Title: Brondum v. Cox
Citation: 232 S.E.2d 687, 292 N.C. 192
Docket Number: 72
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: March 7, 1977

232 S.E.2d 687 (1977) 292 N.C. 192 Willa Ina BRONDUM v. Donald Alvin COX. No. 72. Supreme Court of North Carolina. March 7, 1977. *689 Rufus L. Edmisten, Atty. Gen., by Parks H. Icenhour, Asst. Atty. Gen., and David D. Ward, Associate Atty., Raleigh, for plaintiff appellant. Jordan, Wright, Nichols, Caffrey &amp; Hill, by William W. Jordan and Janet L. Covey, Greensboro, for defendant appellee. LAKE, Justice. The plaintiff instituted her action for divorce in the Family Court of Hawaii on 24 September 1973. She alleged in her complaint: "Either or each party has been domiciled or has been physically present in this State for a continuous period of at least one year and the Plaintiff has been domiciled or has been physically present in this Circuit for a continuous period of at least three months next preceding this application for divorce." The summons and complaint in that action were served upon the defendant in North Carolina by registered mail. The defendant so concedes. Thus, he had actual notice of the pendency of the proceeding in Hawaii and of the allegations of the complaint and the prayer for relief contained therein. He filed no responsive pleading and made no appearance in that action. The Hawaii court thereupon entered judgment *690 in which it "adjudged and decreed that: (1) A decree of absolute divorce is hereby granted to Plaintiff * * *. (2) Plaintiff is awarded the care, custody and control of the minor child * * * of the parties * * *. (3) The name and birth date of the minor child of the parties are as follows: * * * Noelani May Cox * * September 11, 1973." Prior to the institution of the divorce action, the defendant had left the State of Hawaii with no intent to return thereto and with the intent to make his home in North Carolina, which he did and has continued to do. He has not denied that the plaintiff wife was domiciled in the State of Hawaii at the time the divorce action was instituted by her. In the Restatement of Judgments, § 33, Comment a, it is said: In the Restatement of Conflict of Laws, 2d, § 72, it is stated: Clearly, under the circumstances of this case, the State of Hawaii had jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiff's divorce action and to grant her the divorce prayed for. This part of the Hawaii judgment must, therefore, be given full faith and credit by the courts of North Carolina. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 63 S. Ct. 207, 87 L. Ed. 279 (1942). Defendant does not, in the present proceeding, deny the validity of the Hawaii divorce as such. Again, "A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction to determine the custody" of a child who is present in the state, Restatement of Conflict of Laws, 2d, § 79. Thus, the Hawaii court had jurisdiction to award the custody of Noelani May Cox to the plaintiff mother, but that is a different matter from a determination that the defendant is the father of the child and, therefore, has responsibility for her support. As an incident to the divorce decree, the Hawaii court "adjudged" the plaintiff's daughter, Noelani May Cox, the child "of the parties"; that is, the child of the defendant as she was alleged to be in the complaint served upon the defendant in North Carolina by registered mail. The question is whether the Hawaii court had jurisdiction to render this part of its judgment. If so, it too must be given full faith and credit by the courts of North Carolina, otherwise not. In the divorce action the Hawaii court did not have jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. At the time that action was instituted, the defendant was not domiciled in or physically present in the State of Hawaii. Hawaii Revised Statutes, § 580-3.5, provides: *691 Since the defendant was not domiciled in Hawaii at either of the times so specified in the statute, a judgment in personam could not properly be entered against him by the Hawaii court in the plaintiff's action for divorce. Thus, if the adjudication that Noelani May Cox is the child of the defendant was a judgment in personam, that portion of the Hawaii judgment is void for want of jurisdiction and is not entitled to full faith and credit in the courts of this State. If, on the other hand, this adjudication was a judgment in rem, the Hawaii court did have jurisdiction to render it and it must be given full faith and credit in the courts of North Carolina. This portion of the judgment rendered by the Hawaii court was an adjudication of the status of the child in relation to the defendant. Obviously, by virtue of the allegations of the complaint and the prayer for relief contained therein, the defendant had actual notice that the question of the child's status in relation to him was before the Hawaii court for