Title: May v. May
Citation: 2012 WI 35
Docket Number: 2010AP000177
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: April 3, 2012

2012 WI 35 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
10AP177 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
In re the marriage of: 
 
Suzanne R. May, 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
Michael T. May, 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 3, 2012   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 6, 2011 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Maryann Sumi 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
BRADLEY, J., concurs (Opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (Opinion filed).    
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the respondent-appellant there were briefs by Keith 
Wessel, Kristen Lehker and Wessel, Lehker & Fumelle, Inc., 
Madison, and Angela C. Foy and Daniel E. Exner, Cordell Law, 
LLP, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Keith Wessel. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent there was a brief by Robert 
Stanton Jones and Reinhart Boerner Van Deuren, S.C., Milwaukee, 
and oral argument by Robert Stanton Jones.
 
 
2012 WI 35
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2010AP177 
(L.C. No. 
2006FA1556) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the marriage of: 
 
Suzanne R. May, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Michael T. May, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 3, 2012 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Dane County, 
Maryann Sumi, Judge.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   This case is before 
the court on certification by the court of appeals, pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 809.61 (2007–08).1  The certified question is 
whether 
a 
stipulation 
and 
order 
establishing 
a 
33-month 
unmodifiable floor for child support payments is enforceable. 
¶2 
The circuit court for Dane County concluded that the 
order was enforceable when Michael May (Michael), the payor 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007–08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2010AP177   
 
2 
 
spouse, sought to reduce his child support payments to his 
former wife, Suzanne May (Suzanne), a little more than one year 
after entry of the order.  On Michael's appeal from the circuit 
court's order, the court of appeals certified the appeal to us 
because existing case law could be read as conflicting and 
because the court of appeals concluded that there existed a need 
for clarification of the proper legal standard upon which to 
evaluate unmodifiable floors for child support payments. 
¶3 
We conclude that the Mays' stipulation and order for 
child support is enforceable.  The parties freely and knowingly 
entered into the stipulation at issue, and the terms of the 
stipulation 
were 
fair 
and 
equitable 
to 
the 
parties.  
Furthermore, the agreement is not contrary to public policy 
because the circuit court retains its equitable power to 
consider circumstances in existence when the stipulation was 
challenged that were unforeseen by the parties when they entered 
into the agreement if those circumstances adversely affect the 
best interests of the children.  Michael has not demonstrated 
the existence of such circumstances.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
decision of the circuit court. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶4 
Michael and Suzanne May were married on November 9, 
1996.  During the couple's almost nine years of marriage, they 
had two children, N.N.M. in 1998 and J.J.M. in 2002.  In mid-
2005, Suzanne petitioned for divorce in the circuit court for 
Will County, Illinois, and on October 25, 2005, that court 
issued a judgment dissolving the Mays' marriage.  The divorce 
No. 
2010AP177   
 
3 
 
judgment incorporated the parties' Marital Settlement Agreement 
and Joint Parenting Agreement, in which the couple stipulated to 
shared custody of the children, as well as child support 
payments from Michael to Suzanne.   
¶5 
At 
the 
time 
of 
the 
stipulation, 
Michael 
was 
unemployed, having recently lost his job as a packaging engineer 
at Molex, Inc.  Because Michael was unemployed at that time, the 
parties agreed that his child support payments would be $444.44 
per month, in addition to certain past due payments to be made 
soon after entry of the judgment of divorce, as well as costs 
for daycare and extracurricular activities for the children.  As 
part of the stipulation, Michael was required to inform Suzanne 
of any changes in his employment, at which point his support 
obligations would be recalculated.  The stipulation also 
provided that Michael was responsible for 50 percent of the 
children's medical, dental, and vision insurance premiums until 
he became reemployed, after which he would be responsible for 
100 percent of such premiums.   
¶6 
On September 25, 2006, Michael registered the Illinois 
court's judgment in the Dane County circuit court and moved the 
Wisconsin court to modify the judgment of divorce.  Michael 
sought modifications to his obligations for child support, 
insurance premiums, and daycare costs, as well as a placement 
change for the children.  Additionally, Michael sought to 
prevent 
Suzanne 
from 
unilaterally 
altering 
the 
placement 
schedule 
when 
conflicts 
arose 
with 
the 
children's 
No. 
2010AP177   
 
4 
 
extracurricular activities, an issue that would continue to 
raise hackles in the ensuing years.   
¶7 
The family court commissioner, the Honorable Marjorie 
Schuett, dismissed Michael's motion on January 9, 2007, on the 
ground 
that 
there 
had 
been 
no 
substantial 
change 
in 
circumstances since the entry of the earlier child support 
order.  Michael sought a de novo hearing before the circuit 
court, and Suzanne responded by seeking attorney fees for 
Michael's alleged overtrial.2  At the hearing, the circuit court 
allowed the parties ten days to modify or withdraw their 
motions, after which a guardian ad litem would be appointed.  
Michael withdrew his motion for modification and, at the same 
time, the court granted Michael's attorney's request for leave 
to withdraw from representation.   
¶8 
In July 2007, Commissioner Schuett entered another 
order based on a new stipulation that established Michael's 
monthly child support obligation of $1,203.  Even before the 
actual entry of that second comprehensive order, Michael sought 
a de novo review, and soon thereafter, he again moved to revise 
physical 
placement 
and 
to 
modify 
his 
support 
payments.  
Additionally, in September 2007, Commissioner Schuett issued an 
                                                 
2 Overtrial is a family law doctrine that courts employ when 
one party's approach to litigation is unreasonable and causes 
the other party to incur unnecessary expense.  Frisch v. 
Henrichs, 2007 WI 102, ¶2 n.1, 304 Wis. 2d 1, 736 N.W.2d 85.  
When a finding of overtrial is made, a court may order that the 
offending party pay a larger part of the attorney fees of the 
other party.  Id. at ¶2. 
No. 
2010AP177   
 
5 
 
order to show cause regarding remedial contempt for Michael's 
failure to make medical and daycare payments, as well as other 
various payments owed to Suzanne under the July 2007 order.   
¶9 
In October 2007, Michael again moved to modify his 
support payments.  As the parties prepared for a hearing on the 
motion in December 2007, he withdrew that motion and the parties 
entered into another comprehensive stipulation, which ostensibly 
resolved all outstanding issues between them.  On January 7, 
2008, the court entered an order based on that stipulation.  The 
stipulation and order included a reaffirmation of Michael's 
obligation to pay $1,203 per month for child support, which the 
parties agreed "shall be the minimum amount due for a period of 
no less than thirty-three (33) months from December 11, 2007, 
and Michael may not file for a reduction in that amount for the 
full 33 month period."   
¶10 As an apparent quid pro quo for Michael agreeing to 
the unmodifiable floor on child support payments and to make 
payments accordingly, Suzanne agreed to assume 100 percent of 
child care costs as of December 2007.  Additionally, the parties 
agreed that Michael could temporarily make decreased payments on 
his child support arrearages, because, as of the date of the 
stipulation and order, he was working part-time and earning 
approximately $11 per hour.  The specifics of the agreement were 
read into the record at the hearing before the circuit court, 
and both the parties and their attorneys acknowledged that the 
terms stated constituted the agreement of the parties.   
No. 
2010AP177   
 
6 
 
¶11 Soon after entry of the order, Michael's (new) 
attorney moved the circuit court to grant leave to withdraw as 
Michael's counsel, which the court granted.  The record then 
shows more than a year-and-a-half hiatus from litigation between 
the parties, until June 2009.  At that time, Michael sought an 
order for contempt against Suzanne, on grounds that Suzanne had 
failed to comply with the previous court orders regarding shared 
placement, decision-making authority, and previously adjudicated 
childcare costs.  At the same time, Michael also sought a 
reduction in his child support payments.3 
¶12 This recommencement of litigation between the parties 
in June 2009 marks the beginning of the events directly giving 
rise to this appeal.  In response to Michael's motions, Suzanne 
countered with a flurry of motions of her own, including motions 
for contempt, to modify the judgment regarding extracurricular 
activities, and to dismiss Michael's motion to reduce child 
support payments.  On the eve of the hearing on the various 
motions, the parties negotiated and ultimately rescheduled the 
hearing before Commissioner Schuett for September 1, 2009.  At 
the September 1 hearing, Commissioner Schuett denied Michael's 
motions and he sought de novo review in the circuit court.  
                                                 
3 The record shows that at the time of his June 2009 
motions, Michael had recently lost the job he had held since 
approximately May 2008, as a result of his position having been 
"eliminated."  The record also shows that during that period of 
employment, Michael failed to inform Suzanne of his increase in 
salary, as required by earlier stipulations and orders.   
No. 
2010AP177   
 
7 
 
¶13 On September 23, 2009, the circuit court denied 
Michael's motion to hold Suzanne in contempt of court, denied 
Michael's motion to modify his support obligations and held 
Michael in contempt for his failure to comply with the court's 
previous orders regarding payment of child support, healthcare 
costs and past due childcare costs.  The court also concluded 
that Michael was equitably estopped from seeking a reduction in 
his support payments because allowing such modification would 
"unravel" the parties' stipulation of December 2007.  Michael 
appealed and the court of appeals certified the appeal to this 
court, which certification we accepted. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶14 The questions on review are:  (1) whether the December 
2007 stipulation and order establishing unmodifiable minimum 
child support payments for 33 months violate public policy, and 
(2) whether the circuit court erred when it estopped Michael 
from seeking modification of his child support payments, based 
on the parties' agreement that was incorporated into a court 
order.  If a trial court's decision to apply estoppel would 
violate public policy, a reviewing court must reverse that 
decision as an erroneous exercise of discretion.  See King v. 
King, 224 Wis. 2d 235, 248, 590 N.W.2d 480 (1999).  The 
determination of whether equitable estoppel may be applied to an 
uncontested set of facts is a question of law that we review 
No. 
2010AP177   
 
8 
 
independently of the previous court decision.4  Randy A.J. v. 
Norma I.J., 2004 WI 41, ¶12, 270 Wis. 2d 384, 677 N.W.2d 630.  
Where the circuit court has examined the relevant facts and 
concluded that the elements of estoppel are satisfied, the 
decision to grant equitable relief is within the court's 
discretion.  See Affordable Erecting, Inc. v. Neosho Trompler, 
Inc., 2006 WI 67, ¶21, 291 Wis. 2d 259, 715 N.W.2d 620.   
B.  Child Support Stipulations Generally 
¶15 The court of appeals noted in its certification that 
the 
case 
law 
applicable 
to 
unmodifiable 
child 
support 
stipulations could be read as conflicting.  Accordingly, the 
court of appeals requested clarification to ensure proper 
application of public policy when examining the enforceability 
of child support stipulations.  See May v. May, No. 2010AP177, 
2011 WL 51579, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 2011).  To clarify 
the applicable public policy concerns, we examine the relevant 
cases from both this court and the court of appeals. 
¶16 We begin with an examination of the case that Michael 
found so troubling that he requested it be overruled, Honore v. 
Honore, 149 Wis. 2d 512, 439 N.W.2d 827 (Ct. App. 1989).  In 
Honore, the court of appeals held that a stipulation that one 
parent would continue to pay a certain minimum amount in child 
support, 
notwithstanding 
any 
changes 
in 
income 
or 
other 
                                                 
4 Although the parties dispute various facts relating to 
each other's support or care for the children, the existence of 
the December 2007 stipulation and the facts that led to that 
stipulation are not in dispute. 
No. 
2010AP177   
 
9 
 
finances, was not contrary to public policy.  Id. at 516–18.  
The court of appeals relied on the parties' explicit agreement 
that a reduction in the payor's income would not alter the 
payor's child support obligation.  Id. at 516–17.  In so doing, 
the parties stipulated that a decline in the payor's "income or 
other financial factors" would not constitute cause to reduce 
child support, even though such a change would otherwise permit, 
but not obligate, a court to reduce the support obligations.  
Id. at 514; see also Wis. Stat. § 767.32 (1985–86). 
¶17 Under Honore, then, parties are generally free to 
enter into stipulations governing the minimum amount due for 
child 
support, 
and 
a 
circuit 
court 
that 
approves 
such 
stipulations by incorporating them into its order will not be 
reversed to the extent that the order comports with existing law 
and public policy.  We have recently reaffirmed this principle 
in Frisch v. Henrichs, 2007 WI 102, ¶75, 304 Wis. 2d 1, 736 
N.W.2d 85.   
¶18 In Frisch, we explained that "we are sensitive to the 
importance and prevalence of stipulations in helping families 
going through difficult and litigious divorces and curbing 
disagreements [between] the parties.  The ability to contract is 
fundamental to our legal system and may aid parties in settling 
their divorces more amicably."  Id.  We also stated in Frisch 
that, notwithstanding the rights of parents to stipulate for 
child support, "the child's best interests are paramount," 
suggesting that where a conflict between the two values exists, 
the child's best interests must prevail.  Id. 
No. 
2010AP177   
 
10 
 
¶19 Even prior to the court of appeals' decision in 
Honore, we have long recognized that the best interests of the 
child are the primary guidepost for courts considering approval 
and modification of orders for child support.  As early as 1970, 
in Bliwas, we recognized that a court is empowered to make such 
orders and modifications as the best interests of the child may 
require.  Bliwas v. Bliwas, 47 Wis. 2d 635, 639, 178 N.W.2d 35 
(1970).  We also recognized that a court exercising its 
equitable authority could issue certain child support orders 
based on the stipulation of the parties, even though the 
provisions to which the parties stipulated could not be imposed 
absent the agreement.  See id. at 638–40. 
¶20 In Bliwas, the payor father had agreed to pay child 
support for one of the children until that child reached age 21 
in exchange for reduced support payments during the child's 
minority.  See id. at 640.  We concluded that the stipulation 
did not violate public policy and that it was enforceable 
between the parties.  Id. at 638-41.  Our conclusion rested not 
solely on a theory of private contract or inherent authority of 
the court, but on equitable principles that required that "'a 
party who procures or consents to the entry of [a] decree is 
estopped to question its validity, especially where he has 
obtained a benefit from it.'"  Id. at 640 (citation omitted). 
¶21 Soon after Bliwas, we held in Severson v. Severson, 71 
Wis. 2d 382, 238 N.W.2d 116 (1976), that an automatic reduction 
clause in a child support stipulation (reducing the father's 
payments by 20 percent upon each of five children's reaching the 
No. 
2010AP177   
 
11 
 
age of majority) did not violate public policy.  Id. at 387-88.  
Therein, we again held that where the parties reached an 
agreement on a particular provision in the child support 
stipulation, and where that provision did not, either on its 
face or in effect, interfere with the best interests of the 
children, the courts would not excuse enforcement of the 
provision.  See id. at 386–88. 
¶22 In Rintelman v. Rintelman, 118 Wis. 2d 587, 348 N.W.2d 
498 (1984), we upheld a stipulation to continue spousal 
maintenance payments after the payee wife's remarriage, on the 
ground that she had relied on the agreement and, therefore, the 
payor 
husband 
was 
estopped 
from 
denying 
his 
continuing 
obligation.  We stated in Rintelman that no quid pro quo was 
necessary to demonstrate the applicability of estoppel; rather, 
in the context of spousal maintenance and child support: 
[A]ll that need be shown to constitute an estoppel is 
that both parties entered into the stipulation freely 
and knowingly, that the overall settlement is fair and 
equitable and not illegal or against public policy, 
and that one party subsequently seeks to be released 
from the terms of the court order on the grounds that 
the court could not have entered the order it did 
without the parties' agreement. 
Id. at 596. 
¶23 Accordingly, we recognize that Wisconsin courts have 
long utilized their equitable authority to uphold stipulations 
governing child support, and that such stipulations should be 
upheld unless doing so would threaten the best interests of the 
children.  The cases in which binding support agreements have 
No. 
2010AP177   
 
