Title: In re C.B.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 354A19
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: November 20, 2020

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
No. 354A19 
Filed 20 November 2020 
IN THE MATTER OF: C.B., J.B., E.O., C.O., & M.O. 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from order entered on 19 July 
2019 by Judge Wayne L. Michael in District Court, Davie County. This matter was 
calendared in the Supreme Court on 7 October 2020 and determined without oral 
argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
 
Holly M. Groce for petitioner-appellee Davie County Department of Social 
Services. 
 
Ellis & Winters, LLP, by Steven A. Scoggan, for appellee Guardian ad Litem.  
 
Mary McCullers Reece for respondent-appellant mother.  
 
 
HUDSON, Justice.  
 
 
Respondent, the mother of the minor children, C.B. (Connor),1 J.B., E.O., C.O., 
and M.O., appeals from the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights. 
Because we determine the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that 
it was in Connor’s best interests to terminate respondent’s parental rights, we affirm 
the trial court’s order.  
 
                                            
1 A pseudonym is used to protect the juvenile’s identity and for ease of reading.  
IN RE C.B., J.B., E.C., C.O., AND M.O. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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I. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
Respondent has a history with the Davie County Department of Social Services 
(DSS) due to improper supervision and care of her three oldest children. Connor, 
along with two of her other children, was previously removed from respondent’s care 
in 2013 and adjudicated to be neglected and dependent juveniles. They were returned 
to respondent’s custody in 2014.  
Respondent now has five children, each with medical or psychological needs 
that require significant care. Connor has been diagnosed with autism, oppositional 
defiant disorder, and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. He has significant 
behavior difficulties, including kicking, hitting, cursing, cheating, and yelling.  
In January 2016, DSS received a report alleging concerns of improper 
supervision of the children and an injurious environment. DSS found that the 
children were chronically dirty and not receiving proper hygiene and that the home 
was cluttered, filthy, and in disarray. The report was substantiated for neglect and 
in-home services were provided for the family.  
DSS and the in-home services team made multiple home visits from March to 
May 2016 in which they observed “[a] pattern of the children being dirty, the home 
being cluttered, in disarray, and lack of supervision” which placed the children at 
risk. During a 7 July 2016 home visit, a social worker observed Connor to be “out of 
control[,]” running around the house, jumping from the top of the bunk bed near a 
ceiling light fixture, and not being properly supervised. Since the January 2016 
IN RE C.B., J.B., E.C., C.O., AND M.O. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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report, DSS received several additional reports regarding the care of the children, 
and the parents failed to make any improvement in the condition of the home.  
On 12 July 2016, DSS filed juvenile petitions alleging the children were 
neglected and dependent juveniles and DSS obtained non-secure custody. The 
children were adjudicated to be neglected and dependent juveniles on 15 August 
2016. In a separate disposition order entered on 28 September 2016, the trial court 
ordered respondent to complete a psychological evaluation and parenting assessment 
and follow all recommendations; participate in individual counseling, family 
counseling, and medication management and follow all recommendations; participate 
in parenting classes and follow all recommendations; attend all medical 
appointments for the three youngest children; participate in shared parenting with 
all of the foster families; and submit to random drug screens.  
Respondent complied with some aspects of her case plan. However, she failed 
to demonstrate any appreciable progress in improving her parenting skills or in being 
able to manage, control, and meet the needs of her five special needs children. The 
trial court suspended respondent’s supervised visitation in March 2018.  
On 18 March 2019, DSS filed a petition to terminate respondent’s parental 
rights to all five children alleging the grounds of neglect and willful failure to make 
reasonable progress to correct the conditions that led to the children’s removal from 
IN RE C.B., J.B., E.C., C.O., AND M.O. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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her care. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1)–(2) (2019).2 Following a 28 June 2019 hearing 
on the petition, the trial court entered an order on 19 July 2019 concluding that 
grounds existed to terminate respondent’s parental rights as alleged in the petition, 
and that terminating respondent’s parental rights was in the best interests of the 
children. Respondent appealed.  
II. 
Analysis 
On appeal respondent does not challenge the trial court’s adjudication of 
grounds to terminate her parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) and (2) or 
the trial court’s decision regarding the best interest of four of her children. She argues 
the trial court erred in its dispositional decision by determining that termination of 
her parental rights was in the best interest of her oldest child, Connor. Specifically, 
respondent argues that the trial court failed to make necessary findings of fact as 
required by N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a), and that the court’s findings did not support its 
conclusion that termination was in Connor’s best interests. We disagree.  
The termination of a parent’s parental rights in a juvenile matter is a two-
stage process consisting of an adjudicatory stage and a dispositional stage. See 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109, -1110 (2019). “If during the adjudicatory state, the trial court 
finds grounds to terminate parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a), it proceeds 
to the dispositional stage where it must determine whether terminating the parent’s 
                                            
2 DSS also petitioned to terminate the parental rights of the children’s fathers. 
However, none of the fathers are parties to this appeal.  
IN RE C.B., J.B., E.C., C.O., AND M.O. 
 
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rights is in the juvenile’s best interest.” In re J.J.B., 374 N.C. 787, 791 (2020) (cleaned 
up). In determining whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of 
the juvenile, 
the court shall consider the following criteria and make 
written findings regarding the following that are relevant: 
 
(1) The age of the juvenile. 
 
(2) The likelihood of adoption of the juvenile. 
 
(3) Whether the termination of parental rights will aid in the 
accomplishment of the permanent plan for the juvenile. 
 
(4) The bond between the juvenile and the parent. 
 
(5) The quality of the relationship between the juvenile and 
the proposed adoptive parent, guardian, custodian, or other 
permanent placement. 
 
(6) Any relevant consideration. 
 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (2019).  
“The trial court’s assessment of a juvenile’s best interests at the dispositional 
stage is reviewed solely for abuse of discretion.” In re A.U.D., 373 N.C. 3, 6 (2019). 
“[A]buse of discretion results where the court’s ruling is manifestly unsupported by 
reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” 
In re T.L.H., 368 N.C. 101, 107 (2015) (citing State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 285 
(1988)). “We review the trial court’s dispositional findings of fact to determine 
whether they are supported by competent evidence.” In re J.J.B., 374 N.C. at 793. 
IN RE C.B., J.B., E.C., C.O., AND M.O. 
 
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Here, the trial court made the following pertinent findings regarding the 
statutory factors set forth in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) as they pertain to Connor: 
18. . . . 
 
a. [Connor] is 11 years old. . . .  
 
b. The children are each placed in foster homes and are 
doing well. . . . There are no relative placements available 
for the children.  
 
c. Termination of the parental rights of Respondent 
Mother, 
[and 
the 
children’s 
fathers] will aid 
in 
accomplishing the plan of care for the juveniles which is 
currently TPR/adoption. 
 
d. . . . [Connor] is placed in a therapeutic foster home. This 
is not an adoptive home but his behavior has improved 
there. DSS will continue to look for a forever home for him. 
 
e. The children once had bonds with Respondent Mother 
. . . . However, the children have now spent nearly three 
years in foster care and the bond is diminishing. All visits 
ceased in March 2019. . . .  
 
f. There are no barriers to this adoption except for this 
termination of parental rights. The likelihood of adoption 
is high with all children except [Connor] [for] who[m] [it] 
remains unknown at this time. 
 
g. Respondent Mother and Respondent Father [ ] are no 
longer together. The needs of the children are great and 
require significant intervention. 
 
h. . . . [Connor’s] behavior ha[s] improved in [his] most 
recent placements. . . . 
 
19. It is in the best interest of the child that the parental 
rights of Respondent Mother [and the children’s fathers] be 
terminated. 
IN RE C.B., J.B., E.C., C.O., AND M.O. 
 
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A. Challenges to Findings 
In her brief, respondent challenges the trial court’s finding “that the 
termination of [her] parental rights would help to achieve permanence for all of [her] 
children” as it relates to Connor, arguing that this finding is unsupported by the 
evidence. However, the trial court made no such finding. The trial court found only 
that termination “will aid in accomplishing the plan of care for the juveniles which is 
currently TPR/adoption.” At the hearing, the social worker testified that the 
permanent plan for the children is termination of parental rights and adoption and 
that the termination of the parents’ parental rights would aid in achieving that plan. 
The guardian ad litem’s (GAL’s) report, admitted into evidence at the hearing, stated 
the same conclusion. Therefore, this finding is supported by competent evidence.  
Respondent further argues that “in substance, the trial court’s ‘finding’ as to 
likelihood of adoption and accomplishment of the permanent plan amounted to a 
finding that there was insufficient information to make a determination about these 
factors.” As stated above, the trial court made a finding regarding Connor’s 
permanent plan and that finding was supported by competent evidence. Although the 
trial court found that Connor’s likelihood of adoption was “unknown[,]” the trial court 
need not find a likelihood of adoption in order to terminate parental rights. See, e.g., 
In re A.R.A., 373 N.C. 190, 200 (2020) (“[T]he absence of an adoptive placement for a 
juvenile at the time of the termination hearing is not a bar to terminating parental 
rights.” (alteration in original) (quoting In re D.H., 232 N.C. App. 217, 223 (2014))). 
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Therefore, we hold the trial court made the requisite findings under N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1110(a)(2)–(3).  
Respondent also challenges the trial court’s finding that there were “no 
barriers to adoption except for this termination of parental rights” as it relates to 
Connor, arguing that this finding is unsupported by the evidence. She argues that 
Connor’s “severe behavioral and mental health issues” rendered him difficult to care 
for and “landed him in at least nine different placements[.]” She further argues that 
even if “Connor were able to ‘step down’ from a therapeutic setting, DSS would still 
need to identify a family willing to adopt” and “if an adoptive family were to step 
forward, Connor’s consent would be required before any adoption could occur.” See 
N.C.G.S. § 48-3-601 (2019). Respondent’s arguments are misplaced.  
The trial court’s findings show that although Connor had issues that made it 
difficult to determine the likelihood of his adoption, the court did not find those issues 
to be barriers that would necessarily preclude his adoption. Indeed, the trial court 
found that Connor’s behaviors were improving in his current therapeutic foster home. 
At the hearing, a social worker testified about the possibility of Connor stepping down 
to a traditional foster care setting “within the next six months . . . at which time [DSS] 
would then seek for a foster-to-adopt placement.” She further testified that DSS 
believed they would be able to identify an adoptive family for Connor just as they had 
been able to do for the other children. Therefore, we hold the trial court’s finding that 
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there were no barriers to adoption except for the termination of parental rights is 
supported by competent evidence.  
Respondent also argues that the trial court erred by failing to make a finding 
concerning Connor’s attitude toward adoption and the extent to which he would 
consent to be adopted. She argues that because Connor is now twelve years old, he 
must consent to an adoption, and thus this was a “relevant consideration” under 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(6) about which the trial court must make a finding of fact. She 
further argues that there was no evidence presented that Connor wanted to be 
adopted. This Court recently rejected this argument in In re M.A., 374 N.C. 865 
(2020). “To be sure, N.C.G.S. § 48-3-601 provides that a juvenile over the age of twelve 
must consent to an adoption.” In re M.A., 374 N.C. at 880. However, a trial court may 
waive the minor’s consent requirement “upon a finding that it is not in the best 
interest of the minor to require the consent.” N.C.G.S. § 48-3-603(b)(2). Because any 
refusal by Connor to consent “would not necessarily preclude [his] adoption, we hold 
that the trial court was not required to make findings and conclusions concerning the 
extent, if any, to which [the child was] likely to consent to any adoption that might 
eventually be proposed.” In re M.A., 374 N.C. at 880. 
Finally, respondent argues that while the trial court found that Connor’s bond 
with respondent had diminished after three years in foster care and that her 
