Title: Murphy v. Columbus McKinnon Corp.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2020AP001124
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: December 28, 2022

2022 WI 109 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2020AP1124 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Matthew W. Murphy, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
Wisconsin Power and Light Company, 
          Involuntary-Plaintiff, 
     v. 
Columbus McKinnon Corporation, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS  
Reported at 399 Wis. 2d 18, 963 N.W.2d 837 
PDC No:2021 WI App 61 - Published  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 28, 2022   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 12, 2022   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Sauk   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael P. Screnock   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
ROGGENSACK, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined 
except for ¶¶38 and 41.  KAROFSKY, J., filed a concurring 
opinion, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY and DALLET, JJ., joined.  
HAGEDORN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting 
in part, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., 
joined.   
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Larry J. Britton, Shannon M. Trevithick, Debora F. 
Pagel, Esq., Kevin J. English, Erin E. Connare, and Britton & 
Associates, S.C., Mequon, and Phillips Lytle LLP, Buffalo. There 
was an oral argument by Kevin J. English, introduced by Shannon 
M. Trevithick.  
 
 
2 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Douglas J. Phebus, Victor M. Arellano, and Arellano & Phebus, 
S.C. There was an oral argument by Douglas J. Phebus.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Jesse B. Blocher and 
Habush, Habush, & Rottier, S.C., Waukesha, for the Wisconsin 
Association for Justice. There was an oral argument by Jesse B. 
Blocher.   
  
 
 
 
 
 
2022 WI 109 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2020AP1124 
(L.C. No. 
2016CV51) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Matthew W. Murphy, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
Wisconsin Power and Light Company, 
 
          Involuntary-Plaintiff, 
 
     v. 
 
Columbus McKinnon Corporation, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 28, 2022 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ROGGENSACK, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined 
except for ¶¶38 and 41.  KAROFSKY, J., filed a concurring 
opinion, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY and DALLET, JJ., joined.  
HAGEDORN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting 
in part, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., 
joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   We review a published 
decision of the court of appeals1 that reversed in part and 
                                                 
1 Murphy v. Columbus McKinnon Corp., 2021 WI App 61, 399 
Wis. 2d 18, 963 N.W.2d 837. 
No. 
2020AP1124   
 
2 
 
affirmed in part the circuit court's2 grant of summary judgment 
for defendant Columbus McKinnon Corporation ("CMC").  We begin 
with the common law that applied to a design defect and then 
interpret, for the first time, Wis. Stat. § 895.047 (2019-20)3 
following the legislature's creation of this state's product 
liability statute in 2011.  We then apply the statute to the 
facts of this case to affirm the court of appeals' mandate and 
remand for further proceedings.   
¶2 
In interpreting Wisconsin's product liability statute 
when the claim is for a defective design, we conclude as 
follows:  (1) Wis. Stat. § 895.047(1)(a) requires proof of a 
more safe, reasonable alternative design the omission of which 
renders the product not reasonably safe; (2) proof that the 
consumer-contemplation standard4 as set out in § 895.047(1)(b) 
(for strict liability claims for a defective design) has been 
met; and (3) proof that the remaining three factors of a 
§ 895.047(1) claim have been met.  The statute's plain language 
is clear in showing that the legislature codified the common law 
consumer-contemplation standard in § 895.047(1)(b).  We disagree 
with the court of appeals' conclusion that the legislature 
                                                 
2 The Honorable Michael P. Screnock of Sauk County, 
presided. 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2019-20 version unless otherwise indicated. 
4 The consumer-contemplation standard is sometimes referred 
to herein and in our case law as the consumer-contemplation 
test. 
No. 
2020AP1124   
 
3 
 
discarded the consumer-contemplation test by incorporating the 
risk-utility balancing test.  We also decline to adopt comment f 
of Restatement (Third) of Torts §2, upon which the court of 
appeals relied.  With a clear understanding of the requirements 
that a plaintiff must establish, and considering the multiple 
genuine disputes of material fact, which we explain below, we 
affirm the court of appeals in reversing summary judgment and 
remand to the circuit court for further proceedings. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
As a society, we owe a great deal to those who ensure 
electricity 
reaches 
our 
homes, 
work 
places, 
and 
public 
institutions.  But that electricity reaches us, thanks in large 
part, due to the utility line technicians who perform a 
dangerous job.  The United States Bureau of Labor Statistics 
recorded 2,310 nonfatal occupational injuries and illnesses for 
electrical 
power-line 
installers 
and 
repairers 
in 
2013.5  
Plaintiff Matthew Murphy, a line technician for Wisconsin Power 
& Light Company,6 was one of those injured workers, sustaining 
substantial injury after a thirty-foot utility pole fell, 
struck, and came to rest atop him while Murphy attempted to load 
                                                 
5 Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Injuries 
and Illnesses of Line Installers and Repairers (Feb. 28, 2018), 
https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2018/injuries-and-illnesses-of-
line-installers-and-repairers.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 2022). 
6 Murphy "held the positions of Line Technician Apprentice, 
Line Technician, and Technical Assistant."  R. 44 at 52 
(Wisconsin Power & Light Company Response to Interrogatory No. 
15). 
No. 
2020AP1124   
 
4 
 
used utility poles from the ground onto a trailer bed on May 14, 
2013.7  
¶4 
Utility workers lift poles using a truck-mounted boom 
featuring a winch, to which workers fix tongs that attach to the 
pole to enable secure lifting.  Murphy's employer, Wisconsin 
Power and Light Company (WPL), provided regular training to its 
linemen regarding the appropriate procedure for attaching tongs.  
At least two styles of tongs were regularly on the trucks at the 
time of Murphy's injury, including:  "Dixie" style tongs and 
"Hogg-Davis" jaw-style tongs.  Dixie tongs resemble old-
fashioned ice tongs, and are attached by placing a pointed prong 
on either side of the pole.  Once the tongs are lifted upward, 
Dixie tongs close in a manner akin to scissors, and the force of 
upward lifting typically draws the points further into the pole 
against which the tongs are placed.  Different from the two-
prong Dixie tongs, Hogg-Davis jaw-style tongs feature multiple 
(often three) teeth along the inside of each side of the tongs.  
Jaw-style tongs clamp around the pole, providing six surfaces to 
contact the pole during lifting.   
¶5 
When an individual lifts poles alone, line technicians 
are trained to attach the lifting tongs to the winch and then to 
the pole.  Placement on the pole is paramount, and line 
                                                 
7 On the day of the accident, Murphy's "original job 
assignment 
was 
to 
string 
wire 
at 
a 
different 
location. . . .  Plaintiff's work assignment changed to pick up 
poles that had been removed from the ground and left lying to 
the side of Golf Course Road."  R. 44 at 52 (Wisconsin Power & 
Light Company Response to Interrogatory No. 16).   
No. 
2020AP1124   
 
5 
 
technicians must be aware of two critical points for proper tong 
placement:  (1) the balance point relative to the length of the 
pole; 
and 
(2) the 
attachment 
point 
as 
relative 
to 
the 
circumference of the pole.  Regarding the balance point, line 
technicians are trained to place the lifting implement slightly 
off of the balance point so that the higher "light" end is 
toward the lineman.  This placement prevents unpredictable 
teetering in a pole lifted at the exact balance point, and it 
ensures the lineman can push down on the higher end of a 
slightly-askew pole, rather than lift up on the lower end.  
Because poles are typically tapered, the balance point is not 
necessarily in the exact middle of the pole.  As for the 
attachment point on the circumference, the tongs should grasp 
the lower third of the pole's circumference, as viewed by cross-
section, to prevent slipping or falling that is more likely to 
occur from attachment nearer to the middle or top-third points.   
¶6 
After selecting and attaching the desired tongs, line 
technicians are trained to follow certain protocol while loading 
poles from the ground onto a trailer bed.  They are trained to 
perform a test lift to ensure the lifting implement does not 
slip or otherwise fail, and to test the attachment point.8  Line 
technicians then lower and make adjustments to the tongs' 
positioning, as needed.  Having verified the tongs are attached 
securely and at the appropriate placement, line technicians then 
raise the hoist high enough to clear the sides of the truck bed.   
                                                 
8 Test lifts entail lifting the hoist anywhere from six 
inches to two feet. 
No. 
2020AP1124   
 
6 
 
¶7 
Accordingly, line technicians must lift the pole at 
least somewhat higher than six feet to ensure both ends of the 
pole clear the side rails of the truck.  They are trained not to 
lift the hoist "above the lineman's head."  They are similarly 
trained not to stand under suspended poles, or to raise a load 
overhead.  However, line technicians must remain in close 
proximity to the suspended poles, as they are trained to "right" 
an askew pole by placing downward pressure on the upper end to 
ensure the pole remains relatively horizontal to the ground.  
¶8 
While ideally line technicians work in pairs to 
perform this task, utility companies acknowledge this is not 
always feasible, and they also have trained them for independent 
work.  Line technicians have the option to wear a waist belt 
that can remotely control the hoist.  This device allows line 
technicians to operate both the boom and winch, as well as place 
as-needed pressure to right a pole.  
¶9 
Murphy 
had 
worked 
as 
a 
line 
technician 
for 
approximately six years and had loaded and unloaded utility 
poles numerous times.  On the date of his injury, Murphy and a 
colleague worked as a pair to load used utility poles from the 
side of the road to a trailer.  However, due to the poles' 
location, the pair decided to bring the utility poles to the 
location of the boom and hoist truck.  As Murphy's coworker 
dragged poles toward Murphy with one truck, Murphy independently 
loaded poles onto a trailer using a waist belt and a separate 
truck with the boom.  Murphy attached Dixie tongs to an old, 
No. 
2020AP1124   
 
7 
 
weathered, hard pole.  Once hoisted in the air, the pole came 
loose from the tongs and struck Murphy, injuring him severely.  
¶10 Murphy has no recollection of the accident due to his 
injuries; his coworker did not witness the accident as he was 
moving a truck.  The only two eyewitnesses were drivers waiting 
for Murphy's colleague to move the truck out of the way to 
reopen traffic after dragging a pole to Murphy.  
¶11 The Dixie tongs Murphy used on the date of his 
accident were manufactured by defendant CMC.  CMC is aware line 
technicians use the Dixie tongs to lift poles, and it marketed 
the tongs as "pole tongs" in its own advertisements.  Murphy's 
employer purchased the Dixie tongs intending to use them to lift 
poles.  Murphy brought a products liability lawsuit against CMC 
alleging both strict product liability for a design defect under 
Wis. Stat. § 895.047(1), relying on the Hogg-Davis jaw-style 
design as providing a more safe alternative design, and as 
support for a common law claim of negligent design.9  
                                                 
9 Initially, Murphy also alleged strict product liability 
claims on the theory of failure to warn and, in addition to the 
alternative design of "Hogg-Davis" jaw-style tongs, a second 
alternative choker-style design.  Additional defendants included 
CM Hydraulic Tool Supply, Inc., from whom Murphy's employer 
purchased the CMC "Dixie" tongs, and CM Hydraulic's insurer, 
United Fire & Casualty.  Murphy's former employer, Wisconsin 
Power and Light Company, is an involuntary plaintiff in this 
lawsuit.  In September 2018, Murphy, CM Hydraulic, and United 
Fire settled for an undisclosed amount.  Murphy confirmed his 
withdrawal of the failure to warn claim at a hearing for summary 
judgment on December 10, 2018.  The court of appeals confirmed 
Murphy "concedes through silence that he has forfeited and 
abandoned argument based on this purported alternative [choker-
style] design."  Murphy, 399 Wis. 2d 18, ¶14.  The issue of 
choker-style tongs was not raised with this court, so we, too, 
No. 
2020AP1124   
 
8 
 
¶12 Following over two years of discovery, CMC moved for 
summary judgment.  Finding genuine disputes of material fact, 
the circuit court denied summary judgment and recommended the 
parties reconvene with their experts to resolve unanswered 
questions.  Four months later, the court denied summary judgment 
again, reasoning the persistent factual disputes and difficulty 
in allocating fault did not allow for summary judgment on 
Murphy's claims or on CMC's defenses.  The parties set a trial 
date 
for 
April 
2020. 
 
Faced 
with 
delaying 
the 
trial 
significantly due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the circuit court 
sua sponte reconsidered CMC's motion for summary judgment at a 
hearing on motions in limine and granted summary judgment for 
CMC.  Murphy appealed. 
¶13 The court of appeals reversed in part and affirmed in 
part.  Agreeing with the circuit court that there was 
insufficient evidence to support Murphy's second alternative 
choker-design theory, the court of appeals affirmed summary 
judgment on that claim in favor of CMC.  Regarding the primary 
alternative 
design 
theory 
of 
Hogg-Davis 
jaw-style 
tongs, 
however, the court of appeals concluded there were genuine 
disputes of material fact, and reversed summary judgment.10  
Lastly, the court of appeals acknowledged that multiple genuine 
                                                                                                                                                             
treat the second alternative design theory as abandoned. 
10 CMC also raised a question regarding admissibility of 
expert witness testimony on review, which it did not raise at 
the court of appeals.  As this question does not properly appear 
before us, we decline to address it, as is our prerogative.  
State v. Mark, 2006 WI 78, ¶11, 292 Wis. 2d 1, 718 N.W.2d 90. 
No. 
2020AP1124   
 
9 
 
disputes of material fact precluded it from apportioning 
negligence to affirm summary judgment for CMC or from addressing 
CMC's other fact-specific defenses.  CMC sought review before 
us, which we granted.   
II.  DISCUSSION  
A.  Standard of Review 
¶14 This 
case 
presents 
a 
question 
of 
statutory 
interpretation, which we independently decide.  Andruss v. 
Divine Savior Healthcare Inc., 2022 WI 27, ¶24, 401 Wis. 2d 368, 
973 N.W.2d 435.   
¶15 CMC asks us to reinstate the circuit court's grant of 
summary judgment in its favor.  We review summary judgment 
independently.  In so doing, we decide whether there are genuine 
issues of material fact, but we do not resolve any disputed 
factual issues.  Id., ¶¶40, 42.  Essentially, we apply the same 
methodology as the circuit court, although we benefit from the 
decisions of both the circuit court and the court of appeals.  
Butler v. Advanced Drainage Sys., Inc., 2006 WI 102, ¶17, 294 
Wis. 2d 397, 717 N.W.2d 760.   
B.  Development of Wisconsin's Product Liability Law 
¶16 In resolving the issues raised in this case, we review 
the 
development 
of 
Wisconsin's 
product 
liability 
law 
as 
established in the common law and the parties' positions 
regarding 
the 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 895.047(1), 
followed by our statutory interpretation.   
No. 
2020AP1124   
 
10 
 
1.  Common Law11 
¶17 As we begin, we note that the better part of the last 
century featured changes to the landscape of strict product 
liability.  Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 449, 155 N.W.2d 55 
(1967).  While at one point an injured person needed to 
demonstrate privity of contract to establish liability, United 
States jurisdictions, including Wisconsin, dispensed with that 
requirement decades ago.  Id. at 450.  As we moved away from 
grounding defective product claims in contract, we established 
manufacturer and supplier liability in negligence——in tort.  Id. 
at 451-52, relying on Cohan v. Associated Fur Farms, Inc., 261 
Wis. 584, 589, 53 N.W.2d 788 (1952) and Smith v. Atco Co., 6 
Wis. 2d 371, 383-84, 94 N.W.2d 697 (1959).12   
¶18 In Dippel, we voiced a desire to move more slowly in 
developing our products liability law than other jurisdictions.  
Dippel, 37 Wis. 2d at 453.  But, in the absence of statutory 
guidance, we adopted a rule of strict liability in accord with 
                                                 
11 "Common law" has been defined as "The body of law derived 
from judicial decisions."  Black's Law Dictionary 293 (8th ed. 
2004). 
12 Smith v. Atco Co., 6 Wis. 2d 371, 383-84, 94 N.W.2d 697 
(1959) ("The question of liability should be approached from the 
standpoint of the standard of care to be exercised by the 
reasonably prudent person in the shoes of the defendant 
manufacturer or supplier.  Such an approach will eliminate any 
necessity of determining whether a particular product is 
'inherently dangerous.'  If a manufacturer or supplier is 
hereafter to be relieved from liability as a matter of law by 
the courts, such result should be reached on the basis that 
there was no causal negligence established against the defendant 
rather than that the product was not inherently dangerous."). 
No. 
2020AP1124   
 
11 
 
that set forth in § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
(Am. Law Inst. 1965).  Id. at 453, 458-59, 462.13  Section 402A 
states: 
(1)  One 
who 
sells 
any 
product 
in 
a 
defective 
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or 
consumer or to his property is subject to liability 
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user 
or consumer, or to his property, if 
(a) The seller is engaged in the business of 
selling such a product, and 
(b) It is expected to and does reach the user or 
consumer 
without 
substantial 
change 
in 
the 
condition in which it is sold. 
(2)  The 
rule 
stated 
in 
Subsection 
(1) 
applies 
although 
(a) The seller has exercised all possible care in 
the preparation and sale of his product, and 
(b) The user or consumer has not bought the 
product from or entered into any contractual 
relation with the seller.  
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A.  
¶19 By adopting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, we 
set out five requirements that a plaintiff must prove to prevail 
in a strict liability products claim.14  Id. at 460.  At the same 
                                                 
13 "Strict liability in tort for the sale of a defective 
product unreasonably dangerous to an intended user or consumer 
now arises in this state by virtue of a decision of this court 
[as opposed to by statute]."  Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 
462, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967). 
14 "From a reading of the plain language of the rule, the 
plaintiff must prove (1) that the product was in defective 
condition when it left the possession or control of the seller, 
(2) that it was unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer, 
(3) that the defect was a cause (a substantial factor) of the 
plaintiff's injuries or damages, (4) that the seller engaged in 
No. 
2020AP1124   
 
12 
 
time, we acknowledged available defenses of assumption of risk 
and contributory negligence when a plaintiff failed to exercise 
reasonable care.  Id. at 459-60.  We also acknowledged that the 
product must be "reasonably used for the purpose for which it 
was intended," and that the "abuse or alteration of the product 
may relieve or limit liability."15  Id. at 460.   
                                                                                                                                                             
the business of selling such product or, put negatively, that 
this is not an isolated or infrequent transaction not related to 
the principal business of the seller, and (5) that the product 
was one which the seller expected to and did reach the user or 
consumer without substantial change in the condition it was when 
he sold it."  Id. at 460. 
15 However, 
by 
keeping 
traditional 
defenses 
such 
as 
comparative negligence in adopting Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 402A, Wisconsin did not wholesale adopt strict liability.  
Rather, as one justice proclaimed, this court merely adopted a 
manner to establish "negligence as a matter of law and such 
negligence is subject to the ordinary rules of causation and the 
defense applicable to negligence.  While the [Restatement of 
Torts (Second) § 402A], imposes a strict or absolute liability 
regardless of the negligence of the seller, we do not."  Id. at 
464 (Hallows, J., concurring) (underscored sentence adopted in 
Schuh v. Fox River Tractor Co., 63 Wis. 2d 728, 735, 218 N.W.2d 
279 (1974)).  By establishing the requisite elements in § 402A, 
a Wisconsin plaintiff was "relieved of the burden of proving 
specific acts of negligence by the manufacturer who is then 
deemed negligent per se."  Vincer v. Esther Williams All-
Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 69 Wis. 2d 326, 330, 230 N.W.2d 794 
(1975). 
See also, Greiten v. La Dow, 70 Wis. 2d 589, 600 n.1, 235 
N.W.2d 677 (1975) (Heffernan, J. concurring), dismissing the 
language in Arbet v. Gussarson, 66 Wis. 2d 551, 555-56, 225 
N.W.2d 431, that suggests § 402A merely shifted the burden of 
negligence (stating, "Under this doctrine [of strict products 
liability], where plaintiff shows that a manufacturer markets a 
product in a 'defective condition' which is 'unreasonably 
dangerous to the user,' the manufacturer then has the burden to 
prove lack of negligence."). 
No. 
2020AP1124   
 
13 
 
¶20 In Vincer, we clarified that the appropriate test to 
employ as to whether a product is "unreasonably dangerous," as 
required under § 402A(1) of the Restatement (Second), is the 
consumer-contemplation test.  Vincer v. Esther Williams All-
Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 69 Wis. 2d 326, 332, 230 N.W.2d 794 
(1975).  As such, we established that the consumer-contemplation 
test for an unreasonably dangerous defect "depends []on the 
reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer concerning the 
characteristics of this type of product."  Id.  The test is 
objective and not dependent on a particular injured consumer's 
knowledge.  Id.  However, we also reasoned that a particular 
injured consumer's knowledge of the dangerous condition of a 
product may be "evidence of contributory negligence under the 
circumstances."  Id.  We then discussed comments g (defective 
condition) and i (unreasonably dangerous) to § 402A in Vincer, 
id. at 330, 331, and we concluded that "a product can be deemed 
defective and unreasonably dangerous based solely on consumer 
expectations."  Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 2001 WI 109, 
¶4, 245 Wis. 2d 772, 629 N.W.2d 727.   
¶21 Accordingly, 
the 
consumer-contemplation 
test 
was 
employed 
to 
assess 
whether 
a 
product 
was 
"unreasonably 
dangerous" as well as whether it was in a "defective condition."  
Stated otherwise, a litigant was required to show that the 
product design was "dangerous to an extent beyond that which 
would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchased it, 
with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its 
characteristics." 
 
Vincer, 
69 
Wis. 2d 
at 
331 
(quoting 
No. 
2020AP1124   
 
14 
 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. i).  We have 
reaffirmed that "Wisconsin is committed to the consumer-
contemplation 
test 
for 
determining 
whether 
a 
product 
is 
defective."  Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 121 
Wis. 2d 338, 368, 360 N.W.2d 2 (1984); see also Green, 245 
Wis. 2d 772, ¶46. 
¶22 As the law in products liability developed, the 
American Law Institute introduced the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts:  Products Liability, in 1998.  In pertinent part, Section 
2 states: 
A product is defective when, at the time of sale or 
distribution, it contains a manufacturing defect, is 
defective in design, or is defective because of 
inadequate instructions or warnings.  A product: 
(a) contains a manufacturing defect when the 
product departs from its intended design . . . . 
(b) is defective in design when the foreseeable 
risks of harm posed by the product could have 
been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a 
reasonable alternative design by the seller or 
other distributor . . . and the omission of the 
alternative 
design 
renders 
the 
product 
not 
reasonably safe; 
(c) is 
defective 
because 
of 
inadequate 
instructions or warnings . . . . 
Restatement (Third) of Torts § 2. 
¶23 Section 2 of the Third Restatement separated products 
liability claims into three categories:  "manufacturing defects, 
design defects, and defects based on failure to warn."  Godoy ex 
rel. Gramling v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 2009 WI 78, ¶17, 
319 Wis. 2d 91, 768 N.W.2d 674.  CMC has argued that § 2(b) 
No. 
2020AP1124   
 
15 
 
replaced the consumer-contemplation test with the risk-utility 
test as the standard for judging whether a product is in a 
defective condition.  We repeatedly have declined invitations to 
adopt the Restatement (Third) of Torts § 2.  See Sharp v. Case 
Corp., 227 Wis. 2d 1, 19, 595 N.W.2d 380 (1999); Green, 245 
Wis. 2d 772, ¶74.16 
¶24 While parties did not invite this court to adopt the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts § 2 in Godoy or Horst, the separate 
writings in both cases, issued the same day in 2009, expounded 
the merits and deficiencies of both § 402A of Restatement 
(Second) and § 2(b) of the Restatement (Third).17  Godoy, 319 
Wis. 2d 91, Horst v. Deere & Co., 2009 WI 75, 319 Wis. 2d 147, 
769 N.W.2d 536.   
¶25 In 2011, the legislature created Wis. Stat. § 895.047 
as part of Act 2, which altered the landscape of Wisconsin's 
product liability law.  Accordingly, § 895.047 is the first 
statute to guide the judiciary in product liability claims in 
this state.  The statute, now at issue, establishes what a 
plaintiff must show in order to prove a claim of strict 
                                                 
16 See also Haase v. Badger Mining Corp., 2004 WI 97, ¶23, 
274 Wis. 2d 143, 682 N.W.2d 389 (declining to adopt Restatement 
(Third) of Torts § 5). 
17 The parties point out that despite the fact that four 
Justices professed a preference for the Restatement (Third) 
§ 2(b) and spoke favorably of adopting it, the court did not do 
so in either case.  One of the four Justices did not participate 
in either Godoy (Justice Roggensack) or Horst (Justice Ziegler).  
Godoy ex rel. Gramling v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 2009 WI 
78, 319 Wis. 2d 91, 768 N.W.2d 674; Horst v. Deere & Co., 2009 
WI 75, 319 Wis. 2d 147, 769 N.W.2d 536. 
No. 
2020AP1124   
 
16 
 
liability for a design defect.  This case presents the first 
opportunity for judicial statutory interpretation of § 895.047 
since its creation.  We pause briefly to summarize the parties' 
arguments regarding the statute's meaning. 
2.  Parties' Arguments 
¶26 CMC urges this court to read Wis. Stat. § 895.047 as a 
wholesale adoption of the Restatement (Third) of Torts' risk-
utility test as complete replacement of the common law consumer-
contemplation test.  CMC interprets the separate writings in 
Godoy and Horst as directives from the court to the legislature, 
and suggests the legislature adopted the entire Restatement 
(Third) of Torts § 2(b) in response.  CMC argues the identical 
language between a large portion of the Restatement (Third) 
§ 2(b) and one of the five paragraphs of § 895.047(1) must, 
therefore, mean that the legislature did away with decades of 
common law in a few short strokes of the pen.  In asserting 
Wisconsin adopted the Restatement (Third) of Torts when the 
legislature created § 895.047 in 2011, CMC summarily concludes 
that Wisconsin has "abandon[ed] any distinction between strict 
liability and negligence actions."   
¶27 Contrastingly, 
Murphy 
and 
amicus 
argue 
a 
straightforward, plain language reading of Wis. Stat. § 895.047.  
They assert that the Wisconsin Legislature created a unique, 
hybrid products liability claim that includes five requirements, 
but which retains the consumer-contemplation test and the 
distinction between strict liability and negligence as to 
product claims.  
No. 
2020AP1124   
 
17 
 
¶28 We conclude, as we explain below, Wis. Stat. § 895.047 
remains loyal to Wisconsin's roots in the common law consumer-
contemplation test.  While § 895.047 appears to borrow language 
from the Restatement (Third) of Torts, the legislature did not 
adopt the entirety of § 2, nor did it enact the Restatement's 
voluminous comments.18   
3.  Wisconsin Stat. § 895.047 
¶29 Statutory interpretation "begins with the language of 
the statute.  If the meaning of the statute is plain, we 
ordinarily stop the inquiry."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. 
for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 
110.  It is helpful to revisit the principles of statutory 
interpretation we set forth in Kalal: 
Judicial deference to the policy choices enacted into 
law 
by 
the 
legislature 
requires 
that 
statutory 
interpretation focus primarily on the language of the 
statute.  We assume that the legislature's intent is 
expressed in the statutory language.  Extrinsic 
evidence of legislative intent may become relevant to 
statutory interpretation in some circumstances, but is 
not the primary focus of inquiry. . . .  It is the 
enacted law, not the unenacted intent, that is binding 
on the public.  Therefore, the purpose of statutory 
interpretation is to determine what the statute means 
so that it may be given its full, proper, and intended 
effect. 
Id., ¶44.  "Statutory language is read where possible to give 
reasonable effect to every word, in order to avoid surplusage."  
Id., ¶46.  We do not consult extrinsic sources of interpretation 
                                                 
18 Amicus points out Restatement (Third) of Torts § 2 has 18 
comments with a total of 11,000 words.  See also Restatement 
(Third) of Torts § 2. 
No. 
2020AP1124   
 
18 
 
if the statute is unambiguous, although we do read a statute 
within its context and according to its structure in a plain 
reading interpretation.  Id., ¶¶46, 49.   
¶30 With these principles in mind, Wis. Stat. § 895.047(1) 
states in relevant part:  
[A] manufacturer is liable to a claimant if the 
claimant establishes all of the following by a 
preponderance of the evidence:  
(a)  That 
the 
product 
is 
defective 
because 
it . . . is defective in design. . . .  A product is 
defective in design if the foreseeable risks of harm 
posed by the product could have been reduced or 
avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative 
design by the manufacturer and the omission of the 
alternative design renders the product not reasonably 
safe.  
(b)  That the defective condition rendered the 
product unreasonably dangerous to persons or property. 
(c)  That the defective condition existed at the 
time the product left the control of the manufacturer. 
(d)  That 
the 
product 
reached 
the 
user 
or 
consumer without substantial change in the condition 
in which it was sold. 
(e)  That the defective condition was a cause of 
the claimant's damages.  
§ 895.047(1). 
 
In 
so 
providing, 
the 
legislature 
set 
a 
particularized requirement that proof of the requirements of 
"all" paragraphs in subsec. (1) is necessary to prevail on a 
defective design claim.  The legislature has required meeting 
statutory criteria in other contexts.  See, e.g., County of Dane 
v. LIRC, 2009 WI 9, ¶¶26, 27, 315 Wis. 2d 293, 759 N.W.2d 571 
(directing that when statutory criteria define a condition, all 
No. 
2020AP1124   
 
19 
 
the requirements of the statute must be met in order to 
prevail).  Accordingly, each paragraph following subsec. 1 is an 
obligation a plaintiff must satisfy to move forward with a 
defective design, product-liability claim.   
¶31 While the language in para. (a) repeats the language 
from the Restatement (Third) § 2 subsecs. (a), (b), and (c), 
Wis. Stat. § 895.047(1) paras. (b), (c), (d), and (e) codify the 
common law Wisconsin courts have developed and applied for 
decades.  For example, § 895.047(1)(b) requires that the 
"defective 
condition" 
renders 
the 
product 
"unreasonably 
dangerous," which is a part of the common law test.  See 
Tietsworth v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 2004 WI 32, ¶¶7, 8, 270 
Wis. 2d 
146, 
677 
N.W.2d 
233 
(applying 
the 
"unreasonably 
dangerous" common law test to Harley's TC-88's defective 
engine).  Also, in Kozlowski v. John E. Smith's Sons Co., 87 
Wis. 2d 882, 889, 275 N.W.2d 915 (1979), we set out common law 
factors such as recognizing an "unreasonably dangerous product," 
"fail[ing] to exercise ordinary care to render its product 
safe," and "failing to inform users of the defective condition," 
all in regard to an unreasonably dangerous air compression 
sausage stuffer).   
¶32 In addition, Wis. Stat. § 895.047(6) specifically 
maintains the criteria for claims of negligence and breach of 
warranty, claims well-grounded in Wisconsin common law.19  See 
                                                 
19 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.047(6) states:  "Inapplicability.  
This section does not apply to actions based on a claim of 
negligence or breach of warranty." 
No. 
2020AP1124   
 
20 
 
Stehlik v. Rhoads, 2002 WI 73, ¶¶52, 53, 253 Wis. 2d 477, 645 
N.W.2d 889 (explaining the common law limitations on liability 
grounded in negligence); Foley v. City of West Allis, 113 
Wis. 2d 475, 483, 335 N.W.2d 824 (1983) (explaining common law 
standard of ordinary care in regard to use of seat belts); 
Robert H. Lande, A Traditional and Textualist Analysis of the 
Goals of Antitrust, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 2349, 2366 (citing Scalia 
& Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts (2012) 
at 320, explaining the canon of imputed common law meaning as 
providing that when a statute uses a common-law term without 
defining it, the statute adopts its common law meaning).    
¶33 Paragraph (a) of Wis. Stat. § 895.047(1)(a) mirrors 
language from Restatement (Third) § 2.  It does not adopt the 
common law standard as § 895.047(b) does.  The terms and 
language of para. (1)(a) are not complex, technical, or 
difficult 
to 
understand. 
 
Therefore, 
our 
focus 
must 
be 
"primarily on the language of the statute."  Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶44.  Section 895.047(1)(a), as relevant here to 
the issue of claimed design defects, establishes two unambiguous 
requirements that a plaintiff must allege and prove:  (1) "the 
foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been 
reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative 
design;" and (2) "the omission of the alternative design renders 
the product not reasonably safe."  Accordingly, the plain 
language of paragraph (1)(a) is clear.  Since the legislature 
did not direct us further to incorporate or apply a test from 
the Restatement (Third) of Torts § 2, we conclude "[i]t is the 
No. 
2020AP1124   
 
21 
 
enacted law, not the unenacted intent, that is binding on the 
public."  Id.  We interpret para. (1)(a) by its plain language, 
and conclude that the paragraph is unambiguous; therefore, we 
cease our inquiry.  Id., ¶45. 
¶34 However, for the sake of thoroughness, we address 
another of CMC's arguments on the interpretation of para. 
(1)(a).  CMC asserts the word "reasonable/reasonably" in para. 
(1)(a) 
accomplishes 
at 
least 
one, 
if 
not 
all, 
of 
the 
following:  (1) it creates the risk-utility balancing test found 
in Restatement (Third) of Torts § 2(b), and reads in the 
requirements of comment f ("Design defects:  factors relevant in 
determining whether the omission of a reasonable alternative 
design renders a product not reasonably safe");20 (2) it confuses 
                                                 
20 Comment f to Restatement (Third) of Torts § 2 spans three 
pages of the Restatement, so we relay only the portion the court 
of appeals relied on:  
A broad range of factors may be considered in 
determining 
whether 
an 
alternative 
design 
is 
reasonable and whether its omission renders a product 
not reasonably safe.  The factors include, among 
others, 
the 
magnitude 
and 
probability 
of 
the 
foreseeable risks of harm, the instructions and 
warnings accompanying the product, and the nature and 
strength 
of 
consumer 
expectations 
regarding 
the 
product, including expectations arising from product 
portrayal and marketing.  See Comment g.  The relative 
advantages 
and 
disadvantages 
of 
the 
product 
as 
designed and as it alternatively could have been 
designed may also be considered.  Thus, the likely 
effects of the alternative design on production costs; 
the effects of the alternative design on product 
longevity, maintenance, repair, and esthetics; and the 
range of consumer choice among products are factors 
that may be taken into account.  A plaintiff is not 
necessarily required to introduce proof on all of 
No. 
2020AP1124   
 
22 
 
factfinders; and (3) it blurs any relevant distinction between 
the statute's terms.  
¶35 Regardless of where the language that was employed in 
Wis. Stat. § 895.047(1)(a) originated, the legislature left no 
further direction that the statute should be interpreted by 
superimposing extra-statutory language.  Stated otherwise, we 
will not read Restatement language or Restatement comments into 
a statute, simply because the legislature selectively adopted 
some wording from the Restatement.    
¶36 As for CMC's argument that the word "reasonable" 
serves as an impediment to juries, bench and bar alike, we must 
disagree.  Parties adjudicate the issue of reasonability all the 
time——we 
need 
look 
only 
to 
the 
other 
claim 
in 
this 
action:  negligence.  One element of a negligence claim turns on 
whether the defendant's standard of care fell below that of a 
"reasonable person."  Jankee v. Clark Cnty., 2000 WI 64, ¶9, 235 
Wis. 2d 700, 612 N.W.2d 297.  To our knowledge, circuit courts, 
attorneys, and juries have had little trouble understanding and 
applying the issue of reasonability.21   
                                                                                                                                                             
these factors; their relevance, and the relevance of 
other factors, will vary from case to case. 
Restatement (Third) of Torts § 2 cmt. f.  See also Murphy, 399 
Wis. 2d 18, ¶31. 
21 As parties pointed out at oral argument, courts have used 
the Wis. JI——Civil 3260.1 (2014) for Product Liability under 
Wis. Stat. § 895.047 for over a decade and there have been "no 
appeals, no issues."  Our own research turned up no results of 
cases appealing the use or interpretation of the standard Wis. 
JI——Civil 3260.1.  We do, however, note the comments to Wis. JI—
—Civil 3260.1 suggest the legislature abandoned the consumer-
No. 
2020AP1124   
 
23 
 
¶37 At first blush, CMC's final argument regarding the 
challenge in reading Wis. Stat. § 895.047(1)(a) within the 
entirety of § 895.047 provides more substantive contentions, but 
we dispose of the argument because of para. (a)'s plain language 
and para. (b)'s codification of the common law.  CMC asserts 
that para. (a)'s language "not reasonably safe" cannot be read 
in harmony with para. (b)'s "unreasonably dangerous."  But, just 
as we can identify that para. (a) codifies language from the 
Restatement (Third), we also can identify (b)'s "unreasonably 
dangerous" 
language 
as 
a 
codification 
of 
the 
consumer-
contemplation test from this state's common law.  See e.g., 
Dippel, 37 Wis. 2d 443; Vincer, 69 Wis. 2d 326; Green, 245 
Wis. 2d 772.  This is where we recognize the legislature's 
retention of the consumer-contemplation test in the statute.  
Scalia & Garner, supra, at 320 (describing canon of imputed 
common law meaning). 
¶38 Further, Wis. Stat. § 895.047 presents the rare 
situation in which the legislature recorded its findings and 
intent in neighboring Wis. Stat. § 895.046, which also was 
created under Act 2.  While we need not consult legislative 
intent, we have done so to confirm a plain meaning analysis in 
the past.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶51.  In § 895.046(1g), the 
legislature recorded its intent in clarifying product liability 
                                                                                                                                                             
contemplation test and adopted the risk-utility test, which is 
problematic and incorrect. 
No. 
2020AP1124   
 
24 
 
law was in part "to return tort law to its historical, common 
law roots."22   
¶39 As a final matter, we briefly address CMC's argument, 
noted earlier, that Wisconsin's product liability statute 
eliminates plaintiffs' ability to bring a claim in negligence 
for product design.  To the contrary, Wis. Stat. § 895.047(6) 
                                                 
22 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.046(1g) states: 
Legislative findings and intent.  The legislature 
finds that it is in the public interest to clarify 
product liability law, generally, and the application 
of the risk contribution theory of liability first 
announced by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Collins v. 
Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166[, 342 N.W.2d 37] 
(1984), specifically, in order to return tort law to 
its historical, common law roots.  This return both 
protects the rights of citizens to pursue legitimate 
and timely claims of injury resulting from defective 
products, and assures that businesses may conduct 
activities in this state without fear of being sued 
for indefinite claims of harm from products which 
businesses may never have manufactured, distributed, 
sold, or promoted, or which were made and sold decades 
ago.  The legislature finds that the application of 
risk contribution to former white lead carbonate 
manufacturers in Thomas v. Mallett, [2005 WI 129, 285 
Wis. 2d 236, 701 N.W.2d 523], was an improperly 
expansive application of the risk contribution theory 
of 
liability 
announced 
in 
Collins, 
and 
that 
application 
raised 
substantial 
questions 
of 
deprivation of due process, equal protection, and 
right to jury trial under the federal and Wisconsin 
constitutions.  The legislature finds that this 
section protects the right to a remedy found in 
[A]rticle 
I, 
[S]ection 
9, 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, by preserving the narrow and limited 
application 
of 
the 
risk 
contribution 
theory 
of 
liability announced in Collins.   
§ 895.046(1g). 
No. 
2020AP1124   
 
25 
 
plainly states the products liability section "does not apply to 
actions based on a claim of negligence or breach of warranty."  
Such claims establish their provenance outside of § 895.047, and 
the statute does not extinguish a plaintiff's ability to bring a 
claim in negligence against a product manufacturer.  
¶40 Therefore, Wis. Stat. § 895.047(1) enumerates five 
criteria a plaintiff must establish in a defective design claim 
against a manufacturer.23  Despite Restatement (Third), a plain 
language reading of para. (a) establishes two requirements, 
noted 
above. 
 
The 
statute 
in 
other 
paragraphs 
codifies 
Wisconsin's commitment to the consumer-contemplation test (para. 
(b)), while also codifying this state's common law in paras. 
(c), (d), and (e).  Lastly, subsec. (6) does not preclude 
plaintiffs from bringing a common law negligent design claim 
when the plaintiff also alleges a strict liability cause of 
action against a manufacturer. 
¶41 Although we decline to adopt any of Restatement 
(Third) of Torts § 2 comments today, including comment f upon 
which the court of appeals extensively relied, the common law 
                                                 
23 While 
Dippel, 
37 
Wis. 2d 
443, 
establishes 
five 
requirements for a product liability claim under § 402A, and 
Wis. Stat. § 895.047(1) also enumerates five requirements, the 
statute tracks the following changes:  First, § 895.047(1) does 
not include one requirement from Dippel "(4) that the seller 
engaged in the business of selling such product or, put 
negatively, 
that 
this 
is 
not 
an 
isolated 
or 
infrequent 
transaction not related to the principal business of the 
seller;" id. at 460, and secondly, of course, § 895.047(1) 
includes para. (1)(a), the language of which is borrowed from 
the Restatement (Third) of Torts § 2.  
No. 
2020AP1124   
 
26 
 
pre-2011 continues to provide persuasive authority in products 
liability cases.24  
                                                 
24 The Sumnicht factors may be persuasive in regard to the 
reasonableness of a design and are: 
1) [C]onformity of defendant's design to the practices 
of other manufacturers in its industry at the time of 
manufacture; 2) the open and obvious nature of the 
alleged danger; . . . 3) the extent of the claimant's 
use of the very product alleged to have caused the 
injury and the period of time involved in such use by 
the claimant and others prior to the injury without 
any harmful incident. . . . 4) the ability of the 
manufacturer to eliminate danger without impairing the 
product's usefulness or making it unduly expensive; 
and 5) the relative likelihood of injury resulting 
from the product's present design. 
Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 121 Wis. 2d 338, 
372, 360 N.W.2d 2 (1984) (citing Collins v. Ridge Tool Co., 520 
F.2d 591, 594 (7th Cir. 1975)). 
No. 
2020AP1124   
 
27 
 
C.  Summary Judgment 
¶42 This brings us to the court of appeals' decision to 
reverse the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in CMC's 
favor.  "Every decision on a motion for summary judgment begins 
with a review of the complaint to determine whether, on its 
face, it states a claim for relief."  Butler, 294 Wis. 2d 397, 
¶18 (citing Hoida, Inc. v. M&I Midstate Bank, 2006 WI 69, ¶16, 
291 Wis. 2d 283, 717 N.W.2d 17).  If it does, "we examine the 
answer to see if issues of fact or law have been joined."  
Butler, 294 Wis. 2d 397, ¶18.  When the "complaint and answer 
are sufficient to join issue, we examine the moving party's 
affidavits to determine whether they establish a prima facie 
case for summary judgment."  Id.  Any factual dispute will not 
necessarily preclude summary judgment, only disputes of material 
fact will do so.  Id.  Accordingly, we review whether Murphy's 
complaint asserted (1) a strict product liability claim under 
Wis. Stat. § 895.047, and (2) a negligent design claim against 
CMC.  
¶43 To prevail under the strict product liability claim, 
Murphy, a line technician, must demonstrate all of the five 
statutory factors:  First, the foreseeable risks of the Dixie 
tongs could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a 
reasonable alternative design and CMC's omission of a reasonable 
alternative design rendered the Dixie tongs not reasonably safe.  
Murphy's expert witness, Dr. John DeRosia, opined that "[t]here 
are several alternative designs that do not share the single 
point of failure flaw of the Dixie lifting tongs. One device, 
No. 
2020AP1124   
 
28 
 
manufactured by Hogg-Davis . . . uses multiple teeth on each 
side of the tongs.  The [Hogg-Davis] tongs also incorporate a 
locking 
mechanism 
that 
prevents 
them 
[from] 
opening 
inadvertently."25  DeRosia also explained:  
An advantage of the Hogg-Davis tongs would be that the 
weight of the tongs, over 22 pounds, would tend to 
push the tongs open completely, allowing the teeth of 
the tongs to engage fully.  In [an attached photo 
showing the tongs holding a suspended pole], the top 
four of the six teeth are embedded into the wood of 
the pole. The bottom two teeth, being closer together 
than the teeth above also act to trap the pole and 
prevent the pole from escaping.  If a failure of the 
grasp of the upper four teeth occurs, the bottom teeth 
would prevent the pole from falling out of the grasp 
of the tongs."[26]  
¶44 Accordingly, Murphy provided evidence that the Dixie 
tongs, by their defective design of a single attachment point on 
each side of the pole, presented foreseeable risks that a pole 
could fall out of the tongs' grasp.  DeRosia points to a 
reasonable alternative design that features multiple contact 
surfaces, and an additional set of teeth below the teeth 
contacting a suspended pole that would serve to catch the pole 
if a clamp failed.  DeRosia also describes the smaller opening 
at the bottom of the Hogg-Davis tongs that prevents loss of a 
clamped pole.  DeRosia opined that the Dixie tongs' omission of 
additional teeth or contact surfaces renders the Dixie tongs not 
reasonably safe.    
                                                 
25 R. 42 at 4. 
26 R. 154 at 6. 
No. 
2020AP1124   
 
29 
 
¶45 DeRosia also opined that the Dixie tongs failed to 
address the foreseeable risk that a long, heavy pole would tilt 
or teeter when lifted by tongs with a single point on either 
side.  DeRosia's reports sufficiently support the theory that a 
reasonable alternative design, such as the six, half-inch-long 
teeth of the Hogg-Davis tongs, would reduce or avoid the 
foreseeable risks posed by a tilting pole.     
¶46 Second, the Dixie tongs' defect rendered the product 
unreasonably 
dangerous 
to 
persons 
or 
property 
under 
the 
consumer-contemplation standard.  Under that test, "the article 
sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be 
contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the 
ordinary 
knowledge 
common 
to 
the 
community 
as 
to 
its 
characteristics."  Vincer, 69 Wis. 2d at 331.  At the time of 
Murphy's accident, CMC advertised the Dixie tongs as "Lifting 
tongs [] used to lift logs and poles into place.  Lifting tongs 
are certified and tested for overhead lifting."27  Further, the 
pole that fell on Murphy was 600 pounds, well within the Dixie 
tongs' 2,500 pound workload rating.  Given that Murphy was not 
lifting a load beyond the tongs' rated maximum, and that the 
tongs are advertised for lifting poles, and certified for 
overhead lifting, he provided evidence that an ordinary consumer 
would not anticipate anything more than the inherent dangers of 
working with a heavy, suspended load.   Line technicians would 
not expect the Dixie tongs to pose a danger beyond what they 
                                                 
27 R. 42 at 4. 
No. 
2020AP1124   
 
30 
 
could contemplate, such as the tongs losing gripping force based 
on a teetering pole.  Accordingly, based on the evidence Murphy 
presented, an ordinary consumer of Dixie tongs would not 
contemplate the dangers posed by the Dixie tongs' unsafe design.  
Murphy survives on para. (b) as well.   
¶47 The last factor in Murphy's strict product liability 
claim, that the defective design was a cause of Murphy's 
damages, is supported by DeRosia's opinion, but is contested by 
CMC, who has raised Murphy's conduct as a cause of his injuries.  
CMC also had its own expert witness who did not concur in 
DeRosia's judgment.  This does not defeat Murphy's claims but it 
may create disputes of material facts in regard to his strict 
products liability claim for a defectively designed product.28  
¶48 To prevail on the negligent design claim, Murphy must 
establish a traditional negligence claim that CMC owed him a 
duty, that the Dixie tongs' design did not meet the standard of 
care that duty required, and therefore CMC breached its duty, 
which caused his injuries.  Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 
Wis. 2d 166, 181-82, 342 N.W.2d 37 (1984); see also Wis. JI——
Civil 1005.  
¶49 CMC's answer denies all elements of the claims, 
although it concedes it manufactured the Dixie tongs at issue in 
Murphy's injuries.  CMC also asserts Murphy was contributorily 
negligent as a matter of law, which CMC contends precludes his 
                                                 
28 Whether the pole would have fallen from an alternative 
design tongs, e.g., the Hogg-Davis tongs, is a contested 
material fact.   
No. 
2020AP1124   
 
31 
 
recovery.  Therefore, CMC argues, it is entitled to summary 
judgment as a matter of law.  
¶50 A 
review 
of 
the 
record 
suggests 
the 
parties 
dispute:  (1) whether Murphy stood beneath or to the side of the 
pole as it fell; (2) whether Murphy's hands were outstretched to 
right the pole or on the remote control; (3) how high Murphy 
lifted the pole; (4) where Murphy attached the tongs on the 
pole, relative to the two critical points; and (5) whether 
Murphy conducted a test lift.  Because there are these and other 
disputes of material fact, summary judgment is not appropriate.   
¶51 Furthermore, "[a]s a general rule . . . the existence 
of negligence is a question of fact which is to be decided by 
the jury," as are questions of reasonability, and apportionment 
of negligence.  Ceplina v. S. Milwaukee Sch. Bd., 73 Wis. 2d 
338, 342, 243 N.W.2d 183 (1976);  accord Dottai v. Altenbach, 19 
Wis. 2d 373, 375, 120 N.W.2d 41 (1963) ("It is a rare case when 
summary judgment can be granted in an action grounded on 
negligence"); Schuh v. Fox River Tractor Co., 63 Wis. 2d 728, 
744, 218 N.W.2d 279 (1974) ("Generally, the apportionment of 
negligence is for the jury.").  Because there are disputed 
issues of material fact, we affirm the court of appeals in 
reversing summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.  
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶52 In interpreting Wisconsin's product liability statute 
when the claim is for a defective design, we conclude as 
follows:  (1) Wis. Stat. § 895.047(1)(a) requires proof of a 
more safe, reasonable alternative design the omission of which 
No. 
2020AP1124   
 
32 
 
renders the product not reasonably safe; (2) proof that the 
consumer-contemplation standard as set out in § 895.047(1)(b) 
(for strict liability claims for a defective design) has been 
met; and (3) proof that the remaining three factors of a 
§ 895.047(1) claim have been met.  The statute's plain language 
is clear in showing that the legislature codified the common law 
consumer-contemplation standard in § 895.047(1)(b).  We disagree 
with the court of appeals' conclusion that the legislature 
discarded the consumer-contemplation test by incorporating the 
risk-utility balancing test.  We also decline to adopt comment 
f, upon which the court of appeals relied.  With a clear 
understanding 
of 
the 
requirements 
that 
a 
plaintiff 
must 
establish, and considering the multiple genuine disputes of 
material fact, which we have explained above, we affirm the 
court of appeals in reversing summary judgment and remand to the 
circuit court for further proceedings. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
No.  2020AP1124.jjk 
 
1 
 
¶53 JILL J. KAROFSKY, J.   (concurring).  I agree that 
both Murphy's strict liability design defect claim and common 
law negligence claim survive the motion for summary judgment 
because Murphy has introduced material issues of fact on each of 
the claims' elements.1  However, I write to clarify the 
relationship between Wis. Stat. § 895.047 and the common law, as 
well as the application of that law to the facts of this case. 
¶54 I begin my concurrence by laying out the historic 
common law test for a design defect claim, particularly focusing 
on the "defect" and "unreasonably dangerous" elements of the 
claim.  Next, I interpret Wis. Stat. § 895.047, which 
establishes the current test for a design defect claim, and 
delineate which aspects of the current test draw from the common 
law.  Finally, I apply the elements of the statutory test found 
in § 895.047(1)(a) and (1)(b) to the facts of this case and 
determine, as the majority/lead opinion has, that Murphy has 
established disputed issues of material fact for each element.  
                                                 
1 The majority/lead opinion states that in order to prevail 
on its negligent design claim, Murphy will need to establish the 
elements of a traditional negligence claim.  See majority/lead 
op., ¶48.  With regard to the "duty" elements, I note that 
Wisconsin has long followed the minority view set forth in the 
dissent of Palsgraph.  Rockweit by Donahue v. Senecal, 197 Wis. 
2d 409, 419-20, 541 N.W.2d 742 (1995) (discussing Palsgraph v. 
Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928) (Andrews, 
J. dissenting)).  Pursuant to this approach, everyone owes to 
the world at large the duty of exercising ordinary care.  
Hartleberg v. Norwest Bank Wis., 2005 WI 109, ¶17, 283 Wis. 2d 
234, 700 N.W.2d 15.  Thus, in Wisconsin, the test is whether the 
"defendant failed to exercise ordinary care and the act or 
omission complained of was the cause of the plaintiff's injury."  
Hoida, Inc. v. M & I Midstate Bank, 2006 WI 69, ¶22, 291 Wis. 2d 
283, 717 N.W.2d 17; see, also Wis JI-Civil 1005. 
No.  2020AP1124.jjk 
 
2 
 
I.  The Common Law Test 
¶55 Prior to 2011, a litigant seeking to prove a design 
defect claim looked to the consumer contemplation test, derived 
from common law, to satisfy two elements of the claim: (1) that 
the design was "defective," and (2) that the product was 
"unreasonably dangerous."  See Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, 
Inc.,  2001 WI 109, ¶29, 245 Wis. 2d 772, 629 N.W.2d 727 
("[A]lthough 
defect 
and 
unreasonable 
danger 
are 
distinct 
elements to a claim in strict products liability, both elements 
are based on consumer expectations."). 
¶56 To prove a product design "defective" under the 
consumer contemplation test, a litigant was required to show 
that the product was "in a condition not contemplated by the 
ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him."  
Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 69 
Wis. 2d 326, 330, 230 N.W.2d 794 (1975)(quoting Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 402A, cmt. g).      
¶57 To prove a product design was "unreasonably dangerous" 
under the consumer contemplation test, a litigant was required 
to show that the product design was "dangerous to an extent 
beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer 
who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the 
community as to its characteristics."  Vincer, 69 Wis. 2d at 331 
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. i). 
II.  The Current Test 
¶58 In 2011 the legislature enacted Wis. Stat. § 895.047.  
This statute retains the common law distinction between the 
No.  2020AP1124.jjk 
 
3 
 
"defect" and "unreasonably dangerous" elements.  Importantly, 
this statute also abrogates the consumer contemplation test for 
the "defect" element of the claim.  Section 895.047 reads as 
follows: 
(1) Liability of Manufacturer.  In an action for 
damages caused by a manufactured product based on a 
claim of strict liability, a manufacturer is liable to 
a claimant if the claimant establishes all of the 
following by a preponderance of the evidence: 
(a) That the product is defective because it 
contains a manufacturing defect, is defective in 
design, or is defective because of inadequate 
instructions 
or 
warnings. . . . A 
product 
is 
defective in design if the foreseeable risk of 
harm posed by the product could have been reduced 
or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable 
alternative design by the manufacturer and the 
omission of the alternative design renders the 
product not reasonably safe. . . .  
(b) That the defective condition renders the 
product unreasonably dangerous to persons or 
property. 
(c) That the defective condition existed at the 
time 
the 
product 
left 
the 
control 
of 
the 
manufacturer. 
(d) That 
the 
product 
reached 
the 
user 
or 
consumer 
without 
substantial 
change 
in 
the 
condition in which it was sold. 
(e) That the defective condition was a cause of 
the claimant's damages. 
 
¶59 Section (1)(a), the defect element, clearly and 
unambiguously sets out the test for when "[a] product is 
defective in design."  Instead of codifying the common law 
consumer contemplation test, the legislature adopted language 
from the Restatement (Third) of Torts that requires "defect" be 
No.  2020AP1124.jjk 
 
4 
 
proved through the submission of a reasonable alternative 
design, the omission of which renders the product not reasonably 
safe.   
¶60 This statutory test for "defect" is incompatible with 
the common law consumer contemplation test.  Specifically, the 
statute is silent as to consumer contemplation, while the common 
law test required that the product be in a condition "not 
contemplated" by the consumer.  The statute focuses on whether a 
manufacturer adopted a reasonable alternative design, rendering 
a consumer's contemplation of a product's condition irrelevant. 
Clearly, section (1)(a) abrogates the common law with regard to 
the "defect" element.  See Wis. Mfrs. and Com. v. Evers, 2022 WI 
38, ¶15, 977 N.W.2d 374 (stating that statutory language that 
establishes a general rule applicable to all relevant claims 
cannot coexist with contrary common law).    
¶61 While section (1)(a) addresses the "defect" element 
and replaces the common law "defect" test, section (1)(b) 
codifies the "unreasonably dangerous" element of the claim and 
remains consistent with the common law consumer contemplation 
test.  Under the consumer contemplation test, the "unreasonably 
dangerous" element of a strict liability claim merely defines 
what it means to be "unreasonably dangerous."  Because the 
legislature continued using the term "unreasonably dangerous" 
without further definition or explanation, I conclude that the 
common law continues to inform our understanding of that term in 
this context.  
III.  Application of the Current Test 
No.  2020AP1124.jjk 
 
5 
 
¶62 Having parsed out the two elements of a design defect 
strict liability claim at issue here, I now analyze whether 
Murphy established issues of material fact on both of those 
elements.  I do so to further bolster and clarify the 
majority/lead opinion's analysis.  Like the majority/lead 
opinion, I conclude Murphy has established issues of material 
fact and his claims must survive summary judgment. 
¶63 Under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 895.047(1)(a), 
the 
"defect" 
element, Murphy is required to show that "the foreseeable risk 
of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided 
by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the 
manufacturer and the omission of the alternative design renders 
the product not reasonably safe."  To meet his burden, Murphy 
asserts that the Hogg-Davis tongs are a reasonable alternative 
design to the Dixie tongs.  Murphy points to his expert witness, 
who testified that the Hogg-Davis tongs have three features that 
reduce the foreseeable risk that a pole will fall from the tongs 
and cause injury.  First, Murphy's expert testified that the 
Hogg-Davis tongs have multiple teeth on each side of the device 
which create redundancy in the clamping mechanism.  Thus, if one 
tooth slips out of a pole, the other teeth remain embedded.  R. 
154, pg 6.  This redundancy is particularly important when 
handling weathered and worn poles, which are more likely to slip 
out of a tooth's grasp.  Second, Murphy's expert also testified 
that the Hogg-Davis tongs have superior clamping force.  R. 116, 
pg 25-28.  Third, both Murphy's and CMC's expert discussed that 
the Hogg-Davis tongs include a locking mechanism absent in Dixie 
No.  2020AP1124.jjk 
 
6 
 
tongs that would keep the tongs from opening in the event a 
tooth slips.  R. 68, pg 19; R. 118, pg 17-20.  According to 
Murphy, these features reduce the foreseeable risk that a pole 
will fall from the tongs, and the omission of these features 
renders Dixie tongs not reasonably safe. 
¶64 CMC disputes the claim that Hogg-Davis tongs have 
superior clamping force and questions whether the multiple teeth 
of the Hogg-Davis tongs or the inclusion of the locking 
mechanism actually lead to a lower failure rate.  These are 
disputed issues of fact that preclude summary judgment on the 
"defect" element.2 
¶65 Under Wis. Stat. § 895.047(1)(b), the "unreasonably 
dangerous" element, Murphy is required to show that "the 
defective condition renders the product unreasonably dangerous 
to persons or property."  Murphy offers that lack of redundancy 
makes the Dixie tongs too likely to fail, especially when 
lifting old and weathered poles.  Additionally, according to 
Murphy, the inadequate clamping force of the Dixie style tongs 
means the teeth are less likely to fully embed into poles and 
may slip at high rates.  Finally, Murphy argues that the absence 
of the Hogg-Davis style locking mechanism allows Dixie tongs to 
dangerously open and drop poles at higher rates than tongs that 
include the additional locking mechanism.  This is because the 
                                                 
2 The court of appeals in this case looked to the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts comment (f) to apply the reasonable 
alternative design portion of this test.  While it is 
unnecessary to adopt comment (f) in this case, I would not 
foreclose the use of the Restatement's comments, including 
comment (f), as persuasive in future cases. 
No.  2020AP1124.jjk 
 
7 
 
only force holding Dixie tongs closed is the downward force of 
the weight of the pole itself——if a tooth slips, the tongs open 
and the pole drops.  Murphy contends that these dangers are 
beyond the scope of what an ordinary consumer would expect. 
¶66 For a product to be unreasonably dangerous, it must be 
"dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated 
by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary 
knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics." 
Vincer, 69 Wis. 2d at 331 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 402A cmt. i). This is an objective test from the perspective 
of a reasonable consumer of pole tongs, here, a utility worker.   
¶67 Given the emphasis on safety procedures in occupations 
like Murphy's, it can be assumed that a reasonable utility 
worker expects a pole lift to be somewhat dangerous.  Lift 
failures must be anticipated on some level.  However, it is 
unclear whether a reasonable utility worker expects that these 
failures stem only from user error or if utility workers 
reasonably anticipate that the tongs' teeth may slip, even if 
the tongs are placed and used correctly.  The potential for grip 
failure when tongs are used correctly may be beyond the scope of 
what an ordinary utility worker would contemplate.  CMC's own 
expert appears to say that if tongs (of any style) are attached 
correctly, they should not slip and drop a pole.  See R. 118, pg 
19. 
¶68 Furthermore, a lift device could still be unreasonably 
dangerous even though lift failures may not be entirely 
avoidable.  A lift device that fails at significantly higher 
No.  2020AP1124.jjk 
 
8 
 
rates than other devices may be dangerous beyond the level that 
is contemplated by the consumer.  It is not clear from the 
record whether a reasonable utility worker would expect pole 
tongs to fail more often when used on worn and weathered poles.  
Yet there is evidence in the record from Murphy's expert that 
pole tongs do, in fact, fail more often when they are used on 
old and weathered poles.  These implicate questions of fact for 
a jury, and thus summary judgment cannot be granted on the 
"unreasonably dangerous" element on this record. 
¶69 Although it may be a close call, Murphy has introduced 
evidence that consumers expect pole tongs to grip and hold a 
pole if placed correctly and expect pole tongs to grip and hold 
worn and weathered poles.  There is no evidence in the record 
from either side indicating exactly what a utility worker would 
consider to be a reasonable lift failure rate, but Murphy 
contends the failure rate is too high.  In summary, a device 
which fails at higher than usual rates or unexpectedly fails 
under certain circumstances may still be dangerous beyond 
consumer expectations.  Here, Murphy has raised enough of an 
issue to allow a jury to consider it.     
¶70 As to the final three elements, CMC does not dispute 
that Murphy has met the requirements under (1)(c) or (1)(d), so 
it is unnecessary to analyze those elements further.  I agree 
with 
the 
majority/lead 
opinion's 
analysis 
of 
the 
(1)(e) 
causation element and so do not reproduce that analysis here. 
IV.  Conclusion 
No.  2020AP1124.jjk 
 
9 
 
¶71 In conclusion, Wis. Stat. § 895.047(1)(a) abrogates 
the common law test for what makes a design "defective" in a 
strict liability design defect claim, but (1)(b) retains the 
common law consumer contemplation test for what makes a design 
"unreasonably dangerous."  Murphy has established a disputed 
issue of material fact for both of those elements and thus the 
claim must survive CMC's motion for summary judgment. 
¶72 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and REBECCA FRANK DALLET join this concurrence.  
 
    
 
No.  2020AP1124.bh 
 
1 
 
¶73 BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   (concurring in part, dissenting 
in part).  This case involves a negligence claim and a strict 
liability claim against Columbus McKinnon Corporation (CMC) 
alleging that CMC's Dixie tongs were defectively designed.  A 
majority of this court concludes CMC is not entitled to summary 
judgment and sends both claims back to the circuit court.  While 
I agree that the negligence claim can proceed, I part ways with 
respect to the strict liability claim.  Reviewing the undisputed 
material facts in this case, Matthew Murphy has failed to 
present any evidence establishing that the Dixie tongs were 
unreasonably 
dangerous 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 895.047(1)(b).  
Therefore, I would grant CMC's motion for summary judgment on 
the strict liability claim. 
I.  WISCONSIN STAT. § 895.047 
¶74 In 2011, the legislature modified in part and codified 
in part the common law elements of a strict liability claim 
based on a design defect.  See 2011 Wis. Act 2, § 31; Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.047(1).  Under the statute, a plaintiff must establish 
each of the following: 
(a) That the product is defective because it . . . is 
defective in design . . . .  A product is defective in 
design if the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the 
product could have been reduced or avoided by the 
adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the 
manufacturer and the omission of the alternative 
design renders the product not reasonably safe. . . .  
(b) That the defective condition rendered the product 
unreasonably dangerous to persons or property. 
(c) That the defective condition existed at the time 
the product left the control of the manufacturer. 
No.  2020AP1124.bh 
 
2 
 
(d) That the product reached the user or consumer 
without substantial change in the condition in which 
it was sold. 
(e) That the defective condition was a cause of the 
claimant's damages. 
§ 895.047(1).     
¶75 As the majority/lead opinion notes, the backdrop to 
this enactment was debate in this court over whether we should 
jettison the consumer contemplation test adopted from the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts and instead adopt the reasonable 
alternative design test described in the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts:  Products Liability § 2.1  The legislature weighed in and 
created a unique hybrid test via the enactment of Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.047(1).  This case focuses on the meaning and application 
of the elements described in paragraphs (a) and (b). 
¶76 Paragraph (a) requires two showings.  First, a 
plaintiff must prove "the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the 
product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a 
reasonable alternative design by the manufacturer."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.047(1)(a).  Second, a plaintiff must prove "the omission 
of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably 
safe."  Id.  The reasonable alternative design language is 
copied nearly word for word from the Restatement (Third) of 
                                                 
1 See Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 2001 WI 109, ¶¶122-
34, 245 Wis. 2d 772, 629 N.W.2d 727 (Sykes, J., dissenting) 
(advocating for adoption of Restatement (Third) of Torts:  
Products Liability § 2 as a change from the court's current 
common law test); Godoy ex rel. Gramling v. E.I. du Pont de 
Nemours & Co., 2009 WI 78, ¶¶76-110, 319 Wis. 2d 91, 768 
N.W.2d 674 (Prosser, J., concurring) (same); Horst v. Deere & 
Co., 2009 WI 75, ¶¶87-104, 319 Wis. 2d 147, 769 N.W.2d 536 
(Gableman, J., concurring) (same). 
No.  2020AP1124.bh 
 
3 
 
Torts:  Products Liability § 2(b).2  This was, quite consciously, 
a legislative policy decision to depart from the consumer 
contemplation test this court borrowed from the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts and embrace the reasonable alternative design 
test from the Restatement (Third) of Torts——at least in part.  
The parties debate whether we should adopt particular comments 
from the Restatement (Third) of Torts to further clarify the 
meaning of the reasonable alternative design test——comment f in 
particular.  But the legislature did not explicitly incorporate 
any particular comments, and we need not do so in order to 
decide this case.3   
¶77 The 
legislature 
also 
created 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 895.047(1)(b), which requires proof that "the defective 
condition rendered the product unreasonably dangerous to persons 
or property."  This is a separate condition, and it contains no 
                                                 
2 The Restatement (Third) of Torts:  Products Liability 
§ 2(b) provides:   
A product . . . is defective in design when the 
foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could 
have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a 
reasonable alternative design by the seller or other 
distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain 
of distribution, and the omission of the alternative 
design renders the product not reasonably safe . . . . 
The only difference between the two is that the Restatement 
(Third) focuses on the seller or distributor of the product and 
Wis. Stat. § 895.047(1)(a) focuses on the manufacturer.  The 
legislature chose to address the liability of sellers and 
distributers in subsec. (2) of § 895.047 by referencing to the 
same standards for manufacturer liability in subsec. (1).    
3 These comments may very well prove persuasive and useful 
when applying the reasonable alternative design test.  We simply 
leave those questions for another day. 
No.  2020AP1124.bh 
 
4 
 
reference, direct or indirect, to the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts or any other test.  This element was not created out of 
thin air, however.  Under our cases, a strict liability design 
defect claim required this very thing:  proof that the product 
was unreasonably dangerous.  And the test under our common law 
was the consumer-contemplation test.  See Vincer v. Esther 
Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 69 Wis. 2d 326, 332, 
230 N.W.2d 794 (1975) (adopting the consumer contemplation test 
to determine if a product was unreasonably dangerous).  Without 
any textual evidence of a departure from the common law, this 
statutory addition is best read as codifying the common law test 
to determine whether a product is unreasonably dangerous.4 
¶78 Finally, of particular relevance in this case, the 
legislature's modifications to the test for strict liability 
explicitly exempted application to negligence claims.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 895.047(6) ("This section does not apply to actions 
based on a claim of negligence or breach of warranty.").  
Therefore, the ordinary principles of common law negligence 
remain unaltered by these legislative changes.   
II.  APPLICATION 
¶79 Murphy advances two claims against CMC for its 
allegedly defective design of Dixie tongs:  negligence and 
                                                 
4 Another tricky question we leave for another day concerns 
the proper test for determining whether "the omission of the 
alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe" 
under Wis. Stat. § 895.047(1)(a), and to what degree daylight 
exists between a product that is "not reasonably safe" under 
para. (a) and "unreasonably dangerous" under para.(b).   
No.  2020AP1124.bh 
 
5 
 
strict liability.  With respect to Murphy's negligence claim, 
CMC does not develop separate arguments based on traditional 
negligence principles.  Therefore, its summary judgment motion 
on the negligence claim fails.  But CMC does maintain that 
Murphy has presented insufficient evidence on his strict 
liability claim to survive summary judgment.  To that, I now 
turn. 
¶80 The parties in this case focused largely on the proper 
law we should apply, and in that vein, the briefs gave most of 
their attention to the reasonable alternative design requirement 
in Wis. Stat. § 895.047(1)(a).  However, after reviewing the 
record, I conclude that Murphy has failed to marshal any 
evidence that the Dixie tongs are unreasonably dangerous under 
Wis. Stat. § 895.047(1)(b).  For that reason, CMC is entitled to 
summary judgment on its strict liability claim.5 
¶81 Once again, to determine if a product is unreasonably 
dangerous under Wis. Stat. § 895.047(1)(b), we look to the 
common law consumer contemplation test.  We have described that 
test as follows: 
[W]hether a product contains an unreasonably dangerous 
defect depends upon the reasonable expectations of the 
ordinary consumer concerning the characteristics of 
this type of product.  If the average consumer would 
reasonably anticipate the dangerous condition of the 
product and fully appreciate the attendant risk of 
injury, it would not be unreasonably dangerous and 
                                                 
5 "Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and 'the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.'"  Quick Charge Kiosk LLC v. Kaul, 
2020 WI 54, ¶9, 392 Wis. 2d 35, 944 N.W.2d 598 (quoting Wis. 
Stat. § 802.08(2)). 
No.  2020AP1124.bh 
 
6 
 
defective.  This is an objective test and is not 
dependent upon the knowledge of the particular injured 
consumer, although his knowledge may be evidence of 
contributory negligence under the circumstances. 
Vincer, 69 Wis. 2d at 332.  
¶82 This framework calls attention to the end-user of the 
product.  The product in this case is not designed for 
homeowners building a backyard shed or children tinkering with 
Tonka trucks.  The Dixie tongs at issue here are designed to 
lift and move poles weighing up to 2,500 pounds in highly 
specialized construction work.  This is no average consumer 
product.  The consumer contemplation test in this case therefore 
must focus on the objective awareness and knowledge of the 
specially trained workers who use this product.  See id. at 331 
("The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that 
which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who 
purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the 
community as to its characteristics." (quoting Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, § 402A cmt. i)).6  The question, therefore, is 
what a specialist like Murphy would reasonably understand 
concerning the danger of using this product.  No one doubts that 
lifting and moving massive poles is fraught with danger.  But 
the risk of danger or even death does not mean that a product is 
unreasonably dangerous to the end-user.  If mere danger 
sufficed, every chainsaw, extension ladder, and construction 
                                                 
6 Accord Kaiser v. Johnson & Johnson, 947 F.3d 996, 1002, 
1014 (7th Cir. 2020) (noting that for purposes of determining if 
a transvaginal mesh medical device is unreasonably dangerous 
under Indiana law "the relevant consumers here are pelvic-floor 
surgeons").  
No.  2020AP1124.bh 
 
7 
 
vehicle would qualify.  That is not the law.  The test requires 
that we ask whether the end-user of the product would 
"reasonably anticipate the dangerous condition of the product 
and fully appreciate the attendant risk of injury."  Id. at 332.  
If so, even a dangerous product is not unreasonably dangerous 
under our common law, and by extension, under Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.047(1)(b).   
¶83 So we turn to the evidence offered to see whether 
there is any evidence from which a jury could find the Dixie 
tongs are unreasonably dangerous based on the expectations of 
the someone like Murphy——a line technician who is trained to use 
these types of pole-lifting products.  Murphy argues that the 
Dixie tongs are unreasonably dangerous because the tongs only 
have two points of contact and therefore do not have a 
redundancy.  Murphy also notes that CMC knew:  (1) the Dixie 
tongs were used to lift poles; (2) the attendant danger that a 
dropped pole could kill or injure someone; and (3) that workers 
guide poles with one hand while using the Dixie tongs.  Murphy's 
expert, John DeRosia, stated in his report,  
If a single failure occurs, i.e., the grip of a tooth 
on one side of the tongs, the tongs will no longer 
grasp the pole which will fall with potentially 
dangerous consequences.  Other than the engagement of 
the teeth the tongs do not have a mechanism to capture 
the pole.[7]   
                                                 
7 CMC asks us to disregard DeRosia's expert testimony as 
untested speculation.  This is, in effect, a request for the 
court to rule on its Daubert motion that remains pending before 
the circuit court.  See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 
U.S. 579 (1993).  I agree with the majority/lead opinion that we 
should not address this issue because it is not properly before 
us. 
No.  2020AP1124.bh 
 
8 
 
DeRosia continued that this "problem is exacerbated with wooden 
poles that are weathered" and that in order to manipulate the 
pole while lifting it, the "worker is in close proximity to the 
pole."   
¶84 This evidence, if proven, may demonstrate that the 
Dixie tongs could have perilous consequences should something go 
wrong or that the design could have been improved.  But it is 
insufficient 
to 
demonstrate 
that 
the 
Dixie 
tongs 
are 
unreasonably dangerous based on the expectations and dangers the 
end-user would reasonably expect.  Notably, none of this 
evidence addresses the expectations of line technicians like 
Murphy who use the Dixie tongs.  The average user of Dixie tongs 
would undoubtedly appreciate the inherent danger posed by their 
use.  As DeRosia notes, Dixie tongs are advertised for overhead 
lifting of logs and poles.  The summary judgment record reflects 
that Murphy received extensive safety training on how to 
properly use Dixie tongs; the danger of error would not be lost 
on him or others using the product.  The record further reflects 
that CMC is not aware of anyone else who has been injured while 
using Dixie tongs.  It is not investigating any alleged 
incidents nor are there any other lawsuits relating to Dixie 
tongs.  During his deposition, DeRosia also testified that he 
had not investigated a single prior incident where someone was 
injured while using the Dixie tongs.  In short, while Murphy 
introduced evidence of the inherent risk of danger, he produced 
nothing from which a reasonable juror could conclude that Dixie 
No.  2020AP1124.bh 
 
9 
 
tongs are unreasonably dangerous based on the objective and 
known risks to someone who uses them.   
¶85 The majority/lead opinion disagrees.  It states that 
because "Murphy was not lifting a load beyond the tongs' rated 
maximum, and that the tongs are advertised for lifting poles, 
and certified for overhead lifting, he provided evidence that an 
ordinary consumer would not anticipate anything more than the 
inherent dangers of working with a heavy, suspended load."  
Majority op., ¶46.  This argument is difficult to follow.  It 
does not say anything about what an ordinary user of the product 
would reasonably anticipate other than that the product contains 
inherent dangers.  But as already explained, that's not the test 
under Wis. Stat. § 895.047(1)(b).   
¶86 The concurrence reaches the same conclusion but for 
different reasons.  It relies on the absence of evidence to 
conclude summary judgment is improper.  For example, the 
concurrence points to the fact that the record is unclear with 
respect to "whether a reasonable utility worker would expect 
pole tongs to fail more often when used on worn and weathered 
poles."  Concurrence, ¶68.  And it relies on the fact that there 
is no evidence "indicating exactly what a utility worker would 
consider to be a reasonable lift failure rate."  Id., ¶69.  But 
on summary judgment, Murphy must offer some evidentiary basis to 
counter the undisputed evidence that Dixie tongs are not 
unreasonably dangerous.  The fact that Murphy has failed to do 
so is precisely why CMC's motion for summary judgment should be 
granted.    
No.  2020AP1124.bh 
 
10 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶87 In order to prevail on his strict liability claim, 
Murphy must establish all of the requirements of Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.047(1).  The undisputed material facts in the record show 
that the Dixie tongs are not unreasonably dangerous as a matter 
of law under § 895.047(1)(b).  Accordingly, summary judgment 
should be granted to CMC on Murphy's strict liability claim.  I 
respectfully dissent from the court's resolution of the strict 
liability claim, but concur with its conclusion on Murphy's 
negligence claim. 
¶88 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER and Justice REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY join this 
concurrence/dissent. 
 
No.  2020AP1124.bh 
 
1