Title: Jackson v. People
Citation: 376 P.2d 991
Docket Number: 20168
State: Colorado
Issuer: Colorado Supreme Court
Date: December 10, 1962

376 P.2d 991 (1962) Thomas JACKSON, Plaintiff in Error, v. PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Defendant in Error. No. 20168. Supreme Court of Colorado. En Banc. December 10, 1962. *992 Crisjohn &amp; Dyer, Dove Creek, for plaintiff in error. Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., J. F. Brauer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for defendant in error. HALL, Justice. We refer to the parties by name. On August 29, 1961, there was lodged in a justice court in Dolores County, Colorado: On that same day, at 10:00 A.M., Jackson appeared before McAlroy and entered a plea of not guilty. Hearing was had at that time, and Jackson was found guilty and fined $100.00 and costs of $5.00. Jackson paid the fine and costs. On September 6, 1961, Jackson filed with McAlroy, in duplicate, his "Notice of Appeal" and on the same day filed with the county court of Dolores County a copy of said notice and paid to the justice of the peace and to the county court all fees required for perfecting an appeal. On October 16, 1961, the people filed in the county court the following MOTION: On December 11, 1961, the county court entered its findings and judgment dismissing the appeal. Appearing therein is the following: Jackson is here by writ of error seeking reversal. *993 The people urged as reason for dismissal of the appeal in the county court only one ground, namely, that the notice of appeal filed by Jackson failed to comply with the statutory requirements governing appeals. In this court much of the argument of counsel deals with the question of whether one who has been convicted can, after paying his fine, appeal from the judgment. The people contend that the fine having been paid, all questions before the court have become moot. The notice of appeal which Jackson filed consists of two legal sized sheets setting forth in great detail the facts surrounding his trial, conviction, payment of fine and costs of appeal. The statute in effect at the time of this appeal is CRS '53, 79-15-11 (Perm.Supp.). It provides as follows: The objection to the notice is highly technical. Failure to include an "identification of the offense" was in no manner prejudicial to the people. The notice filed contained sufficient information to enable the people to know with certainty what case was being appealed. The notice given motivated the justice of the peace to prepare his "Transcript of Criminal docket" and to forward the same, together with all papers in the case, to the proper county court, and to accept from Jackson the prescribed fee of $1.50 for these services. Understandably, Jackson, having been arrested at 11:00 P.M. and tried and convicted at 10:00 A.M. the following morning would be at a disadvantage in seeking to inform the people of the "identification" of the offense. The people suggest that Jackson might have been found guilty in two or more cases by the same justice of the peace, on the same day, with the same punishment imposed, and under such circumstances the district attorney would not know which case was being appealed. We are persuaded that the prospect of such befuddlement and confusion befalling the district attorney of Dolores County is extremely remote. In 51 C.J.S. Justices of the Peace, § 154b, page 294, we find the following language to which we subscribe: *994 Giving to the statute in question a liberal construction which most courts sanction, we conclude that the notice of appeal filed was, under the circumstances of this case, sufficient to meet the requirements of the statute and that the appeal was perfected and the county court erred in sustaining the motion to dismiss. The further contention, that the question of the right to appeal is now moot for the reason that Jackson has paid his fine, is without merit. Jackson entered a plea of not guilty. The judgment of guilt was expressly made reviewable. The question of guilt is not moot; it is not academic, but very live and real. Jackson's good name has by the judgment of guilt been impaired. He now is burdened with the stigma of guilt which could be of immeasurably greater importance to him and his future status among his fellowmen than the punishment administered. On entry of the judgment of guilt, Jackson had the right to appeal and his appeal was perfected on compliance with CRS '53, 79-15-11(2), (Perm.Supp.), (L. 55, p. 501), supra, and 79-15-11(5) which provides: Prior to 1955 one taking an appeal from a judgment of guilt by a justice of the peace was required, as a prerequisite to the right of appeal, to furnish a bond: In 1955 the legislature saw fit to dispense with the requirement of a bond, thus preserving to those unable to furnish bond the right to appeal. In lieu of the requirement for bond, the legislature provided, CRS '53, 79-15-11(3) (Perm.Supp.): It is true that the foregoing language does not specifically provide that one may pay his fine (voluntarily or involuntarily) and still preserve his right to appeal. That conclusion, however, is irresistible. Clearly the statute covers appellants who desire to stay the judgment. Just who are the other appellants? One must conclude that they are those who do not desire to stay the judgment, but are ready to pay up with money or go to jail as adjudged, and still proceed with the appeal. Decisions dealing with the right to appeal after paying a fine or serving a sentence are not uniform. The majority of states hold that under such circumstances the right to appeal has been waived and the judgment having been satisfied nothing remains to be reviewed. Several states hold to the contrary. We feel that the minority rule is better reasoned, and in harmony with the policy of the legislature in liberalizing the right to appeal, as evidenced by the very clearly implied provisions of 79-15-11(2) and (5), supra. In Commonwealth v. Fleckner, 167 Mass. 13, 44 N.E. 1053, Justice Holmes, speaking for the court, said: "* * * We should be slow to suppose that the legislature meant to take away the right to undo the disgrace and legal discredit of a conviction (Pub.St. c. 169, § 19) merely because a wrongly convicted person has paid his fine or served his term. * * * Of course, the payment of the fine in accordance with the sentence was not a consent to *995 the sentence, but a payment under duress." In People v. Chamness, 109 Cal. App. Supp. 778, 288 P. 20, it is said: In People v. Shambley, 4 I11.2d 38, 122 N.E.2d 172, the Supreme Court of Illinois quoted with approval the following from Avon v. Popa, 96 Ohio App. 147, 121 N.E.2d 254, 256: And then went on and stated: Subsequent to submission of this case on briefs, we have, in City of Pueblo v. Clemmer, Colo., 375 P.2d 99, held that one who has pleaded not guilty, been convicted and paid his fine involuntarily, may appeal from the judgment of guilt. We now hold that under 79-15-11(2) and (5), one complying with the statute may have the judgment of guilt reviewed and that voluntary payment of the fine or service of the sentence imposed constitutes no reason for denying the appeal. We are not unmindful of the following language of this court found in Scott v. Denver, 125 Colo. 68, 241 P.2d 857: We no longer subscribe to the foregoing language or language of similar import in other cases, and expressly disavow the same. We find nothing in 49 C.J.S. 1058, cited as authority for the foregoing conclusions, which deals in any manner with the question of appeals. We do not find the law "well settled" that one who has paid a judgment has lost his right to appeal. On the contrary, we find the "better rule" is stated in 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 214, page 638: In Scott v. Denver, supra, it would seem that the court may have had the impression that Scott, having "voluntarily submitted to the conviction," lost his right to appeal. *996 Subsequent to Scott, supra, the legislature, in 1959, 79-13-2 (Perm.Supp.), expressly provided that: The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to reinstate the case in the county court and proceed with the disposition thereof, as provided by law and in conformity with the views herein expressed. PRINGLE, J., dissents. PRINGLE, Justice (dissenting). The statute in effect at the time of the appeal involved required, among other things, that the notice of appeal, a requisite to jurisdiction of the appellate court, contain an "identification of the offense or crime of which the appellant was convicted." I have searched the notice of appeal for even one word which by any exercise of semantics describes or identifies the crime or offense of which the plaintiff in error was convicted. None appears there. It is true that the statute should be liberally construed as the majority opinion points out, 51 C.J.S. Justices of the Peace § 154 b, but liberal construction does not permit the court to neatly excise from the statute the phrase "identification of the offense or crime of which the appellant was convicted." This the majority opinion does by calling the objection to the notice highly technical. I cannot subscribe to such judicial surgery. Further, I am persuaded that when a defendant in a criminal action voluntarily fully satisfies a judgment against him by paying the fine assessed, the judgment is extinguished, there is nothing left to review and the entire matter is moot. Such is the holding in the majority of states. 5 Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure § 2248. For the reasons above stated, I respectfully dissent.