Title: Com v. Robert Gunter, Aplt (Concurring Opinion)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 84 MAP 2000
State: Pennsylvania
Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Date: May 23, 2001

(Zappala, J. -- M.O.) [J-31-2001] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA MIDDLE DISTRICT COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellee v. ROBERT E. GUNTER, Appellant : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : No. 84 MAP 2000 Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court entered December 30, 1999 at 1032 HBG 1997 affirming the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County entered on September 20, 1997 at No. 1997-865 SUBMITTED: January 17, 2001 CONCURRING OPINION MR. JUSTICE CAPPY DECIDED: MAY 22, 2001 I join the majority opinion to the extent that it holds that the manifest injustice standard should apply where the defendant is seeking to withdraw his guilty plea following sentencing, even in those instances where sentencing occurs immediately following the plea colloquy. As stated by the majority opinion, a manifest injustice occurs where the defendant has not tendered a knowing, intelligent or voluntary plea. See Majority slip opinion at 6; see also Commonwealth v. Persinger, 615 A.2d 1305 (Pa. 1992). I write separately, however, to make clear that in instances where neither the written nor oral colloquy inform the defendant of the significance of pleading nolo contendere, then a defendant has not tendered a knowing, intelligent and voluntary plea and, upon request, [J-31-2001] - 2 the defendant should be permitted to withdraw the guilty plea after sentencing. Although the effect of a plea of nolo contendere is equivalent to a plea of guilty, the import of the pleas is not the same. In pleading nolo contendere; the defendant does not admit his guilt, but merely consents to being punished as if he were guilty. Commonwealth v. Boyd, 292 A.2d 434, 435 (Pa. Super. 1972). See also North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 35 n.8 (1970); Eisenberg v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Public Welfare, 516 A.2d 333, 335 (Pa. 1986). In this case, neither the written nor oral colloquy defined nolo contendere or explained the significance of such a plea to Appellant. Indeed, it is unclear whether Appellant ever realized that there was any distinction between pleading guilty or pleading nolo contedere.1 For this reason alone, a manifest injustice occurred requiring the grant of Appellant’s request to withdraw his plea. Accordingly, I find that there was no reason for the majority to consider counsel’s conduct in analyzing whether a manifest injustice occurred in this case. 1 Although the dissenting opinion asserts that the plea form clearly indicates appellant’s entry of a nolo contendere plea, it overlooks the fact that on this same plea form the word guilty is scratched out and replaced by nolo contendere.