Title: Johnson v. Wisconsin Elections Commission
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2021AP001450-OA
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: March 3, 2022

2022 WI 14 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2021AP1450-OA 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Billie Johnson, Eric O'Keefe, Ed Perkins and 
Ronald Zahn, 
          Petitioners, 
Black Leaders Organizing for Communities, Voces 
de la Frontera, League of Women Voters of 
Wisconsin, Cindy Fallona, Lauren Stephenson, 
Rebecca Alwin, Congressman Glenn Grothman, 
Congressman Mike Gallagher, Congressman Bryan 
Steil, Congressman Tom Tiffany, Congressman 
Scott Fitzgerald, Lisa Hunter, Jacob Zabel, 
Jennifer Oh, John Persa, Geraldine Schertz, 
Kathleen Qualheim, Gary Krenz, Sarah J. 
Hamilton, Stephen Joseph Wright, Jean-Luc 
Thiffeault, and Somesh Jha,  
          Intervenors-Petitioners, 
     v. 
Wisconsin Elections Commission, Marge Bostelmann 
in her official capacity as a member of the 
Wisconsin Elections Commission, Julie Glancey in 
her official capacity as a member of the 
Wisconsin Elections Commission, Ann Jacobs  
in her official capacity as a member of the 
Wisconsin Elections Commission, Dean Knudson in 
his official capacity as a member of the 
Wisconsin Elections Commission, Robert Spindell, 
Jr. in his official capacity as a member of the 
Wisconsin Elections Commission and Mark Thomsen 
in his official capacity as a member of the  
Wisconsin Elections Commission, 
          Respondents, 
The Wisconsin Legislature, Governor Tony Evers, 
in his official capacity, and Janet Bewley 
Senate Democratic Minority Leader, on behalf of 
the Senate Democratic Caucus, 
          Intervenors-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
ORIGINAL ACTION 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 1, 2022   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 19, 2022   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
 
2 
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioners, there were briefs filed by Richard M. 
Esenberg, Anthony F. LoCoco, Lucas T. Vebber and Wisconsin 
Institute for Law & Liberty, Milwaukee. There was oral argument 
by Richard M. Esenberg.  
 
For the intervenors-petitioners Black Leaders Organizing 
for Communities, Voces de la Frontera, League of Women Voters of 
Wisconsin, Cindy Fallona, Lauren Stephenson and Rebecca Alwin, 
briefs, including amicus briefs, were filed by Douglas M. 
Poland, Jeffrey A. Mandell, Rachel E. Snyder, Richard A. Manthe, 
Carly Gerads and Stafford Rosenbaum LLP, Madison; Mel Barnes and 
Law Forward, Inc., Madison; Mark P. Gaber (pro hac vice), 
Christopher Lamar (pro hac vice)and Campaign Legal Center, 
Washington, D.C.; Annabelle Harless (pro hac vice) and Campaign 
Legal Center, Chicago.  There was oral argument by Douglas M. 
Poland. 
 
For the intervenors-petitioners Congressmen Glenn Grothman, 
Mike Gallagher, Bryan Steil, Tom Tiffany and Scott Fitzgerald 
there were briefs, including amicus briefs, filed by Misha 
Tseytlin, Kevin M. LeRoy, and Troutman Pepper Hamilton Sanders 
LLP, Chicago.  There was oral argument by Misha Tseytlin.  
 
For the intervenors-petitioners Lisa Hunter, Jacob Zabel, 
Jennifer 
Oh, 
John 
Persa, 
Geraldine 
Schertz 
and 
Kathleen 
Qualheim, there were briefs, including amicus briefs filed by 
Charles G. Curtis, Jr. and Perkins Coie LLP, Madison; Marc Erik 
Elias (pro hac vice), Aria C. Branch (pro hac vice), Daniel C. 
 
 
3 
Osher (pro hac vice), Jacob D. Shelly (pro hac vice), Christina 
A. Ford (pro hac vice), William K. Hancock (pro hac vice) and 
Elias Law Group LLP, Washington, D.C.  There was oral argument 
by John Devaney (pro hac vice), Perkins Coie LLP, Washington, 
D.C.   
 
For the intervenors-petitioners Citizens Mathematicians and 
Scientists Gary Krenz, Sarah J. Hamilton, Stephen Joseph Wright, 
Jean-Luc Thiffeault and Somesh Jha, briefs were filed by Michael 
P. May, Sarah A. Zylstra, Tanner G. Jean-Louis and Boardman & 
Clark LLP, Madison, and David J. Bradford (pro hac vice) and 
Jenner & Block LLP, Chicago.  There was oral argument by Sam 
Hirsch (pro hac vice), Jenner & Block LLP, Washington, D.C.  
 
For the respondents Wisconsin Elections Commission, Marge 
Bostelmann, Julie Glancey, Ann Jacobs, Dean Knudson, Robert 
Spindell, Jr. and Mark Thomsen there were letter-briefs filed by 
Steven C. Kilpatrick, assistant attorney general, Karla Z. 
Keckhaver, assistant attorney general, Thomas C. Bellavia, 
assistant attorney general. 
 
For the intervenors-respondents the Wisconsin Legislature 
there were briefs, including amicus briefs, filed by Kevin M. 
St. John and Bell Giftos St. John LLC, Madison; Jeffrey M. 
Harris (pro hac vice), Taylor A.R. Meehan (pro hac vice), James 
P. McGlone and Consovoy McCarthy PLLC, Arlington, Virginia and 
Adam K. Mortara and Lawfair LLC, Chicago.  There was oral 
argument by Taylor A.R. Meehan. 
 
For the intervenor-respondent Governor Tony Evers there 
were briefs filed by Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general, Anthony 
D. Russomanno, assistant attorney general and Brian P. Keenan, 
assistant attorney general.  There was oral argument by Anthony 
D. Russomanno. 
 
 
4 
 
For the intervenor-respondent Janet Bewley, State Senate 
Democratic Minority Leader on behalf of the State Senate 
Democratic Caucus there were briefs filed by Tamara B. Packard, 
Aaron G. Dumas and Pines Bach LLP, Madison.  There was oral 
argument by Tamara B. Packard. 
 
There was an amicus brief filed on behalf of William 
Whitford, Hans Breitenmoser, Mary Lynne Donohue, Wendy Sue 
Johnson and Deborah Patel by Ruth M. Greenwood (pro hac vice), 
The Election Law Clinic, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA; with 
whom on the brief were law student-practitioners Mary F. Brown, 
Mark R. Haidar, Meredith A. Manda, Sarah A. Sadlier, Corey M. 
Stewart, Harvard Law School and Jakob Feltham and Hawks Quindel, 
S.C., Madison. 
 
There was an amicus brief filed on behalf of Concerned 
Voters of Wisconsin by Joseph S. Goode, Mark M. Leitner, John W. 
Halpin and Laffey, Leitner & Goode, L.L.C., Milwaukee.  
 
There was an amicus brief filed on behalf of Non-Party 
Legal 
Scholars 
by 
Allison 
Boldt, 
Robert 
Yablon 
and 
the 
University of Wisconsin Law School, Madison. 
 
There was an amicus brief filed by Daniel R. Suhr, 
Thiensville. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2022 WI 14 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2021AP1450-OA 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Billie Johnson, Eric O'Keefe, Ed Perkins and 
Ronald Zahn, 
 
          Petitioners, 
 
Black Leaders Organizing for Communities, Voces 
de la Frontera, League of Women Voters of 
Wisconsin, Cindy Fallona, Lauren Stephenson, 
Rebecca Alwin, Congressman Glenn Grothman, 
Congressman Mike Gallagher, Congressman Bryan 
Steil, Congressman Tom Tiffany, Congressman 
Scott Fitzgerald, Lisa Hunter, Jacob Zabel, 
Jennifer Oh, John Persa, Geraldine Schertz, 
Kathleen Qualheim, Gary Krenz, Sarah J. 
Hamilton, Stephen Joseph Wright, Jean-Luc 
Thiffeault, and Somesh Jha,  
 
          Intervenors-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Elections Commission, Marge 
Bostelmann in her official capacity as a member 
of the Wisconsin Elections Commission, Julie 
Glancey in her official capacity as a member of 
the Wisconsin Elections Commission, Ann Jacobs 
in her official capacity as a member of the 
Wisconsin Elections Commission, Dean Knudson in 
his official capacity as a member of the 
Wisconsin Elections Commission, Robert 
Spindell, Jr. in his official capacity as a 
member of the Wisconsin Elections Commission 
and Mark Thomsen in his official capacity as a 
member of the Wisconsin Elections Commission, 
 
          Respondents, 
FILED 
 
MAR 3, 2022 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
2 
 
The Wisconsin Legislature, Governor Tony Evers, 
in his official capacity, and Janet Bewley 
Senate Democratic Minority Leader, on behalf of 
the Senate Democratic Caucus, 
 
          Intervenors-Respondents. 
 
 
 
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  ANN 
WALSH BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which DALLET 
and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a dissenting 
opinion, in which ROGGENSACK and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, JJ., 
joined.  ROGGENSACK, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which 
ZIEGLER, C.J., and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined.  REBECCA 
GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which 
ZIEGLER, C.J., and ROGGENSACK, J., joined. 
 
 
ORIGINAL ACTION.  Relief granted. 
 
¶1 
BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   Every ten years, states are 
required 
to 
redraw 
the 
boundaries 
for 
congressional 
and 
legislative districts to account for population changes.  This 
means the maps enacted into law in 2011 cannot constitutionally 
serve as the basis for future elections.  The responsibility to 
adopt new district boundaries is not ours in the first instance, 
but that of the legislature and governor via the legislative 
process. 
¶2 
Shortly after the completion of the 2020 decennial 
census, a group of voters petitioned this court to declare the 
2011 maps unconstitutional and remedy the malapportionment.  We 
granted the petition, and subsequently granted intervention to 
all parties that sought it, mindful that relief from this court 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
3 
 
would be necessary only if the legislative process failed.1  We 
have given the political branches a fair opportunity to carry 
out their constitutional responsibilities.  They have not done 
so.  Both this court and the United States Supreme Court have 
held that this failure implicates the constitutional rights of 
voters.  State ex rel. Reynolds v. Zimmermann, 22 Wis. 2d 544, 
562, 126 N.W.2d 551 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 
(1964).  We are therefore left with the unwelcome task of 
filling the gap. 
¶3 
The members of this court were not of one mind 
regarding how——or even whether——to approach this undertaking.  
But having taken this case, we sought input from the parties on 
the law that governs, as well as the process by which we should 
fashion a remedy. 
¶4 
In an order issued on November 17, 2021, and an 
opinion issued on November 30, 2021, we set out the basic 
process and criteria we would use to guide our decision.  
Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2021 WI 87, 399 Wis. 2d 623, 
967 N.W.2d 469.  Rather than craft our own map, we invited all 
parties to this litigation to submit one proposed map for each 
set of districts where new district boundaries are required:  
congress, state senate, and state assembly.  We said we would 
choose maps that minimize changes from current law and evaluate 
maps for compliance with state and federal law.  Id., ¶¶38, 72.  
                                                 
1 For a summary of this case's prior procedural history, see 
Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2021 WI 87, ¶¶5-6, 399 
Wis. 2d 623, 967 N.W.2d 469. 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
4 
 
In so concluding, we rejected an approach that involved this 
court making significant policy decisions or weighing competing 
policy criteria.  We also rejected invitations to consider the 
partisan makeup of proposed districts.  By focusing on legal 
requirements and using the maps currently reflected in Wisconsin 
law as a reference point, we sought to minimize our involvement 
in the numerous policy and political decisions inherent in map-
drawing. 
¶5 
Following our November 30 opinion, parties submitted 
proposed maps, briefs, and expert reports.  And we heard over 
five hours of argument regarding which proposed maps best comply 
with the parameters we established. 
¶6 
Although not bound by any map proposal, we approached 
this task hoping to select submissions from the parties that 
best satisfied the criteria we set forth.  We did so both at the 
suggestion of the parties and in recognition of our limitations.  
While we appreciate the hard work of the parties, we must 
acknowledge that each proposal makes changes that appear 
unnecessary to account for population changes or to otherwise 
comply with the law.  But rather than modify submissions we 
received, we determine that the best approach is to choose the 
maps that best conform with our directives, imperfect though 
they may be. 
¶7 
Congressional 
maps. 
 
We 
received 
proposed 
congressional 
maps 
from 
four 
parties: 
 
the 
Citizen 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
5 
 
Mathematicians and Scientists,2 the Congressmen,3 Governor Tony 
Evers, and the Hunter intervenors-petitioners.4  The first 
question is which map most complies with our least-change 
directive.  With only eight districts, core retention——a measure 
of voters who remain in their prior districts——is the best 
metric of least change, and the map submitted by Governor Evers 
easily scores highest.  His map moves 5.5% of the population to 
new districts, leaving 94.5% in their current districts.  In raw 
numbers, the Governor's proposal to move 324,415 people to new 
districts is 60,041 fewer people than the next best proposal.  
In addition, Governor Evers' submission complies with the 
federal Constitution and all other applicable laws.  We 
therefore adopt Governor Evers' proposed congressional map. 
¶8 
State legislative maps.  We received six state 
legislative 
map 
proposals 
from: 
 
the 
BLOC 
intervenors-
                                                 
2 The Citizen Mathematicians and Scientists include Gary 
Krenz, Sarah J. Hamilton, Stephen Joseph Wright, Jean-Luc 
Thiffeault, and Somesh Jha. 
3 The Congressmen include Congressmen Glenn Grothman, Mike 
Gallagher, Bryan Steil, Tom Tiffany, and Scott Fitzgerald. 
The 
Wisconsin 
Legislature 
endorsed 
the 
Congressmen's 
proposed congressional map, but did not advance any arguments on 
the merits of this proposed map. 
4 The Hunter intervenors-petitioners include Lisa Hunter, 
Jacob Zabel, Jennifer Oh, John Persa, Geraldine Schertz, and 
Kathleen Qualheim. 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
6 
 
petitioners,5 the Citizen Mathematicians and Scientists, Governor 
Evers, the Hunter intervenors-petitioners, Senator Janet Bewley,6 
and the Wisconsin Legislature.  The proposed senate and assembly 
maps making the least changes from current law are once again 
those of Governor Evers.  In their senate proposals, both 
Governor Evers and the Legislature move a nearly identical 7.8% 
of voters to different districts (92.2% core retention), with a 
slight edge to the Legislature for moving 1,958 fewer people.  
However, in their assembly map proposals, Governor Evers moves 
14.2% of voters to new districts, while the Legislature moves 
15.8% (85.8% vs. 84.2% core retention), a difference that 
affects 96,178 people.  No other proposal comes close.  And 
beyond core retention, no other measure of least change alters 
the picture.  The Governor's proposed senate and assembly maps 
produce less overall change than other submissions. 
¶9 
We also conclude that Governor Evers' proposals 
satisfy the requirements of the state and federal constitutions.  
Under the Wisconsin Constitution, all districts are contiguous, 
sufficiently 
equal 
in 
population, 
sufficiently 
compact, 
appropriately nested, and pay due respect to local boundaries.  
Governor Evers' proposed maps also comply with the federal 
constitution's population equality requirement. 
                                                 
5 The 
BLOC 
interventors-petitioners 
included 
the 
organizations Black Leaders Organizing for Communities, Voces de 
la Frontera, and League of Women Voters of Wisconsin, in 
addition to Cindy Fallona, Lauren Stephenson, and Rebecca Alwin. 
6 Senate Minority Leader Janet Bewley intervened as a 
respondent on behalf of the Senate Democratic Caucus. 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
7 
 
¶10 Regarding the Voting Rights Act (VRA), the 2011 maps 
enacted into law include six majority-Black assembly voting 
districts in the Milwaukee area.  Governor Evers, along with 
several other parties, argues the VRA now requires a seventh 
majority-Black assembly district in the Milwaukee area.  As a 
map-drawer, we understand that our duty is to determine whether 
there are "good reasons" to believe the VRA requires a seven-
district configuration.  In assessing the information presented 
by the parties, we conclude there are good reasons to believe a 
seventh majority-Black district is needed to satisfy the VRA.  
Governor Evers' assembly map accomplishes this.  For these 
reasons, we adopt Governor Evers' proposed remedial state senate 
and state assembly maps. 
 
I.  FRAMEWORK FOR OUR DECISION 
¶11 In our prior opinion in this case, we laid out more 
fully the analytical framework for our final decision.  For 
completeness, we briefly summarize our approach here.  Before 
our November 30 opinion, the parties offered a variety of 
arguments regarding which factors we could or should consider in 
providing remedial maps.  See Johnson, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶7.  We 
concluded we would minimize judicial policymaking by starting 
with the 2011 maps previously enacted into law, and change only 
what is "necessary to resolve constitutional or statutory 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
8 
 
deficiencies."7  Id., ¶72.  We further concluded that the 
partisan makeup of districts would not play a role in our 
decision.  Id., ¶39.  We were not unanimous in these 
conclusions, but it is how we as a court decided to proceed.8  So 
we invited parties to submit maps that minimize deviations from 
existing district boundaries and abide by all relevant laws. 
¶12 With this framework in mind, we begin our analysis by 
probing which maps make the least change from current district 
boundaries.  From there, we examine the relevant law to ensure 
that the map producing the least change also comports with all 
state and federal legal requirements. 
 
                                                 
7 The concurrence agreed with this approach and added that 
if there were equally compelling arguments on least change, we 
could look to traditional redistricting criteria to assist our 
decision-making.  Johnson, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶83 (Hagedorn, J., 
concurring).  Our selection of remedial maps in this case is 
driven solely by the relevant legal requirements and the least 
change directive the majority adopted in the November 30 order——
not a balancing of traditional redistricting criteria. 
8 The dissent argued that "[t]rue neutrality could be 
achieved by instead adhering to the neutral factors supplied by 
the state and federal constitutions, the Voting Rights Act, and 
traditional redistricting criteria."  Johnson, 399 Wis. 2d 623, 
¶94 (Dallet, J., dissenting).  Thus, the dissent proposed 
conducting a more open balancing of various policy interests, 
including population equality, compactness, and respect for 
political 
subdivision 
boundaries. 
 
Id. 
 
It 
also 
viewed 
partisanship as "one of the many factors a court must balance 
when enacting remedial maps."  Id., ¶110. 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
9 
 
II.  CONGRESSIONAL MAP 
A.  Least Change 
¶13 Wisconsin 
has 
eight 
congressional 
districts, 
so 
evaluating which maps changed the least is far simpler than for 
legislative maps, where modifications are necessarily more 
numerous and granular.  The core retention figures are therefore 
especially helpful.  Core retention represents the percentage of 
people on average that remain in the same district they were in 
previously.  It is thus a spot-on indicator of least change 
statewide, aggregating the many district-by-district choices a 
mapmaker has to make.  Core retention is, as multiple parties 
contended from the beginning of this litigation, central to a 
least change review.9 
¶14 The parties' submissions rate as follows on core 
retention: 
 
                                                 
9 Three parties asked us to adopt a least change approach, 
and each made it abundantly clear that core retention is central 
to that inquiry.  In briefing advocating a least change approach 
(before our November 30 opinion), the Legislature explained that 
a least change approach is one that "maximizes core retention."  
The Congressmen agreed, arguing that a "'least-change' approach 
would simultaneously 'minimize voter confusion,' and maximize 
'core retention' by limiting the number of people placed in 
different congressional districts."  The Johnson petitioners 
were in full accord:  "Preserving the cores of prior districts 
is the foundation of 'least change' review."  While core 
retention 
is 
not 
the 
only 
relevant 
metric, 
every 
party 
understood that our adoption of a least change approach would 
place core retention at the center of the analysis. 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
10 
 
 
Total People Moved Average Core Retention 
Governor Evers 
324,415 
94.5% 
Congressmen 
384,456 
93.5% 
Hunter 
411,777 
93.0% 
MathSci10 
500,785 
91.5% 
 
¶15 As these numbers reveal, the Governor's map moves the 
fewest number of people into new districts.  It is not a close 
call.  The Governor's proposal moves 60,041 fewer people than 
the next closest submission, that of the Congressmen.11  The 
parties do not offer any other measures of least change that 
counterbalance the Governor's superior core retention. 
¶16 The most significant counterargument on least change 
comes from the Congressmen.  They argue that the Governor's 
proposal makes what they call "gratuitous changes" that are 
unexplained.  For example, they point to the swapping of 
communities between congressional districts 4 and 1.  These 
changes are unnecessary, the Congressmen maintain, because 
district 4 is already substantially underpopulated.  In other 
                                                 
10 In briefing, the Citizen Mathematicians and Scientists 
helpfully employed the "MathSci" moniker to refer to their maps. 
11 Before oral argument, the Congressmen sought leave to 
submit a second map for consideration in addition to their 
initial proposal.  We granted motions by two other parties to 
modify their proposals, but we denied the Congressmen's motion 
because our November 17 order limited parties to a single 
congressional map.  Granting the Congressmen's motion would have 
allowed them to present two congressional maps, while everyone 
else was permitted only one. 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
11 
 
words, they argue that the unstated and unexplained motives 
behind these changes should doom the Governor's proposal.  We 
see two problems with this argument. 
¶17 First, nothing in our prior orders or opinion required 
an explanation of changes at any level of granularity.  In fact, 
the November 30 opinion did not give the parties any specific 
instructions beyond our rubric for deciding the case generally.  
The concurrence encouraged parties to explain "why their maps 
comply with the law, and how their maps are the most consistent 
with existing boundaries."  Johnson, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶87 
(Hagedorn, J., concurring).  But neither that concurrence nor 
any order of the court asked for an explanation for every change 
or provided guidance regarding what level of specificity would 
satisfy the court.12 
¶18 Second, the Congressmen's argument elevates form over 
substance.  In their submission, the Congressmen propose 
significant changes to congressional districts 3 and 7.  They 
explain these changes by referencing population changes in 
district 2.  But the districts most in need of change are 
district 2 in and around Dane County (which needs to shrink), 
and district 4 in Milwaukee County (which needs to grow).  
Applying a least change approach, the more logical place to 
adjust district boundaries to account for these population 
changes would be the districts both adjacent to and in between 
                                                 
12 Moreover, rejecting every map with unexplained changes 
would require us to exclude every proposed state legislative 
map.  All of them contain numerous unexplained changes. 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
12 
 
congressional districts 2 and 4——not district 3 on Wisconsin's 
western border and district 7 in the north and northwest.  So 
while the Congressmen offer an explanation for the change, it 
does not appear to be a particularly good one.  Perhaps, as the 
Congressmen posited, the Governor has other motives; perhaps so 
do the Congressmen.  But rather than weigh motives and pick and 
choose which changes we approve of and which we don't, we look 
to which maps actually produce the least change, not which 
explained their changes the most comprehensively. 
¶19 The most principled way to address least change for 
congressional maps is to choose the map that, in the aggregate, 
moves the fewest number of people into new districts.  In this 
regard, the Governor's proposed map is superior to every other 
proposal.  It is the map with the least change. 
 
B.  Compliance with the Law 
¶20 Having concluded the Governor's proposal best complies 
with our directive to minimize deviations from current district 
boundaries, we next consider whether it complies with all 
relevant laws.  The Wisconsin Constitution contains no explicit 
requirements related to congressional redistricting.  And no 
party develops an argument that the Wisconsin Constitution 
requires something for congressional districts not already 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
13 
 
necessary under the United States Constitution.13  Further, no 
one argues that any congressional submission we received runs 
afoul of the VRA.  The only legal question that remains concerns 
population equality under the United States Constitution. 
¶21 The Governor's map comes close to perfect equality.  
The mathematically ideal district contains 736,714.75 persons, 
and the Governor's districts have either 736,714 people, 736,715 
people, or 736,716 people.  Thus, the total deviation between 
the most and least populated districts is two persons.  Several 
parties argue——mostly at oral argument——that the Governor's two-
person deviation violates the United States Constitution.  This 
is, at best, a strained reading of the law. 
¶22 To be sure, the Supreme Court has explained that there 
is "no excuse for the failure to meet the objective of equal 
representation for equal numbers of people in congressional 
districting other than the practical impossibility of drawing 
equal districts with mathematical precision."  Mahan v. Howell, 
410 U.S. 315, 322 (1973).  On the other hand, the Supreme Court 
has been willing to accept "small differences in the population 
of congressional districts" "so long as they are consistent with 
constitutional norms."  Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740 
(1983).  As the Court explained, "Any number of consistently 
                                                 
13 As we noted in our prior opinion, the parties previously 
disputed whether the Wisconsin Constitution imposes requirements 
consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the federal 
Constitution.  But that issue would not have any substantive 
impact on our decision, so we did not (and here do not) address 
it.  See Johnson, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶13 n.4. 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
14 
 
applied legislative policies might justify some variance, 
including, for instance, making districts compact, respecting 
municipal boundaries, preserving the cores of prior districts, 
and avoiding contests between incumbent Representatives."  Id.  
In Tennant v. Jefferson County Commission, the Supreme Court 
upheld a 4,871-person deviation in West Virginia's congressional 
districts, noting the deviation advanced the state's interests 
in maximizing core retention and maintaining whole counties.  
567 U.S. 758, 762, 764-65 (2012) (per curium). 
¶23 Moreover, many states have adopted districts with 
minor variations.  According to one source cited in briefing, 
following the 2010 census, 14 states implemented maps with 
greater than single-person deviations:  Arkansas (428), Georgia 
(2), Hawaii (691), Idaho (682), Iowa (76), Kansas (15), Kentucky 
(334), Louisiana (249), Mississippi (134), New Hampshire (4), 
Oregon (2), Texas (32), Washington (19), and West Virginia 
(4,871).14  If the law is clear that a two-person deviation (or 
more) is unacceptable, then nearly a third of states with more 
than one congressional district have apparently not gotten the 
message.  We know of no case in which a court has struck down a 
map based on a two-person deviation. 
¶24 In addition, this minor population deviation is 
justified under Supreme Court precedent by our least change 
objective.  In this very proceeding, we have determined that the 
                                                 
14 https://www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/2010-ncsl-
redistricting-deviation-table.aspx 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
15 
 
least change approach should guide our decision.  Core retention 
is central to this analysis, and as our prior discussion 
reveals, the Governor's map does far better on this metric than 
any other map.  Selecting a map from among those submitted to us 
with a maximum deviation of one person would require us to adopt 
a map that does substantially worse on core retention.  The 
United States Supreme Court held that maximizing core retention 
was an acceptable justification for a far greater deviation in 
Tennant.  We see no reason why that rationale would not apply 
with equal force here.  We conclude the two-person deviation 
between 
the 
most- 
and 
least-populated 
districts 
in 
the 
Governor's proposed map does not violate the United States 
Constitution. 
¶25 In 
sum, 
we 
adopt 
Governor 
Evers' 
proposed 
congressional map because it best follows our directive to make 
the 
least 
changes 
from 
existing 
congressional 
district 
boundaries while complying with all relevant state and federal 
laws. 
 
III.  STATE LEGISLATIVE MAPS 
A.  Least Change 
¶26 Our least change inquiry for state legislative maps is 
a bit more complicated.  This is due in part to the sheer number 
of districts involved.  In addition, the Wisconsin Constitution 
requires that three assembly districts be nested within each 
senate district, meaning we need to analyze assembly and senate 
maps jointly.  Wis. Const. art. IV, § 5.  Nevertheless, we again 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
16 
 
begin our least change inquiry by comparing core retention 
scores for each senate and assembly map we received. 
¶27 The parties' senate map submissions rate as follows on 
core retention, in order from least to most change: 
 
 
Total People Moved Average Core Retention 
Legislature 
459,061 
92.2% 
Governor Evers 
461,019 
92.2% 
Senator Bewley 
576,321 
90.2% 
BLOC 
610,568 
89.6% 
Hunter 
1,128,878 
80.8% 
MathSci 
1,513,824 
74.3% 
 
¶28 The parties' assembly map submissions rate as follows 
on core retention, again in order from least to most change: 
 
 
Total People Moved Average Core Retention 
Governor Evers 
837,426 
85.8% 
Legislature 
933,604 
84.2% 
BLOC 
939,513 
84.1% 
Senator Bewley 
984,336 
83.3% 
Hunter 
1,586,059 
73.1% 
MathSci 
2,299,629 
61.0% 
 
¶29 Taken together, the Governor's maps score best on core 
retention.  Although the Legislature's senate map moves 1,958 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
17 
 
fewer people than the Governor's senate map, that slightly 
better performance is outstripped by the Governor's vastly 
superior core retention in the assembly, where the Governor 
moves 96,178 fewer people than the Legislature.  No maps from 
any other party perform nearly as well as the Governor's on core 
retention. 
¶30 Other metrics of least change are helpful, but only 
minimally so in this case.  Both the Legislature and the 
Governor do comparably well minimizing the number of voters who 
would have to wait six years between senate elections.15  The 
Legislature's senate map has this effect on 138,753 people, 
whereas the Governor's does so for 139,606 people.  On 
geographic core retention, the Governor's senate map moves 5.0% 
of the state's geography from one district to another, versus 
the Legislature's 7.1%.  And the Governor's assembly map moves 
11.3% of the state's geography from district to district, 
against the Legislature's 16.5%.  Finally, both the Governor and 
the Legislature pair three incumbents——one pair of senators and 
two pairs of representatives for the Governor, and three pairs 
of representatives for the Legislature.16  Ultimately, none of 
these 
considerations 
outweigh 
the 
Governor's 
superior 
performance on core retention. 
                                                 
15 See Johnson, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶83 n.9 (Hagedorn, J., 
concurring); id., ¶94 n.5 (Dallet, J., dissenting). 
16 Some 
parties 
argue 
that 
considering 
incumbency 
is 
improper.  As a standalone value, that may be true.  But as an 
indicator of least change from existing districts, it could 
constitute a helpful data point. 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
18 
 
¶31 Two other least-change approaches offered by the 
parties are worth further discussion.  First, the Legislature 
argues that the Governor's maps are not acceptable because they 
change Milwaukee-area districts more than other submissions.  
Looking to the degree of change region-by-region has merit, but 
we see little benefit to its application here.  Some of the 
changes to the Governor's maps in the Milwaukee area are driven 
by modifications arguably required by the VRA (more on this 
below).  This necessarily creates a cascading effect on nearby 
districts.  But even if the Legislature's Milwaukee-specific 
complaints have merit, its conclusion does not.  Although the 
Legislature's proposed maps may move fewer voters in some 
Milwaukee-area districts, the Governor's proposed maps move 
fewer voters throughout the rest of the state, leaving 13 
assembly districts outside Milwaukee entirely unchanged from 
their prior configurations.  The Legislature does not explain 
why we should reject the Governor's map for its changes to 
Milwaukee, while accepting the Legislature's proposal to change 
districts even more elsewhere. 
¶32 Second, the Legislature argues that we should weigh as 
a measure of least change the total number of counties and 
municipalities split under each proposal.  We fail to see why 
this is a relevant least-change metric, however.  If a 
municipality was split under the maps adopted in 2011, reuniting 
that municipality now——laudable though it may be——would produce 
more change, not less.  Particularized data about how many 
counties or municipalities remain unified or split may be a 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
19 
 
useful indicator of least change.  But no party saw fit to 
provide that data.17  What we did receive was raw counts of the 
total county and municipal splits under each proposal, and that 
information provides no insight into which map makes the least 
change to existing district boundaries.18 
¶33 Viewing various least change metrics as a whole, and 
relying most heavily on the preeminent core retention metric, we 
conclude the Governor's legislative maps produce the least 
change from current law. 
 
B.  Compliance with the Law 
¶34 Next we consider whether the Governor's legislative 
maps adhere to all relevant laws, starting with the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  As we explained in our prior opinion, the 
Wisconsin Constitution requires that districts be compact, 
                                                 
17 The Legislature provided an accounting of county and 
municipal splits in the proposed legislative maps, but no one 
submitted data documenting how many of those splits were present 
in the 2011 maps, or how many previously split municipalities 
were unified.  The Legislature highlighted a handful of new 
municipal splits in the Governor's map, but those examples were 
limited to Waukesha County and Dane County.  Without statewide 
data, these geographically-limited data points do not allow for 
a meaningful comparison of each proposal's overall performance 
on this metric. 
18 Similarly, population deviation is not an indicator of 
least change.  Quite the opposite.  Given the malapportionment 
here, maximizing population equality requires more change to 
current districts, not less.  That is why, recognizing the 
tension between these two goals, our instructions to the parties 
were to redistrict according to population while minimizing 
change to existing districts. 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
20 
 
contiguous, and proportionally populated; they must respect 
certain local political boundaries; and the districts must 
"nest" three assembly districts within each senate district.  
Johnson, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶¶28-38; Wis. Const. art. IV, §§ 3-5.  
Our cases have long recognized these requirements operate as a 
floor with space for mapmaker discretion.  Zimmerman, 22 
Wis. 2d at 566 ("[T]here are choices which can validly be made 
within constitutional limits."). 
¶35 Therefore, in analyzing compliance with the Wisconsin 
Constitution, we look to whether the maps meet constitutional 
standards, not whether they perform comparatively better or 
worse on these metrics than other maps we received.  We do not, 
for example, scrutinize proposed maps to determine which are 
more 
compact 
or 
which 
contain 
the 
smallest 
population 
deviations.  Our concern is simply whether districts are 
sufficiently compact and sufficiently equal in population to 
comply with the constitution.  Proposed maps are either lawful 
or they are not; no constitutional map is more constitutional 
than another.  For our purposes, so long as a map complies with 
constitutional requirements, better performance on these metrics 
becomes commendable, but not constitutionally required.  In 
other words, they become policy choices——maybe good ones, but 
policy choices nonetheless.  And we have already stated our aim 
to avoid deciding between competing policies.  Johnson, 399 
Wis. 2d 623, ¶3. 
¶36 The Governor's proposed maps fall comfortably within 
the relevant constitutional requirements as laid out in our 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
21 
 
cases.  The districts are contiguous and properly nested.  See 
Wis. Const. art. IV, §§ 4-5.  And with respect to the other 
requirements, the Governor's maps are consistent with historical 
practice and court-sanctioned requirements for compactness, 
respect 
for 
local 
boundaries,19 
and 
population 
equality.  
Regarding population equality in particular, the Governor's 
population deviations——1.20% for the senate and 1.88% for the 
assembly——are well under the deviations previously adopted by 
the legislature and those prescribed by this court.20  See Wis. 
Stat. § 4.001(1) (1971-72) (noting that under the 1972 maps "no 
district deviates from the state-wide average for districts of 
its type by more than one per cent" (for an absolute population 
                                                 
19 As explained in our prior opinion, the geographic 
limitations in the Wisconsin Constitution can no longer be fully 
enforced given the United States Supreme Court's directives on 
population equality.  Johnson, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶35. 
20 The Legislature's expert in this case agreed, explaining 
that the "conventional maximum[]" for population deviation is 
"+/- 5.0%," for an absolute deviation of 10%.  The Governor's 
maps are far below this. 
If the Wisconsin Constitution requires better performance 
than this on population deviation, we have never said so.  Nor 
have we understood State ex rel. Attorney General v. Cunningham, 
81 Wis. 440, 51 N.W. 724 (1892), and State ex rel. Lamb v. 
Cunningham, 83 Wis. 90, 53 N.W. 35 (1892), to afford mapmakers 
no leeway on population deviation.  To the contrary, in State ex 
rel. Bowman v. Dammann, we declined to strike down maps despite 
our conclusion that "fairer results with respect to equality of 
representation" could have been accomplished.  209 Wis. 21, 30, 
243 N.W. 481 (1932).  We explained that only a "wide and bold 
departure" from population equality was beyond the mapmaker's 
discretion.  Id.  Were it otherwise, every map submitted would 
violate the constitution, since better performance on population 
deviation is certainly possible. 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
22 
 
deviation of 2%)); State ex rel. Reynolds v. Zimmerman, 23 
Wis. 2d 606, 618-25, 128 N.W.2d 16 (1964) (adopting legislative 
districts after legislative impasse with substantially larger 
population deviations than those proposed here).  They are also 
well within the population equality requirements of the Equal 
Protection Clause, which are more relaxed for state legislative 
districts than for congressional districts.21  Harris v. Az. 
Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 578 U.S. 253, 259 (2016) ("[W]e 
have refused to require States to justify deviations of 9.9% and 
8%." (citations omitted)); Wis. St. AFL-CIO v. Elections Bd., 
543 F. Supp. 630, 634 (E.D. Wis. 1982) ("We believe that a 
constitutionally acceptable plan . . . should, if possible, be 
kept below 2%."). 
¶37 We next examine whether the Governor's proposed maps 
comply with the Equal Protection Clause's limits on race-based 
districting and the VRA. 
¶38 Under the Equal Protection Clause, "strict scrutiny 
applies when race is the predominate consideration in drawing 
the district lines such that the legislature subordinates 
traditional 
race-neutral 
districting 
principles 
to 
racial 
considerations."  Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 907 (1996) 
(cleaned up).  If racial considerations predominate in a map's 
configuration, the state must "prove that its race-based sorting 
                                                 
21 In the last decennial redistricting cycle, dozens of 
states enacted legislative maps with population deviations 
exceeding those in the Governor's maps——most by a wide margin.  
https://www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/2010-ncsl-
redistricting-deviation-table.aspx 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
23 
 
of voters serves a 'compelling interest' and is 'narrowly 
tailored' to that end."  Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1464 
(2017) (quoting another source).  The Supreme Court "has long 
assumed that one compelling interest is complying with operative 
provisions of the Voting Rights Act."  Id. 
¶39 "Section 2 [of the VRA] prohibits any 'standard, 
practice, or procedure' that 'results in a denial or abridgement 
of the right . . . to vote on account of race.'"  Id. (quoting 
52 U.S.C. § 10301(a)).  The Supreme Court has "construed that 
ban to extend to vote dilution——brought about, most relevantly 
here, by the dispersal of a group's members into districts in 
which they constitute an ineffective minority of voters."  Id. 
(cleaned up).  This means the VRA, when triggered, may require 
the race-conscious drawing of majority-minority districts.  Id. 
at 1470. 
¶40 Our VRA inquiry comes in an unusual procedural 
posture.  Often cases under the VRA present as a challenge to 
particular districts in legislatively drawn maps.  But our task 
is to produce districts in the first instance without the 
benefit of a trial and a fully-developed factual record 
regarding the performance of specific districts.  Sitting in 
this posture, we follow the instructions provided by the Supreme 
Court in Cooper: 
When a State invokes the VRA to justify race-based 
districting, it must show (to meet the "narrow 
tailoring" requirement) that it had "a strong basis in 
evidence" for concluding that the statute required its 
action.  Or said otherwise, the State must establish 
that it had "good reasons" to think that it would 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
24 
 
transgress the Act if it did not draw race-based 
district lines.  That "strong basis" (or "good 
reasons") standard gives States "breathing room" to 
adopt reasonable compliance measures that may prove, 
in perfect hindsight, not to have been needed. 
Id. at 1464 (citations omitted).  Under this precedent, a 
mapmaker may draw districts with racial considerations in mind 
provided "a strong basis in evidence," or "good reasons," 
suggest the VRA requires the mapmaker to do so. 
¶41 A typical § 2 challenge is analyzed under a two-step 
framework, 
beginning 
first 
with 
the 
so-called 
Gingles22 
preconditions, then proceeding to whether minority voting power 
is diluted under the totality of the circumstances.  See 
Rodriguez v. Bexar County, 385 F.3d 853, 859 (5th Cir. 2004).  
Here, the Governor argues——as do several other parties——that 
seven majority-Black assembly districts are required by the 
VRA.23  Applying Cooper, we analyze whether a strong basis in 
evidence suggests the Gingles preconditions are satisfied, and 
if so, whether there are good reasons to think minority voting 
power would be diluted under the totality of the circumstances 
with fewer majority-Black districts.  We see our inquiry as 
limited to determining whether the Governor's proposal is within 
the "leeway" states have "to take race-based actions reasonably 
                                                 
22 Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986). 
23 No one suggests the Governor's senate map violates either 
the Equal Protection Clause or the VRA. 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
25 
 
judged necessary under a proper interpretation of the VRA."24  
Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1472. 
¶42 Beginning with step one, we first determine whether 
there 
are 
"good 
reasons" 
to 
think 
the 
three 
Gingles 
preconditions are met for the Black voting age population in the 
Milwaukee 
area. 
 
In 
Cooper, 
the 
Court 
explained 
the 
preconditions as follows: 
First, a minority group must be sufficiently large and 
geographically compact to constitute a majority in 
some 
reasonably 
configured 
legislative 
district.  
Second, 
the 
minority 
group 
must 
be 
politically 
cohesive.  And third, a district's white majority must 
vote sufficiently as a bloc to usually defeat the 
minority's preferred candidate. . . .  If a State has 
good 
reason 
to 
think 
that 
all 
the 
Gingles 
preconditions are met, then so too it has good reason 
to believe that § 2 requires drawing a majority-
minority district.  But if not, then not. 
Id. at 1470 (cleaned up). 
¶43 First, it is undisputed that the Black voting age 
population in the Milwaukee area is "sufficiently large and 
geographically compact" to form a majority in seven "reasonably 
configured legislative district[s]."25  Id. (quoting another 
                                                 
24 To be clear, this case does not involve a claim under the 
Equal Protection Clause or VRA.  Rather, as remedial map-
drawers, we strive to act in compliance with the Constitution 
and applicable federal laws necessarily relying on the more 
limited record before us.  A standard VRA claim is brought after 
the adoption of new districts.  Such a claim would proceed much 
differently, requiring a fully developed factual record and 
detailed 
findings 
regarding 
the 
performance 
of 
specific 
districts. 
25 Several parties, including the Governor, calculate Black 
voting age population by including "multi-race subcategories" in 
addition to "non-Hispanic Black" and "non-Hispanic (Black + 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
26 
 
source).  Six such districts were created by the 2011 maps, and 
the parties' submissions demonstrate that it is now possible to 
draw a seventh sufficiently large and compact majority-Black 
district. 
¶44 Second, it is also undisputed that Black voters in the 
Milwaukee area are politically cohesive.  Experts from multiple 
parties analyzed voting trends and concluded political cohesion 
existed; no party disagreed. 
¶45 Finally, turning to the third Gingles precondition, 
the parties offered a strong evidentiary basis to believe white 
voters in the Milwaukee area vote "sufficiently as a bloc to 
usually defeat the minority's preferred candidate."  Id. 
(quotation marks omitted).  Experts from multiple parties argued 
this requirement was satisfied by looking at various election 
contests, 
with 
the 
most 
comprehensive 
expert 
analysis 
calculating that white voters in the Milwaukee area defeat the 
preferred candidate of Black voters 57.14% of the time when 
relevant elections are analyzed.26  We received little in the way 
                                                                                                                                                             
White)" categories.  The Legislature excludes "multi-race 
subcategories" from its calculations but raises no objection to 
the inclusion of those categories.  See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 
U.S. 461, 473 n.1 (2003) ("[W]e believe it is proper to look at 
all individuals who identify themselves as black."), superseded 
by statute on other grounds, Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. 
Alabama, 575 U.S. 254, 276-77 (2015). 
26 BLOC's expert "analyzed eight elections between Black and 
white candidates in nonpartisan or Democratic primaries and 
Spring generals in jurisdictions that cover either Milwaukee 
County, Milwaukee City, or both."  In a subsequent report, the 
expert explained that he omitted the 2018 lieutenant governor 
primary from his analysis because "it [did] not simulate an 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
27 
 
of alternative data or analysis to counter this.  To the 
contrary, throughout briefing, all parties appeared to assume 
the VRA requires at least some majority-Black districts in the 
Milwaukee area.  This can only be true if racially polarized 
voting that usually defeats the minority's preferred candidate 
exists.  It was not until oral argument that anyone meaningfully 
contended the third Gingles precondition was not met.  To the 
extent it was suggested in the substantial briefing we received, 
it was virtually unsupported by expert analysis or argument.27  
It is telling that no party saw fit to develop an argument 
supported with data suggesting the VRA preconditions are not 
satisfied with respect to the Black voting age population in and 
around Milwaukee.  We further observe that the federal court 
drawing maps in 1992 assumed racially polarized voting in 
Milwaukee and drew majority-Black districts to comply with the 
VRA.  Prosser v. Elections Bd., 793 F. Supp. 859, 868-71 (W.D. 
Wis. 1992).  No court has concluded otherwise since then.  Based 
on the data we were provided, historical practice, and the 
                                                                                                                                                             
election in which white bloc voting might defeat the choice of 
Black voters."  The Legislature's expert critiqued the omission, 
and noted that supplementing BLOC's election data with it could 
alter the analysis.  The Legislature's expert did not argue that 
any other additional elections besides the 2018 lieutenant 
governor primary should have been included in BLOC's analysis. 
27 Before oral argument, the strongest suggestion that the 
Gingles preconditions might not be satisfied was a comment in 
one of the Legislature's expert reports suggesting "serious 
doubts about whether the Gingles threshold standard is currently 
met in Milwaukee County."  But an alternative analysis was not 
conducted, nor did the Legislature's briefing advance or develop 
this in any meaningful way. 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
28 
 
absence of any sufficiently developed counterargument, we 
conclude there are good reasons to think all three Gingles 
preconditions are satisfied. 
¶46 Moving to the second step, § 2 of the VRA requires 
consideration of the totality of the circumstances to determine 
whether members of a racial group "have less opportunity than 
other members of the electorate to participate in the political 
process and to elect representatives of their choice."  52 
U.S.C. § 10301(b).  The Supreme Court has pointed to various 
factors that might be relevant to this determination, including 
those listed in a Senate Report from the 1982 amendments to the 
VRA, and most pertinently here, "whether the number of districts 
in which the minority group forms an effective majority is 
roughly proportional to its share of the population in the 
relevant area."28  League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 
                                                 
28 The Senate Report factors include: 
the history of voting-related discrimination in the 
State or political subdivision; the extent to which 
voting in the elections of the State or political 
subdivision is racially polarized; the extent to which 
the State or political subdivision has used voting 
practices or procedures that tend to enhance the 
opportunity for discrimination against the minority 
group . . .; the extent to which minority group 
members bear the effects of past discrimination in 
areas such as education, employment, and health, which 
hinder their ability to participate effectively in the 
political process; the use of overt or subtle racial 
appeals in political campaigns; and the extent to 
which members of the minority group have been elected 
to public office in the jurisdiction.  The Report 
notes also that evidence demonstrating that elected 
officials are unresponsive to the particularized needs 
of the members of the minority group and that the 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
29 
 
548 U.S. 399, 426 (2006).  In Johnson v. De Grandy, the Court 
explained that proportionality is highly relevant, but not the 
exclusive measure of minority voting strength.  512 U.S. 997, 
1020-21 (1994).  The Court added that § 2 does not require a 
mapmaker to maximize minority representation.  Id. at 1017.  In 
all of this, we keep in mind that "States retain broad 
discretion in drawing districts to comply with the mandate of 
§ 2."  Shaw, 517 U.S. at 917 n.9. 
¶47 Here, we cannot say for certain on this record that 
seven majority-Black assembly districts are required by the VRA.  
But based on our assessment of the totality of the circumstances 
and given the discretion afforded states implementing the Act, 
we conclude the Governor's configuration is permissible. 
¶48 The 2011 maps enacted into law created six majority-
Black districts in the Milwaukee area.  Over the last decade, 
                                                                                                                                                             
policy 
underlying 
the 
State's 
or 
the 
political 
subdivision's 
use 
of 
the 
contested 
practice 
or 
structure is tenuous may have probative value. 
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 426 
(2006) (quoting Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44-45). 
Like other courts in this posture, we find these factors 
less helpful in the context of this case.  In Prosser, for 
example, the federal court that provided new maps for Wisconsin 
in 1992 did not even mention the Senate Report factors, focusing 
instead other relevant considerations.  See Prosser, 793 
F. Supp. at 869-71.  Similarly, when the U.S. Supreme Court has 
faced VRA challenges regarding the number of majority-minority 
districts drawn, it has focused much of its attention on 
considerations not mentioned in the Senate Report, such as 
proportionality.  See Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1017-
21 (1994); Perry, 548 U.S. at 436-42. 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
30 
 
the Black population in Wisconsin grew by 4.8% statewide, while 
the white population fell by 3.4%.  Based on the current census, 
the Black voting age population statewide is between 6.1% and 
6.5%, although the precise number is subject to some dispute.  
Proportionality would therefore suggest somewhere between six 
and seven majority-Black assembly districts are appropriate.  
Looking a bit deeper, a significant proportion of Wisconsin's 
Black population lives in Milwaukee County where the subject 
districts are principally located.  And there, the Black voting 
age population increased 5.5%, while the white voting age 
population decreased 9.5%.  The baseline of six districts ten 
years ago, combined with population trends since then and 
statewide population numbers now, suggest a seventh majority-
Black district may be required. 
¶49 In addition, we have some concern that a six-district 
configuration could prove problematic under the VRA.  The 
Legislature, for example, submitted a configuration with five 
majority-Black districts, and a sixth just under a majority.  
One of its proposed districts has a Black voting age population 
of 73.28%, a level some courts have found to be unlawful 
"packing" under the VRA.  Ketchum v. Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398, 1418 
(7th Cir. 1984).  Packing occurs when a mapmaker draws district 
lines that pack minority voters "into one or a small number of 
districts to minimize their influence in the districts next 
door."  De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1007.  The risk of packing Black 
voters under a six-district configuration further suggests 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA   
 
31 
 
drawing seven majority-Black districts is appropriate to avoid 
minority vote dilution. 
¶50 Viewing the totality of the circumstances, we see good 
reasons to conclude a seventh majority-Black assembly district 
may be required.  To be clear, the VRA does not require drawing 
maps to maximize the number of majority-minority districts, and 
we do not seek to do so here.  See De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1016-
17.  Rather, on this record, we conclude selecting a map with 
seven districts is within the leeway states have to take 
"actions reasonably judged necessary" to prevent vote dilution 
under the VRA.  Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1472. 
¶51 Based on the foregoing, we conclude the Governor's 
legislative maps comply with all relevant legal requirements.  
Because they are also the maps that produce the least change 
from the previously enacted maps, we adopt them. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶52 To remedy the unconstitutional malapportionment of the 
2011 congressional and state legislative maps, we adopt the 
Governor's proposed congressional and state legislative maps.  
Beginning with the August 2022 primary elections, the Wisconsin 
Elections Commission is enjoined from conducting elections under 
the 2011 maps and is ordered to implement the congressional and 
legislative maps submitted by Governor Evers for all upcoming 
elections.  This order shall remain in effect until new maps are 
enacted into law or a court otherwise directs. 
By the Court.——Relief granted. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.awb 
 
1 
 
¶53 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  I join the 
majority opinion, which selects the Governor's congressional and 
state legislative maps, not because I approve of the "least 
change" approach.  I do not. 
¶54 Having previously voiced my dissent to the adoption of 
that approach, a majority of the court in a prior order 
nevertheless embraced "least change" as the framework that would 
govern the proceedings in this case.  Circumscribed by that 
decision and the parties' reliance upon it when crafting their 
submissions, I join today's majority opinion because the 
Governor's maps adhere most closely to the court's earlier 
directive.  Accordingly, I respectfully concur. 
  
I 
¶55 This case came to us as an original action petition 
filed before the legislature and Governor had even acted on any 
redistricting legislation.  I joined the dissent from the order 
granting the petition due to the myriad "reasons for preferring 
a federal forum" and because this court had "no experience in 
drawing district maps."  Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, No. 
2021AP1450-OA, unpublished order, at 16, 18 (Wis. Sept. 22, 
2021, amended Sept. 24) (Dallet, J., dissenting). 
¶56 The court then solicited briefing from the parties on 
several topics, ranging from procedure to substance to timing.  
Specifically, the court sought the parties' input on how it 
should conduct these proceedings, what criteria it should 
consider, and when final maps should be in place.   
No.  2021AP1450-OA.awb 
 
2 
 
¶57 After redistricting legislation was passed by the 
legislature and vetoed by the Governor, thus failing the 
political process, a majority of the court advised that it would 
apply the "least change" approach to reapportion Wisconsin's 
congressional and state legislative districts in light of the 
2020 census.  That is, the existing maps would serve as a 
template and this court would implement "only those remedies 
necessary to resolve constitutional or statutory deficiencies."  
Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2021 WI 87, ¶72, 399 Wis. 2d 
623, 967 N.W.2d 469; 
see also id., ¶85 (Hagedorn, J., 
concurring).  I again joined the dissent from this decision 
because 
it 
had 
"potentially 
devastating 
consequences 
for 
representative government in Wisconsin."  Id., ¶88 (Dallet, J., 
dissenting).  We then received initial map submissions followed 
by additional rounds of briefing, culminating in over five hours 
of oral argument. 
II 
¶58 The shortcomings of "least change" were on display 
throughout these proceedings.  For example, "least change," as 
set forth in the court's prior order, is unmoored from any legal 
requirement for redistricting.  The parties struggled with 
reconciling it with the United States Constitution, Wisconsin 
Constitution, and Voting Rights Act.   
¶59 Further, beyond core retention, it was unclear if some 
metrics would carry more weight than others.  Throughout 
briefing and oral argument, the "least change" approach did not 
and could not offer an explanation for the tradeoffs and 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.awb 
 
3 
 
discretionary decisions that are intrinsic to map-drawing.  If 
this process has shown us anything, it is that the court should 
depart 
from 
the 
"least 
change" 
approach 
if 
and 
when 
redistricting arrives before it in the decades to come. 
¶60 Although some advance that "least change" is an 
apolitical approach, this court recognized that redistricting is 
"inherently political" when it previously (and wisely) refrained 
from jumping into the fray.  Jensen v. Wis. Elections Bd., 2002 
WI 13, ¶10, 249 Wis. 2d 706, 639 N.W.2d 537.  It dictates where 
candidates can run for office and for whom voters can cast their 
vote.  The process affords the chance to "restore the core 
principle of republican government, namely, that voters should 
choose their representatives, not the other way around."  Ariz. 
State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 576 U.S. 
787, 824 (2015) (internal citation omitted).   
¶61 The people of Wisconsin deserve both a fair process 
and fair maps.  We have cautioned that "[j]udges should not 
select a plan that seeks partisan advantage."  Jensen, 249 Wis. 
2d 706, ¶12 (quoting Prosser v. Elections Bd., 793 F. Supp. 859, 
867 (W.D. Wis. 1992)).  Here, the "least change" approach 
necessarily enshrines the partisan advantage adopted by the 
political branches ten years ago.  Its application undermines, 
rather than fulfills, the promise of a truly representative 
government. 
¶62 That being said, I am bound by the court's earlier 
determination in this case.  Although I disapprove of the "least 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.awb 
 
4 
 
change" approach, I am limited by that prior determination and 
obligated to apply it here. 
¶63 Indeed, a majority of the court previously placed 
limitations on the parties' submissions by setting forth general 
criteria to be employed.  The parties relied on those 
limitations when preparing their maps and arguments.  Because 
they were directed to use a "least change" approach, the parties 
did not sufficiently argue any other standard for distinguishing 
between the submitted maps.  Furthermore, the submitted maps may 
have been far different had the parties known this court would 
entertain criteria other than "least change" as preeminent.  
Thus, as the majority opinion well explains, the Governor's maps 
adhere most closely to the court's prior order. 
¶64 I therefore join the majority opinion in its entirety 
and respectfully concur. 
¶65 I am authorized to state that Justices REBECCA FRANK 
DALLET and JILL J. KAROFSKY join this concurrence. 
 
 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
1 
 
¶66 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J.   (dissenting).  The 
majority opinion demonstrates a complete lack of regard for the 
Wisconsin Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause.  Short 
on legal analysis and long on ipse dixit, the majority opinion 
amounts to nothing more than an imposition of judicial will.  
The majority deems the language of the Wisconsin and United 
States Constitutions to be mere policy.  I dissent because here, 
the majority's decision to select Governor Tony Evers' maps is 
an exercise of judicial activism, untethered to evidence, 
precedent, the Wisconsin Constitution, and basic principles of 
equal protection.  Even those in the majority recognize that 
that there exists a "struggle[]" to reconcile the least change 
approach they adopt with the United States Constitution, 
Wisconsin Constitution, and the Voting Rights Act ("VRA").1  
Concurrence, ¶58.  
                                                 
1 Three of the four justices in the majority would have 
preferred the federal courts to have drawn the maps for 
Wisconsin. 
 
See 
Johnson 
v. 
Wis. 
Elections 
Comm'n, 
No. 
2021AP1450-OA, unpublished order (granting petition for leave to 
commence original action), at 15-18 (Wis. Sep. 22, 2021) 
(Dallet, J., dissenting) (explaining the advantages of federal 
court litigation and concluding that the court should not have 
accepted this original action).  They clearly disagree with the 
least change approach, and the concurrence is far from a 
wholesale endorsement of the analysis in the majority opinion, 
which adopts its own version of least change.  See concurrence, 
¶¶53-64.  Those three justices assert there was a "struggle[]" 
the parties were forced to confront when attempting to reconcile 
least change with the United States Constitution, the Wisconsin 
Constitution, and the VRA.  Id., ¶58.  Yet the majority opinion 
neither recognizes nor resolves any "struggle[]" that exists 
between its version of least change and the law.  This calls 
into question whether the majority opinion is really a lead 
opinion with only Justice Hagedorn fully adopting the reasoning 
therein.  Id. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
2 
 
¶67 Lacking in substantive legal analysis, the majority is 
imbued with personal preference.  The majority disrespects the 
VRA and instead cabins voters for purportedly "good reasons" in 
districts based solely on race, which is nothing short of a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.  But to the majority, 
the Equal Protection Clause is a mere box to check, a speedbump 
on the path to dividing Wisconsin into racial categories.  Not 
one 
case 
cited 
by 
the 
majority 
supports 
its 
race-based 
determination.2  Moreover, the majority implements a previously 
unknown, 
judicial 
test:  "core 
retention." 
 
Because 
the 
majority's adoption of the Governor's maps is unconstitutional, 
and 
conflicts 
with 
the 
record 
and 
well-established 
jurisprudence, I must dissent. 
¶68 For the reasons explained below, I conclude that the 
court should have adopted the maps submitted by the Wisconsin 
Legislature ("the Legislature") and Congressmen Glenn Grothman, 
Mike Gallagher, Bryan Steil, Tom Tiffany, and Scott Fitzgerald 
("the Congressmen"), or in the alternative, the maps submitted 
by the Citizen Mathematicians and Scientists ("CMS").  The court 
could have also drawn its own maps or directed the parties to 
submit new maps that had record support and complied with the 
law.  The maps submitted by the Governor are unconstitutional 
and fatally flawed. 
                                                 
2 See Cooper v. Harris, 581 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 1455 
(2017); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); League of United 
Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006) ("LULAC"); 
Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994).  VRA caselaw, 
including these precedents, are discussed in greater detail in 
Section II.A, infra. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
3 
 
I.  SUMMARY 
A.  No Support For Drawing Districts On The Basis Of Race. 
¶69 Because the Governor has not demonstrated a VRA 
violation, there can be no race-based remedy, let alone one 
constructing a new district and changing six others in Milwaukee 
to include exactly 51% black populations.  It is undisputed that 
the Legislature's maps and the maps submitted by CMS are the 
only race-neutral maps submitted.  Either performs better than 
the Governor's maps under the constitution and the law.  
Alternatively, we could design or draw our own maps, or combine 
positive characteristics of several maps.  Further, we could 
have requested additional briefing to direct the parties, or the 
Legislature or Governor specifically, to improve their maps and 
provide greater record justification for their decisions.  We 
now are the map drawers, we are the government actors, and we 
are the ones that must satisfy strict scrutiny by using racial 
classifications.  It is our duty to be responsible to the law. 
¶70 The 
majority 
adopts 
the 
Governor's 
maps, 
which 
unambiguously divided districts in the Milwaukee area on the 
basis of race alone.  The only valid justification for doing 
this is if a VRA violation were shown, requiring a race-based 
remedy.  Completely absent, however, is any demonstration of a 
VRA violation.  Without a violation, there can be no remedy 
because to take race-based action would violate the Equal 
Protection 
Clause. 
 
In 
other 
words, 
a 
VRA 
remedy 
is 
constitutionally permissible only as required to remedy a VRA 
violation.  Stated even differently, specific evidence must 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
4 
 
demonstrate that white voters block a minority group's vote, and 
due to a variety of local conditions the minority group does not 
have the opportunity to effectively participate in democratic 
elections, inside a district or area where a minority could be 
made into an effective electoral majority.  District-specific 
evidence must demonstrate that the majority-minority group is 
unable to elect the candidate of its choice in a specific 
district.  We have exactly zero evidence of any such thing 
happening in these districts in Milwaukee.  There is zero 
evidence on the conditions and environment of local communities 
warranting a race-based remedy.  Yet, the majority incorrectly 
surmises that there is "good reason" to nonetheless invent this 
remedy. 
¶71 The parties were free to engage in discovery, depose 
experts, and gather the requisite information to advocate for 
their positions.  The Governor completely failed to evidence any 
factual support for his race-based designs.  The only party that 
even attempted to provide the evidence sufficient to justify a 
race-based remedy, the Black Leaders Organizing for Communities 
("BLOC"), agrees that when examining the existing record, the 
Governor's maps do not comply with the VRA, and are thus 
unconstitutional. 
¶72 Nonetheless, the majority places its imprimatur on the 
Governor's maps, which carve seven Assembly districts with 
populations that are curiously at almost exactly 51% African-
American populations.  His maps reduce, not increase, the 
minority percentage in most majority-minority districts.  His 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
5 
 
maps add what was referred to in VRA parlance as "white filler,"3 
to these districts.  The majority cites no support for its VRA 
remedy 
that 
adds 
white 
voters 
and 
reduces 
black 
voter 
percentage.  
¶73 The majority fails to follow VRA jurisprudence and 
instead the majority invents a new, heretofore unknown standard, 
evolved from its own creation of the law and relying heavily on 
alleged party concessions, not evidence.  So says the majority, 
if there are "good reasons" to create race-based districts, the 
court is endowed with the authority to do as it wishes, 
regardless of the complete lack of evidence to support any VRA 
violation.  Tellingly, the majority engages in no substantive 
strict scrutiny analysis of the racial assignment of Milwaukee 
voters, even though such scrutiny is required as a part of the 
legal analysis.  
B. Least Change Is Not Core Retention. 
¶74 In our November 30, 2021 opinion in this case, we 
concluded that our "judicial remedy should reflect the least 
change necessary for the maps to comport with relevant legal 
requirements."  Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2021 WI 87, 
¶¶24-63, 72, 399 Wis. 2d 623, 967 N.W.2d 469.  Nowhere in that 
opinion did we use the phrase "core retention".  Not only were 
the parties not advised that core retention would be the 
decisive factor in the court's decision, but the parties were 
explicitly "invited" by the concurrence to consider factors 
                                                 
3 Counsel from CMS at oral argument explained how map 
drawers construct majority-minority districts when considering 
race.  
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
6 
 
wholly unrelated to least change.4  Johnson, 399 Wis. 2d 623, 
¶¶83, 87 (Hagedorn, J., concurring) (noting that "traditional 
redistricting criteria" would assist in the selection of maps). 
The concurrence, which received no votes in support, was 
perfectly free to include core retention in its analysis.  It 
did not, and for a very simple reason:  no one, neither among 
the parties nor the court, understood core retention was the 
sole factor for determining least change and further, for 
selecting maps.  The core retention analysis in the majority is 
an 
invention, 
made 
after-the-fact 
to 
justify 
a 
policy 
preference.  
¶75 The law instructs us to consider more than one number: 
population 
deviation 
and 
local 
government 
divisions, 
fundamentally underlie the validity of any core retention 
number.  Even so, the Governor's core retention numbers are 
worse than the Legislature's in the Wisconsin Senate.  While the 
Governor's maps move fewer individuals overall, those same maps 
have inordinately high population deviations among districts, 
far greater than the deviations in the Legislature's maps.  The 
Governor's maps also divide an extraordinary number of local 
communities, orders of magnitude more than the Legislature's 
maps.  We are constitutionally required to minimize population 
deviations and local government splits.  Given this significant 
constitutional 
interest, 
we 
should 
adopt 
either 
the 
                                                 
4 Sitting as a court of seven, the concurrence had no 
authority to alone direct the court's business.  For further 
explanation on the November 30 concurrence, see footnote 19, 
infra. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
7 
 
Legislature's or CMS's maps, which score the best out of all the 
submitted maps, or the court should create a map out of the best 
of each.  
¶76 We 
were 
tasked 
with 
selecting 
legislative 
and 
congressional maps that best conform with the law while also 
making as little change as possible to existing district lines.  
We accepted another round of briefing and expert reports, and we 
held over five hours of oral argument.  Despite this extensive 
opportunity to prepare, Governor Tony Evers presented maps that 
had marked population deviation and divided dozens and dozens of 
local municipalities.   
C.  The Governor's Congressional Maps Are Unconstitutional. 
¶77 Knowing that the Legislature and the Congressmen 
intended to submit legislative and congressional maps that were 
already passed by the Wisconsin Legislature in 2021, the 
Governor simply designed maps that met his own partisan ends, 
which appear to be based solely on core retention.  In so doing, 
the Governor substantially increased population deviation and 
local government splits and engaged in an unsubstantiated racial 
gerrymander.  In other words, the Governor inflated the core 
retention number at the expense of the Wisconsin public.  
Inexplicably, the majority now adopts the Governor's maps in 
full, resting entirely on "core retention" as determinative. 
¶78 The court refused to allow the Congressmen to submit 
amended maps, conflicting with our duty to consider all 
available information and the fact that other parties, including 
the Governor, were permitted to amend their maps.  Nonetheless, 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
8 
 
the Governor has a greater population deviation, and under well-
established constitutional law, there is no de minimus deviation 
for congressional districts.  The Governor explained that his 
deviation was caused by his lack of understanding that a lower 
deviation was required.  But carelessness is not a valid 
justification for excessive deviation.  The Governor's (and now 
Wisconsin's) congressional maps are unconstitutional.  The court 
should have adopted the Congressmen's map, or in the alternative 
CMS's map, which includes the lowest deviation available, and 
are both least change. 
II. STATE LEGISLATIVE MAPS 
¶79 In our November 30 opinion, we indicated that any map 
would need to comply with federal and state legal requirements 
and be the least change possible to existing legislative 
districts.  Six parties submitted maps for the Wisconsin Senate 
and Assembly:  the Legislature, CMS, the Hunter Intervenor-
Petitioners ("Hunter"), Senator Janet Bewley, the Governor, and 
BLOC.  The maps submitted by the Legislature and CMS achieve 
minimal changes to existing district lines while best complying 
with the demands of the Wisconsin Constitution and federal law.  
For the most part, the parties argued for the adoption of either 
the Legislature's or the Governor's maps. 
A.  The Equal Protection Clause And The VRA 
¶80 The maps adopted by the majority are nothing short of 
a racial gerrymander, and the Governor failed to present any 
material evidence warranting this substantial departure from the 
principles of equal protection.   
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
9 
 
¶81 Fatally, the majority provides at most a cursory 
analysis on the VRA and the Equal Protection Clause, mustering a 
mere five pages to apply an incredibly important and complex 
area of law.  See Ipse Dixit, Oxford English Dictionary (2022) 
("An unproved assertion resting on the bare authority of some 
speaker.").  Just as BLOC warned, the majority's VRA analysis is 
woefully inadequate at best.  Its use of an aggressive race-
based remedy for no showing of a VRA violation, simply because 
it can, is untenable and legal error.  
¶82 The majority's use of race to draw seven bare-
majority-minority districts undermines that which the VRA was 
properly meant to correct.  It utilizes racial categories to 
move minority voters into newly created districts, with newly 
defined constituencies, which could not have been reasonably 
created using traditional race-neutral redistricting methods.  
Notably, the majority cites broad quotes taken from United 
States Supreme Court precedent, but it conspicuously omits any 
detailed description of the facts and outcomes of those cases, 
i.e., what those cases actually stand for.5  No real attempt at 
grappling with the vast nuances of VRA caselaw, from lower 
courts to the United States Supreme Court, was given.  By 
                                                 
5 For instance, the majority cites Cooper, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 
Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, LULAC, 548 U.S. 399, De Grandy, 512 
U.S. 997.  In Cooper and Shaw, the Court struck down race-based 
district maps under the Equal Protection Clause due to the lack 
of support for VRA compliance.  In LULAC, the Court found that 
maps drawn in Texas lacked support under the VRA, and in 
De Grandy, the Court held that the VRA did not apply at all, 
where a plaintiff sought maximization of majority-minority 
districts.  A more complete analysis on the VRA is provided 
below. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
10 
 
adopting the Governor's maps, the majority is now bringing to 
the fore the incendiary and constitutionally suspect category of 
race.  The majority has a legal responsibility to more fully and 
thoroughly explain itself.  Below, I attempt to fill the void in 
substance the majority leaves for future courts and the public. 
¶83 What's next?  Perhaps a federal court challenge before 
the United States Supreme Court.6  Although braving a face of 
finality, the majority opinion practically begs that the adopted 
maps be subject to further litigation.   
¶84 I first discuss the legal background of the Equal 
Protection Clause, and then turn to a discussion on the VRA and 
its application to this case.   
1.  The Equal Protection Clause 
                                                 
6 The parties to this lawsuit were given the opportunity to 
present evidence, advance support for their favored maps, and 
critique and oppose the maps ultimately adopted.  The next step 
for the case is appeal to the United States Supreme Court.  See 
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730 (1991) (explaining that 
the Supreme Court "reviews a state court decision on direct 
review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257").  The parties are 
precluded from relitigating this case in a separate federal 
lawsuit.  Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 
75, 81 (1984) (explaining that "a federal court must give to a 
state-court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be 
given that judgment under the law of the State in which the 
judgment was rendered"); Wickenhauser v. Lehtinen, 2007 WI 82, 
¶22, 302 Wis. 2d 41, 734 N.W.2d 855 (stating the elements of 
claim preclusion).  "Congress had empowered only [the United 
States Supreme] Court to exercise appellate authority to reverse 
or modify a state-court judgment."  Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi 
Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).  Further, under 
the "Rooker-Feldman" doctrine, "cases brought by state-court 
losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments 
rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and 
inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments" 
fall 
outside 
federal 
district 
courts' 
subject 
matter 
jurisdiction.  Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 464 (2006).   
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
11 
 
¶85 Recognizing the deeply American value that individuals 
should be equally protected under the law, the United States 
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that government cannot sort or 
distinguish 
individuals 
on 
the 
basis 
of 
race 
without 
extraordinary justifications.  "Distinctions between citizens 
solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious 
to a free people, and therefore are contrary to our traditions 
and hence constitutionally suspect."  Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 
Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 309 (2013) (citations and quotations 
omitted).  The Court has recognized that government-sanctioned 
distinctions "threaten to stigmatize individuals by reason of 
their membership in a racial group and to incite racial 
hostility."  Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993).  "Because 
racial characteristics so seldom provide a relevant basis for 
disparate treatment, the Equal Protection Clause demands that 
racial classifications be subjected to the most rigid scrutiny."  
Fisher, 570 U.S. at 309-10 (cleaned up).  Classifications based 
on race "are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored 
to further compelling governmental interests."  Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).  This is a "searching 
judicial inquiry," id., that rejects "any but the most exact 
connection between justification and classification."  Parents 
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 
U.S. 701, 720 (2007) (quotations removed). 
¶86 The Supreme Court has understood the pernicious nature 
of dividing up individuals into legislative districts based on 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
12 
 
race, 
and 
has 
applied 
the 
Equal 
Protection 
Clause 
to 
redistricting.  The Court is exacting in its scrutiny:  
The idea is a simple one:  At the heart of the 
Constitution's guarantee of equal protection lies the 
simple command that the Government must treat citizens 
as individuals, not as simply components of a racial, 
religious, sexual or national class.  When the State 
assigns voters on the basis of race, it engages in the 
offensive and demeaning assumption that voters of a 
particular race, because of their race, think alike, 
share the same political interests, and will prefer 
the 
same 
candidates 
at 
the 
polls. 
 
Race-based 
assignments embody stereotypes that treat individuals 
as the product of their race, evaluating their 
thoughts and efforts——their very worth as citizens——
according to a criterion barred to the Government by 
history and the Constitution.  They also cause society 
serious harm. . . .  
Racial classifications with respect to voting carry 
particular dangers.  Racial gerrymandering, even for 
remedial purposes, may balkanize us into competing 
racial factions; it threatens to carry us further from 
the goal of a political system in which race no longer 
matters——a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments embody, and to which the Nation continues 
to aspire.   
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911-12 (1995) (cleaned up).  
¶87 With this is mind, it is striking how explicitly the 
Governor——and the majority——divide up Wisconsin districts solely 
by race.  While in 2011 the Legislature drew six assembly 
districts that have a majority of black voting-age populations 
("BVAP"), ranging from 51% to 62%, the Governor carves seven 
districts by race with the exactness of only the most gifted 
social scientists.  According to the Governor himself, he drew 
seven districts with BVAP ranging from 50.1% to 51.4%.  At oral 
argument and in briefing, it was clear that race imbued the 
decisions of the Governor in drawing districts.  Explaining his 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
13 
 
district boundaries, he stated the intent was "to produce seven 
majority Black districts in the Assembly."  There is simply no 
way to deny that the Governor created "[d]istinctions between 
citizens solely because of their ancestry," and if his maps are 
adopted, they must overcome strict scrutiny.  Fisher, 570 U.S. 
at 309; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326.    
¶88 On 
the 
other 
hand, 
it 
is 
undisputed 
that 
the 
Legislature drew race-neutral maps.  The Legislature sought to 
retain districts that have high percentages of black individuals 
to as close to the same as they were drawn in 2011, i.e., "least 
change."  See Johnson, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶72.  The core retention 
statistics from high BVAP districts differ dramatically between 
the Legislature and the Governor.  For the Legislature, the core 
retention numbers for those districts were 87.7%, 85.4%, 88.1%, 
100.0%, 94.3%, and 86.4%.  By contrast, high BVAP districts for 
the Governor had core retention percentages of 85.8%, 56.1%, 
58.7%, 91.3%, 58.5%, 75.9%, and 12.7%.  It is clear from the 
data that the Legislature emphasized as little disruption as 
possible for districts representing high percentages of African-
American citizens, as it did for all citizens, regardless of 
race.  By contrast, the Governor's driving motivation was race.  
The Legislature confirmed at oral argument that the drawing of 
its districts was driven by race-neutral constitutional criteria 
and least change, not race.   
¶89 Core retention numbers for high BVAP districts were 
not available for CMS.  However, the varying percentages of BVAP 
in the maps presented help satisfy any concern that their 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
14 
 
district choices were "motivated by a racial purpose or object."  
Miller, 515 U.S. at 913.  CMS has seven districts varying from 
35.2% to 83.2% BVAP.7  The Legislature similarly has six 
districts ranging from 45.8% to 71.5%.  By comparison, the 
Governor has seven districts with pinpoint accuracy of 50% to 
51% BVAP.  While the Governor has the hallmarks of an 
unconstitutional racial gerrymander in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause, the Legislature and CMS do not.    
2.  The VRA 
¶90 The Governor contends that his maps would survive 
strict scrutiny because his seven districts are required under 
§ 2 of the VRA.  Through argument, it was made clear that the 
Governor believed seven majority-minority districts with exactly 
51% BVAP must be drawn because it is mathematically possible to 
do so.  That has never been the law.  Fundamentally, drawing a 
map based on race, to create another district because it can be 
created, is a clear violation of equal protection.  No VRA 
violation has been demonstrated by district-specific evidence.  
Despite the opportunity to engage in discovery, the Governor 
presents no evidence on Wisconsin election history at all, no 
evidence on the unique and specific history and socio-economic 
experiences of minorities in the districts they seek to 
manufacture.  At most, BLOC (not the Governor) submitted 
                                                 
7 At oral argument, CMS also noted the striking degree to 
which race infused the court's consideration and discussions, 
along with the Governor's and others' race-based proposals.  
Unlike the Governor, CMS affirmed that race should not and 
cannot be the motivating factor behind drawing districts.   
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
15 
 
argument (not evidence) about Milwaukee as a county.  Absent the 
requisite showing, no district can be reconfigured based upon 
race without violating the constitutional prohibition against 
race-based action.  Because there is no such evidence, the 
Governor's maps fail and do not withstand constitutional 
scrutiny. 
¶91 The only support presented in an attempt to justify 
race-based districts was submitted by a party who contends the 
Governor's maps violate the VRA:  BLOC.  The majority does not 
explain this but cites to BLOC's VRA record evidence to support 
its choice of the Governor's map.  See majority op., ¶45 
(restating 
BLOC's 
number 
that 
African-American 
preferred 
candidates are blocked "57.14%" of the time).  Even BLOC offers 
only broad assertions that are county specific, and a dearth of 
district-specific race vote blocking.  No party except BLOC 
presented any details on the state and condition of minority 
communities in the districts at issue, and even that evidence is 
deeply flawed.   
¶92 The 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
has 
"assumed 
that . . . complying with operative provisions of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965" can serve as a compelling interest.  
However, the government must still satisfy the narrow tailoring 
and "searching judicial inquiry" that strict scrutiny requires.  
Parents Involved in Community Schools, 551 U.S. at 720; Bush v. 
Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 978 (1996) ("Strict scrutiny remains, 
nonetheless, strict.").  There must be a "strong basis in 
evidence" that the VRA requires the drawing of districts on race 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
16 
 
to ameliorate harm and lack of access experienced by a minority 
community.  Miller, 515 U.S. at 922; accord Shaw v. Reno, 509 
U.S. at 653 ("[R]acial bloc voting and minority-group political 
cohesion [the requirements of a VRA redistricting violation] 
never can be assumed, but specifically must be proved in each 
case in order to establish that a redistricting plan dilutes 
minority voting strength in violation of § 2.").  "Strong" in 
the context of evidence is defined as "convincing; hard to 
refute, ignore, or deny."  Strong, Oxford English Dictionary 
(2022).  This is not, as the majority appears to take it, a 
minor procedural speedbump on the way toward racialized district 
lines.  See, e.g., Cooper v. Harris, 581 U.S. ___, 137 
S. Ct. 1455, 1464 (2017) (holding that the State of North 
Carolina 
lacked 
evidence 
to 
support 
race-based 
district 
boundaries after examining in detail electoral history in the 
districts at issue); Vera, 517 U.S. at 965-83 (examining in 
detail the record justifying the district lines in Texas, 
concluding that race motivated the district boundaries, and 
reasoning that the districts at issue were insufficiently 
compact to justify application of the VRA); Miller, 515 U.S. at 
920-27 (reviewing in the context of § 5 of the VRA that the 
record of the case, the justifications underlying district lines 
in Georgia, and communications between the state and federal 
government, and concluding that race-based district lines were 
not justified under the VRA); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. at 916 
(concluding, even assuming the existence of "strong evidence" to 
support the use of race under the VRA, simply creating majority-
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
17 
 
minority districts where racially polarized voting occurs absent 
a targeted remedy for the geographically compact voters harmed 
fails to satisfy strict scrutiny).8  
¶93 The operative language in § 2 of the VRA is that 
election procedures and practices cannot, in the "totality of 
the circumstances," create  
political processes leading to nomination or election 
in the State or political subdivision are not equally 
open to participation by members of a [protected] 
class of citizens . . . in that its members have less 
opportunity than other members of the electorate to 
                                                 
8 The majority contends that a complete record to support 
racially motivated district lines can be produced in a lawsuit 
after 
the 
maps 
are 
enacted. 
 
Majority 
op., 
¶41 
n.24 
(distinguishing a "VRA claim brought [] after the adoption of 
new districts" from the review provided by the majority, reliant 
upon a "limited record").  Under the majority's theory, VRA 
requirements apply only when a government is brought to court.  
However, state actors must consider whether there is a "strong 
basis" to support race-based distinctions prior to engaging in 
remedial action.  See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. at 910 ("[T]he 
institution that makes the racial distinction must have had a 
strong basis in evidence to conclude that remedial action was 
necessary, 
before 
it 
embarks 
on 
an 
affirmative-action 
program."); see, e.g., Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1469-72 (examining 
the motivation and support for applying a race-based remedy 
under the VRA at the time of redistricting); Miller v. Johnson, 
515 U.S. at 920-27 (reviewing the justifications for a state's 
use of race in redistricting at the time of adoption of the 
maps); Bethune-Hill v. Vir. State Bd. of Elections, 580 U.S. 
___, 137 S. Ct. 788, 801-02 (2017) (examining the evidence and 
justifications for a race-based distinctions at the time 
legislative districts were drawn).  As a court, the majority 
should be considering the law when it selects its maps; the VRA 
is the law. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
18 
 
participate in the political process and to elect 
representatives of their choice.[9]   
52 U.S.C. § 10301(b).  The United States Supreme Court has 
recognized that a violation of the statute is not dependent on 
an "intent to discriminate against minority voters."  Thornburg 
v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 44 (1986).  Instead, courts must look 
at effects to determine if the votes of a minority group have 
been "diluted" to impair the ability of those minorities "to 
elect representatives of their choice."  52 U.S.C. § 10301(b).  
"[T]he 'essence' of a [VRA] § 2 vote dilution claim is that a 
certain 
electoral 
law, 
practice, 
or 
structure 
causes 
an 
inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white 
voters to elect their preferred representatives."  Georgia v. 
Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 478 (2003).  
¶94 Recognizing the broad remedial goals of § 2 of the VRA 
and its more generalized application, untied to discriminatory 
intent, the Supreme Court has held that the drawing of districts 
could constitute an illegal impairment of minority voting rights 
by permitting a white majority to override the minority's choice 
in candidate.  "[I]nteracting with social and historical 
conditions," district lines that prevent a cohesive minority 
from electing their preferred candidate "impairs the ability of 
                                                 
9 The statute also states that "nothing in this section 
establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected 
in numbers equal to their proportion in the population."  52 
U.S.C. § 10301(b).  The United States Supreme Court has made 
clear that there is a difference between minority-preferred 
candidates and minority candidates.  "[T]he ultimate right of 
§ 2 is equality of opportunity, not a guarantee of electoral 
success for minority-preferred candidates of whatever race."  
De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1014 n.11.   
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
19 
 
a protected class to [exercise voting rights] on an equal basis 
with other voters."  Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1007 
(1994).  If certain conditions are met, a map may require the 
"drawing of majority-minority district[s]."  Cooper, 137 S. Ct. 
at 1470.  
¶95 The Supreme Court has demanded that three specific 
elements be met before it finds that the creation of additional 
majority-minority districts are necessary:  "(1) the racial 
group is sufficiently large and geographically compact to 
constitute a majority in a single-member district; (2) the 
racial group is politically cohesive; and (3) the majority votes 
sufficiently as a bloc to enable it usually to defeat the 
minority's preferred candidate."  League of United Latin 
American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 425 (2006) (cleaned 
up) ("LULAC").  
¶96 These three elements of the so-called "Gingles test" 
are necessary prerequisites for the creation of majority-
minority districts.  They do not necessarily prove that an 
election scheme fits the standard of "imped[ing] the ability of 
minority voters to elect representatives of their choice" under 
§ 2 of the VRA.  Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48.  To meet the standard, 
there must be a proven record of discriminatory effects.  Taken 
from a 1982 report from the United States Senate, courts have 
recognized as potentially significant: 
the history of voting-related discrimination in the 
State or political subdivision; the extent to which 
voting in the elections of the State or political 
subdivision is racially polarized; the extent to which 
the State or political subdivision has used voting 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
20 
 
practices or procedures that tend to enhance the 
opportunity for discrimination against the minority 
group . . . ; the extent to which minority group 
members bear the effects of past discrimination in 
areas such as education, employment, and health, which 
hinder their ability to participate effectively in the 
political process; the use of overt or subtle racial 
appeals in political campaigns; and the extent to 
which members of the minority group have been elected 
to public office in the jurisdiction.  The Report 
notes also that evidence demonstrating that elected 
officials are unresponsive to the particularized needs 
of the members of the minority group and that the 
policy 
underlying 
the 
State's 
or 
the 
political 
subdivision's 
use 
of 
the 
contested 
practice 
or 
structure is tenuous may have probative value. 
LULAC, 548 U.S. at 426 (citing Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44-45). 
¶97 None of the factors above are dispositive; however, 
the three Gingles factors must be met before a court considers 
whether the totality of the circumstances justifies a race-based 
remedy.  Courts consider the "totality of the circumstances" as 
a second step to determine if the minority opportunities to 
participate in the electoral process have been impeded.  This is 
an intensively fact-based analysis; it requires submission of 
testimony 
and 
detailed 
expert 
reports 
on 
the 
state 
and 
conditions of a localities' minority community, the extent they 
face discrimination, the extent past discrimination still 
impairs their ability to participate, current election rules, 
and how those rules impact minorities.  De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 
1011 ("[E]quality or inequality of opportunity were intended by 
Congress to be judgments resting on comprehensive, not limited, 
canvassing of relevant facts"); Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45 ("[T]he 
question whether the political processes are 'equally open' 
depends upon a searching practical evaluation of the 'past and 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
21 
 
present reality,' and on a 'functional' view of the political 
process."). 
¶98 To show that a district map is in violation of the VRA 
and requires the creation of additional majority-minority 
districts, there must be thorough factual findings.  The Supreme 
Court has repeatedly refused to apply a VRA remedy without 
detailed factual evidence demonstrating the existence of the 
Gingles factors, even prior to engaging in the more fact-
intensive 
"totality 
of 
the 
circumstances," 
i.e., 
the 
characteristics of the minority community and their voter 
behavior.  See, e.g., Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1471-72 (concluding 
that a majority-minority district created for VRA compliance was 
unconstitutional because past election data showed super-
majority vote percentages by the candidate preferred by African-
Americans and effective white-bloc voting, the third Gingles 
factor, was not proven, despite the possibility that new white 
voters were added who could change the voting results); Bartlett 
v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 19-20 (2009) (plurality) (concluding 
that § 2 of the VRA does not apply where the parties did not 
prove a change in district lines would create a majority 
African-American district, reasoning that the first Gingles 
factor was not met); LULAC, 548 U.S. at 432 (holding that a 
majority-Hispanic district was required but an existing map 
creating a majority-Hispanic district failed to satisfy the VRA 
because different Hispanics in different areas had "differences 
in socio-economic status, education, employment, health, and 
other characteristics," and there was insufficient evidence of 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
22 
 
"compactness" under the first Gingles factor); Gonzalez v. City 
of Aurora, 535 F.3d 594, 600 (7th Cir. 2008) (concluding that no 
evidence was provided that voting opportunities for Hispanics in 
a 
municipality 
were 
impaired, 
the 
plaintiff 
did 
not 
"build . . . a factual record," and no VRA claim lay despite 
Hispanics being dramatically less represented as a portion of 
their population); Clarke v. City of Cincinnati, 40 F.3d 807, 
812-13 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting that the electoral history for 
the public offices at issue demonstrated that "47 percent of 
blacks' preferred black candidates were elected" and thus there 
was "no reason to find that blacks' preferred black candidates 
have 'usually' been defeated" under Gingles). 
¶99 Furthermore, well-established Supreme Court precedent 
states 
that 
§ 2 
violations 
are 
determined 
by 
examining 
individual districts and specific voting groups.  Cooper, 137 
S. Ct. at 1471-72, 1471 n.5 ("[G]eneralized conclusion[s]" of 
state-wide racial polarization in voting "fails to meaningfully 
(or indeed, at all) address the relevant local question: 
whether, in a new version of District 1 created without a focus 
on race, black voters would encounter sufficient white bloc-
voting to cancel their ability to elect representatives of their 
choice." (cleaned up)); LULAC, 548 U.S. at 432, 437 (explaining 
that VRA analysis requires "an intensely local appraisal" of the 
relevant district); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. at 917 ("For example, 
if a geographically compact, cohesive minority population lives 
in south-central to southeastern North Carolina, as the Justice 
Department's objection letter suggested, District 12 that spans 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
23 
 
the Piedmont Crescent would not address that § 2 violation.");  
Abbott v. Perez, 585 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2333-34 (2018) 
(noting, despite evidence of a "long history of discrimination" 
in Texas, a "pattern of disadvantage" for minorities, and 
racially polarized voting in the region, there was insufficient 
evidence of "present local conditions" to support a VRA remedy); 
United States v. City of Euclid, 580 F. Supp. 2d 584, 604-12 
(N.D. Ohio 2008) (examining in detail the need for a race-based 
VRA remedy by considering the conditions and experiences of 
specific African-American communities in a town of 50,000); 
Comm. for a Fair & Balanced Map v. Ill. State of Bd. of 
Elections, 835 F. Supp. 2d 563, 583 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (noting 
that "northern and southern enclaves" of a Hispanic district had 
"a common heritage and share[d] common core value[s]").   
¶100 The inquiry is emphatically not to create "the maximum 
number of majority-minority districts," regardless of the on-
the-ground characteristics of the minority neighborhoods and 
communities at issue.  De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1016 (reversing a 
district court's finding of § 2 violation because more Hispanic 
majority-minority districts could have been created); Gonzalez, 
535 F.3d at 598 ("But neither § 2 nor Gingles nor any later 
decision of the Supreme Court speaks of maximizing the influence 
of any racial or ethnic group."); Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 15 
("Nothing in § 2 grants special protection to a minority group's 
right to form political coalitions.").  
¶101 Thus, from these legal principles a picture of narrow 
VRA compliance for this court emerges.  Legislative boundaries 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
24 
 
must be drawn to create effective majority-minority districts 
only where proof is offered, and accepted by a court, that 
existing 
districts 
or 
districts 
drawn 
using 
race-neutral 
criteria would result in white voters, as a bloc, preventing 
minorities from electing candidates that they support and that 
represent them.  In addition, evidence must be offered and 
accepted that the minority needs representation from their 
choice candidate due to depressed socio-economic statistics as a 
result of current and historical discrimination, election 
practices and procedures that encourage or facilitate racial 
discrimination, and the lack of non-choice candidates to respond 
to the "particularized needs of the members of the minority 
group," among other factors.  LULAC, 548 U.S. at 426, 440.   
¶102 Further, there must be available the creation of 
districts with majority-minority composition.  Id. (stating the 
first Gingles factor of "the racial group is sufficiently large 
and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-
member district" (emphasis added)); Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 19 
(holding that § 2 does not require the creation of below-
majority "opportunity districts," reasoning that 
"a party 
asserting § 2 liability must show by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the minority population in the potential election 
district is greater than 50 percent.").  As the United States 
Supreme Court explained in Cooper, when voters outside the 
minority group act as sufficient "crossover" to "help [the] 
minority to elect its candidate of choice," "it is difficult to 
see how the majority-bloc-voting requirement could be met" under 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
25 
 
Gingles.  Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1471.  If there is not 
substantial proof that a majority-minority district can be 
created, 
that 
minority 
voters 
are 
barred 
from 
effective 
participation, or that minorities are blocked by white voters 
from having representation, any consideration of race during 
redistricting would violate the constitution.  Id. at 1464-65.  
Without the need to draw districts under the VRA, race-neutral 
"traditional 
districting 
principles 
such 
as 
compactness, 
contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions" must control 
this court's decision.  Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 647.  
i. 
Gingles Factors and Bloc Voting 
¶103 Despite the high demands of the VRA, coupled with the 
need to meet VRA standards to justify the use of race to create 
government policy under the Equal Protection Clause, it is 
striking how insubstantial a record the Governor has provided to 
support his racially driven maps.  Courts have made it very 
clear that substantial evidence must be produced of all three 
Gingles factors to permit racial motivations in district 
boundaries.  Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1471-72; Bartlett, 556 U.S. 
at 19-20; LULAC, 548 U.S. at 425; Gonzalez, 535 F.3d at 600; 
Clarke, 40 F.3d at 812-13.  However, unlike the leading cases on 
the VRA, only BLOC engages in any detailed analysis on electoral 
history.  See LULAC, 548 U.S. at 423-29 (describing in detail 
the electoral history, by race, of an at issue congressional 
district to find a VRA violation); Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1470-72 
(explaining the electoral history of an area to determine that a 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
26 
 
majority-minority district fell outside the VRA and was thus 
unconstitutional).   
¶104 The Governor presents, and the majority opinion 
accepts, zero evidence of election history to support the 
application of the Gingles factors to the current maps, the 
Legislature's maps, or other race-neutral alternatives to 
support his division of districts by race.  Further, the 
Governor presents no electoral history evidence to prove the 
existence of the Gingles factors in any of the specific 
districts he drew.  Such evidence is also lacking to show the 
Governor's maps comply with the VRA, as compared to BLOC's maps, 
which also include seven black-majority districts.  In a twist 
of fate, this leaves open the possibility that VRA compliance is 
not met for the Governor's maps, even if the VRA is triggered 
and requires raced-based districts.   
¶105 The only thing the Governor does do that approaches 
objective or scientific argument is cite population percentages 
of African-Americans in Wisconsin.  The Governor thereby 
concludes that seven districts of a bare 51% BVAP can be drawn, 
and must be drawn.  This notwithstanding that the United States 
Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the same logic on numerous 
occasions.  De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1016 (rejecting a claim that 
§ 2 requires states to create "the maximum number of majority-
minority districts"); Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 15 ("Nothing in § 2 
grants special protection to a minority group's right to form 
political coalitions."); Gonzalez, 535 F.3d at 598 ("But neither 
§ 2 nor Gingles nor any later decision of the Supreme Court 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
27 
 
speaks of maximizing the influence of any racial or ethnic 
group.").  Stopping here, the Governor has failed to provide any 
evidence specific to his proposed districts warranting a finding 
of 
white 
bloc 
voting 
that 
can 
effectively 
overcome 
a 
politically-cohesive black voting bloc, let alone strong and 
convincing evidence sufficient to overcome strict scrutiny.  See 
Miller, 515 U.S. at 922.  This alone should counsel the court to 
reject the Governor's map and adopt the race-neutral maps 
presented by either the Legislature or the CMS. 
¶106 This is exactly the form of analysis that the Michigan 
Supreme Court recently applied.  Detroit Caucus v. Indep. 
Citizens Redistricting Comm'n, ___ N.W.2d ___, 2022 WL 329915 
(Mem) (Mich. Feb. 3, 2022).  The court found that "a conclusory 
expert affidavit with no accompanying bloc-voting analysis" was 
insufficient to support the use of race to create additional 
majority-minority districts which the state could have drawn, 
but did not.  Id. at *2.  The Governor in this case has 
presented little more evidence than the inadequate VRA showing 
made in Detroit Caucus.  Notably, when a full and complete 
election 
history 
analysis 
was 
performed 
in 
Michigan, 
"significant 
white 
crossover 
voting 
for 
Black-preferred 
candidates" was found.  Id. 
¶107 Furthermore, the Governor's maps actually reduce the 
percentage of African-American voters in the relevant districts 
from their existing levels.  The VRA is invoked only when 
minorities, due to a mobilized and oppositional majority, cannot 
effectively 
participate 
and 
elect 
preferred 
candidates.  
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
28 
 
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48; De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1007.  The maps 
adopted by the majority reduce this population allegedly 
overpowered by a white majority, instead of giving it a greater 
voice within the aggrieved districts.  Of course then, the 
districts cannot be so aggrieved, and no evidence exists so to 
invoke the VRA.  In other words, before a change is to be made 
under the VRA, there must be a violation of the VRA so to invoke 
its remedy.  The remedy is to cure the suppressed voter effect 
by giving minority voters greater voice, not reducing their 
voice.  Alone, this statistic puts a dagger in the Governor's 
map. 
¶108 Lacking any support in the record, one might turn to 
the presentations made by BLOC, the only other party that 
supported racially-motivated district lines but also provided 
electoral evidence.  In fact, the majority's sole citation to 
electoral history evidence relied on BLOC's expert report.  See 
majority op., ¶45 (restating BLOC's statistics on the rate in 
which African-American preferred candidates are blocked).  Yet 
even that evidence is flawed.  BLOC selects eight oddly 
identified races from Milwaukee County (two comptroller races, 
and one race each for sheriff, democratic gubernatorial primary, 
state assembly, mayor, Milwaukee county executive, and state 
superintendent) to evidence the region's electoral history.  
Only one election was examined that involved the public offices 
at issue in this case: assembly, senate, and congressional 
elections.  This is markedly at odds with traditional VRA 
analysis.  See, e.g., Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1471-72 (examining 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
29 
 
the electoral history of a congressional district at issue in 
the challenge); LULAC, 548 U.S. at 427-28 (explaining electoral 
history in the congressional district at issue); City of Euclid, 
580 F. Supp. 2d at 598-600 (describing non-applicable elections 
in the context of a detailed review of city council elections at 
issue in the lawsuit); Harper v. City of Chicago Heights, 824 
F. Supp. 786, 790, 799-800 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (examining the 
electoral history of specific city commissioner offices at 
issue).   
¶109 While some elections may be of more probative value 
than others, the provision of only eight elections, and only one 
of which involving the elected offices at issue, can hardly 
demonstrate the extent to which black people, under existing and 
race-neutral 
maps, 
lack 
the 
same 
"opportunity . . . to 
participate 
in 
the 
political 
process 
and 
to 
elect 
representatives of their choice" as do white people.  52 U.S.C. 
§ 10301(b); see Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine, 336 F. Supp. 2d 976, 
996 (D.S.D. 2004) (explaining a common hierarchy of election 
history value, when such history is available, noting that 
"[e]ndogenous elections, contests within the jurisdiction and 
for the particular office that is at issue, are more probative 
than exogenous elections").10  Undoubtedly, dozens of elections 
have occurred in the Milwaukee-area state assembly, senate, and 
                                                 
10 If this were otherwise, it is highly likely that 
governments would simply cite state-wide general election 
results (white versus minority percentages) to justify racially 
motivated district lines, in almost every state in almost every 
region of the country.  This would be a dramatic expansion of 
the permissible use of race in American election practices.   
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
30 
 
congressional districts at issue in the past 10 years alone.11  
The court's focus is on the "totality of the circumstances" and 
whether as a whole African Americans are denied the opportunity 
to effectively participate in electoral democracy.  52 U.S.C. 
§ 10301(b).  The consistent election of candidates of choice for 
the African-American community into public office in the 
districts at issue would be highly probative.  Yet the record is 
completely devoid of any evidence that the voters in these 
districts were blocked from voting in the candidates of their 
choice in a way that would invoke the VRA.   
¶110 Even under BLOC's selective analysis, white voters 
engaged in bloc voting to prevent the candidate of choice for 
African-Americans four times.  That is around a 50% rate——hardly 
the kind of strong evidence needed to overcome strict scrutiny.  
Compare Clarke, 40 F.3d at 812-13 (even when considering 
applicable electoral history, concluding that minority-preferred 
candidates were not "usually" defeated when the minority-
preferred candidate was selected in 47% of elections).  BLOC 
disaggregated allegedly polarized election results for each 
individual district it drew for only three races (a Democratic 
gubernatorial primary, a Milwaukee county executive race, and a 
state superintendent race).  But how can the court effectively 
perform an "intensely local appraisal" of district-specific 
evidence when election results for these districts are provided 
for a mere three races, none of which were for the elected 
                                                 
11 The dissent of Justice Roggensack, which follows this 
dissent, identifies many such elections of black-preferred 
candidates in districts that are predominantly white.   
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
31 
 
offices at issue?  LULAC, 548 U.S. at 437.  Of the three races 
selected for district-specific treatment, only one of them had a 
head-to-head race where voters did not split votes between 
several candidates (thus preventing a more complete picture of 
voter preferences).   
¶111 The district-specific evidence of two races BLOC 
provided was limited only to BLOC's proposed assembly districts.  
BLOC did not provide detailed district analyses of the current 
maps, an alternative race-neutral map, nor any other party's 
maps outside one Democratic gubernatorial primary in 2018.  In 
the process of this litigation, the court has not been made 
aware of a single case that found the existence of a strong 
evidentiary record, applied the VRA, and satisfied strict 
scrutiny through use of one election result, let alone a result 
from an exogenous election (from a partisan primary between 
candidates 
with 
strong 
support 
from 
the 
African-American 
community).12  Compare LULAC, 548 U.S. at 427-28 (examining 
partisan general election results); Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1470-
71 (reviewing partisan general election results); City of 
Euclid, 580 F. Supp. 2d at 598-99 (explaining electoral history 
for non-partisan general election results); Harper, 824 F. Supp. 
                                                 
12 See 
Wisconsin 
Governor 
Exit 
Polls, 
CNN, 
https://www.cnn.com/election/2018/results/wisconsin/governor 
(last visited Feb. 10, 2022) (explaining how the Governor was 
elected statewide on the support of 85% of the African-American 
population). 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
32 
 
at 790 (reviewing non-partisan general election results).13  To 
understate the point, this substantially limits the ability of 
the court to effectively judge if African-American voters are 
having their candidates blocked and their voices unlawfully 
stifled, therefore justifying race-based redistricting.  See, 
e.g., Comm. for Fair & Balanced Map, 835 F. Supp. 2d at 587 
                                                 
13 Of course, considering the wide-sweeping scope of VRA 
review, primary elections may be valid considerations when 
determining 
if 
a 
racial 
group 
has 
equal 
opportunity 
to 
participate in elections.  See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 
30, 59 (1986) (reviewing both general and primary election 
results).  However, party makeups can change dramatically over 
time.  At some points in history, a party may contain voters 
with markedly different views on the treatment of minorities.  
See, e.g., Glenn T. Eskew, George C. Wallace, Encyclopedia of 
Alabama, (Jun. 10, 2021) (describing the political history of 
George Wallace, an outspoken supporter of racial segregation and 
a 
lifelong 
Democrat). 
 
BLOC's 
analysis 
presents 
serious 
questions of whether current Democratic primary elections in 
Wisconsin, standing alone, are substantially probative on the 
ability of African-Americans to have effective opportunities, 
voices, and representation in democratic government. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
33 
 
(concluding that white bloc voting was not met where an expert 
failed to provide evidence on specific districts at issue).14 
                                                 
14 Furthermore, race-based redistricting under § 2 of the 
VRA applies only where voting is polarized to such an extent 
that 
a 
white 
majority 
blocks 
African-American-supported 
candidates so that the only way African-American individuals can 
effectively participate in democracy is to create majority-
minority districts.  See Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 19 
(2009) (plurality) (holding that § 2 does not require the 
creation of below-majority "opportunity districts"); Cooper, 137 
S. Ct. at 1464-65.  A bare majority of African-American voters 
is unlikely, absent extraordinary polarization, to prevent white 
bloc-voting (if it exists) from stopping effective African-
American representation.  Along these lines, courts attempting 
to ensure VRA compliance have accepted the need to create VRA 
districts with BVAP percentages materially greater than a bare 
51% majority.  See, e.g., Comm. for a Fair & Balanced Map v. 
Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 835 F. Supp. 2d 563, 582 (N.D. Ill. 
2011) ("60 percent of voting-age population is reasonably 
required to ensure minorities a fair opportunity to elect a 
candidate of their choice."); Hastert v. State Bd. of Elections, 
777 F. Supp. 634, at 647 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (noting that a "65% 
minority population [or 60% minority voting-age population] 
concentration [is] generally regarded as necessary to ensure 
minorities a reasonable opportunity to control a district"); 
Baumgart v. Wendelberger, No. 01-C-0121, 2002 WL 34127471, at *5 
(E.D. Wis. May 30, 2002) (recognizing expert testimony that "a 
minority district requires an 
African–American voting age 
population of at least 60% to guarantee the election of 
candidates of choice"); United States v. City of Euclid, 580 
F. Supp. 2d 584, 594 n.11 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (explaining that the 
efficacy of a "narrow" majority-minority district is subject to 
question and this is remedied by majority-minority districts in 
excess of "60%"); Baldus v. Members of Wis. Gov't Accountability 
Bd., 849 F. Supp. 2d 840, 851 (E.D. Wis. 2012) (creating a 
majority-minority Hispanic district, effective at 67.7% voting-
age population); African American Voting Rights Legal Defense 
Fund, Inc. v. Villa, 54 F.3d 1345, 1348 n.4 (8th Cir. 1995) 
("[A] guideline of 65% of total population (or its equivalent) 
has 
achieved 
general 
acceptance 
in 
redistricting 
jurisprudence."); Ketchum v. Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398, 1403 (7th 
Cir. 1984) ("A guideline of 65% of total population has been 
adopted and maintained for years by the Department of Justice 
and by reapportionment experts and has been specifically 
approved by the Supreme Court.").  When commenting on total 
voter population percentage, the court in Prosser explained that 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
34 
 
¶112 Strikingly, under BLOC's analysis, the Governor's maps 
do not satisfy the VRA, and are thus unconstitutional.  The 
majority not only lacks evidence to support the maps it adopts, 
but the only party who even attempted to prove a VRA need 
determined those maps were illegal.15    
ii. 
Totality of the Circumstances 
¶113 The 
Gingles 
factors 
are 
only 
"necessary 
prerequisites," they are not "sufficient" to justify a race-
                                                                                                                                                             
effective 
majority-minority 
districts 
require 
65% 
minority 
populations "(50 percent plus 5 percent to reflect the lower 
average age of blacks and hence lower voting population, 5 
percent to reflect a lower fraction of registered voters, and 5 
percent to reflect a lower turnout)."  Prosser v. Elections Bd., 
793 F. Supp. 859, 869 (W.D. Wis. 1992).  Even if evidence 
supported the race-based remedy offered by the Governor, his 
bare-majority districts fall outside the mainstream of accepted 
VRA redistricting measures. 
15 Even if, due to specific electoral statistics and 
community-based evidence in Milwaukee, a seventh high-BVAP 
district were required, that in no way explains why the 
remaining six high-BVAP districts must be drawn with a scalpel 
to reach exactly 51% BVAP.  Racially motivated government action 
must be "narrowly tailored" to satisfy strict scrutiny.  Grutter 
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003); see, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 
517 U.S. at 916-18 (concluding that districts drawn on the basis 
of race were not "narrowly tailored" because the government drew 
district lines from scattered minority communities which may 
have different VRA needs and were thus not sufficiently 
compact).  The VRA must be tied to individuals and their 
specific communities, not general categories of race.  Shaw v. 
Hunt, 517 U.S. at 917 (affirming that the VRA protects 
"individual[s]" not "the minority as a group"); LULAC, 548 U.S. 
at 437 ("A local appraisal is necessary because the right to an 
undiluted vote does not belong to the minority as a group, but 
rather to its individual members."); De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1016 
(explaining that, even when the Gingles factors and the totality 
of the circumstances require race-based redistricting, the VRA 
does not support creating "the maximum number of majority-
minority districts"). 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
35 
 
based remedy under the VRA.  Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50; De Grandy, 
512 U.S. at 1011.  In addition to the Gingles factors, the VRA 
requires proof that the "totality of the circumstances" supports 
the drawing of districts on the basis of race.  Gingles, 478 
U.S. at 50; De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1011; LULAC, 548 U.S. at 436; 
Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 24.  Totality of the circumstances is an 
independent, separate requirement; to apply a race-based remedy 
a totality of the circumstances analysis must be provided.  The 
majority's description of the totality of the circumstances is 
shockingly insubstantial.    
¶114 Proportionality of majority-minority districts to the 
"citizen voting-age population" can be relevant to the totality 
of the circumstances analysis.  LULAC, 548 U.S. at 436.  The 
Legislature's expert notes that various data files show an 
African-American 
citizen 
voting-age 
population 
("CVAP") 
of 
either 6.1% of 6.4% (taken from two different U.S. Census data 
files).  The Governor fails to present evidence on the issue.  
While BLOC strenuously opposes the Legislature's numbers, their 
expert suggests an African-American CVAP of 6.5%.  Even if 
BLOC's number were accepted, a proportionality analysis would 
not support seven assembly districts.  There are 99 assembly 
districts, 6.5% of 99 is 6.4, which rounding to the nearest 
whole number would be 6.  At the very least, a proportionality 
analysis does not provide strong support for a seventh district.   
¶115 The majority notes that the African-American CVAP in 
Wisconsin falls between 6.1% and 6.5%, but it fails to complete 
the final step of a proportionality inquiry: multiplying the 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
36 
 
CVAP by the relevant number of seats, here 99.  Majority op., 
¶48.  It thus states a misleading statistic of 6.5% and hopes 
the reader confuses it for a complete proportionality analysis.  
Further, the majority relies heavily on population trends among 
black and white individuals, as well as demographic statistics 
in Milwaukee County.  See majority op., ¶48 ("[A] significant 
proportion of Wisconsin's Black population lives in Milwaukee 
County where the subject districts are principally located.").  
Yet the United States Supreme Court in League of United Latin 
American Citizens v. Perry explicitly rejected the use of 
"regional" as opposed to "statewide" proportionality analysis 
for statewide districting plans.  548 U.S. at 436-38.  And 
proportionality refers to the percentage of a given race in a 
state.  Id. at 436 (explaining that the proportionality of a 
race is determined by comparing the number of minority districts 
to "the [minority] share of the citizen voting-age population").  
Proportionality does not encompass an increase or decrease of 
anything, i.e., population trends amongst the African-American 
population.  The majority both twists the natural meaning of 
English and refuses to comply with explicit Supreme Court 
directives.  
¶116 Beyond proportionality, the majority fails to discuss 
any of the 1982 Senate Report factors relied upon by courts to 
determine if the VRA applies.  Gingles, 478 U.S. at 43-45; 
LULAC, 548 U.S. at 426; see, e.g., City of Euclid, 580 F. Supp. 
2d at 604-12 (providing a totality of the circumstances 
analysis).  Those factors lay at the heart of a totality of the 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
37 
 
circumstances analysis; they are the reason why racially 
motivated maps may satisfy strict scrutiny.  Gingles, 478 U.S. 
at 50; De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1011; LULAC, 548 U.S. at 426; 
Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 24.  Nonetheless, the factors are 
completely ignored.   
¶117 The majority shortcuts the required analysis and 
instead relies on the flawed belief that proportionality is the 
preeminent consideration for totality of the circumstances.  
Majority 
op., 
¶46 
n.28, 
¶¶47-50 
(stating 
that 
courts 
"focus[] . . . [their] attention on considerations not mentioned 
in the Senate Report, such as proportionality," and examining 
only 
proportionality 
in 
a 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances 
analysis). That is flatly contradicted by established United 
States Supreme Court precedent.  De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1011-12 
(rejecting the argument that proportionality is determinative of 
VRA compliance and noting that "[n]o single statistic provides 
courts with a shortcut"); Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47 ("The essence 
of a § 2 claim is that a certain electoral law, practice, or 
structure interacts with social and historical conditions to 
cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and 
white voters to elect their preferred representatives."); LULAC, 
548 U.S. at 426, 436-42 (laying out the Senate Factors as 
considerations for totality of the circumstances analyses and 
examining both proportionality and several Senate Factors when 
determining the VRA required redrawing of certain districts in 
Texas).  By statute, the VRA requires examination of the 
"totality of the circumstances," 52 U.S.C. § 10301; nowhere in 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
38 
 
the statute does it state or imply that proportionality should 
be the primary "focus[] . . . of [the court's] attention."  
Majority op., ¶46 n.28.  
¶118 There is a simple reason no real support is provided 
by the majority for the totality of the circumstances:  there is 
none. The only party who even attempted to argue for VRA 
application under the totality of the circumstances was BLOC.  
The Governor presented no totality of the circumstance support 
for his districts.  Either the majority does not rely on BLOC, 
and thus zero evidence is available to support the application 
of the VRA, or, in the alternative, the majority must rely 
solely on BLOC's analysis.  In either case, there is no 
justification for use of race in drawing the Governor's maps. 
¶119 BLOC's totality of the circumstances analysis is 
deeply flawed and is in the form of an expert opinion alone.  
This lone source of evidence is highly debatable, and strikes an 
unmistakable tone of partisanship, attacking political opponents 
and disfavored policies.  Such conclusory opinion evidence does 
not amount to the kind of factual district-specific evidence 
that could support a conclusion that a VRA violation has 
occurred and the remedy must be creation of seven bare-majority 
districts.  Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1471-72; LULAC, 548 U.S. at 
432; Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. at 917; City of Euclid, 580 
F. Supp. 2d at 604-12; Comm. for Fair & Balanced Map, 835 
F. Supp. 2d at 583.  
¶120 For instance, BLOC claims Milwaukee's choice to close 
polling locations during the COVID-19 Pandemic and voter ID laws 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
39 
 
demonstrate the existence of racially discriminatory election 
practices.  No evidence or explanation is provided as to how 
these basic administrative and perfectly legitimate election 
practices "tend to enhance the opportunity for discrimination 
against the minority group."  Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44-45.  This 
is far cry from the "poll tax, an all-white primary system, and 
restrictive voter registration time periods," used in the past 
in parts of the country to mask disenfranchisement of African-
American voters.  LULAC, 548 U.S. at 439-40; see also De Grandy, 
512 
U.S. 
at 
1018 
("In 
a 
substantial 
number 
of 
voting 
jurisdictions, that past reality has included such reprehensible 
practices 
as 
ballot 
box 
stuffing, 
outright 
violence, 
discretionary registration, property requirements, the poll tax, 
and the white primary; and other practices censurable when the 
object of their use is discriminatory, such as at-large 
elections, 
runoff 
requirements, 
anti-single-shot 
devices, 
gerrymandering, 
the 
impeachment 
of 
office-holders, 
the 
annexation or deannexation of territory, and the creation or 
elimination of elective offices.").   
¶121 The State of Wisconsin must strive to eliminate any 
voting 
practice 
that 
facilitates 
unjust 
discrimination.  
According 
to 
BLOC, 
must 
the 
state 
control 
election 
administration in Milwaukee to prevent consolidation of polling 
locations and covert discriminatory practices?  Must the state 
revoke its Voter-ID laws?  See Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 
753-54 (7th Cir. 2014) (upholding a direct § 2 VRA challenge 
against Wisconsin's Voter-ID law, noting "[s]ection 2(b) tells 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
40 
 
us that § 2(a) does not condemn a voting practice just because 
it has a disparate effect on minorities," there was no finding 
"blacks . . . have less 'opportunity' than whites to get photo 
IDs," and black individuals had equal if not higher voter 
registration and turnout in the 2012 election as compared to 
white individuals); Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2345 (noting that "a 
distorted picture can be created" by the manipulative use of 
statistics, such as "[i]f 99.9% of whites had photo IDs, and 
99.7% of blacks did, it could be said that  blacks are three 
times as likely as whites to lack qualifying ID (0.3 ÷ 0.1 = 3)" 
(quotations omitted)); Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Elections Bd., 
553 U.S. 181, 204 (2008) ("The application of [Indiana's Voter-
ID law] to the vast majority of Indiana voters is amply 
justified by the valid interest in protecting the integrity and 
reliability of the electoral process.").  
¶122 BLOC also looks at general socio-economic correlations 
between white and African-American individuals in Wisconsin, 
including the lower rates of African-American homeownership and 
lower average incomes, and concludes, without any substantial 
analysis on the extraordinary complexities of causation, that 
this is the result of current and past discrimination.  The 
accepted fact that African-American individuals experienced 
despicable forms of discrimination, specifically racial housing 
covenants in the Milwaukee-area, is certainly a factor impacting 
VRA analyses, but mere conclusions of discriminatory effects for 
all African-American individuals in Milwaukee from race-based 
correlations is not substantial evidence of discriminatory 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
41 
 
hindrances on the ability of African-American individuals "to 
participate effectively in the political process."  Gingles, 478 
U.S. at 44-45.  It is the burden of those seeking to use race in 
district boundaries to prove the need for such practices.  Mere 
inferences and assumptions cannot be sufficient. 
¶123 Further, BLOC asserts proof of race baiting and 
racially motivated campaigning by pointing to statements from 
Republicans and conservatives critiquing the Black Lives Matter 
organization, 
taking 
knees 
during 
national 
anthems, 
and 
defunding the police.  Notably, despite the fact that BLOC 
relies heavily on Democratic primary data to demonstrate bloc-
voting and the need for race-drawn districts, the racial animus 
directed toward African-American individuals in campaigns and 
public 
messages 
all 
allegedly 
come 
from 
conservative 
Republicans.  There is no evidence offered by BLOC that the 
Democratic public officials who at times defeat African-American 
preferred candidates, such as the Governor in his Democratic 
primary, are "unresponsive to the particularized needs of the 
members of" the African-American community.  Gingles, 478 U.S. 
at 44-45; see LULAC, 548 U.S. at 426, 440 (explaining in detail 
that a current representative for a district subject to VRA 
scrutiny was "unresponsive" to the needs of the minority 
community).  Shockingly, BLOC contends that African-American 
candidates have only had "mixed success" in the districts at 
issue.  Relying on exogenous and state-wide elections, BLOC 
ignores the fact that the current assembly, senate, and 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
42 
 
congressional districts have elected African-American office 
holders in the vast majority of elections. 
¶124 The evidence offered by BLOC of the totality of the 
circumstances is hardly localized to the historical, societal, 
and economic experiences of specific neighborhoods in Milwaukee.  
Underlying BLOC's analysis is the assumption that all African-
American individuals in Wisconsin have the same history, 
experiences, and effects of discrimination, and there is no need 
to go further than broad strokes of correlations, debatable 
assumptions, and talking-points.  See LULAC, 548 U.S. at 432 
(examining in a VRA analysis that different Hispanics in 
different parts of Texas had "differences in socio-economic 
status, 
education, 
employment, 
health, 
and 
other 
characteristics"); 
Comm. 
for 
Fair 
& 
Balanced 
Map, 
835 
F. Supp. 2d at 583 (noting that "northern and southern enclaves" 
of a Hispanic district had "a common heritage and share[d] 
common core value[s]"); City of Euclid, 580 F. Supp. 2d at 605-
07 (explaining in detail, with numerous experts reports, record 
evidence, and testimony, forms of official discrimination 
against a discrete African-American community in Euclid, Ohio).  
Individuals, communities, and societal groups differ, even if 
they are the same race.  In fact, the maps offered by the 
Legislature and CMS recognize that many of the African-Americans 
moved under the Governor's maps are located in discrete and 
compact neighborhoods.  Following traditional redistricting 
criteria, and putting together those with shared communities, 
interests, and experience, the Legislature's and CMS's districts 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
43 
 
fluctuate in BVAP to recognize this geographical reality.16  By 
comparison, for their purported benefit, the majority chooses to 
displace many African Americans and move them into districts 
with little societal, cultural, and economic similarities.17  
iii. The Majority Opinion and Party Concessions 
¶125 Despite all its faults, BLOC at least provided some 
evidence supporting their VRA claims.  The Governor presented 
nothing, let alone district-specific evidence.  This flies in 
the face of well-accepted precedent on overcoming strict 
scrutiny and proving VRA needs.  See Vera, 517 U.S. at 965-83; 
Miller, 515 U.S. at 920-27; Shaw, 517 U.S. at 916; Cooper, 137 
S. Ct. at 1471-72; Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 19-20; Perry, 548 U.S. 
at 432; Gonzalez, 535 F.3d at 600; Clarke, 40 F.3d at 812-13; 
City of Euclid, 580 F. Supp. 2d at 604-12; Committee for a Fair 
and Balanced Map, 835 F. Supp. 2d at 583; Harper, 824 F. Supp. 
                                                 
16 See John Johnson, Neighborhoods Where Milwaukee Isn't 
Segregated, Marquette University Law School (Feb. 9, 2022), 
https://law.marquette.edu/facultyblog/2022/02/neighborhoods-
where-milwaukee-isnt-segregated/ 
(describing 
the 
demographic 
makeup of the many unique neighborhoods in Milwaukee). 
17 In the process, to obtain his 51% BVAP districts, the 
Governor shifted white voters (referred to as "filler" voters at 
oral arguments) into new districts to achieve targeted racial 
proportions.  The VRA by its text does not apply solely to any 
one race, and both the Equal Protection Clause and the Fifteenth 
Amendment's prohibition on racial discrimination in voting 
practices apply to all races.  See 52 U.S.C. § 10301; U.S. 
Const. amend. XIV; U.S. Const. amend. XV; Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 
630, 657 (1993) ("Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial 
purposes, may balkanize us into competing racial factions; it 
threatens to carry us further from the goal of a political 
system in which race no longer matters——a goal that the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments embody, and to which the 
Nation continues to aspire."). 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
44 
 
At 790, 799-800. Yet that does not seem to bother the majority 
as they walk blindfolded into a buzz saw of Equal Protection 
law.    Given that, under BLOC's analysis, the Governor's maps 
violate the VRA, the majority's maps may bear the usual stigma 
of violating the Equal Protection Clause and the VRA at the same 
time.   
¶126 Counterintuitively, a linchpin of the majority's VRA 
analysis is an alleged lack of evidence and argument.  The 
majority opinion may leave the reader with the misperception 
that all litigants at this court agreed that a racial 
gerrymander under the VRA was necessary.  See majority op., ¶45 
(noting "little . . . alternative data or analysis" to counter 
BLOC's election history and indicating that the "parties 
appeared to assume the VRA requires" race-based district lines).  
That is patently inaccurate.  In briefing, the Legislature was 
clear that its maps both provided African-Americans equal 
opportunity "to participate in the political process and to 
elect representatives of their choice" (thus satisfying the 
VRA), 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b), and was not motivated by race (thus 
satisfying the Equal Protection Clause), Miller, 515 U.S. at 
911-12.  The Legislature asserted that the Governor's maps 
"reveal a policy of prioritizing mechanical racial targets above 
all other districting criteria (save one-person, one-vote), 
meaning there is ample evidence that race motivated the drawing 
of particular lines."  Further, the Legislature claimed, 
correctly, that the Governor "offered zero evidence that the 
existing districts do not give all voters equal opportunity to 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
45 
 
elect their candidate of choice."  In the Legislature's reply 
brief, it argued the Governor presented "novel and likely 
unconstitutional" arguments in support of seven bare majority-
minority 
districts, 
labeled 
by 
the 
Legislature 
as 
an 
"unconstitutional 
racial 
gerrymander." 
 
The 
Legislature 
reaffirmed in the same brief that its "redistricting plan was 
drawn without regard to race."  Further, the Legislature's 
expert, John Alford, described in many pages of detail the 
computational and data concerns with the evidence submitted by 
BLOC to support application of the VRA.  He stated explicitly, 
"[T]he election patterns detailed by [BLOC] raise serious doubts 
about whether the Gingles threshold standard is currently met in 
Milwaukee County." Finally, Mr. Alford observed that, even using 
BLOC's election data, the black-preferred candidate was blocked 
in less than 50% of elections.  
¶127 The central goal of the Legislature's proposed maps 
was to conserve existing boundaries for districts with high 
BVAP, 
not 
draw 
districts 
to 
maximize 
majority-minority 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
46 
 
districts.  The Legislature's race-neutral intentions were 
confirmed at oral argument.18 
¶128 But, even so, why is the majority attached to party 
briefing?  They have a responsibility to read the law, 
understand 
available 
evidence, 
and 
come 
to 
the 
correct 
                                                 
18 The majority adds in an argument that the Legislature's 
districts in some way "pack" African-American voters into a 
district with above 70% BVAP.  Majority op., ¶49.  The 
Legislature has one district at 71.5% BVAP.  As the majority 
notes, it is well established that the VRA requires the creation 
of 
race-based 
districts 
where 
minorities 
are 
"fragment[ed] . . . among several districts where a bloc-voting 
majority can routinely outvote them," or where minorities are 
"pack[ed] . . . into one or a small number of districts to 
minimize 
their 
influence 
in 
the 
districts 
next 
door."  
De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1007; see majority op., ¶49.  But the 
United States Supreme Court has clarified that the VRA applies 
only to the creation of majority-minority districts; it does not 
require splitting up high minority-percentage districts to more 
effectively 
spread 
the 
minority's 
political 
influence.  
Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 19; Cooper 137 S. Ct. at 1471 (explaining 
that 
without 
the 
need 
for 
a 
majority-minority 
district 
sufficient white crossover would undermine the satisfaction of 
the Gingles factors).  Thus, the inquiry is whether there has 
been presented evidence of effective white bloc voting to 
prevent minorities in a specific area and district from 
successfully electing candidates they support.  Even if the 
Legislature drew a higher BVAP district following race-neutral 
redistricting 
criteria 
such 
as 
preserving 
continuity 
of 
interests, geographic compactness, and local government lines, 
without the requisite evidence of a VRA violation in a separate, 
neighboring district where a majority-minority district could be 
created, no race-based remedy under the VRA can be used.  Here, 
there is no such district-specific evidence.  The majority does 
not cite a single case holding that merely having a high BVAP 
district, without the need to prove the Gingles factors or the 
need for a race-based remedy under the totality of the 
circumstances, violates the VRA.  See Ketchum, 740 F.2d at 1403-
06, 1418 (case cited by the majority, noting the commonly 
accepted target of 65-70% minority population percentages in 
applying a VRA remedy, after a VRA violation in relevant 
districts has been established). 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
47 
 
conclusion.  See State v. Hunt, 2014 WI 102, ¶42 n.11, 360 
Wis. 2d 576, 851 N.W.2d 434 ("Because it is our constitutional 
duty to say what the law is, we are not bound by a party's 
concessions of law.").  They, not the litigants, are the 
government actors.  U.S. Const. amend. XIV sec. 1 ("No State 
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws." (Emphasis added.)); Brentwood Academy 
v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001) 
(noting 
that 
only 
those 
"outside 
formally 
governmental 
organizations" fall outside the coverage of the Fourteenth 
Amendment); Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) 
("Under strict scrutiny, the government has the burden of 
proving that racial classifications are narrowly tailored 
measures 
that 
further 
compelling 
governmental 
interests." 
(Emphasis added.)).  They are the ones choosing a map for the 
State of Wisconsin, endorsing district boundaries unambiguously 
motivated by race.  See, e.g., De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 
(reviewing under traditional Equal Protection and VRA standards 
maps approved by the Florida Supreme Court).  The court, acting 
on behalf of the State of Wisconsin, not the parties, must 
overcome strict scrutiny.  See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326 
(describing strict scrutiny demands when the government treats 
individuals differently on the basis of race); Vera, 517 U.S. at 
978 ("Strict scrutiny remains, nonetheless, strict."); see, 
e.g., Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1464; Miller, 515 U.S. at 920-27; 
Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. at 916.  
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
48 
 
¶129 Ultimately, the majority's focus on the parties' 
positions is a tactic of distraction.  The majority may 
understand that it lacks sufficient evidence to support race-
driven maps proposed by the Governor, so to compensate, it turns 
around and reasons that the Governor's maps cannot be rejected 
with what it views as inadequate argument on the part of the 
Legislature and other parties.  But this merely begs the 
question:  why is the court adopting a racially motivated map 
without support in the record?  The majority does not cite a 
single case standing for the proposition that a state action can 
survive strict scrutiny by pointing to the fact that other 
private, non-state actors did not present evidence or arguments 
in favor of a constitutional course of action.  Under the 
majority's logic, could the Legislature, when it passes maps at 
the next redistricting cycle, draw districts on the basis of 
race, without evidence supporting the application of the VRA, by 
simply allowing third-party stakeholders an opportunity to 
object?  The majority's reasoning is foreign to constitutional 
jurisprudence.  
¶130 The majority also cites a prior Wisconsin federal 
court decision that adopted districts in the 1990s with majority 
BVAP.  Prosser v. Elections Bd., 793 F. Supp. 859 (W.D. Wis. 
1992); see majority op., ¶45.  That decision did not analyze the 
Gingles factors, the history of electoral success for African-
American 
preferred 
candidates, 
or 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances, as is required to prove the need for a VRA 
remedy.  Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1471-72; Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
49 
 
19-20; LULAC, 548 U.S. at 432; Gonzalez, 535 F.3d at 600; 
Clarke, 40 F.3d at 812-13.  It was also issued prior to almost 
every major United States Supreme Court precedent on the VRA, 
for example:  Shaw v. Reno, Shaw v. Hunt, Johnson v. De Grandy, 
Miller v. Johnson, Bush v. Vera, League of United Latin American 
Citizens v. Perry, Bartlett v. Strickland, and Cooper v. Harris.  
Nonetheless, the contention that a decision from the 1990s on 
conditions warranting a race-based remedy supports the same 
remedy today is similar to asserting that a race-based remedy in 
Michigan warrants the same in Wisconsin.  Both theories are 
antithetical to a proper VRA analysis.  The circumstances of the 
actual individuals on the ground today, in their specific 
communities, is what drives a VRA review, not assumptions 
derived from how other individuals of the same race were treated 
at different times, in different places, and under different 
circumstances.  Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1471-72; LULAC, 548 U.S. 
at 432; Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. at 917; City of Euclid, 580 F. 
Supp. 2d at 604-12; Comm. for Fair & Balanced Map, 835 F. Supp. 
2d at 583.  No caselaw is cited for the proposition that 
"historical practice," relied upon by the majority, can either 
support race-based district lines or satisfy strict scrutiny.  
Majority op., ¶45.  Surely, many governments in the past would 
have relied on such an argument to support racially motivated 
policies and practices. 
¶131 History is littered with racial animus, hostility, 
discrimination, and desperate treatment.  The Equal Protection 
Clause demands that governments in the United States rise above 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
50 
 
the human temptation of dividing by race and treat individuals 
how basic dignity demands they be treated:  as individuals.  
Only 
in 
specific 
cases, 
with 
exacting 
and 
quantifiable 
information, and with narrowly targeted remedies, may government 
discard equal protection guarantees.  Fisher, 570 U.S. at 309-
10; Miller, 515 U.S. at 911-12, 922; Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 
653.  Lowering the bar for equal protection and allowing it to 
be ignored without extraordinary evidence, and relying primarily 
on conclusory analysis and a court's subjective observations, 
would mark a material turn for equal protection jurisprudence 
and 
an 
unwelcome 
departure 
from 
foundational 
American 
principles.  See majority op., ¶¶43-49 (relying heavily on party 
concessions, incomplete evidence, and an out of context standard 
of 
"good 
reasons" 
to 
justify 
unambiguous 
racial 
classifications).  If that path is followed, a Pandora's box of 
racial grouping, jealousy, division, and animosity may open more 
fully.  And we all may look back in regret at the day equal 
protection 
was 
made 
into 
an 
insubstantial 
and 
secondary 
interest. 
¶132 Given the serious lack of evidence supporting the need 
to draw districts as explicitly based on race as is done by the 
Governor, this court should abide by its constitutional duty to 
treat all Wisconsinites the same regardless of race.  Vera, 517 
U.S. at 965-83; Miller, 515 U.S. at 922; Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 
at 653; Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1464; Fisher, 570 U.S. at 309-10.  
The court has no lawful, constitutional basis to adopt any other 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
51 
 
maps than the race-neutral, constitutional, least change maps 
submitted by the Legislature or, in the alternative, CMS. 
B.  Least Change Is More Than One Core Retention Number. 
¶133 Core retention is the percentage of individuals that 
are retained in the same legislative districts as the maps in 
existence prior to this lawsuit.  Never before oral argument did 
we conclude that the core retention number alone was the sole 
factor to be considered.  In our November 30 opinion, we stated 
that "our judicial remedy should reflect the least change 
necessary 
for 
the 
maps 
to 
comport 
with 
relevant 
legal 
requirements."  Johnson, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶72.  We did not limit 
the factors and considerations that can be taken into account 
when determining whether a map made as little changes as 
possible while complying with the law.  Certainly, we did not 
hold that the map that moves the lowest number of people will be 
selected, regardless of any other change or constitutional 
consideration.  Our majority opinion on November 30 simply never 
mentioned that phrase, "core retention."  A majority of this 
court nonetheless takes a myopic approach and refuses to look 
beyond core retention or even evaluate the underpinnings of how 
those numbers were achieved.  See majority op., ¶24 ("[L]east 
change approach should guide our decision" and "[c]ore retention 
is central to analysis.").   
¶134 Fundamental jurisprudence instructs that the data that 
underlies the core retention numbers may be considered, but in 
conjunction with other valid considerations such as county and 
municipality division and population deviation.  Such routine 
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52 
 
considerations are valid, as is discussed in caselaw, and more 
importantly, they are constitutionally required.  The author of 
the majority opinion now distances himself from these basic 
principles and even his own writing, which explicitly indicated 
"traditional 
redistricting 
criteria" 
would 
be 
considered.  
Johnson, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶83 (Hagedorn, J., concurring).19 
                                                 
19 The majority opinion's author refused to sign onto small 
parts of the November 30 opinion and wrote a separate 
concurrence because, in that Justice's view, the November 30 
opinion unduly limited the court's discretion in selecting a new 
map.  "Legal standards establish the need for a remedy and 
constrain the remedies we may impose, but they are not the only 
permissible judicial considerations when constructing a proper 
remedy," the November 30 concurrence declared triumphantly.  
Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2021 WI 87, ¶83, 399 
Wis. 2d 623, 967 N.W.2d 469 (Hagedorn, J., concurring).  In 
fact, there was a specific factor the concurrence gave special 
favor to:  "one universally recognized redistricting criterion 
is communities of interest," i.e., local communities and 
governments.  Id. (Hagedorn, J., concurring).  The concurrence 
contemplated reliance on this factor when multiple maps were 
comparable on the issue of least change: 
Suppose we receive multiple proposed maps that comply 
with all relevant legal requirements, and that have 
equally compelling arguments for why the proposed map 
most aligns with current district boundaries.  In that 
circumstance, we still must exercise judgment to 
choose the best alternative.  Considering communities 
of 
interest 
(or 
other 
traditional 
redistricting 
criteria) may assist us in doing so. 
Id. (Hagedorn, J., concurring). 
Despite the urge to make this apparently principled opinion 
known in a concurrence, the same logic is absent in the majority 
opinion.  Not only does the opinion cast as insignificant basic 
constitutional 
interests 
in 
maintaining 
local 
government 
boundaries, but it also adopts maps with substantially greater 
divisions of communities of interests, all the while having 
immaterial differences on the (now controlling) least-change 
metric of core retention.  Time changes all things, but 
presumably not that quickly.   
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
53 
 
¶135 Now, four of my colleagues inexplicably adopt core 
retention as the sole factor even though the phrase cannot be 
found in the November 30 majority or concurring opinions.  This 
comes out of thin air and much to the surprise of three members 
of the court.  While the Governor retains 85.8% of individuals 
in their existing districts, the Legislature retains 84.2%, a 
1.6% difference.  However, the Legislature scores better than 
the Governor in the senate, moving several thousand less 
individuals.20  The Governor moves around 95,000 less people in 
the assembly.  Thus, overall, combining the figures for the 
senate and assembly, the Governor moves less people than the 
Legislature, although they are fairly close in measure.  By 
comparison, CMS has a 61% core retention in the assembly and a 
74.3% core retention in the senate.   
¶136 One is left to wonder:  If the Legislature knew that 
core retention was the only criteria to be used, might it have 
submitted different maps if given the chance?  Recall, all 
parties had the benefit of knowing the Legislature's maps before 
submitting their own.  The Legislature advanced support for maps 
                                                                                                                                                             
The parties in this lawsuit submitted maps under guidance 
on what they viewed as the deciding factors for the author of 
the November 30 concurrence.  It was not an unreasonable 
inference that that Justice's vote may decide the outcome of 
this case.  Yet now that Justice, writing the majority opinion, 
claims soft, non-legal factors such as communities of interest 
are not of material importance when the court can identify a map 
with the lowest core retention.  This is a classic example of 
shifted standards. 
20 I recognize that the percentages in the senate are very 
close; with rounding the Governor and the Legislature have a 
92.2% core retention in the senate. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
54 
 
passed by the Assembly and Senate in 2021, which all parties 
could examine in advance.  No such privilege was afforded to the 
Legislature vis-a-vis the Governor's maps. 
¶137 To be clear, core retention is a useful statistic for 
evaluating the amount of changes in a given map, but it cannot 
be the only consideration for the court.  Our November 30 
opinion made clear that any map must not only consider 
statistics reflecting the amount of change, but it must do so 
while comporting best with other legal interests such as per 
capita representation and retaining local communities.  Johnson, 
399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶¶24-38, 72 (describing legal considerations in 
detail).  The November 30 opinion made 
clear that the 
constitutional requirements must be met.  Id., ¶38 ("In 
determining a judicial remedy for malapportionment, we will 
ensure preservation of these justiciable and cognizable rights 
explicitly protected under the United States Constitution, the 
VRA, or Article IV, Sections 3, 4, or 5 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution."). 
 
We 
made 
clear 
that 
in 
remedying 
any 
malapportionment in the existing maps we must not "inadvertently 
choose a remedy that solves one constitutional harm while 
creating another."  Id., ¶34.  As explained below, while the 
Governor has higher core retention numbers than the Legislature 
and 
CMS, 
he 
did 
so 
by 
sacrificing 
other 
constitutional 
considerations.  As we stated in our November 30 opinion, the 
law does not countenance such a result.  
C.  One-Person-One-Vote 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
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¶138 The United States Supreme Court has continuously and 
unambiguously 
reminded 
us 
that, 
in 
apportioning 
state 
legislative 
districts, 
"the 
overriding 
objective 
must 
be 
substantial equality of population among the various districts, 
so that the vote of any citizen is approximately equal in weight 
to that of any other citizen in the State."  Reynolds v. Sims, 
377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964); see also Baumgart, 2002 WL 34127471, 
at *2 (quoting Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 409 (1977)) ("With 
respect to reapportionment, population equality is the 'most 
elemental requirement of the Equal Protection Clause.'").  The 
Constitution "does not permit a State to relegate considerations 
of equality to secondary status and reserve as the primary goal 
of apportionment the service of some other state interest." 
Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 340, modified, 411 U.S. 922 
(1973) (Brennan, J., concurring in part).  
¶139 The United States Supreme Court, recognizing the 
interests of federalism and respect for state sovereignty, has 
acknowledged 
that 
"some 
leeway 
in 
the 
equal-population 
requirement 
should 
be 
afforded 
States 
in 
devising 
their 
legislative reapportionment plans . . . [and that] when state 
legislative districts are at issue we have held that minor 
population 
deviations 
do 
not 
establish 
a 
prima 
facie 
constitutional violation."  Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 23 
(1975). 
 
Likewise, 
the 
Court 
has 
explained 
that 
"the 
Constitution permits 'such minor deviations only as may occur in 
recognizing certain factors that are free from any taint of 
arbitrariness or discrimination.'"  Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
56 
 
440, 444 (1967) (quoting Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 710 
(1964)).  The State of Wisconsin has an independent requirement 
of population equality.  Article IV, Section 3 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution 
states 
that 
new 
maps 
must 
be 
"apportion[ed] . . . according to the number of inhabitants."   
¶140 In analyzing the deviation and the extent to which 
minor 
deviations 
are 
acceptable 
under 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution, courts follow a two-step process.  The first step 
is to calculate the ideal population.  81A C.J.S. States § 140.  
This is done through simple math: population of the state 
divided by the number of applicable districts.  Once the ideal 
population is calculated, it is then possible to determine the 
extent to which a given district population deviates from the 
ideal.  Id.  There is not a mathematical formula extracted from 
the 
Equal 
Protection 
Clause 
establishing 
"what 
range 
of 
percentage deviations is permissible, and what is not."  Mahan, 
410 U.S. at 329.  
¶141 While we do know that "[c]ourt-enacted maps are held 
to a higher standard . . . the Supreme Court has not explained 
how much higher."  Essex v. Kobach, 874 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1082 
(D. Kan. 2012) (citing Connor, 431 U.S. at 414).  District 
courts around the country have generally sought to adopt maps 
that, at most, include a 2% deviation.  See, e.g., Colleton 
Cnty. Council v. McConnell, 201 F. Supp. 2d 618, 655 (D.S.C. 
2002).  
¶142 However, while courts have attempted to reach at most 
2% population deviation when drawing maps, this does not mean 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
57 
 
that courts reach it and then quit. The continual goal of courts 
when drawing maps is minimizing population disparities.  In 
Smith v. Cobb Cnty. Bd. of Elections & Registrations, the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia was 
tasked with drawing the maps for Cobb County, Georgia.  314 
F. Supp. 2d 1274 (N.D. Ga. 2002).  Like other courts, it 
declared that the "most important goal in fashioning this 
remedial plan was to minimize the population deviations among 
the four districts . . . ."  Id. at 1300. Among the plans 
presented to it by the parties was a plan that kept population 
deviation at 1.77%.  Id.  However, in following its declared 
goal, the court still redrew the maps itself and ended with a 
population deviation of 1.51%.  Id. at 1302. 
¶143 Further, the State of Wisconsin has an independent 
requirement of population equality.  Article IV, Section 3 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution states that new maps must be 
"apportion[ed] . . . according to the number of inhabitants."  
Federal courts, respecting the 
independent sovereignty of 
states, have permitted greater deviations than what would be 
permitted for congressional districts.  But that does not imply 
that the Wisconsin Constitution does not place independent 
demands on Wisconsin's own legislative districts.  Chapman, 420 
U.S. at 23.  Notably, while the demands of population equality 
under the United States Constitution are based on the Equal 
Protection Clause, the demands under the Wisconsin Constitution 
are derived from Article IV, Section 3 on the apportionment of 
districts, not equal protection.  See Evenwel v. Abbott, 578 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
58 
 
U.S. 54, 58-61 (2016) (describing the different legal standards 
for state and federal districts under the United States 
Constitution).  When the federal government interprets and 
applies its own apportionment clause in Article I, Section 2 of 
the United States Constitution, it demands "as close to perfect 
equality 
as 
possible," 
with 
little 
leniency 
for 
excess 
deviation.  Id.  
¶144 In line with these principles, the November 30 opinion 
stated that the population deviation should be "as close an 
approximation to exactness as possible" under the Wisconsin 
Constitution. 
 
Johnson, 
399 
Wis. 2d 623, 
¶28 
(quotations 
omitted). 
 
Minimizing 
population 
deviation 
as 
much 
as 
practicable has been established for over a century in Wisconsin 
and at least since State ex rel. Attorney General v. Cunningham, 
81 Wis. 440, 484, 51 N.W. 724 (1892).   
¶145 In Wisconsin, federal courts have played a role in 
drawing the legislative maps for the past three redistricting 
cycles.  The federal courts' determinations came only after the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court chose not to take up the issue.  The 
federal courts recognize redistricting is our responsibility, if 
the legislative and executive branches fail.  Nonetheless, each 
time, the federal panel has stated that population equality 
remained its chief goal and adopted plans as consummate with 
that goal as practicable.  See Wis. State AFL-CIO v. Elections 
Bd., 543 F. Supp. 630, 637 (E.D. Wis. 1982) (describing that 
their plan with a population deviation of 1.74% exemplifies the 
"condition that, in a representative form of government, the 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
59 
 
vote of each person be, to the extent reasonably possible, equal 
in weight to the vote of another"); Prosser, 793 F. Supp. at 866 
(stating that "[b]elow 1 percent, there are no legally or 
politically relevant degrees of perfection," and adopting a map 
with deviation of 0.52 percent); Baumgart, 2002 WL 34127471, at 
*7 (detailing that the court's "attempt to keep population 
deviation between districts as low as possible" yielded a 
deviation of 1.48%).  Last cycle, in 2011, the Legislature 
enacted a map with a "maximum deviation for assembly districts 
[of] 0.76% and 0.62% for senate districts."  Baldus v. Members 
of Wis. Gov't Accountability Bd., 849 F. Supp. 2d 840, 851 (E.D. 
Wis. 2012).  The existing levels of deviation, by surviving the 
constitutional and political processes, are a useful basis for 
comparison when evaluating the deviations proposed in the 
respective maps.  Our November 30 opinion stated that the 
population deviation should be "as close an approximation to 
exactness 
as 
possible" 
under 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution.  
Johnson, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶28 (quotations omitted); see also 
Cunningham, 81 Wis. at 484.   
¶146 With this law in hand, the Governor's maps that have 
been adopted by a majority of this court are highly concerning.  
They contain some of the largest deviations from one-person-one-
vote that were presented to us: 1.883% for the assembly 
districts and 1.179% for the senate districts, over double the 
deviations adopted in the prior maps.  Apparently, to the 
majority, this dramatic departure from the existing maps is not 
relevant 
to 
the 
least 
change 
inquiry. 
 
Meanwhile, 
the 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
60 
 
Legislature (0.759% for the assembly districts and 0.574 for the 
senate districts) and CMS (0.736% for the assembly districts and 
0.501% for the senate districts) have substantially lower 
population deviations. 
¶147 It is clear from the comparisons between the 2011 
maps, historically adopted maps, and the maps proposed by the 
parties, the Governor failed to heed the instructions this court 
gave in Cunningham and repeated in its November 30 opinion.  
While the Governor keeps population deviations below a largely 
arbitrary line of 2 percent, this is by no means the end of the 
analysis.  See Cunningham, 81 Wis. at 484; Cobb Cnty., 314 
F. Supp. 2d at 1300-02.  The Governor fails to provide any 
explanation for why his maps have over double the magnitude in 
population distortions compared to the 2011 maps other than 
vaguely asserting compliance with "least change."  Notably, the 
Legislature was able to design maps with almost the same core 
retention, while also keeping deviation orders of magnitude 
lower.  The Legislature's effort is proof positive that the 
Governor's population deviations among districts were entirely 
unnecessary.  Given advanced software, there is little doubt 
that if the Governor were not striving for other goals, based at 
least in part on race and likely in large part on politics, his 
core retention could have remained the same while lowering 
population deviations.  But while political considerations are 
not included in the constitution, population equality is.  See 
Johnson, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶53 (explaining that partisanship is 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
61 
 
not a legally recognized interest found in the Wisconsin or 
United States Constitutions).  
¶148 The court's interest is in making populations "as 
nearly as [equal] as possible," and thus, the court should adopt 
either the Legislature's map or CMS's map.  Abrams v. Johnson, 
521 U.S. 74, 98-99 (1997); Johnson, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶28.  The 
population deviations included in the Governor's maps allow him 
to 
inflate 
his 
core 
retention 
numbers, 
undercut 
the 
Legislature's numbers, and assert he has provided the least 
change maps.  In the process, however, he ignored interests 
recognized in both the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions 
that individuals should have as close to equal influence in 
elections as possible.  We should embrace this foundational 
democratic value, not just explain it away.21 
D.  Dividing Local Communities 
¶149 Under 
Article 
IV, 
Section 
4 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, assembly districts must be drawn "to be bounded by 
county, precinct, town or ward lines."  As we explained in our 
November 30 opinion: 
Applying the one person, one vote principle may make 
bounding districts by county lines nearly impossible. 
See Wis. State AFL-CIO v. Elec. Bd., 543 F. Supp. 630, 
635 (E.D. Wis. 1982) (stating the maintenance of 
county 
lines 
is 
"incompatib[le] 
with 
population 
equality"); see also 58 Wis. Att'y Gen. Op. 88, 91 
(1969) ("[T]he Wisconsin Constitution no longer may be 
                                                 
21 Particularly if we adopted the approach endorsed by the 
November 
30 
concurrence, 
whereby 
the 
court 
may 
consider 
"traditional redistricting criteria" when selecting between two 
least-change maps.  Johnson, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶83 (Hagedorn, J., 
concurring). 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
62 
 
considered as prohibiting assembly districts from 
crossing county lines, in view of the emphasis the 
United States Supreme Court has placed upon population 
equality in electoral districts.").  Nonetheless, the 
smaller the political subdivision, the easier it may 
be to preserve its boundaries.  See Baumgart v. 
Wendelberger, No. 01-C-0121, 2002 WL 34127471, at *3 
(E.D. Wis. May 30, 2002) ("Although avoiding the 
division of counties is no longer an inviolable 
principle, 
respect 
for 
the 
prerogatives 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
dictate 
that 
wards 
and 
municipalities be kept whole where possible."). 
Johnson, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶35.  
¶150 Courts have recognized for many years that this 
provision serves to protect local communities, which are central 
features of individual identity for voters and are the building 
blocks of Wisconsin's democracy.  State ex rel. Reynolds v. 
Zimmerman, 
22 
Wis. 2d 544, 
555, 
126 
N.W.2d 551 
(1964) 
(explaining that the primary goal of "per capita equality of 
representation" 
must 
still 
comply 
with 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution's "geographical limitations" under Article IV, 
Section 4);  Jensen v. Wis. Elections Bd., 2002 WI 13, ¶6 n.3, 
249 Wis. 2d 706, 639 N.W.2d 537 (explaining that the Wisconsin 
Constitution 
demands 
"respect 
for 
municipal 
boundaries"); 
Baumgart, 2002 WL 34127471, at *3 (stating that in redistricting 
after the 1980 and 1990 censuses, conducted in federal court, 
the courts "did not divide any wards in their respective 
reapportionment plans, and the 1992 panel rejected a proposed 
plan that achieved 0% population deviation by splitting wards");  
Prosser, 
793 
F. Supp. 
at 
863 
("To 
be 
an 
effective 
representative, a legislator must represent a district that has 
a reasonable homogeneity of needs and interests; otherwise the 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
63 
 
policies he supports will not represent the preferences of most 
of his constituents.").  
¶151 Given 
this 
constitutional 
interest 
in 
preserving 
communities of interest and local governments, it is not 
surprising that the Legislature, when it drew the existing maps 
in 2011, sought to limit the amount of county and municipal 
splits.  The Legislature in 2011 permitted 46 county splits in 
its senate map and 58 county splits in its assembly map.  It 
created 48 municipal splits in the senate and 78 municipal 
splits in the assembly.  Although the number of municipal splits 
increased over time as local governments changed size and 
annexed new areas, it is clear from past practice that the state 
has strived to minimize divisions of local communities. 
¶152 The Governor, and the majority who adopted his maps, 
do not seem to care.  Without detailed explanation, they divide 
an inordinate number of local communities.  In the adopted map, 
they included 42 county splits in the senate and 53 in the 
assembly.  There were 117 municipal splits in the senate and 175 
in the assembly, and they split 179 wards in the senate and 258 
in the assembly.  See Prosser, 793 F. Supp. at 866 (explaining 
that wards are "the basic unit of Wisconsin state government for 
voting purposes . . . [y]ou vote by ward").  On January 10, 
2022, we permitted the Governor to amend his map, and he used 
the opportunity to reduce local government divisions.  However, 
according to the Governor's own numbers, he still retained 76 
municipal splits in the senate and 115 in the assembly.  Like 
population deviation, the Governor's stark departure from 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
64 
 
standards for local government divisions used to draw the 
existing maps is of little concern to the majority's least 
change analysis.  Only core retention is considered by the 
majority.  
¶153 My 
colleagues 
on 
the 
other 
side 
devalue 
these 
extraordinary 
divisions 
concluding 
that 
they 
are 
of 
no 
consequence.  I disagree because local changes at polling places 
are of great significance to those affected and are deserving of 
consideration.  For people living in Brookfield, Glendale, and 
De Pere, their communities are now divided.  Their neighbors 
sharing common interests, government, and organizations must 
seek 
representation 
from 
different 
officials 
representing 
different constituencies across unique geographies.  Many 
Wisconsinites may no longer engage in the most fundamental form 
of democratic engagement: discussing and deliberating shared 
election choices with those having similar interests and 
identities.  Although division of local governments may appear 
to be simply a number, it most assuredly is not.  It is a 
constitutional requirement, not some policy choice.  Wis. Const. 
art. IV, § 4.  
¶154 With the adoption of the Governor's maps, local 
communities are the losers.  The majority finds this of no 
consequence, yet Wisconsin is made up of few large cities and 
many local municipalities.  Dividing a town or a county in 
localities of hundreds of thousands of inhabitants may not be 
noticeable by all those residents; however, that is not true for 
the many, many small communities around the state.  In accepting 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
65 
 
the Governor's maps, the majority opinion chooses to favor the 
big city interests over more rural identities. 
¶155 By contrast, the maps offered by the Legislature and 
CMS keep divisions of local communities to a minimum.  The 
Legislature has comparable county splits to the Governor, with 
42 county splits in the senate and 53 splits in the assembly.  
CMS outperforms all parties in this metric by including 28 
county splits in the senate and 40 in the assembly.  Where the 
parties diverge substantially is in municipalities.  The 
Legislature includes a striking low number of municipal splits 
with 28 in the senate and 48 in the assembly.22  CMS, by 
comparison, has 31 municipal splits in the senate and 70 in the 
assembly.  Finally, while the Governor demonstrated little to no 
concern for ward lines, both the Legislature and CMS divided 
zero current ward boundaries.  Given the minimal difference in 
core retention between the Legislature and the Governor, and the 
obvious technical ability to limit local government divisions, 
the Legislature's and CMS's maps provides powerful evidence that 
the drastic number of local government splits made by the 
Governor's maps were entirely unnecessary and represented 
significant change.  If those drawing the Governor's maps were 
not so motivated by race and politics, perhaps they may have 
considered the Wisconsin Constitution.    
¶156 Further, 
if 
my 
colleagues 
would 
consider 
constitutional mandates as more than a policy choice, they would 
                                                 
22 Among municipalities, the Governor split 50 towns.  The 
Legislature, by contrast, split only 16.  At the time the 2011 
maps were passed, they contained 30 town splits. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
66 
 
be required to conclude that the Governor's maps are not 
constitutionally compliant.  In addition, they would be forced 
to recognize that the core retention figures of their preferred 
maps are artificially inflated at the expense of the people and 
their local communities.  Nonetheless, the majority proceeds to 
adopt the Governor's maps, carving up Wisconsin communities for 
the stated and unstated interests of the Governor.  
¶157 Both 
the 
Legislature 
and 
CMS 
demonstrated 
that 
mapmakers could have minimized the changes to existing maps 
while still respecting in large respect the boundaries by which 
Wisconsinites organize themselves at the local level.  While, 
under existing one-person-one-vote jurisprudence from the United 
States Supreme Court, local government boundaries cannot be 
retained in full, that in no way implies that local government 
divisions are of no concern to this court, as the majority 
appears to believe.  Johnson, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶35.  In our 
November 30 opinion, we reaffirmed decades of caselaw that the 
citizens of Wisconsin have a constitutionally protected interest 
in "preserv[ing] [local government] boundaries."  Johnson, 399 
Wis. 2d 623, ¶35 (noting "respect for the prerogatives of the 
Wisconsin Constitution dictate that wards and municipalities be 
kept whole where possible"); Reynolds, 22 Wis. 2d at 555; 
Jensen, 249 Wis. 2d 706, ¶6 n.3; Baumgart, 2002 WL 34127471, at 
*3; Prosser, 793 F. Supp. at 863.  
¶158 The Legislature and CMS took our directives and 
constitutional demands seriously.  The Governor did not. In 
adopting the Governor's maps through its fixation on core 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
67 
 
retention, the majority turns a blind eye to the constitution's 
clear call to consider these boundary line changes. 
III.  CONGRESSIONAL MAPS 
¶159 Only four parties submitted congressional maps: the 
Congressmen; the Governor; Hunter; and CMS.  The Governor's map 
is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause, and the 
court should adopt the Congressmen's map, or in the alternative, 
CMS's map.   
A.  Least Change 
¶160 As explained in the analysis on state maps, least 
change is not defined by a single statistic.  Johnson, 399 
Wis. 2d 623, ¶72.  Nowhere in the November 30, 2021 opinion did 
we hold that core retention is the sole determinant of a least 
change inquiry.  Id. 
¶161 Among other factors and considerations, core retention 
can be a useful statistic to consider.  Here, the Governor has 
the highest core retention with 94.5%.  The Congressmen come in 
second with 93.5%, followed by Hunter at 93% and CMS at 91.5%.  
Thus, the Governor moves around 50,000 fewer people than the 
Congressmen.   
¶162 Of 
note, 
however, 
the 
Congressmen 
attempted 
to 
introduce an amended map, which would have had the lowest core 
retention of any maps.  Given the extraordinary importance of 
this case, and the need to fairly consider all positions and 
evidence presented by the parties, the court should have no 
issue accepting such requests.  Our duty is to consider how best 
to redistrict, and more information is better than less.  
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
68 
 
¶163 The Congressmen's amended map moved almost 100,000 
fewer people than the Governor's map.  Furthermore, both the 
Governor and BLOC were permitted to amend their maps, mostly to 
reduce their local government splits and make their maps more 
attractive for the court to adopt.  Nonetheless, the court, in a 
January 10, 2022 order, chose not to consider the second map 
submitted by the Congressmen.  Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 
No. 2021AP1450-OA, unpublished order (Wis. Jan. 10, 2022).  Due 
to this ruling, only the first map submitted by the Congressmen 
is reviewed.  However, the majority is not relegated to adopting 
only one party's map.  It is endowed with the authority to draw 
the best map, yet it failed to do so. 
¶164 Even though the majority is purportedly driven by the 
single statistic of core retention, it apparently is not 
concerned enough to seek out or adopt the map that scored best 
on that metric.  The court, post argument, regularly allows 
supplemental submissions.  We did in this case.  If there ever 
was a case to ensure that we have the best possible information 
at our disposal, this is it.  Curiously, a majority of the court 
does not want it. 
B.  One-Person-One-Vote 
¶165 The Governor's map cannot be accepted because he has 
an unnecessary and unexplained deviation from perfect population 
equality.  Population equality for congressional districts is 
governed by 
Article I, Section 2 
of the United States 
Constitution, not the Equal Protection Clause.  Evenwel, 578 
U.S. at 58-61. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
69 
 
¶166 In our November 30 opinion, we quoted the United 
States Supreme Court in declaring that, "[There is] no excuse 
for the failure to meet the objective of equal representation 
for equal numbers of people in congressional districting other 
than the practical impossibility of drawing equal districts with 
mathematical precision."  Johnson, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶25 (quoting 
Mahan, 410 U.S. at 322). "[P]opulation alone" is the "sole 
criterion of constitutionality in congressional redistricting 
under Art. I, § 2[.]" Id.  CMS aptly argues that the Governor's 
congressional map should not pass scrutiny because it "fail[s] 
to satisfy even this fundamental requirement [by exhibiting] 
more than the mathematical minimum population deviation between 
districts." 
¶167 The 
Supreme 
Court, 
in 
recognizing 
that 
a 
zero 
deviation will not always be possible, gave the following 
instructions for evaluating a plan that varies from the 
precision of mathematical equality: 
First, the court must consider whether the population 
differences among districts could have been reduced or 
eliminated altogether by a good-faith effort to draw 
districts of equal population. Parties challenging 
apportionment legislation must bear the burden of 
proof on this issue, and if they fail to show that the 
differences could have been avoided the apportionment 
scheme must be upheld. If, however, the plaintiffs can 
establish that the population differences were not the 
result of a good-faith effort to achieve equality, the 
State must bear the burden of proving that each 
significant variance between districts was necessary 
to achieve some legitimate goal.  
Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 730–31 (1983).  The court 
further reaffirmed that "there are no de minimis population 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
70 
 
variations," so long as those variations can "practicably be 
avoided."  Id. at 734. 
¶168 A useful example of this burden shifting mechanism can 
be found in Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (N.D. Ga.), 
aff'd, 542 U.S. 947 (2004).  In Larios, a three-judge panel 
heard 
several 
challenges 
to 
the 
congressional 
and 
state 
legislative reapportionment plans enacted by the Georgia General 
Assembly in 2001 and 2002.  Id. at 1321.  In the relevant 
portion 
of 
the 
opinion, 
the 
panel 
examined 
whether 
the 
plaintiff's challenge to the congressional maps enacted by the 
state legislature complied with the United States Constitution's 
one-person-one-vote 
requirement. 
 
"[T]he 
total 
population 
deviation for the [legislature's] final Congressional Plan was 
only seventy-two people."  Larios, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1354.  At 
the trial, expert testimony concluded that: 
[I]t would be possible to draw a congressional map for 
the State of Georgia with a population deviation of 
plus or minus one person that (1) complied with the 
Voting Rights Act; (2) split fewer counties than the 
present plan; (3) is more compact than the present 
plan; and (4) divides fewer voting precincts than the 
present plan. 
Id. at 1354.   
¶169 Under the Karcher framework, the panel reasoned that 
"[t]he fact that such a plan could have been produced all but 
invalidates any argument that the [legislature] made a good 
faith effort to achieve a zero deviation."  Larios, 300 
F. Supp. 2d at 1354 (citing Karcher, 462 U.S. at 736).  On this 
basis, the panel determined that the plaintiffs had met their 
burden and that the burden was now put on the Legislature to 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
71 
 
show that a "consistently applied legislative policy" justified 
the deviation.  Id.  The State of Georgia contended that 
it did not further reduce the population deviation 
because to do so would have required either splitting 
more precincts [which Georgia has a history of not 
doing] or further splitting existing split precincts 
along something other than an easily recognizable 
boundary [as doing so would make it hard for voters 
and election officials to accurately ascertain which 
voting district they reside].  
Id.  Additionally, the court found that, although the plaintiffs 
showed that the population deviation could be remedied, they did 
not prove that it could be done without splitting precincts 
along something other than recognizable boundary lines.  Id. at 
1355.  Therefore, the panel found that "[g]iven the relatively 
small total deviation of only seventy-two people and the 
importance of the state's interest in avoiding voter confusion, 
we find that the congressional districts do not violate 
plaintiffs' rights under the one-person, one-vote principles of 
Art. I, § 2."  Id. 
¶170 In this case, the Legislature and CMS can point to the 
fact that their maps have a mathematically precise population 
deviation as a means of invalidating any argument that the 
Governor made a good-faith effort to achieve zero deviation. 
Therefore, the burden of explaining what "consistently applied" 
state policy justifies the larger than minimum population 
deviation falls on the Governor.  
¶171 Rather than address this deviation, the Governor 
denies that it exists.  The Governor's population deviation is 
two.  Population deviation (taken as a range of deviation) is 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
72 
 
determined by taking the Governor's maximum deviation above the 
ideal (one person) and adding it to the Governor's minimum 
deviation below the ideal (one person).  See Evenwel, 578 U.S. 
at 59 (explaining that population deviation, when conducting a 
population equality analysis, is calculated by a comparison 
"between the largest and smallest district").  1 + 1 = 2.  
However, the Governor, in his briefs, asserts that his deviation 
is the same as the Congressmen's:  one person.  This assertion 
stems from the incorrect, semantic wordplay of his expert who, 
in her initial report, calculated that "[t]he largest deviation 
is 1 person, with all districts ranging from 1 person below to 1 
person above the ideal population."  The "largest" difference 
between the average population may be one person, but that is 
not the relevant statistic.  Population deviation is the 
difference 
between 
the 
smallest 
and 
largest 
district.  
Importantly, this range of deviation is later acknowledged in 
the Governor's expert report.  
¶172 Despite this burden and the need to explain why his 
districts have greater than necessary population inequality, the 
Governor at oral argument stated a population deviation of two 
was included because the Governor did not believe a lower 
population deviation was required under law.  No explanation or 
details were provided as to why the deviation was necessary, 
applying 
reasonable 
priorities 
such 
as 
"making 
districts 
compact, respecting municipal boundaries, preserving the cores 
of prior districts, and avoiding contests between incumbent 
Representatives."  Karcher, 462 U.S. at 740.  As explained 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
73 
 
above, the United States Constitution requires exactness of 
population absent the "practical impossibility of drawing equal 
districts 
with 
mathematical 
precision." 
 
Johnson, 
399 
Wis. 2d 623, ¶25.  Both CMS and the Congressmen showed a lower 
population deviation could be done, and they too achieved high 
core retention.   
¶173 Given advanced software technology and the immense 
financial resources put to use in this litigation, it was 
abundantly possible for the Governor to achieve a deviation of 
one while retaining the same least change characteristics, such 
as core retention.  Due to a misunderstanding of law, and 
misstatement of the definition of population deviation, the 
Governor 
overlooked 
the 
driving 
consideration 
of 
drawing 
congressional districts "with populations as close to perfect 
equality as possible."  Evenwel, 578 U.S. at 59.  But 
carelessness cannot satisfy the Governor's burden of proving 
"with some specificity that the population differences were 
necessary to achieve some legitimate state objective."  Tennant 
v. Jefferson Cnty. Comm'n, 567 U.S. 758, 760, 763-65 (2012) (per 
curium) (quotations omitted) (holding that a congressional map 
in West Virginia was legal where the state justified its 
deviations by pointing to protection of local communities, 
limiting incumbent pairings, and reducing change in district 
lines).  By contrast, the Governor's deviation was not the 
result of "a good-faith effort to achieve absolute equality" and 
is thus insufficient.  Id. (quoting Karcher, 462 U.S. at 730).  
No.  2021AP1450-OA.akz 
 
74 
 
¶174 The majority picks sides and litigates for the 
Governor, claiming that the two person deviation was necessary 
for least change.  See majority op., ¶24 ("[The Governor's] 
minor population deviation is justified under Supreme Court 
precedent by our least change objective.")  This is a whitewash: 
the Governor admitted that a lower deviation could be done 
without issue, but permitted a deviation of two because he did 
not believe a lower deviation was necessary.  Neither the 
Governor nor any other party argued that a deviation of two 
individuals 
was 
required 
to 
ensure 
a 
least 
change 
map.  
Furthermore, 
it 
is 
facially 
preposterous:  with 
advanced 
computer technology, the Governor could have readily reduced his 
population deviation while maintaining his core retention.  
Simply put, the Governor failed to present a "legitimate state 
objective" for his unnecessary deviation.  Tennant, 567 U.S. at 
760; see also Karcher, 462 U.S. at 730–31 ("[T]here are no de 
minimis population variations.") 
¶175 Only the Congressmen's map and CMS's map should be 
considered by this court.  The Congressmen have higher core 
retention than CMS and should be adopted.  Nonetheless, CMS 
offers a reasonable alternative.  The Governor's maps are 
fatally and constitutionally flawed.  The majority errs in 
adopting them. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶176 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶177 I am authorized to state that Justices PATIENCE DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY join this dissent. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶178 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   (dissenting).  The 
2020 census shows that Wisconsin's growth in population requires 
reapportionment of its congressional and state legislative 
districts.  Reapportionment presents a three dimensional puzzle, 
each 
piece 
of 
which 
has 
statutory 
and 
constitutional 
requirements.  I write to address one error of Governor Evers's 
map reapportioning Wisconsin's Assembly Districts, which four 
members of this court have adopted.  In Wisconsin's single 
member districts, the Assembly map conflicts with the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965, formerly set out in 42 U.S.C. § 1973, now 
within 52 U.S.C. § 10301.  In adopting the Governor's map, a 
majority of this court engages in racial gerrymandering contrary 
to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution, which prohibits separating 
voters into different voting districts based on the race of the 
voter.  Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 580 
U.S. __, __, 137 S. Ct. 788, 797 (2017).  It is my hope that the 
United States Supreme Court will be asked to review Wisconsin's 
unwarranted racial gerrymander, which clearly does not survive 
strict scrutiny.   
¶179 The 
United 
States 
Constitution 
requires 
that 
apportionment be as equal as practicable because population 
disparity in voting districts for the same legislative body 
dilutes the power of some voters.  Concerns about voter 
inequality have been the foundation of the Supreme Court's one-
person-one-vote decisions.  Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.pdr 
 
2 
 
(1964) (explaining that the concept of voter equality "can mean 
only one thing——one person, one vote").   
¶180 The Supreme Court has required near mathematical 
equality for congressional maps.  Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 
74, 98 (1997).  Somewhat more leeway is given when drawing 
boundaries for state legislative districts.  Evenwel v. Abbott, 
578 U.S. 54, 59 (2016).  However, court-drawn maps are held to a 
more 
exacting 
standard 
of 
population 
equality 
than 
are 
legislatively drawn maps.  Abrams, 521 U.S. at 98.    
¶181 The Voting Rights Act prohibits any standard, practice 
or procedure that results in denial or abridgement of the right 
to vote on account of race.  52 U.S.C. § 10301(a); Cooper v. 
Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1464 (2017).1  Subsection (b) provides 
the 
required 
examination 
for 
assessing 
whether 
race 
is 
precluding equal opportunity for a protected class: 
A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based 
on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the 
political processes leading to nomination or election 
in the State or political subdivision are not equally 
open to participation by members of a class of 
citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its 
members have less opportunity than other members of 
the electorate to participate in the political process 
and to elect representatives of their choice.  The 
extent to which members of a protected class have been 
elected 
to 
office 
in 
the 
State 
or 
political 
subdivision 
is 
one 
circumstance 
which 
may 
be 
considered:  Provided, [t]hat nothing in this section 
establishes a right to have members of a protected 
                                                 
1 The provisions of 52 U.S.C. § 10301 have been referred to 
as Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 subsequent to the 
1982 amendment.  See Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1009-10 
(1994).   
No.  2021AP1450-OA.pdr 
 
3 
 
class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in 
the population.   
§ 10301(b). 
¶182 Over the years, the Supreme Court has addressed the 
Voting Rights Act in decisions that explain how it is to be 
applied in various contexts.  Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 
(1986), is the seminal Supreme Court case that sets the 
analytical framework that is required when the Voting Rights Act 
is 
addressed.2 
 
Gingles 
establishes 
all 
three 
threshold 
"prerequisites" that must be affirmatively proved before further 
consideration of a claim of, or potential remedy for, a 
violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act can be addressed in 
reapportionment.  First, there must be proof that a minority 
group is "sufficiently large and geographically compact to 
constitute a majority [in a single-member district];" second, 
the minority group must be "politically cohesive"; and third, 
the "white majority [] vote[ed] sufficiently as a bloc to 
[enable it] usually [to] defeat the minority's preferred 
candidate."  Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1470 (citing Gingles, 478 
U.S. at 51); Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1009-10 (1994) 
(also citing Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51).   
¶183 Cooper is particularly helpful in its instructions 
about how to employ the Gingles "prerequisites."  Cooper sets 
out the "three threshold conditions" for proving voter dilution3 
                                                 
2 Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) arose in a 
challenge to multi-member districts.  Its analysis has been 
applied 
to 
single-member 
district 
challenges 
as 
well.  
De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1000.   
3 Voter dilution, a violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act, may occur when a cohesive minority group is fragmented 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.pdr 
 
4 
 
and then explains that these showings are needed to establish 
that racially polarized voting prevents the minority group's 
choice in the district as actually drawn because the minority 
group is submerged in a larger white voting population.  Cooper, 
137 S. Ct. at 1470.   
¶184 In 
determining 
whether 
the 
third 
Gingles 
"prerequisite" was met, the Court reviewed the success of black 
candidates in past elections.  Id.  It noted that in North 
Carolina, where Cooper arose, "electoral history provided no 
evidence that a § 2 plaintiff could demonstrate the third 
Gingles prerequisite——effective white bloc-voting."  Id.  The 
Supreme Court in Cooper concluded that when an elective district 
"functioned, election year in and election year out, as a 
'crossover' district, in which members of the majority help a 
'large 
enough' 
minority 
to 
elect 
its 
candidate 
of 
choice . . . it is difficult to see how the majority-bloc-voting 
requirement could be met——and hence how § 2 liability could be 
established."  Id. (citing Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 
13, 16 (2009)). 
¶185 The three Gingles prerequisites are factual conditions 
that must be proved in order to establish the first step of a 
claim under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act.  All three 
preconditions must be met before considerations of race could 
lawfully affect drawing district boundaries.  As the Supreme 
Court has explained, "In a § 2 case, only when a party has 
                                                                                                                                                             
among several districts or packed into too few districts.  Id. 
at 1002.  
No.  2021AP1450-OA.pdr 
 
5 
 
established the Gingles requirements does a court proceed to 
analyze whether a violation has occurred based on the totality 
of the circumstances."  Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 11-12.  However, 
to escape the parties' failure to establish the Gingles 
requirements, the majority resorts to protesting that "no party 
saw fit to develop an argument" that the Gingles requirements 
were not satisfied.4  Nevertheless, if we permit this abdication 
to form the basis of the law of the State of Wisconsin, the 
results in this case will effect an unconstitutional, racially 
gerrymandered map.  Our judgments are precedents, and the proper 
interpretation of the law as it relates to these judgments 
cannot simply be left to the parties.  Young v. United States, 
315 U.S. 257, 259 (1942).  Instead, as this state's highest 
court, it is our duty to ensure the proper interpretation of the 
law. 
¶186 Milwaukee is Wisconsin's only county that has a 
sufficiently large and geographically compact black population 
of voters that could meet the Gingles preconditions.  The black 
voters of Milwaukee do vote cohesively for candidates of their 
choice.  However, Milwaukee's history for at least the last ten 
years is that of crossover voting where white voters help black 
voters elect candidates of their choice.   
¶187 Notwithstanding 
the 
Supreme 
Court's 
clear 
instructions, the majority opinion ignores the historical record 
of black voters choosing candidates of their choice and assigns 
voters based solely on their race to create seven majority-
                                                 
4 Majority op., ¶45. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.pdr 
 
6 
 
minority voting assembly districts in Milwaukee County.  The 
Supreme Court "has made clear that unless each of the three 
Gingles prerequisites is established, 'there neither has been a 
wrong nor can be a remedy.'"  Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1472 
(quoting Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 41 (1993) (emphasis in 
Cooper)).  The Supreme Court in Cooper struck down North 
Carolina's racial gerrymander "whose necessity is supported by 
no evidence and whose raison d'etre is a legal mistake."  
Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1472.  
¶188 The map adopted by the majority opinion violates the 
Voting Rights Act for the same reason as North Carolina's choice 
did in Cooper.  Factually, Wisconsin has had significant 
experience 
with 
electing 
black 
candidates 
through 
white 
crossover voting.   
¶189 For 
example, 
in 
2016, 
Gwen 
Moore, 
a 
black 
congresswoman, was elected to Congressional District 4, which 
has only 33.3% black residents.  However, she received 76.74% of 
the vote.5  She was reelected in 2018 with 75.61% of the vote; 
and reelected in 2020 for a third time with 74.65%.  That her 
vote totals exceed the percentage of black residents in her 
district evidences that white voters have crossed over to 
support her elections.    
                                                 
5 The record of votes achieved by black candidates comes 
from state public records of election outcomes and are therefore 
"capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to 
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned."  Wis. 
Stat. § 902.01.   
No.  2021AP1450-OA.pdr 
 
7 
 
¶190 Mandela Barnes, a black state-wide candidate, is 
another example of white crossover voting.  In 2018, Mandela 
Barnes was elected over a white primary opponent for Lieutenant 
Governor with 67.86% of the vote.6   
¶191 David Clarke, a black county-wide candidate, provides 
repetitive examples of white crossover voting.  Clarke was 
elected Milwaukee County Sheriff in 2006 with 77.85% of the 
vote; reelected in 2010 with 80.42% and reelected again in 2014 
with 79.12% of the vote.  Each time he was elected with the 
assistance of white crossover voting, as shown by his percentage 
victories that are well above the black resident percentage of 
Milwaukee County.7  White crossover voting also helped elect 
David Crowley, a black candidate, as the Milwaukee County 
Executive in 2020.  He formerly held a position in Wisconsin's 
Assembly.    
¶192 Since 2012, Lena Taylor, a black state senator, has 
been elected repeatedly to Senate District 4 with vote totals 
showing white voter support.  For example, in 2012, Lena Taylor 
obtained 86.6% of the vote; in 2016 she obtained 98.33% of the 
vote; and in 2020, she obtained 98.34% of the vote.  61.7% of 
the residents of Senate District 4 are black.  
¶193 La Tonya Johnson, a black state senator, has been 
elected repeatedly to public office with vote totals showing 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin's 
black 
population 
of 
voting 
age 
is 
approximately 6.4%.     
7 Approximately 26% of Milwaukee County's residents are 
black. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.pdr 
 
8 
 
support from white voters.  For example, in 2014, she was 
elected to Assembly District 17 with 87.25% of the vote, and in 
2016 she was elected to Senate District 6 with 98.89% of the 
vote.  65.4% of the residents of Assembly district 17 are black 
and 62.1% of Senate District 6 are black residents.  Leon Young, 
a black assemblyman was elected to Assembly District 16 in 2014, 
unopposed.8  In 2014, Jason Fields, a black assemblyman, was 
elected to Assembly District 11, unopposed.9   
¶194 The 
majority 
opinion 
ignores 
Milwaukee 
County's 
historical record of white crossover voting that has provided 
repeated support for black candidates during at least the last 
ten years.  The majority opinion does so in order to create 
seven majority-minority districts in Milwaukee County.  In so 
doing, 
the 
majority 
opinion 
comes 
squarely 
within 
the 
prohibition that assigning voters to voting districts by race 
violates 
the 
Equal 
Protection 
Clause 
of 
the 
Fourteenth 
Amendment.   
¶195 The majority opinion says that it relies on Cooper for 
the racial gerrymander that it creates in Milwaukee County.  The 
majority opinion clearly misunderstands Cooper, which overturned 
racial gerrymandering that occurred in North Carolina.  Let's 
look at Cooper and why the majority opinion fails to follow it. 
¶196 Justice Kagan begins her discussion in Cooper with the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which she 
explains, "limits racial gerrymanders in legislative districting 
                                                 
8 61.5% of the residents of Assembly District 16 are black. 
9 63.7% of the residents of Assembly District 11 are black. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.pdr 
 
9 
 
plans."  Id. at 1463.  As Justice Kagan explained, the Equal 
Protection 
Clause 
"prevents 
a 
State, 
in 
the 
absence 
of 
'sufficient justification,' from 'separating its citizens into 
different voting districts on the basis of race.'"  Id. (quoting 
Bethune–Hill, 137 S. Ct. at 797).  When allocation of voters by 
race has occurred, that allocation must withstand strict 
scrutiny such that the State must prove "its race-based sorting 
of voters serves a 'compelling interest' and is 'narrowly 
tailored' to that end."  Id. at 1464.  
¶197 In order to meet the narrow tailoring for the racial 
assignment of voters, the State must establish by factual proofs 
that it had "good reasons" to believe that the Voting Rights Act 
would be violated if voters were not assigned based on their 
race.  Id.  Cooper explained what it means by "good reasons" 
sufficient to satisfy strict scrutiny.  First, Cooper emphasized 
that the "good reason" to which it referred was factual proof of 
"good reason to think that all the 'Gingles preconditions' are 
met, then so too it has good reason to believe that § 2 requires 
drawing a majority-minority district. . . .  But if not, then 
not."  Id. at 1470.  Second, as the Supreme Court said as it 
examined factual evidence, "[h]ere, electoral history provided 
no evidence that a § 2 plaintiff could demonstrate the third 
Gingles prerequisite——effective white bloc-voting."  Id. 
¶198 It is Cooper's "good reason" phrase that the majority 
opinion picked up as its foundation for assigning voters to 
districts based on race.  The majority said, "we conclude there 
are good reasons to believe a seventh majority-Black district is 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.pdr 
 
10 
 
needed to satisfy the VRA."10  It did so without understanding 
that factual proofs of the Gingles preconditions are necessary 
before it could satisfy "good reason" for assigning voters by 
race in districting.   
¶199 The majority showed how limited its understanding of 
Cooper is by its dismissive treatment of Cooper's requirement to 
factually prove the three Gingles preconditions.11  Factual proof 
is exactly what "good reasons" requires and what the majority 
lacks as it contravenes the Equal Protection Clause by assigning 
voters to districts based on their race.  As Cooper carefully 
explained, there must be proof of effective white bloc-voting 
that prevents the minority's ability to elect the candidate of 
its choice before a § 2 violation can arise.  Id.   
¶200 As the factual evidence above showed, black voters in 
Milwaukee are able to elect candidates of their choice, election 
year in and election year out, for congresswoman, state 
senators, state assembly persons, sheriff and Milwaukee County 
Executive to name only a few.  Just as in North Carolina in 
Cooper, proof of the third Gingles precondition to § 2 liability 
is absent from the majority opinion.  The Voting Rights Act is 
violated by the majority opinion just as it was by the State of 
North Carolina in Cooper.   
¶201 It is beyond dispute that the Governor's districting 
plan adopted by a majority of this court assigns voters to 
districts 
based 
on 
race. 
 
"Racial 
classifications 
are 
                                                 
10 Majority op., ¶10.   
11 Id., ¶45.   
No.  2021AP1450-OA.pdr 
 
11 
 
antithetical 
to 
the 
Fourteenth 
Amendment, 
whose 
'central 
purpose' was 'to eliminate racial discrimination emanating from 
official sources in the States.'"  Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 
907 (1996).  Such an assignment violates the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment unless the racial assignment 
serves a compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to 
meet that interest.  Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1464.   
¶202 Just as it ignores the lack of factual proof for the 
three Gingles preconditions, the majority opinion identifies no 
compelling state interest to which its racial gerrymander is 
narrowly tailored.  Instead, it asserts that if a seventh black 
majority district were not drawn, a § 2 violation may occur, but 
it "cannot say for certain on this record."12   
¶203 To justify its weak position, the majority cites to 
the black population of Wisconsin increasing and the white 
state-wide population decreasing in the last ten years, both by 
less than five percent.13  However, the majority does not 
identify whether any of that population change occurred in 
Milwaukee County; or whether if it occurred in Milwaukee County, 
it occurred in the area of Milwaukee County where the majority 
opinion creates a seventh black majority district.   
¶204 This is not a small error because the means chosen to 
accomplish a race-based purpose "must be specifically and 
narrowly framed to accomplish that purpose."  Shaw, 517 U.S. at 
908.  To meet that standard, the racial assignment of voters 
                                                 
12 Id., ¶47. 
13 Id., ¶48. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.pdr 
 
12 
 
must be remedial to the specific location of the compelling 
state interest identified.  Id. at 915.   
¶205 However, just as in Shaw, the seventh district that 
the majority creates is not remedial to correcting an identified 
compelling state interest.  Stated otherwise, creation of a 
seventh district in one area of Milwaukee County is not a 
narrowly tailored remedy for a population change for the entire 
State of Wisconsin, which the majority asserts as justification 
for creating the seventh district.  The creation of the seventh 
black majority district in Milwaukee County cannot survive 
strict scrutiny.   
¶206 Accordingly, because proof of meeting the third 
Gingles precondition has not been provided, as is required 
before voters may be assigned to voting district by race, and 
because the seventh black majority district does not survive a 
strict scrutiny inquiry, the majority errs, and I respectfully 
dissent.  
¶207 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER and Justice REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY join this 
dissent. 
 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶208 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting). 
[H]e who would place the supreme power in mind, would 
place it in God and the laws; but he who entrusts man 
with it, gives it to a wild beast, for such his 
appetites sometimes make him; for passion influences 
those who are in power, even the very best of men:  
for which reason law is reason without desire.    
Aristotle, A Treatise on Government Bk. III, ch. XVI (William 
Ellis 
trans., 
1912) 
(circa 
384–22 
B.C.), 
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/6762/6762-h/6762-
h.htm#link2H_INTR. 
¶209 Just three months ago, we said this court "will 
confine any judicial remedy to making the minimum changes 
necessary in order to conform the existing congressional and 
state legislative redistricting plans to constitutional and 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
2 
 
statutory requirements."1  Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2021 
WI 87, ¶8, 399 Wis. 2d 623, 967 N.W.2d 469.  Now, the majority 
overrides 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution, 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, and federal statutory law in favor of a policy 
                                                 
1 In a deceptive caricature of our November 30, 2021 
opinion, Justice Ann Walsh Bradley (joined by two other 
justices) claims "'least change,' as set forth in the court's 
prior order, is unmoored from any legal requirement for 
redistricting.  The parties struggled with reconciling it with 
the United States Constitution, Wisconsin Constitution, and 
Voting Rights Act."  Concurrence, ¶58.  Although in this opinion 
the new majority indeed untethers the least-change approach from 
the law, in this court's November 30 opinion (not an "order"), 
we consistently defined "least change" to mean "making only 
those changes necessary for the maps to comport with the one 
person, one vote principle while satisfying other constitutional 
and statutory mandates."  Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2021 
WI 87, ¶8, 399 Wis. 2d 623, 967 N.W.2d 469; see also id., ¶¶4, 
8, 64, 72, 81.  Although the majority corrupts the least-change 
approach by "unmoor[ing]" it from the law——treating a single 
measure of least change, core retention, as an extra-legal 
criterion taking precedence over the law——that is not the way we 
described 
it 
three 
months 
ago. 
 
Any 
"struggle[]" 
to 
"reconcil[e]" the least-change approach with the law stems not 
from our "prior order" but from a misapplication of the least-
change approach that allows core retention (an extra-legal 
criterion) to override the United States Constitution, the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, 
and 
the 
VRA. 
 
Contrary 
to 
the 
concurrence's disingenuous description, we never said core 
retention was a "metric" that would carry any weight, let alone 
"more weight than others."  Concurrence, ¶59.  We never told the 
parties that core retention was "preeminent," id., ¶63; we told 
them to submit maps that made only those changes necessary to 
comply with the law.  Although three justices in the majority 
believe core retention plays far too great a role in the 
majority's analysis, they join it anyway, then lament about it 
in a separate writing.  Despite six justices agreeing core 
retention should not be the sole governing criterion in this 
case, a majority nevertheless selects the Governor's maps 
ostensibly on this basis.  Contrary to the concurrence, nothing 
in our November 30 opinion compels this; properly applied, our 
November 30 opinion stands in opposition to the majority's 
decision.  
    
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
3 
 
goal 
it 
deems 
"commendable"2——"core 
retention"3——a 
phrase 
appearing nowhere in either our November 30, 2021 opinion nor 
even in Justice Hagedorn's concurrence to that opinion (which no 
one joined).  Elevating their subjective policy preferences over 
the law, members of the majority abandon a remedy for 
malapportionment grounded in the law and instead entangle 
themselves in legislative (and therefore blatantly political) 
policymaking by choosing maps based upon what the majority deems 
"best,"4 justified by what the majority determines are "good 
reasons,"5 and using criteria the majority deems "helpful."6   
¶210 In doing so, the majority flouts not only this court's 
precedent but the constitutional separation of powers.  "Because 
the 
judiciary 
lacks 
the 
lawmaking 
power 
constitutionally 
conferred on the legislature" we promised to "limit our remedy 
to achieving compliance with the law rather than imposing policy 
choices."  Id.  The majority now reneges on that promise, 
relegating constitutional mandates to "policy choices" that may 
be protected or disregarded at the whim of the majority of this 
court.7  The majority's decision represents a startling departure 
                                                 
2 Majority op., ¶35. 
3 Id., ¶¶7–8, 13 & n.9, 14–15, 22, 24, 26–30, 33. 
4 Id., ¶6. 
5 Id., ¶45. 
6 Id., ¶13.  The majority is most transparent about its 
"involvement" 
in 
making 
"numerous 
policy 
and 
political 
decisions," see id., ¶4, thereby abandoning its neutral role. 
 
7 Id., ¶35. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
4 
 
from the rule of law and an alarming affront to the people of 
Wisconsin who elected us to uphold the constitutions.   
¶211 The majority's dispositive guidepost——core retention——
exists nowhere in the United States Constitution, the Wisconsin 
Constitution or any statutory law.  Absent from the law, it does 
not appear in our November 30 opinion among the purely legal 
criteria we directed the parties to employ in proposing maps.  
Nevertheless, the majority belatedly invokes core retention as 
justification for its preferred maps, allowing an extra-legal 
criterion to take precedence over the Equal Protection Clause, 
the Voting Rights Act (VRA), and Article IV——the "exclusive 
repository" of "the standards under the Wisconsin Constitution 
that govern redistricting."  Id., ¶63.  "It is 'the province and 
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is[,]' and 
not what we think it should be."  Town of Wilson v. City of 
Sheboygan, 2020 WI 16, ¶51, 390 Wis. 2d 266, 938 N.W.2d 493 
(Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring) (quoting Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)) (modification in the 
original).  Instead of following the law this court declared 
just three months ago, the majority instead adopts maps based on 
its subjective policy preferences, fulfilling the fears of many 
citizens concerned about a judicially-partisan outcome. 
¶212 Remedying 
unconstitutional 
malapportionment——
inequality in the number of citizens in each legislative or 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
5 
 
congressional district——was this court's sole task in this case,8 
and would not have been a particularly challenging one, if the 
majority had confined itself to applying the law.  The majority 
flunks every constitutional test by adopting maps that are not 
even remedial, exhibiting avoidable population inequality (in 
violation 
of 
Article 
IV, 
Section 
3 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, Article 1, Section 2 of the United States 
Constitution, and the Equal Protection Clause) and excessive 
county, town, and ward splits (in violation of Article IV, 
Section 4 of the Wisconsin Constitution).  
¶213 For over a century, this court has required "as close 
an approximation to exactness as possible" in apportioning 
population 
by 
legislative 
districts 
under 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution.  State ex rel. Attorney General v. Cunningham, 81 
Wis. 440, 484, 51 N.W. 724 (1892).  The only justification for 
deviating from exactness is compliance with other constitutional 
requirements (mainly, Section 4).  State ex rel. Lamb v. 
Cunningham, 83 Wis. 90, 150, 53 N.W. 35 (1892).  Similarly, 
nearly fifty years ago the United States Supreme Court declared 
there is "no excuse for the failure to meet the objective of 
equal 
representation 
for 
equal 
numbers 
of 
people 
in 
congressional districting other than the practical impossibility 
                                                 
8 
The 
entire 
point 
of 
this 
proceeding 
was 
to 
"remedy . . . malapportionment, while ensuring the maps satisfy 
all other constitutional and statutory requirements."  Johnson, 
399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶4.  Instead, the majority overrides the 
constitutional 
command 
of 
one 
person, 
one 
vote 
because 
"population deviation is not an indicator of least change."  
Majority op., ¶32 n.18.  The constitution is not expendable at 
the majority's caprice. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
6 
 
of drawing equal districts with mathematical precision."  Mahan 
v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 322 (1973) (emphasis added).  The 
majority conveniently does not address these precedents other 
than to pay lip service to them.     
¶214 Irrefutably, the majority could have adopted maps with 
practically 
perfect 
population 
equality; 
the 
Citizen 
Mathematicians and Scientists drew such maps.  Not only does the 
majority adopt an assembly map and a congressional map with 
unconstitutional population deviations, it also inflicts a 
constitutional harm not present in the 2011 maps by severing the 
boundaries 
of 
numerous 
local 
communities 
with 
no 
lawful 
justification for doing so.  The Governor did not sacrifice 
population equality to preserve local communities, so his 
population 
deviation 
is 
unjustifiable 
and 
therefore 
unconstitutional. 
¶215 If all of these constitutional failings weren't enough 
to disqualify the Governor's maps, their constitutionally 
impermissible dilution of the Black vote in Milwaukee County 
should be.  In Johnson v. De Grandy, the United States Supreme 
Court rejected the "rule of thumb apparently adopted by the 
District Court" in that case (and by the majority in this case) 
"that anything short of the maximum number of majority-minority 
districts consistent with the Gingles conditions would violate 
§ 2 [of the VRA]" as "caus[ing] its own dangers, and they are 
not to be courted."  512 U.S. 997, 1016 (1994).  Expanding the 
number of Black opportunity districts to seven may on the 
surface appear to augment Black voting strength, but in reality 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
7 
 
it jeopardizes the effectiveness of each district by spreading 
the population too thin,9 with each of the Governor's opportunity 
districts hovering just above or just below 50%.10   
¶216 I also write to address an issue with recurring 
significance beyond redistricting.  Justice Hagedorn's November 
30 
concurring 
opinion——which 
no 
one 
joined——is 
not 
the 
"controlling" opinion of this court.11  Setting aside Justice 
Hagedorn's departure from his November 30 position in announcing 
new views as the majority author at this late stage of the case, 
his November 30 concurrence was simply that and the majority 
opinion controls the issues presented.  The apparent confusion 
                                                 
9 Some elected officials characterized plans to reduce the 
Black voting-age population percentages in Milwaukee as part of 
"a national effort to dilute minority communities to create more 
Democratic seats."    See, e.g., Assembly Floor Session, at 
2:18:05 (Nov. 11, 2021) (statement of Rep. Sylvia Ortiz-Velez 
(AD8)), 
https://wiseye.org/2021/11/11/wisconsin-state-assembly-
floor-session-42.   
10 The parties present slightly different ways of measuring 
Black voting-age population.  According to the Legislature, this 
population 
includes 
"non-Hispanic 
Black" 
and 
"non-Hispanic 
(Black + White)."  Legislature's Resp. Br., at 22.  The 
Legislature omits other "multi-race subcategories[.]"  Id.  In 
contrast, 
other 
parties, 
including 
BLOC, 
ask 
that 
these 
subcategories be included.  BLOC's Reply Br., at 8 n.1.  If the 
goal is to draw seven majority-minority districts (which the 
majority suggests is the case), this definitional dispute is 
critical.  In fact, according to the Legislature's definition, 
none of the Governor's seven supposedly VRA-mandated Black 
opportunity districts are above 50.0% (although one is exactly 
50.0%).  Legislature's Resp. Br., at 22. 
11 The 
Hunter 
Intervenor-Petitioners 
expressly 
labelled 
Justice 
Hagedorn's 
concurrence 
"controlling[.]" 
 
Hunter 
Intervenor-Petitioners' Resp. Br., at 6.  A number of other 
parties treated it as controlling without giving it that label.  
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
8 
 
caused by his concurrence derailed the case presentations of 
several parties.   
¶217 To prevent the court's policy-driven mapmaking in the 
future, the next time this court resolves a redistricting 
dispute it should consider withdrawing language from State ex 
rel. Reynolds v. Zimmerman, which prohibited the Legislature 
from implementing state legislative redistricting plans by joint 
resolution.  22 Wis. 2d 544, 569–70, 126 N.W.2d 551 (1964).  
That precedent should be revisited because it does not comport 
with the constitutional text, which assigns the Legislature 
alone the responsibility of redistricting.  The Legislature 
suggested this court may need to revisit Zimmerman, depending on 
how it decided to proceed in this case.12  This issue is worthy 
of the court's attention.   
 
¶218 As a final matter, in the interest of ensuring 
procedural due process, this court should have allowed all 
parties to submit substantive modifications to their proposed 
remedial maps.  The majority disingenuously states, "we invited 
all parties to this litigation to submit one proposed map for 
each set of districts[.]"13  True, we asked each party to submit 
only "one" set of proposed remedial maps; however, we permitted 
the Governor and BLOC to make critical changes that went well 
beyond correcting drafting errors.  For example, the Governor 
                                                 
12 Legislature's 10/26/21 Br., at 20-22 ("Zimmerman is on 
shaky ground in light of the language of . . . Article IV, § 3 
and historical context."). 
13 Majority op., ¶4 (emphasis added).   
 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
9 
 
originally proposed a remedial assembly map that split 80 towns, 
but his modified map splits 50, a reduction of nearly 40%.14  The 
Congressmen asked to submit a modified map, but the same 
majority that now adopts the Governor's modified maps denied the 
Congressmen 
this 
opportunity.15 
 
Instead, 
the 
majority 
inexplicably rushes to select the Governor's unlawful maps, 
eschewing reasoned law for its own desires.  I dissent. 
I.  THE MAJORITY'S REMEDY VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONS 
¶219 The majority guts state constitutional mandates.  In 
our 
November 
30th 
opinion, 
we 
outlined 
the 
"discrete 
requirements" of Article IV, Sections 3 and 4.  Johnson, 399 
Wis. 2d 623, 
¶63. 
 
Section 
3 
requires 
state 
legislative 
districts to be drawn "according to the number of inhabitants."  
Section 4 requires assembly districts "to be bounded by county, 
precinct, town, or ward lines[.]"16  We declared these sections 
"explicitly protect[] . . . justiciable and cognizable rights,"17 
                                                 
14 Johnson v. WEC, No. 2021AP1450-OA, unpublished order, at 
3 (Wis. Jan. 10, 2022) (Roggensack, J., dissenting). 
15 Id. 
16  In one of this court's seminal cases on redistricting, 
Chief Justice Lyon explained a precinct was a form of local 
government that ceased to exist when a part of Article IV of the 
Wisconsin Constitution became fully operative.  State ex rel. 
Attorney General v. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 440, 520, 51 N.W. 724 
(1892) 
(Lyon, 
C.J., 
concurring) 
("[T]he 
precinct 
of 
the 
constitution disappeared when the uniform system of town and 
county government prescribed, by the constitution (art. 4, sec. 
23) became fully operative.  We have now no civil subdivisions, 
other than towns and wards, which are the equivalent of the 
precinct of territorial times.").  Under Article IV, "precinct" 
does not mean election precinct. 
17 Johnson, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶38. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
10 
 
dedicated eleven paragraphs to expounding how these sections are 
satisfied,18 and repeatedly promised Wisconsinites we would 
uphold these sections when selecting remedial state legislative 
maps.19  The majority in this opinion reverses course, treating 
Sections 3 and 4 as mere hortative statements with no operative 
effect.  The majority goes so far as to suggest Section 4 may 
not even be a commendable policy goal——at least, not as 
commendable as core retention.20  Despite the constitutional 
command, the majority actually frowns upon minimizing the number 
of county, town, and ward splits to the extent such an effort 
produces more change from prior maps than the majority deems 
acceptable.21  Least change is an approach designed to minimize 
changes to predecessor maps, but it should go without saying 
that the court must in all respects comply with the law.  The 
Wisconsin Constitution is the supreme law of this state, which 
all members of this court swore an oath to uphold.  The people 
of Wisconsin should be alarmed at the majority's dismissiveness 
toward the constitution. 
                                                 
18 Id., ¶¶28–38. 
19  Id., ¶¶8, 34, 38, 81.  Justice Hagedorn agreed without 
reservation, writing in his solo concurrence, "remedial maps 
must comply with . . . Article IV, Sections 3, 4, and 5 of the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution[.]" 
 
Id., 
¶82 
n.4 
(Hagedorn, 
J., 
concurring). 
20 Majority op., ¶32 ("[T]he Legislature argues that we 
should weigh as a measure of least change the number of counties 
and municipalities split under each proposal.  We fail to see 
why this is a relevant least-change metric, however."). 
21 Id. ("If a municipality was split under the maps adopted 
in 2011, reuniting that municipality now——laudable though it may 
be——would produce more change, not less."). 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
11 
 
¶220 In 1892, this court rejected the majority's current 
construction 
of 
Article 
IV, 
Sections 
3 
and 
4 
as 
mere 
recommendations for being a "dangerous doctrine," which "should 
not be encouraged even to the extent of discussing the question" 
because "[t]he convention, in making the constitution, had a 
higher duty to perform than to give . . . advice."  Cunningham, 
81 Wis. at 485.  It expressly held, "the restrictions on the 
power . . . to make an apportionment, found in sections 3[] 
[and] 4 . . . are mandatory and imperative, and are not subject 
to . . . discretion[.]"  Id. at 486.  Later that same year, this 
court 
declared 
the 
requirements 
of 
these 
sections 
are 
"absolutely 
binding" 
and 
even 
the 
Legislature 
has 
"no 
power . . . to dispense with any one of them."  Lamb, 83 Wis. at 
148.  The majority now endorses this "dangerous doctrine," 
effectively overruling the Wisconsin Constitution.  The majority 
barely 
mentions 
Cunningham 
or 
Lamb, 
despite 
implicitly 
withdrawing language from both seminal decisions.   
¶221 The majority's departure from precedent is, indeed, 
dangerous.  Wisconsin's founders knew political actors would act 
politically.22  
They did not impose a partisan fairness 
requirement 
on 
the 
redistricting 
process, 
Johnson, 
399 
Wis. 2d 623, 
¶¶53–63, 
because 
telling 
partisans 
in 
the 
Legislature not to act for partisan advantage would have been 
like ordering water to be dry.  Cf. The Law and Policy of 
Redistricting Reform, Fed. Soc'y, at 1:06:20 (Apr. 26, 2019), 
                                                 
22 Gerrymandering was a common practice by 1840.  Rucho v. 
Common Cause, 588 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2495 (2019) 
(citation omitted). 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
12 
 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nOi-BEo8ZFc&t=1618s 
(statement 
of Larry Obhof).  The founders did, however, impose the 
requirements of Article IV, Sections 3 and 4 to limit the extent 
to which one party could take control of the state by 
gerrymandering.23  Cunningham, 81 Wis. at 486. 
¶222 The majority assures future political actors they can 
adopt state legislative redistricting plans with population 
deviation nearing 2% that cannot be justified by a good-faith 
attempt to preserve political boundaries.  For comparison, the 
assembly map passed by the Legislature and signed by the 
Governor in 2011 had a population deviation of 0.76%.  Baldus v. 
Members of Wis. Government Accountability Bd., 849 F. Supp. 
2d 840, 851 (E.D. Wis. 2012).  Instead of mentioning this 
feature 
of 
the 
2011 
map, 
the 
majority 
resorts 
to 
a 
legislatively-drawn map from the 1970s that purportedly had a 2% 
population deviation.24  Every assembly map drawn by a federal 
court in the history of Wisconsin has had a lower population 
deviation than the map the majority adopts.  Baumgart v. 
Wendelberger, No. 01-C-0121, 2002 WL 34127471, at *7 (E.D. Wis. 
May 30, 2002) (1.48%); Prosser v. Elections Bd., 793 F. Supp. 
859, 866 (W.D. Wis. 1992) (0.52%); Wis. State AFL-CIO v. 
                                                 
23 They also adopted Article IV, Section 5, which states, in 
relevant part, "no assembly district shall be divided in the 
formation of a senate district."  No one has ever treated 
Section 5 as anything less than an absolute constitutional 
requirement.  Not a single assembly district is divided in the 
formation of any senate district in any proposed remedial plan 
submitted to this court. 
24 Majority op., ¶36. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
13 
 
Elections Bd., 543 F. Supp. 630, 637 (E.D. Wis. 1982) (1.74%).  
The 
majority's 
assurances 
that 
"the 
Governor's 
maps 
are 
consistent 
with . . . court-sanctioned 
requirements 
for . . . population equality"25 is simply false.  This court has 
never recognized a safe harbor for population deviation——until 
now.  H. Rupert Theobald, Equal Representation:  A Study of 
Legislative and Congressional Apportionment in Wisconsin, in 
Wisconsin 
Blue 
Book 
71, 
72 
(1970) 
("The 
Wisconsin 
Constitution has, since 1848, required districts 'according to 
the number of inhabitants', and it does not recognize a 'minimal 
deviation' which could be disregarded.").26 
 
¶223 A 2% automatic safe harbor is quite the gift to 
political 
actors, 
affording 
them 
unprecedented 
map-drawing 
discretion.  Although all but one member of the current majority 
                                                 
25 Id. 
26 According to the majority, this court has never required 
less population deviation than is present in the maps it adopts.  
Id., ¶36 n.20.  However, this court has not decided a 
redistricting case since the rise of the one person, one vote 
principle.  Even before the United States Supreme Court 
established the primacy of this principle in the 1960s, this 
court never recognized any sort of safe harbor, below which maps 
are per se constitutional.  Instead, it has always examined 
whether other constitutional criteria (not extra-legal criteria 
such as core retention) justify the population deviation.  
Neither the Governor nor the majority has pointed to any such 
criteria as justification.  The question is not whether "better 
performance on population deviation is . . . possible."  Id.  As 
the majority acknowledges, it "certainly" is.  Id.  The question 
is whether any legal rationale supports the deviation the 
majority asserts is permissible——not just for the Governor's 
maps but for any map.  There isn't any.  Under controlling 
precedent, population deviation cannot be judged in isolation, 
without consideration of all other constitutional criteria. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
14 
 
decried the 2011 maps as "sharply partisan,"27 they now embrace a 
tool for promoting partisan gerrymanders.28  When a partisan 
gerrymander coexists with population inequality, a subset of the 
people become more politically powerful than the rest of the 
population, raising serious concerns that the people, as a 
whole, have lost control over their own government.  Minimizing 
population 
deviation 
is 
the 
key 
limitation 
on 
partisan 
gerrymandering, as evidenced by England's "infamous rotten 
boroughs."  Johnson, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶30 (citing The Federalist 
No. 56, at 349 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). 
 
¶224 The constraints on the Legislature's redistricting 
power are "very simple and brief;" undermining any one of them 
grants the body significantly more leeway than the constitution 
permits.  Id., ¶58 (quoting Cunningham, 81 Wis. at 511 (Pinney, 
J., concurring)).  While this court is bound by the least-change 
approach, the Legislature is not.  At any time, the Legislature 
and the Governor may implement redistricting plans through the 
political process, which would supplant this court's remedy.29  
Id., ¶19 (majority opinion) (quoting State ex rel. Reynolds v. 
Zimmerman, 23 Wis. 2d 606, 606, 128 N.W.2d 16 (1964) (per 
                                                 
27 
Johnson, 
399 
Wis. 2d 623, 
¶¶88, 
106 
(Dallet, 
J., 
dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 
28 Of course, notwithstanding a partisan gerrymander, when 
map drawers comply with the constitutional command to achieve 
population equality, "[v]oters retain their freedom to choose 
among candidates irrespective of how district lines are drawn."  
Id., ¶55 (majority opinion) (citation omitted).   
29 Majority op., ¶52 ("This order shall remain in effect 
until new maps are enacted into law or a court otherwise 
directs."). 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
15 
 
curiam)).  Under the majority's new redistricting paradigm, one 
side of the political aisle may be politically obliterated, much 
like the words "according to the number of inhabitants" under 
the majority's atextual interpretation.  The majority's opinion 
is a wolf that does not even try to masquerade as a sheep.  See 
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 699 (1988) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
¶225 The 
majority 
rationalizes 
constitutionally 
impermissible population inequality by declaring "the Governor's 
maps 
are 
consistent 
with 
historical 
practice 
and 
court-
sanctioned requirements for compactness, respect for local 
boundaries, and population equality."30  So much for the 
constitution.  The majority points to maps this court approved 
long ago, with substantial population inequality, which the 
majority proclaims constitutes a baseline by which to measure 
proposed remedial maps in this case.  The majority's reliance on 
cases predating the primacy placed by the United States Supreme 
Court on population equality undermines its analysis entirely. 
¶226 In Cunningham and Lamb, this court explained that 
Article IV, Sections 3 and 4 exist in tension.  While Section 3 
requires population equality, Section 4 renders political 
boundary lines inviolable——specifically, the lines dividing 
counties, towns, and wards.  Grouping people into perfectly 
equal districts while respecting political boundaries, in which 
unequal populations live, is challenging.  In Cunningham and 
Lamb, this court gave Sections 3 and 4 near equal weight:  "[I]t 
                                                 
30 Id., ¶36. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
16 
 
is impossible to secure exact and equal representation, by 
reason of the constitutional hindrances mentioned [mainly, 
Section 4]; and it is because of such hindrances, and only 
because of such hindrances, that the legislature, under the 
constitution, are at liberty to depart from equality of 
representation."  Lamb, 83 Wis. at 150 (emphasis added); see 
also id. at 155 ("It follows that the constitution requires the 
legislature to apportion the state into senate and assembly 
districts 'according to the number of inhabitants,' as nearly as 
can 
be 
done 
consistently 
with 
other 
provisions 
of 
the 
constitution mentioned.").  In particular, this court prohibited 
county splits, at the expense of population equality.  Id. at 
148 ("It was determined in the former case [Cunningham], and is 
now conceded, that no county line is to be broken in the 
formation of any assembly district.").   
¶227 This court twice reaffirmed Cunningham and Lamb.  In 
1932, 
this 
court 
declared 
the 
Legislature 
"bound 
by 
constitutional mandate to avoid unnecessary inequalities in 
representation;" however, it also noted "it was recognized in 
[Cunningham and Lamb] that the Constitution contains other 
provisions which militate against absolute equality . . . .  For 
example, the requirement that the districts be bounded by 
county, . . . town, or ward lines[.]"  State ex rel. Bownman v. 
Dammann, 209 Wis. 21, 27, 243 N.W. 481 (1932).   
¶228 A few decades later, this court reiterated that "the 
constitution itself commits the state to the principle of per 
capita 
equality 
of 
representation 
subject 
only 
to 
some 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
17 
 
geographic limitations in the execution and administration of 
this principle."  Zimmerman, 22 Wis. 2d at 556 (emphasis added).  
That statement was not a passing remark.  This court emphasized 
the importance of population equality multiple times: 
It is assumed by all parties and understood by this 
court that a mathematical equality of population in 
each senate and assembly district is impossible to 
achieve, given the requirement that the boundaries of 
local political units must be considered in the 
execution of the standard of per capita equality of 
representation. 
It 
is 
equally 
clear, 
however, 
that 
a 
valid 
reapportionment 'should be as close an approximation 
to exactness as possible, and [that] this is the 
utmost 
limit 
for 
the 
exercise 
of 
legislative 
discretion.' 
. . . . 
[T]he legislature must apportion in direct ratio to 
population, subject only to (1) practical limitations 
in execution of this principle, and (2) precise 
constitutional 
restrictions 
about 
observance 
of 
governmental boundaries in drawing district lines. 
Id. at 563–66.  Until the United States Supreme Court ruled 
otherwise, substantial population inequality was permissible, 
but it had to be justified almost entirely by the preservation 
of political boundaries.  Our November 30 opinion stressed the 
importance of the principle articulated in Zimmerman, although 
we also recognized federal constitutional law uprooted the 
balance this court had struck between Article IV, Sections 3 and 
4, rendering population equality of paramount importance in 
redistricting.  Johnson, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶¶35, 38 (citations 
omitted). 
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18 
 
¶229 Post-Zimmerman, federal constitutional law changed.  
No 
longer 
may 
Article 
IV, 
Sections 
3 
and 
4 
be 
given 
approximately equal weight.  In 1964, the United States Supreme 
Court held, "the Equal Protection Clause requires that a State 
make an honest and good faith effort to construct districts, in 
both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal population as 
practicable."  Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964).  That 
same year, the Court confirmed even state senate districts had 
to comply with the one person, one vote principle.  Maryland 
Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656, 674–75 
(1964).  On the eve of Wisconsin's next redistricting cycle, the 
assembly 
requested 
an 
opinion 
from 
the 
attorney 
general 
regarding the application of Sections 3 and 4 in light of these 
binding precedents.  58 Wis. Att'y Gen. Op. 88 (1969).  The 
attorney general responded, "[i]n my opinion, the Wisconsin 
Constitution no longer may be considered as prohibiting assembly 
districts from crossing county lines, in view of the emphasis 
the United States Supreme Court has placed upon population 
equality among electoral districts."  Id. at 91.  In another 
opinion two years later, the attorney general explained town and 
ward lines still needed to be followed but only "insofar as may 
be consistent with population equality[.]"  60 Wis. Att'y Gen. 
Op. 101, 106 (1971); see also Michael Gallagher, Joseph Kreye & 
Staci 
Duros, 
Redistricting 
in 
Wisconsin 
2020 
17 
(2020), 
https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/misc/lrb/wisconsin_elections_pr
oject/redistricting_wisconsin_2020_1_2.pdf 
(explaining 
respect 
for the unity of political subdivisions is "by no means 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
19 
 
obsolete" but that these boundaries were followed "much more 
meticulously in Wisconsin, and elsewhere, before the advent of 
one person, one vote"); Theobald, A Study of Legislative and 
Congressional Apportionment in Wisconsin, at 72 ("As long as 
they do not conflict with the equal population requirements, all 
other apportionment provisions of the Wisconsin Constitution 
must be given full effect."  (emphasis added)).  Accordingly, 
every proposed remedial map in this case splits substantially 
more counties, towns, and wards than would have been permissible 
under Cunningham and Lamb. 
¶230 Under the original understanding of Article IV, 
Section 3, population inequality was permissible only if a 
"constitutional hindrance[]," i.e., compliance with another 
constitutional requirement, compelled it.  Lamb, 83 Wis. at 150.  
In Reynolds, the United States Supreme Court changed the 
calculation, but the majority nevertheless chooses maps in 
accordance with a bad interpretation of bad law, embracing both 
population inequality and fractured political boundaries.   
¶231 While the truth may be inconvenient for the majority, 
pretending Zimmerman sanctions the Governor's maps because the 
maps approved in Zimmerman had "substantially larger population 
deviations"31 ignores binding precedent of the United States 
Supreme Court.  The majority relegates the United States Supreme 
Court's directive on population equality to a single footnote, 
acknowledging "the geographic limitations in the Wisconsin 
                                                 
31 Id. 
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20 
 
Constitution can no longer be fully enforced"32 as a result.  The 
majority 
neglects 
to 
acknowledge 
that 
those 
"geographic 
limitations" in Article IV, Section 4 can no longer justify the 
extent of population inequality approved in Zimmerman. 
¶232 While federal constitutional law precludes us from 
giving perfect effect to Article IV's original meaning, we could 
nonetheless 
achieve 
population 
equality 
while 
preserving 
political boundaries, something the majority makes no attempt to 
do.  The remedial maps proposed by the Governor, which the 
majority adopts as its own, have both greater population 
deviation and more splits than the Legislature's proposed 
remedial maps.  The Governor offers no explanation for his 
population deviation other than a passing reference to least 
change, despite this court's direction to the parties to be 
mindful of both Sections 3 and 4.  Specifically, the Governor's 
assembly map has more than twice the population deviation of the 
Legislature's map (1.88% compared to the Legislature's 0.76%),33 
and 
double 
the 
municipal 
splits 
(115 
compared 
to 
the 
Legislature's 
52),34 
and 
hundreds 
more 
ward 
splits 
(the 
Legislature 
split 
zero 
wards).35 
 
The 
ward 
splits 
are 
particularly difficult to justify because "the smaller the 
                                                 
32 Id., n.19 (citing Johnson, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶35). 
33 Resp. Expert R. Thomas M. Bryan, at 3. 
34 Suppl. R. Supp. Governor Evers's Proposed Corrected State 
Legislative District Plans, at 5; Expert R. Thomas M. Bryan, at 
18. 
35 The Governor and the Legislature split the same number of 
counties. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
21 
 
political subdivision, the easier it may be to preserve its 
boundaries."  Johnson, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶35 (citing Baumgart, 
2002 WL 34127471, at *3).  While one person, one vote 
necessitates breaking up counties (large units of people), it 
does not necessitate dividing the smallest political units 
recognized in the state. 
¶233 The Governor argues town splits are relevant but not 
village and city splits based on the language of Article IV, 
Section 4.  His interpretation is consistent with Lamb, 83 
Wis. at 148.  Even so, he asks this court to split 50 towns by 
adopting his proposed remedial assembly map——and the majority 
obliges.36  In comparison, the Legislature's map has 52 total 
municipal splits, of which only 16 are town splits (the rest are 
village and city splits).37  At the time of adoption, the 2011 
assembly map split 30 towns.38  A 67% increase in town splits 
hardly reflects "least change." 
¶234 The majority mischaracterizes the record to justify 
the high number of splits.  It states: 
Particularized 
data 
about 
how 
many 
counties 
or 
municipalities remain unified or split may be a useful 
indicator of least change.  But no party saw fit to 
provide that data.  What we did receive was raw counts 
of total county and municipal slits under each 
                                                 
36 Suppl. R. Supp. Governor Evers's Proposed Corrected State 
Legislative District Plans, at 5. 
37 Expert R. Thomas M. Bryan, at 18. 
38 See Legislature's Reply Br., at 13 ("How many towns were 
split by Act 43 is ascertainable by reading the statute, 
identifying in text every town split.  There were 30[.]"  
(citing Wis. Stat. § 4.001, et seq.)). 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
22 
 
proposal, and that information provides no insight 
into which map makes the least change to existing 
district boundaries.[39] 
Problematically, the majority seems to sanction an illegal map——
containing an unlawful number of splits——because the map 
performs well on a single extra-legal criterion, core retention.  
The majority's approach violates its duty to uphold the 
Wisconsin Constitution.40   
 
¶235 Contrary to the majority's assertion, the Legislature 
did provide detailed split analyses,41 which it discussed at 
length in its response brief.  Its expert provided a breakdown 
of every county and municipal split in every proposed remedial 
map (except for the Governor's modified maps).42  To determine 
whether a proposed map retained an existing split or added one 
may be tedious, but it is not particularly difficult to 
ascertain.  The current statutes explicitly state when a split 
                                                 
39 Majority op., ¶32 (second emphasis added). 
40 Adding together the number of county, town, and ward 
splits, the assembly map the majority adopts likely has more 
splits than any map ever implemented in this state.  While the 
majority compares population deviation in its maps with past 
maps, it does not endeavor to make analogous comparisons for 
splits. 
41 Resp. Expert R. Thomas M. Bryan, at App. 2. 
42 This expert report was submitted before the Governor was 
allowed to modify his maps to reduce the number of splits.  The 
fact that this court allowed the Governor to modify his maps 
while denying other parties the opportunity illustrates the 
serious due process problems triggered by the majority's 
acceptance of the Governor's modified maps.  They have not been 
subjected to the same level of adversarial scrutiny as other 
maps.  The Governor's motion to file modified maps was filed on 
January 6, 2022——conveniently, two days after the deadline for 
submitting reply briefs and reply expert reports. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
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occurs.  For example, Wis. Stat. § 4.44(1) declares the 44th 
Assembly District includes "[t]hat part of the town of Harmony 
comprising U.S. census tract 1202, blocks 3004 and 3095," while 
Wis. Stat. § 4.45(1)(a) declares the 45th Assembly District 
includes "[t]he towns of Albany, Decatur, Jefferson, Spring 
Grove, and Sylvester."  By comparing the split analyses to the 
existing statutes, the Legislature explained in its response 
brief "[t]he Governor would split 7 new municipalities in 
Waukesha County's Assembly District 99, including Oconomow[o]c 
and Pewaukee.  Similarly, the Governor would add 8 municipal 
splits in Dane County, including Stoughton and Sue Prairie, even 
though not previously split[.]"43 
¶236 Adding 
to 
its 
infirmities 
under 
the 
law, 
the 
majority's map effectuates a racial gerrymander.  The Governor 
admits he drew his proposed remedial assembly map with the 
express purpose of creating seven Black majority-minority 
assembly districts.  Such race-driven redistricting must survive 
strict scrutiny.  The United States Supreme Court has assumed 
compliance with the VRA can be a compelling state interest.  
Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2315 (2018).  However, VRA 
violations "never can be assumed, but specifically must be 
proved in each case in order to establish a redistricting plan 
dilutes minority voting strength in violation of § 2 [of the 
VRA]."  Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 653 (1993).  A state must 
have "a strong basis in evidence" demonstrating that without 
explicit consideration of race, a redistricting plan would 
                                                 
43 Legislature's Resp. Br., at 16. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
24 
 
transgress the VRA.  Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1464 
(2017) (quoting Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 
S. Ct. 1257, 1274 (2015)).   
¶237 The majority assumes a remedial assembly map with 
fewer than seven Black majority-minority districts would violate 
the VRA.  This assumption is inappropriate, and the Governor has 
failed to establish "a strong basis in evidence" for a seventh 
district.  The majority suggests the VRA requires the drawing of 
a seventh Black majority-minority district because Wisconsin's 
Black voting-age population approaches seven percent.  However, 
Section 2 of the VRA declares "That nothing in this section 
establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected 
in numbers equal to their proportion in the population."  52 
U.S.C. § 10301(b).  In De Grandy, the United States Supreme 
Court held the failure to maximize the number of opportunity 
districts is not a VRA violation.44  512 U.S. at 1017.  
Opportunity is generally measured, the Court said, against 
                                                 
44  Maximization has been rejected because it carries a 
heavy price:  "if the number of minority-majority districts is 
maximized, then it necessarily follows that black influence is 
elsewhere minimized, which reduces the number of districts in 
which blacks, fully participating in an integrated process, can 
hold the balance of power."  In re Apportionment of the State 
Legislature—1992, 486 N.W.2d 639, 654 n.66 (1992) (citation 
omitted)).  In turn, even if Black voters collectively perform 
better, 
a 
portion 
of 
the 
Black 
voting 
population 
is 
"relegate[d]" to the status of "second class . . . wards of the 
political/electoral system."  Id.  Many Black voters object to 
their votes being diluted "within . . . their district merely to 
secure 
the 
chance 
that . . . their 
allies 
in 
other 
districts . . . [are] able to vote more like-minded partisans to 
the legislature."  Cf. Larry Alexander & Saikrishna B. Prakash, 
Tempest in an Empty Teapot:  Why the Constitution Does Not 
Regulate Gerrymandering, 50 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1, 27 (2008).   
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
25 
 
"rough" proportionality.  See id. at 1000, 1023.  The author of 
the majority opinion in De Grandy, writing in dissent in another 
VRA case, explained:  
Several baselines can be imagined; one could, for 
example, compare a minority's voting strength under a 
particular districting plan with the maximum strength 
possible under any alternative.  Not surprisingly, we 
have conclusively rejected this approach; the VRA was 
passed to guarantee minority voters a fair game, not a 
killing.  See Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 
1016–1017, 114 S.Ct. 2647, 129 L.Ed.2d 775 (1994).  We 
have held that the better baseline for measuring 
opportunity 
to 
elect 
under 
§ 
2, 
although 
not 
dispositive, is the minority's rough proportion of the 
relevant population. Id., at 1013–1023, 114 S.Ct. 
2647. 
Bartlett v. Strictland, 556 U.S. 1, 29 (2009) (Scouter, J., 
dissenting) (citation omitted).  The majority skims over De 
Grandy.45   
¶238 The Black voting-age population is between 6.1% and 
6.5%, as Chief Justice Ziegler explains in her dissent.46  
Wisconsin has 99 assembly seats——not 100——so, even taking the 
high estimate of 6.5%, the proportional share of Black assembly 
districts, rounded to the nearest whole number, would be six, 
not seven (99 × 0.065 = 6.4).  Accordingly, even if the Gingles 
                                                 
45 Some United States Supreme Court justices have been quite 
critical of the emphasis placed on proportionality; nonetheless, 
it is the law we are bound to follow.  Holder v. Hall, 512 
U.S. 874, 943–44 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Few words 
would be too strong to describe the dissembling that pervades 
the application of the 'totality of the circumstances' test 
under our interpretation of § 2.  It is an empty incantation——a 
mere conjurer's trick that serves to hide the drive for 
proportionality that animates our decisions."). 
46 Chief Justice Ziegler's dissent, ¶114. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
26 
 
preconditions were satisfied, six districts is sufficient to 
constitute rough proportionality.  See, e.g., Bodker v. Taylor, 
No. Civ.A.1:02-CV-999ODE, 2002 WL 32587312, at *8–9 (N.D. Ga. 
June 5, 2002) (noting Black people constituted 45.2% of the 
population and had only 42.35% of the seats but nonetheless 
finding "the court's map conforms with Section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act" because rough "proportional representation" was 
achieved and while not "dispositive," proportionality is "strong 
evidence" 
that 
"minorities 
have 
an 
equal 
opportunity 
to 
participate" particularly "where there is simply no evidence 
before the court about social, historical or other circumstances 
that might impact whether minorities in Fulton County are denied 
equal opportunity for political participation").47  Justice 
Roggensack 
provides 
many 
"good 
reasons" 
to 
believe 
the 
majority's conclusory analysis of the third Gingles precondition 
is wanting.   
¶239 Rough proportionality is not a safe harbor, but it is 
"obviously an indication that minority voters have an equal 
opportunity, in spite of racial polarization, 'to participate in 
the political process and to elect representatives of their 
choice,' 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)[.]"  De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1020.  
                                                 
47 BLOC referred to Bodker in its brief and included a copy 
of the opinion in its appendix.  It also referred to and 
provided a copy of Stenger v. Kellett, No. 4:11CV2230, 2012 WL 
601017, at *12 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 23, 2012) ("[B]ecause the African 
American 'effective minority' districts are in approximate 
proportion to their population of St. Louis County, the plan 
would likely not violate the Voting Rights Act even if the 
Gingles 
factors 
were 
met, 
given 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances in this case."). 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
27 
 
Just like least change is not reflected by a single number, a 
proper VRA analysis is not governed by a "single statistic[.]"  
Id.  Nevertheless, the "central teaching" of De Grandy is clear:  
"[P]roportionality . . . is 
always 
relevant 
evidence 
in 
determining vote dilution . . . .  Thus, in evaluating . . . the 
totality of the circumstances a court must always consider the 
relationship between the number of majority-minority voting 
districts and the minority group's share of the population."  
Id. at 1025 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Thornburg v. 
Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 99 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in 
judgment)).  The requisite proportionality analysis is missing 
from the majority opinion. 
¶240 "[E]xplicit race-based districting embarks us on a 
most dangerous course."  Id. at 1031 (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment).  "[R]acial classifications 
violate the very essence of the lofty ideals of individual 
equality for which this country strives.  The concept of racial 
classification ought to be repugnant to all Americans."  Robert 
Redwine, Comment, Constitutional Law:  Racial and Political 
Gerrymandering——Different Problems Require Different Solutions, 
51 Okla. L. Rev. 373, 399 (1996).  In the absence of strong 
evidence demonstrating a VRA violation will result from the lack 
of a seventh district, this court should "unerringly and 
unapologetically . . . exalt[] the ideal of individual equality 
without regard to race."  Id.  Exhibiting highly suspect racial 
classifications, the majority's remedy violates the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
28 
 
II.  JUSTICE HAGEDORN'S SOLO CONCURRENCE 
¶241 Justice Hagedorn wrote a solo concurrence to our 
November 
30 
opinion, 
which 
many 
parties 
treated 
as 
the 
controlling opinion.  No justice joined it, and it does not 
constitute binding precedent.  In Wisconsin, a solo concurrence 
can never be controlling.  A point of law is the opinion of this 
court only if a majority of justices both agree on the point and 
join the mandate.  State v. Dowe, 120 Wis. 2d 192, 194 352 
N.W.2d 660 (1984) (per curiam) (citations omitted); Piper v. 
Jones Dairy Farm, 2020 WI 28, ¶22, 390 Wis. 2d 762, 940 
N.W.2d 701 (citations omitted).  Justice Hagedorn joined all but 
six of the 81 paragraphs comprising our November 30 opinion.  
The 75 paragraphs joined by four justices in the majority 
constitute the majority opinion of the court.   
¶242 Perhaps the parties mistakenly assumed the position of 
the United States Supreme Court on this issue applies to 
Wisconsin Supreme Court cases.  The United States Supreme Court 
will consider and count concurring opinions in cases lacking an 
opinion joined by a majority.  In Marks v. United States, the 
Court held, "[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no 
single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five 
justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that 
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgment on 
the narrowest grounds[.]'"  430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (plurality)).  
Federal courts understand the so-called Marks Rule differently.  
Some give precedential effect to the narrowest opinion that 
joined the mandate; others search for a "common denominator" 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
29 
 
that "must embody a position implicitly approved by at least [a 
majority] of Justices who support the judgment."  See United 
States v. Epps, 707 F.3d 337, 348 (D.C. 2013) (quoting King v. 
Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc)). 
¶243 The Marks Rule does not apply to this case, but even 
if it did, Justice Hagedorn's solo concurrence would not be 
controlling.  This court has never applied the Marks Rule to 
interpret its own precedent, but only to interpret federal 
precedent.  See State v. Griep, 2015 WI 40, ¶36, 361 
Wis. 2d 657, 863 N.W.2d 567.  Even if this court had adopted the 
Marks Rule (which has been the subject of substantial scholarly 
criticism),48 it would not apply.  On many points, Justice 
Hagedorn's concurrence is broader than the majority opinion, and 
some of its conclusions lack any common rationale with the 
majority.  For example, Justice Hagedorn said extra-legal 
criteria could be considered in selecting a map——but only those 
extra-legal criteria he deemed important in his subjective 
judgment.49  Three justices in the majority would have stuck to 
                                                 
48 The 
parties' 
reliance 
on 
Justice 
Hagedorn's 
solo 
concurrence illustrates one problem with the Marks Rule.  
Justice Hagedorn represents one-seventh of this court, yet his 
opinion has nonetheless been treated as controlling by most of 
the parties in this case.  The "least popular view[s]" of a 
single justice do not reflect the law.  See Richard M. Re, 
Beyond the Marks Rule, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 1943, 1944 (2019). 
49 Although Justice Hagedorn believes this court can define 
what constitutes a community of interest and then protect that 
community in selecting a map, he acknowledges, "[i]t is not a 
legal requirement[.]"  Johnson, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶83 (Hagedorn, 
J., concurring).  In contrast, Justice Hagedorn was unwilling to 
consider another extra-legal criterion:  partisan fairness.  
Id., ¶87.  This inconsistency has never been explained.  Justice 
Hagedorn agrees this court lacks the institutional competency to 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
30 
 
the law alone, showing an unbridgeable philosophical divide 
regarding the propriety of extra-legal criteria advanced by the 
concurrence. 
¶244 In fairness to the parties who mistook Justice 
Hagedorn's solo concurrence for the opinion of this court, 
perhaps their confusion stemmed from Justice Hagedorn's own 
words.  In his concurrence, he "invited" the parties to submit 
proposed remedial maps and briefing in conformity with his 
idiosyncratic views50——never mind that only this court, acting 
through a majority of participating justices, can "invite" 
parties to do anything.  Justice Hagedorn may have cast the 
deciding vote in this case, but he does not have the power to 
act as a supreme court of one. 
¶245 Justice 
Hagedorn's 
solo 
concurrence 
is 
also 
inconsistent with the views he now expresses as the majority 
author.  Never once did he mention "core retention" in his 
concurrence——nor did the majority, and the dissent used the 
phrase only once, in passing.51  In contrast, today's rather 
                                                                                                                                                             
define what constitutes partisan fairness and which political 
communities deserve special consideration.  For the same 
reasons, "it is not for the Court to define what a community of 
interest is and where its boundaries are, and it is not for the 
Court to determine which regions deserve special consideration."  
Id., ¶71 n.7 (majority opinion) (quoting In re Legislative 
Districting of the State, 805 A.2d 292, 298 (Md. 2002)). 
 
50 Id., ¶63 (Hagedorn, J., concurring). 
   
 
51 Id., ¶97 (Dallet, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
   
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
31 
 
short majority opinion52 uses the phrase a striking 27 times.53  
Justice Hagedorn now says, as the majority author, core 
retention is the "preeminent . . . metric"54 and "especially 
helpful."55  We never determined "core retention is . . . central 
to least change review,"56 despite some parties stating in 
briefing before our November 30 opinion that it might be 
important to consider, nor did we determine that it is a 
"preeminent . . . metric" or "especially helpful."  We never 
mentioned it at all, until now. 
¶246 While we determined that the least-change approach 
should guide this court's decision, no one thought that meant 
maximizing core retention——not even Justice Hagedorn.  There is 
a reason the majority does not direct the reader to any portion 
of our November 30 opinion to support the proposition that core 
retention is dispositive:  this majority made it up.   
¶247 Justice 
Hagedorn's 
concurrence 
contemplates 
a 
situation that should (as a statistical matter) never occur if 
                                                 
52 The majority opinion addresses several issues but spans a 
mere 32 pages.  In contrast, the three-judge federal district 
court opinion in Singleton v. Merrill, one of the most recent 
successful VRA challenges in the context of redistricting, is 
225 pages.  __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2022 WL 265001 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 
24) (per curiam), stayed sub nom. pending cert. review, Merrill 
v. Milligan, 142 S. Ct. 879 (Mem).  In this case, the only full-
fledged VRA analyses come from the three dissents. 
53 Majority op., ¶¶7–8, 13 & n.9, 14–15, 22, 24, 26–30, 33. 
54 Id., ¶33. 
55 Id., ¶13. 
56 Id. 
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core retention is the "preeminent . . . metric" in selecting 
maps——a tie: 
Suppose we receive multiple proposed maps that comply 
with all relevant legal requirements, and that have 
equally compelling arguments for why their proposed 
map most aligns with current district boundaries.  In 
that circumstance, we still must exercise judgment to 
choose the best alternative.  Considering communities 
of 
interest 
(or 
other 
traditional 
redistricting 
criteria) may assist us in doing so. 
Johnson, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶83 (Hagedorn, J., concurring).  
Justice 
Hagedorn 
envisioned 
parties 
presenting 
"equally 
compelling arguments" regarding least change, which is an odd 
turn of phrase if he really meant, "I will vote for whichever 
maps have the best core retention."  The chance of two proposed 
remedial maps having the same core retention probably approaches 
the chance of winning the lottery.  No reasonable person would 
read 
Justice 
Hagedorn's 
concurrence 
and 
think 
a 
slight 
difference in core retention would be dispositive, yet that is 
exactly what the majority now holds. 
¶248 Justice Hagedorn's misunderstanding of the least-
change approach, first displayed in his concurrence, infects the 
majority opinion in a more fundamentally erroneous way than 
equating least change with core retention.  The majority spends 
substantial 
time 
discussing 
Tennant 
v. 
Jefferson 
County 
Commission, 
567 
U.S. 758, 
764–65 
(2012) 
(per 
curiam).  
Specifically, the majority states:  
In Tennant[,] . . . the Supreme Court upheld a 4,871-
person deviation in West Virginia's congressional 
districts, noting the deviation advanced the state's 
interests in maximizing core retention and maintaining 
whole counties. . . .  
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33 
 
 
The United States Supreme Court held that maximizing 
core retention was an acceptable justification for far 
greater deviation in Tennant.[57] 
There are multiple problems with the majority's reliance on 
Tennant.   
 
¶249 First, our November 30 opinion did not recognize least 
change, let alone core retention, as a "state interest."  The 
least-change approach reflects this court's limited power to 
remedy violations of law, which does not include the power to 
write statutes out of whole cloth.  Johnson, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶8 
(majority opinion) ("Because the judiciary lacks the lawmaking 
power constitutionally conferred on the legislature, we will 
limit our remedy to achieving compliance with the law rather 
than imposing policy choices.").  "A least-change approach is 
nothing more than a convenient way to describe the judiciary's 
properly limited role in redistricting."  Id., ¶72.   
 
¶250 The majority errs by treating core retention as a 
state interest of critical importance, at the expense of 
applying the text of the Wisconsin Constitution.  At most, core 
retention may indicate whether this court has exceeded its 
jurisdiction by delving into political decision-making.  In 
choosing the Governor's maps, the majority does not limit itself 
to "making only those changes necessary for the maps to comport 
with the one person, one vote principle while satisfying other 
constitutional 
and 
statutory 
mandates 
(a 
'least-change' 
approach)," id., ¶5, but instead implements Justice Hagedorn's 
                                                 
57 Id., ¶¶22, 24. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
34 
 
previously articulated view, which permits tipping the scales 
with concededly extra-legal criteria.  Id., ¶83 (Hagedorn, J., 
concurring).58   
 
¶251 Second, the West Virginia State Legislature drew the 
map under review in Tennant.  567 U.S. at 760–61.  Courts have 
long been held to higher standards than legislative bodies when 
drawing maps precisely because courts do not get to determine, 
in the first instance, what constitutes a state interest (at 
least not normally).59  The majority's reliance on Tennant is 
misplaced.  
 
¶252 That 
Justice 
Hagedorn's 
majority 
opinion 
is 
a 
perversion of least change is self-evident from the opinion's 
very structure.  The majority "begin[s] [its] analysis by 
probing which map makes the least change from current district 
boundaries.  From there, [it] examine[s] the relevant law[.]"60  
As in any case, the court is supposed to begin with the law.  
Without first knowing what the law requires, there is no way for 
the court to "mak[e] only those changes necessary for the maps 
to comport with the [law]."  Johnson, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶5 
(majority 
opinion). 
 
The 
majority's 
fundamentally 
flawed 
analysis produces an illegitimate remedy. 
                                                 
 
58 
Justice 
Ann 
Walsh 
Bradley 
confirms 
the 
majority 
privileged policy over the law in her concurrence, which is 
joined by all members of the majority except Justice Hagedorn.  
 
59 Chief Justice Ziegler's Dissent, ¶141. 
60 Majority op., ¶12. 
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35 
 
III.  ZIMMERMAN 
¶253 Nearly sixty years have passed since this court last 
resolved redistricting litigation.  In that case, this court 
declared a redistricting plan cannot be implemented by joint 
resolution.  Zimmerman, 22 Wis. 2d at 559.  While Zimmerman has 
been precedent for many years, it is the only case to address 
that issue, and this court has never had the opportunity to 
revisit it because every redistricting case that followed was 
heard exclusively in federal court.  Unlike a fine wine, 
precedent does not necessarily get better with age.61   
¶254 With 
respect 
to 
state 
legislative 
redistricting 
plans,62 the foundation for Zimmerman is weak.  The text of 
Article IV, Section 3 does not contemplate a role for the 
Governor in the drawing of assembly and senate maps.  Compare 
Wis. Const. art. IV, § 3 ("[T]he legislature shall apportion and 
district anew the members of the senate and assembly[.]"), with 
e.g., id. art. I, § 21(1) ("Writs of error . . . shall be issued 
by such courts as the legislature designates by law."  (emphasis 
                                                 
61 See Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2093 (2009) 
(Alito, 
J., 
concurring) 
("The 
dissent, 
finally, 
invokes 
Jackson's antiquity, stating that 'the 23–year existence of a 
simple bright-line rule' should weigh in favor of its retention.  
Post, at 2098.  But in Gant, the Court had no compunction about 
casting aside a 28–year–old bright-line rule.  I can only assume 
that the dissent thinks that our constitutional precedents are 
like certain wines, which are most treasured when they are 
neither too young nor too old, and that Jackson, supra at 23, is 
in its prime, whereas Belton, supra at 28, had turned brownish 
and vinegary."). 
62 Article IV, Section 3 governs assembly and senate 
districts, not congressional districts. 
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36 
 
added)).  While the Legislature's prerogative to enact laws is 
subject to a gubernatorial veto, the constitution does not 
describe the Legislature's duty to redistrict as lawmaking, 
suggesting the constitution denies the Governor a role in the 
process.63   
¶255 In contrast, at the time the Wisconsin Constitution 
was 
adopted, 
Article 
XIV, 
Section 11 
expressly 
provided 
congressional redistricting would involve both the Legislature 
and the Governor.  Wis. Const. Art. XIV, § 11 (1848), repealed 
1982 (declaring the state's two congressional districts, and 
saying they shall be in force "until otherwise provided by law"  
(emphasis added)).  Differences in language typically signal 
differences in meaning, particularly when two provisions of the 
same document use different language to describe analogous 
concepts.  See Parsons v. Associated Banc-Corp., 2017 WI 37, 
¶26, 374 Wis. 2d 513, 893 N.W.2d 212 (quoting Antonin Scalia & 
Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law 170 (2012)) ("'A word or phrase is 
presumed to bear the same meaning throughout a text; a material 
variation in terms suggests a variation in meaning.' . . .  The 
fact that the same section of the state constitution refers 
generally to a matter being 'prescribed by law' and specifically 
to the legislature 'provid[ing]' something 'by statute' strongly 
                                                 
63 Legislature's 10/26/21 Br., at 21 ("The Legislature's 
power to reapportion its districts is specifically enumerated in 
the 
state 
constitution, 
distinct 
from 
its 
lawmaking 
power. . . .  [The text of Article IV, Section 3] does not 
provide that 'the legislature should enact legislation to 
apportion anew' or 'the legislature shall by law apportion 
anew.'"). 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
37 
 
suggests that 'law' in that section has a broader meaning than 
simply 'statutory law.'"  (modification in the original)). 
¶256 The difference between the text of Article IV, Section 
3 and the now repealed Article XIV, Section 11 is particularly 
telling in light of early Wisconsin history.  Under territorial 
law, the Governor had an explicit role in reapportionment.  
Although he did not draw districts, the Governor was responsible 
for assigning a number of representatives to each district.  The 
law provided, in relevant part: 
As soon as practicable after having been furnished 
with the enumeration of the inhabitants of the 
Territory, . . . the Governor of the Territory shall 
apportion the thirteen members of the Council, and 
twenty-six members of the House of Representatives, 
among the several electoral districts as organized by 
law, according to their population, as near as may be, 
as shown by the census taken by virtue of this act.   
1842 Laws Wis. Terr. 50.  Wisconsin's founders did not preserve 
this particular gubernatorial role, and we should be skeptical 
of the idea they gave him an entirely different role——the power 
of vetoing redistricting plans——without using language even 
nearly as explicit.64  See generally James T. Austin, The Life of 
                                                 
64 The Legislature did not try to enact redistricting plans 
by joint resolution until the 1960s, despite gubernatorial 
vetoes of redistricting legislation.  State ex rel. Reynolds v. 
Zimmerman, 22 Wis. 2d 544, 553, 126 N.W.2d 551 (1964).  To some 
extent, this customary practice may inform original meaning, but 
it is evidence of lesser value and of course secondary to the 
plain meaning of the words, as illuminated by historical context 
surrounding their adoption.  See, e.g., SEIU v. Vos, 2020 WI 67, 
¶28, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946 N.W.2d 35 (Hagedorn, J., majority op.) 
("The text of the constitution reflects the policy choices of 
the 
people, 
and 
therefore 
constitutional 
interpretation 
similarly 
focuses 
primarily 
on 
the 
language 
of 
the 
constitution."  (citation omitted)); Coulee Catholic Schs. v. 
LIRC, 2009 WI 88, ¶57, 320 Wis. 2d 275, 768 N.W.2d 868 ("The 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
38 
 
Elbridge Gerry 347 (1829) (explaining Governor Elbridge Gerry 
signed the first so-called "gerrymander" into law because, in 
light of "precedents," he doubted whether he could veto the 
legislation). 
¶257 The 
Legislature 
alone 
has 
the 
constitutionally-
prescribed duty to enact a state legislative redistricting plan 
each decade.  Johnson, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶13.  While a veto may 
frustrate the Legislature's policy agenda, it does not normally 
hinder the Legislature from fulfilling an obligation assigned to 
it by the supreme law.  Whether the Governor actually has the 
power to inhibit a co-equal branch's ability to perform its 
duty, 
absent 
express 
constitutional 
authorization, 
is 
questionable. 
¶258 The Legislature's duty was critical to an argument 
advanced by several "legal scholars"65 in an amicus brief.  They 
claimed, "the whole reason for this litigation is that the 
                                                                                                                                                             
authoritative, and usually final, indicator of the meaning of a 
provision [of the Wisconsin Constitution] is the text——actual 
words used."  (citation omitted)); Jacobs v. Major, 139 
Wis. 2d 492, 504, 407 N.W.2d 832 (1987) ("We need go no further 
than holding that Art. I, sec. 3 has [a] plain, unambiguous 
meaning[.]"); Black v. City of Milwaukee, 2016 WI 47, ¶54, 369 
Wis. 2d 272, 
882 
N.W.2d 333 
(Rebecca 
Grassl 
Bradley, 
J., 
concurring) ("I give priority to the plain meaning of the 
words[.]"  (citation omitted)).  The Legislative and Executive 
branches 
cannot, 
through 
tacit 
understanding, 
change 
the 
constitutional allocation of powers.  Bartlett v. Evers, 2020 WI 
68, 
¶210, 
393 
Wis. 2d 172, 
945 
N.W.2d 685 
(Kelly, 
J., 
concurring/dissenting). 
65 The legal scholars include (in the order listed in the 
brief's appendix) Richard Briffault, Joseph Fishkin, James A. 
Gardner, Michael S. Kang, D. Theodore Rave, David Schultz, Kate 
Shaw, and Robert Yablon. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
39 
 
legislature breached its constitutional duty to redistrict by 
failing to pass a bill with gubernatorial support or a veto-
proof majority."66  This viewpoint is peculiar, but it highlights 
a problem with Zimmerman.  The Legal Scholars blame this 
litigation solely on the Legislature, but an analogous charge 
could be levied against the Governor if in fact the executive 
has any constitutional role to play in redistricting despite the 
absence of a provision granting him one.  As long as this 
court's precedent permits the Governor to veto redistricting 
plans, redistricting is as much his duty as it is the 
Legislature's——but that is inconsistent with the way we have 
described the duty.  E.g., Johnson, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶79 ("[T]he 
legislature must implement a redistricting plan each cycle.").   
¶259 This court's precedent significantly increases the 
likelihood of judicial involvement in what should be a purely 
political process.67  If the political process fails to produce 
                                                 
66 Amicus Br. Legal Scholars, at 5.  The majority similarly 
misstates the Legislature's duty, saying "[w]e have given the 
political branches a fair opportunity to carry out their 
constitutional responsibilities.  They have not done so."  
Majority op., ¶2.  Actually, the Legislature has.  The 
Legislature fulfilled its constitutional duty to "apportion and 
district anew the members of the senate and assembly, according 
to the number of inhabitants," but the Governor vetoed the 
Legislature's plans.  See Wis. Const. Art. IV, § 3.  The 
majority describes our responsibilities as an "unwelcome task," 
majority op. ¶2, which is a strange way of describing the job we 
were elected to perform. 
67 Johnson v. WEC, No. 2021AP1450-OA, unpublished order, at 
11 (Wis. Sept. 22, 2021, amended Sept. 24) (Rebecca Grassl 
Bradley, J., concurring) (explaining 
Zimmerman 
creates "a 
constitutional conundrum").   
 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
40 
 
redistricting 
plans, 
this 
court 
has 
a 
duty 
to 
remedy 
constitutional and other legal defects in the existing maps; 
however, 
if 
this 
court's 
precedent 
defines 
the 
process 
differently than the Wisconsin Constitution, this court has a 
duty to align its precedent with the text of the constitution.  
We cannot mistake "the law" for "the opinion of the judge" 
because "the judge may mistake the law."68  Introduction, William 
Blackstone, Commentaries *71; see also Bryan A. Garner et al., 
The Law of Judicial Precedent 397 (2016) ("The primary and most 
important factor to weigh in considering whether to overrule an 
earlier decision is its correctness.").       
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶260 Our November 30 opinion in this case cabined the 
court's redistricting decision-making to the confines of the 
law.  Unfortunately prophetic, it also cautioned that if four 
                                                 
68 The 2011 assembly and senate maps were adopted by law and 
are codified as statutes (except for a minor change to the 
assembly 
map 
made 
by 
a 
federal 
court). 
 
Johnson, 
399 
Wis. 2d 623, ¶14 (majority opinion).  A joint resolution cannot 
replace duly enacted law——even when that law has been declared 
unconstitutional.  Id., ¶72 n.8.  Contra id., ¶93 n.3 (Dallet, 
J., dissenting) ("[B]oth the Wisconsin and U.S. Constitutions 
require that all maps be redrawn every ten years to account for 
population shifts since the prior census.  These are the sunset 
provisions.  In this respect, the 2011 maps are unlike an 
ordinary unconstitutional statute, since they were enacted 
without any expectation of longevity."  (citations omitted)). 
Perhaps this court should consider, as a remedy, allowing 
the Legislature to redistrict by joint resolution.  Unless a 
court adopts the Governor's maps as it did in this case, a 
court-ordered remedy ultimately denies the Governor control 
anyway.  Zimmerman does not prohibit the Legislature from 
implementing redistricting plans by joint resolution in the 
event of an impasse. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rgb 
 
41 
 
members of this court cast aside those confines, "judges would 
refashion this court as a committee of oligarchs with political 
power superior to both the legislature and the governor."  
Johnson, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶80 (citation omitted).  In this 
opinion, the majority abandons the law, perverts the least-
change 
approach 
into 
a 
license 
for 
policymaking, 
and 
subordinates constitutional commands, statutory restrictions, 
and precedent to the majority's preferences.  I dissent. 
¶261 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER and Justice PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK join 
this dissent. 
 
 
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