Title: Gibney v. Hossack
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13436
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: April 10, 2024

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SJC-13436 
 
THOMAS GIBNEY1  vs.  JOHN A. HOSSACK & another.2 
 
 
 
Essex.     December 6, 2023. – April 10, 2024. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Kafker, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Devise and Legacy, Residuary interests, Survivorship.  Will, 
Construction.  Intent.  Practice, Civil, Presumptions and 
burden of proof, Summary judgment.  Uniform Probate Code. 
 
 
 
Complaint filed in the Essex Division of the Probate and 
Family Court Department on October 4, 2019. 
 
The case was heard by Jennifer M.R. Ulwick, J., on a motion 
for summary judgment. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
Juliet A. Davison for John A. Hossack. 
Frank P. Muzio for the plaintiff. 
 
 
 
1 Individually and as personal representative of the estate 
of Heather W. Hossack. 
 
 
2 Donald Etchison, interested party. 
 
2 
 
 
WENDLANDT, J.  "Death is not the end; there remains the 
litigation over the estate."3  The legal system long has used 
default rules of construction to resolve estate litigation over 
the terms of a will; these rules purport to reflect a testator's 
presumed intent in the absence of contrary evidence.  One such 
default rule is set forth in G. L. c. 190B, § 2-603 (anti-lapse 
statute), of the Massachusetts Uniform Probate Code (MUPC).  It 
generally provides that where a devisee falls within a class of 
specific familial relatives of the testator and where the 
devisee predeceases the testator, the devise does not lapse; 
instead, the devise falls to the living issue of the predeceased 
devisee.  The rule is based on a judgment about the typical 
testator's probable intent to preserve the devise for the 
predeceased devisee's lineal descendants, thereby keeping the 
devise in the family.  A testator can avoid the default 
presumption by indicating "a contrary intention shown by the 
terms of the will."  G. L. c. 190B, § 2-601. 
This case presents the question whether a testator's choice 
to make a devise to an individual "if she survives me," 
demonstrates a contrary intention to avoid application of the 
anti-lapse statute.  Concluding that in the present circumstance 
it does, we affirm the well-reasoned decision of the Probate and 
 
3 8 A. Bierce, The Collected Works of Ambrose Bierce 365 
(1911). 
3 
 
Family Court judge allowing summary judgment in favor of Thomas 
Gibney, the devisee of the residuary estate as set forth in the 
last will and testament (will) of Heather W. Hossack (Heather or 
decedent). 
1.  Background.  The material facts relevant to our 
decision largely are undisputed; where disputes persist on 
summary judgment, we consider the facts in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party, here, John A. Hossack (John).4  
See Hill-Junious v. UTP Realty, LLC, 492 Mass. 667, 668 (2023). 
In March 2019, Heather died.  She was forty-eight years 
old.  Heather was single and had been in a long-term 
relationship with her partner, Donald Etchison; Gibney was her 
neighbor and friend of many years.  Gibney was Heather's primary 
health care proxy.5  Heather did not have children.  She was 
predeceased by her parents, but survived by her brother, John. 
a.  The will.  In March 2016, three years prior to her 
death and shortly after her father died, Heather executed her 
 
4 Because they share a surname, we refer to Heather and John 
Hossack by their first names to avoid confusion. 
 
5 Etchison was the alternative health care proxy. 
 
4 
 
will,6 setting forth her desired distribution of her cash assets, 
her personal and real property, and the remainder of her estate. 
More specifically, Heather devised cash assets held in 
"Baird accounts and U.S. Trust accounts"7 to her mother, Ethel 
Wyman, "if she survives me."  At the time of the will's 
execution, Wyman was eighty-five years old.  In addition, 
Heather devised cash assets held in "Fidelity accounts" to John, 
the only other living member of her immediate family.  His 
devise also was conditioned "if he survives me."  The will 
specified the meaning of "surviv[ing]" the decedent, providing: 
"Requirement of Survival.  No beneficiary shall be 
considered to have survived me and to be entitled to any of 
my estate unless such beneficiary survives me for at least 
NINETY (90) days." 
 
