Title: Faith Properties, LLC, Marjan Vakili and Kevin Vakili v. First Commercial Bank
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1061149
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: January 11, 2008

Rel: 01/11/08
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
_________________________
1061149
_________________________
Faith Properties, LLC, Marjan Vakili, and Kevin Vakili
v.
First Commercial Bank
Appeal from Madison Circuit Court
(CV-05-2125)
WOODALL, Justice.
Faith Properties, LLC ("Faith"), Marjan Vakili, and her
husband, Kevin Vakili, appeal from a summary judgment in favor
of First Commercial Bank ("the Bank") in the Bank's action
against them to set aside as fraudulent certain conveyances of
1061149
2
real estate from the Vakilis to Faith.  We vacate the judgment
and dismiss the appeal.
I. Factual Background
The facts essential to the resolution of this case are
undisputed.  On October 19, 2005, the Bank filed a complaint
(case no. CV-05-2125) against Kevin Vakili alleging breach of
agreements personally guaranteeing payment of loans the Bank
made to corporations Vakili owned.  On November 29, 2005, the
Vakilis sold their principal residence located at  "The
Ledges" in Huntsville.
On December 16, 2005, the Bank filed a "motion for
temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and
permanent injunction, and to seize sales proceeds of
defendant, Kevin Vakili" ("the seizure motion").  In this
motion, the Bank averred that proceeds from the sale of the
Huntsville residence were to have been used to pay the loans,
and it sought an order requiring Kevin Vakili "to tender one-
half of the proceeds realized from the sale of the property
... to the Circuit Court of Madison County, ... so that the
same [could] be held pending a hearing on [the] motion and the
ultimate resolution of the complaint."  That same day, the
1061149
Rule 64 deals with "pre-judgment seizure or attachment."
1
3
trial court entered a "temporary restraining order and order
for writ of seizure," stating, in part:
"[The Bank] has made application in compliance
with Rule 64(b) of the Alabama Rules of Civil
Procedure
 for an Order prohibiting the Defendant,
[1]
Kevin 
Vakili, 
from 
transferring 
or 
otherwise
disposing of those proceeds he received from the
sale of property he owned in Huntsville, Alabama,
and for the seizure of said funds and the placement
of the funds with the Circuit Court of Madison
County.  The court has examined the affidavit and
exhibits attached thereto and finds that reasonable
grounds exist to authorize issuance of this order.
Accordingly,
"IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT the
Defendant, Kevin Vakili, is hereby ordered to
immediately cease transferring, spending, using or
encumbering any of the proceeds he received from the
sale of that property he owned [in] Huntsville,
Alabama, which sale occurred on or about November
29, 2005.  Said Defendant's failure to comply with
this order shall result in his being held in
contempt of this order.
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
THAT the Motion for Preliminary Injunction shall be
heard on THURSDAY, DECEMBER 22, 2005, AT 4:30
P.M....
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
THAT upon approval by the clerk of this court of the
[Bank's] bond in the amount of $10,000.00, that the
Defendant, Kevin Vakili, shall immediately pay into
the registry of the Circuit Court of Madison County,
Alabama, those sums that he received from the sale
of the real property located at The Ledges in
Huntsville, Alabama, which sale occurred on or about
1061149
4
November 29, 2005.  Said proceeds shall include one-
half of the net proceeds received from said sale,
which half is attributed to the one-half ownership
interest that [he] had in said property.  Defendant
Kevin Vakili shall also provide proof to the court
of the amount that he received from the sale of the
property, including a copy of the closing statement
or settlement statement received from the sale of
said property.
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
THAT should the Defendant fail to pay said sums into
court within five (5) days of the date hereof, that
the Sheriff or other duly constituted officer shall
seize said funds and hold the same subject to
further orders of this court.
"TAKE NOTICE THAT THE DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED AS
A MATTER OF RIGHT TO A PRE-JUDGMENT HEARING ON THE
ISSUE OF DISSOLUTION OF THE WRIT OF SEIZURE IF A
WRITTEN REQUEST FOR HEARING IS SERVED UPON COUNSEL
FOR [THE BANK] WITHIN FIVE (5) DAYS FROM THE DATE OF
SEIZURE OF THE PROPERTY BY THE SHERIFF OR OTHER DULY
CONSTITUTED OFFICER.
