Title: Michael Love v. State of Arkansas
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: CR06-1236
State: Arkansas
Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court
Date: December 13, 2007

1 Appellant filed an initial Rule 37.1 petition on September 2, 2005. He later filed a motion to file an amended Rule 37.1 petition on September 16, 2005, and a second Rule 37.1 petition on October 5, 2005. There is no order that grants or denies the motion to file an amended petition. The trial court’s order of denial appears to address the issues contained in the second Rule 37.1 petition based on the headings contained therein. Regardless, the basis for both petitions is that appellant’s plea agreement did not comport with the sentence he received and that trial counsel was responsible for his predicament. ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT No. CR 06­1236 MICHAEL LOVE Appellant v. STATE OF ARKANSAS Appellee Opinion Delivered December 13, 2007 PRO SE APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PULASKI COUNTY, CR 2004­4921, HON. BARRY A. SIMS, JUDGE AFFIRMED. PER CURIAM In2005, appellant MichaelLove entered a plea ofguiltyto first­degree batteryand possession of a firearm by a felon. Appellant was sentenced as a habitual offender with a sentence enhancement for committing the felony in the presence of a child. He received a sentence of 240 months’ imprisonment on each charge to be served concurrently, and the enhancement of sixty months’ imprisonment was to be served consecutively for an aggregate sentence of 300 months’ imprisonment. Subsequently, appellant timely filed in the trial court a verified petition for postconviction reliefpursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1 based onclaims ofineffective assistance ofcounsel. 1 The trial court denied the petition without a hearing, and we granted appellant’s motion to lodge a belated 2 These hearings were held on May 24, 2005, and June 27, 2005, according to appellant’s abstract. ­2­ appeal here from the order. Love v. State, CR 06­1236 (Ark. Jan. 4, 2007) (per curiam). We do not reverse a denial of postconviction relief unless the trial court’s findings are clearly erroneous. Greene v. State, 356 Ark. 59, 146 S.W.3d 871 (2004). A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there was evidence to support it, the appellate court, after reviewing the entire evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Flores v. State, 350 Ark. 198, 85 S.W.3d 896 (2002). We first address a procedural deficiency. Appellant’s claims are primarily based upon testimonyfromthe initialplea­agreement hearing and sentencing hearing 2 as wellas conditions stated in the plea­agreement form. Although appellant’s brief contains a section purporting to be the abstract of the hearings, which is punctuated by arguments designated as an “abstractor’s note,” the actual transcript of the hearings is not contained in the record on appeal. The record does not indicate that appellant filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to supplement the record on appeal to include the transcript of the plea­agreement hearing or the sentencing hearing. Here, appellant fails to provide this court with a record sufficient to conduct a meaningful review of this matter. Campbell v. State, 349 Ark. 111, 76 S.W.3d 271 (2002) (per curiam). The party asserting error has the burden to produce a record sufficient to demonstrate prejudicial error, and this court does not consider evidence not included in the record on appeal. Smith v. State, 343 Ark. 552, 39 S.W.3d 739 (2001). We will, however, not require appellant to file a substituted addendum or abstract to cure these deficiencies in conformance with Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4­2(b), as it is clear on the record before us that appellant could not prevail. See Pardue v. State, 338 Ark. 606, 999 S.W.2d 198 (1999) (per ­3­ curiam); Seaton v. State, 324 Ark. 236, 920 S.W.2d 13 (1996) (per curiam). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that but for counsels’ errors, the result of the trial would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Andrews v. State, 344 Ark. 606, 42 S.W.3d 484 (2001) (per curiam). Where a case involves an allegationofineffectiveness inrelationto a guiltyplea, the sole issue is whether the plea was intelligently and voluntarily entered with the advice of competent counsel. Beulah v. State, 352 Ark. 472, 101 S.W.3d 802 (2003) (per curiam) (citing Mills v. State, 338 Ark. 603, 606, 999 S.W.2d 674, 675 (1999) (per curiam)). The appropriate standard of prejudice is whether, but for counsel’s errors, there is a reasonable probability that the defendant would not have entered a guilty plea and thereby waived his right to a trial. Jones v. State, 355 Ark. 316, 136 S.W.3d 774 (2003). A defendant whose conviction is based upon a plea of guilty normally will have difficulty in proving any prejudice since his plea rests upon his admission in open court that he did the act with which he is charged. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970); Crockett v. State, 282 Ark. 582, 669 S.W.2d 896 (1984) (citing Ark. R. Crim. P. 24.6); Reed v. State, 276 Ark. 318, 635 S.W.2d 472 (1982). The burden is on appellant to provide facts to support his claims of prejudice. Nelson v. State, 344 Ark. 407, 39 S.W.3d 791 (2001) (per curiam). Allegations without factual substantiation are insufficient to overcome the presumption that counsel is effective. Id. Conclusory statements cannot be the basis ofpostconviction relief. Jackson v. State, 352 Ark. 359, 105 S.W.3d 352 (2003). Here, appellant misstated certain basic facts regarding his sentencing. He claims to this court that he entered a plea of guilty to Counts I and III, but was sentenced to Counts I and II. Appellant 3 The judgment and commitment order listed Count III as Count II, and did not appear to dispose of Count II. As the judgment fully set out the crime of felon in possession, the fact that this charge was designated as Count II amounts to no more than a clerical error. Carter v. Norris, 367 Ark. 360, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2006) (per curiam). ­4­ did receive a sentence for Count III, felon in possession of a firearm, but not for Count II, second­ degree battery. 3 As a result, appellant is unable to sustain his claim that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when appellant signed the plea agreement that listed the felon­in­possession charge. Additionally, appellant contends that as part of the plea agreement, he did not acquiesce to receiving a sentence enhancement for committing the felony in the presence of a child, as set forth in the amended felony information. The plea agreement does not reference this enhancement, but the judgment does. Also, the amended information was filed of record prior to the plea agreement hearing and the date appellant signed the plea agreement form. The hearings conducted in this case were crucial to confirm or contradict appellant’s claim on this point. Although appellant’s brief contains an “abstract” of the hearing testimony, we have no way to determine the accuracy of the conversations included by appellant or the relevance of conversations not included. The trial court’s order denying postconviction relief stated that the enhancement was discussed at the hearing andappellant hasnot presented evidence that the trialcourt was incorrect in this statement. Furthermore, the abstract supplied by appellant indicates that the prosecutor did address the enhancement for committing a felony in the presence of a child. Without a showing of facts to support his claim of prejudice, appellant’s arguments amount to mere conclusory statements that cannot support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Nelson, supra; Jackson, supra. Appellant has failed to show that the plea agreement was not intelligently and voluntarily entered with the advice of competent counsel. Beulah, supra. ­5­ Affirmed.