Title: Bailey v. Lampert
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S53154
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: February 8, 2007

FILED: February 8, 2007
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
MICHAEL JON BAILEY,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
ROBERT LAMPERT, Superintendent,
Snake River Correctional Institution,
Respondent on Review.
(CC 02-05-201M; CA A124795; SC S53154)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted November 6, 2006.
Andrew S. Chilton, Chilton, Ebbett &amp; Rohr, LLC, Portland,
argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review.  
Jennifer S. Lloyd, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.  With her
on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H.
Williams, Solicitor General.
Before De Muniz, Chief Justice, and Carson,** Gillette,
Durham, Balmer, Kistler, and Walters, Justices.***
BALMER, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
*Appeal from Malheur County Circuit Court,
Joseph F. Ceniceros, Senior Judge.
203 Or App 45, 125 P3d 771 (2005).
** Carson, J., retired December 31, 2006, and did not
participate in the decision of this case.
*** Linder, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
BALMER J. 
The issue in this case is whether petitioner's
convictions for being a felon in possession of a firearm must be
set aside because the predicate conviction on which his status as
a felon was based was overturned three years after the felon-in-possession convictions.  The trial court set aside the felon-in-possession convictions, but the Court of Appeals reversed. 
Bailey v. Lampert, 203 Or App 45, 125 P3d 771 (2005).  We allowed
review and now affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
In 1995, a trial court convicted petitioner of felony
sexual penetration in the first degree, ORS 163.411, and six
related misdemeanor charges.  His direct appeal was unsuccessful. 
State v. Bailey, 144 Or App 329, 927 P2d 157 (1996), rev den, 324
Or 654 (1997).  In 2000, petitioner, by then a convicted felon,
carried two firearms into a pawn shop to sell them.  As a result,
petitioner was indicted on two counts of being a felon in
possession of a firearm in violation of ORS 166.270.  He later
was convicted of those charges in a trial based on stipulated
facts.  Petitioner appealed but then withdrew the appeal after
his lawyer advised him that he could present no meritorious
issues for appeal.
Meanwhile, petitioner successfully sought post-conviction relief from his 1995 convictions.  In 2003, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the 1995 convictions were
invalid because the prosecutor had failed to disclose to the
defense certain therapy reports regarding the victim and her
mental state, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 US 83, 83 S
Ct 1194, 10 L Ed 2d 215 (1963).  Bailey v. Rae, 339 F3d 1107 (9th
Cir 2003).  Petitioner was not reprosecuted.
Subsequently, petitioner filed this action, seeking
post-conviction relief from his felon-in-possession convictions
on the ground that, because the federal appellate court had
vacated his predicate felony conviction in 2003, his felon-in-possession convictions were invalid and likewise should be set
aside.  He also argued that his appellate counsel had been
ineffective.  The post-conviction court rejected the ineffective-assistance argument but granted post-conviction relief based on
petitioner's argument that vacation of the predicate felony
conviction required reversal of his felon-in-possession
convictions.  The Court of Appeals disagreed, reasoning that
petitioner had been a felon, under the terms of ORS 166.270, when
he had possessed the firearms and concluding that the felon-in-possession convictions therefore were valid.  Bailey, 203 Or App
at 52-53.  The Court of Appeals also concluded that petitioner's
ineffective-assistance argument lacked merit.  Id. at 47.
On review, petitioner again argues that the vacation of
the predicate felony requires reversal of his felon-in-possession
convictions.  Petitioner first makes a statutory construction
argument, asserting that the felon-in-possession statute requires
a "constitutionally valid" predicate felony and, therefore, that
a conviction under that statute must be set aside whenever a
predicate felony is determined not to be constitutionally valid. 
Second, petitioner argues that, under Article I, section 11, of
the Oregon Constitution, an invalid prior conviction cannot be
used to enhance a defendant's punishment, citing this court's
decision in City of Pendleton v. Standerfer, 297 Or 725, 688 P2d
68 (1984), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Probst, 339 Or
612, 626-28, 124 P3d 1237 (2005).  Finally, petitioner makes a
federal constitutional argument that is related to his statutory
interpretation argument.  He concedes that, in Lewis v. United
States, 445 US 55, 100 S Ct 915, 63 L Ed 2d 198 (1980), the
United State Supreme Court held that due process did not bar a
federal felon-in-possession conviction even if the predicate
felony conviction was unconstitutionally obtained and later might
be overturned.  He asserts, however, that, because ORS 166.270
requires a valid predicate felony conviction, a felon-in-possession conviction based on a predicate conviction that later
is overturned violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
We begin with petitioner's statutory argument.  ORS
166.270(1) provides: 
"Any person who has been convicted of a felony under
the law of this state or any other state, or who has
been convicted of a felony under the laws of the
Government of the United States, who owns or has in the
person's possession or under the person's custody or
control any firearm commits the crime of felon in
possession of a firearm."
