Title: Ex parte Thomas Wade Essary. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS (In re: Latrice Burrell, Irene Banks and Loretta Pratcher v. Thomas Wade Essary)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1060458
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: November 2, 2007

REL:11/2/2007
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
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the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
____________________
1060458
____________________
Ex parte Thomas Wade Essary
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
(In re: Latrice Burrell, Irene Banks, and Loretta Pratcher
v.
Thomas Wade Essary)
(Tuscaloosa Circuit Court, CV-04-1663;
Court of Civil Appeals, 2050401)
SMITH, Justice.
Thomas Wade Essary, the defendant below, appeals that
part of the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals reversing
the trial court's summary judgment in his favor.  Burrell v.
Essary, [Ms. 2050401, Oct. 6, 2006] ___ So. 2d ___ (Ala. Civ.
1060458
2
App. 2006).  We reverse that portion of the Court of Civil
Appeals' judgment and render a judgment in favor of Essary.
Facts and Procedural History
    On the evening of May 22, 2002, Essary was driving west on
McPherson Landing Road in Tuscaloosa County.  Essary reached
the intersection of McPherson Landing Road and Highway 69,
where a stop sign obligates the westbound traffic on McPherson
Landing Road to stop and yield to traffic traveling north and
south on Highway 69.  There are no stop signs halting traffic
traveling on Highway 69.  As Essary proceeded through the
intersection, his vehicle collided with a vehicle traveling
south on Highway 69 that was being driven by Latrice Burrell
and occupied by Irene Banks and Loretta Pratcher.
On August 31, 2004, Burrell, Banks, and Pratcher sued
Essary and his automobile insurer in the Hale Circuit Court to
recover damages for negligence, wantonness, and trespass.  The
case was later transferred to the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court.
Essary moved for a summary judgment, asserting that the
negligence claim was barred by the applicable statute of
limitations and that his conduct did not constitute either
wantonness or a trespass.  Essary supported his motion with,
1060458
3
among other things, his deposition and the depositions of
Burrell and Banks.  Essary testified in his deposition that he
did 
not 
see 
Burrell's 
vehicle 
when 
he 
entered 
the
intersection.  Burrell's deposition testimony indicated that
Essary made a "rolling stop" at the intersection and that he
then pulled out in front of the vehicle she was driving.
Essary argued in his motion for a summary judgment that
"the evidence indicates at most that [Essary] made
a 
'rolling 
stop' 
and 
failed 
to 
yield 
the
right-of-way. [Essary], without dispute, testified
that he looked both ways before entering the
intersection and did not see [Burrell's] vehicle
approaching. He testified that he may have failed to
see [Burrell's] vehicle due to the artificial
lighting along the highway. There is no evidence
that [Essary] was drunk, intoxicated, that he was
conscious that [Burrell's] vehicle was near or that
a collision was about to occur. That is, there is no
substantial evidence that [Essary's] conduct rose to
the level of wantonness, as that term is defined in
Alabama."
In opposition to the summary-judgment motion, the
plaintiffs submitted, among other things, an affidavit by
Burrell, in which she stated that, in her "opinion," Essary
came to "rolling stop" at the intersection and, after a
vehicle being driven by Erica Banks passed the intersection,
accelerated into the intersection as he passed the stop sign.
Burrell stated: "In my opinion, he was attempting to 'shoot
1060458
4
through the gap,' between the lead vehicle and the vehicle I
was driving."
After a hearing on the motion, the trial court entered a
summary judgment in favor of Essary on all claims.  The trial
court held, among other things, that there was no substantial
evidence of wanton conduct.  The trial court subsequently
denied a postjudgment motion by the plaintiffs, who then
appealed to this Court.  We transferred the case to the
Alabama Court of Civil Appeals pursuant to Ala. Code 1975, §
12-2-7(6). The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial
court's judgment on the negligence claim and the trespass
claim, but reversed the trial court's judgment on the
wantonness claim, holding that the plaintiffs had established
a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Essary had
acted wantonly.  Burrell v. Essary, supra. Specifically, the
Court of Civil Appeals held:
"Burrell's testimony regarding the circumstances of
the collision conflicted with Essary's testimony and
tended to prove a set of circumstances from which a
jury could draw a 'reasonable inference' that Essary
knew that the vehicle driven by Burrell was close to
the intersection when he accelerated into the
intersection despite being aware that his doing so
would likely or probably result in injury to the
plaintiffs." 
1060458
5
___ So. 2d at ___.  Essary filed an application for rehearing,
which the Court of Civil Appeals overruled. He then petitioned
this Court for certiorari review alleging, among other things,
that the Court of Civil Appeals' decision conflicted with
Wilson v. Cuevas, 420 So. 2d 62 (Ala. 1982).  See Rule
39(a)(1)(D), Ala. R. App. P.  We granted the petition, and we
now reverse the part of the judgment of the Court of Civil
Appeals that reversed the trial court's judgment on the
wantonness claim and render a judgment in favor of Essary on
that claim.
Standard of Review
"'We review this case de novo, applying the oft-
stated principles governing appellate review of a
trial court's grant or denial of a summary judgment
motion:
"'"We apply the same standard of review the
trial court used in determining whether the
evidence presented to the trial court
created a genuine issue of material fact.
Once a party moving for a summary judgment
establishes that no genuine issue of
material fact exists, the burden shifts to
the 
nonmovant 
to 
present 
substantial
evidence creating a genuine issue of
material fact.  'Substantial evidence' is
'evidence of such weight and quality that
fair-minded persons in the exercise of
impartial judgment can reasonably infer the
existence of the fact sought to be proved.'
In reviewing a summary judgment, we view
1060458
6
the evidence in the light most favorable to
the nonmovant and entertain such reasonable
inferences as the jury would have been free
to draw."'"
General Motors Corp. v. Kilgore, 853 So. 2d 171, 173 (Ala.
2002) (quoting American Liberty Ins. Co. v. AmSouth Bank, 825
So. 2d 786, 790 (Ala. 2002)).  Moreover, "[o]n certiorari
review, this Court accords no presumption of correctness to
the legal conclusions of the intermediate appellate court." Ex
parte Toyota Motor Corp., 684 So. 2d 132, 135 (Ala. 1996).
Discussion
The issue before the Court is whether the Court of Civil
Appeals erred in reversing a summary judgment in favor of
Essary on the plaintiffs' wantonness count.  Essary argues
that he produced substantial evidence establishing that no
genuine issue of material fact existed as to the wantonness
count and that the plaintiffs failed to present substantial
evidence creating such an issue.  He argues that, at best, the
evidence in this case shows only mere negligence. 
"Wantonness" has been defined by this Court as the
conscious doing of some act or the omission of some duty while
knowing of the existing conditions and being conscious that,
from doing or omitting to do an act, injury will likely or
1060458
7
probably result.  Bozeman v. Central Bank of the South, 646
So. 2d 601 (Ala. 1994).  To constitute wantonness, it is not
necessary that the actor know that a person is within the zone
made dangerous by his conduct; it is enough that he knows that
a strong possibility exists that others may rightfully come
within that zone.  Joseph v. Staggs, 519 So. 2d 952, 954 (Ala.
1988).  Also, it is not essential that the actor should have
entertained a specific design or intent to injure the
plaintiff, only that the actor is "conscious" that injury will
likely or probably result from his actions.  Id.  "Conscious"
has been defined as "'perceiving, apprehending, or noticing
with a degree of controlled thought or observation: capable of
or marked by thought, will, design, or perception'"; "'having
an awareness of one's own existence, sensations, and thoughts,
and of one's environment; capable of complex response to
environment; deliberate.'"  Berry v. Fife, 590 So. 2d 884, 885
(Ala. 1991) (quoting Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 239
(1981) and The American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language 283 (1969), respectively).
Additionally, when determining if a defendant's actions
constitute wanton conduct, it is important for the court to
1060458
8
distinguish between wantonness and negligence.
"'"Wantonness is not merely a higher degree of
culpability 
than 
negligence. 
Negligence 
and
wantonness, plainly and simply, are qualitatively
different tort concepts of actionable culpability.
Implicit in wanton, willful, or reckless misconduct
is an acting, with knowledge of danger, or with
consciousness, that the doing or not doing of some
act will likely result in injury.... 
"'"Negligence is usually characterized as an
inattention, thoughtlessness, or heedlessness, a
lack 
of 
due 
care; 
whereas 
wantonness 
is
characterized as ... a conscious ... act. 'Simple
negligence is the inadvertent omission of duty; and
wanton or willful misconduct is characterized as
such by the state of mind with which the act or
omission is done or omitted.'  McNeil v. Munson S.S.
Lines, 184 Ala. 420, [423], 63 So. 992 (1913)...."'"
Tolbert v. Tolbert, 903 So. 2d 103, 114-15 (Ala. 2004)
(quoting Ex parte Anderson, 682 So. 2d 467, 470 (Ala. 1996),
quoting in turn Lynn Strickland Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Aero-
Lane Fabricators, Inc., 510 So. 2d 142, 145-46 (Ala. 1987))
(emphasis added).  
The determination whether a defendant's acts constitute
wanton conduct depends on the facts in each particular case.
Ex parte Anderson, 682 So. 2d at 470.  In support of his
motion for a summary judgment, Essary submitted his deposition
and the depositions of Burrell and Irene Banks.  In his
1060458
9
deposition, Essary testified that he drove on McPherson
Landing Road frequently and that he was familiar with the
intersection where the collision occurred.  Essary stated that
on the evening of the accident he was traveling west on
McPherson Landing Road because he wanted to go to a
convenience 
store 
to 
purchase cigarettes. Essary also
testified that, as he approached the intersection, he came to
a full stop, checked the traffic on Highway 69 in both
directions, and did not see any vehicles coming from either
the north or the south on Highway 69.  Essary then drove out
into the intersection, where his vehicle collided with
Burrell's.
In her deposition, Burrell described the accident as
follows:
"[Essary's counsel:]  Okay. All right. I want
you to tell me then what happened then, from the
time you saw [Essary's] car for the first time until
the wreck happened.
"[Burrell:]  I was riding behind [Erica Banks's
sport-utility vehicle]. [Pratcher] saw the car first
and she was starting to tell  me that she didn’t
think that [Essary's] car was going to stop at the
stop sign. We were driving and [Banks's sport-
utility 
vehicle] passed the intersection. And
[Essary's 
car] 
... 
was 
approaching 
the
intersection....
1060458
10
"....
"... He rolled up to the stop sign, but he never
came to a complete stop.
"....
"... And by the time that I realized he wasn’t
going to stop, I threw on the brakes, but I knew I
was going to hit him. It was too late.
"[Essary's counsel:]  So it sounds like you’re
describing a car that maybe slowed down but didn’t
make a full stop.
"[Burrell:]  Yes.
"[Essary's counsel:]  Made kind of what you call
a rolling stop; is that what you’re saying?
"[Burrell:]  Yes." 
Additionally, Burrell stated in an affidavit:
"Mr. Essary appeared, in my opinion, to come to
a rolling stop, wherein he observed the lead vehicle
containing Mrs. Erica Banks which was right in front
of the vehicle I was driving.  As he observed Mrs.
Banks drive by, he did not stop, but actually
accelerated just as he passed the stop sign. In my
opinion, he was attempting to 'shoot through the
gap,' between the lead vehicle and the vehicle I was
driving."
On appeal, Essary claims that the facts in this case are
1060458
11
similar to the facts in Wilson v. Cuevas, supra, in which this
Court held that the defendant's conduct did not constitute
wantonness.  In Wilson, the plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Wilson,
sued the defendant, alleging negligence and wantonness.  At
the close of the evidence, the trial court granted the
defendant's renewed motion for a directed verdict (now a
renewed motion for a judgment as a matter of law, see Rule 50,
Ala. R. Civ. P.) and dismissed the plaintiffs' wantonness
count.  The Wilsons later appealed, alleging, among other
things, that their wantonness claim should have been submitted
to the jury. 
The facts at trial in Wilson tended to show the
following:  The Wilsons were traveling on a motorcycle west on
Spring Hill Avenue, a four-lane road running east and west in
Mobile.  The Wilsons approached Louiselle Street, a two-lane
road that runs north and south and intersects with Spring Hill
Avenue.  Spring Hill Avenue has left-turn lanes in both
directions of travel at the Louiselle Street intersection.
The defendant, who was traveling east in a vehicle on Spring
Hill Avenue, approached the intersection and prepared to make
a left turn onto Louiselle Street, which would require that he
1060458
12
cross in front of the westbound traffic on Spring Hill Avenue.
Mr. Wilson approached the intersection in the inside lane
next to the median; the light at the intersection on Spring
Hill Avenue was green.  As he entered the intersection, Mrs.
Wilson, who was riding behind him on the motorcycle, told him
that the light was changing and that the defendant's
automobile was approaching.  Wilson testified that he next saw
the defendant's car suddenly pull out in front of him in an
attempt to make the left turn through the intersection.  The
Wilsons' motorcycle collided with the defendant's vehicle.
Wilson, 420 So. 2d at 63.
According 
to 
the 
Wilsons, 
the 
defendant 
stated
immediately after the accident:
"'[Defendant] said he was very sorry, that he
did not even see us, that he did notice this car in
the outside lane starting to slow down so he knew
that the light was undoubtedly changing and he was
going to make his turn onto Louiselle before
Louiselle's traffic started moving out, because he
was in a hurry to get to the hospital to see his
father who was in the intensive care. ...'"
Wilson, 420 So. 2d at 64.  
We summarized the Wilsons' argument on appeal as follows:
"Plaintiffs contend that defendant was trying to 'beat' the
1060458
Under the scintilla rule, a motion for a directed verdict
1
would be denied and the case would go to the jury if the
evidence, or any reasonable inference arising therefrom,
furnished the "smallest trace, or a scintilla in support of
the theory of the complaint."  Wilson, 420 So. 2d at 64.
13
traffic, and that his act constituted wanton conduct."  420
So. 2d at 64.  After defining wantonness and noting that the
scintilla rule  applied, we stated: 
1
"Our review of the facts, in a light most
favorable to plaintiffs, leads us to conclude that
plaintiffs' case amounted to no more than a showing
of negligence; the question of negligence was
properly submitted to the jury for its resolution.
Although defendant's act, under other circumstances,
could constitute wanton conduct, here it does not.
The facts do not allow us to reasonably infer that
defendant acted with 'reckless indifference' to the
consequences, had knowledge of the danger present,
or 
otherwise 
came 
within 
the 
definition 
of
wantonness. Where a case for wanton conduct shows no
more than mere negligence, a directed verdict to the
count alleging wantonness is properly given."
Wilson, 420 So. 2d at 64-65.
Essary argues that the instant case is indistinguishable
from Wilson: 
"The plaintiffs' allegation in Wilson ([that] the
defendant was trying to 'beat the traffic') is
indistinguishable from Burrell's allegation in the
present case ([that] Essary was trying to 'shoot the
gap' between vehicles).  In fact, the plaintiffs in
Wilson had a stronger argument for wantonness than
the plaintiffs in the present case because the
1060458
14
Wilson plaintiffs based their wantonness claim on
the defendant's statement that he was in a hurry to
see his father in the hospital. The plaintiffs in
the present case base their allegation on pure
speculation by Burrell. There is no reason why the
result in the present case should be any different
than the [result] in Wilson ...."
Essary's brief at 21-22.  
The evidence, viewed, as it must be, in a light most
favorable to the plaintiffs, the nonmovants, shows that Essary
slowed to a "rolling stop" at the intersection and attempted
to cross the intersection between two moving vehicles.  The
plaintiffs' characterization of Essary's attempt to cross the
intersection between two vehicles as "accelerating" after a
"rolling stop" to "shoot the gap" does not elevate Essary's
actual conduct--as observed by the plaintiffs--from the
negligent failure to exercise good judgment to a wanton act
constituting reckless indifference to a known danger likely to
inflict injury.  At best, the plaintiffs' evidence shows that
Essary, like the defendant in Wilson, made an error in
judgment when he attempted to "beat the traffic" or "shoot the
gap" by passing between Banks's vehicle and Burrell's vehicle.
Wilson holds that such conduct is not wanton.  
Although the evidence indicates that Essary knowingly
1060458
15
entered the intersection, there is nothing from which the
trier of fact could infer that, in moving his vehicle through
the intersection, Essary's state of mind contained the
requisite consciousness, awareness, or perception that injury
was likely to, or would probably, result.  Indeed, the risk of
injury to Essary himself was as real as any risk of injury to
the plaintiffs.  Absent some evidence of impaired judgment,
such as from the consumption of alcohol, we do not expect an
individual to engage in self-destructive behavior.  See
Griffin Lumber Co. v. Harper, 252 Ala. 93, 95, 39 So. 2d 399,
401 (1949) ("There is a rebuttable presumption recognized by
the law that every person in possession of his normal
faculties in a situation known to be dangerous to himself,
will give heed to instincts of safety and self-preservation to
exercise ordinary care for his own personal protection.  It is
founded on a law of nature and has [as] its motive the fear of
pain or death.  Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Wetherington,
245 Ala. 313(9), 16 So. 2d 720 [(1944)].").
The facts here presented do not establish any basis from
which to conclude that Essary was not possessed of his normal
faculties, such as from voluntary intoxication, rendering him
1060458
16
indifferent to the risk of injury to himself when crossing the
intersection if he collided with another vehicle.  Nor is the
act as described by Burrell so inherently reckless that we
might otherwise impute to Essary a depravity consistent with
disregard of instincts of safety and self-preservation.  We
therefore conclude that, as a matter of law, the plaintiffs
failed to offer substantial evidence indicating that Essary
was conscious that injury would likely or probably result from
his actions.
The plaintiffs contend that Clark v. Black, 630 So. 2d
1012 (Ala. 1993), supports the holding of the Court of Civil
Appeals.  In Clark, the plaintiff, a minor, was injured in an
automobile accident.  The minor and his parents sued the
defendant, 
Black, 
seeking 
damages 
for 
negligence 
and
wantonness.  The trial court directed a verdict for Black on
the wantonness count, and the plaintiffs challenged the trial
court's ruling on appeal.  Clark, 630 So. 2d at 1013-14.
The evidence indicated that Black was traveling west on
Union Chapel Road when she approached the intersection of
Union Chapel Road and Watermelon Road.  Black was familiar
with the intersection, and she knew that a stop sign required
1060458
17
traffic on Union Chapel Road to stop at the intersection.
Traffic on Watermelon Road was not required to stop at the
intersection, and there was a "hillcrest" on Watermelon Road
just north of the intersection that impaired visibility.  As
Black approached the intersection, she failed to stop, and she
entered the intersection and collided with a motorcycle driven
by the plaintiff, who was traveling south on Watermelon Road.
Testimony at trial by an eyewitness to the accident indicated
that Black was traveling at a "very fast speed."  Clark, 630
So. 2d at 1016.  In reversing the directed verdict, we stated:
"[The eyewitness's] testimony presented evidence of
such quality and weight that reasonable and fair
minded persons could reach different conclusions as
to whether the operation of Black's vehicle through
the intersection constituted clear and convincing
evidence 
of 
wantonness. 
[The 
eyewitness's]
testimony, if believed by the jury, would provide
clear and convincing evidence that Black, who was
familiar with the intersection, and, consequently,
the dangers posed to traffic traveling south on
Watermelon Road by the 'hillcrest' in that road,
ignored the stop sign, or, otherwise wantonly
entered the intersection.  Consequently, the trial
court erred in directing a verdict for Black on the
claim alleging wanton conduct."
630 So. 2d at 1016 (citations omitted). 
The instant case is distinguishable from Clark.  The
evidence in Clark indicated that the defendant knew of a
1060458
18
particular danger at the intersection, that she was traveling
at a high rate of speed, and that she ignored a stop sign.  No
such set of circumstances exist here.  There is no evidence
indicating that Essary was aware of any particular danger at
the intersection of McPherson Landing Road and Highway 69, and
he did not speed through the intersection while ignoring the
stop sign.  Instead, Burrell's testimony shows that when
Essary reached the intersection, he slowed and made a "rolling
stop."  This testimony, unlike the eyewitness's testimony in
Clark, does not allow for the reasonable inference that
Essary's conduct was wanton. 
Conclusion
We reverse the portion of the Court of Civil Appeals'
opinion reversing the trial court's judgment on the wantonness
claim and we render a judgment in favor of Essary on that
claim.
REVERSED IN PART AND JUDGMENT RENDERED.
See, Lyons, Stuart, Bolin, and Parker, JJ., concur. 
Woodall, J., concurs in the result.  
Cobb, C.J., dissents.  
Murdock, J., recuses himself.
1060458
19
COBB, Chief Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the majority's decision to
reverse the Court of Civil Appeals' judgment based on its
holding that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding
whether Essary acted wantonly.  As the majority correctly
notes, in reviewing a summary judgment, this Court, as well as
the trial court, is to "'"view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmovant and entertain such reasonable
inferences as the jury would have been free to draw."'"
General Motors Corp. v. Kilgore, 853 So. 2d 171, 173 (Ala.
2002) (quoting American Liberty Ins. Co. v. AmSouth Bank, 825
So. 2d 786, 790 (Ala. 2002)).  In support of their opposition
to Essary's motion for a summary judgment, the plaintiffs
submitted to the trial court the affidavit of Latrice Burrell.
Burrell stated in her affidavit:
"I was driving the vehicle which was hit by Mr.
Thomas Essary.
"Just prior to the accident, I noticed Mr.
Essary approaching from McPherson Landing Road.  He
never came to a complete stop at the stop sign.
"Mr. Essary appeared, in my opinion, to come to
a rolling stop, wherein he observed the lead vehicle
containing Mrs. Erica Banks which was right in front
1060458
20
of the vehicle I was driving.  As he observed Mrs.
Banks drive by, he did not stop, but actually
accelerated just as he passed the stop sign.  In my
opinion, he was attempting to 'shoot through the
gap' between the lead vehicle and the vehicle I was
driving.
"Mrs. Banks'[s] vehicle was driving right in
front of me and there were only three or four car
lengths between us.  There was clearly not enough
room between us for Mr. Essary to make it; however,
he attempted to do so anyway."
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmovants -- in this case Burrell, Irene Banks, and Loretta
Pratcher -- I agree with the Court of Civil Appeals that
Burrell's testimony concerning the circumstances surrounding
the automobile collision "tended to prove a set of
circumstances from which a jury could draw a 'reasonable
inference' that Essary knew that the vehicle driven by Burrell
was close to the intersection when he accelerated into the
intersection and that he consciously accelerated into the
intersection despite being aware that his doing so would
likely or probably result in injury to the plaintiffs."
Burrell v. Essary, [Ms. 2050401, October 6, 2006] ___ So. 2d
___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2006).  When considering a motion for
a summary judgment, the trial court does not weigh or
1060458
21
determine the veracity of the evidence before it; that is
within the purview of the ultimate trier of fact.  Instead,
the objective of the trial court when considering a summary-
judgment motion is to determine whether the evidence before it
establishes the existence of a genuine issue of any material
fact.  See generally Rule 56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P.  The
evidence, when viewed most favorably toward Burrell, Banks,
and Pratcher, indicates that Essary came to a rolling stop at
the intersection of McPherson Landing Road and Highway 69,
that he saw Erica Banks's vehicle, which was in front of
Burrell's vehicle, clear the intersection, and that he then
accelerated in an unsuccessful attempt to cross the
intersection as Burrell's 
vehicle 
approached. 
 I 
believe these
facts present the "other circumstances" not presented in
Wilson v. Cuevas, 420 So. 2d 62 (Ala. 1982), and therefore
warrant the reversal of the trial court's summary judgment in
favor of Essary on the wantonness claim.  
I also write to express my disagreement with the
majority's observation that "[a]bsent some evidence of
impaired judgment, such as from the consumption of alcohol, we
do not expect an individual to engage in self-destructive
1060458
22
behavior." ____ So. 2d at ____. The majority then quotes
Griffin Lumber Co. v. Harper, 252 Ala. 93, 95, 39 So. 2d 399,
401 (1949), in which this Court noted:
"There is a rebuttable presumption recognized by the
law that every person in possession of his normal
faculties in a situation known to be dangerous to
himself, will give heed to instincts of safety and
self-preservation to exercise ordinary care for his
own personal protection.  It is founded on a law of
nature and has [as] its motive the fear of pain or
death."
Harper dealt with a single-vehicle automobile accident to
which there were no witnesses.  A loaded log truck, traveling
downhill on a highway, failed to make the curve at the bottom
of the hill, hit an abutment with "great force," and landed in
a ditch.  Both the driver and the passenger were killed.  The
evidence tended to show that the truck was traveling at
approximately 65 to 70 miles per hour as it descended the hill
and that the transmission was in gear.  Likewise, there were
no skid marks, indicating that the driver did not apply the
brakes.  Holding that the circumstances were sufficient to
support a finding that the truck was traveling at an
apparently dangerous speed and that the truck driver knew that
the speed was dangerous, this Court observed:
1060458
23
"So that question is controlled by the inquiry into
the reason for such speed and the reason for not
making the curve.  As to that reason there is no
evidence from which a reasonable inference may be
drawn that it was willful or reckless, or that he
was not doing what he could to avert the danger.
Such brakes on the truck do fail unexpectedly at
times, as shown by the evidence.  Steering
appliances do lock unexpectedly at times, as shown
by the evidence.  Was the failure of the driver due
to such cause?  No one can tell."
252 Ala. at 95, 39 So. 2d at 401.
When there is an absolute void of eyewitness testimony or
direct physical evidence, a rebuttable presumption may exist
that "every person in possession of his normal faculties in a
situation known to be dangerous to himself, will give heed to
instincts 
of 
safety 
and 
self-preservation 
to 
exercise 
ordinary
care for his own personal protection."  Harper, 252 Ala. at
95, 39 So. 2d at 401.  This presumption, however, is not
absolute.  See, e.g., Shirley v. Shirley, 261 Ala. 100, 73 So.
2d 77 (1954) (holding that driver of automobile involved in
single-vehicle accident to which there were no witnesses did
act with wantonness: the estimated speed at the time of the
accident was 75 to 100 miles per hour, the vehicle traveled
705 feet from the time the driver lost control until it came
to a stop, the vehicle overturned 10 to 11 times over a
1060458
24
distance of 240 feet, and the body of one of the occupants was
thrown 72 yards beyond where the vehicle came to rest).  As
this Court has held:  "The most crucial element of wantonness
is knowledge, and while that element need not be shown by
direct evidence –- it may be made to appear by showing
circumstances from which the fact of knowledge is a legitimate
reference."  Roberts v. Brown, 384 So. 2d 1047, 1048 (Ala.
1980).  Unlike the trial court in Harper, the trial court here
was presented with evidence indicating that Essary knowingly
attempted to cross the intersection in the direct path of  the
vehicle in which Burrell, Irene Banks, and Pratcher were
traveling, consciously disregarding the risk that he may
collide with the vehicle.  I believe such evidence warranted
the denial of Essary's summary-judgment motion on the
wantonness claim.  Therefore, I respectfully dissent.