Heather left all her tangible personal property and her 
real property to Etchison.  Unlike the devises to Wyman and 
John, Etchison's devises were "per stirpes."8 
 
6 Heather executed the will immediately before she was 
scheduled to have surgery.  She did not alter her will after the 
surgery. 
 
7 Gibney's complaint states that "the Baird accounts are not 
at issue in this [c]omplaint" because "[Heather] named [John] as 
the beneficiary of the Baird accounts."  
 
8 "Per stirpes" means that the descendants of a deceased 
devisee take "the same share or right . . . as their parent 
would have taken if living."  2 T.H. Belknap, Newhall's 
Settlement of Estates and Fiduciary Law in Massachusetts § 24:4, 
at 44 (5th ed. 1997). 
  
5 
 
Heather named Gibney the devisee of the residuary estate.  
This residuary devise, like Etchison's devise, was "per 
stirpes." 
The will was drafted by a Connecticut attorney, who was, at 
the time, an associate in a Connecticut-based law firm.9  To 
convey to the attorney her desired disposition of her assets, 
Heather filled out a questionnaire.  The attorney prepared a 
draft and reviewed it with Heather by telephone, making certain 
changes thereafter. 
At his deposition, the attorney could not recollect many of 
the details of his conversations with Heather.  However, he 
testified that because he knew that Wyman was elderly, he had 
explained to Heather that if Wyman predeceased her, the Baird 
and U.S. Trust account assets would lapse to the residuary 
estate and be distributed to Gibney, the devisee of the 
residuary estate.  The attorney could not recall which 
Massachusetts statutes, if any, he had consulted in connection 
with his advice to Heather. 
 
9 The attorney was not admitted to practice in 
Massachusetts.  The attorney was part of the law firm that had 
represented Heather in her capacity as the personal 
representative of her father's estate, which was probated in 
Connecticut, from 2014 to 2018.  She inherited the U.S. Trust 
accounts from her father.  Heather's father died shortly before 
Heather's will was drafted, and the same firm handled Heather's 
father's estate. 
 
6 
 
b.  Probate proceedings.  Following Heather's death, Gibney 
was appointed the personal representative of her estate, in 
accordance with the will.10  See G. L. c. 190B, § 3-614.  
Heather's will was admitted to probate, after the Probate and 
Family Court judge found that "[t]he will is valid and 
unrevoked."11 
Counsel for the estate informed John that, because Wyman 
did not survive Heather,12 the devise to Wyman lapsed, and that 
the U.S. Trust accounts would fall to the residuary estate.  
John challenged this interpretation of the will, contending that 
the anti-lapse statute required that the failed devise fall to 
him. 
Gibney, the named beneficiary of the residuary estate, 
filed a complaint, seeking a declaration pursuant to G. L. 
c. 231A, § 1, and instructions pursuant to G. L. c. 215, § 6, 
that the decedent's use of the words "if she survives me" in her 
devise to Wyman evinced the decedent's intent to avoid 
application of the anti-lapse statute.  The judge allowed 
summary judgment in favor of Gibney. 
 
10 The will designated Gibney the "Executor." 
 
11 John does not contest the will's validity. 
 
12 In April 2018, two years after Heather executed her will 
and one year before Heather died, Wyman died. 
7 
 
John timely appealed, and we transferred the case to this 
court on our own motion. 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  "Our review of a 
decision on a motion for summary judgment is de novo."  Metcalf 
v. BSC Group, Inc., 492 Mass. 676, 680 (2023), quoting HSBC Bank 
USA, N.A. v. Morris, 490 Mass. 322, 326 (2022).  "Viewing 'the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom 
summary judgment entered,' . . . '[s]ummary judgment is 
appropriate where there is no material issue of fact in dispute 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.'"  Metcalf, supra at 681, quoting HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 
supra at 326-327. 
This case requires us to consider whether the phrase "if 
she survives me," which is a condition precedent of the devise 
to Wyman, together with the other terms of the will, 
demonstrate, as a matter of law, a "contrary intention shown by 
the terms of the will" to defeat application of the anti-lapse 
statute.  G. L. c. 190B, § 2-601.  John contends that while the 
language "if she survives me" evinces Heather's intent that 
Wyman had to survive Heather in order to take the devise, the 
language is ambiguous as to the disposition of the devise if 
Wyman did not survive Heather.  Accordingly, John maintains that 
there remains a material factual dispute as to Heather's intent 
precluding summary judgment. 
8 
 
b.  Anti-lapse statute and testator's intent.  "The 
fundamental object in the construction of a will is to ascertain 
the testator's intent[] from the whole instrument, attributing 
due weight to all its language, considered in light of the 
circumstances known to the testator at the time of its 
execution, and to give effect to that intent unless some 
positive rule of law forbids."  Flannery v. McNamara, 432 Mass. 
665, 667-668 (2000), quoting Putnam v. Putnam, 366 Mass. 261, 
266 (1974).  If the language of the will is unambiguous, 
"extrinsic evidence to explain its terms is inadmissible."13  
Flannery, supra at 668, quoting Putnam, supra. 
The MUPC14 sets forth certain rules of construction that 
provide default assumptions about a testator's intent, see G. L. 
c. 190B, §§ 2-602 to 2-610; the rules are based on a judgment as 
to the typical testator's probable desires had the testator had 
the foresight to consider the issue.  See Restatement (Third) of 
Property:  Wills and Other Donative Transfers § 5 introductory 
note, at 344 (1999) (default rules "apply because, and only to 
the extent that, the testator . . . failed to address the issue 
 
13 As we explain infra, the language of Heather's will is 
unambiguous; we therefore do not consider extrinsic evidence in 
determining Heather's intent. 
 
14 The MUPC, which was enacted on January 15, 2009, see 
St. 2008, c. 521, governs the will, which was executed in 2016. 
 
9 
 
explicitly in a will provision").  Thus, these presumptions 
govern the interpretation of a will "[i]n the absence of a 
finding of a contrary intention shown by the terms of the will."  
G. L. c. 190B, § 2-601. 
One such default rule of construction is the anti-lapse 
statute, which provides in relevant part:  "[i]f a devisee who 
is . . . a lineal descendant of a grandparent [of the testator] 
. . . fails to survive the testator, . . . the issue of the 
deceased devisee who survive the testator take in place of the 
deceased devisee."  G. L. c. 190B, § 2-603.15 
Applied to the present case, if the anti-lapse statute 
governs Heather's will, the U.S. Trust accounts, which were 
devised to Wyman, a "lineal descendent of [Heather's] 
grandparent," who "fail[ed] to survive the testator, [Heather]," 
fall to John, "the issue of the deceased devisee[, Wyman,] who 
survive[d] the testator[, Heather]."  G. L. c. 190B, § 2-603.  
If, however, the anti-lapse statute does not apply, Wyman's 
 
15 At common law, if a devisee predeceased the testator, the 
devise lapsed unless the will disclosed a contrary intention.  
See Hobbs v. Chesley, 251 Mass. 155, 157 (1925); Worcester Trust 
Co. v. Turner, 210 Mass. 115, 121 (1911).  The essential purpose 
of the "anti-lapse" statutes in the Commonwealth, including its 
most recent iteration in the MUPC, is "to provide that legacies 
and devises to certain relatives who predecease the testator 
pass to specified substitute takers, usually the descendants of 
the predeceased devisee who survive the testator."  14E H.J. 
Alperin, Summary of Basic Law § 18:23, at 46 (5th ed. 2014), 
citing Restatement (Third) of Property:  Wills and Other 
Donative Transfers § 5.5 & comments c, d. 
10 
 
