Title: Ex parte Walter B. Price
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1151041
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: April 14, 2017

Rel:04/14/2017
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2016-2017
____________________
1151041
____________________
Ex parte Walter B. Price
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
(In re: Walter B. Price
v.
Alabama One Credit Union and William A. Lunsford)
(Tuscaloosa Circuit Court, CV-14-901523;
Court of Civil Appeals, 2141012)
PER CURIAM.
This Court granted certiorari review to determine whether 
the Court of Civil Appeals applied the correct standard when
reviewing the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court's order. 
1151041
Facts and Procedural History
In 2004, Walter B. Price, Alan H. Goode, William A.
Lunsford ("Lunsford"), and Cathy Lunsford (Lunsford's wife)
formed Riverfront Development, LLC ("Riverfront"), with the
goal of developing certain real estate located in Tuscaloosa
("the Riverwalk property"). Price and Goode each owned a one-
third interest in the property, and Lunsford owned the
remaining third.  They took title to the Riverwalk property
individually, not through Riverfront.  
Apparently, Price and Lunsford were involved in other
real-estate ventures together.  On August 1, 2005, Price
loaned Lunsford one million dollars for "Summit," a venture
unrelated to the Riverwalk property.  In October 2008,
Lunsford was in default on the August 1, 2005, loan.  Price
made 
several 
proposals 
to 
Lunsford 
regarding 
curing 
Lunsford's
default on the loan.  On November 19, 2008, Lunsford wrote
Price a letter agreeing with Price's proposal that Price would
not have to pay his current capital contribution related to
the Riverwalk property in exchange for his ameliorating part
of Lunsford's debt to Price on the unrelated venture. 
Lunsford stated in the letter that he had first and second
2
1151041
mortgages on all the property he owned and that, because the
construction business had slowed, he had little cash with
which to operate his construction business.  Lunsford wrote
that he thought his only alternative was to sell his interest
the Riverwalk property.  However, one month earlier, Lunsford
had purchased Goode's one-third interest in the Riverwalk
property.1  Price states that he was unaware at that time that
Lunsford had purchased Goode's interest.
Riverfront 
obtained 
the 
building 
permits 
and
environmental permits to construct condominiums and retail
businesses on the Riverwalk property.  In early 2009, Lunsford
told Price that he was still having financial difficulties. 
In June 2009, Lunsford told Price that Danny Butler was
interested in purchasing the Lunsfords' interests and Price's
interests in the Riverwalk property and in Riverfront.  
On July 9, 2009, Lunsford sent Price an e-mail stating
that Alabama One Credit Union ("Alabama One") had approved a
loan for the purchase of the Riverwalk property and suggesting
a closing on the property on Monday, July 13.  On July 10,
1It is unclear from the record whether Goode still has an
interest in Riverfront.
3
1151041
2009, Lunsford sent Price another e-mail stating, in 
pertinent
part:
"Wally thanks for returning my voice mail.  I
fully understand how you feel.  I have spent a ton
[of] time and expense on Summit and have not
realized any personal profit from the deal and still
have my neck stuck out on loans associated with it,
but we had no way of knowing the market would turn
on us.  The only consolation is there is good equity
still there although a far cry from what we
expected.  It has been very frustrating to have to
continue to work to make sales just to keep the
banks satisfied.
"I understand your frustration with projects
that don't turn out like you plan.  I have 4
subdivisions that I would just like for someone to
take over the loans.  I have to put $ in them every
month because we have few lot sales and it's not
fun.  I desperately need the cash that my
construction company has in Riverwalk to keep the
banks satisfied on other projects and that's the
main reason to close as soon as we can.  I too want
to come back in Riverwalk if I have enough cash left
to do so.  I'm taking Danny at his word that he will
let me back in.
"....
"Debbie [Nichols] said she has the closing
papers ready for Monday so talk to Danny and he can
let her know." 
On July 10, 2009, Price sent Lunsford an e-mail stating
that he would not be able to close on Monday. Price stated
that he was talking to "Danny [Butler] about [Price's] buying
back in the deal at some percentage but that has not been
4
1151041
resolved.  Going to try to see him later today or this
weekend.  Danny [Butler] said you may come back in the
Riverwalk project as well."  On July 13, 2009, Lunsford sent
Price an e-mail stating that he had talked to Butler and that
Butler was ready to close and that if they did not close by
Wednesday, July 15, 2009, then Butler was not interested.  On
July 13, 2009, Alabama One sent Price a proposed settlement
statement that provided that the borrower was Riverfront and
that the sellers were "Wm. Lunsford and Wally Price."  
On July 15, 2009, Price transferred all of his interest
in Riverfront to the Lunsfords.  That same day, Price signed
a 
final 
settlement 
statement 
regarding 
the 
Riverwalk property,
which listed Lunsford and Price as the sellers and Riverfront
as the buyer.  At the time Price signed as the seller,
Lunsford had not signed the settlement statement.  According
to Price, Lunsford later signed the statement as a seller and
as the manager and borrower for Riverfront.  Price believed,
based on representations made by Lunsford, Butler, and 
Alabama
One, that Butler would be the borrower and agent for
Riverfront after Butler purchased Riverfront from the
Lunsfords.  Price closed his part of the sale on July 15,
5
1151041
2009, by executing documents presented by Debra Nichols, a
commercial loan officer for  Alabama One. According to Price,
the purpose of those documents was to convey all of Price's
and Lunsford's interest in the Riverwalk property to
Riverfront so Lunsford could then complete the sale of
Riverfront to Butler with financing by Alabama One. 
On July 21, 2009, Lunsford and Price signed a deed
conveying their interests in the Riverwalk property to 
Riverfront.  Lunsford, as "manager/member" of  Riverfront,
borrowed money in 2010 and in November 2012 completed the
condominiums and retail space on the Riverwalk property.  
On December 29, 2012, Price was told by Jerry Griffin
that Butler was not the owner or a member of Riverfront. 
According to Griffin, Butler was promised a discounted
condominium at the Riverwalk property in exchange for
misrepresenting to 
Price 
his 
interest 
in 
purchasing 
Riverwalk. 
On December 28, 2014, Price sued Lunsford and Alabama One
alleging 
fraudulent 
misrepresentation, 
fraudulent 
suppression, 
promissory fraud, breach of the duty of care, breach of the
duty of loyalty, tortious interference with a business
relationship, and civil conspiracy. Price attached 12
6
1151041
documents to his complaint: 1) the articles of organization of 
Riverfront; 2) the 2004 deed from the Tuscaloosa Department of
Education to Lunsford, Goode, and Price for the Riverwalk
property; 
3) 
the 
August 
1, 
2005, 
security 
agreement/promissory
note between Lunsford and Price regarding the Summit real-
estate venture; 4) the November 19, 2008, letter from Lunsford
to Price; 5) the 2008 property deed transferring Goode's
interest in the Riverwalk property to Lunsford; 6) the July 9,
2009, e-mail from Lunsford to Price; 7) the July 10, 2009, e-
mail from Lunsford to Price; 8) the July 10, 2009, e-mail from
Price to Lunsford along with the July 13, 2009, e-mail from
Lunsford to Price; 9) the proposed settlement statement; 10)
the July 15, 2009, settlement statement; 11) the July 21,
2009, property deed from Lunsford and Price to Riverfront; and
12) the July 21, 2009 mortgage agreement between Alabama One
and Riverfront (signed by Lunsford as manager/member), along
with an October 25, 2010, increase in mortgage-indebtedness
agreement.
On January 20, 2015, Alabama One filed a Rule 12(b)(6),
Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to dismiss, arguing that all of
Price's claims were barred by the applicable two-year statutes
7
1151041
of limitations.  Alabama One attached a copy of a July 16,
2013, complaint with attached exhibits Price had 
filed against
Alabama One, Lunsford, and Butler, among others, involving the
same facts as in the present case, which Price had voluntarily
dismissed.  In discussing the statutes of 
limitations, Alabama
One stated that the differences between Price's July 16, 2013,
complaint and attached exhibits and his December 28, 2014,
complaint and attached exhibits highlight that the December
28, 2014, complaint should be dismissed.  Alabama One also
attached a copy of the assignment-of-interest agreement dated
July 15, 2009, which transferred Price's interest in 
Riverfront to the Lunsfords.  
On January 27, 2015, Lunsford filed a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss, adopting all of Alabama One's arguments. 
Lunsford argued that  Price failed to plead fraud with
particularity, that Price failed to allege a basis for tolling
the statutes of limitations regarding his fraud claims, and
that Price's claims were barred by the Statute of Frauds
because the final settlement statement and assignment-of-
interest agreement made any prior oral representations
irrelevant. 
8
1151041
On March 20, 2015, Price filed responses to both motions
to dismiss.  In the responses, Price noted that, if the trial
court were to consider the materials submitted with Alabama
One's motion that were external to Price's complaint, the
motion would be converted into a motion for a summary judgment
and the trial court would be required to treat the motion as
having been filed pursuant to Rule 56, Ala. R. Civ. P. 
In response to the contention that his claims were time-
barred, Price argued that the statutes of limitations were
tolled as to his claims pursuant to § 6-2-3, Ala. Code 1975. 
Price alleged that he did not discover the fraudulent
activities of Lunsford and/or Alabama One until his
conversation with Griffin on December 29, 2012. Price
submitted his affidavit and an affidavit from Griffin. Both
testified that, during a conversation on December 29, 2012,
Griffin informed Price that he understood that Butler had not
purchased the Riverwalk property and that he did not hold any
interest in Riverfront. Price further argued that he could not
have discovered the allegedly fraudulent activities of
Lunsford and Alabama One when he executed the documents for
the closing of the sale of the Riverwalk property.
9
1151041
On June 12, 2015, the trial court conducted a hearing in
which it heard arguments from counsel of all parties on the
motions filed by Alabama One and Lunsford. On June 29, 2015,
the trial court entered a judgment, finding:
"1. [Price's] claims are barred by the statute[s] of
limitations.
"2. Price has not [pleaded] facts in the Complaint
showing that he is entitled to tolling pursuant to
Ala. 
Code 
[1975,] 
§ 
6-2-3, 
nor 
is 
tolling
applicable. See DGB, LLC v. Hinds, 55 So. 3d 218,
226 (Ala. 2010)."
In the judgment, the trial court granted the motions to
dismiss filed by Alabama One and Lunsford, and it dismissed 
Price's complaint with prejudice.
On July 17, 2015, Price filed a Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P.,
motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment, arguing that
his claims were not time-barred. He also argued that, because
the trial court had not excluded materials outside the
pleadings in reaching its judgment, the motions to dismiss had
been converted into motions for a summary judgment, and, thus,
he argued, he should have been permitted to conduct discovery.
Along with the Rule 59 motion, Price filed a motion for leave
to amend his complaint, attaching a proposed amended
complaint.  Alabama One and Lunsford both filed responses to
10
1151041
Price's postjudgment motions. On August 19, 2015, the trial
court denied Price's Rule 59 postjudgment motion. There is no
ruling in the record on the postjudgment motion to amend the
complaint.
On August 31, 2015, Price filed a notice of appeal to
this Court. This Court transferred the appeal to the Court of
Civil Appeals pursuant to § 12-2-7(6), Ala. Code 1975.  The
Court of Civil Appeals held that the motions to dismiss should
have been treated as  summary-judgment motions because Alabama
One attached to its motion the assignment-of-interest
agreement between Price and the Lunsfords.  The Court of Civil
Appeals noted that Price, in his responses to the motions,
recognized that Alabama One had submitted materials outside
the pleadings.  The Court of Civil Appeals further held that
Price was not prejudiced by the conversion of the motions
because, although there had been no discovery, Price had had
sufficient opportunity to present the materials relevant to
the motions and did in fact present two affidavits.  
The Court of Civil Appeals went on to hold that Price's
claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations
because, 
it 
reasoned, 
the 
reasonable-reliance 
standard 
applies
11
1151041
to assertions of reliance on fraudulent misrepresentations in
determining when the statute of limitations begins to run. 
The Court of Civil Appeals explained that, according to the
evidence in the record, Price had experience with real-estate
ventures and he had offered no evidence or allegations to show
that he could not understand the various agreements he
executed relating to Riverfront and the Riverwalk property.
That court further held that the plain terms of the agreements
Price executed contradicted the alleged misrepresentations
that Butler was purchasing Price's and the Lunsfords'
interests in Riverfront. The court reasoned that Price
therefore could not have reasonably relied on the alleged
misrepresentations to persist in that belief and that he had
knowledge of facts that alerted him to the potential for
fraud. As a result, the Court of Civil Appeals concluded that
the statute of limitations began to run on July 15, 2009, and
that Price's claims were time-barred when he filed the
complaint initiating this case on December 28, 2014.  Price v.
Alabama One Credit Union, [Ms. 2141012, June 17, 2016]     So.
3d     (Ala. Civ. App. 2016). 
Discussion
12
1151041
The Court of Civil Appeals reviewed the trial court's
order under the standard of review appropriate for a summary
judgment.  Both sides assert that the applicable standard of
review in this case is the standard applicable to a Rule
12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., dismissal for failure to state a
claim, namely, that the reviewing court does not consider
whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but only
whether the plaintiff may possibly prevail.  See Nance v.
Matthews, 622 So. 2d 297 (Ala. 1993).  In order to determine
the appropriate standard of review, we must first determine
whether the motions to dismiss were converted to motions for
a summary judgment.
In Universal Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Thompson, 776
So. 2d 81, 83 (Ala. 2000), this Court stated:
"[T]he affidavit of Anderson did not require
conversion of the motion for a judgment on the
pleadings into a motion for a summary judgment,
because the record is silent as to whether the trial
court considered that affidavit. See Stockman [v.
Echlin, Inc.], 604 So. 2d [393] at 394 [(Ala.
1992)]. The trial court, in its order, did not
indicate whether it considered Anderson's affidavit,
and the record on appeal contains no transcript of
the hearing on Thompson's motion. Because the record
gives no indication that the trial court considered
matters outside the pleadings, we treat the motion
as a motion for a judgment on the pleadings.
Accordingly, we look only to the pleadings in
13
1151041
determining whether the trial court erred in
granting Thompson's motion."
(Emphasis added.)  Thompson involved a motion for a judgment
on the pleadings, but the Court's rationale is applicable to
a motion to dismiss.  Likewise, in Stockman v. Echlin, Inc.,
604 So. 2d 393, 394 (Ala. 1992), this Court did not consider
a motion for a judgment on the pleadings to have been
converted into a motion for a summary judgment when "the trial
court did not indicate whether it considered matters outside
the pleadings in making its determination."  In Stockman, the
trial court held a hearing on the motion, but there was no
transcript of the hearing and the record was silent as to
whether the trial court 
had considered affidavits presented by
both parties.  The trial court's order indicated that the
matter was before the court on a motion for a judgment on the
pleadings and that, after considering the arguments and briefs
of the parties, it was granting the motion.  Similarly, in
Sims v. Lewis, 374 So. 2d 298, 302 (Ala. 1979), this Court
declined to convert a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to a summary-
judgment motion because "there [was] no indication ... that
the trial court considered [affidavits submitted outside the
14
1151041
pleadings] in making its determination on the 12(b)(6)
motion."  
It is true that this Court also has stated that, "unless
the trial court expressly declines to consider the extraneous
material, its conclusions may be construed to include the
extraneous material."  Phillips v. AmSouth Bank, 833 So. 2d
29, 31 (Ala. 2002)(emphasis on "may" added).  The Phillips
Court did not state, however, that this Court must presume
that a trial court considered extraneous materials submitted
with a motion, thereby putting the trial court in error.  We
recognize, as Justice Bryan correctly points out in his
dissent, that this Court has treated motions with materials
attached as summary-judgment motions, relying on the language
in Phillips and with no discussion of whether this Court had
any discretion in presuming that the trial court considered
the outside materials.  See, e.g., Ex parte Novus Utils.,
Inc., 85 So. 3d 988, 995 (Ala. 2011).  Nevertheless, this
Court has not adopted a bright-line rule as evidenced by the
reasoning in Thompson, Stockman, and Sims.  Rule 12(b)
provides that, if "matters outside the pleading are presented
to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated
15
1151041
as one for summary judgment." (Emphasis added.)  Whether
additional materials attached to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion will
be considered is within the trial court's discretion.  If an
appellate court's review automatically converts a motion to
dismiss supported by additional materials to a motion for a
summary judgment, the discretion provided the trial court to
determine whether to exclude matters outside the pleadings
would be constrained. 
In the present case, Price attached numerous exhibits to
his complaint that were central to or referenced in the
complaint.  Exhibits attached to a pleading become part of the
pleading.  See Rule 10(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.  ("A copy of any
written instrument which is an exhibit to a pleading is a part
thereof 
for 
all 
purposes."); 
McCullough 
v. 
Alabama 
By-Products
Corp., 343 So. 2d 508 (Ala. 1977)(holding that an exhibit
attached to a complaint became part of the complaint and that, 
if there is any variance between the allegations in the
pleading and the exhibit attached, the exhibit controls). 
Alabama One attached to its motion to dismiss Price's
previously filed complaint along with the assignment-of-
interest agreement.  In his motion to dismiss, Lunsford
16
1151041
adopted the arguments raised in Alabama One's motion to
dismiss.  In response to the motions to dismiss, Price filed
affidavits in support of his position. Price also noted that,
if the trial court were to consider the materials submitted
with Alabama One's motion that were external to his complaint,
the motion would be converted into a motion for a summary
judgment and the trial court would be required to treat the
motion as one filed pursuant to Rule 56.
The trial court held a hearing on the motions to dismiss,
but the transcript from that hearing is not in the record. 