12 
 
been invalidated typically have involved factual scenarios in 
which enforcement of the agreements would have run afoul of the 
best interests of the child.  These specific scenarios, however, 
have not materially altered the underlying rule of law where 
stipulations are reviewed to determine whether they are in the 
best interests of the child.  This policy continues to guide 
Wisconsin 
courts 
in 
their 
evaluations 
of 
child 
support 
agreements.  See, e.g., Severson, 71 Wis. 2d at 387–88, Bliwas, 
47 Wis. 2d at 639–40. 
¶24 The 
prototypical 
case 
in 
which 
an 
unmodifiable 
agreement has been invalidated involves a stipulation limiting 
the ability of a parent receiving child support to act in the 
best interests of the children.  For example, in Ondrasek v. 
Tenneson, 158 Wis. 2d 690, 462 N.W.2d 915 (Ct. App. 1990), the 
court of appeals invalidated a stipulation that provided for 
"periodic payments," but barred any other payments designated as 
"child support."  Id. at 693–94.  The court determined that the 
stipulation could have been read either as a complete waiver of 
child support payments or as establishing an unmodifiable 
ceiling on the payor's support obligations.  Id. at 694.  
¶25 Under either interpretation, the court concluded that 
the parties' stipulation impermissibly precluded reconsideration 
of support obligations when one child's placement changed from 
primarily living with the father to primarily with the mother.  
See id.  Therefore, the stipulation threatened to leave 
unaddressed the changing needs of the children.  Id. at 696–97.  
Accordingly, Ondrasek has been cited for the rule that a child 
No. 
2010AP177   
 
13 
 
support stipulation that would prevent a payee spouse from 
seeking an upward modification upon the occurrence of a 
substantial change in circumstances is per se invalid as 
interfering with the best interests of the child.  See id.; see 
also Wood v. Propeck, 2007 WI App 24, ¶21, 299 Wis. 2d 470, 728 
N.W.2d 757. 
¶26 In addition to affirming the payee spouse's ability to 
seek modifications in the best interests of the child, we also 
acknowledge 
the 
principle 
that 
a 
payor 
spouse 
has 
a 
responsibility to act in the best interests of the child.  
Therefore, where a child support stipulation would hinder the 
payor spouse's ability to protect the best interests of the 
child, such stipulation will be invalidated on the same grounds 
as would a stipulation that hinders the payee's ability to 
protect the children.  See Krieman v. Goldberg, 214 Wis. 2d 163, 
177, 571 N.W.2d 425 (Ct. App. 1997).   
¶27 In Krieman, the court of appeals concluded that a 
child support stipulation that imposed an unmodifiable floor on 
the payor spouse's payment obligations without any durational 
limit would not be upheld.  See id. at 178.  The child support 
stipulation in Krieman provided that "neither party shall under 
any circumstances have the right to petition the court for a 
modification of the child support provided for herein."  Id. at 
167.  The court of appeals invalidated the stipulation, 
reasoning that the agreement's lack of a durational limit 
threatened to deprive the payor of the opportunity to seek 
modification upon a substantial change in circumstances, even 
No. 
2010AP177   
 
14 
 
when such change may have negatively affected the best interests 
of his children.  Id. at 175-76.   
¶28 A 
central 
component 
in 
determining 
whether 
an 
unmodifiable child support floor is enforceable is the duration 
of the provision, as the court of appeals has recognized.  See 
Wood, 299 Wis. 2d 470, ¶20; Krieman, 214 Wis. 2d at 175-76; 
Honore, 149 Wis. 2d at 513–14.  In Honore, for example, the 
court of appeals concluded that an approximately three-year 
unmodifiable floor did not violate public policy, even where the 
payor asserted a decrease in his income during that time.  
Honore, 149 Wis. 2d at 513–14.  Conversely, in Krieman, the 
court concluded that a stipulation without any durational limit 
was unenforceable on public policy grounds.  Krieman, 214 
Wis. 2d at 165.  Therefore, a child support obligation that is 
indefinitely unmodifiable will likely violate public policy.  
See id. at 175–78. 
¶29 However, a durational limit will not necessarily save 
a child support stipulation.  In Wood, a stipulation that 
prohibited either party from seeking modification of child 
support 
obligations 
for 
seven 
years 
absent 
"catastrophic 
circumstances" was held to violate public policy.  See Wood, 299 
Wis. 2d 470, ¶1.  The court of appeals determined that the 
stipulation would have prevented the payee mother from obtaining 
a modification even after the children's placement changed from 
shared to primarily with the mother.  See id., ¶11 (citing Wis. 
Stat. § 767.32(1)(a) (2003–04) (later renumbered to Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.59(1f) by 2005 Wis. Act 443 §§ 148–59)).  The court of 
No. 
2010AP177   
 
15 
 
appeals concluded that even though the parties' stipulation was 
intended to be fair to both spouses by imposing a bilateral 
limitation, the stipulation would have interfered with the 
court's ability to make orders in the best interests of the 
children.  Id., ¶¶14, 18. 
¶30 In Frisch, we concluded that a four-year moratorium on 
child support litigation violated public policy because such a 
limitation would have imposed an upper limit on the payee's 
ability to secure support for the children.  See Frisch, 304 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶67.  Such a ceiling would have deprived the payee of 
the ability to seek a modification even upon a showing of a 
substantial change in circumstances necessitating an increase to 
protect the best interests of the children.  Id., ¶74.  In 
Frisch, we also stated that although the four-year unmodifiable 
ceiling violated public policy, no such prohibition existed for 
unmodifiable floors when they are limited in duration.  Id., ¶74 
n.23.  Specifically, we reasoned that "[s]tipulating to a 
minimum amount for a limited period of time does not violate 
public policy because it ensures that a certain amount of child 
support is received, which is in the best interests of the 
children."  Id. 
¶31 Soon after our decision in Frisch, the court of 
appeals decided Jalovec v. Jalovec, 2007 WI App 206, 305 Wis. 2d 
467, 739 N.W.2d 834, which involved yet another four-year 
moratorium on child support litigation.  In Jalovec, however, 
the challenge implicated what could be argued to be an 
unmodifiable floor on child support, because the payor father 
No. 
2010AP177   
 
16 
 
sought to decrease his payment obligations after taking primary 
placement of one of the children.  See id., ¶¶6, 19.  Relying on 
our statement in Frisch that a four-year ceiling was contrary to 
public policy, the court of appeals held that the four-year 
moratorium on requesting a support reduction was also contrary 
to public policy.  Id., ¶19.  It was this reasoning that 
prompted the court of appeals in the instant case to seek 
clarification of the question of when a limited duration, 
unmodifiable floor for child support violates public policy.  
See May, 2011 WL 51579, at *1, 4. 
¶32 In addition to the relevant case law, we also examine 
the statutory bases upon which child support obligations are 
founded.  Of importance to this case is Wis. Stat. § 767.59(1f), 
which guides courts' decisions about whether to modify child 
support orders in two separate ways.  On its face, § 767.59(1f) 
provides courts with examples of factual scenarios that may 
constitute "substantial changes in circumstances" that are 
sufficient to modify orders for child support.  Some of those 
scenarios, listed in § 767.59(1f)(b), give rise to a rebuttable 
presumption that a substantial change has occurred.  For 
example, "[c]ommencement of receipt of aid to families with 
dependent children" sets up a rebuttable presumption of a 
substantial change under § 767.59(1f)(b)1.  Other circumstances, 
for example those listed in paragraph (c), relate possible 
instances in which a court may find that such a change has 
occurred.  Therefore, these provisions signal to courts and 
No. 
2010AP177   
 
17 
 
litigants when modification to child support orders may be 
proper. 
¶33 Moreover, Wis. Stat. § 767.59(1f) also provides some 
preliminary guidance to parties seeking to enter into agreements 
to govern child support.  In particular, § 767.59(1f)(b)2. 
provides that after the passage of 33 months, a rebuttable 
presumption arises that a substantial change in circumstances 
has occurred that warrants a revision of the previous child 
support order, unless the order is expressed as a percentage of 
the payor's income.  The legislature's inclusion of a period of 
time giving rise to a rebuttable presumption conveys that until 
the provided time period is reached, the passage of time, 
without more, may not support the conclusion that a substantial 
change in circumstances has occurred.  Notably, this legislative 
policy comports with decisions of this court and the court of 
appeals 
examining 
durational 
limits 
in 
child 
support 
stipulations. 
¶34 From the foregoing, we conclude that there exists a 
framework governing child support stipulations and orders.  
First, ceilings on child support payments are presumed to be 
invalid.  See Frisch, 304 Wis. 2d 1, ¶74; see also Ondrasek, 158 
Wis. 2d at 694–97.  The foundation for this rule is long-
established:  the best interests of the child require that a 
payee spouse cannot be deprived of the ability to seek a 
modification in child support.  See Ondrasek, 158 Wis. 2d at 
694–97.   
No. 
2010AP177   
 
18 
 
¶35 Second, 
an 
unmodifiable 
floor 
on 
child 
support 
payments that is not limited in duration, e.g., Krieman, 214 
Wis. 2d at 178, or that has an excessively long duration, e.g., 
Wood, 299 Wis. 2d 470, ¶¶12–14, may violate public policy.  Just 
as payees have a duty, and therefore must have the ability, to 
protect the best interests of the children, payors have a duty, 
and therefore also must have the ability, to protect the best 
interests of their children.  Stated otherwise, an unmodifiable 
floor of excessive duration has the potential to impose undue 
hardship on the payor parent's ability to provide for the best 
interests of the children, thereby negatively affecting the 
children's relationships with that parent.  See Krieman, 214 
Wis. 2d at 177–78.  However, we decline to adopt a rule that 
unmodifiable floors that are limited in duration are invalid per 
se.  See Frisch, 304 Wis. 2d 1, ¶74 n.23.  Agreements that 
provide an unmodifiable child support floor for a limited period 
of time often are created to lessen litigation between the 
parties.  Repetitive litigation and the tension it creates are 
not in the best interests of children.   
¶36 Third, where the parties to a child support order have 
entered into a stipulation in regard to child support for a 
limited period of time that the court has adopted, courts will 
attempt to give effect to the parties' intentions where the 
stipulation was entered into freely and knowingly, was fair and 
equitable when entered into, and is not illegal or violative of 
public policy.  See id., ¶68.  In this context, a court's review 
typically will consider the doctrine of equitable estoppel, by 
No. 
2010AP177   
 
19 
 
which a party may be precluded from challenging an agreement 
when the elements of estoppel set forth in Rintelman are 
satisfied.  See Rintelman, 118 Wis. 2d at 596 (stating elements 
of estoppel as (1) both parties entered into the agreement 
freely and knowingly; (2) overall, the settlement is fair and 
equitable; and (3) the agreement is not illegal or violative of 
public policy).  In the event that the elements of estoppel are 
met, courts have the equitable authority to decide whether to 
hold the parties to their bargain or to release them from it.  
See Jalovec, 305 Wis. 2d 467, ¶11. 
¶37 Finally, courts retain the equitable power to consider 
circumstances in existence when the stipulation is challenged 
that were unforeseen by the parties when they entered into the 
stipulation if those circumstances adversely affect the best 
interests of the child.  This is so because the protection of 
children and intervening in their best interests constitute 
long-standing grounds for exercising the equity jurisdiction of 
the courts.  See Dovi v. Dovi, 245 Wis. 50, 57, 13 N.W.2d 585 
(1944). 
Accordingly, 
if 
presented 
with 
the 
circumstances 
described above when a party seeks to enforce such an agreement 
and 
the 
other party seeks to modify the judgment that 
incorporates 
the 
agreement, 
courts 
retain 
the 
equitable 
authority and discretion to refuse to uphold all child support 
stipulations, even those that under principles of estoppel would 
otherwise be enforceable. 
No. 
2010AP177   
 
20 
 
C.  Application 
¶38 The circuit court concluded that the Mays' stipulation 
and the facts of this case required that Michael be held to his 
contractual and judicial child support obligations.  The court 
determined that the elements of estoppel were met, and that 
there were no circumstances that would warrant relief from the 
parties' agreement.  As discussed below, we reach the same 
conclusion. 
¶39 Our review is two-fold:  we first examine the facts as 
found by the circuit court to determine whether the elements of 
estoppel are satisfied as a matter of law; if we conclude that 
they are, we examine the circuit court's decision to apply 
estoppel to determine whether doing so was an erroneous exercise 
of discretion.  We will affirm the circuit court if it examined 
the relevant facts, applied the proper legal standard and, using 
a 
demonstrated 
rational 
process, 
reached 
a 
reasonable 
conclusion.  See Miller v. Hanover Ins. Co., 2010 WI 75, ¶29, 
326 Wis. 2d 640, 785 N.W.2d 493.  Accordingly, we begin by 
examining the elements of estoppel in light of the facts of this 
case. 
¶40 In the context of child support stipulations, the 
first element of estoppel asks whether Michael and Suzanne 
freely and knowingly entered into the support stipulation.  See 
Frisch, 304 Wis. 2d at 1, ¶68.  Judge Sumi conducted a careful 
examination 
to 
determine 
each 
party's 
understanding 
and 
acceptance of the terms of the December 2007 stipulation.  Her 
examination demonstrates that the parties were assisted by 
No. 
2010AP177   
 
21 
 
skilled counsel; that the terms of the stipulation were clearly 
expressed; and that both parties were aware of and in agreement 
on those terms.  We therefore agree with the circuit court that 
both parties freely and knowingly entered into the support 
stipulation. 
¶41 The second element of estoppel requires that the 
stipulation was fair and equitable.  Id.  At the outset, we note 
the apparent incongruity in Michael's stipulation to pay $1,200 
per month when his monthly income from part-time employment at 
the time of the stipulation ranged between $1,600 and $1,800.  
We also note that when Michael became unemployed between the 
time of the stipulation and the time of his challenge to it in 
mid-2009, his income was practically the same as it had been at 
the time of the December 2007 stipulation. 
¶42 At 
first 
blush, 
Michael's 
agreement 
to 
pay 
approximately 75 percent of his income seems high.  Upon further 
examination, though, we are satisfied that the stipulation was 
both fair and equitable because it held Michael, who had 
previously earned $72,000 per year, to his obligation to support 
his children.  The stipulation's provision that support could 
not be reduced for 33 months demonstrates that the parties were 
No. 
2010AP177   
 
22 
 
aware of historical fluctuations in Michael's income,5 as well as 
his history of non-payment and non-compliance with prior orders.  
In addition, the stipulation and order exhibit a quid pro quo:  
Michael was obligated to comply with the minimum payment 
schedule in exchange for modification of his then-existing child 
support 
obligations, 
including 
substantial 
arrearages.  
Therefore, we conclude that the parties' stipulation was fair 
and equitable. 
¶43 The third element of estoppel is whether the agreement 
was illegal or contrary to public policy.  Id., ¶68.  The 
parties' stipulation for child support was not illegal; such 
agreements are provided for by Wis. Stat. § 767.511(1) and Wis. 
Stat. § 767.59(2s).  Rather, the crux of Michael's argument is 
that the stipulation violates public policy.  As discussed in 
our examination of the case law, a stipulation that sets an 
unmodifiable floor for child support for a limited term does not 
necessarily run afoul of the public policy of protecting the 
best interests of the child.  Id. 
                                                 
5 The record shows that less than six months after entering 
the stipulation, and nearly one year before his challenge, 
Michael once again found employment in his field earning 
approximately $72,000 per year.  The record also shows that 
Michael failed to report this substantial change in his income 
to Suzanne as required by the December 2007 stipulation.  
Although these facts could not retroactively support a finding 
that the stipulation was "fair," this behavior does, according 
to the record, demonstrate the continuation of a pattern of 
obstreperousness toward multiple child support orders during the 
years following the parties' divorce.  From that pattern, there 
is ample support for the conclusion that the December 2007 
stipulation was, overall, fair and equitable. 
No. 
2010AP177   
 
23 
 
¶44 As an initial policy matter, we recognize that this 
stipulation does not implicate the prohibition on unmodifiable 
child support ceilings.  See id., ¶74.  Instead, Michael asserts 
that the 33-month unmodifiable floor on his support payments 
suffers from the same infirmities as do ceilings.  As suggested 
in our preceding discussion, we have located no support for the 
conclusion that the 33-month unmodifiable floor is a per se 
violation of the policy of protecting the best interests of the 
child. 
¶45 Contrary to the purpose of a child support ceiling, a 
floor setting the minimum amount of child support payments does 
not threaten to deprive a payee parent of the ability to seek 
more support for his or her child.  This is important because 
the payee is the parent that a court and the parties have 
determined to be more in need of financial support, as between 
the two parents, in order to provide for the best interests of 
the child.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 767.511, Wis. Admin. Code 
§ DCF ch. 150 (prefatory note).  Therefore, when a floor for 
child support payments is implemented and enforced, there is no 
fear that a payee parent will be hindered in his or her ability 
to protect the best interests of the child.  The concerns 
discussed in cases such as Wood, 299 Wis. 2d 470, ¶18, or 
Ondrasek, 158 Wis. 2d at 696–97, are not relevant here, where 
Suzanne, as the payee, was free to seek an upward modification 
if the need presented itself. 
¶46 Next, we note that there exists some potential 
confusion regarding the permissible duration of an unmodifiable 
No. 
2010AP177   
 
24 
 
child support floor.  Without rejecting Honore's determination 
that a three-year stipulation was acceptable, we reaffirm our 
deference to the legislature's presumptive durational limit for 
changed 
circumstances, 
33 
months. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 767.59(1f)(b)2. 
 