"SHOULD DEFENDANT DESIRE SUCH PRE-JUDGMENT
HEARING, HE SHOULD FILE THE ORIGINAL OF HIS WRITTEN
REQUEST FOR SETTING THE HEARING WITH THE CLERK OF
THIS COURT AND A COPY OF SAID REQUEST SHOULD BE
SERVED ON SAID COUNSEL FOR [THE BANK].  IF, AFTER
TIMELY AND PROPER REQUEST, NO HEARING HAS BEEN HELD,
THE WRIT OF SEIZURE AUTHORIZED HEREIN SHALL EXPIRE
ON THE FIFTEENTH (15th) DAY AFTER THE SEIZURE OF THE
PROPERTY BY THE SHERIFF OR OTHER DULY CONSTITUTED
OFFICER.  IF NO REQUEST FOR HEARING IS MADE, THE
WRIT SHALL REMAIN IN EFFECT PENDING ORDERS OF THE
COURT.  HOWEVER, THE COURT, IN ITS DISCRETION, MAY
HEAR A REQUEST FOR DISSOLUTION OF THE WRIT, ALTHOUGH
SAID REQUEST IS SERVED MORE THAN FIVE (5) DAYS FROM
THE DATE OF SEIZURE.
1061149
5
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT a copy of this order
be served upon the defendant with the aforementioned
writ of seizure."
(Capitalization in original.)  The order roughly tracks the
language of Rule 64, Ala. R. Civ. P. 
On December 23, 2005, following a hearing at which Kevin
Vakili did not appear, the court entered an "order for
preliminary injunction," requiring Vakili to immediately "pay
to the Clerk of the Court one half of the net proceeds
received from [the sale of the Vakilis' residence], which half
is attributed to the one-half ownership interest that
Defendant Kevin Vakili had in the property" (the December 16
order and the December 23 order are hereinafter collectively
referred to as "the attachment order").
Meanwhile, on December 19, 2005, a default judgment was
entered against Kevin Vakili, and reflected in the State
Judicial Information System, assessing damages in the amount
of $705,710.01.  On January 13, 2006, Vakili moved for relief
from the default judgment, asserting as a ground the absence
of effective service of process.  On March 3, 2006, the trial
court denied Vakili's motion. 
1061149
6
On July 31, 2006, the Bank filed a "Motion for Leave to
Amend Complaint and Add Third-party Defendants."  The amended
complaint purported to add Faith and Marjan Vakili as
defendants.  The Bank averred that three parcels of real
estate -- two of which were owned by Kevin and one of which
was owned by Kevin and Marjan jointly -- were transferred on
December 16, 2005, to Faith for no consideration, and that
Faith was owned by Marjan and the Vakilis' son.  The complaint
asserted claims under the Alabama Fraudulent Transfer Act,
Ala. Code 1975, §§ 8-9A-4 and -5.  It sought a judgment
setting aside the transfers as void and declaring "that the
properties [were] owned by the prior owners, Kevin Vakili and
Marjan Vakili, as if no such subsequent transfer occurred."
It further sought a judgment against Kevin Vakili declaring
that the default judgment attached as a lien on the properties
in favor of the Bank as of the date of the judgment. 
On February 5, 2007, the Bank moved for a summary
judgment on the claims in the amended complaint.  Faith and
the Vakilis filed a response in opposition to the motion for
a summary judgment.  Concurrently, they moved to dismiss the
amended complaint for lack of jurisdiction, contending that
1061149
7
case no. CV-05-2125 had become final and conclusive between
the parties more than 30 days before the Bank attempted to
amend the complaint. 
On March 28, 2007, the trial court entered a summary
judgment for the Bank.  The judgment stated, in pertinent
part:
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED
that the transfers of the three (3) tracts of
properties from Kevin Vakili and Marjan Vakili to
[Faith] 
... 
constitute 
fraudulent 
conveyances
pursuant to Alabama law and therefore are null and
void and due to be set aside as if the transfers
never 
occurred. 
 
Accordingly, 
title 
to 
the
properties shall vest in the prior owners of said
properties as if the transfers had never occurred.
