Title: Downs v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 116, 2022
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: February 14, 2023

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
PIERRE DOWNS, 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Appellee. 
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No.  116, 2022 
 
Court Below—Superior Court  
of the State of Delaware 
 
Cr. ID No. 1610003784 A & B 
      
Submitted:  November 16, 2022 
Decided:  February 14, 2023 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA, and VAUGHN, Justices.  
O R D E R 
 
On this 14th day of  February 2023, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1)  The defendant-appellant, Pierre Downs, appeals from a Superior Court 
sentence order declaring him an habitual criminal under 11 Del. C. § 4214(c).  He 
argues that the Superior Court erred when it sua sponte continued a scheduled 
sentence hearing in order to give the State an opportunity to file a new or revised 
motion declaring him an habitual offender.  For the reasons that follow, we have 
concluded that the Superior Court’s judgment should be affirmed. 
(2)  In 2018, a jury found the defendant guilty of robbery in the first degree, 
assault in the third degree, theft of a firearm, and conspiracy in the second degree.  
The same jury in a severed trial found the defendant guilty of possession of a firearm 
2 
 
by a person prohibited (“PFBPP”).  The State filed a motion to declare the defendant 
an habitual offender pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4214(d) and the Superior Court granted 
it at sentencing on April 6, 2018.  Section 4214(d) applies where a person who has 
two times been convicted of a violent felony is then convicted of a third violent 
felony.1  The defendant was sentenced to 27 years at Level V for robbery in the first 
degree, 17 years at Level V for PFBPP, and suspended periods of Level V for the 
other charges.  His sentence order reflected that he was sentenced as an habitual 
offender on the robbery in the first degree and PFBPP charges. 
(3)  In the defendant’s direct appeal to this Court, his convictions for robbery 
in the first degree, assault in the third degree, and conspiracy in the second degree 
were affirmed, but his convictions for PFBPP and theft of a firearm were vacated.2  
Following the appeal, the Superior Court resentenced the defendant.  The new 
sentence order imposed the same sentences for first degree robbery, assault in the 
third degree, and conspiracy in the second degree.  After he was resentenced, the 
defendant filed two pro se motions:  a motion for correction of sentence and a motion 
for correction of an illegal sentence.  In the motion for correction of sentence, the 
defendant alleged that he was not subject to habitual offender sentencing because 
one of the two predicate prior convictions, specifically a prior conviction for 
 
1 11 Del. C. § 4214(d). 
2 Downs v. State, 206 A.2d 835, 2019 WL 1040407, at *6 (Del. Mar. 4, 2019) (ORDER). 
3 
 
possession of a deadly weapon by a person prohibited (PDWBPP), was not a violent 
felony when it occurred.  In response to this motion, the State argued that the 
defendant was also subject to habitual sentencing under 11 Del. C. § 4214(c), which 
applies where a person has been two times convicted of a felony, and one time 
convicted of a violent felony, and is then convicted of a subsequent violent felony.3  
The defendant’s motion for correction of an illegal sentence asserted that his 
resentencing occurred without his knowledge and in his absence.  
(4)  The Superior Court denied the motion for correction of an illegal sentence.  
The defendant appealed that denial to this Court.  On appeal, the State recommended 
that the case be remanded for a new resentencing where the defendant could attend 
with counsel and make any arguments he wished concerning sentencing, with the 
Superior Court then entering such order or orders as may be appropriate.4  This Court 
agreed, vacated the defendant’s sentence order, and remanded the matter for a new 
hearing.5  
(5)  On remand, the Superior Court held an office conference with counsel at 
which resentencing and other matters were discussed.  The new sentence hearing 
was scheduled for November 23, 2021.  Prior to the hearing, defense counsel wrote 
a letter to the Superior Court indicating that if the State presented a motion to declare 
 
3 11 Del. C. § 4214(c). 
4 Downs v. State, 259 A.2d 1272, 2021 WL 4075079, at *2 (Del. Sept. 7, 2021) (ORDER). 
5 Id. at *3. 
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the defendant an habitual offender at that hearing, the motion would be opposed. 
 
(6)  When the hearing opened, the Superior Court raised the issue of the 
defendant’s status as an habitual offender.  Defense counsel took the position that 
his habitual offender status was not before the court because no habitual offender 
motion had been filed by the State for that sentence hearing.  The State informed the 
court that it intended to rely on the habitual offender motion filed in 2018.  The 2018 
motion asserted habitual offender status pursuant to Section 4214(d) only, which as 
mentioned, imposes habitual offender status where there is a third conviction of a 
violent felony following two prior violent felony convictions.6  The defense argued 
that Section 4214(d) of the habitual offender statute was not applicable to the 
defendant because the PDWBPP conviction was not a violent felony when it 
occurred.  The State argued that there was an “adequate factual record to support 
finding that the [possession of a deadly weapon by a] person prohibited charge was, 
in fact, a violent offense” because the defendant had a previous conviction of 
possession of a destructive weapon when he was charged with the predicate 
PDWBPP.7  The prior conviction of Possession of a Destructive Weapon, according 
to the State, elevated the predicate PDWBPP to a violent felony.  The parties 
disagreed on that point.  Arguments continued and the court finally commented that:   
 
