Title: Hamilton et al. v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 268, 2001, 293, 2001, 302, 2001
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: February 6, 2003

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
SHARON HAMILTON,  
 
§  No. 268, 2001 
KELCEE JACKSON and 
 
 
§  No. 293, 2001 
TERRI WALSTON, 
 
 
§  No. 302, 2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  Consolidated 
 
 
Defendants Below, 
 
§ 
 
 
Appellants,  
 
§  Court Below–Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§  in and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  I.D. Nos. 9805006798 (Hamilton)  
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§                  9804001029 (Jackson) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§                  9806011006 (Walston) 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
§ 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
  Submitted:  October 22, 2002 
 
 
 
 
     Decided:   February 6, 2003 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH, HOLLAND, BERGER, and 
STEELE, Justices, constituting the Court En Banc. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  Affirmed in Part.  Reversed 
in Part. 
 
 
Joseph A. Gabay, Esquire (argued) and Sheryl Rush-Milstead, 
Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware, for appellant, Sharon Hamilton. 
 
 
Anthony A. Figliola, Jr., Esquire, Figliola & Facciolo, Wilmington, 
Delaware, for appellant, Kelcee Jackson. 
 
 
Jerome M. Capone, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware, for appellant, 
Terri Walston. 
 
 
John Williams, Esquire, Department of Justice, Dover, Delaware, for 
appellee, State of Delaware. 
 
WALSH, Justice:
 
This is a consolidated direct appeal by three defendants, Sharon 
Hamilton ("Hamilton"), Kelcee Jackson ("Jackson") and Terri Walston 
("Walston"). They all appeal from final judgments of conviction that were 
entered by the Superior Court, following a bench trial.  Each defendant was 
convicted of Assault in the Third Degree with regard to the attack on an 
adult female, Brandi Coleman ("Brandi"), who was twenty-two weeks 
pregnant.  Each defendant was also convicted of Manslaughter with regard 
to the death of the twenty-two week old fetus, Tyriek Coleman ("Tyriek").   
 
On appeal, all of the defendants argue that the Superior Court erred as 
a matter of law for three reasons.  First, the defendants assert that the trial 
judge erred in permitting a feticide case to be tried as a homicide case.  
Second, they contend the trial judge erred when he did not permit the 
defendants to take expert depositions prior to trial and permitted the State's 
expert witness to testify without the State fully complying with Superior 
Court Criminal Rule 16's discovery requirements.  Finally, the defendants 
assert that the trial judge erred when refusing to strike the testimony of Dr. 
Muench that was different from the information provided to defense counsel 
in discovery. 
 
We conclude that the trial judge's finding that Jackson and Walston 
lacked the requisite state of mind to support a conviction of Murder Second 
Degree also precludes their conviction for Manslaughter.  Similarly, the 
undisputed finding that Hamilton warned the other defendants of the victim's 
pregnancy precludes her conviction of any degree of an offense involving 
the fetus.  Because the evidence clearly supports the verdicts, we affirm the 
judgments of conviction of Assault Third Degree on Brandi Coleman. 
 
In addition to these common arguments, each defendant raises other 
contentions unique to her own appeal. Hamilton argues that the trial judge 
erred for three additional reasons specific to her convictions:  the trial 
judge's application of title 11, section 271 of the Delaware Code; the trial 
judge's failure to apply title 11, section 274 of the Delaware Code; and the 
trial judge's decision to convict her of Manslaughter when insufficient 
evidence existed to satisfy the statutory elements of the offense.  Jackson 
and Walston raise the additional argument regarding their convictions that 
the trial judge erred in convicting them of Manslaughter when the State 
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that they knew of Brandi's 
pregnancy.  Walston further asserts that the trial judge erred:  by allowing 
Brandi to testify about hearsay information regarding the identity of the 
individual who kicked her, and by permitting Brandi's statements to the 
police to be introduced as a section 3507 statement when it contained 
hearsay. 
I 
 
The defendants' convictions relate to events that occurred on March 
27, 1998.1  On that date, a fight occurred at Eastlawn Avenue which 
involved Hamilton, Jackson and Walston, as well as three additional 
defendants, Shyniece Moore, Kelene Thomas and Keesha Watson.  At the 
time of the incident, the alleged victim, Brandi, was pregnant with the 
alleged victim, Tyriek.   
It is undisputed that prior to the altercation, Hamilton and Kelene 
Thomas drove toward Eastlawn Avenue.  At the intersection of Twenty-
Ninth and Market Streets, Jackson and Walston, along with three other 
women, got into the car.  They drove approximately one half of a mile to the 
200 Block of Eastlawn Avenue.  Upon arriving at Eastlawn Avenue, a fight 
ensued.  During the course of that altercation, Brandi was knocked to the 
ground, beaten, and kicked.   
After the fight, Brandi was taken to Christiana Care and admitted to 
the high-risk delivery unit because of the trauma she had suffered.  She was 
experiencing contractions.  The course of medical treatment decided upon 
because the fetus was twenty-two weeks old was to attempt to stop the 
                                          
 
1 The facts are taken, in part, from the Superior Court’s opinion below. 
contractions and maintain the fetus in-utero.  This treatment initially 
appeared to be successful and the contractions virtually ceased.   
On the afternoon of March 30th vaginal bleeding began to occur.  The 
contractions resumed and Brandi became dilated.  It was noted that blood 
was accumulating within her uterus.  It was then decided that the best course 
of treatment was to promote a birth in the interest of the mother’s safety.  
She was bleeding vaginally and would likely continue to do so unless a birth 
was induced. 
 
At trial, the State and defense offered testimony from physicians 
present at the birth as part of their cases.  Based upon that testimony, the trial 
judge found there is little conflict as to the facts.  There is a strong dispute, 
however, as to the interpretation of those facts.  The trial judge found it is 
undisputed:  
1) 
That immediately prior to delivery, Tyriek's heart was        
beating. 
 
2) 
After the birth, Tyriek had a slow and diminishing heartbeat for 
approximately seventeen minutes. 
 
3) 
Tyriek had an APGAR of 1 and was not considered by any of 
the experts as "viable." 
 
 
4) 
Tyriek showed no voluntary movement and had no respiration. 
 
5) 
Tyriek was pronounced dead at 17:10, eighteen minutes after 
birth. 
 
 
The trial judge noted that the common law has accepted a heartbeat or 
a pulsating umbilical cord as evidence of life ex utero.2  The trial judge 
accepted that definition.  The trial judge ruled that the State established that 
Tyriek was a person who could be the subject matter of a murder 
prosecution. 
 
II 
 
Hamilton, Jackson and Walston were each indicted on two counts of 
Murder in the Second Degree with regard to Tyriek's death.  The first count 
of Murder in the Second Degree charged the defendants with "recklessly" 
causing the death of Tyriek under circumstances manifesting a cruel, wicked 
and depraved indifference to human life, by striking Brandi while she was 
pregnant with Tyriek.3  Following a bench trial, the trial judge concluded 
that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the requisite state of 
mind for such a charge.   
The issue of whether Jackson and Walston knew that Brandi was 
pregnant turned on controverted facts and the credibility of witnesses.  The 
evidence was unclear and in dispute as to when Jackson and Walston knew 
of Brandi's pregnancy or even if they were aware of that fact.  Moreover, the 
                                          
 
2 Stout v. Killen, 10 Del. 14 (Del. Super. 1875). 
3 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 635 (1) (2001). 
trial judge, as the trier of fact, held that "[i]t [was] impossible to state beyond 
a reasonable doubt what each defendant knew, and at what time they knew 
it, about [Brandi’s] condition."4  As such, the trial judge found that the 
evidence was insufficient to establish the level of "recklessness" required by 
statute for a conviction of Murder in the Second Degree.   
Accordingly, the trial judge considered a conviction for the lesser 
included offense of Manslaughter.5  The trial judge determined that 
Jackson's and Walston's conduct demonstrated a conscious disregard of a 
substantial risk of death to the victim of their assault.  The trial court held 
that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants' 
"recklessly" caused the death of Tyriek.  Consequently, Jackson and 
Walston were convicted of Manslaughter. 
Jackson and Walston contend that the evidence adduced at trial was 
insufficient to support their Manslaughter convictions.  The defendants 
assert that the State did not present sufficient evidence to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that they knew Brandi was pregnant.  By failing to prove 
such knowledge, the defendants argue that the State did not establish the 
requisite "reckless" state of mind to uphold their Manslaughter convictions.   
                                          
 
4 State v. Hamilton, No. 9805006798, at 6, 2001 Del. Super. LEXIS 129 (Del. Super. 
Apr. 11, 2001). 
5 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 206(c); Ward v. State, 575 A.2d 1156, 1158 (Del. 1990). 
Both Murder in the Second Degree and Manslaughter require the 
same "reckless" state of mind defined by section 231(c).6  A person acts 
"recklessly" under section 231(c) when the person is "aware of and 
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that . . . will result 
from [his or her] conduct."7  Specifically, this definition requires the 
"conscious creation of risk or, to put it in other terms, conscious disregard of 
a risk" by a person.8   
A party, thus, must be "conscious" of a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk before that party’s conduct can be defined as "reckless."  The term 
"conscious" is commonly defined as "subjectively know or felt."9  
Accordingly, the statute ensures that a party subjectively knows of such a 
risk by requiring that a person is both "aware of" and "consciously 
disregards" the risk before he or she can act "recklessly."   
                                          
