Title: Camargo's Case
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12368
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: May 10, 2018

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SJC-12368 
 
IVES CAMARGO'S CASE. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     January 10, 2018. - May 10, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Workers' Compensation Act, To whom act applies, Independent 
contractor. 
 
 
 
 
Appeal from a decision of the Industrial Accident Reviewing 
Board. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Michael A. Fager for the claimant. 
 
Paul S. Kelly (Bruce J. Barker also present) for Publishers 
Circulation Fulfillment, Inc., & another. 
 
Catherine K. Ruckelshaus, of New York, Audrey Richardson, 
Janette Ekanem, Emily Spieler, & Ingrid Nava, for Brazilian 
Women's Group & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  The claimant, Ives Camargo, seeks review of a 
decision by the reviewing board of the Department of Industrial 
Accidents (department) concerning her claim for workers' 
compensation benefits pursuant to G. L. c. 152.  The reviewing 
2 
 
 
board affirmed the findings of an administrative judge, 
concluding that the clamant was an independent contractor and 
therefore was not entitled to workers' compensation.  The 
reviewing board made this determination on the basis of the 
definition of "employee" contained in the workers' compensation 
statute, as articulated in the twelve-part test from MacTavish 
v. O'Connor Lumber Co., 6 Mass. Workers' Comp. Rep. 174, 177 
(1992), and Whitman's Case, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 348, 353 (2011), 
rather than the definition of employee found in G. L. c. 149, 
§ 148B, the independent contractor statute.  The claimant 
appealed, and we transferred the case to this court on our own 
motion.  The claimant argues that the reviewing board erred in 
(1) failing to use the definition of "employee" under G. L. 
c. 149, § 148B, to determine whether the claimant was an 
employee eligible for workers' compensation under G. L. c. 152; 
and (2) finding that the claimant was an independent contractor 
rather than an employee. 
 
We conclude that the independent contractor statute, G. L. 
c. 149, § 148B, does not determine whether a claimant is an 
employee for the purpose of workers' compensation benefits under 
G. L. c. 152.  The reviewing board correctly applied the 
workers' compensation statute's definition of employee to 
determine whether the claimant was an employee under G. L. 
c. 152, and therefore the claimant was properly classified as an 
3 
 
 
independent contractor for the purposes of workers' 
compensation.1 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  The claimant began working as 
a newspaper delivery agent for Publishers Circulation 
Fulfillment, Inc. (PCF), in 2001.  PCF provides home delivery 
services for newspaper publishers and pays delivery agents to 
deliver newspapers to subscribers.  PCF does not publish its own 
newspapers.  Instead, it acts as a middleman to deliver 
published newspapers.  The claimant was hired by PCF and she 
signed various contracts over the years that identified her as 
an independent contractor.  As part of her contract with PCF, 
she was provided with newspaper delivery routes and a list of 
customers.  Pursuant to the contract, the claimant could make 
her deliveries at any time and in any order she wished, provided 
that the deliveries were completed by 6 A.M. on weekdays and 8 
A.M. on weekends.  To make the deliveries, the claimant used her 
own vehicle, which she did for twelve years.  The claimant was 
paid for each newspaper delivered as well as a weekly stipend, 
paid when she elected to redeliver newspapers to customers who 
did not receive a scheduled delivery. 
                     
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by Brazilian 
Women's Group, Centro Comunitario de Trabajadores, Immigrant 
Worker Center Collaborative, Lynn Worker's Center, Massachusetts 
Coalition for Occupational Safety and Health, Metrowest Worker 
Center, National Employment Law Project, and Service Employees 
International Union Local 32BJ. 
4 
 
 
 
In addition to setting a time by which newspaper delivery 
had to be completed, PCF required the delivery of dry and 
undamaged newspapers.  Delivery agents could purchase bags to 
wrap the newspapers from PCF, which the claimant did, but this 
was not mandatory. 
 
As part of the PCF contract, the claimant was permitted to 
hire assistants or subcontract her deliveries, an option she 
exercised.  Additionally, given the nonexclusivity of the 
contract between the claimant and PCF, the claimant could 
deliver newspapers or other items for other businesses.  She 
also purchased and collected independent contractor work 
insurance and filed her taxes as an independent contractor. 
 
On September 26, 2010, the claimant was loading newspapers 
from PCF into her vehicle using a hand carriage when she fell 
off a ramp and hurt her right knee and right hand.  She reported 
her injury to PCF but did not seek medical treatment.  Despite 
the fall, the claimant finished her work for PCF that day.  On 
January 7, 2011, the claimant reported a second injury; she had 
slipped on ice while delivering newspapers, injuring her right 
leg.  Following this second injury, the claimant was 
hospitalized and eventually underwent two surgeries, one for her 
right knee and the other for her right hand.  The claimant was 
fired in the summer of 2012. 
5 
 
 
 
The claimant filed an initial claim for workers' 
compensation benefits in 2012 with the department.  The insurer 
objected.  After a conference, the administrative judge issued 
an order directing the insurer to pay the claimant temporary 
total incapacity benefits.  The insurer appealed to a hearing, 
seeking a denial of all claims.2  In the decision issued after 
the hearing, the administrative judge determined that the 
claimant was an independent contractor and therefore was not 
entitled to workers' compensation benefits.  The reviewing board 
affirmed, finding that the claimant was an independent 
contractor. 
 
b.  Relevant statutes.  General Laws c. 152 requires 
employers to provide workers' compensation to employees who are 
injured within the scope of their employment.  The law applies 
to "employees," defined as "every person in the service of 
another under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or 
written," with certain exceptions not relevant to this opinion.   
G. L. c. 152, § 1 (4).  See Thorson v. Mandell, 402 Mass. 744, 
746 (1988); McDermott's Case, 283 Mass. 74, 75 (1933).  In 
MacTavish, 6 Mass. Workers' Comp. Rep. at 177, the department 
established a ten-factor test to determine whether an individual 
is an "employee" under the definition provided by G. L. c. 152, 
                     
 
2 The insurer also sought penalties against the claimant for 
fraudulent behavior, but that issue is not before us on appeal. 
6 
 
 
§ 1 (4), or an independent contractor and therefore outside the 
scope of the statute.  The MacTavish factors were then 
supplemented in Whitman's Case, 80 Mass. App. Ct. at 353 n.3, to 
become a twelve-factor test.3  The department has consistently 
applied some formulation of the MacTavish-Whitman factors for 
over one-quarter century to decide whether an individual is an 
employee or independent contractor for workers' compensation 
claims.  See Whitman's Case, 80 Mass. App. Ct. at 353; Stone v. 
All Seasons Painting & Decorating, 25 Mass. Workers' Comp. Rep. 
227, 231-232 (2011); MacTavish, 6 Mass. Workers' Comp. Rep. at 
177.  These factors are congruent to tests used in other 
jurisdictions to determine whether an individual is an employee 
for the purpose of workers' compensation, all of which are 
                     
 
3 The relevant MacTavish-Whitman factors are "(a) the extent 
of control, by the agreement, over the details of the work; (b) 
whether . . . the one employed is engaged in a distinct 
occupation or business; (c) the kind of occupation, with 
reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done 
under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without 
supervision; (d) the skill required in the particular 
occupation; (e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the 
instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person 
doing the work; (f) the length of time for which the person is 
employed; (g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by 
the job; (h) whether . . . the work is a part of the regular 
business of the employer; (i) whether . . . the parties believe 
they are creating the relation of master and servant; (j) 
whether the principal is . . . in business," MacTavish v. 
O'Connor Lumber Co., 6 Mass. Workers' Comp. Rep. 174, 177 
(1992), "[k] the tax treatment applied to payment . . .; and [l] 
the presence of the right to terminate the relationship without 
liability, as opposed to the worker's right to complete the 
project for which he was hired . . . ," Whitman's Case, 80 Mass. 
App. Ct. 348, 353 (2011). 
7 
 
 
largely derived from the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220 
(1958).  See, e.g., Doughty v. Work Opportunities 
Unlimited/Leddy Group, 33 A.3d 410, 419 (Me. 2011) (using 
factors similar to Restatement [Second] of Agency in determining 
who is employee for workers' compensation); Elms v. Renewal by 
Andersen, 439 Md. 381, 393 (2014) (using factors similar to 
MacTavish-Whitman factors to determine whether individual was 
employee for purposes of workers' compensation). 
 
In contrast, the independent contractor statute, G. L. 
c. 149, § 148B, provides the following as a means to determine 
employment status: 
"(a) For the purpose of [G. L. c. 149] and [G. L. 
c. 151 (the minimum wage act)], an individual performing 
any service, except as authorized under this chapter, shall 
be considered to be an employee under those chapters 
unless: -- 
 
"(1) the individual is free from control and direction 
in connection with the performance of the service, both 
under his contract for the performance of service and in 
fact; and 
 
"(2) the service is performed outside the usual course 
of the business of the employer; and, 
 
"(3) the individual is customarily engaged in an 
independently established trade, occupation, profession or 
business of the same nature as that involved in the service 
performed." 
 
 
General Laws c. 149 provides specific benefits and 
protections to employees, including how often an employee must 
be paid, when an employee must be notified of wage deductions, 
8 
 
 
and how much time an employee must be given for break periods 
during work.  See G. L. c. 149, §§ 100, 148, 150A.  As 
originally drafted, the independent contractor statute was 
limited to G. L. c. 149.  In 2004, the statute was amended to 
encompass G. L. c. 151, which provides for a minimum wage.  
Neither of these statutes provides for workers' compensation 
benefits.  General Laws c. 149, § 148B, as amended by St. 2004, 
c. 193, § 26, does, however, make limited reference to G. L. 
c. 152.  It states: 
"(b) The failure to withhold . . . workers 
compensation premiums with respect to an individual's wages 
shall not be considered in making a determination under 
this section. 
 
"(c) An individual's exercise of the option to secure 
workers' compensation insurance with a carrier as a sole 
proprietor or partnership pursuant to [G. L. c. 152, § 1 
(4)] shall not be considered in making a determination 
under this section. 
 
"(d) . . . Whoever fails to properly classify an 
individual as an employee according to this section and in 
so doing violates [G. L. c. 152] shall be punished as 
provided in [G. L. c. 152, § 14,] and shall be subject to 
all of the civil remedies, including debarment, provided in 
[G. L. c. 149, § 27C]." 
 
 
2.  Discussion.  The issue presented in this case is 
whether the definition of "employee" included in G. L. c. 152, 
§ 1, as historically applied by the department, or the 
definition of "employee" set out in G. L. c. 149, § 148B, 
applies to the determination of workers' compensation benefits.  
When reviewing decisions made by the reviewing board, we are to 
9 
 
 
give "due weight to the experience, technical competence, and 
specialized knowledge" of the agency.  McDonough's Case, 448 
Mass. 79, 81 (2006), quoting G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).  In matters 
of statutory interpretation, "deference is due when an agency 
interprets a statute is it charged with administering."  
Springfield v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 469 Mass. 370, 380 (2014).  
However, where the statute is not one that the agency 
administers, no deference is due.  See id.  We exercise de novo 
review of questions of statutory construction in such cases, and 
"we must overturn agency decisions that are not consistent with 
governing law."  McDonough's Case, 448 Mass. at 81.  We owe 
deference to the department's interpretation of the definition 
of employee under G. L. c. 152 and other aspects of this 
statute.  We do not, however, defer to its interpretation of 
G. L. c. 149, § 148B. 
 
a.  Application of G. L. c. 149, § 148B.  The two key 
provisions in the independent contractor statute are G. L. 
c. 149, §148B (a) and (d), which state: 
"(a) For the purpose of [G. L. cc. 149 & 151], an 
individual performing any service, except as authorized 
under this chapter, shall be considered to be an employee 
under those chapters unless . . . . 
 
