Title: HARLAND v ANDERSON
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13119
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: April 8, 1976

No. 13119 I N THE S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1976 G E R A L D R. H A R L A N D , P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, ROY A N D E R S O N and LOTTIE ANDERSON, husband and wife, and A N D E R S O N RANCH CO., a corporation, and the STATE OF M O N T A N A , Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighth Judicial D i s t r i c t , Honorable R. J. Nelson, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Cure, Borer and Lynch, Great F a l l s , Montana Edward W. Borer argued, Great F a l l s , Montana For Respondents: Graybill, Ostrem, Warner & Crotty, Great F a l l s , Montana Donald L. Ostrem argued, Great F a l l s , Montana Submitted: March 1, 1976 Decided : 9P)i 9 - 1976 F i l e d : ;~.PR $ * m 9 9 6 Yr. JuscLce ~ o h l i Jonway darrison Lellvered :he J p i n i u r ~ ~i he Court. P l a i n t i f f Gerald R. Harland appeals from a summary judgmenc granted on two of t h r e e counts i n a complaint f i l e d i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Cascade County, seeking t o e s t a b l i s h an 5asernent across property owned by defendants Roy Anderson and Lottie Anderson, husband and wife, and Anderson Ranch Co. (herein- d f t e r r e f e r r e d t o a s Andersons). The complaint s e t f o r t h t h r e e counts: Count I, seeking t o e s t a b l i s h an easement by prescrip- tion. Count 11, a l l e g i n g damages f o r wrongful interference. Count 111, requesting a road o r r i g h t of way be condemned over defendants' land f o r p l a i n t i f f ' s use. O n motion of Andersons proceedings on Count T I 1 were stayed, pending t h e determination of Counts I and 11. The a c t i o n was commenced January 25, 1972. Andersons answered and took depositions from Harland and one C l i f f o r d Obrecht, ~ a r l a n d ' s predecessor i n i n t e r e s t . O n the b a s i s of these two depositions and Andersons' answers t o i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s , Andersons moved f o r summary judgment which was denied. Thereafter, Andersons secured t h e depositions of t h r e e o t h e r individuals whose testimony could a l l e g e d l y demonstrate t h e long and continued use of a road leading t o ~ a r l a n d ' s property. The property was viewed by the presiding judge and counsel f o r both p a r t i e s . Ander- sons renewed t h e i r motion f o r summary judgment. The d i s t r i c t court on April 21, 1975, entered i t s order granting t h a t motion. Harland appeals t h a t order. The record before t h i s Court c o n s i s t s of t h e pleadings, i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s t o Andersons, the aforementioned depositions and memoranda of counsel concerning the motion f o r summary judgment. From t h i s i t appears t h a t since e a r l y 1971, Harland has been t h e owner of about 3580 acres of land located i n Township 16 North, Range 1 West, Cascade County, Montana. I n addition he l e a s e s about 2360 acres owned by the United S t a t e s and administered by t h e Bureau ~ . f ~clrid :.lanagernenC, these !ancis 3re I-ocaced i-n and are idntiguous with t h e mountain areas southeast of Cascade, Montana. They a r e surrounded by o t h e r ranch properties owned by various p a r t i e s , including the Andersons, who c o n t r o l lands t o t h e west and northwest. For over 50 years a two t r a c k d i r t road has run across ;3nJersons1 land t o the r e a l e s t a t e which i s the subject of t h i s appeal. The road i s crossed a t s e v e r a l points by fences and closed gates owned and controlled by the Andersons. ~ a r l a n d ' s predecessor i n i n t e r e s t , Clifford Obrecht, acquired the property i n 1945. I n June 1948, an agreement was executed between Obrecht and Andersons which granted a r i g h t t o use the contested road by permission. This agreement was t e r - minated i n 1959 and never renewed. Harland affirms t h a t any claims he may have toward t h e use of t h i s road e x i s t only by v i r t u e of those r i g h t s which Obrecht may have had. Y e t , Obrecht admitted i n h i s deposition t h a t he had not used t h e road continuously f o r the f i v e years precedent t o t h e f i l i n g of t h i s action. It i s c l e a r chat no p o s i t i v e representations regarding t h e existence of an easement were ever made t o Harland during t h e negotiations which led t o t h e s a l e of t h e property. Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P., provides t h a t summary judgment is proper i f : "* 7 k * t h e pleadings, depositions, answers t o i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s , and admissions on f i l e 'show t h a t t h e r e i s no genuine i s s u e a s t o any material f a c t and t h a t t h e moving party i s e n t i t l e d t o a judgment 3s a matter of law. * 9~ *I' This Court has on many occasions commented upon t h e nature af che jurcien of proof imposed on t h e moving party under Rule 56. Fhe Court has c o n s i s t e n t l y held t h a t t h e party moving f o r summary judgment has the burden of showing t h e complete absence of any genuine i s s u e as t o a l l f a c t s which a r e deemed material i n l i g h t of those substantive p r i n c i p l e s which e n t i t l e d him t o a judgment a s a matter of law. W e have a l s o held t h e r u l e operates t o hold t h e I I rnovant t o a s t r i c t standard" and t h a t : " I * + : T o s a t i s f y h i s burden the movant must make a showing t h a t i s quite c l e a r what the t r u t h is, and t h a t excludes any r e a l doubt a s t o the existence of any genuine issue of material f a c t . * * *"' Kober & Kyriss v. Stewart & Billings Deaconess Hospital, 148 Mont. 117, 122, 417 P.2d 476. The d i s t r i c t court does not function t o adjudicate genuine issues of f a c t on a motion f o r summary judgment cause--it merely deter- mines whether such issues e x i s t . Thus the party opposing the motion w i l l be indulged t o the extent of a l l inferences which may be reasonably drawn from the offered proof. Mally v. Asanovich, 149 Mont. 99, 105, 423 P.2d 294; Johnson v. St. patrick's Hospital, 148 Mont. 125, 417 P. 2d 469. The primary policy and general purpose underlying Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P., i s t o encourage j u d i c i a l economy through the prompt elimination of questions not deserving of resolution by t r i a l . Silloway v. Jorgenson, 146 Mont. 307, 310, 406 P.2d 167. Thus while the i n i t i a l burden of proof must a t t a c h t o t h e movant, t h a t burden s h i f t s where t h e record discloses no genuine issue of material f a c t . Under these circumstances, the party opposing the motion must come forward with substantial evidence r a i s i n g t h e issue. Rickard v. Paradis, M o n t . , 539 P.2d 718, 32 St.Rep. 834; Roope v. The Anaconda Company, 159 Mont. 28, 494 P.2d 922; Flansberg v. Montana Power Company, 154 Mont. 53, 460 P.2d 263. Once the burden has shifted, the party opposing t h e motion i s held t o a standard of proof about equal t o t h a t i n i t i a l l y imposed upon the moving party: l l I + c * +< the party opposing motion must present f a c t s i n proper form - conclusions of law w i l l not s u f f i c e ; and the opposing p a r t y ' s f a c t s must be material and of a substantial nature, not fanciful, frivolous, gauzy, nor merely suspicious. I I t Silloway v. Jorgenson, 146 Mont. 307, 310, 406 P.2d 167. To e s t a b l i s h the existence of an easement by prescription, th3 party so claiming must show open, notorious, exclusive, adverse, continuous and uninterrupted use of the easement f o r the statutory period prescribed by section 93-2507, R. C.M. 1947. I n support of h i s claims t o t h i s Court, Harland s e t s f o r t h several arguments. The depositions of Warehime, Perrine, and James a r e offered i n an attempt t o e s t a b l i s h use of t h e road by the general public f o r the years 1916-1948, for recreational and occasional other purposes. H e c i t e s Scott v. Weinheimer, 140 Mont. 554, 374 P.2d 91, f o r t h e proposition t h a t the unexplained use of an easement f o r the statutory period w i l l be presumed t o be under a claim of r i g h t and therefore adverse. But Scott i s inapplicable here, where the use of the road was more than adequately explained i n the record. Deponents admittedly owned no land i n t h e area and could not therefore have used the road t o gain access t o t h e i r holdings. There i s no doubt deponents and others used the road f o r recreation, hunting, fishing and occasional timbering operations, but t h i s i s not s u f f i c i e n t t o r a i s e the presumption of adverse use, or a claim of r i g h t under the r u l e i n Scott. The d i s t r i c t court so found and we see no reason t o overrule it. W e next examine the claim t h a t an easement by prescription may e x i s t by v i r t u e of adverse use by t h e Obrechts during t h e time they owned the property now i n question. A t the outset, we discount any use of the road between 1948 through 1959 i n deter- mining the v a l i d i t y of the prescriptive claim. This use was allowed under a duly executed agreement which Andersons terminated i n 1959. Any use which i s permissive i n i t s inception may not ripen i n t o a prescriptive r i g h t , unless there has been a d i s t i n c t and positive assertion by t h e claimant owner of a r i g h t h o s t i l e t o the owner of the servient e s t a t e . Drew v. Burggraf, 141 Mont. 405, 378 P.2d 232. It i s c l e a r there was no such positive assertion here. In f a c t , the record and Obrechtls deposition d i s c l o s e . t o the contrary: "Q. Were you permitted t o use t h i s road a s access t o your mountain properties? A. Formerly, yes. "Q. H o w about i n the l a s t few years? A . Well, I haven't taken c a t t l e up o r anything. There was too much fighting and s t u f f l i k e that. "(2. '\lo problem w i t h Mr. ,inderson i f you went up there t o f i x a fence o r anything? A . No. Not a t f i r s t . I I 'Che d i s t r i c t court found: 1 I . , A -1- -1- , , , , t h e record i s e n t i r e l y devoid of any evidence of open, common, notorious, exclusive, ddverse, continuous o r uninterrupted use of s a i d roadway by any p a r t i e s * + : +< which c o n s i s t s of more than f i v e years p r i o r t o t h e f i l i n g of t h e Complaint herein. f l Chis tinding i s sustained by t h e record. The d i s t r i c t court a i s o found t h e Andersons had maintained " t o t a l dominion" over che roadway. This finding conforms t o the r u l i n g i n Peasley v. Crosper, 103 Mont. 401, 64 P.2d 109, wherein t h e Court held t h a t the presence of gates which must be opened by the u s e r i s strong evidence of permissive r a t h e r than adverse use. F i n a l l y , Harland contends t h a t a s t h e l e s s e e of t h e U n i ~ e c l S t a t e s he is e n t i t l e d t o use any easement appurtenant t o the leasehold property. But t h i s statement i s made without a s c i n t i l l a of evidence t o show t h a t an easement has e i t h e r been ciaimed o r established by the f e d e r a l government. The a l l e g a t i o n i s therefore s t r i c t l y conclusory and speculative. A s such, it was properly resolved i n t h e proceedings f o r summary judgment. The judgment i s affirmed. s i t t i n g f o r Chief J u s t i c e Harrison.