6 11 Del. C. § 4214(d). 
7 App. to Opening Br. at A157. 
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“Well, counsel, this is the first occasion on which the Court has been presented with 
some of the arguments that have been presented today.”8 
(7)  After a recess, the court decided not proceed with sentencing at that time, 
due to the fact that: 
[S]ome new argument and information has been presented 
today with regard to Mr. Downs’ habitual offender status 
that was not previously known, either to the Court or to the 
State . . . .  But I will note again that I did give the defense 
an opportunity to raise the issues prior to today’s hearing, 
and had that been done, the State, I believe, would have 
had an opportunity to respond or determine its position 
based on that.  And certainly, there has been an element of 
surprise here with regard to those issues.9 
 
The Superior Court decided to give the State an opportunity to file a new or revised 
motion to declare the defendant an habitual offender.  Because the defense raised 
certain arguments for the first time at the November 23, 2021 hearing, the court 
decided the State had not had an adequate opportunity to respond to all of the defense 
arguments.  The court also noted that, in addition to its original motion alleging that 
the defendant was an habitual offender under 4214(d) the State had previously 
“made arguments . . . regarding whether Mr. Downs would be considered an habitual 
offender under 4214(c).”10  The defendant opposed the court’s decision to postpone 
sentencing. 
 
8 Id. at A162-63. 
9 Id. at A164-65. 
10 Id. at A171. 
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(8)  On December 6, 2021, the State filed a new habitual offender motion 
pursuant to Sections 4214(c) and (d).  On March 14, 2022, the court held another 
sentence hearing.  The court then declared the defendant an habitual offender under 
11 Del. C. § 4214(c).  The original sentence of 27 years at Level V for robbery first 
degree was reimposed upon the defendant as an habitual offender. 
(9)  On appeal, the defendant claims that the Superior Court’s sua sponte 
postponement of the defendant’s November 23, 2021 sentence hearing and sua 
sponte invitation to the State to refile its habitual offender motion adding a separate 
section of the statute not raised in the State’s original motion was an abuse of 
discretion.11  The defendant contends that the court misapplied its inherent powers 
to manage its docket when it “explicitly postponed the hearing so the State could 
have a better opportunity to respond to the defense arguments.”12  The State argues 
that the sentencing was postponed because the defense presented a new legal 
argument.13  It further argues that permitting it a reasonable opportunity to respond 
to a new argument was neither unfair nor prejudicial to the defendant.14  The State 
contends that on the merits, the defendant is an habitual offender, and cases should 
be decided on the merits and not on procedural grounds.15  
 
11 Opening Br. at 16. 
12 Id. at 22. 
13 Answering Br. at 19. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 16-17. 
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(10)  The defendant also argues that the court violated Superior Court 
Criminal Rule 32(a)(3).16  That rule requires that a motion to declare a defendant an 
habitual criminal must be filed “promptly after conviction and before sentence.”17  
The defendant believes that under Rule 32(a)(3) the State should have been confined 
to its 2018 motion.18  The State argues that its new motion filed December 6, 2021 
was timely because the defendant was not sentenced until March 14, 2022.19  
 
(11)  The parties disagree on the Standard of Review that should be applied 
here.20  The defendant attempts to obtain de novo review by stating that this is a 
review of a question of law regarding the interpretation of the habitual sentencing 
statute.21  It is clear to us, however, that abuse of discretion is the appropriate 
standard of review.  “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court exceeds the 
bounds of reason or has ignored recognized rules of law or practice so as to product 
an unjust result.”22 
 
(12)  The main question as framed by the parties is whether the Superior Court 
properly exercised its inherent power to “manage its affairs”23 when it postponed the 
 
16 Opening Br. at 23-24. 
17 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 32(a)(3). 
18 Opening Br. at 21-22. 
19 Answering Br. at 17-18. 
20 Opening Br. at 16-17; Answering Br. at 6. 
21 Opening Br. at 16-17. 
22 Coppedge v. State, 872 A.2d 959, 2005 WL 991252, at *2 (Del. Apr. 26, 2005) (ORDER) (citing 
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Adams, 541 A.2d 567, 570 (Del. 1988)).  
23 State v. Harris, 616 A.2d 288, 291 (Del. 1992). 
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sentence hearing.  The defendant claims the court abused its power.  The State claims 
it did not.    
(13)  It is well established that the Superior Court has the inherent power to 
“manage its affairs and to achieve the orderly disposition of its business.”24  We find 
it unnecessary to engage in an extensive discussion of that power in this case, 
however, because it is clear to us beyond doubt that the Superior Court’s conduct 
was well within the permissible exercise of the court’s discretion.    
(14)  Both parties were aware that the defendant’s status as an habitual 
offender would be an issue at the November 23, 2021 sentence hearing.  The 
defendant raised arguments that had not been raised previously in support of his 
position that he was not an habitual offender under Section 4214(d).  The State had 
previously put the defendant on notice, after the defendant filed his motion for 
correction of sentence, that the defendant was also an habitual offender under 
Section 4214(c).  After fully listening to the arguments of both sides at the November 
23, 2021 sentence hearing, the judge decided that the State should have an 
opportunity to file a revised motion.  There is no abuse of discretion when a trial 
judge gives parties an opportunity to fully develop the record before ruling on an 
issue’s merits.  There is no unfair prejudice to the defendant here because he was 
given a full opportunity to be heard and he is, in fact, an habitual offender under 
 
24 Id. 
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Section 4214(c). 
(15) Finally, there is no violation of Superior Court Criminal Rule 32(a)(3).  
The relevant sentencing date is March 14, 2022, which was after the revised motion 
was filed. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, it is the order of the Court that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/  James T. Vaughn, Jr.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice