Title: New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency v. A.B.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: December 21, 2017

New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency v. A.B. Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary Sixteen-year-old A.F. and her infant son lived with her biological mother, A.B., in an apartment owned by A.B.’s sister, J.F. In 2012, the New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency (the Division) received a referral that A.F. had run away with her infant son in September 2012. The Division dispatched a caseworker to interview A.B. at her apartment. A.B. disclosed that A.F. had run away several days earlier when A.B. took away A.F.’s laptop and cellphone as punishment for being suspended from school. The caseworker went to the high school and met with A.F. During this meeting, A.F. related that she had been staying with various friends since leaving home. A.F. indicated that she had previously returned home to reconcile with A.B. and that they had gone together to the school to have A.F. reinstated. Near the end of the conference, A.F. expressed that she had “no intention of returning to her mom’s home,” and in fact did not. The issue this case presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court’s review centered on whether defendant A.B. abused or neglected A.F.; that A.B. willfully abandoned A.F.; and that remarks attributed to A.B.’s sister, J.F., were subject to suppression as embedded hearsay. The Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division majority’s judgment that the New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency met its burden of proof concerning A.B.’s abuse or neglect of A.F. The Court found insufficient proof of willful abandonment and therefore reversed on that issue. The Court also found the hearsay evidence was properly suppressed. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUS(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.) New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency v. A.B. (A-27-16) (077664)Argued September 26, 2017 -- Decided December 21, 2017TIMPONE, J., writing for the Court. In this appeal as of right, the Court considers determinations that defendant A.B. abused or neglected A.F., her sixteen-year-old daughter; that A.B. willfully abandoned A.F.; and that remarks attributed to A.B.’s sister, J.F., were subject to suppression as embedded hearsay. Sixteen-year-old A.F. and her infant son lived with her biological mother, A.B., in an apartment owned by A.B.’s sister, J.F. On October 2, 2012, the New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency (the Division) received a referral that A.F. had run away with her infant son in September 2012. The Division dispatched a caseworker to interview A.B. at her apartment. A.B. disclosed that A.F. had run away several days earlier when A.B. took away A.F.’s laptop and cellphone as punishment for being suspended from school. The caseworker went to the high school and met with A.F. During this meeting, A.F. related that she had been staying with various friends since leaving home. A.F. indicated that she had previously returned home to reconcile with A.B. and that they had gone together to the school to have A.F. reinstated. Near the end of the conference, A.F. expressed that she had “no intention of returning to her mom’s home,” and in fact did not. Later that day, the caseworker discovered that A.F. and her infant son were staying with a friend, L.V., whose residence lacked electricity. The caseworker attempted to gain entry to the residence to assess its suitability for a young runaway and her infant. She was refused entry. The caseworker immediately conveyed to A.B. her apprehensions regarding the safety of A.F. and her infant son, as well as the suitability of A.F.’s living arrangement. A.B. voiced concern but was “still not willing to allow the children to come back and reside with her.” A.B. asserted that she lived with her sister, J.F., who owned the apartment and was unwilling to allow A.F. back into the home “as well.” A.B. could think of no one else with whom A.F. could stay. She was also unwilling to consent to an order of emergency removal for A.F. The Division placed A.F. and her son in a resource home. The Division then filed a verified complaint in the Family Part of the Superior Court, Chancery Division, seeking legal custody of A.F. The court conducted a fact-finding hearing to determine whether A.B. abused, neglected, or willfully abandoned A.F. Defense counsel objected to the admission of embedded hearsay in the form of statements attributed to J.F., A.B.’s sister, within the Division’s referral, reports, and documents. The court sustained that objection. During the Law Guardian’s cross-examination of the caseworker, the Law Guardian asked if J.F. ever told her that “she was not willing to let A.F. stay in her house.” Defense counsel objected on the basis of inadmissible hearsay; the judge sustained the objection. During the defense’s summation, the Division objected when defense counsel attempted to reference J.F.’s refusal to allow A.F. into her home. The judge similarly sustained the objection on hearsay grounds. The judge determined that A.B. neglected A.F. in violation of subsections (4)(a) and (5) of N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c), explaining that “refusing to allow a 16 year old child into her home who has an infant herself would be gross