Title: Commonwealth v. Ulani U.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12986
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: April 12, 2021

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SJC-12986 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ULANI U., a juvenile, & another.1 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     January 6, 2021. - April 12, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Contempt.  Practice, Criminal, Contempt proceeding.  Juvenile 
Court.  Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
 
 
 
Complaint for contempt filed in the Plymouth County 
Division of the Juvenile Court Department on September 22, 2017. 
 
The case was heard by Kathryn A. White, J. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
Joseph N. Schneiderman for the juvenile. 
Katherine E. Burdick, for Juvenile Law Center, amicus 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
Melissa Allen Celli, for youth advocacy division of the 
Committee for Public Counsel Services & others, amici curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
 
1 Trial Court, interested party. 
2 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  This case concerns the application of the rules 
of criminal procedure regarding criminal contempt, Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 43 and 44, and their use in the Juvenile Court.  See 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 43, as appearing in 466 Mass. 1501 (2013); 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 44, 378 Mass. 920 (1979).  The sixteen year 
old juvenile was before the Juvenile Court judge for a hearing 
on alleged violations of conditions of her release.  After the 
judge set bail, the juvenile called the judge, among other 
things, a "dumb, white bitch."  The judge found the juvenile in 
criminal contempt for her statement.  At a subsequent sentencing 
hearing on the charge of contempt, taking place after a separate 
complaint had issued alleging common-law criminal contempt with 
the judge who presided over the hearing named as the 
complainant, the judge sentenced the juvenile to ninety days -- 
the maximum sentence under rule 43. 
 
The juvenile timely appealed, and we subsequently granted 
her application for direct appellate review.  The juvenile 
argues that (1) under G. L. c. 119, § 53,2 it was error for the 
judge to hold her in summary criminal contempt, and (2) the 
judge violated requirements of summary criminal contempt 
 
 
2 General Laws c. 119, § 53, provides, in relevant part:  
"[T]he care, custody and discipline of the children brought 
before the court shall approximate as nearly as possible that 
which they should receive from their parents, and that, as far 
as practicable, they shall be treated, not as criminals, but as 
children in need of aid, encouragement and guidance." 
3 
 
proceedings, see rule 43, and therefore the judge should have 
proceeded against her in a nonsummary contempt proceeding 
pursuant to rule 44, the procedures of which the judge also 
violated.  We conclude that the judge abused her discretion by 
not taking the juvenile's status as a child into account when 
she imposed the ninety-day criminal contempt sentence and that 
the judge did not comply with the requirements of rule 43 or 
rule 44.3  We therefore vacate the judgment of contempt.4 
 
Background.  1. Hearing on alleged violations of conditions 
of release.  In 2017, a delinquency complaint issued against the 
juvenile from the Juvenile Court, alleging attempted escape from 
a Department of Youth Services (DYS) facility and malicious 
destruction of property greater than $250.  The juvenile was 
 
 
3 Because we vacate the judgment of contempt on the grounds 
of abuse of discretion and failure to follow the procedures set 
forth in Mass. R. Crim. P. 43 and 44, we need not address the 
juvenile's additional arguments that the sentence constituted 
cruel or unusual punishment, that she did not validly stipulate 
to the finding of summary contempt, and that if no single error 
justifies relief, the cumulative effect of all of the errors 
created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. 
 
 
4 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the youth 
advocacy division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services; 
the children and family law division of the Committee for Public 
Counsel Services; Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers; National Association of Social Workers; Charles 
Hamilton Houston Institute for Race and Justice; Center for Law 
Brain and Behavior of Massachusetts General Hospital; Roxbury 
Youthworks, Inc.; More Than Words; Citizens for Juvenile 
Justice; Mental Health Legal Advisors Committee; and Jessica L. 
Griffin; and by the Juvenile Law Center. 
4 
 
released on recognizance with pretrial conditions of release.  
However, in August 2017, she allegedly violated the conditions 
of her release by running away from a Department of Children and 
Families (DCF) group home. 
 
At the hearing on these alleged violations, the 
Commonwealth alleged that the juvenile was a flight risk because 
she ran away from her group home and because she cut off her 
global positioning system (GPS) monitor imposed from a different 
case.  The Commonwealth requested bail of one dollar and that 
the juvenile be released only to DCF.  The Commonwealth 
acknowledged that "DCF is reluctant or does not bail out their 
juveniles"; therefore, the request for bail of one dollar in 
effect meant a request for a detention order.  See R.L. Ireland, 
Juvenile Law § 1.22 (2d ed. 2006) (discussing certain issues 
present with bail for juveniles).  See also A Juvenile v. 
Commonwealth, 480 Mass. 1012, 1013 n.2 (2018).  The juvenile 
argued against bail, and she also addressed the court herself, 
requesting to avoid DYS commitment and to be granted "[one] more 
chance to go back to the program" where she had been living.  
The judge imposed bail of one dollar and restricted the 
juvenile's release to DCF.5  Children often do not have funds 
 
5 The judge stated on the record, "So, what I will do is 
impose the requested bail of $1.00 DYS -- DCF, I'm sorry, only."  
See R.L. Ireland, Juvenile Law § 1.22 (2d ed. 2006) ("In making 
bail determinations in delinquency cases, Juvenile Court judges 
5 
 
with which to post bail, and as DCF acknowledged, it does not 
post bail on behalf of children in its custody.  The juvenile 
replied: 
"This is my first case.  Like, I don't understand why I 
can't get sent back to my program.  This is my first 
case. . . .  My first case, girl.  You don't even know me 
like that.  You don't know me, girl.  Give me the fucking 
papers.  Fuck you. . . .  Bitch, fuck you. . . .  And DCF 
ain't paying my bill, you dumb, white bitch. . . .  You 
dumb bitch." 
 
 
After a recess, the judge found that calling her "a dumb, 
white bitch" was contemptuous conduct.  She appointed trial 
counsel to represent the juvenile in the contempt matter, the 
juvenile apologized, and counsel did not present any evidence.  
The judge found the juvenile in criminal contempt, and she 
continued the matter for sentencing.  A separate complaint 
issued alleging common-law criminal contempt with the presiding 
judge named as the complainant. 
 
2.  Hearing on contempt sentencing.  At the sentencing 
hearing, the judge ordered the juvenile committed to DYS for 
ninety days, which is the maximum possible sentence for summary 
criminal contempt.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 43 (a) (4).  Trial 
counsel had requested that the juvenile be committed to time 
served of one week, noting that her other attorney was "doing a 
 
frequently impose restrictions regarding who may post the amount 
set, e.g., . . . [DCF] . . . as in the formulation '$1.00 cash 
bail, [DCF] only'").  However, the docket entry states, 
"Temporary mittimus to DYS $1.00 cash bail release to DCF only." 
6 
 
pysch eval for her in another court" and that "maybe there was a 
reason why she acted the way she did." 
 
3.  Hearing on motion to rewrite court order and to address 
court.  The juvenile thereafter moved to rewrite the court order 
and to address the court.  She wrote a letter of apology to the 
judge and apologized in court.  The judge told the juvenile, in 
part, "[S]aying you're sorry . . . doesn't mean that the 
sentence I've imposed goes away.  You have to understand that 
when you speak like that it has consequences.  And sometimes 
those consequences are negative consequences." 
 
In response to a concern raised by the Commonwealth that a 
delinquency commitment would require DYS to have custody of the 
juvenile until she was eighteen, the judge ordered a revised 
mittimus to commit the juvenile to DYS for ninety days as a 
stipulation without bail. 
 
4.  Hearing on motion to vacate and motion to stay 
execution of sentence.  The juvenile subsequently sought relief 
from the contempt judgment and sentence, asserting that (1) the 
judge did not comply with the requirements of summary or 
nonsummary contempt proceedings; (2) the ninety-day sentence did 
not account for, and was not proportionate to, her juvenile 
status; and (3) the ninety-day sentence constituted cruel or 
unusual punishment.  At the hearing on the juvenile's motion to 
vacate and her motion to stay execution of sentence, the judge 
7 
 
resentenced the juvenile to time served and released her to her 
social worker. 
 
5.  Hearing on motion to correct record.  The juvenile next 
moved to correct the record, arguing that the docket 
inaccurately reflected a stipulation to contempt.  She contended 
that she did not stipulate to being found in contempt and that 
there was not a colloquy of the rights she was waiving, nor was 
there a written stipulation to the contempt.  The judge denied 
the motion after a hearing.  The juvenile appealed, and the case 
is now before us on direct appellate review. 
 
Discussion.  The juvenile argues that even though the judge 
resentenced her to time served and she has turned eighteen, the 
case presents a live controversy "because [she] has a continuing 
stake in avoiding any collateral consequences from an invalid 
adjudication of criminal contempt."  We agree.  See Commonwealth 
v. Preston P., 483 Mass. 759, 769 (2020) (presence of record can 
influence officer's decision whether to charge juvenile with 
crime, and "juvenile adjudications can be predicate offenses for 
sentencing enhancements"); Commonwealth v. Oswaldo O., 94 Mass. 
App. Ct. 550, 552-553 (2018), and cases cited (defendant 
agreeing to continuance without finding does not make his appeal 
moot because adjudication of delinquency could adversely affect 
his outstanding request to change his immigration status); 
Commonwealth v. Bain, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 724, 725 n.2 (2018) 
8 
 
(probation violation is not moot after probation period is 
completed because defendant faces collateral consequences and 
violation may be considered in future proceedings for bail, 
sentencing, or parole). 
 
1.  Individualized assessment of juvenile.  The juvenile 
contends that it was error for the judge to hold her in summary 
criminal contempt without considering her juvenile status 
because under G. L. c. 119, § 53, the judge had a mandate to 
treat the juvenile as a child requiring "aid, encouragement and 
guidance."  In this regard, she argues that her being an 
African-American girl exposes her to the risk of implicit bias, 
adolescent brain development makes juveniles unusually prone to 
emotional outbursts, and incarceration should be a last resort 
to avoid retraumatizing a juvenile in a form of custodial limbo. 
 
General Laws c. 119, § 53, provides that children brought 
before the court "be treated, not as criminals, but as children 
in need of aid, encouragement and guidance."  We therefore 
"recognize that the juvenile justice system 'is primarily 
rehabilitative, cognizant of the inherent differences between 
juvenile and adult offenders, and geared toward "the correction 
and redemption to society of delinquent children."'"  See 
Commonwealth v. Humberto H., 466 Mass. 562, 575-576 (2013), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Magnus M., 461 Mass. 459, 461 (2012), 
9 
 
and Metcalf v. Commonwealth, 338 Mass. 648, 651 (1959).  See 
generally, R.L. Ireland, Juvenile Law, supra at § 1.3. 
 
A Juvenile Court judge may impose sanctions for criminal 
contempt and may utilize summary contempt proceedings pursuant 
to rule 43 or 44.  See R.L. Ireland, Juvenile Law, supra at 
§ 1.89.  However, "[a]s the Supreme Court recognized in [Miller 
v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012)], 'children are 
constitutionally different from adults for purposes of 
sentencing,' irrespective of the specific crimes that they have 
committed."  Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk 
Dist., 466 Mass. 655, 670 (2013), S.C., 471 Mass. 12 (2015) 
(Diatchenko I).  Children "are less deserving of the most severe 
punishments."  Id., quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 
(2010).  In Diatchenko I, supra at 669, the court looked to 
"current scientific research on adolescent brain development, 
and the myriad significant ways that this development impacts a 
juvenile's personality and behavior" (footnote omitted). 
 
Judges have inherent power to impose sanctions for 
contempt, and a statutory mandate impairing a judge's authority 
under the rules of criminal procedure "should not be found by 
implication."  See Doe v. Commonwealth, 396 Mass. 421, 422 
(1985) ("statutory mandate denying a court the power to try a 
person for criminal contempt of its orders should not be found 
by implication"); Sussman v. Commonwealth, 374 Mass. 692, 695 
10 
 
(1978) ("Trial judges have the inherent power to deal with 
contumacious conduct in the court room in order to preserve the 
dignity, order, and decorum of the proceedings").  Although we 
do not conclude that § 53 itself restricts a judge's power to 
find a child before him or her in contempt or to impose a 
sanction for that contempt, a judge should take a child's 
characteristics into account when imposing a criminal contempt 
sentence. 
 
The juvenile and amici cite to numerous articles and 
studies in support of their argument that a judge should take a 
child's status as a child and his or her past trauma into 
account when deciding whether to impose a punishment on a child.  
We need not recite them here because, as discussed supra, our 
cases recognize the distinction between adults and children with 
regard to sentencing.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Perez, 480 
Mass. 562, 568-573 (2018); Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 669-671. 
 
The juvenile here was a dually involved child, being 
involved with both DYS and DCF.  She was present in court at the 
time she made her contemptuous statement because she had run 
away from her group home and had cut off her GPS monitor.  She 
expressed to the judge that she wanted "[one] more chance to go 
back to the program."  When told that she would not get another 
chance and would instead have her relative freedom taken away by 
being in custody with the one dollar bail imposed, the juvenile 
11 
 
made what she describes on appeal as "disrespectful comments to 
the judge."  Although her comments required a response from the 
judge, see Commonwealth v. Brunnell, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 423, 425, 
428-429 (2006), given the circumstances of the case, the 
juvenile's characteristics, and the juvenile's apology to the 
judge, we conclude that the ninety-day sentence was outside 
reasonable alternatives.  Compare Commonwealth v. Wilson, 81 
Mass. App. Ct. 464, 467-472, 476 (2012) (defense attorney 
received ninety-day sentence for contempt after "angry outburst 
[that] covered over five pages of the transcript" and continued 
despite judge trying seven times to have attorney stop).  The 
judge therefore abused her discretion, and we vacate the 
judgment of contempt.6 
 
2.  Criminal contempt rules.  The juvenile argues that 
because the judge violated multiple requirements of summary 
criminal contempt proceedings, the Juvenile Court should have 
 
 
6 Because we determine that the judge abused her discretion 
by not taking the juvenile's status as a child into account, and 
there is nothing in the record to indicate that the judge was 
motivated by bias, we need not reach the juvenile's argument 
regarding implicit bias.  We do, however, reemphasize our 
remarks from our June 2020 letter to the members of the State 
bar and judiciary:  "As judges, we must look afresh at what we 
are doing, or failing to do, to root out any conscious and 
unconscious bias in our courtrooms; to ensure that the justice 
provided to African-Americans is the same that is provided to 
white Americans; to create in our courtrooms, our corner of the 
world, a place where all are truly equal."  Letter from the 
Seven Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court to Members of the 
Judiciary and the Bar (June 3, 2020). 
12 
 
proceeded against her in a nonsummary contempt proceeding 
pursuant to rule 44, rather than a summary proceeding pursuant 
to rule 43.  She further asserts that the judge did not follow 
the procedures set forth in rule 44 for a nonsummary contempt 
proceeding.  We agree and therefore vacate the judgment of 
contempt on this ground as well. 
 
"Although the power to punish contumacious conduct is 
inherent in the courts . . . , rule 43 narrowly limits the 
availability of summary contempt."  Vizcaino v. Commonwealth, 
462 Mass. 266, 270 (2012).  "Summary contempt refers to criminal 
contempt punished by the judge summarily -- that is, without due 
process protections such as formal notice, a hearing, and 'all 
that goes with a conventional court trial.'"  Id. at 270-271, 
quoting Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 9 (1952).  "Because 
due process protections are lost . . . , '[s]ummary punishment 
always, and rightly, is regarded with disfavor.'"  Vizcaino, 
supra at 271, quoting Commonwealth v. Corsetti, 387 Mass. 1, 7 
(1982).  Therefore, "rule 43 is narrowly written, and narrowly 
construed."  Vizcaino, supra, citing Corsetti, supra. 
 
Under Mass. R. Crim. P. 43 (a), four prerequisites must be 
met to warrant summary punishment for contempt: 
"(1) summary punishment is necessary to maintain order in 
the courtroom; (2) the contemptuous conduct occurred in the 
presence of, and was witnessed by, the presiding judge; (3) 
the presiding judge enters a preliminary finding at the 
time of the contemptuous conduct that a criminal contempt 
13 
 
occurred; and (4) the punishment for each contempt does not 
exceed three months imprisonment and a fine of $2,000." 
 
 
Rule 43 (b) provides the procedure for summary contempt, 
stating, in part, that "[i]f, after the hearing, the presiding 
judge determines that summary contempt is appropriate, the judge 
shall make a finding on the record of summary contempt, setting 
forth the facts upon which that finding is based.  The court 
shall further announce a judgment of summary contempt in open 
court, enter that judgment on the court's docket, and notify the 
contemnor of the right to appeal."  Mass. R. Crim. P. 
43 (b) (3) (iii).  Rule 43 does not require written findings, 
but that is the better practice.  See Reporters' Notes to Rule 
43, Mass. Ann. Laws Court Rules, Rules of Criminal Procedure 
(LexisNexis 2021). 
 
When a judge does not comply with the requirements for 
criminal contempt under rule 43, a summary contempt prosecution 
becomes a nonsummary contempt prosecution by operation of law 
under rule 44.  See Vizcaino, 462 Mass. at 273, 274-275; 
Reporters' Notes to Rule 44, supra.  See also Mass. R. Crim. P. 
44 (a) ("All criminal contempts not adjudicated pursuant to Rule 
43 shall be prosecuted by means of complaint, unless the 
prosecutor elects to proceed by indictment"). 
 
The judge here did not comply with the requirements of rule 
43.  The judge issued a separate complaint for contempt, there 
14 
 
was no judgment of contempt on the complaint for the underlying 
matter for which the juvenile was appearing in court when the 
contemptuous conduct occurred, and the judge did not provide the 
juvenile with notice of her right to appeal.  See Mass. R. Crim. 
P. 43 (b) (3) (iii).  Because the judge did not comply with the 
mandatory requirements of rule 43, she must have transitioned to 
proceeding under rule 44.  See Vizcaino, 462 Mass. at 273, 274-
275; Reporters' Notes to Rule 44, supra. 
 
However, even were we to treat the matter as having 
proceeded under rule 44, it also did not comply with the 
requirements of that rule.  Under Mass. R. Crim. P. 44 (c), the 
"contempt charges should be heard by a judge other than the 
trial judge 'whenever the nature of the alleged contemptuous 
conduct is such as is likely to affect the trial judge's 
impartiality.'"  Furtado v. Furtado, 380 Mass. 137, 152 (1980), 
quoting Mass. R. Crim. P. 44 (c).  See Commonwealth v. Carr, 38 
Mass. App. Ct. 179, 182 (1995).  The hearing on the sentencing 
for the contempt did not comply with rule 44 because the judge 
who presided over the hearing on the alleged violations of 
conditions of the juvenile's release and had the contempt 
complaint issue, with herself listed as the complainant, was the 
same judge who adjudicated the complaint.  See Mass. R. Crim. P 
44 (c).  The procedures under rules 43 and 44 were not followed; 
therefore, we vacate the judgment of contempt. 
15 
 
 
3.  Cruel or unusual punishment.  The juvenile also argues 
that her ninety-day sentence constituted cruel or unusual 
punishment in violation of art. 26 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights because it did not account for juvenile 
specific characteristics.  Because we vacate the juvenile's 
sentence on the above stated grounds, we do not reach the 
constitutional issue.  However, we note that juvenile law and 
the juvenile courts inherently contemplate a juvenile's status, 
see, e.g., G. L. c. 119, § 53, and that just because there has 
been a violation of a protection afforded to a juvenile, that 
violation does not necessarily rise to the level of cruel or 
unusual.  Compare Commonwealth v. Okoro, 471 Mass. 51, 62 (2015) 
(mandatory life sentence with possibility of parole after 
fifteen years for juvenile convicted of murder in second degree 
not unconstitutional), with Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 667 (life 
sentence without possibility of parole for juvenile constituted 
cruel or unusual punishment). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment of contempt vacated.