The trial court's order does not refer to or indicate that it
considered any document other than the complaint, nor does it
state that the court expressly excluded matters outside the
pleadings.  The order refers only to the motions to dismiss, 
and it dismisses the complaint with prejudice.  The trial
court also cited DGB, LLC v. Hinds, 55 So. 3d 218 (Ala. 2010),
which involved only a motion to dismiss and its corresponding
standard of review.  The trial court's judgment was phrased
entirely in terms of a motion to dismiss. 
Based on the foregoing, we cannot say that the trial
court considered matters outside the complaint.  Therefore,
17
1151041
the motions to dismiss were not converted to motions for a
summary judgment.  We now turn to the merits of Lunsford's and
Alabama One's motions to dismiss.  
In Nance v. Matthews, 622 So. 2d at 299, this Court set
forth the standard of review applicable to an order granting
a motion to dismiss:
"The appropriate standard of review under Rule
12(b)(6)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] is whether, when the
allegations of the complaint are viewed most
strongly in the pleader's favor, it appears that the
pleader could prove any set of circumstances that
would entitle [the pleader] to relief. Raley v.
Citibanc of Alabama/Andalusia, 474 So. 2d 640, 641
(Ala. 1985); Hill v. Falletta, 589 So. 2d 746 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1991). In making this determination, this
Court does not consider whether the plaintiff will
ultimately prevail, but only whether [he] may
possibly prevail. Fontenot v. Bramlett, 470 So. 2d
669, 671 (Ala. 1985); Rice v. United Ins. Co. of
America, 465 So. 2d 1100, 1101 (Ala. 1984).  We note
that a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper only when
it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove
no set of facts in support of the claim that would
entitle the plaintiff to relief."
 
Price alleged in his complaint that he agreed to sell his
interest in the Riverwalk property on July 15, 2009. 
According to Price, he was told that he and Lunsford were
selling their interests in the Riverwalk property to Danny
Butler.  Lunsford told Price that he was having financial
difficulties and that he would have to sell his interest in
18
1151041
the property.  Price could not continue the development of the
Riverwalk property without Lunsford.  Price also alleged that
Lunsford told him that "together they would sale [sic] the
property in combination with all interests in Riverfront
Development, LLC to Butler." Price alleged that, despite the
representations made to him, Butler did not purchase any
interest in Riverfront or the Riverwalk property.  Price
claimed that the purpose of Lunsford's alleged deception was 
to divest Price of his interest in the Riverwalk property. 
Price further alleged that Alabama One participated in the
deception by representing that Butler was  purchasing the
Riverwalk property. Specifically, Price alleged that Alabama
One intentionally held the signing of the 
settlement statement
at different times so that it could conceal the fact that
Lunsford, not Butler, was purchasing the Riverwalk property. 
Price alleged that on December 29, 2012, Jerry Griffin told
him that Butler was not the owner, manager, or a member of 
Riverfront.  According to the complaint, Butler was promised
a discounted condominium in exchange for misrepresenting to
Price his interest in purchasing the Riverwalk property. 
Price filed his complaint on December 28, 2014.  
19
1151041
In their motions to dismiss, Lunsford and Alabama One
argue that Price's claims are untimely and are barred by the
applicable two-year statute of limitations.  
Price argues that
his claims fall within the savings clause of § 6-2-3, which
provides: 
"In actions seeking relief on the ground of
fraud where the statute has created a bar, the claim
must not be considered as having accrued until the
discovery by the aggrieved party of the fact
constituting the fraud, after which he must have two
years within which to prosecute his action."
In DGB, LLC v. Hinds, 55 So. 3d at 226, this Court
stated: 
"This Court has stated: 'When, as in this case, the
plaintiff's complaint on its face is barred by the
statute of limitations, the complaint must also show
that he or she falls within the savings clause of §
6–2–3.' Miller v. Mobile County Bd. of Health, 409
So. 2d 420, 422 (Ala. 1981). '[T]he burden is upon
he who claims the benefit of § 6–2–3 to show that he
comes within it.' Amason v. First State Bank of
Lineville, 369 So. 2d 547, 551 (Ala. 1979). However,
a 'dismissal based on the statute of limitations is
proper only if, from the face of the complaint, it
is apparent that the tolling provisions do not
apply.' Travis v. Ziter, 681 So. 2d 1348, 1351 (Ala.
1996).
"This Court has held that to show that a
plaintiff's claims fall within the savings clause of
§ 6-2-3 a complaint must allege the time and
circumstances of the discovery of the cause of
action. See, e.g., Angell v. Shannon, 455 So. 2d
823, 823–24 (Ala. 1984); Papastefan v. B & L Constr.
20
1151041
Co., 356 So. 2d 158, 160 (Ala. 1978). The complaint
must also allege the facts or circumstances by which
the defendants concealed the cause of action or
injury and what prevented the plaintiff from
discovering the facts surrounding the injury. See,
e.g., Smith v. National Sec. Ins. Co., 860 So. 2d
343, 345, 347 (Ala. 2003); Lowe v. East End Mem'l
Hosp. & Health Ctrs., 477 So. 2d 339, 341–42 (Ala.
1985); Miller, 409 So. 2d at 422. See also Amason,
369 So. 2d at 550."
Here, viewed in a light most favorable to Price, see
Nance, supra, the 
complaint alleges the time and circumstances
of his discovery of the claims by virtue of his conversation
with Griffin, the facts and circumstances by which Lunsford 
and Alabama One 
concealed their fraud, i.e., the circumstances
of the signing of the settlement statement, and the
circumstances that prevented Price from discovering the fraud
within the statutory limitations period, i.e., the publicly
recorded property deed attached to the complaint did not
indicate who owned or managed Riverfront, the entity that was
purchasing the Riverwalk property.  Therefore, the trial court
erred in granting Lunsford's and Alabama One's motions to
dismiss.2  
2The savings clause of § 6-2-3 generally applies not only
to fraud, but also to any cause of action fraudulently
concealed.  DGB, LLC v. Hinds, 55 So. 3d at 225 n. 3.  This
would 
include 
Price's 
breach-of-duty 
and 
tortious-interference
claims. 
