Title: City of Racine v. Waste Facility Siting Board
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1996AP000688
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: March 19, 1998

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-0688 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
City of Racine, Wisconsin, a municipal  
corporation,  
 
Petitioner-Respondent, 
Land Reclamation Company,  
 
Intervenor-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Waste Facility Siting Board, a state  
agency, 
 
Respondent, 
Town of Mount Pleasant and County of  
Racine, 
 
Intervenors, 
R.A.T.E., a local citizens group,  
 
Intervenor-Appellant.  
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
March 19, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
November 19, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Racine 
 
JUDGE: 
Emily S. Mueller 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J. dissents, opinion filed 
 
 
GESKE and BRADLEY, J.J., join 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the intervenor-appellant there was a brief by 
Patrick J. Hudec, Gabrielle Boehm and Hudec Law Offices, S.C., 
East Troy, and oral argument by Patrick J. Hudec. 
 
 
For the petitioner-respondent there was a brief 
and oral argument by Daniel P. Wright, city attorney, Racine. 
 
 
 
For the Intervenor-Respondent, Land Reclamation 
Company, there was a brief (in the court of appeals) by Bradley 
D. Jackson and Foley & Lardner, Madison and oral argument by 
Bradley D. Jackson. 
 
No. 96-0688 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-0688 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
City of Racine, Wisconsin, a municipal  
corporation,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
Land Reclamation Company,  
 
          Intervenor-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Waste Facility Siting Board, a state  
agency,  
 
          Respondent, 
 
Town of Mount Pleasant and County of  
Racine,  
 
          Intervenors, 
 
R.A.T.E., a local citizens group,  
 
          Intervenor-Appellant.  
FILED 
 
MAR 19, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a decision and order of the Circuit Court for 
Racine County, Emily S. Mueller, Judge.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   Residents Against Trash 
Expansion (RATE) appeals a circuit court decision granting 
summary judgment to the City of Racine (City).  The circuit 
court held that RATE’s failure to file a notice of claim with 
the City, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b) (reprinted 
No. 96-0688 
 
2 
below),1 prior to RATE’s counterclaim against the City, required 
dismissal of RATE’s counterclaim.  We agree.  The plain language 
of the statute and case law dictate that compliance with 
§ 893.80(1)(b) is a necessary prerequisite to all actions, 
                     
1 All references to Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1993-94 
version unless otherwise indicated. 
 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)  Claims against governmental 
bodies or officers, agents or employes; notice of 
injury; limitation of damages and suits.  (1)  Except 
as provided in subs. (1m) and (1p), no action may be 
brought or maintained against any . . . governmental 
subdivision . . . upon a claim or cause of action 
unless: . . . 
(a) Within 120 days after the happening of the event 
giving rise to the claim, written notice of the 
circumstances of the claim signed by the party, agent 
or attorney is served on the . . . governmental 
subdivision . . . .  Failure to give the requisite 
notice shall not bar action on the claim if the . . . 
subdivision . . . had actual notice of the claim and 
the claimant shows to the satisfaction of the court 
that the delay or failure to give the requisite notice 
has not been prejudicial to the defendant . . . 
subdivision . . . ; and 
 
(b) A claim containing the address of the claimant and 
an 
itemized 
statement 
of 
the 
relief 
sought 
is 
presented to the appropriate clerk or person who 
performs the duties of a clerk or secretary for the 
defendant . . . [governmental] subdivision . . . and 
the claim is disallowed.  Failure of the appropriate 
body to disallow within 120 days after presentation is 
a disallowance.  Notice of disallowance shall be 
served on the claimant by registered or certified mail 
and the receipt therefor, signed by the claimant, or 
the returned registered letter, shall be proof of 
service.  No action on a claim against any defendant . 
. . subdivision . . . may be brought after 6 months 
from the date of service of the notice, and the notice 
shall contain a statement to that effect.  
No. 96-0688 
 
3 
including 
counterclaims, 
brought 
against 
governmental 
subdivisions.  Other statutes provide some exceptions to the 
application of § 893.80(1)(b), but we are not persuaded that 
this case presents one of the exceptions.  Accordingly, we 
affirm. 
¶2 
The relevant facts for purposes of this appeal are not 
in dispute.  This case focuses on the proposed expansion of a 
private landfill in the City, an expansion supported by the 
City.  During the course of negotiating expansion of the 
landfill, the Waste Facility Siting Board (Board) disqualified 
the City’s representatives on the local siting committee.  The 
Board is a state agency which generally oversees negotiation and 
arbitration for new or expanded solid and hazardous waste 
facilities.  See Wis. Stat. § 144.445.  The local siting 
committee, made up of members of municipalities affected by the 
proposed 
landfill 
expansion, 
negotiates 
with 
the landfill 
company 
regarding 
proposed 
expansions. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 144.445(7). 
¶3 
The City disagreed with the Board’s decision and filed 
this action for circuit court review.  At that point, RATE, a 
local citizens group, successfully intervened as a defendant.  
RATE then filed a counterclaim against the City and a cross-
claim, asking for declaratory relief to keep the City’s 
representatives off the local siting committee.  The circuit 
court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment against 
RATE because RATE failed to comply with the notice of claim 
requirements of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b).   
No. 96-0688 
 
