Title: Greenwald Family Ltd. Partnership v. Village of Mukwonago
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2021AP000069-FT
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 21, 2023

2023 WI 53 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2021AP69-FT 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Greenwald Family Limited Partnership and Darwin 
Greenwald, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
Village of Mukwonago, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 (2022 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 21, 2023   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 20, 2023   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha   
 
JUDGE: 
Lloyd Carter   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the 
Court, in which DALLET, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  
ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion in which ROGGENSACK 
and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, JJ., joined. 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For 
the 
plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners, 
there 
were 
briefs filed by Joseph R. Cincotta and the Law Offices of Joseph 
R. Cincotta, Shorewood. There was an oral argument by Joseph R. 
Cincotta.  
 
For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Remzy D. Bitar, Adam J. Meyers, Gregory M. Procopio, and 
 
 
2 
Municipal Law & Litigation Group, S.C., Waukesha. There was an 
oral argument by Remzy D. Bitar.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Maria Davis and Claire 
Silverman for the League of Wisconsin Municipalities.  
 
 
 
 
2023 WI 53 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2021AP69-FT 
(L.C. No. 
2020CV494) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Greenwald Family Limited Partnership and Darwin 
Greenwald, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Village of Mukwonago, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 21, 2023 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the 
Court, in which DALLET, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  
ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion in which ROGGENSACK 
and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, JJ., joined. 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioners, Greenwald 
Family Limited Partnership and Darwin Greenwald (collectively, 
Greenwald), seek review of an unpublished order of the court of 
appeals that affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of the 
defendant, Village of Mukwonago, due to improper service of a 
No. 
2021AP69-FT   
 
2 
 
notice of appeal.1  Greenwald contends that dismissal is not 
appropriate in this special assessment appeal because it 
satisfied the requirement of Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a)(2019-
20)2 to "serve a written notice of appeal upon the clerk." 
¶2 
Specifically, 
Greenwald 
advances 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 801.14(2) controls the manner of service that we must apply 
here because the failure of Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a) to 
define "serve" renders it ambiguous.  The Village argues to the 
contrary, contending that § 801.14(2) does not apply because the 
clerk is not a "party" to the proceedings.  It additionally 
asserts that § 66.0703(12)(a) is unambiguous and requires strict 
compliance such that Greenwald's failure to serve the clerk 
mandates dismissal of the case. 
¶3 
We conclude that the clerk is not a party to the 
proceeding, and thus Wis. Stat. § 801.14(2) does not apply.  
Additionally, like the court of appeals, we determine that Wis. 
Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a) is unambiguous.  The statute's plain 
meaning mandates service of written notice on the Village clerk, 
which Greenwald did not accomplish.  Therefore, Greenwald's 
failure to comply with § 66.0703(12)(a) requires dismissal of 
this action.     
                                                 
1 Greenwald Fam. Ltd. P'ship v. Village of Mukwonago, No. 
2021AP69-FT, unpublished order (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2022) 
(summarily affirming the order of the circuit court for Waukesha 
County, Lloyd Carter, Judge). 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2019-20 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2021AP69-FT   
 
3 
 
¶4 
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
I 
¶5 
In order to provide context for the legal questions 
presented, we set forth an abbreviated recitation of the 
underlying facts, describing the procedural steps that were 
taken, and those not taken. 
¶6 
Greenwald owns properties in the Village of Mukwonago.  
In 2019, the Village voted to create a special assessment 
district and levied special assessments against properties 
included within this district.  At least one of Greenwald's 
properties was located in the special assessment district.   
¶7 
Greenwald challenged the special assessment.  Its 
complaint alleged jurisdiction "pursuant to Wis. Stats. § 
66.0703(12) governing the right to appeal special assessments 
and other applicable law."   
¶8 
In commencing its challenge, Greenwald filed first a 
summons and complaint in the circuit court.  The next day, 
Greenwald's attorney emailed the Village attorney and the clerk 
of the Village.  The email was addressed to the Village attorney 
and asked if the attorney could "accept service for the 
Village."  The clerk was not included on any subsequent email 
communications.   
¶9 
The 
Village 
attorney 
responded 
to 
Greenwald's 
attorney, stating, "Yes we will admit service, please forward 
that to me at this point[.]"  Greenwald's attorney sent back an 
email with copies of the summons and complaint, along with a 
No. 
2021AP69-FT   
 
4 
 
template denominated "Admission of Service of Summons and 
Complaint."  The Village attorney signed this document, which 
stated:  "I am counsel for the Defendant Village of Mukwonago in 
this action and have received and admit service of an 
authenticated copy of the summons and complaint on behalf of the 
Defendant," and emailed it back to Greenwald's attorney. 
¶10 Weeks later, Greenwald's attorney again emailed the 
Village attorney.  This email message stated, "Attached is a 
copy of a notice relative to the Special Assessment matter.  
This is also being mailed to your office by regular mail."  
Greenwald's attorney additionally attached a cover letter to 
this email that stated: 
Regarding this matter, I have enclosed a Notice of 
Appeal to be provided to the Clerk of the Village in 
accordance with Wis. Stats. 66.0703(12).  Also a check 
in the amount of $150.00 to serve as a bond for costs.  
You have already admitted service of the actual court 
filing and so I gather that the Clerk has actual 
notice 
of 
[Greenwald]'s 
appeal 
of 
the 
special 
assessment.  Please let me know if the Village has any 
objection to this filing.  Or requires further action 
by Plaintiff to be in compliance with the bond 
requirement. 
¶11 In response, the Village filed a motion to dismiss.3  
It argued that because Greenwald did not serve a written notice 
of appeal on the Village clerk, the circuit court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction or competency to proceed.  The motion also 
alleged that Greenwald failed to comply with the specific bond 
                                                 
