Title: Harz v. Borough of Spring Lake
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: June 26, 2018

Harz v. Borough of Spring Lake Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary The issue before the New Jersey Supreme Court in this appeal centered on whether a homeowner, who challenged the issuance of a zoning permit allowing construction on neighboring property, had a statutory right to be heard before the Borough’s Planning Board, and if so, whether the violation of that right gave rise to an action under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 to -2. In 2009, the Borough of Spring Lake’s then zoning officer issued a zoning permit (First Permit) to Thomas Carter to construct a two-and-a-half-story residence. Plaintiff Mary Harz owned adjoining residential property and brought to the attention of the new Borough zoning officer her concern that Carter’s foundation exceeded the height permitted by the Borough’s zoning ordinance. The Supreme Court found that the Borough’s zoning officer did not adhere to the precise statutory procedures for processing Harz’s appeal, and the Court did not take issue with Harz’s claims that the Borough could have responded in a more efficient way to her objections. In the end, however, Harz could not establish that the Borough denied her the right to be heard before the Planning Board. She therefore could not demonstrate that she was deprived of a substantive right protected by the Civil Rights Act. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUS(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized.) Mary Harz v. Borough of Spring Lake (A-48-16) (078711)Argued January 29, 2018 -- Decided June 26, 2018ALBIN, J., writing for the Court. In this appeal, the Court considers whether a homeowner, who challenges the issuance of a zoning permit allowing construction on neighboring property, has a statutory right to be heard before the Borough’s Planning Board, and if so, whether the violation of that right gives rise to an action under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 to -2. The Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL) provisions applicable here, when viewed in their entirety, clearly indicate that the board of adjustment (or planning board acting as a board of adjustment) must conduct a review of an appeal challenging the issuance of a zoning permit and must render a decision. That much is clear because (1) an “interested party” may appeal a decision of a zoning officer to the board, and the zoning officer must transmit “all the papers constituting the record” of the appeal to the board, N.J.S.A. 40:55D- 72(a); (2) the board is empowered to “[h]ear and decide appeals,” N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(a); and (3) the board must “render a decision” within 120 days, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-73(a)(1). On December 31, 2009, the Borough of Spring Lake’s then zoning officer issued a zoning permit (First Permit) to Thomas Carter to construct a two-and-a-half-story residence. Plaintiff Mary Harz owns adjoining residential property and brought to the attention of the new Borough zoning officer her concern that Carter’s foundation exceeded the height permitted by the Borough’s zoning ordinance. On June 21, 2010, Harz’s attorney forwarded a letter to the zoning officer appealing the issuance of the zoning permit and requesting that the zoning officer transmit “the papers constituting the record” to the Planning Board, the body responsible for hearing the appeal. Instead, the zoning officer requested that Carter’s engineer and architect revise the proposed construction plans. The zoning officer did not issue a stop work order or rescind the zoning permit, but construction on the project effectively ceased. When Carter submitted revised plans, the zoning officer rejected them. On August 3, 2010, the zoning officer approved a new set of revised plans and issued an amended zoning permit (Second Permit). The next day, Harz’s attorney forwarded a letter to the zoning officer appealing from the Second Permit on the ground that Carter’s revised plans still violated the height regulations. This time the zoning officer transmitted the appeal to the Planning Board, which scheduled a hearing for the evening of August 11. Mary Harz v. Borough of Spring Lake (A-48-16) (078711) 2. On the day that the hearing was scheduled, the Board’s engineer emailed the Board and the parties an opinion letter stating that Carter’s construction plans were not in full conformance with the Borough’s land-use ordinance. The Borough attorney cancelled the hearing set for that evening, and the zoning officer rescinded the amended zoning permit. The next day, the zoning officer issued a stop work order on Carter’s project. Carter submitted revised construction plans, and on September 1, 2010, the zoning officer issued another permit (Third Permit). Harz believed that the revised plans still violated the Borough’s land-use ordinance. She filed in Monmouth County Superior Court an action seeking temporary restraints to enjoin the construction project until Carter applied for appropriate variances before the Planning Board. The Superior Court granted relief by entering a temporary restraining order. Harz appealed to the Planning Board through the zoning officer, challenging the issuance of the most recent permit. In response to the appeal, the Planning Board conducted a three-day hearing in October and November. On January 12, 2011, the Planning Board passed a Resolution granting in part and denying in part Harz’s appeal. The Board agreed with Harz that Carter’s plans would have resulted in a three-story home in violation of the ordinance. Accordingly, the Board rescinded the Third Permit until Carter satisfied the conditions set for the construction project. After Carter met those conditions, the zoning officer issued a final zoning permit. No appeal was taken from the issuance of that permit. On August 1, 2011, Harz filed a federal and state civil rights action against defendants Borough and Philip Kavanaugh, the initial zoning officer. The nub of Harz’s complaint is that she had to expend substantial funds to retain a lawyer and other professionals in battling the improperly issued zoning permits. She alleges that but for the stop-work injunction she secured from the Superior Court, the Borough would have continued to infringe on her right to have the Planning Board hear her appeal from the issuance of the zoning permits. The trial court granted the Borough’s and Kavanaugh’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint. The Appellate Division affirmed except as to Harz’s state civil rights claim against the Borough, which was remanded for further proceedings. The Court granted the Borough’s petition for certification. 229 N.J. 591 (2017).HELD: The Borough’s zoning officer did not adhere to the precise statutory procedures for processing Harz’s appeal, and the Court does not take issue with Harz’s claims that the Borough could have responded in a more efficient way to her objections. In the end, however, Harz has not established that the Borough denied her the right to be heard before the Planning Board. She therefore cannot demonstrate that she was deprived of a substantive right protected by the Civil Rights Act.1. N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(c) provides in part: “Any person who has been deprived of . . . any substantive rights . . . secured by the Constitution or laws of this State, . . . by a person acting under color of law, may bring a civil action.” Although the Civil Rights Act does not define substantive rights, the Court has recognized that “the term is broad in its conception,” Tumpson v. Farina, 218 N.J. 450, 473 (2014), and has looked to federal jurisprudence Mary Harz v. Borough of Spring Lake (A-48-16) (078711) 3.construing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to formulate a workable standard for identifying a substantive right under the Civil Rights Act, id. at 474-77. In doing so, the Court adopted the three-step test set forth in Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 , 340-41 (1997), id. at 475, 477, which it now refines in light of Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 , 283 (2002), for defining when a statute confers an individual substantive right. Under the refined three-step test, a court must determine: (1) whether, by enacting the statute, the Legislature intended to confer a right on an individual, Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283-84; (2) whether the right “is not so 'vague and amorphous’ that its enforcement would strain judicial competence,” Tumpson, 218 N.J. at 475 (quoting Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340-41); and (3) whether the statute “unambiguously impose[s] a binding obligation on the [governmental entity],” ibid. In addition to satisfying those three “factors,” for purposes of the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, plaintiffs must also “show that the right is substantive, not procedural.” Id. at 478. (pp. 16-22)2 In Tumpson, the Court found that the Faulkner Act conferred on the plaintiffs the substantive right of referendum -- the right to place a recently enacted ordinance before the voters for their approval or disapproval. 218 N.J. at 477-78. Given that the Clerk of the City of Hoboken had barred plaintiffs’ efforts to realize that substantive right, the only remedy then available was through the court system. Id. at 478. Therefore, under the Civil Rights Act, the plaintiffs were entitled to vindicate the right of referendum. Ibid. (pp. 22-23)3. The MLUL clearly conferred on Harz a right to be heard before the Planning Board on her appeal from the issuance of the zoning permit to her neighbor. N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(a), - 72(a), -73(a). The right to a review and decision by the Planning Board under this statutory scheme is not amorphous but rather self-evident. Additionally, the MLUL unambiguously imposes a binding obligation on the Board to provide Harz with the opportunity to be heard. Last, because an interested party’s right to be heard is inextricably tied to a party’s property rights, the MLUL right to be heard is substantive, not procedural. (pp. 23-25)4. However, the Borough never deprived Harz of her right to appeal from an adverse decision of the zoning officer or her right to be heard by the Planning Board. Nothing in the record suggests that had Harz not filed her action in Superior Court, the Planning Board would have denied her a hearing or that the prerogative-writs action was the catalyst for the hearing. For purposes of the Civil Rights Act, Harz did not exhaust the statutory process for securing her right to be heard under the MLUL. This case is unlike Tumpson, where the plaintiffs had exhausted all efforts to have the City Clerk validate their referendum. Harz never reached a dead end in her efforts to be heard, nor is there any evidence that a direct appeal to the Board would have been futile. In fact, in response to her appeal, the Planning Board conducted three days of hearings and ruled, in large measure, in favor of Harz. (pp. 25-28) REVERSED.CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE ALBIN’s opinion. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 48 September Term 2016 078711MARY HARZ, Plaintiff-Respondent, v.BOROUGH OF SPRING LAKE, a municipal corporation of the State of New Jersey; and PHILIP KAVANAUGH, Defendants-Appellants. Argued January 29, 2018 – Decided June 26, 2018 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Paul L. LaSalle argued the cause for appellants (Cleary Giacobbe Alfieri Jacobs, attorneys; Paul L. LaSalle, on the briefs). Roger J. McLaughlin argued the cause for respondent (McLaughlin, Stauffer & Shaklee, attorneys; Roger J. McLaughlin on the brief, and Jeff Thakker, of counsel and on the brief). JUSTICE ALBIN delivered the opinion of the Court. In this appeal, we must determine whether a homeowner, whochallenges the issuance of a zoning permit allowing constructionon neighboring property, has a statutory right to be heardbefore the Borough’s Planning Board, and if so, whether theviolation of that right gives rise to an action under the NewJersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 to -2. 