Title: In re Newell
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S057231
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: June 10, 2010

FILED: June 10, 2010
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In re Complaint as to the Conduct of 
ROBERT D. NEWELL,
Accused.
(OSB No. 07-142; SC
S057231)
On review of the decision of a trial panel of
the Disciplinary Board.
Argued and submitted January 8, 2010.
Mark J. Fucile, Fucile &amp; Reising LLP,
Portland, argued the cause and filed the briefs for the accused.
Mary A. Cooper, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel,
Tigard, argued the cause and filed the brief for the Oregon State Bar.
Before De Muniz, Chief Justice, and Gillette,
Durham, Balmer, Kistler, and Linder, Justices.*
PER CURIAM
The accused is publicly reprimanded.
*Walters, J., did not participate in the
consideration or decision of this case.
PER CURIAM
In this attorney
discipline case, the Bar charged the accused with violating Rule of
Professional Conduct (RPC) 4.2.  Generally, that rule prohibits a lawyer from
communicating on certain subjects with a person whom the lawyer knows is
represented on those subjects.  The trial panel found that the accused had
violated Rule 4.2 and publicly reprimanded him.(1) 
The accused has requested review from this court.
Greenwood Forest
Products was in the business of buying, processing, and selling lumber
products.  James Fahey began working as an accountant for Greenwood in 2000. 
While working for Greenwood, Fahey embezzled money from the company and
disguised his actions in a number of ways, including creating fraudulent
inventory accounts.
In 2002,
Jewett-Cameron, a lumber manufacturer and wholesaler, sought to purchase
Greenwood, and the two businesses entered into an asset-purchase agreement. 
The agreement required Jewett-Cameron to purchase all of Greenwood's inventory
at cost plus two percent.  The transfer of Greenwood's inventory was scheduled
to take place over a period of time.  In an attempt to facilitate the process,
the companies agreed to put Fahey in charge of the books of both companies. 
After the final transfer of Greenwood's inventory, Greenwood claimed that
Jewett-Cameron still owed it additional sums for inventory sales. 
Jewett-Cameron acceded to Greenwood's claim and paid the full price that
Greenwood sought.
In late 2003,
Jewett-Cameron's auditors discovered that numerous accounting errors by
Greenwood had resulted in Greenwood overstating its inventory. 
Jewett-Cameron's auditors also discovered that Fahey had embezzled money from
both Jewett-Cameron and Greenwood by transferring funds from the companies'
accounts directly into his own personal banking account.  The auditors
concluded that Fahey had altered Greenwood's inventory records, which made it
appear that Greenwood had transferred more inventory to Jewett-Cameron than it
actually had.
Those events gave
rise to three legal actions and ultimately this disciplinary proceeding.  In
the first action, Greenwood sued Fahey for conversion.  Specifically, upon
being informed of the accounting irregularities and believing that Fahey was at
least partially responsible, Greenwood brought a civil action against Fahey on
September 7, 2004, for conversion and sought no less than $340,000 in damages
from him.  Greenwood moved for summary judgment.  The trial court granted
Greenwood's summary judgment motion and entered a judgment of approximately $370,000
plus interest against Fahey on May 23, 2005.
In the second
action, Jewett-Cameron sued Greenwood on March 11, 2005, claiming that it had
overpaid Greenwood by approximately $820,000 because of Greenwood's accounting
errors.  The accused represented Jewett-Cameron in that action.  The accused
testified in the disciplinary proceeding that Fahey's actions gave rise, in
part, to Jewett-Cameron's claim against Greenwood; that is, Fahey's actions in
embezzling the funds from Greenwood and overstating its inventory caused, in
part, Jewett-Cameron to pay too much for Greenwood's assets.
The third action
arose out of criminal charges that the state brought against Fahey.  Greenwood
contacted the district attorney, who brought criminal charges for theft against
Fahey on April 18, 2005.  Fahey retained Andrew Coit to represent him in the
criminal action.  On January 18, 2006, Fahey pled guilty to ten counts of
theft.  As part of the plea agreement, Fahey agreed to cooperate with Greenwood's
efforts to locate missing assets, and the trial court delayed the sentencing
hearing to give Fahey time to carry out his part of the plea agreement.
Jewett-Cameron's
civil action against Greenwood was set for trial on May 8, 2006.  Initially,
the accused did not believe that Fahey's testimony would be needed to prove
Jewett-Cameron's claims against Greenwood.  The accused described it as
"one of those situations where, here's a guy who really is at the center
of the action but he's in some [sense] irrelevant to our case."  The
accused, however, told his associate to try to arrange a meeting with Fahey to "see
what he has to say."  At that point, Greenwood's civil action against
Fahey had ended.  The criminal action against Fahey was still ongoing, however,
because Fahey was awaiting sentencing.  The accused testified that he
"knew [that] Coit was representing [Fahey] in the criminal case and * * *
figured that would be the easiest way to get in touch with him." 
Accordingly, the accused's associate contacted Coit to discuss meeting with
Fahey.
On April 27, 2006,
the accused received the following email from his associate:
"I talked to Fahey's attorney [Coit], who
wasn't too happy to talk with me.  He said that Fahey gets sentenced on Tuesday
of next week [May 2, 2006] and is going to the big house.  He is going to talk
with Fahey about meeting with us before then, but said he would require us to
waive any claims against Fahey before we talk to him.  I am supposed to call
him tomorrow to see if Fahey is even willing to talk to us."
The accused believed that Fahey would be
imprisoned before trial and, at that point, decided that he did not need to
interview Fahey.
On May 1, 2006, Coit
moved to continue Fahey's sentencing.  On Thursday, May 4, the accused learned
that Greenwood had subpoenaed Fahey to testify in Jewett-Cameron's action
against Greenwood, and the accused decided that he needed to talk to Fahey
before he testified at trial.  The accused's associate attempted to contact
Coit so that they could speak to Fahey.  On that day, at 4:54 pm, the associate
sent an email to the accused saying that he had left a message for Coit but
that, given Coit's failure to return his earlier calls, he did not expect Coit
to return his most recent call.  A half-hour later, the associate sent the
accused a second email, confirming that Fahey had appeared in court with Coit
to set over the sentencing hearing in the criminal action and that Greenwood
had subpoenaed Fahey to testify in Jewett-Cameron's action against Greenwood.
On Friday, May 5,
the accused had a subpoena served on Fahey for a deposition scheduled for 9:00
a.m. on Saturday, May 6.  Fahey received the subpoena at 6:35 p.m. on Friday,
approximately 14 hours before the deposition was scheduled to begin.  Pursuant
to ORCP 39, the accused served Greenwood's counsel with notice of the
deposition.  The accused, however, did not attempt to notify Coit that he had
subpoenaed Fahey.
The next morning at
Fahey's deposition, the accused and Greenwood's counsel were present.  Coit was
not there.  At the beginning of the deposition, Fahey asked to make a statement
and said:
"For the record, I was served yesterday evening at 6:35
p.m.  I have not had a chance to contact my counsel.  As there is a pending
criminal case on this in Washington County, anything alluding to any of those
areas I will be taking the Fifth Amendment."
After asking some background questions, the
accused began questioning Fahey about his work at Greenwood.
"[The accused]:  What process did you see in your role
as senior accountant when corporate inventory was purchased?  What paperwork
did you see?
"[Fahey]:  The most I would have seen was an invoice
coming in that went into payables.
"[The accused]: So an invoice from Jones Lumber for
eight truckloads of raw plywood?
"[Fahey]:  That's correct.
"[The accused]: And if that went someplace to be
processed, how would you know that?
"[Fahey]: On this one I'm going to assert my Fifth
Amendment privilege until I've consulted counsel."
The accused then began to ask Fahey numerous
questions about Fahey's criminal case:
"[The accused]: Okay.  Well, am I correct that you've
pled guilty to several crimes in state court?
"[Fahey]: Yes.
"[The accused]: Okay.  What are those crimes?
"[Fahey]: I believe they're theft or aggravated theft.
"[The accused]: Ten different counts; right?
"[Fahey]:  Correct.
"[The accused]:  And the theft was from Greenwood
Forest Products, Inc.?
"[Fahey]: Yes.
"[The accused]:  This question I just asked you that
you asserted your Fifth Amendment rights to, isn't that covered by that plea?
"[Fahey]:  I can't -- I don't know.
"[The accused]:  All right.  So if I ask you detailed
questions about accounting processes and paperwork and so on for inventory and
accounts payable and accounts receivable at Greenwood Forest Products, you're
going to assert your Fifth Amendment rights?"
"[Fahey]:  Until I can consult counsel and get a
clarification, yes.
