Title: Advisory Opinion to Attorney General, Etc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC01-2422
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: March 28, 2002

1. Briefs in support of the proposed amendment were submitted jointly in
the name of the American College of Physicians and several other groups (ACP). 
Briefs in opposition to the proposal were submitted jointly by Lorillard Tobacco
and several other groups (Tobacco), as well as by the Florida Restaurant
Association (Restaurant Association).  Smoke-Free for Health, Inc. (Smoke-Free),
the proponent of the measure, filed an initial brief and a reply brief. 
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC01-2422
____________
ADVISORY OPINION TO ATTORNEY GENERAL RE:  PROTECT 
PEOPLE FROM THE HEALTH HAZARDS OF SECOND-HAND 
SMOKE BY PROHIBITING WORKPLACE SMOKING.
[March 28, 2002]
PER CURIAM.
The Attorney General has petitioned this Court for an advisory opinion
concerning the validity of a proposed citizen initiative amendment to the Florida
Constitution.  The proponent of the initiative is a group known as Smoke-Free for
Health, Incorporated (Smoke-Free).   We have jurisdiction.  See art. IV, § 10; art.
V, § 3(b)(10), Fla. Const.  This Court issued an order permitting interested parties
to file briefs with regard to the proposed amendment.1
-2-
The ballot title and summary for the proposed amendment are as follows:
Ballot title:  Protect People from the Health Hazards of Second-Hand
Tobacco Smoke by Prohibiting Workplace Smoking.
Ballot summary:  To protect people from the health hazards of second-hand 
tobacco smoke, this amendment prohibits tobacco smoking in enclosed 
indoor workplaces.  Allows exceptions for private residences except when 
they are being used to provide commercial child care, adult care or health 
care.  Also allows exceptions for retail tobacco shops, designated smoking 
guest rooms at hotels, and other public lodging establishments, and stand-
alone bars.  Provides definitions, and requires the legislature to promptly 
implement this amendment.
The text of the proposed amendment, which would add section 20 to article
X of the Florida Constitution, states:
BE IT ENACTED BY THE PEOPLE OF FLORIDA THAT:
WHEREAS, second-hand tobacco smoke is a known human
carcinogen (contains cancer-causing agents) for which there is no safe
level of exposure, and causes death and disease; WHEREAS,
exposure to second-hand tobacco smoke frequently occurs in the
workplace; and WHEREAS, ventilation and filtration systems do not
remove the cancer-causing substances from second-hand smoke;
NOW, THEREFORE, to protect people from the health hazards of
second-hand tobacco smoke, the citizens of Florida hereby amend
Article X of the Florida Constitution to add the following as section
20:
SECTION 20.  Workplaces Without Tobacco Smoke. — 
(a) Prohibition.  As a Florida health initiative to protect people from the 
health hazards of second-hand tobacco smoke, tobacco smoking is prohibited
in enclosed indoor workplaces.
-3-
(b) Exceptions.  As further explained in the definitions below, tobacco 
smoking may be permitted in private residences whenever they are not being 
used commercially to provide child care, adult care, or health care, or any 
combination thereof; and further may be permitted in retail tobacco shops, 
designated smoking guest rooms at hotels and other public lodging 
establishments; and stand-alone bars.  However, nothing in this section or in 
its implementing legislation or regulations shall prohibit the owner, lessee, or
other person in control of the use of an enclosed indoor workplace from 
further prohibiting or limiting smoking therein.
(c) Definitions.  For purposes of this section, the following words and terms 
shall have the stated meanings:
“Smoking” means inhaling, exhaling, burning, carrying, or possessing
any lighted tobacco product, including cigarettes, cigars, pipe tobacco,
and any other lighted tobacco product.  
“Second-hand smoke,” also known as environmental tobacco smoke (ETS), 
means smoke emitted from lighted, smoldering, or burning tobacco when the
smoker is not inhaling; smoke emitted at the mouthpiece during puff 
drawing; and smoke exhaled by the smoker.  
“Work” means any person’s providing any employment or employment-type 
service for or at the request of another individual or individuals or any public
or private entity, whether for compensation or not, whether full or part-time, 
whether legally or not.
“Work” includes, without limitation, any such service performed by an 
employee, independent contractor, agent, partner, proprietor, manager, 
officer, director, apprentice, trainee, associate, servant, volunteer, and the 
like.
“Enclosed indoor workplace” means any place where one or more persons 
engages in work, and which place is predominantly or totally bounded on all
sides and above by physical barriers, regardless of whether such barriers 
consist of or include uncovered openings, screened or otherwise partially 
covered openings, or open or closed windows, jalousies, doors, or the like.  
-4-
This section applies to all such enclosed indoor workplaces without regard 
to whether work is occurring at any given time.
“Commercial” use of a private residence means any time during which the 
owner, lessee, or other person occupying or controlling the use of the 
private residence is furnishing in the private residence, or causing or 
allowing to be furnished in the private residence, child care, adult care, or 
health care, or any combination thereof, and receiving or expecting to 
receive compensation therefor.
“Retail tobacco shop” means any enclosed indoor workplace dedicated to or
predominantly for the retail sale of tobacco, tobacco products, and 
accessories for such products, in which the sale of other products or 
services is merely incidental.  
“Designated smoking guest rooms at public lodging establishments” means 
the sleeping rooms and directly associated private areas, such as bathrooms, 
living rooms, and kitchen areas, if any, rented to guests for their exclusive 
transient occupancy in public lodging establishments including hotels, 
motels, resort condominiums, transient apartments, transient lodging 
establishments, rooming houses, boarding houses, resort dwellings, bed and 
breakfast inns, and the like; and designated by the person or persons having 
management authority over such public lodging establishment as rooms in 
which smoking may be permitted.
“Stand-alone” bar means any place of business devoted during any time of 
operation predominantly or totally to serving alcoholic beverages, 
intoxicating beverages, or intoxicating liquors, or any combination thereof, 
for consumption on the licensed premises; in which the serving of food, if 
any, is merely incidental to the consumption of any such beverage; and that 
is not located within, and does not share any common entryway or common 
indoor area with, any other enclosed indoor workplace including any 
business for which the sale of food or any other product or service is more 
than an incidental source of gross revenue.
(d) Legislation.  In the next regular legislative session occurring after voter 
approval of this amendment, the Florida Legislature shall adopt legislation 
-5-
to implement this amendment in a manner consistent with its broad purpose 
and stated terms, and having an effective date no later than July 1 of the 
year following voter approval.  Such legislation shall include, without 
limitation, civil penalties for violations of this section; provisions for 
administrative enforcement; and the requirement and authorization of 
agency rules for implementation and enforcement.  Nothing herein shall 
preclude the Legislature from enacting any law constituting or allowing a 
more restrictive regulation of tobacco smoking than is provided in this 
section.
Our inquiry, in determining the validity of an initiative petition, is limited to
two issues:  whether the ballot title and summary is printed in clear and
unambiguous language pursuant to section 101.161(1), Florida Statutes (2001),
and whether the petition satisfies the single subject requirement of article XI,
section 3, Florida Constitution.  This Court does not review the merits of a
proposed amendment.  See Advisory Opinion to the Atty. Gen. re Right of
Citizens to Choose Health Care Providers, 705 So. 2d 563, 565 (Fla. 1998);
Advisory Opinion to the Atty. Gen. re People’s Property Rights Amendments
Providing Compensation for Restricting Real Property Use May Cover Multiple
Subjects, 699 So. 2d 1304, 1306 (Fla. 1997); see also Advisory Opinion to the
Atty. Gen. re Tax Limitation, 644 So. 2d 486, 489 (Fla. 1994) (“This Court does
not have the authority or the responsibility to rule on the merits or the wisdom of
. . . proposed initiative amendments . . . .”).
