Title: Fields v. Anderson Cattle Co.
Citation: 193 Kan. 558, 396 P.2d 276
Docket Number: 43,293
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: November 7, 1964

193 Kan. 558 (1964)
396 P.2d 276
DALE FIELDS and MRS. DALE FIELDS (Mrs. Helen A. Fields), Appellants,
v.
ANDERSON CATTLE COMPANY, INC., a corporation, BLUE STEM FEED YARDS, INC., a corporation, CATTLEMEN'S FEED LOTS, INC., a corporation, Appellees.
No. 43,293

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed November 7, 1964.
Frank C. Sabatini, of Topeka, argued the cause, and O.B. Eidson, Philip H. Lewis, James W. Porter, Charles S. Fisher, Peter Caldwell, William G. Haynes and Roscoe E. Long, all of Topeka, and George L. Allred, of Emporia, were with him on the briefs for the appellants.
Glenn D. Young, Jr., of Wichita, and Russ B. Anderson, of Emporia, argued the cause, and W.F. Lilleston, George C. Spradling, Henry V. Gott, George Stallwitz, Ralph M. Hope, Ronald M. Gott and Edward H. Graham, all of Wichita, were with them on the briefs for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HATCHER, C.:
This was an action to recover permanent damages for injury to real estate resulting from the operation of livestock feed lots as a continuing nuisance, and for a permanent injunction enjoining the further operation of the feed lots as a nuisance.
The pertinent facts necessary to a determination of the limited issues on appeal may be briefly summarized.
The plaintiffs, husband and wife, purchased a home consisting of three acres located in McClaskey's Subdivision, fronting on Prairie Avenue, about 1/4 mile west of the city limits of Emporia, *559 Kansas. The purchase was made in 1957. At that time Anderson Cattle Company operated a feed lot one-half mile north of the home site and one block east of Prairie Avenue which was separated and hidden from the home site by a graded railroad track on the south of the Anderson feed lot. The Atchison, T. &amp; S.F. Rly. Co. had two cattle barns located a fourth of a mile to the north of plaintiffs' home and 4/10ths of a mile east of Prairie Avenue. Occasionally when the wind was in the right direction the plaintiffs would get a whiff of odor from the Anderson feed lot but the same was not annoying to plaintiffs nor did it damage or diminish the value of their property. In the latter part of 1959, the defendant, Cattlemen's Feed Lot, purchased five suburban tracts consisting of approximately 40 acres which were located to the north and adjacent to the plaintiffs' home and constructed feed lots for the feeding of large numbers of cattle. At approximately the same time in 1959, the defendant, Blue Stem Feed Yards, purchased land east of Prairie Avenue and the two barns owned by the Atchison, T. &amp; S.F. Rly. Co. and converted the same into an intensified area for the feeding of large numbers of cattle and great numbers of sheep. The Blue Stem property is located directly north of the property purchased by Cattlemen's Feed Lot. During the same period of time the Anderson Cattle Company expanded their lots one block to the east so that their pens were fronting on Prairie Avenue and expanded their lots 1/4th mile to the west. Since the two new feed lots commenced operations and the expansion of the Anderson lots, up to the date of the trial, there have been up to 15,000 head of cattle and 12,000 head of sheep fed in the area. As a result plaintiffs have been subjected to intense odors and flies which have resulted in a nuisance and diminished the market value of plaintiffs' home.
The plaintiffs brought an action against the defendants, the owners of the feed lots, alleging in their amended petition:
and requesting the following relief:
The issues were framed, the trial court having struck from the original petition plaintiffs' alleged claim for damages resulting from pain, suffering and mental anguish, and the case was tried to a jury.
At the close of the plaintiffs' evidence, the trial court sustained a demurrer to the claim for damages against Anderson Cattle Company but took the demurrer to the claim for injunctive relief under advisement. At the close of all the evidence, Anderson Cattle Company's demurrer to plaintiffs' evidence was sustained in its entirety.
The jury answered special questions in which it found that the defendant, Blue Stem Feed Yards, Inc., had used its property so as to unreasonably pollute the air in and around plaintiffs' property with foul, noxious and offensive odors, but to a lesser degree than the defendant, Cattlemen's Feed Lot, Inc., because of the distance from plaintiffs' property.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs for damages caused by the continuing nuisance in the amount of $4,500. The amount was assessed $3,000 against the Cattlemen's Feed Lot, Inc., and $1,500 against the Blue Stem Feed Yards, Inc. No complaint is lodged in this appeal against the verdict so rendered.
The trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the injunctive feature of the case and concluded that the defendants, Blue Stem Feed Yards, Inc. and the Cattlemen's Feed Lots, Inc., should be restrained and enjoined from operating their feed lots under their existing maintenance procedure. It granted the defendants one year to abate the nuisance in accordance with the court's alternative abatement conditions. On June 20, 1963, the court on its own motion, called a hearing to determine whether the defendants, Cattlemen's Feed Lots, Inc. and Blue Stem Feed Yards, Inc., had complied with the abatement order. It found that the alternative abatement conditions had been complied with and no permanent injunction was entered.
The plaintiffs have appealed. However, they would materially restrict the questions to be reviewed and the result of the appeal. Appellants state:
We will consider the questions.
Did the court err in sustaining the demurrer of Anderson Cattle Company to appellants' evidence and directing a verdict in its favor?
The appellants call our attention to the rule stated in Turner v. Kent, 134 Kan. 574, 575, 7 P.2d 513 as follows:
and contend that although the odor caused by the Anderson Cattle Company might not have been sufficient standing alone to have created a nuisance, it did contribute to the odors created by the other feed lots which created the nuisance. We have no quarrel with appellants' statement of the law. However, we are inclined to agree with the trial court that appellants' evidence did not tend to prove any liability on the part of the Anderson Cattle Company.
The testimony was to the effect that the Anderson Cattle Company pens were built up to Prairie Avenue in the fall of 1955, and completed in their present form in January or February, 1956. The pens were one-half mile north of appellants' home and north of an embankment constructed by the Atchison, T. &amp; S.F. Rly. Co. Both appellants testified that the odor from the Anderson Cattle Company pens was not offensive and there was no offensive odor until 1959, when the Cattlemen's Feed Lot and Blue Stem Feed Yard pens were constructed directly north of their property.
We must conclude the trial court did not commit error in sustaining the Anderson Cattle Company's demurrer to appellants' evidence.
*562 We must also conclude that the trial court did not err in striking as elements of damages pain, suffering and mental anguish.
The abstract does not contain the original petition, the motions or the trial court's order striking the alleged elements of damages. The only information supplied by the abstract on the question is the following statement:
The appellees inform us of the nature of the instruments challenging the allegations of special damages as follows:
Insofar as appellants claimed damages for injuries to their respective health and mental well being the claims are separate, distinct and necessarily personal to each other. Each appellant is concerned only with recovering damages for his own personal injuries without regard to those sustained by the other. The claims on which the causes of action so united are based do not affect all the parties to the action and their joinder is prohibited by G.S. 1949, 60-601.
The question was before this court in Watkins v. City of El Dorado, 183 Kan. 363, 327 P.2d 877, and it is stated on page 367 of the opinion:
We now come to appellants' contention that the Lyon County 1956 Zoning Regulations apply to and cover feed lots and that the trial court erroneously concluded that the zoning regulations do not apply to the use of land and the erection of buildings for the purpose of feeding livestock because such use is strictly for agricultural purposes.
In 1956, the Lyon County Zoning Ordinance was adopted which provided for heavy industrial district regulations in the following language:
Twenty-one industrial uses are then listed including "stock yards or slaughter of animals."
The appellants contend that the enterprise carried on by the appellees was included in the term "stock yards or slaughter of animals" and that therefore permits were required under the zoning ordinance. The appellees contend that the Lyon County Zoning Regulations were adopted pursuant to G.S. 1961 Supp., 19-2927 et seq. Section 19-2929 specifically provides in part:
Appellees further contend that the Lyon County Commissioners omitted feed lots from the list of uses set forth in the regulations pertaining to the area zoned as "heavy industrial district" because they were agricultural enterprises and so exempt from the zoning ordinance by the enabling statute.
The controversy on this point may be simply stated: is the operation of livestock feed lots an industrial or an agricultural enterprise?
