Title: In re Gustafson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S43937
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: November 13, 1998

Filed:  March 7, 2002
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

In re:
Complaint as to the Conduct of
TERESE M. GUSTAFSON,
Accused.
(OSB 97-146; SC S43937)

	On review of the decision of a trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board.
	Argued and submitted November 2, 2000.
	Wayne Mackeson, Portland, argued the cause and filed the
briefs for the accused.  With him on the briefs was Pat
Birmingham.
	Martha M. Hicks, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Lake
Oswego, argued the cause and filed the brief for the Oregon State
Bar.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Durham, Leeson, and Riggs,
Justices.*
	PER CURIAM
	The accused is disbarred, effective 60 days from the date of
filing of this decision.
	*Van Hoomissen, J., retired December 31, 2000, and did not
participate in the decision of this case; Kulongoski, J.,
resigned June 14, 2001, and did not participate in the decision
of this case; Gillette, De Muniz, and Balmer, JJ., did not
participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
		In this lawyer disciplinary proceeding, the Oregon
State Bar (Bar) alleged that the accused violated Code of
Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rule (DR) 1-102(A)(2)
(criminal act that reflects adversely on lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness to practice law); DR 1-102(A)(3)
(dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation); DR 1-102(A)(4)
(conduct prejudicial to administration of justice); DR 7-102(A)(5) (knowingly making false statement of law or fact); DR
7-102(A)(8) (knowingly engaging in illegal conduct or conduct
contrary to DR); and DR 7-106(A) (disregarding ruling of
tribunal). (1)  The facts center on allegations that the accused
failed to comply with a court order requiring the expunction of a
juvenile criminal record and made false statements regarding her
failure to comply.  A trial panel of the Disciplinary Board found
that the Bar has proved a majority of the charges and imposed the
sanction of disbarment.  In light of that penalty, review in this
court is automatic.  Bar Rule of Procedure (BR) 10.1.
		The Bar has the burden of establishing alleged
misconduct by clear and convincing evidence.  BR 5.2.  This court
has defined that standard as evidence establishing that the truth
of the facts asserted is highly probable.  In re Johnson, 300 Or
52, 55, 707 P2d 573 (1985).  Although we review disciplinary
proceedings de novo, we give weight to trial panel credibility
findings.  In re Trukositz, 312 Or 621, 629, 825 P2d 1369 (1992);
see BR 10.6 (de novo standard).  However, the testimony of an
accused lawyer, if this court deems it credible, can be
sufficient to establish facts.  In re Gildea, 325 Or 281, 297,
936 P2d 975 (1997).  In this proceeding, the trial panel made a
specific finding that the accused was not credible.
		For the reasons that follow, we find that the accused
violated all the foregoing disciplinary rules and conclude that
the accused should be disbarred.
I.  FACTS
		We find that the evidence proves the facts set out
below by clear and convincing evidence.  The accused became a
deputy district attorney in Clackamas County in 1981.  In 1992,
two preschool-aged girls accused a teenage boy in their
neighborhood (the juvenile) and his parents of molesting them. 
The Clackamas County District Attorney's office filed a juvenile
delinquency petition against the juvenile in juvenile court, and
a grand jury returned indictments against the parents in circuit
court.  Eventually, the court dismissed the charges against the
adults without prejudice, leaving only the juvenile matter as an
active case.
		In October 1995, the Bar filed an amended formal
complaint against the accused in a disciplinary proceeding
separate from this one.  In that matter, the accused made a
misrepresentation by omission to the juvenile's lawyer regarding
alleged impeachment material.  She also threatened the juvenile's
lawyer with criminal or ethical prosecution without sufficient
cause.  This court determined that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(3) (misrepresentation) and DR 1-102(A)(4) (conduct
prejudicial to administration of justice), and suspended her for
six months.  In re Gustafson, 327 Or 636, 968 P2d 367 (1998)
(Gustafson I).
		In early 1995, while preparing for the juvenile's
trial, the accused collected a large amount of documentary
material, including binders, exhibits, and notes.  At the close
of trial, the trial judge in effect dismissed the charges,
finding that the juvenile was not within the jurisdiction of the
court.
		After the trial, in April 1995, the accused sought and
was granted permission by then Clackamas County District Attorney
O'Leary to keep the trial materials so that she could use them to
defend against the pending disciplinary proceedings, as long as
she cleared that decision with another deputy, Nelson.  Nelson
gave permission to the accused, on the condition that the accused
leave a copy in the office of what she took.  The accused agreed
to that condition, and she took her trial materials and original
exhibits home. (2)
		In May 1995, the juvenile's lawyer, Houze, filed a
motion to expunge the record of the juvenile case under ORS
419 A. 262. (3)  The court treated the expunction as a "best
interests" expunction, in which expunction is appropriate if it
is in the best interests of the juvenile and the public.  See ORS
419A.262(7) (so stating).  Houze delivered the motion to Judge
Morgan, to the District Attorney's office, and to Nickerson, the
juvenile court counselor responsible for the case.  Nickerson
telephoned the accused to ask about opposing the motion.  The
accused agreed to investigate that issue, although it is unclear
whether she did so.  Judge Morgan's judicial assistant also
telephoned the accused and asked her if she would be opposing the
expunction motion; the accused replied that she would not.
		In June 1995, Judge Morgan granted the motion and
ordered the expunction of the juvenile's records.  The order
required "that all judgments, orders, records and references
subject to expunction held by any agency pertaining to the above-named person be destroyed within 21 days."  A District Attorney's
office secretary delivered a copy of the order to the accused
either by giving it to her directly or by placing it on her
chair.
		In August 1995, the accused's lawyer, Shepley, learned
of the expunction order (although he did not mention it to the
accused until October 1996).  The accused maintained that she
first became aware of the expunction order in a conversation with
District Attorney Foote, O'Leary's successor, around September
1995.
		After receiving notice of the expunction motion and
subsequent order, the accused neither notified Judge Morgan that
she possessed records subject to the order, nor did she destroy
those records.  She had given some of the records to the lawyer
who represented her in Gustafson I and submitted others to the
Bar. Her lawyer also showed some of the records to her witnesses. 
Bar counsel realized, when she saw the accused's exhibit list,
that it contained records subject to the expunction order and
notified the accused's lawyer.  At an October 1996 disciplinary
hearing in the prior Bar matter, the trial panel directed the
parties to obtain a protective order from the circuit court,
which they did.
		Houze reacted to the disclosure of his client's
expunged record by filing a motion to conduct a hearing before
Judge Morgan to determine the accused's compliance with ORS
419A.262(22). (4)  Lawyer Shepley now had a conflict, because he had
used some of the juvenile papers in the pending Bar matter,
possibly in violation of the expunction statute.  The accused
hired another lawyer, Tait, to represent her in the compliance
hearing. 
		Houze issued a subpoena duces tecum to Tait, which
requested that the accused produce: 
	"any and all originals and copies of any and all
records, reports, memoranda, pleadings, and all other
documents which were a part of the Clackamas County
district attorney case files concerning the * * *
juvenile."
Tait described the subpoena to the accused over the telephone the
night before the compliance hearing.  Neither Tait nor the
accused have described that conversation in any great detail. 
Nevertheless, in the context of the accused's testimony at the
compliance hearing, we believe that the accused heard and
understood the text of the subpoena.
		The accused decided to produce only the documents that
she had stored in binders that were labeled with the juvenile
case number alone. (5)  She contends that she left at home any
binders that bore case numbers for both the adult and juvenile
cases because "they were pertinent to the adult case."  The
material that she collected included notes for her opening and
closing arguments, demonstrative aids such as transparencies, and
a single-volume transcript.  She put those documents in a
cardboard box to take to the compliance hearing.  She also put
some of the trial exhibits, which she had promised to give back
to the their original owners (i.e., the victims' families), in
the trunk of her car before she drove to the hearing. 
		At the hearing on December 3, 1996, Houze was surprised
at the small size of the box that the accused produced. (6)  He and
the accused engaged in the following dialogue:
	"Q.	Have you, in response to the subpoena served upon
you through your counsel, brought to court with
you today the materials that were sought by the
subpoena?
	"A.	Yes.
		"* * * * *
	"Q.	And what you have personally with you today is the
originals minus what you gave to Mr. Shepley?
	"A.	Correct.
		"* * * * *
	"Q.	Do you have those materials with you right there in
front of you?
	"A.	Yes.
		"* * * * *
	"Q.	* * * [D]o the contents of that box relate specifically
to the subpoena that you were given?
	"A.	I have never seen the subpoena.  I have had it
described to me on the telephone.  And so, yes, it
does.
	"Q.	Are there any other records that you have had in your
possession or still have in your possession in response
to the subpoena that have not been produced today here
in this box?
	"A.	No.
	"Q.	Okay.  Apart from those that Mr. Shepley may have?
	"A.	* * * [E]verything in my possession that relates to the
juvenile case in any way is in this box, as far as
being materials that may have been, as I understand it,
in any way involved in documenting that case.
		"* * * * *
	"Q.	* * * What materials do you have at your home that you
have not produced under the subpoena?
	"A.	I have materials that related to the adult case.
	"Q.	And did you make a determination yourself of what
materials were within and what materials were without
the ambit of the subpoena that was served?
	"A.	Did I decide?
	"Q.	Yes.
	"A.	My understanding is that this relates to documents that
were in the juvenile court case.  And so I took
everything that I had that related to the juvenile
court case in any way and put it in this box.  The
remaining documents are in the possession of my
attorney.
	"Q.	So they are no longer in your home, is that correct?
	"A.	I have no more juvenile documents in my home, that is
correct.
		"* * * * *
	"Q.	* * * So the answer to my question is it was you, then,
who made the determination of what materials you would
produce today of all the materials you took out of the
DA's Office, correct?
	"A.	Mr. Tait and I discussed the subpoena on the telephone,
and I am complying with the subpoena as I understand it
to be.  * * *
		"* * * * *
	"Q.	Can you tell us what quantity of material relative to
that full box, remains in your home?
	"A.	I have nothing that remains in my home at the present
time that has anything to do with the juvenile case.  I
did not exclude anything that I had.  Whether I thought
it was expunged material or could be considered
expunged material, I put everything in the box that I
had that related in any way to the juvenile case.
	"Q.	My question to you is:  What quantity of material
remains in your home that you took out of the District
Attorney's Office relative to that box?
	"A.	You have all that I have from the juvenile court.
	"Q.	I am not asking specifically about juvenile court
material, in your judgment.  Of all the materials that
were in your house, you made a determination of what
materials you believed were pertinent to the subpoena,
correct?
	"A.	If you would like to get me the subpoena I would be
glad to read the subpoena.  That is all the material
that I have.
		"* * * * *
	"Q.	* * * And when did you make the determination of what
materials were responsive to the subpoena and which
were not?
	"A.	When did I make that decision?
	"Q.	Yes.
	"A.	I don't think that I made a decision.  I gathered up
all the materials that had anything to do with the
juvenile case.  As I am understanding, you are talking
about an expungement order in the juvenile case.
		"* * * * *
	"Q.	Well, assume for a moment that the juvenile expunction
statute does have the effect of physically destroying,
permanently destroying all records that existed
concerning a case, and assuming that that were a
potential, that was going to be * * * * * ordered by a
court, then all records that related to the case would,
if that order were signed, be gone forever for any
purpose whatsoever, whether it was other matters
possibly related to the case directly or proceedings
ancillary to it, such as a Bar proceeding or anything
else, right?  They would be gone forever, wouldn't
they?
	"A.	Yes.  If you are suggesting that I kept these knowing
that there was an expungement order, you are wrong."
	During her compliance hearing testimony, the accused
also claimed that she was unaware of the expunction motion and
subsequent order at the time that each of them was filed, and did
not learn of them until she had a conversation with Foote in
September 1995. (7)  She testified that she did not see a copy of
the May 1995 expunction motion until October 1996.  Other
witnesses, however, testified that the accused was given a copy
and was aware of the expunction motion when it was filed.
	Near the conclusion of the hearing, the judge ordered
the accused and her lawyer to produce "[a]nything that is
obviously a juvenile document."  In response, the accused
tendered to the court the exhibits that she was carrying in the
trunk of her car.
	After the hearing, the accused and her lawyers tendered
to the court several additional boxes of material, which included
many documents and exhibits relating to the charges against the
juvenile.  Judge Morgan and his assistants reviewed the materials
and determined that many of them were related to the juvenile
case and, in Judge Morgan's view, were subject to expunction.  We
have reviewed those materials, and we find that they included
"records, reports, memoranda, pleadings, and * * * other
documents which were a part of the Clackamas County district
attorney case files concerning the * * * juvenile," and, as a