-6-
BALLOT TITLE AND SUMMARY
Section 101.161(1), Florida Statutes (2001), states in pertinent part:
Whenever a constitutional amendment or other public measure is
submitted to the vote of the people, the substance of such amendment
. . . shall be printed in clear and unambiguous language on the ballot 
. . . .  [T]he substance of the amendment . . . shall be an explanatory
statement, not exceeding 75 words in length, of the chief purpose of
the measure.  The ballot title shall consist of a caption, not exceeding
15 words in length, by which the measure is commonly referred to or
spoken of.
Thus, the ballot title and summary must clearly and unambiguously state “the chief
purpose of the measure,” Askew v. Firestone, 421 So. 2d 151, 154 (Fla. 1982), 
and must not be misleading.  Advisory Opinion to the Atty. Gen. re Term Limits
Pledge, 718 So. 2d 798, 803 (Fla. 1998).  Moreover, the ballot title and summary
must give “fair notice of the content of the proposed amendment to enable the
casting of an intelligent and informed vote.”  Advisory Opinion to the Atty.
Gen.—Limited Casinos, 644 So. 2d 71, 74 (Fla. 1994).  
We first consider Restaurant Association’s assertions with regard to the
ballot title and summary.  Restaurant Association contends that the title and
summary are misleading because the definition of  “enclosed indoor workplace”
does not indicate that smoking would be banned in places like restaurants, which
many patrons visit for the sole purpose of relaxing.  The summary for the instant
2. We further reject as meritless Restaurant Association’s other claims that
the instant proposal employs vague terms.  
-7-
proposal clearly states the purpose of the amendment is to prohibit tobacco
smoking in enclosed indoor workplaces.  The title also states “Prohibiting
Workplace Smoking.”  The summary indicates that definitions are provided in the
amendment text, thereby alerting voters to review the contents of the amendment
text.  It is obvious that “[t]he seventy-five word limit placed on the ballot summary
as required by statute does not lend itself to an explanation of all of a proposed
amendment’s details.”  Advisory Opinion to the Atty. Gen. re—Amendment to Bar
Government from Treating People Differently Based on Race in Public Education,
778 So. 2d 888, 899 (Fla. 2000).  It is not necessary that the title and summary
explain every ramification of the proposed amendment.  Carroll v. Firestone, 497
So. 2d 1204, 1206 (Fla. 1986).  We conclude that as to Restaurant Association’s
contention, the summary clearly states the chief purpose of the measure and gives
“fair notice of the content of the proposed amendment to enable the casting of an
intelligent and informed vote.”  Limited Casinos, 644 So. 2d  at 74.2  In our view,
the argument that Florida citizens cannot understand that a restaurant may be a
workplace is contrary to rational analysis.  
Restaurant Association also asserts that the summary is misleading because
-8-
it fails to disclose a major change in the law.  Specifically, it argues that the
summary fails to disclose the effect that the proposed amendment would have on
sections 386.203-.205, Florida Statutes (2001).  In general, those sections relate to
existing smoking restrictions under certain circumstances in public places. 
Restaurant Association also contends that the summary is misleading because it
does not disclose that smoking would be banned in workplaces that are not
generally considered to be public places, and therefore fails to disclose its effect
on certain parts of chapter 386, Florida Statutes (2001).  We reiterate our
conclusion that the summary adequately states its chief purpose of banning
smoking in enclosed indoor workplaces and clarity does not require further
references or definitions for validity here.  As suggested by the proponents of the
amendment, it does not stretch logic to presume that most, if not all, voters are
aware that smoking is presently limited in certain public places, given the
pervasiveness of signs and other remonstrations against smoking in those areas,
and that people work in places such as restaurants.  We agree.  “The voter must be
presumed to have a certain amount of common sense and knowledge.”  Advisory
Opinion to the Atty. Gen.—Tax Limitation, 673 So. 2d 864, 868 (Fla. 1996). 
Moreover, contrary to all arguments otherwise, “an exhaustive explanation of the
interpretation and future possible effects of the amendment [is] not required” in
3. Restaurant Association’s reliance on our opinion in Advisory Opinion to
the Atty. Gen. re Casino Authorization, Taxation & Regulation, 656 So. 2d 466,
469 (Fla. 1995), is unavailing.  There, we determined that a ballot summary was
defective because it would mislead voters into believing that to ban casinos in
Florida they must cast an affirmative vote for the amendment.  The summary failed
to disclose that Florida law already banned casinos.  The scenario is not the same
in the instant case, because the ballot summary does not attempt to deceive the
voter into believing or having any particular impression with regard to the present
status of smoking in Florida.  We also note that in the other cases on which
Restaurant Association relies for support on this point, the ballot summary was
misleading because it failed to disclose the proposed measure’s impact on existing
constitutional, not statutory, provisions.
-9-
the ballot title and summary.  Race in Public Education, 778 So. 2d at 899.  We are
most concerned with relationships and impact on other areas of law when we
consider whether the ballot summary and title mislead the voter with regard to
effects and impact on other constitutional provisions.  See Race in Public
Education, 778 So. 2d at 899-900 (stating that ballot summaries must be
invalidated when they fail to mention constitutional provisions that are affected, or
when they fail to define terms adequately or to use consistent terminology).  We
conclude that the instant proposal does not mislead in this area.3  
 
We next consider Tobacco’s arguments that the ballot title and summary are
defective because each contains terms that constitute impermissible political or
inflammatory rhetoric.  Specifically, Tobacco focuses on the use of the words
4. Restaurant Association presents similar arguments on these points in its
opposition brief.
-10-
“protect” and “hazards” in the ballot title and summary, and contends that the
appearance of these terms on the ballot would constitute judicial adjudication of
unproven facts.  On these points, we disagree.4  
On this issue Tobacco asserts that the instant proposal is similar to the
initiative we found invalid in In re Advisory Opinion to the Atty. Gen.—Save Our
Everglades, 636 So. 2d 1336, 1341-42 (Fla. 1994).  There, we determined that the
ballot title was deficient because, in considering the term “save,” a voter could
easily be led into believing that the Everglades ecosystem was lost.  The text of the
amendment itself gave no indication of the severity of pollution and other perils
purportedly threatening the Everglades, and employed the term “restore” rather
than the word “save,” which appeared in the title.  We also noted that the ballot
summary implied that the sugarcane industry would only be required to assist in an
Everglades cleanup, while the amendment text provided no indication that any
other entity would assist the sugarcane industry with the cleanup.  There we
determined that the title caused the proposal to “fly under false colors.”  We
concluded that the ballot summary was political rhetoric with an emotional appeal,
rather than “an accurate and informative synopsis of the meaning and effect of the
5. In determining the meaning of a term in a citizen initiative, we have
previously resorted to a dictionary definition when no definition was provided in
the amendment text.  See Advisory Opinion to the Governor—1996 Amendment 5
(Everglades), 706 So. 2d 278, 282 (Fla. 1996) (providing advisory opinion on
meaning of term “primarily responsible” with regard to initiative on Everglades
preservation).  
6. Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary at 534 (10th ed. 1996). 
Moreover, “hazardous” is defined as “involving or exposing one to risk (as of loss
or harm).”  Id.
-11-
proposed amendment.”  Id. at 1342.  The summary in Save Our Everglades was
determined to be a subjective evaluation of the impact of the proposed amendment
as opposed to a summary of the legal effect which is accomplished by the
summary presented here.  
In our view, the singular use of the word “hazards” in the ballot title and
summary of the instant proposal does not rise to a comparable level of political
and emotional language and subjective evaluation as the language we rejected in
Save Our Everglades.  Since no definition of “hazard” is provided in the text of the
proposed amendment, we resort to the dictionary definition.5  In doing so, we note
that the meaning associated with the term is that of “chance” or “risk.”6  When
considered in this light, the language in the ballot summary consisting of the use
of one word refers to a chance or risk that Florida citizens can evaluate in
connection with the proposed limitations contained within the proposed
-12-
amendment.  Neither we nor the voters decide the fact of harm but evaluate the
proposal with reference to risks or chances.   Moreover, the instant proposal does
not involve, as did the rejected language in Save Our Everglades, the legerdemain
of employing an emotional term (“save”) in the ballot title or summary while
substituting a more docile term (“restore”) in the amendment text.  Authorization
of the instant measure’s appearance on the ballot simply does not constitute
adjudication or acceptance of statements contained therein as a factual
determination.  Our review is confined to the aspects of clarity and lack of
ambiguity within the ballot title and summary.  With regard to the instant proposal,
the voters will ultimately determine the wisdom of the policy alternative presented
to them.  If there is no risk or chance of harm from such conditions the voters’
voice will certainly be heard.  We conclude that the use of the term “hazards” does
not mislead voters and is clearly related to the choice placed before them.  
In a similar manner, use of the term “protect” does not constitute
impermissible political rhetoric or the adjudication of a fact.  Tobacco asserts that
this term has political or emotional underpinnings, and that whether the instant
proposal would “protect” voters from the possible harm of second-hand smoke is
not a fact which this Court should adjudicate.  Yet, in its brief Tobacco alludes to
the amendment proposals in Advisory Opinion to the Atty. Gen.—Fee on the
-13-
Everglades Sugar Production, 681 So. 2d 1124 (Fla. 1996), as exemplars of
“neutral” language in a citizen initiative.  In two of the three amendment proposals
we reviewed in Fee on Everglades, the ballot summary stated that the purpose of
the amendment was for “conservation and protection of natural resources and
abatement of water pollution in the Everglades.”  On one hand, Tobacco implies 
that the use of the term “protection” in Fee on Everglades is neutral and does not
constitute adjudication of a fact.  On the other, however, Tobacco asserts that the
use of the term “protect” in the instant proposal is infected with political or
emotional sentiment.  Moreover, Tobacco posits that the employment of the term
in the instant proposal impermissibly determines, as a factual matter, that voters
would be sheltered from the risk of harm from second-hand smoke.
 We are unable to discern the logic as to how the application of essentially
the same term can produce such dramatically different results.  We concluded in
Fee on Everglades that the ballot titles and summaries were not misleading.  Our
opinion did not in any way indicate that the appearance of the proposed
amendment on the ballot constituted our adjudication or acceptance, as fact, that
the proposals would actually be effective in protecting or conserving the
Everglades.   Nor does our authorization for this proposed amendment to appear 
on the ballot constitute an adjudication of whether second-hand smoke is
7. In his petition seeking review of the instant proposal, the Attorney
General presented a concern with regard to the language that describes when
smoking is permitted in private residences which provide commercial care to
children, adults, or health patients.  Smoke-Free asserted both in its brief and at
oral argument that the language unambiguously indicates that smoking would be
permitted at times during which a private residence is not being used to provide
commercial care.  We agree.  The proposal is not misleading on this point.
-14-
hazardous or whether the proposal will be effective in protecting citizens from any
actual or perceived harm attendant to second-hand smoke.  As mentioned above,
those considerations are reserved for the voters.  The ballot summary and title in
the instant proposal are not misleading, nor are they “clearly and conclusively
defective.”  Askew v. Firestone, 421 So. 2d 151, 154 (Fla. 1982) (noting that
language in citizen initiative must be clearly and conclusively defective to justify
removal of measure from the ballot).  Therefore, we decline to strike the measure
from the ballot based on our review of the title and summary.7
SINGLE-SUBJECT REQUIREMENT   
Article XI, section 3 of the Florida Constitution requires that proposed
citizen-initiative amendments “embrace but one subject and matter directly
connected therewith.”  “[S]ection 3 protects against multiple ‘precipitous’ and
‘cataclysmic’ changes in the constitution by limiting to a single subject what may
be included in any one amendment proposal.”  Advisory Opinion to the Atty. Gen.
re Fish & Wildlife Conservation Comm’n, 705 So. 2d 1351, 1353 (Fla. 1998).  To
8. We agree with the Attorney General that language contained in the
“whereas” clauses of the proposed initiative “[does] not appear to be a part of the
actual proposed amendment to add section 20 to Article X, Florida Constitution.” 
See Letter from Attorney General Robert Butterworth to Chief Justice Charles T.
Wells and Justices of Supreme Court of Florida at 7 (November 7, 2001) (on file
with Supreme Court of Florida).  Performance of a judicial function is therefore
not an issue with regard to the “whereas” language. 
-15-
satisfy the single-subject requirement, a proposed amendment must express a
“logical and natural oneness of purpose.”  Fine v. Firestone, 448 So. 2d 984, 990
(Fla. 1984).  “[I]t is when a proposal substantially alters or performs the functions
of multiple branches of government that it violates the single-subject test.”  Fish &
Wildlife Conservation Comm’n, 705 So. 2d at 1354.  Moreover, the mere
possibility that an amendment might interact with other parts of the Florida
Constitution is not sufficient reason to invalidate the proposed amendment.  See 
Fee on Everglades, 681 So. 2d at 1128.  
Restaurant Association challenges the instant proposal on several single-
subject grounds.  None requires significant discussion, however, as we determine
that the instant proposal focuses on a single subject:  the issue of second-hand
smoke in enclosed indoor workplaces.  The measure respects the legislative
function by making allowance for the Legislature to enact statutes to implement
the constitutional provision.  The proposal does not perform any judicial functions
by adjudicating specific facts.8  We also reject Restaurant Association’s other
-16-
single-subject contentions as lacking in merit.  
The ballot title in the instant proposal does not exceed fifteen words, and the
ballot summary does not exceed seventy-five words, thereby falling within
statutory requirements.  The title and summary also meet the other legal
requirements of article XI, section 3 of the Florida Constitution, and section
101.161(1), Florida Statutes (2001).  Accordingly, we determine that they provide
the citizens of Florida with the necessary information to cast an intelligent and
informed vote.  This opinion encompasses no other issues, and should not be
construed as favoring or opposing the passage of the proposed amendment.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and
QUINCE, JJ., concur.
Original Proceeding - Advisory Opinion to Attorney General
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Louis F. Hubener, III, Assistant
Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,
PRESENTOR
Stephen H. Grimes and Susan L. Kelsey of Holland & Knight, Tallahassee,
Florida,
for Smoke-Free for Health, Inc., SPONSOR  
-17-
Christopher Lawson Nuland, Jacksonville, Florida, for American College of
Physicians - American Society of Internal Medicine, Florida Chapter, Inc. and the
Florida Public Health Association, Inc.; T. Elaine Holmes, Tampa, Florida, for
American Cancer Society, Florida Division, Inc., and AARP; Teresa D. Shelton,
St. Petersburg, Florida, for American Heart Association, Inc. Florida/Puerto Rico
Affiliate; Marshall Collins Deason, Jr., Tampa, Florida, for American Lung
Association of Florida, Inc.; and Michelle Anchors of Anchors, Foster, McInnis &
Keefe, P.A., Fort Walton Beach, Florida, for Center for Florida’s Children, and
National Center for Tobacco-Free Kids, Inc.,   
PROPONENTS
Barry Richard of Greenberg Traurig, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida, and Elliot H.
Scherker and Elliot B. Kula of Greenberg Traurig, P.A., Miami, Florida, for
Lorillard Tobacco Company, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, Associated
Builders & Contractors of Florida, Inc., Cigar Association of America, Inc.,
Florida Hotel and Motel Association, Inc., Florida United Businesses Association,
Inc., Florida Tobacco & Candy Association, Florida Petroleum Marketers and
Convenience Store Association, and Florida Retail Federation; and Stephen W.
Metz, Warren H. Husband, and Susan C. Hauser of Metz, Hauser & Husband,
P.A., Tallahassee, Florida, for the Florida Restaurant Association, Inc., 
OPPONENTS