4 
¶4 
RATE appealed the circuit court order granting the 
City’s summary judgment motion.  Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
809.61, the court of appeals certified to this court the issue 
of whether compliance with Wis. Stat. § 893.80, notice of claim, 
is a necessary prerequisite to a counterclaim for declaratory 
relief against a municipality by an intervening or involuntary 
party.  We conclude that compliance with § 893.80(1)(b) is a 
necessary prerequisite to all actions brought against the 
entities 
listed 
in 
the 
statute, 
including 
governmental 
subdivisions, whether a tort or non-tort action, and whether 
brought as an initial claim, counterclaim or cross-claim.  
Except as provided by statute or case law interpreting those 
statutes, a party must file a notice of claim and follow the 
statutory procedures set forth in § 893.80(1)(b) before bringing 
any action against a governmental subdivision. 
¶5 
In reviewing an order granting summary judgment, we 
apply the same methodology employed by the circuit court.  See 
Doe v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 211 Wis. 2d 312, 332, 565 
N.W.2d 94 (1997).  Summary judgment is proper if there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law.  See Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).  
Whether the moving party in this case, the City, is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law depends on our interpretation of 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b).  Because we determine as a matter of 
law that giving the City a notice of claim under § 893.80(1)(b) 
is a prerequisite to RATE’s counterclaim and cross-claim, we 
No. 96-0688 
 
5 
hold that summary judgment in favor of the City was appropriate 
in this case. 
¶6 
A question of statutory interpretation is a question 
of law which this court reviews de novo.  See Lake City Corp. v. 
City of Mequon, 207 Wis. 2d 156, 162-63, 558 N.W.2d 100 (1997). 
 The goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the 
legislature’s intent.  See Stockbridge School Dist. v. DPI, 202 
Wis. 2d 214, 219, 550 N.W.2d 96 (1996).  The main source for 
statutory interpretation is the plain language of the statute 
itself.  See Jungbluth v. Hometown, Inc., 201 Wis. 2d 320, 327, 
548 N.W.2d 519 (1996).  If the plain language is clear, we may 
not look beyond the language of the statute to ascertain its 
meaning.  See Lake City Corp., 207 Wis. 2d at 164 (citing 
Stockbridge School Dist., 202 Wis. 2d at 220).   
¶7 
Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(1) provides that “no action” 
may be brought against a governmental subdivision, such as a 
municipality, 
unless a claimant provides the 
governmental 
subdivision with “[a] claim containing the address of the 
claimant and an itemized statement of the relief sought . . . .” 
No. 96-0688 
 
6 
 § 893.80(1)(b).2  A claimant cannot file a claim against a 
governmental subdivision until such subdivision disallows the 
claim.  See id.  If the governmental subdivision does not 
disallow the claim, it is considered disallowed after 120 days 
from filing the notice of claim.  See id.  The purpose of this 
statute 
is 
to 
provide 
the 
governmental 
subdivision 
an 
opportunity to compromise and settle a claim without costly and 
time-consuming litigation.  See DNR v. City of Waukesha, 184 
Wis. 2d 178, 195, 515 N.W.2d 888 (1994) (citations omitted).  
The government entity must have enough information “so that it 
can budget accordingly for either a settlement or litigation.”  
Id. at 198; see also Vanstone v. Town of Delafield, 191 Wis. 2d 
586, 593, 530 N.W.2d 16 (Ct. App. 1995). 
¶8 
This court recently held that Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1) 
“applies to all causes of action, not just those in tort and not 
just those for money damages.”  Waukesha, 184 Wis. 2d at 191.  
In Waukesha, this court found that the plain language of the 
statute dictates that § 893.80(1) applies to all actions: “no 
                     
2 The claimant must also present the governmental entity 
with a "written notice of circumstances of the claim . . . ." 
before filing an action.  See Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(a).  In the 
present case, the circuit court denied the City's motion for 
summary judgment on the ground that RATE failed to comply with 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(a), concluding that the requirement was 
adequately waived by the City's actual knowledge of the facts.  
Although a claimant must comply with both § 893.80(1)(a) and 
(b), see Vanstone v. Town of Delafield, 191 Wis. 2d 586, 593, 
530 N.W.2d 16 (Ct. App. 1995), on appeal the City did not 
challenge the circuit court’s denial of its summary judgment 
motion 
for 
noncompliance 
with 
§ 893.80(1)(a). 
 
Therefore 
compliance with § 893.80(1)(a) is not before this court. 
No. 96-0688 
 
7 
action” may be brought against a governmental subdivision unless 
the claimant complies with the notice requirements of the 
statute.  See id.3 
¶9 
Although the court need not look beyond the statute if 
the language is plain, further review of legislative history 
supports the sound holding of Waukesha that the notice of claim 
requirements apply to “all actions.”  
¶10 Chapter 285, Laws of 1977, legislation which repealed 
and recreated Wis. Stat. § 895.43, the predecessor to Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(1), was meant to consolidate and make uniform the 
variety of procedural steps necessary for filing a claim against 
different governmental entities.  See Prefatory Note, ch. 285, 
Laws of 1977.  The statutes that were consolidated by this 1977 
legislation each explicitly provided or had been interpreted to 
apply to causes of action "when the only relief demandable is a 
judgment for money . . . ."  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 59.76 
(1975).  An early draft of the 1977 statute maintained the 
application to tort actions and provided, for example, that "no 
action shall be brought or maintained against a city upon a 
claim or cause of action when the only relief demandable is a 
                     
3 The dissent asserts at page 10 that after this court’s 
holding in DNR v. City of Waukesha, 184 Wis. 2d 178, 515 N.W.2d 
888 (1994), we held that that opinion was too broadly written.  
No such language appears in State ex rel. Auchinleck v. Town of 
LaGrange, 200 Wis. 2d 585, 547 N.W.2d 578 (1996).  In Auchinleck 
this court did say that the holding of Waukesha was too broad 
but only “to the extent it is interpreted as applying to open 
records and open meetings actions . . . .”  200 Wis. 2d 597.  
The holding of Auchinleck narrowly applies to the statutes at 
issue in that case.  
No. 96-0688 
 
8 
judgment for money unless the claimant complies with the 
provisions of s. 895.43."  See Drafting Records, § 4, ch. 285, 
Laws of 1977 (emphasis added).  
¶11 The final version of ch. 285, Laws of 1977, however, 
amended each separate notice of claim statute for filing claims 
against each different type of governmental entity.  The 
legislature deleted any language that limited application of the 
statute to actions where the only relief demandable was a 
judgment for money.  For example, Wis. Stat. § 62.25(1) was 
amended to read: “[n]o action may be brought or maintained 
against a city upon a claim or cause of action unless the 
claimant complies with s. 895.43.”  § 4, ch. 285, Laws of 1977. 
¶12 Similarly, the Prefatory Note initially provided that 
Wis. Stat. § 895.43 (now Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)) applied to 
actions brought against governmental entities "when the only 
relief demandable is a judgment for money."  This language was 
deleted in the final version.  The Prefatory Note also included 
a section explaining that the "$25,000 per person liability 
limitation on local governmental tort liability is broadened to 
apply to all tort actions brought under s. 895.43 . . . "  
Drafting Records, Prefatory Note, ch. 285, Laws of 1977.  This 
entire section was deleted from the final version of the 
Prefatory Note.   
¶13 Also, 
without 
any 
introductory 
or 
explanatory 
comments, the drafting records include numerous pages listing 
statutes which affect governmental entities.  The first was a 
list of statutes "re tort immunity."  The second was a list of 
No. 96-0688 
 
9 
statutes "re claims."  The statutes in the second list impose 
liability on governmental entities for actions other than torts. 
 At the very least, these lists indicate that the legislature 
was aware that the new legislation affected more than tort 
claims. 
¶14 Finally, as noted in Waukesha, ch. 285, Laws of 1977 
changed the statutory language of Wis. Stat. § 895.43 (now Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80(1)) from "no action founded on tort" may be 
brought, to "no action" may be brought against a governmental 
entity without prior notice.  It is clear from the plain 
language, especially as bolstered by the legislative history, 
that the legislature intended that § 893.80(1)(b) apply to "all 
causes of action, not just those in tort and not just those for 
money damages."  Waukesha, 184 Wis. 2d at 191. 
¶15 Following the Waukesha decision, this court created an 
exception to the application of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b) for 
open meetings and open records laws.  See State ex rel. 
Auchinleck v. Town of LaGrange, 200 Wis. 2d 585, 547 N.W.2d 578 
(1996).  We did so because the specific enforcement provisions 
of these statutes take precedence over the general notice 
requirements of § 893.80(1)(b).  See id. at 596.  Under the open 
records law, a requester may immediately bring a mandamus action 
seeking release of records if a municipality withholds or delays 
access to a record.  See Wis. Stat. § 19.37.  Under the open 
meetings act, a complainant must first file a complaint with the 
district attorney.  See Wis. Stat. § 19.97(1).  If the district 
attorney fails to bring an enforcement action within 20 days, 
No. 96-0688 
 
10
the 
complainant 
may 
immediately 
file 
suit 
against 
the 
municipality, seeking declaratory or other appropriate relief.  
See Wis. Stat. § 19.97(4).  In sharp contrast, the notice of 
claim provisions of § 893.80(1)(b) require that a complainant 
wait 120 days after filing a notice of claim or until the 
municipality disallows the claim to file suit against the 
municipality.  See Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b).  Faced with 
seemingly inconsistent statutes, our goal was to ascertain the 
legislature’s intent and construe the legislation accordingly.  
See Auchinleck, 200 Wis. 2d at 594.  Having determined that the 
legislative intent of the open records and open meetings laws 
conflicted with the intent of § 893.80(1)(b), we followed the 
cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that a specific 
statute takes precedence over a general statute.  See id. at 
595-96.  Accordingly, in Auchinleck we determined that the 
specific enforcement procedures of the open meetings and open 
records 
laws 
take 
precedence 
over 
the 
general 
notice 
requirements of § 893.80(1).  See id. at 595-96.   
¶16 RATE now requests that this court create another 
exception to application of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b) for 
counterclaims 
for 
declaratory 
judgment 
in 
cases 
alleging 
violations of Wis. Stat. § 144.445, providing for expansion of a 
landfill.  First, RATE asserts that the rationale used in 
Auchinleck to carve out an exception to compliance with 
§ 893.80(1) for open meetings and open records laws applies to 
this case and many other similar situations.  RATE also offers 
public policy reasons to support its assertion that an exception 
No. 96-0688 
 
11
to § 893.80(1)(b) is required in this case.  RATE finally 
asserts that § 893.80(1)(b) should generally not apply to 
counterclaims which strike directly at the subject matter of the 
claim initiated by the City.  We will address each of RATE’s 
arguments in turn. 
¶17 RATE asserts that the rationale used in Auchinleck to 
carve out an exception to compliance with Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1) 
for open meetings and open records laws applies to this case and 
many other similar situations.  The court of appeals, in Little 
Sissabagama v. Town of Edgewater, 208 Wis. 2d 259, 559 N.W.2d 
914 (Ct. App. 1997), found an exception to application of 
§ 893.80(1)(b) 
because 
the 
general 
notice 
requirements of 
§ 893.80(1)(b) conflicted with the specific appeals procedure in 
Wis. Stat. § 70.47(13) (reprinted below)4 for challenging a 
county’s denial of a request for property tax-exempt status.  
See 208 Wis. 2d at 265-266.  In both Auchinleck and Little 
Sissabagama specific enforcement provisions of the statutes 
compelled the creation of exceptions to the general notice 
requirements of § 893.80(1)(b).   
¶18 RATE has not pointed to specific statutory provisions 
which would justify carving out yet another exception to Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80(1)(b) in this case.  In fact, RATE states that 
there is no specific statutory enforcement scheme for alleged 
                     
4  Wis. Stat. § 70.47(13): “CERTIORARI.  Except as provided in 
s. 70.85, appeal from the determination of the board of review 
shall be by an action for certiorari commenced within 90 days 
after the taxpayer receives the notice under sub. (12).  The 
action shall be given preference.”  Wis. Stat. § 70.47(13).   
No. 96-0688 
 
12
violations of Wis. Stat. § 144.445.  RATE does point to several 
specific statutes that include specific enforcement provisions 
that require filing a claim against a municipality within a time 
frame shorter than allowed by § 893.80(1)(b).  However, these 
statutes are not at issue in this case.  Because there are no 
specific enforcement procedures inconsistent with § 893.80(1)(b) 
in this case, the notice requirements of § 893.80(1)(b) must 
apply.   
¶19 RATE also offers public policy reasons for finding an 
exception to the application of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b).  In 
both 
Auchinleck 
and 
Little 
Sissabagama, 
the 
courts’ 
determinations that the specific enforcement provisions take 
precedence over the general notice requirements of § 893.80(1) 
were supported by public policy.  See Auchinleck 200 Wis. 2d at 
588, 595; Little Sissabagama, 208 Wis. 2d at 266.  However, as 
discussed above, there is no specific statutory enforcement 
procedure in this case.  Public policy cannot, on its own, 
support an exception to compliance with § 893.80(1)(b).  If 
public policy is to prevail, those arguments are best left to 
the legislature.  Having determined that there is no specific 
enforcement procedure in this case, we decline to address RATE’s 
public policy arguments.   
¶20 RATE finally argues that Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b) 
should not apply to counterclaims which strike directly at the 
No. 96-0688 
 
13
subject matter of the claim initiated by the City.5  RATE argues 
that the holding in Milwaukee v. Milwaukee Civic Developments 
(MCD), 71 Wis. 2d 647, 655, 239 N.W.2d 44 (1976), that notice of 
claim requirements applied to the counterclaim because it 
separately and affirmatively demanded money damages, indicates 
that the notice requirements should not apply in this case where 
RATE’s counterclaim requests declaratory, rather than monetary 
relief.  However, RATE fails to acknowledge the change in 
legislative language which occurred after MCD was decided.  As 
discussed earlier in this opinion, ch. 285, Laws of 1977 changed 
the scope of application of the notice requirements from only 
“actions founded on tort” to all actions.  Therefore, this 
court’s 
application 
of 
the 
notice 
requirements 
to 
MCD’s 
counterclaim for money damages, but not to MCD’s counterclaims 
for equitable relief, has been superseded by legislative action.  
¶21 In sum, we see no alternative under the statute and 
case law but to affirm the order granting summary judgment to 
the City and dismissing RATE’s counterclaim because RATE failed 
to 
comply 
with 
the 
notice 
requirements 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
                     
5 At oral argument, counsel for RATE also stated that an 
issue before the court is the applicability of Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(1)(b) to claims under Wis. Stat. ch. 227, providing for 
judicial review of administrative actions.  We decline to 
address this issue.  Chapter 227 review was not briefed by 
either party and both the City’s and Land Reclamation Company’s 
Petitions for chapter 227 review were dismissed by the circuit 
court and not appealed.  
No. 96-0688 
 
14
§ 893.80(1)(b).6  While we find merit in the utility of RATE’s 
arguments, our hands are tied by the plain language of 
                     
6 It is unclear whether the dissent would apply the notice 
of claim statute, Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b) (1993-94), to all 
counterclaims in addition to the counterclaim RATE filed against 
the City of Racine.   
A counterclaim, especially viewed in context of the 
purposes of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b), can and often does have 
the same effect as an original action.  Yet the dissent would 
have us reject application of § 893.80(1)(b) simply because 
RATE’s “action” carried the label of “counterclaim.”  This is 
evidenced by the dissent’s concession in its footnote 6 that a 
counterclaim has characteristics of an action and may be 
transformed into an “action” within the meaning of § 893.80(1) 
if the “counterclaim” survives dismissal of the “action.”  The 
dissent would allow parties such as RATE to escape the broad 
command of § 893.80(1)(b) simply because RATE’s claim carries a 
different name - counterclaim.  This analysis ignores the policy 
purposes behind § 893.80(1) - that of giving the governmental 
entity an opportunity to compromise and settle claims and to 
plan financially for settlement or litigation. 
The dissent’s position is particularly troubling in light 
of the fact that the claims asserted in a counterclaim need not 
be limited to the issues raised in the initial claim.  See Wis. 
Stat. §§ 802.02(1)(a), 802.02(5), 802.07(1), and 803.02.  A 
party could answer a city’s lawsuit with a counterclaim, 
asserting rights that otherwise might be the subject of an 
independent action and having no connection whatever to the 
city’s 
initial 
claim. 
 
In 
fact, 
“Wisconsin’s 
liberal 
counterclaim practice gives almost literal truth to the old saw 
that ‘”plaintiff” is just a name for the [person] who reaches 
the courthouse first.’”  Callaghan’s Wis Pl & Pr (3rd Ed), 
§ 21.43 at 437 (1992).   
No. 96-0688 
 
15
§ 893.80(1)(b).  Were we a legislative body, we might limit the 
notice requirements to tort actions, but we are not such a 
governmental branch.  Our role is to interpret statutes to 
discern legislative intent.  Here, unlike Auchinleck, RATE has 
presented no specific statutory enforcement mechanism which 
might take precedence over the general notice requirements.  
Therefore, we hold that compliance with § 893.80(1)(b) is a 
necessary prerequisite to all actions brought against the 
entities 
listed 
in 
the 
statute, 
including 
governmental 
subdivisions, whether a tort or non-tort action, and whether 
brought as an initial claim, counterclaim or cross-claim.  
Except as provided by statute or case law interpreting those 
                                                                  
The dissent provides no guidance to help circuit courts 
determine whether a counterclaim must be similar, and if so how 
similar to the initial claim to avoid the requirements of the 
notice of claim statute.  These practical considerations render 
application of the dissent’s position highly problematic.  The 
dissent’s position would breed countless litigation as parties 
struggle to determine where the line is drawn.  The dissent 
would encourage piecemeal attacks to Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b). 
 If the statute should be changed, as it perhaps should, these 
efforts should be directed to the legislature where the problem 
began. 
No. 96-0688 
 
16
statutes, a party must file a notice of claim and follow the 
statutory procedures set forth in § 893.80(1)(b) before bringing 
any action against a governmental subdivision.   
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is affirmed. 
 
No. 98-0688.ssa 
 
1 
¶22  SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
CHIEF 
JUSTICE (dissenting).   I dissent because I conclude that Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80(1)(b) (1993-94)7 has no application to RATE's 
counterclaim in this case.8 
¶23 Let me summarize the undisputed procedural facts to 
put this case in the proper context.  The procedural facts are 
as follows:   
¶24 (1) The City of Racine brought an action in circuit 
court seeking review of, among other decisions, the Waste 
Facility Siting Board's determination to disqualify four City 
representatives from sitting on the local siting committee. 
¶25 (2) RATE intervened in the City's action and filed a 
counterclaim against the City, seeking a declaratory judgment to 
disqualify the City's representatives from sitting on the local 
siting committee.  
¶26 (3) The Town of Mt. Pleasant also intervened in the 
City's action, seeking the same relief as that sought by RATE, 
namely 
a 
declaratory 
judgment 
affirming 
the 
Board's 
disqualification of the City's representatives from the local 
siting committee.9  
                     
7 All references to Wisconsin statutes are to the 1993-94 
statutes unless otherwise indicated. 
8 RATE's pleading is labeled a counterclaim and cross claim. 
 The majority opinion refers only to the counterclaim.  I shall 
use the same terminology, recognizing that counterclaims and 
cross claims are different.  See Wis. Stat. § 802.07. 
9 The Town had appeared at the Board proceedings and sought 
disqualification of the City representatives from the local 
siting committee.  The Board ruled in favor of the Town. 
No. 98-0688.ssa 
 
2 
¶27 (4) The circuit court found that RATE's counterclaim 
for declaratory judgment sought in essence the same relief as 
the Town's counterclaim for declaratory judgment.  
¶28 (5) The City sought summary judgment against RATE and 
the Town, arguing that each had failed to comply with the notice 
of claims statute, Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b).  The City later 
conceded that the Town had presented a notice of claim, and the 
circuit court denied the City's summary judgment motion against 
the Town.  
¶29 (6) The circuit court granted the summary judgment 
motion against RATE for RATE's failure to comply with the notice 
of claims statute.  
¶30 I conclude from the procedural history that Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(1)(b) has no application in this case.  I base this 
conclusion on (1) the text of the statute; (2) the legislative 
history of the statute; (3) the legislative purpose of the 
statute; and (4) case law interpreting the statute.   
¶31 First, the text of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b) does not 
support the majority's holding.  On examination of the text we 
see that § 893.80(1) does not expressly apply to counterclaims. 
 Section 
893.80(1) 
governs 
an 
"action 
 . . . brought 
or 
maintained against any . . . governmental subdivision . . . upon 
a claim or cause of action" (emphasis added).  The majority 
opinion studies the word "claim," not "action."10 
                     
10 The parties, like the majority opinion, focus on the word 
"claim" in Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b); they too have overlooked 
the word "action." 
No. 98-0688.ssa 
 
3 
¶32 In using the words "action" and "claim" in Wis. Stat. 
§§ 893.80(1)(a) and 893.80(1)(b), the legislature must have 
intended the words to have different meanings.  The use of the 
word "action" in § 893.80(1) is similar to the use of the word 
"action" 
in 
chapters 
801-847, 
Wisconsin 
civil 
procedure 
statutes.  The word "action" typically refers to the plaintiff's 
commencement 
of 
a 
proceeding. 
 
In 
contrast, 
the 
word 
"counterclaim," when used in the statutes, typically refers to 
pleadings by a defendant in an action brought or maintained by a 
plaintiff.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 802.07 (counterclaims are 
claims brought by a defendant against a plaintiff); § 803.04(1) 
(permissive joinder of parties occurs in an already pending 
action); § 803.09 (intervention occurs in an already pending 
action).  
¶33 In several statutes the word "action" is distinguished 
from the word "counterclaim."  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 814.025 
(governing 
costs 
for 
frivolous 
actions 
by 
plaintiff 
and 
frivolous counterclaims by defendant); § 893.14 (distinguishing 
                                                                  
The court has decided that a counterclaim is a claim under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.80(1) 
but 
has 
not 
decided 
whether 
a 
counterclaim is an action under the statute.  In Milwaukee v. 
Milwaukee Civic Developments, Inc. (MCD), 71 Wis. 2d 647, 656-
58, 239 N.W.2d 44 (1976), the court concluded that the former 
notice of claim statute applied to a counterclaim for money 
damages.  MCD, however, focused on whether a counterclaim is an 
action under the notice of claims statute, not on whether a 
counterclaim is an action under the notice of claims statute 
brought or maintained against the municipality.  Thus MCD does 
not address the question in this case, whether a counterclaim is 
an action brought or maintained against a municipality under the 
notice of claims statute. 
No. 98-0688.ssa 
 
4 
between period of limitation for commencement of actions by 
plaintiff and period of limitation for counterclaims).   
¶34 Perhaps most significant is the statute governing 
notice of claims against the state.  The state notice of claims 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 893.82, defines a civil action to include 
a counterclaim.11  Section 893.80(1)(b), by contrast, does not 
define "action" to include a counterclaim. 
¶35 The majority opinion asserts that the plain language 
of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1) ties its hands.  See majority op. at 
14.  But the majority opinion has failed to consider the plain 
language of § 893.80(1) and instead falls back on DNR v. City of 
Waukesha, 184 Wis. 2d 178, 191, 515 N.W.2d 888 (1994), in which 
the court stated that § 893.80(1)(b) "applies to all causes of 
action, not just those in tort and not just those for money 
damages."  This language deviates from, rather than tracks, the 
statutory language of § 893.80(1).  Section § 893.80(1) does not 
use the phrase "all causes of action"; rather it states that "no 
action may be brought or maintained" against a municipality.   
¶36 In addition to overlooking the statute's use of the 
word "action," the majority opinion overlooks that both Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.80(1)(a) 
and 
§ 893.80(1)(b) 
refer 
to 
the 
governmental subdivision as the defendant.  Section 893.80(1)(a) 
states that failure to give notice of injury does not bar action 
if the governmental subdivision has actual notice of the claim 
                     