3 Wis. Stat. §§ 801.04(1); 802.06(2)(a)2. 
No. 
2021AP69-FT   
 
5 
 
requirements.4  Ultimately, the circuit court granted the motion 
and dismissed the action. 
¶12 Greenwald appealed and the court of appeals summarily 
affirmed the circuit court's order.  Greenwald Fam. Ltd. P'ship 
v. Village of Mukwonago, No. 2021AP69-FT, unpublished order 
(Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2022).  The court of appeals unanimously 
concluded 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 66.0703(12)(a) 
unambiguously 
requires service of a written notice of appeal upon the clerk 
and that Greenwald's failure to comply with this statute 
requires dismissal of the complaint.  It further disposed of 
Greenwald's reliance on Wis. Stat. § 801.14(2) as misplaced 
because "the Village clerk is not and never was a party" to this 
case.  Id. at 3.  Greenwald petitioned for this court's review.  
II 
¶13 We are called upon to review the court of appeals' 
decision summarily affirming the circuit court's order granting 
the Village's motion to dismiss.  Whether a motion to dismiss 
was properly granted is a question of law that this court 
reviews independently of the determinations rendered by the 
circuit court and court of appeals.  Town of Lincoln v. City of 
Whitehall, 2019 WI 37, ¶21, 386 Wis. 2d 354, 925 N.W.2d 520.   
¶14 This review requires us to interpret several Wisconsin 
statutes.  The interpretation of a statute presents a question 
of law that we review independently of the determinations of the 
                                                 
4 Compliance with the statutory bond requirements, Wis. 
Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a), is not at issue in this case and we do 
not address it. 
No. 
2021AP69-FT   
 
6 
 
circuit court and court of appeals.  Sw. Airlines Co. v. DOR, 
2021 WI 54, ¶16, 397 Wis. 2d 431, 960 N.W.2d 384. 
¶15 In our examination we employ tools of statutory 
interpretation that provide guiding principles for our inquiry.  
"[T]he purpose of statutory interpretation is to determine what 
the statute means so that it may be given its full, proper, and 
intended effect."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane 
Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  "We 
assume that the legislature's intent is expressed in the 
statutory language."  Id.   
¶16 "In construing or interpreting a statute the court is 
not at liberty to disregard the plain, clear words of the 
statute."  Id., ¶46.  If the text of the statute is plain and 
unambiguous, our inquiry may stop there.  Id., ¶45.   
III 
¶17 It is clear from the plain language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.0703(12)(a) that in order to file an appeal from a special 
assessment, the clerk must be served.5  That much is not in 
dispute.  Rather, what is in dispute is the manner in which such 
service may be achieved. 
¶18 The Village argues service upon the clerk was not 
accomplished here because nothing was ever actually served on 
                                                 
5 From the outset, the dissent misstates the issue, 
resulting in a skewed focus.  In its very first paragraph, the 
dissent states:  "At issue is whether legal documents were 
properly served on the Village."  Dissent, ¶49.  This is not the 
issue.  Rather, the issue is whether the clerk has been served 
in a manner consistent with Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a). 
No. 
2021AP69-FT   
 
7 
 
the clerk.  Greenwald, on the other hand, contends that service 
was accomplished in a manner consistent with Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.14(2) when it emailed the notice of appeal to the Village 
attorney. 
¶19 In resolving this case, we look first to the texts of 
the relevant statutes and then address each of Greenwald's 
arguments in turn.  Ultimately, we determine, for the reasons 
set forth below, that Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a) controls and 
that Greenwald's failure to comply with its unambiguous mandate 
requires dismissal of this action.     
A 
¶20 We begin our inquiry by examining the text of the 
relevant statutes.  The linchpin of Greenwald's argument is that 
Wis. Stat. § 801.14(2) applies, providing the manner of service 
that we must employ here.  It reaches this assertion in part by 
arguing that Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a) is ambiguous because 
"serve" is not defined.   
¶21 Accordingly, we set forth first the text of Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.14(2).  It provides in relevant part:  
Whenever under these statutes, service of pleadings 
and other papers is required or permitted to be made 
upon a party represented by an attorney, the service 
shall be made upon the attorney unless service upon 
the party in person is ordered by the court.   
§ 801.14(2) (emphasis added). 
¶22 Next, we look to Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a), which 
establishes the right of a person with an interest in land 
No. 
2021AP69-FT   
 
8 
 
affected by the determination of a governing body to appeal the 
determination to the circuit court:  
A person having an interest in a parcel of land 
affected by a determination of the governing body, 
under sub. (8)(c), (10) or (11), may, within 90 days 
after the date of the notice or of the publication of 
the final resolution under sub. (8)(d), appeal the 
determination to the circuit court of the county in 
which the property is located.  The person appealing 
shall serve a written notice of appeal upon the clerk 
of the city, town or village. . . .  
§ 66.0703(12)(a) (emphasis added).  Once the notice of appeal is 
served on the clerk, the statute delineates tasks that the clerk 
must undertake:  
The clerk, if an appeal is taken, shall prepare a 
brief statement of the proceedings in the matter 
before the governing body, with its decision on the 
matter, and shall transmit the statement with the 
original or certified copies of all the papers in the 
matter to the clerk of the circuit court.  
Id. 
¶23 In examining the text of the statutes, we keep in mind 
that "[t]he plain meaning of statutory language is generally the 
'"common," 
"ordinary," 
"natural," 
"normal," 
or 
dictionary 
definition[ ]' of a term."  Wilcox v. Est. of Hines, 2014 WI 60, 
¶25, 355 Wis. 2d 1, 849 N.W.2d 280.  Therefore, in our 
examination, we may "consult a dictionary in order to guide our 
interpretation of the common, ordinary meanings of words," 
Stroede v. Soc'y Ins., 2021 WI 43, ¶12, 397 Wis. 2d 17, 959 
N.W.2d 305, as would the average reader. 
No. 
2021AP69-FT   
 
9 
 
B 
¶24 Greenwald argues that Wis. Stat. § 801.14(2), which 
applies to civil actions generally, controls the resolution of 
this case.  It contends that service was accomplished consistent 
with that statute when it emailed the notice of appeal to the 
Village attorney. 
¶25 At the outset we observe that there is no directive in 
Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a) that points to the application of 
Wis. Stat. § 801.14(2).  The legislature has in certain 
instances specifically directed individuals to follow the 
procedures laid out in chapter 801.   
¶26 For example, Wis. Stat. § 74.37(2)(b)5., providing for 
a claim for an excessive tax assessment, directs an individual 
filing an appeal to serve a claim "on the clerk of the taxation 
district, or the clerk of the county that has a county assessor 
system, in the manner prescribed in s. 801.11(4)."  See also 
Wis. Stat. § 125.12(2)(d) (an individual seeking judicial review 
of the revocation or suspension of an alcohol license must serve 
pleadings "on the municipal governing body in the manner 
provided in ch. 801"); Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1d)(a) (an individual 
bringing a claim against a governmental body or officers, 
agents, or employees is required to serve a written notice of 
the claim under § 801.11).  There is no such directive in 
§ 66.0703(12)(a). 
¶27 Admittedly, the legislature need not always explicitly 
point to ch. 801 in order for it to apply and this opinion 
should not be taken to invoke such a requirement.  Nevertheless, 
No. 
2021AP69-FT   
 
