Title: Cree, Inc. v. Labor & Industry Review Commission
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2019AP001671
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: March 10, 2022

2022 WI 15 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2019AP1671 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Cree, Inc., 
          Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Labor and Industry Review Commission, 
          Respondent-Co-Appellant, 
Derrick Palmer, 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 395 Wis. 2d 642,953 N.W.2d 883 
PDC No:2021 WI App 4 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 10, 2022   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 15, 2021   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit    
 
COUNTY: 
Racine   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael J. Piontek   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
KAROFSKY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK, and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, 
JJ., joined.  DALLET, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Lindsey W. Davis, Robert H. Duffy, and Quarles & Brady 
LLP, Milwaukee. There was an oral argument by Robert H. Duffy. 
 
For the respondent-co-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Steven C. Kilpatrick and Anthony D. Russomanno, assistant 
attorneys general; with whom on the brief was Joshua L. Kaul, 
attorney general. There was an oral argument by Anthony D. 
Russomanno.  
 
 
2 
 
 
For the respondent-appellant there was a brief filed by Alan 
C. Olson and Alan C. Olson & Associates, S.C., New Berlin.  There 
was oral argument by Alan C. Olson. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Legal Action of 
Wisconsin, Inc. by Jessie Long, Sheila Sullivan, Susan Lund, and 
Megan Sprecher, Milwaukee.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
Manufacturers and Commerce by Corydon J. Fish, Madison.
 
 
2022 WI 15 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2019AP1671 
(L.C. No. 
2019CV703) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Cree, Inc., 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Labor and Industry Review Commission, 
 
          Respondent-Co-Appellant, 
 
Derrick Palmer, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
FILED 
 
MAR 10, 2022 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
KAROFSKY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in which 
ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK, and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, JJ., 
joined.  DALLET, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded. 
 
¶1 
JILL J. KAROFSKY, J.   We address whether Cree, Inc. 
(Cree) rescinding its job offer to Derrick Palmer based on his 
conviction record constituted unlawful employment discrimination 
or instead was lawful because the circumstances of Palmer's 
convictions "substantially relate" to the circumstances of the 
No. 
2019AP1671 
 
2 
 
job, per Wis. Stat. § 111.335(3)(a)1.1  We hold that Cree 
sufficiently established that the circumstances surrounding 
Palmer's 2013 convictions for domestic violence substantially 
relate to the circumstances of the offered position as an 
Applications Specialist.  Accordingly, Cree did not unlawfully 
discriminate against Palmer by rescinding its job offer. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Palmer's Convictions 
¶2 
In 2013, Palmer was convicted for committing eight 
crimes of domestic violence against his live-in girlfriend, L.R.  
According to the criminal complaint, the incident began on the 
morning of October 24, 2012, when Palmer and L.R. were arguing 
amidst a break-up and Palmer initially refused to leave their 
residence.  When Palmer eventually left for work, he called L.R. 
multiple times but she did not answer.  Approximately 30 minutes 
after leaving, Palmer returned to the residence and began yelling 
at L.R.  She tried to get away from Palmer by going into the 
bedroom but Palmer followed her.  Palmer then broke L.R.'s 
cellphone by throwing it against a window.  L.R. tried to escape 
from the room but Palmer pushed her onto the bed with such force 
that she bounced off and hit her head on the floor.  When L.R. 
started screaming in hopes that someone would hear her and call 
the police, Palmer grabbed her mouth and squeezed it "real hard."  
                                                 
1 While 
this 
case 
was 
being 
litigated, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 111.335(1)(c)1. 
(2015-16) 
was 
renumbered 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 111.335(3)(a)1. (2017-18).  In this and all subsequent 
references to the Wisconsin Statutes we will refer to the 2017-18 
version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2019AP1671 
 
3 
 
Then Palmer allowed L.R. to get up, but as she tried to reach the 
door handle to escape, Palmer threw her on the bed, straddled her, 
and placed his hand over her mouth and nose, stopping her from 
breathing for about 30 seconds.  Then Palmer started to cry, told 
L.R. that he loved her, and let her up from the bed.  L.R. went 
into the bathroom to get ready for work and Palmer followed her 
and put his hand down the front of her pants.  L.R. told Palmer to 
stop, but Palmer pulled L.R. to the bed and sexually assaulted her 
by engaging in sexual intercourse without her consent.  Palmer 
again left the residence and L.R. contacted the police.  L.R. 
additionally reported that Palmer had engaged in other acts of 
violence, including forced sexual intercourse, during their four-
month relationship. 
¶3 
As a result of the incident, Palmer pleaded no contest 
to two counts of felony strangulation and suffocation, four counts 
of misdemeanor battery, one count of fourth degree sexual assault, 
and one count of criminal damage to property.2  The circuit court 
also dismissed and read in two counts of false imprisonment and 
one count of threats to injure or accuse of a crime.3  The circuit 
court sentenced Palmer to 30 months in prison, 30 months of 
extended supervision, four years of probation, and ordered him to 
                                                 
2 Wis. Stat. § 940.235(1) (2011-12), Wis. Stat. § 940.19(1) 
(2011-12), Wis. Stat. § 940.225(3m) (2011-12), and Wis. Stat. 
§ 943.01(1) (2011-12), respectively. 
3 A "read-in" crime is one that either is not charged or is 
dismissed as part of a plea agreement that the defendant agrees 
the circuit court may consider at sentencing, along with the 
underlying conduct.  See Wis. Stat. § 973.20(1g)(b). 
No. 
2019AP1671 
 
4 
 
register as a sex offender.  Palmer also has a 2001 battery 
conviction related to domestic violence.4 
B.  Palmer's Job Opportunity with Cree 
¶4 
While incarcerated, Palmer earned his mechanical design 
certification through the Wisconsin Department of Corrections 
education program.  He earned high marks and took advantage of 
opportunities to work as a tutor after he graduated from the 
program.  With these new qualifications, in June of 2015 Palmer 
applied to work at Cree's Racine, Wisconsin facility as an 
Applications Specialist.  At that time, Cree manufactured and 
marketed lighting components.5  It employed approximately 1,100 
people at its Racine facility.  The facility itself spanned 600,000 
square feet, including manufacturing space, storage areas, 
offices, cubical farms, break rooms, and the like.  Although 
security cameras monitored some portions of the facility, there 
were also many "nooks and crannies" throughout that experienced 
little foot traffic, no security camera coverage, and noise loud 
enough to drown out a person's voice. 
¶5 
As for the particular job, the Applications Specialist's 
primary responsibilities included designing and recommending 
                                                 
4 Although this charge was not known to Cree when it rescinded 
its employment offer, the record before the Labor and Industry 
Review Commission (LIRC) indicates that Palmer admitted to this 
conviction.  The parties do not dispute that the court may consider 
the 2001 conviction as part of Palmer's conviction record, and 
thus we assume without deciding that it is proper to consider it. 
5 In May of 2019, Cree sold its lighting business to Ideal 
Industries, Inc. 
No. 
2019AP1671 
 
5 
 
lighting systems to customers, sometimes on location at customers' 
facilities.  Cree expected the Applications Specialist to operate 
largely independently and without close supervision.  It also 
expected occasional travel to trade shows, which would require 
unsupervised overnight hotel stays.  Applications Specialists had 
access to most of Cree's Racine facility. 
¶6 
In July 2015 Cree offered Palmer the Applications 
Specialist job subject to a standard background check.  The 
background check revealed Palmer's 2013 convictions.6  Cree 
referred the matter to its general counsel who reviewed Palmer's 
conviction record using a matrix that categorized each of Palmer's 
convictions as a "fail."  Cree then rescinded its offer of 
employment to Palmer. 
C.  Palmer's Discrimination Complaint 
¶7 
Palmer filed a complaint with the Wisconsin Department 
of Workforce Development's Equal Rights Division (ERD) alleging 
that Cree discriminated against him on the basis of his conviction 
record in violation of the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act.7  The 
ERD found probable cause to hold a hearing on the merits before an 
                                                 
6 Palmer was forthcoming to Cree about the existence of a 
conviction record prior to the background check.  He responded 
"yes" to questions on an employment questionnaire asking whether 
he had been convicted of a felony or misdemeanor and stated the 
convictions were domestic-related.  Palmer also disclosed his 2013 
convictions when told there would be a background check. 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 111.321 prohibits all employers from 
engaging "in any act of employment discrimination . . . against 
any individual on the basis of," among other things, a person's 
"conviction record," subject to a few exceptions. 
No. 
2019AP1671 
 
6 
 
administrative law judge (ALJ).  The ALJ heard testimony from 
Palmer, Melissa Garrett (Cree's general counsel), and Lee Motley 
(a recruiter at Cree). 
¶8 
The ALJ also considered the testimony of Dr. Darald 
Hanusa, Cree's expert on domestic violence and domestic violence 
perpetrators.  Dr. Hanusa testified as to the relationship between 
domestic violence, generalized violence and workplace violence, 
noting that there is "a direct relationship" between "a willingness 
to use violence in your intimate relationship" and "your 
willingness to use violence in other settings."  Additionally, 
Dr. Hanusa spoke about the "power principle"——the concept that 
people who struggle with power and control issues tend to overuse 
their power when they do not get what they want.  He testified 
that "the underpinning, underlying issues for men who are violent 
is their struggle with power and control.  And it doesn't just end 
when they leave their house, it enters the workplace as well."  
Dr. Hanusa noted that "the best predictor of future violence is 
what's happened historically."  He also emphasized that a charge 
of strangulation/suffocation is especially concerning given that 
in "the research on femicide, that is the homicide of women, 
suffocation ranks up as very high on every indice . . . for 
homicide."  Based on all the testimony, the ALJ determined that 
Palmer's convictions did substantially relate to the Applications 
No. 
2019AP1671 
 
7 
 
Specialist position and thus, under Wis. Stat. § 111.335(3)(a)1.,8 
Cree did not discriminate against Palmer when it rescinded its job 
offer.  Palmer appealed the ALJ's findings to the Labor and 
Industry Review Commission (LIRC). 
¶9 
LIRC reversed.  LIRC reviewed the ALJ hearing record and 
conferred with the ALJ regarding his impressions of the testifying 
witnesses, but the ALJ did not impart any  specific impressions 
regarding demeanor.  Palmer v. Cree, Inc., ERD Case No. 
CR201502651, at 19 (LIRC, Dec. 3, 2018).  Regardless, LIRC deemed 
Dr. Hanusa's testimony on the connection between domestic violence 
and workplace violence "unhelpful" and proffered its own, opposite 
conclusion regarding crimes of domestic violence:  "where assault 
or battery convictions stem from personal relationships and the 
crimes are committed at home, it cannot necessarily be assumed 
that the individual is likely to engage in the same conduct with 
co-workers or customers at the work place."  Id. at 13 & n.6.  
Based on that view of the domestic crimes at issue, LIRC concluded 
that they did not substantially relate to the Applications 
Specialist job because of: 
 The "high degree of speculation and conjecture" necessary 
to envision a scenario in which Palmer would become 
                                                 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 111.335(3)(a)1. makes it "not employment 
discrimination because of conviction record to refuse to 
employ . . . any individual if," among other reasons, "the 
individual has been convicted of any felony, misdemeanor, or other 
offense the circumstances of which substantially relate to the 
circumstances of the particular job." 
No. 
2019AP1671 
 
8 
 
involved in a personal relationship with a female employee 
"that might end badly"; 
 The fact that the ability to meet female employees and form 
personal relationships with them is not unique to the job 
at issue; 
 The lack of evidence that Palmer would have "significant 
personal interactions" with female employees; 
 The lack of evidence that Palmer would have the opportunity 
to develop personal relationships with clients; and 
 The lack of evidence to suggest that Palmer would act 
violently with coworkers or members of the public. 
Id. at 11-13.  With this view of the record, LIRC determined that 
the finding of a substantial relationship "would require a 
conclusion that unsupervised contact with other people is in and 
of itself a circumstance that might lead the complainant to engage 
in violent conduct."  Id. at 13.  And such a conclusion, LIRC 
continued, would run contrary to its prior decisions rejecting the 
proposition that "the mere presence of other human beings is a 
circumstance that creates a substantial relationship."  Id. 
¶10 The circuit court reversed LIRC's decision,9 concluding 
that it was not supported by substantial evidence.  The circuit 
court relied on Dr. Hanusa's uncontroverted expert testimony in 
deciding that a substantial relationship existed between Palmer's 
convictions and Cree's Applications Specialist position. 
                                                 
9 The Honorable Michael J. Piontek of the Racine County 
Circuit Court presided. 
No. 
2019AP1671 
 
9 
 
¶11 The court of appeals then reversed again, upholding 
LIRC's decision that Cree failed to meet its burden to show a 
substantial relationship between Palmer's convictions and the job 
at hand.  Cree, Inc. v. LIRC, 2021 WI App 4, 395 Wis. 2d 642, 953 
N.W.2d 883.  The court of appeals felt constrained by LIRC's 
disregard for Dr. Hanusa's testimony.  Id. ¶7 n.4 ("[T]he weight 
and credibility of the evidence are for the agency, not the 
reviewing court, to determine." (quoting Milwaukee Symphony 
Orchestra, Inc. v. DOR, 2010 WI 33, ¶31, 324 Wis. 2d 68, 781 N.W.2d 
674) (alteration in original))).  Like LIRC, the court of appeals 
relied heavily on the domestic nature of Palmer's convictions, 
saying his "tendenc[y] and inclination[]" was "to be physically 
abusive 
toward 
women 
in 
a 
live-in 
boyfriend/girlfriend 
relationship."  Id., ¶14 (alterations in original).  Although the 
court of appeals surmised that Palmer was likely to recidivate 
against a future girlfriend, it concluded that such likelihood 
does not substantially relate to the job Cree offered him.  Id. 
¶12 We granted Cree's petition for review and again reverse. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶13 In an employment discrimination appeal, we review LIRC's 
decision rather than the decision of the circuit court or the court 
of appeals while benefiting from their analyses.  Wis. Bell, Inc. 
v. LIRC, 2018 WI 76, ¶28, 382 Wis. 2d 624, 914 N.W.2d 1.  This 
case requires us to interpret Wis. Stat. § 111.335(3)(a)1. and 
determine if the facts of the case fulfill the legal standard set 
out in the statute.  Statutory interpretation is a matter of law 
which we review de novo, giving no deference to the agency's legal 
No. 
2019AP1671 
 
10 
 
conclusions.  Tetra Tech EC., Inc. v. DOR, 2018 WI 75, ¶84, 382 
Wis. 2d 496, 914 N.W.2d 21.  Whether the facts of a case fulfill 
a legal standard is also a matter of law we review de novo.  Id.  
In reviewing LIRC's decision, the court "shall not substitute its 
judgment for that of the agency" when reviewing factual 
determinations, but shall "set aside agency action . . . if it 
finds that the agency's action depends on any finding of fact that 
is not supported by substantial evidence in the record."  Wis. 
Stat. § 227.57(6). 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶14 Wisconsin's laws regarding employment discrimination 
based on conviction record serve two important, and sometimes 
competing, interests——rehabilitating those convicted of crimes and 
protecting the public from the risk of criminal recidivism.  See 
Milwaukee County v. LIRC, 139 Wis. 2d 805, 821-23, 407 N.W.2d 908 
(1987).  As such, Wisconsin law generally prohibits an employer 
from discriminating against prospective employees on the basis of 
their conviction record.  Wis. Stat. §§ 111.321 & 111.322.  But 
"it is not employment discrimination because of conviction 
record . . . [if] the individual has been convicted of any felony, 
misdemeanor, or other offense the circumstances of which 
substantially relate to the circumstances of the particular job."  
Wis. Stat. § 111.335(3)(a)1.  This is known as the "substantial 
relationship test."  As an exception to the general rule against 
discrimination, the employer bears the burden of showing that the 
circumstances of the convicted offense substantially relate to the 
circumstances of the job. 
No. 
2019AP1671 
 
11 
 
A.  The Substantial Relationship Test 
¶15 We first delineate the substantial relationship test by 
interpreting the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 111.335(3)(a)1.  
We then draw guidance from this court's three previous cases 
interpreting the substantial relationship test.  Finally, we 
clarify how convictions for crimes of domestic violence fit into 
the test. 
1.  Plain language interpretation 
¶16 In interpreting Wis. Stat. § 111.335(3)(a)1., we look to 
the statute's plain language and give that language its "common, 
ordinary, and accepted meaning."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. 
for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  
Courts often consult dictionaries to help determine the "common, 
ordinary, and accepted meaning" of statutory language.  Stroede v. 
Soc'y Ins., 2021 WI 43, ¶12, 397 Wis. 2d 17, 959 N.W.2d 305.  The 
operative language in the substantial relationship test includes 
"circumstance" and "substantially relate."  Black's Law Dictionary 
defines "circumstance" as "[a]n accompanying or accessory fact, 
event, or condition, such as a piece of evidence that indicates 
the probability of an event."  Circumstance, Black's Law Dictionary 
306 (11th ed. 2019); see also Circumstance, The American Heritage 
Dictionary of the English Language 347 (3d ed. 1992) ("a condition 
or fact attending an event and having some bearing on it; a 
determining or modifying factor.").  Accordingly, the definition 
of "circumstance" is quite broad and asks the court to consider 
the facts, events, and conditions that accompany both the convicted 
offense and the particular job. 
No. 
2019AP1671 
 
12 
 
¶17 The statute requires that these circumstances must 
"substantially relate" to each other.  "Substantial" is defined in 
Black's Law Dictionary as "important, essential, and material; of 
real worth and importance."  Substantial, Black's Law Dictionary 
1728 (11th ed. 2019).  We take this to mean that the circumstances 
must materially relate to each other, not merely superficially 
relate.  We do not take "substantially relate" to mean that the 
circumstances must be nearly identical to satisfy the test.  
Indeed, elsewhere in the law "substantially" is used and 
interpreted to denote a middle ground——a heightened but not extreme 
standard.10  Therefore, the plain language of the substantial 
relationship test requires that the employer show that the facts, 
events, 
and 
conditions 
surrounding 
the 
convicted 
offense 
materially relate to the facts, events, and conditions surrounding 
the job. 
2.  Previous cases 
¶18 This framework has been further refined by three of our 
previous cases:  Law Enforcement Standards Board v. Village of 
Lyndon Station, 101 Wis. 2d 472, 305 N.W.2d 89 (1981); Gibson v. 
Transportation Commission, 106 Wis. 2d 22, 315 N.W.2d 346 (1982); 
and Milwaukee County v. LIRC, 139 Wis. 2d 805.  Lyndon Station 
                                                 
10 See, e.g., State v. Curiel, 227 Wis. 2d 389, 406, 597 N.W.2d 
697 (1999) (holding that "substantially probable" means "much more 
likely than not" rather than "extreme likelihood"); AllEnergy 
Corp. v. Trempealeau Cnty. Env't & Land Use Comm., 2017 WI 52, 
¶76, 375 Wis. 2d 329, 895 N.W.2d 368 (reiterating that "substantial 
evidence" is more than "a mere scintilla" of evidence but does not 
amount to preponderance of the evidence). 
No. 
2019AP1671 
 
13 
 
concerned whether the Wisconsin Law Enforcement Standards Board 
(LESB) unlawfully discriminated when it deemed a prospective 
police chief ineligible for that appointment because he had been 
convicted of 26 counts of misconduct in public office for 
falsifying uniform traffic citations while working as a chief 
deputy sheriff.  101 Wis. 2d at 475-77.  We held that "common 
sense" dictated that the LESB recognize a substantial relationship 
between the convicted offenses and the job of police chief.  Id. 
at 492.  We pointed to the importance of "[p]ublic trust in the 
integrity of our law enforcement officials" and reasoned that 
someone who had been convicted of 26 felonies would have his 
"effectiveness" as a law enforcement officer "greatly diminished."  
Id. at 492-93. 
¶19 Gibson concerned whether the Wisconsin Department of 
Transportation (DOT) made a properly detailed inquiry into 
Gibson's conviction record when it refused to grant him a school 
bus driver's license.  106 Wis. 2d at 23-24.  The DOT refused to 
license Gibson after considering only the elements of armed 
robbery——the crime for which Gibson was convicted——and not the 
surrounding circumstances, such as the fact that Gibson's 
coconspirator was the one who was armed.  Id.  We held that the 
DOT had a rational basis for limiting its inquiry to the elements 
of the convicted offense as that information alone sufficiently 
established a substantial relationship to the school bus driver 
No. 
2019AP1671 
 
14 
 
job.11  Id. at 27.  We elaborated that the elements of armed robbery 
indicated a "disregard for both the personal and property rights 
of other persons . . . [and] a propensity to use force or the 
threat of force to accomplish one's purposes."  Id. at 28.  We 
considered these traits to be contradictory to the traits required 
to be a bus driver, namely patience and level-headedness.  Id.  We 
cautioned that "this case does not mean that the particular factual 
circumstances of the crime upon which a felony conviction was based 
may never be relevant" in a substantial relationship evaluation 
because 
such 
a 
holding 
would 
impermissibly 
render 
the 
"circumstances of which" language "superfluous."  Id. 
¶20 Milwaukee County contains the most recent and thorough 
discussion of the substantial relationship test.  139 Wis. 2d 805.  
That case concerned whether an individual's convictions for 
misdemeanor patient neglect arising from his employment as a 
nursing home administrator substantially related to being a crisis 
intervention specialist.  Id. at 809.  In defining the scope of 
the substantial relationship inquiry, we looked to the term 
"circumstances."  Id. at 818.  To determine which circumstances 
were relevant, we focused on the underlying statutory purpose, 
highlighting the balance between the two sometimes competing 
                                                 
11 This case, along with the other two cases concerning the 
substantial relationship test, was decided before Tetra Tech EC., 
Inc. v. DOR, 2018 WI 75, 382 Wis. 2d 496, 914 N.W.2d 21, abrogated 
judicial deference to administrative agency interpretations of 
law.  Under the old standard, we upheld an agency's decision if 
there was a rational basis for the agency to come to its 
conclusions.  See Dairy Equip. Co. v. DILHR, 95 Wis. 2d 319, 327, 
290 N.W.2d 330 (1980). 
No. 
2019AP1671 
 
15 
 
rehabilitation and public-protection interests.  Id. at 821-23.  
We determined that although it is "highly desirable to reintegrate 
convicted criminals into the workforce . . . the legislature has 
clearly chosen to not force such attempts at rehabilitation in 
employment settings where experience has demonstrated the 
likelihood of repetitive criminal behavior."  Id. at 823.  It 
declared that the purpose of the substantial relationship test is 
to "[a]ssess[] whether the tendencies and inclinations to behave 
a certain way in a particular context are likely to reappear later 
in a related context, based on the traits revealed."  Id. at 824. 
¶21 Based on that understanding of the test, we interpreted 
"circumstances" 
to 
mean 
those 
circumstances 
material 
to 
"foster[ing] criminal activity," for example, "the opportunity for 
criminal behavior, the reaction to responsibility, or the 
character traits of the person."  Id.  But immaterial details such 
as "the hour of the day the offense was committed, the clothes 
worn during the crime, whether a knife or gun was used, whether 
there was one victim or a dozen[,] or whether the robber wanted 
money to buy drugs or to raise bail money for a friend" fall beyond 
the scope of relevant circumstances.  Id.  We emphasized that this 
line resulted in a practical test which employers can reliably 
apply without a full-blown factual hearing.  Id. at 826.  Finally, 
we addressed the Gibson court's supposed "elements only" test——
that the statutory test requires only a review of the elements of 
the crime——by saying that "[i]t appears that the 'elements only' 
test is not a test distinct from the statutory test.  Rather, 
No. 
2019AP1671 
 
16 
 
focusing on the elements simply helped to elucidate the 
circumstances of the offense."  Id. 
¶22 Applying our refined view of "circumstances," we held 
that the circumstances of the convicted offenses did substantially 
relate to the circumstances of the crisis intervention specialist 
job.  Id. at 828.  We rejected a "superficial" distinction between 
the fact that the offenses were committed in an administrative 
capacity while the job at hand involved direct care, instead 
focusing on the fact that the prospective employee would again be 
responsible for the wellbeing of vulnerable individuals.  Id. at 
830. 
3.  Convictions for crimes of domestic violence 
¶23 The seesawing appellate history in this case reveals the 
need for clarifying how employers, LIRC, and reviewing courts are 
to apply the substantial relationship test to domestic violence 
convictions. 
 
Here 
LIRC, 
following 
a 
pattern 
of 
prior 
administrative cases, determined that acts of domestic violence 
are practically immaterial to recidivism in the workplace because 
of their domestic nature.  LIRC's assumption appears to be based 
on a common, but unsupported, belief that domestic batterers have 
No. 
2019AP1671 
 
17 
 
a tendency to be violent only towards intimate partners.12  LIRC 
reasoned that domestic abusers recidivate in the workplace only 
when engaging in "significant personal interactions" with female 
employees or clients.  Palmer, No. 201502651, at 12.  And when 
that particular scenario takes a "high degree of speculation and 
conjecture" to envision, the risk for recidivism remains low.  Id. 
at 11.  Said differently, LIRC's analysis hinged on a domestic 
batter's chances of finding a new domestic partner at work to then 
victimize at home.  That analysis differs from how LIRC analyzes 
non-domestic crimes of violence, thus yielding inconsistent 
results:  a substantial relationship may exist when a violent 
offense is committed outside the home but is barred when the same 
violent offense is committed against an intimate partner behind 
closed doors. 
¶24 In short, LIRC has created an exception for domestic 
violence 
crimes. 
 
