Title: State v. Jayson S. Williams
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-12-06
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: April 11, 2007

Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JAYSON S. WILLIAMS, Defendant-Respondent. Argued October 30, 2006 Decided April 11, 2007 On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Charles Ouslander, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant (Jeffrey Patrick Barnes, Hunterdon County Prosecutor, attorney). Joseph A. Hayden, Jr., argued the cause for respondent (Walder, Hayden &amp; Brogan and Blank Rome, attorneys; Mr. Hayden and William R. Martin, a member of the District of Columbia bar, of counsel; Mr. Hayden, Mr. Martin, Shawn M. Wright, a member of the District of Columbia bar, and Christopher D. Adams, on the briefs). Catherine A. Foddai, Assistant Bergen County Prosecutor, argued the cause for amicus curiae County Prosecutors Association (John L. Molinelli, Bergen County Prosecutor, President, attorney). Lawrence S. Lustberg argued the cause for amicus curiae Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (Gibbons, Del Deo, Dolan, Griffinger &amp; Vecchione, attorneys; Mr. Lustberg and Claudia Van Wyk, on the brief). JUSTICE LaVECCHIA delivered the opinion of the Court. In connection with the February 2002 shooting death of Costas Gus Christofi, defendant Jayson Williams was charged with aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1) (count one); reckless manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(b)(1) (count two); possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) (count three); aggravated assault by knowingly pointing a firearm at or in the direction of another, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(4) (count four); hindering apprehension, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b) (count five); tampering with a witness, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5(a) (count six); tampering with evidence, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-6(1) (count seven); and fabricating physical evidence, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-6(2) (count eight). See footnote 1 After a lengthy trial, defendant was convicted on all counts concerning his post-shooting conduct (counts five through eight). The jury acquitted defendant of aggravated manslaughter, possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, and aggravated assault by knowingly pointing a firearm at or in the direction of another, but could not reach a verdict on reckless manslaughter. The court therefore accepted the jury s verdict on all of the counts except for reckless manslaughter and declared a mistrial as to that count. Facing retrial on the reckless manslaughter charge, defendant filed a motion to exclude evidence of his conduct immediately after the shooting. See footnote 2 Defendant asserted that his post-shooting conduct is irrelevant to whether he acted recklessly at the time of the shooting, and that the evidence is unduly prejudicial. The State argued that, notwithstanding that the crime involves a reckless mens rea element, the evidence is relevant as demonstrative of a consciousness of guilt that is probative of defendant s state of mind during the shooting incident. The State also disputed that the evidence would cause undue prejudice. The trial court held the evidence to be inadmissible. Its determination was grounded on the conclusion that post-crime evidence of consciousness of guilt is not relevant to demonstrate recklessness. Moreover, the court found that introduction of the post-shooting-conduct evidence would be unduly prejudicial to defendant in the retrial, notwithstanding the court s contrary conclusion at the first trial when it declined to sever the post-shooting counts from the shooting counts. In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division affirmed. See footnote 3 We granted the State leave to appeal, 187 N.J. 487 (2006), and now, we reverse. 4. The probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed by its apparent prejudice. [Cofield, supra, 127 N.J. at 338 (citing Abraham P. Ordover, Balancing The Presumptions Of Guilt And Innocence: Rules 404(b), 608(b), And 609(a), 38 Emory L.J. 135, 160 (1989)).] In this matter, the State seeks to admit evidence of defendant s post-shooting cover-up conduct, for which he has been convicted, for a permitted purpose under the Rule - intent. Defendant s state of mind at the time Christofi was shot is the material issue in dispute in the retrial. Therefore, in applying the test for admission of defendant s other-crimes conduct under Rule 404(b), prong one of Cofield requires examination of the evidence for its relevance to the issue in dispute . Accordingly, when the State alleges criminal recklessness, it must demonstrate through legally competent proofs that defendant had knowledge or awareness of, and then consciously disregarded, a substantial and unjustifiable risk. N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(3). Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JAYSON S. WILLIAMS, Defendant-Respondent. CHIEF JUSTICE ZAZZALI dissenting. The majority presents a comprehensive and viscerally appealing rationale supporting the introduction of defendant Jayson Williams post-shooting criminal conduct. Because of the proposed evidence s lack of relevancy, the substantial prejudice that the majority s ruling will visit on this defendant, and the deference owed to the trial court s evidentiary determinations, I respectfully dissent. The majority concludes that the evidence is admissible under N.J.R.E. 404(b) because it satisfies the other crimes admissibility test this Court set forth in State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328 (1992). Specifically, the majority finds that defendant s post-shooting criminal conduct is relevant because it can support inferences having a logical tendency to prove that defendant was aware that the victim s fatal injuries were not the product of an accident, but were caused by defendant s criminal recklessness. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 20). Further, the majority concludes that the evidence s probative value is not outweighed by undue prejudice. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 27). I instead would affirm the trial court s exclusion of the post-shooting conduct under N.J.R.E. 404(b) because the evidence in question is not relevant to a material issue, Cofield, supra, 127 N.J. at 338, and, more important, because the prejudice of such evidence is overwhelming. Indeed, not only is the probative value . . . outweighed by its apparent prejudice, ibid., I believe that the prejudice eclipses any relevance. In any event, I would afford appropriate deference to the trial court s evidentiary ruling under the applicable abuse of discretion standard. 2. It must be similar in kind and reasonably close in time to the offense charged; 3. The evidence of the other crime must be clear and convincing; and 4. The probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed by its apparent prejudice. [Cofield, supra, 127 N.J. at 338.] Because the Cofield prongs are in the conjunctive, the evidence is inadmissible if it fails any of the prongs. The first prong of the Cofield test evaluates the evidence s relevance. Ibid. The relevancy of evidence denotes its logical connection between the proffered evidence and a fact in issue. Darby, supra, 174 N.J. at 519 (quotation omitted). Here, the State seeks to introduce the post-shooting evidence to establish defendant s recklessness, namely, that defendant was aware, after the shooting, that he had consciously disregard[ed] a substantial and unjustifiable risk. N.J.S.A. 2C:1-1(b)(3). Recklessness connotes an awareness of a risk, State v. Simon, 161 N.J. 416, 464 (1999), and pre-incident awareness is material to the determination of culpability, State v. Sewell, 127 N.J. 133, 148-49 (1992). The State theorizes that defendant s attempted cover-up of the killing reveals that he knew he had consciously disregard[ed] a substantial and unjustifiable risk. The State alleges that defendant s post-shooting conduct implies that he knew he had committed a criminal, reckless homicide as opposed to a non-criminal, accidental killing. In advance of defendant s pending retrial for reckless manslaughter, the trial court evaluated the evidence s relevancy as part of its Cofield analysis. During the hearing, the court noted that the post-shooting conduct had to be relevant to the jury s choice between recklessness and a criminally-blameless accident, the argument advanced by defendant. The trial court explained that it was trying to probe with regard to consciousness . . . what the post[-]shooting conduct demonstrates. Recognizing that, from the beginning, defendant has argued that he tragically caused the death of Mr. Christofi but did so accidentally, the court inquired whether defendant merely exhibited consciousness of accidentally causing the death. The trial court concluded that defendant s post-shooting conduct was not relevant to the reckless manslaughter charge because post-shooting conduct is really not probative of [defendant s] guilt or his consciousness of guilt as to reckless conduct. The Appellate Division affirmed, noting that it was unable to locate any reported decisions allowing consciousness of guilt evidence when the requisite culpable mental state is less than knowing. See footnote 10 The panel concluded that the trial court reasonably determined, in this case, that the confidence with which one could attribute the post-shooting conduct to a consciousness of guilt is so minimal as to require exclusion. State v. Williams, No. A-2724-04T5 (App. Div. Apr. 21, 2006) (slip op. at 17). I agree with the courts below and find that defendant s post-shooting conduct is not relevant to whether there was criminal recklessness at the time of the shooting. Defendant s post-shooting acts are indicative only of his awareness that he just killed Christofi, not whether the act was reckless or accidental. Indeed, as the majority observes, defendant had much to lose from causing even an accidental death, including harming his public reputation as a television broadcaster and former professional basketball player, and exposing himself to potential civil liability. Thus, defendant s deplorable post-shooting conduct is at least as consistent with a recognition that he made a tragic and stupid mistake -- but one that was an accident nonetheless -- as it is with criminal recklessness. Because the post-shooting conduct is not relevant to determining defendant s state of mind at the time Christofi was shot, ante at ___ (slip op. at 10), I find that the evidence fails the first prong of the Cofield test and is thus inadmissible. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY NO. A-12 SEPTEMBER TERM 2006 ON APPEAL FROM Appellate Division, Superior Court STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JAYSON S. WILLIAMS, Defendant-Respondent. DECIDED April 11, 2007 Chief Justice Zazzali PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice LaVecchia CONCURRING OPINION BY DISSENTING OPINION BY Chief Justice Zazzali