Title: Swan v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 509, 2001, 546, 2001
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: April 9, 2003

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
RALPH E. SWAN, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  Nos. 509/546, 2001 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
)  [CONSOLIDATED] 
Appellant,  
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for Kent County 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  Cr. A. Nos. IK01-05-0668, IK01-05-0670 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
)  and IK01-06-0672 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
)  ID No. 00020004767 
 
Submitted:  November 13, 2002 
Decided:  April 9, 2003 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH, HOLLAND, BERGER and STEELE, 
Justices, constituting the Court en Banc. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED and REMANDED. 
 
 
Leo John Ramunno (argued), Wilmington, Delaware, for appellant. 
 
 
Kim E. Ayvazian and John Williams (argued), Department of Justice, 
Georgetown, Delaware, for appellee. 
 
 
 
STEELE, Justice: 
 
2
 
 
This is Ralph Swan’s direct appeal from his conviction for the murder of 
Kenneth Warren and related charges.1  In this appeal, Swan asserts seven grounds 
of error: (1) the trial judge erred by failing to disqualify one of Swan’s court-
appointed attorneys; (2) the trial judge erred by allowing the State to introduce 
various out of court statements made by Swan and his co-defendant, Adam 
Norcross; (3) the prosecutor’s remarks during the penalty phase of the trial denied 
Swan the right to a fair trial; (4) the trial judge erred as a matter of law and abused 
his discretion by including a general unanimity instruction and by failing to 
instruct on an accomplice culpability for the degree of homicide; (5) there was 
insufficient evidence presented at trial to sustain the convictions; (6) the Delaware 
death penalty statute is unconstitutional; and, (7)  this court’s statutorily mandated 
review of Swan’s sentence requires the Superior Court to impose a sentence of life 
imprisonment rather than a death sentence.   
After carefully reviewing the record and considering his claims, we are 
satisfied that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in his evidentiary rulings 
and that Swan received a fair trial.  We also hold that the 1991 Delaware death 
penalty statute, as applied to Swan, is constitutional.  Finally, having reviewed the 
facts and circumstances of the crime and relevant information about Swan as 
                                                          
 
1 A Grand Jury indicted Swan for: three counts of Murder in the First Degree (one count of 
intentional murder and two counts of felony murder); Robbery in the First Degree; Burglary in 
the First Degree; five counts of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony; and 
Conspiracy in the Second Degree.  The jury convicted him of all the charges.   
 
3
mandated by statute, we conclude that the imposition of the death sentence is 
proportionate.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
I. 
Factual and Procedural Background2 
 
Shortly after 8 p.m. on November 4, 1996, the Warren family was settling in 
for the night in their Kenton, Delaware home.  Kenneth Warren was sitting at the 
kitchen bar eating a sandwich while his wife, Tina, and their 19-month-old son, 
Dustin, were sitting on the family room couch watching television.  Tina’s mother 
Lillian had just left, after babysitting Dustin while Tina attended an aerobics class.  
Suddenly, two armed, masked men dressed in camouflage burst through the glass 
patio doors leading to the family room.  They immediately ran into Kenneth and a 
struggle ensued.  The intruders shot Kenneth four times, killing him, while his wife 
and son watched.  The intruders grabbed Tina’s purse from the kitchen counter and 
fled. During the commission of this crime, Tina Warren observed that both 
assailants carried handguns.  One of the handguns appeared to be bronze or copper 
colored.  One assailant appeared to have been shot in the left shoulder.   
 
Ballistics evidence indicated that Kenneth Warren had been shot four times 
with two different types of handguns, a semi-automatic and a revolver.  Kenneth 
was shot twice in the back; once on the left side of his head behind the left ear; and 
once through the top of his head.  The fourth bullet, fired from a gun barrel held 
tightly against the top of his head, had traveled through the skull down into the 
 
4
back of his neck, killing him instantly.  Examination of the three bullets removed 
from the victim’s body revealed that the two back wounds had been made by a 
.357 caliber copper/nickel jacketed bullets manufactured by the Winchester 
Western Corporation under the “Silver Tip” trademark and had been fired from a 
revolver, manufactured by either Smith & Wesson, Ruger, or Taurus.  A 10 
mm/.40 S & W caliber triple copper jacketed bullet fired from a 10mm semi-
automatic gun made by Smith & Wesson or Irwindale, however, caused the fatal 
wound.  
 
Tina’s credit cards and checkbook were found in late November 1996 
behind the rear fence of the Eastern Shore Concrete Company in Middletown, 
Delaware.  The police searched the area and discovered her pocketbook fifteen feet 
away from the fence and her telephone calling card just inside the fence.  The 
discovery of the purse and its contents at the concrete plant, however, did not lead 
to any suspects.   
 
Swan and Norcross both worked at the Eastern Shore Concrete Company at 
the time of the murder.  On October 20, 1996, about a month before the murder, 
Norcross’ former roommate reported the theft of two handguns from his residence: 
a .357 caliber Smith & Wesson revolver and a .40 caliber black Smith & Wesson 
semi-automatic handgun.  Around the same time, during the fall of 1996, another 
employee of the concrete plant named Matthew Howell took work breaks with 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
2 Our recitation of the facts here may be liberally cross-referenced to similar facts found in the 
 
5
Swan and Norcross.  Howell later testified that a few weeks before the murder, 
Norcross asked whether he wanted to join Norcross and Swan in a robbery.  
Howell declined.   
About a week later, Norcross told Howell that he drove a red sports car to a 
person’s house located on a dark road and fired a shot at a glass patio door around 
the back of the house.  He stated that he wore camouflage clothing and a mask that 
covered everything but his eyes.  When he entered the house, a man came up to 
him and fell to his knees, grabbing hold of Norcross.  Norcross put the gun to the 
side of man’s head and pulled the trigger and the man “fell like a bag of potatoes.”  
Norcross told Howell that Swan was hit in the shoulder either by the homeowner 
or crossfire.  Norcross also told Howell that he had earlier robbed an armory in 
Middletown and stole fatigues and ration packs.  He then told Howell that he 
grabbed a pocketbook from this house and threw it in the woods behind the 
concrete plant.  Norcross then, allegedly in front of Howell, disposed of what 
appeared to be a checkbook by dropping it into a concrete product that was being 
poured.  He also told Howell that he threw the guns into the Chesapeake and 
Delaware Canal and burned the clothing in a barrel.    Norcross told all this to 
Howell because he claimed not to trust Swan and wanted someone to know what 
happened.  Howell did not report this information to the police because Norcross 
threatened to kill him. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
related trial of Adam Norcross.  See Norcross v. State, 816 A.2d 757 (Del. 2003). 
 
6
Norcross told Howell all this information a day after the incident occurred.  
Within a day or so after this conversation, Howell observed that Swan had injured 
his left shoulder and wore a bloodstained bandage.  In December of 1996, Howell, 
Swan, and Norcross were laid off from the concrete plant.   
Norcross dated Gina Ruberto during his employment at the concrete plant.  
She observed Norcross with a black handgun that had to be clicked back to 
operate.  Ruberto also testified to seeing a big green duffel bag in Norcross’ 
bedroom.  Ruberto testified that Norcross was upset one night and showed her a 
newspaper article about a murder and robbery.  Norcross started crying and told 
her about breaking into the back of a home occupied by a man and his wife while 
wearing camouflage clothing.  Norcross stated that he took a pocketbook and 
disposed of it behind a fence at the concrete plant.  Norcross also stated that he 
threw the weapon in the water and burned the clothing in the green duffel bag.  
Two weeks later, Ruberto saw Swan’s left arm in a sling.  A few months later, she 
saw Swan without a shirt and noticed a purplish bruise or scar on his shoulder.  She 
asked Swan about the scar and Swan stated he hurt his shoulder while boxing.   
In 1997, Norcross worked as a farmhand near Chesapeake City, Maryland.  
He married Bridget Phillips in April, and in June or July of that year, Norcross 
invited Swan to work at the farm.  Swan moved into the same house with the 
couple, and one day Phillips overheard a loud conversation between the two men.  
They were laughing about an incident where Swan had been shot.  Norcross then 
 
7
explained to his wife that he and Swan had planned to “rob” an empty home, but 
found it occupied.  He told her that the victim fired a shot and died because he 
“tried to play hero.”  Later, Phillips saw Swan without his shirt and observed a scar 
on his left shoulder.  Norcross pointed to the scar and said that scar resulted from a 
gunshot.  Swan responded by sticking his finger in the scar and saying, “Yes, and 
the bullet is still in there.”  Norcross also told Phillips that they would never be 
caught because they had worn masks. 
Norcross and Phillips separated in December 1997, and two years later she 
contacted the Delaware State Police.  The police arrested Norcross on February 9, 
2000, and he gave a statement the following day.  Norcross admitted that he was 
present during the incident, but in this version of the story, said that Swan killed 
Warren.  Norcross claimed that Swan started shooting, but that Norcross’ gun 
would not fire.  Swan allegedly grabbed Norcross’ gun, cleared it, and then used it 
to shoot Warren in the head.  After the two men started running to Swan’s car, 
Swan told Norcross that he wanted to go back and kill the woman because she was 
a witness.  Norcross stopped Swan by shooting him in the shoulder.  The two men, 
who both worked at the Eastern Shore Concrete Company in Middletown, 
disposed of Tina’s purse and their weapons the next day.    
On a morning scheduled for preliminary hearings, Swan and Norcross were 
in separate holding cells in the Kent County courthouse when correctional officers 
intercepted a note Swan had dictated to an inmate.  In the note, Swan warned 
 
8
Norcross not to trust or talk to his attorney and gave his grandmother’s telephone 
number as a means of communicating with him.  Swan further warned Norcross, 
“Don’t say anything or if you did, say you lied.”  Swan also told another inmate 
that he had nothing to worry about as long as Norcross kept his mouth shut.   
Warren’s mother testified that she noticed a red car parked nearby when she 
left shortly before the murder.  Several witnesses testified that Swan owned a red 
Dodge Daytona at the time of the murder and later painted the car blue/black in 
April 1997.  Additional testimony revealed that Swan was placed on restricted duty 
at the concrete plant due to a shoulder injury and that he had a scar on his left 
shoulder consistent with a gunshot wound.  
Swan was a martial arts boxer and presented an alibi defense that he had 
sparred with a professional boxer named Michael Stewart from October 1996 
through November or early December 1996.  He also presented evidence that the 
scar on his shoulder could not have resulted from a gunshot wound and that he 
showed no signs of injury when he participated in a February 8, 1997 kickboxing 
tournament.   
Swan’s trial for Murder First Degree and related charges began on June 5, 
2001.  The jury found Swan guilty of all charges.  At the penalty hearing following 
the conviction for Murder First, the jury voted seven to five that the aggravating 
circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances.  On October 3, 2001, after 
considering the jury recommendation, the trial judge sentenced Swan to death. 
 
9
II. 
Swan’s Allegations of Error 
A. 
The Request for Disqualification of Counsel  
Swan first argues that the trial judge should have granted him a new trial 
because, during the guilt phase of the proceedings against him, the Governor of 
Delaware nominated Swan’s attorney, David Jones, for a position as a Family 
Court Commissioner.  Kenneth Warren’s aunt is Delaware State Senator Nancy 
Cook.  Swan claims Senator Cook’s ability to influence other Senators who would 
vote in Jones’ confirmation resulted in a conflict of interest.  This Court reviews a 
trial judge’s denial of a motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion.3   
During one of Jones’ initial interviews with Swan, Jones told Swan that he 
discussed a nomination for an appointed position with Senator Cook the previous 
year, that Jones would continue to seek the nomination, but that Jones did not have 
a personal relationship with Senator Cook and had only spoken to Senator Cook on 
one or two prior occasions.  Swan moved for new counsel approximately one year 
before the trial took place.  The trial judge denied the motion.  Swan raised the 
same objection when he moved for a new trial during the penalty phase of his trial.  
Specifically, Swan claimed that the relationship between Senator Cook and Jones 
created an “appearance of impropriety” that may have affected Swan’s Sixth 
Amendment rights.  In response, the trial judge noted that Senator Cook abstained 
                                                          
 
3 Wilmington Country Club v. Cowee, 747 A.2d 1087, 1092 (Del. 2000). 
 
10
from voting on Jones’ confirmation as a Commissioner.  The trial judge also noted 
that Swan did not present any evidence of improper conduct by Jones.   
The Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel provides for 
representation free from conflicts of interest or divided loyalties.4  This right 
applies irrespective of whether the attorney is appointed or privately retained.5  
Though the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant effective assistance of 
counsel, it does not provide the defendant counsel of his or her choice.6  Delaware 
Lawyers’ Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7(b) provides:  
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client 
may be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another 
client or to a third person, or by the lawyer’s own interests, unless: 
 
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be 
adversely affected; and  
(2) the client consents after consultation.7 
 
The comments to Rule 1.7 note that an inquiry into a conflict of interest must 
include an analysis of the likelihood that actual conflict will arise and the likely 
prejudice to the client from the conflict if it does arise.8  
When a judge is alerted to possible conflicts of interest, the judge must take 
adequate steps to determine whether the conflicts warrant separate counsel.9  In the 
                                                          
 
4 Lewis v. State, 757 A.2d 709, 714 (Del. 2000). 
5 Id. at 715. 
6 Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988); In re Kennedy, 472 A.2d 1317, 1331 (Del. 
1984)). 
7 Prof. Cond. R. 1.7(b). 
8 Prof. Cond. R. 1.7, cmt.  
9 Walker v. State, 790 A.2d 477 (Del. 2002) (quoting Wheat v. U.S., 486 U.S. 153, 160 (1988).  
 
11
recent decision of Mickens v, Taylor, the United States Supreme Court held that 
when a trial judge fails to inquire into a potential conflict of interest that he knew 
or reasonably should have known existed, a defendant, in order to establish a Sixth 
Amendment violation, must demonstrate that the conflict of interest adversely 
affected his lawyer’s performance.10  We do not need to decide whether the 
Delaware Constitution affords a defendant more protection than the United States 
Constitution when the trial judge fails to inquire into a potential conflict of interest.   
When Swan alerted the trial judge about a possible conflict of interest, the 
trial judge took adequate steps to determine whether the conflict warranted new 
counsel.  After receiving Swan’s pro se motion, the trial judge sent a letter to 
Swan’s counsel and asked for a response.  Defense counsel then submitted a 
detailed response denying the existence of a conflict.  The trial judge then ruled on 
Swan’s claim at the proof positive hearing on June 29, 2000.  The trial judge took 
proper steps to determine whether a conflict of interested existed after Swan filed 
his motion.  
The trial judge also properly determined that Swan’s attorney did not have a 
conflict of interest.  The trial judge concluded that Senator Cook had no role in the 
nomination process of a judicial candidate and that she had abstained from voting 
on Jones’ confirmation.  The trial judge further noted that the Senate did not 
confirm Jones until after the guilt phase of the trial and, therefore, there was no 
                                                          
 
10 535 U.S. 162, 173-74 (2002). 
 
12
reason for any interaction between Senator Cook and Jones at that time because his 
name had not yet been submitted to the Senate.  The Senate did confirm him before 
the penalty phase but Senator Cook did not vote on his confirmation.  The trial 
judge explained that Swan had done no more than ask the court to speculate that 
Senator Cook acted in some way to influence voting Senators because he could 
produce no evidence of improper conduct on anyone’s part.11 
We agree with the trial judge’s conclusion that Jones did not have a conflict 
of interest when he represented Swan.  Up until the release of Jones’ nomination 
during the guilt phase of Swan’s trial, Jones merely intended to submit his name if 
a position for Commissioner became open in the future.  The Comments to Rule 
1.7 note that an inquiry into a conflict of interest must include an analysis of the 
“likelihood that actual conflict will arise and the likely prejudice to the client from 
the conflict if it does arise.”  Here, the likelihood of conflict was remote.  Neither 
Jones nor Senator Cook could have known when a position would become 
available.   
The trial judge also correctly determined that Swan failed to demonstrate 
any prejudice as a result of his counsel’s alleged conflict of interest.  Swan made 
no claim of deficient performance.  He never specified what he believed Jones did 
or failed to do in light of the alleged conflict that he argued could have prejudiced 
his defense.  Thus, Swan’s argument reduces itself to the claim that the conflict 
                                                          
 
11 State v. Swan, 2001 WL 1012265 (Del. Super.). 
 
13
created an “appearance of impropriety.”12  The trial judge further noted that Jones’ 
defense of Swan was highly skilled and vigorous, evidenced by the fact that the 
jury deliberated four days before convicting Swan and on horrendously 
unfavorable facts recommended the death penalty by only a seven to five vote.  
Given the trial judge’s thoughtful inquiry and reasoned conclusion, we cannot find 
that he abused his discretion when he denied Swan’s Motions to Disqualify 
Counsel or for a New Trial.   
                                                          
 
12 Appellant’s Op. Br. at 14. 
 
14
 
B. 
The Admission of Co-Defendant Adam Norcross’ Statements 
Swan argues that his co-defendant’s various hearsay statements, admitted 
into evidence after Norcross invoked his Fifth Amendment right not to testify, 
deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.  Swan argues that the 
statements were not reliable because Norcross provided several different versions 
of the incident to different witnesses.  He also argues that the use of plural 
pronouns and phrases in redacted statements were intended to inculpate him.  He 
complains that Mathew Howell’s testimony about Norcross’ statements was 
admitted without redaction.  He complains generally about hearsay testimony from 
Bridget Phillips and that the trial judge erred by not granting a mistrial when the 
State played a tape of Gina Ruberto’s statement that included a plural phrase.   
This Court reviews de novo claims alleging the infringement of a 
constitutional right and evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.13  Since Swan’s 
co-defendant Norcross invoked his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, he was 
unavailable for trial.  The State was forced to rely on the statement against penal 
interest exception to the hearsay rule to enter Norcross’ statements into evidence.14  
The trial judge ordered that any references to Swan be redacted where 804(b)(3)  
was relied upon for admission as well as any plural usage that in the context of the 
statement could unfairly implicate Swan as the accomplice.  The trial judge also 
                                                          
 
13 Williamson v. State, 707 A.2d 350, 354 (Del. 1998). 
 
15
redacted any statement that suggested Norcross’ accomplice fired the fatal shot.  
The trial judge permitted plural usage for statements where Swan was not 
implicated and Norcross was not shifting the blame.   
This Court has held that the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause 
imposes strict requirements for admission of statements against penal interest if 
those statements also inculpate someone other than the hearsay declarant.15  Swan 
relies on Barrow v. State16 and Lilly v. Virginia17 to argue that Norcross’ statements 
were not truly self-inculpatory.  However, Norcross’ statements are analogous to 
the footnote in Barrow where this Court explained that a statement that the hearsay 
declarant participated in the robbery, without stating his role, would be truly self-
inculpatory.18  Norcross specifically admitted to Howell and Phillips that he shot 
Kenneth Warren.  In addition, Norcross fully implicated himself in the conspiracy, 
burglary, robbery, and murder in speaking with Gina Ruberto and the police.  No 
reasonable person in Norcross’ position would have made such statements unless 
he believed them to be true.  Furthermore, Swan conceded at trial that those parts 
of Norcross’ statements confessing that he was one of the two people who broke 
into the Warren house and planned the robbery were admissible under the hearsay 
exception for statements against penal interest.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
14 D.R.E. 804(b)(3) (2002). 
15 Smith v. State, 647 A.2d 1083, 1080-90 (Del. 1994). 
16 749 A.2d 1230 (Del. 2000). 
17 527 U.S. 116 (1999). 
18 Barrow, 749 A.2d at 1244, n.12. 
 
16
The trial judge correctly admitted Norcross’ statements to his co-worker, 
Matthew Howell under the co-conspirators exception to the hearsay rule.19  A 
statement is not hearsay if made by a co-conspirator of a party during the course 
and in furtherance of the conspiracy; provided that the conspiracy has first been 
established by a preponderance of the evidence to the satisfaction of the court.20  
This Court has held that the trial court may rely on the statement itself to establish 
the conspiracy.21  Howell’s statements meet the requirements of this exception 
because Norcross attempted to solicit Howell to join the conspiracy to commit 
robbery.     
The trial judge properly allowed Bridget Phillips to relay Swan’s adopted 
admissions pursuant to D.R.E. 801(d)(2)(A) & (B).  Phillips testified that Norcross 
admitted that he and Swan were involved in the murder of Kenneth Warren.  With 
Swan present, Norcross told Phillips that Swan was shot during the scuffle with the 
victim.  Norcross pointed to a scar on Swan’s shoulder and stated that the scar was 
the result of a gunshot wound that occurred during the robbery.  Swan, present at 
the time Norcross made the statement, confirmed it.  Swan then stated that the 
bullet is still in there, gesturing with his hand toward the scar.  These statements 
and actions manifested Swan’s adoption of belief of the truth of Norcross’ 
statements made while Phillips was present. 
                                                          
 
19 D.R.E. 801(d)(2)(E) (2002). 
20 Id. 
21 Lloyd v. State, 534 A.2d 1262, 1264-65 (Del. 1987). 
 
17
The trial judge did not abuse his discretion by denying Swan’s motion for a 
mistrial where one plural reference was not redacted from a taped statement made 
by Norcross’ former girlfriend, Gina Ruberto.  In the statement, Ruberto repeated 
an account of the robbery and murder that Norcross gave her shortly after the 
murder had occurred.  Despite the trial judge’s order that references to any 
accomplice be redacted, the State failed to redact one plural pronoun reference 
where Ruberto mentioned that Norcross had said “they” parked the red car near the 
victim’s home.  Upon defense objection, the trial judge immediately provided a 
curative instruction to the jury: 
A portion of the tape you have just heard and a portion of the 
transcript … contained material that I have ruled inadmissible.  I 
believe that it got in there inadvertently, but I don’t know that for 
sure. 
 
