Title: In re Druten (Disbarment)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 109240
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: May 24, 2013

1 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 109,240 
 
In the Matter of DAVID M. DRUTEN, 
Respondent. 
 
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE 
 
Original proceeding in discipline. Opinion filed May 24, 2013. Disbarment. 
 
Alexander M. Walczak, Deputy Disciplinary Administrator, argued the cause, and Stanton A. Hazlett, 
Disciplinary Administrator, was with him on the formal complaint for the petitioner. 
 
Respondent did not appear. 
 
Per Curiam: This is an original proceeding in discipline filed by the office of the 
Disciplinary Administrator against the respondent, David M. Druten, of Merriam, an 
attorney admitted to the practice of law in Kansas in 1970. 
 
 
On August 14, 2012, the office of the Disciplinary Administrator filed a formal 
complaint against the respondent alleging violations of the Kansas Rules of Professional 
Conduct (KRPC); on October 1, 2012, the office filed a supplement to the formal 
complaint. The respondent did not file an answer. A hearing was held on the complaint 
before a panel of the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys on May 16, 2012, at 
which the respondent did not appear. The hearing panel determined that respondent 
violated KRPC 1.1 (2012 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 436) (competence), 1.3 (2012 Kan. Ct. R. 
Annot. 454) (diligence), 1.4(a) (2012 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 473) (communication), 3.3(a)(1) 
(2012 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 582) (candor toward tribunal), 3.4 (2012 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 
589) (fairness to opposing party and counsel), 8.1 (2012 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 634) 
(knowing false statement; failure to respond to lawful demand for information from 
2 
 
disciplinary authority), 8.4(c) (2012 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 643) (conduct involving 
misrepresentation), and Kansas Supreme Court Rule 211(b) (2012 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 
350 (failure to file answer in disciplinary proceeding). 
 
Upon conclusion of the hearing, the panel made the following findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, as well as the following recommendation to this court: 
 
"FINDINGS OF FACT 
 
. . . . 
 
"5. 
The Kansas Supreme Court admitted the Respondent to the practice of 
law in the State of Kansas on June 25, 1970. On July 1, 2011, the Respondent changed 
his status as an attorney from an active attorney to a retired attorney. 
 
"6. 
In 1996, the Missouri Supreme Court admitted the Respondent to the 
practice of law in the State of Missouri. The Respondent remains a licensed attorney in 
Missouri. 
 
"7. 
On January 24, 2008, Damon Jeffries retained the law firm, Coates & 
Logan[,] to file suit as a result of an accident involving a building collapse. The 
Respondent was employed by Coates & Logan as an attorney. Coates & Logan assigned 
the case to the Respondent. 
 
"8. 
On September 21, 2009, three days before the statute of limitations 
expired, the Respondent filed a petition on behalf of Mr. Jeffries in the District Court of 
Scott County, captioned Damon Todd Jeffries v. Lucas Metal Works, case number 00012. 
The court later stated: 
 
'The petition was two pages long with three counts: (1) negligence (2) 
products liability and (3) loss of consortium. The pleading was as bare 
bones of a petition that could possibly pass muster for liberally construed 
notice pleadings.' 
 
3 
 
Prior to filing suit, the Respondent failed to thoroughly investigate the accident which led 
to Mr. Jeffries' injuries. 
 
"9. 
On December 17, 2009, opposing counsel took Mr. Jeffries' deposition. 
The Respondent represented Mr. Jeffries at the deposition. During the deposition, 
opposing counsel asked Mr. Jeffries whether the concrete had been tested. Mr. Jeffries 
testified regarding this matter at the hearing on the formal complaint, as follows: 
 
'Q. 
And were you asked a question by Mr. Spahn concerning the 
cement strength and whether testing had been done? 
'A. 
Yes, sir. 
'Q. 
Can you tell us about that, the questioning and what occurred 
thereafter? 
'A. 
Well, me and Mr. Druten, in some of our first hearings—or first 
conversations at my house, I had told him that I had had concrete 
testing done on the project. I had a friend out of Kansas City do 
the concrete testing. He was moonlighting. He did this as a 
profession. His main thing was, you know, he couldn't lose his 
job, didn't charge me anything. When I would come to Kansas 
City, I would bring cylinders up to him. He would test them then 
give me a call back, said, you know, your strength's good. 
'Q. 
Excuse me. You said he could lose his job. Was that because he 
was moonlighting? 
'A. 
Yes, sir. 
'Q. 
Okay. And his employer did not permit it? 
'A. 
I'm going to— 
'Q. 
Or he didn't know? 
'A. 
He didn't know. 
'Q. 
Okay. 
'A. 
So I would bring samples to him. Mr. Druten was well aware of 
this at the very beginning of the case. So at the deposition of 
December 17th, I was under the understanding when Mr. Spahn 
asked me the question, "Did Michael & Sons do concrete 
testing," and the first thing I done was look at Dave and— 
4 
 
