Title: In RE ADOPTION OF REYNARD v. Kelly
Citation: 251 N.E.2d 413, 252 Ind. 632
Docket Number: 668S99
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: October 15, 1969

252 Ind. 632 (1969)
251 N.E.2d 413
IN RE ADOPTION OF REYNARD
v.
KELLY ET UX.
No. 668S99.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed October 15, 1969.
*633 Jack Welchons, Marion, Albert W. Ewbank, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Kiley, Osborn, Kiley &amp; Harker, by Albert C. Harker, Marion, for appellees.
No petition for rehearing filed.
GIVAN, J.
This is a matter of the adoption of two minor children whose natural mother, Sydney K. Kelly, is now married to one Charles Ray Kelly, who seeks to adopt her natural children. The natural father of the children is the appellant, Nathan H. Reynard, who appeared in the trial court and objected to the granting of the adoption. It was the decision of the Trial Court that the natural father had deserted and abandoned the minor children and had failed to pay support for them for a period of one year immediately prior to the filing of the petition and therefore, his consent was unnecessary to the adoption.
The Court further found that it was in the best interest of the children that the adoption be granted.
The appellant, who is the natural father of the children, assigns as error in this Court the overruling of his motion for a new trial contending that the Trial Court's decision is not sustained by sufficient evidence and is contrary to law. It is appellant's contention that the evidence shows that he did not, in fact, abandon the children within the meaning of the statute which would authorize the Court to grant the adoption without his consent.
*634 An examination of the evidence shows that the appellant is a fighter pilot in the United States Air Force now stationed in Vietnam. He was formerly married to appellee, Sydney K. Kelly, who, after divorcing the appellant, married Charles Ray Kelly, who is also an appellee. At the time of the divorce the natural mother obtained the custody of the children, and the appellant was ordered to pay support for the children. This he did until June of 1965, which was two months after the marriage of the mother to Charles Ray Kelly.
Following the remarriage of the mother, difficulties arose concerning visitation with the children. This difficulty was aggravated at least in part by reason of the appellant's military duties which prevented visitation on a regularly scheduled basis. The appellant testified that he had, during this period of time, employed seven different attorneys attempting to arrange suitable visitation with his children but had never been able to accomplish this.
During the entire year of 1966, the appellant was on duty in Vietnam and Thailand, during which time he could not have visited with his children under any circumstances.
During the period of time following June of 1965, until the present the appellant had without benefit of a modification order taken it upon himself to refuse to make regular support payments to the extent that at the time of the hearing in the trial court in this cause he was in excess of $5,000.00 in arrears.
In the summer of 1966, the appellant made three $25.00 payments at a time when his monthly income was approximately $1330.00.
In March or April of 1967, immediately upon appellant's return from Vietnam, he sent a $1500.00 Cashier's check to his attorney for presentation to his former wife as a partial payment of back support. However, this check was refused by his former wife and returned to the appellant.
*635 Charles Ray Kelly had filed his petition for adoption on the 24th day of January, 1967. There is also evidence in the record that there had been a change for the better in the children after their mother had married Mr. Kelly. Mr. Kelly himself testified to his love for the children and an interest in them.
The appellant testified that he had remarried, and that he was returning overseas to continue his tour of duty.
There was evidence in the record that the appellant had great difficulty in attempting to visit with his children and it would appear very little cooperation except from his former wife's parents, who appeared to remain on friendly terms with him and aided him somewhat in maintaining a small degree of contact with his children.
There is evidence in the record that the appellant suffered a nervous breakdown during this period of time, and that he himself ruled out visitation on occasion because of his emotional instability and that he was fearful he would upset the children too much by a display of emotion in their presence.
The question before this Court is whether or not the decision of the Trial Court was supported by the evidence and is in keeping with the statute. The statute in question reads as follows:
The above statute has been interpreted by this Court as follows:
The fact that appellant had made some token payments prior to the filing of the petition for adoption and had subsequent to the filing of the petition for adoption tendered some $1500.00 on a $5,000.00 arrearage does not, in our opinion, comply with the meaning of the statute, even though the statute does have the language *638 "... has failed to pay any support money for a period of one (1) year ..."
Prior cases in Indiana which we have examined deal with the situation where the father has made no payment whatsoever within the year immediately prior to the filing of the petition for adoption. Therefore, in the case at bar the question is presented as to whether or not a token payment of some $75.00 during the year immediately prior to the filing of the petition for adoption is sufficient to comply with the terms of the statute thus requiring consent of the natural father.
In the use of the above language can it be said that the legislature meant that nominal support payments would be sufficient? We think not. If such is to be the interpretation, then a natural father could forever block adoption of his children by making a yearly payment of a dollar, and then refuse to give his consent. We hold that the legislative intent must be interpreted in this statute to mean that where the natural father has the ability but fails to substantially comply with any order of support previously entered by a Court or fails to make substantial contributions to the support of his natural children, his consent is not necessary to the granting of an adoption.
This same problem was encountered by the Supreme Court of Louisiana when they were faced with a similar factual situation and a similar statute. That Court stated:
In making this decision we are not condoning the difficulty which the appellant met in attempting to establish visitation with his children. However, in all matters of this nature, the total welfare of the children must be the paramount consideration, and no natural parent regardless of the difficulties he may be experiencing with his former spouse is justified to unilaterally, without benefit of court order, refuse to pay the amount of support previously ordered by the Court. When he chooses this avenue of redress, regardless of his love and affection for the children, he places himself in a position of removing the necessity of his consent to their adoption. Adoption can then be granted, if it be demonstrated to a Court of probate jurisdiction that the welfare of the children will be best served.
In the case at bar the Trial Court heard the evidence and had the parties before him. This Court will not overturn a decision of the Trial Court under the above circumstances. We will not weigh the evidence. J.I. Case Co. v. Sandefur (1964), 245 Ind. 213, 197 N.E.2d 519; Woods v. Deckelbaum (1963), 244 Ind. 260, 191 N.E.2d 101.
We hold that the failure of the appellant to provide support was a fact upon which the Trial Court could base its decision *640 that the consent of appellant was not necessary. We further hold that there is evidence in the record upon which the Trial Court was justified in finding that it was to the best interests of the children that the adoption be granted.
The judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed.
DeBruler, C.J., Arterburn and Hunter, JJ., concur; Jackson, J., dissents with opinion.
JACKSON, J.
I am unable to agree with the determination reached by the majority in the case at bar and dissent thereto.
As stated in the majority opinion, this case comes to us by way of appeal from the decision of the Grant Circuit Court granting the adoption of appellant's minor children to appellee without the written consent of the father. The action was instituted below on January 24, 1967, by Charles Ray Kelly, second, and present husband of the divorced wife of appellant, filing a petition to adopt the two minor children of appellant and his divorced wife, now Sydney K. Kelly. The court granted the petition and ordered such adoption, the decree bearing date of March 22, 1968, to be entered nunc pro tunc as of December 26, 1967.
The petition filed herein, omitting heading and formal parts, reads as follows:
*642 It appears from the record herein that thereafter, on June 15, 1967, there was filed in the trial court an affidavit of non-residence of the natural father (appellant), and notice was ordered issued to him returnable August 7, 1967.
Such affidavit, in pertinent part, omitting heading, formal parts and jurat, reads as follows:
Thereafter, appellant entered his appearance herein by counsel and on September 5, 1967, filed his verified answer and cross-complaint to the petition for adoption filed by Charles Ray Kelly. Such answer and cross-complaint, omitting heading and formal parts, reads in pertinent part as follows:
The finding of the court on which the judgment is allegedly based, in pertinent part reads as follows:
The decree of adoption, in pertinent part reads as follows, to-wit:
This cause being at issue on petitioner's petition and respondent's answer, and the Court, having heard evidence thereon and being duly advised in the premises, now finds that Sydney Kay Kelly, the mother and natural parent of the Infants Reynard, consented in writing to the adoption by petitioner as prayed for by joining in said petition with him.
Appellant's Motion for New Trial, omitting title, formal parts and signature, in pertinent part reads as follows:
The above motion for new trial was filed in the Grant Circuit Court on January 23, 1968. The same was overruled by said court on March 22, 1968. The record with respect thereto reading in pertinent part as follows:
The record before us discloses that appellant and his former wife were married December 10, 1955, while both were students at Ohio University. Upon graduation appellant was commissioned in the United States Air Force and assigned to McAllen, Texas, where he was stationed for six months. Thereafter he was stationed at Laredo, Texas, during which time his son Stuart Glen Reynard was born at the hospital at Kelly Air Force Base, San Antonio, Texas. His daughter, Toby Kay Reynard, was born while appellant was stationed at Myrtle Beach Air Force Base, South Carolina. Thereafter appellant was assigned to Bitburg, Germany. Mrs. Reynard and the children accompanied him to Germany.
It appears that Mrs. Reynard preferred to have no more children. By mutual agreement appellant consented to and did undergo a vasectomy during the year 1963, and prior to November 18, 1963, the result of which denies him further heirs of his body. Sometime during November, 1963, the parties separated and on November 18, 1963, Mrs. Reynard and the children returned to the home of her parents in Marion, Indiana.
Appellant next saw his wife in Marion, Indiana, on December 23, 1963, at the Spencer Hotel. As soon as he arrived in Marion on December 23, 1963, he called his father-in-law, Mr. Overman, and asked to see his children. Mr. Overman came down to see him and after riding around all day, Mr. Overman said he would discuss the matter with his daughter and would call him later and let appellant know what the decision was. That evening Mrs. Reynard came to the hotel and she and appellant had a long discussion, during which appellant was invited to come to her parents' home about ten o'clock Christmas morning to see his children, that is if he would come out without upsetting the children, and could spend one or two hours. His wife and her parents did *648 not want him to show any emotion on seeing the children for the first time in a month and a half. Appellant felt that he could not avoid showing emotion with the children and in deference to the wishes of his wife and her parents he did not see the children on that occasion.
The next time appellant saw his wife was in January, 1964, Appellant was in a psychiatric ward in the hospital at Dayton, Ohio. His confinement therein resulted from a nervous breakdown due to fatigue and emotional upset over his marital situation. Appellant next saw Mrs. Reynard and his children in Feburary, 1964, at her parents' home in Marion, from six until nine in the evening. At that time, on his wife's complaint, he was there picked up and placed in jail over night and released the next morning. He saw the children again early in March, 1964, shortly before he was returned to active duty and assignment to Eglin Field, Florida. Repeatedly during the year 1964, he sought to see the children and to have them for a visit but was denied both.
The record discloses that appellant and his former wife, Sydney Reynard Kelly, were divorced September 22, 1964. Appellant was not personally present at the trial, but was represented by counsel, first by Mr. Kiley, in an original waiver under the Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act, who when the proceedings were contested withdrew his appearance. Mr. Tobin represented appellant in the divorce procedings in property settlement rights and support.
The evidence in the record discloses that appellant's payments for support for his wife and children started out at $375.00 a month, then went down to $285.00, then to $200.00, then to $175.00 in the final decree. Support was paid in full every month to April of 1965, when it got delinquent. The arrearage of support started to accumulate in May, 1965, a little over a year after appellant last saw his children. The record also discloses appellant has made support payments totaling $425.00 to the office of the clerk of the trial court *649 and has sent the further sum of $1,500.00 to one of his attorneys to use in an attempted settlement of the arrearage in support. However, the money in the clerk's office has not been drawn by Mrs. Reynard Kelly and she and her attorneys refused to accept the $1,500.00, and that money was returned to appellant. It further appears that during the period from March, 1964, to October 25, 1967, appellant had sent birthday and Christmas gifts to his children, a good many of which had been withheld from said children, who were unaware of the fact that the gifts had been sent. It also appears that appellant has had a total of seven attorneys representing him in attempts to obtain visitation rights with his children and that such attempts were all unavailing. It also appears beyond the shadow of a doubt that the former wife of appellant, who had custody of the children by the terms of the divorce decree, refused to permit her former husband, the father of the children, to see them unless he consented to the adoption here appealed from. Further, she refused to discuss the payment of support money saying "[a]t this time we are not interested in any money whatsoever, we had filed for adoption." The record also discloses that appellant was advised by his counsel in 1965, that counsel was told by Mrs. Kelly's attorney that appellant would be attached and put in jail if he appeared in Grant County and attempted to see his children or to take legal steps to obtain the right to visit them. The record also discloses that appellant, except for the year 1966, which he spent in Viet Nam, has been a resident of Fort Walton Beach, Florida, for the past three and one half years.
Even the majority opinion in citing authority in support of the interpretation of the statute (§ 3-120 Burns', supra) adopts a portion of the language cited in Emmons v. Dinelli (1956), 235 Ind. 249, 259, 133 N.E.2d 56 as follows:
I ask where and how, in view of the fact that appellant admittedly had employed a total of seven lawyers to assist him in obtaining visitation rights with his children, can it be alleged, let alone concluded, that appellant was guilty of "careless and negligent failure to perform the duties of parenthood ...," and "a significant element of the offense of abandonment or desertion, which neglect is to be considered regardless of any actual `intention' or `settled purpose' by the parent to relinquish the proprietary claim of the parent to his child." The reasoning of the majority opinion on this score is all the more untenable in view of the uncontradicted evidence in the record that the Grant Superior Court, the court in which the divorce proceedings were held, refused to permit appellant's counsel to file, or proceed to hearing on a petition to require the former wife (Sydney Kelly) to permit appellant to visit his children.
*651 The majority opinion is in error, on two counts, when it states "[t]herefore, in the case at bar the question is presented as to whether or not the payment of some $75.00 during the year immediately prior to the filing of the petition for adoption is sufficient to comply with the terms thus requiring consent of the natural father." I again point out that the petition for adoption filed in this cause and relied upon by the appellees was, and is, predicated on the theory of abandonment or desertion for six months or more immediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition and not on the theory that the father of the child or children failed to pay any support money for a period of one (1) year immediately prior to the filing of the adoption proceedings. Of course the consent of the father is required in the case at bar.
Second, while I deem it outside the issues in this case by virtue of the allegations of the petition, the majority opinion seeks to fire a double barreled blast at appellant by alleging abandonment for six months and proving abandonment by an attempted showing of failure to pay support for a year immediately preceding the filing of the petition. That position and posture is untenable for several reasons. First, the former wife made several statements to the effect they didn't want support for the children, they (she and her present husband, I assume) wanted appellant to consent to the adoption. Second, she (the former wife), through counsel, refused to accept the $1,500.00 payment tendered by appellant's counsel to apply to an alleged arrearage in support payments, as well as certain sums paid into the clerk of the Grant Circuit Court. Third, our case law does not support or sustain appellee or the majority opinion on this score as will be seen by reference thereto later on herein. Fourth, during the entire period, before, during and after the filing of the petition for adoption, appellant was exerting every possible effort, through counsel, to obtain visitation rights with his children. At the same time, according to undisputed testimony in the record, the Grant *652 Superior Court was refusing to let counsel file petitions for appellant and the appellees and their counsel were threatening appellant with arrest if he even appeared in Grant County. There is no denial that the former wife had him arrested and thrown in jail the last time appellant saw his children at her home. Nor is there any reason to doubt that she would have had him arrested on sight since the record shows, without contradiction, that she had an attachment for him issued in December, 1966, before he returned from Viet Nam, and another issued on January, 1967. Finally, the statute does not permit the strange construction placed upon it by the majority opinion. The statute permits adoption without written consent of the parents in either of two ways: A. On proof that the child has been abandoned or deserted for six (6) months or more immediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition, and it is so adjudged; B. In all cases where the father of any child or children has failed to pay any support money for a period of one (1) year immediately prior to the filing of adoption proceedings, etc. In the case at bar appellant made some payments to the clerk and through counsel tendered a substantial payment to the former wife and her counsel which tender was refused. Therefore, appellant is not within the area of discretion of the court whereby it could dispense with the filing of the father's written consent. Furthermore, the petition for adoption did not allege failure to provide support for more than one (1) year, it alleged abandonment. That must be proved or it fails. That proof was not made and the petition must fail.
I do not approve of appellant's action in withholding support payments, but under the circumstances shown here by the record, I must say that it represents an understandable human reaction and an unsuccessful attempt to at least improve his bargaining position with respect to seeing his children. I also point out that the petitioner failed to introduce into evidence the decree of divorce or a certified copy thereof. It seems to me the evidence as to the amount of the payments *653 is hearsay. As I read the record there is no evidence whatever as to the due dates of payment, nor is there any showing that the former wife had the exclusive and continuing custody of these children. Furthermore, the petition for adoption is predicated on abandonment for six months, not failure to support for a year, consequently the question of support is outside the issues of this case.
The record herein discloses that appellant spent the year 1966 on assigned duty in Viet Nam. Exhibit one filed in said cause were orders sending him to Viet Nam departing January 27, 1966. Exhibit two is a set of orders for change of station back to the United States, he arrived back in the United States on January 16, 1967. The petition for adoption was filed in the Grant Circuit Court on January 24, 1967, and was immediately referred to the County Department of Public Welfare for investigation. So far as the record discloses there was no attempt made to obtain service on appellant until June 15, 1967, when an affidavit of his non-residence was filed.
The record discloses charges by appellant that the court refused to permit the filing of petitions, on his behalf, to obtain visitation rights for him with his children. These charges are not denied, explained or attempted to be evaded either by appellee or anyone else. No denial is made of the record that appellant was permitted to see his children only three times during the period from September 18, 1963, to the date of trial herein in December, 1967, and on the occasion of the second visit his former wife had him thrown in jail for such visit. Nor is there any denial that the wife, during all the time thereafter, threatened to send or have appellant sent to jail if he came to Grant County to see the children. There is no denial that she caused an attachment to issue out of said county against appellant in December, 1966, before he had completed his tour in Viet Nam, and had one issued against him again in January, 1967, before the Petition for Adoption was filed.
*654 The record further discloses the employment by appellant of several lawyers, seven all told, in attempts to get to visit his children. In spite of all this record, appellee and his counsel in their brief in support of the Petition for Adoption argue "REYNARD'S FAILURE TO SUPPORT HIS CHILDREN, AND HIS LACK OF VISITATION WITH THEM AND CONCERN FOR THEIR WELFARE CONSTITUTES ABANDONMENT OF THEM." In oral argument counsel for appellee complained that appellant only visited the children three times. The third visit appellant had with his children since the separation in 1963 was on the day the adoption case was tried in December, 1967, and that visit was made possible by the indulgence and order of the trial court, over the objections of appellant's former wife and her counsel. The speciousness of the argument on visitation made by appellees' counsel is equalled only by that of the son who murdered his parents and then sought clemency on the ground that he was an orphan.
Appellant's Answer Brief contains an exhaustive review of the law applicable to the case at bar and for that reason is, in pertinent part, adopted and made a part of and included in this dissent, as follows:
In Force, the Court said:
Chaney stated the rule as follows:
In Bryant, the Court added:
The pertinent part of the statute provides:
Petitioner admits this. On page 5 of his brief he says:
The Court added:
Without weighing the evidence herein, but merely reviewing it for the purpose of determining whether or not the judgment *660 of the trial court is sustained by sufficient evidence of probative value, Dent v. Dent (1961), 241 Ind. 606, 174 N.E.2d 336; Kraus v. Kraus, Executor (1956), 235 Ind. 325, 132 N.E.2d 608; I must and do come to the conclusion that the evidence does not sustain the judgment appealed from and is therefore contrary to law.
Again I must point out that the theory of petitioners' complaint or petition was based on abandonment for six months, not on failure to support for one year immediately prior to the date of the filing of the petition for adoption. See paragraph six of the petition page two of this dissent. The finding of the court (page four of this dissent) clearly indicates the cause was tried on the theory of abandonment and no other. The judgment was to be "... on findings." To be valid it had to be. There is in the finding not one scintilla of evidence or one word finding that appellant "failed to pay any support money for said children for a period of at least one year prior to the date the petition was filed," as is asserted in the judgment rendered March 22, 1968 (emphasis supplied). It is, therefore, clearly apparent the trial and findings were on one theory, abandonment and desertion, that being the issue before the court for determination, and that this court now affirms on a different theory, failure to pay support, which was not in issue on the trial. The finding is further deficient in that it fails to state that the abandonment was for six months immediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition for adoption.
I am further of the opinion the issues presented the trial court by the petition and answer limited the court to the consideration of the question of abandonment. The attempted injection of the question of failure to support for a year, thrown in the judgment by appellees' counsel in preparing the judgment, is a nullity in the absence of a trial on a petition for adoption alleging such ground.
The entire proceedings in this case constitute such a flagrant abuse of discretion, denial of basic human and constitutional *661 rights of the appellant as to require the reversal of this judgment on the grounds of public policy as well as for the legal defects pointed out in this dissent.
The judgment herein should be reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court with instructions to grant appellant's Motion for a New Trial.
NOTE.  Reported in 251 N.E.2d 413.