Title: MEDHUS WILLIAMS REDDIG v DUTTE
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 14693
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: November 21, 1979

No. 14693 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1979 MELROY L. MEDHUS, JR., BEN WILLIAMS, BILLY G. REDDIG and LYNNE A. REDDIG, Plaintiffs and Appellants, KENNETH A. DUTTER, MARY E. DUTTER, THOMAS J. DEUTSCH, and JANET M. DEUTSCH, Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, Honorable Robert Sykes, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: Hash, Jellison, O'Brien and Bartlett, Kalispell, Montana For Respondents: Moore, Lympus and Doran, Kalispell, Montana Warden, Walterskirchen and Christiansen, Kalispell, Montana Submitted on briefs: August 15, 1979 Decided: YOV 2 1 1 9 7 9 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Appellants i n i t i a t e d t h i s a c t i o n i n D i s t r i c t Court, t h e Eleventh J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , the Honorable Robert C. Sykes presiding, asking t h e c o u r t t o enjoin respondents from obstructing appellants' use of a road t h a t crossed respon- dents' property. Appellants sought t o o b t a i n a decree grant- ing them an easement along t h e road. Appellants a l s o sought damages f o r interference with t h e use of t h e road, and appel- l a n t Medhus sought damages f o r t r e s p a s s t o h i s property. Respondents f i l e d a counterclaim a g a i n s t appellant Medhus f o r timber t r e s p a s s and sought an order requiring Medhus t o move a fence erected along t h e boundary of t h e i r property and the Medhus property. The District Court found t h a t appellants had an ease- ment f o r roadway purposes across a portion of respondents' property, but found no easement across another s e c t i o n of t h e property. The c o u r t ordered appellants be allowed t o remove some personal property from the portion of t h e roadway across which no easement was found. However, t h e c o u r t entered no findings, conclusions o r judgment concerning appellants' t r e s p a s s c l a i m . The c o u r t f u r t h e r found appellant Medhus had not com- mitted timber t r e s p a s s but had erected a fence on respondents' property. The c o u r t ordered t h e fence moved t o t h e c o r r e c t boundary l i n e . The D i s t r i c t Court awarded c o s t s of t h e s u i t t o respondents, including t h e c o s t of a boundary survey done a t t h e request of respondents. Appellants appeal t h i s judg- ment. Respondents Thomas Deutsch and J a n e t Deutsch a r e t h e l e g a l owners, and respondents Kenneth Dutter and Mary Dutter are t h e e q u i t a b l e owners, being purchasers under c o n t r a c t f o r deed, of c e r t a i n r e a l property located i n Flathead County. The disputed road passes a c r o s s t h e i r property. The Deutsches acquired t h e property i n 1964 from A. P. and Martha T. Marcoux. The Marcouxes conveyed t h e property t o t h e Deutsches by a warranty deed. The deed contained lan- guage r e f e r r i n g t o an easement f o r road purposes a c r o s s t h e premises. The n o t i c e of purchasers' i n t e r e s t giving n o t i c e of t h e c o n t r a c t under which t h e Dutters hold t h e i r e q u i t a b l e i n t e r e s t t o t h e property contains s i m i l a r language. This property w i l l be r e f e r r e d t o a s t h e "Dutter property." Appellant Melroy Medhus owns r e a l property t h a t lies east of t h e Dutter property and above it on a mountainside. This property w i l l be r e f e r r e d t o as t h e "Medhus property." Appellants B i l l y G. Reddig and Lynne A. Reddig are buying a p o r t i o n of t h e Medhus property under c o n t r a c t f o r deed. Appellant Ben Williams is t h e owner of t h r e e p a r c e l s of r e a l property which a r e east of both t h e Dutter and Medhus prop- er ties. F o o t h i l l s Road, a public highway, passes c l o s e t o t h e western boundary of t h e Dutter property. Near t h e southern boundary of t h e Dutter property a d i r t and gravel road l e a v e s F o o t h i l l s Road and goes up t h e mountainside a c r o s s t h e Dutter property. This roadway leaves t h e Dutter prop- e r t y and e n t e r s t h e Medhus property and forms a "Y" on t h e Medhus property. The D i s t r i c t Court found, apparently f o r t h e sake of completeness, t h a t a l l of t h e a p p e l l a n t s had an easement along t h a t roadway from t h e F o o t h i l l s Road t o t h e boundary of the Dutter property. A n easement over t h i s s e c t i o n of road w a s n o t asked f o r i n a p p e l l a n t s ' complaint. The northern brand of t h e "Y" continues a c r o s s t h e Medhus property and r e e n t e r s the Dutter property f o r 300 f e e t whereupon it r e e n t e r s t h e Medhus property and continues e a s t e r l y and up t h e mountainside onto t h e Williams property. The D i s t r i c t Court found t h a t none of t h e a p p e l l a n t s had an easement across t h i s 300 f o o t road on t h e Dutter property. The following diagram approximates t h e p o s i t i o n of t h e property of the p a r t i e s and road i n dispute (marked "disputed road" on t h e diagram): - - -- - -- - - - - - - \ \ \ i MEDHUS Property granted easement. The use of t h e 300 f o o t road marked "disputed road" on t h e diagram i s t h e c e n t e r of controversy i n t h i s case. Appellants do n o t c o n t e s t t h e portion of t h e judgment order- i n g them t o move t h e i r fence, and respondents do n o t chal- lenge t h e f i n d i n g of an easement of t h e o t h e r s e c t i o n of t h e road. The Trablik property marked on t h e diagram i s n o t i n - volved i n t h e c u r r e n t dispute. The road was b u i l t i n 1933 by t h e Koenig b r o t h e r s , loggers working east of t h e Dutter and Medhus p r o p e r t i e s . Before constructing and using t h e road, t h e loggers g o t permission from Clarence Haines, then t h e owner of t h e Dutter property. The D i s t r i c t Court found t h a t s i n c e t h e 19301s, t h e disputed road has seldom been used. The c o u r t found t h a t neighbors used t h e road f o r c u t t i n g firewood o r Christmas trees and members of t h e general p u b l i c used t h e road t o go up M i l l Creek t o hunt, hike and gather huckle- b e r r i e s . The bridge over M i l l Creek leading t o t h e road washed o u t f o r a period of time and was replaced i n t h e 1970's. Dutter bulldozed t h e road s h u t i n 1978, leading t o t h e i n s t i g a t i o n of t h i s s u i t . This appeal raises t h e following i s s u e s f o r our con- s i d e r a t i o n : 1. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court err i n f i n d i n g t h a t appel- l a n t s d i d n o t e s t a b l i s h a p r e s c r i p t i v e easement a c r o s s t h e disputed road? 2. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court err i n f i n d i n g t h a t appel- l a n t s d i d n o t e s t a b l i s h an easement of record across t h e disputed road? 3. Did t h e ~ i s t r i c t Court err i n n o t e n t e r i n g find- i n g s , conclusions and a judgment on a p p e l l a n t s 1 t r e s p a s s claim? 4. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court err i n awarding c o s t s t o t h e respondents? To e s t a b l i s h t h e existence of a p r e s c r i p t i v e easement, t h e p a r t y claiming t h e easement must show open, notorious, exclusive, adverse, continuous and uninterrupted use of t h e easement claimed f o r t h e s t a t u t o r y period. G a r r e t t v. Jackson (1979), - Mont. - 1 - P.2d - , 36 St.Rep. 1769, 1771; Hayden v. Snowden (1978), Mont. - , 576 P.2d 1115, 1117, 35 St.Rep. 367, 369; Taylor v. Petranek (1977), Mont. , 568 P.2d 120, 1 2 2 , 34 St.Rep. 905, 909; Harland v. Anderson (1976), 169 Mont. 447, 451, 548 P.2d 613, 615. The controversy i n t h i s case t u r n s on whether a p p e l l a n t s showed t h e use of t h e disputed road by them and t h e i r predecessors i n i n t e r e s t was adverse r a t h e r than permissive. I f a p p e l l a n t s f a i l e d t o show adverse use, they have n o t e s t a b l i s h e d a l l t h e elements necessary t o p e r f e c t an easement by p r e s c r i p t i o n and t h e D i s t r i c t Court r u l i n g on t h i s i s s u e must be upheld. I n Taylor, w e s a i d : "Although a use permissive i n i t s inception may r i p e n i n t o a p r e s c r i p t i v e r i g h t , it cannot do s o u n l e s s t h e r e i s a l a t e r d i s t i n c t and p o s i t i v e a s s e r t i o n of a r i g h t h o s t i l e t o t h e owner, which must be brought t o t h e a t t e n t i o n of t h e owner, and t h e use continued f o r t h e f u l l p r e s c r i p t i v e period. ( C i t a t i o n s omitted.)" 568 P.2d a t 123. I n Wilson v. Chestnut (1974), 164 Mont. 484, 491, 525 P.2d 2 4 , 27, we approvingly quoted 2 Thompson on Real Prop- e r t y (1961 Replacement), Easements, 8345, a s follows: I1 I . . . I f t h e user began by t h e permission of t h e owner, it w i l l n o t r i p e n i n t o an adverse o r h o s t i l e r i g h t u n t i l n o t i c e of such adverse u s e r i s brought home t o t h e owner and t h e user continued t h e r e a f t e r f o r t h e s t a t u t o r y period.'" See a l s o White v. Kamps (1946), 119 Mont. 102, 171 P.2d 343. Here, the testimony shows the use of the disputed road was originally permissive. Clarence Haines gave the Koenig brothers permission to build and use the road. Since the use of the road was permissive at its inception, to find a prescriptive easement here we must find in the record a distinct and positive assertion of a right to use the dis- puted road hostile to the owners by those claiming the easement. The record must also show the right was brought to the attention of the owners and continued use of the easement for the full statutory period. Looking to the record, we find occasional use of the road by hunters, hikers and neighbors cutting Christmas trees and gathering firewood. We have previously held this type of use insufficient to raise a presumption of adverse use. Taylor v . Petranek, supra, 568 P.2d at 123; Harland v. Anderson, supra, 169 Mont. at 451-452. Being insufficient to initially establish adverse use, this type of use does not represent the distinct and positive assertion of a hostile right brought home to the owner of the purportedly servient tenement necessary to transform originally permis- sive use into adverse use. Under these facts, the use of the road began permissively and continued to be permissive until Dutter blocked the road in 1978. Appellants, there- fore, did not establish the existence of a prescriptive easement across the Dutter property. The second issue raised by this appeal concerns the language in the deeds used to convey the Dutter property- The language in the deeds reads, "Subject, however to an easement for road purposes now existing over and across the herein described premises." The majority r u l e i s t h a t an easement cannot be c r e a t e d i n favor of a s t r a n g e r t o t h e deed. Wilson v. Chestnut, supra, 164 Mont. a t 492; s e e a l s o Annot., 88 ALR2d 1199, 1201-1202 (1963). I n t h e proper case, however, w e w i l l d e p a r t from t h a t r u l e t o give e f f e c t t o t h e g r a n t o r ' s i n t e n t . S t a t e of Montana, By and Through t h e Montana S t a t e F i s h and G a m e Commission v. Cronin (1978), Mont. , 587 P.2d 395, 399, 35 St.Rep. 1798, 1802; Wilson, 164 Mont. a t 492. The question thus becomes one of determining t h e i n t e n t of t h e g r a n t o r s i n including t h e above language i n t h e deeds. Before t h e c r e a t i o n of an easement i n a s t r a n g e r t o a conveyance w i l l be recognized, t h e i n t e n t of t h e g r a n t o r t o c r e a t e t h e easement must be c l e a r l y shown. Cushman v. Davis (1978), 145 Cal.Rep. 791, 793, 80 Cal.App.3d 731. I f it appears it i s a s l i k e l y t h e purpose of t h e c l a u s e i n t h e deed was t o p r o t e c t t h e g r a n t o r ' s warranty of t i t l e as t o r e s e r v e an easement, w e w i l l n o t d e p a r t from t h e majority r u l e and f i n d an easement. Wilson, 164 Mont. a t 492. To determine t h e i n t e n t of t h e grantor i n s i t u a t i o n s s i m i l a r t o t h e case a t bar, c o u r t s have considered t h e express language of t h e deed, Wilson, 164 Mont. a t 492; testimony by g r a n t o r s s t a t i n g t h e i r i n t e n t , Willard v. F i r s t Church of C h r i s t , S c i e n t i s t , P a c i f i c a (1972), 102 Cal.Rep. 739, 498 P.2d 987, 989; t h e f a c t t h a t t h e g r a n t o r received less value f o r t h e property conveyed because of t h e e x i s t e n c e of an easement, Mott v. Stanlake (1975), 65 Mich.App. 440, 234 N.W.2d 667, 668, and Willard, 498 P.2d a t 989-990; and, t h e s u f f i c i e n c y of t h e d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e l o c a t i o n of t h e easement and whether o r n o t t h e r e s e r v a t i o n names a dominant tenement, S t a t e of Montana, By and Through t h e S t a t e F i s h and G a m e Commission v. Cronin, supra, 587 P.2d a t 399. Considering these factors here, we find the language contained in the deed almost identical to the language in ~ilson, where we held no easement had been reserved. Further, respondent Deutsch stated he knew the deed contained the lan- guage and had discussed it with appellant Bill Reddig, but that he did not know the implications of the language. Deutsch said he did know there was a road up to the home on the Dutter property that nobody other than the owners should be using. This testimony indicates that in executing the documents that passed equitable title to the property, Deutsch did not intend to create an easement. There is no testimony on the record showing any of the grantors of the Dutter property received less than full value for the land because of the existence of an easement. Finally, although the language of the deed does locate the easement, it fails to name a dominant tenement. Considering these factors together, here, as in Wilson, it is as likely the grantors intended to pro- tect their warranty of title as to reserve an easement. Thus, the deeds do not establish an easement of record. The third issue raised by this appeal involves the failure of the District Court to enter findings, conclusions or a judgment concerning Count IV of appellants' complaint. This count alleges Dutter trespassed on the Medhus property while bulldozing the disputed road shut and damaged the property by removing gravel to build the Kelly bump that blocked the road. Appellants elicited testimony at the hearing on this case supporting the claim. The trial judge did not, however, enter findings, conclusions or judgment concerning the matter* The District Court should have made findings concerning this issue and entered a judgment accordingly. Claver v, Rosen- q u i s t (1972), 160 Mont. 4 , 13, 499 P.2d 1235, 1240. W e there- f o r e r e t u r n t h e matter t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court with i n s t r u c t i o n s t o e n t e r findings, conclusions and a judgment on t h i s i s s u e . I n doing so, t h e c o u r t should hold whatever further proceed- i n g s , i f any, it deems necessary. The f i n a l i s s u e r a i s e d here d e a l s with t h e award of c o s t s t o respondents. Sections 25-10-101 and 25-10-102, MCA, c o n t r o l t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of t h i s question. Those sec- t i o n s r e q u i r e t h e awarding of c o s t s t o t h e p l a i n t i f f s o r t h e defendants i n cases of t h i s nature upon a judgment i n t h e i r favor. I n t h i s case, t h e judgment granted a p p e l l a n t s an ease- ment over a portion of respondents' property, b u t denied a p p e l l a n t s any r i g h t t o use t h e s e c t i o n of road over which t h e a p p e l l a n t s prayed f o r an easement i n t h e i r complaint. O n remand, t h e D i s t r i c t Court may f i n d i n favor of a p p e l l a n t s o r respondents on a p p e l l a n t s ' t r e s p a s s claim. The judgment s t a t e d respondents should take nothing by t h e i r counter- claim b u t a l s o ordered Medhus t o move h i s fence. Respon- d e n t s had requested t h e fence be moved a s p a r t of t h e i r counterclaim. The judgment thus found i n favor of both p a r t i e s t o t h e l a w s u i t on d i f f e r e n t i s s u e s involved i n t h e case. W e have previously held t h a t a p l a i n t i f f need n o t recover on a l l claims presented by a complaint t o be e n t i t l e d t o c o s t s under s e c t i o n 25-10-101, MCA. Jones v. Great Northern Railroad Company (1923), 68 Mont. 231, 242-245, 217 P. 673, 677-678. W e have a l s o allowed a defendant t o recover c o s t s when only p a r t i a l l y successful on a counterclaim b u t t o t a l l y s u c c e s s f u l i n d e f e a t i n g t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s claim. Spencer v. Mungus (1903), 28 Mont. 357, 359-360, 72 P. 663, 664. W e have never squarely faced, however, t h e i s s u e of awarding c o s t s i n a case where t h e p l a i n t i f f p a r t i a l l y succeeds on t h e complaint and t h e defendant p r e v a i l s a s t o a p a r t of t h e counterclaim. I n t h e only case presenting t h e question, t h e Court decided i n favor of t h e defendant without discussion. Aronow v. H i l l (1930), 87 Mont. 153, 163, 286 P. 140, 1 4 4 . Montana adopted i t s c o s t s t a t u t e from C a l i f o r n i a . That state still has a s i m i l a r s t a t u t o r y s e t u p f o r awarding c o s t s . Section 1032, Cal. Code Civ. Proc. I n i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e i r c o s t s t a t u t e s , t h e C a l i f o r n i a c o u r t s have come t o t h e s a m e r e s u l t reached i n Aronow by determining which p a r t y prevailed on t h e main i s s u e i n controversy i n a case. Whiting v. Squeglia (1924), 70 Cal.App. 108, 232 P. 986, 990. I n Whiting t h e p l a i n t i f f s f i l e d a complaint and t h e defendant counterclaimed. The t r i a l c o u r t entered a judg- ment granting t h e p l a i n t i f f s p a r t of t h e r e l i e f they re- quested and t h e defendant p a r t of h i s c l a i m with c o s t s t o t h e defendant. Whiting, 232 P. a t 987. On appeal, t h e award of c o s t s w a s upheld under t h e c o s t s s t a t u t e based on t h e r a t i o n a l e t h a t t h e defendant had prevailed on t h e main i s s u e i n controversy and, t h e r e f o r e , judgment had been entered i n h i s favor. Whitinq, 232 P. a t 990. Given t h e use of t h e main i s s u e i n controversy r u l e i n C a l i f o r n i a i n i n t e r p r e t i n g c o s t s t a t u t e s s i m i l a r t o those i n Montana, w e now adopt t h e r u l e i n Montana f o r i n t e r p r e t i n g s e c t i o n s 25-10-101 and 25-10-102, MCA. I f a p l a i n t i f f f i l e s a complaint i n an a c t i o n covered by s e c t i o n 25-10-101, MCA, and succeeds only p a r t i a l l y , t h e p l a i n t i f f i s e n t i t l e d t o c o s t s . I f an a c t i o n i s f i l e d , t h e defendant counterclaims and succeeds i n having t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s claim t o t a l l y denied b u t only recovers a p o r t i o n of t h e r e l i e f demanded i n t h e counterclaim, t h e defendant should r e c e i v e c o s t s . I f , however, a p a r t y i n i t i a t e s a l a w s u i t , t h e defendant counter- claims, and t h e judgment awards both p a r t i e s p a r t of t h e r e l i e f they seek, t h e p a r t y p r e v a i l i n g on t h e main i s s u e i n controversy i n t h e case must be allowed c o s t s . Applying t h i s r u l e t o t h e c a s e a t b a r , w e f i n d t h e D i s t r i c t Court c o r r e c t l y awarded c o s t s t o respondents. The main i s s u e i n controversy h e r e was t h e e x i s t e n c e o f an easement a c r o s s t h e d i s p u t e d road. The c l o s i n g of t h e road p r e c i p i t a t e d t h e l a w s u i t and most of t h e testimony a t t h e t r i a l concerned t h e e x i s t e n c e of an easement over t h e road. Respondents p r e v a i l e d on t h a t i s s u e . The c o s t s t a t u t e s t h e r e f o r e e n t i t l e d them t o t h e i r c o s t s of s u i t , i n c l u d i n g t h e c o s t of t h e survey necessary t o determine boundary between t h e Medhus and D u t t e r p r o p e r t i e s . The judgment i s affirmed i n p a r t b u t remanded t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court w i t h i n s t r u c t i o n s t o e n t e r a judgment on a p p e l l a n t s ' t r e s p a s s claim. W e concur: Cbref J u s t i c e i$&Z&+ J u s t i c e s