In its commonly accepted sense the term "agriculture" includes the breeding, rearing and feeding of livestock in preparation for *564 market. The preparation of farm products for market is the dominating purpose of the agriculturalist.
Whether the owner of livestock fattens his cattle for market in the blue stem pastures of the Flint Hills or in feed lots where they are given more condensed rations, the preparation for market continues as an agricultural pursuit.
In 3 C.J.S., Agriculture, § 1, page 366, it is stated.
In Dill v. Excel Packing Co., 183 Kan. 513, 331 P.2d 539, this court considered the operation of a cattle feed lot an agricultural pursuit in stating at page 525 of the opinion:
This court passed directly on the question in Carp v. Board of County Commissioners, 190 Kan. 177, 373 P.2d 153, where it is held in the second paragraph of the syllabus:
In the Carp case the feeder was engaged in the purchase and feeding of hogs for slaughter. In the case now before us for determination the record does not disclose the ownership of the livestock or the manner in which the ownership was acquired. The record does disclose that the livestock was being fed for slaughter. In the Carp case it is stated at page 179 of the opinion:
We must conclude that the feeding of livestock for market is an agricultural pursuit and that the structures used in connection therewith are for agricultural purposes.
The last contention to be considered presents a more serious problem. The appellants contend that the trial court so conducted the hearing on the question of whether the nuisance had been abated as to prejudice their rights and deny them due process of law. What transpired at the hearing is not in dispute.
On June 20, 1963, the court on its own motion, called a hearing in regard to whether or not appellees, Blue Stem Feed Yard, Inc. and Cattlemen's Feed Lot, Inc., had complied with the court's abatement order entered June 29, 1962. The appellants were present in person and with witnesses and desired to cross-examine witnesses called by the court to show that the appellees had not changed their operation since the trial and had not complied with the abatement order. The court refused the appellants an opportunity to present evidence to the court or to cross-examine the witnesses with whom the court had discussed the matter and who were present in the courtroom. The following discussion took place:
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The appellees attempt to support the trial court's procedure stating:
The suggestion has no application to the question before us. The trial court had found that the operation of the feed lots under existing conditions constituted a nuisance which should be enjoined. The court gave the appellees the alternative of abating the nuisance. It exercised its discretion when it found that the nuisance should be enjoined unless abated. Whether the alternative was complied with and the nuisance abated was not a matter of discretion but a question of fact.
Under the American system of jurisprudence due process requires a reasonable opportunity to be heard where a question of fact affecting a property right is to be determined.
It will be understood that we are not passing on the question as to whether or not the nuisance has been abated. We are only holding here that the question should not be determined without giving the parties a reasonable opportunity to be heard.
The judgment and rulings in the trial on the merits are affirmed. The judgment of the trial court on the question of the abatement of the nuisance is reversed with instructions to grant the parties a reasonable opportunity to be heard before making a final determination of the question.
APPROVED BY THE COURT.
FATZER, J. dissenting:
In my opinion, the record is sufficient to sustain the conclusion that the feeding operations conducted by the three feed lots in question are purely commercial enterprises, where literally thousands of sheep and cattle belonging to buyers, brokers and owners, are fed and fattened annually by the defendants for profit, and in no sense may this be described as an agricultural pursuit. The feed lots in question are 700 feet from the city limits of Emporia, within the three mile zoning area of the city, and are bounded on the north and east by commercial and residences, on the south by suburban, and on the west by commercial and farming. Clearly, the use of the land and buildings in question is in violation of the Lyon County 1956 Zoning Regulation, and the district court erred in concluding otherwise.
The case of Carp v. Board of County Commissioners, 190 Kan. 177, 373 P.2d 153, is not in point. There, the plaintiff was feeding his own hogs for the market on his own farm. Likewise, the case of Dill v. Excel Packing Co., 183 Kan. 513, 331 P.2d 539, is not helpful to the defendants. There, the feed lot was six miles from the city limits of Wichita, outside the three mile zoning area. The area was bounded completely on all sides by farms, with the exception of a few suburban tracts. In the opinion it was said:
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I would reverse the judgment and permanently enjoin the three defendants from conducting their feeding operations in violation of the zoning regulation.