Title: State v. Craig
Citation: 372 P.2d 128, 70 N.M. 176
Docket Number: 6902
State: new-mexico
Issuer: new-mexico Supreme Court
Date: June 5, 1962

372 P.2d 128 (1962) 70 N.M. 176 STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. H. W. CRAIG, Defendant-Appellant. No. 6902. Supreme Court of New Mexico. June 5, 1962. Robert W. Ward, Lovington, for defendant-appellant. Earl E. Hartley, Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, Carl P. Dunifon and Mark C. Reno, Asst. Attys. Gen., Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellee. CHAVEZ, Justice. Appellant, H. W. Craig, was convicted by a jury of selling property which he did not own and which he had not been given the right to sell in violation of § 40-21-40, N.M.S.A., 1953 Comp. From the judgment and sentence he prosecutes this appeal. Appellant, under a written contract, was purchasing a certain lot in Hobbs, New Mexico, upon which there was a frame house. Appellant had intended to construct a woodwork shop on the lot and attach it to the house. After purchasing the lot and frame building, appellant was unable to obtain a building permit to add to or extend the frame building and was told by the building inspector that he would have to construct a fireproof building, such as a block concrete building, because the premises were in a fire zone. Appellant then consulted counsel and was advised that, since he intended to build a block building on the lot, if he would make the monthly payments provided for in the contract, he had the right to sell the frame building. Appellant sold the frame building for $2000 and thereafter was charged with the sale of the frame house without right in violation of § 40-21-40, supra. We might add that the lot in question is owned by Elizabeth Manley, a widow, and Inza Jane Manley Adams. Cecil P. Stracener entered into a contract to purchase the lot from the ladies Manley and Adams, and thereafter Stracener moved the frame house onto the lot. Subsequently, Stracener and wife entered into a written contract for the sale of the lot to appellant. Before selling and moving the frame house off the *129 premises, appellant contacted Mrs. Adams, who consented to appellant's selling the frame house. The only question presented is whether the trial court committed error in refusing to grant appellant's requested instruction to the effect that intent had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt before appellant could be convicted. The trial court gave the following instructions: Section 40-21-40, supra, which appellant was charged with violating, provides: *130 Appellant presents the following question: Can a person be guilty of violating § 40-21-40, supra, if he, in fact, had no criminal intent and if the issue of criminal intent is not submitted to the jury? The trial court instructed the jury that if appellant wilfully and knowingly sold the property involved, that he is guilty of the crime charged. Appellant's requested instruction raises the defense that appellant could not be convicted unless the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant knew that he had no right to sell the frame house. Appellant also contends that the situation was made worse by the trial court's instruction No. 13, which instructed the jury that appellant could not sell the house off the property, or by any such sale reduce the existing improvements, without the consent of the Straceners. Appellant argues that there is evidence upon which the jury could have found that appellant did have the right to make the sale. Appellant at all times admitted that he made the sale of the frame house and knew that he had done so. His defense was that he sought and obtained the advice of two attorneys, one of them being the attorney who drafted the contract of purchase between the Straceners and appellant, and acting on the advice of counsel, he thought that he had the right to sell the frame house. This court, on two occasions, has considered the statute in question. State v. Blevins, 40 N.M. 367, 60 P.2d 208, and State v. Hughes, 43 N.M. 109, 86 P.2d 278. In State v. Blevins, supra, the defendant was convicted of selling "* * * one neat cattle of the property of R.L. Durham, * * * contrary to the provisions of Section 35-1617, N.M.S.A., 1929 Comp." (§ 40-21-40, N.M.S.A., 1953 Comp.) Defendant contended that he should have been prosecuted under § 35-2405 of the 1929 Compilation, which was a more specific statute making it a crime to knowingly sell cattle. In that case this court said: The State argues that under the language of the statute a specific intent is not required and directs our attention to State v. Alva, 18 N.M. 143, 151, 134 P. 209, wherein it is said: Whether a criminal intent is to be regarded as essential is a matter of construction. In State v. Lawson, 59 N.M. 482, 286 P.2d 1076, we quoted from State v. Shedoudy, 45 N.M. 516, 524, 118 P.2d 280, 285, as follows: The Lawson case involved Ch. 63, Laws of 1925, entitled "An Act Defining the Crime of Making, Causing to be Made or Processing Any Implements or Things Adapted, Designed or Commonly Used for the Commission of Burglarly, Larceny, Safe-Cracking or Other Crime and Providing a Penalty Therefor" and we held that criminal intent was an element of the crime defined by the Act. In that case the trial court instructed the jury that specific intent was an element of the crime which the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. There is no language or inference in § 40-21-40, supra, clearly showing that criminal intent is not required. A consideration of the matter prohibited leads us to the conclusion that the legislature did not intend the offense to be one of malum prohibitum. We believe that the statute in question demands the inclusion of intent as an element of the crime of which appellant was convicted, and that the jury should have been instructed that criminal intent was an element of the crime which the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. The general rule at common law was that scienter was a necessary element in the indictment and proof of every crime, and this was followed in regard to statutory crimes even where the statutory definition did not in terms include it. However, there was a modification of this rule in respect to prosecution under statutes which are in the nature of police regulations, where the emphasis of the statute is evidently upon achievement of some social betterment rather than the punishment of the crimes as in cases of mala in se. United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 42 S. Ct. 301, 66 L. Ed. 604. That case and United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280, 42 S. Ct. 303, 66 L. Ed. 619, are authority in those cases dealing with regulatory offenses. The rule in the case before us is stated in Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 72 S. Ct. 240, 96 L. Ed. 288, wherein the court quoted from People v. Flack, 125 N.Y. 324, 334, 26 N.E. 267, 270, 11 L.R.A. 807 as follows: See also Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 78 S. Ct. 240, 2 L. Ed. 2d 228. The case is reversed with direction to set aside the judgment and sentence and grant appellant a new trial. IT IS SO ORDERED. CARMODY and MOISE, JJ., concur. COMPTON, C.J., and NOBLE, J., not participating.