 
6 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §§ 632(1), 635(1).  “The basic difference between Manslaughter 
and Murder in the Second Degree . . . is that the latter requires a showing that the 
homicide was committed ‘under circumstances which manifest a cruel, wicked and 
depraved indifference to human life,’ while the former does not.”  Waters v. State, 443 
A.2d 500, 502-03 (Del. 1982).   
7 That risk must be of such a nature and degree that a disregard of it constitutes “a gross 
deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the 
situation.”  Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 231(c). 
8 Delaware Criminal Code with Commentary 30 (1973). 
9 Webster’s II: New Riverside University Dictionary 300 (3d ed. 1994); see Black’s Law 
Dictionary (7th ed. 1999) (defining “knowing” as “deliberate; conscious”).  Where a 
word is not defined in the Delaware Criminal Code “it has its commonly accepted 
meaning, and may be defined as appropriate to fulfill the purposes of the provision.”  Del. 
Code Ann. tit. 11, § 221(c). 
For a rational trier of fact to find that Jackson and Walston acted 
"recklessly," the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendants were "aware of" and "consciously disregard[ed]" a substantial 
and unjustifiable risk of death to Tyriek through their conduct.  Here the 
evidence is in dispute as to what the defendants knew regarding Brandi's 
pregnancy.  If Jackson and Walston did not know that Brandi was pregnant, 
they could not have been "aware of" and "consciously disregard[ed]" a risk 
to the unborn fetus or child.10   
The State's failure to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Jackson 
and Walston knew that Brandi was pregnant prevented the State from 
establishing that the defendants acted "recklessly" in causing the death of 
Tyriek.  Thus, the same factual findings that precluded Jackson and Walston 
from being convicted of Murder in the Second Degree preclude those 
defendants from being convicted of Manslaughter.  Accordingly, Jackson’s 
and Walston’s conviction of Manslaughter must be reversed.  
                                          
 
10 The Court notes, however, that on June 10, 1999 the General Assembly enacted 
legislation making an assault upon a pregnant woman that results in a miscarriage a 
serious felony.  Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §§ 605, 606.  Under such legislation, a defendant 
may not raise as a defense the he or she was “unaware that the victim was pregnant.”  Id.  
Unfortunately, this legislation was not in effect at the time of the incident involved in this 
case.  Although the current legislation would likely have been applicable to the facts of 
this case had the law been in effect at the time, the Court must resolve this matter under 
prior law.  
 
A more difficult question is presented with respect to Hamilton's 
conduct, as an accomplice, in allegedly causing Tyriek's death.  In order for 
Hamilton to be found liable under section 271, for any degree of homicide, 
the trier of fact was required to make an individual determination under 
section 274.  That statute provides: 
When, pursuant to Section 271 of this title, 2 or more persons 
are criminally liable for an offense which is divided into 
degrees, each person is guilty of an offense of such degree as is 
compatible with that person's own culpable mental state and 
with that person's own accountability for an aggravating fact or 
circumstance. 
 
In Hamilton's case, the term "offense" in section 271 and section 274 is 
construed in pari materia to mean "homicide."11  The various degrees of 
homicide are distinguished by the defendant's mental state and the 
circumstances surrounding the death of the victim.  Thus, the trier of fact 
was required as a matter of Delaware law to consider what degree of 
homicide was consistent with Hamilton's mental state:  First Degree Murder, 
Second Degree Murder, Manslaughter or Criminally Negligent Homicide.12 
 
Based on our view of the record, a rational trier of fact could not find 
the requisite "intentional" state of mind for a First Degree Murder 
                                          
 
11 Demby v. State, 744 A.2d 976, 979-80 (Del. 2000) (citing Chance v. State, 685 A.2d 
351, 357 (Del. 1996)); Johnson v. State, 711 A.2d 18, 30 (Del. 1998). 
12 Chance v. State, 685 A.2d at 357, 359.  In Herring v. State, this Court stated that the 
crimes of Manslaughter and Criminally Negligent Homicide constituted "degrees" of 
homicide under section 274.  Herring v. State, 2002 Del. LEXIS 6 at *5 n.5 (Del. Supr. 
Jan. 8, 2002). 
conviction.  In addition, it would be difficult for a trier of fact to find the 
requisite "reckless" state of mind for a conviction of Murder in the Second 
Degree or Manslaughter.  Although Hamilton knew that Brandi was 
pregnant, she did not "consciously disregard" the risk of an assault on Tyriek 
since the trial court found that she told the other defendants not to touch 
Brandi because she was pregnant.   
Curiously and ironically, the trier of fact determined that the other 
defendants had no direct knowledge that Brandi was pregnant, while 
Hamilton knew of the pregnancy and warned the other defendants not to 
touch Brandi.  This point bears repeating.  The record reflects and the trial 
court found, that while there was no doubt that Hamilton attempted to warn 
Jackson and Walston about Coleman's pregnancy, the State failed to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Jackson and Walston comprehended that 
warning.  While not explicit in the trial court's opinion, this dissonance is 
perhaps best explained by the frenzied atmosphere in which the warning was 
given. 
In addition, Hamilton lacked the requisite state of mind for a 
conviction of Criminally Negligent Homicide.  Under Title 11, section 631 
of the Delaware Code, Hamilton could be convicted of Criminally Negligent 
Homicide if "with criminal negligence, [she] cause[d] the death of [Tyriek]."  
To act in a "criminally negligent" manner, Hamilton would have "fail[ed] to 
perceive a risk that . . . [death would] result from [her] conduct."13  If, as the 
State contends, the fetus is considered a person who could be the object, or 
victim, of the offense of criminally negligent homicide, the State was 
required to prove that Hamilton failed to perceive the risk of harm to that 
person.14 
 
As previously noted, Hamilton was relieved of responsibility for 
manslaughter because she attempted to warn the other defendants, (the 
principals to whom she is alleged to have been an accomplice), not to touch 
Brandi.  Hamilton's admonition to the other defendants not to touch Brandi 
extends to any risk of bodily harm, direct or indirect.  In short, if Hamilton is 
relieved of criminal liability because she warned her confederates not to 
touch Brandi because she was pregnant, her warning to them precludes a 
state of mind necessary for criminal negligent homicide.  As Section 271 
requires, her responsibility is measured by her "own mental state."  Hamilton 
cannot be faulted for failing to perceive "a risk" when she actually warned 
against that risk in advance of the confrontation.   
                                          
 
13 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 231(d). 
14 For purposes of this appeal, we accept the State's contention, arguendo, without 
deciding the specific question of personhood. 
It is inconsistent to relieve the other defendants of criminal 
responsibility and at the same time impose criminal liability on Hamilton.    
Criminally negligent homicide cannot be established without proof that the 
defendant perceived the risk resulting from specific conduct.  That 
perception cannot be established where the evidence demonstrates that 
Hamilton took affirmative steps to insure that the other defendants were 
made aware of Brandi's pregnancy, with the intention of protecting her 
because of her condition.  In sum, we conclude that Hamilton's warning to 
her co-defendants precludes the establishment of the requisite state of mind 
to support any degree of homicide which was a foreseeable consequence of 
the assault. 
 
III 
 
The trial judge acquitted the defendants of Assault Second Degree 
(Count III of the Indictment) because he concluded that the State failed to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt, one essential element of Assault Second 
Degree  that the  victim Brandi Coleman suffered a physical injury, as 
required by 11 Del. C. § 612(a)(1), "which creates a substantial risk of 
death."  11 Del. C.  § 222(23).  The court based its conclusion on the expert 
medical evidence presented at trial to the effect that prompt medical 
treatment received by Brandi precluded a "substantial risk" of dying.  The 
court did conclude that all defendants were guilty of Assault Third Degree 
because it was clearly established that Brandi suffered "physical injury" to 
the extent she suffered "pain and impairment of physical condition." 
 
The Superior Court made specific factual findings that both Walston 
and Jackson physically assaulted Brandi, causing physical injury.  With 
respect to the finding of guilt of Hamilton the Superior Court concluded that 
she "secured the services" of the other defendants to participate in the fight 
and transported them to the scene.  While this is a somewhat tenuous basis 
for a conviction of assault given the warnings imparted by Hamilton with 
respect to Brandi's pregnancy, there is a legal basis for finding Hamilton 
guilty under the provision of  11 Del. C. § 271(2) to the extent she solicited 
or requested the other defendants to engage in a fight that could result in 
physical injury to a third party.  Hamilton's solicitude and warning 
concerning Brandi's pregnancy did not preclude a conviction for recklessly 
placing her in harm's way of injuries sustained in a fight.  11 Del. C. § 
611(1). 
 
In sum, we conclude, as a matter of law that all defendants lacked the 
requisite state of mind to sustain any degree of homicide, even if it is 
assumed that the fetus could be the victim of a homicide.  As to those 
convictions, the judgment of the Superior Court is REVERSED.  For the 
reasons stated, the convictions of all defendants on the charges of Assault 
Third Degree are AFFIRMED. 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice concurring:   
I join in the Court's opinion with regard to Jackson and Walston.  I 
concur in the Court's conclusions with regard to Hamilton.