devise passes to the residuary estate devised to Gibney.  See 
G. L. c. 190B, § 2-604 ("a devise, other than a residuary 
devise, that fails for any reason becomes a part of the 
residue"). 
c.  Language of survivorship.  The anti-lapse statute is 
grounded in the judgment that the typical testator probably did 
not intend to "disinherit[] a line of descent."  Restatement 
(Third) of Property:  Wills and Other Donative Transfers § 5.5 
comment f, at 383.  See generally Halbach & Waggoner, The UPC's 
New Survivorship and Antilapse Provisions, 55 Alb. L. Rev. 1091, 
1099 (1992) (stating that anti-lapse statutes "give effect . . . 
to what are perceived as highly probable intentions.  They 
prevent unintended disinheritance of one or more lines of 
descent, by presumptively creating an alternative or substitute 
gift in favor of the descendants of certain of the decedent's 
predeceased relatives"). 
When a will imposes no survivorship condition or alternate 
disposition on a devise if the devisee predeceases the testator, 
there is no indication in the terms of the will that the 
testator contemplated the possibility that the devisee might 
predecease her.  As such, the anti-lapse statute fills in the 
testator's missing intent with a presumption against 
disinheritance of certain lineal descendants, allowing the 
devisee's living issue to take in the devisee's stead.  G. L. 
11 
 
c. 190B, § 2-603.  Accord Dewire v. Haveles, 404 Mass. 274, 277 
n.5 (1989) ("The policy underlying [the anti-lapse statute] 
might fairly be seen as supporting, as a rule of construction 
. . . , the substitution of a class member's surviving issue for 
a deceased class member if the class is made up of children or 
other relations of the testator"). 
A different situation is presented here.  The language "if 
she survives me" evinces that Heather had the foresight to 
consider that the devisee -- Wyman, her eighty-five year old 
mother -- might predecease her and, upon such consideration, 
conditioned the devise upon the devisee's survival.  There is no 
need to substitute a judgment (in the form of the rule of 
construction embodied in the anti-lapse statute) as to what the 
testator might have done if she had considered the issue; 
Heather contemplated the eventuality and provided for it 
expressly in the will.  In these circumstances, the anti-lapse 
statute's presumed intention must cede to the expressed 
intention of the testator:  that the devise fail, or lapse, if 
the survivorship condition is not met.16 
 
16 While not dispositive, this appears to be the 
understanding prevalent among practitioners in the Commonwealth.  
See Drafting Wills and Trusts in Massachusetts § 1.9.2 (Mass. 
Cont. Legal Educ. 6th ed. 2023) ("The [MUPC] attributes to words 
of survivorship their plain meaning; such language is sufficient 
to avoid the anti-lapse statute"); Massachusetts Basic Practice 
Manual § 1.2.3(i) (Mass. Cont. Legal Educ. 7th ed. 2022) ("In 
 
12 
 
Our conclusion in this regard is informed by the 
Legislature's rejection of Uniform Probate Code (UPC) 
§ 2-603(b)(3) -- a proposed subsection of the anti-lapse statute 
that set forth a rule of construction suggested here by John.  
Specifically, UPC § 2-603(b)(3), provided, in relevant part:  
"words of survivorship, such as in a devise to an individual 'if 
he [or she] survives me,' . . . are not, in the absence of 
additional evidence, a sufficient indication of an intent 
contrary to the application of [the anti-lapse statute]."  
Uniform Probate Code § 2-603(b)(3), 8 U.L.A. (Part I) 146 
(Master ed. 2023). 
 
