Title: JACK RAMEY STAMPER, JR. V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2005-SC-000410-MR
State: Kentucky
Issuer: Kentucky Supreme Court
Date: August 24, 2006

IMPORTANTNOTICE NOT TO BE PUBLISHED PINION THIS OPINIONISDESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDSIRE PROMULGATED BYTHE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c)., THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOTBE CITED OR USEDASAUTHORITYINANA' OTHER CASE INANYCOURTOF THISSTATE. JACK RAMEY STAMPER, JR . V 6$111armt Could of 2005-SC-0410-MR APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT HONORABLE STEPHEN K. MERSHON, JUDGE 02-CR-2191 AND 03-CR-2613 COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT Affirm_ incq RENDERED : AUGUST 24, 2006 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED DAT'~~ APPELLANT A jury of the Jefferson Circuit Court convicted Appellant of two counts of First Degree Rape, First Degree Burglary, two counts of Kidnapping, and Third Degree Arson . For these crimes, Appellant was sentenced to a total of seventy years imprisonment . Appellant now appeals to this Court as a matter of right . Ky . Const . § 110(2)(b) . For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm Appellant's convictions . The crimes for which Appellant was convicted stem from a brutal attack on Appellant's estranged wife, Brenda, and her boyfriend . Brenda had separated from Appellant after twenty-one years of marriage . Prior to Appellant's attack, Brenda sought and was granted a Domestic Violence Order which required Appellant to vacate the trailer in which they lived, to stay one thousand (1,000) feet away from Brenda at all times, and to refrain from damaging property . After entry of the Domestic Violence Order, Brenda changed all the locks on the trailer and continued to occupy the marital residence . On the night of September 29, 2002, Brenda and her boyfriend were sleeping in the trailer. At about four o'clock in the morning, she awoke to the sensation of her breasts being fondled . When she opened her eyes, Appellant was standing over her and her boyfriend . Appellant proceeded to berate the couple and threaten them with a concrete trowel . Brenda testified that she believed that Appellant was going to kill both her and her boyfriend . Appellant demolished the room and then attacked Brenda, beating her with his fists . Both of Brenda's eyes were blackened and her nose was broken . After beating her, he forced her to kneel on the floor while brutally raping her in front of the boyfriend . After the rape, Appellant questioned the couple for some time about their relationship . He then forced the boyfriend into the bathroom, telling him that he would kill Brenda if he left the bathroom . Appellant proceeded to rape Brenda a second time . After the second rape, Appellant left the trailer . Upon Appellant's departure, Brenda dressed and left the trailer. She immediately went to a neighbor's trailer to ask for help . When she returned to her own trailer, she saw Appellant with a gas can . Appellant poured gasoline throughout the trailer and then set it on fire . The boyfriend managed to escape the trailer prior to its being set on fire . Appellant fled from the area and remained at large for approximately five months . At trial, Appellant testified on his own behalf. He acknowledged being aware of the Domestic Violence Order . He also admitted breaking into the trailer that night, assaulting Brenda, threatening to kill both her and her boyfriend, and setting the trailer on fire . However, he disputed raping her, alleging that the sex was consensual . He further admitted having the concrete trowel with him in the bedroom, but testified that he did not threaten anyone with it . The jury convicted Appellant of all the charges set forth above. Appellant now appeals to this Court, alleging several errors which he claims entitle him to a new trial . For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm Appellant's convictions . Appellant first alleges he was unduly prejudiced by evidence admitted at trial which tended to show a long standing pattern of domestic violence perpetuated against Brenda by Appellant . This evidence consisted of several years' worth (going back to 1995) of Emergency Protective Orders ("EPOs") and Domestic Violence Orders ("DVOs") entered against Appellant . Appellant contends that such evidence was not admissible pursuant to KRE 404(b), which prohibits the use of other crimes, wrongs, or acts "to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith ." Id . At a hearing on the matter, the trial court applied the balancing test set forth in Bell v . Commonwealth , 875 S.W.2d 882 (Ky . 1994), finding that the evidence was admissible for the purpose of proving motive and intent and that its potential for prejudice did not outweigh its probative value . See KRE 404(b)(1) (evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts admissible to show, among other things, motive and intent) . We agree, finding no error in the trial court's ruling . Appellant's contention that evidence of previously issued EPOs was not relevant to prove his motive or intent the night he broke into the trailer is without merit . See McCarthy v . Commonwealth , 867 S .W.2d 469, 470 (Ky . 1993) (testimony regarding history of EPOs entered against defendant was "relevant as evidence of motive or state of mind, and also as part of the immediate circumstances bearing on the crimes charged"), overruled on other grounds by, Lawson v. Commonwealth , 53 S .W.3d 534, 544 (Ky . 2001); see also , Davis v. Commonwealth , 147 S .W.3d 709, 722 (Ky . 2005) ("Generally, evidence of prior threats and animosity of the defendant against the victim is admissible as evidence of motive, intent or identity, whereas evidence of prior threats or violence against an unrelated third-party is generally regarded as inadmissible character evidence .") (internal citation omitted) . Furthermore, Appellant testified at trial that he did not intend to damage the property or kidnap and assault Brenda when he broke into the trailer. Rather, he testified that he broke into the trailer for the purpose of obtaining keys to his deceased father's car . Thus, Appellant's history of committing acts of violence against Brenda was not only probative to prove Appellant's state of mind that night, but also it was probative to rebut his contention that he did not intend to kidnap and harm his wife when he broke into the trailer . See,,eq ., Neal v . Commonwealth , 95 S.W.3d 843, 853 (Ky . 2003) (evidence regarding disciplinary write-ups incurred in prison was admissible to rebut claim that defendant was rehabilitating while in prison) . We also find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's finding that the potential for prejudice did not outweigh the probative value of the above referenced evidence . Bell , supra, at 890 ("A ruling based on a proper balancing of prejudice against probative value will not be disturbed unless it is determined that a trial court has abused its discretion.") . Appellant essentially admitted most of the acts which he was alleged to have committed in this case . What he did not admit was intent to kidnap, harm, or rape his wife . Under such circumstances, the prejudicial nature of Appellant's prior history of domestic violence against his wife was substantially outweighed by its probative value . deprived him of his right to be presumed innocent and relieved the Commonwealth of the burden of proving each crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, Appellant claims it was error for the trial court to instruct the jury, with each charge, that " you will find the defendant, Jack Ramey Stamper, Jr., guilty under this Instruction if, and only if, you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following . . . ." Rather, Appellant claims that the preferable lead-in sentence for jury instructions should be "you will find the defendant, Jack Ramey Stamper, Jr ., not guilty unless you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following . . . ." (emphasis added) . Appellant next alleges the trial court issued erroneous jury instructions that We find nothing in the wording referenced above that deprives Appellant of his right to be presumed innocent or otherwise relieves the Commonwealth of the burden of proving each crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' Moreover, the jury in this case was specifically instructed on the presumption of innocence and the Commonwealth's burden of proof as follows : The law presumes a defendant to be innocent of a crime and the indictment shall not be considered as evidence or as having any weight against him . You shall find the defendant not guilty unless you are satisfied from the evidence alone and beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty. If upon the whole case you have a reasonable doubt that he is guilty, you should find him not guilty. Accordingly, Appellant's claim is without merit . In his final assignment of error, Appellant claims the trial court erred in finding that KRS § 509.050, also known as the kidnapping exemption statute, was not applicable in this case . KRS 509.050, states in pertinent part, "A person may not be ' In fact, this wording mimicks the form instructions given in 1 W . Cooper, Kentucky Instructions to Juries (Criminal) §§ 3.76, 3.77, 4.23, 5 .07, 5.20 (1999) . 5 convicted of unlawful imprisonment in the first degree, unlawful imprisonment in the second degree, or kidnapping when his criminal purpose is the commission of an offense defined outside this chapter and his interference with the victim's liberty occurs immediately with and incidental to the commission of that offense, unless the interference exceeds that which is ordinarily incident to commission of the offense which is the objective of his criminal purpose." Id. "The kidnapping exemption statute is to be strictly construed and the burden is upon a defendant to show that it should apply." Murphy v. Commonwealth , 50 S .W .3d 173, 180 (Ky.2001) . The trial court's decision will not be disturbed unless there is an abuse of discretion . Id. The evidence in this case showed that Brenda and her boyfriend were held hostage by Appellant for approximately three hours . During this time, Appellant terrorized them, threatened them, questioned them about their relationship, and raped and assaulted Brenda . Under such circumstances, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the statute to be inapplicable in this case . Appellant also argues that the trial court applied an incorrect and overly burdensome standard of review in determining that the kidnapping exemption statute was inapplicable in this case . Even if this were true, any such error would be harmless since, under any conceivable standard, the statute simply does not apply to the facts of this case . For the reasons set forth herein, the judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed . All concur . ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Bruce P . Hackett Deputy Appellate Defender Office of the Louisville Metro Public Defender 200 Advocacy Plaza 719 W. Jefferson Street Louisville, KY 40202 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Gregory D. Stumbo Attorney General James Havey Assistant Attorney General Office of Attorney General Criminal Appellate Division 1024 Capital Center Drive Frankfort, KY 40601