Title: People v. McDaniel
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S171393
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: August 26, 2021

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
DON’TE LAMONT MCDANIEL, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S171393 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court  
No. TA074274-01 
 
 
August 26, 2021 
 
Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, Groban, and Jenkins concurred. 
 
Justice Liu filed a concurring opinion. 
 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
S171393 
 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
Defendant Don’te Lamont McDaniel was convicted of two 
counts of first degree murder for the shootings of Annette 
Anderson and George Brooks, two counts of attempted murder 
for the shootings of Janice Williams and Debra Johnson, and 
possession of a firearm by a felon.  (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 
664 & 187, subd. (a), former 12021, subd. (a)(1); all 
undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.)  The 
jury found true the special circumstance of multiple murder.  
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3).)  The jury also found true the allegations 
of intentional discharge and use of a firearm, intentional 
discharge resulting in great bodily injury and death, and 
commission of the offense for the benefit of, at the direction of, 
and in association with a criminal street gang.  (§§ 12022.53, 
subd. (d), 122022.53, subds. (d) & (e)(1), 186.22, subd. (b)(l).)  
After the first penalty phase jury deadlocked, a second jury 
delivered a verdict of death on December 22, 2008.  This appeal 
is automatic.  (§ 1239, subd. (b).)  We affirm. 
I.  FACTS 
A. Guilt Phase 
1. Prosecution Case 
The events occurred in and around Nickerson Gardens, a 
large public housing complex in Southeast Los Angeles.  In 2004, 
the Bounty Hunter Bloods gang was active in Nickerson 
Gardens, with about 600 members registered in law 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
2 
enforcement databases.  McDaniel and Kai Harris were 
members of the Bounty Hunter Bloods, as was one of the 
victims, Brooks. 
On April 6, 2004, at 3:30 a.m., officers responded to reports 
of gunshots at Anderson’s apartment in Nickerson Gardens.  
Entering through the back door, they observed the bodies of 
Anderson and Williams.  Williams appeared to be alive.  
Brooks’s body was slumped against the refrigerator.  In the 
living room, an officer observed Johnson, who had a gunshot 
wound to the mouth and was trying to stand up. 
Anderson died at the scene from multiple gunshot wounds.  
Stippling indicated that the wound to her face was inflicted at 
close range.  Cocaine and alcohol were present in Anderson’s 
body at the time of her death.  Brooks also died at the scene from 
multiple gunshot wounds; he suffered five wounds to the face, 
and stippling indicated they were fired at close range.  Williams 
survived gunshot wounds to her mouth, arms, and legs, and she 
spent three to four months in the hospital.  Johnson also 
survived gunshots to the face and chest and underwent multiple 
surgeries. 
Physical evidence collected at the scene included ten nine-
millimeter and six Winchester .357 magnum cartridge cases.  
Investigators found one nine-millimeter cartridge case on 
Brooks’s stomach and two .357 magnum cartridge cases on his 
neck.  Two nine-millimeter cartridge cases were found near 
Anderson’s 
hands. 
 
