Title: State Ex Rel. Wagner v. Hedman
Citation: 195 N.W.2d 420
Docket Number: 43367
State: Minnesota
Issuer: Minnesota Supreme Court
Date: February 25, 1972

195 N.W.2d 420 (1972) STATE of Minnesota ex rel. Leon D. WAGNER, Jr., Appellant, v. Kermit HEDMAN, Sheriff of Ramsey County, Respondent. No. 43367. Supreme Court of Minnesota. February 25, 1972. *421 Terrance S. O'Toole and Hamilton E. Cochrane, St. Paul, for appellant. Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., William B. Randall, County Atty., Steven DeCoster, Asst. County Atty., St. Paul, for respondent. Heard and considered en banc. KNUTSON, Chief Justice. This is an appeal from an order of the district court discharging a writ of habeas corpus in an extradition proceeding. Petitioner, Leon D. Wagner, Jr., was arrested June 10, 1971, pursuant to a fugitive warrant under Minn.St. 629.13 issued by the St. Paul municipal court upon the complaint of a deputy sheriff stating that the authorities in Denver, Colorado, had issued a warrant for petitioner's arrest on a charge of "Short Check (Felony)." Pursuant to § 629.07 a rendition warrant was issued July 6, 1971, by the governor of Minnesota. This rendition warrant was based on a charge of theft, which was at variance with the charge in the fugitive warrant. This habeas corpus proceeding was then brought under § 629.10 seeking release of petitioner. The findings and order of the court were issued on August 13, 1971, discharging the writ of habeas corpus. The case raises two questions: (1) Does the variance between the charge in the fugitive warrant and the charge in the rendition warrant invalidate the proceeding? (2) Is there sufficient proof to show that petitioner was in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the alleged offense? 1. With respect to the first question, we think it is enough to say that a rendition warrant issued by the governor of this state pursuant to § 629.07 is presumptive evidence that the person named therein is a fugitive from the justice of the demanding state. In re Sanders, 154 Minn. 41, 191 N.W. 391 (1922); State ex rel. Denton v. Curtis, 111 Minn. 240, 126 N.W. 719 (1910); State ex rel. Arnold v. Justus, 84 Minn. 237, 87 N.W. 770 (1901). The issuance of a fugitive warrant authorized by § 629.13 is a separate proceeding from the issuance of a rendition warrant. State ex rel. Brown v. Hedman, 280 Minn. 69, 157 N.W.2d 756 (1968). In Bebeau v. Granrud (N.D.) 184 N.W.2d 577, 581 (1971), the North Dakota court said: See, also, McClearn v. Jones, 162 Colo. 354, 426 P.2d 192 (1967). We are satisfied that the variance between the charge in the fugitive warrant and the charge in the rendition warrant does not justify release of petitioner on habeas corpus. 2. The other question involved presents more difficulty. One of the prerequisites to extradition is that petitioner must have been in the demanding state at the time the alleged offense was committed. In State ex rel. Gegenfurtner v. Granquist, 271 Minn. 207, 208, 135 N.W.2d 447, 448 (1965), we set forth the requirements of extradition as follows: In State v. Limberg, 274 Minn. 31, 142 N.W.2d 563 (1966), we set forth in more detail what the requirements are with respect to a valid extradition proceeding. We reiterated much of what was said in Gegenfurtner, but we think the rule in this state is now established in Limberg, and, even at the expense of unduly extending this opinion, we quote what we there said (274 Minn. 35, 142 N.W.2d 566): While the stringent requirements for producing evidence of absence are illustrated by many of our prior cases and were followed in the later cases of State ex rel. Lyon v. Peters, 289 Minn. 534, 185 N.W.2d 272 (1971), and State ex rel. Reed v. Hedman, 289 Minn. 548, 185 N.W.2d 273 (1971), the test with respect to proof that the petitioner was in the demanding state at the time the alleged offense was committed is established in Limberg, where we said (274 Minn. 37, 142 N.W.2d 567): In the present case, it was alleged that the offense for which extradition was requested was committed on July 1, 1970. Petitioner denied unequivocally being in Colorado during or about the time it was alleged in the rendition warrant that the offense was committed. He was supported by his sister and brother-in-law, who testified that he spent all of June and July 1970 and much of the summer in their home in St. Paul. The records of the municipal court of St. Paul show that petitioner was charged with having committed misdemeanors in St. Paul on June 8 and again on June 23. The only evidence even remotely tending to show that petitioner was in Colorado during the time the alleged offense was supposed to have been committed was the testimony of petitioner's father-in-law, Willie Rasberry, with whom petitioner is having difficulty; and the record shows that much animosity exists on the part of this witness. It was not until the trial court assumed the role of questioner that answers were elicited that could conceivably put petitioner in Colorado when the alleged crime was supposed to have been committed. Even then the testimony is so unsatisfactory that we are convinced it failed to furnish the minimal proof required under our prior decisions to overcome the unequivocal denial of presence in the demanding state at the time the alleged offense was supposed to have been committed. If our decision in Limberg means anything, it must be that upon the alleged fugitive's denial of presence in the demanding state some credible evidence must be produced by the demanding state to rebut such denial. From a reading of the record, we agree with the respondent that "the testimony of Willie Rasberry was not noteworthy either for lucidity or consistency." We think it was so lacking in credibility that it must be held to be insufficient to overcome the positive testimony of petitioner and his supporting witnesses and the other evidence that he was not in Colorado when the alleged offense was committed. We hold that Rasberry's testimony does *424 not satisfy the proof required by Limberg and the other cases cited above. Petitioner has now been held in jail since June 1971. We can see no justification for this long incarceration in an extradition proceeding. Someone should have taken action to bring the case to a conclusion so that petitioner could be either released or extradited. He should at least have been released on bail. In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the evidence submitted to show that petitioner was in Colorado at the time this offense could have been committed, he should now be released. It is therefore ordered that the order discharging the writ of habeas corpus be vacated, the writ be reinstated, and the petitioner be forthwith discharged.