negligence. It’s just reckless disregard for the safety of her child.” A divided Appellate Division panel affirmed. The panel majority rejected A.B.’s contention that a finding of abuse or neglect under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4) could not be sustained because A.F. was not actually harmed in any way. “[T]he risks inherent in barring a sixteen-year-old child from the family home without arranging any alternative source of shelter or support are obvious,” the majority observed. The panel majority affirmed the judge’s finding of willful abandonment under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(5), holding that the record contained substantial and credible evidence that A.B. willfully abdicated any responsibility for her daughter: A.B. refused to permit A.F. to return home despite being informed by the Division that A.F.’s living arrangement was ill-advised and failed to make other arrangements for A.F.’s care and support. Lastly, the panel majority found no error in the judge’s conclusion that the hearsay testimony regarding A.B.’s sister was unreliable. 1 The dissenting panel member disagreed with the majority’s refusal to consider evidence of the sister’s ownership of the apartment and her decision not to re-admit A.F., contending that the caseworker’s testimony on the matter was competent, material, and relevant evidence. The dissent further took issue with the panel majority’s finding of abuse or neglect because there was neither evidence of actual harm to A.F. nor the threat of harm. The dissent further disputed the panel majority’s finding of abandonment under the statute because A.B. gave no indication that she intended to permanently bar her daughter or was abdicating her parental rights and duties. A.B. appealed to the Court as of right. See R. 2:2-1(a)(2).HELD: The Division met its burden of proof concerning A.B.’s abuse or neglect of A.F. under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4). The Court finds insufficient proof of willful abandonment under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(5) and reverses on that issue. The hearsay evidence was properly suppressed.1. The hearsay statements at issue were the subject of objection and were excluded early in the proceedings. Importantly, it was defense counsel who objected at the commencement of the fact-finding hearing to “any hearsay statements from . . . [J.F.].” The Court has long recognized the doctrine of invited error, which operates to bar a disappointed litigant from arguing on appeal that an adverse decision below was the product of error, when that party urged the lower court to adopt the proposition now alleged to be error. A.B. succeeded in having the trial court take a certain course of action; she cannot now condemn the very determination for which she advocated merely because the consequences of that determination have proved unfavorable. (pp. 14-16)2. Hearsay may not be admitted into evidence unless it falls into a recognized exception. When a hearsay statement contains another hearsay statement, the embedded hearsay must independently fall within one of the exceptions to be admissible. Here, J.F.’s purported refusal to allow A.F. to return to the apartment was referenced in documents about which the caseworker was asked. Although the documents themselves benefitted from an exception to the hearsay rule, it was not an abuse of the trial court’s discretion to find that the remarks within those reports attributed to J.F.—who did not testify—were hearsay within hearsay that did not fall within an independent exception. Thus, even absent invited error, the judge did not abuse her discretion in excluding the hearsay statements. (p. 17)3. To prove abuse or neglect under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(a), the Division must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the child’s physical, mental, or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired; and (2) the impairment or imminent impairment results from the parent’s failure to exercise a minimum degree of care. A.F. was sixteen years old and caring for a premature infant. When A.F.’s school became aware that she had run away, the school referred the issue to the Division. The Division then asked A.B. to contact them pertaining to A.F.; A.B. never did so. Only later did A.B. concede that she was unaware of A.F.’s whereabouts. The caseworker then unearthed that A.F. was living in a residence lacking electricity, so she visited the home to determine its adequacy. When the caseworker concluded that the home was unsuitable, she implored A.B. to sign an emergency removal or to allow the children to return home; A.B. refused both entreaties. A.B. failed to exercise the minimum degree of care. That failure placed A.F.’s physical, mental, and emotional condition in imminent danger of becoming impaired. The Court affirms the panel majority’s finding of A.B.’s abuse or neglect of A.F. per N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4). (pp. 17-22)4. In Lavigne v. Family & Children’s Society, the Court set forth the standard required for the State to prove abandonment under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(5) as “any conduct on the part of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child.” 11 N.J. 473, 480 (1953). The facts here do not support that A.B.’s conduct amounted to a “settled purpose” to forego her parental rights. The dissent suggested several factors from the record indicating that A.B. had no intention of abdicating her parental rights and duties: A.B. periodically permitted A.F. back into the dwelling; A.B. accompanied A.F. to school to help her get reinstated after suspension; and A.B., upon receiving her own housing, permitted A.F. to return to live with her. The Court reverses the finding of the panel majority and holds that the State did not meet its burden in proving that A.B. willfully abandoned A.F. per N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(5). (pp. 22-24) The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED IN PART and REVERSED IN PART. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ- VINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE TIMPONE’s opinion. 2 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 27 September Term 2016 077664NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v.A.B., Defendant-Appellant.IN THE MATTER OF A.F., Minor. Argued September 26, 2017 – Decided December 21, 2017 On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Clara S. Licata, Designated Counsel, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender Parental Representation, attorney; T. Gary Mitchell, Deputy Public Defender, of counsel, and Clara S. Licata, of counsel and on the briefs). Sara M. Gregory, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney; Andrea S. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel, and Joyce Calefati Booth, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Melissa R. Vance, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent A.F. (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender Law 1 Guardian, attorney; Melissa R. Vance, on the brief). Mary M. McManus-Smith argued the cause for amicus curiae Legal Services of New Jersey (Melville D. Miller, Jr., President, attorney; Mary M. McManus-Smith, Melville D. Miller, Jr., and Jeyanthi C. Rajaraman, on the brief). JUSTICE TIMPONE delivered the opinion of the Court. This case comes before us as a matter of right from adivided Appellate Division panel. The panel majority upheld thetrial court’s determinations that defendant A.B. abused orneglected A.F., her sixteen-year-old daughter; that A.B.willfully abandoned A.F.; and that remarks attributed to A.B.’ssister, J.F., were subject to suppression as embedded hearsay.The dissenting panelist disagreed with all three determinations. We now affirm the panel majority’s judgment that the NewJersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency met itsburden of proof concerning A.B.’s abuse or neglect of A.F. Wefind, however, insufficient proof of willful abandonment andtherefore reverse on that issue. We also find that the hearsayevidence was properly suppressed. I. We marshal the following facts from the record. Sixteen-year-old A.F. and her infant son lived with herbiological mother, defendant A.B., in an apartment owned by 2 A.B.’s sister, J.F. A.F. and A.B. had a tumultuousrelationship, which spurred the incidents that resulted in thiscase. On October 2, 2012, the New Jersey Division of ChildProtection and Permanency (the Division) received a referralthat A.F. had run away with her infant son in September 2012.The referral included concerns that A.F. smoked marijuana,consumed alcohol, and exhibited inadequate parenting. TheDivision dispatched a caseworker to interview A.B. at herapartment, where she told the caseworker she had been havingdifficulty with A.F., who was very disrespectful. A.B.disclosed that A.F. had run away with her infant son severaldays earlier when A.B. took away A.F.’s laptop and cellphone aspunishment for being suspended from school for cursing at ateacher. A.B. tried to reach A.F. by cellphone but, when sherefused to answer, A.B. cancelled A.F.’s cellphone service. In October 2012, in response to a call from A.F.’s highschool, the caseworker went to the high school and met with A.F.During this meeting, A.F. related that she had been staying withvarious friends since leaving home. A.F. indicated that she hadpreviously returned home to reconcile with A.B. and that theyhad gone together to the school to have A.F. reinstated. Duringthe conference with the school’s Management Crisis Team, A.F.and A.B. got into an argument, and A.B. “made statements that 3 she was close to kicking [A.F.] out of her home.” Near the endof the conference, A.F. expressed that she had “no intention ofreturning to her mom’s home,” and in fact did not. Later that day, the caseworker discovered that A.F. and herinfant son were staying with a friend, L.V., whose residencelacked electricity. The caseworker attempted to gain entry tothe residence to assess its suitability for a young runaway andher infant. She was refused entry. The caseworker immediatelyconveyed to A.B. her apprehensions regarding the safety of A.F.and her infant son, as well as the suitability of A.F.’s livingarrangement. A.B. voiced concern but was “still not willing toallow the children to come back and reside with her,”emphasizing “she was not willing to take [A.F.] back” given thatA.F. “was very disrespectful.” A.B. asserted that she lived with her sister, J.F., whoowned the apartment and was unwilling to allow A.F. back intothe home “as well.” A.B. could think of no one else with whomA.F. could stay. She was also unwilling to consent to an orderof emergency removal for A.F. The Division resorted to anemergency removal process and placed A.F. and her son in aresource home. The Division then filed a verified complaint inthe Family Part of the Superior Court, Chancery Division,seeking continued legal custody of A.F. At an order to showcause hearing, the court determined that the Division’s removal 4 was proper and that the Division would retain custody of A.F.The court later continued the Division’s custody of A.F. On February 19, 2013, the court conducted a fact-findinghearing to determine whether A.B. abused, neglected, orwillfully abandoned A.F. within the meaning of Title 9, N.J.S.A.9:6-8.21 to -8.73. As a preliminary matter, defense counselobjected to the admission of embedded hearsay in the form ofstatements attributed to J.F., A.B.’s sister, within theDivision’s referral, reports, and documents. The courtsustained that objection. At the fact-finding hearing, the Division’s caseworker wasits only witness. During the Law Guardian’s cross-examinationof the caseworker, the Law Guardian asked if J.F. ever told herthat “she was not willing to let A.F. stay in her house.”Defense counsel objected on the basis of inadmissible hearsay;the judge sustained the objection. During the defense’ssummation, the Division objected when defense counsel attemptedto reference J.F.’s refusal to allow A.F. into her home. Thejudge similarly sustained the objection on hearsay grounds.During defense counsel’s cross-examination of the caseworker,the Division objected when defense counsel intimated that J.F.refused to allow A.F. back into the apartment, arguing that itwas not a proper question for that witness to answer. The judgesustained the objection. 5 In an oral decision rendered on the record, the judgedetermined that A.B. neglected A.F. in violation of subsections(4)(a) and (5) of N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c), explaining that“refusing to allow a 16 year old child into her home who has aninfant herself would be gross negligence. It’s just recklessdisregard for the safety of her child.” A divided Appellate Division panel affirmed in anunpublished opinion. The panel majority rejected A.B.’scontention that a finding of abuse or neglect under N.J.S.A.9:6-8.21(c)(4) could not be sustained because A.F. was notactually harmed in any way, reasoning that “the statute makesexpressly clear that actual impairment of the child is notrequired to support a finding of neglect.” The panel majoritysimilarly dismissed A.B.’s argument that the judge failed tomake an explicit finding that A.F. was in imminent danger asdefined by N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4). “[T]he risks inherent inbarring a sixteen-year-old child from the family home withoutarranging any alternative source of shelter or support areobvious,” the majority observed. The panel majority affirmed the judge’s finding of willfulabandonment under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(5), holding that therecord contained substantial and credible evidence that A.B.willfully abdicated any responsibility for her daughter. Thepanel majority found support for that finding in evidence that 6 A.B. refused to permit A.F. to return home despite beinginformed by the Division that A.F.’s living arrangement was ill-advised, as well as A.B.’s failure to make other arrangementsfor A.F.’s care and support. Lastly, the panel majority rebuffed the dissent’s argumentthat A.B.’s due process rights were violated by the suppressionof hearsay testimony concerning J.F.’s alleged refusal to allowA.F. back into the apartment. The panel majority noted that thejudge had discretion to determine the credibility of theevidence adduced at the fact-finding hearing and found no errorin the judge’s conclusion that the hearsay testimony regardingA.B.’s sister was unreliable. The dissenting panel member disagreed with the majority’srefusal to consider evidence of the sister’s ownership of theapartment and her decision not to re-admit A.F., contending thatthe caseworker’s testimony on the matter was competent,material, and relevant evidence. The dissent further took issue with the panel majority’sfinding of abuse or neglect, reasoning that even if A.B. hadprecluded A.F. from returning home, that act does not justify anabuse or neglect finding because there was neither evidence ofactual harm to A.F. nor the threat of harm. The dissent notedthat A.F. ran away on other occasions and each time returnedhome unscathed. 7 The dissent further disputed the panel majority’s findingof abandonment under the statute. The dissenting panelistmaintained that abandonment required a finding that a parentmust exhibit a willful forsaking of her parentalresponsibilities, whereas A.B. gave no indication that sheintended to permanently bar her daughter or was abdicating herparental rights and duties. A.B. appealed to this Court as of right. See R. 2:2-1(a)(2). We granted leave to Legal Services of New Jersey(LSNJ) to appear as amicus curiae. II. A. A.B. advances three arguments on appeal and urges thisCourt to reverse the decision of the panel majority. First, sheasserts that it was error to exclude hearsay testimony allegingthat her sister J.F. was instrumental in prohibiting A.F. fromreturning to her apartment. A.B. argues that the panelmajority’s reliance on Division of Youth & Family Services v.J.Y., 352 N.J. Super. 245 (App. Div. 2002), to support exclusionof the hearsay statements was misplaced. Rather, A.B. arguesthat the J.Y. decision established a shield to protect againstthe State’s misuse of hearsay and casual non-evidentialassertions as evidence in a Title 9 case and that the FamilyPart judge flouted J.Y.’s demand for “fairness and formality in 8 a Title 9 trial.” A.B. also adopts the dissenting judge’sassertion that the exclusion of the hearsay statementsconstituted a due process violation. Second, A.B. argues that the Division did not presentsufficient evidence to sustain a finding of abuse or neglectagainst her under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4). Specifically, A.B.contends that the Division was required to show: (1) that A.F.’s physical, mental, or emotional condition was impaired or in imminent danger of becoming impaired; (2) that A.B. failed to exercise a minimum degree of care in providing her daughter with adequate shelter[;] and (3) that she was financially able to do so or had been offered the financial means to do so. A.B. maintains that the Division did not meet its burden ofproving any of those elements. As to the harm or impairmentprong, A.B. argues that the panel majority created a categoricalrule in holding that “the risks inherent in barring a sixteen-year-old from the family home without arranging any alternativesource of shelter are obvious.” A.B. asserts that this Courtcondemned such rules in the Title 9 context in Division of ChildProtection & Permanency v. E.D.-O., 223 N.J. 166, 192-93 (2015).A.B. maintains that even if V.L.’s home lacked electricity, thatalone would not indicate that A.F. was in danger of impairment.A.B. argues that the Division did not make the requisite showingof imminent peril to A.F. A.B. further asserts that the 9 Division failed to provide evidence of her financial ability toprovide shelter. Lastly, A.B. argues that the trial court’s finding ofabandonment under Title 9 must be reversed because there were noproofs presented to demonstrate that she intended to willfullyforego her parental responsibilities. A.B. stresses that therecord indicates she had no intent of abandoning A.F. asevidenced by the fact that she allowed A.F. to return to thefamily home on several occasions. B. The Division counters that it demonstrated abuse or neglectof A.F. by A.B. by a preponderance of the evidence and asks thisCourt to affirm the panel majority. The Division echoes thetrial court’s finding that A.B.’s refusal to allow A.F. backinto the apartment amounted to gross negligence and evidencedher reckless disregard for A.F.’s safety. The Division alsoadopts the panel majority’s holding that “the risks of leaving ateenager without a source of shelter are 'obvious.’” TheDivision notes that A.B. refused services offered to her,including substance abuse treatment, and failed to seekassistance even after A.F. had left the home. In addition, theDivision alleges that A.B. thwarted its attempts to provide herwith assistance when she failed to apprise the Division of herissues with A.F. 10 The Division underscores that the trial court acted withinits discretion in excluding the hearsay statements at issuebecause those statements were not credible and A.B. sought andwas granted their exclusion. A.B. cannot now argue thatprecluding the statements was error, the Division argues, underthe doctrine of invited error. The Division notes that A.B.’sargument was not raised below. The Division urges this Court to affirm the panelmajority’s finding of abandonment under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(5).The Division contends that A.B.’s refusal to allow A.F. backinto the home amounted to a “willful or intentional act” underthe statute. C. The Law Guardian, appearing on behalf of A.F., argues thatthe court properly excluded as hearsay statements regardingJ.F.’s refusal to allow A.F. to return to the apartment,stressing that those statements did not qualify for anenumerated exception because they were unreliable and lackedcorroboration. The Law Guardian agrees that the Divisionproperly showed, by a preponderance of the evidence, A.B.’sabuse or neglect of A.F. under subsections (4) and (5) ofN.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21. The Law Guardian submits that the risks thatarise from “leaving a child without adequate shelter need not beexplained” and are plainly evident. The Law Guardian also 11 supports the finding of abandonment under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(5), arguing that A.B. had an obligation to “provide orarrange housing for her child” and her not doing so amounted toa failure to “provide for her child’s safety and well-being.” D. As amicus curiae, LSNJ urges this Court to reverse thepanel majority’s holding and argues that the Division should nothave initiated abuse or neglect proceedings. Rather, LSNJcontends, the Division should have performed its “duty toprovide the resources necessary to ensure adequate housing”instead of placing the onus on A.B. for not “seek[ing] help fromthe Division to shelter her daughter.” LSNJ advocates that forthe Division to meet its burden of proof under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(a), it must prove either that the parent had thefinancial means to provide for his or her child or that theDivision affirmatively offered the financial or other resourcesnecessary to secure adequate housing. LSNJ additionallycontends that the Division could have provided shelter for A.F.under the New Jersey Homeless Youth Act, codified in relevantpart at N.J.S.A. 9:12A-1. LSNJ advances that A.B.’s refusal to allow A.F. to returnhome was simply an acknowledgment of her lack of options.According to LSNJ, A.B. exhibited her intent to continue to 12 parent A.F.; LSNJ therefore takes issue with the panelmajority’s finding of willful abandonment. III. A. The New Jersey Constitution dictates that the SuperiorCourt include a family part. N.J. Const. art. VI, § 3, ¶ 3.Accordingly, our Constitution assigned to the Family Divisionthe formidable task of adjudicating some of the most sensitiveand precarious issues within contemporary society. See, e.g.,Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. I.S., 214 N.J. 8, 14 (2013)(“Family courts are expected to address many difficultsituations . . . .”). The United States Supreme Court has long recognized thefundamental right of individuals to “establish a home and bringup children” as “essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness.”Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 , 399 (1923). The Supreme Courtlater stated that “the interest of parents in the care, custody,and control of their children -- is perhaps the oldest of thefundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.” Troxelv. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 , 65 (2000). The sacrosanctobligations involved in childrearing extend beyond evenlongstanding legal doctrine. The bearing and raising ofchildren is one of the most intimate endeavors society pursues.It is for this very reason that we have “invest[ed] the family 13 court with broad discretion because of its specialized knowledgeand experience in matters involving parental relationships andthe best interests of children.” Div. of Youth & Family Servs.v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 427 (2012); see also Cesare v. Cesare,154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998) (“Because of the family courts’ specialjurisdiction and expertise in family matters, appellate courtsshould accord deference to family court factfinding.”); Div. ofYouth & Family Servs. v. M.C. III, 201 N.J. 328, 343 (2010).Indeed, we defer to family part judges “unless they are so wideof the mark that our intervention is required to avert aninjustice.” F.M., 211 N.J. at 427. B. We first consider whether the judge properly excluded theembedded hearsay statements at issue. “Trial judges are givenwide discretion in exercising control over their courtrooms” andhave “the ultimate responsibility of conducting adjudicativeproceedings in a manner that complies with required formality inthe taking of evidence and the rendering of findings.” Div. ofYouth & Family Servs. v. J.Y., 352 N.J. Super. 245, 264 (App.Div. 2002). Appellate courts review evidentiary determinationsby a trial court, including hearsay determinations, for abuse ofdiscretion. See Carmona v. Resorts Int’l Hotel, Inc., 189 N.J. 354, 379 (2007). 14 Before the fact-finding hearing, defense counsel objectedto the admission of embedded hearsay contained in the referraldocument and the Division’s reports, and, specifically, to anyhearsay statements from J.F.’s boyfriend and J.F. The judgeconcurred and sustained the objection. During the fact-findinghearing, defense counsel raised a hearsay objection when the LawGuardian referenced J.F.’s refusal to allow A.F. back into herapartment. Later, the Division objected on the same groundswhen defense counsel referenced the refusal in his summation.The Division similarly objected when defense counsel implied incross-examining the caseworker that J.F. refused to allow A.F.back into the apartment, arguing that it was not a question forthe witness to answer -- an apparent shorthand for a hearsayobjection. As with defense counsel’s preliminary objection, thecourt sustained all three objections and excluded the challengedtestimony as inadmissible hearsay. The panel majority affirmed. The dissenting judge, citing to Smith v. Delaware &Atlantic Telegraph & Telephone Co., 63 N.J. Eq. 93, 95 (Ch.1902), aff’d, 64 N.J. Eq. 770 (E. & A. 1902), concluded thatthis Court’s jurisprudence requires that “hearsay evidence notobjected to should be considered evidential.” The dissent wrotethat “A.B.’s statement that her sister objected to A.F.’s returnto the home entered the record without objection and should havebeen given its natural and logical probative effect” 15 particularly because “if the decision to bar A.F. was made byJ.F., A.B. cannot be held responsible for not allowing herdaughter to return to the home.” Those arguments were largelyadopted by A.B. on appeal to this Court. The reasoning underpinning those arguments is problematic.The hearsay statements at issue were the subject of objectionand were excluded early in the proceedings. Importantly, it wasdefense counsel who objected at the commencement of the fact-finding hearing to “any hearsay statements from . . . [J.F.].” This Court has long recognized the doctrine of invitederror, which “operates to bar a disappointed litigant fromarguing on appeal that an adverse decision below was the productof error, when that party urged the lower court to adopt theproposition now alleged to be error.” Brett v. Great Am.Recreation, 144 N.J. 479, 503 (1996); accord State v. Jenkins,178 N.J. 347, 358 (2004). A.B. succeeded in having the trialcourt take a certain course of action; she cannot now condemnthe very determination for which she advocated merely becausethe consequences of that determination have proved unfavorable.The doctrine of invited error is predicated “on considerationsof fairness and preservation of the integrity of the litigationprocess.” Brett, 144 N.J. at 503. Here, A.B. attempts toaccomplish precisely what our jurisprudence prohibits. 16 Hearsay, which may not be admitted into evidence unless itfalls into a recognized exception, N.J.R.E. 802, is defined as“a statement, other than one made by the declarant whiletestifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to provethe truth of the matter asserted.” N.J.R.E. 801(c). When ahearsay statement contains, in turn, another hearsay statement,the embedded hearsay must independently fall within one of theexceptions set forth in N.J.R.E. 803 or 804 to be admissible.Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. N.T., 445 N.J. Super. 478,497 (App. Div. 2016); see also N.J.R.E. 805. Here, J.F.’s purported refusal to allow A.F. to return tothe apartment was referenced in documents about which thecaseworker was asked. Although the documents themselvesbenefitted from an exception to the hearsay rule, it was not anabuse of the trial court’s discretion to find that the remarkswithin those reports attributed to J.F. -- who did not testify -- were hearsay within hearsay that did not fall within anindependent exception. Thus, even absent invited error, thejudge did not abuse her discretion in excluding the hearsaystatements, and we affirm the panel majority’s determination onthat point. B. We next turn to the findings of abuse or neglect and ofabandonment, both in violation of Title 9. The focus of Title 9 17 “is not the 'culpability of parental conduct’ but rather 'theprotection of children.’” E.D.-O., 223 N.J. at 178 (quotingG.S. v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 157 N.J. 161, 177 (1999)). Title9 delineates the standards for adjudicating cases of abuse orneglect. The act provides interim relief for children at riskand defines “the standards for abuse and neglect proceedingsagainst parents and guardians.” Div. of Youth & Family Servs.v. A.L., 213 N.J. 1, 18 (2013). The “paramount concern” ofTitle 9 is to ensure the “safety of the children,” so that “thelives of innocent children are immediately safeguarded fromfurther injury and possible death.” N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.8. Title 9 defines an abused or neglected child as a child less than 18 years of age . . . whose physical, mental, or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired as the result of the failure of his parent or guardian . . . to exercise a minimum degree of care . . . in supplying the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, education, medical or surgical care though financially able to do so or though offered financial or other reasonable means to do so. [N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(a).]Included under Title 9 is a separate category of abuse orneglect: “willful abandonment.” A child less than 18 years ofage may be found to be abused or neglected if the child has beenwillfully abandoned by his parent or guardian. N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(5). 18 The panel majority affirmed the judge’s findings that A.B.abused or neglected A.F. under subsections (4)(a) and (5) ofN.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21. We analyze each finding in turn. In doingso, we review the judge’s legal conclusions de novo. ManalapanRealty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Twp. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366,378 (1995). As we have stressed, however, “appellate courtsshould accord deference to family court factfinding” inrecognition “of the family courts’ special jurisdiction andexpertise in family matters.” Cesare, 154 N.J. at 413; see alsoM.C. III, 201 N.J. at 343. 1. We turn first to the finding that A.F. was abused orneglected under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(a). To prove abuse orneglect under that subsection, the Division must establish by apreponderance of the evidence that: (1) the child’s physical,mental, or emotional condition has been impaired or is inimminent danger of becoming impaired; and (2) the impairment orimminent impairment results from the parent’s failure toexercise a minimum degree of care. In G.S., we elaborated on the standard required to meet the“minimum degree of care” element. We adopted the intermediaryposition between simple negligence and the intentionalinfliction of harm. G.S., 157 N.J. at 179. Simply put, we haveheld that “a guardian fails to exercise a minimum degree of care 19 when he or she is aware of the dangers inherent in a situationand fails adequately to supervise the child or recklesslycreates a risk of serious injury to that child.” Id. at 181.To determine if a parent or guardian failed to exercise aminimum degree of care, we must additionally “account for thesurrounding circumstances,” E.D.-O., 223 N.J. at 180 (citingG.S., 157 N.J. at 181–82), given that “[a]buse and neglect cases'are fact-sensitive,’” ibid. (citing Div. of Youth & FamilyServs. v. T.B., 207 N.J. 294, 309 (2011)). In A.L., we considered whether a newborn whose stool testedpositive for cocaine metabolites was abused or neglected by hismother under Title 9 if she used drugs during pregnancy. 213 N.J. at 8–9. We explained that circumstances in which actualimpairment is lacking will still meet the impairment element ifthere is “evidence of imminent danger or substantial risk ofharm.” Id. at 22. Intuitively, a court need not sit idly byuntil a child is actually impaired by parental inattention orneglect. Id. at 23. The plain language of the statute revealsthat if the Division can prove by a preponderance of theevidence that a child faces imminent danger of impairment, thestatutory element will be satisfied. See ibid. Guided by this framework, we find sufficient support forthe determination that A.B. neglected A.F. under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4). A.F. was sixteen years old and caring for a 20 premature infant. When A.F.’s school became aware that she hadrun away, the school referred the issue to the Division. TheDivision then asked A.B. to contact them pertaining to A.F.;A.B. never did so. Only later did A.B. concede that she wasunaware of A.F.’s whereabouts. The caseworker then unearthedthat A.F. was living in a residence lacking electricity, so shevisited the home to determine its adequacy. When the caseworkerconcluded that the home was unsuitable, she implored A.B. tosign an emergency removal or to allow the children to returnhome; A.B. refused both entreaties. Viewing those facts collectively, we agree with the panelmajority regarding N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4) and hold that A.B.’sconduct here was grossly negligent because she was clearly awareof the dangers inherent in the situation. The perils facing asixteen-year-old caring for a four-month-old infant, who is leftto fend for herself, bereft of any parental supervision,guidance, or care, are self-evident. A.B. not only failed toadequately supervise A.F. but exacerbated the existing dangersto her daughter by terminating A.F.’s cellphone service andrefusing to allow the children back into the apartment after theDivision caseworker explicitly delineated the hazards theyfaced. The panel majority correctly concluded that “the risksinherent in barring a sixteen-year-old child from the familyhome without arranging any alternative source of shelter or 21 support are obvious.” Clearly, A.B. failed to exercise theminimum degree of care. That failure placed A.F.’s physical,mental, and emotional condition in imminent danger of becomingimpaired. We affirm the panel majority’s finding of A.B.’s abuse orneglect of A.F. per N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4). 2. Finally, we address the Division’s allegation that A.F. wasabandoned under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(5). Abandonment of a child shall consist in any of the following acts by anyone having the custody or control of the child: (a) willfully forsaking a child; (b) failing to care for and keep the custody and control of a child so that the child shall be exposed to physical or moral risk without proper and sufficient protection; (c) failing to care for and keep the control and custody of a child so that the child shall be liable to be supported and maintained at the expense of the public, or by child caring societies or private persons not legally chargeable with its or their care, custody and control. [N.J.S.A. 9:6-1.] The Division argues that A.B.’s actions, including herrefusal to allow A.F. and her infant son to return home,amounted to a “willful or intentional act” that qualified asabandonment under the statute. The judge found that the Statehad met its burden of proof and that A.B. had abandoned A.F.The panel majority affirmed. 22 In Lavigne v. Family & Children’s Society, Chief JusticeVanderbilt, writing for the Court, set forth the standardrequired for the State to prove abandonment under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(5): [t]he statutory notion of abandonment does not necessarily, we think, imply that the parent has deserted the child, or even ceased to feel any concern for its interests. It fairly may, and in our judgment does, import any conduct on the part of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child. [ 11 N.J. 473, 480 (1953) (emphasis added) (quoting Winans v. Luppie, 47 N.J. Eq. 302, 304 (E. & A. 1890)).] Conduct by a parent that evinces a settled purpose toforego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims tothe child is an extremely high bar. The facts here do notsupport that A.B.’s conduct amounted to a “settled purpose” toforego her parental rights. The dissent suggested severalfactors from the record indicating that A.B. had no intention ofabdicating her parental rights and duties: A.B. periodicallypermitted A.F. back into the dwelling; A.B. accompanied A.F. toschool to help her get reinstated after suspension; and A.B.,upon receiving her own housing, permitted A.F. to return to livewith her. While A.B. undoubtedly took questionable actions and hadbouts of ambivalence concerning her daughter that we hold to be 23 neglectful under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4), the facts here give noindication that she willfully relinquished her parental rights.Stated plainly, to find abandonment under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(5), the trial court must make specific findingsconcerning the conduct of the parent or guardian evidencing atrue forsaking of the child. No such conduct is present here. For those reasons, we reverse the finding of the panelmajority and hold that the State did not meet its burden inproving that A.B. willfully abandoned A.F. per N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(5). IV. The panel majority’s judgment affirming the finding thatA.B. abused or neglected A.F. under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(a)is affirmed. The judgment affirming the finding that A.B.abandoned A.F. per N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(5) is reversed. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE TIMPONE’s opinion. 24