Title: State v. Church of Nazarene of Logansport
Citation: 377 N.E.2d 607
Docket Number: 678S112
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: June 16, 1978

377 N.E.2d 607 (1978)
STATE of Indiana, Appellant (Plaintiff below),
v.
THE CHURCH OF THE NAZARENE OF LOGANSPORT, Logansport Savings &amp; Loan Assoc. of Logansport, Auditor of Cass County and Treasurer of Cass County, Appellee (Defendant below).
No. 678S112.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
June 16, 1978.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen. of Indiana, Anthony J. Metz, III, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellant.
Roger K. Claudon, Conover, Claudon &amp; Billings, Valparaiso, Frederick Sabatini, Hanna, Small, Sabatini &amp; Becker, Logansport, *608 for appellee the Church of the Nazarene of Logansport.
PRENTICE, Justice.
This matter is before us upon the petition of the appellant (State of Indiana) for transfer, following the decision and opinion of the Court of Appeals, First District, which appears at 354 N.E.2d 320. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and remanded the cause with an order for remittitur by the defendant and a new trial in the event the defendant should elect not to make such remittitur.
We hold that the Court of Appeals was correct in its determination of error but that its order of remittitur, under the circumstances of this case, contravenes our ruling in Parkison, Treasurer v. Thompson (1905), 164 Ind. 609, 73 N.E. 109, and is in conflict with Wood v. Pague (1937), 103 Ind. App. 577, 5 N.E.2d 1011. Accordingly, transfer is granted, and the decision and opinion of the Court of Appeals, First District, is now ordered vacated.
Upon the issue controlling our decision, we adopt the opinion of the Court of Appeals and the statement of facts, as authored by Judge Lybrook:
The Court of Appeals at this juncture, proceeded under Rule A.P. 15(N)(5) and directed a remittitur of $16,338, reasoning that, without the aforementioned inadmissible evidence, the award could not have exceeded the sum of $28,662, as disclosed by the foregoing summary of testimony and computations. The fallacy of such order is that it presupposes that only that amount of the award in excess of the maximum allowable under the evidence properly admitted was attributable to a consideration of the evidence that was improperly admitted. Such a position does not comport with that portion of Rule A.P. 15 which required the correction of error, without a new trial, to be "practicable and fair to all parties." An appellate tribunal may order the modification of a judgment to correct an error when a new trial is not required. The authority of an appellate court to so modify judgments would appear to be inherent but was, nevertheless, specifically provided by the Legislature by its special session act of 1881, Ch. 38, § 649, p. 240 (Burns 1933, § 2-3234). This authority has been carried into our rules of appellate procedure as Rule A.P. 15(N) and recognized by Acts of 1969, Ch. 191 (now I.C. 34-5-1-2). Such authority includes the authority, in a proper case, to direct a remittitur or to affirm, conditioned upon a remittitur. The authority, however, does not permit an appellate court to speculate upon what the jury intended.
A review of the cases wherein the reviewing court has ordered a remittitur of excessive damages reveals that such corrective action has been confined to those cases wherein the amount of excess is definite, Halstead v. Stahl (1911), 47 Ind. App. 600, 94 N.E. 1056; 5B C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 1869, and to those cases for unliquidated damages wherein there was no error other than excessive damages appearing to have been caused by passion or prejudice. 5B C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 1861.
The case before us is analogous to Mowes v. Robbins (1918), 68 Ind. App. 82, 120 N.E. 51, wherein the appeal was from a judgment entered in an action for fraud and assigned an instruction as error. The overruling of the motion for a new trial had *611 been conditioned upon the appellee's entering a remittitur, which had been done. After rejecting the appellee's contention that the erroneous instruction was harmless, the appeals court responded to the remittitur issue:
In the case at bar, the range of damages that could have been properly found extended from $4,075 to $28,662. The damages, as appraised by the witness Hunning, were $96,050, which he arrived at by rather complicated computations which included various amounts for various elements, all of which amounts were of a highly speculative nature and some of which elements were not allowable. The difference between the damages under his admissible testimony and his testimony that was inadmissible was $67,388. Omitting Mr. Hunning's testimony, the highest appraisal of damages was $5,900. We are, therefore, at a loss to understand why the Court of Appeals determined that $28,662 of the jury award was motivated by properly admitted evidence and only $16,338 thereof by the improperly admitted evidence, when from all that appears from the record, the entire award may have been based upon the evidence improperly admitted. In accord, Oldfather v. Zent (1895), 14 Ind. App. 89, 41 N.E. 555 (admission of improper evidence); Indianapolis Traction &amp; Terminal Co. v. Menze (1909), 173 Ind. 31, 88 N.E. 729 (manifest error in assessment of damages and conflicting evidence on issue of liability); 5B C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 1869.
Other errors assigned and not treated by the Court of Appeals should be here ruled upon, as they may be pertinent to a retrial of the case.
Prior to the commencement of trial, the appellant filed a motion in limine, seeking an order to preclude the appellee from offering evidence or making mention of anything relative to the intended future use of the subject of property. The motion was overruled, and the appellant has assigned such ruling as reversible error. Without determining whether or not the court erred in this connection, it appears that the motion sought to enjoin the offer of evidence that was inadmissible and, if sufficiently specific and limited, it should have been granted.
It is doubtful, however, that reversible error could be predicated upon the denial of such a motion alone. The harm, if any, comes when the objectionable matter is tendered or admitted, and a further objection or motion would be required at the critical point in the trial. The limine order is very much like an order suppressing particular evidence; and we have held that notwithstanding an erroneous ruling upon the motion to suppress, if the error is to be preserved for appeal, there must be a proper objection made at the time the evidence is offered. Pointon v. State (1978), Ind., 372 N.E.2d 1159; Stowers v. State (1977), Ind., 363 N.E.2d 978. Conversely, an offer to prove will generally be required to preserve error in sustaining a motion in limine. Niehaus v. State (1977), Ind., 359 N.E.2d 513.
Appellee's witness, Wade, arrived at a valuation of the land prior to the take by determining that it could be best utilized as three residential building lots and by totaling her appraised value of each such lot. The appellant moved to have the testimony stricken because of an improper method of valuation, i.e., mentally subdividing, citing Southern Indiana Gas &amp; Electric Company v. Riley (1973), 260 Ind. 643, 299 N.E.2d 173, and State v. Maplewood Heights Corporation (1973), 261 Ind. 305, 302 N.E.2d 782. We are unable to rule specifically upon the issue, because the records and briefs do not sufficiently enlighten us. The rule cited by Appellant precludes the determination of the value of land by considering it to be something which it is not. For example, a ten acre parcel of land susceptible of being subdivided into streets and twenty home sites having a value of $5,000 each may not be appraised as twenty home sites having a total value of $100,000. This is true, simply because the ten acre parcel is raw material, not the finished product, and it must be appraised as raw material. Nevertheless, if the same ten acre parcel was susceptible of being utilized as ten home sites, without encountering development expenses, and each such lot would have a market value of $5,000, the total value would properly be arrived at by totaling the value of the ten lots  $50,000. This, of course, presupposes a ready market for the ten lots at the price of $5,000 each. Under such circumstances, it would not be required that the land be valued at the price it would bring if sold as one unit. Multiple sales may be anticipated, so long as in so doing, the enterprise does not take on the form of a business venture entailing capital, skill, risk, profit and other such elements that combine to determine the price of the finished product.
Thus, we see no error in the method of valuation used by the witness, Wade, provided she was considering the land as it was on the day of the take. We are confused, however, because it appears that the Church building was situated upon a portion of the land. Obviously, that portion of the land occupied by the Church building or necessarily devoted to the Church use could not be appraised as vacant land.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial.
GIVAN, C.J., and HUNTER and PIVARNIK, JJ., concur.
DeBRULER, J., concurs in result.