Title: HOLLEYMAN v. HOLLEYMAN
Citation: 2003 OK 48, 78 P.3d 921
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: May 13, 2003

HOLLEYMAN v. HOLLEYMAN Annotate this Case HOLLEYMAN v. HOLLEYMAN 2003 OK 48 78 P.3d 921 Case Number: 95584 Decided: 05/13/2003 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA CYNTHIA JO HOLLEYMAN, now WARD, Plaintiff/Appellant, ON CERTIORARI TO THE OKLAHOMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIV. IV ¶0 The parties divorced in 1993, and in 1999 Father stopped making child support payments when the child graduated from high school at the age of 21 years. Mother filed an application seeking additional child support and other relief. Father responded with a motion to dismiss challenging the jurisdiction of the court. The Honorable Joseph Balkenbush, Judge of District Court of Oklahoma County, granted the motion and Mother appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the judgment. On certiorari we hold that parties to a divorce may agree to child support obligations in addition to those required by statute, and that the trial court must determine if such agreement was made by the parties. CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; OPINION OF THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS VACATED; AND JUDGMENT OF DISTRICT COURT REVERSED Jim Pearson, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. for Plaintiff/Appellant William E. Liebel, James T. Gorton, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant/Appellee SUMMERS, J. ¶1 Our question involves the enforceability of a divorce decree by which the parties purport to agree "to leave the child support open after the minor child reaches the age of eighteen and/or complete high school . . ." based on the needs of the child, if any. The parties agree that the child is a "special needs" child with some degree of retardation and seizure problems. ¶2 Mother and Father divorced in 1993 when their child was fifteen years old. Father stopped providing medical insurance in 2000. Mother then sought an order from the District Court to (1) compel Father to provide medical insurance, (2) pay additional child support, (3) reimburse Mother for payments made to maintain the insurance and for medical expenses, (4) pay child support payments that were unpaid since 1999, and (5) adjudicate future support amounts needed by the child. She alleged that at the time of the divorce the parties agreed that Father would provide support after the child was 21 years old. ¶3 Father responded to Mother's application with a motion to dismiss. He stated that he stopped making the child support payments in May of 1999 after the child graduated from high school at the age of 21 years. He argued that the District Court was without jurisdiction to order payments to support a child after the child has reached the age of 21 years. ¶4 The trial court heard argument of counsel and granted the motion to dismiss. Mother appealed and the judgment was affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals. We vacate the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals and reverse the judgment of the District Court. ¶5 The Father maintains that the decree is not a judgment by consent, or "consent decree." We have discussed the characteristics of a consent decree: A consent judgment is the agreement of the parties entered upon the record with the sanction of the court. McRary v. McRary, 228 N.C. 714, 719, 47 S.E.2d 27, 31 (1948). A consent decree in a divorce is the result of negotiations between the parties and subsequent settlement of the issues involved, which settlement is then presented to the court as a proposed judgment. Although it is not a judicial determination of the rights of the parties, it acquires the status of a judgment through the approval of the judge of the pre-existing agreement of the parties. Whitehead v. Whitehead, Father's brief describes the events leading up to the decree: "After the parties had been litigating the trial for a matter of days, settlement discussions ensued between the parties and their respective counsel that led to the Journal Entry Order and Decree of Divorce . . . ." The record supports this description in that the decree states that the parties agreed to the provisions of the divorce decree "with regard to all issues." Decree of Divorce, O.R. at 9. The decree is a judgment by consent or a "consent decree." ¶6 Of course, characterizing the decree as a consent decree does not determine that the parties agreed to a particular matter. The controversy in the trial court centered on one provision of the 1993 divorce decree. It states that: IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED by the Court that the Defendant shall pay child support in the amount of Four Hundred Dollars ($400.00) per month, deviated from the child support guidelines, attached hereto as Exhibit "A", as agreed upon by the parties. Due to the special needs of the minor child, the parties have agreed to leave the child support open after the minor child reaches the age of eighteen (18) and/or completes high school, and the Court will retain jurisdiction for either party to file an application for further support based upon the specific needs and requirements of the minor child, if any. Id. O.R. at 11. Mother claims that the trial court has jurisdiction to order more child support because of Father's agreement. Father claims that a District Court has no subject matter jurisdiction to compel child support payments for the support of children after they have reached the age of 21 years, and that subject matter jurisdiction cannot be created by an agreement of parties. ¶7 We have said that a parent has a legal duty to support his or her child until the child reaches the age of majority. State, ex rel. Dept. of Human Services ex rel. Jones v. Baggett, Any child shall be entitled to support by the parents until