Title: State v. Anthony
Citation: 2015 WI 20
Docket Number: 2013AP000467-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: March 3, 2015

2015 WI 20 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2013AP467-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Eddie Lee Anthony, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 352 Wis. 2d 755, 843 N.W.2d 711) 
(Ct. App. 2014 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 3, 2015 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 9, 2014 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Richard J. Sankovitz 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
BRADLEY, J., concurs. (Opinion filed).  
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (Opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Kimberly L. Alderman and Alderman Law Firm, Madison, 
and oral argument by Kimberly L. Alderman. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by 
Marguerite M. Moeller, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 WI 20
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2013AP467-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2010CF4153) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Eddie Lee Anthony, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 3, 2015 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   On August 20, 2010, Eddie Lee 
Anthony (Anthony) killed S.J., the mother of his children.  The 
evidence showed that Anthony beat and stabbed S.J. 45 times with 
an ice pick while their children hid in a closet in the next 
room.  In addition to the puncture wounds, S.J. suffered four 
broken ribs, as well as numerous abrasions and contusions, 
leading the medical examiner to consider the cause of death 
"multiple sharp and blunt force injuries." 
¶2 
Anthony never denied killing S.J.  His theory of the 
case was self-defense.  To support that theory, Anthony planned 
No. 
2013AP467-CR   
 
2 
 
to serve as the sole eyewitness at his jury trial.  But that 
strategy never came to fruition, as the circuit court1 refused to 
allow Anthony's testimony. 
¶3 
The impetus for the circuit court's decision regarding 
Anthony's right to testify involved an unusual situation: 
Anthony adamantly insisted that he would inform the jury of his 
prior conviction for armed robbery which occurred in 1966.2  
Anthony protested that this conviction was wrongful3 and that he 
"stayed [in prison] like 12 mother-fucking years for something 
[he] didn't do."  He argued that he had a right to inform the 
jury of this information because he wanted the jury to know "the 
truth, the whole truth."     
¶4 
Needless to say, it is unusual for a defendant on 
trial for first-degree intentional homicide to insist on 
bringing up a prior felony conviction involving a violent crime.  
However, Anthony explained that he wanted the predominantly 
white jury in "one of the most racist cities in the country" to 
know that he believed his purportedly wrongful conviction from 
1966 was racially motivated.4  Apparently, Anthony believed that 
                                                 
1 Milwaukee County, the Honorable Richard J. Sankovitz, 
presiding. 
2 According to the presentence investigation report (PSI), 
Anthony's conviction for armed robbery occurred on January 25, 
1967.  He was paroled on or about August 29, 1978.    
3 No evidence in the record supports Anthony's contention 
that his conviction for armed robbery was wrongful.   
4 Anthony is an African-American male.  
No. 
2013AP467-CR   
 
3 
 
the State's charge of first-degree intentional homicide in this 
case was also racially motivated, as Anthony insisted that he 
killed S.J. in self-defense.    
¶5 
The circuit court decided that Anthony's proposed 
testimony 
concerning 
the 
alleged 
wrongful 
conviction 
was 
irrelevant.  The circuit court explained the basis for its 
ruling multiple times.  With each explanation, Anthony became 
more agitated, to the point where additional sheriff's deputies 
were called into the courtroom (a total of eight were present).  
Anthony promised numerous times that, if permitted to testify, 
he would disobey the circuit court's evidentiary ruling.  He 
emphasized at one point, "I'm going to keep saying it.  You got 
to carry me out of here."   
¶6 
Anthony gave every indication that his irrelevant 
testimony would not stop at the alleged wrongful conviction.  He 
insisted he would tell the jury "everything I can remember all 
the way back to when I was five years old."  In fact, he stated 
more than once that he wanted to "bring everything out." 
¶7 
In light of Anthony's conduct, detailed further below, 
the circuit court determined that Anthony forfeited his right to 
testify at trial.  The jury convicted Anthony of first-degree 
intentional homicide.  He was sentenced to life imprisonment 
without the possibility of release under extended supervision.    
¶8 
The primary issue before the court is a significant 
one: did the circuit court violate Anthony's constitutional 
right to testify when it determined, over timely defense 
objection, that Anthony forfeited his right by exhibiting 
No. 
2013AP467-CR   
 
4 
 
stubborn and defiant conduct that threatened both the fairness 
and reliability of the criminal trial process as well as the 
preservation of dignity, order, and decorum in the courtroom?   
¶9 
The secondary issue that this case presents is one 
that we have recently addressed: is a violation of the right to 
testify subject to harmless error analysis? 
¶10 Because the circuit court's forfeiture determination 
was not arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes it was 
designed to serve,5 we hold that the circuit court did not err in 
denying Anthony the right to testify.  Anthony forfeited his 
right to testify by displaying stubborn and defiant conduct that 
presented a serious threat to both the fairness and reliability 
of the criminal trial process and the preservation of dignity, 
order, and decorum in the courtroom. 
¶11 Although we conclude that the circuit court did not 
err in refusing to allow Anthony's testimony, we further hold 
that, even if we assumed error, such error is subject to 
harmless error analysis.  Given the overwhelming evidence of 
Anthony's guilt, the assumed error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.   
¶12 Therefore, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals and uphold Anthony's conviction. 
I. Background 
                                                 
5 See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55-56 (1987) (stating 
that the right to testify is subject to reasonable limitations 
which are not "arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes 
they are designed to serve.").    
No. 
2013AP467-CR   
 
5 
 
A. Facts6 
¶13 On the night of August 20, 2010, Anthony and S.J. 
argued at their home.  Anthony had accused S.J. of having an 
affair.  Their argument spanned the course of approximately one 
hour and a half, taking place both inside and outside their 
home.   
¶14 Multiple people witnessed the argument.  One witness, 
L.J., S.J.'s 17 year-old daughter, recounted most of the 
incident leading to her mother's death.  L.J. testified that she 
overheard Anthony tell S.J. that if she (S.J.) left the house he 
would kill her.  At the time, Anthony was holding an ice pick in 
his hand.    
¶15 Despite Anthony's threat, S.J. left the house and went 
for a walk.  Anthony tailed her with the ice pick.  L.J. 
followed Anthony and S.J. to a neighborhood park, where she 
witnessed the couple continuing their argument.  Anthony and 
S.J. eventually returned home; L.J. went to a friend's house. 
¶16 Roughly 15 minutes later, L.J. received a phone call 
from S.J.  S.J. was screaming and asked L.J. to hurry home.  
When L.J. arrived, the doors were locked and she could hear S.J. 
screaming.  L.J. called 9-1-1.  Anthony then exited the home and 
told L.J. that her mother did not want her to call the police.  
He said that S.J. would come outside in 10 to 15 minutes.   
                                                 
6 The following facts are taken from witness testimony at 
trial. 
No. 
2013AP467-CR   
 
6 
 
¶17 Once Anthony drove away, L.J. kicked in the front door 
and found her mother dead in an upstairs room.              
¶18 Neighbors Sandra Rasco and Tiera Patterson Hogans 
corroborated much of L.J.'s testimony.  They also testified that 
S.J. told them that Anthony had held an ice pick to her throat 
and threatened to take her to the woods and kill her.  That 
threat occurred just two days prior to S.J.'s death. 
¶19  Three witnesses were inside S.J. and Anthony's home 
at the culmination of the argument.  R.J. is the daughter of 
S.J. and Anthony.  She saw Anthony enter S.J.'s room with an ice 
pick.  At the time, R.J. was hiding in a closet in another room 
with her two sisters, M.J. and A.J.  R.J. heard S.J. yell "stop, 
please stop" and "I'm sorry, I'm sorry."   
¶20 After 
fleeing 
the 
scene, 
Anthony 
visited 
Janet 
Mayfield, the mother of his teenage son.  He told Mayfield that 
he stabbed S.J. "forty to fifty times."  He never mentioned 
self-defense.  He explained that he believed S.J. was having an 
affair and that Rasco had something to do with it.  He asked 
Mayfield for a gun and money.  He stated that he was going to 
return to his home to kill Rasco and the man that he suspected 
of having an affair with S.J.   
¶21 The medical examiner, Christopher Poulos, testified 
that S.J. suffered 45 "sharp force injuries" involving the head, 
chest, abdomen, arms, hands, and leg.  Poulos opined that seven 
No. 
2013AP467-CR   
 
7 
 
of these wounds could be considered "defensive puncture wounds."7  
Poulos testified to a reasonable degree of medical certainty 
that the 45 "sharp force injuries" could have been caused by an 
ice pick.   
¶22 S.J. also sustained numerous "blunt force trauma 
wounds."  These included a contusion of the head, multiple 
abrasions and contusions of the torso, and four broken ribs. 
¶23 However, the single most lethal injury, according to 
Poulos, was a three to four inch puncture wound to S.J.'s aorta. 
B. Procedural History 
¶24  Anthony was arrested in Bradley, Illinois, after a 
highway police chase.  The State charged Anthony with one count 
of first-degree intentional homicide, contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.01(1)(a).8  Anthony entered a not guilty plea and went to 
trial. 
¶25 At trial, the State presented the evidence detailed 
above.  After the State rested, the circuit court asked 
Anthony's counsel whether Anthony wanted to testify.  Counsel 
responded that Anthony wished to do so.   
                                                 
7 Poulos defined "defensive puncture wounds" as those that 
"one describes of the hands or forearms of someone who will be 
in a position to try to ward off a blow."   
8 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2009-
10 
version 
unless 
otherwise 
indicated. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 940.01(1)(a) provides that "whoever causes the death of 
another human being with intent to kill that person or another 
is guilty of a Class A felony."   
No. 
2013AP467-CR   
 
8 
 
¶26 The circuit court then addressed the matter of 
Anthony's prior convictions relevant for impeachment purposes.9  
Based on a pretrial ruling,10 the circuit court instructed 
Anthony to answer "two" if asked how many prior convictions he 
possessed.11  After some explanation, Anthony stated that he 
understood.   
¶27 However, Anthony then asked whether he had a right to 
"open the door" and "bring in all [his] convictions all the way 
back to 1966."   He explained: 
I'm thinking now it might be to my benefit to show 
that in my mind if I go back all the way to 1966——
because like I say [] I don't care what nobody do 
think, but in 1966 I was convicted of an armed robbery 
of a white man. I was only 19 and I was innocent. I 
stayed like 12 mother-fucking years for something I 
didn't do. I'm going to tell it to the jury.  
¶28 The circuit court ruled that such testimony was 
irrelevant to the charge of first-degree intentional homicide, 
                                                 
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 906.09(1) provides that "[f]or the 
purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that 
the witness has been convicted of a crime or adjudicated 
delinquent is admissible. . . ."  However, under Wis. Stat. 
§ 906.09(2), such evidence "may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice." 
10 Milwaukee 
County, 
the 
Honorable 
Kevin 
E. 
Martens, 
presiding.  
11 At the pretrial hearing, the State argued that four of 
Anthony's prior convictions were relevant for impeachment 
purposes.  Those convictions dated back as far as 1996.  
However, the circuit court determined that only two of the four 
were relevant: two convictions for bail jumping in violation of 
Wis. Stat. 946.49(1)(a).  Those convictions occurred in 2003.  
No. 
2013AP467-CR   
 
9 
 
to which Anthony responded "I'll bring it up. I have a right."  
The circuit court explained that the alleged wrongful conviction 
could not help the jury decide whether Anthony committed the 
charge he currently faced.  Anthony retorted that he wanted the 
jury to "know the truth, the whole truth."  In the midst of this 
discussion, Anthony's reasoning became clearer:  
I know when I got convicted of [] the armed robbery, 
do you understand, [I had] an all white jury [and] now 
I got eleven white people on the jury. This is 2011.  
That happened do you understand 40 some years ago 
[and] . . . Milwaukee [is] one of the most racist [] 
cities in the country, and the jury [is] going to feel 
what I say. If they don't feel it I'll be glad to die 
in prison. 
¶29 The circuit court asked Anthony to "take a deep breath 
and calm down."  The circuit court explained that if Anthony 
testified about the alleged wrongful conviction he would be cut 
off.  Anthony interrupted: 
Cut me off. [The jury is the] judge of the facts.  
That's a fact that happened that's true. I'm going to 
keep saying it. You got to carry me out of here. I'm 
going to say it, your Honor. . . . 
The following exchange ensued: 
THE COURT: We're kind of running out of time here. I 
just want to be clear with you. If you respect me 
you'll respect this. If you go into detail about [the 
alleged wrongful conviction] I'm directing you to stop 
talking and if you don't stop talking I will take you 
off the stand, bring you back in the bullpen. 
THE DEFENDANT: Okay, all right. 
THE COURT: That means that the rest of your story will 
not be told to the jury. You'll be in direct violation 
of my direction to you not to talk about the armed 
robbery. If you go into that that's the end of your 
No. 
2013AP467-CR   
 
10 
 
testimony. I'll find you've blatantly violated my rule 
to you and they will take you off the stand. That will 
be the end of it. 
THE 
DEFENDANT: 
Okay. 
We'll 
do 
that, 
whatever, 
whatever. 
THE COURT: Mr. Anthony, I'm talking. 
THE DEFENDANT: I'm sorry, I'm sorry. 
THE COURT: You're promising me right now you're going 
to break my rule? 
THE DEFENDANT: I promise you right now I want the jury 
to hear the facts because you said the jury is the 
judge of the facts, you are the judge of the law, and 
Anpu Aungk.12 I know this for a fact. If you're as 
honorable as you appear to be to me when you think 
about all the things that have happened to people like 
me in this country you cannot deny what I'm about to 
say. . . . 
¶30 After Anthony engaged in a brief discussion with 
counsel, the circuit court asked whether he would agree not to 
talk about the alleged wrongful conviction.  Anthony responded 
that he could not avoid it.  The circuit court ruled that 
Anthony could no longer testify:  
THE COURT: I could put you on the stand but if you 
went into that, I try to cut off that line of 
questioning I'd have a difficult situation for two 
reasons.   
THE DEFENDANT: I understand. 
THE COURT: The difficulties would be visited on your 
head. First of all the jury would hear the part about 
the armed robbery but not all the rest of the story 
and so they might think oh, this is the guy who's not 
                                                 
12 Anthony described "Anpu Aungk" as "my Egyptian protector, 
the high priest."    
No. 
2013AP467-CR   
 
11 
 
only accused of killing [S.J.] but he's also an armed 
robber and they wouldn't get the rest of the facts.  
That's one problem. I want to avoid that. 
The other problem is this: You're going to be shackled 
to the witness stand. I can't easily remove you from 
the courtroom. I'll have to remove the jury from the 
courtroom instead, and removing the jury from the 
courtroom is not something I can do effortlessly or 
quietly or without seeing that you would be making a 
ruckus on the stand. When I say "ruckus" what I'm 
referring to is the way that you were very, you know, 
very animated [in the way you were] talking before. I 
don't want you to look worse in the eyes of the jury 
because of the way you're behaving on the stand, so if 
you're promising me right now that you're going to 
talk about this matter that I've excluded I won't let 
you take the stand. I don't want to make this worse 
for yourself than it is already. 
¶31 Anthony's counsel objected and made an offer of proof 
as to Anthony's anticipated trial testimony.  Anthony would have 
testified that he killed S.J. in self-defense.  He would have 
explained that a physical altercation between himself and S.J. 
ensued and that he believed S.J. had picked up a knife.  At that 
point, Anthony would testify, he used the ice pick to defend 
himself.   
¶32 Anthony also would have testified that he stabbed S.J. 
so many times because he did not realize or understand the 
threat had been terminated.  Regarding Anthony's decision to 
flee the scene of the crime, he would have explained that he had 
a heightened fear of police due to past experiences in both 
Wisconsin and Illinois.   
¶33 The circuit court ensured that Anthony understood he 
would not be able to testify about his self-defense theory if he 
insisted on disobeying the circuit court's evidentiary ruling.  
No. 
2013AP467-CR   
 
12 
 
The circuit court once again asked whether Anthony intended to 
break its rule, to which Anthony responded "Your Honor, I want 
the jury——I want the jury to know everything I can remember all 
the way back to when I was five years old."   
¶34 The circuit court provided Anthony with two more 
opportunities to change his mind, but to no avail.  In the midst 
of the discussion, the circuit court further expounded the basis 
for its ruling:  
THE COURT: This is not out of respect for me. I'm not 
making an arbitrary ruling making people follow just 
for my pleasure. I have this rule because this jury 
has a difficult decision to make. I don't want it made 
more difficult by having to consider matters which 
don't 
help 
their 
decision, 
and 
your 
difficult 
experience in Illinois as a younger man doesn't help 
them make their decision today. It might in your mind 
inject some sympathy into the jury for you but they're 
explicitly told they can't decide the case based on 
sympathy. They can't have sympathy for [S.J.], they 
can't have sympathy for you. They have to decide what 
the facts are without regard to sympathy. 
 . . .  
If it was a simple balancing test, if somebody told me 
that they were intentionally going to break one of the 
rules that we set for the court and it carried only a 
little bit of prejudice and there was an awful lot of 
probative value they would otherwise have in their 
testimony, if it was just a balancing test we would 
apply, [it would] give a person carte blanche to break 
the court's rules, so [he or she would] break it every 
time. There's nothing a court could do to enforce 
those rules. While at this point it seems like there's 
nothing that serious about Mr. Anthony telling his 
sorry tale about what happened in the sixties we don't 
know for sure whether that is something that would 
make a difference to this jury that might [] end this 
very carefully [] constructed process we have of 
getting the truth which is why I've said this can't 
No. 
2013AP467-CR   
 
13 
 
come in. As a consequence if Mr. Anthony tried to get 
it in he's forfeited his right to testify.13 
As a result of the circuit court's ruling, Anthony was unable to 
offer any evidence of self-defense.     
¶35 On September 15, 2011, the jury found Anthony guilty 
of first-degree intentional homicide.  On October 28, 2011, the 
circuit court sentenced Anthony to life imprisonment without 
eligibility for release under extended supervision.14  The 
circuit court entered a judgment of conviction on November 1, 
2011.   
¶36 On October 16, 2012, Anthony filed a post-conviction 
motion for a new trial on the basis that he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel.  Anthony contended in part that 
his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that 
Anthony's right to testify was absolute, subject only to telling 
the truth.   
                                                 
13 The discussion concerning Anthony's right to testify 
occurred outside the presence of the jury.  At the conclusion of 
the discussion, a deputy from the Milwaukee County Sheriff's 
Office requested that Anthony wear a stun belt.  The circuit 
court was concerned "not about the timing of the stun belt but 
about the fact the jury's sitting now for an hour and 15 minutes 
without anything going on."  Given that concern and the presence 
of eight sheriff's deputies in the courtroom, the circuit court 
declined to order Anthony to wear the stun belt.  However, the 
circuit 
court 
did 
note 
that 
Anthony 
was 
"speaking 
very 
forcefully" with a "good deal of anger in his voice."      
14 At the sentencing hearing, the circuit court noted 
Anthony's evident inability to control his anger.  The circuit 
court explained: "You're sitting there in a wheelchair with 1, 
2, 3, 4, 5 extra deputies because of that [one] incident in my 
court where you couldn't contain your rage, and that's what I'm 
concerned about."    
No. 
2013AP467-CR   
 
14 
 
¶37 The circuit court denied Anthony's post-conviction 
motion in a written decision dated February 5, 2013.  The 
circuit court reasoned that Anthony was not prejudiced15 by his 
trial counsel's failure to argue the absolute nature of his 
right to testify because it would have rejected that argument 
anyway.  It noted that the right to testify is subject to 
reasonable limitations, such as procedural and evidentiary rules 
that control the presentation of evidence.   
¶38 The circuit court also reasoned that the right to 
testify can be limited in order to preserve dignity, order, and 
decorum in the courtroom, citing to Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 
337 (1970), for support.  In Allen, the United States Supreme 
Court held that a criminal defendant may forfeit his or her 
constitutional right to be present at trial through misconduct.  
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970).   
¶39 Relying in part on Allen to justify its decision 
concerning forfeiture, the circuit court recounted Anthony's 
demeanor 
at 
trial, 
described 
above. 
 
