Title: In Re Kesler
Citation: 433 N.E.2d 643, 89 Ill. 2d 151
Docket Number: 55041
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: February 19, 1982

89 Ill. 2d 151 (1982)
433 N.E.2d 643
In re JOHN A. KESLER, Attorney, Respondent.
No. 55041.

Supreme Court of Illinois.
Opinion filed February 19, 1982.
*152 Philip Schickedanz, of Springfield, for the Administrator of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission.
Robert B. Oxtoby, of Van Meter, Oxtoby &amp; Funk, of Springfield, for respondent.
Respondent suspended.
JUSTICE UNDERWOOD delivered the opinion of the court:
This reciprocal disciplinary action under our Rule 763 (73 Ill.2d R. 763) was initiated by the Administrator of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission as a *153 consequence of the disbarment by the Indiana Supreme Court of respondent, John A. Kesler. The Hearing Board provided in our disciplinary system (73 Ill.2d Rules 751 through 771), apparently believing Rule 763 required discipline identical to that imposed by the sister State except in unusual circumstances not present here, recommended disbarment. That recommendation was affirmed by the Review Board.
In relevant part Rule 763 states:
It has been stipulated by the parties that in all significant respects the Indiana and Illinois disciplinary rules are identical. Respondent's sole contention is that substantially less *154 discipline is warranted in Illinois than was imposed in Indiana.
We believe it apparent that Rule 763 does not require an automatic imposition in Illinois proceedings of the same discipline imposed by the State in which the misconduct occurred or in which prior disciplinary action had been taken. We think this intent appears from the language of the rule that "he [the attorney] may be subjected to the same discipline in this State" (emphasis added) and the provision in clause (5) permitting the respondent to urge that his conduct "warrants substantially less discipline in this State." Clearly clause (5) would be meaningless if the rule required imposition of the same discipline imposed in the other jurisdiction. That a particular sanction has resulted in the sister State from the same conduct is persuasive of the propriety of that sanction, but it is not binding, and our adjudicatory bodies may recommend, and we may impose, different discipline where analysis of the evidence compels such result. No other interpretation can be placed upon our opinion in In re Neff (1980), 83 Ill. 2d 20, in which both the dismissal recommended by the Review Board and the action taken by us differed from the discipline recommended in Wisconsin, the originating State. This is not to indicate, of course, that the factual findings in the Indiana proceedings may now be disputed, for they, like the finding of guilt in a criminal case upon which subsequent disciplinary proceedings are based, are res judicata. (Neff; In re Cook (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 26, 32; In re Andros (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 419, 423.) We turn, then, to a consideration of the evidence before us.
Respondent is a native of Clark County, Illinois, where many of his relatives still reside. He attended law school in Indiana and was admitted to both the Indiana and Illinois bars in 1951. He practiced as a sole practitioner, principally in Terre Haute, Indiana, and five Illinois counties on or near the Indiana border, doing considerable trial work in personal *155 injury, criminal and divorce cases. While he handled other matters, including some probate cases, he had very few estates as large as the Grammer estate, in the administration of which the misconduct occurred. He had served two terms as a representative in the Indiana legislature and had been an unsuccessful candidate for judge. At the time of the Indiana disciplinary hearings he was the Democratic candidate for the State senate in a heavily Democratic district. He attributed his defeat to publicity resulting from the fact that the hearing officer at the supposedly confidential disciplinary proceedings permitted the news media and photographers to "invade" the hearing room.
The misconduct facts as testified to in the Illinois proceedings are apparently substantially as testified to in the Indiana proceedings and are summarized in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Indiana, from which we quote:
The Indiana court stated that respondent's failure to include any mention of the escrow agreement in the petition for partial distribution filed in the Vigo County circuit court constituted a "misrepresentation" to that court. In his Illinois testimony respondent stated that he had disclosed to the Vigo circuit court the details of the escrow arrangement during the hearing on the petition "as the transcript here shows without contradiction, exactly what his and my arrangement was. It suited the judge and it suited John Smith and we handled it exactly that way." The "transcript" referred to apparently was of the Indiana disciplinary proceedings, copies of which both counsel had and offered to the hearing panel. The panel declined to admit the transcript, however, presumably because of its belief that it *159 had no discretion as to the disciplinary sanction. Consequently we can only assume that the absence of any attempt to impeach respondent's Illinois testimony regarding disclosure to the court indicates its compatibility with his Indiana testimony. We mention this, not in criticism of the finding of misrepresentation by the Supreme Court of Indiana, but only because we believe respondent's oral explanation to the court mitigates its absence from the petition. Respondent testified that the escrow agreement was in writing and signed only by him. While he had given John Smith a copy, the latter did not recall receiving it when he testified in the Indiana proceedings. The transcript of those proceedings apparently contained a copy of the agreement.
Respondent also testified here that his annual income was in excess of $100,000 at the time of these events, and there was evidence that his net worth at the time of the hearings exceeded $1 million. His 1979 Federal income tax return shows a tax of $86,519 on an adjusted gross income of $187,274. While readily conceding he should never have commingled the funds, respondent repeatedly and emphatically denied any intent to permanently retain the $27,500 or to keep it beyond the time at which Federal estate tax clearance was received for the estate. He conceded that John Smith was entitled to interest upon the repaid principal but testified he had made no effort to pay it during the pendency of the Illinois proceedings because his attorney thought he ought not to do so. He also testified, somewhat imprecisely, that he kept the securities purchased with the $27,500, or the receipt for them, in a lock box attached to the escrow agreement or other papers explaining the custody arrangement.
Some 35 letters or statements from judges, legislators, lawyers, the Terre Haute chief of police and officers, a minister, and other community leaders were introduced attesting to respondent's professional ability, community activity and standing, and his good reputation prior to the *160 disbarment. These character statements portray respondent as an honest, outspoken, hardworking lawyer who was quite active in community affairs and who represented his clients with ability, dedication and vigor. Several tell of his unpaid services to indigent clients and community organizations; several others suggest the disciplinary proceedings to have been politically inspired. In addition to the statements attesting to a somewhat unusual amount of community activity, respondent testified to his service in the armed forces, to the presidencies or equivalent positions held by him in his church groups, veterans' organizations, service clubs, and PTA clubs, and to his former memberships in various bar organizations. He further testified that about the time the disciplinary proceedings commenced in Indiana he returned to Indiana University and audited a course in legal ethics. It was disclosed by respondent during the Illinois proceedings that he had received a private reprimand from the Indiana Supreme Court in connection with his service as a probate commissioner. While its basis is not entirely clear, that reprimand apparently resulted from respondent's subsequent representation of heirs in an estate in which he, as probate commissioner, had originally admitted the will to probate. The import of respondent's testimony was that he had inadvertently overlooked his earlier part in the formality of admitting the will to probate.
There is, of course, not the slightest doubt that respondent's handling of the $27,500 constituted a prohibited commingling and conversion of client funds. (79 Ill.2d R. 9-102.) Respondent readily concedes the error of his conduct and indicates his willingness to pay John Smith interest for the periods, ranging from six months to two years, during which respondent received the income from the converted funds. The Indiana Supreme Court viewed the conduct as not merely poor accounting practices but, rather, as a deliberate course of conduct designed to benefit respondent at the expense of the estate. It considered disbarment *161 necessary "in order to demonstrate this Court's total abhorence of the acts of misconduct." (___ Ind. ___, ___, 397 N.E.2d 574, 579-80.) While respondent's substantial income and net worth tend to support his disavowal of any intent to permanently convert the funds, and also militate against any need on his part for the comparatively insignificant amount of income from the converted funds, it seems odd that he made no effort to reimburse the estate or Smith for the lost earnings. It is undisputed, too, that the conversions were not inadvertent, but were, as the Indiana court indicated, the result of an intentional, deliberate course of conduct. That the arrangement was agreed to by respondent's elderly, lay coexecutor affords no justification for the surprising insensitivity to his professional responsibilities manifested by respondent. If he was, as he appears to have been, seriously concerned as to additional taxes, it would have been a simple matter to have retained the identical amounts in the estate account.
Two principal purposes of our disciplinary system are to safeguard the public and maintain the integrity of the legal profession. (In re Spencer (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 496, 501.) As this court pointed out in In re Clayter (1980), 78 Ill. 2d 276, 281:
This court has consistently condemned commingling, and the conversion which so frequently results has been the occasion for disciplinary action ranging from disbarment (In re Smith (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 134) to censure (Clayter; see also In re Schlax (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 66; In re Brody (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 152; In re Smith (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 250; In re Sherman (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 590; In re Wyatt (1972), 53 Ill. 2d 44; In re Fumo (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 429; In re Lingle (1963), 27 Ill. 2d 459). Without intending to minimize the serious nature of respondent's misconduct, it can fairly be said that the instances in which this court has disbarred lawyers because of commingling and conversion have involved circumstances of a substantially more aggravated character than appear here. (See, e.g., In re Smith (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 134; In re Stillo (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 49; In re Smith (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 250; In re Ahern (1962), 26 Ill. 2d 104.) So far as this record indicates, respondent had no intention of permanently retaining the funds; he was always in a position to repay the $27,500 and did so promptly in the amount requested as soon as he became aware that John Smith was objecting. These facts differ from the usual case involving commingling and conversion where the funds are restored only after lengthy delays during which the client has vainly sought to obtain that to which he was rightfully entitled. In re Brody (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 152; In re Wyatt (1972), 53 Ill. 2d 44; In re Fumo (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 429.
Unquestionably, a substantial disciplinary sanction is called for, but we are of the opinion that suspension is sufficient. Respondent will apparently be eligible to seek reinstatement in Indiana after November 15, 1984. Were we to disbar here, our rules, as do Indiana's, preclude reinstatement for five years. Considering respondent's repentant *163 attitude, his prior good reputation, and his community activities, we believe it unnecessary for the protection of the public or the integrity of the profession (In re Saladino (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 263) to extend a suspension beyond the time at which respondent can seek readmission to practice in Indiana.
Accordingly, respondent is suspended until November 15, 1984.
Respondent suspended.