Beyond 
the 
legislature's 
rebuttable 
presumption of 33 months, case law suggests that stipulations 
lasting more than four years could be too lengthy.  See Frisch, 
304 Wis. 2d 1, ¶74.  So, too, stipulations that are not related 
to a point in time that reasonably would support a reevaluation 
of the parties' support obligations and needs may not meet with 
the approval of the circuit court.  See Wood, 299 Wis. 2d 470, 
¶20.  Section 767.59(1f)(b)2.'s rebuttable presumption that 
arises at 33 months represents what the legislature has 
determined is a reasonable time to reconsider support. 
¶47 From these principles, we conclude that the Mays' 33-
month stipulation did not violate public policy.  Where the 
parties entered into the stipulation freely and knowingly, where 
the overall agreement is fair and equitable, and where the 
stipulation is not violative of public policy, a court should be 
cautious when asked to allow one of the parties to disavow the 
agreement.  Although courts retain their equitable power to 
modify child support payments notwithstanding the parties' 
agreement to an "unmodifiable" floor, due to the absence in this 
case of unforeseen circumstances that negatively affect the best 
interests of the children, the agreement and order do not 
No. 
2010AP177   
 
25 
 
violate public policy.6  Accordingly, we agree with the circuit 
court and conclude that the final element of estoppel is 
satisfied.   
¶48 Our analysis turns, then, to whether the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion when it held Michael 
estopped from challenging the stipulation within the 33-month 
period of its existence.  See King, 224 Wis. 2d at 248.  We 
conclude that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its 
discretion:  the court examined the relevant facts, applied 
proper legal standards, and used a demonstrated rational process 
to reach a conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach.  
Miller, 326 Wis. 2d 640, ¶29.  Therefore, we affirm the circuit 
court's decision to apply equitable estoppel to preclude 
Michael's challenge to the Mays' stipulation by modifying the 
order that incorporates it. 
¶49 As a final matter, we acknowledge Michael's argument 
that the passage of time and the development of more holistic 
notions of post-divorce family structure warrant overruling the 
court of appeals' decision in Honore.  Michael argues that the 
shift in policy, as expressed in the relevant administrative 
code sections, see, e.g., Wis. Admin. Code § DCF ch. 150, 
support his argument that the financial integrity of the payor 
parent has become a greater priority than ever before, and that 
that policy supports his attempt to reduce his payments.  
                                                 
6 Indeed, 
Michael 
has 
not 
pointed 
to 
any 
changed 
circumstances since the entry of the 2007 order. 
No. 
2010AP177   
 
26 
 
Although Michael seems to argue that the policies of the late-
1980s are of a bygone era, we nonetheless continue to view the 
Honore court's analysis and conclusion as persuasive.  In 
Frisch, we referred to Honore with approval, and therefore, even 
if times have changed since 1989 when Honore was decided, we do 
not accept the argument that such changes justify our rejection 
of the equitable principles enunciated in Honore.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶50 We conclude that the Mays' stipulation and order for 
child support is enforceable.  The parties freely and knowingly 
entered into the stipulation at issue and the terms of the 
stipulation were fair and equitable.  Furthermore, the agreement 
is not contrary to public policy because the circuit court 
retains its equitable power to consider circumstances in 
existence 
when 
the 
stipulation 
was 
challenged 
that 
were 
unforeseen by the parties when they entered into the agreement 
if those circumstances adversely affect the best interests of 
the children.  Michael has not demonstrated the existence of 
such circumstances.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the 
circuit court. 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2010AP177.awb 
 
1 
 
¶51 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  This case 
presents an important issue with far-reaching consequences.  
Wisconsin circuit courts have jurisdiction over thousands of 
divorces across the state.  To ease contentious litigation and 
settle their expectations, parties to a divorce often enter into 
purportedly "unmodifiable" stipulations establishing a set level 
of child support.       
¶52 The court of appeals certified this case to this court 
so that we could clarify whether stipulations establishing 
unmodifiable, limited-duration floors on child support are 
contrary to public policy.  The responsibility of this court is 
to provide clear guidance on this important issue that affects 
courts and litigants on a daily basis.  I do not join the 
majority out of concern that its purported answer to this 
question creates confusion rather than clarity.  
I 
¶53 I agree with many of the underpinnings of the majority 
opinion.  The child's best interests are, and should be, the 
guidepost of a court's determination on whether to modify child 
support.  Majority op., ¶19.  Parties may stipulate to a 
limited-duration, unmodifiable child support floor, and such 
stipulations are not categorically contrary to public policy. 
Id., ¶35.  Such a stipulation can help a family going through a 
difficult divorce by curbing disagreements and litigation among 
the spouses.  See id., ¶¶35-36.  Nevertheless, a court retains 
the discretion to modify a limited-duration unmodifiable floor 
No.  2010AP177.awb 
 
2 
 
on child support when the facts of an individual case warrant a 
modification.  Id., ¶¶15, 24. 
¶54 As I see it, the court's discretion to modify an 
otherwise unmodifiable child support floor can be explained as 
follows: As a result of the party's stipulation to make child 
support unmodifiable for a limited duration, a party under a 
child support order may be estopped from later seeking its 
modification.  However, even if all the elements of the 
equitable defense of estoppel are met, a circuit court may 
within its discretion decline to apply the doctrine of estoppel.  
See id., ¶36 (citing Jalovec v. Jalovec, 2007 WI App 206, ¶11, 
305 Wis. 2d 467, 739 N.W.2d 834).  Circuit courts should be 
trusted to wisely exercise their discretion under the facts of a 
particular case.  
¶55 This is precisely the analysis undertaken by the 
circuit court in this case.  The court found that the elements 
of estoppel were met, and then it exercised its discretion, 
estopping Michael from seeking a modification.  I agree with the 
majority that the circuit court examined the relevant facts, 
applied a proper standard of law, and used a demonstrated 
rational process to reach a conclusion that a reasonable judge 
could reach.  Id., ¶48.  Accordingly, there was no erroneous 
exercise of discretion.   
II 
¶56 The majority's approach is not so straightforward.  
Rather, as explained by the dissent, the majority's analysis of 
No.  2010AP177.awb 
 
3 
 
this reoccurring situation leaves many unanswered questions in 
its wake.  
¶57 First, the majority employs circular reasoning.  It 
concludes that unmodifiable stipulations are not contrary to 
public policy because, when they are contrary to public policy, 
they can be modified.  See id., ¶3.   
¶58 Second, 
the 
majority's 
discussion 
of 
when 
an 
unmodifiable stipulation should be modified is difficult to 
understand.  The majority asserts that a circuit court may 
"consider circumstances in existence when the stipulation is 
challenged that were unforeseen by the parties when they entered 
into the stipulation if those circumstances adversely affect the 
best interests of the child."  Id., ¶37.    
¶59 Although the majority's analysis appears to rest upon 
the 
above 
statement, 
it 
is 
difficult 
to 
evaluate 
that 
statement's import.  It may be that the majority means nothing 
more than what I have set forth above.  That is, estoppel is an 
equitable defense, and even when all of the elements of estoppel 
are met, the circuit court must exercise its discretion in 
deciding whether to apply it.   
¶60 However, the majority can also be interpreted as 
creating 
a 
new 
or 
different 
legal 
standard——unforeseen 
circumstances.  According to the majority, a party must 
No.  2010AP177.awb 
 
4 
 
demonstrate unforeseen circumstances before a circuit court can 
exercise its authority to modify the parties' stipulation.1   
¶61 Is this "new" standard really nothing more than the 
existing "substantial change in circumstances" standard under 
Wis. Stat. § 767.59(1f)?  See dissent, ¶83.  Does the majority 
intend to create a new standard?  Whatever it is doing, it 
should be clearly stated in order to provide clear guidance to 
litigants and courts. 
¶62 In addition to uncertainty about whether the majority 
has created a new standard, further questions remain.  If the 
majority does intend to create a new standard, how does this new 
standard, "unforeseen circumstances," fit with the "substantial 
change in circumstances" standard for modifying orders in the 
absence of a stipulation?  See Wis. Stat. § 767.59(1f).  Is 
"unforeseen circumstances" a higher or lower hurdle than 
"substantial change in circumstances"?  The majority does not 
say.     
¶63 I agree that the circuit court did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion when it denied Michael's motion to 
modify child support on account of equitable estoppel.  However, 
because I am concerned that the majority confuses rather than 
clarifies the law, I respectfully concur.   
                                                 
1 If the majority has created a new standard, I fear that 
its effect will be to limit the circuit court's authority to 
safeguard the best interests of the child.  If a party must 
establish 
unforeseen circumstances, then the majority has 
shifted the focus from the best interests of the child to 
whether the litigants actually foresaw the circumstances when 
they entered into the stipulation. 
No.  2010AP177.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶64 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting). This case 
presents an oft-recurring situation.  A clear answer is needed, 
one that can readily be applied in the numerous child support 
cases that present substantially the same issue.  The majority 
opinion does not, in my opinion, fit the bill.  
I 
¶65 The 
issue 
presented 
is 
"whether . . . a 
33-month 
unmodifiable floor for child support payments is enforceable."  
Majority op., ¶1.1  The majority answers in the affirmative, 
relying on the equitable power of circuit courts to modify 
unmodifiable child support orders (notwithstanding the parties' 
stipulation that it is "unmodifiable"), unforeseen circumstances 
that adversely affect the best interests of the child, the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel, case law discussing equitable 
estoppel, and the duration of an "unmodifiable" stipulation.  
Majority op., ¶3 & passim.  Thus, according to the majority 
opinion, 
the 
parties 
cannot 
effectively 
stipulate 
to 
unmodifiable child support.   
¶66 Stripping away the language in the majority opinion 
about the doctrine of equitable estoppel and the application of 
the doctrine, I read the essence of the majority opinion as 
holding that a stipulation imposing a floor on child support is 
                                                 
1 The 
circuit 
court's 
2008 
judgment 
incorporated 
the 
parties' stipulation regarding child support.  Both parties were 
represented by counsel.  Neither party appealed the judgment.  
Neither party claims in the present proceeding that he or she 
did not understand the stipulation or that when the stipulation 
was adopted it was unfair to the parties or was not in the best 
interests of the child.     
No.  2010AP177.ssa 
 
2 
 
enforceable against the payer (here Michael May) unless the 
payer shows that "unforeseen circumstances" exist at the time 
the payer seeks to modify child support and that "those 
circumstances adversely affect the best interests of the child." 
¶67 I agree with the majority opinion that a circuit court 
has the power to modify a support order, regardless of whether 
the stipulation purports to be "unmodifiable."  I do not join 
the majority opinion because there is a simpler, more straight-
forward approach to this case.       
¶68 Once the court acknowledges that the circuit court has 
the power to modify "unmodifiable" support orders, which it does 
in the present case, the court should not, in my opinion, create 
its own rules and standards to govern when this power may be 
exercised. 
 
Rather, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§767.59(1f), 
the 
statute 
governing modification of support orders, should take over. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 767.59(1f) demonstrates that the legislature 
has carefully attempted to shape circuit courts' and parties' 
power to modify child support.  In its entirety, Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.59(1f) provides: 
SUPPORT: SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES.  
(a) Except as provided in par. (d), a revision under 
this section of a judgment or order as to the amount 
of child or family support may be made only upon a 
finding of a substantial change in circumstances.  
(b) In an action under this section to revise a 
judgment or order with respect to the amount of child 
support, any of the following constitutes a rebuttable 
presumption of a substantial change in circumstances 
sufficient to justify a revision of the judgment or 
order:  
No.  2010AP177.ssa 
 
3 
 
1. Commencement of receipt of aid to families with 
dependent children under s. 49.19 or participation in 
Wisconsin works under ss. 49.141 to 49.161 by either 
parent since the entry of the last child support 
order, including a revision of a child support order 
under this section.  
2. Unless the amount of child support is expressed in 
the judgment or order as a percentage of parental 
income, the expiration of 33 months after the date of 
the entry of the last child support order, including a 
revision of a child support order under this section.  
3. Failure of the payer to furnish a timely disclosure 
under s. 767.54.  
4. A difference between the amount of child support 
ordered by the court to be paid by the payer and the 
amount that the payer would have been required to pay 
based on the percentage standard established by the 
department under s. 49.22(9) if the court did not use 
the percentage standard in determining the child 
support payments and did not provide the information 
required 
under 
s. 
46.10(14)(d), 
49.345(14)(d), 
301.12(14)(d), 
or 
767.511(1n), 
whichever 
is 
appropriate.  
(c) In an action under this section to revise a 
judgment or order with respect to an amount of child 
support, any of the following may constitute a 
substantial change of circumstances sufficient to 
justify revision of the judgment or order:  
1. Unless the amount of child support is expressed in 
the judgment or order as a percentage of parental 
income, a change in the payer's income, evidenced by 
information 
received 
under 
s. 
49.22(2m) 
by 
the 
department or the county child support agency under s. 
59.53(5) or by other information, from the payer's 
income determined by the court in its most recent 
judgment or order for child support, including a 
revision of a child support order under this section.  
2. A change in the needs of the child.  
3. A change in the payer's earning capacity.  
4. Any other factor that the court determines is 
relevant.  
No.  2010AP177.ssa 
 
4 
 
(d) In an action under this section to revise a 
judgment or order with respect to child or family 
support, the court is not required to make a finding 
of a substantial change in circumstances to change to 
a fixed sum the manner in which the amount of child or 
family support is expressed in the judgment or order. 
¶69 In sum, my preferred holding in the present case is to 
apply Wis. Stat. § 767.59(1f) to govern the circuit court's 
power and the rights and responsibilities of payers and payees 
in modification of a child support order, regardless of whether 
the stipulation for support (upon which the circuit court's 
order is based) is purportedly "unmodifiable."   
¶70 My preferred holding would forthrightly accomplish 
what the majority opinion might be doing in what I consider a 
circular, hard-to-follow fashion.       
¶71 My preferred holding, just like the majority opinion, 
majority op., ¶¶3, 47, deprives parties of the ability to 
stipulate to a truly unmodifiable child support floor.  This 
result is necessary because freedom of contract cannot take 
precedence over the best interests of the child.2  While it is 
more frequently the case that raising the amount of child 
support would be in the child's best interests, situations could 
arise in which lowering the amount would be in the child's best 
interests because of fluctuations in the parents' income levels.  
See majority op., ¶35.  
¶72 When an "unmodifiable" floor or a ceiling on child 
support is at issue, the judicial methodology, in my opinion, 
should be the same as when the child support stipulation is 
                                                 
2 See Frisch v. Henrichs, 2007 WI 102, ¶75, 304 Wis. 2d 1, 
736 N.W.2d 85. 
No.  2010AP177.ssa 
 
5 
 
silent about whether it is modifiable:  Apply Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.59(1f) to determine whether the parties may obtain a 
modification of child support.  
¶73 I recognize that "unmodifiable" stipulations are meant 
to avoid the frivolous, repeated motions that unfortunately 
sometimes are filed in the aftermath of a contentious divorce.  
But crucially, courts are not powerless to curb abusive 
litigation 
tactics. 
 
See 
majority 
op., 
¶7 
n.2. 
 
More 
importantly, the legislature has attempted to reduce motions to 
change child support by creating a high bar for modifying child 
support (i.e., a substantial change in circumstances) precisely 
to put a brake on repetitive, unnecessary litigation.  If this 
legislative brake is insufficient, the legislature should create 
a steeper burden on those seeking modification of child support 
and impose steeper consequences for frivolous or abusive 
attempts to modify child support.  Until that time, I believe 
courts should apply Wis. Stat. § 767.59(1f).  
II 
¶74 Beyond my fundamental disagreement with the majority's 
approach, I do not join the majority because its reasoning 
presents numerous quandaries and glitches. 
¶75 First, the majority's rule is circular.  It in effect 
holds that unmodifiable floors on child support, for limited 
durations, 
are 
enforceable, 
but 
explains 
that 
they 
are 
enforceable because circuit courts may modify them.  In other 
words, a stipulation adopting an unmodifiable floor on child 
support is enforceable because it is judicially modifiable!   
No.  2010AP177.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶76 This circularity allows the majority to confusingly 
and incorrectly apply equitable estoppel in the present case.  
Majority op., ¶¶3, 38-48.  The first two elements of estoppel 
are not implicated by the present case.  First, the parties 
freely and knowingly entered into the stipulation.  Second, the 
terms were fair and equitable to the parties when made.   
¶77 The confusion arises in the majority's treatment of 
the third element:  Equitable estoppel is not available if the 
stipulation is contrary to public policy.     
¶78 The majority holds that the stipulation in the present 
case is not contrary to public policy because a court may modify 
it.  Majority op., ¶¶3, 47.  Accordingly, as a matter of law, 
the payer in the present case is not equitably estopped from 
seeking a modification.    
¶79 I understand why the majority opinion falls into the 
trap of trying to apply equitable estoppel in the present case.  
Prior cases have analyzed an unmodifiable floor on support in 
terms of the third element of equitable estoppel (public 
policy), and the parties' arguments in the present case discuss 
equitable estoppel and public policy.3  Consequently, the 
majority opinion feels compelled to use this analysis.   
¶80 The majority errs, however, because it fails to 
recognize that the third element of equitable estoppel no longer 
applies because the majority holds, as a matter of law, that the 
"unmodifiable" floor is judicially modifiable, and consequently 
                                                 
3 Michael May's brief addresses estoppel but takes a broader 
view of the case law.  See majority op., ¶49. 
No.  2010AP177.ssa 
 
7 
 
the stipulation is not against public policy.  Majority op., 
¶¶3, 47.  Thus, as a matter of law, the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel does not apply in the present case.  The majority is 
oblivious to the fact that as a result of its opinion, the 
equitable estoppel analysis falls out of the picture.    
¶81 Nevertheless, 
the 
majority 
moves 
to 
the 
second 
question applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel according 
to our prior case law.  The question then becomes, may the payer 
(here Michael May) get a modification of the support stipulation 
inasmuch as he is not equitably estopped?  In other words, may 
the circuit court exercise its discretion to modify child 
support regardless of equitable estoppel?  That depends, 
according to the majority opinion, on whether the payer 
demonstrates that unforeseen circumstances exist that adversely 
affect the best interests of the child, which leads me to the 
next reservation I have about the majority opinion.  
¶82 Second, the majority opinion unnecessarily introduces 
new, undefined criteria to cases involving modification of a 
stipulation on child support.   
¶83 Are "unforeseen circumstances," majority op., ¶3, the 
same as a "substantial change in circumstances" under Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.59(1f), which governs modification of support orders?4   
                                                 
4 Noting that no statutory definition exists for what 
constitutes a substantial change in circumstances, the court of 
appeals has explained that "[o]ne shorthand definition for a 
substantial 
change 
in 
circumstances 
is 
that 
it 
is 
some 
unforeseen event which occurs after an agreement has been 
executed."  Jalovec v. Jalovec, 2007 WI App 206, ¶24, 305 
Wis. 2d 467, 739 N.W.2d 834. 
No.  2010AP177.ssa 
 
8 
 
¶84 Is "adversely affect the best interests of the child," 
majority op., ¶3, the same standard as "in the best interests of 
the child?"    
¶85 I cannot tell whether the majority is creating a 
higher bar for a circuit court to modify child support when the 
parties' 
stipulation 
is 
"unmodifiable" 
than 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 767.59(1f) provides when the stipulation does not include an 
"unmodifiable" provision.  Since an "unmodifiable" stipulation 
and a stipulation that does not include an "unmodifiable" 
provision are, as a matter of law, both judicially modifiable, 
why shouldn't a court treat the two stipulations the same? 
¶86 Third, the majority opinion's reliance on a circuit 
court's power to modify "unmodifiable" stipulations is a break 
from the analyses in past case law.  Because the majority 
nevertheless relies on equitable estoppel and does not explain 
prior cases in terms of this change in the analysis, the 
majority creates confusion and incoherence in the case law.  
¶87 In prior cases, the court has assumed that an 
"unmodifiable" stipulation is actually unmodifiable and analyzed 
the stipulation as such.   
¶88 For example, in Frisch v. Henrichs, 2007 WI 102, ¶¶76-
77, 304 Wis. 2d 1, 736 N.W.2d 85, this court held that any 
unmodifiable stipulation imposing a ceiling on child support 
violates public policy and is unenforceable.  The Frisch court 
acknowledged that "[t]he ability to contract is fundamental to 
our legal system and may aid parties in settling their divorces 
more amicably," but recognized that in the child support 
No.  2010AP177.ssa 
 
9 
 
context, "the child's best interests are paramount."  Frisch, 
304 Wis. 2d 1, ¶75.  A truly unmodifiable ceiling would violate 
public policy because it would prevent a modification of child 
support even when there is a substantial change in circumstances 
and modification would be in the child's best interests. 
¶89 Frisch seems to have been wrongly decided in light of 
the 
majority's 
newfound 
reliance 
on 
the 
circuit 
court's 
equitable power to modify "unmodifiable" stipulations.  Under 
the majority's reasoning, unmodifiable stipulations imposing a 
ceiling on child support should be enforceable because circuit 
courts have the discretion to modify them when necessary to 
protect the child's best interests.  Despite the incoherence 
injected into the Frisch holding by the majority's holding in 
the present case, the majority opinion, ¶¶31, 45-46, claims it 
reaffirms Frisch (although it adds a new twist that is not 
present in the Frisch opinion).5 
¶90 Similar incoherence arises in the majority's treatment 
of Krieman v. Goldberg, 214 Wis. 2d 163, 571 N.W.2d 425 (Ct. 
App. 1997).  In Krieman, the court of appeals held that an 
unmodifiable floor on child support that was unlimited in 
duration violates public policy and is unenforceable.  The 
Krieman court stated that "an unreviewable stipulation for child 
                                                 
5 The majority opinion at ¶34 reads Frisch as holding that 
ceilings on child support payments are "presumed" to be invalid, 
citing ¶74 of Frisch and Ondrasek v. Tenneson, 158 Wis. 2d 690, 
694-96, 462 N.W.2d 915 (Ct. App. 1990).  Neither Frisch nor 
Ondrasek refers to a presumption.  Both cases held that the 
unmodifiable agreements placing a ceiling on child support were 
per se unenforceable as contrary to the public policy of 
protecting the best interest of the child. 
No.  2010AP177.ssa 
 
10 
 
support 
could 
jeopardize 
a 
payer 
parent's 
financial 
future . . . ." 
 Id. at 178 (emphasis added).  Such a 
stipulation "may have detrimental effects on the parent/child 
relationship and in this way would ultimately not serve the best 
interests of the child."  Id. 
¶91 As Krieman demonstrates, under prior case law, the 
duration 
of 
the 
unmodifiable 
stipulation 
was 
of 
great 
importance.  But duration was significant because it was 
understood 
that 
"unmodifiable" 
in 
the 
stipulation 
meant 
unmodifiable.  Duration was a proxy for determining whether the 
stipulation was in the best interests of the child or against 
public policy (that is, not in the best interests of the child).  
The longer the duration of the stipulation, the more likely the 
stipulation would prevent a modification of child support 
despite a substantial change in circumstances that rendered the 
current support not in the best interests of the child.  
¶92 Under the majority's reasoning, duration should be 
irrelevant.  Yet the majority treats duration as potentially 
dispositive.  Majority op., ¶¶36, 44, 47.  According to the 
majority opinion (which admits to being influenced by Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.59(1f)), a 33-month stipulation is acceptable but a 
stipulation lasting more than four years may be too lengthy.  
Majority op., ¶46.  If circuit courts have the power to modify 
unmodifiable stipulations imposing a floor on child support, why 
does the duration of the stipulation matter?  Under the logic of 
the majority opinion, an unmodifiable stipulation of unlimited 
duration imposing a floor on child support is not per se 
No.  2010AP177.ssa 
 
11 
 
contrary to public policy because the circuit court has the 
power to modify it at any time for unforeseen circumstances that 
adversely affect the best interests of the child.  
¶93 Frisch and Krieman are not the only cases that no 
longer make sense in light of the majority opinion.  A dramatic 
additional example is Honore v. Honore, 149 Wis. 2d 512, 439 
N.W.2d 827 (Ct. App. 1989), in which the court of appeals held 
that an unmodifiable floor lasting approximately three years was 
enforceable and not contrary to public policy, despite the fact 
that the stipulation prevented modification of child support 
even on "a showing of cause."  Honore, 149 Wis. 2d at 516.   
¶94 The present case features a nearly identical fact 
pattern as Honore.  The child support floor is unmodifiable here 
for 33 months, compared to approximately 36 months in Honore.  
The 
majority 
claims 
that 
it 
is 
not 
rejecting 
"Honore's 
determination that a three-year stipulation was acceptable," 
majority op., ¶46, but in fact, the majority overrules Honore 
sub silentio.   
¶95 The Honore court explicitly held that the stipulation 
could not be modified even on a showing of cause; the floor on 
child support in Honore was truly unmodifiable for three years 
and was nevertheless declared enforceable.  Under the majority's 
reasoning in the present case, Honore is no longer good law.  
According to the majority opinion, the Honore stipulation could 
be judicially modified for cause within the three-year period, 
that is, the stipulation would be judicially modified if the 
payer or payee demonstrated at any time unforeseen circumstances 
No.  2010AP177.ssa 
 
12 
 
that adversely affected the best interests of the child.  The 
majority does not come to terms with this reality or the 
incoherence in the case law. 
¶96 The court of appeals certified the instant case to 
this court to clarify what the court of appeals saw as confusion 
in the case law.  The certification memorandum asks whether a 
recent court of appeals decision, Jalovec v. Jalovec, 2007 WI 
App 206, 305 Wis. 2d 467, 739 N.W.2d 834, which held that a 
four-year unmodifiable floor on child support was against public 
policy, was inconsistent with the following footnote in Frisch, 
304 Wis. 2d 1, ¶74 n.23:  "Stipulating to a minimum amount for a 
limited period of time does not violate public policy because it 
ensures that a certain amount of child support is received, 
which is in the best interests of the children."   
¶97 The certification also asked this court to explain 
whether it mattered for purposes of public policy if the 
duration of an unmodifiable floor on child support was "tied to" 
a future time when it would be logical to reexamine support. 
¶98 How does the majority opinion clarify the meaning and 
continued validity of the Frisch footnote and the continued 
validity of Jalovec and other case law developed by the court of 
appeals?  It doesn't.   
¶99 The majority does not answer the court of appeals' 
question about a stipulation's duration being "tied to" a 
logical point in the future.  It merely states that stipulations 
not related to a reasonable future reevaluation point "may not 
meet with the approval of the circuit court."  Majority op., 
No.  2010AP177.ssa 
 
13 
 
¶47.  Under the standard actually adopted by the majority, why 
does the duration of the stipulation matter, irrespective of 
whether it is "tied to" a logical point in the future?  A court 
may modify the terms of the stipulation if needed for the best 
interests of the child.  
¶100 The 
majority 
has 
created 
a 
new 
approach 
to 
unmodifiable stipulations imposing a floor on child support.  It 
focuses on the circuit court's equitable power to modify 
"unmodifiable" stipulations under certain circumstances and has 
jammed this approach onto past case law without explaining the 
dramatic shift in the court's analytical framework.  Rather than 
acknowledging that its methodology clashes with prior case law 
involving "unmodifiable" floors on child support, the majority 
tries to save prior cases in some form and muddies the waters 
even further. 
III 
¶101 Despite these concerns, I believe that circuit courts 
will wisely apply the majority's opinion in the same way that 
they apply Wis. Stat. § 767.59(1f) to payers and payees seeking 
to modify child support orders (that do not include any 
"unmodifiable" provision).  The majority's analysis relying on 
equitable estoppel and unforeseen circumstances that adversely 
affect the best interests of the child will morph into the 
statutory standards of "substantial change in circumstances" and 
"the best interests of the child." 
¶102 Nevertheless, I dissent rather than concur because the 
majority errs in its bottom line in the present case. 
No.  2010AP177.ssa 
 
14 
 
¶103 The majority claims that the circuit court applied the 
majority opinion's analysis when the circuit court applied 
equitable estoppel and denied the payer's attempt to modify the 
stipulation.  Majority op., ¶48.  Yet the circuit court did not 
know about the majority opinion's newly minted equitable power 
of the circuit court and therefore could not have applied it and 
did not apply it.   
¶104 The circuit court heard legal argument by counsel for 
both parties about whether the stipulation violated "public 
policy" 
(which 
was 
not 
defined) 
and, 
relatedly, 
whether 
equitable estoppel could apply.  Neither counsel nor the circuit 
court 
addressed 
the 
significance 
of 
any 
"unforeseen 
circumstances" that might "adversely affect the best interests 
of the child."  Although the circuit court heard counsel briefly 
summarize 
background 
facts 
that 
led 
the 
payer 
to 
seek 
modification, the circuit court did not hold a hearing to figure 
out whether there were unforeseen circumstances that adversely 
affect the best interests of the child.  The circuit court 
focused entirely on the question whether a 33-month unmodifiable 
child support floor was void as a matter of law as contrary to 
public policy, the third element of equitable estoppel.     
¶105 The circuit court carefully applied the then-existing 
equitable estoppel framework.  It concluded that the 33-month 
unmodifiable floor was not void as a matter of law, which 
satisfied the third legal element of equitable estoppel.  
Therefore, the payer could be equitably estopped from seeking 
modification of the "unmodifiable" stipulation.   
No.  2010AP177.ssa 
 
15 
 
¶106 The circuit court then announced, properly, that it 
was exercising its discretion whether to apply equitable 
estoppel in the present case and decided to apply equitable 
estoppel, but did not explain why it decided to do so, beyond 
the fact that the legal elements of equitable estoppel were 
satisfied.  The circuit court stated:  "So all the requirements 
for the application of estoppel have been met.  I exercise my 
discretion, which is the final step under [Jalovec], I exercise 
my discretion to apply the doctrine of estoppel . . . ."  
¶107 As this court often notes, a discretionary decision 
must be founded upon proper legal standards.6  In the present 
case, the circuit court simply concluded that estopping the 
payer spouse did not violate public policy "where the children's 
best interest demand that they continue to receive a certain 
amount of child support or at least a minimum level."  This 
language is reminiscent of Frisch, in which the court explained 
in a footnote that unmodifiable floors do not violate public 
policy because they "ensure[] that a certain amount of child 
support is received."7  But the circuit court's discretionary 
decision was not based on the legal standard the majority 
creates today.  The circuit court made no findings about 
unforeseen circumstances that might adversely affect the best 
interests of the child and this court cannot make any such 
findings on the basis of the record before it.   
                                                 
6 See, e.g., McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 277, 182 
N.W.2d 512 (1971). 
7 Frisch, 304 Wis. 2d 1, ¶74 n.23.   
No.  2010AP177.ssa 
 
16 
 
¶108 The majority opinion is correct that the payer has not 
demonstrated the existence of such circumstances, majority op., 
¶3, but it fails to acknowledge or realize that the payer was 
never given the opportunity to make any such demonstration 
because it was not the focus of the hearing.  Thus, under the 
reasoning of the majority opinion, the matter must be remanded 
to the circuit court to give the payer an opportunity to 
demonstrate "unforeseen circumstances" that "adversely affect 
the best interests of the child."   
¶109 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
 
 
No.  2010AP177.ssa 
 
 
 
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