Title: State v. Hunt
Citation: 2012 WI 72
Docket Number: 2010AP001155
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 29, 2012

2012 WI 72 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2010AP594 & 2010AP1155 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In re the commitment of Carl Cornelius Gilbert, 
Jr.: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
Carl Cornelius Gilbert, Jr., 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
In re the commitment of Price T. Hunt: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
Price T. Hunt, 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 333 Wis. 2d 157, 798 N.W. 2d 889 
(Ct. App. 2011 – Published) 
PDC No: 2011 WI App 61 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 29, 2012   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 10, 2012 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Jeffrey A. Wagner (In case 10AP594) 
Jeffrey A. Conen (In case 10AP1155) 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (Opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins dissent.    
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
In case 2010AP594: 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
filed by Ellen Henak, and Hannah B. Schieber, assistant state 
public defenders and oral argument by Hannah B. Schieber. 
 
 
 
2
For the petitioner-respondent the cause was argued by 
Warren D. Weinstein, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was J.B. Van Hollen. 
 
In case 2010AP1155: 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
filed by Michael J. Gonring, Leah Stoecker, Eric J. Van 
Schyndle, Allison E. Cimpl-Wiemer and Quarles and Brady, LLP., 
Milwaukee and oral argument by Eric J. Van Schyndle. 
For the petitioner-respondent the cause was argued by 
Warren D. Weinstein, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was J.B. Van Hollen. 
 
 
2012 WI 72
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2010AP594 & 2010AP1155 
(L.C. No. 
2006CI12 & 2007CI9)  
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the commitment of Carl Cornelius Gilbert, 
Jr.: 
 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Carl Cornelius Gilbert, Jr., 
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 29, 2012 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
In re the commitment of Price T. Hunt: 
 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Price T. Hunt, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
2010AP594 & 2010AP1155   
 
2 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   We review a published 
decision of the court of appeals1 affirming orders of the circuit 
court for Milwaukee County, Jeffrey A. Wagner and Jeffrey A. 
Conen, Judges.2 
¶2 
We are asked to decide whether Wisconsin Statutes 
chapter 980 (2005-06)3 requires the dismissal of a pending 
commitment petition when the individual subject to the petition 
is re-incarcerated because of the revocation of parole or 
extended supervision.  We hold that the State may proceed with a 
ch. 980 
commitment 
after 
the 
revocation 
of 
a 
subject 
individual's parole or extended supervision.  Based on that 
holding, we conclude that both of the ch. 980 commitments at 
issue in this case are valid, and therefore affirm the court of 
appeals. 
I. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶3 
The facts of these cases are undisputed and we will 
address the facts of Gilbert and Hunt's ("Petitioners") cases in 
turn. 
                                                 
1 State v. Gilbert, 2011 WI App 61, 333 Wis. 2d 157, 798 
N.W.2d 889. 
2 Gilbert and Hunt's cases were heard independently at the 
circuit court level, but were consolidated by the court of 
appeals.   
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2010AP594 & 2010AP1155   
 
3 
 
A. 
Carl Cornelius Gilbert, Jr. 
¶4 
Carl Cornelius Gilbert, Jr. ("Gilbert") was convicted 
of second-degree sexual assault and was sentenced to ten years 
in prison.4  On December 4, 2006, while Gilbert was still in the 
custody of the Department of Corrections ("DOC"), the State 
filed a petition seeking his commitment pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.02.  The same day, the circuit court reviewed the 
petition, found probable cause to believe Gilbert was eligible 
for commitment, and ordered Gilbert detained by the DOC and 
transferred to a facility approved by the Department of Health 
Services ("DHS").  A day later, the DOC released Gilbert on 
parole and transferred him to the Wisconsin Resource Center 
("WRC") in Winnebago, Wisconsin, which is maintained and 
operated by DHS. 
¶5 
Less than ten days after being transferred to WRC, 
Gilbert violated the conditions of his parole.  Consequently, 
the DOC placed a "hold" on his parole, and on January 19, 2007, 
he was transferred to the Milwaukee Secure Detention Facility 
("MSDF"), which is maintained and operated by the DOC.  While 
the issue of determination of Gilbert's parole revocation was 
pending, a hearing was held on March 22, 2007, where the circuit 
court found probable cause to believe that Gilbert was a 
"sexually violent person" within the meaning of Wis. Stat. 
ch. 980 and ordered him transferred for evaluation to the WRC 
                                                 
4 Second-degree sexual assault is a predicate offense under 
Wis. Stat. § 980.01(6)(a). 
No. 
2010AP594 & 2010AP1155   
 
4 
 
"or such other authorized institution as may be determined by 
the [DHS]."  However, on August 8, 2007, Gilbert’s parole was 
revoked, and he was re-incarcerated, this time at Dodge 
Correctional Institution, which is maintained and operated by 
the DOC. 
¶6 
On October 17, 2007, DOC granted Gilbert parole a 
second time and transferred him back to WRC, pending resolution 
of the Wis. Stat. ch. 980 commitment petition filed on December 
4, 2006.  On November 25, 2007, Gilbert violated the terms of 
his second parole. As a result, he was re-incarcerated at the 
MSDF pending his revocation hearing, and his parole was revoked 
on December 28, 2007.  
¶7 
On February 4, 2008, Gilbert's ch. 980 commitment 
trial began.  After a three-day trial, the jury found him to be 
a "sexually violent person" within the meaning of § 980.01(1).  
Following the trial, the circuit court entered a commitment 
order pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 980.06.  He was not, however, 
sent back to WRC or to any other DHS facility, but rather was 
transferred by the DOC to Waupun Correctional Institution to 
serve the balance of his sentence that resulted from the 
December 28, 2007, revocation.  He then served out the remainder 
of the sentence resulting from his second revocation in the 
custody of the DOC.  In accordance with the condition of this 
period of incarceration, Gilbert was transferred to the custody 
of the DHS. 
¶8 
On January 15, 2009, while in the custody of the DHS, 
Gilbert brought a post-conviction motion in which he asserted 
No. 
2010AP594 & 2010AP1155   
 
5 
 
that his December 28, 2007 parole revocation required dismissal 
of the ch. 980 petition.  On December 17, 2009, the circuit 
court held a motion hearing, and on February 18, 2010, the 
circuit court issued an oral ruling denying the motion.  Gilbert 
appealed this motion to the court of appeals. 
B. 
Price T. Hunt 
¶9 
Price T. Hunt ("Hunt") was convicted of third-degree 
sexual assault5 and misdemeanor battery.  Hunt was sentenced to a 
term of incarceration of ten years, consisting of five years 
initial confinement and five years extended supervision.  His 
expected release date from incarceration to extended supervision 
was September 4, 2007. 
¶10 On August 23, 2007, the State filed a Wis. Stat. 
ch. 980 commitment petition, seeking Hunt’s commitment as a 
sexually violent person.  On the same day that the State filed 
the petition, the circuit court found there was probable cause 
to believe that Hunt met the statutory criteria for a ch. 980 
commitment.  The court ordered Hunt transferred to a detention 
facility approved by the DHS pending the resolution of the 
ch. 980 commitment petition. In compliance with this order, Hunt 
was transferred to the WRC (and DHS custody) when he was 
released to extended supervision in September of 2007.  On 
October 16, 2007, the circuit court found probable cause to 
                                                 
5 Third-degree sexual assault is a predicate offense under 
Wis. Stat. § 980.01(6)(b). 
No. 
2010AP594 & 2010AP1155   
 
6 
 
believe that Hunt was a "sexually violent person" within the 
meaning of § 980.01(1). 
¶11 While in the custody of the DHS, and while his 
commitment trial was pending, Hunt violated the terms of his 
extended supervision.  His extended supervision was subsequently 
revoked on May 29, 2008.  About a month after the revocation of 
Hunt's extended supervision, but before his re-incarceration, he 
moved to dismiss the commitment petition, or in the alternative, 
to be transferred to "an approved DHS facility."  Following the 
filing of this motion, but prior to the hearing on it, the 
circuit court ordered Hunt re-confined for two years, and Hunt 
was transferred to the Racine Correctional Institution.  A 
hearing on the motion was held on September 29, 2008, after 
which the circuit court denied both Hunt’s motion to dismiss and 
the request to be transferred. 
¶12 Hunt's commitment case was tried in July of 2009, and 
the circuit court found him to be a sexually violent person and 
ordered commitment. 
¶13 On May 7, 2010, Hunt appealed the order denying his 
motion to dismiss and the judgment and commitment order.  The 
court of appeals consolidated Gilbert and Hunt’s appeals.  See 
State v. Gilbert, 2011 WI App 61, 333 Wis. 2d 157, 798 
N.W.2d 889.  The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court and 
held that dismissal of a Wis. Stat. ch. 980 proceeding is not 
required when the subject of the petition is transferred to the 
custody of the DOC before a ch. 980 commitment order is entered.  
Id., ¶1.  Hunt remained at the Racine Correctional Institution 
No. 
2010AP594 & 2010AP1155   
 
7 
 
in the custody of the DOC until March 30, 2010——the scheduled 
conclusion of his sentence——when he was transferred to the WRC, 
where he is currently confined.  Gilbert and Hunt petitioned for 
review from this court, which we granted. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶14 We are required to construe Wis. Stat. ch. 980.  This 
is a matter of statutory interpretation, and therefore a 
question of law that the court reviews de novo. Noffke ex rel. 
Swenson v. Bakke, 2009 WI 10, ¶9, 315 Wis. 2d 350, 760 
N.W.2d 156.  We interpret statutes independently, but benefit 
from both our prior analyses and that of prior courts.  State v. 
Henley, 2010 WI 97, ¶29, 328 Wis. 2d 544, 787 N.W.2d 350. 
III. 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
¶15 Statutory interpretation "begin[s] with the language 
of the statute, because it is the language that expresses the 
legislature's intent." Hocking v. City of Dodgville, 2010 WI 59, 
¶18, 326 Wis. 2d 155, 785 N.W.2d 398 (citing State ex rel. Kalal 
v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶¶44-45, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110).  Moreover, "[w]e attempt, whenever 
possible, to give reasonable effect to every word, avoiding both 
surplusage and absurd or unreasonable results."  Id., ¶18 
(citing Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46). 
¶16 In addition to the plain language of the statute, 
"scope, context, and purpose are perfectly relevant to a plain-
meaning interpretation of an unambiguous statute."  Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶48.  Further, "[a] review of statutory history is 
part of a plain meaning analysis."   Richards v. Badger Mut. 
No. 
2010AP594 & 2010AP1155   
 
8 
 
Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶22, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581.  
Accordingly, we examine the language, context, purpose, and 
history of Wis. Stat. ch. 980 while undertaking our analysis. 
IV. 
DISCUSSION 
¶17 Although the facts of the Petitioners’ cases are 
different, they present the court with a single issue for 
review: Whether Wis. Stat. ch. 980 requires the dismissal of a 
pending commitment petition when the individual subject to the 
petition is incarcerated because of the revocation of either 
parole or extended supervision.  We hold that ch. 980 does not 
require such a dismissal, and accordingly conclude that both 
Gilbert and Hunt were properly committed under ch. 980 after 
their 
parole 
and 
extended 
supervision, 
respectively, 
was 
revoked. 
¶18 The Petitioners make slightly different arguments with 
regard to the issue presented by this case.6  Gilbert makes three 
arguments: First, that proceeding with a Wis. Stat. ch. 980 
petition after a parole revocation violates the plain language 
of 
ch. 980; 
second, 
that 
interpreting 
ch. 980 
to 
allow 
simultaneous commitment and incarceration would result in 
unconstitutional violations of the protections against double 
jeopardy and ex post facto laws, as well as in violations of 
substantive due process; and third, that the ch. 980 petitions 
                                                 
6 Gilbert and Hunt's arguments, although not identical, 
often cover what is substantively the same ground.  Accordingly, 
we refer to their arguments collectively as the "Petitioners' 
arguments." 
No. 
2010AP594 & 2010AP1155   
 
9 
 
are moot when the State revokes parole and returns the 
individual to prison. 
¶19 Hunt makes three similar arguments:  First, that 
allowing a Wis. Stat. ch. 980 petition to continue when the 
subject of the petition is returned to prison is contrary to the 
express 
language 
of 
the 
statute; 
second, 
that 
State 
v. 
Szulczewski, 216 Wis. 2d 495, 574 N.W.2d 660 (1998) and State v. 
White, 2000 WI App 147, 237 Wis. 2d 699, 615 N.W.2d 667 deny a 
circuit court the discretion to stay a chapter 980 commitment 
proceeding in favor of imposing a prison sentence;7 and third, 
that permitting a ch. 980 petition to continue when the subject 
of the petition is incarcerated removes the constitutional 
protections of due process.8 
¶20 We agree with the court of appeals that each of the 
Petitioners' 
arguments 
are 
centered 
on 
the 
statutory 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. ch. 980.  For that reason, the 
                                                 
7 We need not address this argument or Gilbert's argument 
that ch. 980 petitions are moot when the State revokes parole 
and returns the individual to prison because we conclude that   
ch. 980 
does 
not 
preclude 
simultaneous 
incarceration 
and 
commitment.  Therefore, the circuit court does not need to stay 
the proceedings, and the proceedings are not moot even if parole 
or extended supervision is revoked before a commitment order is 
entered. 
8 Hunt's constitutional arguments are unclear.  His initial 
brief to this court contained scant argument——slightly more than 
500 words, including citation——addressing his constitutional 
concerns.  In this section of his argument, the words "due 
process" appear only once, and no other constitutional argument 
is made.  In his reply brief, Hunt provides only a conclusory 
sentence alleging that his due process rights were violated. 
No. 
2010AP594 & 2010AP1155   
 
10 
 
court of appeals disposed of the Petitioners' constitutional 
arguments in a single footnote.  See Gilbert, 333 Wis. 2d 157, 
¶11 n.9 (interpreting the Petitioners' constitutional arguments 
as relying "entirely on their interpretations of Wis. Stat. 
ch. 980" and as "not developed beyond their interpretations of 
ch. 980.").  Because we believe that each of the Petitioners' 
arguments are centered on the interpretation of the statute, we 
first turn to a brief overview of ch. 980. 
¶21 Wisconsin Stat. ch. 980 "provides for the involuntary 
commitment of certain individuals who are found to be sexually 
violent persons."9  State v. Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d 252, 541 
N.W.2d 105 (1995).  As such, ch. 980 prescribes a detailed 
procedure that the State must follow in order to commit a 
sexually violent person.10 
                                                 
9 For a history of ch. 980 and other states' sexual offender 
commitment laws, see generally Juliet M. Dupuy, Comment, The 
Evolution of Wisconsin's Sexual Predator Law, 79 Marq. L. Rev. 
873 (1996), and Rebecca Kennedy Hamrin, Comment, Supervised 
Release Under Chapter 980: Alternatives to Protect Wisconsin 
While Upholding the Constitution, 2007 Wis. L. Rev. 889. 
10 We reviewed the constitutionality of ch. 980's procedures 
as a whole in 1995 in two cases: State v. Carpenter, 197 
Wis. 2d 252, 541 N.W.2d 105 (1995), and State v. Post, 197 
Wis. 2d 279, 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995).  In those cases, we 
determined, inter alia, that ch. 980 commitments do not violate 
the constitutional prohibitions of double jeopardy and ex post 
facto laws, see Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d at 259, or substantive 
due process and equal protection, see Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 293-
94.  See generally Erich C. Straub & James E. Kachelski, The 
Constitutionality of Wisconsin's Sexual Predator Law, Wis. Law., 
July 1995. 
No. 
2010AP594 & 2010AP1155   
 
11 
 
¶22 The Petitioners do not contend that the State violated 
any of the procedures of Wis. Stat. ch. 980; instead, they 
allege 
ch. 980 
does 
not 
contain 
suitable 
procedures 
for 
commitment after parole or extended supervision is revoked and 
the individual subject to the petition is re-incarcerated.  We 
do not agree.  Our review of ch. 980 reveals that the statute 
allows a ch. 980 commitment petition to proceed through its 
normal course after parole or extended supervision has been 
revoked.  We turn first to a review of the purpose of ch. 980, 
because the purpose of ch. 980 informs our interpretation of its 
language. 
A. 
The Purpose of Chapter 980 Does Not Require Dismissal 
¶23 The primary goal of Wis. Stat. ch. 980 is two-fold: 1) 
the treatment of sexually violent persons, and 2) the protection 
of society from those persons.  See State v. West 2011 WI 83, 
¶27, 336 Wis. 2d 578, 800 N.W.2d 929; State v. Post, 197 
Wis. 2d 279, 308, 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995); Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d 
at 271 ("[T]he principal purposes of ch. 980 are the protection 
of the public and the treatment of convicted sex offenders." 
(quoting Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983))).  
This purpose highlights the fact that ch. 980 is not a punitive 
provision, but instead provides a means for treating sexually 
violent persons "who are at a high risk to reoffend in order to 
reduce the likelihood that they will engage in such conduct in 
the future."  Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d at 271.   
¶24 We have consistently interpreted Wis. Stat. ch. 980 in 
light of this purpose.  In West, we reviewed the history of 
No. 
2010AP594 & 2010AP1155   
 
12 
 
several amendments to ch. 980, emphasizing that, with each 
successive 
amendment, 
the 
legislature 
has 
increasingly 
demonstrated its concern for the protection of the public.  336 
Wis. 2d 578, ¶¶42-44 (discussing three separate amendments that 
added protections for the public from sexually violent persons). 
¶25 In State ex rel. Marberry v. Macht, we held that 
"[r]elease of a ch. 980 patient whose dangerousness or mental 
disorder has not abated serves neither to protect the public nor 
provide care and treatment for the patient."  2003 WI 79, ¶30, 
262 Wis. 2d 720, 665 N.W.2d 155, cert. denied 540 U.S. 997 
(2003).  In that case, we declined to order the release of a 
sexually violent person, because release was "not justifiable 
under the dual purposes of the statute: protection of the public 
from sexually violent persons likely to reoffend and care and 
treatment of the patient."  Id.  In State v. Schulpius, we 
reiterated our holding in Marberry that even "where there was a 
violation of procedural due process . . . release is not only 
inappropriate, it is not justifiable under the dual purposes of 
the statute."  2006 WI 1, ¶39, 287 Wis. 2d 44, 707 N.W.2d 495, 
cert. denied 547 U.S. 1138 (2006) (quoting Marberry, 262 
Wis. 2d 720, ¶30). 
¶26 In light of these cases, it is clear that the 
protection of the public from sexually violent persons is of 
central importance in Wis. Stat. ch. 980 cases.  We continue our 
review of ch. 980 with this principle in mind.  We turn next to 
a discussion of the language of ch. 980, ultimately determining 
that it does not require the dismissal of a pending commitment 
No. 
2010AP594 & 2010AP1155   
 
13 
 
petition when the individual subject to the petition is re-
incarcerated because of the revocation of parole or extended 
supervision.  
B. 
Chapter 980 and Re-Incarceration 
¶27 Wisconsin Stat. ch. 980 does not expressly address the 
issue presented by this case: Whether ch. 980 requires the 
dismissal of a pending commitment petition when the individual 
subject to the petition is incarcerated because of a revocation 
of parole or extended supervision.  However, the statute 
provides procedures for similar situations, and thereby provides 
guidance for our resolution of the issues in this case. 
¶28 We examine three portions of Wis. Stat. ch. 980 that 
are relevant to our determination of whether dismissal is 
required in these cases.  We conclude that ch. 980 does not 
require such a dismissal because it: 1) does not contain 
language allowing for dismissal in this case; 2) does not set a 
time period for execution of a commitment order; and 3) states 
that an individual may be simultaneously committed under ch. 980 
No. 
2010AP594 & 2010AP1155   
 
14 
 
and incarcerated at a DOC facility.11  We address each of these 
three components of ch. 980 in turn. 
1. 
Chapter 980 Provides Only Two Means for Dismissal of a 
Chapter 980 Commitment Petition 
¶29 The thrust of the Petitioners' argument is that the 
circuit court must dismiss a pending Wis. Stat. ch. 980 
commitment petition if the individual subject to the petition is 
re-incarcerated for a parole or extended supervision revocation.  
The language of ch. 980, however, authorizes only two methods by 
which a circuit court may dismiss a pending commitment petition: 
1) failure to find probable cause "to believe that the person is 
a sexually violent person" under § 980.04(3), or 2) failure to 
                                                 
11 The 
dissent 
takes 
issue 
with 
us 
for 
allegedly 
interpreting "statutory provisions in isolation while ignoring 
the context set forth in surrounding provisions."  Dissent, ¶81 
(citing State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 
2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110).  In fact, our 
approach to ch. 980 is a holistic one, and, by examining the 
inner workings of the statute related to this case, undertakes 
an analysis of its context.  See Part IV.B.1. (discussing that 
ch. 980 provides only two means for dismissal of a ch. 980 
commitment petition); Part IV.B.2. (discussing that nothing in 
the language or context of ch. 980 requires immediate execution 
of a commitment order); Part IV.B.3. (discussing that section 
980.07(6m) does not conflict with ch. 980 when it allows an 
individual to be simultaneously committed under ch. 980 and 
incarcerated at a DOC facility). 
The dissent takes an alternative approach.  See Dissent, 
¶98 (stating that the reason for the 2005 changes to ch. 980 are 
"revealed 
by 
examining 
th[e] 
legislative 
history"). 
 
It 
undertakes an analysis that is representative of the precise 
evil that Kalal was designed to combat: the use of legislative 
history in lieu of the language of the statute.  See Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶51. 
No. 
2010AP594 & 2010AP1155   
 
15 
 
prove "beyond a reasonable doubt that the person is a sexually 
violent person" under § 980.05(5).12 
¶30 Nothing in Wis. Stat. ch. 980 requires dismissal of a 
pending commitment petition under the conditions proposed by the 
Petitioners; therefore, it is unreasonable to assume that the 
legislature impliedly authorized circuit courts to dismiss 
pending ch. 980 commitment petitions when the individual subject 
to the petition has been re-incarcerated for a subsequent parole 
                                                 
12 The State suggests that Wis. Stat. ch. 980 provides two 
means for terminating a commitment: vacating the judgment under 
§ 980.101(2)(a), and discharge under § 980.09.  However, neither 
of these provisions is relevant to the issue in this case, 
because both deal with the termination of commitment after the 
entry of an order of commitment under § 980.06.  The issue in 
this case deals with the dismissal of a petition, not a final 
commitment order. 
No. 
2010AP594 & 2010AP1155   
 
16 
 
or 
extended 
supervision 
violation.13 
 
See 
Noffke, 
315 
Wis. 2d 350, ¶27 n.7 ("[E]very word excluded from a statute must 
be presumed to have been excluded for a purpose . . . .").  The 
legislature could have included a provision in ch. 980 requiring 
dismissal in such situations, but it did not.  We will not 
judicially engraft such a dismissal requirement into the 
statute.  See Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co., 2009 WI 
27, ¶41, 316 Wis. 2d 47, 762 N.W.2d 652 (holding that this court 
does not insert words into statutes). In short, the statute 
                                                 
13 This reasoning is especially persuasive given that the 
legislature has amended Wis. Stat. ch. 980 thirty times in less 
than twenty years, and every successive legislature has made 
some change to ch. 980.  See 1995 Wis. Act 27, § 9126(19)(a); 
1995 Wis. Act 77, §§ 693 to 698; 1995 Wis. Act 225, § 536; 1995 
Wis. Act 276, §§ 2g, 2k, 2n; 1995 Wis. Act 440, §§ 106 to 114; 
1997 Wis. Act. 27, §§ 5491b to 5491x; 1997 Wis. Act. 181, §§ 112 
to 114; 1997 Wis. Act. 205, §§ 104 to 105; 1997 Wis. Act. 252, 
§ 193; 1997 Wis. Act. 275, §§ 8e to 8f; 1997 Wis. Act 283, 
§§ 450 to 453; 1997 Wis. Act 284, §§ 4 to 10; 1997 Wis. Act 295, 
§ 48; 1999 Wis. Act 9, §§ 3216d, 3217d to 3220d, 3221, 3222d, 
3223c, 3223h to 3223L, 3230m, 3231m, 3232, 3232p to 3238d, 
3238h, 3238j, 3238t, 3239, 3239d; 1999 Wis. Act 32, §§ 409, 410; 
1999 Wis. Act 185, § 193(1); 1999 Wis. Act 407, §§ 407 to 408; 
2001 Wis. Act 16, §§ 4034ye to 4034yt, 9259(12j); 2003 Wis. Act 
187, §§ 1 to 7; 2005 Wis. Act 253, § 174; 2005 Wis. Act 277, 
§§ 96, 97; 2005 Wis. Act 344, §§ 633 to 635; 2005 Wis. Act 431, 
§§ 15 to 20; 2005 Wis. Act 434, §§ 60 to 130; 2007 Wis. Act 20, 
§§ 3928 to 3930, 9121(6)(a); 2007 Wis. Act 96, §§ 171 to 174; 
2007 Wis. Act 97, §§ 331 to 334; 2009 Wis. Act 26, § 13; 2009 
Wis. Act 28, §§ 3401, 3405; 2009 Wis. Act 248, § 1.  Currently, 
two bills are under review that would further amend ch. 980.  
See 2011 S.B. 169; 2011 S.B. 214.  Given this cavalcade of 
proposed and enacted amendments, it is unreasonable to assume 
that the legislature intended to require the dismissal of a 
pending ch. 980 commitment petition if the individual subject to 
the petition is re-incarcerated on a parole or extended 
supervision violation, and simply forgot to create a provision 
to do so. 
No. 
2010AP594 & 2010AP1155   
 
17 
 
provides no indication that a circuit court should do anything 
but consider a ch. 980 commitment petition if the individual 
subject to the petition is re-incarcerated for a parole or 
extended supervision violation. 
¶31 Our conclusion that Wis. Stat. ch. 980 does not 
require 
dismissal 
is 
consistent 
with 
our 
prior 
holdings 
regarding its purposes.  As we have discussed, one of the 
purposes 
of 
ch. 980 
is 
the 
"protection 
of 
the 
public," 
Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d at 258, and we have described release 
from custody of an individual still considered dangerous as 
incompatible with this goal, Marberry, 262 Wis. 2d 720, ¶30.  We 
would do violence to the purpose of ch. 980 if we were to 
conclude that dismissal of a pending ch. 980 commitment petition 
is warranted where the language of the statute does not so 
require. 
¶32 Accordingly, we conclude that Wis. Stat. ch. 980 does 
not require the dismissal of a pending commitment petition when 
the individual subject to that petition has been re-incarcerated 
due to a violation of parole or extended supervision. 
2. 
Section 980.06 Does Not Require Immediate Execution of a 
Commitment Order Where Revocation Proceedings Are Pending 
¶33 Even if the language of Wis. Stat. ch. 980 does not 
provide for the dismissal of a pending ch. 980 commitment 
petition when the individual subject to the petition has been 
re-incarcerated for a parole or extended supervision revocation, 
we must determine whether post-revocation prosecution of a 
ch. 980 petition conflicts with other provisions of ch. 980.  We 
No. 
2010AP594 & 2010AP1155   
 
18 
 
thus turn to § 980.06, the general provision that grants circuit 
courts the authority to commit sexually violent persons to the 
care and custody of the DHS.  Section 980.06 states, in relevant 
part:  
If a court or jury determines that the person who is 
the subject of a petition under s. 980.02 is a 
sexually violent person, the court shall order the 
person 
to 
be 
committed 
to 
the 
custody 
of 
the 
department for control, care and treatment until such 
time as the person is no longer a sexually violent 
person. 
¶34 The Petitioners focus on the language of this section 
that states a sexually violent person must be "committed to the 
custody of the department for control, care and treatment."  Id.  
They argue that because this section requires "treatment" of 
sexually violent persons, and because the DOC does not provide 
such 
treatment, 
a 
sexually 
violent 
person 
cannot 
be 
simultaneously committed to DHS custody under Wis. Stat. ch. 980 
and in the custody of the DOC.  We disagree, because this 
interpretation adds to the language of § 980.06 and ignores 
other sections of ch. 980. 
¶35 While we acknowledge that Wis. Stat. § 980.06 requires 
the circuit court to "order the person to be committed to the 
custody of the [DHS] for control, care and treatment," see 
§ 980.06, ch. 980 does not specify when that commitment must 
commence.  Stated a different way, while § 980.06 sets forth the 
requirements for a proper commitment order, neither that section 
nor any other section of ch. 980 contains language stating when 
the individual requirements (control, care, and treatment) of 
No. 
2010AP594 & 2010AP1155   
 
19 
 
that order must be satisfied.  See id.  Although the legislature 
did not direct the court regarding the timing or execution of 
commitment orders, we think it important to review the statutory 
history of ch. 980 to shed light on the current statute. 
¶36 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.06 remains in much the same form 
as it was in 1993 when ch. 980 became law.  Compare § 980.06 
(2005-06) with 1993 Wis. Act 479, § 40.  However, prior to 2005, 
the State could not file a ch. 980 commitment petition more than 
90 days before an inmate's release date from DOC custody.  
§ 980.02(ag) (2003-04) (stating that a petition could be filed 
if "[t]he person is within 90 days of discharge or release, on 
parole, extended supervision or otherwise, from a sentence that 
was 
imposed 
for 
a 
conviction 
for 
a 
sexually 
violent 
offense . . . ."). 
¶37 Before 2006, it was nearly impossible for a commitment 
order to be executed before the release of the individual from 
incarceration because the lengthy procedure required by Wis. 
Stat. ch. 980 could not be accomplished in the 90 days leading 
up 
to 
discharge 
or 
release. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 980.02(ag), .04, .05 (2003-04) (outlining detention, probable 
cause procedures hearing, and expert examination procedures and 
establishing procedures for trial).  However, in 2006, the 
legislature repealed § 980.02(ag) (2003-04) and replaced it with 
§ 980.02(1m) (2005-06), which requires only that the ch. 980 
commitment petition be filed "before the person is released or 
No. 
2010AP594 & 2010AP1155   
 
20 
 
discharged."14  See 2005 Wis. Act 434, §§ 82-83 (amending and 
updating § 980.02).15 
¶38 By enacting Wis. Stat. § 980.02(1m), the legislature 
removed the pre-existing 90-day requirement, thereby extended 
the 
possible 
time 
for 
the 
filing 
of 
ch. 980 
commitment 
petitions.  Under a plain reading of § 980.02(1m), the State may 
file16 a ch. 980 commitment petition at any time after the 
                                                 
14 The dissent contends that because Wis. Stat. § 980.015(2) 
states that the "the agency with jurisdiction shall inform each 
appropriate district attorney and the department of justice 
regarding the person as soon as possible beginning 90 days prior 
to the applicable date" of release from a term of imprisonment, 
that a ch. 980 commitment petition may not be filed before that 
point.  Dissent, ¶84-85.  There is no language in the statute 
that supports this assertion.  Instead, the statute simply 
states that "[a] petition filed under this section shall be 
filed 
before 
the 
person 
is 
released 
or 
discharged."  
§ 980.02(1m). 
15 Act 434 amended a significant portion of ch. 980.  See 
generally 2005 Wis. Act 434.  Compare Wis. Stat. ch. 980 (2003-
04) with Wis. Stat. ch. 980 (2005-06).  We discuss only those 
portions relevant to the issues presented by these cases. 
16 Once a Wis. Stat. ch. 980 commitment petition has been 
filed, the statute requires the process to move forward by 
prescribing the duties which the circuit court must perform.  
See §§ 980.04(1) ("Upon the filing of a petition under s. 
980.02, the court shall review the petition to determine whether 
to issue an order for detention of the person who is the subject 
of the petition."); 980.04(2)(b)1. ("[T]he court shall hold the 
probable cause hearing within 30 days . . . after the filing of 
the petition . . ."); 980.05(1) ("A trial to determine whether 
the person who is the subject of a petition under s. 980.02 is a 
sexually violent person shall commence no later than 90 days 
after 
the 
date of the probable cause hearing under s. 
980.04 . . ."). 
 
This 
statutory 
framework 
requires 
the 
commitment process to move forward after the filing of the 
petition. 
No. 
2010AP594 & 2010AP1155   
 
21 
 
"person has been convicted of a sexually violent offense."  
§ 980.02(2)(a)(1). 17 
¶39 Because the State may now file a commitment petition 
at any time after the "person has been convicted of a sexually 
violent offense," Wis. Stat. § 980.02(1m), it is possible that a 
circuit court could enter a commitment order under § 980.06 well 
before the sexually violent person was released from DOC 
incarceration.  Yet, as the Petitioners stress, § 980.06 seems 
to require commitment "to the custody of the department for 
control, care and treatment."  This provision, the Petitioners 
argue, requires immediate commitment to the DHS following the 
entry of a commitment order.  However, the Petitioners' view of 
the language of these two provisions would create an internal 
conflict within the statute: How could an individual be 
committed to the custody of the DHS for control, care and 
                                                 
17 The dissent argues that if the legislature had intended 
for its amendment to change the procedures for a ch. 980 
commitment petition, "this significant change surely would have 
been highlighted in the portions of the legislative history that 
described the bill."  Dissent, ¶96.  In so doing, the dissent 
elevates the legislative history of the Act——or the lack 
thereof——to a position of greater importance than the actual 
language of the act.  However, if the legislature had intended 
to merely codify the holding of State v. Keith, 216 Wis. 2d 61, 
573 N.W.2d 888 (Ct. App. 1997), it could have codified the 
precise language of that holding, which it did not do.  
Therefore, we hold that we are bound by the enacted language of 
the statute, not the extensive legislative history as summarized 
by the dissent.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶44 ("Extrinsic 
evidence of legislative intent may become relevant to statutory 
interpretation in some circumstances, but is not the primary 
focus of inquiry.  It is the enacted law, not the unenacted 
intent, that is binding on the public."). 
No. 
2010AP594 & 2010AP1155   
 
22 
 
treatment while still incarcerated at a DOC facility?  Under the 
Petitioner's view of the statute, the committed individual would 
have to be in two places at once.  Such an interpretation would 
render a clearly absurd result; therefore, we must interpret the 
statute not as the Petitioners suggest, but in a way that 
harmonizes the provisions of the statute and gives effect to 
every word.  State v. Fischer, 2010 WI 6, ¶24, 322 Wis. 2d 265, 
778 N.W.2d 629. 
¶40 To harmonize the statutes, we must first answer the 
question of whether Wis. Stat. ch. 980 allows for simultaneous 
ch. 980 commitment and DOC incarceration.  We turn next to this 
question. 
3. 
Section 980.07(6m) States that an Individual May Be 
Simultaneously Committed Under Chapter 980 And Incarcerated at a 
DOC Facility 
¶41 To answer the question of whether a sexually violent 
person can be committed under Wis. Stat. ch. 980 and, at the 
same time, subject to DOC incarceration, we turn first to 
§ 980.07(6m).  It states that "[i]f a person committed under s. 
980.06 is incarcerated at a county jail, state correctional 
institution, or federal correction institution for a new 
criminal charge or conviction or because his or her parole was 
No. 
2010AP594 & 2010AP1155   
 
23 
 
revoked, any reporting requirement . . . does not apply during 
the incarceration period."  § 980.07(6m)18 
¶42 This provision 1) demonstrates that the legislature 
anticipated that simultaneous commitment and incarceration might 
occur and 2) clarifies that the legislature intended to allow 
it.  In light of the legislature’s recognition expressed in Wis. 
Stat. § 980.07(6m), the Petitioners argument that a sexually 
violent person cannot be simultaneously committed under ch. 980 
and incarcerated in a DOC facility is contrary to the language 
of the statute.  And, while the Petitioners were re-incarcerated 
before 
their 
commitments 
were 
finalized——meaning 
that 
§ 980.07(6m) does not apply directly to the issue presented by 
this case——its language offers insight into how we should apply 
ch. 980 as a whole. 
¶43 First, Wis. Stat. § 980.07(6m) states that sexually 
violent persons may be simultaneously in DOC custody while 
subject to a commitment order.  While this provision, as the 
petitioners point out, appears to conflict with §§ 980.06 (the 
general commitment provision) and .065 (the general provision 
                                                 
18 Before 2006, ch. 980 was silent regarding simultaneous 
commitment and incarceration.  See generally Wis. Stat. ch. 980 
(2003-04).  However, in 2005 Wis. Act 434, the legislature added 
the provisions above, which remains in the same form in the 
statutes today.  See 2005 Wis. Act 434, § 110m. 
No. 
2010AP594 & 2010AP1155   
 
24 
 
regarding placement at DHS facilities),19 it is this court's duty 
to harmonize the statutes, not ignore one section, while 
enforcing another.  See Beard v. Lee Enters., Inc., 225 
Wis. 2d 1, 15, 591 N.W.2d 156 (1999) ("Apparently conflicting 
provisions of law should be construed so as to harmonize them 
and thus give effect to the leading idea behind the law."); 
Fontana v. Fontana-On-Geneva Lake, 69 Wis. 2d 736, 742, 233 
N.W.2d 349 (1975) ("In construing several sections of the 
statutes relating to a single subject it is the duty of the 
court to give force and effect to the different sections and not 
ignore any of them. . . .  In interpreting these statutes we 
must, if it is possible to do so, harmonize and reconcile 
them.") (internal citations omitted). 
¶44 Second, to harmonize Wis. Stat. §§ 980.06 (the general 
commitment provision), .065 (the general provision regarding 
placement at DHS facilities), and .07(6m) (the provision that 
allows for DOC custody following the revocation of parole), we 
must give effect to each provision.  Accordingly, in light of 
§ 980.07(6m), we must reconcile the statute in a way that allows 
for the simultaneous commitment and incarceration at a DOC 
facility.  To do so, we conclude that §§ 980.06 and .065 provide 
the general rule (commitment to a DHS facility to the custody of 
                                                 
