Title: Wall v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC19-1727
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: May 20, 2021

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC19-1727 
____________ 
 
CRAIG ALAN WALL, SR., 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
May 20, 2021 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Capital Collateral Regional Counsel (CCRC) appeals the circuit 
court’s order granting Wall’s motion to dismiss postconviction 
counsel and proceedings, filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.851.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. 
Const.  For the reasons below, we affirm the circuit court’s order 
granting Wall’s waiver. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Wall was sentenced to death for the 2010 murders of his 
infant son, C.J., and C.J.’s mother, Laura Taft.  See Wall v. State, 
 
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238 So. 3d 127 (Fla. 2018).  In 2015, Wall pleaded no contest to 
C.J.’s murder and guilty to Laura’s murder.  Wall conducted his 
own penalty phase and Spencer hearing with standby counsel 
present.1  Wall was sentenced to death for both murders, and this 
Court affirmed his convictions and sentences.  See 238 So. 3d at 
146. 
 
In March 2018, CCRC was appointed to represent Wall in 
postconviction proceedings.  In July 2019, Wall filed a pro se 
motion to monitor and remove CCRC counsel Shepherd and, if 
denied, to waive postconviction counsel and proceedings.  At a 
status hearing in August 2019, CCRC counsel Shepherd asked the 
postconviction court to appoint two experts to evaluate Wall’s 
competency before holding a hearing on the motion.  The court 
orally denied counsel’s request and set a hearing on Wall’s motion. 
 
CCRC counsel then filed a written motion to determine Wall’s 
competency, seeking the appointment of two experts to conduct an 
evaluation.  The court denied the motion and conducted the hearing 
on Wall’s motion on August 23, 2019. 
 
 
1.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
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At the motion hearing, the postconviction court initially 
addressed the first part of Wall’s motion, which sought a Nelson 
hearing for the purpose of removing and replacing CCRC counsel 
Shepherd.2  However, the court denied Wall’s request and instead 
conducted a Durocher/Faretta colloquy for the purpose of ruling on 
Wall’s motion to waive postconviction counsel and proceedings.3 
 
The court ultimately found that Wall’s waiver of postconviction 
counsel and proceedings was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, 
and it orally accepted Wall’s waiver.  The court issued a written 
order to that effect on September 18, 2019.  CCRC now appeals the 
circuit court’s order. 
ANALYSIS 
 
CCRC argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by 
refusing to appoint experts to reevaluate Wall for competency before 
ruling on Wall’s waiver, and that the court abused its discretion by 
finding that Wall was competent to waive postconviction counsel 
 
 
2.  Nelson v. State, 274 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973). 
 
3.  Durocher v. Singletary, 623 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 1993); Faretta 
v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 
 
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and proceedings.  CCRC also argues that Wall’s waiver was not 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  However, we conclude that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion with respect to Wall’s 
competency and that Wall’s waiver was knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily made. 
I. Competency 
 
CCRC asserts that Wall’s disruptive behavior, combined with 
an expert’s conclusion that severe mental illness renders Wall 
incompetent, established a basis for ordering a new competency 
evaluation.  The State correctly argues that the circuit court was 
not obligated to reevaluate Wall’s competency.  We begin by 
reviewing relevant background and then turn to our analysis. 
   
During the pretrial phase, in May 2013, Dr. Jill Poorman 
evaluated Wall and deemed him incompetent to proceed.  Wall, 238 
So. 3d at 141.  However, in December 2013, Dr. Poorman 
reevaluated Wall and concluded that he was competent to proceed.  
Id.  The trial court accepted Dr. Poorman’s conclusion.  Id.  
Dr. Poorman also conducted subsequent evaluations of Wall—
including an evaluation prior to Wall’s pleas in 2015—each 
resulting in a conclusion that Wall was competent.  Id.  On direct 
 
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appeal, this Court rejected Wall’s claim that he was not competent 
to plead.  Id. at 141-42. 
 
In 2019, in response to Wall’s motion to waive postconviction 
counsel and proceedings, CCRC requested that the postconviction 
court appoint experts to evaluate Wall’s competency.  At an 
August 2, 2019, status hearing, CCRC stated that it had retained a 
mental health expert who reviewed Wall’s records and determined 
that severe mental illness rendered Wall incompetent.  CCRC urged 
the court to have Wall evaluated for competency before the waiver 
hearing.  However, the judge concluded that there was no basis for 
a preliminary competency evaluation and that he would determine 
at the waiver hearing whether to order a competency evaluation.  In 
an exchange with CCRC counsel Shepherd at the status hearing, 
Judge Federico stated: 
 
THE COURT: All right.  Well, what you’re telling me 
just reinforces what I’ve seen over the past nine years.  If 
he is not happy with his lawyers or that the interaction 
with his lawyers, with you, is the same that it’s been over 
the course of the nine years relative to representation, 
interaction without counsel, no matter how good his 
lawyers are or how experienced they are, it’s never 
enough or never good enough in that situation. 
 
And so this is more of the same from what I can tell 
regarding that.  Erratic behavior because he is angry or 
upset at the lawyers or people in general does not 
 
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necessarily lead to competency issues with Mr. Wall.  
He’s a special case, as you’ve found out over the course 
of your representation. 
 
And I also agree with what the AG said that he’s not 
likely to assist in the evaluation.  He wants to get here 
and vent his spleen and tell us what he wants to tell us.  
And I totally agree with what she said that he’s not gonna 
cooperate until he actually has the opportunity to come 
and do that.  If I think things have changed relative to his 
and [my] interaction, then I’ll be able to figure that out 
fairly quickly, I believe. 
 
 
Subsequently, at the waiver hearing on August 23, 2019, the 
postconviction court concluded that no competency evaluation was 
required.  The exchange between the court and CCRC, with 
interjections from Wall, reads in relevant part: 
 
MS. SHEPHERD [CCRC]: I just—I wanted to 
reiterate our position that if Mr. Wall—you decide he is 
making the decision to waive today, before you render a 
final decision allowing him to do that, that he be 
evaluated by two experts for competency. 
 
 
THE COURT: It says if there’s something about this 
hearing that suggests it’s necessary to do that. 
 
 
THE DEFENDANT: It says reasonable grounds. 
 
 
MS. SHEPHERD [CCRC]: Yes, your Honor.  You are 
correct.  It is—the rule says if there’s— 
 
 
THE COURT: Nothing has changed over eight— 
 
 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
 
 
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THE COURT: —I would say eight years that 
Mr. Wall has been here.  The same affect, the same 
interaction, the same level of intelligence, the same 
ability to respond, to talk, to communicate.  While he can 
be vociferous in the way he speaks and a little profane— 
 
 
THE DEFENDANT: That was a nice way to say it. 
 
 
THE COURT: Thank you.  There is nothing that he 
is acting like today that isn’t something that I’ve seen 
over the years throughout the— 
 
 
THE DEFENDANT: It’s based on frustration, your 
Honor. 
 
 
THE COURT: Throughout the—I understand.  
Throughout the—but, again, that shows that he’s 
competent— 
 
 
MS. SHEPHERD [CCRC]: Your Honor— 
 
 
THE COURT: —because he understands what’s 
going on.  He’s oriented.  He knows what the process is.  
He’s done the research.  He’s thought about it.  He’s 
come here with a plan.  He’s got an idea.  I mean, all of 
those things are the same that I’ve seen throughout.  He 
was able to waive—not only able to plead guilty, but he 
was able to waive having counsel to represent him and 
represent him in the penalty phase, which is even a 
higher standard than competence to go to trial if you 
have to represent yourself, and he was found to be 
competent.  The Florida Supreme Court upheld all those 
findings. 
 
So unless there is something different—and, 
frankly, I haven’t seen anything different.  This is more 
the same interaction that we’ve had over the last eight 
years throughout this entire process.  There is nothing 
here to suggest to me that I need to have him evaluated 
by experts. 
 
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MS. SHEPHERD [CCRC]: Your Honor, I would argue 
that simply because the fact that this is the same 
interaction that you’ve been having since the beginning 
would indicate that he is incompetent.  It’s our position 
he was never competent to go pro se and, likely, never 
competent to proceed.  And he’s manifestly shown that 
he has an inability to conduct himself according to 
courtroom etiquette, the profanity, interrupting, ranting 
about irrelevant— 
 
 
THE DEFENDANT: I have a disregard for authority.  
That’s all that amounts to. 
 
 
MS. SHEPHERD [CCRC]: He’s indicating— 
 
 
THE DEFENDANT: That’s not—that’s not— 
 
 
THE COURT: Hold on, Mr. Wall. 
 
 
MS. SHEPHERD [CCRC]: Further, we do have a 
mental health expert that has opined preliminarily that 
he may have a mental illness that is preventing him from 
being competent.  And under Dusky that can qualify.  
Your Honor, there is no harm to any of the parties— 
 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, because you know I’m not 
going to cooperate.  That’s why you’re trying to force it, 
because you know and he knows I’m not gonna do it. 
 
 
THE COURT: Mr. Wall, please. 
 
 
MS. SHEPHERD [CCRC]: There is no harm or 
prejudice to any of the parties having him evaluated just 
to ensure—this man is making the decision to waive his 
ability to challenge his death sentences.  This is the 
ultimate decision anyone can make in a court of law.  He 
deserves to be competent during that process. 
 
 
THE DEFENDANT: I deserve counsel. 
 
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THE COURT: We agree he deserves—your argument 
is with the Supreme Court.  They’ve reviewed everything 
that happened to this point.  They said there was no 
error in any of those prior hearings and nothing has 
changed. 
 
 
THE DEFENDANT: That was the argument on 
appeal too, your Honor, and they said nope. 
 
 
THE COURT: Can I—can I finish?  Okay.  All right.  
So they said, you know, there was no error, that they 
upheld everything that was done, and there’s nothing 
that’s changed or nothing that I’ve seen.  That’s part of 
the reason that I had him here today, because I wanted 
to see with my own eyes and hear with my own ears to 
make sure that nothing had changed and that he was 
still competent and that I didn’t need to do these things 
as far as appointing doctors before we went further and 
addressed the merits of what he had filed.  So that’s part 
of why I wanted him here, so I could have this discussion 
with him and to make sure that there weren’t any issues 
and that nothing had changed and I needed to have him 
evaluated further. 
 
As we’ve talked about, he’s a bright enough fellow.  
He understands.  He is capable of doing his own 
research.  He’s advocated for his own positions.  That’s 
not somebody that doesn’t understand the process or 
understand the surroundings around him or understand 
what the possible consequences are.  In fact, he’s making 
an open-eyed decision.  Whether you agree with it, 
whether you think it’s the best decision or not, he’s 
making decisions for himself and he has throughout this 
process. 
 
So, I don’t see anything that’s changed or anything 
that requires me to take additional steps.  I understand 
you’re here to try and protect his interest regardless of 
how he feels about you personally, and I appreciate that, 
but I don’t really need to— 
 
 
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THE DEFENDANT: I don’t. 
 
 
THE COURT: I know.  But I don’t feel any need to 
take any additional steps in that regard.  But thank you 
for making the record in that regard.  Okay? 
 
 
Ensuring a defendant’s competency is a continuing obligation 
of the court.  See Nowitzke v. State, 572 So. 2d 1346, 1349 (Fla. 
1990).  “However, only if bona fide doubt is raised as to a 
defendant’s mental capacity is the court required to conduct 
another competency proceeding.”  Hunter v. State, 660 So. 2d 244, 
248 (Fla. 1995) (citing Pericola v. State, 499 So. 2d 864, 867 (Fla. 
1st DCA 1986)).  Moreover, “[a] presumption of competence attaches 
from a previous determination of competency to stand trial.”  Id. 
(citing Durocher, 623 So. 2d at 484 (Fla. 1993)). 
 
A trial court’s failure to hold a competency hearing is subject 
to the abuse of discretion standard.  Fowler v. State, 255 So. 2d 
513, 514 (Fla. 1971).  Similarly, the court’s determination of 
competency to waive postconviction counsel and proceedings is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  Trease v. State, 41 So. 3d 119, 
124 (Fla. 2010) (citing Alston v. State, 894 So. 2d 46, 57 (Fla. 
2004)).  “[T]he relevant test for competency in the context of waiving 
collateral counsel and collateral proceedings in Florida is whether 
 
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the person seeking waiver has the capacity to ‘understand[ ] the 
consequences of waiving collateral counsel and proceedings.’ ”  
Slawson v. State, 796 So. 2d 491, 502 (Fla. 2001) (alteration in 
original) (quoting Durocher, 623 So. 2d at 485)). 
 
Based on our review of the record, there were no reasonable 
grounds for the circuit court—whose observations of Wall remained 
consistent over time—to order a new competency evaluation of Wall.  
The circuit court did not abuse its discretion by not ordering a 
competency evaluation of Wall, nor in concluding that Wall was 
competent to waive postconviction counsel and proceedings. 
II. Validity of Wall’s Waiver 
 
Having concluded that the circuit court did not err in finding 
that Wall was competent to waive postconviction counsel and 
proceedings, we now turn to the court’s conclusion that Wall’s 
waiver was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered.  “This 
Court reviews a trial court’s order finding a voluntary, knowing, and 
intelligent waiver of postconviction counsel and proceedings for an 
abuse of discretion.”  Trease, 41 So. 3d at 124 (citing Alston, 894 
So. 2d at 57).  The circuit court did not err in finding that Wall’s 
waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. 
 
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Wall was advised that he was not entitled to a Nelson hearing 
for the purpose of removing CCRC postconviction counsel.  
Nonetheless, Wall stated under repeated questioning that he 
wanted to dismiss CCRC counsel and that he understood the 
implications of his waiver: 
 
THE COURT: All right.  Well, I have to make sure 
that you understand it and that you understand if you’re 
dismissing counsel and you’re giving up all your post-
conviction proceeding— 
 
 
THE DEFENDANT: And, I’m telling you to kill me 
faster.  Yes, I understand. 
 
 
THE COURT: All right.  Then you’re gonna be 
warrant ready; you understand that? 
 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yep. 
  
 
THE COURT: All the Governor has to do is sign a 
warrant and then you’re— 
 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Oh, no, no, because you just 
skipped over—again, you’re trying to fool her family.  
There is no governor sign a warrant.  These people are 
gonna appeal whether I want it or not, just like I 
explained. 
 
The colloquy later continued: 
 
MS. SHEPHERD [CCRC]: Also—yeah, I just want to make 
it clear he’s not only forfeiting his state proceedings, he’s 
forfeiting his federal proceedings as well.  You know, a 
claim of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel 
is cognizable in certain circumstances, and he’s going to 
 
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waive that opportunity.  He’s going to waive the federal 
courts considering anything.  I also want— 
 
 
THE COURT: Especially considering the fact that 
you really haven’t even filed a claim yet.  So he doesn’t 
know what your claim would be. 
 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Oh, I know.  I know. 
 
 
THE COURT: —the witnesses you’d call or how you 
would litigate that claim. 
 
 
THE DEFENDANT: I know it’s not mine. 
 
 
THE COURT: So you’re basically giving it up without 
even knowing— 
 
 
THE DEFENDANT: I know it’s not mine and I know 
what she’s been telling me, and it’s not—it’s not worth a 
damn, trust me. 
 
 
THE COURT: Their point is— 
 
 
THE DEFENDANT: She’s already ineffective. 
 
 
THE COURT: —it would be smarter to wait to see 
what they file— 
 
 
THE DEFENDANT: I’m not gonna wait and see and 
drag this crap out no more, man. 
 
 
THE COURT: All right. 
 
 
THE DEFENDANT: I’m done with it. 
 
 
THE COURT: I get it. 
 
 
MS. SHEPHERD [CCRC]: I also—I want to make 
sure that Mr. Wall understands that he’s also waiving the 
 
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consideration of any future developments in the law that 
might apply retroactively to him.  So there’s been 
situations, for example, with Hurst relief where people 
would have been entitled to Hurst relief and not have a 
death sentence and they waived their proceedings.  He 
needs to understand that— 
 
 
THE COURT: Yeah, I probably should have said that 
too.  She’s making a good point, and I probably should 
have discussed that.  Things may change.  They may 
throw the statute out.  They may change the statute— 
 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Why do you think that I asked 
you to give me my plea agreement so when they do 
change something, I still get killed.  Or if I don’t get 
killed, I get my trial for my son.  You robbed me of that.  
Don’t sit here and try to pontificate to me about that rule.  
If you didn’t do that, I wouldn’t have to worry about that.  
You did that, presented that I didn’t do what I did. 
 
 
THE COURT: By waiving this claim now, you’re 
giving up the right, if the law does change, to be able to 
challenge anything regarding that or to do anything if it 
does. 
 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Well, hopefully my letters to the 
Governor after I’m death eligible will get him to do it 
quicker.  Maybe a few letters, a couple pictures of my son 
and Laura will make him do it faster. 
 
 
THE COURT: All right.  It appears he understands 
that this is a waiver for all time and for all purposes, 
which— 
 
 
THE DEFENDANT: That way I don’t lose my ability 
to do it. 
 
 
THE COURT: —I’ve tried to make clear to him.  
What else? 
 
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MS. SHEPHERD [CCRC]: Substantively, I think 
that’s all, your Honor.  Of course, I’ll reiterate our 
concern about competency just for the record and also 
our concern about this waiver being knowing, intelligent, 
and voluntary.  Once again, I don’t know if it is 
considering how much he’s hesitated throughout this 
process.  I don’t feel any of the answers were 
unequivocal— 
 
 
THE DEFENDANT: You see any hesitation, your 
Honor?  I ain’t seen no hesitation. 
 
 
THE COURT: Again, for the third time today, it’s an 
uncomfortable position, but I find myself agreeing with 
Mr. Wall.  I don’t see a lot of hesitancy about the 
proceedings he’s taken.  He hasn’t equivocated and he 
hasn’t said that he doesn’t want— 
 
 
THE DEFENDANT: I wouldn’t say anger.  It’s 
frustration that I don’t have any rights. 
 
 
THE COURT: Okay. 
 
 
THE DEFENDANT: That I’m being tied up. 
 
 
THE COURT: But you’re giving up—but the bottom 
line is you’re giving up even more of your rights.  Because 
you’re frustrated you don’t have the rights you want, 
you’re giving up mostly—pretty much all the rights you 
have left that I can summarize. 
 
 
THE DEFENDANT: The only right I want is the right 
to get my sentence and to die by electrocution, which 
they’re—that’s the only right they’re denying me right 
now. 
 
 
THE COURT: All right. 
 
 
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THE DEFENDANT: They’re denying me that.  That’s 
it.  Oh, and they didn’t put senior on my last name 
because—you said they would, but they said fuck—fuck 
Judge Federico. 
 
 
THE COURT: Well, you’re putting yourself in the 
position that— 
 
 
THE DEFENDANT: That’s the only two things that I 
wanted.  I think I told you that from the beginning. 
 
 
THE COURT: I know.  But the appeal— 
 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Two things, electrocution and 
putting senior on my ID card.  You couldn’t give me 
either one. 
 
 
THE COURT: The appeal from this and the 
Governor’s warrant is the only thing that’s sitting 
between you now and the end, right?  You understand 
that?  Everything else is gone.  The 3.851, removing 
counsel, coming back later, all of that is done, over. 
 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Right. 
 
 
THE COURT: They’re fired. 
 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Uh-huh. 
 
 
THE COURT: And that hearing’s over. 
 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Uh-huh. 
 
 
THE COURT: Right? 
 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Oh, one thing about that, 
though, is she’s incorrect.  I can file—I should be able to 
file—a state habeas corpus has nothing to do with any of 
the crap that they’re talking about.  Once I file a state 
 
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habeas corpus, it goes to the feds.  Under federal rules, 
right, the feds are obligated to assign me federal 
postconviction counsel.  Once they do that, then them 
people can argue what they want, right? 
 
 
THE COURT: You’re done with the— 
 
 
 
THE DEFENDANT: I’m done with the state— 
 
 
THE COURT: You’re done with me and you’re done 
with the state court for purposes of challenging any— 
 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Post-conviction 3.851 hearings, 
yes. 
 
 
THE COURT: Correct. 
 
After a discussion regarding federal postconviction proceedings, the 
exchange continued: 
 
THE COURT: 3.851(i), motion to dismiss counsel 
and post-conviction proceedings.  Based on everything 
we’ve discussed today, I’ve tried to go over everything 
with you.  She’s added some things.  We’ve talked about 
it all.  Bottom line, final answer, you want counsel 
dismissed and the post-conviction proceedings 
dismissed.  Is that correct? 
 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Deal or no deal.  You sure you 
want that briefcase, sir?  Yeah, I want the brief—I don’t 
want the briefcase, but open it anyway.  Yes, I—I—this is 
what I want to do, sir. 
 
 
THE COURT: Dismiss counsel and the post-
conviction proceedings, yes? 
 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
 
 
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THE COURT: All right.  Then I’ll grant Mr. Wall’s 
motion to dismiss counsel and the post-conviction 
proceedings.  He understands the consequences.  I’ve 
tried to go over them with him.  We’ve tried to have— 
 
 
THE DEFENDANT: The consequences is death, a 
quicker death, not a slow and dragged out— 
 
 
THE COURT: I believe he understands the 
consequences.  We’ve had a full discussion of it.  The 
lawyers have been here to put on the record what they 
want.  He’s heard all of that.  I think he’s competent.  
He’s made that decision, and he’s indicated for the record 
his reasons for making that decision.  So I’ll grant it as 
his request.  All right? 
 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Thank you. 
 
 
THE COURT: All right.  Thank you. 
 
The record conclusively establishes that Wall understood what he 
was waiving and the consequences of his waiver.  The 
postconviction court did not err in concluding that Wall was 
competent to waive postconviction counsel and proceedings. 
 
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CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order 
granting Wall’s motion to waive postconviction counsel and 
proceedings. 
 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LABARGA, LAWSON, MUÑIZ, 
COURIEL, and GROSSHANS, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Pinellas County, 
Philip James Federico, Judge – 522010CF003759XXXXNO 
 
Eric Pinkard, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Adrienne Joy 
Shepherd, Ali A. Shakoor, and Lisa Marie Bort, Assistant Capital 
Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle Region, Temple Terrace, 
Florida; and Craig Alan Wall, Sr., pro se, Raiford, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Marilyn 
Muir Beccue, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee