Title: State v. Eckert
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 120566
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: January 20, 2023

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 120,566 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
JUSTIN BURKE ECKERT, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
Multiplicity is the charging of a single offense in several counts of a complaint or 
information. The principal danger of multiplicity is that it creates the potential for 
multiple punishments for a single offense, which is prohibited by the Double Jeopardy 
Clauses of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and § 10 of the Kansas 
Constitution Bill of Rights. 
 
2. 
Questions involving multiplicity are questions of law subject to unlimited 
appellate review. 
 
3. 
 
When analyzing claims of multiplicity, the overarching inquiry is whether the 
convictions are for the same offense. There are two components to this inquiry, both of 
which must be met for there to be a double jeopardy violation:  (1) Do the convictions 
arise from the same conduct? and (2) By statutory definition are there two offenses or 
only one? 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
4. 
 
When analyzing whether sentences relating to two convictions that arise from 
unitary conduct result in a double jeopardy violation, the test to be applied depends on 
whether the convictions arose from the same statute or multiple statutes. If the double 
jeopardy issue arises from convictions for multiple violations of a single statute, the unit 
of prosecution test is applied. If the double jeopardy issue arises from multiple 
convictions of different statutes, the strict-elements test is applied. 
 
5. 
The statutory definition of the crime determines what the Legislature intended as 
the allowable unit of prosecution. There can be only one conviction for each allowable 
unit of prosecution. The determination of the appropriate unit of prosecution is not 
necessarily dependent on whether there is a single physical action or a single victim. 
Rather, the key is the nature of the conduct proscribed. 
 
6. 
The most fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the 
Legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained. In ascertaining this intent, a court 
begins with the plain language of the statute, giving common words their ordinary 
meaning. When a statute is plain and unambiguous, a court should not speculate about the 
legislative intent behind that clear language, and it should refrain from reading something 
into the statute that is not readily found in its words. But if a statute's language is 
ambiguous, a court may consult canons of construction to resolve the ambiguity.  
 
7. 
 
K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-5709(b) is ambiguous regarding the unit of prosecution, so 
application of traditional canons of statutory construction is necessary to discern its 
meaning.  
 
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8. 
Courts must construe a statute to avoid unreasonable or absurd results.  
 
9. 
 
The rule of lenity is a canon of statutory construction applied when a criminal 
statute is ambiguous to construe the uncertain language in the accused's favor. 
 
10. 
Applying traditional canons of statutory construction to K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-
5709(b), we hold the Legislature intended to tie a single unit of prosecution to multiple 
items of paraphernalia in indeterminate numbers. 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed March 4, 2022. 
Appeal from Miami District Court; AMY L. HARTH, judge. Opinion filed January 20, 2023. Judgment of 
the Court of Appeals affirming in part and reversing in part the district court is affirmed. Judgment of the 
district court is affirmed in part and reversed in part.   
 
Kai Tate Mann, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause, and was on the briefs for 
appellant.  
 
Elizabeth Sweeney-Reeder, county attorney, argued the cause, and Rebecca S. Silvermintz, 
assistant county attorney, Jason A. Vigil, assistant county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, 
were with her on the briefs for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
STANDRIDGE, J.:  A jury convicted Justin Eckert of 8 counts of felony possession 
of drug paraphernalia under K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-5709(b)(1) and 17 counts of 
misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia under K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-5709(b)(2). 
 
4 
 
 
 
Eckert appealed, arguing his convictions within each statutory subsection were 
multiplicitous because they relied on multiple items of paraphernalia used for the same 
purpose as part of a unitary course of conduct. A Court of Appeals panel agreed, finding, 
at a minimum, K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5709(b) is ambiguous because the term "drug 
paraphernalia" can be either singular or plural and therefore must be construed in Eckert's 
favor under the rule of lenity. Alternatively, the panel held the plain language of the 
statute supports finding one unit of prosecution based on Eckert's intent for possessing 
drug paraphernalia, not the quantity of paraphernalia possessed. As a result of its holding, 
the panel reversed 7 of the felony possession convictions and 16 of the misdemeanor 
possession convictions. State v. Eckert, No. 120,566, 2022 WL 628660, at *10, 13 (Kan. 
App. 2022) (unpublished opinion). 
 
On the State's petition for review, we affirm the Court of Appeals' conclusion that 
the Legislature intended the term "drug paraphernalia" as used in K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-
5709(b) to be tied to a single unit of prosecution and that Eckert's drug paraphernalia 
possession convictions within each statutory subsection of K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-5709(b) 
were multiplicitous. As explained below, however, we reach this result through a 
different path than the Court of Appeals.    
 
RELEVANT FACTS 
 
In December 2016, Amber Dial reported to the Miami County Sheriff's Office that 
her boyfriend, Eckert, had beaten her. As a result of these beatings, Dial sustained a head 
gash that required several staples, three broken ribs, a swollen black eye, multiple bruises 
all over her body, and a busted lip. Dial testified that Eckert also threatened her at some 
point with a knife by placing the knife up close to the front of her neck.  
 
 
5 
 
 
 
The day after Dial spoke with law enforcement, officers executed a search warrant 
at Eckert's home. During the search, officers found a tent, 9 grown marijuana plants, and 
more than 25 drug paraphernalia objects, including a propane tank and a blower.  
 
The State charged Eckert with aggravated kidnapping, attempted second degree 
murder, aggravated battery, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, criminal threat, 
cultivating marijuana, and intending to use/possess drug paraphernalia. The State later 
amended the information to include 28 other counts of possession of paraphernalia with 
intent to manufacture/plant/cultivate controlled substances. Specifically, the State 
charged Eckert with eight felony counts of possessing drug paraphernalia to manufacture, 
cultivate, and plant marijuana based on possession of propane, a blower, water jugs, 
lights, fans, a tent, a ventilation system, and a pump. K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-5709(b)(1) 
(felony possession). The State also charged Eckert with 21 misdemeanor counts of 
possessing drug paraphernalia to store marijuana and to introduce marijuana into the 
human body based on possession of 2 bongs, rolling papers, 10 pipes, a roach clip and 3 
storage containers. K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-5709(b)(2) (misdemeanor possession).  
 
Before trial, the district court dismissed four of the misdemeanor drug 
paraphernalia charges. A jury ultimately found Eckert guilty of all remaining charges, 
except the attempted second-degree murder charge. The court sentenced Eckert to a 
controlling prison sentence of 362 months and 36 months' postrelease supervision. For 
each felony drug paraphernalia possession conviction, the court sentenced Eckert to 11 
months' imprisonment to run concurrent to all other sentences.  
 
On direct appeal, Eckert raised several trial and sentencing issues. Relevant here, 
he claimed (1) his convictions for possessing drug paraphernalia were multiplicitous and 
(2) there was insufficient evidence to support two of his drug paraphernalia convictions: 
the blower and the propane. A Court of Appeals panel agreed with Eckert on the 
 
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multiplicity issue, finding the evidence supported a single conviction for felony drug 
paraphernalia possession under K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-5709(b)(1) and a single conviction 
for misdemeanor drug paraphernalia possession under K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-5709(b)(2). 
The panel reversed the remaining 23 drug paraphernalia possession convictions and 
vacated the sentences for those convictions. As a result of its decision, the panel did not 
reach the sufficiency issue. Eckert, 2022 WL 628660, at *10, 13.  
 
Eckert and the State filed competing petitions for review. We denied Eckert's 
petition but granted the State's cross-petition for review and Eckert's conditional cross-
petition for review. Jurisdiction is proper. See K.S.A. 20-3018(b) (providing for petitions 
for review of Court of Appeals decisions); K.S.A. 60-2101(b) (Supreme Court has 
jurisdiction to review Court of Appeals decisions upon petition for review).  
 
ANALYSIS 
 
The State argues the panel erred when it found Eckert's possession of drug 
paraphernalia convictions were multiplicitous. If we find the panel erred on the 
multiplicity issue, Eckert argues in his cross-petition that the State presented insufficient 
evidence to support the propane tank and blower as drug paraphernalia. 
 
"[M]ultiplicity is the charging of a single offense in several counts of a complaint 
or information." State v. Thompson, 287 Kan. 238, 244, 200 P.3d 22 (2009); State v. 
Schoonover, 281 Kan. 453, 475, 133 P.3d 48 (2006). "The principal danger of 
multiplicity is that it creates the potential for multiple punishments for a single offense, 
which is prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and § 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights." 
Thompson, 287 Kan. at 244. Questions involving multiplicity are questions of law subject 
to unlimited appellate review. Schoonover, 281 Kan. at 462.  
 
7 
 
 
 
 
When analyzing claims of multiplicity, 
 
"the overarching inquiry is whether the convictions are for the same offense. There are 
two components to this inquiry, both of which must be met for there to be a double 
jeopardy violation: (1) Do the convictions arise from the same conduct? and (2) By 
statutory definition are there two offenses or only one?" Schoonover, 281 Kan. at 496. 
 
The State concedes all the drug paraphernalia possession convictions arose from 
the same conduct, as each item was part of the marijuana farm. Thus, our focus is on the 
second component of the inquiry:  whether the conduct constituted one or more offenses 
by statutory definition. In making this inquiry, the test to be applied depends on whether 
the convictions arose from the same statute or multiple statutes. If the double jeopardy 
issue arises from convictions for multiple violations of a single statute, the unit of 
prosecution test is applied. If the double jeopardy issue arises from multiple convictions 
of different statutes, the strict-elements test is applied. Schoonover, 281 Kan. at 497.  
 
Because Eckert's 25 drug paraphernalia convictions are for multiple violations of a 
single statute, we answer the second question by applying the unit of prosecution test. See 
Schoonover, 281 Kan. at 497-98. Under the unit of prosecution test, "the statutory 
definition of the crime determines what the Legislature intended as the allowable unit of 
prosecution. There can be only one conviction for each allowable unit of prosecution." 
281 Kan. at 497-98. "The determination of the appropriate unit of prosecution is not 
necessarily dependent upon whether there is a single physical action or a single victim. 
Rather, the key is the nature of the conduct proscribed." 281 Kan. at 472.  
 
Our analysis necessarily begins with the language of K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-
5709(b): 
 
8 
 
 
 
 
"(b) It shall be unlawful for any person to use or possess with intent to use any 
drug paraphernalia to: 
 
(1) Manufacture, cultivate, plant, propagate, harvest, test, analyze or distribute a 
controlled substance; or 
 
(2) store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a 
controlled substance into the human body." K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-5709(b)(1), (2). 
 
The State argued, and the Court of Appeals held, that the Legislature intended 
charges under subsection (b)(1) to be a separate unit of prosecution from charges under 
subsection (b)(2). This conclusion tracks the express language in the statute, which 
differentiates the nature of the conduct proscribed under subsection (b)(1) (felony 
convictions for cultivating a controlled substance) from the nature of the conduct 
proscribed under subsection (b)(2) (misdemeanor convictions for storing a controlled 
substance). Eckert does not challenge this holding.  
 
Relevant to the issue presented in the State's petition for review, however, the 
panel found the statutory language within each subsection is ambiguous regarding the 
nature of the conduct proscribed because the term "drug paraphernalia" can be construed 
as either a singular or a plural noun. Finding the nature of the conduct, and thus the unit 
of prosecution, to be ambiguous, the panel held it must be construed in Eckert's favor 
under the rule of lenity. Alternatively, the panel held "the plain language of the statute 
supports finding that the unit of prosecution is based on Eckert's intent for possessing the 
drug paraphernalia, not the quantity of paraphernalia he possessed." Eckert, 2022 WL 
628660, at *10. 
 
 
9 
 
 
 
In its petition for review, the State argues the panel erred in finding the language 
within each subsection of K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-5709(b) ambiguous regarding the nature 
of the conduct proscribed. The State claims the plain language of the applicable statute 
clearly and unambiguously reflects the Legislature's intent to consider each of the 25 
individual drug paraphernalia items possessed by Eckert separate and independent units 
of prosecution. In the State's view, the phrase "any drug paraphernalia" in the statute 
shows that the Legislature clearly intended multiple units of prosecution for each 
individual item of drug paraphernalia possessed.  
 
The State's claim requires us to interpret K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-5709(b). Statutory 
interpretation is a question of law subject to de novo review. See Johnson v. U.S. Food 
Serv., 312 Kan. 597, 600-01, 478 P.3d 776 (2021).   
 
"The most fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the Legislature 
governs if that intent can be ascertained. In ascertaining this intent, we begin with the 
plain language of the statute, giving common words their ordinary meaning. When a 
statute is plain and unambiguous, an appellate court should not speculate about the 
legislative intent behind that clear language, and it should refrain from reading something 
into the statute that is not readily found in its words. But if a statute's language is 
ambiguous, we will consult our canons of construction to resolve the ambiguity. 
[Citations omitted.]" 312 Kan. at 600-01. 
 
The State relies on State v. Booton, No. 113,612, 2016 WL 4161344, at *10 (Kan. 
App. 2016) (unpublished opinion), to support its claim that the plain language of the 
statute reflects the Legislature's intent to consider each of the 25 individual drug 
paraphernalia items possessed by Eckert separate and independent units of prosecution. 
There, a jury convicted a defendant of three separate counts of drug paraphernalia 
possession based on possessing a glass pipe, baggies, and a digital scale. The panel 
analyzed several prior cases and concluded the term "any" allowed for multiple 
 
10 
 
 
 
prosecutions when there were multiple paraphernalia items. 2016 WL 4161344, at *8-10; 
see State v. Hulsey, No. 109,095, 2014 WL 4627486, at *11-12 (Kan. App. 2014) 
(unpublished opinion) (holding that using "any" in statute criminalizing child 
pornography supported separate convictions for multiple images), rev. denied 302 Kan. 
1015 (2015); State v. Odegbaro, No. 108,493, 2014 WL 2589707, at *9 (Kan. App. 2014) 
(unpublished opinion) (the same was true for a statute criminalizing making a false 
information), rev. denied 302 Kan. 1018 (2015); State v. Odell, No. 105,311, 2013 WL 
310335, at *8 (Kan. App. 2013) (unpublished opinion) (holding that a statute 
criminalizing traffic in contraband at a correctional institution supported separate 
convictions for multiple charges). 
 
Although not stated explicitly, the Booton holding—and the State's reliance on 
it—is grounded in an implicit finding that the plain and unambiguous language in K.S.A. 
2016 Supp. 21-5709(b) reflects the Legislature intended the term "paraphernalia" to be a 
singular noun. According to the State, deciding whether the term "paraphernalia" is 
singular or plural is critical to the outcome here. If we construe the term "paraphernalia" 
as singular, as the State argues, we reasonably could conclude the Legislature intended to 
tie a single unit of prosecution to possession of any single paraphernalia item. If, 
however, we construe the term "paraphernalia" as plural, we then could reasonably 
conclude the Legislature intended to tie a single unit of prosecution to either possession 
of any single paraphernalia item or possession of any number of paraphernalia items.   
 
In construing K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-5709(b), we begin with its plain language, 
giving common words their ordinary meaning. But in construing the plain language of the 
statute of conviction, we also must construe the definitional statute applicable to all 
crimes involving controlled substances, including the drug paraphernalia possession 
crimes here. See Bruce v. Kelly, 316 Kan. 218, 224, 514 P.3d 1007 (2022) ("[E]ven when 
the language of the statute is clear, we must still consider various provisions of an act in 
 
11 
 
 
 
pari materia to reconcile and bring those provisions into workable harmony, if 
possible."). 
 
The definitional statute defines "drug paraphernalia" to mean "all equipment and 
materials of any kind that are used . . . in . . . cultivating, growing . . . producing, 
processing, preparing . . . or otherwise introducing into the human body a controlled 
substance and in violation of this act." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 21-5701(f).  
 
In terms of grammar and ordinary usage, the word paraphernalia is designated as a 
noncount or mass noun. See Collins Dictionary, 
https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/paraphernalia (paraphernalia is 
an uncountable noun); Oxford Learners Dictionaries, 
https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/us/definition/english/paraphernalia?q=parap
hernalia (same); Macmillan Dictionary, 
https://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/paraphernalia (same); 
Britannica Dictionary, https://www.britannica.com/dictionary/paraphernalia (same).  
 
Like the word paraphernalia, the word equipment also is designated as a noncount 
or mass noun in ordinary usage as well. See Collins Dictionary, 
https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/equipment (equipment is an 
uncountable noun); Oxford Learners Dictionaries, 
https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/us/definition/english/equipment?q=equipme
nt (same); https://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/equipment 
(same); Britannica Dictionary, https://www.britannica.com/dictionary/equipment (same); 
Cambridge Dictionary, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/equipment 
(same).  
 
 
12 
 
 
 
So what is a noncount or mass noun? One well-known dictionary defines it as "a 
noun that denotes a homogeneous substance or a concept without subdivisions and that in 
English is preceded in indefinite singular constructions by some rather than a or an." The 
definition gives examples of "sand" and "water" as mass nouns. Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/mass%20noun. Bryan Garner 
describes it as a noun which, in some contexts, is neither singular nor plural, but instead 
is an "aggregation" which is "taken as an indeterminate whole." Garner, The Chicago 
Guide to Grammar, Usage, and Punctuation 22 (2016). The Writing Center at George 
Mason University puts it this way:  "Noncount nouns are the nouns that cannot be 
counted, and they do not make a distinction between singular and plural forms. Although 
these nouns may refer to large quantities of things, they act like singular nouns 
grammatically." https://writingcenter.gmu.edu/writing-resources/grammar-style/count-vs-
noncount-nouns.   
 
Adding more ambiguity to the mix, the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary 
designates the word "paraphernalia" as a noun "plural in form but singular or plural in 
construction." Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/paraphernalia. This designation refers to a circumstance when a 
noun that is plural in form takes a singular verb in sentence construction. An example of 
this is the word "news." Although plural, when used in a sentence we say, "the news is 
good today" and not "the news are good today." See also American Heritage Online 
Dictionary, https://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=paraphernalia (designating 
"paraphernalia" as a plural noun used with a singular or a plural verb); Collins Online 
Dictionary, https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/paraphernalia 
(noting that paraphernalia is sometimes used with a singular verb and sometimes used 
with a plural verb). 
 
 
13 
 
 
 
Based on the plain language of the substantive and definitional statute, and giving 
common words their ordinary meaning, we conclude the term drug paraphernalia as used 
in K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-5709(b) is an uncounted, mass noun that does not make a 
distinction between singular and plural forms. For this reason, we cannot discern from the 
plain language of the statute whether the Legislature intended one unit of prosecution for 
each separate single item of paraphernalia or one unit of prosecution for multiple items of 
paraphernalia in indeterminate numbers. Because we find the language of the statute 
ambiguous as to the unit of prosecution, we employ rules of statutory construction. See 
State v. Arnett, 307 Kan. 648, 653, 413 P.3d 787 (2018) ("If the language of the statute is 
unclear or ambiguous," the court may turn "to canons of statutory construction, consult 
legislative history, or consider other background information to ascertain the statute's 
meaning."). We find two statutory construction tools helpful here:  (1) construing statutes 
to avoid unreasonable or absurd results and (2) construing ambiguous criminal statutes in 
favor of the accused (rule of lenity).  
 
Unreasonable or absurd results 
 
A court "must construe a statute to avoid unreasonable or absurd results." Arnett, 
307 Kan. at 654. We presume the Legislature "does not intend to enact useless or 
meaningless legislation. . . . Equally fundamental is the rule of statutory interpretation 
that courts are to avoid absurd or unreasonable results." State v. Frierson, 298 Kan. 1005, 
1013, 319 P.3d 515 (2014). 
 
Under the State's unit of prosecution argument, a defendant could be charged 
separately for each item of paraphernalia possessed. When asked at oral argument 
whether a defendant could be charged with 1,000 separate counts of drug paraphernalia 
possession based on the use or possession with intent to use 1,000 separate plastic 
baggies to store a controlled substance, the State decisively answered in the affirmative 
 
14 
 
 
 
but noted it likely would use prosecutorial discretion to decide whether to charge all 
1,000 counts.  
 
Although the question at oral argument was a hypothetical one, the facts here 
present a good illustration of unreasonable and absurd results if we adopt the State's 
argument. Two of Eckert's felony convictions result from possession of a propane tank 
and a blower. When found by law enforcement, the propane tank was connected to the 
blower to make a heater. The State charged two felony counts—one based on possession 
of the propane tank and one based on possession of the blower—when it just as 
reasonably could have charged one felony count based on possession of a heater. In 
contrast, consider Eckert's felony conviction resulting from possession of fans. A 
photograph introduced at trial showed law enforcement discovered multiple fans in the 
grow room. Although the State alleged Eckert to be in possession of more than one fan, 
the State charged only one felony count based on possession of "fans."    
 
The same goes for the misdemeanor charges. Three of Eckert's misdemeanor 
convictions result from three separate empty storage containers. The State charged three 
misdemeanor counts based on possession of the three individual empty containers when it 
just as reasonably could have charged one misdemeanor count based on possession of 
empty storage containers. On the other hand, one of Eckert's misdemeanor convictions 
resulted from possession of rolling papers. Given it was charged in the plural, we 
reasonably assume Eckert possessed more than one rolling paper. Although the State 
alleged Eckert to be in possession of more than one rolling paper, the State charged only 
one misdemeanor count based on possession of rolling papers.  
 
The State's interpretation of K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-5709(b) means it has the 
unfettered discretion to file as many or as few drug paraphernalia possession charges as it 
wants based on how it arbitrarily groups or separates items. As seen from the examples 
 
15 
 
 
 
above, construing the statute in this way produces unreasonable, absurd, and arbitrary 
results.  
 
 
Rule of lenity 
 
When faced with ambiguity about whether the Legislature intended one unit of 
prosecution for each separate single item of paraphernalia or one unit of prosecution for 
multiple items of paraphernalia in indeterminate numbers, this court applies the rule of 
lenity. The rule of lenity provides that "'[a]ny reasonable doubt about the meaning [of a 
criminal statute] is decided in favor of anyone subjected to the criminal statute.'" State v. 
Williams, 303 Kan 750, 760, 368 P.3d 1065 (2016). Here, the rule of lenity overcomes 
the ambiguity of the statute and supports Eckert's contention that the Legislature intended 
to tie a single unit of prosecution to multiple items of paraphernalia in indeterminate 
numbers. See State v. Coman, 294 Kan. 84, 97, 273 P.3d 701 (2012) ("If . . . there are two 
reasonable and sensible interpretations of a criminal statute, the rule of lenity requires the 
court to interpret its meaning in favor of the accused."). 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The term "drug paraphernalia" in K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-5709(b)(1) and (b)(2) is 
ambiguous regarding the unit of prosecution within each subsection. Applying canons of 
traditional statutory construction, we conclude the Legislature intended to tie a single unit 
of prosecution to multiple items of paraphernalia in indeterminate numbers. We therefore 
affirm the panel's finding of multiplicity and its decision to reverse all but one felony 
possession conviction and all but one misdemeanor possession conviction. Given this 
disposition, we need not address Eckert's claim of insufficient evidence supporting his 
felony convictions of possession of the propane tank and blower.  
 
 
16 
 
 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming in part and reversing in part the 
district court is affirmed. The judgment of the district court is affirmed in part and 
reversed in part.