Title: Taylor v. Taylor
Citation: 398 So. 2d 267
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: May 1, 1981

398 So. 2d 267 (1981)
Mary Ruth TAYLOR
v.
Cecil H. TAYLOR.
79-932.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
May 1, 1981.
*268 Chris S. Christ and Michael Sheier, Birmingham, for appellant.
Bobby R. Newman of Nolen &amp; Newman, Fayette, for appellee.
ALMON, Justice.
Cecil and Mary Ruth Taylor were divorced in 1975. As part of the divorce decree, the judge awarded Mary Ruth possession of the Taylors' forty acres during the minority of the Taylors' children. In July of 1979, Cecil petitioned the court to sell the property and divide the proceeds. The trial judge determined that Cecil was entitled to his requested relief and entered an order which provided in part:
Although not clear from the record, it appears that notice of the sale which was to be held on February 18, 1980, was published before the sale was stayed pending an April 28, 1980, hearing on Mary Ruth's motion for new trial. When her motion was denied at that hearing, the trial judge issued an order which provided, in part:
The notice of sale published in The Journal Record on May 1, 1980 and May 8, 1980, provided:
The sale was held on May 9, 1980, in accordance with the notice. Cecil Taylor was the successful bidder at a purchase *269 price of $42,000.00. The clerk of the circuit court filed the report of sale with trial judge on May 15, 1980, and he confirmed the sale after finding:
On June 26, 1980, Mary Ruth Taylor filed notice of appeal.
The question we must initially decide is Cecil's motion to dismiss this appeal. He contends that Mary Ruth's motion for new trial was denied on April 28, 1980, that the order denying same was entered on the docket on that date, and that the forty-two day period provided by Rule 4, ARAP, within which she could appeal expired on June 9, 1980. He argues that Mary Ruth's notice of appeal filed June 26, 1980, is untimely and therefore is due to be dismissed pursuant to Rule 2(a), ARAP.
It is a well established rule that, with limited exceptions, an appeal will lie only from a final judgment which determines the issues before the court and ascertains and declares the rights of the parties involved. Kelley v. U.S.A. Oil Corp., 363 So. 2d 758 (Ala.1978); Alabama Public Service Commission v. Redwing Carriers, Inc., 281 Ala. 111, 199 So. 2d 653 (1967). Decrees and orders entered in equity proceedings involving the sale and division of real property present an unusual situation, as this Court has previously noted:
Sexton v. Sexton, 280 Ala. 479, 195 So. 2d 531 (1967) (citations omitted).
It is clear from the notice of appeal that Mary Ruth does not appeal from the decree ordering the sale, but instead appeals from the decree confirming the sale. The forty-two day period for appeal from that decree, which was entered on May 15, 1980, would have expired on June 27, 1980. Mary Ruth's notice, filed on June 26, 1980, was therefore timely filed. Cecil's motion to dismiss the appeal is due to be denied.
The thrust of Mary Ruth's first argument is that the trial judge erred to reversal when he confirmed the sale which had not been preceded by the requisite publication. We disagree because we conclude that Mary Ruth may not now raise questions concerning the sufficiency of the notice of sale.
The rule which controls this case was established in Cargile v. Ragan, 65 Ala. 287 (1880). In that case the Cargiles' land was purchased by Cunningham at a judicial sale. Cunningham subsequently conveyed the land to the Ragans. Four years after the judicial sale to Cunningham had been confirmed by the court, Ragan sued to recover possession from the Cargiles. The trial judge refused to permit the Cargiles to attack, by way of objecting to its admission, the judicial sale and confirmation. In affirming the trial judge, this Court stated:
65 Ala. at 292. This principle was recently applied by this Court in Conville v. Liveoak, 342 So. 2d 1319 (Ala.1977), and Baer v. Alco Land and Timber Company, Inc., 291 Ala. 640, 285 So. 2d 913 (1973). See also Harris v. Stevenson, 147 Ala. 537, 41 So. 1008 (1906); In Re Burr Mfg. &amp; Supply Co., 217 F. 16 (2d Cir. 1914). Although these cases involved a collateral attack upon the validity of the sale, the principle remains the same when the attack is a direct one: a party to a judicial sale who has an opportunity to except to irregularities surrounding the sale, but who fails to raise the objection or exception may not later attack the validity of the sale in an appellate court of this State.
By virtue of the decree entered January 15, 1980, Mary Ruth had notice that the clerk's report of the sale would "lie over in the Office of the Clerk for five days [following the sale] for exceptions and objections thereto by any party of interest * *." The record is devoid of any evidence that Mary Ruth filed any objections or exceptions to the sufficiency of the publication which preceded the sale. She is therefore precluded from raising for the first time on appeal an issue she should have raised before.
In her second argument, Mary Ruth contends the trial judge erred to reversal when he failed to consider the provisions of Code 1975, § 35-6-100, which provides:
Mary Ruth apparently interprets this statute to require that, when a proceeding for sale for division has been instituted, a joint owner who desires to purchase his property at a judicial sale must give notice of same to the court at least ten days prior to trial. She contends Cecil failed to give such notice. Mary Ruth's interpretation of the statute is incorrect. It does not mandate that in every instance where a joint owner desires to purchase the property he must give notice of that desire. It merely provides a method of avoiding the necessity of a public sale by compelling the court to sell the property to a joint owner if the other owners consent to such sale. The fact that Cecil failed to invoke the provisions of § 35-6-100 in no way affects the validity of the sale.
For the foregoing reasons, the trial judge's decree confirming the sale is due to be affirmed.
MOTION TO DISMISS DENIED; AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C. J. and FAULKNER, EMBRY and ADAMS, JJ., concur.