Title: Gilpin v. Joyce
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 981801
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 16, 1999

Present:  All the Justices 
 
KIMBERLEY M. GILPIN 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 981801 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
April 16, 1999 
KEVIN CHARLES JOYCE 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF STAFFORD COUNTY 
James W. Haley, Jr., Judge 
 
 
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether a defendant 
who makes a general appearance without having been served with 
process is entitled to assert the bar against judgment provided 
by our Rule 3:3. 
 
The parties have stipulated to the facts and proceedings in 
the trial court.  On June 20, 1996, Kimberley M. Gilpin filed a 
motion for judgment seeking damages from Leslie Mae Dailey and 
Kevin Charles Joyce for injuries Gilpin alleged she had received 
in an automobile accident on June 23, 1994.  Gilpin did not 
request service of process on either defendant. 
 
On October 30, 1997, Joyce, by counsel, filed a “motion to 
dismiss” citing that part of Rule 3:3 which provides: 
No judgment shall be entered against a defendant 
who was served with process more than one year after 
the commencement of the action against him unless the 
court finds as a fact that the plaintiff exercised due 
diligence to have timely service on him.[ ] 
1
 
                     
1A similar provision appears in Rule 2:4 applicable to 
pleadings in chancery suits. 
Joyce also filed grounds of defense, a counterclaim arising out 
of the same automobile accident, a certificate of service of 
interrogatories, and a motion to produce.  Joyce had never been 
served with a notice of motion for judgment. 
 
On December 1, 1997, the trial court granted Gilpin’s 
motion for a nonsuit of her claims against Dailey.2  On that same 
day, the trial court heard oral argument on Joyce’s motion to 
dismiss.  At that hearing, it was stipulated that Gilpin had not 
exercised due diligence in order to obtain service of process on 
Joyce.  Thereafter, in accord with a request from the trial 
court, the parties filed briefs stating their respective 
positions on the issue of dismissal of Gilpin’s action. 
 
On May 29, 1998, the trial court entered an order 
sustaining Joyce’s motion and dismissing Gilpin’s motion for 
judgment with prejudice.  We awarded Gilpin this appeal. 
 
“An appearance for any other purpose than questioning the 
jurisdiction of the court—because there was no service of 
process, or the process was defective, or the action was 
commenced in the wrong county, or the like—is general and not 
special, although accompanied by the claim that the appearance 
is only special.”  Norfolk and Ocean View Railway Co. v. 
                     
2On brief, Gilpin correctly states that she was prohibited 
from taking a nonsuit of her claims against Joyce because of his 
counterclaim against her.  See Code § 8.01-380(C). 
 
2
Consolidated Turnpike Co., 111 Va. 131, 136, 68 S.E. 346, 348 
(1910)(emphasis added).  Joyce did not make a special 
appearance.  Rather, by filing a grounds of defense and a 
counterclaim, Joyce made a general appearance in the trial court 
proceedings.  Indeed, on brief, Joyce concedes this is so.  A 
general appearance “is a waiver of process, equivalent to 
personal service of process, and confers jurisdiction of the 
person on the court.”  Nixon v. Rowland, 192 Va. 47, 50, 63 
S.E.2d 757, 759 (1951). 
 
In 1977, the General Assembly enacted Code § 8.01-277, 
which provides in pertinent part that: 
 
A person, upon whom process to answer any action 
has been served, may take advantage of any defect in 
the issuance, service or return thereof by a motion to 
quash filed prior to or simultaneously with the filing 
of any pleading to the merits. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
Under familiar principles, because this statute is in 
derogation of the common law, we will strictly construe it.  By 
its express terms, this statute applies only where process has 
actually been served on the defendant.  Thus, this statute does 
not permit Joyce to simultaneously make a general appearance and 
assert the protection of the bar provided in Rule 3:3 because he 
was not served with process.  Joyce’s general appearance was 
entirely voluntary. 
 
3
 
We reach the same conclusion with regard to Rule 3:3 under 
the circumstances of this case.  By its express terms, this rule 
applies only where there has been service of process.  As we 
have noted, Joyce made a voluntary general appearance without 
having been served with process. 
 
Joyce contends, however, that his general appearance more 
than one year after the commencement of an action should be 
equivalent to a service of process more than one year after the 
commencement of an action.  Thus, he asserts that he is entitled 
to the protection of Rule 3:3.  The bedrock of Joyce’s position 
is that, because the trial court had not obtained personal 
jurisdiction over him within one year following commencement of 
Gilpin’s action, Rule 3:3 serves as an absolute bar to any 
judgment being entered against him.  We disagree. 
 
It is true that a voluntary general appearance subjects a 
defendant to the jurisdiction of the trial court and, thus, may 
be considered “equivalent to personal service of process.”  
Nixon, supra.  However, unlike a defendant who makes a voluntary 
appearance, a defendant actually served with process is under a 
compulsion to make an appearance or suffer a default judgment.  
Thus, in Gilbreath v. Brewster, 250 Va. 436, 463 S.E.2d 836 
(1995), we held that the defendants, who were actually served 
with process more than one year after commencement of the action 
against them, were entitled to dismissal of the claim against 
 
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them with prejudice under Rule 3:3 while still maintaining a 
counterclaim and a third-party claim.  Id. at 441-42, 463 S.E.2d 
at 838. 
 
The distinction between the facts in Gilbreath and those in 
the present case is that in the former case service of process 
was actually secured on the defendants and, thus, their 
appearance was necessary to avoid default.  Here, Joyce was 
under no such compulsion.  We believe that this is the very 
distinction the legislature intended to create when it enacted 
Code § 8.01-277 permitting only a defendant who has been 
actually served with process to raise specific jurisdictional 
challenges prior to or simultaneously with the filing of any 
pleading to the merits.  This same distinction is consistent 
with the express terms of Rule 3:3 and our holding in this 
appeal.3
                     
3We recognize that in Dennis v. Jones, 240 Va. 12, 393 
S.E.2d 390 (1990), we held that where substituted service of 
process through the Department of Motor Vehicles was ineffective 
and, thus, personal jurisdiction was not obtained over the 
defendant, the resulting default judgment would be set aside and 
the motion for judgment would “be dismissed under Rule 3:3 
because it had been pending since 1987 and defendant has not 
been served with valid process.”  Id. at 20, 393 S.E.2d at 395 
(emphasis added).  Unlike the present case, in Dennis the 
plaintiff made an actual attempt to serve process, and the 
defendant was subsequently required to appear in order to 
contest the resulting default judgment against her.  Here, 
however, Joyce’s appearance was entirely voluntary. 
 
5
 
For these reasons, the judgment of the trial court will be 
reversed, Gilpin’s motion for judgment will be reinstated, and 
the matter will be remanded for a trial on the merits of the 
motion for judgment and on Joyce’s counterclaim. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
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