21
1151041
We note that, even if we reviewed the trial court's order
as a summary judgment, as did the Court of Civil Appeals, a
genuine issue of material fact exists, thereby making
inappropriate either a dismissal based on the complaint alone
or a summary judgment based on the voluntarily dismissed
complaint3 and assignment-of-interest agreement attached to
Alabama One's motion to dismiss along with Price's affidavits.
Considering the attachments to the motion to dismiss and
3It is undisputed that Price voluntarily dismissed the
prior complaint.  The Court of Civil Appeals did not discuss
this attachment to the motion to dismiss in their analysis of
the treatment of the motions to dismiss.   Price did not refer
to his voluntarily dismissed complaint in the present
complaint; thus, the attachment was outside the pleadings.  We
recognize that the effect of a voluntary dismissal is to
render the proceedings a nullity and to leave the parties as
if the action had never been brought. Gallagher Bassett
Servs., Inc. v. Phillips, 991 So. 2d 697, 700 (Ala. 2008).  A
voluntary dismissal is of no effect -- it is a legal nullity. 
A voluntary dismissal places the parties in a position as if
the suit had never been filed.  Ex parte Sealy, LLC, 904 So.
2d 1230 (Ala. 2004).  However, we cannot say that the trial
court could not consider the voluntarily dismissed complaint
in this case.  There is still a court record of the
voluntarily dismissed complaint, though the complaint is
considered a nullity.  Both Price's voluntarily dismissed
complaint and the complaint in this case involve fraud claims
against Lunsford and Alabama One. Cf. Marrero v. Costco
Wholesale Corp., 52 F. Supp. 3d 437, 441 (D. P.R.
2014)(holding that the defendant's attachment to its 
motion to
dismiss of the plaintiff's prior voluntarily dismissed
complaint could not be considered where the voluntarily
dismissed complaint asserted different claims).    
22
1151041
Price's affidavits, as the Court of Civil Appeals assumed the
trial court did, Price has presented a jury question, making
a summary judgment inappropriate.
Price alleged that he did not discover, and reasonably
could not have discovered, the fraudulent activities of
Lunsford and/or Alabama One until his conversation with
Griffin on December 29, 2012.  Price submitted his own
affidavit and one from Griffin. Both testified that, during a
conversation on December 29, 2012, Griffin informed Price that
he understood that Butler had not purchased the Riverwalk
property and did not hold any interest in Riverfront.  Price
further argued that he reasonably failed to discover the
allegedly fraudulent activities of Lunsford and Alabama One
when he executed the documents for the closing of the sale of
the Riverwalk property because of the misrepresentations by
Lunsford and employees of Alabama One. His affidavit in
support of his responses contained the following testimony:
"11. On July 13, 2009, I was sent a proposed HUD One
Settlement Statement sent to me by facsimile from
[Alabama 
One]. 
The 
borrower 
was 
listed 
as
[Riverfront]. This in no way as alleged in the
Motion to Dismiss filed by [Alabama One] would have
alerted me that Danny Ray Butler was not the
purchaser of the Riverwalk property or [Riverfront]
nor led me to inquire. In fact, I was told that
23
1151041
Danny Ray Butler was purchasing our entire interest
in [the Riverwalk property] through [Riverfront] by
W.A. Lunsford and Danny Ray Butler. I believed it
because Debbie Nichols, [Alabama One's] Loan Officer
in 
charge 
of 
conducting 
the 
closing, 
made
representations to me that Danny Ray Butler had to
close 
by 
that 
date, 
I 
relied 
upon 
these
representations and this HUD One proposed settlement
statement and statements by W.A. Lunsford and Danny
Ray Butler to believe that the Lunsfords were
conveying their entire interest out of financial
necessity and that Danny Ray Butler was the
purchaser and would lose his financing if I didn't
act to close on that day. I had no interest in
divesting myself of my interest in [the Riverwalk
property] that I had worked so diligently to
procure. I would have never sold my interest to the
Lunsfords, any LLC or other business entity which
they owned, I specifically stated to W.A. Lunsford
and Danny Ray Butler that I did not want to sell,
but was doing so because I could not stand alone
financially to continue the project. ...
"12. On July, 15, 2009, I was misled by [Alabama
One's] closing officer and by the final HUD
Settlement Statement presented to me at closing. At
the time this document was signed by me, W.A.
Lunsford's line for signature as Seller was unsigned
and the line for signature of the Borrowers and
Manager of [Riverfront] was unsigned. At the time I
signed all the closing documents, I asked the
closing officer when W.A. Lunsford and Danny Ray
Butler would be by to sign the closing documents.
The [Alabama One] closing officer replied that they
would be by later that day to sign all the necessary
documents. I did not receive copies of the fully
executed documents, including the HUD statements,
until January of 2013. Up until my December 29,
2012, conversation with Jerry Griffin, it was my
firm belief that the Lunsfords and I had sold all
our 
interest 
in 
the 
Riverwalk 
Property 
and 
[Riverfront].
24
1151041
"13. I believed the false representations made by
W.A. Lunsford that he was forced to sell his
interest in the ... Riverwalk [property] and
[Riverfront] to Danny Ray Butler, because of his
poor financial condition. I also believed the false
representations made by Debbie Nichols an officer at
[Alabama One], along with the misrepresentations
made by Danny Ray Butler that he was the purchaser
and he was the one obtaining the financing from
[Alabama One]. These false representations were made
in order to remove me as a partner from [Riverfront]
and as a co-owner of [the Riverwalk property]."
In his "Amended Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
Filed by Alabama One Credit Union," Price noted that Alabama
One had attached certain closing documents to its motion, but
he argued that "[t]he documents alleged would fit within what
[Price] was told by Lunsford: that Danny Butler was buying
both Riverfront Development, LLC and the Riverwalk Property." 
