Title: In re Marriage of Schneider
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 97430
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: January 21, 2005

Docket No. 97430-Agenda 14-November 2004.
In re MARRIAGE OF EARL M. SCHNEIDER, Appellant, and JODI
							ANN SCHNEIDER, Appellee.
Opinion filed January 21, 2005. 
	JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:
	Appellant, Earl Schneider, filed a petition in the circuit court of
Lake County seeking the dissolution of his marriage to appellee, Jodi
Ann Schneider. The circuit court entered a judgment for dissolution
of marriage incorporating its findings and decisions. Among the
contested issues at trial was the value of Earl's dental practice. In
valuing Earl's dental practice, the circuit court excluded personal
goodwill and accounts receivable from the fair market value of the
practice. The circuit court also allocated 67% of the marital assets to
Jodi, noting the duration of the marriage, the reasonable opportunity
of each spouse for the future acquisition of capital assets and income,
and that the apportionment of assets was in lieu of maintenance. The
circuit court also determined that each party would be responsible for
his or her own attorney fees.
	The appellate court affirmed the circuit court in part and reversed
in part. 343 Ill. App. 3d 628. The appellate court affirmed the circuit
court's holding that each party should be responsible for his or her
own attorney fees. However, the appellate court held that personal
goodwill and accounts receivable should have been included in the
valuation of Earl's dental practice. The appellate court therefore
reversed the circuit court's valuation of the dental practice and
remanded for a redistribution including those assets. This court then
allowed Earl's petition for leave to appeal the appellate court's
holding that personal goodwill and accounts receivable should have
been included in the valuation of the dental practice. 177 Ill. 2d R.
315.

BACKGROUND
	Earl and Jodi were married in August 1985. The parties had three
children during their marriage: Ashley, born in 1986; Justin, born in
1989; and Jordan, born in 1991. Earl filed a petition for dissolution of
marriage on September 15, 2000. Prior to trial on the petition for
dissolution, the parties stipulated that Earl's gross income as a self-employed dentist was $325,000, with a net income of $195,000. In
addition, each party waived maintenance, although Jodi later indicated
that she had reserved the right to seek a disproportionate share of the
assets in light of her waiver of maintenance. Child support was set at
$5,400 a month until Ashley attained majority or graduated high
school. Thereafter, child support was set at $4,062.25 until Justin
attained majority or graduated high school. Child support then was
reduced to $3,250 per month until Jordan attained majority or
graduated high school. The tax exemptions for the children were
allocated to Earl, and Earl agreed to pay the children's health
insurance. Jodi was awarded sole custody of the children.
	At trial, Jodi testified that she graduated from college in 1981
with a B.S. in accounting. She became a CPA in 1983. After
graduating, Jodi began working full time as a staff accountant for
Warady and Davis. Jodi was promoted to supervisor when she was
pregnant with Ashley. Jodi continued to work full time until Ashley
was born in 1986. Over Earl's objections, Jodi then worked part-time
until Justin was born. After Justin was born, Jodi stopped working at
Warady and Davis pursuant to Earl's request, although she continued
to do bookkeeping and payroll taxes for one client, working
approximately four hours every three months. In addition, Jodi did the
receivables, accounting, payables, bills and insurance for Earl's dental
practice from the time he graduated from dental school until
approximately the summer of 2000. Jodi testified that had she
continued to work full time for Warady and Davis, she would have
been promoted to manager and then to partner. Managers earn from
$75,000 to $100,000 a year, while partners earn more than $100,000
a year.
	Jodi went back to work part-time for Warady and Davis in
September 1998, when her youngest child began school. She currently
has three clients. Jodi earned a gross income of $4,385.25 in 2000.
From January through October 2001, Jodi had grossed approximately
$5,800. Jodi testified that she earns $30 an hour at Warady and Davis.
	Earl testified that on March 24, 1987, he entered into an
employment agreement with Jack E. Taub, D.D.S., Ltd., an Illinois
professional corporation. Pursuant to the employment agreement, Earl
was to receive a monthly salary equal to 40% of the net collections of
his monthly billings. On August 24, 1987, Earl entered into a second
employment agreement with Jack E. Taub, D.D.S., Ltd., which
provided for a monthly draw of $4,000 through January 31, 1988, and
on a year-to-year basis thereafter, provided Earl had purchased certain
shares of Jack E. Taub, D.D.S., Ltd. Also on August 24, 1987, Earl
entered into a stock purchase and redemption agreement with Dr.
Taub and Jack E. Taub, D.D.S., Ltd. Earl testified that he purchased
the dental practice from Dr. Taub in 1987 for $350,000, although
agreed interest payments brought the total cost to $550,000. Dr. Taub
agreed to stay at the practice for 30 months, and also agreed to a five-mile radius noncompete provision. Earl testified that he did not lose
any of Dr. Taub's patients following the transition, and that the
practice's current gross income was approximately $800,000 a year.
Jodi claimed that the total purchase price for the business was
$650,000.
	As noted, at trial on the petition for dissolution, the parties
contested the valuation of Earl's dental practice and the allocation of
marital property. Earl's expert witness, Stephen Mareta, testified that
the fair market value of the dental practice was $346,300. Of this
amount, Mareta attributed $311,300 to personal goodwill and
$35,000 to fixed assets. The fixed assets included property and
equipment, but did not include cash on hand, accounts receivable, cash
surrender value of life insurance, and loans due from officers. Mareta
testified that the accounts receivable were merely a reflection of future
income.
	Jodi's expert witness, Bruce Richman, testified that the fair
market value of the dental practice was $481,000. Richman attributed
$144,413 to tangible assets, including accounts receivable, furniture
and equipment, cash surrender value of insurance, and inventory.
Richman attributed the remaining $336,587 to intangible assets,
although Richman stated that those intangible assets did not include
personal goodwill. Richman described the intangible assets as
including dental records, the leasehold interest, a trained work force,
intellectual property, trade names and enterprise goodwill.
	On January 23, 2002, the circuit court entered its findings and
decision. The circuit court valued Earl's dental practice at $38,300.
This amount included $8,000 in inventory and $30,330 in furniture
and equipment. The circuit court did not include accounts receivable,
cash on hand, cash surrender value of life insurance, and loans due
from officers in the valuation, accepting Earl's argument that including
those items in the valuation would result in a double counting of those
assets. In addition, the circuit court held that any goodwill that existed
in the practice was personal goodwill that should not be included in
determining the fair market value of the dental practice. The circuit
court stated that Jodi's expert witness had failed to establish the
existence of any enterprise goodwill in the practice.
	The circuit court next addressed each party's request for
contribution toward attorney fees. The circuit court noted that both
parties had been extremely litigious and "quarrelsome" during the
entire process, and that each had been unreasonable from time to time,
resulting in an unnecessarily expensive divorce. The circuit court held
that legal fees would not be based upon the misconduct or
litigiousness of the other party because both parties were equally
guilty of such conduct. The circuit court then considered the factors
set forth in section 503 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of
Marriage Act (Dissolution Act) (750 ILCS 5/503 (West 2000)), as
well as the allocation of marital property and debt, and held that each
party should be responsible for his or her own legal fees and costs.
	The circuit court then allocated 67% of the marital assets to Jodi
and 33% to Earl, for an approximate distribution of $326,000 to Jodi
and $161,000 to Earl. The circuit court stated that in determining the
allocation of marital assets, it found that the following factors weighed
heavily in favor of a disproportionate allocation: the duration of the
marriage (750 ILCS 5/503(d)(4) (West 2000)); whether the
apportionment of assets was in lieu of or in addition to maintenance
(750 ILCS 5/503(d)(10) (West 2000)); and the reasonable opportunity
of each spouse for future acquisition of capital assets and income (750
ILCS 5/503(d)(11) (West 2000)). The circuit court then entered a
judgment for dissolution of marriage on March 4, 2002, incorporating
its findings and decision. The circuit court subsequently denied Earl's
motion for reconsideration.
	Earl then appealed the circuit court's judgment and Jodi filed a
cross-appeal. Earl later filed a motion to dismiss his appeal, so that
only Jodi's cross-appeal remained pending. Relevant to the instant
case, Jodi argued on appeal that the circuit court had erred in its
valuation of Earl's dental practice and thus in its ultimate distribution
of the marital property. Jodi argued that the circuit court should have
included goodwill, accounts receivable, loans due from officers, cash
surrender value of insurance policies, and cash on hand in its valuation
of the dental practice. Jodi also argued that the circuit court should
have ordered Earl to contribute to her attorney fees.
	The appellate court, with one justice dissenting, reversed the
circuit court in part. 343 Ill. App. 3d 628. The appellate court found
that the circuit court erred in excluding personal goodwill from the
valuation of Earl's dental practice. 343 Ill. App. 3d at 636. The
appellate court acknowledged that this court, in In re Marriage of
Zells, 143 Ill. 2d 251 (1991), held that personal goodwill is not to be
considered a divisible marital asset. 343 Ill. App. 3d at 635. The
appellate court concluded, however, that if goodwill is not considered
as part of a spouse's income-generating ability relative to a
maintenance award, it may be considered in the valuation of a
professional practice as a divisible marital asset. 343 Ill. App. 3d at
636. In addition, the appellate court held that accounts receivable are
business assets and should have been included in the valuation of the
dental practice. 343 Ill. App. 3d at 637. Likewise, the appellate court
found that the circuit court erred in not including the cash on hand,
cash surrender value of insurance policies and loans due from officers
in determining the fair market value of the dental practice. 343 Ill.
App. 3d at 637. The appellate court therefore reversed the circuit
court's property distribution and remanded to the circuit court for a
redistribution including the items of marital property that were
erroneously omitted from the original judgment for dissolution. 343
Ill. App. 3d at 637. Finally, the appellate court held that the circuit
court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Jodi was able to
pay her own attorney fees. 343 Ill. App. 3d at 638.
	Justice Bowman, dissenting, disagreed with the majority's
conclusion that the circuit court erred in not including personal
goodwill in the valuation of Earl's dental practice. 343 Ill. App. 3d at
638 (Bowman, J., dissenting). Justice Bowman stated that the
majority's holding was contrary to the language expressed by this
court in Zells. 343 Ill. App. 3d at 638 (Bowman, J., dissenting).
Justice Bowman noted that the circuit court considered both Jodi's
waiver of maintenance and the future income generating ability of
each party in awarding Jodi a disproportionate share of the marital
assets. 343 Ill. App. 3d at 639 (Bowman, J., dissenting). In addition,
the circuit court based its child support award on Earl's income from
his dental practice. 343 Ill. App. 3d at 639 (Bowman, J., dissenting).
Justice Bowman concluded that, because the personal goodwill of
Earl's dental practice was reflected in the child support award, any
additional consideration of goodwill in the valuation of his dental
practice would be duplicative and improper. 343 Ill. App. 3d at 639
(Bowman, J., dissenting), quoting Zells, 143 Ill. 2d  at 256.
	Earl then petitioned this court for leave to appeal from the
appellate court's holding that goodwill and accounts receivable should
have been included in the valuation of his dental practice. This court
allowed Earl's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315. Jodi
cross-appealed, again challenging the circuit court's failure to order
Earl to pay her costs and attorney fees. Jodi also argues on cross-appeal that if this court finds that goodwill and accounts receivable
were properly excluded from the valuation of Earl's dental practice,
this court should remand to the circuit court for a reconsideration of
Jodi's waiver of maintenance.

ANALYSIS
	As noted, Earl first argues that the appellate court erred in
including the personal goodwill of his dental practice as an element of
valuation. Generally, the valuation of assets in an action for
dissolution of marriage is a question of fact, and the circuit court's
determination will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. In
re Marriage of Stone, 155 Ill. App. 3d 62, 70 (1987). However, the
issue in this case-whether personal goodwill must be considered a
divisible marital asset when spousal maintenance is not
awarded-presents an issue of law and not a question of fact.
Accordingly, this court reviews the issue de novo. See In re Marriage
of Crook, 211 Ill. 2d 437, 442 (2004).
	In support of his claim that the appellate court erred in
considering personal goodwill in valuing his dental practice, Earl
contends that the appellate court majority misinterpreted this court's
decision in In re Marriage of Zells, 143 Ill. 2d 251 (1991). At issue
in Zells was the division and distribution of marital property between
a lawyer and his spouse. Zells, 143 Ill. 2d  at 252. The circuit court
and the appellate court had found that the goodwill in the husband's
law practice was a marital asset subject to division and distribution.
Zells, 143 Ill. 2d  at 252. In addressing the issue, this court noted that
the appellate court districts were divided on the issue of whether
personal goodwill should be considered in valuing a professional
practice. Zells, 143 Ill. 2d  at 254-55. For example, the Fifth District,
in In re Marriage of White, 98 Ill. App. 3d 380, 384 (1981), had held
that goodwill was a factor to be considered in valuing a professional
corporation. The White court had noted that "despite the intangible
quality of good will in a professional practice, it is of value to the
practicing spouse both during and after the marriage and its value is
manifested in the amount of business and, consequently, in the income
which the spouse generates." White, 98 Ill. App. 3d at 384.
	In contrast, the First District had taken the position that the
goodwill of a professional business was not marital property subject
to division. In re Marriage of Wilder, 122 Ill. App. 3d 338 (1983).
The Wilder court declined to follow the reasoning of the Fifth District
in White, finding that the White court's definition of goodwill was
reflected in three of the factors that the trial court must consider in
apportioning marital property under section 503(d) of the Dissolution
Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 40, par. 503(d), now 750 ILCS 5/503(d)
(West 2000))), including the ability to generate income. Wilder, 122
Ill. App. 3d at 347.
	Subsequently, the Third District elected to follow Wilder rather
than White. In re Marriage of Courtright, 155 Ill. App. 3d 55 (1987).
The appellate court in Courtright stated that:
			"Although many businesses possess this intangible known
as good will, the concept is unique in professional business.
The concept of professional good will is the sole asset of the
professional. If good will is that aspect of a business which
maintains the clientele, then the good will in a professional
business is the skill, the expertise, and the reputation of the
professional. It is these qualities which would keep patients
returning to a doctor and which would make those patients
refer others to him. The bottom line is that this is reflected in
the doctor's income-generating ability." Courtright, 155 Ill.
App. 3d at 58.
The court in Courtright concluded that, although goodwill had not
been considered in the trial court's valuation of the husband's business
itself, goodwill was a factor in examining the husband's income
potential. Courtright, 155 Ill. App. 3d at 59. The court held that "[t]o
figure good will in both facets of the practice would be to double
count and reach an erroneous valuation." Courtright, 155 Ill. App. 3d
at 59.
	Upon review of the appellate court decisions, this court in Zells
agreed with the reasoning of the court in Courtright. Zells, 143 Ill. 2d 
at 256. We held that:
		"Adequate attention to the relevant factors in the Dissolution
Act results in an appropriate consideration of professional
goodwill as an aspect of income potential. The goodwill
value is then reflected in the maintenance and support
awards. Any additional consideration of goodwill value is
duplicative and improper." Zells, 143 Ill. 2d  at 256.
We stated that "[g]oodwill represents merely the ability to acquire
future income. Consideration of goodwill as a divisible marital asset
results in gross inequity." Zells, 143 Ill. 2d  at 254.
 	In this case, in addressing our decision in Zells, the appellate
court majority focused on the statement that "goodwill value is then
reflected in the maintenance and support awards." The appellate court
majority interpreted Zells as holding that "personal goodwill, if used
as a factor in calculating income potential, on which the maintenance
and support awards are based, cannot also be used as a divisible
marital asset." (Emphasis added.) 343 Ill. App. 3d at 635. The
majority therefore concluded that "if goodwill is not considered as
part of a spouse's income-generating ability relative to a maintenance
award, it may be considered in the valuation of a professional practice
as a divisible marital asset." 343 Ill. App. 3d at 636. The majority also
rejected the dissent's assertion that personal goodwill was reflected in
the child support award. 343 Ill. App. 3d at 636. The majority
interpreted Zells as providing that personal goodwill must be reflected
in both the maintenance and support awards. 343 Ill. App. 3d at 636.
Thus, if personal goodwill was reflected only in the award of child
support, the exclusion of goodwill from the valuation of the dental
practice would result in an unfair and unjust distribution of marital
property. 343 Ill. App. 3d at 636. Consequently, the court concluded
that, because Jodi had waived maintenance, personal goodwill should
have been included when valuing Earl's dental practice.
	Earl disputes the appellate court's application of Zells. Earl
maintains that Zells held that only one of the allowances predicated on
future income, maintenance or support, was necessary for a double
count of goodwill to exist if goodwill is also used to value an asset.
Earl additionally observes that the majority did not address this court's
decision in In re Marriage of Talty, 166 Ill. 2d 232 (1995). Talty held
that an impermissible double count takes place if professional goodwill
is used first to give the other spouse a disproportionate share of the
assets and then is used in valuing the business. Talty, 166 Ill. 2d  at
238-39. Earl argues that because Jodi sought and received a
disproportionate share of the marital assets, an impermissible double
counting would take place if Earl's professional goodwill is
considered in valuing his dental practice.
	Upon review, we agree with Earl that the appellate court majority
misinterpreted our decision in Zells. Section 503(d) of the Dissolution
Act sets forth relevant factors to be considered in dividing marital
property in just proportions. These factors include:
			"(5) the relevant economic circumstances of each spouse
when the division of property is to become effective,
including the desirability of awarding the family home, or the
right to live therein for reasonable periods, to the spouse
having custody of the children;
* * *
			(8) the age, health, station, occupation, amount and
sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate,
liabilities, and needs of each of the parties;
			***
			(10) whether the apportionment is in lieu of or in addition
to maintenance; 	
			(11) the reasonable opportunity of each spouse for future
acquisition of capital assets and income[.]" 750 ILCS
5/503(d)(5), (d)(8), (d)(10), (d)(11) (West 2000).
