Title: Mississippi State Board of Pharmacy v. Steele
Citation: 317 So. 2d 33
Docket Number: N/A
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: July 28, 1975

317 So. 2d 33 (1975) MISSISSIPPI STATE BOARD OF PHARMACY v. James T. STEELE. MISSISSIPPI STATE BOARD OF PHARMACY v. Edward L. SCHUH. Nos. 48121, 48122. Supreme Court of Mississippi. July 28, 1975. *34 A.F. Summer, Atty. Gen. by R. Hugo Newcomb, Sr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Watkins, Pyle, Ludlam, Winter &amp; Stennis, Ernest G. Taylor, Jr., Jackson, for appellant. Wells, Gerald, Brand, Watters &amp; Cox, Scott P. Hemleben, Frank T. Moore, Jr., Jackson, for appellees. Before RODGERS, ROBERTSON and BROOM, JJ. ROBERTSON, Justice. The Mississippi State Board of Pharmacy has appealed to this Court from an order of the Chancery Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County, Mississippi, reversing an order of the Pharmacy Board which had revoked the store permits of James T. Steele, manager of Super D Drug Store No. 25, Jackson, Mississippi, and Edward L. Schuh, manager of Super D Drug Store No. 14, Tupelo, Mississippi. As to Steele, the advertisement complained of appeared in the Jackson Daily News on December 15, 1971, as follows: As to Schuh, the objectionable advertisement, according to the Board, appeared in the Tupelo Daily Journal, in the issue of January 24, 1972, in this form: The State Board of Pharmacy took the position that these advertisements violated Article IV-1(a) of the Board's Rules and Regulations, which provides: These advertisements emanated from the home office of Super D Drugs, Inc., in Memphis, Tennessee, and pharmacists Steele and Schuh had nothing whatsoever to do with the composing and publishing of these advertisements. After notice to Steele and Schuh and after a separate hearing in each case, the store permit to each of them was revoked. The only basis for revoking the store license of each pharmacist was the advertising of a discount on prescription drugs. The basic issue in these two cases and eight other related cases is whether the Pharmacy Board had authority under the statute creating such Board to pass and enforce such a rule or regulation prohibiting the advertising of a discount on prescription drugs. Being a creature of the Legislature, the Board of Pharmacy is an agency with powers limited to those granted in the statutes creating and providing for the Pharmacy Board. In Mississippi Milk Commission v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 235 So. 2d 684 (Miss. 1970), this Court said: The notice to Steele and Schuh stated that "the grounds for such hearing" were Sections 8852(a), (b), (f), and 8862.5(1)(c), Mississippi Code of 1942 Annotated. Section 8852(a), (b), (f), [Mississippi Code of 1972 Annotated, Section 73-21-13(a), (b), (f)] provides: Section 8862.5(1)(c) [Mississippi Code of 1972 Annotated, Section 73-21-39(1)(c)], provides: From a careful reading of these statutes, it is apparent to us that the power to regulate advertising of drugs was not expressly granted nor can it be necessarily implied from the language used by the legislature. It could be logically argued that the power to regulate such advertising, having to do with the pricing of prescription drugs, was expressly withheld from the Pharmacy Board in this proviso of Section 73-21-39(1): We are of the opinion, as was the Chancellor, that the State Board of Pharmacy, being a creature of the Legislature, did not have the statutory authority either expressly or by implication to issue Article IV-1(a) of the Rules and Regulations of the Board of Pharmacy, and that such article was and is invalid. Almost identical statutes and regulations were involved in Oregon Newspaper Publishers Ass'n, Inc. v. Peterson, 244 Or. 116, 415 P.2d 21 (1966). In deciding that case the Supreme Court of Oregon said: The same result was reached by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Osco Drug, Inc. v. Wisconsin Pharmacy Examining Board, 61 Wis.2d 689, 214 N.W.2d 47 (1974), wherein that Court said: We have carefully noted that Section 73-21-13(a) limits the power of the State Board of Pharmacy to make by-laws and regulations to those "not inconsistent with the laws of this state, as may be necessary for the protection of the public, ..." [Emphasis added]. The appellant Board contends that the prohibition against advertising a discount on prescription drugs was "necessary for the protection of the public." This contention was also made and firmly rejected in Maryland Board of Pharmacy v. Sav-A-Lot, Inc., 270 Md. 103, 311 A.2d 242 (1973); Pennsylvania State Board of Pharmacy v. Pastor, 441 Pa. 186, 272 A.2d 487 (1971); and Stadnik v. Shell's City, Inc., 140 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 1962). In Stadnik, the Supreme Court of Florida had this to say: The appellant also contends that State Board of Optometry v. Orkin, 249 Miss. 430, 162 So. 2d 883 (1964), is analogous, and the holding in that case should control the holding in this case. We do not agree. There is a vast difference between the practice of optometry and the practice of pharmacy. The optometrist is in command all the way: he examines the patient, diagnoses the problem, prescribes the corrective lenses, fills his own prescriptions, and dispenses the glasses. In direct contrast, the pharmacist only fills prescriptions specifically prescribed by qualified and licensed medical doctors for their patients. The distinction was clearly and succinctly made in Pennsylvania State Board of Pharmacy v. Pastor, supra, when the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania said: For these reasons, the decree of the Chancery Court reversing and setting aside the order of the State Board of Pharmacy must be and is hereby affirmed. Affirmed. GILLESPIE, C.J., and PATTERSON, INZER, SMITH, SUGG and WALKER, JJ., concur.