Title: Margaret M. Sopha v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corporation
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1998AP001343
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: October 27, 1999

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-1343 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
Margaret M. Sopha, Individually and as Special 
Administrator of the Estate of Robert W. Sopha,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation, Pittsburgh-
Corning Corporation, Rapid American Corporation, 
Owens-Illinois, Inc., Building Service 
Industrial Sales  Co., Inc., Allied Insulation 
Supply Co., Inc., Sprinkmann Sons Corporation,  
Milwaukee Insulation Co., Inc., All-Temp 
Insulation Inc., GAF Corporation, Armstrong 
World Industries, Asbestos Claim Management 
Corporation, and Amchem Products, Inc.,  
 
Defendants-Respondents.  
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
October 27, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
September 10, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Gerald C. Nichol 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-appellant there were briefs by 
Bruce A. Ranta and Cunningham & Lyons, S.C., Milwaukee and oral 
argument by Bruce A. Ranta. 
 
 
For the defendants-respondents there was a brief 
by Trevor J. Will, G. Michael Halfenger, Marti L. Schreier and 
Foley & Lardner, Milwaukee and oral argument by Trevor J. Will. 
 
No. 
98-1343 
 
 
1 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 98-1343 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN:  
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Margaret M. Sopha, Individually and as  
Special Administrator of the Estate of  
Robert W. Sopha,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation,  
Pittsburgh-Corning Corporation, Rapid  
American Corporation, Owens-Illinois,  
Inc., Building Service Industrial Sales  
Co., Inc., Allied Insulation Supply Co.,  
Inc., Sprinkmann Sons Corporation,  
Milwaukee Insulation Co., Inc., All-Temp  
Insulation Inc., GAF Corporation,  
Armstrong World Industries, Asbestos  
Claim Management Corporation, and Amchem  
Products, Inc.,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
Appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Dane County, 
Gerald C. Nichol, Circuit Court Judge.  Reversed and cause 
remanded. 
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE.   This case 
comes before the court on certification of the court of appeals 
FILED 
 
OCT. 27, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
98-1343 
 
 
2 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (1997-98).1  Margaret 
Sopha, individually and the Estate of Robert Sopha, acting 
through 
the 
special 
administrator 
Margaret 
Sopha, 
the 
plaintiffs, appeal an order of the Circuit Court for Dane 
County, Gerald C. Nichol, Judge. The order granted the motion of 
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation et al., the defendants, to 
dismiss the plaintiffs’ action on the ground that it was barred 
by the statute of limitations. We reverse the order of the 
circuit court and remand the cause to the circuit court for 
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
¶2 
In March 1987, Robert Sopha and his wife Margaret 
filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County 
seeking damages for injuries to Robert’s lungs allegedly caused 
by exposure to asbestos. The action was dismissed “on the merits 
and with prejudice.”2 
¶3 
The plaintiffs commenced this action in March 1997, 
alleging that Robert Sopha had been diagnosed with mesothelioma, 
a malignant condition allegedly caused by exposure to asbestos. 
 The plaintiffs assert, and the circuit court found, that 
mesothelioma is distinct from the asbestos-related injuries 
alleged in the plaintiffs’ 1987 complaint. 
¶4 
The first issue presented is whether a diagnosis of a 
non-malignant asbestos-related condition (here either pleural 
                     
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1997-98 text unless otherwise noted.  
2 Sopha v. Carey Canada, Inc., No. 87-CV-743-127 (Oct. 23, 
1989). 
No. 
98-1343 
 
 
3 
thickening or asbestosis) triggers the statute of limitations 
for any and all injuries to the plaintiffs caused by exposure to 
asbestos, or whether a later diagnosis of a distinct and later 
manifested 
malignant 
asbestos-related 
condition 
(here 
mesothelioma) triggers a new statute of limitations on the 
distinct and later manifested condition.  We conclude that a 
diagnosis of a non-malignant asbestos-related lung pathology 
does not trigger the statute of limitations with respect to a 
claim for a later diagnosed, distinct malignant asbestos-related 
condition. 
¶5 
The second issue presented is whether the doctrine of 
claim preclusion bars the plaintiffs, whose first action for a 
non-malignant asbestos-related condition ended in a judgment of 
dismissal, from bringing a second action for damages for a 
malignant asbestos-related condition. We conclude that the 
doctrine of claim preclusion is not applicable in this case. 
¶6 
Our 
holding 
in 
this 
case 
implicates 
important 
interests for the plaintiffs, defendants, and the legal system. 
After weighing carefully the interests underlying the statute of 
limitations, the single cause of action rule, the discovery 
rule, rules limiting recovery to damages that are reasonably 
certain and the doctrine of claim preclusion, the court 
concludes that the plaintiffs should be allowed to go forward 
with their suit.  We hold that a person who brings an action 
based on a diagnosis of a non-malignant asbestos-related 
condition may bring a subsequent action upon a later diagnosis 
of a distinct malignant asbestos-related condition.  The 
No. 
98-1343 
 
 
4 
diagnosis of a malignant asbestos-related condition creates a 
new cause of action and the statute of limitations governing the 
malignant asbestos-related condition begins when the claimant 
discovers, or with reasonable diligence should discover, the 
malignant asbestos-related condition. 
 
I 
 
¶7 
For purposes of this appeal we set forth the following 
facts. Robert Sopha worked as an insulator from 1951 until his 
retirement in 1995.  He was regularly exposed to insulation 
products containing asbestos during his employment.  Sometime 
prior to 1987 Robert Sopha was apparently diagnosed with non-
malignant pleural thickening.  Pleural thickening is a non-
malignant physical condition involving the lining surrounding 
each lung and the lining inside the chest cavity and is often 
indicative of exposure to asbestos.  
¶8 
In March 1987, Robert Sopha and his wife filed a 
complaint in the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County seeking 
damages 
for 
injuries 
to 
his 
lungs, 
namely, 
“asbestosis, 
pulmonary fibrosis and other pathology of the lungs plus the 
risk of cancer,” allegedly caused by exposure to asbestos. After 
the defendants moved to dismiss the lawsuit on the basis of the 
three-year statute of limitations, the plaintiffs moved to 
voluntarily dismiss the action.  The action was dismissed “on 
No. 
98-1343 
 
 
5 
the merits and with prejudice” by order dated October 23, 1989.3 
 The circuit court made no findings of fact. 
¶9 
In December 1996 Robert Sopha was diagnosed for the 
first time with mesothelioma, a malignant condition of the 
pleural lining allegedly caused by exposure to asbestos. The 
plaintiffs brought an action to recover damages for mesothelioma 
in March 1997. 
¶10 Although the defendants, the circuit court and the 
court of appeals assert that the case is suitable for summary 
judgment and that no material facts are in dispute, the parties 
apparently disagree about the nature of Robert Sopha’s injuries 
in 1987. 4   
¶11 The 
plaintiffs 
assert 
that 
Robert 
Sopha’s 
1987 
complaint contains numerous generic allegations that were not 
applicable to Robert Sopha’s condition at that time.  They 
assert that although the 1987 complaint indicates that Robert 
Sopha was diagnosed with asbestosis, he was really diagnosed 
with non-disabling pleural thickening. Brief and Appendix of 
Plaintiff-Appellant at 6 n. 1. 
¶12 The 
defendants 
disagree 
with 
the 
plaintiffs’ 
characterization of Robert Sopha’s asbestos-related physical 
condition in 1987. The defendants point out that, according to 
                     
3 Sopha v. Carey Canada, Inc., No. 87-CV-743-127 (Oct. 23, 
1989). 
4 The defendants’ pleadings denied or put at issue 
allegations in the complaint.  They accept allegations in the 
complaint as true for the limited purpose of deciding their 
motion to dismiss. 
No. 
98-1343 
 
 
6 
Robert Sopha’s 1987 complaint, he had asbestosis and his 
injuries were serious, permanent and excruciatingly painful.5  
The significance of the disagreement between the parties is not 
altogether clear.  The defendants may be suggesting that if 
Robert Sopha had asbestosis in 1987, he might have been able to 
prove 
that 
it 
was 
reasonably 
certain 
he 
would 
develop 
mesothelioma and he therefore could have recovered damages for 
mesothelioma in the 1987 action. 
¶13 The defendants assert, however, that whether Robert 
Sopha had asbestosis in 1987 or whether he had pleural 
thickening is neither material nor in dispute.  It is not 
material, according to the defendants, because under existing 
law the result is the same regardless of which condition Robert 
Sopha had in 1987. According to the defendants, the 1997 action 
is barred.  It is not in dispute, according to the defendants, 
because the plaintiffs offered no evidence at the circuit court 
in the present case concerning Robert Sopha’s diagnosis as of 
1987.  Joint Brief and Appendix of Defendants-Respondents at 9. 
¶14 The circuit court and court of appeals assumed, and 
this court accepts, the following  undisputed facts for purposes 
of the summary judgment ruling: In December 1996 Robert Sopha 
                     
5 The plaintiffs' 1987 allegations were that Robert Sopha’s 
condition had been “diagnosed as asbestosis, pulmonary fibrosis 
and/or other pathology of the lungs, circulatory systems, 
pulmonary and respiratory systems, [and] that he suffers the 
possibility of contracting cancer.”  The complaint thus alleged 
the possibility of developing cancer and did not allege cancer-
related injuries. 
No. 
98-1343 
 
 
7 
was diagnosed for the first time with mesothelioma, a malignant 
condition distinct from the other asbestos-related conditions 
from which Robert Sopha suffered in 1987.  Furthermore, 
according to the circuit court and court of appeals, it could 
not be predicted with reasonable certainty in 1987 that Robert 
Sopha would develop an asbestos-related malignancy. 
¶15 Robert Sopha died in November 1997 of mesothelioma, 
and the complaint was amended to include a claim for wrongful 
death.  On November 26, 1997, the defendants moved to dismiss 
the action on the grounds that the action was barred by the 
statute of limitations and by the doctrine of claim preclusion. 
 Relying on information outside the pleadings, the circuit court 
treated the motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 802.06(3). 
¶16 The circuit court concluded that the statute of 
limitations barred the 1997 action. The circuit court applied 
the “single cause of action” rule, which dictates that all 
claims for personal injury caused by a tortfeasor’s course of 
conduct are part of a single cause of action and must be brought 
in a single lawsuit.  According to the circuit court, the 
plaintiffs’ cause of action against the defendants for all 
personal injuries caused by exposure to asbestos accrued in the 
1980s when the plaintiffs first discovered the injuries caused 
by Robert Sopha’s exposure to asbestos. The circuit court ruled 
that the later appearance of mesothelioma, a new injury not 
known earlier, did not start a new limitation period or give the 
plaintiffs a new cause of action.   
No. 
98-1343 
 
 
8 
¶17 Accordingly, the circuit court held that the 1997 
cause of action was barred because it accrued more than three 
years before the 1997 action was commenced.  Although the 
circuit court acknowledged that it was troubled by the result, 
it concluded it was not at liberty to adopt a new theory of the 
application of the statute of limitations to asbestos cases.  
¶18 The circuit court rejected the defendants’ argument 
that claim preclusion barred the plaintiffs’ cause of action.  
The circuit court held that because the plaintiffs could not 
have recovered for mesothelioma in the 1987 action, claim 
preclusion would not bar them from bringing a subsequent action 
for that new injury. 
¶19 The plaintiffs appealed the order of the circuit court 
to the court of appeals, and the court of appeals certified the 
appeal to this court. 
 
II 
 
¶20 This court reviews an order granting summary judgment 
using the same methodology as the circuit court.  Although we 
review the motion for summary judgment de novo, we benefit from 
the analysis of the circuit court. A motion for summary judgment 
will be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law."  Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2). 
No. 
98-1343 
 
 
9 
 
III 
 
¶21 The first issue presented is whether a diagnosis of a 
non-malignant asbestos-related condition (here either pleural 
thickening or asbestosis) triggers the statute of limitations 
for any and all injuries to the plaintiffs caused by exposure to 
asbestos or whether a later diagnosis of a distinct and later 
manifested 
malignant 
asbestos-related 
condition 
(here 
mesothelioma) triggers a new statute of limitations on the  
distinct and later manifested condition.   
¶22 The statute of limitations applicable to the present 
case provides that an action to recover damages for injuries to 
the person shall be commenced within three years from the time 
the cause of action accrues. Wis. Stat. §§ 893.04 and 893.54.6 
The question thus becomes: When did the plaintiffs’ cause of 
action to recover damages for mesothelioma accrue?  “This court 
                     
6 Wis. Stat. § 893.04 provides: 
. . .  a period of limitation within which an action may be 
commenced is computed from the time the cause of action 
accrues until the action is commenced. 
Wis. Stat. § 893.54 provides: 
The following actions shall be commenced within 3 years or 
be barred: 
(1) An action to recover damages for injuries to the 
person. 
(2) An action brought to recover damages for death caused 
by the wrongful act, neglect or default of another.   
No. 
98-1343 
 
 
10
has the power to establish when claims accrue.” Hansen v. A.H. 
Robbins, Inc., 113 Wis. 2d 550, 559, 335 N.W.2d 578 (1983).  
¶23 This court has stated that “a cause of action accrues 
when there exists a claim capable of enforcement, a suitable 
party against whom it may be enforced, and a party with a 
present right to enforce it.”7 
¶24 The defendants argue that the plaintiffs’ cause of 
action accrued when Robert Sopha was diagnosed with pleural 
thickening or asbestosis in the late 1970s or early 1980s. The 
plaintiffs had a claim capable of enforcement; the plaintiffs 
had suitable parties against whom the claim may be enforced; and 
the plaintiffs had a present right to enforce the claim. 
Accordingly the defendants conclude that the plaintiffs’ cause 
of action for all asbestos-related injuries accrued in the 
1980s; that the 1997 action was not filed within three years 
after the cause of action accrued; and that the 1997 action is 
barred by the statute of limitations.  
¶25 The answer to the question of when the plaintiffs’ 
cause of action accrued for the recovery of damages for 
mesothelioma is not as simple as the defendants contend.  Three 
judicially created rules come into play in resolving what 
constitutes a cause of action and when a cause of action accrues 
for purposes of applying the statute of limitations.  These 
rules are (1) the single cause of action rule; (2) the discovery 
                     
7 Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 194 Wis. 2d 302, 
315, 533 N.W.2d 780 (1995).  See also Meracle v. Children’s 
Serv. Socy, 149 Wis. 2d 19, 26, 437 N.W.2d 532 (1989). 
No. 
98-1343 
 
 
11
rule; and (3) the rule limiting recovery of damages for 
reasonably certain consequences. 
¶26 The defendants contend that the determinative rule in 
the present case is the “single cause of action” rule, sometimes 
referred to as the “single injury rule”8 or the "rule against 
claim splitting."9  The single cause of action rule determines 
what constitutes a cause of action. According to the single 
cause of 
action rule, 
all 
injuries 
caused 
by 
a 
single 
transaction or series of transactions by a tortfeasor are part 
of a single cause of action so that “a later injury from the 
same tortious act does not restart the running of the statute 
[of limitations].”10 
¶27 The rule is designed to protect an alleged tortfeasor 
from multiple actions by limiting a claimant to one action for 
injuries arising from the tortfeasor's one course of conduct.  
The defendants urge that a later appearance of a new injury (in 
this case mesothelioma) does not create a new cause of action or 
start the running of a new statute of limitations. 
¶28 The plaintiffs rely on the discovery rule announced by 
this court in the Hansen11 and Borello12 cases.  The discovery 
                     
8 Potts v. Celotex Corp., 796 S.W.2d 678, 680 (Tenn. 1990). 
9 Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 cmt. h. (1982) 
(relating to claim preclusion). 
10 Segall v. Hurwitz, 114 Wis. 2d 471, 482, 338 N.W.2d 333 
(Ct. App. 1983).   
11 Hansen v. A.H. Robbins Co., Inc., 113 Wis. 2d 550, 335 
N.W.2d 578 (1983). 
No. 
98-1343 
 
 
12
rule established that a tort claim accrues for the purposes of 
the statute of limitations “on the date the injury is discovered 
or with reasonable diligence should be discovered, whichever 
occurs first.” Hansen, 113 Wis. 2d at 560.  The Hansen court 
declared that “[i]t is manifestly unjust for the statute of 
limitations to begin to run before a claimant could reasonably 
become aware of the injury”.  Hansen, 113 Wis. 2d at 559. 
¶29 The 
plaintiffs 
argue 
that 
they 
had 
no 
way 
of 
discovering Robert Sopha’s mesothelioma until he was diagnosed 
with the condition in 1996 and that pursuant to the discovery 
rule their cause of action for mesothelioma accrued at that 
time.   
¶30 The defendants contend that the discovery rule does 
not apply in the present case because in the 1980s the 
plaintiffs knew that they had an injury allegedly attributable 
to the defendants’ conduct, even though they did not know the 
full extent of the injury.  Therefore, according to the 
defendants, even if we were to apply the discovery rule, all the 
elements of the plaintiffs’ cause of action based on exposure to 
asbestos 
were 
present 
in 
the 1980s 
and 
the 
statute of 
limitations began to run.  They conclude that the 1997 action is 
therefore barred by the statute of limitations. 
¶31 The defendants make a valid point.  Several Wisconsin 
cases support the proposition that the appearance of the first 
                                                                  
12 Borello v. U.S. Oil Co., 130 Wis. 2d 397, 388 N.W.2d 140 
(1989). 
No. 
98-1343 
 
 
13
compensable injury starts the statute of limitations running for 
all claims based on the tortfeasor’s single course of conduct, 
even for future injuries that may be difficult to predict.13 
¶32 
The defendants’ argument leads to discussion of the 
third rule that demarcates the damages recoverable in an action 
and therefore affects what constitutes a cause of action and the 
date of accrual.  The third rule declares that recovery for 
damages 
may 
be 
had 
for 
“reasonably 
certain 
injurious 
consequences of the tortfeasor's negligent conduct, not for 
merely 
possible 
injurious 
consequences.”14 
In 
Wisconsin 
a 
claimant cannot recover for speculative or conjectural damages.  
                     
13 See, e.g., Nierengarten v. Lutheran Soc. Servs. of Wis., 
219 Wis. 2d 686, 702, 580 N.W.2d 320 (1998) (parents’ cause of 
action against adoption agency accrued in 1990 with diagnosis of 
child’s attention deficit hyperactivity disorder; statute of 
limitations barred 1995 lawsuit alleging a more severe injury); 
Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 194 Wis. 2d 302, 317, 533 
N.W.2d 780 (1995)(claimant’s cause of action for non-consensual 
sex accrued at time of sexual contact, not later when claimant 
learned of emotional distress); Olson v. St. Croix Valley Mem’l 
Hosp., 55 Wis. 2d 628, 633, 201 N.W.2d 63 (1972)(statute of 
limitations commenced when blood transfusion impaired claimant’s 
  capacity for childbearing, even though her injury did not 
manifest until four years later); Elfers v. St. Paul Fire and 
Marine Ins. Co., 214 Wis. 2d 499, 506, 571 N.W.2d 469 (Ct. App. 
1997)(claimant may not wait and see full extent of injuries but 
must file a lawsuit upon learning of disabling injury); Banc One 
Bldg. Management Corp. v. W.R. Grace Co., 210 Wis. 2d 62, 78, 
565 N.W.2d 154 (Ct. App. 1997)(cause of action for asbestos-
related damage to building accrued when owner first learned that 
asbestos was present and would increase costs of renovation 
project). 
14 Brantner v. Jenson, 121 Wis. 2d 658, 663-64, 360 N.W.2d 
529 (1985)(quoted with approval in Meracle v. Children’s Serv. 
Socy of Wis., 149 Wis. 2d  at 27).  
No. 
98-1343 
 