result, that they were within the ambit of the subpoena.
	In sum, the facts that we find may be stated as
follows:  After the accused knew that the expunction motion had
been filed and that the order had been signed, she failed to
inform Judge Morgan that she had records subject to expunction,
failed to destroy those records in compliance with the order, and
released those records in her prior Bar matter.  Additionally,
despite the fact the accused had relevant records in the trunk of
her car and at home, she testified falsely at the compliance
hearing that she had complied with the subpoena, that she had
produced all the relevant records in her possession, and that she
had no other records.  She also testified falsely at the
compliance hearing that she did not keep records relating to the
juvenile case knowing that an expunction order had been entered.
II.  PROCEEDINGS BELOW
	Count one of the Bar's amended complaint alleged that,
after Judge Morgan signed the expunction order, the accused (1)
failed to inform Judge Morgan that she possessed records subject
to the expunction order; (2) failed to destroy those records in
compliance with the expunction order; and (3) released those
records in her prior Bar proceeding, in violation of DR 1-102(A)(2), DR 1-102(A)(4), DR 7-106(A), and ORS 9.527(3).  Count
two alleged that the accused testified falsely in the trial of
her prior Bar matter, in violation of DR 1-102(A)(2), DR 1-102(A)(3), DR 1-102(A)(4), DR 7-102(A)(5), DR 7-102(A)(8), and
ORS 9.527(4). (8)  Count three alleged that the accused falsely
testified at the compliance hearing, by stating that she had
complied with the subpoena issued to her, that she had produced
the relevant documents, and that she had produced everything she
had and had nothing left at home, in violation of DR 1-102(A)(2),
DR 1-102(A)(3), DR 1-102(A)(4), and DR 7-102(A)(8).  Count four
alleged that the accused falsely testified at the compliance
hearing that:  (a) she had made copies of any records that she
had taken home and left copies of those records in the District
Attorney's office; (b) she did not receive a copy of the
expunction motion at the time that it was filed; (c) she was not
aware that that motion had been filed; (d) she was not aware that
the expunction order had been signed at the time that it was
signed; (e) she had not seen a copy of the expunction motion
before the compliance hearing; and (f) she did not keep records
relating to the juvenile case knowing that the expunction order
had been entered, in violation of DR 1-102(A)(2), DR 1-102(A)(3),
DR 1-102(A)(4), DR 7-102(A)(5), DR 7-102(A)(8), and ORS 9.527(4). 
Count five alleged that the accused's conduct would have
warranted denying her application to the Bar, if she were
applying for admission, under ORS 9.527(1).
	After a hearing, the trial panel found that the Bar had
sustained its burden of proof on counts one, three, subpart (f)
of four, and five.  The trial panel made a finding that the
accused was not credible, in that "[h]er testimony on issues
large and small changed not only over the course of the many
court and disciplinary proceedings in which she has been involved
in the last four years, but also within the proceeding itself." 
The trial panel found that "[t]he accused knew by no later than
October 1995 that an order had been entered," but "did not advise
the court that she had documents subject to the motion at her
home" or destroy any of the documents in her possession.  In the
trial panel's view, the accused had kept the records to use them
in her prior Bar proceeding.
	The trial panel found that, although the accused had
brought only a small box of documents to the compliance hearing,
she testified that she had brought with her to the courtroom all
the documents subject to the subpoena and had brought everything
in her possession that related "in any way" to the juvenile case. 
However, it was apparent at the compliance hearing that the
accused still had documents at her home, and it turned out that
she still possessed a large number of documents related to the
juvenile case.  In addition, the trial panel dismissed the
accused's arguments that she had complied with the enforcement
hearing subpoena in good faith, because, when she had stated
under oath that she had brought everything with her to the
compliance hearing, she had known that she had the juvenile case
trial exhibits in the trunk of her car.
	In determining a sanction, the trial panel noted that
the accused's lack of honesty was pervasive and intentional and
that, as a result of her actions, she caused at least potential
injury to the juvenile whose records she released and actual
injury to the legal system.  The trial panel concluded that
"[t]he accused has refused to acknowledge the wrongful conduct
involved in this case."  The trial panel determined that the
accused's testimony and conduct suggested that "the accused
simply does not recognize the ethical bounds of her profession,"
and that she should be disbarred.
III.  DISCUSSION
A.   Compliance With The Expunction Order
	

  DR 1-102(A)(2)



	The Bar charged that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(2) by releasing the juvenile records that were subject to
expunction under ORS 419 A. 260 and ORS 419 A. 262.
	ORS 419 A. 260 and ORS 419 A. 262 provide a process by
which a person's juvenile records relating to "contact" with a
law enforcement agency may be expunged.  "Expunction" includes
"[t]he removal and destruction or sealing of a judgment or order
related to a contact," ORS 419A.260(b)(A), and "[t]he removal and
destruction of all records and all references," ORS
419A.260(b)(B).  A "contact" is defined as "any instance in which
a person's act or behavior, or alleged act or behavior, which
could result in a juvenile court's assumption of jurisdiction,"
comes to the attention of a law enforcement agency, other state
agency, or juvenile court.  ORS 419A.260(a); see also ORS
419B.100 (1995) (jurisdictional bases of juvenile court); ORS
419C.005 (1995) (same).  A "record" includes "a fingerprint or
photograph file, report, exhibit or other material which contains
information relating to a person's contact with any law
enforcement agency or juvenile court or juvenile department[.]" 
ORS 419A.260(d).
	On the application of either the person who was the
subject of those records, the juvenile department, or on a
court's own motion, the juvenile court may order expunction.  ORS
419A.262(2).  For example, the court may order expunction when it
finds that the juvenile is not within the jurisdiction of the
court, ORS 419A.262(2)(d), or when expunction is in the best
interests of the juvenile and the public, ORS 419A.262(7). 
Notice of the expunction application must be given to the
district attorney in the county in which the proceedings are
pending and to the district attorney in any county in which
records may be kept, and both are permitted to file objections to
the proposed expunction.  ORS 419A.262(10)(a) and (11).  After a
court orders expunction, a copy of the order must be sent to each
agency subject to that order.  ORS 419A.262(16).  Within 21 days
of receipt, those agencies then are expected to indicate
compliance by endorsing the order and returning it to the court
or juvenile department.  ORS 419 A. 262 (16).  Six weeks after the
copies of the orders are sent out, the court provides the person
whose record has been expunged with a copy of the expunction
order, a list of complying and noncomplying agencies, and a
written notice of rights and effects of expunction.  ORS
419A.262(17).  The juvenile court then expunges its own records,
except the original expunction order and a list of complying and
non-complying agencies, which are preserved under seal.  Id.  
	Once a record is expunged, the contact that was the
subject of the expunged record shall not be "disclosed" by any
agency.  ORS 419A.262(19).  An order of expunction and a list of
complying and non-complying agencies may be "released" from
confidentiality "only on order of the court originating the order
of expunction, based on a finding that review of a particular
case furthers compliance with the expunction provisions" of the
statute.  ORS 419A.262(22).  More importantly, "[a] person who
intentionally releases all or part of an expunged record commits
a Class C misdemeanor." (9)  ORS 419A.262(25) (emphasis added).
	We conclude that the records that the accused possessed
were subject to expunction.  Whether the Clackamas County
District Attorney's office might have had a meritorious ground
for objecting to the proposed expunction is irrelevant.  Because
that District Attorney's office did not contest the expunction
proceeding and the resulting order, the order was binding on that
office and its personnel, including the accused.  The accused
argues that the statute applies to state agencies only, not to
persons who possess records for their own purposes, and she
maintains that she held the records as a private citizen for use
in her Bar proceedings, not as an agent of the District
Attorney's office.  We reject that argument, because it ignores a
vital fact, which is that the accused had access to the records
only by virtue of her employment.  Indeed, her possession of the
records was related directly to the fact that she worked in the
District Attorney's office, in that she took the records to
defend herself from allegations of misconduct as a lawyer in that
office.  Moreover, the District Attorney did not transfer title
of the records to her and make them her property, rather than the
state's property.  They remained the property of the District
Attorney's office even after the accused took them home.  A
district attorney's office could not comply with the expunction
statute merely by transferring possession of the records to
another party, such as the accused.  Rather, a district attorney
must destroy records when ordered to do so.  ORS 419A.260(b)(B);
ORS 419 A. 262.  In this instance, the records that the trial court
ordered destroyed became exhibits in another legal proceeding, a
result that was not consistent with the purpose of the statute.
	The Bar maintains that the accused "release[d]" the
expunged juvenile records in her prior Bar proceeding, thereby
violating ORS 419A.262(24).  The statute does not define the term
"release."  To determine the intent of the legislature, we first
look to the text and context of the statute.  The text of the
statute is the best evidence of legislative intent.  PGE v.
Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 611, 859 P2d 1143
(1993).  If the intent is clear from the text and context,
further analysis is unnecessary.  Id.
	Based on the following discussion, we conclude that the
unmistakable intent of ORS 419 A. 262 is to preserve the
confidentiality of a juvenile's contact with law enforcement once
a court has ordered expunction of that juvenile's records.  The
term "release" must be understood in that context.  For example,
"release" commonly is defined to include "to set free from
restraint."  Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary, 1917
(unabridged ed 1993).  The restraint, in this instance, was the
confidential nature of the expunged records.  ORS 419A.262(22)
provides that an order of expunction and a list of complying and
noncomplying agencies may be "released from confidentiality" only
on order of the original court.  "Release" thus refers to a
termination of the confidentiality required by statute. 
"Releas[ing]" records unlawfully means to make them available to
others, thus disregarding their confidential status.
	In sum, the accused's release of the juvenile records
was unlawful.  Disregarding the court's order to expunge the
records and disregarding the juvenile's interest in the
confidentiality of the records, the accused used them as exhibits
in her defense in the prior Bar matter.  Although those records
might have been useful to her defense, once she was aware of the
expunction order, she was not privileged to use them in her Bar
proceeding without seeking leave of the court that ordered the
expunction.
	It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to "[c]ommit
a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness to practice law."  DR 1-102(A)(2).  A
charge under DR 1-102(A)(2) requires the court to determine
initially what criminal act the accused committed.  In re Allen,
326 Or 107, 102-21, 949 P2d 710 (1997).  As noted, under ORS
419A.262(25), "[a] person who intentionally releases all or part
of an expunged record commits a Class C misdemeanor."
	Next, we must determine whether that criminal act
reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or
fitness to practice law.  To do so, we consider:
	"the lawyer's mental state; the extent to which the act
demonstrates disrespect for the law or law enforcement;
the presence or absence of a victim; the extent of
actual or potential injury to a victim; and the
presence or absence of a pattern of criminal conduct."
Allen, 326 Or at 122 (quoting In re White, 311 Or 573, 589, 815
P2d 1257 (1991)).  Here, the accused acted intentionally,
breaching the juvenile's privacy to benefit herself and injuring
the juvenile in the process.  The accused demonstrated disrespect
for the law in disregarding the court's order of expunction and
her use of the records reflected adversely on her fitness to
practice law.
	