the child reaches eighteen (18) years of age. If a dependent child is regularly and continuously attending high school, said child shall be entitled to support by the parents through the age of eighteen (18) years. Thus, at the time of the decree this statute-based obligation for child support did not extend beyond the child's nineteenth birthday. Id. ¶8 But the decree in this case is a consent decree, and parties to a consent decree may agree to obligations between themselves that exceed those required by law. If the agreement between the parties regarding support and maintenance is intended as final and binding, leaving nothing for determination by the court on the question of the amount of the allowance, such decree is not subject to modification without the consent of both parties. Stuart, Thus, when a trial court is requested to enforce a child-support obligation upon a parent an important issue must be addressed: What is the source of that obligation? Does the obligation spring from mandatory law or does it spring from a consensual agreement? We noted this distinction in Greeson v. Greeson, ¶9 In Greeson we observed that a trial court did not possess statutory power to modify child support retroactively, but the parties could agree to such modification and incorporate such agreement in a judgment by consent. We explained that such a consent decree was judicially enforceable. With this contention we agree. Under However, it is agreed that the order of December 21, 1946 was a consent order entered by the court upon the agreement and consent of the parties. While in its retroactive aspect it is void as a court order, yet being a consent order, it is in the nature of a contract, and in the absence of fraud or mistake, is a binding obligation between the parties thereto. Greeson v. Greeson, Just as parties may consent to a retroactive adjustment of their personal rights, they may also contract as to their personal rights in the future. For example, in Kittredge v. Kittredge, The husband argues the trial court did not have the jurisdictional power to divide his future earnings because the consent of his rights even though he consented to the division. In Ettinger v. Ettinger, Kittredge v. Kittredge ¶10 Father further argues that a "consent decree may not leave anything for determination by the trial court." He relies upon language in Whitehead stating that: "If the agreement between the parties regarding support and maintenance is intended as final and binding, leaving nothing for determination by the court on the question of the amount of the allowance, such decree is not subject to modification without the consent of both parties." Whitehead v. Whitehead, ¶11 Once we recognize that parties may agree to alter their obligations the next steps are determining if such agreement did occur and the substance of the agreement. We use principles of contract law to make these determinations. We have said that we construe a consent judgment "as other contracts" and ascertain the intent of the parties. An agreed judgment is in the nature of a contract and is to be construed as other contracts. Grayson v. Pure Oil Co., 189 Okl. 550, ¶12 Father points to the lack of specificity in an amount to be determined in the future. A lack of specificity in either the amount or scope of an obligation does not necessarily mean an absence of a judicially enforceable obligation. We have explained that even if a provision of a contract is too vague and indefinite to determine the intent of the parties, their conduct may supply the necessary information to determine intent of the parties. Bartlett v. Sterling Const. Co., ¶13 The intent of the parties at the time they entered into an agreement controls the meaning of their written contract, and the statutory rules for ascertaining intent are set out at ¶14 We note that while this matter was pending the Legislature added ¶15 The trial court dismissed the claims with two conclusions: first, that it did not possess subject matter jurisdiction, and secondly, that once a child reaches his or her majority the child is the proper party to bring a legal action against a parent for the parent's failure to pay support during that child's minority. A child does possess an independent right to maintain an action and to request support and maintenance. State Dept. of Human Services ex rel. K.A.G. v. T.D.G., ¶16 Generally, we use a de novo standard to review a trial court's dismissal of a party's petition for relief because such dismissal is usually based solely upon an issue of law and not fact. Miller v. Miller, ¶17 That order is correct insofar as it determines a lack of jurisdiction to award statutory child support under Title 43. But district courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate the existence and effect of contracts. Here the Mother's claim is for enforcement of a contract she alleges to be in effect. She alleges consideration for the bargain by way of her agreeing to give up part of her statutorily calculated child support. The Father does not dispute this, but the trial court has never adjudicated the existence or non-existence of that alleged contract. The trial court did not determine whether Father agreed to pay child support after the child reached her majority. We will not determine in the first instance whether the decree contains such an agreement. Oklahoma Public Employees Association v. Oklahoma Dept. of Central Services, supra; Patel v. OMH Medical Center, Inc., supra. The Mother is entitled to her day in court to prove what, if anything, the parties agreed to, and whether the Father is in fact in breach of any agreement. ¶18 The opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals is vacated. The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. ¶19 WATT, C.J., OPALA, V.C.J., HODGES, HARGRAVE, KAUGER, SUMMERS, JJ. - Concur ¶20 LAVENDER, BOUDREAU, WINCHESTER, JJ. - Dissent FOOT