Title: State v. Townsend
Citation: 237 Or. 527, 392 P.2d 459
Docket Number: N/A
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: May 20, 1964

Reversed and remanded May 20, 1964.
*528 Ray D. Robinett, Portland, argued the cause and filed briefs for the appellant.
Gerald R. Pullen, Deputy District Attorney, Portland, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was George Van Hoomissen, District Attorney, Portland.
Before McALLISTER, Chief Justice, and PERRY, O'CONNELL, DENECKE and LUSK, Justices.
REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR NEW TRIAL.
PERRY, J.
The defendant was convicted of the crime of robbery while not armed with a dangerous weapon. From the judgment of conviction the defendant appeals.
The record clearly discloses that the defendant assaulted with his fists a Mr. Dunn on Couch Street in the city of Portland; that a billfold belonging to Dunn was taken from his person and was found in the room of the defendant.
The defendant contends there is no evidence to support the verdict in that the indictment charged the taking of "approximately $15 in money", and the evidence failed to prove that amount.
1. Dunn, the prosecuting witness, tesitfied in response to the question:
He also testified the amount was just an estimate.
The defendant also assigns as error the following instruction given by the trial court:
The record discloses that one Patricia Carpenter had been jointly indicted with the defendant. Miss Carpenter was not, however, being tried jointly with the defendant. All of the evidence in this case is to the effect that the defendant himself committed all of the overt acts which are necessary to constitute the crime of which he was charged.
2, 3. The above instruction would have relevance only if there was some evidence that this defendant had aided and abetted another in the perpetration of *530 the crime so that he could be charged and convicted as a principal.
The defendant admitted the assault and the possession of the billfold. His defense was that he did not assault Dunn to rob him, but for being with his girl, and that he picked up the wallet while he was excited and under the influence of drugs and liquor.
4. While the instruction was improper, it is unnecessary for us to consider whether or not it was prejudicial since this case must be retried.
The defendant also contends that the trial court erred "by prohibiting comment by defense counsel on use and effect of drugs taken by the parties prior to the commission of the crime charged" in his argument to the jury.
The defendant was interrogated by a police officer at approximately 3:00 p.m. on the day following the assault. At this interview the defendant had admitted the assault, but stated he knew nothing concerning the billfold. The defendant's counsel, in reconciling the statement of the officer and the subsequent admission of possession by the defendant, argued that the defendant at the time he made the statement to the officer was under the influence of drugs taken the evening before. His argument and what occurred is reported as follows:
*532 There was evidence by Miss Carpenter that the taking of the drug caused her to get on a "cheap drunk" and that the drug makes "you sleepy."
5. It is evident from the defendant's brief that he did not understand the import of the court's comment. The trial court was calling attention to the fact that there was no testimony in the record as to the medical use of the drug. The trial court should have pointed out with more clarity wherein counsel was going outside the evidence in the case, but there can be no error when the trial court requires, as he should, that the argument be kept within the confines of the record. 53 Am Jur 385, Trial § 480.
6. The defendant also assigns as error the failure of the trial court to sustain his objection to the examination into the reasons why defendant's parole under a former conviction was revoked.
The defendant on direct examination testified that he had been convicted of the "charge of auto theft" in 1954 when he was 18 years old; that he was released from the penitentiary in 1962; that he served approximately eight years.
On cross-examination, after stating he had not been in prison custody the eight years, but had been granted a parole for a period of time and then his parole had been revoked, the following question was asked and an objection made:
*533 Defendant was then asked:
and defendant gave the following answer:
The trial court's statement in overruling the objection was clearly error.
The subject of the revocation of the defendant's parole was not in anywise referred to by the defendant on direct examination, and was not thereby open for cross-examination.
ORS 45.600 provides as follows:
To permit an examination as to the cause of the revocation of a parole would be the equivalent of granting the right to inquire into arrests and particular wrongdoing, thus nullifying the prohibition of the statute which limits the impeachment to proof of convictions. State v. Rollo, 221 Or 428, 351 P2d 422.
The particular question, when reduced to substance, was the equivalent of asking the defendant what particular wrong he had committed to cause a revocation of *534 his parole. Defendant's impeachment in this manner was highly prejudicial. He had admitted the assault and only denied the intent to rob. Whether his account of what transpired, in part corroborated by the state's witnesses, was to be believed was the controlling feature of his defense.
In our opinion, this error affected the substantial right of the defendant and prevented him from being accorded a fair trial.
The judgment is reversed for a new trial.