Title: Kenneth P. Mader v. Community Credit Plan, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1997AP003626
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 9, 1999

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-3620, 97-3626, 98-0092 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
Frank M. Kett,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Community Credit Plan, Inc.,  
 
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner.  
 
Kenneth P. Mader,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Community Credit Plan, Inc.,  
 
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner.  
 
Marcia K. Johnson and Hulda M. Johnson,  
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
v. 
Community Credit Plan, Inc.,  
 
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  222 Wis. 2d 117, 586 N.W.2d 68 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1998-Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 9, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
June 2, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha and Walworth 
 
JUDGE: 
Kathryn W. Foster and James L. Carlson 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
Wilcox, J., dissents (opinion filed) 
 
 
Crooks and Prosser, J.J., join 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner there 
were briefs by Arthur M. Moglowsky, Penny G. Gentges and Bass &  
 
Moglowsky, S.C., Milwaukee and oral argument by Arthur M. 
Moglowsky. 
 
 
 
For all the plaintiffs-appellants there was a 
brief by Gerald R. Harmon and Harmon Law Office, Milwaukee and 
oral argument by Gerald R. Harmon. 
 
 
Amicus curiae was filed by Stephen E. Meili and 
Consumer Law Litigation Clinic, Madison for Center for Public 
Representation, Inc. 
 
 
Amicus curiae was filed by Edward J. Heiser, Jr., 
and Whyte Hirschboeck Dudek, S.C., Milwaukee for the Wisconsin 
Financial Services Association. 
 
 
Nos. 97-3620, 97-3626, 98-0092 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
Nos. 97-3620, 97-3626, 98-0092 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Frank M. Kett, 
 
  
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v. 
 
Community Credit Plan, Inc., 
 
 
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 9, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
Kenneth P. Mader, 
 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v. 
 
Community Credit Plan, Inc. 
 
 
 
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
Marcia K. Johnson and Hulda M. Johnson, 
 
 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
 
v. 
 
Community Credit Plan, Inc., 
 
 
 
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE.   This is a 
review of a published decision of the court of appeals, Kett v. 
Nos. 97-3620, 97-3626, 98-0092 
 
2 
Community Credit Plan, Inc., 222 Wis. 2d 117, 586 N.W.2d 68 (Ct. 
App. 1998), which reversed two orders, one of the Circuit Court 
for Waukesha County, Kathryn W. Foster, Judge, and one of the 
Circuit Court for Walworth County, James L. Carlson, Judge.   
¶2 
This review involves three actions against Community 
Credit Plan, Inc., for damages for alleged violations of the 
Wisconsin Consumer Act, Wis. Stat. chs. 421-427 (1995-96).1  
Marcia and Hulda Johnson filed an action in Walworth County; 
Frank M. Kett and Kenneth P. Mader each filed an action in 
Waukesha County.  These three actions were consolidated at the 
court of appeals.  We refer to the four plaintiffs collectively 
as "the customers."   
¶3 
The review at bar arises from earlier replevin actions 
that Community Credit brought in Milwaukee County Circuit Court 
against these customers to recover their vehicles that were 
collateral for loans.  Community Credit obtained default 
replevin judgments in these actions, but the Milwaukee County 
Circuit Court later vacated the judgments because the actions 
were commenced in Milwaukee County Circuit Court in violation of 
the venue provision of the Wisconsin Consumer Act; the actions 
were dismissed. After the Milwaukee County Circuit Court entered 
the default replevin judgments but before it vacated the 
judgments, Community Credit took possession of the customers' 
vehicles by nonjudicial recovery. 
                     
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1995-96 version unless otherwise noted.  
Nos. 97-3620, 97-3626, 98-0092 
 
3 
¶4 
In the actions presently before this court the 
customers 
are 
seeking 
damages 
from 
Community 
Credit 
for 
wrongfully taking possession of the vehicles and for other 
practices prohibited by the Wisconsin Consumer Act.  The 
customers moved for summary judgment in the circuit court on the 
liability issues.2   
¶5 
Three issues are presented in this review.  Each 
involves interpretation of the Wisconsin Consumer Act and 
application of the Act to undisputed facts.  The three issues of 
law are as follows: 
¶6 
(I) Does Community Credit's taking possession of the 
vehicles by nonjudicial recovery pursuant to the default 
replevin judgments entered by the Milwaukee County Circuit Court 
in violation of the venue provision of the Wisconsin Consumer 
Act violate Wis. Stat. § 425.206?  If so, the customers are 
entitled to damages under Wis. Stat. § 425.305.  
                     
2 This court reviews a summary judgment using the same 
methodology as the circuit court.  State ex. rel. Auchinleck v. 
Town of LaGrange, 200 Wis. 2d 585, 591-92, 547 N.W.2d 587 
(1996).  The methodology of summary judgment is set forth in 
Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2), which provides that summary judgment 
shall be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law." 
Community Credit filed counterclaims seeking deficiency 
judgments for the amounts the customers still owe on the loans 
beyond the amounts of the proceeds that Community Credit 
obtained from its sale of their repossessed vehicles.  The 
counterclaims are not in issue in this review. 
Nos. 97-3620, 97-3626, 98-0092 
 
4 
¶7 
(II) 
Did 
Community 
Credit 
engage 
in 
prohibited 
practices in violation of Wis. Stat. § 427.104(1)(h) and (j)?  
In other words, did Community Credit engage in conduct that 
could reasonably be expected to threaten or harass the customers 
or persons related to the customers or claim, or attempt or 
threaten to enforce a right with knowledge or reason to know 
that the right did not exist?  If Community Credit engaged in 
either of these prohibited practices, the customers are entitled 
to damages under Wis. Stat. §§ 425.304 and 427.105.  
¶8 
(III) 
Are 
the 
customers 
entitled 
to 
reasonable 
attorney fees under Wis. Stat. § 425.308?  
¶9 
The Circuit Court for Waukesha County granted summary 
judgment to Community Credit and dismissed all the customers' 
claims, reasoning that the customers waived their claims by not 
objecting to the default judgments before Community Credit 
repossessed the vehicles.3  
                     
