Title: Hardin v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 20S-CR-418
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: June 23, 2020

I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 20S-CR-418 
Brian E. Hardin, 
Appellant (Defendant), 
–v– 
State of Indiana, 
Appellee (Plaintiff). 
Argued: September 26, 2019 | Decided: June 23, 2020 
Appeal from the Morgan Circuit Court, 
No. 55C01-1709-F2-1851 
The Honorable Matthew G. Hanson, Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, 
No. 18A-CR-2629 
Opinion by Justice Goff 
Justice Massa concurs. 
Justice Slaughter concurs with separate opinion. 
Justice David concurs in part, dissents in part with separate opinion in which 
Chief Justice Rush joins. 
 
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Jun 23 2020, 2:18 pm
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-CR-418 | June 23, 2020 
Page 2 of 21 
Goff, Justice. 
Both our federal and state constitutions provide protections from 
unreasonable searches and seizures.  This case implicates those 
protections by raising the following question: Do law-enforcement officers 
violate either constitution by searching a person’s vehicle when the person 
drives that vehicle up to his or her house while officers are there executing 
a search warrant for the house that does not address vehicles?  Based on 
the circumstances here, we answer “no” and affirm the trial court.  In 
arriving at that answer, we provide guidance on the test applicable to 
these specific types of situations under the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.  We also survey our precedent under Article 1, 
Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution and provide generally applicable 
guidance on our totality-of-the-circumstances test.  
Factual and Procedural History 
Late one night in September 2017, a team of four law-enforcement 
officers prepared to execute a warrant to search Brian Hardin’s home in 
Camby, Indiana.  The search sprang from a multi-agency investigation 
into the alleged drug-dealing activities of several people, including 
Hardin.  As part of this investigation, officers wiretapped one of Hardin’s 
confederates, Jerry Hall, and intercepted communications between the 
two men regarding the purchase and distribution of methamphetamine.  
Officers also observed Hardin driving a truck, registered in his name, to 
his home in Camby and Hall’s home in Indianapolis.  Indiana State Police 
(ISP) Detective Joshua Allen put this information in an affidavit seeking a 
warrant to search Hardin’s home for drugs and related items.  The 
Morgan Superior Court issued the warrant but did not address the 
treatment of vehicles that might be found on the premises.   
The four officers, including Detective Allen, forcibly entered Hardin’s 
home, learned that no one else was there, and began their search.  In the 
garage, they found digital scales and “heat seal bags that contained a 
crystal substance” which tested positive for methamphetamine.  Tr. Vol. 2, 
p. 93.  The officers also found syringes and two “pay and owe sheets,” 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-CR-418 | June 23, 2020 
Page 3 of 21 
which Detective Allen described as ledgers to keep track of who owed 
money for drugs provided.  Id. at 118.  While the officers were at the 
home, Hardin’s girlfriend and her daughter arrived, and the officers 
escorted them both inside the home for supervision.  Also during the 
search, the officers learned from police executing a search warrant on 
Hall’s home in Indianapolis that Hardin had recently obtained a large 
amount of methamphetamine from Hall.   
Based on this information, Detective Allen and ISP Trooper John 
Patrick left in separate vehicles to try to find Hardin.  ISP Detective Matt 
Fleener and ISP Trooper Kent Rohlfing stayed behind in case Hardin came 
back to the home.   
While Detective Allen and Trooper Patrick looked for their suspect, 
Hardin returned home.  Trooper Rohlfing, covering the front door of 
Hardin’s home, saw a truck pull into the driveway and heard the 
overhead-garage door open.  A few seconds later, Hardin opened the door 
between the garage and kitchen, which Detective Fleener was covering.  
Detective Fleener identified himself as a law-enforcement officer and 
quickly closed the gap between himself and a backpedaling Hardin.  After 
a scuffle, Detective Fleener and Trooper Rohlfing handcuffed Hardin and 
had him sit in a chair.  They then called EMS to tend to Hardin’s minor 
injuries and informed Detective Allen and Trooper Patrick that Hardin 
was in custody at the home.   
Detective Allen and Trooper Patrick returned to the home, and 
Detective Allen searched the vehicle Hardin drove into his driveway—the 
same one officers observed him driving during previous surveillance.  
Detective Allen found 108 grams of crystal methamphetamine in a black 
bag underneath the driver’s seat.   
The State charged Hardin with two counts: dealing in 
methamphetamine and possession of methamphetamine.  It also sought a 
habitual-offender enhancement, which it later dismissed.   
Hardin filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence obtained during 
the search.  Basing his argument on both the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-CR-418 | June 23, 2020 
Page 4 of 21 
Constitution, Hardin argued that the officers exceeded the scope of the 
warrant by searching his vehicle, which was not mentioned in the 
warrant.  After a hearing, the trial court denied the suppression motion.  
Specifically, the trial court found that Hardin’s vehicle, parked in the 
driveway to his home, was within the curtilage of the home and therefore 
fell within the scope of the warrant.  Alternatively, the court found that 
probable cause and the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s 
warrant requirement supported the search of Hardin’s vehicle.  Hardin 
did not seek interlocutory appeal, and the case proceeded to a bench trial.   
At trial, Hardin objected to the introduction of the evidence obtained 
during the search of his vehicle, reiterating and incorporating the 
suppression arguments he previously made.  The trial court overruled the 
objection and admitted the evidence.  Ultimately, the court found Hardin 
guilty of both counts—dealing in and possession of methamphetamine—
and sentenced him to an aggregate term of nearly twenty-two years.   
Hardin appealed, challenging the admission of the evidence found in 
his vehicle based on the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 11.  The 
Court of Appeals affirmed in a split decision.  Hardin v. State, 124 N.E.3d 
117 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).  Relying on recent precedent from the Court of 
Appeals and the fact that Hardin did not challenge the trial court’s finding 
that his vehicle was within the curtilage of his home, the majority found 
that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 123–24.  It 
likewise found no violation of Article 1, Section 11 based on the totality of 
the circumstances.  Id. at 124.  Judge Mathias, however, dissented.  Id. at 
125–26 (Mathias, J., dissenting).  In concluding that the search violated 
both our federal and state constitutions, he focused on the relative ease 
with which the law-enforcement officers could have included a 
description of Hardin’s vehicle in the warrant for the home and with 
which they could have obtained a separate warrant specifically for the 
vehicle.  Id (Mathias, J., dissenting). 
