Title: Long v. Vielle
Citation: 549 So. 2d 968
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: August 4, 1989

549 So. 2d 968 (1989)
Athalie D. LONG
v.
Yvonne VIELLE f/k/a Yvonne Vielle Bowers.
87-1338.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
August 4, 1989.
Thomas M. Galloway of Collins, Galloway &amp; Smith, Mobile, for appellant.
Julie L. Christie, Mobile, for appellee.
MADDOX, Justice.
This is an appeal from a judgment reforming a deed to real property located in Mobile County.
The facts are as follows. In February 1979, Yvonne Vielle, formerly known as Yvonne Vielle Bowers, was the grantee in a deed, executed by Athalie D. Long pursuant to a contract for the sale of real property for $10,000. Long also conveyed the property adjoining Vielle's property to Vielle's mother. Specifically, Long conveyed to Vielle a parcel of land consisting of two lots, which we will refer to as lots one and two.[1] Vielle was actually put in possession of, and claimed to own lots one, two, and three. The land in question here is lot three. Vielle and Long agree that the deed conveyed to Vielle lots one and two; Vielle contends that the deed should be reformed to include a description of lot three. She argues that it was the intent of the parties that Long convey these three lots and that by mutual mistake the deed referred to only lots one and two.
The record reveals that shortly after purchasing the property, Vielle undertook to clear off the property with a tractor and a large mower. After clearing off the property, Vielle installed a septic tank and placed a mobile home and a wooden storage building on the property. Long never *969 voiced any complaints concerning the improvements made on the property.
Approximately one year after Vielle obtained possession of the subject property, Long received a property tax assessment for the property on which Vielle's mobile home was situated. Long forwarded the assessment to Vielle. Vielle, in turn, went to the courthouse to check on the status of her property taxes. No error in the assessments Vielle had previously received was discovered, nor was there any indication that she was delinquent in the payment of property taxes.
In May 1986, Vielle discovered that Sharon Long, daughter-in-law of Athalie Long and neighbor of Vielle, had recently purchased lot three from the State of Alabama for back taxes owed.
Vielle sued Athalie D. Long, seeking reformation of the deed description so that it would reflect what Vielle contended had been the true intentions of the parties.
The trial court, after hearing testimony, entered an order on March 25, 1988, reforming the deed. That order provided as follows:
The first issue we address is whether there was sufficient evidence before the trial court of a mutual mistake on which to base a reformation of the deed.
It is readily apparent, from a reading of Athalie Long's testimony at trial, that both parties were under the mistaken belief that the deed conveyed the property from the Burns property line (i.e., the line of a certain neighboring landowner) to within 100 feet of the Grand Bay water tower. In essence, the description contained within the deed erroneously omitted a portion of the property intended to be conveyed. The following testimony of Athalie Long, given on cross-examination, clearly exposes her intentions regarding the conveyance:
"A. No.
"* * * *
"* * * *
It is axiomatic that a court in Alabama may exercise its equitable jurisdiction to reform a deed that does not accurately reflect the intentions of the parties. "One ground for reformation of a written instrument is mutuality of mistake." Powell v. Evans, 496 So. 2d 723, 725 (Ala.1986). (Citations omitted.) With regard to mutuality of mistake, this Court in Palmer v. Palmer, 390 So. 2d 1050, 1053 (Ala.1980), stated:
The trial court did not err in reforming the deed.
We must next determine whether Sharon Long was a bona fide purchaser for value. Reformation should not be granted if a bona fide purchaser has since acquired legal title to the disputed property "in good faith for value without notice, either actual, constructive, or inquiry, of the grounds for reformation." Lee v. Brown, 482 So. 2d 293, 297 (Ala.1985).
Alabama Code 1975, § 35-4-153, provides:
With regard to bona fide purchasers this Court has stated:
"A bona fide purchaser is one who (1) purchases legal title, (2) in good faith, (3) for adequate consideration, (4) without notice of any claim of interest in the property by any other party.... Notice sufficient to preclude a bona fide purchase may be actual or constructive or may consist of knowledge of facts which would cause a reasonable person to make an inquiry which would reveal the interest of a third party."
Rolling "R" Constr., Inc. v. Dodd, 477 So. 2d 330, 331-32 (Ala.1985).
Recently, this Court stated:
"`[If a purchaser has] sufficient information to stimulate inquiry which would lead to knowledge of adverse or hostile and superior claim or title, and fails therein, the injury is the result of his own follyhe is wanting in good faith, an indispensable element of a purchaser (for value) without notice and a court of equity will not protect such reckless purchaser.'
Leslie v. Click, 221 Ala. 163, 165, 128 So. 170, 172 (1930)."
Taylor v. Kohler, 507 So. 2d 426, 427 (Ala. 1987).
Sharon Long, who lived across the road from the disputed property, was clearly on notice of Vielle's claim.
The next issue we address is whether the judgment is, nevertheless, void because an indispensable party was not before the court. Athalie Long argues that the trial court erred in entering its judgment without having made Sharon Long, the purchaser at the tax sale, a party. Athalie Long contends that Sharon Long was an indispensable party whose rights were adversely affected by the judgment entered. We disagree.
Rule 19(a), Ala.R.Civ.P., provides in relevant part:
"(a) Persons to Be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to jurisdiction of the court shall be joined as a party in the *972 action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party. If he should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue and his joinder would render the venue of the action improper, he shall be dismissed from the action."
J.C. Jacobs Banking Co. v. Campbell, 406 So. 2d 834, 849-50 (Ala.1981). (Emphasis added.)
A similar conclusion was reached by this Court in Morris v. Owens, 292 Ala. 159, 161, 290 So. 2d 646, 648 (Ala.1974), wherein it was stated:
"`In Holland v. Flinn, 239 Ala. 390, 195 So. 265 [1940], this court stated that the absence of necessary parties under the Declaratory Judgment Act was a jurisdictional defect, and further that regardless of such statute the presence of necessary parties is jurisdictional. This holding was quoted with approval in the case of City of Mobile et al. v. Gulf Development Co., Inc., 277 Ala. 431, 440, 171 So. 2d 247 [1965].
"`A judgment or decree is not binding on anyone unless the court rendering the same had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter of the cause. See Farrell v. Farrell, 243 Ala. 389, 10 So. 2d 153 [1942]. The decree of a trial court which has not obtained jurisdiction over necessary parties is void. Board of Trustees of Employees' Retirement System of the City of Montgomery, Alabama v. Dorothy Carr Talley, [286 Ala. 661, 244 So. 2d 791 (1971),] supra.'
"`Thus the absence of necessary or indispensable parties in a deed reformation suit is a jurisdictional defect and this Court holds that such defect can be brought to the attention of an appellate court on appeal from a decree involving a bill in the nature of a bill of [review] even when it is not called to the attention of the trial court.'
"In the case of Harris v. Johnson, 176 Ala. 445, 448, 58 So. 426 (1912), this court held that the absence of necessary or indispensable parties necessitated the dismissal of the cause without prejudice or a reversal with directions to allow the cause to stand over for amendment, even though no notice was taken in the court below of the omission of parties. Board of Trustees of Employees' Retirement System of the City of Montgomery, Alabama v. Talley, 286 Ala. 661, 244 So.2d *973 791 (1971) is another recent case to the same effect.
The law regarding indispensable parties is quite clear, but it is not inflexible. In Moody v. Moody, 339 So. 2d 1030, 1034 (Ala. Civ.App.), cert. denied, 339 So. 2d 1035 (Ala. 1976), the Court of Civil Appeals described one instance of flexibility:
"`If a non-party who thus participates in litigation has an interest sufficiently close to the matter in litigation, and has adequate opportunity to litigate in support of or in defense against the cause of action on which the suit is based, the policies ... require that the participating non-party should be bound by the resulting judgment to the same extent as though he were a party to the action....'"
In the case at bar, the evidence is undisputed that Sharon Long purchased the property from the State of Alabama for back taxes. It is also without dispute that Sharon Long lived directly across the street from the property in dispute. Furthermore, at all times subsequent to 1979, Sharon Long had knowledge of Vielle's claim to the property. In fact, Sharon Long was present and actually testified at the trial of this matter. Accordingly, she had ample opportunity to be heard on issues pertinent to a determination of proper title to the property in question. Therefore, Sharon Long is not within that class of parties who are guaranteed protection by Rule 19. Consequently, based on these facts, we fail to see how any prejudice to Sharon Long results by the trial court's judgment. Sharon Long was not "absent" within the contemplation of Rule 19(a), Ala. R.Civ.P.
This case was tried ore tenus. We have said:
Watson v. Herring, 549 So. 2d 33 (Ala. 1989)
The trial court's judgment reforming the deed is therefore due to be, and it is hereby, affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and ALMON, ADAMS and STEAGALL, JJ., concur.
[1]  It appears that Long owned three lots (which we will call lots one, two, and three), and that the deed to Vielle referred to two of these lots.