"[The accused]:  Okay.  Who is your counsel?
"[Fahey]:  Andrew Coit.
"[The accused]:  Can you spell the last name please?
"[Fahey]:  C O I T.
"[The accused]:  And he's located here in Portland?
"[Fahey]:  That's correct.  He has an office in
Portland and an office in Eugene.
"[The accused]:  And you have not talked to him about
this deposition?
"[Fahey]:  That is correct.
"[The accused]:  Have you tried to retain any other
counsel for this deposition?
"[Fahey]:  No.
"[The accused]:  Is Andrew Coit the only person who
has represented you in connection with any legal proceedings?
"[Fahey]:  No.
"[The accused]: Who else has represented you?
"[Fahey]:  I have been represented by Andrea Davis of
Harrang Long Gary "Rudnick.
"[The accused]:  Anyone else?
"[Fahey]: Adam Dean is Andrew Coit's law partner.
"[The accused]: And I take it you don't have home
phones for either Adam Dean or Andrew Coit?
"[Fahey]:  That is correct.
"[The accused]:  What has Andrea Davis represented you
in connection with?
"[Fahey]:  A civil case.
"[The accused]:  That's the case brought by Greenwood
Forest Products against you?
"[Fahey]:  Correct."
The accused
continued, and, in the course of the deposition, repeatedly asked Fahey
questions about the amount of money that Fahey had taken -- an issue that was
central both to Jewett-Cameron's lawsuit against Greenwood and also to the
state's criminal charges against Fahey.  Fahey took the Fifth Amendment in
response to some of the questions and expressed concern that his criminal
attorney was not present to represent him at the deposition.
The accused
continued asking Fahey questions about the criminal case, but Fahey did not
respond to the questions because he thought the court had issued a protective
order.  When the accused asked about the scope of the protective order, Fahey
responded, "I don't know.  Without counsel here I can't answer
that."  The deposition continued with the accused asking more questions
and Fahey asserting the Fifth Amendment at various times.  Later in the
deposition, Fahey discussed his meeting with Greenwood's counsel regarding
Jewett-Cameron's action against Greenwood.  Fahey told the accused that Coit
had arranged the interview and explained that he had had a lawyer present with
him at that meeting.
"[The accused]:  Why did you agree to meet with
[Greenwood's] lawyer in connection with this case?
"[Fahey]:  Mr. Coit had mentioned to me, had mentioned
that he or his firm had been contacted by [Greenwood's counsel in this civil
case].  I was asked if I would be willing by Mr. Coit to sit down with
[Greenwood's counsel].  I asked Mr. Coit if there was any advantage or
disadvantage for me to do so.  Mr. Coit informed me that since, that his, since
he or Adam Dean would be there, the scope of what we would discuss would be
incredibly limited but with regard to the fact that it is possible that a
letter could have been written to the judge [in the criminal case] saying at
least he [Fahey] agreed to sit down with us and talk, that it might be within
my benefit to do so.  That is all from Mr. Coit to me.
"[The accused]:  Do you know why your lawyer has refused to
talk to our firm?
"[Fahey]:  No idea.  I had no idea that your firm had even
attempted to contact my attorney."
On Monday, May 8, Coit learned of the
deposition and later moved to seal the deposition transcript.  After holding a
hearing, the trial court granted Coit's motion.  Coit later reported the
accused to the Bar.
The Bar filed
disciplinary proceedings against the accused.  In its first cause of complaint,
the Bar alleged that the accused had violated RPC 4.2 because he deposed Fahey
on a subject on which the accused knew that Fahey was represented in the
criminal matter.  Alternatively, the Bar alleged that the accused violated that
rule when he deposed Fahey on a subject on which the accused knew that Fahey
was represented in the civil action between Jewett-Cameron and Greenwood.  In
his answer, the accused admitted most of the allegations in the complaint,
including the allegation that he knew that Fahey had representation in
connection with his criminal prosecution for theft.  However, the accused
denied that he knew that Fahey was represented for purposes of the
Jewett-Cameron litigation.  The accused also asserted that, under RPC 4.2(b),
the deposition was authorized by law.