order to avoid the question of whether the devise lapses under 
the Massachusetts anti-lapse statute if the beneficiary 
predeceases the testator, the phrase 'if he [or she] survives 
me' should be used"); A Practical Guide to Estate Planning in 
Massachusetts § 3.1.4(l) (Mass. Cont. Legal Educ. 5th ed. 2022) 
("It is always best to avoid the complexities involved in the 
application of [the anti-lapse] statute by providing in the will 
for the possibility of a beneficiary predeceasing the testator 
by use of phrases such as the following:  If he survives me"); 
Drafting Wills and Trusts in Massachusetts § 1.9.2 (Mass. Cont. 
Legal Educ. 3d ed. 2013) (legacy specifying "that the relative 
must survive the testator as a condition of receiving the 
legacy" avoids legacy "pass[ing] to the relative's issue"); M.A. 
Leahy, R.C. Barry, Jr., & B.P. Willensky, Massachusetts Bar 
Association, Drafting the Simple Will 10-11 (2008) ("If 'to 
Jason James, if he survives me,' then bequest will lapse if 
Jason does not survive the testator . . . .  If 'to Jason 
James,' the anti-lapse statute applies"); Halbach & Waggoner, 
The UPC's New Survivorship and Antilapse Provisions, 55 Alb. L. 
Rev. at 1104 (discussing common understanding "that attaching 
words of survivorship to a devise is a foolproof method of 
defeating an anti[-]lapse statute"). 
 
13 
 
Under the proposed subsection, the testator would have had 
to make an explicit statement of disinheritance or to identify 
an alternative devisee to avoid the anti-lapse statute.  See 
Uniform Probate Code § 2-603 comment, 8 U.L.A. (Part I) 150 
(Master ed. 2023).17  Given the comprehensive scheme set forth in 
the MUPC, we regard the Legislature's rejection of this proposal 
as purposeful.  Cf. City Elec. Supply Co. v. Arch Ins. Co., 481 
Mass. 784, 788 (2019), quoting Leary v. Contributory Retirement 
Appeal Bd., 421 Mass. 344, 348 (1995) ("When interpreting the 
absence of language in an otherwise 'detailed and precise 
[statute], we regard [an] omission as purposeful'"). 
 
In the present case, the devise is to Wyman, who was in her 
mid-eighties when Heather executed the will, "if she survives 
me."  Absent language in the will to the contrary, this language 
sufficed to show Heather's intent to avoid the anti-lapse 
statute.  See Flannery, 432 Mass. at 667, quoting Putnam, 366 
Mass. at 266 (we must "ascertain the testator's intention from 
 
17 Because the UPC's comments provide a rationale for a 
subsection of the anti-lapse statute that the Legislature did 
not adopt, John's reliance on them is misplaced.  See Uniform 
Probate Code § 2-603 comment, 8 U.L.A. (Part I) 149-152.  The 
UPC editors' proposed subsection and the attendant comments have 
been criticized for misapprehending the case law, citing to 
cases that subsequently were superseded, and substituting the 
editors' boilerplate language for the generally accepted words 
of survivorship.  See Cooper, A Lapse in Judgment:  Ruotolo v. 
Tietjen and Interpretation of Connecticut's Anti-Lapse Statute, 
20 Quinnipiac Prob. L.J. 204, 211-218 (2007). 
 
14 
 
the whole instrument" [emphasis added]).  Rather than calling 
into question this conclusion, the will as a whole supports it.  
In particular, the will specifies that a devisee is only 
considered to have "survived" Heather if the devisee survives 
her for at least ninety days, further evincing that the 
circumstance of a predeceased devisee was contemplated and 
specifically considered.  In addition, the devises to Wyman and 
John are conditioned "if [he or she] survives me," while the 
devises to Gibney and Etchison are made "per stirpes"; in other 
words, where Heather intended that a devise should fall to a 
deceased devisee's issue, she did so expressly.  The absence of 
similar language for Wyman and John bolsters our conclusion that 
Heather intended for Wyman and John to receive their devises 
only if they survived her; otherwise, these devises would lapse 
and fall to the residuary estate.18 
Order granting summary 
  judgment affirmed.  
 
18 Because the will is not ambiguous, we need not consider 
extrinsic evidence.  See Flannery, 432 Mass. at 668.