Hardin petitioned for transfer, which we now grant, thereby vacating 
the Court of Appeals opinion.  See Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A). 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-CR-418 | June 23, 2020 
Page 5 of 21 
Standard of Review 
We review a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence at trial 
for an abuse of discretion.  Carpenter v. State, 18 N.E.3d 998, 1001 (Ind. 
2014).  “But the ultimate determination of the constitutionality of a search 
or seizure is a question of law that we consider de novo.”  Id. 
Discussion and Decision 
Hardin argues that the trial court should not have admitted the 
evidence found during the search of his vehicle because the search 
violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.  He acknowledges that 
the law-enforcement officers obtained a warrant for his home and that the 
trial court found that his vehicle was within the home’s curtilage when the 
officers searched it.  Neither Hardin nor the State asks us to address 
whether the vehicle was parked within the home’s curtilage, so we 
assume without deciding that the trial court correctly resolved that issue.  
Instead, Hardin contends that the search was constitutionally 
unreasonable and not supported by the warrant for his home, which 
addressed neither vehicles generally nor his vehicle specifically.  We 
consider the nuances of this argument under the Fourth Amendment and 
Article 1, Section 11 below. 
I. The search of Hardin’s vehicle did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment because the vehicle fell within 
the scope of the warrant for Hardin’s home. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:  
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-CR-418 | June 23, 2020 
Page 6 of 21 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.   
A warrant covering a house allows searches of things and places within 
the house that could contain the object of the search.  United States v. Ross, 
456 U.S. 798, 820–21 (1982) (“A lawful search of fixed premises generally 
extends to the entire area in which the object of the search may be found 
and is not limited by the possibility that separate acts of entry or opening 
may be required to complete the search.”).  The boundaries of a house for 
Fourth Amendment purposes extend beyond the physical structure of the 
house itself to include the curtilage—that is, “the area immediately 
surrounding and associated with the home.”  Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 
1663, 1670 (2018) (citations omitted).  Thus, the holding of Ross extends 
into the curtilage, meaning that a warrant for a house generally allows 
searches of the things and places located in the curtilage that could 
contain the object of the search.  See Sowers v. State, 724 N.E.2d 588, 590–91 
(Ind. 2000).  This case tests the limits of that established Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence.  Specifically, it requires us to answer the 
following question: When can police, armed with a warrant to search a 
home, search a vehicle located in the home’s curtilage?1 
In answering this question of first impression for our Court, “we 
consider the opinions and law of other jurisdictions as helpful to our 
analysis.”  Ackerman v. State, 51 N.E.3d 171, 180 (Ind. 2016).  Other courts 
faced with this question have generally fallen into one of two broad 
groups, differing in whether they consider who owns or controls the 
vehicle to be searched. 
 
 
1 The warrant here described the premises without placing any specific limitation on searches 
of vehicles.  The inclusion of such a limitation in a warrant could change the analysis.  See 
United States v. Johnson, 640 F.3d 843, 845–46 (8th Cir. 2011) (noting that warrants may contain 
limitations on vehicle searches, constraining officers’ authority to search). 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-CR-418 | June 23, 2020 
Page 7 of 21 
Courts in one group don’t consider ownership or control of the vehicle 
at all.  They allow searches of any vehicle found on the premises for which 
a warrant has been issued.   
• See, e.g., United States v. Singer, 970 F.2d 1414, 1418 (5th Cir. 1992) 
(“This court has consistently held that a warrant authorizing a 
search of ‘the premises’ includes vehicles parked on the 
premises.”);  
• United States v. Armstrong, 546 F. App’x 936, 939 (11th Cir. 2013) 
(unpublished) (stating that a search warrant for “the ‘property’ at 
the described location . . . is sufficient to support a search of a 
vehicle parked on the premises”);  
• McLeod v. State, 772 S.E.2d 641, 646 (Ga. 2015) (citation omitted) 
(“Vehicles parked within the curtilage of a dwelling to be searched 
pursuant to a warrant may also be searched pursuant to that 
warrant.”).   
• See generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.10(c), at 
955–56 (5th ed. 2012 & Supp. 2019) (noting that many decisions do 
not suggest a limitation to which vehicles on a property being 
searched pursuant to a warrant may be searched). 
Courts in the other group do consider ownership or control of the 
vehicle in determining whether it falls within the scope of the warrant.  
These courts differ slightly in how they describe the test, but they 
generally exclude guests’ vehicles from the scope of a warrant for a home 
while allowing law-enforcement officers to search the vehicles of the 
home’s owner or resident.   
• See, e.g., United States v. Gottschalk, 915 F.2d 1459, 1461 (10th Cir. 
1990) (defining the scope of a premises search warrant “to include 
those automobiles either actually owned or under the control and 
dominion of the premises owner or, alternatively, those vehicles 
which appear, based on objectively reasonable indicia present at 
the time of the search, to be so controlled”);  
• United States v. Patterson, 278 F.3d 315, 318 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing 
Gottschalk, 915 F.2d at 1461) (providing the same rule);  
• United States v. Duque, 62 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation 
omitted) (holding that “a search warrant authorizing a search of a 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-CR-418 | June 23, 2020 
Page 8 of 21 
particularly described premises may permit the search of vehicles 
owned or controlled by the owner of, and found on, the premises”);  
• United States v. Pennington, 287 F.3d 739, 745 (8th Cir. 2002) (citation 
omitted) (noting that, even when not specifically listed in a 
warrant, “a vehicle found on the premises (except, for example, the 
vehicle of a guest or other caller) is considered to be included 
within the scope of a warrant authorizing a search of the 
premises”);  
• United States v. Evans, 92 F.3d 540, 543–44 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating 
that a warrant to search a house allows law enforcement to search a 
vehicle within the premises “unless [the vehicle] obviously 
belonged to someone wholly uninvolved in the criminal activities 
going on in the house”);2  
• State v. Patterson, 371 P.3d 893, 899 (Kan. 2016) (adopting the test as 
outlined by the Tenth Circuit in Gottschalk).   
• See generally 2 LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.10(c), at 955–56 
(asserting that “the conclusion that a description of premises covers 
vehicles parked thereon should at least be limited to vehicles under 
the control (actual or apparent) of the person whose premises are 
described”). 
Although courts in this group initially spoke of searching vehicles of the 
homeowner rather than resident (such as a renter), they later interpreted 
the rule to cover both.  See, e.g., Evans, 92 F.3d at 543 (“We cannot think of 
any reason for distinguishing between an owner and a tenant, or for that 
matter between an owner or tenant on the one hand and a sublessee or 
intermittent occupant . . . on the other.”); United States v. Hohn, 606 F. 
App’x 902, 909 (10th Cir. 2015) (unpublished). 
 
2 Evans appears to have shifted the Seventh Circuit’s jurisprudence in this area toward a 
presumption that a vehicle found on premises subject to a search warrant may be searched, 
except in special situations.  Compare Evans, 92 F.3d at 543–44, with United States v. Percival, 756 
F.2d 600, 612 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding “that a search warrant authorizing a search of 
particularly described premises may permit the search of vehicles owned or controlled by the 
owner of, and found on, the premises”). 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-CR-418 | June 23, 2020 
Page 9 of 21 
We find that the better of these two approaches is to consider 
ownership or control of a vehicle in determining whether it falls within 
the scope of a general premises warrant, excluding vehicles of guests or 
other visitors from the warrant’s scope.  Vehicles of guests and other 
visitors to a home are on the property only temporarily, whether it’s to 
visit with a friend, to deliver a package, or for some other reason.  When a 
warrant for a home fails to mention such a transient vehicle, the probable 
cause supporting the warrant does not extend to that vehicle which 
happens to be temporarily on the property when officers execute the 
warrant.  See 2 LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.10(c), at 956–57 (“[T]he 
probable cause determination made by the magistrate [regarding the 
home to be searched] does not extend to the vehicle the visitor has left 
outside.”).  However, the probable cause supporting a warrant for a home 
would extend to the owner or resident’s vehicle given the close, long-term 
connections between the owner/resident, the home, and the vehicle.  Thus, 
we conclude that a general warrant to search a specifically described 
premises like a home includes the ability to search vehicles within the 
curtilage that could contain the object of the search and that are “either 
actually owned or under the control and dominion of the premises owner 
[or resident] or, alternatively, those vehicles which appear, based on 
objectively reasonable indicia present at the time of the search, to be so 
controlled.”  Gottschalk, 915 F.2d at 1461.  Accord 2 LaFave, Search and 
Seizure § 4.10(c), at 955–56 (“[T]he conclusion that a description of 
premises covers vehicles parked thereon should at least be limited to 
vehicles under the control (actual or apparent) of the person whose 
premises are described.”).3 
This test is easily met here.  Neither party challenges the trial court’s 
finding that Hardin’s vehicle was in the home’s curtilage when law 
enforcement searched it, and the vehicle could contain the drugs and 
 
3 Applying this test under normal circumstances, a general warrant to search a home will 
cover a vehicle in a garage attached to the home or in the curtilage.  See State v. Lucas, 112 
N.E.3d 726, 730–31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (upholding this type of search under a slightly 
tougher standard). 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-CR-418 | June 23, 2020 
Page 10 of 21 
related items described in the search warrant.  And three independent 
bases supported the connection between Hardin and his vehicle.  First, 
police knew, based on their prior observations of Hardin and the vehicle’s 
registration, that Hardin owned the vehicle.  Second, police knew that the 
vehicle was under Hardin’s control by their prior observations of him 
driving it combined with the fact that he drove it to his house right before 
the search.  See United States v. Rivera, 738 F. Supp. 1208, 1218–19 (N.D. 
Ind. 1990) (upholding a search of a truck that officers had seen the 
defendant drive up the driveway of his house right before the search and 
on other, prior occasions).  Third, even if the police didn’t know that he 
owned and controlled the vehicle, his act of driving it into his own 
driveway right before the search represents an objectively reasonable 
indicator of his control over the vehicle.  As a result, the general premises 
warrant permitting law enforcement’s search of Hardin’s home also 
supported law enforcement’s search of his vehicle, and this search did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment.4 
II. The search of Hardin’s vehicle did not violate 
Article 1, Section 11 because it was reasonable 
based on the totality of the circumstances. 
Hardin also argues that the search of his vehicle violated Article 1, 
Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.  Although Article 1, Section 11 
contains language nearly identical to the Fourth Amendment, we interpret 
Article 1, Section 11 independently.  See Shotts v. State, 925 N.E.2d 719, 726 
(Ind. 2010).  In cases involving this provision of our Constitution, the State 
must show that the challenged police action was reasonable based on the 
totality of the circumstances.  Robinson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 362, 368 (Ind. 
2014).  See also Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027, 1034 (Ind. 2013) (quoting 
Duran v. State, 930 N.E.2d 10, 17 (Ind. 2010)) (“‘[W]e focus on the actions of 
 
4 Because we find that the officers searched Hardin’s vehicle pursuant to the warrant, we do 
not address Hardin’s alternate argument concerning the automobile exception to the Fourth 
Amendment warrant requirement.  
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-CR-418 | June 23, 2020 
Page 11 of 21 
the police officer,’ and employ a totality-of-the-circumstances test to 
evaluate the reasonableness of the officer’s actions.”). 
Important competing interests underlie this totality-of-the-
circumstances test to determine reasonableness.  On one hand, Hoosiers 
want to limit excessive intrusions by the State into their privacy.  See, e.g., 
State v. Washington, 898 N.E.2d 1200, 1206 (Ind. 2008) (citing State v. Quirk, 
842 N.E.2d 334, 339–40 (Ind. 2006)) (“The purpose of this section is to 
protect those areas of life that Hoosiers consider private from 
unreasonable police activity.”); Membres v. State, 889 N.E.2d 265, 274 (Ind. 
2008) (noting that the Article 1, Section 11 test “is designed to deter 
random intrusions into the privacy of all citizens”).  And so we liberally 
construe Article 1, Section 11 to protect individuals.  Marshall v. State, 117 
N.E.3d 1254, 1261 (Ind. 2019) (quoting Holder v. State, 847 N.E.2d 930, 940 
(Ind. 2006)); Grier v. State, 868 N.E.2d 443, 444 (Ind. 2007) (citing State v. 
Gerschoffer, 763 N.E.2d 960, 965 (Ind. 2002)).  On the other hand, Hoosiers 
are interested in supporting the State’s ability to provide “safety, security, 
and protection from crime.”  Holder, 847 N.E.2d at 940 (quoting Gerschoffer, 
763 N.E.2d at 966).  By employing a totality-of-the-circumstances test, we 
aim to strike the proper balance between these competing interests in light 
of Article 1, Section 11’s protection from unreasonable searches and 
seizures.  See id. (“It is because of concerns among citizens about safety, 
security, and protection that some intrusions upon privacy are tolerated, 
so long as they are reasonably aimed toward those concerns.”). 
We provided a framework for conducting this totality-of-the-
circumstances test for reasonableness in Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 
361 (Ind. 2005).  See also Watkins v. State, 85 N.E.3d 597, 600 (Ind. 2017) 
(noting the comprehensive application of Litchfield to Article 1, Section 11 
claims).  While acknowledging the possibility of “other relevant 
considerations under the circumstances,” we stated that the 
reasonableness of a law-enforcement officer’s search or seizure requires 
balancing three factors: “1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge 
that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method of the 
search or seizure imposes on the citizen’s ordinary activities, and 3) the 
extent of law enforcement needs.”  Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 361.  When 
weighing these factors as part of our totality-of-the-circumstances test, we 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-CR-418 | June 23, 2020 
Page 12 of 21 
consider the full context in which the search or seizure occurs.  Garcia v. 
State, 47 N.E.3d 1196, 1199 (Ind. 2016).  See also Austin, 997 N.E.2d at 1034–
37 (examining the challenged traffic stop and search as part of the longer 
chain of interactions between the defendant and law enforcement around 
the time of the stop and search); Quirk, 842 N.E.2d at 340–43 (same).  So, 
we examine, at different points in our analysis, the perspectives of both 
the officer and the person subjected to the search or seizure.  Garcia, 47 
N.E.3d at 1199.  And, while the existence of a valid warrant certainly plays 
an important role in our review, a warrant does not necessarily make all 
law-enforcement action related to the warrant reasonable.  Sowers, 724 
N.E.2d at 591.  See also Watkins, 85 N.E.3d at 601–03 (analyzing whether 
law enforcement’s method of executing a search warrant violated Article 
1, Section 11).  Thus, the Litchfield factors provide guidance and structure 
to our analysis of Article 1, Section 11 claims while staying true to 
considering the totality of the circumstances. 
With this general guidance in mind, we now address the Litchfield 
factors, summarizing guiding principles specific to each and considering 
the facts here. 
A. The Degree of Police Concern, Suspicion, or Knowledge 
1. 
Specific Guiding Principles 
We begin our analysis by examining the law-enforcement officers’ 
“degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has 
occurred.”  Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 361.  In evaluating the officers’ degree 
of suspicion, we consider all “the information available to them at the 
time” of the search or seizure.  Duran, 930 N.E.2d at 18.  This includes the 
officers’ knowledge of the existence of a valid search warrant, which 
provides strong support for an officer’s concern that a violation has 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-CR-418 | June 23, 2020 
Page 13 of 21 
occurred and that evidence of the violation will be found in the place 
identified in the warrant to be searched.  Watkins, 85 N.E.3d at 601.5 
2. 
Application 
Here, the search of Hardin’s vehicle was supported not only by a 
warrant but also by very recent information indicating that evidence of 
criminal activity would be in the vehicle.   
The officers had obtained a warrant for Hardin’s home, and Hardin 
does not challenge the conclusion that he parked his vehicle within the 
curtilage of the home—an area that, at least for Fourth Amendment 
purposes, is considered “part of the home itself.”  Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1670 
(citation omitted).  While the warrant did not specifically identify 
Hardin’s vehicle, it provided strong support for the officers’ belief that 
Hardin was involved in illegal drug activity in and around his home.  
Indeed, the search of the home prior to Hardin’s arrival confirmed this 
belief when it revealed items consistent with dealing drugs.  And in 
conducting surveillance prior to obtaining the warrant, officers observed 
Hardin driving his vehicle to and from his home, and they knew that the 
vehicle was registered to him.   
In addition to the warrant, the officers also had recent information 
indicating that Hardin would have drugs in his vehicle.  During the search 
of Hardin’s home, the officers learned from police executing a separate 
warrant that Hardin had recently picked up a large amount of 
methamphetamine from Jerry Hall.   
So, before officers searched Hardin’s vehicle, they knew he was 
involved in illegal drug activities in and around his home, they found 
drug-related items in the home but a conspicuous absence of the drugs 
themselves, and they heard that Hardin had just received a large amount 
 
5 The focus of this factor can change slightly depending on the action challenged.  For 
example, when a defendant challenges the reasonableness of an arrest-warrant execution, we 
do not test the arresting officer’s concern that a violation has occurred.  Instead, we test the 
officer’s belief regarding the location and presence of the defendant.  Duran, 930 N.E.2d at 18. 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-CR-418 | June 23, 2020 
Page 14 of 21 
of methamphetamine.  Hardin then drove his vehicle up the driveway to 
his home.  At this point, with all the information the officers knew, they 
had an extremely strong basis to believe that they would find drugs in 
Hardin’s vehicle.  See Tr. Vol. 2, p. 25 (Detective Allen testifying, “[W]hen 
we were done searching the house and we hadn’t found [the 
methamphetamine], it . . . was my thought that [Hardin] would have that 
on his person.  Which is common.”). 
B. The Degree of Intrusion 
1. 
Specific Guiding Principles 
The second Litchfield factor we consider is “the degree of intrusion the 
method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen’s ordinary 
activities.”  Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 361.  In the years since Litchfield, we 
have given several points of guidance regarding this factor. 
First, we consider the degree of intrusion from the defendant’s point of 
view.  Carpenter, 18 N.E.3d at 1002.  Thus, a defendant’s consent to the 
search or seizure is relevant to determining the degree of intrusion.  
Duran, 930 N.E.2d at 18 n.4. 
Second, when examining the degree of intrusion into the citizen’s 
ordinary activities, we consider the intrusion into both the citizen’s 
physical movements and the citizen’s privacy.  We have focused on the 
degree of intrusion into the defendant’s physical movements in our traffic-
stop cases.  See Austin, 997 N.E.2d at 1035–36 (comparing the facts of that 
case with those in Quirk); State v. Hobbs, 933 N.E.2d 1281, 1287 (Ind. 2010).  
And in our trash-search cases and others, we have focused on the 
intrusion into the defendant’s privacy.  See Duran, 930 N.E.2d at 18; 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-CR-418 | June 23, 2020 
Page 15 of 21 
Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 363–64.  But both types of intrusions—into 
physical movement and privacy—are relevant to this Litchfield factor.6 
Third, by focusing on the degree of intrusion caused by the method of 
the search or seizure, we’re saying that how officers conduct a search or 
seizure matters.  For example, we have found a high degree of intrusion 
when officers executed a search warrant using a battering ram, flash-bang 
grenade, and SWAT team as well as when officers conducted a 
warrantless strip search of a misdemeanor arrestee as a matter of course.  
Watkins, 85 N.E.3d at 601–02 (search warrant); Garcia, 47 N.E.3d at 1201–02 
(citing Edwards v. State, 759 N.E.2d 626, 629 (Ind. 2001)) (strip search).  In 
examining the way that officers conduct a search or seizure, we continue 
to consider the totality of the circumstances and look at “all of the 
attendant circumstances”—not a single aspect of the search or seizure in 
isolation.  Garcia, 47 N.E.3d at 1202.  This includes considering whether 
officers conduct their search or seizure pursuant to a warrant since a 
warrant informs the subject of the search or seizure of the limitations 
imposed on the officers’ actions by a detached judicial officer.  See 
Carpenter, 18 N.E.3d at 1002 (considering the lack of a warrant in 
examining the degree of intrusion).7 
Fourth, privacy interests in vehicles do not render them beyond the 
reach of reasonable police activity.  Hardin relies on our statement that 
“Hoosiers regard their automobiles as private and cannot easily abide 
 
6 Considering privacy in this factor should not be confused with a test for reasonableness that 
focuses exclusively on the defendant’s expectation of privacy, which we’ve expressly rejected.  
Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 359.  Instead, as noted above, “‘we focus on the actions of the police 
officer,’ and employ a totality-of-the-circumstances test to evaluate the reasonableness of the 
officer’s actions.”  Austin, 997 N.E.2d at 1034 (quoting Duran, 930 N.E.2d at 17).  Considering 
how an officer’s actions intrude on the defendant’s privacy constitutes merely a piece of our 
totality-of-the-circumstances test. 
7 We hasten to reiterate that whether officers have a warrant is only one piece of the puzzle.  
Specifically regarding this degree-of-intrusion factor, officers may still greatly intrude on a 
person’s ordinary activities when armed with a warrant.  See Watkins, 85 N.E.3d at 601–02 
(noting a high degree of intrusion despite the existence of a warrant).  See also Duran, 930 
N.E.2d at 18–19 (noting that the possibility that officers could have obtained a warrant did not 
reduce the degree of intrusion). 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-CR-418 | June 23, 2020 
Page 16 of 21 
their uninvited intrusion” to argue for a high degree of intrusion here.  See 
Brown v. State, 653 N.E.2d 77, 80 (Ind. 1995).  But Hardin reads Brown too 
broadly in connection with this factor.  We agree that Hoosiers regard 
vehicles as private areas not subject to random police rummaging.  See 
Taylor v. State, 842 N.E.2d 327, 334 (Ind. 2006) (“Automobiles are among 
the ‘effects’ protected by Article 1, Section 11.”).  But that doesn’t mean 
that vehicles are beyond the reach of reasonable law-enforcement 
activities.  We’ve recognized that “[h]ouses and premises of citizens 
receive the highest protection,” Carpenter, 18 N.E.3d at 1002 (citation 
omitted), yet they are not completely off limits to law enforcement.  Read 
in the proper context, Brown is more about low police suspicion or concern 
and a lack of law-enforcement needs (Litchfield factors one and three) than 
an overly excessive intrusion (this Litchfield factor).  Brown, 653 N.E.2d at 
80 (noting both the delay between when a similar-looking vehicle left a 
crime scene and when police found Brown’s vehicle parked on a public 
street and searched it as well as the lack of need for an immediate, 
warrantless search).  See also Myers v. State, 839 N.E.2d 1146, 1153–54 (Ind. 
2005) (upholding a warrantless search of a vehicle and distinguishing 
Brown based in part on the low degree of suspicion that the vehicle 
searched in Brown contained contraband).  Thus, while we continue to 
recognize that Hoosiers regard their vehicles as private, Brown does not 
provide an impenetrable shield for those vehicles. 
With these specific guiding principles in mind, we turn to the facts of 
this case to determine the degree of intrusion. 
2. 
Application 
Here, considering all the attendant circumstances, the search of 
Hardin’s vehicle resulted in a moderate degree of intrusion.  We begin by 
recognizing the obvious intrusion into Hardin’s privacy by the search of 
his vehicle.  Myers, 839 N.E.2d at 1154 (“[T]he interior search of the 
defendant’s personal car was likely to impose an intrusion . . . .”).  
However, the degree of that intrusion was lessened by the way officers 
conducted the search.  Hardin does not argue that the officers searched his 
vehicle in an egregious manner as could’ve been the case if officers had 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-CR-418 | June 23, 2020 
Page 17 of 21 
torn apart his seats or ripped out his dashboard looking for hidden 
compartments.  Cf. Bell v. State, 818 N.E.2d 481, 486 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) 
(finding a warrantless search unreasonable under Article 1, Section 11 
based on the totality of the circumstances, but before Litchfield, when 
officers “dismantle[d] the vehicle’s glove box and searched inside the 
vehicle’s chassis”).  Instead, the search appears to have been no more 
extensive than a visual inspection of the interior of the vehicle—
something someone might do to find a credit card or french fry dropped 
between a seat and the center console.  In addition to moderating the 
intrusion into Hardin’s privacy, the officers did not intrude into his 
physical movements by searching his vehicle since he was already in 
police custody.  See Hobbs, 933 N.E.2d at 1287.  As a result, the officers’ 
search of Hardin’s vehicle resulted in a moderate intrusion.8 
C. The Extent of Law-Enforcement Needs 
1. 
Specific Guiding Principles 
We round out our analysis under the Litchfield framework by 
considering “the extent of law enforcement needs” related to the search or 
seizure.  Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 361.  These law-enforcement needs exist 
not only when officers conduct investigations of wrongdoing but also 
when they provide emergency assistance or act to prevent some imminent 
harm.  Carpenter, 18 N.E.3d at 1002; Trimble v. State, 842 N.E.2d 798, 804 
(Ind. 2006).  
 
8 We also note that the officers possessed a warrant to search Hardin’s home, and they 
searched his vehicle in connection with that warrant.  However, a warrant does little to lessen 
the degree of intrusion into a person’s privacy—from that person’s perspective—when it 
authorizes a search as a matter of law rather than by its express language.  The warrant here 
did not expressly reference Hardin’s vehicle or any other vehicles, so we give it little weight 
in evaluating the degree of intrusion.  But had the warrant expressly included Hardin’s 
vehicle—something the officers could have easily requested—we would have given it more 
weight, and the admissibility of the evidence from the search may have been clearer. 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-CR-418 | June 23, 2020 
Page 18 of 21 
In reviewing the extent of law-enforcement needs, we look to the needs 
of the officers to act in a general way.  See Marshall, 117 N.E.3d at 1262 
(recognizing the “need to enforce traffic-safety laws”); Austin, 997 N.E.2d 
at 1036 (recognizing the need to combat drug trafficking). 
But we also look to the needs of the officers to act in the particular way 
and at the particular time they did.  See Duran, 930 N.E.2d at 19 (finding 
“[t]he law enforcement needs were not pressing” to execute an arrest 
warrant when the officers had shaky information on the location of the 
subject and he was not a flight risk); Myers, 839 N.E.2d at 1154 (upholding 
a search of a vehicle based in part on elevated law-enforcement needs 
when the vehicle’s owner was not under arrest and might have driven the 
vehicle away).  In considering the needs of law-enforcement officers in 
this more specific way, however, we take a practical approach and do not 
require officers to undertake duplicative tasks.  See Garcia, 47 N.E.3d at 
1203 (quoting Guilmette v. State, 14 N.E.3d 38, 42 (Ind. 2014)) (noting that it 
“would be extremely cumbersome to require law enforcement to take the 
‘belt-and-suspenders’ approach of applying for an independent warrant 
anytime they wish to examine or test a piece of evidence they have 
already lawfully seized”). 
2. 
Application 
Here, the officers had a moderate need to search Hardin’s vehicle 
immediately when he arrived at his home. 
Regarding the broad need to act in this situation, we’ve recognized that 
law-enforcement needs in combating drug trafficking—“from individual 
operators to large-scale, corporate-like organizations”—are great.  Austin, 
997 N.E.2d at 1036.  The officers here knew of Hardin’s 
methamphetamine-dealing activities from their previous surveillance, and 
they found evidence of those activities in Hardin’s home.  Thus, the 
officers had a general need to stop Hardin’s criminal activities. 
Hardin argues, however, that the officers did not have a pressing need 
to immediately search his vehicle, so they should have obtained a separate 
warrant.  This presents a closer question.  On one hand, officers may not 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-CR-418 | June 23, 2020 
Page 19 of 21 
have had a pressing need to search the vehicle because Hardin was 
secured and unable to drive the vehicle away.  Also, given the number of 
law-enforcement agencies and officers involved in executing two search 
warrants simultaneously, it seems plausible—at least on this record—that 
the officers at the scene could have called on additional officers to get a 
separate warrant for the vehicle.  On the other hand, there were only four 
officers present at the scene.  They had to secure the people on the 
property (Hardin, Hardin’s girlfriend, and Hardin’s girlfriend’s daughter) 
and the property itself, assist EMS personnel, and respond to anyone that 
might show up later.  See Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 124–25 (noting that Hardin’s 
mother and her husband arrived at Hardin’s home toward the end of the 
search).  And one officer injured his rotator cuff while entering Hardin’s 
home, which impacted his ability to physically secure people.  If no other 
officers were able to assist, it may not have been practical to obtain a 
separate warrant for the car, increasing the need to immediately search it. 
However close a question the officers’ immediate needs were, we 
cannot ignore the other facts of the situation.  The officers had a warrant 
for the home, and Hardin drove his vehicle into the home’s driveway, 
which neither party disputes was part of the curtilage.  Requiring the 
officers to obtain a separate warrant for Hardin’s vehicle in this situation 
would amount to adopting the “cumbersome . . . ‘belt-and-suspenders’ 
approach” we rejected in Garcia and Guilmette.  See Garcia, 47 N.E.3d at 
1203 (quoting Guilmette, 14 N.E.3d at 42). 
With the officers’ general need to combat drug trafficking and their 
warrant for the home, the officers had at least a moderate need to search 
Hardin’s vehicle. 
D. Balancing the Totality of the Circumstances 
Balancing the three Litchfield factors based on the totality of the 
circumstances, we find this search reasonable.  First, based on the warrant 
and developments from other investigations, the officers had an extremely 
high degree of concern that Hardin’s vehicle contained illegal drugs.  This 
factor weighs heavily in the State’s favor.  Second, while officers intruded 
on Hardin’s privacy by searching his vehicle, they reduced the degree of 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-CR-418 | June 23, 2020 
Page 20 of 21 
that intrusion by exercising restraint in conducting their search.  Their 
search also did not intrude on Hardin’s physical movements since he had 
already been detained.  Thus, while officers moderated the intrusion, they 
still intruded into his ordinary activities, and this factor weighs 
moderately in Hardin’s favor.  Third, given the general need to combat 
drug trafficking and their possession of a warrant for Hardin’s home, 
officers had at least a moderate need to search Hardin’s vehicle when they 
did.  This factor weighs moderately in the State’s favor.  On balance, the 
moderate intrusion here did not outweigh the law-enforcement concerns 
and needs, and the search did not violate Article 1, Section 11 of the 
Indiana Constitution. 
Conclusion 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, 
Section 11 protect against unreasonable searches and seizures.  The search 
here did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the law-enforcement 
officers knew that Hardin owned and controlled the vehicle searched and 
objectively reasonable indicia showed the same, so the vehicle in this 
situation fell within the scope of the warrant for the home.  The search did 
not violate Article 1, Section 11 because the high degree of law-
enforcement concern and moderate law-enforcement need outweighed the 
moderate intrusion caused by the search, so the search was 
constitutionally reasonable based on the totality of the circumstances.  
Thus, we affirm the trial court’s admission of the evidence obtained from 
the search of the vehicle.  
Massa, J., concurs. 
 
Slaughter, J., concurs with separate opinion. 
 
David, J., concurs in part, dissents in part with separate opinion in 
which Rush, C.J., joins. 
 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-CR-418 | June 23, 2020 
Page 21 of 21 
A TT O R N E Y F O R  A PP E LLA N T  
Glen E. Koch, II 
Boren, Oliver & Coffey, LLP 
Martinsville, Indiana 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LE E  
Curtis T. Hill, Jr. 
Attorney General of Indiana 
Angela Sanchez 
Andrew Kobe 
Monika Prekopa Talbot 
Deputy Attorneys General 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
Slaughter, J., concurring. 
I agree that the warrantless search of Hardin’s vehicle did not violate 
his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
or its counterpart in the Indiana Constitution. I join the Court’s opinion 
because I agree with its legal analysis, including how it applied our three-
factor Litchfield test to Hardin’s claims under Article 1, Section 11 of our 
state constitution. See Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356 (Ind. 2005). 
I write separately, however, to highlight a recurring problem with 
Litchfield. In the fifteen years since we decided Litchfield, our case reports 
have ballooned with examples of ongoing uncertainty among litigants and 
lower courts with how to apply its three factors for assessing whether 
challenged law-enforcement activity violates our constitution. See, e.g., 
State v. Washington, 898 N.E.2d 1200 (Ind. 2008) (applying Litchfield to 
undisputed facts, trial court granted motion to suppress, court of appeals 
affirmed 2–1, and Supreme Court reversed trial court 3–2); Webster v. State, 
908 N.E.2d 289 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (applying Litchfield, trial court denied 
motion to suppress, and court of appeals reversed 2–1). 
This longstanding uncertainty is evident here. Although the 
underlying facts are undisputed, respected jurists at all levels of our 
judiciary have arrived at different conclusions about what Litchfield means 
for Hardin. The nine judges who have reviewed his case have looked at 
the same facts and applied the same legal standard. Yet we have reached 
widely varying conclusions about the legal consequence of these 
uncontested facts. I cannot imagine a clearer sign of precedent in need of 
reconsideration. 
Under Litchfield, no one can predict how courts will decide a given case 
with a given set of facts. The resulting uncertainty is not good for law 
enforcement, which needs clear rules so it can conform its conduct to the 
law. It is not good for individuals, who need clear guidance on whether 
law enforcement has violated their rights. And it is not good for courts, 
which must vindicate these rights. In practice, Litchfield amounts to a legal 
Rorschach test—an “eye-of-the-beholder” inquiry incompatible with the 
rule of law. The problem, I submit, lies not with the disputed 
constitutional provision but with the test we have devised for interpreting 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-CR-418 | June 23, 2020 
Page 2 of 2 
it. Like most totality-of-the-circumstances tests that balance multiple 
factors, Litchfield is not susceptible to a clear application that produces an 
obvious legal outcome. 
Going forward, I hope the opportunity arises to consider a bright-line 
rule as a successor test to Litchfield for interpreting Article 1, Section 11—
one consistent with our framers’ constitution and with the text, history, 
and structure of this constitutional provision.  
David, Justice, concurring in part, dissenting in part. 
I concur in Part I of this opinion and wish to commend the majority’s 
well-reasoned Fourth Amendment analysis. I respectfully dissent from 
Part II, however, because our state’s constitution provides heightened 
protections for Hoosiers and, in my view, the facts of this particular case 
weigh differently than the majority’s conclusion. I would find that the 
evidence obtained from Hardin’s vehicle must be suppressed because the 
search was unreasonable under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana 
Constitution. 
As the majority correctly recites, even though the language in Article 1, 
Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution closely tracks the language of the 
Fourth Amendment, our state’s courts interpret the Section separately and 
independently from the Fourth Amendment. Robinson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 
362, 368 (Ind. 2014). Section 11’s purpose is “to protect from unreasonable 
police activity those areas of life that Hoosiers regard as private.” Brown v. 
State, 653 N.E.2d 77, 79 (Ind. 1995) (citing Moran v. State, 644 N.E.2d 536, 
540 (Ind. 1994)). Our Court has previously determined that the 
reasonableness of a search or seizure turns “on a balance of: 1) the degree 
of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the 
degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the 
citizen’s ordinary activities, and 3) the extent of law enforcement needs.” 
Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 361 (Ind. 2005). Bearing these factors in 
mind, the State must demonstrate that the police conduct at issue was 
reasonable under a totality of the circumstances. Robinson, 5 N.E.3d at 368 
(quoting State v. Washington, 898 NE.2d 1200, 1205-06 (Ind. 2008), reh’g 
denied). Importantly, however, these factors are non-exclusive. See Jacobs v. 
State, 76 N.E.3d 846, 852 (Ind. 2017).  
In the present case, I believe a warrant not only could have been 
obtained, but that it should have been obtained. Much like the majority, I 
agree that this case demands careful application of our precedent in 
Litchfield. Respectfully, however, I would balance these factors in a way 
similar to our Court of Appeals colleague Judge Mathias and find that the 
search of Hardin’s vehicle was unreasonable. See Hardin v. State, 124 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-CR-418 | June 23, 2020 
Page 2 of 4 
N.E.3d 117, 125–26 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (Mathias, J., dissenting). Thus, I 
would suppress the evidence and remand for a new trial. 
The first factor we analyze under Litchfield is the degree of concern, 
suspicion, or knowledge that a violation occurred. 824 N.E.2d at 361. 
Admittedly, there was a high degree of concern that Hardin was dealing 
in methamphetamine. The record indicates plenty of validly obtained 
intelligence that he was discussing buying and selling the drug with 
another party. While I agree with the majority’s conclusion that “very 
recent information indicat[ed] that evidence of criminal activity would be 
in the vehicle” (Slip Op. at 13), I disagree that the search of Hardin’s 
vehicle was supported by the warrant obtained in this case because the 
vehicle was neither mentioned in the warrant nor was it present at the 
onset of the search. Thus, although there was a high degree of concern 
that a crime was being committed, there are other factors in play that must 
be analyzed. 
Regarding Litchfield’s second factor—the degree of intrusion the 
method of a search or seizure imposes on a citizen’s ordinary activities—I 
believe the search was highly intrusive for several reasons. Our Court’s 
decision in Brown v. State, 653 N.E.2d 77 (Ind. 1995), provides a solid 
foundation for analyzing this factor. While the Brown decision predates 
the formal totality of the circumstances test announced in Litchfield, the 
case nonetheless turns on the reasonableness of police behavior with 
respect to “those areas of life that Hoosiers regard as private.” Id. at 79 
(citation omitted). In that case, a police officer seized a vehicle that was 
thought to have been used in a robbery. After impounding the vehicle, the 
officer began looking for evidence of the robbery. During that search, 
Brown arrived and was placed under arrest, and the officer discovered 
incriminating evidence. Brown challenged the admissibility of the 
evidence on Article 1, Section 11 grounds, but his motion to suppress was 
denied and he was ultimately convicted. See id. at 79, 81. 
On transfer, our Court held the search of the automobile was 
unreasonable under Article 1, Section 11 based on several, fact-specific 
circumstances. Id. at 80. Of particular note, our Court observed that “there 
was little likelihood that the car would be moved and thus lost to the 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-CR-418 | June 23, 2020 
Page 3 of 4 
police.” Id. Additionally, “[t]here was neither a shortage of time nor an 
emergency,” and “the police were not engaged in a community caretaking 
function.” Id. Our Court also declared, “With respect to automobiles 
generally, it may safely be said that Hoosiers regard their automobiles as 
private and cannot easily abide their uninvited intrusion.” Id.  
While I agree with the majority’s conclusion that “Brown does not 
provide an impenetrable shield” for Hoosiers’ vehicles (Slip Op. at 16), I 
read Brown for the broader proposition that courts should give pause 
whenever police engage in searches of a vehicle without a warrant or 
under the guise of a valid exception to the warrant requirement. My 
concern extends to other vehicles that may have arrived at Hardin’s 
residence during the search. Would police have carte blanche access to 
any vehicle that comes on to the property during a warrant’s execution? 
While certainly the State would say “no” to parcel delivery trucks or 
utility maintenance vehicles, the lines start to blur when it comes to a 
visiting friend or the occasional person that uses a stranger’s driveway to 
turn their vehicle around. Would these individuals be at risk of a sudden 
search of their vehicle because they happened to be in the wrong place at 
the wrong time?  
For these reasons, I would conclude there was a high degree of 
intrusion. True, the police did not use flash-bang grenades, see Watkins v. 
State, 85 N.E.3d 597, 601 (Ind. 2017), nor did police rip apart the car to 
discover evidence, see Bell v. State, 818 N.E.2d 481, 486 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). 
And though it is also true that Hardin was under arrest at the time of the 
search, this is just one consideration when evaluating the level of intrusion 
imposed by a particular search. The fact remains that Hardin was secured, 
mere feet away as the officer rifled through his truck, and there was 
neither a shortage of time nor an emergency. Given Brown’s broad 
statement that Hoosiers regard their vehicles as private, I believe these 
facts elevate the degree of intrusion.  
Finally, with regard to the extent of law enforcement needs, I return 
again to the fact that Hardin had already been detained. It would have 
been a minor inconvenience for the police to obtain a separate warrant for 
the vehicle. In fact, prior opinions of this Court instruct that it would have 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-CR-418 | June 23, 2020 
Page 4 of 4 
been “best practice” for the police to take the additional step of obtaining 
a warrant. Our opinion in Brown, for example, explained, “Judicial 
approval makes it much more likely that the police are doing everything 
possible to make certain that the search is appropriate.” 653 N.E.2d at 80. 
Stated differently, seeking and securing a warrant based on probable 
cause increases the odds police conduct will be viewed as reasonable. 
Indeed, the “preference for warrants is based on the belief that a neutral 
and detached magistrate is more likely to be a fair evaluator of the 
relevant circumstances than the police officer actively involved in 
investigating a particular crime.” Id.; see also Lacey v. State, 946 N.E.2d 548, 
553 (Ind. 2011) (finding constitutional uncertainty is minimized when 
police obtain express judicial authorization).  
Beginning from this proposition—that it is best practice for officers to 
obtain a warrant—and ending with the facts that Hardin was no longer a 
flight risk and the vehicle was not going anywhere, I would find that the 
extent of law enforcement needs in this situation was extremely low. 
Though combatting the use and sale of drugs in our communities is 
certainly of utmost importance, I cannot agree that, on these facts, this 
factor weighs at all in the State’s favor.  
On balance, I believe the search was unreasonable under Article 1, 
Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution because, although the degree of 
concern or suspicion was relatively high, both the level of intrusion and 
needs of law enforcement weigh heavily against the State. I would 
suppress the evidence obtained from Hardin’s vehicle and remand this 
matter for a new trial. 
Rush, C.J., joins.