10 
 
although we do not rest our conclusion on this omission, the 
lack of a directive informs our discussion.  We are mindful of 
the maxim that if the legislature wanted to give such a 
directive, it certainly knows how to do so. 
¶28 Having examined what Wis. Stat. § 801.14(2) does not 
direct, we turn to examine its language and discern what it 
actually directs:  if a party to the proceeding is represented, 
service on that party can be accomplished by service on the 
attorney.  § 801.14(2) ("Whenever under these statutes, service 
of pleadings and other papers is required or permitted to be 
made upon a party represented by an attorney, the service shall 
be made upon the attorney unless service upon the party in 
person is ordered by the court.").6  It follows that if the clerk 
                                                 
6 The dissent asserts in conclusory fashion that Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.14(2) applies.  See Dissent, ¶69.  It advances that 
"Wisconsin Stat. § 801.14(2) appears to require that Greenwald 
serve the Village attorney, not the Village clerk."  Id.  
However, the dissent fails to address whether the municipal 
clerk is a "party represented by an attorney," such that 
§ 801.14(2) would require service upon the attorney here.  
Absent the conclusion that the clerk is a party (a conclusion 
the dissent does not reach), the dissent fails to explain how 
§ 801.14(2) could apply. 
 
In contrast to the conclusory assertion above, the bulk of 
the dissent's statutory analysis applies § 801.11(4).  The 
obvious problem for the dissent is that Greenwald never briefed 
or argued that statue below.  Accordingly, neither the circuit 
court nor the court of appeals considered it.  We first see 
§ 801.11 in Greenwald's reply brief in this court.  
No. 
2021AP69-FT   
 
11 
 
of the Village is a party to this proceeding, then service of 
the notice of appeal may be satisfied by serving the clerk's 
attorney.   
¶29 This begs the question:  is the clerk a party to the 
proceeding?  The word "party" in the context of a legal 
proceeding is commonly defined as "[a] person or group involved 
in a legal proceeding as a litigant," Party, American Heritage 
Dictionary of the English Language 1321 (3d ed. 1992), or "one 
(as a person, group, or entity) constituting alone or with 
others one of the sides of a proceeding, transaction, or 
agreement." 
 
Party, 
Merriam-Webster 
Online 
Dictionary, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/party 
(last 
visited 
June 12, 2023).  Greenwald says yes, that the clerk is a party 
"because the Clerk is part of the party at issue, the Village."   
¶30 At oral argument, Greenwald's attorney repeatedly 
returned to the language of Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a), 
emphasizing that the written notice of appeal must be served 
upon the clerk of the municipality.  In its briefing, it also 
attempted to draw support from Outagamie County v. Town of 
Greenville, 2000 WI App 65, 233 Wis. 2d 566, 608 N.W.2d 414, to 
emphasize 
the 
relationship 
between 
the 
clerk 
and 
the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Generally, "issues not raised or considered by the circuit 
court will not be considered for the first time on appeal."  
McKee Fam. I, LLC v. City of Fitchburg, 2017 WI 34, ¶32, 374 
Wis. 2d 487, 893 N.W.2d 12.  Similarly, "arguments raised for 
the first time in reply briefs are generally not addressed'"  
Paynter v. ProAssurance Wis. Ins. Co., 2019 WI 65, ¶108, 387 
Wis. 2d 278, 929 N.W.2d 113. 
No. 
2021AP69-FT   
 
12 
 
municipality.  Greenwald highlighted a portion of a footnote 
stating, "[c]ertainly, the better procedure is for an aggrieved 
party to first file its notice of appeal with the circuit court 
and then serve the notice on the appropriate party——here, the 
town clerk."  Id., ¶12 n.3.  Greenwald appears to conclude based 
on this footnote that the clerk is a "party" to this special 
assessment challenge.  
¶31 However, Greenwald reads too much into the use of the 
word "party" in this footnote.  It is readily apparent from the 
quotation in Outagamie County that the term "party" there is 
used in the colloquial sense, referring generally to an entity.  
If, as Greenwald contends, clerks can be defined as parties 
solely because they are part of the party at issue, then anyone 
who is part of the Village could also be classified as a party 
to the proceeding.  Surely all municipal employees do not become 
parties to legal proceedings against a municipality by virtue of 
their employment.   
¶32 Similarly, Greenwald also reads too much into the use 
of the word "of" in Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a).  The language 
of § 66.0703(12)(a) requires service "upon the clerk of the 
city, town or village."  This language does not name the clerk 
as a representative of the municipality.  Rather, it merely 
states the job title of the person who must be served. 
¶33 Municipal clerks, while playing a vital role in the 
functioning of local government, neither determine special 
assessments 
nor 
impose 
or 
enforce 
special 
assessments.  
Additionally, 
Greenwald 
asserts 
that 
the 
clerk 
is 
the 
No. 
2021AP69-FT   
 
13 
 
"representative" or the "official representative" of the Village 
body politic, but cites no authority for the proposition that in 
this context the clerk is synonymous with the Village.  Put 
simply, the fact that the legislature designated the clerk as 
the official upon whom a notice of appeal must be served does 
not transform the clerk into a party to the lawsuit. 
¶34 Indeed, Greenwald's preferred construction of the term 
"party" in Wis. Stat. § 801.14(2) considerably broadens this 
term.  Such a construction would lead to conflicting statutory 
obligations, resulting in confusion to the bar and public.   
¶35 We are in accord with the admonition advanced in the 
helpful 
amicus 
curiae 
brief 
of 
the 
League 
of 
Wisconsin 
Municipalities that warns of the confusion that would result 
from Greenwald's statutory interpretation:  
Construing "party" under § 801.14(2) to include a 
clerk simply by virtue of being a municipal officer 
tasked with receiving the notice of appeal will 
completely redefine and substantially broaden the term 
"party," and place the mandatory requirements of §§ 
801.14(2) and § 66.0703(12)(a) directly in conflict.  
Such a broad definition would lead to confusion and 
potentially 
open 
a 
Pandora's 
box 
of 
competing 
obligations. 
¶36 Ultimately, we conclude that the clerk is not a party 
to the proceeding and thus Wis. Stat. § 801.14(2) does not 
apply.  Such application would broaden the term "party" and 
No. 
2021AP69-FT   
 
14 
 
place 
the 
two 
statutory 
provisions 
in 
conflict, 
causing 
unnecessary confusion.7   
C  
¶37 We turn next to Greenwald's claims of ambiguity.  It 
argues that Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a) is ambiguous because 
"serve" is not defined.  Accordingly, it advances that if 
procedural language is ambiguous, it must be liberally construed 
to permit a determination on the merits.  See DOT v. Peterson, 
226 Wis. 2d 623, 633, 594 N.W.2d 765 (1999).   
¶38 In 
examining 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 66.0703(12)(a)'s 
plain 
language, several requirements are readily apparent from the 
text.  First, a person seeking an appeal under § 66.0703(12)(a) 
must file within 90 days after the date of notice or publication 
of the final resolution.  Second, and most importantly for our 
purposes, the text indicates that one of the steps required for 
appeal is serving a written notice of appeal "upon the clerk."  
This requirement is important because, as the statute continues, 
the clerk must commence with administrative tasks related to the 
appeal:  preparing a brief statement of the proceedings and 
transmitting the statement with all relevant materials to the 
                                                 
7 The 
Village 
additionally 
contends 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 66.0703 and 801.14 conflict and that because § 801.14 is 
general and § 66.0703 is more specific, the latter must control.  
See Belding v. Demoulin, 2014 WI 8, ¶17, 352 Wis. 2d 359, 843 
N.W.2d 373 ("In the event of 'a conflict between a general and a 
specific statute, the latter controls.'").  However, because we 
conclude that the clerk is not a party, and Wis. Stat. § 801.14 
applies to parties only, it is not necessary to reach this 
argument. 
No. 
2021AP69-FT   
 
15 
 
clerk of the circuit court.  These obligations are unambiguous 
and readily discernable by anyone examining the text of the 
statute.  
¶39 The fact that "serve" is not defined does not compel a 
finding of ambiguity.  "[A] statute is ambiguous if it is 
capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons 
in two or more senses."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶47.  Our goal in 
statutory interpretation is to ascertain the meaning of a 
statute.  Id.  It is not to search for ambiguity.  Id.  The 
statute unambiguously requires service of a notice of appeal 
upon the clerk, meaning that something must be presented or 
delivered to the clerk.  That did not happen here and therefore 
Greenwald's argument in favor of liberal construction due to 
ambiguity is unavailing. 
¶40 Greenwald turns to the rules of civil procedure 
because, it claims, "[i]nitiating a circuit court challenge to a 
special assessment" is unclear and that filing and service of a 
summons and complaint is equivalent to filing and service of the 
notice of appeal.  It relies on Mayek v. Cloverleaf Lakes 
Sanitary Dist. #1, 2000 WI App 182, 238 Wis. 2d 261, 617 N.W.2d 
235, for this assertion of ambiguity.   
¶41 In 
Mayek, 
the 
plaintiff 
challenged 
a 
special 
assessment by filing a summons and complaint with the circuit 
court and, importantly, served it on the clerk.  Id., ¶2.  The 
defendant argued that the plaintiff's actions in serving the 
clerk with the summons and complaint did not pass muster because 
No. 
2021AP69-FT   
 
16 
 
a summons and complaint is not the same as a notice of appeal.  
Id., ¶3.   
¶42 The court of appeals concluded that Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.60(12) 
(1997-1998),8 
the 
predecessor 
statute 
to 
§ 66.0703(12)(a), was ambiguous.  Id., ¶5.  The language was 
determined to be ambiguous because "[a]lthough § 66.60(12)(a) 
sets forth a process to initiate an appeal of a special 
assessment, 
it 
does 
not 
fully 
describe 
that 
process.  Specifically, it does not prescribe how the appeal is 
to be filed in the circuit court."  Id.  (internal citation 
omitted).  Thus, plaintiff's construction of the statute was 
reasonable and his "summons and complaint challenging an 
assessment constitute[d] a notice of appeal for purposes of 
complying with Wis. Stat. § 66.60(12)."  Id., ¶25. 
¶43 However, Mayek is inapplicable to the situation at 
hand.  In Mayek, the plaintiff actually served the summons and 
complaint on the clerk.  Id., ¶2.  In this case, Greenwald 
served the summons and complaint on the Village attorney only.  
Although, as explained in Mayek, there may be ambiguity 
describing how the appeal is to be filed in the circuit court, 
there is no ambiguity in describing the requirement that the 
                                                 
8 The statute at issue, Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a), was 
renumbered and amended in 1999.  1999 Wis. Act 150, § 532.  
According to the legislative drafting file, amendments to 
chapter 
66 
were 
"nonsubstantive, 
editorial 
changes 
that 
modernize the language," and "primarily a technical project to 
make ch. 66 more useful to those who refer to it."  Drafting 
File, 1999 Wis. Act 150, Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, 
Wis. 
No. 
2021AP69-FT   
 
17 
 
clerk must be served with a notice of appeal.  As expressed 
above, serving the Village attorney here does not constitute 
serving the clerk.  Hence, although the Mayek plaintiff 
fulfilled 
his 
statutory 
obligations 
to 
serve 
the 
clerk, 
Greenwald did not. 
D 
¶44 Finally, we turn to Greenwald's remaining argument 
that because the Village attorney initially admitted service of 
the summons and complaint, the attorney was then obligated to 
accept delivery of future filings.9  The Village rebuts this 
argument by asserting that even though the Village attorney 
admitted service of the summons and complaint, he did so on 
behalf of the Village governing body and not the clerk.   
¶45 We agree that the Village attorney's act of admitting 
service after the first email does not obviate Greenwald's 
statutory obligation pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a) to 
serve a notice of appeal upon the clerk in this special 
assessment appeal.  The Village attorney's response to the first 
email did not in any way imply that he represented the clerk.  
Importantly, the email that Greenwald's attorney sent asked the 
Village attorney if he would "accept service for the Village."  
                                                 
9 At oral argument several avenues of potential relief were 
advanced by the court.  Specifically suggested were the timeline 
of filing a notice of appeal, see Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a), 
as well as ethical obligations to refrain from contact with a 
person represented by counsel.  See SCR 20:4.2.  However, 
because those theories were neither briefed here nor argued 
below, we do not address them. 
No. 
2021AP69-FT   
 
18 
 
The Village attorney accepted service of the summons and 
complaint on behalf of the defendant Village only.  He never 
told Greenwald's attorney that he was accepting such service on 
behalf of the clerk as well.  Thus, § 66.0703(12)(a) still 
requires Greenwald to serve a written notice of appeal upon the 
clerk, which it did not accomplish.  
¶46 Requiring compliance with procedural statutes can 
sometimes yield difficult results.  Yet "[c]ompliance with the 
statutory provisions prescribing the manner for proceeding in 
the circuit court serves the public policy of maintaining an 
orderly and uniform way of conducting court business."  Aiello 
v. Village of Pleasant Prairie, 206 Wis. 2d 68, 72, 556 N.W.2d 
697 (1996).   
¶47 In sum, we conclude that the clerk is not a party to 
the proceeding, and as such, Wis. Stat. § 801.14(2) does not 
apply.  Additionally, like the court of appeals, we determine 
that Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a) is unambiguous.  The statute's 
plain meaning mandates service of written notice on the Village 
clerk, 
which 
Greenwald 
did 
not 
accomplish. 
 
