Title: Florida Department Of Revenue, Et Al. v. James (Willie) Cummings, Et Al.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC04-1045
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: April 27, 2006

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC04-1045 
____________ 
 
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, et al., 
Petitioners, 
 
vs. 
 
JAMES (WILLIE) CUMMINGS, et al., 
Respondents. 
 
[May 11, 2006] 
 
BELL, J. 
We have for review Department of Revenue ex rel. Preston v. Cummings, 
871 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), which expressly and directly conflicts with 
State Department of Revenue ex rel. Baggs v. Pate, 824 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 1st DCA 
2002).  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.  The issue before us 
is whether a legal father (i.e., a man married to the child’s mother at the time of 
birth) is an indispensable party in a paternity action brought by the State of Florida 
Department of Revenue under chapter 409, Florida Statutes (2000), to establish 
that a man other than the legal father is the child’s biological father and, as such, is 
 
 
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obligated to provide child support.1  In Cummings, the Second District held that 
the legal father is an indispensable party to such actions unless the pleading 
conclusively establishes that the legal father’s rights to the child have been 
divested by some earlier judgment.  See 871 So. 2d at 1061-62.  For the reasons 
explained below, we agree with the Second District.   
I. Facts 
This case arose from six consolidated actions to determine paternity and 
establish child support.2  In each case, the State of Florida Department of Revenue 
(“Department”) filed a standardized complaint entitled “Complaint to Establish 
Paternity, Child Support and Other Relief Without Affecting Legal Rights of 
Husband of Mother at Time of Birth.”  Each complaint was filed on behalf of a 
mother against the man she alleged to be her child(ren)’s biological father (i.e., the 
“putative father”).  Although the complaints acknowledge that the mother was 
married to a man other than the putative father at the time the child was born, only 
the putative father is named as a respondent.  The body of the complaint states that 
“this is an action to establish paternity, child support, and other relief for minor 
child(ren).”  Among its prayers for relief, the Department requests a court order 
“Determin[ing] the Respondent/ Biological Father to be the father of the child(ren) 
                                          
 
 
1.  We recognize that chapter 409 has been amended since the Department 
filed these actions.  However, we do not address the amendments in the opinion.  
 
2.  For a more extensive description of the factual background surrounding 
this case, see the opinion below.  Cummings, 871 So. 2d at 1056-58.   
 
 
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who owes a duty of support” and requiring him to pay child support and health 
care expenses.   
The Department served this standardized complaint on each putative father 
and attempted to provide a Notice of Action to each legal father.  The Notice of 
Action stated:    
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the above-styled action 
has been filed to determine the paternity of the child(ren) born on the 
dates indicated in the Complaint to determine paternity and Exhibits 
attached thereto, a copy of which is attached hereto.  In filing this 
action, Petitioners seek to have the named Respondent ordered to pay 
child support for the child(ren) who are the subject of this action.  
YOU ARE NOT THE NAMED RESPONDENT.  If you were legally 
married to the mother named in the Complaint at the time the 
child(ren) was either conceived or born, you may have legal rights or 
responsibilities you wish to assert.   
Although in filing this action, the Petitioners do not seek to 
affect any rights you may possess, YOU SHOULD CONSULT WITH 
AN ATTORNEY OF YOUR OWN CHOOSING WITH REGARD 
TO YOUR RIGHTS AND POTENTIAL RESPONSIBILITIES.  Your 
failure to file a pleading and/or attend a hearing in this cause will be 
interpreted as you having no objection to the Respondent being 
adjudicated to be the biological father of the named child(ren).   
 
The Department mailed this notice to each of the six legal fathers at his last known 
address.  In addition, it attempted to personally serve this notice on five of the legal 
fathers and to constructively serve the remaining legal father through publication in 
the Tampa Bay Review.  Ultimately, these attempts at service failed, and none of 
the legal fathers appeared at any of the proceedings.   
 
 
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The Circuit Court in Pinellas County dismissed all six complaints for failure 
to name the legal father as an indispensable party.  On appeal, the Second District 
affirmed.  Cummings, 871 So. 2d at 1056.  It first determined that the complaints 
“do not establish a legal basis for . . . ignor[ing] the presumption of each child's 
legitimacy by pursuing support from a putative biological father without joining 
the legal father”; and second, that “it appears likely” that these proceedings should 
have been initiated against the legal fathers instead of the putative fathers.  Id. at 
1056-57.  The Second District also recognized that while the law allows a legal 
father to “disavow his parental rights and responsibilities in favor of the biological 
father,” it also allows him to assert them and to “fulfill the rights and 
responsibilities of parenthood.”  Id. at 1061.  Finally, the court noted that it is 
impossible to know if the legal father will choose to assert these rights if he is not 
named as a party.  Id.   Based on these findings, the Second District held that “a 
legal father . . . is an indispensable party in any action to determine paternity and to 
place support obligations on another man unless the pleading conclusively 
establishes that the legal father’s rights to the child have been divested by some 
earlier judgment.”  Id. at 1061-62.   
 
The Second District acknowledged that its holding conflicted with Pate, 824 
So. 2d at 1039, in which the First District held that a legal father was not an 
indispensable party in a similar action.  824 So. 2d at 1039.  The First District 
 
 
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based its holding on the fact that this Court did not expressly require legal fathers 
to be named as indispensable parties in Florida Department of Health & 
Rehabilitative Services v. Privette, 617 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 1993).  In Privette, 617 So. 
2d at 307-08 & n.4, this Court recognized that a legal father’s “unmistakable 
interest” in paternity actions to establish a putative father’s obligation to provide 
child support entitled him to notice of the action.  The Court did not, however, 
address the procedures necessary to protect this interest, particularly when the legal 
father's whereabouts are unknown.  This is the issue we address today.   
II. Analysis 
 
Because this appeal arises from the trial court’s decision to dismiss a 
complaint based on a question of law, we review it de novo.  Execu-Tech Bus. 
Sys., Inc. v. New Oji Paper Co., 752 So. 2d 582, 584 (Fla. 2000).  
 
 As the Second District recognized, the presumption of legitimacy requires a 
holding that the legal father is an indispensable party in an action to determine 
paternity and to place support obligations on another man unless it is conclusively 
established that the legal father’s rights to the child have been divested by some 
earlier judgment.  To explain this holding, we begin by defining the term 
“indispensable party.”  We then explain why the presumption of legitimacy 
requires that a legal father be named an indispensable party in these actions.  
Finally, we conclude by recognizing that these types of cases have long presented 
 
 
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Florida courts with significant dilemmas that will persist as long as the relevant 
statutory provisions remain unchanged.    
A. Indispensable Party 
 
An indispensable party is one whose interest in the controversy makes it 
impossible to completely adjudicate the matter without affecting either that party’s 
interest or the interests of another party in the action.  Hertz Corp. v. Piccolo, 453 
So. 2d 12, 14 n.3 (Fla. 1984) (describing indispensable parties as ones so essential 
to a suit that no final decision can be rendered without their joinder); Bastida v. 
Batchelor, 418 So. 2d 297, 299 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (“An indispensable party [is] 
one without whom the rights of others cannot be determined.”).  As we stated in 
Oakland Properties Corp. v. Hogan, 117 So. 846, 848 (Fla. 1928) (quoting Indian 
River Mfg. Co. v. Wooten, 37 So. 731, 731 (Fla. 1904) (syllabus)):  
The general rule in equity is that all persons materially 
interested, either legally or beneficially, in the subject-matter of the 
suit, must be made parties either as complainants or defendants, so 
that a complete decree may be binding upon all parties.   
The Fourth District elaborated on this rule in Phillips v. Choate, 456 So. 2d 556, 
557 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (quoting Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130, 139 
(1855)), where it defined an indispensable party as one whose interest in the 
controversy is of “such a nature that a final decree cannot be made without either 
affecting that interest, or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final 
termination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience.”   
 
 
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In light of this definition, we must next determine if the presumption of 
legitimacy that arises whenever a child is born during marriage endows legal 
fathers with such a material interest in these paternity actions that a final decree 
cannot be rendered without their joinder.  We find that it does.    
B. The Presumption of Legitimacy 
A child born during marriage is presumed to be the child of both the 
husband and wife.  This presumption of legitimacy is “one of the strongest 
rebuttable presumptions known to law.”  Cummings, 871 So. 2d at 1059 (quoting 
G.T. v. Adoption of A.E.T., 725 So. 2d 404, 410 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)).  As stated 
earlier, in Privette we recognized that this presumption grants legal fathers an 
“unmistakable interest” in paternity actions brought by the Department.  617 So. 
2d at 307.  This recognition was grounded in a significant line of caselaw.  The 
presumption of legitimacy protects a legal father’s parental rights when another 
party brings an action to assume those rights.  G.F.C. v. S.G., 686 So. 2d 1382, 
1385 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (finding that because the presumption of legitimacy 
established the legal father’s paternity “by law,” a putative father could not bring a 
paternity action under chapter 742, Florida Statutes (1995)); G.T. v. Adoption of 
A.E.T., 725 So. 2d 404, 410 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (recognizing that the legal father 
would have had a right to contest an adoption proceeding if he had acted on this 
right in a timely fashion).  The presumption of legitimacy may even prevent the 
 
 
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child’s mother from contesting the legal father’s parental rights.  Hess v. Hess, 466 
So. 2d 1179, 1179-80 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (preventing a mother from challenging 
visitation rights granted to a legal father in a separation agreement by claiming the 
legal father is not the biological father of the child).  Moreover, once a legal father 
challenges a paternity action by raising the presumption of legitimacy, he is 
estopped from later denying paternity and freeing himself from a duty of support.  
S.B. v. D.H., 736 So. 2d 766, 767 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).  In light of this caselaw, we 
must  agree with the Second District that these paternity actions “certainly” impact 
the legal father’s ability to assert his right to a host of interests that lie at the heart 
of the parent-child relationship.  Cummings, 871 So. 2d at 1060 (recognizing that 
the paternity action will “certainly” affect the legal father’s rights to the “care, 
custody and control of the child”). 
We also agree with the Second District that these proceedings carry 
significant legal and practical implications because they will likely cause the legal 
father’s name to be removed from the child’s birth certificate.  See Cummings, 871 
So. 2d at 1060.  At the time the child is born, the legal father’s name is listed as the 
child’s father on the birth certificate.  § 382.013(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2000) (“If the 
mother is married at the time of birth, the name of the husband shall be entered on 
the birth certificate as the father of the child, unless paternity has been determined 
otherwise by a court of competent jurisdiction.”).  The Department’s actions to 
 
 
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determine paternity would change this without the legal father’s knowledge.3  At 
the time the Department filed its complaints, Florida law required a court order to 
remove the legal father’s name from a birth certificate; however,  the relief 
requested in these actions would bring about this change.  §§ 382.015(2), 
382.016(5), Fla. Stat. (2000).  Section 382.015 required the clerk of the court to 
forward a copy of a court order determining paternity to the Department, and the 
Department was required to amend the birth certificate in accordance with this 
order.   § 382.015(2), Fla. Stat. (2000).   It seems that unless the court order 
expressly prohibited the Department from removing the legal father’s name, his 
name would be removed without his knowledge.     
This removal carries significant practical and legal implications  
Pragmatically, the father named in the birth certificate is generally considered the 
father of the minor child.  Indeed, Florida courts have considered a birth certificate 
in determining whether a child is a “survivor” in a wrongful death action, whether 
                                          
 
 
3.  As stated earlier, we recognize that chapter 409 has been amended since 
the Department filed the complaints in the circuit court.  Effective January 1, 2006,  
the Legislature amended chapter 409 to permit the Department to initiate an 
administrative proceeding to determine paternity and an obligation to provide 
support in actions like these.  § 409.256, Fla. Stat. (2005).  The Legislature also 
amended section 382.013 to require the name of the father and the surname of the 
child be changed automatically pursuant to this proceeding.  § 382.013(2)(e), Fla. 
Stat. (2005).  This opinion does not address these amendments.      
       
 
 
 
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a man is a “parent” under a kidnapping statute, and as “prima facie evidence” of 
parentage.  See Achumba v. Neustein, 793 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) 
(finding that the illegitimate child of the deceased was not able to recover in a 
wrongful death action because the child’s birth certificate named the legal father); 
Muniz v. State, 764 So. 2d 729, 730 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (holding that the 
kidnapping statute’s exemption for “parents” prevented the man named as father 
on the child’s birth certificate from being charged with the crime).  In essence, a 
legal father’s material interests are necessarily impacted by these paternity actions 
as filed by the Department; therefore, he is an indispensable party.  See Hinson v. 
Hinson, 356 So. 2d 372, 374-75 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (finding a properly 
authenticated birth certificate is “prima facie evidence” that the deceased was the 
father of the child claiming the right to recover in a wrongful death action).   
C. The Need for Legislative Consideration 
 
We recognize that these types of cases have long presented Florida courts 
with significant dilemmas, and as legal scholars have noted, these dilemmas will 
persist as long as certain statutory provisions remain unchanged. 4  The service of 
                                          
 
 
4.  For an excellent discussion of the presumption of legitimacy and the 
dilemmas courts confront when faced with children born during marriage but 
fathered by someone other than the mother’s husband, see Chris W. Alternbernd, 
Quasi-Marital Children: The Common Law’s Failure in Privette and Daniel Calls 
for Statutory Reform, 26 Fla. St. U.L.Rev. 219 (1999).    
 
 
 
 
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process statute does not permit constructive service of process in paternity cases, 
and there is no express provision within chapter 409 to authorize constructive 
service or to ensure that a legal father’s interests are appropriately protected.  See § 
409.257, Fla. Stat. (2000) (requiring personal service); see also § 49.011, Fla. Stat. 
(2000) (listing the actions and proceedings in which service of process by 
publication may be made––a list that does not include paternity actions); see also 
T.J.K. v. N.B., 237 So. 2d 592, 595 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970) (holding that constructive 
service of process is not permitted by statute).  Whether the statutes should be 
modified to address this dilemma is a policy decision for the Legislature to decide. 
III. Conclusion 
 
For the reasons stated above, we approve the Second District’s holding in 
Cummings, 871 So. 2d 1055, and disapprove Pate, 824 So. 2d 1038, to the extent it 
is inconsistent with this opinion.  We hold that a legal father is an indispensable 
party in an action to determine paternity and to place support obligations on 
another man unless it is conclusively established that the legal father’s rights to the 
child have been divested by some earlier judgment.  
  It is so ordered. 
WELLS, ANSTEAD, LEWIS, QUINCE, and CANTERO, JJ., concur. 
PARIENTE, C.J., concurs in result only. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
 
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Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Second District - Case Nos. 2D02-5261, 2D02-5264, 2D02-5277,  
2D02-5279, 2D02-5318, and 2D02-5333 
 
 
(Pinellas County) 
 
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and William H. Branch, Assistant Attorney 
General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Louis K. Rosenbloum, P.A., Pensacola, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent