Title: Zack v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC15-1756, SC16-1090
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: June 15, 2017

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC15-1756 
____________ 
 
MICHAEL DUANE ZACK, III,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC16-1090 
____________ 
 
MICHAEL DUANE ZACK, III,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
JULIE L. JONES, etc.,  
Respondent. 
 
[June 15, 2017] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Michael Duane Zack, III, appeals an order of the circuit court denying his 
motion to vacate his conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death filed 
under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and petitions this Court for a writ 
 
 
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of habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  For 
the reasons that follow, we affirm the denial of postconviction relief and deny the 
habeas petition.  
FACTS 
 
On June 25, 1996, Michael Zack was indicted for the sexual assault, 
robbery, and first-degree murder of Ravonne Smith.  We described the facts of the 
case on direct appeal as follows: 
 
 
Although the murder of Smith took place on June 13, 1996, the 
chain of events which culminated in this murder began on June 4, 
1996, when Edith Pope (Pope), a bartender in Tallahassee, lent her car 
to Zack.  In the weeks prior, Zack had come to Pope’s bar on a regular 
basis.  He generally nursed one or two beers and talked with Pope; she 
never saw him intoxicated.  He told her that he had witnessed his 
sister murder his mother with an axe.  As a result, Pope felt sorry for 
Zack, and she began to give him odd jobs around the bar.  When 
Zack’s girlfriend called the bar on June 4 to advise him that he was 
being evicted from her apartment, Pope lent Zack her red Honda 
automobile to pick up his belongings.  Zack never returned. 
 
 
From Tallahassee, Zack drove to Panama City where he met 
Bobby Chandler (Chandler) at a local pub.  Over the next several 
days, Zack frequented the pub daily and befriended Chandler.  
Chandler, who owned a construction subcontracting business, hired 
Zack to work in his construction business.  When Chandler discovered 
that Zack was living out of a car (the red Honda), he invited Zack to 
live with him temporarily.  On the second night at Chandler’s, Zack 
woke up screaming following a nightmare.  Chandler heard Zack 
groan words which sounded like “stop” or “don’t.”  Although 
Chandler questioned him, Zack would not discuss the nightmare.  
Two nights later, on June 11, 1996, Zack left Chandler’s during the 
night, stealing a rifle, a handgun, and forty-two dollars from 
Chandler’s wallet.  Zack drove to Niceville, and on the morning of 
June 12, 1996, pawned the guns for $225. 
 
 
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From Niceville, Zack traveled to Okaloosa County and stopped 
at yet another bar.  At this bar, Zack was sitting alone drinking a beer 
when he was approached by Laura Rosillo (Rosillo).  The two left the 
bar in the red Honda and drove to the beach, reportedly to use drugs 
Zack said he possessed.  Once on the beach, Zack attacked Rosillo 
and beat her while they were still in the Honda.  He then pulled 
Rosillo from the car and beat her head against one of the tires.  
Rosillo’s tube top was torn and hanging off her hips.  Her spandex 
pants were pulled down around her right ankle.  The evidence 
suggests she was sexually assaulted; however, the sperm found in 
Rosillo’s body could not be matched to Zack.  He then strangled her, 
dragged her body behind a sand dune, kicked dirt over her face, and 
departed. 
 
 
Zack’s next stop on this crime-riddled journey was Dirty Joe’s 
bar located near the beach in Pensacola.  He arrived there on the 
afternoon of June 13, 1996, and met the decedent, Ravonne Smith.  
Throughout the afternoon, Smith, a bar employee, and Zack sat 
together in the bar talking and playing pool or darts.  The bar was not 
very busy, so Smith spent most of her time with Zack.  Both bar 
employees and patrons testified that Zack did not ingest any 
significant amount of alcohol and that he did not appear to be 
intoxicated.  In the late afternoon, Smith contacted her friend Russell 
Williams (Williams) and invited him to the bar because she was 
lonely.  Williams arrived at the bar around 5:30 p.m.  Prior to leaving 
the bar around 7 p.m., Smith called her live-in boyfriend, Danny 
Schaffer, and told him she was working late.  Smith, Williams, and 
Zack then left the bar and drove to the beach where they shared a 
marijuana cigarette supplied by Zack.  Afterwards, they returned to 
the bar and Williams departed.  Zack and Smith left the bar together 
sometime around 8 p.m. and eventually arrived at the house Smith 
shared with her boyfriend. 
 
 
Forensic evidence indicates that immediately upon entering the 
house Zack hit Smith with a beer bottle causing shards of glass and 
blood to spray onto the living room love seat and two drops of blood 
to spray onto the interior doorframe.  Zack pursued Smith down the 
hall to the master bedroom leaving a trail of blood.  Once in the 
bedroom Zack sexually assaulted Smith as she lay bleeding on the 
bed.  Following the attack Smith managed to escape to the empty 
guest bedroom across the hall.  Zack pursued her and beat her head 
against the bedroom’s wooden floor.  Once he incapacitated Smith, 
 
 
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Zack went to the kitchen where he got an oyster knife.  He returned to 
the guest bedroom where Smith lay and stabbed her in the chest four 
times with the knife.  The four wounds were close together in the 
center of Smith’s chest.  Zack went back to the kitchen, cleaned the 
knife, put it away, and washed the blood from his hands.  He then 
went back to the master bedroom, placed Smith’s bloody shirt and 
shorts in her dresser drawer, stole a television, a VCR, and Smith’s 
purse, and placed the stolen items in Smith’s car. 
 
 
During the night, Zack drove Smith’s car to the area where the 
red Honda was parked.  He removed the license plate and several 
personal items from the Honda then moved it to a nearby lot.  Zack 
returned to Panama City in Smith’s car and attempted to pawn the 
television and VCR.  Suspecting the merchandise was stolen, the shop 
owners asked for identification and told Zack they had to check on the 
merchandise.  Zack fled the store and abandoned Smith’s car behind a 
local restaurant.  Zack was apprehended after he had spent several 
days hiding in an empty house. 
 
 
After he was arrested, Zack confessed to the Smith murder and 
to the Pope and Chandler thefts.  Zack claimed he and Smith had 
consensual sex and that she thereafter made a comment regarding his 
mother’s murder.  The comment enraged him, and he attacked her.  
Zack contended the fight began in the hallway, not immediately upon 
entering the house.  He said he grabbed a knife in self-defense, 
believing Smith left the master bedroom to get a gun from the guest 
bedroom. 
 
Zack v. State (Zack I), 753 So. 2d 9, 13-14 (Fla. 2000) (footnotes omitted).  A jury 
found Zack guilty on all counts on September 15, 1997.  Id. at 12.   
 
After the penalty phase hearing, the jury recommended a sentence of death 
by a vote of eleven to one.  Id.  Following the jury’s recommendation, the trial 
court sentenced Zack to death on November 14, 1997.1  On direct appeal, Zack 
                                          
 
 
1.  The trial judge found the following six aggravators to support the death 
sentence: 
 
 
 
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raised twelve issues.2  Id. at 16 n.5.  We affirmed the convictions and death 
sentence.  Id. at 26.  On October 2, 2000, the Supreme Court denied certiorari 
review.  Zack v. Florida, 531 U.S. 858 (2000).  
                                          
 
 
(1) the defendant was convicted of a capital felony while under a 
sentence of felony probation; (2) the crime was committed in 
conjunction with a robbery, sexual battery, or burglary; (3) 
the defendant committed the crime to avoid lawful arrest; (4) the 
defendant committed the crime for financial gain; (5) the crime was 
especially heinous, atrocious, [or] cruel; and (6) the crime was 
committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner.  
 
Zack I, 753 So. 2d at 12-13.  The trial court assigned little weight to the following 
four mitigators: 
 
 
(1) the defendant committed the crime while under an extreme mental 
or emotional disturbance; (2) the defendant was acting under extreme 
duress; (3) the defendant lacked the capacity to appreciate the 
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law; and (4) nonstatutory mitigating factors of 
remorse, voluntary confession, and good conduct while incarcerated.  
Zack’s age was not considered a mitigating factor.  
 
Id. at 13. 
 
 
2.  Zack raised the following claims on direct appeal:  
 
(1) the court erred in admitting Williams[v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 
1959),] rule evidence; (2) the court erred in denying a motion for 
judgment of acquittal on the sexual battery charge; (3) the trial court 
erred in denying the motion for judgment of acquittal on the robbery 
charge; (4) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on felony 
murder based upon a burglary; (5) the sentencing order failed to 
consider all of the mitigating evidence presented; (6) the trial court 
erred in finding that the murder was committed to avoid or prevent a 
lawful arrest; (7) the trial court erred in finding that the murder was 
committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner; (8) the trial 
 
 
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On October 18, 2002, Zack filed his first amended 3.851 motion in the trial 
court, raising six claims.  While Zack’s motion was pending, the Supreme Court 
decided Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), which held that the execution of 
an intellectually disabled person is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of 
the Eighth Amendment.  The trial court denied Zack’s rule 3.851 motion on July 
14, 2003.  Zack raised six issues before this Court on appeal.3  Zack v. State (Zack 
II), 911 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. 2005).  This Court affirmed the trial court’s order and 
noted that the “evidence in this case shows Zack’s lowest I.Q. score to be 79.”  Id. 
                                          
 
court erred in using victim impact evidence; (9) the trial court erred in 
admitting the rebuttal evidence from Candice Fletcher; (10) the trial 
court erred by failing to give Zack’s proposed instruction on the role 
of sympathy; (11) the trial court erred in retroactively applying the 
aggravating factor of a murder committed while on felony probation; 
and (12) the trial court erred in refusing to admit a family photo 
during the penalty phase.  
 Zack I, 753 So. 2d at 16 n.5. 
 
3.  On postconviction appeal, Zack raised the following issues: (1) trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the DNA evidence presented by 
the State; (2) counsel was ineffective because he failed to prepare Zack to testify at 
trial; (3) counsel was ineffective because he made prejudicial remarks to the jury in 
the opening statement and closing argument; (4) the trial court erred in summarily 
denying claims raised in his motion for postconviction relief involving Zack’s right 
to a Frye[v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923),] hearing and the 
constitutionality of the death sentence under Atkins; (5) that Florida’s capital 
sentencing scheme is unconstitutional under Ring[v. Arizona, 536 U.S 584 
(2002)]; and (6) collateral counsel was ineffective.  Zack II, 911 So. 2d at 1197. 
 
 
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at 1201.  The Court also denied relief on Zack’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, 
filed on February 12, 2004.  Id. at 1203.  
 
Zack filed a successive postconviction motion on December 1, 2004, raising 
an Atkins claim.  The trial court denied the claim without an Atkins hearing, 
finding that after a review of the expert trial testimony none had found Zack’s I.Q. 
to be near the required statutory figure of 70 in order to establish intellectual 
disability.  This Court affirmed the trial court’s denial.  In its order, this Court 
relied on Cherry v. State, 781 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 2000), and held that “Zack has not 
provided any new evidence of [intellectual disability] and previous evidence 
demonstrates that his I.Q. was well above the statutory figure of 70 or below.”    
 
On March 4, 2005, Zack filed a second petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
based upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 
(2004).  This Court denied the petition on October 6, 2005.  Zack v. Crosby, 918 
So. 2d 240 (Fla. 2005).   
 
Zack also filed a federal habeas petition that included an Atkins claim.  Zack 
v. Crosby, 607 F. Supp. 2d 1291 (N.D. Fla. 2008).  All claims not based on Atkins 
were dismissed with prejudice as untimely.  Id. at 1295.  Zack’s Atkins claim was 
denied with prejudice on the merits on March 26, 2009.  In its order, the court 
found that the record refuted Zack’s allegation that he is intellectually disabled and 
held that the record uniformly concluded that Zack’s I.Q. was significantly above 
 
 
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the minimum threshold for intellectual disability.  The Eleventh Circuit, in an en 
banc opinion, affirmed the dismissal of many of the claims in the habeas petition as 
untimely.  Zack v. Tucker, 704 F.3d 917 (11th Cir. 2013).  The Supreme Court 
denied certiorari review on October 7, 2013.  Zack v. Crews, 134 S. Ct. 156 
(2013).   
 
On May 26, 2015, Zack filed a second successive postconviction motion 
raising a claim of intellectual disability based on Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 
(2014).  The trial court summarily denied the motion on July 8, 2015.  Zack now 
appeals from the circuit court’s denial of relief, arguing that the court erred in (1) 
summarily denying Zack an evidentiary hearing on his intellectual disability claim 
and (2) dismissing Zack’s motion on the basis that his I.Q. was too high for an 
Atkins hearing without considering other evidence as required by Hall. 
ANALYSIS 
 
Zack’s first claim is based on the trial court’s summary denial of his motion 
pursuant to a rule of law that has now been found unconstitutional under Hall.  
During the pendency of this case, we determined that Hall applies retroactively as 
a development of fundamental significance.  Walls v. State, 213 So. 3d 340, 346 
(Fla. 2016).   
 
A postconviction court’s decision on whether to grant an evidentiary hearing 
on a claim is a pure question of law, reviewed de novo.  Mann v. State, 112 So. 3d 
 
 
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1158, 1162 (Fla. 2013).  A claim may be summarily denied if it is legally 
insufficient or positively refuted by the record.  Id. at 1161.  To prevail on a claim 
of intellectual disability, a defendant must establish three elements: (1) 
significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning, (2) existing concurrently 
with deficits in adaptive behavior, and (3) manifesting prior to age 18.  § 921.137, 
Fla. Stat. (2016); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.203. 
 
Hall recognizes that intellectual disability “is a condition, not a number.”  
Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 2001.  In a recent opinion, we found that Hall requires courts to 
consider all three prongs of intellectual disability in tandem and that no single 
factor should be dispositive of the outcome.  See Oats v. State, 181 So. 3d 457, 459 
(Fla. 2015).  However, Hall also states that a “defendant must be able to present 
additional evidence of intellectual disability” where “a defendant’s I.Q. test score 
falls within the test’s acknowledged and inherent margin of error.”  Hall, 134 S. Ct. 
at 2001.  Generally, the standard error of measurement is approximately five 
points.  Id. at 1998 (citing to Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders 28 (rev. 3d ed. 1987)).  Thus, an “I.Q. score of 70 is considered to 
represent a band or zone of 65 to 75.”  Id.  
 
The trial court correctly found the significantly subaverage intellectual 
functioning prong dispositive of Zack’s intellectual disability claim based on 
 
 
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Zack’s scores prior to age 18, which were all over 75.  At the Huff4 hearing, Zack 
presented his full range of scores, as well as evidence of adaptive deficits before 
age 18.  The record demonstrates five I.Q. scores for Zack: a score of 92 in 1980 
when Zack was 11 years old, and four scores after Zack turned 18—84 and 86 in 
1997 at 27 years of age, 79 in 2002, and 80 in 2015.  While a holistic hearing is 
required, defendants must still be able to meet the first prong of Hall.  Because 
Zack’s current score is well above 75, and there are no scores in his history below 
75, it is unlikely that he would ever be able to satisfy the significantly subaverage 
intellectual functioning prong.  Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s summary 
denial of Zack’s intellectual disability claim.   
 
Zack’s second claim is that the trial court erred in dismissing his motion on 
the basis that his I.Q. was too high for an Atkins hearing without considering other 
evidence as required by Hall.  In reviewing the trial court’s determination that 
Zack is not intellectually disabled, “this Court examines the record for whether 
competent, substantial evidence supports the determination of the trial court.”  
State v. Herring, 76 So. 3d 891, 895 (Fla. 2011).  We do not “reweigh the evidence 
or second-guess the circuit court’s findings as to the credibility of witnesses.”  
                                          
 
 
4.  Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993). 
 
 
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Brown v. State, 959 So. 2d 146, 149 (Fla. 2007).  However, questions of law are 
reviewed de novo.  Herring, 76 So. 3d at 895.   
 
We find that the trial court’s determination that Zack did not satisfy the 
significantly subaverage intellectual functioning prong is supported by competent, 
substantial evidence.  As previously mentioned, Zack provided several I.Q. scores 
that were all well outside the standard error of measurement.  While Zack argues 
that Hall requires the trial court to consider other evidence, a defendant’s scores 
must first fall within the test’s acknowledged and inherent margin of error.  Hall, 
134 S. Ct. at 2001.  Here, all of the scores presented—92, 84, 86, 79, and 80—are 
outside of the test’s margin of error and the presentation of evidence regarding the 
other two prongs do not cure Zack’s inability to satisfy the first.  Consequently, we 
affirm the trial court’s determination. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
In his petition for habeas corpus relief, Zack asserts that his death sentence is 
unconstitutional under Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).  In Hurst v. Florida, 
the Supreme Court found that a jury must make a specific factual finding with 
regard to the existence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances supporting a 
death sentence in order to preserve the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.  Id. at 
622.  We have interpreted Hurst v. Florida, an extension of Ring v. Arizona, 536 
U.S. 584 (2002), to require a jury to unanimously find each aggravating factor, that 
 
 
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the aggravating factors are sufficient to warrant death, and that the aggravating 
factors outweigh the mitigation.  See Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So. 3d 40, 57, 66 
(Fla. 2016), cert. denied, No. 16-998 (U.S. May 22, 2017).  However, Zack’s first-
degree murder conviction and sentence of death were final in 2000, before the 
Supreme Court decided Ring.  Therefore, Zack is not entitled to Hurst relief 
because Hurst does not apply retroactively to cases that were final before Ring was 
decided.  See Asay v. State, 210 So. 3d 1, 22 (Fla. 2016).  Accordingly, we deny 
relief on this claim. 
CONCLUSION  
 
In light of the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s denial of relief on Zack’s 
postconviction motion to vacate his conviction of first-degree murder and sentence 
of death, and we deny habeas relief.  
 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and QUINCE, J., concur. 
CANADY, J., concurs specially with an opinion, in which POLSTON, J., concurs. 
PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion. 
LAWSON, J., concurs in result with an opinion. 
LEWIS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
CANADY, J., specially concurring. 
 
I concur in the conclusion that Zack’s IQ scores justify the denial of his 
intellectual disability claim.  I also agree that Zack is not entitled to Hurst v. 
 
 
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Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), postconviction relief and that the habeas petition 
should therefore be denied.  But I would not rely on Asay v. State, 210 So. 3d 1 
(Fla. 2016).  Instead, I would deny the Hurst claim on two grounds.  First, no Hurst 
error occurred in this case—given the contemporaneous convictions establishing 
aggravation.  See Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40, 77-83 (Fla. 2016) (Canady, J., 
dissenting).  Second, in any event Hurst should not be given retroactive 
application.  See Mosley v. State, 209 So. 3d 1248, 1285-91 (Fla. 2016) (Canady, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
POLSTON, J., concurs. 
 
PARIENTE, J., concurring in result. 
 
I would not deny retroactive application of Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So. 3d 
40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, No. 16-998 (U.S. May 22, 2017), to Zack, but because 
I am bound by this Court’s precedent from Asay v. State, 210 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 2016), 
I concur in result with the majority’s rejection of Zack’s Hurst claim.  I do concur, 
however, in the majority’s rejection of Zack’s intellectual disability claim and 
write separately to emphasize that Zack’s range of IQ scores do not approach “the 
test’s acknowledged and inherent margin of error.”  Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 
1986, 2001 (2014).  As the majority explained, “[t]he record demonstrates five I.Q. 
scores for Zack: a score of 92 in 1980 when Zack was 11 years old, and four scores 
after Zack turned 18—84 and 86 in 1997 at 27 years of age, 79 in 2002, and 80 in 
 
 
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2015.”  Majority op. at 10.  Thus, because Zack’s lowest I.Q. scores do not fall 
within the test’s margin of error, it is unnecessary to conduct a “conjunctive and 
interrelated” assessment of Zack’s evidence of intellectual disability as required by 
Hall.  Cf. Walls v. State, 213 So. 3d 340, 346 (Fla. 2016); Oats v. State, 181 So. 3d 
457, 467 (Fla. 2015). 
LAWSON, J., concurring in result. 
 
See Okafor v. State, No. SC15-2136, slip op. at 15 (Fla. June 8, 2017) 
(Lawson, J., concurring specially). 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Escambia County,  
Linda Lee Nobles, Judge - Case No. 171996CF002517XXXAXX 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus  
 
Robert S. Friedman, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Dawn B. Macready 
and Stacy Biggart, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Northern 
Region, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Charmaine M. Millsaps, Assistant 
Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
for Appellee/Respondent