Title: ANTHONY FINCH V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2008-SC-000633-MR
State: Kentucky
Issuer: Kentucky Supreme Court
Date: November 25, 2009

IMPORTANT NOTICE NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE ; HOWEVER, UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS, RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED OPINIONTHAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE ACTION. uprrme (~Vurf of 2008-SC-000633-MR RENDERED : NOVEMBER 25, 2009 NOT TO BE PUBISHED ON APPEAL FROM GRAVES CIRCUIT COURT V. HONORABLE TIMOTHY C . STARK, JUDGE NO . 08-CR-00030 COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT AFFIRMING Appellant Anthony Finch was convicted of trafficking in a controlled substance, second or subsequent offense . On appeal, he claims that the trial court erred by not allowing him to impeach the testimony of a confidential informant with prior inconsistent testimony. Because there is no evidence in the record that the informant ever gave prior testimony and what evidence is in the record tends to show that the informant did not previously testify, there was no error and Appellant's conviction is affirmed . I. Background Appellant was the subject of a controlled drug buy performed by Keith Chambers, who was working as a confidential informant for the Graves County Sheriff's Department . The controlled-buy operation was aimed at the home of Jonathan Runyon . In the course of setting up the buy, Detective George Workman met with Chambers and searched him to see if he had drugs on his person . Detective Workman then gave Chambers a $20 bill with which to buy crack cocaine and fitted him with a recording device . When Chambers went to the targeted residence, he found that Runyon had left to get some food, but that Appellant was present. After some conversation, Appellant offered to go get some crack cocaine for Chambers . Chambers gave the $20 from the sheriff's department to Appellant, who left and returned a short time later with a quantity of crack cocaine. Appellant was subsequently indicted for trafficking in a controlled substance, second or subsequent offense. The jury found Appellant guilty at trial. He was sentenced to twenty years in prison and therefore appeals to this Court as a matter of right. Ky . Const. § 110(2)(b) . II. Analysis Appellant raises a single issue on appeal . He claims the trial court improperly limited his ability to impeach Keith Chambers, who testified against him at trial. Chambers testified that while Appellant was off getting crack cocaine for him, Jonathan Runyon returned to his house . Chambers claimed he tried to buy additional cocaine from Runyon . Appellant's trial counsel attempted to impeach Chambers on this point with contradictory testimony he allegedly provided at the preliminary hearing in the district court . Defense counsel argued at trial that this testimony was essential to raise reasonable doubt about who sold the cocaine to Chambers . The testimony in question allegedly showed that Chambers had nothing on his person when he was sent to the house, meaning he would have had no money with which to buy additional drugs after giving the $20 to Appellant . The Commonwealth objected to the impeachment and the objection was sustained. Appellant now argues that Chambers should have been permitted to testify to the prior testimony he gave at the preliminary hearing and that the judge, in disallowing the testimony, committed a reversible error. The Commonwealth responds by arguing that Appellant's claim is both misleading and without merit because Chambers did not testify at the preliminary hearing, meaning there was no contradictory testimony, at least from him, with which to impeach him. The issue, then, turns on what actually occurred at the preliminary hearing in question . Unfortunately, no transcript or video of the preliminary hearing is included in the record on appeal . It is the appellant's responsibility to present a complete record for review . "When the record is incomplete, this Court must assume that the omitted record supports the trial court ." Chestnut v. Commonwealth , 250 S.W .3d 288, 303 (Ky. 2008) ; Commonwealth v. Thompson, 697 S.W.2d 143, 145 (Ky. 1985) ("It has long been held that, when the complete record is not before the appellate court, that court must assume that the omitted record supports the decision of the trial court.") ; Commonwealth, Dept . of Highways v. Richardson, 424 S.W .2d 601, 603 (Ky. 1967) . Since a record of the preliminary hearing is missing from the record presented to this Court, the missing record must be presumed to support the trial court's decision to disallow the impeachment. This Court must conclude that Chambers did not testify at the preliminary hearing and therefore could not be impeached by that nonexistent testimony during the trial . Moreover, the indirect evidence of the hearing that was included in the record supports the trial court's decision . The docket sheet from the Graves District Court for the preliminary hearing includes handwritten notes by the judge . According to this document the only person who testified at the preliminary hearing was Detective George Workman . Based on the record thus presented to this Court, it appears that the Commonwealth's position is correct. After reviewing the trial record, specifically the testimony of Chambers and the bench conference on the Commonwealth's objection, it is apparent that appellate counsel has misunderstood what happened at trial and thus has raised a non-issue to this Court. When Appellant's trial counsel sought to introduce the allegedly conflicting testimony, it appears that the testimony in question was actually that of Detective Workman from the preliminary hearing, not testimony of Chambers himself. The following is a transcript of the dialogue surrounding the objection: Defense Counsel: If you gave the money to Mr . Finch, how were you going to buy that crack cocaine from [Mr. Runyon] right then? Chambers : I could use my money. Defense Counsel: I believe, you testified earlier that Mr. Kemp, to Mr. Kemp, that nothing was found on you when you were searched, meaning no more money. Commonwealth : Objection, that's not what he said. He testified that he didn't have anything illegal or improper on him. Defense Counsel: Can we approach? Judge: Yes . Defense Counsel: He testified that he didn't have anything illegal, but also at the preliminary hearing with George Workman, he testified that there was nothing found on his person, that the only money that he was provided to him was the money George provided for him and that there was no other money. Commonwealth : If he's got a certified copy of the transcript from downstairs he can use that to impeach the witness, but uh . . . Defense Counsel: Oh we'll show-it will be on, George is who we are going to impeach, I'm just trying- Judge: George is the one that said it so you're going to have to deal with George on that. Defense Counsel: Let's wait for George , okay . Judge: I'm going to sustain the objection, Defense Counsel: Okay. Judge : But you can do it that way. Defense Counsel: Okay. Though it was initially unclear whose testimony defense counsel was referring to when he first mentioned the preliminary hearing, once the Court said, "George is the one that said it," and defense counsel replied, "Let's wait for George," it was clear that the contradictory testimony was actually that of Detective Workman. This makes sense in light of the fact that Detective Workman did testify as to standard controlled-buy procedure wherein the police first search an informant to make sure he does not already have contraband on his person before sending him into the buy. In theory, such a search might have turned up other money that Chambers might have had . Appellant's trial counsel, thus, recognized that there was no contradictory prior testimony by Chambers ; instead, there was only contradictory testimony from another witness, Detective Workman . The trial judge was therefore correct in disallowing the impeachment during Chambers' testimony as counsel cannot impeach a witness with another person's inconsistent testimony while the witness is testifying. What defense counsel first attempted-impeachment of one witness with the prior inconsistent statement of another witness-is simply not allowed. Had Detective Workman later testified inconsistent with his earlier statements at the preliminary hearing, then his prior statements would be admissible . But defense counsel was actually attempting to demonstrate a general contradiction between two witnesses . Such impeachment is allowable, but it must be done in a proper manner . Inconsistencies between different witnesses' testimony has to be shown by directly eliciting the varying and contradictory testimony of the witnesses. Counsel may then argue that the witnesses contradicted each other to the jury and urge the jury to believe one witness over the other. Or, if Detective Workman had testified before Chambers, it would not be improper to ask Chambers about how and why his testimony differed from that of Detective Workman, though he could "not be required to characterize the testimony of another witness, particularly a well-respected police officer, as lying ." Moss v. Commonwealth , 949 S.W.2d 579, 583 (Ky. 1997) . "Counsel should be sufficiently articulate to show the jury where the testimony of the witnesses differ without resort to blunt force ." Id. But neither of these approaches is what defense counsel initially sought to do, which was to impeach Chambers with another person's prior out-of- court statements . That practice is clearly improper, if only because the prior statements would be hearsay, a fact that Appellant's trial counsel eventually understood . This led him to agree to pursue the apparent contradiction through the proper witness, Detective Workman, who had not yet testified. That Appellant's counsel chose to pursue this issue on appeal appears to be the result of a lack of careful review of the record and a lack of communication with trial counsel . The latter problem is, unfortunately, not a new one. As was noted over twenty-five years ago in Thompson, This case graphically illustrates a recurring problem encountered by the appellate courts of this Commonwealth in criminal cases . When a case is tried by one attorney from its initiation to conviction and then handled by a second attorney during the appellate process, there is seldom, if ever, any communication between the two attorneys upon direct appeal . Thus, on many occasions, non-issues and "straw men" appear before us which should have been eliminated before briefing, saving countless hours for everyone. 697 S.W .2d at 145 . More unfortunately, this problem is not one that is readily solvable, given the high case-loads carried by both trial and appellate counsel and the fact that there is a great deal of other value in the division of labor between trial and appeal . This Court can only encourage appellate counsel whenever possible to communicate with trial counsel and to engage in a careful review of the record to avoid the sort of non-issue presented in this case . III. Conclusion Appellant's sole contention being without merit, the judgment of the Graves Circuit Court is affirmed . All sitting . All concur . COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Karen Shuff Maurer Assistant Public Advocate Department of Public Advocacy 100 Fair Oaks Lane Suite 302 Frankfort, Kentucky 40601 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: Jack Conway Attorney General Bryan Darwin Morrow Office of Attorney General 1024 Capital Center Drive Frankfort, Kentucky 40601