Title: P. v. Celis
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S107885
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: July 26, 2004

1
Filed 7/26/04 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S107885 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 4/1 D037578 
RENATO CELIS, 
) 
 
) 
San Diego County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. SCD 152535 
___________________________________ ) 
 
 
Suspecting defendant of drug trafficking, police officers stopped him at 
gunpoint behind his house, handcuffed him, and made him sit on the ground.  The 
officers then entered defendant’s house to determine whether there was anyone 
inside who might endanger their safety.  They did not find anyone, but they did 
see a large box with uniformly sized, wrapped packages that, after a search, 
proved to contain cocaine.   
 
We address two issues.  Was the officers’ initial seizure of defendant an 
arrest requiring probable cause, or was it merely a detention requiring only a 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity?  And was the officers’ entry into and 
inspection of defendant’s house permissible as a “protective sweep” under the 
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Maryland v. Buie (1990) 494 U.S. 325 
(Buie)?  We conclude that defendant was initially detained, not arrested, and that 
the facts known to the officers fell short of those necessary to justify a Buie 
protective sweep.   
 
 
2
 
 
I 
 
Defendant was charged in San Diego County with conspiracy (Pen. Code, 
§ 182, subd. (a)(1)) and possession of more than 20 kilograms of cocaine for sale 
(Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11351, 11370.4, subd. (a)(4)).  He moved to suppress the 
evidence.  (Pen. Code, § 1538.5.)   
 
At the hearing on the suppression motion, the prosecution presented 
testimony by Detective John Strain of the Tustin Police Department in Orange 
County.  Strain was a member of a task force investigating state-wide drug 
trafficking by a group suspected of concealing and transporting drugs inside large 
truck tires.  In December 1999, task force members saw a small red pickup truck 
deliver one such tire to a residence in Los Angeles County.  Suspecting that the 
tire would be used to transport drugs, police executed a search warrant at that site 
and seized $400,000 in cash and the tire, which had been slit open.  Later, 
California Highway Patrol officers stopped the red pickup truck in San Diego 
County.  Hidden in a false compartment in the truck was $50,000 in cash.  In 
January 2000, task force members found another cut-open truck tire together with 
drug packaging materials in an abandoned house in Los Angeles County.  In none 
of these incidents did police recover drugs or weapons. 
 
Task force members later learned that the red pickup truck involved in the 
truck tire delivery in Los Angeles County was registered to someone with an 
address on Concepcion Street in the City of San Diego.  During surveillance at 
that location, they saw a car parked outside; they traced its registration to a San 
Diego house on A Street, defendant’s residence.  They then put defendant’s house 
under surveillance.   
 
3
 
On April 26, 2000, Detective Strain saw defendant leave his home in a 
minivan and drive to a tire store in San Diego.  There, defendant put an air 
pressurizing tank into his van and drove home.  Later that same day, he drove to 
the Mexican border with the tank still in his minivan.  He parked his car and 
walked across the border, where the undercover officers lost sight of him.   
 
The next day, task force members followed defendant as he drove around 
San Diego with his wife.  Defendant engaged in “evasive driving,” such as making 
abrupt lane changes, which to Detective Strain indicated that defendant knew he 
was being followed.  Later that day, defendant drove from his home to the same 
tire store he had visited the previous day.  He left the store with a deflated tire.  
The tire was too big for defendant’s minivan, but Detective Strain thought it would 
fit a one-ton pickup truck.  That same day, defendant returned to the tire store, this 
time accompanied by a man, who was later identified as Luis Ordaz.  They took an 
air pressurizing tank into the tire shop.  After a while, they returned with the tank 
to defendant’s house and took it inside.   
 
