Title: Wallace v. Couch
Citation: 642 S.W.2d 141
Docket Number: N/A
State: Tennessee
Issuer: Tennessee Supreme Court
Date: September 7, 1982

642 S.W.2d 141 (1982) Max F. WALLACE, father and next of kin of Jeffrey M. Wallace, Deceased, Appellant, v. Donald P. COUCH and David L. Couch, Appellees. Supreme Court of Tennessee. September 7, 1982. Rehearing Denied December 6, 1982. John K. Morgan, Morgan, Garner, Wood &amp; Guthrie, David R. Prickett, Morgan, Garner, Wood &amp; Guthrie, Chattanooga, for appellant. David E. Harrison, Stringer &amp; Grant, P.C., Chattanooga, for appellees. ALLISON B. HUMPHREYS, Special Justice. This is a wrongful death case in which the issue is whether the trial judge erred in giving the jury the following instruction: The jury returned judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $65,534. On motion for a new trial, the trial judge made an additur to the judgment, in the amount of $9,466, and final judgment was entered in plaintiff's favor in the amount of $75,000. *142 The Court of Appeals approved the charge in question and affirmed the judgment. This Court granted review because of the novelty of the question. The facts are that on August 19, 1978, plaintiff-appellant's son, Jeffrey M. Wallace, was killed instantly when an automobile he was driving collided head-on with an automobile driven by David L. Couch. Plaintiff-appellant brought suit under T.C.A. §§ 20-5-106 and 20-5-107, the Tennessee Wrongful Death Act. The issues were negligence, proximate cause and contributory negligence. There is evidence to support the verdict, so this aspect of the case is of no concern. Capsulated, plaintiff-appellant's contention is that the only elements for the jury's consideration in a case like this, where death is instantaneous, are those set out in Davidson Benedict Co. v. Severson, 109 Tenn. 572, 614-615, 72 S.W. 967, 977 (1902), as follows: Citing many cases that use this quotation, plaintiff-appellant's counsel forcefully argues that as the minus factor, probable living expenses, is not mentioned in Davidson Benedict nor in any of the cases following after it, it was improper for the trial judge to instruct the jury as he did, thereby adding to the elements mentioned in Davidson Benedict, the additional element, the deduction of probable living expenses. The fault in this argument is that Davidson Benedict did not consider the question of deducting probable living expenses nor was the question considered in any of the other cases cited in connection with this argument. Apparently it was not brought to the attention of the Court by the parties and so went undecided and uncommented on. The question has not, however, entirely escaped attention. In Calfee v. O'Neal Steel, Inc., (Tenn. App., E.S., filed June 22, 1976), an unreported opinion, an instruction to this effect was held to be "proper in a broad sense" but that failure to give it upon request was not error, because there was no evidence on that issue. This statement was based on the old case of Knoxville, C.G. &amp; L. Railroad Co. v. Wyrick, 99 Tenn. 500, 42 S.W. 434 (1897), where the following is found: In the next paragraph it was shown by quotation from Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Butler, 57 Pa. 335, 338 (1868), that by pecuniary loss it was meant Because of the similarity of the Tennessee, Pennsylvania and New York Wrongful Death Statutes, this Court has looked favorably on the constructions placed on their statutes by the Pennsylvania and New York courts. In the case of Nashville &amp; Chattanooga Railroad Co. v. Stevens, 56 Tenn. 12 (1871), referring to the similarity between the Tennessee Wrongful Death Statutes and those of New York and Pennsylvania, the Court stated, at page 18: The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in the case Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 282 A.2d 206 (1971), stated the reason for making a deduction for decedent's personal expenses as follows: As an award for death to the beneficiaries, without a reduction of the deceased's living expenses, would include an amount which the beneficiaries could not possibly receive, the overwhelming majority rule has evolved as stated in 76 A.L.R.3d 125 (1977), as follows: As we have noticed, in Calfee v. O'Neal Steel, Inc., supra, the Court of Appeals said that an instruction along this line would be proper in a case where the subject had been dealt with as an issue and evidence directed toward it. In support of that statement that Court cited 22 Am.Jur.2d Death § 153 (1965), which we adopt to this extent: In Stuart M. Speiser's treatise Recovery for Wrongful Death, (2d ed. 1975), which deals extensively and fully with the subject of recovery for wrongful death, the following is to be found: It is evident that we should use method of calculation number one. From all of the foregoing, we are of the opinion the instruction given the jury correctly stated the law on the subject. This holding does not, however, decide this case. Plaintiff-appellant contends that, even if the instruction correctly stated the law, it should not have been given because of the lack of evidence on the issue of personal maintenance expenses. In support of this contention, plaintiff-appellant relies on Calfee v. O'Neal Steel, Inc., supra. This reliance is based on the Calfee court's refusal to apply the personal maintenance expense rule in that case (even though it held that such expenses would be deductible in a proper case) because there was no evidence on this issue. In a wrongful death case, where there is evidence as to life expectancy, health and habits, present living conditions and standards, all bearing on the manner and nature of decedent's present scale of living, it is not unreasonable to permit a jury to use this information in projecting future living expenses in order to reach a verdict. It is not inevitable that decedent would have lived to join the work force, nor that he would have enjoyed health enough to join the work force, nor that he would have entertained the attitude to join the work force. However, it was inevitable that, if the decedent had lived and worked and earned an income, he would have had living expenses. This puts it within the category of those matters of which jurors may to some degree rely on their everyday experience and knowledge, especially when this is bolstered by such evidence as is found in this case. In 9 Wigmore on Evidence, § 2570, p. 726 (3d ed. 1981), the following is found: On the basis of all of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. Costs are adjudged against plaintiff-appellant. HARBISON, C.J., and COOPER, BROCK and DROWOTA, JJ., concur. ALLISON B. HUMPHREYS, Special Justice. A petition to rehear has been filed. After thorough consideration, it is denied. *145 The Court prefers to adhere to the propositions of law set out in its Opinion. COOPER, BROCK, HARBISON and DROWOTA, JJ., concur.