Title: Cannon v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 418, 2001
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: August 28, 2002

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
EVERETT CLIFTON CANNON and § 
ALLIE MARIE CANNON, his wife,  
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Defendants Below, 
 
§ 
 
 
Appellants,  
 
 
§ No. 418, 2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
§ Court Below: Superior Court  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ of the State of Delaware in and 
STATE OF DELAWARE, UPON THE 
§ for Sussex County 
RELATION OF THE SECRETARY OF 
§ C.A. No. 01C-05-015 
THE DEPARTMENT OF  
 
 
§ 
TRANSPORTATION, 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: May 21, 2002 
 
 
 
Decided: 
August 28, 2002 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH, HOLLAND, BERGER, and 
STEELE, Justices, constituting the Court En Banc. 
 
 
Appeal from Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
John A. Sergovic, Jr., Esquire, Sergovic, Ellis & Shirey, P.A., Georgetown, 
Delaware, for Appellants. 
 
 
Mark F. Dunkle, Esquire, Parkowski & Guerke, P.A., Dover, Delaware, for 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WALSH, Justice for the Majority: 
 
2
 
In this interlocutory appeal from a Superior Court order of possession, we 
address the scope of the condemnation powers delegated to the Department of 
Transportation of the State of Delaware (“DelDOT”).  The appellants/defendants 
below are the owners of 6.5 acres of land in Sussex County that DelDOT seeks to 
condemn in order to create a wetlands mitigation site. The wetlands mitigation is 
required as a condition of the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers’ permit to fill other 
wetlands in connection with the Route 54 highway reconstruction project in Sussex 
County. After a contested condemnation hearing, the Superior Court granted 
DelDOT’s request for possession.  The property owners have appealed, arguing 
that DelDOT lacks the authority to condemn land for wetlands mitigation, and, 
even if it has such authority, it acted unreasonably by failing to explore alternative 
sites.  We agree with the trial court that DelDOT’s statutory grant of authority to 
condemn land extends to wetlands mitigation, and that it acted within that authority 
in this case.   
 
I. 
 
Appellants Everett and Allie Cannon (“the Cannons”) own a coastal farm on 
the Little Assawoman Bay that is adjacent to the current Route 54 in Sussex 
County, Delaware.  Route 54 serves as an essential hurricane evacuation route for 
the seashore area but is often rendered inaccessible due to flooding.  In recognition 
 
3
of this problem, DelDOT commenced a study in 1992 to determine what 
improvements should be made to the road.  Seven design alternatives for the Route 
54 project were considered.  The study evaluated each alternative design for its 
social, economic, and environmental impact on the surrounding area, as required 
by the National Environmental Policy Act.  With the exception of the first 
alternative, to do nothing, all of the designs, to varying extents, would necessarily 
interfere with the Cannons’ property and require the filling of wetlands.  
Eventually, after public notice and debate, DelDOT chose a design featuring an 
elevated viaduct and a six foot elevated fill berm to access it.  The viaduct will 
extend across approximately 2,460 feet of the Cannons’ land and cross federally 
protected wetlands.  
 
The Cannons did not dispute DelDOT’s plan to condemn the portion of their 
land necessary for actual highway improvements.  The Cannons did, however, 
refuse to surrender any of their land to accommodate wetlands mitigation 
necessitated by the project.  The Route 54 project will require the filling of 1.87 
acres of wetlands and removal of .955 acres of fill for temporary and shading of 
wetlands.  Acting under the authority delegated to it by the Clean Water Act, the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (“the Corps”) requires a permit to fill wetlands and 
maintains a “no net loss” policy, which requires wetlands mitigation to accompany 
any wetland filling operation.  33 U.S.C. § 1344; 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(r).  This 
 
4
means, essentially, that DelDOT must create wetlands to replace those lost by the 
Route 54 improvements.  Thus, DelDOT sought condemnation of 6.5 acres of the 
Cannons’ property in order to create the necessary wetlands. 
 
DelDOT cannot build the Route 54 project without a fill permit from the 
Corps, and the Corps will not issue a permit without acceptable wetlands 
mitigation.  By virtue of a memorandum of understanding between the Corps and 
the Environmental Protection Agency, the Corps operates under a protocol of 
sequential review of possible mitigation sites.  Under the protocol, the most 
desirable site is one that is both on-site and in-kind.  If the most preferred 
mitigation site is not practical or feasible, the Corps will consider alternatives in 
descending order of preference:  off-site and in-kind, on-site and out-of-kind, and 
off-site and out-of-kind.  The Cannons’ land is both on-site and in-kind, because it 
is adjacent to the impact area and amenable to the creation of tidal wetlands.  In 
short, the Cannons’ wetlands essentially replicate the wetlands to be filled in 
constructing the road. 
 
DelDOT hired an expert wetlands consultant, Edward Launay, to develop a 
wetlands mitigation plan that would be acceptable to the Corps.  Based on 
Launay’s recommendation, DelDOT offered only one mitigation site to the Corps, 
the Cannons’ property.  After the Cannons expressed their opposition to having 
their land used for wetlands mitigation, DelDOT investigated the feasibility of off-
 
5
site mitigation sites.  Launay reviewed all DelDOT-owned land in Sussex County 
and concluded that none would be acceptable to the Corps as suitable for the 
creation of  tidal wetlands.  The Cannons concede that their land is the best 
ecological site, but argue that other, less desirable sites could be acceptable to the 
Corps.  Despite the Cannons’ opposition, the Corps granted DelDOT’s fill permit 
and DelDOT is prepared to go forward with construction of the Route 54 project.  
According to the Corps’ permit, however, construction cannot begin until DelDOT 
actually acquires the Cannon property.  Although wetlands mitigation is needed 
before construction can begin, once the highway is built it will play no role in the 
function of the roadway.             
 
II. 
 
Our standard and scope of review of the Superior Court’s interpretation of 
the condemnation statute is de novo.  Public Water Supply Co. v. DiPasquale, 735 
A.2d 378, 382-83 (Del. 1999).   
 
The Cannons first argue that DelDOT lacks statutory authority to condemn 
private land for wetlands mitigation purposes.  Although 17 Del. C. § 132(c) does 
not contain language authorizing DelDOT to condemn land specifically for 
“wetlands mitigation,” DelDOT asserts that the grant of condemnation power is 
broad enough to encompass this purpose.  The Superior Court agreed, holding that 
 
6
the taking of the Cannons’ land is “necessary for a proper, public purpose, ” 
because, as a practical matter, DelDOT cannot make the improvements to Route 54 
without providing wetlands mitigation. 
 
We agree with the Superior Court that 17 Del. C. § 132 grants DelDOT the 
authority to condemn land for wetlands mitigation, if necessary to advance the 
underlying purpose of construction and maintenance of the State’s roadways.  It is 
beyond dispute that as a sovereign governmental entity, the State of Delaware 
retains the power of eminent domain and that it may delegate that power to 
agencies charged with furthering some public good.  Thomison v. Hillcrest Athletic 
Ass’n., 5 A.2d 236, 238 (Del. Super. 1939).  The statute granting DelDOT the 
power of eminent domain provides that, in furtherance of the construction of a 
comprehensive and permanent system of state highways, DelDOT may: “[a]cquire 
by condemnation or otherwise any land, easement, franchise, material or property, 
which, in the judgment of the Department, shall be necessary therefor . . ..”  17 
Del. C. § 132(c)(4).  The General Assembly further granted DelDOT the power to 
do “whatever is incidental and germane to the scope of the duties and powers 
conferred on it by law.”  17 Del. C. § 132(d). 
 