Some 40 minutes later, defendant came through the back door of his house, 
rolling a large inflated truck tire toward the alley.  It appeared to Detective Strain 
to be the same tire defendant had brought back from the tire shop.  About the same 
time, Ordaz arrived in the alley driving a full-sized green pickup truck.  
Suspecting that the tire defendant was rolling toward the alley contained either 
money or narcotics, Detective Strain pulled out his gun and ordered defendant and 
Ordaz to stop.  Defendant was handcuffed and made to sit down against the wall 
of the house.  Because Detective Strain had noticed that defendant’s wife and 
“possibly a male juvenile” lived with him, Strain together with other officers 
entered the house to determine if there was anyone inside who might endanger 
their safety.  It took less than two minutes to walk through the 500-square-foot 
house.  The officers did not find anyone inside, but did see a wooden box large 
 
4
enough to conceal a person.  Inside the box were several uniformly sized, wrapped 
packages.  Some 20 minutes later, the officers obtained defendant’s consent to 
search the packages, which proved to contain 16 kilograms of cocaine.  They also 
searched the large truck tire, which contained 25 kilograms of cocaine.   
 
After denial of his motion to suppress evidence, defendant pled guilty and 
received a 12-year prison sentence.  The Court of Appeal rejected defendant’s 
challenge to the trial court’s denial of his suppression motion, and it affirmed the 
judgment of conviction.  We granted defendant’s petition for review.   
II 
 
The federal Constitution’s Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits unreasonable seizures.  Our 
state Constitution includes a similar prohibition.  (Cal. Const., art. I, § 13.)  “A 
seizure occurs whenever a police officer ‘by means of physical force or show of 
authority’ restrains the liberty of a person to walk away.”  (People v. Souza (1994) 
9 Cal.4th 224, 229, quoting Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 19, fn. 16.)  Whether 
a seizure has taken place is to be determined by an objective test, which asks “not 
whether the citizen perceived that he was being ordered to restrict his movement, 
but whether the officer’s words and actions would have conveyed that to a 
reasonable person.”  (California v. Hodari D. (1999) 499 U.S. 621, 628.)  Thus, 
when police engage in conduct that would “communicate[] to a reasonable person 
that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business,” 
there has been a seizure.  (Kaupp v. Texas (2003) 538 U.S. 626, 629; Florida v. 
Bostick (1991) 501 U.S. 429, 437.)   
 
When the seizure of a person amounts to an arrest, it must be supported by 
an arrest warrant or by probable cause.  (Kaupp v. Texas, supra, 538 U.S. at 
p. 630.)  Probable cause exists when the facts known to the arresting officer would 
persuade someone of “reasonable caution” that the person to be arrested has 
 
5
committed a crime.  (Dunaway v. New York (1979) 442 U.S. 200, 208, fn. 9.)  
“[P]robable cause is a fluid concept – turning on the assessment of probabilities in 
particular factual contexts.”  (Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 213, 232.)  It is 
incapable of precise definition.  (Maryland v. Pringle (2003) 540 U.S. ___, ___, 
124 S.Ct. 795, 800.)  “ ‘The substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a 
reasonable ground for belief of guilt,’ ” and that belief must be “particularized 
with respect to the person to be . . . seized.”  (Ibid.)   
 
But “not all seizures of the person must be justified by probable cause to 
arrest for a crime.”  (Florida v. Royer (1983) 460 U.S. 491, 498 (plur. opn.).)  In 
Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. 1, the United States Supreme Court created a 
limited exception that allows police officers to “stop and . . . frisk for weapons” 
when they have an “articulable suspicion [the] person has committed or is about to 
commit a crime.”  (Florida v. Royer, supra, at p. 498.)  Thus, an officer who lacks 
probable cause to arrest can conduct a brief investigative detention when there is 
“ ‘some objective manifestation’ that criminal activity is afoot and that the person 
to be stopped is engaged in that activity.”  (People v. Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at 
p. 230; see also United States v. Cortez (1981) 449 U.S. 411, 417.)  Because an 
investigative detention allows the police to ascertain whether suspicious conduct is 
criminal activity, such a detention “must be temporary and last no longer than is 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.”  (Florida v. Royer, supra, at 
p. 500; see also Wilson v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 777, 784 [describing a 
detention as limited in “duration, scope and purpose”].)   
 
