Title: State v. Denis L.R.
Citation: 2005 WI 110
Docket Number: 2003AP000384-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 8, 2005

2005 WI 110 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP384-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Denis L.R.,  
          Defendant, 
Dawn R.,  
          Intervenor-Petitioner-Appellant- 
          Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2004 WI App 51 
Reported at:  270 Wis. 2d 663, 678 N.W.2d 326 
(Ct. App. 2004-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 8, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 5, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Sheboygan   
 
JUDGE: 
Gary Langhoff   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
intervenor-petitioner-appellant-petitioner 
there 
were briefs by Dwight D. Darrow and Darrow, Dietrich & Hawley, 
S.C., Sheboygan, and oral argument by Dwight D. Darrow. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Sandra 
L. Nowack, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
2005 WI 110 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP384-CR  
(L.C. No. 
02CF235) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Denis L.R.,  
 
          Defendant, 
 
Dawn R.,  
 
          Intervenor-Petitioner-Appellant- 
          Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 8, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed and 
cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
¶1 
LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   Dawn R. seeks review of a 
published court of appeals decision that affirmed a circuit 
court's order that concluded Dawn waived the therapist-patient 
privilege of her three-year-old daughter, Kirstin R., by 
No. 
2003AP384-CR   
 
2 
 
volitionally disclosing a significant part of the matter or 
communication.1    
¶2 
Kirstin 
received 
counseling 
at 
Choices 
Family 
Education Services (Choices Family Services).  There, she told 
her therapist, Judy Droppers, that her grandfather, Denis L.R., 
sexually assaulted her.  Brian Fears, the clinical director at 
Choices Family Services, reported the sexual assault to the 
authorities, 
and 
the 
State 
charged 
Denis 
with 
sexually 
assaulting Kirstin.   
¶3 
Dawn, who is also Denis's daughter, overheard Kirstin 
tell Droppers that Denis did not sexually assault her.  Dawn 
relayed this information to her grandmother, Helen R.  The 
circuit court conducted an in camera review of Kirstin's 
counseling records to look for any information that either 
inculpates or exculpates Denis.  Apparently, the court found no 
information.   
¶4 
At issue in this case is whether the circuit court may 
conduct an in camera interview of Droppers.  Since Dawn 
overheard Kirstin tell Droppers that Denis both did and did not 
sexually assault her, Droppers may have information that is 
relevant to both the State and Denis that, for some reason, 
Droppers did not reduce to writing.   
¶5 
After the circuit court concluded that Dawn waived 
Kirstin's privilege by telling Helen about what Dawn overheard, 
                                                 
1 State v. Denis L.R., 2004 WI App 51, 270 Wis. 2d 663, 678 
N.W.2d 326. 
No. 
2003AP384-CR   
 
3 
 
the court ordered an in camera interview with Droppers to 
determine if she had any relevant information related to the 
sexual assault.  Dawn intervened in this criminal action to 
protect Kirstin's therapist-patient privilege.  As noted, the 
court 
of 
appeals 
affirmed 
the 
circuit 
court's 
order 
by 
concluding that Dawn waived Kirstin's privilege. 
¶6 
Dawn argues the court of appeals decision should be 
reversed because she contends she could not claim Kirstin's 
privilege, as she is not Kirstin's "guardian" for purposes of 
Wis. Stat.  § (Rule)905.04(c)(3) (2001-02).2  Alternatively, Dawn 
argues that she could not have waived Kirstin's privilege 
because she did not intend to waive the privilege. 
¶7 
We do not address these issues regarding waiver 
because we conclude that there is no privilege here.  Fears 
reported the sexual assault to the authorities, presumably 
pursuant 
to 
his 
mandatory 
reporting 
obligations 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 48.891.  Under the circumstances presented, we 
conclude that Fears' reporting the abuse to the authorities 
under Wis. Stat. § 48.891 extinguishes Kirstin's privilege under 
Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 905.04(4)(e)2.  Thus, there is no privilege 
with respect to any "confidential communications made or 
information 
obtained 
or 
disseminated 
for 
purposes 
of 
 . . . treatment of the patient's . . . mental or emotional 
condition . . . " with respect to the sexual abuse.  See 
                                                 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-
02 version, unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2003AP384-CR   
 
4 
 
Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 905.04(2).  Therefore, any information the 
counselors at Choices have that is relevant to the prosecution 
or defense of Denis for the sexual assault is not privileged.  
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals on 
other grounds. 
I 
¶8 
On May 6, 2002, the State charged Denis L.R. with 
repeated first-degree sexual assault of his granddaughter, 
Kirstin.  See Wis. Stat. §§  948.02(1) and 948.025(1).  Kirstin 
was three years old.  Dawn is Denis's daughter and Kirstin's 
mother. 
¶9 
The authorities first learned of the sexual assaults 
when Fears, the clinical director at Choices Family Services 
reported that Kirstin made statements during counseling that 
indicated 
that 
Denis 
sexually 
assaulted 
her 
on 
several 
occasions.    
¶10 Denis's preliminary hearing was held on May 15, 2002.  
At the hearing, a social worker testified that she spoke with 
Kirstin on May 4, 2002.  The social worker testified that 
Kirstin told her that "Papa," referring to Denis, put his "butt" 
in Kirstin's "butt."  Through the use of anatomical drawings, 
Kirstin identified that "butt" referred to her and Denis's 
genitalia.  The Sheboygan County Circuit Court, Honorable 
Timothy M. Van Akkeren, bound Denis over for trial and the State 
filed an information charging Denis with the same crime as 
stated in the criminal complaint. 
No. 
2003AP384-CR   
 
5 
 
¶11 At one point, Dawn consented to release Kirstin's 
medical and hospital records and her counseling records from 
Choices Family Services to the State, presumably to aid the 
prosecution of Denis.  However, she revoked this consent before 
the State obtained any of the records.   
¶12 Denis then filed a Shiffra3 motion for in camera 
inspection of, among other records, Kirstin's counseling records 
from Choices.  As part of his materiality showing, Denis 
submitted 
an 
affidavit 
by 
Helen 
(Denis's 
mother, 
Dawn's 
grandmother, and Kirstin's great-grandmother).  Helen averred 
that she "had discussions with Dawn regarding counseling 
services provided to Kirstin."  During those discussions, Dawn 
told Helen "that Kirstin had been seeing a counselor by the name 
of Judy Droppers at Choice Family Services . . . on two or more 
occasions in May or June, 2002."4  Helen stated that Droppers 
"used play therapy, and in one of those sessions talked about 
some of the allegations surrounding the criminal investigation 
in this case."  Helen further indicated that "[a]ccording to 
Dawn, on one occasion, Kirstin informed the counselor that 
nothing happened between her and [Denis], contrary to the 
allegations underlying the criminal case."  
                                                 
3 State v. Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d 600, 499 N.W.2d 719 (Ct. 
App. 1993) 
4 The parties do not dispute that any communications between 
Kristin and Droppers fall under the counselor-patient privilege, 
regardless 
of 
whether 
Droppers 
is 
a 
family 
therapist, 
professional counselor, or other mental health professional. 
No. 
2003AP384-CR   
 
6 
 
¶13 The State did not object to Denis's Shiffra motion, 
noting that it too needed the records to aid the prosecution of 
its case.   
¶14 The circuit court, Honorable Gary Langhoff, ordered 
the State, to the extent it was legally capable of doing so 
under Wis. Stat. § 146.82(2)(a)11., (2001-02)5 to obtain all 
records relating to Kirstin from Choices Family Services.  The 
court stated that it would then make further orders regarding 
any in-camera interviews with the counselors from Choices Family 
Services. 
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 146.82(2)(a)11. states: 
Notwithstanding sub. (1), patient health care records 
shall 
be 
released upon 
request 
without 
informed 
consent in the following circumstances: 
. . . .  
To 
a 
 . . . district 
attorney 
for 
purposes 
of 
investigation of threatened or suspected child abuse 
or neglect or suspected unborn child abuse or for 
purposes of prosecution of alleged child abuse or 
neglect, if the person conducting the investigation or 
prosecution identifies the subject of the record by 
name. 
 
The 
health 
care 
provider 
may 
release 
information by initiating 
contact 
with 
a 
county 
department, sheriff or police department or district 
attorney without receiving a request for release of 
the information.  A person to whom a report or record 
is disclosed under this subdivision may not further 
disclose it, except to the persons, for the purposes 
and under the conditions specified in s. 48.981 (7). 
 
No. 
2003AP384-CR   
 
7 
 
¶15 Choices reluctantly turned the records over to the 
State after the court issued a subpoena duces tecum.6  The court 
examined the records in camera but apparently did not find any 
inculpatory 
information 
pertaining 
to 
the 
sexual 
assault 
allegations 
or 
exculpatory 
information 
regarding 
Kirstin's 
alleged recantation.7   
¶16 The State later moved to allow Kirstin to testify 
through videotaped deposition.  At the motion hearing, on 
October 9, 2002, the State also raised the issue of whether Dawn 
waived Kirstin's privilege.  The State took the position that 
she waived the privilege based on the information contained in 
Helen's affidavit, which was previously submitted by Denis with 
his Shiffra motion, and based on similar statements Dawn made to 
the assistant district attorney who was prosecuting the case.  
As noted above, Dawn had stated that Kirstin contradictorily 
told her counselors at Choices Family Services that Denis did 
and did not sexually assault her.  Because that information went 
                                                 
6 According to the cover letter and the affidavit, both 
dated September 13, 2002, the State's subpoena duces tecum was 
requested pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 146.82(2)(a)11.  The subpoena 
was issued by the court pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 968.135 (the 
general statute regarding criminal subpoenas for documents) and 
146.82(2)(a)11.   
 
7 The 
subpoena 
duces 
tecum 
instructed 
Choices 
Family 
Services to turn over all records relating to Kirstin's 
counseling she received at Choices Family Services.  Those 
counseling records have not been made part of the appellate 
record.  Therefore, we cannot determine what the circuit court 
viewed in camera or what information is contained in those 
counseling records. 
No. 
2003AP384-CR   
 
8 
 
to the core of the counseling sessions, the State argued that 
Dawn waived Kirstin's privilege.   
¶17 Denis opposed the State, arguing that Dawn did not 
disclose any significant part of any matter or communication 
because there were multiple purposes for Kirstin attending the 
counseling sessions and because the statements Dawn made 
regarding what Kirstin stated were relatively brief in time 
compared with the length of the overall sessions.  At the motion 
hearing, Dawn testified that she took Kirstin and her sibling to 
Choices to receive counseling for "possible allegations of 
sexual assault and for [the] children to vent out other issues," 
including school problems and "stressors in the family."  She 
stated that the children had two counseling sessions at Choices 
Family Services with Droppers.  Dawn also stated that she was 
present during both of the sessions.  During the sessions, Dawn 
testified 
she 
overheard 
Kirstin 
make 
a 
couple 
of 
brief 
statements to Droppers regarding the alleged sexual assault.  
According to Dawn, Kirstin said that "Pappy's butt touched my 
butt," during one session, and in the other session Kirstin 
denied that anything happened.  Dawn agreed that she told her 
grandmother, Helen, about what she overheard, but maintained 
that she did not intend to waive any privilege by doing so. 
¶18 The court took the matter under advisement.  On 
October 22, 2002, the court, sua sponte, scheduled a hearing to 
determine whether a guardian ad litem should be appointed to 
represent Kirstin's interests.  The State argued that one should 
be appointed because Kirstin's and Dawn's interests did not 
No. 
2003AP384-CR   
 
9 
 
coincide, while Denis opposed the appointment.  On November 11, 
2002, the court concluded that a guardian ad litem would not be 
appointed because it could not "say that [Dawn was] not acting 
in [Kirstin's] best interests." 
¶19 On November 22, 2002, the State moved for an in camera 
interview with Kirstin's counselor from Choices Family Services, 
Droppers.  The court did not decide the issue, and, on December 
20, 2002, the State moved the court to "reconsider or consider 
with finality" the State's motion for a determination that Dawn 
waived Kirstin's counselor-patient privilege. 
¶20 The court concluded that Dawn did waive Kirstin's 
privilege.  Although the statements Dawn overheard and restated 
to Helen were relatively brief in time and did not relate to all 
of the purposes of Kirstin's counseling, the court determined 
that the statements were material and "germane to a significant 
part of the matter being discussed at the time, that is an 
alleged sexual assault."  However, the court found the waiver 
was limited to "only those statements, impressions, opinions, et 
cetera which are attendant to the issues of purported sexual 
assault."  Given the waiver, the court later determined that it 
would schedule an in camera hearing with Droppers to examine 
matters relating to the alleged sexual assault.  The court 
issued an order accordingly. 
¶21 Dawn moved to intervene, claiming that she was "the 
privilege[] 
holder 
under 
§ 905.04, 
Wis. 
Stats. 
for 
the 
counseling records for her daughter, Kirstin R."  Further, "as 
the privilege[] holder for Kirstin, [Dawn] has the right to 
No. 
2003AP384-CR   
 
10 
 
refuse to disclose any privileged information contained in the 
counseling relationship between Kirstin R., [Dawn] (the movant), 
and/or Judy Droppers, [t]he counselor, and/or Choices Family 
Education Services, Inc."  Dawn then alleged that the court's 
conclusion that Dawn waived Kirstin's privilege "impair[ed] 
[Dawn's] ability to protect her interests both in the Trial 
Court and in any appeal of that decision."  Finally, Dawn stated 
that as the privilege holder for Kirstin, "[Dawn's] interests 
are inadequately represented by any of the existing parties of 
this action."  The circuit court allowed her to intervene, and 
she appealed the court's order. 
¶22 In a published decision, the court of appeals affirmed 
the circuit court's order.  State v. Denis L.R., 2004 WI App 51, 
¶1, 270 Wis. 2d 663, 678 N.W.2d 326.  Dawn seeks review. 
II 
¶23 Before setting forth the standard of review, we must 
first set forth what the arguments are in order to refine 
exactly what it is we are reviewing.  The arguments in this case 
have fundamentally evolved since the case was handled by the 
court of appeals.  At the court of appeals, Dawn agreed that the 
privilege belonged to Kirstin, but Dawn argued that as Kirstin's 
natural mother, she was Kirstin's guardian and therefore could 
claim Kirstin's privilege.  See Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 905.04(3).8   
                                                 
8 Wisconsin Stat. (Rule) § 905.04(3) states: "The privilege 
may be claimed by the patient, by the patient's guardian or 
conservator, or by the personal representative of a deceased 
patient."   
No. 
2003AP384-CR   
 
11 
 
¶24 Dawn proceeded to argue that she did not waive 
Kirstin's privilege because the brief statement she overheard 
Kirstin tell the counselor amounted to 30-seconds worth of 
statements in 120 minutes of counseling and because Kirstin was 
at counseling to discuss more than just the sexual assault.  
Under these circumstances, Dawn claimed, she did not disclose 
"any significant part of the matter or communication."  See 
Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 905.11.   
¶25 Dawn also argued she could not have waived the 
privilege because she did not intend to waive the privilege.  
¶26 The State countered by arguing that the waiver inquiry 
should not focus on the statement's brevity when compared with 
the therapy session's overall time.  Instead, the State 
maintained that the statement should be evaluated in light of 
the therapy sessions' purposes.  Because Dawn's statements 
regarding what Kirstin said during counseling concerned one of 
the purposes for which Kirstin was in treatment, that being the 
sexual assault, the State contended that Dawn disclosed a 
"significant part of the matter or communication."  See 
Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 905.11.   
¶27 In response to Dawn's second argument, the State 
claimed that a person need not have a specific intent to waive 
an evidentiary privilege in order for the privilege to be 
waived.  Instead, the State maintained that an evidentiary 
privilege 
is 
waived 
when 
the 
underlying 
statement 
is 
volitionally disclosed.   
No. 
2003AP384-CR   
 
12 
 
¶28 The court of appeals agreed with the State.  See Denis 
L.R., 270 Wis. 2d 663, ¶¶16, 19.   
¶29 Dawn has since switched tactics.  She now argues that 
she was a member in group therapy.  See Wis. Stat. (Rule) 
§ 905.04(2). 
¶30  Alternatively, Dawn contends that she could not have 
waived 
Kirstin's 
privilege 
because 
she 
is 
not 
Kirstin's 
"guardian" for purposes of claiming and waiving Kirstin's 
privilege under Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 905.04(3).9  Looking to other 
statutory sections, Dawn contends that a parent, though a 
"natural guardian," is not a guardian in this instance because 
to be a guardian requires a court appointment or qualification 
to act on behalf of the minor child.10  Similarly, Dawn claims 
                                                 
9 As noted earlier, in Dawn's motion to intervene in the 
circuit court, Dawn claimed she was the privilege holder for 
Kirstin.  With Dawn now arguing she is not Kirstin's privilege 
holder because she is not Kirstin's guardian for purposes of 
Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 905.04, Dawn does not explain how she has 
any interest in this litigation or standing to intervene.  
10 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 48.02(8) ("'Guardian' means the 
person named by the court having the duty and authority of 
guardianship."); Wis. Stat. § 51.40(1)(f) ("'Guardian' means a 
guardian of the person appointed by a court under ch. 880."); 
Wis. Stat. § 146.34(1)(d) ("'Guardian' means the person named by 
the court under ch. 48 or 880 having the duty and authority of 
guardianship."); Wis. Stat. § 880.01(3) ("'Guardian' means one 
appointed by a court to have care, custody and control of the 
person of a minor or an incompetent or the management of the 
estate 
of 
a 
minor, 
an 
incompetent 
or 
a 
spendthrift."); 
Wis. Stat. § 880.81(7) ("'Guardian' means a person appointed or 
qualified by a court as a guardian of the person or estate, or 
both, of an individual, including a limited guardian, but not a 
person 
who 
is 
only 
a 
guardian 
ad 
litem."); 
Wis. Stat. § 938.02(8) ("'Guardian' means the person named by 
the court having the duty and authority of guardianship."). 
No. 
2003AP384-CR   
 
13 
 
that she is not her daughter's conservator, as that term also 
requires appointment or qualification by a court.11   
¶31 Alternatively, she renews her argument that she could 
not have waived Kirstin's privilege because she did not 
knowingly, intentionally, and voluntarily waive it.  See Johnson 
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). 
¶32 The State has responded to Dawn's shifting positions 
by doing the same.  The State now argues that the issue of 
waiver 
is 
irrelevant. 
 
Because 
Kirstin's 
counselors 
had 
reasonable ground to believe that Kirstin was the victim of 
child sexual assault, the State argues there is no privilege at 
all and thus no need to address any of the waiver issues.  See 
Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 905.04(4)(e).   
¶33 The 
State 
then 
makes 
a 
number 
of 
alternative 
arguments.  First, the State maintains that the record does not 
support an implicit circuit court finding that Dawn was a 
participant in group therapy with Kirstin.  Second, the State 
contends that in the courts below, Dawn has conceded that she is 
Kirstin's guardian for purposes of claiming the privilege and 
therefore this court should hold her to that position.  Third, 
the State maintains that as Kirstin's natural guardian, Dawn can 
                                                 
11 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 880.61(3) ("'Conservator' means a 
person appointed or qualified by a court to act as general, 
limited or temporary guardian of a minor's property or a person 
legally 
authorized 
to 
perform 
substantially 
the 
same 
functions."); 
§ 880.81(3) 
("'Conservator'" 
means 
a 
person 
appointed or qualified by a court by voluntary proceedings to 
manage the estate of an individual, or a person legally 
authorized to perform substantially the same functions."). 
No. 
2003AP384-CR   
 
14 
 
claim and waive the privilege.  And finally, the State asserts 
that to waive a privilege requires only a volitional disclosure 
of confidential communications, as opposed to an intentional, 
voluntary, and knowing waiver of the privilege.12    
III 
¶34 Having set forth the arguments, the starting point is 
whether Kirstin has a privilege in the first instance given the 
exception to privilege for child abuse under Wis. Stat. (Rule) 
§ 905.04(4)(e)2.  The resolution of this issue requires an 
interpretation of § 905.04(4)(e)2. 
¶35 The interpretation of court rules present questions of 
law, which we review independently.  See Harold Sampson 
Children's Trust v. Linda Gale Sampson 1979 Trust, 2004 WI 57, 
¶15, 271 Wis. 2d 610, 679 N.W.2d 794.  When we interpret court 
rules, we turn to the rules of statutory construction for 
guidance.  State v. Sorenson, 2000 WI 43, ¶15, 234 Wis. 2d 648, 
611 N.W.2d 240.  We assume that the legislature's and this 
court's intent is expressed in the language of the statute and 
rule.  Id.  Therefore, we begin with the language of the statute 
or rule.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 
                                                 
12 In the trial court, the State sought production of 
confidential records under Wis. Stat. § 146.82(2)(a)11. The 
State now asserts that patient health care records do not 
include records that are subject to Wis. Stat. § 51.30, the 
Mental Health Act.  The State further asserts that pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 51.30(6), §§ 905.03 and 905.04 supersede § 51.30 
with respect to communications between physicians and patients.  
It has not been established in this record that Choices Family 
Services is a Chapter 51 provider or that § 51.30 is applicable 
here.  Nor was this argument presented to the trial court.  We 
therefore decline to treat this as a request under Chapter 51. 
No. 
2003AP384-CR   
 
15 
 
2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  Generally, 
language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning.  
Id.  Further, we consider language "in the context in which it 
is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to 
the language of surrounding or closely-related statutes; and 
reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results."  Id., ¶46.  
Unless this interpretive process yields an ambiguity, our 
inquiry ends.  Id. 
IV 
¶36 Wisconsin Stat. (Rule) 
§ 905.04(2) 
provides 
the 
general rule of privilege.  It states: 
(2) GENERAL RULE OF PRIVILEGE.  A patient has a 
privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any 
other 
person 
from 
disclosing 
confidential 
communications 
made 
or 
information 
obtained 
or 
disseminated for purposes of diagnosis or treatment of 
the patient's physical, mental or emotional condition, 
among 
the 
patient, 
the 
patient's 
physician, the 
patient's 
registered 
nurse, 
the 
patient's 
chiropractor, 
the 
patient's 
psychologist, 
the 
patient's social worker, the patient's marriage and 
family therapist, the patient's professional counselor 
or persons, including members of the patient's family, 
who are participating in the diagnosis or treatment 
under the direction of the physician, registered 
nurse, 
chiropractor, 
psychologist, 
social 
worker, 
marriage 
and 
family 
therapist 
or 
professional 
counselor. 
¶37 The 
therapist-patient 
privilege 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
(Rule) § 905.04(2) is a testimonial rule of evidence.  Steinberg 
v. Jensen, 194 Wis. 2d 439, 464, 534 N.W.2d 361 (1995).  The 
overriding purpose of the therapist-patient privilege is to 
prevent 
the 
unnecessary 
disclosure 
of 
"confidential" 
No. 
2003AP384-CR   
 
16 
 
information.  Id. at 459.  The public policy underpinning this 
privilege is to encourage patients to freely and candidly 
discuss mental health concerns with their therapists by ensuring 
that those concerns will not be unnecessarily disclosed to third 
persons.  See id.   
¶38 However, this privilege is not absolute.  Aside from 
the fact that statutory privileges are to be strictly and 
narrowly construed, Steinberg, 194 Wis. 2d at 464, there are a 
number of exceptions to the therapist-patient privilege set 
forth 
in 
Wis. Stat. (Rule) 
§ 905.04(4). 
 
One 
of 
those 
exceptions, Wis. Stat. § 905.04(4)(e)2., concerns child abuse.  
Section 905.04(4)(e)2 reads:  
There 
is 
no 
privilege 
in 
situations 
where 
the 
examination of an abused or neglected child creates a 
reasonable ground for an opinion of the . . . family 
therapist or professional counselor that the abuse or 
neglect 
was 
other 
than 
accidentally 
caused 
or 
inflicted by another.   
¶39 In Rusecki v. State, 56 Wis. 2d 299, 317-318, 201 
N.W.2d 832 (1972), this court observed that "[w]hile there are 
no Wisconsin cases interpreting [what is now § 905.04(4)(e)2.] 
as applying to other than child abuse juvenile litigations, a 
plain reading would appear to include any case where a child is 
injured other than accidentally."13  We agree.  Our review of the 
                                                 
13 At the time of Rusecki v. State, 56 Wis. 2d 299, 201 
N.W.2d 832 
(1972), 
the 
prior 
version 
of Wis. Stat. (Rule) 
§ 905.04(4)(e), Wis. Stat. § 885.21(1)(f) (1971), provided: 
 
(1) No physician or surgeon shall be permitted to 
disclose any information he may have acquired in 
attending any patient in a professional character, 
No. 
2003AP384-CR   
 
17 
 
statute's language indicates that the child abuse exception 
applies when three criteria are satisfied.   
¶40 The first criterion requires an "examination" of the 
child to have occurred.  There is no requirement that any 
particular person conduct the examination, as Wis. Stat. (Rule) 
§ 905.04(4)(e)2 requires only that an examination occurred.  The 
word examination is not defined in the statute, so we turn to 
ordinary dictionary definitions to determine the word's common 
and ordinary meaning.  See Garcia v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 
2004 WI 93, ¶14, 273 Wis. 2d 612, 682 N.W.2d 365.  An 
examination is "the act or process of examining or state of 
being examined."  Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 790 
(unabr. 1986).  To "examine," in turn, means "to test by an 
appropriate method  . . . to look over:  inspect visually or by 
use of other senses.  . . .  To inspect or test for evidence of 
disease or abnormality.  . . .  To inquire into the state of 
esp. by introspective processes."  Id.  Thus, the term 
"examination" refers to and can encompass a wide variety of 
                                                                                                                                                             
necessary to enable him professionally to serve such 
patient, except only: 
. . . .  
(f) In situations where the examination of an abused 
or injured child creates a reasonable ground for an 
opinion of the physician or surgeon that the condition 
was other than accidentally caused or inflicted by 
another.  
No. 
2003AP384-CR   
 
18 
 
exploratory practices.14  See also, 7 Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin 
Practice: Wisconsin Evidence § 504.4, at 292 (2d ed. 2001) 
(referring 
to 
the 
"examination" 
as 
simply 
an 
"initial 
determination"). 
¶41 The second criterion requires that the examination 
create "a reasonable ground for an opinion" of the enumerated 
providers that the child has been abused or neglected.   
¶42 The third criterion requires that the opinion must 
relate to abuse or neglect that was caused by means other than 
accident or infliction by another.  "Abuse" is broadly defined 
in Wis. Stat. § 48.02(1), but for purposes of this case it 
suffices to note that the definition includes sexual contact.  
See 
Wis. Stat. § 48.02(1)(b); 
Wis. Stat. (Rule) 
§ 905.04(4)(e)1.a.   
¶43 When 
these 
criteria 
are 
satisfied, 
Wis. Stat. 
(Rule) § 905.04(4)(e)2 states that "[t]here is no privilege."  
As 
noted, 
the 
"privilege" 
applies 
to 
"confidential 
                                                 
14 In a brief footnote, and without explanation, the court 
of appeals has stated that the requisite examination is a 
"physical examination" of a possibly abused or neglected child.  
See State ex rel. Klieger v. Alby, 125 Wis. 2d 468, 473 n.7, 373 
N.W.2d 57 (Ct. App. 1985).  Klieger was overruled by Steinberg 
v. Jensen, 194 Wis. 2d 439, 534 N.W.2d 361 (1995), on different 
grounds, 
and, 
to 
the 
extent 
Klieger 
has 
any 
remaining 
precedential value, we withdraw the limitation on the exception 
requiring a physical exam.  We see nothing in the exception that 
limits 
its 
purview 
to 
opinions 
formed 
from 
physical 
examinations.  In fact, most of the enumerated providers in the 
exception are mental health providers.  See 7 Daniel D. Blinka, 
Wisconsin Practice: Wisconsin Evidence § 504.4, at 292 (2d ed. 
2001) ("Most often these cases will involve some form of 
physical abuse, but emotional abuse is also within its aegis."). 
No. 
2003AP384-CR   
 
19 
 
communications made or information obtained or disseminated for 
purposes of . . . treatment of the patient's . . . mental or 
emotional condition . . . . "  Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 905.04(2).  
We agree with the State that these criteria are satisfied here. 
A 
¶44 First, there was an examination of Kirstin.  Dawn 
brought Kirstin and a sibling to Choices Family Services where 
they had two one-hour counseling sessions.  Dawn indicated she 
brought 
her 
children 
to 
Choices 
after 
learning 
of 
the 
possibility that Kirstin was sexually assaulted.15   
¶45 At a motion hearing, Dawn testified the purpose of the 
counseling sessions was to "rationalize and reason out what was 
going on."  The record contains little information about the 
counseling sessions, other than that the counselors utilized a 
form of "play therapy" during which time Kirstin stated, and 
recanted, 
that 
Denis 
put 
his 
"butt" 
in 
her 
"butt."  
Nevertheless, we conclude the record establishes that an 
examination of Kirstin occurred. 
B 
¶46 The second and third criteria are also satisfied 
because there was a reasonable ground for an opinion of one of 
the enumerated providers in Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 905.04(4)(e)2. 
that Kirstin had been abused or neglected and that the abuse or 
                                                 
15 Dawn stated she also brought Kirstin and her sibling to 
Choices to address other family issues. 
No. 
2003AP384-CR   
 
20 
 
neglect was by means other than accident or infliction by 
another.   
¶47 This conclusion flows from the consideration of what 
Kirstin stated to Droppers at Choices Family Services during the 
counseling sessions followed by what Fears did in reaction to 
those statements.  As already noted, during the counseling 
sessions, Kirstin stated that Denis put his "butt" in her 
"butt."  After the counseling sessions, Fears, the clinical 
director of Choices Family Services contacted the police to 
report 
Denis 
for 
sexually 
assaulting 
Kirstin, 
presumably 
pursuant to his mandatory reporting obligation. 
¶48 According to Wis. Stat. § 48.981(2), counselors are 
legally required to report to the authorities if the counselor 
has "reasonable cause to suspect" that the child "has been 
abused or neglected."16  Wisconsin Stat. § 48.981(3)(a) further 
                                                 
16 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.981(2)(a) provides: 
Any of the following persons who has reasonable cause 
to suspect that a child seen by the person in the 
course of professional duties has been abused or 
neglected or who has reason to believe that a child 
seen by the person in the course of professional 
duties has been threatened with abuse or neglect and 
that abuse or neglect of the child will occur shall, 
except as provided under sub. (2m), report as provided 
in sub. (3): 
. . . .  
9. A medical or mental health professional not 
otherwise specified in this paragraph. 
. . . .  
11. A marriage and family therapist 
No. 
2003AP384-CR   
 
21 
 
requires the counselor to inform the authorities of "the facts 
and circumstances contributing to a suspicion of child abuse or 
neglect . . . ."  Id.  Reports and records of suspected child 
abuse, even though confidential, may be reported to law 
enforcement officers and agencies, as well as a district 
attorney, 
for 
purposes 
of 
investigation 
or 
prosecution.  
Wis. Stat. § 48.981(7)(a)8.  
¶49 The meaning of these mandatory reporting statutes was 
explained in State v. Hurd, 135 Wis. 2d 266, 272-73, 400 N.W.2d 
42 (Ct. App. 1986).  In Hurd, an administrator of a boys' youth 
ranch, was charged with violating the reporting statute's 
mandatory reporting requirements after learning that one of the 
adults residing at the ranch made advances toward some, and 
sexually assaulted at least one, of the boys.  Id. at 270.  He 
argued that the above-mentioned mandatory reporting standards 
were unconstitutionally vague.  Id. at 271.  The court of 
appeals disagreed.  Id. 
¶50 The court initially determined that "the reasonable 
cause to suspect" that the child "has been abused or neglected" 
standard required an examination of "the totality of the facts 
and circumstances actually known to, and as viewed from the 
standpoint of, [the defendant]."  Id. at 272-73.  According to 
the court of appeals, the test is "whether a prudent person 
would have had reasonable cause to suspect child abuse if 
                                                                                                                                                             
12. A professional counselor. 
No. 
2003AP384-CR   
 
22 
 
presented with the same totality of circumstances as that 
acquired and viewed by the defendant."  Id. at 273.17   
¶51 The court then focused attention on the meaning of the 
term "suspicion" in Wis. Stat. § 48.981(3)'s requirement that 
the 
person 
inform 
the 
authorities 
of 
"the 
facts 
and 
circumstances contributing to a suspicion of child abuse."  Id. 
at 272.  Turning to the ordinary dictionary definition of the 
word, the court of appeals observed that "suspicion" means a 
"belief or opinion based upon facts or circumstances which do 
not amount to proof."   Id. at 274 (citation and quotation 
omitted).   
¶52 Viewing these standards together, the court of appeals 
concluded the "reasonable cause to suspect" standard ultimately 
"involves a belief, based on evidence but short of proof, that 
an ordinary person would reach as to the existence of child 
abuse."  Id.   
¶53 The court of appeals in Hurd recognized that a 
counselor's reporting requirement centers on a reasonable belief 
or opinion based on the totality of circumstances that the child 
has been abused.  We conclude that this test is analogous to 
Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 905.04(4)(e)2.'s "reasonable ground for an 
                                                 
17 Although the test utilized a standard of reasonableness, 
the court noted similar standards were employed in other 
substantive crimes and areas of criminal law.  State v. Hurd, 
135 Wis. 2d 266, 273, 400 N.W.2d 42 (Ct. App. 1986). 
No. 
2003AP384-CR   
 
23 
 
opinion" standard.18  Where a counselor reports child abuse under 
Wis. Stat. § 48.981(2) and (3), that counselor has expressed a 
"reasonable ground for an opinion  . . . that the abuse or 
neglect was other than accidentally caused or inflicted by 
another."  See Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 905.04(4)(e)2.19   
¶54 Here, Fears formed a reasonable suspicion that child 
abuse occurred, as he informed the police "that he became aware 
of the fact that a 3-year old girl had made admission that her 
grandfather had sexually assaulted her on several occasions."  
Thus, 
according 
to 
the 
reporting 
obligations 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 48.981 and in light of Hurd, it necessarily means 
that he had reasonable grounds to form an opinion that Kirstin 
had been abused.  Further, from the totality of circumstances 
surrounding the nature of the allegations, there is no doubt 
that Fears' opinion was premised on his suspicion that the abuse 
was other than accidentally caused.   
¶55 Accordingly, 
because 
the 
strictures 
of 
Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 905.04(4)(e)2. have been met, there is no 
privilege with regard to any confidential communications Kirstin 
                                                 
18 That 
is 
to 
say, 
the 
counselor's 
opinion 
is 
not 
necessarily the equivalent of an expert's testimonial opinion 
that answers an ultimate issue of fact, which ordinarily must be 
stated to a reasonable degree of certainty.   
19 This syllogism will not always hold true.  Those required 
to report under Wis. Stat. § 48.981 include many persons not 
mentioned in Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 905.04(4)(e)2.  Thus, for 
example, if a teacher has a reasonable suspicion that a child is 
abused, and that child has been seeing a counselor, the 
teacher's reporting does not abrogate the child's counselor-
patient relationship. 
No. 
2003AP384-CR   
 
24 
 
made at Choices Family Services regarding the sexual assault for 
purposes of treatment.20  See Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 905.04(2) 
("privilege" refers to "confidential communications made or 
information 
obtained 
or 
disseminated 
for 
purposes 
of 
 . . . treatment of the patient's . . . mental or emotional 
condition . . . . ").   
¶56 The State seeks an in camera review of Droppers.  
However, the record is silent as to whether Droppers has any 
information that is relevant to the sexual assault.  A 
reasonable inference could be drawn to support this position, 
but there is no indication of this in the record.  Further, in 
connection with the trial court's review of Kirstin's records 
that were turned over because of Fears' opinion, we do not know 
which records were examined or what is contained in those 
records.  All that we do know is that Dawn overheard Kirstin 
tell Droppers that Denis did and did not sexually assault her.  
Assuming 
this 
information 
is 
not 
contained 
in 
Kirstin's 
counseling records, Droppers may have information that has not 
been reduced to writing that is relevant to either the State or 
to Denis in the prosecution of this case.   
                                                 
20 We limit the breadth of the exception's application 
because Kirstin went to counseling for many reasons.  The 
exception applies to the extent that any communications made for 
mental health treatment regarding the sexual abuse are not 
privileged.  Kirstin's other communications that related to 
other reasons for attending counseling remain privileged, unless 
they relate to the opinion that Kirstin was abused or neglected. 
No. 
2003AP384-CR   
 
25 
 
¶57 If Droppers has such information, then, consistent 
with our conclusion above, that information is not privileged.  
As that information is not privileged, there is no need for an 
in camera review.  The parties may ask Droppers about any 
communications Kirstin made during therapy for mental health 
treatment regarding the sexual abuse.21 
                                                 
21 This conclusion does not do violence to Kirstin's 
substantive right to confidentiality to her patient health 
records under Wis. Stat. § 146.82(1).  See State v. Allen, 200 
Wis. 2d 301, 311, 546 N.W.2d 517 (Ct. App. 1996).   
In Allen, the court of appeals held that information 
covered 
by 
the 
evidentiary 
privilege 
statute, 
Wis. Stat. 
(Rule) § 905.04, 
and 
confidentiality 
of 
records 
statute, 
§ 146.82, will overlap in many instances "because a patient's 
health care record under § 146.82 may often include a record of 
a confidential communication between the patient and a health 
care provider under  § 905.04."  Id. at 309.  The court of 
appeals concluded that "although §§ 146.82 and 905.04 are 
recited in different chapters of the statutes, they both address 
the confidential or privileged status of health care information 
and communications."  Id.  Accordingly, they must be read 
together in pari materia to avoid any conflicts, as "they 
represent a collective statement as to the reach and limits of 
the confidentiality and privilege which attach to such records 
or communications."  Id. at 309-10. 
No. 
2003AP384-CR   
 
26 
 
V 
¶58 In sum, we conclude that there is no privilege here 
because an examination of Kirstin created a reasonable ground 
for an opinion that she was abused and that her abuse was other 
than accidentally caused or inflicted by another.  Because there 
is no privilege with respect to any communications Kirstin made 
for purposes of mental health treatment related to the sexual 
abuse, there is no need for an in camera review of Droppers.  
The 
parties 
may 
ask 
Droppers 
questions 
regarding 
any 
communications Kirstin made for purposes of treatment that is 
relevant to the prosecution or defense of Denis for the sexual 
assault. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals, and remand this matter to the trial court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
By the Court.—Affirmed and cause remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
                                                                                                                                                             
This case does not directly involve patient health care 
records, though, as the trial court has already examined them in 
camera for material information.  Still, if there is a 
communication documented in Kirstin's health care records that 
was 
missed, 
requiring 
Droppers 
to 
testify 
as 
to 
that 
communication 
does 
not 
violate 
Kirstin's 
right 
to 
confidentiality because there is also an exception to patient 
confidentiality 
for 
child 
abuse. 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 146.82(2)(a)11. provides that a patient's health care records 
"shall be released . . . [t]o a  . . . district attorney for 
purposes of investigation of threatened or suspected child abuse 
or neglect . . . or for  purposes of prosecution of alleged 
child 
abuse 
or 
neglect, 
if 
the 
person 
conducting 
the 
investigation or prosecution identifies the subject of the 
record by name."  Those records can then be disclosed for 
purposes of investigation or prosecution.  See id. citing 
Wis. Stat. § 48.981(7)(a)8. 
No. 
2003AP384-CR   
 
 
 
1