Title: Hicks v. Boshears
Citation: 846 S.W.2d 812
Docket Number: N/A
State: Tennessee
Issuer: Tennessee Supreme Court
Date: January 25, 1993

846 S.W.2d 812 (1993) Iris Jean HICKS, Nancy Ellen Chadwell, Marcella Reed, and Alice Marie Ashbury, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Gifford Harold BOSHEARS, Defendant-Appellee. Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Knoxville. January 25, 1993. *813 David L. Buuck, Glen R. Claiborne, Claiborne, Davis, Buuck &amp; Hurley, Knoxville, for plaintiffs-appellants. Frank Dossett, LaFollette, for defendant-appellee. REID, Chief Justice. This case presents an appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeals sustaining summary judgment for the defendant. The plaintiffs are the children of the defendant Gifford Harold Boshears and his deceased wife, who was feloniously killed by Boshears. The suit seeks the declaration that the plaintiffs are the owners of certain real property that was owned by their parents as tenants by the entirety at the time of their mother's death in 1971. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment submitted upon stipulation of facts and argument of counsel, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The record does not support the summary judgment. This case requires the accommodation of two historic and significant legal principles that, in the factual context presented, initially appear to be incompatible. These principles are the maxim that a wrongdoer will not be allowed to benefit from his crime, and the characteristics of a tenancy by the entirety. The first proposition, that on which the plaintiffs base their claim and which was found by the Chancellor and the Court of Appeals to be inapplicable to this case, is found in Box v. Lanier, 112 Tenn. 393, 79 S.W. 1042 (Tenn. 1903). In that case, the personal representative of the husband, *814 who had feloniously killed his wife and then killed himself, claimed by right of inheritance, choses in action (benefits under an insurance policy) owned by the wife at the time of her death. In discussing the husband's right of inheritance, the Court discussed the principle of law on which plaintiffs rely: 112 Tenn. at 409, 79 S.W. 1042. In applying the maxim to the facts of that case, the Court stated: Id. at 409-11, 79 S.W. 1042. Accordingly, the Court did not allow the husband to inherit from his murdered wife. In response to the suggestion in Box v. Lanier for "speedy corrective legislation," Chapter 11, Public Acts of 1905 was enacted. Carter v. Hutchison, 707 S.W.2d 533, 536 (Tenn. App. 1985). That legislation, as amended in 1976, is set out in T.C.A. § 31-1-106 (1984) and is declaratory of the common law enunciated in Box v. Lanier. *815 The second legal proposition, that whereby the defendant prevailed in the trial court and Court of Appeals, concerns the nature of a tenancy by the entirety, and is set forth in Beddingfield v. Estill &amp; Newman, 118 Tenn. 39, 100 S.W. 108 (1906). In Beddingfield, a husband murdered his wife and then attempted to convey land which he and his wife had held as tenants by the entirety. Their children brought suit claiming that because of the husband's crime he forfeited his title to the property. In deciding the case, the Court discussed the nature of the interest held by each tenant: And again: 118 Tenn. at 44-46, 100 S.W. 108 (citations omitted). The Court in Beddingfield held that the husband took no additional interest in the property by surviving his wife, and therefore, there was no violation of the statute prohibiting a murderer from acquiring property as a result of his crime. The Court stated, "We do not think that either the common law rule or statute, here invoked, apply to this case," id. at 44, 100 S.W. 108, and found that the two legal principles, the nature of the survivor's interest in a tenancy by the entirety and the statute prohibiting a murderer from profiting by his ill deed, were mutually exclusive. In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals relied on the reasoning in Beddingfield, and found that the statute was not applicable to the termination of the right of survivorship caused by the death of the wife. However, it appears that in Beddingfield, the court did not have before it the statute as enacted, and it further appears that because there is a substantial enlargement of the surviving tenant's interest in property incident to the conversion of a tenancy by the entirety into a fee simple estate, the proper interpretation of the statute reveals that it is applicable to the facts of the case before the Court. The discrepancies between the language relied upon by the Court in Box v. Lanier, and the statute are not insignificant. The subsequent amendment to the statute also is worth noting. Consequently, all three are reproduced as follows: the "statute" relied upon in Beddingfield: Chapter 11, Public Acts of 1905, as enacted and in effect when Beddingfield was decided: T.C.A. § 31-1-106 (1984): The terms of the statute enacted do not require the conclusion that the statute is inapplicable to the termination of the tenancy by the entirety caused by the wife's murder. The Court emphasized in Beddingfield that the husband did not "inherit, acquire, or otherwise take any interest or estate in the lands from or through his wife." 118 Tenn. at 45, 100 S.W. 108. However, the statute's application is not so narrow as to limit forfeiture to property taken "from or through his wife." The forfeiture also applies to "any person who ... would take said property by deed, will or otherwise, at the death of the deceased." (Emphasis added.) The Court stated in the same paragraph: Id. Central to this description of the process whereby the tenancy by the entirety is converted into a fee simple estate are the phrases "takes and becomes" and "being terminated," which denote the passing of certain rights in and to the property. Similar expressions are the operative words of Chapter 11, Public Acts of 1905. The statute reduced to the provisions relevant to this case would read as follows: The language of the statute and the description of the conversion of a tenancy by the entirety into a fee simple found in Beddingfield are not incompatible. Analysis of the statute reveals that "take" is parallel with "inherit," so "take" means something different from "inherit." "Otherwise" *817 is in the disjunctive with "will" and "deed," so it contemplates "taking" by some legal means other than by will or deed. Likewise, "right" means something different from "interest" and "estate." "Any part thereof" appearing in the statute, reasonably could apply to the interest which constitutes the difference between a tenancy by the entirety and a fee simple estate, that described in Beddingfield as "the interest of the deceased being terminated by his or her death." "Take" in the statute reasonably could have the same meaning as "takes and becomes vested" in the Court's description of the conversion from a tenancy by the entirety into a fee simple in Beddingfield, and "otherwise" in the phrase "deed, will or otherwise," reasonably could include "the termination of a tenancy by the entirety" in the Beddingfield description. The amended statute, which like the original statute was intended to be declaratory of the common law, is even more susceptible to the interpretation suggested herein. "[T]ake said property by deed, will or otherwise" in the second clause of the statute, was changed to read "take the property, or any part thereof, by will, deed, or otherwise" "shall forfeit all right, interest and estate" was changed to "shall forfeit all right therein"; and "by will, deed, or other conveyance duly executed by the deceased in his or her lifetime" was changed to "by will, deed or other conveyance, as the case may be." The first change leaves no doubt that "take," which has been seen to mean something different from "inherit," is applicable to more than the alienation of a vested estate by will or deed. The second change, in which "right" replaced "right, interest and estate," emphasizes that the statute is not limited in effect to interests and estates. The change from "will, deed, or other conveyance duly executed by the deceased in his or her lifetime" to "will, deed or other conveyance, as the case may be," expands the category of means by which the forfeited property may pass to persons other than the killer, and would include instruments whereby tenancies by the entirety are created. Based on this analysis, the statute reasonably could be construed to provide: The majority of jurisdictions recognize as a property interest the benefit that accrues to the surviving tenant, on the death of the other tenant by the entirety, and prevent the surviving killer from obtaining this benefit. Though no consensus among the jurisdictions exists on the treatment of the killer's remaining interest, the analysis made in those jurisdictions holding that a tenancy by the entirety becomes a tenancy in common upon the murder of a tenant is consistent with our statute. For instance, in Grose v. Holland, 357 Mo. 874, 211 S.W.2d 464 (Mo. 1948), a husband murdered his wife, and then claimed complete ownership of property that they had held as tenants by the entirety. The plaintiffs, heirs of the deceased wife, claimed that the husband should not be allowed to profit by his wrongful act. That court held that the fiction of complete ownership in the whole of the entirety property must give way to the equitable principle that no one shall be permitted to profit by his own crime. Id. 211 S.W.2d at 466-67. Finding that the husband "did acquire a practical, substantial benefit" by the murder, the court held that the property descends as if it were formerly held as tenants in common. Id.; see also Estate of Sudduth, 718 S.W.2d 149 (Mo. App. 1986). Likewise, in the case of Luecke v. Mercantile Bank of Jonesboro, 286 Ark. 304, 691 S.W.2d 843 (1985), a husband killed his wife and then committed suicide. The plaintiff asked that court to impose a constructive trust on the assets of the husband's *818 estate, including property held as tenants by the entirety, for the benefit of the wife's estate, as restitution for the husband's wrongful act. The court found that the "logical conclusion was that the murder/suicide severed the marital relationship and the parties became tenants in common, entitling each to recover one-half of the property." Id. 691 S.W.2d at 845. Accordingly, in the case before the Court, the statute prohibits the defendant from gaining the conversion of his tenancy by the entirety into a fee simple estate. Instead, the tenancy by the entirety is converted into a tenancy in common by the defendant's act in feloniously killing the other tenant. The result is that an undivided one-half interest in the property is owned by the defendant, and an undivided one-half interest descends by "the laws of descent and distribution, or by will, deed, or other conveyance" as the case may be. Chapter 11, Public Acts of 1905. The conversion of a tenancy by the entirety into a tenancy in common at the time of the felonious murder of a spouse, prevents a person from turning an expectant interest into a vested interest by "kill[ing], or conspir[ing] with another to kill, or procur[ing] to be killed, any other person." This conclusion accommodates the two historic legal principles at issue: the equitable maxim that one should not be allowed to profit by wrongdoing, codified in the statutory prohibition against a killer taking or inheriting property from his victim, and the ownership of property as tenants by the entirety. T.C.A. §§ 31-1-106, 108 (1984). This interpretation does not, as contended by the defendant, violate Article 1, Section 12 of the state constitution by allowing a forfeiture of vested interest in land. As discussed above, the defendant's interest in the property at the time of the murder was not a fee simple estate. He has no constitutional right to have the tenancy by the entirety converted into a fee simple by his felonious act. T.C.A. § 31-1-106 only prohibits the conversion of a tenancy by the entirety into a fee simple estate by his criminal act to his benefit. The interest that he already possessed, an undivided interest in the property equally shared with his wife, is preserved and converted into a non-contingent estate. This conclusion also is consistent with the treatment of tenancies by the entirety in other areas of the law. At common law and in Tennessee, divorce converts a tenancy by the entirety into a tenancy in common. "Where husband and wife hold by the entireties and the marriage is ended by divorce, the tenancy also comes to an end and is converted into a tenancy in common." C. Moynihan, Introduction to the Law of Real Property 232 (1962). In Hopson v. Fowlkes, 92 Tenn. 697, 23 S.W. 55 (1893), an action for ejectment, the land was owned by husband and wife by the entireties when they were granted a divorce. The Court stated: 92 Tenn. at 702, 23 S.W. 55. See also Cline v. Cline, 186 Tenn. 509, 212 S.W.2d 361, 362 (1948). The Court further held, "the decree of divorce had the effect to make them tenants in common... ." 92 Tenn. at 703, 23 S.W. 55. The Uniform Simultaneous Death Act effectively converts a tenancy by the entirety into a tenancy in common. T.C.A. § 31-3-104 (1984) provides: In Brundige v. Alexander, 547 S.W.2d 232 (Tenn. 1976), the Court discussed the effect of the Act: Id. at 235 (citations omitted). The Court held in that case that when the tenants by the entirety die simultaneously, or otherwise come within the meaning of the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act, that statute controls the disposition of property held by decedents as tenants by the entirety. In Conner v. Holbert, 49 Tenn. App. 319, 354 S.W.2d 809 (1961), application of the statute codified as T.C.A. § 31-1-106 prevented the vesting of the right to curtesy. In that case, the husband who feloniously killed his wife was denied the right to curtesy in property owned by the wife in fee. The Court rejected the claim that such denial was the forfeiture of an estate forbidden by the Tennessee Constitution. The Court found that the husband had "a status entitling him to an estate by the curtesy consummate on the contingency that his wife dies," id. 354 S.W.2d at 812, and held that, under the statute, his felonious murder of the wife prevented the contingent right from becoming a vested estate. Though perhaps not so persuasive as the above, the Tennessee inheritance tax statute demonstrates the policy of the state with regard to tenancies by the entirety. T.C.A. § 67-8-305(a)(1) (1989) treats tenancies by the entirety as though each tenant owned a one-half undivided interest in fee. Pursuant to that statute, upon the death of a tenant by the entirety, one-half of the value of the property held by the entirety is included in determining the value of the net taxable estate. This decision in no way affects the existence or characteristics of tenancies by the entirety in Tennessee. Indeed, a prior decision to abolish that estate was quickly recognized as an unfortunate mistake which "released a veritable Pandora's box of legal pandemonium." Robinson v. Trousdale Co., 516 S.W.2d 626, 628-29 (Tenn. 1974). The judgments of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are reversed, and judgment will be entered granting summary judgment for the plaintiffs. The costs are taxed against the defendant. DROWOTA, DAUGHTREY, O'BRIEN and ANDERSON, JJ., concur.