The trial panel
found that the accused had violated RPC 4.2.  Specifically, the panel found
that the accused asked questions related to the criminal conduct in violation
of RPC 4.2 and rejected the accused's argument that RPC 4.2 applies "only
if the witness is represented in the same proceeding as the proceeding in which
the deposition was taken."  The panel concluded that that rule covers
"instances such as the present case in which the [a]ccused knew the
witness to be represented in a pending criminal proceeding but nevertheless
proceeded to interrogate the witness about that subject."
The trial panel also
rejected the accused's argument that the questions fell under the
"authorized by law" exception in RPC 4.2(b).  The panel reasoned that
"a witness's right to counsel can [not] be overcome by a deposition
subpoena alone."  Alternatively, the panel reasoned that, even if it
could, the circumstances in this case -- a Friday evening summons for a
Saturday morning deposition without any notice to the witness's counsel -- did not
come within the exception.  After noting that the accused had no prior disciplinary
record, the panel publicly reprimanded him.  The accused sought review from
this court.  The Bar did not seek review and does not contest the trial panel's
disposition of this matter.
On review, the
accused notes that the trial panel found that he did not know that Coit
represented Fahey in the civil action between Jewett-Cameron and Greenwood but
that he did know that Coit represented Fahey in the pending criminal action. 
In the accused's view, that finding is dispositive.  Specifically, the accused
argues that RPC 4.2 barred him from contacting Fahey only if the accused knew
that Fahey was represented in the action between Jewett-Cameron and Greenwood. 
He contends that, because he did not know that fact, RPC 4.2 does not apply. 
The accused argues alternatively that, even if RPC 4.2 applied, his
communication with Fahey came within a specific exception to that rule for
communications "authorized by law."  We begin with the accused's
argument that RPC 4.2 only applies if he knew that Coit represented Fahey in
Jewett-Cameron's action against Greenwood.
RPC 4.2 provides:
"In representing a client or the lawyer's
own interests, a lawyer shall not communicate or cause another to communicate on
the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be
represented by a lawyer on that subject unless:
"(a) the lawyer has the prior consent of a
lawyer representing such other person;
"(b) the lawyer is authorized by law or by
court order to do so; or
"(c) a written agreement requires a written
notice or demand to be sent to such other person, in which case a copy of such
notice or demand shall also be sent to such other person's lawyer."
RPC 4.2 does not prohibit all communications
between a lawyer and a person represented by counsel.  Rather, that rule
prohibits communications between lawyers and represented persons only when (1) the
communication occurs in the course of the lawyer's representation of a client
or the lawyer's interests; (2) the person with whom the lawyer communicates is
represented; (3) the communication is on the subject of both the lawyer's
representation and the person's representation; and (4) the lawyer knows that
the person is represented on that subject.
In this case, there
is no dispute that the accused communicated with Fahey in the course of
representing Jewett-Cameron, that Fahey was represented in the criminal action,
and that the accused knew that he was communicating with Fahey on the subject
on which Fahey was represented.  The only question is whether the communication
concerned the subject on which the accused represented Jewett-Cameron and on
which Coit represented Fahey.  As a factual matter, the answer to that question
is "yes."  The subject on which the accused represented
Jewett-Cameron was Greenwood's alleged overstatement of its inventory.  The
accused sought to recover part of the purchase price from Greenwood on the
theory that Greenwood's assets were less than its books showed.  Coit
represented Fahey on that same subject.  The criminal action was based on
Fahey's embezzlement from Greenwood, which resulted in Greenwood's overstated
inventory.  Factually, each lawyer's representation involved a common subject
-- whether Greenwood's books were overstated.
The accused does not
dispute that factual proposition.  He argues instead that the word
"subject" in RPC 4.2 means "matter" and that
"matter" means the specific legal matter on which he was representing
his client.  More specifically, the accused argues that his communication with
Fahey would violate RPC 4.2 only if Coit represented Fahey in Jewett-Cameron's
action against Greenwood and if the accused knew that fact.
The accused's
argument is difficult to square with the text of the rule.  The rule uses the
word "subject," not "matter."  In this context,
"subject" means
"something concerning which something is said or done 
* * *    &lt; a ~ worth of a great
dramatist&gt;."
Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 2275 (unabridged ed 2002).  "Subject," the word that the
rule uses, is broader than the word "matter," as the accused defines
it.(2)
The context of RPC
4.2 is also at odds with the accused's interpretation of the term
"subject."  See Stevens v. Czerniak, 336 Or 392, 401,
84 P3d 140 (2004) (explaining that the context for interpreting a statute's
text includes "'the preexisting common law and the statutory framework
within which the law was enacted'" (quoting Denton and Denton, 326
Or 236, 241, 951 P2d 693 (1998)).  RPC 4.2 is generally modeled on American Bar
Association (ABA) Model Rule 4.2 (2002).(3) 
Oregon's rule differs from the ABA model rule in at least one respect.  The
model rule prohibits a lawyer from communicating with a "person the lawyer
knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter."  The Oregon rule
prohibits a lawyer from communicating with a person "the lawyer knows to
be represented by a lawyer on that subject."
The Oregon rule's
use of "subject" rather than the defined term "matter" cuts
against the accused's argument that we should substitute "matter" for
"subject."  See PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or
606, 611, 839 P2d 1143 (1993) (use of a term in one section of a statute but
not another implies a purposeful choice); RPC 1.0(i) (defining
"matter").  Indeed, RPC 4.2 continues the use of the term
"subject" found in former DR 7-104 (1984).  In construing a
former version of the rule, this court held that it prohibited a district
attorney from communicating with a defendant regarding the defendant's
participation as an undercover drug informant when the district attorney knew that
the defendant was represented on pending rape and robbery charges.  In re
Burrows, 291 Or 135, 143-44, 629 P2d 820 (1981).  In that case, the accused
argued that his communications did not relate to the rape or the robbery
charges, the particular matters on which the defendant was represented,
"but to the separate subject matter of undercover drug activities."  Id.
at 142.  This court disagreed.  It reasoned that, because it was clear that the
defendant's participation as an undercover informant would affect his
sentencing in the rape and robbery proceedings, "'the subject matter of
the [accused's] communications necessarily involved the pending criminal
charges.'"  Id. at 143-44 (quoting and adopting the trial panel's
findings).
In Burrows,
this court did not interpret the rule narrowly to refer only to the pending
criminal action, as the accused urges.  Had it done so, it would have held that
the matter on which the defendant in Burrows was represented was limited
to the rape and robbery proceedings and did not extend to his participation as
an undercover agent or any communications regarding that future status.  That
interpretation provides context for the use of the term "subject" in
RPC 4.2.
The accused,
however, points out that, after this court decided Burrows in 1981, former
DR 7-104(A)(1) was amended in 1984 to prohibit communication "on the
subject of the representation, or on directly related subjects, with a person he
knows to be represented by a lawyer on that subject, or directly related
subjects."  The accused also notes that, when RPC 4.2 was adopted in 2005,
that rule continued to use the word "subject" but omitted the phrase
"or on directly related subjects."  That omission, the accused
reasons, limits the scope of the present rule to situations where the contacted
party is represented specifically in the contacting attorney's case.  RPC 4.2,
however, continues to use the word "subject."  Although the removal
of the phrase "or on directly related subjects" may make a difference
in some other case, that omission is of no consequence here.  Rather, it is
sufficient for the purposes of this case to hold, as we do, that the accused
communicated with Fahey on the subject on which Coit represented Fahey and on
which the accused represented Jewett-Cameron.  The accused's communication
accordingly was a "communicat[ion] on the subject of the
representation" within the meaning of RPC 4.2.
The accused raises a
second argument.  He contends that, even if RPC 4.2 generally prohibited him
from communicating with Fahey regarding his embezzlement of funds from
Greenwood, his communication with Fahey came within an exception to that general
rule.  Specifically, the accused argues that his communication with Fahey was
"authorized by law" under Rule 4.2(b).  The accused reasons that
"[d]epositions have been recognized both nationally and in Oregon as being
'authorized by law' for purposes of the rule."  He concludes that, because
the deposition was properly noticed under ORCP 39,(4) his communication came
within that exception.
We agree with the
accused that a deposition is authorized by law, but we think that the accused
reads the exception too broadly.  RPC 4.2 prohibits a lawyer, in the course of
representing a client, from communicating on the subject of the representation
with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by a lawyer on that subject. 
RPC 4.2 recognizes three exceptions to that broad prohibition:  (1) if the
other lawyer consents; (2) if the communication is authorized by law; or (3) if
a written agreement requires a written demand or notice be sent to the represented
person.  Without the "authorized by law" exception or the consent of
the opposing party's lawyer, a lawyer could not cross-examine the opposing
party at trial, depose that party, or subpoena a represented witness to testify
before the grand jury.  See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers
§ 99 comment g (2000) (direct communications permitted under the
"authorized by law" exception for cross-examination and depositions);
United States v. Schwimmer, 882 F2d 22, 28 (2d Cir 1989) (federal rule
of criminal procedure permitted federal prosecutor under the "authorized
by law" exception to question represented witness during grand jury
proceedings).
The "authorized
by law" exception permits a lawyer to communicate directly with another
party in those situations without the consent of that party's lawyer.  However,
nothing in the terms of that exception or the cases interpreting it suggests
that the exception goes as far as the accused would take it.  The accused would
interpret the exception to permit an end-run around the represented person's
lawyer.  As we understand the accused's argument, as long as a lawyer can
subpoena a nonparty witness to testify at trial or in a deposition before the
witness has an opportunity to contact his or her own lawyer, the
"authorized by law" exception would permit the lawyer to ask that
witness unlimited questions without any opportunity for the witness's lawyer to
protect his or her client's interests.  That interpretation of the exception,
if accepted, would undermine the purpose of the rule.  See Restatement at §
99 comment g (2000) ("Whether direct communication is authorized
depends on the legal justification for the contact in the situation, having
regard for the interest in protecting client-lawyer relationships and avoiding
overreaching of represented nonclients.").  (Parenthetical omitted.)
The accused
identifies no case that has adopted such a sweeping interpretation of the
exception.  Rather, the cases that the accused cites assume that the
represented person who is subject to deposition, cross-examination, or
questioning before the grand jury has had, at minimum, an opportunity to notify
his or her lawyer.  In Schwimmer, for example, the Second Circuit explained
that the federal rules of criminal procedure permitted the federal prosecutor
to question the witness but did not permit the witness's counsel to be
present.  882 F2d at 28.  In holding that the prosecutor's conduct was
authorized by law within the meaning of a comparable ethical rule, the Second
Circuit explained that the witness 
"[wa]s not the target of [the prosecutor's]
investigation, his testimony is immunized pursuant to § 6002, and he may
consult with counsel at any time outside the grand jury room.  Accordingly,
the prosecutor's direct questioning of Schwimmer before the grand jury outside
the presence of his counsel is authorized by law and therefore does not
violate the Code of Professional Responsibility."
Id. (emphasis
added).  Contrary to the accused's interpretation of that exception, the Second
Circuit did not read the exception to give one lawyer the power to unilaterally
exclude another lawyer from any opportunity to protect his or her client's
interests.
The accused argues
that the trial panel's decision in In re Blackmore, 12 DB Rptr 286
(1999), is persuasive and that we should follow it.  In our view, the accused's
reliance on Blackmore is misplaced, because the question in that case
differs from the question presented here.  The disciplinary proceeding against
Blackmore arose as result of two actions.  In the first action, International
Composites brought a contract claim against Evergreen Plastics.  Id. at
287.  In the second action, one of Evergreens' former employees, Tyacke,
brought a wage claim against Evergreen.  Id.  Blackmore represented
Evergreen in both International Composites' contract action and also in
Tyacke's wage claim.  Id.
International
Composites served a notice of deposition on Tyacke in its action against
Evergreen.  Id.  Before attending the deposition, Tyacke consulted with
his lawyer, who decided that Tyacke should attend the deposition alone.  Id. 
Tyacke did so, and Blackmore questioned him during the deposition on matters
that were relevant to International Composites' contract claim against Evergreen. 
Id.  Those matters were also relevant to Tyacke's wage claim against
Evergreen.  Id. at 286-87.
The trial panel held
that Blackmore's communication with Tyacke at the deposition did not violate former
DR 7-104(A)(1) because it was authorized by law.  Among other things, the
trial panel reasoned that, were the answer otherwise, "Tyacke could
prevent [Evergreen's] discovery of jointly relevant information in the
commercial case by refusing to bring [his lawyer] to his deposition."  Id.
at 290.(5)
In Blackmore,
Tyacke had the opportunity to consult with his lawyer and decide whether to
attend the deposition alone, knowing that he would be subject to questioning by
Blackmore.  In this case, Fahey never had that opportunity.  The difference
matters, as this court recognized in In re Williams, 314 Or 530, 840 P2d
1280 (1992).  In Williams, a tenant had brought her lawyer to a
statutorily required meeting with her landlord, who was represented on that
subject.  Id. at 538-39.  The tenant's lawyer knew that fact but communicated
with the landlord without the landlord's lawyer being present.  Id.  In
the resulting disciplinary proceeding, this court rejected the tenant's
lawyer's argument that the statute that required the meeting authorized the
tenant's lawyer to communicate with the landlord without the landlord's lawyer
present.  Id. at 539.  The court then noted:
"The accused also argues:
'If [the accused] were required to refrain from attending
the meeting, then [the landlord], by choosing not to have her attorney attend,
could have effectively negated [the tenant's] right to representation [at the
statutorily required meeting].  The authorized by law exception prevents that
result.'
"Had [the landlord's lawyer] chosen not to attend the
meeting, knowing that the accused would attend, a different case would be
presented.  That case is not before us."
Id. at 539 n
4.
Blackmore posed
the same problem that the accused's hypothetical posed in Williams, and
we cannot improve on the answer in Williams.  If, as in Blackmore,
Fahey's lawyer had chosen not to attend the deposition, knowing that the
accused would attend and question Fahey, a different case would be presented. 
That case is not before us, and we need not endorse or disagree with the result
in Blackmore to conclude that the "authorized by law"
exception does not extend so far that it permits one lawyer to unilaterally
exclude a represented witness's lawyer from the deposition.
Having concluded
that the exception does not apply, we turn to the sanction.  The trial panel
issued a public reprimand.  The Bar does not argue that a greater sanction is
appropriate.  The accused contends only that no sanction should be imposed. 
The issue regarding the sanction accordingly reduces to a narrow one:  If we
conclude, as we do, that the accused violated a disciplinary rule, may we
decline to impose any sanction on the accused?
On that point, Bar
Rule (BR) 6.1(a) identifies the potential "dispositions or sanctions in
disciplinary proceedings."  They are:  (1) dismissal of some or all the
charges; (2) a public reprimand; (3) a suspension for a period from 30 days to
five years; (4) a suspension for a period from 30 days to five years stayed in
whole or in part; and (5) disbarment.  BR 6.1(a).  Under that rule, if we find
that a lawyer has violated a disciplinary rule, the minimum sanction that we
can impose is a public reprimand.(6) 
We recognize that, in this case, there are substantial mitigating factors.  The
trial panel found, and the Bar does not dispute, that the accused has an
exemplary reputation among his peers and also a long and distinguished record
of service to the Bar and the community.  The rules, however, require that, if
we find a violation, as we do, one of the four listed sanctions must follow. 
In this case, we conclude that the appropriate sanction is a public reprimand. 
Publishing an opinion in which we find that the accused committed an ethical
violation is in itself a public acknowledgment of improper conduct.  A public
reprimand is merely a mirror of the opinion itself.
The accused is
publicly reprimanded.
1. The
Bar also charged the accused with violating RPC 4.4(a).  The trial panel did
not find a violation of that rule.  Because the Bar does not challenge that
decision, we do not discuss that rule.
2. "Matter"
is a defined term for the purposes of the Rules of Professional Conduct.  See
RPC 1.0(i) (defining matter).  In discussing the accused's argument, we
express no opinion on whether his definition of the term "matter" is
consistent with the definition of that term in RPC 1.0(i).  Rather, the
question in this case is whether "subject," the term that RPC 4.2
uses, is broader than "matter," as the accused defines it. 
3. ABA
Model Rule 4.2 provides:
"In representing a client, a lawyer shall
not communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the
lawyer knows to be represented by another
lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or
is authorized to do so by law or a court order."
4. The
accused notes that ORCP 39 C(1) requires notice to "every other party to
the action."  The accused reasons that, under ORCP 39 C(1), he was not
required to notify Fahey's counsel because Fahey was not a "party to the
action."
5. The
trial panel in Blackmore offered various rationales to support its
conclusion.  We identify only one of those rationales and express no opinion on
the other rationales.  We also note that, although disciplinary panel opinions
may be persuasive, they have no precedential value in this court.
6. The
accused cites a prior opinion of this court, In re Ainsworth, 289 Or
479, 614 P2d 1127 (1980), for the proposition that this court "should
simply let its opinion stand without sanction."  However, unlike in this
case where we find specifically that the accused violated an ethical rule, in Ainsworth,
we declined to specifically determine whether the accused had committed an
ethical violation and dismissed the complaint.  See id. at 490-91, 493.