determination and had ample opportunity to be heard in that court in opposition to the contention of the plaintiff with reference thereto. A judgment rendered by a court having jurisdiction to do so estops the parties to the action "as to all issuable matters contained in the pleadings, including all material and relevant matters within the scope of the pleadings, which the parties, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, could and should have brought forward." Bruton v. Light Co., 217 N.C. 1, 6 S.E.2d 822 (1940). This well established rule has been applied in other jurisdictions to determinations of paternity in divorce proceedings in which the husband and alleged father did not appear or did not contest his paternity of the child. Garcia v. Garcia, 148 Cal. App. 2d 147, 306 P.2d 80 (1957); Peercy v. Peercy, 154 Colo. 575, 392 P.2d 609 (1964); Farmer v. Farmer, 177 Kan. 657, 281 P.2d 1075 (1955); Byrd v. Travelers Insurance Co., 275 S.W.2d 861 (Tex.Civ.App.1955). In our opinion, this is a correct application of the rule. Thus, if the Hawaii court had jurisdiction to determine the status of the child in relation to the defendant, its determination thereof would be binding upon the defendant in the courts of this State, notwithstanding his failure to appear and to contest the issue of paternity. Nothing else appearing, the liability of a man for the support of a child born to his wife and conceived during coverture may be determined in and as an incidental feature of an action brought by the wife for divorce in a court having jurisdiction to grant such divorce. However, the right to support is the right of the child, and the mother's action for a divorce can confer upon the court no greater jurisdiction to determine the status of the child in relation to the husband than would an action brought by the child to establish such status. In Hartford v. Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles, 47 Cal. 2d 477, 304 P.2d 1 (1956), an illegitimate child domiciled in California sued for a declaration that the defendant, domiciled in New York, was his father, the mother of the child being dead. The summons and complaint in the California action were served upon the defendant by publication and by personal service in New York. The defendant moved to quash the service, which motion the trial court denied. On appeal the Supreme Court of California reversed, saying through Justice Traynor: In Watkins v. Watkins, 194 Tenn. 621, 254 S.W.2d 735 (1953), the court held that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is essential to a judgment on a motion by the wife in a divorce action to determine the status of her children for the purpose of their future support in the event the husband should return to the jurisdiction of the court. In Neill v. Ridner, 153 Ind.App. 149, 286 N.E.2d 427 (1972), the court said that a paternity action is an action in personam. To the same effect see, In Re Hindi, 71 Ariz. 17, 222 P.2d 991 (1950) and State v. Murphy, 354 S.W.2d 42 (Mo.App., 1962). In a lengthy note entitled "Developments in the Law-State Court Jurisdiction," in 73 Harv.L.Rev. 909, at page 979, it is said: A judgment establishing the status of paternity necessarily fixes upon the adjudicated father a personal obligation for the support of the minor child. We, therefore, conclude that such judgment is one in personam and can be rendered only by a court having jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. It would, of course, be true that the order of the Hawaii court purporting to fix the amount which the defendant must pay for the support of his alleged minor child is a judgment in personam which the courts of this State are not required to give full faith and credit since the Hawaii court did not have jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Since the Hawaii court's adjudication of paternity, if given full faith and credit, is a final determination of the defendant's personal liability, though the amount to be paid remains undetermined, we conclude that it also is an adjudication in personam. It follows that the courts of this State are not required to give full faith and credit to the determination by the Family Court of Hawaii that the defendant is the father of Noelani May Cox. In the present action brought under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, G.S. Chapter 52A, the issue of paternity may be relitigated and, in that relitigation, the defendant is entitled to an order directing that the mother and child submit to a blood grouping test as provided in G.S. 8-50.1. If it be determined that the defendant is the father of the child, the duty of support is that provided in G.S. 52A-8. We find no error in the judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the denial by the District Court of the defendant's motion for a blood grouping test and his motion for a trial by jury. AFFIRMED.