The 
circuit 
court 
referenced additional factual findings: "I recall how enraged he 
was, how tensely coiled he became the more he insisted on 
                                                 
15 To succeed on a claim for ineffective assistance of 
counsel, a defendant must demonstrate both that counsel's 
performance was deficient and that it prejudiced the defense.  
State v. Carter, 2010 WI 40, ¶21, 324 Wis. 2d 640, 782 N.W.2d 
695 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).  
To prove prejudice, a defendant must show that "'there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, 
the 
result 
of 
the 
proceeding 
would 
have 
been 
different.'"  Id., ¶37 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 
No. 
2013AP467-CR   
 
15 
 
telling the jury about the 1966 conviction, and how close he 
seemed to a breaking point."  The circuit court explained, "I 
did not state these additional observations in so many words at 
the time.  I was hoping not to provoke another outburst."   
¶40 In light of Anthony's insistence on disregarding the 
circuit court's evidentiary ruling as well as his angry 
demeanor, the circuit court held that Anthony had forfeited his 
right to testify.  Consequently, the circuit court reasoned that 
Anthony could not show prejudice for purposes of his claim for 
ineffective assistance.   
¶41 The court of appeals affirmed.16  The court of appeals 
did not decide whether the circuit court erred in its forfeiture 
determination.  Rather, it performed a harmless error analysis 
and concluded that any error on the part of the circuit court 
was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of Anthony's 
guilt. 
¶42 We granted Anthony's petition for review.  
II. Standard of Review 
¶43 We 
are 
asked 
to 
determine 
whether 
Anthony's 
constitutional right to testify was violated.  "Whether an 
individual is denied a constitutional right is a question of 
constitutional fact that this court reviews independently as a 
question of law."  State v. Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d 721, 748, 546 
N.W.2d 406 (1996).  We accept the circuit court's findings of 
                                                 
16 State v. Anthony, No. 2013AP467-CR, unpublished order 
(Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2014).  
No. 
2013AP467-CR   
 
16 
 
evidentiary 
or 
historical 
fact 
unless 
they 
are 
clearly 
erroneous.  State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶45, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 
761 N.W.2d 612.  We apply "constitutional principles to those 
evidentiary or historical facts independently of the circuit 
court and court of appeals but benefitting from those courts' 
analyses."  Id. 
¶44 We are also asked to decide whether a violation of a 
defendant's right to testify is subject to harmless error 
analysis.  "Whether a particular error is structural and 
therefore not subject to a harmless error review is a question 
of law for our independent review."  State v. Nelson, 2014 WI 
70, ¶18, 355 Wis. 2d 722, 849 N.W.2d 317.  Whether an error is 
harmless is also a question of law for our independent review.  
Id. 
III. Discussion 
A. Right to Testify  
¶45 Under the common law rule, criminal defendants were 
prohibited from testifying on their own behalf at trial.  
Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 573-74 (1961).  They were 
deemed incompetent to do so, the theory being that their 
testimony was self-serving and therefore untrustworthy.  Id.  
However, beginning in 1864, states began to enact general 
competency statutes for criminal defendants, and the United 
States Congress followed suit in 1878.  Id. at 577.  Those laws 
helped serve the presumption of innocence that attaches to 
criminal prosecutions.  See id. at 580-81 ("Experience under the 
American competency statutes was to change the minds of many who 
No. 
2013AP467-CR   
 
17 
 
had opposed them.  It was seen that the shutting out of [a 
defendant's testimony] could be positively hurtful to the 
accused, and that innocence was in fact aided, not prejudiced, 
by the opportunity of the accused to testify under oath."). 
¶46 Over a century later, the United States Supreme Court 
explicitly recognized that a defendant in a criminal case has a 
fundamental constitutional right to testify in his or her own 
defense.  Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 49 (1987); See also 
United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 96 (1993).  That right 
stems from several provisions of the Constitution:  
the Fourteenth Amendment, which protects a defendant's 
due process right to be heard and offer testimony; the 
Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, 
which protects a defendant's right to call witnesses 
in her favor; and the Fifth Amendment, which protects 
a defendant's right against compelled testimony unless 
he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his 
own will.   
Nelson, 355 Wis. 2d. 722, ¶19 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
¶47 It has been recognized that the right to testify is 
grounded in personal autonomy and may not be waived by counsel.  
See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983).  In Wisconsin, we 
require that a circuit court "conduct a colloquy with the 
defendant in order to ensure that the defendant is knowingly and 
voluntarily waiving his or her right to testify."  State v. 
Weed, 2003 WI 85, ¶40, 263 Wis. 2d 434, 666 N.W.2d 485.  Stated 
differently, the right to testify cannot be lost, that is to say 
No. 
2013AP467-CR   
 
18 
 
forfeited, by a defendant's silence.  Nelson, 355 Wis. 2d 722, 
¶20. 
¶48 Although the right to testify is a fundamental 
constitutional right grounded in personal autonomy, it is not 
absolute.  For example, there is no constitutional right to 
commit perjury.  State v. McDowell, 2004 WI 70, ¶34, 272 Wis. 2d 
488, 681 N.W.2d 500 (quoting Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 173 
(1986)).  There is also no constitutional right to present 
irrelevant evidence.  State v. Robinson, 146 Wis. 2d 315, 332, 
431 N.W.2d 165 (1988).  Moreover, a criminal defendant's right 
to 
present 
relevant 
testimony 
is 
subject 
to 
reasonable 
restrictions.  Rock, 483 U.S. at 55-56.   
¶49 In Rock, the United States Supreme Court considered 
whether Arkansas' per se rule prohibiting the admission of 
hypnotically refreshed testimony violated the petitioner's right 
to testify.  Id. at 45.  Arkansas' rule was designed to ensure 
that only reliable evidence be admitted at trial.  Id. at 56.  
Because Arkansas considered hypnotically refreshed testimony per 
se unreliable, circuit courts had no discretion to admit such 
testimony, even if the circumstances of a particular case 
established the trustworthiness of the evidence.  Id. at 57 
n.12.   
¶50 The Court in Rock recognized that the right to present 
relevant testimony is not limitless and "'may, in appropriate 
cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the 
criminal trial process.'"  Id. at 55 (quoting Chambers v. 
Mississippi, 
410 
U.S. 
284, 
295 
(1973)). 
 
For 
example, 
No. 
2013AP467-CR   
 
19 
 
"[n]umerous state procedural and evidentiary rules control the 
presentation of evidence and do not offend the defendant's right 
to testify."  Id. at 55 n.11.  However, such limitations on the 
right to testify "may not be arbitrary or disproportionate to 
the purposes they are designed to serve."  Id. at 56. 
¶51 Having determined that "[w]holesale inadmissibility of 
a defendant's testimony is an arbitrary restriction on the right 
to testify in the absence of clear evidence by the State 
repudiating the validity of all posthypnosis recollections," Id. 
at 61, the Court in Rock held that Arkansas' per se rule 
violated the defendant's right to testify.  Id. at 62.  Central 
to the Court's reasoning was the fact that the per se rule 
impeded the circuit court's ability to control the presentation 
of evidence so as to effectuate the ascertainment of truth.  See 
id. at 56-62. 
¶52  The 
takeaway 
from 
Rock 
is 
a 
"methodology 
for 
reviewing a decision denying a defendant's request to testify."  
Arredondo v. Pollard, 498 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1126 (E.D. Wis. 
2007).  "The reviewing court asks whether the reasons given for 
the denial are sufficiently persuasive to justify depriving the 
defendant of his fundamental constitutional right to testify."  
Id. 
B. Forfeiture by Conduct 
¶53 Prior to reviewing the circuit court's decision to 
deny Anthony's request to testify, we must address a threshold 
issue in this case: whether a criminal defendant may forfeit his 
or her right to testify through conduct incompatible with the 
No. 
2013AP467-CR   
 
20 
 
assertion of the right.  Neither the United States Supreme Court 
nor this court has addressed the issue.   
¶54 "We have recognized two distinct ways in which a 
defendant may give up his rights: waiver and forfeiture."  State 
v. Pinno, 2014 WI 74, ¶56, 356 Wis. 2d 106, 850 N.W.2d 207.  
Waiver "'is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a 
known right.'"  Ndina, 315 Wis. 2d 653, ¶29 (quoting United 
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993)).  "[W]aiver typically 
applies to those rights so important to the administration of a 
fair trial that mere inaction on the part of a litigant is not 
sufficient to demonstrate that the party intended to forgo the 
right."  State v. Soto, 2012 WI 93, ¶37, 343 Wis. 2d 43, 817 
N.W.2d 848.   
¶55 Forfeiture, on the other hand, often involves "'the 
failure to make the timely assertion of a right.'"  Ndina, 315 
Wis. 2d 653, ¶29 (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 733).  "Rights that 
are 
subject 
to 
forfeiture 
are 
typically 
those 
whose 
relinquishment will not necessarily deprive a party of a fair 
trial, and whose protection is best left to the immediacy of the 
trial, such as when a party fails to raise an evidentiary 
objection."  Soto, 343 Wis. 2d 43, ¶36.  However, there is a 
second aspect to forfeiture: "doing something incompatible with 
the assertion of a right. . . ."  State v. Vaughn, 2012 WI App 
129, ¶21, 344 Wis. 2d 764, 823 N.W.2d 543 (citing Allen, 397 
U.S. at 343). 
¶56 As previously noted, we have held that the right to 
testify is subject to waiver, not forfeiture, in so far as a 
No. 
2013AP467-CR   
 
21 
 
defendant's inaction in asserting the right is concerned.  Weed, 
263 Wis. 2d 434, ¶¶39-40.  We now conclude that the right to 
testify may, in appropriate cases, be subject to forfeiture 
where conduct incompatible with the assertion of the right is at 
issue.     
¶57 Case law supports our position.  In Allen, the issue 
was whether Allen forfeited his constitutional right to be 
present at trial by engaging "in speech and conduct which [was] 
so noisy, disorderly, and disruptive that it [was] exceedingly 
difficult or wholly impossible to carry on the trial."  Allen, 
397 U.S. at 338.  At trial, Allen had requested to conduct his 
own defense.  Id. at 339.  During voir dire, Allen argued with 
the judge "in a most abusive and disrespectful manner."  Id.  He 
later threatened the judge, tore up his appointed counsel's 
legal files, and threw papers on the floor.  Id. at 340.  
Despite warning, Allen did not reform his conduct, leading the 
circuit court to remove him from the courtroom on two separate 
occasions.  Id. at 340-41. 
¶58 The United States Supreme Court rejected the notion 
that Allen's right to be present "was so 'absolute' that, no 
matter how unruly or disruptive [Allen's] conduct might be, he 
could never be held to have lost that right so long as he 
continued to insist upon it, as Allen clearly did."  Id. at 342.  
The Court held: 
[W]e explicitly hold today that a defendant can lose 
his right to be present at trial if, after he has been 
warned by the judge that he will be removed if he 
continues his disruptive behavior, he nevertheless 
No. 
2013AP467-CR   
 
22 
 
insists 
on 
conducting 
himself 
in 
a 
manner 
so 
disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court 
that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the 
courtroom. Once lost, the right to be present can, of 
course, be reclaimed as soon as the defendant is 
willing to conduct himself consistently with the 
decorum and respect inherent in the concept of courts 
and judicial proceedings. 
It is essential to the proper administration of 
criminal justice that dignity, order, and decorum be 
the hallmarks of all court proceedings in our country.  
The flagrant disregard in the courtroom of elementary 
standards of proper conduct should not and cannot be 
tolerated. We believe trial judges confronted with 
disruptive, 
contumacious, 
stubbornly 
defiant 
defendants must be given sufficient discretion to meet 
the circumstances of each case. No one formula for 
maintaining appropriate courtroom atmosphere will be 
best in all situations. 
Id. at 343.  Thus, Allen stands for the proposition that a 
defendant may forfeit a fundamental constitutional right through 
conduct incompatible with the assertion of the right.   
¶59 In our view, the rationale of Allen logically extends 
to the context of the right to testify, given that a corollary 
to removal may be denial of that right.  We are not alone in 
this opinion.  See, e.g., United States v. Ives, 504 F.2d 935, 
941 (9th Cir. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 421 U.S. 944 
(1975), opinion reinstated in relevant part, 547 F.2d 1100 (9th 
Cir. 1976) (holding that a defendant may forfeit the privilege 
to testify through conduct); Douglas v. State, 214 P.3d 312, 322 
(Alaska 2009) (applying the Allen standards to determine whether 
the defendant forfeited his right to testify in person through 
misconduct); State v. Chapple, 36 P.3d 1025, 1033-34 (Wash. 
2001) (relying on Allen and Ives to determine whether the 
No. 
2013AP467-CR   
 
23 
 
defendant lost his right to testify by way of his conduct).  We 
agree with the reasoning of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit:  
It is evident that the conduct of a defendant in the 
courtroom 
can 
become 
so 
inconsistent 
with 
the 
necessary decorum for effective administration of 
justice that reasonable restraints are necessary. It 
is even more evident that such conduct cannot be 
allowed when the defendant takes center stage on the 
witness stand. He has no more liberty and freedom to 
testify in a way degrading to the judicial system than 
he has to rob a bank. . . . 
Ives, 504 F.2d at 941.   
¶60 Although the United States Supreme Court has not 
expressly stated that a defendant may forfeit the right to 
testify through conduct, it seems probable that it would reach 
such a conclusion in light of Allen and its indication in Rock 
that the right to testify is subject to legitimate interests in 
the criminal trial process.  Surely, the preservation of 
dignity, order, and decorum in the courtroom constitutes a 
legitimate interest in the criminal trial process that may 
outweigh 
a 
defendant's 
right 
to 
testify 
in 
certain 
circumstances.    
¶61 While we have not addressed the forfeiture by conduct 
issue in the context of the right to testify, we have held that 
a criminal defendant may forfeit his or her constitutional right 
to 
counsel 
through 
manipulative 
or 
disruptive 
conduct.   
Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d at 752-56; accord United States v. 
Leggett, 162 F.3d 237, 250 (3d Cir. 1998); United States v. 
McLeod, 53 F.3d 322, 324-25 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. 
No. 
2013AP467-CR   
 
24 
 
Bauer, 956 F.2d 693, 695 (7th Cir. 1992).  In Cummings, the 
defendant repeatedly refused to cooperate with various court-
appointed attorneys, constantly complained about the attorneys' 
performance, 
and 
made 
it 
impossible 
for 
an 
attorney 
to 
effectively represent him.  Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d at 753-54.  We 
held that "there may be situations, such as the one before us, 
where a circuit court must have the ability to find that a 
defendant has forfeited his right to counsel."  Id. at 756.   
¶62 In a footnote to Cummings, we recommended that "trial 
courts in the future, when faced with a recalcitrant defendant, 
follow the first four steps outlined in the dissent before 
determining that a defendant has forfeited his or her right to 
counsel."  Id. at 756 n.18.  Those four steps, designed to 
ensure that a defendant understands the consequences of his or 
her actions, are:  
(1) explicit warnings that, if the defendant persists 
in “X” [specific conduct], the court will find that 
the right to counsel has been forfeited and will 
require the defendant to proceed to trial pro se; (2) 
a colloquy indicating that the defendant has been made 
aware of the difficulties and dangers inherent in 
self-representation; (3) a clear ruling when the court 
deems the right to counsel to have been forfeited; 
[and] (4) factual findings to support the court's 
ruling. . . . 
Id. at 764 (Geske, J., dissenting).  Thus, Cummings not only 
demonstrates 
that 
a 
defendant 
may 
forfeit 
a 
fundamental 
constitutional right through conduct incompatible with the 
assertion of the right, it provides guidance to circuit courts 
faced with making such a determination. 
No. 
2013AP467-CR   
 
25 
 
¶63 Since Cummings, the court of appeals has held that 
criminal defendants may, through their conduct, forfeit their 
right to an on-the-record colloquy designed to ensure that their 
decision not to testify is a knowing and voluntary one.  Vaughn, 
344 Wis. 2d 764, ¶26.  Citing Allen, 397 U.S. at 343, the court 
of appeals explained: 
As we have seen, however, a defendant in a criminal 
case may lose fundamental rights (such as the right to 
appear at the trial and confront the accusers) when 
the defendant forfeits those rights by interfering 
with the ability of the trial court to protect those 
rights. . . . By refusing to come to court so the 
trial 
court 
could 
personally 
explain 
what 
Weed 
requires must be explained, Vaughn made it, as a 
practical matter consistent with safety, impossible 
for the trial court to explain his right to testify, 
and determine whether his decision to not testify was, 
in 
Weed's 
phrase, 
"knowing, 
intelligent, 
and 
voluntary." 
Id. (internal citations omitted).  
¶64  The foregoing case law demonstrates that forfeiture by 
conduct 
is 
not 
a 
novel 
concept, 
even 
where 
fundamental 
constitutional rights are concerned.  In light of that case law, 
and in light of the United States Supreme Court's declaration 
that the right to testify may "'bow to accommodate other 
legitimate interests in the criminal trial process,'" Rock, 483 
U.S. at 55 (quoting Chambers, 410 U.S. at 295), we conclude that 
a criminal defendant may forfeit his or her right to testify 
through conduct incompatible with the assertion of the right in 
appropriate cases.  However, we stress that a circuit court's 
determination on forfeiture must be guided by Rock's balancing 
test.  Thus, a forfeiture determination may not be arbitrary or 
No. 
2013AP467-CR   
 
26 
 
disproportionate to the purposes it is designed to serve.  Rock, 
483 U.S. at 56.  Stated differently, a complete denial of the 
right to testify must be reasonable under the circumstances of 
the case.  
C. Anthony Forfeited his Right to Testify  
¶65 Having established that a criminal defendant may 
forfeit his or her right to testify through conduct incompatible 
with the assertion of the right, we proceed to consider whether 
Anthony forfeited his right to testify in his own defense.   
¶66 Anthony argues that the circuit court erred in its 
forfeiture determination.  He submits that the circuit court 
went where no court has gone before: denying a criminal 
defendant the right to testify where his conduct did not first 
warrant removal from the courtroom.  Painting this case 
exclusively as a "disruption case" under Allen, Anthony contends 
that there is no precedent for stripping a defendant "of his 
right to testify based on 'disruptive' behavior when he was 
never so disruptive as to render it impossible to carry on the 
trial in his presence."  In his view, the circuit court's 
decision in this case amounted to nothing more than a protective 
measure based on the circuit court's fear that Anthony may 
become disruptive.  Anthony maintains that there is no basis in 
existing law for such a preemptive application of Allen.     
¶67 Anthony 
recognizes 
that 
Rock 
permits 
reasonable 
limitations on the right to testify where legitimate interests 
in the criminal trial process are concerned.  However, he argues 
that the Rock balancing test weighs in his favor.  In asserting 
No. 
2013AP467-CR   
 
27 
 
that the circuit court's forfeiture determination was arbitrary 
or disproportionate to the purposes it was designed to serve, 
Anthony questions whether legitimate interests in the criminal 
trial process were really at issue.  As to the preservation of 
courtroom decorum, Anthony contends that "there is no authority 
to support the proposition that [the right to testify] can be 
circumscribed by principles of decorum."  Regarding the interest 
in maintaining order in the courtroom, Anthony argues that the 
circuit court's concern for the jury's safety may have arisen 
post hoc.17  As for the circuit court's interest in controlling 
the presentation of evidence, Anthony submits that he never 
"indicated that he would testify in anything but a truthful and 
relevant manner." 
¶68 In sum, according to Anthony, the complete denial of 
his right to testify was a "far too severe punishment for [his] 
minor disruption and dissent," particularly in light of the fact 
that he planned to serve as the sole eyewitness in support of 
his self-defense theory. 
¶69 The State contends that Anthony forfeited his right to 
testify 
by 
refusing 
to 
comply 
with 
the 
circuit 
court's 
evidentiary ruling and posing a threat to the preservation of 
dignity, order, and decorum in the courtroom.  The State 
disagrees with Anthony's assertion that a circuit court can only 
bar a defendant from testifying where his or her conduct 
                                                 
17 Post hoc is defined as "[a]fter this; consequently."  
Black's Law Dictionary 4 (7th ed. 1999).  
No. 
2013AP467-CR   
 
28 
 
warrants removal from the courtroom.  According to the State, a 
denial of the right to be present at trial is a more extreme 
sanction than denial of the right to testify because removal 
from the courtroom infringes upon several rights: the right to 
confrontation, the right to conduct a defense, and the right to 
appear before a jury.  Thus, per the State's reasoning, it is 
illogical to require the same level of misconduct to justify the 
denial of both rights.   
¶70 The State acknowledges an absence of case law directly 
addressing the issue before the court; however, it contends that 
cases dealing with forfeiture of a defendant's right to counsel 
through conduct inconsistent with the assertion of the right are 
more persuasive than the "disruption" type cases that Anthony 
offers.  See, e.g., Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d at 752-56; United 
States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1100 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(recognizing that a defendant can forfeit or "waive by conduct" 
his 
or 
her 
right 
to 
counsel 
through 
dilatory 
tactics).  
Specifically, the State argues "[i]f a defendant can be found to 
have forfeited or 'waived by conduct' the right to counsel 
without an explicit waiver and absent any violent behavior, it 
logically follows that a defendant can also be found to have 
forfeited his right to testify without engaging in behavior that 
merits removal from the courtroom." 
¶71 Recognizing that Rock sets forth the appropriate test 
for determining the propriety of a circuit court's decision 
concerning forfeiture of the right to testify, the State asserts 
that 
the 
circuit 
court's 
interests 
in 
controlling 
the 
No. 
2013AP467-CR   
 
29 
 
presentation of the evidence and preserving dignity, order, and 
decorum in the courtroom justified the complete denial of 
Anthony's right to testify.   
¶72 We agree with the State and hold that Anthony 
forfeited his right to testify by displaying stubborn and 
defiant conduct that presented a serious threat to both the 
fairness and reliability of the criminal trial process as well 
as the preservation of dignity, order, and decorum in the 
courtroom. 
¶73 As a preliminary matter, we concur with the State that 
a circuit court need not remove a defendant from the courtroom 
in order to justify a denial of the right to testify.  The cases 
that we have cited for the proposition that a defendant may 
forfeit 
a 
constitutional 
right 
through 
conduct 
do 
not 
exclusively involve the type of violent and disruptive behavior 
that may necessitate removal from the courtroom.  See, e.g., 
Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d at 752-56; See also Taylor v. United 
States, 414 U.S. 17, 20 (1973) (holding that the defendant 
waived or forfeited his constitutional right to be present 
through his voluntary absence).  Therefore, when determining 
whether a defendant forfeited his or her right to testify 
through conduct, we believe the appropriate inquiry is to 
consider the totality of the circumstances in order to assess 
whether the defendant interfered with the circuit court's 
ability to protect that right.  We reiterate that such an 
inquiry must be guided by Rock's balancing test——the forfeiture 
determination must not be arbitrary or disproportionate to the 
No. 
2013AP467-CR   
 
30 
 
purposes it is designed to serve.  In other words, a complete 
denial of the right to testify must be reasonable under the 
circumstances of the case.  
¶74 In this case, we recognize two distinct interests that 
formed the basis of the circuit court's complete denial of 
Anthony's 
right 
to 
testify. 
 
Both 
constitute 
legitimate 
interests in the criminal trial process.     
¶75 The first involves the circuit court's ability to 
control the presentation of evidence so as to ensure the 
fairness and reliability of the criminal trial process.  The 
primary purpose of a criminal trial is to develop "relevant 
facts on which a determination of guilt or innocence can be 
made."  United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 230 (1975); See 
also State v. McClaren, 2009 WI 69, ¶5, 318 Wis. 2d 739, 767 
N.W.2d 550 ("Ascertainment of the truth is the primary objective 
of a trial. . . .").  "Efficiency is a secondary objective of a 
trial, but where it can be attained with constitutionally 
permitted measures, it is highly desirable."  McClaren, 318 Wis. 
2d 739, ¶5.  
¶76 Under Wis. Stat. § 906.11, circuit courts are charged 
with serving these two purposes.  The statute provides, in 
relevant part: 
(1) Control by judge. The judge shall exercise 
reasonable 
control 
over 
the 
mode 
and 
order 
of 
interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as 
to do all of the following: 
(a) Make the interrogation and presentation effective 
for the ascertainment of the truth. 
No. 
2013AP467-CR   
 
31 
 
(b) Avoid needless consumption of time. 
(c) 
Protect 
witnesses 
from 
harassment 
or 
undue 
embarrassment. 
Wis. Stat. § 906.11(1).  We have held that Wis. Stat. § 906.11 
enables a circuit court "to try to be certain that a jury is 
presented with admissible, reliable evidence and to make 
pretrial rulings so that the trial runs smoothly."  McClaren, 
318 Wis. 2d 739, ¶3.  Indeed, the trial process requires as 
much:  
The adversary process could not function effectively 
without adherence to rules of procedure that govern 
the orderly presentation of facts and arguments to 
provide each party with a fair opportunity to assemble 
and submit evidence to contradict or explain the 
opponent's case. The trial process would be a shambles 
if either party had an absolute right to control the 
time and content of his witnesses' testimony. 
Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410-411 (1988). 
¶77 It is clear from our review of the record that 
Anthony's proposed testimony likely would have confused or 
misled 
the 
jury, 
thereby 
presenting 
an 
obstacle 
to 
the 
ascertainment of truth.  As the circuit court acknowledged, the 
jury had "a difficult decision to make," and irrelevant matters 
such as Anthony's alleged wrongful conviction; Anthony's status 
as an African-American male; Anthony's religious beliefs; and 
Anthony's memories "all the way back to when [he] was five years 
old" would not have helped the jury make its decision.   
¶78 To take but one example, if Anthony had been allowed 
to testify about his alleged wrongful conviction, it is possible 
that the State would have felt compelled to prove that Anthony's 
No. 
2013AP467-CR   
 
32 
 
conviction was never overturned and may have been completely 
legitimate.  In other words, the issue of Anthony's purported 
wrongful conviction had the obvious potential to develop into a 
trial within a trial, thereby confusing the jury as to the 
issues it was required to decide, or worse, misleading the jury 
into thinking that it could determine Anthony's guilt or 
innocence in this case based on the likelihood that he was 
wrongfully convicted of armed robbery in 1966.  To further 
complicate matters, the trial within a trial likely would have 
constituted a needless consumption of time. 
¶79 Where, as here, a defendant repeatedly promises to 
disobey a circuit court's evidentiary ruling, the effect of 
which would seriously threaten the fairness and reliability of 
the criminal trial process, we think it fair to say that a 
circuit court has a legitimate interest in placing reasonable 
limitations on a defendant's right to testify.  See Chambers, 
410 U.S. at 302 ("In the exercise of this right, the accused, as 
is required of the State, must comply with established rules of 
procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and 
reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence."); See 
also Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 327 (2006) ("While 
the Constitution thus prohibits the exclusion of defense 
evidence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that 
are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to 
promote, well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges 
to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by 
No. 
2013AP467-CR   
 
33 
 
certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or potential to mislead the jury."). 
¶80 The second distinct interest underlying the circuit 
court's forfeiture determination concerned the preservation of 
dignity, order, and decorum in the courtroom.  In our view, the 
record is clear that Anthony posed a serious threat to that 
legitimate interest in the criminal trial process as well.    
¶81 The circuit court made findings of fact with respect 
to Anthony's demeanor at trial, both in its oral decision and 
its written decision post-conviction, and we defer to them 
unless they are clearly erroneous.  Ndina, 315 Wis. 2d 653, ¶45.  
The circuit court observed that Anthony was "quite animated" 
when insisting to testify to irrelevant matters, i.e., he was 
"speaking very forcefully" with "a good deal of anger in his 
voice."  The circuit court noted how "enraged" and "tensely 
coiled" Anthony became and "how close he seemed to a breaking 
point."18  Based on Anthony's demeanor, the circuit court 
expressed concern that Anthony would cause "a ruckus on the 
stand" and pose a threat to the security of the jury.   
                                                 
18 Anthony suggests that these findings of fact, described 
in the circuit court's written decision post-conviction, were 
the product of a post hoc rationalization for the circuit 
court's 
forfeiture 
determination. 
 
However, 
we 
recently 
explained that "taking judges at their word is a fundamental 
assumption built into our legal system."  State v. Robinson, 
2014 WI 35, ¶48, 354 Wis. 2d 351, 847 N.W.2d 352.  "In the 
absence of clear evidence to contrary, we decline to assign 
improper motive on the part of the circuit court."  Id.   
No. 
2013AP467-CR   
 
34 
 
¶82 The circuit court's observations are supported by 
other portions of the record.  For example, the record shows 
that Anthony threatened that he would need to be carried out of 
the courtroom if he could not testify freely.  At some point, 
additional sheriff's deputies were called into the courtroom, 
bringing the total present to eight.  Toward the end of the 
circuit court's discussion with Anthony, the sheriff's office 
requested that Anthony wear a stun belt for the remainder of the 
trial.  Also, at Anthony's sentencing, the circuit court noted 
the presence of additional sheriff's deputies "because of that 
[one] incident in my court where you couldn't contain your rage, 
and that's what I'm concerned about." 
¶83 Where, as here, a defendant displays such disruptive 
conduct, we find it rational to conclude that a circuit court 
has a legitimate interest in placing reasonable limitations on 
the right to testify.19 
¶84 Having 
identified 
two 
legitimate 
interests 
that 
warranted the imposition of reasonable limitations on Anthony's 
right to testify, the question remains whether the circuit 
court's complete denial of that right was in fact reasonable 
under the circumstances.  Stated differently, we consider 
                                                 
19 Contrary to Anthony's assertion, there is case law 
supporting the proposition that the right to testify can be 
circumscribed by principles of decorum.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Ives, 504 F.2d 935, 941-46 (9th Cir. 1974), vacated on 
other grounds, 421 U.S. 944 (1975), opinion reinstated in 
relevant part, 547 F.2d 1100 (9th Cir. 1976). 
No. 
2013AP467-CR   
 
35 
 
whether 
the 
circuit 
court's 
forfeiture 
determination 
was 
arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes it was designed to 
serve.   
¶85 The circuit court's complete denial of Anthony's right 
to testify was reasonable in light of the totality of the 
circumstances in this case.  Though we do not wish to diminish 
the importance of Anthony's self-defense testimony, which was 
certainly relevant to the charged offense, we cannot condone 
Anthony's blatant disrespect for the criminal trial process.  To 
do so would seriously jeopardize a circuit court's ability to 
fulfill 
its 
constitutionally 
or 
legislatively 
mandated 
obligations, including those imposed by Wis. Stat. § 906.11. 
¶86 The United States Supreme Court has stated countless 
times that adherence to rules of evidence and procedure is 
essential to the proper functioning of our criminal trial 
process.  See, e.g., Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302; Rock, 483 U.S. 
at 55 n.11; Taylor, 484 U.S. at 410-411.  That numerous rules 
controlling the presentation of evidence "do not offend the 
defendant's right to testify"20 is a sure indication that a 
circuit court's interest in effectuating the ascertainment of 
truth is tantamount to the constitutional right to testify.21  By 
                                                 
20 Rock, 483 U.S. at 55 n.11.  
21 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court in Rock appeared 
most concerned with the fact that the evidentiary rule at issue 
stripped the circuit court of its ability to control the 
presentation of evidence so as to facilitate the truth-seeking 
process.  See id., 483 U.S. at 56-62. 
No. 
2013AP467-CR   
 
36 
 
repeatedly 
refusing 
to 
comply 
with 
the 
circuit 
court's 
instruction not to discuss irrelevant matters before the jury, 
Anthony gave the circuit court little choice but to completely 
deny his right to testify for fear of compromising the primary 
purpose of the criminal trial process.  
¶87 In light of this conduct alone, we would be hard 
pressed not to conclude that Anthony forfeited his right to 
testify.  But Anthony's conduct did not stop there.  The more 
Anthony insisted on disregarding the circuit court's evidentiary 
ruling, the more disruptive and enraged he became, to the point 
where the circuit court legitimately believed that Anthony posed 
a threat to the orderliness of the courtroom, including the 
security of the jurors.22  We think the United States Supreme 
Court was clear when it stated that such a "flagrant disregard 
in the courtroom of elementary standards of proper conduct 
should not and cannot be tolerated."  Allen, 397 U.S. at 343.   
¶88 We are mindful, as was the circuit court, that "courts 
must indulge every reasonable presumption against the loss of 
constitutional rights. . . ."  Id.  In its post-conviction 
written decision, the circuit court explained that it considered 
less restrictive alternatives to forfeiture.  For example, it 
considered permitting Anthony to provide irrelevant testimony 
and later instructing the jury to ignore it.  However, it noted 
                                                 
22 The circuit court pointed out in its post-conviction 
written decision that the nearest juror sat eight feet away from 
the witness stand.  
No. 
2013AP467-CR   
 
37 
 
that such an approach would "condone disrespect for the court's 
rulings."  In addition, it might have provoked a disturbance 
once Anthony witnessed the circuit court "nullifying his attempt 
to sway the jury."   
¶89 That Anthony was likely to erupt at the provision of a 
limiting instruction is clear from the record; thus, we find it 
reasonable to conclude that a limiting instruction would not 
have minimized a significant risk presented by Anthony's 
testimony.  Moreover, while we presume that juries follow 
properly given jury instructions, State v. Marinez, 2011 WI 12, 
¶41, 331 Wis. 2d 568, 797 N.W.2d 399, we note that a jury 
instruction in this case would not have solved a separate 
problem created by Anthony's unfettered testimony: a needless 
consumption of time. 
¶90 The circuit court considered at least one other 
alternative to forfeiture.  It explained that it could have put 
Anthony on the stand and directed his attorney not to broach the 
subject of Anthony's prior convictions.  However, the circuit 
court identified the obvious flaw in that approach.  Given 
Anthony's determination to testify freely, he likely would have 
found a way to raise irrelevant matters on his own, thereby 
creating the potential for a substantial disturbance once the 
circuit court intervened.   
¶91 As the United States Supreme Court explained in Allen, 
"[n]o one formula for maintaining the appropriate courtroom 
atmosphere will be best in all situations."  Id.  Indeed, the 
Court stressed that "trial judges confronted with disruptive, 
No. 
2013AP467-CR   
 
38 
 
contumacious, stubbornly defiant defendants must be given 
sufficient discretion to meet the circumstances of each case."  
Id.  We read this statement as a caution against the type of 
"Monday-morning quarterbacking" that may arise on appellate 
review of these situations.   
¶92 Importantly, the Court in Allen upheld the circuit 
court's forfeiture determination despite the fact that there 
were other coercive measures that could have been used with the 
defendant.  Id. at 344-46.  The Court found significance in the 
fact that the defendant was both warned of the potential 
consequences of his actions and given the opportunity to 
participate at trial if he reformed his conduct.  Id. at 346.   
¶93 Of course, that is exactly what happened in this case.  
The circuit court warned Anthony on several occasions that he 
would not be allowed to testify if he continued his misbehavior.  
The 
circuit 
court 
also 
provided 
Anthony 
with 
multiple 
opportunities to reform his conduct. 
¶94 Under these circumstances, the circuit court was not 
required to put Anthony on the stand and wait for the fireworks.  
The criminal trial process deserves better.  
¶95 Therefore, we conclude that Anthony forfeited his 
right to testify by exhibiting stubborn and defiant conduct that 
posed a serious threat to the both the fairness and reliability 
of the criminal trial process and the preservation of dignity, 
order, and decorum in the courtroom. 
D. Harmless Error 
No. 
2013AP467-CR   
 
39 
 
¶96 Although we conclude that there was no error in this 
case, we wish to take the opportunity to confirm that a 
violation of a criminal defendant's right to testify to relevant 
evidence is subject to harmless error analysis.  Nelson, 355 
Wis. 2d 722, ¶¶32-33.23  Even if we assumed error in this case, 
we would conclude that the error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt given the overwhelming evidence of Anthony's 
guilt. 
¶97 Despite 
our 
recent 
decision 
in 
Nelson, 
Anthony 
contends that a violation of the right to testify is a 
structural error and thus not subject to harmless error analysis 
where a defendant wishes to testify about relevant matters.  He 
argues that our decision in Nelson is confined to situations 
where a defendant wishes to testify about irrelevant matters.  
Anthony reasons that a violation of a defendant's right to 
testify about relevant evidence is a "separate and more 
pervasive error than denying a defendant the ability to testify 
as to irrelevant matters."  According to Anthony, this is 
because 
there 
is 
no 
constitutional 
right 
to 
testify 
to 
irrelevant evidence, United States v. Sheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 
(1998), whereas there is a constitutional right to testify to 
relevant evidence.  Rock, 483 U.S. at 55.   
                                                 
23 We note that Nelson has filed a petition for a writ of 
certiorari before the United States Supreme Court and that 
petition is currently pending review.   
No. 
2013AP467-CR   
 
40 
 
¶98 Alternatively, Anthony argues that if harmless error 
review applies to a violation of a defendant's right to testify 
to relevant evidence, any error here was not harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Specifically, Anthony submits: "[b]ecause 
[he] was prevented from mounting any defense at all against the 
State's allegations, it cannot be shown beyond a reasonable 
doubt that his testimony could not have presented some jury 
question as to whether he intended to kill S.J. or was defending 
himself. . . ."  To support his position, he maintains that he 
would have testified that he killed S.J. in self-defense, as 
S.J. was high on crack cocaine on the night in question and 
therefore attacked him.24  He also would have testified that he 
fled the scene of the crime because he has a special fear of 
police.     
¶99 The State argues that a violation of the right to 
testify is subject to harmless error analysis regardless whether 
the excluded testimony is relevant.  It points out that there is 
no qualifying language in Nelson supporting Anthony's narrow 
reading of the decision.  The State maintains that "the 
relevance or irrelevance of a defendant's proposed testimony 
should not affect the threshold determination of whether a 
particular constitutional violation amounts to structural error; 
logically, it only factors into the harmless-error analysis."  
                                                 
24 S.J.'s purported crack cocaine use on the night in 
question was not included in Anthony's offer of proof regarding 
his anticipated trial testimony.   
No. 
2013AP467-CR   
 
41 
 
According to the State, a court can assess the effect that a 
wrongful exclusion of relevant evidence has on a trial outcome 
just as easily as it can with respect to the wrongful exclusion 
of irrelevant evidence.   
¶100 Thus, according to the State, harmless error analysis 
is appropriate, and any error on the part of the circuit court 
in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the 
overwhelming evidence of Anthony's guilt.  
¶101 We agree with the State.  First, a violation of a 
defendant's right to testify to relevant evidence is subject to 
harmless error analysis.  In Nelson, we explained without 
qualification that "[a]n error denying the defendant of the 
right to testify on his or her own behalf bears the hallmark of 
a trial error."  Nelson, 355 Wis. 2d 722, ¶32.  Unlike 
structural errors,25 trial errors "'occur[] during presentation 
of the case to the jury and their effect may be quantitatively 
assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to 
determine whether [they were] harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.'"  Id., ¶30 (quoting United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 
U.S. 140, 148 (2006)).  The fact that a defendant's testimony 
may be significant to the issues in the case does not mean that 
                                                 
25 Structural errors "'defy analysis by harmless-error 
standards because they affec[t] the framework within which the 
trial proceeds, and are not simply . . . error[s] in the trial 
process itself."  State v. Nelson, 2014 WI 70, ¶30, 355 Wis. 2d 
722, 849 N.W.2d 317 (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 
279, 309-10 (1991)).    
No. 
2013AP467-CR   
 
