Title: Kenneth Ness and Susan Ness v. Digital Dial Communications, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1996AP003436
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 7, 1999

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-3436 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
Kenneth Ness and Susan Ness, Alan Knight, d/b/a 
Knight Land Surveying, Debra D. Honore and 
Patrick C. O'Donnell,  
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
Douglas F. Mann, as receiver for Digital Dial 
Communications, Inc.,  
 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
Digital Dial Communications, Inc.,  
 
Defendant, 
U.S. Billing, Inc., and Zero Plus Dialing, Inc.,  
 
Garnishees-Defendants-Respondents-
 
Petitioners.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISON OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  222 Wis. 2d 374, 588 N.W.2d 63 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1998-Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 7, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
May 27, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Racine 
 
JUDGE: 
Stephen A. Simanek 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: Steinmetz, J., did not participate. 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the garnishees-defendants-respondents-
petitioners there were briefs by Thomas L. Shriner, Jr., Douglas 
M. Hagerman, G. Michael Halfenger and Foley & Lardner, Milwaukee 
and oral argument by Thomas L. Shriner, Jr. 
 
 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants was a brief by 
David L. DeBruin, Douglas P. Dehler and Michael Best & Friedrich, 
LLP, Milwaukee and oral argument by David L. DeBruin. 
 
 
For the appellant there was a brief by Terry E. 
Johnson and Peterson, Johnson, Murray, S.C., Milwaukee and oral 
argument by Terry E. Johnson. 
 
No. 96-3436 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-3436 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Kenneth Ness and Susan Ness, Alan Knight,  
d/b/a Knight Land Surveying, Debra D.  
Honore and Patrick C. O'Donnell,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
Douglas F. Mann, as receiver for Digital  
Dial Communications, Inc.,  
 
          Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Digital Dial Communications, Inc.,  
 
          Defendant, 
 
U.S. Billing, Inc., and Zero Plus  
Dialing, Inc.,  
 
          Garnishees-Defendants- 
          Respondents-Petitioners.  
FILED 
 
JUL 7, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   Petitioners, U.S. Billing, 
Inc. and Zero Plus Dialing, Inc., seek review of a published 
court of appeals decision, Ness v. Digital Dial Communications, 
Inc., 222 Wis. 2d 374, 588 N.W.2d 63 (Ct. App. 1998), which 
reversed a Racine County Circuit Court order.  In that order, 
the circuit court granted a motion to vacate a default judgment 
against U.S. Billing, Inc. and Zero Plus Dialing, Inc. as 
garnishee defendants.  The court of appeals reversed, holding 
No. 96-3436 
 
2 
that according to Wis. Stat. § 801.14(1) (1995-96),1 an amended 
garnishment summons and complaint that was filed but not served 
on a defaulting party does not create a new twenty-day window 
for the defaulting party to answer the amended complaint.2  See 
Ness, 222 Wis. 2d at 376.  We affirm the court of appeals.  A 
defaulting party cannot answer an amended complaint, thereby 
attempting to cure its default, when the party is already in 
default at the time the amended complaint is filed.3  This 
decision is in harmony with our decision in Holman v. Family 
Health Plan, No. 97-1490-FT, op. at 2 (S. Ct. 1999), which held 
that the default judgment in that case was a nullity.4  
I. 
¶2 
The facts of this case are as follows.  The plaintiffs 
are residents of Wisconsin, and representatives of a certified 
                     
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1995-96 text unless otherwise noted.   
2 See Wis. Stat. § 812.11.  According to the 1995-96 
Wisconsin Statutes, a defendant also had twenty days to serve an 
answer to a complaint in an ordinary civil action.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 802.06(1).  We note, however, that this subsection was 
amended to allow 45 days for filing.  See 1997 Wis. Act 187, 
§§ 16, 22(1). 
3 This holding does not apply to amended complaints that 
present new or additional claims for relief, which under Wis. 
Stat. § 801.14(1) must be served on every party, including a 
party already in default.  
4 In contrast to this case, where the default occurred 
before the amended complaint was filed, the default judgment in 
Holman was void because the plaintiff there filed the amended 
complaint before the defendant defaulted, and therefore, the 
amended complaint superseded the original complaint.  See Holman 
v. Family Health Plan, No. 97-1490-FT, op. at 3 (S. Ct. 1999).  
No. 96-3436 
 
3 
class that sued the defendant, Digital Dial Communications, Inc. 
(Digital Dial) for “slamming”the unauthorized changing of 
consumers’ long distance carrier.  Plaintiffs obtained a $1 
million default judgment against Digital Dial.  The circuit 
court determined that Digital Dial was on the brink of 
insolvency and appointed a receiver, Douglas Mann for Digital 
Dial, to recover moneys that other entities owed Digital Dial.  
The receiver initiated garnishment actions against those who 
owed money to Digital Dial.  U.S. Billing, Inc., (U.S. Billing) 
and Zero Plus Dialing, Inc., (Zero Plus) were among those 
entities.   
¶3 
U.S.  Billing and Zero Plus are two businesses 
employed by Digital Dial to collect long distance fees that 
customers send to their local phone service carrier.  The two 
corporations are related:  both corporations are subsidiaries of 
U.S. Long Distance Corp., and the in-house counsel for both 
corporations is the same person.  On April 19, 1996, the circuit 
court issued an injunction which required U.S. Billing and Zero 
Plus to turn over to Mann all of Digital Dial’s assets within 
their possession or under their control. 
¶4 
Because Zero Plus and U.S. Billing were unclear about 
the court order, Racine County Circuit Court Judge Emily Mueller 
sent out a clarification, a Supplemental Order Regarding 
Appointment of a Receiver, describing in greater detail the 
extent to which Zero Plus and U.S. Billing needed to comply with 
the court order.  On July 1, 1996, the in-house counsel for both 
corporations sent a letter to the receiver, stating that both 
No. 96-3436 
 
4 
entities would comply.  However, a dispute remained as to 
whether moneys collected outside the state of Wisconsin were 
under the jurisdiction of the court.  On July 11, 1996, the in-
house counsel for both U.S. Billing and Zero Plus wrote to the 
receiver and disputed the receiver’s claim that non-Wisconsin 
funds were subject to garnishment by a Wisconsin court.  The in-
house counsel for the garnishees held his position that his 
clients were responsible for a total of $9,449.18, only those 
moneys collected from Wisconsin consumers. 
¶5 
On June 27, 1996, the receiver filed a garnishment 
action against these two businesses, the garnishees.  Zero Plus 
was served with the garnishment summons and the complaint 
through its registered agent in Wisconsin on July 1, 1996, and 
its in-house counsel was served on July 8, 1996. U.S. Billing is 
a Texas-based corporation, but rather than sending the summons 
and complaint to that corporation, Mann mistakenly sent them to 
a Wisconsin-based corporation also named U.S. Billing, Inc., on 
July 1, 1996.  The Wisconsin-based U.S. Billing, Inc., promptly 
answered the complaint, disavowing any relationship to the 
events outlined in the complaint.  The receiver, recognizing his 
error, sent the summons and complaint to the correct U.S. 
Billing on July 8, 1996, and through a registered agent in 
Texas, personally served U.S. Billing’s in-house counsel on July 
16, 1996.  
¶6 
Neither Zero Plus nor the Texas-based U.S Billing 
answered the complaint.  On July 22, 1996, Zero Plus defaulted. 
 On July 29, 1996, the Texas-based U.S. Billing defaulted. 
No. 96-3436 
 
5 
¶7 
The receiver sent out a letter on August 19, 1996, to 
Zero Plus and U.S. Billing’s in-house counsel, letting counsel 
know that the court order included all moneys, not just those 
collected from Wisconsin consumers. 
¶8 
On August 27, 1996, the receiver amended the caption 
of the complaint, correctly naming "U.S. Billing, a Texas 
Corporation" as the garnishee rather than the Wisconsin-based 
corporation that was originally on the complaint, so that the 
judgment 
docket 
would 
correctly 
identify 
the 
accurate 
corporation.  The amended complaint also named Zero Plus as a 
garnishee.  This amended complaint was not sent to U.S. Billing, 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 801.14(1). 
¶9 
On August 28, 1996, the receiver moved for a $1 
million default judgment against Zero Plus and the Texas-based 
U.S. Billing.  This motion for default judgment was for failure 
to answer the original garnishment complaint, though the amended 
complaint’s caption was on the notice of motion.  
¶10 On September 11, 1996, the motion to grant default 
judgment was heard.  The garnishees filed an affidavit stating 
that the two corporations did not answer the complaint because 
they did hold certain of Digital Dial’s assets.  The garnishees 
did not assert any defense to the plaintiff’s garnishment 
action.  They also objected to the plaintiff’s attempted 
garnishment of funds generated outside the state of Wisconsin, 
questioning both the jurisdiction of the court and the powers of 
the receiver.  The circuit court found these reasons to be 
No. 96-3436 
 
6 
inapplicable and granted a default judgment against U.S. Billing 
and Zero Plus.  
¶11 On September 16, 1996, U.S. Billing and Zero Plus 
filed a motion to vacate the default judgment.  The garnishees 
filed a proposed answer to the original complaint, stating that 
$9,449.18 was the only amount at issue, that amount collected 
from Wisconsin consumers.  The hearing on the motion to vacate 
was held October 11, 1996.  The garnishees argued excusable 
neglect, but the circuit court disagreed, finding that the 
proposed answer failed to meet the criteria for a garnishment 
under Wis. Stat. § 812.11(1), and held that the default judgment 
would not be vacated.  
¶12 The garnishees filed a second motion to vacate the 
default judgment on October 31, 1996, again including a proposed 
answer.  The second motion to vacate the default judgment was 
heard on November 18, 1996.  Though the garnishees raised 
alternative grounds for vacating the default judgment, the judge 
vacated the judgment solely on the ground that the original 
complaint on which the default judgment was based was superseded 
by the amended complaint filed on August 27, 1996.  Because the 
garnishees had filed their proposed answer within 20 days of the 
amended complaint, they argued that the answer was timely and 
they were not in default.  This time, the circuit court agreed 
and vacated the judgment. 
¶13 The court of appeals reversed the circuit court’s 
decision.  Ness, 222 Wis. 2d at 376.  It held that Wis. Stat. § 
801.14 provides an exception to the service requirement.  Id. at 
No. 96-3436 
 
7 
380.  The statute says, in part, “No service need be made on 
parties in default for failure to appear . . . .”  Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.14(1). The court of appeals stated that “an amended 
pleading that does not present any additional claims for relief 
against a defaulting party relates back to the time the original 
complaint was filed; therefore, it does not create another 
twenty-day response period for an answer.” Id. at 383. 
¶14 This court granted the garnishees’ petition for review 
on January 12, 1999. 
II. 
¶15 Circuit courts have discretion in deciding whether to 
grant a motion to vacate a default judgment.  Marotz v. Marotz, 
80 Wis. 2d 477, 483, 259 N.W.2d 524 (1977).  A circuit court's 
discretionary decision is reviewed under an erroneous exercise 
of discretion standard.  See id.5  A reviewing court will uphold 
a discretionary decision if the circuit court considered the 
relevant facts, properly interpreted and applied the law, and 
reached a reasonable determination.  Hartung v. Hartung, 102 
Wis. 2d 58, 66, 306 N.W.2d 16 (1981).  The issue presented in 
this case is one of statutory construction, a question of law 
which we review de novo.  J.L. Phillips & Assocs., Inc. v. E&H 
Plastic Corp., 217 Wis. 2d 348, 354, 577 N.W.2d 13 (1998). 
                     
5 This 
court, 
in 
City 
of 
Brookfield 
v. 
Milwaukee 
Metropolitan Sewerage District, 171 Wis. 2d 400, 423, 491 N.W.2d 
484 (1992), changed the abuse of discretion standard to an 
erroneous exercise of discretion standard.  The two standards 
are to be treated as the same.  See id.  
No. 96-3436 
 
8 
¶16 We conclude that a defaulting party cannot answer an 
amended complaint, thereby attempting to cure its default, when 
the party is already in default at the time the amended 
complaint is filed.6  Our decision recognizes an exception to the 
basic rule that an amended complaint supersedes an original 
complaint. See J.F. Ahern Co. v. Building Comm'n, 114 Wis. 2d 
69, 79, 336 N.W.2d 679 (Ct. App. 1983).  
¶17 This exception is premised first on a plain reading of 
Wis. Stat. § 801.14.  In particular, § 801.14(1)7 requires most 
documents related to a case, unless otherwise ordered by the 
                     
6 The court of appeals expressed its holding by stating that 
"the filing of an amended garnishment complaint that does not 
require service when it does not present any additional claims 
for relief against a defaulting party relates back to the time 
the original complaint is filed."  Ness v. Digital Dial 
Communications, Inc., 222 Wis. 2d 374, 376, 588 N.W.2d 63 (Ct. 
App. 1998).  While we decline to use the phrase "relates back" 
in our holding, we interpret this phrase to mean simply that the 
twenty-day window for a garnishee defendant to answer starts on 
the day the original complaint is filed.  This phrase does not 
suggest that the court of appeals based its reasoning on Wis. 
Stat. § 802.09(3), the "relation back doctrine," which refers to 
statutes of limitation. 
7 Wis. Stat. § 801.14(1) provides: 
Every order required by its terms to be served, every 
pleading unless the court otherwise orders because of 
numerous defendants, every paper relating to discovery 
required to be served upon a party unless the court 
otherwise orders, every written motion other than one 
which may be heard ex parte, and every written notice, 
appearance, demand, offer of judgment, undertaking, 
and similar paper shall be served upon each of the 
parties.  No service need be made on parties in 
default for failure to appear except that pleadings 
asserting new or additional claims for relief against 
them shall be served upon them in the manner provided 
for service of summons in s. 801.11.   
No. 96-3436 
 
9 
court or specified in this section, to be served on every party. 
 Moreover, § 801.14(4) states that any document that must be 
served must also be filed with the circuit court, thereby 
certifying that all parties required to be served have been 
timely served with the document.  Yet, § 801.14(1) expressly 
permits a plaintiff to forego service of pleadings on parties 
already in default, unless the pleading asserts some new or 
additional claim for relief.  Because no service need be made on 
defaulting parties, see § 801.14(1), an amended complaint does 
not supersede the original complaint with regard to any party in 
default at the time the amended complaint is filed.     
¶18 Our analysis centers on the role service plays in the 
course of an action.  A civil action seeking a personal judgment 
is commenced upon the filing of a summons and a complaint with 
the circuit court; additionally, a defendant must be served with 
an authenticated copy of the summons and complaint within 60 
days of the filing.  Wis. Stat. § 801.02(1);8  Schlumpf v. 
Yellick, 94 Wis. 2d 504, 507, 288 N.W.2d 834 (1980).  As such, 
both filing and service are necessary to properly commence an 
action.  Wisconsin Stat. § 801.14(1) similarly demands that an 
amended complaint be both filed and served on all partiesexcept 
a defaulting party.  The purpose of service of summons or 
process is to provide adequate notice to a party of the 
commencement of an action against it, fulfilling a party's right 
                     
8 We note that this subsection was amended to allow 90 days 
for filing.  See 1997 Wis. Act 187, §§ 7, 22(1).  
No. 96-3436 
 
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to constitutional due process of law, as well as to confer 
personal jurisdiction on the court over the person served.  See 
Varnes v. Local 91, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n of U.S. & Canada, 
674 F.2d 1365, 1368 (11th Cir. 1982);9 Bell v. Employers Mut. 
Cas. Co., 198 Wis. 2d 347, 362, 541 N.W.2d 824 (Ct. App. 1995); 
2 Callaghan's Wisconsin Pleading and Practice § 14.01 (1996). 
 
¶19 A party in default for failing to answer forfeits its 
due process right to notice of further pleadings.  See Appleton 
Elec. Co. v. Graves Truck Line, Inc., 635 F.2d 603, 610 (7th 
Cir. 1980).  Since a defaulting party has through inaction lost 
its right to notice of further pleadings, a plaintiff, according 
to Wis. Stat. § 801.14(1), is not required to serve the 
defaulting party with an amended complaint.  Similarly, a 
defaulting party loses the right to answer the amended complaint 
and revive its defense.  Essentially, in those circumstances, 
the defaulting party halts the action at the point in time of 
the original complaint.  The amended complaint therefore 
supersedes the original as to any other party except the 
defaulting party.  Because the amended complaint does not 
supersede the original complaint with regard to the defaulting 
party, the defaulting party does not receive a new window in 
which to file an answer to the amended complaint. 
                     
9 This court may examine analogous federal rules and case 
law to guide its interpretation of the Wisconsin Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  See Schauer v. DeNeveu Homeowner's Ass'n, 194 
Wis. 2d 62, 73, 533 N.W.2d 470 (1995).  
No. 96-3436 
 
11
¶20 The 
petitioners 
propose a 
bright-line 
rule 
that 
whenever a plaintiff files an amended complaint, regardless of 
the defendant's timing, the defendant receives a new time period 
to answer.  Pet. Brief at 45-53.  The petitioners claim that 
other states have adopted their proposed approach.  See Reichert 
v. TRW, Inc., 611 A.2d 1191 (Pa. 1992); Grieco v. Perry, 697 
A.2d 1108 (R.I. 1997); Caprock Constr. Co. v. Guaranteed 
Floorcovering, Inc., 950 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997); Harris 
v. Shoults, 877 S.W.2d 854 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994).  However, we do 
not find the reasoning of the other states' courts persuasive 
under the circumstances presented here.   
¶21 Petitioners 
first 
cite 
Reichert, 
in 
which 
the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that by not first serving the 
amended complaint, the plaintiffs could not obtain default 
judgment against the defendant.  See Reichert, 611 A.2d at 1193-
94.  However, in that case, the amended complaint made 
substantially 
new 
claims 
for 
relief, 
and 
as 
such, 
the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court required the plaintiff to serve the 
defendant with an amended complaint prior to taking default 
judgment.  See id. at 1193.   
¶22 Wisconsin Stat. § 801.14(1) also requires a plaintiff 
to serve even a defaulting defendant with an amended complaint 
when the amended complaint contains "new or additional claims 
for relief."  However, that provision does not apply to this 
case because the amended complaint did not present new or 
additional claims.  Here, the amended complaint was merely a 
No. 96-3436 
 
12
technical change.10  See Hoesley v. La Crosse VFW Chapter, 46 
Wis. 2d 501, 502, 175 N.W.2d 214 (1970).  Reichert does not 
persuade us to adopt the petitioner's bright-line rule since 
Reichert specifically relates to a claim which under § 801.14(1) 
would also require service.   
¶23 The two Texas cases petitioners cite, Harris and 
Caprock, never explicitly addressed the issue of whether an 
amended complaint can provide a new time period within which to 
answer for a party that is in default when the amended complaint 
is filed.  Instead, both cases focused on the relationship 
between a defendant's failure to answer an amended complaint, 
which had never been served on the defendant, and what the 
defendant has admitted in regard to the complaint upon which the 
default judgment is based.  See Caprock, 950 S.W.2d at 205; 
Harris, 877 S.W.2d at 855.  Neither case specifies whether the 
parties were in default at the time the amended complaints were 
filed.  As such, those cases are not persuasive under the 
circumstances presented here.  These two cases do, however, 
support the decision of this court in Holman.  See Holman, op. 
at 2. 
¶24 Finally, we do not find Grieco persuasive.  In Grieco, 
the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint, but did not 
                     
10 As we stated earlier, Zero Plus and U.S. Billing are 
subsidiaries of U.S. Long Distance Corp. and have the same in-
house counsel.  At the outset, Zero Plus was served correctly.  
Because of the relationship between Zero Plus and U.S. Billing, 
as far as these parties are concerned, the amended complaint is 
to be viewed as a technical change.   
No. 96-3436 
 
13
serve one of the defendants with it.  Grieco, 697 A.2d at 1108. 
 The second amended complaint made only a minor name change.  
Id.  The court held the second amended complaint superseded the 
first, and the defendant was not in default.  Id. at 1109.  It 
is difficult to draw any parallel between Grieco and this case, 
however, because Grieco does not state whether the defendant was 
in default when the second amended complaint was filed. 
Therefore, nothing in Grieco persuades us that it is analogous 
to the fact situation here. 
 
 
¶25 The exception recognized today is also premised on 
fundamental 
underlying 
principles 
of 
civil 
procedure.  
Petitioners have requested this court to create a rule whereby a 
defaulting party could cure its default by answering an amended 
complaint within a certain period of its filing.  We agree with 
the court of appeals that such a rule would mean that "[t]he 
defaulting 
party 
[who] 
has 
previously 
disregarded 
its 
opportunity for defending itself or presenting additional issues 
or claims in the action . . . is fortuitously allowed to 
'restart the clock' for filing a response."  Ness, 222 Wis. 2d 
at 382-83.  The rule proposed by the petitioners runs contrary 
to our long-standing preference, as reflected by Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.14, for parties who have met their burden and are in good 
standing, over those who have failed to meet their burden and 
are in default.  By adopting the petitioner's rule, we would, in 
fact, punish the party in good standing by being lenient with 
the defaulting party.    
No. 96-3436 
 
14
¶26 Moreover, Wis. Stat. § 802.09(1) creates a liberal 
amendment policy for plaintiffs:  a party has the right to amend 
within six months, and after that period "leave [to amend] shall 
be freely given at any stage of the action when justice so 
requires."  The petitioner's proposed rule would also hinder a 
plaintiff's ability to liberally amend because by amending the 
plaintiff would give the defendant a way to cure its default.  
This undoubtedly would pose a serious conflict for a plaintiff 
who would be torn between taking a default judgment and 
correcting the pleadings through amendment.  Finally, the 
petitioners' proposal most certainly would result in inefficient 
judicial administration.  See, e.g., Reichert, 611 A.2d at 1194. 
 For these reasons, we also decline to adopt the petitioners' 
proposed rule. 
¶27 At the court of appeals, "[a]ll parties agree[d] that 
§ 801.14, Stats., exempted Mann from serving the defaulting 
defendants with the amended garnishment complaint."  Ness, 222 
Wis. 2d at 382.  To reiterate, the defendants were in default 
when the plaintiffs filed the amended complaint since they had 
not answered the original complaint within twenty days.  Once 
the defendants defaulted, they lost their ability to answer the 
amended complaint because the amended complaint did not assert 
new 
or 
additional 
claims 
for 
relief. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 801.14(1). 
¶28 Our holding is consistent with our decision in Holman, 
in which we stated that the default judgment in that case was a 
nullity.  Holman, op. at 2.  In Holman we acknowledged that an 
No. 96-3436 
 
15
amended complaint supersedes an original complaint when the 
plaintiff files the amended complaint in the circuit court 
before the defendant defaults.  Id. at 5-6.  To summarize 
Holman's facts:  the plaintiffs filed a complaint in the circuit 
court and served the complaint on both defendants.  Id. at 3.  
Six days later, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, but 
this time they failed to serve the amended complaint on one of 
the defendants, Family Health Plan.  Id.  When Family Health 
Plan did not answer the original complaint within the statutory 
period, the plaintiffs moved for default judgment.  Id.  The 
circuit court entered default judgment against Family Health 
Plan, who then moved for relief from the default judgment.  Id. 
at 3-4.  At that point, Family Health Plan also filed an answer 
to the original complaint; however, the circuit court denied 
relief.  Id. at 4.  The court of appeals affirmed the circuit 
court's judgment.  Id.   
¶29 This court reversed the court of appeals' decision, 
noting 
that 
an 
amended 
complaint 
supersedes 
an 
original 
complaint at the time of filing, under the circumstances of that 
case.  Id. at 6.  Since the amended complaint was filed before 
the first statutory period to answer ended, even though Family 
Health Plan was not served with the amended complaint, a new 
period to answer began the day the amended complaint was filed. 
 See id. at 9.      
¶30 The facts in Ness present the converse of Holman:  in 
Ness the amended complaint was filed after the garnishee 
defendants defaulted, while in Holman the amended complaint was 
No. 96-3436 
 
16
filed before the defendants defaulted.  The timing of the 
default is the key to these two cases.  When a defendant 
defaults before an amended complaint is filed, the defendant 
loses the right to cure its default by answering the amended 
complaint.  When an amended complaint is filed before a 
defendant defaults on the original complaint, the defendant 
receives an extension on its time to answer. 
III.  
¶31 We hold that a defaulting party cannot answer an 
amended complaint, thereby attempting to cure its default, when 
the party is already in default at the time the amended 
complaint is filed, unless the amended complaint relates to a 
new or additional claim for relief. 
 Accordingly, we affirm 
the decision of the court of appeals. 
 
¶32 By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
¶33 DONALD W. STEINMETZ, J. did not participate. 
 
No. 96-3436 
 
1