Title: McCarthy v. The Governor
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11625
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: April 7, 2015

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SJC-11625 
 
MICHAEL J. McCARTHY & another1  vs.  THE GOVERNOR & another.2 
 
 
 
April 7, 2015. 
 
 
 
Governor.  Council.  Constitutional Law, Governor.  Secretary of 
the Commonwealth.  Judge.  Jurisdiction, Equitable. 
 
 
 
 
The plaintiffs, Michael J. McCarthy and Mary-Ellen Manning, 
filed a complaint in the county court in July, 2013, against the 
Governor and the Secretary of the Commonwealth, seeking to 
establish that McCarthy had been nominated, confirmed, and 
appointed to a Massachusetts judgeship in 2012, and that he is 
therefore entitled to a commission for that office.3  The 
plaintiffs alleged, in part, that when the Governor "nominates" 
a candidate for judicial office, the nominee automatically is 
"appointed" without further gubernatorial action when a majority 
of the Executive Council's members records its advice and 
consent to the nomination.  The plaintiffs alleged that that is 
what happened here.  They further alleged that the Governor, 
once a nominee has been confirmed by the Council, is required to 
sign a commission, and that the Secretary of the Commonwealth is 
                                                          
 
 
1 Mary-Ellen Manning, a former member of the Executive 
Council. 
 
 
2 Secretary of the Commonwealth. 
 
 
3 Michael J. Albano, a current member of the Executive 
Council, was also named as a plaintiff in the complaint.  He is 
not a party to this appeal. 
 
2 
 
 
 
obligated to issue the commission, but that the Governor and the 
Secretary failed to perform these duties in McCarthy's 
situation.  The plaintiffs sought relief in the nature of 
mandamus, declaratory relief, and, in the alternative, equitable 
relief. 
 
 
A single justice of this court allowed the Governor's and 
the Secretary's motion to dismiss.  The plaintiffs appeal.  We 
affirm the judgment of the single justice. 
 
 
Background.  On August 23, 2012, the Governor nominated 
McCarthy for the position of Associate Justice in the Southern 
Berkshire Division of the District Court Department.  The 
Executive Council held a hearing on McCarthy's nomination on 
September 19, 2012, and the Council's members voted on it at 
their next weekly meeting, on September 26, 2012.  Three 
councillors voted in favor of the nomination, three councillors 
voted against the nomination, and one councillor, plaintiff 
Mary-Ellen Manning, abstained.4  The nomination thus failed to 
garner the necessary votes for confirmation.  Although the 
Council met again on October 10 and 17, 2012, it took no further 
action concerning the McCarthy nomination at those meetings.  
However, on October 17, Manning, who had initially abstained 
from voting, delivered a letter to the Governor stating that she 
now "advise[d] in favor of and consent[ed] to the appointment 
of" McCarthy, and that the "Council Register will so reflect."  
Neither the Governor nor the Secretary took any further steps 
concerning McCarthy's August 23, 2012, nomination in response to 
Manning's letter. 
 
 
On January 3, 2013, the Governor resubmitted McCarthy's 
nomination to the Council, for the same judicial position.  The 
Council considered this second nomination at its meeting on 
February 13, 2013.  Again the nomination failed to garner the 
votes needed for confirmation.  The Governor, accordingly, 
thereafter sent a letter to the Council stating that he 
considered the matter closed.  On February 21, 2013, however, 
notwithstanding the adverse vote on his second nomination, 
McCarthy appeared before two commissioners authorized to 
administer oaths and purported to take the oath of office as an 
Associate Justice of the Southern Berkshire District Court.  
McCarthy apparently took the position, as he now claims in this 
action, that his first nomination had resulted in his successful 
                                                          
 
 
4 The Governor presided over the September 26, 2012, 
meeting.  The Lieutenant Governor was not in attendance. 
 
3 
 
 
 
appointment to the judgeship.  For that he relies on Manning's 
letter to the Governor on October 17, 2012, outside of the 
formal hearing and voting process, which he claims was a valid 
vote in his favor and the final vote needed for his 
confirmation. 
 
 
The Governor has never signed, and the Secretary has never 
issued, a commission to McCarthy. 
 
 
Discussion.  The Governor is charged under the 
Massachusetts Constitution with the "obligation to nominate and 
appoint all judicial officers, subject to the advice and consent 
of the Executive Council."  Opinion of the Justices, 461 Mass. 
1205, 1207 (2012).5  The Constitution contemplates that the 
Governor both "nominate" and "appoint" each candidate for 
judicial office.  The nomination is separate and distinct from 
the appointment.  Among other things, an appointment can occur 
only after the advice and consent of the Executive Council.  See 
Opinion of the Justices, 210 Mass. 609, 611 (1912).  See also 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 155 (1803).  The 
nomination comes first chronologically in the sequence, followed 
by the advice and consent of the Council, and then the 
appointment by the Governor. 
 
 
It is wholly within the Governor's power and discretion to 
decide whom to nominate.  See Opinion of the Justices, 461 Mass. 
at 1212.  As we have said, however, the Governor's power to 
appoint is subject to the advice and consent of the Council.  An 
appointment may occur only if the Council "shall approve of it, 
and take affirmative action which fairly may be called advising 
it."  Id., quoting Opinion of the Justices, 190 Mass. 616, 620 
(1906).  That said, even if the Council consents to a 
nomination, the decision whether to appoint remains the 
Governor's prerogative.  He must take some affirmative act "on 
the advice and consent of the [Council] to his own nomination," 
Marbury v. Madison, supra at 157, in order to effectuate the 
appointment.  See Juggins v. Executive Council, 257 Mass. 386, 
                                                          
 
 
5 Specifically, Part II, c. 2, § 1, art. 9, of the 
Constitution of the Commonwealth provides: 
 
 
"All judicial officers . . . shall be nominated and 
appointed by the governor, by and with the advice and 
consent of the council; and every such nomination shall be 
made by the governor, and made at least seven days prior to 
such appointment." 
 
4 
 
 
 
389 (1926) ("Whether the Governor takes advice or not, his 
conclusion must rest finally upon his own judgment"). 
 
 
The Governor's appointment of an individual to judicial 
office becomes effective "when the last act to be done by the 
[Governor is] performed."  Marbury v. Madison, supra.  See 1 Op. 
Attorney Gen. 140, 141 (1894).  At a minimum, this requires that 
the Governor communicate unequivocally his determination, 
informed by the Council's advice and consent, to exercise the 
power of appointment.  Rep. A.G., Pub. Doc. 12, at 96 (1972) 
("Appointment occurs, of course, when the Council has given its 
advice and consent to the nomination and the judicial commission 
has been issued" [emphasis added]).  The appointment, like the 
nomination, is highly discretionary, and it is for the Governor 
and the Governor alone to decide.  There is nothing ministerial 
about the Governor's decisions to nominate and appoint.  
Contrast Rep. A.G., Pub. Doc. 12, at 107 (1984) (describing 
Secretary's role in judicial appointment process; stating that 
Secretary "functions in a . . . ministerial manner with respect 
to gubernatorial appointments").  As stated in Opinion of the 
Justices, 190 Mass. at 619-620, when the Governor has the power 
to act, "[t]he act, first of all, and afterwards for all time, 
is the act of the Governor." 
 
 
There is nothing in the record before us to suggest that 
the Governor took action to appoint McCarthy to the vacant 
judgeship at any time.  To the contrary, the evidence is that 
the Governor did not proceed with an appointment in any fashion 
after the vote of the Council on McCarthy's first nomination on 
September 26, 2012, or after Manning's letter on October 17.  
Instead, he resubmitted the nomination to the Council.  
Likewise, after the Council's vote on the second nomination, the 
Governor indicated that he considered the matter closed.  Thus, 
even if we were to assume for the sake of discussion, as the 
plaintiffs argue, that the votes of the councillors at the 
September 26 meeting, supplemented with Manning's purported vote 
by letter to the Governor on October 17, combined to constitute 
the requisite "advice and consent" and the required number of 
votes in favor of McCarthy's nomination, we conclude 
nevertheless that McCarthy did not validly obtain a judgeship.6,7 
                                                          
 
 
6 Michael J. McCarthy's unilateral act of reciting the oath 
of office before persons qualified to administer oaths (see G. 
L. c. 30, § 11) did not transform the situation and somehow 
create a valid "appointment" where there was none.  Where the 
Governor does not make an appointment, no valid commission can 
5 
 
 
 
 
Moreover, the Constitution "discloses the intent [of the 
framers] that the Council shall act in a formal manner upon 
matters coming before it."  Scullin v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 304 
Mass. 75, 78-79 (1939).  See Answer of the Justices, 461 Mass. 
1201, 1203-1204 (2012) ("The Massachusetts Constitution requires 
the Council to perform its duties with appropriate formality").  
The requisite level of formality for confirmation of a 
nomination was missing here.  At the meeting on September 26, 
2012, at which the Council voted on McCarthy's first nomination, 
the formal vote -- three in favor, three opposed, and one 
abstention -- was insufficient to confirm his nomination.  
Manning's subsequent attempt to cast a vote, by her letter to 
the Governor three weeks later, on October 17, 2012, occurred 
outside the Council's formal meeting and voting process.  
Indeed, there appears to have been no formal action of any kind 
by the Council -- no further meeting, discussion, or vote -- on 
McCarthy's first nomination after the September 26 meeting and 
vote.  Although the Governor and Council may promulgate rules of 
procedure to govern the hearing and voting process, see Pineo v. 
Executive Council, 412 Mass. 31, 37 (1992), no such rules have 
been brought to our attention, let alone a rule that would 
authorize a post hoc change in the duly recorded votes to occur 
by a letter to the Governor outside the formal process.  In the 
absence of a valid rule authorizing such a procedure, we cannot 
conclude that Manning's purported vote was proper. 
 
 
The single justice was correct to dismiss the complaint.  
Regardless of his reason, the Governor took no action to 
effectuate a judicial appointment.  Neither an action for 
mandamus nor an action seeking declaratory relief will lie 
against the Governor.  Milton v. Commonwealth, 416 Mass. 471, 
475 (1993).  Further, the court's equitable powers may not be 
used to provide relief that is contrary to statutory or 
constitutional requirements.  Haverty v. Commissioner of 
Correction, 440 Mass. 1, 8 (2003), quoting Immigration & 
Naturalization Serv. v. Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875, 883 (1988) 
("Courts of equity can no more disregard statutory and 
constitutional requirements and constitutional provisions than 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
issue and the purported taking of the oath is an empty gesture.  
Rep. A.G., Pub. Doc. 12, at 109 & n.6 (1984). 
 
 
7 The Governor and the Secretary have suggested that this 
appeal is moot because the Governor later nominated and (with 
the Council's advice and consent) appointed another individual 
to the judgeship sought by McCarthy.  We do not agree that the 
appeal is moot. 
6 
 
 
 
can courts of law").  Although, in appropriate circumstances, 
mandamus and declaratory relief are available against the 
Secretary, this case does not present such circumstances.  The 
Secretary cannot be compelled to act where he had no legal duty 
to do so.  See G. L. c. 30, § 12 (Secretary is empowered to 
issue commission only to "[a] person appointed to an office by 
the governor").  Where the Governor did not act to appoint 
McCarthy after the Council's proceedings, the Secretary could 
not issue a valid commission to McCarthy.   
 
 
Conclusion.  The single justice correctly declined to grant 
the requested declaratory relief, relief in the nature of 
mandamus, and equitable relief, and properly dismissed the 
plaintiffs' complaint. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
Raipher D. Pellegrino for the plaintiffs. 
 
Jo Ann Shotwell Kaplan, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Michael C. Walsh, pro se, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.