In any event, I have stricken that tape and that transcript from the 
record.  They are no longer in evidence and you are to disregard 
anything you might recall, either from the tape or from the transcript.  
You may be guided by the testimony that Ms. Ruberto has given from 
the stand and the cross-examination you are about to hear.  And the 
very first tape, the short tape, is still in evidence.  But the tape that 
was just played for you is no longer evidence in this case.22 
 
This instruction neutralized prejudice to the defendant, and the jury must be 
presumed to have followed the court’s instructions.23 
                                                          
 
22 Appellant’s App. at 84. 
23 Lewis v. State, 626 A.2d 1350, 1358 (Del. 1993); see also, Capano v. State, 781 A.2d 556, 589 
(Del. 2001) (“As a general rule, we must presume that ‘jurors followed the court’s instructions’”) 
(internal citations omitted).  
 
18
The trial judge took great pains to ensure that the portions of Swan’s 
accomplice’s statements (Norcross’ confession to the police and his out-of-court 
statements to Howell, Ruberto, and Phillips) that inculpated Swan were redacted, 
as well as any portions which appeared to shift blame from Norcross to Swan, or 
anyone else.  Norcross’ statements contain sufficient guarantees of reliability and 
are consistent in their essential elements: that Norcross and another person dressed 
in camouflage clothing broke into a home occupied by a family, shot the husband, 
and a stole a purse.  Aside from Norcross’ confession, the statements made to his 
co-worker, his girlfriend, and his wife were not made under the pressure of a police 
interrogation, where a declarant, arguably, is more likely to shift blame to others in 
order to curry favor with authorities.  
C. 
The Prosecutor’s Closing Remarks 
Swan challenges several comments made by the prosecutor during closing 
argument.  He contends that the comments deprived him of his right to a fair and 
impartial trial.  All the comments were made during the guilt phase of trial.  Swan 
objected to two of the comments claiming the first comment asked the jury to place 
themselves in the place of the victim and the second comment expressed the 
prosecutor’s own opinion.  Swan argues that the trial judge should have granted a 
mistrial upon the defense objection to those comments.  The remaining comments 
were not objected to at trial and Swan now complains that they constituted plain 
error.   
 
19
The law in this area is well settled.  The prosecutor “represents all the 
people, including the defendant” and must “seek justice, not merely convictions.”24  
In pursuing both goals, the prosecutor should abide by the American Bar 
Association’s standards governing prosecution and defense functions.25  Consistent 
with those standards, the prosecutor should not: (i) express personal beliefs as to 
the credibility of witnesses; (ii) misrepresent the evidence presented at trial; (iii) 
comment on the fact that a defendant exercised the right to remain silent; (iv) 
denigrate the role of defense counsel; (v) misrepresent the legal effect of 
defendant’s statements; (vi) appeal to the jury’s sense of personal risk or the level 
of safety in the community; or (vii) attempt to inflame the prejudices of the jury by 
name-calling or other pejorative language.26 
Objectionable statements that were not objected to at trial are reviewed for 
plain error.27  To be plain, the error must affect substantial rights, generally 
meaning that it must have affected the outcome of the trial.28  Under plain error 
review, the error complained of must be so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights 
so as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial.29  The burden of 
persuasion is on the defendant to demonstrate that a forfeited error is prejudicial.30 
                                                          
 
24 Hunter v. State, 2002 Del. LEXIS 803, *8 (Del. Supr.) (quoting Bennett v. State, 164 A.2d 
442, 446 (Del. 1960)). 
25 Id. at *8-9. 
26 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
27 Trump v. State, 753 A.2d 963, 970 (Del. 2000). 
28 United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-34 (1993). 
29 Capano v. State, 781 A.2d 556, 653 (Del. 2001). 
30 Brown v. State, 729 A.2d 259, 265 (Del. 1999). 
 
20
In the first challenged remark, Swan claims the prosecution violated the 
“golden rule” by asking the jury place themselves in the place of the victim.   
“Think about home.  What is home?  Come back from vacation, you want to sit 
there.”  Defense counsel immediately objected on the grounds that, “the prosecutor 
is asking the jury to place themselves in the place of the victim.”  The trial judge 
sustained this objection and the prosecutor rephrased the comment by referring 
specifically to the victim’s home.31   
The trial judge correctly and promptly sustained defense counsel’s objection 
to the prosecutor’s invocation of the “golden rule” argument.  The prosecutor’s 
reference to the sanctity of the home effectively asked the jury to place themselves 
in the place of the victim.   
Swan next claims the prosecutor injected his personal opinion to the jury, 
although defense counsel made no objection to the following comments: 
I’m suggesting, ladies and gentlemen, that the – that what Michael Stewart’s 
memory of that event is with regard to his involvement with Swan, the 
evidence would suggest, ladies and gentlemen, that perhaps Michael’s 
mistaken.32 
 
Swan claims that the prosecutor again injected his own opinion in the 
argument.  This time, defense counsel raised an objection: 
A bullet goes boom, like that.  Can’t it just go there?  He even gave 
Mr. O’Connor a tough time about three-eights of an inch or 7/16s, 
whatever the nonsense was. But doesn’t it – conceptualize – unless 
                                                          
 
31 Appellant’s Op. Br. at 37. 
32 Appellant’s Op. Br. at 38. 
 
21
I’m just slow or something, it seems to me that a bullet can go 
through–  
 
MR. JONES: 
Again, your Honor, objection to injecting the 
prosecutor’s personal opinion into the argument. 
 
THE COURT: 
Yes, it’s getting to be that, Mr. O’Neill.  Let me 
tell you about what we’re fussing about here.  Our 
Supreme Court has said that it’s improper for an 
attorney to say, “In my personal opinion,” or “In 
my opinion,” the Supreme Court thinks [it] is 
improper.  The attorneys should use, “the evidence 
suggests,” or things like that.  They’re not to put 
their own personal opinion or personal credibility 
on the line.  I’ve seen it happen over and over 
again, the “I” slips in, sometimes inadvertently, so 
just – 
 
MR. O’NEILL: 
I understand, your Honor. 
 
THE COURT: 
-- a warning shot. 
 
MR. O’NEILL: 
And I – the State will continue. 
 
It is a well-established principle that the prosecutor has a special obligation 
to avoid assertions of personal knowledge.33  The prosecutor’s use of the word “I” 
only serves to emphasize for the jury that prosecutor’s personal belief about the 
point being argued to the jury.34  However, the objection and the trial judge’s 
immediate intervention prevented the State from finishing its arguably improper 
presentation concerning the bullet related evidence.  In addition, the prosecutor’s 
use of “I” in discussing the testimony of Michael Stewart was later qualified by the 
                                                          
 
33 Trump v. State, 753 at 967. 
34 Id. 
 
22
use of the “the evidence suggests.”  Thus, neither comment improperly denied 
Swan a fair trial.35  
In reviewing the remaining four statements, our analysis includes a review 
of both the statements’ individual and cumulative effect.36  Improper prosecutorial 
comments in closing argument only constitute plain error if credibility is a central 
issue, the case is close, and the comment is so clearly prejudicial that defense 
counsel’s failure to object is inexcusable and the trial judge must intervene sua 
sponte in the interest of fundamental fairness.37  None of the remarks challenged 
for the first time on appeal satisfy this three-part plain error analysis. 
The prosecutor’s remark that, “Friends and relatives lost a good man, a hard-
working honest man” in the victim was not improper.  The State is permitted to 
draw legitimate inferences from the record.  This inference is a fair comment on 
the evidence and is supported by the record.  The prosecutor’s remark that, “It is 
time to do what is right as supported by the evidence.  Justice demands it” is 
neither inflammatory nor prejudicial as the prosecutor is merely asking the jury to 
decide the case on the basis of the evidence.  Noting that the trial against the 
accused is also the victim’s day in court does not constitute plain error.38  Tina 
Warren corroborated the prosecutor’s comment that Norcross’ statement indicated 
                                                          
 
35 There is no per se rule that the use of the work “I” or “we” in closing argument is improper.  
Cousins v. State, 2001 Del. LEXIS 513, *3 (Del. Supr.) (citing Trump, 753 A.2d at 968). 
36 Mason v. State, 658 A.2d 994, 999 (Del. 1995); Michael v. State, 529 A.2d 752, 765 (Del. 
1987). 
37 Trump, 753 A.2d at 964. 
 
23
that Norcross committed the murder with another individual.  The prosecutor 
merely emphasized that another witness confirmed Norcross’ account.  He did not 
impermissibly attempt to bolster a witness’ credibility.   
After reviewing all the prosecutor’s remarks that Swan claims violated his 
right to a fair trial, we conclude that only the prosecutor’s reference to the golden 
rule was improper.  However, once a prosecutor’s remarks are found to be 
improper, the inquiry does not end. The court must consider whether the remark 
prejudicially affected the defendant’s right to a fair trial.39  The three factors to be 
considered in making this determination are: (i) the closeness of the case, (ii) the 
centrality of the issue, and the (iii) the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the 
error.40  As discussed more fully in the sections of this opinion addressing Swan’s 
claim that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of the crimes alleged and 
this court’s automatic review of Swan’s sentence, this was not a close case.  In 
addition, although a curative instruction would have been beneficial, the trial judge 
did sustain defense counsel’s motion and the prosecutor changed his argument to 
specifically refer to the victim’s home.  This limited, improper comment did not, 
standing alone or with other comments, deprive Swan of a fair trial.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
38 Diaz v. State, 508 A.2d 861, 866 (Del. 1986).   
39 Pennell v. State, 602 A.2d 48, 51 (Del. 1991). 
40 Hughes v. State, 437 A.2d 559, 571 (Del. 1981). 
 
24
D. 
Jury Instructions 
Swan argues for the first time on appeal that the trial judge erred by refusing 
to give the jury specific instructions that clearly separated the State’s theories of 
intentional murder and accomplice liability.  According to Swan, the trial judge 
should have provided a Chance41 instruction commanding the jury to find either 
that Swan was the principal in committing first degree murder by firing the fatal 
shot, or that he was the accomplice by firing the other shots that did not kill the 
victim.  Swan contends that the trial judge’s instruction violated Swan’s Sixth 
Amendment rights by confusing the jury to the point where some jurors may have 
convicted Swan as Norcross’ accomplice, while others convicted him as the 
principal.   
This Court reviews jury instructions for plain error when the parties fail to 
raise an objection at trial.42  When a case involves two people and a single incident 
where the State may have difficulty proving the two’s respective roles, specific 
unanimity instructions need not be given because a general unanimity instruction 
serves to prevent both persons from escaping criminal responsibility where there is 
compelling evidence that they jointly planned and carried out the criminal 
enterprise.43   
                                                          
 
41 Chance v. State, 685 A.2d 351 (1996).   
42 McDade v. State, 693 A.2d 1062, 1064 (Del. 1997). 
43 Liu v. State, 628 A.2d 1376, 1386 (Del. 1993). 
 
25
Swan and Norcross were engaged in the same enterprise, at the same time 
and cannot escape liability simply because the State cannot prove which defendant 
inflicted the fatal wound.  The jury need not unanimously decide whether Swan 
fired the fatal shot where both theories of liability required the jury to determine 
that Swan participated in the robbery and was one of the assailants that fired a 
weapon.  As we noted in Liu, in a case involving two people and a single incident 
where the State my have difficulty proving their respective roles, a “general 
unanimity instruction serves to prevent both persons from escaping criminal  
responsibility, where there is compelling evidence that they jointly planned and 
carried out the criminal enterprise.”44  The bullets removed from Warren’s body 
were shot from two different guns, and the record reveals that both Swan and 
Norcross were both active participants in the murder. 
Were a Chance instruction required under these circumstances, this Court 
would face the same problem noted in Liu.  Since the jurors cannot determine who 
was the principal and who was the accomplice, both Swan and Norcross could 
escape liability because the jury could not make a specific culpability assessment 
for each defendant.  As the jury may find both defendants guilty of the first degree 
murder offense without definitively finding one the principal actor, the jury must 
also be permitted to assign the same level of culpability to both actors since they 
were involved in the same criminal enterprise and where one could conclude it to 
                                                          
 
44 Id.  
 
26
be equally possible for both to have fired the fatal shot.  There is here no credible 
argument, as in Chance, that Warren’s death was an unintended consequence of 
either Swan’s or Norcross’ actions.  Therefore, the trial judge did not err by 
refusing to give an instruction setting forth the varying degrees of culpability for 
accomplice liability.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
 
27
 
E. 
Sufficiency of the Evidence 
Swan argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of the 
crimes alleged.  He argues that the State’s case consisted only of the 
uncorroborated hearsay statements of his co-defendant without any physical 
evidence connecting Swan to the crimes.  He also argues that the jury’s 
deliberation of four days illustrate that this is a close case.  Despite these claims, 
Swan failed to move for a directed verdict or a judgment of acquittal at trial nor did 
he raise a claim of insufficient evidence in his motion for a new trial.   
In the absence of a motion for directed verdict or for judgment of acquittal 
notwithstanding the verdict, this Court reviews claims of insufficient evidence for 
plain error.45  Swan bears the burden of demonstrating actual prejudice and the 
error complained of “must be apparent from the face of the record.”46  This claim 
essentially summarizes Swan’s previous arguments about the hearsay statements 
admitted at trial.  Though the evidence was primarily circumstantial, this Court 
does not require direct evidence to sustain a verdict.47  The jury deliberated for four 
days because this was a complicated case.  The trial involved numerous witnesses 
whose testimony assembled the picture of the man who invaded the Warren home 
with Norcross that fateful night.   
                                                          
 
45 Monroe v. State, 652 A.2d 560, 563 (Del. 1995). 
46 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986). 
47 Robertson v. State, 596 A.2d 1345, 1355 (Del. 1991). 
 
28
Tina Warren corroborated many of Norcross’ statements when she testified 
that two armed and masked men burst through the rear door of her home, shot 
Kenneth Warren in front of Tina and their young son, and took her purse after 
abandoning an attempt to take Kenneth’s wallet.  She also testified that one of the 
men appeared to have suffered an injury to his shoulder.  Matthew Howell, Gina 
Ruberto, Tina Holotanko, and Swan’s foreman at the concrete plant testified to 
seeing a wound or injury to his left shoulder around the time of the murder.  
Bridget Phillips overheard Norcross and Swan talking about a time when Swan 
been shot and observed a scar on Swan’s left shoulder to which he pointed, 
informing her that the bullet was still there from the murder.   
Lillian Warren testified that she saw a small red sports car parked near her 
son’s home on the night of the murder.  Norcross told witnesses that he had driven 
to the residence in a red sports car, a red Dodge Daytona, and several witnesses 
testified that Swan owned a red Dodge Daytona, in which Norcross was a frequent 
passenger, and which Swan had painted dark blue/black in April 1997.  Swan and 
Norcross both worked at a concrete plant in Middletown, the same plant where 
Tina’s purse and its contents were discovered a few weeks after the murder.  Prior 
to being laid off, Swan was placed on light duty at the concrete plant because of his 
injured left shoulder.  Lastly, while in custody Swan warned Norcross in a note not 
to talk to his lawyer or if he had, to say that he lied.  The note was intercepted and 
 
29
Swan told his cellmate that he had nothing to worry about as long as Norcross kept 
his mouth shut. 
There is ample evidence in the record to support the jury’s verdict.  
Norcross’ hearsay statements combined with Swan’s admissions, post-arrest 
conduct, and various other pieces of circumstantial evidence established a prima 
facie case of first degree murder, felony murder, burglary, robbery, and conspiracy.  
Accordingly, there is no plain error evident from the record. 
F. 
The Constitutionality of the Death Penalty Statute 
Swan argues that the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Ring v. 
Arizona48 rendered the 1991 version of Delaware’s death penalty statute 
unconstitutional.49  Brice v. State,50 decided after Swan advanced these arguments, 
resolves this issue.  In Brice, this Court addressed several questions concerning the 
2002 amendment to §4209, and held that Ring only extends to the narrowing phase 
of the sentencing process.  Thus, once a jury finds unanimously and beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the existence of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance, 
the defendant becomes death eligible and Ring’s constitutional requirement of jury 
fact-finding is satisfied.51 
In this case, Swan was sentenced under the 1991 version of §4209, which 
did not require the jury to find the existence of a statutory aggravating 
                                                          
 
48 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
49 11 Del. C. § 4209 
50 815 A.2d 314 (Del. 2003). 
 
30
circumstance unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt.  But the jury did meet 
the Brice standard, since it convicted Swan unanimously and beyond a reasonable 
doubt of, among other crimes, two counts of felony murder under 11 Del. C. 
§636(a)(6).  A conviction under §636(a)(2)-(7) establishes the existence of a 
statutory aggravating circumstance under §4209(e)(2).  In Brice and Norcross, this 
Court held that §4209(e)(2) satisfies Ring.  Thus, we conclude that the 1991 
version of §4209 is constitutional as applied to Swan.   
G. 
Automatic Review of Death Penalty 
Pursuant to 11 Del. C. §4209(g)(2), this Court conducts an independent 
review of any death sentence imposed by the Superior Court.  The purpose of that 
review is to determine whether: (i) the evidence supports a finding of at least one 
statutory aggravating circumstance; (ii) the death penalty was imposed arbitrarily 
or capriciously; and (iii) the sentence is disproportionate when compared to similar 
cases arising under the statute.52  This Court recognizes the importance of its 
statutory responsibility, inasmuch as “death as a punishment is unique in its 
severity and irrevocability.”53 
1. 
Statutory Aggravating Circumstances54 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
51 Id.; Norcross v. State, 816 A.2d at 767. 
52 Norcross, 816 A.2d at 767.   
53 Sullivan v. State, 636 A.2d 931, 948-49 (Del. 1994) (internal citations omitted). 
54 Norcross and Swan both had separate trials.  In both cases, the State alleged that the applicable 
statutory aggravating circumstances were that Swan and Norcross committed the murder while 
engaged in robbery first degree and burglary first degree.  Although this Court independently 
reviewed the Swan’s death sentence, our analysis includes several of the same points discussed 
in Norcross, 816 A.2d 757 (Del. 2003). 
 
31
The State alleged that the applicable statutory aggravating circumstances in 
this case were that Swan committed the murder while he engaged in the crime of 
robbery first degree and burglary first degree.55  As discussed above, the jury 
convicted Swan of two counts of felony murder based on Warren having been 
murdered while Swan and Norcross committed robbery first degree and burglary 
first degree.  Though Swan claims that there was insufficient evidence to support 
the jury’s verdict, this Court found that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the 
verdict as discussed above.  Nevertheless, the Court reviewed the evidence in order 
to make its own finding on this issue.   
This was not a close case.  There is no dispute that two masked intruders, 
wearing camouflage clothing, broke into Warren’s home at night, that they killed 
Kenneth Warren, and that they took Tina’s purse.  Norcross’ statements to three 
witnesses and his statement to the police established the fact that Swan was one of  
those men.  Despite conflicting evidence on the question of who fired the fatal 
shot, as the trial judge noted, it does not matter.  Swan and Norcross were both 
armed; both men were shooting; and Warren suffered four bullet wounds from two 
different guns.  The trial judge correctly concluded, “[t]he evidence leaves no 
doubt that both defendants were acting in concert with murderous intent when 
                                                          
 
55 11 Del. C. §4209(e)(1)(j).   
 
32
Warren was killed.”56  We are satisfied that there was sufficient evidence to 
support the felony murder convictions. 
2. 
Whether the Sentence was Arbitrary and Capricious 
The trial judge carefully considered a number of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances in reaching his determination, consistent with the jury’s seven to 
five recommendation, to impose the death penalty.  The mitigating circumstances 
are minimal in the case of this defendant.  His ability to function well in prison and 
contribute to prison welfare was noted by the trial judge as well as testimony from 
Swan’s father, aunts, and cousins indicating a familial relationship of mutual 
affection.  The trial judge noted that there was insufficient evidence about Swan’s 
childhood to conclude that his upbringing was so bad that it constituted a 
mitigating circumstance.   
The 
aggravating 
circumstances 
are, 
as 
the 
trial 
judge 
noted, 
“overwhelming.”  What happened on November 4, 1996 was “every family’s worst 
nightmare.”57  Society deems the home as one place where a person should feel 
secure from the elements that may place their family at risk.  The members of 
Warren’s family may never again enjoy that feeling of safety in one’s home.    The 
fact that Swan and Norcross executed Warren in his own home in front of his wife 
and son is an aggravator of utmost proportions. 
                                                          
 
56 State v. Swan, 2001 WL 1012265 (Del. Super.). 
57 Norcross, 816 A.2d at 768. 
 
33
The ruthlessness of the crime is compounded by the fact that Swan saw the 
Warren family through the patio doors before he broke in.58  Swan knew he would 
be confronting Warren.  Swan had a gun, and could have demanded valuables, 
Tina’s purse or Kenneth’s wallet.  But Warren was given no chance to comply with 
any demands.  He was attacked immediately and brutally murdered.   
The trial judge also noted Swan’s significant criminal history.  In 1991, in 
Texas, he pleaded guilty to two felonies, possession of a deadly weapon and armed 
robbery.  The trial judge was especially troubled by the facts of the armed robbery 
charge noting that Swan and two confederates invaded a computer business, bound 
and assaulted the employees, and stole over $100,000 in computer equipment.59  
Though not considered the ringleader, Swan refused to identify the others involved 
in the crime after his apprehension.  The trial judge was further troubled by the fact 
that Swan served five years of a twelve year sentence and murdered Warren within 
a year after his release.  The presence of a mask, a .32 caliber revolver, and 
ammunition in Swan’s apartment discovered following his arrest for this murder 
suggested that he may have been contemplating further criminal activity.   
Finally, the devastating impact of this murder on Warren’s family and 
friends adds another aggravating circumstance.  In almost any murder, there are 
loved ones left to grieve.  But in this murder, because Warren was so close to his 
                                                          
 
58 Id. 
59 State v. Adam Norcross and Ralph Swan, 2001 WL 1223198, *6 (Del. Super.) (sentencing 
opinion). 
 
34
extended family, the number of victims and the extent of their suffering is 
noteworthy.   
In sum, the Superior Court’s decision to impose the death penalty was 
neither arbitrary nor capricious.  The trial judge found that the aggravating 
circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances and the record fully 
supports that finding.   
3. 
Proportionality Review 
The final aspect of this Court’s statutory review is the determination of 
proportionality.  The Court compares the “universe” of death penalty cases to this 
one to determine whether imposition of the death penalty in this case is 
proportionate.60  In performing this task the Court recognizes that a “definitive 
comparison of the ‘universe’ of cases is almost impossible.”61  “[S]entencing 
decisions involve difficult and uniquely human judgments that defy codification 
and that build discretion, equity, and flexibility into a legal system.”62  
“Recognizing these limitations, this Court looks to the factual background of 
relevant cases to determine the proportionality of the sentence imposed.”63 
                                                          
 
60 Cases governed by the 1991 amendment to §4209 are most persuasive, but earlier cases may 
still be considered.  Lawrie v. State, 643 A.2d 1336, 1350 (Del. 1994). 
61 Pennell v. State, 604 A.2d 1368, 1376 (Del. 1992). 
62 Wright v. State, 633 A.2d 329, 342-343 (Del. 1993) (internal citations omitted). 
63 Clark v. State, 672 A.2d 1004, 1010 (Del. 1996). 
 
35
 
As with others sentenced to death, Swan committed an unprovoked, cold-
blooded execution of a defenseless victim, presumably for pecuniary gain.64  In 
addition, Swan invaded the victim’s home to commit the murder, a factor that has 
resulted in the death penalty in other cases.65  Finally, Swan managed to escape 
detection and arrest for several years resulting from his co-defendant’s actions of 
burning his clothing, disposing of his gun, and threatening the lives of those people 
that he had told about the killing.  Similar conduct factored into the death sentences 
in Capano v. State66 and Weeks v. State.67 
                                                          
 
64 See, e.g., Zebroski v. State, 715 A.2d 75 (Del. 1998); Jackson v. State, 684 A.2d 745 (Del. 
1996); Weeks v. State, 653 A.2d 266 (Del. 1995); Sullivan v. State, 636 A.2d 931 (Del. 1994); 
Wright v. State, 633 A.2d 329 (Del. 1993). 
65 See, e.g., Lawrie v. State, 643 A.2d 1336 (Del. 1994); Gattis v. State, 637 A.2d 808 (Del. 
1994); Red Dog v. State, 616 A.2d 298 (Del. 1992). 
66 781 A.2d 556 (Del. 2001). 
67 653 A.2d 266 (Del. 1995). 
 
36
 
III. 
Conclusion 
 
After carefully reviewing the entire record, this Court concluded that the 
death sentence imposed on Swan is appropriate under 11 Del. C. § 4209.  
Accordingly, the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  This matter is 
REMANDED to the Superior Court for further proceedings in accordance with this 
opinion. 
 
37
APPENDIX A 
Cases Decided Under 11 Del. C. § 4209 
As Amended in 1991 by 68 Del. Laws Ch. 189∗ 
 
Name:  
 
Meri-Ya Baker  
Criminal ID:   
90011925DI 
County:  
 
New Castle 
Sentence:  
 
Life Imprisonment 
Decision on appeal: 
No. 360, 1992, 1993 WL 557951, Holland, J. (Dec. 30, 1993) 
 
Name:  
 
 
Jermaine Barnett 
Criminal ID:   
9506017682 
County:  
 
New Castle 
Sentence:  
 
Life (following second penalty hearing) 
Decision on appeal:  749 A.2d 1230 (2000) (remanding for new sentencing) 
 
Name:  
 
Hector S. Barrow  
Criminal ID:   
9506017661 
County:  
 
New Castle 
Sentence:  
 
Life (following second penalty hearing) 
Decision on appeal:  749 A.2d 1230 (2000) (remanding for new sentencing) 
 
Name:  
 
Tyreek D. Brown  
Criminal ID:   
9705011492 
County:  
 
New Castle 
Sentence:  
 
Life Imprisonment 
Decision on appeal:  No. 314, 1998, 1999 WL 485174, Hartnett, J. (Mar. 1, 1999) 
 
Name:  
 
Justin L. Burrell  
Criminal ID:   
9805012046 
County:  
 
Kent 
Sentence:  
 
Life Imprisonment 
Decision on appeal:  766 A.2d 19 (2000) 
 
Name:  
 
 
Luis G. Cabrera 
Criminal ID:   
9703012700 
County:  
 
New Castle 
Sentence:  
 
Life Imprisonment 
Decision on appeal:  747 A.2d 543 (2000) 
                                                          
 
∗ The Universe of cases prior to 1991 is set forth in appendices to prior opinions by this Court, 
and those appendices are incorporated herein by reference. See, e.g., Lawrie v. State, 643 A.2d 
1336, 1352-56 (Del. 1994).  
 
38
 
Name:  
 
Thomas J. Capano  
Criminal ID:   
9711006198 
County:  
 
New Castle 
Sentence:  
 
Death 
Decision on appeal:  781 A.2d 556 (2001)  
 
Name:  
 
James B. Clark, Jr.   
Criminal ID:   
9406003237 
County:  
 
New Castle 
Sentence:  
 
Death 
Decision on appeal:  672 A.2d 1004 (1996) 
 
Name:  
 
Charles M. Cohen  
Criminal ID:   
90001577DI 
County:  
 
New Castle  
Sentence:  
 
Life Imprisonment 
Decision on appeal:  No direct appeal taken 
 
Name:  
 
James T. Crowe, Jr.   
Criminal ID:   
9508008979 
County:  
 
New Castle 
Sentence:  
 
Life Imprisonment 
Decision on appeal:  No. 33, 1997, 1998 WL 736389, Walsh, J. (Oct. 8, 1998) 
 
Name:  
 
David F. Dawson  
Criminal ID:   
88K00413DI 
County:  
 
New Castle (venue changed) 
Sentence:  
 
Death 
Decision on appeal:  637 A.2d 57 (1994) 
 
Name:  
 
Curtis Demby  
Criminal ID:   
9412011308 
County:  
 
New Castle 
Sentence:  
 
Life Imprisonment 
Decision on appeal:  744 A.2d 976 (2000) 
 
Name:  
 
Byron S. Dickerson  
Criminal ID:   
90011926DI 
County:  
 
New Castle 
Sentence:  
 
Life Imprisonment 
Decision on appeal:  No. 353, 1992, 1993 WL 541913, Veasey, C.J. (Dec. 21, 1993) 
 
39
 
Name:  
 
Cornelius E. Ferguson  
Criminal ID:   
91009926DI 
County:  
 
New Castle 
Sentence:  
 
Death 
Decision on appeal:  642 A.2d 772 (1994) 
 
Name:  
 
Donald Flagg  
Criminal ID:   
9804019233  
County:  
 
New Castle  
Sentence:  
 
Life Imprisonment 
Decision on appeal:  No direct appeal taken 
 
Name:  
 
Robert A. Gattis  
Criminal ID:   
90004576DI 
County:  
 
New Castle 
Sentence:  
 
Death 
Decision on appeal:  637 A.2d 808 (1994) 
 
Name:  
 
Arthur Govan  
Criminal ID:   
92010166DI 
County:  
 
New Castle 
Sentence:  
 
Life Imprisonment 
Decision on appeal:  No. 363, 1993, 1995 WL 48359, Walsh, J. (Jan. 30, 1995) 
 
Name:  
 
Robert W. Jackson, III  
Criminal ID:   
92003717 
County:  
 
New Castle 
Sentence:  
 
Death 
Decision on appeal:  684 A.2d 745 (1996) 
 
Name:  
 
David Jones  
Criminal ID:   
9807016504 
County:  
 
New Castle  
Sentence:  
 
Life Imprisonment 
Decision on appeal:  798 A.2d 1013 (2002) 
 
Name:  
 
Mark A. Kirk  
Criminal ID:   
9612002650 
County:  
 
New Castle 
Sentence:  
 
Life Imprisonment 
Decision on appeal:  No. 532, 1997, 1999 WL 415802, Berger, J. (Apr. 29, 1999) 
 
40
 
Name:  
 
David J. Lawrie  
Criminal ID:   
92K03617DI 
County:  
 
Kent 
Sentence:  
 
Death 
Decision on appeal:  643 A.2d 1336 (1994) 
 
Name:  
 
Thomas M. Magner  
Criminal ID:   
9509007746 
County:  
 
New Castle 
Sentence:  
 
Life Imprisonment 
Decision on appeal:  No. 224, 1997, 1998 WL 666726, Walsh, J. (July 29, 1998) 
 
Name:  
 
Frank W. Moore, Jr.   
Criminal ID:   
92S03679DI 
County:  
 
Sussex 
Sentence:  
 
Life Imprisonment 
Decision on appeal:  No. 214, 1993, 1994 WL 202289, Holland, J. (May 9, 1994) 
 
Name:  
 
 
Adam Norcross 
Criminal ID:   
0002006278 
County:  
 
Kent 
Sentence:  
 
Death 
Decision on appeal:  816 A.2d 757 (2003) 
 
Name:  
 
Jack F. Outten  
Criminal ID:   
92000786DI 
County:  
 
New Castle 
Sentence:  
 
Death 
Decision on appeal:  650 A.2d 1291 (1994) 
 
Name:  
 
James W. Perez  
Criminal ID:   
93001659 
County:  
 
New Castle 
Sentence:  
 
Life Imprisonment 
Decision on appeal:  No. 207, 1993, Moore, J. (Feb. 3, 1994)  
 
Name:  
 
James Allen Red Dog  
Criminal ID:   
91001754DI 
County:  
 
New Castle 
Sentence:  
 
Death 
Decision on appeal:  616 A.2d 298 (1992)  
 
Name:  
 
Luis Reyes 
Criminal ID:  
9904019329 
County: 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
Death 
Decision on appeal: 
No. 149 & 171, 2002, WL 1617920, Holland, J. (Mar. 25, 2003) 
 
41
 
Name:  
 
Jose Rodriguez  
Criminal ID:   
93001668DI 
County:  
 
New Castle 
Sentence:  
 
Life Imprisonment 
Decision on appeal:  No. 466, 1993, 1994 WL 679731, Walsh, J. (Nov. 29, 1994) 
 
Name:  
 
Richard Roth  
Criminal ID:   
9901000330 
County:  
 
New Castle 
Sentence:  
 
Life Imprisonment 
Decision on appeal:  788 A.2d 101 (2001) 
 
Name:  
 
Nelson W. Shelton  
Criminal ID:   
92000788DI 
County:  
 
New Castle 
Sentence:  
 
Death 
Decision on appeal:  652 A.2d 1 (1995) 
 
Name:  
 
 
Steven W. Shelton  
Criminal ID:   
92000787DI 
County:  
 
New Castle 
Sentence:  
 
Death 
Decision on appeal:  650 A.2d 1291 (1994) 
 
Name:  
 
Donald J. Simmons  
Criminal ID:   
92000305DI 
County:  
 
New Castle 
Sentence:  
 
Life Imprisonment 
Decision on appeal:  No direct appeal taken 
 
Name:  
 
 
Brian David Steckel 
Criminal ID:   
9409002147 
County:  
 
New Castle 
Sentence:  
 
Death 
Decision on appeal:  711 A.2d 5 (1998) 
 
Name:  
 
Willie G. Sullivan  
Criminal ID:   
92K00055 
County:  
 
Kent 
Sentence:  
 
Death 
Decision on appeal:  636 A.2d 931 (1994) 
 
Name:  
 
Antonio L. Taylor  
Criminal ID:   
9404018838 
County:  
 
Kent 
Sentence:  
 
Life Imprisonment 
Decision on appeal:  685 A.2d 349 (1996) 
 
42
 
Name:  
 
Charles H. Trowbridge  
Criminal ID:   
91K03044DI 
County:  
 
Kent 
Sentence:  
 
Life Imprisonment 
Decision on appeal:  No. 234, 1995, 1996 WL 145788, Veasey, C.J. (Mar. 4, 1996) 
 
Name:  
 
James W. Virdin  
Criminal ID:   
9809015552 
County:  
 
Kent 
Sentence:  
 
Life Imprisonment 
Decision on appeal:  780 A.2d 1024 (2001) 
 
Name:  
 
John E. Watson  
Criminal ID:   
91008490DI 
County:  
 
New Castle 
Sentence:  
 
Life Imprisonment 
Decision on appeal:  No direct appeal taken 
 
Name:  
 
 
Dwayne Weeks 
Criminal ID:   
92010167 
County:  
 
New Castle 
Sentence:  
 
Death 
Decision on appeal:  653 A.2d 266 (1995) 
 
Name:  
 
Roy R. Williamson  
Criminal ID:   
93S02210DI 
County:  
 
Sussex 
Sentence:  
 
Life Imprisonment 
Decision on appeal:  669 A.2d 95 (1995) 
 
Name:  
 
Jermaine M. Wright  
Criminal ID:   
91004136 
County:  
 
New Castle 
Sentence:  
 
Death 
Decision on appeal:  671 A.2d 1353 (1996)  
 
Name:  
 
Craig A. Zebroski  
Criminal ID:   
9604017809 
County:  
 
New Castle 
Sentence:  
 
Death 
Decision on appeal:  715 A.2d 75 (1998)