Title: Hickman v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 385, 2022
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: January 12, 2023

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
STEVEN L. HICKMAN, 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 385, 2022 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§  Cr. ID Nos. S2111007403 
§                      S2112001120 
§                     
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted:   December 1, 2022 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
January 12, 2023 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
 
 
 
ORDER 
 
Upon consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the appellee’s motion to 
affirm, and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
Steven L. Hickman filed this appeal from a Superior Court order 
sentencing him for a violation of probation (“VOP”).  The State has moved to affirm 
the judgment below on the ground that it is manifest on the face of Hickman’s 
opening brief that the appeal is without merit.  We agree and affirm. 
(2) 
On February 7, 2022, Hickman pleaded guilty to theft of $1500 or more, 
second-degree conspiracy, and possession of a deadly weapon by a person prohibited 
(“PDWBPP”).  The Superior Court sentenced Hickman as follows:  for felony theft, 
to two years of imprisonment, suspended for one year of Level III probation; for 
2 
 
second-degree conspiracy, to two years of imprisonment, suspended for one year of 
Level III probation; and for PDWBPP, to three years of imprisonment, suspended 
for one year of Level III probation. 
(3) 
On July 6, 2022, a probation officer filed a VOP report.  The report 
alleged that Hickman was in violation of probation because on March 4, 2022, police 
had arrested Hickman and charged him with disorderly conduct; police had charged 
Hickman with driving with a suspended or revoked license and other motor-vehicle 
offenses on four dates in April, May, and June 2022; a warrant against Hickman for 
shoplifting had issued on July 2, 2022; Hickman had not reported any police contact 
to probation; Hickman had failed to report to probation for required office visits on 
multiple occasions; Hickman had moved out of the residence that he had reported as 
his address, without reporting a change of address to probation, and the officer had 
been unable to contact Hickman since that time; and Hickman had failed to report 
for a scheduled substance-abuse evaluation as required by his sentencing order.  On 
September 14, 2022, a probation officer filed another VOP report alleging that, in 
addition to the previously reported violations, Delaware State Police had arrested 
Hickman on September 5, 2022, and charged him with additional offenses, including 
carrying a concealed dangerous instrument. 
(4) 
At a VOP hearing on October 7, 2022, the Superior Court found 
Hickman in violation of probation and sentenced him as follows:  for felony theft, 
3 
 
to one year and ten months of imprisonment, suspended upon successful completion 
of a program selected by the Department of Correction for one year of Level III 
probation; for second-degree conspiracy, to two years of imprisonment, suspended 
for one year of Level III probation; and for PDWBPP, to three years of 
imprisonment, suspended for one year of Level III probation.  Hickman has 
appealed.   
(5) 
On appeal, Hickman appears to argue that the court could not find him 
to be in violation of probation for incurring new criminal charges before he was 
convicted of the new offenses.  The record before the Court on appeal does not 
reflect on what basis the Superior Court found Hickman to be in violation of 
probation.1  But the VOP report asserted that Hickman was in violation of probation 
based on incurring new charges and failing to report police contact; Hickman does 
not dispute that he incurred new charges, nor does he claim that he reported his 
contact with police.  The Superior Court has the authority to revoke probation and 
to impose a VOP sentence on the basis that a probationer has been charged with new 
criminal conduct, regardless of whether the new charges have yet been adjudicated.2  
 
1 See Tricoche v. State, 525 A.2d 151, 154 (Del. 1987) (stating that the appellant has the burden to 
produce such portions of the transcript as are necessary to give this Court a fair and accurate 
account of the context in which the claim of error occurred and all evidence relevant to the 
challenged finding or conclusion). 
2 See Wood v. State, 2012 WL 3656404, at *1 (Del. Aug. 24, 2012) (“There is no merit to Wood’s 
claim that he could not be found guilty of a VOP on the basis of new and unproven criminal 
charges.  Delaware law provides that the Superior Court has the authority to revoke probation on 
the basis that a probationer has been charged with new criminal conduct.”); Cruz v. State, 990 A.2d 
4 
 
Moreover, unlike in a criminal trial, the State must prove a VOP by only a 
preponderance of the evidence, which is “some competent evidence” to “reasonably 
satisfy the judge that the conduct of the probationer has not been as good as required 
by the conditions of probation.”3  Because the standard of proof of a VOP is lower 
than the “reasonable doubt” standard that applies in a criminal trial, “we have held 
that the Superior Court has the authority to revoke a defendant’s probation for 
incurring new criminal charges even if those charges are later dismissed.”4 
(6) 
Hickman also appears to challenge the allegation in the VOP report that 
he failed to report to numerous required office visits on the basis that he called or 
sent information via fax to the probation officer instead.  Again, although Hickman 
has not provided a transcript of the VOP hearing, his argument seems to concede 
that he did not attend the required meetings.  We find no basis for reversing the 
Superior Court’s determination that Hickman had violated his probation. 
(7) 
Finally, to the extent that Hickman challenges the VOP sentence that 
the Superior Court imposed, this Court’s appellate review of a sentence is extremely 
limited and generally ends upon a determination that the sentence is within statutory 
 
409 (Del. 2010) (affirming VOP that was based on probationer’s incurring new criminal charges 
of which defendant had been acquitted before VOP was imposed); see also Kurzmann v. State, 
903 A.2d 702, 717 (Del. 2006) (“The State can proceed against a probationer by filing a VOP 
petition alleging a new criminal offense, even if the State concedes that it does not have enough 
evidence to prosecute the probationer and to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he has 
committed the underlying criminal offense.”). 
3 Trotter v. State, 2022 WL 2311083, at *1 (Del. June 27, 2022) (internal quotations omitted). 
4 Id. 
5 
 
limits.5  Once Hickman committed a VOP, the Superior Court was authorized to 
impose any period of incarceration up to and including the balance of Level V time 
remaining on his sentence.6  The record does not reflect, and Hickman does not 
argue, that the VOP sentence exceeded statutory limits or the Level V time that was 
previously suspended.  We find no basis for reversal. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is 
GRANTED and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        Chief Justice 
 
 
 
5 Kurzmann, 903 A.2d at 714. 
6 11 Del. C. § 4334(c).