Title: Debaun v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC13-2336
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: March 16, 2017

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC13-2336 
____________ 
 
GARY G. DEBAUN, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Respondent. 
 
[March 16, 2017] 
 
CANADY, J. 
 
In this case we consider whether the term “sexual intercourse” as used in the 
context of a statutory scheme enacted to prevent the spread of sexually 
transmissible diseases encompasses conduct beyond penile-vaginal intercourse. 
We have for review State v. Debaun, 129 So. 3d 1089, 1095 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013), 
in which the Third District Court of Appeal held that the term “sexual intercourse” 
as used in section 384.24(2), Florida Statutes (2011), encompasses conduct beyond 
penile-vaginal intercourse, including oral and anal intercourse between two men.  
The Third District certified that its decision is in direct conflict with L.A.P. v. 
State, 62 So. 3d 693, 694-95 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011), in which the Second District 
 
 
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held that the term “sexual intercourse” as used in section 384.24(2) applies only to 
“the penetration of the female sex organ by the male sex organ.”  We have 
jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  Because we conclude that the term 
“sexual intercourse” in section 384.24(2) encompasses conduct beyond penile-
vaginal intercourse, we approve the decision of the Third District in Debaun and 
disapprove the decision of the Second District in L.A.P. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
In 2011, Gary G. Debaun was charged with violating section 384.24(2), 
Florida Statutes (2011), which provides: 
It is unlawful for any person who has human immunodeficiency 
virus infection, when such person knows he or she is infected with 
this disease and when such person has been informed that he or she 
may communicate this disease to another person through sexual 
intercourse, to have sexual intercourse with any other person, unless 
such other person has been informed of the presence of the sexually 
transmissible disease and has consented to the sexual intercourse. 
The charge arose from a homosexual relationship between Debaun and the 
victim, C.M.  Debaun, 129 So. 3d at 1090.  Before engaging in sexual activity with 
Debaun, C.M. requested that Debaun provide him with a laboratory report 
confirming that Debaun was not infected with human immunodeficiency virus 
(HIV).  Id.  Debaun obliged and provided C.M. with a lab report indicating that he 
was HIV negative.  Id.  But after engaging in oral and anal intercourse with 
Debaun, C.M. learned that Debaun had forged his doctor’s signature on the lab 
 
 
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report and was in fact HIV positive.  Id.  C.M. reported the crime and assisted law 
enforcement in obtaining admissions from Debaun during a controlled phone call.  
Debaun was subsequently charged with violating section 384.24(2), a third-degree 
felony.1 
Debaun moved to dismiss the charge under Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.190(c)(4), arguing that the term “sexual intercourse,” which is not 
defined in chapter 384, applies only to penetration of the female sex organ by the 
male sex organ.  Id. at 1091.  The trial court granted Debaun’s motion to dismiss 
based on the decision of the Second District in L.A.P., 62 So. 3d at 694-95, which 
held that the term “sexual intercourse” in section 384.24(2) applies only to penile-
vaginal intercourse between a male and a female.  Id.  The State appealed.  Id.   
On appeal, the Third District rejected the holding of L.A.P. and concluded 
that the “meaning of the term ‘sexual intercourse’ as used in section 384.24(2) 
includes more than an act where a male’s penis is placed inside a female’s vagina, 
and encompasses the oral and anal sexual activity” in which Debaun engaged with 
the victim.  Id. at 1095.  The court reversed the order dismissing the charge against 
Debaun and certified conflict with L.A.P.  Id.   
                                          
 
 
1.  See § 384.34(5), Fla. Stat. (2011) (“Any person who violates s. 384.24(2) 
commits a felony of the third degree . . . .  Any person who commits multiple 
violations of s. 384.24(2) commits a felony of the first degree . . . .”). 
 
 
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In reaching its conclusion that section 384.24(2) applied to conduct beyond 
penile-vaginal intercourse, the Third District ascertained the plain and ordinary 
meaning of “sexual intercourse” from an edition of Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary that was published the same year that section 384.24(2) 
was enacted, defining “sexual intercourse” as either “heterosexual intercourse 
involving penetration of the vagina by the penis” or “intercourse involving genital 
contact between individuals other than penetration of the vagina by the penis.”  Id. 
at 1091 (citing Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2082 (1986)).  
Having determined that “the plain and ordinary meaning of the term ‘sexual 
intercourse’ as used in section 384.24(2) includes more than an act where a male’s 
penis is placed inside a female’s vagina” and recognizing that it would thwart 
legislative intent to interpret the statute as prohibiting only penetration of the 
vagina by the penis, the court concluded that Debaun “engaged in acts which fall 
within the plain and ordinary meaning of the term ‘sexual intercourse’ as used in 
section 384.24(2).”  Id. at 1091-92. 
The Third District found support for its conclusion within the legislative 
history of chapter 384.  Prior to the enactment of the Control of Sexually 
Transmissible Disease Act in 1986, chapter 384 was known as the Venereal 
Diseases Act.  Id. at 1093.  Under the Venereal Diseases Act, it was “unlawful for 
any female afflicted with any venereal disease, knowing of such condition, to have 
 
 
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sexual intercourse with any male person, or for any male person afflicted with any 
venereal disease, knowing of such condition, to have sexual intercourse with any 
female.”  § 384.02, Fla. Stat. (1985), repealed by ch. 86-220, § 91, Laws of Fla.  In 
1986, when the Venereal Diseases Act was repealed and replaced by the Control of 
Sexually Transmissible Disease Act, and section 384.02 was replaced by section 
384.24, the application of the Act was expanded from only sexual intercourse 
between “any female . . . with any male person” and “any male person . . . with any 
female” to sexual intercourse between “any person . . . with any other person.”  
Compare § 384.02, Fla. Stat. (1985), with § 384.24, Fla. Stat. (1986).  The Third 
District concluded that these changes to the statutory scheme in chapter 384 
evinced the Legislature’s intent to expand the definition of “sexual intercourse” 
beyond conduct involving only a man and a woman.  Debaun, 129 So. 3d at 1094.   
In L.A.P., which was decided two years before Debaun, the Second District 
concluded “that sexual intercourse is an unambiguous phrase which must be given 
its plain meaning in the absence of a definition in chapter 384.”  62 So. 3d at 694.  
In order to ascertain the plain meaning of the term, the court relied on the 
definition of “sexual intercourse” provided in section 826.04, Florida Statutes, 
which prohibits incest.  The incest statute defines “sexual intercourse” as “the 
penetration of the female sex organ by the male sex organ . . . .”  Id. (alteration in 
original) (quoting § 826.04, Fla. Stat. (2008)).  Based on this definition, the Second 
 
 
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District concluded that the Legislature’s use of the term “sexual intercourse within 
section 384.24(2) is clear[ly] and unambiguous[ly]” limited to heterosexual penile-
vaginal intercourse, and therefore “the statute d[id] not apply to [L.A.P.’s] 
actions”—“engaging in oral sex and digital penetration of the vagina without 
informing her partner of her HIV positive status.”  Id. at 694-95. 
During the pendency of Debaun’s appeal, the Fifth District also considered 
the scope of the term “sexual intercourse” in section 384.24(2).  See State v. D.C., 
114 So. 3d 440 (Fla. 5th DCA), review dismissed, 123 So. 3d 557 (Fla. 2013) 
(table).  Like Debaun, the defendant in D.C. was charged with violating section 
384.24(2) after engaging in oral and anal intercourse with another man without 
first disclosing that he was HIV positive.  Id. at 441.  D.C. moved to dismiss the 
charge, “contending that sexual intercourse, as that term is used in section 
384.24(2), takes place only when the female sex organ is penetrated by the male 
sex organ and, therefore, the statute did not apply to [his] alleged conduct, which 
involved homosexual oral and anal sex” between two men.  Id.  The trial court 
granted the motion and dismissed the charge based on the Second District’s earlier 
decision in L.A.P., and the State appealed.  Id. at 440-41, 443.   
On appeal, the Fifth District sought to “determine the plain and obvious 
meaning of [the] statute’s text by referring to dictionaries.”  Id. at 442.  After 
reciting a number of definitions from various dictionaries, the court noted that none 
 
 
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of the definitions uncovered by the court or cited by D.C. limited “sexual 
intercourse” to “heterosexual vaginal intercourse.”  Id.  The Fifth District therefore 
concluded that “the plain and ordinary meaning of the term sexual intercourse, as 
used in section 384.24(2), includes vaginal, anal, and oral intercourse between 
persons, regardless of their gender.”  Id.  The court stated that limiting the meaning 
of “sexual intercourse” in the statute to penile-vaginal intercourse “would lead to 
‘a result clearly contrary to legislative intent.’ ”  Id. (quoting State v. Burris, 875 
So. 2d 408, 410 (Fla. 2004)).  In reversing the trial court’s order dismissing the 
information, the Fifth District also certified conflict with the Second District’s 
decision in L.A.P.2  Id. at 443. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
In the analysis that follows, we first consider the plain and ordinary meaning 
of the term “sexual intercourse” and conclude that it is not limited to only penile-
vaginal intercourse.  We then conclude that the plain and ordinary meaning of 
“sexual intercourse” controls in section 384.24(2) because it effectuates the 
legislative intent of the statute.  Lastly, in light of the plain and ordinary meaning 
and the legislative intent, we explain why the definitions of “sexual intercourse” 
                                          
 
 
2.  D.C. sought review of the decision in this Court based on the certified 
conflict with L.A.P., but because he failed to timely file his notice to invoke this 
Court’s jurisdiction, the case was dismissed.  D.C. v. State, 123 So. 3d 557 (Fla. 
2013) (table). 
 
 
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provided in the incest statute and referenced in the case law cited in L.A.P. are not 
applicable to section 384.24(2).  
The narrow issue before the Court is whether the term “sexual intercourse” 
as used in section 384.24(2) is limited to conduct involving the penetration of the 
female sex organ by the male sex organ or whether it encompasses conduct beyond 
penile-vaginal intercourse.  This presents a question of statutory interpretation, 
which is subject to de novo review.  Anucinski v. State, 148 So. 3d 106, 108 (Fla. 
2014). 
With regard to questions of statutory interpretation, we have stated: 
Our purpose in construing a statute is to give effect to the 
Legislature’s intent.  When a statute is clear, courts will not look 
behind the statute’s plain language for legislative intent or resort to 
rules of statutory construction to ascertain intent.  Instead, the statute’s 
plain and ordinary meaning must control, unless this leads to an 
unreasonable result or a result clearly contrary to legislative intent. 
Paul v. State, 129 So. 3d 1058, 1064 (Fla. 2013) (quoting Burris, 875 So. 2d at 
410).  “Where, as here, the [L]egislature has not defined the words used in a 
[statute], the language should be given its plain and ordinary meaning.”  Sch. Bd. 
of Palm Beach Cnty. v. Survivors Charter Sch., Inc., 3 So. 3d 1220, 1233 (Fla. 
2009) (second alteration in original) (quoting Fla. Birth-Related Neurological 
Injury Comp. Ass’n v. Fla. Div. of Admin. Hearings, 686 So. 2d 1349, 1354 (Fla. 
1997)).  “When considering the [plain] meaning of terms used in a statute, this 
Court looks first to the terms’ ordinary definitions[, which] . . . may be derived 
 
 
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from dictionaries.”  Dudley v. State, 139 So. 3d 273, 279 (Fla. 2014) (second and 
third alterations in original) (quoting Trinidad v. Fla. Peninsula Ins. Co., 121 So. 
3d 433, 439 (Fla. 2013)); see also E.A.R. v. State, 4 So. 3d 614, 632 (Fla. 2009); 
Barco v. Sch. Bd. of Pinellas Cnty., 975 So. 2d 1116, 1122 (Fla. 2008).  Because 
the Legislature did not define “sexual intercourse” in chapter 384, we look to the 
dictionary in order to ascertain the plain and ordinary meaning of the term. 
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines “sexual intercourse” 
as both “heterosexual intercourse involving penetration of the vagina by the penis” 
and “intercourse involving genital contact between individuals other than 
penetration of the vagina by the penis.”  Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary 2082 (1993).  The American Heritage Dictionary defines “sexual 
intercourse” as “[s]exual union between a male and a female involving insertion of 
the penis into the vagina” and “[s]exual activity that includes insertion of the penis 
into the anus or mouth.”  The American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language 1606 (5th ed. 2011).  Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines 
“intercourse” as “physical sexual contact between individuals that involves the 
genitalia of at least one person.”  Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 652 
(11th ed. 2014).  Thus, the plain meaning of “sexual intercourse” clearly 
encompass acts beyond penile-vaginal intercourse.  Because this Court must apply 
the plain meaning of the term unless doing so would render an absurd result or a 
 
 
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result clearly contrary to legislative intent, we turn next to a discussion of the 
legislative intent behind the statute.  
Chapter 384 is known as the “Control of Sexually Transmissible Disease 
Act.”  § 384.21, Fla. Stat. (2011).  It is contained within Title XXIX of the Florida 
Statutes, which is titled “Public Health.”  Section 384.22 explicitly sets forth the 
legislative intent and purpose of the Act as follows: 
The Legislature finds and declares that sexually transmissible 
diseases constitute a serious and sometimes fatal threat to the public 
and individual health and welfare of the people of the state and to 
visitors to the state.  The Legislature finds that the incidence of 
sexually transmissible diseases is rising at an alarming rate and that 
these diseases result in significant social, health, and economic costs, 
including infant and maternal mortality, temporary and lifelong 
disability, and premature death.  The Legislature finds that sexually 
transmissible diseases, by their nature, involve sensitive issues of 
privacy, and it is the intent of the Legislature that all programs 
designed to deal with these diseases afford patients privacy, 
confidentiality, and dignity.  The Legislature finds that medical 
knowledge and information about sexually transmissible diseases are 
rapidly changing.  The Legislature intends to provide a program that is 
sufficiently flexible to meet emerging needs, deals efficiently and 
effectively with reducing the incidence of sexually transmissible 
diseases, and provides patients with a secure knowledge that 
information they provide will remain private and confidential. 
§ 384.22, Fla. Stat. (2011) (emphasis added).  Within the Act, section 384.24(2) 
seeks to further the Legislature’s intent to reduce the incidence of sexually 
transmissible diseases by making it unlawful for any person with HIV to 
knowingly expose another person to HIV through sexual intercourse without 
 
 
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informing the other person of the presence of the disease and obtaining that 
person’s consent to the intercourse and exposure to the disease. 
According to the CDC, HIV can be spread through vaginal, anal, and oral 
sex, but anal sex presents the greatest risk of transmitting the infection.  Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, HIV Transmission, 
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/basics/transmission.html (last visited March 1, 2017).  
Further, although gay, bisexual, and other men who have sex with men represent 
only about 2% of the United States population, they are the population most 
severely affected by HIV.  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Fact Sheet: 
HIV Among Gay and Bisexual Men (Sept. 2016), 
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/pdf/group/msm/cdc-hiv-msm.pdf.  In 2014, gay and 
bisexual men accounted for the majority (67%) of new HIV infections, as well as 
the majority of all people (55%) living with HIV in the United States as of 2013.  
Id. 
When the plain meaning of the term “sexual intercourse”—which includes 
oral and anal intercourse between two men—is applied to section 384.24(2), the 
statute acts to prohibit HIV-positive individuals from engaging in the sexual acts 
that are most likely to transmit the infection to a sexual partner without informing 
the partner of the presence of the infection and obtaining the partner’s consent to 
the intercourse despite the presence of the infection.  This is a reasonable result, 
 
 
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which gives full effect to the Legislature’s intent to reduce the incidence of HIV.  
Thus, the plain meaning of the term controls in section 384.24(2). 
Lastly, we explain why although “[i]n the absence of a statutory definition, it 
is permissible to look to case law or related statutory provisions that define the 
term,” L.A.P., 62 So. 3d at 694 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Brake, 796 
So. 2d 522, 528 (Fla. 2001)), the definitions of “sexual intercourse” provided in the 
incest statute and referenced in the cases cited by the Second District in L.A.P. are 
not applicable to section 384.24(2). 
First, when a court looks to other statutory provisions to define a term that 
lacks its own statutory definition, the provision to which a court looks must be 
related to the provision lacking a definition.  “[T]he incest statute addresses ‘the 
violation of generally accepted societal standards involving marriage and sexual 
intercourse between persons related within the specified degrees.  Society’s 
interests in prohibiting incest include the prevention of pregnancies which may 
involve a high risk of abnormal or defective offspring.’ ”  Beam v. State, 1 So. 3d 
331, 334 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (quoting Slaughter v. State, 538 So. 2d 509, 512 
(Fla. 1st DCA 1989)); see also Carnes v. State, 725 So. 2d 417, 418 (Fla. 2d DCA 
1999) (“The obvious purpose of the incest statute is to address the evil of sexual 
intercourse between persons who are related to each other within specific 
degrees.”).  Section 384.24(2), which is located in a different chapter and under a 
 
 
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different title than the incest statute, addresses a separate evil and is not related to 
the incest statute.   
Second, application of the definition of “sexual intercourse” provided in the 
incest statute (“penetration of the female sex organ by the male sex organ”) to 
section 384.24(2) would fail to give full effect to the statute and the legislative 
intent of chapter 384 by excluding from the statute’s ambit both the type of sexual 
intercourse with the highest risk of communicating HIV and the category of 
individuals accounting for the majority of existing and new HIV infections.  
Application of such a limited definition would exempt from prosecution HIV-
positive individuals who knowingly expose their unwitting partners to HIV by 
engaging in penile-anal or penile-oral intercourse.  HIV-positive individuals could 
engage in homosexual activity with impunity while those engaging in heterosexual 
activity would need only avoid penile-vaginal intercourse in order to circumvent 
the law.  Nothing in the statutory text or context indicates that the Legislature 
intended to reduce the incidence of HIV only among those who partake exclusively 
in heterosexual penile-vaginal intercourse while allowing the incidence of HIV to 
continue to “ris[e] at an alarming rate,” section 384.22, Florida Statutes, among 
those engaging in penile-anal or penile-oral intercourse with a member of the same 
or opposite sex.  Such incongruous results would vitiate the intent of the 
Legislature to curtail the spread of HIV. 
 
 
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Because the incest statute is directed at the prevention of certain pregnancies 
there is no reason for the term “sexual intercourse” as used in that statute to 
encompass any act beyond penile-vaginal intercourse.  But as used in a statute 
directed at curtailing the spread of HIV—which can be communicated through 
vaginal, anal, and oral intercourse, and is in fact most likely to be spread through 
anal intercourse—it would be absurd for the term “sexual intercourse” to apply 
only to the act of heterosexual penile-vaginal intercourse.  If the Legislature 
intended to exclude from section 384.24(2) knowing and unconsented exposure to 
HIV through oral or anal sexual intercourse, it could have provided a specific and 
limited definition of “sexual intercourse,” just as it did in the incest statute. 
In addition to the incest statute, the Second District in L.A.P. relied on four 
cases in support of its conclusion that the definition of “sexual intercourse” 
provided in the incest statute limits the use of the term in section 384.24(2) to 
penile-vaginal intercourse.  One of those cases, Green v. State, 765 So. 2d 910 
(Fla. 2d DCA 2000), did not define “sexual intercourse.”  Two of those cases, State 
v. Bowden, 18 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 1944), and Williams v. State, 109 So. 305 (Fla. 
1926), considered the definition of the term as applied to the obsolete crime of 
carnal intercourse with an unmarried female of previous chaste character under the 
age of eighteen years.  And the fourth case, Lanier v. State, 443 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 3d 
DCA 1983), decision quashed, 464 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 1985), merely relied on the 
 
 
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definition in Williams.  None of those cases compel us to impose a limitation on 
the application of section 384.24(2) to only penile-vaginal intercourse.  Further, the 
Second District ignored more recent case law in which the term “sexual 
intercourse” was used to describe homosexual conduct.  E.g., Hawker v. State, 951 
So. 2d 945 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (using the term “sexual intercourse” throughout 
the opinion to refer to conduct between two males); Grohs v. State, 944 So. 2d 450, 
457 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (referring to “sexual intercourse” involving two males). 
Finally, we reject the suggestion that the rule of lenity in section 775.021(1), 
Florida Statutes, requires that we adopt the restricted definition of “sexual 
intercourse” urged by Debaun.  The rule “that criminal statutes must be strictly 
construed does not require that the words of an enactment be given their narrowest 
meaning or that the lawmaker’s evident intent be disregarded.”  United States v. 
Giles, 300 U.S. 41, 48 (1937) (citing United States v. Corbett, 215 U.S. 233, 242 
(1909)).  The term “sexual intercourse” is commonly understood to broadly refer to 
various sexual acts—including the sexual act at issue here.  In certain contexts, the 
term refers specifically—that is, more narrowly—to penile-vaginal intercourse.  
But in the context of section 384.24(2), “sexual intercourse” unambiguously 
denotes sexual conduct that includes acts of oral and anal intercourse. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
 
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The term “sexual intercourse” in section 384.24(2) encompasses conduct 
beyond heterosexual penile-vaginal intercourse.  We therefore approve the Third 
District’s decision in Debaun and disapprove the Second District’s decision in 
L.A.P. to the extent that it conflicts with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, and POLSTON, JJ., 
concur. 
LAWSON, J., did not participate. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Third District - Case No. 3D11-3094 
 
 
(Monroe County) 
 
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Brian Lee Ellison, Assistant Public 
Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; Richard L. Polin, Bureau 
Chief, and Joanne Diez and Jeffrey R. Geldens, Assistant Attorneys General, 
Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent