Title: In re Lawrence
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S46876
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: September 13, 2001

FILED:  September 13, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

In re Complaint as to the Conduct of
J. MARK LAWRENCE,
Accused.
(OSB 95-249, 97-123; SC S46876)

	On review of the decision of a trial panel of the Disciplinary Board.
	Argued and submitted May 3, 2001.
	Paula J. Lawrence, Lawrence &amp; Houser, P.C., McMinville, argued the cause and filed the
brief for the accused.
	Mary A. Cooper, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Lake Oswego, argued the cause and
filed the briefs for the Oregon State Bar.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson, Riggs, and De Muniz,
Justices.*  
	PER CURIAM
	The accused is suspended from the practice of law for a period of 60 days, commencing
60 days from the date of filing of this decision.
	*Kulongoski, J., resigned June 14, 2001, and did not participate in the decision of this
case.
		PER CURIAM
		In this lawyer discipline proceeding, the Oregon State
Bar (Bar) charged the accused with violating various disciplinary
rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility and with
violating one statute.  The trial panel found that the accused
violated Disciplinary Rule (DR) 5-101(A)(1) (continuing
employment without full disclosure when exercise of judgment on
behalf of client is or may be affected by business, property, or
personal interests), dismissed the other charges, and reprimanded
him.  The Bar and the accused both sought review in this court. 
ORS 9.536(1); Bar Rule of Procedure (BR) 10.1 and BR 10.3.  In
addition to the DR 5-101(A)(1) violation, the Bar continues to
allege that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(2) (committing
criminal act reflecting adversely on lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness, or fitness to practice law) and ORS 9.460(1)
(failing to support constitution and laws of the United States
and this state) when he failed to timely file state and federal
tax returns. (1)    
	We consider the matter de novo and may adopt, modify,
or reject the decision of the trial panel.  ORS 9.536(3); BR
10.6.  The Bar has the burden of establishing alleged misconduct
by clear and convincing evidence.  BR 5.2.  For the reasons that
follow, we find that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(2) and DR
5-101(A)(1), and that a 60-day suspension is the appropriate
sanction.
I.  FACTS
	We find the following facts by clear and convincing
evidence.  The accused has been a member of the Bar since 1989. 
After he was admitted to practice, the accused worked as a deputy
district attorney until 1992.  In 1992, the accused opened his
own law office as a sole practitioner.  His practice was not
lucrative financially, and he entrusted the bookkeeping for his
law practice to his mother, Hohman, who lives in Colorado. 
Hohman is not a licensed tax preparer, and the accused did not
pay her for her bookkeeping services.  The accused sent Hohman
the original documents she needed to keep the books for the
accused's law practice.  The accused did not retain photocopies
of the documents for purposes of preparing his tax returns, and
he did not expect Hohman to prepare the tax returns for him. 
	In early 1993, the accused called Hohman, asking her to
send him the documents he needed to file his 1992 tax returns. 
Hohman had not yet completed the accused's bookkeeping for that
year, but she told the accused not to worry about his taxes
because she guessed that he had not made enough money to owe
taxes that year.  The accused received an extension of time until
August 1993 to file his 1992 tax returns, but he failed to file
his 1992 tax returns by that deadline.  Hohman did not return any
records that the accused had requested in 1993.   
	Hohman eventually told the accused that she planned to
finish the accused's bookkeeping records for 1992 and 1993 by
April 1994.  However, in early 1994, Hohman's computer failed,
and she was unable to recover any information from it.  At that
time, Hohman was working full time as a bookkeeper for three
business customers who were paying clients.  The accused's
bookkeeping was her lowest priority while she reconstructed the
files she had lost when her computer failed.
	The accused called Hohman a number of times in 1994,
asking her to return to him the records he had sent to her.  The
accused explained to Hohman that he needed to file his tax
returns.  The accused thereafter missed the April 15, 1994,
filing deadline for his 1993 taxes.  Late in October 1994, the
accused stopped sending Hohman his business records because "it
was not working."  Hohman again promised to send the accused his
business records in time for him to file his tax returns for
1992, 1993, and 1994 by April 15, 1995.  However, by early April
1995, Hohman had returned only some of the accused's records.
	On or about April 1, 1995, the accused gave what
records he had to his licensed tax preparer.  Thereafter, the tax
preparer told the accused that much of the documentation he
needed to prepare the accused's tax returns was missing.  The
accused again called Hohman, asking her to find and return the
missing records.  Hohman told the accused that she thought she
had sent him everything.  The accused thereafter received an
extension until October 1995 to file his 1994 tax returns, but he
missed that filing deadline. In late 1995, the accused's sister
found the missing records in a storage unit that Hohman had
rented.  When the accused received the records, he gave them to
his tax preparer.  
	In January 1996, the tax preparer completed the
accused's tax returns for 1992, 1993, and 1994. The accused paid
all taxes due, as well as late fees and accumulated interest for
those years.  The Internal Revenue Service and the Oregon
Department of Revenue took no criminal action against the accused
for his untimely filings.  
	The tardy filings came to the attention of the Bar
after the accused testified under oath at a judgment debtor
examination in September 1995 that he had not filed any state or
federal tax returns for the years 1992, 1993, or 1994.  The
debtor examination had arisen out of the accused's representation
of Rabon in a dissolution matter that forms the basis of one of
the Bar's complaints against the accused.  In representing Rabon,
the accused failed to file a timely response, and the trial court
entered a default judgment against Rabon.  The accused moved to
set aside the default and arranged for another lawyer, Houser, to
represent Rabon.  The trial court denied the motion to set aside
the default judgment.  Houser thereafter told both the accused
and Rabon that, in his opinion, Rabon had a viable legal
malpractice claim against the accused for having allowed the
default judgment to be taken.  
	The accused continued to represent Rabon for several
months on child support and visitation matters, without making
full written disclosure to Rabon of the possibility that his own
interests in avoiding a malpractice claim might affect his
professional judgment.  However, the accused did obtain a written
release from Rabon providing that the accused would continue to
handle Rabon's dissolution and child support matters for no fee
in exchange for Rabon giving up any malpractice claim.  The trial
court thereafter denied contempt and support modification motions
that the accused had filed on Rabon's behalf and imposed
sanctions on the accused and Rabon jointly and severally, in the
amount of $1,500.  When the accused did not pay the sanction,
opposing counsel filed the judgment debtor examination against
the accused.  It was during that examination that the accused
disclosed that he had not filed tax returns for 1992, 1993, and
1994.
	On December 14, 1995, the State Professional
Responsibility Board referred both the Rabon and tax matters to
the Local Professional Responsibility Committee for
investigation. The Bar filed its first formal complaint against
the accused on March 4, 1997, more than a year after the accused
had paid all back taxes, penalties, and interest.  The Bar
amended its complaint twice, and the charges were not heard until
January 26 and 27, 1999.  The trial panel issued its decision on
August 16, 1999, which, as noted, found the accused had violated
DR 5-101(A)(1) and imposed a public reprimand. 
II.  ALLEGED VIOLATIONS
A.  DR 1-102(A)(2)
	In its first cause of complaint, the Bar alleges that
the accused "knowingly and willfully" failed to file personal tax
returns timely for the years 1992, 1993, 1994, thereby violating
DR 1-102(A)(2).  That rule provides: 
	"It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
		"* * * * *
		"(2) Commit a criminal act that reflects adversely
on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness to
practice law[.]"
		To find a violation of DR 1-102(A)(2), the Bar must
present clear and convincing evidence that the accused committed
a criminal act and that the act reflects adversely on the
accused's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness to practice law. 
In re Hassenstab, 325 Or 166, 175-76, 934 P3d 1110 (1997).  We
may examine any evidence in the record that is relevant to that
question.  In re Allen, 326 Or 107, 121, 949 P2d 710 (1997). 
Proof of a conviction is not required to establish a violation of
the disciplinary rule.  In re Kimmell, 332 Or 480, ___, ___ P3d
___ (August 30, 2001) (slip op. at 6).  
		The Bar contends that the accused's failure to timely
file 1992, 1993, and 1994 federal and state tax returns violated,
respectively, two criminal statutes:  26 USC § 7203 and ORS
314.075(1).  The federal statute, 26 USC § 7203, provides, in
part: 
		"Any person required under this title to pay any
estimated tax or tax, or required by this title or by
regulations made under authority thereof to make a
return, keep any records, or supply any information,
who willfully fails to pay such estimated tax or tax,
make such return, keep such records, or supply such
information, at the time or times required by law or
regulations, shall, in addition to other penalties
provided by law, be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon
conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than
$25,000 ($100,000 in the case of a corporation), or
imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both, together with
the costs of prosecution. * * *" 
(Emphasis added.)  The Oregon statute, ORS 314.075, provides, in part:
		"No person, or officer or employee of a
corporation or a member or employee of a partnership,
shall, with intent to evade any requirement of any law
imposing taxes upon or measured by net income or any
lawful requirement of the Department of Revenue
thereunder:
		"(1) Fail to pay any tax or to make, sign or
verify any return or to supply any information
required[.]"
(Emphasis added.)
		Both statutes generally make it a crime not to file tax
returns at the time or times required by law.  Violation of the
federal statute is a misdemeanor, while violation of the Oregon
statute is a Class C felony.  26 USC § 7203; ORS 314.991.  The
accused contends that the Bar failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that his failure to file his tax returns
timely was "willful" under 26 USC § 7203 or that he acted with
the "intent to evade" the requirements of the law under ORS
314.075.  According to the accused, he failed to file his tax
returns in a timely manner because he was unaware that it was a
crime to file untimely tax returns and because, under the
circumstances, it was impossible for him to file any sooner. 
Accordingly, the accused maintains, the Bar did not show that he
was guilty of a criminal act.  
	As the term is used in 26 USC § 7203, "willful" means a
"voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty."  Cheek
v. United States, 498 US 192, 201, 111 S Ct 604, 112 L Ed 2d 617
(1991).  A willful violation is established by evidence of a
deliberate intent to disobey the filing requirement.  Proof of an
evil motive or bad faith is not a required element of willful
failure to file tax returns under 26 USC § 7203.  Id. at 200-01. 
Moreover, a taxpayer's intent to report income and pay tax on it
sometime in the future "does not vitiate the willfulness required
by § 7203."  Samsone v. United States, 380 US 343, 354, 85 S Ct
1004, 13 L Ed 2d 882 (1965).  
	In this proceeding, the accused admits that he failed
to file his tax returns for 1992, 1993, and 1994 in a timely
manner and that he was aware of his duty to do so.  The accused
testified that he knew that April 15 is the statutory deadline
for filing tax returns.  Moreover, the accused filed for
extensions of time in which to file his 1992 and 1994 returns,
but then he failed to file his returns by the extended deadlines. 
In short, the accused knew that his conduct was unlawful.  The
accused's assertion that he did not know that it was a crime to
fail to file tax returns at the time or times required by law is
not a defense to the charge that his failure to do so was
willful.  
	It is true that the United States Supreme Court has
held that a taxpayer may not be convicted of willful failure to
file a tax return if the taxpayer subjectively misunderstood the
tax laws or if the taxpayer was ignorant of the tax laws.  Cheek,
498 US at 202.  That holding does not aid the accused here.  The
accused does not argue that he misunderstood the tax laws or that
he did not know of his legal duty to file his tax returns in a
timely manner.  Rather, the accused's only argument is that he
did not know that his failure to do so carried criminal
consequences.  Such a defense does not negate a finding of a
willful failure to file a tax return at the time or times
required by law.  See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 214 F Supp
629, 630-31 (DC Del 1963) ("wilfulness" required to sustain
convictions for failure to pay special wagering occupational tax
established by showing defendant knew tax was owed, even without
showing that defendant also knew failure to comply carried
criminal, not merely civil, sanctions).  The accused committed a
criminal act when he willfully violated 26 USC § 7203 by failing
to file tax returns in the time or times required by law. (2)
	Not every criminal act reflects adversely on a lawyer's
"fitness to practice law" within the meaning of DR 1-102(A)(2). 
As this court noted in In re White, 311 Or 573, 589, 815 P2d 1257
(1991), "[t]here must be some rational connection other than the
criminality of the act between the conduct and the actor's
fitness to practice law."  White identified "pertinent
considerations" with respect to whether a criminal act adversely
reflects on a lawyer's fitness to practice law:
	"[T]he lawyer's mental state; the extent to which the
act demonstrates disrespect for the law or law
enforcement; the presence or absence of a victim; the
extent of actual or potential injury to a victim; and
the presence or absence of a pattern of criminal
conduct."  
Id.  We turn to those considerations in determining whether the
accused's violations of 26 USC § 7203 reflect adversely on his
fitness to practice law.  
	As we discuss later in this opinion, a lawyer's mental
state when engaging in particular conduct may be intentional,
knowing, or negligent.  In this instance, the accused knew that
he had a duty to file tax returns timely, and he demonstrated
that he knew how to request extensions of time for filing.  His
willful failure to file his tax returns at the time or times
required by law was an intentional act.  Moreover, the accused's
violations of 26 USC § 7203 extended over three years.  The
accused's repeated failures to file timely tax returns, and his
failure to take the steps necessary to be able to do so, reflect
disrespect for the law.  The accused's conduct was not
"victimless," as his actions affected the federal government. 
Based on those considerations, we conclude that the accused's
violations of 26 USC § 7203 reflect adversely on his fitness to
practice law.  Having found both that the accused committed a
criminal act by failing to file timely tax returns for the years
1992, 1993, and 1994, and having found that such actions reflect
adversely on his fitness to practice law, we conclude that the
accused violated DR 1-102(A)(2).   
B.  ORS 9.460(1)
	The Bar alleges that the accused's failure to file
timely tax returns for three years also violated ORS 9.460(1). (3) 
Although, in the past, this court has found that the same conduct
can violate both the Code of Professional Responsibility and a
provision of ORS Chapter 9, see, e.g., In re Gatti, 330 Or 517, 8
P3d 966 (2000); In re Allen, 326 Or 107, 949 P2d 710 (1997) In re
Bridges, 298 Or 53, 688 P2d 1335 (1984) (each so finding), such a
finding generally has not served to enhance the sanction that
this court has imposed for a violation or violations of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.  In this proceeding, the Bar does
not argue that a finding that the accused violated ORS 9.460(1),
in addition to DR 1-102(A)(2), for failing to file timely his tax
returns, would enhance the sanction that we would impose for the
accused's violation of the disciplinary rule.  We conclude that a
finding that the accused violated ORS 9.460(1) would have no
practical effect on the sanction that we impose in this case. 
Therefore, we decline to address the Bar's charge that the
accused violated that statute.  See In re Kimmell, 332 Or at __
(slip op. at 9) (also declining to address Bar's charge of
statutory violation after finding violation of Code of
Professional Responsibility for same conduct because finding of
statutory violation would have no practical effect on sanction).
C.  DR 5-101(A)(1)
	The next matter on review is the Bar's fourth cause of
complaint.  The Bar alleges that, by continuing to represent
Rabon when the accused had a potential conflict of interest 
without providing proper written disclosure as defined by DR 10-101(B)(2), the accused violated DR 5-101(A)(1).  DR 5-101(A)(1)
provides, in part:
		"Except with the consent of the lawyer's client
after full disclosure, 
		"(1) a lawyer shall not accept or continue
employment if the exercise of the lawyer's professional
judgment on behalf of the lawyer's client will be or
reasonably may be affected by the lawyer's own
financial, business, property, or personal interests. 
* * *"
(Emphasis added.)  Under DR 10-101(B)(2), "full disclosure"
includes the requirement that the lawyer recommend that "the
recipient seek independent legal advice to determine if consent
should be given and shall * * * contemporaneously confirm[] [such
advice] in writing."  (Emphasis added.)  
	As noted, the trial panel found that the accused
violated DR 5-101(A)(1).  On review, the accused concedes that he
did not follow the letter of DR 10-101 because he did not advise
Rabon in writing of his potential conflict of interest. 
According to the accused, however, the Bar has not proved by
clear and convincing evidence that he violated the "spirit" of
the full disclosure requirement because he took other steps to
protect Rabon's interests, including having him consult with
Houser.  We disagree with the accused that the explicit wording
of the rule, requiring notice to the client in writing, may be
dispensed with so casually.  See In re Brandt/Griffin, 331 Or
113, 135, 10 P3d 906 (2000) ("DR 10-101(B)(2) requires that an
oral disclosure be 'confirmed in writing'").  We conclude that
the accused violated DR 5-101(A)(1) by failing to inform Rabon in
writing of the accused's potential conflict of interest.  
III.  SANCTION
	Having found that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(2)
and DR 5-101(A)(1), we turn to the appropriate sanction.  This
court follows a well-established methodology in determining the
appropriate sanction for violating disciplinary rules.  See In re
Gustafson, 327 Or 636, 652-53, 968 P2d 367 (1998) (describing
methodology).  The Bar recommends a suspension of at least six
months for the tax matters, but is satisfied with a public
reprimand for the Rabon matter.  The accused contends that he
challenged the trial panel's recommendation that he receive a
public reprimand for his violation of DR 5-101(A)(1) only because
the Bar has placed other aspects of the trial panel's decision at
issue by seeking review in this court.  We accept without further
discussion the Bar's and the accused's agreement that a public
reprimand is the appropriate sanction for the accused's violation
of DR 5-101(A)(1) in the Rabon matter.  We turn to the
appropriate sanction for the accused's violation of DR 1-102(A)(2) in the tax matters.  
A.  Duty Violated
	The accused violated his duty to the public to maintain
his personal integrity when he willfully violated 26 USC § 7203
by not filing his tax returns by the time or times required by
law.  American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions (1991) (amended 1992) (ABA Standards) 5.1.  As noted in
the commentary to ABA Standard 5.0: 
		"The public expects the lawyer * * * to abide by
the law; public confidence in the integrity of officers
of the court is undermined when lawyers engage in
illegal conduct." 
ABA Standards at 36. 
B.  Mental State
	The ABA Standards recognize three mental states:
intentional, knowing, and negligent.  A lawyer acts intentionally
by acting with the conscious objective or purpose of
accomplishing a particular result.  A lawyer acts knowingly by
being consciously aware of the nature or attendant circumstances
of the conduct, but not having a conscious objective to
accomplish a particular result.  A lawyer acts negligently by
failing to heed a substantial risk that circumstances exist or
that a result will follow, which failure is a deviation from the
standard of care that a reasonable lawyer would exercise in the
situation.  ABA Standards at 7.
	In this case, the accused's mental state in violating
26 USC § 7203 was intentional.  The accused was aware of his
legal duty to file tax returns at the time required by law, and
he repeatedly failed to do so.  That the accused intended to file
his tax returns at some later time does not mean that he did not
act intentionally when he failed to file his returns in a timely
manner.
C.  Actual or Potential Injury
	The accused's failure to file timely returns caused
actual injury, because it hindered the federal government in its
ability to administer the tax system and collect taxes. 
D.  Preliminary Sanction under ABA Standards
	The accused's misconduct implicates two ABA Standards. 
ABA Standard 5.11 provides, in part: 
		"Disbarment is generally appropriate when:
	"(a) a lawyer engages in serious criminal conduct, a
necessary element of which includes intentional
interference with the administration of justice, false
swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, extortion,
misappropriation, or theft; or the sale, distribution
or importation of controlled substances; or the
intentional killing of another; or an attempt or
conspiracy or solicitation of another to commit any of
these offenses; or
	"(b) a lawyer engages in any other intentional conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on
the lawyer's fitness to practice." 
ABA Standard 5.12 provides: 
		"Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer
knowingly engages in criminal conduct which does not
contain the elements listed in Standard 5.11 and that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to
practice."
E.  Aggravating Factors
	There are two relevant aggravating circumstances in
this proceeding.  First, the accused engaged in a pattern of
misconduct by filing tax returns in an untimely manner for three
years.  ABA Standard 9.22(c).  Second, factoring in the Rabon
matter, the accused committed multiple violations of the
disciplinary rules.  ABA Standard 9.22(d).  
F.  Mitigating Factors
	There are several mitigating factors.  First, the Bar
became aware of the accused's misconduct in 1995, but it did not
file a complaint until 1997, and the trial panel did not hear the
matter until 1999.  The case was not at issue for argument before
this court until May 2001.  The Bar concedes that it is
responsible for the long delay in this proceeding.  During the
delay, the accused abandoned his solo law practice and joined a
law firm.  His disciplinary record since the events that led to
this proceeding is unblemished.  See In re Unrein, 323 Or 285,
288, 917 P2d 1022 (1996) (citing delay as particularly
significant mitigating factor when four years elapsed between
misconduct and court's decision, and no additional complaints had
been filed).  On the facts of this proceeding, the significant
delay in the disciplinary process is an important mitigating
factor in determining the appropriate sanction.  ABA Standard
9.32(j).
	There are other mitigating factors.  The accused has no
prior disciplinary record.  ABA Standard 9.32(a).  The accused
has cooperated fully during the disciplinary proceedings, ABA
Standard 9.32(e), and other penalties and sanctions have been
imposed on the accused in the form of penalties and interest, ABA
Standard 9.32(k). 
	Considering the duty violated, the accused's mental
state, the injury caused, and aggravating and mitigating factors, 
it appears that a suspension from the practice of law would be
the appropriate sanction in this proceeding.  We turn to this
court's case law to determine whether the Bar's recommendation of
a six-month suspension is appropriate.
G.  Case Law 
	This court never has been sanguine about a lawyer's
failure to pay taxes.  See, e.g., In re Morris, 215 Or 180, 182,
332 P2d 885 (1958) (warning lawyers that court will not be
lenient in discipline of lawyers who fail to file tax returns in
compliance with law).  In In re DesBrisay, 288 Or 625, 629-30   
n 2, 606 P2d 1148 (1980), which was decided before this court
began to follow the ABA Standards methodology, this court
described the range of sanctions that it had imposed in
situations in which lawyers had failed to file tax returns:
		"The ethical violations in each case and our
dispositions of the proceedings are as follows: In re
Thomas Graham Walker, 240 Or 65, 399 P2d 1015 (1965)
(the accused was convicted of failing to file a return
for the year 1958 and was suspended for two years); In
re James L. Means, 218 Or 480, 342 P2d 1119 (1959) (the
accused pleaded guilty to two counts of failing to file
income tax returns.  He had been disciplined before on
similar charges and was therefore permanently
disbarred); In re LeRoy L. Lomax, 216 Or 281, 338 P2d
638 (1959) (the accused pleaded guilty to two charges
of failing to file income tax returns and was suspended
from practice for one year); In re Maurice C. Corcoran,
215 Or 660, 337 P2d 307 (1959) (a suspension of 18
months was imposed when the attorney pleaded nolo
contendere to two counts of failing to file tax returns
and failed to file returns in two other years); In re
Richard R. Morris, 215 Or 180, 332 P2d 885 (1958) (the
attorney pleaded guilty to three charges of failing to
file returns and was suspended for one year); In re
McKechnie, 214 Or 531, 330 P2d 727 (1958) (McKechnie
was suspended from the practice of law for six months
after pleading guilty to failing to file tax returns in
two consecutive years); In re Claude M. Johns, Jr., 212
Or 587, 321 P2d 281 (1958) (Johns pleaded guilty to two
counts of failing to file tax returns and admitted that
he also failed to file returns in five earlier years. 
He was suspended for one and one-half years); In re
Franz E. Wagner, 210 Or 457, 311 P2d 751 (1957) (the
accused was suspended for one year after he pleaded
guilty to three counts of failing to file tax returns);
In re Means, 207 Or 638, 298 P2d 983 (1956) (Means
pleaded guilty to two counts of failing to file federal
tax returns and did not dispute the bar's allegation
that he had failed to file returns 'over a period of
years' prior to the years covered by his guilty pleas. 
Means was suspended from the practice of law for six
months)."
The court then noted that, although suspensions of six months to
two years were the appropriate sanction in most cases involving a
lawyer's failure to file taxes, a four-year suspension was
warranted in DesBrisay's case because of extenuating
circumstances and the accused's cavalier attitude.  DesBrisay,
288 Or at 630-32.   
	In this proceeding, unlike the cases summarized above,
the accused did not fail to pay his taxes altogether.  Neither
did he seek to evade paying them or falsify his tax obligations. 
See In re Pennington, 220 Or 343, 348 P2d 774 (1960) (disbarring
accused for felony of filing false and fraudulent returns;
distinguishing the seriousness of such misconduct from misconduct
in failure-to-file cases).  The accused paid the penalties and
interest that accrued because of his late filings.  The accused's
misconduct in this proceeding stemmed from his errors in judgment
in failing to keep copies of the records that he sent to Hohman
and in persisting to rely on her services even after it had
become evident that she was not able to provide the bookkeeping
service that he needed.  Although we do not condone those errors,
they do not suggest the same level of disregard of legal duties
that was present in the cases summarized in DesBrisay and for
which lengthy suspensions from the practice of law were necessary
to protect the public. 
	Nonetheless, the willful failure to file tax returns in
a timely manner warrants a significant suspension from the
practice of law.  Moreover, repeated failure to do so, and
violation of another rule as well -- in this instance, DR 5-101(A)(1) -- ordinarily would justify even a longer period of
suspension.  Under other circumstances, we might agree with the
Bar that a six-month suspension, or more, would be the
appropriate sanction.  In this proceeding, however, the
mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances. 
See In re Wittemyer, 328 Or 448, 462, 980 P2d 148 (1999)
(appropriate sanction in discipline proceedings always depends on
facts and circumstances of that proceeding).  The more than five-year delay, coupled with the accused's unblemished disciplinary
record in the intervening years, suggest that a six-month
suspension is not appropriate here.  We conclude that suspending
the accused from the practice of law for 60 days is the
appropriate sanction.
	The accused is suspended from the practice of law for a
period of 60 days, commencing 60 days from the date of filing of
this decision.



1. The Bar does not seek review of the trial panel's
dismissal of the second, third, and fifth causes of complaint.

2. Because the finding of a violation of 26 USC § 7203 is
a crime that provides a basis for discipline, we need not decide
whether the accused also committed a crime under the state
provision, ORS 314.075(1).  The Bar does not argue otherwise. 

3. ORS 9.460 provides, in part:
	"An attorney shall:
	"(1) Support the Constitution and laws of the United
States and of this state[.]"