Title: State v. Hamilton
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 124PA15
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: December 18, 2015

NO. COA14-706 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 20 January 2015 
 
 
STEPHANIE L. NEEDHAM, 
Individually, And as  
“Guardian Ad Litem” for  
John Doe, Jane Doe and  
June Doe, Minor Children 
 
Plaintiffs, 
 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
Buncombe County 
No. 12 CVS 04611 
ROY ALAN PRICE,  
 
Defendant.  
 
 
 
 
 
Appeal by plaintiff from order entered 3 February 2014 by 
Judge J. Thomas Davis in Buncombe County Superior Court.  Heard 
in the Court of Appeals 3 December 2014. 
 
Paul Louis Bidwell and Douglas A. Ruley, for plaintiff-
appellant Guardian Ad Litem.   
 
Jack W. Stewart, for defendant-appellee.  
 
 
ELMORE, Judge. 
 
 
 
Plaintiff, Guardian Ad Litem and parent of three minor 
children, appeals from an order granting defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment against plaintiff on her claims on behalf of 
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the minor children.  After careful consideration, we affirm, in 
part; reverse, in part.         
I. Facts 
Stephanie L. Needham (plaintiff) and Roy Alan Price 
(defendant) had engaged in a long-term domestic relationship but 
were separated at some point before 20 November 2009.  Three 
children were born of the relationship (the minor children).  
Plaintiff filed a complaint on 26 September 2012 alleging 
individual claims against defendant and also bringing claims on 
behalf of her minor children against defendant (the minor 
children’s claims) for negligence, premises liability, negligent 
infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress (IIED), gross negligence, and punitive 
damages.  In the complaint, plaintiff alleged, in relevant part, 
the following facts: 
5. That [plaintiff and the minor children] 
were occupying a home owned by Defendant . . 
. 
when, 
at 
approximately 
1:25 
a.m., 
Defendant 
surreptitiously 
entered 
the 
residence through the garage and attic; as 
Defendant attempted to enter the dwelling 
area, he caused an attic ladder to unfold to 
the hallway below, striking [plaintiff] on 
the back of her head, neck and right 
shoulder 
and 
causing 
her 
serious 
and 
permanent injuries.  
 
6. That [the] minor children were awakened 
by the noise from the attic and observed 
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[plaintiff] being struck by the ladder; they 
recoiled in terror, screaming as [plaintiff] 
collapsed to the floor crying out in pain; 
and 
watched 
in 
shock 
as 
their 
father 
descended the ladder shouting obscenities at 
their fallen mother, causing them severe 
emotional distress.  
 
7. That [plaintiff] sustained injuries in 
the subject incident including, but not 
limited to, cervical spine, right upper and 
lower extremities, left upper and lower 
extremities, 
nerve 
damage, 
and 
post-
traumatic stress disorder.  
 
8. 
That 
[the] 
minor 
children 
sustained 
emotional/psychological injuries, including 
but not limited to, post-traumatic stress 
disorder, as a direct result of the subject 
incident.  
 
Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on all of the 
minor children’s claims, arguing that “there [was] no genuine 
issue as to any material fact in controversy due to the parent-
child immunity doctrine[.]”  After a hearing on said motion, the 
trial court entered an order (the order) granting summary 
judgment in defendant’s favor and dismissing all of the minor 
children’s claims. 
II. Analysis 
a.) Interlocutory Appeal 
 
We must first address the interlocutory nature of this 
appeal.  “Generally, there is no right of immediate appeal from 
interlocutory orders and judgments.”  Goldston v. Am. Motors 
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Corp., 326 N.C. 723, 725, 392 S.E.2d 735, 736 (1990).  “An 
interlocutory order is one made during the pendency of an 
action, which does not dispose of the case, but leaves it for 
further action by the trial court in order to settle and 
determine the entire controversy.”  Veazey v. City of Durham, 
231 N.C. 357, 362, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1950) (citations 
omitted).  An order granting partial summary judgment is 
interlocutory and ordinarily cannot be appealed “because it does 
not completely dispose of the case[.]”  Jeffreys v. Raleigh Oaks 
Joint Venture, 115 N.C. App. 377, 379, 444 S.E.2d 252, 253 
(1994) (citation and quotation marks omitted).   
However, immediate appeal of an interlocutory order is 
available when it “affects a substantial right.”  Sharpe v. 
Worland, 351 N.C. 159, 162, 522 S.E.2d 577, 579 (1999) 
(citations and quotation marks omitted).  Our Supreme Court has 
noted that “the right to avoid the possibility of two trials on 
the same issues can be such a substantial right.”  Bockweg v. 
Anderson, 333 N.C. 486, 490-91, 428 S.E.2d 157, 160 (1993) 
(citation 
and 
internal 
quotation 
marks 
omitted). 
 
The 
possibility of a second trial “affects a substantial right only 
when the same issues are present in both trials, creating the 
possibility that a party will be prejudiced by different juries 
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in separate trials rendering inconsistent verdicts on the same 
factual issue.”  Green v. Duke Power Co., 305 N.C. 603, 608, 290 
S.E.2d 593, 596 (1982).  
This appeal clearly arises from an interlocutory order 
because the trial court would be required to address plaintiff’s 
claims notwithstanding the dismissal of the minor children’s 
claims.  However, the order affects a substantial right because 
should we dismiss this appeal, plaintiff could proceed to trial 
on her individual claims, which overlap with, and arise from, 
the same set of facts as the minor children’s claims.  Thus, if 
plaintiff later appeals the trial court’s dismissal of the minor 
children’s claims, and we were to rule that the trial court 
erred, then a trial on the minor children’s claims could occur.  
A second trial arising from the same facts as plaintiff’s 
individual claims could result in an inconsistent jury decision 
on overlapping issues.  Accordingly, we hold that the order 
affects 
a 
substantial 
right 
and 
address 
the 
merits 
of 
plaintiff’s arguments on behalf of the minor children. 
b.) Summary Judgment   
i. Parent-Child Immunity 
 
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by granting 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the minor children’s 
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claims for gross negligence, IIED, and punitive damages.  
Specifically, plaintiff avers that the doctrine of parent-child 
immunity does not apply to claims based on willful and malicious 
acts.  We agree.   
Plaintiff concedes 
that the doctrine of 
parent-child 
immunity would bar the minor children’s claims for ordinary 
negligence.  Thus, the trial court’s decision to dismiss the 
minor children’s claims of negligence, premises liability based 
on ordinary negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional 
distress are not at issue.   
 
“Our standard of review of an appeal from summary judgment 
is de novo; such judgment is appropriate only when the record 
shows that ‘there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law.’”  In re Will of Jones, 362 N.C. 569, 573, 669 S.E.2d 572, 
576 (2008) (quoting Forbis v. Neal, 361 N.C. 519, 524, 649 
S.E.2d 382, 385 (2007)).  We must consider “the pleadings, 
affidavits and discovery materials available in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party[.]”  Pine Knoll Ass’n, Inc. v. 
Cardon, 126 N.C. App. 155, 158, 484 S.E.2d 446, 448 (1997) 
(citations omitted). 
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The parent-child immunity doctrine “bar[s] actions between 
unemancipated children and their parents based on ordinary 
negligence.”  Doe By & Through Connolly v. Holt, 332 N.C. 90, 
95, 418 S.E.2d 511, 514 (1992) (emphasis in original) (citations 
omitted).  However, the doctrine “has never applied to, and may 
not be applied to, actions by unemancipated minors to recover 
for injuries resulting from their parent’s willful and malicious 
acts.”  Id. at 96, 418 S.E.2d at 514.  An act is willful “when 
it is done purposely and deliberately in violation of law or 
when it is done knowingly and of set purpose, or when the mere 
will has free play, without yielding to reason.”  Yancey v. Lea, 
354 N.C. 48, 52-53, 550 S.E.2d 155, 157-58 (2001) (citation and 
quotation marks omitted).  Moreover, the terms “willful and 
wanton 
conduct” 
and 
“gross 
negligence” 
have 
been 
used 
interchangeably to describe conduct falling between “ordinary 
negligence and intentional conduct.”  Id. at 52, 550 S.E.2d at 
157 (quotation marks omitted).  Thus, the doctrine of parent-
child immunity clearly does not bar the minor children’s claims 
of gross negligence and IIED.   
ii. Forecast of Evidence 
Even though the parent-child immunity doctrine does not bar 
the minor children’s claims of gross negligence and IIED, we 
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must also determine whether 
plaintiff 
forecast sufficient 
evidence of each element of these claims.  See Waddle v. Sparks, 
331 N.C. 73, 82, 414 S.E.2d 22, 27 (1992).   
The tort of IIED requires a showing of: “(1) extreme and 
outrageous conduct, (2) which is intended to cause and does 
cause (3) severe emotional distress.”  Shreve v. Duke Power Co., 
85 N.C. App. 253, 256-57, 354 S.E.2d 357, 359 (1987) (citation 
and quotation marks omitted).  The first element requires 
conduct that “exceeds all bounds usually tolerated by a decent 
society.”  Phillips v. Rest. Mgmt. of Carolina, L.P., 146 N.C. 
App. 203, 213, 552 S.E.2d 686, 693 (2001) (citation and 
quotation marks omitted).  The second element can be satisfied 
by showing that a defendant “acts recklessly in deliberate 
disregard of a high degree of probability that the emotional 
distress will follow[.]”  Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437, 449, 
276 S.E.2d 325, 333 (1981) (citations and quotation marks 
omitted).  Finally, the third element is “any emotional or 
mental disorder, such as, for example, neurosis, psychosis, 
chronic depression, phobia, or any other type of severe and 
disabling emotional or mental condition which may be generally 
recognized and diagnosed by professionals trained to do so.”  
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Waddle, 331 N.C. at 83, 414 S.E.2d at 27 (citation and quotation 
marks omitted). 
Here, in the light most favorable to plaintiff as supported 
by her affidavit and complaint, defendant entered the residence 
at 1:25 a.m. through the garage and attic, waking up and 
startling the minor children.  The minor children were in 
defendant’s presence as they observed plaintiff being struck by 
a ladder and collapsing to the floor “crying out in pain” while 
defendant “shout[ed] obscenities” at her.  Subsequently, the 
minor 
children 
suffered 
“emotional/psychological 
injuries, 
including but not limited to, post-traumatic stress disorder; 
and the medical records submitted in discovery support the 
same.”  Such forecasted evidence is sufficient to raise genuine 
issues of material fact as to each essential element of the 
minor children’s IIED claim.  See Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & 
Gynecology Associates, P.A., 327 N.C. 283, 305, 395 S.E.2d 85, 
98 (1990) (considering “plaintiff’s proximity to the . . . act, 
the relationship between the plaintiff and the other person for 
whose welfare the plaintiff is concerned, and whether the 
plaintiff personally observed the . . . act” as factors in 
determining the viability of an emotional distress claim).  
Thus, the trial court erred by dismissing the minor children’s 
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IIED claim.  Consequently, the trial court also erred by 
dismissing the minor children’s claim for punitive damages 
related to the IIED claim.      
With regard to gross negligence, a plaintiff, in addition 
to pleading the facts on each element of negligence (duty, 
breach of that duty, proximate cause, and injury), must also 
forecast sufficient evidence of “wanton conduct[.]”  Clayton v. 
Branson, 170 N.C. App. 438, 442-43, 613 S.E.2d 259, 264 (2005) 
(citation and quotation marks omitted).  The “duty” element in 
an actionable negligence claim “presupposes the existence of a 
legal relationship between parties by which the injured party is 
owed a duty by the other, and such duty must be imposed by law.”  
Pinnix v. Toomey, 242 N.C. 358, 362, 87 S.E.2d 893, 897 (1955).  
It is well established that “[p]arents in this State have an 
affirmative legal duty to protect and provide for their minor 
children.”  State v. Walden, 306 N.C. 466, 473, 293 S.E.2d 780, 
785 (1982). 
The minor children’s claim for gross negligence in this 
case properly alleged wanton conduct: “[T]he acts and omissions 
as set forth above indicate such a reckless indifference to, or 
conscious disregard for, the rights and safety of others and, 
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specifically, of [the] Minor Children, sufficient to constitute 
willful and wanton negligence.” 
Additionally, the time and nature of defendant’s entry into 
the residence, his conduct towards plaintiff in the presence of 
the minor children despite her vulnerable physical condition, 
and the minor children’s resulting injuries forecast evidence 
sufficient to raise genuine issues of material fact as to each 
essential element of the minor children’s gross negligence 
claim.   
Accordingly, the trial court erred by dismissing the minor 
children’s gross negligence claim.  In light of our ruling, the 
trial court also erred by dismissing the minor children’s claim 
for punitive damages stemming from their gross negligence claim.   
III. Conclusion 
In sum, we affirm the trial court’s order granting summary 
judgment to defendant on the minor children’s claims of 
negligence, premises liability, and negligent infliction of 
emotional distress.  However, we reverse the trial court’s 
dismissal of the minor children’s claims for IIED and gross 
negligence along with the punitive damages related to these 
remaining claims. 
Affirmed, in part; reversed, in part.   
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Judges STEPHENS and DAVIS concur.