Title: Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility v. Donald K. Kraemer
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1994AP002563-D
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 1, 1996

No. 94-2563-D 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
 
 
 
No.  94-2563-D 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN             :                IN SUPREME COURT 
                                                                   
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against DONALD J. KRAEMER, Attorney at Law. 
 
FILED 
 
 
MAY 1, 1996 
 
 
 Marilyn L. Graves 
  Clerk of Supreme Court 
  
Madison, WI  
 
                                                                
   
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding. 
 
Attorney's 
license 
suspended. 
 
PER 
CURIAM.   The 
Board 
of 
Attorneys 
Professional 
Responsibility (Board) appealed from the referee's conclusions of 
law in respect to the professional misconduct of Attorney Donald 
J. Kraemer in having engaged in sexual contact with a client and 
from the recommendation that Attorney Kraemer be publicly 
reprimanded for that misconduct and receive a private reprimand 
for his neglect of that client's legal matter.  The Board 
contended that the referee's application of a rule of professional 
conduct to conduct that occurred several years prior to the 
 
No. 94-2563-D 
 
 
 
2 
effective date of the rule was improper and that the applicable 
rules were those in effect at the time of the misconduct.   
 
We determine that the applicable professional conduct rules 
are those that were in effect when Attorney Kraemer's misconduct 
occurred, not the rule subsequently enacted.  On the issue of 
discipline, we determine that the seriousness of Attorney 
Kraemer's having unsolicited sexual contact with a client, 
together with his neglect of a legal matter, warrants the 
suspension of his license to practice law for six months.  
Attorney Kraemer used his professional position in the attorney-
client 
relationship 
for 
purposes 
of 
his 
own 
personal 
gratification, violating thereby the fundamental duty of trust 
inherent in the position he assumed as lawyer for his client.   
 
Attorney Kraemer was admitted to practice law in Wisconsin in 
1962 and practices in Waukesha.  In 1991, the Board publicly 
reprimanded him for having had his secretary sign and notarize a 
client's name on a notice of personal injury claim to be filed 
with the state and falsely stating to the Board in its 
investigation of the matter that he had no knowledge of the 
forgery.  That reprimand was imposed also for his neglect in 
filing the notice of claim late.  The referee in this proceeding, 
Attorney Joan Kessler, made findings of fact based on testimony 
and evidence presented at a disciplinary hearing, and those 
findings are not disputed.   
 
No. 94-2563-D 
 
 
 
3 
 
In May, 1985, dissatisfied with the representation provided 
by a law firm she had retained to represent her in a personal 
injury matter, a woman retained the law firm at which Attorney 
Kraemer was employed.  Attorney Kraemer became acquainted with the 
woman while he was working on her legal matter.  In August, 1987, 
when it appeared the personal injury action would go to trial, the 
matter was transfered to another attorney in the office but that 
transfer of responsibility was not made known to the client.  The 
referee found that a "sexual relationship" began between Attorney 
Kraemer and the client, with a number of sexual contacts between 
the two occurring at the client's apartment, while the personal 
injury matter was pending with the law firm but after Attorney 
Kraemer ceased any personal involvement in it.   
 
Sometime after the client's claim was settled in early March, 
1988, Attorney Kraemer gave the woman expensive jewelry, which she 
accepted, and sexual intimacy followed.  The referee considered 
the gift and its retention as reflecting the voluntary and mutual 
nature of the sexual relationship between the client and Attorney 
Kraemer.   
 
Following the gift, there was no contact between Attorney 
Kraemer and the client until the woman called Attorney Kraemer in 
1992 for legal assistance in pursuing support arrearages and other 
payments that had been ordered in a paternity matter concerning 
the child the woman had in March, 1990, fathered by a man she had 
expected to marry.  The woman had called several other attorneys 
 
No. 94-2563-D 
 
 
 
4 
to represent her but was unable to pay the hourly fees of $120 to 
$130 they had requested.  The woman offered to pay Attorney 
Kraemer an hourly fee of $25 or $30 and he agreed to represent her 
but did not charge her a fee.  While representing her in that 
matter, sexual contact occurred between them.   
 
In the course of the representation, Attorney Kraemer 
obtained but neglected to record a judgment for child support 
arrearages and medical payments to which the woman was entitled.  
The client herself recorded a judgment lien prior to the sale of 
real estate to which it applied and received the funds to which 
she was entitled by virtue of the lien.   
 
In determining whether Attorney Kraemer's sexual contact with 
the client in 1988 and 1992 constituted professional misconduct, 
the referee applied the rule the court adopted in April, 1995, SCR 
20:1.8(k),1  prohibiting a lawyer's sexual relations with a client 
                     
     1  SCR 20:1.8 provides, in pertinent part:  Conflict of 
interest:  prohibited transactions 
 
. . . 
 
(k)(1)  In this paragraph:   
 
(i)  "Sexual relations" means sexual intercourse or any other 
intentional touching of the intimate parts of a person or causing 
the person to touch the intimate parts of the lawyer.   
 
(ii)  If the client is an organization, "client" means any 
individual who oversees the representation and gives instructions 
to the lawyer on behalf of the organization.   
 
(2)  A lawyer shall not have sexual relations with a current 
client unless a consensual sexual relationship existed between 
them when the lawyer-client relationship commenced.   
 
(3) 
 
In-house 
attorneys 
representing 
governmental 
or 
corporate entities are governed by SCR 20:1.7(b) rather than by 
this paragraph with respect to sexual relations with other 
employees of the entity they represent.    
 
No. 94-2563-D 
 
 
 
5 
under specified circumstances.  The referee applied that rule to 
conduct that had occurred long before its enactment apparently 
because she understood the Board to have agreed to that rule's 
applicability, based on Board counsel's assertion that the 1995 
rule codified existing law.   
 
The referee concluded that the sexual contact Attorney 
Kraemer had with the client while his law firm was representing 
her in the personal injury matter violated the rule but that the 
sexual contact three years later during his representation of her 
in the paternity matter did not because a "consensual sexual 
relationship" existed between them before the attorney-client 
relationship in that matter commenced.  The referee based the 
latter finding, in part, on the fact that after the personal 
injury matter was concluded, Attorney Kraemer gave the woman a 
present, she accepted it, and sexual contact followed.   
 
The referee further concluded that Attorney Kraemer's failure 
to record the judgment in the paternity matter as a lien against 
real estate constituted neglect, in violation of SCR 20:1.3.2   
 
The referee recommended separate discipline for each type of 
Attorney Kraemer's misconduct:  a public reprimand for the sexual 
contact and a private reprimand for the neglect.  The referee 
recognized the seriousness of sexual contact with a client because 
                     
     2  SCR 20:1.3 provides:  Diligence 
 
A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness 
in representing a client.   
 
No. 94-2563-D 
 
 
 
6 
of the substantial risk it poses to the quality of the attorney's 
legal services and that the client will be imposed upon unfairly, 
but she opined that neither of those circumstances was present 
here.   
 
In this appeal, as in the course of the disciplinary 
proceeding, the Board asserted that the rules of professional 
conduct applicable to Attorney Kraemer's conduct are those that 
were in force at the time of that conduct:  the general rule 
prohibiting 
a 
lawyer 
from 
representing 
a 
client 
if 
that 
representation may be materially limited by the lawyer's own 
interests, 
unless 
the 
lawyer 
reasonably 
believes 
the 
representation will not be adversely affected and the client 
consents in writing after consultation, SCR 20:1.7(b);3 and the 
                     
     3  SCR 20:1.7 provides, in pertinent part:   
 
. . . 
 
(b)  A lawyer shall not represent a client if the 
representation of that client may be materially limited by the 
lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person, 
or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:   
 
(1)  the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will 
not be adversely affected; and 
 
(2)  the client consents in writing after consultation.  When 
representation of multiple clients in a single matter is 
undertaken, the consultation shall include explanation of the 
implications of the common representation and the advantages and 
risks involved.   
 
To the extent any of Attorney Kraemer's sexual contact with 
the client occurred prior to 1988, it is governed by the 
predecessor of that rule, former SCR 20.24 (1):   
 
Refusing employment when the interests of the lawyer may 
impair his or her independent professional judgment.   
 
(1)  Except with the consent of the client after full 
disclosure, a lawyer may not accept employment if the exercise of 
his or her professional judgment on behalf of the client will be 
or reasonably may be affected by his or her own financial, 
business, property or personal interests.   
 
No. 94-2563-D 
 
 
 
7 
conduct rule established by this court in the line of cases 
dealing with lawyer unsolicited sexual contact with clients.  See 
State v. Heilprin, 59 Wis. 2d 312, 207 N.W. 2d 878 (1973); 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gibson, 124 Wis. 2d 466, 369 
N.W.2d 695 (1985); Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hallows, 136 
Wis. 2d 72, 401 N.W.2d 557 (1987); Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Woodmansee, 147 Wis. 2d 837, 434 N.W.2d 94 (1989); 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hanson, 150 Wis. 2d 588, 442 
N.W.2d 51 (1989); Disciplinary Proceedings Against Ridgeway, 158 
Wis. 2d 452, 462 N.W.2d 671 (1990); Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Heilprin, 168 Wis. 2d 1, 482 N.W.2d 908 (1992);  and 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Strigenz, 185 Wis. 2d 370, 517 
N.W.2d 190 (1994).  Pursuant to SCR 20:8.4(f),4 violation of the 
latter rule constitutes professional misconduct.   
 
The Board's contention is correct.  Whether or not the Board 
correctly characterized the 1995 rule as codifying existing law in 
respect to attorney sexual contact with clients, SCR 20:1.8(k) was 
adopted with no retrospective effect.  Accordingly, Attorney 
Kraemer's conduct is governed by SCR 20:1.7(b) and 8.4(f).   
 
Applying those rules to the facts before us, we conclude that 
Attorney Kraemer's sexual contact with his client while she was 
                     
     4  SCR 20:8.4 provides, in pertinent part:   
 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:   
 
. . . 
 
(f)  violate a statute, supreme court rule, supreme court 
order or supreme court decision regulating the conduct of lawyers; 
 
No. 94-2563-D 
 
 
 
8 
represented by his law firm and while he represented her in the 
paternity matter violated SCR 20:8.4(f).  In respect to his 
failure to file the judgment lien, we adopt the referee's 
conclusion that his neglect of the client's legal matter violated 
SCR 20:1.3.   
 
On the issue of discipline, the Board contended that the 
seriousness of Attorney Kraemer's misconduct warrants discipline 
more severe than the reprimands recommended by the referee.  Based 
on discipline imposed in prior cases for attorney sexual contact 
with clients and in light of Attorney Kraemer's neglect of the 
client's legal matter and his prior discipline, the Board argued 
that the misconduct established in this proceeding warrants a six-
month license suspension.  The Board also took the position that 
the court should not follow the unprecedented recommendation of 
separate discipline for different acts of misconduct, as the court 
heretofore has considered the totality of an attorney's misconduct 
established in a proceeding in determining the discipline to 
impose.   
 
In determining appropriate discipline to impose here, we 
consider the seriousness of that misconduct, particularly Attorney 
Kraemer's sexual contact with his client while he or his law firm 
represented her in two different matters at two different times, 
as well as the comparatively less serious matter of his failure to 
file a judgment lien on her behalf, which resulted in no harm to 
the client due to her resourcefulness in protecting her own 
 
No. 94-2563-D 
 
 
 
9 
interests.  To assess the seriousness of Attorney Kraemer's sexual 
dealings with his client, it is necessary to understand the nature 
of what the referee's report referred to as their "consensual 
sexual relationship."  The nature and extent of that relationship 
are disclosed in the undisputed testimony of Attorney Kraemer and 
the client in the record before us.   
 
In 1987, when the first sexual contact between Attorney 
Kraemer and the woman occurred, the woman was 33 years old, single 
and childless.  Attorney Kraemer was 48, married and had children. 
 Between 1987 and 1992, the two had sexual contact on six or seven 
occasions.  Each of those took place during Attorney Kraemer's 
visits to the client's apartment, visits he initiated.   
 
The first time Attorney Kraemer visited her, the client 
expected he would discuss the pending personal injury matter.  
Instead, Attorney Kraemer talked about marital problems he was 
experiencing.  During that visit, Attorney Kraemer initiated 
sexual contact, which culminated in intercourse.  The client 
testified that she initially refused his proposal of sexual 
contact but agreed because she thought it was expected of her and 
that if she did not consent, Attorney Kraemer would have her 
personal injury action dismissed.   
 
During the months that followed, Attorney Kraemer visited the 
client at her apartment on five or six occasions, each time 
telephoning from his automobile at midday and asking if he could 
stop by.  Most, if not all, of the sexual contact that occurred 
 
No. 94-2563-D 
 
 
 
10 
during those visits consisted of masturbatory manipulation by the 
client on Attorney Kraemer.  Two months after the client's 
personal injury case settled in early 1988, Attorney Kraemer 
visited her and gave her a pearl necklace and earrings and a 
masturbatory act ensued.   
 
There was no further contact between Attorney Kraemer and the 
woman until February, 1992, when the woman asked his assistance in 
pursuing child support arrearages and payment of medical bills to 
which she was entitled pursuant to the resolution of a paternity 
proceeding.  Attorney Kraemer went to the client's apartment to 
pick up an authorization to permit him access as her attorney to 
the paternity file and, while there, he requested that she perform 
a masturbatory act on him.  The client testified that she felt 
pressured to comply because she needed legal assistance promptly, 
as a court hearing was scheduled for a month thereafter.  
 
After the paternity matter was completed, Attorney Kraemer 
called the woman in June, 1993 stating that he wanted two hours 
alone with her.  When the woman told him that her need to care for 
her child seldom left her alone, Attorney Kraemer responded, "Work 
it out.  That's an order."  The woman did not comply with that 
demand and had no further contact with Attorney Kraemer.   
 
Those 
facts 
demonstrate 
that, 
rather 
than 
a 
sexual 
"relationship," the sexual contact Attorney Kraemer had with his 
client constituted the recurrent sexual exploitation of her.  
Notwithstanding that the sexual contact was consensual, at least 
 
No. 94-2563-D 
 
 
 
11 
to the extent that the client did not physically resist, it was 
unsolicited by her and, she testified, unwelcome.  Moreover, other 
than his visits to her apartment, Attorney Kraemer never met with 
the client socially.   
 
Except for the occasion on which he gave her the jewelry, the 
only time he spent with her occurred while he or his law firm was 
representing her in a pending legal matter.  The fact that it was 
Attorney Kraemer who initiated the sexual contact in each instance 
and the nature of that contact support the conclusion that 
Attorney Kraemer was using his professional position representing 
the woman's interests in pending litigation to extract sexual 
favors from her.  In so doing, he impermissibly took advantage of 
the dominance that often characterizes the lawyer's position in an 
attorney-client relationship.   
 
A lawyer frequently is retained to protect a client's 
interest that is threatened or to promote the client's interests 
by recourse to the legal system.  The attorney-client relationship 
is grounded in trust:  the client's justifiable expectation that 
the lawyer retained will act in the client's best interests.  
Dependent on the lawyer to determine how best to protect or 
further those interests the client is apt to accede to the 
lawyer's advice and counsel and becomes vulnerable to a lawyer's 
inappropriate personal conduct.  The prospect of terminating the 
lawyer's representation and starting over with new counsel places 
 
No. 94-2563-D 
 
 
 
12 
the client at a disadvantage in dealing with the lawyer on a 
personal level.   
 
It is clear from the record before us that Attorney Kraemer's 
client was at a disadvantage in dealing with his sexual advances. 
 Moreover, even if his representation of the client was not in 
fact materially limited by his personal interests, Attorney 
Kraemer's sexual contact with her created the potential for such 
conflict.  His fiduciary relationship as the client's attorney 
imposed on Attorney Kraemer the responsibility to act in her best 
interests.  His abuse of that relationship to further his own 
personal interests was egregious.     
 
As discipline for his professional misconduct established in 
this proceeding, we suspend Attorney Kraemer's license to practice 
law for six months.  Consistent with prior cases dealing with 
attorney unsolicited sexual contact with clients, that suspension 
corresponds to the seriousness of that misconduct. 
 
IT IS ORDERED that the license of Attorney Donald J. Kraemer 
to practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of six 
months, commencing June 3, 1996.    
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date of this 
order Donald J. Kraemer pay to the Board of Attorneys Professional 
Responsibility the costs of this proceeding, provided that if the 
costs are not paid within the time specified and absent a showing 
to this court of his inability to pay the costs within that time, 
 
No. 94-2563-D 
 
 
 
13 
the license of Donald J. Kraemer to practice law in Wisconsin 
shall remain suspended until further order of the court.   
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Donald J. Kraemer comply with the 
provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a person whose 
license to practice law in Wisconsin has been suspended.   
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
94-2563-D 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary 
 
 
 
Proceedings Against 
 
 
 
Donald J. Kraemer, 
 
 
 
Attorney at Law. 
 
 
 
_________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST KRAEMER 
 
                                                              
 
Opinion Filed:  
May 1, 1996 
Submitted on Briefs: 
February 29, 1996 
Oral Argument: 
 
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
 
 
COUNTY: 
 
 
JUDGE: 
 
 
                                                              
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: 
 
                                                              
 
 
No. 94-2563-D 
 
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For 
the 
Board 
of 
Attorneys 
Professional 
Responsibility there were briefs by Gregg Herman, counsel, 
Milwaukee. 
 
 
For Donald J. Kraemer there was a brief by Gerald P. Boyle, 
Milwaukee.