Title: Wingfield v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 189, 2012
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: October 15, 2012

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
BUFFEL WINGFIELD,  
§ 
 
 
§  
No.  189, 2012 
 
Defendant Below, 
§  
 
Appellant, 
§  
Court Below:  Superior Court of 
 
 
§  
the State of Delaware, in and for 
 
v. 
 
§  
New Castle County 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
§  
Cr. I.D. No. 1107013815 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
 
 
Submitted: September 26, 2012 
 
 
Decided: 
October 15, 2012 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 15th day of October 2012, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties 
and the record in this case, it appears to the Court that: 
1. 
Buffel Wingfield, the defendant-below (“Wingfield”), appeals from his 
conviction of one count of Possession of Ammunition by a Person Prohibited 
(“PABPP”) after a Superior Court jury trial.  On appeal, Wingfield claims that the 
trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a mistrial, after the State 
“presented the jury with inadmissible evidence [in] its opening argument [and from 
the testimony of the State’s] only witness in its case in chief.”  We find no error 
and affirm. 
 
2
2. 
In July 2011, the police executed a valid search of a retail store, Golden 
Fleece Spiritual Supplies (“Golden Fleece”), in Wilmington.  Inside the office of 
the Golden Fleece, Officer Vincent Jordan found five live rounds of ammunition, 
as well as a business card with the name “Buffel” on it.  Police later searched 
Wingfield’s home and found a single live round of ammunition and a soft handgun 
case.  Officer Jordan was not present when the ammunition and gun case were 
found in the home.  Based on the discoveries at the Golden Fleece and at 
Wingfield’s home, the police arrested Wingfield and charged him with PABPP. 
3. 
During the April 2012 jury trial, the prosecutor’s opening statement 
referred to the ammunition found at Wingfield’s home.  Moreover, during Officer 
Jordan’s direct examination, the prosecutor asked Officer Jordan, “[D]o you recall 
where [the live round] was found?” Wingfield’s counsel objected, on hearsay 
grounds, that Officer Jordan was not testifying from firsthand knowledge.  The 
trial court sustained the objection, and the State withdrew the question.  The State 
called no other witnesses in connection with the search of Wingfield’s home. 
4. 
Wingfield’s counsel then moved for a mistrial on the ground that the 
testimony about the evidence taken from Wingfield’s home was inadmissible 
hearsay.  The trial court denied the motion for a mistrial, but agreed that the 
evidence collected from Wingfield’s home, and Officer Jordan’s testimony relating 
 
3
to the search of the home, were inadmissible.  The court then issued the following 
curative instruction: 
The jury is instructed not to consider any evidence regarding the 
search warrant or evidence recovered during the execution of the 
search warrant at [Wingfield’s home].  State’s Exhibit No. 2[, the 
evidence collected from the search of Wingfield’s home,] is stricken 
from the record and you are not to consider it for any purposes. 
 
5. 
During the State’s rebuttal case, testimony by its rebuttal witness 
established that Wingfield was the manager of the Golden Fleece, and that when 
the witness visited the business, Wingfield was “usually back at the desk” in the 
office.  Wingfield also admitted to possessing the ammunition found in the office, 
although he claimed that he had taken possession of the ammunition from a child 
as a precaution.   
6. 
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted Wingfield of PABPP.  
The Superior Court then sentenced Wingfield to one year of imprisonment at Level 
V suspended immediately for one year at Level II probation. 
7. 
On appeal, Wingfield argues that the Superior Court’s denial of his 
motion for a mistrial violated the United States and Delaware Constitutions.  We 
review the Superior Court’s denial of a motion for a mistrial for abuse of 
discretion.1  We review questions of law de novo.2 
                                                 
1 Ashley v. State, 798 A.2d 1019, 1022 (Del. 2002). 
2 Gattis v. State, 955 A.2d 1276, 1281 (Del. 2008). 
 
4
8. 
A trial court should grant a mistrial only if there is “manifest necessity 
or [if] the ends of public justice would be otherwise defeated.”3 In most cases, a 
“trial judge’s prompt curative instructions ‘are presumed to cure error and 
adequately direct the jury to disregard improper statements.’”4  “Juries are 
presumed to follow the trial judge’s instructions.”5 
9. 
A trial court considers three factors in deciding whether to grant a 
mistrial based on a prosecutorial error:  “(1) the closeness of the case, (2) the 
centrality of the issue affected by the error, and (3) the steps taken to mitigate the 
effects of the error.”6  These factors “are not conjunctive,” and must be applied “in 
a contextual, case-by-case, and fact sensitive manner.”7  Should we find that 
reversal is not warranted based on those three factors, we may still reverse if “the 
prosecutor’s statements or misconduct are repetitive errors that require reversal 
because they cast doubt on the integrity of the judicial process.”8 
                                                 
3 Revel v. State, 956 A.2d 23, 27 (Del. 2008) (citing Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748, 752 (Del. 
2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
4 Id. (quoting Pena v. State, 856 A.2d 548, 551 (Del. 2004)). 
5 Id. (citations omitted). 
6 Baker v. State, 906 A.2d 139, 149 (Del. 2006) (citing Hughes v. State, 437 A.2d 559, 571 (Del. 
1981)). 
7 Id. 
8 Id. (citing Hunter v. State, 815 A.2d 730, 732 (Del. 2002)). 
 
5
10. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying 
Wingfield’s motion for a mistrial.  This was not a close case.  The police found 
ammunition and one of Wingfield’s business cards in an office that Wingfield 
regularly, although not exclusively, used.  Wingfield also admitted to possessing 
the ammunition.  Although the alleged error was central to the issue of whether 
Wingfield knowingly possessed the ammunition at his home, it was irrelevant to 
the separate issue of whether Wingfield knowingly possessed the ammunition 
found at the Golden Fleece.  That evidence was independently obtained from a 
separate search, and was unrelated to the evidence obtained from Wingfield’s 
home.  The Superior Court also issued a clear and prompt curative instruction that 
effectively cured any error. 
11. The claimed error was also not of the kind that would “cast doubt on 
the integrity of the judicial process.”9  The two discrete references to the 
ammunition found in Wingfield’s home did not taint the entire trial, especially 
because the trial judge instructed the jury not to consider any evidence from 
Wingfield’s home.   
                                                 
9 See id. 
 
6
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
        Justice