3 The Waukesha County Circuit Court, in granting summary 
judgment in favor of Community Credit, made the following 
comments during its oral ruling on the record: 
 
In the month of February when I believe all these 
items were repossessed there was a judgment which 
permitted Community Credit, the defendant in the 
action to the replevin the vehicle.  Under those 
facts . . . I find that it is appropriate to grant 
summary judgment dismissing cause of action under the 
425.206 basis . . . .  [W]hat we had here was an 
avoidable judgment, not a void, and the fact of the 
matter is it wasn't voided or vacated until months 
after 
the 
underlying 
event 
occurred. . . .  
[Plaintiffs] may have come . . . at the time that the 
original 
process 
was 
served 
and 
original 
return . . . and they would have certainly had an 
opportunity to voice an objection and apparently a 
Nos. 97-3620, 97-3626, 98-0092 
 
5 
¶10 The Circuit Court for Walworth County granted summary 
judgment in favor of Community Credit on the customers' wrongful 
repossession claims.4  It refused to grant summary judgment on 
the prohibited practice claims because it concluded that genuine 
issues of material fact exist with regard to the elements of 
knowledge.  
¶11 The court of appeals concluded that summary judgment 
should be entered in favor of the customers on all claims and 
remanded the causes for determination of damages.5  We agree with 
the court of appeals and affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals.  The language, the legislative history, and the 
                                                                  
valid objection to the hearing of this matter in 
Milwaukee County as opposed to Waukesha County.   
 
4 The Walworth County Circuit Court granted summary judgment 
in favor of Community Credit on the wrongful repossession claim, 
holding that because Community Credit had a judgment the 
repossession was not wrongful.  
5 We agree with the court of appeals' response to the 
argument that the customers waived their claims by not appearing 
in the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, which is as follows: 
A court 
cannot gain 
subject matter jurisdiction 
through waiver. . . .  When judgments are void due to 
lack 
of 
jurisdiction, 
they 
can 
be 
attacked 
collaterally at any time. . . . Here, the Milwaukee 
court lacked jurisdiction over the actions.  This 
jurisdictional defect cannot be waived.  Furthermore, 
to dismiss these claims on waiver grounds runs 
contrary to the purpose of the venue statute.  It is 
meant to protect consumers from having to travel to 
distant fora to defend.  To hold that failure to 
appear to object to venue constitutes waiver would 
defeat this goal. 
 
Kett, 222 Wis. 2d at 131-32 (citations omitted). 
Nos. 97-3620, 97-3626, 98-0092 
 
6 
interplay of the statutes, as well as the legislative policies 
expressed in the Wisconsin Consumer Act, support our conclusion 
that the default replevin judgments on which Community Credit 
relied for possession of the collateral by nonjudicial recovery 
were invalid at the time of entry for purposes of Wis. Stat. 
§ 425.206(1)(b) because Community Credit had not commenced the 
replevin actions in a county of proper venue.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that Community Credit engaged in wrongful repossession 
in violation of Wis. Stat. § 425.206 and engaged in prohibited 
practices in violation of Wis. Stat. § 427.104(1)(h) & (j). 
I 
¶12 The first issue is whether Community Credit's taking 
possession of the vehicles by nonjudicial recovery pursuant to 
the invalid Milwaukee County Circuit Court default replevin 
judgments violates of Wis. Stat. § 425.206.  At the time of 
Community Credit's taking of the vehicles, the customers had not 
surrendered, nor agreed to surrender, possession to Community 
Credit.  Community Credit could have relied on execution to take 
possession of the collateral, but it chose instead to undertake 
Nos. 97-3620, 97-3626, 98-0092 
 
7 
nonjudicial recovery of the collateral after entry of the 
Milwaukee County Circuit Court replevin default judgments.6   
¶13 The parties agree that the default replevin judgments 
of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court were invalid because venue 
was not in Milwaukee County.7  The question is whether Community 
                     
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 425.205(5) provides: "Upon entry of 
judgment . . . [a merchant] shall have the right to (a) have 
execution issued to require the sheriff . . . to take the 
same . . . collateral from [the customer] or (b) immediately 
exercise the right to nonjudicial recovery of the collateral" 
(sometimes referred to as self-help repossession).  See William 
C. Whitford & Harold Laufer, The Impact of Denying Self-Help 
Repossession of Automobiles: A Case Study of the Wisconsin 
Consumer Act, 1975 Wis. L. Rev. 607, 613; Steven W. Moglowsky, 
Money Judgments & Replevins--Commencing an Action and Taking 
Judgment at 11, in State Bar of Wisconsin, The Nuts and Bolts of 
Collections and Creditors' Rights (April 1998).  
7  In the companion case, Community Credit Plan, Inc. v. 
Johnson, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ (of even date), the 
circuit court granted the motions of the customers to vacate and 
set aside the default replevin judgments on the grounds that 
venue in Milwaukee County was improper.  Community Credit did 
not oppose vacating the judgments on the basis of venue.  
Community Credit does not argue that venue was proper.  See 
Circuit Court's Orders Vacating Judgments and Dismissing Actions 
Without Prejudice.  The circuit court also granted Community 
Credit's motion to dismiss the small claims replevin actions 
brought in Milwaukee county without prejudice. 
Neither party has contested these aspects of the judgments 
and orders.  The parties dispute only the ramifications of 
having vacated the default replevin judgments on the grounds of 
defective venue and having the Milwaukee County replevin actions 
dismissed without prejudice.  
Nos. 97-3620, 97-3626, 98-0092 
 
8 
Credit's nonjudicial recovery of collateral pursuant to the 
judgments conformed to the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 425.206. 
Section 425.206 provides in pertinent part as follows: 
 
425.206 
 
Nonjudicial 
enforcement 
limited. 
 
