Title: State v. Stephenson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2018AP002104
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: December 18, 2020

2020 WI 92 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2018AP2104 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In re the commitment of Jamie Lane Stephenson: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
Jamie Lane Stephenson, 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 389 Wis. 2d 322,935 N.W.2d 842 
PDC No:2019 WI App 63 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 18, 2020   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 14, 2020   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dunn   
 
JUDGE: 
Rod W. Smeltzer   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of 
the Court, in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., ZIEGLER, HAGEDORN, and 
KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion in which DALLET, J., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Jefren E. Olsen assistant state public defender. There 
was an oral argument by Jefren E. Olsen. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Donald V. Latorraca, assistant attorney general; with whom on 
the brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an 
oral argument by Donald V. Latorraca. 
2020 WI 92 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2018AP2104 
(L.C. No. 
2011CI1) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
: 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the commitment of Jamie Lane Stephenson: 
 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Jamie Lane Stephenson, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 18, 2020 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of 
the Court, in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., ZIEGLER, HAGEDORN, and 
KAROFSKY, 
JJ., joined. 
 
ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, 
J., filed 
a 
dissenting opinion in which DALLET, J., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   Jamie Lane Stephenson 
seeks review of the court of appeals decision1 affirming the 
circuit court's denial2 of his Chapter 980 petition for discharge 
                                                 
1 State v. Stephenson, 2019 WI App 63, 389 Wis. 2d 322, 935 
N.W.2d 842. 
2 The Honorable Rod W. Smeltzer, Dunn County Circuit Court, 
presided. 
No. 
2018AP2104   
 
2 
 
from his commitment as a sexually violent person.  Stephenson 
raises three issues.  First, he contends that Chapter 980 
requires the State to present expert testimony in order to prove 
he is dangerous because his mental disorder makes it more likely 
than not that he will re-offend in a sexually violent manner.  
Because the State failed to do so, Stephenson asserts there is 
insufficient evidence to continue his Chapter 980 commitment.  
Second, Stephenson asks this court to overrule the sufficiency-
of-the-evidence standard of review this court adopted in Curiel.3  
Third, he claims that even if expert testimony is not required, 
and even if we do not overrule Curiel, the evidence was 
nevertheless 
insufficient 
to 
support 
the 
circuit 
court's 
decision denying his petition for discharge. 
¶2 
We hold the State is not required to present expert 
testimony to prove the required dangerousness element in Wis. 
Stat. § 980.01(7) (2017-18).4  We further reject Stephenson's 
request to overrule Curiel and, instead, reaffirm Curiel's 
holding that the appropriate standard of review to use in 
Chapter 980 cases is the sufficiency-of-the—evidence test set 
forth in our criminal law.  Finally, we hold the evidence of 
record satisfies the sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard.  We 
affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
                                                 
3 In re Commitment of Curiel, 227 Wis. 2d 389, 597 N.W.2d 
697 (1999). 
4 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2018AP2104   
 
3 
 
¶3 
Stephenson has a lengthy history of committing sexual 
assaults.  In 2000, when he was 15 years old, the State charged 
Stephenson with three counts of fourth-degree sexual assault.  
One of these charges resulted in a delinquency adjudication.  In 
2001, Stephenson sexually assaulted a high school classmate.  In 
that case, Stephenson led the student to a secluded area of the 
high school, forcefully pushed her up against a wall, pulled 
down her pants, and began engaging in forced intercourse.  
Stephenson was subsequently adjudicated delinquent for second-
degree sexual assault of a child. 
¶4 
In 2004, Stephenson engaged in sexual intercourse with 
two 15-year-old girls.  The State charged Stephenson with two 
counts of second-degree sexual assault of a child, and he later 
pled guilty to two counts of fourth-degree sexual assault of a 
child.  The circuit court placed him on two years of probation.  
Also in 2004, Stephenson engaged in sexual intercourse with a 
12-year-old girl in Minnesota when he was 19 years old.  The 
State of Minnesota charged Stephenson with one count of second-
degree criminal sexual conduct.  Stephenson was ultimately 
convicted of this charge and placed on 25 years of probation. 
¶5 
In 2007, Stephenson corresponded with a 14-year-old 
girl over the internet and lied to her about his age.  When he 
eventually met her face-to-face, Stephenson pinned her down and 
forced her to engage in sexual intercourse.  That same year, 
Stephenson restrained a 16-year-old girl and forcibly engaged in 
sexual intercourse with her while her parents were away.  The 
girl was eventually able to escape. 
No. 
2018AP2104   
 
4 
 
¶6 
For these incidents in 2007, the State charged 
Stephenson with two counts of sexual assault of a child.  
Stephenson subsequently pled guilty to one count of second-
degree sexual assault of a child and, in 2009, was sentenced to 
two years of initial confinement followed by four years of 
extended supervision.  In 2011, as Stephenson's release date 
neared, the State filed a petition to qualify Stephenson as a 
"sexually violent person," pursuant to Wis. Stat. ch. 980.  The 
circuit court committed Stephenson to a secure mental health 
facility. 
¶7 
In 2017, Stephenson petitioned the circuit court to 
discharge him from commitment.  The State opposed Stephenson's 
release.  The circuit court considered his petition and 
conducted a discharge trial.  In order to continue Stephenson's 
commitment on the basis that he remained a "sexually violent 
person," the State was required to prove three elements by clear 
and convincing evidence:  (1) that he has been convicted of a 
sexually violent offense [hereinafter the "first element"],5 (2) 
that he has a mental disorder that predisposes him to acts of 
sexual violence [hereinafter the "second element"],6 and (3) that 
he is dangerous to others because the mental disorder makes it 
more likely than not that he will engage in one or more future 
                                                 
5 "Sexually violent offense" is defined in Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.01(6). 
6 In full, "mental disorder" is defined as a "congenital or 
acquired 
condition 
affecting 
the 
emotional 
or 
volitional 
capacity that predisposes a person to engage in acts of sexual 
violence."  Wis. Stat. § 980.01(2).  
No. 
2018AP2104   
 
5 
 
acts of sexual violence [hereinafter the "third element"].  Wis. 
Stat. § 980.01(7). 
¶8 
At the discharge trial, there was no dispute over the 
first element:  Stephenson had been convicted of a host of 
sexually violent offenses.  In order to establish the second 
element, the State introduced testimony from an expert witness, 
Donn Kolbeck, a psychologist employed by the Department of 
Health Services (DHS) who had previously evaluated Stephenson.  
Kolbeck 
testified 
that 
he 
diagnosed 
Stephenson 
with 
two 
qualifying mental disorders:  (1) Other Specified Personality 
Disorder, with antisocial and borderline features, and (2) 
Alcohol Abuse Disorder. 
¶9 
Kolbeck 
testified 
that 
Stephenson's 
personality 
disorder meant that he possesses an "enduring pattern of inner 
experience and behavior that deviates . . . markedly from the 
expectations 
of 
the 
individual's 
culture 
leading 
to 
impairments[] 
in 
cognitions, 
emotions, 
interpersonal 
functioning, and impulse control."  Kolbeck further stated that 
Stephenson exhibits "a long history of deceitfulness, conning 
and manipulation in the context of sexually violent behaviors, 
impulsivity, irritability, consistent irresponsibility, and a 
lack 
of 
remorse." 
 
According 
to 
Kolbeck, 
Stephenson's 
personality disorder "has a direct causal connection to [his] 
sexually violent behaviors in the community." 
¶10 With regard to the other qualifying mental disorder, 
Kolbeck testified that, while Stephenson's symptoms were in 
remission given his controlled environment, Stephenson's "use of 
No. 
2018AP2104   
 
6 
 
alcohol . . . was a condition that predisposed him to engage in 
acts 
of 
sexual 
violence." 
 
He 
further 
testified 
that 
Stephenson's 
alcohol 
consumption 
grew 
heavily 
over 
time, 
progressing 
to 
"frequent 
intoxication" 
during 
his 
life.  
According to Kolbeck, Stephenson also admitted that he had 
"never committed a crime sober" and that he was still "capable 
of social drinking" in the community. 
¶11 Additionally, Kolbeck testified regarding Stephenson's 
numerous 
rule 
violations 
while 
committed. 
 
Noting 
that 
Stephenson's anti-social traits were "still active," Kolbeck 
explained that Stephenson repeatedly covered his room window 
with a towel, despite contrary instructions from staff.  When 
confronted with this violation, Stephenson lied, claiming this 
behavior 
had 
been 
allowed 
by 
other 
unit 
staff 
members.  
Additionally, while in confinement, Stephenson had been cited 
repeatedly for trying to obtain property that he was not allowed 
to have.  In one case, Stephenson violated the rules by ordering 
women's 
lingerie——an 
item 
expressly 
prohibited 
under 
the 
facility's policies. 
¶12 Kolbeck 
also 
stated 
that 
Stephenson 
produced 
a 
concerning result on a non-suppressed penile plethysmograph 
test, 
during 
which 
Stephenson 
became 
aroused 
by 
stimuli 
"depicting teenager coercive interactions" as well as by graphic 
depictions of "victims crying or in some form of suffering" 
related to sexual deviancy.  Kolbeck testified that Stephenson 
tested highly on measures of psychopathy, as quantified by the 
Psychopathy Checklist—Revised (PCL-R).  While most individuals 
No. 
2018AP2104   
 
7 
 
in the "prison population" score "roughly 23" on the PCL-R, 
Stephenson scored a "29," which is "consistent with a high 
degree of psychopathy."  Kolbeck opined that these indicators 
suggest that Stephenson manifests characteristics of shallow 
affect, grandiosity, and manipulation. 
¶13 Next, Kolbeck addressed the third element:  whether 
Stephenson's mental disorder makes it more likely than not that 
he will engage in one or more future acts of sexual violence.  
In opining on this issue, Kolbeck employed two actuarial risk 
instruments 
to 
measure 
Stephenson's 
risk 
of 
future 
dangerousness:  the Static-99R and the Violence Risk Scale—Sex 
Offense Version (VRS-SO).  Based on these assessment tools, 
Kolbeck concluded that Stephenson had a 41 percent probability 
of re-offending.  Importantly, Kolbeck defined "re-offense" as 
the probability of Stephenson being arrested or charged with a 
sexual crime, not his actual likelihood of committing future 
acts of sexual violence.  Stephenson's score on this instrument 
(41 percent) was lower than the "more likely than not" standard 
required for the third element.  As a result, Kolbeck concluded 
that, under this measure, Stephenson did not satisfy the third 
element. 
¶14 Following Kolbeck's testimony, Stephenson introduced 
his own expert witness, Courtney Endres, a psychologist whose 
evaluation of Stephenson supported his discharge petition.  With 
respect to the second element, Endres testified that Stephenson 
"no longer meets the criteria for a mental disorder as defined 
under Wisconsin Chapter 980."  As to the third element, Endres 
No. 
2018AP2104   
 
8 
 
opined that Stephenson's "risk falls below the threshold" and 
that he "is not likely to reoffend in the future."  Although 
Endres used the same Static-99R and VRS-SO instruments employed 
by Kolbeck, Endres applied slightly different risk assessment 
factors and determined that Stephenson posed a 10 percent risk 
of re-offense over five years and a 17 percent risk over ten 
years.  Accordingly, Endres concluded that Stephenson no longer 
met the statutory criteria for commitment as a sexually violent 
person. 
¶15 Stephenson 
also 
presented 
testimony 
from 
Darren 
Matusen, a psychologist at Stephenson's treatment facility.  
Matusen explained Stephenson's intensive three-phase treatment 
program during commitment and stated that Stephenson was in 
phase three of this program.  He opined that Stephenson had made 
progress in his treatment, even though he "is still callous at 
times."  He also stated that, while Stephenson "has a history of 
minimizing the seriousness of his sexual offenses," he has more 
recently 
"acknowledged 
that 
adolescents 
are 
incapable 
of 
consent" and has "taken responsibility" for his crimes.  Matusen 
also testified that, during the previous year, Stephenson 
assessed his own risk of re-offending as a "five out of ten" 
chance. 
¶16 After hearing all of the testimony, the circuit court 
denied Stephenson's discharge petition, finding that he remained 
a sexually violent person.  The court ruled that, based upon 
Kolbeck's testimony, Stephenson suffers from both of the 
aforementioned mental disorders and "does have a risk to 
No. 
2018AP2104   
 
9 
 
reoffend."  Nonetheless, the circuit court acknowledged that 
Stephenson "has made significant progress" in his treatment and 
therefore granted him supervised release pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.08(4)(cg). 
¶17 Following 
the 
circuit 
court's 
determination, 
Stephenson filed a motion for postcommitment relief.  In his 
motion, Stephenson conceded the first two elements of the 
criteria 
for 
commitment 
as 
a 
"sexually 
violent 
person," 
challenging only the third element.  Stephenson argued the State 
failed to meet its burden of proof on the third element because 
no expert testified that he was more likely than not to commit a 
future act of sexual violence.  Specifically, Kolbeck testified 
that Stephenson's risk of arrest or conviction for committing 
future acts of sexual violence was only 41 percent, a figure 
failing to satisfy the "more likely than not" standard, 
Stephenson argued.  Stephenson further claimed that, even if 
expert testimony was not required for the third element, the 
State's evidence was insufficient to prove that Stephenson was 
dangerous.  The circuit court denied this motion, holding that 
the State was not required to present expert testimony on the 
third element and that the State presented sufficient evidence 
to deny his discharge.  Stephenson appealed, and the court of 
appeals affirmed the circuit court's ruling.  We granted 
Stephenson's petition for review. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶18 Stephenson asks this court to interpret Wisconsin's 
sexually violent person commitment laws under Wis. Stat. ch. 980 
No. 
2018AP2104   
 
10 
 
and to consider whether expert testimony is required to continue 
a commitment.  This court reviews questions of statutory 
interpretation "independently, [while] . . . benefit[ing] from 
the decisions by the court of appeals and circuit court."  In re 
Commitment of Talley, 2017 WI 21, ¶24, 373 Wis. 2d 610, 891 
N.W.2d 390; see also Racine Cnty. v. Oracular Milwaukee, Inc., 
2010 WI 25, ¶24, 323 Wis. 2d 682, 781 N.W.2d 88.  Additionally, 
Stephenson asks this court to overrule Curiel and adopt a 
different 
standard 
of 
reviewing 
whether 
the 
evidence 
is 
sufficient to uphold the factfinder's determination that a 
person is sexually violent.  The standard of review we apply 
presents a question of law that we review de novo.  See In re 
Commitment of Curiel, 227 Wis. 2d 389, ¶¶52-53, 597 N.W.2d 697 
(1999). 
III.  DISCUSSION 
A. Expert Testimony for Chapter 980 Proceedings 
¶19 Stephenson contends that, during Chapter 980 discharge 
trials, the State must present expert testimony to satisfy its 
burden of establishing the third element:  that the committee is 
dangerous to others because his mental disorder makes it more 
likely than not that he will engage in one or more future acts 
of sexual violence.  Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7).  Stephenson asserts 
that, because the State's expert witness failed to testify 
Stephenson was "more likely than not to reoffend," the circuit 
court wrongfully denied his petition for discharge.  We are not 
persuaded. 
No. 
2018AP2104   
 
11 
 
¶20 In essence, Stephenson asks this court to breathe 
requirements into a Wisconsin statute that are textually absent.  
Nowhere does Wis. Stat. ch. 980 require expert testimony for 
determinations of a committee's dangerousness, nor should this 
court invade the province of the legislature to create a rule 
out of whole cloth.  Indeed, the legislature is capable of 
enacting 
such 
language 
if 
it 
chooses. 
 
In 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 980.07(1), for example, the legislature requires that expert 
examiners conduct "reexamination[s] of the person's mental 
condition . . . [every] 12 months to determine whether the 
person has made sufficient progress for the court to consider 
whether the person should be . . . discharged."  Similarly, the 
legislature expressly invites courts to hear expert testimony 
when a committee denies the facts in a petition alleging that he 
is sexually violent.  Wis. Stat. § 980.031.7  Not so for 
§ 980.09.  While this court could mandate expert witness 
testimony to support the third element, we decline to do so.  
"The requirement of expert testimony is an extraordinary one, 
and [it is applied] by the trial court only when unusually 
complex or esoteric issues are before the jury."  White v. 
Leeder, 149 Wis. 2d 949, 960, 440 N.W.2d 557 (1989).8  This court 
                                                 
7 "If a person who is the subject of a petition filed under 
§ 980.02 denies the facts alleged in the petition, the court may 
appoint at least one qualified licensed physician, licensed 
psychologist, or other mental health professional to conduct an 
examination of the person's mental condition and testify at 
trial."  Wis. Stat. § 980.031. 
8 The dissent cites the "Basic Guide to Wisconsin Small 
Claims Actions" for the proposition that Wisconsin "acknowledges 
No. 
2018AP2104   
 
12 
 
rightly refuses to read words into a statute that are simply not 
there, and this case is no exception. See Bruno v. Milwaukee 
Cnty., 2003 WI 28, ¶16, 260 Wis. 2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 656. 
¶21 As 
a 
general 
matter, 
expert 
testimony 
may 
be 
admissible at trials if, inter alia, "scientific, technical, or 
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue."  Wis. 
Stat. § 907.02(1).9  But within the context of Chapter 980, 
                                                                                                                                                             
the need for" expert testimony from a "full-time mechanic or a 
repair person" in a "motor vehicle faulty repair case."  
Dissent, ¶¶58-59.  Neither the guide nor Wisconsin law says 
that.  Setting aside the fact that "[t]his document is only a 
general guide" and not the law, the language cited by the 
dissent simply says that if a party is planning to present the 
testimony of an expert witness, it is "almost always necessary" 
to have the expert testify in person:  
  
Having the expert witness testify in person is almost 
always necessary. Merely repeating what your expert 
told you will probably not be allowed. A written 
statement or affidavit from the expert witness will 
not be sufficient. 
   
While "My Cousin Vinny" certainly established how compelling 
expert testimony can be regarding the characteristics of a car, 
the dissent's claim that "this court acknowledges the need for 
an expert to testify even in a small claims motor vehicle faulty 
repair case" is plainly wrong. 
 
9 Contrary to the dissent's construction of Wis. Stat. 
§ 907.02(1), nothing in the text of this statute requires the 
admission of expert testimony; to the contrary, its language is 
permissive rather than mandatory, affording the trial court the 
discretion to admit expert testimony if it will "assist the 
trier of fact":  
 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact 
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as 
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify 
No. 
2018AP2104   
 
13 
 
determinations of future dangerousness rest soundly within the 
purview of lay factfinders.  Courts recognize factfinders to be 
quite adept at understanding how an individual's criminal 
history, admissions of wrongdoing (or lack thereof), performance 
on supervision, or progress in treatment inform his likelihood 
of committing future acts of violence.  See, e.g., State v. 
Randall, 2011 WI App 102, ¶¶9-10, 19, 336 Wis. 2d 399, 802 
N.W.2d 94 (holding that, in a case involving a petitioner's 
commitment on grounds of insanity, the factfinder properly 
concluded that the petitioner's past crimes and poor behavior 
during commitment showed that he "still pose[d] a danger to 
society"); 
Estelle 
v. 
Smith, 
451 
U.S. 
454, 
472 
(1981) 
(discussing the important role of a factfinder in assessing an 
individual's future danger to society). 
¶22 In this case, Kolbeck testified that, based on 
calculations using Static-99R and VRS-SO, Stephenson had a 41 
percent risk of re-offending, which he defined as the risk of 
being arrested and charged with a crime of sexual violence.  
While this is below the threshold of "more likely than not," a 
factfinder could reasonably determine that other evidence, 
separate from these actuarial instruments, weighs in favor of 
continued commitment based on the likelihood of Stephenson 
                                                                                                                                                             
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if the 
testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, the 
testimony is the product of reliable principles and 
methods, and the witness has applied the principles 
and methods reliably to the facts of the case. 
 
No. 
2018AP2104   
 
14 
 
committing future acts of sexual violence, regardless of whether 
he ultimately faced arrest or charges as a result.  For example, 
Kolbeck testified that Stephenson scored disproportionately high 
on measures of psychopathy, repeatedly violated the treatment 
facility's policies, and generated a concerning result on his 
non-suppressed penile plethysmograph test.  Weighing these 
additional factors falls squarely within the comprehension and 
competency of lay factfinders.  After all, in a variety of other 
sorts of cases, a factfinder's principal duty involves reviewing 
the entire panorama of evidence, weighing its significance, and 
drawing conclusions therefrom.10  See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 
443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979) (discussing how factfinders must 
weigh the evidence and draw reasonable inferences in criminal 
trials); Lang v. Lowe, 2012 WI App 94, ¶¶16-18, 344 Wis. 2d 49, 
820 N.W.2d 494 (discussing how factfinders appropriately weigh 
evidence in civil actions). 
¶23 No Wisconsin appellate court has ever required trial 
courts to hear expert testimony on the third element.  More than 
two decades ago, this court expressly declined to create such a 
rule and held that the circuit court properly considered the 
State's other evidence——namely, that the committee had a 25-year 
                                                 
10 Of course, this is not to say that a factfinder would not 
benefit from hearing expert testimony on the third element.  As 
the State admits, it may often prove difficult for the State to 
demonstrate without an expert a committee's likelihood of 
engaging in future acts of sexual violence sufficient to render 
him dangerous to others.  But to mandate expert testimony is an 
entirely different matter. 
No. 
2018AP2104   
 
15 
 
criminal history, was deliberately violating his rules of 
supervision, and was in denial of his need for treatment.  In re 
Commitment of Kienitz, 227 Wis. 2d 423, ¶31, 597 N.W.2d 712 
(1999) (stating that, "[b]ecause there was expert testimony on 
the issue of future acts of sexual violence in this case," it 
need not opine on whether "expert testimony is required as a 
matter of law.").  Likewise, the United States Supreme Court has 
never required experts to testify on "future dangerousness" 
either.  In Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 472 (1981), the 
Court held that, on the issue of capital sentencing procedures 
(which require a determination of "dangerousness"), "the jury's 
resolution of the future dangerousness issue is in no sense 
confined to the province of psychiatric experts."  In another 
case, the Court stated that experts should not have the only say 
in whether or not an individual is dangerous, given that lay 
juries and courts can "sensibly" arrive at such conclusions.  
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 896 (1983) (superseded by 
statute on other grounds). 
¶24 Stephenson relies heavily upon Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
v. LIRC, 2000 WI App 272, 240 Wis. 2d 209, 621 N.W.2d 633, as 
well as Brown County Human Services v. B.P., 2019 WI App 18, 386 
Wis. 2d 557, 927 N.W.2d 560, for his assertion that the State is 
required 
"to 
present 
expert 
opinion 
testimony 
that 
the 
respondent is dangerous."  Both cases are inapposite.  In Wal-
Mart Stores, an employee brought an employment discrimination 
suit alleging that his employer fired him because of his 
obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD).  240 Wis. 2d 209, ¶¶2-3.  
No. 
2018AP2104   
 
16 
 
The court of appeals held that the employee needed to present 
expert testimony in order to prove that his OCD caused the 
behavior that led to his firing.  Id., ¶16.  While the 
employee's therapist testified regarding the employee's OCD 
diagnosis, she provided no evidence that the OCD caused the 
behaviors triggering his firing.  Id., ¶23.  In the absence of 
such expert testimony, the court of appeals concluded the Labor 
and Industry Review Commission erred in determining that Wal-
Mart discriminated against the employee on the basis of his 
disability.  Id., ¶1.  Similarly, the court of appeals in B.P. 
decided that a parent facing termination of parental rights 
needed to present expert testimony to support his assertion that 
his 
psychological 
condition 
caused 
him 
not 
to 
visit 
or 
communicate with his child.  386 Wis. 2d 557, ¶48.  Without such 
expert testimony, the court concluded that the trier of fact 
would have to speculate.  Id., ¶49.  Unlike either of those 
cases, in this Chapter 980 proceeding, an expert witness did 
supply the causal link between Stephenson's mental disorder and 
his prior sexually violent behaviors.  Kolbeck testified that 
Stephenson's 
personality 
disorder 
"has 
a 
direct 
causal 
connection 
to 
[his] 
sexually 
violent 
behaviors 
in 
the 
community." 
¶25 Notwithstanding this linkage established by expert 
testimony, Stephenson nevertheless argues that the holdings of 
Wal-Mart Stores and B.P. should prohibit a factfinder from 
determining that a committee is dangerous to others without an 
expert witness opining that the committee's mental disorder 
No. 
2018AP2104   
 
17 
 
makes it more likely than not that he will engage in one or more 
future acts of sexual violence.  We disagree.  The rule applied 
in Wal-Mart Stores and B.P. does not fit the factfinder's 
determination under Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7).  Unlike the third 
element 
of 
that 
statute, 
the 
inquiries 
requiring 
expert 
testimony 
in 
Wal-Mart 
Stores 
and 
B.P. 
were 
entirely 
retrospective, involving whether mental health conditions caused 
behaviors that had already occurred.  The issue in Wal-Mart 
Stores was whether the employee's past conduct was caused by his 
mental disorder; similarly, the issue in B.P. was whether the 
parent's past conduct was caused by his psychological condition—
—both decidedly different inquiries than in Chapter 980 cases, 
in which any proffered expert testimony would inform the 
committee's propensity to commit future acts of sexual violence.  
In other words, the court of appeals deemed expert testimony 
necessary to establish a causal link between the employee's 
disorder and the conduct for which he was fired in Wal-Mart 
Stores, as well as to establish a causal link between the 
father's psychological condition and the conduct for which the 
State sought to terminate his parental rights in B.P.  Both of 
these considerations fall beyond the competence of the lay 
factfinder, who, without expert testimony, cannot determine 
whether a mental health condition or a disorder did in fact 
cause particular behaviors.  In contrast, the third element 
under Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7) asks the factfinder to make a risk 
assessment regarding the likelihood the committee will engage in 
No. 
2018AP2104   
 
18 
 
future acts of sexual violence, a predictive determination long 
regarded as well within the province of the lay factfinder. 
¶26 Significantly, Chapter 980 cases involve a multitude 
of supplemental evidence pertinent to the third element that is 
simply irrelevant in employment discrimination and termination 
of parental rights cases.  In discharge proceedings, the State 
typically presents evidence of the committee's progress in 
treatment, his performance on psychometric evaluations, and the 
nature of his mental disorder.  The factfinder in Chapter 980 
cases has a comprehensive range of evidence at its disposal when 
assessing whether an individual's mental disorder makes it more 
likely than not that he will re-offend in a sexually violent 
manner——a 
characteristic 
often 
lacking 
in 
ordinary 
civil 
disputes involving psychological evaluations.  In this respect, 
among others, Chapter 980 cases are an entirely different 
species of law compared to ordinary civil disputes.  After all, 
"[t]he primary goals and purposes of ch. 980 are to treat 
sexually violent persons and to protect society from the danger 
posed by those persons," and the array of evidence available to 
factfinders reflects these consequential aims.  In re Commitment 
of West, 2011 WI 83, ¶27, 336 Wis. 2d 578, 800 N.W.2d 929. 
¶27 Nonetheless, Stephenson maintains that the language of 
Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7) suggests that expert testimony is 
required to prove that an individual is dangerous to others 
because his mental disorder makes it more likely than not that 
he will commit future acts of sexual violence.  Stephenson's 
argument rests upon his interpretation of language in State v. 
No. 
2018AP2104   
 
19 
 
Sorenson, 2002 WI 78, ¶20, 254 Wis. 2d 54, 646 N.W.2d 354, 
indicating that § 980.05(4) "contemplates that the state must 
put forth expert evidence showing the respondent's mental 
disorder."  According to Stephenson's argument, because the 
statute directly links the mental disorder to the individual's 
likelihood to re-offend in a sexually violent manner, if expert 
testimony is required to prove the existence of a mental 
disorder, expert testimony must also be required for the third 
element.  We are unpersuaded.   
¶28 As 
a 
preliminary 
matter, 
whether 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 
980.05(4) requires expert testimony to establish a committee's 
mental disorder was not an issue before the court in Sorenson.  
It is not necessary for us to resolve that issue in this case 
either.  As Stephenson concedes, Kolbeck's diagnoses supply 
sufficient evidence to establish that Stephenson has a mental 
disorder that predisposes him to acts of sexual violence.  The 
State's expert linked Stephenson's mental disorder with his 
potential for recidivism (thereby satisfying the second element) 
and it was the factfinder's role to then determine whether 
No. 
2018AP2104   
 
20 
 
Stephenson's mental disorder made him more likely than not to 
commit a future act of sexual violence (the third element).11   
¶29 As Chapter 980 makes clear, a "mental disorder" is a 
"congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or 
volitional capacity that predisposes a person to engage in acts 
of sexual violence."  Wis. Stat. § 980.01(2) (emphasis added).  
Accordingly, when an expert testifies to a committee's mental 
disorder, he establishes that the committee has a predisposition 
for acts of sexual violence.  The next statutory step involves 
assessing the likelihood the committee will commit such acts in 
the 
future. 
 
Logically, 
when 
ascertaining 
a 
committee's 
potential for committing acts of sexual violence in the future, 
the factfinder necessarily ties its determination to the 
predisposition produced by the mental disorder.  In other words, 
when providing testimony sufficient to establish the second 
element, the expert lays the foundation for any forthcoming 
evidence 
pertinent 
to 
the 
third 
element. 
 
Because 
the 
determination of whether the committee is more likely than not 
to engage in future acts of sexual violence remains squarely 
                                                 
11 The dissent misconstrues the court's statutory analysis 
by suggesting that the "majority's interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.01(7) 
erroneously 
collapses 
the 
required 
statutory 
elements from three to two."  Dissent, ¶61.  Of course, simply 
because expert testimony is not required for the third element 
does not mean that the element falls away.  The dissent 
misunderstands the simple issue in this case, which is whether 
expert testimony is necessary to determine whether it is more 
likely than not that the committee will engage in future acts of 
sexual violence.  The court's conclusion that the answer to this 
inquiry falls within the purview of the factfinder does not mean 
this statutory element disappears. 
No. 
2018AP2104   
 
21 
 
within the purview of the factfinder, expert testimony on the 
third element may inform the factfinder's decision but it is not 
necessary to conclude that a person is sexually violent. 
B. Sufficiency-of-the-Evidence in Chapter 980 Appeals 
¶30 Stephenson next asks us to overrule Curiel and depart 
from the sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard of review courts 
have been using for over 20 years.  Under Curiel, appellate 
courts review Chapter 980 cases by asking whether "the evidence, 
when viewed most favorably to the state and [the commitment], is 
so insufficient in probative value and force that it can be said 
as a matter of law that no trier of fact, acting reasonably, 
could have found [the person sexually violent] beyond a 
reasonable doubt" at an initial commitment trial and by "clear 
and convincing evidence" at a discharge trial.  See In re 
Commitment of Curiel, 227 Wis. 2d 389, ¶52, 597 N.W.2d 697 
(citation omitted); Wis. Stat. §§ 980.05(3) (at an initial 
commitment trial, the State must prove "beyond a reasonable 
doubt" that the individual is a sexually violent person) and 
980.09(3) (at a discharge trial, the State must prove "by clear 
and convincing evidence" that the individual still meets the 
criteria for commitment as a sexually violent person).  This 
sufficiency-of-the-evidence test is the same standard that we 
apply 
in 
reviewing 
criminal 
convictions. 
 
Curiel, 
227 
Wis. 2d 389, ¶53.  Stephenson asks us to jettison this standard 
and instead apply independent review to whether the evidence 
satisfied the legal standard for dangerousness.  We see no 
reason to do so. 
No. 
2018AP2104   
 
22 
 
¶31 In Curiel, the court concluded that, because Chapter 
980 proceedings "share[] many of the same procedural and 
constitutional 
features 
present 
in 
criminal 
prosecutions," 
courts must apply the criminal standard of review to Chapter 980 
cases.  Id., ¶54.  Although it is true that Curiel partly relied 
upon a now-repealed statute to support its holding,12 many of the 
same rights recognized for criminal defendants continue to apply 
to committees in Chapter 980 proceedings.  As provided by Wis. 
Stat. §§ 980.03(2) and (3), sexually violent offenders have the 
right to remain silent, to be provided with counsel, to request 
jury trials at initial commitment, to have the State prove 
initial commitment "beyond a reasonable doubt," and to present 
and cross-examine witnesses.  Like criminal trials, Chapter 980 
proceedings also demand that the State turn over "[a]ny 
exculpatory evidence" which may inform a committee's right to 
discharge.  Wis. Stat. § 980.036(2)(j).  Indeed, although 
criminal trials and Chapter 980 proceedings possess important 
differences 
(e.g., 
the 
latter 
is 
not 
for 
purposes 
of 
punishment), their relevant procedures are decidedly analogous——
a fact properly recognized by 
Curiel.  If Chapter 980 
proceedings and criminal actions "parallel" each other in 
substantive respects, as Curiel noted, then it only makes sense 
that 
these 
cases 
have 
mirroring 
standards 
for 
reviewing 
                                                 
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.05(1m) has since been legislatively 
repealed.  See 2005 Wis. Act 434 §§ 101, 131(1).  This statute 
provided that "[a]ll constitutional rights available to a 
defendant in a criminal proceeding are available to the 
[individual subject to commitment proceedings]." 
No. 
2018AP2104   
 
23 
 
challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence.  Curiel, 227 
Wis. 2d 389, ¶55. 
¶32 In asking this court to uproot established case law, 
Stephenson omits any discussion of Wisconsin's commitment to the 
doctrine of stare decisis.  This court respects the doctrine of 
stare decisis and will not overturn precedent absent a "special 
justification."  State v. Roberson, 2019 WI 102, ¶49, 389 
Wis. 2d 190, 935 N.W.2d 813 (citation omitted).  "This court 
follows the doctrine of stare decicis scrupulously because of 
[its] abiding respect for the rule of law," and "[this] court's 
decision to depart from precedent is not to be made casually."  
Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 2003 WI 108, 
¶94, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257; see also Progressive N. 
Ins. v. Romanshek, 2005 WI 67, ¶41, 281 Wis. 2d 300, 697 
N.W.2d 417.  Typically, we explore five factors before deciding 
whether to overturn precedent and we are "more likely" to do so 
only "when one or more of the following circumstances is 
present:  (1) [c]hanges or developments in the law that have 
undermined the rationale behind the decision; (2) there is a 
need to make a decision correspond to newly ascertained facts; 
(3) there is a showing that the precedent has become detrimental 
to coherence and consistency in the law; (4) the prior decision 
is 'unsound in principle'; or (5) the prior decision is 
'unworkable in practice.'"  Bartholomew v. Wisconsin Patients 
Comp. Fund & Compcare Health Servs. Ins. Corp., 2006 WI 91, ¶33, 
293 Wis. 2d 38, 717 N.W.2d 21. 
No. 
2018AP2104   
 
24 
 
¶33 At no point does Stephenson grapple with these 
factors.  In particular, he never asserts why the current 
standard is "unworkable" or "unsound," nor does he identify any 
newly-ascertained 
facts 
about 
Chapter 
980 
proceedings 
or 
inconsistencies in the law that would justify overturning 
Curiel.  At best, Stephenson's argument impliedly invokes the 
first factor, based upon the state legislature's repeal of Wis. 
Stat. § 980.05(1m) years after the Curiel decision.  As 
previously explained, this statutory change did nothing to 
undermine the rationale underlying the Curiel decision.  Chapter 
980 proceedings have much in common with criminal actions, 
warranting analogous standards of review.  While this court is 
not "barred from pursuing a sound and prudent course for the 
sake of upholding its prior precedent," Stephenson's failure to 
even mention the doctrine of stare decisis while urging us to 
upend well-established precedent fatally foils his argument.  
Johnson Controls, 264 Wis. 2d 60, ¶96.  
C.  The Evidence is Sufficient. 
¶34 Stephenson further argues that, even without mandating 
expert testimony for the third element or overturning Curiel, 
the circuit court nonetheless lacked sufficient evidence to deny 
his motion for postcommitment relief or to find that he remained 
a sexually violent person.13  Again, we are not persuaded. 
                                                 
13 Stephenson concedes that he has been previously convicted 
of a sexually violent offense and that he suffers from a mental 
disorder that predisposes him to acts of sexual violence. 
No. 
2018AP2104   
 
25 
 
¶35 Applying the Curiel standard, we will not reverse an 
order denying a discharge motion based on insufficient evidence 
"unless the evidence, viewed most favorably to the state and 
[the commitment], is so insufficient in probative value and 
force that it can be said as a matter of law that no trier of 
fact, acting reasonably, could have found" the person sexually 
violent by "clear and convincing evidence" at a discharge trial.  
See Curiel, 227 Wis. 2d 389, ¶52 (citation omitted).   The court 
of appeals correctly concluded that the evidence was more than 
sufficient to uphold the circuit court's denial of Stephenson's 
petition for discharge. 
¶36 The facts of this case disproportionately weigh 
against Stephenson.  First, Stephenson's criminal history proves 
his penchant for re-offending in a sexually violent manner.  
From 2000 to 2007, Stephenson was convicted six times for 
violent sexual behavior against children.  Some of these crimes 
occurred 
while 
he 
was 
on 
probation 
for 
past 
offenses.  
Furthermore, Stephenson's comments and conduct during his time 
in the treatment facility indicate he is still unable to control 
his behavior.  Stephenson repeatedly violated the rules of the 
treatment facility and, at least on one occasion, attempted to 
obtain sexually-suggestive clothing that he knew was banned.  
When confronted with these indiscretions, Stephenson proceeded 
to concoct lies and exhibit anti-social behavior. 
¶37 Moreover, the results of Stephenson's non-suppressed 
penile plethysmograph test also support the circuit court's 
finding.  As Kolbeck testified, Stephenson became aroused by 
No. 
2018AP2104   
 
26 
 
stimuli "depicting teenager coercive interactions" as well as by 
graphic depictions of "victims crying or in some form of 
suffering."  In addition, Stephenson scored highly on measures 
of psychopathy, reflecting his propensity for exhibiting shallow 
affect, grandiosity, and manipulation.  These psychometric 
scores 
correspond 
to 
Kolbeck's 
personal 
evaluations 
of 
Stephenson, which show that he continually exhibited traits of 
impulsivity, irritability, deceitfulness, and lack of remorse.  
A reasonable factfinder could conclude, as did the circuit 
court, that Stephenson would, more likely than not, act upon his 
sexual urges if released into the community. 
¶38 Perhaps most importantly, the circuit court afforded 
appropriate weight to the results generated by Kolbeck's 
actuarial 
instruments, 
in 
light 
of 
all 
of 
the 
evidence 
presented.  While Kolbeck's conclusion that Stephenson posed a 
41 percent risk of being arrested and convicted of a crime of 
sexual 
violence 
falls 
below 
the 
"more 
likely 
than 
not" 
threshold, 
the 
statutory 
inquiry 
examines 
the 
likelihood 
Stephenson 
would 
commit 
future 
acts 
of 
sexual 
violence, 
irrespective of whether he might be apprehended for, or 
convicted of, such crimes.  Taking into account the evidence as 
a whole, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Stephenson 
met 
the 
"more 
likely 
than 
not" 
threshold 
for 
future 
dangerousness.  Given that Stephenson continually exhibited 
traits of manipulation and deceit, a factfinder could reasonably 
conclude that Stephenson's actual risk of committing future acts 
No. 
2018AP2104   
 
27 
 
of sexual violence, while nonetheless evading the law, was "more 
likely than not." 
¶39 Lastly, 
Kolbeck's 
testimony 
was 
sufficient 
to 
establish the nexus between Stephenson's mental disorders and 
his 
potential 
for 
recidivism. 
 
In 
particular, 
although 
Stephenson's Alcohol Abuse Disorder was then in remission given 
his confinement, Stephenson expressed a willingness to engage in 
"social drinking" if released into the community——a troubling 
statement for an individual who has "never committed a [sexual 
assault] sober."  Moreover, Kolbeck stated that Stephenson's 
personality disorder "has a direct causal connection to [his] 
sexually 
violent 
behaviors 
in 
the 
community"——an 
equally 
disconcerting observation considering that Stephenson's anti-
social traits were "still active."  Given these facts, a 
reasonable factfinder could conclude, as the circuit court did, 
that Stephenson would likely exhibit behaviors corresponding to 
these disorders and thereby pose a danger to the community. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶40 We conclude the court of appeals did not err in 
upholding 
the 
circuit 
court's 
order 
denying 
Stephenson's 
petition for discharge from his Chapter 980 commitment.  We 
reject all three of Stephenson's arguments.  First, we hold the 
State is not required to present expert testimony to prove that 
a person is dangerous because his mental disorder makes it more 
likely than not that he will re-offend in a sexually violent 
manner.  The statutes do not require expert testimony on that 
element and we decline to create a rule not set forth in the 
No. 
2018AP2104   
 
28 
 
text.  Second, we reaffirm the sufficiency-of-the evidence test 
articulated in Curiel as the appropriate standard of review for 
challenges to a Chapter 980 commitment.  Finally, our review of 
the record reveals overwhelming evidence from which a reasonable 
factfinder could have found that Stephenson continues to satisfy 
the definition of a "sexually violent person."  Accordingly, we 
affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No.  2018AP2104.awb 
 
1 
 
¶41 ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, 
J.   (dissenting). 
 
In 
its 
application, Chapter 980 of the Wisconsin Statutes rides on the 
cusp 
between 
constitutionality 
and 
unconstitutionality.  
Although civil in nature, it gives the government power to lock 
up individuals indefinitely——including for life——even though 
they have already completed their criminal sentence.  All 
recognize that a significant liberty interest is at stake here. 
 
¶42 In order to ensure that Chapter 980 falls on the 
constitutional 
side 
of 
the 
divide, 
enhanced 
procedural 
safeguards are afforded to respondents.  Rather than applying 
the rules that normally attend a civil law proceeding, some 
criminal law procedural safeguards are instead applied to 
provide added protections in order to survive constitutional 
challenges.   
¶43 The majority opinion undermines this delicate balance 
in two ways.  First, it erroneously determines that expert 
testimony is not required to establish the causal link that Wis. 
Stat. § 980.01(7) requires:  that the individual is more likely 
than not to engage in future acts of sexual violence because of 
the diagnosed mental disorder.  In reaching its erroneous 
determination, the majority either ignores or misconstrues 
precedent related to the necessity of expert testimony and 
effectively collapses the elements for determining a sexually 
violent person from three to two.   
¶44 Additionally, the majority errs by perpetuating the 
Curiel1 standard of review framework.  Under the guise of 
                                                 
1 State v. Curiel, 227 Wis. 2d 389, 416-417, 597 N.W.2d 697 
(1999).   
No.  2018AP2104.awb 
 
2 
 
acknowledging the need for enhanced procedural 
safeguards 
available to Chapter 980 respondents, the majority actually 
leaves respondents with diminished protection.  The standard of 
review that it applies saddles the respondent with a nearly 
insurmountable burden to overcome when reviewing the sufficiency 
of the evidence. 
¶45 By examining the causal requirement set forth in Wis. 
Stat. § 980.01(7), and in light of what United States Supreme 
Court precedent demands as well as what our Wisconsin precedent 
and statutes require, I arrive at a conclusion contrary to that 
of the majority.  I determine that due process demands, and our 
precedent and statutes require, that expert testimony be 
presented in order to establish the causal link between an 
individual's mental disorder and the risk that the individual is 
more likely than not to engage in future acts of sexual 
violence. 
¶46 I 
further 
determine 
that 
when 
reviewing 
the 
sufficiency 
of 
the 
evidence 
on 
the 
issue 
of 
future 
dangerousness, appellate courts must apply a two-step standard 
of review that is applied in other cases of constitutional fact.  
When applying this framework, questions of historical fact 
should be accorded deference, while the question of whether the 
facts meet a required legal standard presents a question of law 
that is subject to independent appellate review.  I see no 
justification (and the majority offers none) for applying a more 
onerous standard of review in Chapter 980 civil commitments than 
is applied in Chapter 51 civil commitments, which adhere to the 
No.  2018AP2104.awb 
 
3 
 
two-step constitutional fact standard of review.  See Langlade 
Cnty. v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶47, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 
277.  In fact, any textual justification for reviewing Chapter 
980 cases under a different standard than Chapter 51 cases 
disappeared with the repeal of Wis. Stat. § 980.05(1m). 
¶47 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶48 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.01(7) contains three elements 
that the State must prove in order to continue Stephenson's 
Chapter 980 commitment:  (1) that he has been convicted of a 
sexually violent offense; (2) that he suffers from a mental 
disorder; and (3) that he is dangerous because his mental 
disorder makes it more likely than not that he will engage in 
future acts of sexual violence.  § 980.01(7).  At issue here is 
whether expert testimony is necessary for the State to prove the 
required causal link set forth in the third element. 
¶49 At the discharge trial, both the State's expert and 
Stephenson's expert agreed that Stephenson did not meet the 
third element for continued commitment as a sexually violent 
person.  The State introduced testimony from Dr. Don Kolbeck, a 
psychologist, to establish the second element necessary to 
commit Stephenson:  that Stephenson suffers from a mental 
disorder.  See Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7).  Dr. Kolbeck testified 
that he had diagnosed Stephenson with two qualifying mental 
disorders:  (1) Other Specified Personality Disorder, with 
antisocial and borderline features; and (2) Alcohol Abuse 
Disorder.  Majority op., ¶8. 
No.  2018AP2104.awb 
 
4 
 
¶50 In reaching his opinion that Stephenson did not meet 
the criteria for the third element necessary to sustain his 
continued 
commitment, 
Dr. 
Kolbeck 
discussed 
Stephenson's 
progress 
during 
his 
course 
of 
treatment 
along 
with 
his 
performance on two actuarial risk instruments:  the Static-99R 
and the Violence Risk Scale-Sex Offense Version (VRS-SO).2  The 
test results indicated that Stephenson had a 41 percent 
probability of sexual re-offense.  Id., ¶13.  When called upon 
to give an opinion regarding the necessary third element, Dr. 
Kolbeck concluded based on Stephenson's progress in treatment 
and test results that he did not satisfy the more likely than 
not standard for continued commitment.  Id.; see Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.01(1m) (defining "likely" as "more likely than not"). 
¶51 Stephenson introduced his own expert witness, Dr. 
Courtney Endres, who disagreed with the State's expert as to the 
second element and concluded that Stephenson "no longer [met] 
the criteria for a mental disorder as defined under Wisconsin 
Chapter 980."  Majority op., ¶14.  However, she agreed with Dr. 
Kolbeck that Stephenson was unlikely to sexually re-offend and 
thus no longer met the statutory criteria for commitment as a 
sexually violent person.  Id.  Endres used the same risk 
assessment instruments employed by Dr. Kolbeck and determined 
that Stephenson evinced a 10 percent risk of re-offense over 
                                                 
2 Dr. Kolbeck testified that the VRS-SO provides the best 
framework for assessing dynamic risk among the available tools.  
Furthermore, 
he 
explained 
that 
it 
provides 
a 
meaningful 
quantification of risk reduction as a result of treatment 
progress.   
No.  2018AP2104.awb 
 
5 
 
five years and 17 percent risk over ten years.  Id.  Despite 
both experts testifying that Stephenson did not meet the third 
element necessary for recommitment, the circuit court denied the 
discharge petition.  Id., ¶16.   
II 
¶52 With the relevant testimony in hand, I begin with an 
examination of the of language of Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7).  It 
provides:  "'Sexually violent person' means a person who has 
been convicted of a sexually violent offense . . . , and who is 
dangerous because he or she suffers from a mental disorder that 
makes it likely that the person will engage in one or more acts 
of sexual violence." 
¶53 Importantly, the language of the statute requires that 
there must be a causal nexus between the diagnosed mental 
disorder and the likelihood of sexual re-offense.  That is, in 
order to be a "sexually violent person" within the meaning of 
Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7), individuals must be more likely than not 
to engage in future acts of sexual violence because they suffer 
from a particular mental disorder.  See Wis. Stat. § 980.01(1m). 
¶54 Thus, the issue presented here is whether the answers 
to the following questions are within the common knowledge of 
the average lay person or do they require some technical 
knowledge or expertise in order to establish the third element 
necessary for Stephenson's continued commitment.  The questions 
are:   
Does the mental illness ("other specified personality 
disorder, with antisocial and borderline features") cause 
No.  2018AP2104.awb 
 
6 
 
Stephenson to be more likely than not to engage in future 
acts of sexual violence? 
 
Or, in the alternative, does the mental illness ("alcohol 
abuse disorder") cause Stephenson to be more likely than 
not to engage in future acts of sexual violence? 
¶55 Although we engage in pages of analysis and legal 
exegesis, the issue presented is really quite simply addressed. 
Yes, expert testimony is required.  Why?  Because the answers 
call for technical knowledge and expertise beyond that of the 
average lay person.  Such a conclusion is supported by the plain 
language of Wis. Stat. § 907.02(1).  This subsection states: 
If 
scientific, 
technical, 
or 
other 
specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand 
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a 
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, 
training, 
or 
education, 
may 
testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if the 
testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, the 
testimony is the product of reliable principles and 
methods, and the witness has applied the principles 
and methods reliably to the facts of the case. 
 
¶56 Wisconsin courts have long held that expert testimony 
is required "concerning matters involving special knowledge or 
skill or experience upon subjects which are not within the realm 
of the ordinary experience of mankind, and which require special 
learning, study and experience."  Cramer v. Theda Clark Mem'l 
Hosp., 45 Wis. 2d 147, 150, 172 N.W.2d 427 (1969).  This case 
presents such a matter. 
 
¶57 The testimony at issue in this case involves the 
interpretation of diagnostic tests and the application of data, 
No.  2018AP2104.awb 
 
7 
 
principles, and methods to the facts of the case.  Ultimately, 
it requires a determination of whether a specific mental illness 
will more likely than not cause an individual to engage in 
future acts of sexual violence.  This is hardly the daily fare 
of the average lay person.  Expert testimony on these subjects 
is required, as they concern areas of specialized information 
outside the realm of ordinary knowledge. 
¶58 Such a conclusion is supported by instructions on this 
court's website when it advises litigants that even in small 
claims cases where special knowledge or skill is involved, 
expert testimony is required to prove the case.  For example, we 
instruct litigants that in a small claims motor vehicle faulty 
repair case that a "full-time mechanic or a repair person" may 
be sufficient to qualify as the expert and that "[h]aving the 
expert witness testify in person is almost always necessary" 
(emphasis added). "Basic Guide to Wisconsin Small Claims 
Actions", 
https://www.wicourts.gov/formdisplay/SC-
6000V_instructions.pdf?formNumber=SC-
6000V&formType=Instructions&formatId=2&language=en, at 10 (Nov. 
2019).   
¶59 For heaven's sake, if this court acknowledges the need 
for an expert to testify even in a small claims motor vehicle 
faulty repair case, then surely an expert is needed to opine on 
the above technical question.  Such an inquiry is firmly within 
the realm of expert testimony.   
¶60 Nevertheless, the State advances that expert testimony 
is not required to prove that a person's mental disorder will 
No.  2018AP2104.awb 
 
8 
 
more likely than not cause the person to engage in future acts 
of sexual violence.  According to the State, the common 
understanding of the jury is sufficient to evaluate the required 
causal link between the mental disorder and the likelihood of 
future sexually violent acts.  The majority follows suit. 
¶61 In the majority's view, by testifying to the second 
element, the presence of a mental disorder, an expert "lays the 
foundation for any forthcoming evidence pertinent to the third 
element."  Majority op., ¶29.  In essence, the majority's 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7) erroneously collapses 
the required statutory elements from three to two and thereby 
renders the third element mere surplusage.  This is quite a 
leap.  Our case law is clear that, "[s]tatutory language is read 
where possible to give reasonable effect to every word, in order 
to avoid surplusage."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane 
Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. 
¶62 Compounding its error in failing to require expert 
testimony on the third element, the majority conflates a 
predisposition for acts of sexual violence with a likelihood 
that such acts will be committed.  In the majority's view, when 
an expert testifies to the presence of a qualifying mental 
disorder, they additionally lay the foundation for the third 
element, whether an individual has a likelihood of sexually 
violent re-offense.   Majority op., ¶28.    
¶63 But the majority fails to recognize the distinction 
between predisposition and probability.  Although a respondent 
may have a predisposition toward acts of sexual violence, the 
No.  2018AP2104.awb 
 
9 
 
third element of the Chapter 980 analysis is concerned with the 
probability that sexually violent conduct will occur in the 
future. 
¶64 By conflating the second element of predisposition 
with the third element of probability, the majority risks 
raising due process concerns.  The majority's belief that a lay 
factfinder can independently discern the required causal link is 
little more than a commentary on the ability of lay factfinders 
to determine general dangerousness.  While lay factfinders may 
be 
competent 
to 
examine 
varied 
facts 
to 
assess 
general 
dangerousness, that is not at issue in this case.   
¶65 Chapter 980 cases present an inquiry different than 
the general criminal law inquiry of future dangerousness and due 
process concerns place different demands.  In Chapter 980 cases, 
"due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment 
bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the 
individual is committed."  State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 313, 
541 N.W. 2d 115 (1995) (citation omitted).  Chapter 980 passes 
due process muster specifically because it requires a nexus 
between a respondent's mental disorder and the probability of 
future dangerousness.  State v. Laxton, 2002 WI 82, ¶22, 
254 Wis. 2d 185, 647 N.W.2d 784.  In other words, the mental 
disorder must make the individual dangerous in a specific way as 
opposed to the general dangerousness that accompanies any 
analysis of potential recidivism.  See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 
U.S. 346, 358 (1997).  Such an inquiry mandates special 
expertise. 
No.  2018AP2104.awb 
 
10 
 
¶66 Stephenson cites also to two Wisconsin cases for the 
proposition that expert testimony must be presented when making 
determinations about probability of sexually violent re-offense.  
See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. LIRC, 2000 WI App 272, 240 Wis. 2d 
209, 621 N.W.2d 633; Brown Cnty. Human Servs. v. B.P., 2019 WI 
App 18, 386 Wis. 2d 557, 927 N.W.2d 560.  In both cases, the 
courts determined that expert testimony was needed to establish 
the causal link between an individual's mental disorder and the 
conduct at issue.   
¶67 First, in Wal-Mart, an employee asserted that his 
termination was improperly based on conduct resulting from his 
mental disorder.  Wal-Mart, 240 Wis. 2d 209, ¶25.  The employee 
suffered from obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD), the symptoms 
of which include the high reactive behaviors that occasioned the 
termination.  Id., ¶2.  At issue in the case was whether expert 
testimony was required to establish the causal link between the 
employee's mental disorder and the conduct for which he was 
fired.  Id., ¶11.   
¶68 The court determined that expert testimony was indeed 
required to establish that conduct which formed the basis for 
the 
employment 
termination 
was 
caused 
by 
the 
employee's 
disability.  Id., ¶¶16-17.  Additionally, the court noted that, 
"[i]nferring the required causal link from the evidence in the 
present record, without expert testimony on the issue, is 
speculation, not the drawing of a reasonable inference to which 
we must defer."  Id., ¶25. 
No.  2018AP2104.awb 
 
11 
 
¶69 Second, B.P. involved a termination of parental rights 
due to abandonment of a child.  B.P., 386 Wis. 2d 557, ¶2.  B.P. 
raised a good cause defense to allegations that he had not 
visited or communicated with his child for a six-month period by 
claiming that his mental health diagnoses caused him to do so.  
Id., ¶43.  The court concluded that B.P. needed expert testimony 
to relate his factual assertions to his good cause defense 
because making such a causal link was outside of the ordinary 
experience of humankind.  Id., ¶¶48-49.  Thus, in both Wal-Mart 
and B.P., the court reasoned that the establishment of a causal 
nexus between their conduct and a mental illness required the 
submission of expert testimony. 
¶70 The majority attempts to distinguish these cases, 
contending that Stephenson's case is about future actions, not 
past ones.  Majority op., ¶25.  True enough, but why does this 
matter?  If expert testimony is needed to look at a fully 
developed fact record and make causal links with the benefit of 
20/20 hindsight, then surely no less can be demanded when the 
trier of fact looks forward on the same basis. 
III 
¶71 The majority errs next in its discussion of Curiel and 
the sufficiency of the evidence standard in Chapter 980 cases.  
It perpetuates the Curiel criminal standard of review under 
which appellate courts review Chapter 980 cases by asking 
whether, "the evidence, when viewed most favorably to the state 
and [the commitment], is so insufficient in probative value and 
force that it can be said as a matter of law that no trier of 
No.  2018AP2104.awb 
 
12 
 
fact . . . could have found [the person sexually violent] beyond 
a reasonable doubt . . . ."  Majority op., ¶30; see State v. 
Curiel, 227 Wis. 2d 389, 416-17, 597 N.W.2d 697 (1999). 
¶72 On review, Curiel advocated a two-step constitutional 
fact standard of review with facts being reviewed under a 
deferential standard and the application of facts to the legal 
standard being reviewed independently.  Opposing this framework, 
the State asserted that the criminal standard of review should 
be applied. 
¶73 The Curiel court applied the criminal standard of 
review without engaging in much analysis.  It decried that 
although each party offered a standard of review, neither party 
gave any rationale to support its position:  "[a]side from 
describing these competing standards of review, neither party 
provides reasons why one or the other standard of review is 
appropriate for ch. 980 proceedings."  Curiel, 227 Wis. 2d at 
416-17.  The Curiel court opted for the criminal law standard of 
review.  At the time, the Curiel court's approach may have found 
support in Wis. Stat. § 980.05(1m) (1995-96) which provided 
that, "[all] constitutional rights available to a defendant in a 
criminal proceeding are available to the [individual subject to 
commitment proceedings]."  Majority op., ¶31 n.12.  However, 
Wis. Stat. § 980.05(1m) was repealed in 2005.  See 2005 Wis. Act 
434, § 101.  Thus, any textual support for applying a more 
onerous standard of review in Chapter 980 cases than that 
applied in Chapter 51 cases disappeared with the repeal of the 
statute.  
No.  2018AP2104.awb 
 
13 
 
¶74 The majority relies solely on Curiel to support its 
conclusion.  It opines that because Chapter 980 affords enhanced 
procedural safeguards similar to those found in criminal 
prosecutions, such as the right to counsel and the right to 
remain silent, it follows that respondents in Chapter 980 cases 
should be subject to the criminal standard of review.  See 
Majority op., ¶31.  Therein lies the Achilles heel of the 
majority's analysis. 
¶75 Rather than providing more protection to the Chapter 
980 
respondent 
in 
order 
to 
successfully 
straddle 
the 
constitutional divide, the majority actually provides less.  The 
criminal 
standard 
of 
review 
is 
more 
onerous 
than 
a 
constitutional fact standard of review.  It saddles the 
respondent 
in 
a 
Chapter 
980 
commitment 
with 
a 
nearly 
insurmountable burden to overcome when reviewing the sufficiency 
of the evidence. 
¶76 Adopting the two-part standard of review in Chapter 
980 cases is consistent with the way this court reviews civil 
commitment proceedings under Wis. Stat. § 51.20.  Both focus on 
a determination of dangerousness.  In Langlade County v. D.J.W., 
this court concluded that "[a] determination of dangerousness is 
not a factual determination, but a legal one based on underlying 
facts."  391 Wis. 2d 231, ¶47.  We concluded that the court of 
appeals erred for doing the very thing that the majority does 
today:  "applying the standard of review for findings of fact to 
a legal determination . . . ."  Id. 
No.  2018AP2104.awb 
 
14 
 
¶77 There is no reason to apply different standards of 
review to assessments of the sufficiency of evidence of 
dangerousness in Chapter 51 civil commitment and Chapter 980 
civil 
proceedings. 
 
In 
both, 
the 
commitment 
implicates 
fundamental due process rights because both potentially result 
in a significant deprivation of liberty.  Likely the majority 
proffers no reason justifying such disparate treatment because 
no reasonable explanation can be found. 
¶78 I conclude that evidence supporting a finding of 
dangerousness under Chapter 980 should be reviewed using the 
constitutional fact standard.  As explained above, due process 
concerns circumscribe commitments under Chapter 980 to persons 
who have a mental disorder that more likely than not will cause 
them to commit future acts of sexual violence. 
¶79 The Chapter 980 context is best served by adopting 
this two-part standard with facts being reviewed under the 
clearly erroneous standard and the application of those facts to 
the legal standard being reviewed independently.  As we 
explained in State v. Phillips, such an approach serves the 
interests of greater uniformity of application and clarity in 
the legal standard while taking into account the significant 
liberty interests at stake in these proceedings: 
[T]he 
principal 
reason 
for 
independent 
appellate 
review of matters of constitutional fact is to provide 
uniformity in constitutional decision-making.  It is 
the duty of the reviewing court to independently apply 
constitutional principles to the facts as found by the 
circuit court because the scope of constitutional 
protections, representing the basic value commitments 
of our society, cannot vary from trial court to trial 
court, or from jury to jury.  In applying the skeletal 
No.  2018AP2104.awb 
 
15 
 
constitutional rule, appellate courts flesh out the 
rule and provide guidance to litigants, lawyers, and 
trial and appellate courts. 
State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 194, 577 N.W.2d 794 (1998) 
(internal citations and quotations omitted). 
¶80 In sum, for the reasons set forth above, I determine 
that expert testimony is required to establish the causal link 
between an individual's mental disorder and the risk that the 
individual is more likely than not to engage in future acts of 
sexual violence.  Because no expert testimony was presented at 
Stephenson's discharge trial to support this requirement, I 
conclude that the State failed to meet its burden of proof.  
Additionally, I determine that the two-step constitutional fact 
standard of review should be applied to sufficiency of evidence 
challenges in Chapter 980 proceedings. 
¶81 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.  
¶82 I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA FRANK 
DALLET joins this dissent. 
 
 
No.  2018AP2104.awb 
 
16