Title: People v. Childress
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 84566
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: April 20, 2000

Opinion filed April 20, 2000.
JUSTICE HEIPLE delivered the opinion of the court:
The petitioner, John Childress, appeals from a Cook County circuit court 
order dismissing his post-conviction petition. Because petitioner was sentenced 
to death, this court has jurisdiction over the instant appeal pursuant to 
Supreme Court Rule 651(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 651(a)). For the following reasons, we 
now affirm.
BACKGROUND
A jury in the circuit court of Cook County convicted petitioner of first 
degree murder, home invasion, burglary and attempted aggravated criminal sexual 
assault and sentenced petitioner to death. On direct appeal, this court reversed 
petitioner's conviction for burglary, but affirmed petitioner's remaining 
convictions and death sentence. People v. Childress, 158 Ill. 2d 275 
(1994). The United States Supreme Court denied petitioner's petition for writ of 
certiorari. Childress v. Illinois, 513 U.S. 881, 130 L. Ed. 2d 143, 115 S. Ct. 215 (1994).
Petitioner subsequently filed a post-conviction petition alleging that his 
trial counsel was ineffective for, inter alia, (1) failing to ask 
prospective jurors whether they would automatically impose the death penalty if 
petitioner was found guilty of first degree murder; (2) failing to introduce 
into evidence photographs of wounds on petitioner's hands which depicted 
defensive wounds consistent with petitioner's claim that the victim was the 
initial aggressor; and (3) failing to investigate and present mitigating 
evidence regarding petitioner's medical and family background at sentencing.
The trial court dismissed petitioner's first and third claims without 
conducting an evidentiary hearing. The trial court conducted an evidentiary 
hearing on petitioner's remaining claim regarding defense counsel's failure to 
introduce the photographs of petitioner's hands. At the evidentiary hearing, the 
parties stipulated that the victim was stabbed to death on the night of August 
15, 1989, and that petitioner was arrested by the police the following day. 
Deborah Hansen, an investigator for the Cook County public defender's office, 
testified that on August 17, 1989, she took 10 Polaroid photographs of cuts on 
petitioner's hands.
Karen Shields, an assistant Cook County public defender, testified that she 
had been an assistant public defender for approximately eight years when she was 
appointed to represent petitioner. At that time, Shields was a member of the 
Cook County public defender's homicide task force, which was composed of more 
experienced public defenders who exclusively represented defendants charged with 
murder. Shields testified that she examined the photographs prior to trial but 
decided not to introduce the photographs into evidence at trial because she 
thought the wounds were fingernail scratches which could have been inflicted 
while petitioner was stabbing the victim. Shields also testified that it was 
impossible to tell from the photographs how old the wounds were. Shields was 
concerned that the photos were a "double-edged sword" because they were a "vivid 
reminder" to the jury of the injuries suffered by the petitioner compared to 
numerous stab wounds suffered by the victim. (The victim sustained 12 stab 
wounds and 10 incised wounds.) Shields testified that she was concerned the 
State would use the photos against petitioner.
Charles Buchholz, an assistant Cook County public defender who served as 
Shields' co-counsel at petitioner's trial, testified that he also examined the 
photographs of petitioner's hands prior to trial. Buchholz testified that he 
wrote a memo memorializing why he and Shields decided not to introduce the 
photographs at trial and placed the memo in petitioner's case file. The memo 
states that the photos "show some minor scrapes and cuts" which were 
inconsistent with petitioner's statement that he struggled with the victim and 
took the knife away from her before stabbing her. Buchholz testified that Karen 
Shields added a brief notation at the bottom of the memo stating, "The photos do 
not look like knife wounds but more like cigarette burns."
Kathleen Pantle and Crystal Marchigiani, two assistant Cook County public 
defenders who worked with Shields on the homicide task force, testified that 
Shields asked them to look at the photographs of the wounds on petitioner's 
hands. Pantle testified that she told Shields that the photographs would not 
help the defense because the injuries were minor and she did not think 
petitioner's injuries were of the magnitude that would have been inflicted 
during the course of the struggle with the victim. Marchigiani testified that 
she also told Shields that she would not use the photographs at trial because 
she "didn't think that these injuries would lead somebody to act as Mr. 
Childress was alleged to have acted."
Laverne Lewis, petitioner's cousin, testified that she played cards with 
petitioner in the afternoon on the day following the murder. Lewis testified 
that she noticed "[l]ittle small" cuts on petitioner's right hand. She asked 
petitioner how he got the cuts, and he responded that "he got into it with 
somebody."
After considering the evidence presented at the hearing, the trial court 
dismissed petitioner's claim.
ANALYSIS
At the motion to dismiss stage in post-conviction proceedings, all 
well-pleaded facts that are not positively rebutted by the trial record are to 
be taken as true. The inquiry into whether a post-conviction petition contains 
sufficient allegations of constitutional deprivations does not require the trial 
court to engage in any fact-finding or credibility determinations. People v. 
Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 385 (1998). As a result, there is little 
justification for giving deference to the trial court's conclusions as to the 
sufficiency of the allegations in the post-conviction petition. 
Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 388-89. The standard of review for a trial 
court's decision to dismiss post-conviction claims without conducting an 
evidentiary hearing, therefore, is de novo. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 389. By contrast, we will not reverse a trial court's decision to dismiss 
petitioner's claim after conducting an evidentiary hearing unless it is 
manifestly erroneous. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 385.
Petitioner first argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
ask prospective jurors during voir dire whether they would automatically impose 
the death penalty after a conviction of murder. Petitioner argues that counsel's 
failure to ask this question, which is commonly referred to as a 
"reverse-Witherspoon" question, led to the impanelment of a jury which 
was predisposed to impose the death penalty.
Petitioner did not raise this argument on direct appeal. Normally, issues 
which could have been raised on direct appeal but were not are considered 
waived. People v. Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d 509, 522 (1995). Petitioner, 
however, alleges that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise 
this argument on direct appeal. Therefore, the doctrine of waiver does not bar 
consideration of his claim. Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d  at 522-23.
Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are measured against 
the same standard as those dealing with ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 
A petitioner who contends that appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance 
of counsel must show that the failure to raise an issue on direct appeal was 
objectively unreasonable and that the decision prejudiced petitioner. People 
v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418, 435 (1999). Unless the underlying issue is 
meritorious, petitioner suffered no prejudice from counsel's failure to raise it 
on direct appeal. West, 187 Ill. 2d  at 435. We, therefore, must 
determine whether petitioner's underlying ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel claim would have been successful if raised on direct appeal.
Petitioner's ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim is meritless. In 
Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 119 L. Ed. 2d 492, 112 S. Ct. 2222 
(1992), the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant is entitled, 
upon his request, to inquire whether a prospective juror would 
automatically impose the death penalty no matter what evidence was presented in 
aggravation and mitigation. Morgan, 504 U.S.  at 736, 119 L. Ed. 2d  at 
507, 112 S. Ct.  at 2233. Nothing in Morgan, however, suggests that 
defense counsel is constitutionally required to ask such a question, and 
petitioner fails to cite any authority to support such a proposition. Indeed, 
the fact that a defendant is entitled to such voir dire questioning only upon 
his request demonstrates that defense counsel is under no constitutional 
obligation to ask such a question. See People v. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205, 221 (1997) (holding permissive nature of reverse-Witherspoon 
question renders it "not ' "so central to an accurate determination of 
innocence or guilt" ' as to constitute a component of basic due process"), 
quoting People v. Flowers, 138 Ill. 2d 218, 241-42 (1990), quoting 
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 313, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334, 358, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1077 (1989). It bears repeating that "[t]here is no precise catechism or 
formula of questions that can precisely identify those prospective jurors whose 
opposition to the death penalty will prevent them from fulfilling their duties 
as jurors." People v. Cloutier, 156 Ill. 2d 483, 499 (1993). The same 
holds true for questions intended to identify pro-death penalty bias among 
prospective jurors. The mere fact that a "reverse-Witherspoon" question 
might have been helpful in identifying such bias does not render trial counsel's 
failure to ask every veniremember such a question objectively unreasonable. See 
People v. Terrell, 185 Ill. 2d 467, 485 (1998).
Moreover, petitioner concedes that his trial counsel did ask one member of 
the venire whether every murder conviction deserved the death penalty. This fact 
demonstrates that defense counsel was aware of defendant's entitlement to ask 
such a question and that counsel's failure to ask every other venire member this 
question was a matter of trial strategy rather than ineptitude or unfamiliarity 
with the law. Under these circumstances, petitioner has failed to overcome the 
strong presumption that his trial counsel's failure to 
"reverse-Witherspoon" every member of the venire was the product of 
sound trial strategy, not incompetence. People v. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d 404, 454 (1998).
Petitioner next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
introduce the photographs of his hands at trial. These photographs, petitioner 
contends, depict wounds which would have corroborated his defense at trial that 
the victim was the aggressor and provoked petitioner's conduct. Petitioner 
argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this 
argument on direct appeal.
Defense counsel's decision not to introduce the photographs of petitioner's 
hands at trial was not objectively unreasonable. Karen Shields, an experienced 
public defender, after consultation with three of her colleagues, made a 
strategic decision not to use the photographs because she thought that the 
photographs would not be helpful to the defense. Shields feared that the State 
would actually use the photographs against petitioner to highlight the slight 
nature of the wounds on petitioner's hands compared to the devastating stab 
wounds inflicted on the victim by petitioner. We agree with the trial court's 
assessment that defense counsel's decision not to use the photographs at trial 
was a strategic choice made after thorough investigation of law and facts 
relevant to the plausible options available. As such, trial counsel's conduct is 
virtually unchallengeable. People v. Gosier, 165 Ill. 2d 16, 22 (1995), 
citing People v. Franklin, 135 Ill. 2d 78, 117 (1990) (1984), quoting 
Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668, 690, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 695, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2066 (1984). The trial court's dismissal of petitioner's claim that 
his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to use the photographs at trial 
was not manifestly erroneous.
Petitioner's final argument is that his trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence at sentencing regarding 
petitioner's medical and family background. In support of his claim, petitioner 
has attached a number of reports and affidavits to his post-conviction petition 
from witnesses who were not called to testify at his sentencing hearing. Dr. 
Michael Kovar conducted a psychological evaluation and neurological assessment 
of petitioner. Dr. Kovar concluded in his report that petitioner has a number of 
serious cognitive deficits, suggesting underlying organic brain damage and 
deteriorating neuropsychological functioning caused by long-term substance abuse 
and traumatic head injury. Dr. Keenan Ferrell, a psychologist, determined that 
petitioner suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of being 
raped at age 12 and growing up in a violent environment. Dr. Ferrell concluded 
that petitioner was predisposed to act out violently. Dr. John R. Conte, a 
professor of social work and expert on childhood sexual abuse, expressed his 
opinion that petitioner's acts of violence are a direct result of the violence, 
abandonment, and history of betrayal experienced by petitioner throughout his 
lifetime.
Petitioner also included a number of affidavits from family members and 
friends who recounted petitioner's troubled family history, alcoholism and drug 
abuse, and the premature deaths of several family members, including the death 
of petitioner's step-father, Willie Scott, approximately two weeks before the 
murder. A report prepared by a mitigation specialist, Caryn Platt Tatelli, 
documented the depressed and impoverished environment in which petitioner was 
raised, his limited education, the sexual and emotional abuse he suffered as a 
child, as well as his extensive background of substance abuse and 
criminality.
In order to secure a reversal of his death sentence, petitioner must show 
that his trial counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness and there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, 
the jury would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances did not warrant death. People v. Madej, 177 Ill. 2d 116, 
135 (1997), quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 695, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698, 
104 S. Ct.  at 2069. Even if we assume that petitioner has shown that his trial 
counsel was deficient for failing to investigate and present this additional 
evidence at sentencing, we hold that petitioner has failed to demonstrate that 
he suffered any prejudice from this deficiency.
Initially, we note that most of the evidence attached to petitioner's 
post-conviction petition is not inherently mitigating. A jury, for example, may 
consider the evidence regarding petitioner's mental and psychological 
impairments as either mitigating or aggravating, depending on whether the 
evidence evokes compassion or demonstrates possible future dangerousness. 
Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 406. Similarly, evidence of a defendant's 
troubled childhood, including evidence that a defendant was physically or 
sexually abused as a child, has no inherently mitigating value and may, in fact, 
actually be aggravating. People v. Madej, 177 Ill. 2d 116, 140 (1997). 
Likewise, the mere fact that petitioner views his history of drug and alcohol 
abuse as mitigating does not require the jury to do the same. Madej, 
177 Ill. 2d  at 138-39 (stating a defendant's drug history may have no mitigating 
value and may even be aggravating).
In this case, the jury could easily have concluded that much of the evidence 
regarding petitioner's psychological impairments was, in fact, aggravating. Dr. 
Ferrell's psychological evaluation, for example, concludes that petitioner is 
"effectively predisposed to overreact and strike out against others with violent 
gestures." Similarly, Dr. Conte concluded that petitioner has a history of 
victimizing others and that he has a "warped and violent" notion of "maleness" 
such that "any action or word which is perceived as questioning his maleness 
would be a serious threat and require an excessive response." Such conclusions 
are powerful evidence of petitioner's future dangerousness.
Even many of the affidavits from petitioner's family members contain highly 
damaging aggravating evidence. For example, John Branch, petitioner's adoptive 
brother, averred in his affidavit that petitioner has a history of being 
sexually aggressive and that he molested his half-brother Thomas when Thomas was 
10 or 11 years old. Hattie Ivey, the mother of petitioner's daughter Sadie, 
stated that petitioner never took care of his daughter and was never there to 
support her. Ivey remarked that petitioner was constantly in and out of jail and 
that he told her that he could make more money by doing illegal things than by 
working. Virtually all of these affidavits attest to petitioner's extensive 
abuse of drugs and alcohol.
Even if the jury could have viewed the evidence attached to the 
post-conviction petition as mitigating, the fact that a defendant was physically 
or sexually abused as a child or has impaired cognitive abilities does not 
preclude imposition of a death sentence when that evidence is outweighed by 
aggravating evidence. Madej, 177 Ill. 2d  at 139-40. Here, the 
aggravating evidence supporting the jury's imposition of the death penalty was 
overwhelming. Petitioner has an extensive criminal record spanning three 
decades. Petitioner has a prior conviction for murder, as well as convictions 
for armed robbery, criminal trespass to a vehicle, burglary, resisting arrest, 
disorderly conduct, unlawful use of a weapon, attempted aggravated criminal 
sexual assault, kidnaping and unlawful restraint. Petitioner has a history of 
victimizing others. The State presented evidence at sentencing that petitioner 
was caught having sex with a mentally retarded woman and attempted to sexually 
molest his own daughter Sadie McGee when she was 8 years old. (In her affidavit 
attached to the post-conviction petition, Sadie now admits that petitioner 
actually did molest her.)
The circumstances surrounding the murder in this case are particularly brutal 
and heinous. Petitioner stabbed the victim, who was approximately 5 feet 2 
inches tall and weighed only 90 pounds, 12 times and inflicted 10 more incise 
wounds. Petitioner committed the murder in the presence of the victim's 
six-year-old son. A neighbor who responded to the screams of the victim 
testified that she saw petitioner having sex with the victim while the knife 
still protruded from her chest.
In light of the foregoing evidence, petitioner has not shown a reasonable 
probability that the outcome of his sentencing hearing would have been different 
if his trial counsel had presented the additional evidence attached to the 
post-conviction petition. We, therefore, hold that petitioner has failed to make 
a substantial showing that his right to effective assistance of counsel at his 
sentencing hearing was violated.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County 
dismissing petitioner's post-conviction petition is affirmed. The clerk of this 
court is directed to enter an order setting Thursday, September 14, 2000, as the 
date on which the sentence of death entered in the circuit court is to be 
imposed. The petitioner shall be executed in the manner provided by law. 725 
ILCS 5/119-5 (West 1996). The clerk of this court shall send a certified copy of 
the mandate in this case to the Director of Corrections, the warden of Tamms 
Correctional Center, and the warden of the institution where petitioner is now 
confined.
Judgment affirmed.
CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree that Childress' convictions should not be disturbed. In my view, 
however, his sentence of death cannot be allowed to stand. For the reasons set 
forth in my partial concurrence and partial dissent in People v. Bull, 
185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), the Illinois death penalty law violates the eighth and 
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. 
VIII, XIV) and article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 
1970, art. I, §2). Childress' sentence of death should therefore be vacated, and 
the cause should be remanded for imposition of a sentence of imprisonment. 720 
ILCS 5/9-1(j) (West 1996).