Title: Roach v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 951416
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: March 1, 1996

Present:  All the Justices 
 
STEVE ROACH 
 
v.  Record No. 951416 
OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
                                       March 1, 1996 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GREENE COUNTY 
 
Lloyd C. Sullenberger, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we review a capital murder conviction and a 
death sentence imposed upon Steve Edward Roach for the murder of 
Mary Ann Hughes, his 70-year-old neighbor.
1
 
I. PROCEEDINGS 
 
Juvenile petitions were issued against Roach, who was 17 
years old at the time of these offenses, charging him with 
capital murder, use of a firearm in the commission of murder, and 
robbery.  The Commonwealth gave notice of intent to try Roach as 
an adult and a transfer hearing was conducted in the Greene 
County Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court (the 
juvenile court).  Finding probable cause to believe that Roach 
committed the crimes, the juvenile court advised the 
Commonwealth's Attorney that he could seek indictments against 
Roach before a grand jury.  The circuit court then reviewed the 
transfer order under Code § 16.1-269 and found probable cause to 
believe that Roach committed all three offenses. 
 
Roach was tried as an adult on indictments charging (1) 
capital murder of Mary Ann Hughes in the commission of robbery 
                     
     
1Roach has not appealed his convictions of robbery and use 
of a firearm in the commission of murder. 
 
 
 
 
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while armed with a deadly weapon, in violation of Code 
§ 18.2-31(4); (2) use of a firearm in the commission of murder, 
in violation of Code § 18.2-53.1; and (3) robbery by violence to 
the person of Mary Ann Hughes, in violation of Code § 18.2-58.  
At the first stage of a bifurcated jury trial conducted pursuant 
to Code §§ 19.2-264.3 and -264.4(A), Roach was found guilty as 
charged in all three indictments.
2
 
At the penalty phase of the capital murder trial, the court 
struck the evidence as to the "vileness" predicate of a capital 
sentence, but submitted the case to the jury upon the "future 
dangerousness" predicate.  The jury found that the "future 
dangerousness" predicate was satisfied and unanimously fixed 
Roach's punishment at death. 
 
Upon review of victim impact statements and a probation 
officer's report, and after conducting a sentencing hearing, the 
trial court sentenced Roach in accord with the jury verdict on 
the capital murder conviction.  Further, the court sentenced 
Roach to three years imprisonment for the use of a firearm in the 
commission of a murder and to life imprisonment for robbery. 
 
II.  THE EVIDENCE 
 
Guilt Phase
                     
     
2Since Roach was a juvenile at the time these offenses were 
committed, the jury did not fix punishment on the noncapital 
charges.  See Code § 16.1-272. 
 
 
 
 
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We will review the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the Commonwealth, the prevailing party below.  Cheng v. 
Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 42, 393 S.E.2d 599, 608 (1990).  On the 
evening of December 3, 1993, Mary Ann Hughes was shot and killed 
in her home about five miles west of Stanardsville.  Hughes was 
standing at her open front door when she was shot.  Her body was 
discovered the next day. 
 
The cause of death was a single shotgun wound to the chest, 
which caused injury to an artery, the chest wall, and the right 
lung.  Dr. Deborah Kay, the medical examiner who performed the 
autopsy on Hughes, recovered shotgun pellets and wadding from 
Hughes's chest.  The pellets and wadding were identified as 
number eight shot from a 12 gauge Remington shot shell case.   
 
The day before the killing, Roach brought a 12 gauge shotgun 
to a neighbor's house, and he and two friends engaged in shooting 
the gun in the back yard using number eight shot.  The police 
later recovered from the neighbor's back yard number eight shot 
that was consistent with a 12 gauge Remington shell case.  
 
Roach and Hughes were also neighbors.  Roach helped Hughes 
with household chores and also spent a great deal of time 
visiting her.  The evidence showed that Roach was familiar with 
Hughes's habits, and that Hughes customarily deposited her social 
security check in the bank within the first few days of each 
month.  
 
On the night she was killed, Hughes's purse, containing a 
 
 
 
 
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Discover credit card and approximately sixty dollars in cash, was 
taken from her home.  Hughes owned a 1981 Buick Regal, which also 
was taken. 
 
In the early morning hours of December 4, 1993, Gregory Lee 
Giuriceo, Jr., a deputy sheriff for Nottoway County, noticed a 
Buick Regal parked in a parking lot of a shopping center in 
Blackstone.  Roach was identified by Giuriceo as the operator of 
the car.  After leaving the parking lot, Giuriceo determined that 
the automobile was registered to Hughes.  
 
Later in the morning of December 4, 1993, Roach attempted to 
use Hughes's Discover bank card at an automated teller machine in 
Louisburg, North Carolina.  A video tape from the machine showed 
Roach attempting to withdraw cash from Hughes's account.  
 
On December 5, 1993, Trooper David F. Chavis of the South 
Carolina Highway Patrol observed a 1981 Buick Regal automobile 
with Virginia plates which was being driven at 69 miles per hour 
in a 55 mile per hour zone.  He activated the lights on his 
patrol car and proceeded behind the Buick.  The driver of the 
Buick drove the automobile over to the left shoulder of the road, 
got out of the car, ran into the woods at the side of the road, 
and escaped.  The driver was wearing clothes which matched the 
description of the clothes Roach had been seen wearing for the 
previous two days. 
 
Trooper Chavis impounded the vehicle and traced its 
ownership to Hughes.  Items retrieved from the automobile 
 
 
 
 
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included Hughes's purse, a blue jacket, a number eight load 
shotgun shell, and a plastic bag from a Winn-Dixie grocery store. 
 Mahlon Jones, a fingerprint expert employed by the 
Commonwealth's Division of Forensic Science, identified a latent 
palm print from the plastic bag as matching Roach's left palm 
print.  In addition, latent fingerprints were recovered from the 
automobile which matched Roach's fingerprints.  
 
Roach made several telephone calls to his aunt, Annie Betty 
Dean, while he was in North Carolina and South Carolina.  During 
those telephone conversations, she asked him to "come home and 
give [himself] up."  On December 6, 1993, Roach contacted Sheriff 
William L. Morris and arranged to come that day with his father 
to the Sheriff's Department for questioning. 
 
At the Sheriff's Department, Morris advised Roach of his 
Miranda rights in the presence of Roach's father.  Roach waived 
his rights, and both he and his father signed the waiver form.  
Sheriff Morris then questioned Roach out of his father's 
presence.  Clarence Roberts, an acquaintance of the Roach family 
and an employee of the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 
was present with Morris during the interview. 
 
At first, Roach told Morris that he and a friend, Scott 
Shifflett, went to Hughes's house on the evening of December 3, 
1993.  Roach said that Shifflett left the 12 gauge shotgun at the 
door, and that they entered the house and played Yahtzee with 
Hughes.  Roach recounted that Shifflett then took the keys to the 
 
 
 
 
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Buick Regal and the two began to leave the house.  Roach said 
that, after he left, Shifflett ran back to the front door, fired 
one shot, and ran back to the Buick with Hughes's purse.  
According to Roach, Shifflett said that he had "fired through the 
roof to scare her." 
 
Roach stated that Shifflett then jumped into the driver's 
seat of the Buick and they drove to North Carolina.  He said that 
Shifflett must have tried to use Hughes's Discover credit card 
while Roach was in a Winn-Dixie store making some purchases.  
Roach also stated that he and Shifflett abandoned Hughes's 
vehicle in North Carolina. 
 
During the questioning, Morris related to Roach certain 
evidence that had already been discovered, stating, "[W]ith all 
these discrepancies in the story, . . . I'm finding it really a 
little difficult to believe some of the things you're telling 
me."  Roberts then told Roach that he knew Roach was lying and 
that "this is a heavy burden to carry on your shoulders for the 
rest of your life, if you committed this act you need to tell 
Sheriff Morris and you need to unburden yourself."    
 
Roach then told Morris, 
 
I went over there and saw her counting the money and as 
I was leaving, I had the shotgun laying at the door and 
I shot her, took the money, the car and left, went to 
North Carolina.  And I cashed -- I tried to use -- use 
the credit card but -- about four times[,] but it 
wouldn't work. 
 
When asked where he shot Hughes, he answered, "In the chest." 
 
At trial, Roach offered evidence that there was no gunshot 
 
 
 
 
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residue on his hands or clothes when he was arrested.  He also 
presented evidence that no footprints at the scene of the crime 
matched the shoes he was wearing on December 3, 1993.  In 
addition, Barbara Llewellyn, an expert employed by the Division 
of Forensic Science in the analysis of blood and body fluid, 
testified that, when Roach was arrested, he had no blood on his 
clothing, except a "very light stain" on his shirt, despite the 
fact that the fatal wound perforated one of Hughes's arteries and 
the pattern of blood splatters indicated that the person who had 
fired the gun was standing within five feet of Hughes. 
 
Penalty Phase
 
During the penalty phase of the trial, the Commonwealth put 
on evidence of Roach's prior juvenile convictions.  Roach had 
been convicted twice of grand larceny of an automobile.  He 
committed the first larceny in May 1993 and the second in August 
1993.  In connection with the first automobile larceny, Roach was 
convicted of reckless driving and failure to stop for a police 
officer.  
 
In June 1993, Roach was convicted of breaking and entering a 
residential dwelling and of grand larceny arising out of the 
burglary.  Roach gained entry to the home by breaking a window.  
He then ransacked the house and stole a .357 magnum pistol. 
 
In August 1993, Roach was sentenced to supervised probation 
and house arrest under the supervision of his parents at all 
times.  He violated the conditions of this probation when he left 
 
 
 
 
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the family home and carried a weapon.  
 
When Roach was placed on probation in August 1993, a 
psychological evaluation was ordered.  The psychologist 
recommended that Roach and his family attend family counseling 
and that Roach increase his level of academic attainment.  Roach 
had stopped attending school in 1991 when he was 14 years old. 
 
According to John T. Frey, Roach's probation officer, Roach 
and his family attended counseling sessions at the regional 
counseling center prior to December 1993.  Roach also enrolled in 
G.E.D. classes in the adult education program offered by Greene 
County. 
 
Shirley Ann Roach, Roach's mother, testified that she and 
Roach's father had separated and reconciled their marriage four 
times during Roach's childhood.  She testified that she and her 
husband requested that Roach be released from compulsory 
education at age 14 because he was needed around the house to do 
chores and to care for his brothers.  She also stated that she 
did not realize that possessing a weapon violated the terms of 
Roach's probation because the probation papers did not explicitly 
state this fact. 
 
John Roach, Roach's father, testified that he was frequently 
absent from home.  He also suffered from significant health 
problems.  When Steve Roach was six years old, John Roach 
sustained a shotgun injury which required him to remain in the 
hospital for six months.  While being treated for the gunshot 
 
 
 
 
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wound, he contracted Hepatitis C from a blood transfusion.  The 
medication he received for this condition caused mood changes. 
 
John Roach testified that, when his wife left him, life "got 
worse" for his children.  He began drinking heavily and brought 
young girls into the home in order to make his wife jealous.  He 
stated that the children were present when this occurred and that 
they did not receive parental supervision.  He also stated that 
Steve Roach had free access to all the guns in the house. 
 
Several family friends and relatives testified on Steve 
Roach's behalf.  Clarence Roberts testified that Roach had 
performed numerous "odd jobs" for him, and that Roach was "an 
excellent employee."  Tammy Estes, Roach's half sister, stated 
that Roach often helped his neighbors, including Hughes, cut 
firewood, cook, and clean their laundry.  
 
Wendell Lamb, the pastor of Roach's church, testified that 
Roach volunteered his time to help paint and remodel the church 
and to work at a camp for children in the George Washington 
National Forest.  Lamb conceded that, while Roach was doing 
volunteer work for the church, he was accused of stealing a 
watch.  Roach and the owner of the watch resolved the dispute 
privately. 
 
Roach testified on his own behalf.  He stated that, shortly 
after 9:00 p.m. on December 3, 1993, he walked to Hughes's house 
with his shotgun.  When she opened the door, he fired once, 
walked past her body, and took her purse and the keys to her car. 
 
 
 
 
- 10 - 
 He stated that he then drove to North Carolina and attempted to 
use her Discover credit card to get cash.  Roach testified that 
he did not know Hughes had died until he spoke by telephone with 
his aunt. 
 
Roach also testified that, when he went to Hughes's house, 
he knew she had just received her social security check, knew the 
location of her purse, and intended to steal both items.  
However, he stated that he did not intend to hurt her, and that 
he could not explain "what went . . . through [his] mind."  He 
also testified that he was sorry he had killed Hughes, stating, 
"I wish I could bring her back."   
 