visitation was ceased, it did not find that Connor’s relationship with respondent was 
detrimental to his well-being. Respondent asserts that “[t]his finding provided little 
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to support a conclusion that [respondent’s] rights to Connor should be terminated.” 
There is no requirement that the trial court make a specific finding that the parent’s 
relationship with the child was detrimental before it can terminate parental rights. 
The trial court’s finding addressed the requisite factor in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(4)—
the bond between parent and child. Further, “the bond between parent and child is 
just one of the factors to be considered under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a), and the trial 
court is permitted to give greater weight to other factors.” In re Z.L.W., 372 N.C. 432, 
437 (2019).  
B. Best Interest Determination 
Respondent contends the trial court’s findings of fact do not support its 
conclusion that termination of her parental rights was in Connor’s best interests. In 
arguing that the trial court’s dispositional decision constituted an abuse of discretion, 
respondent primarily relies on the Court of Appeals’ decision in In re J.A.O., 166 N.C. 
App. 222 (2004).  
This case is distinguishable from In re J.A.O. Here, although the court found 
that Connor has significant medical and psychological needs, the severity of those 
issues does not appear to reach the same level as the juvenile in In re J.A.O. See also 
In re J.J.B., 374 N.C. 787, 794 (2020); In re J.S., 374 N.C. 811, 824 n. 4 (2020). 
Although Connor has had at least nine placements in the three years he has been in 
foster care, the court found that his behaviors were improving in his current 
therapeutic placement. The juvenile in In re J.A.O. was fourteen at the time of the 
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termination hearing and sixteen at the time the Court of Appeals issued its opinion. 
Connor was only eleven at the time of the termination hearing and is currently twelve 
years old. Further, the trial court in this case did not find that adoption was unlikely 
but instead found that the likelihood of adoption was unknown. Notably, the GAL in 
this case recommended terminating respondent’s parental rights in her report, 
stating that “[t]he farther [Connor] gets from visitation with his biological family the 
likelihood of adoption is greater.” Additionally, the mother in In re J.A.O. had made 
some reasonable progress towards correcting the conditions which led to the removal 
of her child from her care, whereas here, respondent failed to make such progress. 
Instead, the trial court found that the parents “have been unable to correct the 
conditions that led to children’s removal” and that “[their] situation is no better today 
than it was at the time of the removal.”  
Respondent argues that this case, as in In re J.A.O., “requires realistic 
weighing of the likelihood of adoption by an as-yet unidentified adoptive parent 
against the sense of permanence offered by relationships already in place.” To the 
extent respondent is asking this Court to reweigh the record evidence and to 
substitute our weighing of the relevant statutory criteria for that of the trial court, 
we decline to do so as “such an approach would be inconsistent with the applicable 
standard of review, which focuses upon whether the trial court’s dispositional 
decision constitutes an abuse of discretion rather than upon the manner in which the 
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reviewing court would weigh the evidence were it the finder of fact.” In re I.N.C., 374 
N.C. 542, 551 (2020).  
Here, the trial court’s dispositional findings demonstrate that it considered the 
relevant statutory criteria in N.C.G.S. 7B-1110(a) and made a reasoned 
determination that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in Connor’s best 
interests. The trial court made findings, supported by competent evidence, concerning 
Connor’s age, the likelihood of adoption for Connor, whether termination would aid 
in accomplishing the permanent plan of adoption, and respondent’s bond with 
Connor. Because Connor was not in a pre-adoptive placement, the court was not 
required to make a finding regarding Connor’s bond with prospective adoptive 
parents. In re A.R.A., 373 N.C. at 200. Further, although he did not have an adoptive 
placement at the time of the hearing, “the lack of a proposed adoptive placement for 
[the child] at the time of the termination hearing is not a bar to terminating parental 
rights.” In re A.J.T., 374 N.C. 504, 513 (2020).   
III. 
Conclusion 
We are satisfied that the trial court’s conclusion that it was in Connor’s best 
interests to terminate respondent’s parental rights was neither arbitrary nor 
manifestly unsupported by reason. For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order 
terminating respondent’s parental rights.  
AFFIRMED.