ORS 166.270(3) defines the phrase "has been convicted of a
felony." (1)  Generally, a person "'has been convicted of a
felony' if, at the time of conviction for an offense, that
offense was a felony under the law of the jurisdiction in which
it was committed."  To satisfy the elements of ORS 166.270(1),
one must have been convicted of a felony and then possessed a
firearm.  That is all that the statute requires to convict a
person of being a felon in possession of a firearm.
ORS 166.270(3) also sets out specific exceptions to ORS
166.270(1).  Subsection (3) defines "conviction" as a "felony
under the law of the jurisdiction in which it was committed" but
then provides that a conviction "shall not be deemed" a felony
conviction if (1) the trial court that entered the predicate
conviction had "declared the conviction to be a misdemeanor at
the time of judgment" or (2) the conviction was for marijuana
possession and was before 1972.  ORS 166.270(4) (2) creates two additional exceptions, one for a felon who has completed his
sentence at least 15 years before the felon possesses the firearm
and another for persons who have had their felony convictions
expunged or have been granted relief under a specific federal
statute.  Defendant does not argue that any of the specific
exceptions in ORS 166.270(3) or (4) apply to him.  
Petitioner, however, contends that neither the text nor
the context of ORS 166.270 provides a "compelling" answer to the
question of whether an invalid predicate conviction can support a
conviction for felon in possession of a firearm.  In support of
that basic argument, petitioner first asserts that the statute
does not explicitly define the term "convicted of a felony."  As
to that assertion, petitioner is simply wrong.  ORS 166.270(3),
in fact, does define the term explicitly, as discussed above:  a person "has been convicted of a felony" if the person was
convicted of "an offense" that, at the time of conviction, "was a
felony under the law of the jurisdiction in which it was
committed."  As a matter of statutory construction, ORS
166.270(3) makes it abundantly clear that an existing felony
conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction is a sufficient
predicate for a subsequent felon-in-possession conviction.  
That conclusion is supported by the two exceptions that
ORS 166.270(4)(b) provides to the prohibition on a felon's
possession of a firearm.  Under those exceptions, a person who
has been "[g]ranted relief" from the felony conviction or "has
had" his or her record "expunged" is not prohibited from
possessing a firearm.  The exceptions are prospective only --
that is, they remove the disability only after the felony
conviction is set aside.  They do not operate retroactively to
void a felon-in-possession conviction if the predicate felony
conviction later is set aside.
Petitioner argues that changes that the legislature has
made to ORS 166.270 support a narrow reading of the statute. 
Petitioner characterizes earlier versions of the felon-in-possession statute as demonstrating a "conservative" approach
that requires a "restrictive reading."  On the contrary, the
legislature has broadened the scope of the statutory ban over
time by expanding the kinds of firearms that a felon may not
possess.  For example, the felon-in-possession statute formerly
did not include hunting rifles within the scope of the
prohibition, but the legislature subsequently changed the wording
of the statute to extend to all firearms.  Compare ORS 166.270(1) (2005) (banning felon from possessing "any firearm") with ORS 166.270(1) (1987) (banning felon from possessing, inter alia, "a shotgun having a barrel less than 18 inches in length").  Petitioner has identified nothing in the context of ORS 166.270 that supports his position here.
Despite the apparent applicability of ORS 166.270(1) to
petitioner's circumstances, he asserts that this court should
apply a rule of statutory construction, the "rule of lenity," to
hold in his favor.  The rule of lenity -- to the extent that such
a rule exists -- presumes that any ambiguities in a criminal
statute that imposes multiple punishments for a crime should be
resolved in favor of lenity at sentencing.  See State v. Welch,
264 Or 388, 393, 505 P2d 910 (1973) ("'It may fairly be said to
be a presupposition of our law to resolve doubts in the
enforcement of a penal code against the imposition of a harsher
punishment.'" (quoting Bell v. United States, 349 US 81, 83-84,
75 S Ct 620, 99 L Ed 905 (1955))).  Assuming that the rule ever
truly existed, ORS 161.025(2) requires that we construe penal
statutes "according to the fair import of [their] terms," rather
than construing them "strictly."  In other words, the legislature
has eliminated the availability of any "rule of lenity" by
statute.
Based on our analysis of the text and context of ORS
166.270, we conclude that the legislature intended to, and did,
focus on a person's status at the time that he or she possessed a
firearm.  The legislature determined that a person who has the
status of "felon" at that time -- even if that status later might
change because the prior felony conviction is reversed or set
aside -- falls within the class of persons that are not permitted
to possess firearms.  See Lewis, 445 US at 67 (similarly
interpreting federal felon-in-possession statute).  Under ORS
166.270(1), the predicate for the crime of felon-in-possession is
the status of being a felon at the time of possession of the
firearm.  
Petitioner nonetheless argues that, because his felony
conviction later was set aside, that conviction was invalid ab
initio and therefore also was invalid at the time that he
possessed the firearms.  Although that assertion may be true in
some sense, the fact remains that, at the time that petitioner
possessed the firearms involved here, he "ha[d] been convicted of
a felony," ORS 166.270(1), and no court had overturned or set
aside that conviction.  Many consequences, beginning with
possible incarceration and including a prohibition on possessing
firearms, flow from a felony conviction.  Constitutional or
statutory defects in that conviction may lead, at a later time,
to the conviction being set aside on appeal or through collateral
proceedings.  If a court sets aside the conviction, then the
defendant may be freed from incarceration and no longer subject
to the other disabilities that accompany the defendant's status
as a felon.  But those consequences are lifted only after the
conviction is overturned or set aside.  As this court stated,
after reviewing the various pre- and post-trial protections
available to criminal defendants:
"[I]t is the public policy of this state to treat any
person who has been convicted of any criminal offense
as validly convicted unless and until the person's
conviction has been reversed, whether on appeal or
through post-conviction relief, or the person otherwise
has been exonerated."
Stevens v. Bispham, 316 Or 221, 230, 851 P2d 556 (1993).  The
fact of a person's status as a felon remains intact "unless and
until" the felony conviction has been set aside.  And that fact
is what matters for purposes of ORS 166.270. (3)  
It necessarily follows that a person's status as one
who "has been convicted of a felony" -– and therefore is subject
to prosecution under ORS 166.270 if the person possesses a
firearm –- continues unless and until the conviction is
invalidated or the person brings himself or herself within one of
the statutory exceptions.  Although this court has not had
occasion to address the question, that conclusion is consistent
with Court of Appeals' decisions construing ORS 166.270.  See,
e.g., State v. Dintelman, 112 Or App 350, 353, 829 P2d 719 (1992)
(person is "convicted of a felony" for purposes of ORS 166.270
when person is found guilty and judgment of conviction is
entered); State v. Anderson, 10 Or App 34, 37, 497 P2d 1218 (1972) (rejecting argument that defendant was not "convicted
felon" because his conviction was pending on appeal).  We agree
with those decisions.  We also note that the federal courts that
have considered the analogous federal felon-in-possession statute
all have reached that same conclusion.  See, e.g., United States v. Padilla, 387 F3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir 2004) (even when predicate felony conviction is void ab initio, conviction must be invalidated before felon possesses firearm; later relief will not
invalidate felon-in-possession conviction on which it was
predicated); Burrell v. United States, 384 F3d 22, 27-28 (2d Cir
2004) (petitioner not entitled to relief where predicate felony
conviction was not set aside until after felon-in-possession
conviction).
Petitioner's conduct thus falls within the statutory
definitions set out in ORS 166.270, and that statute does not
make any provision for setting aside his felon-in-possession
convictions on the ground that the predicate felony conviction
later was overturned.  Petitioner stands convicted under the
statute unless that application of the statute violates a state
or federal constitutional right, and we now turn to petitioner's
constitutional claims.
We note at the outset that the state does not dispute
petitioner's claim that his 1995 felony conviction was
constitutionally invalid.  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals so
held and set aside the conviction, and, as noted, the state chose
not to retry petitioner.  Moreover, although petitioner's 1995
conviction was not set aside until 2003, the constitutional
infirmity in that conviction was present from the date of the
conviction.  From those premises, petitioner makes two arguments
in support of his contention that it is constitutionally
impermissible for the state to have used his conviction for any
purpose.  
As noted previously, petitioner first contends that,
under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution, the
state may not use an invalid prior conviction in any subsequent
proceeding. (4)  For that proposition, petitioner relies on
Standerfer, 297 Or 725, a DUII case in which this court
considered the subsequent effect of an earlier uncounseled DUII
conviction.  Because the defendant in Standerfer had a prior DUII
conviction, the trial court in that case refused to consider
whether the defendant was eligible for diversion.  As a result,
the defendant was subject to criminal sanctions, including
incarceration.  Based on the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, (5) this court concluded that the uncounseled
prior conviction could not be used to support guilt or enhance
punishment in a subsequent criminal proceeding.  In the course of
reaching that conclusion, this court stated:
"The state cannot use an invalid prior conviction in a
subsequent prosecution if to do so would lead to a
disposition of the subsequent offense less favorable to
defendant than that which would obtain in the absence
of the prior invalid conviction.  Thus, an invalid
prior conviction may not be used to support guilt or
enhance punishment in a subsequent criminal
proceeding."
Standerfer, 297 Or at 731.
Petitioner's reliance on Standerfer fails for several
reasons, the most fundamental of which -- and the only one that
we address in detail -- is that, in Standerfer, the state sought
to use the defendant's prior DUII conviction to, in effect,
enhance the sentence for his second DUII conviction.  Because the
defendant challenged the validity of the prior conviction at his
sentencing on the second conviction and this court agreed that it
was invalid, the prior conviction could not be used to deny the
defendant the opportunity to seek diversion.  In this case,
petitioner's felony conviction was not a fact for the court to
consider at a sentencing hearing; rather, it was an element of
the crime that petitioner committed, and it is undisputed that
petitioner had the status of "felon" at the time that he
possessed the firearm.  No court involved in the felon-in-possession proceeding questioned –- or was asked to question -–
petitioner's status as a felon at the time that he possessed the
firearm.  In contrast to Standerfer, petitioner's predicate
felony convictions were not found to have been invalid until
three years after he had possessed a firearm. (6)  
Finally, petitioner argues that the use of his felony
conviction violated his rights under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. (7)  In rejecting petitioner's
federal constitutional argument, the Court of Appeals relied on
Lewis, 445 US 55, in which, as noted, the United States Supreme
Court affirmed a federal conviction for felon-in-possession of a
firearm, despite assuming that the underlying felony conviction
was constitutionally invalid.  See id. at 65 ("We therefore hold
that [the federal statute] prohibits a felon from possessing a
firearm despite the fact that the predicate felony may be subject
to collateral attack on constitutional grounds."). 
Petitioner agrees that Lewis stands for the proposition
that no violation of due process occurs when a legislature
prohibits the possession of a firearm by a person whose felony
conviction actually has not been overturned, even if that
conviction had been unconstitutionally obtained.  Instead,
petitioner attempts to distinguish Lewis by maintaining that the
Oregon felon-in-possession statute, unlike the federal statute,
requires a constitutionally valid conviction.  Petitioner's due
process argument thus leads directly back to his statutory
argument, which we already have rejected. (8)
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
1. ORS 166.270(3) provides:
"For the purposes of this section, a person 'has been convicted of a felony' if, at
the time of conviction for an offense, that offense was a felony under the law of
the jurisdiction in which it was committed.  Such conviction shall not be deemed
a conviction of a felony if:
"(a) The court declared the conviction to be a misdemeanor at the time of
judgment; or
"(b) The offense was possession of marijuana and the conviction was prior
to January 1, 1972."
2. ORS 166.270(4) provides:
"Subsection (1) of this section does not apply to any person who has been:
"(a) Convicted of only one felony under the law of this state or any other
state, * * * and who has been discharged from imprisonment, parole or probation
for said offense for a period of 15 years prior to the date of the alleged violation of
subsection (1) of this section; or
"(b) Granted relief from the disability under 18 U.S.C. 925(c) or has had
the person's record expunged under the laws of this state or equivalent laws of
another jurisdiction."
"[R]elief from the disability" involves petitioning the United States Attorney General for special
dispensation.  See 18 USC § 925(c) (describing procedure).
3. This court considered an analogous statute in State v. Sims, 335 Or 269, 274, 66 P3d 472
(2003), and held that, in a felony driving-while-revoked prosecution, the state had to prove only
the fact that the driver's license was revoked and not that the revocation was valid.
4. Article I, section 11, provides, in part, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
have the right to * * * counsel[.]"
5. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall * * * have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defence."  US Const, Amend VI.
6. Standerfer does not support petitioner's Article I, section 11, claim for the additional
reason that Standerfer was decided on the basis of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
counsel, the defendant having raised no Article I, section 11, claim.  See Standerfer 297 Or at
727 &amp; n 1 (so stating).  Moreover, this court's analysis and holding in Standerfer rested solely on
the importance of the constitutional right to counsel that was denied to the defendant in his
earlier DUII case, and neither the analysis nor the holding supports petitioner's argument that a
conviction that is invalid for reasons other than lack of counsel should be treated similarly.  Here,
petitioner's 1995 conviction was set aside not because he was denied the right to counsel, but
because the prosecution failed to provide potentially exculpatory information to him.  Finally,
because Standerfer relies on the Sixth Amendment, that decision does not help petitioner in this
felon-in-possession context because the Supreme Court held in Lewis that, although an
uncounseled conviction cannot be used for some purposes, there is no constitutional impediment
to using such a conviction as a predicate offense for a felon-in-possession conviction unless and
until the conviction has been set aside.  Lewis, 445 US at 66-67.
7. "No state shall * * * deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law[.]"  US Const, Amend XIV. 
8. As noted earlier, petitioner also sought post-conviction relief on the ground that his
appellate counsel was inadequate.  The post-conviction court and the Court of Appeals rejected
that claim without discussion, and we decline to address it here.