Title: Wood v. Hayes
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1100750
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: September 7, 2012

REL: 9/7/2012
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2012
____________________
1100750
____________________
Joni Wood
v.
Karrie Hayes
____________________
1100751
____________________
Darren Woods
v.
Karrie Hayes
Appeals from Lauderdale Circuit Court
(CV-06-400)
1100750 and 1100751
Although both Darren and Joni are children of Stevie
1
Woods, the legal spelling of Joni's last name is "Wood" with
no final "s."
In the proceedings at the Court of Criminal Appeals
2
arising out of this incident, Woods is referred to as "Steve"
Woods.
2
MURDOCK, Justice.
Darren Woods and his half sister Joni Wood,  appeal
1
separately from a judgment based on a jury verdict in favor of
Karrie Hayes and against Joni in the amount of $437,761.52 and
against Darren in the amount of $86,540.49 for violating the
Alabama Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, § 8-9A-1 et seq.
("AUFTA"). We have consolidated the two appeals for the
purpose of writing one opinion.  In both appeals, we reverse
and remand.
I.  Facts and Procedural History
On the morning of September 28, 2004, Karrie Hayes, then
age 14, was alone inside the house where she resided with her
mother in Florence.  Jason Earl Pruitt, at the request and
under the direction of Stevie Woods,  the father of Darren and
2
Joni, released a large amount of propane gas into the
residence and then ignited the gas, causing the residence to
1100750 and 1100751
According to the facts related by the Court of Criminal
3
Appeals in its unpublished memorandum addressing the direct
appeal of Stevie Woods from his conviction for first-degree
arson arising out of this incident, Stevie Woods paid Pruitt
$3,000 to destroy the house because Woods believed that Amy
Hayes, Karrie's mother, had stolen money from him.  Woods v.
State (No. CR-06-1150), 64 So. 3d 1150 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009)
(table).
3
explode into flames.   Hayes was thrown from the house into
3
the front yard.  As a result of the explosion, Hayes sustained
severe burns to over 70 percent of her body.  
Investigators quickly learned of Pruitt's involvement,
and Pruitt thereafter implicated Stevie Woods.  Officer Travis
Clemmons, chief investigator for the Lauderdale County
Sheriff's Department, confronted Stevie Woods the day after
the accident. Officer Clemmons testified at trial that Woods
appeared visibly shaken when he was told that someone was in
the house when it was set ablaze.
On January 27, 2006, Stevie Woods was arrested and
charged with arson for the burning of the residence in which
Hayes was living.  Both Stevie Woods and Pruitt were convicted
of arson in the first degree on November 8, 2006.  The Court
of Criminal Appeals affirmed Woods's conviction in an
unpublished memorandum on November 6, 2009, Woods v. State
(No. CR-06-1150), 64 So. 3d 1150 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009)
1100750 and 1100751
4
(table), and this Court denied his petition for a writ of
certiorari on February 12, 2010, Ex parte Woods (No. 1090391),
76 So. 3d 876 (Ala. 2010) (table). Darren and Joni were not
implicated in the crime.
As a result of the injuries she sustained in the
explosion, Hayes was placed in a medically induced coma from
which she awoke after a month and a half.  She stayed in the
hospital for approximately two and a half months and underwent
12 surgeries during that period.  Most of the surgeries were
for skin grafts to cover the burned areas of Hayes's body.
Hayes also had to undergo extensive physical therapy.  Hayes's
treating physician, Dr. William Hardin, then chief surgeon in
the burn unit at Children's Hospital of Alabama, testified by
video deposition at trial that Hayes "will require ongoing
lifetime care.  She will not be normal.  She will suffer the
effects of this through her entire life.  It will effect her
not only physically but emotionally, psychologically.  Her
life is changed forever."
On September 20, 2006, Hayes, through her mother, filed
a civil action against Stevie Woods and Pruitt seeking damages
for the injuries she sustained as a result of the destruction
1100750 and 1100751
Initially, Amy Hayes and Jerry Parnell, the owner of the
4
house, filed individual claims in the same complaint, but
those claims were not pursued at trial.  During the course of
the litigation, Karrie Hayes reached the age of majority, and,
as a result, she pursued the action through trial on her own
behalf.
Hayes also named Stevie Woods's sister, Patsy Ann Scott,
5
and his other daughter, Kaylee Woods, as defendants, but these
defendants later were dismissed from the action by motions
filed by Hayes.  
5
of the residence.   In amended complaints filed on May 7,
4
2007, and September 29, 2008, Hayes added claims alleging the
fraudulent transfer of assets against Stevie Woods, Darren,
Joni, and Flower Wood Development, LLC ("Flower Wood"), and
conspiracy to engage in the fraudulent transfers and seeking
injunctive relief to bar further transfers.  With regard to
these claims, Hayes specifically alleged that, with the
knowledge of the existence of Hayes's claims against him,
Stevie Woods fraudulently transferred real and personal
property to various relatives,  including Darren and Joni, as
5
well as to Flower Wood.  
Pursuant to Rule 42, Ala. R. Civ. P., Darren and Joni
filed a motion requesting that the claims against them related
to the alleged fraudulent transfers be tried separately from
the personal-injury claims filed against Stevie Woods and
1100750 and 1100751
6
Pruitt.  One of the stated grounds for separate trials was
that 
"[i]t is anticipated that photographs of the
Plaintiff, 
Karrie 
Hayes, 
medical 
testimony
concerning the condition of Karrie Hayes, testimony
of 
Karrie 
Hayes 
describing 
her 
injuries 
and
condition, her pain and suffering and her other
damages and injuries will be elicited at the trial
of the case.
"The testimony 
and 
evidence 
described 
above 
will
prejudice 
the 
Defendants 
in 
the 
fraudulent
conveyance claims which said prejudice will not be
able to be cured by any instruction the Court may
give to disregard that evidence on damages when
deciding issues in the fraudulent conveyance case.
"All the proof about Karrie Hayes's damages [is]
not admissible to prove any elements of the claims
concerning fraudulent conveyances."
Darren and Joni later filed a supplement to their motion
for separate trials in which they contended that "[t]he motive
and intent of [Hayes] in offering photographs and other
[evidence] of serious injury is to inflame the jury in their
favor and appeal to the jury's sympathy."  They attached to
the supplement an affidavit from David Odem, cocounsel for
Stevie Woods in the criminal action against him resulting from
the incident.  In the affidavit, Odem stated that "[t]he
photographs of Karrie Hayes were gruesome, awful, horrible.
1100750 and 1100751
Pruitt had failed to answer the complaint, and a default
6
judgment was entered against him.  On December 1, 2010, he
filed a motion stating that he did not contest the allegations
against him and that he agreed to be bound jointly and
7
In fact, I cannot think of adequate words to describe how bad
they were." 
The trial court subsequently ordered bifurcated trials
for the claims in Hayes's complaint.  The first trial would
address Hayes's claims for "damages for acts relating to the
explosion and fire made the basis of this litigation."  The
second trial would address "[a]ll issues related to fraudulent
conveyances." 
In the same order, the trial court found that Stevie
Woods's "willful, improper and contemptuous refusal to give
deposition testimony has prevented [Hayes] from obtaining
testimony and evidence necessary for the adequate prosecution
of [her] case" and that Woods had "continued to exhibit a
pattern and practice of willful disobedience to the Rules of
Civil Procedure and to Orders of this Court."  As a result of
Stevie Woods's lack of cooperation, the trial court ruled that
all of Hayes's facts concerning her personal-injury claims
"are to be taken as established," leaving damages as the only
issue to be determined by the jury.   
6
1100750 and 1100751
severally by any jury verdict as to damages entered against
Stevie Woods.
8
On December 8, 2010, a jury awarded Hayes $5 million
against Stevie Woods and Pruitt on her personal-injury claims.
Stevie Woods did not appeal the verdict.  
Before the trial on Hayes's fraudulent-transfer claims,
the trial court entered an order assessing more sanctions
against Stevie Woods because of his continued lack of
cooperation.  The trial court also determined before trial
that 11 deeds had been used to fraudulently transfer 9 parcels
of real property from Stevie Woods to Darren, Joni, and Flower
Wood, and the trial court set aside those deeds.  The order
setting aside those deeds further stated that "the issue of
any additional real and personal property which may have been
fraudulently transferred among the defendants is not disposed
of by this Court's ruling and remains at issue for trial."
The defendants did not challenge the order and do not do so on
appeal.  
Stevie Woods refused to answer all but the most
preliminary questions in his deposition, responding to nearly
every question that he was "tak[ing] the Fifth."  As a result,
the trial court issued further sanctions against Woods,
1100750 and 1100751
9
including finding that Woods was barred from opposing Hayes's
claims or the damages sought and that "[a]ll questions
Defendant Stevie Woods refused to respond to during his
deposition questioning are hereby taken as established for
purposes of this action."  Several of the established facts
concerned Woods's transferring assets to Darren, Joni, and
Flower Wood.  It also was established that Stevie Woods had
not contributed any money to pay for Hayes's medical expenses
or to compensate her for her injuries.  The defendants
likewise did not challenge this order.
On February 22, 2011, the trial on Hayes's fraudulent-
transfer claims commenced.  During the opening statement of
Hayes's counsel, counsel for the defendants objected to
Hayes's counsel's showing the jury photographs of Hayes's
injuries.  Counsel for Darren, Joni, and Flower Wood stated
that "the damage[s] case against Stevie [Woods] is simply not
relevant to any issue to be presented here ... it's just
simply not relevant evidence." The trial court overruled the
objection.  Later in the opening statement, defendants'
counsel interjected that 
"[t]he defendants, Joni Woods [sic], Darren Woods,
and Flower Wood Development stipulate that any
1100750 and 1100751
10
injuries sustained by Miss Hayes very unfortunately
were horrible and that the judgment has already been
rendered against Stevie Woods for five million
dollars as [Hayes's counsel] has said.  She has
hospital and doctor bills [that are] astronomical
and we stipulate to all that making all of this not
relevant."  
Hayes's first witness was Officer Clemmons, who testified
about what he had observed at the scene of the explosion on
the day it occurred as well as some details about the criminal
investigation.  Counsel for Darren, Joni, and Flower Wood
objected that Officer Clemmons's testimony was irrelevant to
the 
issue 
whether 
the 
transactions 
in 
question 
were
fraudulent.  The trial court overruled the objection.  
Officer Clemmons testified concerning the condition of
the house when he arrived on the scene, and he verified
photographs of damage done to the residence.  He testified as
to Hayes's condition immediately after the incident, stating
that "she was skin -— she was, I mean, it was actually falling
off of her, her arms."  He stated that Hayes asked him if she
was going to die, but that he did not answer her.  Instead, he
walked away because "out of all I've seen in my line of work
[her condition] was probably the worst and I couldn't handle
1100750 and 1100751
11
it."  Officer Clemmons also stated that he talked with Stevie
Woods the day after the explosion and he told Woods 
"about the house exploding, [Hayes] being in the
house and talked to him to the point of -- he was
standing —- we were standing right in front of my
car and when I started talking to him about [Hayes]
being in the house and could possibly die, Jason
[Pruitt] gone to the hospital, his -— he was shaking
and his knees were shaking so bad he had to lean up
against my car."
Hayes next offered video deposition testimony from
Dr. Hardin.  Counsel for Darren, Joni, and Flower Wood
objected that Hardin's testimony did "not establish any
material fact the consequence of which bears on the truth or
falsity of any issue to be tried."  The trial court overruled
the objection.  Dr. Hardin testified as to the extent of
Hayes's injuries, the number and kinds of procedures she had
endured, and the extent of her recovery.  Dr. Hardin stated
that Hayes "sustain[ed] significant injuries that included a
major total body surface area burn."  He also identified and
discussed photographs of Hayes's surgical treatment that were
admitted into evidence over the objection of counsel.  
Hayes's counsel then played excerpts of Stevie Woods's
video deposition.  Facts established against Stevie Woods by
his refusal to answer questions included the fact that he
1100750 and 1100751
12
owned several rental properties in the Florence area, that
multiple parcels of real property had been transferred to
Darren and to Joni, but that no money was paid in exchange for
those properties, that Stevie Woods had had conversations with
Joni concerning the establishment of Flower Wood, that Joni
collects the rent from Stevie Woods's rental properties and
passes it on to him, and that Stevie Woods had transferred
cash to Darren and Joni following the incident. 
Hayes's counsel next called Darren to testify.  Darren
testified that currently he lives in the house his father
lived in at the time of the incident, that he pays no rent for
living in the house, and that he does not have a job and he
does not go to school.
With regard to various financial transactions, Darren
testified that he was 16 years old in September 2004 when the
explosion occurred and that he did not own any real property
at the time.  He stated that he was 18 years old in December
2006 when deeds indicate that his father transferred real
property to him and to Joni.  Darren claimed that he had never
bought or sold property and that he was not familiar with the
properties listed in the deeds.  Darren admitted that his
1100750 and 1100751
13
signature appeared on deeds dated in mid 2007 transferring
real property from himself and Joni to Flower Wood, but he
denied any memory of the transfers.  He admitted that he had
had a joint bank account with his father, but he stated that
he did not write checks, that his father had signing
privileges on the account, and that Joni had a durable power
of attorney for their father.  Darren denied any awareness of
$40,000 having been deposited into the joint account.  Though
Darren admitted that his signature appeared on a check for
$25,000 made out to Margaret Ann Hill for the purchase of real
property and that his signature also appeared on the warranty
deed for the property, he denied having any knowledge of the
transaction or of the subsequent transfer of the same property
to Flower Wood.  Darren stated that he did not know much about
Flower Wood other than that it was organized for tax purposes.
He denied knowledge of checks made out to him by the Florence
Housing Authority and deposited into his joint account.
Darren stated that he assumed his father or Joni must have
signed the checks on his behalf.  
On cross-examination, Darren testified that his father's
health in 2006 was poor, as demonstrated by the facts that
1100750 and 1100751
14
Stevie Woods had diabetes, had had a leg amputated, and had
undergone two open-heart surgeries.  Darren denied having any
knowledge of any deeds, transactions, deposits, or withdrawals
done in his name during the period in question.  He also
denied attempting to hide money to keep it from Hayes.  
Hayes's counsel next called Joni to testify.  Joni
testified that she has held Stevie Woods's power of attorney
since early 2006 and that from the time of Woods's conviction
on November 8, 2006, she ran the family business.  Exactly one
month after her father's conviction and sentence, Joni filed
articles of organization for Flower Wood, naming herself as
the sole member.  Joni admitted that she and Darren did not
pay any money to their father for land that was transferred to
them following the incident involving Hayes.  She also
admitted that, when property that had been transferred to them
subsequently was transferred to Flower Wood, no money was
exchanged.  She stated that the reason for the transfers of
her father's property was that he was ill in 2006 and he
believed he was going to die and he wanted to pass on his
property to his children before that occurred.  Joni admitted
that her father recovered from his illness but that none of
1100750 and 1100751
15
the transferred property has been returned to him.  She also
admitted that she had been receiving rental income from some
of the properties that was being deposited into bank accounts
for the benefit of Flower Wood, Darren, and herself.  She
stated that some of the income from the rental properties she
uses for her personal expenses because "this job is my only
source of income."  Joni also admitted that she had recently
built a new house.  
Joni denied knowledge of property transactions about
which Hayes's counsel asked her, stating that everything was
a blur at the time the transactions occurred because of her
father's ordeal and the death of her grandmother.  One such
transaction involved the sale of property by Stevie Woods to
H & H Land Company and someone else, in connection with which
the property was placed in Darren's and Joni's name. She and
Darren then deeded the property to Flower Wood, which in turn
deeded it to the purchasers.  Joni admitted that a portion of
the proceeds from that sale was deposited into her personal
bank account.  Joni then purchased property from Vella Ruth
Darby and deeded the property to Flower Wood.
1100750 and 1100751
16
Joni admitted that Stevie Woods had given her and Darren
money as well as real property since 2004, but she stated that
this was because he was being generous to them.  She also
claimed that she and Darren worked for their father by serving
as caregivers, paying bills, and setting up health insurance
because their father could not read or write.  
On cross-examination, Joni denied that her father
attempted to hide anything from Hayes and testified that she
did not try to hide assets from Hayes.  She contended that
most of the transactions in question occurred as a result of
having to pay for Stevie Woods's legal representation and
because Stevie Woods wanted to give his children his property
before he died.  
The jury then heard testimony from Hayes.  Hayes
testified about what she remembered of the incident, about her
injuries, and her recovery.  Defendants' counsel objected to
her testimony and to the admission of more photographs of
Hayes's injuries.  The trial court overruled the objections.
It was established that Hayes's medical bills exceeded
$1 million.  She also testified that she had not received any
compensation from the Woods family for her injuries.  
1100750 and 1100751
We note that Darren previously testified that at one time
7
he had had a joint checking account with his father.
17
At the close of Hayes's case, the defendants moved for a
judgment as a matter of law, which the trial court denied. The
defendants then presented further testimony from Darren during
which he stated that title to property valued at $477,600
already had been transferred back into his father's name as a
result of the transactions the trial court previously had set
aside. Darren also testified that he has no money and that he
no longer had a checking account.   Following Darren's
7
testimony, the case was submitted to the jury.  
On February 24, 2011, the jury returned a verdict in
favor of Hayes and against Darren for violating the AUFTA and
assessed damages in the amount of $86,540.49.  It found
against Joni for violating the AUFTA and for conspiracy to
violate the AUFTA and assessed damages in the amount of
$437,761.52; it found against Flower Wood for violating the
AUFTA and assessed damages in the amount of $32,247.50.
The defendants did not file postjudgment motions.  Darren
and Joni appeal the verdicts entered against them; Flower Wood
has not appealed the verdict entered against it.  
1100750 and 1100751
18
II.  Standard of Review
Darren and Joni argue on appeal that the judgments
against them should be reversed on the ground that the trial
court erred in admitting into evidence highly prejudicial
photographs, 
medical 
records, 
and 
testimony 
concerning 
Hayes's
injuries and photographs and testimony concerning the
explosion.
"'"The standard applicable to a review of a
trial court's rulings on the admission of evidence
is determined by two fundamental principles. The
first grants trial judges wide discretion to exclude
or to admit evidence."' Mock v. Allen, 783 So. 2d
828, 835 (Ala. 2000) (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
v. Thompson, 726 So. 2d 651, 655 (Ala. 1998)).
Despite the latitude afforded the trial court in its
evidentiary rulings, a trial court exceeds its
discretion where it admits prejudicial evidence that
has no probative value. See Powell v. State, 796 So.
2d 404, 419 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999), aff'd, 796 So.
2d 434 (Ala. 2001).
"'"The second principle 'is that a judgment
cannot be reversed on appeal for an error [in the
improper admission of evidence] unless ... it should
appear that the error complained of has probably
injuriously affected substantial rights of the
parties.'"' Mock, 783 So. 2d at 835 (quoting
Wal-Mart Stores, 726 So. 2d at 655, quoting in turn
Atkins v. Lee, 603 So. 2d 937, 941 (Ala. 1992)). See
also Ala. R. App. P. 45. 'The burden of establishing
that an erroneous ruling was prejudicial is on the
appellant.' Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ryan,
589 So. 2d 165, 167 (Ala. 1991)."
1100750 and 1100751
Darren and Joni also argue on appeal that the trial court
8
erred in failing to grant their motion for a judgment as a
matter of law based on the ground of insufficiency of the
evidence and in failing to order a new trial on the ground
that the jury's verdict was against the great weight of the
evidence.  As noted, however, none of the defendants filed a
postjudgment motion.  Such a motion, among other things, is
necessary to preserve for appeal an alleged error by the trial
court in not entering a judgment as a matter of law based on
insufficiency of the evidence.  See King Mines Resort, Inc. v.
Malachi Min. & Minerals, Inc., 518 So. 2d 714, 716 (Ala.
1987).  Likewise, a postjudgment motion is necessary to
preserve for appeal an argument that a new trial was warranted
based on the great weight of the evidence.  Id. at 717. Thus,
Darren and Joni have waived their argument that the trial
court erred in failing to enter a judgment as a matter of law
or and in failing to order a new trial.  
19
Middleton v. Lightfoot, 885 So. 2d 111, 113-14 (Ala. 2003)
(emphasis omitted).  
8
III.  Analysis
The essence of Darren and Joni's argument is as follows:
"The trial court permitted presentation of
extensive graphic evidence of Hayes's physical
injuries caused not by any conveyance of property,
but 
by 
a 
fire 
in 
which 
[Darren 
and 
Joni]
indisputably played no role. This evidence was
irrelevant to the issues on trial, had no probative
value in determining whether there had been a
violation of the Alabama Fraudulent Transfers Act by
Appellants Joni Wood and Darren Woods, and served
solely to inflame the passions of the jury to the
point that it was impossible for Joni Wood and
Darren Woods to receive a fair trial."
Thus, Darren and Joni contend that evidence pertaining to the
circumstances and extent of Hayes's injuries was irrelevant
1100750 and 1100751
20
and prejudicial and should have been excluded.  The
sufficiency of Darren's and Joni's objections to this evidence
is not in question in this appeal.
In deciding whether to admit evidence in the face of
objections on these grounds, "the trial court must determine
whether the evidence is relevant and probative, Rule 401, Ala.
R. Evid., and whether the probative value of the evidence is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
Rule 403, Ala. R. Evid."  Woods v. State, 13 So. 3d 1, 19
(Ala. Crim. App. 2007).  
"'"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is
of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.' Ala. R. Evid. 401. Under this
rule, '[e]vidence is to be admitted if it possesses
"any tendency," in logic or experience, to lead to
the fact or inference for which it is offered.'
Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 401."
Middleton, 885 So. 2d at 115.  See also Taylor v. General
Motors Corp., 707 So. 2d 198, 203 (Ala. 1997) (stating that
"[e]vidence is relevant when it has some tendency to shed
light on the inquiry at issue").  Thus, the first question we
must address is whether the circumstances and extent of
1100750 and 1100751
Section 8-9A-4(c) provides:
9
"(c) A transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent
as to a creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose
21
Hayes's injuries are "fact[s] that [are] of consequence to the
determination of the action."  885 So 2d at 115.  
The trial court gave the following charge to the jury,
without objection, concerning Hayes's burden to prove a
violation of the AUFTA:
"[Hayes] claims to be a creditor of the debtor
Stevie Woods and claims that the debtor fraudulently
transferred an asset or interest in an asset when
the debtor transferred money and real property to
the transferees Joni Woods and Darren Woods. [Hayes]
has the burden of proving to your reasonable
satisfaction the following elements: 
"1. [Hayes] is a creditor of the debtor Stevie
Woods.
"2. That the debtor transferred an asset or an
interest in an asset without receiving a reasonably
equivalent value in exchange for the transfer.
"3. That the debtor intended to incur, or believed
or reasonably should have believed that he would
incur, debts beyond his ability to pay as they
became due."
The 
charge 
was 
taken 
from 
Alabama 
Pattern 
Jury
Instruction: Civil 18.21, and it is consistent with the latter
of two types of constructive fraud described in Ala. Code
1975, § 8-9A-4(c).   The Alabama Comment to this Code section
9
1100750 and 1100751
before or after the transfer was made, if the debtor
made the transfer without receiving a reasonably
equivalent value in exchange for the transfer and
the debtor:
"(1) Was engaged or was about to
engage in a business or a transaction for
which the remaining assets of the debtor
were unreasonably small in relation to the
business or transaction; or
"(2) Intended to incur, or believed or
reasonably should have believed that he or
she would incur, debts beyond his or her
ability to pay as they became due."
22
states that "[s]ubsection (c) of this section list two types
of fraud, which are commonly identified as constructive
fraud."  Ala. Code 1975, § 8-9A-4, Comment 3. 
This Court has explained:
"An existing creditor seeking to set aside a
conveyance may do so because of either actual fraud
or constructive fraud. Actual fraud denotes the
actual mental operation of intending to defeat or
delay the rights of the creditor. On the other hand,
constructive 
fraud 
is 
based 
on 
facts 
and
circumstances which courts have said constitute
legal fraud, regardless of actual intent. The term
'constructive fraud' is generally used to refer to
those instances where a grantor, indebted at the
time, conveys property without receiving valuable
consideration."
Granberry v. Johnson, 491 So. 2d 926, 928-29 (Ala. 1986).
Darren and Joni contend that the manner in which Hayes
was injured and the gruesome nature of her injuries are
1100750 and 1100751
In her brief, Hayes states that the $5 million verdict
10
against Stevie Woods "was still potentially subject to appeal"
at the time of the trial against Darren and Joni.  This is not
the case.  Because the $5 million verdict was entered December
8, 2010, it had to be appealed by January 19, 2011.  The trial
against Darren and Joni did not occur until February 22, 2011.
23
irrelevant to establishing the elements of a constructive
fraudulent transfer.  Hayes counters that the evidence was
relevant to establishing that she was a creditor of Stevie
Woods (the first element) and to demonstrating that Woods knew
that the debt exceeded his ability to pay it (the third
element).  
Concerning the first element, the fact that Stevie Woods
was a debtor to Hayes was not in issue at trial.  A $5 million
verdict in favor of Hayes and against Woods concerning her
personal injuries had been entered before the trial of Hayes's
claims against Darren and Joni relating to the alleged
fraudulent transfers.  Stevie Woods did not appeal that
verdict, and the jury was informed of the verdict in the
opening statements of counsel for both parties.
  Indeed,
10
during 
opening 
statements 
counsel 
for 
the 
defendants
stipulated to the judgment against Stevie Woods and to the
fact that Hayes had incurred over $1 million in medical bills.
Evidence of the full extent and gruesome nature of Hayes's
1100750 and 1100751
24
injuries was not necessary to establishing an element of the
claim that was not in dispute.
As mentioned, Hayes also contends in these appeals, as
she did before the trial court, that "the nature and extent of
[Hayes's] injuries are fully probative for showing what was or
should have been in Stevie Woods' mind in the weeks and months
following the explosion."  In other words, Hayes contends that
the evidence was relevant to demonstrate the third element of
a constructive fraudulent transfer -- that Stevie Woods knew
or should have known that the debt he owed Hayes would be
beyond his ability to pay because of the magnitude of her
injuries.  Thus, according to Hayes, the jury needed to be
shown pictures of Hayes's injuries and to be told about the
ordeal of her recovery because the evidence had a bearing on
the magnitude of the debt Stevie Woods owed Hayes.  
The problem with this argument is that no testimony
solicited from Stevie Woods, Darren, or Joni indicated that
Stevie Woods knew, or should have known, the full extent and
gruesome nature of Hayes's injuries at the time he incurred
the debt or at any time before he started transferring assets
to his children.  In his deposition, Stevie Woods did not
1100750 and 1100751
25
testify concerning his knowledge of Hayes's condition, and, in
fact, he was not asked any questions on that subject.
Likewise, neither Darren nor Joni was asked whether their
father was aware of the nature and extent of Hayes's injuries
at the time the transfers were made.  The only testimony
provided at trial on this subject was elicited from Officer
Clemmons, who related to Stevie Woods the day after the
explosion that Hayes had been in the house when it exploded
and that she had sustained life-threatening injuries.  It
would have been reasonable for the jury to infer from that
testimony that Stevie Woods knew or should have known that he
had incurred a debt to Hayes based on the fact that he had
been told that she had sustained life-threatening injuries.
There is no evidence to indicate, however, that Stevie Woods
knew or should have known of the extent of Hayes's injuries as
depicted by the evidence presented at trial or that the debt
he might incur as a result of those injuries would be beyond
his ability to pay because of the nature of those injuries or
the kind of medical care that would be required to recover
from such injuries.
1100750 and 1100751
26
As noted above, "relevant evidence" must concern a "fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action."
Rule 401, Ala. R. Evid.  The creditor-debtor relationship
between Hayes and Stevie Woods was not in question, and Hayes
presented no evidence indicating that Stevie Woods knew the
full extent and gruesome nature of Hayes's injuries at the
time he made the transfers in question.  Consequently, the
testimony and documentary evidence detailing the same could
not assist in establishing the third element of the
constructive-fraudulent transfer claims.
For good reason, the trial court ordered that the trial
of Hayes's claims solely against Stevie Woods based on
personal injuries she sustained in the explosion proceed
separately from the trial of Hayes's claims alleging
fraudulent transfers against Stevie Woods, Darren, Joni, and
Flower Wood.  It did so following a motion from Darren, Joni,
and Flower Wood in which those defendants expressed grave
concerns about the possibility of evidence regarding Hayes's
injuries "inflam[ing]" the jury against them.  The trial
court's order bifurcating the trial of Hayes's claims
constituted 
an 
implicit 
acknowledgment 
that 
evidence 
regarding
1100750 and 1100751
27
the explosion and Hayes's resulting injuries could only
distract from a trial on the claims alleging fraudulent
transfers.  Despite taking the measure of ordering separate
trials on those claims, the trial court then allowed Hayes to
present much of the evidence concerning the explosion, her
injuries, and her recovery that she had presented in the first
trial of her personal-injury claims against Stevie Woods.  
"'Trial judges have wide discretion to
exclude or admit evidence even of minor
probative value on issues litigated in the
cases. The test is that the evidence must
only shed light on the main inquiry, and
not withdraw attention from the main
inquiry. Cherry v. Hill, 283 Ala. 74, 214
So.2d 427 (1968); see also, C. Gamble,
McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 21.01(6) (3rd
ed. 1977).'"
Scarber v. Kelsoe, 594 So. 2d 68, 70 (Ala. 1992) (quoting Ryan
v. Acuff, 435 So. 2d 1244, 1217 (Ala. 1983) (emphasis added)).
The evidence in question drew attention away from the
pertinent inquiry –- whether the real-property transactions
were fraudulent transfers.  Instead, the evidence emphasized
Hayes's pain and suffering.  See also, e.g., Middleton, 885
So. 2d at 113 (observing that "[d]espite the latitude afforded
the trial court in its evidentiary rulings, a trial court
1100750 and 1100751
28
exceeds its discretion where it admits prejudicial evidence
that has no probative value" (emphasis omitted)). 
As we noted in our statement of the standard of review,
an erroneous ruling as to the admission of evidence by a trial
court constitutes reversible error only if the error has
probably injuriously affected substantial rights of the
appealing parties.  In this instance, the prejudice to Darren
and Joni resulting from the admission of photographs of the
crime scene and Hayes's gruesome condition following the
explosion as well as testimony detailing the extent of Hayes's
injuries and the manner in which those injuries radically
affected her life is obvious. The evidence had "'an undue
tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis.'"  Gipson
v. Younes, 724 So. 2d 530, 532 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998) (quoting
Rule 403, Fed. R. Evid., Advisory Committee Notes 1972).
Therefore, the trial court's admission of the evidence
constitutes reversible error.  
IV.  Conclusion
The trial court's admission of evidence that was entirely
irrelevant to Hayes's fraudulent-transfer claims and that was
highly prejudicial to Darren and Joni warrants reversal of the
1100750 and 1100751
29
jury verdicts against Darren and Joni.  Accordingly, the
judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the cause is
remanded for a new trial consistent with this opinion.  
1100750 –- REVERSED AND REMANDED.
1100751 –- REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Malone, C.J., and Woodall, Bolin, and Main, JJ., concur.