Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE REINSTATEMENT OF OTIS
Citation: 175 P.3d 357, 2007 OK 82
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: October 30, 2007

IN THE MATTER OF THE REINSTATEMENT OF OTIS Annotate this Case IN THE MATTER OF THE REINSTATEMENT OF OTIS 2007 OK 82 175 P.3d 357 Case Number: SCBD-5281 Decided: 10/30/2007 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA IN THE MATTER OF THE REINSTATEMENT OF: JERRY E. OTIS TO MEMBERSHIP IN THE OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION AND TO THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS. PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT ¶0 Petitioner Jerry E. Otis filed a petition for reinstatement to membership in the Oklahoma Bar Association (OBA). Through the Office of the General Counsel, the OBA opposes reinstatement. After a hearing, a Trial Panel of the Professional Responsibility Tribunal (PRT) recommended denial of reinstatement. After de novo review, we deny reinstatement. PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT IS DENIED; PETITIONER IS ORDERED TO PAY COSTS. Stanley M. Ward, Woodrow K. Glass, Scott F. Brockman, Norman, Oklahoma, for Petitioner, Janna Dunagan Hall, Assistant General Counsel, Oklahoma Bar Association, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Respondent. OPINION WATT, Justice: ¶1 Petitioner Jerry E. Otis voluntarily submitted his resignation from membership to the Oklahoma Bar Association (the Bar) pending disciplinary proceedings on November 23, 1993. This Court found Otis had complied with the provisions of Rule 8.1, Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings (RGDP), 5 O.S. 1991, Ch. 1, App. 1-A FACTS ¶2 Otis was admitted to the Oklahoma Bar Association on July 26, 1966. He practiced law in Antlers, Oklahoma, until August 1, 1993. Otis was appointed Conservator of the Mary L. Cothran Conservatorship on May 26, 1981. Over the course of approximately 10 years, Otis used funds from the conservatorship estate to pay his personal debts. Mary died on May 3, 1995. On or about August 30, 1996, Otis entered a plea of nolo contendere, with a plea agreement in the district court, to the charge of Embezzlement by Trustee, ¶3 An audit ¶4 Otis testified that after his resignation he first worked as a real estate agent for a short time. From February, 1995 until June, 2000, he was employed by a non-profit organization in Hugo, Oklahoma, Little Dixie Community Action Agency. The agency provided housing assistance to low income persons. He testified he disclosed his past to his employer. Following that employment, he worked for Goodland Presbyterian Children's Home, a place for long-term care for troubled boys, ages six through twelve. Otis served as Goodland's Assistant Director for Development, in a fundraising capacity until October 1, 2006. He testified that if his reinstatement petition is granted, he intends to do pro bono work for Legal Aid for lower income clients. He also testified that he will not put himself in the position again of being tempted with the money of other people. He has essentially retired and wants to restore his reputation as a lawyer. TRIAL PANEL REPORT ¶5 The Trial Panel found Otis had presented evidence showing compliance with two of the three requirements of Rule 11.5, RGDP, 5 O.S. 2001, Ch. 1, App. 1-A. Of great concern to the trial panel is the question of restitution. Admittedly Petitioner paid the sum of restitution of $33,272.13 Nonetheless, the OBA Board of Governor's (sic) determined and notified Petitioner Otis in January of 1998 that the victims (sic) claim was approved in the amount of $133,076.00. As stated, Petitioner has paid only $45,066.42 ¶6 Although the Trial Panel found Otis repaid the Client Security Fund $45,066.24 as directed, and as required by Rule 11.1, RGDP, STANDARD OF REVIEW AND BURDEN OF PROOF ¶7 This Court considers a petition for reinstatement by a de novo standard of review. Matter of Reinstatement of Massey, ¶8 Additionally, there are eight factors which this Court considers in determining fitness for reinstatement. They are: (1) applicant's present moral fitness, (2) demonstrated consciousness of the conduct's wrongfulness and the disrepute it has brought upon the legal profession, (3) the extent of rehabilitation, (4) the original misconduct's seriousness, (5) conduct after resignation, (6) time elapsed since the resignation, (7) applicant's character, maturity and experience when he resigned, and (8) present legal competence. Matter of Reinstatement of Blevins, ¶9 In Matter of Reinstatement of Smith, While we have permitted attorneys to be reinstated after convictions of crimes, we do not agree to reinstatement without a thorough and critical review of the crimes committed and their effect on the legal profession. 'To this end the evidence must support a finding that the Applicant would not commit any serious crime if readmitted. Foremost consideration must be given to protecting the public welfare. Finally, there must be a determination that reinstatement would not adversely effect the Bar. Matter of Reinstatement of Cantrell, Matter of Reinstatement of Smith, CONTENTIONS ¶10 Otis contends he has fully reimbursed Mary's heirs for the funds he embezzled from her estate through his payments of $40,000.00 ¶11 The Bar contends reinstatement should be denied. It contends Otis has failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that he had a demonstrated consciousness of the wrongfulness of his conduct and the disrepute it brought upon the legal profession, citing his testimony that he did not believe Mary was harmed by his misconduct because of her mental incapacity at the time. DISCUSSION ¶12 This Court has held that restitution, by itself, is not a basis for imposing lenient discipline. See State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. Raskin, ¶13 In the case, Matter of Reinstatement of Massey, supra, a case involving misappropriation, this Court denied reinstatement, despite the payment of restitution in full. Massey embezzled money from his attorney trust account. He used the money to help operate his firm and to pay salaries. The misappropriation was widespread and affected multiple clients and instances of misconduct. Massey testified at his PRT hearing that he paid his own salary out of other cases he was working on rather than the embezzled funds, thus implying he did not personally benefit from his misconduct. In his brief filed later, however, he recognized the personal benefit from the standpoint that he was able to keep his office open and pay salaries, including his own. This Court did not have a "firm conviction or belief" that if readmitted, he would not commit similar misconduct. ¶14 Thus, while making full restitution to a lawyer's victims will not necessarily preclude disbarment or insure reinstatement, this Court is more concerned in the instant case with Otis's position that no further restitution is necessary. At the PRT hearing, Otis was asked who was harmed by his misconduct. He acknowledged Mary's heirs suffered because the money he took would have gone to them. He also included the Bar, his fellow lawyers, his family and himself as those who suffered by his misconduct. However, he also testified Mary never suffered because she lived in a nursing home and "she always was provided for." He acknowledged she was incapacitated and suffering from dementia at the time he disclosed his misconduct to her family. He thus implied Mary was not harmed because she was unable to comprehend his breach of her trust. He acknowledged Mary's family was frustrated knowing their aunt's money was being taken without her knowledge. Regardless of whether Mary's immediate needs were being met, which we assume was the case, and regardless of whether she knew her immediate needs were being met, Mary was harmed by Otis because her trust in him was abused. A person in need of assistance with financial matters entrusts his or her livelihood to a Conservator, knowing that there may be a time in the future when the Conservator alone will have to make decisions because of the Ward's incapacity. This is precisely when a Conservator is needed the most. The trust Mary gave to Otis was not returned to her when it mattered most. He essentially used Mary's funds as his own for almost ten years. ¶15 Otis also testified that he does not believe he owes any more money as restitution because he only embezzled approximately $75,000.00, and $85,000.00 was repaid. He testified he had made no attempt since the final accounting to determine what he owes Mary's heirs, how much was paid to himself or how much he paid to the taxing authorities on his own behalf. He further testified he did not pay himself a fee as Conservator of Mary's funds and that he believed his final accounting prepared for the court was truthful. However, we note that on the final accounting, the payments to himself for the years of 1982, 1983, 1984, and 1986, have the notation "Cons. Fee" next to his name, and in 1985, there is an expenditure with the notation "(fee- -Jan-Aug)" following his name. ¶16 Otis testified that no funds which he paid to Pate, Mary's brother, were kicked back to himself for his personal use. Apparently, he believes the checks made to Pate should not be included in the total sum of his misappropriation because he did not use those funds. However, this Court has defined three levels of culpability when evaluating the mishandling of funds in attorney disciplinary proceedings. They are: 1) commingling; 2) simple conversion; and 3) misappropriation, i.e., theft by conversion or otherwise. Commingling occurs when a client or third person's monies are combined with the attorney's personal funds. See State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Taylor, . . . The third, and most serious infraction, occurs when funds are misappropriated. This happens when an attorney purposefully deprives a client or third person of money by way of deceit and fraud. See State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Johnston, State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. Parsons, ¶17 While misappropriation of client funds is the most serious of money-related professional misconduct, Matter of Reinstatement of Fraley, ¶18 The Bar's Application to Assess Costs against Otis pursuant to Rule 11.1(c) is granted. The Bar is entitled to be reimbursed in the amount of $1309.75. CONCLUSION ¶19 For reinstatement to be warranted, we must have a firm conviction that the petitioner would not engage in similar misconduct, i.e., the evidence must be clear and convincing. Matter of Reinstatement of Massey, REINSTATEMENT IS DENIED; PETITIONER IS ORDERED TO PAY COSTS WINCHESTER, C.J., EDMONDSON, V.C.J., HARGRAVE, KAUGER, WATT, TAYLOR, COLBERT, JJ. - CONCUR OPALA, J. - NOT PARTICIPATING FOOT