Title: Terrell Johnson v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC96-333
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: October 25, 2001

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC96333
____________
TERRELL M. JOHNSON,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[October 25, 2001]
PER CURIAM.
Terrell M. Johnson appeals an order of the circuit court denying his motion
for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.  We have
jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.
Johnson was convicted of first-degree murder for the shooting death of an
Orange County bar owner and of second-degree murder for the shooting of a bar
customer during the same incident in 1979.  The pertinent facts of the crime are
described in detail in this Court’s opinion on Johnson’s direct appeal.  See
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Johnson v. State, 442 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1983).  The decision was first appealed to
this Court in 1980, but when the transcript of the proceedings was discovered to be
incomprehensible we relinquished jurisdiction to the circuit court in order to
reconstruct the record and to hold an evidentiary hearing as to the accuracy of the
reconstructed record.  The supplemental transcript was submitted to this Court,
and was examined on direct appeal.  On appeal, we affirmed both the conviction
and the sentence.  See id.
Johnson originally filed a motion for postconviction relief in June 1985. 
Pursuant to a legislative act passed in June 1985, the circuit court appointed the
Office of the Capital Collateral Representative (CCR) to represent Johnson and
ordered CCR to re-plead all of the issues in Johnson’s 3.850 motion.  CCR refiled
Johnson’s motion for postconviction relief with the trial court in October 1986.  An
evidentiary hearing was held in December 1986 and the trial court denied the motion
in June 1989.  On appeal, this Court affirmed the denial of relief.  See Johnson v.
State, 593 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1992).
In January 1995, Johnson filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with this
Court and filed a supplemental habeas petition in February.  This Court found the
twenty-three issues raised in Johnson’s habeas petition either to be procedurally
barred because they had been raised and rejected on direct appeal or in his
1. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
2. Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993).  The Huff hearing requirement
was incorporated in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851(c).  Under this rule,
a trial court must conduct a hearing to determine whether an evidentiary hearing is
required before ruling on any rule 3.850 motion filed by a death-sentenced prisoner.
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previous 3.850 proceeding or to be meritless.  See Johnson v. Singletary, 695 So.
2d 263 (Fla. 1996).
In February 1997, Johnson filed a second 3.850 motion with the circuit
court, alleging newly discovered evidence and evidence of a previously unknown
Brady1 violation.  The circuit court tolled the time limits in rules 3.851 and 3.852 to
permit Johnson to pursue his public records requests.  A status hearing was held
on December 28, 1998, and Johnson filed his consolidated motion on January 28,
1999.  A Huff2 hearing was held on May 3, 1999, and the circuit court entered an
order on June 15, 1999, denying Johnson all relief without an evidentiary hearing.
Johnson appeals that summary denial to this Court and raises five issues. 
Johnson claims that (1) summary denial was improper; (2) he was denied access to
public records relating to the jurors; (3) he was denied effective assistance of
counsel because his postconviction attorneys were prohibited by rule from
interviewing the jurors to determine if constitutional error occurred; (4) the method
of execution in Florida is unconstitutional; and (5) he is incompetent to be
3. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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executed.
In his first issue on appeal, Johnson claims that he was entitled to an
evidentiary hearing on his claims of: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) newly
discovered evidence; and (3) several Brady violations.  These claims relate to the
following evidence, some of which was recently provided to Johnson by Orange
County law enforcement officers after a public records request:  a copy of a
Miranda3 card showing that at 12:05 a.m. on January 6, 1980, Johnson refused to
sign the card; previously illegible handwritten police notes indicating that at one time
the police suspected the involvement of a second individual in the murders; a
statement by the girlfriend of the customer victim that he was the type of person
who would resist a robbery attempt; and Johnson’s good conduct on death row
for nearly twenty years.
The time limit for filing postconviction motions in capital cases does not
apply where “the facts on which the claim is predicated were unknown to the
movant or the movant’s attorney and could not have been ascertained by the
exercise of due diligence.”  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(b)(1) (emphasis added).  The
trial court concluded that the copy of the Miranda card indicating Johnson’s refusal
to sign it approximately two hours after he was arrested could not constitute newly
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discovered evidence for two reasons.  First, Johnson was present when he refused
to sign the card and was personally aware of his initial refusal and all the
circumstances surrounding his interrogation.  Second, a letter from the state
attorney to Johnson’s trial counsel specifies that a Miranda card was one of the
items turned over to defense during discovery.
Johnson contends that his condition during the interrogation (undergoing
forced detoxification after his arrest) belies the trial court’s conclusion that he was
personally aware of his initial refusal and all the circumstances surrounding his
interrogation.  During the original motion to suppress hearing, one of the police
officers testified that Johnson was “very tired, red-eyed, extremely nervous” with
“wrinkled and unkempt clothing” and “messed up” hair.  However, the same officer
also testified that Johnson did not appear to be under the influence of intoxicating
substances and that he appeared to understand everything that was occurring. 
Johnson also cites medical testimony from his previous 3.850 hearing as to the
physical and mental effects of forced detoxification.  While the trial court
concluded that the reference to a Miranda card in the state attorney’s letter
regarding items turned over to the defense during discovery also proves that the
refusal was known to Johnson, there were at least seven or eight Miranda cards
involved in this case according to police officers who testified at the original
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suppression hearing.
However, whether Johnson or his attorney had knowledge about the refusal
to sign the card is only one prong that must be satisfied in order to grant relief on a
claim of newly discovered evidence.  The evidence must also be "of such nature
that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial."  Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d
512, 521 (Fla. 1998).  Even assuming that all questioning should have stopped after
Johnson refused to sign the Miranda card in question and his subsequent
statements should not have been admitted, Johnson voluntarily and spontaneously
made inculpatory statements to an officer one month later while being transported
for a psychiatric examination.  These statements were admissible and the refusal to
sign the card has no bearing on them.  Thus, the trial court correctly concluded that
the refusal to sign the card would not produce an acquittal on retrial and no relief
was warranted on this claim.
Johnson further argues that the refusal to sign the card was Brady material
and that his personal knowledge had no bearing on the State’s obligation to present
the card to the defense.  A defendant must demonstrate the following elements
before a Brady violation has been proven:  (1) the evidence at issue is favorable to
the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; (2) the
evidence has been suppressed by the State, either wilfully or inadvertently; and (3)
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the defendant has been prejudiced by the suppression of this evidence.  See
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999); Way v. State, 760 So. 2d 903, 910 (Fla.
2000); Thompson v. State, 759 So. 2d 650, 662 (Fla. 2000).  Under this standard, 
Johnson could not prevail on the Brady claim for the same reason discussed above: 
his voluntary inculpatory statements, which had no connection with the alleged
Brady claim, were properly admitted; and thus Johnson was not prejudiced by the
suppression of the refusal to sign the card.  Thus, the trial court properly denied
relief on this claim.
Although Johnson’s trial counsel was provided a copy of police notes
regarding the murders, Johnson claims that the notes were illegible.  Thus, he
contends, he was unaware that the police originally investigated the possibility of a
co-suspect based on a witness report that two white males left the bar after the
shooting.  However, Johnson’s counsel was also provided a copy of the police
complaint report during discovery, as evidenced by the state attorney’s letter
regarding discovery materials.  This report clearly states that a named witness saw
“two W/M drive away from the tavern.”  Thus, any police investigation of a co-
suspect is not newly discovered evidence nor is it withheld Brady evidence. 
Furthermore, the fact that the police might have investigated the possibility of a co-
suspect does not establish a reasonable probability that the outcome would be
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different had Johnson presented this information at trial and cannot satisfy either the
Brady or Jones standards.  Thus, the trial court correctly denied relief without a
hearing on this claim.
Johnson also claims that the police withheld exculpatory character evidence
regarding the customer victim.  According to the victim’s girlfriend, he was the type
of person who would have resisted the robbery attempt.  Under section
90.404(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2000), evidence of a pertinent trait of character of
the victim of the crime may be offered by the accused.  While this evidence might
have been admissible if known to Johnson at the time of trial, it would not
“probably produce an acquittal on retrial,” nor have any effect on Johnson’s death 
sentence.  Johnson was convicted of second-degree murder for shooting the
customer, even though he could have been convicted of first-degree felony murder
under his version of the events, i.e., he shot the victims after the customer lunged at
him during the attempted robbery.  Even if the jury had heard this character
evidence explaining the victim’s behavior during the attempted robbery, it would
not “probably produce acquittal” of second-degree murder on retrial.  At most, this
character evidence would present additional support for the second-degree
conviction.  Further, Johnson’s death sentence was not imposed for the
customer’s second-degree murder but for the first-degree murder of the bar owner. 
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Thus, the character evidence had no bearing on the jury’s penalty phase
deliberations.  Accordingly, the trial court properly denied relief on this claim as the
evidence would not affect either Johnson’s conviction or his death sentence.
Finally, Johnson claims that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his
claim that his record of good conduct as a death row inmate for nearly twenty years
constitutes a mitigating circumstance.  This information was not available at the time
of Johnson’s trial and thus was not available as mitigation evidence then. While
evidence of Johnson’s adjustment to confinement would be relevant mitigation
evidence in a new sentencing proceeding, see Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S.
1 (1986), it has no bearing on his trial counsel’s effectiveness or any other issue
cognizable in this postconviction proceeding.  Thus, the trial court properly denied
relief on this claim.
Issues two and three both relate to juror information.  Johnson claims that he
was denied public records regarding the jurors (issue two) and that he was denied
effective assistance of counsel because rule 4-3.5(d)(4) of the Rules Regulating the
Florida Bar precluded postconviction counsel from interviewing the jurors to
determine whether constitutional error occurred (issue three).
We consider Johnson’s public records claim first.  In 1998, this Court
amended Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852, relating to public records
4. Counsel representing Johnson at the 1998 status hearing had recently been
assigned to the case after Johnson’s previous postconviction attorney left CCR.
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requests in capital proceedings.  The amended rule, which became effective on
October 1, 1998, provides that a capital defendant who was represented by
collateral counsel and had already initiated the public records process had ninety
days to serve a written demand for additional public records not previously
requested.  At a status hearing on December 28, 1998, Johnson’s CCR counsel
represented to the court that “I believe we’re done with the public records, my
understanding from talking to the prior attorney on this case.”4  Based upon this
representation, the trial court granted Johnson thirty days to file a consolidated
3.850 motion and set the Huff hearing for May 3, 1999.  However, on December
31, 1998, CCR counsel in Miami filed requests for public records in all cases
subject to the ninety-day limitation of amended rule 3.852.  This included three
public requests in Johnson’s case relating to juror information, which were filed
only three days after the status hearing.  In his 3.850 motion below, Johnson
notified the court that these requests were still pending and that the matter had not
been resolved.  On appeal, Johnson states that he needs these documents to
preserve his rights regarding any irregularities in the jurors’ backgrounds and that
there was inadequate time to properly compel the production of the public records
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during the thirty days allotted for the filing of his amended 3.850 motion. 
Apparently, Johnson is claiming that the trial court should have refrained from
ruling on his 3.850 motion until he obtained the juror information requested.
The trial court denied relief on this claim because it determined that
Johnson’s claim of not being able to access this information was attributable to his
own late-filed request.  The trial court further noted that rule 3.850 is not the proper
vehicle to compel the production of these records and that Johnson should have
brought these allegations in a motion to compel production of the records or filed a
motion to continue his rule 3.850 filing in order to resolve the public records issue
before his motion was due.  Moreover, the court noted, there is nothing in
Johnson’s motion to explain why he could not have requested these records at an
earlier date.
In Buenoano v. State, 708 So. 2d 941 (Fla. 1998), the defendant argued that
the trial court should have addressed her public records request prior to denying
her third 3.850 motion.  This Court concluded that Buenoano was precluded from
asserting this claim because she alleged no reasons why she could not have made
these requests within the time limits of rule 3.850.  See id. at 943.  Here, Johnson
has not asserted any reason why he could not have requested these juror
background records before he filed his first 3.850 motion, nor has he asserted any
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specific juror misconduct that has been disclosed since his first 3.850 motion was
denied.  He appears to be seeking general juror information in order to “research
and discover” possible irregularities in the jurors’ backgrounds.  Accordingly, we
find that the trial court properly denied relief on this claim.
In issue three Johnson asserts that rule 4-3.5(d)(4) of the Rules Regulating
the Florida Bar conflicts with his constitutional rights to a fair trial and effective
assistance of counsel.  Rule 4-3.5(d)(4) prohibits a lawyer from initiating
communication with any juror regarding a trial with which the lawyer is connected,
except to determine whether the verdict may be subject to legal challenge.  The rule
provides that the lawyer "may not interview the jurors for this purpose unless the
lawyer has reason to believe that grounds for such challenge may exist."  Id. 
Before conducting such an interview, the lawyer must file a notice of intention to
interview setting forth the names of the jurors to be interviewed and deliver copies
of the notice to the trial judge and opposing counsel a reasonable time before the
interview.
Johnson claims that this rule impermissibly prevented his attorney from
investigating possible juror misconduct.  The trial court denied relief on this claim
on several grounds, finding that (1) Johnson has no right to effective assistance of
postconviction counsel; (2) even if the rule is unconstitutional, Johnson would not
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be entitled to question the jurors absent some cause to believe that juror
misconduct had occurred, which Johnson did not show; and (3) the claim was
untimely and procedurally barred as it could have been raised before and in fact
was raised to some degree in Johnson’s first postconviction motion.
As explained by this Court in Baptist Hospital of Miami, Inc. v. Maler, 579
So. 2d 97, 100 (Fla. 1991), juror interviews are not permissible unless the moving
party has made sworn allegations that, if true, would require the court to order a
new trial because the alleged error was so fundamental and prejudicial as to vitiate
the entire proceedings.  This standard was formulated "in light of the strong public
policy against allowing litigants either to harass jurors or to upset a verdict by
attempting to ascertain some improper motive underlying it."  Id.
In Arbelaez v. State, 775 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 2000), this Court concluded that
no evidentiary hearing was required on a claim of juror misconduct which
amounted to a complaint “about a defendant's inability to conduct ‘fishing
expedition’ interviews with the jurors after a guilty verdict is returned.”  Id. at 920. 
We find Johnson’s claim involves such a “fishing expedition.”  During his first
postconviction motion proceedings, Johnson was permitted to interview the jury
foreman.  On appeal, this Court ruled that the foreman’s testimony was
inadmissible because it inhered in the verdict and related to jury deliberations. See
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Johnson, 593 So. 2d at 210.  Thus, the trial court properly denied this claim without
an evidentiary hearing because it is without merit and procedurally barred.
In his fourth issue on appeal, Johnson claims that Florida’s method of
execution is unconstitutional.  This Court has repeatedly rejected claims that
electrocution is unconstitutional.  See, e.g., Provenzano v. Moore, 744 So.2d 413
(Fla.1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1182 (2000); Jones v. State, 701 So. 2d 76, 79
(Fla. 1997); Medina v. State, 690 So. 2d 1241, 1244 (Fla. 1997).  Johnson also
seeks leave to amend this claim in light of the recent amendment of Florida’s death
penalty statute to permit an inmate to choose between electrocution and lethal
injection.  See §§ 922.10, 922.105, Fla. Stat. (2000).  However, this Court has also
rejected claims that lethal injection is unconstitutional and that the application of the
amended statute violates the ex post facto clause.  See Provenzano v. State, 760
So. 2d 137 (Fla.) (finding that lethal injection is not unconstitutional method of
execution), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1255 (2000); Bryan v. State, 753 So. 2d 1244
(Fla.) (same), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1185 (2000); Sims v. State, 754 So. 2d 657
(Fla.) (finding no ex post facto violation), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1183 (2000).
In his final claim, Johnson argues that he is not competent to be executed. 
However, Johnson alleges no facts in support of this allegation, nor did he offer
any support of this claim at the trial court.  In fact, he even concedes that this claim
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is not ripe for consideration at this time.  Thus, the trial court properly denied this
claim as being without merit.
Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court’s summary denial of
Johnson’s rule 3.850 motion for postconviction relief and affirm the order below.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and
QUINCE, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Orange County,
A. Thomas Mihok, Judge - Case No. 80-101
Neal Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and William M. Hennis, III,
Assistant CCRC-South, Office of the Capital Collateral Regional Counsel - South,
Fort Lauderdale, Florida,
for Appellant
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Kenneth S. Nunnelley, Assistant
Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Floridal
for Appellee