1 Plaintiff Mary Harz filed a lawsuit under the Civil RightsAct against defendants Borough of Spring Lake and its zoningofficer. Harz claimed that a zoning permit issued to herneighbor for construction of a residence violated the Borough’sland-use ordinance and that, when she appealed, she was deniedher right to be heard before the Planning Board -- a rightrequired by provisions of the Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL). 1 See N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70; -72(a). In her lawsuit, she contendsthat the denial of that statutory right contravened asubstantive right protected by the Civil Rights Act, entitlingher to relief. The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summaryjudgment and dismissed Harz’s civil rights claim. The AppellateDivision reversed, concluding that the Borough violated asubstantive right -- Harz’s statutory right of “obtaining aboard’s review of an alleged zoning violation.” Based on the summary judgment record, we cannot concludethat the Borough denied Harz a substantive right cognizableunder the Civil Rights Act. The record does not support a1 The board of adjustment typically has the authority to “[h]ear and decide” appeals taken from the decisions of zoning officers. See N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(a). However, in certain municipalities, such as the Borough of Spring Lake, the planning board exercises the functions of the board of adjustment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-25(c). 2 finding that the Borough blocked Harz from eventually securing atimely review by the Planning Board. More specifically, Harzdid not exhaust the administrative means available under theMLUL to have her objections heard by the Board. Although the Borough’s zoning officer did not adhere to theprecise statutory procedures for processing Harz’s appeal, thatdeviation ultimately did not infringe on Harz’s right to haveher objections reviewed by the Board. Further, Harz cannot showthat her success in securing a Superior Court order imposingtemporary restraints on her neighbor’s construction was thecatalyst for the Board providing her a three-day hearing. ThePlanning Board scheduled that hearing after Harz filed an appealin the ordinary course under the MLUL. We do not take issue with Harz’s claims that the Boroughcould have responded in a more efficient way to her objections.In the end, however, Harz has not established that the Boroughdenied her the right to be heard before the Planning Board. Shetherefore cannot demonstrate that she was deprived of asubstantive right protected by the Civil Rights Act. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the AppellateDivision and dismiss Harz’s civil rights claim. 3 I. To understand the facts presented and issues raised in thiscase, we begin with a brief primer on the relevant MLULprovisions governing this case. The MLUL was “designed to reform the procedures for theplanning and regulation of land uses.” L. 1975, c. 291;Governor’s Statement to S. 3054 (Jan. 14, 1976). Important forour purposes is the process set forth in the MLUL for appealingfrom decisions of administrative officers, such as a zoningofficer. Typically, a zoning officer must issue a zoning permitbefore a construction official can issue a permit to anapplicant seeking to build on a lot. William M. Cox & Stuart R.Koenig, N.J. Zoning & Land Use Administration (Cox & Koenig)§ 2.8 at 16 (2018). Before issuing a permit, the zoning officermust first determine that the applicant’s intended plans for theproperty are permissible under both the zoning laws of themunicipality and the MLUL. Id. § 2.8 at 16-17.N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(a) empowers the board of adjustment to“[h]ear and decide appeals where it is alleged by the appellantthat there is error in any order, requirement, decision orrefusal made by an administrative officer based on or made inthe enforcement of the zoning ordinance.” Section 70(a) permitsappeals to a board of adjustment not only by property owners whoare denied zoning permits to build on their property, but also 4 those who are aggrieved by the issuance of such permits. SeeCox & Koenig § 26-1.1 at 559. To that end, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-72(a) specifically providesthat “[a]ppeals to the board of adjustment may be taken by anyinterested party affected by any decision of an administrativeofficer of the municipality based on or made in the enforcementof the zoning ordinance.” (emphasis added). The MLUL broadlydefines an “interested party” as “any person, whether residingwithin or without the municipality, whose right to use, acquire,or enjoy property is or may be affected by any action takenunder [the MLUL],” “in an administrative proceeding before amunicipal agency.” N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4 (emphasis added). Aninterested party clearly includes a neighbor who is affected “bythe grant of a building permit that will result in a structure[on adjacent property] that violates the zoning ordinance.” Cox& Koenig § 26-1.1 at 559.N.J.S.A. 40:55D-72(a) also sets forth the timeframe andprocess for filing an appeal to the board of adjustment and theobligation of the administrative officer to transmit the appeal: Such appeal shall be taken within 20 days by filing a notice of appeal with the officer from whom the appeal is taken specifying the grounds of such appeal. The officer from whom the appeal is taken shall immediately transmit to the board all the papers constituting the record upon which the action appealed from was taken. 5 Section 72(a) does not specify the event that triggers thecommencement of the twenty-day limitations period. See Trenkampv. Township of Burlington, 170 N.J. Super. 251, 267 (Law Div.1979). In the case of an applicant who receives direct noticeof the denial of a zoning permit, the notice appears to be theobvious trigger. However, because no provision requires theadministrative officer to notify a nearby property owner aboutthe issuance of a zoning permit, the property owner may not knowof the official action until well beyond the twenty-daylimitations period. See Cox & Koenig § 26-1.2 at 560. In thatcircumstance, courts have taken the sensible position that “thetime for appeal begins to run from the date an interested personknew or should have known of the permit’s issuance.” Trenkamp,170 N.J. Super. at 268; see also Sitkowski v. Zoning Bd. ofAdjustment of Lavalette, 238 N.J. Super. 255, 260 (App. Div.1990). Two other procedural requirements are imposed by the MLULupon the filing of a zoning appeal. First, “[t]he board ofadjustment shall render a decision not later than 120 days afterthe date . . . an appeal is taken from the decision of anadministrative officer.” N.J.S.A. 40:55D-73(a)(1).2 Second,2 In the case of an “applicant,” the board’s failure “to render a decision within such 120-day period,” absent the applicant’s consent, “shall constitute a decision favorable to the applicant.” N.J.S.A. 40:55D-73(b). An “applicant” is “a 6 “[a]n appeal to the board of adjustment shall stay allproceedings in furtherance of the action in respect to which thedecision appealed from was made unless” the administrativeofficer certifies that a stay would “cause imminent peril tolife or property.” N.J.S.A. 40:55D-75. The statutory languageis less than clear about whether the filing of the appeal staysthe effect of a zoning permit without the issuance of a separatestop work order. However, commentators have opined that“[p]resumably a timely appeal by a neighbor would, under thissection, stay the right to build pursuant to the permit granteduntil its validity could be ruled on by the zoning board ofadjustment.” Cox & Koenig § 26-1.5 at 562. The applicable MLUL provisions, when viewed in theirentirety, clearly indicate that the board of adjustment (orplanning board acting as a board of adjustment) must conduct areview of an appeal challenging the issuance of a zoning permitand must render a decision. That much is clear because (1) an“interested party” may appeal a decision of a zoning officer tothe board, and the zoning officer must transmit “all the papersconstituting the record” of the appeal to the board, N.J.S.A.40:55D-72(a); (2) the board is empowered to “[h]ear and decidedeveloper submitting an application for development.” N.J.S.A. 40:55D-3. 7 appeals,” N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(a); and (3) the board must “rendera decision” within 120 days, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-73(a)(1). The nature and extent of the board’s review or any hearingis not the issue before us. II. The relevant facts are adduced from the summary judgmentrecord. On December 31, 2009, the Borough of Spring Lake’s thenzoning officer issued a zoning permit (First Permit) to ThomasCarter to construct a two-and-a-half-story residence and adetached garage on property he owns in the Borough. PlaintiffMary Harz owns adjoining residential property and was unaware ofthe issuance of the permit at the time. In the late spring of2010, after construction began on Carter’s residence, Harzobserved that the structure’s foundation appeared to be toohigh. Harz then reviewed the development plans on file at theSpring Lake Zoning Office and brought to the attention of thenew Borough zoning officer her concern that Carter’s foundationexceeded the height permitted by the Borough’s zoning ordinance.Unsatisfied with the zoning officer’s responses, Harz retainedan attorney. On June 21, 2010, Harz’s attorney forwarded a letter to thezoning officer appealing the issuance of the zoning permit. Theletter alleged that the construction plans for Carter’s property 8 allowed for an impermissible elevation of the property, improperretaining walls, and an excessive height of the building inviolation of various provisions of the Borough’s land-useordinance. The letter further requested that the zoning officertransmit “the papers constituting the record” to the PlanningBoard, the body responsible for hearing the appeal. Instead of transmitting the appeal to the Planning Board,the zoning officer requested that Carter’s engineer andarchitect revise the proposed construction plans. Carter’sattorney gave “verbal assurances” to Harz’s attorney thatconstruction would not proceed until the zoning officer approvedthe revised plans. The zoning officer did not issue a stop workorder or rescind the zoning permit, as requested by Harz, butevidently construction on the project effectively ceased. When Carter submitted revised plans, the zoning officerrejected them, specifying that the plans’ shortcomings wouldhave to be addressed before the issuance of an amended permit.On August 3, 2010, the zoning officer approved a new set ofrevised plans and issued an amended zoning permit (SecondPermit). The next day, Harz’s attorney forwarded a letter to thezoning officer appealing from the Second Permit on the groundthat Carter’s revised plans still violated the Borough’s heightregulations. This time the zoning officer transmitted the 9 appeal and all relevant documents to the Planning Board, whichscheduled a hearing for the evening of August 11. Two daysbefore the hearing, Harz’s engineer forwarded a letter to theBoard’s engineer, identifying parts of the construction plansthat violated the Borough’s land-use ordinance. On the day that the hearing was scheduled, the Board’sengineer emailed the Board and the parties an opinion letterstating that Carter’s construction plans were not in fullconformance with the Borough’s land-use ordinance. The Boroughattorney cancelled the hearing set for that evening, and thezoning officer rescinded the amended zoning permit. The nextday, the zoning officer issued a stop work order on Carter’sproject. Carter submitted revised construction plans, and onSeptember 1, 2010, the zoning officer issued another permit(Third Permit). Harz believed that the revised plans stillviolated the Borough’s land-use ordinance. She did not proceedwith a direct appeal to the Planning Board, pursuant to N.J.S.A.40:55D-72(a). Instead, she filed in Monmouth County SuperiorCourt an Order to Show Cause and an action in lieu ofprerogative writs seeking temporary restraints to enjoin theconstruction project until Carter applied for appropriatevariances before the Planning Board. On September 7, theSuperior Court granted relief by entering a temporary 10 restraining order and directed the parties to appear for ahearing on the Order to Show Cause. On September 16, the courtentered an order continuing the temporary restraint onconstruction.3 The next day, Harz appealed to the Planning Boardthrough the zoning officer, challenging the issuance of the mostrecent permit. In response to the appeal, the Planning Board conducted athree-day hearing in October and November. On January 12, 2011,the Planning Board passed a Resolution granting in part anddenying in part Harz’s appeal. The Board agreed with Harz thatCarter’s plans would have resulted in a three-story home inviolation of the ordinance restricting the height of thestructure to two-and-a-half stories. The Borough also agreedthat the ordinance prohibited the construction of retainingwalls and the grading done on the property. The Boroughrejected, however, a number of other objections Harz raised. Accordingly, the Board rescinded the Third Permit untilCarter satisfied the conditions set by the Board for theconstruction project. On February 9, 2011, after Carter metthose conditions, the zoning officer issued a final zoningpermit.3 The record before us does not reveal the nature of any proceedings held relating to the Order to Show Cause. 11 No appeal was taken from the issuance of that permit. III. A. On August 1, 2011, Harz filed a federal and state civilrights action against defendants Borough and Philip Kavanaugh,the initial zoning officer, in the Monmouth County SuperiorCourt, Law Division. Harz brought claims under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983, alleging that defendants violated her First Amendmentright to petition the government and her right to due processand equal protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.She also brought a claim under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act,N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 to -2, alleging that defendants violated hersubstantive rights under the New Jersey Constitution and statelaws. Last, Harz alleged that defendants engaged in bothwillful misconduct by issuing the First Permit and civilconspiracy. She sought compensatory and punitive damages aswell as attorney’s fees. The nub of Harz’s complaint is that she had to expendsubstantial funds to retain a lawyer and other licensedprofessionals in battling the improperly issued zoning permits.She alleges that but for the stop-work injunction she securedfrom the Superior Court, the Borough would have continued toinfringe on her right to have the Planning Board hear her appealfrom the issuance of the zoning permits. Harz credits her 12 Superior Court complaint as the “catalyst” for vindicating herrights. The trial court granted the Borough’s and Kavanaugh’smotion for summary judgment on all of Harz’s claims anddismissed the complaint. In dismissing Harz’s state civilrights claim, which alleged a violation of her substantive rightto a hearing before the Planning Board pursuant to the MLUL, thetrial court explained: “There’s nothing in the statute whichestablished a right to a hearing on every appeal. [Harz’s]interpretation that the 'right to be heard’ means the right to ahearing is flawed. [Harz] may be 'heard’ by filing her appeal.” B. In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division affirmedthe dismissal of all of Harz’s claims, except her state civilrights claim against the Borough. The panel found that thetrial court improvidently granted summary judgment because theevidentiary record supported the basis for a violation of asubstantive right under the Civil Rights Act. That claimtherefore was remanded for further proceedings. The panel determined that, under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-72, Harzhad a substantive right to appeal the issuance of the First andSecond zoning permits. The panel maintained that the Boroughviolated that right when the zoning officer failed to transmither initial appeal to the Planning Board and later, after the 13 rescission of the Second Permit, when the Borough attorneycancelled the hearing before the Board. Relying on Tumpson v.Farina, 218 N.J. 450 (2014), the panel reasoned that “[t]hefailure to transmit a zoning appeal and the unauthorizedcancellation of a board meeting give rise to a cause of actionto compel compliance.” The panel essentially concluded thatHarz’s prerogative-writs action was the means by which Harzvindicated her substantive right to secure the “[B]oard’s reviewof an alleged zoning violation.” We granted the Borough’s petition for certificationchallenging the reinstatement of Harz’s state civil rightsclaim. 229 N.J. 591 (2017). IV. A. The Borough argues that N.J.S.A. 40:55D-72 does not conferon an “interested party,” such as Harz, the “right to a boardhearing” on an appeal challenging the issuance of a zoningpermit and therefore the Appellate Division erred in finding theviolation of a cognizable substantive right under the CivilRights Act. According to the Borough, Section 72(a) “merelysets forth a discretionary procedure by which an interestedparty can appeal a zoning permit to a board.” It submits that,even assuming that Section 72(a) confers a right to appeal to aBoard, Harz “received relief under the statute because the 14 appealed zoning permits issued to her neighbors were eitherwithdrawn (after Harz’s first Notice of Appeal) or rescinded(after Harz’s second Notice of Appeal).” In the Borough’s view,the withdrawal and rescission of the permits rendered mootHarz’s appeals to the Board. Last, the Borough contends thatthe zoning officer’s “failure to immediately transmit the recordto the Planning Board” was, at most, a procedural defect ratherthan the violation of a substantive right under the Civil RightsAct. B. Harz contends that the MLUL conferred on her thesubstantive right to a Board “hearing” on her appeal challengingthe issuance of the zoning permits. She asserts that thesubstantive right to a hearing is readily discernable from thestatutory scheme, which provides her the right to appeal thezoning officer’s decision, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-72(a), entitles herto a decision from the Planning Board, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-73(a)(1),and “vests the Board with the power to 'hear and decide theappeal, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(a).’” Harz argues that the zoningofficer did not abide by the unambiguous statutory obligation,which required that he transmit the appeal to the Board. Shefurther argues that neither the Borough attorney nor zoningofficer had the statutory authority to cancel the Board hearingafter the rescission of the Second Permit. She disputes the 15 Borough’s claim that she received relief because the first twopermits issued were, in effect, rescinded and instead insiststhat her “substantive right was to receive 'relief’ from theBoard.” Finally, Harz submits that her substantive statutoryrights were vindicated only because she filed a prerogative-writs action in Superior Court, which resulted in her receivinginjunctive relief and having her appeal heard by the Board. V. A. In determining whether the trial court properly grantedsummary judgment -- or the Appellate Division properly reversed-- we apply the same standard used by those courts: we view theevidence in the light most favorable to Harz, who was the non-moving party. See Murray v. Plainfield Rescue Squad, 210 N.J. 581, 584 (2012). Our review of the law -- both the MLUL and theCivil Rights Act -- is de novo, and we owe no deference to theinterpretive conclusions of either the trial court or AppellateDivision. Ibid. Indeed, we may review the statute “with fresheyes.” Fair Share Hous. Ctr., Inc. v. State League ofMunicipalities, 207 N.J. 489, 493 n.1 (2011). B. The core issue is whether the Borough of Spring Lakedeprived Harz of a cognizable substantive right to be heard bythe Planning Board under the MLUL in violation of the New Jersey 16 Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 to -2. In addressing thatissue, we first turn to the relevant language of the CivilRights Act. Subsection (c) of N.J.S.A. 10:6-2 provides in part: “Anyperson who has been deprived of . . . any substantive rights,privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws ofthis State, . . . by a person acting under color of law, maybring a civil action for damages and for injunctive or otherappropriate relief.” N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(c). The prevailing partyin a private cause of action under the Civil Rights Act may alsoreceive “reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.” N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(f). Indeed, the attorney’s fee provision is one of the CivilRights Act’s “most powerful remedies” because it allows averagecitizens to attract competent counsel to vindicate theirsubstantive rights when violated by official action. Tumpson,218 N.J. at 479-80. “[O]ur State Civil Rights Act is modeled off of theanalogous Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and isintended to provide what Section 1983 does not: a remedy forthe violation of substantive rights found in our StateConstitution and laws.” Id. at 474 (citing S. Judiciary Comm.Statement to S. 1558 (May 6, 2004); Governor’s Statement uponSigning A. 2073 (Sept. 10, 2004)). Although the Civil RightsAct does not define substantive rights, we have recognized that 17 “the term is broad in its conception.” Id. at 473. We havelooked to federal jurisprudence construing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 toformulate a workable standard for identifying a substantiveright under the Civil Rights Act. 4 Id. at 474-77. In doing so,we adopted the three-step test set forth in Blessing v.Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 , 340-41 (1997), id. at 475, 477, whichwe will now refine in light of Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 , 283 (2002), for defining when a statute confers anindividual substantive right. In accordance with Tumpson, the first step is determiningwhether the Legislature “intended the statute” to confer a“benefit” on an individual. 218 N.J. at 475, 477 (citingBlessing, 520 U.S. at 340-41). Gonzaga, however, emphasizedthat nothing “short of an unambiguously conferred right” willsupport a cause of action under the federal civil rights law.536 U.S. at 283. In Gonzaga, the student plaintiff filed a Section 1983lawsuit seeking damages against Gonzaga University for failing4 We note that unlike 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which protects against “the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,” the Civil Rights Act protects only against the deprivation of “substantive rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of this State,” N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(c). Tumpson, 218 N.J. at 477. In short, the Civil Rights Act does not provide a remedy for the deprivation of procedural rights. 18 to enforce provisions of the Family Educational Rights andPrivacy Act of 1974 (FERPA), a federal law that “prohibit[s] thefederal funding of educational institutions that have a policyor practice of releasing education records to unauthorizedpersons.” Id. at 276. The student contended that Gonzaga’sdisclosure of his disciplinary records to unauthorized thirdpersons violated FERPA and therefore entitled him to damagesunder Section 1983. Id. at 277. The Supreme Court determinedthat although FERPA’s nondisclosure provisions were enforceableagainst the University by the government, those provisions didnot confer on the student a privately enforceable right againstthe University. Id. at 290. The Supreme Court explained that“it is rights, not the broader or vaguer 'benefits’ or'interests,’ that may be enforced under the authority of[Section 1983].” Id. at 283. Thus, the test is “whetherCongress intended to create a federal right” enforceable by theperson directly benefitted. Id. at 283-84. Thus, in light of Gonzaga, we now recalibrate the firststep. In the three-step test, a court must determine: (1)whether, by enacting the statute, the Legislature intended toconfer a right on an individual, ibid.; (2) whether the right“is not so 'vague and amorphous’ that its enforcement wouldstrain judicial competence,” Tumpson, 218 N.J. at 475 (quotingBlessing, 520 U.S. at 340-41); and (3) whether the statute 19 “unambiguously impose[s] a binding obligation on the[governmental entity],” ibid. In addition to satisfying those three “factors,” forpurposes of our Civil Rights Act, plaintiffs must also “showthat the right is substantive, not procedural.” Id. at 478(explaining that “'[s]ubstantive’ addresses those rights andduties that may give rise to a cause of action, whereas'procedural’ addresses 'the manner and the means’ by which thoserights and duties are enforced” (citations omitted)). Becauseour description of substantive rights in Tumpson may not besufficiently precise, we use this occasion to provide additionalguidance. In essence, a substantive right is “[a] right that can beprotected or enforced by law; a right of substance rather thanform.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1437, 1438 (9th ed. 2009)(defining a procedural right, in contrast, as “[a] right thatderives from legal or administrative procedure; a right thathelps in the protection or enforcement of a substantive right”).Certain substantive rights are readily familiar to us: the“unalienable rights” of “enjoying and defending life andliberty, [and] acquiring, possessing, and protecting property,”N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 1; see also U.S. Const. amend. XIV; theright to freedom of speech and to petition the government forredress of grievances, U.S. Const. amend. I; the right to not 20 have private property taken for public use without justcompensation, U.S. Const. amend. V; and the right to be freefrom unreasonable seizures, U.S. Const. amend. IV. There aremany other substantive rights specifically mentioned in ourFederal and State Constitutions. Other substantive rights areidentified in our constitutional jurisprudence, such as: theright to privacy, In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 39-40 (1976); theright to marriage, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597-99 (2015); and the right to parental autonomy,Johnson v. Johnson, 204 N.J. 529, 543-44 (2010). Still otherrights are conferred by statute. See Rosenberg v. Town of NorthBergen, 61 N.J. 190, 199-200 (1972) (“The Legislature isentirely at liberty to create new rights or abolish old ones aslong as no vested right is disturbed.”). Here, the nature of the substantive right at issue -- aproperty right -- is clearly identifiable. The right of aninterested party to appeal the issuance of a zoning permit -- tohave her concerns “heard” -- is rooted in principles of propertyrights, specifically the right to not be deprived of an interestin one’s property without process. Thus, “any person, whetherresiding within or without the municipality, whose right to use,acquire, or enjoy property is or may be affected by any actiontaken under [the MLUL]” is an “interested party.” N.J.S.A.40:55D-4; see also N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 1 (guaranteeing right 21 to acquire, possess, and protect property). Because an adjacentproperty owner’s rights “may be affected” by construction onneighboring property, the adjacent owner -- as an interestedparty under the MLUL -- has a right to have her concerns heardin some form. C. In Tumpson, we applied the three-part Blessing test, albeitwithout the Gonzaga refinement, and found that the Faulkner Actconferred on the plaintiffs the substantive right of referendum-- the right to place a recently enacted rent control ordinancebefore the voters for their approval or disapproval. Tumpson,218 N.J. at 477-78. In that case, the Clerk of the City ofHoboken violated provisions of the Faulkner Act by refusing toaccept the plaintiffs’ referendum petition and place thechallenged ordinance on the ballot. Id. at 471-72. Havingexhausted their efforts with the City Clerk, the plaintiffsfiled an action in lieu of prerogative writs seeking suspensionof the effective date of the ordinance until the holding of areferendum. Id. at 459. They also sought relief under the NewJersey Civil Rights Act. Ibid. In applying the Blessing test, we held: first, theLegislature, through the Faulkner Act, clearly intended toconfer the right of referendum on the plaintiffs and voters ofHoboken; second, the right as enunciated in the statute was 22 neither “vague” nor “amorphous,” and its application wasstraightforward; and third, the Clerk was unambiguously requiredto accept and file the referendum petition. Id. at 477-78.Moreover, because the Clerk’s failure to file the petition gaverise to a cause of action, we determined that “by definition,the right of referendum is substantive in nature.” Id. at 478. The Clerk’s refusal to accept the referendum petitionessentially represented a dead end for the plaintiffs. Id. at486. Although the filing of a referendum petition with theClerk in Tumpson may at first glance appear to be merelyprocedural, the filing of the petition was inextricablyintertwined with the vindication of the plaintiffs’ right ofreferendum. See id. at 468-71. Given that the Clerk had barredplaintiffs’ efforts to realize that substantive right, the onlyremedy then available was through the court system. Id. at 478.Therefore, under the Civil Rights Act, the plaintiffs wereentitled to vindicate the right of referendum by securing ajudicial order placing the ordinance on the ballot for a vote bythe residents of Hoboken and to obtain the statutory relief ofattorney’s fees. Ibid. VI. A. We now apply the principles enunciated in Tumpson indetermining whether, in violation of the Civil Rights Act, the 23 Borough of Spring Lake violated Harz’s right to be heard by thePlanning Board. The MLUL clearly conferred on Harz a right to be heardbefore the Planning Board on her appeal from the issuance of thezoning permit to her neighbor -- a permit she claimed violatedthe Borough’s land-use ordinance.5 First, Harz is an “interestedparty” under the MLUL because she resides within the Borough andthe zoning officer’s issuance of the permit to the neighbor“affected” her right to use or enjoy her property. See N.J.S.A.40:55D-4; Cox & Koenig § 26-1.1 at 559 (noting that “interestedparty” includes neighbor affected “by the grant of a buildingpermit that will result in a structure that violates the zoningordinance”). Second, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-72(a) provides an“interested party,” such as Harz, the right to appeal a zoningofficer’s decision to the Planning Board, acting as a board ofadjustment. Third, on the filing of the appeal, the zoningofficer was required to “immediately transmit to the [PlanningBoard] all the papers constituting the record.” Ibid. Fourth,N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(a) empowers a board of adjustment to “[h]earand decide appeals” taken from an administrative officer, such5 This case does not present an occasion for this Court to limn the nature or the scope of such a hearing, which may depend on the mundane or unique circumstances of the matter presented to the board of adjustment or planning board. 24 as a zoning officer. Last, the Planning Board was required torender a decision on Harz’s appeal within 120 days. N.J.S.A.40:55D-73. The right to a review and decision by the Planning Boardunder this statutory scheme is not amorphous but rather self-evident. Additionally, the MLUL “unambiguously impose[s] abinding obligation on the [Board]” to provide Harz with theopportunity to be heard. See Tumpson, 218 N.J. at 475 (quotingBlessing, 520 U.S. at 340-41). Last, because an interestedparty’s right to be heard is inextricably tied to a party’sproperty rights, we find that the MLUL right to be heard issubstantive, not procedural. Moreover, it is a right that canbe enforced through an action in lieu of prerogative writs. Seeid. at 478; see also N.J.S.A. 40:55D-18 (providing that “aninterested party . . . may institute any appropriate action orproceedings to prevent” erection of unlawful structure). B. Whatever may be the nature or the scope of the right to beheard on an appeal from a zoning officer’s decision, the Boroughdid not violate a substantive right as envisaged under the CivilRights Act. The Borough never deprived Harz of her right toappeal from an adverse decision of the zoning officer or herright to be heard by the Planning Board. Certainly, after Harzfiled her appeal from the issuance of the First Permit, the 25 zoning officer should have transmitted the record to thePlanning Board, as the statute requires. The failure to do so,however, did not deprive Harz of a substantive right because shesuffered no adverseness. The zoning officer made clear toHarz’s neighbor that the current permit was no longer operativeand an amended permit would have to be issued because ofconcerns raised by Harz. The Borough was responding to Harz,even if not to her full satisfaction. Importantly, construction effectively ceased until thezoning officer issued the Second Permit. When Harz appealedfrom that permit, the zoning officer forwarded the record to thePlanning Board. Although the Board scheduled a hearing, thecancellation of that hearing did not deprive Harz of asubstantive right because -- before the hearing -- the SecondPermit was rescinded based on her objections to her neighbor’sproposed construction. In addition, the Borough entered a stopwork order halting any construction on the neighbor’s property.Again, Harz suffered no adverseness to any property right shepossessed. When the Third Permit issued, at first, Harz did notproceed with an appeal to the Planning Board pursuant toN.J.S.A. 40:55D-72(a) but instead filed a prerogative-writsaction and Order to Show Cause in Superior Court aimed atenjoining the permit. That was her right, and one contemplated 26 by N.J.S.A. 40:55D-18. Her success in obtaining a restrainingorder, however, did not signify that the Borough denied her theright to be heard. Indeed, after filing the prerogative-writsaction, she filed an appeal with the zoning officer in theordinary course. Nothing in the record suggests that had Harznot filed her action in Superior Court, the Planning Board wouldhave denied her a hearing or that the prerogative-writs actionwas the catalyst for the hearing. For purposes of the CivilRights Act, Harz did not exhaust the statutory process forsecuring her right to be heard under the MLUL. This case is unlike Tumpson, where the plaintiffs hadexhausted all efforts to have the City Clerk validate theirreferendum petition and place the challenged ordinance on theballot for a vote by the residents of Hoboken. The plaintiffsin Tumpson had reached the end of the line in seeking anadministrative remedy with the City Clerk, and it was at thatpoint that the plaintiffs were deprived of the right ofreferendum and pursued their civil rights claim in SuperiorCourt. Here, if the zoning officer had permitted constructionto proceed on Carter’s property and blocked Harz’s ability toappeal to and be heard by the Board, that scenario would be morecomparable to what plaintiffs experienced in Tumpson. But Harznever reached a dead end in her efforts to be heard by thePlanning Board, nor is there any evidence in the record that a 27 direct appeal to the Board would have been futile.6 In fact, inresponse to her appeal, the Planning Board conducted three daysof hearings and ruled, in large measure, in favor of Harz. Cast in that light, Harz did not prove that the Boroughdeprived her of the right to be heard, even under the indulgentsummary judgment standard that requires the evidence to beviewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff.7 VII. For the reasons stated above, we reverse the judgment ofthe Appellate Division, which reinstated Harz’s civil rightsclaim against the Borough, and now dismiss that claim. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE ALBIN’s opinion.6 The record does not suggest that the Borough engaged in a course of conduct to wear down Harz by repeated rescissions and reissuances of permits, rendering futile her efforts to appeal. We therefore need not address a scenario of bad faith efforts to deliberately burden an interested party’s right to appeal. 7 Given our determination that Harz does not have a state civil rights claim, we decline to reach the respondeat superior arguments about whether Harz’s claims actually lie against the municipal actors or the Borough. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 , 694 (1978) (concluding that “it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983”). Moreover, as noted by the Appellate Division, these arguments were not raised below with the trial court. 28