Title: Southern Railway Company v. Stallings
Citation: 107 So. 2d 873
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: November 6, 1958

107 So. 2d 873 (1958)
SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY
v.
Millard STALLINGS.
6 Div. 63.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
November 6, 1958.
Rehearing Denied January 8, 1959.
*875 Cabaniss &amp; Johnston, Leigh M. Clark and Drayton T. Scott, Birmingham, for appellant.
Jackson, Rives, Pettus &amp; Peterson, Birmingham, for appellee.
GOODWYN, Justice.
This is an appeal by Southern Railway Company, defendant below, from a personal injury judgment in favor of Millard Stallings, plaintiff below, for $30,000 and from an order overruling defendant's motion for a new trial. The action is brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq.
Plaintiff was injured on June 14, 1954, while working for the defendant as a boilermaker in its Norris Yards in Jefferson County. The case went to the jury only on count two as last amended. For answer to the complaint the defendant interposed a plea in short by consent. Amended Count two alleges that plaintiff "was caused to slip and fall by reason of an oily and slippery place on the floor" of the diesel shop where he was working. It is charged that defendant "negligently failed to exercise reasonable care to furnish and maintain plaintiff a reasonably safe place to perform his work for the defendant." Plaintiff's injuries and damages are alleged to be as follows: "The bones in plaintiff's right hand were broken and crushed and the muscles, nerves, tendons and ligaments in his said hand were torn and injured," which caused great physical pain and mental anguish to plaintiff; that plaintiff "was permanently injured"; that "he will be caused to suffer great physical pain and mental anguish in the future"; that "his nerves *876 and nervous system were shocked and impaired and he was caused to be hospitalized and caused to undergo serious and painful medical and surgical care and treatment for said injuries"; that he "was caused to lose wages from his regular employment as a boilermaker and his power and capacity to work and earn money has been permanently impaired."
While not admitting that defendant's negligence proximately caused plaintiff's injury, the defendant says in brief that "the point is not made on this appeal that a jury issue was not presented as to liability or that the verdict as to liability is against the great weight of the evidence."
The points argued by appellant, and relied on for reversal, are thus stated in its brief:
I.
After carefully considering the evidence, in the light of applicable rules of review, we find no justifiable basis for ordering a remittitur (as a condition to affirmance) on the ground that the jury's verdict was excessive.
When this court has before it a question of excessiveness of a jury's verdict there are certain well-established rules which control our review. As said in Louisville &amp; Nashville Railroad Co. v. Tucker, 262 Ala. 570, 581, 80 So. 2d 288, 298:
See, also, Firestone Tire and Rubber Company v. Nixon, 264 Ala. 433, 435, 87 So. 2d 829; Hudson v. Stripling, 261 Ala. 196, 203, 73 So. 2d 514; Alabama Great Southern R. *877 Co. v. Baum, 249 Ala. 442, 449, 31 So. 2d 366, 372. In the last cited case (an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act) it was said:
The plaintiff in the case before us, at the time of his injury on June 14, 1954, was 51 years old. He had been employed by defendant since the age of 15, the first four years as an apprentice boilermaker and thereafter as a "full-fledged" boilermaker. He left school in the 7th grade. During the two years prior to his injury his monthly earnings were around $375 a month. Between the time of his injury and the date of trial (April 23 and 24, 1956) plaintiff was able to work a total of "about 30 or 31 days." There is medical testimony (Dr. S. Ralph Terhune, an orthopedist of Birmingham) that plaintiff had a 50% permanent disability in the use of his right wrist; that he had a badly displaced fracture of the large bone of the forearm at its distal end with severe displacement of the fragments, and multiple fracture lines, and also a fracture of the ulna styloid. Dr. Terhune first saw plaintiff on September 20, 1954, when he was sent by another doctor for treatment. His testimony is stated in appellant's brief to be as follows (which we think, with some additions, is adequate to show the nature of plaintiff's injury):
Dr. Terhune also testified that he felt that plaintiff "had had all necessary treatment and that he had reached maximum improvement" as to the operation performed on plaintiff's wrist. He further testified, in part, as follows:
"That was the extent of the operation."
There was evidence from which the jury could find that plaintiff was wholly incapacitated from doing his work as a boilermaker.
There was evidence from which the jury could find three elements of damages, viz.: The loss of wages from the time of the injury to the date of trial, plaintiff's pain and suffering resulting from the injury, both past and future, and impairment of his earning capacity. It appears to be established that the loss in wages as of the time of trial approximated $8,000. As to the fixing of damages for pain and suffering, this court, speaking through Mr. Justice Sayre in Whitman's Fifth Ave. Garage Co. v. Ricks, 211 Ala. 527, 529-530, 101 So. 53, 55, had this to say:
As to diminution in plaintiff's earning capacity the evidence is clear that he had a permanent injury to his right wrist incapacitating him from working as a boilermaker, the only kind of employment he had been engaged in for about 37 years. There appears to be no controversy that his life expectancy, at the time of the trial, was 19.17 years, without considering the kind of work he was engaged in, and 17.50 years as a boilermaker for a railroad. Although there is no evidence specifically defining the extent of plaintiff's overall incapacity to engage in gainful work, it nevertheless was a question for the jury, in their fair and enlightened discretion, to fix the amount of damages for impairment of earning capacity. Armour and Co. v. Cartledge, 234 Ala. 644, 648, 176 So. 334; Walker County v. Davis, 221 Ala. 195, 199, 128 So. 144; Birmingham Electric Co. v. Cleveland, 216 Ala. 455, 459-461, 113 So. 403. From Walker County v. Davis, supra, [221 Ala. 195, 128 So. 148] is the following:
See, also, Newton v. Altman, 227 Ala. 465, 467, 150 So. 698; Mackintosh Co. v. Wells, 218 Ala. 260, 264, 265, 118 So. 276; Gray v. Cooper, 216 Ala. 684, 685, 114 So. 139.
Considering the elements of damage and "remembering that the authority vested in courts to disturb the verdict of a jury on the ground of excessive damages is one which should be exercised with great caution" (Louisville &amp; Nashville Railroad Co. v. Tucker, supra), we are constrained to hold that the trial court's refusal to set aside the verdict on the ground of excessiveness should not be interfered with. We are unable to say that the amount of the verdict is the result of passion, prejudice, partiality or corruption on the part of the jury, especially in view of the trial court's refusal to set the verdict aside after hearing the evidence.
As already noted, one of plaintiff's witnesses was an actuary (William L. Farmer, Chief Actuary for Protective Life Insurance Company) who testified as to plaintiff's life expectancy. During the course of his examination he was asked the following question:
To this question the defendant interposed the following objection:
The objection was overruled. The actuary then testified that the amount needed to produce $375 per month for 17.50 years at 3% was $61,397.55. In response to further questioning he testified that the amount needed at 3½% was $60,069.18; at 4%, $56,872.95; at 4½%, $54,799.95; and at 5%, $52,841.49.
The defendant, in its brief, recognizes that "most courts, including this court, are committed to the proposition that in a case claiming damages for the permanent impairment or loss of earning capacity, evidence as to life expectancy and the present value of a reduction of earnings due to the injury is admissible." But, says the defendant: "If that were all that is involved here, there would have been no error in admitting the testimony of the actuary." Perhaps the best way to state defendant's position is to quote the following from its brief:
We think it clear that there is no evidence of plaintiff's total permanent disability nor of total and permanent impairment of his earning capacity. On the other hand, it is equally clear that he has suffered at least a partial permanent disability from which the jury could reasonably find that there has resulted a permanent impairment of earning capacity to some degree. The question, then, is whether it was prejudicial and reversible error to admit in evidence the actuary's testimony based on figures relating to total incapacity when there is evidence supportive of partial incapacity only and no evidence of any specific percentage of overall impairment of plaintiff's earning capacity.
We are in accord with the view expressed by defendant that the trial court should carefully instruct the jury concerning the use of such actuarial figures. However, it seems to us, from a consideration of the entire record, including the trial court's oral charge and the actuary's testimony on cross-examination, that the jury was sufficiently informed as to the use of such testimony. We quote the following from the oral charge:
The following is from the cross-examination of the actuary:
"Q. And you would have $6,006 here, wouldn't you? A. Yes.
"Q. And $5,687 here? A. Yes.
"Q. And $5,479 here? A. Yes, sir.
*883 "Q. And $5,284 there? A. Yes, sir.
"Q. $37.50 would be one-tenth of that? A. Yes.
It seems to us it was a matter for the jury, in the first place, to determine from the evidence the extent of impairment of plaintiff's earning capacity in the future. After making such determination there would then be a basis for the jury to apply such percentage of incapacity to the figures given by the actuary. In view of the circumstances here, particularly the trial court's oral charge, we do not think it can be said that the actuary's testimony was prejudicial to the defendant. This court dealt with a similar problem in two fairly recent cases, viz.: Louisville &amp; N. R. Co. v. Steel, 257 Ala. 474, 480, 481, 59 So. 2d 664; Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. Gambrell, 262 Ala. 290, 297, 78 So. 2d 619.
From the Steel case is the following [257 Ala. 474, 59 So.2d 669]:
In the Gambrell case we had this to say [262 Ala. 290, 78 So.2d 624]:
The defendant excepted to the following portion of the court's oral charge, viz.:
There was injected into the case the fact that plaintiff was receiving $127.62 per month under the Railroad Retirement Act. It seems to be conceded by both parties that such evidence had no place in the trial. And it further appears that both parties contributed to this situation. It seems to us that this portion of the court's oral charge was an effort to clear up for the jury any confusion which might have resulted from such testimony. We see no reversible error in this portion of the oral charge.
Error is assigned in refusing to give defendant's requested charges Nos. 14, 21 and 22. Requested charge No. 14 is as follows:
Requested charges Nos. 21 and 22 are to the same effect. These charges are what are sometimes referred to as "single juror" charges. Their refusal was not reversible *885 error. Code 1940, Tit. 7, § 273; City of Birmingham v. Bowen, 254 Ala. 41, 45-46, 47 So. 2d 174; City of Bessemer v. Clowdus, 261 Ala. 388, 395, 74 So. 2d 259.
From what we have said it follows that the judgment appealed from is due to be affirmed. It is so ordered.
Affirmed.
All the Justices concur.