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED
that upon the setting aside of said transfers, that
[the Bank's] judgment recorded on December 20, 2005,
shall attach as a lien to said three (3) properties
as of the date of recordation pursuant to applicable
law."
On April 26, 2007, the trial court entered an amended
judgment denying the motion of Faith and the Vakilis to
dismiss the amended complaint.  From that judgment Faith and
the Vakilis appealed, contending, among other things, that the
trial court "lost jurisdiction to entertain [the Bank's] July
31, 2006, Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint when it entered
its March 3, 2006, denial of Vakili's post-judgment motion."
1061149
8
Appellants' brief, at 26.  We are thus presented with a
threshold question regarding our subject-matter jurisdiction,
the resolution of which turns on the degree of finality to be
afforded the March 3, 2006, order denying Kevin Vakili's
motion to set aside the default judgment.
II. Discussion
A judgment entered by a trial court without subject-
matter jurisdiction is void.  Ex parte Norfolk Southern Ry.,
816 So. 2d 469, 472 (Ala. 2001).  Thus, unless the trial court
had subject-matter jurisdiction when it entered the summary
judgment, that judgment was a nullity and must be set aside.
Pinkerton Sec. & Investigation Servs., Inc. v. Chamblee, 961
So. 2d 97 (Ala. 2006).
In that connection, it is well settled that "a judgment
is not subject to revision after all the claims of all
parties have been adjudicated, absent a timely motion filed
pursuant to Rules 55, 59, or 60, Ala. R. Civ. P."  Pratt
Capital, Inc. v. Boyett, 840 So. 2d 138, 143 (Ala. 2002)
(emphasis added).  See also Harper v. Brown, Stagner,
Richardson, Inc., 845 So. 2d 777, 779 (Ala. 2002) (Rule 60,
Ala. R. Civ. P., is not a vehicle by which to amend a
1061149
9
complaint following a final judgment to "add new claims
against a new defendant").  Otherwise stated, a trial court
has no jurisdiction to entertain a motion to amend a complaint
to add new claims or new parties after a final judgment has
been entered, unless that "judgment is first set aside or
vacated" pursuant to the state's rules of civil procedure.
Greene v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of Nevada, 115 Nev. 391,
393, 990 P.2d 184, 185 (1999); see also Paganis v. Blonstein,
3 F.3d 1067 (7th Cir. 1993);  DiPaolo v. Rollins Leasing
Corp., 700 So. 2d 31 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); 6 Charles
Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1489 (2d
ed. 1990). 
The default judgment in this case has not been set aside.
Indeed, the trial court declined Vakili's invitation to set it
aside, and the Bank has never challenged the judgment.  On the
contrary, the Bank argues that, because Vakili did not appeal
from the denial of his motion to set aside the judgment, the
judgment is now final and unreviewable.  The Bank's brief, at
10, 19 n.8.  
The 
Bank, 
however, 
contends 
that 
"the 
court 
had
jurisdiction over the case notwithstanding the entry of the
1061149
10
default judgment against Vakili."  The Bank's brief, at 26
(emphasis added).  This is so, because, it argues, "the court
only entered a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction, reserving the right of the court to also enter a
Permanent Injunction at a later date."  Id.  Thus, according
to the Bank, through the seizure motion and the trial court's
action on that motion, the court retained jurisdiction to
consider an amended pleading at a later date, specifically, on
July 31, 2006.  We disagree.
"'A judgment that conclusively determines all of the
issues before the court and ascertains and declares the rights
of the parties involved is a final judgment.'"  Boyett, 840
So. 2d at 144 (quoting Nichols v. Ingram Plumbing, 710 So. 2d
454, 455 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998)).  "A judgment that declares
the rights of the parties and settles the equities is final
even though the trial court envisions further proceedings to
effectuate the judgment."  Wyers v. Keenon, 762 So. 2d 353,
355 (Ala. 1999).  Otherwise stated, a judgment that is
"definitive of the cause in the court below, leaving nothing
further to be done, save [its enforcement]," is a final
judgment.  Ex parte Gilmer, 64 Ala. 234, 235 (1879).
1061149
11
"Claims adjudicated in a previous non-final order become
final ... at the time the last party or claim is disposed of."
