Title: In re O.W.D.A.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 397A19
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: November 20, 2020

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
No. 397A19  
Filed 20 November 2020 
IN THE MATTER OF: O.W.D.A. 
 
On writ of certiorari pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-32(b) to review an order entered 
on 15 August 2019 by Judge C.W. McKeller in District Court, Henderson County. 
This matter was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 7 October 2020 
but determined on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) 
of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
 
Deputy County Attorney Sara H. Player for petitioner-appellee Henderson 
County Department of Social Services. 
 
Michelle FormyDuval Lynch, for appellee Guardian ad Litem. 
 
Edward Eldred for respondent-appellant father. 
 
 
HUDSON, Justice. 
 
 
Respondent-father appeals from the trial court’s order terminating his 
parental rights to O.W.D.A. (Owen).1 After careful review, we affirm. 
At Owen’s birth in February 2017, his mother tested positive for oxycodone, 
amphetamines, 
and 
methamphetamines, 
and 
Owen 
tested 
positive 
for 
                                            
1 A pseudonym is used in this opinion to protect the juvenile’s identity and for ease of 
reading. 
IN RE O.W.D.A. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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amphetamines and methamphetamines. Consequently, the mother agreed to a safety 
plan where she would be supervised with Owen by the maternal grandparents.  
The Henderson County Department of Social Services (DSS) filed a petition on 
6 July 2017 alleging that Owen was a neglected juvenile. At the time DSS filed the 
petition, the mother was unemployed and did not have stable housing for herself and 
Owen other than in the maternal grandparents’ home. DSS stated that respondent-
father was in jail due to a probation violation, was unemployed, and had no stable 
income. Respondent-father admitted to having an extensive criminal history which 
included convictions for obtaining property by false pretenses, fraud, larceny, and 
drug-related offenses. Additionally, respondent-father admitted to using heroin and 
methamphetamine prior to and since Owen’s birth.  
At the time of the adjudicatory hearing on 21 December 2017, Owen was in a 
kinship placement with the maternal grandparents. On 7 February 2018, the trial 
court entered the consent order in which it adjudicated Owen a neglected juvenile. 
The trial court entered a separate dispositional order on the same day, and DSS was 
granted legal custody of Owen.  
Following hearings held on 8 November and 13 December 2018, the trial court 
entered a review order on 11 February 2019. The trial court made extensive findings 
regarding how both respondent-father and the mother were and were not making 
progress in the areas required by the court; ultimately, the court found that neither 
parent was making sufficient progress toward reunification, such that “[i]t is neither 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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possible nor likely that the juvenile can be returned to a parent within six months.” 
Accordingly, the trial court ordered that the primary permanent plan for the juvenile 
be adoption with a secondary permanent plan of guardianship.  
On 12 February 2019, DSS filed a petition to terminate respondent-father’s 
and the mother’s parental rights. DSS alleged that grounds existed to terminate 
respondent-father’s parental rights based on neglect and willful failure to make 
reasonable progress during the requisite period of time. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1)–(2) 
(2019). On 28 June 2019, respondent-father filed an answer in which he opposed 
termination of his parental rights. The mother relinquished her parental rights on 11 
July 2019. Following a hearing held on 25 July 2019, the trial court entered an order 
on 15 August 2019 in which it determined that grounds existed to terminate 
respondent-father’s parental rights as alleged in the petition. The trial court further 
concluded it was in Owen’s best interest that respondent-father’s parental rights be 
terminated. Accordingly, the trial court terminated his parental rights.  
On 11 September 2019, respondent-father gave timely notice of appeal 
pursuant to N.C.G.S. §§ 7A-27(a)(5) and 7B-1001(a1)(1). Respondent-father’s counsel, 
however, failed to sign the notice of appeal. On 13 February 2020, cognizant of the 
defect in the notice of appeal, respondent-father filed a petition for writ of certiorari. 
On 10 March 2020, we allowed respondent-father’s petition for writ of certiorari. 
Respondent-father argues that the trial court erred by adjudicating that 
grounds existed to terminate his parental rights. “Our Juvenile Code provides for a 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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two-step process for termination of parental rights proceedings consisting of an 
adjudicatory stage and a dispositional stage.” In re Z.A.M., 374 N.C. 88, 94 (2020) 
(citing N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-1109, -1110 (2019)). “At the adjudicatory stage, the petitioner 
bears the burden of proving by ‘clear, cogent, and convincing evidence’ the existence 
of one or more grounds for termination under section 7B-1111(a) of the General 
Statutes.” In re A.U.D., 373 N.C. 3, 5–6 (2019) (quoting N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(f) (2019)). 
We review a trial court’s adjudication of grounds to terminate parental rights “to 
determine whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent and convincing 
evidence and the findings support the conclusions of law.” In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. 388, 
392 (2019) (quoting In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 111 (1984)). “The trial court’s 
conclusions of law are reviewable de novo on appeal.” In re C.B.C., 373 N.C. 16, 19 
(2019). 
“[A]n adjudication of any single ground in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) is sufficient 
to support a termination of parental rights.” In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. at 395. We begin 
our analysis with consideration of whether grounds existed to terminate respondent-
father’s parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1). A trial court may 
terminate parental rights where it concludes the parent has neglected the juvenile 
within the meaning of section 7B-101 of the General Statutes. N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(1) (2019). A neglected juvenile is defined, in pertinent part, as a juvenile 
“whose parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker does not provide proper care, 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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supervision, or discipline; . . . or who lives in an environment injurious to the 
juvenile’s welfare . . . .” N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(15) (2019).  
Termination of parental rights based upon this statutory 
ground requires a showing of neglect at the time of the 
termination hearing or, if the child has been separated 
from the parent for a long period of time, there must be a 
showing of past neglect and a likelihood of future neglect 
by the parent. 
 
In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. 835, 843 (2016) (citing In re Ballard, 311 N.C. 708, 713–15 
(1984)). “When determining whether such future neglect is likely, the district court 
must consider evidence of changed circumstances occurring between the period of 
past neglect and the time of the termination hearing.” In re Z.V.A., 373 N.C. 207, 212 
(2019) (citing Ballard, 311 N.C. at 715). “However, this evidence of changed 
conditions must be considered in light of the history of neglect by the parents and the 
probability of a repetition of neglect.” Smith v. Alleghany Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 114 
N.C. App. 727, 732 (1994) (quoting Ballard, 311 N.C. at 714). 
Here, the trial court found that Owen was adjudicated neglected on 21 
December 2017 and noted the requirements that respondent-father was required to 
complete in order to achieve reunification. Among these requirements were that 
respondent-father refrain from substance abuse, obtain a mental health assessment 
and comply with all recommendations, including medication compliance, maintain 
stable income, obtain and maintain an appropriate residence that would be “sufficient 
and safe” for respondent-father and Owen, refrain from criminal activity, maintain 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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contact with his social worker, and complete a parenting class. The trial court also 
made the following additional findings of fact concerning the adjudication of neglect, 
respondent-father’s compliance with his case plan, and its determination that there 
would be a repetition of neglect should Owen be returned to respondent-father’s care:  
18. The essential underlying issues of the neglect 
adjudication that concerned the father were [his] abuse of 
alcohol and illegal substances as well as housing and 
employment instability. The juvenile has been in [DSS’] 
custody since he was 10 months old and, prior to entering 
[DSS’] custody, he was in a kinship placement with [his 
maternal grandparents]. The father was given the 
opportunity to work a case plan in the In-home services 
case prior to [DSS] filing a petition for neglect and did not 
work the plan sufficient to prevent custody being granted 
to [DSS]. Throughout the history of this case, the father 
tested positive for illegal substances on numerous drug 
screens even after engaging in DART treatment on two 
separate occasions. The father had a major relapse in May 
2018 
and 
was 
found 
in 
the 
possession 
of 
Methamphetamine and the implements to use the drug in 
June 2018. He is currently incarcerated for the next several 
years as a result of his criminal activity related to his 
continued use of drugs. 
 
19. The father obtained a mental health assessment with 
Family Preservation Services/Parkway on May 29, 2018, 
but failed to follow through with the recommended 
treatment. He was assigned a therapist, but never started 
therapy. By his own admission, he is not taking the 
medication prescribed by a mental health professional 
while incarcerated. 
 
20. The father has had a sporadic employment history. He 
was terminated from his employment at Asheville 
Packaging after less than a month due to being late for 
work. Prior to his incarceration, he was performing 
occasional odd jobs with a friend, but did not have stable 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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income and employment. 
 
21. The father only recently started a parenting class while 
incarcerated. He had the opportunity to take parenting 
classes during the time period that he was not incarcerated 
from December 21, 2017 to June 27, 2018 and failed to do 
so. 
 
22. Prior to his incarceration, the father was residing with 
the paternal grandfather of the juvenile. The father did not 
want the social worker to visit the home, stating that he 
was only staying there temporarily. The father also stated 
that he did not feel that the home was appropriate for the 
juvenile. This was the last residence that the father had 
prior to his incarceration and now he will be incarcerated 
for at least three years.  
 
23. The father’s progress on his case plan prior to entering 
incarceration in July 2018 was not reasonable progress 
under the circumstances towards correcting the conditions 
which led to the neglect adjudication. Although the father 
has been incarcerated on multiple occasions throughout 
the course of this case, there was a period of time from 
December 21, 2017 to June 27, 2018 when he was not 
incarcerated and could have worked his case plan and 
court-ordered requirements for reunification given to him 
at Disposition on December 21, 2017 and he failed to do so. 
 
. . . .  
 
26. The father has neglected the juvenile within the 
meaning of Chapter 7B of the General Statutes, and there 
is a probability that such neglect would recur if the 
Juvenile were to be in the care of the father. 
 
27. While the father is currently incarcerated, based upon 
the father’s lack of progress during the substantial period 
of time that he was not in custody, the Court has 
determined that the neglect of the juvenile would likely be 
repeated if the juvenile were to be placed in the father’s 
care. 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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 “Findings of fact not challenged by respondent are deemed supported by competent 
evidence and are binding on appeal.” In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 407 (2019). 
 
We first consider respondent-father’s challenge to the portion of finding of fact 
number 18 which states, in part, that “[t]he essential underlying issues of the neglect 
adjudication that concerned the father were the abuse of alcohol and illegal 
substances as well as housing and employment instability.” Respondent-father 
contends that the sole essential underlying issue of the neglect adjudication that 
related to him was his incarceration. We are not persuaded. 
 
First, respondent-father stipulated to the findings of fact and consented to 
Owen’s adjudication as a neglected juvenile. Among the trial court’s findings of fact 
were: 
12. 
The 
father 
admitted 
to 
using 
heroin 
and 
methamphetamine prior to and since the juvenile’s birth. 
The father was on probation and his probation was 
violated. He was recommended for an intensive outpatient 
program. At the time the petition was filed, the father was 
in jail and the father was likewise unemployed and had no 
stable income or housing. Father has an extensive criminal 
history including convictions for obtaining property by 
false pretenses, fraud, larceny and drug-related offenses. 
 
Respondent-father did not appeal from the trial court’s adjudicatory order and is 
bound by the doctrine of collateral estoppel from re-litigating this issue. See In re 
T.N.H., 372 N.C. at 409 (stating that because the challenged findings of fact 
concerned necessary facts that were stipulated to by the mother when the juvenile 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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was adjudicated neglected, and the mother did not appeal from the adjudicatory 
order, she was bound by the doctrine of collateral estoppel from re-litigating the 
findings of fact) (citing King v. Grindstaff, 284 N.C. 348, 356 (1973)). Respondent-
father cannot now contend that the above issues did not lead to the juvenile’s 
adjudication as neglected. Therefore, finding of fact number 12 above, which was 
stipulated to by respondent-father in the adjudication order, supports finding of fact 
number 18 in the order terminating respondent-father’s parental rights in Owen. 
Additionally, we note that the trial court’s finding stated that “[t]he essential 
underlying issues of the neglect adjudication that concerned the father were [his] 
abuse of alcohol and illegal substances as well as housing and employment 
instability.” Although it appears that the direct issues that led to the adjudication of 
neglect primarily related to the mother, the trial court was permitted to consider 
indirect issues which contributed to Owen’s neglect and removal. See In re B.O.A., 
372 N.C. 372, 381 (2019) (stating that “the trial judge in an abuse, neglect, or 
dependency proceeding has the authority to order a parent to take any step 
reasonably required to alleviate any condition that directly or indirectly contributed 
to causing the juvenile’s removal from the parental home” (emphasis added)). Thus, 
we conclude that finding number 18 is supported by clear, cogent, and convincing 
evidence. 
We next consider respondent-father’s arguments that the trial court erred by 
concluding that grounds existed pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) to terminate 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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his parental rights. Respondent-father contends the trial court erroneously relied on 
circumstances that existed twelve months prior to the termination hearing and failed 
to consider the circumstances that had changed during the intervening months. 
Relatedly, respondent-father asserts that the trial court considered only one 
circumstance that existed at the time of the hearing: his incarceration. Respondent-
father thus argues that the trial court terminated his parental rights solely because 
he was incarcerated and would remain incarcerated for several more years. 
Respondent-father cites In re N.D.A., 373 N.C. 71 (2019), and argues that “a trial 
court may not use incarceration as a sword to terminate parental rights[.]” We do not 
find his arguments persuasive. 
We first note that In re N.D.A. is distinguishable from this case. In In re N.D.A., 
the trial court concluded that grounds existed to terminate the father’s parental 
rights on the ground of neglect by abandonment. This Court stated: 
A trial court is entitled to terminate a parent’s parental 
rights in a child for neglect based upon abandonment 
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) in the event that the 
trial court finds that the parent’s conduct demonstrates a 
“wilful neglect and refusal to perform the natural and legal 
obligations of parental care and support.” We agree with 
the Court of Appeals that, “in order to terminate a parent’s 
rights on the ground of neglect by abandonment, the trial 
court must make findings that the parent has engaged in 
conduct ‘which manifests a willful determination to forego 
all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the 
child’ as of the time of the termination hearing.” 
 
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Id. at 81 (citations omitted). The father in In re N.D.A. had been incarcerated when 
DSS began its investigation relating to the juvenile, remained incarcerated when the 
juvenile was adjudicated neglected, and continued to be incarcerated for a period of 
time thereafter. Id. at 82. This Court vacated and remanded the trial court’s 
termination order upon determining that: 
the trial court’s findings of fact did not adequately support 
a determination that respondent-father’s parental rights in 
[the juvenile] were subject to termination based upon 
neglect by abandonment given the absence of any findings 
concerning respondent-father’s ability to contact petitioner 
or [the juvenile], to exercise visitation, or to pay any 
support in order to determine that his abandonment was 
willful.  
 
Id.  
Here, the trial court’s conclusion that grounds existed to terminate respondent-
father’s parental rights was not based upon neglect by abandonment. Instead, the 
trial court determined that there would be a likelihood of future neglect based upon 
respondent-father’s history of failure to comply with his case plan. In addition to 
finding that the father was incarcerated at the time of the hearing, the trial court 
also found that during the period before his incarceration respondent-father: (1) failed 
to refrain from substance abuse; (2) obtained a mental health assessment but failed 
to follow through with the recommended treatment; (3) failed to maintain stable 
employment or income; (4) failed to take parenting classes; and (5) failed to maintain 
stable housing suitable for Owen. The court considered each of these failures as 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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evidence of past neglect and the likelihood of future neglect. See In re Z.V.A., 373 N.C. 
at 211–12 (stating that if it cannot be shown whether the parent is neglecting the 
child at the time of the termination hearing because the parent and child have been 
separated, “there must be a showing of past neglect and a likelihood of future neglect 
by the parent”); see also In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. at 412–13 (recognizing that although 
“[i]ncarceration, standing alone, is neither a sword nor a shield in a termination of 
parental rights decision,” respondent-mother’s history of unstable housing and her 
failure to complete her case plan before becoming incarcerated supported the trial 
court’s conclusion to terminate her parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(9)).   
Furthermore, the trial court here did not look only at past circumstances in 
making its determination. While the trial court emphasized respondent-father’s 
failure to comply with his case plan before his incarceration, it is evident that the 
trial court also considered evidence of changed circumstances occurring during his 
incarceration, which began in late June 2018. Specifically, the trial court found and 
considered that respondent-father had started taking a parenting class and that he 
was working while incarcerated. The trial court also found and considered, however, 
that respondent-father, by his own admission, was not taking the medication 
prescribed to him for his mental health while incarcerated.  
Although a court “must consider evidence of changed circumstances occurring 
between the period of past neglect and the time of the termination hearing,” In re 
Z.V.A., 373 N.C. at 212, “evidence of changed conditions must be considered in light 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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of the history of neglect by the parents and the probability of a repetition of neglect,” 
Smith, 114 N.C. App. at 732 (quoting Ballard, 311 N.C. at 714).  Therefore, although 
respondent-father may have made some minimal progress during his most recent 
incarceration, the trial court was within its authority to weigh the evidence and 
determine that these eleventh-hour efforts did not outweigh the evidence of his 
persistent failures to make improvements while not incarcerated, and to conclude 
that there was a probability of repetition of neglect should Owen be returned to his 
care. See id. at 732 (holding that the trial court adequately considered mother’s 
improved psychological condition and living conditions at the time of the hearing even 
though it found, because of recency of improvement, that probability of repetition of 
neglect was great), disc. review denied, 337 N.C. 696 (1994); see also In re J.H.K., 215 
N.C. App. 364, 369 (2011) (“Relevant to the determination of probability of repetition 
of neglect is whether the parent has made any meaningful progress in eliminating 
the conditions that led to the removal of the children.” (cleaned up)). Taken together, 
the trial court’s findings support its conclusion that grounds existed pursuant to 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) to terminate respondent-father’s parental rights. 
The trial court’s conclusion that one statutory ground for termination existed 
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) is sufficient in and of itself to support 
termination of respondent-father’s parental rights. In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. at 395. As 
such, we need not address respondent-father’s arguments regarding N.C.G.S. § 7B-
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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1111(a)(2).2 Furthermore, respondent-father does not challenge the trial court’s 
conclusion that termination of his parental rights was in Owen’s best interest. See 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (2019). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order 
terminating respondent-father’s parental rights. 
AFFIRMED. 
                                            
2 We note respondent-father’s challenge to finding of fact 13. However, this finding of 
fact related solely to the trial court’s conclusion that grounds existed to terminate his 
parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2). Accordingly, this finding is not 
necessary to affirm the trial court’s conclusion that grounds existed under N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(1) to terminate respondent-father’s parental rights, and we therefore decline to 
address it. See In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. at 407 (“[W]e review only those findings necessary to 
support the trial court’s determination that grounds existed to terminate respondent’s 
parental rights.” (citing In re Moore, 306 N.C. 394, 404 (1982)).