'Q. 
Dave is who? 
'A. 
Mr. Druten. Excuse me. And I said, "Can we take a break?" And 
so we stopped, we went into another room, and I asked Mr. 
Druten, I said, "Well, you know, what do I say here?" I had a 
very tight stance that I was not going to divulge the man that had 
did the testing for me. And Mr. Druten looked at me and said, 
"Well you're going to say what you want to say, so go ahead." 
Went back in the room, I answered the question that there was 
not any concrete testing done. 
'Q. 
Okay. Now, after, did you have a conversation with Mr. Druten 
at the conclusion of your deposition? 
'A. 
Yes, sir. 
'Q. 
Did this subject come up? 
'A. 
I remember we were sitting there talking and something was 
brought up about how I did, and he gave me a letter grade of an 
A minus. 
'Q. 
A minus meaning how well you— 
'A. 
How well I performed. 
'Q. 
During the questioning, during the deposition? 
'A. 
Yes. 
'Q. 
At any time did Mr. Druten suggest to you or ask you to correct 
your statement to either Mr. Spahn, the attorney for Lucas 
Metals, or file any type of paperwork concerning your 
questions—the question and answer as to the cement testing? 
'A. 
No, sir. 
'Q. 
Nothing was said. 
'A. 
Repeat the question again, sir. 
'Q. 
Nothing further was said by Mr. Druten with regard to this. 
'A. 
No, sir.' 
 
 
"10. 
Neither the Respondent nor Mr. Jeffries ever corrected or explained the 
answer to opposing counsel or to the court. 
 
5 
 
 
"11. 
The Respondent failed to respond to discovery requests and court orders. 
On August 10, 2010, the court issued a memorandum decision and order detailing the 
history of difficulties in this case and, ultimately, dismissing Mr. Jeffries' suit. 
Specifically, the court stated: 
  
'2. 
The defendant, on October 15, 2009, filed a motion for [a more] 
definite statement and, in the alternative, a motion to dismiss. The gist of 
the defendant's motion was to seek more information as to how the 
defendant was alleged to be liable for injuries to the plaintiffs. This 
matter was heard in Scott County on November 6, 2009, by Judge Quint. 
Judge Quint apparently denied the motions of the [defendant,] telling the 
parties to flesh out the allegations through discovery. It is noted that the 
court has not been able to find an actual journalization of this matter in 
its cursory review of the file, only judge's notes in the official file. 
 
'3. 
On November 24, 2009, Judge Quint held a discovery 
conference via telephone. In that hearing it was ordered that plaintiffs 
would disclose their expert witness by April 1, 2010 and defendant 
would do likewise by June 1, 2010. 
 
'4. 
Subsequent to the November 24 ruling by Judge Quint, the 
defendant again filed a motion regarding a lack of information 
concerning facts supporting the plaintiff's allegation of fault in the 
defendant. This time the motion was concerned with a lack of any 
answers to discovery requests. The matter was heard by Judge Wurst on 
February 1, 2010. Judge Wurst, among other things, ruled that the 
plaintiff was ordered to fully answer in writing and under oath 
interrogatories 19 and 20. The plaintiff was further directed to comply 
with the defendant's request for production of documents. And it was 
further directed that the plaintiff do all this by February 22, 2010. 
 
'5. 
February 22, 2010, comes and goes without compliance by the 
plaintiff. The defendant filed yet another motion to dismiss due to the 
plaintiff['s failure] to comply with discovery and further, his failure to 
6 
 
comply with the court's order of February 1, 2010. During a telephone 
conference on this motion on the 14th day of April the plaintiff['s] 
attorney stated that he had been too busy with another very large case 
with an arduous trial, in which he lost, to tend to the discovery 
requirement of the instant case. The plaintiff['s] attorney stated that he 
was now ready to concentrate on this case and could comply with all 
requests for discovery by Friday of the next week. 
 
'6. 
So as to[] not punish the client[] for possible dilatory acts on the 
part of the[] attorney, the court took the attorney-for-the-plaintiff['s] 
representation that the various orders of discovery complained of in the 
defendant's motion could be satisfied by the close of business on Friday 
of next week, April 23, 2010, and made the same the order of the court. 
 
'7. 
The court further reset the time limits for the notification of 
expert witnesses. The plaintiff was ordered to designate [his] expert with 
copy of the expert's report on or before June 1, 2010. The defendant was 
likewise to designate with a copy of the report on or before August 1, 
2010. 
 
'8. 
The parties were advised that the above due dates and time limits 
[were] not advisory. Serious sanctions [would] be considered upon 
failure to fully and completely comply with discovery requests within the 
limits imposed. 
 
'9. 
The court also deemed it proper to assess attorney fees to the 
plaintiff[] to be paid to the attorney for the defendant in the amount of 
$750.00 within 30 days. 
 
'10. 
On the 11th day of May, 2010, the defendant filed yet again 
another motion to dismiss for failure to comply with the court's discovery 
order. The defendant also filed a motion for protective order when the 
plaintiff served a notice to take deposition with subpoena duces tecum on 
7 
 
a date that the defendant's attorney had a conflict and for which the 
defendant was given only an eight-day[] notice. 
 
'11. 
On June 4, 2010, the plaintiff filed a designation of its experts 
regarding losses and injuries but declined to supply any report from any 
of them in violation of the court's direct order. The plaintiff further failed 
to even name an expert for causation, again in violation of the court's 
direct order. On that said same day, June 4, 2010, the plaintiff filed for an 
extension of time to designate its expert for causation. 
 
'12. 
The matter was heard by the court on the 20th day of July, 2010. 
 
'13. 
Presenting problems at the hearing on the 20th of July involved 
the ordered answers of interrogatories by the plaintiff and requests for 
production. The plaintiff's attorney had represented to the court at the last 
hearing that he was going to visit with his client and obtain the answers 
and had done so and supplied them to the defendant. However, it appears 
that the answers were unsworn and contained only the signature of the 
plaintiff's attorney. All attorneys in this action and the court are aware 
that only the signature of the plaintiff's attorney will not suffice. When 
asked by the court why the plaintiff had not signed the answers the 
plaintiff's attorney proceeded to tell the court that he had been involved 
in a very large case and difficult trial and had not had time to follow 
through. When reminded that such was offered at the last hearing as 
reason for not complying but that it was represented to be then completed 
and he could not attend to this case, the attorney for the plaintiff replied 
that he had no explanation. The attorney for the plaintiff also offered that 
he had at that moment an affidavit signed by his client attesting to the 
interrogatories. When asked by the court why that had not already been 
sent to the defendant's attorney, the plaintiff's attorney stated that he had 
no explanations. 
 
'14. 
Other presenting problems involved an only partial designation 
of experts to be used by the plaintiff and no expert reports from any of 
8 
 
them. No explanation was offered for any of these deficiencies except 
perhaps that fact that he had not yet been able to [depose] the defendant's 
witness or witnesses. The court can only speculate why those depositions 
were required before even the economic physical injury expert witness 
reports could be prepared. The court would surely expect the plaintiff to 
have a reasonable handle on such issues as the plaintiff was injured 
almost three years before this case was filed. The court also notes that the 
short notice for the deposition sought by the plaintiff was not valid notice 
and the short notice for subpoena duces tecum was also not valid notice. 
Further, if there had been a hint of cooperation by the plaintiff in the 
setting of this deposition, the court may have taken a different view of 
the matter. But, there was not. There was seemingly only a unilateral 
setting of the deposition during a time when the defendant's attorney was 
trying to cooperate and choose a date that would be advantageous to 
both. 
 
'15. 
In short, nothing that was ordered to be done by the court at the 
time of the last hearing was done or completed by the plaintiff with 
absolutely no explanation forthcoming by the plaintiff. 
 
'16. 
K.S.A. 60-237(b)(2) provides a [series] of sanctions to be 
imposed. The first sanction is to declare a matter for which discovery is 
sought to be designated as true. This does not fully fit the situation at 
hand. The situation at hand is one in which the defendant has repeatedly 
asked the plaintiff to produce and delineate facts to support the plaintiff's 
claim. The court instead [of] using this specific sanction [s]imply ordered 
the plaintiff to cooperate with discovery [on] several occasions. Which 
he did not.  
 
'17. 
The second possible sanction listed in K.S.A. 60-237(b)(2) is not 
allowing the offending party to challenge anything the offended party 
presents along the line of the matter about which discovery was not 
forthcoming. This, in the instant case, is tantamount to dismissal as the 
plaintiff has not cooperated with even the most basic and foundational 
9 
 
discovery sought by the defendant, to-wit: what is the factual basis for 
your claims. To avoid the use of this sanction and the resulting dismissal, 
the court had again ordered the plaintiff to cooperate with discovery and 
further ordered the payment of attorney fees. 
 
'18. 
The third possible sanction listed in K.S.A. 60-237(b)(2), the 
final and most serious option, is to strike the pleading of offending [sic] 
party, staying proceedings until compliance is had, or dismissal. As the 
discovery sought, the factual basis for the plaintiff's suit and claim for 
damages, is absolutely foundational and nothing else can proceed in an 
orderly fashion without needless repetition of discovery activity, it would 
serve no purpose to simply stay the proceedings until discovery is 
complied with. Matters have been stayed long enough simply by the 
plaintiff's failure to comply with discovery requests. Striking the 
pleadings about which discovery is being sought would be tantamount to 
a dismissal. This leaves the court with overtly dismissing the case for 
failure to comply with discovery requests and orders. And it would 
appear such would be proper. 
 
'19. 
The court would perhaps take a slightly different approach had 
the plaintiff's attorney demonstrated any inclination to comply. H[is] 
promises to deliver interrogatory answers within a week of the hearing 
on the same in February w[ere] apparently hollow in that he utterly failed 
to deliver any answers signed by the plaintiff. And this was after his 
representation that he was making or would make a trip to see his client 
to obtain the answers. Additionally, his representation at the July hearing 
that he had an affidavit signed by the plaintiff to support the 
interrogatories and would tender the same to the defendant did not solve 
any problems as he apparently had the affidavit for some time but still 
had not supplied it to the defendant. He had made promises to the court 
before. He had ample time between the filing of the motion by the 
defendant to deliver such a document to the defendant, but apparently 
without any excuse had failed to do so. The court is also acutely aware 
that at the hearing on the 20th of July that the plaintiff's attorney asserted 
10 
 
that he had been preoccupied with another extremely difficult case as at 
least a part of the reason he had not complied with the court's last orders 
regarding discovery. The court pointed out to the attorney for the 
plaintiff that the same excuse was proffered at the February 26th hearing 
and the attorney for the plaintiff had further represented that such was 
then behind him. He had stated that he could not concentrate on the 
instant case. To have the same excuse presented at the next hearing five 
months or so on down the line, leaves the court to question the resolve of 
the plaintiff's attorney to be absolutely forthright with the court. 
 
'20. 
It has been nearly a year since the matter was filed. There have 
been four hearings held in this matter regarding discovery and lack of 
cooperation in discovery matters essential to the progress of this case. 
None of the efforts of the court have been apparently successful in 
getting the attention of the plaintiff's attorney. It is an extremely serious 
matter to dismiss a case for lack of cooperation of an attorney for a party 
in the case. But, there does not appear to be anything that this court can 
do to gain the attention of the plaintiff. Specific and direct orders and 
assessment of attorney fees seem to have failed. In the face of continuous 
delays and a lack of forthrightness in counsel regarding the reasons for 
delays and representations of what will take place that did not take place, 
the court is not left with any option other the dismissal. 
 
'21. 
This case is dismissed pursuant to K.S.A. 60-237(b)(2)(C) for 
repeatedly failure to cooperate and comply with the lawful discovery 
orders of the court and further, as per the conditions of K.S.A. 60-241(b), 
this dismissal shall be without prejudice. 
 
'22. 
No further journalization of this matter shall be required. 
 
'IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.' 
  
"12. 
On August 23, 2010, the Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. 
However, the Respondent failed to cite any statutes or submit a brief in support of his 
11 
 
motion. On September 7, 2010, the court took up the Respondent's motion for 
reconsideration. On October 12, 2010, the court issued a memorandum decision and 
order, denying the Respondent's motion for reconsideration. In its memorandum, the 
court stated: 
 
'2. 
In any event, after review of the case file, all of the foregoing 
proceedings in this matter, and the transcript of the hearing on the motion 
to reconsider, the court is satisfied that the correct decision has been 
[made] and the decision complained of should not be altered or amended. 
 
'3. 
It is frustratingly noted that one of the issues of discovery that 
could have been incredibly easy to correct, that being a supplying of 
sworn answers to interrogatories, was still not corrected even with all of 
the documents presented to the court at the time of the hearing on the 
instant motion to reconsider. And this after time and time again the 
attorney for the plaintiff asserting that he had a sworn affidavit from this 
client attesting to the answers to the interrogatories. Such has never been 
presented at any time to or even been seen by either the defendant or the 
court. 
 
'4. 
It is also noted that some of the documents the plaintiff's attorney 
presented to the court at the hearing as evidence of all he had done in the 
case were seen by the defendant's attorney for the first time at the hearing 
itself. 
 
'5. 
It is further noted that the plaintiff's attorney stated emphatically 
at the hearing on his motion to reconsider that he had never had a 
malpractice claim. The court is not sure why this was of importance in 
this case, but it did arouse the curiosity of the court. As a result, the court 
found the case of In re Druten, 267 Kan. 790, 82 P.2d 978 (1999). It is 
noted that the attorney for the plaintiff raised the issue, but the court is 
now wishing it had asked the attorney a few questions regarding the 
definition of malpractice he was wishing to assert. Legal malpractice, as 
with any tort and as the concept is generally used, would appear to 
12 
 
involve an attorney owing a duty, damages being suffered by the person 
owed the duty, and the attorney being the cause of the damages. It would 
appear that the attorney for the plaintiff did have a prior claim for 
malpractice. 
 
'6. 
It is also noted that the attorney for the plaintiff asserted at the 
hearing on his motion to reconsider that his problems with attending to 
this case were in part caused by the death of his mother, apparently 
around the time depositions were being scheduled in this matter. (This 
apparently is after his problems caused by a very large case he was 
involved with and presented twice to the court as part of his reason for 
not attending to this case. See the court's previous decision in this 
matter.) This may be sadly so, but nothing was ever said to the 
defendant's attorney nor the court about this until the hearing on his 
motion to reconsider. And it is yet still apparent that not even the 
affidavit of his client verifying the answers to the interrogatories has 
been delivered to anyone. 
 
'7. 
It should also be noted that the court has declined to simply 
replace the attorney for the plaintiff with another, as was suggested by 
the attorney for the plaintiff. The court is not aware of any such authority 
residing with the court. 
 
'8. 
It should also be noted that the attorney for the plaintiff pointed 
out to the court that his client was seriously injured. The court has little 
doubt about that claim, but such is only one factor and not alone a 
decisive factor. The court cannot be a rubber stamp for one side or the 
other in personal injury cases no matter how sympathetic the court may 
be to the situation. The court still has an obligation to conduct a fair 
proceeding understanding that the defendant is not presumed to be at 
fault in this type of case. The statutory discovery procedures are designed 
to help in providing a fair proceeding. They can be bent to some degree 
to fit the necessity of a situation, but they cannot be ignored time and 
time again. At a point there is nothing left to do but what the court did as 
13 
 
nothing appeared to be able to get the attention of the attorney for the 
plaintiff. 
 
'9. 
The decision should not and will not be altered. No further 
journalization shall be required.' 
  
"13. 
On September 9, 2010, the Respondent filed a notice of appeal. 
However, the Respondent failed to docket the appeal. Thereafter, opposing counsel filed 
a motion to dismiss the appeal. On December 22, 2010, the court dismissed the appeal. 
 
"14. 
On October 15, 2010, the Respondent went to Mr. Jeffries['] home and 
informed Mr. Jeffries that the lawsuit had been dismissed. The Respondent assured Mr. 
Jeffries that he would be refiling the suit within six months. In February, 2011, the 
Respondent informed Mr. Jeffries that he was on his way to refile the suit. However, the 
Respondent never refiled Mr. Jeffries' suit. 
 
"15. 
From February, 2011, through early May, the Respondent set up 
numerous meetings with Mr. Jeffries regarding his case. However, each time, the 
Respondent cancelled the meetings. On May 9, 2011, the Respondent met with Mr. 
Jeffries at Mr. Jeffries' home. For the first time, the Respondent informed Mr. Jeffries 
that he had not refiled the suit. The Respondent falsely stated that he did not refile the 
case because when he went to refile the suit, the judge told him that if he refiled the suit, 
the judge would file a felony perjury charge against Mr. Jeffries for his deposition 
testimony. 
 
"16. 
On September 28, 2011, Mr. Jeffries filed a disciplinary complaint 
against the Respondent. 
 
"17. 
On December 2, 2011, the Respondent responded to Mr. Jeffries' 
complaint. In his response, the Respondent included false statements: 
 
'Since Mr. Jeffries has retained counsel, [sic] filed a claim with 
the carrier and filed this complaint I believe I am relieved of any attorney 
client privilege and need to address the primary reason I believe the firm 
14 
 
no longer wanted to represent him. During his deposition, Mr. Jeffries 
was asked if he performed any testing of the concrete, apparently a 
requirement of the seller of the building or of the industry. He made the 
damaging admission that he had not. He later told me that he had 
actually lied under oath and had, in fact, had the testing done by a 
friend he refused to identify. I advised him to correct the record and 
said he had forgotten to mention it in his deposition. He refused. I 
felt I could not reveal this to the other side and advised Mr. Coates and 
Mr. Logan of the situation since Mr. Jeffries had admittedly lied under 
oath, possibly committed perjury and refused to correct the 
misinformation.' 
 
"18. 
On November 8, 2012, the Hearing Panel conducted a hearing on the 
formal complaint. The Respondent failed to appear at the hearing. 
 
"CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
 
"19. 
Based upon the findings of fact, the Hearing Panel concludes as a matter 
of law that the Respondent violated KRPC 1.1, KRPC 1.3, KRPC 1.4, KRPC 1.16, 
KRPC 3.3(a)(1), KRPC 3.4, KRPC 8.4(c), and Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 211, as detailed below. 
 
"20. 
The Respondent failed to appear at the hearing on the formal complaint. 
It is appropriate to proceed to hearing when a Respondent fails to appear only if proper 
service was obtained. Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 215 governs service of process in disciplinary 
proceedings. That rule provides, in pertinent part as follows: 
 
'(a) 
Service upon the respondent of the formal complaint in 
any disciplinary proceeding shall be made by the Disciplinary 
Administrator, either by personal service or by certified mail to the 
address shown on the attorney's most recent registration, or at his or her 
last known office address. 
. . . . 
 
15 
 
'(c) 
Service by mailing under subsection (a) or (b) shall be 
deemed complete upon mailing whether or not the same is actually 
received.' 
 
In this case, the Disciplinary Administrator complied with Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 215(a) by 
sending a copy of the formal complaint and the notice of hearing, via certified United 
States mail, postage prepaid, to the address shown on the Respondent's most recent 
registration. The Hearing Panel concludes that the Respondent was afforded the notice 
that the Kansas Supreme Court Rules require. 
 
 
"KRPC 1.1 
 
"21. 
Lawyers must provide competent representation to their clients. KRPC 
1.1. 'Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and 
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.' The Respondent failed to 
implement the thoroughness reasonably necessary for the representation of Mr. Jeffries. 
Additionally, the Respondent failed to competently represent Mr. Jeffries when he failed 
to have Mr. Jeffries sign the interrogatory answers. Accordingly, the Hearing Panel 
concludes that the Respondent violated KRPC 1.1. 
 
 
"KRPC 1.3 
 
"22. 
Attorneys must act with reasonable diligence and promptness in 
representing their clients. See KRPC 1.3. The Respondent failed to diligently and 
promptly represent Mr. Jeffries by repeatedly failing to timely respond to discovery 
requests and comply with the court's orders. Because the Respondent failed to act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing his client, the Hearing Panel 
concludes that the Respondent violated KRPC 1.3. 
 
 
"KRPC 1.4 
 
"23. 
KRPC 1.4(a) provides that '[a] lawyer shall keep a client reasonably 
informed about the status of a matter.' In this case, the Respondent violated KRPC 1.4(a) 
16 
 
when he failed to timely inform Mr. Jeffries regarding the status [of] the suit. 
Accordingly, the Hearing Panel concludes that the Respondent violated KRPC 1.4(a). 
 
 
"KRPC 3.3 
 
"24. 
KRPC 3.3(a)(1) provides that '[a] lawyer shall not knowingly make a 
false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal.' The Respondent made false 
statements of material fact to the Court when he stated that he had complied with the 
discovery requests—knowing that Mr. Jeffries had not signed the interrogatory answers 
and when he provided reasons for failure to comply with the discovery requirements. 
Because the Respondent provided false information to the Court, the Hearing Panel 
concludes that the Respondent violated KRPC 3.3(a)(1). 
 
 
"KRPC 3.4 
 
"25. 
According to KRPC 3.4, a lawyer shall not: 
. . . .  
 
'(b) 
falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify 
falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law; 
 
'(c) 
knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a 
tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid 
obligation exists; 
 
'(d) 
in pretrial procedure, make a frivolous discovery request 
or fail to make a reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally 
proper discovery request by an opposing party; 
 
. . . .' KRPC 3.4. 
 
The Respondent violated KRPC 3.4 three different ways. First, the Respondent violated 
KRPC 3.4(b) when he assisted Mr. Jeffries in testifying falsely. Second, the Respondent 
violated KRPC 3.4(c) when he repeatedly failed to comply with court orders regarding 
17 
 
deadlines. Finally, the Respondent violated KRPC 3.4(d) when he failed to comply with 
the defendant's discovery requests, when he failed to timely designate his expert 
witnesses, and when he failed to properly designate his expert witnesses by providing 
their reports. Thus, the Hearing Panel concludes that the Respondent repeatedly violated 
KRPC 3.4. 
 
 
"KRPC 8.1 
 
"26. 
Attorneys must provide accurate and honest information during the 
course of disciplinary proceedings. Additionally, attorneys must cooperate in disciplinary 
investigations. 
 
'An applicant for admission to the bar, or a lawyer in connection 
with a bar admission application or in connection with a disciplinary 
matter, shall not: 
 
(a) 
knowingly make a false statement of material 
fact; or 
 
(b) 
fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a 
misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in 
the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful 
demand for information from an admissions or 
disciplinary authority, except that this rule does not 
require disclosure of information otherwise protected by 
Rule 1.6.' KRPC 8.1. 
 
The Respondent violated KRPC 8.1(a) when he provided false information in his written 
response to Mr. Jeffries' initial complaint. The Respondent violated KRPC 8.1(b) when 
he failed to provide a written answer to the formal complaint. Accordingly, the Hearing 
Panel concludes that the Respondent violated KRPC 8.1. 
 
18 
 
 
"KRPC 8.4(c) 
 
"27. 
'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.' KRPC 8.4(c). The Respondent 
engaged in conduct that involved dishonesty when he falsely told his client that he was 
refiling the [lawsuit] in February, 2011. Additionally, the Respondent also engaged in 
conduct that involved dishonesty when he stated in his written response to Mr. Jeffries' 
complaint that Mr. Jeffries later told him that he had, in fact, had the concrete tested. The 
Respondent knew prior to Mr. Jeffries' deposition that the concrete had been tested and 
that Mr. Jeffries did not intend to disclose that the concrete had been tested. Finally, the 
Respondent engaged in conduct that involved dishonesty when he stated to the court that 
he had complied with the discovery requirements knowing that Mr. Jeffries had not 
signed the interrogatory answers and when he provided reasons for failing to comply with 
the discovery requirements. As such, the Hearing Panel concludes that the Respondent 
violated KRPC 8.4(c). 
 
 
"Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 211(b) 
 
"28. 
The Kansas Supreme Court Rules require attorneys to file answers to 
formal complaints. Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 211(b) provides the requirements: 
   
'The Respondent shall serve an answer upon the Disciplinary 
Administrator within twenty days after the service of the complaint 
unless such time is extended by the Disciplinary Administrator or the 
hearing panel.' Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 211(b). 
 
The Respondent violated Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 211(b) by failing to file a timely written 
answer to the formal complaint. Accordingly, the Hearing Panel concludes that the 
Respondent violated Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 211(b). 
 
19 
 
 
"AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 
 
"STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 
 
"29. 
In making this recommendation for discipline, the Hearing Panel 
considered the factors outlined by the American Bar Association in its Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (hereinafter 'Standards'). Pursuant to Standard 3, the factors 
to be considered are the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the potential or actual 
injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and the existence of aggravating or mitigating 
factors. 
 
"30. 
Duty Violated.  The Respondent violated his duty to his client to provide 
competent and diligent representation and adequate communication. Also, the 
Respondent violated his duty to the public and the legal profession to maintain his 
personal integrity. Finally, the Respondent violated his duty to the legal system to comply 
with court orders. 
 
"31. 
Mental State.  The Respondent knowingly and intentionally violated his 
duties. 
 
"32. 
Injury.  As a result of the Respondent's misconduct, the Respondent 
caused actual injury to Mr. Jeffries, the legal profession, and the legal system. 
 
 
"Aggravating and Mitigating Factors 
 
"33. 
Aggravating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may 
justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its 
recommendation for discipline, the Hearing Panel, in this case, found the following 
aggravating factors present: 
 
"34. 
Prior Disciplinary Offenses.  The Respondent has been previously 
disciplined on one occasion. On July 9, 1999, the Kansas Supreme Court censured the 
Respondent for having violated KRPC 1.1, KRPC 1.3, KRPC 1.4, KRPC 3.2, and KRPC 
8.4(c). 
 
20 
 
"35. 
Dishonest or Selfish Motive.  The Respondent repeatedly engaged in 
dishonest conduct. As such, the Hearing Panel concludes that the Respondent's 
misconduct was motivated by dishonesty. 
 
"36. 
A Pattern of Misconduct.  The Respondent has engaged in a pattern of 
misconduct by repeatedly engaging in the same type of misconduct throughout Mr. 
Jeffries' case. 
 
"37. 
Multiple Offenses.  The Respondent committed multiple rule violations. 
The Respondent violated KRPC 1.1, KRPC 1.3, KRPC 1.4, KRPC 3.3, KRPC 3.4, KRPC 
8.1, KRPC 8.4, and Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 211. Accordingly, the Hearing Panel concludes that 
the Respondent committed multiple offenses. 
 
"38. 
Bad Faith Obstruction of the Disciplinary Proceeding by Intentionally 
Failing to Comply with Rules or Orders of the Disciplinary Process.  The Respondent 
fail[ed] to provide a written answer to the formal complaint in this case. Additionally, the 
Respondent failed to appear at the hearing on the formal complaint. The Respondent's 
fail[ure] to provide a written answer to the formal complaint and the Respondent's failure 
to appear at the hearing on the formal complaint amounts to bad faith obstruction of the 
disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with rules and orders of the 
disciplinary process. 
 
"39. 
Submission of False Evidence, False Statements, or Other Deceptive 
Practices During the Disciplinary Process.  In his initial response to Mr. Jeffries' 
complaint, the Respondent provided false information. Thus, this aggravating factor also 
applies. 
 
"40. 
Substantial Experience in the Practice of Law.  The Kansas Supreme 
Court admitted the Respondent to practice law in the State of Kansas in 1970. At the time 
of the misconduct, the Respondent had been practicing law for more than 40 years. 
 
"41. 
Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may 
justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its 
21 
 
recommendation for discipline, the Hearing Panel, in this case, found no mitigating 
circumstances present. 
 
"42. 
In addition to the above-cited factors, the Hearing Panel has thoroughly 
examined and considered the following Standards: 
 
'4.41 
Disbarment is generally appropriate when: 
. . . . 
(b) 
a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for 
a client and causes serious or potentially serious 
injury to a client; or 
. . . . 
'5.11 
Disbarment is generally appropriate when: 
. . . . 
(b) 
a lawyer engages in any other intentional 
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation that serious adversely reflects 
on the lawyer's fitness to practice.' 
 
 
"RECOMMENDATION 
 
"43. 
At the hearing on the formal complaint, the Deputy Disciplinary 
Administrator recommended that the Respondent be disbarred. 
 
"44. 
The Respondent's misconduct is serious and warrants [] serious 
discipline. Accordingly, based upon the findings of fact, [the] conclusions of law, the 
aggravating factors, and the Standards listed above, the Hearing Panel unanimously 
recommends that the Respondent be disbarred." 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
In a disciplinary proceeding, this court considers the evidence, the findings of the 
disciplinary panel, and the arguments of the parties and determines whether violations of 
22 
 
KRPC exist and, if they do, the discipline to be imposed. Attorney misconduct must be 
established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Foster, 292 Kan. 940, 945, 258 P.3d 
375 (2011); see Supreme Court Rule 211(f) (2012 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 350). Clear and 
convincing evidence is "'evidence that causes the factfinder to believe that "the truth of 
the facts asserted is highly probable."'" In re Lober, 288 Kan. 498, 505, 204 P.3d 610 
(2009) (quoting In re Dennis, 286 Kan. 708, 725, 188 P.3d 1 [2008]). 
 
The respondent was given adequate notice of the formal complaint, to which he 
did not file an answer; he filed no exceptions to the hearing panel's final hearing report. 
With no exceptions before us, the panel's findings of fact are deemed admitted. Supreme 
Court Rule 212(c), (d) (2012 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 368). Furthermore, the evidence before 
the hearing panel establishes the charged misconduct in violation of KRPC 1.1 (2012 
Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 436), 1.3 (2012 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 454), 1.4(a) (2012 Kan. Ct. R. 
Annot. 473), 3.3(a)(1) (2012 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 582), 3.4 (2012 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 589), 
8.1 (2012 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 634), 8.4(c) (2012 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 643), and Kansas 
Supreme Court Rule 211(b) (2012 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 350) by clear and convincing 
evidence and supports the panel's conclusions of law. We therefore adopt both the panel's 
findings of fact and its conclusions of law. 
 
The only remaining issue before us is the appropriate discipline for respondent's 
violations. At the hearing before this court, at which the respondent did not appear, the 
office of the Disciplinary Administrator recommended that the respondent be disbarred. 
The hearing panel also recommended that the respondent be disbarred. 
 
 
We agree that respondent's conduct merits disbarment. 
 
23 
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCIPLINE 
 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that David M. Druten be disbarred from the practice of 
law in the state of Kansas, effective on the filing of this opinion, in accordance with 
Supreme Court Rule 203(a)(1) (2012 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 294). 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondent shall comply with Supreme Court 
Rule 218 (2012 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 397) and Rule 219 (2012 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 398). 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the costs of these proceedings be assessed to the 
respondent and that this opinion be published in the official Kansas reports.