Title: Norman O. Brown v. Jody Bradley
Citation: 2003 WI 14
Docket Number: 2001AP003324-W
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: March 6, 2003

2003 WI 14 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-3324-W 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Norman O. Brown,  
 
Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Jody Bradley, Warden, North Fork Correctional 
Facility, and Jon Litscher, Secretary, 
Department of Corrections,  
 
Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 6, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 8, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
SYKES, J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner there was a brief by Greg J. Carman, 
Shorewood, and oral argument by Greg J. Carman. 
 
For the respondents the cause was argued by James M. 
Freimuth, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
2003 WI 14 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-3324-W  
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Norman O.  
Brown,  
 
          Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Jody Bradley, Warden, North Fork  
Correctional Facility and Jon Litscher,  
Secretary, Department of Corrections,  
 
          Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 6, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ORIGINAL PETITION for writ of habeas corpus.  Writ granted; 
rights declared.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The Petitioner, Norman O. 
Brown, seeks reinstatement of his petition for review which was 
previously dismissed as untimely filed.1  Brown contends that 
this court should apply retroactively the tolling rule for pro 
                                                 
1 The petitioner had filed the petition seeking review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals.  State v. Brown, 
Nos. 99-2567-CR and 99-2568-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. 
App. July 6, 2000) (affirming orders denying his postconviction 
motions for plea withdrawal issued by the Circuit Court for Dane 
County, Maryann Sumi, Judge).   
No. 
01-3324-W   
 
2 
 
se prisoners that it adopted in State ex rel. Nichols v. 
Litscher, 2001 WI 119, 247 Wis. 2d 1013, 635 N.W.2d 292, and 
deem his petition for review "timely." 
¶2 
We now conclude that the tolling rule we adopted in 
Nichols is a civil procedural rule with limited retroactive 
application.  It applies retroactively to cases on direct review 
or not yet final when Nichols was decided and to pro se 
prisoners who had raised the issue in habeas petitions that were 
still pending before this court.  Because this court denied 
Brown's petition for review prior to deciding Nichols, he is not 
entitled to relief under this application of the tolling rule.  
However, we determine that denying relief to Brown would be 
unjust because this court denied Brown's petition for habeas 
corpus while nearly simultaneously granting Nichols' petition 
raising virtually the same claim.  Accordingly, we reinstate 
Brown's petition for review pursuant to Harmann v. Hadley, 128 
Wis. 2d 371, 382 N.W.2d 673 (1986). 
I 
 
¶3 
Brown's petition for review stemmed from the circuit 
court's denial of his motion to withdraw his no contest plea.2  
The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, and 
remanded the case to the circuit court to determine whether the 
prosecution had breached the plea agreement it reached with 
                                                 
2 Brown pled no contest to six counts of forgery-uttering, 
party to the crime, as a repeat offender.  He was subsequently 
convicted and sentenced to three consecutive five-year prison 
terms, and to 16 years of probation, to run after his release 
from prison.   
No. 
01-3324-W   
 
3 
 
Brown.  The circuit court determined that no breach occurred, 
and the court of appeals affirmed that determination on July 6, 
2000. 
 
State 
v. 
Brown, 
Nos. 
99-2567-CR 
and 
99-2568-CR, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. July 6, 2000). 
 
¶4 
Brown, 
who 
was 
incarcerated 
in 
the 
North 
Fork 
Correctional Facility in Sayre, Oklahoma, submitted to this 
court a pro se petition for review.  Under Wis. Stat. § 808.10 
and Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 809.62(1), he had 30 days to file his 
petition.  This court did not receive Brown's petition for 
review until August 9, 2000, two days after the statutory 
deadline.  It therefore dismissed the petition as untimely.        
 
¶5 
Brown subsequently wrote the court, outlining the 
steps he had taken to prepare and file his petition for review, 
and asking that the court accept his petition as timely filed.  
This court treated Brown's correspondence as a motion for 
reconsideration and denied it.  Brown then filed a petition for 
a writ of habeas corpus, which the court denied.  Finally, on 
December 12, 2001, after this court had decided Nichols and 
adopted a tolling rule for pro se prisoners' petitions for 
review, Brown filed another habeas petition, claiming that the 
tolling rule should apply to his petition for review.     
II 
 
¶6 
This court ordered briefing on only one issue: 
"whether the tolling rule adopted in [Nichols] should receive 
prospective or retroactive application."  To resolve this issue, 
we first examine Nichols to set the stage for our discussion. 
No. 
01-3324-W   
 
4 
 
 
¶7 
Much as in this case, Nichols involved a pro se 
prisoner's attempt to file a petition for this court's review.3  
Nichols, 247 Wis. 2d 1013, ¶3.  The filing deadline for Nichols' 
petition was February 25, 2000, 30 days after the court of 
appeals affirmed his conviction.  Nichols gave his completed 
petition to the prison librarian for copying on February 15, 
2000.  He received the copies on a Friday afternoon, February 
18, 2000, too late for outgoing mail on that day.  The prison 
mailroom was closed on the weekend.  Id. at ¶¶2-4. 
 
¶8 
Nichols delivered the petition to the mailroom on 
Monday, February 21.  The clerk of court received the petition 
on Monday, February 28, three days after the deadline.  This 
court dismissed the petition for review as untimely, and then 
denied Nichols' subsequent petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  
Id. at ¶¶4-6. 
 
¶9 
On reconsideration, Nichols urged the court to adopt a 
"prison mailbox rule" whereby a pro se prisoner's petition would 
be considered filed when delivered to the proper prison 
authorities for mailing.  Id. at ¶6.  Such a rule had been 
established by the Supreme Court in Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 
266 (1988).  We declined to implement the prison mailbox rule, 
but instead adopted a similar "tolling" rule that had been 
employed by the court of appeals in State ex rel. Shimkus v. 
                                                 
3 Like Brown, Nichols was incarcerated in the North Fork 
Correctional Facility.  State ex rel. Nichols v. Litscher, 2001 
WI 119, ¶2, 247 Wis. 2d 1013, 635 N.W.2d 292.   
No. 
01-3324-W   
 
5 
 
Sondalle, 2000 WI App 238, 239 Wis. 2d 327, 620 N.W.2d 409.  
Nichols, 247 Wis. 2d 1013, ¶24. 
 
¶10 
We concluded that "the 30-day deadline for receipt of 
a petition for review is tolled on the date that a pro se 
prisoner delivers a correctly addressed petition to the proper 
prison authorities for mailing."  Id. at ¶32.  We further 
determined that the tolling rule applied to Nichols.  Id.  
However, we specifically declined to determine whether the rule 
would generally apply retroactively or prospectively, noting 
that "because [Wis. Stat.] § 808.10 applies to all petitions for 
review, both 
civil 
and 
criminal, 
it 
is 
unclear if the 
retroactivity analysis used in civil cases should govern."  Id. 
at ¶30.  We stated that a determination of retroactive or 
prospective application "should be made with the benefit of 
briefs and argument on the merits by parties who take adverse 
positions."  Id. at ¶31. 
 
¶11 
In the present case, the parties' disagreement is 
largely over the degree to which the tolling rule should apply 
retroactively, and over whether the rule is a civil or a 
criminal rule.  Brown argues that the civil procedural rules 
apply, in part because one of the statutes governing the filing 
of petitions for review, Wis. Stat. § 808.10,4 is located within 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 808.10 provides: 
A decision of the court of appeals is reviewable 
by the supreme court only upon a petition for review 
granted by the supreme court. The petition for review 
shall be filed in the supreme court within 30 days of 
the date of the decision of the court of appeals. 
No. 
01-3324-W   
 
6 
 
the chapters of the statutes which govern civil procedure.  He 
further asserts that under either civil or criminal analysis, he 
is entitled to relief. 
 
¶12 
The State initially advances that the tolling rule is 
a criminal procedural rule.  It then briefly asserts that if the 
rule is civil in nature, it should be applied prospectively.  
Ultimately, it argues that regardless of whether it is civil or 
criminal, prospective or retroactive, it should apply only to 
cases pending on direct review or not yet final when Nichols was 
decided and to pro se prisoners who filed habeas petitions 
seeking a prison mailbox rule before Nichols was decided but 
whose petitions were not yet acted upon by this court. 
 
¶13 In 
general, 
rules 
for 
criminal 
procedure 
apply 
retroactively only to those cases pending on direct review or 
not yet final.  Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987); 
State v. Koch, 175 Wis. 2d 684, 694, 499 N.W.2d 152 (1993).  The 
standards for civil procedural rules differ in that retroactive 
application is presumed.  Browne v. WERC, 169 Wis. 2d 79, 112, 
485 N.W.2d 376 (1992).  In Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 
(1971), the Supreme Court established factors to consider in 
determining whether the presumption is overcome such that the 
new civil rule would apply prospectively.  This court adopted 
No. 
01-3324-W   
 
7 
 
the Chevron standards in Kurtz v. City of Waukesha, 91 
Wis. 2d 103, 109, 280 N.W.2d 757 (1979).5 
 