 
It is true that the assignment-of-interest agreement
shows that Price was transferring his interest in Riverfront
to Lunsford, but Price alleged that he was told this was one
of the intermediate steps necessary before Butler ultimately
purchased the entire enterprise.  He also presented testimony
that it was necessary that the closing happen immediately or
that Butler would back out. The assignment-of-interest
agreement alone does not negate Price's allegations in his
complaint with regard to the transfer of the Riverwalk
25
1151041
property.  The evidence, on balance, may favor Lunsford and
Alabama One's version of events, but it cannot be said that
Price did not present a genuine issue of fact as to a scenario
under which he could possibly prevail.  That is, Price
detailed and supplied evidence of a fraudulent scheme, the
true nature of which he did not discover until years after the
transaction occurred, and, therefore, the applicable statutes
of limitations were tolled.  
For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Civil
Appeals is reversed and the case remanded for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Stuart, Bolin, Parker, and Main, JJ., concur.
Murdock, J., concurs specially.
Shaw and Bryan, JJ., dissent.
Wise, J., recuses herself.
26
1151041
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur in the main opinion, except that I decline the
opportunity to reaffirm the absolute nature of the rule stated
in McCullough v.  Alabama By-Products Corp., 343 So. 2d 508
(Ala.  1977).  Aside from that comment, I write separately to
comment briefly on (1) the notion that the complaint filed in
Walter B. Price's 2013 action was a nullity, as discussed in
note 3 of the main opinion and (2) the issue of how to treat
the July 15, 2009, assignment-of-interest agreement attached
to Alabama One Credit Union's motion to dismiss.  
As the main opinion explains, Price's 2013 complaint,
having been previously dismissed, is a nullity in the sense
that it cannot be revived or reviewed as a basis for a pending
action.  That is not to say, and I do not read the main
opinion as saying, that statements in the 2013 complaint
(assuming that complaint to have been properly submitted to
the trial court otherwise) could not be considered by the
trial court in the underlying action.
"A party's pleading in a prior case is
admissible in a subsequent action as an admission of
the truth of the facts stated in the pleading if
such pleading was filed [on] behalf of the party in
another action, and was drawn under the party's
direction or with his knowledge of its content."
27
1151041
Yates v. Christian Benevolent Funeral Homes, Inc., 356 So. 2d
135, 137 (Ala. 1978).  See also City of Gulf Shores v. Harbert
Int'l, 608 So. 2d 348, 354 (Ala. 1992) (noting that "a party's
pleadings in a prior case are admissible against that party in
a subsequent action as an admission against interest").  Thus,
hypothetically, if statements in Price's July 16, 2013,
complaint contained statements evidencing knowledge by Price
more than two years before the filing of the December 28,
2014, complaint that Danny Butler was not involved in the
transaction at issue, then the 2013 complaint would be
relevant to the statute-of-limitations defense presented in
Alabama One's motion to dismiss.
In point of fact, though, Price's 2013 complaint contains
no such statements.  Thus, Price's 2013 complaint is
irrelevant to the motions to dismiss ruled upon by the trial
court in the present case.
The same cannot necessarily be said, however, as to the 
July 15, 2009, assignment (by which Price transferred his
interest in Riverfront Development, LLC, to William A.
Lunsford), a copy of which was attached to Alabama One's
motion to dismiss.  It might be argued that we must determine
28
1151041
whether the trial court did or did not consider this
attachment in order to know whether the motion is to be
treated as one seeking a dismissal or a summary judgment.  As
the main opinion explains, however, the resolution of this
issue ultimately is not dispositive in the present case
because, even if we were to assume the trial court considered
this 
attachment, the 
affidavits 
submitted 
by 
Price 
nonetheless
create a genuine issue of material fact, thereby requiring the
reversal of the trial court's judgment in any event.
29
1151041
SHAW, Justice (dissenting).  
I respectfully dissent.  
The plaintiff below, Walter B. Price, owned an interest
in 
Riverfront 
Development, 
LLC 
("Riverfront"), and 
an 
interest
in a piece of real estate ("the Riverwalk property") that was
to be developed by Riverfront.  Price alleged in his complaint
that his business partner in Riverfront and co-owner of the
Riverwalk property, William A. Lunsford, convinced him 
to sell
both Riverfront and the Riverwalk property to Danny Butler. 
He further alleged that Lunsford and Alabama One Credit Union
("Alabama 
One") 
fraudulently 
represented 
that 
a 
transaction in
which Price engaged on July 15, 2009, was transferring both to
Butler.  In this transaction, Price signed, as a "seller," a
Department of Housing and Urban Development settlement
statement that detailed the sale of the Riverwalk property to
Riverfront and Riverfront's borrowing of funds from Alabama
One to finance the purchase.  In his verified complaint, Price
alleged that he believed that Butler "would be the borrower-
in-fact, acting as an agent for Riverfront."  
In its motion to dismiss, Alabama One claimed that there
was evidence showing that Price knew, or should have known, in
30
1151041
July 2009 of the alleged fraud and, thus, that the applicable
two-year statute of limitations began to run at that time and
expired before the complaint was filed in 2014.  It
specifically referred, among other things, to the settlement
statement, a deed, and a document titled "Assignment of
Interest in Limited Liability Company," dated July 15, 2009,
in which Price assigned his interest in Riverfront to
Lunsford, and not the purported purchaser, Butler.  This
assignment, which Alabama One attached to its motion, had not
been included as an attachment to the complaint.  Alabama One
argued that Price "knew that Mr. Lunsford was receiving
[Price's] share of the company.  Indeed, [Price] signed an
Assignment of Interest in Limited Liability Company agreement
on July 15, 2009, transferring his interest in the company to
Bill Lunsford."
In his response and in an amended response to the motion
to dismiss, Price argued that the settlement statement and the
deed did not alert him to any potential fraud.4  He also filed
an affidavit.  However, in both of his responses to Alabama
4As to the settlement statement, Price asserted that it
was not yet signed by Lunsford when Price signed it.
31
1151041
One's motion to dismiss, he completely failed to address
whether the 
assignment showed that he transferred his interest
in Riverfront to Lunsford or whether that should have alerted
him that he was transferring his interest in Riverfront to
Lunsford and not Butler.  Further, the affidavit states
nothing about the assignment.  The trial court, in issuing its
judgment, could have concluded that the assignment Price
failed to address showed that he knew that his interest in
Riverfront was being transferred to Lunsford and not to
Butler.  These would have been facts alerting him to the
possibility that Lunsford was actually purchasing Riverfront
and that the statute of limitations began to run at that time.
Price's initial brief filed in the Court of Civil Appeals 
similarly failed to specifically address the significance of
the assignment and whether it could be deemed to have alerted
him to the nature of the alleged fraud.  Instead, at most,
Price alleged that there was an arrangement whereby he would
assign all of his interest in Riverfront to Lunsford and 
Lunsford would then transfer the company to Butler.  On page
two of his initial brief to the Court of Civil Appeals, he
stated, without citation to the record: "Price closed his part
32
1151041
of the sale to Butler on July 15, 2009 by executing documents.
... The purpose of these documents was, in pertinent part, to
convey all Price's and Lunsford's title to [Riverfront] so
that Lunsford could complete the sale to and financing by
Butler that same afternoon."  However, I see no evidence in
the record substantiating an assertion that Price was to
convey his interest in Riverfront to Lunsford so that Lunsford
could later convey the entire company to Butler.  No argument
or assertion to this effect was made in Price's responses to
the motions to dismiss filed in the trial court.  Nothing in
the verified complaint, its attachments, or in the affidavit
mention this factual assertion.  
In his reply brief to the Court of Civil Appeals, Price
for the first time directly addressed the significance of the
assignment.  He stated in response to the appellee's
arguments: "The record, as Price points out in his initial
brief, clearly shows the basis for Price's reasonable belief
and reliance on the Defendants' false representation that
Butler, Alabama One and [Riverfront's] managing member
Lunsford would complete the [Riverfront] sale closing and
financing with Danny Butler that same afternoon."  Again, I
33
1151041
see no evidence in the record stating that ownership in 
Riverfront was to be placed in Lunsford's hands so that it
could be transferred to Butler later that day.  Price did not
make any such argument in the trial court in opposition to
Alabama One's claim that the assignment showed Price that he
was not, in fact, transferring his interest in Riverfront to
Butler.  The affidavit is silent as to this issue.
In its opinion, the Court of Civil Appeals held, as 
Alabama One argued in the trial court, that the assignment
should have, in July 2009, alerted Price to the fact that 
Riverfront was not being transferred to Butler, thus putting
Price on notice of alleged fraud and starting the running of
the statute of limitations.  Price cannot now dispute this
holding because he failed to properly address the issue both
in the trial court and on appeal.
The main opinion in the instant case states:  "It is true
that 
the 
assignment-of-interest agreement 
shows 
that 
Price 
was
transferring his interest in Riverfront to Lunsford, but 
Price
alleged that he was told this was one of the intermediate
steps necessary before Butler ultimately purchased the entire
enterprise." ___ So. 3d at ___.  This is merely an
34
1151041
"allegation" 
because 
(1) 
Price 
presented 
no 
evidence
indicating 
that 
such 
"intermediate 
steps" 
were 
ever
contemplated; (2) he failed to allege so in his complaint; (3)
when presented in the trial court with the argument that the
assignment should have alerted him that Butler was not
purchasing Riverfront, he remained silent; and (4) his first
allegation explaining this unsupported assertion came in his
reply brief filed in the Court of Civil Appeals.  Price's
response to the assignment is untimely and unsupported by
substantial evidence.  I cannot hold the Court of Civil
Appeals in error for failing to reverse the trial court's
judgment on a factual assertion explained for the first time
on appeal in a reply brief and not supported by substantial
evidence.
As to the issue whether Alabama One's motion to dismiss
was converted to a motion for summary judgment, Rule 12(b),
Ala. R. Civ. P., requires that "[i]f ... matters outside the
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court," then
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion "shall be treated as one for summary
judgment." (Emphasis added.)  As noted above, the motion to
dismiss specifically argued and referenced the assignment, a
35
1151041
matter outside the pleading.  This was the strongest piece of
evidence showing when Price should have understood that 
Riverfront was not being purchased by Butler.  Price did not
address it in his response.  I think that it is appropriate to
assume that the strongest piece of evidence supporting the
trial court's judgment, which was "not excluded by the trial
court" and which Price did not attempt to rebut, was
considered by it.  Thus, the motion to dismiss was converted
to a motion for a summary judgment.
I think that the Court of Civil Appeals, addressing the
narrow issues argued in the trial court and the evidence
presented, correctly affirmed the judgment.  I therefore
respectfully dissent. 
36
1151041
BRYAN, Justice (dissenting).
I write specially to address the tension in the law
concerning when a Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to
dismiss is converted into a summary-judgment motion.  The main
opinion relies on precedent stating that, when the record is
silent as to whether the trial court considered matters
submitted outside the pleadings, no conversion occurred.  ___
So. 3d at ___ (citing Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v.
Thompson, 776 So. 2d 81, 83 (Ala. 2000); Stockman v. Echlin,
Inc., 604 So. 2d 393, 394 (Ala. 1992); and Sims v. Lewis, 374
So. 2d 298, 302 (Ala. 1979)).   In this case, the trial court
gave the parties no notice that it would consider the
submitted evidence and treat the motions to dismiss as
summary-judgment motions.  Thus, the main opinion concludes
that, under the above-cited precedent, no conversion occurred
and that it is reviewing a ruling on a motion to dismiss.
In resolving this issue, the main opinion deals with a
case possibly at tension with the main opinion's resolution,
Phillips v. AmSouth Bank, 833 So. 2d 29 (Ala. 2002).  The
Court in Phillips stated that, "unless the trial court
expressly declines to consider the extraneous material, its
37
1151041
conclusions may be construed to include the extraneous
material."  Phillips, 833 So. 2d at 31.  The main opinion
deals with Phillips by emphasizing that, if the trial court
did not expressly decline to consider the material, a
reviewing court "may" –– but is not required to –– conclude
that a conversion occurred.  However, since Phillips was
decided in 2002, both this Court and the Court of Civil
Appeals have decided cases citing Phillips but going further
than Phillips regarding the effect of the trial court's
silence.  For example, in Ex parte Novus Utilities, Inc., 85
So. 3d 988, 995 (Ala. 2011), this Court, citing Phillips,
stated: "Although Novus styled its motion as a motion to
dismiss, the trial court had before it materials outside the
pleadings, and it did not expressly decline to consider those
materials in making its ruling. Therefore, the motion to
dismiss was converted into a motion for a summary judgment."
In Ex parte Novus, the trial court's failure to expressly
decline to consider the materials submitted led to the
conclusion that a conversion had in fact occurred; this
conflicts with the authority relied on in the main opinion,
which says that the trial court's silence indicates that no
38
1151041
conversion occurred.  I read Ex parte Novus as stating that
the trial court's failure to expressly decline to consider
materials outside the pleadings automatically causes a
conversion in the trial court; as a natural consequence, a
reviewing court cannot treat the motion any differently after
the fact (as one reading of Phillips may suggest).  There was
no discussion in Ex parte Novus as to whether, relying on
Phillips, this Court was exercising discretion to 
consider the
motion as one seeking a summary judgment.  Because the parties
need to know what type of motion they are dealing with in the
trial court, an "automatic" conversion before the trial court
makes more sense than allowing a reviewing court to construe
the motion as one or the other after the fact.  
There are several cases similar to Ex parte Novus
indicating that a trial court's failure to expressly decline
to consider materials outside the pleadings causes a
conversion to occur: Adams v. Tractor & Equip. Co., 180 So. 3d
860, 864 (Ala. 2015) ("There is no indication in the record
that the circuit court excluded the affidavits attached to the
motion to dismiss. ... Accordingly, the motion to dismiss had
been converted to a motion for a summary judgment."); Ex parte
39
1151041
Ismail, 78 So. 3d 399, 402 n.1 (Ala. 2011) ("Dr. Ismail styled
his motion as a motion to dismiss.  However, the trial court
had before it materials outside the pleadings, and it did not
expressly decline to consider those materials in making its
ruling.  Therefore, the motion to dismiss was converted into
a motion for a summary judgment."); Hoff v. Goyer, 160 So. 3d
768, 770 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014) (quoting Ex parte Ismail and
Phillips); Ex parte Vest, 130 So. 3d 574, 577-78 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2013) ("Because (1) the mother had supported her motions
[for dismissal] with the matter outside the pleadings and (2)
the Elmore Circuit Court, in ruling on those motions, did not
expressly decline to consider the matter outside the
pleadings, those motions were automatically converted to
motions for a summary judgment."); and Casa Invs. Co. v.
Boles, 931 So. 2d 53, 57 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005) ("Although the
trial court characterizes its ... judgment as one granting a
motion to dismiss, because both sides submitted supporting
evidentiary materials and the trial court did not expressly
exclude consideration of those evidentiary materials the
motion is properly treated as one for a summary judgment.");
cf. Turner v. Moore, 76 So. 3d 842, 845 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011)
40
1151041
(concerning whether a motion for a judgment on the pleadings
was converted under Rule 12(c): "We cannot determine from the
record whether the trial court considered the exhibits
attached to the defendants' motion when it entered the
judgment. ... For purposes of this opinion, we will assume
that the trial court did consider the evidence the defendants
submitted in support of their motion; therefore, we will use
the standard applicable in reviewing the propriety of a
summary judgment.").
The above line of cases indicates that, unless the trial
court expressly declines to consider the submitted materials,
the motion to dismiss is converted to a summary-judgment
motion.  That is, a conversion occurs if the trial court
simply remains silent about the submitted materials.  That
proposition conflicts with the precedent relied on in the main
opinion, which states that silence by the trial court means
that no conversion occurred.  Thus, it appears to me that the
main 
opinion 
has 
effectively 
overruled the 
post-Phillips cases
discussed above.  However, the parties have not asked us to
overrule any of those cases, and I am therefore disinclined to
do so.  See Moore v. Prudential Residential Servs. Ltd.
41
1151041
P'ship, 849 So. 2d 914, 926 (Ala. 2002) ("Stare decisis
commands, at a minimum, a degree of respect from this Court
that makes it disinclined to overrule controlling precedent
when it is not invited to do so."). 
Thus, I would not hold the Court of Civil Appeals in
error for concluding that the motions to dismiss had been
converted into summary-judgment motions.  In its alternative
conclusion, the main opinion concludes that, even assuming
such a conversion occurred, a genuine issue of material fact
exists, which precludes the entry of a summary judgment. 
However, I disagree with that conclusion for the reasons
stated by Justice Shaw in his dissent.  Thus, because I
believe the Court of Civil Appeals correctly affirmed the
trial court's judgment, I respectfully dissent.5 
5The conflicting precedent outlined above parallels
differing views by federal courts construing Rule 12(d), Fed.
R. Civ. P., which is substantially similar to the conversion
provision in Rule 12(b).  See, e.g., Garita Hotel Ltd. P'ship
v. Ponce Fed. Bank, F.S.B., 958 F.2d 15, 18-19 (1st Cir.
1992), and cases cited therein.  The position reflected in the
main opinion appears to be the majority rule.  Id.; 73 Am.
Jur. 2d Summary Judgment § 19 (2012) ("A motion to dismiss is
not automatically transformed into a motion for summary
judgment simply because matters outside pleadings are filed
with the court.  The test is whether the court actually takes
cognizance of the supplementary materials.  The decision to
convert a motion into a motion for summary judgment takes
place at the discretion of the court and at the time that the
42
1151041
  
court decides not to exclude the extraneous matters."
(footnotes omitted)); and Motion to Dismiss –– Conversion to
Summary Judgment Motion, 12 No. 7 Fed. Litigator 194 (1997)
(noting that the "view that conversion of a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss into a summary judgment motion does not
occur until the district court affirmatively decides not to
exclude 
materials 
outside 
the 
pleadings from 
its 
consideration
of the motion is the way most courts look at it"). 
43