"(d) . . .  Whoever fails to properly classify an 
individual as an employee according to this section and in 
so doing violates [G. L. c. 152] shall be punished as 
provided in [G. L. c. 152, § 14,] and shall be subject to 
all of the civil remedies, including debarment, provided in 
[G. L. c. 149, § 27C]." 
10 
 
 
 
 
The claimant argues that the reference to G. L. c. 152 in 
subsection (d) incorporates the three-part independent 
contractor test set out in G. L. c. 149, § 148B, into G. L. 
c. 152, and thus, the definition of "employee" in G. L. c. 149, 
§ 148B (a), should be used in lieu of the definition of 
"employee" found in G. L. c. 152, § 1, and the MacTavish-Whitman 
factors.  We disagree. 
 
For questions of statutory interpretation, we must consider 
"the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all the words 
construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, 
considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the 
mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to 
be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may 
be effectuated."  Depianti v. Jan-Pro Franchising Int'l, Inc., 
465 Mass. 607, 620 (2013), quoting Industrial Fin. Corp. v. 
State Tax Comm'n, 367 Mass. 360, 364 (1975).  Additionally, the 
statute must "be construed 'so that effect is given to all its 
provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or 
superfluous.'"  Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 
427 Mass. 136, 140 (1998), quoting 2A B. Singer, Sutherland 
Statutory Construction § 46.06 (5th ed. 1992).  Here, where two 
statutes intersect, we must look at both statutes to determine 
11 
 
 
whether § 148B applies to the workers' compensation laws of 
G. L. c. 152. 
 
In interpreting the scope of § 148B, we need look no 
further than the plain and unambiguous language provided by the 
Legislature in subsection (a) of the statute.  See Phillips v. 
Equity Residential Mgt., LLC, 478 Mass. 251, 257 (2017).  The 
Legislature provided that § 148B applies "for the purposes of 
[G. L. c. 149] and [G. L. c.] 151."  G. L. c. 149, § 148B.  In 
so doing, the Legislature has expressed its intent to limit the 
applicability of the independent contractor statute to G. L. 
cc. 149 and 151.  See Spaniol's Case, 466 Mass. 102, 108-109 
(2013) (declining to combine laws where Legislature intended to 
keep them separate).  If the Legislature had wanted to 
substitute the G. L. c. 149, § 148B, independent contractor 
statute for the definition of "employee" included in G. L. 
c. 152, § 1, it could have expressly done so in § 148B (a).  The 
Legislature also has used the standard language it usually 
includes whenever it intends to displace or supersede related 
provisions in all other statutes, "Notwithstanding any general 
or special law to the contrary . . . ."  See Mosey Cafe, Inc. v. 
Licensing Bd. of Boston, 338 Mass. 199, 203-204 (1958) (implying 
that "notwithstanding any general or special law heretofore" 
language shows legislative intent to displace prior inconsistent 
legislation); Beacon S. Station Assocs. v. Assessors of Boston, 
12 
 
 
85 Mass. App. Ct. 301, 306 (2014) (stating that "notwithstanding 
any general or special law to the contrary" language is used to 
displace inconsistent statutes). 
 
Although the independent contractor statute does not apply 
to G. L. c. 152 in its entirety or change the definition of an 
employee for the purposes of workers' compensation claims,  
G. L. c. 149, § 148B (d), contains a specific and isolated 
cross-reference to G. L. c. 152, that requires consideration and 
understanding.  In its written decision, the reviewing board 
addressed and clarified this cross-reference for workers' 
compensation purposes: 
 
