Title: MARGARET PHILLIPS V MIRAC INC
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 121831
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: July 6, 2004

_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice  
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
Opinion 
FILED JULY 6, 2004 
MARGARET PHILLIPS, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE ESTATE OF REGEANA DIANE HERVEY,
Deceased, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v 
No. 121831 
MIRAC, INC., 
Defendant-Appellee. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
TAYLOR, J.  
In this case, we granted leave to appeal to consider 
whether MCL 257.401(3), which caps the amount of a lessor’s 
liability in motor vehicle leases of thirty days or less, 
violates plaintiff’s rights under the Michigan Constitution 
to a jury trial,1 equal protection,2 or due process.3
 We 
1 Const 1963, art 1, § 14. 
2 Const 1963, art 1, § 2. 
3 Const 1963, art 1, § 17. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
hold that this damages cap does not implicate plaintiff’s 
right to a jury trial, and does not violate her rights to 
equal protection or due process. 
Court 
of 
Appeals 
decision 
constitutional. 
Therefore, we affirm the 
that 
the 
statute 
is 
I 
Regeana Diane Hervey died in an automobile accident 
while a passenger in a vehicle being driven by Da-Fel Reed. 
Reed had leased the vehicle from Mirac, doing business as 
Enterprise 
Rent-A-Car. 
Margaret 
Phillips, 
decedent’s 
mother and the personal representative of decedent’s 
estate, initiated a lawsuit against Mirac on the basis of 
MCL 257.401(3).4
 Generally, MCL 257.401(3) establishes 
vicarious liability for automobile lessors when permissive 
users, such as Reed, are negligent and cause automobile 
accidents injuring others. 
The act also caps the damages 
for such lessors at $20,000 for each injured person to a 
maximum of $40,000 for each accident. 
While reserving for resolution the constitutionality 
of the damage caps, the parties before trial executed a 
“high-low” agreement for a $150,000 minimum award and a 
4 Reed also was sued. 
A jury found her negligent;
however, she is not a party to this appeal. 
2  
 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
 
$250,000 maximum award. 
The jury returned a verdict of 
$900,000 against Mirac. 
This would, of course, have been 
reduced to $250,000 pursuant to the high-low agreement, 
unless the statutory damage caps were constitutional, in 
which case the damages would be reduced to $20,000. 
The trial court concluded that the damage caps were 
unconstitutional on the basis that the statute, in capping 
damages, violated the right of trial by jury found in art 
1, § 14 of the Michigan Constitution. 
The essence of its 
holding was that the right of jury trial includes the right 
of having a jury not only determine damages, but that the 
jury’s determination cannot be altered by the Legislature 
or courts. The trial court also concluded that the statute 
violated 
the 
Michigan 
Constitution’s 
provision 
that 
guarantees to citizens equal protection of the laws.5  That 
is, 
that 
it 
impermissibly 
causes 
similarly 
situated 
litigants to be treated differently. 
Using the same 
reasoning, the trial court concluded that the statute also 
violates the Michigan Constitution’s guarantee of due 
process of law.6 
5 Const 1963, art 1, § 2.  
6 Const 1963, art 1, § 17.  
3  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed in a two-to­
one opinion.7  The majority determined that the cap did not 
infringe plaintiff’s right to trial by jury for two 
reasons. 
First, because the Legislature can abolish or 
modify common-law and statutory rights and remedies, it 
necessarily 
follows 
that 
it 
can 
limit 
the 
damages 
recoverable for a cause of action. Second, it decided that 
the statute does not infringe the right to a jury trial 
because the damages cap does not remove from the jury the 
determination of facts and amount of damages. 
The statute 
simply limits the amount of damages that can be recovered 
from a lessor of vehicles. 
Thus, the cap only limits the 
legal consequences of the jury’s finding. 
251 Mich App at 
590-595. 
Therefore, having determined that the cap did not 
implicate any fundamental right, the majority analyzed 
whether the cap violates plaintiff’s right to equal 
protection under the rational basis test. 
The majority 
concluded that “it can reasonably be assumed that Michigan 
has a legitimate interest in the continued operation of 
automobile 
rental 
businesses, 
and 
protecting 
those 
businesses from large damages awards in jury trials bears a 
7 251 Mich App 586; 651 NW2d 437 (2002). 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
rational 
relationship 
to 
that 
end.” 
Id. 
at 
598. 
Therefore, the statute did not violate plaintiff’s equal 
protection rights. 
Similarly, because the tests for due 
process and equal protection are essentially the same, the 
cap also did not violate plaintiff’s due process rights. 
Id. at 598. 
The Court of Appeals dissent would have held that the 
damages cap is unconstitutional because it violates the 
right to a jury trial. 
The dissent explained that 
“[b]ecause our constitution confers a right to trial by 
jury, and because the right to trial by jury in Michigan 
extends to a determination of damages, the damages cap in 
the instant case is unconstitutional.” 
Id. at 599. 
Thus, 
the statutory damages cap renders the jury’s role illusory. 
The dissent stated that the Legislature may be free to 
abolish a cause of action, but it may not abolish a right 
mandated by the Constitution. Id. at 600. 
This Court granted plaintiff’s application for leave 
to appeal, “limited to whether MCL 257.401(3) constitutes 
an unconstitutional denial of plaintiff’s right to a jury 
trial, equal protection, or due process.”8 
8 468 Mich 943 (2003). 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
II
 
 
When construing a constitutional provision, we must 
give the words their plain meaning if they are obvious on 
their face. 
“If, however, the constitutional language has 
no plain meaning, but is a technical, legal term, we are to 
construe those words in their technical, legal sense.” 
Silver Creek Drain Dist v Extrusions Div, Inc, 468 Mich 
367, 375; 663 NW2d 436 (2003); Michigan Coalition of State 
Employee Unions v Civil Service Comm, 465 Mich 212, 222­
223; 634 NW2d 692 (2001), quoting 1 Cooley, Constitutional 
Limitations (8th ed), p 132. 
The constitutionality of a statute is a question of 
law that is reviewed de novo. 
Tolksdorf v Griffith, 464 
Mich 1, 5; 626 NW2d 163 (2001). 
Statutes are presumed 
constitutional. 
We exercise the power to declare a law 
unconstitutional 
with 
extreme 
caution, 
and 
we 
never 
exercise it where serious doubt exists with regard to the 
conflict. 
Sears v Cottrell, 5 Mich 251, 259 (1858); 
accord, Taylor v Gate Pharmaceuticals, 468 Mich 1, 6; 658 
NW2d 
127 
(2003). 
“Every 
reasonable 
presumption 
or 
intendment must be indulged in favor of the validity of an 
act, and it is only when invalidity appears so clearly as 
to leave no room for reasonable doubt that it violates some 
provision of the Constitution that a court will refuse to 
6 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
sustain its validity.” Cady v Detroit, 289 Mich 499, 505; 
286 NW 805 (1939). 
III 
The statute at issue in this case, MCL 257.401, 
provides in part: 
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (1), a person
engaged in the business of leasing motor vehicles
who is the lessor of a motor vehicle under a 
lease providing for the use of the motor vehicle
by the lessee for a period of 30 days or less is
liable for an injury caused by the negligent
operation of the leased motor vehicle only if the
injury occurred while the leased motor vehicle
was being operated by an authorized driver under
the lease agreement or by the lessee's spouse, 
father, mother, brother, sister, son, daughter,
or other immediate family member. Unless the 
lessor, or his or her agent, was negligent in the
leasing of the motor vehicle, the lessor's 
liability under this subsection is limited to
$20,000.00 because of bodily injury to or death
of 1 person in any 1 accident and $40,000.00
because of bodily injury to or death of 2 or more 
persons in any 1 accident. [Emphasis added.] [9] 
9 Subsection 1 of the statute provides: 
This section shall not be construed to limit 
the right of a person to bring a civil action for
damages for injuries to either person or property
resulting from a violation of this act by the
owner or operator of a motor vehicle or his or
her agent or servant. The owner of a motor 
vehicle is liable for an injury caused by the
negligent operation of the motor vehicle whether
the negligence consists of a violation of a 
statute of this state or the ordinary care 
standard required by common law. The owner is not
liable unless the motor vehicle is being driven
with his or her express or implied consent or
(continued…) 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
Thus, this statute imposes on a motor vehicle lessor 
vicarious liability for bodily injury or death resulting 
from the negligence of the lessee (or a listed member of 
the lessee’s family). 
The statute, however, sets upper 
limits on that vicarious liability in the amounts of 
$20,000 for each person and $40,000 for each accident. 
The Michigan Constitution states that: 
The right of trial by jury shall remain, but
shall be waived in all civil cases unless 
demanded by one of the parties in the manner
prescribed by law. [Const 1963, art 1, § 14.] 
At issue is whether this constitutional provision 
makes what the Legislature attempted to do—cap damages even 
though a jury found that the damages were greater than the 
cap—unconstitutional. 
That 
is, 
does 
MCL 
257.401(3) 
unconstitutionally infringe the right of trial by jury? 
The first step in our analysis is to identify the 
scope of the right as enumerated in the Constitution. 
Our 
Constitution from the time of statehood has had a provision 
concerning the right of jury trials. In its earliest form, 
(…continued)
knowledge. It is presumed that the motor vehicle
is being driven with the knowledge and consent of
the owner if it is driven at the time of the 
injury by his or her spouse, father, mother,
brother, 
sister, 
son, 
daughter, 
or 
other 
immediate member of the family. [MCL 257.401(1).] 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
 
the right was expressed in Const 1835, art 1, § 9: “The 
right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.” 
This was 
changed somewhat by Const 1850, art 6, § 27: “The right of 
trial by jury shall remain, but shall be deemed to be 
waived in all civil cases unless demanded by one of the 
parties in such manner as shall be prescribed by law.” 
This language was unchanged in Const 1908, art 2, § 13, and 
the 1963 Constitution did not change the substance but only 
updated the language slightly. As can be seen, we have had 
virtually the same provision in our Constitution throughout 
our history and the nub of our inquiry must be, then, what 
does it mean to say “the right of trial by jury shall 
remain”? 
This Court, speaking through Justice Thomas M. Cooley 
addressed this in 1880, saying: 
The Constitution of the State provides that
‘The right of trial by jury shall remain, but
shall be deemed to be waived in all civil cases,
unless demanded by one of the parties in such
manner as shall be prescribed by law.’ Article 
vi. § 27. The right is to remain. What right?
Plainly the right as it existed before; the right
to a trial by jury as it had become known to the
previous jurisprudence of the State. 
[Swart v 
Kimball, 43 Mich 443, 448; 5 NW 635 (1880)
(emphasis in original).] 
What is to be taken from this is that to determine 
what this phrase, “the right of trial by jury shall 
remain,” means, one must look to the jurisprudence of the 
9  
 
 
 
 
 
state. 
That is, this phrase is a technical legal phrase 
with the meaning those understanding the jurisprudence of 
this state would give it. 
As we said in Michigan 
Coalition, supra at 223, drawing on Justice Cooley’s method 
of analysis, in construing technical legal terms used in a 
constitution, “we must suppose these words to be employed 
in 
their 
technical 
sense.” 
Quoting 
Constitutional 
Limitations, supra. 
It is this technical legal meaning 
that the ratifiers of the 1963 Constitution are held to 
have adopted. 
We thus must look for the meaning of “the 
right of trial by jury” before 1963, as understood by those 
learned in the law at the time. 
See Conservation Dep’t v 
Brown, 335 Mich 343, 346; 55 NW2d 859 (1952). 
Considerable insight into this scope of this right, 
both historically and as it was understood in the first 
half 
of 
the 
twentieth 
century, 
is 
provided 
in 
the 
encyclopedic article on this issue in the 1918 Harvard Law 
Review by Harvard Law professor Austin Wakeman Scott, Trial 
by jury and the reform of civil procedure, 31 Harv L R 669 
(1918). 
While, not surprisingly, Professor Scott found 
certain elements to have long been regarded as of the 
“essence” 
of 
trial 
by 
jury, 
such 
as 
unanimity, 
impartiality, and competence of the jury, id. at 672-674, 
he also found that the only matters “properly within the 
10  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
province of the jury” are questions of fact. 
Id. at 675. 
All other questions, being questions of law, are for the 
court. 
Id. at 677.10  Professor Scott’s article served as 
the bedrock for the United States Supreme Court decision, 
Tull v United States, 481 US 412; 107 S Ct 1831; 95 L Ed 2d 
365 (1987), in which the Court discussed these concepts and 
concluded that the jury was confined to finding facts and 
that law was for the courts and, moreover, that falling 
within the ambit of law was the assessment of civil 
penalties. 
As the Court said, “The assessment of civil 
penalties thus cannot be said to involve the ‘substance of 
a common-law right to a trial by jury,’ nor a ‘fundamental 
10 That this view is accurate seems incontrovertible 
when the scholarly Scott article is read, and it is 
reinforced by the most renowned commentator on the English
common law in the eighteenth century, William Blackstone,
who noted that the jurors “are judges of fact.”  3 Comm 
361, reprinted in 5 Kurland & Lerner, The Founder’s 
Constitution 345 (1986), and even Thomas Jefferson, who was
famously no friend of government officials decimating the
power of the common people: “. . . JURIES therefore . . .
determine all matters of fact, leaving to the permanent
judges to decide the law resulting from those facts.”
Thomas Jefferson to the Abbé Arnoux, July 19, 1789, 
reprinted in Kurland & Lerner, supra at 364. These ancient 
references concerning the status of the common law before
Michigan’s 
statehood 
are 
significant 
because 
in 
our 
earliest Constitution, by way of the ordinances of 1787 for
the government of the Northwest Territory, we adopted what
was in essence the English common law in existence on that
date. 
See In re Sanderson, 289 Mich 165, 174; 286 NW 198
(1939); In re Lamphere, 61 Mich 105, 108; 27 NW 882 (1886);
Stout v Keyes, 2 Doug 184 (Mich 1845). 
11  
 
 
 
 
 
element of a jury trial.’” 
Tull, supra at 426. 
This 
holding in Tull was not unexpected because it followed a 
similar holding in Galloway v United States, 319 US 372, 
392; 63 S Ct 1077; 87 L Ed 1458 (1943), in which the Court 
opined 
that, 
as 
expressed 
in 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution, the right of trial by jury extends only to 
“its most fundamental elements, not the great mass of 
procedural forms and details . . . .” 
No other understanding of the proper area for juries 
to exercise power can be found in Michigan jurisprudence. 
In 1962, in deciding McClelland v Scholz, 366 Mich 423, 
426; 115 NW2d 120 (1962), the Court found unexceptional a 
court rule that required juries to decide questions that 
relate “only to material issues of fact,” a finding that 
the Court could not have reached had the rule breached the 
“right 
of 
trial 
by 
jury” 
provision 
in 
the 
1908 
Constitution. 
Moreover, this approach echoed a similar 
earlier holding in May v Goulding, 365 Mich 143, 148-149 
(1961). 
Further, in giving an overview of the area of the 
law in 1994, this Court held: “Juries traditionally do not 
decide the law or the outcome of legal conflicts. . . . To 
maintain the traditional role of the jury, the jury must 
remain the factfinder; a jury may determine what happened, 
how, and when, but it may not resolve the law itself.” 
12  
 
 
 
 
 
Charles Reinhart Co v Winiemki, 444 Mich 579, 601; 513 NW2d 
773 (1994). 
It is clearly the case that, at the time of the 
drafting and ratification of the 1963 Constitution, those 
sophisticated 
in 
the 
law 
understood, 
and 
thus 
the 
instrument adopted, that the right of trial by jury 
encompassed a jury that could find facts, including the 
amount of damages. 
See, e.g., Wood v Detroit Automobile 
Inter-Ins Exchange, 413 Mich 573, 583-584; 321 NW2d 653 
(1982). 
However, regarding the law, it was for the court 
to decide that on the basis of the common law, the 
Constitution, or the statutes the Legislature had enacted. 
This should not be taken as dismissing the jury’s 
importance. 
It is for the jury to assimilate the facts 
presented at trial, draw inferences from those facts, and 
determine what happened in the case at issue. 
See, e.g., 
Green v Detroit U R Co, 210 Mich 119, 129; 177 NW 263 
(1920). As important as those duties are, however, matters 
of law concern the legal significance of those facts. 
Accordingly, excluded from the jury’s purview are such 
matters as whether a party has met its burden of proof, 
whether certain evidence may be considered, which witnesses 
may testify, whether the facts found by the jury result in 
a party being held liable, and the legal import of the 
13  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
amount of damages found by the jury.11  Thus, for example, 
while a jury may find a defendant has acted negligently and 
the amount of damages occasioned thereby, the court may 
apply the governmental immunity act, MCL 691.1407, and find 
there is no liability, despite the plaintiff’s damages. Or 
a jury may find a hunter has been injured and damaged on a 
defendant’s property because of the defendant’s negligence, 
but the recreational trespass act, MCL 324.73107, will, in 
certain 
circumstances, 
preclude 
liability. 
Moreover, 
uncontroversially, after the jury has been dismissed, a 
court may enter an order that doubles or trebles the amount 
of damages assessed, pursuant to any of the numerous 
11 See Etheridge v Med Ctr Hosps, 237 Va 87, 96; 376
SE2d 525 (1989), in which the Supreme Court of Virginia
noted: 
“The province of the jury is to settle 
questions of fact, and when the facts are 
ascertained the law determines the rights of the
parties.” . . . Once the jury has ascertained the
facts and assessed the damages, however, the 
constitutional mandate is satisfied. 
Thereafter,
it is the duty of the court to apply the law to
the facts. 
[Quoting WS Forbes & Co v Southern 
Cotton Oil Co, 130 Va 245, 260; 108 SE 15 
(1921)(citations deleted).] 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit has reached the same conclusion: “[O]nce the jury
has made its findings of fact with respect to damages, it
has fulfilled its constitutional function; it may not also
mandate compensation as a matter of law.” 
Boyd v Bulala,
877 F2d 1191, 1196 (CA 4, 1989). 
14  
 
 
  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
statutes that concern postverdict adjustment of damages.12 
In many ways this parallels the criminal system. While the 
jury is to find the facts, the court defines the crime and 
determines the sentence along with any fees or fines to be 
imposed on the basis of the guidance and requirements set 
forth by the Legislature. 
The damage cap is of a piece 
with these numerous examples that for generations have not 
been successfully challenged on the basis of constitutional 
infirmity and that reflect the previously unchallenged 
understanding springing from a recognition that juries 
decide only facts. 
Thus we conclude that the damages cap contained in MCL 
257.401(3) does not offend the constitutional right of 
trial by jury because the amount the plaintiff actually 
receives was never within those things a jury can decide. 
12 Statutes doubling or trebling damages include MCL
125.996, 230.7, 257.1336; statutes that set a minimum 
recoverable amount include MCL 14.309, 339.916, 445.257,
445.911, 550.1406; statutes that provide for adding costs,
fees, interest or penalties to awards include MCL 35.462,
125.1449m; 
court-determined 
remittitur 
and 
additur 
is 
provided for in MCR 2.611(E); and postverdict reduction of
awards to present value is permitted by MCL 600.6306(1)(c).
“[T]he practice of awarding damages far in excess of actual
compensation for quantifiable injuries was well recognized
at the time the Framers [of the United States Constitution]
produced the Eighth Amendment [relating to excessive bail,
fines, or cruel or unusual punishment].” 
Browning-Ferris
Ind of Vermont, Inc v Kelco Disposal, Inc, 492 US 257, 274;
109 S Ct 2909; 106 L Ed 2d 219 (1989). 
15  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
Damage 
caps 
are 
constitutional 
in 
causes 
of 
action 
springing out of the common law because the Legislature has 
the power under our Constitution13 to abolish or modify 
nonvested, common-law rights and remedies. 
Donajkowski v 
Alpena Power Co, 460 Mich 243, 256 n 14; 596 NW2d 574 
(1999). 
The case is even more convincing when, as here, 
the liability—an owner’s liability for the negligent 
driving of a permissive user—is a statutory creation. 
If 
the Legislature can create a cause of action, it must be 
able to eliminate or modify it. 
Karl v Bryant Air 
Conditioning Co, 416 Mich 558, 573-576; 331 NW2d 456 
(1982). Otherwise, one Legislature could bind a subsequent 
Legislature to not undo its work. 
This is impermissible. 
Pittsfield Twp v Washtenaw Co, 468 Mich 702, 713; 664 NW2d 
193 (2003), citing Malcolm v East Detroit, 437 Mich 132, 
139; 468 NW2d 479 (1991). 
That being so, it logically 
follows that the Legislature can also take the less drastic 
step of leaving the cause of action intact, but limiting 
the damages recoverable for a particular cause of action 
13 Art 3, § 7 of the Michigan Constitution states: 
The common law and the statute laws now in 
force, not repugnant to this constitution, shall
remain in force until they expire by their own
limitations, or are changed, amended or repealed. 
16  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
from a particular defendant.14
 See Karl, supra at 577; 
Shavers v Attorney General, 402 Mich 554, 623; 267 NW2d 72 
(1978). 
Like 
the 
congressionally 
imposed 
civil 
penalties 
discussed in Tull, supra at 426, the Michigan Legislature’s 
limits 
on 
defendant’s 
liability 
do 
not 
involve 
the 
“‘substance of a common-law right to a trial by jury,’” or 
a “‘fundamental element of a jury trial.’” (Citations 
deleted.) These are things that are not under the umbrella 
of the right. 
In other words, MCL 257.401(3) only limits 
the legal consequences of the jury’s finding regarding the 
liability. 
Plaintiff’s right to a jury trial is not 
implicated. 
She has had a jury trial and the jury 
determined the facts of her case. 
The jury’s function is 
complete. 
It is up to the court to determine the legal 
effect of those findings, whether it be that her damages 
14 We note that the Legislature has limited a 
plaintiff’s ability to fully recover his assessed damages
in other circumstances, such as where he is more than fifty
percent at fault, MCL 600.2955a (constitutionality upheld
in Wysocki v Kivi, 248 Mich App 346; 639 NW2d 572 [2001])
and 500.3135; if he was operating his own vehicle while
uninsured, MCL 500.3135(2)(c); if a judgment in his favor
was discharged in bankruptcy, MCL 600.2914; if his claim
involves noneconomic damages in a products liability 
action, MCL 600.2946a (constitutionality upheld in Kenkel v 
Stanley Works, 256 Mich App 548; 665 NW2d 490 [2003]). 
17  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
are capped, reduced, increased, tripled, reduced to present 
value, or completely unavailable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IV
 
Plaintiff also asserts that MCL 257.401(3) violates 
our Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause, which provides 
in part, “No person shall be denied the equal protection of 
the laws . . . .” 
Const 1963, art 1, § 2.  It is her 
argument that she, unlike plaintiffs in litigation not 
concerning rental cars, cannot recover what the jury has 
decided are her damages. 
Thus, she argues, she is denied 
the equal protection of the law under the Michigan 
Constitution. 
At issue, then, is whether the different treatment 
given 
to 
plaintiffs 
in 
cases 
of 
this 
sort 
is 
constitutional. 
As is apparent, when any statute is 
passed, the Legislature is almost invariably deciding to 
treat certain individuals differently from others.  This 
exercise of discrimination between citizens means, for 
example, that some pay taxes at one rate, while others pay 
at another rate. 
Or some get a tax or social service 
benefit that others do not, and so on.  Line drawing of 
this sort is inherent in all governments and in ours it is 
done at the state level by the Legislature, Const 1963, art 
4, § 1, and locally by local legislative bodies. 
The 
18  
 
 
 
 
 
Constitution of Michigan was, in fact, written in large 
part to institutionalize this method of decision-making. 
Thus, it is apparent that when the Legislature acts, it 
cannot be that the mere occurrence of different outcomes 
between two citizens is in itself sufficient to make an act 
unconstitutional. 
Otherwise, what the Constitution gives 
with one hand—the right to representative government—it 
would have taken away with the other—the equal protection 
guarantee. 
Accordingly, courts here and elsewhere in the 
United States have been very guarded about overruling the 
legislatures’ decisions by declaring unconstitutional the 
classifications that a legislature defined. 
Indeed, the 
undesirability of courts entering into this area prompted 
United States Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 
to deride all arguments of this sort as “the usual last 
resort of constitutional arguments.” 
Buck v Bell, 274 US 
200, 208; 47 S Ct 584; 71 L Ed 1000 (1927). Yet, even with 
this reluctance, the courts have been willing to intervene 
in a narrow class of cases. 
As the law has developed, the first category of such 
cases is where “strict scrutiny,” as the courts have 
described it, has been applied to the legislative decision. 
For a decision to be subject to such scrutiny, it must be a 
classification that is based on “suspect” factors such as 
19  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
race, national origin, ethnicity, or a “fundamental right.” 
Harvey v Michigan, 469 Mich 1, 6-7; 664 NW2d 767 (2003); 
Plyler v Doe, 457 US 202, 216-217; 102 S Ct 2382; 72 L Ed 
2d 786 (1982). 
When such review is called for, the courts 
require “the State to demonstrate that its classification 
has 
been 
precisely 
tailored” 
and 
it 
must 
“serve 
a 
compelling governmental interest.” 
Plyler, at 216-217; 
DeRose v DeRose, 469 Mich 320, 353; 666 NW2d 636 
(2003)(“narrowly tailored”). 
If this is missing, the 
statute falls to the Constitution. 
The second type of case in which courts will intervene 
are those described as cases that implicate intermediate 
level scrutiny. 
Here, the court, using “heightened 
scrutiny,” reviews legislation creating classifications on 
such bases as illegitimacy and gender. Harvey, supra at 8. 
Under this standard, a challenged statutory classification 
will be upheld only if it is substantially related to an 
important governmental objective. Id. 
The third level is “rational basis” review. 
Under 
this test, “courts will uphold legislation as long as that 
legislation 
is 
rationally 
related 
to 
a 
legitimate 
government purpose.” 
Crego v Coleman, 463 Mich 248, 259; 
615 NW2d 218 (2000). 
This highly deferential standard of 
review requires a challenger to show that the legislation 
20  
 
 
 
 
 
is “‘arbitrary and wholly unrelated in a rational way to 
the objective of the statute.’” Id., quoting Smith v 
Employment Security Comm, 410 Mich 231, 271; 301 NW2d 285 
(1981). 
In the present case, plaintiff claims that the 
discrimination imposed on her should be evaluated on the 
basis of strict scrutiny. 
She characterizes the right at 
issue as the right to a jury trial. 
However, rights are 
always to be identified at “the most specific level at 
which 
a 
relevant 
tradition 
protecting, 
or 
denying 
protection to, the asserted right can be identified.” 
Michael H v Gerald D, 491 US 110, 127 n 6; 109 S Ct 2333; 
105 L Ed 2d 91 (1989). 
This means that, rather than 
describing the right sweepingly, we are to define it with 
the most precision possible. 
In this case, we conclude 
that the right at issue here is not the overarching right 
to have a jury trial but, more precisely, a claimed right 
to have a jury’s assessment of damages be unmodifiable as a 
matter of law. 
With the right properly understood, we turn to whether 
it is of the sort to which strict scrutiny applies. 
The 
United States Supreme Court has developed a test for strict 
scrutiny that this Court has followed when interpreting our 
own Constitution. 
See, e.g., DeRose, supra. 
Because this 
21  
 
 
 
 
 
case clearly does not result in discrimination by race, 
national origin, or ethnicity, nor affect an interest that 
is 
fundamental, 
that 
is, 
“an 
interest 
traditionally 
protected by our society,” Michael H, supra at 122, this 
statute does not warrant strict scrutiny review. 
While 
rights such as this may be “important and valuable,” they 
are not encompassed by strict scrutiny unless they are 
“implicit in ‘the concept of ordered liberty.’” 
People v 
Gonzales, 356 Mich 247, 260; 97 NW2d 16 (1959), citing 
Palko v Connecticut, 302 US 319; 58 S Ct 149; 82 L Ed 288 
(1937). The right to full recovery in tort is not only not 
a fundamental right, it is not a right at all, as the 
discussion above makes clear. 
Therefore, strict scrutiny 
does not apply. 
Concerning intermediate scrutiny, this legislative 
action has nothing to do with allegations of gender or 
illegitimacy and thus heightened scrutiny is inappropriate. 
This leaves the rational basis test as the proper 
foundation for analysis. 
Rational basis applies to social 
and economic legislation, of which this is an example. 
Romein v Gen Motors Corp, 436 Mich 515, 525; 462 NW2d 555 
(1990). 
The rational basis test considers whether the 
“classification 
itself 
is 
rationally 
related 
to 
a 
legitimate governmental interest.” 
Shavers, supra at 554, 
22  
 
 
 
 
quoting United States Dep’t of Agriculture v Moreno, 413 US 
528, 533; 93 S Ct 2821; 37 L Ed 2d 782 (1973). 
But the 
rational basis test does not test “the wisdom, need, or 
appropriateness of the legislation . . . .” 
Crego, supra 
at 260. 
We examine the purpose with which the legislation 
was enacted, not its effects: “That the accommodation 
struck may have profound and far-reaching consequences 
. . . provides all the more reason for this Court to defer 
to the congressional judgment unless it is demonstrably 
arbitrary or irrational.” 
Duke Power Co v Carolina Envir 
Study Group, 438 US 59, 83-84; 98 S Ct 2620, 57 L Ed 2d 595 
(1978). 
In discerning the purpose, we look to “any set of 
facts, either known or which could reasonably be assumed, 
even if such facts may be debatable.” 
Harvey, supra at 7. 
Applying this law, we conclude that this statute, obviously 
designed to reduce insurance costs for automobile lessors, 
could have been seen as a measure that, because costs of 
operations are reduced, increases the number of providers 
from which Michigan consumers may choose, or even just to 
enhance automobile sales for our leading domestic industry 
as more lessors transact business in the state. 
Moreover, 
as we are informed by a brief amicus curiae, the amendment 
of 
MCL 
257.401, 
limiting 
lessor’s 
liability 
removed 
Michigan from the small remaining minority of states that 
23  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
still impose unlimited liability on automobile lessors. 
This could be seen as joining with other states in viewing 
vicarious liability as unwise public policy, at least in 
these circumstances. 
Thus, the legislation is rationally 
related to legitimate governmental interest. 
Because MCL 257.401(3) satisfies the rational basis 
test, it does not violate the rights granted by the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Michigan Constitution. 
V 
Plaintiff also argues that MCL 257.401(3) violates her 
substantive 
due 
process 
rights 
under 
the 
Michigan 
Constitution, which provides in pertinent part that no 
person shall “be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law . . . .” 
Const 1963, art 1, § 
17. 
To analyze whether a plaintiff’s due process rights 
have been violated, we determine “whether the legislation 
bears a reasonable relation to a permissible legislative 
objective.” 
Detroit v Qualls, 434 Mich 340, 366-367 n 49; 
454 NW2d 374 (1990). 
This is, in essence, the same test 
employed in the equal protection analysis, and we reach the 
same 
result. 
Therefore, 
because 
we 
find 
that 
MCL 
257.401(3) does not violate plaintiff’s rights under 
Michigan’s Equal Protection Clause, we also find it does 
not violate her rights under Michigan’s Due Process Clause. 
24  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VI
 
 
By holding that damage caps legislation is permissible 
and inoffensive to the Constitution, we join many other 
states in reaching this conclusion. Some of the more well­
written opinions include the Supreme Court of California, 
which stated in Fein v Permanente Med Group, 38 Cal 3d 137, 
161; 695 P2d 665; 211 Cal Rptr 368 (1985), “[W]e know of no 
principle of California—or federal—constitutional law which 
prohibits the Legislature from limiting the recovery of 
damages in a particular setting in order to further a 
legitimate state interest.” 
The Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts, in English v New England Med Ctr, Inc, 405 
Mass 423, 427; 541 NE2d 329 (1989), held, “the personal, 
substantive right of a tort victim to recover damages is 
not a fundamental interest.” 
(Quotation marks deleted.) 
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia similarly 
upheld damages caps in Robinson v Charleston Area Med Ctr, 
Inc, 186 W Va 720, 729; 414 SE2d 877 (1991), saying, “the 
‘rational basis’ test for state constitutional equal 
protection purposes is applicable in this jurisdiction to 
. . . statutory limitation on remedies in certain common­
law causes of action, such as statutory ‘caps’ on the 
recoverable amount of damages.” 
The Supreme Court of 
Indiana, in Johnson v St Vincent Hosp, Inc, 237 Ind 374, 
25 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
396; 404 NE2d 585 (1980), stated, concerning a similar 
statutory cap on damages, “It is not a presumption which 
prevents recovery of more than that amount, but the policy 
of the law in the statute. The limitation is not a denial 
of due process on this basis.” 
The Supreme Court of 
Virginia, in Etheridge, 237 Va 95, 96, noted, “[A] remedy 
is a matter of law, not a matter of fact,” and “although a 
party has the right to have a jury assess his damages, he 
has no right to have a jury dictate through an award the 
legal consequences of its assessment.” 
Reinforcing the findings of a majority of state 
supreme courts on this issue is the analysis of the United 
States Supreme Court that “statutes limiting liability are 
relatively commonplace and have consistently been enforced 
by the courts.” 
Duke Power, 438 US 88-89 n 32 (citations 
deleted). 
What these courts have been unwilling to do is to 
usher in a new Lochner15 era. It was during that era when, 
for a time after the industrial expansion of the United 
States began in the mid-nineteenth century and, on the 
basis of strained constitutional interpretation, the United 
15 Lochner v New York, 198 US 45; 25 S Ct 539; 49 L Ed
937 (1905). 
26  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
States Supreme Court threw out economic regulations that 
had been won in the political process. 
The central theme 
of the Lochner jurisprudence was, as Justice Peckham wrote 
of the ill-fated New York state effort to regulate the 
hours of bakers, “[A]re we all 
. . . at the mercy of 
legislative majorities?” 
Id. at 59. 
He and a majority of 
the Court concluded, “No.”16
 Yet, by the mid-1930s, in 
Nebbia v New York, 291 US 502, 537; 54 S Ct 505; 78 L Ed 
940 (1934), Justice Owen Roberts’s majority opinion for the 
Court stated that “a state is free to adopt whatever 
economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public 
welfare . . . . With the wisdom of the policy adopted, 
. . . the courts are both incompetent and unauthorized to 
deal.” 
From that time, economic regulation, such as the 
16 This case is taken as the signature case of this
era, without doubt, because of the striking dissent of
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, in which, regarding economic
regulation, he famously said: 
This case is decided upon an economic theory
which a large part of the country does not 
entertain. If it were a question whether I agreed
with that theory I should desire to study it
further and long before making up my mind. But I
do not conceive that to be my duty, because I
strongly 
believe 
that 
my 
agreement 
or 
disagreement has nothing to do with the right of
a majority to embody their [sic] opinions in law.
[Lochner v New York, 198 US 75 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).] 
27  
 
 
 
 
 
  
measure we deal with today, has consistently been held to 
be an issue for the political process, not for the courts. 
Along with the noted jurisdictions, we are unwilling to 
turn our backs on this law. 
It is into this mainstream 
that we again steer our economic regulation jurisprudence. 
We hold that the damages cap in MCL 257.401(3) is 
constitutional and does not violate plaintiff’s rights to a 
jury trial, equal protection, or due process under the 
Michigan Constitution. 
Therefore, we affirm the decision 
of the Court of Appeals. 
Clifford W. Taylor
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
28  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
MARGARET PHILLIPS, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE ESTATE OF REGEANA DIANE HERVEY,
Deceased, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
No. 121831 
MIRAC, INC., 
Defendant-Appellee. 
WEAVER, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
I concur in the majority’s conclusion that MCL 
257.401(3), which caps the amount of a lessor’s liability 
in motor vehicle leases of thirty days or less, does not 
violate plaintiff’s constitutional rights to a jury trial,1 
equal protection,2 or due process.3  But I do so pursuant to 
my own reasoning, which is set forth below. 
I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the 
right to trial by jury must be interpreted according to the 
meaning that those “learned in the law” would give the 
1 Const 1963, art 1, § 14. 
2 Const 1963, art 1, § 2. 
3 Const 1963, art 1, § 17. 
 
 
 
 
   
 
                                                 
 
phrase. 
Our primary rule of constitutional interpretation 
must be the common understanding that the people would have 
given 
the 
constitutional 
provision 
at 
the 
time 
of 
ratification, not the meaning that those “learned in the 
law” would give it. 
Facts and Proceedings Below 
Plaintiff’s decedent, Regeana Hervey, was killed in a 
car accident on October 27, 1997, when Da-Fel Reed, the 
driver of the car in which Ms. Hervey was a passenger, lost 
control of her vehicle and struck another vehicle. 
Ms. 
Reed had leased the car that she was driving from defendant 
Mirac, Inc., which does business as Enterprise Rent-A-Car. 
The parties stipulated that the lease was for a period of 
thirty days or less. Decedent’s mother, plaintiff Margaret 
Phillips, sued Ms. Reed, as well as defendant. 
The suit 
against defendant was premised on the owner’s liability 
statute, MCL 257.401.4 
Before trial, the parties entered into an agreement 
that collection of a judgment against defendant Mirac, 
Inc., would exceed $20,000 only if MCL 257.401(3), which 
imposes a $20,000 cap on defendant’s liability, were deemed 
unconstitutional. 
The parties further agreed that even if 
4 Ms. Reed is not a party to this appeal. 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
the cap were deemed unconstitutional, the maximum judgment 
to be entered on the verdict would be $250,000 and the 
minimum judgment to be entered on the verdict would be 
$150,000. 
Additionally, the agreement recognized that Ms. 
Reed was uncollectible, and plaintiff agreed that she would 
not seek entry of a judgment against Ms. Reed on any 
verdict. 
Following a jury trial in November 1999, the jury 
found Ms. Reed negligent and awarded plaintiff $900,000 in 
damages. 
Plaintiff then requested that a judgment of 
$250,000 be entered against defendant Mirac, Inc., on the 
verdict, while defendant requested that a judgment of 
$20,000 be entered on the verdict. 
In determining which 
judgment to enter, the trial court concluded that MCL 
257.401(3) was unconstitutional and entered a judgment 
against defendant for $250,000. 
First, the trial court determined that the statute 
violated plaintiff’s right to a jury trial. 
The trial 
court stated that the 1963 Constitution, court rule, and 
case law all provide for the right to a jury’s assessment 
of 
damages 
and 
that 
this 
right 
must 
be 
preserved. 
Consequently, the Legislature could not impose a cap on the 
jury’s assessment of damages and its attempt to do so in 
MCL 257.401(3) violated the constitutional right to have a 
3  
 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
jury assess damages, as that right existed in 1929, before 
the ratification of Michigan’s current Constitution in 
1963. The trial court found more persuasive decisions from 
those states that had similarly concluded that damage caps 
violate the right to a jury trial. But the trial court did 
acknowledge that the Legislature could eliminate the 
owner’s liability statute altogether. 
Second, the trial court determined that the statute 
violated plaintiff’s rights to equal protection under the 
law. 
The trial court reasoned that the right to a jury 
trial was a fundamental right and, therefore, required a 
strict scrutiny review. 
The trial court concluded that, 
because there was no compelling governmental interest in 
regulating Michigan’s car rental industry, the statute 
failed the strict scrutiny test. 
Third, the trial court concluded that the statute 
violated the constitutional right to due process for the 
same reasons that the statute violated the right to equal 
protection.5 
5 The trial court also concluded that the statute did 
not violate the separation of powers doctrine. 
That issue 
is not before this Court. 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
Defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed 
in a two-to-one published opinion.6  Addressing the right to 
a jury trial, the Court of Appeals majority held that the 
cap did not infringe plaintiff’s right to trial by jury for 
two reasons. First, because the Legislature can abolish or 
modify common-law and statutory rights and remedies, it 
necessarily 
follows 
that 
it 
can 
limit 
the 
damages 
recoverable for a cause of action. 
Second, the statute 
does not infringe the jury’s right to decide cases because 
the damages cap does not remove from the jury the 
determination of facts and amount of damages. 
The statute 
simply limits the amount of damages that can be recovered 
from a lessor of vehicles. 
Thus, the cap only limits the 
legal consequences of the jury’s finding. 
251 Mich App 
590-595. 
Next, the majority addressed whether the cap violates 
plaintiff’s right to equal protection under the law. 
Because the statute at issue is social or economic 
legislation, the majority examined it under the rational 
basis test. 
The majority concluded that it was reasonable 
to assume that Michigan has a legitimate interest in the 
continued operation of automobile rental businesses and 
6 251 Mich App 586; 651 NW2d 437 (2002). 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
that protecting these businesses from large damage awards 
was rationally related to that purpose. 
Therefore, the 
statute did not violate plaintiff’s equal protection 
rights. 
Similarly, because the tests for due process and 
equal protection are essentially the same, the cap also did 
not violate plaintiff’s due process rights. 
Id. at 595­
598. 
The Court of Appeals dissenter would have held that 
the damages cap is unconstitutional because it violates the 
right to a jury trial. 
The dissenter explained that 
“[b]ecause our constitution confers a right to trial by 
jury, and because the right to trial by jury in Michigan 
extends to a determination of damages, the damages cap in 
the instant case is unconstitutional.” 
Id. at 599. 
The 
statutory damages cap renders the jury’s role illusory. 
While the Legislature may be free to abolish a cause of 
action, it may not abolish a right mandated by the 
Constitution. Id. at 600. 
Plaintiff appealed and this Court granted leave to 
appeal, “limited to whether MCL 257.401(3) constitutes an 
unconstitutional denial of plaintiff’s right to a jury 
trial, equal protection, or due process.”7 
7 468 Mich 941 (2003). 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Standard of Review 
The constitutionality of a statute is a question of 
law that is reviewed de novo. 
Tolksdorf v Griffith, 464 
Mich 1, 5; 626 NW2d 163 (2001). 
Statutes are presumed 
constitutional. This Court has stated: 
No rule of construction is better settled in 
this country, both upon principle and authority,
than that the acts of a state legislature are to
be presumed constitutional unless the contrary is
shown; and it is only when they manifestly
infringe some provision of the constitution that
they can be declared void for that reason. 
In 
cases of doubt, every possible presumption, not
clearly inconsistent with the language and the
subject matter, is to be made in favor of the
constitutionality of the act. 
The power in declaring laws unconstitutional
should be exercised with extreme caution, and 
never where serious doubt exists as to the 
conflict . . . . 
These rules are founded in the 
best reasons; because, as suggested by my brother
Manning, while the supreme judicial power may
interfere to prevent the legislative and other
departments 
from 
exceeding 
their 
powers, 
no 
tribunal has yet been devised to check the 
encroachments of that judicial power itself. 
[Sears 
v 
Cottrell, 
5 
Mich 
251, 
259-260 
(1858)(emphasis in original).] 
Analysis 
The statute at issue in this case, MCL 257.401, 
provides in part: 
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (1), a person
engaged in the business of leasing motor vehicles
who is the lessor of a motor vehicle under a 
lease providing for the use of the motor vehicle
by the lessee for a period of 30 days or less is
liable for an injury caused by the negligent 
7  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
operation of the leased motor vehicle only if the
injury occurred while the leased motor vehicle
was being operated by an authorized driver under
the lease agreement or by the lessee's spouse, 
father, mother, brother, sister, son, daughter,
or other immediate family member. Unless the 
lessor, or his or her agent, was negligent in the 
leasing of the motor vehicle, the lessor's 
liability under this subsection is limited to
$20,000.00 because of bodily injury to or death 
of 1 person in any 1 accident and $40,000.00
because of bodily injury to or death of 2 or more
persons in any 1 accident. [Emphasis added.] [8] 
Right to a Jury Trial 
Plaintiff asserts that MCL 257.401(3) violates art 1, 
§ 14 of the Michigan Constitution, which provides: 
The right of trial by jury shall remain, but
shall be waived in all civil cases unless 
8 Subsection 1 of the statute provides: 
This section shall not be construed to limit 
the right of a person to bring a civil action for
damages for injuries to either person or property
resulting from a violation of this act by the
owner or operator of a motor vehicle or his or
her agent or servant. The owner of a motor 
vehicle is liable for an injury caused by the
negligent operation of the motor vehicle whether
the negligence consists of a violation of a 
statute of this state or the ordinary care 
standard required by common law. The owner is not
liable unless the motor vehicle is being driven
with his or her express or implied consent or
knowledge. It is presumed that the motor vehicle
is being driven with the knowledge and consent of
the owner if it is driven at the time of the 
injury by his or her spouse, father, mother,
brother, 
sister, 
son, 
daughter, 
or 
other 
immediate member of the family. [MCL 257.401(1).] 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
 
demanded by one of the parties in the manner
prescribed by law. 
In all civil cases tried by
12 jurors a verdict shall be received when 10
jurors agree. 
I disagree that the statute violates the right to a jury 
trial and find the Court of Appeals analysis on this point 
persuasive. 
But before explaining my rationale for 
concluding that the statute is constitutional, I wish to 
note my continued disagreement with rules of constitutional 
interpretation set forth in the majority opinion. 
Our 
primary rule of constitutional interpretation must be the 
common understanding that the people would have given the 
constitutional provision at the time of ratification, not 
the meaning that those “learned in the law” would give it. 
See, e.g., Adair v Michigan, 470 Mich 105, 143; ___ NW2d 
___ (2004) (Weaver, J., dissenting in part and concurring 
in part); 
Silver Creek Drain Dist v Extrusions Division, 
Inc, 468 Mich 367, 382; 663 NW2d 436 (2003) (Weaver, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
Therefore, on 
this important point, I dissent from the majority opinion. 
First, as the Court of Appeals noted, the damages cap 
contained in MCL 257.401(3) does not violate plaintiff’s 
right to a jury trial because the Legislature has the power 
under our Constitution to abolish or modify common-law and 
statutory rights and remedies. 
Donajkowski v Alpena Power 
9  
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
Co, 460 Mich 243, 256 n 14; 596 NW2d 574 (1999). Art 3, § 
7 of the Michigan Constitution states: 
The common law and the statute laws now in 
force, not repugnant to this constitution, shall
remain in force until they expire by their own
limitations, or are changed, amended or repealed. 
Where the Legislature can completely eliminate a cause of 
action, it logically follows that the Legislature can also 
take the less drastic step of limiting the damages 
recoverable for a particular cause of action. See Kirkland 
v Blaine Co Med Ctr, 134 Idaho 464, 468; 4 P3d 1115 (2000); 
Murphy v Edmonds, 325 Md 342, 373; 601 A2d 102 (1992). In 
other words, if the Legislature can completely eliminate an 
owner’s liability, it follows that it may take the less 
drastic step of limiting an owner’s liability.9 
9 The dissent acknowledges that the Legislature can
repeal a statute, but then concludes that it cannot take
the less drastic step of limiting the remedy provided by
the statute because to do so abrogates a citizen’s 
constitutional rights. Post at 4. 
This makes no sense. 
Before the enactment of MCL 257.401, an “owner of a motor
vehicle was not liable for the negligence of a person to
whom he had loaned it” unless the vehicle was used in 
operation of the owner’s business. 
Moore v Palmer, 350 
Mich 363, 392; 86 NW2d 585 (1957). It was only through the
Legislature’s enactment of MCL 257.401 that a cause of
action against motor vehicle owners was created. 
If the 
Legislature can completely eliminate this cause of action
that it created against the owner of a motor vehicle
without violating the Constitution, it certainly may take
the less drastic step of limiting the remedy for the cause
of action it created. 
10  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Second, as the Court of Appeals also explained, MCL 
257.401(3) does not violate plaintiff’s right to a jury 
trial because the provision does not infringe the jury’s 
right to decide the case. 
The jury still determines the 
facts and the damages incurred by plaintiff. 
It is only 
after the jury has done so that the cap is applied to limit 
liability. 
Thus, MCL 257.401(3) only limits the legal 
consequences of the jury’s finding regarding the liability. 
As the Maryland Court explained in Murphy, supra at 373: 
The 
General 
Assembly, 
however, 
did 
not 
attempt to transfer what is traditionally a jury
function to the trial judge. 
Instead, the 
General Assembly abrogated any cause of action
for 
noneconomic 
tort 
damages 
in 
excess 
of 
$350,000; it removed the issue from the judicial
arena. No question exists concerning the role of
the judge versus the jury with respect to 
noneconomic 
damages 
in 
excess 
of 
$350,000.
Therefore, 
no 
question 
concerning 
the 
constitutional 
right 
to 
a 
jury 
trial 
is 
presented. 
I find it noteworthy that the limitation on damages in 
this case applies only to limit the lessor’s liability. 
There is no cap on the damages that limits the liability of 
the lessee or operator of the vehicle. This distinction is 
recognized in MCL 257.401(4), which provides: 
A person engaged in the business of leasing
motor vehicles as provided under subsection (3)
shall notify a lessee that the lessor is liable
only up to the maximum amounts provided for in
subsection (3), and only if the leased motor
vehicle was being operated by the lessee or other 
11  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
authorized driver or by the lessee's spouse,
father, mother, brother, sister, son, daughter,
or other immediate family member, and that the 
lessee may be liable to the lessor up to amounts
provided for in subsection (3), and to an injured 
person for amounts awarded in excess of the 
maximum amounts provided for in subsection (3).
[Emphasis added.] 
Thus, a plaintiff has the opportunity for a complete 
recovery against the party whom the jury has determined to 
be negligent—the lessee or operator of the vehicle, and 
this opportunity makes plaintiff’s argument that the cap 
violates the right to a jury trial even less convincing.10 
10 The recognition of this possibility of recovery was
relied 
on 
in 
a 
recent 
Florida 
case 
upholding 
the 
constitutionality of a similar Florida statute. 
The 
Florida Court explained: 
[Fla 
Stat 
324.021, 
which 
limits 
the 
liability of short-term motor vehicle lessors]
does not violate this section of the Florida 
Constitution by limiting plaintiff’s right to 
trial by jury. 
Under this statute, a jury still
retains the ability to fully assess all damages
against those at fault. 
Section 324.021 merely
limits a plaintiff’s available damages from the
owner of the vehicle. 
A plaintiff retains the
ability to recover fully from the lessee or 
operator of the vehicle. 
[Enterprise Leasing Co
South Central, Inc v Hughes, 833 So 2d 832, 838
(Fla App, 2002).] 
I note that I do not consider the possibility of
complete recovery from the negligent party to be a 
constitutional prerequisite for upholding a damages cap. 
12  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For these reasons, I conclude that MCL 257.401(3) does 
not violate plaintiff’s right to a jury trial. 
Equal Protection 
Plaintiff also asserts that MCL 257.401(3) violates 
her right to equal protection under the law. 
Michigan’s 
Equal Protection Clause provides in part, “No person shall 
be denied the equal protection of the laws . . . .” Const 
1963, art 1, § 2. Equal protection challenges are reviewed 
using one of three levels of scrutiny: 
rational basis, 
heightened or intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny. 
Harvey v Michigan, 469 Mich 1, 6-7; 664 NW2d 767 (2003). I 
disagree with plaintiff’s contention that the statute at 
issue in the present case should be reviewed under a strict 
scrutiny standard because the right to a jury trial is a 
fundamental right. 
The strict scrutiny standard of review 
typically applies to laws in which classifications are 
based on “suspect factors” such as race, ethnicity, or 
national 
origin. 
Id. 
at 
7. 
Social 
or 
economic 
legislation, on the other hand, is generally subject to 
review under the rational basis test. People v Perlos, 436 
Mich 
305, 
332; 
462 
NW2d 
310 
(1990. 
Tort 
reform 
legislation, such as the statute in the present case, is 
typically treated as socioeconomic legislation that is 
13  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
subject to rational basis review. 
See Stevenson v Reese, 
239 Mich App 513, 517-518; 609 NW2d 195 (2000). 
The 
rational 
basis 
test 
considers 
whether 
the 
“classification 
itself 
is 
rationally 
related 
to 
a 
legitimate governmental interest.” 
Id.
 But it does not 
test 
“the 
wisdom, 
need, 
or 
appropriateness 
of 
the 
legislation . . . .” 
Crego v Coleman, 463 Mich 248, 260; 
615 NW2d 218 (2000). 
I agree with the Court of Appeals 
that 
this legislation passes that test because it can
reasonably 
be 
assumed 
that 
Michigan 
has 
a 
legitimate interest in the continued operation of
automobile 
rental 
businesses, 
and 
protecting
those businesses from large damage awards in jury
trials bears a rational relationship to that end.
[251 Mich App 598.][11] 
Because the statute satisfies the rational basis test, it 
does not violate the rights granted by the Equal Protection 
Clause.12 
11 The dissent makes much of the other measures that 
might have been taken by the Legislature to address the
concerns of car rental companies. Post at 5-6, 8-9. In my
opinion, such analysis usurps the Legislature’s role to
weigh interests and policy considerations when enacting a
statute. 
12 I note that had a majority of this Court in Harvey,
not overruled the heightened scrutiny articulated in 
Manistee Bank & Trust Co v McGowan, 394 Mich 655; 232 NW2d
636 (1975), 
consistently with my dissent in Harvey, I 
would have employed the “fair-and-substantial-relation-to­
the-object-of-the-legislation” test from Manistee Bank when 
(continued…) 
14  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
  
 
 
Due Process 
Lastly, plaintiff argues that MCL 257.401(3) violates 
her due process rights. The Michigan Constitution provides 
in pertinent part that no person shall “be deprived of 
life, liberty or property without due process of law.” 
Const 1963, art 1, § 17. 
The test for due process is 
“whether the legislation bears a reasonable relation to a 
permissible legislative objective.” 
Shavers v Attorney 
General, 402 Mich 554, 612; 267 NW2d 72 (1978). 
This is 
essentially the same test employed in the equal protection 
analysis. 
Doe v Dep’t of Social Services, 439 Mich 650, 
682 n 36; 487 NW2d 166 (1992). 
Therefore, for the same 
reasons that MCL 257.401(3) does not violate the rights 
secured by the Equal Protection Clause, it also does not 
violate those secured by the Due Process Clause. 
Conclusion 
I agree that the damages cap is constitutional and 
does not violate plaintiff’s rights to a jury trial, equal 
(…continued) 
analyzing plaintiff’s equal protection claim in this case.  
See Harvey, supra at 16-19 (Weaver, J., dissenting).  
However, even under this heightened scrutiny, I would have 
concluded that the statute is constitutional and does not  
violate plaintiff’s equal protection rights.  
15  
 
 
 
 
protection, or due process. 
Therefore, I concur in the 
result of the majority opinion, but under my own reasoning. 
I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the right to 
a jury trial must be interpreted according to the meaning 
that those “learned in the law” would give the phrase. 
Rather, our primary rule of constitutional interpretation 
must be the common understanding that the people would have 
given the constitutional provision at the time of its 
ratification. 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
16  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
MARGARET PHILLIPS, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE ESTATE OF REGEANA DIANE HARVEY,
DECEASED, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
No. 121831 
MIRAC, INC, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting). 
Michigan’s Constitution provides our citizens with the 
right to trial by jury. Const 1963, art 1, § 14.  Because 
I believe the right to a jury trial is a fundamental right 
that encompasses the right to have our citizens awarded 
damages based on the jury’s determination and because I 
believe MCL 257.401(3),1 the damages cap in this case, 
1 MCL 257.401(3), covering civil actions and the 
liability of a lessor of a motor vehicle, states the
following: 
Notwithstanding subsection (1), a person
engaged in the business of leasing motor vehicles
who is the lessor of a motor vehicle under a 
lease providing for the use of the motor vehicle
by the lessee for a period of 30 days or less is
liable for an injury caused by the negligent
operation of the leased motor vehicle only if the
injury occurred while the leased motor vehicle
(continued…) 
 
 
 
                                                 
violates plaintiff’s right to a jury trial, as well as 
plaintiff’s equal protection and substantive due process 
rights, I respectfully dissent. 
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A TRIAL BY JURY 
“The right of trial by jury shall remain, but shall be 
waived in all civil cases unless demanded by one of the 
parties in the manner prescribed by law.” 
Const 1963, art 
1, § 14. 
“The right to jury trial in civil litigation is 
of constitutional dimension.” 
Wood v Detroit Automobile 
Inter-Ins Exchange, 413 Mich 573, 581; 321 NW2d 653 (1982). 
The right to a jury trial is a fundamental right, “regarded 
as the great bulwark of the liberty of the citizen.” McRae 
v Grand Rapids, L & D R Co, 93 Mich 399, 401; 53 NW 561 
(1892); see also People v Smith, 383 Mich 576, 578; 177 
NW2d 164 (1970) (“Trial by jury is a basic constitutional 
right.”). 
(…continued)
was being operated by an authorized driver under
the lease agreement or by the lessee's spouse, 
father, mother, brother, sister, son, daughter,
or other immediate family member. Unless the 
lessor, or his or her agent, was negligent in the
leasing of the motor vehicle, the lessor's 
liability under this subsection is limited to
$20,000.00 because of bodily injury to or death
of 1 person in any 1 accident and $40,000.00
because of bodily injury to or death of 2 or more
persons in any 1 accident. 
2  
 
 
                                                 
 
  
  
 
  
The right to a jury trial also encompasses the right 
to have the jury determine damages. 
Leary v Fisher, 248 
Mich 574, 578; 227 NW 767 (1929). In Aho v Conda, 347 Mich 
450, 455; 79 NW2d 917 (1956), this Court stated that “the 
question of damages is fundamentally a jury question.” 
In 
Rouse v Gross, 357 Mich 475, 481; 98 NW2d 562 (1959), this 
Court stated, “The right of trial by jury ordinarily refers 
to a right to present or defend an actionable claim to 1 
jury to the point of jury verdict and judgment.” 
See also 
Rich v Daily Creamery Co, 303 Mich 344, 349; 6 NW2d 539 
(1942); Sweeney v Hartman, 296 Mich 343, 347; 296 NW 282 
(1941).2 It is perplexing, to say the least, that the 
2 While the majority uses a scholarly article written
in the Harvard Law Review to support its position, I
believe that cases decided by justices from this Court are
more persuasive in determining the rights of Michigan
citizens. 
The majority does cite two Michigan cases—May v
Goulding, 365 Mich 143, 148-149; 111 NW2d 862 (1961), and
McClelland v Scholz, 366 Mich 423, 426; 115 NW2d 120
(1962)—for the unremarkable proposition that a jury cannot
decide an issue of law. 
However, the cases cited have
nothing to do with the issue of the jury determining
damages. 
None of the questions submitted to the jury in
May and McClelland that were deemed improper by this Court
had anything to do with damages. 
I also vehemently disagree with the majority that “the
right of trial by jury” is a “technical legal phrase” that
is to be determined “as understood by those learned in the
law at the time.” 
Ante at 10. 
The primary rule of
constitutional interpretation is “common understanding.”
Macomb Co Taxpayers Ass’n v L’Anse Creuse Pub Schools, 455
Mich 1, 6; 564 NW2d 457 (1997). 
“A constitution is made 
(continued…) 
3  
 
 
 
                                                 
  
 
majority argues that the damages cap does not implicate 
plaintiff’s right to a jury trial. 
The majority argues 
that damages were “never within those things a jury can 
decide.” 
Ante at 15. 
But a jury does decide damages. 
Merely because the majority deems a damages determination 
to be part of the “great mass of procedural forms and 
details,” ante at 12, and not within the jury’s purview, 
does not change the fact that part of the jury’s historic 
role has been to determine damages. 
Thus, the damages cap 
invades the jury’s role. 
Because of the $20,000 damages 
cap, when the amount of damages determined by the jury is 
over 
$20,000, 
the 
jury’s 
determination 
is 
of 
no 
consequence. 
The right to a jury trial is illusory in the 
most severe cases, those in which the amount of damages 
exceeds $20,000. 
Surely, this illusory “right” does not 
comport with our citizens’ constitutional right to trial by 
jury. 
The right to a jury trial is not satisfied by 
providing jurors the opportunity to announce an award and 
then have it arbitrarily ignored with no regard for the 
(…continued)
for the people and by the people. 
The interpretation that
should be given it is that which reasonable minds, the
great mass of the people themselves, would give it.” 
Id.,
quoting Livingston Co v Dep’t of Management & Budget, 430 
Mich 635, 642; 425 NW2d 65 (1988) (quoting Cooley’s Const
Lim 81) (quotation marks deleted). 
4  
 
 
facts of the case. 
Our constitutional mandates certainly 
must be afforded more than mere lip service. 
While the 
Legislature can change, amend, or repeal a statute, it 
cannot abrogate a citizen’s constitutional right to trial 
by jury. Because the damages cap is applied automatically, 
without regard to the jury’s assessment of damages, the 
damages cap violates our citizens’ constitutional right to 
trial by jury. 
Because the right to a jury trial is a fundamental 
right, the damages cap must withstand strict scrutiny to be 
deemed constitutional. Doe v Dep’t of Social Services, 439 
Mich 650, 662; 487 NW2d 166 (1992). 
Under a strict 
scrutiny analysis, a statute will be upheld if it is 
precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental 
interest. 
Id. 
In this case, the alleged “compelling” 
governmental interest that prompted the damages cap is the 
continued viability of the automobile rental industry. The 
Legislature’s response to the alleged crisis in the 
automobile rental industry was to restrict recovery for the 
most severely injured plaintiffs. 
No matter the merits of 
the claim, the Legislature restricted a victim’s damages, 
resulting in an arbitrary limit on the amount of damages a 
victim can recover. 
This means that the victims who are 
the most severely injured will have their damages reduced 
5  
 
 
the most, while less seriously injured victims can fully 
recover. 
Even if one were to agree that a crisis existed 
and that such a crisis may be considered a compelling 
governmental interest, the Legislature’s action was not 
precisely tailored. There were numerous other measures the 
Legislature could have taken, such as requiring automobile 
rental drivers to be insured, that would have addressed the 
alleged crisis while not making such a sweeping restriction 
to our citizens’ fundamental right. 
Notably, the Legislature’s decision to limit the 
amount of recovery from the automobile rental industry 
makes the industry less accountable to the public, and it 
is the public’s interests that are to be protected by the 
statute. 
Because of the damages cap, the industry has no 
incentive to ensure that drivers are insured. 
Assuming 
that the automobile rental industry was being held liable 
for damages that totaled such an amount as to threaten the 
viability of the industry, then the industry necessarily 
recognized that the number of uncollectible drivers was 
causing this problem. 
The simple solution would be to 
mandate that drivers are insured, thereby ensuring that 
victims would have a viable avenue by which to collect 
damages. 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
The concurrence asserts that a victim still has a 
cause of action to recover from the driver of the rented 
automobile. 
However, this alternate avenue of recovery 
belies reality. 
As discussed, there is no mandate 
requiring the automobile rental industry to ensure that 
rental drivers are insured. 
An automobile rental company 
can rent to an uninsured driver knowing that a severely 
injured victim would likely have no way to recover from the 
driver for any damages caused. 
Therefore, while the 
concurrence claims that this is an alternate avenue for 
recovery, in reality, this avenue is often a dead end. 
Thus, because even a cursory review of other available 
measures indicates that the statute is not precisely 
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest, it 
cannot withstand strict scrutiny. 
Therefore, the damages 
cap at issue is unconstitutional. 
II. EQUAL PROTECTION AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 
Our Constitution states, “No person shall be denied 
the equal protection of the laws . . . .”  Const 1963, art 
1, § 2. 
Further, our Constitution provides, “No person 
shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law.” Const 1963, art 1, § 17. The 
test to determine if legislation comports with substantive 
due process is essentially the same as the test used for 
7  
 
 
 
 
equal protection. 
Shavers v Attorney General, 402 Mich 
554, 612-613; 267 NW2d 72 (1978). To resolve a due process 
or equal protection challenge, this Court must identify the 
objective that the challenged statute seeks to achieve. 
O’Brien v Hazelet & Erdal, 410 Mich 1, 13-14; 299 NW2d 336 
(1980). 
The claimed objective of implementing the damages 
cap is to ensure the continued viability of the automobile 
rental industry. 
However, the entire statute’s broader 
objective “is for the benefit of the public and the 
prevention of unrecompensed injury . . . .” 
Miller v 
Manistee Co Bd of Rd Comm’rs, 297 Mich 487, 493; 298 NW 105 
(1941), overruled in part by Mead v Michigan Pub Service 
Comm, 303 Mich 168; 5 NW2d 740 (1942). 
The 
statute 
at 
issue 
establishes 
several 
classifications, 
among 
them 
it 
distinguishes 
between 
victims who were injured by a motor vehicle and victims 
injured by a rented motor vehicle. 
Within this latter 
classification, the statute also distinguishes between 
those with severe injuries and those with lesser injuries. 
Because the classifications and the arbitrary damages cap 
impermissibly interfere with a fundamental right–the right 
to trial by jury–the legislation is reviewed by strict 
scrutiny. 
Harvey v Michigan, 469 Mich 1, 12; 664 NW2d 767 
(2003). 
As explained in section one, the legislation 
8  
 
 
cannot withstand strict scrutiny because, even assuming a 
compelling governmental interest, it is not precisely 
tailored. 
Further, 
even 
evaluating 
the 
damages 
cap 
under 
rational-basis review, it is highly suspect. 
To prevail 
under rational-basis review, it must be shown that the 
legislation is “‘arbitrary and wholly unrelated in a 
rational way to the objective of the statute.’” 
Id. at 7, 
quoting Smith v Employment Security Comm, 410 Mich 231, 
271; 301 NW2d 285 (1981). 
A classification reviewed under 
“[rational] basis passes constitutional muster if the 
legislative judgment is supported by any set of facts, 
either known or which could reasonably be assumed, even if 
such facts may be debatable.” Harvey, supra at 7. 
While a plaintiff bears a heavy burden to rebut the 
presumption that a statute is constitutional, it is not an 
insurmountable hurdle. Rational-basis review does not mean 
that, merely because a crisis is alleged by representatives 
of 
an 
industry, 
any 
action 
taken 
is 
a 
valid 
and 
constitutional one. 
Regarding the damages cap at issue, there is no 
indication that past damages awards were threatening the 
automobile rental industry. Further, a concern over future 
damages awards and the viability of the automobile rental 
9  
 
 
 
 
 
 
industry is so tenuous that it is unable to withstand 
rational-basis scrutiny. 
Because the damages cap is 
arbitrary and not rationally related to a legitimate 
governmental 
objective, 
the 
damages 
cap 
violates 
plaintiff’s equal protection and substantive due process 
rights. 
No matter the intentions of the Legislature, if a 
statute improperly contravenes the rights afforded our 
citizens by the Constitution, we must strike down that 
legislation. 
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DAMAGES CAP IN GENERAL 
The damages cap in this case differs from other forms 
of remedies that affect damages awards, such as remittitur, 
additur, and treble damages. 
Remittitur, additur, and 
treble damages are based on the facts presented at trial. 
See Moore v Spangler, 401 Mich 360, 371, 373; 258 NW2d 34 
(1977); Shepard v Gates, 50 Mich 495, 497-498; 15 NW 878 
(1883). 
Remittitur or additur is used only after a court 
has determined that a party has not received a fair trial 
because the verdict is clearly or grossly excessive or 
inadequate. 
The damages cap in this case, however, is an 
arbitrary amount that limits recovery regardless of the 
jury award or the facts presented at trial. 
On a broader level, the impetus behind damages caps is 
that they are necessary to ensure that certain defendants 
10  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
are not driven out of business by runaway jury verdicts. 
However, our justice system has numerous mechanisms to 
ensure that verdicts are just. 
Summary disposition, 
directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and 
remittitur are all readily available mechanisms to make 
certain that verdicts are fair. 
And, of course, our 
nation’s centuries-old jury system was designed to ensure a 
fair trial for all parties. While I do not contend that a 
damages cap can never be constitutional, we must not 
blindly accept claims of a crisis made by those who have a 
distinct interest in seeing liability limited. 
Other jurisdictions have also held that damages caps 
applied to various causes of actions are unconstitutional. 
In Kansas Malpractice Victims Coalition v Bell, 243 Kan 
333, 342, 345-346; 757 P2d 251 (1988), overruled in part by 
Bair v Peck, 248 Kan 824; 811 P2d 1176 (1991), the Kansas 
Supreme Court stated that when the trial court enters 
judgment for less than the jury verdict, it “is an 
infringement on the jury’s determination of the facts, and, 
thus, is an infringement on the right to a jury trial.” 
The court further stated: 
Pain and suffering have no known dimensions,
mathematical or financial. 
There is no exact 
relationship between money and physical or mental
injury or suffering, and the various factors 
involved are not capable of proof in dollars and 
11  
 
 
cents. 
For this very practical reason the only
standard 
for 
evaluation 
is 
such 
amount 
as 
reasonable 
persons 
estimate 
to 
be 
fair 
compensation for the injuries suffered, and the
law has entrusted the administration of this 
criterion 
to 
the 
impartial 
conscience 
and 
judgment of jurors, who may be expected to act
reasonably, intelligently and in harmony with the
evidence. 
[Bell at 346, quoting Domann v Pence,
183 Kan 135, 141; 325 P2d 321 (1958).] 
In Morris v Savoy, 61 Ohio St 3d 684, 690; 576 NE2d 
765 (1991), the Ohio Supreme Court found no rational 
relationship between a medical malpractice damages cap and 
public health or welfare, and further held that the cap was 
unreasonable and arbitrary. Numerous other cases have also 
held that damages caps are unconstitutional. See also Best 
v Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill 2d 367, 409; 689 NE2d 1057 
(1997) (for a list of jurisdictions); Tenold v Weyerhaeuser 
Co, 127 Ore App 511, 524-525; 873 P2d 413 (1994); Henderson 
v Alabama Power Co, 627 So 2d 878, 891 (Ala, 1993), 
overruled in part Ex parte Apicella, 809 So 2d 865 (Ala, 
2001) (“[I]t is improper for the legislature to substitute 
itself for the jury and to fix an arbitrary, predetermined 
limit” on the jury’s award.); Brannigan v Usitalo, 134 NH 
50, 57; 587 A2d 1232 (1991); Sofie v Fibreboard Corp, 112 
Wash 2d 636, 638; 771 P2d 711 (1989); Condemarin v Univ 
Hosp, 775 P2d 348, 364 (opinion by Durham, J.), 367 
(Zimmerman, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) 
12  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
(Utah, 1989); Lucas v United States, 757 SW2d 687, 690-691 
(Tex, 1988); Coburn v Agustin, 627 F Supp 983, 996-997 (D 
Kan, 1985); Carson v Maurer, 120 NH 925, 940-941, 943-944; 
424 A2d 825 (1980) (“It is simply unfair and unreasonable 
to impose the burden of supporting the medical care 
industry solely upon those persons who are most severely 
injured and therefore most in need of compensation.”); 
Arneson v Olson, 270 NW2d 125, 126, 135 (ND, 1978); Wright 
v Central DuPage Hosp Ass’n, 63 Ill 2d 313, 329-330; 347 
NE2d 736 (1976).3 
The breadth of decisions from jurisdictions around our 
nation should give us pause before we allow dubious 
allegations to erode our citizens’ constitutional rights. 
No industry should be allowed to shift its burden of 
responsibility and accountability to the shoulders of the 
severely injured merely because it claims to be in crisis. 
3 Although many of these deal with damages caps in
medical malpractice cases, the fact that the caps have been
deemed unconstitutional is relevant to the issue in this 
case. 
The medical “crisis” that has led to medical 
malpractice damages caps being enacted has received much 
more study than the alleged crisis in the automobile rental
industry. 
Yet, as the above cases indicate, numerous
jurisdictions have rejected the arguments that the damages
caps are constitutional or necessary. 
13  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Thomas Jefferson considered trial by jury to be “the 
only anchor ever yet imagined by man, by which government 
can be held to the principles of its constitution.”4  Today, 
the majority casts our citizens adrift by finding their 
constitutional rights are expendable merely because of an 
alleged “crisis” in the automobile rental industry. 
The 
majority 
merrily 
“steer[s] 
our 
economic 
regulation 
jurisprudence,” ante at 28, into the mainstream, while 
ignoring the citizens who are severely injured along the 
way. 
Therefore, I must respectfully dissent. 
I would 
reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals because the 
damages cap violates plaintiff’s fundamental right to a 
jury trial, as well as plaintiff’s equal protection and 
substantive due process rights. 
Michael F. Cavanagh
Marilyn Kelly 
4 Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Thomas Paine, July 11,
1789. Wulffrith’s Quotations,

(accessed May 20, 2004). 
14