Title: Jackson v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 248, 2023
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: April 22, 2024

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
TYREE JACKSON, 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 248, 2023 
§ 
§  Court Below–Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§  Cr. ID No. 1908012526 (N) 
§   
§                      
§ 
 
Submitted: January 30, 2024 
Decided: 
April 22, 2024 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; LEGROW and GRIFFITHS, Justices. 
 
 
ORDER 
 
After consideration of the non-merit brief and motion to withdraw filed by the 
appellant’s counsel under Supreme Court Rule 26(c), the State’s response, and the 
Superior Court record, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
In October 2019, appellant Tyree Jackson was charged by indictment 
with three counts of drug dealing, three counts of possession of a firearm during the 
commission of a felony, three counts of possession of a firearm by a person 
prohibited (“PFBPP”), six counts of endangering the welfare of a child, one count 
of aggravated possession, one count of possession of ammunition by a person 
prohibited, and one count of second-degree conspiracy.  On February 24, 2020, 
Jackson pleaded guilty to one count of PFBPP.  In exchange for his guilty plea, the 
 
 
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State agreed not to file a habitual-offender petition and to dismiss the remaining 
charges.  The Superior Court sentenced Jackson in accordance with the plea 
agreement to fifteen years of incarceration, suspended after the minimum-mandatory 
term of ten years for six months of Level IV probation followed by eighteen months 
of Level III probation.  Jackson did not appeal his conviction or sentence. 
(2) 
In December 2020, Jackson filed a pro se motion for postconviction 
relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  At Jackson’s request, the Superior 
Court appointed counsel to represent him.  Postconviction counsel filed an amended 
motion for postconviction relief raising one claim: trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to move to suppress the evidence because Jackson’s initial detention was not 
supported by reasonable articulable suspicion.1  After expanding the record with 
briefing, an affidavit from trial counsel, oral argument, and supplemental briefing, 
the Superior Court denied Jackson’s motion.2  This appeal followed. 
(3) 
On appeal, postconviction counsel has filed a brief and a motion to 
withdraw under Rule 26(c).  Postconviction counsel asserts that, after a complete 
and careful examination of the record, he could not identify any arguably appealable 
issues.  Postconviction counsel informed Jackson of the provisions of Rule 26(c) and 
provided him with a copy of the motion to withdraw and a draft of the accompanying 
 
1 At one point, Jackson told the court that he wished to proceed pro se to supplement counsel’s 
amended motion, but he withdrew the request shortly thereafter. 
2 State v. Jackson, 2023 WL 4104290 (Del. Super. June 20, 2023). 
 
 
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brief.  Postconviction counsel also informed Jackson of his right to supplement his 
attorney’s presentation.  Jackson has raised issues for the Court’s consideration, 
which postconviction counsel attached to the Rule 26(c) brief.  The State has 
responded to the Rule 26(c) brief and has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s 
judgment. 
(4) 
The standard and scope of review applicable to the consideration of a 
motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under Rule 26(c) is twofold.  First, 
the Court must be satisfied that defense counsel has made a conscientious 
examination of the record and the law for claims that arguably could be raised on 
appeal. 3  Second, the Court must conduct its own review of the record and determine 
whether the appeal is so totally devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that it 
can be decided without an adversary presentation.4 
(5) 
The record reflects the following.  On April 19, 2019, police were 
monitoring a city-owned surveillance camera in the area of the 200 block of North 
Harrison Street in Wilmington, Delaware.  The area covered by the camera included 
208 North Harrison Street (“the residence”). The camera captured footage of a 
man—later identified as Malik Youngblood—engaging in suspected hand-to-hand 
 
3 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wis., 486 U.S. 429, 442 
(1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
4 Penson, 488 U.S. at 81-82. 
 
 
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drug transactions in front of the residence.5  Another individual, later identified as 
Jackson, was also present.  Around 11:24 a.m., Jackson and Youngblood scrambled 
quickly into the residence in response to seeing an individual with a handgun.6  
Approximately one minute later, Jackson ran out of the residence and down North 
Harrison Street with a black handgun in plain view.7  After standing at the 
intersection of North Harrison Street and Second Street for a few moments, Jackson 
turned around and retreated into the residence.8  In response to these events, police 
officers responded and ordered the occupants of the residence to exit.9  Jackson 
complied, and an officer immediately detained him.10  After ascertaining Jackson’s 
identity and conducting a criminal background check, police learned that Jackson 
was a person prohibited from owning or possessing a firearm.  Because witnesses 
informed them that there were children still inside the residence, the officers 
conducted a protective sweep of it, during which they observed marijuana plants in 
plain view.  Police then obtained a search warrant for the residence and found 
additional drugs and three firearms (one loaded black 9mm Beretta handgun, one 
loaded black High Standard .357 magnum revolver, and one black Ruger .223 ranch 
 
5 Jackson, 2023 WL 410420, at *2. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at *3. 
10 The police also detained Youngblood, who exited the house with several children, when he 
emerged. 
 
 
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rifle).  After waiving his Miranda rights, Jackson admitted that he had purchased a 
.357 magnum revolver earlier in the day. 
(6) 
Jackson’s arguments that he has submitted for the Court’s consideration 
may be fairly summarized as follows: trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
move to suppress the evidence obtained (i) pursuant to the search warrant issued for 
the residence; (ii) from the warrantless protective sweep of the residence; and (iii) 
through Jackson’s detention, which, he argues, was not based on reasonable 
articulable suspicion.  In connection with these claims, Jackson also maintains that 
his guilty plea was coerced.  After careful review, we find no merit to Jackson’s 
arguments. 
(7) 
We review Jackson’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under 
the well-known two-part test articulated in Strickland v. Washington.11   In order to 
prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must (i) show 
that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and 
(ii) demonstrate prejudice.12  Although not insurmountable, the Strickland standard 
is deferential and our review of counsel’s representation is “subject to a strong 
presumption that the representation was professionally reasonable.”13  “Objectively 
unreasonable performance is performance where no reasonable lawyer would have 
 
11 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
12 Id. at 688, 694. 
13 Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990). 
 
 
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conducted the defense as this lawyer did.”14  In the context of a guilty plea, the 
defendant establishes “prejudice” when he can show “that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would 
have insisted on going to trial.”15  
(8) 
We review Jackson’s first two ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
for plain error because they were not presented to the trial court in the first instance.16  
We find no plain error here.  Because there is no evidence that Jackson had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy at the residence, he lacked standing to challenge 
the search warrant,17 and trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a 
meritless motion to suppress.  For the same reason, we also reject Jackson’s claim 
that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress the evidence 
obtained during the protective sweep of the residence.   
 
14 Owens v. State, 301 A.3d 580, 588-89 (Del. 2023) (cleaned up). 
15 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 60 (Del. 1988) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985)). 
16 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 8 (“Only questions fairly presented to the trial court may be presented for 
review; provided, however, that when the interests of justice so require, the Court may consider 
and determine any question not so presented.”). 
17 See Wilson v. State, 2002 WL 31106354, at *1 (Del. Sept. 18, 2002) (“The fact that [the 
defendant] was alone in [the] home in the afternoon, wearing no shoes, establishes only that he 
was a casual guest. As such, he has no standing to contest the validity of the search.”).  Jackson 
argued for the first time during oral argument in the Superior Court that he was an overnight guest 
at his codefendant’s home.  Because he did not raise this claim in his amended motion for 
postconviction relief, trial counsel did not respond to it, and we do not know if Jackson told trial 
counsel that he was an overnight guest at the house.  Trial counsel’s affidavit, which describes his 
efforts to mount a defense to Jackson’s charges, suggests, however, that he did not believe that 
Jackson had standing to challenge the sweep or the warrant. 
 
 
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(9) 
Turning to Jackson’s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to 
move to suppress the evidence based on Jackson’s initial detention, trial counsel 
squarely addressed this claim in his affidavit.  Although counsel agreed that he had 
originally opined—based on the limited testimony and evidence presented at 
Jackson’s preliminary hearing—that there were grounds for filing a meritorious 
motion to suppress, his opinion changed after reviewing “hours” of “extensive” 
video surveillance of the residence during the morning of August 19, 2019.18  
Specifically, trial counsel opined that he “did not reasonably believe that a 
suppression motion would have been successful in light of the multiple drug 
transactions that had been observed being conducted by Youngblood on the front 
porch of the residence in which Defendant Jackson was present with a handgun.”19  
Rather than file a frivolous suppression motion, trial counsel “focused on attempting 
to mitigate the difficult situation in which Defendant Jackson found himself … given 
his eligibility for sentencing as a[] habitual offender.”20  We note that trial counsel 
successfully secured the State’s agreement to refrain from seeking habitual offender 
sentencing.  In light of the evidence in the record, we cannot find that counsel’s 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.  Moreover, 
Jackson has not shown that, but for trial counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress 
 
18 App. to Opening Br. at A423-24. 
19 Id. at A424. 
20 Id. at A424. 
 
 
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based on Jackson’s initial detention, there is a reasonable probability that he would 
have not availed himself of the plea agreement, but would have gone to trial on the 
eighteen-count indictment and faced sentencing as a habitual offender. 
(10) Finally, we also review Jackson’s claim that his plea was coerced for 
plain error because it was not raised below.  The record before the Court reflects that 
the plea provided a substantial benefit to Jackson—as noted, the State dismissed 
seventeen other charges in exchange for Jackson’s guilty plea to one count of 
PFBPP, and Jackson avoided being declared (and sentenced as) a habitual offender.  
Indeed, Jackson received the minimum-mandatory sentence for PFBPP.  Under these 
circumstances and taking into consideration Jackson’s representations on the Truth-
in-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form as well as his sworn testimony during the guilty plea 
colloquy, Jackson’s claim of coercion is belied by the record.21  
(11) The Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded that 
Jackson’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably appealable 
issue.  We are also satisfied that Jackson’s counsel has made a conscientious effort 
to examine the record and the law and has properly determined that Jackson could 
not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal. 
 
21 See Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997) (“In the absence of clear and convincing 
evidence to the contrary, [a defendant] is bound by his answers on the Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty 
Plea From and by his sworn testimony prior to the acceptance of the guilty plea.”). 
 
 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED.  Counsel’s motion to withdraw is moot. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/ N. Christopher Griffiths 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice