Title: Carter v. Chesterfield County Health Commission
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 991870
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 21, 2000

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, and 
Kinser, JJ., and Poff, Senior Justice 
 
VANCE W. CARTER, JR., ADMINISTRATOR OF 
THE ESTATE OF VANCE W. CARTER, SR., 
DECEASED 
 
v.  Record No. 991870     OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
April 21, 2000 
CHESTERFIELD COUNTY HEALTH 
COMMISSION, D/B/A LUCY CORR 
NURSING HOME 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
Theodore J. Markow, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court 
properly concluded that a county health commission was immune 
from tort liability because it was entitled to the status of a 
municipal corporation and was performing a governmental 
function in the operation of a nursing home. 
 
Vance W. Carter, Jr., Administrator of the Estate of 
Vance W. Carter, Sr., (the Administrator) filed a motion for 
judgment against the Chesterfield County Health Commission, 
d/b/a Lucy Corr Nursing Home, (the Commission) and others 
alleging that negligent acts of the Commission's employees in 
treating or failing to treat the decedent resulted in his 
death.  The Commission filed a special plea of sovereign 
immunity.  Based on the pleadings, memoranda, and argument of 
counsel, the trial court ruled that the operation of the 
nursing home by the Commission was a governmental function 
and, therefore, entitled to sovereign immunity.  The trial 
court dismissed the Administrator's claim against the 
Commission and granted the Administrator's motions to non-suit 
the remaining defendants.  We awarded the Administrator an 
appeal. 
The Commission is a political subdivision created by a 
locality pursuant to statutory authorization.  We have held 
that such entities may be entitled to the status of a 
municipal corporation for purposes of immunity from tort 
liability in certain circumstances.  Virginia Elec. and Power 
Co. v. Hampton Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 217 Va. 
30, 33, 225 S.E.2d 364, 367 (1976); Hampton Roads Sanitation 
Dist. v. Smith, 193 Va. 371, 377, 68 S.E.2d 497, 501 (1952).  
The parties generally agree that the Commission is entitled to 
the status of a municipal corporation. 
Municipal corporations are immune from tort liability 
when performing governmental functions, but are not immune 
when exercising proprietary functions.  City of Richmond v. 
Long's Adm'rs, 58 Va. (17 Gratt.) 375, 379 (1867), rev'd on 
other grounds, First Va. Bank-Colonial v. Baker, 225 Va. 72, 
301 S.E.2d 18 (1983).  The principles to be applied in 
determining whether a municipality is engaged in a proprietary 
or governmental function for purposes of immunity are well 
established.  A function is considered governmental if it is 
the exercise of an entity's political, discretionary, or 
 
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legislative authority.  If the function is a ministerial act, 
"assumed in consideration of the privileges conferred by . . . 
charter," and involves no discretion, it is proprietary.  Id.
 
The parties also agree that the Commission would be 
entitled to immunity if the operation of the nursing home were 
a governmental function.*  However, the Administrator asserts 
that the traditional analysis applied in determining whether a 
municipal function is proprietary or governmental is not 
applicable to entities such as the Commission because such 
"locally created commissions are further removed from the 
state" and, therefore, they "enjoy less protection than a 
municipality."  Rather, according to the Administrator, a new 
four-factor test for such locally created entities was 
enunciated and applied in Hampton Redevelopment and should be 
applied here.  We disagree with the Administrator. 
In Hampton Redevelopment, the housing authority relied 
solely on the statutory declaration of governmental purpose 
contained in Code § 36-2(1) to establish that the operation 
and maintenance of the housing development was a governmental 
function.  The housing authority did not challenge the trial 
                     
* The Commission, interpreting language in Hampton 
Redevelopment, also argued that the governmental-proprietary 
analysis was not applicable to it and that it was entitled to 
the absolute immunity from tort liability enjoyed by 
Chesterfield County because it was created by the county, not 
 
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court's conclusion that, absent the statutory declaration, the 
operation of the project would be "'as a normal matter, a 
proprietary function.'"  217 Va. at 36, 225 S.E.2d at 369.  
This Court rejected the housing authority's argument and 
concluded that maintaining and operating the housing project 
was a proprietary function "under any interpretation of the 
rules for determining whether a particular function is 
governmental or proprietary."  Id.
There is no indication in the Hampton Redevelopment 
opinion that the Court either intended to, or did, establish a 
new test for determining the nature of functions undertaken by 
entities such as the housing authority.  Consequently, Hampton 
Redevelopment does not support the Administrator's contention 
that entities such as the Commission should be afforded less 
protection than municipalities in matters of tort immunity or 
that a different standard should be applied to such entities 
in considering matters of governmental or proprietary 
functions.  Therefore, in resolving the case before us, we 
apply the same principles applied to municipalities. 
Although the principles for differentiating governmental 
and proprietary functions are easily recited, as we have often 
noted, application of these principles "has occasioned much 
                                                                
by a municipality.  This argument was not raised in the trial 
court, and we do not consider it here.  Rule 5:25. 
 
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difficulty."  Ashbury v. City of Norfolk, 152 Va. 278, 282, 
147 S.E. 223, 224 (1929).  Generally speaking, when the 
allegedly negligent act is one involving the maintenance or 
operation of the service being provided, the function is 
deemed to be proprietary.  Thus, a housing authority was not 
entitled to immunity because the alleged negligence — the 
location, installation, and maintenance of an electric 
"switching point box" — was part of the operation and 
maintenance of the housing project and therefore involved a 
proprietary function of the housing authority.  Hampton 
Redevelopment, 217 Va. at 32, 225 S.E.2d at 366. 
In contrast, we have held that municipalities are immune 
from tort liability based on allegations of negligence in the 
design of roads or streets or in the provision of hospital, 
ambulance, garbage, and emergency street clearing services.  
See Edwards v. City of Portsmouth, 237 Va. 167, 375 S.E.2d 747 
(1989); Fenon v. Norfolk, 203 Va. 551, 125 S.E.2d 808 (1962); 
City of Norfolk v. Hall, 175 Va. 545, 9 S.E.2d 356 (1940); 
Ashbury, 152 Va. 278, 147 S.E. 223; Long, 58 Va. (17 Gratt.) 
375.  The allegations of negligence in those cases involved 
acts performed in conjunction with the direct provision of the 
governmental service.  We variously described the functions at 
issue as exercises of a municipality's discretion, Long, 58 
Va. (17 Gratt.) at 379, activities undertaken for the common 
 
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good, id., or in the interest of public health and safety, 
Edwards, 237 Va. at 171, 375 S.E.2d at 750, and exercises of 
powers "delegated or imposed" upon the municipality.  Id., 375 
S.E.2d at 749. 
The Administrator argues that the operation of the 
nursing home in this case is a proprietary function because 
fees were charged, the nursing home was not available for the 
benefit of all Chesterfield residents but "only a select few" 
(as well as non-Chesterfield County residents), the same 
service was available from private vendors, the nursing home 
chiefly served the poor rather than a general public need, and 
was "designed to privatize the County's nursing home 
business."  These factors, as the Administrator correctly 
contends, were identified in Hampton Redevelopment as indicia 
of a proprietary function.  However, as noted above, these 
factors did not create a new test and were not contested 
matters in that case. 
More importantly, many of these same characteristics were 
raised and rejected as relevant indicia of proprietary 
functions in a subsequent case.  In Edwards, the appellant 
argued that the City-provided emergency ambulance service was 
a proprietary function because such service was not needed for 
the health, safety, and welfare of the City, fees were charged 
for the service, the service benefited only those who chose to 
 
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use and pay for it rather than the general public, and the 
City was not the only provider of emergency ambulance service.  
237 Va. at 170, 375 S.E.2d at 749.  The Court in Edwards 
rejected these arguments and stated that the test for 
establishing a proprietary function "cannot be whether the 
same thing is done by private entities" or whether a fee is 
charged.  237 Va. at 171-72, 375 S.E.2d at 750.  Rather the 
test applied by the Court in Edwards was "whether, in 
providing such services, the governmental entity is exercising 
the powers and duties of government conferred by law for the 
general benefit and well-being of its citizens."  Id. at 172, 
375 S.E.2d at 750. 
In light of the holding in Edwards, the Administrator's 
argument that the Commission was engaged in a proprietary 
function cannot be sustained simply on the basis that the 
Commission charged a fee and provided a service which was not 
available to every citizen in the county and was also 
available from private sources.  
Edwards is also instructive because of another similarity 
it shares with the instant case.  In Edwards, former Code 
§ 32.1-156 required the City to make a finding that the 
ambulance services were necessary to preserve, protect, and 
promote public health, safety, and general welfare prior to 
authorizing the ambulance service.  In making that finding and 
 
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authorization, the City, according to Edwards, exercised its 
police powers and "the governmental aspect of the undertaking 
[was] controlling."  237 Va. at 172, 376 S.E.2d at 750. 
As in Edwards, prior to creating the Commission, 
Chesterfield County was required to find that there was a 
public need for the Commission and that the nursing services 
were necessary to protect the public health and welfare.  Code 
§ 15.2-5202.  The County's resolution stated that a public 
need existed for the establishment of the Commission, that the 
public health and welfare required the operation of public 
hospital facilities, "particularly nursing homes," and that 
the Commission was to operate the nursing home, hospital, or 
health center facility.  While these declarations are not 
dispositive, they are more significant than the statutory 
declarations justifying expenditure of public funds cited in 
Hampton Redevelopment.  As in Edwards, by enacting the 
resolution creating the Commission, the local government 
exercised its police power.  Furthermore, the provision of 
nursing home services at issue here is of the same nature as 
the provision of emergency ambulance services in Edwards and 
the hospital services in Long, and unlike the safe maintenance 
and operation of a housing project at issue in Hampton 
Redevelopment.  
 
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Considering our prior cases and the record here, we 
conclude that the provision of nursing services by the 
Commission was not a ministerial act of a proprietary nature, 
but an exercise of the County's police power for the common 
good and, thus, was governmental in nature. 
Finally, the Administrator argues that the trial court 
erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing because the 
record was insufficient to support a finding of immunity.  
This argument was primarily based on the Administrator's 
contention that the Commission "was required to introduce 
evidence that it met the Hampton Redevelopment test."  As 
discussed above, that case did not establish a new test to be 
applied here.  Therefore, we reject these assignments of 
error. 
For the reasons stated, we conclude that the trial court 
did not err in holding that the Commission was entitled to 
immunity from tort liability in this case because the 
operation of a nursing home was a governmental function.  
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed. 
Affirmed. 
 
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