Title: Farrakhan v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 060252
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 12, 2007

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and 
Agee, JJ., and Russell, S.J. 
 
SHAKA AMIR FARRAKHAN 
 
v.  Record No. 060252  
OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
January 12, 2007 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
Virginia Code § 18.2-308(A) provides in part that it is 
unlawful for "any person" to carry "about his person, hidden 
from common observation . . . any dirk, bowie knife, 
switchblade knife, ballistic knife, machete, razor" or "any 
weapon of like kind as those enumerated in this subsection."  
A first offense violation of this code provision is a Class 1 
misdemeanor.  Further, Code § 18.2-308.2 provides that it is a 
Class 6 felony for a previously convicted felon "to knowingly 
and intentionally carry about his person, hidden from common 
observation, any weapon described in subsection A of § 18.2-
308."  In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of 
Appeals erred in holding that the knife carried by the 
defendant was a "weapon of like kind" under Code § 18.2-
308(A). 
I. 
Facts and Proceedings Below 
 
On the morning of January 8, 2004, Shaka Amir Farrakhan 
("Farrakhan") entered a women's furnishings store.  While 
Farrakhan looked at women's boots, the store manager "walked 
 
2
to the front door, turned [her] back to the front door and 
started facing inside of the store."  Farrakhan selected two 
shoe boxes and began to walk towards the front door.  Seeing 
the store manager standing at the front of the store, 
Farrakhan commented:  "Oh, look.  You're over here waiting for 
me." 
 
Farrakhan started to leave the store, and the store 
manager asked:  "Sir, can I get my boots back, please?"  At 
some point either before or after the store manager's 
question, Farrakhan "pulled out a knife from inside of his 
jacket."  The store manager testified that it looked like a 
kitchen knife.  Farrakhan jabbed the knife toward the store 
manager stating:  "[G]et the fuck out of my way."  The store 
manager then backed away from Farrakhan.  Farrakhan exited the 
store with the boots, and the store manager "ran to call 911."  
After leaving the store, Farrakhan was apprehended by police.  
A knife was recovered from the sidewalk where the police had 
pursued Farrakhan. 
 
Farrakhan was charged with one count of robbery and one 
count of possession of a concealed weapon "described in 
Virginia Code § 18.2-308A" "having previously been convicted 
of a felony offense."  In the bench trial, upon the conclusion 
of the Commonwealth's case-in-chief and again at the 
conclusion of the presentation of all the evidence, Farrakhan 
 
3
moved to strike the concealed weapon charge because he 
maintained that the knife was not enumerated in Code § 18.2-
308(A) or a "weapon of like kind."  The trial court found 
Farrakhan guilty of robbery* and possession of a concealed 
weapon by a felon.  The trial court observed that the knife 
used by Farrakhan was "not a pen knife or a pocket knife or 
something else," but was a "kitchen knife" with a "long, thin 
blade." 
 
Farrakhan appealed to the Court of Appeals, where his 
conviction was affirmed.  Farrakhan v. Commonwealth, Record 
No. 1804-04-4 (November 29, 2005). Farrakhan appeals to this 
Court upon one assignment of error: 
 
The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the 
erroneous rulings of the trial court in not 
granting Defendant's motion to strike and in 
finding the evidence sufficient to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was 
guilty of possessing a concealed weapon by a 
convicted felon because the kitchen knife at 
issue is not a "weapon of like kind" for the 
purposes of VA CODE § 18.2-308(A). 
II. Analysis 
The construction of a statute is a question of law which 
we review de novo upon appeal.  Dowling v. Rowan, 270 Va. 510, 
519, 621 S.E.2d 397, 401 (2005).  Code § 18.2-308(A) is not a 
model of clarity.  The interpretative history of the phrase 
                     
* Farrakhan's conviction upon the charge of robbery is not 
before us on appeal. 
 
4
"weapon of like kind" in Code § 18.2-308(A) has proven to be 
problematic to trial and appellate courts of the Commonwealth.  
For example, in Ricks v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 442, 445, 
499 S.E.2d 575, 576 (1998), the Court of Appeals held that 
"the language of the statute does not provide that the purpose 
for carrying the knife is relevant.  Rather, the physical 
characteristics of the knife determine whether the knife is a 
weapon contemplated by the statute."  Two years later in 
Delcid v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 14, 18, 526 S.E.2d 273, 
275 (2000), the Court of Appeals held that a "determination 
whether a given bladed instrument is an implement or a weapon 
requires consideration not only of the physical character of 
the instrument itself, but also of the circumstances 
surrounding its possession and use."  In 2005, the Court of 
Appeals in Ohin v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 194, 199, 622 
S.E.2d 784, 786 (2005), focused upon "a knife's weapon-like 
properties" and held that "[a] 'weapon of like kind' includes 
a knife that, while not possessing the exact physical 
properties of the enumerated knives, has the characteristics 
of a fighting knife just the same."  The Court of Appeals 
added "[t]his focus on a knife's weapon-like properties 
'excludes from concealed weapons statutes innocuous household 
and industrial knives which may be carried for legitimate 
 
5
purposes.' "  Id.  Additionally, the Court of Appeals held in 
this case that: 
While nominally described as a "kitchen knife," 
the knife when viewed is more akin to a 
butcher's knife.  It is 12 3/4 inches long with 
a sharp 7 3/4 inch blade that is finely honed 
and has a sharp point.  It possesses, as 
discussed in Delcid, "unquestionable utility as 
a stabbing weapon."  This was the threat posed 
by appellant. 
 
In considering whether a knife is a 
"weapon of like kind" we look not only to the 
appearance of the instrument, but also to the 
purpose for which it was employed and the 
circumstances surrounding its use. 
Farrakhan v. Commonwealth, Record No. 1804-04-4, slip op. at 
7-8 (November 29, 2005) (internal citation omitted). 
In accordance with the principles of statutory 
construction of penal statutes, a court must not add to the 
words of the statute nor ignore the words of the statute and 
must strictly construe the statute and limit its application 
to cases falling clearly within the statute.  Turner v. 
Commonwealth, 226 Va. 456, 459, 309 S.E.2d 337, 338 (1983).  
Additionally, it is a "settled principle of statutory 
construction that every part of a statute is presumed to have 
some effect and no part will be considered meaningless unless 
absolutely necessary."  Hubbard v. Henrico Ltd. P'ship, 255 
Va. 335, 340, 497 S.E.2d 335, 338 (1998).  The phrase "weapon 
 
6
of like kind" in Code § 18.2-308(A) must be interpreted 
consistent with these principles. 
Code § 18.2-308(A) includes numerous enumerated items, 
some of which are bladed, such as a dirk, bowie knife, 
switchblade knife, ballistic knife, machete, razor, and a 
"disc" or "throwing star" or "oriental dart" "having at least 
two points or pointed blades."  Some enumerated items are 
without blades such as a slingshot, metal knucks, black jack, 
nun chuck, or fighting chain.  Some enumerated items are 
designed for fighting purposes such as a dirk, bowie knife, or 
switchblade knife.  Other enumerated items are not designed 
for fighting purposes, such as a machete or a razor, but 
unfortunately are now commonly understood to be "weapons." 
If the bladed item in question meets the definition of an 
enumerated item within Code § 18.2-308(A), the evidence is 
clearly sufficient for a conviction under the statute.  
Additionally, if the bladed item is not enumerated, 
concealment of the item may be proscribed by Code § 18.2-
308(A) if it is a "weapon of like kind."  However, before 
examination of similar physical characteristics to enumerated 
items, the item in question must first be a "weapon." 
Clearly, the General Assembly did not intend all bladed 
items to fall within the proscription of Code § 18.2-308(A).  
The knife possessed by Farrakhan is an ordinary kitchen knife 
 
7
with a blade sharpened on one side and a handle below.  If a 
chef concealed the same ordinary kitchen knife and carried it 
to a restaurant, surely it was not the intention of the 
legislature to criminalize such conduct.  The same difficulty 
occurs with other ordinary items as well.  For example, does 
the office worker who purchases a letter opener and "conceals" 
it in the bag provided by the store violate the statute 
because of the item's resemblance to a "dirk?" 
Because an offense under Code § 18.2-308(A) is 
"possessory" in nature, it is committed upon concealment.  
Subsequent use or circumstances may not be considered in the 
definitional analysis of "weapon."  Because we must strictly 
construe a penal statute, we hold that in order to be a 
"weapon" within the definition of "weapon of like kind," the 
item must be designed for fighting purposes or commonly 
understood to be a "weapon."  Upon establishing that the item 
in question is a "weapon," the analysis continues to determine 
if the item possesses such similar characteristics to the 
enumerated items in the Code § 18.2-308(A) such that its 
concealment is prohibited. 
We hold that the kitchen knife possessed by Farrakhan is 
not a "weapon," because it is not designed for fighting 
purposes nor is it commonly understood to be a "weapon."  
 
8
Consequently, it is unnecessary in this case to compare its 
physical characteristics to the enumerated items. 
We are mindful that a kitchen knife is a potentially 
dangerous object, particularly in the hands of a person with 
criminal intent, but so also is an ordinary pocket knife or a 
letter opener.  Here we are concerned with what is proscribed 
by statute as unlawful not simply what may be dangerous.  We 
are compelled to interpret this statute in accordance with the 
principles of statutory construction recited herein. 
Conclusion 
 
We will reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and 
vacate the defendant's conviction for possession of a 
concealed weapon by a felon under Code § 18.2-308(A). 
Reversed and vacated.