Title: Henry Garcia v. State Of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC04-866
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: November 30, 2006

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC04-866 
____________ 
 
HENRY GARCIA, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
____________ 
 
No. SC05-1316 
____________ 
 
HENRY GARCIA, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
JAMES R. MCDONOUGH, etc., 
Respondent. 
 
[November 9, 2006] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Henry Garcia, a prisoner sentenced to death, appeals the denial of his motion 
for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 and also 
petitions for a writ of habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), 
(9), Fla. Const.  As explained below, we affirm the denial of Garcia’s 3.850 motion 
and deny his habeas petition. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Two elderly sisters were found dead in their home on January 17, 1983.  
They had been stabbed repeatedly––one thirty times and the other fourteen times.  
Many of their wounds were defensive.  One also suffered vaginal and anal injuries, 
inflicted while she was still alive.  According to the medical examiner, the women 
died in the early morning hours of Sunday, January 16, 1983.  A next-door 
neighbor corroborated that at 6 a.m. on Sunday she awoke to the sound of breaking 
glass.  Whoever committed the crimes had broken some glass panes and slashed 
the screen on the victims’ back door. 
On the evening before the murders, Garcia planned to go on a date with his 
employer’s daughter.  She cancelled the date, however, so that she could spend 
time with another man.  Feliciano Aguayo, who worked with Garcia in the fields 
and considered him a friend, noticed that Garcia was angry and urged him to spend 
the night at home.  Instead, Garcia persuaded Aguayo to drop him off at a bar 
about a half-mile from the victims’ house.  Aguayo and his family also lived about 
a half-mile from the victims.  At 7 a.m. the next morning, Aguayo’s mother 
Elizabeth Feliciano saw Garcia running toward their home from that direction.  She 
observed blood on his clothes and face.   
 
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Garcia came to the door and asked for Aguayo, who went outside to speak 
with him.  According to Aguayo, Garcia was “upset” and “scared.”  He had fresh 
blood on his clothing and a bent knife “full of blood.”  Garcia told Aguayo that he 
had been walking home from a bar fifteen miles away (not the nearby bar where 
Aguayo dropped him off) when suddenly he was attacked “for no reason at all” by 
two men and a woman who beat him with a tire iron in the middle of a field.  He 
claimed to have stabbed the woman and possibly one man in self-defense.  As 
Aguayo drove Garcia to his labor camp, Garcia kept repeating, “I told them not to 
get me mad.  I have this animal inside of me.” 
Shortly after the murders, Rufina Perez overheard Garcia speaking to a 
group of men in the fields, where she also worked.  She initially thought they were 
joking.  Garcia admitted that he “got in trouble with these women,” but kept saying 
that he did not “have to worry about it, because they are already in hell.”  One of 
the men asked him, “Te las chingastes?”––meaning, “Did you fuck them up?”––to 
which Garcia responded affirmatively.  He explained that, to gain entry to their 
home, he “went through the back door” and “ripped out the screen door.”  When 
Garcia noticed that Perez was eavesdropping, he cut off the conversation.   
At the first trial in this case, the jury convicted Garcia of both murders and 
unanimously recommended two death sentences, which the trial court imposed.  
We reversed his convictions, however, and remanded for a new trial because the 
 
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trial court had prevented Garcia from introducing payroll records indicating that 
his employment in the fields ended more than a week before the murders, and thus 
before the conversation that Perez allegedly overheard.  See Garcia v. State, 564 
So. 2d 124 (Fla. 1990).  We explained that “Perez’s testimony provided a crucial 
link between Garcia and the crimes.”  Id. at 127. 
At the retrial, Garcia introduced the payroll records.  Nevertheless, the jury 
found him guilty of both murders, as well as one count each of sexual battery and 
armed robbery.  For his murder of the sister who was sexually assaulted, the jury 
unanimously recommended a death sentence.  For the other sister’s murder, it 
recommended a life sentence by a vote of seven-to-five.  The trial court found four 
aggravating factors for each murder: (1) murder committed under a sentence of 
imprisonment; (2) prior violent felony conviction; (3) murder committed while 
engaged in sexual battery; and (4) murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or 
cruel (HAC).  Garcia did not present any mitigation evidence, and no mitigators 
were found.  The trial court, overriding the jury’s life recommendation for one of 
the murders, imposed two death sentences. 
We affirmed Garcia’s convictions and sentences on direct appeal.  Garcia v. 
State, 644 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1085 (1995).  While 
acknowledging that “this case was based substantially on circumstantial evidence,” 
 
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we concluded “that the evidence was inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis 
of innocence.”  Id. at 62. 
Garcia then filed a motion for postconviction relief under rule 3.850.  The 
circuit court denied most of his claims summarily, but granted an evidentiary 
hearing on others.  Among them were claims that Garcia’s trial counsel provided 
ineffective assistance because he failed to investigate and present mitigation 
evidence, as well as evidence of a familial relationship between the State’s three 
main witnesses.   
At the beginning of the evidentiary hearing, Garcia personally waived his 
penalty phase claims, contrary to his counsel’s advice.  As to the remaining guilt 
phase claims, he called only one witness: retrial counsel Reemberto Diaz.  Diaz 
admitted that, in preparing for the retrial, he “relied primarily on the investigation 
that was done in preparation for the initial trial.”  The circuit court also admitted 
into evidence a postconviction deposition of Perez, who was gravely ill at the time.  
She admitted that another witness, Aguayo, was married to her sister.  No one ever 
asked her about the relationship, so she had not disclosed it.  She also admitted that 
Garcia’s codefendant (who went unmentioned at trial) was her friend and that she 
visited him in prison. 
 
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After the evidentiary hearing, the circuit court denied all relief.  Garcia now 
appeals to this Court.  He also petitions for a writ of habeas corpus.  We analyze 
each in turn. 
II. 3.850 APPEAL 
 
Garcia raises many issues in his 3.850 appeal.  We begin by analyzing 
(A) whether he validly waived his penalty phase claims, (B) whether his 
postconviction counsel had a conflict of interest, and (C) whether he was 
improperly denied access to public records.  We then analyze (D) the claims on 
which the circuit court granted an evidentiary hearing and (E) other claims that the 
circuit court summarily denied.  Finally, we review (F) his cumulative error claim. 
A. Waiver of Penalty Phase Claims 
The circuit court granted an evidentiary hearing on Garcia’s claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to present mitigation evidence, 
including evidence of Garcia’s mental health and his difficult childhood.  
However, when the evidentiary hearing began, Garcia––against his counsel’s 
advice––announced that he no longer wished to pursue any penalty phase claims.  
The circuit court, after conducting an extensive colloquy, accepted this waiver.  
Garcia now claims that the court erred by accepting the waiver without first 
requiring his counsel to proffer all available mitigation evidence into the record. 
 
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We find no error.  The precedents on which Garcia relies in demanding a full 
proffer of all available mitigation evidence did not involve the waiver of 
postconviction penalty phase claims; they involved the waiver of mitigation at the 
trial itself.  In the pivotal case, Koon v. Dugger, 619 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 1993), we 
recognized “the right of a competent defendant to waive presentation of mitigating 
evidence” at trial.  Id. at 249.  To ensure a valid waiver, we imposed various 
procedural requirements, including that defense counsel explain whether “he 
reasonably believes there to be mitigating evidence that could be presented and 
what that evidence would be.”  Id. at 250.  More recently, in Muhammad v. State, 
782 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 2001), we emphasized that the trial court should always 
“consider all mitigating evidence ‘contained anywhere in the record, to the extent it 
is believable and uncontroverted,’” even if the defendant wishes not to present 
mitigation.  Id. at 363 (quoting Farr v. State, 621 So. 2d 1368, 1369 (Fla. 1993)). 
We have not, however, extended this logic to a defendant’s waiver of 
postconviction penalty phase claims.  See, e.g., Ferrell v. State, 918 So. 2d 163, 
174 (Fla. 2005) (holding that a defendant who merely “opted to forego” the 
presentation of evidence thereby waived his claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel in failing to seek a social worker’s assistance) (quoting Owen v. State, 773 
So. 2d 510, 515 (Fla. 2000)).  The two situations are drastically different.  At trial, 
the sentencer needs to decide whether to impose the death penalty.  Mitigation 
 
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evidence is always relevant to that decision.  Conversely, at the postconviction 
stage, prisoners need not argue at all trial counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing to 
present mitigation evidence.  Moreover, even if they do bring such claims, they 
must prove trial counsel’s deficiency before the effect of that mitigating evidence 
becomes relevant.  Because of these distinctions, we have not required a full 
proffer of available mitigation evidence before a postconviction waiver of penalty 
phase claims.  We require only that such waivers be “knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary.”  Alston v. State, 894 So. 2d 46, 57 (Fla. 2004) (using this language in a 
different context, where a prisoner waived his rights to “postconviction counsel 
and proceedings”) (quoting Durocher v. Singletary, 623 So. 2d 482, 485 (Fla. 
1993)). 
We conclude that Garcia did waive his postconviction penalty phase claims 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.  According to his colloquy with the trial 
court, Garcia discussed the waiver many times with his counsel and understood its 
ramifications.  Although Garcia may not have known every detail of his penalty 
phase claims, he attested in a sworn affidavit that he read his entire postconviction 
motion, which adequately summarized the additional mitigation evidence that his 
counsel intended to present.  The record strongly supports the trial court’s decision 
to accept his waiver as valid. 
 
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B.  Conflict of Interest 
Garcia also claims that the trial court erred in allowing him to be represented 
by an attorney with a conflict of interest.  At the beginning of the evidentiary 
hearing, just before the waiver colloquy, postconviction counsel revealed that his 
second cousin shared office space with Garcia’s trial counsel, Reemberto Diaz.  
Asked about this relationship, Garcia stated that “it doesn’t bother me at all.”  He 
then stated, “It’s just shared space.  It wasn’t working together.”  When Diaz 
testified, however, he clarified that he did practice jointly with postconviction 
counsel’s second cousin on some cases.  Postconviction counsel claimed he was 
unaware of this fact and “would have no way of knowing” it.  Diaz did not 
consider it “anything of a conflict nature.”  Asked again about the relationship, 
Garcia stated that it did not bother him, and that he wished to go forward with the 
hearing.  Given that neither lawyer felt the relationship would affect the case, and 
in light of Garcia’s informed consent, we agree with the trial court that no conflict 
existed. 
C.  Public Records 
Garcia accuses the Miami-Dade Police Department of improperly 
withholding public records relevant to his case.  They include notes from the 
interrogation of Wally Gomez, who saw Garcia on the day of the crime, as well as 
a sworn statement and lie detector results from Ann Gomez, who also saw Garcia 
 
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that day.  After conducting a search, the Department “object[ed] to producing these 
records because they do not exist.”  The circuit court summarily denied relief on 
Garcia’s public records claim.  Garcia now seeks a remand for an evidentiary 
hearing. 
We have “rejected the argument that an evidentiary hearing is required to 
resolve every postconviction motion that alleges a public records violation.  The 
defendant must support his motion . . . with specific factual allegations.”  Johnson 
v. State, 904 So. 2d 400, 404 (Fla. 2005) (quoting Thompson v. State, 759 So. 2d 
650, 659 (Fla. 2000)).  In multiple cases, we have “upheld the summary denial of 
public records claims based on a defendant’s mere speculation about the existence 
of unproduced records.”  Id.  The case most similar to this one is Downs v. State, 
740 So. 2d 506 (Fla. 1999).  There, the defendant alleged that a sheriff’s office had 
withheld notes from witness interviews, whereas the interviewing officer attested 
that all records had been disclosed.  Because the defendant “did not proffer or 
assert the existence of any evidence that such notes existed and were improperly 
being withheld,” id. at 511, we affirmed the summary denial of relief.  Id. at 518. 
Like the defendant in Downs, Garcia alleges that a law enforcement agency 
is withholding records from witness interviews.  Like the sheriff’s office in Downs, 
the Department claims it has searched for the records and determined they do not 
exist.  The sole reason that Garcia offers for believing in their existence is that both 
 
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witnesses allegedly told his investigator that they were interviewed and that the 
conversations “should have been memorialized.”  Whether they were, in fact, 
memorialized remains pure conjecture.  Because the Department has expressly 
denied that the records exist, we affirm the summary denial of Garcia’s claim. 
D.  Evidentiary Hearing Claims 
 
At the evidentiary hearing, Garcia attempted to prove that his trial counsel 
was ineffective in failing to present various facts to the jury, including (1) the 
familial relationship between the State’s three main witnesses, (2) a police report 
containing inconsistent statements by one of those witnesses, (3) the existence of 
other suspects, and (4) Garcia’s alleged intoxication at the time of the crime.1  The 
standard that governs ineffective assistance claims is the two-pronged test from 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984): first, Garcia must show that his 
counsel’s performance was deficient––i.e., unreasonable under prevailing 
professional norms; and second, he must show that the deficiency prejudiced the 
defense––i.e., that it undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial by creating 
“a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different.”  Valle v. State, 778 So. 2d 960, 965-66 
                                          
 
1.  Along with the ineffective assistance claims, Garcia also alleges that 
these facts constitute newly discovered evidence; that the State violated Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to disclose them; and that the State 
violated Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), by presenting them falsely.  
Like the circuit court, we reject these conclusory claims as meritless.  We discuss 
in detail only the ineffective assistance claims. 
 
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(Fla. 2001) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000)).  Applying this 
standard, the circuit court found neither deficiency nor prejudice on any of these 
claims.  We review each one separately. 
1.  Witnesses’ Relationship 
The three witnesses whose testimony connected Garcia to the crime––
Feliciano Aguayo, Elizabeth Feliciano, and Rufina Perez––were all related to each 
other.  Aguayo, whose mother is Elizabeth, married Perez’s sister.  Although this 
familial relationship was noted on an early police report, Garcia’s trial counsel 
never mentioned it to the jury and could not recall it at the evidentiary hearing.  
The State, however, repeatedly told the jury that the witnesses were unconnected.  
Garcia claims his trial counsel was deficient in failing to expose the witnesses’ 
relationship and in failing to argue that they might have fabricated their testimony 
in hopes of receiving a reward.   
Nothing in the record suggests that the witnesses actually did conspire to 
testify against Garcia, or even that they sought remuneration for their testimony.  
One of the witnesses, Perez, denied hearing about the reward before trial.  Another 
witness, Elizabeth Feliciano, knew of the reward but testified that she neither 
sought nor received any money.  All that Garcia has demonstrated is a familial 
relationship.  Even the strength of that relationship remains unclear.  Perez testified 
that she did not know the Felicianos very well “because I never visit them.”  She 
 
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apparently knew Aguayo better, but cautioned that their relationship “got nothing 
to do [with] what they say on the others.”  At the evidentiary hearing, Garcia’s trial 
counsel testified that he would not have emphasized a familial relationship to the 
jury unless he could have shown that it influenced the witnesses’ testimony.  
Absent any evidence that the relationship did, in fact, influence their testimony, we 
reject Garcia’s ineffective assistance claim on both the deficiency and prejudice 
prongs. 
2.  Impeaching Perez 
Garcia alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to impeach 
Perez with statements attributed to her in a police report from August 1983, seven 
months after the murders.  The report states that Perez, while working in the fields, 
“heard [Garcia] say something like ‘Night before last I killed some guys and old 
ladies.’”  At trial, however, and again in her postconviction deposition, Perez 
recalled the confession differently.  She testified that Garcia spoke of killing 
women only––not men.  She denied that Garcia’s codefendant participated in the 
conversation, as the police report suggested.  She also disputed the report’s 
assertion that she refused to give the police a formal statement.  She testified that 
the report, which wrongly referred to her by her former husband’s last name, was 
“all lies.”  The circuit court, while not going that far, agreed that the report was 
 
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“confusing” and “inaccurate,” and dismissed it as having “little or no value for 
impeachment purposes.”   
We reach the same conclusion as the circuit court.  The police report 
contains demonstrable inaccuracies.  For example, it mistakenly refers to Perez as 
“Mrs. Feliciano”––the name of another main witness––only one sentence before 
recounting what Perez heard in the fields.  The same carelessness could have 
pervaded other aspects of the report.  Moreover, while Garcia would prefer to 
emphasize the differences between the report and Perez’s trial testimony, an 
effective attorney would have been equally mindful of their similarities.  The 
report states that Perez heard Garcia confess to “having stabbed to death a woman, 
possibly old, and that the woman did not even defend herself.”  Drawing the jury’s 
attention to this earlier account might have been more harmful than helpful to the 
defense.  Garcia, who failed to question trial counsel about this issue at the 
evidentiary hearing, clearly has not met his burden of proving deficiency.  
Additionally, we find no prejudice.  More powerful challenges to Perez’s 
testimony––for instance, that she delayed in telling the authorities because she 
thought Garcia was joking, and that payroll records indicated that Garcia stopped 
working with Perez before the murders––were presented to the jury, which 
nonetheless returned a guilty verdict.  Our confidence in the outcome is not 
undermined. 
 
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3.  Other Suspects 
Garcia alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to elicit 
additional testimony about other suspects––particularly a homeless suspect named 
John Conners, whose hairs were tested for comparison with “dirty” hairs found at 
the crime scene.  Trial counsel acknowledged that Conners was a “good scapegoat” 
and recalled actively investigating him.  He even mentioned Conners at various 
points in the trial.  Yet he feared that by pushing the issue any further, he might 
inadvertently open the door for the State to explain why all other suspects had been 
cleared of suspicion, which was because Garcia’s codefendant had confessed and 
implicated Garcia in the murders.  Counsel did not want to risk the introduction of 
this evidence.  Also, he feared that if he called the investigators most familiar with 
Conners, they would “stick it to me.”  Thus, he simply tried to show that Conners’s 
involvement was “a reliable possibility.”   
In light of these reasonable strategic considerations, we agree with the 
circuit court that trial counsel’s performance was not deficient.  See, e.g., Robinson 
v. State, 913 So. 2d 514, 524 (Fla. 2005) (“Strategic decisions do not constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been considered and 
rejected and counsel’s decision was reasonable under the norms of professional 
conduct.”) (quoting Brown v. State, 894 So. 2d 137, 147 (Fla. 2004)).  Also, we 
note that Garcia has not demonstrated prejudice.  As the circuit court explained in 
 
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rejecting this claim, Garcia has “produced no testimony concerning any other 
suspects.” 
4.  The Intoxication Defense 
At trial, Garcia’s attorney did not attempt to mount an intoxication defense.  
He briefly mentioned intoxication, but only to explain Garcia’s muddled memory 
of what happened on the night of the murders.  Garcia claims his attorney was 
ineffective in failing to present the defense.  As the circuit court correctly noted, 
however, an intoxication defense would have undermined Garcia’s claim that he 
had nothing to do with the murders.  Trial counsel strategically decided not to 
present such a defense.  We have held that such decisions are not deficient.  
See, e.g., State v. Williams, 797 So. 2d 1235, 1239 (Fla. 2001) (“[C]ounsel cannot 
be deemed ineffective for failing to pursue the voluntary intoxication defense as 
such a defense would have been inconsistent with [defendant’s] theory of the 
case.”). 
E.  Summarily Denied Claims 
While granting an evidentiary hearing on some of Garcia’s claims, the 
circuit court denied most of them summarily.  Garcia now appeals the summary 
denial of certain claims, alleging he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing.  We have 
explained that “a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a 
postconviction relief motion unless (1) the motion, files, and records in the case 
 
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conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, or (2) the motion or a 
particular claim is legally insufficient.”  Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055, 1061 
(Fla. 2000) (citing rule 3.850 and various cases).   
Applying this standard, we reject many of Garcia’s claims without 
discussion.  First, we reject various claims as procedurally barred because they 
were or could have been raised on direct appeal.  These include Garcia’s claims 
that the State presented insufficient evidence of burglary and sexual battery; that 
the trial court failed to weigh unrefuted mitigation; that the trial court failed to play 
an independent role in sentencing; that the capital sentencing statute is 
unconstitutional; that Garcia’s parole violation and other nonstatutory aggravators 
should not have been considered in sentencing; that improper comments by the 
prosecutor deprived him of a fair trial; and that the State used a “straw-man alibi” 
to shift the burden of proof.  To the extent that Garcia tries to repackage these 
claims in the language of ineffective assistance, they remain procedurally barred.  
See, e.g., Cherry v. State, 659 So. 2d 1069, 1072 (Fla. 1995) (stating that a 
defendant on postconviction may not “counter the procedural bar” on issues that 
were or could have been raised on direct appeal by “couch[ing] his claim . . . in 
terms of ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to preserve or raise those 
claims”). 
 
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We reject other claims because they are legally insufficient under controlling 
caselaw.  These include Garcia’s claims that he is entitled to retroactive relief 
under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); that he is innocent of the death 
penalty; that Florida’s system of lethal injection is unconstitutional; that the trial 
court’s finding of the prior conviction aggravator violated Johnson v. Mississippi, 
486 U.S. 578 (1988); that his right to the assistance of competent mental health 
experts was denied; and that he is insane to be executed, which is a premature 
claim at this stage. 
Finally, we reject various ineffective assistance claims because they are 
conclusively refuted by the record.  The record shows that Garcia’s trial counsel 
was not deficient in failing to present model prisoner testimony; in emphasizing 
the heinous nature of the crime; in making the closing argument; in failing to 
object to comments about the jury’s advisory role; in failing to request a change of 
venue; in failing to object to the use of the underlying felony as an aggravator; in 
failing to prepare certain defense witnesses; in cross-examining certain State 
witnesses; in failing to refute misstatements about Garcia’s relationship with the 
daughter of one of his employers; in failing to challenge the trial court’s alleged 
bias; in failing to object to comments that diminished the importance of the penalty 
phase; or in failing to object to inadequate or inaccurate jury instructions.  We also 
reject as insufficient Garcia’s allegations that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s 
 
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deficiency, if any, in failing to object to victim impact letters; in allowing the 
medical examiner and a lay witness to testify beyond the scope of their expertise; 
in questioning potential jurors at voir dire; in failing to present evidence of 
Garcia’s intermittent work schedule; in failing to ensure a complete record for 
appeal; or in failing to locate witness William Diaz.  
We find only two of Garcia’s summarily denied claims worthy of extended 
discussion.  They relate to the cross-examination of (1) Feliciano Aguayo and (2) 
Elizabeth Feliciano. 
1.  Feliciano Aguayo 
Garcia claims that his trial counsel was ineffective in cross-examining 
Feliciano Aguayo.  Among other things, he claims that Aguayo should have been 
asked about inconsistencies between his trial testimony and statements attributed to 
him in an earlier police report.  Aguayo initially told investigators that Garcia 
arrived at his home slightly later on Sunday morning (roughly 8:30 a.m.) and that 
Garcia repeatedly uttered the phrase “I told him not to make me mad” (not “I told 
them not to get me mad,” as Aguayo testified at trial).  Also, Aguayo omitted facts 
to which he later testified––for example, that on the day of the murders he and his 
mother visited the field where Garcia claimed to have been attacked, but found no 
evidence of the event.   
 
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We need not analyze whether trial counsel was deficient in cross-examining 
Aguayo, because Garcia clearly has not demonstrated prejudice.  See, e.g., Pietri v. 
State, 885 So. 2d 245, 256 (Fla. 2004) (“[A] court considering a claim of 
ineffectiveness of counsel ‘need not make a specific ruling on the performance 
component of the test when it is clear that the prejudice component is not 
satisfied.’”) (quoting Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986)).  
At trial, Aguayo admitted that he could not remember precisely when Garcia came 
to his home, or the specific timing of other events on the weekend of the murder.  
Nevertheless, his mother confirmed the time when Garcia came to their house, as 
well as their attempt to investigate Garcia’s story later that day.  Impeaching 
Aguayo on those issues would not have affected the outcome.  Nor is our 
confidence undermined by the possibility that Garcia repeatedly said “I told him 
not to make me mad,” rather than “I told them not to get me mad.”  Garcia had 
already told Aguayo that two men and a woman randomly attacked him in a field 
and that he killed one or two of them.  Whether he attributed his anger to “him” or 
“them,” his story remained the same.  The jury, however, did not believe it.  
Rather, the jury concluded that Garcia did kill multiple people––but under very 
different circumstances from those described to Aguayo.  We remain confident that 
the jury would have reached the same conclusion even if Garcia’s trial counsel had 
impeached Aguayo as Garcia suggests. 
 
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2.  Elizabeth Feliciano 
Garcia also alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to impeach 
Elizabeth Feliciano, who saw Garcia on the morning of the murders, with an 
August 1983 police report, which stated that she heard Garcia but “did not see him 
because she was taking a shower.”  At trial, confusion arose on this very point.  
Elizabeth, testifying through a translator, implied on direct examination that as she 
“was going into the shower” she “was able to see [Garcia] crossing the street, 
running towards my house.”  On cross-examination, Garcia’s attorney pressed her: 
“What could you see from the bathroom when you were taking a shower?”  
Elizabeth clarified that she “had already come out [of the shower] when [she] saw 
Mr. Henry running.”  She then recounted the situation in great detail.  Given that 
the jury witnessed this confusion and clarification firsthand, we conclude that trial 
counsel’s failure to impeach the witness with the police report was neither 
deficient nor prejudicial.  The report is the same one that we deemed unreliable in 
our analysis of whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to impeach Perez. 
F.  Cumulative Error 
The final claim in Garcia’s 3.850 appeal is one of cumulative error.  Even 
when we consider all of his claims cumulatively, however, we remain confident in 
the outcome.  We therefore reject this claim as well. 
 
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III. HABEAS CLAIMS 
Garcia also petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus, raising multiple 
claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.  As we have explained, “[t]he 
criteria for proving ineffective assistance of appellate counsel parallels the 
Strickland standard for ineffective assistance of trial counsel.”  Zack v. State, 911 
So. 2d 1190, 1204 (Fla. 2005) (citing Wilson v. Wainwright, 474 So. 2d 1162, 
1163 (Fla. 1985)).  We consider, first, whether appellate counsel made “a serious 
error . . . falling measurably outside the range of professionally acceptable 
performance and, second, whether the deficiency in performance compromised the 
appellate process to such a degree as to undermine confidence in the correctness of 
the result.”  Teffeteller v. Dugger, 734 So. 2d 1009, 1027 (Fla. 1999) (quoting 
Suarez v. Dugger, 527 So. 2d 190, 192-93 (Fla. 1988)).  Each of Garcia’s claims 
will be analyzed under this standard. 
A.  Incomplete Record 
Garcia claims that his appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to ensure a 
complete record on appeal.  He points to three mistakes.  First, he claims that 
appellate counsel should have sought a remand for reconstruction of the record, 
because many bench conferences at trial were not transcribed.  We reject this claim 
as facially insufficient because Garcia “has not pointed to any errors that occurred 
during the untranscribed portions of the proceedings.”  Thompson v. State, 759 So. 
 
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2d 650, 660 (Fla. 2000).  Second, Garcia claims that appellate counsel should have 
sought an evidentiary hearing to determine the actual words used by Perez, whose 
testimony the trial court corrected.  On direct appeal, however, we evaluated this 
very issue and determined that the correction was “not misleading.”  Garcia, 644 
So. 2d at 62.  This attempt to relitigate the issue is procedurally barred.  Finally, 
Garcia alleges that appellate counsel should have argued that the trial court 
violated his due process rights by failing to transcribe certain testimony that the 
judge read back to the jury.  As Garcia acknowledges, however, appellate counsel 
did argue that the read-back should have been transcribed.  We have warned that it 
is “not appropriate to use a different argument to relitigate the same issue” already 
decided on direct appeal.  Harvey v. Dugger, 656 So. 2d 1253, 1256 (Fla. 1995) 
(citing Medina v. State, 573 So. 2d 293, 295 (Fla. 1990)). 
B.  Neighbor’s Testimony 
Garcia alleges that his appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to 
challenge “victim impact” testimony by one of the victims’ neighbors.  As the first 
witness at the guilt phase, the neighbor described her relationship with the victims 
and how she relayed news of the murders to one of their nieces, a nun.  The 
defense objected to this testimony on relevancy grounds, but the trial court allowed 
it.  Garcia alleges that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the 
testimony on the grounds of bias, passion, and prejudice, and in failing to argue 
 
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that Garcia’s right to a fair trial was violated.  We conclude, however, that 
appellate counsel adequately challenged the neighbor’s testimony.  As part of a 
general prosecutorial misconduct claim, Garcia’s brief on direct appeal argued: 
“Irrelevant references to a victim’s family are improper appeals to sympathy.  
Making the point that such a family member was a nun and doing so through a 
witness for whom the prosecutor also sought sympathy magnified the impropriety.  
The prosecutor’s actions here ignored her responsibilities and were clearly 
inappropriate.”  We rejected this argument on direct appeal, see Garcia, 644 So. 2d 
at 63, and likewise reject Garcia’s attempt to relitigate the issue in his habeas 
petition. 
Additionally, Garcia alleges that his appellate counsel provided ineffective 
assistance in failing to challenge the trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial 
based on an emotional outburst at the end of the neighbor’s testimony.  As she was 
leaving the stand, the neighbor allegedly “thanked the Court, thanked the 
prosecutor, looked at [defense counsel] and advised [him] that she had just had 
three heart attacks, in a not very friendly fashion.”  The trial court denied the 
defense’s motion for mistrial, stating that it “could almost to a certainty say the 
jury didn’t hear her,” and that “the witness’s testimony, really, was simply for 
identification, and it doesn’t really imply in any way that the defendant is guilty.”  
Even if appellate counsel had challenged this ruling, we clearly would not have 
 
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granted relief.  As we have explained, in “reviewing motions for mistrial dealing 
with emotional outbursts from witnesses, appellate courts should defer to trial 
judges’ judgments and rulings when they cannot glean from the record how intense 
a witness’s outburst was.”  Thomas v. State, 748 So. 2d 970, 980 (Fla. 1999).  This 
is one of those situations. 
C.  Evidentiary Issues 
Garcia alleges that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge 
three evidentiary rulings to which his trial counsel objected.  We discuss each in 
turn.  First, Garcia’s trial counsel objected when the State attempted to bolster 
Perez’s credibility by asking her if she supplied her employer with her social 
security number.  Perez testified that she did supply the number, but the 
employer’s bookkeeper later testified that the number did not appear on any of 
Perez’s payroll records.  We agree with Garcia that this testimony constituted 
improper character evidence.  Nevertheless, the error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  It is inconceivable that Perez’s uncorroborated, self-interested 
statement could have enhanced her credibility in the eyes of the jury.  Thus, an 
appellate challenge would not have succeeded. 
Second, defense counsel objected when the State asked one of its witnesses 
whether Garcia’s employer had “ever produce[d]” the payroll records to 
investigators.  At that point, the defense had not yet attempted to introduce the 
 
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records.  The defense argued that the witness’s testimony “was improper 
impeachment to evidence that I have not yet introduced or attempted to introduce.”  
The trial court responded that “[t]he evidence was entered anticipatorily under our 
rules as I understand.”  We need not address the propriety of this ruling, because it 
clearly did not harm Garcia, who introduced the payroll records later in the 
proceedings as anticipated.   
Finally, defense counsel objected when the trial court permitted a detective 
to sit at the prosecution’s table throughout trial, despite the defense’s invocation of 
the rule of witness sequestration.  We have explained that “[t]he rule of witness 
sequestration is not an absolute rule which must be invoked at the mere request of 
counsel.  The trial judge is endowed with a sound judicial discretion to decide 
whether particular prospective witnesses should be excluded from the sequestration 
rule.”  Randolph v. State, 463 So. 2d 186, 191 (Fla. 1984).  One exception to the 
rule is for witnesses whose presence is essential to one of the parties.  We have 
explained that “the trial court has wide discretion in determining which witnesses 
are essential.”  Knight v. State, 746 So. 2d 423, 430 (Fla. 1998) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 616.1, at 509 
(1998 ed.)).  For example, in Knight, a detective was exempted from the 
sequestration rule because he was essential to the State.  We found no abuse of 
discretion.  Although the detective “was a fact witness,” we noted that his 
 
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testimony dealt with information that had been addressed in prior proceedings, and 
thus his “ongoing courtroom presence did not implicate any of the dangers 
normally implicit when a witness hears other testimony prior to testifying.”  Id.  
The same is true here.  The detective was called as a defense witness simply to 
explain that charges had been filed against the defendant using an alias that also 
appeared in the payroll records from Garcia’s employer.  The trial court acted 
within its discretion in allowing the detective to stay in the courtroom.  Appellate 
counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim. 
D.  Limits on Cross-Examination 
Garcia alleges that his appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to 
challenge the trial court’s improper limitation of Garcia’s right to cross-examine 
one of the detectives who testified for the State.  Having reviewed the relevant 
portions of the transcript, however, we conclude that none of the alleged errors was 
preserved for appeal.  Thus, appellate counsel could not have raised the issue 
successfully.   
E.  Individualized Sentencing 
On direct appeal, we rejected Garcia’s claim that the trial court erred in 
finding no mitigating circumstances.  Garcia, 644 So. 2d at 63.  Garcia now alleges 
that his appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to bring to our attention a line 
of cases from the United States Supreme Court––Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 
 
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U.S. 1 (1986), Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983), Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 
U.S. 104 (1982), and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).  These cases establish 
that, in evaluating mitigation evidence, the sentencer must “consider[] all relevant 
facets of the character and record of the individual offender.”  Skipper, 476 U.S. at 
8.  Our ruling on direct appeal complied with this well-known principle.  We 
therefore deny this claim. 
F.  Cumulative Error 
Garcia closes his habeas petition with a claim of cumulative error.  Because 
we remain confident in the result of Garcia’s direct appeal, we deny this claim as 
well. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons given above, we affirm the denial of Garcia’s motion for 
postconviction relief under rule 3.850.  We deny his petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus. 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and 
BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
 
 
 
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Two Cases: 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Dade County,  
Diane Ward, Judge - Case No. 85-23640B 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 
 
Neal A. Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Southern Region, William 
M. Hennis, III, Litigation Director, CCRC and Roseanne Eckert, Assistant CCRC, 
Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida and Sandra S. Jaggard, 
Assistant Attorney General, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent 
 
 
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