Dr. Gary Lee Hawk, a forensic psychologist appointed by the 
court, testified concerning his evaluation of Roach.  Hawk met 
with Roach on six different occasions and spoke with Roach's 
parents and other family members.  Hawk determined that Roach was 
of average intelligence and had mild depressive symptoms.  Hawk 
found no indication that Roach had suffered any brain injury.  He 
also found no evidence that Roach suffered from any serious 
mental illness.   
 
Hawk testified that Roach lied to him about a number of 
things and gave him four different versions of what happened on 
December 3, 1993.  He also stated that Roach was "particularly 
immature" for his age.  Hawk concluded that Roach had poor 
"impulse control" and "did not show very good ability in many 
situations to control his emotions or behavior like seventeen-
 
 
 
 
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year-old or eighteen-year-old individuals should do."   
 
Hawk related Roach's immaturity to the fact that he did not 
get the guidance and the structure that children need to mature. 
 Hawk further stated that Roach's probation violation for 
carrying a weapon was a result of this lack of structure and 
supervision.  He also testified that there was no pattern of 
violent behavior in Roach's life.   
 
Hawk stated that, in psychological terms, Roach's act of 
killing a friend arose from the fact that "[a]dolescents in 
conflict, adolescents in turmoil frequently express extremely 
strong and angry emotions with very little provocation . . .  If 
it's an immature adolescent, that sort of reaction is more 
extreme."  Hawk stated that "displacement of emotion" occurs when 
one person or situation makes a person angry, but the feelings 
and anger are expressed toward someone else. 
 
Hawk stated, "Knowing that this was a woman that [Roach] was 
close to, and knowing that there was not an existing pattern of 
this sort of violent offending, and considering what he told me, 
it's dynamics like that [which] would explain [the murder] in 
psychological terms."  In addition, Hawk testified that, "[i]n 
terms of normal development," impulsiveness diminishes and 
"doesn't cause problems for the person."   
 
III.  ARGUMENTS WAIVED 
 
Because Roach did not address in his briefs assignments of 
 
 
 
 
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error 15(c), 16(f), and 16(h), he is deemed to have waived them.
3 
 Rule 5:27.  Also, since Roach did not ask the trial court to 
strike certain prospective jurors for cause, after they heard 
another prospective juror state a belief that Roach was guilty, 
he has waived this objection to the empanelment of those jurors. 
 Rule 5:25.
4
 
IV. ISSUES PREVIOUSLY DECIDED 
 
Roach has advanced a number of arguments that we have 
rejected in previous decisions.  Finding no reason to modify our 
previously expressed views, we will reaffirm our earlier 
 
     
3  These assignments of error are: 
 
 
15(c):  Virginia's juvenile transfer statute is 
unconstitutional as applied. 
 
 
16(f):  The trial court erred in overruling the motion to 
prohibit the imposition of the death penalty and to strike the 
capital murder charge on the grounds that the post-sentence 
report infringes upon the defendant's rights to due process, to 
confront his accusers, to be free from cruel and unusual 
punishment, and to effective assistance of counsel. 
 
 
16(h):  Virginia's death penalty statutes as administered 
deny capital defendants effective assistance of counsel. 
     
4Roach has also argued that he received ineffective 
assistance of counsel during voir dire based on this occurrence. 
 However, such a claim is not reviewable on direct appeal.  
Walker v. Mitchell, 224 Va. 568, 570, 299 S.E.2d 698, 699 (1983); 
Browning v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 295, 297, n.2, 452 S.E.2d 
360, 362, n.2 (1994); see Acts 1990, ch.74. 
 
 
 
 
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decisions and reject the following contentions: 
 
A.  The denial of a jury instruction that Roach would be 
required to serve a minimum of twenty-five years before becoming 
eligible for parole.  In Joseph v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 78, 84, 
452 S.E.2d 862, 866, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 204 
(1995), we held that such an instruction is not available to 
defendants who will be eligible for parole at a future date. 
 
B.  The trial court's refusal to limit evidence of juvenile 
and unadjudicated crimes as background evidence at sentencing.  
Rejected in Beaver v. Commonwealth, 232 Va. 521, 528-29, 352 
S.E.2d 342, 346-47, cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1033 (1987).  
 
C.  The Virginia transfer statute does not provide 
individualized consideration of a juvenile's moral culpability 
and maturity.  Rejected in Wright v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 177, 
182-83, 427 S.E.2d 379, 383-84 (1993), vacated and remanded, ___ 
U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 2701 (1994), aff'd, 248 Va. 485, 450 S.E.2d 
361 (1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 1800 (1995); 
Thomas v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 1, 7, 419 S.E.2d 606, 609, cert. 
denied, 506 U.S. 958 (1992). 
 
D.  The sentencing verdict form prescribed by Code 
§ 19.2-264(D) renders the jury's option of imposing a life 
sentence unconstitutionally vague and obscures mitigation 
evidence.  We rejected these contentions in Stockton v. 
Commonwealth, 241 Va. 192, 215, 402 S.E.2d 196, 209, cert. 
denied, 502 U.S. 902 (1991), and in LeVasseur v. Commonwealth, 
 
 
 
 
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225 Va. 564, 594-95, 304 S.E.2d 644, 661 (1983), cert. denied, 
464 U.S. 1063 (1984).  Thus, we find no error in the trial 
court's refusal to substitute Roach's proposed verdict form for 
the statutory sentencing verdict form. 
 
E.  The death penalty statutes do not give meaningful 
guidance to jurors that they may impose a death sentence only if 
they determine beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating 
circumstances outweigh mitigating ones.  Rejected in Breard v. 
Commonwealth, 248 Va. 68, 74, 445 S.E.2d 670, 674-75, cert. 
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 442 (1994); Watkins v. 
Commonwealth, 229 Va. 469, 490-91, 331 S.E.2d 422, 438 (1985), 
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1099 (1986).   
 
F.  Code § 19.2-264.4(C) violates the defendant's rights 
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution because the jury may find future dangerousness based 
upon unadjudicated crimes.  Rejected in Evans v. Commonwealth, 
222 Va. 766, 770, 284 S.E.2d 816, 817-18 (1981), cert. denied, 
455 U.S. 1038 (1982); see also Watkins v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 
341, 352, 385 S.E.2d 50, 56 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1074 
(1990). 
 
G.  The capital murder and death penalty statutes as 
administered are unconstitutional for every reason cited by the 
majority in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).  In 
Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 615, 635-36, 292 S.E.2d 798, 
810 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1228 (1983), we held that the 
 
 
 
 
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Virginia capital murder statutes eliminated the constitutional 
violations identified in Furman.  Further, in Clark v. 
Commonwealth, 220 Va. 201, 212, 257 S.E.2d 784, 791 (1979), cert. 
denied, 444 U.S. 1049 (1980), we rejected the argument that the 
Virginia death penalty sentencing statutes violated the 
restrictions of the Furman holding. 
 
H.  The death penalty statutes deny defendants meaningful 
appellate review and deny defendants equal protection of the law 
and due process of law because of the single tier of appellate 
review of death sentences.  Rejected in Payne v. Commonwealth, 
233 Va. 460, 473-74, 357 S.E.2d 500, 508, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 
933 (1987). 
 
V.  PRETRIAL MATTERS 
A.  Juvenile Court Issues 
 
Roach contends that the statutes defining the authority of 
juvenile court intake officers violate the separation of powers 
clauses of the Virginia Constitution, Art. I, § 5 and Art. III, 
§ 1.  He asserts that, since intake officers are employees of the 
Department of Youth and Family Services, an executive agency, 
they are constitutionally prohibited from exercising the judicial 
powers of determining probable cause, issuing petitions or 
criminal warrants, or issuing detention orders. 
 
Initially, we note that statutes are presumed to comply with 
the Virginia and United States Constitutions and will be declared 
unconstitutional only when their provisions plainly violate 
 
 
 
 
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either document.  Etheridge v. Medical Ctr. Hosp., 237 Va. 87, 
94, 376 S.E.2d 525, 528 (1989).  In Winchester & Strasburg R.R. 
v. Commonwealth, 106 Va. 264, 55 S.E. 692 (1906), we stated that 
the separation of the executive, judicial, and legislative 
branches of government is "indispensable to public liberty."  
However, we emphasized that the separation required by the 
Virginia Constitution is not an absolute separation.  We held 
that the branches of government need not "be kept wholly and 
entirely separate and distinct, and have no common link or 
dependence . . .  The true meaning is that the whole power of one 
of these departments should not be exercised by the same hands 
which possess the whole power of either of the other 
departments."  Id. at 270, 55 S.E. at 694 (citations omitted). 
 
The juvenile and domestic relations district court judges 
share appointment, assignment, and discharge powers over the 
intake officers with the Department of Youth and Family Services. 
 See Code §§ 16.1-233 and -235.  In filing a petition to initiate 
a criminal case, the intake officer makes a determination that 
there is probable cause to believe that a juvenile has committed 
a criminal offense.  See Code § 16.1-260.  However, the juvenile 
and domestic relations district court, not the Department of 
Youth and Family Services, has original jurisdiction over matters 
involving the delinquent juvenile.  Code § 16.1-241.  Further, 
the failure of an intake officer to file a petition does not 
divest the juvenile and domestic relations district court of 
 
 
 
 
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jurisdiction over the juvenile.  Code § 16.1-260(G). 
 
Thus, juvenile intake officers do not exercise the whole 
power of the judiciary.  Because such officers exercise only a 
limited judicial function, and the juvenile and domestic 
relations district court retains actual control over the 
juveniles, we conclude that the intake officer's authority to 
issue criminal petitions does not violate the separation of 
powers guaranteed by the Virginia Constitution. 
 
Next, Roach argues that the circuit court acquired 
jurisdiction to try him only for the lesser included offense of 
first degree murder.  He asserts that, since the juvenile court 
did not render a probable cause determination concerning the 
presence of aggravating circumstances supporting imposition of 
the death penalty, the circuit court did not acquire jurisdiction 
to impose the death penalty.  We disagree. 
 
Before Roach could be transferred to the circuit court for 
trial as an adult, the juvenile court was required by former Code 
§ 16.1-269 (now § 16.1-269.1) to determine whether there was 
probable cause to believe that he committed an offense which 
would be a felony had it been committed by an adult.  The 
aggravating circumstances required for imposition of the death 
penalty are not elements of the crime of capital murder.  They 
relate only to the punishment authorized after conviction of the 
offense.  Therefore, the juvenile court was not required to make 
a probable cause determination of the sufficiency of the evidence 
 
 
 
 
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in support of the statutory predicates for imposition of the 
death penalty. 
B. 
Bill of Particulars 
 
Roach filed a motion for a bill of particulars.
5  The trial 
 
     
5The motion for a bill of particulars requested that the 
trial court enter an order directing the Commonwealth: 
 
 
a)  To identify the grounds, and all of them, on which 
it contends that defendant is guilty of Capital Murder 
under Va. Code Ann. [§] 18.2-31. 
 
 
b)  To identify the evidence, and all of it, upon which 
it intends to rely in seeking a conviction of Defendant 
upon the charge of Capital Murder. 
 
 
c)  To identify the aggravating factors, if any, upon 
which it intends to rely in seeking the death penalty, 
should defendant be convicted of Capital Murder. 
 
 
d)  If the response to (c) includes statement that 
Commonwealth intends to prove the "vileness" factor as 
set out in Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4C, to identify as 
many of the components of the factor, torture, 
depravity of mind, aggravated battery on which it 
intends to offer evidence. 
 
 
e)  If the response to (c) include statements that 
Commonwealth intends to prove the "vileness" factor as 
set out in Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4C, to identify 
every narrowing construction of that factor on which it 
intends to offer evidence. 
 
 
f)  If the response to (c) include statements that the 
Commonwealth intends to use to prove the "future 
dangerousness" factor as set out in Va. Code Ann. § 
19.2-264.4C, to identify any unadjudicated allegations 
of misconduct by defendant upon which it intends to 
offer evidence and any circumstances of the offense it 
contends are relevant to proof of the factor. 
 
 
g)  To identify the evidence, and all of it, on which 
it intends to rely in support of the aggravating 
factors identified, and all other evidence which it 
intends to introduce in support of its contention that 
 
 
 
 
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court granted the motion with respect to paragraph (f) involving 
unadjudicated allegations of misconduct and "any circumstances of 
the offense [the Commonwealth] contends are relevant to proof of 
the [future dangerousness] factor."  The court denied the balance 
of the motion.  Roach argues that the trial court's denial of the 
remaining parts of the motion constitutes error based on the 
gravity of the penalty sought.  We disagree. 
 
A defendant is not entitled to a bill of particulars as a 
matter of right.  Code § 19.2-230 provides that a court "may 
direct the filing of a bill of particulars."  Thus, the trial 
court has discretion whether to require the Commonwealth to file 
a bill of particulars.  Quesinberry v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 364, 
372, 402 S.E.2d 218, 223, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 834 (1991). 
 
If the indictment gives a defendant sufficient "notice of 
the nature and character of the offense charged so he can make 
his defense," no bill of particulars is required.
6  Wilder v. 
(..continued) 
death is the appropriate punishment for this Defendant. 
     
6The capital murder indictment alleged that "[o]n or about 
December 3, 1993, STEVE EDWARD ROACH . . . did, in the County of 
Greene, unlawfully and feloniously commit capital murder by the 
willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of Mary Ann Hughes 
in the commission of robbery while armed with a deadly weapon, 
which offense is punishable as a felony in violation of Section 
18.2-31(4) of the Code of Virginia." 
 
 
 
 
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Commonwealth, 217 Va. 145, 147, 225 S.E.2d 411, 413 (1976).  The 
indictment in this case met that standard.  Therefore, the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in denying the balance of 
Roach's motion.  See Strickler v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 482, 490, 
404 S.E.2d 227, 233, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 944 (1991). 
C. 
Voluntariness of Roach's Confession 
 
Roach argues that the trial court erred in refusing to 
suppress his confession as being involuntary "for purposes of 
exposing him to the death penalty."  Roach asserts that his 
waiver of Miranda rights was "questionable," and that he made his 
statements based on the mistaken belief that he would receive the 
benefit of a lesser penalty in exchange for admitting that he had 
shot Hughes.  He contends that the statements were induced by 
Sheriff Morris's allegedly misleading remarks such as "the truth 
is so very, very important to you, to us and to yourself."   
 
In assessing the voluntariness of Roach's statement, we 
apply a well-established standard of review.  In Gray v. 
Commonwealth, 233 Va. 313, 356 S.E.2d 157, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 
873 (1987), we said: 
 
A defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights is valid 
only if the waiver is made knowingly, voluntarily and 
intelligently, Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475.  Whether a 
statement is voluntary is ultimately a legal rather 
than factual question.  See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 
104, 110, 106 S.Ct. 445, 450 (1985).  Subsidiary 
factual questions, however, are entitled to a 
presumption of correctness.  Id. at 112, 106 S.Ct. at 
451.  The test to be applied in determining 
voluntariness is whether the statement is the "product 
of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its 
maker," or whether the maker's will "has been overborne 
and his capacity for self-determination critically 
 
 
 
 
- 21 - 
impaired."  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 
225 (1973).  In determining whether a defendant's will 
has been overborne, courts look to "the totality of all 
the surrounding circumstances," id. at 226, including 
the defendant's background and experience and the 
conduct of the police, Correll v. Commonwealth, 232 Va. 
454, 464, 352 S.E.2d 352, 357 (1987); Stockton, 227 Va. 
at 140, 314 S.E.2d at 381. 
 
Id. at 324, 356 S.E.2d at 163. 
 
The record shows that Roach was of average intelligence, and 
that he telephoned Sheriff Morris to initiate the questioning.  
Prior to the interrogation, Morris advised Roach and Roach's 
father of Roach's Miranda rights.  Although John Roach was not 
present during the interrogation, both he and Steve Roach 
indicated that they understood the Miranda rights and they signed 
the waiver forms.  During the interrogation, there was no mention 
of the death penalty at any time.  Roach stated to Morris that he 
was making the statements of his own free will, without pressure 
of threats or promises. 
 
We also consider the factual findings made by the trial 
court.  The trial court found that Roach "was not intoxicated 
[and] understood his surroundings and the questions asked of 
him."  The court found that the interrogation atmosphere was not 
coercive and that Roach had not been threatened in any way.  The 
court found that the entreaties to Roach to tell the truth did 
not overbear Roach's will.  Because these factual findings are 
supported by the record, we accord them substantial weight in our 
determination whether Roach's statements were voluntary.  Miller 
v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112 (1985). 
 
 
 
 
- 22 - 
 
Based on the above evidence and findings, we hold that 
Roach's statements were voluntary.  No threats or promises were 
made to induce the confession and there is no evidence indicating 
that the confession was coerced.  Instead, the evidence 
demonstrates that the statements were the product of Roach's free 
and unconstrained choice. 
D. 
Venue 
 
Roach filed a motion for a change of venue on the basis that 
the crime, a "high profile" murder in a rural setting, rendered 
the trial court unable to empanel an impartial jury.  The trial 
court took the motion under advisement and, after the jury was 
empaneled, overruled the motion.   
 
Roach argues that the trial court erred in denying his 
motion for a change of venue because the pretrial publicity was 
widespread and prejudicial.  He notes that over 50 percent of the 
jury pool was familiar with Roach, the victim, members of her 
family, the Commonwealth's Attorney, or witnesses.  The trial 
court observed, however, that although 31 jurors were stricken 
for cause, "a large number of those were stricken because of 
their view concerning the death penalty and not because of any 
evidence of bias for or against the accused or the prosecution." 
 
A presumption exists that a defendant can receive a fair 
trial in the jurisdiction in which the offense occurred.  
Stockton, 227 Va. at 137, 314 S.E.2d at 380.  In order to 
overcome this presumption, a defendant must demonstrate that the 
 
 
 
 
- 23 - 
citizens of the jurisdiction feel such prejudice against the 
defendant as is reasonably certain to prevent a fair trial.  Id. 
 Further, the decision whether to grant a change of venue lies 
within the sound discretion of the trial court.  George v. 
Commonwealth, 242 Va. 264, 274, 411 S.E.2d 12, 18, cert. denied, 
503 U.S. 973 (1992). 
 
The fact that there have been media reports about the 
accused and the crime does not necessarily require a change of 
venue.  Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 389, 407, 384 S.E.2d 
757, 767-68 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1063 (1990).  Another 
significant factor the trial court must consider is "the 
difficulty encountered in selecting a jury."  Mueller v. 
Commonwealth, 244 Va. 386, 398, 422 S.E.2d 380, 388 (1992), cert. 
denied, 507 U.S. 1043 (1993). 
 
Roach did not overcome the presumption that he could receive 
a fair trial in Greene County.  He concedes that only six members 
of the jury pool were so prejudiced by media coverage that they 
could not give him a fair trial.  Given the relative ease with 
which the jury was selected, we hold that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying Roach's motion for a change of 
venue. 
E. 
Jury Selection 
 
Roach next argues that the trial court erred in refusing to 
strike for cause juror Breeden.  During voir dire, juror Breeden 
testified that Daniel Bouton, the Commonwealth's Attorney, 
 
 
 
 
- 24 - 
formerly had represented him in a legal matter.  Although Bouton 
was not representing Breeden in any matter at the time of trial, 
Breeden stated that he would regard Bouton as his personal 
attorney.  Breeden also testified that his former connection with 
Bouton would not affect his ability to be impartial.  Roach 
argues that this relationship presented an inherent conflict, and 
that Breeden was more likely to be influenced by Bouton's closing 
argument because he was accustomed to looking to Bouton for legal 
guidance. 
 
The trial court's decision whether to strike a juror for 
cause is a matter submitted to its discretion and will not be 
disturbed on appeal unless the refusal constitutes manifest 
error.  Stockton, 241 Va. at 200, 402 S.E.2d at 200.  Further, in 
Calhoun v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 256, 263, 307 S.E.2d 896, 900 
(1983), we refused to adopt a per se rule disqualifying a juror 
solely because the juror had been represented by the 
Commonwealth's Attorney at some time in the past. 
 
In the present case, the trial court had the opportunity to 
observe Breeden's demeanor when evaluating his statement that his 
ability to be impartial would not be affected by his former 
association with Bouton.  Nothing in the record suggests that the 
trial court abused its discretion in accepting Breeden's 
statement that he could be impartial in the trial of the case.  
Thus, we find no merit in Roach's argument.
7
                     
     
7We also find no merit in Roach's claim that his Fourteenth 
 
 
 
 
- 25 - 
 
VI.  GUILT PHASE ISSUES 
 
Roach argues that the trial court erred in refusing to set 
aside the verdict of capital murder based on the alleged absence 
of evidence corroborating his confession that he was the 
"triggerman."  Roach asserts that his confession was inadequate 
as a matter of law to establish that he was the immediate 
perpetrator of the killing. 
 
In addition, Roach argues that the trial court erred in 
failing to instruct the jury that the "triggerman" portion of his 
confession had to be corroborated before he could be convicted of 
capital murder.  He also assigns as error the court's refusal of 
an instruction defining a principal in the second degree, as well 
as its refusal of an instruction that only the immediate 
perpetrator of a killing can be convicted of capital murder.  We 
disagree with the above assertions. 
 
The Commonwealth need not corroborate an entire confession, 
but it must corroborate the elements of the corpus delicti.  
Watkins, 238 Va. at 348, 385 S.E.2d at 54.  In the present case, 
the Commonwealth met its burden of corroborating the corpus 
delicti of capital murder. 
 
The corpus delicti of a homicide consists of "proof of the 
(..continued) 
Amendment rights were violated by the trial court's refusal to 
strike Breeden for cause.  The record before us offers no support 
for such a claim. 
 
 
 
 
- 26 - 
victim's death from the criminal act or agency of another 
person."  Swann v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 222, 236, 441 S.E.2d 
195, 205, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 234 (1994).  The 
testimony of Dr. Kay, the medical examiner, established that 
Hughes died from a shotgun wound to the chest.  There was no 
evidence that the wound was self-inflicted.  Further, the 
Commonwealth produced evidence which tended to corroborate that 
Roach was the "triggerman" in the killing. 
 
The Commonwealth showed that Roach owned a 12 gauge shotgun 
and that he had shot number eight shot from it the day before the 
murder.  The shot and wadding retrieved from Hughes's chest were 
consistent with the type used in Roach's weapon.  The 
Commonwealth also produced evidence taken from Hughes's car 
including a number eight shot shell casing, as well as latent 
fingerprints which matched Roach's fingerprints. 
 
The corpus delicti of robbery, the predicate offense of this 
capital murder charge, was also corroborated by evidence 
independent of Roach's confession.  The autopsy report revealed 
evidence of violent force used on Hughes, and the videotape from 
the automatic teller machine showed Roach attempting to use 
Hughes's credit card.  Further, as stated above, latent 
fingerprints matching Roach's fingerprints were found in Hughes's 
vehicle, which was taken from the murder scene. 
 
Since the Commonwealth sufficiently corroborated the corpus 
delicti of capital murder, the trial court did not err in denying 
 
 
 
 
- 27 - 
Roach's motion to set aside the verdict.  Likewise, the court did 
not err in failing to instruct the jury that Roach's confession 
that he was the "triggerman" must be corroborated since the court 
had already correctly determined, as a matter of law, that the 
confession was sufficiently corroborated to go to the jury.  See 
Watkins, 238 Va. at 350-51, 385 S.E.2d at 55.   
 
Finally, there was no error in the trial court's refusal to 
give a jury instruction that only the immediate perpetrator of 
the killing can be found guilty of capital murder.  There was no 
evidence that Roach acted with an accomplice other than the first 
version of his confession, which he later recanted.  Also, since 
his theory that another person was the triggerman was unsupported 
by the evidence, Roach was not entitled to an instruction 
defining a principal in the second degree.  See Eaton v. 
Commonwealth, 240 Va. 236, 255, 397 S.E.2d 385, 397 (1990), cert. 
denied, 502 U.S. 824 (1991). 
 
VII.  PENALTY PHASE ISSUES 
 
Juror Question
 
Roach contends that the jury prematurely began deliberations 
during the penalty phase of the trial.  In support of his claim, 
he notes that, after the jury had been instructed but before it 
began deliberating, one juror asked the trial court, "Does life 
in prison mean with no chance of parole or truly life in prison, 
or is he eligible for parole?"   
 
At this point, Roach's counsel informed the trial court that 
 
 
 
 
- 28 - 
"unless the possibility can be excluded that this question 
originated solely with one juror, the defense would respectfully 
move for a mistrial."  The trial court declined to question the 
jury on the matter, but gave the jury an additional instruction 
stating, "Having found the defendant guilty, you should impose 
such punishment as you feel is just under the evidence and within 
the instructions of the Court.  You are not to concern yourself 
with what may happen afterwards." 
 
We find no merit in Roach's claim.  The question posed by 
the individual juror does not indicate that the jury had begun 
deliberating Roach's penalty.  Thus, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying the mistrial motion. 
 
Jury Instructions
 
Roach argues that the trial court erred in refusing to 
instruct the jury on the meaning of the word "probability," in 
the context of the "future dangerousness" provision of Code 
§ 19.2-264.2.  We disagree.  In Mickens v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 
395, 403, 442 S.E.2d 678, 684, vacated on other grounds, 513 U.S. 
___, 115 S.Ct. 307 (1994), we held that the word "probability," 
as it appears in the statutory context of the "future 
dangerousness" predicate, is not ambiguous.  Therefore, Roach was 
not entitled to a jury instruction defining that word.  See 
Lovisi v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 848, 850, 188 S.E.2d 206, 207, 
208 (1972). 
 
Roach next asserts that he was denied his Fourteenth 
 
 
 
 
- 29 - 
Amendment right of equal protection, because he was refused an 
instruction informing the jury that, if he received a life 
sentence on the capital murder charge, he would not be eligible 
for parole for 25 years.  In contrast, Roach argues, certain 
"adjudicated recidivists" are entitled to an instruction 
informing the jury that they would be ineligible for parole if 
given a life sentence for the same offense.  See Simmons v. South 
Carolina, 512 U.S. 2198 (1994). 
 
As stated above, in applying the rule of Simmons, this Court 
has held that a defendant charged with capital murder is entitled 
to an instruction regarding parole eligibility only when (1) the 
defendant's future dangerousness is in issue, and (2) the 
defendant is ineligible for parole at the time he is sentenced on 
the capital murder charge.  Wright, 248 Va. at 487, 450 S.E.2d at 
362.  Since Roach does not contend that he was ineligible for 
parole when he was sentenced, he was not entitled to an 
instruction regarding parole eligibility.  Moreover, Roach has 
not suffered a denial of equal protection from the refusal of 
such an instruction, because a non-suspect classification is 
involved here and that classification "rationally advances a 
reasonable and identifiable governmental objective."  Schweiker 
v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 235 (1981); see Evans, 228 Va. at 481, 
323 S.E.2d at 122. 
 
When a "recidivist" is ineligible for parole at the time of 
sentencing on a capital murder charge, this fact is relevant to 
 
 
 
 
- 30 - 
the issue whether "there is a probability that the defendant 
would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a 
continuing serious threat to society."  See Code § 19.2-264.2(1). 
 In contrast, the fact that Roach would be eligible for parole in 
25 years is not probative of this issue.  This fact could do 
nothing more than invite the jury to speculate on the effect 
incarceration might have on Roach.  The elimination of such 
improper speculation provides a rational basis supporting the 
denial of the requested instruction.  Thus, Roach's equal 
protection claim fails.  See Schweiker at 235. 
 
Standard of Proof for Future Dangerousness
 
Roach argues that, because this Court has never reversed a 
death sentence based on insufficiency of evidence of "future 
dangerousness," "Virginia cases articulate no standards to 
confine the reach of" that sentencing factor.  Roach contends 
that such standards must be articulated. 
 
We disagree, because the conclusion Roach urges ignores the 
central purpose of Code § 19.2-264.2, that of individualized 
consideration of the defendant and the crime committed.  Under 
the direction of Code § 19.2-264.2, the trier of fact may not 
impose the death penalty unless it finds "future dangerousness" 
beyond a reasonable doubt, upon consideration of all relevant 
evidence of the defendant's background, as well as the crime for 
which the defendant is being sentenced.  This individualized 
consideration necessarily precludes the articulation of precise 
 
 
 
 
- 31 - 
requirements for a finding of "future dangerousness."  Moreover, 
a defendant is protected from an unsupported finding of "future 
dangerousness" by the right to appellate review of the 
sufficiency of the evidence in support of that finding. 
 
Sufficiency of Evidence
 
of "Future Dangerousness"
 
Under Code § 19.2-264.2, the death penalty may not be 
imposed unless the trier of fact shall find one or both of two 
aggravating factors we have referred to as "future dangerousness" 
and "vileness."  Yeatts v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 121, 139, 410 
S.E.2d 254, 265 (1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 946 (1992).  In 
the present case, the jury found "future dangerousness," meaning 
"there is a probability that [Roach] would commit criminal acts 
of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to 
society."  Code § 19.2-264.2. 
 
Roach argues that the Commonwealth failed to produce 
sufficient proof of his "future dangerousness."  He first 
emphasizes that the only expert psychological testimony at the 
penalty phase was given by Dr. Hawk, who stated that there was no 
pattern of violent behavior in Roach's life.  Although he 
concedes that "[a]ll of [his] misconduct arguably involved 
potential for violence," Roach asserts that the Commonwealth 
never introduced evidence of any actual or threatened violence in 
his past behavior.  He also notes that his misconduct occurred 
only during the period of his family's "disintegration."  
 
 
 
 
- 32 - 
Further, given his difficult family background and the fact that 
he had only one probation violation prior to December 3, 1993, 
Roach asserts that the jury's finding of "future dangerousness" 
is unsupported by the evidence.  We disagree. 
 
The evidence in the penalty phase showed that, within 
approximately a seven-month period prior to Roach's murder of 
Hughes, he had broken and entered a private residence, stolen a 
.357 Magnum pistol from that dwelling, committed two automobile 
larcenies, and violated a condition of his probation. 
 
As this Court emphasized in Yeatts, 
 
Burglary laws are based primarily upon a recognition of 
the dangers to personal safety created by the usual 
burglary situation - the danger that the intruder will 
harm the occupants in attempting to perpetrate the 
intended crime or to escape and the danger that the 
occupants will in anger or panic react violently to the 
invasion, thereby inviting more violence. 
 
242 Va. at 140, 410 S.E.2d at 266 (citations omitted).  Thus, 
Roach's commission of burglary, and his theft of a .357 Magnum 
pistol during the burglary, were relevant evidence in determining 
his "future dangerousness."
8  See id. 
 
The jury also heard evidence from John Frey, Roach's 
probation officer, that Roach violated his probation in carrying 
a shotgun.  Violent behavior arose from this probation violation 
                     
     
8The fact that the dwelling Roach broke and entered was 
unoccupied at the time of the offense is a fortuitous 
circumstance that does not affect our analysis here. 
 
 
 
 
- 33 - 
when Roach used the shotgun to kill Mrs. Hughes.  Therefore, both 
the fact of the violation and its particular nature were relevant 
evidence in the jury's determination of "future dangerousness." 
 
Most significantly, this Court has recognized that the facts 
and circumstances surrounding the capital murder alone may be 
sufficient to support a finding of "future dangerousness."  See 
Murphy v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 136, 145, 431 S.E.2d 48, 53, 
cert. denied, 510 U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 336 (1993).  Here, Roach 
killed a defenseless, 70-year-old neighbor because he wanted her 
money.  He admitted that Mrs. Hughes had always been kind to him. 
 Yet, after shooting her at point-blank range, he walked past her 
body, robbed her of her money and car keys, and left her lying on 
the floor. 
 
From this evidence, the jury was entitled to conclude that 
Roach placed little value on human life and was willing to kill 
even a defenseless friend in order not to be identified as the 
perpetrator of a robbery.  Given Roach's escalating pattern of 
criminal behavior culminating in the murder of Mrs. Hughes, the 
jury had sufficient evidence from which to find, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that there was a probability that Roach would 
commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a 
continuing serious threat to society. 
 
Our conclusion in this regard is not altered by Dr. Hawk's 
testimony.  Although he testified that Roach had no pattern of 
violent behavior in his life, the jury was entitled to weigh this 
 
 
 
 
- 34 - 
opinion in conjunction with all the evidence of Roach's criminal 
behavior, including the facts and circumstances surrounding his 
robbery and murder of Mrs. Hughes. 
 
Roach also argues that the "trial court erred [by] finding 
that no good cause had been shown to set aside the sentence of 
death and impose a sentence of imprisonment for life."  In 
reviewing the record pursuant to Code § 19.2-264.5, the trial 
court is vested with discretion, upon good cause shown, to set 
aside the sentence of death.  Here, the record shows that the 
trial court reviewed all evidence presented in both mitigation 
and aggravation of the offense.  Based on the evidence presented, 
we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in finding an 
absence of "good cause shown" to set aside the jury verdict of 
death and to impose a sentence of life imprisonment. 
 
VIII.  SENTENCE REVIEW 
 
Under Code § 17-110.1(C)(1) and (2), we are required to 
determine "[w]hether the sentence of death was imposed under the 
influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor" 
and "[w]hether the sentence of death is excessive or 
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, 
considering both the crime and the defendant." 
A. 
Passion and Prejudice 
 
Roach contends that the sentence of death was imposed under 
the influence of passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary factor.  
In support of his argument, he restates several of the errors 
 
 
 
 
- 35 - 
assigned above.  Since we have found no error in the trial 
court's rulings, we reject this argument.  See Pope v. 
Commonwealth, 234 Va. 114, 127, 360 S.E.2d 352, 360 (1987), cert. 
denied, 485 U.S. 1015 (1988); Wise v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 322, 
335, 337 S.E.2d 715, 723 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1112 
(1986).  Additionally, our independent review of the entire 
record fails to disclose that the jury's death sentence "was 
imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other 
arbitrary factor."  Code § 17-110.1(C). 
B. 
Excessiveness and Proportionality 
 
Roach contends that the death sentence is excessive and 
disproportionate to those imposed in similar cases.  He argues 
that comparable death sentence cases involve "fact patterns more 
aggravated as to (1) surrounding circumstances of the offense, 
(2) age and background of the defendant and (3) unrebutted 
defense evidence offered in mitigation."  With regard to evidence 
in mitigation, Roach relies primarily on Dr. Hawk's testimony and 
the other testimony concerning Roach's school, work, and family 
life. 
 
In conducting the proportionality review, we consider 
"whether other sentencing bodies in this jurisdiction generally 
impose the supreme penalty for comparable or similar crimes, 
considering both the crime and the defendant."  Jenkins v. 
Commonwealth, 244 Va. 445, 461, 423 S.E.2d 360, 371 (1992), cert. 
denied, 507 U.S. 1036 (1993).  With this purpose in mind, we have 
 
 
 
 
- 36 - 
compared the record in this case with the records in other 
capital murder cases to determine whether the death penalty 
imposed here is "excessive or disproportionate to the penalty 
imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the 
defendant."  Code § 17-110.1(C)(2). 
 
Here, the jury based its sentence of death only on the 
"future dangerousness" predicate.  Therefore, in making our 
proportionality determination we have given particular 
consideration to other capital murder cases in which robbery was 
the underlying felony and the death penalty was based only on the 
"future dangerousness" predicate. 
 
Those cases were compiled in Yeatts, 242 Va. at 143, 410 
S.E.2d at 267-68, and supplemented in Chichester v. Commonwealth, 
248 Va. 311, 332-33, 448 S.E.2d 638, 652 (1994), cert. denied, 
___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 1134 (1995).  The following additional 
cases involving robberies and findings of "future dangerousness" 
were decided after Chichester and have been considered by us:  
Chandler v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 270, 455 S.E.2d 219, cert. 
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 233 (1995); Joseph, 249 Va. 78, 
452 S.E.2d 862.  We have also reviewed the records in capital 
murder cases in which robbery was the underlying offense and a 
sentence of life imprisonment was imposed. 
 
Based on this review, we conclude that, while there are 
exceptions, juries in this Commonwealth generally impose the 
death sentence for crimes comparable or similar to Roach's murder 
 
 
 
 
- 37 - 
of Mrs. Hughes.  Roach killed an elderly, defenseless friend with 
a shotgun at point blank range in the process of robbing her of a 
portion of her social security funds.  This crime, like the other 
death sentence crimes we have reviewed, shows extreme cruelty and 
lack of respect for human life. 
 
In addition, although there was evidence in mitigation 
concerning Roach's status as a 17-year-old offender and his 
family background, the present case also involved significant 
evidence in aggravation of the offense.  As stated above, Roach 
had been found guilty of four felonies in the seven-month period 
prior to the commission of this offense.  Although he had been on 
supervised probation since August 1993, this rehabilitative 
measure did not deter Roach from carrying a weapon in violation 
of the terms of his probation.  Moreover, his use of this weapon 
to kill Mrs. Hughes represented the ultimate failure of 
rehabilitative efforts on his behalf.  Given this escalating 
pattern of criminal behavior, which culminated in the commission 
of the present offense, we conclude that the imposition of the 
death penalty in this case is neither excessive nor 
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in comparable cases. 
 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
 
We find no reversible error in the issues presented here.  
Having reviewed Roach's sentence of death pursuant to Code 
§ 17-110.1, we decline to commute the sentence of death.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
 
 
 
 
- 38 - 
 
Affirmed.