¶14 We determine that civil standards apply.  Nothing in 
the language of the statutes setting a time limit for the filing 
of 
petitions 
for 
review, 
Wis. Stat. §§ 808.10 
or 
809.62, 
indicates that the statutes are criminal in nature.  Sections 
808.10 and 809.62 apply to petitions regarding both civil and 
criminal matters.  While the tolling rule in question applies 
only to petitions filed by pro se prisoners, those prisoners may 
file petitions relating to matters other than their convictions—
—matters that are civil in nature.  We conclude, much as the 
court did in M.W. v. Monroe County DHS, 116 Wis. 2d 432, 442, 
342 N.W.2d 410 (1984), that because the statutes at issue are 
essentially civil in nature, we will apply the civil standards 
set forth in Chevron and Kurtz. 
¶15 We next consider whether the application of the new 
rule should be retroactive or prospective.  To aid in this 
                                                 
5 The Supreme Court has abandoned the standards it announced 
in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971), and now applies 
the standard it announced in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S 314 
(1987) (new rules are retroactive to cases pending on direct 
review or not final) to new civil rules as well as new criminal 
rules.  See Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 
97 (1993); State v. Thiel, 2001 WI App 52, ¶10 n.6, 241 
Wis. 2d 439, 625 N.W.2d 321.  The court of appeals in Thiel 
declined to follow Harper, noting that Harper applies only to 
the interpretation of federal law, and that amending Wisconsin's 
standards is the role of the Wisconsin Supreme Court.  Thiel, 
239 Wis. 2d 432, ¶10 n.6.  In this case, although briefly noted, 
neither party argued or briefed the issue of whether the Harper 
standard should apply.  Thus, we do not address the issue. 
No. 
01-3324-W   
 
8 
 
determination, Chevron/Kurtz sets forth three factors for our 
consideration: 
(1) Does the rule "establish a new principle of law, 
either by overruling clear past precedent on which 
litigants may have relied, or by deciding an issue of 
first impression whose resolution was not clearly 
foreshadowed"? 
(2) Will retroactive operation further or retard the 
operation of the rule in question? 
(3) Will retroactive application produce substantial 
inequitable results?  
 
          
Chevron, 404 U.S. at 106. 
 
¶16 
Wisconsin generally adheres to the doctrine that 
retroactive application of judicial decisions is the rule, not 
the exception.  State v. Thiel, 2001 WI App 52, ¶7, 241 
Wis. 2d 439, 
625 
N.W.2d 321. 
 
Yet, 
sometimes 
retroactive 
application of a new rule is unsettling because of a justifiable 
reliance on a contrary view of the law.   
 
¶17 
The Chevron/Kurtz factors require us to consider if 
reliance on a contrary rule of law was so justified and so 
detrimental as to require deviation from the traditional 
retroactive application.  A prospective application of a new 
rule is used to mitigate hardships that may occur by retroactive 
application.  Harmann, 128 Wis. 2d at 378-379. 
 
¶18 
The first Chevron/Kurtz factor inquires whether the 
new rule overruled clear past precedent or decided an issue of 
first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed.  
Nichols did not overrule any clear past precedent.  Brown 
contends, however, that because this court "relied heavily" on 
No. 
01-3324-W   
 
9 
 
Houston, 487 U.S. 266, its adoption of the tolling rule in 
Nichols was clearly foreshadowed.  We disagree.   
 
¶19 
Until the Nichols decision, the 30-day period for 
filing petitions for review operated for 23 years without a 
tolling rule for pro se prisoners.  Thirteen years elapsed 
between the adoption of the "prison mailbox rule" announced in 
Houston and our decision in Nichols.  After discussing the 
proposed "prison mailbox rule," we declined to adopt it and 
reaffirmed that depositing a petition in a prison mailbox does 
not constitute a filing of the petition.  Nichols, 247 
Wis. 2d 1013, ¶¶11, 20, 24. 
 
¶20 
Instead, we embraced the tolling rule that the court 
of appeals had adopted in Shimkus, 239 Wis. 2d 327.  Admittedly, 
determining whether Shimkus foreshadowed our decision in Nichols 
presents us with a close call.  We note, however, that Shimkus 
involved a different statute and different procedures.  Id. at 
¶¶24-25.  We conclude that while the Shimkus decision certainly 
guided our decision in Nichols, neither Houston nor Shimkus 
clearly foreshadowed the adoption of a tolling rule for pro se 
prisoners filing a petition for review.  
 
¶21 
The Chevron/Kurtz second factor draws us to consider 
if retroactivity would further or retard the operation of the 
Nichols tolling rule.  Brown argues that retroactivity would 
further the operation of the rule and would ensure that 
similarly 
situated 
prisoners 
would 
be 
treated 
alike.  
Conversely, the State argues for limited retroactivity and 
contends that a full retroactive application of the rule is more 
No. 
01-3324-W   
 
10 
 
apt to retard than promote its purpose of aiding pro se 
prisoners who timely give their petitions to proper prison 
authorities for mailing.  The State asserts that it would be 
difficult or impossible in many cases to determine whether 
petitions dismissed as untimely were actually timely delivered 
to prison officials for mailing. 
 
¶22 
We agree with the State that full retroactivity could 
create a myriad of problems which frustrate the operation of the 
rule.  We acknowledged in Nichols that both Nichols and the 
State agreed that the use of a certificate of mailing would 
resolve factual questions regarding whether a prisoner had 
timely and appropriately delivered a petition for mailing.  
Nichols, 247 Wis. 2d 1013, ¶27.  We concluded that use of such a 
certificate "would create a rebuttable presumption that the 
prisoner had delivered his or her petition to the proper prison 
authorities on the particular day certified."  Id.   
 
¶23 
In Nichols we also noted the State's averment that 
"many prisons do not have a general 'log-in' system that 
identifies the date on which a prisoner submits outgoing mail."  
Id.  Nichols put both prison officials and prisoners on notice 
of the importance of keeping such records.   
 
¶24 
Full retroactivity of the tolling rule would include 
petitions 
filed 
before 
Nichols, 
and 
before 
we 
discussed 
including an affidavit or certificate of mailing.  Petitioners 
who had not taken the step of including an affidavit or 
certificate of mailing would often have no evidence other than 
their testimony regarding whether they timely delivered for 
No. 
01-3324-W   
 
11 
 
mailing a petition for review.  The State would often have no 
evidence regarding timeliness other than the fact of the 
untimely filing.  Under these circumstances, a court would have 
no adequate method of determining whether the tolling rule 
should apply in a given case.  Thus, we agree with the State 
that limited retroactivity here promotes the purpose of the rule 
but that full retroactivity is more apt to frustrate the 
operation of the rule. 
 
¶25 
The third Chevron/Kurtz factor requires us to consider 
the equities of retroactivity.  We note again the difficulties 
with full retroactivity in determining whether a petition 
dismissed as untimely would have been timely under the tolling 
rule.  Although the burden of persuasion regarding proof of 
mailing is on the prisoner, the State may be disadvantaged due 
to the passage of time in countering prisoners' claims of timely 
delivery of petitions for review.  We also consider the 
interests that the State, crime victims, and others have in the 
finality of cases.  Full retroactive application could produce 
inequitable results because it opens up cases that have long 
been thought by everyone, including crime victims, to have been 
final. 
 
¶26 
Having considered the three Chevron/Kurtz factors, we 
conclude that neither a prospective nor a fully retroactive 
application of the tolling rule we adopted in Nichols is 
warranted.  A limited retroactive application best promotes the 
operation of the rule and produces the most equitable results.  
Such an approach permits some pro se prisoners to benefit from 
No. 
01-3324-W   
 
12 
 
the new rule without the accompanying difficult proof problems 
which frustrate the operation of the rule.  Additionally, a 
limited retroactive application recognizes the value of finality 
of cases and the inequities that result from reopening cases 
thought to be long since closed.   
 
¶27 
Limited retroactive application also is consistent 
with our holding in Schmelzer and the court of appeals holding 
in Thiel.  State ex rel. Schmelzer v. Murphy, 201 Wis. 2d 246, 
258-59, 548 N.W.2d 45 (1996); Thiel, 241 Wis. 2d 439, ¶¶18-19.  
In both cases, the court determined that a new rule should apply 
to matters on direct appeal that are not final before the date 
we adopted the new rule.6  Schmelzer also extended its 
application to petitioners who had raised the issue in habeas 
petitions that were still pending before this court.    
 
¶28 
Brown's petition for review was final and he had no 
pending habeas petition at the time we adopted the tolling rule 
in Nichols.  His petition for habeas corpus was denied on 
October 6, 2000, and his opportunity to petition the United 
States Supreme Court for certiorari had expired.  We issued the 
Nichols decision on November 6, 2001, approximately a year 
later.  In fact, we had not even granted Nichols' petition for 
review at the time we denied Brown's petition.  Brown's petition 
                                                 
6 A case is not final if "prosecution is pending, no 
judgment of conviction has been entered, the right to a state 
court appeal from a final judgment has not been exhausted, and 
the time for certiorari review in the United States Supreme 
Court has not expired."  Thiel, 241 Wis. 2d 439, ¶19 n.10; State 
v. Koch, 175 Wis. 2d 684, 694 n. 3, 499 N.W.2d 152 (1993). 
No. 
01-3324-W   
 
13 
 
therefore does not fall within the limited retroactivity 
appropriate for the tolling rule. 
III 
 
¶29 
Brown asserts that a decision to apply the tolling 
rule in such a way as to deny him relief is unjust.  He contends 
that he and Nichols were in virtually the same situation and 
took virtually the same actions in seeking review of their 
cases.  He notes that he filed a petition for review advocating 
a prison mailbox rule, and that we denied his petition only 
shortly before granting review of Nichols' petition.  Brown 
advances that our decision to deny his petition but to grant 
Nichols' 
petition 
was 
"somewhat 
of 
an 
arbitrary 
selection . . . bordering on serendipity." 
 
