Title: Mark Dean Schwab v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC07-1603
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: November 1, 2007

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
_____________ 
 
No. SC07-1603 
_____________ 
 
MARK DEAN SCHWAB, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
[November 1, 2007] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Mark Dean Schwab, a prisoner under sentence of death and under an active 
death warrant, appeals the circuit court’s order denying his successive motion for 
postconviction relief, which was filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.851.  Because the order concerns postconviction relief from a sentence 
of death, this Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under article V, section 3(b)(1), 
Florida Constitution.  For the reasons stated below, we affirm the postconviction 
court’s order denying relief. 
This case involves the kidnapping and murder of eleven-year-old Junny 
Rios-Martinez in April 1991.  Schwab was convicted of first-degree murder, sexual 
battery of a child, and kidnapping, and was sentenced to death.  The factual 
background and procedural history of this case are detailed in this Court’s opinion 
on Schwab’s direct appeal.  See Schwab v. State, 636 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1994).  After 
we affirmed his conviction and sentence of death, Schwab unsuccessfully sought 
postconviction relief, both before this Court and before the federal courts.  See 
Schwab v. State, 814 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 2002) (affirming circuit court’s denial of 
motion for postconviction relief and denying petition for writ of habeas corpus); 
Schwab v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2006) (affirming trial court’s denial of 
federal habeas corpus relief), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1126 (2007).  On July 18, 
2007, Governor Charlie Crist signed a death warrant setting Schwab’s execution 
for November 15, 2007.  In response to the signing of the death warrant, Schwab 
filed a second motion for postconviction relief, raising two claims: (1) Florida’s 
lethal injection method of execution violates the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the United States Constitution and corresponding provisions of the 
Florida Constitution; and (2) newly discovered evidence reveals that Schwab 
suffers from neurological brain impairment, which makes his sentence of death 
constitutionally unreliable.  After the State filed its response, the postconviction 
court summarily denied all claims presented in the successive motion.  This appeal 
follows. 
ANALYSIS 
 
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In his first claim, Schwab raises numerous subissues relating to whether 
Florida’s lethal injection protocol violates the Eighth Amendment.1  Schwab first 
asserts that the postconviction court erred in summarily denying this claim without 
holding an evidentiary hearing.  The State contends that Schwab’s challenge to 
Florida’s method of execution is procedurally barred because Schwab should have 
raised it within one year of the time that lethal injection became a method of 
execution.  We disagree that this claim is procedurally barred.  Schwab relies on 
the execution of Angel Diaz and alleges that the newly created lethal injection 
protocol does not sufficiently address the problems which occurred in the case of 
Diaz—a claim that did not exist when lethal injection was first authorized.  As this 
Court has held before, when an inmate presents an Eighth Amendment claim 
which is based primarily upon facts that occurred during a recent execution, the 
claim is not procedurally barred.  See Buenoano v. State, 565 So. 2d 309, 311 (Fla. 
1990) (holding Eighth Amendment challenge to electrocution was not procedurally 
                                          
 
 
1.  As to this issue, Schwab asserts that the postconviction court erred by: (1) 
summarily denying his Eighth Amendment claim; (2) rejecting a foreseeable risk 
standard; (3) rejecting his argument that the use of a paralytic violates the Eighth 
Amendment; (4) declining to take judicial notice of another case which was also 
raising this same claim (the case of State v. Lightbourne, No. 1981-170CF (Fla. 5th 
Cir. Ct.)); (5) deferring unduly to the Department of Corrections; (6) declining to 
find that the problems with Angel Diaz’s execution are relevant to this claim; (7) 
denying Schwab’s request for public records; (8) rejecting Schwab’s argument that 
consciousness assessment must meet a clinical standard using medical expertise 
and equipment; and (9) finding the motion for postconviction relief was 
insufficiently pled. 
 
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barred because the “claim rest[ed] primarily upon facts which occurred only 
recently during Tafero’s execution”); see also Lightbourne v. McCollum, No. 
SC06-2391 (Fla. order filed Dec. 14, 2006) (relinquishing this same claim to the 
circuit court for an evidentiary hearing after problems occurred during Diaz’s 
recent execution and implicitly recognizing that this claim was not procedurally 
barred). 
In a somewhat related subclaim, Schwab asserts that the circuit court erred 
in failing to take judicial notice of the circuit court record in State v. Lightbourne, 
No. 1981-170CF (Fla. 5th Cir. Ct.) (Lightbourne).  Before addressing this claim on 
the merits, it is important to review the unique circumstances of the Lightbourne 
case and its impact here. 
On December 13, 2006, Angel Diaz was executed by lethal injection, but the 
lethal chemicals were injected subcutaneously, resulting in an execution which 
took substantially longer than any previous lethal injection execution in Florida.  
The next day, Ian Lightbourne and other death row inmates filed an emergency all 
writs petition, challenging whether Florida’s lethal injection protocol violates the 
Eighth Amendment and requesting a hearing on the matter.  This Court 
relinquished jurisdiction to the circuit court to decide the issues that required 
factual development, thus implicitly recognizing that the petitioners raised a legally 
cognizable claim.  See Lightbourne v. McCollum, No. SC06-2391 (Fla. order filed 
 
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Dec. 14, 2006) (relinquishing jurisdiction).  While the Eighth Amendment claim 
was still being litigated in Lightbourne, Governor Crist signed Schwab’s death 
warrant.  Schwab then filed a motion for postconviction relief, raising the claim 
that the procedure for lethal injection is unconstitutional and relying on the newly 
discovered evidence pertaining to Diaz’s execution and the findings of the 
Governor’s Commission on Administration of Lethal Injection. 
In the order denying postconviction relief, the court below recognized that 
judicial oversight of the protocol was appropriate but found that judicial economy 
would not be served by holding a hearing on the matter when this same issue was 
already extensively explored by Judge Angel in Lightbourne.  Despite this ruling, 
the court then stated without elaboration: “The parties have stipulated that the 
Lightbourne hearing testimony may be judicially noticed in this case, but the Court 
has deliberately elected not to take judicial notice at this time and has not reviewed 
the evidence presented therein.”  Schwab challenges this decision, asserting that 
the postconviction judge should have granted the motion, particularly since both 
parties stipulated to the introduction of this material and reasonably relied upon the 
Lightbourne materials being in the record based on the court’s initial 
representations indicating that it would take notice of that testimony. 
Section 90.202, Florida Statutes (2006), provides in relevant part: 
 
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A court may take judicial notice of the following matters, to the 
extent that they are not embraced within s. 90.201 [setting forth those 
items that “must” be judicially noticed]:  
. . . . 
(6) Records of any court of this state or of any court of record 
of the United States or of any state, territory, or jurisdiction of the 
United States. 
 
See § 90.202(6), Fla. Stat. (2006).  Taking judicial notice of such matters is purely 
a matter of judicial discretion.  See id.; Elmore v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 895 So. 
2d 475, 478 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).  Under the unique circumstances of this case and 
based on the court’s other ruling summarily denying relief, we hold that the 
postconviction court erred in failing to take judicial notice of the record in 
Lightbourne.  Since Schwab’s allegations were sufficiently pled, the 
postconviction court should have either granted Schwab an evidentiary hearing, or 
if Schwab was relying upon the evidence already presented in Lightbourne, the 
court should have taken judicial notice of that evidence.2  Cf. Sims v. State, 750 
So. 2d 622, 623 n.3 (Fla. 1979) (taking judicial notice of records in Provenzano v. 
Moore, 744 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1999); Provenzano v. State, 739 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 
1999); Jones v. State, 701 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1997); and Jones v. Butterworth, 691 So. 
2d 481 (Fla. 1997)).  Nevertheless, the postconviction court’s error is harmless 
                                          
 
 
2.  In this case, judicial notice would have been sufficient because Schwab 
has not presented any argument as to specific evidence he wanted to present in this 
case that had not been presented in the Lightbourne proceeding. 
 
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because this Court considered all of the evidence presented in Lightbourne when 
reviewing the Eighth Amendment challenge presented here. 
In the third subissue that we address, Schwab challenges the circuit court’s 
ruling which denied his public records requests.  Schwab filed an initial motion to 
compel the production of numerous records from Florida’s Department of 
Corrections (DOC), including materials pertaining to the training of execution 
team members; the records pertaining to the identity and addresses of non-
departmental persons who consulted with the DOC concerning execution training; 
documentation of the qualifications, licenses, training, and education of execution 
team members; copies of training manuals and other items pertaining to the 
training of execution team members; medication management and chemical 
procurement protocols; records of mock executions; scientific and research 
materials used by the DOC for preparing lethal chemicals; and any nondisclosure 
agreements between the DOC and suppliers of the chemicals.  The DOC responded 
with numerous objections.  After holding a hearing on the requests and objections, 
the circuit court issued a lengthy order, finding that Schwab did not demonstrate 
that the requested records related to a colorable claim for relief and concluded that 
Schwab was on a fishing expedition.3  In order to dispute the finding as to a fishing 
                                          
 
 
3.  Schwab filed the motion to compel prior to filing his motion for 
postconviction relief, and the court ruled on the motion before the rule 3.851 
motion was filed.  In its order, the court recognized that it was difficult to assess 
 
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expedition, Schwab filed a motion for reconsideration with an attachment from a 
“quality assurance auditor,” explaining in detail that the quality assurance auditor 
needed the requested documents in order to provide an assessment as to the 
reliability and efficacy of the DOC’s execution procedures.  The circuit court 
denied the motion for reconsideration, explaining that since it found that an 
evidentiary hearing was not warranted, the court found no reason to reconsider its 
prior decision in denying the motion to compel. 
As recognized above, Schwab was either entitled to an evidentiary hearing 
or to have the court below take judicial notice as to the evidence presented in 
Lightbourne.  Schwab does not allege that there were public records that he needed 
which were not produced or admitted into evidence in Lightbourne.  Moreover, 
while Schwab’s motion for consideration did provide more detail as to how the 
requested information was relevant to his claims, his argument for production 
relied upon the affidavit of a “quality assurance auditor.”  Schwab fails to 
sufficiently explain how this auditor is qualified to provide a reliability and 
efficacy report on DOC’s method of execution.  Accordingly, we deny this claim. 
                                                                                                                                        
how certain requested materials would relate to any claim since no claims had yet 
been filed. 
 
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In the final lethal injection subissue that we specifically address,4 Schwab 
challenges the use of a paralytic drug during an execution, alleging that there is no 
legitimate clinical reason for using a paralytic and that the Governor’s Commission 
on Administration of Lethal Injection questioned the wisdom of using such a 
drug.5  Without commenting specifically on the argument concerning the chemic
mix used during lethal injection, the trial court concluded that Schwab did not 
allege facts which required an evidentiary hearing regarding whether the current 
DOC protocol might be found to violate his constitutional rights.  On appeal, 
al 
                                          
 
4.  Schwab raises numerous other Eighth Amendment challenges that were 
also presented in Lightbourne.  This Court addresses those arguments in depth in 
that opinion.  Accordingly, we do not repeat those same rulings here but rely on 
our concurrent holding in Lightbourne v. McCollum, No. SC06-2391 (Fla. Nov. 1, 
2007), to dispose of Schwab’s challenges as to whether the postconviction court 
erred when it rejected a foreseeable risk standard, deferred unduly to DOC, and 
rejected his argument that a consciousness assessment must meet a clinical 
standard using medical expertise and equipment.  Schwab also contends that the 
circuit court erred in finding that his motion was insufficiently pled.  We do not 
interpret the lower court’s order as denying the motion as insufficiently pled and 
thus reject this claim. 
 
5.  The Commission recommended that: 
[T]he Governor have the Florida Department of Corrections on an 
ongoing basis explore other more recently developed chemicals for 
use in a lethal injection execution with specific consideration and 
evaluation of the need for a paralytic drug like pancuronium bromide 
in an effort to make the lethal injection execution procedure less 
problematic.  
The Governor’s Commission on Administration of Lethal Injection, Final Report 
with Findings and Recommendations (March 1, 2007) at 13 (emphasis added). 
 
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Schwab argues that the trial court erred in summarily rejecting his claim because 
his factual allegations were not conclusively refuted by the record. 
Before addressing Schwab’s specific challenge, it is important to note: (1) 
Schwab does not assert that he would have presented any additional testimony or 
other evidence regarding pancuronium bromide than that presented in Lightbourne; 
and (2) Schwab relies upon no new evidence as to the chemicals employed since 
this Court’s previous rulings rejecting this very challenge.  In Sims v. State, 754 
So. 2d 657, 668 (Fla. 2000), after reviewing the evidentiary hearing, including 
testimony from defense experts which questioned the chemicals to be administered 
during executions, this Court held that “the procedures for administering the lethal 
injection . . . do not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment.”  754 So. 2d at 668.  The Court reiterated its Sims holding in 
Hill v. State, 921 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 2006), where the petitioner challenged the use of 
specific chemicals in lethal injection, asserting that a research study published in 
the medical journal The Lancet presented new evidence that Florida’s lethal 
injection procedures may subject the inmate to unnecessary pain.  See id. at 582 
(discussing Leonidas G. Koniaris et al., Inadequate Anaesthesia in Lethal Injection 
for Execution, 365 Lancet 1412 (2005)).  This Court held that the study did not 
justify holding an evidentiary hearing in the case and relied on its prior decision in 
Sims.  Id. at 583; see also Rutherford v. State, 926 So. 2d 1100, 1113-14 (Fla.) 
 
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(rejecting the argument that the study published in The Lancet presented new 
scientific evidence that Florida’s lethal injection procedure created a foreseeable 
risk of the gratuitous infliction of unnecessary pain on the person being executed), 
cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1160 (2006); Rolling v. State, 944 So. 2d 176, 179 (Fla. 
2006) (same). 
In turning to the evidence presented in Lightbourne regarding this claim, we 
find that the toxicology and anesthesiology experts who testified in Lightbourne 
agreed that if the sodium pentothal is successfully administered as specified in the 
protocol, the inmate will not be aware of any of the effects of the pancuronium 
bromide and thus will not suffer any pain.  Moreover, the protocol has been 
amended since Diaz’s execution so that the warden will ensure that the inmate is 
unconscious before the pancuronium bromide and the potassium chloride are 
injected.  Schwab does not allege that he has additional experts who would give 
different views as to the three-drug protocol.  Given the record in Lightbourne and 
our extensive analysis in our opinion in Lightbourne v. McCollum, we reject the 
conclusion that lethal injection as applied in Florida is unconstitutional. 
In his second claim for relief, Schwab argues that his sentence of death is 
constitutionally unreliable based upon newly discovered evidence of neurological 
impairment and a connection between brain pathology and sexual offense.  Schwab 
submitted, as attachments to his rule 3.851 motion, a report by Dr. Hyman H. 
 
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Eisenstein, Ph.D., a neuropsychologist, which concluded that Schwab suffers from 
organic brain impairment in the frontal lobe of the right brain, and two recent 
scholarly articles regarding brain anatomy and sexual offense. 
To obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, a defendant must 
meet two requirements.  First, the evidence must not have been known by the trial 
court, the party, or counsel at the time of trial, and it must appear that the defendant 
or defense counsel could not have known of it by the use of diligence.  Second, the 
newly discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would probably produce 
an acquittal on retrial.  See Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512, 521 (Fla. 1998).  If the 
defendant is seeking to vacate a death sentence, the second prong requires that the 
newly discovered evidence would probably yield a less severe sentence.  See Jones 
v. State, 591 So. 2d 911, 915 (Fla. 1991).  Claims in successive motions may be 
denied without an evidentiary hearing “[i]f the motion, files, and records in the 
case conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief.”  White v. State, 32 
Fla. L. Weekly S494, S495 (Fla. July 12, 2007) (citing Fla. R. Crim. P. 
3.851(f)(5)(B)). 
We affirm the circuit court’s holding that Schwab’s claim regarding 
neurological impairment is procedurally barred because it could have been raised 
in Schwab’s initial postconviction proceeding.  The record reveals that Schwab 
repeatedly alleged that he suffers from brain damage in his initial postconviction 
 
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motion.  The trial court granted Schwab an evidentiary hearing on the claims that 
included brain damage allegations, and Schwab presented no evidence regarding 
his brain damage.  Schwab had an opportunity to pursue this topic as potential 
mitigation and failed to do so.  Thus, he is now procedurally barred from doing so. 
As for Schwab’s argument that he is entitled to a new trial due to two recent 
scientific articles regarding brain anatomy and sexual offense, this Court has not 
recognized “new opinions” or “new research studies” as newly discovered 
evidence.  Cf. Diaz v. State, 945 So. 2d 1136, 1144 (Fla.) (holding doctor’s letter 
discussing lethal injection research was not newly discovered evidence because 
author’s conclusions were based on data from 1950), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 850 
(2006); Rutherford v. State, 940 So. 2d 1112, 1117 (Fla. 2006) (holding American 
Bar Association report published in 2006 was not newly discovered evidence 
because it was “a compilation of previously available information related to 
Florida’s death penalty system”), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 465 (2006). 
Even if the articles were “newly discovered” evidence, we agree with the 
postconviction court that Schwab has not satisfied the second Jones prong.  Jones, 
591 So. 2d at 915.  The alleged newly discovered evidence is not of such a nature 
that it would probably yield a less severe sentence on retrial.  While the sentencing 
judge found that the trial evidence established the “substantially impaired ability to 
conform one’s conduct” mitigating factor, he also found that the trial evidence 
 
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indicated that Schwab may have been “unwilling” rather than “unable” to control 
his desires.  Accordingly, new evidence truly demonstrating that Schwab could not 
control his conduct could impact sentencing.  However, we agree with the 
postconviction court that these scientific articles are not such evidence.  As the 
postconviction court found, “neither article affirmatively asserts that [brain 
damage] causes such crimes as committed by Mr. Schwab.”  Neither article posits 
a solely neuroanatomical etiology for sexual offense, nor do the articles negate the 
sentencing judge’s conclusion that carefully planned crimes such as those 
committed by Schwab are largely inconsistent with Schwab’s claim that he could 
not control his behavior. 
Based on the foregoing, Schwab is not entitled to a new trial on the basis of 
this allegedly newly discovered evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the circuit court’s order denying 
Schwab’s successive motion for postconviction relief. 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., 
concur. 
ANSTEAD, J., concurs in result only. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
 
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An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Brevard County,  
Charles M. Holcomb, Judge - Case No. 05-1991-7249-AXXX 
 
Bill Jennings, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Mark S. Gruber, Peter J. 
Cannon, and Daphney Gaylord, Assistant CCRC, Middle Region, Tampa, Florida 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Kenneth S. Nunnelley, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee