h i s cause defendant Thomas J. Helehan's p r o p e r t y i n t e r e s t w a s condemned by p l a i n t i f f and possession taken i n October, 1965. I n June, 1976, defendant was awarded $30,866 by a condemnation commission and judgment was entered f o r t h a t amount p l u s i n t e r e s t and c o s t s , making a t o t a l judgment of $87,742.04. P l a i n t i f f sought t o have t h e judgment amended but w a s refused. Counsel f o r defendant then moved t h e c o u r t t o o r d e r p l a i n t i f f t o make a d e p o s i t i n t o c o u r t of t h e amount of t h e award and judgment, which w a s granted by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t . P l a i n t i f f f i l e d n o t i c e of appeal and a p p l i e d f o r a s t a y upon f i l i n g a supersedeas bond. This was denied by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t and p l a i n t i f f w a s a g a i n ordered t o make t h e d e p o s i t . P l a i n t i f f then, ex p a r t e , secured from t h i s Court a n o r d e r s t a y i n g t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s o r d e r . Defendant moved f o r an adversary hearing which was granted. Such hearing was h e l d , b r i e f s f i l e d by t h e p a r t i e s and counsel w e r e heard i n o r a l argu- ment and t h e m a t t e r submitted f o r d e c i s i o n . While many c o n t e n t i o n s a r e made by p l a i n t i f f t h a t t h e s t a y o r d e r should remain i n e f f e c t , w e a r e confronted w i t h t h e s t a t u t e , s e c t i o n 93-9920, R.C.M. 1947, which provides i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : "At any t i m e a f t e r t h e f i l i n g of t h e preliminary condemnation o r d e r o r a f t e r t h e r e p o r t and a s s e s s - ment of t h e commissioners have been made and f i l e d i n t h e c o u r t , and e i t h e r before o r a f t e r appeal from such assessment, o r from any o t h e r o r d e r o r judgment i n t h e proceedings, t h e c o u r t o r any judge thereof a t chambers, upon a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e p l a i n - t i f f , s h a l l have power t o make a n o r d e r t h a t upon payment i n t o c o u r t f o r t h e defendant e n t i t l e d t h e r e - t o of t h e amount of compensation claimed by t h e defendant i n h i s answer o r t h e amount assessed, e i t h e r by t h e commissioners o r by t h e jury, a s t h e c a s e may be, t h e p l a i n t i f f be a u t h o r i z e d , i f a l r e a d y i n possession of t h e property of such defendant sought t o be a p p r o p r i a t e d , t o c o n t i n u e i n such pos- s e s s i o n ; o r , i f n o t i n possession, t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f be authorized t o t a k e possession of such property and use and possess t h e same during t h e pendency and u n t i l t h e f i n a l conclusion of t h e proceedings and l i t i g a t i o n , and t h a t a l l a c t i o n s and proceed- ings a g a i n s t t h e p l a i n t i f f on account thereof be stayed u n t i l such t i m e * * *. " * * * t h e defendant e n t i t l e d t h e r e t o , i f t h e r e be no d i s p u t e as t o t h e ownership of t h e property, may a t any time demand and r e c e i v e upon o r d e r of t h e c o u r t , a l l o r any p a r t of t h e money so deposited * * * " * * * and provided, f u r t h e r , t h a t t h e c o u r t s h a l l not order t h e d e l i v e r y t o any defendant of more than seventy-five (75) per c e n t of t h e money de- posited on h i s account except upon posting of bond by such defendant equal t o t h e amount i n excess of seventy-five (75) per c e n t , with s u r e t i e s t o be approved by t h e c o u r t ; t o repay t o t h e p l a i n t i f f such amounts withdrawn a s a r e i n excess of h i s f i n a l award i n t h e proceedings." This Court i n S t a t e v. Bradshaw Land & Livestock Co., 99 Mont. 95, 103, 43 P.2d 674, i n r e f e r r i n g t o t h i s s e c t i o n of our Codes, s t a t e d : "By t h e s e s t a t u t e s t h e p l a i n t i f f s a r e accorded t h e r i g h t of appeal t o t h i s c o u r t . They must, i n order t o g a i n possession, pay t h e amount of t h e compensation and damages awarded i n t o c o u r t . I f they do not pay t h e amount of t h e judgment within t h i r t y days, and a showing of nonpayment i s made, t h e t r i a l c o u r t must s e t a s i d e t h e e n t i r e proceedings and r e s t o r e possession. N o method i s provided f o r a s t a y of proceedings pending a n appeal; i n f a c t , t h e s t a t u t e expressly d e c l a r e s t h a t none of t h e proceedings provided f o r by s t a t u t e s h a l l operate a s a s t a y of proceed- ings. It is expressly provided t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f s , by payment i n t o c o u r t of t h e amount assessed, ' s h a l l not be thereby prevented o r precluded from appeal- ing from such assessment, but may appeal i n t h e same manner and with t h e same e f f e c t a s i f no money had been deposited o r s e c u r i t y given.' These s t a t u t o r y provisions, i f v a l i d , a r e conclusive of t h e r i g h t of t h e p l a i n t i f f s t o appeal." The Department of Highways contends t h a t s e c t i o n 93-9917, R.C.M. 1947, i s a u t h o r i t y f o r a s t a y of t h e judgment, while de- fendant c a l l s a t t e n t i o n t o s e c t i o n 93-9905(3), R.C.M. 1947, which provides i n p a r t : " * * * Such appeal does n o t s t a y any f u r t h e r proceedings under t h i s chapter, except t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t on motion o r ex p a r t e may g r a n t a s t a y f o r such period of t i m e and under such conditions a s t h e c o u r t deems proper." A s h e r e t o f o r e s t a t e d t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t denied a s t a y t o t h e Department of Highways. This apparent c o n f l i c t was recognized by t h i s Court i n Robertson v. S t a t e Highway Comm'n, 148 Mont. 275, 281, 282, 420 P.2d 2 1 , where w e s t a t e d : "A f u r t h e r procedural matter appears. After t h e w r i t of execution issued, respondents f i l e d a n o t i c e of appeal and perfected t h e i r appeal. Re- spondents urge t h a t t h i s s t a y s t h e judgment under R.C.M. 1947, 5 93-8011. Respondents d i d not f i l e a bond, a s s e r t i n g t h a t even though such a bond i s required under s e c t i o n 93-8011, (and t h i s being an eminent domain case, see Rule 81) t h a t under Rule 6 2 ( e ) , M.R.Civ.P., no s e c u r i t y is required when t h e S t a t e i s t h e a p p e l l a n t . There is seemingly a c o n f l i c t here between t h e Rules of C i v i l Procedure, Rule 6 2 ( e ) and s e c t i o n 93-8011, whether s e c u r i t y is required i n eminent domain appeals. However, here again comes t h e c o n f l i c t between t h e a p p l i c a n t s ' p o s i t i o n t h a t t h i s i s an eminent domain proceeding i n i t s e n t i r e t y and t h a t of t h e respondents who would d i v i d e t h e case; t h a t is, (1) eminent domain a s t o record property owners and (2) damages ( i n - verse condemnation) a s t o t h e a p p l i c a n t s . This c o n f l i c t , i f it be one, may n e c e s s a r i l y be involved i n t h e appeal of t h e judgment on its m e r i t s . But, f o r our purposes here, w e indulge i n t h e presumption of c o r r e c t n e s s of t h e judgment and w i l l not permit a c o l l a t e r a l a t t a c k . (See g e n e r a l l y 30 C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 326, pp. 195-198; Thompson v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 78 Mont. 170, 253 P. 313; Mitchell v. Garfield County, 123 Mont. 115, 208 P.2d 497.)" When t h e matter came on f o r hearing on t h e m e r i t s no i s s u e w a s r a i s e d i n t h i s regard. See Montana S t a t e Highway Comm'n vs. Robertson & Blossom, 151 Mont. 205, 4 4 1 P.2d 181. It is our opinion t h a t t h e Department of Highways must make t h e d e p o s i t of t h e award granted by t h e commissioners. However, c e r t a i n questions a s t o t h e amount of t h e judgment a r e r a i s e d , such a s t h e allowance of of an a t t o r n e y f e e without a hearing, allowing i n t e r e s t a t lo%, and allowing a c o s t b i l l without n o t i c e . These matters should be heard by t h e c o u r t upon n o t i c e and should not be required t o be deposited and become s u b j e c t t o withdrawal. The s i t u a t i o n here is much l i k e t h a t i n Robertson v. S t a t e Highway Comm'n, 148 Mont. 275, 283, 4 2 0 P.2d 21, where w e held no i n t e r e s t be deposited. T h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i s d i r e c t e d t o make an amend d P order r e q u i r i n g d e p o s i t award. W e concur: LL J u tice ---------------- s i t t i n w p l a c e of M r . Wesley C a s t l e s .