Title: State v. Deal
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 98292
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: February 17, 2012

1 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
Nos. 98,292 
        98,952 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
DANA WAYNE DEAL, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
 
1. 
 
K.S.A. 21-3402 defines murder in the second degree as the killing of a human 
being committed either intentionally or unintentionally but recklessly under 
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. The 
unambiguous language of this statute requires the killing—the result—to be either 
intentional or unintentional.  
 
2. 
The evidence is sufficient to establish an unintentional but reckless second-degree 
murder in violation of K.S.A. 21-3402(b) where the evidence most favorable to the State 
establishes:  The defendant went to the victim's house; the victim became physically 
aggressive and tried to hit the defendant with a tire iron; and the defendant wrestled the 
tire iron away, and, without an intent to kill, struck blows to the victim's shoulder, neck, 
and head area.  
 
 
 
2 
 
3. 
Even if it was error to give a "no duty to retreat" instruction in this case, the error 
was not reversible because the instruction would not have reasonably misled the jury in 
light of the instructions as a whole and the evidence. By the defendant's own admission, 
there was an altercation between him and the victim, early in the altercation the defendant 
had control of the only weapon used against the defendant, the defendant subsequently hit 
the victim out of anger rather than in an attempt to defend himself, and the defendant did 
not suffer a major injury sufficient to warrant the victim's brutal beating. 
 
4. 
 
An appellate court lacks jurisdiction to review a criminal defendant's complaint 
that a sentencing court abused its discretion by sentencing the defendant to any term 
within the presumptive grid block, even if the sentence is the aggravated term. 
 
5. 
 
Use of prior convictions in a criminal defendant's criminal history score to 
enhance the defendant's sentence without requiring the history to be included in the 
complaint and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt does not violate the 
defendant's constitutional rights under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 
2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000). 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in 41 Kan. App. 2d 866, 206 P.3d 529 (2009). 
Appeal from Cowley District Court; NICHOLAS M. ST. PETER, judge. Opinion filed February 17, 2012. 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is affirmed. Judgment of the district court is 
affirmed. 
 
 
Lydia Krebs, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief for 
appellant. 
 
3 
 
 
James R. Spring, deputy county attorney, argued the cause, and Christopher E. Smith, county 
attorney, and Steve Six, attorney general, were with him on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
LUCKERT, J.:  Dana Wayne Deal appeals, arguing in part there is insufficient 
evidence to support his conviction for unintentional but reckless second-degree murder in 
violation of K.S.A. 21-3402(b). Deal argues the evidence established that he intentionally 
hit Donald Irvin with a metal tire iron and Irvin died as a result of these intentionally 
inflicted blows. Because Deal acted intentionally in inflicting these blows, he argues he 
cannot be guilty of unintentional but reckless second-degree murder.  
 
On direct appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected this argument and affirmed Deal's 
conviction and sentence. State v. Deal, 41 Kan. App. 2d 866, 206 P.3d 529 (2009). On 
review of that decision, we affirm the Court of Appeals and the jury verdict. We hold that 
K.S.A. 21-3402 focuses culpability on whether a killing is intentional, not on whether a 
deliberate and voluntary act leads to death. In this case, there is evidence that Deal did 
not intend to kill Irvin, and this evidence is sufficient to support the jury's determination 
that Deal committed an unintentional but reckless second-degree murder.  
 
In addition, we reject Deal's other arguments that the jury was misled by a "no 
duty to retreat" jury instruction and that his sentence is unconstitutional because the jury 
did not determine he should be sentenced to the longest term in the applicable grid box or 
his criminal history.  
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
Deal's conviction was based on events that occurred on the night of July 8, 2005, 
and the early morning of July 9, 2005. Between 11 p.m. and midnight, Ric Montoya 
4 
 
knocked on the door of Irvin's next door neighbor, Karla Halstead, and asked if Irvin was 
there. Halstead noticed that Montoya was intoxicated and was unable to understand her as 
she explained he had the wrong house. Halstead eventually closed the door and left 
Montoya standing on her front porch.  
 
About 45 minutes later, Halstead looked out of her kitchen window and saw 
Montoya and another man coming out of the side door of Irvin's house. Although 
Halstead knew Montoya, she did not recognize the other man. Halstead saw the 
unidentified man walk across the street and throw an object over a 10- to 12-foot dike on 
the north side of the street. Halstead then saw the unidentified man and Montoya get into 
a white pickup truck and drive away with the headlights off.  
 
Someone made a 911 call regarding a disturbance at Irvin's house, and law 
enforcement officers and emergency medical services (EMS) personnel responded. The 
first officer to arrive saw an open side door and a person, who was later identified as 
Irvin, lying on the floor. Irvin was unresponsive and appeared to have lost a large amount 
of blood. He was declared dead at the hospital.  
 
As law enforcement officers investigated Montoya's possible involvement, they 
learned Montoya had been with Deal around the time of the incident. They contacted 
Deal, who agreed to talk to officers. After being Mirandized, Deal initially denied being 
at Irvin's house during the night. Deal's statement changed, however, after officers told 
Deal his truck had been seen at Irvin's house, a neighbor had identified Montoya, and 
they knew he had been with Montoya that night.  
 
