Title: Wiley v. Bohannon Services, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2120330
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: March 15, 2013

REL: 03/15/2013 
Notice: T h i s 
o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o f o r m a l 
r e v i s i o n b e f o r e 
p u b l i c a t i o n i n 
t h e 
advance 
s h e e t s o f 
Southern Reporter. 
R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o 
n o t i f y t h e 
Reporter of 
Decisions, 
Alabama 
A p p e l l a t e 
C o u r t s , 
300 D e x t e r Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 
((334) 
2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f 
any t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n 
o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may be made 
b e f o r e t h e 
o p i n i o n i s 
p r i n t e d i n 
Southern Reporter. 
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS 
OCTOBER TERM, 2012-2013 
2120330 
Tommy S. Wiley 
v. 
Bohannon Services, Inc. 
Appeal from Lauderdale C i r c u i t Court 
(CV-11-900054) 
THOMAS, Judge. 
Tommy S. W i l e y a p p e a l s from a judgment o f 
t h e L a u d e r d a l e 
C i r c u i t 
C o u r t 
("the t r i a l 
c o u r t " ) 
i n f a v o r o f Bohannon 
S e r v i c e s , I n c . 
("Bohannon"). 
2120330 
The r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t W i l e y , an employee of Bohannon, 
s u f f e r e d an 
i n j u r y t o h i s s h o u l d e r as a r e s u l t of a work-
r e l a t e d a c c i d e n t on September 28, 
2010. 
On March 7, 
2011, 
W i l e y 
f i l e d a c o m p l a i n t r e q u e s t i n g t h a t the 
t r i a l 
c o u r t s e t 
the 
i s s u e 
of 
W i l e y ' s 
r i g h t 
t o 
r e c e i v e 
t o t a l - d i s a b i l i t y 
b e n e f i t s f o r an immediate h e a r i n g , o r d e r Bohannon t o pay a 15% 
p e n a l t y p u r s u a n t t o § 25-5-59, A l a . Code 1975, 
and award any 
o t h e r b e n e f i t s t o w h i c h W i l e y 
may 
be 
e n t i t l e d . 
Bohannon 
answered the c o m p l a i n t on March 20, 2011, and a s s e r t e d v a r i o u s 
d e f e n s e s . 
A h e a r i n g was h e l d August 1, 2011, a t which time 
c o u n s e l 
f o r 
b o t h p a r t i e s i n f o r m e d the 
t r i a l 
c o u r t t h a t a s e t t l e m e n t 
had been reached, 
and the terms of the s e t t l e m e n t agreement 
were r e a d i n t o the r e c o r d . 
Both p a r t i e s were t o s e p a r a t e l y 
f i l e a p r o p o s e d s e t t l e m e n t agreement and o b t a i n a p p r o v a l from 
the 
t r i a l 
c o u r t . 
On September 20, 
2011, 
Bohannon 
f i l e d 
a 
m o t i o n 
t o 
e n f o r c e 
the 
s e t t l e m e n t 
agreement 
o r , 
i n 
the 
a l t e r n a t i v e , t o d i s m i s s the a c t i o n w i t h p r e j u d i c e . 
A c c o r d i n g 
to Bohannon, W i l e y had 
f a i l e d t o 
f i l e a p r o p o s e d s e t t l e m e n t 
agreement as r e q u i r e d by the 
t r i a l 
c o u r t and had r e f u s e d t o 
s i g n the p r o p o s e d s e t t l e m e n t agreement s u b m i t t e d t o the 
t r i a l 
2 
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c o u r t by Bohannon. 
W i l e y 
f i l e d 
a response 
t o Bohannon's 
m o t i o n t o e n f o r c e the s e t t l e m e n t agreement on September 
20, 
2011, 
i n w h i c h he a v e r r e d t h a t he d i d not agree w i t h 
c e r t a i n 
p r o v i s i o n s 
of 
the 
p r o p o s e d 
s e t t l e m e n t 
agreement 
t h a t 
was 
s u b m i t t e d t o the 
t r i a l 
c o u r t by Bohannon, and he 
r e q u e s t e d 
t h a t the 
t r i a l c o u r t s e t the m a t t e r f o r a h e a r i n g . 
The 
t r i a l c o u r t h e l d a h e a r i n g on October 31, 2011. 
On 
November 7, 2011, the t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r e d a judgment g r a n t i n g 
Bohannon's m o t i o n t o e n f o r c e the s e t t l e m e n t agreement.
1 
The 
November 7, 2011, 
judgment a l s o s e t out the d e t a i l s of 
the 
s e t t l e m e n t agreement and 
s t a t e d t h a t Bohannon would not 
be 
r e s p o n s i b l e 
f o r any 
b e n e f i t s or m e d i c a l 
b i l l s 
i n c u r r e d by 
W i l e y , 
o t h e r 
than 
t h o s e 
i d e n t i f i e d 
i n 
the 
s e t t l e m e n t 
agreement. 
W i l e y 
f i l e d a motion on December 6, 2011, 
s t y l e d 
as an 
" a p p l i c a t i o n t o s e t a s i d e s e t t l e m e n t , motion f o r r e l i e f 
1 S e c t i o n 25-5-56, A l a . Code 1975, p r o v i d e s , i n p e r t i n e n t 
p a r t , t h a t "[u]pon s e t t l e m e n t s b e i n g approved, judgment s h a l l 
be 
e n t e r e d t h e r e o n 
and 
d u l y e n t e r e d on the r e c o r d s of 
the 
c o u r t i n the same manner and have the same e f f e c t as 
o t h e r 
judgments or as an award i f the s e t t l e m e n t i s not f o r a lump 
sum." 
We 
note 
t h a t , a l t h o u g h the 
t r i a l 
c o u r t ' s November 
7, 
2011, judgment was prompted by Bohannon's motion t o e n f o r c e , 
t h a t 
judgment 
was 
a l s o , 
e f f e c t i v e l y , 
a 
f i n a l 
judgment 
a p p r o v i n g the s e t t l e m e n t agreement. See Rule 5 8 ( a ) , A l a . R. 
C i v . 
P. 
( d i s c u s s i n g the methods of 
r e n d e r i n g an 
o r d e r 
or 
judgment). 
3 
2120330 
from judgment p u r s u a n t 
t o Rule 
60(b)(6) 
and 
6 0 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( 2 ) 
[, 
A l a . 
R. 
C i v . P.,] 
and motion t o 
a l t e r , 
v a c a t e 
or amend," 
p u r s u a n t 
t o Rule 
59, 
A l a . R. 
C i v . P. 
In summary, 
W i l e y 
a v e r r e d i n the December 6, 2011, postjudgment motion t h a t he 
had d i s c o v e r e d new 
e v i d e n c e 
r e g a r d i n g h i s m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n 
t h a t 
r e n d e r e d 
the 
s e t t l e m e n t 
agreement 
u n j u s t 
and 
t h a t , 
t h e r e f o r e , 
the 
s e t t l e m e n t 
agreement 
s h o u l d 
be 
s e t 
a s i d e . 
W i l e y 
a l s o asked 
the 
t r i a l 
c o u r t t o s e t the m a t t e r 
f o r a 
h e a r i n g . 
Bohannon f i l e d a response 
t o W i l e y ' s postjudgment 
m o t i o n on J a n u a r y 5, 2012; W i l e y 
f i l e d a r e p l y on J a n u a r y 
24, 
2012. 
On 
June 
5, 
2012, 
the 
t r i a l 
c o u r t 
e n t e r e d 
an 
o r d e r 
p u r p o r t i n g t o g r a n t W i l e y ' s postjudgment m o t i o n t o s e t a s i d e 
the 
s e t t l e m e n t 
agreement, 
p r o v i d e d 
t h a t 
W i l e y 
r e i m b u r s e 
Bohannon f o r any s e t t l e m e n t p r o c e e d s t h a t W i l e y had r e c e i v e d 
and a l l c o s t s and a t t o r n e y f e e s t h a t Bohannon had i n c u r r e d 
d u r i n g the c o u r s e 
of 
t h i s 
a c t i o n ; the 
t r i a l 
c o u r t s e t 
the 
m a t t e r 
f o r a h e a r i n g on September 6, 
2012. 
W i l e y 
f i l e d 
a 
m o t i o n on August 29, 2012, 
r e q u e s t i n g r e l i e f from the June 5, 
2012, 
o r d e r and 
f o r l e a v e t o amend the 
o r i g i n a l 
c o m p l a i n t . 
A f t e r 
the 
h e a r i n g 
on 
September 
6, 
2012, 
the 
t r i a l 
c o u r t 
4 
2120330 
e n t e r e d an o r d e r on September 11, 2012, 
i n which the 
t r i a l 
c o u r t 
found 
t h a t 
W i l e y 
had 
f a i l e d 
t o 
comply 
w i t h 
the 
r e q u i r e m e n t s o f the June 5, 2012, o r d e r and t h e r e f o r e d e n i e d 
W i l e y ' s 
r e q u e s t s 
f o r 
r e l i e f 
and 
e n f o r c e d 
the 
p r e v i o u s l y 
e n t e r e d s e t t l e m e n t agreement. 