(1)  
Notwithstanding 
any 
other 
provision 
of 
law, 
no 
merchant may take possession of collateral or goods 
subject to a consumer lease in this state by means 
other than legal process in accordance with this 
subchapter except when: 
 
 
. . . .  
 
 
(b) Judgment for the merchant has been entered in 
a proceeding for recovery of collateral or leased 
goods under s. 425.205, or for possession of the 
collateral or leased goods under s. 425.203(2);  
 
 
. . . .  
 
(3) a violation of this section is subject to s. 
425.305.8  [Emphasis added.] 
                                                                  
This court has adopted the reasoning and decision of the 
court of appeals in the companion case.  See Community Credit 
Plan, Inc. v. Johnson, slip op. at 6 (of even date).  This court 
adopted the following language of the court of appeals: "Based 
on [Wis. Stat. § 421.401(2)(b)], we conclude that, regardless of 
whether or not [Community Credit] moved for voluntary dismissal, 
a 
dismissal 
due 
to 
improper 
venue 
would 
have 
resulted. 
[Community Credit's] prosecution of these seven actions in the 
Milwaukee County Circuit Court was a violation of the venue 
provision of the [Wisconsin Consumer Act]."  Johnson, 221 
Wis. 2d at 775.  
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 425.305 sets forth the damages for 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 425.205 as follows: 
425.305  Transactions which are void.  (1)  In a 
transaction 
to 
which 
this 
section 
applies, 
the 
customer shall be entitled to retain the goods, 
services or money received pursuant to the transaction 
without obligation to pay any amount. 
 
Nos. 97-3620, 97-3626, 98-0092 
 
9 
¶14 We must determine under Wis. Stat. § 425.206(1)(b) 
whether Community Credit proceeded to take possession of 
collateral by nonjudicial recovery with judgments entered in 
proceedings 
for 
recovery 
of 
collateral 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 425.205. 
¶15 As we have said, Community Credit and the customers 
agree that the default replevin judgments were invalid because 
the replevin actions against the customers were commenced in 
Milwaukee County Circuit Court in violation of the venue 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 421.401.9  Indeed this court has held these 
                                                                  
 
(2) In addition, the customer shall be entitled 
to recover any sums paid to the merchant pursuant to 
the transaction.  
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 421.401, the venue statute, in its 
entirety provides the following: 
421.401  Venue.  (1) The venue for a claim arising out 
of a consumer transaction or a consumer credit 
transaction is the county: 
 
 
(a) Where the customer resides or is personally 
served: 
 
 
(b) Where the collateral securing a consumer 
credit transaction is located; or  
 
 
(c) Where the customer sought or acquired the 
property, services, money or credit which is the 
subject of the transaction or signed the document 
evidencing his or her obligation under the terms of 
the transaction. 
 
 
 
(2) When it appears from the return of service of 
the summons or otherwise that the county in which the 
action is pending under sub. (1) is not a proper place 
of trial for such action, unless the defendant appears 
and waives the improper venue, the court shall act as 
follows: 
 
Nos. 97-3620, 97-3626, 98-0092 
 
10
default replevin judgments invalid in a decision released this 
same date.  See note 7 above.  Thus the invalidity of the 
default replevin judgments is a settled matter.  
¶16 The question then is whether these default replevin 
judgments, which were vacated because of a defect of venue after 
recovery of collateral, can be deemed to be valid judgments 
under Wis. Stat. § 425.206(1)(b) and as such protect Community 
Credit, which used nonjudicial recovery, from the charges of 
wrongfully taking possession of collateral. 
¶17 Community Credit rests its argument that it had valid 
judgments when the collateral was recovered for purposes of Wis. 
Stat. § 425.206(1)(b) on the general venue statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.50(1), which provides that "[a] defect in venue shall not 
                                                                  
 
(a) Except as provided in par. (b), if it appears 
that another county would be a proper place of trial, 
the court shall transfer the action to that county. 
 
 
(b) If the action arises out of a consumer credit 
transaction, the court shall dismiss the action for 
lack of jurisdiction. 
 
 
(3) If there are several defendants, and if venue 
is based on residence, venue may be in the county of 
residence of any of them. 
 
Nos. 97-3620, 97-3626, 98-0092 
 
11
affect the validity of any order or judgment." 10  Noting that 
§ 801.50(5)(m) refers to § 421.401, which contains the venue 
provisions applicable to actions arising from consumer credit 
transactions, Community Credit contends that § 801.50(1) is 
applicable to the Milwaukee County Circuit Court replevin 
actions.  Community Credit further notes the Wis. Stat. 
§ 425.205(1) statement that "replevin actions shall be conducted 
in accordance with ch. 799 [the Small Claims Act]," and the Wis. 
Stat. § 799.04 provision that except as otherwise provided in 
chapter 799, the general rules of practice and procedure in 
chapter 801 apply.  Community Credit argues that these various 
provisions demonstrate that § 801.50(1) governs the venue of 
actions arising from consumer credit transactions and that the 
default replevin judgments in this review were, on recovery of 
the vehicles, valid under § 801.50(1).  
¶18 Thus Community Credit argues that the circuit court 
should have held that the default replevin judgments in this 
case were, when the vehicles were taken by nonjudicial recovery, 
                     
10 Community Credit appears also to argue that wrongful 
repossession requires some form of egregious conduct and 
presents two cases as illustration.  First, it cites Wachal v. 
Ketterhagen Motor Sales, Inc., 81 Wis. 2d 605, 260 N.W.2d 770 
(1978), in which an officer of the creditor brought a set of car 
keys to the customer's house and repossessed his station wagon. 
 Wachal, 81 Wis. 2d at 607.  Second, Community Credit cites 
First Wisconsin Nat'l Bank v. Nicolaou, 113 Wis. 2d 524, 335 
N.W.2d 390 (1983), in which a creditor wrongfully repossessed a 
car in California without service of process or a hearing.  
These cases do not hold that Wis. Stat. § 425.206 requires that 
"means other than legal process" must be some form of egregious 
conduct.  
Nos. 97-3620, 97-3626, 98-0092 
 
12
voidable under Wis. Stat. § 801.50(1), but not void.  Community 
Credit argues that whereas a void judgment is a nullity and 
proceedings founded upon it are worthless, proceedings founded 
on a voidable judgment are generally valid until the judgment is 
set aside.11   
¶19 Our reading of the venue provisions does not lead to 
Community Credit's conclusion that Wis. Stat. § 801.50(1) is 
applicable to the Milwaukee County Circuit Court replevin 
actions arising from consumer credit transactions.  
¶20 We agree with Community Credit that in general a 
defect in venue is not a jurisdictional defect affecting the 
validity of a judgment.  Nevertheless, we agree with the court 
of appeals that this case falls within a legislatively crafted 
exception to the general venue provision.  Several reasons lead 
us to conclude that the defect in venue in these replevin 
actions arising from consumer credit transactions render the 
Milwaukee County default replevin judgments invalid from the 
time of entry for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 425.206(1)(b). 
¶21 First, the legislature has expressly declared that in 
consumer credit transactions, such as those in this case, a 
defect in venue under Wis. Stat. § 421.401 is jurisdictional.  
                     
11 We use the phrase "validity of the judgments at the time 
of entry for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 425.206(1)(b)" (or a 
similar phrase), rather than the words void and voidable, 
because the former phrase is descriptive of the issue in the 
case.  The court of appeals and Community Credit use the words  
"void" (meaning invalid at the time of entry of judgment) and 
voidable (meaning invalid when the judgment is set aside).   
Nos. 97-3620, 97-3626, 98-0092 
 
13
The venue statute provides that if venue is wrong and "[i]f the 
action arises out of a consumer credit transaction, the court 
shall dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 421.401(2)(b).12 
¶22 The legislature's use of the words "for lack of 
jurisdiction" makes clear that a default replevin judgment 
entered by a circuit court in the face of improper venue is 
invalid for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 425.206(1)(b) when entered. 
                     
12 The word jurisdiction can refer to personal jurisdiction, 
subject matter jurisdiction or the competence of a court. 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 421.401(2)(b) 
makes 
clear 
that 
jurisdiction does not refer to personal jurisdiction.  Milwaukee 
County Circuit Court had personal jurisdiction of the customers 
in the default replevin action.  
Subject matter jurisdiction and competence are terms that 
have been inconsistently used and defined by courts and 
commentators across the country.  See In the Interest of B.J.N. 
and H.M.N., 162 Wis. 2d 635, 656 n.17, 469 N.W.2d 845 (1991).   
This court has said that no circuit court is without 
subject matter jurisdiction. Mueller v. Brunn, 105 Wis. 2d 171, 
176, 313 N.W.2d 845 (1991).  We have labeled a circuit court's 
inability to adjudicate the specific case before it because of a 
failure to comply with a statutory requirement as a loss of 
competence.  In the Interest of B.J.N. and H.M.N., 162 Wis. 2d 
635, 656. 
As this court explained in In the Interest of B.J.N. and 
H.M.N., 162 Wis. 2d at 656-57 and n.17, the critical focus is 
not, however, on the terminology. The focus is on the effect of 
non-compliance with a statutory requirement.  See also Miller 
Brewing Co. v. LIRC, 173 Wis. 2d 700, 705-06, 495 N.W.2d 660 
(1993). 
In this case we have a statutory requirement (venue), and 
our discussion focuses on the effect of non-compliance with this 
statutory requirement.  
Nos. 97-3620, 97-3626, 98-0092 
 
14
 The language reflects a clear legislative intent to prevent any 
judgment, other than a judgment of dismissal, from being entered 
in an action arising out of a consumer credit transaction when 
venue is improper and the customer has failed to appear and 
waive the defect.  This interpretation gives meaning to the 
words "for lack of jurisdiction," by invalidating a replevin 
judgment from the time of entry if venue in the action was 
improper, 
rather 
than 
rendering 
the 
words 
"for 
lack 
of 
jurisdiction" surplusage as Community Credit's interpretation 
would mandate. 
¶23 Second, the legislature's different treatment of venue 
for consumer actions and consumer credit transactions shows a 
deliberate legislative intent to give meaning to the words "lack 
of 
jurisdiction" 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 421.401(2)(b). 
 
If 
a 
transaction giving rise to an action is a consumer transaction, 
the remedy for defective venue is transfer of the action to the 
proper place of trial.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 421.301(13) and 
421.401(2)(a).  If, on the other hand, a transaction giving rise 
to an action is a consumer credit transaction, the remedy for 
defective venue is dismissal of the action for lack of 
jurisdiction.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 421.301(10) and 421.401(2)(b). 
 Thus by providing that a replevin judgment is invalid when 
entered if the venue in the action was improper, the legislature 
specifically insured that those using credit are protected from 
having to defend replevin actions in distant forums.   
¶24 Third, the legislative history of the relevant venue 
statutes 
on 
which 
Community 
Credit 
relies, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
Nos. 97-3620, 97-3626, 98-0092 
 
15
§§ 421.401(2)(b) 
and 
801.50(1), 
demonstrates 
that 
the 
legislature intended venue for actions arising from consumer 
credit transactions to be jurisdictional in nature and intended 
a defect in venue to invalidate the replevin judgment when 
entered if the venue in the action was improper. 
¶25 In 1983, the legislature repealed and recreated Wis. 
Stat. § 801.50, the general venue statute, and in doing so added 
the following language in subsection (1):  "A defect in venue 
shall not affect the validity of any order or judgment."  1983 
Wis. Act 228.  This statutory language is, according to a 
Judicial Council Note, "designed to separate questions of venue 
from questions of jurisdiction and competency.  A defect in 
venue is not jurisdictional and does not affect the competence 
of the court.  The cure for a defect in venue is to change the 
place of trial."13 
¶26 In that same enactment, the 1983 legislature created 
Wis. Stat. § 421.401, a venue provision specific to consumer 
transactions.  This provision did not contain any language 
making venue a jurisdictional issue.  See Wis. Stat. § 421.401 
(1983-84).  However, in a separate enactment, that same 1983 
legislature created a specialized venue provision for consumer 
credit transactions.  See Wis. Stat. § 425.501(2)(1983-84); 1983 
Wis. Act 389, § 8.  That newly created venue provision specific 
to consumer credit transactions expressly stated that if venue 
                     
13 Judicial Council Prefatory Note, 1983, Wis. Stat. Ann. 
§ 801.50 (1994). 
Nos. 97-3620, 97-3626, 98-0092 
 
16
is improper the court lacks jurisdiction other than to dismiss 
the action.  The venue provision included the following 
jurisdictional language: 
 
If venue is correct the case shall continue.  If venue 
is not correct, the court shall dismiss the action 
unless the defendant appears and waives the improper 
venue.  If the defendant does not appear and waive the 
improper venue, the court shall lack jurisdiction 
other than to dismiss the action. 
Wis. Stat. § 425.501(2) (1983-84) (emphasis added).14  
¶27 In other words, the 1983 legislature extensively 
overhauled the general venue provision of Wis. Stat. § 801.50 to 
declare 
that 
venue 
is 
not 
a 
jurisdictional 
matter 
and 
simultaneously declared that venue is a jurisdictional matter in 
actions relating to consumer credit transactions.   
¶28 Subsequently, the 1987 legislature consolidated the 
venue provisions for consumer transactions and consumer credit 
transactions but treated the two venue provisions differently.  
See 1987 Wis. Act 208; Wis. Stat. § 421.401(2)(a) & (b)(1987-
                     
14 The 
Legislative 
Reference 
Bureau 
analysis 
of 
this 
provision states:  
This bill also establishes venue requirements for all 
consumer credit transactions.  The place of trial may 
be in the county where a customer resides, is 
personally served or signed the document evidencing 
the transaction or in the county where the collateral 
securing the transaction is located. If venue is 
improper, the court must dismiss the action unless the 
customer waives the improper venue.  If the customer 
does not waive the improper venue, the court lacks 
jurisdiction other than to dismiss the action.   
 
Analysis by the Legislative Reference Bureau, 1983 A.B. 1084.  
Nos. 97-3620, 97-3626, 98-0092 
 
17
88).  The Judicial Council Note to the 1987 legislation 
expressly declares that the substance of the special venue 
provision for consumer credit transactions, which included the 
jurisdictional language quoted above, was to be imported to Wis. 
Stat. § 421.401(2)(b), which relates only to consumer credit 
transactions.  See Judicial Council Note, 1987 A.B. 309, § 5.  
Consequently, we read the § 421.401(2)(b) phrase that "the court 
shall dismiss the action for lack of venue" as having the same 
meaning as the phrase in the predecessor statute that "the court 
shall lack jurisdiction other than to dismiss the action."  Thus 
we conclude that when venue is defective in an action arising 
from a consumer credit transaction, any judgment except a 
judgment of dismissal is invalid when entered because the 
circuit court lacks jurisdiction other than to dismiss the 
action.  
¶29 The 
1987 
legislature 
did 
not 
amend 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 801.50(1) to take into account the special venue provision 
applicable to consumer credit transactions.  So in 1987, as in 
1983, the two venue provisions, §§ 801.50(1) and 421.401(2)(b), 
need to be harmonized.  The only conclusion we can reach to give 
effect to both statutes is that the venue provision relating to 
consumer 
credit 
transactions, 
which 
was 
adopted 
after 
§ 801.50(1) and is the more specific statute, governs consumer 
credit transactions.  
¶30 This 
legislative 
history 
contravenes 
Community 
Credit's assertion that Wis. Stat. § 801.50(1), declaring that a 
defect of venue shall affect the validity of a judgment, was 
Nos. 97-3620, 97-3626, 98-0092 
 
18
intended to override the language of Wis. Stat. § 421.401(2)(b), 
declaring that a defect of venue in an action arising from a 
consumer credit transaction results in dismissal of the action 
for lack of jurisdiction.  The legislative history supports the 
conclusion that such a defect in venue renders the replevin 
judgment invalid for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 425.206(1)(b) when 
entered. 
¶31 Fourth, our interpretation that a defect in venue is a 
jurisdictional defect that renders a replevin judgment invalid 
at the time of entry for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 425.206(1)(b) 
advances the legislative goal that a replevin action be brought 
in a county that is convenient for the customer.  The Wisconsin 
legislature clearly intended the Wisconsin Consumer Act to 
assist consumers, particularly those of limited means, in 
combating unfair business practices.15  The express legislative 
purposes are to protect consumers as follows:  The Wisconsin 
Consumer Act (Wis. Stat. chs. 421-427) is intended to protect 
customers 
from 
"unfair, 
deceptive, 
false, 
misleading 
and 
unconscionable 
practices 
by 
merchants," 
Wis. 
Stat. 
                     
15 As one observer of the Wisconsin Consumer Act's drafting 
process noted, the Wisconsin Consumer Act "goes further to 
protect consumer interests than any other such legislation in 
the country."  Another commentator acknowledged that the 
Wisconsin Consumer Act's underlying purpose is to benefit 
consumers, particularly low income consumers, and is "probably 
the most sweeping consumer credit legislation yet enacted in any 
state."  Jeffrey Davis, Legislative Restriction of Creditor 
Powers and Remedies:  A Case Study of the Negotiation and 
Drafting of the Wisconsin Consumer Act, 72 Mich. L. Rev. 3, 6 
(1973); Edward J. Heiser, Jr., Wisconsin Consumer Act—A Critical 
Analysis, 57 Marq. L. Rev. 389, 389, 481 (1974). 
Nos. 97-3620, 97-3626, 98-0092 
 
19
§ 421.102(2)(b), and "to permit and encourage the development of 
fair and economically sound consumer practices in consumer 
transactions," Wis. Stat. § 421.102(2)(c).  The legislature also 
mandates that chapters 421 to 427 are to be "liberally construed 
and applied to promote their underlying purposes and policies." 
 Wis. Stat. § 421.102(1). 
¶32 One unfair business practice the legislature was 
specifically concerned about was that creditors were bringing 
replevin actions in counties that were unrelated to the 
transaction.  The legislature wanted to prohibit creditors from 
forcing consumers to distant forums just to object to venue. 
¶33 This concern about the forum was clearly expressed in 
the federal consumer credit protection act, which provides a 
basis for interpreting the Wisconsin Consumer Act.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 421.102 (2)(d).  Congress was well aware in enacting the 
federal act that the filing of actions against customers in 
distant forums is unfair and unjust: 
 
[T]his legislation also addresses the problem of 
"forum abuse," an unfair practice in which debt 
collectors file suit against consumers in courts which 
are so distant or inconvenient that consumers are 
unable to appear.  As a result, the debt collectors 
obtain a default judgment and the consumer is denied 
his day in court. 
S. Rep. No. 95-382, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. at 5 (reprinted in 1997 
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1695, 1699).  
¶34 Community Credit argues that "[t]he venue statute 
governing consumer credit transactions is clearly not designed 
to assure customers that legal actions must be venued in the 
Nos. 97-3620, 97-3626, 98-0092 
 
20
county where the customer resides, or, for that matter, a 
convenient county."  Brief for Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner 
at 17.  Responding to this argument, the court of appeals wrote: 
 "This statement, at best, demonstrates a complete and utter 
misunderstanding of the purpose behind the WCA.  At worst, it is 
a brazen misrepresentation of well-established Wisconsin law."  
Kett, 222 Wis. 2d at 125.   
¶35 Contrary 
to 
Community 
Credit's 
assertion, 
the 
Wisconsin Consumer Act is designed to prevent creditors from 
bringing replevin actions in distant locales and forcing 
customers to defend at distant locations or risk default 
judgment and repossession.  We further agree with the court of 
appeals' conclusions that in enacting chapters 421 to 427 the 
"legislature granted special protection to those buying on 
credit against having to defend in distant fora," and that "the 
act is meant to prevent creditors from dragging customers to 
defend 
in 
distant 
locales 
or 
risk 
default 
judgment 
and 
subsequent repossession."  Kett, 222 Wis. 2d at 126, 127.  We 
therefore view the issue of forum to be of central concern to 
the legislature when it enacted the Wisconsin Consumer Act venue 
provision.16  This legislative intent and purpose regarding 
                     
16 See also Judicial Council Prefatory Note, 1983 Wis. Act 
228, Wis. Stat. Ann. § 801.50 (1994):  
Present venue for small claims arising out of consumer 
transactions can be so inconvenient to the customer 
that prosecuting or defending these claims becomes 
prohibitively expensive. 
 
Nos. 97-3620, 97-3626, 98-0092 
 
21
convenient forums for customers guide our interpretation and 
application of the venue provision of the Act.  
¶36 Holding the default replevin judgments as invalid in 
this case for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 425.206(1)(b) when 
entered and applying the penalties of § 425.305 to Community 
Credit would induce compliance with the venue provision.  A 
basic purpose of the remedies the legislature adopted in the 
Wisconsin Consumer Act is to "induce compliance with the 
Wisconsin Consumer Act and thereby promote its underlying 
objects."  First Wis. Nat'l Bank v. Nicolaou, 113 Wis. 2d 524, 
533, 334 N.W.2d 390 (1983).  On the other hand, if this court 
were to interpret the Wisconsin Consumer Act to enable creditors 
to obtain default replevin judgments in violation of the venue 
provision and then use nonjudicial recovery to obtain possession 
of the collateral, creditors like Community Credit would have 
little if any incentive to commence replevin actions in a county 
of proper venue.   
¶37 Considering 
the 
legislative 
goal 
of 
requiring 
creditors to commence replevin actions in a county convenient to 
the consumer and the purpose of the statutory remedies to induce 
compliance, we conclude that the legislature intended that a 
default replevin judgment in a consumer credit action entered in 
a county in violation of the venue provision would be invalid 
when entered for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 425.206(1)(b) and 
creditors such as Community Credit who exercise nonjudicial 
recovery under an invalid replevin judgment would be subject to 
the penalties imposed by § 425.305.   
Nos. 97-3620, 97-3626, 98-0092 
 
22
¶38 Community Credit argues that the court of appeals 
failed to consider the implications of its decision, namely that 
a defect in venue imposes significant damages on the merchant.  
It argues, as an example, that significant damages could 
potentially be imposed if a return date on a small claims 
summons is scheduled by the court on a day contrary to the time 
limitations mandated by the small claims act.  We need not 
decide the hypothetical Community Credit poses.  We need decide 
only the fact situation presented in this case relating to 
venue.  
¶39 Fifth, Community Credit errs in contending that the 
circuit court was at fault for entering the default replevin 
judgments despite the error in venue.  According to Community 
Credit, if there was an error in venue, it was not its fault for 
bringing the actions in the wrong county, but rather the fault 
of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court for not dismissing the 
actions.17  Community Credit interprets the venue statute as 
imposing a duty on the circuit court to dismiss the action for 
lack of jurisdiction, rather than as imposing a duty on the 
creditor to file the action in the proper county.  
¶40 Community Credit is mistaken in its argument that as a 
matter of law it has the right to commence replevin actions in 
any county subject only to the risk that upon return of the 
                     
17 Community Credit also appears to put the onus on the 
customers to raise the venue defect, even though the statute 
clearly states that if the venue is defective the circuit court 
shall dismiss the action unless the customer appears and waives 
the improper venue. 
Nos. 97-3620, 97-3626, 98-0092 
 
23
summons the circuit court would dismiss the action if it were 
not filed in the proper place.  Nothing in the statutes shifts 
the responsibility for commencing a replevin action in the 
correct county from Community Credit to the circuit court.  We 
agree with the court of appeals that "Community Credit seems to 
be saying that filing a replevin action in a county where venue 
does not lie is permissible as long as one does not get caught." 
 Kett, 222 Wis. 2d at 125.  We are not persuaded by Community 
Credit's argument.   
¶41 Sixth, Community Credit mistakenly argues that because 
the only penalty for violation of venue is dismissal of the 
action, it is not subject to the penalties provided by Wis. 
Stat. § 425.305.  Our interpretation of the statutes does not 
penalize Community Credit for violating the venue provisions.  
Instead, Community Credit is subject to the penalties imposed by 
§ 425.305 for resorting to nonjudicial recovery of collateral 
based on default replevin judgments by a circuit court that was 
not the proper venue under Wis. Stat. § 421.401.  
¶42 In summary, we have examined the interplay of several 
provisions:  Wis. Stat. § 421.102 (purposes and rules of 
construction of the Wisconsin Consumer Act), §§ 421.401 and 
801.50(1) (venue provisions), § 425.205 (replevin actions to 
recover collateral), § 425.206 (nonjudicial enforcement limited) 
and § 425.305 (penalties for violation of § 425.206).  To 
comport 
with 
the 
legislative 
policies 
and 
the 
statutory 
provisions we conclude that the venue provision must be 
interpreted to protect consumers and favor their participation 
Nos. 97-3620, 97-3626, 98-0092 
 
24
in the legal process.  The legislature understood that consumers 
are likely to have limited resources, whereas creditors are more 
apt to have resources and be familiar with the law.  If a 
replevin action is brought in a county that has no nexus with 
the consumer, the likelihood of a default judgment increases, 
the creditor is favored and the debtor is disadvantaged.  We 
conclude that the legislature did not intend a default replevin 
judgment based on improper venue to result in a legally binding 
and enforceable judgment when, as in this case, the creditor 
resorts to nonjudicial recovery of the collateral.  Creditors 
can protect themselves from the severe penalties for a violation 
of § 425.206 by commencing consumer credit actions in the proper 
venue. 
¶43 In this case, the default replevin judgments were 
entered in Milwaukee County Circuit Court in violation of the 
applicable 
venue provision 
of Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 421.401(2)(b).  
Because the venue was wrong, the Milwaukee County Circuit Court 
had jurisdiction only to dismiss the actions and not to enter 
judgments.  Because the default replevin judgments were entered 
by the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, which did not have 
jurisdiction to enter them, the judgments were invalid when 
entered for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 425.206(1)(b) and when 
Community Credit took possession of the vehicles by nonjudicial 
recovery.  The judgments were thus not entered in a proceeding 
for recovery of collateral under Wis. Stat. § 425.205, as 
required by Wis. Stat. § 425.206.  By taking possession of 
collateral by nonjudicial recovery without a valid judgment 
Nos. 97-3620, 97-3626, 98-0092 
 
25
under § 425.205, Community Credit is, as a matter of law, 
subject to the penalty provision of § 425.305.  
II 
¶44 The second issue presented is whether Community Credit 
engaged in prohibited practices in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 427.104(1)(h) and (j).  Section 427.104(1)(h) and (j) provide 
that in attempting to collect an alleged debt, a debt collector 
shall not "engage in other conduct which can reasonably be 
expected to threaten or harass the customer" or "claim or 
attempt or threaten to enforce a right with knowledge or reason 
to know that the right does not exist."  If Community Credit 
engaged in either of these prohibited practices, the customers 
are entitled to damages under Wis. Stat. §§ 425.30418 and 
427.105.19 
                     
18 Wisconsin Stat. § 425.304 provides the following: 
A person who commits a violation to which this section 
applies is liable to the customer in an amount equal 
to the greater of: 
 
 
(1) Twice the amount of the finance charge in 
connection with the transaction, except that the 
liability under this subsection shall not be less than 
$100 nor greater than $1,000; or 
 
 
(2) The actual damages, including any incidental 
and consequential damages, sustained by the customer 
by reason of the violation. 
 
19 Wisconsin Stat. § 427.105 provides in relevant part the 
following: 
(1) A person injured by violation of this chapter may 
recover actual damages and the penalty provided in s. 
425.304; but notwithstanding any other law actual 
damages shall include damages caused by emotional 
Nos. 97-3620, 97-3626, 98-0092 
 
26
¶45 The complaints alleged the circumstances surrounding 
the commencement of the replevin actions improperly venued in 
Milwaukee County and the pursuit of the default replevin 
judgments.  The complaints further alleged that Community Credit 
knew that it had no grounds for venue of the actions in 
Milwaukee County and knew it had no basis for pursuing the 
default judgments it obtained.  
¶46 The court of appeals held that Wis. Stat. § 427.014 
applies to a creditor commencing an action to repossess secured 
collateral.  The court of appeals further held that Community 
Credit engaged in prohibited debt collection practices as a 
matter of law.  The court of appeals concluded that Community 
Credit had a duty to know that Milwaukee County was not the 
proper venue and that Community Credit's filing of a replevin 
action in Milwaukee County was an attempt to enforce a right it 
had reason to know did not exist.  
¶47 Community 
Credit 
continues 
to 
dispute 
the 
applicability of chapter 427 to it because it claims it was not 
attempting to collect a debt.  We agree with the court of 
appeals that the replevin actions were the first steps to 
deficiency judgments against the customers and that Wis. Stat. 
§ 427.104 applies to a creditor commencing an action to 
repossess secured collateral.   
                                                                  
distress 
or 
mental 
anguish 
with 
or 
without 
accompanying physical injury proximately caused by a 
violation of this chapter.  
Nos. 97-3620, 97-3626, 98-0092 
 
27
¶48 Community 
Credit 
asserts 
that the 
customers are 
attempting to turn a defect in venue into an violation of 
chapter 427, that a violation of the venue provision is not the 
type of conduct that chapter 427 was designed to vindicate and 
that because the alleged violation of the Wisconsin Consumer Act 
relates to venue, the only penalties are dismissal of the action 
and perhaps the penalty provided in Wis. Stat. § 425.302(2), 
which is applicable to all violations for which no other remedy 
is specifically provided.  As we previously explained, we are 
not persuaded by Community Credit's position that its only 
violation is the violation of venue.  As a result of the 
improper venue, Community Credit has violated other provisions 
of the Act for which penalties may be assessed.  
¶49 According to Community Credit, it cannot be liable for 
multiple penalties.  It relies on Associated Financial Services 
v. Hornik, 114 Wis. 2d 163, 336 N.W.2d 395 (Ct. App. 1983).  The 
Hornik court held that Wis. Stat. § 424.304 allows a consumer to 
collect one penalty assessment up to a maximum of $1,000 in 
addition to any actual damages in any action where the consumer 
establishes a violation to which § 425.304 is applicable.  
Hornik, 114 Wis. 2d at 173.  In the instant review, Community 
Credit is subject to only one penalty under § 424.304 for the 
violation of § 427.104.  Nothing in the decision of the court of 
appeals contravenes the Hornik holding.   
¶50 In sum, Community Credit has set forth no reason that 
persuades this court that the court of appeals erred in 
concluding that Community Credit engaged in prohibited debt 
Nos. 97-3620, 97-3626, 98-0092 
 
28
collection practices as a matter of law by attempting to enforce 
a right it had reason to know did not exist.  
III 
¶51 The third and final issue presented is whether the 
customers are entitled to reasonable attorney fees under Wis. 
Stat. § 425.308.  Section 425.308 provides that if the customer 
prevails in an action arising from a consumer transaction, the 
customer shall recover, in addition to costs and expenses, a 
reasonable amount for attorney fees. 
¶52 Community Credit appears to take the position that 
violation of the venue statute (and violation of the other 
statutes resulting from violation of the venue statute) are not 
violations of the Wisconsin Consumer Act that would justify an 
award of reasonable attorney fees.  Community Credit relies on 
Suburban State Bank v. Squires, 145 Wis. 2d 445, 427 N.W.2d 393 
(Ct. App. 1988).  In Squires, the court of appeals concluded 
that no violation of the Wisconsin Consumer Act had occurred and 
therefore concluded that no attorney fees would be awarded under 
the Act.  In contrast to Squires, in the case at bar we have 
concluded that violations of the Act have occurred.   
¶53 We agree with the court of appeals that the causes 
should be remanded to the two circuit courts for determination 
of reasonable attorney fees under Wis. Stat. § 425.308. 
¶54 For the reasons set forth, we affirm the decision of 
the court of appeals, which remands the causes to the respective 
circuit courts for determination of appropriate damages under 
Nos. 97-3620, 97-3626, 98-0092 
 
29
Wis. Stat. §§ 425.305 and 427.105, as well as reasonable 
attorney fees under § 425.308. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.  
Nos. 97-3620, 97-3626, 98-0092.jpw 
 
1 
¶55 JON 
P. 
WILCOX, 
J. 
(Dissenting).   The 
majority 
concludes that the legislature did not intend a replevin 
judgment based on improper venue to result in a legally binding 
and 
enforceable 
judgment 
when 
the 
creditor 
resorts 
to 
nonjudicial enforcement.  Majority at 17, 24.  Based on an error 
in venue, the creditor is, in effect, strictly liable and 
subject to disproportionate damages and attorney fees for 
enforcing its “invalid” judgment (for wrongful repossession and 
prohibited debt collection).  See Wis. Stat. §§ 425.304, 
425.305, 425.308 and 427.105.20  The 1971 legislature could not 
have intended an error in venue to result in such unfair 
consequences.  
¶56 It is undisputed that the customers defaulted on their 
consumer credit loans.  In fact, they have never raised a valid 
defense for their non-payment.  Yet today the customers have hit 
the jackpot by simply defaulting on their consumer credit 
transaction.  I believe the legislature intended the Wisconsin 
Consumer Act to provide more of a balance between the consumers’ 
                     
20 According to the majority, Community Credit is liable for 
the following damages:  twice the amount of the finance charge 
in connection with the transaction up to $1,000 or the actual 
damages, including incidental and consequential damages, Wis. 
Stat. § 425.304(1) and (2); customer retains the goods, services 
or money without obligation to pay any amount, and recovery of 
any sums paid to the merchant, Wis. Stat. § 425.305; reasonable 
amount for attorney fees, Wis. Stat. § 425.308; and actual 
damages, including damages caused by emotional distress or 
mental anguish with or without accompanying physical injury, 
Wis. Stat. § 427.105. 
Nos. 97-3620, 97-3626, 98-0092.jpw 
 
2 
and the creditors’ interests.21  The balance is now tipped, and 
only further legislative action can equalize the scale. 
¶57 Because I do not agree with the majority’s mandate, I 
dissent. 
¶58 I am authorized to state that Justices N. Patrick 
Crooks and David T. Prosser join in this dissenting opinion. 
 
                     
21 Jeffrey Davis, Legislative Restriction of Creditor Powers 
and Remedies:  A Case Study of the Negotiation and Drafting of 
the Wisconsin Consumer Act, 72 Mich. L. Rev. 3, 6 (1973). 
Nos. 97-3620, 97-3626, 98-0092.jpw 
 
1