And 
this 
exception 
disregards 
other 
circumstances material to fostering criminal activity when crimes 
of domestic violence are at issue.  True, both the domestic setting 
of the offense and the intimate relationship with the victim are 
                                                 
12 LIRC cited its prior decisions for the idea that when 
dealing with domestic assault or battery convictions "it cannot 
necessarily be assumed that the individual is likely to engage in 
the same conduct with co-workers or customers at the work place."  
Palmer v. Cree, Inc., ERD Case No. CR201502651, at 13 (LIRC, Dec. 
3, 2018) (citing Murphy v. Autozone, ERD Case No. 200003059 (LIRC, 
May 7, 2004)); see also Robertson v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 
ERD Case No. CR200300021 (LIRC, Oct. 14, 2005); Knight v. Wal-Mart 
Stores East LP, ERD Case No. CR200600021 (LIRC, Oct. 11, 2012); 
and Johnson v. Rohr Kenosha Motors, ERD Case No. CR201602571 (LIRC, 
Apr. 29, 2020). 
No. 
2019AP1671 
 
18 
 
"circumstances" that are not identical to the setting and 
relationships Palmer would encounter at Cree.  Yet the substantial 
relationship test does not require an exact identity between these 
circumstances.  For example, the armed robbery conviction in Gibson 
was deemed to substantially relate to employment as a school bus 
driver despite the robbery not being committed in an employment 
setting nor involving children as the victims.  106 Wis. 2d 22.  
As we later explained in Milwaukee County, that result was correct 
because the relevant circumstances of the offense are those 
material to the likelihood of recidivism in the workplace, such as 
"the 
opportunity 
for 
criminal 
behavior, 
the 
reaction 
to 
responsibility, or the character traits of the person."  139 Wis. 
2d at 824.  Thus, similar to the armed robbery conviction in Gibson 
and the several counts of patient neglect in Milwaukee County, 
crimes of domestic violence are to be assessed to determine 
"whether the tendencies and inclinations to behave a certain way 
in a particular context are likely to reappear later in a related 
context."  Id. 
¶25 To summarize, we apply the substantial relationship test 
to a domestic violence conviction the same way we would to any 
other conviction.  According to our precedent, which no party asks 
No. 
2019AP1671 
 
19 
 
use to revisit,13 we must look beyond any immaterial identity 
between circumstances——such as the domestic context of the offense 
or an intimate relationship with the victim——and instead examine 
the circumstances material to fostering criminal activity.  The 
material circumstances are those that exist in the workplace that 
present opportunities for recidivism given the character traits 
revealed by the circumstances of a domestic violence conviction. 
¶26 In applying this framework, we first ask whether there 
are opportunities in a workplace that would allow a domestic 
violence perpetrator to recidivate.  One such opportunity would be 
the ability to isolate victims.  Perpetrators of domestic violence 
often commit their crimes under a veil of secrecy inside the home.  
Indeed, this aspect of domestic violence explains the inclination 
to treat crimes of domestic violence differently from other violent 
crimes.  And it leads to the misconception that unlike other 
violent offenders, domestic violence perpetrators are sufficiently 
                                                 
13 The dissent's umbrage with this opinion is misplaced. 
Really 
the 
dissent's 
contention 
is 
aimed 
at 
this 
court 
interpretation of "circumstances" in Milwaukee County v. LIRC, 139 
Wis. 2d 805, 824, 407 N.W.2d 908 (1987).  Yet the dissent offers 
no grounds for overturning this precedent, and for good reason——
to do so would be to develop the parties' arguments for them.  See, 
e.g., Christus Lutheran Church of Appleton v. DOT, 2021 WI 30, ¶21 
n.12, 396 Wis. 2d 302, 956 N.W.2d 837.  Moreover, for over three 
decades LIRC has been applying Milwaukee County's interpretation 
to crimes where domestic violence is not at issue.  See, e.g. 
Weston v. ADM Milling Co., ERD Case no. CR200300025 (LIRC Jan. 18, 
2006); McCain v. Favorite Nurses, ERD Case No. 200302482 (LIRC 
Apr. 27, 2005); Santos v. Whitehead Specialties, Inc., ERD Case 
No. 8802471 (LIRC, Feb. 26, 1992).  This opinion simply ensures 
that same standard applies consistently to all crimes, including 
those of domestic violence. 
No. 
2019AP1671 
 
20 
 
deterred from engaging in violence when in public.  However, this 
pubic versus private, work versus home dichotomy misses the mark.  
The specific setting of the crime is immaterial; what matters is 
that the abusers engage in violence under circumstances where their 
victims are isolated away from those who might intervene.14  That 
isolation 
occurs 
not 
just 
in 
the 
home——under 
the 
right 
circumstances, it can be achieved in a car, in a private room, in 
a storage closet, or in a parking lot.  Thus, when considering 
crimes of domestic violence, we look for the opportunities that 
may exist within the circumstances of the job that would allow a 
perpetrator to isolate a victim. 
¶27 Next we must identify the character traits revealed by 
the elements of a crime of domestic violence.  Here, we refer to 
the testimony of Cree's domestic violence expert, Dr. Hanusa, on 
                                                 
14 See Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 380 (2008) (Souter, 
J. concurring in part) (confirming that the inference drawn from 
the "classic abusive relationship" is that the abuser means "to 
isolate the victim from outside help, including the aid of law 
enforcement and the judicial process"). 
No. 
2019AP1671 
 
21 
 
general 
principles 
informing 
domestic 
violence 
offenses.15  
Dr. Hanusa testified that there is "a direct relationship" between 
"a willingness to use violence in your intimate relationship" and 
"your willingness to use violence in other settings."  He also 
pointed out that the best predictor for future violent behavior 
was past violent behavior.  Put simply, Dr. Hanusa's testimony 
shows that crimes of domestic violence, like other violent crimes, 
indicate a character trait of willingness to use violence against 
others. 
¶28 Dr. Hanusa also explained the "power principle," that 
acts of domestic violence are rooted in power and control.  He 
further testified that those who have issues with power and control 
resort to violence when they believe their power or authority is 
threatened, regardless of who the victim is.  This indicates a 
character trait of willingness to use violence when one's power 
and 
authority 
is 
threatened. 
 
Thus, 
when 
reviewing 
the 
circumstances of the job, we consider whether a domestic violence 
                                                 
15 We reference Dr. Hanusa's testimony not for his opinion on 
Palmer's particular recidivism risk but instead for his exposition 
on general principles regarding domestic violence offenders.  See 
State v. Dobbs, 2020 WI 64, ¶42, 392 Wis. 2d 505, 945 N.W.2d 609 
(distinguishing expert opinions about a particular individual from 
expert expositions on general principles).  This limited reference 
to his testimony presents no conflict with LIRC finding 
Dr. Hanusa's testimony "unhelpful"; that determination was not 
based 
on 
credibility——the 
ALJ 
"had 
no 
specific 
demeanor 
impressions to impart"——and faulted only Dr. Hanusa's opinion of 
Palmer's particular recidivism risk because he had not personally 
interviewed or treated Palmer.  See Palmer, ERD Case No. 
CR201502651, at 19.  No fault was found with respect to his 
exposition on domestic-violence general principles. 
No. 
2019AP1671 
 
22 
 
perpetrator's power and authority will be threatened in ways that 
may trigger a violent response. 
B.  Application 
¶29 Having defined the substantial relationship test and the 
proper way to analyze a conviction for a crime of domestic violence 
within that framework, we now apply that test to Palmer's case.  
We begin by detailing the circumstances both of Palmer's 
convictions and of the Applications Specialist position at Cree.  
We then compare those circumstances and ultimately conclude that 
Cree met its burden to show a substantial relationship. 
1.  The circumstances of Palmer's convictions 
¶30 First, we look to the character traits evinced by the 
elements of Palmer's offenses.  Palmer was convicted of two counts 
of strangulation and suffocation, four counts of battery, one count 
of fourth degree sexual assault, and one count of criminal damage 
to property.  Importantly, each offense requires as an element 
that Palmer acted intentionally.  In addition, the offenses contain 
the following elements: 
 Strangulation 
and 
suffocation 
requires 
that 
the 
defendant impede the normal breathing or circulation of 
blood by applying pressure on the throat or neck or 
blocking the victim's nose or mouth; 
 Battery requires that the defendant caused bodily harm 
to the victim without consent; 
 Fourth degree sexual assault requires that the defendant 
had nonconsensual sexual contact with the victim; and 
No. 
2019AP1671 
 
23 
 
 Criminal damage to property requires that the defendant 
caused damage to property belonging to another without 
consent. 
These elements, informed by the domestic context of the offenses, 
exhibit the following character traits: 
 Willingness to use extreme acts of violence to achieve 
power and control over another person, particularly when 
the victim is isolated; 
 Willingness to engage in nonconsensual sexual conduct 
for the purpose of sexual gratification, degradation, or 
humiliation; 
 Willingness to use extreme violence to stop another 
person's breathing or circulation; 
 Disregard for the health and safety of others; 
 Lack of respect for bodily autonomy; 
 Unwillingness or inability to control anger or other 
emotions, particularly in the face of a perceived power 
differential; and 
 Disregard for the property rights of others. 
This list illustrates far more than a mere tendency to be "anti-
social."  See Milwaukee County, 139 Wis. 2d at 831 (Abrahamson, 
J., concurring) (voicing concern that an emphasis on describing 
circumstances of an offense too generally could lead to viewing 
all individuals who have conviction records as "anti-social" 
"recidivist[s]" fit for few employment positions.).  Palmer's 
crimes show a tendency to violently exert his power to control 
No. 
2019AP1671 
 
24 
 
others, and thus Palmer poses a real threat to the safety of 
others. 
¶31 These traits are not overgeneralizations untethered from 
the circumstances of Palmer's crimes, as the dissent suggests.  In 
every criminal case that results in a conviction, there is a direct 
link between the elements of an offense and the defendant's 
particular conduct.  Indeed, the traits we have identified here 
are each borne out by the specific facts of Palmer's offenses.  
Palmer 
brutally 
attacked 
L.R., 
physically 
injuring 
her, 
endangering her life, and violating her sexually.  No expert is 
needed to appreciate that these facts demonstrate Palmer's 
willingness to use extreme violence or his disregard for the health 
and safety of others. 
¶32 In addition to these character traits, we consider other 
relevant and readily ascertainable circumstances of the offense 
such as the seriousness and number of offenses, how recent the 
conviction is, and whether there is a pattern of behavior.16  We 
consider the seriousness of the convicted offense because the more 
serious the offense, the less we can expect an employer to carry 
the risk of recidivism.  See Milwaukee County, 139 Wis. 2d at 823 
                                                 
16 The court in Milwaukee County emphasized the need for "a 
semblance of practicality about what the test requires.  A full-
blown factual hearing is not only unnecessary, it is impractical."  
Milwaukee County, 139 Wis. 2d at 826.  These circumstances can be 
ascertained from the record of conviction itself and thus do not 
require any "full-blown" hearing.  Furthermore, the court in 
Milwaukee County similarly looked to the "pattern of neglect of 
duty" evinced by the twelve misdemeanor counts to determine there 
was a substantial relationship in that case.  Id. at 828. 
No. 
2019AP1671 
 
25 
 
("This law should be liberally construed to effect its purpose of 
providing jobs for those who have been convicted of crime and at 
the same time not forcing employers to assume risks of repeat 
conduct by those whose conviction records show them to have the 
'propensity' to commit similar crimes . . . .").  The possible 
consequences to an employer of hiring a recidivist shoplifter is 
a matter of petty cash and missing property.  The experience may 
be inconvenient and frustrating but is unlikely to result in any 
great harm to the employer, its staff, or its customers.  In 
contrast, the possible consequences of an employer hiring someone 
who has committed strangulation, battery, and sexual assault 
include a threat to the very safety and bodily autonomy of 
employees and customers.  If harm were to befall a customer or 
employee, an employer could face potential liability. 
¶33 The recentness of the offenses and any pattern of 
conviction are additional readily ascertainable considerations.  
If significant time has passed since a potential employee's last 
conviction, then that tends to indicate rehabilitation and reduces 
the likelihood of recidivism.  But the existence of convictions 
with similar elements that predate the most recent conviction 
undermine 
an 
inference 
of 
rehabilitation, 
increasing 
the 
recidivism risk. 
¶34 Thus, in considering these circumstances of Palmer's 
convictions, we recognize the undeniable seriousness of his 
offenses and an emerging pattern of behavior.  His convictions for 
battery and sexual assault are themselves grave offenses, but his 
conviction for strangulation and suffocation is a particularly 
No. 
2019AP1671 
 
26 
 
concerning offense given its association with homicide.  Palmer 
applied for a job at Cree in 2015, only two years after his multiple 
2013 convictions.  Before that, Palmer had an additional domestic 
battery conviction in 2001, indicating an emerging pattern. 
2.  The circumstances of Cree's job 
¶35 As an Applications Specialist at Cree, Palmer would have 
been working in and have access to most of Cree's large facility 
alongside over 1,000 coworkers.  As his place of work, the layout 
and characteristics of Cree's facility are "accompanying or 
accessory fact[s], event[s], or condition[s]," of Palmer's 
particular job with Cree.17  See Circumstance, Black's Law 
Dictionary 306 (11th ed. 2019).  Some portions of the facility are 
heavily populated but other portions are secluded.  The facility 
is extremely loud in places, which could cover the sounds of a 
struggle.  While some portions of the facility are covered by 
security cameras, the cameras are largely located at entrances and 
exits and in places where injuries are likely to occur. 
                                                 
17 The 
dissent 
misreads 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 111.335(3)(a)1., 
suggesting that the circumstances of the "particular job" narrowly 
means circumstances unique to that particular job.  That 
"uniqueness" limitation appears nowhere in the statue.  Cree's 
Racine facility is a circumstance of this particular Application 
Specialist job, in the way that a different facility where a 
different Application Specialists might work is not particular to 
the position Cree offered Palmer.  That other employees in other 
jobs at Cree might share the same space does not change the fact 
that the shared facility is a circumstance of this particular 
Applications Specialist job.  Nor does it matter that Cree 
"expected" an Applications Specialist to be in a particular part 
of the facility; the record is clear that, despite the expectation, 
Palmer could still access much of the facility. 
No. 
2019AP1671 
 
27 
 
¶36 The Applications Specialist position works largely 
independently and with no day-to-day supervision.  Palmer would 
have been expected to interact with co-workers and customers 
regularly.  By providing pre and post sales customer support, 
Palmer would have been subject to deadlines and responsible for 
satisfying customer demands.  Because of the independent nature of 
his position, he would have been expected to provide some level of 
conflict resolution between Cree and its customers.18  Applications 
Specialists must occasionally assist customers at their facilities 
in uncontrolled and unpredictable environments.  For example, they 
work with "industrial accounts . . . building new facilities, such 
as an office building, a school, a retail establishment, or an 
automotive dealership[.]"  Palmer, No. 201502651, at 12.  Trade 
shows would have required Palmer to travel with no supervision, 
giving him access to rental cars and hotel rooms.  Id. at 4. 
3.  The substantial relationship 
¶37 Based on the evidence Cree submitted, the circumstances 
of Palmer's convictions substantially relate to the Applications 
Specialist position in at least two regards.  First, Palmer's 
willingness to use violence to exert power and control over others 
substantially relates to the independent and interpersonal nature 
of a pre and post sales job like the Applications Specialist 
position.  The relevant circumstances of the Applications 
                                                 
18 The Application Specialist job posting stated that the job 
performs a "mixture of design, presales and post sales customer 
support responsibilities[,]" and would be "part of a team, [] 
applying project management skills to drive your own projects to 
completion."  Palmer, No. 201502651, at 3-4. 
No. 
2019AP1671 
 
28 
 
Specialist position would have presented situations where Palmer's 
power or authority could have been threatened.  Palmer would have 
been responsible for designing an appropriate lighting system for 
Cree's customers and responding to their complaints, problems, and 
demands.  Furthermore, in this situation, he was likely going to 
interact with coworkers and supervisors who may have challenged 
his ideas or perceived authority.  These kinds of challenges and 
demands could lead Palmer to react, consistent with his past 
behavior, in a violent manner in order to exert his own power or 
control.  
¶38 Second, the absence of regular supervision creates 
opportunities for violent encounters.  LIRC's decision in this 
case emphasized that unsupervised contact with other people cannot 
in and of itself be a circumstance that might lead someone to 
violent recidivism.  This is true, but it is not just the 
unsupervised contact with others that creates the substantial 
relationship in this case.  The lack of supervision is bolstered 
by the secluded nature of portions of the large facility, the 
covering noise in portions of the facility, and the broad 
opportunities afforded to Palmer when working with clients on 
location or traveling for trade shows.  Palmer's conviction record 
evinces a propensity to use violence to exert power and control 
over others, particularly when they are isolated and unable to 
attain 
help. 
 
Cree's 
Racine 
facility 
offers 
sufficient 
opportunities for Palmer to either encounter a victim in isolation 
or to intentionally isolate someone in one of the secluded, noisy 
portions of the facility that experience little foot traffic.  
No. 
2019AP1671 
 
29 
 
Furthermore, traveling to customer sites or for trade shows 
provides more significant opportunities to isolate and victimize 
someone. 
¶39 Several other factors also weigh in favor of finding a 
substantial relationship.  First, the seriousness of Palmer's 
convictions would force Cree to assume the risk of Palmer repeating 
his conduct and threatening the safety of employees, customers, 
and the public.  Additionally, the recentness of Palmer's 
convictions——a scant two years——eliminates any favorable inference 
of a long-dormant conviction record.  Finally, Palmer's emerging 
pattern of domestic violence convictions further highlight his 
recidivism risk. 
¶40 When we consider the fostering opportunities for 
conflict and violence in light of the character traits shown by 
Palmer's convictions along with the seriousness, relative 
recentness, and emerging pattern to Palmer's crimes, we conclude 
that Cree met its burden to show a substantial relationship between 
Palmer's convicted offenses and the Applications Specialist 
position.  Palmer's willingness to use violence to exert power and 
control over others substantially relates to the independent and 
interpersonal circumstances of the position, the layout of the 
facility——which provides sufficient opportunities to isolate a 
victim——and the opportunities created by unsupervised travel.  To 
be abundantly clear, this holding is based on the specific 
circumstances of Palmer's convictions and this particular 
Applications Specialist job.  Nothing in this opinion condemns all 
domestic violence offenders to a life of unemployment.  But in 
No. 
2019AP1671 
 
30 
 
this case, Cree sufficiently demonstrates that requiring it to 
employ Palmer would force it to carry too much risk relating to 
his recent criminal behavior. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶41 We hold that Cree met its burden to establish a 
substantial relationship between the circumstances of Palmer's 
convicted offenses and the circumstances of the Applications 
Specialist position.  Accordingly, Cree did not unlawfully 
discriminate against Palmer based on his conviction record.  
Because LIRC's contrary conclusion conflicts with our prior 
direction on how to apply the substantial relationship test, we 
remand to the circuit court with instructions to remand the matter 
to LIRC with direction to dismiss Palmer's complaint on the merits. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is reversed 
and the cause remanded to the circuit court with instructions. 
 
No.  2019AP1671.rfd 
1 
 
 
¶42 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   (dissenting).  The text of 
Wis. Stat. § 111.335 prohibits discrimination on the basis of an 
applicant's conviction record unless the circumstances of the 
applicant's 
offenses 
are 
substantially 
related 
to 
the 
circumstances of the particular job he seeks.  The majority ignores 
that context-specific directive, focusing instead on generic 
"character traits," as well as the general qualities of the 
workplace, gutting the anti-discrimination policy of the Fair 
Employment Act in the process.  The court should instead realign 
its interpretation and application of § 111.335(3)(a)1. with the 
statute's actual text and express purpose.  Under such an analysis, 
Cree unlawfully discriminated against Palmer because it failed to 
show that the circumstances of Palmer's offenses are substantially 
related to the circumstances of the lighting-specialist job for 
which he applied.  I therefore respectfully dissent. 
I 
A 
¶43 The Fair Employment Act makes it illegal, generally, for 
employers to refuse to hire an applicant based on the applicant's 
criminal record.  Wis. Stat. § 111.321.  Notwithstanding that 
general prohibition, the legislature has carved out a number of 
"exceptions and special cases."  Wis. Stat. § 111.335.  Some 
exceptions target specific jobs; for instance, an employer may 
lawfully refuse to hire "as an installer of burglar alarms" anyone 
convicted of a felony.  § 111.335(3)(c).  Some target certain 
employers, such as an "educational agency," allowing them to 
No.  2019AP1671.rfd 
2 
 
lawfully discriminate against persons convicted of a felony.  
§ 111.335(3)(e).  Other exceptions target specific crimes, 
permitting the lawful discrimination against an applicant who was 
convicted of "knowingly us[ing] a false academic credential" or 
"falsely claiming to have a legitimate academic credential."  
§§ 111.335(3)(f), 440.52(13)(c). 
¶44 In 
addition 
to 
those 
targeted 
exceptions, 
the 
legislature enacted a broader exception that applies when the 
applicant has been convicted of any offense "the circumstances of 
which substantially relate to the circumstances of the particular 
job."  § 111.335(3)(a)1.  Although we have addressed this exception 
in prior cases, we have never defined "circumstances" or 
"substantially relate" in the context of § 111.335.  Because those 
words are also not defined in the Fair Employment Act, I look to 
their common meanings.  See Clean Wis., Inc. v. DNR, 2021 WI 72, 
¶22, 398 Wis. 2d 433, 961 N.W.2d 611.  A "circumstance" is a 
"detail accompanying or surrounding an event"; a "fact attending 
an event and having some bearing on it."1  A "relation" is a 
"connection" or "logical or natural association between two or 
more 
things."2 
 
And 
"substantial" 
means 
to 
a 
"considerable . . . degree."3  Thus, § 111.335(3)(a)1. applies 
when the details and attending facts surrounding both the 
applicant's prior offense and potential job are connected to a 
considerable degree. 
                                                 
1 E.g., Am. Heritage Dictionary 347 (3d ed. 1994). 
2 Id. at 1523. 
3 Id. at 1791. 
No.  2019AP1671.rfd 
3 
 
¶45 That definition is consistent with the Fair Employment 
Act's express anti-discrimination purpose.  See State v. Jendusa, 
2021 WI 24, ¶24, 396 Wis. 2d 34, 955 N.W.2d 777 (statutes must be 
interpreted in line with their purpose).  The legislature directed 
courts to "liberally construe[]" the Act so as to "encourage and 
foster to the fullest extent practicable the employment of all 
properly qualified individuals regardless of . . . conviction 
record."  Wis. Stat. § 111.31(3).  It therefore follows that we 
must narrowly construe exceptions such as § 111.335(3)(a)1. so 
that they do not swallow the Act's anti-discrimination rule.  See 
McNeil v. Hansen, 2007 WI 56, ¶10, 300 Wis. 2d 358, 731 N.W.2d 273 
("If a statute is liberally construed,' . . . exceptions must be 
narrowly construed.'") (quoted source omitted).  To that end, the 
employer must show that the "circumstances" of the offense 
referenced in § 111.335(3)(a)1. are closely tethered to the 
specific facts of the applicant's conviction, not to general 
characteristics that may or may not apply to this particular 
applicant.  See Gibson v. Transp. Comm'n, 106 Wis. 2d 22, 29, 315 
N.W.2d 346 (1982) (the burden of proof is on the employer).  The 
employer must also prove that the connection between the particular 
circumstances of the applicant's offenses and those of the job is 
strong 
and 
specific, 
not 
tenuous 
and 
general. 
 
See 
§ 111.335(3)(a)1.  
¶46 Despite those clear textual directives, the court has 
generally struggled to follow them.  Of the three cases in which 
No.  2019AP1671.rfd 
4 
 
the court has previously interpreted § 111.335(3)(a)1.,4 only once 
has our interpretation been true to the text.  In that case, LESB 
v. Village of Lyndon Station, 101 Wis. 2d 472, 305 N.W.2d 89 
(1981), William Jessen had applied to be Lyndon Station's chief of 
police, a job for which one of the primary responsibilities was 
enforcing local traffic laws.  Id. at 492.  Jessen, however, had 
previously been convicted of 26 felony counts of misconduct in 
public office for falsifying traffic tickets while he was the chief 
deputy sheriff for Juneau County.  Id. at 476.  We concluded that 
the particular details surrounding Jessen's specific offense——that 
he wrote false traffic tickets while serving as a deputy sheriff—
—were closely and strongly connected to the position of chief of 
police such that it was not unlawful discrimination for Lyndon 
Station to refuse to hire Jessen: 
[U]nder the facts of this case, it can hardly be said 
that the circumstances of the offense for which Jessen 
was convicted fail to meet the substantial relationship 
exception [in the Fair Employment Act], as common sense 
dictates that a conviction of the felony of misconduct 
in public office for falsifying traffic tickets 
certainly bears a substantial relationship to the duties 
of a police officer who is called upon to issue traffic 
citations. 
Id. at 492.  Consistent with the statute's narrow focus, we did 
not consider the general "character traits" of a person who commits 
misconduct in public office.  Nor did we consider the general work 
environment of Lyndon Station's police department.  Instead, we 
                                                 
4 Although it has not always been numbered § 111.335(3)(a)1., 
the relevant text of the statute has been the same since 1977, 
when the conviction-record basis was added to the Fair Employment 
Act's prohibited bases for discrimination.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 111.32(5)(h)2.a. (1977–78). 
No.  2019AP1671.rfd 
5 
 
focused on the relationship between the facts surrounding Jessen's 
convictions and the job of a police chief. 
¶47 Contrast that textual analysis, rooted in the facts of 
the case, with our two more recent decisions interpreting 
§ 111.335. 
 
In 
Gibson 
v. 
Transportation 
Commission, 
106 
Wis. 2d 22, 315 N.W.2d 346 (1982), and Milwaukee County v. LIRC, 
139 Wis. 2d 805, 407 N.W.2d 908 (1987), we concluded that certain 
character traits are inherent in the elements of a crime such that 
everyone who commits that crime necessarily has those traits.  In 
both cases, the court divined these character traits from nothing 
but its own judgment——not record evidence, not expert testimony, 
not a statutory provision.  See Gibson, 106 Wis. 2d at 28; 
Milwaukee County, 139 Wis. 2d at 828.  In Gibson, for instance, 
the court flatly asserted that anyone who commits armed robbery 
has a "propensity to use force . . . to accomplish one's 
purposes," as well as a lack of "patience [and] level-headedness."  
106 Wis. 2d at 28.  While some people who commit armed robbery 
undoubtedly posses these qualities, the same cannot be assumed of 
every person who commits that crime.  Concluding otherwise requires 
the court to play armchair psychologist, making assumptions about 
what character traits might be associated with each particular 
criminal offense.   
¶48 Followed to its logical end, an analysis rooted in 
generic "character traits" obliterates the express policy of the 
Fair Employment Act.  The Act is meant to "encourage and foster to 
the fullest extent practicable the employment of all properly 
qualified individuals regardless of . . . conviction record."  See 
Wis. Stat. § 111.31(3).  It further requires employers to evaluate 
No.  2019AP1671.rfd 
6 
 
an 
applicant 
based 
upon 
the 
applicant's 
"individual 
qualifications . . . rather than upon a particular class to which 
the individual may belong."  § 111.31(2).  Neither of those policy 
statements can be squared with an analysis focused on general 
character qualities rather than the specific circumstances of the 
case at hand.  Indeed, Justice Abrahamson presciently sounded the 
alarm 35 years ago about the consequences of the atextual 
"character traits" approach: 
I fear that what may emerge from the majority opinion is 
an emphasis on describing the circumstances of the 
offense at a high level of generality.  At the highest 
level of generality, according to the majority opinion, 
an individual convicted of a crime is an "anti-social" 
"recidivist," and anti-social recidivists are fit for 
few employment positions.  Clearly the majority cannot 
have intended this approach because such an approach 
tends to eviscerate the statute. 
Milwaukee 
County, 
139 
Wis. 2d 
at 
831-32 
(Abrahamson, J., 
concurring).  To prevent the Act's exceptions from eviscerating 
its anti-discriminatory purpose, the court should return to the 
text of § 111.335(3)(a)1. and analyze whether the actual 
circumstances of an applicant's offense are substantially related 
to those of the job for which he applied. 
B 
¶49 Under the proper text-based approach, Cree failed to 
prove a substantial relationship between the circumstances of 
Palmer's offenses and those of the lighting-specialist position.  
Regarding the circumstances of Palmer's offenses, the record 
before LIRC included the criminal complaint, which described the 
horrifying facts underlying Palmer's convictions for strangulation 
No.  2019AP1671.rfd 
7 
 
and suffocation, battery, sexual assault, and damaging property.  
See majority op., ¶¶2–3.  As for the circumstances of the lighting-
specialist job, LIRC found that the position would require Palmer 
primarily to design lighting systems for clients.5  Within the 
company, lighting specialists work on teams with other specialists 
and coordinate project designs with teams of engineers.  They also 
interact directly with customers, "most[ly]" by phone and email 
but "occasionally" in person either at the company's demonstration 
rooms, "on the trade show floor" (requiring travel to the trade 
show), or in "other industrial setting[s]."  Palmer v. Cree, Inc., 
No. 201502651, at 4, 12 (LIRC, Dec. 3, 2018).  LIRC found "no 
evidence" that Palmer would be "supervising or mentoring female 
employees, nor is there anything to suggest that he would be 
working closely with female employees."  Id. at 12.  It also found 
"nothing in the record" indicating that Palmer would interact with 
customers in "private homes or other isolated settings."  Id. 
¶50 Based on the circumstances as found by LIRC, Cree has 
failed to establish a strong connection between the circumstances 
of Palmer's offenses, despicable as they are, and the circumstances 
of the lighting-specialist position.  Lighting specialists work in 
a "cubicle farm," not in an isolated or secluded area.  See id. at 
                                                 
5 The circumstances of both the offense and the particular 
job are factual determinations.  See State v. Thiel, 2003 WI 111, 
¶21, 264 Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 305 ("Findings of fact include 
'the circumstances of the case . . . .'") (quoted source omitted).  
We must therefore defer to LIRC's findings unless no reasonable 
fact finder could have made the same determination.  Milwaukee 
Symphony Orchestra, Inc. v. DOR, 2010 WI 33, ¶31, 324 Wis. 2d 68, 
781 N.W.2d 674.  As the court of appeals noted, Cree does not 
challenge LIRC's factual findings.  Cree, Inc. v. LIRC, 2021 WI 
App 4, ¶10, 395 Wis. 2d 642, 953 N.W.2d 883. 
No.  2019AP1671.rfd 
8 
 
4.  Client meetings take place either in the company's 
demonstration rooms or in public settings, such as the trade-show 
floor or "an office building, a school, a retail establishment, 
[or an] automotive dealership" where the lighting system will 
eventually be installed, not individuals' homes or isolated 
settings.  See id. at 12.  It is true that Palmer's offenses 
involved a violent assault on a woman and the lighting-specialist 
position would require Palmer to interact with co-workers and 
clients, some of whom will be women.  But as LIRC pointed out, 
interacting with others, including women, is not a circumstance of 
this particular job, but rather a circumstance of having a job 
generally.  See id. at 11–12. 
¶51 Moreover, no single circumstance of a person's offense 
is dispositive.  The domestic nature of Palmer's offenses is just 
one 
of 
many 
circumstances 
that 
informs 
the 
substantial-
relationship analysis, all of which must be considered to determine 
whether the circumstances of the offense are in fact substantially 
related to those of the job.  Thus, when the relevant offenses 
"stem from personal relationships and the crimes are committed at 
home, it cannot necessarily be assumed that the individual is 
likely to engage in the same conduct with co-workers or customers 
at the workplace."  See id. at 13 (emphasis added).  It was Cree's 
burden to prove otherwise, a burden that LIRC concluded Cree failed 
to meet:  "[T]here is nothing in the record regarding the types of 
interactions with co-workers or with the public that might raise 
a concern that [Palmer] would act in a violent manner."  Id. at 
12–13.  Indeed, to conclude that there is a substantial 
relationship in this case would be to say that the "mere presence 
No.  2019AP1671.rfd 
9 
 
of other human beings is a circumstance that creates a substantial 
relationship."  See id. at 13.  LIRC rightly rejected such a 
conclusion as contrary to the Fair Employment Act and correctly 
determined that Cree unlawfully discriminated against Palmer on 
the basis of his conviction record. 
II 
¶52 The majority's contrary holding undermines the anti-
discrimination policy of the Fair Employment Act by allowing 
employers to refuse to hire all domestic-violence offenders, 
regardless of the circumstances.  Instead of focusing on the 
specific circumstances of Palmer's offenses, the majority 
redefines "circumstances of the offense" to mean the "general 
character traits" it claims are somehow "revealed by the elements 
of a crime of domestic violence."  See majority op., ¶27.  
Similarly, rather than analyzing the particular circumstances of 
the lighting-specialist position, the majority relies upon 
generalities about Cree's work environment.  The majority arrives 
at these conclusions by failing to follow the proper standard of 
review, improperly substituting its own factual findings for 
LIRC's.  The result is a substantial-relationship analysis that is 
unrecognizable in the text or the explicit policy of the Fair 
Employment Act. 
A 
¶53 The majority gets off on the wrong foot by ignoring the 
standard of review.  The court must defer to LIRC's findings of 
fact, including the circumstances of both Palmer's convictions and 
No.  2019AP1671.rfd 
10 
 
the lighting-specialist job, as well as its weight and credibility 
determinations unless no reasonable fact finder could reach the 
same conclusions.  See Milwaukee Symphony Orchestra, Inc. v. DOR, 
2010 WI 33, ¶31, 324 Wis. 2d 68, 781 N.W.2d 674.  For that reason, 
the majority's reliance on the testimony of Cree's expert witness, 
Dr. Hanusa, is improper.  LIRC found Dr. Hanusa's testimony 
"unhelpful" and gave it no weight in its analysis.  See Palmer, 
No. 201502651, at 13 n.6.  LIRC made no exception for Dr. Hanusa's 
"exposition on general principles regarding domestic violence 
offenders."  See majority op., ¶27 n.15.  Thus, Dr. Hanusa's 
testimony is not properly before the court, and the majority may 
not rely on it for any purpose.  The majority also inappropriately 
relies on Cree's assertions that Palmer would be expected to 
interact 
with 
customers 
one-on-one 
in 
"uncontrolled 
and 
unpredictable environments" and to "provide some level of conflict 
resolution between Cree and its customers."  See id., ¶36.  LIRC 
found "nothing in the record" to support any of those assertions.  
See Palmer, No. 201502651, at 12 ("the conclusion that [Palmer] 
would be meeting one-on-one with clients in private settings is 
not supported by the record"); id. ("There is nothing in the record 
to suggest that [Palmer] would be performing his services in 
private homes or other isolated settings, nor did [Cree] specify 
that the on-site meetings with clients would be conducted one-on-
one."); id. (Cree "did not contend that [Palmer] would be required 
to deal with angry or irate customers or that there were any 
conflicts presented in his relationships with the public.").  The 
majority identifies no error by LIRC on any of these points; 
therefore it cannot substitute its own factual findings for LIRC's. 
No.  2019AP1671.rfd 
11 
 
B 
¶54 The majority continues down the wrong path by ignoring 
the text of the Fair Employment Act.  Under § 111.335(3)(a)1., 
Cree's decision to not hire Palmer is lawful only if there is a 
substantial relationship between the circumstances of his offenses 
and those of the lighting-specialist position.  The majority gets 
each part of that analysis wrong:  it recasts circumstances of the 
offense as general character traits; it over-generalizes the 
circumstances of the job; and it invents a substantial relationship 
between the two. 
¶55 Beginning with the circumstances of Palmer's offenses, 
the majority fails to consider Palmer's conduct and other facts of 
his offenses as the relevant circumstances.  Instead, it shifts 
the meaning of "circumstances" to include whatever general 
"character traits" Dr. Hanusa testified to and those it conjures 
from the elements of Palmer's crimes.  See majority op., ¶¶27–28, 
30–31.  Not only is the court unqualified to divine psychological 
traits from conduct, but, as discussed above, such general 
characterizations are incompatible with the Fair Employment Act's 
requirement that employers evaluate applicants based on their 
"individual qualifications," not on the general group to which the 
applicant may belong.  See §§ 111.31; 111.335(3)(a)1.  Also, 
general character traits that may be common to most persons who 
commit certain crimes are neither attending facts nor surrounding 
No.  2019AP1671.rfd 
12 
 
details of a specific person's offenses——especially when, as here, 
there is no evidence that the offender actually has such traits.6 
¶56 To boot, the majority identifies character traits at 
such a high level of generality that they likely substantially 
relate to the circumstances of most any job, thus establishing a 
hurdle that no person with a conviction record is likely to clear.  
For example, the majority asserts that anyone who commits the same 
crimes as Palmer necessarily exhibits a "disregard for the health 
and safety of others."  See majority op., ¶30.  I can think of no 
job to which a respect for the health and safety of others is not 
substantially related.  Such a total prohibition on employment for 
individuals convicted of offenses such as Palmer's must be 
rejected. 
 
See 
Milwaukee 
County, 
139 
Wis. 2d 
at 
831-32 
(Abrahamson, J., concurring). 
¶57 Moving 
even 
further 
away 
from 
the 
text 
of 
§ 111.335(3)(a)1., the majority claims that the "recentness" of 
Palmer's convictions and his "emerging pattern" of criminal 
behavior are circumstances of his offenses.  See majority op., 
¶¶32–34.  In reality, however, both are just different ways of 
talking about general character traits rather than the facts of 
Palmer's offenses.  To be sure, the date of the offense is a fact 
of that offense, but how much time has passed since that date is 
not.  Likewise for the majority's argument about a pattern of 
conduct.  Setting aside the point that no party raised that 
argument, the number of times someone has been convicted of a crime 
                                                 
6 Even if Dr. Hanusa's testimony were properly before the 
court, nowhere does he testify that Palmer actually has any of the 
general character traits he describes. 
No.  2019AP1671.rfd 
13 
 
says nothing about the details surrounding any of those offenses.  
And there is no logical relationship between how long ago or how 
many times Palmer has been convicted and the job responsibilities 
of a lighting specialist.  At bottom, few if any of what the 
majority claims as circumstances of Palmer's offenses are, in fact, 
circumstances of those offenses. 
¶58 The majority's approach to the circumstances of the 
lighting-specialist job is similarly flawed.  Again failing to 
focus on the particular circumstances of that position, the 
majority falls back on high-level generalities, identifying 
generic characteristics of employment at Cree.  For instance, the 
majority notes the size of Cree's facility and the fact that most 
employees have "access" to most of the facility.  See majority 
op., ¶¶4, 35.  But there is nothing in the record to suggest that, 
as a lighting specialist, Palmer would be expected to access the 
whole of Cree's facility.  Rather, the record establishes that 
lighting specialists typically work in a cubicle farm or, when 
meeting clients face-to-face at Cree's facility, in the company's 
demonstration rooms.  The so-called "nooks and crannies" of Cree's 
expansive facility, see id., ¶4, are no more a circumstance of the 
lighting-specialist 
position 
than 
all 
parts 
of 
Mitchell 
International Airport are a circumstance of working for a food 
vendor there.  Indeed, the text of § 111.335(3)(a)1. explicitly 
precludes such a broad reading.  See § 111.335(3)(a)1. (focusing 
on the circumstances of the "particular job").  And even when the 
majority points to an actual circumstance of the job——such as the 
potential for Palmer to travel to trade shows——it fails to explain 
No.  2019AP1671.rfd 
14 
 
how such a generic and mundane fact informs the substantial-
relationship test.7 
¶59 Given its errors regarding the relevant circumstances of 
Palmer's offenses and the lighting-specialist job, it is no 
surprise that the majority gets the ultimate substantial-
relationship conclusion wrong.  But worse than just getting it 
wrong the majority opinion threatens the anti-discrimination 
policy at the heart of the Fair Employment Act by concluding that 
individuals convicted of crimes of domestic violence are unfit to 
work in close proximity to other people, regardless of the 
circumstances.  For example, the majority claims that employing 
someone with Palmer's convictions could lead to certain negative 
consequences for employers.  See majority op., ¶32.  But that is 
whole point of the Fair Employment Act.  The Act is premised in 
part on the idea that, left to their own devices, few employers 
would hire convicted criminals, especially those convicted of 
violent crimes, a scenario that the legislature has determined 
"substantially and adversely affects the general welfare of the 
state."  § 111.31(1).  Accordingly, the legislature made the policy 
decision that unless an employer can demonstrate a substantial 
relationship between the circumstances of this applicant's 
convictions and this particular job, it is prohibited from 
discriminating against the applicant on the basis of his conviction 
record.  § 111.335(3)(a)1.   
                                                 
7 While traveling to trade shows is a circumstance of the 
lighting-specialist position, the fact that Palmer would have 
"access to rental cars and hotel rooms" is not.  See majority op., 
¶36.  He has "access" to both regardless of where he works. 
No.  2019AP1671.rfd 
15 
 
¶60 In no way does that policy determination excuse an 
applicant's convictions or diminish their offensiveness.  Rather, 
it reflects the Act's goals of reintegrating into the workforce 
individuals 
convicted 
of 
crimes 
and 
furthering 
their 
rehabilitation, thus lessening the chances they will commit more 
crimes.  See Milwaukee County, 139 Wis. 2d at 823.  Whether or not 
the majority considers that "to be a wise policy decision," it is 
one "the legislature was entitled to make and to which [the court] 
must defer."  See Kohn v. Darlington Cmty. Schs., 2005 WI 99, ¶43, 
283 Wis. 2d 1, 698 N.W.2d 794. 
¶61 The majority opinion, however, suggests a different 
approach for domestic-violence offenders such as Palmer.  It 
instructs LIRC and reviewing courts to ignore the circumstances 
related to "the domestic context of the offense or an intimate 
relationship with the victim" and instead focus on the general 
character traits supposedly "revealed" by a domestic-violence 
conviction.  See majority op., ¶25.8  Through that framing, the 
majority creates a per se substantial relationship between a 
domestic-violence conviction and the circumstances of any job that 
involves working with other people.  That reasoning seemingly 
extends to all violent convictions, creating a per se substantial 
                                                 
8 Ironically, given its insistence that LIRC and reviewing 
courts analyze a domestic-violence conviction "the same way [they] 
would . . . any other conviction," majority op., ¶25, the 
majority's position requires LIRC and reviewing courts to do the 
opposite.  It forces them to disregard the domestic circumstance 
of a domestic-violence offense, thereby treating such offenses 
differently than any other.  The majority's approach is also a 
solution in search of a problem.  As explained above, supra, ¶¶9–
10, LIRC analyzed Palmer's offenses as it would any other, by 
considering all of the relevant circumstances of the offenses. 
No.  2019AP1671.rfd 
16 
 
relationship between any such conviction and any job involving 
other people.  In short, the majority crafts an exception to the 
Fair Employment Act that swallows the Act's general rule against 
such discrimination. 
¶62 The 
text 
of 
§ 111.335, 
however, 
proscribes 
the 
majority's position in two ways.  First, a categorical exception 
for domestic-violence convictions would render meaningless the 
textual directive that LIRC and reviewing courts must consider the 
"circumstances" of each particular offense.  See § 111.335(3)(a)1.  
Second, had the legislature wanted to enact such a categorical 
exception to the Act's protections, it would have done so, just as 
it did it elsewhere in § 111.335.  Under subsec. (4)(a), for 
example, a licensing agency may lawfully discriminate against a 
potential licensee if, in addition to meeting the same substantial-
relationship test as in 
§ 111.335(3)(a)1., the licensee's 
conviction was for either "an exempt offense" or a "violent crime 
against a child."  An "exempt offense" is defined as any crime 
listed in ch. 940 ("Crimes against life and bodily security") or 
certain crimes against children.  See § 111.335(1m)(b).  The 
legislature included no similar categorical exception for 
employers regarding domestic-violence convictions.   
¶63 It likewise declined to single out domestic-violence 
convictions under any of the specific "exceptions and special 
cases."  As mentioned above, no employer is required to hire as a 
burglar-alarm 
installer 
anyone 
convicted 
of 
any 
felony.  
§ 111.335(3)(c).  All private-investigation firms are allowed to 
lawfully discriminate against anyone convicted of any felony.  
§ 111.335(3)(b).  The legislature enacted no such exception for 
No.  2019AP1671.rfd 
17 
 
any of the crimes Palmer committed.  The lack of a categorical 
exception for domestic-violence convictions doesn't mean that Cree 
was required to hire Palmer; only that because it didn't hire him 
based on his criminal record, the substantial-relationship test 
applies.  See § 111.335(3)(a)a.  The majority's interpretation, 
however, essentially eliminates that test for applicants with 
domestic-violence convictions. 
III 
¶64 The text of § 111.335(3)(a)1. is straightforward and 
clear.  If an employer wants to discriminate against an applicant 
or employee due to that person's conviction record, it must 
demonstrate a substantial connection between the factual details 
surrounding the person's convictions and the circumstances of the 
particular job for which the person is applying.  Here, LIRC 
correctly determined that Cree failed to establish such a 
connection between Palmer's convictions and its lighting-
specialist position.  The majority's erroneous conclusion to the 
contrary has no basis in the text of the Fair Employment Act and 
undermines the Act's express policy of promoting the reintegration 
into the workforce of those who have been convicted of crimes. 
¶65 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH BRADLEY 
and BRIAN HAGEDORN join this opinion. 
No.  2019AP1671.rfd 
 
 
1