Title: Everett v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 602, 2006
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: June 28, 2007

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
PATRICK D. EVERETT, 
 
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No. 602, 2006 
 
Defendant Below-   
 
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Appellant,  
 
 
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Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
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of the State of Delaware in and 
 
 
 
 
 
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for New Castle County 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
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STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
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ID # 0602023552 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
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Appellee. 
 
 
 
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Submitted:  June 20, 2007 
   Decided:  June 28, 2007 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 28th day of June 2007, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties 
and their contentions at oral argument, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) Appellant Patrick D. Everett appeals his convictions of Possession of a 
Deadly Weapon by a Person Prohibited, Possession of Ammunition by a Person 
Prohibited, and Possession of a Weapon with a Removed, Obliterated, or Altered 
Serial Number resulting from his Superior Court bench trial.  Everett argues that 
the Superior Court erred when it denied his motion to suppress the evidence 
supporting his conviction.  We find no merit to his argument and affirm. 
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(2) On February 28, 2006, Officer Hugh Stephey of the Wilmington Police 
Department responded to a report of assault made by Carla Collozo.  Collozo told 
Stephey that a man had “just struck her in the face.”  In addition, she pointed out a 
gray Ford Crown Victoria driving away as the assailant’s vehicle.  The Police 
searched the area and found the vehicle near the scene of the crime. 
(3) After the Police located the vehicle, they went back to Collozo to obtain 
more information.  Police asked Collozo to identify the name and, if possible, the 
date of birth of her assailant.  She told the police that she was assaulted by “Patrick 
Everett with a date of birth of 8/14/1978.”  Stephey then ran a “data check” and 
discovered that Everett was on probation and had a history of drug and weapons 
offenses.  In response to questioning, Collozo told police that she saw Everett with 
a gun one week prior to the assault and believed that he had a gun in his vehicle at 
that time. 
(4) Stephey went back to the vehicle and asked Everett if he would consent 
to a search of his vehicle.  Everett refused.  Stephey then called Everett’s probation 
officer, William Baker, Jr, and explained what had happened.  Baker arrived and 
questioned Everett about whether he had a gun in his car.  Everett did not respond.  
Baker testified that Everett was “sweating profusely and just looked really scared.”  
After first obtaining his supervisor’s approval to conduct an administrative search, 
Baker discovered a 9mm handgun with an obliterated serial number in the vehicle.   
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(5) Everett contends that the Superior Court erred when it denied his motion 
to suppress the weapon because the search violated his rights under the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 6 of the 
Delaware Constitution.  Specifically, he contends that Probation Officer Baker 
acted in contravention of Probation and Parole Procedure 7.19 by performing a 
search “solely on the basis of a request from law enforcement officials.”1  “This 
Court reviews the trial court's denial of a motion to suppress, after an evidentiary 
hearing, under an abuse of discretion standard.”2 
(6) A probation officer’s authority to perform an administrative search is 
granted by 11 Del. C. § 4321(d).3  Pursuant to this section, the Department has 
established guidelines for conducting administrative searches, including approval 
from a supervisor.  Relying on State v. Harris,4 Everett contends that Baker acted 
                                          
 
1 Procedure 7.19 provides, in pertinent part, that “[s]earches should never be made solely on the 
basis of a request from law enforcement officials, but should be the decision of the Officer.”  See 
State v. Harris, 734 A.2d 629, 634 (Del. Super. 1998) (citing Procedure No. 7.19). 
2 Bunting v. State, 907 A.2d 145 (Del. 2006) (TABLE). 
3 11 Del. C. § 4321(d) provides: 
Probation and parole officers shall exercise the same powers as constables under 
the laws of this State and may conduct searches of individuals under probation 
and parole supervision in accordance with Department procedures while in the 
performance of the lawful duties of their employment and shall execute lawful 
orders, warrants and other process as directed to the officer by any court, judge or 
Board of Parole of this State; however, a probation and parole officer shall only 
have such power and duties if the officer participates in and/or meets the 
minimum requirements of such training and education deemed necessary by the 
Department and Board of Examiners.  
4 734 A.2d at 634.  
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contrary to Procedure 7.19 because he conducted a search based solely on a request 
of law enforcement officials.   
(7) “[P]robationers do not have the same liberties as ordinary citizens.”5  For 
that reason, “administrative searches of probationer homes require only reasonable 
grounds, even if the probation officers do not satisfy each technical requirement of 
the search and seizure regulations of the Department of Correction.”6  Thus, 
substantial compliance with Department protocol satisfies the protections afforded 
by both the Delaware and Federal Constitutions.7 
(8) Everett’s argument that Baker acted as a law enforcement officer at the 
request of the police is contradicted by the record.  Baker was informed by police 
that one of his probationers was just accused of committing an assault and 
possessing a weapon in his vehicle.  Both were violations of Everett’s probation.  
Upon arriving at the scene, Baker conducted his own independent investigation.  
When he asked Everett if he had a weapon in the vehicle, Everett became nervous 
and began acting out of character.8  Moreover, Baker requested and received 
                                          
 
5 Donald v. State, 903 A.2d 315, 319 (Del. 2006). 
6 Id.; Bunting v. State, 907 A.2d 145 (Del. 2006) (TABLE). 
7 Donald, 903 A.2d at 319; Bunting, 907 A.2d at 145. 
8 Baker testified as follows:  
I asked Patrick what was going on, if there was a weapon in the car.  And having 
a good rapport with him, I expected him to answer me.  He didn’t.  He was 
sweating profusely and just had a very scared look in his eyes. . . .  That gave me 
the impression that, you know, there was probably a weapon in the car because of 
the rapport I had developed with him in a year and half of supervising him.” 
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permission from his supervisor to perform the search.  Under the totality of the 
circumstances, Baker’s search of Everett’s vehicle was in substantial compliance 
with DOC regulations and reasonable.  The Superior Court did not err when it 
denied Everett’s motion to suppress. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/Henry duPont Ridgely  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice