Title: Crocker v. Riverside Brick & Supply Co.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 060469
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 12, 2007

PRESENT: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Lemons, and Agee, 
JJ., and Stephenson, S.J. 
 
PATRICIA CROCKER 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 060469   SENIOR JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR. 
 
 
 
January 12, 2007 
RIVERSIDE BRICK & SUPPLY COMPANY, INC. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
Theodore J. Markow, Judge 
 
 
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the trial court 
erred in ruling that the plaintiff's personal injury action was 
barred pursuant to the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act, Code 
§ 65.2-100, et seq. (the Act). 
I 
 
Patricia M. Crocker filed in the Circuit Court of the City 
of Richmond a motion for judgment against Riverside Brick & 
Supply Company, Inc. (Riverside), alleging that she had 
sustained severe injuries that had been proximately caused by 
the negligence of Riverside's employees.  Riverside filed a plea 
in bar, asserting that the trial court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction because Crocker's claim was barred by Section 65.2-
302 of the Act.  The trial court ruled that Crocker, at the time 
of her injury, was the statutory employee of Riverside and, 
therefore, her sole right and remedy was under the Act.  
Accordingly, the trial court sustained Riverside's plea and 
 
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dismissed the motion for judgment.  We awarded Crocker this 
appeal. 
II 
 
Riverside is in the business of selling masonry materials.  
Riverside purchased from Van Sant Equipment (Van Sant) stone 
that was to be delivered on pallets.  Van Sant hired Jevic, a 
shipping company, to deliver the stone to Riverside.  Crocker 
was employed by Jevic as a tractor-trailer driver. 
 
On November 19, 2002, Crocker drove a tractor-trailer with 
a load of stone to Riverside's facility.  When she arrived at 
Riverside's delivery yard, she was met by Charlie W. Weeks, a 
Riverside employee, and he told her where to park. 
 
Riverside did not have a loading dock, and it was very rare 
for materials to be delivered to Riverside by tractor-trailer.  
On the rare occasion that a delivery was made by tractor-
trailer, the truck driver ordinarily moved the freight to the 
trailer's tailgate using a device called a "pallet jack."  It 
was unusual for a tractor-trailer to arrive without a pallet 
jack, but Crocker did not have one. 
 
Weeks told Crocker that Riverside's employees would remove 
the pallets after they were dragged by a forklift to the 
trailer's tailgate.  From the tailgate, the pallets would be 
 
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lifted off the trailer by another forklift located on the 
ground. ∗ 
 
In order to drag the pallets to the tailgate, each pallet 
needed to be hooked by a strap attached to a forklift.  Weeks 
testified that he told Crocker that she would have to attach the 
strap hook to each pallet because Riverside employees were not 
allowed to go inside the trailer and that Crocker agreed to 
attach the strap.  Weeks, however, also testified that it was 
his responsibility to get the trucks unloaded and that, most of 
the time, he did it himself.  Crocker testified that "the 
company that we deliver to is supposed to unload the freight, 
because [Jevic] said all we're supposed to do is . . . back up 
to the dock, and [Riverside is] supposed to, with a forklift, 
take the pallets off." 
 
Nevertheless, Crocker attached the strap hook to each of 
the pallets in the Jevic trailer.  She would then stand aside as 
Weeks, operating a forklift, dragged each pallet to the tailgate 
so that it could then be lifted off the trailer by another 
forklift, also operated by a Riverside employee. When the next-
to-the-last pallet was to be unloaded, Crocker informed Weeks 
that there was a height change in the trailer's floor that would 
prevent the pallet from readily sliding across the floor, and 
                     
 
∗ If Riverside had had a loading dock, the pallets of stone 
could have been unloaded by a forklift. 
 
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she told Weeks to wait for her to exit the trailer before 
dragging the pallet. 
 
Crocker attached the strap hook to the pallet and 
immediately moved away from it and toward the trailer's 
tailgate.  Weeks, however, did not wait, and, before Crocker 
could exit the trailer, a board broke from the pallet, flew 
through the air, and hit her. 
 
Notwithstanding its judgment, the trial court found that 
"the parties agree that it was the responsibility of Riverside 
employees to remove pallets from the delivery truck. . . .   
Delivering to Riverside[] . . . was the only responsibility of 
Ms. Crocker as an employee of Jevic."  The trial court made no 
finding that any contractual obligation existed for Jevic, 
through its employee Crocker, to assist in unloading the 
trailer. 
III 
 
The Act, in Code § 65.2-307, prohibits an employee from 
maintaining a tort action against his employer for an injury 
sustained during the course of his employment.  An injured 
employee also is precluded from bringing a personal injury 
action against a party, who is not his employer, if that party 
is deemed to be his "statutory employer." 
 
Code § 65.2-302(A) sets forth the test for determining 
whether a party qualifies as a statutory employee as follows: 
 
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When any person (referred to in this section as 
"owner") undertakes to perform or execute any work 
which is a part of his trade, business or occupation 
and contracts with any other person (referred to in 
this section as "subcontractor") for the execution or 
performance by or under such subcontractor of the 
whole or any part of the work undertaken by such 
owner, the owner shall be liable to pay to any worker 
employed in the work any compensation under this title 
which he would have been liable to pay if the worker 
had been immediately employed by him. 
Pursuant to Code § 65.2-307, the rights and remedies under the 
Act "shall exclude all other rights and remedies."  The only 
exception to this exclusivity provision is contained in Code 
§ 65.2-309(A), which permits an injured employee to maintain an 
action against an "other party."  An "other party" is "a 
stranger to the trade, occupation, or business in which the 
employee was engaged when he was injured."  Peck v. Safway Steel 
Products, Inc., 262 Va. 522, 525, 551 S.E.2d 328, 329 (2001). 
 
Riverside contends that Crocker, at the time of her injury,  
was engaged in an essential part of its trade, business, or 
occupation.  The trial court agreed, stating that "[r]emoving 
the product was the responsibility of Riverside, and Ms. 
Crocker's assistance in the removal qualified her as Riverside's 
statutory employee." 
 
We have decided many cases regarding the delivery of 
various materials, and two of these cases have facts that are 
strikingly similar to the facts in the present case.  The more 
recent case is Stevens v. Ford Motor Co., 226 Va. 415, 309 
 
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S.E.2d 319 (1983), and the other is Buffalo Shook Co. v. 
Barksdale, 206 Va. 45, 141 S.E.2d 738 (1965). 
 
In Stevens, the plaintiff was a truck driver employed by a 
freight line company.  The plaintiff was injured while 
delivering automobile parts to a plant operated by Ford Motor 
Company (Ford).  When the plaintiff arrived at the Ford plant, 
he found that Ford's loading dock was not in alignment with the 
truck's bed.  He, therefore, asked a Ford forklift operator to 
raise the dock leveler (a ramp connecting the truck bed to the 
facility's loading dock) by using his forklift so the trailer 
could be unloaded.  Instead of using his forklift, the Ford 
employee directed an unknown man to assist the plaintiff.  While 
the plaintiff and the unknown man were trying to raise the 
leveler by hand, the leveler fell on the plaintiff's foot.  The 
plaintiff received workers' compensation benefits from his 
employer for his injuries.  226 Va. at 417-19, 309 S.E.2d at 
320-22. 
 
The plaintiff then filed a tort action against Ford, which 
Ford contended was barred by the Act.  Id. at 417, 309 S.E.2d at 
320.  We held that the plaintiff was not Ford's statutory 
employee, even though the plaintiff endeavored to assist in the 
unloading, because unloading the freight was the sole 
responsibility of Ford.  The plaintiff was not engaged in Ford's 
trade, business, or occupation and, thus, could maintain the 
 
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action against Ford, who was an "other party."  Id. at 420, 309 
S.E.2d at 322. 
 
In Buffalo Shook Co., the plaintiff was a truck driver 
employed by Glen H. Bolt to deliver a load of lumber to Buffalo 
Shook Company (Buffalo Shook).  Bolt was a sawmill operator, and 
Buffalo Shook was engaged in manufacturing tobacco hogsheads and 
pallets from lumber purchased from Bolt and others.  The 
plaintiff's only duties were to drive the delivery truck and 
loosen chains so the lumber could be unloaded by Buffalo Shook.  
At the request of a Buffalo Shook employee, however, the 
plaintiff assisted with the operation of a forklift used to take 
the lumber from the truck and was injured.  206 Va. at 46-47, 
141 S.E.2d at 740. 
 
The plaintiff received workers' compensation benefits for 
his injuries.  Id. at 47, 141 S.E.2d at 740.  He also filed a 
personal injury action against Buffalo Shook and one of its 
employees (the Defendants).  The Defendants contended that the 
plaintiff was precluded from maintaining the action because 
neither defendant was an "other party" as defined by the Act.  
Id. at 46-47, 141 S.E.2d at 740.  In holding that the plaintiff 
could maintain the action, we said the following: 
Here [the plaintiff] was engaged in the business of 
Bolt, which was the sawmill business.  Bolt sold 
lumber from his sawmill to Buffalo Shook and delivered 
it on the latter's premises on a truck driven by [the 
plaintiff].  It was not a part of the trade, business 
 
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or occupation of Bolt to unload the truck.  When [the 
plaintiff] undertook to help he was not engaging in 
the trade, business or occupation of Bolt and 
defendants did not thereby become engaged in the 
business of Bolt, but were clearly "other parties," 
strangers to the business of Bolt. 
Id. at 48, 141 S.E.2d at 741. 
 
We conclude that Stevens and Buffalo Shook Company are 
virtually indistinguishable from the present case and hold, 
therefore, that Riverside is an "other party" within the meaning 
of the Act.  In the present case, Crocker was not Riverside's 
statutory employee because, even though she endeavored to assist 
in unloading the pallets of stone, the unloading of the freight 
was the sole responsibility of Riverside.  Crocker was engaged 
only in the business of Jevic, which was under no duty or 
obligation to Riverside to unload the trailer, and therefore was 
not engaged in the trade or business of Riverside.  Accordingly, 
Crocker is not precluded by the Act from maintaining her tort 
action against Riverside. 
IV 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's judgment will 
be reversed, and the case will be remanded for further 
proceedings. 
Reversed and remanded.