Title: Ploof v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 48, 2018
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: September 18, 2018

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
GARY W. PLOOF, 
 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 48, 2018 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§ 
§  Cr. ID No. 111003002 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: September 12, 2018 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
September 18, 2018 
 
Before VALIHURA, SEITZ and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 18th day of September, 2018, after careful consideration of the parties’ 
briefs, and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that the judgment of the 
Superior Court should be affirmed on the basis of and for reasons stated in its 
December 28, 2017 Memorandum Opinion and for the additional reasons set forth 
below. 
 
A motion for post-conviction relief, unless asserting a newly recognized and 
retroactively applicable right, may not be filed more than one year after the judgment 
of conviction is final.  Appellant Gary Ploof’s judgment of conviction became final 
in 2004, and the second post-conviction relief motion summarily dismissed below 
was filed in 2014.  Therefore, the Superior Court correctly concluded that Ploof’s 
 
2 
amended second motion for post-conviction relief was procedurally barred as an 
untimely and successive motion.  We expressly reject Ploof’s contention that his 
2017 resentencing as a result of our holdings in Rauf v. State1 and Powell v. State2 
restarted the post-conviction relief clock with respect to the underlying convictions.  
And because Ploof did not show that new evidence exists that creates a strong 
inference that he is actually innocent, the Superior Court’s summary dismissal of 
Ploof’s second post-conviction relief motion was proper. 
 
Ploof also claims that the current iteration of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 
is unconstitutional because it fails to provide him an adequate state remedy to 
address the constitutional violations that allegedly infected his trial.  We disagree.  
We previously addressed this question in Turnage v. State,3 where Turnage argued 
that the amended Rule 61 denied her due process of law and meaningful access to 
the courts: 
The United States Supreme Court has held that “[s]tates have no 
obligation to provide [postconviction] relief.” 
 
Thus, Turnage is arguing about the extent to which the State has 
afforded a right to postconviction relief that it does not have to afford 
at all.  Therefore, the amended Rule 61 provides more due process and 
access to the courts than is constitutionally required.  Moreover, the 
amended form of Rule 61 still provides a broad right to file a first 
petition within “one year after the judgment or conviction is final,” and 
even allows successive petitions in the compelling circumstance when 
                                               
 
1 145 A.3d 430 (Del. 2016) (per curiam). 
2 153 A.3d 69 (Del. 2016 (per curiam). 
3 2015 WL 6746644 (Del. Nov. 4, 2015) (unpublished table decision). 
 
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a person “pleads with particularity that new evidence exists that creates 
a strong inference that the movant is actually innocent” or “that a new 
rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review 
. . . , applies to the movant’s case.” 
 
 
As we recognized in Turnage, Rule 61 does not foreclose all possibilities of 
post-conviction relief; it simply requires that such challenges be brought together 
and filed within a one-year period.  Because Rule 61 provides more extensive due 
process safeguards than are constitutionally required, Ploof’s argument is without 
merit. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Gary F. Traynor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice