Title: Oregon v. Ward
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S066598
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: October 29, 2020

188	
October 29, 2020	
No. 40
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
MICUS DUANE WARD,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC C132352CR) (CA A163157) (SC S066598)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted March 9, 2020.
Bear Wilner-Nugent, Bear Wilner-Nugent Counselor & 
Attorney at Law LLC, Portland, argued the cause and filed 
the briefs for petitioner on review.
Patrick M. Ebbett, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, 
argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review. 
Also on the brief were Ellen Rosenblum, Attorney General, 
and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
Rosalind M. Lee, Rosalind Manson Lee LLC, Eugene, filed 
the brief for amici curiae Oregon Criminal Defense Lawyer’s 
Association and Oregon Justice Resource Center.	
FLYNN, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The 
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is 
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
Balmer, J., dissented and filed an opinion.
______________
	
*  Appeal from Washington County Circuit Court, Rick Knapp, Judge. 295 Or 
App 636, 437 P3d 298, rev allowed, 365 Or 556 (2019).
Cite as 367 Or 188 (2020)	
189
Case Summary: Defendant was indicted for aggravated and felony murder 
and moved to suppress statements made during two custodial interrogations as 
obtained in violation of his rights against self-incrimination under Article I, sec-
tion 12, of the Oregon Constitution. The trial court found that officers conducting 
the first interrogation violated defendant’s rights by continuing to question him 
after he unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent but that officers con-
ducting the second interrogation obtained a valid waiver of defendant’s rights 
under the circumstances. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: (1) an appellate 
court reviews the question of whether a waiver of Article I, section 12, rights 
against self-incrimination is knowing and intelligent, as it does the question of 
whether the waiver was voluntary, as ultimately a matter of law; (2) the state 
failed to meet its burden to prove that it obtained defendant’s knowing, intelli-
gent, and voluntary waiver before the second interrogation under the totality of 
the circumstances—including the initial violation of defendant’s right to remain 
silent, the lack of a complete record of the interrogation that followed that vio-
lation, and the fact that defendant remained incarcerated following the viola-
tion for four days without being provided counsel; and (3) the trial court’s error 
in admitting the statements from the second interrogation requires reversal of 
defendant’s conviction.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The judgment of the cir-
cuit court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further 
proceedings.
190	
State v. Ward
	
FLYNN, J.
	
Defendant was convicted of aggravated and felony 
murder. After being arrested for that crime, and before 
being appointed counsel, defendant was twice interrogated 
while in custody. The trial court suppressed the statements 
that defendant made during the first interrogation, because 
the court determined that officers conducting that interro-
gation continued to question defendant after he invoked his 
right to remain silent, in violation of defendant’s Article I, 
section 12, rights against self-incrimination. But the trial 
court refused to suppress defendant’s statements from the 
second interrogation, because it determined that the officers 
who conducted that interrogation obtained a valid waiver 
of defendant’s Article I, section 12, rights. The trial court 
thus suppressed statements that defendant made during 
the first interrogation but not those he made during the sec-
ond interrogation. A jury found defendant guilty, and he was 
sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.
	
On review, taking into account the totality of the 
circumstances, we conclude that the state failed to prove 
that defendant validly waived his rights before the second 
interrogation. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court 
erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress, and we 
further conclude that the error requires a reversal of defen-
dant’s conviction and a remand for a new trial.1
I.  INTRODUCTION TO ARTICLE I, SECTION 12
	
Before describing the relevant facts, we describe the 
basic constitutional principles that frame the dispute in this 
case. Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution pro-
vides that “[n]o person shall * 
* 
* be compelled in any crimi-
nal prosecution to testify against himself.” Or Const, Art I, 
§ 12.2 That constitutional provision guarantees a right to 
	
1  We also allowed review to consider whether the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution prohibit a trial court from impos-
ing life without the possibility of parole on a person with intellectual disabili-
ties. Because we remand for a new trial, we do not reach defendant’s sentencing 
argument.
	
2  The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution is similar. It spec-
ifies that “[n]o person shall * 
* 
* be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself.” US Const, Amend V. Defendant does not separately challenge 
the validity of his waiver under that federal provision.
Cite as 367 Or 188 (2020)	
191
remain silent and a “derivative or adjunct right to have the 
advice of counsel in responding to police questioning.” State 
v. Turnidge, 359 Or 364, 399, 374 P3d 853 (2016). As part of 
the constitutional guarantee, if a person in custody or other 
similarly compelling circumstances unequivocally invokes 
one of the rights guaranteed by Article I, section 12, rights, 
then “police must honor that request and stop questioning.” 
State v. McAnulty, 356 Or 432, 455, 338 P3d 653 (2014) (cit-
ing State v. Davis, 350 Or 440, 459, 256 P3d 1075 (2011) 
(“[I]f there is a right to remain silent that is guaranteed 
by Article I, section 12, it is a right to insist that the police 
refrain from interrogation after a person who is in custody 
or otherwise in compelling circumstances has invoked the 
right to remain silent.”)).
	
Even a person who has initially invoked those rights 
may later waive them, but the state bears the burden of prov-
ing a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver “under the 
totality of the circumstances.” State v. Nichols, 361 Or 101, 
107, 390 P3d 1001 (2017). In addition to the general “totality 
of the circumstances” inquiry, to ensure that any waiver is 
knowing as well as voluntary, officers must provide a person 
with the so-called Miranda warnings—that the person “has 
a right to remain silent and to consult with counsel and that 
any statements that the person makes may be used against 
the person in a criminal prosecution.”3 State v. Vondehn, 
348 Or 462, 474, 236 P3d 691 (2010). Those warnings are 
required for a valid waiver in part “[b]ecause a custodial 
interrogation is inherently compelling.” Id.
II.  FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
	
With that legal overview as a guide, we describe the 
pertinent facts in a manner consistent with our obligation 
to accept “ 
‘the trial court’s findings of historical fact if evi-
dence in the record supports them.’ 
” See McAnulty, 356 Or 
at 449 (quoting State v. James, 339 Or 476, 481, 123 P3d 251 
(2005)).
	
3  Oregon’s Miranda warnings are named for the decision of the United States 
Supreme Court, which requires the same warnings under the Fifth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution. Vondehn, 348 Or at 470. On an independent 
state-law basis, this court has required the same warnings “to effectuate the 
protections afforded by Article I, section 12.” Id.
192	
State v. Ward
	
The murder victim was the great-grandmother of 
defendant’s cousin, Joda Cain, who lived with the victim 
in Washington County. Before the murder, Cain had pur-
chased a plane ticket for defendant to fly from his home in 
Kansas City to Portland. Defendant, who was 19 at the time 
and has intellectual disabilities, boarded the plane without 
identification by falsely claiming to be a minor.4 Cain and a 
friend picked defendant up from the airport and took him to 
the victim’s home.
	
The friend fell asleep at the home around midnight 
and awoke to hear the victim screaming. He heard defen-
dant demanding money and heard Cain say, “Just do it.” The 
friend then heard sounds of someone being attacked, and he 
fled the house. The next morning, police found the victim’s 
body in her bedroom. She had been beaten to death with a 
small sledgehammer that police found at the scene. A trail 
of blood led from the victim’s bedroom to the garage, and her 
car was missing.
	
The same morning, a state trooper spotted the vic-
tim’s car weaving erratically on the interstate in eastern 
Oregon. Cain was driving, and defendant was a passen-
ger. After a high-speed chase, police forced the car to stop 
and arrested Cain. Defendant ran away but was quickly 
arrested, too. Evidence in the car and blood on defendant’s 
clothes tied defendant to the murder.
	
An officer read defendant his Miranda warnings 
at the scene and then took him to the Union County Jail, 
where defendant was again given Miranda warnings and 
then interrogated. When one of the officers asked if defen-
dant was “going to visit with us here today at all?” defendant 
gave a negative response that the officer acknowledged by 
asking, “No?”5 But the officers then repeated Miranda warn-
ings and continued the interrogation by telling defendant 
that Cain had decided to “be honest.” They told defendant 
	
4  Messages offered at trial indicate that defendant did so at the direction of 
Cain, but the reason for defendant’s deception is not relevant to our analysis. 
	
5  The trial court explained that it could not determine from the interrogation 
video whether defendant responded by shaking his head to indicate “no” or ver-
bally indicated that he did not want to talk, but the court found that the officer’s 
“no” was verbalizing a negative response by defendant.
Cite as 367 Or 188 (2020)	
193
that Cain had described the murder and car theft as entirely 
defendant’s responsibility and encouraged defendant to give 
his “version of events.” As described in defendant’s brief, he 
“largely maintained his silence,” but made at least some 
statements that the trial court suppressed.
	
After the interrogation, defendant was held at the 
Union County jail for four days, until two detectives from 
Washington County arrived. Before driving defendant back 
to Washington County, the detectives read Miranda warn-
ings to him, and defendant responded “yes” when asked if he 
understood those rights. During the four- to five-hour drive 
to Washington County, the detectives did not talk to defen-
dant about the case. But upon arriving at the Washington 
County Sheriff’s Office, the detectives took defendant into a 
“soft” interview room, meaning it was furnished more like a 
living room than a typical jail interview room.
	
At that point, without repeating Miranda warnings 
or asking defendant whether he wanted to waive his rights, 
the detectives began questioning defendant. Defendant 
answered questions without repeating his earlier assertion 
that he did not want to talk. The detectives made no threats 
or promises and described the tone of the interview as a 
“very relaxed conversation.” Defendant’s ability to commu-
nicate did not appear to the detectives “to be impaired by 
any sort of substance or mental problems,” and his answers 
appeared to “make sense in a contextual fashion.” In 
response to the questions, defendant denied knowing any-
thing about the murder, denied ever being in the victim’s 
bedroom, and denied having her blood on his clothing. He 
told the officers that Cain had woken him late at night ask-
ing if he wanted to go for a ride, and, when asked why he 
had run after police stopped the car, defendant answered 
that he was afraid he would go to jail for lying about his age 
when he flew to Portland.
	
Defendant was eventually indicted for two counts 
of aggravated murder and two counts of felony murder. 
Before defendant filed the pretrial motion to suppress that 
is at issue on review, the trial court conducted two other 
proceedings that are pertinent to defendant’s arguments 
on review. In the first, the court found that defendant was 
194	
State v. Ward
unfit to proceed with trial as a result of his intellectual dis-
ability and committed him to the Oregon State Hospital for 
treatment. The court based that finding on the report from a 
court-ordered psychological evaluation in which the author, 
Dr. Stover, concluded that defendant had a “mild” intellec-
tual disability that made him unable to aid and assist his 
attorney or meaningfully participate in his defense at that 
time.
	
Nine months later, the trial court held another 
hearing and determined that defendant had the capacity to 
stand trial. The court based that decision on a later report 
from Dr. Stover, who had concluded that defendant “gained 
trial competency” through education about the legal process, 
although he recommended accommodations so that defen-
dant would better understand his attorneys’ legal advice. 
During the same hearing, the prosecutor confirmed that the 
state would not be seeking the death penalty because it con-
ceded that defendant “does, in fact, suffer from an intellec-
tual disability” that would make it constitutionally imper-
missible to impose that penalty, under the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 US 304, 
122 S Ct 2242, 153 L Ed 2d 335 (2002).
	
After the ruling that the case would proceed toward 
trial, defendant moved to suppress the statements that he 
had made to the officers during the first interrogation in 
Union County and the second interrogation in Washington 
County. The trial court agreed with defendant that the offi-
cers had violated defendant’s rights during the first inter-
rogation by continuing to question him after he made an 
unequivocal invocation of his right to remain silent. But 
the court determined that defendant’s statements from 
the second interrogation, four days later, were admissible. 
The court reasoned that defendant’s earlier invocation of 
his right to remain silent did not preclude the Washington 
County interrogation because a “reasonable period of time” 
had passed and the interrogation was conducted by new 
officers who provided new Miranda warnings before inter-
viewing defendant in a “soft room.” The court emphasized 
that the officers had made “no threats or promises” and that 
“there was nothing to indicate” to the officers “that there 
was anything mentally or emotionally upsetting” defendant.
Cite as 367 Or 188 (2020)	
195
	
At trial, the state introduced defendant’s statements 
from the second interview and argued that the statements 
were “provable lies” and, thus, evidence of defendant’s “con-
sciousness of guilt.” The jury found defendant guilty of both 
aggravated murder and felony murder, and the court sen-
tenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole.
	
Defendant appealed and challenged multiple trial 
court rulings, including the court’s denial of defendant’s 
motion to suppress the statements from his second interro-
gation. Defendant argued that the state failed to meet its 
burden to prove that the second interrogation was supported 
by defendant’s valid waiver of his rights under the circum-
stances of this case. He pointed to the earlier violation of 
his right to remain silent when the Union County offices 
ignored his invocation of that right, to the fact that he was 
held in custody for days without an opportunity to obtain 
legal advice (because appointment of counsel was delayed 
until after his arraignment upon arriving in Washington 
County), and to the fact that the renewed advice of rights 
was separated in time and distance from the interrogation 
in Washington County. Finally, he argued that the court 
could not ignore the circumstance of his intellectual dis-
ability, which he contended made the Miranda violation, the 
extended incarceration without access to legal advice, and 
the lack of contemporaneous warnings more significant for 
defendant than for the average person in custody. The Court 
of Appeals rejected defendant’s challenges, and this court 
allowed review.
III.  ANALYSIS
	
On review, defendant renews his argument that 
the trial court erred in concluding that defendant validly 
waived his Miranda rights prior to the Washington County 
interrogation, given “the peculiar factual circumstances of 
defendant’s detention” combined with the “innate difficul-
ties” created by his intellectual disability. Defendant points 
first to the officers’ failure to honor his initial invocation 
of his right to remain silent, which, he argues, shaped his 
understanding of Miranda rights. Defendant also points to 
the fact that he was then held for four days without being 
“afforded an opportunity to have counsel appointed, much 
196	
State v. Ward
less to meet with counsel,” and that the Washington County 
interrogation took place hours after the detectives provided 
the second set of Miranda warnings—rather than when 
defendant’s “recollection of his rights was fresh.” Finally, 
defendant argues that the “unusual sequence of events” 
must be considered in the context of his “heightened suscep-
tibility to failing to understand” his rights as a result of his 
intellectual disability.
	
The state insists that the trial court ruled correctly, 
but the state also raises a threshold issue regarding the 
standard by which we must review the trial court’s ruling. 
We begin by addressing that preliminary issue.
A.  Standard of Review
	
On review, the state urges a distinction between the 
standard of review that applies to the question whether a 
defendant waived his rights “voluntarily” and the standard 
of review that applies to the question whether a defendant 
waived his rights “knowingly and intelligently.” The state 
argues that, in evaluating whether the trial court erred, 
this court should treat as essentially a factual inquiry the 
question of whether defendant knowingly and intelligently 
waived his rights and should defer to the trial court’s deter-
mination in that respect.6 But appellate review of the trial 
court’s waiver determination is not limited in the way that 
the state contends.
	
As the state acknowledges, whether the circum-
stances of a particular case demonstrate a voluntary waiver 
is a question of law that we review without deference to the 
trial court, although we are bound by the trial court’s fac-
tual findings if there is evidence to support them. See State 
v. Jackson, 364 Or 1, 21, 430 P3d 1067 (2018) (analyzing the 
voluntariness of a statement as a question of law). The state 
also acknowledges that we have never held that a purely fac-
tual standard applies to whether a waiver was knowing and 
	
6  Although not entirely clear, it appears that the Court of Appeals may have 
accepted the state’s characterization of the standard by which courts should 
review whether a waiver was knowing and intelligent. See State v. Ward, 295 Or 
App 636, 655, 437 P3d 298 (2019) (concluding that the record contains “constitu-
tionally sufficient evidence for the trial court to find that defendant had know-
ingly and voluntarily waived his right to remain silent”).
Cite as 367 Or 188 (2020)	
197
intelligent. However, the state views the standard of review 
for whether a waiver was knowing and intelligent as an open 
question, and it urges us to follow the Ninth Circuit, which 
has described as “essentially a question of fact” whether a 
waiver of federal Miranda rights was knowing and intelli-
gent. U.S. v. Doe, 155 F3d 1070, 1074 (1998); see also U.S. v. 
Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F3d 1118, 1127 (9th Cir 2005). Of 
course, we are not bound by decisions of the Ninth Circuit—
or any other federal circuit—even on questions of federal law. 
State v. Moyle, 299 Or 691, 707, 705 P2d 740 (1985); see also 
Van De Hey v. U.S. National Bank, 313 Or 86, 95 n 9, 829 P2d 
695 (1992) (“only decisions of the Supreme Court of the United 
States are binding on this court in the interpretation of fed-
eral law”).7 Thus, we understand the state to cite Rodriguez-
Preciado merely as an example of persuasive analysis that 
this court should adopt for purposes of Article I, section 12.
	
We agree with the state’s implicit premise—and 
that of the Ninth Circuit—that the inquiry into whether a 
waiver is knowing and intelligent can be distinct from the 
inquiry into whether the waiver was voluntary. See State v. 
Haynes, 288 Or 59, 64-65, 602 P2d 272 (1979) (“[K]nowledge 
of these [Article I, section 12,] rights is not conclusive on the 
separate issue of voluntariness.”); see also State v. Joslin, 
332 Or 373, 386, 29 P3d 1112 (2001) (“[D]efendant’s waiver 
of that right under Article I, section 12, although voluntary, 
was not knowingly made and, therefore, was invalid.”). We 
also emphasize that, regardless of whether the “knowing 
and intelligent” component of a valid waiver is—like the 
voluntariness component—a legal determination, the deter-
mination in a particular case will be based on underlying 
factual findings by which this court is bound if there is any 
evidence to support them. See Jackson, 364 Or at 21 (articu-
lating rule with respect to voluntariness determination).
	
7  With respect to issues arising under Article I, section 12, we have some-
times looked for guidance to Fifth Amendment decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court, “particularly” because that court first required “the warnings 
that this court later required to effectuate the protections afforded by Article I, 
section 12.” Vondehn, 348 Or at 470. But Vondehn also makes clear that we must 
independently determine the scope of Article I, section 12, rights and, indeed, 
reached a different conclusion about the significance of a Miranda violation 
under Article I, section 12, than the US Supreme Court had reached under the 
Fifth Amendment. Id. at 475-76.
198	
State v. Ward
	
But the state fails to explain why we should be 
persuaded by the Ninth Circuit’s rule that only one part 
of the valid-waiver test involves a legal question. Indeed, 
Rodriguez-Preciado provides no analysis for its rule that 
“knowingly and intelligently,” unlike “voluntarily,” should 
be reviewed as a factual determination. Nor does the case 
on which Rodriguez-Preciado relied, Collazo v. Estelle, 940 
F2d 411, 416 (9th Cir 1991), or the case on which Collazo 
relied, Derrick v. Peterson, 924 F2d 813, 823 (9th Cir 1990), 
overruled on other grounds by U.S. v. Preston, 751 F3d 1008 
(9th Cir 2014).
	
If this court has never expressly rejected the state’s 
proposed bifurcated standard of review for the three compo-
nents of a valid waiver, we do so now. This court’s Article I, 
section 12, case law has treated the question of whether a 
waiver of constitutional rights was “knowing and intelli-
gent” as ultimately a question of law, just as the question of 
whether the waiver is voluntary is ultimately a question of 
law. For example, in State v. Singleton, 288 Or 89, 602 P2d 
1059 (1979), this court considered whether the defendant, 
who initially invoked his Miranda rights, validly waived 
those rights at a later point. After describing it as the state’s 
burden “to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and 
intelligently waived” his Article  I, section 12, rights, this 
court explained that “the question of waiver is not simply a 
question of historical fact, but one which requires the appli-
cation of constitutional principles to the facts as found.” 
 
Id. at 104. This court then considered “the historic facts of 
this case in the light of the constitutional standards” and 
held that the defendant “made a knowing and intelligent 
waiver” of his constitutional rights. Id. at 108-09.
	
As our approach in Singleton illustrates, we review 
whether the state has proven a valid waiver as ultimately a 
legal question—“the application of constitutional principles 
to the facts as found”—even when the dispute focuses on 
whether the defendant “knowingly and intelligently” waived 
his Article I, section 12, rights. Id. at 104. See also Haynes, 
288 Or at 70 (identifying information that, under certain 
circumstances, police categorically must provide to permit 
a determination that the defendant “knowingly and intelli-
gently” waived Article I, section 12, right to counsel); State v. 
Cite as 367 Or 188 (2020)	
199
Acremant, 338 Or 302, 321, 108 P3d 1139 (2005) (describing 
a single standard of review for whether a waiver is “knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary under the totality of the circum-
stance”—that, “[a]lthough we are bound by its findings of his-
torical fact, we review a trial court’s conclusions regarding 
a defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel for legal error”). 
Moreover, reviewing as a question of law all requirements 
for a valid waiver of Article I, section 12, rights aligns with 
how this court reviews other questions that bear on whether 
officers have honored those rights. See State v. Avila-Nava, 
356 Or 600, 609, 341 P3d 714 (2014) (“[W]hether a defen-
dant’s statements amounted to an unequivocal invocation of 
the right against self-incrimination, an equivocal invocation, 
or no invocation at all, is a question of law,” although “what a 
defendant said or did not say, is a question of fact.”).
	
The state, nevertheless, argues that treating the 
knowledge requirement for a valid waiver as a question 
of fact is analogous to how we treat other “questions of a 
person’s awareness and understanding.” The state points, 
as examples, to cases that identify questions regarding a 
criminal defendant’s mental state or condition as a ques-
tion of fact for the jury to decide. See State v. Herrera, 286 
Or 349, 360, 594 P2d 823 (1979) (“[T]he decision of whether 
the defendant has a mental disease or defect [for purposes 
of affirmative defense] is a question of fact for the jury” if 
there is enough evidence “to permit reasonable persons to 
conclude that the evidence preponderates in favor of a find-
ing of mental disease or defect.”); State v. Wolleat, 338 Or 
469, 478, 111 P3d 1131 (2005) (in context of discussing the 
mental state element of kidnapping, explaining that, “in 
most cases the question of whether the defendant intended 
to interfere substantially with the victim’s liberty will pres-
ent a question of fact for the jury”).
	
But those examples do not involve the standard 
for proving a waiver of a constitutional right. Rather, they 
describe statutory elements that must be proven for a jury to 
find a defendant guilty or not guilty of a crime—an inquiry 
that is inherently factual. See State v. Lotches, 331 Or 455, 
498, 17 P3d 1045 (2000) (explaining that this court reviews a 
jury’s finding of guilt “solely to determine whether a rational 
factfinder, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
200	
State v. Ward
the state, and accepting all reasonable inferences and cred-
ibility choices, could find the elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt”). By contrast, the question here involves 
whether the police violated defendant’s constitutional rights 
by interrogating him without obtaining a valid waiver. As 
our past decisions indicate, we determine the answer to that 
ultimate question as a matter of law, although we defer to 
the trial court’s findings of the underlying historical facts. 
Acremant, 338 Or at 321.
B.  The Framework for Analyzing this Case
	
As we have explained above, a defendant’s state-
ments obtained during a custodial interrogation are admis-
sible only if the state proves that the defendant was given 
Miranda warnings and made a knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary waiver of those rights under the totality of the cir-
cumstances. Nichols, 361 Or at 107.8 We emphasize “total-
ity” because the opinion of the Court of Appeals and the 
arguments advanced by the state both highlight individual 
circumstances that, in isolation, might demonstrate that 
defendant validly waived his Article I, section 12, rights.
	
The Court of Appeals first considered the impact 
of the earlier violation by asking if it “tainted” defendant’s 
later statements to the extent that they “cannot properly be 
seen as the product of a truly voluntary waiver of the right 
against self-incrimination.”  State v. Ward, 295 Or App 636, 
650, 437 P3d 298 (2019). The court answered that question 
by applying the standard that this court has established for 
determining whether a defendant’s statements—or other 
evidence—must be suppressed solely as the product of the 
earlier constitutional violation. Id. at 650-53 (quoting and 
discussing State v. Jarnagin, 351 Or 703, 713-18, 277 P3d 
535 (2012)). After concluding that the violation was not 
sufficiently egregious to require suppression by itself, the 
Court of Appeals looked separately at the delay between the 
	
8  In addition to determining whether the state proved a valid waiver of 
Article I, section 12, rights, some cases require a separate inquiry into whether 
statements following a waiver were voluntary. See McAnulty, 356 Or at 459 
(analyzing validity of waiver and “voluntariness” of subsequent statements 
separately); Acremant, 338 Or at 321-25 (2005) (same). We do not understand 
defendant to contend that his statements were involuntary apart from his waiver 
argument.
Cite as 367 Or 188 (2020)	
201
Miranda warnings that the officers read immediately before 
driving defendant to Washington County and the interro-
gation that occurred several hours later. Id. at 654. With 
respect to that temporal gap, the court considered whether 
“a reasonable person could believe that his or her rights have 
changed since the time they were originally given,” and the 
court concluded that the “circumstances did not require the 
police to readminister Miranda warnings closer in time to 
the interrogation.” Id. at 654-55.
	
That analytical framework presents several chal-
lenges. First, Jarnagin expressly cautioned that the stan-
dard the Court of Appeals quoted does not apply to cases in 
which the question is whether the defendant validly waived 
his rights despite an earlier violation; rather, the standard 
“applies to derivative statements; * 
* 
* a different calculus 
applies when a defendant remains in custody and officers 
seek to remedy an earlier Miranda violation. 9 351 Or at 716 
n 8. As we have emphasized, when the state contends that 
a defendant validly waived his rights despite an earlier vio-
lation, “there is a presumption that the waiver was invol-
untary and the state has a ‘heavy burden’ to demonstrate 
that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived 
those rights.” Singleton, 288 Or at 104. Second, by limiting 
the inquiry to whether the Washington County statements 
were the product of a voluntary waiver, the Court of Appeals 
overlooked the extent to which an earlier violation can affect 
whether a later waiver is knowing and intelligent, as well 
as voluntary. We have emphasized that a particular harm 
that occurs when police have refused to honor a suspect’s 
invocation of Article I, section 12, rights is that the violation 
	
9  Although the resolution of this case ultimately does not turn solely on the 
effect of the initial violation, we caution that the Court of Appeals’ application 
of the Jarnagin factors may have underestimated the significance of the Union 
County violation on defendant’s later decision to speak with the Washington 
County officers. For example, the court reasoned that the nature of the violation 
in this case was not especially “flagrant,” Ward, 295 Or App at 651, but this court 
has strongly suggested that such a conclusion should be limited to violations that 
consist of “the officers fail[ing] to recognize that the circumstances had become 
sufficiently compelling to require Miranda warnings.” State v. Swan, 363 Or 121, 
133, 420 P3d 9 (2018) (quoting Jarnagin, 351 Or at 717). As we emphasized in 
Swan, “by contrast” to cases like Jarnagin, when officers ignored the defendant’s 
invocation of his Article I, section 12, right to counsel and asked numerous ques-
tions, “the violation was flagrant and repeated.” Id. at 134. 
202	
State v. Ward
may have “created the impression that the assertion of one’s 
rights was meaningless.” State v. Foster, 288 Or 649, 656, 
607 P2d 173 (1980). Finally, considering whether the vio-
lation, alone, or the delay, alone, requires suppression of 
defendant’s Washington County statements falls short of 
the question that ultimately concerns the court: whether 
the state proved, under the totality of the circumstances, 
that defendant made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 
waiver of the Article I, section 12, rights at the time of the 
Washington County interrogation. See Nichols, 361 Or at 
107 (describing standard).
	
In addressing that question, the state’s arguments 
in this court continue to focus too narrowly on only some 
of the relevant circumstances. Specifically, the state argues 
that it established a valid waiver with the evidence that 
defendant answered questions after having been advised of 
his Miranda rights and having indicated that he understood. 
If the state were drawing on a clean slate—without an ear-
lier refusal to honor defendant’s invocation of rights—then 
the state might be correct that it could prove a valid waiver 
with that evidence alone. See Nichols, 361 Or at 108 (con-
cluding that those circumstances proved a valid waiver but 
emphasizing that “nothing in the record suggests a lack of 
knowledge, consent, or voluntariness about that decision”); 
but see James, 339 Or at 488-89 (rejecting suggestion that 
a suspect’s statements made after Miranda warnings are 
“presumptively admissible”); Joslin, 332 Or at 383 (waiver 
not knowing and intelligent when officers failed to advise 
defendant both that “an identified lawyer has been hired or 
appointed and is seeking to consult with a suspect who is 
subject to custodial interrogation”). But the slate here was 
not clean. The state’s argument fails to give adequate weight 
to the violation that preceded the Washington County inter-
rogation, a circumstance that the state bears a “heavy bur-
den” to overcome. See Singleton, 288 Or at 104.
	
When a suspect in custody exercises the right to 
remain silent, police must “scrupulously honor” that request. 
McAnulty, 356 Or at 461 (quoting Michigan v. Mosley, 423 
US 96, 104, 96 S Ct 321, 46 L Ed 2d 313 (1975)); Singleton, 
288 Or at 102 (same). When the prior violation consists of 
a failure to scrupulously honor a defendant’s invocation of 
Cite as 367 Or 188 (2020)	
203
his Article I, section 12, rights, it can have a particularly 
significant impact on a defendant’s later decision to answer 
questions. See State v. Swan, 363 Or 121, 133-34, 420 P3d 
9 (2018) (highlighting the distinction as affecting whether 
the violation is “egregious or flagrant” for purposes of deter-
mining if defendant’s statements were tainted by an ear-
lier Miranda violation); Jarnagin, 351 Or at 717 (same). Of 
particular concern, it can “create[ 
] the impression that the 
assertion of one’s rights was meaningless.” Foster, 288 Or at 
656. Thus, if the state fails to “scrupulously honor” a defen-
dant’s invocation of the right to remain silent, as we empha-
sized in Singleton, then the state bears a “heavy burden” 
to prove “that the defendant has subsequently waived those 
rights.” 288 Or at 104.
	
In those cases in which we have held that the state 
proved a valid waiver despite a prior violation, we have 
pointed to countervailing circumstances that are absent 
from this record. For example, in concluding that the defen-
dant in McAnulty had twice validly waived her Miranda 
rights following an earlier violation, we emphasized that 
the defendant first initiated the renewed conversation by 
asking to speak privately with the officers because “she had 
something to tell them.” 356 Or at 453, 459. We also empha-
sized that, when the officers next interrogated the defen-
dant in McAnulty, they had freshly advised the defendant 
of her Miranda rights immediately before the interrogation, 
and she had signed a form expressly acknowledging that 
she understood those rights. Id. Likewise in Jarnagin, in 
which we concluded that the defendant had validly waived 
his rights following an earlier unlawful interrogation, the 
defendant had agreed to be transported from his home to 
the police station to be interviewed and, upon arriving, was 
given Miranda warnings, signed a written consent, and 
made clear that he understood his rights by volunteering 
that he could “at any time, decide that [he] would like a law-
yer or not answer any further questions.” 351 Or at 712, 724.10 
	
10  In addition, as we highlighted in Swan, the Miranda violation in Jarnagin 
consisted of the less “egregious” failure “to recognize that the circumstances 
had become sufficiently compelling to require Miranda warnings.” 363 Or at 133 
(quoting Jarnagin, 351 Or at 717). Thus, Jarnagin identified the issue as “when 
belated Miranda warnings will and will not suffice.” 351 Or at 721.
204	
State v. Ward
Indeed, we have pointed to similar circumstances as aiding 
the state’s ability to prove a valid waiver, even in the absence 
of a prior constitutional violation. See State v. Meade, 327 Or 
335, 341-42, 963 P2d 656 (1998) (even without a prior vio-
lation, affirmative waiver immediately following adminis-
tration of Miranda warnings was “significant” to conclusion 
that the defendant validly waived his rights).
	
Here, however, the state can identify no similar cir-
cumstances that would aid the state in carrying its burden 
to overcome the harm of the prior violation. Defendant did 
not voluntarily travel to the Washington County interroga-
tion room or in any way initiate a conversation about the 
crime. Although defendant answered “yes” when asked if 
he understood his rights, the state cannot point to the kind 
of affirmative statements that, in Jarnagin, demonstrated 
that the defendant had a meaningful understanding of the 
words that had been recited to him.11 And the state cannot 
point to evidence that defendant affirmatively consented to 
be interrogated or affirmatively waived his rights. Indeed, 
the only evidence of officers asking defendant whether he 
wanted to speak with them is the evidence from Union 
County, and defendant’s answer to those officers was that 
he did not want to talk.
	
Another circumstance that can ease the state’s bur-
den following a violation of a defendant’s Article I, section 
12, rights is a sufficient gap in time—at least if the gap is 
followed by fresh Miranda warnings. See Jarnagin, 351 Or 
at 722-23 (emphasizing the “substantial break in time”—
during which the defendant remained with a friend in his 
own home—before he agreed to be interviewed at the police 
station, was given fresh warnings, and affirmatively con-
sented to waive his rights). Here, the state emphasizes that, 
following the violation of defendant’s rights, four days passed 
before the detectives provided new Miranda warnings, drove 
	
11  We do not suggest that an inquiry into a defendant’s degree of compre-
hension is required in the ordinary case. Indeed, in a case that did not involve 
overcoming the harm of a prior violation, we observed that “asking an accused 
whether he understands the warning given him does very little, if anything, 
to guarantee his understanding” and that “[w]e do not believe such an inquiry 
and an affirmative response is necessary in order to assure compliance with 
Miranda.” State v. Karcher, 252 Or 564, 566-67, 451 P2d 110 (1969).
Cite as 367 Or 188 (2020)	
205
defendant to Washington County, and began a new interro-
gation. Given those circumstances, according to the state, 
“any taint had long since dissipated.” But the state overlooks 
countervailing factors that undermine the value of the gap 
in time and fresh warning in this case.
	
First, any value that the passage of time might 
normally provide was diluted in this case by the fact that 
defendant was held in jail during that entire time without 
the benefit of advice from counsel. See Foster, 288 Or at 656-
57. As we emphasized in Foster, in concluding that a waiver 
following a previous violation was not valid, the defendant 
had been held in custody “for over 30 hours” without the 
benefit of legal advice that the defendant had requested. 
Id. Similarly, in State v. Mendacino, we explained that the 
 
seventy-two-hour gap between an unlawful interrogation 
and a later interrogation—preceded by fresh Miranda 
warnings—was insufficient to dissipate harm of the earlier 
violation because the defendant remained in jail and did not 
consult with an attorney between the interrogations. 288 Or 
231, 238, 603 P2d 1376 (1979). Here, the state has offered no 
reason to conclude that the days of incarceration did any-
thing to minimize the harm from the earlier violation.
	
Second, any value that the fresh Miranda warn-
ings might normally have provided was undermined by the 
fact that the detectives gave those warnings at the start of 
the five-hour trip to Washington County. We agree with the 
Court of Appeals that a short delay and change of location, 
alone, generally will not preclude the state from proving a 
valid waiver. See State v. Stevens, 311 Or 119, 138, 806 P2d 
92 (1991) (“mere transfer to another car and another officer 
did not necessarily require” renewed Miranda warnings).12 
But this is not a case in which delay and a change of location 
are the only obstacles to the state proving a valid waiver. 
Instead, the relevant circumstances, here, began with the 
officers in Union County ignoring defendant’s invocation 
of his right to remain silent, then holding him in jail for 
	
12  In Jarnagin, we quoted LaFave for the proposition that it is “generally 
accepted that fresh warnings are not required after the passage of just a few 
hours.” 351 Or at 725 (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel, Nancy J. King, 
& Orin S. Kerr, 2 Criminal Procedure § 6.8(b), 805 (3d ed 2007)).
206	
State v. Ward
four days without the opportunity to speak with counsel. 
Thus, the question here is whether the manner in which 
the Washington County detectives provided new warnings 
was sufficient to overcome the harm of the prior violation—
the impression that invoking Article I, section 12, rights is 
meaningless. See Foster, 288 Or at 656. Under the totality 
of the circumstances, the poorly timed warnings did little to 
help the state meet its burden.
	
Third, the state’s ability to meet its burden is 
impaired by the limited record of what transpired as a 
result of the Miranda violation. Both parties in briefing 
have offered a general characterization of defendant’s state-
ments after he invoked his right to remain silent, but—as 
the Court of Appeals observed—“[t]he precise nature of 
those statements is uncertain based on the record from 
the suppression hearing.” Ward, 295 Or App at 649 n 7. We 
addressed a similar record deficiency in Swan, in which we 
considered whether the state had met its burden to show 
that the defendant’s decision to take a breath test was not 
the product of a DUII interview that the state conducted in 
violation of the defendant’s Article I, section 12, rights. 363 
Or at 133. The obstacle for the state in Swan was that there 
was no evidence of what the defendant said during the DUII 
interview and so “no way of knowing whether or how [the] 
defendant’s decision to take the test was causally connected 
to his earlier responses.” Id. at 136. Given the absence of evi-
dence, we concluded that the state failed to meet its burden. 
Id.
	
The record in this case presents a similar obsta-
cle for the state. As the Court of Appeals noted, the record 
reveals that the state played a video recording of the unlaw-
ful Union County interrogation only up to a point shortly 
after defendant invoked his right to remain silent, and 
 
“[t]here is no indication that the court also was provided with 
a transcript of the interrogation or otherwise reviewed what 
defendant said to the police after invoking his rights under 
Miranda.” Ward, 295 Or App at 649 n  7. Thus, when the 
trial court ruled at the conclusion of the suppression hear-
ing that defendant provided a knowing, intelligent, and vol-
untary waiver, it necessarily did so with “no way of knowing 
whether or how” statements that defendant or the officers 
Cite as 367 Or 188 (2020)	
207
made during the earlier, unlawful interrogation affected 
defendant’s decision to answer questions when he reached 
Washington County. See Swan, 363 Or at 136. Accordingly, 
we cannot assume that the court made any implicit find-
ings regarding the course of the unlawful interrogation that 
could help the state meet its heavy burden to prove that 
defendant subsequently validly waived his Article I, section 
12, rights.
	
Finally, defendant argues that all of the other cir-
cumstances that he has identified as preventing proof of a 
valid waiver must be filtered through the lens of his estab-
lished intellectual disability, which he describes as creat-
ing a “heightened susceptibility” to not understanding his 
rights. In general, we agree that a defendant’s mental lim-
itations should be considered when determining whether 
the defendant made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 
waiver under the totality of the circumstances. See Jackson, 
364 Or at 30 (“a defendant’s mental condition is a factor 
that must be considered, as part of the totality of the cir-
cumstances, in determining whether a defendant’s confes-
sion was voluntary”); see also Meade, 327 Or at 341 (even 
without a prior violation, identifying as “significant” to valid 
waiver inquiry the fact that the defendant was “highly edu-
cated”). The state contends, however, that defendant failed 
to preserve this argument regarding his mental disability. 
Defendant offers a complicated response that relies on a 
statement in one written memorandum that his challenge 
to the Washington County interrogation “incorporated by 
reference” arguments from an earlier memorandum and on 
the fact that the judge who decided the suppression motion 
had earlier presided over the hearings regarding defen-
dant’s competence to stand trial. He urges this court to 
analyze the record below in light of the purposes of pres-
ervation. We decline to undertake that analysis, however, 
because we conclude that this case does not turn on the 
role of defendant’s intellectual disability. Considering all 
of the other circumstances that we have identified—from 
the Union County officers’ failure to honor defendant’s ini-
tial invocation of his right to remain silent, which shaped 
his understanding of his rights; to the extended period of 
incarceration without counsel; to the significant separation 
208	
State v. Ward
by time and distance between new Miranda warnings and 
the interrogation in Washington County; to the absence of 
evidence that defendant initiated conversation or affirma-
tively waived his rights—we are persuaded that the state 
failed to prove that it obtained defendant’s knowing, intelli-
gent and voluntary waiver of his Article I, section 12, rights 
before the Washington County custodial interrogation.13 
Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying defendant’s 
motion to suppress his statements from the Washington 
County interrogation.
C.  Significance of the Erroneously Admitted Statements
	
We also conclude that the error is one that requires 
us to reverse defendant’s conviction. That determination is 
governed by Article VII (Amended), section 3, of the Oregon 
Constitution, which provides, in part:
“If the supreme court shall be of opinion, after consider-
ation of all the matters thus submitted, that the judgment 
of the court appealed from was such as should have been 
rendered in the case, such judgment shall be affirmed, not-
withstanding any error committed during the trial[.]”
Or Const, Art VII (Amended), § 3. We have described our 
obligation under that provision as one “to decide whether 
there was ‘little likelihood’ that the error affected the jury’s 
verdict.” McAnulty, 356 Or at 460 (quoting State v. Davis, 
336 Or 19, 32, 77 P3d 1111 (2003)). In McAnulty, we con-
cluded that the erroneous admission of some of the defen-
dant’s statements did not require reversal “on the particular 
facts” of that case because the illegally obtained statements 
	
13  This case does not call upon us to specify where the state fell short in its 
proof of a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver. Although we have occasion-
ally described a waiver as invalid solely because it was not voluntary or solely 
because it was not knowingly made, we have also identified circumstances that 
affect all three components of a valid waiver. See, e.g., Vondehn, 348 Or at 474 
(Miranda warnings “ensure that a person’s waiver is knowing as well as volun-
tary”). Our discussions in Singleton and Foster suggest that ignoring a suspect’s 
assertion of Article I, section 12, rights can similarly affect all three components 
of the inquiry. Foster, 288 Or at 656-57 (explaining that the violation “created the 
impression that the assertion of one’s rights was meaningless”); Singleton, 288 
Or at 104 (“when in such a case it is contended by the state that the defendant 
has subsequently waived those rights there is a presumption that the waiver was 
involuntary and the state has a ‘heavy burden’ to demonstrate that the defendant 
knowingly and intelligently waived those rights”).
Cite as 367 Or 188 (2020)	
209
described the same kind of abusive conduct against the vic-
tim that the defendant later described in legally obtained 
statements that we described as “more substantial admis-
sions” of abuse of the victim. Id. at 460-61. Indeed, we con-
cluded that the erroneous admission was “harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt” (the federal constitutional standard). 
Id. at 462. We reasoned that “the jury would have regarded 
the improperly admitted evidence as duplicative or unhelp-
ful,” relying on but distinguishing Davis, in which this court 
reversed after concluding that erroneously excluded evi-
dence was “influential because it substantiated the defen-
dant’s version of events,” was not “ 
‘duplicative or unhelpful’ 
to the jury,” and was “not cumulative, because the excluded 
evidence was ‘qualitatively different than the evidence that 
the jury heard.’ 
” Id. at 460-61 (quoting Davis, 336 Or at 
33-34).
	
Here, defendant explains that his illegally obtained 
statements consisted of a series of easily disproven factual 
assertions, including denying that he had ever been in the 
victim’s room and denying that the victim’s blood had been 
on his clothing. Defendant emphasizes that the value to the 
state of offering defendant’s denials of easily proven facts 
was that they tended to indicate defendant’s consciousness 
of guilt. Indeed that is precisely the use that the state made 
of the evidence: The prosecutor argued to the jury in closing 
that “provable lies still are an indicator of one’s consciousness 
of guilt” and added, “[W]ho lies to police, innocent people or 
guilty people? I think you’ll all agree guilty people do.” As 
in Davis, we conclude that the illegally obtained statements 
provided the jury with evidence of defendant’s mental state 
that was qualitatively different than the other evidence that 
the state presented and tended to substantiate the state’s 
theory that not only was defendant in the victim’s room, but 
he also actively participated in the victim’s murder. Under 
the circumstances, we cannot conclude that there was “little 
likelihood” that the error affected the verdict. Accordingly, 
we reverse and remand.
	
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. 
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case 
is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
210	
State v. Ward
	
BALMER, J., dissenting.
	
I respectfully dissent. The facts of this case are 
tragic. The evidence at trial showed that defendant, who 
has intellectual disabilities, likely was manipulated by 
his cousin, Joda Cain, to engage in criminal conduct with 
Cain during which defendant killed the victim—Cain’s 
great-grandmother—with a hammer. A jury convicted 
defendant of aggravated murder and felony murder, and he 
was sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole.
	
The majority reverses defendant’s convictions and 
remands the case for a new trial; as a result, it does not 
reach defendant’s constitutional challenges to his sentence. 
The majority concludes that the trial court, although it 
granted defendant’s motion to suppress statements that 
he made during an October 5, 2013, interview with police, 
erred in denying the motion as to statements during a sec-
ond interview on October 9. It also concludes that the error 
was not harmless. I disagree with both of those conclusions.
	
The sequence of events concerning defendant’s 
statements is straightforward. On October 5, 2013, the night 
that the victim was killed in Washington County, Cain and 
defendant were apprehended in eastern Oregon after a high-
speed car chase. Police read defendant his Miranda rights 
at the time of his arrest. Defendant acknowledged that he 
understood those rights. Later that night, police interviewed 
defendant at the Union County jail and again administered 
Miranda warnings. They had already talked to Cain, who 
told them that defendant had killed the victim. The police 
asked whether defendant wanted to talk, and although he 
indicated that he did not, they nevertheless asked him for 
his side of the story. Defendant denied any wrongdoing. On 
October 9, two detectives arrived from Washington County 
to return defendant to Hillsboro. Those officers also gave 
defendant Miranda warnings. As the majority notes, defen-
dant said that he understood his rights, but he did not indi-
cate whether he wanted to talk. No questioning occurred 
during the five-hour drive. Back in Washington County 
later that day, defendant was interviewed in the sheriff’s 
office. The officers did not repeat the Miranda warnings 
or ask defendant whether he wanted to waive his rights. 
Cite as 367 Or 188 (2020)	
211
Defendant responded to the officers’ questions. His answers 
were consistent with his more general response during the 
October 5 interview—that he didn’t do anything wrong.
	
On defendant’s motion to suppress his statements, 
the trial court concluded that the October 5 statements 
should be suppressed because he had indicated to the offi-
cers that he did not want to talk, and they had improperly 
continued their questioning after that refusal. As to the 
October 9 statements, the trial court concluded that “defen-
dant’s Miranda rights were appropriately read to him” by 
the Washington County officers, that “he understood those 
rights,” and that he “knowingly waived” them.
	
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court ruling. 
State v. Ward, 295 Or App 636, 437 P3d 298 (2019). It recog-
nized the factors that we identified in State v. Jarnagin, 351 
Or 703, 277 P3d 535 (2012), as being critical to the assess-
ment of whether the waiver of the right to remain silent was 
“truly voluntary.” Ward, 295 Or App at 650. It specifically 
noted that “a Miranda waiver may be tainted by a prior 
Miranda violation.” Id. Determining whether such a taint 
exists “is fact intensive” and requires the court to decide, 
“ 
‘considering all the circumstances,’ 
” whether a defendant’s 
decision to speak to officers “ 
‘is sufficiently a product of an 
earlier Miranda violation that suppression is necessary to 
vindicate’ 
” the defendant’s rights. Id. (quoting Jarnagin, 351 
Or at 717). As to the impact of the October 5 Miranda viola-
tion, the court noted that the violation was “not especially 
‘flagrant’ 
” or coercive, compared to other cases where a later 
waiver was held to be involuntary; the officers had not used 
“flagrantly coercive tactics in an effort to elicit an incrimi-
nating response.” Ward, 295 Or App at 651. Indeed, “defen-
dant maintained his innocence throughout the exchange 
and made no patently inculpatory remarks.” Id. The court 
carefully examined each of the Jarnagin factors, id. at 651-
54, as well as defendant’s argument that the delay between 
the Miranda warnings given the morning of October 9 and 
the interview five hours later constituted an Article I, sec-
tion 12, violation, id. at 654-55. It discussed in detail the 
trial court record, comparing the facts in the case to earlier 
cases from this court and the Court of Appeals. It under-
stood that it was required to base its determinations on the 
212	
State v. Ward
totality of the circumstances. Id. at 650, 654, 655. The Court 
of Appeals did everything our precedents ask of it.
	
The Court of Appeals ultimately concluded that 
defendant’s October 9 statements were not derived from 
or the product of the October 5 Miranda violation and that 
police were not required to give additional Miranda warn-
ings later on October 9, after the initial warning before the 
drive. Id. at 655. The court concluded that there was “consti-
tutionally sufficient evidence for the trial court to find that 
defendant had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right 
to remain silent on October 9.” Id.
	
When the Court of Appeals has applied what is 
essentially the correct legal standard, the fact that this 
court might disagree with the lower court’s application 
of the law to the facts of a particular case is usually not 
a reason to allow review. That is simply “error correction,” 
because the case does not necessarily “present[ 
] a signifi-
cant issue of law.” ORAP 9.07(1). To be sure, we sometimes 
do allow review simply in order to correct errors by lower 
courts, including the Court of Appeals, and I do not disagree 
with that practice. But we should do so sparingly, and I do 
not think we should have allowed review here.
	
That said, the majority does provide some clarifica-
tion of the proper consideration of whether a waiver of rights 
under Article  I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution is 
“voluntary,” “knowing,” and “intelligent.” 367 Or at __. As 
with many other determinations that trial courts and juries 
make, and that appellate courts are charged with review-
ing, those determinations may “ultimately” be legal ques-
tions that courts review for “legal error.” However (as the 
majority recognizes), those legal conclusions are crucially 
based on facts—evidence and permissible inferences and 
presumptions—that are found by factfinders. And, as the 
majority again correctly observes, we are bound to accept 
those underlying factual findings “if there is any evidence 
to support them.” 367 Or at __. I agree with the majority’s 
description of those distinctions.
	
 But the majority discusses those issues primarily 
to reject the state’s arguments to this court. The majority 
faults the Court of Appeals’ approach to the Article I, section 
Cite as 367 Or 188 (2020)	
213
12, analysis, stating that it “may have accepted the state’s 
characterization” of the “knowing and intelligent” inquiry 
as essentially factual, and thus subject to a more deferential 
standard of review. 367 Or at __ n  6. It reaches that con-
clusion based on the Court of Appeals’ statement that there 
was “constitutionally sufficient evidence for the trial court 
to find” a knowing and voluntary waiver. Id. (quoting Ward, 
295 Or App at 655). That is not a very charitable reading of 
the Court of Appeals’ decision. Perhaps the Court of Appeals 
should have said that there was a “sufficient factual basis 
for the trial court to reach the legal conclusion that defen-
dant had made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver.” 
That, after all, is what the Court of Appeals plainly meant 
when it used the sentence quoted by the majority to sum up 
its previous nine pages of detailed analysis of the factual 
record and the controlling case law. More importantly, the 
approach taken by the Court of Appeals—the consideration of 
the various factors we identified in Jarnagin and the compar-
ison to cases such as State v. Mendacino, 288 Or 231, 603 P2d 
1376 (1979), and State v. McAnulty, 356 Or 432, 338 P3d 653 
(2014)—is essentially the same kind of careful review that 
the majority undertakes. The majority gives greater weight to 
certain facts than the Court of Appeals did, and, as a result, 
reaches a different legal conclusion.1 But, in my view, little in 
the majority opinion articulates a substantially different rule 
of law than the Court of Appeals applied or identifies a seri-
ous analytical error, other than that court’s ultimate legal 
conclusion regarding the validity of defendant’s waiver.
	
Of course, it is within the authority of this court 
to review Court of Appeals’ legal rulings, including its 
	
1  For example, the majority, although agreeing with the Court of Appeals 
that resolution of the Miranda issue “does not turn solely on the effect of the ini-
tial violation,” nevertheless concluded that that court “may have underestimated 
the significance” of the earlier violation. 367 Or at __ n 9. Similarly, the majority 
acknowledges that the Court of Appeals considered both the possible taint from 
the earlier Miranda violation and the delay between the new Miranda warnings 
given before the drive to Washington County and the questioning several hours 
later, but it nevertheless asserts that the Court of Appeals failed to consider those 
factors together as part of the “totality of the circumstances.” 367 Or at __. But 
the Court of Appeals did understand that it was required to determine whether 
defendant’s waiver was “knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the totality of 
the circumstances,” Ward, 295 Or App at 650 (internal quotations omitted), and 
it appears to me that it did so. 
214	
State v. Ward
application of legal standards to specific circumstances. I 
agree with the Court of Appeals’ assessment of the totality 
of the circumstances as meeting the standard required for a 
valid waiver. But the legal issue is a close one, and although 
the majority reaches a different conclusion, its legal analysis 
does not appear to me to differ significantly from that of the 
Court of Appeals. For that reason, we probably should not 
have allowed review of this case.
	
I turn to the question of whether the error found by 
this court—the trial court’s failure to suppress defendant’s 
statements during the October 9 interview—was preju-
dicial, that is, whether there was little likelihood that the 
error affected the jury’s verdict. McAnulty, 356 Or at 460.
	
The majority sets out defendant’s statements: that 
he didn’t know anything about the murder, hadn’t been in 
the victim’s bedroom, and didn’t have the victim’s blood 
on this clothes; that Cain had awakened him at night and 
asked if he wanted to go for a ride; that he had run when he 
and Cain were stopped by police in eastern Oregon because 
he was afraid he would go to jail for lying about his age 
when he had flown to Portland. 367 Or at __. The major-
ity concludes that, because defendant’s statements were lies 
that could easily be disproved, they indicated defendant’s 
“consciousness of guilt,” id. at __, and thus “tended to sub-
stantiate the state’s theory that * 
* 
* [defendant] actively 
participated in the victim’s murder.” Id. at __. Even if that 
were true, given the other evidence presented at trial, it is 
apparent that defendant’s statements provided little addi-
tional probative evidence of his guilt.
	
Miranda warnings were first developed to protect 
against coerced confessions of guilt, truthful or not. Of 
course, defendant’s statements here are not those kinds of 
statements: nothing defendant said could remotely be con-
sidered a true (or false) confession. Nor are they the kind of 
partially inculpatory statements that might give police leads 
to seek other evidence of defendant’s guilt. And, because 
defendant did not testify, they were not used for impeach-
ment purposes.
	
Yes, defendant’s statements were easily disproved. 
But the overwhelming evidence that disproved them would 
Cite as 367 Or 188 (2020)	
215
have been front and center in the trial in any event, as it will 
be in any re-trial. That evidence demonstrates there is lit-
tle likelihood that the statements affected the jury’s verdict. 
On the night of the murder, several of Cain’s friends partied 
at the victim’s home, along with Cain and defendant, and 
they saw defendant wearing a pair of football gloves that 
belonged to Cain. One of those gloves was later found in the 
getaway car near where defendant was sitting in the pas-
senger seat. The glove had the victim’s blood on it and her 
Rolex watch inside. Defendant’s shirt, pants, and shoes all 
had the victim’s blood on them. There was no blood on Cain’s 
shoes. (Cain’s clothes had been inadvertently washed when 
he was first incarcerated after being arrested.) A button was 
missing from one of defendant’s shirts, and it was found in 
the victim’s room. Another person at the victim’s home fell 
asleep after the party, but awoke to hear the victim scream-
ing. He testified that the victim said, “Stop, stop.”; “No more, 
no more”; and “I’ll give you $1,000.” He also said that he 
heard defendant ask, “Where’s the money?” in a loud voice, 
and that he heard Cain say, “Just do it[.]” And he heard 
“rumbling” that sounded like “someone * 
* 
* being attacked.”
	
In the face of that testimonial and physical evi-
dence, defendant’s statements would not have affected the 
jury’s verdict. Defendant’s theory at trial was that, although 
defendant also had been in the victim’s bedroom, Cain had 
killed the victim. Defendant argued that his intellectual 
disability helped explain why he did not leave while the 
attack was taking place (as did Cain’s other friend who was 
in the house), try to stop Cain, or seek help for the victim. 
Defendant also sought to show that he was manipulated 
by Cain to come to Portland as part of Cain’s plan to rob, 
and perhaps harm, the victim, manipulation made easier 
by defendant’s intellectual disability. Although the major-
ity emphasizes that defendant’s easily proven lies “tended 
to indicate defendant’s consciousness of guilt,” 367 Or at __, 
that much would have been obvious to the jury from defen-
dant’s acknowledgment that he had been in the victim’s 
room, the testimonial and physical evidence of his involve-
ment in the victim’s death, and the evidence that defendant 
had attempted to flee when police stopped the car in eastern 
Oregon. As a result, to the extent that defendant’s denials 
216	
State v. Ward
of involvement were easily disproved and therefore might 
have been evidence of his “consciousness of guilt,” those 
statements were of little additional probative value, given 
the other evidence at trial.
	
There was little likelihood that the error here, if 
error it was, affected the jury’s verdict. And, of course, all 
the evidence set out above will almost certainly be intro-
duced at the re-trial, and the result will almost certainly be 
the same.
	
I respectfully dissent.