"We do not agree that subsection (d) of § 148B can be 
interpreted to include [G. L. c.] 152 in toto.  The 
subsection addresses expanded penalties for misclassifying 
workers, not whether an individual is an employee or an 
independent contractor for the purpose of workers' 
compensation benefits . . . .  The subsection's requirement 
that a party that misclassifies a worker in violation of 
§ 148B (d) 'and in so doing' violates [G. L. c.] 152 
creates two criteria.  The first is the violation of 
§ 148B (d), the second is when that violation also violates 
[G. L. c.] 152.  This language does not supplant the 
MacTavish-Whitman analysis, but merely notes that when the 
facts of a given case demonstrate a misclassification of a 
worker as an independent contractor under § 148B, the 
penalties of [G. L. c. 152,] § 14 (3)[,] are applicable.  
It does not apply to a determination whether an individual 
is eligible for workers' compensation benefits."  (Emphasis 
in original.) 
 
We agree. 
 
This provision recognizes that a misclassification of an 
employee under § 148B may also result in a misclassification of 
13 
 
 
an employee under G. L. c. 152, and "in so doing" it will 
trigger the heightened penalties provided by both G. L. c. 152, 
§ 14, and G. L. c. 149, § 27C.  See L.Y. Nason, C.W. Koziol, & 
R.A. Wall, Workers' Compensation § 8.1 (3d ed. 2003 & Supp. 
2017) (adoption of 2004 amendment to G. L. c. 149, § 148B, has 
no impact on determination of employment status under G. L. 
c. 152, § 1, but does provide for punishment when there is 
misclassification under both statutes); Advisory A.G., Doc. No. 
2008/1 at 4 (2008) (misclassifying employee under G. L. c. 152 
is separate and distinct act from misclassifying employee under 
G. L. c. 149, § 148B).  See also Massachusetts Delivery Ass'n v. 
Coakley, 671 F.3d 33, 37 n.3 (1st. Cir. 2012) ("improper 
classification under § 148B, of itself, does not appear to give 
rise to a cause of action; instead, the statute seems to require 
that an improper classification result in a violation of one of 
the referenced chapters [including G. L. c. 152]"). 
 
The plain language and legislative history indicate that 
the Legislature intended that the definitions of an employee and 
an independent contractor in § 148B apply generally only to 
G. L. cc. 149 and 151.  The cross-reference to G. L. c. 152 was 
specific and limited:  if, in violating the three-prong test for 
determining an independent contractor in § 148B, the 
misclassification also violates G. L. c. 152, the penalties 
applicable to misclassification under G. L. c. 152 as well as 
14 
 
 
G. L. c. 149 apply.  There is no intent to broaden § 148B beyond 
this. 
 
Our laws have imposed differing, and not uniform, 
definitions of employees and independent contractors.  
Currently, there are at least four distinct methods used to 
determine employment status in the Commonwealth.  General Laws 
c. 152, § 1, provides a definition of an employee for workers' 
compensation claims, and the department uses the MacTavish-
Whitman factors to determine employment status.  General Laws 
c. 149, § 148B, provides a three-prong test to define employment 
status under G. L. cc. 149 and 151.  A third definition is 
provided in G. L. c. 151A, § 2, for the purpose of unemployment 
insurance, which uses a three-prong test that is similar to, but 
distinct from, the test in G. L. c. 149, § 148B.  In particular, 
the second prong expands the definition of independent 
contractor from work performed outside "the usual course of 
business" to include work performed "outside of all the places 
of business."  See Athol Daily News v. Board of Review of the 
Div. of Employment & Training, 439 Mass. 171, 176, 179 (2003) 
(board erred in awarding unemployment insurance to newspaper 
carriers by failing to consider importance of their making 
deliveries outside of business premises).  Finally, a fourth 
definition of employee is provided in G. L. c. 62B, § 1, for the 
purposes of withholding taxes on wages, and the department of 
15 
 
