Title: People v. Mendoza
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S065467
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: November 10, 2011

1 
Filed 11/10/11 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S065467 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
RONALD BRUCE MENDOZA, 
) 
Super. Ct. No. KA 032117 
 
) 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
 
____________________________________) 
 
A jury convicted defendant Ronald Bruce Mendoza of first degree murder 
(Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)),1 and found true the allegation that he personally 
used a firearm in commission of the murder (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)).  The jury also 
found true the three special-circumstance allegations that defendant intentionally 
killed a police officer (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(7)), that he committed murder for the 
purpose of avoiding a lawful arrest (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(5)), and that he 
intentionally killed the victim by means of lying in wait (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)).  
Thereafter the jury returned a verdict of death.  At the sentencing hearing, the trial 
court struck the lying-in-wait special circumstance and then entered a judgment of 
death.  Appeal to this court is automatic.  (§ 1239, subd. (b).) 
                                              
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 
indicated. 
2 
Because the trial court had no authority to strike a special circumstance 
found by the jury, we reinstate the lying-in-wait special circumstance.  As so 
modified, the judgment of death is affirmed. 
I.  FACTS 
A. The Guilt Phase 
At approximately 1:30 a.m. on May 11, 1996, defendant shot Pomona 
Police Officer Daniel Tim Fraembs in the face and killed him.  The evidence 
included the testimony of an eyewitness to the shooting, defendant‟s pager found 
at the crime scene, testimonial and physical evidence linking defendant to the 
purchase of the murder weapon and ammunition, and telephone conversations 
between defendant and his mother, tape-recorded with court approval. 
1. The Prosecution Case 
Defendant, also known as “Boxer,” was a member of the Happy Town 
street gang.  In November 1995, defendant was released on parole from a 
California Youth Authority facility (CYA facility; now Div. of Juvenile Facilities).  
As two of the conditions of parole, he was not to possess any deadly weapon and 
was not to knowingly associate with gang members.  Defendant was informed that 
violation of a parole condition could result in his return to a CYA facility, where 
he would face 575 days, plus an additional one year in custody for possession of a 
weapon.  Defendant signed a form stating he understood the parole conditions. 
Testimony from Jason Meyers and Dean Coleman established that about 
two weeks before Officer Fraembs‟s murder, Meyers drove defendant to 
Coleman‟s residence, where defendant purchased a Haskell .45-caliber handgun 
from Coleman for $150 or $155.  Meyers agreed to buy bullets for the gun, 
because defendant did not have the required California driver‟s license or 
identification card to do so.  They went to a Big 5 Sporting Goods store, where 
3 
Meyers used defendant‟s money to purchase a green and yellow box of Remington 
.45-caliber bullets. 
Johanna Flores was 19 years old at the time of the 1997 trial.  Her 
nickname was “Goon,” but she did not belong to any gang.  Flores had been in a 
romantic relationship with defendant and was with him when he shot Officer 
Fraembs. She testified as the key witness against defendant regarding the events of 
the night leading up to the murder. 
Flores testified that on May 10, 1996, after her work shift ended at 11:00 
p.m., she went with Chantal Cesena to the Pomona home of a Happy Town gang 
member named “Tank,” where Flores saw defendant and another gang member 
named Jasper.  Defendant wore black jeans, a white shirt, and a black bomber-
style jacket with orange lining, small pockets, and a front zipper.  Defendant, 
Flores, Jasper, and Chantal Cesena sat talking together for a while.  At some point, 
Chantal Cesena received a call from her relative, Joseph “Sparky” Cesena, asking 
her to pick him up.2  Chantal declined, saying she had to do something else. 
At a later point, defendant and Flores argued over a page defendant 
received from Brandy Valore, the mother of his child.  Flores punched defendant 
on his left side, hitting a gun tucked into his waistband.  Flores saw the gun when 
defendant removed it from his waistband to check it.  She had seen defendant with 
this gun before; he said it was a .45-caliber gun. 
After things calmed down between defendant and Flores, they both spoke 
with Sparky by telephone.  Defendant and Sparky agreed to meet by the railroad 
tracks, and Flores decided to go along.  When they left Tank‟s house, defendant 
was carrying his gun and his pager. 
                                              
2  
Henceforth we will refer to the two Cesenas by the names used at trial:  
Chantal and Sparky. 
4 
On their way to the railroad tracks, defendant and Flores encountered a man 
and two women (Jason Meyers, Cherie Hernandez, and Elva Arambula) who were 
walking from the opposite direction.  When one of the women (Hernandez) gave 
defendant a cigarette and lit it for him, Flores got mad and cursed and slapped 
defendant.3  The two groups separated, and defendant and Flores continued toward 
the railroad tracks.  As they neared the tracks, Sparky appeared from a small 
pathway through some bushes.  Sparky wore gray khaki pants, a white shirt, and a 
gray and black striped sweater.  He had a knife. 
As the three walked back to Tank‟s house, a bright light turned on behind 
them.  Defendant looked over his left shoulder and said, “Oh, shit, the jura.”  
“Jura” meant “cops.”  A police car stopped behind them, and Officer Fraembs 
exited the vehicle.  Defendant said, “Oh, shit.  I got the gun.”  Flores told 
defendant to run, because she did not want him to “get in trouble” or “do anything 
stupid.”  Sparky also told him to run.  Defendant stayed put. 
Officer Fraembs asked, “How are you guys doing tonight?”  Flores 
described Fraembs as “real nice” and not like other police officers who were mean 
or sarcastic.  She thought Fraembs might have stopped them “for curfew check, 
nothing major.”  Defendant responded to Fraembs‟s inquiry with “an attitude,” 
saying something like, “What the hell are you stopping us for” or “What are you 
stopping us for.”  Defendant was being “rude” and “a jerk.”  At that point, 
Fraembs told defendant and Flores to “have a seat right there,” indicating the curb.  
                                              
3  
Flores did not know the names of these individuals, but Meyers and 
Arambula also testified about the encounter.  Arambula further testified that, after 
her preliminary hearing testimony, she received what she perceived to be a threat, 
although defendant was not the person who made the threat. 
5 
He called Sparky, who was wearing a knife sheath and was nearest to him, over to 
the patrol car.  Sparky put his hands on the hood, and Fraembs stood behind him. 
As Officer Fraembs started patting down Sparky, defendant slowly moved 
behind Flores and draped his left arm over her shoulder while leaving his right 
hand free.  Defendant was standing very close behind Flores, with his chest 
against her back, and leaning forward as they moved toward the street.  He slowly 
pushed her forward, forcing her to step off the curb into the street.  Flores felt 
defendant slide his hand down between himself and the small of her back as he 
continued to move her toward Fraembs, who was still patting down Sparky.  When 
they got within six or seven feet of Fraembs, defendant pushed Flores aside. 
At that point, Flores turned back to look at defendant and saw him with his 
arms stretched out and both hands holding the gun.  He took another step or two 
toward Officer Fraembs, and pointed the gun at the officer‟s upper body from a 
distance of about two and a half feet.  Defendant fired once, shooting Fraembs in 
the face. 
Immediately afterward, defendant turned the gun on Flores and asked, “Are 
you going to say anything?”  Flores replied, “No, I didn‟t see nothing, I didn‟t hear 
nothing, I don‟t know nothing.”  Flores took defendant‟s threat seriously, and 
when he repeated his question, she repeated she didn‟t hear, see, or know 
anything. 
Defendant told Flores to run, then he took off running.  Flores starting 
running behind defendant, but soon lost sight of him.  Defendant did not look back 
at Flores and did not wait for her to catch up to him.  Sparky had already run 
away, back toward the bushes from which he had earlier emerged. 
As Flores ran, she began hearing sirens and ran faster.  She reached her 
home, but did not sleep.  She did not call 911 or the police to report the shooting, 
6 
because she was afraid defendant and his gang would do something to her.  At 
sunrise, Flores told her sister what had happened. 
Early in the morning of May 11, 1996, Flores called defendant at his home.  
His brother Angel, who belonged to the Happy Town gang and was known as 
“Bandit,” answered.  Angel said something threatening to Flores, then handed the 
phone to defendant.  When Flores asked how defendant was, he replied, “I‟m fine.  
I‟m a killer.”  Defendant said he didn‟t give a fuck, and “It‟s just another day in 
the hood.”  Defendant asked Flores about his pager and told her, “I think I lost it 
over there.” 
Later that day or the following day, Flores told her parents what happened.  
Her father spoke with their family priest, Father Charles Gard, who offered to 
speak with Flores.  On May 15, 1996, Flores told Gard about the shooting and 
defendant‟s involvement.  She was “very upset” and “very distraught,” yet “very 
confident in what she was saying.”4  Gard persuaded Flores to talk to the police. 
Two homicide detectives interviewed Flores at Father Gard‟s church.  At 
first Flores did not tell the detectives about Chantal and Jasper being at Tank‟s 
house before the shooting.  Chantal was Flores‟s good friend and Flores did not 
want anything to happen to her.  Flores was also afraid that Jasper might do 
“something” if she said he was there.  But even though Flores had been threatened 
by both defendant and his brother, she ultimately decided to testify because she 
believed that what defendant did was wrong, and that he had the chance to run 
away but did not do so.  At Flores‟s request, however, the Pomona Police 
Department relocated her and her family. 
                                              