  DR 1-102(A)(4)



		It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to "[e]ngage
in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice." 
DR 1-102(A)(4).  Prejudice to the administration of justice
results "from multiple acts that cause some harm or a single act
that causes substantial harm."  In re Rhodes, 331 Or 231, 236, 13
P3d 512 (2000) (citing In re Haws, 310 Or 741, 748, 801 P2d 818
(1995).)  "Harm to the administration of justice can occur when
either the substantive rights of a party to the proceeding or the
procedural functioning of a case or hearing is impaired."  In re
Meyer, 328 Or 211, 214, 970 P2d 652 (1999).  Here, the accused
undermined the expunction proceedings by releasing the juvenile's
records in her Bar disciplinary matter, by failing to inform
Judge Morgan that she possessed records subject to the expunction
order, and by failing to destroy those records in compliance with
the expunction order.  Accordingly, we conclude that the accused
engaged in acts that caused harm to the administration of justice
and thereby violated DR 1-102(A)(4).
	3.	DR 7-106(A)
		"A violation of DR 7-106(A) occurs when a lawyer
disregards a tribunal's ruling made in the course of a
proceeding, unless the lawyer's action amounts to 'appropriate
steps in good faith to test the validity' of the ruling." 
Rhodes, 331 Or at 235.  The accused does not argue that she was
attempting to test the validity of the expunction order.  For the
same reasons that we have concluded that the accused violated DR
1-102(A)(2) and (A)(4), we conclude that she violated DR 7-106(A).
B.   False Testimony
		As noted above, we conclude that the accused gave false
testimony under oath at the compliance hearing regarding her
compliance with the compliance hearing subpoena.  We also
conclude that she possessed records relating to the juvenile case
and knew that the expunction order had been entered, yet
testified under oath to the contrary.
	1.	DR 1-102(A)(2)
		It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to "[C]ommit
a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness to practice law."  DR 1-102(A)(2). 
First, we identify the criminal act, Allen, 326 Or at 121, which
in this instance is perjury.  See ORS 162.065 (stating perjury
occurs when "person makes a false sworn statement in regard to a
material issue, knowing it to be false").  We then consider the
lawyer's mental state; the extent to which the act demonstrates
disrespect for the law or law enforcement; the presence or
absence of a victim; the extent of actual or potential injury to
a victim; and the presence or absence of a pattern of criminal
conduct.  Allen, 326 Or at 122 (so stating).  We need not
undertake that detailed analysis here, because it is axiomatic
that false testimony under oath "reflects adversely on the
lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness to practice law"
under DR 1-102(A)(2).  We therefore conclude that the accused
violated DR 1-102(A)(2).
	2.	DR 1-102(A)(3)
		It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to "[e]ngage
in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation."  DR 1-102(A)(3).  The accused's
misrepresentations at the compliance hearing were both false and
material, in that they concerned the subject of the hearing.  See
In re Kluge, 332 Or 251, 255, 27 P3d 102 (2001)
(misrepresentation requires showing of materiality and
materiality involves information that would or could influence
significantly hearer's decision-making process).  We conclude
that the accused's false testimony under oath violated DR 1-102(A)(3).
	3.	DR 1-102(A)(4)
		As noted, it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to
engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice.  DR 1-102(A)(4).  Prejudice to the administration of
justice may result from a single act that could cause substantial
potential harm.  Rhodes, 331 Or at 236.  We conclude that the
accused's false testimony under oath violated DR 1-102(A)(4).
	4.	DR 7-102(A)(5)
		In the lawyer's representation of a client or in
representing the lawyer's own interests, a lawyer shall not
"[k]nowingly make a false statement of law or fact."  DR 7-102(A)(5).  In making false statements under oath at the
compliance hearing, we conclude that the accused violated DR 7-102(A)(5).
	5.	DR 7-102(A)(8)
		In the lawyer's representation of a client or in
representing the lawyer's own interests, a lawyer shall not
"[k]nowingly engage in * * * illegal conduct or conduct contrary
to a disciplinary rule."  DR 7-102(A)(8).  The accused's false
testimony under oath was both illegal and contrary to other
disciplinary rules, as we have discussed.  We conclude that the
accused violated DR 7-102(A)(8).
IV.  SANCTION
		Having determined that the accused violated a number of
ethical rules, we turn now to the determination of an appropriate
sanction.  In addition to its own cases, this court refers to the
American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions (1991) (amended 1992) (ABA Standards) for guidance in
determining the appropriate sanction for lawyer misconduct.  See,
e.g., Kluge at 259.
		This court first considers three factors in determining
the appropriate sanction:  the duty violated; the accused
lawyer's mental state; and the actual or potential injury caused
by the accused lawyer's misconduct.  See, e.g., Id.;  ABA
Standard 3.0.  We then examine any aggravating or mitigating
circumstances to determine if the sanction should be adjusted. 
See, e.g., Kluge at 259; ABA Standard 3.0.  Finally, we compare
prior Oregon cases and the sanctions imposed in them.  In re
Devers, 328 Or 230, 244, 974 P2d 191 (1999).
A.   Preliminary Considerations
		The accused violated her duty to the public to maintain
personal integrity.  ABA Standard 5.1; see In re Unrein, 323 Or
285, 288, 917 P2d 1022 (1996) (lawyer violated duty to maintain
personal integrity by making misrepresentations in filing for
unemployment benefits).  Similarly, the accused violated her duty
to the legal system to refrain from false statements, fraud, and
misrepresentation.  ABA Standard 5.0, 5.1.
		The three mental states under the ABA standards are
intentional, knowing, and negligent.  According to those
standards, an intentional act is one done with "the conscious
objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result."  ABA
Standards at 6.
	"'Knowledge' is the conscious awareness of the nature
or attendant circumstances of the conduct but without
the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a
particular result."
Id. at 7.  We conclude that the accused acted intentionally
because the goal of her conduct was to mislead the court during
the compliance hearing about what she had in her possession and
her knowledge of the expunction order, and to retain the records
for her own use in her disciplinary proceeding.
		Next, we conclude that the juvenile suffered injury
from the accused's misuse of his expunged records.  Injury may
range from serious to slight.  ABA Standards at 7.  "[A]
reference to 'injury' alone indicates a level of injury greater
than 'little or no' injury."  Id.  The juvenile was entitled to
full compliance with the expunction order.  Further court
proceedings were necessary, because the accused had the records,
did not bring that fact to the attention of the juvenile court,
and did not destroy them.  In addition, the legal system suffered
injury, because a trusted law enforcement official, sworn to
uphold this state's laws and seek justice, made serious
misrepresentations during a judicial proceeding.
		Disbarment is an available sanction when a lawyer, with
the intent to deceive the court, makes a false statement and
causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party, or
causes a significant or potentially significant adverse effect on
the legal proceeding.  ABA Standard 6.11.  Disbarment also is
available when "a lawyer engages in serious criminal conduct, a
necessary element of which includes intentional interference with
the administration of justice, false swearing, misrepresentation,
fraud, extortion, misappropriation or theft."  ABA Standard
5.11(a).  Additionally, a lawyer may be disbarred for engaging in
any other intentional conduct that involves "dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects
upon the lawyer's fitness to practice" law.  ABA Standard
5.11(b).
B.   Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
		"[A]ggravating circumstances are any considerations or
factors that may justify an increase in the degree of discipline
to be imposed."  ABA Standard 9.21.  Having been admitted to the
Bar in 1981, the accused has substantial experience in the
practice of law.  ABA Standard 9.22(i). (10)  She also has a prior
disciplinary record.  ABA Standard 9.22(a); see Gustafson I, 327
Or 636 (six-month suspension for violating DR 1-102(A)(3) and DR
1-102(A)(4) for conduct related to earlier portion of facts
underlying this matter).  In weighing prior offenses, we consider
the relative seriousness of the prior offense and resulting
sanction; the similarity of the prior offense to the offense in
the case at bar; the number of prior offenses; the relative
recency of the prior offense; and the timing of the current
offense in relation to the prior offense and resulting sanction,
specifically, whether the accused lawyer had been sanctioned for
the prior offense before engaging in the offense in the case at
bar.  In re Jones, 326 Or 195, 200, 951 P2d 149 (1997)
(describing weight of prior offenses).  The prior offense arose
from the same case as the current offense and the kind of offense
was similar, both relating to misrepresentation and conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice.  The accused,
however, was not sanctioned for the prior offense before engaging
in the offenses before us.  For that reason, we conclude that the
prior offense carries little weight.
		"[M]itigating circumstances are any considerations or
factors that may justify a reduction in the degree of discipline
to be imposed."  ABA Standard 9.31.  Neither the Bar nor the
accused argues that any mitigating circumstances exist.
C.   Oregon Cases
		This court consistently has held under similar
circumstances that intentional misrepresentations by a lawyer to
a court, particularly misrepresentations made under oath,
adversely reflect upon the lawyer's fitness to practice law and
may subject a lawyer to disbarment.  See, e.g., In re Garvey, 325
Or 34, 932 P2d 549 (1997) (disbarment for lying under oath and
assisting escape); In re Spies, 316 Or 530, 852 P2d 831 (1993)
(misrepresentations to the court, and other irresponsible
conduct, justified disbarment); In re Miller, 310 Or 731, 801 P2d
814 (1990) (misrepresentations to the court, in light of prior
record, justified disbarment); In re Hawkins, 305 Or 319, 751 P2d
780 (1988) (filing false affidavit with probate court justified
disbarment).
		Considering the totality of accused's conduct and the
absence of any mitigating circumstances, we conclude, in
accordance with our case law, that disbarment is the appropriate
sanction.
		The accused is disbarred, effective 60 days from the
date of filing of this decision.




1. 	We decline to consider the Bar's statutory charges
under ORS 9.527(3) (willful disobedience of court order regarding
one's professional conduct), ORS 9.527(4) (willful deceit or
misconduct in legal profession), and ORS 9.527(1) (conduct that
would justify denying one's application to practice law), for the
reasons set out in In re Kimmell, 332 Or 480, 487, 31 P3d 414
(2001).

2. 	The accused has not located or accounted for the copies
that she allegedly left in the office.  The Bar argues that the
accused did not make the copies.  It is just as possible,
however, that the accused made the copies and then discarded
them.  Some testimony in the record placed the binders in the
accused's office after she left the District Attorney's office. 
We decline to find that the accused did not make those copies,
because the Bar has not proved that allegation by clear and
convincing evidence.

3. 	All references to ORS 419 A. 260 and ORS 419 A. 262 are to 
the 1995 version of the statutes.

4. 	ORS 419A.262(22) (1995) provided: 
		"An order of expunction and list of complying
agencies shall be released from confidentiality only on
order of the court originating the order of expunction,
based on a finding that review of a particular case
furthers compliance with the expunction provisions of
this chapter."

5. 	The accused left at home various binders in the adult
case or combined cases that contained, for example, medical,
psychological, and police reports, and that she did not look
through the individual binders to determine whether they
contained documents regarding the juvenile case.

6. 	The accused maintains, apparently as a defense, that
"it was obvious to all concerned * * * that the documents in the
box were only a portion of all the documents she had in her
possession."  She contends that Houze and the court were not
misled by the relatively small number of documents that she
tendered in response to the subpoena.  However, it is not a
defense to misrepresentation in this context to argue that the
deceived parties should have known better than to believe what
the accused told them.

7. 	In 1997, the accused recalled that the deputy district
attorney responsible for juvenile matters had sent the accused a
note apprising her of the expunction motion while it was pending
in 1995.  The accused recalled that she wrote "OK TG" on the note
and returned it to him.  She did not remember those facts until
after the compliance hearing.

8. 	The Bar later abandoned the second count of its
complaint.

9. 	The person subject to the order has a civil right of
action against "any person who intentionally violates the
confidentiality provisions" of the statute, including punitive
damages, costs, and attorney fees.  ORS 419A.262(23).  In
addition, a "public employee" who intentionally violates an
expunction order may be subject to dismissal from employment. 
ORS 419A.262(24).  Although the statute addresses the compliance
of state agencies, it also speaks in terms of enforcing
compliance civilly against "any person," ORS 419A.262(23),
criminally against "a person," ORS 419A.262(25), and by
terminating "public employees."  ORS 419A.262(24).

10. 	Arguably, as a person charged with enforcing laws for
the protection of the public, the accused in this case ought to
be held to a higher standard than other lawyers.  However, the
accused in In re Leonhardt, 324 Or 498, 930 P2d 844 (1997)
(former district attorney disbarred for crimes committed in
office) was not held to a higher standard, and we decline to hold
the accused in this matter to a standard different from that
which we apply to other lawyers.