Investigators 
also 
recovered 
drug 
paraphernalia, including a metal wire commonly used with a 
crack pipe near Anderson’s hand, a glass vial containing a 
crystal-like substance, and a plastic bag containing a rock-like 
substance in Brooks’s pants. 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
3 
Five days later, during a traffic stop, Deputy Sheriff 
Marcus Turner recovered a loaded Ruger nine-millimeter gun 
and associated ammunition from McDaniel.  McDaniel 
identified himself as Mitchell Reed.  About one month later, 
Officer Freddie Piro arrested a member of the Black P-Stone 
gang in Baldwin Hills, an area 13 miles away from Nickerson 
Gardens.  During the arrest, Officer Piro recovered a .375 
magnum Desert Eagle handgun.   
Ten of the cartridges recovered from the scene matched 
the nine-millimeter Ruger recovered from McDaniel.  Six of the 
cartridges found at the scene matched the .357 magnum Desert 
Eagle.  The examiner also analyzed projectile evidence 
recovered at the scene and concluded that none was fired by the 
nine-millimeter gun.  The source of other ballistics evidence was 
inconclusive.   
In addition to this physical evidence, the prosecution 
introduced testimony from the survivors of the shooting and 
other witnesses who placed McDaniel and Harris at or near the 
crime scene.  The defense case consisted primarily of exploiting 
inconsistencies in these witnesses’ statements and the fact that 
many of the witnesses were intoxicated at the time of the 
shooting.   
Williams testified that she was sitting at the table with 
Anderson on the evening of the shooting.  Williams heard a 
whistle and then a knock on the back door.  Elois Garner was at 
the backdoor and identified herself.  Anderson opened the door, 
and Williams saw McDaniel enter the apartment shooting.  
After Williams was shot, she fell on the floor and lost 
consciousness.  Williams had known McDaniel for about 10 
years. 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
4 
Although Williams had a history of drug use, she denied 
using drugs that night, but she testified that she had been 
drinking.  She did not see Anderson or Brooks doing cocaine, nor 
did she see any other drug paraphernalia in the apartment.  
Williams did not realize that Johnson was in the living room and 
thought Johnson was in jail at the time.  At the preliminary 
hearing, Williams testified that she had “nodded off” 
immediately before the shooting.  When confronted with this 
prior testimony, she admitted to being “in and out” that night 
and that her head was down on the table at the time of the knock 
on the back door.  Williams first identified McDaniel as the 
shooter on April 12, 2004, when officers showed her a six-pack 
photo lineup in the hospital.   
Johnson died of unrelated causes before trial, so the 
prosecutor read her testimony from the preliminary hearing.  At 
3:00 a.m. on April 6, 2004, Johnson was sleeping on the living 
room floor at Anderson’s home.  She awoke to the sound of 
multiple gunshots coming from the kitchen.  Johnson saw 
McDaniel enter through the back door then exit the kitchen and 
head toward the hallway.  She looked up and saw McDaniel in 
dark clothes standing over her.  He shot her and then crouched 
down and moved toward the front door.  She heard two male 
voices during the shooting, neither of which was Brooks’s.  
McDaniel was the only person she saw in the living room.   
When Detective Mark Hahn interviewed Johnson at the 
hospital on April 9, 2004, she initially said she did not see the 
shooter because she was asleep when she was shot.  During the 
preliminary hearing, she explained that she did not identify 
McDaniel because she was afraid.  On April 12, the detectives 
showed her a six-pack photo lineup.  Johnson circled McDaniel’s 
photograph but did not tell the police his name; instead, she 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
5 
wrote “shorter black boy.”  The court attempted to clarify whom 
she was comparing McDaniel to since she only saw one shooter 
in the house.  She explained that Williams had told her at the 
hospital a second man was involved:  “a tall, light-skinned dude 
at the backdoor.” 
The prosecution also introduced testimony from various 
witnesses recounting the events immediately before and after 
the shooting.  On the night leading up to the shooting, Derrick 
Dillard was with Brooks at Anderson’s apartment in Nickerson 
Gardens.  Dillard and Brooks left Anderson’s apartment to go to 
Harris’s house a half-block away.  After 15 minutes, they left to 
return to Anderson’s apartment.  On the way, Brooks, Harris, 
and Dillard ran into McDaniel.  Brooks and McDaniel spoke 
briefly, and McDaniel asked Brooks “where have he been” and 
said that “Billy Pooh’s looking for him.”  Detective Kenneth 
Schmidt testified that William Carey went by the name “Billy 
Pooh.” 
Dillard and Brooks proceeded to Anderson’s house along 
with Prentice Mills.  They went into Anderson’s bedroom and 
used cocaine.  Dillard testified that Anderson called out that 
someone was at the door for Brooks, and Brooks left the room.  
Dillard heard the back door open, followed by female screams 
and gunshots.  After the gunshots stopped, Dillard did not hear 
anything and remained under the bed.  After 10 minutes, he and 
Prentice left the room.  Prentice left the house.  Dillard called 
911 and then left. 
That night, Garner was drinking Olde English and 
walking in the vicinity of Anderson’s apartment.  She was 
approached by McDaniel and someone named “Taco,” whom she 
later identified as Harris.  She had seen both men before in the 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
6 
neighborhood.  McDaniel put a gun to her head and ordered her 
to knock on Anderson’s back door.  Both men were wearing 
black. 
Garner’s testimony diverged from the testimony of 
Dillard, Williams, and Johnson in several respects.  Garner 
testified that she knocked at the back door but did not say 
anything.  After knocking, she ran to a nearby parking lot.  
About five minutes later, she heard two gunshots and then two 
more, which conflicted with other witnesses’ testimony that they 
heard immediate gunfire.  She saw McDaniel and Harris run 
out of the back of Anderson’s apartment toward the gym.  After 
the shooting had ended, she returned to the apartment and 
looked inside.  She saw Anderson on the ground. 
During her first interview on April 15, 2004, Garner said 
she had heard the shots, but she did not identify the shooters or 
tell the police about knocking on Anderson’s door.  During an 
interview on May 26, she identified McDaniel and Harris, and 
she told police that McDaniel had held a gun to her head. 
Angel Hill was Harris’s girlfriend and lived with him at 
Dollie Sims’s house a half-block away from Anderson’s 
apartment.  On April 6, Hill saw McDaniel and Harris sitting on 
Sims’s porch.  Hill left the house and went to a nearby parking 
lot.  She heard gunshots.  She was supposed to pick up Dillard 
from Anderson’s apartment, so she got in her car and drove over.  
No one came to the back door when she knocked.  After that, she 
returned to Sims’s house where she saw McDaniel and Harris 
smoking on the porch.  Hill, Harris, and McDaniel then went to 
the home of Tiffany Hawes, McDaniel’s girlfriend. 
Hill testified that at Hawes’s home, McDaniel was 
“bragging about” the shooting like it was “a big joke.”  They 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
7 
watched a news report about the shooting, and McDaniel 
explained what had happened in Anderson’s apartment.  He 
said to Harris, “You disappointed me, man.”  At some point, 
Carey arrived.  McDaniel and Carey discussed what had 
happened, and McDaniel again bragged about the shooting. 
The defense emphasized that Hill had provided conflicting 
testimony throughout the investigation.  While Harris was in 
jail awaiting trial, he asked Hill to tell the police he had never 
left the house that night.  Hill wrote Harris a letter saying she 
would do anything for him.  In her first police interview on April 
13, 2004, Hill said she was home with Harris the entire night.  
She was using PCP, crystal meth, cocaine, marijuana, and 
liquor on the night before the shooting. 
Shirley Richardson also lived in Sims’s house.  Richardson 
testified that on the night of the shooting, she, Hill, and Harris 
were home getting high on PCP, crystal meth, and cocaine.  
McDaniel came over that night wearing black.  He had a long 
gun and asked Harris to leave the house with him.  Harris did 
not want to leave but eventually left.  Richardson saw Harris 
with a Desert Eagle handgun that night.  A few minutes after 
Harris left, Richardson heard gunshots.  When McDaniel and 
Harris returned to Sims’s house, Harris appeared upset. 
On the night of the shootings, Sims returned home from 
work at 12:30 a.m. and saw Harris, Hill, Richardson, and 
Kathryn Washington in Harris’s bedroom.  Sims fell asleep for 
about 30 minutes and awoke to McDaniel banging on her back 
door and asking for Harris.  Harris told her not to open the door 
and to go back to her room.  From inside her room, she heard 
McDaniel tell Harris that someone in the projects had been 
robbing the places where he “hustled,” and he wanted Harris to 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
8 
help him “to go handle this.”  Fifteen minutes after McDaniel, 
Harris, Richardson, Hill, and Washington left the house, Sims 
heard gunshots.  Ten minutes after the gunshots, Hill, 
Richardson, and Washington returned to the house.  Five 
minutes later, Harris returned.  When McDaniel returned, he 
talked about buying tickets for all of them to go to Atlanta, 
saying, “We can all take this trip and stuff and everything be 
cool.  Just everything, keep it under the rock and we keep 
pushing.” 
On the morning of April 6, 2004, McDaniel asked Hawes 
to pick him up near 112th Street and Compton Avenue. She 
picked him up first, then picked up Harris and Hill at Sims’s 
house.  They went back to her house where they watched news 
coverage of the shooting.  Contrary to Hill’s testimony, Hawes 
testified that McDaniel did not say anything while watching the 
news and that she did not see Billy Pooh at her house that night. 
When police searched Hawes’s house in December 2004, 
they found a newspaper article about the shooting at Anderson’s 
apartment and an obituary for William Carey (Billy Pooh), who 
was killed sometime after the shooting.  The police also found 
bus tickets to Atlanta in Mitchell Reed’s name. 
Myesha Hall lived three doors down from Anderson in a 
second-story Nickerson Gardens apartment.  Around 3:00 a.m. 
on April 6, 2004, she was standing at her window when she 
heard four single gunshots.  She saw a short Black man wearing 
a white T-shirt run out of the back door of Anderson’s 
apartment.  After that, she heard “a lot of shots, like automatic.”  
She then saw two tall Black men wearing dark-colored clothes 
run out of Anderson’s back door.  She did not hear any more 
gunshots after that. 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
9 
2.  Defense Case 
The defense presented one witness, Dr. Ronald Markman, 
a 
psychiatrist 
familiar 
with 
the 
effects 
of 
PCP, 
methamphetamine, cocaine, marijuana, and alcohol.  He 
testified to the effects of each drug on perception when used 
individually and the effects when used together.  The “slowing” 
or “depressant qualities” of marijuana could possibly be 
neutralized by the stimulating effect of methamphetamine or 
cocaine.  The symptoms that are common to the drugs would be 
accentuated when those drugs are taken together.   
B. Penalty Phase 
1. Prosecution Case 
After the first jury hung in the penalty phase, the 
prosecutor presented the guilt phase evidence described above 
concerning the circumstances of the capital offense.  The 
remainder of the prosecution’s case focused on McDaniel’s prior 
bad acts (section 190.3, factors (b), (c)) and victim impact 
evidence (section 190.3, factor (a)).   
a. Prior Bad Acts 
A little after midnight on April 6, 1995, Javier Guerrero’s 
car broke down on the 105 freeway.  He was given a ride to a 
payphone at 112th Street and Central Street in Los Angeles.  
While he was calling his family, three men approached him.  
One put a gun to his head.  All three demanded money.  The 
three men searched him, took his watch, then ran away.  
Guerrero identified a suspect that night in a field lineup but did 
not see that suspect in the courtroom.  That night, Officer Hill 
saw the robbery and apprehended one of the participants, whom 
he identified as McDaniel. 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
10 
On February 29, 1996, Thomas Tolliver was working as a 
campus security aide at Markman Middle School.  At noon, 
Tolliver encountered McDaniel and two other individuals on the 
campus.  Tolliver asked them to leave.  McDaniel asked Tolliver 
if he was strapped.  Tolliver again told McDaniel to leave.  
McDaniel said, “I’m going to come back and shoot your mother 
fucking ass.”  The three individuals then ran away.   
On December 8, 2001, Officer Shear saw McDaniel and 
tried to detain him.  As McDaniel ran away, Shear noticed a 
large stainless steel handgun in McDaniel’s waistband.  
McDaniel fled into the upstairs bedroom of a nearby apartment.  
Shear obtained consent to search the apartment.  McDaniel 
came outside and was handcuffed.  Inside the upstairs bedroom, 
officers found a .357-caliber handgun containing five hollow 
point bullets.   
On January 18, 2002, Officer Moreno was on patrol near 
Nickerson Gardens.  When he observed McDaniel, he got out of 
the patrol car.  McDaniel ran, and Moreno noticed that 
McDaniel had a handgun in his left hand.  McDaniel fled into a 
nearby apartment.  Inside that apartment, officers found 
McDaniel.  In the stovetop, they found the unloaded TEC-9 
handgun that they had previously seen in McDaniel’s 
possession.  Officer Shear was also pursuing McDaniel that day 
and searched the apartment.  In an upstairs bedroom, Shear 
found an Uzi assault rifle and ammunition.  The prosecutor 
presented evidence of McDaniel’s conviction on June 27, 2002, 
for possession of an assault weapon. 
On April 21, 2002, Ronnie Chapman was in his mother’s 
backyard in Nickerson Gardens.  Chapman’s cousin Jeanette 
Geter saw McDaniel and his brother Tyrone approach 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
11 
Chapman.  She testified that she saw McDaniel shoot Chapman.  
Police officers saw McDaniel running less than a block away 
wearing a royal blue silk shirt.  At trial, an officer testified that 
he found “the same blue shirt” at McDaniel’s house in an 
unrelated incident. 
On January 23, 2004, around midnight, officers responded 
to reports of gunfire at an address on East 111th Place.  Officer 
Davilla secured the area by setting up a perimeter.  McDaniel 
walked by and sat on the hood of a nearby car.  Davilla ordered 
McDaniel to leave.  McDaniel looked in Davilla’s direction and 
said, “Fuck that shit.”  Davilla approached McDaniel, grabbed 
him, and escorted him away from the secured area.  Davilla 
released McDaniel and told him he would be arrested if he did 
not leave.  McDaniel raised his fists and walked toward Davilla, 
who pushed McDaniel backward.  McDaniel then threw a punch 
at the top of Davilla’s head.  Davilla hit McDaniel in the face, 
and the two fell on the ground.  Another officer hit McDaniel in 
the legs with a baton. 
The defense called Joshua Smith, who witnessed this 
incident.  Smith testified that this was a case of “police 
brutality” and that he had not heard McDaniel yell at the officer 
and had not seen him challenge the officer to a fight. 
Kathryn Washington testified about the murder of Akkeli 
Holley, which occurred on July 4, 2003.  Washington denied 
witnessing the murder, and the prosecution played a tape of a 
previous interview where she discussed witnessing the shooting.  
In her taped interview, she discussed seeing a shootout among 
Holley, a man named Roebell, and “R-Kelley” (McDaniel’s 
moniker).  Washington could not tell whether Roebell or R-
Kelley was shooting.  She testified that around the time Holley 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
12 
was shot, she was using drugs daily, including PCP, cocaine, 
marijuana, alcohol, and methamphetamine.  The defense again 
called Dr. Markman, who discussed the effects of these drugs on 
perception, as he had testified in the guilt phase. 
On June 27, 2004, officers at the Men’s Central Jail 
conducted a search of the cell that McDaniel shared with two 
other inmates.  The search revealed several shanks that were 
concealed from view.  Two shanks were found under one 
inmate’s mattress.  A single shank was found in a mattress that 
had McDaniel’s property on top of it.  The officer did not know 
how long McDaniel had been in that cell and acknowledged it 
was a transitional cell. 
On June 21, 2006, McDaniel was using one of the phones 
in a cell in the Compton Courthouse lockup.  A sheriff’s deputy 
asked him to move cells, and McDaniel attempted to hit him 
with his right hand.  The officer hit McDaniel twice in the face.  
McDaniel suffered bruising and swelling to his face, and the 
officer fractured his own hand. 
On November 21, 2006, a sheriff’s deputy was escorting an 
inmate from the law library back to his cell at the Men’s Central 
Jail.  As they passed the cell block, McDaniel and his cellmate 
threw several small cartons filled with excrement at the inmate. 
b. Victim Impact Evidence 
Anderson’s brother testified about the impact of her death 
on their family.  Anderson was the “backbone of the family” and 
“the life of the party.  She just kept everybody’s spirits up.”  She 
was a role model and lived in Nickerson Gardens “pretty much 
her whole life.”  Their mother took Anderson’s death “real 
hard. . . .  [H]er health just went down.”  
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
13 
Anderson’s only child, Neisha Sanford, testified about the 
impact of her mother’s death.  She described their close 
relationship and her mother’s bond with her grandsons.  
Sanford discussed her mother’s battle with cancer and the fact 
that “she wanted to start spending more time with [her 
grandsons] because she was sick.”  Anderson was the “core of the 
family.”  Since her mother’s death, Sanford “[didn’t] have a life 
anymore.  My life ended four years ago.  Him taking my mother’s 
life, that was the end of my life.” 
Sanford’s son also testified about the impact of his 
grandmother’s death.  He talked about spending “everyday” at 
his “little granny’s home” and holidays like birthdays and 
Christmas.  Her death “affect [sic] me a lot because me and my 
Grandma, we were really close. . . .  [I]t make [sic] me sad all the 
time.” 
2. Defense Case 
The defense case in mitigation focused on McDaniel’s 
childhood, the pressures of living in Nickerson Gardens, his 
cognitive impairment from fetal alcohol syndrome, and his 
positive contributions to family members and friends.   
McDaniel’s mother testified that she drank while 
pregnant with McDaniel.  McDaniel’s father, who lived across 
the street with another woman, beat McDaniel’s mother once in 
front of McDaniel and his brother.  His early life was chaotic, 
and they frequently moved.  At one point when McDaniel was 
about seven or eight, they lived on Skid Row.  His mother 
started using cocaine at this time.  She beat McDaniel with a 
belt to make him strong.  Her brother Timothy was a father 
figure to McDaniel.  Timothy sold drugs and was killed when 
McDaniel was about 12.  His death affected McDaniel and made 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
14 
him “angry and hostile, he really got involved with the gangs 
and stuff.” 
McDaniel’s father testified that he and McDaniel’s mother 
drank while she was pregnant with McDaniel.  He never lived 
with McDaniel’s mother and their children.  He moved to 
Sacramento when McDaniel was two or three and did not return 
until he was 11 or 12.  By that time, McDaniel had joined a gang.  
McDaniel’s father testified that if you don’t join a gang, you had 
problems and that Nickerson Gardens was a place people go to 
die. 
The mother of McDaniel’s two children described how 
McDaniel maintains a close relationship with them by sending 
cards and calling.  She confirmed that McDaniel did “good 
things” for her and their children like buying diapers and being 
present at the hospital when they were born. 
Two of McDaniel’s cousins described Nickerson Gardens 
and the impact of Timothy’s death on McDaniel.  One explained, 
“Growing up in the projects as a young adult, especially a male, 
is a hard task.  When you stay in it, you are bound to get caught 
up.  And when I say caught up, that means either you are gonna 
die or you’re going to go to jail for a long time.” 
McDaniel’s friend testified that she wrote McDaniel from 
prison to tell him she was thinking about suicide, and he 
contacted the people in charge of the mental health unit to get 
her help.  She credited McDaniel with saving her life.  
Father Boyle is a Jesuit priest and the founder of Homeboy 
Industries, the largest gang intervention program in the 
country.  Father Boyle did not know McDaniel but discussed the 
reasons that kids join gangs:  “[T]hough the prevailing culture 
myth is that kids are seeking something when they join a 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
15 
gang, . . . in fact they’re fleeing something always. They’re 
fleeing trauma. . . .  They’re fleeing sexual, emotional, physical 
abuse.”  He emphasized the need “to examine with some 
compassion the degree of difficulty there is in being free enough 
to choose” to join a gang. 
Dr. Fred Brookstein is a professor of statistics and a 
professor of psychiatry and behavioral sciences.  He directs a 
research unit that studies fetal alcohol and drug impacts on 
children.  After analyzing a scan of McDaniel’s brain, Dr. 
Brookstein found signs of brain damage caused by prenatal 
exposure to alcohol.  He testified that people with this kind of 
damage have “problems with moral decisions.” 
Dr. Nancy Cowardin has a Ph.D. in educational 
philosophy and special education and runs a program called 
Educational Diagnostics.  Based on her assessment of McDaniel 
in 2005 and a review of his school records, she opined that 
McDaniel has learning disabilities that predate his behavioral 
problems.  McDaniel had a verbal IQ of 73 and a nonverbal IQ 
of 100.  This “lopsidedness is what accounts for his learning 
disability.” 
II.  PRETRIAL ISSUES 
A. Batson/Wheeler Motion  
McDaniel first claims that the prosecutor’s use of a 
peremptory strike during jury selection prior to the guilt phase 
violated Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 (Batson) and 
People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 (Wheeler).   
1. Facts 
During voir dire, the judge conducted a first round of 
questioning to elicit prospective jurors’ views on the death 
penalty.  The judge asked jurors to rate themselves on a scale of 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
16 
one to four based on their ability to impose the death penalty.  
Category one jurors “would never ever vote for death regardless 
of what the evidence was.”  Category two jurors are “proponents 
of the death penalty. . . .  If he killed someone, he should die.”  A 
category three juror is “the person who says I’m okay with the 
death penalty. . . .  But not me.  I can’t vote to put somebody to 
death.”  A category four juror is “comfortable with the fact that 
[he or she] can go either way.” 
After the court and parties resolved for-cause challenges 
based on prospective jurors’ death penalty views, a second round 
of questioning on the non-capital portion of the questionnaire 
began.  Before beginning, the trial court emphasized to counsel 
that this round of questioning was to be a “very limited voir dire 
to back up the questionnaires if there are responses on, oh, 
things, that somebody writes his occupation and you don’t know 
what it is that he does and you want some information.”  Not 
every juror was questioned, and at times the judge interjected 
to remind counsel of the limited nature of the questioning.  The 
prosecutor questioned jurors on their beliefs that police officers 
lie, experiences with gangs, law enforcement experience, prior 
jury experience, familiarity with Nickerson Gardens, drug 
history, and religious beliefs. 
After additional for-cause challenges, the parties began 
exercising peremptory strikes.  After the prosecutor struck 
Prospective 
Juror 
No. 28, 
defense 
counsel 
made 
a 
Batson/Wheeler motion.  At that time, the prosecutor had used 
three of his eight peremptory strikes to excuse Prospective 
Jurors Nos. 7, 13, and 28, all of whom were Black.  Four other 
Black jurors were seated in the box. 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
17 
In support of his motion, defense counsel noted that 
Prospective Juror No. 28 “seemed fairly strong on the death 
penalty.  There was nothing obvious in his questionnaire that I 
could see. . . .”  The trial court noted that “[h]e is a 73-year-old 
man.  He is a retired electrician.  His nephew was arrested and 
charged with a crime that was not specified.”  The court found 
no prima facie case:  “There are a lot of African Americans on 
this panel.  There are a number that are seated in the box as we 
speak.  I will be mindful of it but I am not going to find a prima 
facie case at this time.” 
The prosecutor later used his 11th and 12th peremptory 
strikes to remove Prospective Jurors Nos. 40 and 46, both of 
whom were Black.  At that time, three other Black jurors were 
seated in the box.  Defense counsel made a Batson/Wheeler 
motion.  The court noted the prosecutor’s three previous strikes 
against Black jurors, then found “a prima facie case of excusals 
based on race,” and excused the jury for a hearing on the motion.  
The court told the prosecutor:  “I am concerned about the fact 
that of the twelve peremptory challenges the People have 
exercised, five have been to African Americans.”  The court 
asked the prosecutor to explain his reasons for the strikes.   
As to Prospective Juror No. 7, the prosecutor explained 
that her responses that she would always vote against death 
were such that “[he] had initially hoped to actually dismiss [her] 
for cause. . . .”  The court agreed with this justification:  “My 
notes reflect she said she would not always vote for death 
penalty.  Always vote for life.  Death would not bring back the 
victims.  That she thought life without parole was more severe.” 
The prosecutor gave three reasons to excuse Prospective 
Juror No. 13.  First, he was concerned that Prospective Juror 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
18 
No. 13’s response that “police officers lie . . . if it suits the needed 
outcome . . . indicated an anti-police bias.”  Her questionnaire 
suggested “concern about the effectiveness of the death penalty” 
and that “the death penalty is appropriate for a child victim,” 
but the case did not involve child victims.  Her husband was also 
a criminal defense attorney.  The court made no comments about 
this juror and asked the prosecutor to continue to Prospective 
Juror No. 28. 
The prosecutor offered three reasons to excuse Prospective 
Juror No. 28.  “My primary problem with this juror was the fact 
that he, along with many others, . . . indicated that life without 
parole is a more severe sentence, which I don’t think is a good 
instinct to have on a death penalty jury.”  The prosecutor offered 
additional reasons for the strike.  Prospective Juror No. 28 also 
stated in his questionnaire that he did not want to serve on the 
trial because it would be too long.  “I try not to have jurors on 
death penalty cases that don’t want to be here. . . .”  Finally, the 
prosecutor explained that he was “also trying, to the extent 
possible with the jurors available to me, to have a jury with as 
much formal education as possible.  And this juror I think just 
completed 12th grade. . . .” 
Defense counsel responded:  “There were many jurors — 
those particular reasons, the education, L-WOP is more severe, 
the uncomfortable — you know, the time issue with regard to 
the jury, there are a lot of people on this panel that have 
reflected — and you corrected them in your opening remarks 
and they all backed off of any problem in that regard.  As far as 
education goes, I haven’t gone through it particularly but there 
are lots of jurors —.” 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
19 
The court interjected to confirm whether Prospective 
Juror No. 28 answered “no” to the question about whether he 
could impose the death penalty if he thought it was appropriate.  
Defense counsel confirmed that Prospective Juror No. 28 
responded no, but that during voir dire he said he had made a 
mistake.  “Yeah I don’t remember that one way or the other.  I 
just have a blank on that,” the court said.  “All right, let me hear 
your next excuse number.” 
As to Prospective Juror No. 40, the prosecutor explained 
that he challenged her due to her response that “[she didn’t] 
want the responsibility of deciding anyone’s guilt or innocence 
and possibly being wrong.”  The court did not comment on this 
justification and asked, “What about 46?” 
The prosecutor explained that Prospective Juror No. 46 
did not believe the death penalty was a deterrent, “which is not 
an attitude that I considered to be a fair attitude.”  He was also 
concerned that Prospective Juror No. 46 listened to a “very 
liberal political radio station where they frequently have 
specials and guest speakers and interviews that are anti-death 
penalty advocates.” 
Turning to the merits of the defense motion, the court said:  
“I have a great deal of respect for the attorney in this case, Mr. 
Dhanidina.  And I hold him in high regard.  He has tried many 
cases before me.  I have always found him to be an utmost 
professional.  I have never thought that he was trying to do 
anything underhanded.  I believe peremptory challenges should 
have some flexibility in the way the judge looks at them.  I am 
accepting of the articulated reasons that have been advanced 
here.  I suppose the defense is arguing that we should — that 
this court should not allow 46 to be excused or are you arguing 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
20 
that this — that Mr. Dhanidina is making false representations 
to the court and that this panel should be dismissed and we 
should start all over again?  I would just like to know what the 
defense is saying.” 
Defense counsel replied that he was “not asking that the 
panel be dismissed and start all over.  I am just asking that 
Juror Number 46 not be excused.”  After a pause in the 
proceedings, the court granted the request.  “I am going to strike 
the peremptory.  I feel that the radio station that somebody 
listens to is not a valid reason.” 
The prosecutor emphasized that the radio station was only 
one of the justifications that he offered.  “And the juror works 
for a nonprofit.  Volunteers.  Works for an organization of urban 
possibilities.  Just throughout the questionnaire there are a 
number of race-neutral reasons.”  He asked for a brief recess to 
“consult with [his] supervisors about what to do in this situation.  
Because this is highly unusual.” 
“I don’t like the Wheeler law,” the court said.  “I am trying 
to apply it the best I can.  I think that he looked like an 
acceptable juror. . . .  I am not going to give you more time to 
research it.  We’re going to seat him and let’s go on with it.”  
After the prosecutor exercised an additional five peremptory 
strikes, both sides accepted the jury.  The final jury contained 
four Black, three Hispanic, three White, and two Asian jurors. 
On April 29, 2008, the jury hung in the penalty phase of 
deliberations, and the court declared a mistrial.  On May 28, the 
prosecutor 
filed 
a 
motion 
for 
reconsideration 
of 
the 
Batson/Wheeler ruling on the ground that the court improperly 
applied the for-cause standard for dismissal.  Specifically, the 
motion argued that the court’s stated acceptance of “the reasons 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
21 
articulated here” should have been enough to shift the burden 
back to McDaniel, and that the court’s follow-up comment that 
“the radio station that somebody listens to is not a valid reason” 
showed that the court was applying the standard “reserved for 
for-cause challenges, when a judge is to determine whether or 
not actual bias has been shown.” 
The court heard the motion in July 2008, before beginning 
jury selection for the second penalty trial.  The court asked 
defense counsel whether he felt the court erred.  Defense counsel 
replied, “I have talked to Mr. Dhanidina and I have seen how 
the jury came out racial-wise and in terms of how many African 
Americans there were on the jury at the end of it.  And I told Mr. 
Dhanidina that I would submit it to the court.” 
Denying the motion, the court said, “[T]his is a motion 
brought that really has nothing to do with this trial.  It has 
something to do with the prosecutor’s perception of his record as 
a prosecutor. . . .  And I am a little reluctant to get into this 
because I just feel that this is something we shouldn’t be doing.”  
The court continued,  “I don’t think that I was wrong and I stand 
by my ruling. . . .  I still don’t think they [the prosecutor’s 
reasons for striking Prospective Juror No. 46] were valid under 
the circumstances because I think there were other jurors who 
said similar statements as this juror.  I just felt that in an 
abundance of caution and since this was a capital case that I had 
to do what I did.” 
2. Analysis 
The Attorney General argues that in accepting the 
reseating of Prospective Juror No. 46, McDaniel waived his 
right to a new trial, which is the remedy he seeks in this appeal.  
McDaniel argues that because the court never found a 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
22 
Batson/Wheeler violation as to Prospective Juror No. 28, it 
follows that he never waived a remedy for that violation.  We 
need not decide this issue because, as we explain, McDaniel’s 
claim fails on the merits. 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution prohibits a party from using peremptory 
challenges to strike a prospective juror because of his or her 
race.  (See Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 89.)  The high court set 
forth a three-step framework in Batson to determine whether a 
litigant has violated this right.  First, the moving party must 
establish a prima facie case of discrimination “by showing that 
the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of 
discriminatory purpose.”  (Id. at p. 94.)  Second, once the moving 
party “makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the 
[striking party] to come forward with a neutral explanation for 
challenging” the prospective juror in question.  (Id. at p. 97.)  
Third, if the proffered justification is race-neutral, then the 
court must consider whether the movant has proved it was more 
likely than not that the peremptory challenge was based on 
impermissible discrimination.  (Id. at p. 98.) 
The 
present 
case 
involves 
Batson’s 
third-stage 
requirement that the opponent of the strike prove purposeful 
discrimination.  Beginning our review at the third stage is 
appropriate in the circumstances presented here.  (See People v. 
Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 392 (Scott).)  After the trial court 
found no prima facie case with respect to Prospective Juror 
No. 28, the court later asked the prosecutor to explain his 
reasons for the strikes — including the strike of Prospective 
Juror No. 28 — in connection with McDaniel’s subsequent 
Batson/Wheeler motion following the strike of Prospective Juror 
No. 46.  McDaniel thus renewed his challenge to the excusal of 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
23 
Prospective Juror No. 28 at that time, and the court rejected this 
renewed motion before discussing the requested remedy for the 
violation found regarding Prospective Juror No. 46. 
At step three, courts look to all relevant circumstances 
bearing on the issue of discrimination.  (See Snyder v. Louisiana 
(2008) 552 U.S. 472, 478.)  Relevant circumstances may include 
the race of the defendant, the ultimate racial composition of the 
jury, the pattern of strikes, and the extent or pattern of 
questioning by the prosecutor during voir dire.  (See Miller-El v. 
Cockrell (2003) 537 U.S. 322, 240–241, 245 (Miller-El); Batson, 
supra, 476 U.S. at p. 97; Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 281.)  A 
court may also consider the fact that the prosecutor 
impermissibly struck other jurors “for the bearing it might have 
upon the strike” of the challenged juror.  (Snyder, at p. 478.)  The 
high court has also held that comparative juror analysis may be 
probative of purposeful discrimination at Batson’s third stage.  
(Miller-El, at p. 241.)  We defer to a trial court’s ruling only if 
the court has made a “ ‘sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate 
the nondiscriminatory justifications offered’ ” by the prosecutor.  
(People v. Gutierrez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1150, 1159 (Gutierrez).)  
Here we find that the trial court made a sincere and 
reasoned attempt to evaluate the prosecutor’s justifications 
based on the court’s observations regarding the circumstances 
of the strike and its active participation in voir dire.  In 
evaluating the justifications, the court asked the prosecutor 
questions and referred to its own notes, at times interjecting its 
own observations that confirmed the prosecutor’s justifications.  
The record from the motion to reconsider the Batson/Wheeler 
ruling reveals that the court was also testing the applicability of 
the prosecutor’s justifications against other jurors.  In rejecting 
the prosecutor’s reasons for striking Prospective Juror No. 46, 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
24 
the court said:  “I still don’t think they were valid under the 
circumstances because I think there were other jurors who said 
similar statements as this juror.”  Throughout the process, the 
court made clear that it was cognizant of the prosecutor’s rate of 
strikes and the current composition of the jury, which shows 
that the court considered the circumstances of the strikes. 
Nor did the trial court overlook “powerful evidence of 
pretext,” as McDaniel’s briefing suggests, in declining to find a 
Batson/Wheeler violation as to Prospective Juror No. 28 when it 
granted McDaniel’s Batson/Wheeler motion as to Prospective 
Juror No. 46.  The parties dispute whether the court applied the 
correct standard in ruling on Prospective Juror No. 46.  (See 
People v. Baker (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1044, 1076–1077 [focus is on 
the “ ‘genuineness’ ” of the proffered reasons, not their 
“analytical strength,” though the latter may shed light on the 
former]; People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 660; see also 
Miller-El, supra, 537 U.S. at pp. 338–339.)  We can assume, 
without deciding, that it did.  Although a prior Batson violation 
is a relevant circumstance for a court to consider in determining 
whether there was purposeful discrimination (see Snyder, 
supra, 552 U.S. at p. 478), the trial court here was well aware of 
the violation when it ruled on all five strikes at the same time. 
McDaniel argues that under Gutierrez, a trial court is 
obligated to make specific findings “when the circumstances are 
so suspicious that follow-up and individualized analysis is the 
only way to create a record of ‘solid value.’ ”  In Gutierrez, we 
distinguished “neutral reasons for a challenge [that] are 
sufficiently self-evident, if honestly held, such that they require 
little additional explanation” from situations where “it is not 
self-evident why an advocate would harbor a concern.”  
(Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1171.)  In the latter instances, 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
25 
particularly where “an advocate uses a considerable number of 
challenges to exclude a large proportion of members of a 
cognizable group,” the court must “clarif[y] why it accepted the 
. . . reason as an honest one.”  (Id. at p. 1171.)  But unlike in 
Gutierrez, the prosecutor’s justifications here did not require 
additional explanation.  (See People v. DeHoyos (2013) 
57 Cal.4th 79, 111 [“It is reasonable to desire jurors with 
sufficient education and intellectual capacity”]; People v. Cash 
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, 725 [“possible reluctance to vote for 
death” and “seeming reluctance to serve” are race-neutral 
justifications].) 
McDaniel also suggests that deference is inappropriate 
here because the court denied the motion regarding Prospective 
Juror No. 28 based on a reason not offered by the prosecution.  
But we do not agree with McDaniel’s reading of the record in 
this regard.  Even though, as McDaniel notes, the trial court 
brought up a potential reason from Prospective Juror No. 28’s 
questionnaire, it is not apparent that the trial court relied on it 
in denying the motion.  Applying deference to the trial court’s 
ruling, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the race-
neutral reasons given by the prosecutor for his strike of 
Prospective Juror No. 28. 
McDaniel is Black, and at the time of the second Batson 
motion, the prosecutor had used five of twelve peremptory 
challenges to strike Black jurors.  As discussed below, this strike 
rate is significantly higher than the share of prospective jurors 
who were Black and higher than the percentage of prospective 
jurors then seated in the jury box who were Black.  However, at 
the time the prosecutor struck Prospective Juror No. 46, three 
other Black jurors were seated in the box who would eventually 
serve on the jury.  Juror Nos. 8 and 10 had been sitting in the 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
26 
box since the beginning of jury selection.  The prosecutor had 
also declined three times to strike Juror No. 7, who was seated 
in the box at that time. 
Despite the relatively high rate of strikes against Black 
jurors at the time of the motion, the final racial composition of 
the jury was diverse and contained more Black jurors than 
jurors of any other race.  Comparing the final composition of the 
jury to the overall pool reveals that Black jurors were 
overrepresented on the jury, even factoring in the disallowed 
strike of Prospective Juror No. 46.  Black jurors comprised 16 
percent of the total juror pool.  The final jury was 33 percent 
Black.  Even without Prospective Juror No. 46, Black jurors 
would have comprised 25 percent of the empaneled jury.  To be 
sure, the fact that the final jury contained four Black jurors is 
not conclusive since the “[e]xclusion of even one prospective 
juror for reasons impermissible under Batson and Wheeler 
constitutes structural error.”  (People v. Krebs (2019) 8 Cal.5th 
265, 292.)  But the fact that the prosecution accepted a panel 
with three Black jurors when it had enough remaining 
peremptory challenges to strike them suggests that the 
prosecutor did not harbor bias against Black jurors.  (See id. at 
p. 293.) 
The same trend holds true when we compare the final jury 
to the composition of jurors who reached the box.  Among the 
jurors who reached the box, 19 percent were Black.  Although 
Black jurors comprised 42 percent of the prosecutor’s strikes at 
the time of the Batson/Wheeler motion, the fact that Black jurors 
also comprised a disproportionate share (33 percent) of the 
empaneled jury compared to the Black percentage among jurors 
who reached the box tends to weigh against a finding of 
purposeful discrimination.  (Cf. People v Fuentes (1991) 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
27 
54 Cal.3d 707, 711–712 [finding Batson violation where 
prosecutor used 14 of 19 peremptory challenges to strike Black 
jurors and the sworn jury contained three Black jurors and three 
Black alternates].)  At the same time, the fact that the trial court 
found the prosecutor violated Batson/Wheeler in striking 
Prospective Juror No. 46 is also a relevant consideration.  (See 
Snyder, supra, 552 U.S. at p. 478.) 
Although Prospective Juror Nos. 7, 13, and 40 were also 
the subject of peremptory challenges, McDaniel only challenges 
the strike of Prospective Juror No. 28.  McDaniel urges us to find 
pretext in the fact that the prosecutor’s voir dire of Prospective 
Juror No. 28 consisted of only one question, which was 
unrelated to his primary reason for the strike.  In this case, after 
resolving the parties’ challenges to prospective jurors for cause, 
the trial court urged both sides to limit voir dire.  We have said 
that “trial courts must give advocates the opportunity to inquire 
of panelists and make their record.  If the trial court truncates 
the time available or otherwise overly limits voir dire, unfair 
conclusions might be drawn based on the advocate’s perceived 
failure to follow up or ask sufficient questions.”  (People v. Lenix 
(2008) 44 Cal.4th 602, 625.)  Given the limitations on voir dire 
imposed by the trial court, as well as the fact that the prosecutor 
struck five non-Black jurors without asking them a single 
question, the observation that the prosecutor asked Prospective 
Juror No. 28 only one question is not by itself evidence of 
pretext. 
McDaniel next argues that the prosecutor’s education 
justification itself is a circumstance of pretext in that it 
disproportionately excluded Black jurors.  “ ‘ “[A]n invidious 
discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality 
of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
28 
[classification] bears more heavily on one race than another.”  
[Citation.]  If a prosecutor articulates a basis for a peremptory 
challenge that results in the disproportionate exclusion of 
members of a certain race, the trial judge may consider that fact 
as evidence that the prosecutor’s stated reason constitutes a 
pretext for racial discrimination.’ ”  (People v. Melendez (2016) 
2 Cal.5th 1, 17–18, quoting Hernandez v. New York (1991) 
500 U.S. 352, 363 (Hernandez).)  Educational disparities in the 
seated jurors fell across racial lines.  None of the Black seated 
jurors had attended college.  Of the three White jurors who 
served, two had graduate degrees and one was pursuing a 
graduate degree.  But the fact that the jury ultimately included 
four Black jurors lessens the inference that the prosecutor used 
this criterion to exclude Black jurors. 
Nor do we infer pretext from the fact that other Black 
jurors served who had comparable education levels to 
Prospective Juror No. 28.  The prosecutor did not couch the 
education criterion in categorical terms; he explained that he 
was trying “to the extent possible with the jurors available to 
me, to have a jury with as much formal education as possible.”  
In addition to these qualified terms, the education justification 
was, by the prosecutor’s own account, not the primary reason for 
striking Prospective Juror No. 28.  Finding pretext because the 
prosecutor did not uniformly deploy this criterion to exclude 
Black jurors would perversely incentivize litigants to use 
“subjective criterion [that] hav[e] a disproportionate impact” to 
uniformly exclude jurors of certain racial groups.  (Hernandez, 
supra, 500 U.S. at p. 370.)   
 
We next compare Prospective Juror No. 28 with similarly 
situated non-Black panelists whom the prosecutor did not 
strike.  (See Miller-El, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 241.)  The 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
29 
individuals compared need not be identical in every respect 
aside from ethnicity:  “A per se rule that a defendant cannot win 
a Batson claim unless there is an exactly identical white juror 
would leave Batson inoperable; potential jurors are not products 
of a set of cookie cutters.”  (Id. at p. 247, fn. 6.) 
Prospective Juror No. 28 was a 73-year-old Black man.  
Before retiring, he was an electrician at an aircraft company.  
He had served in the military.  He marked his education level 
as “12 years.”  He believed that LWOP was a more severe 
penalty than death.  He indicated that he would not be open to 
considering evidence of mitigation in the penalty phase.  He 
answered “no” to the question of whether regardless of his views, 
he would be able to vote for death if he believed, after hearing 
all the evidence, that the death penalty was appropriate.  He 
said he would not like to serve on a jury because it was “to [sic] 
long.”  During voir dire, Prospective Juror No. 28 put himself in 
category 4, and the court asked no other questions except to 
remark that “you don’t want to serve because this case is going 
to be too long.  I appreciate you being here.”  The prosecutor’s 
“primary concern” about Prospective Juror No. 28 was his views 
on the severity of life without the possibility of parole.  One non-
Black seated juror, Juror No. 4, expressed the same view on the 
questionnaire, as did three alternate jurors.  
Juror No. 4 was a 30-year-old Hispanic man who worked 
as an office services coordinator.  Like Prospective Juror No. 28, 
he answered that life without the possibility of parole was a 
more severe penalty because “in prison you have someone telling 
you when to sleep; wake; etc.  In death you are done.  So in prison 
it makes you like a kid again and no grown person likes that.”  
During voir dire, he clarified that he saw himself as belonging 
to category 4.  During voir dire, Juror No. 4 indicated that he 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
30 
understood that death was the more severe penalty.  Because 
Juror No. 4 clarified that he understood death was the more 
severe penalty, he was materially different from Prospective 
Juror No. 28. 
McDaniel urges us not to consider Juror No. 4’s 
rehabilitation because neither the prosecutor nor the judge 
questioned Prospective Juror No. 28 on this point.  As described 
above, the judge encouraged the parties to limit voir dire; many 
prospective jurors were not asked any questions.  The 
prosecutor’s practice of asking jurors to raise their hands in 
response to questions also impeded the development of a full 
record on this point.  But in a Batson/Wheeler motion, the 
burden is on the defendant to prove purposeful discrimination.  
(Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 90.)  Faced with a record that is 
silent in this way, we have no basis to infer that Prospective 
Juror No. 28, upon questioning, would have given an answer 
similar to Juror No. 4’s. 
Three alternate jurors also thought LWOP was the more 
severe penalty.  Alternate Juror No. 2, a 48-year-old White man, 
believed LWOP was a more severe penalty because “[t]here’s a 
long time to think about what you have done and pay for it every 
day.”  Alternate Juror No. 4, a 53-year-old Hispanic woman 
believed that LWOP was the more severe penalty because 
“[t]hey need to think about what they did for the rest of their 
life.”  Alternate Juror No. 5, a 32-year-old Hispanic woman, 
believed that LWOP was the more severe penalty because “[y]ou 
live the rest of your life in prison without freedom.”  During voir 
dire, these jurors confirmed they were category 4 jurors but were 
not asked any other questions about their death penalty views. 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
31 
It is significant that these alternate jurors shared the 
same LWOP views as Prospective Juror No. 28 and that the 
prosecutor said his “primary concern” about Prospective Juror 
No. 28 was his views on LWOP compared to the death penalty.  
As discussed, however, there are circumstances here that dispel 
suspicion.  McDaniel relies on Snyder to contend that once the 
prosecution’s LWOP justification fails comparative analysis, the 
inquiry into discriminatory intent must end.  But in Snyder, the 
high court’s finding of a Batson violation flowed not simply from 
comparative analysis, but also from the fact that the 
prosecutor’s 
justification 
was 
“highly 
speculative” 
and 
untethered to the record.  (Snyder, supra, 552 U.S. at p. 482; see 
id. at pp. 482–483.)  That is not the case here.  All of the 
prosecutor’s stated reasons were supported by the record.  (See 
People v. Reynoso (2003) 31 Cal.4th 903, 924.)  Moreover, in 
Snyder, the prosecutor struck all the Black jurors on the panel.  
(Synder, at p. 476.)  At the time of the second Batson/Wheeler 
motion in this case, two Black jurors — Juror Nos. 8 and 10 — 
had been sitting in the box since the beginning of jury selection.  
The prosecutor had also declined three times to strike Juror 
No. 7, another Black juror who was seated in the box at that 
time.  Finally, even excluding Prospective Juror No. 46, the jury 
would have contained the same number of Black jurors as it did 
White and Hispanic jurors, despite the fact that Black jurors 
comprised a lower percentage of both the overall jury pool and 
the prospective jurors who reached the jury box. 
Ultimately, having considered the totality of the 
circumstances, including the fact that the judge found a 
Batson/Wheeler violation for Prospective Juror No. 46, we 
conclude that the trial court’s ruling was supported by 
substantial evidence. 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
32 
3. Motion for Judicial Notice 
McDaniel urges us to take judicial notice of the 
Batson/Wheeler proceedings in his codefendant Kai Harris’s 
trial.  A reviewing court may take judicial notice of records of 
“any court of this state” provided that the moving party provides 
the adverse party notice of the request.  (Evid. Code, § 452, 
subd. (d)(1); see also Evid. Code, §§ 459, 453.)  Yet even when 
these criteria are met, the reviewing court retains some 
discretion to deny judicial notice.  Without deciding whether 
such information is generally relevant to an appellate court’s 
review of a trial court’s Batson/Wheeler ruling on direct review, 
we exercise our discretion to deny the request here.  We do so 
without prejudice to McDaniel presenting such information on a 
fuller record in connection with a petition for habeas corpus if 
he so chooses.  (See Foster v. Chatman (2016) 578 U.S. __ 
[136 S.Ct. 1737]; Miller-El, supra, 537 U.S. 322.) 
B. Denial of Motion to Suppress Firearm  
McDaniel next challenges the trial court’s denial of his 
motion to suppress the gun discovered during the April 11, 2004, 
traffic stop.  McDaniel argues that because the officer lacked 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, he could not order 
McDaniel to remain in the car against his will.  Because the gun 
would not have been discovered if he had been permitted to leave 
the scene, it should have been suppressed.  McDaniel argues its 
admission was prejudicial error under the state and federal 
Constitutions.   
1. Facts 
Five days after the shooting, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s 
Deputies Marcus Turner and Eric Sorenson were on vehicle 
patrol at 120th Street and Central Avenue near Nickerson 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
33 
Gardens.  Deputy Turner noticed a blue Toyota without a license 
plate and activated the lights to pull the car over.  The car 
continued driving for about 10 seconds.  Deputy Turner noticed 
the passenger’s head moving back and forth “like he was 
conversating [sic] with the driver” but did not notice other 
suspicious movements.  A few seconds after Deputy Turner 
activated the sirens, the car pulled over. 
As soon as the car stopped, the passenger door opened, and 
a man later identified as McDaniel began to exit the vehicle.  
Deputy Sorenson had just begun to exit the police car.  Deputy 
Turner, who was still in the driver’s seat, testified on direct 
examination that “the passenger door came open and the 
passenger at the door stepped out and made a motion and tried 
to run out of the vehicle.”  On cross-examination, Deputy Turner 
acknowledged that McDaniel was standing up in the door well 
but had not stepped beyond the door.  He acknowledged that it 
was not unusual for passengers to exit vehicles during traffic 
stops.  Deputy Turner testified that his partner yelled, “ ‘Get 
back in the car,’ ” and McDaniel complied.   
Deputy Turner arrested the driver of the Toyota for not 
having a driver’s license and placed him in the police car.  
Because the driver had no driver’s license, the deputies decided 
to impound the vehicle.  Deputy Turner returned to the car to 
pull out the passenger so that he could inventory the car.  As he 
extended his hand to McDaniel, he noticed a bulge in McDaniel’s 
right pocket that resembled a gun.  Deputy Turner patted him 
down and retrieved a loaded Ruger semiautomatic handgun and 
a separate loaded magazine. 
After argument, the judge denied McDaniel’s motion to 
suppress, saying,  “I think the officer had every right to do what 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
34 
he did under the circumstances and I was particularly 
persuaded by the fact that he had decided to inventory the car 
once he determined that the driver did not have a license.  And 
I found his testimony to be credible.” 
2. Analysis 
The Attorney General argues that McDaniel’s claim is 
forfeited because defense counsel never explicitly stated that 
“the deputies violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they 
ordered him to return to the car” and did not cite any of the 
authorities relied on in this appeal.  Because we can resolve 
McDaniel’s claim on the merits, we need not decide whether it 
was forfeited. 
For purposes of the Fourth Amendment, both the driver 
and passenger are seized when an officer pulls over a vehicle for 
a traffic infraction.  (Brendlin v. California (2007) 551 U.S. 249, 
251 (Brendlin).)  Following a lawful traffic stop, a police officer 
may order the driver out of the vehicle pending completion of the 
stop.  (Pennsylvania v. Mimms (1997) 434 U.S. 106, 111 
(Mimms).)  In Maryland v. Wilson (1997) 519 U.S. 408, 410 
(Wilson), the high court extended the Mimms rule to the 
passengers of legally stopped vehicles.  The high court observed 
that “traffic stops may be dangerous encounters,” and the “same 
weighty interest in officer safety is present regardless of 
whether the occupant of the stopped car is a driver or 
passenger.”  (Wilson, at p. 413.)  The court reasoned that the 
“ ‘risk of harm to both the police and the occupants is minimized 
if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned command of the 
situation.’ ”  (Id. at p. 414, quoting Michigan v. Summers (1981) 
452 U.S. 692, 702–703.)  The case for the passenger’s personal 
liberty is “stronger than that for the driver,” but as a practical 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
35 
matter, since the passenger is already stopped, “[t]he only 
change in their circumstances which will result . . . is that they 
will be outside of, rather than inside of, the stopped car.”  
(Wilson, at p. 414.)  The court characterized this additional 
intrusion as “minimal” given that the presence of “more than 
one occupant of the vehicle increases the possible sources of 
harm to the officer.”  (Id. at pp. 413, 415.)   
Wilson left open whether an officer may order a passenger 
of a legally stopped vehicle to remain in the car after the 
passenger has attempted to exit.  (Wilson, supra, 519 U.S. 408, 
415, fn. 3.)  McDaniel argues that Terry v. Ohio (1968) 
392 U.S. 1 governs, requiring “articulable suspicion” to detain 
the passenger of a lawfully stopped vehicle.  (Id. at p. 31; see 
also id. at p. 21, fn. omitted [officer must point to “specific and 
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences 
from those facts, reasonably warrant” the stop].)  Yet the high 
court in Arizona v. Johnson (2009) 555 U.S. 323 (Johnson) 
observed that Mimms, Wilson, and Brendlin “cumulatively 
portray Terry’s application in a traffic-stop setting” and 
“confirm[ed]” that “the combined thrust” of those three decisions 
is “that officers who conduct ‘routine traffic stop[s]’ may ‘perform 
a “patdown” of a driver and any passengers upon reasonable 
suspicion that they may be armed and dangerous.’ ”  (Johnson, 
at pp. 331–332.) 
Johnson further elaborated that “[a] lawful roadside stop 
begins when a vehicle is pulled over for investigation of a traffic 
violation.  The temporary seizure of driver and passengers 
ordinarily continues, and remains reasonable, for the duration 
of the stop.  Normally, the stop ends when the police have no 
further need to control the scene, and inform the driver and 
passengers they are free to leave.  [Citation.] An officer’s 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
36 
inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the 
traffic stop . . . do not convert the encounter into something 
other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not 
measurably extend the duration of the stop.”  (Johnson, supra, 
555 U.S. at p. 333.)  Indeed, “the tolerable duration of police 
inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the 
seizure’s ‘mission’ — to address the traffic violation that 
warranted the stop, [citation] and attend to related safety 
concerns.”  (Rodriguez v. United States (2015) 575 U.S. 348, 
354.)  Although “certain unrelated checks” by an officer may be 
tolerated, absent reasonable suspicion a traffic stop “ ‘can 
become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably 
required to complete th[e] mission.’ ”  (Id. at p. 354; see id. at 
pp. 354–355.) 
McDaniel’s detention here complied with high court 
precedent.  Under Johnson, his temporary seizure was 
reasonable for the duration of the stop, and Deputy Sorenson 
“surely was not constitutionally required to give [McDaniel] an 
opportunity to depart the scene after he exited the vehicle 
without first ensuring that, in so doing, [the officer] was not 
permitting a dangerous person to get behind [him].”  (Johnson, 
supra, 555 U.S. at p. 334, fn. omitted.)  There is no indication 
that the officers did anything more than that or otherwise 
prolonged the stop beyond the time reasonably required to 
complete the mission.  Deputy Turner processed the driver for 
the Vehicle Code violation while Deputy Sorenson stood next to 
the passenger side of the vehicle with his gun drawn.  Because 
the driver had no license, the deputies decided to impound and 
inventory the vehicle.  The officers then promptly investigated 
whether McDaniel posed a threat.  When Deputy Turner 
directed his attention to McDaniel, who was still sitting in the 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
37 
passenger seat, he observed a bulge in his pocket that resembled 
the shape of a gun.  A reasonable officer observing the outline of 
a gun in a passenger’s pocket would perceive an ongoing safety 
threat that justifies a pat down search.  Under these 
circumstances, admission of the gun was not error. 
C. Admission of Kanisha Garner’s Hearsay  
McDaniel argues that the trial court improperly admitted 
hearsay evidence that was the basis for the gang enhancement 
under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1).  He claims that the 
admission of the hearsay evidence, in addition to being error 
under the Evidence Code, also violated his rights under the state 
and federal Constitutions to a fair and reliable capital 
sentencing hearing and due process. 
1. Facts 
Before trial, the prosecutor filed a motion in limine to 
introduce hearsay statements made by George Brooks to his 
sister Kanisha Garner concerning how he obtained the drugs he 
sold as a declaration against interest.  In support he attached 
Kanisha’s testimony from the trial of Kai Harris.  (We refer to 
the witness by first name to avoid confusion with Elois Garner.)  
The court held a brief hearing during which defense counsel 
objected to the admission of the statements on federal 
constitutional grounds.  The court asked whether Brooks’s 
statement was testimonial, and defense counsel conceded that it 
was “probably not testimonial.”  The court admitted the 
statement “over objection.”  
The Attorney General urges us to find the argument 
forfeited because defense counsel did not object to Kanisha’s 
testimony at trial.  The Attorney General points to our decisions 
holding that a motion in limine does not always preserve the 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
38 
issue if the party fails to object once the evidence is offered.  
(People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 190, disapproved on 
other grounds in People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830, 
fn. 1.)  Because we can resolve McDaniel’s claim on the merits, 
however, we need not decide whether it was forfeited. 
The parties also dispute which version of the hearsay 
statements should be considered:  Kanisha’s statements from 
Kai Harris’s trial that the prosecutor proffered during the pre-
trial motion or the statements that she actually made at trial.  
We need not decide which statements are the proper focus of 
review.  Although cross-examination of Kanisha at McDaniel’s 
trial yielded a more forceful declaration that Brooks did not 
intentionally steal the drugs, Kanisha’s statements at Harris’s 
trial were substantially similar.  Both statements contain the 
admission that Brooks was dealing drugs.  Both statements 
recount how he obtained the drugs, who gave him the drugs, as 
well as the fact that he did not pay for them and that Billy Pooh 
was looking for him. 
2. Analysis 
A declaration against interest is an exception to the 
general rule that hearsay statements are inadmissible under 
California law.  (Evid. Code, §§ 1200, subd. (b), 1230.)  “Evidence 
Code section 1230 provides that the out-of-court declaration of 
an unavailable witness may be admitted for its truth if the 
statement, when made, was so far against the declarant’s 
interests, penal or otherwise, that a reasonable person would 
not have made the statement unless he or she believed it to be 
true.”  (People v. Westerfield (2019) 6 Cal.5th 632, 704.)  The 
focus of the declaration against interest exception to the hearsay 
rule is the basic trustworthiness of the declaration.  (People v. 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
39 
Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730, 745.)  “ ‘ “In determining whether 
a statement is truly against interest within the meaning of 
Evidence Code section 1230, and hence is sufficiently 
trustworthy to be admissible, the court may take into account 
not just the words but the circumstances under which they were 
uttered, the possible motivation of the declarant, and the 
declarant’s relationship to the defendant.” ’ ”  (People v. Masters 
(2016) 62 Cal.4th 1019, 1055–1056.)  We review a trial court’s 
decision whether a statement is admissible under Evidence 
Code section 1230 for abuse of discretion.  (People v. Grimes 
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 698, 711 (Grimes).)   
McDaniel does not dispute that Brooks’s admission that 
he was dealing drugs was a declaration against his penal 
interest.  He argues that the statements detailing how he 
obtained the drugs and from whom should be excluded as a 
collateral statement because they were not against his penal or 
social interest, and they lack indicia of trustworthiness.   
The Attorney General argues that the collateral 
statements were sufficiently against Brooks’s social interest 
because “Brooks’s statement regarding whom he had stolen the 
drugs from and the circumstances surrounding the theft would 
most certainly subject Brooks to retaliation by Carey and 
appellant, and possibly the Bounty Hunters.”  McDaniel in turn 
argues that the statements were designed to enhance Brooks’s 
social status because claiming “that he had obtained a few 
ounces of cocaine from a top level distributor in the projects . . . 
is clearly suggestive of ‘an exercise designed to enhance his 
prestige.’ ”  (See People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 155 
(Lawley) [a hearsay declarant seeking admission in Aryan 
Brotherhood who claims to be carrying out the organization’s 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
40 
will in killing victim might have been an exercise designed to 
enhance prestige].)   
Unlike in Lawley, where the declarant was seeking full 
membership in the Aryan Brotherhood, the record does not 
suggest that Brooks, who was already a Bounty Hunter Blood, 
was seeking a higher social status in that gang.  To the contrary, 
Kanisha testified that Brooks had recently been released from 
prison, and Carey “was trying to give him some stuff to make 
money with out of jail.”  Her responses to his description of the 
“incident” in which he did not pay for the drugs indicate that she 
feared for him and that she expected he would face retaliation 
from Carey and his associates who had “status in the projects.”  
In light of this evidence, we conclude that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in admitting the statements as a declaration 
against social interest.   
D. Pitchess Motion  
McDaniel requests that we independently review the 
sealed record of the trial court discovery rulings pursuant to 
Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess) in 
order to determine whether the in camera review process 
complied with the law. 
Before trial, McDaniel filed several Pitchess motions 
seeking to discover documents related to incidents that the 
prosecution planned to use in the penalty phase.  McDaniel 
initially sought discovery into “complaints of dishonesty, lying, 
falsifying or fabricating evidence, committing perjury, and the 
like” for two Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department deputies.  
The trial court ruled McDaniel had not made a sufficient 
showing for an in camera hearing. 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
41 
McDaniel subsequently sought discovery into “incidents of 
fabrication, lying, assaultive conduct, and excessive force” and 
“harassment” on the part of 14 Los Angeles Police Department 
officers.  He additionally sought discovery into “assaultive 
behavior, mistreatment of people in custody, [and] dishonesty” 
for four Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department deputies.  The 
judge found good cause and, due to the volume of the requests, 
conducted four in camera hearings. 
“ ‘When a defendant shows good cause for the discovery of 
information in an officer’s personnel records, the trial court 
must examine the records in camera to determine if any 
information should be disclosed.  [Citation.]  The court may not 
disclose complaints over five years old, conclusions drawn 
during an investigation, or facts so remote or irrelevant that 
their disclosure would be of little benefit.  [Citations.]  Pitchess 
rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion.’ ” (People v. Rivera 
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 338 (Rivera).)  Although Evidence Code 
section 1045, subdivision (b)(1) excludes from disclosure 
“[i]nformation consisting of complaints concerning conduct 
occurring more than five years before the event or transaction 
that is the subject of the litigation in aid of which discovery or 
disclosure is sought,” disclosure of such information may still be 
required under Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 (Brady).  
(See City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 1, 
13–15 & fn. 3.) 
In this case, the record includes sealed transcripts of the 
in camera hearings and copies of all the documents that the trial 
court reviewed.  With respect to Los Angeles County Sheriff’s 
Department records, the custodian of records made all 
potentially relevant documents available to the trial court for 
review, was placed under oath at the in camera hearing, and 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
42 
stated for the record “ ‘what other documents (or category of 
documents) not presented to the court were included in the 
complete personnel record, and why those were deemed 
irrelevant or otherwise nonresponsive to the defendant’s 
Pitchess motion.’ ”  (Rivera, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 339.)  The trial 
court found information for two deputies that it deemed 
discoverable.  However, because the trial was about to start, the 
court, instead of disclosing this information to the defense, ruled 
that the prosecution could not use the incidents that involved 
these deputies.   
With respect to the Los Angeles Police Department 
records, the custodian of records made available to the trial 
court for review all potentially relevant information from the 
relevant Pitchess periods and the time since.  The record in this 
case also shows that defense counsel waived any right to have 
the custodian or the court review any older records that might 
have been available.  Accordingly, this is not an appropriate case 
to further consider the handling of confidential records more 
than five years old.  (City of Los Angeles, supra, 29 Cal.4th at 
p. 15, fn. 3; see People v. Superior Court (Johnson) (2015) 
61 Cal.4th 696, 715–722 [resolving issue regarding prosecutors’ 
Brady obligations based on the premise that defendants can 
ensure production of Brady material through the Pitchess 
process]; see also Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. 
Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 28, 55 [discussing Johnson’s 
reasoning].) 
In sum, based on our review of these records, we conclude 
that the trial court examined all the relevant information and 
otherwise complied with applicable law. 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
43 
III.  GUILT PHASE ISSUE 
Sufficiency of the Evidence for Gang Enhancement  
McDaniel argues that there was insufficient evidence of 
collaborative activities or collective organizational structure to 
support the gang enhancement conviction under section 186.22, 
subdivision (b)(l). 
To prove the existence of a criminal street gang, we 
explained in People v. Prunty (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59 (Prunty) that 
section 
186.22, 
subdivision 
(f) 
requires: 
an 
“ ‘ongoing 
organization, association, or group of three or more persons’ that 
shares a common name or common identifying symbol; that has 
as one of its ‘primary activities’ the commission of certain 
enumerated offenses; and ‘whose members individually or 
collectively’ have committed or attempted to commit certain 
predicate offenses.”  (Prunty, at p. 66.)    McDaniel challenges 
the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence connecting the 
predicate offenses to the Bounty Hunter Bloods and the evidence 
connecting himself to the Bounty Hunter Bloods.   
Detective Kenneth Schmidt testified that between 1998 
and 2006 he worked as a gang detective in Nickerson Gardens 
gathering intelligence on the Bounty Hunter Bloods.  He 
described the signs and symbols particular to the Bounty 
Hunter Bloods, like hats and hand signs with the letter “B” and 
red clothing.  Their turf was “predominately in and around 
Nickerson Gardens.”  Primary activities of the gang included 
“narcotics, street robberies and a lot of crimes involving 
shootings and murder.” 
Schmidt identified McDaniel in court and described his 
gang tattoos:  a tattoo across his back that read “Nickerson,” and 
the letters “B” and “H” on the back of his arms that stood for 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
44 
“Bounty Hunter.”  McDaniel also had tattoos of “A” and “L” for 
Ace Line, “C” and “K” for Crip Killer, “BIP” for Blood in Peace, 
and “BHIP” for Bounty Hunter in Peace. 
Schmidt also described a tattoo of “111,” which stood for 
111th Street, “the north end of the Nickerson Gardens, also 
known as Ace Line.”  Ace Line refers to “one of the clicks [sic] 
inside Bounty Hunters itself.”  Schmidt described the various 
cliques within the Bounty Hunters in Nickerson Gardens and 
the lack of “structured hierarchy other than O.G., old gangsters 
that have been around longer.”  The cliques “all grow up 
together.  They live together.  It could be at anyone [sic] point in 
time, they’ll say they’re Ace Line or Five Line.”  Sometimes there 
was “inner gang fighting” over turf for drug sales.  He testified 
that he had seen William Carey (Billy Pooh), a known narcotics 
trafficker, with McDaniel on fewer than 10 occasions.  He 
identified Carey, George Brooks, Derek Dillard, Prentice Mills, 
and Kai Harris as Bounty Hunter Bloods. 
Schmidt described predicate crimes committed by Ravon 
Baylor, who “admitted to [him] that he was a Bounty Hunter 
Blood,” and Lamont Sanchez, whom he “knew as a Bounty 
Hunter Blood also.”  This knowledge was based on statements 
and wiretaps overheard during an investigation for murder and 
attempted murder.  The prosecutor introduced the certified 
records of Baylor and Sanchez’s convictions. 
 “ ‘We review the sufficiency of the evidence to support an 
enhancement using the same standard we apply to a conviction.’  
[Citation.]  ‘We presume every fact in support of the judgment 
the trier of fact could have reasonably deduced from the 
evidence.  [Citation.]  If the circumstances reasonably justify the 
trier of fact’s findings, reversal of the judgment is not warranted 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
45 
simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be 
reconciled with a contrary finding.’ ”  (Rivera, supra, 7 Cal.5th 
at p. 331.)   
McDaniel argues that under Prunty, the prosecution had 
to prove that McDaniel knew Baylor and Sanchez because these 
two gang members belonged to “an unidentified clique of the 
umbrella gang the Bounty Hunter Bloods.”  Prunty held that a 
showing of an associational or organizational connection is 
required when the prosecution, in seeking to prove that a 
defendant committed a felony to benefit a given gang, 
establishes the commission of the required predicate offenses 
with evidence of crimes committed by members of the gang’s 
alleged subsets.  (Prunty, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 67.)   
In this case, there were no allegations that Baylor and 
Sanchez were members of a subset of the Bounty Hunter Bloods.  
The prosecution relied on McDaniel’s membership in the 
umbrella organization of the Bounty Hunter Bloods to prove the 
organizational nexus with the predicate offenses committed by 
two documented Bounty Hunter Bloods.  In closing, the 
prosecutor argued that the shooting “benefitted the Bounty 
Hunters because it sent the message of what happens to you 
when you mess with one of the higher members of the gang.”  
Defense counsel was free to cross-examine the gang expert as to 
the basis of his classification of the predicate offenders and 
establish their allegiance to a particular subset of the umbrella 
organization.  McDaniel did not do so.  Moreover, Schmidt’s 
testimony established that, whatever their cliques, the Bounty 
Hunter Bloods gang members “all grow up together,” “live 
together,” and “at anyone [sic] point in time, they’ll say they’re 
Ace Line or Five Line,” thus evidencing “fluid or shared 
membership among the subset or affiliate gangs” (Prunty, 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
46 
supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 78).  And although McDaniel contends 
that the different cliques of the Bounty Hunter Bloods “feuded” 
like “Hatfields and McCoys,” Prunty also observed that “evidence 
that subset gangs have periodically been at odds does not 
necessarily preclude treating those gangs collectively under the 
STEP Act [California Street Terrorism Enforcement and 
Prevention Act of 1988].”  (Prunty, at p. 80.)  We conclude that 
substantial evidence supports the enhancements.   
To the extent we construe McDaniel’s claims to challenge 
the sufficiency of an organizational nexus between himself and 
the Bounty Hunter Bloods, we find this claim unpersuasive.  
Unlike Prunty, where the defendant admitted he was a “ ‘Norte’ 
and a ‘Northerner’ ” but claimed identification with the Detroit 
Boulevard subset (Prunty, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 68), the 
evidence that McDaniel was a Bounty Hunter Blood includes 
more than the fact that he had Bounty Hunter Bloods tattoos.  
While the Norteños’ gang turf encompassed the “broad 
geographic area” of Sacramento (Prunty, at p. 79), the Bounty 
Hunter Bloods’ turf was limited to the area in and around 
Nickerson Gardens.  Schmidt’s testimony also revealed an 
association between McDaniel and Carey, a Bounty Hunter 
Blood.  (See Prunty, at p. 73, [“long-term relationships among 
members of different subsets” and “behavior demonstrating a 
shared 
identity 
with 
one 
another 
or 
with 
a 
larger 
organization”].)  And Schmidt testified that Kai Harris was a 
Bounty Hunter Blood, and six witnesses placed McDaniel and 
Harris together on the night of the murders.  Angel Hill testified 
that McDaniel told Harris, “You disappointed me, man,” and 
bragged about the shooting to Carey.  From these facts, the jury 
could have inferred relationships, “shared goals,” and the fact 
that these Bounty Hunter Bloods members “ ‘back up each 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
47 
other.’ ”  (Prunty, at p. 78.)  These facts are sufficient to establish 
an organizational link between McDaniel and the Bounty 
Hunter Bloods. 
IV.  PENALTY PHASE ISSUES 
A. Anderson’s Cancer Diagnosis  
McDaniel contends that the court erred in admitting 
evidence of Anderson’s cancer diagnosis during the penalty 
phase, in violation of his rights to a fair penalty trial and a 
reliable penalty determination.  
At the penalty trial, Anderson’s daughter, Neisha Sanford, 
testified that her mother was diagnosed with cancer in 1989 
and, from that point on, was “back and forth” in treatments like 
chemotherapy that caused her to lose her hair.  Sanford testified 
that the treatments made her mother ill and “affected her a lot.” 
“She drank, you know, she had on and off ongoing problems with 
drugs and stuff.  Yeah.  She dealt with it pretty rough,” Sanford 
said.  Anderson had a recurrence of cancer prior to her death 
and wanted to spend more time with her grandchildren. 
Before the start of the penalty retrial, the trial court held 
an Evidence Code section 402 hearing to determine the 
admissibility of this evidence and to reconsider its prior ruling 
that the defense could not introduce evidence that Anderson had 
drugs in her system at the time of her death.  The prosecutor 
argued that the cancer evidence was relevant to show Anderson 
was a vulnerable victim, which was a circumstance of the crime 
under section 190.3, subdivision (a).  He argued that the 
evidence also contextualized the other victim impact testimony 
and mitigated evidence that Anderson had drugs in her system 
at the time of her death.  The court noted that the cancer 
evidence and the toxicology report “kind of tie together” and 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
48 
admitted both, reasoning that “[o]ne approach to take, is throw 
up my hands and let it all come in and let the jury there sort it 
out, which will probably be the safest way from an appellate 
review standpoint.” 
Under the Eighth Amendment to the federal Constitution, 
evidence relating to a murder victim’s personal characteristics 
and the impact of the crime on the victim’s family is relevant to 
show the victim’s “ ‘uniqueness as an individual human being’ ” 
and thereby “the specific harm caused by the defendant.”  (Payne 
v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808, 823, 825.)  The federal 
Constitution bars this evidence only if it is so unduly prejudicial 
as to render the trial fundamentally unfair.  (Ibid.)  In 
California, such evidence is generally admissible as a 
circumstance of the crime pursuant to section 190.3, 
subdivision (a).  “ ‘On the other hand, irrelevant information or 
inflammatory rhetoric that diverts the jury’s attention from its 
proper role or invites an irrational, purely subjective response 
should be curtailed.’ ”  (People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 
836 (Edwards), overruled on other grounds in People v. Diaz 
(2015) 60 Cal.4th 1176.)   
In People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 671, evidence of a 
victim’s cerebral palsy was a relevant circumstance of the crime 
because it “could tend to show that defendant mounted and 
executed his fatal attack without significant resistance — and 
therefore with unnecessary brutality.”  Here, by contrast, the 
shooting occurred moments after Anderson opened the door, and 
the prosecution did not introduce evidence that linked her 
cancer with her vulnerability to this type of attack. 
The Attorney General argues that this evidence was 
properly admitted and showed Anderson’s uniqueness and the 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
49 
impact of her death on family members.  Yet we need not resolve 
the issue because even assuming admission of the cancer 
evidence was error, we find no prejudice.  The mere reference to 
the fact that Anderson was ill at the time of her death was not 
likely to “divert[] the jury’s attention from its proper role or 
invite[] an irrational, purely subjective response.”  (Edwards, 
supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 836.)  The court had already ruled that 
the prosecution could not use more inflammatory evidence of 
Anderson’s cancer, such as photos of her undergoing 
chemotherapy.  In light of other circumstances of the murders — 
such as the fact that Anderson was shot multiple times at close 
range — and the other acts of violence adduced during the 
penalty phase, there is no reasonable possibility that the cancer 
testimony affected the penalty phase verdict.  (People v. Abel 
(2012) 53 Cal.4th 891, 939 [“[I]n light of the nature of the crime 
and the other aggravating factors, including defendant’s 
criminal history, there is no reasonable possibility [victim’s 
mother’s testimony] affected the penalty verdict.”])   
B. Lingering Doubt Instruction  
McDaniel next argues that the trial court erred in refusing 
to instruct the penalty phase jury on lingering doubt.  He urges 
us to reconsider our holdings that a lingering doubt instruction 
is not constitutionally required.  (People v. Streeter (2012) 
54 Cal.4th 205, 265 (Streeter); People v. Hamilton (2009) 
45 Cal.4th 863, 948 (Hamilton).)  Even if not constitutionally 
required in all cases, McDaniel argues that the circumstances 
warrant an instruction. 
During the penalty-phase instructional conference, the 
trial court considered defense counsel’s request for an 
instruction that the jury “may, however, consider any lingering 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
50 
doubt you have about the evidence in deciding penalty.”  The 
trial court denied the request, explaining “I am not going to give 
a lingering doubt instruction since this a retrial of the penalty 
phase.  I don’t want the jury speculating about the crime.”  After 
closing argument, defense counsel proposed two slightly 
different instructions related to lingering doubt.  The trial court 
again rejected the instruction, explaining that “the problems I 
have with that is, that this jury did not hear the evidence in the 
guilt phase and I think it would be inappropriate.  [¶]  I allowed 
Mr. Brewer to make somewhat [sic] I thought was far ranging 
comments about the crime. . . .” 
McDaniel argues that specific circumstances in this case 
warranted a lingering doubt instruction.  The first circumstance 
is that he had requested a lingering doubt instruction.  But an 
objection alone does not warrant an instruction.  (E.g., Streeter, 
supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 265 [trial court properly refused request 
for lingering doubt instruction]; People v. Brown (2003) 
31 Cal.4th 518, 567 [same].)   
McDaniel also argues that a lingering doubt instruction is 
warranted where the penalty phase jury is not the jury that had 
rendered the guilt verdicts.  We have repeatedly held that a 
lingering doubt instruction for a second penalty-phase jury is 
not required where that jury is “ ‘steeped’ ” in the nuances of the 
capital crimes.  (People v. Gonzales and Soliz (2011) 52 Cal.4th 
254, 326; People v. DeSantis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1198, 1239–1240.)  
In the penalty phase, the prosecution and defense introduced 
the guilt-phase eye-witness testimony and ballistics evidence 
that McDaniel asserts is relevant to lingering doubt.  In closing 
argument, defense counsel emphasized the ballistics evidence 
from the gun linked to Harris to suggest that McDaniel did not 
cause the “mayhem” alone.  Defense counsel also referenced 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
51 
inconsistencies and gaps in the testimony of Angel Hill and 
Derrick Dillard to argue there was insufficient evidence that 
McDaniel himself created all the “carnage.” 
Next, McDaniel argues that the trial court repeatedly 
instructed the jury that it “must accept” the guilt phase jury’s 
finding that McDaniel had personally killed Anderson, which 
left no room for them to consider lingering doubt.  Compounding 
the error of this instruction, he claims, was the prosecutor’s 
argument that McDaniel had personally killed Anderson, which 
relied heavily on an appeal to the findings of the prior jury.  
McDaniel’s reliance on People v. Gay (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1195, 
1224, where the trial court instructed the jury that the 
defendant’s responsibility had been “conclusively proven and 
that there would be no evidence presented in this case to the 
contrary,” is inapposite.  In Gay, the error that the trial court’s 
statements compounded was the trial court’s limitation of 
evidence related to lingering doubt in the penalty phase.  (Ibid.)  
As discussed above, ample evidence of this lingering doubt was 
introduced.  Moreover, a statement that the jury “must” accept 
the guilt-phase findings is qualitatively different than a 
statement that the defendant’s guilt has been “conclusively 
proven” and that no evidence would be introduced to the 
contrary.  (Ibid.)  Nor did the prosecutor’s statements that “the 
verdicts have significance in this case, ladies and gentleman,” 
preclude the jury from considering lingering doubt.  These 
comments merely conveyed the fact that the prior jury found 
McDaniel to be the actual shooter.   
In sum, the circumstances of this case do not warrant 
departure from our precedent holding that the lingering doubt 
instruction is not constitutionally required.  (Streeter, supra, 
54 Cal.4th at p. 265; Hamilton, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 948.) 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
52 
C. California Jury Trial Right 
McDaniel contends that Penal Code section 1042 and 
article I, section 16 of the California Constitution require the 
penalty phase jury to unanimously determine all “issues of fact,” 
including factually disputed aggravating circumstances.  He 
further contends that these provisions require the penalty phase 
jury to determine the ultimate penalty verdict beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Because numerous instances of aggravating 
evidence, including ten instances of past crimes, were 
introduced in the penalty phase, McDaniel contends that the 
failure to instruct on unanimity was prejudicial.  McDaniel also 
argues that the failure to instruct on the reasonable doubt 
standard requires reversal.  We asked the Attorney General for 
supplemental briefing to address these issues in greater detail, 
as well as a reply from McDaniel. 
In light of our request for supplemental briefing, a number 
of amici curiae also sought leave to file briefs informing the court 
of their positions.  These amici present a range of perspectives 
on the relevant issues before us.  Some amici focus on the 
historical understanding of the California Constitution’s jury 
trial right.  Others argue that there is no binding precedent 
because this case presents issues that our cases have not 
carefully considered.  Many amici focus on issues and arguments 
adjacent to the core questions posed by our briefing order, which 
specifically concerned Penal Code section 1042 and California 
Constitution article I, section 16.  For example, some arguments 
are grounded principally in the federal jury trial right, including 
Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 (Apprendi) and its 
progeny.  These arguments are distinct from the state law issues 
before us, and we address McDaniel’s arguments related to the 
federal jury trial right separately below.  Several amici, 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
53 
including Governor Gavin Newsom, advance views of history 
and social context that link capital punishment with racism.  
These claims sound in equal protection, due process, or the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishment, and do not bear directly on the specific state law 
questions before us.  Finally, two amici support respondent and 
argue that neither the California Constitution nor the Penal 
Code requires unanimity or a reasonable doubt standard at the 
penalty phase. 
With these perspectives before us, we examine (1) whether 
unanimity is required for factually disputed aggravating 
circumstances during the penalty phase and (2) whether 
reasonable doubt applies to the jury’s ultimate penalty 
determination.  At oral argument, the Attorney General 
acknowledged that McDaniel and amici advance “persuasive 
arguments . . . that imposing” the requirements “that the jury 
unanimously determine beyond a reasonable doubt factually 
disputed aggravating evidence and the ultimate penalty verdict 
. . . would improve our system of capital punishment and make 
it even more reliable.”  The Attorney General also noted that 
“statutory reforms to impose those requirements deserve serious 
consideration, particularly in light of the important policy 
concerns that McDaniel and his amici have raised.”  
Nevertheless, the Attorney General contends, state law as it 
stands does not require jury unanimity on factually disputed 
aggravating circumstances or application of the reasonable 
doubt standard to the ultimate penalty determination.  Having 
carefully considered these claims, we conclude that the Attorney 
General is correct. 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
54 
1. Unanimity 
Article I, section 16 provides:  “Trial by jury is an inviolate 
right and shall be secured to all, but in a civil cause three-
fourths of the jury may render a verdict.  A jury may be waived 
in a criminal cause by the consent of both parties expressed in 
open court by the defendant and the defendant’s counsel.”  (Cal. 
Const., art. I, § 16.)  Penal Code section 1042 provides:  “Issues 
of fact shall be tried in the manner provided in Article I, Section 
16 of the Constitution of this state.”  Together these provisions 
codify a right to juror unanimity on issues of fact in criminal 
trials. 
We have previously held that jury unanimity on the 
existence of aggravating circumstances is not required under 
the state Constitution.  (See, e.g., People v. Hartsch (2010) 
49 Cal.4th 472, 515.)  McDaniel urges us to reconsider this 
precedent because those cases rested on “ ‘uncritical’ analysis” 
of the state jury trial right and did not discuss the applicability 
of section 1042.  Various amici likewise suggest that there is no 
binding precedent on this issue or that we should depart from 
any such precedent.  McDaniel appears correct that these 
decisions, while speaking generally of California constitutional 
provisions, did not rest on any considered analysis of our state 
constitutional or statutory guarantee.  (See, e.g., People v. 
Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 536, 598 [summarily rejecting 
challenges under “the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial clause, the 
Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause, the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process and equal protection 
clauses, and the analogous provisions of, apparently, article I, 
sections 7, 15, 16, and 17”], disapproved on other grounds in 
People v. Riccardi (2012) 54 Cal.4th 758.)  McDaniel also 
observes that although our decisions have primarily considered 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
55 
application of the federal Sixth Amendment jury trial right to 
our capital punishment scheme (see, e.g., People v. Snow (2003) 
30 Cal.4th 43, 126, fn. 32; People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 
1192, 1235, fn. 16), the federal right is not coextensive with the 
state jury trial right (see Mitchell v. Superior Court (1989) 49 
Cal.3d 1230, 1241). 
We are mindful that McDaniel’s “state constitutional . . . 
claim cannot be resolved by a mechanical invocation of current 
federal precedent.”  (People v. Chavez (1980) 26 Cal.3d 334, 352; 
see also People v. Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136, 153 [death 
penalty instruction was “incompatible with this [state 
constitutional] guarantee of ‘fundamental fairness’ ” although it 
did not violate federal due process principles]; People v. Engert 
(1982) 31 Cal.3d 797, 805 (Engert) [former death penalty statute 
violates state due process clause although it likely did not 
violate Eighth Amendment].)  As we explain, however, 
McDaniel does not persuade us that there is an independent 
state law principle grounded in Article I, Section 16 requiring 
unanimity among the penalty jury in order to find the existence 
of aggravating circumstances in the face of disputed evidence. 
As an initial matter, we note that although McDaniel 
raises a question of state constitutional and statutory law with 
applicability to a wide range of factual determinations beyond 
the context of capital sentencing, his arguments also rest to a 
significant degree on the analytical underpinnings of the United 
States Supreme Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.  
Apprendi and its progeny fundamentally concern sentencing 
and require any fact, other than the fact of a prior conviction, 
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed 
statutory maximum to be found by a unanimous jury and proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  (Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
56 
p. 490.)  The statutory maximum in this context means the 
maximum sentence permissible based solely on the facts 
reflected in the jury’s verdict or admitted by the defendant.  
(Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296, 303.) 
We have rejected arguments that the Sixth Amendment 
requires unanimity with respect to aggravating circumstances 
because “the jury as a whole need not find any one aggravating 
factor to exist” under the statute and the penalty determination 
“is a free weighing of all the factors relating to the defendant’s 
culpability.”  (People v. Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 126, fn. 32; 
see People v. Capers (2019) 7 Cal.5th 989, 1014; People v. 
Rangel, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1235.)  Even if we were to revisit 
that conclusion, it is a discrete Sixth Amendment issue, not a 
general issue concerning the scope of the jury trial right with 
implications beyond the sentencing context.  (See, e.g., Evid. 
Code, §§ 1101, subds. (b) & (c), 1108, subds. (a) & (b).)  And we 
have not adopted Apprendi’s reasoning as our own independent 
understanding of article I, section 16 of the California 
Constitution, nor has McDaniel asked us to. 
Separate and apart from Sixth Amendment principles, 
McDaniel argues that aggravating factors — in particular, 
factually disputed evidence of past criminal acts under factor (b) 
or factor (c) of section 190.3 — are “issues of fact” within the 
meaning of section 1042.  Courts have described the state 
constitutional guarantee as attaching to “the trial of issues that 
are made by the pleadings.”  (Dale v. City Court of City of Merced 
(1951) 105 Cal.App.2d 602, 607; see also Koppikus v. State 
Capitol Commissioners (1860) 16 Cal. 249, 254 [state jury trial 
right is a “right . . . which can only be claimed in actions at law, 
or criminal actions, where an issue of fact is made by the 
pleadings”].)  Section 1041 specifies that an “issue of fact” arises 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
57 
“[u]pon a plea of not guilty.”  McDaniel relies on section 190.3, 
which states that “no evidence may be presented by the 
prosecution in aggravation unless notice of the evidence to be 
introduced has been given to the defendant within a reasonable 
period of time as determined by the court, prior to trial.”  He 
argues that “[t]o the extent that aggravating factors and the 
punishment of death are required to be raised in pleadings,” the 
aggravating evidence is an “issue of fact” within the meaning of 
section 1042.  In response, the Attorney General argues that 
because a defendant cannot plead to a particular sentence 
during 
the 
penalty 
phase, 
the notice 
of 
aggravating 
circumstances is not within the scope of sections 1041 and 1042. 
The focus of a capital penalty proceeding differs from the 
guilt trial.  (See People v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1136 
[“Choosing between the death penalty and life imprisonment 
without possibility of parole is not akin to ‘the usual fact-finding 
process’ ”].)  In the guilt trial, the statutory special circumstance 
establishes a factual predicate of the capital offense.  We have 
characterized the statutory special circumstance as the 
eligibility factor that “narrow[s] the class of death-eligible first 
degree murderers.”  (People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 287.)  
The “fact or set of facts” that undergird the special circumstance 
must be “found beyond a reasonable doubt by a unanimous 
verdict” in order to “change[] the crime from one punishable by 
imprisonment of 25 years to life to one which must be punished 
either by death or life imprisonment without possibility of 
parole.”  (Engert, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 803, fn. omitted; see 
§ 190.4, subd. (a).) 
In the penalty trial, aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances aid the jury in selecting the appropriate penalty.  
After a true finding on the special circumstance, the penalty 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
58 
phase jury must determine “whether the aggravating 
circumstances, as defined by California’s death penalty law 
(§ 190.3), so substantially outweigh those in mitigation as to call 
for the penalty of death, rather than life without parole.”  (People 
v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 589.)  Aggravating 
circumstances, such as section 190.3, factor (b) or factor (c) 
evidence, “enable the jury to make an individualized assessment 
of the character and history of a defendant to determine the 
nature of the punishment to be imposed.”  (People v. Grant 
(1988) 45 Cal.3d 829, 851.) 
Although section 190.3 requires notice of aggravating 
circumstances, this notice does not establish that an 
aggravating circumstance comes within the meaning of section 
1041 or 1042.  (See People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 799 
[contrasting notice requirement of section 190.3 with offenses 
charged in an information], abrogated on other grounds in Scott, 
supra, 61 Cal.4th 363.)  As a matter of state law, the factual 
assessments for aggravating circumstances at the penalty phase 
are akin to the determinations jurors make in considering prior 
uncharged crimes in the guilt phase of a trial.  (Evid. Code, 
§ 1101, subd. (b) [evidence of prior misconduct relevant in 
determining motive, opportunity, and intent]; id., subd. (c) 
[prior misconduct relevant for impeachment].)  In some 
circumstances, admission of these prior acts also requires notice.  
For example, when a criminal defendant is accused of a sexual 
offense, evidence of the defendant’s commission of another 
sexual offense may be admissible under certain circumstances 
provided that notice is served on the defendant before trial.  
(Evid. Code, § 1108, subds. (a) & (b); see also § 1054.7.)  Jury 
unanimity has not been held to be a prerequisite to individual 
jurors considering this evidence (see CALCRIM No. 1191A); the 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
59 
mere requirement of notice, without more, does not transform 
these prior criminal acts into “issues of fact” within the meaning 
of sections 1041 and 1042. 
Moreover, jury unanimity does not normally extend to 
subsidiary or foundational factual issues in other contexts.  As 
McDaniel observes, the jury in a typical guilt trial must be 
unanimous in its verdict and must agree on the specific crime of 
which the defendant is guilty.  (See People v. Russo (2001) 25 
Cal.4th 1124, 1132 (Russo); People v. Diedrich (1982) 31 Cal.3d 
263, 281.)  But the jury need not unanimously agree on 
subsidiary factual issues, such as specific details of the act.  (See 
Russo, at p. 1132 [“[W]here the evidence shows only a single 
discrete crime but leaves room for disagreement as to exactly 
how that crime was committed or what the defendant’s precise 
role was, the jury need not unanimously agree on the basis or . . . 
the ‘theory’ whereby the defendant is guilty.”]; People v. Mickle 
(1991) 54 Cal.3d 140, 178, fn. omitted [“[T]he unanimity rule 
does not extend to the minute details of how a single, agreed-
upon act was committed.”].)  We have said that aggravating 
factors for purposes of section 190.3 are such “foundational” 
matters that do not require jury unanimity.  (People v. Miranda 
(1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 99 [“Generally, unanimous agreement is not 
required on a foundational matter.  Instead, jury unanimity is 
mandated only on a final verdict or special finding.”], 
disapproved on another ground in People v. Marshall (1990) 
50 Cal.3d 907, 933, fn. 4; People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 
1067 [“Jury unanimity on such ‘foundational’ matters is not 
required.”].)  We see no basis in section 1042 or article I, section 
16 for the unanimity rule that McDaniel urges here. 
McDaniel focuses specifically on factor (b) and factor (c) 
evidence and, relying on Russo, argues that because these 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
60 
factors require consideration of multiple discrete crimes, they 
implicate section 1042.  We explained in Russo that in a 
standard criminal guilt trial, “when the evidence suggests more 
than one discrete crime, either the prosecution must elect 
among the crimes or the court must require the jury to agree on 
the same criminal act.”  (Russo, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1132.)  
To hold otherwise would create a “ ‘danger that the defendant 
will be convicted even though there is no single offense which all 
the jurors agree the defendant committed.’ ”  (Ibid.)  But the 
jury’s consideration of factor (b) or factor (c) evidence in a capital 
penalty trial does not present the same concern.  The finding of 
a prior offense under factor (b) or factor (c) alone is not sufficient 
under the statute for the jury to return a death verdict, nor does 
it automatically lead to such a result.  Accordingly, neither 
factor (b) nor factor (c) evidence implicates section 1042. 
This is not to say there are no limits on the introduction of 
aggravating evidence.  The creation in 1957 of a bifurcated guilt 
and penalty trial in capital cases “broaden[ed] the scope of 
relevant evidence admissible on the issue of penalty,” including 
evidence of other crimes, provided that its admission was 
consistent with other evidentiary rules.  (People v. Purvis (1959) 
52 Cal.2d 871, 883, disapproved on another ground in People v. 
Morse (1964) 60 Cal.2d 631, 637, fn. 2, 648–649 (Morse); see 
Purvis, at pp. 883–884 [evidence of other crimes cannot be 
proven with hearsay]; People v. Hamilton (1963) 60 Cal.2d 105, 
134, disapproved on another ground in Morse, at pp. 637, fn. 2, 
648–649 and People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 866 
[“flimsy, speculative testimony should not have been admitted” 
in penalty trial].)  As evidence of past crimes became 
increasingly integrated into the penalty phase, this court has 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
61 
expressed concerns that “in the penalty trial the same 
safeguards should be accorded a defendant as those which 
protect him in the trial in which guilt is established.”  (People v. 
Terry (1964) 61 Cal.2d 137, 149, fn. 8.)  Evidence of prior 
criminal acts “may have a particularly damaging impact on the 
jury’s determination whether the defendant should be 
executed.”  (People v. Polk (1965) 63 Cal.2d 443, 450 (Polk).) 
Recognizing the need for safeguards in the capital 
sentencing context, our cases have departed from the rule, 
applicable at guilt trials, that the preponderance of the evidence 
standard generally applies to proof of prior crimes before the 
jury may consider them.  (See People v. Carpenter (1997) 
15 Cal.4th 312, 381; see also, e.g., People v. Foster (2010) 
50 Cal.4th 1301, 1346 [in a guilt trial (1) the jury cannot 
“consider the evidence of defendant’s prior crimes unless it 
found those crimes proven by a preponderance of the evidence; 
(2) it [can]not find defendant guilty unless the prosecution 
proved the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) 
if the evidence of prior crimes was necessary to prove an 
essential fact, the jury [can]not rely upon that evidence unless 
the prosecution proved the prior crimes beyond a reasonable 
doubt”].)  At capital penalty trials, before jurors can consider 
evidence of past crimes as an aggravating factor, “they must be 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt” that the defendant 
committed the crime.  (Polk, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 451; see 
People v. McClellan (1969) 71 Cal.2d 793, 804–806.)  Relying on 
this precedent, we have read the same requirement into 
subsequent iterations of the death penalty statute.  (See People 
v. Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 53–55 [applying this rule to 
the 1977 death penalty statute]; Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at 
p. 97 [current death penalty statute]; see also People v. Williams 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
62 
(2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 458–459 [applying rule to factor (b) 
evidence].)  We have since emphasized that “the rule is an 
evidentiary one and is not constitutionally mandated.”  
(Miranda, at p. 98.) 
McDaniel does not press a due process justification for the 
unanimity requirement, nor does he offer an evidentiary 
justification that would require unanimity on aggravating 
evidence.  When trial courts have given a unanimity instruction 
on aggravating circumstances, we have said that requiring “a 
unanimous special finding in that regard actually provided 
greater protection than that to which defendant was entitled 
under the statute.”  (People v. Caro (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1035, 1057.)  
“As to the possibility that jurors who were not convinced of 
defendant’s guilt in the uncharged crimes might have been 
influenced by the prejudicial effect of the evidence, such a risk 
is inherent in the introduction of any evidence of prior criminal 
activity under factor (b), and . . . ‘the reasonable doubt standard 
ensures reliability.’ ”  (Ibid.) 
To the extent some amici argue that a constitutional right 
to 
unanimity 
also 
attaches 
to 
the 
ultimate 
penalty 
determination, we express no view on that issue as McDaniel 
does not advance this argument and the statute already 
contains such a requirement.  (§ 190.4, subd. (b).) 
In sum, while this court has previously imposed additional 
reliability requirements on the jury’s consideration of 
aggravating evidence in the penalty phase, we hold that neither 
article I, section 16 of the California Constitution nor Penal 
Code section 1042 provides a basis to require unanimity in the 
jury’s 
determination 
of 
factually 
disputed 
aggravating 
circumstances. 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
63 
2. Reasonable Doubt 
McDaniel also asks us to reconsider our prior holding that 
the state Constitution does not require the degree of certainty 
attached to the jury’s ultimate decision to impose the death 
penalty to be “ ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”  (People v. Hartsch, 
supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 515.)  His arguments also seem to require 
the jury to be instructed that in order to choose a death verdict, 
it must find that aggravating circumstances outweigh 
mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt; various 
amici explicitly argue as much.  McDaniel is correct that our 
prior decisions have not fully considered the state jury trial right 
or section 1042 in this context.   
Pointing to People v. Hall (1926) 199 Cal. 451, McDaniel 
and various amici argue that the state jury trial right was 
historically understood to apply to the capital sentencing 
decision as a constitutional matter.  Hall said:  “Under the law 
the verdict in such a case must be the result of the unanimous 
agreement of the jurors and the verdict is incomplete unless, as 
returned, it embraces the two necessary constituent elements; 
first, a finding that the accused is guilty of murder in the first 
degree, and, secondly, legal evidence that the jury has fixed the 
penalty in the exercise of its discretion.”  (Id. at p. 456.)  There, 
the jury returned a guilty verdict but made no penalty 
determination and specifically disclosed in its verdict that it 
could not reach a 
 “unanimous agreement as to degree of 
punishment.”  (Id. at p. 453.)  The trial court nonetheless 
entered judgment and imposed the death penalty.  We viewed 
this as error and reasoned that “[i]n legal effect th[e jury trial] 
right was denied to the defendant in the case at bar,” rejecting 
the government’s argument that “the defect in the form of the 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
64 
verdict constitute[d] no more than ‘matter of procedure.’ ”  (Id. 
at pp. 457–458.) 
For further support, McDaniel points to People v. Green 
(1956) 47 Cal.2d 209 (Green), which overruled a line of our cases 
beginning with People v. Welch (1874) 49 Cal. 174 (Welch), and 
to Justice Schauer’s dissenting opinion in People v. Williams 
(1948) 32 Cal.2d 78, 89–100, 101–104 (dis. opn. of Schauer, J.)).  
In Welch, a case predating Hall, this court interpreted the 
language in section 190 “as if it read” that a defendant convicted 
of first degree murder “ ‘[s]hall suffer death, or (in the discretion 
of the jury) imprisonment in the State prison for life.’ ”  (Welch, 
at p. 180.)  Welch understood the jury’s discretion to be 
“restricted” such that it “is to be employed only where the jury 
is satisfied that the lighter penalty should be imposed,” and thus 
the lesser punishment of life imprisonment could be imposed 
only where the jury unanimously found it appropriate.  (Id. at 
p. 179.)  Under Welch, jury unanimity as to a judgment of death 
was not required, and a jury verdict of first degree murder that 
was silent as to punishment would result in a sentence of death. 
After Welch, a line of our cases criticized its holding yet 
refused to find error in jury instructions following it.  (Green, 
supra, 47 Cal.2d at pp. 227–229 [collecting cases].)  In some 
cases, however, we adopted a different construction of 
section 190, holding that “the Legislature ‘confided the power to 
affix the punishment within these two alternatives to the 
absolute discretion of the jury, with no power reserved to the 
court to review their action in that respect.’ ”  (Id. at p. 229, 
quoting People v. Leary (1895), 105 Cal. 486, 496).  Hall partially 
receded from Welch’s holding and required jury unanimity for a 
sentence of death to be imposed, at least where the verdict was 
not completely silent on the matter.  (Hall, supra, 199 Cal. at 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
65 
pp. 456–458.)  Yet it was not until 1956 that this court formally 
overruled Welch and its progeny by holding in Green that 
section 190 “indicates no preference whatsoever as between the 
two equally fixed alternatives of penalty” and that it would be 
“error to instruct contrary to the terms of the statute.”  (Green, 
at pp. 231–232.)   
McDaniel points out that Green stated “it is for the jury — 
not the law — to fix the penalty” (Green, supra, 47 Cal.2d at 
p. 224) and cited with approval language from the high court’s 
opinion in Andres v. United States (1948) 333 U.S. 740 that the 
Sixth Amendment’s “requirement of unanimity extends to all 
issues — character or degree of the crime, guilt and 
punishment — which are left to the jury.”  (Green, at p. 220, 
quoting Andres, at p. 748.)  Moreover, Justice Schauer’s dissent 
in Williams explained his view that the state jury trial right 
“and the statutes (Pen. Code, §§ 190, 1042, 1157) give to a 
defendant charged with murder the right, where he does not 
waive a jury trial, to have the jury determine not only the 
question of his guilt or innocence and the question of the class 
and degree of the offense, but also, if the offense be murder of 
the first degree, the penalty to be imposed.  The law does not 
give any preference to either penalty but leaves such selection 
solely to the jury, and it requires that the jury be unanimous in 
its determination of the penalty as it must be unanimous on the 
questions of guilt and class or degree of the crime.”  (Williams, 
supra, 32 Cal.2d at p. 102 (dis. opn. of Schauer, J.).) 
Yet none of these authorities specifically discuss a 
reasonable 
doubt 
standard 
for 
the 
capital 
penalty 
determination; at most, they could support the conclusion that 
a defendant has the right to a determination by a unanimous 
jury.  Because section 190.4, subdivision (b) already contains 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
66 
such a requirement, we need not reach this question as a 
constitutional matter.  If anything, the authorities cited by 
McDaniel and amici suggest that the ultimate penalty 
determination is entirely within the discretion of the jury, 
without any preference for either of the two available 
punishments, not necessarily that the jury may choose the death 
penalty only if it believes the punishment is warranted beyond 
a reasonable doubt. 
The crux of McDaniel’s argument is that article I, 
section 16 encompasses the protections of the common law right 
to a jury trial, including the right to factual findings by a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt, and that article I, section 16 applies 
to the capital penalty determination, thereby requiring the jury 
to select the appropriate punishment using a reasonable doubt 
standard.  For present purposes, we assume without deciding 
that McDaniel’s foundational premise is correct — i.e., that the 
right to a reasonable doubt standard governing factfinding by a 
jury in criminal cases is secured by article I, section 16 and not 
solely grounded in due process (see In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 
358, 364; People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 481).  Even so, we 
conclude that the jury’s ultimate decision selecting the penalty in 
a capital case does not constitute “factfinding” in any relevant 
sense. 
We have consistently described the penalty jury’s 
sentencing selection in terms that eschew a traditional factual 
inquiry.  We have emphasized that the penalty verdict 
“ ‘constitute[s] a single fundamentally normative assessment’ ” 
(People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 569) and “is inherently 
normative, not factual” (People v. Lightsey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 
668, 731).  Indeed, we have rejected applying the harmlessness 
standard under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 because 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
67 
a “capital penalty jury . . . is charged with a responsibility 
different in kind from . . . guilt phase decisions:  its role is not 
merely to find facts, but also — and most important — to render 
an individualized, normative determination about the penalty 
appropriate for the particular defendant — i.e., whether he 
should live or die.”  (People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 448; 
see also Watson, at p. 836.) 
We also have cited Kansas v. Carr (2016) 577 U.S. 108 to 
support our conclusion that capital “sentencing is an inherently 
moral and normative function.”  (People v. Winbush (2017) 
2 Cal.5th 402, 489.)  Carr considered whether “the Eighth 
Amendment 
requires 
capital-sentencing 
courts 
. . . 
‘to 
affirmatively inform the jury that mitigating circumstances need 
not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”  (Carr at pp. 118–119.)  
In rejecting such a requirement, the high court explained that 
whereas the statutory “facts justifying death . . . either did or did 
not exist[,] . . . [w]hether mitigation exists . . . is largely a judgment 
call (or perhaps a value call)” and “what one juror might consider 
mitigating another might not.”  (Ibid.) 
As Carr and our precedent explain, the jury’s selection of the 
penalty in a capital case under existing law is not a traditional 
factfinding inquiry.  Even if the jury trial right under article I, 
section 16 is applicable to the penalty phase of a capital trial and 
encompasses the right to factual findings beyond a reasonable 
doubt, we do not understand it to require the penalty phase jury 
to select the appropriate punishment beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
As McDaniel and various amici note, at one time during 
the era of unitary guilt and penalty trials, our court expressed a 
preference for a reasonable doubt standard for the penalty 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
68 
verdict.  In People v. Cancino (1937) 10 Cal.2d 223 (Cancino), 
the court reasoned that “it would be more satisfactory in death 
penalty cases if the court would instruct the jurors that if they 
entertain a reasonable doubt as to which one of two or more 
punishments should be imposed, it is their duty to impose the 
lesser.”  (Id. at p. 230.)  Cancino nevertheless upheld an 
instruction that omitted a burden of proof for the penalty 
verdict; the court found dispositive the fact that the instructions 
“fully informed” the jury “as to its discretion.”  (Ibid.)   
In People v. Perry (1925) 195 Cal. 623 (Perry), the trial 
court apparently gave the jury three instructions related to the 
penalty 
determination. 
The 
defendant 
challenged 
one 
instruction that, consistent with Welch, said (1) “while the law 
vests [the jury] with a discretion as to whether a defendant shall 
suffer death or confinement in the state prison for life, this 
discretion is not an arbitrary one, and is to be employed only 
when the jury is satisfied that the lighter penalty should be 
imposed.”  (Id. at p. 640.)  This was given alongside two other 
instructions:  (2) “ ‘[i]f the jury should be in doubt as to the 
proper penalty to inflict the jury should resolve that doubt in 
favor of the defendant and fix the lesser penalty, that is, 
confinement in the state prison for life,’ ” and (3) “[i]n the 
exercise of your discretion as to which punishment shall be 
inflicted, you are entirely free to act according to your own 
judgment.”  (Ibid.)  We stated the law as follows:  “It is the jury’s 
right and duty to consider and weigh all the facts and 
circumstances attending the commission of the offense, and 
from these and such reasons as may appear to it upon a 
consideration of the whole situation, determine whether or not 
in the exercise of its discretion, life imprisonment should be 
imposed rather than the infliction of the death penalty.”  (Ibid.)  
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
69 
We ultimately held in Perry that there was no error with the 
challenged instruction and that if “there was any vice . . . it was 
rendered harmless” by the third instruction quoted above.  
(Ibid.)   
As 
McDaniel 
notes, 
People 
v. 
Coleman 
(1942) 
20 Cal.2d 399 characterized Perry as having “held” that “if any 
doubt be engendered as to the punishment to be imposed, the 
jury should not impose the extreme penalty.”  (Id. at p. 406.)  But 
this was not Perry’s holding, and we have instead cited Perry 
repeatedly for the proposition that it is the jury’s “duty to 
consider and weigh all the facts and circumstances” and then to 
“exercise . . . its discretion” in selecting the penalty.  (Perry, 
supra, 195 Cal. at p. 640; see Hall, supra, 199 Cal. at p. 455; 
People v. Leong Fook (1928) 206 Cal. 64, 69; People v. 
Pantages (1931) 212 Cal. 237, 271; see also Green, supra, 
47 Cal.2d at p. 227 [describing Perry as a case where we 
“affirmed judgments imposing the death sentence where 
instructions based on the Welch decision . . . were given” but 
“disapproved the giving of such instructions”].)  Today 
CALCRIM No. 766 and CALJIC No. 8.88 apprise the jury of its 
sentencing discretion.  (See CALCRIM No. 766 [“Determine 
which penalty is appropriate and justified by considering all the 
evidence and the totality of any aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances.”]; CALJIC No. 8.88 [“To return a judgment of 
death, each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating 
circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the 
mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life 
without parole.”]; People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 849–850.)   
Contrary to McDaniel’s contention, Cancino and Perry 
neither hold nor suggest there is a constitutional requirement 
that a jury make the capital penalty determination using a 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
70 
reasonable doubt standard.  Those cases, decided in the context 
of unitary capital trials, found that giving such an instruction 
was not error under the statutes then in force when 
accompanied by an instruction explaining the jury’s ultimate 
discretion in selecting the appropriate penalty.  It is not clear 
that decisions like Cancino and Perry have any further 
significance to the constitutional question at hand.  Rather, we 
think those cases must be understood in the context of this 
court’s conflicting decisions regarding the jury’s role in capital 
sentencing under section 190 following Welch and before that 
decision was finally overruled in Green.  Green made clear that 
“[t]he law . . . indicates no preference whatsoever as between the 
two equally fixed alternatives of penalty.”  (Green, supra, 
47 Cal.2d at p. 231.)  And following Green, this court repeatedly 
rejected the argument that a reasonable doubt instruction as to 
punishment is required.  (See, e.g., People v. Purvis (1961) 
56 Cal.2d 93, 96 (Purvis), disapproved on another ground in 
Morse, supra, 60 Cal.2d at pp. 637, fn. 2, 648–649.) 
McDaniel and amici also point to language in the 1957 
death penalty statute, which bifurcated the guilt and penalty 
trials for the first time.  That statute provided that 
“determination of the penalty . . . shall be in the discretion of the 
. . . jury trying the issue of fact on the evidence presented, and 
the penalty fixed shall be expressly stated in the decision or 
verdict.”  (Stats. 1957, ch. 1968, § 2, p. 3510.)  They argue that 
this statutory language treats the “determination of the 
penalty” as an “issue of fact” within the meaning of section 1042 
and thus the reasonable doubt standard, as required by article I, 
section 16, applies.   
But, as explained, the penalty jury’s ultimate sentencing 
decision is not a traditional factual determination in any 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
71 
relevant sense.  Moreover, whatever the Legislature understood 
“issue of fact” to mean within the context of the 1957 death 
penalty statute does not control the meaning of “issue of fact” in 
section 1042, which far predates the 1957 law.  Section 1042 was 
first enacted in 1872, when the death penalty was hardly an 
obscure or hidden feature for felony convictions.  As amicus 
curiae Criminal Justice Legal Foundation noted in its brief, 
“Nearly all felonies were nominally capital offenses at common 
law.  (See 4 W. Blackstone, [Commentaries (1st ed. 1769)] 
p. 98.)”  (See Tennessee v. Garner (1985) 471 U.S. 1, 13 & fn. 11.)  
Section 1042’s companion provision, section 1041, was also 
enacted in 1872 and specifies circumstances that give rise to an 
issue of fact under section 1042:  “An issue of fact arises: [¶] 
1. Upon a plea of not guilty. [¶] 2. Upon a plea of a former 
conviction or acquittal of the same offense. [¶] 3. Upon a plea of 
once in jeopardy. [¶] 4. Upon a plea of not guilty by reason of 
insanity.”  (§ 1041.)  Even if section 1041 does not provide an 
exhaustive list, it is notable that the penalty determination is 
not an enumerated “issue of fact.”  Indeed, when section 1041 
was last amended by the Legislature in 1949, California law 
specified the death penalty as an appropriate punishment for 
six separate crimes, ranging from first degree murder to perjury 
in a capital case and kidnapping for ransom.  (See Subcom. of 
the Judiciary Com., Rep. on Problems of the Death Penalty and 
its Administration in California (Jan. 18, 1957) Assembly 
Interim Committee Reports 1955–1957, Vol. 20, no. 3, p. 22.) 
Our early construction of the 1957 statute further 
confirms that the penalty determination is not an “issue of fact” 
under section 1042.  The 1957 law set forth three phases of a 
capital trial with separate determinations:  guilt, penalty, and 
sanity at the time of the commission of the offense.  Consistent 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
72 
with then-existing law, the penalty phase included an 
exemption from the death penalty for “any person who was 
under the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the 
crime” (Stats. 1957, ch. 1968, § 2, p. 3510), which previously had 
been construed to “impose[] the burden of proof by a 
preponderance of evidence on the defendant . . . on the issue of 
under-age” (People v. Ellis (1929) 206 Cal. 353, 358).  This 
structure appeared to recognize that burdens of proof can apply 
to certain determinations in the post-guilt phases, such as 
minority or insanity.  But the statute did not specify a burden of 
proof for the penalty determination itself.  To the contrary, the 
statute, consistent with Green, Perry, and Hall, entrusted the 
penalty determination entirely to “the discretion of the court or 
jury.”  (Stats. 1957, ch. 1968, § 2, p. 3510.)  And, for whatever 
reason, the Legislature and the electorate chose not to retain 
this reference to “issue of fact” in subsequent iterations of the 
death penalty scheme.  
Shortly after enactment of the 1957 statute, Justice 
Traynor, writing for the court, reiterated that “the jury has 
absolute discretion in fixing the penalty and is not required to 
prefer one penalty over another” and upheld the trial court’s 
rejection of an instruction “that if [the jury] entertained a 
reasonable doubt as to which of the penalties to impose, the 
lesser penalty should be given.”  (Purvis, supra, 56 Cal.2d at 
p. 96, fn. omitted.)  Despite the language in the 1957 statute now 
relied on by McDaniel and amici, Purvis rejected the argument 
that a reasonable doubt standard applies to the penalty 
determination and gave no indication that section 1042 had any 
bearing on the matter.  Instead, Purvis construed the 1957 
statute in a manner consistent with Green’s holding that the 
prior version of section 190 “indicate[d] no preference 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
73 
whatsoever as between the two equally fixed alternatives of 
penalty.”  (Green, supra, 47 Cal.2d at p. 231.)  Although Purvis’s 
discussion of this issue was brief, this court reaffirmed and 
applied Purvis’s holding in several cases.  (See In re 
Anderson (1968) 69 Cal.2d 613, 622–623; People v. Smith (1966) 
63 Cal.2d 779, 795; People v. Hines (1964) 61 Cal.2d 164, 
173, disapproved 
of 
on 
another 
ground 
in People 
v. 
Murtishaw (1981) 29 Cal.3d 733, 774, fn. 40; People v. Hamilton, 
supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 134; People v. Harrison (1963) 59 Cal.2d 
622, 633–634; People v. Howk (1961) 56 Cal.2d 687, 699.)  We 
see no basis in section 1042 or in the 1957 statute or its 
legislative history to revisit Purvis’s holding, and we have 
rejected arguments that the current capital punishment scheme 
statutorily requires a reasonable doubt standard at the penalty 
phase.  (See People v. Virgil (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1210, 1278.)  
McDaniel also notes that Colorado, New Jersey, 
Nebraska, and Utah have read the reasonable doubt standard 
into their death penalty statutes based in part on concerns 
grounded in due process, the Eighth Amendment, and 
fundamental fairness.  As the New Jersey Supreme Court 
explained, “[i]f anywhere in the criminal law a defendant is 
entitled to the benefit of the doubt, it is here.  We therefore hold 
that as a matter of fundamental fairness the jury must find that 
aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors, and this 
balance must be found beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (State v. 
Biegenwald (N.J. 1987) 524 A.2d 130, 156; see also People v. 
Tenneson (Colo. 1990) 788 P.2d 786, 797 [“[T]he jury still must 
be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
should be sentenced to death.”]; State v. Wood (Utah 1982) 
648 P.2d 71, 83 [“Furthermore, in our view, the reasonable 
doubt standard also strikes the best balance between the 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
74 
interests of the state and of the individual for most of the 
reasons stated in In re Winship [(1970)] 397 U.S. 358”]; State v. 
Simants (Neb. 1977) 250 N.W.2d 881, 888, disapproved on 
another ground in State v. Reeves (Neb. 1990) 453 N.W.2d 359 
[reading reasonable doubt burden into silent statute].)  At least 
one state has imposed this requirement for the penalty verdict 
by statute.  (Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-603, subd. (a)(3).) 
To the extent the Attorney General argues that 
implementation of the reasonable doubt standard and jury 
unanimity with regard to the ultimate penalty verdict would be 
unworkable, practice from other states suggests otherwise.  
Moreover, as noted, the Attorney General has acknowledged 
that requiring the penalty jury to “unanimously determine 
beyond a reasonable doubt factually disputed aggravating 
evidence and the ultimate penalty verdict . . . would improve our 
system of capital punishment and make it even more reliable,” 
and that statutory reforms “deserve serious consideration.”  
Nevertheless, to date our Legislature and electorate have not 
imposed such requirements by statute, and the out-of-state 
holdings above are based at least in part on due process or 
Eighth Amendment grounds.  McDaniel does not ask us to 
reconsider our precedent that has concluded otherwise as a 
matter of due process. 
In sum, having examined our case law and relevant 
history, we are unable to infer from the jury trial guarantee in 
article I, section 16 of the California Constitution or Penal Code 
section 1042 a requirement of certainty beyond a reasonable 
doubt for the ultimate penalty verdict. 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
75 
D. Additional Challenges to the Death Penalty  
McDaniel raises a number of challenges to the 
constitutionality of California’s death penalty statute that we 
have previously rejected, and we decline to revisit those holdings 
in this case. 
“Penal 
Code 
sections 
190.2 
and 
190.3 
are 
not 
impermissibly broad, and factor (a) of Penal Code section 190.3 
does not make imposition of the death penalty arbitrary and 
capricious.”  (People v. Sánchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 411, 487 
(Sánchez).)   
As described above, “ ‘[e]xcept for evidence of other crimes 
and prior convictions, jurors need not find aggravating factors 
true beyond a reasonable doubt; no instruction on burden of 
proof is needed; the jury need not achieve unanimity except for 
the verdict itself; and written findings are not required.’ ”  
(Sánchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 487.) 
Likewise, we have held that the high court’s decision in 
Hurst v. Florida (2016) 577 U.S. 92 does not alter our conclusion 
under the federal Constitution or under the Sixth Amendment 
about the burden of proof or unanimity regarding aggravating 
circumstances, the weighing of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances, or the ultimate penalty determination.  (People 
v. Capers, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1014; People v. Rangel, supra, 
62 Cal.4th at p. 1235.)  And we have concluded that Hurst does 
not cause us to reconsider our holdings that imposition of the 
death penalty does not constitute an increased sentence within 
the meaning of Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466, or that the 
imposition of the death penalty does not require factual findings 
within the meaning of Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584.  
(People v. Henriquez (2017) 4 Cal.5th 1, 46.)  As McDaniel 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
76 
acknowledges, neither Ring nor Hurst decided the standard of 
proof that applies to the ultimate weighing consideration. 
“Use in the sentencing factors of such adjectives as 
‘extreme’ (§ 190.3, factors (d), (g)) and ‘substantial’ (id., 
factor (g)) does not act as a barrier to the consideration of 
mitigating evidence in violation of the federal Constitution.”  
(People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 614–615.)  “By advising 
that a death verdict should be returned only if aggravation is ‘so 
substantial in comparison with’ mitigation that death is 
‘warranted,’ ” CALJIC No. 8.88 “clearly admonishes the jury to 
determine whether the balance of aggravation and mitigation 
makes death the appropriate penalty.”  (People v. Arias (1996) 
13 Cal.4th 92, 171.)  “[T]he phrase ‘ “so substantial” ’ in CALJIC 
No. 8.88 is not unconstitutionally vague.”  (People v. Henriquez, 
supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 46.)   
A trial court need not delete inapplicable statutory 
sentencing factors in CAJIC No. 8.85 from the jury instructions 
(People v. Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566, 610) or instruct that the 
jury can consider certain statutory factors only in mitigation.  
(People v. Beck and Cruz (2019) 8 Cal.5th 548, 671 (Beck and 
Cruz).)   
CALJIC 8.88 “clearly stated that the death penalty could 
be imposed only if the jury found that the aggravating 
circumstances outweighed mitigating.  There was no need to 
additionally advise the jury of the converse . . . .”  (People v. 
Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 978.)   
We decline to reconsider our precedent holding that a jury 
cannot consider sympathy for a defendant’s family in mitigation.  
(People v. Rices (2017) 4 Cal.5th 49, 88; People v. Ochoa (1998) 
19 Cal.4th 353, 456.)  The trial court need not instruct that there 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
77 
is a presumption of life.  (Beck and Cruz, supra, 8 Cal.5th at 
p. 670.)   
“The absence of a requirement of intercase proportionality 
review does not violate the Eighth Amendment.”  (People v. 
Amezcua and Flores (2019) 6 Cal.5th 886, 929.)  “The California 
sentencing scheme does not violate the equal protection clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment by denying capital defendants 
certain 
procedural 
safeguards 
afforded 
to 
noncapital 
defendants.”  (Ibid.)  “California law does not violate 
international norms, and thus contravene the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, by imposing the death penalty as 
regular punishment for substantial numbers of crimes.”  (Ibid.)   
E. Cumulative Error  
McDaniel contends that the cumulative effect of errors at 
the guilt and penalty phase requires reversal.  While we 
assumed that admission of Anderson’s cancer was error, we 
concluded there was no reasonable possibility that the victim 
impact testimony affected the verdict.  There are no other errors 
to cumulate.   
CONCLUSION 
We affirm the judgment. 
LIU, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
S171393 
 
Concurring Opinion by Justice Liu 
 
Over the years, this court has repeatedly rejected the 
claim that California’s death penalty scheme violates the jury 
trial right guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution as interpreted in Apprendi v. New Jersey 
(2000) 530 U.S. 466 (Apprendi) and related cases.  We do so 
again today, adhering to precedent.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 76–
77.)  I write separately, however, to express doubts about the 
way our case law has resolved a key facet of this claim.  There 
is a serious question whether our capital sentencing scheme is 
unconstitutional in light of Apprendi, and I have come to believe 
the issue merits reexamination by this court and other 
responsible officials. 
In Apprendi, the United States Supreme Court held that 
“[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that 
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed 
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at 
p. 490.)  This holding spawned a major shift in Sixth 
Amendment jurisprudence, and the high court has been 
continually elaborating its far-reaching ramifications over the 
past 20 years.  (See Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584 (Ring); 
Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 (Blakely); U.S. v. 
Booker (2005) 543 U.S. 220 (Booker); Cunningham v. California 
(2007) 549 U.S. 270 (Cunningham); Alleyne v. United States 
(2013) 570 U.S. 99 (Alleyne); Hurst v. Florida (2016) 577 U.S. 92 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
2 
(Hurst).)  Many decisions, including several of the high court’s 
own precedents, have been overruled in Apprendi’s wake. 
Our case law has held that the Apprendi rule does not 
disturb California’s death penalty scheme.  Yet our decisions in 
this area consist of brief analyses that have largely addressed 
high court opinions one by one as they have appeared on the 
books.  In my view, we have not fully grappled with the 
analytical underpinnings of the Apprendi rule and the totality 
of the high court’s 20-year line of decisions. 
The high court has made clear that “the ‘statutory 
maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a 
judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the 
jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.”  (Blakely, supra, 542 
U.S. at p. 303, italics in original.)  Our precedent has repeatedly 
asserted that a defendant becomes eligible for the death penalty 
upon a conviction for first degree murder and a jury’s true 
finding of one or more special circumstances.  (See, e.g., People 
v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 589–590, fn. 14 (Anderson) 
[“[U]nder the California death penalty scheme, once the 
defendant has been convicted of first degree murder and one or 
more special circumstances has been found true beyond a 
reasonable doubt, death is no more than the prescribed 
statutory maximum for the offense . . . .”]; People v. Ochoa 
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 454 (Ochoa) [“[O]nce a jury has 
determined the existence of a special circumstance, the 
defendant stands convicted of an offense whose maximum 
penalty is death. . . .  Accordingly, Apprendi does not restrict the 
sentencing of California defendants who have already been 
convicted of special circumstance murder.”].) 
But this assertion, in the context of Apprendi, appears 
incorrect.  Under our death penalty scheme, “the maximum 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
3 
sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts 
reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant” 
(Blakely, supra, 542 U.S. at p. 303) upon a conviction for first 
degree murder and special circumstance true finding — with 
nothing more — is life imprisonment without parole.  A death 
verdict is authorized only when the penalty jury has 
unanimously determined that “the aggravating circumstances 
outweigh the mitigating circumstances” (Pen. Code, § 190.3; see 
People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, 541–542, fn. 13, revd. on 
other grounds sub nom. California v. Brown (1987) 479 U.S. 
538) — which necessarily presupposes that the penalty jury has 
found at least one section 190.3 circumstance to be aggravating.  
(All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.)  
Our cases have not satisfactorily explained why this additional 
finding of at least one aggravating factor, which is a necessary 
precursor to the weighing determination and is thus required 
for the imposition of a death sentence, is not governed by the 
Apprendi rule. 
This issue is not a mere technicality.  The Apprendi rule 
states what the Constitution requires in the context of criminal 
sentencing, and it has particular significance in cases where the 
special circumstance findings by the guilt jury are not 
necessarily aggravating.  In such cases, the prosecution may 
rely on a bevy of prior criminal conduct under section 190.3, 
factors (b) and (c), some of which may be disputed, to show 
aggravation during the penalty trial.  For example, the 
prosecution here introduced evidence of 10 prior criminal acts 
by McDaniel under factor (b), ranging from threatening a school 
official and instances of weapon possession to battery of peace 
officers and prior instances of robbery, shooting, and killing.  
Some of the evidence was vigorously contested by McDaniel, and 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
4 
only one prior act — possession of an assault weapon — was 
accompanied by documentary evidence of a conviction under 
factor (c).   
Especially where it is not clear that any special 
circumstance findings by the guilt jury are aggravating at the 
penalty phase, section 190.3, factor (b) or (c) evidence may prove 
critical to the sentencing decision.  It is true that each penalty 
juror may consider evidence of prior criminal activity as an 
aggravating factor only if the juror is “convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt” that the defendant committed the prior crime.  
(People v. Polk (1965) 63 Cal.2d 443, 451; see People v. 
McClellan (1969) 71 Cal.2d 793, 804–806.)  Yet the penalty jury 
“as a whole need not find any one aggravating factor to exist.”  
(People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 126, fn. 32 (Snow).) 
To illustrate:  Suppose the prosecution introduces 
evidence of three prior criminal acts (A, B, and C).  Some jurors 
may find that A was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, but not 
B and C; other jurors may find B proven, but not A and C; others 
may find C proven, but not A and B; and still others may find 
none proven at all and instead find some other circumstance to 
be aggravating.  Or the jurors may find various prior crimes 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt but differ as to which one or 
ones are aggravating.  There is little downside for the 
prosecution to provide a broad menu of aggravating evidence for 
the penalty jury to consider, since we presume on appeal that 
“any hypothetical juror whom the prosecution’s evidence might 
not have convinced beyond a reasonable doubt . . . followed the 
court’s instruction to disregard the evidence.”  (People v. Yeoman 
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 132–133.)  Our capital sentencing scheme 
allows the penalty jury to render a death verdict in these 
circumstances.  But I am doubtful the Sixth Amendment does. 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
5 
In the case before us, McDaniel raises some Sixth 
Amendment and Apprendi arguments, but this portion of his 
briefing focuses primarily on his state law claims.  His Apprendi 
arguments mostly mirror his state law arguments or emphasize 
that the penalty jury’s weighing determination is a factual issue 
subject to Apprendi.  Those arguments are different from my 
focus here:  the finding by the penalty jury of at least one 
aggravating factor relevant to the sentencing determination.  
Although today’s decision does not revisit this issue, I believe 
the issue should be reexamined in a case where it is more fully 
developed.  The constitutionality of our death penalty scheme in 
light of two decades of evolving Sixth Amendment jurisprudence 
deserves careful and thorough reconsideration. 
I. 
“The Sixth Amendment provides that those ‘accused’ of a 
‘crime’ have the right to a trial ‘by an impartial jury.’  This right, 
in conjunction with the Due Process Clause, requires that each 
element of a crime be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”  (Alleyne, supra, 570 U.S. at p. 104.)  To convict a 
defendant of a serious offense, the jury’s verdict must be 
unanimous.  (See Ramos v. Louisiana (2020) 590 U.S. __, __ 
[140 S.Ct. 1390, 1397].) 
In the 20 years since Apprendi, the high court’s precedents 
in this area, individually and as a whole, have underscored how 
robust and far-reaching the Apprendi rule is.  As noted, 
Apprendi held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, 
any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the 
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, 
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (Apprendi, supra, 
530 U.S. at p. 490.)  Apprendi involved a plea agreement for 
multiple felonies arising from the defendant’s “fir[ing of] several 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
6 
.22-caliber bullets into the home of an African-American family 
that 
had 
recently 
moved 
into 
a 
previously 
all-white 
neighborhood.”  (Id. at p. 469.)  To evaluate a hate crime 
sentencing enhancement that carried an extended term of 
imprisonment, the trial judge held an evidentiary hearing on the 
defendant’s intent and “concluded that the evidence supported 
a finding ‘that the crime was motivated by racial bias.’ ”  (Id. at 
p. 471.)  Because this subsequent factfinding by the judge under 
a preponderance of the evidence standard increased the 
maximum sentence, the high court held that this scheme 
violated the Sixth Amendment.  (Id. at p. 491.)  The high court’s 
inquiry into whether a particular fact increases the penalty for 
a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum was 
functional in nature; it disregarded whether the fact is formally 
considered an element of the crime or a sentencing factor, since 
“[m]erely using the label ‘sentence enhancement’ . . . surely does 
not provide a principled basis for” distinction.  (Id. at p. 476.)  
Apprendi also preserved “a narrow exception to the general rule” 
for the fact of a prior conviction but noted “it is arguable” that 
allowing the exception is “incorrect[]” based on Apprendi’s 
reasoning, at least “if the recidivist issue were contested.”  
(Apprendi, at pp. 489–490; see id. at pp. 487–490 [declining to 
overrule Almendarez-Torres v. U.S. (1998) 523 U.S. 224, the 
source of the exception].) 
A few years later, the high court clarified in Blakely “that 
the ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum 
sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts 
reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.  
[Citations.]  In other words, the relevant ‘statutory maximum’ is 
not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding 
additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
7 
additional findings.”  (Blakely, supra, 542 U.S. at pp. 303–304.)  
This is so because “[w]hen a judge inflicts punishment that the 
jury’s verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the 
facts ‘which the law makes essential to the punishment.’ ”  (Id. 
at p. 304.)  Blakely found a Sixth Amendment violation because 
the defendant “was sentenced to more than three years above 
the 53-month statutory maximum of the standard range 
because he had acted with ‘deliberate cruelty,’ ” and the judge 
“could not have imposed” that “sentence solely on the basis of 
the facts admitted in the guilty plea.”  (Id. at pp. 303–304.) 
In Booker, the Supreme Court applied Apprendi to the 
federal sentencing guidelines, holding that the trial judge’s 
additional factfinding violated the Sixth Amendment when it 
resulted in “an enhanced sentence of 15 or 16 years [under the 
guidelines] instead of the 5 or 6 years authorized by the jury 
verdict alone.”  (Booker, supra, 543 U.S. at p. 228; see id. at 
pp. 233–235.) 
In Cunningham, the high court considered California’s 
determinate sentencing law, which “assign[ed] to the trial judge, 
not to the jury, authority to find the facts that expose a 
defendant to an elevated ‘upper term’ sentence.”  (Cunningham, 
supra, 549 U.S. at p. 274.)  The scheme specified three precise 
terms (lower, middle, and upper) and directed the trial court “to 
start with the middle term, and to move from that term only 
when the court itself finds and places on the record facts — 
whether related to the offense or the offender — beyond the 
elements of the charged offense” and “ ‘established by a 
preponderance of the evidence.’ ”  (Id. at pp. 277, 279.)  Because 
“[t]he facts so found are neither inherent in the jury’s verdict nor 
embraced by the defendant’s plea, and they need only be 
established by a preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
8 
reasonable doubt,” the high court held that this scheme violated 
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.  (Id. at p. 274.)   
The Supreme Court has also applied the Apprendi rule to 
capital sentencing.  In Ring, the high court considered Arizona’s 
scheme, in which a defendant “could not be sentenced to death, 
the statutory maximum penalty for first-degree murder, unless 
further findings were made.”  (Ring, supra, 536 U.S. at p. 592.)  
State law required the trial judge “to ‘conduct a separate 
sentencing hearing to determine the existence or nonexistence 
of [certain enumerated] circumstances . . . for the purpose of 
determining the sentence to be imposed’ ” and permitted “the 
judge to sentence the defendant to death only if there [wa]s at 
least one aggravating circumstance and . . . ‘no mitigating 
circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.’ ”  (Id. 
at pp. 592–593.)  The high court, before Apprendi, had upheld 
Arizona’s scheme under the Sixth and Eighth Amendments 
(Walton v. Arizona (1990) 497 U.S. 639 (Walton)), and the high 
court in Apprendi left Walton’s Sixth Amendment holding 
undisturbed (Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at pp. 496–497).  “The 
key distinction, according to the Apprendi Court, was that a 
conviction of first-degree murder in Arizona carried a maximum 
sentence of death.  ‘Once a jury has found the defendant guilty 
of all the elements of an offense which carries as its maximum 
penalty the sentence of death, it may be left to the judge to 
decide whether that maximum penalty, rather than a lesser one, 
ought to be imposed.’ ”  (Ring, at p. 602.)  But two years after 
Apprendi, the high court reversed itself, holding in Ring that 
this distinction was untenable and inconsistent with the 
Arizona Supreme Court’s own construction of the state’s capital 
sentencing law.  (Id. at p. 603.)  Ring thus overruled Walton’s 
Sixth Amendment holding.  (Id. at p. 609.) 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
9 
In Ring, the state argued that because “Arizona law 
specifies ‘death or life imprisonment’ as the only sentencing 
options” for a first degree murder conviction, “Ring was 
therefore sentenced within the range of punishment authorized 
by the jury verdict.”  (Ring, supra, 536 U.S. at pp. 603–604.)  The 
high court rejected this argument, explaining that it 
“overlook[ed] Apprendi’s instruction that ‘the relevant inquiry is 
one not of form, but of effect.’ ”  (Id. at p. 604.)  The “first-degree 
murder statute ‘authorize[d] a maximum penalty of death only 
in a formal sense,’ ” Ring explained, because the finding of at 
least one aggravating circumstance at the sentencing phase is 
required for a death sentence.  (Ibid.)  “In effect, ‘the required 
finding [of an aggravated circumstance] expose[d] [Ring] to a 
greater punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty 
verdict’ ” alone.  (Ibid.)  Ring thus made clear that if “a State 
makes an increase in a defendant’s authorized punishment 
contingent on the finding of a fact, that fact — no matter how 
the State labels it — must be found by a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  (Id. at p. 602.)  Further, “[a]ggravators 
‘operate as statutory “elements” of capital murder . . . [when,] in 
their absence, [the death] sentence is unavailable.’ ”  (Id. at 
p. 599, quoting Walton, supra, 497 U.S. at p. 709, fn.1 (dis. opn. 
of Stevens, J.).)  Ring also recognized that Walton’s distinction 
“between elements of an offense and sentencing factors” was 
“untenable” in light of Apprendi.  (Ring, at p. 604.) 
More recently, in Hurst, the high court applied Apprendi 
and its progeny to a state capital sentencing scheme it had twice 
upheld under the Sixth Amendment.  (Hurst, supra, 577 U.S. at 
p. 101, overruling Hildwin v. Florida (1989) 490 U.S. 638 
(Hildwin) and Spaziano v. Florida (1984) 468 U.S. 447 
(Spaziano).)  Under Florida’s death penalty scheme at the time, 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
10 
a defendant convicted of a capital felony could receive a 
maximum sentence of life imprisonment based on the conviction 
alone.  (Hurst, at p. 95.)  A sentence of death required “an 
additional sentencing proceeding ‘result[ing] in findings by the 
court that such person shall be punished by death.’ ”  (Ibid.)  
Florida used a “hybrid” model “ ‘in which [a] jury renders an 
advisory verdict but the judge makes the ultimate sentencing 
determinations.’ ”  (Ibid., quoting Ring, supra, 536 U.S. at 
p. 608, fn. 6.)  The high court found Ring’s analysis to “appl[y] 
equally to Florida’s” scheme because, “[l]ike Arizona at the time 
of Ring, Florida does not require the jury to make the critical 
findings necessary to impose the death penalty” — instead 
“requir[ing] a judge to find these facts” — and “the maximum 
punishment [the defendant] could have received without any 
judge-made findings was life in prison without parole.”  (Hurst, 
at pp. 98–99.)  Focusing again on function over form, the high 
court found Florida’s “advisory jury verdict” to be “immaterial” 
for purposes of satisfying the Sixth Amendment because the jury 
“ ‘does not make specific factual findings with regard to the 
existence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances and its 
recommendation is not binding on the trial judge.’ ”  (Hurst, at 
pp. 98–99.) 
Just last year, in an Eighth Amendment case, the high 
court again confirmed that “[u]nder Ring and Hurst, a jury must 
find the aggravating circumstance that makes the defendant 
death eligible.”  (McKinney v. Arizona (2020) 589 U.S. __, __ 
[140 S.Ct. 702, 707] (McKinney).)  At the same time, the court 
reaffirmed its prior decisions holding that the Constitution does 
not require “a jury (as opposed to a judge) . . . to weigh the 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances or to make the 
ultimate sentencing decision” in a capital proceeding.  (Ibid.)  
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
11 
McKinney also rejected the claim that it was error for the trial 
judge in that case, as opposed to a jury, to find the aggravating 
circumstance that raised the statutory maximum penalty to 
death; that claim could not succeed because the “case became 
final . . . long before Ring and Hurst” and those decisions “do not 
apply retroactively on collateral review.”  (Id. at p. __ [at 
p. 708].) 
In sum, under Apprendi and its progeny, the Sixth 
Amendment requires any fact, other than the fact of a prior 
conviction, that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the 
statutory maximum to be found by a unanimous jury and proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  The statutory maximum means the 
maximum sentence permissible based solely on the facts 
reflected in the jury’s verdict or admitted by the defendant, 
without any additional factfinding.  (Blakely, supra, 542 U.S. at 
p. 303.)  It does not matter if the additional fact to be found is 
termed an “aggravating circumstance,” a “sentencing factor,” or 
a “sentencing enhancement”; the high court has emphasized 
that “ ‘the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect.’ ”  
(Ring, supra, 536 U.S. at p. 604.) 
II. 
True to its word, the high court has consistently elevated 
function over form in applying Apprendi.  (Apprendi, supra, 530 
U.S. at p. 494; see also Ring, supra, 539 U.S. at p. 602; id. at 
p. 610 (conc. opn. of Scalia, J.) [“[T]he fundamental meaning of 
the jury-trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is that all facts 
essential to imposition of the level of punishment that the 
defendant receives — whether the statute calls them elements 
of the offense, sentencing factors, or Mary Jane — must be found 
by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”]; Southern Union Co. v. 
U.S. (2012) 567 U.S. 343, 358–359 [“Apprendi and its progeny 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
12 
have uniformly rejected” the argument “that in determining the 
maximum punishment for an offense, there is a constitutionally 
significant difference between a fact that is an ‘element’ of 
the offense and one that is a ‘sentencing factor.’ ”].)  The high 
court has repeatedly looked past statutory labels to determine 
the substantive role that a fact or factor plays in the sentencing 
decision. 
As noted, this approach has led the high court to overrule 
several of its precedents.  Walton upheld capital sentencing 
schemes that “requir[e] judges, after a jury verdict holding a 
defendant guilty of a capital crime, to find specific aggravating 
factors before imposing a sentence of death.”  (Apprendi, supra, 
530 U.S. at p. 496.)  Apprendi reaffirmed Walton, but in Ring, 
the high court found Walton untenable in light of Apprendi and 
overruled it.  (Ring, supra, 536 U.S. at pp. 604–605, 609.)  In 
Hurst, the high court overruled Spaziano and Hildwin as 
inconsistent with Apprendi.  (Hurst, supra, 577 U.S. at p. 102.)  
And in Alleyne, the high court held that any fact that increases 
the statutory minimum penalty must also be found by a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt, overruling Harris v. U.S. (2002) 536 
U.S. 545, 557 and McMillan v. Pennsylvania (1986) 477 U.S. 79.  
(Alleyne, supra, 570 U.S. at p. 103; see United States v. 
Haymond (2019) 588 U.S. __, __ [139 S.Ct. 2369, 2378].)  These 
overrulings indicate the breadth and force of the Apprendi rule. 
The high court’s decisions have also made clear that the 
requirements of the Sixth and Eighth Amendments are distinct.  
After initially holding in Walton that Arizona’s capital 
sentencing scheme complied with both the Sixth and Eighth 
Amendments, and then overruling Walton’s Sixth Amendment 
holding in Ring, the high court left intact Walton’s Eighth 
Amendment holding that “the challenged factor . . . furnishes 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
13 
sufficient guidance to the sentencer” and thus did not violate the 
Eighth Amendment.  (Walton, supra, 497 U.S. at p. 655; see 
Kansas v. Marsh (2006) 548 U.S. 163, 169.)  The high court has 
understood the Eighth Amendment to be fundamentally 
concerned with narrowing a sentencer’s discretion to ensure 
that punishment is commensurate and proportional to the 
offense.  (See Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 59; 
Maynard v. Cartwright (1988) 486 U.S. 356, 362.)  The Sixth 
Amendment, by contrast, ensures that the facts necessary for a 
criminal punishment are found by a unanimous jury and proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  In light of these different inquiries 
under the Sixth and Eighth Amendments, a scheme that 
satisfies one does not necessarily satisfy the other.  (See Ring, 
supra, 539 U.S. at p. 606 [“The notion ‘that the Eighth 
Amendment’s restriction on a state legislature’s ability to define 
capital crimes should be compensated for by permitting States 
more leeway under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments in proving 
an aggravating fact necessary to a capital sentence . . . is 
without precedent in our constitutional jurisprudence.’ ”].) 
The high court’s evolving jurisprudence has also caused 
state courts to reexamine earlier decisions.  “Following 
Apprendi,” the Hawaii Supreme Court “repeatedly considered 
whether Hawaii’s extended term sentencing scheme comported 
with Apprendi.  Until 2007, [the court] concluded that it did so, 
on the ground that Hawaii’s scheme only required the judge to 
determine ‘extrinsic’ facts, rather than facts that were ‘intrinsic’ 
to the offense.  [Citations.]  It was not until Maugaotega II, that 
th[e] court acknowledged that the United States Supreme 
Court, in Cunningham, rejected the validity of [Hawaii’s] 
intrinsic/extrinsic distinction, which formed the basis of these 
decisions.  [State v. Maugaotega (Hawaii 2007) 168 P.3d 562, 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
14 
572–577].”  (Flubacher v. State (Hawaii 2018) 414 P.3d 161, 
167.) 
The Delaware Supreme Court had repeatedly held that 
the state’s death penalty scheme complied with Apprendi and 
its progeny.  (See McCoy v. State (Del. 2015) 112 A.3d 239, 269–
271; Swan v. State (Del. 2011) 28 A.3d 362, 390–391; Brice v. 
State (Del. 2003) 815 A.2d 314, 321–322.)  After Hurst, the court 
changed course and held that Delaware’s law violates the Sixth 
Amendment’s requirement that “the existence of ‘any 
aggravating circumstance,’ statutory or non-statutory, that has 
been alleged by the State for weighing in the selection phase of 
a capital sentencing proceeding must be made by a jury, . . . 
unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (Rauf v. State 
(Del. 2016) 145 A.3d 430, 433–434; see id. at p. 487, fn. omitted 
(conc. opn. of Holland, J.) [Hurst squarely “invalidated a judicial 
determination of aggravating circumstances” and “also stated 
unequivocally that the jury trial right recognized in Ring now 
applies to all factual findings necessary to impose a death 
sentence under a state statute”].) 
The Florida Supreme Court, on remand after Hurst, 
concluded that the Sixth Amendment requires the jury to “be 
the finder of every fact, and thus every element, necessary for 
the imposition of the death penalty.”  (Hurst v. State (Fla. 2016) 
202 So.3d 40, 53.)  “These necessary facts include . . . find[ing] 
the existence of the aggravating factors proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the aggravating factors are sufficient to 
impose death, and that the aggravating factors outweigh the 
mitigating circumstances.”  (Ibid., fn. omitted.)  Noting that 
“Florida law has long required findings beyond the existence of 
a single aggravator before the sentence of death may be 
recommended or imposed,” the court “reject[ed] the State’s 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
15 
argument that Hurst v. Florida only requires that the jury 
unanimously find the existence of one aggravating factor and 
nothing more.”  (Id. at p. 53, fn. 7.)  The court “also conclude[d] 
that, just as elements of a crime must be found unanimously by 
a Florida jury, all these findings . . . are also elements that must 
be found unanimously by the jury.”  (Id. at pp. 53–54.)   
More recently, the Florida Supreme Court “partially 
recede[d]” from its holding on remand from Hurst.  (State v. 
Poole (Fla. 2020) 297 So.3d 487, 501 (Poole).)  In Poole, the court 
distinguished between the two findings required during the 
state’s sentencing phase:  (a) “[t]he eligibility finding . . . ‘[t]hat 
sufficient aggravating circumstances exist’ ”; and (b) “[t]he 
selection finding . . . ‘[t]hat there are insufficient mitigating 
circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.’ ”  
(Id. at p. 502, quoting Fla. Stat. § 921.141.)  The court 
determined that the selection or weighing finding “ ‘is mostly a 
question of mercy’ ” and “ ‘is not a finding of fact [to which the 
jury trial right attaches], but a moral judgment.’ ”  (Poole, at 
p. 503; cf. McKinney, supra, 589 U.S. at pp. __–__ [140 S.Ct. at 
pp. 707–708].)  However, and most relevant here, the court did 
not disturb its prior holding that the jury must find “one or more 
statutory aggravating circumstances” unanimously and beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  (Ibid.) 
Moreover, many state legislatures have responded to 
Apprendi and its progeny in the capital context and, especially 
after Blakely, more broadly in criminal sentencing.  (See Stemen 
& Wilhelm, Finding the Jury: State Legislative Responses to 
Blakely v. Washington (2005) 18 Fed. Sentencing Rep. 7 
[providing an overview of state reforms].)  Immediately after 
Ring, Arizona enacted statutory changes conforming its death 
penalty scheme to Ring’s requirements.  Arizona law now 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
16 
provides for two phases of the capital sentencing proceeding:  
(1) the aggravation phase, in which “the trier of fact . . . 
determine[s] whether one or more alleged aggravating 
circumstances have been proven” (Ariz. Rev. Stat., § 13-752(C)); 
and (2) the penalty phase, in which “the trier of fact . . . 
determine[s] whether the death penalty should be imposed” (id., 
subd. (D)).  In the aggravation phase, the jury must “make a 
special 
finding 
on 
whether 
each 
alleged 
aggravating 
circumstance has been proven” (id., subd. (E)); “a unanimous 
verdict is required to find that the aggravating circumstance has 
been proven” (ibid.); and “[t]he prosecution must prove the 
existence of the aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable 
doubt” (id. § 13-751(B)).  Then, in the penalty phase, the jury 
considers “any evidence that is relevant to the determination of 
whether there is mitigation that is sufficiently substantial to 
call for leniency” (id. § 13-752(G)), and the defendant has the 
burden 
of 
“prov[ing] 
the 
existence 
of 
the 
mitigating 
circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence” (id. § 13-
751(C)).  Jurors “do not have to agree unanimously that a 
mitigating circumstance has been proven to exist”; “[e]ach juror 
may consider any mitigating circumstance found by that juror 
in determining the appropriate penalty.”  (Ibid.) 
Likewise, Florida enacted statutory reforms to its capital 
sentencing regime following Hurst.  Florida law now requires 
that the jury find, “beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of 
at least one aggravating factor” in order for the defendant to be 
eligible for the death penalty.  (Fla. Stat., § 921.141(2)(a); see 
id., subd. (2)(b)1.)  The jury must also “unanimous[ly]” “return 
findings identifying each aggravating factor found to exist” (id., 
subd. (2)(b)) and “[u]nanimously” recommend a sentence of 
either life without parole or death “based on a weighing of . . . 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
17 
[¶] . . . [w]hether sufficient aggravating factors exist[,] . . . [¶] 
[w]hether aggravating factors exist which outweigh the 
mitigating circumstances found to exist[,] . . . [¶] [and, based on 
that], whether the defendant should be sentenced to life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole or to death” (id., 
subd. (2)(b)2.; see id., subd. (c)).  Only if the jury unanimously 
recommends a sentence of death can the court then decide 
whether to “impose a sentence of life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole or a sentence of death” (id., subd. (3)(a)(2)) 
“after considering each aggravating factor found by the jury and 
all mitigating circumstances” (id., subd. (3)(b)). 
In sum, the high court’s Apprendi jurisprudence has 
prompted significant reexamination and reform of capital 
sentencing schemes in many states.  Yet California is not among 
them, and our precedent is in conflict with decisions from other 
states.  (See Poole, supra, 297 So.3d at pp. 501–503 [recognizing 
that the state law requirement of at least one aggravating factor 
in order to impose death is subject to the Apprendi rule]; Rauf 
v. State, supra, 145 A.3d at pp. 433–434 [any aggravating 
circumstance used in a capital sentencing proceeding must be 
found by a unanimous jury beyond a reasonable doubt].) 
III. 
We first confronted the impact of Apprendi on California’s 
death penalty scheme in Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th 543.  In a 
footnote, we found Apprendi inapplicable to the penalty phase 
because “under the California death penalty scheme, once the 
defendant has been convicted of first degree murder and one or 
more special circumstances has been found true beyond a 
reasonable doubt, death is no more than the prescribed 
statutory maximum for the offense; the only alternative is life 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
18 
imprisonment without possibility of parole.”  (Id. at pp. 589–
590, fn. 14.) 
We elaborated on this distinction in Ochoa, reasoning that 
“Apprendi itself excluded from its scope ‘state capital sentencing 
schemes requiring judges, after a jury verdict holding a 
defendant guilty of a capital crime, to find specific aggravating 
factors before imposing a sentence of death.’ ”  (Ochoa, supra, 26 
Cal.4th at p. 453, quoting Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 496.)  
In Ochoa, we specifically relied on Apprendi’s reaffirmation of 
Walton and noted similarities between the California and then-
current Arizona schemes.  (Ochoa, at pp. 453–454.) 
But our reliance on Walton was soon undercut by Ring.  
After Ring overruled Walton and found Arizona’s scheme 
unconstitutional, we reverted to rejecting the argument that 
Apprendi “mandates that aggravating circumstances necessary 
for the jury’s imposition of the death penalty be found beyond a 
reasonable doubt . . . for the reason given in People v. Anderson, 
supra, 25 Cal.4th at pages 589–590, footnote 14” (quoted above).  
(Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 126, fn. 32.)  We concluded that 
Ring “does not change this analysis” because “[u]nder 
California’s scheme, in contrast [to Arizona’s], each juror must 
believe the circumstances in aggravation substantially outweigh 
those in mitigation, but the jury as a whole need not find any 
one aggravating factor to exist” since “[t]he final step . . . is a 
free weighing of all the factors relating to the defendant’s 
culpability, comparable to a sentencing court’s traditionally 
discretionary decision to, for example, impose one prison 
sentence rather than another.”  (Ibid.)  We insisted that 
“[n]othing in Apprendi or Ring suggests the sentencer in such a 
system constitutionally must find any aggravating factor true 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (Ibid.) 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
19 
In People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, we further 
explained that because the penalty “jury merely weighs the 
factors enumerated in section 190.3 and determines ‘whether a 
defendant eligible for the death penalty should in fact receive 
that sentence . . .’ [citation] [n]o single factor therefore 
determines which penalty — death or life without the possibility 
of parole — is appropriate.  [¶] . . . [And] [b]ecause any finding 
of aggravating factors during the penalty phase does not 
‘increase[ ] the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed 
statutory 
maximum’ 
[citation], 
Ring 
imposes 
no 
new 
constitutional requirements on California’s penalty phase 
proceedings.”  (Id. at p. 263.) 
We reaffirmed this reasoning after Blakely (see People v. 
Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 731 (Morrison)), Booker (see 
People v. Lancaster (2007) 41 Cal.4th 50, 106), Cunningham (see 
People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1297 (Prince)), and 
Hurst (People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1235).  But in 
each instance, our analysis was brief, ranging from a few 
sentences to a short paragraph or two.  And we relied more on 
grounds for distinguishing the sentencing schemes at issue in 
the high court’s opinions than on any thorough examination of 
the analytical underpinnings of the Apprendi line of decisions. 
For instance, despite Blakely’s clarification of what “the 
‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes” means — i.e., “the 
maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the 
facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant” 
(Blakely, supra, 542 U.S. at p. 303) — we concluded that Blakely 
“d[id] not undermine our analysis” because it “simply relied on 
Apprendi and Ring to conclude that a state noncapital criminal 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury was violated 
where the facts supporting his sentence, which was above the 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
20 
standard range for the crime he committed, were neither 
admitted by the defendant nor found by a jury to be true beyond 
a reasonable doubt” (Morrison, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 731).  We 
distinguished Cunningham on the ground that it “involve[d] 
merely an extension of the Apprendi and Blakely analyses to 
California’s determinate sentencing law and has no apparent 
application to the state’s capital sentencing scheme.”  (Prince, 
supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1297.) 
And we distinguished Hurst on the ground that under 
California’s sentencing scheme, unlike Florida’s, “a jury weighs 
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and reaches a 
unanimous penalty verdict” and “this verdict is not merely 
‘advisory.’ ”  (Rangel, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1235, fn. 16, 
quoting Hurst, supra, 577 U.S. at p. 98.)  We explained that “[i]f 
the jury reaches a verdict of death, our system provides for an 
automatic motion to modify or reduce this verdict to that of life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole,” but the trial 
court “rules on this motion . . . simply [to] determine[] ‘whether 
the jury’s findings and verdicts that the aggravating 
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances are 
contrary to law or the evidence presented.’ ”  (Rangel, at p. 1235, 
fn. 16, quoting § 190.4; see People v. Capers (2019) 7 Cal.5th 
989, 1014 [reaffirming this same reasoning to distinguish 
Hurst].) 
These analyses in our case law appear to rest on the 
observation that under California’s capital sentencing scheme, 
“the jury as a whole need not find any one aggravating factor to 
exist.”  (Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 126, fn. 32.)  Thus, when 
the prosecution offers evidence of multiple instances of prior 
criminal conduct as aggravating evidence in support of a death 
verdict, the jury need not agree on which prior crimes, if any, 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
21 
have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  Two jurors may 
find the existence of one prior crime, while three other jurors 
may focus on another prior crime, a single juror may fixate on 
still another or none at all, and so on.  Yet our case law deems 
the jury as a whole to have found the existence of at least one 
aggravating factor so long as each juror finds one (any one) prior 
crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt — or none at all so long 
as the juror finds another section 190.3 factor to be aggravating. 
The observation that this is how California’s sentencing 
scheme works is not an argument for its constitutionality under 
Apprendi.  Under section 190.3, the penalty jury may not return 
a death verdict unless it has found at least one aggravating 
circumstance.  It is not clear why that finding is not governed by 
the Apprendi rule.  We have compared the jury’s “free weighing” 
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the penalty 
determination 
to 
“a 
sentencing 
court’s 
traditionally 
discretionary decision.”  (Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 126, 
fn. 32.)  But it is precisely the sentencing court’s traditional 
discretion that the Apprendi rule upends, cabining it to a 
prescribed statutory range supported by proper jury findings.  
(See Cunningham, supra, 549 U.S. at p. 292; McKinney, supra, 
589 U.S. at pp. __–__ [140 S.Ct. at pp. 707–708].)  To say that 
California law does not require the jury to agree on any one 
aggravating factor does not answer the Apprendi claim; it 
simply states the problem. 
Our repeated insistence that death is no more than the 
statutory maximum upon a first degree murder conviction and 
a true finding of a special circumstance also cannot carry the 
day.  The same argument — made by this court in the analogous 
context of determinate sentencing — was considered and 
rejected in Cunningham.  Before Cunningham, we upheld 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
22 
California’s determinate sentencing law under Apprendi, 
Blakely, and Booker.  (See People v. Black (2005) 35 Cal.4th 
1238, 1254 (Black), judg. vacated and cause remanded for 
further consideration in light of Cunningham, supra, 549 U.S. 
270, sub nom. Black v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 1190.)  In 
Black, we rejected the argument that “a jury trial [wa]s required 
on the aggravating factors on which an upper term sentence is 
based, because the middle term is the ‘maximum sentence a 
judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the 
jury verdict . . . .’ ”  (Black, at p. 1254, italics omitted, quoting 
Blakely, supra, 542 U.S. at p. 303.)  We explained that “the 
California determinate sentence law simply authorize[s] a 
sentencing court to engage in the type of factfinding that 
traditionally has been incident to the judge’s selection of an 
appropriate sentence within a statutorily prescribed sentencing 
range.”  (Ibid.)  We held that the “the upper term is the 
‘statutory maximum’ ” and viewed the statutory “requirement 
that the middle term be imposed unless an aggravating factor is 
found” as “merely a requirement that the decision to impose the 
upper term be reasonable,” “preserv[ing] the traditional broad 
range of judicial sentencing discretion.”  (Id. at pp. 1254–1255, 
fn. omitted.)  We also analogized the determinate sentencing law 
to “the post-Booker federal sentencing system.”  (Id. at p. 1261.) 
Notwithstanding our understanding of California’s 
determinate sentencing law, the high court in Cunningham 
rejected our reasoning in Black.  The high court concluded that 
“[i]f the jury’s verdict alone does not authorize the sentence, if, 
instead, the judge must find an additional fact to impose the 
longer term, the Sixth Amendment requirement is not 
satisfied.”  (Cunningham, supra, 549 U.S. at p. 290.)  
Cunningham also rejected Black’s comparison to the advisory 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
23 
federal sentencing guidelines because under California’s 
sentencing scheme “judges are not free to exercise their 
‘discretion to select a specific sentence within a defined range.’ ”  
(Id. at p. 292, quoting Booker, supra, 543 U.S. at p. 233.)  
Rather, by “adopt[ing] sentencing triads, three fixed sentences 
with no ranges between them,” judges have “no discretion to 
select a sentence within a range.”  (Cunningham, at p. 292.)  
Instead, a judge must impose the middle term absent 
“[f]actfinding to elevate a sentence,” and Cunningham 
concluded that the high court’s “decisions make plain” that such 
factfinding “falls within the province of the jury employing a 
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, not the bailiwick of a 
judge determining where the preponderance of the evidence 
lies.”  (Ibid.) 
Our reasoning distinguishing Apprendi and its progeny in 
the capital context appears analogous to the reasoning in Black 
that Cunningham rejected.  We have said that “death is no more 
than the prescribed statutory maximum” upon a special 
circumstance first degree murder conviction (Anderson, supra, 
25 Cal.4th at pp. 589–590, fn. 14), and we have emphasized the 
jury’s “free weighing” penalty determination to conclude that it 
is equivalent to “a sentencing court’s traditionally discretionary 
decision” (Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 126, fn. 32).  But just as 
the determinate sentencing law in Cunningham prescribed 
“sentencing triads” with three discrete options as opposed to 
allowing a judge to select “ ‘within a defined range’ ” 
(Cunningham, supra, 549 U.S. at p. 292), California’s capital 
sentencing scheme similarly provides for two discrete options in 
the case of a conviction for first degree murder with a special 
circumstance finding — “death or imprisonment in the state 
prison for life without the possibility of parole” (§ 190.2, 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
24 
subd. (a)).  And like the requirement to impose the middle term 
absent factfinding in aggravation, in the capital context “a 
sentence of confinement in state prison for a term of life without 
the possibility of parole” is required unless the jury finds one or 
more aggravating circumstances and “concludes that the 
aggravating 
circumstances 
outweigh 
the 
mitigating 
circumstances.”  (§ 190.3.) 
After the high court vacated Black and remanded for 
further consideration in light of Cunningham, we decided People 
v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799 (Black II).  We rejected the 
argument that there is a “right to jury trial on all aggravating 
circumstances that may be considered by the trial court, even if 
one aggravating circumstance has been established in 
accordance with Blakely.”  (Id. at p. 814.)  Instead, we held that 
“as long as a single aggravating circumstance that renders a 
defendant eligible for the upper term sentence has been 
established in accordance with the requirements of Apprendi 
and its progeny, any additional fact finding engaged in by the 
trial court in selecting the appropriate sentence among the three 
available options does not violate the defendant’s right to jury 
trial.”  (Id. at p. 812.)   
We reasoned that “Cunningham requires us to recognize 
that aggravating circumstances serve two analytically distinct 
functions 
in 
California’s 
current 
determinate sentencing 
scheme.  One function is to raise the maximum permissible 
sentence from the middle term to the upper term.  The other 
function is to serve as a consideration in the trial court’s exercise 
of its discretion in selecting the appropriate term from among 
those authorized for the defendant’s offense.  Although the 
[determinate sentencing law] does not distinguish between 
these two functions, in light of Cunningham it is now clear that 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
25 
we must view the federal Constitution as treating them 
differently.  Federal constitutional principles provide a criminal 
defendant the right to a jury trial and require the prosecution to 
prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt as to factual 
determinations (other than prior convictions) that serve the first 
function, but leave the trial court free to make factual 
determinations that serve the second function.  It follows that 
imposition of the upper term does not infringe upon the 
defendant’s constitutional right to jury trial so long as one 
legally sufficient aggravating circumstance has been found to 
exist by the jury, has been admitted by the defendant, or is 
justified 
based 
upon 
the 
defendant’s 
record 
of 
prior 
convictions.”  (Black II, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 815–816.) 
The continued applicability of this part of Black II is not 
clear in light of statutory changes to the determinate sentencing 
law made in response to Cunningham.  (See Stats. 2007, ch. 3, 
§ 2; § 1170, subd. (b).)  Even so, and despite our conclusion that 
Cunningham “has no apparent application to the state’s capital 
sentencing scheme” (Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1297), there 
is an argument for extending Black II’s reasoning to the jury’s 
consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in 
the capital context under section 190.3.  But, as I explain, the 
argument is not convincing. 
Under Black II, one could argue that our death penalty 
scheme comports with Apprendi as follows:  A jury must find at 
least one special circumstance under section 190.2 for the 
defendant to be death-eligible and for the proceeding to continue 
into a penalty phase, and that special circumstance must be 
found unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt.  (§ 190.1.)  
Then, any such special circumstance found true by the guilt 
phase jury automatically becomes a consideration for the 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
26 
penalty phase jury under section 190.3, factor (a), since that 
factor includes “[t]he circumstances of the crime of which the 
defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and the 
existence of any special circumstances found to be true pursuant 
to Section 190.1.”  Thus, in light of the guilt phase jury’s special 
circumstance finding(s), the structure of our death penalty 
scheme arguably ensures at least “one legally sufficient 
aggravating circumstance has been found to exist by the jury, 
has been admitted by the defendant, or is justified based upon 
the defendant’s record of prior convictions.”  (Black II, supra, 
41 Cal.4th at p. 816.) 
However, nothing in our case law has applied Black II’s 
reasoning in this manner, and we have not characterized a 
special circumstance finding as an aggravating factor or 
specifically cited section 190.3, factor (a) in this context.   
Instead, we have reasoned (unpersuasively in my view) that the 
special circumstance finding means “death is no more than the 
prescribed statutory maximum for the offense” upon conviction 
at the guilt phase, and “[h]ence, facts which bear upon, but do 
not necessarily determine, which of the[] two alternative 
penalties [i.e., death or life imprisonment without the possibility 
of parole] is appropriate do not come within the holding 
of Apprendi.”  (Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 589–590, 
fn. 14, italics omitted; see Ochoa, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 454.)  
We have also observed that “[t]he literal language of [factor] (a) 
presents a theoretical problem . . . , since it tells the penalty jury 
to consider the ‘circumstances’ of the capital crime and any 
attendant statutory ‘special circumstances[,]’ . . . [and] the latter 
are a subset of the former, [so] a jury given no clarifying 
instructions might conceivably double-count any ‘circumstances’ 
which were also ‘special circumstances.’ ” (People v. Melton (1988) 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
27 
44 Cal.3d 713, 768.)  In Melton, we held that when requested “the 
trial court should admonish the jury not to do so.”  (Ibid.; see People 
v. Monterroso (2004) 34 Cal.4th 743, 789–790.)  Applying Black II’s 
rationale in the manner described above would conceive of the 
special circumstance finding as serving multiple functions, in 
tension with our holding in Melton. 
Moreover, the structure of our death penalty statute 
presents a problem for extending Black II in the manner above.  
Whereas states like Arizona and Florida statutorily enumerate 
a specific list of factors that, if found to exist by the jury, have 
been deemed per se aggravating, section 190.3 takes a different 
approach:  It enumerates a combined list of potentially relevant 
factors and leaves it to the penalty phase jury to determine 
whether, in a given case, each individual factor is aggravating, 
mitigating, or irrelevant for sentencing selection.  (See § 190.3 
[the penalty jury “shall take into account any of the following 
factors if relevant” (italics added)].)  Nothing in our death 
penalty scheme deems a special circumstance to be per se 
aggravating.  Instead, section 190.3 leaves it to the penalty jury 
to 
determine 
whether 
“the 
existence 
of 
any 
special 
circumstances found to be true” is an aggravating factor 
“relevant” to the penalty determination.  (§ 190.3, factor (a).)  
The penalty jury’s finding in this regard — i.e., whether 
the existence of a special circumstance is aggravating and thus 
“relevant” to the penalty determination (§ 190.3) — is not 
dissimilar from other determinations that, though arguably 
normative or moral in nature as opposed to purely factual, are 
nonetheless governed by the Apprendi rule.  For example, 
Blakely involved a finding in aggravation of “ ‘deliberate 
cruelty’ ” to support the more severe sentence that was imposed.  
(Blakely, supra, 542 U.S. at p. 303.)  The high court concluded 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
28 
that “[w]hether the judge’s authority to impose an enhanced 
sentence depends on finding a specified fact (as in Apprendi), 
one of several specified facts (as in Ring), or any aggravating 
fact (as here [in Hurst]), it remains the case that the jury’s 
verdict alone does not authorize the sentence.”  (Id. at p. 305.)  
Hurst likewise applied the Apprendi rule to an aggravating 
circumstance finding that the capital crime was “ ‘heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel’ ” (Hurst, supra, 577 U.S. at p. 96) — a 
common aggravating factor in many state statutes (see, e.g., 
Clemons v. Mississippi (1990) 494 U.S. 738, 743, fn. 1; Ala. Code, 
§ 13A-5-49(8); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann., § 15A-2000(e)(9); Okla. 
Stat. Ann., tit. 21, § 701.12(4)). 
Thus, in contrast to the statutory regimes in other states, 
a special circumstance finding under our scheme does not mean 
the jury has found the existence of the special circumstance to 
be aggravating — and that is the crucial determination needed 
at the penalty phase.  By expressly leaving this determination 
to the penalty jury, our statutory scheme does not treat a special 
circumstance found true at the guilt phase to be a per se 
aggravating factor relevant to the sentencing decision.  If the 
existence of a special circumstance forms no part of the jury’s 
calculus in weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances, 
then it cannot satisfy Black II’s requirement that at least “one 
legally sufficient aggravating circumstance has been found to 
exist by the jury.”  (Black II, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 816; see 
Ring, supra, 536 U.S. at p. 604 [“ ‘the relevant inquiry is one not 
of form, but of effect’ ”].) 
This concern is hardly speculative.  The list of special 
circumstances in section 190.2 is broad and includes a number 
of circumstances, such as commission of murder during a 
burglary or robbery, that do not seem necessarily aggravating 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
29 
in every case.  As just one example, consider People v. Yeoman, 
supra, 31 Cal.4th 93, which involved a first degree murder 
conviction and a robbery-murder special circumstance true 
finding arising from the robbery and killing of an elderly female 
motorist whose car had broken down.  At the penalty phase, the 
prosecution’s “evidence in aggravation consisted of the 
circumstances of the capital offense (§ 190.3, factor (a)), three 
prior felony convictions (id., factor (c)) and five incidents of 
criminal activity involving violence or a threat of violence (id., 
factor (b)).”  (Yeoman, at p. 108.)  The defendant contested some 
of this aggravating evidence, including an earlier robbery and 
attempted kidnapping of another female motorist, which the 
prosecution also introduced at the guilt phase under Evidence 
Code section 1101, subdivision (b) to show intent, as well as 
another killing not charged in the proceeding and used only as 
factor (b) evidence.  Can it be said that the special circumstance 
finding comprised the “one legally sufficient aggravating 
circumstance . . . found to exist by the jury” that the Apprendi 
rule requires?  (Black II, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 816.)  Or did the 
jury instead predicate its sentencing decision on findings with 
regard to contested evidence under factors (b) and (c)? 
There are many other cases involving robbery-murder or 
burglary-murder special circumstance findings where the 
prosecution relied on extensive evidence of prior criminal 
activity to show aggravation at the penalty phase.  (See, e.g., 
People v. Grimes (2016) 1 Cal.5th 698; People v. Jackson (2014) 
58 Cal.4th 724; People v. Abel (2012) 53 Cal.4th 891; People v. 
Friend (2009) 47 Cal.4th 1.)  In such cases, it is hardly clear — 
because our death penalty scheme does not require clarity — 
that the jury found the existence of a special circumstance to be 
a “relevant” aggravating factor.  (§ 190.3.)  If the jury made no 
PEOPLE v. MCDANIEL 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
30 
such finding, then it is quite possible that individual jurors 
seized on different items in the prosecution’s proffered menu of 
aggravating circumstances and that no single aggravating 
circumstance was found beyond a reasonable doubt by a 
unanimous jury.  The Apprendi rule appears to foreclose a death 
judgment in such cases because life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole is “the maximum sentence” authorized 
under California law at the penalty phase absent a jury finding 
of at least one aggravating circumstance.  (Blakely, supra, 
542 U.S. at p. 303.) 
* 
* 
* 
In sum, the 20-year arc of the high court’s Sixth 
Amendment jurisprudence raises serious questions about the 
constitutionality of California’s death penalty scheme.  There is 
a world of difference between a unanimous jury finding of an 
aggravating circumstance and the smorgasbord approach that 
our capital sentencing scheme allows.  Given the stakes for 
capital defendants, the prosecution, and the justice system, I 
urge this court, as well as other responsible officials sworn to 
uphold the Constitution, to revisit this issue at an appropriate 
time. 
 
LIU, J. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. McDaniel 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal XX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published)  
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S171393 
Date Filed: August 26, 2021 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County: Los Angeles  
Judge: Robert J. Perry  
 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Michael J. Hersek and Mary K. McComb, State Public Defenders, 
under appointments by the Supreme Court, Peter R. Silten and Elias 
Batchelder, Deputy State Public Defenders, for Defendant and 
Appellant. 
 
Molly O’Neal, Public Defender (Santa Clara), and Michael Ogul, 
Deputy Public Defender, for California Public Defenders Association 
and Santa Clara County Public Defender as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Phillips Black and John Mills for Hadar Aviram and Gerald Uelman as 
Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Shilpi Agarwal, Summer Lacey and Brian W. Stull for American Civil 
Liberties Union, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of 
Northern California, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of 
 
 
Southern California and American Civil Liberties Union Foundation as 
Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
U.C. Berkeley School of Law, Elisabeth Semel and Erwin Chemerinsky 
for Governor Gavin Newsom as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant 
and Appellant. 
 
Keker, Van Nest & Peters, Steven A. Hirsch, Jo W. Golub and Jason 
George for Vicente Benavides Figueroa and Manuel Lopez as Amici 
Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer and Steven L. Mayer for George Gascón; 
Natasha Minsker for Gil Garcetti; Diana Becton, District Attorney 
(Contra Costa), Chesa Boudin, District Attorney (San Francisco), 
Jeffrey F. Rosen, District Attorney (Santa Clara), and Tori Verber 
Salazar, District Attorney (San Joaquin), as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris, Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, 
Gerald A. Engler and Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorneys 
General, James William Bilderback II, Assistant Attorney General, 
Dana M. Ali, Jaime L. Fuster and Kathy S. Pomerantz, Deputy 
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.  
 
Kent S. Scheidegger and Kymberlee C. Stapleton for Criminal Justice 
Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
 
Mark Zahner, Robert P. Brown, Chief Deputy District Attorney and 
Philip P. Stemler, Deputy District Attorney, for California District 
Attorneys Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
 
Hogan Lovells US, Christopher J. Cox, Gurtej Singh, Rupinder K. 
Garcha, William M. Regan, Allison M. Wuertz, Daniel J. Petrokas and 
Peter W. Bautz for Janet C. Hoeffel, Rory K. Little, Emad H. Atiq and 
James Q. Whitman as Amici Curiae. 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Elias Batchelder 
Deputy State Public Defender 
1111 Broadway, 10th Floor 
Oakland, CA 94607 
(510) 267-3300 
 
John Mills 
Phillips Black, Inc. 
1721 Broadway, Suite 201 
Oakland, CA 94612 
(888) 532-0897 
 
Dana M. Ali 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 S. Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA 90013 
(213) 269-6067