Title: Bryant v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 150, 2004
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: November 30, 2004

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 604 (2004).  
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
TIEREEOTAY BRYANT
§
§
No. 150, 2004
Defendant Below,
§
Appellant,
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Court Below: Superior Court
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of Delaware in and for New
v.
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Castle County
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STATE OF DELAWARE,
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ID No.0307009841 
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Plaintiff Below,
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Appellees.
§
Submitted: October 12, 2004
Decided:  November 30, 2004
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, BERGER and RIDGELY, Justices.
ORDER
This 30  day of November, 2004, on consideration of the briefs of the
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parties, it appears to the Court that:
(1)  Tiereeotay Bryant appeals from his conviction in the Superior Court
on the charge of reckless endangering in the first degree.   He contends that the
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evidence presented by the State at trial was insufficient and did not prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that he was aware of the presence of the victim
when he allegedly fired multiple shots into the victim’s apartment.  We
 
Transcript of Trial Proceedings on February 5, 2004 at 65.  
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DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 531, 636 (2004).
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Id. at § 604.  
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Id. at § 1447A.  
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conclude that the evidence presented was sufficient to convict Bryant and
therefore affirm.  
(2)  On the night of July 15, 2003, Bryant went to the apartment of
Tanisha Price.  Bryant had been acquainted with Price because his girlfriend,
Mia Butler, was Price’s former roommate.  Price and Butler allegedly had a
falling out which caused Butler to move out of the apartment.  On the night in
question, Price’s boyfriend, Walter Davis, answered Bryant’s knock at the
apartment door.  Bryant asked whether Price was available.  Davis responded
for Bryant to “hold on” and that he would “get” Price.   As Davis locked the
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door behind him and called for Price, he heard several gunshots, one of which
passed through the apartment door, striking him.  Bryant was later arrested and
charged with attempted murder in the first degree of Davis,  reckless
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endangering in the first degree of Price  and two counts of possession of a
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firearm during the commission of a felony.   Bryant was convicted on the
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reckless endangering in the first degree charge but acquitted on the remaining
Dixon v. State, 567 A.2d 854, 857 (Del. 1989) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
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307, 319 (1979)).  
Skinner v. State, 575 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Del. 1990) (citing Colvin v. State, 472 A.2d
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953, 964 (Md. 1984)).  
Id. (citing Williams v. State, 539 A.2d 164, 168 (Del. 1988) (citing Holland v. United
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States, 348 U.S. 121, 139 (1954)).  
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 604 (2004).
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charges.         
(3)  Bryant’s contention that the evidence presented at trial was
insufficient to support a finding of guilt is without merit.  We review such a
contention for “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prosecution, [including all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom,]
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.”   We are not required to determine whether we
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believe that the evidence presented at trial establishes guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt; rather, we must merely review the present record and inquire as to
whether a rational trier of fact could have found that guilt was established.   In
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doing so, we do not distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence.  
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(4)  
“A person is guilty of reckless endangering in the first degree
when the person recklessly engages in conduct which creates a substantial risk
of death to another person.”   “A person acts recklessly with respect to an
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Id. at § 231(c).
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element of an offense when the person is aware of and consciously disregards
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the element exists or will result from the
conduct.”   Bryant argues that because he was unaware that Price was present
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in the apartment when he allegedly fired the shots through the apartment door,
the State failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the mental state for
reckless endangerment in the first degree.  Bryant’s argument is not supported
by the facts in the present record.  The record establishes that after Bryant
conversed with Davis, he learned that Price was located in the apartment.  We
therefore conclude that there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the
conclusion that a rational trier of fact could have found that Bryant was guilty
of recklessly endangering Price by firing several shots through the apartment
door knowing that Price was located therein.          
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NOW THEREFORE, IT IS SO ORDERED that the judgment of the
Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  
BY THE COURT:
/s/Henry duPont Ridgely     
Justice