19 "The department shall place a person committed under s. 
980.06 at the secure mental health facility established under s. 
46.055, the Wisconsin resource center established under s. 
46.056 or a secure mental health unit or facility provided by 
the department of corrections under sub. (2)."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.065. 
No. 
2010AP594 & 2010AP1155   
 
25 
 
the DHS), and § 980.07(6m) provides an exception to that general 
rule 
(simultaneous 
commitment and incarceration) when the 
sexually violent person commits an offense which leads to either 
revocation or a new charge.  Clearly, §§ 980.06 and .065 apply 
each 
time 
an 
individual 
is 
committed, 
because 
there 
is 
necessarily a commitment order and, as part of that order, 
placement at a DHS facility for that commitment.  However, 
§ 980.07(6m) applies to only those situations where parole has 
been revoked after the entry of a commitment order——necessarily 
a smaller number of cases. 
¶45 Accordingly, 
we 
conclude 
that 
simultaneous 
incarceration at a DOC facility and commitment under Wis. Stat. 
ch. 980 is permissible.  We have also concluded that the 
language of ch. 980 provides only two means for dismissal of a 
ch. 980 commitment petition, and neither is applicable in these 
cases.  Additionally, we have concluded that ch. 980 does not 
set a time period for execution of a commitment order.  In so 
doing, we have analyzed three separate sections of ch. 980 that, 
when viewed together and in light of the purpose of ch. 980, 
present a clear result.  In the next section, we interpret 
ch. 980 as a whole, giving effect to each of its provisions, 
"harmoniz[ing] them and thus giv[ing] effect to the leading idea 
behind the law."  Beard, 225 Wis. 2d  at 15. 
C. 
Harmonizing Chapter 980 
¶46 It is our duty to interpret the statutes in a way that 
1) preserves the purpose of the statute, 2) attains a reasonable 
result, and 3) gives reasonable effect to every word.  See 
No. 
2010AP594 & 2010AP1155   
 
26 
 
Beard, 225 Wis. 2d at 15; Fischer, 322 Wis. 2d 265, ¶24 ("When 
confronted with an apparent conflict between statutes, the court 
construes sections on the same subject matter to harmonize the 
provisions and to give each full force and effect. The court 
will not construe statutes so as to work unreasonable results.") 
(internal 
citations 
omitted); Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶44 
("Statutory language is read where possible to give reasonable 
effect to every word . . . ."). 
¶47 Based on our interpretation of Wis. Stat. ch. 980, we 
conclude that it does not require the dismissal of a pending 
commitment petition when the individual subject to the petition 
is re-incarcerated because of the revocation of parole or 
extended supervision.  This result must follow for several 
reasons. 
¶48 First, such a result is consistent with the purpose 
and language of Wis. Stat. ch. 980.  Chapter 980 does not 
require dismissal, see ch. 980, and, although it does require 
commitment to the "custody of the department for control, care 
and treatment," it does not require an immediate execution of 
the commitment order where parole or extended supervision has 
been revoked, see § 980.06.  Further, ch. 980 allows for 
simultaneous commitment and incarceration, see § 980.07(6m), and 
one of its overarching purposes is the protection of the public 
from sexually violent persons, see West 336 Wis. 2d 578, ¶27; 
Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 308; Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d at 258. 
¶49 With these principles in mind, we conclude that to 
harmonize Wis. Stat. ch. 980, we must hold that the State may 
No. 
2010AP594 & 2010AP1155   
 
27 
 
pursue a ch. 980 commitment petition after the individual 
subject to the petition has been re-incarcerated due to a 
violation of parole or extended supervision.  This harmonization 
comports with the language of ch. 980, which does not require a 
dismissal, and reflects our prior holding that an order for 
commitment need not be executed immediately.  Finally, our 
holding gives effect to the overall statutory scheme, designed 
to protect the public from sexually violent persons, because it 
allows the State to retain control of sexually violent persons 
rather than releasing them as a result of their own bad 
behavior. 
¶50 Second, our holding not only harmonizes Wis. Stat. 
ch. 980, it also avoids an absurd result.  Hocking, 326 
Wis. 2d 155, ¶18 ("We attempt, whenever possible, to . . . 
avoid[] . . . absurd or unreasonable results." (citing Kalal, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46)).  Under the Petitioners' view of the 
statutes, a sexually violent person properly committed under 
ch. 980 and not subject to parole or extended supervision would 
be incentivized to commit non-sexual violent crimes while in DHS 
custody.  The application of the Petitioners’ argument would 
mean that the State would have only two choices following the 
commission of such a crime by a committed individual: 1) 
prosecute the individual for the crime, thereby ending the 
individual's 
commitment, 
or 
2) 
forgo 
prosecution 
of 
the 
individual, thereby continuing the commitment, but allowing the 
individual to evade punishment. 
No. 
2010AP594 & 2010AP1155   
 
28 
 
¶51 If the State chooses the first option in this 
scenario, and is successful in convicting the individual of the 
crime, the State would be precluded from seeking re-commitment 
under Wis. Stat. ch. 980.  For, if the individual committed a 
non-980 
predicate 
offense 
(an 
offense 
not 
listed 
in 
§ 980.01(6)), such as the offenses that were committed here, the 
language of § 980.02(1m-2) prevents the State from petitioning 
for re-commitment under ch. 980.  This section requires, inter 
alia, that the State prove that the person "has been convicted 
of a sexually violent offense," § 980.02(2)(a)1., and that the 
ch. 980 petition must be "filed before the person is released or 
discharged" from the sentence for that sexually violent offense, 
§ 980.02(1m). 
¶52 As the court of appeals made clear in State v. 
Treadway, this provision means that the State may file a Wis. 
Stat. ch. 980 commitment petition at the conclusion of either 
consecutive or concurrent sentences where one or more of the 
sentences served is a ch. 980 predicate offense.  See 2002 WI 
App 195, ¶17, 257 Wis. 2d 467; 651 N.W.2d 334; see also State v. 
Keith, 216 Wis. 2d 61, 72, 573 N.W.2d 888 (Ct. App. 1997).  The 
new sentence would be neither consecutive nor concurrent with a 
sentence for a sexually violent offense; therefore, the sexually 
violent person could not be recommitted at the conclusion of the 
new 
sentence 
for 
the 
non-sexually 
violent 
crime. 
 
See 
§ 980.02(1m) (requiring the filing of the ch. 980 commitment 
petition before the person is released); see also Treadway, 257 
Wis. 2d 467, ¶17; Keith, 216 Wis. 2d at 72.  Accordingly, if the 
No. 
2010AP594 & 2010AP1155   
 
29 
 
Petitioners are correct, and a sexually violent person cannot be 
simultaneously committed under ch. 980 and incarcerated at a DOC 
facility, then a committed sexually violent person could 
permanently end a valid commitment by engaging in criminal 
behavior.  
¶53 This is an absurd result.  The legislature could not 
have intended, when it enacted Wis. Stat. ch. 980, that a 
committed sexually violent person could, by engaging in criminal 
behavior, terminate his own commitment.  This, however, is the 
result that would follow if we were to accept the Petitioners' 
argument.20 
¶54 By harmonizing the provisions contained in Wis. Stat. 
§§ 980.02(1m), .06, .065, and 07(6m), we avoid this absurd 
result, 
and 
interpret 
the 
statute 
in 
a 
tenable 
way.  
Accordingly, we conclude that ch. 980 does not require the 
dismissal of a pending commitment petition when the individual 
                                                 
20 The Petitioners' interpretation of the statute is further 
weakened by the fact that it leads to opposite outcomes based 
solely on happenstance.  If, as the Petitioners suggest, a Wis. 
Stat. ch. 980 commitment petition must be dismissed if a parole 
or extended supervision revocation occurs before commitment, but 
not after a commitment order is issued, then whether a sexually 
violent person may be committed or must have his petition 
dismissed is completely dependent on when he commits the 
offense.  Therefore, the Petitioners' argument reduces as 
follows: If the sexually violent person’s parole or extended 
supervision is revoked pre-commitment, even if the revocation is 
only days——or even hours——before the order is entered, the 
pending ch. 980 commitment petition must be dismissed.  If, 
however, his parole or extended supervision is revoked post-
commitment, § 980.07(6m) applies, and he may be transferred to a 
DOC facility while still subject to a ch. 980 commitment. 
No. 
2010AP594 & 2010AP1155   
 
30 
 
subject to the petition is re-incarcerated because of the 
revocation of parole or extended supervision. 
D. 
Our Interpretation of Chapter 980 Does Not Render the 
Statute Constitutionally Infirm 
¶55 The Petitioners argue, albeit in slightly different 
manners, that the interpretation of Wis. Stat. ch. 980 adopted 
above deprives them of constitutional protections.21  We observe, 
like the court of appeals, that these arguments are 1) poorly 
developed, 
and 
2) 
dependent 
upon 
flawed 
statutory 
interpretation.  Therefore, although we need not address the 
constitutionality of a statute where a constitutional challenge 
has not been fully developed or briefed, see State v. Johnson, 
2009 WI 57, ¶71, 318 Wis. 2d 21, 767 N.W.2d 207; see also Lake 
Beulah Mgmt. Dist. v. State Dep't of Natural Res., 2011 WI 54, 
¶29 n.26, 335 Wis. 2d 47, 799 N.W.2d 73; State v. Franklin, 2004 
WI 38, n.5, 270 Wis. 2d 271, 677 N.W.2d 276, we will comment 
briefly on the Petitioners' arguments for the sake of clarity. 
¶56 The Petitioners correctly assert that this court must 
interpret 
Wis. 
Stat. 
ch. 980 
to 
avoid 
constitutional 
infirmities.  See State v. Stenklyft, 2005 WI 71, ¶8, 281 
Wis. 2d 484, 
697 
N.W.2d 769 
(holding 
that 
courts 
should 
interpret statutes as constitutional whenever possible); State 
ex rel. Friedrich v. Dane Cnty. Cir. Ct., 192 Wis. 2d 1, 24, 531 
                                                 
21 Gilbert 
argues 
that 
simultaneous 
commitment 
and 
incarceration violates his substantive due process, double 
jeopardy, and ex post facto constitutional protections.  Hunt, 
alternatively, 
implies 
that 
simultaneous 
commitment 
and 
incarceration violates due process. 
No. 
2010AP594 & 2010AP1155   
 
31 
 
N.W.2d 32 (1995) (stating that this court must "indulge every 
presumption in order to preserve the constitutionality of a 
legislative enactment").  The Petitioners go on to conclude, 
however, that an interpretation that allows both simultaneous 
commitment and incarceration would do the exact opposite: 
instead of avoiding constitutional infirmities, it would create 
them.  We disagree with each of the Petitioners' conclusion for 
the following reasons. 
¶57 The Petitioners argue that, in accordance with Foucha 
v. Louisiana, a committed individual "may be held as long as he 
is 
both 
mentally 
ill 
and 
dangerous, 
but 
no 
longer."  
504 U.S. 71, 77 (1992).  This, the Petitioners assert, precludes 
simultaneous incarceration and commitment of a sexually violent 
person.  Although, as the court of appeals noted, their argument 
is undeveloped for the complexity of the challenge they assert, 
the Petitioners argue that because a simultaneously incarcerated 
and committed sexually violent person's mental condition could 
not be assessed at the time of commitment, Foucha precludes 
commitment. 
¶58 This argument fails because nothing in our decision 
today precludes——or even suggests——that the State may forgo the 
statutory commitment procedures set forth in Wis. Stat. ch. 980.  
Those procedures adequately ensure that at the issuance of a 
commitment order, the court has determined that the committed 
individual 
is——at 
that moment——a sexually violent person.  
Further, if the individual serves his sentence of incarceration 
and is transferred to DHS custody, he will then be subject to 
No. 
2010AP594 & 2010AP1155   
 
32 
 
periodic reevaluation to determine whether he remains a sexually 
violent person.  See § 980.07.  Because our opinion does not 
remove any of these procedural protections, sexually violent 
persons continue to be "held as long as [they are] both mentally 
ill and dangerous, but no longer."  Foucha, 504 U.S. at 77.  
Therefore, the Petitioners' argument that Foucha precludes 
commitment is misplaced. 
¶59 Next, the Petitioners argue that "allow[ing] civil 
commitment to prison would . . . render[] Chapter 980 punitive," 
in violation of the constitutional protection against double 
jeopardy.  It must first be noted, of course, that the statute 
does not permit, nor does our opinion contemplate, "commitment 
to prison."  The Petitioners were not "committed to prison"; 
instead, they were re-incarcerated for parole and extended 
supervision violations. 
¶60 Further, it is the language of the statute which 
determines whether a statute is punitive for constitutional 
purposes.  See Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 261 (2001) ("[T]he 
question whether an Act is civil or punitive in nature 
is . . . one of statutory construction."); Kansas v. Hendricks, 
521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997).  Therefore, because we have repeatedly 
determined, after lengthy analysis, that Wis. Stat. ch. 980 is 
not a punitive statute, Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d at 258-59, State 
v. Burris, 2004 WI 91, ¶36, 273 Wis. 2d 294, 682 N.W.2d 812; 
State v. Rachel, 2002 WI 81, ¶18, 254 Wis. 2d 215, 647 
N.W.2d 762; State v. Hezzie R., 219 Wis. 2d 848, 879, 580 
N.W.2d 660 (1998), we once again adopt our prior reasoning and 
No. 
2010AP594 & 2010AP1155   
 
33 
 
re-affirm our prior holdings that ch. 980 is not a punitive 
statute.22 
¶61 Accordingly, we conclude that because Wis. Stat. 
ch. 980 is not a punitive statute and our decision upholds the 
procedural requirements of ch. 980, our interpretation does not 
render the statute constitutionally infirm.  
V. 
CONCLUSION 
¶62 We are asked to decide whether Wisconsin Statutes 
chapter 980 requires the dismissal of a pending commitment 
petition when the individual subject to the petition is re-
incarcerated because of the revocation of parole or extended 
supervision.  We hold that the State may proceed with a ch. 980 
commitment after the revocation of a subject individual's parole 
or extended supervision.  Based on that holding, we conclude 
that both of the ch. 980 commitments at issue in this case are 
valid, and therefore affirm the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
                                                 
22 The Petitioners also submit that an interpretation of 
Wis. Stat. ch. 980 that permits simultaneous incarceration and 
commitment violates constitutional protections against ex post 
facto laws.  However, although the Petitioners make this 
assertion, their argument to that effect is underdeveloped, 
amounting to a single briefed paragraph.  Therefore, we decline 
to address it.  State v. Johnson, 2009 WI 57, ¶71, 318 
Wis. 2d 21, 767 N.W.2d 207. 
No.  2010AP594 & 2010AP1155.awb 
 
1 
 
¶63 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  Chapter 980 is 
an involuntary commitment statute.  It permits the State to 
confine a person indefinitely not as punishment for what that 
person has done, but rather based on the person's mental state 
and what that person might do in the future.   
¶64 Since its inception, Chapter 980 has survived multiple 
constitutional challenges because commitment under that chapter 
rests on an assessment of the person's current mental state.  A 
person can be committed under Chapter 980 if there is a showing 
that the person is dangerous because of a mental disorder that 
makes it likely that the person will engage in future acts of 
sexual violence.  
¶65 The majority undermines this bedrock principle of 
Chapter 980.  It appears to hold that there need not be any 
finding that a person is mentally ill or dangerous at the time 
the 
person 
is 
actually 
committed 
to 
an 
institution 
for 
treatment.  Instead, it permits an involuntary commitment to act 
like a detainer that can be executed "at any time" after the 
findings of mental illness and dangerousness are made.  Under 
the majority's analysis, these findings could have been made 
months or even years before the person is actually committed to 
the custody of the Department of Health Services (DHS) for 
treatment.    
¶66 Because 
the 
majority's 
interpretation 
cannot 
be 
squared with the constitution, the statute, or the legislative 
history, I respectfully dissent.     
I 
No.  2010AP594 & 2010AP1155.awb 
 
2 
 
¶67 Allowing an involuntary commitment order to be entered 
"at any time" unconstitutionally divorces the findings of mental 
illness and dangerousness from the time the commitment is 
actually "executed."  I have previously observed that repeated 
legislative amendments which made the statute increasingly 
punitive 
threatened 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
involuntary 
commitments under Chapter 980.  State v. Rachel, 2002 WI 81, 254 
Wis. 2d 215, 647 N.W.2d 762 (Bradley, J., concurring).  Here, it 
is not the legislature but rather, it is the majority opinion of 
this court that further compromises the constitutionality of the 
statute.   
¶68 The majority determines that the commitment orders in 
this case are valid based upon its conclusion that a circuit 
court is permitted to "enter a commitment order . . . well 
before the sexually violent person [is] released from DOC 
[Department of Corrections] incarceration."  Majority op., ¶39.   
¶69 To reach this conclusion, the majority asserts that 
the language of the commitment statute "does not set a time 
period for execution of a commitment order," id., ¶28, and does 
not explicitly state "when [a] commitment must commence," id., 
¶35.  Because the legislature removed a provision of the statute 
requiring the State to allege in the petition that the person is 
within 90 days of discharge or release from DOC custody, id., 
¶36, the majority concludes that the legislature intended to 
permit the State to file a petition "at any time after the 
person has been convicted of a sexually violent offense," id., 
¶38.   
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¶70 Tagged on to the end of the opinion, after already 
arriving at the holding in this case, the majority states: "We 
will 
comment 
briefly on the Petitioners' [constitutional] 
arguments for the sake of clarity."  Id., ¶55.  It appears to 
conclude that there is no constitutional infirmity here because 
Chapter 
980, 
in 
its 
various 
iterations, 
has 
withstood 
constitutional challenges in the past.  Id., ¶60.    
¶71 Ultimately, 
the 
majority 
reemploys 
its 
statutory 
analysis in lieu of any constitutional analysis.  It relies on 
the fact that the person is mentally ill and dangerous at the 
time the commitment order is entered in an attempt to salvage 
its constitutionality——even if the order is not actually 
executed (meaning the person is not actually committed to DHS 
custody) until years or even decades later.  Id., ¶58.  
II 
¶72 The 
majority's 
interpretation 
authorizes 
an 
unconstitutional result.  If the majority were correct that the 
statute allowed a commitment order to be entered "at any time 
after the person has been convicted of a sexually violent 
offense," this conclusion would singlehandedly undermine the 
constitutionality 
of 
Chapter 
980. 
 
Just 
last 
year, 
we 
acknowledged that Chapter 980 "required the State to prove the 
individual's mental disorder and dangerousness . . . at the time 
of commitment."  State v. West, 2011 WI 83, ¶95, 336 
Wis. 2d 578, 800 N.W.2d 929 (emphasis added).  This requirement 
is necessary to avoid violations of due process, ex post facto, 
and double jeopardy.  
No.  2010AP594 & 2010AP1155.awb 
 
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¶73 Substantive due process requires that an involuntary 
commitment is based on a person's current mental illness and 
dangerousness.  Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992); State 
v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 294, 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995).  In 
Foucha, the United States Supreme Court explained that a person 
could be involuntarily committed "as long as he is both mentally 
ill and dangerous, but no longer."  504 U.S. at 77.  It held: 
"[K]eeping Foucha against his will in a mental institution is 
improper absent a determination in civil commitment proceedings 
of current mental illness and dangerousness."  Id. at 78 
(emphasis added). 
¶74 Similarly, 
to resolve a substantive due process 
challenge in Post, we relied on the fact that "Chapter 980 
authorizes the civil commitment of persons, previously convicted 
of a sexually violent offense, who currently suffer from a 
mental disorder that predisposes them to repeat such acts."  197 
Wis. 2d at 294.  "[T]he focal point of commitment is not on past 
acts but on current diagnosis of a present disorder," which is 
"conceptualized 
as 
a clinically significant behavioral or 
psychological syndrome or pattern that . . . must reflect a 
current state of distress."  Id. at 307, 306.  (emphasis added).   
¶75 Additionally, both the United States Supreme Court and 
this court have explained that the focus on the person's current 
mental state may be necessary to protect an involuntary 
commitment statute from violating the constitutional prohibition 
against ex post facto laws.  In Kansas v. Hendricks, the Court 
held that a commitment scheme similar to Chapter 980 does not 
No.  2010AP594 & 2010AP1155.awb 
 
5 
 
raise ex post facto concerns because it "permits involuntary 
confinement based upon a determination that the person currently 
both suffers from a 'mental abnormality' or 'personality 
disorder' and is likely to pose a future danger to the public." 
521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997) (emphasis in original).   
¶76 Likewise, in State v. Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d 252, 274, 
541 N.W.2d 105 (1995), this court explained that Chapter 980 
survived an ex post facto challenge because "[t]he legislative 
aim is not punishment but regulation of a present situation."   
The Carpenter court's determination relied on Chapter 980's 
focus on "the offender's current mental condition and the 
present danger to the public, not punishment."  Id.   
¶77 For similar reasons, both the Hendricks Court and the 
Carpenter court have explained that the focus on a person's 
mental state protects an involuntary commitment statute from 
violating 
the 
constitutional 
prohibition 
against 
double 
jeopardy.  See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 363 ("[T]he confinement's 
duration 
is . . . linked 
to 
the 
stated 
purposes 
of 
the 
commitment, namely, to hold the person until his mental 
abnormality no longer causes him to be a threat to others."); 
Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d at 268 ("[T]he person is entitled to 
discharge as soon as his or her dangerousness or mental disorder 
abates.").  The crux of this analysis is that an involuntary 
commitment does not constitute a second punishment for a past 
offense because it is based on the current condition of the 
committed person.     
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¶78 The teachings of these cases are clear.  To avoid 
multiple constitutional infirmities, there must be a finding 
that the person suffers from a mental disorder and that he is 
dangerous at the time he is committed.  These determinations 
cannot be made months or years in advance of the execution of a 
commitment.    
¶79 The majority appears to interpret the statutory text 
in a manner that purposefully overlooks this bedrock principle.  
It concludes that an involuntary commitment order can be entered 
"at any time after the person has been convicted of a sexually 
violent offense" and then "executed" at a later date.  Majority 
op., ¶¶38, 45.   
III 
¶80 In addition to being contrary to constitutional 
principles, the majority's interpretation is difficult to square 
with the language and expressed legislative intent underlying 
Chapter 980.  In concluding that a circuit court is permitted to 
enter a commitment order "well before the sexually violent 
person [is] released from DOC incarceration," the majority 
relies on two premises: (A) the fact that the statute does not 
explicitly provide when a commitment must be executed; and (B) 
the inferences it derives from 2005 amendments to Chapter 980.  
When carefully examined, both fall apart. 
¶81 The first premise falls apart because the majority 
interprets the statutory provisions in isolation while ignoring 
the context set forth in surrounding provisions.  This approach 
violates a basic canon of statutory construction.  State ex. rel 
No.  2010AP594 & 2010AP1155.awb 
 
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Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 
681 
N.W.2d 110 
("Context 
is 
important 
to 
meaning. . . . Therefore, statutory language is interpreted in 
the context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of 
a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-
related statutes . . . .").   
¶82 The second premise falls apart because the majority 
makes inferences about legislative intent without even examining 
the legislative history.1  Had the majority chosen to examine, 
rather than to guess and infer, it would have discovered that 
the relevant 2005 amendments to Chapter 980 were meant to 
clarify 
and 
codify 
State 
v. 
Keith, 
216 
Wis. 2d 61, 
573 
N.W.2d 888 (Ct. App. 1997)——not to permit a commitment order to 
be entered "at any time."   
A 
¶83 Contrary to the majority's assertions, the language of 
Chapter 980, when examined in context, contemplates that a 
person will not remain in DOC custody once a petition for 
involuntary commitment has been filed.  Instead, the person will 
be transferred to the custody of the DHS.  An examination of 
                                                 
1 The 
majority 
takes 
issue 
with 
my 
consultation 
of 
legislative 
history. 
 
It 
asserts 
that 
my 
analysis 
"is 
representative of the precise evil that Kalal was designed to 
combat."  Majority op., ¶28 n.11.  In Kalal, however, the court 
recognized that "[e]xtrinsic evidence of legislative intent may 
become 
relevant 
to 
statutory 
interpretation 
in 
some 
circumstances," and that one of those circumstances is when 
statutory language is ambiguous.  271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶¶44, 50-51.  
Another circumstance may be to avoid an unconstitutional 
interpretation. 
 
See 
id., 
¶63 
n.11 
(Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
concurring).  Both circumstances are present here.       
No.  2010AP594 & 2010AP1155.awb 
 
8 
 
three separate provisions of Chapter 980 provides this necessary 
context.   
¶84 First, the State's decision to file a petition is 
generally triggered when the DOC sends notice that a person is 
within 90 days of release or discharge.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 980.015(2) provides:  
If an agency with jurisdiction has control or custody 
over a person who may meet the criteria for commitment 
as 
a 
sexually 
violent 
person, 
the 
agency 
with 
jurisdiction shall inform each appropriate district 
attorney and the department of justice regarding the 
person as soon as possible beginning 90 days prior to 
the applicable date of . . . the anticipated discharge 
or release . . . from a sentence of imprisonment or 
term of confinement in prison that was imposed for a 
conviction for a sexually violent offense, from a 
continuous term of incarceration, any part of which 
was imposed for a sexually violent offense . . . .  
(Emphasis added.) 
¶85 Second, 
the 
plain 
language 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 980.04 states 
that 
upon 
the 
filing 
of 
a 
petition, 
an 
incarcerated 
person 
will 
not 
be 
subjected 
to 
continued 
incarceration.  Instead, the statute provides that upon the 
filing of a petition, "[i]f the person is serving a sentence of 
imprisonment, . . . the court shall order that the person be 
transferred to a detention facility approved by" the DHS.  Wis. 
Stat. § 980.04(1).  
¶86 Third, once a commitment trial has been held and the 
person has been determined to be sexually violent, "the court 
shall order the person to be committed to the custody of the 
[DHS] for control, care and treatment until such time as the 
person is no longer a sexually violent person."  Wis. Stat. 
No.  2010AP594 & 2010AP1155.awb 
 
9 
 
§ 980.06.  The court's order "shall specify that the person be 
placed in institutional care."  Id.    
¶87 The term "shall" is presumed to be mandatory when it 
appears in a statute.  State v. Kywanda F., 200 Wis. 2d 26, 33, 
546 N.W.2d 440 (1996).  Nevertheless, the majority appears to 
conclude that this statutory mandate is ambiguous.  Although the 
statute provides that the court shall order the person be 
committed to the custody of the DHS, the majority seizes on the 
fact that the language of the statute "does not set a time 
period for execution of a commitment order," majority op., ¶28, 
and does not explicitly state "when [a] commitment must 
commence," id., ¶35.    
¶88 It 
is 
true 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 980.06 
does 
not 
explicitly say that the court shall order the person to be 
"immediately" committed to the custody of the DHS.  It is also 
true that the statute does not say that the court shall order 
the person to be committed to the custody of the DHS within a 
certain number of days of the entry of a commitment order.     
¶89 Nevertheless, the language of the statute is to be 
read in context——in light of the surrounding sections of Chapter 
980, set forth above.  It also must be read in light of court 
No.  2010AP594 & 2010AP1155.awb 
 
10 
 
decisions about the constitutionality of involuntary commitments 
generally and Chapter 980 in particular.2   
¶90 When read in this light, any ambiguity about when a 
commitment must commence fades away.  A commitment must commence 
once the person has been committed as a sexually violent person.  
To allow a commitment to act as a detainer to be executed at 
some later date compromises the bedrock principle of a Chapter 
980 commitment——that it is based on the current condition of the 
person who is committed. 
B 
¶91 To bolster its unconstitutional conclusion that the 
State may file a petition for commitment "at any time after the 
person has been convicted of a sexually violent offense," the 
majority compares the previous version of the statute with the 
version that exists today.  It draws inferences about the 
legislature's 
intent by isolating two discrete amendments 
ushered in by 2005 Wis. Act 434 without examining its 
accompanying legislative history.   
¶92 The 
majority 
points 
to 
former 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 980.02(2)(ag) (2003-04), which provided that a petition for 
commitment must allege that "[t]he person is within 90 days of 
discharge or release . . . from a sentence that was imposed for 
                                                 
2 As set forth above, the constitution requires that the 
State must carry its burden of proving that the person is both 
mentally ill and dangerous.  Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 
80 (1992).  This constitutional requirement is codified in Wis. 
Stat. § 980.01(7), which defines a "sexually violent person," in 
part, as a person "who is dangerous because he or she suffers 
from a mental disorder that makes it likely that the person will 
engage in one or more acts of sexual violence." 
No.  2010AP594 & 2010AP1155.awb 
 
11 
 
a conviction for a sexually violent offense."  When the statute 
was amended in 2005, the legislature repealed that subsection 
and created subsection 980.02(1m), which reads: "A petition 
filed under this section shall be filed before the person is 
released or discharged."  2005 Wis. Act 434, §§ 82, 83.  
¶93 The phrase "[b]efore the person is released or 
discharged" could be interpreted differently by reasonably well-
informed persons.  It could be interpreted to mean at any time 
before the person is released or discharged, as the majority 
asserts.  Or, when read in context with the surrounding 
statutes, it could be interpreted to mean shortly before the 
person is released or discharged.  See infra., ¶83.          
¶94 The majority does not acknowledge this ambiguity, and 
it sees no need to examine the relevant legislative history.  
Instead, it leaps to the conclusion that the legislature plainly 
intended to "extend[] the possible time for the filing of ch. 
980 commitment petitions" so that "a circuit court could enter a 
commitment order under § 980.06 well before the sexually violent 
person was released from DOC incarceration."  Majority op., 
¶¶38, 39.    
¶95 The majority's conclusion would represent a dramatic 
departure from the prior version of the statute, in which the 
petition could not be filed until the person was within 90 days 
of release.  It would also be a dramatic departure from how 
Chapter 980 had previously been described in decisions of 
Wisconsin courts.  See, e.g., Keith, 216 Wis. 2d 61.  When I 
No.  2010AP594 & 2010AP1155.awb 
 
12 
 
review the relevant legislative history, I see no indication 
that the 2005 amendments intended to usher in such a change.   
¶96 If the bill was intended to change Chapter 980 as 
dramatically as the majority asserts, this significant change 
surely would have been highlighted in the portions of the 
legislative history that described the bill.  It is not.   
¶97 If the majority's interpretation is correct, then the 
significant change ushered forth by the 2005 amendment entirely 
evaded the attention of the Legislative Council staff members 
who were in charge of drafting the bill and the Joint 
Legislative Council that recommended the measures to the 
legislature.  None of the numerous documents drafted by the 
Legislative Council or the Joint Legislative Council to explain 
the "key provisions" of the bill mentions that it changes the 
law to allow a person to be committed "at any time after the 
person has been convicted of a sexually violent offense."3  See, 
                                                 
3 The portion of the Joint Legislative Council's Report to 
the Legislature which discusses the amendments to Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.02, the section of Chapter 980 which addresses commitment 
petitions, provides:  
Commencement of Commitment Proceedings 
Under current law, if an agency with jurisdiction 
(i.e., the agency with the authority or duty to 
release or discharge the person) has control or 
custody over a person who may meet the criteria for 
commitment as an SVP, the agency must inform each 
appropriate district attorney (DA) and DOJ regarding 
the person as soon as possible beginning three months 
prior to the applicable date of the following: (1) the 
anticipated discharge from a sentence, anticipated 
release 
on 
parole 
or 
extended 
supervision, 
or 
anticipated release from imprisonment of a person who 
has been convicted of an SVO; (2) the anticipated 
release from a secure juvenile facility of a person 
No.  2010AP594 & 2010AP1155.awb 
 
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e.g., Wisconsin Legislative Council Report to the Legislature, 
Special Committee on Sexually Violent Persons Commitment (Sept. 
9, 
2005), 
available 
at 
http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lc/committees/study/2004/SVPC/files/R
L_05_08_svpc.pdf; Memorandum from Ronald Sklansky, Senior Staff 
Attorney at the Wisconsin Legislative Council, to Members of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
adjudicated delinquent on the basis of an SVO; or (3) 
the termination or discharge of a person who has been 
found not guilty of an SVO by reason of mental disease 
or defect.   
Under the bill, for persons under a sentence, the 
agency must inform the DA and DOJ regarding the person 
as soon as possible beginning 90 days before the date 
of the anticipated discharge or release on parole or 
extended supervision, or otherwise, from a sentence of 
imprisonment or term of confinement in person that was 
imposed for a conviction for an SVO, from a continuous 
term of incarceration, any part of which was imposed 
for an SVO, or from a prison placement under the 
intensive sanctions program, any part of which was 
imposed for an SVO. . . . The DA and DOJ must also be 
notified of the anticipated release on parole or 
discharge of a person committed under ch. 975, Stats. 
(the sex crimes chapter in effect prior to the 
creation of ch. 980), for an SVO. 
Filing a Commitment Petition  
Under current law, DOJ may file a petition to commit a 
person as an SVP at the request of the agency with the 
authority or duty to release or discharge the person.  
If DOJ does not file a petition, the DA for the county 
in 
which 
the 
person 
was 
convicted, 
adjudicated 
delinquent, or found not guilty by reason of insanity 
or mental disease, defect, or illness, or the county 
in which the person will reside, may file the 
petition.  The bill specifies that the DA of the 
county in which the person is in custody may also file 
the 
petition; 
a 
juvenile 
court 
does 
not 
have 
jurisdiction over a petition involving a child; and 
filing fees are eliminated.   
No.  2010AP594 & 2010AP1155.awb 
 
14 
 
Special Committee on Sexually Violent Person Commitments (Sept. 
13, 
2004), 
available 
at 
http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lc/committees/study/2004/SVPC/index.h
tm.  
¶98 The reason for removing Wis. Stat. § 980.02(2)(ag) 
(2003-04) and creating sub. (1m) is revealed by examining this 
legislative history.  Both changes were part of a larger package 
of amendments that were enacted to remove the ambiguity in 
former Wis. Stat. § 980.02(2)(ag) that had been identified by 
the court of appeals in State v. Keith, 216 Wis. 2d 61.   
¶99 In Keith, the defendant served consecutive sentences 
for first-degree sexual assault, second-degree sexual assault, 
and fourth-degree sexual assault.  On the day before he was 
scheduled to be released, the State filed a Chapter 980 petition 
for his commitment as a sexually violent person.   
¶100 Keith asserted that the court lacked jurisdiction to 
commit him.  In support of this argument, he relied on Wis. 
Stat. § 980.02(2)(ag), which provided that a petition must 
allege that the person was "within 90 days of discharge or 
release . . . from a sentence that was imposed for a conviction 
for a sexually violent offense."  Because Keith was serving only 
a sentence for fourth-degree sexual assault at the time of his 
release, and because that offense does not qualify as a sexually 
violent offense, Keith argued that the petition must be 
dismissed. 
¶101 The court of appeals disagreed.  It concluded that the 
language of sub. (2)(ag) was ambiguous because it failed to 
No.  2010AP594 & 2010AP1155.awb 
 
15 
 
address how consecutive sentences should be treated.  Id. at 70.  
Ultimately, it concluded that the petition was timely because 
Keith's three consecutive sentences should be treated as one 
continuous sentence for purposes of determining whether the 
petition had been timely filed under sub. (2)(ag).  It stated: 
"[T]here is absolutely no indication that the legislature 
intended to predicate ch. 980 proceedings on whether a sexually 
violent offense was the last sentence ordered in a string of 
consecutive sentences."  Id. at 72. 
¶102 The 
legislative 
history 
indicates 
that 
the 
legislature's intent in removing sub. (2)(ag) was to remove the 
ambiguity identified in Keith——not to permit a petition to be 
filed "well before the sexually violent person [is] released 
from DOC incarceration."  At the same time the legislature 
removed sub. (2)(ag), it amended the notice statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.015(2)(a), to codify the precise language from Keith and 
ensure that notice would be sent within 90 days of discharge or 
release "from a continuous term of incarceration, any part of 
which was imposed for a sexually violent offense."  See 2005 
Wis. Act 434, § 75; Keith, 216 Wis. 2d at 71.   
¶103 That the legislature removed sub. (2)(ag) for the 
purpose of omitting the ambiguity identified in Keith is 
supported by the documents produced by the Legislative Council 
and by the testimony considered by the Special Committee on 
Sexually Violent Persons Commitment.  As a memo written by the 
Legislative Liaison to the Public Defender's Office explains, 
the amendment to the procedure for commencing a petition 
No.  2010AP594 & 2010AP1155.awb 
 
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"codifies State v. Keith and clarifies the law."  Memorandum by 
Krista Ginger, Wisconsin State Public Defender Legislative 
Liaison, to Members of the Special Committee on Sexually Violent 
Person Commitments at 2 (Jan. 31, 2005).    
IV 
¶104 As described above, the majority's conclusion is not 
motivated by constitutional requirements, the language of the 
statute, or the relevant legislative history.  Rather, the 
majority's conclusion appears to be motivated by a policy 
concern.   
¶105 Instead of constitutional analysis, it substitutes 
emotional appeal.  The majority posits that its interpretation 
is necessary to prevent sexually dangerous persons from evading 
commitment and being released into the community.  It asserts 
that "release from custody of an individual still considered 
dangerous" is incompatible with the goal of protecting the 
public, majority op., ¶31, and that its conclusion is necessary 
to "allow[] the State to retain control of sexually violent 
persons rather than releasing them as a result of their own bad 
behavior," id., ¶49.  
¶106 No one wants sexually violent people who are dangerous 
to be released into the streets.  Likewise, no one wants 
sexually violent people to avoid being held accountable for 
their bad behavior.  Yet, no one should allow this court to 
ignore its obligation to examine and apply the constitutional 
requirements.  The majority's failure to do so here compromises 
the constitutionality of Chapter 980.   
No.  2010AP594 & 2010AP1155.awb 
 
17 
 
¶107 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.  
¶108 I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent.   
 
 
 
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