Title: Ex parte State of Alabama. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CRIMINAL (In re: State of Alabama v. George Martin)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1091450
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: January 7, 2011

REL: 01/07/2011
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
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before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
_________________________
1091450
_________________________
Ex parte State of Alabama
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  State of Alabama
v.
George Martin)
(Mobile Circuit Court, CC-99-2696.60)
WOODALL, Justice.
1091450
Martin, a former State Trooper, was convicted of the 1995
1
murder of his wife, made capital because it was done for
pecuniary gain.  See § 13A-5-40(a)(7), Ala. Code 1975. The
trial court, overriding the jury's recommendation, sentenced
Martin to death.  Martin's conviction and sentence were
ultimately affirmed on direct appeal.  See Martin v. State,
931 So. 2d 774 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005).   
2
On May 6, 2010, Mobile Circuit Judge Robert Smith entered
an order granting George Martin  discovery of the entire
1
investigation file of the Mobile Police Department. The State
petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the
trial court to vacate that discovery order. See Rule 21(e)(1),
Ala. R. App. P.  The petition is denied.
The parties have been battling over discovery for several
years.  Martin filed a Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., petition in
2006 and promptly sought discovery of the prosecution's files,
which, according to the State, are "one and the same" as the
Mobile Police Department's investigation file. Petition, at 3.
Hereinafter, we will simply refer to that investigation file
as "the file."  After a hearing, the trial court granted the
motion and ordered discovery of the file.  The State then
petitioned the Court of Criminal Appeals for a writ of
mandamus.
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3
In a written opinion, the Court of Criminal Appeals
granted the State mandamus relief with regard to the discovery
of the file.  Ex parte State, 4 So. 3d 1196 (Ala. Crim. App.
2008).  Martin based his claim to discovery of the file on
allegations "that the State had violated Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to disclose [26 items of]
exculpatory evidence."  4 So. 3d at 1200.  "After a hearing,
"[t]he circuit court agreed that some of [these] claims were
procedurally barred or meritless."  Id.  Nevertheless, the
trial court granted the discovery motion and ordered
production of the file.  
The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the trial
court had not adequately considered the good-cause standard
for postconviction discovery addressed in Ex parte Land, 775
So. 2d 847 (Ala. 2000), or cases of the Court of Criminal
Appeals holding "that a petitioner is not entitled to
discovery in a Rule 32 proceeding if the discovery relates to
issues that are procedurally barred."  4 So. 3d at 1198.
Therefore, the Court of Criminal Appeals vacated the discovery
order as to the file and directed the trial court to "comply
1091450
Also, the Court of Criminal Appeals stated that "[t]he
2
circuit court may direct Martin to file a new discovery motion
given that Martin has filed an amended Rule 32 petition."  4
So. 3d at 1202.
4
with [these] cases when considering Martin's discovery
motion." 4 So. 3d at 1202.  
2
In September 2008, Martin filed an amended motion seeking
discovery of the file.  In January 2009, the trial court
entered another order granting Martin access to the file.  The
State again petitioned the Court of Criminal Appeals for a
writ of mandamus.  In resolving this second petition, the
Court of Criminal Appeals did not address the merits of the
discovery issue.  Instead, in an order issued on September 17,
2009, it held that an intervening appeal by the State of the
trial court's order granting in part Martin's Rule 32 petition
had deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to enter the
discovery order, and, for that reason, it declared the order
void and directed the trial court to set it aside.
Thereafter, in May 2010, the trial court issued another
discovery order regarding the file. The order incorporated the
January 2009 order, as well as Martin's amended discovery
motion, and found that Martin had established "good cause" and
had pleaded "facially meritorious claims."  The State then
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filed its third mandamus petition in the Court of Criminal
Appeals. On July 13, 2010, the Court of Criminal Appeals, by
order, denied the State's petition. On July 23, the State
filed its petition for a writ of mandamus in this Court.
The State's petition raises two issues.  The first is
whether the trial "court's discovery order indicate[s] that it
made an independent review of the claims in Martin's amended
motion for discovery."  Petition, at 9.  The second is whether
the trial "court abused its discretion in finding that Martin
demonstrated good cause for discovery of the ... file."
Petition, at 20.  For the reasons discussed below, we conclude
that the State is not entitled to review of the trial court's
discovery order by way of a petition for a writ of mandamus.
"'[P]ostconviction proceedings filed pursuant to Rule
32[, Ala. R. Crim. P.,] are civil proceedings.' State v.
Hutcherson, 847 So. 2d 378, 383 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001)."  Ex
parte Wright, 860 So. 2d 1253, 1254 (Ala. 2002).  Although the
State has only a limited right to appeal in a criminal case,
see Ex parte King, 23 So. 3d 77, 78-79 (Ala. 2009), the State,
pursuant to Rule 32.10(a), Ala. R. Crim. P., has the right to
1091450
"Circuit courts are vested with discretion in deciding
3
whether to grant postconviction discovery requests."  Ex parte
Perkins, 941 So. 2d 242, 245 (Ala. 2006).
6
appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals a circuit court's
decision on a Rule 32 petition. 
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, and "[t]his Court
will not issue the writ of mandamus where the petitioner has
'"full and adequate relief"' by appeal."  Ex parte Ocwen Fed.
Bank, FSB, 872 So. 2d 810, 813 (Ala. 2003) (quoting State v.
Cobb, 288 Ala. 675, 678, 264 So. 2d 523, 526 (1972), quoting
in turn State v. Williams, 69 Ala. 311, 316 (1881)). Further,
"this Court will not reverse a trial court's ruling on a
discovery issue unless the trial court has clearly exceeded
its discretion." Ocwen, 872 So. 2d at 813.   Consequently, in
3
seeking review of the trial court's discovery order by a
petition for a writ of mandamus, it would appear that the
State "has an affirmative burden to prove" that "trial court
clearly exceeded its discretion" and that the State "does not
have an adequate remedy by ordinary appeal."  Id. 
The State points out that "[t]his Court has held that
'mandamus [is] the proper avenue for appellate review of
[postconviction discovery] orders.'  Ex parte Turner, 2 So. 3d
1091450
7
806, 811 (Ala. 2008)."  Petition, at 11.  Although this is
true, the State makes no effort to explain why it does not
have an adequate remedy by appeal.  "The burden rests on the
petitioner to demonstrate that its petition presents ... an
exceptional case –- that is, one in which an appeal is not an
adequate remedy." Ocwen, 872 So. 2d at 814 (emphasis added).
Thus, if the two-part Ocwen standard applies in a case
involving postconviction discovery, the State's petition must
be denied.  We hold that that standard does apply in such a
case; therefore, we deny the State's petition.
In prior cases, this Court has not applied the Ocwen
standard in addressing mandamus petitions seeking review of
discovery orders in Rule 32 proceedings.  Land predated Ocwen
and has been relied upon in some post-Ocwen cases for the
proposition that mandamus is the proper avenue for appellate
review of discovery orders in postconviction proceedings.
See, e.g., Turner, 2 So. 3d at 810-11, and Perkins, 941 So. 2d
at 245.  However, in our post-Ocwen cases, we have never
addressed the applicability of Ocwen's two-prong standard in
cases such as this.  Our oversight in failing to apply that
standard is no excuse for a continued failure to adhere to the
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8
principles carefully crafted in Ocwen, in which "'this Court
announced that it would no longer review discovery orders
pursuant to extraordinary writs,'" Ex parte St. Vincent's
Hosp., 991 So. 2d 200, 207 (Ala. 2008)(quoting Ex parte
Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 879 So. 2d 1134, 1136-37 (Ala.
2003)), except in those exceptional cases in which the
petitioner can demonstrate that an appeal will not provide an
adequate remedy.  We see no reason these principles should not
apply to mandamus review of postconviction discovery orders.
As already mentioned, trial courts are vested with discretion
regarding postconviction discovery requests, and each party
has the right to appeal from the trial court's decision on a
Rule 32 petition.  To the extent that Land, Turner, Perkins,
and any other cases are inconsistent with this opinion, those
cases are hereby overruled.   
For these reasons, the State's petition for a writ of
mandamus is denied.
PETITION DENIED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Stuart, Smith, Bolin, Parker,
Murdock, and Shaw, JJ., concur.