Title: Crandall v. ND High School Activities Ass'n
Citation: 261 N.W.2d 921
Docket Number: 9412
State: north-dakota
Issuer: north-dakota Supreme Court
Date: January 26, 1978

261 N.W.2d 921 (1978) Carl CRANDALL, by his next friend, Nona Crandall, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. NORTH DAKOTA HIGH SCHOOL ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATION and F. U. Smith, Executive Secretary, Defendants and Appellants. Civ. No. 9412. Supreme Court of North Dakota. January 26, 1978. *922 Zuger &amp; Bucklin, Bismarck, for defendants and appellants; argued by Leonard H. Bucklin, Bismarck. McClintock, Butz &amp; Kraft, Rugby, for plaintiff and appellee; argued by Carlan J. Kraft, Rugby. SAND, Justice. The North Dakota High School Activities Association [hereinafter Association] appealed from an order, also serving as a memorandum of decision,[1] filed in McHenry *923 County district court on 1 September 1977, enjoining it from holding Drake High School student Carl Crandall ineligible to participate in interscholastic activities or from imposing any sanctions upon Crandall or the school by reason of his participation. The board of directors of the Association, on 22 August 1977, ruled that Carl Crandall would be ineligible for interscholastic activities at the Drake High School for 18 weeks unless his parents moved into the Drake High School district. Immediately thereafter, Nona Crandall, the mother of Carl Crandall, commenced this action with a summons and complaint seeking a declaratory judgment under Chapter 32-23, North Dakota Century Code, and a judgment restraining and enjoining the Association from declaring Carl ineligible for interscholastic activities (football), and from penalizing Drake High School. At the same time she filed an affidavit and requested the court to issue an order restraining and enjoining the Association from declaring Carl ineligible for interscholastic activities at Drake High School during the pendency of the action. The court issued its order to show cause and subsequently held a hearing on 30 August 1977, at which time oral testimony was received. After the hearing, the court issued its memorandum opinion which also served as an order. Counsel for the respective parties later stipulated that "it is their understanding and agreement that the Court's order dated September 1, 1977 [memorandum opinion order], is not preliminary in nature and that no further action needs to be taken by any party to make the order final." The court also issued an order confirming the memorandum opinion order "as the final order in this case." The stipulation and confirmation by the court that the order was final appears an obvious effort to satisfy Rule 54(b), North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure. Under these circumstances, the memorandum opinion order is appealable. Carl attended the eighth and ninth grades at Drake High School, where he lettered in football. During the 1976-77 school year he was a sophomore at Mott High School. His father, a Methodist minister, was then transferred from Mott to Cleveland, at which point Carl elected to attend Drake High School during the 1977-78 school year. His parents, at the time, were residents of Cleveland. At the hearing on the order to show cause, Carl testified that he decided to attend Drake High School primarily because he believed its scholastic program to be superior to Cleveland's. The following exchange took place on direct examination of Carl. The trial court held that the rule upon which the Association found Carl ineligible *924 was unreasonable and in violation of his personal rights. The trial court's memorandum opinion stated: The memorandum of decision was converted into a final order restraining and enjoining the Association, as stated earlier. The appeal followed. The Association, the appellant, is an unincorporated association of North Dakota high schools which administers a program of interscholastic activities, including athletic competition among its member schools. Its purpose is stated in Article II of its Constitution: Article XIII of the Association's By-Laws contains the "Rules of Eligibility" for competitors in interscholastic contests. Section X of Article XIII, which is significant to the issues involved here, provides in part: The Association, on appeal, contends it is a voluntary association and that absent allegations of fraud, mistake, bad faith, or collusion, the courts should not interfere in its internal affairs, which include its eligibility rules. Alternatively, the Association contends that its eligibility rules satisfy the requirement of reasonableness. Although the Association considers and refers to itself as a voluntary association, it was brought out during oral argument, and it is common knowledge, that its program, by various means, is primarily supported by and through the use of public funds. Some of the items which are paid for from public funds, to name a few, include salaries of coaches, costs of uniforms, costs of equipment, costs of transportation, the cost for maintaining a field or area to practice, and the payment of membership dues, which is substantial amount. The Legislature has endorsed the program of the Association by the enactment of § 15-29-08(20), NDCC, which provides as follows: In our view, the Association has been recognized by the Legislature as performing a valid, needed function in administering interscholastic activities and as such is acting in a manner comparable to a quasi-governmental body. We further believe rules are necessary to accomplish and fulfill the purposes and objectives of the Association. Although Drake High School voluntarily agreed to be a member of the Association and pay dues as permitted by law and to abide by the rules of the Association, we believe that the trial court had jurisdiction to review the regulations in question because the Association is primarily supported by public funds and is performing a quasi-governmental function. In Quimby v. School District No. 21 of Pinal County, 10 Ariz.App. 69, 455 P.2d 1019 (1969), the Arizona Court of Appeals, after a student alleged his individual rights were being violated, reviewed a regulation making a student ineligible for interscholastic activities. The Court, discussing judicial review of the state high school activities association, stated: This concept applies to the instant case. We are not persuaded by the Association's argument that the court should not interfere with the internal affairs of a voluntary association absent fraud, lack of jurisdiction, or the invasion of property or pecuniary rights or interests. We agree with the trial court that it had jurisdiction. However, we do not concur in the results reached by the trial court. The responsibility for the total educational process rests with the Legislature and the school officials. We must assume that they collectively are concerned with the development of the whole person without overemphasizing extra-curricular activities, including sports, so as not to interfere with the academic goals and responsibilities of life, which is the objective of the educational system. See also, Article VIII, Education, North Dakota Constitution. Until the school system itself undertakes to administer the extra-curricular activities, or separates itself completely, the Association will have to continue to perform this function; otherwise we would have a vacuum in which each school would be guided solely by its own individual concepts which could invite disaster. As stated in Bunger v. Iowa High School Activities Association, 197 N.W.2d 555, 561 (Iowa 1972): The purpose behind the Association's eligibility rules pertaining to athletics, found in Article XIII, Section X, may be stated as being two-fold: (1) to prevent schools from recruiting or pirating students for interscholastic competition; and (2) to eliminate athletics as a student's reason for transferring from one school to another. We believe the purpose behind the rules is legitimate and that the Association's eligibility rules are reasonably related to that purpose. See, Quimby, supra, 455 P.2d at 1022. Court decisions have established that voluntary associations have the power to adopt reasonable bylaws and rules which, if not in violation of a law or public policy, will be binding upon their members. See, e. g., *926 Kentucky High School Athletic Association v. Hopkins County Board of Education, 552 S.W.2d 685 (Ky.App.1977). A general statement of the law is found at 6 Am. Jur.2d, Associations and Clubs, § 6: In Libby v. Perry, 311 A.2d 527, 532 (Me. 1973), the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine recognized that the constitution and bylaws of a voluntary association, when not unreasonable or contrary to public policy or constitutional or statutory law, make up a valid and enforceable contract between the members and the association. The Court noted: The Minnesota Supreme Court, in Brown v. Wells, 288 Minn. 468, 181 N.W.2d 708, 711 (1970), held that where eligibility rules for hockey tournaments were adopted to de-emphasize extra-curricular activities detracting from the total educational process, such rules were not unreasonable or arbitrary. The Court said: We agree with this standard of review. Carl also asserted that the eligibility rules are arbitrary and unreasonable because they contain no exception for students who transfer solely for academic reasons. The exceptions to the eligibility rules are found in subsection (b), Section X, Article XIII, of the Association's By-Laws: The eligibility rules in Section X apply to all member schools and students and the Association's Board of Directors can make exceptions only as provided in subsection (b), although the Board can hear appeals from dissatisfied participants, parents, contest officials, coaches, or member schools. Even though Crandall argued that the rules should not apply to him because he transferred primarily for academic reasons, the fact remains that the eligibility rules make no distinction for this reason. Perhaps the Association does not make this distinction because of the administrative burden of a case-by-case ruling. However, we do not believe that this Court should determine the wisdom of such rules when they are reasonable and when they accomplish the legitimate purpose for which they were promulgated without being discriminatory. These rules apply equally to Association member schools and students. See, e. g., Bruce v. South Carolina High School League, 258 S.C. 546, 189 S.E.2d 817, 819 (1972). Under these circumstances, justice requires that we reverse the order of the district court and remand the case for the purpose of dissolving the restraining order *927 against the North Dakota High School Activities Association. We also find it necessary to state that the Association should not impose any sanctions or otherwise penalize Drake High School for the past activity, as suggested in the Association's brief, because, as the record reflects, the school acted pursuant to a court order. It would be unjust to penalize or sanction the high school for complying with a court order, particularly where the high school was not a party to the proceedings and was not in a position to take appropriate action to either modify or set aside any judicial order. The Association, however, may impose upon Carl Crandall the eighteen-week waiting period in the new school year (1978-1979) if he attends Drake High School unless his parents take up residence there. The order appealed from is reversed and this matter is remanded to the trial court with instructions to dissolve the restraining order against the North Dakota High School Activities Association. Because this is a matter of public concern, no costs are allowed to either party. ERICKSTAD, C. J., and PAULSON, PEDERSON and VOGEL, JJ., concur. [1] The memorandum of decision contained adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law to satisfy the requirements of Rule 52(a), North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure.