Title: General Accident Insurance Company of America v. Schoendorf & Sorgi
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1994AP002042
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 21, 1996

No. 94-2042 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
 
 
 
No.  94-2042 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN             :                IN SUPREME COURT 
                                                                   
 
 
General Accident Insurance Company of 
America and Quarles & Brady, a partnership, 
 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross 
Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
 
v. 
 
Schoendorf & Sorgi and Northwestern National 
Casualty Company, 
 
 
Defendants-Respondents-Cross 
Appellants-Cross Petitioners. 
 
 
FILED 
 
 JUN 21, 1996 
 
 
 Marilyn L. Graves 
  
Clerk of Supreme Court 
  
Madison, WI  
                                                                
   
 
Thomas J. Rhoda and Fremont Indemnity 
Company, 
 
 
Defendants-Third Party Plaintiffs-
Respondents-Cross Appellants-
Cross Petitioners, 
 
 
v. 
 
Thomas J. Schoendorf, Michael L. Sorgi, 
Joseph F. Schoendorf, Jr. and John A. 
Lynch, 
 
 
Third Party Defendants-Cross 
Appellants-Cross Petitioners. 
                                                                
   
 
 
 
No. 94-2042 
 
 
 
2 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed and 
remanded. 
 
ROLAND B. DAY, C.J.   Petitioners General Accident Insurance 
Company of America and Quarles & Brady (collectively, "Quarles & 
Brady") seek review of a court of appeals decision1 affirming the 
non-final orders of the circuit court of Milwaukee County, Arlene 
D. Connors, Judge.  The circuit court had dismissed Quarles & 
Brady's contribution claim and granted in part a motion in limine 
excluding certain evidence relating to tax assessments at issue in 
Quarles & Brady's claim for equitable subrogation.  Cross-
Petitioners, the Schoendorf & Sorgi firm and others (collectively, 
"Schoendorf") seek review of the circuit court's denial of their 
motion for summary judgment dismissing Quarles & Brady's equitable 
subrogation claim because the claim was allegedly barred by the 
applicable statute of limitations, which was also affirmed by the 
court of appeals.  We conclude that the court of appeals correctly 
affirmed the circuit court on all issues, although we affirm the 
circuit court's ruling on the statute of limitations issue on a 
different rationale.   
 
In 1975, Westridge Orthopedics, Ltd., retained Schoendorf & 
Sorgi's predecessor law firm and Thomas J. Rhoda, an accountant, 
to establish a pension and profit-sharing plan ("the plan") that 
                     
     1  General Accident Ins. Co. v. Schoendorf & Sorgi, 195 
Wis. 2d 
784, 
537 
N.W.2d 
33 
(Ct. 
App. 
1995) 
[hereinafter 
Schoendorf]. 
 
No. 94-2042 
 
 
 
3 
would qualify under the Internal Revenue Code.  In late 1980, 
Westridge hired Quarles & Brady to review the plan.2  Quarles & 
Brady determined that the plan did not comply with the applicable 
law.  Although Westridge asked Quarles & Brady to bring the plan 
into compliance, Quarles & Brady did not do so.3 
 
The Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") audited Westridge's plan 
in 1984, and, on March 29, 1985, formally notified Westridge that 
the plan had been disqualified for the period beginning January 1, 
1975, and ending December 31, 1983.  Quarles & Brady pursued an 
administrative appeal of the disqualification; this appeal was 
unsuccessful.  The IRS subsequently imposed tax assessments 
against Westridge's plan for the tax years 1979 to 1983.4  The IRS 
specified the assessment for each tax year in its notice.   
 
Quarles & Brady and its malpractice carrier, General Accident 
Insurance Company of America, in 1989 and 1990 settled any 
malpractice claims Westridge could have asserted against Quarles & 
                     
     2  Westridge did not continue to retain the Schoendorf firm 
in this matter, and thus Quarles & Brady and the Schoendorf firm 
were never jointly retained.   
     3  In a letter to its liability carrier, Quarles & Brady 
stated that the task of preparing the necessary documents was 
forgotten.  Quarles & Brady also stated that it had notified its 
clients of its error and had advised them that it would accept 
responsibility for the error.  The letter specified that Quarles & 
Brady believed it was responsible for damages resulting from the 
assessment of additional tax liabilities against the plan for the 
years 1981, 1982, and 1983.   
     4  The IRS did not impose assessments for the years before 
1979 because the statute of limitations had run on those years.   
 
No. 94-2042 
 
 
 
4 
Brady, the Schoendorf firm, and Rhoda.  On January 28, 1991, 
Quarles & Brady brought an action seeking contribution from Rhoda, 
the Schoendorf firm, and their insurers.5  Quarles & Brady alleged 
that the Schoendorf firm and Rhoda were negligent in drafting the 
plan and in not submitting it to the Internal Revenue Service for 
approval.  Rhoda and the Schoendorf firm sought summary judgment 
dismissing Quarles & Brady's contribution claim, arguing that 
Quarles & Brady was a successive tortfeasor and thus had no right 
to contribution.  Rhoda and the Schoendorf firm also argued that 
any claim that Quarles & Brady might have had for equitable 
subrogation against them was barred by the statute of limitations.  
 
The circuit court granted summary judgment to Rhoda and the 
Schoendorf firm on the contribution matter, but denied the motion 
on the statute of limitations issue.  Rhoda and the Schoendorf 
firm then sought an order in limine to exclude from the trial any 
evidence relating to tax assessments against Westridge for the 
years 1980 through 1983.  The circuit court granted the motion in 
part, ruling that Quarles & Brady was solely responsible for the 
assessments for the years 1981 through 1983, but that the evidence 
was unclear as to who was responsible for the assessments for 
1980.  The court of appeals granted the parties leave to appeal 
                     
     5  Although Quarles & Brady's complaint sought contribution, 
the circuit court also treated the claim as founded in equitable 
subrogation.  "Subrogation is an equitable doctrine . . . which is 
available when someone other than a mere volunteer pays a debt or 
demand which should have been satisfied by another."  Perkins v. 
Worzala, 31 Wis. 2d 634, 637, 143 N.W.2d 516 (1966). 
 
No. 94-2042 
 
 
 
5 
the circuit court's orders, and affirmed the circuit court on all 
issues.   
 
We first review the circuit court's grant of summary judgment 
dismissing Quarles & Brady's contribution claim.  Our review is de 
novo.  Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 315, 401 
N.W.2d 816 (1987).  The circuit court concluded that the parties 
were successive tortfeasors because their conduct was separated by 
five years and because their conduct had produced discrete, 
apportionable harm.  The harm was apportionable because of the 
specified yearly tax assessments imposed against the plan.  We 
conclude, as did the court of appeals, that the circuit court 
correctly dismissed Quarles & Brady's contribution claim, because 
an action for contribution cannot lie when the parties are 
successive tortfeasors.   
 
The three prerequisites to a contribution claim are "1. Both 
parties must be joint negligent wrongdoers;  2. they must have 
common liability because of such negligence to the same person;  
3. one such party must have borne an unequal proportion of the 
common burden."  Farmers Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Milwaukee Auto. 
Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 512, 515, 99 N.W.2d 746 (1959); see also Giese 
v. Montgomery Ward, 111 Wis. 2d 392, 404, 331 N.W.2d 585 (1983).  
"[T]o recover on the basis of contribution, nonintentional 
negligent tort-feasors must have a common liability to a third 
person at the time of the accident created by their concurring 
negligence."  Farmers Mut., 8 Wis. at 519.  Thus, as the court of 
 
No. 94-2042 
 
 
 
6 
appeals in this case reasoned, "successive tortfeasors—those whose 
negligent acts produce discrete, albeit overlapping or otherwise 
related, injuries—may not assert claims of contribution against 
one another."  Schoendorf, 195 Wis. 2d at 792 (citing, inter alia, 
Fisher v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 173 Wis. 57, 60, 180 
N.W. 269 (1920)). 
 
Quarles & Brady argues that the harm in this case is 
indivisible, and that the Schoendorf firm's negligent drafting 
could be a cause of all the assessments leveled against the plan. 
 This argument, however, ignores the circuit court's finding, 
which we conclude is supported by the record, that Quarles & Brady 
was solely responsible for the assessments made against the plan 
for and after 1981.  There would have been no such assessments, 
therefore, if Quarles & Brady had followed through on its client's 
request to correct the plan.  Furthermore, the Schoendorf firm was 
no longer retained after Westridge retained Quarles & Brady; the 
Schoendorf firm thus did not have the ability to correct the plan. 
  
The situation presented in this case is in this respect 
dissimilar to more common tort situations, such as a physical 
injury caused by one party which is then aggravated by a second 
party (malpractice by a treating doctor, for example), or a 
physical injury caused by the combined negligence of two or more 
parties (a multiple-car accident, for example).  In these cases, 
liability is joint.  See Butzow v. Wausau Memorial Hosp., 51 
Wis. 2d 281, 285-87, 187 N.W.2d 349 (1971); Restatement (Second) 
 
No. 94-2042 
 
 
 
7 
of Torts § 879 (1979).6  In the present case, however, the only 
harm takes the form of yearly assessments.  The circuit court's 
conclusion that Quarles & Brady was responsible for assessments 
occurring after its failure to correct the plan, coupled with the 
fact that Schoendorf was no longer in a position to correct its 
negligence, creates a plain division of liability, falling first 
on Schoendorf, then on Quarles & Brady.7  The fact that the 
assessments are continuous (i.e., they were imposed on a yearly 
basis over a consecutive series of years) does not mean they are 
indivisible, or that they spring from one cause.  Rather, they are 
best characterized as resulting from successive torts.  Unlike the 
damages suffered in more typical tort cases (such as the injuries 
to the plaintiff in Butzow, 51 Wis. 2d at 283, consisting of a 
broken hip suffered in a fall and the later aggravation of this 
injury), the damages in this case do not combine to form an 
                     
     6  As this Restatement section and its comments make clear, 
in the first situation the parties are jointly liable only for the 
aggravation, while in the second situation the parties are liable 
for the entire harm.  Nothing in our decision today alters these 
black-letter rules of joint liability. 
     7  The precise point at which the assessments should be 
divided is not at issue in this opinion, in which our review is 
limited to the circuit court's non-final orders.  However, we note 
that Schoendorf denies all allegations of negligence, and 
furthermore has argued that none of the assessments would have 
occurred if Quarles & Brady had amended the plan in 1980 (due to 
an "amnesty" program then in effect), so there may ultimately be a 
determination that all of the assessments were caused by Quarles & 
Brady.  These determinations will be made on remand.  For purposes 
of this discussion, we assume only the possibility of negligence 
on the part of Schoendorf. 
 
No. 94-2042 
 
 
 
8 
indivisible harm.  For this reason, we find much of the precedent8 
on which the parties ask us to rely inapplicable because the cases 
do not involve a divisible harm springing from the actions of 
successive tortfeasors.  However, Butzow and Fisher remain valid 
for the general proposition that an earlier tortfeasor may be 
liable for damages inflicted by a successive tortfeasor. 
 
We further note, as did the court of appeals below, that 
"[t]he right of contribution is founded upon principles of equity 
and natural justice."  Schoendorf, 195 Wis. 2d at 794 (quoting 
Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 225, 210 N.W. 822 (1926)).  The 
facts stated above lead us to conclude that Quarles & Brady's 
inaction produced a harm separate from Schoendorf's negligence.  
They are thus successive tortfeasors, and because successive 
tortfeasors may not be joined in a contribution action, Quarles & 
Brady's contribution claim must fail.  See Fisher, 173 Wis. at 
60.9 
                     
     8  Quarles & Brady relies on Brown v. LaChance, 165 Wis. 2d 
52, 477 N.W.2d 296 (Ct. App. 1991) and Grosskopf Oil, Inc. v. 
Winter, 156 Wis. 2d 575, 457 N.W.2d 514 (Ct. App. 1990).  The 
court of appeals in its opinion also distinguished these cases.  
See Schoendorf, 195 Wis. 2d at 794 n.5. 
     9  For similar reasons, we reject Quarles & Brady's argument 
that finding it solely liable for the assessments imposed after it 
agreed to correct the plan is effectively an application of the 
"last clear chance" doctrine, a doctrine not recognized in this 
state, see Wilmet v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 233 Wis. 335, 
346, 289 N.W. 815 (1940).  Because we conclude there was no common 
liability in this case, we are not relieving Schoendorf of 
liability for the portion of the harm caused by Quarles & Brady; 
rather, we are concluding that the harm caused by Quarles & Brady 
was distinct and Schoendorf was never liable for it.  Quarles & 
Brady was a successive tortfeasor in this case, not a joint 
 
No. 94-2042 
 
 
 
9 
 
To summarize our analysis of this issue, this case is 
admittedly unusual in that the IRS has provided specific figures 
allowing us to apportion the harm with rare precision.  We should 
not alter our analysis, however, merely because the present 
situation is neatly apportionable while the vast majority of cases 
are not.  We conclude, therefore, that the circuit court correctly 
granted summary judgment dismissing Quarles & Brady's contribution 
claim. 
 
Although Quarles & Brady cannot seek contribution, it may 
still recover any portion of the settlement paid to Westridge that 
is attributable to Schoendorf's negligence.  The recovery of such 
compensation is possible through legal subrogation.  See Fisher, 
173 Wis. 57, 62.  Subrogation is derived "from the equitable 
doctrine of preventing unjust enrichment and placing the loss 
ultimately on the wrongdoers," Employers Health Ins. v. General 
Casualty Co., 161 Wis. 2d 937, 956, 469 N.W.2d 172 (1991) 
(citations omitted), and "permits those who pay a claim that `in 
equity should have been satisfied by another' to recover that 
payment from the person or entity primarily liable," Schoendorf, 
195 Wis. 2d at 795 (quoting Interstate Fire & Casualty Co. v. City 
of Milwaukee, 45 Wis. 2d 331, 334, 173 N.W.2d 187 (1970)).  The 
circuit court in this case ruled after a motion in limine that 
(..continued) 
tortfeasor whose actions relieved another of liability.  This case 
does not involve the "last clear chance" doctrine. 
 
No. 94-2042 
 
 
 
10 
Quarles & Brady could not introduce evidence at trial of its 
settlement payments for the years 1981 through 1983.   
 
Quarles & Brady also seeks review of this ruling.  A trial 
court's discretionary decision to admit or exclude evidence will 
be upheld if the decision has "a reasonable basis" and was made 
"in accordance with accepted legal standards and in accordance 
with the facts of record."  State v. Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d 334, 342, 
340 N.W.2d 498 (1983) (citation omitted); see also Franz v. 
Brennan, 150 Wis. 2d 1, 6, 440 N.W.2d 562 (1989).  Our conclusion 
on this issue is compelled by our previous analysis in this case. 
 We have already noted that the circuit court's conclusion that 
Quarles & Brady was solely responsible for the assessments for the 
years 1981 through 1983 is supported by the record.  Quarles & 
Brady admitted its responsibility for these assessments in a 
letter to its insurer,10 and the assessments for and after 1981 
would not have been levied if Quarles & Brady had followed up on 
its client's request to correct the plan.  Because Quarles & Brady 
cannot recover the portion of the settlement attributable to these 
assessments from Schoendorf, the circuit court acted within its 
                     
     10  In its briefs before this court, Quarles & Brady argues 
that its letter to its insurer is not an admission of sole 
responsibility, but simply a notice of claim and possible damages 
as required by its insurance policy.  Our review, however, is not 
of this letter, but of the circuit court's conclusion that Quarles 
& Brady bore responsibility for the 1981-1983 assessments.  As 
already stated, we find the circuit court's conclusion to be 
supported by the record as a whole, including the facts stated in 
this opinion. 
 
No. 94-2042 
 
 
 
11 
discretion in ruling that evidence of such assessments would be 
irrelevant.  We therefore affirm on this issue.    
 
The next issue is raised by Schoendorf's cross petition.  
Schoendorf seeks review of that portion of the court of appeals' 
decision which affirmed the circuit court's denial of Schoendorf's 
motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of Quarles & Brady's 
claim because it was allegedly filed after the running of the 
applicable statute of limitations.  The court of appeals, ruling 
on a basis not briefed by the parties, held that an action for 
subrogation, like an action for contribution, accrues when payment 
is made.  Schoendorf, 195 Wis. 2d at 797.  The court of appeals 
also held that Wis. Stat. § 893.92 (1993-94)11 should be the 
applicable statute of limitations in a subrogation action.  The 
court of appeals noted that its result would be the same under the 
parties' analysis, which reasoned that an action for subrogation 
would be subject to the statute of limitations for the underlying 
tort.  Schoendorf, 195 Wis. 2d at 798-800 n.9.  
  
We conclude that the parties' analysis is correct.  As this 
court has previously observed, subrogation "contemplates full 
substitution and places the party subrogated in the shoes of the 
                     
     11  Section 893.92 provides: 
 
 
Action for contribution.  An action for contribution 
based on tort, if the right of contribution does not 
arise out of a prior judgment allocating the comparative 
negligence between the parties, shall be commenced 
within one year after the cause of action accrues or be 
barred. 
 
 
No. 94-2042 
 
 
 
12 
[plaintiff]."  Heifetz v. Johnson, 61 Wis. 2d 111, 120, 211 N.W.2d 
834 (1973) (citation omitted).  "The original right of the 
plaintiff measures the extent of the subrogated party's right."  
American Standard Ins. Co. v. Cleveland, 124 Wis. 2d 258, 262, 369 
N.W.2d 168 (Ct. App. 1985) (citing Garrity v. Rural Mut. Ins. Co., 
77 Wis. 2d 537, 541, 253 N.W.2d 512 (1977)).  Thus, in Heifetz, 
this court held that the statute of limitations for subrogation 
claims is the statute of limitations on the underlying tort, 
because the running of that statute of limitations extinguishes 
the rights of the original plaintiff.  Heifetz, 61 Wis. 2d at 115, 
124.  The statute of limitations in the present case, therefore, 
is that of the underlying tort, legal malpractice.  The court of 
appeals thus erred in concluding that the cause of action in this 
case accrued when payment is made, a standard applicable to 
contribution actions.  The court of appeals also erred in applying 
Wis. Stat. § 893.92, the statute of limitations for contribution 
actions, to the present case; the correct statute of limitations 
is the six-year statute of limitations applicable to legal 
malpractice actions.  See Wis. Stat. § 893.53 (1993-94)12; 
Hennekens v. Hoerl, 160 Wis. 2d 144, 148 n.2, 465 N.W.2d 812 
                     
     12  Section 893.53 provides: 
 
 
893.53  Action for injury to character or other rights. 
 An action to recover damages for an injury to the 
character or rights of another, not arising on contract, 
shall be commenced within 6 years after the cause of 
action accrues, except where a different period is 
expressly prescribed, or be barred. 
 
No. 94-2042 
 
 
 
13 
(1991).  That portion of the court of appeals opinion which held 
that an action for subrogation accrues when payment is made and 
Wis. Stat. § 893.92 is the statute of limitations applicable to a 
subrogation action is hereby overruled.   
 
The next question is whether the claim in the present 
matter was timely filed.  This in turn requires a 
determination of when Westridge's (and hence Quarles & 
Brady's) cause of action accrued.   
A claim for relief 
accrues when "there exists a claim capable of present 
enforcement, a suable party against whom it may be 
enforced, and a party who has a present right to enforce 
it."  Barry v. Minahan, 127 Wis. 570, 573, 107 N.W. 488 
(1906).  A tort claim is not "capable of present 
enforcement" until the plaintiff has suffered actual 
damage.  Actual damage is harm that has already occurred 
or is reasonably certain to occur in the future.  Actual 
damage is not the mere possibility of future harm.  
Meracle v. Children's Serv. Soc., 149 Wis. 2d 19, 26-27, 
437 N.W.2d 532 (1989).  
 
Hennekens, 160 Wis. 2d at 152-53 (footnotes omitted).  Schoendorf 
notes that Hennekens also states that actual damage can occur even 
without a "contemporaneous monetary loss" when a plaintiff has 
sustained "injury to a legal interest or loss of a legal right."  
Id. at 153-54.  Schoendorf argues that Westridge suffered actual 
 
No. 94-2042 
 
 
 
14 
damage in 1975, when it received a defective plan.  However, a 
claim for relief does not accrue until the potential plaintiff 
knows of or should have through an exercise of reasonable 
diligence discovered the injury.  See id. at 160.  Schoendorf 
therefore argues that Westridge learned it had suffered actual 
damage in 1980, when it was informed that the plan required 
amendment.  Schoendorf also argues that Westridge would have 
suffered actual damage in the form of the attorney's fees Quarles 
& Brady would have charged to amend the plan, had the work been 
performed.   
 
We first note that this argument requires us to accept a 
convoluted interpretation of Schoendorf's alleged negligence.  As 
noted previously in this opinion, Schoendorf denies any negligence 
in crafting the plan; yet for purposes of determining the accrual 
of Westridge's cause of action, Schoendorf asks that we conclude 
that Westridge suffered actual damage upon its receipt of 
Schoendorf's negligently-drafted plan.  Schoendorf wishes to "have 
it both ways."  We need not take such a complicated position, 
however, because we conclude, as did the court of appeals under 
its alternative holding in this case, that any damage was 
"inchoate until the plan could no longer be brought into 
compliance for the assessment years."  Schoendorf, 195 Wis. 2d at 
799 n.9.  Thus, Westridge did not suffer actual damage until it 
was notified by the IRS in March of 1985 that its plan was 
disqualified; 
before 
that 
time, 
Westridge 
knew 
only 
that 
 
No. 94-2042 
 
 
 
15 
assessments against the plan were a possibility, and, as stated in 
Hennekens, "[a]ctual damage is not the mere possibility of future 
harm."  Hennekens, 160 Wis. 2d at 153.13  Quarles & Brady's 
complaint, filed in January of 1991, was within the six-year 
statute of limitations.  Thus, we affirm the court of appeals 
decision affirming the circuit court's denial of Schoendorf's 
motion for summary judgment. 
                     
     13  The court of appeals, see 195 Wis. 2d at 799-800 n.9, thus 
correctly analogized the present situation to that of Meracle, 149 
Wis. 2d 19.  In Meracle, this court held that a couple who had 
learned their adopted child was at risk for Huntington's disease 
did not suffer actual damage (under the theory that they had been 
promised a healthy child by the adoption agency) until the child 
actually developed the disease, and not when they had learned of 
the risk.  Id. at 22-30.  Likewise, the court of appeals correctly 
distinguished two cases cited by Schoendorf, Denzer v. Rouse, 48 
Wis. 2d 528, 180 N.W.2d 521 (1970), and Boehm v. Wheeler, 65 
Wis. 2d 668, 223 N.W.2d 536 (1974), because these cases are "not 
only contrary to the line of precedent running through Hennekens, 
but would have the unfortunate result of compelling the premature 
filing of lawsuits at the first faint scent of potential injury." 
 Schoendorf, 195 Wis. 2d at 800 n.9. 
 
No. 94-2042 
 
 
 
16 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
 
No. 94-2042 
 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
94-2042 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
General Accident Insurance Company of  
 
 
 
America, and Quarles & Brady, a partnership,   
          
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants-  
 
 
 
        Cross Respondents-Petitioners,  
 
 
 
         v.  
 
 
 
Schoendorf & Sorgi and Northwestern  
 
 
 
National Casualty Company,   
 
 
 
        Defendants-Respondents-  
 
 
 
        Cross Appellants-  
 
 
 
        Cross Petitioners,  
 
 
 
Thomas J. Rhoda and Fremont Indemnity  
 
 
 
Company,   
 
 
 
        Defendants-Third Party Plaintiffs-  
 
 
 
        Respondents-Cross Appellants-  
 
 
 
        Cross Petitioners,  
 
 
 
         v.  
 
 
 
Thomas J. Schoendorf, Michael L. Sorgi,  
 
 
 
Joseph F. Schoendorf, Jr., and John A. Lynch,   
 
 
 
        Third Party Defendants-  
 
 
 
        Cross Appellants-  
 
 
 
        Cross Petitioners.  
 
 
 
____________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
 
Reported at:  195 Wis. 2d 784, 537 N.W.2d 33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
  
 
 
                                                              
 
Opinion Filed:  
June 21, 1996 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
May 29, 1996 
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
ARLENE D. CONNORS 
 
                                                              
 
 
 
 
No. 94-2042 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: 
 
 
                                                              
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For the plaintiffs-appellants-cross respondents-
petitioners there were briefs by Terry E. Johnson, Peter F. 
Mullaney and Peterson, Johnson & Murray, S.C., Milwaukee and oral 
argument by Peter F. Mullaney. 
 
 
For all the cross petitioners there were briefs by Jeffrey J. 
Liotta, Sheila M. Gavin and Hinshaw & Culbertson, Milwaukee and 
Robert F. Johnson and Cook & Franke, S.C., Milwaukee and oral 
argument by Jeffrey J. Liotta.