W i l e y f i l e d a motion s t y l e d as a " m o t i o n f o r new 
t r i a l or 
i n the a l t e r n a t i v e motion f o r r e l i e f 
from judgment or o r d e r 
and motion t o a l t e r , v a c a t e or amend p u r s u a n t t o R u l e [ s ] 59 
and 60," A l a . R. C i v . P., 
on September 25, 2012. 
The 
t r i a l 
c o u r t d e n i e d t h a t motion on October 4, 2012. 
W i l e y f i l e d 
an 
a p p e a l w i t h t h i s c o u r t on October 22, 
2012. 
I n i t s 
b r i e f t o t h i s c o u r t , Bohannon a s s e r t s t h a t W i l e y ' s 
a p p e a l i s u n t i m e l y because h i s December 6, 2011, 
postjudgment 
motion was d e n i e d by o p e r a t i o n of law, p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 
59.1, 
A l a . 
R. 
C i v . P., 
on March 5, 2012, 
and, 
t h u s , h i s a p p e a l , 
f i l e d more t h a n seven months l a t e r , was u n t i m e l y . 
We 
agree. 
A l t h o u g h W i l e y ' s December 6, 2011, motion i n v o k e d b o t h R u l e 59 
and R u l e 6 0 ( b ) , A l a . R. C i v . P., as a u t h o r i t y f o r the m o t i o n , 
" [ t ] h e ' c h a r a c t e r of a [ m o t i o n ] i s d e t e r m i n e d and 
i n t e r p r e t e d 
from i t s e s s e n t i a l s u b s t a n c e , 
and not from i t s d e s c r i p t i v e 
name or t i t l e . ' " Ex p a r t e A l f a Mut. Gen. I n s . Co., 684 So. 2d 
5 
2120330 
1281, 
1282 
( A l a . 1996) 
( q u o t i n g Union 
S p r i n g s T e l . Co. 
v. 
 
Green, 
285 
A l a . 114, 
117, 
229 
So. 
2d 
503, 
505 
( 1 9 6 9 ) ) . 
W i l e y ' s motion, which was 
f i l e d w i t h i n 30 days a f t e r the e n t r y 
of 
the November 7, 2011, judgment, was, 
i n s u b s t a n c e and i n 
l e g a l e f f e c t , a motion t o a l t e r , amend, or v a c a t e the judgment 
p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 5 9 ( e ) , A l a . R. C i v . P. 
" ' I t 
i s w e l l 
s e t t l e d 
t h a t 
[an 
a p p e l l a t e 
c o u r t ] l o o k s t o the essence of a m o t i o n , 
not n e c e s s a r i l y t o i t s t i t l e , t o d e t e r m i n e 
how 
the motion i s t o be c o n s i d e r e d under 
the Alabama R u l e s o f 
C i v i l 
P r o c e d u r e . 
Ex 
p a r t e A l f a M u t u a l G e n e r a l I n s . Co., 
[684 
So. 
2d 
1281 
( A l a . 1 9 9 6 ) ] . 
[The 
Alabama 
Supreme 
C o u r t ] 
has 
h e l d 
on 
s e v e r a l 
o c c a s i o n s t h a t a motion 
f i l e d 
w i t h i n 
the 
30-day l i m i t a t i o n of R u l e 5 9 ( e ) , s e e k i n g 
r e l i e f 
from a judgment t h a t i s a v a i l a b l e 
under R u l e 5 9 ( e ) , s h o u l d be t r e a t e d as a 
R u l e 
59(e) 
motion 
t o 
a l t e r , 
amend, 
or 
v a c a t e 
the 
judgment. 
See 
Ex 
p a r t e 
A l f a 
 
M u t u a l G e n e r a l I n s . Co., 
s u p r a ; Sexton v. 
P r i s o c k , 495 So. 2d 581 
( A l a . 1986); H o l t  
v. F i r s t N a t i o n a l Bank of M o b i l e , 372 
So. 
2d 
3 
( A l a . 1979) . See, 
a l s o , 
Evans 
v. 
 
W a d d e l l , 689 So. 2d 23 ( A l a . 1997) 
( n o t i n g 
t h a t 
[the 
Alabama 
Supreme] 
C o u r t 
has 
r e p e a t e d l y 
c o n s t r u e d 
a 
"motion 
t o 
r e c o n s i d e r " a judgment, when i t has been 
f i l e d w i t h i n 30 days a f t e r the e n t r y of a 
f i n a l judgment, as a R u l e 59(e) m o t i o n ) . A 
R u l e 60(b) motion t o s e t a s i d e a judgment  
cannot be s u b s t i t u t e d f o r a R u l e 59 motion  
so as t o a v o i d the o p e r a t i o n o f R u l e 59.1. 
See M a t k i n v. Smith, 531 So. 2d 876 ( A l a . 
1988); Ingram v. P o l l o c k , 557 So. 2d 
1199 
( A l a . 
1989) . The C o u r t of C i v i l A p p e a l s has 
6 
2120330 
a l s o 
r e c o g n i z e d 
t h e s e 
p r i n c i p l e s . 
See, 
e.g., Conway v. Housing A u t h o r i t y of the  
Birmingham 
D i s t r i c t , 
676 So. 2d 344 ( A l a . 
C i v . 
App. 1996); Ex p a r t e Adams, 534 So. 2d 
626 
( A l a . C i v . App. 
1988); 
Simmons 
v. 
 
Simmons, 390 
So. 2d 622 
( A l a . C i v . App. 
1980) .' 
"Ex 
p a r t e 
Johnson, 
715 
So. 
2d 783, 785-86 ( A l a . 
1998) 
(emphasis added)." 
C u r r y v. C u r r y , 962 So. 2d 261, 263-64 ( A l a . 
C i v . App. 2007); 
see a l s o Goodyear T i r e & Rubber Co. v. Haygood, 93 So. 3d 132, 
140 n.2 
( A l a . C i v . App. 
2 0 1 2 ) ( " [ B ] e c a u s e Goodyear's 
second 
postjudgment m o t i o n was 
f i l e d w i t h i n 30 days of the e n t r y of 
the 
judgment, 
t h a t postjudgment m o t i o n was 
r e q u i r e d t o be 
t r e a t e d as a m o t i o n 
f i l e d p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 5 9 ( e ) , not as a 
R u l e 6 0 ( b ) , A l a . R. C i v . P., m o t i o n s e e k i n g r e l i e f 
from a 
judgment 
based 
on 
newly 
d i s c o v e r e d 
e v i d e n c e . " ) . 
A 
postjudgment motion t h a t i s not d i s p o s e d o f by the t r i a l c o u r t 
w i t h i n 90 days i s c o n s i d e r e d d e n i e d by o p e r a t i o n o f law. See 
R u l e 59.1, A l a . R. C i v . P. 
As n o t e d e a r l i e r , i n the p r e s e n t 
case, W i l e y ' s December 6, 2011, postjudgment motion was d e n i e d 
by o p e r a t i o n o f law on March 5, 2012. 
Under s u b d i v i s i o n s (1) and (3) o f R u l e 4 ( a ) , A l a . R. App. 
P., a n o t i c e of a p p e a l must be 
f i l e d 
e i t h e r w i t h i n 42 days 
a f t e r 
the 
t r i a l 
c o u r t 
has 
a c t e d 
upon 
a 
t i m e l y 
f i l e d 
7 
2120330 
postjudgment motion or w i t h i n 42 days a f t e r such a motion has 
been 
d e n i e d 
by 
o p e r a t i o n of 
law 
p u r s u a n t 
t o 
R u l e 
59.1. 
T h e r e f o r e , the 42-day p e r i o d i n which W i l e y c o u l d have 
f i l e d 
a t i m e l y a p p e a l e x p i r e d on A p r i l 16, 2012. 
As n o t e d above, 
W i l e y f i l e d a n o t i c e o f a p p e a l on October 22, 2012. 
For the 
reasons s e t f o r t h h e r e i n , W i l e y d i d not t i m e l y 
f i l e a n o t i c e 
of a p p e a l . 
A c c o r d i n g l y , we d i s m i s s t h i s a p p e a l f o r l a c k o f 
j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
See R u l e 2 ( a ) ( 1 ) , A l a . R. App. 
P. 
("An 
a p p e a l 
s h a l l be d i s m i s s e d i f the n o t i c e of a p p e a l was 
not 
t i m e l y 
f i l e d t o i n v o k e the j u r i s d i c t i o n o f the a p p e l l a t e 
c o u r t . " ) . 
In d i s m i s s i n g the a p p e a l , we note t h a t the t r i a l c o u r t ' s 
o r d e r s e n t e r e d on June 5 and September 11, 2012, were e n t e r e d 
a f t e r the t r i a l c o u r t l o s t j u r i s d i c t i o n of the m a t t e r on March 
5, 2012, 
and, 
t h u s , are v o i d . 
As a r e s u l t , 
we 
d i r e c t 
the 
t r i a l c o u r t t o v a c a t e t h o s e o r d e r s . 
APPEAL DISMISSED WITH INSTRUCTIONS. 
Thompson. P.J., and P i t t m a n , Moore, and Donaldson, J J . , 
c o n c u r . 
8