The distinction between a detention and an arrest “may in some instances 
create difficult line-drawing problems.”  (United States v. Sharpe (1985) 470 U.S. 
675, 685; see also United States v. Torres-Sanchez (9th Cir. 1996) 83 F.3d 1123, 
1127 [there is no “ ‘bright-line for determining when an investigatory stop crosses 
the line and becomes an arrest’ ”].)  This much is clear:  A brief stop and pat-down 
 
6
of someone suspected of criminal activity is merely an investigative detention 
requiring no more than a reasonable suspicion.  (Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at 
pp. 6-7.)  But removing a 17-year-old youth from his bed at 3 a.m. and 
transporting him in handcuffs by patrol car to the police station for questioning has 
been held to be unreasonable absent probable cause to believe that the youth has 
committed a crime.  (Kaupp v. Texas, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 630.)  In the high 
court’s view, such “involuntary transport to a police station for questioning is 
‘sufficiently like arres[t] to invoke the traditional rule that arrests may 
constitutionally be made only on probable cause.’ ”  (Ibid.)   
 
Defendant here contends he was subjected to a warrantless arrest when, as 
he was rolling a large truck tire into the alley behind his house, he was stopped at 
gunpoint, handcuffed, and made to sit on the ground while police officers walked 
through the house to determine if anyone posing a danger to their safety was 
inside.  For reasons discussed below, we conclude that stopping and handcuffing 
defendant, and making him sit on the ground for a few minutes was only an 
investigative detention. 
 
“[T]here is no hard and fast line to distinguish permissible investigative 
detentions from impermissible de facto arrests.  Instead, the issue is decided on the 
facts of each case, with focus on whether the police diligently pursued a means of 
investigation reasonably designed to dispel or confirm their suspicions quickly, 
using the least intrusive means reasonably available under the circumstances.”  (In 
re Carlos M. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 372, 384-385; see also United States v. 
Sharpe, supra, 470 U.S. at pp. 685-688.)  Important to this assessment, however, 
are the “duration, scope and purpose” of the stop.  (Wilson v. Superior Court, 
supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 784.) 
 
With respect to duration, the United States Supreme Court has said that 
“ ‘the brevity of the invasion of the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests is an 
 
7
important factor in determining whether the seizure is so minimally intrusive as to 
be justifiable on reasonable suspicion.’ ”  (United States v. Sharpe, supra, 470 
U.S. at p. 685.)   
 
With regard to the scope of the police intrusion, stopping a suspect at 
gunpoint, handcuffing him, and making him sit on the ground for a short period, as 
occurred here, do not convert a detention into an arrest.  (See People v. Soun 
(1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1499, 1517 [detention when the defendant “was removed 
from the car at gunpoint by a large number of police officers, was forced to lie on 
the ground, was handcuffed and placed in a patrol car, was transported from the 
site of the stop a distance of three blocks to a parking lot,” where he was held for 
30 minutes]; In re Carlos M., supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at p. 384 [detention when 
defendant was handcuffed and transported to hospital for identification by rape 
victim; 30-minute duration]; Haynie v. County of Los Angeles (9th 2003) 339 F.3d 
1071, 1077 [“A brief . . . restriction of liberty, such as handcuffing, during a Terry 
stop is not a de facto arrest.”]; Gallegos v. City of Los Angeles (9th Cir. 2002) 308 
F.3d 987, 991 [driver stopped at gunpoint and ordered out of his truck, handcuffed 
and held in a patrol car for between 45 and 60 minutes was detained, not arrested]; 
United States v. Alvarez (9th Cir. 1990) 899 F.2d 833, 838-839 [investigative 
detention when defendant forced at gunpoint to get out of his car]; United States v. 
Buffington (9th Cir. 1987) 815 F.2d 1292, 1300 [no arrest when driver was 
stopped at gunpoint, ordered out of car and forced to lie on the ground]; United 
States v. Bautista (9th Cir. 1982) 684 F.2d 1286, 1289 [handcuffing did not 
convert detention into arrest]; but see People v. Campbell (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 
588, 595-596 [defendant functionally under arrest when police at an airport 
stopped him at gunpoint, handcuffed him, and took him to an office for 
questioning; restraint went beyond that “reasonably necessary for a detention.”].)  
 
8
 
Of significance too are the facts known to the officers in determining 
whether their actions went beyond those necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 
stop, that is, to quickly dispel or confirm police suspicions of criminal activity.  
(Florida v. Royer, supra, 460 U.S. at p. 500; In re Carlos M., supra, 220 
Cal.App.3d at p. 384.)  Although a routine traffic stop would rarely justify a police 
officer in drawing a gun or using handcuffs, such actions may be appropriate when 
the stop is of someone suspected of committing a felony.   
 
Here, Detective Strain had reason to suspect that defendant was concealing 
either drugs or drug proceeds in the large truck tire he was rolling out the back 
door of his house toward a waiting pickup truck driven by Ordaz.  Faced with two 
suspects, each of whom might flee if Detective Strain stopped one but not the 
other, it was not unreasonable for him to draw his gun to ensure that both suspects 
would stop.  Doing so did not turn defendant’s investigative detention into an 
arrest; nor did the use of handcuffs or making defendant sit on the ground for the 
few minutes it took Strain and his fellow officers to walk through defendant’s 500-
square-foot house to ascertain the presence of persons posing a danger to the 
officers.1   
 
We next decide whether, as defendant contends, the warrantless police 
entry into defendant’s house was an unreasonable search.   
III 
 
The federal and state Constitutions prohibit not only unreasonable seizures 
but also unreasonable searches.  (U.S. Const., 4th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., 
art. I, § 13.)  “It is axiomatic that the ‘physical entry of the home is the chief evil 
against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.’ ”  (Welsh v. 
                                             
 
1   
Inside, the officers saw a large wooden box containing uniformly sized 
wrapped packages, which Detective Strain described as “numerous kilos” of what 
he surmised to be cocaine. 
 
9
Wisconsin (1984) 466 U.S. 740, 748.)  A warrantless entry is “presumptively 
unreasonable.”  (Payton v. New York (1980) 445 U.S. 573, 587.)  This 
presumption can be overcome by a showing of one of the few “specifically 
established and well-delineated exceptions” to the warrant requirement (Katz v. 
United States (1967) 389 U.S. 347, 357), such as “ ‘hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, 
or imminent destruction of evidence, . . . or the need to prevent a suspect’s escape, 
or the risk of danger to the police or to other persons inside or outside the 
dwelling’ ” (Minnesota v. Olson (1990) 495 U.S. 91, 100).  The United States 
Supreme Court has indicated that entry into a home based on exigent 
circumstances requires probable cause to believe that the entry is justified by one 
of these factors such as the imminent destruction of evidence or the need to 
prevent a suspect’s escape.  (Ibid.)   
 
One recognized exigent circumstance that will support the warrantless entry 
of a home -- the risk of danger to police or others on the scene -- also provides the 
justification for a “protective sweep” of a residence under the high court’s decision 
in Buie, supra, 494 U.S. 325.   
 
In Buie, defendant and another man robbed a restaurant.  One of the robbers 
was wearing a red jogging suit.  Police obtained an arrest warrant for the 
defendant and executed it at his house.  There, one officer shouted into the 
basement for everyone to come up.  When the defendant did so, he was promptly 
arrested.  Another officer then entered the basement “ ‘in case there was someone 
else’ down there.”  (Buie, supra, 494 U.S. at p. 328.)  In plain view the officer saw 
a red jogging suit, which he seized.  (Ibid.)  Charged with the restaurant robbery, 
the defendant moved to suppress the jogging suit.  The trial court denied the 
motion.  That ruling was overturned by the Maryland Court of Appeals, that 
state’s highest tribunal, which invalidated the search because the officers lacked 
probable cause to search the basement.  (Id. at p. 329.)  That decision, in turn, was 
 
