Title: Chustak v. Northern Indiana Public Service Co.
Citation: 288 N.E.2d 149
Docket Number: 1270S314
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: October 18, 1972

288 N.E.2d 149 (1972)
William CHUSTAK et al., Appellants,
v.
NORTHERN INDIANA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY, Appellee.
No. 1270S314.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
October 18, 1972.
*150 Blachly, Tabor &amp; Bozik, of Duane W. Hartman and Glenn J. Tabor, Valparaiso, for appellants.
George W. Douglas, of Douglas, Douglas &amp; Douglas, Valparaiso, Richard W. Johnson and William H. Eichhorn, of Schroer, Eichhorn &amp; Morrow, Hammond, for appellee.
*151 PRENTICE, Justice.
This is an appeal from the order of the trial court permitting the plaintiff (appellee) to appropriate a right-of-way 150 feet in width for electrical transmission and distribution lines upon, through and over the lands of the defendants (appellants). Defendants here seek to reverse the order of the trial court, contending that it erred in the following respects:
The complaint herein was filed on October 7, 1970, and by summons the defendants were notified on October 27, 1970 to appear on November 2, 1970 and show cause, if any, why the property sought to be condemned should not be appropriated. Although not affirmatively disclosed by the record, it appears that the parties and the court agreed to continue the hearing date to November 12, 1970. On November 9, 1970, the defendants mailed to the plaintiff a request to produce, as follows:
*152 On November 12, 1970 the defendants appeared and filed their objections to the appropriation and a motion to produce, said objections and motion being as follows:
The parties proceeded to an evidentiary hearing upon the objections, without having obtained a ruling upon the motion to produce, at the conclusion of which the court ordered the appropriation and appointed appraisers.
(1) There is nothing in the record to show whether the defendants' aforesaid written motion to produce was overruled or withdrawn. No ruling appears. We cannot assume that the court overruled the written motion; and by proceeding without protest and without a ruling, Defendants waived any error that might otherwise have been averted. Barnes v. State (1971), Ind., 266 N.E.2d 617; Wilhoite v. State (1971), Ind., 266 N.E.2d 23; Brown v. State (1970), Ind., 262 N.E.2d 515.
The defendants contend by their reply brief that the court reserved its ruling upon the motion for pre-trial discovery and refers us to transcript Page 90, which does reflect that the court reserved its ruling upon a motion of the defendants. We do not interpret such reservation as having been addressed to the pre-trial discovery motion, however, but rather to the defendants' in-trial motion made moments earlier and reflected at transcript Page 84. This motion was to require the plaintiff to produce certain books, which were later obtained and are hereinafter mentioned. Referring to such motion, we are somewhat confused by counsel's colloquy, "At this point I will renew my motion to produce documents listed in the motion * * *." Notwithstanding the use of the word "renew", we view it as an in-trial motion to produce and not as a refiling of the pre-trial motion, which was the only motion previously filed. The pre-trial motion being for the purpose of trial preparation, we are unable to perceive how it could be entertained during the course of a trial. Nor are we able to conclude from such colloquy whether the pre-trial motion had been previously ruled upon, withdrawn or waived. The record in these particulars leaves much to the imagination, and we must acknowledge that our conclusions here stated may be inaccurate. If so, however, we remind the defendants that they have the burden of presenting a correct and clear record of the proceedings and that we are required to resolve ambiguities in favor of the judgment of the trial court.
There is an additional reason for ruling against the defendants upon this proposition, however. The true spirit of the new discovery rules may be described *153 as two fold: 1) to provide for a minimum of court involvement in the discovery process and, 2) to allow for a more liberal discovery procedure. In the instant case the defendants were seeking discovery of the plaintiff's computations as to the width of the required right-of-way. These computations were not made in preparation for litigation, but rather in the ordinary course of the utility's business. The discovery of such items is controlled by Trial Rule 34, IC 1971, 34-5-1-1. Under Trial Rule 34 (A)(1) the computations were discoverable. Trial Rule 34(A)(1) provides:
Trial Rule 34(B) provides the procedure to be followed:
If the request for discovery is denied, the party making the request may move under Trial Rule 37, IC 1971, 34-5-1-1 for an order compelling discovery. Trial Rule 37 (A) provides, in pertinent part:
If the item sought to be discovered falls within the scope of the discovery rules and the moving party has complied with the procedural requirements, the court is to grant such motion, subject, of course, to protective orders, if appropriate, under Rule 26(C), IC 1971, 34-5-1-1. Collins v. Bair (1971), Ind., 268 N.E.2d 95.
Applying the rules above set forth to the instant case, this Court can not say the defendants acted reasonably under Trial Rule 34(B) in waiting until November 9, 1970 to write the letter requesting discovery. This is especially true under the circumstances of this case because the defendants knew that the hearing was slated for November 12, 1970. Further, Trial Rule 37(A) requires reasonable notice to all affected persons. Here the defendants, *154 by waiting until the day of the hearing seem to flaunt the requirement of reasonable notice. A party may not wait until the last possible moment to act, then rely upon the discovery rules and expect the court to halt its proceedings in order to accommodate his motion. The defendants had notice of the proceedings on October 27, 1970. Their proper course of action would have been seasonably to request discovery and ascertain whether or not the utility company would allow them to examine the requested materials and computations. Trial Rule 34(B) provides that the party from whom discovery is sought shall have thirty (30) days in which to reply. Therefore, the proper procedure for the defendants would have been to request the court to require a reply in a shorter period or move to have the hearing postponed.
As previously stated, the defendants waived error addressed to the denial of their written motion for discovery. A later discovery motion was made, however, and although it does not clearly appear that the defendants have properly raised any question concerning the rulings thereon, the issue is so closely tied to the one raised by the ruling upon the written motion that we think we should go to it. Following the filing of the written motion, the parties proceeded with the hearing, and the next mention of discovery came after the hearing was under way and Plaintiff's expert witness was being cross examined. At that point, the defendants' counsel announced:
From the oral motion, above recited, it would be difficult to determine just what the defendants wanted or what they were entitled to receive. However from the colloquy that followed it may be determined that what was wanted was a book (or books) referred to as "standards" and the plaintiff's computations supporting its decision that a right-of-way of 150 feet was required. The court ordered the production of the "standards" and continued the hearing to the following afternoon to give Defendants time to review them. The reason for the production order was that the witness had testified that his testimony was given in reliance upon them as opposed to information within his own knowledge. The court declined to order production of the plaintiff's computations during the course of the trial, theorizing that there was nothing about them that was required to enable the defendants' engineer to make their determination as to the reasonableness of the proposed appropriation. We find no fault with this ruling. Although we think the defendants may have been entitled to obtain such computations under a proper and timely pretrial motion, the trial judge has broad discretion with respect *155 to the discovery he will permit during trial.
(2) Defendants have conceded that the decision of the trial court was supported by sufficient evidence to condemn a 150 foot easement for one 345 KV transmission line, but seeks to set the order aside upon the grounds that the order does not so limit the use of the easement. This appears to us to be an objection different from that raised in the trial court, which was addressed not to the extent to which the easement sought would be used but rather to the quantity of the defendants' land that would be required.
A question cannot be raised on appeal unless a proper and timely objection was made in the trial court. Warner v. Reed (1916), 62 Ind. App. 544, 113 N.E. 386; Helms v. Cook (1916), 62 Ind. App. 629, 111 N.E. 632; Barnes v. State (supra); Wilhoite v. State (supra); Brown v. State (supra).
Appellants insist that their objection in the trial court and their assignment of error to this Court raised this question, but we cannot agree. The objection stated "* * * the real estate sought to be condemned * * * exceeds its needs * * *." The assignment of errors was, "The court erred in overruling Defendant-Appellants' objection, which objection contended that Plaintiff-Appellee was condemning more real estate than it needed for the use contemplated." (Our emphasis) The question presented was clearly one of quantity of land to be impressed with the easement and not the extent of the servitude. Whether or not the plaintiff may, at some future time, burden the easement with lines in addition to the 345 KV one is an issue not here considered.
Affirmed.
ARTERBURN, C.J., and DeBRULER, GIVAN and HUNTER, JJ., concur.