Title: Ex parte State of Alabama.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1170446
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: August 31, 2018

REL: August 31, 2018
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2018
____________________
1170446
____________________
Ex parte State of Alabama
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re: State of Alabama
v.
Jeffery Ray Duncan)
(Clay Circuit Court, CC-16-148 and CC-16-149;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-16-0890)
MENDHEIM, Justice.
1170446
I.  Facts and Procedural History
Jeffery Ray Duncan pleaded guilty to unlawful possession
of marijuana in the second degree, a Class A misdemeanor, see
§ 13A-12-214, Ala. Code 1975, and to unlawful possession of a
controlled substance, a Class D felony, see § 13A-12-212, Ala.
Code 1975.  Before sentencing, Duncan made application to, and
was accepted into, the Clay-Coosa Drug Court Program ("the
drug-court program").  The Clay Circuit Court set Duncan's
case on the next drug-court docket and continued the
imposition of Duncan's sentence pending Duncan's successful
completion of, or expulsion from, the drug-court program.
Duncan was accepted into the drug-court program in
January 2017.  Less than a month later, Duncan was sentenced
to 48 hours in jail for violating the terms and conditions of
the drug-court program.  Duncan was subsequently sentenced to
jail on three additional occasions for violating the terms and
conditions of the drug-court program.  In May 2017, the
circuit court removed Duncan from the drug-court program,
based 
on 
a 
recommendation 
of 
the 
drug-court-program
coordinator and on the circuit court's finding that Duncan was
"unwilling and/or unable to abide by the rules ... of the
2
1170446
[drug-court program]."1  According to the May 2017 order, over
the course of four months participating in the drug-court
program, Duncan had tested positive for the presence of drugs
on three occasions, had "missed court and monitoring
sessions," and had "failed to complete an assessment as
directed by the court."  In addition to removing Duncan from
the drug-court program, the circuit court's order required
Duncan to appear for a sentencing hearing.
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel argued that
the presumptive sentencing standards applied and that they
mandated that Duncan's sentence not include incarceration. 
See Ala. Code 1975, §§ 12-25-30 to -38; Presumptive and
Voluntary Sentencing Standards Manual.  Specifically, defense
counsel argued that the "sentencing event" in Duncan's case
included both drug convictions and that the presumptive
sentencing standard applicable to "the most serious offense"
in Duncan's case (the class D felony controlled-substance
conviction) mandated no jail time.  The circuit court
determined, however, that Duncan's misdemeanor marijuana
1Duncan did not challenge the sanctions for violation of
the terms and conditions of the drug-court program or his
removal from that program.
3
1170446
conviction was not subject to the presumptive sentencing
standards, and it sentenced Duncan to 12 months in jail for
that conviction.  For the felony controlled-substance
conviction, the circuit court applied the presumptive
sentencing standards and sentenced Duncan to 23 months'
imprisonment, which the court suspended, and placed Duncan on
2 years' supervised probation.2  The circuit court ordered
that Duncan's sentences were to run concurrently.  
Duncan appealed his sentences to the Court of Criminal
Appeals.  Duncan v. State, [Ms. CR-16-0890, December 15, 2017]
___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2017).  On appeal, Duncan
argued that the sentences imposed by the circuit court
"represented an improper departure from the presumptive
sentencing standards," Duncan, ___ So. 3d at ___, because the
circuit court imposed a period of incarceration, although he
says the presumptive sentencing standards did not provide for
incarceration under the facts of his case.  The State argued
that the circuit court "properly sentenced Duncan to jail time
pursuant to § 13A-5-8.1, Ala. Code 1975, because Duncan was
2Under 
the 
presumptive 
sentencing 
standards, 
the 
suspended
sentence is considered to be a "non-prison" disposition. 
Presumptive and Voluntary Sentencing Standards Manual 27, 28.
4
1170446
terminated from a drug-court program for noncompliance." 
Duncan, ___ So. 3d at ___.3  
The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the judgment of
the circuit court, holding (1) that the 
presumptive sentencing
standards applied to both convictions, (2) that the
presumptive sentencing standards did not authorize a sentence
of imprisonment in Duncan's case, (3) that the circuit court
had no authority to sentence Duncan to jail on the misdemeanor
conviction, and (4) that § 13A-5-8.1 required a sentence
imposed after termination from a drug-court program to fully
comply with the presumptive sentencing standards, including
the dispositional component of the sentence.  Judge Joiner
dissented with an opinion, which Judge Burke joined. 4 
3Section 13A-5-8.1 provides, in pertinent part: 
"If a defendant is participating in a court
supervised evidence-based treatment program ... or
any other court ordered rehabilitative program and
is subsequently terminated from that program, the
court may then order that the defendant be confined
in either a prison [or] jail-type institution .... 
The court shall impose a sentence length that
complies with either Section 13A-5-6, Section 13A-5-
9, or the sentencing guidelines, whichever is
applicable.  ..."
(Emphasis added.)
4Judge Burke also issued a separate dissenting opinion.
5
1170446
II. Analysis
The main opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals
discussed the presumptive sentencing standards as follows:
"In 2012, the legislature enacted § 12-25-34.2,
Ala. Code 1975, effective May 15, 2012, to implement
presumptive sentencing standards.  See Act No. 2012-
473, Ala. Acts 2012.  See also Hyde v. State, 185
So. 3d 501, 502-04 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015)(detailing
the history of the 2012 amendment to the Alabama
Sentencing Reform Act of 2003, codified at §§ 12-25-
30 to -38, Ala. Code 1975).  The presumptive
sentencing standards became effective on October 1,
2013, see Clark v. State, 166 So. 3d 147 (Ala. Crim.
App. 2014), and were amended on October 1, 2016, to
'incorporate the new Class D felonies,' to add
additional nonviolent crimes to the presumptive
sentencing standards, and to 'provide information on
the new sentencing parameters for all Class C and
Class D felony offenses.'  See Presumptive and
Voluntary Sentencing Standards Manual 15. 
"The Presumptive and Voluntary Sentencing
Standards Manual, as amended, sets forth the
offenses subject to the presumptive sentencing
standards and provides circuit courts instructions
and worksheets to use in imposing a sentence under
the presumptive sentencing standards. ...  'A
sentencing event includes all convictions sentenced
at the same time, whether included as counts in one
case or in multiple cases, regardless of whether
offenses are worksheet offenses.'  Presumptive and
Voluntary Sentencing Standards Manual 23 (emphasis
in original).  The Presumptive and Voluntary
Sentencing Standards Manual sets forth five rules
used to determine the 'most serious offense' at a
sentencing event.  'Rule 5' provides that, '[w]here
a sentencing event includes both a worksheet offense
and a non-worksheet offense and the worksheet
offense has a higher statutory maximum penalty
6
1170446
governed by the felony offense classification, the
worksheet offense is the most serious offense and
the Standards are applicable to the convictions in
that sentencing event.'  Presumptive and Voluntary
Sentencing Standards Manual 24. 
"In 
this case, Duncan pleaded guilty to 
unlawful
possession of a controlled substance, a Class D
felony, see § 13A-12-212(b), Ala. Code 1975, and
unlawful possession of marijuana in the second
degree, a Class A misdemeanor, see § 13A-12-214(b),
Ala. Code 1975.  Possession of a controlled
substance 
is 
a 
worksheet 
offense 
under 
the
presumptive 
sentencing 
standards; 
however,
possession of marijuana in the second degree is a
non-worksheet offense.  Presumptive and Voluntary
Sentencing Standards Manual 21.  Duncan was
sentenced  in both cases and for both convictions at
the same time.  Because Duncan's sentencing event
included both a worksheet offense and a non-
worksheet offense and his worksheet offense –-
possession of a controlled substance –- carried a
higher statutory maximum penalty as a Class D felony
than the non-worksheet offense, the worksheet
offense constituted the 'most serious offense' and
the presumptive sentencing standards were applicable
to both convictions when the circuit court sentenced
Duncan. 
"Furthermore, the record contains worksheets
that 
were 
prepared 
in 
anticipation 
of 
the
application of the presumptive sentencing standards. 
The worksheets recommend a sentence disposition and
a range of sentence length from which a sentence is
chosen.  Presumptive and Voluntary Sentencing
Standards Manual 16.  In Duncan's case, the circuit
court received a 'Drug Sentence Length Worksheet'
that provided for a sentencing range of 13 to 32
months for a straight sentence and 6 to 14 months
for a split sentence.  The circuit court also
received a 'Drug Prison In/Out Worksheet' that
recommended a 'non-prison' sentence based, in part,
7
1170446
on Duncan's having no prior felony convictions. 
Pursuant to the presumptive sentencing standards,
'[i]f the most serious offense at a sentencing event
is a Class D felony and the offender's presumptive
Prison In/Out worksheet recommendation is "OUT," a
county jail sentence becomes a sentencing option
only if the offender has been previously convicted
of any three or more felonies, or previously
convicted of any two or more felonies that are Class
A or Class B felonies.'  Presumptive and Voluntary
Sentencing Standards Manual 27.  ..."
Duncan, ___ So. 3d at ___.
The central question in this case is the proper
construction of § 13A-5-8.1.  The main opinion of the Court of
Criminal Appeals rejected the State's argument and held that,
for offenses subject to the presumptive sentencing standards,
a sentence imposed pursuant to § 13A-5-8.1 must comply with
both the dispositional and durational components of the
presumptive sentencing standards, if those standards apply. 
In 
Duncan's case, the presumptive sentencing standards did 
not
provide for incarceration.
In his dissent, Judge Joiner disagreed as to the
dispositional component, stating:
"I believe that § 13A-5-8.1, Ala. Code 1975,
when read in conjunction with the Alabama Sentencing
Commission's  Presumptive and Voluntary Sentencing
Standards Manual (2016), authorizes the sentences
the circuit court imposed in this case.  Therefore,
I respectfully dissent.
8
1170446
"....
"Despite having had multiple 'second chances,'
Duncan eventually was terminated from the drug court
program.  The circuit court sentenced Duncan to
concurrent sentences of 23 months' imprisonment for
the conviction for unlawful possession of a
controlled substance and 12 months in jail for the
second-degree-marijuana-possession conviction.  The
circuit court suspended the 23-month sentence on the
Class D felony conviction but did not suspend the
12-month 
jail 
sentence 
on 
the 
misdemeanor
conviction.
"....
"The main opinion rejects the State's argument
that § 13A-5-8.1, Ala. Code 1975, authorizes the
circuit court to depart from the dispositional
recommendation of 'non-prison' in the presumptive
sentencing standards.  I disagree.
"Section 13A-5-8.1, Ala. Code 1975, was created
by Act No. 2015-185, Ala. Acts 2015 -- the same
legislative act that created the 'Class D' felony
classification and that 'further required the
Alabama Sentencing Commission to incorporate the new
Class D felonies into the Sentencing Standards.' 
Presumptive and Voluntary Sentencing Standards
Manual 15 (2016).  The relevant portion of § 13A-5-
8.1, Ala. Code 1975, quoted by the main opinion, is
as follows:
"'If a defendant is participating in
... 
[a] 
court 
ordered 
rehabilitative
program 
and 
is 
subsequently 
terminated 
from
that program, the court may then order that
the defendant be confined in either a
prison [or] jail-type institution ....  The
court shall impose a sentence length that
complies with either Section 13A-5-6,
9
1170446
Section 
13A-5-9, 
or 
the 
sentencing
guidelines, whichever is applicable.'
"The first sentence quoted above addresses
disposition of an offender –- that is, it gives a
sentencing court the option of ordering confinement
for an offender like Duncan who is terminated from
a drug court program.  The second sentence addresses
the durational component of the sentence that may be
imposed on that offender.
"As the main opinion notes, the dispositional
recommendation for the most serious offense in
Duncan's case –- the Class D felony –- is 'non-
prison.'  Thus, for the  disposition in Duncan's
case to comply with the Standards, the sentencing
court would have to impose a 'non-prison' sentence
for both convictions for which Duncan was sentenced
at the 'sentencing event.'  In other words, the
sentencing court would have to impose non-prison
sentences on both the Class D felony conviction and
the misdemeanor conviction.
"...  Thus, if Duncan were being sentenced under
the sentencing standards, 'county jail' would not be
a dispositional option in his case under ordinary
circumstances ....  Duncan's participation in and
termination from a drug court program, however,
changed the circumstances to those contemplated by
§ 13A-5-8.1.  The first sentence of § 13A-5-8.1 gave
the circuit court the discretion to depart from the
dispositional 
requirements 
of 
the 
sentencing
standards.  That sentence made 'county jail' a
sentencing option for the circuit court as to both
convictions for which Duncan was sentenced, but it
did not require that he be sentenced to jail on
both.
"The second sentence of § 13A-5-8.1, as noted
above, addresses the durational component of the
sentence that may be imposed on Duncan.  The main
opinion reads this second sentence as rendering
§ 13A-5-8.1 inapplicable to Duncan's case because
10
1170446
§ 13A-5-8.1 does not specifically list § 13A-5-7[,
Ala. Code 1975,] as an option for imposing a
sentence duration.  The main opinion fails to
consider, however, whether the 12-month sentence
length imposed on Duncan's misdemeanor conviction
'complies with ... the sentencing guidelines.'
  
"As to sentence duration in Duncan's case, the
Presumptive and Voluntary Sentencing Standards
Manual addresses ranges of sentence length for the
Class D felony conviction only.  The manual does not
specifically provide sentence-length ranges for
misdemeanors or other 'non-worksheet' offenses.  The
manual presumes, however, that existing law outside
the standards will provide sentence lengths for non-
worksheet offenses for which an offender is
sentenced at a 'sentencing event' under the
sentencing standards.  (If that presumption is not
the case, there could never be a sentence length
imposed on a non-worksheet offense because the
standards do not provide sentence lengths for non-
worksheet offenses.)  Thus, a sentence length
imposed on a non-worksheet offense complies with the
durational requirements of the sentencing standards
if (1) it comports with law outside the standards
and (2) it is not longer than what the sentencing
standards authorize for the most serious offense. 
In Duncan's case, the duration of sentence imposed
on the misdemeanor conviction -- 12 months -- (1)
was 
authorized 
by 
existing 
law 
outside 
the
standards, see § 13A-5-7, Ala. Code 1975, and
(2) did not exceed the sentence length authorized
for the most serious offense.  Thus, I would affirm
the circuit court's imposition of sentence in this
case because it complies with Alabama law." 
Duncan, ___ So. 3d at ___ (Joiner, J., dissenting).
We agree with Judge Joiner's analysis of the interplay
between the presumptive sentencing standards and § 13A-5-8.1
11
1170446
and with his conclusion that the circuit court did not exceed
its discretion in sentencing Duncan to jail.  The first
sentence of § 13A-5-8.1 authorizes a circuit court to impose
a prison or jail sentence on a defendant who was terminated
from a drug-court program.  When the presumptive sentencing
standards apply, the foregoing authority is not limited to
cases in which the dispositional recommendation is "prison." 
Instead, § 13A-5-8.1 gives the sentencing court the option to
order confinement of an offender who is terminated from a
drug-court program, without regard to the dispositional
component of 
the 
presumptive sentencing standards.  
The second
sentence of § 13A-5-8.1 addresses the durational component of
the sentence (the court "shall impose a sentence length that
complies").  It provides that the duration of the sentence is
determined by the presumptive sentencing standards if they
apply, or by § 13A-5-6 or § 13A-5-9, Ala. Code 1975.  As Judge
Joiner discusses, this construction eliminates many illogical
results and is a better fit with the actual language of the
statute.5 
5In addition to the problems identified by Judge Joiner,
this approach avoids the incentive for a defendant to choose
termination from a drug-court program and a sentence of
probation, rather than a short jail stay, for violating the
12
1170446
In the present case, § 13A-5-8.1 authorizes (but does not
require) the circuit court to impose a prison or jail sentence
on Duncan.  The duration of the sentence was to be determined
as provided in the presumptive sentencing standards.  The
parties agree that the duration of the sentence imposed on
Duncan 
is 
consistent 
with 
the 
presumptive 
sentencing
standards.
III.  Conclusion
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of
Criminal Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. 
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Stuart, C.J., and Bolin, Parker, Shaw, Main, Bryan, and
Sellers, JJ., concur.
rules of the drug-court program.  
13