Title: Oakes v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 590, 2012
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: May 23, 2013

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DONALD OAKES,  
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 590, 2012 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below—Superior Court  
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
Cr. ID No. 1009008282 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§   
 
Submitted: March 8, 2013 
Decided: 
May 23, 2013  
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 23rd day of May 2013, upon consideration of the briefs of the 
parties and the Superior Court record, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Donald Oakes (“Oakes”), filed this appeal from 
the Superior Court’s denial of his first motion for postconviction relief under 
Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61”).  We conclude there is no 
merit to the appeal and affirm the Superior Court’s judgment. 
(2) 
By grand jury indictment on November 8, 2010, followed by a 
reindictment on March 14, 2011, Oakes was charged with Assault in the 
Second Degree, Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of 
a 
Felony 
(“PDWDCF”), 
Malicious 
Interference 
with 
Emergency 
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Communications, and Criminal Mischief.  On May 3, 2011, the Superior 
Court dismissed the charges without prejudice when the victim failed to 
appear for trial.  By order dated June 22, 2011, the Superior Court vacated 
the dismissal, and the case was rescheduled for trial.   
(3) 
On September 13, 2011, the first day of Oakes’ trial, Oakes met 
with his defense counsel but then left the courthouse.  The resulting capias 
was returned on October 4, 2011. 
(4) 
On October 24, 2011, Oakes was reindicted on the charges of 
Assault in the Second Degree, PDWDCF, Malicious Interference with 
Emergency Communications, and Criminal Mischief.  Oakes was also 
charged with Aggravated Menacing, PDWDCF, Noncompliance with Bond 
Conditions, and Act of Intimidation (hereinafter “the additional charges”). 
(5) 
On November 16, 2011, Oakes pled guilty to Aggravated 
Menacing and PDWDCF.  As part of the plea agreement, the State nolle 
prossed the remaining charges.  The State also agreed not to seek to have 
Oakes sentenced as a habitual offender and to cap its sentence 
recommendation to four years at Level V.  On February 17, 2012, the 
Superior Court sentenced Oakes to a total of five and one-half years at Level 
V suspended after four years for decreasing levels of probation. 
3 
 
(6) 
On April 10, 2012, Oakes filed a motion for postconviction 
relief.  Oakes challenged the additional charges sought in the October 24, 
2011 reindictment and alleged that his defense counsel’s failure to challenge 
the additional charges was ineffective assistance of counsel. 
(7) 
Oakes’ postconviction motion was referred to a Superior Court 
commissioner who directed that the State file a response to the motion and 
that Oakes’ defense counsel file an affidavit responding to the allegations of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  After those pleadings were filed, Oakes 
filed an “amendment” to the postconviction motion followed by a reply to 
the State’s response. 
(8) 
In a report dated September 11, 2012, the commissioner 
recommended that the postconviction motion should be denied.  By order 
dated October 10, 2012, Superior Court adopted the report and 
recommendation and denied Oakes’ motion for postconviction relief.  This 
appeal followed. 
(9) 
Having carefully considered the parties’ briefs, we conclude 
that the denial of Oakes’ postconviction motion should be affirmed.  The 
Superior Court appropriately denied Oakes’ ineffective counsel claim as 
without merit after determining that Oakes’ decision to accept the plea offer 
was a “rational choice” that was made after defense counsel fully advised 
4 
 
him of “all the potential risks, defenses and benefits, and all the potential 
issues in the case.”  Significantly, Oakes did not allege in his postconviction 
motion and does not allege on appeal (nor does the record reflect) that his 
guilty plea was unknowing and/or involuntary.  A voluntary guilty plea 
constitutes a waiver of any alleged errors or defects occurring prior to the 
entry of the plea.* 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                          
 
* See Smith v. State, 2004 WL 120530 (Del. Jan. 15, 2004) (citing Somerville v. State, 
703 A.2d 629, 631 (Del. 1997)).