Title: Foster v. Commissioner of Correction (No. 2)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12935
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: June 2, 2020

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SJC-12935 
 
STEPHEN FOSTER1 & others2  vs.  COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION & 
others3 (No. 2). 
 
 
June 2, 2020. 
 
 
Commissioner of Correction.  Parole.  Commissioner of Public 
Safety.  Governor.  Imprisonment, Safe environment.  
Constitutional Law, Sentence, Imprisonment, Cruel and 
unusual punishment.  Due Process of Law, Sentence, 
Commitment.  Practice, Criminal, Sentence, Execution of 
sentence.  Practice, Civil, Civil commitment. 
 
 
 
In Foster v. Commissioner of Correction (No. 1), 484 Mass.    
,     (2020) (Foster [No. 1]), we denied the plaintiffs' motion 
for a preliminary injunction and transferred the case to the 
Superior Court for a final adjudication on the merits.  In this 
opinion, we address the motions brought by the Governor and the 
chair of the parole board (parole board) to dismiss the claims 
against them.  For the reasons that follow, we allow the 
Governor's motion and we allow in part and deny in part the 
parole board's motion. 
 
 
Discussion.  1.  Allegations of the complaint.  In deciding 
the motions to dismiss, we accept as true the factual 
                                                          
 
 
1 On behalf of himself and all others similarly situated. 
 
 
2 Michael Gomes, Peter Kyriakides, Richard O'Rourke, Steven 
Palladino, Mark Santos, David Sibinich, Michelle Tourigny, 
Michael White, Frederick Yeomans, and Hendrick Davis, on behalf 
of themselves and all others similarly situated. 
 
 
3 Chair of the parole board, Secretary of the Executive 
Office of Public Safety and Security, and the Governor. 
2 
 
 
 
allegations of the complaint and the reasonable inferences that 
can be drawn from those facts in the plaintiffs' favor.  See 
Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 625 n.7 (2008).  
We do not address, let alone attempt to resolve here, the truth 
of those allegations; that is, whether in fact the conditions of 
confinement during the COVID-19 pandemic comport with State and 
Federal constitutional requirements, and whether the defendants 
have in fact "acted or failed to act with deliberate 
indifference."  Foster (No. 1), 484 Mass. at     .  Instead, our 
narrow focus is on whether the plaintiffs' complaint adequately 
"state[s] a claim upon which relief can be granted" against the 
Governor and the parole board,"4 Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 
Mass. 754 (1974); in other words, whether the allegations, if 
true, plausibly suggest an entitlement to any relief against 
these defendants.  Iannacchino, supra at 635-636. 
 
 
The complaint alleges that, by confining the plaintiffs 
"under conditions that put them in grave and imminent danger of 
contracting the COVID-19 virus, and failing to implement an 
effective mechanism to reduce the incarcerated population to a 
safe level, [the] [d]defendants are deliberately indifferent to 
the substantial risk of serious harm suffered by [the] 
[p]laintiffs."  They allege that each of the defendants is (1) 
violating the plaintiffs' right to be free from cruel or unusual 
punishment and their right to substantive due process, as 
guaranteed under the Declaration of Rights in the Massachusetts 
Constitution, and as secured by G. L. c. 231A (count one); and 
(2) violating their right to be free from cruel and unusual 
punishment and their right to substantive due process as 
guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, and as secured by 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 (count two).  Additionally, the plaintiffs allege 
that confining persons who have been civilly committed under 
G. L. c. 123, § 35, in correctional facilities violates those 
individuals' rights to substantive due process under the Federal 
and State Constitutions, as secured by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 
G. L. c. 231A, respectively (count three). 
 
 
By its terms, the complaint seeks injunctive relief 
pursuant to G. L. c. 231A and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  In particular, 
it seeks an order requiring the defendants, "their agents, 
officials, employees, and all persons acting in concert with 
them" to confine prisoners in particular ways; requiring certain 
                                                          
 
 
4 The Governor has also moved to dismiss the complaint for 
"[l]ack of jurisdiction over the subject matter."  Mass. R. Civ. 
P. 12 (b) (1), 365 Mass. 754 (1974).  Because of the result 
reached, we do not separately address the point. 
3 
 
 
 
medical and health arrangements; prohibiting the ongoing 
confinement in correctional facilities of persons civilly 
committed under G. L. c. 123, § 35; reducing the number of 
persons incarcerated in prisons and jails; and mandating that 
the parole board take certain actions.  The complaint also seeks 
an order "[m]aximizing the use of commutation and clemency" by 
the Governor and "[m]aximizing the use of the Governor's 
emergency powers and all other available mechanisms to grant 
releases to all those who are vulnerable." 
 
 
2.  Governor's motion to dismiss.  Although the complaint 
broadly alleges that the defendants have violated the 
plaintiffs' State and Federal constitutional rights, the 
specific allegations against the Governor are notably few.  The 
complaint alleges that the "Governor has refused to act on his 
near plenary emergency powers when it comes to the health and 
safety of prisoners."  The plaintiffs seek to compel the 
Governor to use his authority to order a reduction in the prison 
population, because, absent his exercise of authority, "[t]here 
have been no commutations, no furloughs, no increase in earned 
good times, no releases by the [Department of Correction] to 
home confinement, little if any increase in the use of medical 
parole, and no effort by the parole board to streamline the 
parole process or modify the criteria for release in light of 
COVID-19." 
 
 
The plaintiffs are not entitled to relief against the 
Governor under the declaratory judgment statute, G. L. c. 231A, 
because the statute, by its terms, expressly does "not apply to 
the governor and council or the legislative and judicial 
departments."  G. L. c. 231A, § 2.  See Milton v. Commonwealth, 
416 Mass. 471, 475 (1993); Alliance, AFSCME/SEIU, AFL-CIO v. 
Secretary of Admin., 413 Mass. 377, 377 n.1 (1992), and cases 
cited. 
 
 
Nor is their position enhanced by invoking, as they do, the 
inherent power of this court "to say what the Constitution 
requires, when the question is properly presented."  Bates v. 
Director of the Office of Campaign & Political Fin., 436 Mass. 
144, 168 (2002), quoting Horton v. Attorney Gen., 269 Mass. 503, 
507 (1929), and citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 
(1803).  Had they alleged that the Governor affirmatively took 
action that was unconstitutional, or that anything he has done 
actually caused harm to the plaintiffs from alleged 
constitutional violations, the situation may well be different.  
But they do not challenge anything the Governor has in fact 
done; they only complain of what they allege he could have done 
4 
 
 
 
but did not.  And they certainly do not contend that the 
Governor had any direct, affirmative involvement in causing the 
challenged prison conditions.  See Hannon v. Beard, 979 F. 
Supp. 2d 136, 141-142 (D. Mass. 2013) (no direct connection 
between prison conditions and Governor's actions), and cases 
cited.  See also Brown v. Rhode Island, 511 Fed. Appx. 4, 5 (1st 
Cir. 2013) (dismissing claims against Governor where plaintiff 
did not challenge any affirmative acts of Governor).  Moreover, 
the Governor cannot be found liable based on a theory of 
respondeat superior or vicarious liability, that is, on the 
theory that he is legally responsible for the conduct of those 
he appointed to government service or to the agencies they lead.  
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (vicarious 
liability not applicable in such actions); Brown, supra 
(respondeat superior theory of liability not available in such 
circumstances). 
 
 
In short, the complaint claims that the Governor is liable 
for things he has not done.  First, it alleges that he is 
responsible for failing to reduce the prison population by 
failing to exercise his executive authority to pardon and grant 
clemency.  Second, it alleges that he has failed to exercise his 
emergency powers to mitigate the situation.  These are not 
actionable claims.  With respect to the first alleged failure to 
act, it is well settled that the Governor's authority to grant 
pardons and other clemency is exclusively an executive 
authority.  See Part II, c. 2, § 1, art. 8, of the Massachusetts 
Constitution, as amended by art. 73 of the Amendments to the 
Massachusetts Constitution ("The power of pardoning offences 
. . . shall be in the governor, by and with the advice of 
council . . .").  This court cannot compel him to exercise it.  
See District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist. v. Watson, 381 Mass. 
648, 667 n.10 (1980) (judicial branch cannot control executive 
clemency). 
 
 
With respect to the second alleged failure to act, viz., 
the Governor's failure to utilize his emergency powers to 
mitigate the situation, this court should tread lightly in 
telling any Governor when or how to exercise his or her powers.  
It is one thing for a court to order a Governor to cease 
engaging in action the court has found to be unconstitutional; 
it is quite another for a court affirmatively to direct a 
Governor how to act.  For that reason, among others, this court 
historically has been unwilling to order a Governor to act where 
the relief sought, if deserved, can be provided by means of a 
court order against some defendant other than the Governor.  See 
Milton, 416 Mass. at 475-476; Rice v. Draper, 207 Mass. 577, 579 
5 
 
 
 
(1911).  Cf. LIMITS v. President of the Senate, 414 Mass. 31, 34 
(1992).  If the plaintiffs in this case are indeed entitled to a 
remedy at the conclusion of the case, it can be provided by an 
appropriate order or orders directed to the other executive 
branch officials in the case.  See Milton, supra.  See also 
Barnes v. Secretary of Admin., 411 Mass. 822, 822 n.2 (1992).  
As stated, there is no claim that the Governor himself, by any 
affirmative act he has taken, has "overstepp[ed] constitutional 
bounds."  Horton, 269 Mass. at 507.  And we are confident, as 
this court always has been, that any declaration that we or the 
Superior Court may ultimately issue requiring action by any of 
the remaining defendants will be met with prompt compliance.  
See LaChance v. Commissioner of Correction, 475 Mass. 757, 765 
(2016), quoting Massachusetts Coalition for the Homeless v. 
Secretary of Human Servs., 400 Mass. 806, 825 (1987) (where 
declaratory judgment is directed to public officials, injunctive 
order is "generally unnecessary" because Massachusetts courts 
"assume that public officials will comply with the law declared 
by a court").  The Governor's presence is simply not necessary 
to provide any relief that a court may order in this case. 
 
 
3.  Parole board's motion to dismiss.  The plaintiffs 
allege in their complaint that the parole board has "fail[ed] to 
implement an effective mechanism to reduce the incarcerated 
population to a safe level," and that there has been "little if 
any increase in the use of medical parole, and no effort by the 
parole board to streamline the parole process or modify the 
criteria for release in light of COVID-19."  The complaint in 
essence claims that the parole board is failing to take steps 
that it is empowered to take to protect the plaintiffs from 
COVID-19, and that its deliberate indifference to the 
plaintiffs' plight creates "a substantial risk of serious harm 
to [the plaintiffs'] health or safety."  Foster (No. 1), 484 
Mass. at     .  Accordingly, the complaint seeks an order 
requiring the parole board to exercise its authority under G. L. 
c. 127, §§ 130 et seq., and 120 Code Mass. Regs. § 200.10 (2017) 
to make persons serving house of correction sentences eligible 
for early parole; to consider the dangers posed by COVID-19 when 
evaluating, as the statute requires it to do, whether "release 
is not incompatible with the welfare of society"; to 
presumptively grant parole to parole eligible individuals; to 
expedite the release of individuals who have been granted parole 
or medical parole; to ensure no prisoner is held beyond his or 
her "release to supervision date," see G. L. c. 127, § 130B; and 
to conduct parole hearings for parole eligible prisoners not 
6 
 
 
 
later than sixty days prior to their parole eligibility date, as 
required by G. L. c. 127, § 136.5 
 
 
Accepting the allegations of the complaint as true, as we 
must in considering a motion to dismiss, we conclude that the 
plaintiffs have alleged facts which, if proved, are sufficient 
to state a constitutional claim that the parole board was 
deliberately indifferent to the risk of death and serious 
illness to certain prisoners, particularly elderly and medically 
vulnerable prisoners.  See Iannacchino, 451 Mass. at 636.  See 
also Good v. Commissioner of Correction, 417 Mass. 329, 334 
(1994) (Commissioner of Correction proper party defendant where 
he had "ability to prevent harm").  The complaint alleges that 
the parole board has authority to implement effective measures 
to reduce the incarcerated population by, for example, 
expediting parole hearings and releases and, perhaps, 
considering the impact of COVID-19 as part of its assessment.  
If, as the plaintiffs contend, the parole board has been 
deliberately indifferent in its exposure of the prisoners to 
"unreasonable risks from the COVID-19 pandemic," Foster (No. 1), 
484 Mass. at    , then the parole board's failure to act within, 
and to the extent of, its authority may, if such deliberate 
indifference is proved, entitle the plaintiffs to relief. 
 
 
We recognize that the scope of the parole board's authority 
is defined by statute, see G. L. c. 27, § 4, and G. L. c. 127, 
§§ 130 et seq., and that "the court's equitable powers may not 
be used to provide relief that is contrary to statutory or 
constitutional requirements."  McCarthy v. Governor, 471 Mass. 
1008, 1010-1011 (2015), citing Haverty v. Commissioner of 
Correction, 440 Mass. 1, 8 (2003).  See Immigration & 
Naturalization Serv. v. Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875, 883 (1988) 
("Courts of equity can no more disregard statutory and 
constitutional requirements and provisions than can courts of 
law" [citation omitted]).  Where, however, the parole board has 
authority to act and it fails to do so, for example, by failing 
to consider early parole in circumstances that are "sufficiently 
compelling," see Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs. v. Chief 
Justice of the Trial Court, 484 Mass. 431, 452 (2020), quoting 
120 Code Mass. Regs. § 200.10, or by failing to hold timely 
hearings, this court (and likewise the Superior Court) can 
exercise its equitable authority to require the parole board to 
exercise its statutory authority to remedy a constitutional 
                                                          
 
 
5 The plaintiffs do not oppose dismissal of the claim 
against the parole board relating to individuals civilly 
committed under G. L. c. 123, § 35. 
7 
 
 
 
violation, if such a violation were to be found.  Indeed, if the 
plaintiffs' constitutional claims were to prevail and if this 
court (or the Superior Court) were to order the population of 
incarcerated inmates to be reduced, the parole board would be a 
logical and necessary party to accomplish a reasonable and 
sensible remedial process.  See Richardson v. Sheriff of 
Middlesex County, 407 Mass. 455, 469-470 (1990). 
 
 
Conclusion.  The Governor's motion to dismiss the complaint 
is allowed.  The parole board's motion is allowed only with 
respect to the claims of the individuals civilly committed under 
G. L. c. 123, § 35, and is otherwise denied. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
James R. Pingeon for the plaintiffs. 
 
Stephen G. Dietrick for Commissioner of Correction & 
another. 
 
Ryan P. McManus, Special Assistant Attorney General, for 
the Governor. 
 
Michael R. Byrne for the parole board. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Tatum A. Pritchard for Disability Law Center, Inc. 
 
Rachael Rollins, District Attorney for the Suffolk 
district, & Hon. Jon Santiago, pro se. 
 
Matthew R. Segal for American Civil Liberties Union of 
Massachusetts & another.