10
vacated by the United States Supreme Court, which concluded that the probable 
cause standard did not apply to a “protective sweep.”  (Id. at pp. 327, 337.)  The 
court explained that as incident to an arrest “the officers could, as a precautionary 
matter and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, look in closets and 
other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could 
be immediately launched.”  (Id. at p. 334 [describing the limited search incident to 
arrest authorized by Chimel v. California (1969) 395 U.S. 752, 762].)  But it 
stressed that beyond that, an inspection undertaken outside the immediate area of 
the arrest must be supported by “articulable facts which, taken together with the 
rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in 
believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those 
on the arrest scene.”  (Buie, supra, at p. 334.)  The high court then remanded the 
case to the Maryland Court of Appeals to reconsider whether the prosecution’s 
evidence at the suppression hearing was sufficient to justify the officer’s entry into 
the basement as a “protective sweep” under the reasonable suspicion standard 
articulated in Buie.  (Id. at p. 337.)   
 
In authorizing the protective sweep of the defendant’s house in Buie, supra, 
494 U.S. 325, the high court drew on principles set out in Terry v. Ohio, supra, 
392 U.S. 1.  That decision allowed officers incident to an on-the-street detention to 
conduct “a limited patdown for weapons where a reasonably prudent officer would 
be warranted in the belief, based on ‘specific and articulable facts,’ and not on a 
mere ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or “hunch,” ’ ‘that he is dealing 
with an armed and dangerous individual.’ ”  (Buie, supra, at p. 332, quoting Terry 
v. Ohio, supra, at pp. 21, 27.)  Buie recognized that with “an arrest in the home,” 
there existed “an analogous interest of the officers in taking steps to assure 
themselves that the house in which a suspect is being, or has just been, arrested is 
 
11
not harboring other persons who are dangerous and who could unexpectedly 
launch an attack.”  (Id. at p. 333.)  
 
From the high court’s decision in Buie, supra, 494 U.S. 325, we draw these 
conclusions:  A protective sweep of a house for officer safety as described in Buie, 
does not require probable cause to believe there is someone posing a danger to the 
officers in the area to be sweep.  (Buie, supra, at p. 327.)  A Buie sweep is unlike 
warrantless entry into a house based on exigent circumstances (one of which 
concerns the risk of danger to police officers or others on the scene); such an entry 
into a home must be supported by probable cause to believe that a dangerous 
person will be found inside.  (See Minnesota v. Olson, supra, 495 U.S. 91, 100.)  
A protective sweep can be justified merely by a reasonable suspicion that the area 
to be swept harbors a dangerous person.  (Buie, supra, at p. 327.)  Like the limited 
patdown for weapons authorized by Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 27, a 
protective sweep may not be based on “a mere ‘inchoate and unparticularized 
suspicion or “hunch.” ’ ”  (Buie, supra, at p. 332.)   
 
In Buie, supra, 494 U.S. 325, the officer who conducted the protective 
sweep of the defendant’s basement did so while already lawfully inside the house 
to serve an arrest warrant.  Given these facts, questions arise whether Buie’s 
lowered level of justification -- reasonable suspicion that a person posing a danger 
to the officers is in the area to be searched -- is limited only to those situations in 
which the officers are already lawfully inside a house conducting an arrest, or 
whether it will support the entry into a house, as in this case, by officers who lack 
probable cause to make an arrest but who have lawfully detained a suspect just 
outside.  Appellate courts have differed regarding the requirements for a protective 
sweep.  Some have concluded, consistent with the facts presented in Buie, that a 
protective sweep must be “incident to” a lawful arrest inside a house.  (See United 
States v. Davis (10th Cir. 2002) 290 F.3d 1239, 1242, fn. 4 [protective sweep must 
 
12
be “incident to” lawful arrest inside a house]; United States v. Reid (9th Cir. 2000) 
226 F.3d 1020, 1027 [when a suspect is detained after fleeing an apartment, Buie 
does not authorize protective sweep of the apartment].)  Other courts have upheld 
protective sweeps when the officers were lawfully inside a house for some purpose 
other than to arrest a suspect.  (See United States v. Gould (5th Cir. en banc 2004) 
364 F.3d 578 [officers lawfully inside house with consent can conduct a protective 
sweep for officer safety]; United States v. Daoust (1st Cir. 1990) 916 F.2d 757 
[upholding protective sweep incident to serving a search warrant].)  Still others 
have allowed a protective sweep of a house when the officers were not inside the 
house at all, but had arrested a suspect just outside; in these cases the officers then 
entered the house to conduct the sweep.  (See United States v. Wilson (5th Cir. 
2001) 306 F.3d 231, 238-239; United States v. Watson (5th Cir. 2001) 273 F.3d 
599, 603; Sharrar v. Felsing (3d Cir. 1997) 128 F.3d 810, 823; United States v. 
Colbert (6th Cir. 1996) 76 F.3d 773; United States v. Henry (D.C. Cir. 1995) 48 
F.3d 1282, 1284.)   
 
Those cases upholding the entry of a house for a protective sweep after 
police had made an arrest outside the house relied on the rationale  that “in some 
circumstances, an arrest taking place just outside a home may pose an equally 
serious threat to the arresting officers” as one conducted inside the house.  (United 
States v. Colbert, supra, 76 F.3d at p. 776, italics added; accord, Sharrar v. 
Felsing, supra, 128 F.3d at p. 824.)  Would that rationale also apply when officers 
enter a home to conduct a protective sweep after lawfully detaining a suspect 
outside the residence?  (See State v. Revenaugh (1999) 173 Idaho 774, 776-777 
[992 P.2d 769, 777-778] [upholding warrantless entry of house as “protective 
sweep” after officers detained defendant on his front porch on suspicion of drug 
possession].)  That is an issue we need not resolve here because the facts known to 
the officers when they entered defendant’s house fell short of the reasonable  
 
13
suspicion standard necessary to justify a protective sweep under Buie, supra, 494 
U.S. 325.    
 
When, as here, we review a ruling on a defense motion to suppress 
evidence, we defer to the trial court’s factual findings, but we independently apply 
the requisite legal standard to the facts presented.  (People v. Ayala (2000) 23 
Cal.4th 225, 255; People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 182.)  Officer Strain 
testified that the officers had on April 26 and 27, 2000 conducted a surveillance of 
defendant’s house on A Street in San Diego.  During that time, the officers noted 
the presence of defendant’s wife and “possibly a male juvenile” in the home.  But 
when on the afternoon of April 27th the officers entered defendant’s house for a 
protective sweep just moments after detaining defendant in his backyard as he 
rolled a large truck tire toward Ordaz’s waiting truck in the alley, they had no 
knowledge of the presence of anyone in defendant’s house.  As the trial court 
found, the officers “had not been keeping track of who was in the house”; thus, 
when they entered the house to conduct a protective sweep, they did so without 
“any information as to whether anyone was inside the house.”  Also, there is no 
indication that when stopped by the officers, either defendant or Ordaz was armed.  
Moreover, until defendant later consented to a search of the large truck tire he was 
rolling from the back door of his house toward the alley, the officers were unaware 
that the tire (like the similar tires found in the two Los Angeles County 
investigations we discussed earlier) had been cut open and then resealed to conceal 
cocaine.  The facts known to the officers before they performed the protective 
sweep fell short of what Buie requires, that is, “articulable facts” considered  
 
14
together with the rational inferences drawn from those facts, that would warrant a 
reasonably prudent officer to entertain a reasonable suspicion that the area to be 
swept harbors a person posing a danger to officer safety.  (Buie, supra, 494 U.S. at 
pp. 327, 334.)   
 