Statutes that vest the power of eminent domain in an agency must be strictly 
construed, however, because, by their operative nature, they subjugate the rights of 
private property owners to the greater public need.  State ex rel. Sharp v. 0.6878 
 
7
Acres of Land, 105 A.2d 205, 206 (Del. Super. 1954).  Despite the strict 
construction we must accord 17 Del. C. § 132, our overriding goal is to determine 
the intent of the legislature.  In this vein, we note that the Superior Court has 
construed the statute to allow DelDOT to condemn property for the purpose of 
building a toll plaza and an administrative building, which the court deemed 
“necessary for the construction and use” of a state highway.  State v. M. Madic, 
Inc., C.A. Nos. 96C-11-192, 96C-11-193, 96C-11-196, 96C-11-197, slip. op. 17-
19, Quillen, J. (Del. Super. Jan. 24, 1997).  Ultimately, the court reasoned, the 
property owners’ proffered interpretation of the statute would “hamstring 
DelDOT’s efforts to construct any state roadway, and Title 17 is not so restrictive.”  
Id.   
 
Courts in other states have also concluded that environmental mitigation is a 
practical necessity for public construction projects and have allowed state agencies 
to condemn private land for wetlands mitigation.  See State v. Trap Rock 
Industries, Inc., 768 A.2d 227, 231 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (holding that, 
“[a]lthough mitigation is strictly environmental in its nature, the highway could not 
have been constructed without [it] . . . [t]herefore, the property at issue was 
realistically needed for transportation purposes”); Dare County Board of Education 
v. Sakaria, 456 S.E.2d 842, 845-46 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that county 
 
8
board of education was statutorily authorized to condemn land for use as wetlands 
mitigation, as necessary to construction of new athletic facilities). 
 
The same rationale is applicable here.  Were the Cannons’ very narrow 
construction of the statute to be accepted, DelDOT would be substantially 
hampered in its efforts to fulfill its statutory mandate to establish a comprehensive 
system of state highways.  17 Del. C. § 132(a).  Whenever a proposed roadway 
interfered with federally protected wetlands, and the property owner refused to sell, 
DelDOT would be forced to abandon the project, no matter how “necessary” and 
compelling would be the public need.  We do not believe that the General 
Assembly, in conferring upon DelDOT a broad grant of condemnation power, 
intended that such authority be exercised only with the consent of adjacent 
landowners, where wetlands mitigation is required by federal law.    
III. 
 
   
Having determined that DelDOT has the statutory authority to condemn land 
for wetlands mitigation, we address the Cannons’ claim that, in this instance, 
DelDOT abused that authority.  First, a discussion of the standard of review 
applicable to the Superior Court’s decision, and DelDOT’s decision, is necessary.  
The General Assembly has granted DelDOT the authority to condemn private land 
for public use, providing that DelDOT may “[a]cquire by condemnation or 
otherwise any land, easement, franchise, material or property, which, in the 
 
9
judgment of the Department, shall be necessary therefor . . ..”  17 Del. C. § 
132(c)(4) (emphasis supplied).  There is little question that DelDOT’s 
condemnation of the Cannons’ property was for a public use, i.e., to enable the 
State to improve a hurricane evacuation route.  The question raised by the Cannons 
is, was the taking of their wetlands, in particular, necessary?  The statute makes 
clear that DelDOT is empowered to make that determination in the first instance.  
Once DelDOT determines a particular property is necessary to the fulfillment of its 
duty to maintain the State’s highways, the courts must accord broad deference to 
that decision.  
 
  When the General Assembly delegates the right of eminent domain to a 
governmental agency for a public purpose, as it has to DelDOT, it may also 
delegate to such agency the power of determining what property and how much 
property is necessary for the purpose.  State ex rel. Sharp v. 0.62033 Acres of 
Land, 110 A.2d 1 (Del. Super. 1954), aff’d, 112 A.2d 857 (Del. 1955).  The only 
limit to that power is that it may not be exercised “thoughtlessly or arbitrarily.”  
0.24148, 0.23831 & 0.12277 Acres of Land v. State ex rel. Smith, 145 A.2d 388 
(Del. 1958); see also Public Water Supply Co. v. DiPasquale, 735 A.2d 378, 383 
n.9 (Del. 1999) (noting that expert agency determinations of fact, applied to settled 
law, are reviewed for an abuse of discretion). Indeed, the Superior Court Civil 
Rules recognize that deference is owed to DelDOT’s condemnation 
 
10
determinations.  Rule 71.1, governing condemnation proceedings, provides that 
“[i]n all such condemnation proceedings the burden shall be upon the property 
owner to overcome the presumption of regularity and the prima facie case of 
necessity for public use presented by the institution of such proceeding.”  Super. 
Ct. Civ. R. 71.1 (emphasis supplied). 
 
The power of eminent domain belongs exclusively to the legislative branch.  
See Joslin Mfg. Co. v. City of Providence, 262 U.S. 668, 678-79 (1923) (stating 
“[t]hat the necessity and expediency of taking property for public use is a 
legislative and not a judicial question is not open to discussion”).  The General 
Assembly’s exercise of that power through delegation to an administrative agency 
may be reviewed by the courts only to ensure that the power is not wielded 
punitively or arbitrarily.  Our standard of review “mirrors that of the Superior 
Court.”  Public Water Supply Co v. DiPasquale, 735 A.2d 378, 380 (Del. 1999).  
In this case, the Superior Court accorded DelDOT the proper deference when it 
reviewed its necessity determination for "fraud, bad faith, or gross abuse of 
discretion."  State ex rel. Sharp v. 0.62033 Acres of Land, 110 A.2d 1, 6 (Del. 
Super. 1954), aff’d, 112 A.2d 857 (Del. 1955).  Accordingly, we review DelDOT’s 
determination that the Cannons’ land is necessary for the Route 54 highway project 
for fraud, bad faith, or abuse of discretion. 
 
11
 
While there is no evidence that DelDOT acted fraudulently or in bad faith, 
the Cannons contend that DelDOT acted unreasonably and abused its discretion in 
selecting their property as necessary for wetlands mitigation without first exploring 
if there were any State-owned lands that would suffice.  DelDOT maintains that, 
because the Cannons’ land is both on-site and in-kind, the Corps would not have 
accepted anything less.  Indeed, the Corps would not consider an alternative 
mitigation site unless the Cannons’ land was not “practical or feasible.”  Given our 
determination that DelDOT has the authority to acquire the Cannons’ land, it 
would be unlikely that the Corps would deem it impractical.  Furthermore, 
DelDOT did investigate alternative mitigation sites, but found that DelDOT did not 
own any land in the vicinity that would be suitable to wetlands mitigation.  We do 
not believe that DelDOT was obligated to conduct an inventory of all State-owned 
lands.  It is enough that DelDOT hired an expert to determine the best mitigation 
site available, researched the feasibility of alternative mitigation sites, and 
attempted to negotiate with the Cannons before resorting to condemnation. 
 
The fact that DelDOT focused on the Cannons' property as the first choice 
for wetland's mitigation is understandable because it was "on-site/in-kind" and 
readily acceptable to the Corps.  The dissenters complain that the choice was made 
before exploration of other alternatives.  But when DelDOT's taking was 
challenged in the Superior Court, the agency was able to demonstrate that no other 
 
12
site in its available inventory achieved the same level of acceptability.  
Importantly, DelDOT was able to justify the necessity of the taking when required 
to do so  in the Superior Court and we agree with the Superior Court's ruling that 
the process followed by DelDOT was "rational and logical."1 
 
 
DelDOT has been charged by the General Assembly with doing whatever is 
necessary to ensure that the citizens of this state have suitable highways upon 
which to travel.  There is no question that DelDOT had a “proper public purpose” 
to pursue the Route 54 project.  See Wilmington Parking Authority v. Land with 
Improvements, Situate in the City of Wilmington, 521 A.2d 227 (Del. 1986).  A 
hurricane evacuation route that routinely floods is clearly a matter of public 
concern and its improvement is in the best interest of the public.  Although there 
may be more that DelDOT could have done to avoid condemning the Cannons’ 
land for wetlands mitigation, we cannot say that it acted unreasonably in choosing 
the site that gave it the greatest chance of obtaining the permit from the Corps 
which was required to begin construction of the project.  
                                          
 
1 In its bench ruling, the Superior Court noted that "as a practical matter, that if DelDOT had 
even gone and looked at [the other] properties, they would not have ranked as high as the 
Cannons' property in terms of being suitable for wetlands mitigation."  The court commented that 
it was satisfied, based on the testimony of DelDOT's environmental consultant, that the agency 
acted "in a very fair, rational and logical manner, and, second, Mr. Cannon had made it pretty 
clear that he didn't want any of his lands to be used for wetlands, and based on the testimony that 
I heard, he never changed his mind, and if he did change his mind, he never communicated that 
to DelDOT." 
 
