Title: The Florida Bar v. Allan M. Elster
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC92-968
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: October 12, 2000

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
Nos. SC92968, SC93090, SC93091, SC93092
____________
THE FLORIDA BAR,
Complainant,
vs.
ALLAN M. ELSTER,
Respondent.
[October 12, 2000]
PER CURIAM.
In this consolidated appeal, we have for review four separate attorney
discipline cases.  All four cases involve Allan M. Elster’s representation of clients
in immigration matters.  Case number SC92968 involves Elster’s representation of
Antonio and Joani Sabatier.  The referee issued a report and recommendation in
this case on March 17, 1999, finding that Elster had committed several ethical
violations and recommending that he be suspended from the practice of law for
sixty days.   The three remaining cases, SC93090, SC93091,  and SC93092,
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involve Elster’s representation of  Dominga Zavala, Modesto Vargas, and Yanique
Duval, respectively.  These three cases were consolidated below, and the referee
issued a single report and recommendation on June 4, 1999, again finding a number
of ethical violations and recommending that Elster be suspended for eighteen
months.  We have jurisdiction.  Art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.  For the reasons
expressed below, we approve the referee’s findings of fact, but we reject the
recommended discipline and find that a three-year suspension is the appropriate
sanction for Elster’s collective misconduct in these four cases.
FINDINGS OF FACT
A.  The Sabatier Case
In this case, Elster was retained to represent Antonio Sabatier and his
daughter, Joani, before the United States Immigration Court. The Sabatiers paid
Elster $400 toward a total fee of $800 for handling the entire matter, and they
informed Elster that they had a court hearing scheduled for August 6, 1996.  The
referee found that Elster failed to file a notice of appearance on their behalf, failed
to appear at the scheduled hearing, failed to accomplish any meaningful work on
their behalf, effectively abandoned them and their cause of action, and failed to
make any attempt to inform them that he did not intend to continue to represent
them.  The referee also found that both before and after the date of the hearing, the
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Sabatiers and their successor counsel made numerous attempts to contact Elster by
phone and electronic pager, but he failed to return any of the phone calls or pages. 
Finally, the referee found that due to Elster’s complete lack of work on the
Sabatiers’ behalf, he collected an excessive fee of $400.  Based on these findings,
the referee recommended that Elster be found guilty of violating rules 3-4.2
(violation of Rules of Professional Conduct grounds for discipline), 4-8.4(a)
(lawyer shall not violate Rules of Professional Conduct), 4-1.1 (competent
representation), 4-1.3 (reasonable diligence), 4-1.16(d) (protection of client’s
interest upon termination of representation), 4-1.4(a) (keeping client reasonably
informed), and 4-1.5(a) (excessive fee) of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar.
Elster essentially disagrees with the referee’s findings of fact in the Sabatier
case on the basis that they are contrary to his own testimony.  However, in order to
successfully challenge the referee’s findings, Elster must demonstrate "that there is
no evidence in the record to support [the referee’s] findings or that the record
evidence clearly contradicts the conclusions."   Florida Bar v. Spann, 682 So. 2d
1070, 1073 (Fla. 1996).  Elster has not met this burden. 
It is clear that the referee weighed the credibility of Elster’s testimony in this
case and, where the evidence was in conflict, chose to credit the documentary
evidence and the testimony of other witnesses over the testimony of Elster. 
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Because the referee is in the best position to judge the credibility of the witnesses,
we defer to the referee’s assessment and his resolution of the conflicting testimony. 
 See  Florida Bar v. Fredericks, 731 So. 2d 1249, 1251 (Fla. 1999) (stating that “the
referee is in a unique position to assess the credibility of witnesses, and his
judgment regarding credibility should not be overturned absent clear and
convincing evidence that his judgment is incorrect”); Florida Bar v. Thomas, 582
So. 2d 1177, 1178 (Fla. 1991) (same); Florida Bar v. Hayden, 583 So. 2d 1016,
1017 (Fla. 1991) (stating that where testimony conflicts, referee is charged with
responsibility of assessing credibility based on demeanor and other factors). 
Accordingly, we find that there is competent substantial evidence in the record to
support the referee’s findings in this case.  
B.  The Zavala, Vargas, and Duval Cases
In the Zavala case, the referee found that Elster provided Dominga Zavala
with a misleading business card, which bore the name “Immigration Verification
Associates,”  upon which she relied to retain him to represent her in an appeal of
the deportation order previously entered against her.  He collected his full fee from
her, filed a motion to reopen and stay her deportation, which was swiftly denied as
inadequate, filed a motion for rehearing of that denial which was also denied, and
then filed an emergency appeal.  After filing the emergency appeal, Elster
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communicated with Zavala for approximately two months at the Krome Detention
Center where she was being held, after which he abandoned her and failed to
communicate with her despite her frequent attempts to communicate with him. 
Zavala was deported on November 11, 1996.  
Although the referee stated that Elster’s legal work for Zavala was
“unprofessional, legally inadequate and possibly constituted malpractice,” he found
that it did not rise to the level of unethical conduct.  However, the referee found that
through the use of the business card and his letterhead, which also bore the name
“Immigration Verification Associates,” Elster violated rules 4-7.1(a) (misleading
communication about lawyer’s services), 4-7.2(k) (non-complying advertisement),
4-7.7(b) (trade name), 4-7.7(f) (statement that lawyer practices in partnership or
other organization), and 4-8.4(c) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation).  The referee also found that by intentionally disseminating the
business card and letterhead for the purpose of financial gain, Elster violated rule 4-
7.1(a) (misleading communication about lawyer’s services), 4-7.2(k)
(noncomplying advertisement), 4-7.7(b) (trade name), and 4-8.4(c) (conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and that by collecting a
legal fee through the use of a noncomplying advertisement, he violated rule 4-1.5(a)
(fee generated by employment obtained through noncomplying advertisement). 
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Finally, the referee found that by failing to communicate with his client for the last
five months she was in the country, Elster violated rule 4-1.4(a) (keeping client
reasonably informed and complying with reasonable requests for information), and
4-1.4(b) (explaining matter to client to extent reasonably necessary to permit
informed decisions). 
In the Vargas case, the referee found that Elster was retained to represent
Modesto Vargas in an appeal of the deportation order previously entered against
him.  Elster assured Vargas and his family that he could stop the deportation when
he knew or should have known that Vargas was ineligible for a waiver of
deportation due to his drug convictions.  After accepting a total fee of $2500 from
the Vargas family, Elster failed and refused to take any significant action and did
absolutely no work on Vargas’s behalf.  Once Vargas was moved from Krome
Detention Center to the Manatee County Jail to await deportation, Elster failed to
return most of Vargas’s and his family’s many calls, messages, and pages.  Vargas
ultimately agreed to voluntary departure from the United States.
The referee found that by failing to recognize and advise Vargas and his
family that he was not eligible for a waiver of deportation and could not obtain such
a waiver, Elster violated rules 4-1.1 (competent representation), 4-1.3 (reasonable
diligence), 4-1.4(a) (keeping client reasonably informed), and 4-1.4(b) (explaining
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matter to client to extent reasonably necessary to permit informed decisions).  The
referee found that by accepting $2500 in fees for a case he knew or should have
known had no likelihood of success as a matter of law, Elster violated rule 4-1.5(a)
(excessive fee); that by assuring Vargas’ family that his deportation could be
stopped when he knew or should have known this to be untrue, he violated rule 4-
8.4(d) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation); and that
by accepting a fee and taking little or no action on the case, he violated rule 4-
1.3(reasonable diligence) and 4-1.5(a) (excessive fee).    Finally, the referee found
that by abandoning Vargas with no notice, without returning his file, or returning
any unearned fees, Elster violated rule 4-1.16(d) (termination of representation), and
that by failing to properly communicate with Vargas, he violated 4-1.4(a) (keeping
client reasonably informed) and 4-1.4(b) (explaining matter to client to extent
reasonably necessary to permit informed decision). 
In the Duval case, the referee found that Yanique Duval, a foreign medical
doctor, hired Elster to obtain for her the immigration status necessary to allow her
to legally live and practice medicine in the United States.  Elster informed Duval that
he would obtain permanent residency status for her within three months, that her
immigration request would be controlled by the requirements of section 203(b) (2)
of the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA), and that she could be granted
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permanent resident status by obtaining a job offer from a teaching facility or
medical institution.  Elster knew or should have known that this information was
incorrect and that he could not, under any process or application of law, obtain
permanent residency status for Duval within three months.  After accepting a partial
fee of $500 from Duval, Elster did no work of any kind on Duval’s behalf, failed to
return Duval’s calls or otherwise communicate with her after the initial meeting, and
failed to inform her of his change of address.  Duval also gave Elster a money order
in the amount of $130, made payable to the U. S. Immigration and Naturalization
Service, for the express purpose of paying costs in her case.  This money order
was never tendered to the INS on Duval’s behalf and was not returned to Duval. 
Elster was unable to produce or account for the money order.  Based on these
findings, the referee found that Elster violated rules 4-1.1(competent
representation), 4-8.4(c) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation), 4-1.4(a) (keeping client reasonably informed and promptly
complying with reasonable requests for information), 4-1.4(b) (explaining matter to
extent reasonably necessary to permit informed decision), 4-1.3 (reasonable
diligence), 4-1.5(a) (excessive fee), 4-1.15(c) (property held in trust), and 1-3.3
(record bar information).  Additionally, as to all three cases, the referee found that
by virtue of the totality of his misconduct, Elster violated rule 3-4.2 (violation of
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Rules of Professional Conduct is cause for discipline) and rule 4-8.4(a) (lawyer
shall not violate Rules of Professional Conduct).
In challenging the referee’s findings in these cases, Elster first argues that the
referee’s findings in the Zavala case regarding the misleading nature of his business
card are erroneous because neither Zavala nor any other member of the public
testified that they were actually mislead.  The only evidence necessary to prove the
misleading nature of the card, however, is the card itself, which was introduced into
evidence, and Elster’s own admissions that the information on the card is false.  
A firm name or advertisement is misleading in violation of bar rules if it is
“inherently misleading to the public or . . . operatively misleading.” Florida Bar v.
Fetterman, 439 So. 2d 835, 838 (Fla. 1983).  Thus, even if, as Elster argues here,
there is no evidence that the public has actually been misled, the name or
advertisement is still in violation of bar rules if it is “inherently misleading.”  Id. 
Whether or not a particular trade name is to be deemed inherently misleading will
depend upon the particular facts and circumstances of each case.  Id.  
Here, the card reads “Immigration Verification Associates” and also
indicates that Enrique Santiago, Elster’s informal Spanish interpreter, is
“President.”  Elster admits he gave this card to Zavala before she hired him  and
that the information on the card is totally false–he has not and never has had any
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associate attorneys working for him, Immigration Verification Associates is not and
never has been incorporated, and thus, Enrique Santiago is not and never has been
its president.   The fact that the card bears Elster’s name as well does not remedy
its totally false and misleading nature.  Accordingly, the referee’s finding that the
card is misleading is correct and is supported by competent substantial
evidence–the card itself and Elster’s own admissions.
Elster’s remaining challenges to the referee’s findings in the Zavala, Vargas,
and Duval cases are based simply on the fact that those findings are contrary to his
own testimony or that of his Creole interpreter, Faubert Etienne.   However, as in
the Sabatier case, it is clear that the referee weighed the credibility of the witnesses
in this case and, where the testimony was in conflict, chose  to believe the
testimony of the other witnesses over that of Elster and Etienne.  Accordingly,
because the referee is in the best position to judge the credibility of the witnesses,
we defer to the referee’s assessment in this regard.   See Florida Bar v. Fredericks,
731 So. 2d 1249, 1251 (Fla. 1999); Florida Bar v. Thomas, 582 So. 2d 1177, 1178
(Fla. 1991); Florida Bar v. Hayden, 583 So. 2d 1016, 1017 (Fla. 1991).  Because 
Elster has not met his burden to show that there is no evidence in the record to
support the referee’s findings or that the record evidence clearly contradicts the
conclusions,  we approve the referee’s factual findings in the Zavala, Vargas, and
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Duval cases.    
DISCIPLINE
In contrast with a review of the referee's findings of fact, which should be
upheld if supported by competent substantial evidence, this Court has a broader
scope of review regarding discipline because it bears the ultimate responsibility of
ordering the appropriate sanction.  See  Florida Bar v. Vining, 707 So. 2d 670, 673
(Fla. 1998).  In the Sabatier case, the referee recommended that Elster be
suspended for sixty days.  Separately, in the Zavala, Vargas, and Duval cases, the
referee recommended that Elster be suspended for eighteen months.  If each case
were considered alone, we would likely agree with the recommended discipline. 
However, considering all four cases together, we find that a harsher discipline is
required.  
Due to the pattern of misconduct involved here, the Bar argues that Elster
should be disbarred.  However, in previous cases which have involved similar
circumstances, we have imposed a long-term suspension.  See, e.g., Florida Bar v.
Morrison, 669 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 1996) (holding that failure to act with diligence and
promptness in representing client, failure to keep client reasonably informed, and
failure to comply with requests for information warranted one-year suspension); 
Florida Bar v. Brakefield, 679 So. 2d 766 (Fla. 1996) (holding that failure to clarify
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status of representation, failure to attend depositions and hearings, failure to keep
clients reasonably informed and failure to act with reasonable diligence warranted
six-month suspension); Florida Bar v. Winderman, 614 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 1993)
(holding that failing to keep clients reasonably informed and failing to do other
functions warranted one-year suspension followed by one-year term of probation); 
Florida Bar v. Patterson, 530 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1988) (finding that faulty
representation of client, neglect of legal matters, failure to communicate with clients,
failure to refund unearned legal fees in timely manner and abandonment of clients
warranted one-year suspension); Florida Bar v. Schilling, 486 So. 2d 551 (Fla.
1986) (holding that neglect of responsibilities in two matters warranted six-month
suspension).  Most of these cases involved multiple instances of neglect and many
involved similar prior misconduct. 
Here, Elster’s misconduct involves multiple similar violations and is very
serious for two reasons.  First, “[c]onfidence in, and proper utilization of, the legal
system is adversely affected when a lawyer fails to diligently pursue a legal matter
entrusted to that lawyer’s care.  A failure to do so is a direct violation of the oath a
lawyer takes upon his admission to the bar.” Schilling, 486 So. 2d at 552.  Second,
the gravity of Elster’s misconduct is heightened by one very important aggravating
factor not present in any other case involving a pattern of conduct as serious as that
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in which Elster has engaged: vulnerability of the victims.  The facts of these four
cases, considered together,  clearly show a pattern of egregious exploitation by
Elster of a very vulnerable class of individuals.  The facts show that Elster was
misleading and victimizing foreign nationals who were unfamiliar with the legal
system in this country and many of whom were in very precarious legal situations.  
Accordingly, based on these factors, we find that a three-year suspension is the
appropriate sanction.
Allan M. Elster is hereby suspended from the practice of law for three years. 
The suspension will be effective thirty days from the filing of this opinion so that
Elster can close out his practice and protect the interests of existing clients.  If
Elster notifies this Court in writing that he is no longer practicing and does not need
the thirty days to protect existing clients, this Court will enter an order making the
suspension effective immediately.  Elster shall accept no new business from the
date this opinion is filed until he is reinstated.  Judgment is entered for The Florida
Bar, 650 Apalachee Parkway, Tallahassee, Florida 32399, for recovery of costs
from Allan M. Elster in the amount of $7,790.46,  for which sum let execution
issue.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS and
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QUINCE, JJ., concur.
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS SUSPENSION.
Four Cases Consolidated:
Original Proceedings - The Florida Bar
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, and John A. Boggs, Staff Counsel,
Tallahassee, Florida, and Lorraine C. Hoffmann, Bar Counsel, Fort Lauderdale,
Florida,
for Complainant
Allan M. Elster, pro se, Miami, Florida,
for Respondent