Title: People v. Abel
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S064733
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: March 19, 2012

1 
Filed 3/19/12 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S064733 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
 
JOHN CLYDE ABEL, 
) 
 
) 
Orange County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 95CF1690 
 
____________________________________) 
 
A jury convicted defendant John Clyde Abel of the first degree murder of 
Armando Miller (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)), also finding he had personally used 
a firearm in the commission of the offense (id., § 12022.5, subd. (a)) and finding 
true the special circumstance that defendant had committed the murder during the 
course of a robbery (id., § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)).  It imposed a sentence of death.  
We affirm the judgment. 
I.  FACTS 
A.  Introduction 
Armando Miller’s family owned the Alameda Market in the City of 
Orange.  Every Friday morning, Miller or his father withdrew either $10,000 or 
$20,000 from the Sunwest Bank in Tustin to provide check-cashing services to the 
market’s customers.  On Friday, January 4, 1991, Miller withdrew $20,000.  A 
few moments later, an unidentified man in the bank’s parking lot shot Miller once 
in the head, killing him.  The man left, carrying a paper bag.  The money was 
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never recovered.  Defendant was linked to the crime by the descriptions provided 
by witnesses who saw the man in the parking lot, the witnesses’ selection of 
defendant’s photograph out of photographic lineups, one witness’s in-court 
identification of defendant, and a second witness’s testimony that a photograph 
taken of defendant near the time of Miller’s death was a photograph of the man 
she had seen.  In addition, defendant admitted he had been in the market on at least 
one occasion, and there was evidence he was aware someone from the market 
typically withdrew large sums from the bank on Fridays.  Further, a woman who 
had participated in a series of armed robberies with defendant later in 1991 
testified defendant had told her about killing Miller and given her the murder 
weapon.  
B.  Prosecution’s Guilt Phase Case 
Police responding to reports of the murder found an expended .22-caliber 
shell casing close to Miller’s body, but little other physical evidence.  No one saw 
the shooting, but several witnesses reported seeing a man with a gun, or a man 
running from the vicinity of the shooting carrying a paper bag. 
Detectives showed witnesses numerous photographs and many 
photographic lineups of men resembling the description of the gunman, but the 
witnesses reported that none was of the man they had seen.  Detectives also 
interviewed Miller’s family and showed them photographs, trying to discover if 
they knew anyone who might have been the killer, but again to no avail.  The 
investigation was suspended after all leads had been exhausted without bringing 
the police any closer to identifying the killer.  It was reopened on August 3, 1993, 
after Police Detective Nasario Solis received an anonymous telephone call from a 
woman who told him Miller was killed by a man named John Abel, who was then 
serving a long prison sentence for a series of bank robberies.  Detective Solis 
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learned that defendant was incarcerated in Folsom State Prison for a number of 
armed robberies.  He obtained defendant’s photograph and over the next year 
attempted to corroborate other information provided by the anonymous caller. 
Detective Tom Tarpley picked up the investigation when he rotated into the 
homicide unit in 1995.  In March 1995, he showed witness Bettina Redondo a 
photographic lineup containing defendant’s photograph.  Redondo picked 
defendant’s photograph out, saying he was the man she had seen.  Tarpley showed 
the photographic lineup to a second witness, Colleen Heuvelman, who 
immediately identified defendant as the man she had seen.  Tarpley showed the 
photographic lineup to Miller’s mother, America Miller, who reported having seen 
defendant in the market with James Gano, a regular customer who had also 
arranged mortgage loans for the business and was aware of the family’s practice of 
obtaining funds on Friday mornings for the check-cashing aspect of the business.  
Tarpley also contacted Lorraine Ripple, who had been convicted of committing a 
number of armed robberies with defendant, asking her if she had any information 
about Miller’s murder.  Ripple said defendant had told her he killed Miller and had 
given her the murder weapon. 
Linda Pratt, who had been a teller at Sunwest Bank, testified she cashed a 
$20,000 check for Miller on the morning of his death.  A short time later, she 
heard a popping sound from outside the bank, looked out the window, and saw 
Miller lying on the ground.  She also saw a person wearing a navy blue watchman 
cap and carrying a bag run away through a gap in the bushes outside the bank. 
Bettina Redondo testified she was outside a building next to the bank when 
she heard what sounded like a gunshot and saw a man standing with his arm 
extended, holding in his hand a small, smoking gun.  The man walked toward her 
through the bushes.  She went back into the building, but watched the man, who 
passed within approximately 15 feet of her.  She looked carefully so she could 
4 
describe him to the police.  He appeared to be in his late 40’s or early 50’s, was of 
medium build, and was carrying a brown bag with a holiday design that looked 
like it was from a grocery store.  He wore a dark blue or black watchman cap over 
his ears and hair, a dark blue windbreaker, and loose trousers.  Redondo estimated 
she observed the man’s face for between 20 and 30 seconds.  She recalled he was 
unshaven and had well-defined cheeks and jaw and the beginnings of a mustache. 
Redondo related having worked with a police artist to put together a 
composite picture of the man she had seen, being shown “over a thousand” 
photographs and selecting a photograph of a man who later was identified as Larry 
Jones.  But after viewing Jones in a live lineup, she realized he was not the 
gunman.  In March 1995, Detective Tarpley showed her another photographic 
lineup.  She picked out defendant’s photograph, telling Tarpley “on the record” 
she was 80 percent certain defendant was the man, but “off the record” she was 
100 percent certain he was the man.  Redondo explained she had not wanted to be 
the only person to identify defendant.  She did not identify defendant at trial, 
explaining she was not comfortable because so much time had passed.  But she 
confirmed defendant’s photograph was a photograph of the man she had seen. 
Colleen Heuvelman testified she was working at the bank on the morning 
of January 4, 1991, but had to leave early to take care of her son, who was ill.  She 
was acquainted with Miller and chatted with him for a moment on her way out.  
She left through a door to the parking lot, turned a corner, and nearly ran into a 
man standing there.  Heuvelman got into her car but continued to watch the man 
while she put the seatbelt on her son and placed her keys in the ignition; she 
estimated she observed him for well over a minute.  She kept watching because it 
was unusual to see anyone where the man was standing.  She described him as a 
White male, approximately 46 to 48 years old, with high cheek bones, the 
mustache of a man who had not shaved in three or four days, thin lips, and very 
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dark eyes.  He wore a coat and a dark-colored watchman cap.  He had a bit of 
graying hair sticking out from under the cap.  When Heuvelman got home, she 
learned Miller had been shot in the bank’s parking lot.  She immediately called the 
police, telling them she thought she might have seen the gunman.  The following 
day, and again about two months later, police showed Heuvelman a number of 
photographs, but although some resembled the man she had seen, his picture was 
not among them.  In 1995, Detective Tarpley showed her a photographic lineup 
that contained defendant’s photograph.  She identified defendant almost 
immediately.  She also identified defendant at trial, stating she was 100 percent 
certain he was the man in the bank’s parking lot on the morning of January 4, 
1991. 
Lorraine Ripple, who had committed a large number of robberies with 
defendant, admitted to multiple convictions for robberies committed in 1987 and 
1991.  She also admitted she had been convicted of assaulting a prison guard, and 
stated she would be spending the rest of her life in prison.  She said she had not 
been promised anything in return for her testimony and would not benefit from it; 
to the contrary, she believed her overall situation would be made more difficult.  
Ripple testified she had known defendant since the early 1960’s and had spent 
time with him on and off over the years.  In March 1991, after being released from 
prison, she lived for a while with Deborah Lankford.  During that time, defendant 
spent five days a week with her.  He was married at the time and spent weekends 
with his wife.  Ripple reported that once when they were in bed together defendant 
told her he had killed someone in Tustin, telling her it was “an easy score, that he 
had hit a guy inside a bank, coming out.  And [the victim] had a business, a little 
mini store . . . and he cashed checks for a lot of ‘wetbacks’ . . . .”  Ripple testified 
defendant had given her the gun he used to kill Miller, which she described as a 
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.22-caliber automatic handgun that ejected casings.  She later traded it to a 
Mexican connection for drugs. 
Ripple stated defendant always had a mustache in 1991.  He had a blue 
windbreaker and a navy knit watchman cap he wore with the cuff turned up.  He 
used glasses for reading, but did not normally wear them at other times.  When 
shown a June 1991 picture taken of defendant wearing a windbreaker and a 
watchman cap, Ripple reported it accurately represented defendant’s appearance at 
that time.  
Ripple confirmed Detective Tom Tarpley had contacted her in 1995, asking 
if she had any information about Miller’s death.  She said she did not tell him 
anything immediately, but after he had “earned her respect” she told him what she 
knew, even though she was aware she would receive no benefit for it. 
On cross-examination, Ripple agreed that when Detective Tarpley first 
contacted her he told her defendant had “given her up,” but she said she knew it 
was not true, asserting investigators always said such things to try to play people 
off against one another.  Defense counsel also brought out, apparently in an 
attempt to suggest Ripple had fabricated stories about defendant, that Ripple told 
Tarpley defendant had been involved in other murders.  Ripple also testified that 
in early 1991 a lot of guns were “floating around” among her acquaintances, 
including more than one .22-caliber weapon, several MAC-11 “machine pistols,” 
and an AK-47 assault rifle.  They traded or provided guns to one another 
depending on need.  She had seen defendant with two MAC-11’s.  Defendant gave 
her the gun he used to kill Miller after she asked for a “hot gun” that she would 
dispose of after committing a crime.  Ripple reaffirmed she traded the gun to a 
Mexican connection for drugs, adding she later robbed the connection and had a 
bad habit of robbing connections. 
7 
Detective Steven Rubino testified that in October 1991 he was part of a 
team that had arrested defendant in connection with another offense.  Police 
searching defendant’s car found in it a loaded MAC-11 semiautomatic pistol, a 
loaded .22-caliber pistol, extra ammunition for both weapons, a photograph of 
James Gano, a pill bottle with Lorraine Ripple’s name on it, and two savings 
passbooks that did not belong to defendant.  The .22-caliber pistol was not the 
weapon used to kill Miller.  
C.  Defendant’s Guilt Phase Case 
Defendant testified on his own behalf.  He admitted to “around two dozen” 
felony convictions, “almost all for robbery,” many of which were for armed 
robbery.  He admitted he had committed bank robberies in 1973 and 1981.  He 
admitted to a series of armed robberies in 1991.  He also admitted he was serving 
a state prison sentence of 44 years 8 months, and a federal prison sentence of 
53 years 8 months.  Defendant admitted he had once gone with James Gano to the 
Alameda Market.  He admitted knowing Lorraine Ripple, but disputed her claim 
that they had been acquainted since the 1960’s, asserting he first met her in March 
or April 1991, when she was living with his friend, Deborah Lankford.  He 
explained he could not have known Ripple in the 1960’s because he was in prison 
for most of that decade.  He denied ever having an intimate relationship with 
Ripple.  He denied telling her he had committed other murders or telling her the 
Tustin killing was “an easy score.”  He denied giving Ripple a .22-caliber 
automatic or any kind of gun.  He said she had never told him she had given the 
gun to a connection, but she did tell him she had robbed her connection three 
times.  Defendant stated he had been paroled in February 1990, after 17 years in 
prison.  He initially worked at a restaurant, but began to work for James Gano in 
late 1990, after Gano started a mortgage company.  He recalled working on a loan 
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for Elaine Tribble, stating he had visited her at her home in Long Beach about a 
half-dozen times.  He thought he might have delivered mortgage documents to her 
at her home on January 4, 1991, and he testified that after leaving Tribble’s home 
that day he went to Wilmington and then to San Pedro to visit another potential 
customer.  In San Pedro, he used a pay phone to make a collect call to Gano’s 
office.  He had been trying to obtain records of the call but understood from his 
lawyers and investigators that the mortgage company’s records for the period from 
January 3 through February 4, 1991, were missing. 
Defendant denied standing outside the Sunwest Bank at 10:30 a.m. on the 
morning of January 4, 1991, or shooting anyone there.  He suggested he could not 
have been the man in the parking lot because, unlike that man, he wore glasses, 
stating he wore glasses in prison before his release on parole in 1990 and 
continued to wear them thereafter. 
On cross-examination, defendant admitted he had been out of prison for 
various periods from 1966 until 1990, sometimes because he had escaped; it thus 
was possible for him to have become acquainted with Ripple in the 1960’s.  He 
also admitted committing armed robberies on 11 occasions during those years.  He 
admitted gambling and using drugs in 1991, but stated he did not start using until 
February of that year, approximately one month after Miller was killed.  He 
admitted committing approximately 10 robberies with Ripple.  He also admitted 
he and Deborah Lankford had once broken into a residence and robbed the 
occupants at gunpoint, taking their savings passbooks.  He believed the passbooks 
had been recovered from the trunk of his car when he was arrested in October 
1991. 
Defendant’s friend, Deborah Lankford, testified for the defense.  She 
admitted she was in state prison serving an 11-year term for armed robbery, had 
committed a number of other felonies, including numerous armed robberies and 
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several bank robberies, and would later be going to federal prison.  She said she 
had known defendant for nearly 20 years, but denied having any romantic or 
sexual relationship with him.  She testified that during 1990 and early 1991, 
defendant was living in Fullerton, near a restaurant where he worked.  His wife-to-
be, Vicki, joined him on the weekends.  Lankford provided an alibi for defendant, 
asserting he had been at her house every day in early 1991 taking care of her 
because she was sick with the flu.  She thought he might have taken her to a clinic 
on January 4, 1991. 
Lankford testified she introduced Ripple to defendant in 1991.  She never 
saw anything suggesting defendant and Ripple were romantically involved, but 
she reported that by June 1991, Ripple was talking about defendant as if he 
belonged to her.  Ripple also seemed to believe Lankford was in a sexual 
relationship with defendant and was telling other people bizarre stories about 
Lankford.  In February 1996, Lankford wrote to Ripple, complaining Ripple was 
spreading vicious lies about defendant and Lankford.  Ripple wrote back that 
defendant had used her and she was getting even with him.  But Lankford could 
not produce Ripple’s letter, explaining she had sent it to her parents from prison 
but they had never received it. 
On cross-examination, Lankford admitted she had not told anyone 
defendant might have been with her when Miller was shot, even though she had 
been in regular contact with defendant and knew he had been accused of 
murdering Miller.  The prosecutor showed her a letter defendant had written to her 
in which he made a number of sexual comments and described “doing it” to her in 
the dining room and up the stairs into the bathroom.  Lankford claimed she had not 
received the letter.  She admitted defendant sometimes made sexual remarks to 
her, but said again that she had never been intimate with him, theorizing that by 
“doing it,” defendant might have been referring to taking drugs.  The prosecutor 
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also asked Lankford about Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) records detailing 
a statement she had made.  She denied making the statement, denied involvement 
in the crimes described in the records, and denied she told agents defendant had a 
gambling habit.  She also said she did not recall defendant wearing a dark-colored 
windbreaker jacket or a navy blue watchman cap.  When she was shown the 
June 1991 photograph of defendant wearing the jacket and cap, she responded she 
could not say the photograph was of defendant and did not recognize the clothing.   
Elaine Tribble confirmed that in late 1990 and early 1991 she was talking 
to defendant about obtaining a loan from James Gano’s mortgage company.  She 
recalled defendant had come to her home in Long Beach on several occasions, but 
she could not remember which days he visited or exactly when she filled out the 
mortgage application.  She had been unable to locate any of the loan documents 
and could not remember if they had been returned to her. 
Miller’s fiancée, Holly Daniels, testified she had worked at or visited the 
Alameda Market in late 1990 and early 1991.  She was very familiar with James 
Gano and had seen him at the market, but she did not recall that he had ever 
brought any friends with him and did not remember seeing defendant.  She 
thought that Larry Jones, the man originally picked out of a photographic lineup 
by Bettina Redondo, might have been ejected from the market for drunkenness. 
Sergeant Mark Bergquist, who had been involved in the first phase of the 
investigation, confirmed that Redondo had picked Larry Jones out of a 
photographic lineup.  He recalled both America Miller and Holly Daniels saying 
Armando Miller had forcibly ejected Jones from the market.  Bergquist took 
Redondo to a live lineup in March 1991.  He remembered seeing Redondo become 
agitated when faced with Jones, but he said she picked another man out of the 
lineup and, as they were leaving, said that man also was not the person she had 
seen.  Bergquist said the police had investigated whether Jones or another man 
11 
might have been involved in Miller’s death, but the investigations did not lead to 
any arrests. 
No one who had seen the man in the bank’s parking lot said he wore 
glasses.  Heuvelman was particularly struck with the man’s deep-set eyes and 
specifically stated he had not worn glasses.  John Sano, defendant’s parole officer 
in 1990 and 1991, testified he thought defendant might have worn glasses in 1990.  
Sano remembered defendant having a mustache but did not think it was the style 
of mustache described by the prosecution’s witnesses.  But on cross-examination, 
Sano agreed he was unlikely to remember if a client had worn glasses on a 
particular day or to perfectly recall the appearance of a client’s mustache.  He also 
agreed defendant was not wearing glasses in a photograph taken of him on the day 
of his release and had not worn glasses on that day. 
Optometrist Dr. Eric Bass testified he had provided glasses to defendant in 
1990.  He stated his records indicated that, although defendant needed some 
correction to see distance in his right eye, he required only a very slight correction 
to his left eye for distance.  In his opinion, a person with defendant’s prescription 
would have difficulty reading, but would be able to see and probably would be 
permitted to drive without correction. 
Susan Maitland, the sister of defendant’s former wife, Vicki, testified she 
had been acquainted with defendant since the late 1980’s and had socialized with 
defendant and Vicki in late 1990 and early 1991.  She said defendant always wore 
glasses, was clean and neat in appearance, and his mustache did not match the 
mustache described by prosecution witnesses.  On cross-examination, she 
admitted she could not recall if defendant always had the same style of mustache.   
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D.  Prosecution’s Penalty Phase Case 
1.  Other criminal activity (Pen. Code, § 190.3, factors (b) and (c))  
The prosecution introduced evidence of 15 separate robberies committed by 
defendant, showing further that defendant had been armed during at least 14 of 
them. 
On September 8, 1981, defendant and three other men, all armed, robbed a 
Los Angeles savings and loan.  During the robbery, one of the men pointed a gun 
at the teller’s face.  On June 14, 1991, defendant and another man, both armed, 
entered a bank in Hacienda Heights, yelling and screaming.  They threatened to 
blow the branch manager’s head off; made all the employees and customers lie on 
the floor; pointed guns between the legs of two male tellers, threatening to blow 
their “f—ing balls off” if they did not give them hundreds fast enough; and 
threatened to hurt a baby if the baby did not stop crying.  On June 25, 1991, 
defendant and another man, shouting and brandishing guns, held up a bank in 
Rowland Heights.  One of the men, using a large automatic gun, shot through the 
glass on the “bandit barrier window” covering the teller service area.  The other 
man had a handgun, which he pointed in turn at each teller, forcing the tellers to 
give him the cash out of their drawers. 
On August 29, 1991, defendant and Ripple committed an armed robbery of 
a pharmacy and its owner.  Defendant was armed with an Uzi submachine gun.  
On September 4, 1991, defendant and Ripple robbed a pizza restaurant.  During 
the course of the robbery, defendant brandished a weapon that looked like an Uzi.  
On September 6, 1991, defendant and Ripple robbed a pharmacy in San Pedro and 
defendant threatened to shoot anyone who followed him.  On September 8, 1991, 
defendant and a woman robbed a florist’s shop in Harbor City.  Defendant was 
armed with an Uzi.  On September 12, 1991, defendant and a woman robbed a 
Hallmark store in Seal Beach, during which they herded everyone to the back of 
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the store and forced an employee to open the cash register.  On September 18, 
1991, defendant and Ripple robbed a pizza restaurant in Lakewood.  Defendant 
put a gun to the owner’s head.  He became upset as the owner fumbled trying to 
open the cash register, and Ripple admonished him not to hurt the owner.  As they 
left with the money, defendant told the owner:  “Don’t come out or I’ll shoot you.”  
On September 19, 1991, a woman committed an armed robbery of a florist’s shop 
in Wilmington.  After leaving the shop, the woman got into a car driven by 
defendant. 
On September 24, 1991, there was a disturbance at an Alpha Beta 
supermarket in Hacienda Heights.  At the direction of the store’s manager, checker 
David Clure grabbed a woman who was attempting to run out of the store.  As 
Clure wrestled with the woman near the store’s entrance, defendant drove up in a 
car that did not have any license plates.  Defendant got out, holding a gun in his 
hand.  He said, “Let her go,” and fired the gun into the air.  When Clure continued 
to hold onto the woman, defendant fired another shot into the asphalt near Clure’s 
foot.  He fired a third shot, hitting the building over the entrance to the store, and 
then fired into the door frame.  Clure released the woman, who got into the car.  
Another woman was in the backseat of the car, holding a pistol. 
On September 25, 1991, defendant and a woman robbed a San Pedro nail 
salon and its customers.  Defendant, armed with what looked like a large rifle or 
shotgun, yelled at the customers to throw their purses into the center of the room 
where they were collected by the woman.  On September 28, 1991, defendant 
entered a shoe store, pulled out a gun, and told an employee, Jerry Song, “Open 
the register.  If you move, I’ll kill you.”  The store’s manager, Mark Inki Kim, 
tried to close the cash drawer and grabbed at defendant’s hands.  Defendant 
attempted to shoot Kim several times, but his gun failed to fire.  He ran out of the 
store, chased by Song and Kim, and escaped by diving into a car being driven by a 
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woman.  On October 1, 1991, Ripple, armed with a gun, robbed the owner of a 
San Pedro pet grooming business.  Ripple left in a car driven by defendant, who 
was holding a gun that looked like a machine gun. 
On October, 3, 1991, Dolores and Fred Clay, after withdrawing 
approximately $400 from their bank, were having lunch in a Long Beach 
restaurant.  They noticed defendant and Deborah Lankford at the bar.  Defendant 
and Lankford broke into the Clays’ residence later that day.  Defendant pointed a 
gun at them and pushed Fred Clay back into a chair.  Defendant took the Clays’ 
money, jewelry, and a savings account passbook.  The passbook was recovered 
from the trunk of defendant’s car when he was arrested later in October 1991.   
The jury was also provided with certified documents disclosing that 
defendant had suffered a 1963 conviction for armed robbery, a 1996 conviction for 
armed robbery, a 1976 conviction for possession of marijuana, a 1967 conviction 
for felony escape, a 1973 conviction for bank robbery, 1977 convictions for escape 
from federal custody and bank robbery, a 1981 conviction for bank robbery, and a 
1986 conviction for racketeering and extortion. 
2.  Victim impact evidence (Pen. Code, § 190.3, factor (a))  
Armando Miller’s father, Robert Miller, testified that Armando was his 
oldest son.  Robert was working at the family’s market when someone from the 
bank called, telling him there had been a robbery and Armando had been shot and 
was being taken to the hospital.  At the hospital, a doctor told him Armando had 
been shot in the head and was brain dead.  Robert said it felt like “falling in a hole 
. . . something you’re not expecting and it’s hard to believe.”  He said the hurt and 
the sadness never go away; “[t]he only thing you can do, I guess, is just keep on 
going and think of other things in your life . . . .” 
15 
Armando’s mother, America Miller, testified that Armando had been a very 
happy man.  At the time of his death, he had a two-month-old daughter who had 
been very precious to him.  America spoke about how difficult it was to lose her 
son, adding that they had not only lost Armando, “we lost another one, Bobby.  He 
got real hurt because he love Armando . . . .  [¶] So Bobby got hurt in his heart.  
He got so much hate, you know, that he can’t trust, who could do this to his 
brother, so this make him sick for his heart. . . .  [¶] So, you know, he don’t just 
kill me one son he kill me two sons.”  She testified that her other children also 
missed Armando very much. 
E.  Defendant’s Penalty Phase Case 
The defense presented no evidence at the penalty phase. 
II.  PRETRIAL AND GUILT PHASE ISSUES 
A.  Delay in Bringing Charges  
Defendant, noting that the police had learned his name from the anonymous 
caller on August 3, 1993, but charges were not filed against him until June 23, 
1995, contends the case should have been dismissed for investigative delay.  We 
disagree.  
A defendant’s state and federal constitutional speedy trial rights (U.S. 
Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15, cl. 1) do not attach before the 
defendant is arrested or a charging document has been filed.  (People v. Nelson 
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 1242, 1250.)  Nonetheless, a defendant is not without recourse if 
a delay in filing charges is prejudicial and unjustified.  The statute of limitations is 
usually considered the primary guarantee against overly stale criminal charges 
(People v. Archerd (1970) 3 Cal.3d 615, 639), but the right of due process 
provides additional protection, safeguarding a criminal defendant’s interest in fair 
adjudication by preventing unjustified delays that weaken the defense through the 
16 
dimming of memories, the death or disappearance of witnesses, and the loss or 
destruction of material physical evidence (Nelson, at p. 1250).   
A defendant seeking relief for undue delay in filing charges must first 
demonstrate resulting prejudice, such as by showing the loss of a material witness 
or other missing evidence, or fading memory caused by the lapse of time.  (People 
v. Archerd, supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 639-640.)  Prejudice to a defendant from 
precharging delay is not presumed.  (People v. Nelson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at 
p. 1250; People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 107.)  In addition, although “under 
California law, negligent, as well as purposeful, delay in bringing charges may, 
when accompanied by a showing of prejudice, violate due process . . . .  If the 
delay was merely negligent, a greater showing of prejudice would be required to 
establish a due process violation.”  (Nelson, at pp. 1255-1256.)1  If the defendant 
establishes prejudice, the prosecution may offer justification for the delay; the 
court considering a motion to dismiss then balances the harm to the defendant 
against the justification for the delay.  (Id. at p. 1250.)  But if the defendant fails to 
meet his or her burden of showing prejudice, there is no need to determine 
whether the delay was justified.  (Serna v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 239, 
249; Scherling v. Superior Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 493, 506.) 
Defendant claims he met his burden of showing prejudice from the 
precharging delay through evidence that Elaine Tribble could not remember the 
specific date defendant had delivered mortgage documents to her in Long Beach 
and was unable to produce any documents that might have supported his claim of 
visiting her on January 4, 1991.  But defendant made no showing that Tribble’s 
                                              
1  
Because the law under the California Constitution is at least as favorable to 
defendant as federal law, we apply California law to defendant’s claim.  (See 
People v. Nelson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1251.)  
17 
recall would have been more specific had she been contacted earlier, or that she 
could or would have provided documentary evidence to support his claim.  To the 
contrary, Tribble said she could not remember if any mortgage documents had 
been returned to her, but if they had been, she had probably destroyed them. 
Defendant’s claim that Tribble would have provided further support for the 
defense had police arrested defendant earlier is thus mere speculation.  
Defendant also complains the delay caused his memory and the memory of 
James Gano to fade, but again he made no showing of actual prejudice.  The 
record reflects that both defendant and Gano had detailed recall of events 
occurring on or near January 4, 1991.  For example, defendant could describe 
Tribble’s house and its location.  He recalled Tribble had told him she had 
changed her mind about the loan because she would be getting a loan from a 
family member.  He stated that after returning the loan documents to Tribble, he 
went to Wilmington and then to San Pedro to talk to a prospective client but was 
unable to find the prospective client.  He then called the mortgage company from a 
pay phone in San Pedro located on Gaffney Street between Second and Fourth 
Streets, speaking with Gano’s partner.  Gano did not testify at trial, but at the 
preliminary hearing he specifically recalled defendant had come to his house on 
the evening of January 4, 1991.  Gano provided a detailed report of the matters 
they discussed and the actions they had taken as a result of their discussion.  
Moreover, far from aiding defendant, Gano’s testimony at the preliminary hearing 
directly and explicitly incriminated him.2 
                                              
2  
Gano testified at the preliminary hearing that he and defendant had been 
friends since they met in Lompoc in 1978.  Gano knew the victim and his family, 
and had introduced them to defendant.  He testified he could not recall if he told 
defendant about the Millers’ check-cashing operations, but thought it was possible.  
He recalled defendant asking how the Millers did their banking, feeling concern 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
18 
Defendant also complains the delay rendered him unable to obtain 
telephone records from the mortgage company that would have shown he called 
the company from San Pedro on January 4, 1991.  When defendant first raised the 
issue of precharging delay, the mortgage company records appeared to have been 
lost or destroyed, but by the time defendant testified at trial, the records, 
comprised of eight boxes found in a storage locker, had been located and 
examined.  Defendant submitted the declaration of his investigator, Kristin Smith, 
that she had searched through all eight boxes of records for any loan documents 
that might have related to Elaine Tribble and for any telephone bills for calls 
received on January 4, 1991.  She found telephone billing statements for 
August 1991 and January and February 1992, but no records for January 1991.  
Defendant has not shown Smith would have found additional records had the 
investigation proceeded more quickly. 
Defendant also failed to show the delay prevented him from obtaining 
records from the telephone company.  His investigator, Smith, asserted that on 
August 22, 1997, she requested copies of billing statements for Money Funders 
Mortgage that included January 1991, but was told the telephone company’s 
records extended back only to August 1991.  Assuming, as Smith’s declaration 
suggests, the telephone company kept records for a six-year period, defendant had 
nearly one and a half years after the date of his arrest in which to obtain the 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
defendant might harm his friends and warning defendant to leave them alone.  On 
the evening Miller was murdered, defendant came to Gano’s house.  He told Gano 
“he had to pop the kid,” and asked Gano to hide a black steel .22-caliber handgun 
defendant said he had used to shoot Miller.  Gano hid the gun first in his garage 
and then in the brush near a creek or lake.  On the following day, defendant 
returned, asking Gano for the gun.  Gano and defendant retrieved the gun, and 
defendant left with it. 
19 
records he claims would have exonerated him.  Further, evidence of a call made on 
January 4, 1991, would not have provided him with an alibi.  According to 
defendant’s testimony, the call was made after he visited Tribble and conducted 
other business, suggesting that if it was made at all, it was made long after the 
murder. 
Defendant, accordingly, did not meet his initial burden of showing 
prejudice resulting from the precharging delay.  The prosecution therefore was not 
required to show justification for the delay, and the court had no obligation to 
balance the harm from the delay against the justification.  (Serna v. Superior 
Court, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 249.)  But the record also reflects that the police 
actively investigated the case after receiving the anonymous call, obtaining 
defendant’s photograph and attempting to corroborate the information provided by 
the caller.3  Defendant complains that police investigators could have pursued the 
case more aggressively, matters might have moved more quickly had investigators 
immediately shown defendant’s picture to witnesses, and investigators chose to 
give priority to more recent cases or might have factored into their decisions that 
defendant would be incarcerated for a long time. 
                                              
3  
Detective Solis was told by the caller that a man who owned or worked at 
an Italian restaurant on Tustin Avenue had said Miller was killed by John Abel, 
who was then in prison for a series of bank robberies.  The caller could not 
remember the address of the restaurant and said it had closed.  She remembered 
the owner’s first name was John, but she did not know his last name.  She also 
mentioned a man named Bobby might have been involved in the murder.  Solis 
reported that, over the next year or so, he unsuccessfully tried to locate the 
restaurant, its owner, or someone named “Bobby” who might have been the man 
mentioned by the caller or who might have known defendant.  He also spoke with 
other investigators who had some knowledge of John Abel, but they were unaware 
of any connection between Abel and another man named “John” or a man named 
“Bobby.” 
20 
But “[a] court may not find negligence by second-guessing how the state 
allocates its resources or how law enforcement agencies could have investigated a 
given case.  ‘ . . . Thus, the difficulty in allocating scarce prosecutorial resources 
(as opposed to clearly intentional or negligent conduct) [is] a valid justification for 
delay . . . .’ ”  (People v. Nelson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 1256-1257.)  For the 
same reason, the difficulty in allocating scarce investigative resources provides a 
valid justification for delay. 
We conclude defendant is not entitled to relief on his claim of precharging 
delay.  
B.  Denial of Motion for Pretrial Lineup  
Defendant, before trial, filed a motion for a physical lineup for the purpose 
of exploring whether he could be identified by Bettina Redondo, Colleen 
Heuvelman, or any other witness.  He contends the trial court abused its discretion 
by denying the motion.  We disagree. 
In Evans v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 617, we held that when 
eyewitness identification is shown to be a material issue and there exists a 
reasonable likelihood of mistaken identification, due process may require “that an 
accused, upon timely request therefor, be afforded a pretrial lineup in which 
witnesses to the alleged criminal conduct can participate.”  (Id. at p. 625.)  We 
reasoned that because the People are able to compel a lineup, fairness requires the 
defendant be given a reciprocal right to discover and use lineup evidence.  (Ibid.; 
see also People v. Hansel (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1211, 1221.)  We explained:  “A 
properly conducted lineup is, among other things, a device by which the People 
can discover which witnesses are able to identify an accused and thus provide 
material evidence of guilt.  At the same time the lineup may reveal that other 
witnesses, perhaps some who should be able to identify the real perpetrator of a 
21 
crime, are unable to identify the particular accused as such criminal.  If so, that 
evidence is equally material and access thereto should not be denied an accused.”  
(Evans, at p. 623.)  A trial court ruling on a request for a pretrial lineup considers 
the benefits to be derived from it, the reasonableness of the request, and the 
resulting burden on the prosecution, the police, the court, and the witnesses.  (Id. 
at p. 625.)  Further, “[t]he broad discretion vested in a trial judge or magistrate 
includes the right and responsibility on fairness considerations to deny a motion 
for a lineup when that motion is not made timely.  Such motion should normally 
be made as soon after arrest or arraignment as practicable.  We note that motions 
which are not made until shortly before trial should, unless good cause is clearly 
demonstrated, be denied in most instances by reason of such delay.”  (Id. at p. 626; 
accord, People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 725.) 
Defendant’s motion, filed on December 30, 1996, was untimely.  The 
complaint charging defendant with the murder of Armando Miller had been filed 
on June 23, 1995, defendant made his first court appearance in the matter on 
July 28, 1995, and the preliminary hearing was held on December 14, 1995.  
Detective Tarpley testified at the hearing that Bettina Redondo and Colleen 
Heuvelman had picked defendant out of photographic lineups.  Defense counsel 
also observed that identification was a material issue, noting Redondo at one time 
had identified another man as the gunman, although she later recanted that 
identification.  Defendant, therefore, was well aware that the ability of the 
witnesses to identify him would be an issue at trial.  In People v. Baines (1981) 30 
Cal.3d 143, we held that, in the absence of good cause for the defendant’s delay, 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying a motion for a pretrial lineup 
made two and a half months after the date of the defendant’s arrest, and one and a 
half months after the preliminary hearing.  The motion in the present case was 
made a year and a half after defendant was arrested on the charges and a year 
22 
after the preliminary hearing.  Defendant asserts that the burden of conducting the 
lineup was lessened because the trial was continued after he filed the motion.  But 
a lineup is always burdensome, and that the trial was continued does not justify 
defendant’s delay in making the motion.  Defendant’s explanation for the delay 
was that he had been sent back to prison after the preliminary hearing, counsel had 
not conferred with him about the matter for another six months, and after 
discussing the matter they were uncertain whether a pretrial lineup would be of 
any aid to defendant’s case.  But neither defendant’s failure to act nor the defense 
team’s indecision about trial strategy establishes good cause for delay. 
In addition, unlike the situation in Evans v. Superior Court, supra, 11 
Cal.3d 617, where the witnesses’ ability to link the defendant to the crime was 
explored for the first time at trial, the substance and quality of the eyewitnesses’ 
observations in this case and their ability to identify defendant were known long 
before defendant filed his motion.  That the witnesses had picked defendant out of 
pretrial photographic lineups also meant they could not have been influenced by 
the inherent suggestiveness of his presence at the defense table.  That the 
witnesses had identified defendant from a photograph taken shortly after the 
murder was more significant than their ability or inability to pick him out of a live 
lineup conducted long after the murder.  Indeed, the record suggests defendant’s 
appearance had changed somewhat since the time of the crimes.4  
                                              
4  
At the hearing on defendant’s motion, the prosecutor asserted:  
“[D]efendant, at least from a facial hair standpoint, looks quite a bit different than 
the descriptions back at the time of the crime—  [¶] . . .  [¶] . . . I don’t think a 
lineup would tend to resolve the issue here, because he looks a lot different than he 
did then.”  And Bettina Redondo, while confirming defendant’s photograph in the 
photographic lineup was a picture of the man she had seen in January 1991, 
declined to state whether defendant, sitting at the defense table, was or was not 
that man, stating that too much time had gone by.  
23 
Under the circumstances presented here, due process did not require 
affording defendant a pretrial lineup.  
C.  Judicial Misconduct  
Defendant contends the trial court denied him a fair trial and an impartial 
jury by making quips and sarcastic comments throughout the proceedings.  He 
complains, further, that the court improperly allied itself with the prosecution and 
created a hostile atmosphere for the defense. 
“ ‘Although a jury trial, especially for a capital offense, is obviously a 
serious matter, “Well-conceived judicial humor can be a welcome relief during a 
long, tense trial.” ’ ”  (People v. Monterroso (2004) 34 Cal.4th 743, 761.)  Still, 
“ ‘the court should refrain from joking remarks which the jury might interpret as 
denigrating a particular party or his attorney.’ ”  (People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 
1153, 1175.)  “When ‘the trial court persists in making discourteous and 
disparaging remarks to a defendant’s counsel and witnesses and utters frequent 
comment from which the jury may plainly perceive that the testimony of the 
witnesses is not believed by the judge . . . it has transcended so far beyond the pale 
of judicial fairness as to render a new trial necessary.’ ”  (People v. Sturm (2006) 
37 Cal.4th 1218, 1233.)  But a defendant seeking relief on such a theory must 
establish prejudice.  “ ‘[O]ur role . . . is not to determine whether the trial judge’s 
conduct left something to be desired, or even whether some comments would have 
been better left unsaid.  Rather, we must determine whether the judge’s behavior 
was so prejudicial that it denied [the defendant] a fair, as opposed to a perfect, 
trial.’ ”  (People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 78.)  We make that determination 
on a case-by-case basis, examining the context of the court’s comments and the 
circumstances under which they occurred.  (People v. Cash (2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, 
730.)  Thus, the propriety and prejudicial effect of a particular comment are 
24 
judged by both its content and the circumstances surrounding it.  (People v. 
Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 735.)   
In addition, a defendant who fails to make a timely objection to the claimed 
misconduct forfeits the claim unless it appears an objection or admonition could 
not have cured any resulting prejudice or that objecting would have been futile. 
(People v. Sturm, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1237; People v. Monterroso, supra, 34 
Cal.4th at p. 761.) 
1.  Disparaging counsel and exhibiting hostility toward the defense 
The court directed a number of sarcastic remarks toward defense counsel, 
but it by no means spared the prosecutor,5 indicating its comments were a matter 
of personal style, not the result of a belief that any of the attorneys was 
incompetent or that the defense case lacked merit. 
Defendant complains generally about the court’s comments throughout the 
proceedings, but specifically cites two remarks.  The first was made during a 
                                              
5  
For example, while questioning Lorraine Ripple about defendant’s facial 
hair, the prosecutor asked:  “[Y]ou are talking about between his lips and then you 
said sometimes he let it grow beyond his lips?”  The court interjected, “Between 
his lips is in his mouth—  [¶] . . .  [¶]  —where you put your foot.”  On another 
occasion, after the prosecutor complained defense counsel’s line of questioning 
was improper and would be unduly time consuming, the court stated:  “I have 
found that you know how to make objections and are reasonably familiar with the 
rules of evidence, occasionally.”  When the prosecutor objected that defense 
counsel had mischaracterized the evidence by asking Detective Tarpley if Ripple 
had told him she had robbed one of the individuals who supplied her with drugs, 
the court responded:  “Sure.  Rip off the connection, you like that better.”  When 
the prosecutor objected to a defense question, and then attempted to withdraw the 
objection because he realized the question was likely to lead to evidence favoring 
the prosecution, the court responded:  “Too late.  Sustained.  Sustained is 
sustained.  [¶] . . .  [¶] You got to think before you object.  [¶] . . .  [¶] But nice 
try.”   
25 
pretrial conference in connection with a discussion of the extent to which 
defendant would be restrained during trial.  There had been some indication 
defendant had escaped custody on a past occasion.  Defense counsel said the 
escape was nothing more than a “walkaway” occurring in 1967, asserting:  “But 
Mr. Abel’s 53 years old.  I think he’s been around the block, he has no intention 
. . . .”  The court interrupted, stating:  “You know, I’m 61 and I’m going to outlive 
both of my bailiffs, so 53 doesn’t impress me at all.  Poor old gentleman.  Am I 
supposed to feel sorry for him?”  When counsel sought to explain further, the 
court stated:  “All of that was just silliness, for the record.  Ultimately he’s going 
to be handcuffed before the jury.”  The court’s comment could not have influenced 
the jury, as the jury did not hear it.  Nor do we view it as an expression of hostility 
against defendant or his attorneys.  Rather, as with the other remarks made by the 
court throughout the trial, the comment reflects the court’s propensity for quipping 
whenever the opportunity arose.  
Defendant also specifically cites an admonition made by the court during 
defense counsel’s closing argument after the prosecutor had objected that counsel 
had no evidentiary support for an asserted fact.  The court stated it did not know if 
there was any evidence on the point.  It then said:  “Ladies and Gentlemen, if 
either side’s attorney intentionally misrepresents any fact during the course of the 
trial, including their argument, of course, and you think they’re lying to you, you 
can disregard their whole argument if you want to.  [¶] Go ahead.”  Defense 
counsel, without objecting, responded, “Thank you,” and returned to his argument.  
Later, outside the presence of the jury, the prosecutor asked for an admonition.  
Defense counsel stated he, too, was not “thrilled” with the court’s statement.  The 
court denied the prosecutor’s request, stating it had only told the jury “what is 
common sense.” 
26 
The prosecutor, clearly concerned about the court’s remark, later told the 
jury he did not believe defense counsel had been lying and did not think the court 
meant to suggest counsel was lying, explaining the court was simply telling the 
jury what the attorneys say is not evidence.  The prosecutor continued:  “So, I 
would implore you, please, do not disregard everything [defense counsel] said.  He 
made some points.  [¶] It’s valid for you to listen to his points, to consider his 
points.  And I would admit to you, and I would tell you right now, he did not 
intentionally misstate anything.”  At the conclusion of the prosecutor’s closing 
argument, the court told the jury:  “Sometimes the attorneys get overly sensitive 
about things that the court says.  I just want you folks to know that I think that the 
three lawyers that have worked in this case are the finest lawyers around.  I have 
worked with them for years.  They’re honorable people.  [¶] The court doesn’t 
have any belief that anybody lied to you about anything.  I made reference to that 
at the request of the prosecution.”  
The trial court’s remark was inappropriate and potentially prejudicial, 
suggesting attorneys might lie to the jury and instructing jurors they could ignore 
an attorney’s entire argument if they believed the attorney intentionally 
misrepresented anything.  That the comment was made during defense counsel’s 
closing argument increased the potential for prejudice to defendant, particularly 
because it followed the prosecutor’s complaint that defense counsel’s assertions 
were not supported by the record.  Although defendant did not fully object to the 
comment, the court by reason of the prosecutor’s request for an admonition was 
aware its comments were objectionable and by its response demonstrated any 
further objection from defendant would have been futile.  Under these 
circumstances, defense counsel’s failure to make a formal objection did not waive 
the issue.  (See People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 735.) 
27 
But although we find the court should not have made the comment, we also 
find it did not deprive defendant of a fair trial.  By the time the comment was 
made, the jury was fully familiar with the court’s judicial style, and the court’s 
later assurance that all of the lawyers were honorable people limited or eliminated 
any prejudice from its earlier remarks.  Any possible prejudice was further 
reduced by the court’s subsequent instruction that jurors should disregard anything 
suggesting the court’s own assessment of the facts or the credibility of any witness 
and should form their own conclusions.  When considered in the context of the 
trial as a whole, the court’s comment, although improper, could not have had any 
effect on the jury’s verdict. 
2.  Joking that prospective jurors would be punished if they spoke 
about the case 
Defendant complains that during voir dire, after admonishing prospective 
jurors not to talk about the case, the court added:  “Because if we catch you talking 
about the case, we have to have you shot, or some other reasonable form of 
punishment.”  In People v. Monterroso, supra, 34 Cal.4th 743, we rejected a claim 
that a similar comment, made by the same judge, constituted misconduct.  In that 
case, the court told prospective jurors that any juror who disregarded his 
instructions should or would be shot.  We found the “comments, even when 
considered in conjunction with the trial judge’s numerous other efforts at humor 
throughout the trial, did not so trivialize the proceedings as to raise a question 
whether the jurors were fully conscious of the gravity of their decision.”  (Id. at 
p. 762.)  We reach the same conclusion here. 
3.  Allying itself with the prosecutor and preventing the defense from 
presenting its case 
Defendant asserts the court improperly and prejudicially allied itself with 
the prosecutor by commiserating openly about defense counsel, taking an active 
28 
role in the examination of witnesses to bring out evidence favorable to the 
prosecution, and interfering with the defense. 
Defendant’s claim that the court commiserated with the prosecutor is based 
on the court’s comments after the prosecutor complained that defense counsel was 
testifying rather than soliciting evidence from a witness.  The court responded, “I 
don’t know how to stop him; do you have a hint for me . . . ?”  The prosecutor 
replied, “All I can do is object.”  The court then sustained the objection.  The 
court’s response did not suggest an alliance with the prosecutor.  To the contrary, 
the court implicitly chided the prosecutor while making the point it would not rule 
in the absence of an objection.  
As to the claim the court improperly interjected itself into the proceedings 
to bring out or clarify the evidence, “ ‘a judge should be careful not to throw the 
weight of his judicial position into a case, either for or against the defendant.’ ”  
(People v. Sturm, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1237.)  But “[t]he object of a trial is to 
ascertain the facts and apply thereto the appropriate rules of law, in order that 
justice within the law shall be truly administered.”  (People v. Mendez (1924) 193 
Cal. 39, 46.)  To this end, “the court has a duty to see that justice is done and to 
bring out facts relevant to the jury’s determination.”  (People v. Santana (2000) 80 
Cal.App.4th 1194, 1206.)  “[I]t is not merely the right but the duty of a trial judge 
to see that the evidence is fully developed before the trier of fact.”  (People v. 
Carlucci (1979) 23 Cal.3d 249, 255; see Pen. Code, § 1044 [“It shall be the duty 
of the judge to control all proceedings during the trial, and to limit the introduction 
of evidence and the argument of counsel to relevant and material matters, with a 
view to the expeditious and effective ascertainment of the truth regarding the 
matters involved.”].)  
Defendant complains that the court directed defendant to take off his 
glasses so Bettina Redondo could see his face.  The direction was consistent with 
29 
the court’s duty to see that justice is done and to bring out facts relevant to the 
jury’s determination.  (See People v. Santana, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 1197.)  
That the court later denied the prosecutor’s request that defendant be directed to 
put on a hat to allow Redondo to see defendant’s facial features in the same 
manner as she had observed the features of the gunman demonstrates the court 
was not favoring the prosecution.  Defendant also complains that after Colleen 
Heuvelman testified she told the police the man she had seen had been wearing a 
long military-style trench coat, the court remarked that a coat or jacket then shown 
to the witness, apparently a trench coat, was not a military-style coat.  The court 
should not have interjected its own knowledge of military-style coats into the 
proceedings, but its comment, if anything, undermined the prosecution’s attempt 
to show defendant was the man Heuvelman had seen. 
Defendant next complains that the court improperly interfered with defense 
counsel’s cross-examination of Heuvelman.  Counsel, armed with a transcript of 
Detective Tarpley’s interview of Heuvelman, observed that Heuvelman had told 
Tarpley that, as she was chatting with Miller just before leaving the bank to take 
care of her son, her son was behaving “like a wild man.”  Counsel asked 
Heuvelman if her son had been with her.  After she said yes, he asked if the son 
had been acting like a wild man.  Heuvelman said yes.  Counsel asked if the son 
had been running around.  Heuvelman said she had needed to restrain her son 
earlier, but her son was standing next to her, holding her hand, when she was 
speaking with Miller.  The court then called the attorneys to the bench and said to 
defense counsel:  “Mr. Freeman, if you’ve got some prior inconsistent statements 
or something that you want to impeach her with, get to it, don’t be reading the 
entire transcript into the record.  I don’t care about the kid and how he was 
running around the place or any of that kind of silliness.”  Counsel explained he 
was trying to impeach the witness’s earlier statement that she could not recollect if 
30 
her son had been with her at the bank.  The court replied:  “I don’t care about the 
kid, it’s superfluous and it’s not improper [sic] impeaching.  [¶] The court’s 
objection is sustained.”  The court then allowed counsel to examine the witness 
about matters, including her son’s conduct, that might have distracted her when 
she was watching the man in the bank’s parking lot.  
Contrary to defendant’s argument, the court did not prevent defense 
counsel from testing the witness’s powers of observation or her memory of events.  
It forestalled an irrelevant discussion of the son’s presence and conduct in the 
bank.  That the son was with Heuvelman and was presenting distractions had 
never been in dispute.  The court’s “silliness” remark, made at the bench, could 
not have influenced the jury. 
Defendant complains the court improperly curtailed his cross-examination 
of Detective Solis.  Solis testified about a field showup during which witnesses 
were asked if a man found in the area shortly after Miller was shot was the man 
they had seen in the bank’s parking lot.  None of the witnesses identified the man, 
who was then released.  Defense counsel later asked if Solis recalled a witness had 
said the man fit the gunman’s profile.  The court summoned the attorneys to the 
bench and remarked that Solis’s report of a witness’s statement would be hearsay.  
Defense counsel asserted the evidence was being offered to test the detective’s 
credibility or recollection, not for the truth of the matter stated.  But because 
Solis’s ability or inability to recall the details of the field showup could not have 
aided the defense, it is likely the defense was soliciting hearsay evidence.  In any 
event, the field showup took place because the man resembled the descriptions of 
the gunman; that a witness agreed he resembled the gunman added nothing to the 
defense case.  Finally, Solis had little reason to recall if a witness confirmed the 
resemblance; the important point to him would have been that the witnesses said 
the man was not the man they had seen.  Counsel’s line of questioning thus was 
31 
not directed at any admissible evidence that could have aided defendant.  The 
court’s refusal to allow further questioning on the matter therefore was well within 
its discretion to manage the trial.  Moreover, defendant could not have been 
prejudiced by the court’s ruling. 
The proceedings relating to defense investigator Douglas Portratz are 
somewhat more disturbing, although for reasons having nothing to do with judicial 
misconduct.  Portratz spoke with witness Bettina Redondo in January 1997, a few 
months before trial commenced.  Redondo testified Portratz showed her 
photographs of defendant and of James Gano’s brother-in-law, Craig Elz, 
compared them to the composite drawing Redondo had helped prepare, told her 
Elz’s photograph more closely resembled the drawing than defendant’s 
photograph, and told her Elz had been involved in another robbery.  Redondo felt 
Portratz was trying to convince her Elz had murdered Miller.  The court called the 
attorneys to the bench and asked the prosecutor if he had caused Portratz to be 
arrested for attempting to dissuade a witness.  When the prosecutor said no, the 
court said:  “Why not?  I mean, I haven’t seen a better case for it than this.  [¶] . . .  
[¶] Is it in the scheme of things, I hope?”  The court’s remarks, made out of the 
jury’s hearing, could not have caused the jury to think the court believed the 
defense team had acted dishonestly.  Defendant, however, asserts the comments 
must have had a chilling effect on the defense.  But that the court was legitimately 
concerned a defense investigator may have attempted to influence a witness 
should not have caused the defense to shy away from presenting legitimate 
evidence to support its case.  Further, nothing in the record hints that the court’s 
words chilled defense efforts. To the contrary, after the bench conference defense 
counsel cross-examined Redondo at length, exploring Redondo’s reasons for 
believing Portratz was trying to convince her Elz was the murderer; making the 
point that other persons, including Elz, generally met the description of the man 
32 
Redondo had seen; and eliciting Redondo’s statement she could not be certain 
defendant, as he appeared at trial, was that man. The jury also heard a tape of 
Portratz’s interview with Redondo and was provided with a transcript of the 
interview.  The defense therefore was able to, and did, use material from the 
interview to suggest Redondo may have been mistaken, and the jury was fully 
informed about the statements both Redondo and Portratz made during the 
interview. 
Defendant next complains the court repeatedly denied defense requests for 
a sidebar conference, while granting the prosecution’s requests.  He provides two 
examples.  In the first, defense counsel, after objecting to the form of the 
prosecutor’s question, asked if the court wished the attorneys to approach the 
bench.  The court overruled the objection and denied the request to approach.  In 
the second, defense counsel, during the prosecution’s redirect examination of a 
witness, objected that the prosecutor seemed to be misrepresenting that the defense 
had pursued a particular line of questioning.  The court agreed it could not recall if 
defense counsel had asked the disputed questions.  Defense counsel then asked to 
approach the bench.  The court denied the request.  After asking a question on 
another subject, the prosecutor asked to approach the bench, explaining he wished 
to cover two additional areas but thought he had better approach before going 
forward.  The court granted the request.  Nothing in either exchange suggests the 
court favored the prosecution.  Having heard the defense objections, the court 
could assess whether a sidebar conference was necessary.  But it did not know 
what areas the prosecutor intended to pursue.  By granting the prosecutor’s 
request, the court thus protected defendant from the possibility the prosecutor 
would elicit testimony that might unfairly damage defendant’s case.  Defendant 
has no cause to complain.  
33 
Defendant asserts the court unfairly and improperly suggested defendant’s 
wife had been in jail.  He mischaracterizes the court’s words.  Defense counsel had 
asked Lorraine Ripple if she recalled when defendant got married.  The court 
stated:  “That’s hearsay, counsel.  Sustained.  She’s probably in custody now.”  
In context, it appears the court was referring to Ripple’s time in custody, observing 
that because Ripple was in custody at the time of the wedding, anything she said 
about it would be based on hearsay.  Further, defendant did not object or seek an 
admonition, forfeiting his claim of error. 
The court also on many occasions sustained defense objections and 
sometimes made its own objections to the prosecutor’s questions.  It also on its 
own initiative acted to protect defendant.  For example, after defense counsel 
asked Lorraine Ripple if Detective Tarpley had said why he had contacted her, the 
court called counsel to the bench and warned that the question might open the door 
to evidence that would cause the jury to learn about all of defendant’s criminal 
activity. 
In sum, the record does not support defendant’s claim that the court allied 
itself with the prosecutor against him, prevented him from exploring weaknesses 
in the prosecution’s evidence, or prevented him from presenting a full defense. 
4.  Biasing the jury toward the death penalty 
Defendant complains the court expressed a pro-prosecution bias during voir 
dire by suggesting it favored the death penalty and believed persons willing to 
impose the death penalty have more character or inner strength than persons who 
would choose against death.   
“[T]rial courts should be evenhanded in their questions to prospective 
jurors during the ‘death-qualification’ portion of the voir dire, and should inquire 
into the jurors’ attitudes both for and against the death penalty to determine 
34 
whether these views will impair their ability to serve as jurors.”  (People v. 
Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 908-909.)  But the portion of the voir dire to 
which defendant refers here was not a part of the court’s attempt to explore 
prospective jurors’ attitudes toward the death penalty.  Rather, the court was 
impressing on the prospective jurors that should they find defendant guilty, they 
would have no option but to impose a very serious penalty.  It explained that if 
jurors found defendant was guilty of a murder committed during the course of a 
robbery, they would be required to impose a penalty of either life without the 
possibility of parole or death.  The court then asked if prospective jurors would 
have difficulty imposing either penalty and whether in determining the penalty 
they would consider and weigh mitigating and aggravating factors.  The court’s 
remarks were designed to impress on the prospective jurors the gravity of their 
task; they entailed no suggestion that the court favored one penalty over the other, 
or favored the prosecution over the defense. 
In a related claim, defendant asserts the court during voir dire twice 
improperly insinuated a sentence of life without the possibility of parole might not 
mean defendant would be imprisoned for the rest of his life.  Defendant somewhat 
mischaracterizes the court’s comments.  The court again was acknowledging that 
both death and life without the possibility of parole are significant penalties and 
explaining that if the trial reached the penalty phase, the jury would be required to 
choose one or the other.  It explained that although it was impossible to guarantee 
the jury’s verdict would be enforced, that uncertainty should not distract jurors 
from the gravity of their decision.  The court thus explained that, generally 
speaking, a sentence of life without the possibility of parole means the defendant 
will spend his life in prison and will die there.  It later stated:  “Previously I told 
you that for purposes of your decision, you have to assume that the government 
will keep the man locked up for his entire life and he’ll die in prison.  That’s the 
35 
assumption you have to make.  We’re not telling you and guaranteeing to you that 
that’s true.  We’re simply trying to impose upon you the gravity of your 
responsibility as jurors.  [¶] And with regards to that very strong gravity of your 
responsibility, you must assume that if you impose life without parole, that means 
what it says; if you impose the death penalty, that means that ultimately the death 
penalty will be carried out.”  The remarks were not made in a context that would 
convey to the prospective jurors that defendant might be released if the jury did 
not impose a verdict of death; the court was impressing on them that they would 
have no option but to impose one of two harsh penalties were they to return a 
verdict finding defendant guilty of first degree murder. 
Defendant complains the court rushed the jury toward a verdict of death by 
observing at the end of the guilt phase that juries generally have no reason to listen 
to all the testimony a second time.  He cites the court’s remark that the process of 
having the reporter read back testimony is time-consuming and the court’s request 
that the jury determine whether a rereading was necessary before asking for one.  
The court’s words, spoken at the end of the guilt phase, did not suggest the court 
was biased toward death.  Nor do we see anything in them rushing the jury toward 
a verdict or suggesting the jury could not ask for a rereading of the testimony if it 
wished.  The court was simply explaining there was good reason to refrain from 
requesting a rereading if it would not be helpful.  Any possible misunderstanding 
would in any event have been cured by the court’s further explanation that it was 
not intending to dissuade the jury from receiving the testimony, and its 
admonishment that “[y]ou may take as long or as brief a time as you need to reach 
a verdict.  You are under absolutely no time requirements or constraints in 
reaching such a verdict.” 
We conclude defendant is not entitled to reversal for judicial misconduct.  
36 
D.  Admission of Evidence of Threats to Ripple and Her Family and 
Evidence of Defendant’s Gang Affiliation; Prosecutorial 
Misconduct 
Defendant contends he suffered irremediable prejudice, requiring reversal 
of the judgment, because Lorraine Ripple was allowed to testify that he was 
affiliated with a gang and to suggest he had threatened her and her sons to prevent 
her from testifying. 
The first mention of what defendant now claims was inadmissible evidence 
occurred in response to questions by defense counsel.  The prosecutor had elicited 
from Ripple testimony that defendant had told her he killed someone in Tustin 
who had a little ministore that cashed checks for “wetbacks.”  She also stated 
defendant had given her the gun he used, which she had later traded for drugs.  
During cross-examination, defense counsel explored several areas with Ripple and 
then asked if police investigators had offered her some kind of benefit in exchange 
for her agreement to testify.  She replied that an investigating officer had offered 
to put in “a good word” to have her transferred to the California Institution for 
Women (CIW) for the trial and that she had responded, “yeah, that’s some deal.”  
Before counsel asked another question, Ripple added:  “And it’s like right now, 
I’ve got my son, all my friends, I have got two letters in the past week, one from 
Arizona prison, one from Leavenworth that are flat out:  don’t take the stand, don’t 
say a word.  And I’m—you know, I’ve got a lot of problems even with my sons 
over this.”  Defendant did not move to strike the comments or ask the court to 
admonish the jury. 
On redirect, the prosecutor referred to Ripple’s outburst, saying:  “I think 
you indicated something about having sons in Arizona, things of that nature, that 
caused you some concern as you sit here today.  Could you please explain what 
you were talking about to the jury?”  Ripple replied, “Okay.  My son is also 
affiliated with a gang that [defendant] was once a member of—” The prosecutor 
37 
interrupted, “Before we talk about that, I just—”  Ripple stated, “Is that what you 
wanted?”  The prosecutor said, “I just want to ask do you have any concerns over 
your own son’s safety?”  There was no further mention of gang affiliation.  In 
response to the prosecutor’s further questions, Ripple testified she had one son in 
state prison and another in federal prison.  She stated she had received letters 
directing her not to take the witness stand and she believed her decision to testify 
placed her and her sons at risk.  Ripple also said Deborah Lankford did not want 
her to testify and had written to other inmates in Ripple’s unit.  Ripple said she 
had been attacked by six inmates in the prison yard.  Defense counsel interrupted, 
objecting that the prosecutor was seeking hearsay evidence.  The court overruled 
the objection.  The prosecutor then asked why Ripple had agreed to testify against 
defendant.  Ripple’s only response was that she had developed “respect” for Mike 
Proctor, one of the officers who had investigated Ripple in connection with her 
own crimes, who had asked her to contact him if she ever decided to talk about 
anything.  Ripple reported she had since provided information to Proctor on 
several occasions.  Later, after questioning Ripple on other topics, defense counsel 
returned to the officer’s offer to have Ripple moved to CIW, reading from a letter 
Ripple had written to the officer, in which she wrote:  “ ‘Let’s face another fact.  
You’re offering me one year at C.I.W. and the rest of my life in the hole.’ ”  
Ripple, agreeing the officer had made the offer, then said:  “And while we’re 
putting all this in the record, let’s go one better.  [Defendant has] had Debbie 
[Lankford] sending all this paperwork to every god damn prison in the fuckin’ 
state laying on my sons to keep me off the stand.  Now, put that in your record if 
one of my kids gets hurt.” 
Defendant did not at that time move to strike or seek an admonition to the 
jury.  But after Ripple’s testimony concluded and the jury was excused for the day, 
defendant moved for a mistrial, arguing that the prosecution had elicited improper 
38 
character evidence about gang connections and letters threatening the witness.  
The court denied the motion.  On the following day, after further discussion, the 
court adopted the prosecutor’s suggestion to treat defendant’s motion for a mistrial 
as a timely objection to the evidence.  It then admonished the jurors:  “During 
redirect examination, the defense objected to a portion of witness Lorraine 
Ripple’s testimony regarding possible retaliation against herself or family 
members.  Upon further reflection, the court believes . . . the objection to be a 
proper one.  You are therefore instructed that the answer of the witness dealing 
with that limited portion of her testimony is stricken.  You are hereby instructed 
not to consider or discuss that portion of her testimony in any fashion in deciding 
this case.” 
A defendant who fails to make a timely objection or motion to strike 
evidence may not later claim that the admission of the evidence was error (People 
v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 869; People v. Hayes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1211, 
1261) or that the prosecutor committed misconduct by adducing it (People v. 
Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1072).  Further, “[w]hen an objection is made to 
proposed evidence, the specific ground of the objection must be stated.  The 
appellate court’s review of the trial court’s admission of evidence is then limited 
to the stated ground for the objection.  (Evid. Code, § 353.)”  (People v. Kennedy 
(2005) 36 Cal.4th 595, 612.)  “What is important is that the objection fairly inform 
the trial court, as well as the party offering the evidence, of the specific reason or 
reasons the objecting party believes the evidence should be excluded, so the party 
offering the evidence can respond appropriately and the court can make a fully 
informed ruling.  If the court overrules the objection, the objecting party may 
argue on appeal that the evidence should have been excluded for the reason 
asserted at trial, but it may not argue on appeal that the court should have excluded 
the evidence for a reason different from the one stated at trial.  A party cannot 
39 
argue the court erred in failing to conduct an analysis it was not asked to conduct.”  
(People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 435.) 
The present case illustrates the reason for the foregoing rule.  During 
Ripple’s testimony on redirect examination by the prosecutor, wherein she 
referred to threats of retaliation against herself and her sons, defendant’s only 
objection was that the testimony was hearsay, but he now complains that the 
evidence was irrelevant and inflammatory.  A timely objection on those grounds, 
if sustained, would have prevented any further testimony on the subject of threats 
and would have allowed the court to make an admonition to reduce any prejudice 
from the testimony already heard by the jury.   
Nonetheless, in light of the trial court’s decision to treat the matter as if 
defendant had made a timely objection, we will review the merits of his argument.  
As defendant observes, this court has held that evidence of a third party’s attempt 
to intimidate a witness is inadmissible against a defendant unless there is reason to 
believe the defendant was involved in the intimidation.  (E.g., People v. Williams 
(1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 200-201; People v. Hannon (1977) 19 Cal.3d 588, 599.)  
But we were responding to the use of the evidence to show the defendant’s 
consciousness of guilt; we were not concerned with whether it was relevant to 
some other issue, such as the witness’s credibility.  (Hannon, at p. 599; People v. 
Weiss (1958) 50 Cal.2d 535, 554.)  Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency in 
reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact or consequence, including evidence 
relevant to the credibility of a witness.  (Evid. Code, § 210; People v. Kennedy, 
supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 615.)  Thus, “ ‘[e]vidence that a witness is afraid to testify 
or fears retaliation for testifying is relevant to the credibility of that witness and is 
therefore admissible.  [Citations.]  An explanation of the basis for the witness’s 
fear is likewise relevant to her credibility and is well within the discretion of the 
trial court.  [Citations.]’ ”  (People v. Mendoza (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1056, 1084.)  
40 
“Moreover, evidence of a ‘third party’ threat may bear on the credibility of the 
witness, whether or not the threat is directly linked to the defendant.”  (Ibid.)  
Ripple’s credibility was a significant issue in this case.  The evidence therefore 
had substantial probative value, justifying its admission.  (Evid. Code, § 352.)  The 
court did not err by denying defendant’s motion for a mistrial. 
Defendant’s related argument that the prosecutor committed misconduct by 
eliciting evidence of defendant’s gang affiliation and possible threats to Ripple 
also fails.  A prosecutor commits misconduct by intentionally eliciting 
inadmissible testimony.  (People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 960.)  That 
was not the situation here.  As we have said, evidence of real or perceived threats 
to Ripple or her sons was relevant to the issue of Ripple’s credibility.  Whether 
evidence of defendant’s gang affiliation was relevant to Ripple’s credibility is 
debatable, but even assuming the evidence should not have been admitted, the 
record fails to support defendant’s claim of misconduct.  Defendant asserts the 
prosecutor “cleverly calculated the introduction of inadmissible evidence to 
prejudice defendant . . . [by specifically] asking Ripple to talk about her concerns 
for her sons, knowing it would undoubtedly lead to a disclosure about 
[defendant’s] gang affiliations.”  Ripple, however, first mentioned her sons in 
response to defense counsel’s questions.  When the prosecutor on redirect asked 
her to explain, and Ripple for the first time mentioned gang affiliation, the 
prosecutor interrupted and quickly changed the subject to focus on the sons’ 
imprisonment.  Defendant finds support for his argument in Ripple’s further 
statement, after the prosecutor’s interruption, “Is that what you wanted?”  In 
context, however, it appears the prosecutor wanted Ripple to talk about the threats 
she or her sons had received, was surprised by her mention of gangs, and changed 
the subject to prevent prejudice to defendant.  This interpretation is consistent with 
the prosecutor’s later request for a jury admonition and his emphasis during 
41 
closing argument that the jury should not consider evidence of defendant’s 
criminal past except for the limited purpose of defendant’s credibility. 
In any event, the gang reference was brief and indicated only that defendant 
had once been a member of a gang.  It could not have prejudiced defendant in the 
eyes of the jurors, who were fully aware defendant was a dangerous man who had 
committed numerous violent crimes and had spent a substantial portion of his life 
in prison.  Finally, any possible prejudice was dispelled by the court’s admonition 
to the jury to disregard that portion of Ripple’s testimony.  (People v. Burgener, 
supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 870 [any error in admitting evidence is harmless where the 
court has instructed the jury to disregard the evidence].) 
Defendant also complains that even if evidence of threats against Ripple or 
her family members was admissible, the prosecutor committed prejudicial 
misconduct by asserting during closing argument that Ripple was testifying “at 
great risk to herself and great risk to her family,” because the court had 
admonished the jury that it should not consider evidence of retaliation against 
Ripple or her family.  The court’s admonition, however, was not a blanket 
instruction to disregard all evidence of threats against Ripple; it was directed 
toward Ripple’s responses to the prosecutor’s questions during redirect 
examination.  Other evidence also tended to show Ripple had reason to fear 
retaliation, such as her responses to defense counsel’s questions, Deborah 
Lankford’s testimony about telling friends in the prison system that Ripple was 
informing on defendant, and Lankford’s concession that a prisoner risked his or 
her life by informing on someone.  The prosecutor was entitled to draw an 
inference from this evidence that Ripple knew her testimony was putting her and 
her family at risk.  “ ‘Prosecutors have wide latitude to discuss and draw 
inferences from the evidence at trial.  [Citation.]  Whether the inferences the 
42 
prosecutor draws are reasonable is for the jury to decide.’ ”  (People v. Letner and 
Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 179.) 
We conclude, for the reasons we have stated, that defendant has shown 
neither that the trial court erred nor that the prosecutor committed misconduct. 
E.  Admission of Evidence of Defendant’s Arrest for an Unrelated 
Crime and of the Weapons and Pill Bottle Found in His Possession 
at the Time of His Arrest 
Defendant contends reversal is required because Detective Steven Rubino, 
who arrested defendant in 1991 for an unrelated crime, was permitted to testify 
about guns and ammunition discovered during a search of defendant’s car, and 
because the guns and ammunition were shown to the jury. 
The complained-of testimony followed the examination and cross-
examination of Lorraine Ripple.  Defense counsel, apparently seeking to discredit 
Ripple, asked if investigators had ever told her defendant had “given her up?”  
Ripple responded that Detective Tarpley had told her a pill bottle with her name 
on it had been found in defendant’s car at the time of his 1991 arrest.  Counsel 
then asked if Ripple had told Tarpley she had been involved with defendant in 
other murders, eliciting her testimony that defendant had given her the .22-caliber 
murder weapon after Ripple told him she needed a gun to kill someone; he had 
given her other guns, including a MAC-11 semiautomatic pistol; her 
acquaintances passed guns around freely; she had traded the murder weapon for 
drugs; she had robbed her Mexican drug connection or connections several times; 
and defendant liked to brag about his crimes, including the murders he had 
committed.6  
                                              
6  
As mentioned above, the trial court, clearly concerned with counsel’s 
questions, called the attorneys to the bench and warned the defense that this line of 
inquiry could cause the jury to learn far more about defendant’s criminal history 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
43 
On redirect, Ripple testified it was common for anyone in her circle of 
acquaintances who needed a gun to ask for one and to give it back later.  She 
described a number of weapons that had been “floating around,” also testifying 
she had seen defendant with a MAC-11 semiautomatic pistol and a .22-caliber 
handgun that was not the gun used to kill Miller.  The prosecutor then showed 
Ripple several firearms contained in evidence envelopes.  Ripple stated that a 
MAC-11 and a .22-caliber handgun looked like those she had seen in defendant’s 
possession.  She identified a .38-caliber handgun as her own, saying she had used 
it in several robberies. 
Defendant did not object or seek an admonition.  But as discussed 
previously, he moved for a mistrial after Ripple’s testimony was completed.  We 
earlier considered and rejected the argument that a mistrial should have been 
granted because Ripple had linked defendant to a gang and expressed her belief 
that her cooperation in defendant’s prosecution threatened her own safety and that 
of her sons.  As relevant here, counsel also complained that the jury had seen guns 
unrelated to Miller’s murder, asserting jurors were likely to assume defendant had 
used the guns during the commission of other crimes.  The court denied the 
motion for a mistrial and adjourned the proceedings for the day.   
The following morning, before the jury was called in, defense counsel 
expressed concern that prosecution witness Detective Steven Rubino would testify 
that the guns had been recovered during a search of defendant’s car in connection 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
than defendant might wish.  Counsel responded that the defense team had 
discussed the matter with defendant and had decided to ask Ripple about her 
statements to police that defendant had committed other murders.  He explained 
the statements would support the defense claim that Ripple’s obsession with 
defendant caused her to fabricate stories about him and his criminal activities.  
44 
with an unrelated crime.  Counsel argued that evidence defendant had possessed 
weapons on another occasion was irrelevant, cumulative, unduly prejudicial, and 
“pushed up . . . against the edges of” impermissible character evidence.  
By this time, the defense had requested a psychiatric examination of Ripple 
and had expressed its intent to discredit her testimony by establishing she was 
obsessed with defendant and had been fabricating stories about his criminal 
activities.  The prosecutor asserted Rubino’s testimony would corroborate Ripple’s 
statements about defendant’s gun possession.  After further discussion, it was 
agreed Rubino’s interaction with defendant would be referred to as a “contact” 
rather than an arrest, and Rubino would explain the guns were not linked to 
Miller’s murder. 
Rubino then testified, without defense objection, that in October 1991 he 
was part of a multijurisdictional criminal apprehension detail that led him and 
approximately nine other officers to follow defendant to a parking lot where 
defendant’s car was parked.  Rubino testified he then contacted defendant.  The 
prosecutor asked, “When you contacted him, was he contacted by several deputies 
with guns drawn?”  Rubino said yes.  Defendant did not object.  Rubino then 
testified he searched defendant’s car, finding a loaded MAC-11 semiautomatic 
pistol under the right front passenger seat, a loaded .22-caliber pistol under the 
driver’s seat, some additional fully loaded magazines, a photograph, and a plastic 
vial with Lorraine Ripple’s name on it.  He said the .22-caliber pistol was not 
related to Miller’s murder.  
After Rubino was excused and the jury was in recess, defense counsel again 
asked for a mistrial, complaining the detective’s testimony was even more 
prejudicial than anticipated.  The court denied the motion. 
Evidence a defendant possessed weapons that were not used to commit a 
crime is inadmissible to show the defendant committed the crime.  (People v. 
45 
Riser (1956) 47 Cal.2d 566, 577.)  But here, the evidence was introduced for a 
different reason:  to corroborate Ripple’s testimony of having seen similar 
weapons in defendant’s possession during the same general time period.  
Similarly, evidence police found a pill bottle with Ripple’s name on it in the trunk 
of defendant’s car corroborated Ripple’s testimony that Detective Tarpley had told 
her about the discovery of the pill bottle when he told her defendant had “given 
her up.”  That the evidence was not admissible to show defendant committed a 
criminal act did not prevent it from being admitted on the issue of Ripple’s 
credibility. 
Defendant also contends the evidence was inadmissible under Evidence 
Code section 1101, subdivision (a):  “[E]vidence of a person’s character . . . is 
inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion.”  
But subdivision (a)’s restriction on the use of character evidence has no 
application when the evidence is offered on the issue of a witness’s credibility.  
(People v. Stern (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 283, 297.)  Indeed, subdivision (c) of 
Evidence Code section 1101 expressly allows the admission of evidence for that 
purpose.  In addition, defendant’s objection was that the evidence was cumulative 
and inflammatory.  Although he asserted the evidence “pushed up” against the 
edges of Evidence Code section 1101, he did not object that it was inadmissible 
character evidence, thus forfeiting the claim.  (People v. Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th 
at p. 435; People v. Kennedy, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 612.)  This rule has particular 
force here because counsel’s assertion suggested a concession that the evidence 
did not violate Evidence Code section 1101; thus, there was no reason for the 
court to analyze the point. 
Defendant contends he was excused from the necessity of making a timely 
objection or request for admonition because the trial court’s rulings on the 
objections he made both before and after Detective Rubino’s testimony 
46 
demonstrated that a further objection or request would have been futile.  (See 
People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 820.)  If by this contention defendant means 
the court had indicated it would reject an argument that the evidence was 
inadmissible character evidence under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision 
(a), we agree.  As we have said, subdivision (a)’s restrictions on evidence have no 
application where, as here, the evidence relates to a witness’s credibility.  To the 
extent defendant argues the trial court’s rulings excused him from objecting that 
the witness’s statements were inflammatory, or from seeking a jury admonition on 
similar grounds, we do not agree.  When defendant expressed concerns about the 
prejudicial effect of Rubino’s testimony, the court responded by admonishing the 
prosecutor that Rubino should not speak of an arrest, with the result that the 
prosecutor proposed to have the witness refer to the arrest as a “contact.”  There is 
no reason to assume the court would have been unresponsive to other complaints 
about the prejudicial nature of the evidence had defendant made a meritorious 
objection.  
Finally, evidence defendant possessed weapons at the time of his arrest in 
October 1991 could not have prejudiced defendant, who admitted to multiple 
armed robberies, including a series of armed robberies during that year. 
For all the above reasons, we conclude the admission of evidence of 
defendant’s 1991 arrest and the weapons and pill bottle found in his car at the time 
of his arrest provides no basis for reversal. 
F.  Lorraine Ripple’s Psychiatric Records 
During cross-examination, defense counsel asked Ripple if she had any 
history of mental health treatment.  She replied she had recently received 
treatment for trouble sleeping due to isolation.  She also spoke of a long-term 
personal and professional relationship with a psychologist who was writing a book 
on prolonged isolation.  Defense counsel subsequently filed a motion to appoint a 
47 
psychologist to examine Ripple for mental illness and requested access to Ripple’s 
psychiatric, disciplinary, and drug treatment records.  In support of the motion and 
request, defense counsel referred to Ripple’s statements about her mental health 
treatment and her angry response to defense questions.  He further asserted, on 
information and belief, that Ripple had displayed “bizarre behavior” while 
incarcerated, had at one time slashed her own throat, and had been placed on a 
suicide watch.  He claimed that inmates reported Ripple fantasized about 
defendant.  Defense counsel explained:  “All of the above combination of facts 
and circumstances are such that there is a grave concern by defendant that the 
mental health of the witness is significantly impaired.  Her state of depression may 
well contribute to her flights of fantasy regarding the defendant.  She may no 
longer have an ability to distinguish fantasy from reality.” 
The trial court did not order the examination, but it ordered the California 
Department of Corrections to release Ripple’s psychiatric records to the court.  
After reviewing the records in camera, the court explained it had balanced 
defendant’s need for the records against Ripple’s privacy rights and had 
determined the records contained nothing of particular value to the defense.  The 
court read to the jury the only portion of the records it found relevant to 
defendant’s argument that Ripple’s credibility was affected by her mental health 
problems:  “ ‘Ripple, Lorraine.  Since inmate Ripple, W27065, is not suffering 
from a serious mental disorder, and since more than six months has elapsed since 
her previous self-destructive behavior, it is recommended that the “Sharps 
restriction” described in my chrono dated 5/28/96 be lifted.  [¶] Although Ripple is 
perhaps a no greater than average risk of dangerousness to herself at this time, this 
does not mean that her dangerousness to others has declined.’ ” 
Defendant does not dispute that the trial court properly reviewed the 
psychiatric records in camera.  (See generally Pennsylvania v. Ritchie (1987) 480 
48 
U.S. 39, 58; Davis v. Alaska (1974) 415 U.S. 308, 320; People v. Gurule (2002) 
28 Cal.4th 557, 591-595; People v. Hammon (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1117, 1124; 
People v. Webb (1993) 6 Cal.4th 494, 518.)  He claims, however, that the court 
erred by failing to disclose material he could have used to impeach Ripple, thereby 
violating his constitutional right to confrontation (U.S. Const., 6th & 14th 
Amends.).7 
As an initial matter, whether defendant’s arguments are properly directed at 
the right of confrontation is far from certain.  “ ‘The main and essential purpose of 
confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-
examination.’ ”  (Davis v. Alaska, supra, 415 U.S. at pp. 315-316, italics omitted.)  
The high court has not decided if the right of confrontation embraces a right to 
discover information necessary to make cross-examination effective.  That 
question arose in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, supra, 480 U.S. 39, but the justices did 
not reach a consensus.  As we have since explained, “after [Ritchie], ‘it is not at all 
clear “whether or to what extent the confrontation or compulsory process clauses 
of the Sixth Amendment grant pretrial discovery rights to the accused.” ’ ”  
(People v. Gurule, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 592.)  Although defendant in this case 
did not seek discovery of the records until after trial had commenced, the 
uncertainty attending application of the confrontation right to discovery logically 
extends to his complaint that the trial court’s failure to disclose Ripple’s 
psychiatric records at trial deprived him of information he could use to cross-
examine her. 
                                              
7  
After trial in this matter was completed, Ripple executed a release of the 
records, waiving her privacy rights in them.  Defendant therefore has reviewed the 
records in their entirety and cites specific portions to support his arguments. 
49 
We need not resolve the question here.  Claims such as defendant’s 
implicate the fundamental fairness of trials and are therefore subject to analysis 
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  (Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 56; People v. 
Martinez (2009) 47 Cal.4th 399, 451-453; People v. Gurule, supra, 28 Cal.4th at 
pp. 592-593; People v. Hammon, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 1126-1128; People v. 
Webb, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 517-518.)  We have recognized that “[w]hen a 
defendant proposes to impeach a critical prosecution witness with questions that 
call for privileged information, the trial court may be called upon . . . to balance 
the defendant’s need for cross-examination and the state policies the privilege is 
intended to serve.”  (Hammon, at p. 1127.)  In this context, the records should be 
disclosed if they are “material.”  (Martinez, at p. 453.)  “ ‘ “[E]vidence is material 
only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to 
the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  A ‘reasonable 
probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.” ’ ”  (Ibid.)  We also consider any adverse effect nondisclosure might 
have had on counsel’s investigations and trial strategy.  (In re Brown (1998) 17 
Cal.4th 873, 887.)  Nothing in Ripple’s psychiatric records rises to this standard or 
implicates the preparation or presentation of defendant’s case. 
Defendant could not have used the records to argue Ripple suffered from a 
mental health problem affecting her credibility.  The records do not suggest Ripple 
suffered from delusions or hallucinations, nor do they contain any reports of 
cognitive difficulties or other problems that could have affected Ripple’s ability to 
perceive, recall, or describe events, or her ability or willingness to tell the truth.  
Defendant cites references in the records to “antisocial personality disorder” and 
“psychopathy,” but the terms are not defined and, even if in some contexts they 
might be used to describe traits relevant to credibility, the contexts in which they 
50 
are used here generally refer to the difficulties Ripple was experiencing adjusting 
to prison life.8  That Ripple was unhappy, difficult, and antisocial was clear from 
her trial testimony; an awareness that a prison psychiatrist had described her as 
antisocial and psychopathic could not have affected the jury’s view of her 
credibility.  Nor do the records show or suggest Ripple was in any way obsessed 
with defendant so as to support that defense theory. 
Defendant’s chief argument has nothing to do with Ripple’s mental health.  
He contends disclosure of the records would have allowed him to impeach Ripple 
by showing she was promised a significant benefit for testifying against him and 
was threatened with harsh consequences should she decline to testify.  Defendant 
claims he could also have shown that both Ripple and Detective Tarpley were 
untruthful because each testified Ripple had received no benefit for her testimony, 
with the result the jury would have concluded Tarpley was either untruthful or 
incompetent, thus fatally undermining the prosecution’s case.  
In support of this argument, defendant cites a paragraph in a May 1996 
psychologist’s evaluation.  The evaluation includes the psychologist’s report of 
Ripple’s explanation of her reasons for an aggressive outburst at a meeting with 
the institutional classification committee.  It recites that Ripple told him “they” 
had told her she could do what they wanted or she could rot in the secured housing 
unit, and they wanted her to testify against her “ ‘ex-old man’ ” “ ‘[b]ecause I ran 
                                              
8  
For example, defendant cites a September 19, 1996, mental health 
assessment that recites:  “Ripple slit throat 2/9/96.  Impulsive act after verbal 
exchange w/ staff.  Not seriously depressed then or now.  Extreme psychopathy in 
my opinion.  Been 6 months since attempt.  No [significant suicide history] noted 
described.  Dangerousness to others . . . to self, avg.”  The same record reports 
Ripple’s cognition as “[n]ormal, but antisocial,” and further recites that no 
perception disturbances were noted and Ripple did not exhibit any delusions or 
problems with orientation, memory, attention, or concentration.  
51 
a lot with the Aryan Brotherhood gang members over the years and saw and know 
about a lot of killings.  My ex-old man was an enforcer for the Chicago Crime 
Family, John Able [sic].  If they think I’m gonna tell them something that’s gonna 
endanger my sons in prison they’re nuts’. . . .  ‘I got upset, I’ll grant you that.  
They told me if I testified they’d transfer me south.  What a deal huh?  I can give 
them information that’ll get my sons killed and trade that for being able to go to a 
prison down south where I can see my grandchildren.’ ”  Defendant also cites the 
handwritten notes of a psychologist on a master mental health treatment plan dated 
February 13, 1996:  “testify pressing to go to CIW,” and “under pressure from 
Orange County to testify against high rank leaders . . . .”  
Defendant’s argument presumes the trial court’s responsibility to examine 
the records extended beyond determining if they supported his stated reasons for 
requesting them:  that Ripple might have been diagnosed with a mental disorder 
affecting her credibility, or that the records might show she was obsessed with 
defendant.  Thus, he now claims he is entitled to relief because the trial court did 
not also comb through the records searching for anything defendant might 
possibly use to impeach Ripple, or any other prosecution witness, on some other, 
unmentioned theory.  Defendant cites no authority for that proposition, but even 
were he correct, the uncertain, speculative nature of his claims falls far short of 
establishing the records contain matter that, if disclosed, would have been material 
to his defense.  
Defendant’s argument assumes Ripple was referring to pressure to testify 
against him in this trial, but if anything, the record suggests Ripple was not talking 
about this case.  There is no evidence defendant was a “high rank leader” of any 
organization or that Ripple’s asserted experience with the Aryan Brotherhood had 
anything to do with her testimony in this case.  Ripple spoke at trial of her 
knowledge of many murders, some involving defendant and some involving other 
52 
persons.  She also spoke of providing information about other murders to 
Detective Mike Proctor, who was not involved in the investigation of this case, 
and she mentioned she had been approached by a number of other agencies which 
presumably were interested in obtaining information from her.  Defendant’s 
argument also assumes Ripple’s response to the psychologist concerning her 
outburst accurately reported what others told her at the meeting, but there is no 
compelling reason why that should be true.  Defendant assumes, without 
supporting evidence, that Ripple’s decision to testify against him was motivated 
by the promises and threats she claimed to have received.  But Ripple expressed 
disdain for the promised benefit and further told the psychologist:  “Well I stopped 
doing what men on the street wanted me to do before my arrest and I’m not going 
to do what those men want either.”  Defendant also assumes Ripple’s reference to 
being transferred “down south” meant an offer of a permanent transfer to a 
preferred facility as opposed, for example, to a temporary transfer to put her in 
proximity to the court where she would testify.  Finally, defendant assumes Ripple 
was indeed transferred “down south” as a result of her willingness to testify.  But 
at most the record discloses Ripple was housed at CIW when called upon to testify 
in defendant’s case.  That Ripple had been offered a permanent transfer “down 
south” in return for her testimony in this case, or had been threatened with 
anything for failing to testify, is mere conjecture.  
Just as the records do not show Ripple received a benefit for testifying, they 
also do not show defendant could have used them to establish Ripple and Tarpley 
were untruthful.  Even had the records provided evidence persons attending the 
institutional classification committee meeting had made threats and promises 
connected to this case—and they do not—the records are not inconsistent with 
anything Ripple or Tarpley testified to at trial.  Both witnesses explained that 
Ripple had been offered housing at CIW if she testified.  Ripple testified a district 
53 
attorney investigator had told her that, if she agreed to testify, “he’d . . . put in a 
good word to have me transferred to [CIW for] the trial.”  Later she said the 
investigator had told her he thought he could have her moved to CIW for one year.  
The jury was also aware of Ripple’s views of that offer; defense counsel read to 
the jury Ripple’s written response:  “ ‘You’re offering me one year at CIW and the 
rest of my life in the hole.’ ”  Detective Tarpley testified he told Ripple she would 
in all likelihood be called as a witness and might be housed at CIW, and an 
investigator told her that “if she had concerns about her safety, that we could 
possibly house her at CIW, so [she] would not be in the same facility as Mr. 
Abel.”  The psychiatric records do not show either witness was lying.  Nor did 
nondisclosure of the psychiatric records prevent defendant from learning that some 
kind of offer to transfer Ripple to CIW had been made, so as to foreclose 
defendant from investigating the matter further.  
Defendant argues he could have used the records to show Ripple had lied 
about her mental health because she did not report she had been diagnosed with 
antisocial personality disorder or psychopathy.  But the records do not suggest 
Ripple was aware of the diagnosis or had any reason to know what the terms 
meant.  Further, Ripple was not asked about her mental health; she was asked if 
she had been treated for mental health issues.  The records do not show Ripple had 
received or was receiving any significant treatment related to her mental health or 
any treatment she might reasonably believe had any impact on her trial testimony.  
The records, therefore, did not provide a basis for impeaching Ripple’s testimony 
about her treatment. 
Defendant also argues the records showed Ripple lied about her criminal 
history, because when recounting that history to the jury she did not mention all 
the criminal acts and acts of violence she had reported to mental health personnel.  
But Ripple’s testimony reflects she was not in the least unwilling to talk about her 
54 
criminal history, her use of weapons, or her violent lifestyle.  That she did not 
mention every crime or violent act could not have affected the jury’s view of her 
character or credibility. 
For similar reasons, defendant is not entitled to relief on the theory the 
records would have enabled him to show Ripple was manipulative and had little 
conscience.  Both points were clearly established by Ripple’s trial testimony.  
In sum, defendant’s arguments that the records were material are premised 
on speculation and conjecture, not actual information contained in the records.  
Neither his right of confrontation nor his right to due process was violated by their 
nondisclosure. 
G.  Other Claims of Evidentiary Error  
Defendant contends the court should have sustained his objection that the 
prosecutor, when questioning Colleen Heuvelman, asked a leading question.   
The prosecutor was referring to a photographic lineup that included a photograph 
of Larry Jones.  Heuvelman testified she told police investigators that Jones 
resembled the man she had seen.  The prosecutor, after confirming Heuvelman had 
told the police that Jones’s “eyes were close,” asked, “Did you tell the police that 
there was a possibility of 20 to 40 percent?”  Heuvelman said yes.  The prosecutor 
then asked:  “Did you ever identify [Jones] as being the person that you saw 
standing outside the bank?”  Defendant objected that the prosecutor was leading 
the witness.  The court overruled defendant’s objection, and Heuvelman 
responded, “No, sir.”  Accepting for purposes of argument that the prosecutor’s 
question was leading,9 the evidence could not have prejudiced defendant, as other 
                                              
9  
“ ‘A “leading question” is a question that suggests to the witness the answer 
that the examining party desires.’  (Evid. Code, § 764.)  Questions calling for a 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
55 
evidence firmly established defendant was the only person Heuvelman ever 
positively identified as the man she had seen. 
Defendant also complains his ability to question Detective Tarpley was 
compromised because the court sustained objections that some of defense 
counsel’s questions were leading.  But nothing prevented counsel from eliciting 
the evidence he sought by rephrasing his questions.  The court also did not err by 
overruling a defense objection on hearsay grounds after the prosecutor asked 
Lorraine Ripple if Deborah Lankford had said anything to Ripple about testifying.  
The evidence was admitted not to establish the truth of anything Lankford had 
said, but to bolster Ripple’s credibility by showing she was testifying despite her 
fear her testimony would compromise her safety. 
Finally, the record belies defendant’s claims that the trial court’s rulings 
had a chilling effect on the defense.  The court’s interruptions, quips, comments, 
and evidentiary rulings undoubtedly were somewhat irritating, but nothing in the 
record suggests defendant was thereby dissuaded or prevented from attacking the 
prosecution’s evidence or from fully presenting his case.  
H.  Cumulative Errors 
Defendant argues that even if each asserted error, individually, does not 
require reversal, the errors, when considered cumulatively, undermined the 
integrity of the trial.  We have found merit in only two of defendant’s claims of 
error:  that the trial court should not have admonished the jurors they could 
disregard an attorney’s entire argument if they believed the attorney had lied to 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer are not leading unless they are unduly suggestive under the 
circumstances.”  (People v. Harris (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1269, 1285.) 
56 
them, and that the court should not have interjected into the proceedings its 
personal knowledge of military-style coats. 
We conclude that contrary to defendant’s argument, there is no reasonable 
probability the identified errors had any effect on the outcome of the trial.  This is 
so even if we consider the errors in conjunction with other evidence that we have 
found to have been admitted without error, such as threats made to Lorraine 
Ripple, defendant’s sometime gang membership, his arrest for an unrelated crime, 
and his possession of weapons unrelated to Miller’s murder.  The case against 
defendant was not close.  Defendant met the description of the murderer and was 
positively identified as that man by two witnesses who had taken great care to 
observe the gunman and who had provided a detailed description of him.  Colleen 
Heuvelman rejected numerous pictures of other men, but positively identified 
defendant almost immediately upon seeing his photograph.  Although Bettina 
Redondo at one time picked another man out of a photographic lineup and a third 
man out of a physical lineup, that she recanted each identification and expressed 
great concern about picking the wrong man added weight to her positive 
unrecanted identification of defendant’s photograph in the only photographic 
lineup in which his photograph appeared and her assertion at trial that his 
photograph was a picture of the man she had seen in the bank’s parking lot.  Miller 
apparently was murdered by a man who knew Miller would be in the parking lot 
of Sunwest Bank on the morning of the murder, carrying a substantial amount of 
cash.  Defendant, the man identified as the murderer by the witnesses, had been in 
Miller’s market and had reason to know Miller withdrew substantial amounts of 
money from the bank on Friday mornings.  Ripple, although far from a perfect 
witness, had been intimately involved in defendant’s criminal activities; that he 
would confess to her he had killed Miller was not incredible. 
57 
We have reviewed the evidence in its entirety and conclude that, to the 
extent any of defendant’s claims of error have merit, they neither individually nor 
cumulatively require reversal under either the Chapman (Chapman v. California 
(1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24) or the Watson (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 
836) standard. 
I.  Instruction on Felony Murder and the Jury’s Finding of Felony 
Murder 
The information charged defendant with murder with malice aforethought 
in violation of Penal Code section 187, subdivision (a).  But the jury was 
instructed with first degree felony murder and convicted defendant of that crime.  
Defendant, arguing that under our decision in People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 
441, murder with malice aforethought and felony murder are separate offenses, 
contends the failure to charge him with felony murder deprived the court of 
jurisdiction to try him on that theory.  He also claims allowing the jury to convict 
him of an uncharged crime violated his rights to due process, a jury determination 
of each element of the charged crime, adequate notice of the charges, and a fair 
and reliable guilt trial. 
As defendant recognizes, we have rejected similar claims on many 
occasions.  We have explained that the statement in the plurality opinion in People 
v. Dillon, supra, 34 Cal.3d at page 476, footnote 23, that felony murder and 
murder with express or implied malice “are not the ‘same’ crimes,” means only 
that the two forms of murder have different elements even though there is but a 
single statutory offense of murder.  (People v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 386, 412-
413; People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 394-395; People v. Pride (1992) 
3 Cal.4th 195, 249.)  We have further explained that an accusatory pleading 
charging murder need not specify the theory of murder upon which the 
prosecution intends to rely.  (People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 369.)  We 
58 
thus have consistently rejected the argument that a defendant charged only with a 
violation of Penal Code section 187, subdivision (a) may not be convicted of first 
degree murder, including first degree felony murder.  (E.g., People v. Morgan 
(2007) 42 Cal.4th 593, 771-772; Hughes, at pp. 369-370.) 
A pleading referring only to Penal Code section 187, subdivision (a) 
provides adequate notice that the defendant might be convicted of first degree 
murder on a felony-murder theory.  (People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 
1131.)  Further, a special circumstance allegation that a defendant murdered the 
victim during the course of a robbery provides more than adequate notice that the 
prosecution will be pursuing a felony-murder theory of first degree murder.  
(People v. Moore, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 413.)  Here, the information filed against 
defendant alleged the special circumstance of murder during the commission of a 
robbery.  (Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(17).)  In addition, “ ‘generally the accused 
will receive adequate notice of the prosecution’s theory of the case from the 
testimony presented at the preliminary hearing.’ ”  (People v. Hughes, supra, 27 
Cal.4th at pp. 369-370.)  In this case, the prosecutor at the preliminary hearing 
established probable cause that the murder occurred during the commission of a 
robbery, and the case was tried on the theory that the murder was committed 
during the course of a robbery.  Defendant thus had ample notice the prosecution 
was proceeding on a theory of felony murder. 
Defendant cites the admonition in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 
466, 476 that “ ‘any fact (other than [a] prior conviction) that increases the 
maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a 
jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”  (Italics added.)  But Apprendi and 
its progeny address “the Sixth Amendment right to a jury determination of facts 
used in sentencing beyond the elements of the charged offenses.”  (People v. 
Moore, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 413.)  These cases do not create new notice 
59 
requirements for alternative theories of a substantive offense such as a theory of 
first degree murder.   
III.  PENALTY PHASE ISSUES 
A.  Effect of the Murder upon Family Members  
 “Unless it invites a purely irrational response from the jury, the devastating 
effect of a capital crime on loved ones and the community is relevant and 
admissible as a circumstance of the crime under [Penal Code] section 190.3, factor 
(a).)”  (People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1056-1057.)  The 
United States Constitution bars victim impact evidence only if it is so unduly 
prejudicial as to render the trial fundamentally unfair.  (People v. Burney (2009) 
47 Cal.4th 203, 258, citing Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808, 825.)  The 
testimony of Miller’s parents about their own emotions following their son’s death 
and the effect it had on their lives did not exceed acceptable limits. 
Defendant complains, however, that America Miller impermissibly asserted 
the murder caused the death of her other son, Bobby.  A family member may 
properly testify about the effect of a murder on another family member, and it is 
not required that the other family member had been present at the scene during or 
immediately after the crime.  (See People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 132 
[victim’s mother-in-law properly allowed to testify about the impact of the murder 
on the victim’s daughter, and the victim’s parents properly allowed to testify about 
the impact of the murder on their other children and grandchild]; People v. Wilson 
(2005) 36 Cal.4th 309, 357 [proper for the victim’s sister to speak about the effect 
of the crime on the victim’s daughters and on her own daughter].)  Nevertheless, 
unless supported, a witness’s statements that the defendant’s crime caused or 
hastened the death of a third person are improper speculation.  (People v. Brady 
(2010) 50 Cal.4th 547, 577-578 [improper for the victim’s sister to testify that 
60 
their mother had given up on life six months after the murder]; People v. 
Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 197 [trial court correctly told a witness it was 
improper to speculate that the victim’s death may have contributed to the death of 
the victim’s mother].)  But here, America Miller’s statement, even if improper 
speculation, could not have prejudiced defendant.  Immediately after America 
Miller spoke about Bobby’s death, the prosecutor asked if Bobby had died of heart 
problems and, after receiving an affirmative response, moved on to other topics. 
The prosecutor referred to the statement during closing argument, telling the jurors 
that even if America Miller believed the murder was a factor in the death of her 
second son, there was no evidence supporting such a belief and they should not 
consider the statement except as it showed the impact of the murder on her.10  
That the jury would have understood America Miller’s statement to be an assertion 
of medical fact is highly improbable, particularly after the prosecutor’s careful 
explanation.  (Brady, at p. 578.)   
Further, in light of the nature of the crime and the other aggravating factors, 
including defendant’s criminal history, there is no reasonable possibility America 
                                              
10  
The prosecutor explained:  “I know Ms. Miller said something about her 
son Bob, Bob having heart problems.  Ladies and Gentlemen . . . we’re not 
suggesting in no way, shape, or form, that John Abel is responsible for the death of 
her other son.  I mean, this is a mother, obviously, in her mind she feels that this 
somehow impacted her son’s heart.  But we’re not asking you to hold Mr. Abel 
responsible for the heart problems of Bob, Bobby Miller, who eventually died.  
[¶] But in her own mind—this is, again, the impact of this crime on this victim and 
the victim’s family.  In her mind, the way she’s dealing with this is she feels the 
killing of Armando Miller is such a heartbroken event to her other son, who he 
was close to, that this is what caused his illness.  [¶] There’s no evidence of that, 
there’s no proof of that.  So I ask you not to consider that the death of Bobby 
Miller had anything to do with this incident.  That is just her impression and it’s 
part of her victim impact, but there’s no proof of that.” 
61 
Miller’s statement affected the penalty verdict.  (See People v. Brown (1988) 46 
Cal.3d 432, 447-448.)  
B.  Denial of Defendant’s Automatic Application for Modification of 
the Death Verdict 
1.  Court’s consideration of additional victim impact evidence 
Before ruling on defendant’s automatic application for modification of the 
verdict of death (Pen. Code, § 190.4, subd. (e)), the court permitted Miller’s 
fiancée, Holly Daniels, and his mother, America Miller, to make brief statements.  
Daniels told the court how Miller’s death had affected her and their daughter.  
America Miller said her faith allowed her to forgive defendant, and admonished 
defendant to accept God.  Defendant contends the judgment of death must be 
vacated because the court improperly heard victim impact statements that had not 
been considered by the jury in fixing the penalty at death. 
In ruling on a defendant’s application for modification of a verdict under 
Penal Code section 190.4, subdivision (e), the trial court “ ‘must independently 
reweigh the evidence of aggravating and mitigating factors presented at trial and 
determine whether, in its independent judgment, the evidence supports the death 
verdict.’ ”  (People v. Carrington, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 201.)  A trial court ruling 
on the application therefore should not consider evidence, including statements 
from the victim’s relatives, that was not presented to the jury during the penalty 
phase of the trial.  (People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1184.)  Here, 
although the court allowed Miller’s fiancée and mother to speak, it did so only 
after expressing agreement with the jury’s finding that the circumstances in 
aggravation were so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances 
that the penalty of death was warranted.  The statements therefore did not factor 
into the court’s decision to deny the motion.  Further, defendant did not object, 
thereby forfeiting his claim.  (See People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 907.) 
62 
2.  Suggestion defendant was required to establish mitigating factors 
“beyond a reasonable doubt” 
Defendant, citing the trial court’s statement that it found no “factors in 
mitigation proven beyond a reasonable doubt,” contends the court misunderstood 
the standard by which it was to review the jury’s determination of penalty, 
requiring reversal of the judgment of death.  Defendant is correct that because the 
sentencing function is inherently moral and normative, not functional, it is not 
susceptible to a burden of proof quantification; neither the prosecution nor the 
defense has the burden of proof during the penalty phase.  (People v. Moore, 
supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 415; People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 767.)  Thus, it 
would be error to deny a motion for modification because the defendant failed to 
prove the existence of mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.  But that is 
not what happened here. 
The trial court opened the proceedings by explaining it was required to 
review the evidence, taking into account and being guided by the aggravating and 
mitigating factors referred to in Penal Code section 190.3, to make a determination 
as to whether the jury’s findings and verdicts were contrary to law or to the 
evidence presented.  (See Pen. Code, § 190.4, subd. (e).)  The court stated it 
agreed with the jury’s findings that the aggravating factors were so substantial in 
comparison with the mitigating factors that the penalty of death was warranted, 
and it found the jury had correctly determined that the robbery-murder special 
circumstance was true.  The court explained that after conducting the requisite 
review of the evidence, it found the evidence of defendant’s guilt and the special 
circumstances to be overwhelming; the victim’s family had suffered as a result of 
the crime; defendant had suffered numerous prior convictions, “most of which 
were armed robbery of homes, businesses and banks”; and at least 20 separate 
robbery victims had testified about the violent crimes defendant had committed 
63 
against them.  Defendant had offered no factors in mitigation, but the court, 
referring to the factors listed in Penal Code section 190.3, nonetheless observed 
that defendant had not committed murder while acting under extreme duress or 
any mental or emotional disturbance or defect; defendant’s age at the time of the 
murder, 47, was not a mitigating factor; the victim had not participated in 
defendant’s homicidal conduct and had not consented to the conduct; there were 
no circumstances defendant might reasonably have believed to have provided a 
moral justification or extenuation for his conduct; there were no circumstances 
that might extenuate the gravity of the crime; and defendant’s capacity to 
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or the requirements of the law had not 
been in any way impaired as the result of mental disease, defect, or the effect of 
any intoxicants or drugs or a combination thereof. 
The record therefore reflects that the court thoroughly understood its 
statutory obligation and carefully analyzed the evidence in light of that obligation.  
When considered in context, the court’s further statement that it found beyond a 
reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty and there were aggravating factors and 
no mitigating factors appears to have been made to emphasize the absence of any 
evidence of mitigating factors, not to suggest defendant was required to prove 
their presence beyond a reasonable doubt.  But even if the court misstated the law, 
the misstatement seems to have been no more than a slip of the tongue.  In People 
v. Mayfield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 142, 196, we rejected a claim of error after 
recognizing that the trial court had correctly applied the law even if it had not 
correctly and consistently pronounced it.  We reject defendant’s claim here for the 
same reason. 
We conclude the trial court carefully and conscientiously performed its 
duty under Penal Code section 190.4.  (See People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 
640.) 
64 
C.  Other Death Penalty Claims  
Our past decisions have repeatedly addressed and rejected the other 
challenges defendant makes to the death penalty.  He states no persuasive reason 
why we should reconsider settled law. 
Thus, we continue to hold that California’s death penalty law does not 
violate the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution or international 
law (People v. Moore, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 417; People v. Brasure (2008) 42 
Cal.4th 1037, 1071-1072), including article VII of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (Dec. 16, 1966) (People v. Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 
530, 595; People v. Butler (2009) 46 Cal.4th 847, 885). 
California’s death penalty statute “is not invalid for failing to require 
(1) written findings or unanimity as to aggravating factors, (2) proof of all 
aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, (3) findings that aggravation 
outweighs mitigation beyond a reasonable doubt, or (4) findings that death is the 
appropriate penalty beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (People v. Snow, supra, 30 
Cal.4th at p. 126; accord, People v. Moore, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 415; People v. 
Bell (2007) 40 Cal.4th 582, 620.) 
The United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
supra, 530 U.S. 466, and its progeny, do not establish a Sixth Amendment right to 
determination of particular aggravating factors, or a finding that aggravation 
outweighs mitigation beyond a reasonable doubt or by a unanimous jury.  (People 
v. Moore, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 415-416; People v. Taylor (2009) 47 Cal.4th 
850, 899.) 
A defendant’s Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights do not 
require an instruction that mitigating factors need not be found by a unanimous 
jury or by any particular standard of proof.  (People v. Lomax, supra, 49 Cal.4th at 
p. 594; People v. Ervine (2009) 47 Cal.4th 745, 810.)  Moreover, here the jury was 
65 
specially instructed:  “There is no requirement that all jurors unanimously agree on 
any matter offered in mitigation or aggravation.  Each juror makes an individual 
evaluation of each fact or circumstance in aggravation or mitigation of penalty.  
Each juror should weigh and consider such matters regardless of whether or not 
they are accepted by other jurors.”   
The inclusion of the phrase “so substantial” in CALJIC No. 8.88, used here 
(jurors “must be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in 
comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life 
without parole”), does not render the instruction impermissibly vague.  (People v. 
Lomax, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 595; People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 43.)  The 
term “warrants” in the instruction is not overbroad and adequately conveys that the 
central inquiry is whether death is “appropriate.”  (People v. Griffin (2004) 33 
Cal.4th 536, 593; People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 315-316.)  
CALJIC No. 8.88 is not unconstitutional for failing to inform the jury it 
must return a sentence of life without the possibility of parole if it determines the 
circumstances in mitigation outweighed those in aggravation.  (People v. Lomax, 
supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 595; People v. Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 42.)  The 
instruction is not defective for failing to recite that neither party in a capital case 
bears the burden of persuading the jury of the appropriateness or inappropriateness 
of the death penalty.  We have long held that because the assessment of 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances required of penalty jurors is inherently 
normative, not factual, it is not susceptible to a burden of proof quantification.  
(People v. Moore, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 415; People v. Bell, supra, 40 Cal.4th at 
p. 620.)  
The failure to require intercase proportionality review does not render the 
death penalty law unconstitutional.  (People v. Moore, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 417; 
66 
People v. Lomax, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 595; People v. Hamilton (2009) 45 
Cal.4th 863, 960.) 
D.  Cumulative Error  
Defendant’s final complaint is that even if reversal is not required by the 
errors occurring in his trial when considered individually, it is required by their 
cumulative effect, which he claims undermines any confidence in the integrity of 
the proceedings.  We previously concluded the outcome of the trial was unaffected 
by the only errors occurring during the guilt phase.  Finding no additional errors 
during the penalty phase, we reject defendant’s complaint for the reasons we have 
already stated. 
IV.  DISPOSITION 
We affirm the judgment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J.
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Abel 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S064733 
Date Filed: March 19, 2012 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Orange 
Judge: Robert R. Fitzgerald 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Michael J. Hersek, State Public Defender, under appointment by the Supreme Court, Kate Johnston and 
Mary K. McComb, Deputy State Public Defenders for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr.,  and Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Adrianne S. Denault and James D. Dutton, 
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Mary K. McComb 
Deputy State Public Defender 
801 K Street 
Sacramento, CA  95814 
(916) 322-2969 
 
James D. Dutton 
Deputy Attorney General 
110 West A Street, Suite 1100 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 645-2212