13
 
Accordingly, we affirm. 
 
14
VEASEY, Chief Justice, concurring: 
 
 
I join in the opinion of the majority, but I write separately to emphasize that, 
in my view, the affirmance of the judgment of the trial court is compelled by the 
narrow scope of the standard of review.  The determination of whether the taking 
of the Cannons’ land for wetlands mitigation was necessary is controlled by the 
standard of review at two levels:  (i) that exercised by the Superior Court when 
DelDOT’s decision to condemn a particular wetland was challenged by the 
Cannons and (ii) when this Court reviews the Superior Court.  In each case, the 
standard is the same.   
 
We all agree that the ultimate issue in this case is the “necessity” 
determination of DelDOT to take the Cannons’ land for wetlands mitigation.  The 
Superior Court heard live testimony on that point and made findings of fact, based 
on the evidence presented at trial.  Based on those findings the trial court 
concluded that DelDOT had not abused its discretion in making the determination 
of necessity for taking the Cannon property. 
 
The issue before the Superior Court was not whether the trial judge should 
substitute his judgment for that of DelDOT, the agency charged by the General 
Assembly with the statutory responsibility to make that judgment.  Rather, the 
issue before the trial judge was whether the DelDOT determination was based on 
supportable facts and reason, whether or not the trial judge would have reached the 
 
15
same judgment in the first instance.  Stated differently, the issue before the trial 
judge was whether DelDOT’s exercise of its “judgment,” as called for in the 
statute, was the product of fraud, bad faith or abuse of discretion.2  The trial judge 
applied that analysis to the facts adduced at trial3 and concluded that DelDOT’s 
judgment was not an abuse of discretion.   
 
The next and final level of review is that to be applied by this Court.  
Although our scope of review on statutory construction and constitutionality is de 
novo, our scope of review is deferential on the trial judge’s factual findings on 
DelDOT’s “judgment” of the “necessity” of the taking of the Cannons’ property.  
Specifically, the issue is not whether we would agree in the first instance with 
DelDOT’s determination of necessity or even whether, in the second instance, we 
would have come to the same conclusion as did the trial judge on this record.  
Rather, our task is as follows: 
In exercising our power of review, we have the duty to review the 
sufficiency of the evidence and to test the propriety of the findings 
below.  We do not, however, ignore the findings made by the trial 
judge.  If they are sufficiently supported by the record and are the 
product of an orderly and logical deductive process, in the exercise of 
judicial restraint we accept them, even though independently we might 
have reached opposite conclusions.  It is only when the findings below 
                                          
 
2  State ex rel. Sharp v. 0.62033 Acres of Land, 112 A.2d 857, 859 (Del. 1955) (“In the absence 
of fraud, bad faith or abuse of discretion, the determination of the Legislature or of the state 
agency to whom the power has been delegated will not be disturbed.”). 
3   See, e.g., facts set forth in the Majority Opinion at 12, n.1. 
 
 
16
are clearly wrong and the doing of justice requires their overturn that 
we are free to make contradictory findings of fact.4 
 
 
In my view, the findings of the trial court on the exercise of  DelDOT’s 
discretion meets this test of our judicial review.  The Cannons’ land was favorably 
located as “on-site and in-kind.”  DelDOT did, ultimately, consider other 
alternatives, and, upon examining those alternatives, it found that none achieved 
the same level of acceptability as the Cannon property. 
 
DelDOT’s judgment of necessity permits it to consider a rank order of 
preferences within the universe of acceptable sites.  A relevant and permissible 
factor in that analysis is what DelDOT believes the Corps would likely accept.  
DelDOT is not relegated to a choice of only minimally acceptable sites in the face 
of an objection by the landowner of the preferred site.  Therefore, whether or not 
we are comfortable with the result or whether we would have preferred a different 
                                          
 
4  Levitt v. Bouvier, 287 A.2d 671, 673 (Del. 1972) (emphasis added); cf. Hudak v. Procek, ___ 
A.2d ____, 2002 WL 1337663 (Del. Supr.), at *1 (stating that, when this Court’s “scope of 
review is narrow and accords considerable deference to the trial judge’s factual findings,” those 
findings will not be disturbed, “whether or not we would independently have reached the same 
conclusions”);  Young v. Frase, 702 A.2d 1234, 1235 (Del. 1997) (stating, in the context of a 
trial court’s decision regarding a motion for additur or a new trial, that this Court will “not 
substitute [its] judgment for that of the trial judge, who presided at trial and heard the evidence,” 
unless her “determination is beyond the range of reasonableness or constitutes an abuse of 
discretion”).  Cf. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del. 
1994) (“If a board selected one of several reasonable alternatives, a court should not second-
guess that choice even though it might have decided otherwise or subsequent events may have 
cast doubt on the board’s determination.  Thus, courts will not substitute their business judgment 
for that of the directors, but will determine if the directors’ decision was, on balance, within a 
range of reasonableness.”). 
 
17
outcome, in my view our affirmance of the trial court is compelled by our narrow 
scope of review. 
 
 
 
 
 
18
HOLLAND, Justice, with whom Justice Steele joins, dissenting: 
 
 
We agree with the holding by the majority that DelDOT has the statutory 
authority to condemn land for wetlands mitigation if that action is reasonably 
necessary for the purpose of maintaining State highways.  The record reflects that 
DelDOT’s condemnation of the Cannons’ additional property for wetlands 
mitigation was unnecessary and unreasonable.  Accordingly, we respectfully 
dissent. 
Eminent Domain 
The power of eminent domain is an inherent aspect of sovereign authority.  
It is the “power to compel a transfer of property from a private owner to the 
government for a public purpose.”5  The power of eminent domain is the most 
drastic of all interferences with private property rights.  James Madison expected 
that “[i]ndependent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar 
manner the guardians of those rights.”6 
Our constitutional democracy frequently calls for balancing competing 
rights of fundamental importance.  There is no doubt that the State of Delaware can 
exercise its sovereign authority to condemn private property for the greater public 
good.  Article I, Section 8 of the Delaware Constitution, however, prohibits the 
                                          
 
5 James W. Ely, Jr., The Guardian of Every Other Right:  A Constitutional History of Property 
Rights 5 (2d ed. 1998). 
6 12 The Papers of James Madison 204-07 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds., 1979). 
 
19
taking of the Cannons’ property for public use “without the consent of his or her 
representatives.”   
Unbridled Administrative Discretion 
 
The power of eminent domain belongs exclusively to the legislative branch 
of the government.7  The General Assembly may delegate the right of eminent 
domain to an administrative agency for a public purpose.  The General Assembly’s 
ability to delegate an exclusively legislative function, however, is carefully 
circumscribed by the parameters of the non-delegation doctrine. 
 
This Court has recognized that the non-delegation doctrine is based upon a 
fundamental principle of constitutional democracy:  “[a]dministrators should not 
have unguided and uncontrolled discretionary power to govern as they see fit.”8  
Accordingly, reviewing Courts must focus on the “totality of protections against 
[administrative] arbitrariness,” including “both substantive standards and 
procedural safeguards,” i.e., due process or the law of the land, as the latter term 
appears in the Delaware Constitution.9  Where it is not feasible for the General 
Assembly to set precise guidelines, the presence of administrative procedural 
safeguards may compensate for the lack of precise statutory standards.10 
                                          
 
7 See Joslin Mfg. Co. v. City of Providence, 262 U.S. 668, 678-79 (1923). 
8 Atlantis I Condo. Ass’n v. Bryson, 403 A.2d 711, 713 (Del. 1979). 
9 Id. at 713, 717. 
10 Id. at 713. 
 
20
In most situations involving action delegated to an administrative agency, an 
aggrieved party has a right of administrative review that is subject to the right of 
judicial review.11  That two-tiered system of review is designed to protect 
adversely affected parties from arbitrary administrative decisions.12  In this case, 
the General Assembly did not provide any statutory standards for DelDOT to use 
in making its administrative determination of necessity.  DelDOT did not 
apparently adopt any substantive or procedural safeguards for either making a 
determination of necessity or for providing administrative review of that decision.  
Accordingly, judicial review is the only protection the Cannons have against 
an exercise of unbridled administrative discretion by DelDOT.  The applicable 
statute provides for DelDOT to exercise its judgment in making the determination 
of necessity for condemning private property.  There is no precedent, however, for 
judicial deference to an administrative agency’s determination that it is necessary 
to condemn private property for a public purpose when that determination is made 
without any substantive or procedural safeguards.   
Statutes that vest the power of eminent domain in an administrative agency 
must be strictly construed because by their operative nature they subrogate rights 
of private property owners to the greater public need.13  The record reflects that the 
                                          
 
11 Id. at 717. 
12 Id.  
13 See State ex rel. Sharp v. 0.6878 Acres of Land, 105 A.2d 205, 206 (Del. Super. Ct. 1954). 
 
21
Cannons have demonstrated conclusively that, although DelDOT was required to 
provide property for wetlands mitigation, it was not necessary to take the Cannons’ 
additional private property to accomplish that purpose.  The Cannons’ 
constitutionally protected private property rights cannot be subordinated to an 
administrative agency’s decision to repudiate the pursuit of a myriad of acceptable 
alternatives for wetlands mitigation, simply as a matter of its own convenience. 
Issue Presented 
 
This case relates to two separate takings of the Cannons’ private property by 
DelDOT.  The primary taking is of wetlands property owned by the Cannons that 
the State wants to use for the purpose of improving Route 54.  The Cannons 
acknowledge that the State has the right to exercise its sovereign power of eminent 
domain to condemn their private wetlands property for the purpose of actually 
improving Route 54, notwithstanding the Cannons’ objections to that taking.  
Accordingly, the record does not support the majority’s assertion that “[w]ere the 
Cannons’ very narrow construction of the statute to be accepted, . . . [w]henever a 
proposed roadway interfered with federally protected wetlands, and the property 
owner refused to sell, DelDOT would be forced to abandon the project, no matter 
how ‘necessary’ and compelling would be the public need.”  The primary taking of 
the Cannons’ private wetlands property for the purpose of actually improving 
Route 54 is simply not an issue in this case.  
 
22
The issue in this case is the “additional taking” of the Cannons’ private 
property that the State seeks to condemn for the purpose of mitigating the wetlands 
that will be lost when Route 54 is improved.  The Cannons contend that the 
additional taking of their private property is not necessary.  DelDOT submits that 
the taking of the Cannons’ additional property for wetlands mitigation is necessary 
to improve Route 54 because the State cannot make improvements to Route 54 
without a permit from the Corps and the Corps will not issue a permit to the State 
unless the State provides additional land for wetlands mitigation.   
The logical question is, can DelDOT accommodate the Corps’ wetlands 
mitigation requirement without taking additional private property from the 
Cannons?  The record reflects the answer to that question is an unqualified “yes.”  
The Corps has a hierarchy of preferences for property that will each satisfy its 
general requirement for wetlands mitigation.  The Corps’ hierarchy of preferences 
is a specific recognition that one or more of the Corps’ highest preferences of 
property for wetlands mitigation may not be available. 
 
Why then did DelDOT offer the Cannons’ additional private property to the 
Corps for wetlands mitigation?  The answer is because DelDOT knew that the 
Cannons’ additional property comported with the Corps’ highest preference for on-
site and in-kind wetlands mitigation.  DelDOT offered the Cannons’ additional 
private property to guarantee the Corps’ permit approval by avoiding negotiations 
 
23
with the Corps about other property that the State either owned or could buy, 
because any of those other properties would be further down the Corps’ hierarchy 
of preferences for wetlands mitigation.  Accordingly, the question presented to this 
Court is, whether an administrative agency can condemn the Cannons’ additional 
private property simply because it did not want to negotiate with the Corps about 
providing for wetlands mitigation with other property that the State owned or could 
buy?  
Property and Liberty 
 
The most definitive and authoritative book on property rights and liberty in 
America was written by Professor James W. Ely, Jr.14  The title for Professor Ely’s 
work was inspired by Virginian Arthur Lee’s declaration that “[t]he right of 
property is the guardian of every other right, and to deprive a people of this, is in 
fact to deprive them of their liberty.”15  A brief historical review is helpful to 
understand why DelDOT had no authority to condemn the Cannons’ private 
property.   
 
The origin of property rights in America can be traced to the Magna Charta 
in 1215, which protected the rights of property owners against arbitrary action by 
the sovereign.  It provided in chapter 39 that “[n]o freeman shall be taken or 
                                          
 
14 James W. Ely, Jr., The Guardian of Every Other Right:  A Constitutional History of Property 
Rights (2d ed. 1998). 
15 See id. at 26 (quoting Arthur Lee, An Appeal to the Justice and Interests of the People of Great 
Britain, in the Present Dispute with America 14 (New York, 1775)).  
 
24
imprisoned, or disseised . . . unless by the lawful judgment of his peers, or by the 
law of the land.”  With this language, the Magna Charta secured the rights of 
private property owners against deprivations by the sovereign without due process 
of law.16  That guarantee remains one of the most fundamental tenets of our 
American constitutional democracy.   
 
In 1687, when the State of Delaware constituted the three lower counties of 
Pennsylvania, William Penn (“Penn”) arranged for the publication of a 
commentary on the Magna Charta.17  Penn implored American colonists “not to 
give away any thing of Liberty and Property that at present they do . . . enjoy.”18  
In 1689, John Locke (“Locke”) wrote his famous Second Treatise on Government, 
which asserted that legitimate government was based on a compact between the 
people and their rulers.19  “According to Locke, private property existed under 
natural law before the creation of political authority.  Indeed, the principal purpose 
of government was to protect these natural property rights, which Locke fused with 
liberty.”20  Undoubtedly influenced by Locke, the rights of property owners were 
                                          
 
16 Id. at 13. 
17 Id. 
18 William Penn, The Excellent Priviledge of Liberty and Property Being the Birth-Right of the 
Free-Born Subjects of England (Philadelphia, William Bradford 1687). 
19 Ely, supra, at 17. 
20 Ely, supra, at 17. 
 
25
characterized by the most prominent political theorists in the eighteenth century as 
the “bulwark of freedom from arbitrary government.”21 
In 1721, John Trenchard stated, “All Men are animated by the Passion of 
acquiring and defending Property, because Property is the best Support of that 
Independency, so passionately desired by all Men.”22  The Lockean theory of 
property rights was reflected in the English common law.  In his Commentaries on 
the Laws of England (1765-1769), William Blackstone acknowledged the 
influence of Locke’s formulation on the law’s evolution.  Blackstone summarized 
the English common law on property rights in broad terms:  “So great moreover is 
the regard of the law for private property, that it will not authorize the least 
violation of it.”23  Prior to the American Revolution, property ownership became 
identified with the preservation of political liberty.  Blackstone’s Commentaries 
were studied as a definitive summary of English common law.24  The Declaration 
of Independence reflected the inseparability of political liberty and private property 
described in the compact theory of Locke.25   
1776 Delaware Constitution 
                                          
 
21 Ely, supra, at 17.  
22 John Trenchard, Cato’s Letters, no. 68, Mar. 3, 1721, in The English Libertarian Heritage 
177-78 (David L. Jacobson, ed. 1965). 
23 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *135. 
24 Ely, supra, at 17. 
25 Ely, supra, at 29. 
 
26
 
Following the Declaration of Independence from the English monarchy, the 
historic authority of general sovereignty became vested in each of the former 
colonial states.26  As new sovereign entities, each state drafted its own 
constitution.27  The first colonial constitutions attempted to set forth in writing 
universal principles, grounded in reason.28   
The challenge in writing state constitutions was to reconcile the known 
conceptions of sovereignty with “notions about the popular foundations of 
legitimate government.”29  Those efforts were influenced by philosophers, such as 
Charles Montesquieu, Jean Jacques Rousseau, and Locke, and by English 
common-law scholars, like Edward Coke, Henry deBracton and William 
Blackstone.30  Each state constitution attempted to define sovereignty with 
precision and to restrain its exercise within marked boundaries.31 
 
The first Delaware Constitution and the Declaration of Rights and 
Fundamental Rules of the Delaware State (“Declaration of Rights”) were adopted 
                                          
 
26 See generally Randy J. Holland, State Constitutions:  Purpose and Function, 69 Temp. L. Rev. 
989, 989-90 (1996). 
27 See Willi P. Adams, The First American Constitutions:  Republican Ideology and the Making 
of the State Constitutions in the Revolutionary Era 4 (1980); Gordon S. Wood, Foreword:  State 
Constitution-Making in the American Revolution, 24 Rutgers L.J. 911, 913-14 (1993); Note, The 
Theory of State Constitutions, 196 Utah L. Rev. 542 (1966). 
28 Adams, supra, at 4. 
29 Jefferson Powell, Languages of Power, A Source Book of Early American Constitutional 
History 22 (1991). 
30 Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, A History of the American Constitution 6 (1990). 
31 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 168 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Calder v. 
Bull, 3 U.S. (1 Dall.) 386, 398-99 (1798) (Iredell, J., dissenting in part)). 
 
27
in September 1776.  The primary authorship of the 1776 Delaware Constitution 
and Declaration of Rights is traditionally ascribed to Thomas McKean, a Delaware 
lawyer and signatory of the Declaration of Independence.32  McKean had studied 
the English common law at the Middle Temple in London, where he was a 
contemporary of William Blackstone.33   
 
The first section of the Declaration of Rights reflected a continued adherence 
to the philosophy of Locke and provided that “all government of right originates 
from the people, is founded in compact only, and instituted solely for the good of 
the whole.”34  The first Delaware Constitution also reflected a continued adherence 
to the English common law and stated:   
The common law of England, as well as so much of the statute law as 
have been heretofore adopted in practice in this State, shall remain in 
force, unless they shall be altered by a future law of the Legislature;  
such parts only excepted as are repugnant to the rights and privileges 
contained in this constitution . . . .35   
 
The 1776 Delaware Constitution was preceded by the Declaration of 
Rights.36  The principles from the Magna Charta that protected property rights 
                                          
 
32 Proceedings of the Assembly of the Lower Counties on Delaware 1770-1776, of the 
Constitutional Convention of 1776, and of the House of Assembly of the Delaware State 1776-
1781, at 25 (Claudia L. Bushman et al. eds., 1986). 
33 See Randy J. Holland, Introduction to The Delaware Bar in the Twentieth Century xix, xxv 
(Helen L. Winslow et al. eds., 1994). 
34 Declaration of Rights and Fundamental Rules of the Delaware State of 1776, § 1.   
35 Del. Const. of 1776, art. XXV; see also Jonathan M. Hoffman, By the Course of the Law:  The 
Origins of the Open Courts Clause of State Constitutions, 74 Or. L. Rev. 1279, 1308 (1995). 
36 The Declaration of Rights was adopted by the convention on September 11, 1776.  Shortly 
thereafter, the first constitution of the State of Delaware was enacted on September 20, 1776.  
 
28
were included in the 1776 Declaration of Rights.  Section 10 provided that “every 
member of society hath a right to be protected in the enjoyment of life, liberty and 
property [and] . . . no part of a man’s property can be justly taken from him or 
applied to public uses without his own consent or that of his legal 
Representatives.”37  Section 12 provided that “every freeman for every injury done 
him in his goods, lands or person, by any other person, ought to have remedy by 
course of the law of the land.”38 
United States Constitution 
 
Protecting the right to acquire and own private property was also of a 
paramount importance to the Framers of the United States Constitution.  Invoking 
the philosophy of Locke, John Rutledge of South Carolina told the delegates at the 
Philadelphia Convention that “[p]roperty was certainly the principal object of 
Society.”39  Alexander Hamilton stated, “One great objt. of Govt. is personal 
protection and the security of Property.”40  According to Professor Ely, “many 
                                                                                                                                        
See generally Wood, supra, at 921 (noting that the Delaware Constitution, as with constitutions 
from four other states, was prefaced with a bill of rights, “combining in a jarring but exciting 
manner ringing declarations of universal principles with motley collections of common law 
procedures”). 
37 Declaration of Rights and Fundamental Rules of the Delaware State of 1776, § 10. 
38 See id. § 12. 
39 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 534 (Max Farrand ed., 1937).  
40 Id. at 302. 
 
29
provisions of the Constitution pertain to property interests and were designed to 
rectify the abuses that characterized the revolutionary era.”41 
 
In 1790, John Adams stated, “Property must be secured or liberty cannot 
exist.”42  The Fifth Amendment became effective in 1791 and explicitly 
incorporated into the United States Constitution Locke’s theory that “protection of 
property is a chief aim of government.”43  The importance of the Fifth Amendment 
is described by Professor Ely:   
As finally adopted, the Fifth Amendment contains two important 
property guarantees, along with procedural safeguards governing 
criminal trials.  The amendment provides in part that no person shall 
be “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”  Madison’s decision to place this language next to 
criminal justice protections, such as the prohibitions against double 
jeopardy and self-incrimination, underscored the close association of 
property rights with personal liberty.  Individuals needed security 
against both arbitrary punishment and deprivation of property.44 
 
According to Professor Ely, the Due Process Clause in the Fifth Amendment was a 
direct descendant of the Magna Charta and the initial state constitutions (like 
Delaware’s) and “in time became the most significant constitutional guarantee of 
property rights.”45  
                                          
 
41 James W. Ely, Jr., The Guardian of Every Other Right: A Constitutional History of Property 
Rights 43 (2d ed. 1998).   
42 Discourses on Davila, in 6 The Works of John Adams 280 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 
Boston, Little Brown 1851).  
43 Ely, supra, at 54. 
44 Ely, supra, at 54. 
45 Ely, supra, at 54. 
 
30
Present Delaware Constitution 
 
Following the enactment of the United States Constitution and the operative 
effectiveness of the Bill of Rights in 1791, Delaware adopted its own new 
constitution in 1792.  The President of the 1792 Delaware Constitutional 
Convention was John Dickinson, who had studied the common law of England at 
the Middle Temple in London with Thomas McKean and, thus, was also a 
contemporary of William Blackstone.46  John Dickinson and the other framers of 
the 1792 Delaware Constitution clearly intended to preserve and incorporate the 
well-established common-law principles from the 1776 Delaware Constitution into 
the protections afforded by the Bill of Rights in the 1792 Delaware Constitution.   
Today, the first document that appears in the Delaware Code is the Magna 
Charta.47  The entire Delaware Bill of Rights has remained virtually intact since 
those provisions were adopted in the 1792 Delaware Constitution.  Article I, 
Section 8 of the present Delaware Constitution provides:  “nor shall any person’s 
property be taken or applied to public use without the consent of his or her 
representatives, and without compensation being made.” 
Although this history demonstrates that property rights are fundamental to 
liberty, they are not paramount.  In 1798, United States Supreme Court Justice 
                                          
 
46 Randy J. Holland, Introduction to The Delaware Bar in the Twentieth Century xix, xxv, xxxiii 
(Helen L. Winslow et al. eds., 1994). 
47 Del. Code Ann. vol. 1 (1975). 
 
31
James Iredell noted that public projects “are necessarilly sometimes built upon the 
soil owned by individuals.”48  Accordingly, Justice Iredell acknowledged that 
“private rights must yield to public exigencies.”49    
 
Necessity Preserves Balance 
The members of the General Assembly are the representatives elected to 
protect the Article I, Section 8 private property rights of Delaware’s citizens, such 
as the Cannons.  The General Assembly has properly placed the burden on the 
State to demonstrate “necessity” as a condition precedent to taking private property 
for a public purpose.50  Title 17, section 132(c)(4) of the Delaware Code permits 
DelDOT to discharge its duties under section 132(b) by enabling DelDOT to 
“[a]cquire by condemnation or otherwise any land, easement, franchise, material or 
property, which, in the judgment of the Department shall be necessary.”   
It is uncontested that DelDOT could not build the Route 54 project without 
providing a proposal for wetlands mitigation that was approved by the Corps.  In 
order to condemn the Cannons’ additional property for compensatory mitigation, 
however, DelDOT had to establish that specific condemnation of that particular 
parcel was necessary to commence the Route 54 project.  In this case, the record 
                                          
 
48 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (1 Dall.) 386, 400 (1798) (Iredell, J., dissenting in part). 
49 Id. 
50 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 17, § 132(c)(4) (1995); see also Wilmington Parking Auth. v. Land 
with Improvements, 521 A.2d 227, 232-33 (Del. 1987). 
 
32
reflects that DelDOT has failed to demonstrate that it was necessary to take the 
Cannons’ additional property for the public purpose of improving Route 54.  That 
purpose could have been accomplished by satisfying the Corps’ requirement for 
wetlands mitigation with other land already owned by the State or other land 
purchased by the State from a willing seller.  The basis for these conclusions is 
found in the analysis of the law and the facts that follows. 
Federal Statutory and Regulatory Scheme 
 
Section 404(a) of the Clean Water Act generally bans the “discharge of 
dredged or fill material into the navigable waters” of the United States without a 
prior permit from the United States Army Corps of Engineers (the “Corps”).51  
Section 404 vests the Corps with the statutory authority to regulate wetlands 
development.52  Section 404(b)(1) provides that the decision to issue a permit for 
the discharge of fill material into wetlands is made using guidelines developed by 
the Corps and the Environmental Protection Agency (the “EPA”).53  
Pursuant to section 404(b)(1), the EPA develops section 404(b)(1) 
Guidelines, in conjunction with the Corps, for use by the Corps as the permitting 
                                          
 
51 See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2001); Randall S. Guttery et al., Federal Wetlands Regulation: 
Restrictions on the Nationwide Permit Program and the Implications for Residential Property 
Owners, 37 Am. Bus. L.J. 299, 301-02 (2000). 
52 See 33 U.S.C. § 1344. 
53 See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b)(1); Guttery et al., supra, at 302. 
 
33
authority.54  In evaluating all applications for Department of the Army permits, the 
Corps will deny a permit involving activities with section 404 discharges into 
navigable waters unless the discharge complies with the EPA’s 404(b)(1) 
Guidelines.55  In addition to ensuring compliance with the section 404(b)(1) 
Guidelines, the Corps considers wetlands mitigation throughout the permit 
application review process.56  A general statement of the Corps’ wetlands 
mitigation policy for evaluating permit applications is set forth in 33 C.F.R. § 
320.4(r).57  This general statement is not, however, “a substitute for the mitigation 
requirements necessary to ensure that a permit action under section 404 of the 
Clean Water Act complies with the section 404(b)(1) Guidelines.”58  
Provisions addressing compliance with the EPA’s 404(b)(1) Guidelines are 
set forth in 40 C.F.R. pt. 230 at subpart B.  In reviewing an application’s 
compliance with the section 404(b)(1) Guidelines and determining whether to 
grant or deny a permit for the discharge of fill material into wetlands, the Corps 
must further follow the general policies of 33 C.F.R. pt. 320 and procedures of 33 
                                          
 
54 Guidelines for Specification of Disposal Sites for Dredged or Fill Material, 45 Fed. Reg. 
85,336 (Dec. 24, 1980) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 230). 
55 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a)(1) (2001). 
56 See id. § 320.4(r)(1). 
57 See id. § 320.4(r) n.l. 
58 See id. 
 
34
C.F.R. pt. 325.59  33 C.F.R. § 320.4(g) states that “[a]uthorization of work or 
structures by [the Department of the Army] does not convey a property right, nor 
authorize any injury to property or invasion of other rights.”  Under 33 C.F.R. § 
320.4(g)(6), an  “applicant’s signature on an application is an affirmation that the 
applicant possesses or will possess the requisite property interest to undertake the 
activity proposed in the application.”60  Similarly, 33 C.F.R. § 325.1(d)(7) states 
that an applicant’s signature will be an affirmation that the applicant will possess 
the requisite property interest.  Accordingly, the federal statutory and regulatory 
scheme clearly contemplates that an applicant will offer land that it owns for 
purposes of wetlands mitigation.   
In this case, the applicant, DelDOT, did not offer any land owned by the 
State of Delaware to the Corps for wetlands mitigation.  Instead, DelDOT’s 
application to the Corps for a wetlands permit only offered the Cannons’ additional 
land on the assumption that DelDOT had the absolute authority to condemn any 
property that it wanted to seize for wetlands mitigation.  Whether the Cannons’ 
                                          
 
59 33 C.F.R. § 323.1 (2001).  Adherence to such general policies and procedures is required in 
addition to those special policies, practices and procedures to be followed by the Corps in 
connection with permits to authorize section 404 discharges.  See id.  
60 Richard Hassel (“Hassel”), Assistant Chief of the Corps’ Regulatory Branch, testified that the 
Corps Regulatory Program does not require land ownership in its permit decision.  Hassel stated 
that if the proposed activity was not contrary to the public interest and complied with the 
necessary federal regulations, the permit would be issued conditioned upon receiving the 
necessary legal instruments to perform the work on the property. 
 
35
additional property could be condemned for compensatory wetlands mitigation is 
the crux of this matter. 
Memorandum of Agreement 
 
In furtherance of the federal statutory and regulatory guidelines, the EPA 
and the Department of the Army entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (the 
“MOA”) for determining mitigation under the Clean Water Act section 404(b)(1) 
Guidelines.61  This MOA articulates “the policy and procedures to be used in the 
determination of the type and level of mitigation necessary to demonstrate 
compliance with the Clean Water Act . . . Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines.”62  The 
MOA “must be adhered to when considering mitigation requirements for standard 
permit applications.”63   
The MOA is the operative document in this appeal.  Pursuant to the MOA, 
the Corps must subject individual permit applications to “a process known as 
                                          
 
61 Memorandum of Agreement Between the Environmental Protection Agency and the 
Department of the Army Concerning the Determination of Mitigation Under the Clean Water 
Act Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines, 55 Fed. Reg. 9,210, at I (Mar. 12, 1990) [hereinafter 1990 
Memorandum of Agreement].  The MOA does not change substantive regulatory requirements, 
maintaining the need for compliance with the EPA’s 404(b)(1) Guidelines.  1990 Memorandum 
of Agreement, at I.  
62 1990 Memorandum of Agreement, supra, at I. 
63 1990 Memorandum of Agreement, supra, at I.  The MOA focuses on standard permits which 
are “those individual permits which have been processed through application of the Corps public 
interest review procedures (33 CFR 325) and EPA’s Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines.”  1990 
Memorandum of Agreement, supra, at I.  An individual permit, such as DelDOT’s permit, means 
a “Department of the Army authorization that is issued following a case-by-case evaluation of a 
specific project involving the proposed discharge(s) in accordance with the procedures of this 
part and 33 CFR part 325 and a determination that the proposed discharge is in the public interest 
pursuant to 33 CFR part 320.”  33 C.F.R. § 323.2(g) (2001). 
 
36
mitigation sequencing” to determine whether the section 404(b)(1) Guidelines have 
been met.64  Under the mitigation sequencing program, the Corps initially assesses 
an application to determine whether the proposed activity “avoids adverse impacts 
on wetlands to the maximum extent [practicable].”65  Next, the Corps considers 
appropriate and practicable66 requirements that could be placed on the proposed 
activity to minimize any remaining unavoidable impacts.67  Finally, the Corps must 
lessen the effect of unavoidable impacts by requiring the permit applicant to 
provide appropriate and practicable compensatory mitigation when minimization is 
not possible.68   
“The objective of mitigation for unavoidable impacts is to offset 
environmental losses.”69  Such mitigation should provide, at a minimum, one for 
one functional replacement, recognizing that the minimum requirement may not be 
appropriate and practicable in all cases.70  The MOA does not itself, however, 
establish “a no net loss policy for the Nation’s wetlands.”71   
                                          
 
64 Guttery et al., supra, at 314; see also 1990 Memorandum of Agreement, supra, at II.C.; 
Appellants’ App. at 248.  
65 Guttery et al., supra, at 314; 1990 Memorandum of Agreement, supra, at II.C.  
66 The MOA specifically states that “[i]n determining ‘appropriate and practicable’ measures to 
offset unavoidable impacts, such measures should be appropriate to the scope and degree of 
those impacts and practicable in terms of cost, existing technology, and logistics in light of 
overall project purposes.”  1990 Memorandum of Agreement, supra, at II.C. 
67 Guttery et al., supra, at 314-15; 1990 Memorandum of Agreement, supra, at II.C. 
68 Guttery et al., supra, at 314-15; 1990 Memorandum of Agreement, supra, at II.C. 
69 1990 Memorandum of Agreement, supra, at III.B. 
70 1990 Memorandum of Agreement, supra, at III.B. 
71 1990 Memorandum of Agreement, supra. 
 
37
Mitigation Sequencing 
The MOA mitigation sequencing program was triggered in this case because 
the Corps determined that the impact to wetlands caused by the DelDOT Route 54 
project required compensatory mitigation.  The relevant provision of the MOA 
addressing DelDOT’s obligation for compensatory mitigation states:   
Appropriate and practicable compensatory mitigation is required for 
unavoidable adverse impacts which remain after all appropriate and 
practicable minimization has been required.  Compensatory actions 
(e.g., restoration of existing degraded wetlands or creation of man-
made wetlands) should be undertaken, when practicable, in areas 
adjacent or contiguous to the discharge site (on-site compensatory 
mitigation).  If on-site compensatory mitigation is not practicable, 
off-site compensatory mitigation should be undertaken in the same 
geographic area if practicable (i.e., in close physical proximity and, to 
the extent possible, the same watershed).  In determining 
compensatory mitigation, the functional values lost by the resource to 
be impacted must be considered.  Generally, in-kind compensatory 
mitigation is preferable to out-of-kind.72 
 
Under this provision, a hierarchy of preferences is established regarding the type of 
compensatory action that should be undertaken.  The MOA sets forth a preference 
for on-site compensatory mitigation over off-site, and in-kind compensatory 
mitigation over out-of-kind. 
The MOA provides, as appears from the testimony, the following 
hierarchical preferences for compensatory mitigation: on-site, in-kind; on-site, out-
                                          
 
72 Memorandum of Agreement Between the Environmental Protection Agency and the 
Department of the Army Concerning the Determination of Mitigation Under the Clean Water 
Act Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines, 55 Fed. Reg. 9,210, at II.C.3 (Mar. 12, 1990) (emphasis 
added) [hereinafter 1990 Memorandum of Agreement].   
 
38
of-kind; off-site, in-kind; off-site, out-of-kind.  In assessing the type of 
compensatory actions the permit applicant will be required to undertake, the MOA 
conditions the compensatory action on whether it is “practicable.”73  The MOA 
specifically states that in determining “practicable” mitigation “[p]racticable is 
defined at Section 230.3(q) of the Guidelines.”74  “Section 230.3(q) of the 
Guidelines reads as follows:  ‘The term practicable means available and capable of 
being done after taking into consideration cost, existing technology, and logistics in 
light of overall project purposes.’”75   
The proper focus on the “practicability” of accommodating the Corps’ 
preference for compensatory action by DelDOT with on-site, in-kind 
compensatory mitigation must logically begin on land already owned by the State 
or available from a willing seller.  If undertaking on-site compensatory mitigation 
was not practicable from land owned by the State or that could be voluntarily 
acquired, the MOA permitted DelDOT to offer off-site compensatory mitigation.   
Therefore, it was not necessary to condemn the Cannons’ additional land to 
accomplish the improvements to Route 54.   
DelDOT’s Mitigation Proposal 
                                          
 
73 1990 Memorandum of Agreement, supra, at II.C.3. 
74 1990 Memorandum of Agreement, supra, at II.B. 
75 1990 Memorandum of Agreement, supra, at II.B.n.3 (alteration in original) (quoting 40 C.F.R. 
§ 230.3(q)). 
 
39
 
DelDOT’s Route 54 project design, constructing an elevated viaduct and a 
six foot elevated fill berm to access it, crossed wetlands.  The fill for the 
approaches to the viaduct required DelDOT to obtain permits to fill wetlands from 
the Corps.  DelDOT engaged Edward Launay (“Launay”), a professional wetland 
scientist, to address the issue of wetlands mitigation.   
After conducting an assessment of potential wetlands mitigation sites along 
the Route 54 corridor, Launay selected only one mitigation site, an additional 6.53 
acres of the Cannons’ land.  Initially, Launay did not conduct a formal off-site 
search “since the environmental agencies prefer on-site mitigation as a first option 
and the Cannon property provided an ideal site adjacent to the roadway 
improvements.”  After a June 3, 1999 meeting with the Cannons, however, 
DelDOT agreed to have Launay review other potential off-site areas near the 
project.  
 
Nevertheless, the record reflects that Launay submitted the Cannons’ 
property to the Corps as the only mitigation site, apparently without reviewing 
other off-site areas.  Consequently, the Cannons requested, pursuant to the 
Freedom of Information Act, that DelDOT identify and provide all “lands held by 
the State which are earmarked or could be used for mitigation of filling Federal 
Title 10 Section 404 wetlands.”  In response to the Cannons’ Freedom of 
 
40
Information Act request, DelDOT sought to obtain answers through internal 
communications.   
Those internal communications reflect that, in response to the Cannons’ 
request, DelDOT Real Estate employee, V. Wayne Rizzo (“Rizzo”), was asked to 
provide a list of all State owned lands in the Route 54 project vicinity, which 
would also be passed on to Launay to review for mitigation potential.  On June 15, 
2000, Rizzo determined that no DelDOT owned lands existed in the Route 54 
project vicinity.  On June 19, 2000, DelDOT asked for the evaluation of other state 
owned land in the area. 
 
Thereafter, as a result of these internal communications, in response to the 
Cannons’ Freedom of Information Act request, Launay was asked to review 
eighteen excess Sussex County properties owned by DelDOT for potential use as 
wetlands mitigation sites.76  Launay issued a report evaluating DelDOT’s 
properties on September 28, 2000.77  Launay stated that he thought he was 
requested to study other DelDOT properties since DelDOT “wanted to make sure 
that they didn’t, in fact, hold other properties that could be suitable and to prepare a 
document stating so.”  Launay determined that the eighteen DelDOT properties 
                                          
 
76 Although Rizzo’s June 15, 2000 response indicated that DelDOT did not own any lands in the 
vicinity, Launay’s report clearly states that DelDOT provided and requested him to evaluate a 
list of Sussex County properties owned by DelDOT.  No further reference is made within the 
DelDOT internal communications as to where such a list was generated.   
77 Appellants’ App. at 190-217 (Evaluation of Wetland Mitigation Potential for Sussex County 
Properties Owned by the Delaware Department of Transportation). 
 
41
were inferior to the Cannons’ additional property and unacceptable as mitigation 
sites. 
 
 
Cannons Oppose Application 
 
After DelDOT submitted its application for a wetlands fill permit to the 
Corps, a public notice was issued on December 12, 2000.  In response to that 
notification, the Cannons formally protested the use of their property as a wetlands 
mitigation site by letter to the Corps dated January 3, 2001.  The Cannons also 
requested that the Corps look to other lands owned by the State of Delaware for 
mitigation purposes.   
DelDOT responded to the Cannons’ letter by submitting to the Corps 
Launay’s report, which rejected other DelDOT mitigation sites as inferior to the 
Cannons’ property.  Not surprisingly, the Corps disregarded the Cannons’ protest.  
The Corps issued a permit to DelDOT to fill wetlands for the proposed 
improvements to Route 54 upon the condition that DelDOT secure ownership of 
the Cannons’ additional property prior to commencing work.   
DelDOT Creates Necessity 
DelDOT argues that condemnation of the Cannons’ additional property was 
necessary since the Corps, under the MOA’s sequential review, would require 
 
42
wetlands mitigation for the Route 54 project on-site and in-kind, regardless of 
whether other State owned off-site locations were available for mitigation 
purposes.  This argument is contrary to the MOA’s express language.  What 
DelDOT purports to be the Corps’ “requirement” for on-site and in-kind 
compensatory mitigation is in actuality a non-mandatory preference.  Moreover, 
the Corps preference for on-site and in-kind compensatory action yields in a 
hierarchical order whenever that preferred action is not practicable.  The Corps 
then allows an applicant to offer compensatory action off-site in the same 
geographic area, if practicable.   
To be “practicable,” either on-site or off-site actions should be reasonable in 
terms of cost, existing technology, and logistics in light of overall project purposes, 
i.e., from land that the applicant already owns or could acquire from a willing 
seller.  By selecting and submitting only the most preferred, on-site and in-kind 
solution, DelDOT assumed that compensatory mitigation through a voluntary sale 
or condemnation of the Cannons’ additional property was a practicable alternative.  
DelDOT knew, however, that the Cannons did not intend to voluntarily transfer 
their additional property by at least June 3, 1999.   
Notwithstanding its knowledge of the Cannons’ refusal to sell additional 
land, DelDOT applied for a permit from the Corps by offering the Cannons’ 
property as the only mitigation site for compensatory mitigation.  The Corps 
 
43
approved DelDOT’s permit by requiring the acquisition of the Cannons’ additional 
property prior to commencement of the project.  Thus, DelDOT  
argues it became “necessary” for DelDOT to condemn the Cannons’ property in 
order to fulfill Special Condition 28 of the DelDOT permit to fill wetlands to 
improve Route 54.  The federal regulations specifically provide, however, that a 
permit from the Corps “does not authorize any injury to property or invasion of 
rights or any infringement of Federal, state or local laws or regulations.”78 
 
By submitting only the Cannons’ additional property for wetlands 
mitigation, DelDOT guaranteed that the Corps would condition its grant of a 
permit to fill wetlands on DelDOT’s acquisition of the Cannons’ property.  In this 
appeal, DelDOT has the temerity to argue that it is now “necessary” to condemn 
the Cannons’ additional land for wetlands mitigation so that Route 54 can be 
improved.  In fact, DelDOT suggests that it had the right to submit any private 
property anywhere in the State for wetlands mitigation and then to condemn that 
property if its acquisition was a condition for obtaining a permit for construction 
from the Corps.   
                                          
 
78 33 C.F.R. § 320.4 (g)(6)(2001). 
 
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DelDOT operated under the assumption that the State had the absolute right 
to condemn the Cannons’ additional property.79  Thus, DelDOT did not offer the 
Corps any other State owned property for wetlands mitigation.  If any necessity 
existed for acquiring the Cannons’ additional property for mitigation purposes, 
DelDOT created that necessity by limiting its review to one potential mitigation 
site that it did not own and that the Cannons did not want to sell.   
Cannons Condemnation Unnecessary 
Launay testified that the Cannons’ additional property was the only 
mitigation site submitted to the Corps.  Launay testified that in negotiations with 
the Corps on DelDOT’s behalf, he operated under the assumption that “ultimately 
the State somehow would acquire that piece of property.”  Launay testified that 
DelDOT offered the Corps the most preferred mitigation site in order to ease and 
facilitate the negotiation process for a permit to fill wetlands.  Therese Fulmer, 
DelDOT’s 
Manager 
of 
Environmental 
Studies, 
Planning, 
and 
Project 
Development, also testified that DelDOT operated under the assumption that they 
had the power of condemnation and attempted to accommodate the Corps’ 
                                          
 
79 On February 9, 2001, DelDOT stated in a letter to the Corps that for DelDOT “to obtain 
possession on the property acquisitions that [it] could not negotiate to a settlement, [the 
Cannons’ additional property,] it [would] be necessary for [DelDOT] to demonstrate to the court 
that [the] project [would] in fact be permitted by the Corps.”  Accordingly, DelDOT requested 
the Corps to issue the previously accepted permit, “with appropriate conditions,” by mid-March.  
That date was requested because DelDOT believed “that [it] would allow [DelDOT] sufficient 
time to complete the property acquisitions.” 
 
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preference for on-site compensatory mitigation without even considering off-site 
compensatory mitigation options. 
Launay testified that at least 100 acres of State owned land existed that could 
have been reviewed and offered to the Corps, located in the same watershed, 
within some level of the Corps’ mitigation preferences.  The Corps’ representative 
testified that if it was convinced that the Cannons’ property was not practicable or 
feasible the Corps would have considered other mitigation sites.80  Accordingly, 
DelDOT’s conscious choice to submit only one mitigation site, which it did not 
even own, to accommodate a non-mandatory preference by the Corps resulted in 
the Corps’ imposition of a condition that does not constitute the statutory necessity 
which would enable DelDOT to condemn the Cannons’ additional property.   
Conclusion 
 
The record reflects that condemnation of the Cannons’ additional property 
for wetlands mitigation was neither necessary nor reasonable.  Although it was 
necessary for DelDOT to provide for wetlands mitigation to receive a permit for 
construction of the improvements to Route 54 from the Corps, it was not necessary 
to offer the Cannons’ additional property to accomplish that purpose.  In the 
                                          
 
80 Hassel testified that if the State could not condemn the Cannons’ additional property the 
Cannons’ mitigation site would not be feasible for compensatory mitigation.  Hassel stated the 
Corps would then sequentially review other potential mitigation sites under the MOA’s hierarchy 
to find a practicable and feasible alternative.   
 
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absence of establishing a necessity, DelDOT had no statutory authority to condemn 
the Cannons’ additional land. 
DelDOT’s actions also violated the private property rights that are 
guaranteed to the Cannons by Article I, Section 8 of the Delaware Constitution.  
That provision in the Delaware Constitution protects against a taking of the 
Cannons’ private property for public purposes without the consent of the Cannons’ 
elected representatives.  The General Assembly conditioned DelDOT’s authority to 
exercise the inherent sovereign powers of eminent domain upon a demonstration of 
necessity.  Since DelDOT’s condemnation of the Cannons’ additional land was 
unnecessary, it was not in accordance with the applicable statute enacted by the 
Cannons’ elected representatives.  In the absence of procedural safeguards, 
DelDOT’s action also violated the non-delegation doctrine that is based upon the 
due process rights of private property owners that are guaranteed by the term “law 
of the land” in Article I, Section 8. 
The Superior Court’s decision to affirm DelDOT’s finding of necessity is 
not supported by the record and is not the product of a logical deductive process.  
DelDOT’s condemnation of the Cannon’s additional land was both legally 
erroneous and constituted an abuse of the sovereign power of eminent domain.  
Therefore, we respectfully dissent. 
 
 
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