Title: State v. Moore
Citation: 230 Kan. 495, 639 P.2d 458
Docket Number: 52,932
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: January 15, 1982

230 Kan. 495 (1982)
639 P.2d 458
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee,
v.
PEARLIE JUNIOR MOORE, Appellant.
No. 52,932

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed January 15, 1982.
Laurence R. Hollis, of Wichita, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellant.
Beverly Dempsey, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Robert T. Stephan, attorney general, and Clark V. Owens, district attorney, were with her on the brief for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FROMME, J.:
Pearlie Junior Moore appeals from a jury conviction of aggravated robbery (K.S.A. 21-3427). Appellant urges error based on (1) a remark of the prosecutor, (2) the refusal to permit expert testimony concerning the credibility of eyewitness identifications of the defendant, and (3) the refusal to grant a new trial.
Appellant was charged and tried jointly with codefendant Louis J. Reynolds. The so-called prejudicial remark of the prosecutor occurred during the cross-examination of the codefendant Reynolds. Reynolds was cross-examined as follows:
"A. Yes.
"Q. Grew up together?
"A. Yeah.
"Q. Hang out together a lot?
"A. Yeah.
*496 "A. No, sir.
"A. No, sir.
"Q. Consider yourself a friend of Pearlie's?
"A. Yes.
"MR. HOLLIS: Objection, Your Honor.
"MR. WHITTIER: Object to that 
"MR. HOLLIS: Gracious sakes.
"MR. WHITTIER: Inappropriate.
The remark which appellant contends was prejudicial is: "Throughout these proceedings you're quite content to let Pearlie take the heat on this, aren't you?" The real basis for appellant's contention appears to rise from his interpretation of the meaning behind this statement. Although the statement was directed to Reynolds, the appellant considers the statement to be an indirect reference to his (Moore's) failure to take the witness stand.
However, the objections to the question were immediately sustained by the court, and the jury was admonished to disregard the question. Additionally the question was directed toward Reynolds. It does not refer to Moore's failure to testify. It merely indicates that Reynolds could have assumed more responsibility for the crime and thus have assisted Moore in defending against the charge. There was no prejudicial error in the remark so far as Moore was concerned. It was handled properly by the trial court.
The second issue being raised concerns the refusal of the trial court to permit the defendant, an indigent, to obtain expert testimony concerning the weight and credibility which the jurors should attach to testimony regarding eyewitness identification. K.S.A. 60-456 provides:
....
The expert testimony proposed by defendant was general in nature and was not to be based on the specific facts of this case. It was to be obtained and offered to assist the jury in deciding what weight and credibility should be given to testimony of eyewitnesses who identified the defendant at the trial as the person who committed the crime. In Frase v. Henry, 444 F.2d 1228 (10th Cir.1971), it is said:
See also Atkins v. Bayer, 204 Kan. 509, 511, 464 P.2d 233 (1970); and 2 Jones on Evidence § 417 (5th ed. 1958).
Although an expert witness may give an opinion on an ultimate issue as provided in K.S.A. 60-456(d), such witness may do so only insofar as the witness aids the jury in the interpretation of technical facts or assists the jury in understanding the material in evidence. An expert witness may not pass on the weight or credibility of evidence for those matters are strictly within the province of the jury. Frase v. Henry, 444 F.2d 1228; 2 Jones on Evidence § 417.
More specifically, in State v. Warren, 230 Kan. 385, 395, 635 P.2d 1236 (1981), this court faced the question of whether to allow expert testimony on eyewitness identification evidence and it concluded:
We hold it is proper to exclude such expert testimony. See also State v. Reed, 226 Kan. 519, 601 P.2d 1125 (1979). Since such expert testimony is not admissible, it follows that there can be no error in refusing to authorize a defendant to hire such an expert witness from funds appropriated to aid indigent defendants.
On oral argument it was argued that the trial court should have instructed the jury as to the weight and credibility of eyewitness *498 identification testimony. No instruction on the subject was requested at trial. K.S.A. 60-251(b) provides:
There is no contention any instruction given at the trial was clearly erroneous. Defendant waived any right to a more specific instruction on the subject by failure to object and failure to submit a requested instruction in writing.
The final issue raised by appellant concerns the failure to grant a new trial. The motion was based on appellant's allegations that he was acquainted with one or more of the jurors, having worked with them at Boeing Aircraft. Nothing further is said or shown in the record. The mere allegation in a motion for new trial that defendant was acquainted with one or more of the jurors is not a sufficient basis for granting a new trial. The granting of a motion for new trial lies within the discretion of the trial court, and the motion should not be sustained unless the court is satisfied a different verdict would result if a new trial was had. State v. Larkin, 212 Kan. 158, 161, 510 P.2d 123, cert. denied 414 U.S. 848 (1973).
The judgment is affirmed.