Oliver v. Townsend, 534 So. 2d 1038, 1046 (Ala. 1988).  A
trial "'court cannot, by its subsequent action, divest a
[judgment] of its character of finality.  A final [judgment]
is not rendered interlocutory by the retention of the case on
the docket, nor by the subsequent rendition of another
[judgment] therein.'"  Boyett, 840 So. 2d at 144-45 (quoting
Nichols, 710 So. 2d at 456, quoting in turn Mingledorf v.
Falkville Downtown Redev. Auth., 641 So. 2d 830, 832 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1991)).  Neither can a final judgment "be made
nonfinal by the trial court's calling it nonfinal."  Smith v.
Fruehauf Corp., 580 So. 2d 570, 572 (Ala. 1991) (emphasis
added).  
After the denial of a postjudgment motion directed at a
final judgment, "the trial court loses jurisdiction over the
action."  Chamblee, 961 So. 2d at 102.  The application of
these principles compels the conclusion that, when the trial
court denied Vakili's postjudgment motion on March 3, 2006, it
lost jurisdiction to entertain an amendment to the complaint.
1061149
12
It is clear that the relief sought by the seizure motion
and granted by the attachment order was essentially that of a
"pre-judgment seizure or attachment."  Rule 64(b)(2)(C).
"[A]ttachment is a legal process which seizes and holds the
property of the defendant until the rights of the parties are
determined in the principal suit."  Old Kent Bank v. Stoller,
254 Ill. App. 3d 1085, 1092, 627 N.E.2d 265, 269, 194 Ill.
Dec. 149, 153 (1993) (emphasis added).  "The levy of an
attachment ... creates a lien in favor of the plaintiff."
Ala. Code 1975, § 6-6-76.  However, the lien is "inchoate and
imperfect, until [the] judgment  is rendered, for it is that
alone which determines the claim on which the attachment rests
to be just."  Hale v. Cummings, 3 Ala. 398, 400 (1842).  "If
[the plaintiff] fails to establish his claim, the inchoate
lien is entirely gone ...."  Id.  A "[f]inal judgment marks
the completion of the attachment and the underlying suit."
Enterprise Bank v. Magna Bank of Missouri, 894 F. Supp. 1337,
1343 (E.D. Mo. 1995), aff'd, 92 F.3d 743 (8th Cir. 1996)
(emphasis added).  Thus, after a judgment for the plaintiff,
the disposition of the lien perfected by the judgment devolves
into a matter of enforcement of the judgment, which, as we
1061149
As noted above, Kevin Vakili did not appear at the
2
December 22, 2005, hearing on the seizure motion.  Pursuant to
Rule 64(b)(2)(C), nonattendance constitutes a "waiver of any
objections to the pre-judgment seizure or attachment."  This
appeal involves no issue regarding the propriety of the
default judgment or the attachment order.
"This Court [looks] at the substance of a motion ... to
3
determine how that motion is to be construed under the Alabama
Rules of Civil Procedure."  Pontius v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 915 So. 2d 557, 562-63 (Ala. 2005).
13
have already noted, does not disturb the finality of the
judgment.  See Wyers, 762 So. 2d at 355.
In entering the default judgment and the attendant
attachment order, the trial court granted all the relief the
Bank had requested.   Despite the use in the attachment order
2
of the term "preliminary injunction,"  no further action in
3
the case was contemplated as of March 3, 2006, other than
enforcement of the judgment, as no claim remained outstanding.
Attachment of the proceeds of the sale of the Vakilis'
residence at The Ledges was sought merely as an aid in
enforcing the judgment; it was not a vehicle to extend
indefinitely the life of the lawsuit.  Thus, it could not
serve as a conduit to connect the undisputedly final default
judgment, which became unappealable 43 days after March 3,
1061149
14
2006, with the motion to amend the complaint filed on July 31,
2006.
III. Conclusion 
For these reasons, the summary judgment was void, and it
is hereby vacated.  Moreover, a void judgment will not support
an appeal.  Gulf Beach Hotel, Inc. v. State ex rel. Whetstone,
935 So. 2d 1177, 1183 (Ala. 2006).  Therefore, the appeal is
dismissed.
JUDGMENT VACATED; APPEAL DISMISSED.
Cobb, C.J., and See, Smith, and Parker, JJ., concur.