¶30 
We agree with Brown's argument that he and Nichols are 
similarly situated parties——the facts and procedural histories 
of the two cases are strikingly similar.7  
  
                                                 
7 "Similarly situated parties" are those whose cases are 
"factually and legally similar" and "share similar procedural 
histories."  Thiel, 241 Wis. 2d 239, ¶16 n.9 (citing Bell v. 
County of Milwaukee, 134 Wis. 2d 25, 28, 40-41, 396 N.W.2d 328 
(1986)).  
No. 
01-3324-W   
 
14 
 
 
Brown Case 
 
Nichols Case 
Motion for 
reconsidera-
tion of 
dismissal of 
petition for 
review-denied 
September 5, 2000 
 
Petition for writ of 
habeas corpus 
requesting review of 
dismissal of petition 
for review-denied 
September 12, 2000 
Shimkus decision 
September 14, 2000  
 
Shimkus decision 
September 14, 2000 
Petition for writ of 
habeas corpus 
requesting review of 
denial of reconsidera-
tion motion 
October 3, 2000 
 
Motion for 
reconsidera-tion of 
denial of habeas 
petition 
October 3, 2000 
 
Petition for writ of 
habeas corpus denied 
October 6, 2000 
 
Motion for 
reconsidera-tion 
granted 
December 12, 2000 
 
¶31 
We addressed a similar situation in Harmann v. Hadley, 
128 Wis. 2d 371, 382 N.W.2d 673 (1986).  In Harmann, the 
petitioner (Harmann) filed a negligence action against two 
adults who furnished alcohol to a minor who consumed the alcohol 
and then caused injury to Harmann.  Id. at 372.  The complaint 
was dismissed by the circuit court because the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court had held in Olson v. Copeland, 90 Wis. 2d 483, 280 
N.W.2d 178 (1979), that the negligent furnishing of alcohol was 
not the cause of the injury.  Harmann, 128 Wis. 2d at 372.  This 
court denied Harmann's petition to bypass the court of appeals.  
While the appeal was pending, this court issued Sorensen v. 
Jarvis, 
119 
Wis. 2d 627, 
644-45, 
350 
N.W.2d 108 
(1984), 
overruling Olson. 
 
¶32 
Meanwhile, this court held in Koback v. Crook, 123 
Wis. 2d 259, 276, 366 N.W.2d 857 (1985), that a social host was 
liable for injury caused by a minor to whom the host had 
No. 
01-3324-W   
 
15 
 
negligently furnished alcohol.  The Koback decision, issued on 
April 30, 1985, was applied prospectively.  The court employed 
the device of "sunbursting,"8 determining that the holding would 
apply prospectively where "the conduct which causes injury 
occurs on or after September 1, 1985," and also to the parties 
in the case.  Id. at 277; see Harmann, 128 Wis. 2d at 373-74, 
378.  Harmann's action was not covered by the prospective 
application of the Koback holding, and the court of appeals 
affirmed the dismissal of the case on May 29, 1985.  Harmann, 
128 Wis. 2d at 372-74. 
 
¶33 
This court then determined that a failure to apply the 
Koback rule to Harmann would be unjust.  The court stated that 
"[t]he chance, but determinative, circumstance here is the 
timing of the Harmanns' petition to bypass."  Id. at 383.  The 
court noted that while Harmann's case was pending in the court 
of appeals, it granted the petition to bypass in Koback.  It 
stated: 
The Kobacks and the Harmanns were pursuing the 
same claims in the circuit court, the court of 
appeals, and this court during the same time period.  
Because of the procedural histories of the Sorensen, 
Koback and Harmann cases and our remanding Harmann to 
the court of appeals rather than holding it pending 
the outcome of Sorensen, the plaintiffs in Koback and 
Sorensen received the benefit of our new rules, while 
the Harmann plaintiffs did not.   
                                                 
8 "Sunbursting" is "prospective overruling" used to limit 
the effect of a new rule.  Harmann v. Hadley, 128 Wis. 2d 371, 
382 N.W.2d 673 (1986).  
No. 
01-3324-W   
 
16 
 
A basic tenet in our judicial system is that 
individuals 
similarly 
situated 
should 
be 
treated 
similarly.  When we examine the procedural histories 
of the Sorensen, Koback and Harmann cases, we find it 
is hard to justify denying the Harmanns the benefit of 
the Koback rule when months before Koback they 
presented the same issue to this court.  Had we 
withheld our decision on the Harmann petition to 
bypass perhaps the Kobacks, rather than the Harmanns, 
would 
now 
be 
seeking 
relief 
from 
the 
rule 
of 
prospectivity. 
Id. at 384-85. 
¶34 The court concluded based on the similar procedural 
histories of the cases that it could not "in all fairness deny 
the Harmanns their day in court."  Id. at 386.  It noted that 
"[b]ut for our decision to deny the Harmann petition to bypass, 
the Harmann case would have established the rule of liability 
and subjected the defendants in this case to liability."  Id. 
¶35  We think that the reasoning of Harmann is applicable 
to this case.  As we noted above, the procedural histories of 
Nichols and Brown are extremely similar.  Brown's motion for 
reconsideration was denied September 5, 2000.  Nichols' habeas 
petition was denied September 12, 2000.  Brown filed a habeas 
petition on October 3, 2000.  Nichols moved for reconsideration 
on the very same day, October 3, 2000.  Yet, we denied Brown's 
No. 
01-3324-W   
 
17 
 
habeas 
petition 
and 
we 
granted 
Nichols' 
motion 
for 
reconsideration.9 
¶36 We conclude that because Brown and Nichols are 
similarly situated parties, it would be unjust under these 
circumstances to grant relief to Nichols while denying relief to 
Brown.  We therefore grant Brown's petition for writ of habeas 
corpus and reinstate his petition for review. 
IV 
 
¶37 
In sum, we hold that the tolling rule for the filing 
of petitions for review by pro se prisoners set forth in 
Nichols, 247 Wis. 2d 1013, applies retroactively to cases on 
direct appeal that were not finalized before the date we adopted 
the tolling rule and to pro se prisoners who had raised the 
issue in habeas petitions that were still pending before this 
court.  We further conclude that because Brown is "similarly 
situated" to Nichols, and because it would be unjust to deny him 
relief under the procedural history of this case, we grant Brown 
the relief he has requested.     
 
By the Court.—The petition for writ of habeas corpus is 
granted; rights declared. 
                                                 
9 Harmann provided a specific remedy in a very narrow 
circumstance.  It dealt with cases similarly situated:  two 
cases on direct appeal (Kobeck and Harmann) just moments apart.  
The same is true here:  two cases on collateral habeas review 
(Nichols and Brown) just moments apart.  The dissent errs by 
comparing the two subsequent cases benefiting from the exception 
to the exception without also comparing the two original cases 
creating the exception to the exception.  The analogy is thus 
not properly made and should be rejected; Harmann is not being 
extended here.   
No.  01-3324-W.dss 
 
1 
 
¶38 DIANE S. SYKES, J.   (dissenting).  I would deny this 
habeas petition.  This case does not present a retroactivity 
question in the usual sense, that is, whether a newly declared 
rule of law applies retroactively to cases still open on direct 
review or to events or conduct that predate the announcement of 
the rule. See Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 
97 (1993).  Rather, this case presents the more difficult 
question of whether a newly declared rule can be applied 
retroactively in a collateral attack on a judgment already 
final.  See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 299 (1989); State ex 
rel. Schmelzer v. Murphy, 201 Wis. 2d 246, 258-59, 548 N.W.2d 45 
(1996). 
¶39 In Harper, the United States Supreme Court standardized 
its general approach to retroactivity analysis.  It abandoned 
the multi-factor test of Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 
(1971), for civil cases, just as it had earlier, in Griffith v. 
Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987), abandoned the multi-factor test 
of Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), in criminal cases.  
Harper, 509 U.S. at 90.  The Court held that:  
[w]hen this Court applies a rule of federal law to the 
parties before it, that rule is the controlling 
interpretation of federal law and must be given full 
retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct 
review and as to all events, regardless of whether 
such events predate or postdate our announcement of 
the rule.   
Id. at 97.  The federal rules for civil and criminal 
retroactivity are thus now the same. 
¶40 Because our retroactivity jurisprudence is based on 
that of the United States Supreme Court, we will at some point 
No.  01-3324-W.dss 
 
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be asked to adopt Harper, overrule Kurtz v. City of Waukesha, 91 
Wis. 2d 103, 280 N.W.2d 757 (1979) (in which we adopted the 
Chevron Oil retroactivity test for civil cases), and bring our 
law 
into 
conformity 
with 
the 
now-uniform 
federal 
rule.10  
However, we have not been asked to do so in this case. 
¶41 As the majority notes, although the respondents 
(collectively the "State") mentioned Harper in its brief, it 
declined to take a position on whether we ought to enunciate a 
uniform standard of retroactivity for civil and criminal cases; 
Brown did not even cite Harper.  Majority op., ¶13 n.5.   While 
it is clear that Chevron Oil is no longer good law and Kurtz 
should therefore be revisited, I agree that the question is 
better left for another case because the issue was not fully 
developed here.  Without addressing Harper, the court continues 
to apply Chevron Oil, as it has since Kurtz.  See majority op., 
¶¶ 13-26 ("Chevron/Kurtz").  Cf. Harper, 586 U.S. at 99-100 
("[T]he Supreme Court of Virginia has simply incorporated into 
state law the three-pronged analysis of Chevron Oil and the 
criminal retroactivity cases overruled by Griffith.  We reject 
the department's defense of the decision below.").  
¶42 In any event, as I have noted, the retroactivity 
question in this case is narrower, and concerns whether a new 
rule can be applied retroactively in a collateral attack on a 
judgment already final.  In Teague, a plurality of the Supreme 
                                                 
 
10    In State v. Koch, 175 Wis. 2d 684, 694, 499 N.W.2d 152 
(1993), this court followed Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 
(1987), and abandoned the multi-factor retroactivity test in 
criminal cases. 
  
No.  01-3324-W.dss 
 
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Court 
answered 
this 
question 
"no" 
(with 
certain 
limited 
exceptions), a position that has since been endorsed by a 
majority of the Supreme Court.  See Schmelzer, 201 Wis. 2d at 
257 n.7, (citing Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 416, 466-67 
(1993)).  The Teague plurality was persuaded by Justice Harlan's 
view, articulated in Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675 
(1971)(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), 
that new rules should be applied retroactively to cases on 
direct review and not yet final, but not to cases on collateral 
habeas review.  Teague, 489 U.S. at 310.  This distinction in 
retroactivity analysis is based on the nature of the judicial 
process on the one hand (once law is declared by an appellate 
court it should be applied to cases not yet adjudicated) and the 
nature of the habeas corpus remedy on the other (it attacks 
judgments that have already been reviewed and are long-since 
final, where the interest in repose is strong).  Id. at 306. 
¶43 The exceptions to the rule of nonretroactivity for 
cases on collateral review are: "First, a new rule should be 
applied retroactively [on collateral review] if it places 
'certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the 
power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe.'" Id. 
at 307 (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 692 (Harlan, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part)).  "Second, a new rule should be 
applied retroactively [on collateral review] if it requires the 
observance of 'those procedures that . . . are "implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty."'"  Id. (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 
No.  01-3324-W.dss 
 
4 
 
693 
(quoting 
Palko 
v. 
Connecticut, 
302 
U.S. 
319, 
325 
(1937)(Cardozo, J.)). 
¶44 In Schmelzer, this court generally adopted the Teague 
rule of nonretroactivity for cases that have already become 
final, with a limited modification for claims that, by their 
nature, can "only be made through a form of collateral relief."  
Schmelzer, 201 Wis. 2d at 258.  In Schmelzer, it was a claim of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, which can only be 
pursued by writ of habeas corpus under State v. Knight, 168 Wis. 
2d 509, 484 N.W.2d 540 (1992).  Id.  The court announced a new 
right to effective assistance of appellate counsel in the 
preparation of a petition for review and applied it to the 
petitioner Schmelzer.  Then, applying Griffith and Teague, the 
court held that the new rule was applicable to cases in the 
direct appellate "pipeline" but not to cases already final.  
Schmelzer, 201 Wis. 2d at 258-59.  More specifically: 
[W]e conclude that we may apply the new rule announced 
in this case to the defendant, Schmelzer, although, 
consistent 
with 
Teague, 
we 
do 
not 
apply 
it 
retroactively to cases finalized before the issuance 
of this opinion.  This result is somewhat inequitable, 
in that we have afforded relief to one defendant while 
not allowing relief to others similarly situated——the 
result 
disfavored 
in 
Griffith. 
Nonetheless, 
we 
conclude it would be more inequitable, under the 
special situation posed 
here, 
to adopt 
Teague's 
holding entirely and not only deny the benefit of the 
new rule to this defendant but also to foreclose the 
possibility of any new rule being created in this type 
of case. 
Id. at 258.  The court also indicated in a footnote that persons 
whose Knight habeas petitions were filed but not yet decided by 
No.  01-3324-W.dss 
 
5 
 
the court were "nonfinal" for purposes of retroactivity.  Id. at 
259 n.9. 
¶45 As the majority notes, Brown's case was final a year 
before this court decided State ex rel. Nichols v. Litscher, 
2001 WI 119, 247 Wis. 2d 1013, 635 N.W.2d 292.  Majority op., 
¶28.  Furthermore, the rule announced in Nichols does not fall 
within either of the Teague exceptions.  The tolling rule is 
intended to compensate for the vagaries of prison mail systems 
and is applicable to a layer of appellate review that is 
permissive rather than as-of-right.  It concerns neither 
primary, individual conduct, nor procedures that are implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty. 
¶46 Accordingly, applying Teague and Schmelzer, Brown 
cannot seek retroactive application of the Nichols tolling rule 
in this collateral habeas attack.  Only Nichols himself, and 
others coming after him, may benefit from the new tolling rule. 
¶47 The majority reaches a substantially similar conclusion 
in Part II, although it does so by a different route.  Applying 
the Chevron/Kurtz test, the majority concludes that "neither a 
prospective nor a fully retroactive application of the tolling 
rule we adopted in Nichols is warranted."  Majority op., ¶26.  
The majority decides that "limited retroactive application" of 
Nichols is appropriate: retroactive application to cases pending 
on direct appeal and not yet final, and to "pro se prisoners who 
had raised the issue in habeas petitions that were still 
pending" at the time Nichols was decided.  Majority op., ¶¶26-
27. 
No.  01-3324-W.dss 
 
6 
 
¶48 
This 
is 
basically 
the 
same 
as 
applying 
the 
Harper/Griffith retroactivity rule, and adding any pro se 
prisoners with habeas petitions pending at the time of Nichols, 
pursuant to the Schmelzer footnote.  In any event, Brown does 
not qualify for the limited retroactivity adopted by the 
majority, which the majority readily acknowledges.  Majority 
op., ¶28. 
¶49 The majority then invokes Harmann v. Hadley, 128 Wis. 
2d 371, 382 N.W.2d 673 (1986), and applies Nichols retroactively 
anyway. In Harmann, this court made an exception to the 
prospective-only adoption of social host liability that it had 
announced a year before.  In Koback v. Crook, 123 Wis. 2d 259, 
277, 366 N.W.2d 857 (1985), this court held that social hosts 
can be liable for injury caused by minors to whom they 
negligently furnish alcohol, and employed the technique of 
"sunbursting" to limit the effect of this new liability rule, 
applying it to the parties in Koback but otherwise making it 
prospective only from a specified date four months after the 
date of decision.  See Harmann, 128 Wis. 2d at 373-74. 
¶50 "Sunbursting" is an exception to the general rule of 
retroactivity, intended to ameliorate the "inequities [that] may 
occur when a court departs from precedent and announces a new 
rule of law."  Id. at 377-78.  The Harmann case was pending in 
the court of appeals at the time Koback was decided (this court 
having denied the Harmanns' petition to bypass), but because of 
the "sunbursting," the Koback rule did not apply retroactively, 
as ordinarily would have been the case.  This court allowed the 
No.  01-3324-W.dss 
 
7 
 
Harmanns to take advantage of the new liability rule.  Id. at 
386. 
¶51 In other words, Harmann is an exception to an 
exception, intended to restore retroactivity where it otherwise 
would have existed but for the court's "sunbursting" of the new 
rule.  Harmann does not address the issue of retroactivity in 
the context of a collateral attack on a judgment already final; 
it only allowed a still-pending, non-final case to move forward 
under the newly created rule.  It is not surprising, then, that 
neither Brown nor the State found the Harmann case relevant 
enough to warrant citation here. 
¶52 I find it ironic that the majority declines to address 
Harper, which at least was cited although not expounded upon by 
the State, yet it grants habeas relief based on a case not cited 
by either party.  This approach——permitting retroactivity simply 
because Brown is "similarly situated" to Nichols——undercuts 
Schmelzer's 
adoption 
of 
the 
Teague 
general 
rule 
of 
nonretroactivity in cases on collateral habeas review.  I would 
not extend Harmann to final judgments, especially not without 
subjecting the issue to the adversarial process, and especially 
No.  01-3324-W.dss 
 
8 
 
not without giving the State a fair opportunity to be heard.11  
Therefore, I respectfully dissent.  
       
 
                                                 
11 Footnote 9 of the majority opinion misses the point 
entirely.  I do not quarrel with the majority's conclusion that 
the petitioner in State ex rel. Nichols v. Litscher, 2001 WI 
119, 247 Wis. 2d 1013, 635 N.W.2d 292, and the petitioner in 
this case may have been similarly situated at the time their 
respective petitions for review were denied.  That does not mean 
that Harmann v. Hadley, 128 Wis. 2d 371, 382 N.W.2d 673 (1986), 
applies.  Harmann and the case whose rule it applied, Koback v. 
Crook, 123 Wis. 2d 259, 366 N.W.2d 857 (1985), were direct 
review cases; nothing in Harmann authorizes the reopening of 
judgments already final for purposes of retroactive application 
of a new rule of law.  Collateral review cases are governed by 
State ex rel. Schmelzer v. Murphy, 201 Wis. 2d 246, 548 N.W.2d 
45 (1996), and Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).  The 
majority has sua sponte extended Harmann to cases on collateral 
review. 
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1