Title: Agnew v. Hjelle
Citation: 216 N.W.2d 291
Docket Number: 8970
State: north-dakota
Issuer: north-dakota Supreme Court
Date: March 27, 1974

216 N.W.2d 291 (1974) Allan M. AGNEW, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Walter R. HJELLE, Highway Commissioner, Appellee. Civ. No. 8970. Supreme Court of North Dakota. March 27, 1974. *292 Christensen, Christensen &amp; Bear, Bismarck, for petitioner-appellant. Vernon R. Pederson, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Bismarck, for appellee. *293 ERICKSTAD, Chief Justice. This is an appeal from an order of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Burleigh County, entered September 14, 1973, which affirmed an administrative order entered after hearing on July 5, 1973, revoking the driver's license of the petitioner-appellant, Allan M. Agnew (hereinafter Agnew), for refusing to submit to a breathalyzer test under the Implied Consent Law, Chapter 39-20, N.D.C. C. Agnew was arrested June 13, 1973, for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The arresting officer, Richard Tessier of the Bismarck Police Department, testified at the administrative revocation hearing conducted pursuant to Section 39-20-05, N.D.C.C., by Breen Kennelly, hearing officer, acting as agent of the appellee, Walter R. Hjelle, the State Highway Commissioner (hereinafter Commissioner), that from the patrol car in which he was following Agnew he observed Agnew driving his pickup east on Broadway in the city of Bismarck and that the pickup seemed to be moving erratically from the soft shoulder of the road to the middle of the travelled portion and back again. Tessier further testified that after observing Agnew's pickup weave from the travelled portion of the road to the shoulder and back again to the travelled portion several times, he flipped on his red light with the intention of stopping it. Officer Tessier testified that when the pickup stopped, Agnew had trouble finding his driver's license and that Agnew went through his wallet twice before finding it. The officer further testified he saw Agnew's driver's license the first time Agnew looked through his wallet, but that Agnew went by it. At this point, Tessier asked Agnew to step out of the car and walk to the rear of the vehicle, off the travelled portion of the road. Tessier testified Agnew stumbled slightly getting out of the pickup and as he walked to the tailgate area of the pickup, where he stopped to support himself by leaning against the tailgate. Agnew several times refused to perform coordination tests requested by Tessier, such as the balance test and walking a straight line heel to toe. Tessier also testified there was a strong odor of alcohol emanating from Agnew, that Agnew refused to stand free from the pickup without support, and refused to look Tessier straight in the eyes so he could use the flashlight to check his pupillary reaction. At this time Tessier informed Agnew he was under arrest for driving while intoxicated, and Agnew was placed in the patrol car and taken to the police station. On the way to the station Agnew was given the Miranda warnings and asked if he would consent to a breathalyzer test. Agnew would only state he wanted to speak with his attorney. Once at the station, Agnew was repeatedly asked if he would consent to the test, but he continued to maintain he would do nothing until he talked to his attorney. Agnew was allowed to call his attorney, who also happened to be the Bismarck City Prosecutor. Tessier testified that once the City Prosecutor arrived, Agnew was given the opportunity to confer with him. It was after this conference that Tessier again requested Agnew to submit to the test, whereupon Agnew said, "No, I'm not going to take the test." Shortly thereafter Agnew was requested to walk a white line painted on the floor of the station so that the police could videotape his efforts. This Agnew also refused to do. On cross-examination, Tessier testified he overheard the City Prosecutor tell Agnew that because he was the City Prosecutor he could neither represent nor advise Agnew. Agnew made no further request for counsel, the test was never administered, Agnew posted his own bond, and called a friend to take him home. Tessier conceded on cross-examination that the affidavit required by Section 39-20-04, N.D. C.C., was prepared by him that same evening but not signed and notarized until two days later. This affidavit was marked as an exhibit and introduced into evidence at the hearing. *294 Officer Udland testified he heard Tessier place Agnew under arrest, that Agnew insisted upon calling his attorney, and that Udland was present at the police station when Agnew refused to take the test. Agnew did not testify at the hearing, on advice of counsel. The only testimony presented at the hearing was that of Tessier and Udland. Agnew states the issues as follows: One further issue is raised in the State's brief: whether this court has jurisdiction to hear the instant appeal since the only judicial review provided for in Section 39-20-06, N.D.C.C., is an appeal from the administrative hearing to the district court. The State maintains that no review in the supreme court is authorized. Before dealing with the issues raised by Agnew, we will address the State's jurisdictional challenge. The provisions of the Administrative Agencies Practices Act, Chapter 28-32, N.D.C.C., are applicable to orders of revocation issued by the Commissioner under Section 39-20-04, N.D.C.C. In the Administrative Agencies Practices Act specific provision is made for appeals to the supreme court in cases such as the one at bar. Our review of fact-questions in such cases is limited to determining whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the hearing officer's findings of fact. Borman v. Tschida, 171 N.W.2d 757 (N.D. 1969). Agnews's first two issues on appeal to this court, in essence, ask whether the affidavit the arresting officer submits to the Highway Commissioner pursuant to Section 39-20-04, N.D.C.C., can be used validly by the Commissioner in making a determination to revoke a driver's license, if it is not properly sworn to or if it contains false statements. Section 39-20-04, N.D.C.C., reads in part: *295 Under Section 39-20-04, N.D.C.C., the police officer's affidavit must affirmatively show three elements: 1) That he had reasonable grounds to believe the arrested person had been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon the public highways while under the influence of intoxicating liquor; 2) That the person was placed under arrest; 3) That he refused to submit to the test or tests. Upon the basis of such affidavit, the Commissioner must revoke a driver's license subject only to the opportunity for a prerevocation hearing and a postrevocation review. Agnew requested the prerevocation hearing pursuant to Section 39-20-05, N.D.C.C. We see from Section 39-20-05, N.D.C. C., that the scope of review of the hearing is limited to the same three elements the affidavit must cover. That the affidavit was signed without the recitation of an oral oath and that the affidavit in its preprinted part contained a statement that in addition to informing Agnew that the officer intended to determine the alcohol content of his blood by means of a breathalizer, the officer requested Agnew to submit to a test of his "blood, saliva or urine which would be done by a physician, qualified technician, chemist, or registered nurse" are immaterial. The law does not require that an oral oath be taken, nor does it require that the officer inform the arrested person of his right to "have a physician, or a qualified technician, chemist, registered nurse or other qualified person of his own choosing administer a chemical test or tests in addition to any administered at the direction of a law enforcement officer." Section 39-20-02, N.D.C.C. The record discloses that the hearing officer did not rely upon the affidavit of the police officer in reaching his decision to revoke Agnew's license, but that he relied upon the evidence adduced at the hearing. Thus, the issues raised by Agnew which assume that the affidavit is the basis for the revocation of his driver's license and that it somehow misled the hearing officer or prejudiced Agnew are unfounded. After defining the scope of the administrative hearing described in Section 39-20-05, N.D.C.C., the following appears in the hearing officer's conclusions of law: Having determined that the first two issues are without merit, we next consider the third issue, which we have earlier stated herein. It appears in this issue that Agnew is contending that he became confused as to his rights when he was first informed that he could remain silent and had a right to consult with an attorney pursuant to the Miranda warnings and then later was told that his driver's license would be revoked if he did not submit to a test to determine the alcohol content of his blood; that therefore he did not knowingly refuse to take such a test; and that because of that the failure to comply with the Implied Consent Law was not based upon a knowledgeable refusal. Agnew relied upon State, Department of Highways v. Beckey, 291 Minn. 483, 192 N.W.2d 441 (1971), in support of his contention. In Beckey the State of Minnesota was appealing from an order of a municipal court which rescinded an order of the commissioner of highways which administratively directed the revocation of Beckey's driver's license because of his refusal to permit a chemical blood-alcohol test pursuant to Minnesota's Implied Consent Statute. Minnesota Statute 169.123, Subdivision 6, which sets forth the scope of inquiry at the Minnesota hearing, is significantly different from Section 39-20-05, N. D.C.C. While both statutes require a showing of probable cause, arrest, and refusal to take the test, the Minnesota statute requires a determination of whether the refusal to take the test was based upon reasonable grounds, whether the officer informed the person that his right to drive might be revoked if he refused the test, and whether the officer informed the person that he had the right to have additional tests made by persons of his own choosing. On the other hand, not only does our statute not provide for such a determination, but it specifically prohibits an issue being made of whether the person was informed that his privilege to drive would be revoked or denied if he refused to submit to such a test or tests. Even discounting the significant statutory differences, Beckey is not authority *297 for Agnew's position. In Beckey there was conflicting evidence on the issue of the reasonableness of the refusal in light of the possible confusion which might result when the arrested person, having been given the Miranda warnings, indicated he was asserting a right which he had just been told he was free to assert. The lower Minnesota court resolved the conflicting evidence, and the Minnesota supreme court stated such findings of fact were not "clearly erroneous". In the case at bar, Agnew did not testify. There is no evidence in the record which supports the assertions on appeal that Agnew was confused. We have only the uncontradicted testimony of the two officers that Agnew unequivocally refused the test. If we were to assume for argument purposes only that Agnew's refusal was from confusion growing out of the Miranda warnings, Beckey still does not support Agnew's position since in Beckey the officer made no attempt to explain that the person had no constitutional right to consult with an attorney before deciding to take the test, something the Minnesota supreme court said should have been done. In the case at bar Tessier testified that both he and Udland attempted to explain to Agnew that he had no constitutional right to consult an attorney regarding the taking of the test. The so-called "confusion doctrine" has been asserted with success under limited circumstances in California, in Rust v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 267 Cal. App. 2d 545, 73 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1968). In a later case, Rust is acknowledged and explained. See also Goodman v. Orr, 19 Cal. App. 3d 845, 97 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1971). Even if we were to recognize the existence in this State of such a doctrine, which we do not, the circumstances in the instant case are not such as would bring it into play. Having reviewed the findings of the Commissioner in light of the evidence submitted to the Commissioner, we find there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the Commissioner and that they are not contrary to law. Before we conclude our opinion, we think it proper to comment on the civil nature of an Implied Consent Statute as it relates to revocation of drivers' licenses for failure to take a chemical test to determine alcoholic content of blood. As we said in Borman, proceedings under the Implied Consent Law are civil in nature. Courts which have considered the question generally hold that refusing to submit to a chemical test until counsel is consulted is an unreasonable refusal, there being no right to counsel in a civil proceeding. See Rusho v. Johns, 186 Neb. 131, 181 N.W.2d 448 (1970); State v. Pandoli, 109 N.J.Super. 1, 262 A.2d 41 (1970); Blow v. Comm'r of Motor Vehicles, 83 S.D. 628, 164 N.W.2d 351 (1969); Deaner v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 285, 170 S.E.2d 199 (1969); Ent v. State Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 265 Cal. App. 2d 936, 71 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1968). The order of the district court affirming the order of the Commissioner revoking Agnew's driver's license is affirmed. VOGEL, TEIGEN, PAULSON and KNUDSON, JJ., concur.