Title: E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co. v. Eggleston
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 011739
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: June 7, 2002

PRESENT: All the Justices 
 
E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY 
 
v.  Record No. 011739 
OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
June 7, 2002 
BRENDA G. EGGLESTON 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
Brenda G. Eggleston was employed by E.I. du Pont de Nemours 
and Company (Du Pont).  During her employment, she received 
temporary incapacity payments under the Workers' Compensation 
Act for three different injuries arising out of her work.  
Eggleston was diagnosed with work-related bilateral carpal 
tunnel syndrome on September 28, 1989.  She was awarded 
temporary total incapacity benefits for a four-week period from 
September 26, 1990 through October 30, 1990 and permanent 
partial incapacity benefits from January 30, 1992 through July 
29, 1992.  Next, Eggleston received temporary total incapacity 
benefits for a five-week period in 1992 as a result of an injury 
to her right shoulder. 
 
On March 9, 1993, Eggleston was awarded temporary partial 
incapacity benefits of $74.35 per week based on a diagnosis of 
bilateral gamekeepers' thumb.  Although Du Pont did assign 
Eggleston to light duty work because of her physical conditions, 
ultimately Du Pont terminated Eggleston for medical reasons on 
November 30, 1993. 
 
Immediately following her termination and while receiving 
temporary partial incapacity benefits for the gamekeepers' thumb 
injury, Eggleston filed an application for a change of condition 
seeking temporary total incapacity benefits under her 
gamekeepers' thumb claim, but later, by amended application, 
sought permanent incapacity benefits, based on all three 
injuries.  Following a hearing in 1994, the deputy commissioner 
awarded Eggleston temporary total incapacity benefits stating 
that Eggleston's "physical limitations are the result of 
bilateral gamekeepers thumb, bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome 
and right shoulder problems."  The amount of the weekly payment 
was based on Eggleston's wages at the time she suffered her 
gamekeepers' thumb injury.  Du Pont did not appeal the decision 
of the deputy commissioner. 
 
In February 1999, Du Pont filed a change in condition 
application under all three of Eggleston's claim files, seeking 
various reductions in, and credits for, the incapacity payments 
it was making.  As relevant to this appeal, Du Pont asserted 
that Eggleston's gamekeepers' thumb injury had resolved itself 
and that the incapacity award should be appropriately reduced.  
Du Pont also asserted that it was entitled to a weekly credit 
against each injury toward the 500-week maximum recovery period 
established by Code § 65.2-518, rather than a credit limited to 
 
2
the gamekeepers' thumb injury, the crediting mechanism imposed 
by the Commission. 
 
Based on the evidence produced, the deputy commissioner 
concluded that the gamekeepers' thumb injury had resolved 
itself, and went on to hold that because the 1994 award was 
"based upon a finding that the claimant was disabled in part 
from all three compensable conditions, the employer has now 
established that the claimant's disability is due only to her 
two remaining conditions:  bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and 
the right shoulder injury."  The deputy commissioner directed 
that the weekly incapacity payment be based on Eggleston's 
highest weekly wage at the time she was diagnosed with bilateral 
carpal tunnel syndrome and that the payments made under the 
award be credited against the bilateral carpal tunnel injury 
claim. 
 
The deputy commissioner denied Du Pont's request that it 
receive credit against each of the underlying injuries, rather 
than just the gamekeepers' thumb injury, for each week that it 
paid the 1994 award, concluding that such credit was not 
authorized under the Workers' Compensation Act and, therefore, 
the weekly payments under the 1994 award had been properly 
credited to the gamekeepers' thumb injury only.  The decision of 
the deputy commissioner was affirmed by the Commission and by 
the Court of Appeals.  E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co. v. 
 
3
Eggleston, Record No. 2648-00-2, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 394 (Va. 
App. July 3, 2001) (unpublished).  On appeal, Du Pont again 
asserts that it was entitled to a credit for purposes of Code 
§ 65.2-518 against each of Eggleston's injuries for each payment 
it made pursuant to the 1994 award. 
 
We begin our analysis of the issue presented in this appeal 
mindful of two principles to be applied when considering 
benefits and awards available under the Workers' Compensation 
Act, Code §§ 65.2-100 through –1310 (the Act).  First, "[t]he 
right to compensation under the workmen's compensation law is 
granted by statute, and in giving the right the legislature had 
full power to prescribe the time and manner of its exercise."  
Winston v. City of Richmond, 196 Va. 403, 407, 83 S.E.2d 728, 
731 (1954).  Second, the Act is remedial legislation and should 
be liberally construed in favor of the injured employee.  Byrd 
v. Stonega Coke & Coal Co., 182 Va. 212, 221, 28 S.E.2d 725, 729 
(1944). 
 
As both the Commission and Court of Appeals recited, the 
General Assembly authorized crediting a single payment as more 
than one week for purposes of Code § 65.2-518, in only one 
instance.  That instance is where the claimant is receiving a 
benefit for both a permanent loss and a benefit for partial 
incapacity.  Code § 65.2-503(E)(2) authorizes an employer to 
make a single payment comprised of the amount due an employee 
 
4
pursuant to an award of permanent loss (Code § 65.2-503) and 
partial incapacity (Code § 65.2-502) and provides that such 
single payment must be credited as two weeks compensation for 
purposes of the 500-week compensation limitation. 
 
This section, of course, does not apply in this case 
because this case involves one, not two, awards and does not 
involve an award for a temporary partial and a contemporaneous 
award for permanent loss.  However, a well-recognized rule of 
statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, 
provides that the mention of a specific item in a statute 
implies that other omitted items were not intended to be 
included within the scope of the statute.  Smith Mountain Lake 
Yacht Club v. Ramaker, 261 Va. 240, 246, 542 S.E.2d 392, 395 
(2001); Commonwealth v. Brown, 259 Va. 697, 704-05, 529 S.E.2d 
96, 100 (2000); Board of Supervisors v. Wilson, 250 Va. 482, 
485, 463 S.E.2d 650, 652 (1995); Turner v. Wexler, 244 Va. 124, 
127, 418 S.E.2d 886, 887 (1992).  Thus, specifically allowing a 
simultaneous or double crediting for two awards under the 
circumstances contemplated by Code § 65.2-503(E)(2) and not 
providing for such double crediting for the purpose of Code 
§ 65.2-518 under any other circumstances, leads us to the 
conclusion that the General Assembly did not authorize or intend 
to authorize a double credit in circumstances in which the 
 
5
General Assembly has not authorized either a combined payment 
for more than one award or a double credit for a single payment. 
 
Nevertheless, Du Pont argues in this appeal that the 
failure to simultaneously credit the 1994 award against each of 
Eggleston's injuries violates Code § 65.2-518 by allowing more 
than 500 weeks of compensation for a single injury. 
 
The difficulty in this case is the nature of the injury 
upon which the 1994 award was based.  The relevant portion of 
the deputy commissioner's opinion in 1994 stated: 
 
From the evidence we find that the claimant 
continues to have marked physical restrictions as 
revealed by the medical records and her own testimony 
at hearing.  Claimant's physical limitations are the 
result of bilateral gamekeepers thumb, bilateral 
carpal tunnel syndrome and right shoulder problems.  
As a result of her physical limitations she was 
provided some light duty work with the employer but 
this did not prove to be consistent with her abilities 
and accordingly she was terminated from employment for 
physical reasons.  Given this circumstance, we find 
ample justification for finding that the claimant 
. . . is not able to perform her pre-injury or even 
light duty work provided by her employer. 
 
The deputy commissioner also found that the claimant had tried 
to find other employment, but was unsuccessful.  The deputy 
commissioner then proceeded to enter "[a]n award . . . for the 
payment of temporary total disability benefits." 
 
The deputy commissioner unquestionably determined that the 
claimant qualified for temporary total incapacity benefits, but 
did not identify the specific injury upon which he based his 
 
6
award.  The significance of this omission arises from the 
mandates of the Workers' Compensation statutes.  Code § 65.2-506 
provides that a claimant may not receive compensation for more 
than one injury at a time and Code § 65.2-518 provides that a 
claimant may not receive more than 500 weeks of compensation for 
any injury.1  Identification of the injury is essential to the 
application of these statutes. 
                     
 
1 Code § 65.2-518 provides that compensation "under this 
title shall in no case" exceed 500 weeks.  As the parties agree, 
"in no case" refers to a 500-week limit on compensation per 
injury or occupational disease, not per claimant, per award, or 
per type of award. 
 
Applying the 500-week limitation period to each injury has 
its roots in the history of the Act.  The limitations period 
originally was found in the sections dealing with total and 
partial disability, originally sections 30 and 31 in Chapter 400 
of Acts 1918, respectively.  The relevant language of those 
sections provided: 
 
 
Sec. 30.  Where the incapacity for work 
resulting from the injury is total, the employer 
shall pay . . . to the injured employee during 
such total incapacity a weekly compensation . . . 
and in no case shall the period covered by such 
compensation be greater than five hundred weeks 
. . . . 
 
 
Sec. 31.  Except as otherwise provided in 
the next section hereafter, where the incapacity 
for work resulting from the injury is partial, 
the employer shall pay . . . to the injured 
employee during such incapacity a weekly 
compensation . . . and in no case shall the 
period covered by such compensation be greater 
than three hundred weeks from the date of the 
injury.  In case the partial incapacity begins 
after a period of total incapacity, the latter 
period shall be deducted from the maximum period 
herein allowed for partial incapacity. 
 
7
 
Du Pont's position that the award should be credited 
against each injury for purposes of the compensation limit of 
Code § 65.2-518 depends on its characterization of the award as 
a "combined award" based on three separate injuries.  However, 
one award for three separate injuries violates Code § 65.2-506's 
prohibition against paying benefits for more than one injury at 
a time. 
 
Du Pont made no attempt in 1994, and does not argue here, 
that the award was or should have been somehow apportioned among 
the three injuries based on each injury's contribution to the 
disabling condition, constituting in effect three awards.  Nor 
did Du Pont seek to have the award attributed to a new "combined 
injury" distinct from the three separate injuries in order to 
insure compliance with Code § 65.2-506. 
 
Furthermore, prior to this appeal, Du Pont did not argue 
that Eggleston's request for temporary total incapacity was 
                                                                  
 
 
A plain reading of these two sections shows that the 
limitations period was applied to the injury.  This language 
remained virtually unchanged until 1990, when the General 
Assembly eliminated the restriction regarding payment of partial 
disability for a period measured "from the date of the injury."  
Then, in 1997, the General Assembly deleted the limitation 
period from the partial and total temporary disability sections, 
Code §§ 65.2-500 and -502, and placed the 500-week limitation 
period in Code § 65.2-518.  Nothing in the legislative history 
or case law since 1997 indicates that moving the 500-week 
limitation period to Code § 65.2-518 constituted a substantive 
change which would require applying the limitations period to 
something other than the injury. 
 
8
dependent on all three injuries and that, without any one of 
them, her incapacity claim would fail.  The record shows that 
when Du Pont initiated the instant litigation in 1999, its 
application for change in condition asserted that one of the 
claimant's injuries, the gamekeepers' thumb, had resolved itself 
and asked the Commission to "reduce the amount of temporary 
total disability benefits being paid to the claimant."  Du Pont 
did not ask that the 1994 award be terminated because one of the 
three injuries upon which the award was based no longer existed, 
thereby implicitly recognizing that the condition of temporary 
total incapacity did not necessarily require the existence of 
all three injuries. 
 
We agree that, fairly read, the language of the deputy 
commissioner in his 1994 opinion implies, although it does not 
state, that he found the claimant's incapacity resulted from the 
three injuries.  We also agree that the language gives rise to 
an inference that some combination of the injuries supported the 
award for temporary total incapacity.  However, neither of these 
inferences provides sufficient guidance to resolve the question 
of whether the 1994 award should have been simultaneously 
credited against each of Eggleston's injuries for purposes of 
the 500-week compensation limitation.  Thus, we turn to the 
applicable case law and the Commission's actions in handling the 
1994 award. 
 
9
 
The workers' compensation statutes do not address the 
proper treatment of a single award that is based on a 
combination of injuries.  However, workers' compensation case 
law developed by the Court of Appeals provides some guidance.  
The Grief Companies/Genesco, Inc. v. Hensley, 22 Va. App. 546, 
553, 471 S.E.2d 803, 807 (1996), involved two injuries which 
"together caused total disability."  In that case, the 
Commission had determined that the claimant's temporary total 
disability was " 'due partially to her right hand condition and 
partially to the left.  It cannot be determined which condition 
is predominately disabling.' "  Id. at 550, 471 S.E.2d at 805-
06.  The right hand condition had predated the left hand 
condition and, based on that condition, the claimant was 
receiving temporary total disability benefits at the time the 
left hand condition arose.  Id.  The Court of Appeals concluded 
that because the condition of the left hand "contributes to" the 
total incapacity, that condition "may properly be considered the 
basis for a total incapacity award."  Id. at 553, 471 S.E.2d at 
807.  The Court of Appeals went on to instruct that, pursuant to 
Code § 65.2-5062, the total incapacity award should be paid for 
                     
 
2 Code § 65.2-506, in its entirety, reads: 
 
Compensation after second injury in same employment. –  
If an employee receives an injury for which 
compensation is payable while he is still receiving or 
entitled to compensation for a previous injury in the 
 
10
the left hand first and, when that compensation was exhausted or 
the condition resolved itself, the temporary total incapacity 
award the claimant had been receiving for the right hand should 
be resumed, "if justified."  Id.
 
The rule of the Grief case is that where more than one 
injury contributes to the incapacitating condition, a component 
injury may be the basis for the temporary total incapacity 
award.  When that injury resolves itself or the compensation 
limitation of Code § 65.2-518 is reached, the claimant can 
continue to receive temporary total incapacity benefits based on 
the other component injury only if the evidence still supports a 
finding that the claimant is totally incapacitated based on the 
other component injury. 
 
The procedure prescribed by the Court of Appeals in the 
Grief case is precisely the process employed by the Commission 
                                                                  
same employment, he shall not at the same time be 
entitled to compensation for both injuries, but if he 
is, at the time of the second injury, receiving 
compensation under the provisions of § 65.2-503, 
payments of compensation thereunder shall be suspended 
during the period compensation is paid on account of 
the second injury, and after the termination of 
payments of compensation for the second injury, 
payments on account of the first injury shall be 
resumed and continued until the entire amount 
originally awarded has been paid.  However, if, at the 
time of the second injury, he is receiving 
compensation under the provisions of § 65.2-502, then 
no compensation shall be payable on account of the 
first injury during the period he receives 
compensation for the second injury. 
 
11
in this case.  The Commission treated the deputy commissioner's 
1994 award as an award based on the condition resulting from 
three separate injuries.  The gamekeepers' thumb injury 
contributed to the condition causing the total loss of earning 
capacity, that is the temporary total incapacity, and as such 
could be considered as the basis for the award.  Accordingly, 
the Commission, as in Grief, attributed the award to the 
gamekeepers' thumb injury.  When that injury resolved itself, 
following the hearing on Du Pont's application for change in 
condition, the deputy commissioner determined that "the employer 
has now established that the claimant's disability is due only 
to her two remaining conditions."3  Again, as in Grief, because 
the continued compensation was "justified," the compensation 
award could be based on a component of the disabling condition 
and that component, the carpal tunnel injury, would be credited 
with the award until that injury resolved itself or the 
compensation limit for that injury was reached. 
 
Nothing in this procedure allows the claimant to recover 
more than 500 weeks of compensation for any one injury nor is 
compensation for each component injury guaranteed.  Following 
resolution of or compensation exhaustion for the initial injury, 
                     
 
3 Although Grief suggests that the claimant bears the burden 
to establish continued disability, in this case Du Pont 
apparently did not dispute Eggleston's continued disability 
 
12
Eggleston carries the burden of showing that a component injury 
continues to support a finding of temporary total incapacity. 
 
Accordingly, because the circumstances of this case do not 
come within the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act that 
authorize the Commission to credit a single payment as more than 
one week compensation for purposes of Code § 65.2-518 and 
because the crediting procedure followed by the Commission in 
this case did not result in a violation of Code § 65.2-518, we 
will affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
Affirmed.
                                                                  
because it did not appeal the 2000 ruling of the deputy 
commissioner in this regard. 
 
13