11 See also Wis. Stat. § 401.201(1), a general provision of 
the Uniform Commercial Code expressly defining "action" to 
include a counterclaim.  
No. 98-0688.ssa 
 
5 
and the claimant shows that the failure to give notice "has not 
been prejudicial to the defendant" governmental subdivision.  
Section 893.80(1)(b) states that "[n]o action on a claim against 
any defendant . . . subdivision or agency . . . may be brought 
after 6 months from the date of service of the notice" (emphasis 
added).  
¶37 In sum, the majority opinion fails to focus on the 
textual questions presented:  Does a counterclaim constitute an 
"action" brought or maintained against a municipality, and how 
can Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1), which refers to a defendant 
governmental subdivision, be interpreted to apply to a plaintiff 
municipality?  Instead the majority opinion concentrates on 
whether a claim must be founded on tort or equitable relief 
under § 893.80(1)(b).  
¶38 I conclude on the basis of the text of Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(1)(b) that RATE's counterclaim is not an "action" under 
the 
statute 
and 
that 
the 
statute 
applies 
only 
when 
a 
governmental subdivision is a defendant in a lawsuit, not when 
the government subdivision is a plaintiff against whom a 
counterclaim is filed under the circumstances of this case.12  
                     
12 While the Wisconsin statutes do not generally treat a 
counterclaim as an action, I recognize that a counterclaim has 
characteristics of an action and could be the subject matter of 
an 
independent 
action 
if 
it 
were 
not 
interposed 
as 
a 
counterclaim.  
No. 98-0688.ssa 
 
6 
¶39 Second, the majority opinion's lengthy recitation of 
the legislative history to Wis. Stat. § 898.80(1)(b) mistakenly 
focuses on the application of the statute to tort claims in 
contrast 
to 
non-tort 
claims, 
rather 
than 
on 
whether 
counterclaims are actions brought or maintained under the 
statute and whether the statute applies when the governmental 
subdivision is the plaintiff rather than the defendant.  The 
majority opinion fails to recognize what is clear from the 
legislative history:  that the legislature, in recreating 
§ 895.43 
(the 
predecessor 
to 
§ 893.80(1)), 
contemplated 
situations in which municipalities are sued as defendants, not 
situations in which municipalities initiate litigation.   
¶40 The prefatory note to ch. 285, Laws of 1977, explains 
that 
the 
act 
created 
uniform 
procedures 
to 
follow 
when 
"prosecuting a claim" against a municipality.  The prefatory 
note further states that "[n]otice of disallowance of a claim 
 . . .  shall include a statement of the date of disallowance 
and time during which a claimant may commence a court action" 
and that "suits [must] be commenced within 6 months of the date 
of service of notice of allowance" (emphasis added). 
                                                                  
In the event a plaintiff's action is dismissed and a 
defendant's counterclaim survives dismissal of the action, the 
counterclaim may become an "action . . . brought or maintained" 
against a municipality.  When the counterclaim thus becomes an 
action against a municipality, it may then have to meet all the 
requirements of an action.  The municipality might then raise 
the notice of claim issue.  See Sewerage Comm'n of Milwaukee v. 
DNR, 102 Wis. 2d 613, 633-34 n.6, 307 N.W.2d 189 (1981) 
(dismissing 
plaintiff's 
action 
but 
allowing 
defendant's 
counterclaim to lie barring some jurisdictional defect).   
No. 98-0688.ssa 
 
7 
¶41 The language "prosecuting a claim," "claimant may 
commence a court action," and "suits [must] be commenced" as 
used in the prefatory note demonstrate that the legislature 
contemplated situations in which claimant-plaintiffs commence 
litigation against municipality-defendants.  The prefatory note 
does not make sense when the notice of claim requirement is 
applied to a counterclaim brought by a claimant-defendant 
against a municipality-plaintiff in response to litigation the 
municipality commenced raising the very issue addressed in the 
counterclaim.  
¶42 I 
conclude 
that 
application 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.80(1)(b) to RATE's counterclaim is contrary to the 
legislative history of the notice of claims statute. 
¶43 Third, the legislative purpose in enacting Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(1)(b) is defeated by the majority's holding.  The 
purpose of the statute has been repeated numerous times in our 
case law:  Municipalities shall be afforded the opportunity to 
settle claims and to set aside funds to pay any anticipated 
judgments.  See DNR v. Waukesha, 184 Wis. 2d at 195; State ex 
rel. Auchinleck v. Town of LaGrange, 200 Wis. 2d 585, 593, 547 
N.W.2d 587 (1996).  
¶44 In this case the City brought the action and thus 
cannot maintain that notice of claim was needed to effect 
compromise without suit or to prevent litigation.  RATE's 
failure to file a notice of claim did not cost the City an 
opportunity to settle RATE's counterclaim.  By its own decision 
No. 98-0688.ssa 
 
8 
to commence litigation the City saw fit to discard the 
application of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b).13 
¶45 Furthermore, RATE's counterclaim was based exclusively 
on facts presented in the City's action and sought in essence 
the same relief as that sought by the Town.  The City concedes 
that the Town gave notice of its claim.  Under these 
circumstances the notice of claim requirement has no application 
to RATE's counterclaim. 
¶46 The holding of the majority opinion leads to the 
absurd result of allowing the City to press its claim against 
the Board while RATE, relying on the identical set of facts and 
substantially the same legal theories as the Board and the Town, 
is denied an opportunity to assert a counterclaim against the 
City.  Under the majority's reasoning, if the City had joined 
RATE as a party defendant in the action, RATE would be denied an 
effective defense against the City's action because the City 
could assert that RATE had not filed a notice of claim.  
¶47 I 
conclude 
that 
application 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.80(1)(b) to RATE's counterclaim is inconsistent with the 
purpose of the notice of claims statute.  As I explain later, 
                     
13 This court gave weight to this argument in State ex rel. 
Auchinleck v. Town of LaGrange, 200 Wis. 2d 585, 596, 547 N.W.2d 
587 (1996).  The Auchinleck court reasoned, in part, that when a 
municipality has control over whether a suit will be filed based 
on its actions so that the municipality contemplates the issues 
and decides at the outset what it believes to be the appropriate 
action, allowing that municipality an additional 120 days to 
contemplate how to respond to a claim in large part duplicates 
the process in which the municipality has already engaged.  
No. 98-0688.ssa 
 
9 
the majority opinion is also inconsistent with a purpose of the 
counterclaim statute.  
¶48 Fourth, the case law does not support the majority's 
position.  DNR v. Waukesha, the centerpiece of the majority 
opinion, 
involves 
a 
set 
of 
facts 
wholly 
distinct 
and 
distinguishable from this case, and DNR v. Waukesha is, as the 
court has already said, too broadly written.   
¶49 The DNR v. Waukesha court considered the applicability 
of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b) to an action brought by the DNR 
against the City of Waukesha to enforce an environmental 
regulation.  In this case, by contrast, a declaratory relief 
action was brought by the City against the Board.  DNR v. 
Waukesha therefore is not controlling since this case involves a 
municipality acting as the initiator of litigation, not as the 
defendant in a lawsuit.  
¶50 Moreover, in the short time since DNR v. Waukesha was 
decided, this court has retreated from a universal application 
of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b).  See Auchinleck, 200 Wis. 2d 585. 
 In Auchinleck the court held that § 893.80(1)(b) does not apply 
to actions commenced under the open records and open meetings 
laws.   
¶51 The Auchinleck court stated that the "all actions" 
language from DNR "is too broad," and concluded that the open 
meetings and open records laws are exempt from the notice of 
claim requirement because the policy of public access to 
governmental affairs underlying those laws would be undermined 
by strict adherence to the notice of claims statute.  Id. at 
No. 98-0688.ssa 
 
10
597.  In this case the majority opinion's conclusion defeats a 
purpose of the counterclaim statute, namely disposing of all 
points of controversy between the litigants in one action in 
order to avoid multiple suits.14   
¶52 There are other exceptions to the "all actions" 
language of DNR v. Waukesha.  For instance, the notice of claim 
requirement is preempted pursuant to the Supremacy Clause when a 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is brought in a state court.  See Felder 
v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988).  Will the court refuse to 
view an injunctive proceeding requiring immediate judicial 
action or a declaratory judgment suit challenging governmental 
action on constitutional grounds as exceptions to the "all 
actions" language of DNR v. Waukesha? 
¶53 In summary, I conclude that the application of the 
notice 
of 
claim 
requirement 
to 
RATE's 
counterclaim 
is 
inconsistent with the text, the legislative history and the 
purpose of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b), and is not supported by 
the case law interpreting the statute.  Accordingly I would 
reverse the circuit court decision granting summary judgment 
against RATE for failure to comply with § 893.80(1)(b). 
¶54 For the foregoing reasons I dissent. 
                     
14 A purpose of the counterclaim statute is to dispose of 
all points of controversy between the litigants in one action in 
order to avoid multiple suits.  See 3 Jay E. Grenig & Walter L. 
Harvey, Wisconsin Practice:  Civil Procedure § 207.2, at 282 (2d 
ed. 1994); 6 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary K. Kane, 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1406, at 31-32 (2d ed. 1990). 
No. 98-0688.ssa 
 
11
¶55 I am authorized to state that Justice Janine P. Geske 
and Justice Ann Walsh Bradley join this opinion. 
 
 
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