Therefore, 
Greenwald's failure to comply with § 66.0703(12)(a) requires 
dismissal of this action.     
¶48 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.
No.  2021AP69-FT.akz 
 
1 
 
¶49 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J.   (dissenting).  I 
dissent because the majority incorrectly concludes that Darwin 
Greenwald and Greenwald Family Limited Partnership (collectively 
"Greenwald") 
cannot 
challenge 
the 
levying 
of 
a 
special 
assessment against Greenwald's property because its attorney 
sent the pertinent service documents to the Village's attorney, 
as instructed, rather than to the clerk.  At issue is whether 
legal documents were properly served on the Village.  The facts 
of this case are fairly unremarkable in that it is undisputed 
the Village attorney, who asked to be served the documents and 
who accepted service of the documents, was served.  Greenwald 
initially notified, in the same email, both the Village clerk 
and the Village attorney that Greenwald had filed suit and 
inquired who should be served with the documents.  Specifically, 
Greenwald, through counsel, asked them both if the Village 
attorney "can accept service for the Village."  The Village 
attorney replied to Greenwald alone, removing the clerk from the 
email, and said he "will admit service" for the Village.  The 
Village clerk was also not included on future emails, including 
the emails that served the legal documents.1  Now the Village 
argues that its attorney is not authorized to accept service, 
despite the attorney specifically accepting and admitting 
service for the Village.  It was the attorney who removed the 
                                                 
1 It is undisputed that Greenwald thereafter sent the 
Village attorney both a summons and complaint and a document 
titled "notice of appeal," all within the 90-day statutory time 
limit.  Either set of documents can serve as a notice of appeal 
to the Village, and the Village attorney received both.   
No.  2021AP69-FT.akz 
 
2 
 
clerk from the email, indicating to Greenwald's counsel that 
further communication with the clerk was to go through Village 
counsel.  Attorneys accept service on behalf of their clients on 
a regular basis.  This is nothing new.   
¶50 To determine how to properly "serve" the Village under 
Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a), one must look to Wis. Stat. ch. 801 
governing service in civil cases.  Under Wis. Stat. § 801.11(4), 
personally serving the president or clerk is an option for 
serving a municipality.  But the Village was represented by 
counsel, who agreed to accept service, and Greenwald was 
therefore not wrong to serve the Village attorney under Wis. 
Stat. § 801.14(2).  In fact, that statute may require that the 
attorney be served instead of the clerk.  At a minimum, there is 
flexibility in the service requirements under the relevant 
statutes.  As further example, one may instead serve whoever "is 
apparently" able to receive process.  § 801.11(4)(b).  It is 
difficult to see how that is not satisfied by service on the 
Village's attorney.  One may also serve a municipality "by some 
other method" with the responding party's written consent.  Wis. 
Stat. § 801.18(5)(d).  Again, given that the Village attorney 
asked for and accepted service on behalf of the Village, how 
isn't that satisfied?  Greenwald successfully served the Village 
under either of these provisions.  The Village attorney branded 
himself as the person "apparently" able to receive process.  His 
email accepting service also constituted consent on behalf of 
the Village to accept service in the manner it was received.  As 
No.  2021AP69-FT.akz 
 
3 
 
a result, Greenwald properly served the Village in conformance 
with § 66.0703(12)(a), and its lawsuit should proceed.  
¶51 The majority, nonetheless, concludes Greenwald's claim 
must be dismissed because it was the Village attorney instead of 
the non-attorney Village clerk who received the documents.  The 
majority opinion departs from the law and common sense.  Serving 
the Village attorney, like serving the Village clerk, here 
constitutes service of the Village itself.  The Village 
attorney, like the Village clerk, represents the Village to 
receive process.  Not every village may be in a position to have 
a known attorney who can accept service, and the statutes 
provide a process for serving villages without attorneys.  But 
that process is not exclusive.  Greenwald properly served the 
Village, relying on counsel's acceptance of service.  Do we 
really 
expect 
lawyers 
to 
serve 
counsel 
and 
also 
serve 
represented parties for fear that counsel will later somehow 
argue that they were not qualified to accept service for their 
client?  The majority does.  I would not.  Importantly, the law 
does not dictate such a result. 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶52 On March 17, 2020, Greenwald filed a complaint in 
Waukesha County circuit court challenging the Village of 
Mukwonago's 
special 
assessment 
of 
Greenwald's 
property.  
According to the complaint, Greenwald owns "properties located 
in or adjacent to the Village of Mukwonago."  The complaint 
alleged that in 2019, the Village established a special 
assessment 
district 
that 
included 
several 
of 
Greenwald's 
No.  2021AP69-FT.akz 
 
4 
 
properties.  The Village mailed Greenwald a notice of the final 
resolution on January 16, 2020.  Greenwald alleged the Village's 
special 
assessment 
was 
unlawful 
because 
"[t]he 
planned 
improvements are not needed or wanted by [Greenwald] and more 
importantly will not benefit [its] properties," and because the 
Village "impose[d] [the] special assessment against properties 
located [in] and governed by the Town of Mukwonago, not the 
Village."  
¶53 Greenwald's response to the Village's motion to 
dismiss included several emails Greenwald exchanged with Village 
officials.  On March 18, 2020, Greenwald sent an email with the 
subject line, "RE:  GFLP et al v. Village 20-CV-494 – Special 
Assessment" to the Village attorney and the Village clerk.  
Another attorney, who also represented the Village, was copied 
on the email.  The email states, "[A]ttached are copies of a new 
case file[d] yesterday regarding the Chapman Blvd Special 
Assessment.  Please let me know if you can accept service for 
the Village." 
¶54 The Village attorney replied to Greenwald's email two 
days later, stating, "Yes we will admit service, please forward 
that to me at this point."  The Village attorney copied the 
other attorney for the Village on this reply email, but he 
removed the Village clerk from the email.  The Village clerk was 
not included on any further emails.  
¶55 Greenwald's attorney replied by email on March 23, 
2020.  He sent copies of the summons and complaint along with a 
template for admission of service.  The Village attorney signed 
No.  2021AP69-FT.akz 
 
5 
 
the admission of service and returned it to Greenwald the next 
day.  The admission states, "I am counsel for the Defendant 
Village of Mukwonago in this action and have received and admit 
service . . . on behalf of the Defendant."  The Village attorney 
also signed the admission, listed his title as "Attorney for 
Defendant," and included his state bar number.  
¶56 On April 9, 2020, Greenwald sent a notice of appeal to 
the Village attorney both by mail and email.  It included a 
cover letter confirming that the Village clerk received notice 
and requesting that the Village attorney notify Greenwald of any 
deficiencies.  In lieu of filing a responsive pleading, the 
Village filed a motion to dismiss based on Greenwald's failure 
to personally serve the Village clerk a notice of appeal.  
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶57 This 
case 
presents 
a 
question 
of 
statutory 
interpretation, which we review de novo.  Nowell v. City of 
Wausau, 2013 WI 88, ¶19, 351 Wis. 2d 1, 838 N.W.2d 852.  
"[S]tatutory interpretation 'begins with the language of the 
statute.  If the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily 
stop the inquiry.'"  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane 
Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (quoting 
Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶43, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 
N.W.2d 659).  "Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, 
and accepted meaning, except that technical or specially-defined 
words 
or 
phrases 
are 
given 
their 
technical 
or 
special 
definitional 
meaning." 
 
Id. 
 
"[S]tatutory 
language 
is 
interpreted in the context in which it is used; not in isolation 
No.  2021AP69-FT.akz 
 
6 
 
but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of 
surrounding or closely-related statutes . . . ."  Id., ¶46.   
¶58 "Statutes are closely related when they are in the 
same chapter, reference one another, or use similar terms."  
State v. Reyes Fuerte, 2017 WI 104, ¶27, 378 Wis. 2d 504, 904 
N.W.2d 773.   
Any word or phrase that comes before a court for 
interpretation 
is . . . part 
of 
an 
entire 
corpus 
juris.  So, if possible, it should no more be 
interpreted to clash with the rest of that corpus than 
it 
should 
be 
interpreted 
to 
clash 
with 
other 
provisions of the same law.   
Antonin 
Scalia 
& 
Bryan 
A. 
Garner, 
Reading 
Law:  The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 252 (2012).   
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶59 The law does not require that the Village clerk be 
served even though the Village attorney represented that he 
would accept service for the Village.  The issue in this case is 
whether Greenwald satisfied its obligation to "serve a written 
notice of appeal upon the clerk of the . . . [V]illage" under 
Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a).  The statute provides in relevant 
part, 
A person having an interest in a parcel of land 
affected by a determination of the governing body, 
under sub. (8)(c), (10) or (11), may, within 90 days 
after the date of the notice or of the publication of 
the final resolution under sub. (8)(d), appeal the 
determination to the circuit court of the county in 
which the property is located.  The person appealing 
shall serve a written notice of appeal upon the clerk 
of the city, town or village and execute a bond to the 
city, town or village in the sum of $150 with 2 
sureties or a bonding company to be approved by the 
city, town or village clerk, conditioned for the 
faithful prosecution of the appeal and the payment of 
No.  2021AP69-FT.akz 
 
7 
 
all costs that may be adjudged against that person.  
The clerk, if an appeal is taken, shall prepare a 
brief statement of the proceedings in the matter 
before the governing body, with its decision on the 
matter, and shall transmit the statement with the 
original or certified copies of all the papers in the 
matter to the clerk of the circuit court. 
§ 66.0703(12)(a). 
 
The 
statute 
prescribes 
the 
procedures 
property owners must follow in order to challenge special 
assessments.  "Procedural statutes are to be liberally construed 
so as to permit a determination upon the merits of the 
controversy if such construction is possible."  Kincyl v. 
Kenosha County, 37 Wis. 2d 547, 555-56, 155 N.W.2d 583 (1968).   
¶60 There are no exacting requirements as to the form the 
notice of appeal must take, but a summons and complaint can 
serve as a notice of appeal.2  Mayek v. Cloverleaf Lakes Sanitary 
Dist. No. 1, 2000 WI App 182, ¶¶8-9, 238 Wis. 2d 261, 617 
N.W.2d 235.  The statute requires that a property owner must 
"serve" a notice of appeal, but it does not answer how one 
achieves service.  It does not require any one method.  Nowhere 
does Wis. Stat. ch. 66 define the term "serve," nor does it 
establish procedures for accomplishing service.  Though "serve" 
is a common term in legal parlance,3 it is further defined 
elsewhere.  Specifically, the procedures for service are 
                                                 
2 For this reason, any distinction between Greenwald's email 
sending the summons and complaint, and the email sending the 
notice of appeal, is immaterial.  
3 See Serve, Black's Law Dictionary 1643 (11th ed. 2019) 
("[t]o make legal delivery of (a notice or process)"; "[t]o 
present (a person) with a notice or process as required by 
law"); Serve, The American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language 1649 (3d ed. 1992) ("[t]o deliver or present (a writ or 
summons)"; "[t]o present such a writ to"). 
No.  2021AP69-FT.akz 
 
8 
 
prescribed in Wis. Stat. ch. 801 concerning commencement of an 
action and venue.4   
¶61 Upon examining Wis. Stat. ch. 801, it becomes clear 
why Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a) states a property owner must 
serve a notice of appeal upon the clerk of the municipality.5  
Wisconsin Stat. § 801.11(4) states the manner for serving a 
summons 
for 
"political 
corporations 
or 
bodies 
politic," 
including counties, towns, cities, technical college districts, 
school districts and boards, and villages.  Under § 801.11(4), 
one serves a political corporation or other body politic "by 
personally serving any of the specified officers, directors, or 
agents."  For actions against a village, the statute specifies 
"the president or clerk thereof."  Id.  Not every village may 
have an attorney, but every village does have a president and a 
clerk.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 61.24-25. 
¶62 This 
illuminates 
why 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 66.0703(12)(a) 
states property owners "shall serve a written notice of appeal 
upon the clerk of the city, town or village."  It is because 
service upon the clerk is itself service upon the municipality.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 801.11(4) says as much, equating service upon 
                                                 
4 Speaking out both sides of its mouth, the majority 
recognizes "the legislature need not always explicitly point to 
ch. 801 in order for it to apply," yet claims Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.0703's "lack of a directive informs [its] discussion."  
Majority op., ¶27.  The term "serve" is a part of the whole 
corpus juris, and we should not do violence upon our consistent 
and coherent system of laws by ignoring that fact.   
5 Interestingly, the majority does not engage or quarrel 
with the reasoning I employ.  It merely jumps to my conclusions 
and says it disagrees.  See majority op., ¶¶17 n.5, 28 n.6. 
No.  2021AP69-FT.akz 
 
9 
 
the clerk with service upon the municipality.  After all, 
municipalities are not themselves natural persons who may 
themselves receive personal service.  They are creatures of 
statute.  See City of Madison v. Town of Fitchburg, 112 
Wis. 2d 224, 240, 332 N.W.2d 782 (1983) ("It is well settled 
that 
a 
municipality[ 
is] 
a 
creature 
of 
the 
legislature . . . .").  Municipalities rely on the people who 
serve their communities as local officials, and they cannot 
interact with outside entities unless it is through those 
officials.  Oconto Co. v. Jerrard, 46 Wis. 317, 328, 50 N.W. 591 
(1879) ("The state acts through its municipalities, and the 
municipalities act through their officers.").  Here, the 
attorney operates as the attorney for the Village and therefore 
as an attorney for the clerk to the extent the clerk acts as a 
representative for the Village.  Serving the attorney a notice 
of appeal therefore achieves service upon the clerk as a 
representative of the Village.   
¶63 The court of appeals in Mayek, 238 Wis. 2d 261, 
discussed the notice of appeal in such a fashion even if it did 
not rule on the issue.  While explaining that "serving a summons 
and complaint challenging the assessment constitutes a notice of 
appeal" under Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a), id., ¶7, the court 
repeatedly 
described 
such 
service 
as 
service 
upon 
the 
municipality.  The court said the property owner "reasonably 
treated his complaint as a notice of appeal and served it on the 
district's clerk as the method of obtaining service on the 
district."  Id., ¶8 (emphasis added).  
No.  2021AP69-FT.akz 
 
10 
 
¶64 Even if a municipal clerk is not a party to the 
litigation, a clerk receiving service in a suit against the 
municipality clearly acts on behalf of the municipality while 
performing that ministerial function.  The majority's assertion 
to 
the 
contrary——that 
a 
municipality's 
clerk 
is 
not 
a 
representative 
of 
the 
municipality——flatly 
ignores 
how 
Wisconsin's municipalities operate and the roles local officials 
play while acting on behalf of those municipalities.  See 
majority op., ¶¶32-33.  The majority's artificial distinction 
between 
serving 
a 
municipality's 
clerk 
and 
serving 
a 
municipality may create unintended consequences, such as service 
upon a clerk being deemed insufficient to affect service upon 
the municipality.  The reality is that by serving the municipal 
clerk, like serving the attorney, one serves the municipality.  
Thus, the question is whether Greenwald served the Village in a 
manner permitted under the Wisconsin Statutes.  
¶65 Wisconsin Stat. § 801.11(4) provides that personally 
serving the Village clerk is a permissible method for serving 
the Village.  However, there is flexibility.  There are a number 
of situations where directly serving the clerk is either not 
necessary or not permitted.  
¶66 For one, serving a village under Wis. Stat. § 801.11 
is 
permissive, 
whereas 
service 
upon 
the 
attorney 
for 
a 
represented party under Wis. Stat. § 801.14 is fairly read as 
mandatory.  Section 801.11 begins, "A court of this state having 
jurisdiction of the subject matter and grounds for personal 
jurisdiction . . . may exercise personal jurisdiction over a 
No.  2021AP69-FT.akz 
 
11 
 
defendant by service of a summons as follows" (emphasis added).  
However, service upon the attorney for a represented party 
appears to be mandatory.  Section 801.14(2) states, "Whenever 
under these statutes, service of pleadings and other papers is 
required or permitted to be made upon a party represented by an 
attorney, the service shall be made upon the attorney unless 
service upon the party in person is ordered by the court" 
(emphasis added).  In other words, if a municipality is 
represented by counsel, that arguably must take precedence over 
other forms of service, and a claimant should serve the 
municipality through its attorney.  There is seemingly only one 
exception to this rule:  "unless service upon the party in 
person is ordered by the court."  Id.  There is no exception for 
serving a municipal clerk.  If the statute did provide an 
exception permitting service under § 801.11, it would likely say 
so.  That statute is referenced in § 801.14(1) regarding parties 
in default, but no similar reference exists in § 801.14(2).  
Section 801.14(2) 
instead 
discusses 
situations 
where 
"an 
attorney . . . has consented in writing to accept service by 
electronic mail," which is exactly what happened in this case.  
These all indicate that Greenwald properly served the Village by 
delivering the summons and complaint to the Village attorney.   
¶67 Even if it were the case that service must be affected 
through a municipal clerk, the statutes provide alternatives to 
serving the clerk directly.  Wisconsin Stat. § 801.11(4)(b) 
lists one such alternative.  It states, "In lieu of delivering 
the copy of the summons to the person specified, the copy may be 
No.  2021AP69-FT.akz 
 
12 
 
left in the office of such officer, director or managing agent 
with the person who is apparently in charge of the office."  Id. 
(emphasis added).  We examined this language in Keske v. Square 
D Co., 58 Wis. 2d 307, 206 N.W.2d 189 (1973).6  The process 
server in Keske attempted to serve a corporation.  Upon arriving 
at the main reception area, the receptionist stated the person 
who could receive service was unavailable.  Id. at 309.  The 
process server was instead "specifically directed to serve" a 
different individual who "appeared to be in charge."  Id. at 
313-14. 
 
We 
explained 
the 
statute's 
"use 
of 
the 
word 
'apparently' can only refer to what is apparent to the person 
actually serving the summons."  Id. at 313.  Even though the 
person who received process testified he was not "in charge" of 
the office, this was unimportant because of the circuit court's 
finding that he "appeared to be in charge."  Id. at 313-14.  
These provisions also suggest that service on the Village is not 
as strict as the majority suggests. 
¶68 Additionally, Wis. Stat. § 801.18(5)(d) is seemingly 
even more expansive.  It concerns service of "[i]nitiating 
documents," which include a summons and complaint and notice of 
appeal.  § 801.18(1)(j), (5)(d).  It requires that initiating 
documents "shall be served by traditional methods," which simply 
"means 
those 
methods 
of 
filing 
and 
serving 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 801.11(5)(a) uses the same language with 
regard to service upon domestic or foreign corporations or 
limited liability companies.  The statute has since been 
renumbered from its previous version, Wis. Stat. § 262.05 (1972-
73).   
No.  2021AP69-FT.akz 
 
13 
 
documents . . . provided 
under 
statutes 
and 
local 
rules."  
§ 801.18(1)(m), (5)(d).  However, such service by "traditional 
methods" is required "unless the responding party has consented 
in writing to accept electronic service or service by some other 
method."  § 801.18(5)(d).  Section 801.18(5)(d) therefore 
permits service through methods other than those "provided under 
statutes" so long as "the responding party has consented in 
writing."  That is the case here. 
¶69 Greenwald properly served the Village under any one of 
these statutes.  Wisconsin Stat. § 801.14(2) appears to require 
that Greenwald serve the Village attorney, not the Village 
clerk.  The Village attorney said to do so and admitted service.  
In the admission of service, the Village attorney confirmed the 
Village was represented by counsel in this matter, stating, "I 
am counsel for the Defendant Village of Mukwonago in this 
action."  The Village attorney signed his name above his title, 
"Attorney for Defendant," and provided his state bar number, 
clearly conveying that he was operating as the Village's legal 
representation in that litigation.  Under these circumstances, 
Greenwald's counsel was between a rock and a hard place.  If he 
instead 
serves 
the 
Village 
clerk, 
ignoring 
the 
Village 
attorney's instruction to serve him and that he would accept 
service for the Village, consequences could ensue.  An attorney 
is expected to communicate through counsel, not directly with 
the other lawyer's client.  The majority opinion creates 
unnecessary conflict and uncertainty for lawyers who should be 
able to accept service for their clients.   
No.  2021AP69-FT.akz 
 
14 
 
¶70 The Village attorney's actions also make sense in 
light of the rules of professional conduct, which prohibit 
lawyers 
from 
"communicat[ing] 
about 
the 
subject 
of 
the 
representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented 
by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the 
consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or 
a court order."  SCR 20:4.2(a).  This includes, "[i]n the case 
of 
a 
represented 
organization, . . . communications 
with 
a 
constituent of the organization . . . whose act or omission in 
connection with the matter may be imputed to the organization."  
Id. ABA cmt.7.  It is at least reasonable to conclude, under 
this rule, that once the Village attorney identified himself as 
the Village's representative, Greenwald's attorney could not 
contact the Village clerk.  When the Village attorney replied to 
Greenwald's attorney's initial email, the Village attorney 
removed the Village clerk from the conversation.  As a 
constituent of the Village, the clerk could not be contacted or 
directly served by Greenwald's counsel.  By removing the Village 
clerk 
from 
the 
email 
conversation, 
the 
Village 
attorney 
communicated to Greenwald's counsel that there was no reason to 
contact the clerk, and all communication should go through the 
attorney.  That was confirmed by the admission of service. 
¶71 Even if Greenwald was permitted to directly serve the 
Village clerk, the Village attorney had the apparent ability to 
receive service under Wis. Stat. § 801.11(4)(b).  Greenwald's 
initial email, which included the Village clerk, asked for 
confirmation that the Village attorney can receive service.  The 
No.  2021AP69-FT.akz 
 
15 
 
Village attorney confirmed that he will admit service, and he 
did not keep the Village clerk on the email chain.  In doing so, 
the Village attorney directed Greenwald to himself rather than 
the Village clerk as a person capable of receiving service on 
behalf of the Village.  The Village attorney's representations 
rendered him "apparently in charge of the office" such that he 
could receive service on behalf of the Village.  Permitting the 
Village to benefit from any apparent misdirection would "produce 
a situation whereby a process server becomes a participant in a 
game of 'hide 'n seek' at the mercy of secretaries or anyone 
else who chooses to prevent him from accomplishing his task."  
Keske, 58 Wis. 2d at 315.  This is not a result our service 
statutes condone. 
¶72 Finally, Greenwald would have properly served the 
Village under Wis. Stat. § 801.18(5)(d).  The Village, acting 
through the Village attorney, consented to receive process in 
the manner it was served.  Over email, the Village attorney told 
Greenwald, "Yes we will admit service, please forward that to me 
at this point."  "[T]he [village] attorney may bind the 
municipality to the same extent that any attorney may bind his 
or her client.  A [village] attorney is clothed with sufficient 
apparent authority to bind a client for services that are 
routinely and directly connected with the representation. . . ." 
10 McQuillian Mun. Corp. § 29:20 (3d ed. 2022) (footnotes 
omitted) ("[T]he universally accepted generalization in this 
matter is that the city attorney has power to institute court 
actions and defend actions against the municipality . . . ."); 
No.  2021AP69-FT.akz 
 
16 
 
see also 64 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 1148 (2023) ("A city 
attorney may bind the municipality to the same extent that an 
attorney may bind a client, absent limitations.").  Acting 
through the Village attorney, an individual whose job is to 
speak for the Village in litigation matters, the Village gave 
Greenwald written consent to serve the Village in the manner it 
did.  It cannot be the case——and is not the case under the law——
that Greenwald's action must be dismissed for relying on this 
representation.  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶73 I conclude that Greenwald properly served the Village 
in accordance with Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a).  To determine 
how to properly "serve" the Village under § 66.0703(12)(a), one 
must look to Wis. Stat. ch. 801 governing service in civil 
cases.  Under Wis. Stat. § 801.11(4), though personally serving 
the clerk is the default for serving a municipality, the Village 
was represented by counsel and Greenwald was in compliance with 
the statute in serving the Village attorney under Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.14(2).  Even if personal service upon the Village clerk 
were required, there is flexibility.  One may instead serve 
whoever 
"is 
apparently" 
able 
to 
receive 
process.  
§ 801.11(4)(b).  One may also serve a municipality "by some 
other method" with the responding party's written consent.  Wis. 
Stat. § 801.18(5)(d).  Greenwald successfully served the Village 
under either of these provisions too.  The Village attorney 
branded himself as the person "apparently" able to receive 
process.  The Village attorney's email accepting service also 
No.  2021AP69-FT.akz 
 
17 
 
constituted consent on behalf of the Village to accept service 
in the manner it was received.  As a result, Greenwald properly 
served the Village, and its lawsuit should proceed.    
¶74 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶75 I am authorized to state that Justices PATIENCE DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY join this dissent. 
No.  2021AP69-FT.akz 
 
1