Title: DEREK EUGENE LEMON V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2006-SC-000636-MR
State: Kentucky
Issuer: Kentucky Supreme Court
Date: December 20, 2007

IMPORTANT NOTICE NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE ; HOWEVER, UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS, RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT . OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE ACTION. 'Q ~vuyrrmr (~ourf of `p't 2006-SC-000636-MR DEREK EUGENE LEMON APPELLANT ON APPEAL FROM CARTER CIRCUIT COURT V . HONORABLE ROBERT McGINNIS, JUDGE NO . 04-CR-00040 COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT AFFIRMING I. Introduction Derek Eugene Lemon was convicted of Manslaughter in the Second Degree,' Robbery in the First Degree, and Burglary in the First Degree. Under the terms of his agreement with the Commonwealth, Lemon received ten (10) years for manslaughter, and twenty (20) years each for robbery and for burglary . Lemon was sentenced to thirty (30) years in prison . Appealing to this Court as a matter of right, Lemon argues the circuit court committed reversible error by granting motions to quash his subpoenas for two co-defendants, and by denying his motion to strike a juror for cause . Finding no error, we affirm . 11. Factual Background ' Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 507.040 . KRS 515.020 . 3 KRS 511 .020 . 4 Kentucky Constitution §110(2)(b). RENDERED : DECEMBER 20, 2007 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED On July 11, 2003, Lemon and four others drove to the home of forty (40) year-old Brian Keith Waugh in Carter County . Their purpose was to take money from Waugh because of a previous marijuana deal which had gone bad . The driver of the vehicle, Tommy Fritz, remained in the car while the others, including Lemon, went inside the house . Finding Waugh asleep on the couch, Lemon held him down as he and Daniel Fortner began to beat him extensively. The kitchen was ransacked and marijuana stolen . The others then assisted Lemon in beating Waugh . After participating in the beating, Lemon stole money from Waugh's pants which were lying on the floor beside the couch . Waugh died as a result of injuries sustained in the beating . Two of the four assailants were Daniel and Josh Fortner. They had been present when the original plans were made to carry out the crime against Waugh . In fact, it had been Josh Fortner who had complained of being ripped off by Waugh in a drug deal and suggested the group go get his money back . The evidence revealed that both the Fortner brothers participated in beating Waugh, and Josh participated in ransacking the kitchen . The Fortner brothers also split the money and marijuana taken from Waugh at Tommy Fritz's house afterwards . The overwhelming evidence against Lemon, which went uncontroverted at trial, included the testimony of three co-defendants, namely, Randall Miller, Tommy Fritz and David Fritz .5 The other two individuals involved in the assault, Daniel and Josh Fortner, were tried by jury and convicted prior to Lemon's trial . Even though the Fortner brothers' convictions were on appeal, Lemon subpoenaed them both to testify at his trial . The trial court sustained motions to quash the subpoenas made by the Fortner brothers' lawyers . Thereafter, Lemon elected to present no evidence in his defense . 5 David Fritz did not accompany the group to Mr . Waugh's trailer . He testified for the Commonwealth and pled guilty to facilitation to commit burglary . 2 The jury found Lemon guilty and, in accordance with his agreement with the Commonwealth, he was sentenced to thirty (30) years in prison . Final judgment was entered on August 14, 2006 . Lemon timely appealed . 111. Analysis A. Granting the Motions to Quash Lemon's Subpoenas Lemon's first argument is that the circuit court erred in granting the motions to quash his subpoenas for the Fortner brothers . Lemon does not dispute the fact that the Fortner brothers played major roles in the death of Waugh . In addition to helping plan the crime, they accompanied Lemon and Miller to Waugh's trailer and participated in the beating and robbery . Both were convicted for their roles in the incident . At the time of Lemon's trial, both Josh and Daniel had appeals pending before this Court .6 Despite these circumstances, Lemon subpoenaed the Fortner brothers to testify at his trial . Josh Fortner filed a motion to quash the subpoena . Through his attorney, Josh indicated his intention to assert his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination . During a hearing on the motion to quash, Lemon's attorney asked that the court conduct an in camera review of the questions he intended to ask. It was Lemon's contention that the questions would not call for self-incriminating answers . Further, Lemon's attorney argued that the court should transport Josh for avowal testimony and force him to assert his claim of privilege before the court . The court overruled Lemon's motion to transport and for avowal testimony . Further, the court granted Josh's motion to quash the subpoena . When Daniel Fortner's attorney filed a motion to quash, the court granted the motion on the same grounds . 6 Josh Fortner appealed in 2006-SC-000020-MR, and Daniel Fortner appealed in 2006- SC-000002-MR. Lemon now argues the court erred in failing to allow a dry run as set out in Combs v . Commonwealth, 74 S .W.3d 738 (Ky . 2002) . As a result, Lemon points out that there is no record of the questions he intended to ask. Further, he argues the court simply assumed the Fortners would invoke their Fifth Amendment rights . Citing to Clayton v . Commonwealth , 786 S .W.2d 866 (Ky . 1990), and Combs , supra, Lemon argues the Fortner brothers had to be present and personally invoke their Fifth Amendment rights . Finally, Lemon argues that the error cannot be harmless as it . precluded him from presenting a defense . It has long been recognized in Kentucky that "neither the prosecution nor the defense may call a witness knowing that the witness will assert his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination ." Combs , 74 S.W.3d at 742, citing Clayton v. Commonwealth , 786 S.W.2d at 868. The general rule applies where a witness invokes privilege to avoid answering any substantive questions . Id . However, Kentucky courts have recognized it is not an all or nothing approach . Id. citing Commonwealth v . Gettys , 610 S .W.2d 899 (Ky.App . 1980) . In Combs , this Court cautioned that "[a] defendant's Sixth Amendment right to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor does not transcend the adversarial system and defense witnesses must be subject to the prosecution's cross examination ." 74 S .W.3d at 743 . (Internal citation and quotes omitted.) This Court reasoned that "[w]here a defense witness refuses to answer questions that go to the heart of the direct testimony on a central issue, however, the truth-seeking function of the court is impaired ." Id . However, this Court went on to recognize that "[w]hen cross- examination is precluded only with respect to collateral issues, the Sixth Amendment does not require the court to strike the witness's testimony." Id . at 744. Thus, when a preliminary inquiry reveals a witness would claim privilege in response to some questions, yet otherwise provides relevant testimony, the general rule gives way . In_ these circumstances, it is incumbent upon the trial court to allow the witness to testify, but limit the scope of cross-examination to avoid unrelated topics upon which the witness would invoke privilege . Id . at 742 . In the Combs case, the defense called the witness as an alibi witness . The witness in that case testified she was with the defendant at another location at the time of the alleged offense . 74 S .W.3d at 739-40 . However, the witness invoked her right against self-incrimination as to questions concerning her role in alleged shoplifting that occurred at that location . Id . This differs from our case, where Lemon made it clear that other than Miller, only the Fortner brothers could testify as to what occurred in Waugh's trailer . Thus, despite Lemon's claims to the contrary, it was not an error for the court to accept the Fortner bothers' argument that to be relevant, the questions would relate not to collateral events, but to the events for which they were convicted . While the dry run approach set out in Combs , supra , is generally appropriate as a means of determining the scope of the questions and the impact of the claims of privilege, it was not necessary in this case . The Fortner brothers were convicted of offenses that arose during the same events upon which Lemon would seek to question them, not some unrelated collateral offenses . To have allowed Lemon to obtain answers concerning the events surrounding the death of Waugh, and then allow the Fortner brothers to invoke their right against self-incrimination so as to preclude the Commonwealth from questioning them concerning the events discussed on direct examination, would have impaired the truth-seeking function of the court . Nor do we find it necessary for the Fortner brothers to be present in court to invoke privilege . The Fortner brothers, through their attorneys, made it clear they would invoke their right against self-incrimination in regards to questions relating to the events surrounding their offenses . Thus, we reject Lemon's claim that the court merely speculated that the Fortner's would invoke their rights . Under these circumstances, we cannot say the court abused its discretion in granting the motions to quash Lemon's subpoenas to his co-defendants . See Clayton v. Commonwealth , 786 S .W .2d at 868 . B. Motion to Strike a Juror For Cause Lemon's second argument concerns the circuit court's decision to deny his motion to strike a juror for cause . During voir dire, one of the panel members, Juror No. 41, made it known that she suffered from a medical condition that could require frequent bathroom breaks . In response, the court indicated that if she made her needs known, they could be accommodated . As voir dire continued, Juror No . 41 also indicated that her children, when they were young, had played with the victim's children . There was no indication of any type of friendship or relationship between the juror and the victim - only that the children had played together. When Lemon's attorney asked if that would affect her ability to listen to the evidence, the juror responded not necessarily . When asked if it would weigh on her mind, she acknowledged that it could . Lemon's attorney then asked if it would make her feel bad or embarrassed if she had to find Lemon not guilty . The juror responded, "It might." Finally, when asked if it would make her change her mind about the evidence, she responded, "I don't think so ." At the conclusion of voir dire, Lemon made a motion to dismiss Juror No . 41 for cause . As grounds, Lemon argued (1) that her medical condition would be disruptive, and (2) that she had a relationship with the victim's family . The court denied the motion . In doing so, the court noted that the medical condition could be accommodated and that none of her answers established a close relationship that would warrant a strike for cause . On appeal, Lemon argues the court abused its discretion by denying his motion to strike the juror for cause . Lemon argues the juror had a relationship with the Waugh family which was sufficiently close to necessitate her dismissal for cause . Without acknowledging that the relationship consisted of nothing more then her children playing with Waugh's children, Lemon focuses on her answers during voir dire . It is his contention that her answers created doubt as to her ability to be fair . Finally, Lemon notes that Juror No . 41 did sit on the jury that convicted him.' Kentucky has long recognized that "a determination as to whether to exclude a juror for cause lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and unless the action of the trial court is an abuse of discretion or is clearly erroneous, an appellate court will not reverse the trial court's determination ." Pendleton v . Commonwealth, 83 S .W .3d 522, 527 (Ky. 2002)(Internal quotes and citations omitted.) . A juror is excused for cause "[w]hen there is reasonable ground to believe that a prospective juror cannot render a fair and impartial verdict on the evidence[.]" See Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 9 .36(1) . As we noted in Randolph v . Commonwealth , a juror may be disqualified based on a "connection to the case, parties or attorneys and that is a bias that will be In an attempt to bolster his argument, Lemon notes that during the second day of trial Juror No . 41 left the courtroom shortly after a blowup picture of Waugh's living room was presented by the Commonwealth . The record indicates a recess was called and a juror did leave . Approximately four minutes later the juror can be seen returning . There is no indication from the tape that she was in distress, either at the time she left or upon returning . After the trial resumed, the Commonwealth introduced a blowup picture of Waugh lying on the couch . Instead of demonstrating distress over the photograph, the juror's behavior appears to be consistent with the medical condition she raised during voir dire . 7 implied as a matter of law." 716 S .W.2d 253, 255 (Ky . 1986),8 citing Tayloe v. Commonwealth , 335 S .W .2d 556 (Ky . 1960) . We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to find such a connection in this case . Juror No. 41 is not related to the parties . Nor is she involved in the case . The sole connection Lemon can point to is that her children, when they were little, played with Waugh's children . Lemon failed to develop any evidence which would suggest that the juror and the Waugh family had any type of relationship at the time their children knew each other, much less that such a relationship continued to the present time . Finally, Lemon failed to demonstrate that the juror could not render a fair and impartial verdict on the evidence . If anything, the answers suggested that while she might feel bad about the result, she would base her decision on the evidence presented . Under these circumstances we cannot say the circuit court abused its discretion or was clearly erroneous in denying the challenge for cause . IV . Conclusion As Lemon has failed to demonstrate the circuit court abused its discretion, either in granting the motions to quash subpoenas to Lemon's co-defendants or in denying his motion to strike a juror for cause, we conclude the Carter Circuit Court did not commit reversible error and we affirm Lemon's conviction . All sitting . All concur. 1988). 8 Overruled on other grounds by Shannon v. Commonwealth , 767 S.W.2d 548 (Ky. 8 COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANT : Emily Holt Rhorer Department of Public Advocacy 100 Fair Oaks Lane Suite 302 Frankfort, KY 40601 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE : Gregory D . Stumbo Attorney General Courtney J . Hightower Assistant Attorney General Office of Attorney General Criminal Appellate Division 1024 Capital Center Drive Frankfort, KY 40601-8204