 
14
¶33 
As explained earlier, for purposes of this appeal we 
assume that the plaintiffs could not have recovered damages for 
mesothelioma before 1996, because it was not reasonably certain 
before that year that Robert Sopha would develop mesothelioma. 
According to the defendants’ reasoning, the plaintiffs’ claim 
for mesothelioma was therefore, on the one hand, barred by the 
statute of limitations if brought in 1997 because the cause of 
action accrued in the 1980s under the single cause of action and 
discovery 
rules.  
On 
the 
other 
hand, according to the 
defendants’ reasoning, the plaintiffs’ claim for mesothelioma 
would have been premature if brought in the l980s because 
recovery of damages was limited to reasonably certain injuries. 
If the court adopts the defendants’ position, the plaintiffs 
will have no opportunity, at any time, to recover for the most 
severe injuries allegedly caused by defendants’ conduct. The 
defendants’ argument imparts, as one court wrote, “ultimate 
meaning to the phrase ‘catch 22’.”15  
¶34 These three rules, delineating for purposes of the 
statute of limitations what constitutes a cause of action, when a 
cause of action accrues and what damages are recoverable in an 
action, are not ironclad.  “The question of what constitutes a 
cause of action and the concept of a statute of limitation is 
basically a question of public policy.”  Olson v. St. Croix 
                     
15 Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 495 A.2d 495, 502 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985). 
No. 
98-1343 
 
 
15
Valley Mem’l Hosp., 55 Wis. 2d 628, 636, 201 N.W.2d 63 
(1972)(Hallows, C.J., concurring). 
¶35 In this case the rules must be considered in the 
context of asbestos injuries and this action brought to recover 
damages for mesothelioma.  The rules must be balanced and 
weighed as we attempt to resolve whether the statute of 
limitations bars the plaintiffs’ 1997 action.  
¶36 Two conflicting public policies are raised by a 
statute of limitations: discouraging stale and fraudulent claims 
and allowing diligent meritorious claimants to seek redress for 
injuries sustained.16 The problems caused by the lapse of time 
must be balanced against the value of allowing meritorious 
claims. Hansen, 113 Wis. 2d at 559. 
¶37 The single cause of action rule, like the statute of 
limitations, seeks to deter stale claims and to allow repose for 
alleged tortfeasors, thus enabling them to plan for the future 
with certainty about liability. The single cause of action rule 
also seeks to deter vexatious and multiple lawsuits arising out 
of the same tortious incident.17   
¶38 The discovery rule, by comparison, is grounded in 
considerations 
of 
justice, 
reasonableness 
and 
fundamental 
fairness. Hansen, 113 Wis. 2d at 560. The discovery rule allows 
a cause of action to go forward when an injured person has had 
                     
16 Hansen, 113 Wis. 2d at 558. 
 
17 Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 520 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).  
No. 
98-1343 
 
 
16
no opportunity to litigate a claim. Allowing such a meritorious 
claim to proceed “outweighs the threat of stale or fraudulent 
actions.”18  Although the statute of limitations and the single 
cause of action rule are designed to deny a forum to claimants 
who do not diligently pursue their claims, the plaintiffs in the 
present case did not “sleep” on their claim for mesothelioma. 
They brought the 1997 action promptly after the diagnosis. In 
this case the discovery rule militates in favor of splitting the 
actions and starting the statute of limitations anew upon the 
diagnosis of mesothelioma. 
¶39 Furthermore, although stale claims are disfavored 
because the search for the truth is often hampered by the 
destruction, loss or fading of evidence and the death or 
disappearance of witnesses, in this case allowing the plaintiffs 
to proceed furthers the search for the truth. The evidence 
relating to the existence of Robert Sopha’s mesothelioma, its 
cause and the resultant damage has developed since 1987. 
Allowing claims to proceed when claimants file within three 
years of discovering an asbestos-related malignancy, as opposed 
to trying damages for the risk or fear of cancer when the first 
effects of exposure to asbestos appear, promotes the development 
of 
more 
accurate 
factual 
records 
for 
deciding 
damages.19  
                     
18 Hansen, 113 Wis. 2d at 559. See also Spitler v. Dean, 148 
Wis. 2d 630, 633, 436 N.W.2d 308 (1989).  
  
19 Wilson v. Johns-Manville Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 119 (D.C. 
Cir. 1982). 
No. 
98-1343 
 
 
17
Moreover, there is almost no chance that the allegation of the 
existence of mesothelioma or any other malignancy would be 
fraudulent.   
¶40 Although the objectives of the single cause of action 
rule are finality and judicial economy, allowing a separate 
cause of action for an asbestos-related malignancy if and when 
it occurs promotes judicial economy.  
¶41 As the plaintiffs argue, and as other jurisdictions 
have recognized, a holding that bars the plaintiffs’ cause of 
action for an asbestos-related malignancy creates incentives for 
claimants to rush to the courthouse to initiate anticipatory 
litigation.20  Those who are diagnosed with pleural thickening or 
other non-malignant asbestos-related injuries will be encouraged 
to file lawsuits immediately upon diagnosis, even if they are 
asymptomatic and would otherwise be reluctant to sue. To protect 
themselves they will be forced to initiate litigation based on 
the possibility that they will develop more serious asbestos-
related conditions in the future. 
¶42 The court must also take into account the objective of 
tort 
law 
that 
meritorious 
claimants 
recover 
adequate 
compensation from tortfeasors.21  Unless the plaintiffs’ 1997 
action is allowed to proceed the plaintiffs may never recover 
for serious injuries allegedly caused by the defendants. 
                     
20  See, e.g., Wilson v. Johns-Manville, 684 F.2d at 120; 
Eagle-Picher Indus., 481 So. 2d at 522(citing cases). 
 
21 See CLL Assoc. v. Arrowhead Pacific Corp., 174 Wis.2d 
604, 610, 497 N.W.2d 115 (1993) (articulating the purposes 
served by tort law). 
No. 
98-1343 
 
 
18
¶43 In asbestos cases the crucial interests of allowing 
diligent claimants an opportunity to recover for serious injury 
or wrongful death and of deterring anticipatory lawsuits 
outweigh the threat of stale or fraudulent actions and a 
tortfeasor’s interest in repose. As one court stated, “[t]he 
dimensions of asbestos litigation are so vast, and the potential 
for inequity so great, that the need for finality—-and the rule 
against [claim] splitting—-pales in importance.”22 
¶44 We therefore hold that the statute of limitations does 
not bar the plaintiffs’ 1997 action. The diagnosis of a non-
malignant asbestos-related lung pathology does not trigger the 
statute of limitations with respect to an action for a later 
diagnosed, distinct malignant asbestos-related condition.  
¶45 Our decision brings us in conformity with the majority 
of other jurisdictions that have considered the issue of whether 
the statute of limitations bars an action for a later diagnosed 
                     
22 Eagle-Picher Indus., 481 So. 2d at 525. 
No. 
98-1343 
 
 
19
malignant asbestos-related condition.23  These jurisdictions 
conclude that the community’s interest in compensating persons 
                     
23 See, e.g., Wilson v. Johns-Manville, 684 F.2d at 120-21 
(diagnosis 
of 
mild 
asbestosis 
did 
not 
start 
statute 
of 
limitations 
for 
mesothelioma 
caused 
by 
same 
exposure 
to 
asbestos);  Miller v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 817 P.2d 
111, 113 (Colo. 1991) (diagnosis of pleural thickening did not 
start statute of limitations for later claim for asbestosis); 
Eagle-Picher Indus., 481 So. 2d at 520 (claim for increased risk 
of getting cancer upon diagnosis of asbestosis dismissed; 
complainant may sue if later diagnosed with cancer); VaSalle v. 
Celotex Corp., 515 N.E.2d 684 (Ill. App. 1987) (claim for lung 
cancer not barred by earlier diagnosis of asbestosis); Wilber v. 
Owens-Corning 
Fiberglas 
Corp., 
476 
N.W.2d 
74, 
78 
(Iowa 
1991)(claim for mesothelioma did not accrue when plaintiff was 
diagnosed with asbestosis); Pierce v. Johns-Manville Sales 
Corp., 464 A.2d 1020, 1028 (Md. 1983) (claim for lung cancer not 
barred by earlier diagnosis of asbestosis when no recovery was 
had for asbestosis); Larson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 399 
N.W.2d 1, 9 (Mich. 1986) (claims for asbestos-related cancer not 
barred by earlier diagnosis of asbestosis when no prior action 
for asbestosis brought); Marinari v. Asbestos Corp., 612 A.2d 
1021, 1028 (Pa. Super. 1992) (diagnosis of pleural thickening 
did not start statute of limitations for late action based on 
lung cancer), modified on other grounds, Simmons v. Pacor, Inc., 
674 A.2d 232, 237-39 (Pa. 1996) (claim based on diagnosis of 
asymptomatic pleural plaques is sufficient to state a limited 
claim for medical monitoring damages; discussing with approval 
that part of Marinari that addressed the statute of limitations 
question); Potts v. Celotex Corp., 796 S.W.2d 678, 685 (Tenn. 
1990)(claim for mesothelioma not barred by earlier diagnosis of 
asbestosis). 
No. 
98-1343 
 
 
20
for injuries caused by the tortious acts of others “would be 
significantly 
undermined 
by 
a 
judge-made 
rule 
that 
upon 
manifestation of any harm, the injured party must then, if ever, 
sue for all harms the same exposure may (or may not) occasion 
sometime in the future.” 24 
 
IV 
 
¶46 Even if we were to hold for the plaintiffs on the 
statute of limitations issue, the defendants argue that the 
doctrine 
of 
claim 
preclusion 
requires 
dismissal 
of 
the 
plaintiffs’ action.25  
                                                                  
A 
few 
jurisdictions 
have 
held 
that 
the 
statute 
of 
limitations begins to run on the manifestation of the first 
asbestos-related illness.  See, e.g., Joyce v. A.C. & S., Inc., 
785 F.2d 1200, 1203-05 (4th Cir. 1986)(under Virginia law, 
diagnosis of pleural thickening triggered statute of limitations 
for all asbestos-related disease); Matthews v. Celotex Corp., 
569 F.Supp 1539, 1542-43 (D.N.D. 1983) (under North Dakota law, 
claim for lung cancer was dismissed on statute of limitations 
grounds when plaintiff was diagnosed with asbestos-related 
pulmonary disease more than six years earlier); Pustejovsky v. 
Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 980 S.W.2d 828, 831-33 (Tx. Ct. App. 
1998)(single action rule prohibits claim splitting in asbestos 
cases; case dismissed on statute of limitations grounds),review 
granted; accord Pecorino v. Raymark Indus., 763 S.W.2d 561, 569-
71 (Tx. Ct. App. 1988). 
24 Wilson v. Johns-Manville, 684 F.2d at 119. 
25 The term claim preclusion replaces res judicata; the term 
issue preclusion replaces collateral estoppel.  Northern States 
Power Co. v. Bugher, 189 Wis. 2d 541, 550, 525 N.W.2d 723 
(1995). 
No. 
98-1343 
 
 
21
¶47 The doctrine of claim preclusion provides that a final 
judgment on the merits bars parties from relitigating any claim 
that arises out of the same relevant facts, transactions or 
occurrences.26  Ordinarily a final judgment is conclusive in all 
subsequent actions as to all matters "which were litigated or 
which might have been litigated in the former proceedings."27  
Claim preclusion focuses on judgments and their preclusive 
effect. 
¶48 Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, a subsequent 
action is barred when the following three factors are present: 
(1) identity between the parties or their privies in the prior 
and present suits;28 (2) prior litigation resulted in a final 
                     
26 Northern States Power, 189 Wis. 2d at 550. See also 
Depratt v. West Bend Mutual Ins. Co., 113 Wis.2d 306, 311-12, 
334 N.W.2d 883 (1983)(adopting the transactional approach set 
forth in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 (1982) to 
determine whether two suits involve the same cause of action). 
27 Depratt, 113 Wis.2d at 310.  See also Lindas v. Cady, 183 
Wis.2d 547, 558, 515 N.W.2d 458 (1994). 
 
28 The parties to the 1987 and 1997 actions are, for the 
most part, identical. In the 1987 action both Margaret and 
Robert Sopha were named plaintiffs.  In the 1997 action Margaret 
Sopha is suing in her own right and on behalf of Robert Sopha’s 
estate.  
 
No. 
98-1343 
 
 
22
judgment on the merits by a court with jurisdiction;29 and (3) 
identity of the causes of action in the two suits. Northern 
States Power Co. v. Bugher, 189 Wis. 2d 541, 551, 525 N.W.2d 723 
(1995). 
¶49 We address the question whether the 1987 and 1997 
actions are based on the same cause of action so that claim 
preclusion applies.  Our analysis is similar to our earlier 
discussion of when a cause of action accrues for the purposes of 
the statute of limitations.  The policies underlying claim 
preclusion and the single cause of action rule, which we 
discussed earlier in addressing the statute of limitations, are 
closely related.30  
¶50 The plaintiffs argue that claim preclusion does not 
apply because they could not have recovered for mesothelioma in 
                                                                  
Ten of the thirteen defendants named in the present action 
were also named in the 1987 action.  One of the new defendants, 
Rapid American Corp., was sued in part for assuming the 
asbestos-related liabilities of a defendant in the first action, 
Celotex.  Two defendants (Amchem Products Inc. and All Temp 
Insulation Inc.) were not parties to the first action.  The 
defendants assert that because the plaintiffs have not disputed 
claim preclusion as to these new defendants on the grounds that 
they were not sued in the first action, the plaintiffs have 
waived such an argument.  Because we hold that the plaintiffs’ 
action is not barred by claim preclusion, we do not address the 
merits of this argument relating to these three defendants. 
29 The plaintiffs’ 1987 action was dismissed on the merits 
and with prejudice.  We do not address the plaintiffs’ 
contention that when an earlier judgment does not contain any 
factual findings it does not bind the parties on any issue which 
might arise in a subsequent case involving a different cause of 
action. 
30 Wilson v. Johns-Manville, 684 F.2d at 118 n. 36.  
No. 
98-1343 
 
 
23
1987, when there was no “reasonable certainty” that Robert Sopha 
would develop this condition.  This argument would not generally 
bar the defense of claim preclusion.  Ordinarily, a subsequent 
injury resulting from a tortfeasor’s conduct does not give rise 
to a new cause of action for the purposes of claim preclusion. 
The 
Restatement 
(Second) 
of 
Judgments 
explains: 
“It 
is 
immaterial that in trying the first action he [the claimant] was 
not in possession of enough information about the damages, past 
or 
prospective, 
or 
that 
the 
damages 
turned 
out 
to 
be 
unexpectedly large and in excess of the judgment.”31  
¶51 Claim preclusion rests on the policy that justice is 
better served by ensuring finality of judgments and furthering 
repose, rather than by allowing a claimant the opportunity to 
obtain 
improved 
justice 
in 
a 
second 
action. 
This 
court 
summarized the purposes of claim preclusion as follows: “the 
doctrine of claim preclusion provides an effective and useful 
means to ‘relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple 
lawsuits, 
conserve 
judicial 
resources, 
and, 
by 
preventing 
inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication.’”  
Northern States Power, 189 Wis. 2d at 559 (quoting Allen v. 
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980)).  
                     
31 Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 25, cmt. c (1982). 
In contrast to the rule stated in the Restatement, some 
courts would allow claim splitting when the claimant does not 
know the full dimensions of the claim at the time of the first 
action. See 18 Charles Alan Wright et. al., Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 4415 (1981) (citing cases). 
  
No. 
98-1343 
 
 
24
¶52 Although the purposes underlying claim preclusion are 
important, this court does not blindly apply the doctrine of 
claim preclusion. The federal seventh circuit court of appeals 
acknowledged this principle of Wisconsin law as follows:  
 
Wisconsin law does not treat res judicata as an 
ironclad 
rule 
which 
must 
be 
implacably 
applied 
whenever its literal requirements are met, regardless 
of 
any 
countervailing 
considerations. 
(citations 
omitted)  While cases admitting exceptions to the rule 
are rare, we believe that the Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin would not turn a deaf ear to argument that 
in a particular sort of case the policy reasons for 
allowing an exception override the policy reasons for 
applying the general rule.  
 
Patzer v. Board  of Regents, 763 F.2d 851, 856 (7th Cir. 
1985).32 
¶53 Exceptions to the doctrine of claim preclusion, 
confined within proper limits, are “central to the fair 
administration 
of 
the 
doctrine 
of 
res 
judicata.” 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 26, cmt. i (1982).  
Claim 
preclusion 
may 
be 
disregarded 
in 
appropriate 
circumstances when the policies favoring preclusion of a 
second action are trumped by other significant policies. 
Claim preclusion, like the single cause of action rule and 
                     
32 The seventh circuit cited Wendlend v. Wendlend, 29 
Wis. 2d 145, 157, 138 N.W.2d 185 (1965) (making exception to 
claim preclusion in child custody cases), and McCourt v. 
Algiers, 4 Wis. 2d 607, 611, 91 N.W.2d 194 (1958)(stating that 
doctrine of res judicata is based on proposition that repeated 
litigation of identical issues is undesirable when not necessary 
to prevent unfairness). 
No. 
98-1343 
 
 
25
the discovery rule, is a principle of public policy applied 
to render justice, not to deny it.  Any exception to claim 
preclusion, 
however, 
must 
be 
limited 
to 
special 
circumstances or the exceptions will weaken the values of 
repose and reliance.33  
¶54 We 
conclude 
that 
this 
case 
presents 
a 
special 
circumstance in which claim preclusion should not apply.  A 
holding that claim preclusion bars a second action would force 
claimants to choose between seeking recovery for non-malignant 
asbestos-related injuries, 
such as 
pleural 
thickening, or 
waiting for the development of more serious malignant injuries. 
Those claimants who wait and do not develop malignant conditions 
would likely lose their claim for non-malignant injuries because 
the statute of limitations will have run.  Those claimants, like 
the plaintiffs, who bring an action immediately for damages for 
their non-malignant injuries would be forced to seek damages for 
the fear of developing cancer; 34 they would not be permitted to 
recover for the malignant condition they might later develop.  
¶55 Exposure to asbestos can result in several injuries 
that have long latency periods.  A claimant in an asbestos case 
cannot know all the injuries when the early manifested harms 
                     
33 18 Charles Alan Wright et. al., Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 4415 (1981). 
34 Brantner v. Jenson, 121 Wis. 2d 658, 666, 360 N.W.2d 529 
(1985)(“A doctor’s realistic prediction as to the possibility of 
future 
surgery, 
illness 
or 
disability 
may 
give 
rise 
to 
reasonable fear and anxiety in the victim concerning his or her 
future health and well-being.”). 
No. 
98-1343 
 
 
26
appear and consequently cannot sue for all damages at one time. 
 Although latent conditions may occur as a result of any 
tortious conduct, we can reasonably expect latent conditions to 
materialize 
in 
asbestos 
cases. 
That 
factor 
distinguishes 
asbestos cases from most other tort cases. Under these special 
circumstances relating to exposure to asbestos, the interest in 
finality of judgments is outweighed by the needs of claimants 
who, through no fault of their own, cannot discover all possible 
injuries when the first injury appears.  
¶56 This court continues to recognize the important values 
inherent in the doctrine of claim preclusion. Today’s decision 
carves out what we view as a narrow exception to that doctrine. 
Allowing the plaintiffs’ 1997 action to proceed permits a 
meritorious claim to be litigated and at the same time does not 
open the courts to vexatious, repetitious or needless claims. 
¶57 In 
sum, 
the 
court 
concludes 
that 
because 
the 
development of mesothelioma could not have been reasonably 
predicted when the 1987 action was brought, an exception to 
claim preclusion is justified in this case. As the Restatement 
of Judgments declares, claim preclusion shall not be enforced if 
it "is clearly and convincingly shown that the policies favoring 
preclusion of a second action are overcome for an extraordinary 
reason . . . ." 
Restatement 
(Second) 
of 
Judgments 
§ 26(f) 
(1982).  The overwhelming interest in justice served by allowing 
the plaintiffs’ 1997 cause of action to proceed outweighs the 
policies favoring claim preclusion.  To bar plaintiffs’ cause of 
action in this case would be to deny justice. 
No. 
98-1343 
 
 
27
¶58 Several jurisdictions that have decided the question 
of claim preclusion in asbestos cases similar to this one have 
come to the same conclusion that we reach today.35  
V 
¶59 We next consider the defendants’ other arguments 
against today’s holding. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A. 
¶60 The defendants argue that allowing the plaintiffs’ 
1997 action to proceed deprives them of their vested property 
right in the 1987 judgment or of their constitutionally 
protected right to be free of a claim once the statute of 
limitations has expired.  They assert that extension of the 
period of limitations after its expiration amounts to a taking 
of property without due process of law.  As we stated in 
Borello, 130 Wis. 2d at 416, “[c]learly, once a statute of 
limitations has run, the party relying on the statute has a 
vested property right in the statute-of-limitations defense, and 
                     
35 See Marinari v. Asbestos Corp., 612 A.2d at 1028-29 (“we 
today join a majority of jurisdictions which have responded to 
this difficult issue by holding that an asbestos plaintiff may 
assert, in a second lawsuit, a claim for a distinct, separate 
disease if and when it develops at a later time”), modified on 
other grounds, Simmons v. Pacor, Inc, 674 A.2d at 237-39 (claim 
based on diagnosis of asymptomatic pleural plaques would be 
sufficient to state a limited claim for medical monitoring 
damages only; discussing with approval the part of Marinari 
which allows claim splitting); Eagle-Picher Indus., 481 So. 2d 
at 520 (claimants may bring second action for asbestos-related 
cancer diagnosed after first action); Devlin v. Johns-Manville 
Corp., 495 A.2d 495, 500-502 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985) 
(claimants may bring a second action for exposure to asbestos if 
and when asbestos-related cancer diagnosed). 
No. 
98-1343 
 
 
28
new law which changes the period of limitations cannot be 
applied retroactively to extinguish the right.”   
¶61 However, as the defendants recognize, Borello held 
that an interpretation of when a cause of action accrues does 
not offend vested property rights.  Borello, 130 Wis. 2d at 417-
21. In this case, as in Borello, we are interpreting when a 
cause of action accrues.  We hold that until Robert Sopha was 
diagnosed with mesothelioma in 1996, the plaintiffs had no 
enforceable claim for mesothelioma. Because the plaintiffs had 
no claim for damages for mesothelioma until 1996, their 1997 
cause of action for mesothelioma was not barred by the statute 
of limitations, and nothing in this opinion revives a statute of 
limitations. Furthermore, the 1987 judgment never encompassed 
the claim for damages for mesothelioma and so the 1997 action 
does not violate the defendants’ property rights in the 1987 
judgment. We therefore reject the defendants’ argument that our 
holding violates the defendants’ constitutional rights. 
 
 
 
 
 
B. 
¶62  The defendants further argue that any change in the 
statute of limitations is for the legislature, citing State v. 
Chrysler Outboard Corp., 219 Wis. 2d 130, 580 N.W.2d 203 
(1998).  In Chrysler Outboard, the court acknowledged that 
“Wisconsin courts have traditionally held that statutes of 
limitations are policy considerations within the province of 
No. 
98-1343 
 
 
29
the legislature.”36  We wholeheartedly agree with this 
statement. 
¶63 But the court in Chrysler Outboard distinguished 
that case in which it refused to adopt the discovery rule for 
violations of state law from tort cases involving concealed, 
latent injuries in which the discovery rule had already been 
adopted. 219 Wis. 2d at 156.  In Chrysler Outboard the court 
deferred to the legislature.  In tort cases involving latent 
injuries this court has, when the demands of justice so 
require, interpreted when a cause of action accrues.  The 
seminal decision is, of course, Hansen v. A.H. Robbins, Inc., 
113 Wis. 2d 550, 559-60, 335 N.W.2d 578 (1983), in which the 
court adopted the discovery rule for tort cases, thus 
exercising its power to determine when claims accrue “in the 
interest of justice and fairness.” Hansen is precedent for 
this case. 
 
 
 
 
 
C. 
¶64 The defendants contend that our holding will encourage 
all those diagnosed with asymptomatic pleural thickening or 
minor asbestos-related injuries to file lawsuits, when they 
might not otherwise do so.  The defendants assert that, while 
actual damages for such claims would be small, claimants could 
potentially recover significant damages for fear of future 
injury and then in subsequent suits recover significant damages 
                     
36 State v. Chrysler Outboard Corp., 219 Wis. 2d 130, 156, 
580 N.W.2d 203 (1998)(quoting Miller v. Kretz, 191 Wis. 2d 573, 
580, 531 N.W.2d 93 (Ct. App. 1995)). 
No. 
98-1343 
 
 
30
if 
a 
malignancy 
develops. 
The 
defendants 
argue 
that 
a 
tortfeasor’s payment both for risk of future cancer and for the 
cancer that later develops is unfair.  In this case, however, 
the plaintiffs did not recover compensation in the 1987 action. 
The scenario the defendants present is not before us, and we do 
not address it.  
¶65 The defendants point out that our decision raises the 
possibility that a claimant could seek punitive damages more 
than once against the same tortfeasor. Although we recognize 
such an issue as a theoretical possibility, the facts of this 
case do not present this issue, and we do not address it. 
¶66 The defendants further contend that allowing multiple 
actions for different injuries caused by the same course of 
tortious conduct creates a slippery slope down which our 
jurisprudence relating to statute of limitations and claim 
preclusion would slide.  The defendants misconstrue the nature 
of our holding.  We do not overrule any of our prior cases.  
Decisions such as Nierengarten v. Lutheran Soc. Servs. of Wis., 
219 Wis. 2d 686, 580 N.W.2d 320 (1998), and Pritzlaff v. 
Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 194 Wis. 2d 302, 533 N.W.2d 780 (1995) 
are still good law.  Our decision today carves out a limited 
exception to the single cause of action rule and the claim 
preclusion doctrine.  Although unforeseen injuries with long 
latency periods may occur in any tort case, asbestos cases are 
different.  We know that exposure to asbestos can involve both 
long latency periods before the appearance of physical changes 
and the progression of distinct physical diseases. These aspects 
No. 
98-1343 
 
 
31
of exposure to asbestos are what differentiate asbestos cases 
from the run of the mill personal injury case and are central to 
our holding.  We recognize that claims based on exposure to 
other toxic substances may have patterns of disease progression 
similar to claims based on exposure to asbestos.  The court will 
consider those cases when they are presented. 
 
 
 
 
 
D. 
¶67 The defendants urge that if the court is not willing 
to dismiss the plaintiffs’ 1997 action, then the court should 
bar a cause of action for asymptomatic pleural thickening, 
eliminating recovery of damages for medical expenses, fear of 
future injury and punitive damages.  If the court bars the cause 
of action for pleural thickening, contend the defendants, it 
could logically establish that the statute of limitations for 
mesothelioma and other more serious asbestos injuries does not 
begin to run until the claimant discovers the serious injury. 
Such a holding, the defendants assert, is consistent with this 
court’s holdings in Nierengarten, 219 Wis. 2d at 701-02, and 
Meracle v. Children’s Serv. Socy of Wis., 149 Wis. 2d 19, 26, 
437 N.W.2d 532 (1989), that a cause of action arises only upon 
No. 
98-1343 
 
 
32
the expenditure of “extraordinary expenses.” Some jurisdictions 
have adopted this approach.37  
¶68 We decline to adopt the blanket ruling the defendants 
request.  A decision whether a claimant can recover for pleural 
thickening or asbestosis must be made by the circuit court on a 
case-by-case basis.  If the claimant fails to prove damages, the 
circuit court should dismiss the action.  
 
 
 
 
 
E. 
¶69 The 
defendants 
propose 
alternative 
options 
for 
claimants who are diagnosed with pleural thickening or minor 
asbestos-related injuries that will allow the claimants to file 
litigation if serious injuries develop in the future.  First, 
the defendants suggest that a claimant can seek in a lawsuit or 
in a negotiated settlement the right to file subsequent 
litigation if and when cancer or other more serious asbestos-
related injuries arise.38  Second, the defendants suggest that a 
claimant can sign up on the “pleural registry.” The registry, as 
we understand it, was created by  members of the plaintiffs’ and 
                     
37 See In re Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases, 734 F.Supp. 
1563, 1567 (D. Haw. 1990)(“mere 
presence 
of . . . pleural 
plaques in the lung unaccompanied by an objectively verifiable 
functional impairment is not enough [to recover]"); Owens-
Illinois v. Armstrong, 591 A.2d 544, 560-61 (Md. App. 1991)(no 
damages recovered for pleural thickening because no functional 
impairment or harm), rev’d in part on other grounds, 604 A.2d 47 
(Md. 1992); Simmons v. Pacor, Inc., 674 A.2d at 235-238 
(asymptomatic pleural thickening gives rise to recovery for 
medical monitoring only). 
38 Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 26(1)(b) and cmt b. 
(1982) explain that a court in a first action may expressly 
reserve a claimant’s right to maintain a second action. 
No. 
98-1343 
 
 
33
defendants’ bars and allows those exposed to asbestos to “sign 
up” upon discovering that they have pleural thickening or other 
non-malignant asbestos-related conditions.  Those who sign up 
may bring future claims if and when they develop more serious 
asbestos-related injuries, and the signatory entities agree not 
to assert the defense of the statute of limitations. 
¶70 While these may be good solutions to an admittedly 
difficult situation for both claimants and alleged tortfeasors, 
this court cannot rely on voluntary private arrangements to 
dictate our jurisprudence for those who cannot or do not avail 
themselves of these alternatives.  
¶71 Indeed, if we were to hold today that the plaintiffs’ 
1997 action was barred by the statute of limitations or the 
doctrine of claim preclusion, alleged tortfeasors may have 
little reason to enter any such agreements or maintain a 
registry. In any event, these alternatives do not help the 
plaintiffs in the present case. 
 
 
 
 
 
F.   
¶72 The defendants further request that even if this court 
allows the plaintiffs’ 1997 action to proceed, we should apply 
our holding prospectively. The plaintiffs do not object to 
applying the holding prospectively as long as they get the 
benefit of the ruling.  
¶73 We should not decide the question of prospective or 
retroactive application of the holding in this case without 
briefs on the merits by parties who take adverse positions.  
No. 
98-1343 
 
 
34
¶74 In sum, for the reasons set forth, we hold that a 
person who brings an action based on a diagnosis of a non-
malignant asbestos-related condition may bring a subsequent 
action upon a later diagnosis of a distinct malignant asbestos-
related condition.  The diagnosis of a malignant asbestos-
related condition creates a new cause of action and the statute 
of 
limitations 
governing 
the 
malignant 
asbestos-related 
condition begins when the claimant discovers, or with reasonable 
diligence 
should 
discover, 
the 
malignant 
asbestos-related 
condition. The order of the circuit court is reversed and the 
cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with 
this holding. 
By the Court.  The order of the circuit court is reversed 
and the cause remanded. 
 
 
 
No. 
98-1343 
 
 
1