Title: Shana Barnes v. State Of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC06-662
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: November 29, 2007

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC06-662 
____________ 
 
SHANA BARNES,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Respondent. 
 
[November 29, 2007] 
 
LEWIS, C.J. 
 
Petitioner Shana Barnes seeks review of the decision of the First District 
Court of Appeal in Barnes v. State, 922 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (Barnes 
II), asserting that it expressly and directly conflicts with the decision of this Court 
in Young v. State, 645 So. 2d 965 (Fla. 1994), and the decision of the Fifth District 
Court of Appeal in Janson v. State, 730 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999), review 
denied, 767 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 2000), on a question of law.  We have jurisdiction.  
See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On August 7, 2000, Shana Barnes was charged with second-degree murder 
after she shot her husband with a firearm.  A jury convicted Barnes of the crime, 
but on appeal the First District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for a new 
trial because it concluded that the jury instructions on the issue of self-defense 
were “confusing, misleading, and erroneous.”  Barnes v. State, 868 So. 2d 606, 607 
(Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (Barnes I).  During a hearing before the retrial, the State 
announced that on retrial it intended to read to the jury the testimony of Barnes 
from the first trial.  Counsel for Barnes conceded that the prior testimony was 
admissible, but filed a motion in limine for redaction of portions of the testimony 
that were allegedly improper.  After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion in 
part and ordered that various portions of the testimony be redacted.   
During that hearing, the State also informed the trial court that, in addition to 
having the testimony of Barnes read to the jury, it intended to introduce the 
transcript into evidence as an exhibit and requested that the jury have the written 
transcript of that testimony in the jury room to review during deliberations.  
Counsel for Barnes objected, contending that this testimony constituted an 
admission and the defendant had not issued a written admission statement.  Barnes 
asserted that admissions are introduced only through a witness who testifies with 
regard to what a defendant has stated.  The State disagreed and suggested that the 
transcript was similar to a statement of a defendant that has been given at a police 
 
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station.  The trial court entered a preliminary ruling that the transcript would be 
admitted into evidence to be utilized as an exhibit.   
During the retrial and before the State actually read the transcript, counsel 
for Barnes again objected to admission of the transcript into evidence.  Counsel 
explained: 
[T]he problem we see is the same problem as exists when you let [a] 
videotaped deposition go back and that is, that the jury––it’s the only 
trial testimony that the jury will have in front of them and they 
therefore give it undue weight and too much attention compared to all 
the other evidence in the case.  Especially when they have heard it 
read by question and answer in the courtroom.  
The State responded that it was necessary for the jury to have the written transcript 
of the prior testimony during deliberations to afford the jury with a document to 
compare the prior testimony with the prior written statement Barnes provided to 
law enforcement officers.  The State contended that the written transcript of 
testimony constituted a statement against interest because it was in conflict with 
the prior written statement Barnes had given to the police.  The State emphasized 
that the jury would not be informed that the written transcript was testimony from 
a prior trial.  The trial court overruled the objection, and the testimony of Barnes 
from the first trial was subsequently read to the jury.  One assistant state attorney 
read the questions and a different assistant state attorney responded to the 
questions by reading the responses of Barnes during the initial trial.   
 
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The State then sought to place the written transcript of testimony into 
evidence as an exhibit.  Barnes again objected and asserted that this would be the 
only testimony from the trial that would be taken to the jury room and it would, 
therefore, be unduly emphasized over other evidence and testimony.  The trial 
court overruled the objection and concluded that this prior trial testimony 
constituted a sworn statement which contained admissions.  The trial court 
expressed the belief that the introduction into evidence of a written transcript of a 
defendant’s prior trial testimony as an exhibit was distinguishable from 
transcribing the testimony of other witnesses and admitting those transcripts into 
evidence and sending them back to the jury room with the jury for deliberations. 
During closing argument, the State referred to and argued the discrepancies 
it perceived between the prior testimony of Barnes and her written statement to the 
police.  The jury returned its verdict and convicted Barnes of second-degree 
murder and found that she discharged a firearm during the crime.  The trial court 
sentenced Barnes to twenty-seven years’ incarceration with a twenty-five-year 
mandatory minimum.   
On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction and 
sentence.  See Barnes v. State, 922 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (Barnes II).  
The First District held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it 
 
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allowed the jury to take the written transcript of the defendant’s prior trial 
testimony into the jury room as an exhibit in evidence:  
The trial judge properly admitted the statements in question as an 
exhibit of numerous admissions made by the Appellant.  See Delacruz 
v. State, 734 So. 2d 1116, 1122 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (finding that 
defendant’s prior statements, whether exculpatory or not, were 
admissible against defendant as admissions under section 90.803(18), 
Florida Statutes (citing Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 
803.18, at 733-34 (1999 ed.))).  The fact that the State published the 
exhibit to the jury does not turn the exhibit into “testimony.”  
Accordingly, the trial judge acted within his discretion to allow the 
jury to take the exhibit into the jury room.  See Fla. R. Crim. P. 
3.400(a)(4) (permitting the judge to allow “all things received into 
evidence other than depositions” into the jury room).  
Id. at 382. 
 
This Court granted review of the decision of the First District on the basis 
that it expressly and directly conflicts with the decisions in Young v. State, 645 So. 
2d 965 (Fla. 1994), and Janson v. State, 730 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999), 
review denied, 767 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 2000).  See Barnes v. State, 948 So. 2d 758 
(Fla. 2007) (table).  In Young, this Court held that trial testimony presented 
through videotape to a jury should not also be permitted in the jury room as an 
exhibit, and further that videotaped out-of-court interviews with child victims are 
not allowed into the jury room during deliberations.  See 645 So. 2d at 967.  The 
Fifth District in Janson relied upon Young when it held that the trial court erred 
when it allowed the written transcript of the testimony of two witnesses into the 
jury room.  See 730 So. 2d at 734-35.  
 
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ANALYSIS 
Both parties agree that the defendant’s testimony from her first trial was, 
most assuredly, admissible in the retrial of the second-degree murder charge.  See 
State v. Billie, 881 So. 2d 637, 639 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (quoting Harrison v. 
United States, 392 U.S. 219, 222 (1968) for the proposition that “a defendant’s 
testimony at a former trial is admissible in evidence against him in later 
proceedings”).  In Billie, the Third District explained that under the Florida 
Evidence Code, prior testimony is admissible in a subsequent proceeding as an 
admission by the defendant.  See id.; § 90.803(18), Fla. Stat. (2003).  The discrete 
issue presented by the instant case is not whether the prior testimony was 
admissible, but whether the trial court should have admitted into evidence a written 
transcript of the defendant’s prior trial testimony after it had actually been read 
during the retrial proceedings, thereby allowing the jury access to and use of that 
written transcript of testimony during deliberations.   
Admissibility of the Transcript into Evidence 
A trial court ruling with regard to the admissibility of evidence is reviewed 
under the abuse of discretion standard.  See Alston v. State, 723 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 
1998).  Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.400, “Materials to the Jury Room,” 
provides that a trial court has the discretion to allow the jury to take into the jury 
room “all things received into evidence other than depositions.”  Fla. R. Crim. P. 
 
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3.400(a)(4) (emphasis supplied).   For purposes of our decision today, we must 
decide whether the written transcript of the prior trial testimony was a “thing” that 
should have been received into evidence after it had already been read during the 
trial proceedings as testimonial evidence.  We conclude that it was not. 
We commence our analysis by noting that, unlike a signed confession, a 
transcript of prior testimony is not generally considered physical evidence in a 
criminal case.  As noted by the Illinois Supreme Court, signed confessions 
constitute valuable physical evidence and are appropriately submitted to the jurors 
during deliberations along with any other properly admitted physical evidence: 
[A] signed confession which has been shown by the State to be free 
from coercive conditions is among the strongest kinds of physical 
evidence the prosecution may produce, and when the tests of 
admissibility have been met and the defense afforded the full 
opportunity to point out any circumstances which may go to 
undermine the credibility of the confession in the eyes of the jury, 
there appears to us no valid reason to preclude the written confession 
from going to the jury room along with other exhibits which the trial 
judge may deem proper.  . . .  Nor, in our opinion, is there a logical 
reason to distinguish between a written confession and other physical 
evidence of a concededly damaging nature such as murder weapons, 
bloodstained clothing or gruesome photographs insofar as their 
presence in the jury room is concerned.  In our judgment all should be 
governed by the general rule governing exhibits of physical evidence 
which may be taken to the jury room if the sound discretion of the 
trial judge dictates that they bear directly on the charge. 
People v. Caldwell, 236 N.E.2d 706, 714 (Ill. 1968) (emphasis supplied). 
On the other hand, this Court and a number of other jurisdictions have held 
that depositions and other evidence of a testimonial nature should not be provided 
 
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to a jury during deliberations.  Moreover, despite the specific preclusion provided 
by rule 3.400(a)(4), this subdivision has not been exclusively limited to 
depositions.  For example, in Young, this Court held that videotaped statements by 
child victims of alleged sexual abuse could not be taken into the jury room during 
deliberations.  See 645 So. 2d at 967.  We explained: 
When introduced to prove sexual abuse, the videotaped 
interviews of children are self-serving in the sense that they are 
testimonial in nature and assert the truth of the children’s statements.  
They are more akin to depositions de bene esse in which testimony is 
preserved for later introduction at the trial.  
. . . [A]llowing a jury to have access to videotaped witness 
statements during deliberations has much the same prejudicial effect 
as submitting depositions to the jury during deliberations.  By 
permitting the jurors to see the interview once again in the jury room, 
there is a real danger that the child’s statements will be unfairly given 
more emphasis than other testimony.  
Id. (emphasis supplied).  The Fifth District relied upon the Young decision in 
Janson when it concluded that the written transcripts of the testimony of two 
witnesses should not have been allowed into the jury room.  See 730 So. 2d at 734-
35.       
 
A number of other jurisdictions have precluded the use of written forms of 
testimonial evidence in the jury room during deliberations.1  One factually relevant 
                                          
 
 
1.  See, e.g., Pearson v. State, 604 S.E.2d 180, 183 (Ga. 2004) (“‘[W]ritten 
testimony,’ which merely duplicates a witness’ oral testimony or substitutes as a 
written record of his testimony should be withheld from the jury.”); Wright v. 
Premier Elkhorn Coal Co., 16 S.W.3d 570, 572 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999) (“In general, 
testimonial evidence (such as a copy of a deposition) is not allowed in a jury room. 
 
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decision in the case we decide today is the decision of the District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals in Fuller v. United States, 873 A.2d 1108 (D.C. 2005).  In Fuller, 
the defendant asserted on appeal that the trial court had erred when it allowed the 
jury to possess a written transcript of his prior testimony during deliberations.  See 
id. at 1115.  The testimony had also been read to the jury during the trial.  See id. at 
1112.  The Court of Appeals held that the trial court should not have allowed the 
jury access to the written transcript: 
Although courts are not uniform, most consider that it is within the 
discretion of the judge to allow “many types of tangible exhibits [and] 
written exhibits generally except for those that are testimonial in 
nature . . . .  The reason underlying this latter exception is that 
writings which are merely testimony in a different form should not, by 
being allowed to the jury, be unduly emphasized over the other purely 
oral testimony in the case.”  2 McCormick on Evidence § 217 at 30 
(John William Strong, ed., 5th ed. 1999) (emphasis added).  A clear 
distinction is drawn between admitting previous testimony (from a 
transcript) as evidence, and providing the transcript to the jury: 
[W]ritten testimony is not to be read by the jury in the 
jury room but is to be read to them in open court, subject 
to all objections to be made, the same as if the witness 
were present and testifying.  The written record thereof 
should not be taken to the jury room where the jury might 
read it.  A written instrument, made an exhibit in the 
                                                                                                                                        
The rationale behind banning such testimonial evidence from the jury room is the 
likelihood that the triers of fact may place more emphasis on written rather than 
spoken words since the written words are readily before them physically while the 
spoken words uttered at trial can only be conjured up by memory.”); State v. 
Brooks, 675 S.W.2d 53, 57 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (“[T]he use of the depositions at 
trial simply took the place of testimony of live witnesses and, therefore, was 
testimonial in nature.  Generally, exhibits . . . which are testimonial in nature may 
not be given to the jury during their deliberations . . . .”). 
 
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cause but not consisting of testimony of a witness in the 
case, may of course be taken to the jury room the same as 
maps, diagrams, and other exhibits.  But the testimony of 
a witness is in a different category . . . .  If . . . the jury 
takes the depositions or transcript to be read and 
discussed while the oral evidence contra has in a measure 
faded from the memory of the jurors, it is obvious that 
the side sustained by written evidence is given an undue 
advantage.  The law does not permit depositions or 
witnesses to go to the jury room. Why should a witness 
be permitted to go there in the form of written testimony? 
State v. Solomon, 96 Utah 500, 87 P.2d 807, 811 (1939). 
Id. at 1116-17.  We agree with this analysis from the District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals.  Accordingly, we conclude that when prior testimony has been read to a 
jury during the trial proceeding as testimonial evidence, a written transcript of that 
testimony is not and should not be considered a “thing” that should be entered into 
evidence as an exhibit and provided to the jury during deliberations pursuant to 
rule 3.400(a)(4). 
Moreover, in Fuller, the Court of Appeals noted that even enhanced 
concerns arise when the prior testimony of a defendant is provided to the jurors in 
transcript form as compared to the prior testimony of a witness: 
The risk that the jury might give undue weight to some 
testimony because it is available in transcript form over jurors’ 
recollection of other, untranscribed trial testimony is heightened 
where the transcript is of the testimony of the defendant, because a 
defendant’s admissions normally carry particular force with a jury.  
Moreover, there is a Fifth Amendment concern, for even if a 
defendant’s testimony from a prior trial has been properly admitted as 
evidence, a transcript of that testimony might receive greater scrutiny 
 
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––and invite impermissible inferences––where the defendant has 
exercised his constitutional right not to take the stand at a second trial. 
Id. at 1117.  There are numerous factors that may influence whether a defendant 
decides to testify during any given proceeding.  The nature of the proceeding, the 
composition of the jury, and the prior trial experience are only a few of those 
variable factors.  The Fuller court reasoned that it is far more questionable for 
jurors to receive a written transcript of a defendant’s prior testimony than that of a 
witness.  The Fuller court determined that when the prior testimony of a defendant 
is to be provided in transcript form to jurors during deliberations, the trial court 
should give the jurors specific instructions with regard to the use of the transcript: 
A trial judge should first consider whether the jurors have a particular 
need for the transcript, and if so, give a special instruction cautioning 
against unduly emphasizing the transcript over other evidence.  In a 
case where the transcript is of the defendant’s testimony, the judge 
should further caution the jury, if requested by the defense, against 
making impermissible inferences contrasting the defendant’s decision 
to testify at an earlier trial and his choice not to testify at the second 
trial. 
 Id. at 1118 (citations and footnote omitted).  
We conclude that some of the concerns discussed in Fuller with regard to the 
constitutional rights of a defendant are also compelling.  The Fifth Amendment to 
the United Constitution provides that no defendant “shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself.”  U.S. Const. amend V.  Under the 
Florida Constitution, a defendant has the right to testify in his or her defense.  See 
 
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art. I, §16, Fla. Const.  Based on the specific circumstances presented by each trial 
(e.g., the timing, the evidence offered by the State, the jurors selected), a defendant 
may choose to testify or not.  Nonetheless, if for some reason the result of that first 
trial is inconclusive, or the defendant is awarded a new trial based upon trial-court 
error, the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent under the United States 
Constitution is implicated and remains intact during all subsequent proceedings.  
However, if a defendant would choose to exercise the right to remain silent in a 
subsequent proceeding, and the State allowed to introduce into evidence a written 
transcript of the prior testimony as an exhibit, questions could arise in the minds of 
jurors as to why the defendant is not testifying in the current proceeding when he 
or she chose to do so previously.  Although the parties may give great effort to 
conceal the fact that the testimony is actually from a prior trial, as occurred in the 
instant case, the jurors will most likely realize that on some occasion in the past the 
defendant elected to offer an explanation and discuss what happened with regard to 
the alleged crime, but currently declines to do so.  We conclude that when a jury is 
provided the prior trial testimony of a defendant which is read during trial and is 
also given that testimony in written transcript form to scrutinize and consider as a 
tangible exhibit during deliberations, in the absence of any other testimony offered 
during the trial, the choice of the defendant to remain silent may, as recognized in 
Fuller, “invite impermissible inferences.”  873 A.2d at 1117.  We decline to issue a 
 
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principle of law that could potentially and very realistically jeopardize or denigrate 
the Fifth Amendment right of a defendant to remain silent during trial.  Therefore, 
we hold that a transcript of the prior trial testimony of a defendant, even more so 
than that of a witness, is not a “thing” to be admitted into evidence as an exhibit for 
jurors to examine during deliberations after the testimony has been read during the 
trial proceedings as testimonial evidence.  See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.400(a)(4). 
In light of the foregoing, we hold that it was an abuse of discretion for the 
trial court to place a written transcript of the defendant’s prior testimony into 
evidence after it had been read to the jury and also an abuse to allow the jurors to 
possess and utilize this transcript during deliberations.  
Harmless Error 
 
Our inquiry does not end with our conclusion that an abuse of discretion has 
occurred.  We must next consider whether the erroneous admission of the written 
transcript into evidence and the use of the written transcript by the jurors during 
deliberations constitute harmless error.  We have explained the harmless error test 
as follows: 
Harmless error is not a device for the appellate court to substitute 
itself for the trier-of-fact by simply weighing the evidence.  The focus 
is on the effect of the error on the trier-of-fact. The question is 
whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the 
verdict.  The burden to show the error was harmless must remain on 
the state.  If the appellate court cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the error did not affect the verdict, then the error is by definition 
harmful. 
 
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State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1139 (Fla. 1986) (emphasis supplied).   
 
In Fuller, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals concluded that even 
though the trial judge erroneously provided the jury with the written transcript of 
the defendant’s prior testimony during deliberations, the error did not warrant 
reversal of the conviction:   
Appellant claims that the prosecutor’s frequent references to his 
testimony at closing demonstrate that it was used against him and 
further directed the jury to focus on the transcript.  Appellant’s 
testimony from the first trial that was read and given to the jury in 
transcript form, however, was not inculpatory, but consistent with his 
defense in the second trial that he had been misidentified and that 
Jones, the person who was with him at the time of the shooting, had 
shot Murray.  Other than the general argument that the jury is prone to 
overemphasize transcribed testimony, appellant has not referred us to 
any portion of the transcript that––if given particularized scrutiny by 
the jury––would have seriously prejudiced his defense.  The jury’s 
reading of the transcript would, if anything, have presented 
appellant’s case again while the jurors deliberated, as defense counsel 
urged them to do during closing argument.  Although the trial judge 
did not specifically instruct the jury with respect to the transcript of 
appellant’s prior testimony, he did instruct the jurors that they must 
not draw any inference of guilt from appellant’s decision not to testify 
at the second trial.  Finally, we consider the strength of the 
government’s case.  While there were some inconsistencies in their 
accounts, two eyewitnesses who knew appellant from the 
neighborhood positively identified him as the shooter.  Several other 
witnesses provided a motive for the shooting and another said 
appellant had confessed to having shot Murray, albeit in self-defense. 
Considering the matter in the context of the entire trial, we are 
confident that the jury’s access to a transcript of the non-testifying 
appellant’s testimony from a previous trial did not sway the verdict, 
and that any error in providing the transcript was therefore harmless. 
873 A.2d at 1118 (emphasis supplied).    
 
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Unlike the transcript in Fuller, which the Court of Appeals deemed not to be 
inculpatory, see id., the State here utilized the written transcript of the testimony to 
demonstrate that Barnes had made inconsistent statements with regard to the facts 
of the crime when she gave her statement to police when compared with her 
testimony at her first trial.  The key fact upon which the State primarily focused 
was the location of a gun just prior to the shooting.   The location of the gun was 
most relevant to the defendant’s assertion that when she shot her husband, her 
actions were spontaneous or reflexive in nature.  The State noted that in the 
original written statement given to police, Barnes stated that the gun was on the 
passenger seat of the vehicle which she occupied at the time she shot her husband.  
However, when she testified at the first trial, she stated that the gun was in her 
purse.  During closing argument, the State specifically directed the attention of the 
jury to this inconsistency: 
Whether it was on the seat or in the purse.  The gun.  Her original 
statement, her written statement to the police indicated that the gun 
was on the seat, however, in her later statement on April 24, 2002, all 
of a sudden it’s in her purse, sitting on top of her purse where it had 
stayed from the time she put it in her purse, walked through the house, 
pass[ed] Gregory Barnes, out to the car, got in the car, threw her purse 
there and the gun is still conveniently on top of it ready for her to just 
grab and shoot.  That’s inconsistent. 
 
It’s inconsistent to what she said that night.  It’s inconsistent 
with the details of what had to occur for this to happen and how fast it 
had to occur.  
 
Her explanation for that inconsistency, well, in the purse which 
is on the seat.  No.  That’s not something you leave out.  That’s not 
something that someone that after going through her written statement 
 
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. . . leaves out.  She didn’t leave out that it was in her purse.  It was 
never in her purse.  It was right there on the seat ready to shoot him in 
the face. 
During rebuttal, the State again focused on the inconsistency: 
 
And ladies and gentlemen, the critical distinction of the gun being in 
the seat as she told the police––it was reflected in their notes as read 
from the stand.  It is reflected in her written statement and then in her 
testimony from the year 2002––in the first part of questioning she said 
it was on the seat.  Later in questioning when asked why would you 
carry a loaded gun around walking through your household to get in a 
car to go drive to your peaceful spot downtown, why would you do 
that?  Then her answer changed to oh, it was in the purse. 
 
But ladies and gentleman, I invite you to look at that picture.  
The purse is either zipped up or so narrow at the top that that gun was 
nowhere near the top of that purse.  It was on the seat or maybe in her 
lap, but it wasn’t in that purse.   
The State referred to this distinction as “critical” at least two times during rebuttal.  
Finally, and importantly, the State urged the jurors to “[l]ook at the quotes in the 
transcript.”  These closing argument excerpts clearly demonstrate that the State 
focused heavily on asserted inconsistencies in the two statements during closing 
arguments.  Additionally, the jurors never received an instruction from the trial 
court that they should not emphasize the written transcript of the testimony over 
other evidence offered during trial.  Cf. Fuller, 873 A.2d at 1118 (holding that, 
under similar circumstances, the trial court should provide such an instruction to 
the jurors). 
It is impossible here, as it will most often be the situation, to divine what 
actually transpired when the jury retired to deliberate on the issue of the guilt or 
 
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innocence of Barnes.  It is for these reasons that we cannot say beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the presence of both the statement to police and the written 
transcript of her prior testimony in the jury room during deliberations, where the 
inconsistencies between these two documents could be viewed side by side, did not 
contribute to the guilty verdict.   Therefore, we conclude that the State has not 
sustained its burden to demonstrate that the trial-court error in this case was 
harmless.  See DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d at 1139; see also Young, 645 So. 2d at 968 
(holding that while allowance of videotaped statements of children in the jury 
room during deliberations might not constitute fundamental error, it could not be 
deemed harmless).  
 
Accordingly, we are compelled to quash Barnes II and remand for a new 
trial. 
 
It is so ordered. 
WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct 
Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
First District - Case No. 1D04-5450 
 
(Duval County) 
 
Louis K.  Rosenbloum, Pensacola, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
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Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Trisha Meggs Pate, Bureau Chief Criminal 
Appeals, and Thomas D. Winokur, Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent