Title: State ex rel. Vacation Management Solutions, LLC v. Honorable Joan L. Moriarty
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC98323
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: November 24, 2020

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
STATE ex rel. 
     ) 
VACATION MANAGEMENT 
     ) 
SOLUTIONS, LLC,  
     ) 
     ) 
Relator, 
     ) 
     ) 
v. 
     ) 
No. SC98323 
     ) 
THE HONORABLE JOAN L. 
     ) 
MORIARTY, 
     ) 
     ) 
Respondent. 
     ) 
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN MANDAMUS 
Vacation Management Solutions, LLC, (“VMS”) seeks a writ of mandamus 
ordering the circuit court to transfer Kyle Klosterman’s case from the City of St. Louis to 
St. Charles County or Warren County.  Because Klosterman did not reply to VMS’s 
motion to transfer venue within 30 days as required by Rule 51.045(b), the action must be 
transferred pursuant to Rule 51.045(c).  This Court makes permanent its preliminary writ 
of mandamus. 
Background 
Klosterman filed an action against VMS and Innsbrook Properties, Inc., in the 
Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, alleging violations of the Missouri Merchandising 
Opinion issued November 24, 2020
2 
 
Practices Act.  Klosterman, using VRBO.com, purchased a vacation package for a 
condominium owned by Innsbrook Properties.  VMS allegedly managed the property.  
After he bought the package, Klosterman claims his reservation was cancelled and 
rebooked for a higher price against his wishes.1  Klosterman later voluntarily dismissed 
Innsbrook Properties from the suit but proceeded against VMS. 
 
On June 17, 2019, VMS filed both a motion to dismiss and a motion to transfer 
venue.  In its transfer motion, VMS argued the City of St. Louis was an improper venue 
because no events related to the alleged violations occurred there.  VMS further 
contended venue was proper in either Warren County, where the rental property is 
located, or in St. Charles County, where VMS’s registered agent is located.  Klosterman 
did not file a reply to the motion.  In December 2019, the circuit court overruled VMS’s 
motion to dismiss.  VMS filed a petition for a writ of prohibition in the court of appeals 
seeking to prevent the case from moving forward in the City of St. Louis and to compel 
transfer.  The writ petition was denied.  This Court subsequently issued a preliminary writ 
of mandamus.  VMS now seeks to make the preliminary writ permanent. 
Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
This Court has the authority to issue and determine original remedial writs.  Mo. 
Const. art. V, sec. 4.1.  “Mandamus is a discretionary writ that is appropriate where a 
court has exceeded its jurisdiction or authority and where there is no remedy through 
                                              
1 Klosterman further alleged he objected to the change and the package was ultimately cancelled 
altogether.  Because of these difficulties, Klosterman purportedly had to pay significantly more 
for his trip. 
3 
 
appeal.”  State ex rel. Kauble v. Hartenbach, 216 S.W.3d 158, 159 (Mo. banc 2007).  To 
be entitled to mandamus, a relator “must allege and prove . . . a clear, unequivocal, 
specific right to a thing claimed.”  State ex rel. Furlong Cos., Inc. v. City of Kan. City, 
189 S.W.3d 157, 166 (Mo. banc 2006).  Extraordinary writs can be used to remedy 
improper venue decisions before a case is ultimately resolved.  State ex rel. Zellers v. 
Stacey, 583 S.W.3d 436, 438 (Mo. banc 2019). 
Analysis 
 
VMS argues transfer to Warren County or St. Charles County is required for two 
reasons.  First, VMS alleges transfer must occur pursuant to subdivisions (b) and (c) of 
Rule 51.045 because Klosterman did not reply to the motion to transfer within 30 days.  
Second, VMS contends transfer is mandatory based on section 508.010.10, RSMo 2016, 
as the circuit court did not overrule the motion to transfer venue within 90 days of filing.  
This Court finds VMS’s first argument dispositive. 
 
In interpreting this Court’s rules, principles similar to statutory interpretation are 
used.  In re Hess, 406 S.W.3d 37, 43 (Mo. banc 2013).  The plain and ordinary language 
of the rule is used to discern this Court’s intent.  Id.  If intent is clear based solely on this 
principle, this Court adopts the plain and ordinary meaning of the rule without resorting 
to other methods of construction.  Id.   
Rule 51.045 outlines the procedure for seeking transfer based on improper venue.  
Rule 51.045(a) states that a motion to transfer, which alleges an alternative, proper 
county and explains the basis for venue there, must be filed by the party alleging 
improper venue within 60 days of service.  Rule 51.045(b) provides the opposing party 
4 
 
can file a reply demonstrating that venue is proper in the current forum or improper in the 
suggested county or counties within 30 days of filing of the original motion.  If good 
cause is shown, the circuit court can extend the period for filing a reply.  Rule 51.045(b).  
But if no reply is filed, pursuant to Rule 51.045(c), “the court shall order transfer to one 
of the counties specified in the motion.” 
 
As required by Rule 51.045(a), VMS filed a proper motion to transfer venue.  The 
motion alleged improper venue, suggested potential proper venues, namely Warren 
County or St. Charles County, and explained why venue was appropriate in those 
counties.  Further, the motion was filed within 60 days of service.  Klosterman, however, 
failed to file a reply within 30 days of VMS’s filing.  Consequently, Rule 51.045(c) 
required the circuit court to order transfer to either Warren County or St. Charles 
County.2 
 
Klosterman contends Local Rule 33.7.2 of the Twenty-Second Judicial Circuit, the 
circuit embracing the City of St. Louis, prevents issuance of a permanent writ.  
Specifically, Klosterman posits Local Rule 33.7.2 requires every motion to be called for a 
hearing before a ruling can be issued.  Contrary to Klosterman’s theory, Local Rule 
33.7.2 merely states in what division pretrial motions should be heard, as evidenced by  
Local Rule 33.7’s general title—Pre-Trial Motions, Where Heard.3  Clearly, Local Rule 
                                              
2 Klosterman cites State ex rel. Jennings v. Riley, 236 S.W.3d 630 (Mo. banc 2007), to argue this 
Court has rejected the argument that transfer must be granted merely because a reply was not 
filed.  In 2011, the language of Rule 51.045 was amended, and the change became effective in 
2012.  Jennings is no longer dispositive. 
3 Local Rule 33.7.2 provides:  
5 
 
33.7.2 does not require a hearing to be held on a motion to transfer based on improper 
venue before a ruling is made.  Further, local rules cannot be inconsistent with this 
Court’s rules.  Rule 50.01.  As a result, Local Rule 33.7.2 cannot alter or prevent the 
application of Rule 51.045. 
 
For the first time at oral argument, Klosterman argued, based on good cause, he 
was granted leave to file a late reply.  An appellate court will not consider arguments not 
raised in a party’s brief. Rule 84.13(a); see also Franklin Farms, LLC v. N. Am. Auction 
Co., 554 S.W.3d 497, 499 n.2 (Mo. App. 2018).   Klosterman’s good cause and grant of 
leave argument was not raised in his brief; therefore, this Court will not review it.   
Conclusion 
Because Klosterman did not reply to VMS’s motion to transfer alleging improper 
venue within 30 days, pursuant to subdivisions (b) and (c) of Rule 51.045, the circuit 
court is required to transfer the case to Warren County or St. Charles County.  This Court 
makes permanent its preliminary writ of mandamus. 
 
 
______________________________ 
Mary R. Russell, Judge 
 
 
All concur. 
                                              
All . . . pre-trial motions [besides certain motions addressed in Rule 33.7.1] shall 
be heard in the division in which the case is pending, except that if the judge in the 
division in which the case is pending is unavailable, a motion may be heard and 
determined in Division 1.