 
revenue applies the Internal Revenue Code's twenty-factor 
analysis to determine employment status.  See Technical 
Information Release 05-11 (Sept. 13, 2005), Official MassTax 
Guide, at PSW-206 (Thomson Reuters 2018) (amendments to G. L. 
c. 149, § 148B, do not change statutory definition of "employee" 
found in G. L. c. 62B).  It is thus not uncommon to have 
competing definitions of the same word where the purposes of the 
respective statutes are different.  If the Legislature intends 
to impose a uniform standard definition of employee or 
independent contractor across all employment related statutes in 
the Commonwealth, it may of course do so.  However, the isolated 
cross-references in G. L. c. 149, § 148B, alone do not so 
provide. 
This lack of uniformity also reflects differences in the 
particular laws.  The laws governing workers' compensation, 
unemployment insurance, minimum wages, and tax withholding serve 
different, albeit related, purposes.  Each involves a complex 
allocation of costs and benefits for individuals, companies, and 
State government itself.  Other States that employ multiple 
tests for determining employee or independent contractor status 
depending on the context have emphasized these differences.  
See, e.g., Terry v. Sapphire Gentlemen's Club, 336 P.3d 951, 
957-958 (Nev. 2014), and cases cited (describing why Nevada and 
other States have concluded that goals of workers' compensation 
16 
 
 
laws are not in pari materia with wage laws, with each being 
enacted for precise and distinct reasons resulting in different 
tests to determine employment status).  We need not, however, 
belabor the similarities or differences in the statutes, as it 
is up to the Legislature to decide how much uniformity to 
impose, and it has done so with care and particularity in these 
statutory schemes. 
 
Adopting this understanding of G. L. c. 152 and G. L. 
c. 149, § 148B, we conclude that the independent contractor 
statute, G. L. c. 149, § 148B, does not displace the definition 
of "employee" in G. L. c. 152, § 1, and therefore G. L. c. 149, 
§ 148B, is not used to determine employment status for workers' 
compensation claims under G. L. c. 152.4 
 
b.  Claimant's employment status.  As stated above, the 
definition of "employee" provided in G. L. c. 152, § 1, governs 
the claimant's employment status in her claim for workers' 
compensation benefits.  The MacTavish-Whitman factors provide 
                     
 
4 We also recognize that G. L. c. 152, and the case law 
interpreting it, place the burden on the individual seeking 
workers' compensation to prove all elements of a claim under 
G. L. c. 152, including employee status.  See Ginley's Case, 244 
Mass. 346, 347 (1923); Connolly's Case, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 35, 37 
(1996).  In comparison, G. L. c. 149, § 148B, places the burden 
of proof as to independent contractor status on the defendant, 
in this case, the putative employer.  Somers v. Converged 
Access, Inc., 454 Mass. 582, 589 (2009).  We discern no intent 
on the Legislature's part in amending § 148B to shift the burden 
of proof in workers' compensation cases; indeed, this would 
reflect another significant change in the workers' compensation 
law. 
17 
 
 
the appropriate test to determine employment status for claims 
filed under G. L. c. 152.  See Whitman's Case, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 
at 353 n.3; MacTavish, 6 Mass. Workers' Comp. Rep. at 177.  "The 
question of employment status within the meaning of G. L. 
c. 152, § 1 (4), is essentially a question of fact for the 
board, not to be set aside if it is justified by the evidence, 
unless, of course, it is tainted by some error of law" 
(quotations and citations omitted).  Whitman's Case, supra at 
353. 
 
The claimant fails to allege an error of law with respect 
to the application of the MacTavish-Whitman factors in this 
case.  Moreover, the evidence supports the finding that the 
claimant was an independent contractor.  In working for PCF, the 
claimant was allowed to expand her business to deliver 
newspapers and other items for other companies; supplied all 
necessary instruments to complete her job at PCF, including 
using her own vehicle to make deliveries; hired substitutes to 
complete the job; purchased her own independent contractor work 
insurance; and filed taxes as an independent contractor.  In 
applying the MacTavish-Whitman test to these facts, the 
administrative judge properly concluded, and the reviewing board 
properly affirmed, that the claimant was an independent 
contractor under G. L. c. 152, § 1. 
18 
 
 
 
3.  Conclusion.  For the reasons discussed, we hold that 
the independent contractor statute, G. L. c. 149, § 148B, is not 
used to determine employment status for workers' compensation 
claims under G. L. c. 152.  We also affirm the determination of 
the reviewing board that the claimant was an independent 
contractor. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J. (concurring, with whom Lowy and Budd, JJ., 
join).  I agree with the court that, in enacting the independent 
contractor statute, G. L. c. 149, § 148B, the Legislature did 
not intend to displace the definition of "employee" contained in 
the workers' compensation statute, G. L. c. 152, § 1.  I write 
separately only to express my concern about the practical 
consequences of this statutory scheme, which, by setting forth a 
patchwork of different standards for determining whether a 
worker is an employee or an independent contractor, may 
exacerbate the already complex problem of worker 
misclassification. 
 
Worker misclassification is a serious problem, both in our 
Commonwealth and across the nation.  See Somers v. Converged 
Access, Inc., 454 Mass. 582, 592-593 (2009); Advisory A.G., Doc. 
No. 2008/1 (2008).  Where an employee is misclassified as an 
independent contractor, he or she is deprived of many important 
benefits and protections, such as minimum wages and overtime 
pay, unemployment insurance, and workers' compensation.  See 
G. L. c. 151, § 1 (minimum wage); G. L. c. 151, § 1A (overtime 
pay); G. L. c. 151A (unemployment insurance); G. L. c. 152 
(workers' compensation).  Misclassification also "imposes 
significant financial burdens on the Federal government and the 
Commonwealth in lost tax and insurance revenues," while exposing 
2 
 
 
employers who properly classify their workers to unfair 
competition from those who do not.  Somers, supra at 593. 
 
Part of the challenge in preventing misclassification is 
that there is no uniform definition of an "employee."  Instead, 
the law sets forth several different standards for determining 
who is an employee and who is an independent contractor, 
depending on the context.  In 2004, the Massachusetts 
Legislature took a significant step toward harmonizing these 
standards, amending the independent contractor statute, G. L. 
c. 149, § 148B, so that its presumption in favor of employee 
status applied not only to the wage and hour laws contained in 
G. L. c. 149 but also to the minimum wage and overtime laws in 
G. L. c. 151.  See St. 2004, c. 193, § 26.  However, the law 
governing employment relations in this State remains far from 
uniform. 
 
As the court notes, Massachusetts law articulates at least 
four different standards for determining employment status.  
Ante at    .  For purposes of determining whether a worker is 
entitled to wage and hour protections, minimum wage, or 
overtime, we apply the three-prong independent contractor test 
in G. L. c. 149, § 148B (a).  But to determine whether a worker 
is entitled to unemployment insurance, we must apply a different 
three-prong test, set forth in G. L. c. 151A, § 2.  Meanwhile, 
whether a worker is entitled to workers' compensation depends on 
3 
 
 
an analysis of twelve separate factors, see MacTavish v. 
O'Connor Lumber Co., 6 Mass. Workers' Comp. Rep. 174, 177 
(1992), and Whitman's Case, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 348, 353 n.3 
(2011), and whether a worker is an employee for purposes of 
income tax withholding requires an examination of twenty 
factors.  See G. L. c. 62B, § 1 (incorporating Internal Revenue 
Code's definition of "employee"); Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 
296, 298-299 (listing twenty factors).  In addition, who bears 
the burden of proof as to employment status -- the employer or 
the worker -- also varies across different contexts.  Under wage 
and hour, minimum wage, and overtime laws, an individual who 
performs services is presumed to be an employee unless the 
employer can prove that he or she is in fact an independent 
contractor.  See G. L. c. 149, § 148B (a); Somers, 454 Mass. at 
589.  The same holds true for purposes of unemployment 
insurance.  See G. L. c. 151A, § 2;  Athol Daily News v. Board 
of Review of the Div. of Employment & Training, 439 Mass. 171, 
175 (2003).  But that presumption disappears in the context of 
workers' compensation, where the claimant bears the burden to 
prove his or her entitlement.  See Connolly's Case, 41 Mass. 
App. Ct. 35, 37 (1996). 
 
The practical result of this patchwork statutory scheme is 
confusion and uncertainty.  With so many different standards, it 
is difficult for employers to classify their workers properly, 
4 
 
 
even where they intend to comply with the law.  See Deknatel & 
Hoff-Downing, ABC on the Books and in the Courts:  An Analysis 
of Recent Independent Contractor and Misclassification Statutes, 
18 U. Pa. J.L. & Soc. Change 53, 65 (2015).  Enforcement also 
becomes more challenging, as State agencies must expend greater 
resources to interpret and implement nonuniform laws.  See id.  
See also Buscaglia, Crafting a Legislative Solution to the 
Economic Harm of Employee Misclassification, 9 U.C. Davis Bus. 
L.J. 111, 129-130 (2008). 
 
Most importantly, workers must struggle to understand and 
assert their rights.  Although Massachusetts laws require 
employers to post notices in workplaces explaining the various 
protections and benefits available to employees, see, e.g., 
G. L. c. 151, § 16 (notice of minimum wage); G. L. c. 151A, 
§ 62A (g) (notice of unemployment insurance coverage), these 
notices offer little guidance to workers who do not know, as a 
threshold matter, whether they are employees or not.  
Ascertaining one's own employment status can be especially 
difficult given that, under the current law, the same worker can 
be an employee for one purpose but an independent contractor for 
another.  Consider, for example, a worker who is deemed an 
employee under the independent contractor statute, G. L. c. 149, 
§ 148B (a), but not under the workers' compensation statute, 
G. L. c. 152, § 1.  If her employer complies with the law, then 
5 
 
 
that worker would receive minimum wages, overtime pay, and other 
protections associated with employee status.  She may assume on 
that basis that she is also eligible for workers' compensation, 
and choose not to purchase comparable insurance.  But when that 
same worker is injured in the workplace, and seeks workers' 
compensation, she would be denied those benefits, realizing only 
then, when it is too late, that she was never entitled to them 
in the first instance.  Or suppose her employer does not comply 
with the law, and does not provide her with minimum wage, 
overtime pay, and the other benefits to which she is entitled.  
If her employer then also tells her, correctly, that she is not 
entitled to workers' compensation because she is an independent 
contractor, how do we realistically expect her to understand 
that, for the purposes of wage and hour, minimum wage, and 
overtime laws, she is still an employee, and is therefore being 
denied her benefits under those laws? 
 
I do not doubt that the different standards for determining 
employment status are tailored, as the court points out, to meet 
the different purposes of the laws governing employment 
relations in our State.  See ante at    .  I suggest only that 
it is time to confront the problems that arise from this complex 
statutory scheme, especially to workers.  Some States have taken 
steps to harmonize their laws; at least one State, Maine, has 
adopted a single, uniform standard for determining employment 
6 
 
 
status under unemployment insurance, workers' compensation, and 
other employment laws.  See 2012 Me. Legis. c. 643 
(standardizing definition of "independent contractor" across 
laws); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 26, § 591 (2007 & Supp. 2017) 
(employment practices); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 26, § 1043 
(2007 & Supp. 2017) (unemployment insurance); Me. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. tit. 39-A, § 102 (2001 & Supp. 2017) (workers' 
compensation).  See also Or. Rev. Stat. § 670.700 (mandating 
cooperation between State agencies to "establish consistency in 
agency determinations relating to the classification of 
workers").  Other States have introduced measures designed to 
provide more guidance to workers as to their employment status.  
See, e.g., 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 185/15 (2008) (requiring 
construction contractors to post information about worker 
classification); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 275:49(V) (2010 & Supp. 
2017) (requiring employers to post information about criteria 
for classifying worker as employee or independent contractor).  
Whether such reforms would be appropriate in Massachusetts is, 
of course, a question for the Legislature and, as this case 
illustrates, a pressing one -- which I invite the Legislature to 
address.