Unquestionably, the work of a police officer in the field is often fraught 
with danger.  At any given moment, a seemingly safe encounter or confrontation 
with a citizen can suddenly turn into an armed and deadly attack on the officer.  
Society’s interest in protecting police officers must, however, be balanced against 
the constitutionally protected interest of citizens to be free of unreasonable 
searches and seizures.  In considering both interests, the United States Supreme 
Court has articulated certain legal rules, allowing, for instance, a warrantless entry 
into a home when exigent circumstances exist, or permitting a protective sweep of 
areas of a home where persons in hiding may pose a danger to officer safety.  As 
we mentioned earlier, when the entry of a house for officer safety is based on 
exigent circumstances, the officers must have probable cause to believe that a 
dangerous person will be found inside.  (See Minnesota v. Olson, supra, 495 U.S. 
91, 100.)  But a protective sweep, as described by the high court in Buie, supra, 
494 U.S. 325, can be justified by a standard lower than probable cause, namely, 
reasonable suspicion.  (Id. at p. 327.)  Because, as we explained on page 13, ante, 
that lower standard was not satisfied here, if follows that the higher standard 
requiring probable cause was not met either.   
 
Because neither standard was met, the police entry into defendant’s home 
was “presumptively unreasonable.”  (Payton v. New York, supra, 445 U.S. 573, 
587.)  
 
15
 
DISPOSITION 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed.  On remand, the trial 
court is to set aside defendant’s guilty plea, vacate the order denying defendant’s 
motion to suppress evidence, and to reconsider that motion in light of our 
conclusions here.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
BAXTER, J. 
CHIN, J. 
BROWN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY WERDEGAR, J. 
 
 
I concur in the majority’s conclusion the police entry into defendant’s home 
was unlawful.  Unlike the majority, however, I would resolve the case simply by 
application of the established principle that, lacking probable cause, the officers’ 
warrantless entry into defendant’s home was in violation of his Fourth 
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.  (Minnesota v. 
Olson (1990) 495 U.S. 91, 100.)   
 
In speculating about the application of Maryland v. Buie (1990) 494 U.S. 
325 (Buie) to circumstances admittedly not present here, i.e., to a detention outside 
the home when police have a reasonable suspicion that persons inside the home 
might pose a danger to the officers (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 11-13), the majority 
goes far afield.  Buie is completely inapposite to this case.  Buie involved a lawful 
arrest, pursuant to a warrant, effected inside the defendant’s home.  The high court 
held only that, incident to such an arrest, the officers could conduct a protective 
sweep of the immediate area of the arrest for purposes of officer safety and, on 
reasonable suspicion, a protective sweep of the entire house.  (Buie, supra, at 
p. 334.)  This case, by contrast, involves a detention, a detention, moreover, 
effected well outside the home and unattended by either probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion to believe dangerous persons would be found inside the 
house. 
 
 As the majority recognizes, “[t]he United States Supreme Court has 
indicated that entry into a home based on exigent circumstances requires probable 
cause to believe that the entry is justified” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 9).  The high 
court also has recognized that, incident to a lawful arrest within a home, a 
 
2 
protective sweep of the home beyond the immediate area of the arrest may be 
justified by reasonable suspicion.  (Buie, supra, 494 U.S. at p. 334.)  This case 
involves neither.  Here police detained defendant outside his home.  Accordingly, 
their warrantless entry into the home unsupported by probable cause violated his 
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.  Our 
opinion need say no more.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Celis 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 98 Cal.App.4th 621 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S107885 
Date Filed: July 26, 2004 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Diego 
Judge: Albert T. Harutunian III and Peter C. Deddeh 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Nicholas DePento for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, 
Assistant Attorney General, Steven T. Oetting, Rhonda L. Cartwright-Ladendorf and Sabrina Y. Lane-
Erwin, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Nicholas DePento 
444 West C Street, #120 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 236-1151 
 
Sabrina Y. Lane-Erwin 
Deputy Attorney General 
110 West “A” Street, Suite 1100 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 645-2565