42 
 
its absence is incapable of assessment.  Id., ¶33.  Thus, we 
made clear in Nelson that a violation of the right to testify is 
subject 
to 
harmless 
error 
analysis 
irrespective 
of 
the 
testimony's relevance.   
¶102 Second, even if we assumed that the circuit court 
erred in denying Anthony the right to testify, we would conclude 
that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  In 
Nelson, we explained that a reviewing court should consider the 
following factors in determining whether a denial of the right 
to testify was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt:  
(1) the importance of the defendant's testimony to the 
defense case; (2) the cumulative nature of the 
testimony; (3) the presence or absence of evidence 
corroborating 
or 
contradicting 
the 
defendant 
on 
material points; and (4) the overall strength of the 
prosecution's case.   
Id., ¶46.  
¶103 The first two factors weigh in Anthony's favor, as it 
is clear that Anthony's self-defense testimony was important to 
his defense, and no other witness could have provided that 
evidence.  As a result, Anthony had no way to rebut the State's 
allegation that he intentionally killed S.J.  
¶104 However, the latter two factors clearly favor the 
State, and, in our view, tip the scales in support of harmless 
error.  As we demonstrated at the outset of this decision, the 
evidence of Anthony's guilt was substantial.  The majority of 
evidence presented at trial contradicted Anthony's self-defense 
theory, thereby contributing to the overall strength of the 
State's case.  The gruesome nature and extent of S.J.'s injuries 
No. 
2013AP467-CR   
 
43 
 
completely undermine Anthony's claim of self-defense.  Moreover, 
at least three witnesses testified that Anthony threatened to 
kill S.J. with an ice pick, either on the day in question or two 
days earlier.  In addition, one witness testified that Anthony 
admitted to stabbing S.J. "forty to fifty times" because he 
thought S.J. was cheating on him, not because he was acting in 
self-defense.  The evidence also showed that S.J. was a sickly 
woman who suffered from rheumatoid arthritis, particularly in 
the hands, and that she was likely incapable of holding a knife. 
¶105 Given the evidence before us, we are satisfied that 
any assumed error on the part of the circuit court was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  
IV. Conclusion  
¶106 Because the circuit court's forfeiture determination 
was not arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes it was 
designed to serve,  we hold that the circuit court did not err 
in denying Anthony the right to testify.  Anthony forfeited his 
right to testify by displaying stubborn and defiant conduct that 
presented a serious threat to both the fairness and reliability 
of the criminal trial process and the preservation of dignity, 
order, and decorum in the courtroom. 
¶107 Although we conclude that the circuit court did not 
err in refusing to allow Anthony's testimony, we further hold 
that, even if we assumed error, such error is subject to 
harmless error analysis.  Given the overwhelming evidence of 
Anthony's guilt, the assumed error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.   
No. 
2013AP467-CR   
 
44 
 
¶108 Therefore, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals and uphold Anthony's conviction. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
     
 
    
    
 
 
No. 
2013AP467-CR   
 
 
 
1 
 
¶109 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  Contrary to the 
majority, I conclude that it was error to exclude the 
defendant's testimony.  I agree with the dissent that the 
circuit court's interest in enforcing its evidentiary ruling did 
not justify a complete denial of the defendant's right to 
testify.   
¶110  However, like the majority, I determine that any 
error was harmless.  The evidence of the defendant's guilt was 
substantial.  The gruesome nature of the offense and extent of 
the victim's injuries appear to undermine the defendant's claim 
of self-defense.  Several witnesses testified that the defendant 
threatened to kill the victim with an ice pick.  One witness 
also testified that the defendant admitted to killing the victim 
because she was cheating on him.  Given the evidence, I am 
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless.  
Accordingly, I concur. 
No.  2013AP467-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶111 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   (dissenting). 
 
I 
disagree with the majority opinion's resolution of both issues 
presented in the instant case:  I. Did the circuit court violate 
the defendant's constitutional right to testify?  II. Is the 
violation of a criminal defendant's right to testify to relevant 
evidence (here, self-defense) subject to harmless error review? 
¶112 I would hold that the defendant was unconstitutionally 
deprived of the right to testify on his own behalf.  I would 
further hold that harmless error review does not apply when a 
criminal defendant is denied the right to testify to relevant 
evidence.  See my dissent in State v. Nelson, 2014 WI 70, ¶¶67-
79, 
355 
Wis. 2d 722, 
849 
N.W.2d 317 
(Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
dissenting), petition for cert. filed, 83 U.S.L.W. 3440 (U.S. 
Nov. 13, 2014) (No. 14-555).  The majority opinion extends 
Nelson. 
¶113 For these reasons, I would reverse the court of 
appeals decision and grant the defendant a new trial. 
I 
¶114 The majority opinion correctly acknowledges that "a 
defendant in a criminal case has a fundamental constitutional 
right to testify in his or her own defense."1  As the majority 
opinion points out, this right "is not absolute";2 some 
limitations are both inevitable and permissible.  However, 
according to Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 56 (1987), any 
                                                 
1 Majority op., ¶46. 
2 Id., ¶48. 
No.  2013AP467-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
limitations placed on a defendant's right to testify "may not be 
arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed 
to serve."  In other words, the importance of the defendant's 
right to testify in his own defense must be balanced against any 
dangers posed by allowing the defendant to testify.  As the 
majority explains, "'[t]he reviewing court [must] ask[] whether 
the reasons given for the denial are sufficiently persuasive to 
justify 
depriving 
the 
defendant 
of 
his 
fundamental 
constitutional right to testify.'"3 
¶115 In the instant case, the "limitation" imposed on the 
defendant's right to testify was in fact a complete denial of 
that right, which prevented the defendant from testifying to 
relevant evidence, namely self-defense.  The majority opinion 
determines 
that 
this 
"limitation" 
was 
"not 
arbitrary 
or 
disproportionate to the purposes it was designed to serve," and 
thus that the circuit court did not err.4 
¶116 I cannot agree. 
¶117 First, the circuit court's interest in enforcing an 
evidentiary 
ruling 
cannot 
outweigh 
the 
defendant's 
constitutional right to testify. 
¶118 In the instant case, the defendant wished to present 
evidence that he killed the victim in self-defense.  The 
majority opinion recognizes the importance of the defendant's 
                                                 
3 Id., ¶52 (quoting Arredondo v. Pollard, 498 F. Supp. 2d 
1113, 1126 (E.D. Wis. 2007)). 
4 Majority op., ¶10. 
No.  2013AP467-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
self-defense testimony.5  To explain why he fled the scene, the 
defendant also intended to testify that he had been wrongfully 
convicted in the 1960s and had a heightened fear of the criminal 
justice system.  The defendant's fleeing the scene was presented 
by the State as evidence of guilt. 
¶119 The circuit court sought to prevent the defendant's 
introduction of information about his 1960s conviction, which 
the circuit court viewed as irrelevant and unduly prejudicial.  
The defendant insisted on speaking about the prior conviction.  
To keep this evidence out, the circuit court prevented the 
defendant from testifying altogether.  As a result, the 
defendant was unable to present any evidence of self-defense 
(the defendant's only defense).6 
¶120 The transcript of the circuit court's colloquy with 
the defendant, much of which is reproduced in the majority 
opinion,7 demonstrates that the circuit court's primary reason 
for denying the defendant his right to testify was the circuit 
court's desire to exclude irrelevant testimony.8 
                                                 
5 See majority op., ¶85. 
6 See id., ¶34. 
7 See id., ¶¶26-34. 
8 The following statements by the circuit court are 
illustrative: 
I'm not making an arbitrary ruling making people 
follow just for my pleasure.  I have this rule because 
this jury has a difficult decision to make.  I don't 
want it made more difficult by having to consider 
matters which don't help their decision, and your 
(continued) 
No.  2013AP467-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶121 The 
circuit 
court's 
goal 
of 
preventing 
the 
introduction of what it viewed as irrelevant and unduly 
prejudicial evidence is, of course, a valid one.  Indeed, it is 
obligatory.9  Consequently, irrelevance and undue prejudice "may 
be the basis for objecting to the defendant's testimony and for 
sustaining objections to the defendant's testimony once the 
defendant takes the stand."10  But they cannot be the bases for 
preventing the defendant from taking the stand in the first 
place when the defendant intended to provide relevant testimony 
regarding self-defense. 
                                                                                                                                                             
difficult experience in Illinois as a younger man 
doesn't help them make their decision today. . . .  
. . . . 
If it was a simple balancing test, if somebody told me 
that they were intentionally going to break one of the 
rules that we set for the court and it carried only a 
little bit of prejudice and there was an awful lot of 
probative value they would otherwise have in their 
testimony . . . [it 
would] 
give 
a 
person 
carte 
blanch[e] to break the court's rules . . . . There's 
nothing a court could do to enforce those rules. . . . 
As a consequence if [the defendant] tried to get [the 
excluded evidence] in he's forfeited his right to 
testify. 
9 See Wis. Stat. § 904.02 (2009-10) ("Evidence which is not 
relevant is not admissible."); Wis. Stat. § 904.03 (2009-10) 
("[E]vidence 
may 
be 
excluded 
if 
its 
probative 
value 
is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusing of the issues, or misleading the jury . . . .").  All 
subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2009-
10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
10 State v. Nelson, 2014 WI 70, ¶84, 355 Wis. 2d 722, 849 
N.W.2d 317 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting). 
No.  2013AP467-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶122 In the instant case, this court is barring relevant 
testimony.  In Nelson, the court insisted it was barring only 
irrelevant testimony.11  In my dissent in Nelson, I took the 
position that "a court should not use the relevance of a 
defendant's testimony to justify barring the defendant from 
taking the stand at all.  We cannot know whether [his or] her 
testimony is relevant before [he or] she testifies."12  The 
majority opinion extends Nelson in the present case. 
¶123 Further, 
that 
the 
defendant's 
testimony 
may 
be 
prejudicial to the defense cannot justify a trial court's denial 
of the defendant's right to testify.  "[A] circuit court cannot 
refuse to allow a defendant to testify solely because the court 
wishes to protect the defendant from himself or herself."13 
¶124 Thus, the defendant in the instant case should have 
been permitted to take the witness stand and give relevant 
testimony.  If a part of the defendant's testimony was 
objectionable, the State could have objected and the circuit 
court could have sustained the objection.  If necessary, the 
                                                 
11 Nelson, 355 Wis. 2d 722, ¶49 n.14. 
12 Id., ¶84 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting).  Cf. Luce v. 
United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 (1984) (holding that a court 
cannot weigh the probative value of a defendant's testimony 
against its prejudicial effect when the defendant has not 
testified because "the precise nature of the defendant's 
testimony . . . is unknowable"). 
13 Nelson, 355 Wis. 2d 722, ¶24.  See also id., ¶82 
(Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting) ("That the defendant may be ill-
advised or unwise to testify is not the legal standard for 
determining whether the circuit court erred in barring the 
defendant from testifying."). 
No.  2013AP467-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
circuit court could also have provided a limiting instruction, 
as the majority opinion acknowledges.14  These steps would have 
comprised a proportionate response——if not a perfect solution——
to 
irrelevant 
or 
unduly 
prejudicial 
testimony 
from 
the 
defendant. 
¶125 In contrast, preventing the defendant from taking the 
stand altogether, which prevented the defendant from giving 
relevant 
testimony 
regarding 
self-defense, 
constituted 
a 
disproportionate response in violation of the defendant's 
fundamental constitutional right to testify.15 
¶126 Second, to the extent the circuit court based its 
denial of the defendant's right to testify on a determination 
that the defendant forfeited that right through "stubborn and 
defiant conduct that posed a serious threat to . . . the 
preservation of dignity, order, and decorum in the courtroom,"16 
the circuit court's response was disproportionate. 
¶127 The majority opinion quotes the statement in Illinois 
v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970), that "courts must indulge 
every reasonable presumption against the loss of constitutional 
rights,"17 but fails to apply it to the present case.  Comparing 
the facts of Allen with the facts of the present case 
demonstrates this failure. 
                                                 
14 See majority op., ¶89. 
15 See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 56 (1987). 
16 Majority op., ¶95. 
17 Id., ¶88. 
No.  2013AP467-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
¶128 The defendant in Allen sought to represent himself at 
trial.  However, when trial commenced, the defendant's behavior 
posed a significant problem.  The defendant repeatedly engaged 
in abusive, disrespectful, and disruptive conduct in the 
presence of the jury.  For example, the defendant argued loudly 
with the judge, used violent language to threaten the judge, 
talked over opposing counsel, and ripped up papers from his case 
file. 
¶129 In response, the judge instructed appointed counsel to 
take over representing the defendant, and repeatedly warned the 
defendant that his outbursts could result in removal from the 
courtroom.  Eventually, the judge did remove the defendant from 
the courtroom.  However, the defendant was permitted to return 
later that day.  When his disruptive conduct resumed, he was 
removed again, and then permitted to return again.  After his 
second removal and return, the defendant remained in the 
courtroom for the rest of his trial. 
¶130 The record in the instant case shows that the 
defendant never behaved in an unruly manner when the jury was 
present; that his disruptive conduct was limited to a single, 
lengthy colloquy with the circuit court in which the defendant 
insisted that if he took the stand, he would not follow the 
circuit court's instructions regarding the subject matter of his 
testimony; and that the circuit court responded to this 
contumacy by depriving the defendant entirely of his right to 
testify. 
No.  2013AP467-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
¶131 The judge in Allen faced far more egregious conduct 
than is present in the instant case, and yet the judge went to 
far greater lengths to protect the defendant's constitutional 
rights than did the circuit court in the instant case. 
¶132 The same is true with regard to subsequent cases that 
have relied on Allen to justify the denial of criminal 
defendants' rights to testify and be present in the courtroom.  
Trial judges have given defendants second and third chances to 
participate in trial after initially denying the defendants' 
rights to testify and be present in the courtroom.18  Trial 
judges have also developed work-arounds to avoid the complete 
denial of defendants' constitutional rights.19 
¶133 With this precedent in mind, I conclude that the 
circuit court's complete denial of the defendant's right to 
testify in the present case, which prevented the defendant from 
testifying 
to 
relevant 
evidence 
regarding 
self-defense, 
                                                 
18 See, e.g., United States v. Ives, 504 F.2d 935, 942-46 
(9th Cir. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 421 U.S. 944 (1975) 
(the defendant engaged in persistent disruptive behavior, 
including repeated physical attacks against multiple attorneys, 
but the trial court nevertheless gave him three opportunities to 
testify). 
19 See, e.g., Ives, 504 F.2d at 943-44 (the trial court 
accommodated an unruly defendant's preference for testifying 
from the defense table without first taking an oath); Douglas v. 
State, 214 P.3d 312 (Alaska 2009) (after extreme disruptive 
conduct, including frequently interrupting the proceedings, 
insulting his attorneys, and even striking one of his attorneys 
in the face, the trial court offered to allow the defendant to 
testify telephonically). 
No.  2013AP467-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
constitutes a disproportionate response to the dangers posed by 
the defendant's unruly conduct.   
¶134 In sum, the importance of the defendant's right to 
give relevant testimony in his own defense must be balanced in 
the instant case against the possibility that the defendant 
would introduce irrelevant testimony and engage in disruptive 
behavior.  In the instant case, the appropriate balance was not 
struck.  The circuit court failed to "indulge every reasonable 
presumption against the loss of constitutional rights."20 
¶135 The question to be asked is whether "the reasons given 
for the denial are sufficiently persuasive to justify depriving 
the defendant of his fundamental constitutional right to 
testify."21  My answer is no.  I conclude that the complete 
denial of the defendant's constitutional right to testify was 
error. 
II 
¶136 I further conclude that the error in the instant case 
is not subject to harmless error review.  Rather, automatic 
reversal is appropriate and the defendant is entitled to a new 
trial.  I disagree with the majority opinion's statement that it 
is "confirm[ing] that a violation of a criminal defendant's 
right to testify to relevant evidence is subject to harmless 
                                                 
20 Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970). 
21 Arredondo v. Pollard, 498 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1126 (E.D. 
Wis. 2007). 
No.  2013AP467-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
error analysis."  Majority op., ¶96 (citing Nelson, 355 
Wis. 2d 722, ¶¶32-33). 
¶137 The holding of the majority opinion is not dictated by 
Nelson.  The Nelson court insisted the defendant's proposed 
testimony was irrelevant and applied harmless error review to 
the exclusion of the defendant's irrelevant testimony.  In 
contrast, the court in the present case applies harmless error 
review to the exclusion of the defendant's relevant testimony 
regarding self-defense. 
¶138 I explored in Nelson the distinction between errors 
that are subject to harmless error analysis and errors that are 
not.22  In short, "a limited class of fundamental constitutional 
errors defy analysis by harmless error standards" and "are so 
intrinsically harmful as to require automatic reversal."23 
¶139 I maintained in Nelson that "the defendant's right to 
testify falls within this category of fundamental rights not 
subject to harmless error analysis."24   
¶140 In my dissent in Nelson, 355 Wis. 2d 722, ¶72-79 
(Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
dissenting), 
I 
cited 
three 
primary 
considerations supporting this conclusion.  These considerations 
are even more compelling in the instant case, in which the 
                                                 
22 Nelson, 355 Wis. 2d 722, 
¶¶70-71 (Abrahamson, C.J., 
dissenting). 
23 Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7 (1999) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
24 Nelson, 
355 
Wis. 2d 722, 
¶72 
(Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
dissenting). 
No.  2013AP467-CR.ssa 
 
11 
 
defendant was barred from testifying to relevant evidence 
regarding self-defense: 
1. 
The right to testify is meaningless if the defendant 
is not allowed to actually testify.  Testifying gives 
the defendant an opportunity to face his or her 
accusers, to tell his or her story, and to attempt to 
persuade 
those 
who 
will 
make 
a 
decision 
that 
profoundly affects the defendant's life and liberty.  
"[T]here 
[i]s 
no 
rational 
justification 
for 
prohibiting the sworn testimony of the accused, who 
above all others may be in a position to meet the 
prosecution's case."25 
2. 
The right to testify is intertwined with the right of 
self-representation.  In Faretta v. California, 422 
U.S. 806 (1975), the United States Supreme Court 
declined to apply harmless error review to the denial 
of a defendant's right of self-representation.  In 
Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52 (1987), the United 
States Supreme Court stated that the right to testify 
is even more fundamental than the right of self-
representation.  If a denial of the right to self-
representation is not subject to 
harmless error 
review, and the right to testify is an even more 
fundamental 
right 
than 
the 
right 
of 
self-
                                                 
25 Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 582 (1961). 
No.  2013AP467-CR.ssa 
 
12 
 
representation, it follows that the right to testify 
is not subject to harmless error review. 
3. 
The error of denying the defendant's right to testify 
falls within the various formulations the United 
States Supreme Court has provided for the category of 
errors not subject to harmless error review.  For 
example, the error undermines a right founded on 
respect for free choice and individual human dignity; 
the error infects the entire trial process, rendering 
it fundamentally unfair; and the error produces 
consequences that are unquantifiable, indeterminate, 
and unmeasurable. 
¶141 My 
conclusion 
that 
the 
erroneous 
denial 
of 
a 
defendant's right to testify is not subject to harmless error 
review is well summarized by Judge Godbold in his dissent in 
Wright v. Estelle, 572 F.2d 1070, 1078 (5th Cir. 1978) (Godbold, 
J., dissenting) (citations omitted): 
To deny a defendant the right to tell his story from 
the stand dehumanizes the administration of justice.  
I cannot accept a decision that allows a jury to 
condemn to death or imprisonment a defendant who 
desires to speak, without ever having heard the sound 
of his voice. 
The decision whether to testify is a matter of higher 
quality and dignity than trial happenings such as 
whether to object to evidence. 
¶142 In sum, because I determine that the circuit court 
erred in depriving the defendant of his right to testify to 
relevant evidence regarding self-defense and that this error is 
No.  2013AP467-CR.ssa 
 
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not subject to harmless error review, I would reverse the court 
of appeals decision and grant the defendant a new trial. 
¶143 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
 
 
No.  2013AP467-CR.ssa 
 
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