Title: Briggs v. Johnson
Citation: 196 N.W.2d 470
Docket Number: 42994
State: Minnesota
Issuer: Minnesota Supreme Court
Date: March 31, 1972

196 N.W.2d 470 (1972) Norman B. BRIGGS, et al., Respondents, v. George A. JOHNSON, et al., Appellants. No. 42994. Supreme Court of Minnesota. March 31, 1972. George A. Johnson, pro se, Bruce R. S. Johnson, Minneapolis, for appellants. Cohen &amp; Budd, Minneapolis, for respondents. Heard before KNUTSON, C. J., and MURPHY, OTIS, and PETERSON, JJ. OTIS, Justice. This is an action to enjoin the cancellation of a contract for deed. The issue is whether the purchasers' default in payments on a mortgage constituted a violation of the conditions of the contract so as to authorize the vendors to cancel the contract. The trial court found that the vendees' payment of the mortgage is not a condition precedent to keeping the contract in force, and we agree. *471 The parties have stipulated to the facts as follows: The relevant provisions of the contract for deed are as follows: The trial court found that defendants drafted the contract and that, subsequent to plaintiffs' execution of the mortgage note, defendants also executed it and assumed responsibility for the payment of the mortgage without invitation, knowledge, or approval of plaintiffs. The court reached the following conclusion: *472 In a memorandum, the court gave the following reasons for its holding: We concur in the decision of the trial court, recognizing the dilemma in which the vendors find themselves. While defendants argue that the reference in the contract to the first mortgage of $22,500 implies as a matter of law that the purchasers' obligation to maintain the mortgage is superimposed on the contract as a condition thereof, this was not expressed in the contract. It can as readily be construed to indicate only the manner in which the financing would be accomplished, that is to say $3,000 in cash, $22,500 by securing a mortgage, and the balance of $4,500 to be paid by a contract for deed over a 7-year period. While it is likely that the prospective mortgagee would not make the loan without the vendors' joining on the mortgage note, this was not anything contemplated by the contract for deed between the parties. To that extent, vendors were volunteers. The cases cited by defendants do not require a different result. In Gustafson v. Koehler, 177 Minn. 115, 224 N.W. 699 (1929), we held that where property is purchased subject to a mortgage without an express assumption clause, the purchaser's agreement to assume could be shown by parol. We concluded that the grantor had a cause of action against the grantee for failing to pay the mortgage without the grantor himself being required to pay that debt. Kirk v. Welch, 212 Minn. 300, 3 N.W.2d 426 (1942), involved an express assumption of a mortgage by the purchaser. We said that an agreement to assume a mortgage is also one to pay the same and confers on the grantor a cause of action for the balance of the purchase price under a contract for deed. Neither of these cases governs the decision in the matter before us. There was no mortgage on the property when plaintiffs purchased it. The contract was prepared by defendants and contained no express agreement that plaintiffs had a duty to keep current the payments on the mortgage which was contemplated. We need not anticipate the remedies available to defendants in order to enforce their contract. They have received at least $25,500 on the contract and are entitled to recover the remainder by whatever legal route they select. While they may lose their security interest if the mortgage is foreclosed, the purchasers' liability on the contract is not thereby satisfied. Nor do we speculate on what equitable rights defendants may have if they themselves continue to make payments on the mortgage. Suffice it to say that we share the views expressed by the trial court that to construe the contract in the manner for which defendants contend would deprive plaintiffs of their right to redeem within 6 months and would reduce that period to 30 days. We are of the opinion that had this been the intention of the parties, it was incumbent on defendants, who drafted the instrument and who were professional real estate brokers, to impose that duty on the purchasers by including an express provision to that effect. Affirmed.