4  
Flores spoke to Father Gard in confidence because she feared retaliation.  
She eventually gave him permission to testify regarding her statements. 
7 
Evidence at the crime scene corroborated Flores‟s testimony and 
statements.  Officer Fraembs was found shot in the face, with his gun secured in 
its snapped-shut holster and his baton still attached to his belt.  A spent shell 
casing was on the ground about 12 feet from the body, and an expended bullet lay 
in the grass about 40 to 50 feet away.  A senior criminalist with the sheriff‟s 
department testified that the casing was made by Remington Peters and designed 
for a .45-caliber semiautomatic weapon, and was consistent with the expended 
bullet.  The criminalist‟s examination of these items indicated that the projectile 
could have been fired from a Haskell .45-caliber semiautomatic weapon.  
Additionally, defendant‟s pager was found at the scene. 
In a search of defendant‟s residence, police found a green and yellow 
Remington .45-caliber ammunition box bearing a Big 5 Sporting Goods price tag 
in the bedroom occupied by defendant‟s mother and Harry Lukens.  The box 
contained one .32-caliber bullet and an otherwise empty plastic ammunition tray, 
on which defendant‟s left thumbprint was found.  A black nylon camera lens case 
containing 17 Remington .45-caliber bullets was recovered from a trash can in the 
enclosed back yard.  Lukens identified the lens case as his, but not the bullets.  He 
had not seen the case for a year and did not know how it got into the trash can. 
Defendant made incriminating statements after the murder.  He initially 
sold the murder weapon to Joseph Silva for $100, telling him, “Hey, did you know 
I killed a cop?”  Defendant later decided to get the gun back and told Silva, in a 
police-recorded telephone conversation, “I‟m gonna have somebody come and 
pick it up from you man . . . .  I can‟t have that in Pomona.”  Around that time, a 
Happy Town gang member named “Casper” warned Silva that he and his entire 
family would be killed if Silva were to testify that defendant admitted shooting a 
police officer.  Defendant‟s brother Angel retrieved the gun from Silva. 
8 
While defendant was in custody, the court approved the recording of his 
telephone conversations with his mother, Lola Delgado.  On May 22, 1996, 
defendant told his mother to burn a certain jacket.  Although the statements in that 
conversation were not entirely clear, defendant apparently was referring to the 
jacket he wore the night of the murder, a black and orange jacket with tiny 
pockets.  On May 24, 1996, defendant told his mother he wanted “Goon” (Flores) 
to be told she “better realize what she‟s doing.”  After complaining that Goon was 
“suppose to be gang” but “now she‟s fucking crumbling down,” defendant told his 
mother, “we gotta do something” because “if she‟s a witness, I‟m gonna be gone.”  
Defendant also warned that “as far as she‟s willing to go, the police ain‟t going to 
protect her.” 
2. The Defense Case 
Rupert Bascomb, a private security guard, testified he was on duty at a 
company at the time and near the scene of the murder.  He observed a police car 
cruise by “real slow” and then drive out of sight.  Shortly thereafter, Bascomb 
heard a gunshot and then a woman‟s voice say, “Let‟s get out of here” or “Let‟s 
move from here.”  He thought he saw two possibly male figures wearing dark 
clothing run toward an incinerator behind a building.  One had something in his 
hand. 
The defense sought to undermine Johanna Flores‟s credibility and to 
establish her bias against defendant.  It also argued that if the jury believed 
defendant was the shooter, it should find he did not act with premeditation.  
Finally, the defense contended that Officer Fraembs did not act lawfully when he 
stopped and detained defendant, Sparky, and Flores. 
9 
B. The Penalty Phase 
1. The Prosecution Case 
The prosecution presented evidence that on July 30, 1994, Ryan Schultz 
and his girlfriend drove to a house in Pomona to smoke marijuana and “get high” 
with some friends.  While Schultz was inside the house, more than 10 gunshots 
were fired outside.  Schultz went outside and saw that his brand new 1994 Ford 
Thunderbird had been “shot up.”  Three or four individuals, including defendant, 
were standing by Schultz‟s car, and defendant was holding an M-1 military rifle.  
Schultz ran back into the house, followed by defendant and his companions.  
Defendant used his rifle to hit Schultz in the face and on the side of the head.  
Schultz fell to the ground and was beaten.  Afterward, defendant “basically” told 
Schultz to “get the fuck out the house before we kill you.”  Schultz suffered 
injuries to his head, face, and arms; his jewelry and money were taken. 
The prosecution also presented victim impact testimony from Officer 
Fraembs‟s adoptive mother and sister, and from two police officers who had 
worked and formed close friendships with him. 
2. The Defense Case 
Defendant‟s aunt testified regarding defendant‟s family and his care by his 
grandparents while his mother was in prison.  His aunt was “very surprised” to 
learn of his involvement in the killing of a police officer, and asked the jury to 
consider defendant‟s daughter and family. 
Brandy Valore, the mother of defendant‟s baby daughter, testified she was 
first attracted to defendant because he had “good manners” and was “real polite, 
very intelligent.”  Valore said defendant loved his daughter and asked the jury to 
spare his life for his daughter‟s sake. 
10 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. Sufficiency of Premeditated and Deliberate Murder Evidence 
Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction 
of premeditated and deliberate first degree murder.  This claim is without merit for 
the reasons below. 
In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a jury‟s finding of 
premeditated and deliberate murder, a reviewing court considers the entire record 
in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it contains 
substantial evidence — that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid 
value — from which a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  (People v. Burney (2009) 47 Cal.4th 203, 253; People v. 
Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1124.)  When the circumstances reasonably justify 
the jury‟s findings, a reviewing court‟s opinion that the circumstances might also 
be reasonably reconciled with contrary findings does not warrant reversal of the 
judgment.  (Ibid.) 
“ „A verdict of deliberate and premeditated first degree murder requires 
more than a showing of intent to kill.  [Citation.]  “Deliberation” refers to careful 
weighing of considerations in forming a course of action; “premeditation” means 
thought over in advance.  [Citations.]‟  (People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 
1080.)  „ “Premeditation and deliberation can occur in a brief interval.  „The test is 
not time, but reflection.  “Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity and 
cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly.” ‟ ”  [Citation.]‟  (People v. 
Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 849; see People v. Harris (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1269, 
1286-1287.)”  (People v. Solomon (2010) 49 Cal.4th 792, 812.) 
In People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, we identified three types of 
evidence — evidence of planning activity, preexisting motive, and manner of 
11 
killing — that assist in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting 
findings of premeditation and deliberation.  (People v. Solomon, supra, 49 Cal.4th 
at p. 812.)  We have made clear, however, that “ „Anderson did not purport to 
establish an exhaustive list that would exclude all other types and combinations of 
evidence that could support a finding of premeditation and deliberation.‟  
[Citations.]”  (Ibid.)  Using Anderson as a guide, we turn to the instant record. 
1. Planning Activity 
Defendant contends there was no evidence of a prior plan to kill or even 
meet Officer Fraembs, emphasizing it was Fraembs who initiated the early 
morning encounter.  Defendant also points to Flores‟s testimony that he was 
nervous after shooting the officer and acted like he did not know what he had just 
done; this, he claims, did not suggest he killed as the result of “preexisting 
reflection” rather than “mere unconsidered or rash impulse.”  (People v. Perez, 
supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1125.)  We are not convinced. 
In People v. Brady (2010) 50 Cal.4th 547, the defendant shot a police 
officer only a few minutes after the officer first shined his patrol vehicle‟s 
spotlight on the defendant‟s car.  In rejecting the argument that evidence of 
extensive planning was lacking, we found that a rational trier of fact could have 
concluded that the defendant, knowing he illegally possessed a firearm, rapidly 
and coldly formed the idea to use his firearm before the officer became aware of 
its existence.  (Id. at pp. 563-564; People v. Solomon, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 812 
[cold, calculated judgment may result from thoughts occurring in rapid 
succession].) 
Here, as in People v. Brady, the record contains substantial evidence that 
the killing did not result from an unconsidered or rash impulse.  Although 
defendant did not initiate the contact with Officer Fraembs, Flores‟s testimony 
12 
amply supported the inference that defendant devised a plan to kill Fraembs once 
the officer indicated he would conduct a weapons search.  As Fraembs began his 
patdown of Sparky, defendant acted as if he were complying with Fraembs‟s 
direction to sit down on the curb.  By using Flores as a shield and carefully 
controlling her movement, defendant was able to approach Fraembs without 
attracting attention and to maneuver himself to a position of advantage over the 
unsuspecting officer.  Once defendant got within six or seven feet of the officer, he 
was able to draw his gun while still screened by Flores.  Defendant then pushed 
her aside and quickly stepped even closer to Fraembs.  He took aim with both 
arms extended and shot the officer in the face.  Defendant‟s plan proved 
successful, as Fraembs was taken utterly by surprise and had no opportunity to 
reach for his own weapons. 
2. Preexisting Motive 
Defendant claims the prosecution failed to show a motive consistent with 
planning and deliberation, because the evidence was insufficient to prove he killed 
Officer Fraembs in order to avoid arrest and parole revocation.  We disagree. 
Although defendant was never heard to say he killed to avoid arrest and 
parole revocation, ample circumstantial evidence supported this point.  Defendant 
was on parole and subject to parole conditions that he not possess a weapon and 
not knowingly associate with gang members.  Having signed a form 
acknowledging the terms of his parole, defendant knew that a violation could 
result in his being returned to a correctional institution for 575 days, plus a 
possible additional year for the actual possession of a weapon. 
The evidence of defendant‟s parole conditions provided context to his 
murderous action.  A month or two before the shooting, defendant told Flores he 
was on parole and “didn‟t want to go back” or “couldn‟t go back” to jail.  More 
13 
critically, on the night of the murder, defendant told Sparky to “hurry up” and 
meet him by the railroad tracks “because I‟m strapped,” meaning defendant was 
carrying a gun, and “I don‟t want to get busted.”  When Officer Fraembs pulled up 
behind defendant, Sparky, and Flores, defendant said, “Oh, shit, the jura [cops]” 
and “Oh, shit.  I got the gun.”  Both Sparky and Flores told defendant to run, but 
he did not do so.  Instead, defendant was “rude” and acted like a “jerk” in 
challenging Fraembs.  Fraembs responded by conducting a weapons search, 
presumably for officer safety reasons. 
As the prosecution told the jury during closing argument, it was reasonable 
to infer from this evidence that once Officer Fraembs started to pat down Sparky, 
defendant figured his turn would be next.  Given the evidence of Fraembs‟s 
actions and defendant‟s knowledge that his gun possession violated his parole 
conditions, a rational jury could conclude that defendant‟s motive for killing the 
officer was to avoid arrest and a resulting return to custody.  (See, e.g., People v. 
Vorise (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 312, 318-319, 322 [rational jury could conclude that 
defendant shot victim to avoid lawful arrest, where evidence showed defendant 
drew his weapon and fired after hearing victim‟s wife say she was going to call 
police].) 
3. Manner of Killing 
Defendant concedes that a single shot to the head might support the 
inference of a deliberate intent to kill.  We agree.  (E.g., People v. Caro (1988) 
46 Cal.3d 1035, 1050 [“a close-range gunshot to the face is arguably sufficiently 
„particular and exacting‟ to permit an inference that defendant was acting 
according to a preconceived design”].)  Defendant argues, however, that “there are 
absolutely no facts to support planning activity” on his part.  We could not 
disagree more. 
14 
None of the evidence suggested that defendant fired his weapon in a rash or 
panicked reaction to Officer Fraembs‟s appearance on the scene; indeed, all the 
evidence pointed to the contrary.  Although defendant was startled when Fraembs 
first pulled up, he refused to flee and instead opted to confront the officer.  When 
Fraembs indicated he would conduct a weapons search, defendant reacted in a 
cool and focused manner:  he contrived to act as if he were following Fraembs‟s 
instruction to take a seat on the curb, but in actuality he formed a plan to approach 
and shoot Fraembs while the officer was distracted with Sparky.  Because the 
manner of killing reflected stealth and precision, a rational jury could conclude 
that a preconceived design was behind the killing.  (See People v. Halvorsen 
(2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 422 [victims shot in the head or neck from within a few 
feet]; People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 232 [noting the calm, cool, and 
focused manner of the subject shootings].) 
In sum, the evidence of planning, motive, and manner of killing was 
compelling and amply supported a finding of premeditation and deliberation. 
B. Sufficiency of Lying-in-wait Evidence 
Following presentation of the prosecution‟s case-in-chief, defendant moved 
for a judgment of acquittal.  (§ 1118.1.)  As relevant here, defendant argued the 
evidence was insufficient to support the charge of first degree murder by means of 
lying in wait and the lying-in-wait special-circumstance allegation, primarily 
because it did not show a substantial period of watching and waiting for an 
opportune time to act.  The trial court denied this motion.  Subsequently, 
defendant objected to the giving of instructions on lying-in-wait first degree 
murder (CALJIC No. 8.25) and on the lying-in-wait special circumstance 
(CALJIC No. 8.81.15).  He also requested that the court, pursuant to section 1385, 
15 
strike the allegation or disallow prosecution argument on these theories.  The court 
overruled the objection and denied the request. 
After the jury rendered its guilt and death verdicts, defendant moved for a 
new trial and for modification of the verdict or reduction of the penalty.  As 
relevant here, he reiterated his contentions concerning the lying-in-wait evidence.  
The trial court denied defendant‟s motions, but agreed the evidence of waiting and 
watching was insubstantial as a matter of law.  Relying specifically on section 
1385, the court struck the lying-in-wait special circumstance.5 
On appeal, both defendant and the People have complaints on this matter.  
Defendant asserts the reading of jury instructions on lying-in-wait first degree 
murder and the lying-in-wait special circumstance was error and violated his state 
and federal constitutional rights to due process and reliable guilt and penalty 
determinations.  He further argues that the first degree murder conviction cannot 
be sustained on a lying-in-wait theory, and that the lying-in-wait special 
circumstance should remain stricken.  Conversely, the People seek reinstatement 
of the lying-in-wait special circumstance, contending it was supported by 
sufficient evidence and the trial court lacked the authority to strike it.  We address 
defendant‟s arguments first. 
1. Requirements of Lying in Wait 
The principles governing our analysis are settled.  “ „The requirements of 
lying in wait for first degree murder under Penal Code section 189 are “slightly 
different” from the lying-in-wait special circumstance under Penal Code section 
                                              
5  
The trial court used the terms “striking” and “dismissing” interchangeably 
to describe its ruling on the lying-in-wait special circumstance.  For purposes of 
our discussion, we discern no difference between the two terms and shall refer to 
the court‟s action as “striking” the special circumstance. 
16 
190.2, subdivision (a)(15).  [Citation.] . . .  We focus on the special circumstance 
because it contains the more stringent requirements.  [Citation.]  If, as we find, the 
evidence supports the special circumstance, it necessarily supports the theory of 
first degree murder.  [¶] The lying-in-wait special circumstance requires “an 
intentional murder, committed under circumstances which include (1) 
concealment of purpose, (2) a substantial period of watching and waiting for an 
opportune time to act, and (3) immediately thereafter, a surprise attack on an 
unsuspecting victim from a position of advantage . . . .”  [Citations.]‟ ”  (People v. 
Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 22.) 
We have explained the elements of the lying-in-wait special circumstance 
as follows.  “ „ “The element of concealment is satisfied by a showing „ “that a 
defendant‟s true intent and purpose were concealed by his actions or conduct.  It is 
not required that he be literally concealed from view before he attacks the 
victim.” ‟ ”  [Citation.]‟ ”  (People v. Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 22.)  As for the 
watching and waiting element, the purpose of this requirement “is to distinguish 
those cases in which a defendant acts insidiously from those in which he acts out 
of rash impulse.  [Citation.]  This period need not continue for any particular 
length „ “of time provided that its duration is such as to show a state of mind 
equivalent to premeditation or deliberation.” ‟  [Citation.]”  (People v. Stevens 
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 182, 202, fn. omitted.)6  “The factors of concealing murderous 
                                              
6  
In People v. Stevens, supra, 41 Cal.4th 182, we made clear that, although 
the first degree murder formulation refers to “by means of” lying in wait and the 
pre-2000 definition of the special circumstance referred to “while” lying in wait, 
such difference did not change “the principle that for a murder conviction and for 
a special circumstance finding the lying in wait need not continue for any 
particular period of time provided that its duration is such as to show a state of 
mind equivalent to premeditation or deliberation.”  (Id. at p. 202, fn. 11.) 
17 
intent, and striking from a position of advantage and surprise, „are the hallmark of 
a murder by lying in wait.‟  [Citation.]”  (Stevens, at p. 202.) 
Defendant first claims the evidence was insufficient to prove a “substantial” 
period of watching and waiting for a favorable or opportune time to act, because 
the entire encounter was “fleeting” and it was “only a matter of seconds” until the 
shooting occurred. 
As defendant acknowledges, we have never fixed a minimum time period 
for this requirement.  Indeed, “ „[t]he precise period of time is . . . not critical,‟ ” so 
long as the period of watchful waiting is “ „substantial.‟ ”  (People v. Moon, supra, 
37 Cal.4th at p. 23 [“a few minutes can suffice”]; see People v. Edwards (1991) 
54 Cal.3d 787, 825-826 [wait was “a matter of minutes”].) 
Here, it may be that only a few minutes elapsed between the time Officer 
Fraembs pulled up in his car and the time of the shooting.  Nonetheless, a rational 
jury could find that defendant, who was carrying a gun in knowing violation of his 
parole conditions, decided at or near the outset of the encounter that he would kill 
the officer rather than face a certain return to custody.  As the trial testimony 
reflected, when Fraembs drove up, defendant ignored the suggestions of both 
Flores and Sparky to simply flee the scene.  At the point Fraembs exited his car to 
question them, defendant rudely challenged the officer, but did not panic or 
immediately reach for his gun and shoot.  Instead, as Fraembs began a patsearch of 
Sparky after directing defendant and Flores to sit on the curb, defendant positioned 
himself behind Flores so that his right arm was hidden from the officer‟s view.  He 
then controlled her movements in order to approach the officer without attracting 
attention.  Once they were close enough that defendant could not miss hitting 
Fraembs, he pushed Flores aside, drew his weapon, and stepped even closer to the 
officer before firing.  On this record, a rational jury could conclude that defendant 
did not react impulsively to Fraembs‟s appearance at the scene, but that he 
18 
watched Fraembs for a substantial period as he not only waited for, but 
affirmatively engineered, the opportune moment to launch a surprise attack.7 
Defendant next contends there was insufficient evidence establishing the 
other lying-in-wait requirements of concealment of purpose and a surprise attack 
on an unsuspecting victim from a position of advantage.  We disagree.  Although 
Officer Fraembs was certainly aware of defendant‟s physical presence, the 
evidence reflected that defendant managed to conceal his murderous purpose so 
well that he took the officer completely by surprise when he fired the single deadly 
shot at close range.  From this evidence, a rational jury could infer that defendant 
did not kill out of rash impulse, but rather in a purposeful manner that required 
stealth and maneuvering to gain a position of advantage over the unsuspecting 
officer.  (See People v. Russell (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1228, 1245 [defendant “shot at 
the officers from a position of advantage before the officers had time to even draw 
their weapons”]; People v. Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 22-23; see also People 
v. Stevens, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 203 [substantial evidence of premeditation and 
deliberation dispels inference that killing resulted from a rash impulse].)8 
                                              
7  
Flores told the police in a pretrial interview that defendant had “panicked” 
when Officer Fraembs stopped the three.  At trial, she clarified that defendant 
appeared panicked when he first saw the light from the police car, but then moved 
slowly and deliberately as described above.  After shooting Fraembs, however, 
defendant appeared scared he would be caught. 
 
8  
Defendant claims that Officer Fraembs was not unsuspecting and not 
attacked from a position of advantage because Fraembs knew he was in a hostile 
environment and took protective action by conducting a patsearch.  We disagree.  
Although Fraembs decided to take precautionary action, the police who responded 
to the shooting found him with his gun secured in its holster and his baton still 
attached to his belt.  From this evidence, a rational jury could conclude that 
defendant took Fraembs completely by surprise. 
19 
Finally, defendant asserts his actions were not of the same character as 
those found to constitute lying in wait in other cases, e.g., he did not wait for a 
victim to arrive at a chosen location, or follow or lure a victim to a particular spot, 
or murder a victim in his sleep.  No matter.  Because each case necessarily 
depends on its own facts, and because defendant‟s conduct clearly satisfied each 
of the lying-in-wait requirements, the attempt to contrast this case with others falls 
short.  (See People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 516 [comparing facts of 
different cases did not demonstrate the insufficiency of premeditation evidence in 
the case at hand].)  
Having determined that substantial evidence supported the lying-in-wait 
special-circumstance finding, we conclude the evidence necessarily supported the 
conviction of lying-in-wait first degree murder.  (People v. Moon, supra, 
37 Cal.4th at p. 24.)  Accordingly, the trial court did not err or violate defendant‟s 
constitutional rights when it allowed the prosecution to present its lying-in-wait 
theory and instructed the jury accordingly.  Nor did the jury act unreasonably in 
returning a first degree murder conviction and a true finding on the lying-in-wait 
special-circumstance allegation.  No reversal is warranted. 
2. Authority to Strike the Special Circumstance 
We now address the trial court‟s section 1385 ruling.  The People contend 
that, once the jury found the lying-in-wait special circumstance to be true, the trial 
court could not strike or dismiss it pursuant to section 1385.  We agree. 
Section 1385 generally authorizes a judge to order an action dismissed in 
furtherance of justice.  (§ 1385, subd. (a).)  However, section 1385.1 provides:  
“Notwithstanding Section 1385 or any other provision of law, a judge shall not 
strike or dismiss any special circumstance which . . . is found by a jury or court as 
provided in Sections 190.1 to 190.5, inclusive.”  In light of section 1385.1, the 
20 
court had no authority to strike the lying-in-wait special circumstance.  (People v. 
Lewis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 214, 228; People v. Johnwell (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 
1267, 1283.) 
In its brief, the People requested that we reinstate the lying-in-wait special 
circumstance pursuant to section 1260.9  In his reply brief, defendant objected to 
review of the section 1385 ruling on the ground that the People could not and did 
not separately appeal it.  In light of the parties‟ contentions, we invited 
supplemental briefing on whether review of the trial court‟s ruling is appropriate 
under section 1252, which provides in part:  “On an appeal by a defendant, the 
appellate court shall, in addition to the issues raised by the defendant, consider and 
pass upon all rulings of the trial court adverse to the State which it may be 
requested to pass upon by the Attorney General.” 
Defendant advances three reasons why section 1252 does not provide a 
basis for the People to obtain appellate review of the trial court‟s ruling.  First, he 
contends that the People‟s only remedy for obtaining review in this type of 
circumstance is to petition for writ of mandate in the Court of Appeal (Code Civ. 
Proc., § 1085),10 and that here, the People‟s failure to do so bars our review of the 
issue.  Second, defendant asserts that, even if review is appropriate at this time, 
section 1385.1 did not prevent the trial court‟s action.  Third, he argues that 
                                              
9  
Section 1260 provides:  “The court may reverse, affirm, or modify a 
judgment or order appealed from, or reduce the degree of the offense or attempted 
offense or the punishment imposed, and may set aside, affirm, or modify any or all 
of the proceedings subsequent to, or dependent upon, such judgment or order, and 
may, if proper, order a new trial and may, if proper, remand the cause to the trial 
court for such further proceedings as may be just under the circumstances.” 
 
10  
Defendant claims the state could not file a separate appeal of this issue 
pursuant to section 1238. 
21 
permitting the People to obtain review under section 1252 would violate his due 
process rights.  For the reasons below, none of this is persuasive. 
Section 1252 is broadly worded and allows an appellate court, on appeal by 
a defendant, to “consider and pass upon all rulings of the trial court adverse to the 
State which it may be requested to pass upon by the Attorney General.”  (Italics 
added.)  Contrary to defendant‟s position, the statutory language does not suggest 
that section 1252 may be used only when writ relief has been sought and denied.  
Nor has any decision so held. 
While there is some merit to the contention that section 1252 should be 
subject to reasonable limitations, our application of the statute in this case is 
essentially consistent with its application in People v. Braeseke (1979) 25 Cal.3d 
691.  There, the trial court suppressed the defendant‟s first confession to police but 
admitted the rest of the challenged evidence against him.  (Id. at pp. 697-698.)  On 
appeal, the defendant contended that the admitted evidence should have been 
excluded because it was the product of the first confession, which was suppressed 
as unlawfully obtained.  After noting the People could not have appealed the order 
suppressing the first confession, Braeseke determined it would be “patently 
unreasonable” to bar the People from seeking its review under section 1252, 
because if the trial court erred in ruling the first confession was inadmissible, it 
would follow that the challenged evidence was admissible even though based 
upon erroneous reasoning.  (Braeseke, at p. 700.)  Accordingly, Braeseke 
concluded that “the People may, on an appeal by the defendant and pursuant to the 
provisions of section 1252, obtain review of allegedly erroneous rulings by the 
trial court in order to secure an affirmance of the judgment of conviction.”  (Id. at 
p. 701, italics added, fn. omitted.) 
Consistent with People v. Braeseke, supra, 25 Cal.3d 691, we hold that 
section 1252 permits the People to seek review and correction of a trial court‟s 
22 
erroneous striking of a special circumstance in a capital appeal.  We do so because 
defendant‟s narrower interpretation of the statute could lead to the invalidation of 
a death judgment if this court or a federal court were to conclude, for whatever 
reason, that other non-struck special-circumstance findings in a case cannot stand, 
or that the invalidity of one or more special circumstances in such a case would 
require reversal of a death judgment.  When the evidence and the law support a 
struck special-circumstance finding, allowing the People to seek review of a trial 
court‟s clear violation of section 1385.1 will help ensure that a defendant‟s death 
judgment will not be set aside for any error unless “a miscarriage of justice” has 
occurred.  (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.)  Accordingly, we conclude that the People‟s 
failure to separately appeal or petition for writ review of the erroneous striking of 
the lying-in-wait special circumstance stands as no bar to our consideration of the 
matter, or to the exercise of our statutory power under section 1260. 
Defendant contends that, even if review is appropriate at this time, section 
1385.1 is intended to prevent a court from striking a jury‟s special circumstance 
finding only when the striking would alter the defendant‟s sentence.  Here, he 
emphasizes, the death sentence remained unaffected by the court‟s action.  We are 
not convinced. 
The language of section 1385.1 is unambiguous in the breadth of its 
application:  “Notwithstanding Section 1385 or any other provision of law, a judge 
shall not strike or dismiss any special circumstance which is admitted by a plea of 
guilty or nolo contendere or is found by a jury or court as provided in Sections 
190.1 to 190.5, inclusive.”  Defendant‟s proposed limitation, which finds no 
23 
support in the statutory language or in the ballot materials pertaining to its 
enactment, must be rejected.11 
Defendant next contends that application of section 1252 would violate his 
due process rights.  This contention, however, is based on the erroneous 
assumption that the statute does not authorize review where, as here, the People 
first sought review of trial court‟s action in the respondent‟s brief.  Indeed, any 
issue raised pursuant to section 1252 is, by its nature, properly raised in the 
respondent‟s brief.  Moreover, defendant‟s opening brief cited section 1385.1 with 
respect to the trial court‟s striking of the lying-in-wait special circumstance; 
therefore, he cannot claim surprise or late notice regarding this purely legal issue.  
Defendant also seems to have anticipated controversy concerning the trial court‟s 
action, for he fully briefed the issue whether sufficient evidence supported the 
lying-in-wait special circumstance. 
Finally, defendant argues that if section 1385.1 deprived the trial court of 
authority to strike the lying-in-wait special circumstance under section 1385, the 
matter should be remanded to allow that court to address its concerns pursuant to 
section 190.4 or section 1181,12 or under compulsion of the state and federal 
                                              
11  
Defendant bases his interpretation on Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 
53 Cal.3d 282.  Tapia stated in a footnote that section 1385.1 “appears to be a 
direct response to our opinion in People v. Williams (1981) 30 Cal.3d 470,” in 
which we held that a trial court had power to dismiss a special circumstance 
finding in order to modify the particular defendant‟s sentence of life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole.  (Tapia, at pp. 298-299, fn. 17.)  Even if Tapia 
was correct in noting that Williams prompted the enactment of section 1385.1, 
there appears no basis for restricting the statute‟s application to the context at issue 
in Williams. 
 
12  
As relevant to defendant‟s contentions, section 190.4, subdivision (e), 
provides that in every case where a death verdict is rendered, the trial court must 
review the evidence and determine “whether the jury‟s findings and verdicts that 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
24 
Constitutions.  We see no basis for a remand.  Among other things, our 
determination that sufficient evidence supports the lying-in-wait special 
circumstance means that the trial court would have no statutory or constitutional 
basis for modifying the verdict or ordering a new trial based on the perceived 
insufficiency of such evidence. 
Having concluded that the trial court had no authority to strike a special 
circumstance, we reinstate the lying-in-wait special circumstance pursuant to our 
statutory power under section 1260. 
C. Absence of Instruction Requiring Unanimous Agreement on 
Theory of Murder 
The trial court did not instruct the jury that it had to unanimously agree on 
which if any statutory form of murder he committed (premeditated and deliberate 
or lying in wait).  Relying on Schad v. Arizona (1991) 501 U.S. 624 and 
Richardson v. United States (1999) 526 U.S. 813, defendant contends the failure to 
do so was error and violated his state and federal constitutional rights to due 
process, to have the state establish proof of first degree murder beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and to a reliable guilt determination. 
We have repeatedly rejected this identical contention (e.g., People v. 
Russell, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 1256-1257; People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 
1158, 1221; People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 824), and defendant offers 
no persuasive basis on which to revisit our conclusions. 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances are contrary 
to law or the evidence presented.”  Section 1181, paragraph 6, provides that the 
trial court may grant a defendant‟s application for a new trial “[w]hen the verdict 
or finding is contrary to law or evidence . . . .” 
25 
D. Sufficiency of the Evidence Supporting the Special Circumstance 
Allegations of Murder of a Police Officer and Murder to Avoid a 
Lawful Arrest 
At the close of the prosecution‟s case-in-chief, defendant challenged the 
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the special circumstance allegations of 
murder of a police officer (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(7)) (section 190.2(a)(7)) and murder 
to avoid a lawful arrest (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(5)) (section 190.2(a)(5)).  Relying on 
section 1118.1, defendant moved to strike these two special circumstances on the 
ground that, as a matter of law, Officer Fraembs was not acting lawfully in 
performing his duties when he was killed.13  The trial court denied defendant‟s 
motion, and also overruled his objection to the applicable jury instructions.  (See 
CALJIC Nos. 8.81.5, 8.81.7, 8.81.8.)  On appeal, defendant maintains the 
evidence was insufficient to prove that Fraembs‟s exercise of his duties was 
lawful. 
In ruling on a section 1118.1 motion, the trial court applies the same 
standard used by the appellate court “ „ “in reviewing the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support a conviction, that is, „whether from the evidence, including all 
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, there is any substantial evidence of 
the existence of each element of the offense charged.‟ ”  [Citation.]  “The purpose 
of a motion under section 1118.1 is to weed out as soon as possible those few 
instances in which the prosecution fails to make even a prima facie case.”  
                                              
13  
Strictly speaking, section 1118.1 provides that a defendant may move for “a 
judgment of acquittal of one or more of the offenses charged in the accusatory 
pleading if the evidence then before the court is insufficient to sustain a conviction 
of such offense or offenses on appeal.”  The People contest the merits of 
defendant‟s motion, but do not contend the motion cannot be used to strike special 
circumstance allegations.  Accordingly, we shall the analyze his claim under that 
code section.  (Accord, People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 160-161 
& fn. 18.) 
26 
[Citations.]  The question “is simply whether the prosecution has presented 
sufficient evidence to present the matter to the jury for its determination.”  
[Citation.]  The sufficiency of the evidence is tested at the point the motion is 
made.  [Citations.]  The question is one of law, subject to independent review.‟  
(People v. Stevens (2007) 41 Cal.4th 182, 200.)”  (People v. Lynch (2010) 
50 Cal.4th 693, 759.) 
1. Police Officer Murder:  Lawful Exercise of Duties 
As relevant here, section 190.2(a)(7) provides that a defendant is eligible 
for the death penalty when “[t]he victim was a peace officer . . . who, while 
engaged in the course of the performance of his or her duties, was intentionally 
killed, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that the victim 
was a peace officer engaged in the performance of his or her duties . . . .”  For 
purposes of this statute, “engaged in the course of the performance of his or her 
duties” means the officer must have been acting lawfully at the time the offense 
was committed.  (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1020 [officer‟s conduct 
must be objectively lawful, but defendant need not subjectively understand its 
legality]; People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 791; People v. Gonzalez 
(1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1218-1221.)  This special circumstance serves “to afford 
special protection to officers who risk their lives to protect the community.”  
(Jenkins, at p. 1021.) 
Here, the prosecution presented testimonial and physical evidence that 
established the following.  Officer Fraembs was in full uniform and driving in his 
marked patrol car at 1:30 a.m., when he saw two males and one female walking on 
a lonely industrial street.  Defendant was dressed in black pants with a black 
bomber-style jacket, and Sparky wore a baggy T-shirt and baggy pants with a 
27 
knife sheath attached to his belt.14  Although Fraembs was not alive to explain 
why he chose to make contact with the three pedestrians, certain inferences were 
reasonably drawn from the evidence.  As the prosecution reasoned in its closing 
argument to the jury, “It is 1:30 in the morning and [Fraembs] elected to find out 
what is going on with these three people. . . .  Are these three motorists that have 
been stranded and are looking for help?  Is this female who is in the presence of 
the two males, is she involuntarily in their company?  Are these three people who 
are lost?  Are these three people suspects who are looking for a vehicle to 
burglarize or perhaps a business to burglarize because, remember, this is an 
industrial street.  [¶] Officer Fraembs doesn‟t know.” 
Consistent with the theory that Officer Fraembs may have thought the three 
needed help, Johanna Flores testified that Fraembs was “real nice” when he asked, 
“How are you guys doing tonight?”  Flores seemed untroubled by the officer‟s 
approach, thinking the stop might have been “for curfew check, nothing major.”  
What happened next was significant.  Although Fraembs asked his question in a 
friendly and nonaccusatory manner, the male who was a “lot taller” than Fraembs 
responded with “an attitude,” saying something like, “What the hell are you 
stopping us for” or “What are you stopping us for.”  That male was defendant, 
who in Flores‟s words was acting “rude” and being “a jerk.”  The other male had a 
knife sheath hanging from his belt.15  Again, Fraembs was not alive to explain his 
                                              
14  
Police discovered a knife in the vicinity in which Sparky was found after 
the murder.  The knife fit into Sparky‟s sheath. 
 
15  
At the hearing on defendant‟s motion to strike, the trial court stated its 
belief that Officer Fraembs observed the knife and knife sheath on Sparky‟s 
person, and that Fraembs “apparently was looking to see what weapons, if any, 
Sparky had, in addition to a knife that might hurt him . . . .”  Substantial evidence 
supported that belief as well as the court‟s decision to submit the matter to the 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
28 
actions, but Flores testified that, at that juncture, he told defendant and Flores to 
“have a seat right there” on the curb.  Fraembs called Sparky, the male nearest to 
him, with the baggy clothes and knife, over to the patrol car.  Sparky put his hands 
on the hood, and Fraembs stood behind him and started conducting a patsearch. 
The question is whether, on this record, the evidence was sufficient to 
prove that Officer Fraembs was acting lawfully when he was killed.  For the 
reasons below, we conclude the answer is yes. 
As defendant concedes, Officer Fraembs initiated a lawful consensual 
encounter when he approached defendant and his companions to ask how they 
were doing.  (See Florida v. Royer (1983) 460 U.S. 491, 497 [“law enforcement 
officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an 
individual on the street or in another public place” or “by putting questions to him 
if the person is willing to listen”]; People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 328 
[consensual encounter found where officer approached the defendant at a crime 
scene, “inquired whether he could assist him, and posed basic and preliminary 
questions” in a nonaccusatory and routine manner to establish whether the 
defendant might possess information concerning the crime].)  Defendant, however, 
contends the consensual encounter ripened into an illegal detention when Fraembs 
directed Flores and him to take a seat on the curb and ordered Sparky to the patrol 
car for a patsearch. 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
jury, including photographic evidence showing that, when the police found Sparky 
just after the murder, a knife sheath hung from his belt.  On appeal, of course, we 
presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact 
could reasonably have deduced from the evidence.  (People v. Moon, supra, 
37 Cal.4th at p. 22.) 
29 
Unlike a consensual encounter, a detention is a seizure within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution; a seizure occurs when 
an officer restrains a person‟s liberty by force or show of authority.  (People v. 
Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 363, and cases cited.)  A consensual encounter may 
turn into a lawful detention when an individual‟s actions give the appearance of 
potential danger to the officer.  (People v. Rosales (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 325, 
330.)  “The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the 
issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be 
warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.”  (Terry v. 
Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 27; see Glaser, at p. 366; In re H.M. (2008) 167 
Cal.App.4th 136, 143.)  There is no question that “a perfectly reasonable 
apprehension of danger may arise long before the officer is possessed of adequate 
information to justify taking a person into custody for the purpose of prosecuting 
him for a crime.”  (Terry v. Ohio, at pp. 26-27.)  But because protection of the 
officer and others nearby is the sole justification, the search must be “confined in 
scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other 
hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer.”  (Id. at p. 29; see In re 
H.M., at p. 143.) 
We conclude the prosecution‟s evidence was sufficient to support a finding 
that Officer Fraembs was acting lawfully when he detained defendant and his 
companions to conduct a patsearch for weapons.  As the record reflects, what 
began as a consensual encounter turned into a potentially threatening situation for 
Fraembs when defendant reacted to his friendly approach in a hostile manner.  It 
was the middle of the night, and Fraembs was a lone officer outnumbered by three 
people, including one confrontational, much taller male and a second male 
wearing a knife in a sheath.  Both males were wearing clothing loose enough to 
conceal other weapons, and there was no one in the immediate vicinity who might 
30 
offer assistance.  Such evidence amply supports the conclusion that, at that point, 
sufficient grounds supported Fraembs‟s decision to temporarily detain the three 
individuals to check for other weapons.  (See People v. Rosales, supra, 
211 Cal.App.3d at p. 330.) 
Defendant disagrees and contends the photographic evidence showed that 
Sparky‟s knife sheath might not have been visible under his loose-fitting T-shirt.  
That, however, was a question for the trier of fact.  (See ante, fn. 15.)  But even 
assuming Fraembs did not know if any of the three were armed, it remains the case 
that he did not draw his gun, use his baton or handcuffs, or arrest anyone.  Instead, 
Fraembs apparently decided a limited detention to conduct a patsearch was a 
sufficient precautionary measure for his safety, and he started with the male who 
was closest to him.  This was perfectly appropriate.  The totality of the 
circumstances gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of danger on the officer‟s 
part, and the detention and patsearch were reasonably designed to discover 
weapons.  (Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 29; In re H.M., supra, 
167 Cal.App.4th at p. 143.) 
Because the evidence supports the conclusion that Officer Fraembs acted in 
accordance with the Fourth Amendment, the trial court properly denied 
defendant‟s motion to strike the section 190.2(a)(7) special-circumstance 
allegation and related instructional objections. 
2. Murder to Avoid Lawful Arrest 
As relevant here, section 190.2(a)(5) provides that a defendant is eligible 
for the death penalty when “[t]he murder was committed for the purpose of 
avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest . . . .”  (Italics added.)  Emphasizing the 
italicized language, defendant contends this special circumstance should have been 
struck because any arrest occurring during Officer Fraembs‟s unlawful detention 
31 
also would have been unlawful, and therefore outside the scope of the statute.  As 
explained, however, the prosecution‟s evidence supported the lawfulness of the 
detention.  That being the case, the evidence was sufficient to establish that 
defendant would have been subject to a lawful arrest if Fraembs had discovered 
his loaded, concealed weapon during the course of that detention. 
Defendant‟s motion to strike the special circumstance allegation of murder 
to avoid lawful arrest was correctly denied, and his related instructional objections 
were properly overruled. 
E. Evidence of Threats 
Defendant contends the trial court committed reversible error by improperly 
admitting evidence of threats made to three witnesses and evidence of Johanna 
Flores‟s relocation, as well as by excluding testimony that Flores had threatened 
defendant several weeks before the shooting.  He claims the erroneous evidentiary 
rulings undermined the integrity of his trial and violated his state and federal 
constitutional rights to a fair trial, confrontation of witnesses, due process, 
effective assistance of counsel, and a reliable and nonarbitrary sentencing process. 
1. “Third Party” Threat Against Flores 
Flores testified at the preliminary hearing that she called defendant the 
morning after the shooting.  Defendant‟s brother Angel answered and told her, “I 
thought you were dead.”  When Flores asked why, Angel replied, “That‟s what we 
do to jaina[s] who see things, who see things they should not see.”16  At trial, the 
prosecutor contended Flores should be permitted to testify about this conversation 
because Angel‟s threat was relevant to her state of mind and credibility.  Although 
                                              
16  
“Jaina” apparently is a Spanish slang term for “girl” or “girlfriend.” 
 
32 
defense counsel acknowledged that Flores had been “scared from Day One,” he 
argued that Angel‟s statements did not constitute a direct threat to Flores, that the 
evidence was inadmissible hearsay, and that it should be excluded under Evidence 
Code section 352. 
After taking a recess to consider the matter, the trial court ruled it would 
allow the prosecution to elicit testimony from Flores that she felt threatened by 
defendant and Angel, and was afraid to testify.  The court ruled, however, that the 
particular statement by Angel — referring to “jaina[s] . . . who see things they 
should not see” — would not be allowed, subject to reconsideration of the ruling 
in the event Flores recanted or her memory became selective.17  Thereafter, Flores 
testified that Angel said something threatening to her the morning after the 
shooting, causing her to feel “really scared” at the time.  Flores also testified the 
police relocated her entire family at her request. 
Evidence Code section 780 provides in relevant part:  “Except as otherwise 
provided by statute, the court or jury may consider in determining the credibility 
of a witness any matter that has any tendency in reason to prove or disprove the 
truthfulness of his testimony at the hearing, including but not limited to any of the 
following:  [¶] . . .  [¶] (f) The existence or nonexistence of a bias, interest, or other 
motive.  [¶] . . . [¶] (j) His attitude toward the action in which he testifies or toward 
the giving of testimony.”  As we have recognized, “[e]vidence that a witness is 
afraid to testify or fears retaliation for testifying is relevant to the credibility of that 
                                              
17  
The court ruled, however, that Flores could testify regarding any 
threatening statements defendant himself had made to her.  Consistent with this 
ruling, Flores testified that after Officer Fraembs‟s shooting, defendant pointed his 
gun at her and twice asked if she was going to say anything.  Flores took 
defendant‟s action seriously, and each time responded that she did not see, hear, or 
know anything. 
33 
witness and is therefore admissible.  [Citations.]  An explanation of the basis for 
the witness‟s fear is likewise relevant to her credibility and is well within the 
discretion of the trial court.  [Citations.]”  (People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 
833, 869; see People v. Valencia (2008) 43 Cal.4th 268, 302.)  Moreover, 
evidence of a “third party” threat may bear on the credibility of the witness, 
whether or not the threat is directly linked to the defendant.  (See People v. Guerra 
(2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1142; People v. Olguin (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1368 
(Olguin).) 
Olguin, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th 1355, is instructive.  There, an eyewitness to 
a gang-related shooting testified he left the crime scene and did not voluntarily 
provide information to the police because “ „I didn‟t want anything to happen to 
my house or to my family.‟ ”  (Id. at p. 1368.)  Over the defendants‟ objection, the 
witness testified that someone telephoned him a few days after the shooting, that 
the caller said they knew where the witness lived and he had better watch his back, 
and that the caller also mentioned the name of the defendants‟ gang.  The witness 
further testified that someone subsequently “spray-painted the word „Rata‟ 
(Spanish for „rat‟) on his driveway.”  (Ibid.)  In holding the challenged evidence 
was properly admitted, Olguin explained:  “Just as the fact a witness expects to 
receive something in exchange for testimony may be considered in evaluating his 
or her credibility [citation], the fact a witness is testifying despite fear of 
recrimination is important to fully evaluating his or her credibility.  For this 
purpose, it matters not the source of the threat.  It could come from a friend of the 
defendant, or it could come from a stranger who merely approves of the 
defendant‟s conduct or disapproves of the victim. . . .  [¶] Regardless of its source, 
the jury would be entitled to evaluate the witness‟s testimony knowing it was 
given under such circumstances.  And they would be entitled to know not just that 
the witness was afraid, but also, within the limits of Evidence Code section 352, 
34 
those facts which would enable them to evaluate the witness‟s fear.  A witness 
who expresses fear of testifying because he is afraid of being shunned by a rich 
uncle who disapproves of lawyers would have to be evaluated quite differently 
than one whose fear of testifying is based upon bullets having been fired into her 
home the night before the trial.”  (Id. at pp. 1368-1369.) 
Likewise, in People v. Avalos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 216 (Avalos), an eyewitness 
to a crime hesitated before responding affirmatively when asked by the prosecutor 
whether the person she previously identified in a lineup (i.e., the defendant) was in 
the courtroom.  (Id. at p. 232.)  At an in camera hearing, the trial court ruled the 
prosecution might ask whether the witness was reluctant to testify out of fear, 
because “the fact she felt fear, whether or not caused by specific acts of any 
persons connected with the trial, was relevant to her credibility and . . . the 
probative value outweighed any potential prejudice to defendant.”  (Ibid.)  Upon 
resuming the stand, the witness testified she was afraid to testify.  Defense counsel 
then clarified during cross-examination that the witness‟s fear was due only to the 
importance of the event.  (Ibid.)  On appeal, we concluded the evidence was 
properly admitted:  “The determination that an explanation of [the witness‟s] 
hesitation would be relevant to the jury‟s assessment of her credibility was well 
within the discretion of the trial court.”  (Ibid.)  Moreover, the evidence had no 
prejudicial impact given counsel‟s clarification that the witness‟s fear did not 
reflect on the defendant.  (Ibid.) 
These authorities make clear that a trial court has discretion, within the 
limits of Evidence Code section 352, to permit the prosecution to introduce 
evidence supporting a witness‟s credibility on direct examination, particularly 
when the prosecution reasonably anticipates a defense attack on the credibility of 
that witness.  That is what happened here.  Flores was the prosecution‟s key 
witness, and the credibility of her testimony was essential to establish defendant‟s 
35 
guilt of the charged crimes and the truth of the special circumstance allegations.  
As the People point out, the defense signaled a strategy of challenging Flores‟s 
credibility as early as the preliminary hearing, when it questioned Flores regarding 
her gang affiliations, her drug and alcohol use, her sex life and her jealousy toward 
defendant‟s relationship with Valore, and her fights with defendant.  Thus at trial, 
the prosecution was keenly aware of the possibility that the jurors would believe, 
as the defense later sought to establish through cross-examination of Flores and 
Meyers and during closing argument, that Flores was a jealous, foul-mouthed, 
drug-abusing, “hard-core home girl gang banger” who was wrongfully accusing 
defendant of murder because of his relationship with Valore.  Under these 
circumstances, the trial court properly allowed the prosecution to support Flores‟s 
credibility by eliciting her direct examination testimony that she became fearful 
after speaking with Angel the morning after the shooting. 
Defendant maintains that none of Flores‟s testimony on the point was 
admissible because she never recanted her testimony nor were there substantial 
inconsistencies in it.18  To support this position, he relies on People v. Brooks 
(1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 180, which purported to hold that a witness‟s testimony 
concerning a threat she received was irrelevant because the witness gave no 
inconsistent testimony before the threat testimony was elicited.  According to 
Brooks, the absence of any prior inconsistent testimony on the part of that witness 
meant “there was no issue of credibility,” thus rendering “the „threat‟ evidence . . . 
immaterial to any issue and irrelevant to the case.”  (Id. at p. 187.) 
We are not persuaded by Brooks for several reasons.  First, Brooks cited no 
authority for the proposition that inconsistent testimony is a prerequisite to the 
                                              
18  
Defendant concedes Flores‟s trial testimony contradicted her earlier 
statements, but argues the inconsistencies were insubstantial. 
36 
admission of evidence of a third party‟s threat or a witness‟s fear, and such a 
proposition finds no support in the terms of Evidence Code section 780.  Second, 
as other authorities explain, evidence that a witness testifies despite fear is 
important to fully evaluating his or her credibility.  (E.g., Olguin, supra, 
31 Cal.App.4th at p. 1369.)  The logic of this rationale does not hinge on whether 
the witness gave prior inconsistent testimony.  Third, Brooks is contrary to 
decisions of this court that have recognized the relevance of such evidence when 
inconsistent testimony was not at issue.  (E.g., People v. Valencia, supra, 
43 Cal.4th at pp. 301-302; People v. Dickey (2005) 35 Cal.4th 884, 912-913; 
People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 280-281; People v. Warren (1988) 
45 Cal.3d 471, 481; Avalos, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 232; People v. Green (1980) 
27 Cal.3d 1, 19-20; accord, Olguin, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1368-1369.)19 
Finally, defendant claims that the trial court “completely ignored the 
question of whether the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighed its probative 
value” and that it failed to rule on his Evidence Code section 352 objection.  This 
claim is contradicted by the record, which discloses the court took a recess for the 
express purpose of considering several issues pertaining to Flores‟s testimony, 
including this particular one.  Upon reconvening, the court discussed the parties‟ 
authorities and fashioned a ruling that recognized the relevance of Angel‟s threats 
and at the same time addressed defendant‟s concerns regarding prejudice.20  
                                              
19  
People v. Brooks, supra, 88 Cal.App.3d 180, is hereby disapproved to the 
extent it is inconsistent with the views expressed herein. 
 
20  
The court stated it would permit Flores‟s testimony that Angel said 
something threatening to her, but would exclude evidence of Angel‟s actual words 
unless Flores recanted or exhibited selective memory in her trial testimony.  
Defendant, however, did not request a limiting instruction with regard to the 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
37 
Contrary to defendant‟s suggestion, the evidence of Angel‟s threat was not 
cumulative to the evidence that defendant threatened Flores at the scene of the 
crime; nor was it unduly prejudicial.  Accordingly, admission of the evidence was 
not erroneous under Evidence Code section 352. 
2. Third Party Threats Against Arambula and Silva 
Defendant next contends the trial court erred by admitting evidence that 
(1) Elva Arambula became frightened by a threat she received following her 
preliminary hearing testimony, and (2) Joseph Silva became frightened after a 
Happy Town gang member named Casper told him to keep his mouth shut and 
said his entire family would be killed if he testified that defendant had admitted 
shooting a cop. 
Arambula and Silva both gave testimony that was inconsistent with their 
earlier statements in certain respects.21  On appeal, defendant and the People 
dispute whether the inconsistencies were substantial or minor.  Regardless of this 
disagreement, the testimony was properly admitted.  As discussed, evidence that a 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
evidence of Angel‟s threat, so the trial court was not obligated give one.  (People 
v. Sapp, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 301.) 
 
Moreover, the court was not required to explicitly state it was engaging in 
the Evidence Code section 352 weighing process when it fashioned its order.  
(People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 259, fn. 1 [record must affirmatively 
show the trial court weighed prejudice against probative value, but court need not 
expressly state it did so].) 
 
21  
The inconsistency involving Arambula concerned her account of the 
direction in which defendant and Flores were walking when the two groups parted 
before the shooting occurred.  The inconsistency involving Silva pertained to his 
testimony that he could have told the police that defendant said he had used the 
gun Silva purchased “to kill a cop,” but that this was “not the way it happened.” 
38 
witness is afraid to testify or fears retaliation for testifying is relevant to that 
witness‟s credibility (People v. Burgener, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 869; Evid. Code, 
§ 780), and may be admissible whether or not the threat is directly linked to the 
defendant (see People v. Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1142; Olguin, supra, 
31 Cal.App.4th at p. 1368.)  As also explained, recantation or inconsistent 
testimony is not a prerequisite for the admission of evidence of a third party‟s 
threat or a witness‟s fear, although here such evidence might have explained the 
witnesses‟ inconsistent accounts of events (see ante, fn. 21) and Silva‟s demeanor 
while testifying.22  This contention is rejected. 
Defendant next contends that Evidence Code section 352 required 
exclusion of these third party threats.  We disagree.  Not only was the evidence 
relevant to each witness‟s credibility, but any potential for prejudice was 
eliminated by the trial court‟s express instructions that the jury was to consider 
such evidence for the sole purpose of determining the credibility of these 
witnesses.  Moreover, the court allowed the parties to clarify that the threat against 
Arambula had not been made by defendant.23 
                                              
22  
Although Silva denied being afraid during the prosecution‟s direct 
examination, he apparently was a reluctant witness and testified with his back 
toward defendant. 
 
23  
Defendant additionally contends that, whether or not the claimed errors 
were prejudicial at the guilt phase, they adversely affected the penalty 
determination, particularly with regard to the evidence in aggravation concerning 
the beating of Ryan Schultz, whose car was shot up.  In this regard, defendant 
notes that Schultz testified he did not initially tell the police what happened 
because he feared defendant‟s gang.  Having concluded that admission of the 
threat evidence was not error at all, we reject this penalty phase claim as meritless. 
39 
3. Alleged Atmosphere of Fear 
Defendant complains the erroneous admission of the alleged threats and 
testimony regarding witnesses‟ fear created an atmosphere of fear among the 
jurors such that he was deprived of his constitutional rights to due process and a 
fair trial.  To prove his point, defendant identifies one instance in which some of 
the jurors approached the bailiff about a spectator in court who, even though he 
had not said or done anything, made them feel “uncomfortable.”  Defendant also 
notes that another time, a juror told the court he was worried that a newspaper 
photographer had taken his picture. 
Defendant forfeited review of this constitutional claim by failing to raise it 
at trial.  (People v. Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1201; see People v. Williams 
(1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 208-209.)  Even assuming it was properly preserved, we 
would find it lacking in merit.  As discussed above, the evidence of third party 
threats and the witnesses‟ fear was relevant on the issue of witness credibility.  
The questioning and closing argument concerning such evidence was brief and 
noninflammatory, and limiting instructions were given as requested. 
Although some jurors initially expressed concern about the courtroom 
spectator and newspaper photographer, the record reflects that the trial court 
immediately addressed each concern to the apparent satisfaction of the jurors.24  
                                              
24  
With regard to the courtroom spectator, the court discussed the matter with 
the parties and thereafter told the jury:  “One thing I wanted to talk to you about 
very briefly:  some of you had expressed concern as to a spectator that was in the 
courtroom and this concern was expressed to the bailiff.  Our information is that 
that person is a citizen in the community, that he is a spectator.  All of you know 
that courtrooms are open to the public and they are free to come in to view at any 
time they may wish to.  It‟s our belief that there is no reason for anyone to be 
concerned about that person.  If that should change, we will inform you.  I don‟t 
believe there is anything to be concern[ed] about.”  To the extent the presence of 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
40 
Whether considered individually or together, these incidents did not reflect an 
atmosphere of fear that deprived defendant of due process or a fair trial. 
In sum, defendant fails to establish that any error occurred, much less one 
of constitutional dimension. 
4. Flores’s Threat Against Defendant 
After the prosecution concluded its direct examination of Jason Meyers, the 
defense asked the trial court to allow Meyers to testify he heard Flores tell 
defendant, about a month and a half before the shooting, that she could have 
defendant “taken out” by “Cherryville.”  The prosecution vigorously objected, 
arguing in part that the evidence was more prejudicial than probative and that 
Flores, who had concluded her testimony but was subject to re-call, should have 
been given the opportunity to deny or explain the alleged threat.  The court agreed 
that Flores‟s relationship and general demeanor with defendant in the two weeks 
leading up to the shooting would be relevant to show any bias or motive she might 
have to testify falsely against defendant, but concluded that the alleged threat was 
too remote to be relevant and excluded the testimony.  Specifically, the court 
rejected defense counsel‟s argument that Flores‟s threat to have defendant taken 
out by members of a rival gang would be relevant to show she might be willing to 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
the particular spectator in the courtroom initially worried some jurors, the record 
shows no continued concern after the court‟s statements. 
 
The incident involving the newspaper photographer involved only one 
juror, who informed the court he was behind the victim‟s mother and a police 
officer when he was photographed.  The court ordered production of all the 
photographs taken, and ascertained the juror had in fact appeared in a single 
unpublished photograph.  The court ordered that the photograph and negative be 
destroyed, and that the newspaper not publish any photograph in which a juror 
appeared. 
41 
wrongly accuse defendant out of intense hatred and bias.  On appeal, defendant 
contends the court‟s exclusion of the alleged threat was contrary to state law and 
also deprived him of his federal constitutional rights to present his defense and to 
due process and a fair trial.  We disagree. 
Under Evidence Code section 352, a trial court has “broad power to control 
the presentation of proposed impeachment evidence „ “ „to prevent criminal trials 
from degenerating into nitpicking wars of attrition over collateral credibility 
issues.‟  [Citation.]” ‟  [Citation.]”  (People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 195.)  
“ „[W]e have repeatedly held that “not every restriction on a defendant‟s desired 
method of cross-examination is a constitutional violation.  Within the confines of 
the confrontation clause, the trial court retains wide latitude in restricting cross-
examination that is repetitive, prejudicial, confusing of the issues, or of marginal 
relevance.”  [Citation.]‟  [Citations.]”  (People v. Harris (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1269, 
1292.)  “On appeal, we evaluate the court‟s ruling by applying an abuse of 
discretion standard.”  (Mills, at p. 195.) 
It bears mentioning that, by the time the issue of Flores‟s alleged threat 
arose, the jury had already heard substantial testimony concerning the stormy 
relationship between Flores and defendant, and specifically about Flores‟s anger 
and jealousy over defendant‟s interactions with other women.  Flores herself 
testified that she was angry at defendant for “screwing” and for maintaining a 
sexual relationship with Valore, and that she told defendant “[i]t‟s either Brandy 
or me.”  Flores also acknowledged that, on the night of Officer Fraembs‟s 
shooting, she argued with defendant when he received a page from Valore while at 
Tank‟s house and got so mad she hit him.  As the two walked to meet Sparky, 
Flores was again angered when defendant asked a girl for a cigarette.  Meyers 
confirmed during his direct examination that Flores reacted to the cigarette request 
42 
by “getting all crazy with [defendant], hitting him and calling him names and 
cursing at him.” 
On this record, we cannot say the trial court abused its broad discretion in 
excluding evidence of Flores‟s alleged threat.  First, the jury had already heard 
substantial evidence of Flores‟s potential bias or motive to lie, so the court could 
reasonably view Meyers‟s additional impeachment testimony as being of marginal 
value.  (See People v. Harris, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1292.)  Second, the court 
could reasonably decide that the alleged threat would cause confusion or undue 
prejudice, given the significant difference between a jealous woman who threatens 
to have a rival gang “take out” her cheating boyfriend, and one who, several weeks 
following a capital murder, manipulates the criminal justice system with false 
accusations against the boyfriend to ensure his conviction of murder.25  Third, the 
possibility that the prosecution would seek to re-call Flores to deny or explain the 
alleged threat, and the time such questioning would have consumed, also was a 
valid consideration. 
We find no abuse of discretion under Evidence Code section 352.  We also 
reject defendant‟s related constitutional claims.  (People v. Mills, supra, 48 Cal.4th 
at p. 196 [routine application of state evidentiary law does not implicate a 
defendant‟s constitutional rights].) 
F. Evidence Regarding Defendant’s Parole 
Defendant challenges the trial court‟s rulings pertaining to his parole status 
and related matters. 
                                              
25  
In the court‟s words, “I see a difference in kind between having Cherryville 
take you out and having the entire judicial system or the entire justice system put 
you out of commission, so to speak.” 
43 
1. Admission of Parole-related Evidence 
The trial court permitted the introduction of evidence that defendant was on 
parole from the CYA at the time of the shooting, that he was subject to a parole 
condition that he not possess a weapon, that he signed a form acknowledging the 
terms of his parole, and that he was on notice that a parole violation could result in 
his being returned to custody for 575 days, plus a possible additional year for the 
actual possession of a weapon.  The court also allowed Flores to testify that, a 
month or two before the shooting, defendant had told her he was on parole and 
“didn‟t want to go back” or “couldn‟t go back” to jail.  The prosecution relied on 
this evidence, as well as on statements defendant made the night of the shooting 
about his carrying a gun, to bolster its theory that defendant committed the willful, 
deliberate, and premeditated murder of Officer Fraembs in order to avoid arrest 
and a return to custody on a serious parole violation. 
Defendant contends the evidence of his parole status and conditions and 
Flores‟s testimony on the point should have been excluded as more prejudicial 
than probative.  Although defendant‟s Evidence Code section 352 objection to 
such evidence was overruled at a pretrial hearing in June 1997, the People assert 
the issue has not been preserved for review because that objection was deficient 
and the defense neglected to make appropriate objections during the trial 
testimony of Flores and of defendant‟s parole officer.  No matter.  The claim is 
handily rejected on the merits. 
For purposes of Evidence Code section 352, evidence is considered unduly 
prejudicial if it tends to evoke an emotional bias against the defendant as an 
individual and has a negligible bearing on the issues.  (People v. Padilla (1995) 
11 Cal.4th 891, 925.)  Put another way, evidence should be excluded “ „ “when it 
is of such nature as to inflame the emotions of the jury, motivating them to use the 
information, not to logically evaluate the point upon which it is relevant, but to 
44 
reward or punish one side because of the jurors‟ emotional reaction.  In such a 
circumstance, the evidence is unduly prejudicial because of the substantial 
likelihood the jury will use it for an illegitimate purpose.”  [Citation.]‟  (People v. 
Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 439.)”  (People v. Howard (2010) 51 Cal.4th 15, 
32.) 
Here, the evidence of defendant‟s parole status and his awareness of the 
consequences he faced if arrested for carrying a gun was highly probative of his 
mental state and motive at the time of the shooting.  (See ante, pt. II.A.2.)  
Defendant‟s statement to Flores that he “didn‟t want to go back” or “couldn‟t go 
back” to jail was probative for the same reason, and the circumstance that it might 
have been uttered a month or two before the shooting did not render the evidence 
irrelevant, or too remote or unreliable.  (People v. Taylor (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1155, 
1173 [that witness‟s conversation with defendant occurred three years before 
defendant‟s commission of robbery and murder affected the weight of the 
evidence, not its admissibility]; People v. Douglas (1990) 50 Cal.3d 468, 511 
[“remoteness of evidence goes to its weight and not to its reliability”].) 
At the same time, none of this evidence was inflammatory or substantially 
likely to elicit an impermissible emotional response from the jury.  Evidence that 
defendant was on parole from a juvenile detention center and did not want to go 
back was not so emotionally charged as to inhibit its logical evaluation by the jury.  
Nor would the evidence, by virtue of its nature, have prompted the jury to punish 
defendant.  No abuse of discretion appears. 
2. Exclusion of Prior Parole Violation 
When the court was considering whether to admit the parole-related 
evidence, defense counsel referred to evidence that a month before Officer 
Fraembs‟s shooting, defendant was tested for drugs by his parole officer and was 
45 
found “positive for methamphetamine.”  Counsel also indicated that defendant had 
previously admitted drug use to his parole officer, who then advised defendant to 
“clean up” before the drug test.  Asserting this was “strong corroborative 
circumstantial evidence” that defendant “might have been under the influence of 
methamphetamine at the time he shot [Fraembs],” counsel argued the evidence 
should “come in for that purpose.”  The court disagreed, concluding the evidence 
was speculative on the issue because the positive drug test would not have 
established that defendant was under the influence a month later when he shot 
Fraembs, and no witness who observed defendant on the evening in question 
described him as acting under the influence. 
Defendant does not argue the court‟s ruling was erroneous on the basis 
described above.  Instead, he characterizes his admissions of drug use and his 
positive drug test as evidence that a prior violation of a parole condition did not 
result in a parole revocation or return to custody.  Excluding this evidence was 
error, he claims, because it would have rebutted the prosecution‟s claim that he 
shot Officer Fraembs to avoid arrest for carrying a gun in violation of parole.  We 
reject this claim for the following reasons. 
First, a fair reading of the record discloses that defendant neglected to 
advance this theory of admissibility at trial.  Procedurally, then, the issue has not 
been preserved for review.  (Evid. Code, § 354; People v. Ervine (2009) 
47 Cal.4th 745, 779.) 
Second, even assuming the evidence should have been admitted, its absence 
was harmless.  Evidence that defendant‟s parole was not revoked on the basis of 
his admissions of drug use and the single positive drug test would have done little 
to prove defendant‟s lack of concern that his parole could and would have been 
revoked for the much more serious violations of carrying a loaded, concealed 
weapon in the company of Sparky, a gang member (knowingly associating with 
46 
gang members was a separate parole violation).  Indeed, defendant specifically 
fretted over his gun carrying more than once the evening of the shooting.  Not only 
did defendant say he did not want to get “busted” for being “strapped” when 
meeting Sparky at the railroad tracks, but defendant‟s immediate reaction when 
Officer Fraembs pulled up behind them was to say, “Oh, shit, the [cops]” and “Oh, 
shit.  I got the gun.”  On this record, it is not reasonably probable that admission of 
the proffered evidence would have garnered a more favorable result for defendant.  
(People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) 
3. Failure to Give Limiting Instruction 
Defendant next contends the trial court erred by failing to give CALJIC 
No. 2.50, which instructs the jury as to the limited use of other-crimes evidence.  
Although defense counsel indicated at a pretrial hearing that he would request this 
instruction if the jury were to hear about the crimes defendant committed as a 
juvenile, it appears counsel did not do so in light of certain changed circumstances 
at trial.26 
Generally, a court is not required to instruct sua sponte on the limited 
admissibility of evidence of a defendant‟s prior crimes.  (See People v. Padilla, 
supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 950; People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 214; People v. 
Collie (1981) 30 Cal.3d 43, 63.)  Notwithstanding this general rule, we have 
                                              
26  
At the pretrial hearing, defense counsel said that if the prosecution were to 
introduce evidence of defendant‟s parole status to prove mental state and motive, 
counsel would seek to show that defendant had committed a juvenile commercial 
burglary so the jury would not speculate why he was on parole, and to then submit 
CALJIC No. 2.50 to limit the jury‟s consideration of the matter.  After learning 
from defendant‟s parole officer that defendant had in fact been on parole for 
residential burglary and for assaulting a school officer, counsel informed the court 
he would not introduce such evidence at trial.  When Flores and defendant‟s parole 
officer testified concerning defendant‟s parole status, counsel did not ask them 
about the prior offenses and made no request for a limiting instruction. 
47 
recognized the possibility there might be “an occasional extraordinary case in 
which unprotested evidence of past offenses is a dominant part of the evidence 
against the accused, and is both highly prejudicial and minimally relevant to any 
legitimate purpose.  In such a setting, the evidence might be so obviously 
important to the case that sua sponte instruction would be needed to protect the 
defendant from his counsel‟s inadvertence.”  (Collie, at p. 64.) 
This case does not present the type of “extraordinary” situation 
contemplated in People v. Collie, supra, 30 Cal.3d 43.  As explained, the evidence 
of defendant‟s parole status and parole conditions was highly relevant to the 
central issue of defendant‟s mental state and intent with regard to both the first 
degree murder count and the charged special circumstances.  At the same time, it 
was not inflammatory and “there was little, if any, danger that the jury would 
consider such evidence for any . . . improper purposes . . . including general 
criminal disposition.”  (People v. Bunyard (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1189, 1226.)27  
Consequently, no sua sponte instruction was required. 
Because there is no merit to any of the foregoing evidentiary and 
instructional claims of state law error, it follows that the claimed errors did not 
violate his state and federal constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial. 
G. CALJIC No. 2.51 
With defendant‟s agreement, the trial court instructed the jury pursuant to 
CALJIC No. 2.51, as follows:  “Motive is not an element of the crime charged and 
                                              
27  
Defendant complains the need for CALJIC No. 2.50 was particularly acute 
because the jury was told he was a gang member and likely surmised his parole 
status was associated with gang activity.  As indicated, however, it was the 
defense‟s decision to refrain from asking the witnesses about the crimes that led to 
defendant‟s parole status. 
 
48 
need not be shown.  However, you may consider motive or lack of motive as a 
circumstance in this case.  Presence of motive may tend to establish the defendant 
is guilty.  Absence of motive may tend to show the defendant is not guilty.” 
Notwithstanding his acquiescence at trial, defendant complains on appeal 
that CALJIC No. 2.51 fails to adequately instruct that motive alone is insufficient 
to establish guilt,28 that the instruction impermissibly lessens the prosecution‟s 
burden of proof with regard to the element of intent, that it shifts the burden of 
proof to defendants to prove their innocence, and that its use violated his state and 
federal constitutional rights to due process, a fair jury trial, and reliable guilt and 
penalty determinations.  We reject these claims, as we have before (e.g., People v. 
Tate (2010) 49 Cal.4th 635, 699; People v. Friend (2009) 47 Cal.4th 1, 53; People 
v. Wilson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 22; People v. Cleveland, supra, 32 Cal.4th at 
p. 750), and see no reason to revisit their merits. 
H. CALJIC Nos. 2.02, 2.21.2, 2.22, 2.27, 8.20 
Defendant contends the trial court gave several instructions that 
undermined the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in violation of his 
constitutional rights to due process, trial by jury, and a reliable guilt verdict:  
CALJIC Nos. 2.02, 2.21.2, 2.22, 2.27, and 8.20. 
As defendant acknowledges, we have previously rejected such contentions 
as to all the instructions cited.  (E.g., People v. Tate, supra, 49 Cal.4th at pp. 697-
698; People v. Hartsch (2010) 49 Cal.4th 472, 506; People v. Friend, supra, 
                                              
28  
To the extent this claim merely concerns the clarity of the instruction, it is 
not cognizable on appeal given defendant‟s failure to request clarification at trial.  
(People v. Wilson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1, 22; People v. Cleveland (2004) 32 Cal.4th 
704, 750.) 
49 
47 Cal.4th at p. 53; People v. Whisenhunt (2008) 44 Cal.4th 174, 220-221.)  We 
decline to reconsider our position. 
I. Validity of the Lying-in-wait Special Circumstance 
Defendant argues the lying-in-wait special circumstance, as interpreted by 
this court, violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
because it fails to adequately narrow the class of persons eligible for the death 
penalty and fails to provide a meaningful basis for distinguishing cases in which 
the death penalty is sought from cases in which it is not.  We have repeatedly 
rejected these same contentions.  (People v. Carasi (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1263, 1310; 
People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 678; People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 
515-516; People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 127.)  We do the same here. 
J. Challenges to California’s Death Penalty Statute and Related 
Instructions 
Defendant makes a number of challenges to the constitutionality of our 
state death penalty sentencing scheme and the jury instructions thereunder.  We 
have previously rejected all such challenges, as follows. 
Contrary to defendant‟s assertions, section 190.3, factor (a), is not applied 
in such a “wanton and freakish” manner that it results in the arbitrary and 
capricious imposition of the death penalty in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  (People v. Russell, 
supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1274; People v. Bennett (2009) 45 Cal.4th 577, 630-631; 
People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 1050-1053.) 
“Neither the federal nor the state Constitution requires that the penalty 
phase jury make unanimous findings concerning the particular aggravating 
circumstances, find all aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, or find 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating 
factors.”  (People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 689.)  Moreover, jury 
50 
unanimity is not required with regard to unadjudicated criminal activity.  (People 
v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 799.)  There is no constitutional requirement that 
the jury find beyond a reasonable doubt that death is the appropriate punishment.  
(People v. Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 199-200; People v. Romero (2008) 
44 Cal.4th 386, 428.)  The Supreme Court‟s decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey 
(2000) 530 U.S. 466, Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296, and Ring v. 
Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584 have not altered these conclusions.  (Jennings, at 
p. 689; Carrington, at p. 200; Dykes, at pp. 799-800.) 
“ „The death penalty scheme is not unconstitutional because it fails to 
allocate the burden of proof — or establish a standard of proof — for finding the 
existence of an aggravating factor . . . .  [Citations.]‟ ”  (People v. Jennings, supra, 
50 Cal.4th at p. 689.)  Nor was the trial court required to instruct the jury that there 
is no burden of proof at the penalty phase.  (Ibid.)  The federal Constitution does 
not require that the state bear some burden of persuasion at the penalty phase, and 
the jury instructions were not deficient in failing to so provide.  (People v. Russell, 
supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1272; People v. Friend, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 89.)  
Defendant was not entitled to an instruction regarding a “ „ “presumption of 
life.” ‟ ”  (Russell, at p. 1272; see People v. Ervine, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 811.) 
CALJIC Nos. 8.85 and 8.88 do not fail to provide the jury with the 
guidance legally required for administration of the death penalty to meet 
constitutional minimum standards.  (People v. Bramit (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1221, 
1248-1249, and cases cited.)  More specifically, CALJIC No. 8.88‟s use of the 
phrase “so substantial,” and of the term “warranted” instead of “appropriate,” does 
not render the instruction impermissibly vague or ambiguous.  (People v. Russell, 
51 
supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1273; People v. Tate, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 712.)29  
Where, as here, the jury is instructed in the language of CALJIC No. 8.88, the 
court need not further instruct that life without parole is mandatory if mitigation 
outweighs aggravation, or that life without parole is permissible even if 
aggravation outweighs mitigation.  (Tate, at p. 712, and cases cited.) 
Our standard penalty phase instructions do not call for jury unanimity on 
mitigating factors; nor do they mislead a jury into believing such unanimity is 
required.  (People v. Hawthorne (2009) 46 Cal.4th 67, 104.)  Moreover, “[t]he trial 
court need not instruct that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard and the 
requirement of jury unanimity do not apply to mitigating factors.”  (People v. 
Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 897.) 
Written findings by the jury during the penalty phase are not 
constitutionally required, and their absence does not deprive defendant of 
meaningful appellate review.  (People v. Russell, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1274; 
People v. Salcido (2008) 44 Cal.4th 93, 166.) 
The trial court was not required, at defendant‟s request, to delete the 
inapplicable factors in aggravation and mitigation.  (People v. Zambrano (2007) 
41 Cal.4th 1082, 1185; People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 439-440 [when a 
jury has been given standard statutory instructions, we assume it has followed 
such instructions and has concluded that mitigating factors were inapplicable if not 
supported by the evidence].)  Nor was the trial court “constitutionally required to 
instruct the jury as to which of the listed sentencing factors are aggravating, which 
are mitigating, and which could be either mitigating or aggravating, depending 
                                              
29  
To the extent defendant casts this claim as one of instructional error, his 
failure to request a clarifying instruction at trial forfeits review of the issue.  
(People v. Russell, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1273.) 
52 
upon the jury‟s appraisal of the evidence.  [Citations.]”  (People v. Jennings, 
supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 690.)  “Additionally, „the statutory instruction to the jury to 
consider “whether or not” certain mitigating factors were present did not 
unconstitutionally suggest that the absence of such factors amounted to 
aggravation.  [Citation.]‟ ”  (Ibid.)  Finally, the inclusion of inapplicable factors 
did not deprive defendant of his right to an individualized sentencing 
determination based on permissible factors relating to him and his crime.  (People 
v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1215, 1280.)30 
                                              
30  
In connection with these claims, defendant contends the prosecution 
separately discussed section 190.3, factor (d) (extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance), factor (e) (victim participant), factor (f) (moral justification), factor 
(g) (extreme duress or substantial domination), factor (h) (impairment or 
intoxication), and factor (j) (defendant accomplice), and then argued to the jury 
that the absence of evidence in mitigation under these factors made each factor 
one in aggravation.  We have held it error for a prosecutor to make this type of 
argument (People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 491 (Lucas); People v. 
Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 289), but it is unclear whether defendant 
advances a misconduct claim on this basis. 
 
To the extent a misconduct claim is presented, defendant forfeited its 
review by failing to make appropriate objections or requests for admonishment at 
trial.  (See Lucas, supra, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 491-492.)  In any event, “[w]e have 
repeatedly held that the prosecutorial comment to which defendant now objects is 
nonprejudicial” where, as here, the prosecution‟s closing argument emphasized the 
aggravated nature of the charged crime, relevant under section 190.3, factor (a), as 
the main basis for a death verdict and also relied on other evidence of the 
defendant‟s prior violent conduct, relevant under section 190.3, factor (b).  (Lucas, 
at p. 492, and cases cited.) 
 
Rather than asserting a misconduct claim per se, defendant appears to 
contend he was prejudiced by the combination of the prosecution‟s erroneous 
argument and the court‟s failure to delete inapplicable factors from the standard 
instruction and failure to instruct that certain factors could be considered solely as 
mitigating.  We have rejected similar contentions in the past.  As we explained in 
Lucas, supra, 12 Cal.4th at page 493, the standard penalty phase instructions 
“helped assure that the jury was not misled [citations], and permit us to assume the 
jury understood how to evaluate the absence of a particular mitigating factor 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
53 
“[A]djectives such as „extreme‟ in section 190.3, factors (d) and (g), or 
„substantial‟ in section 190.3, factor (g), do not serve as an improper barrier to the 
consideration of mitigating evidence.  [Citation.]”  (People v. Jennings, supra, 
50 Cal.4th at p. 690.) 
California‟s death penalty sentencing scheme is not constitutionally 
defective in omitting to provide for intercase proportionality review.  (People v. 
Russell, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1274; People v. Jennings, supra, 50 Cal.4th at 
p. 691.)  Moreover, “[b]ecause capital defendants are not similarly situated to 
noncapital defendants, California‟s death penalty law does not deny capital 
defendants equal protection by providing certain procedural protections to 
noncapital defendants but not to capital defendants.  [Citation.]”  (Jennings, at 
p. 690.) 
Finally, we once again reject the contention that California‟s use of the 
death penalty is “inconsistent with international norms” and therefore violates the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  (People v. 
Russell, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1275; People v. Jennings, supra, 50 Cal.4th at 
pp. 690-691.) 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
[citation].  Such properly instructed jurors were „unlikely to give substantial 
aggravating weight to the absence of obviously mitigating factors, such as victim 
participation or consent, belief in moral justification, or extreme duress or 
domination, which are rarely present in capital homicides.‟  [Citation.]”  This 
reasoning is equally applicable here, where the jury received the same instructions, 
even though the jury also heard improper argument concerning the absence of 
extreme mental disturbance and impairment as factors in aggravation. 
54 
K. Cumulative Error 
Defendant contends the cumulative prejudicial effect of the errors in both 
the guilt phase and the penalty phase requires reversal of his conviction and 
sentence of death.  We have rejected nearly all of defendant‟s claims of error, and 
when we have found or assumed error, we have determined defendant was not 
prejudiced.  Whether such claims are considered individually or together, we find 
no prejudicial error at either phase of the proceedings. 
III.  DISPOSITION 
We conclude that the trial court had no authority to strike the lying-in-wait 
special circumstance (§ 1385.1), and we hereby order its reinstatement (§ 1260).  
As modified, the judgment is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Mendoza 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S065467 
Date Filed: November 10, 2011 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Alfonso M. Bazan 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Michael J. Hersek, State Public Defender, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Denise Kendall, 
Assistant State Public Defender, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Keith H. Borjon, Sharlene A. 
Honnaka, John R. Gorey, Karen Bissonnette and Blythe J. Leszkay, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Denise Kendall 
Assistant State Public Defender 
221 Main Street, 10th Floor 
San Francisco, CA  94105 
(415) 904-5600 
 
Blythe J. Leszkay 
Deptuy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 620-6426