Faced with that information, Deal admitted to fighting Irvin and explained what 
led to the fight. Specifically, he told the officers he and Montoya were driving around the 
previous night when Montoya told him Irvin had kept Deal's girlfriend at Irvin's residence 
5 
 
for 3 days during which time Irvin had drugged and sexually abused her. Because Deal 
wanted to get Irvin's side of the story, he drove to Irvin's house.  
 
Deal's statement was consistent with Halstead's account; he indicated that 
Montoya, who Deal described as being drunk, initially went to the wrong house. Deal, 
however, knocked on Irvin's door and confronted Irvin about the alleged incident with 
Deal's girlfriend. Deal and Irvin argued, and Irvin told Deal to get out of his house. At 
that point, according to what Deal told the officers, Irvin picked up a metal tire iron and 
swung it at Deal twice. Deal reported he was able to block the blows with his arms. But 
the officers did not see any scrapes or red marks evident at that point in time.  
 
Deal told the officers he kicked Irvin in the groin, grabbed the tire iron away from 
Irvin, and struck Irvin twice with the tire iron—one time in the head and one time in the 
left shoulder area. In a later written statement, however, Deal indicated he struck Irvin 
once in the front right area of his head and another time in his right head and neck area, 
when Irvin "came at me again." During his interview, Deal further stated that when Irvin 
fell to the floor, he kicked Irvin "in the ass." According to Deal, Montoya came into the 
room while he was kicking Irvin. Deal indicated Montoya "poked and sliced" at Irvin 
with a fillet knife. Montoya also kicked Irvin several times.  
 
When Deal and Montoya left Irvin's house, according to Deal's written statement, 
Irvin was "on the floor moaning" and was "beat down but not hurt to [sic] bad." Deal told 
the officers he knew Irvin was hurt but he did not mean to kill Irvin. According to Deal, 
Irvin did not deserve to die no matter what he had done.  
 
Officers later found a tire iron, which was approximately 18 to 20 inches long, and 
a fillet knife on the north side of the dike near Irvin's house. In addition, officers found a 
variety of tools, including tire-changing and jack equipment, in Deal's truck.  
 
6 
 
On July 10, 2005, Deal agreed to do a "walk-through" interview at Irvin's house. 
Once during the interview, Deal referred to the tire iron used during the incident as "my 
bar." Deal told the officers his emotions got out of hand when Irvin showed disrespect 
towards his girlfriend. Deal stated he was not thinking during the incident, he felt he was 
defending himself when he hit Irvin the first time, and he struck out of anger when he hit 
Irvin the second time. Deal told the officers he knew Irvin carried knives and guns, and 
he believed Irvin might have kept a gun or knife in the corner of the room. During the 
"walk-through" interview, one of the officers noticed a small red mark on Deal's forearm 
that had not been observed the previous day. Deal flinched when the officer touched it.  
 
Deal provided additional information at subsequent interviews. In an interview 
conducted on July 11, 2005, Deal mentioned that Irvin had pointed a squirt gun at him. 
On February 15, 2006, a videotaped deposition was taken of Deal. During the deposition, 
Deal went into detail about a .38 caliber gun that Irvin possessed. He also described a 
modified paintball gun owned by Irvin that shot "steel" bullets that "would go through a 
two-by-four." This was the first time Deal had mentioned the .38 caliber or the modified 
paintball gun.  
 
Dr. Lawrence Czarnecki conducted the autopsy on Irvin's body. At trial, Dr. 
Czarnecki testified Irvin had blunt force injuries to his head, chest, abdomen, left 
shoulder area, legs, and head. Describing the injuries to each of these areas of the body, 
Dr. Czarnecki explained that Irvin sustained a depressed fracture to his head and Irvin's 
skull had been pushed into his brain; the head injuries were on both the left and right side 
of the head. Irvin sustained four rib fractures and breaks in each forearm. There were 
lacerations, abrasions, and contusions on Irvin's arms and legs. Irvin also had a 3/8-inch 
incision on his right leg, but that injury was not enough to kill him. Dr. Czarnecki opined 
that the cause of Irvin's death was multiple blunt and sharp force injuries; nevertheless, 
Irvin's blunt force injuries to his head were enough to kill him.  
 
7 
 
Deal was initially charged with premeditated first-degree murder in violation of 
K.S.A. 21-3401(a) or, alternatively, felony murder in violation of K.S.A. 21-3401(b). 
Before the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, Deal entered into an agreement with the 
State:  Deal agreed to testify against Montoya, and the State agreed to reduce the charge 
against Deal to unintentional but reckless second-degree murder in violation of K.S.A. 
21-3402(b). (In the cases we will discuss, there are various terms used as shorthand labels 
for violations of this statute, including reckless second-degree murder, depraved heart 
murder, unintentional murder, and unintentional but reckless murder; we will refer to the 
violations as unintentional but reckless second-degree murder.)  
 
In addition to instructing the jury on unintentional but reckless second-degree 
murder, the trial court also gave jury instructions on the lesser included offenses of 
voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter. The jury ultimately convicted 
Deal of unintentional but reckless second-degree murder. Deal was sentenced to 168 
months in prison, which represented the aggravated number in the appropriate sentencing 
grid box.  
 
As previously noted, Deal appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed his 
conviction and sentence. Deal, 41 Kan. App. 2d 866. Deal then filed a petition for 
review, which we granted. Consequently, our jurisdiction arises under K.S.A. 20-3018(b) 
(petition for review) and K.S.A. 22-3602(e) (same). See Supreme Court Rule 8.03 (2011 
Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 69). 
 
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
 
First, Deal argues the State failed to present sufficient evidence to convict him of 
unintentional but reckless second-degree murder under K.S.A. 21-3402(b). K.S.A. 21-
3402 states:  "Murder in the second degree is the killing of a human being committed:  (a) 
8 
 
Intentionally; or (b) unintentionally but recklessly under circumstances manifesting 
extreme indifference to the value of human life." (Emphasis added.)  
 
Our standard for reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence argument is well 
established:  The standard of review requires us to review all the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the State. If, when the evidence is viewed in this light, a rational 
factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, we must 
affirm. State v. Martinez, 290 Kan. 992, 1003, 236 P.3d 481 (2010). 
 
In raising this issue, Deal contends all the evidence presented by the State showed 
he acted intentionally in beating Irvin, and neither the State nor the defense presented any 
evidence he acted unintentionally but recklessly. In making this argument, Deal focuses 
on the voluntariness of his actions of hitting Irvin, stating:  "It is not enough . . . to show 
that Irvin's death was unintentional but reckless; the State must show that the action that 
caused the death was unintentional but reckless." Because (1) Deal intended to hit Irvin 
with the metal bar, (2) he swung at Irvin's head area, and (3) death resulted, Deal argues 
the killing was intentional not reckless. 
 
Court of Appeals Analysis 
 
 
Rejecting these arguments, the Court of Appeals determined there was sufficient 
evidence to support the jury's verdict that Deal had unintentionally but recklessly caused 
Irvin's death. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied heavily on State v. 
Robinson, 261 Kan. 865, 873, 934 P.2d 38 (1997). In that case, Robinson had been 
convicted of unintentional but reckless second-degree murder after he killed Richard 
Crowley, who "was clearly the initial aggressor." Robinson, 261 Kan. at 867. The 
incident that led to Crowley's death began when Crowley approached Jeremy 
Hendrickson and his three friends, one of whom was Jerry Robinson, about threats 
Hendrickson had made against Crowley's sons. As the confrontation became heated, 
9 
 
Crowley hit one of the boys in the face. Crowley eventually pulled a metal baseball bat 
out of his truck and chased the boys with it, swinging at them when they got close.  
 
While they were running away from Crowley, each boy grabbed a golf club out of 
a nearby car. The boys surrounded Crowley and taunted him by calling him names and 
swinging their clubs at him. Crowley was able to break free from the boys, but one of 
them hit Crowley in the back with a golf club. When one of the boys tripped and fell, 
Crowley hit him twice with the bat. Hendrickson then struck Crowley twice in the back 
or in the ribs with a golf club. The boy who had fallen to the ground was able to roll away 
from Crowley and began to get off the ground. At that time, Robinson fatally struck 
Crowley in the head with his golf club. Robinson testified that he was not trying to hit 
Crowley in the head but was trying to hit him in the arms in order to make him stop 
hitting his fallen friend with the bat. Robinson also testified that he could not remember 
whether his eyes were open or closed when he hit Crowley.  
  
On appeal, Robinson argued the evidence was insufficient to convict him of 
unintentional but reckless second-degree murder for two reasons:  (1) because his 
"extreme indifference" involved only one specific person, Crowley, and not human life in 
general; and (2) because he killed Crowley in an imperfect right to self-defense situation. 
In rejecting the defendant's first argument, this court held the elements of unintentional 
but reckless second-degree murder could be met if a defendant manifested an extreme 
indifference to the value of a specific human life as compared to human life in general. 
Robinson, 261 Kan. at 880. Additionally, this court held the evidence, which indicated 
Robinson swung a golf club at Crowley with great force, intending to hit him, was 
sufficient for the jury to find that Robinson recklessly killed a person while manifesting 
an extreme indifference to the value of one specific human life. Robinson, 261 Kan. at 
881. 
 
10 
 
The Robinson court recognized the jury could have found that Robinson 
intentionally struck Crowley in the head in defense of Robinson's friend, which would 
have gone to the defense theories of self-defense or imperfect self-defense. But, when the 
evidence was viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, "the jury could have 
found that blindly swinging a golf club at a person with great force constitutes extreme 
recklessness 'manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human life.'" Robinson, 
261 Kan. at 881. In other words, there was reckless conduct of wildly swinging the club 
as well as a reckless disregard for the risk of death in circumstances that showed an 
extreme indifference to the value of an individual human life.  
 
 
In this case, the Court of Appeals discussed a portion of the Robinson court's 
analysis regarding whether action aimed at one person was covered by the statute, noting 
this discussion provided support for the State's view of the evidence in this case. 
Specifically, the Robinson court had pointed to an article written by Professor Emil 
Tonkovich in The Kansas Criminal Code:  1992 Amendments, 41 Kan. L. Rev., Crim. 
Proc. Ed. 73, 78 (1993). Professor Tonkovich was a member of the Kansas Judicial 
Council Criminal Law Advisory Committee that proposed the initial version of the 1992 
Kansas Criminal Code amendments in which second-degree murder was expanded to 
include unintentional but reckless killings under circumstances manifesting an extreme 
indifference to the value of human life.  
 
Professor Tonkovich explained Kansas' unintentional but reckless second-degree 
murder provision was modeled after the same provision in the Model Penal Code. 
Professor Tonkovich also discussed some of the Committee's comments, stating: 
 
''Depraved-heart [unintentional but reckless second-degree] murder includes extremely 
reckless killings and killings resulting from actions which were intended to inflict serious 
bodily injury. [Citation omitted.] Examples of depraved heart murder include: (1) killing 
a child while target shooting at school windows during school hours; and (2) killing a 
11 
 
person while beating him with a baseball bat with intent to severely injure him." 
(Emphasis added.) 41 Kan. L. Rev., Crim. Proc. Ed. at 78.  
 
As the Court of Appeals in this case noted, the two cited examples describe 
voluntary and deliberate conduct:  a gun is fired for target practice or a baseball bat is 
swung. Although the firing of the gun and the swinging of the bat were intentional, 
voluntary acts, each voluntary act resulted in an unintentional killing because the actors 
did not have the conscious objective to kill or a conscious awareness that their actions 
would result in the killing of a human being. In the example most like the facts of this 
case, Professor Tonkovich described using the baseball bat with the intent to beat, not the 
intent to kill, but in circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of 
human life.  
 
Applying this analysis to the facts of this case, the Court of Appeals majority 
concluded Professor Tonkovich's second example was comparable to the circumstances 
of this case. The majority explained: 
 
"Although Deal's statements indicated that he did not intend to kill Irvin, his use of a tire 
tool to brutally beat Irvin establishes that he had the intent to severely injure him. Deal's 
conduct of striking Irvin in the head (a vital area of a person's body) with a tire tool after 
having taken it away from Irvin showed that Deal had intended to severely injure Irvin. 
Hence, Deal's actions furnished the extreme recklessness towards human life required for 
the crime of unintentional second-degree murder." Deal, 41 Kan. App. 2d at 875. 
 
In other words, according to the Court of Appeals, despite Deal's commission of an 
intentional beating, the unintended result of death and attendant circumstances showing 
an extreme disregard for the value of human life placed this crime in the category of 
unintentional but reckless second-degree murder. 
 
12 
 
 
One member of the Court of Appeals panel concurred in the holding but noted 
there were reasons to distrust Deal's self-serving statements. He observed, however, that 
it was not necessary to accept Deal's statements to affirm the verdict because, "[i]n 
looking at the sufficiency of the evidence, we must look at the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict," and other evidence supported the verdict. Deal, 41 Kan. 
App. 2d at 895 (Leben, J., concurring).  
 
Regardless of whether Deal's statements were factored into the analysis, the Court 
of Appeals panel members all agreed a rational jury could have found Deal guilty of 
unintentional but reckless second-degree murder because "[t]he amount of force used by 
Deal and the number of times that Deal hit Irvin showed that Deal recklessly killed Irvin 
'under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.'" Deal, 
41 Kan. App. 2d at 878.  
 
Deal's Arguments on Review 
 
In his petition for review, Deal distinguishes Robinson on several grounds. First, 
Deal notes, Robinson focused on the validity and application of the "manifesting extreme 
indifference" language in the unintentional but reckless second-degree murder statute. 
That language is not at issue in the present case. Second, Deal notes the Robinson court 
was not presented with the issue of whether an intentional blow or strike resulting in an 
unintended death can support a conviction for unintentional but reckless second-degree 
murder. While both of these points are valid, neither undercuts the validity of the Court 
of Appeals' reliance on the Robinson analysis. This is because the Robinson analysis 
overlaps with and touches on the question of whether a deliberate and voluntary act can 
result in an unintentional but reckless killing, the issue presented by Deal. And that 
analysis supports the Court of Appeals' application of the statute in this case and the 
conclusion that a deliberate and voluntary act can result in an unintentional but reckless 
killing if the specific intent to kill, as required by K.S.A. 21-3402(a), is not proven. 
13 
 
Deal also distinguishes Robinson by arguing there is no evidence in this case 
similar to the evidence that Robinson swung the golf club "blindly" by closing his eyes 
and was trying to hit the victim in the arms, not the head. Robinson, 261 Kan. at 881. He 
suggests there is, therefore, no support for the State's argument that Deal struck the 
victim "wildly and blindly, [and] did not know where on the victim's person he had struck 
him." We agree with Deal; unlike the circumstances in Robinson, there is no evidence 
Deal swung "blindly," failed to take aim, or missed his mark. Rather, by his own 
admission, Deal used the tire iron to purposefully hit Irvin in the neck, shoulder, and 
head. Nevertheless, this distinction does not make the analysis in Robinson inapplicable 
because blind conduct, while one form of reckless conduct, is not the only type of 
conduct that can be reckless; even an intentional blow can result in an unintentional but 
reckless killing. Once again, this point is illustrated by Professor Tonkovich's example of 
an unintentional but reckless second-degree murder resulting when a baseball bat is used 
with the purpose of injuring someone, meaning that the blows are intentionally struck on 
the body of the victim so that an injury results. The critical point illustrated in the 
example is that it is not the intent to inflict a blow but the intent to kill that is the focal 
point.  
 
Deal also suggests, however, that in addition to the lack of evidence of blind or 
wild swinging of the tire iron the facts of this case are more like the circumstances in 
several Kansas cases that focused on whether a defendant's conduct was intentional. In 
each of the cases cited by Deal, the focus was on whether a defendant convicted of an 
intentional homicide—premeditated first-degree murder or intentional second-degree 
murder—for shooting, strangling, or beating a victim was entitled to a lesser included 
offense instruction on unintentional but reckless second-degree murder. See State v. 
Cavaness, 278 Kan. 469, 101 P.3d 717 (2004) (beating and torturing; premeditated first-
degree murder); State v. Jones, 267 Kan. 627, 984 P.2d 132 (1999) (manual 
strangulation; intentional second-degree murder); State v. Bailey, 263 Kan. 685, 952 P.2d 
1289 (1998) (shooting; intentional second-degree murder), overruled on other grounds by 
14 
 
State v. Davis, 283 Kan. 569, 158 P.3d 317 (2006); State v. Clark, 261 Kan. 460, 931 
P.2d 664 (1997) (shooting; premeditated first-degree murder); State v. Pierce, 260 Kan. 
859, 927 P.2d 929 (1996) (shooting; premeditated first-degree murder).  
 
Because each of these cases dealt with a claim of error based on the district court's 
failure to give a lesser included offense instruction, this court evaluated whether the jury 
could have reasonably convicted the defendant of the lesser offense; if not, it was not 
error to fail to give the instruction. See K.S.A. 22-3414(3); State v. Simmons, 282 Kan. 
728, 741-42, 148 P.3d 525 (2006) (stating standard of review). In each case, we 
concluded there was no error in failing to give the instruction, despite the defendant's 
comment that he did not intend to kill the victim. This means, according to Deal, "a 
defendant does not act unintentionally but recklessly where the evidence establishes that 
death was an unintended consequence of an intentional act." Contrary to Deal's argument, 
the facts of these cases do not necessarily support this conclusion. In each case, there 
were facts to support the appellate court's conclusion that a jury could not have 
reasonably convicted the defendant of unintentional but reckless second-degree murder.  
 
More critically, the language of K.S.A. 21-3402 does not support Deal's argument. 
Rather, the unambiguous language of this statute requires the killing—the result—to be 
either intentional or unintentional. Based on this language, this court has recognized that 
K.S.A. 21-3402(a), the provision relating to intentional second-degree murder, defines a 
specific intent crime; a defendant must have the specific intent to kill. State v. Hayes, 270 
Kan. 535, 543, 17 P.3d 317 (2001); State v. Pope, 23 Kan. App. 2d 69, 73, 927 P.2d 503 
(1996), rev. denied 261 Kan. 1088 (1997); see Richie v. State, 149 S.W.3d 856, 857 (Tex. 
App. 2004) ("murder is known as a 'result of conduct offense.' [Citation omitted.] . . . 
That is, the statute requires the accused to have had a particular mind set . . . viz the 
prohibited result.").  
 
15 
 
On the other hand, under K.S.A. 21-3402(b) the result—the killing—must be 
unintentional. 1 LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law §§ 5.1, 5.2 (2d ed. 2003) 
(criminal culpability for reckless murder is defined in the Model Penal Code by looking 
at the attendant circumstances and the result). While the Kansas Legislature has not 
further defined an "unintentional" killing, it has defined "intentional conduct." Under the 
definition in K.S.A. 21-3201(b), conduct is intentional if it is "purposeful," "willful," 
"knowing," and "not accidental." To be an unintentional, the killing must be the opposite 
of these things. State v. Shannon, 258 Kan. 425, 429, 905 P.2d 649 (1995) (defendant 
cannot intend an unintentional crime).  
 
But, even though the killing is unintentional, the legislature imposed a requirement 
that the killing be committed "recklessly." The legislature did not define "recklessly" but 
did define "reckless conduct" as "conduct done under circumstances that show a 
realization of the imminence of danger to the person of another and a conscious and 
unjustifiable disregard of that danger." K.S.A. 21-3201(c). Citing this definition, we 
recently explained that for a defendant's conduct to be reckless the defendant "must know 
that he or she is putting others in imminent danger . . . but need not foresee the particular 
injury that results from his or her conduct" for the conduct to be reckless. State v. Gatlin, 
292 Kan. 372, 377, 253 P.3d 357 (2011); see also State v. Bolton, 274 Kan. 1, 8, 49 P.3d 
468 (2002) (reckless second-degree murder is an unintentional killing that requires 
reckless behavior). Substituting these definitions for the defined terms, an unintentional 
but reckless second-degree murder in violation of K.S.A. 21-3402(b) is a killing of a 
human that is not purposeful, willful, or knowing but which results from an act performed 
with knowledge the victim is in imminent danger, although death is not foreseen. See, 
e.g., See State v. Tahah, 293 Kan. 267, 272, 262 P.3d 1045 (2011) (defendant stated he 
was lowering rifle when "'a round went off'" and "'I didn't want to kill her'"); State v. 
Cordray, 277 Kan. 43, 56, 82 P.3d 503 (2004) (evidence sufficient to support jury verdict 
of unintentional but reckless second-degree murder where the defendant fired a gun in the 
general direction of a vehicle at night, striking an occupant); see also State v. Jones, 27 
16 
 
Kan. App. 2d 910, 915, 8 P.3d 1282 (2000) (held jury could have found evidence 
supporting recklessness where witnesses testified defendant shot gun randomly over 
crowd of people with eyes closed).  
 
 
Deal essentially asks us to ignore the statute's focus on whether the killing is 
intentional or unintentional. We cannot do so; basic rules of statutory interpretation 
prohibit us from ignoring the clear meaning of the statute. See State v. Urban, 291 Kan. 
214, 216, 239 P.3d 837 (2010) (discussing rules of statutory interpretation and 
construction); Manly v. City of Shawnee, 287 Kan. 63, 70, 194 P.3d 1 (2008) ("court was 
not imbued with the discretion or authority to ignore the legislature's words in its quest to 
divine what the law should or should not be"). 
 
We recognize, however, that there is language in the cases cited by Deal that 
focused on whether the conduct was intentional rather than whether the killing was 
intended. E.g., Jones, 267 Kan. at 633 ("actions were intentional and not reckless"); 
Bailey, 263 Kan. at 690 (defendant "contends that an intentional act done without regard 
to the consequences is reckless. Neither the case law nor the legislative history supports 
this argument."); Pierce, 260 Kan. at 867 ("The defendant's actions were intentional.").  
 
Notwithstanding the contrary language in this court's previous decisions, today we 
hold that K.S.A. 21-3402 focuses culpability on whether a killing is intentional or 
unintentional, not on whether a deliberate and voluntary act leads to death. In the present 
case, the facts most favorable to the State are that Deal went to Irvin's house to get Irvin's 
side of the story, Irvin became physically aggressive and tried to hit Deal with the tire 
iron, Deal wrestled the tire iron away, and Deal, without an intent to kill, struck Irvin one 
time in the shoulder area and one time in the head. While Deal acted deliberately, he 
denied he intended to kill, and it cannot be said that death, as opposed to serious injury, is 
a substantially certain result of hitting someone in the head with a metal bar, albeit a risk 
and even a probable risk. As a result, there were circumstances that showed a realization 
17 
 
of danger and a conscious and unjustifiable disregard of that danger in circumstances 
manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human life. In other words, the 
evidence was sufficient to establish an unintentional but reckless second-degree murder 
in violation of K.S.A. 21-3402(b). 
 
"NO DUTY TO RETREAT" JURY INSTRUCTION 
 
Next, Deal argues reversible error occurred when the trial court gave the "no duty 
to retreat" instruction. The "no duty to retreat" instruction was requested by the State 
during the instruction conference after the trial court decided to grant Deal's request for a 
self-defense instruction. The instruction stated: 
 
"When on his home ground, a person is not required to retreat from an aggressor, 
but may stand on his ground and use such force to defend himself as he believes, and a 
reasonable person would believe, necessary."  
 
This instruction is identical to the pattern instruction formerly provided in PIK Crim. 3d 
54.17-A (2001 Supp.).  
 
Deal objected to the instruction, arguing there was no evidence he was the initial 
aggressor. The trial court rejected this argument because there was evidence that Irvin 
told Deal to get out of his house, but Deal did not leave. According to the trial judge, 
"This is a unique situation where I think the jury has the opportunity to find as a question 
of fact who was the initial aggressor, if any." In addition, the trial court instructed the jury 
on self-defense, in accordance with K.S.A. 21-3211 (Furse 1995). Among other 
instructions, the trial court explained; "A person is justified in the use of force against an 
aggressor when and to the extent it appears to him and he reasonably believes that such 
conduct is necessary to defend himself against such aggressor's imminent use of unlawful 
force."  
 
18 
 
On appeal, Deal argues the trial evidence did not establish the unusual 
circumstances that have justified giving the instructions in past cases, citing State v. 
Saleem, 267 Kan. 100, 977 P.2d 921 (1999); State v. Ricks, 257 Kan. 435, 894 P.2d 191 
(1995); and State v. Scobee, 242 Kan. 421, 748 P.2d 862 (1988).  
 
The Court of Appeals agreed, holding that "[a]lthough the 'no duty to retreat' 
instruction properly stated the law, the facts of this case did not warrant such an 
instruction." Deal, 41 Kan. App. 2d at 882. But the court noted that, "[e]ven if erroneous 
in some way, instructions are not reversible error if they properly and fairly state the law 
as applied to the facts of the case and could not have reasonably misled the jury. State v. 
McKissack, 283 Kan. 721, 732, 156 P.3d 1249 (2007)." Deal, 41 Kan. App. 2d at 879. 
Concluding that reversal was not warranted, the Court of Appeals explained:  
 
"Contrary to Deal's argument, there was nothing to mislead the jury that Deal did not 
have the right to fight back in self-defense. Moreover, the State never argued to the jury 
that Deal did not have a right to defend himself from Irvin's blows. 
 
"The problem that Deal faces on this issue is that the evidence was overwhelming 
that his brutal beating of Irvin was not done in self-defense. While arguably Deal's first 
blow to Irvin might have been done in self-defense, the rest of the blows to Irvin could 
not be justified as such. When Deal was able to wrestle the tire tool away from Irvin, he 
had control of the only weapon that had been used on him. Deal himself admitted to the 
officers that he felt he was defending himself when he hit Irvin the first time and that he 
struck out of anger when he hit Irvin the second time. Moreover, there was no evidence 
that Deal had suffered major injury during the incident sufficient to warrant the brutal 
beating that Irvin received." Deal, 41 Kan. App. 2d at 883. 
 
 
On petition for review, Deal disagrees with some of the Court of Appeals' 
reasoning that led it to conclude the instruction should not have been given. In addition, 
he disagrees with the conclusion the error was harmless.  
 
19 
 
 
Ordinarily, even though the outcome of the Court of Appeals' determination of 
error is favorable to an appellant, because of the precedential effect of the opinion we 
would address an appellant's argument that there were flaws in the Court of Appeals 
analysis. Here, however, as a practical matter, the Court of Appeals opinion has no 
precedential value. This is because, as the Court of Appeals noted, after Deal's trial, the 
pattern instruction at issue was amended to reflect legislative changes to Kansas' self-
defense statutes. See K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 21-3218(a); PIK Crim. 3d 54.17-A (2006 and 
2007 Supp.). Then, after the Court of Appeals decision, the 2010 legislature further 
amended Kansas' statutes regarding self-defense, leading the PIK committee to determine 
the instruction was no longer necessary and to delete it from the recommended 
instructions. See PIK 54.17-A (2010 Supp.). Because the instruction is no longer 
necessary under any circumstances, we conclude no purpose would be served by a 
discussion of the caselaw underlying the instruction, especially because we agree with the 
Court of Appeals that the error, if any, did not mislead the jury and was not reversible 
error.  
 
In arguing we should reverse the conviction, Deal takes exception with the Court 
of Appeals' statement that the State never argued to the jury that Deal did not have a right 
to defend himself from Irvin's blows. Deal points to several comments made by the 
prosecutor during closing argument, such as "a man may use force to protect himself in 
his own home" and Irvin "had a right to defend himself from a man who had already 
physically attacked him" a few weeks prior. The prosecutor also commented that Irvin 
"may have hit" Deal but that "he was justified in protecting himself." The prosecutor 
further argued: 
 
"[Deal] did not have a right to defend himself. [Deal] is the initial aggressor. 
"[Deal] went to that house willingly. No one had a gun to his head. No one said, 
[Deal], you'll drive over to [Irvin's] house or I'll beat the crap out of you. He went on his 
own. He made that decision. He made the decision to walk up to [Irvin's] house. He made 
20 
 
the decision to confront [Irvin]. He made the decision to cross the threshold into [Irvin's] 
house uninvited and confront [Irvin]. Where I come from I think he got what he 
deserved."  
 
 
Although the trial court sustained defense counsel's objection to these remarks, 
Deal contends the damage had already been done.  
 
 
Regardless of whether the Court of Appeals overlooked these statements by the 
prosecutor, this oversight does not change the remainder of the Court of Appeals' analysis 
regarding the overwhelming evidence against Deal.  
 
 
We are persuaded in reaching this conclusion by several factors. First, the trial 
court's action in sustaining the objection to a portion of the prosecutor's argument made it 
clear that part of the argument was inappropriate. Further, the "no duty to retreat" 
instruction did not go so far as to instruct the jury that Irvin was not the initial aggressor 
or even that he could not be the initial aggressor; rather the instruction merely stated that 
he did not have to retreat if Deal was the aggressor. PIK Crim. 3d 54.17-A (2001 Supp.) 
("When on his home ground, a person is not required to retreat from an aggressor, but 
may stand on his ground and use such force to defend himself as he believes, and a 
reasonable person would believe, necessary." [Emphasis added.]). Nor did the instruction 
equate trespassing with aggression. Rather, the determination of who was the initial 
aggressor—Deal or Irvin—remained with the jury.  
 
In addition, the jury instructions as a whole laid out two paths of analysis for the 
jury's consideration, and those paths varied depending on whether the jury believed Irvin 
or Deal was the initial aggressor. See State v. Appleby, 289 Kan. 1017, 1059, 221 P.3d 
525 (2009) (appellate court is required to consider the instructions as a whole and not 
isolate any one instruction in considering if jury could have been misled by instructions). 
Importantly, even if, as Deal argues, Kansas law did not support giving the "no duty to 
21 
 
retreat" instruction under circumstances where the alleged victim, as opposed to the 
defendant, was standing on home ground, Irvin was justified in the use of reasonable 
force if Deal was the aggressor. See K.S.A. 21-3211 (Furse 1995) ("A person is justified 
in the use of force against an aggressor when and to the extent it appears to him and he 
reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself or another against 
such aggressor's imminent use of unlawful force."). On the other hand, the self-defense 
instructions advised the jury that if Irvin was the aggressor Deal had the right to defend 
himself. Hence, the instructions gave the jury the option to determine either Deal or Irvin 
was the aggressor.  
 
 
Furthermore, contrary to Deal's argument, there was evidence to support either 
path. For example, Deal referred to the tire iron as "my bar" during the walk-through 
interview; this suggested Deal brought the bar into the house and was the initial 
aggressor. Also, Deal's version of the events was contradicted when officers did not 
observe the defensive injuries one would expect if Deal had blocked Irvin's blows with 
the tire iron. (They noticed only one small red mark.) 
 
 
More critically, however, Deal's argument is defeated by the evidence of the brutal 
and extensive beating that occurred, a beating far exceeding the force necessary to 
wrestle the tire iron from Irvin. See K.S.A. 21-3211 (Furse 1995) ("A person is justified 
in the use of force against an aggressor when and to the extent it appears to him and he 
reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself or another against 
such aggressor's imminent use of unlawful force." [Emphasis added.]). As the Court of 
Appeals noted, Deal quickly gained control of the only weapon that Irvin was alleged to 
have used. He did so, according to his statement, by hitting Irvin in the groin. Granted, 
Deal also stated he hit Irvin one time with the tire iron in self-defense. But he admitted he 
hit Irvin again out of anger as well. Added to that, the physical evidence is contrary to 
Deal's position. Dr. Czarnecki testified to broken ribs, arms, and blows to both sides of 
22 
 
Irvin's head. Once Irvin was disarmed and disabled, Deal and Montoya continued to beat 
Irvin to death.  
 
 
We conclude that even if the giving of the "no duty to retreat" instruction was 
error, it was not reversible error. 
 
JOHNSON ISSUE 
 
Deal next argues the trial court violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 
(2000), when it sentenced him to the aggravated sentence in the grid block—168 
months—without requiring the aggravating factors to be put before a jury and proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  
 
Deal recognizes this court rejected this same argument in State v. Johnson, 286 
Kan. 824, 190 P.3d 207 (2008). There, this court held because the Kansas Sentencing 
Guidelines Act provides the trial court with discretion to impose any sentence within the 
presumptive range, the prescribed statutory maximum sentence under Cunningham v. 
California, 549 U.S. 270, 127 S. Ct. 856, 166 L. Ed. 2d 856 (2007), is the high number in 
the applicable sentencing grid box. Therefore, a sentence to any term, including an 
aggravated term, within the range in a presumptive grid box does not violate Cunningham 
or Apprendi. Johnson, 286 Kan. at 851. Moreover, because a sentence that falls within 
the applicable grid box is a presumptive sentence, appellate courts lack jurisdiction to 
consider a challenge to such sentence under K.S.A. 21-4721(c). Appellate courts lack 
jurisdiction even if the sentence is to the longest term in the presumptive grid box for a 
defendant's convictions. Johnson, 286 Kan. at 851-52; see State v. Houston, 289 Kan. 
252, 278, 213 P.3d 728 (2009) ("While Houston asks us to reconsider Johnson, he has not 
presented any new facts or law that merit reconsideration of this issue. Accordingly, we 
see no reason to retreat from that position now."). Deal's argument fails. 
23 
 
IVORY ISSUE 
 
Finally, Deal contends that the trial court violated his rights under the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution under Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466, 
when it sentenced him to an increased sentence, based upon his criminal history, without 
requiring that the State prove his criminal history to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.  
 
Deal concedes that this issue is controlled by our decision in State v. Ivory, 273 
Kan. 44, 41 P.3d 781 (2002). And this court has continued to consistently follow Ivory. 
See, e.g., State v. McCaslin, 291 Kan. 697, 731, 245 P.3d 1030 (2011). Deal provides no 
compelling reason to revisit our current holding on the constitutionality of calculating 
criminal history scores without submitting them to a jury.  
 
Affirmed.  
 
MORITZ, J., not participating. 
DAVID L. STUTZMAN, District Judge, assigned. 1 
 
1REPORTER'S NOTE: District Judge Stutzman was appointed to hear case Nos. 
98,292 and 98,952 vice Justice Moritz pursuant to the authority vested in the Supreme 
Court by Art. 3, § 6(f) of the Kansas Constitution.