	In Zells we noted that adequate attention to the preceding factors
would result in an appropriate consideration of professional goodwill
as an aspect of income potential that would then be reflected in the
maintenance and support awards. Zells, 143 Ill. 2d  at 256. We
therefore held that any additional consideration of goodwill value is
duplicative and improper. Zells, 143 Ill. 2d  at 256. However, as this
court made clear in Talty, the basis for our holding in Zells was not
simply the fact that maintenance and support were awarded. Rather,
the basis for our holding in Zells was the fact that personal goodwill
"is already reflected in a number of the circumstances that must be
considered by a judge in making an equitable division of property
under the [Dissolution] Act." Talty, 166 Ill. 2d  at 237. Specifically we
stated:
			" 'A workable definition of goodwill is that "goodwill is
the value of a business or practice that exceeds the combined
value of the physical assets." (2 Valuation and Distribution of
Marital Property, sec. 23.04[1] (M. Bender ed. 1984).)' (In
re Marriage of White (1986), 151 Ill. App. 3d 778, 780.)
'Goodwill represents merely the ability to acquire future
income.' (Zells, 143 Ill. 2d  at 254.) To the extent that the
goodwill of the car dealership depends on [the husband's]
personal efforts, the same elements that underlie that
calculation were also considered by the court in its
assessment of the criteria contained in section 503(d)." Talty,
166 Ill. 2d  at 238.
Notably, in Talty, although no award of maintenance or child support
was made, this court nonetheless held that personal goodwill should
not be considered an asset of the business because the elements that
constitute personal goodwill are considered under section 503(d) of
the Dissolution Act in dividing marital property. Talty, 166 Ill. 2d  at
240.
	In this case, as in Talty, the personal goodwill in Earl's dental
practice was considered by the circuit court in assessing the criteria in
section 503(d) and in deciding to award Jodi a disproportionate share
of the marital assets. Any further consideration of that goodwill in
valuing Earl's dental practice would amount to an impermissible
double counting. Accordingly, we find that the appellate court erred
in holding that personal goodwill should have been included in the
valuation of Earl's dental practice.
	Notwithstanding this court's decisions in Zells and Talty, Jodi
argued in her brief and at oral argument that this court should follow
the approach taken by the appellate court in In re Marriage of
Grunsten, 304 Ill. App. 3d 12 (1999), in valuing Earl's dental practice.
Grunsten held that, in valuing a closely held corporation, it was proper
to consider the price paid for the corporation four years earlier, as
well as the increase in gross revenues since the corporation was
purchased. Grunsten, 304 Ill. App. 3d at 18. Jodi argues that this
court should look to the price that Earl paid Dr. Taub for his dental
practice, as well as at the increase in revenues since Earl purchased the
practice in order to determine a fair market value for the practice.
	We decline to adopt the approach set forth in Grunsten for
purposes of the valuation in this case. The issue of goodwill in valuing
the corporation was not addressed by the court in Grunsten.
Moreover, the corporation in Grunsten was a closely held
corporation, while Earl's dental practice is a professional corporation.
The goodwill in a professional practice is generally personal in nature,
while the goodwill in a corporation might include both personal and
enterprise goodwill. Talty, 166 Ill. 2d  at 239. As we recognized in
Talty, the duplication of the factors set forth in section 503(d) of the
Act is limited to personal goodwill and does not extend to enterprise
goodwill. Talty, 166 Ill. 2d  at 239-40. Because the court in Grunsten
did not address the issue of goodwill, let alone whether any enterprise
or personal goodwill existed in the corporation, we find that Grunsten
is inapposite.
	Earl next argues that the appellate court erred in remanding this
cause to the circuit court with directions to consider accounts
receivable in distributing the marital estate.(1) Earl concedes that courts
have classified accounts receivable as assets, but argues that no court
has considered the issue of double counting with regard to accounts
receivable. Earl contends that the accounts receivable are analogous
to goodwill. Earl argues that accounts receivable are income from
which child support payments are made, so that if accounts receivable
are considered in valuing the dental practice, the same money is being
paid upon twice. Jodi responds that goodwill and accounts receivable
are distinguishable. Goodwill is an intangible asset, while accounts
receivable are tangible, or fixed, assets and may be considered in
valuing Earl's dental practice.
	Because the issue of whether accounts receivable are properly
included in valuing a professional corporation presents an issue of law,
our review is de novo. See In re Marriage of Crook, 211 Ill. 2d 437,
442 (2004). Although this court has not considered the issue, our
appellate court has addressed whether accounts receivable should be
considered in valuing a professional practice. In In re Marriage of
Tietz, 238 Ill. App. 3d 965, 973 (1992), the respondent husband
argued that the trial court erred in valuing his law practice by taking
into consideration accounts receivable. Relying on this court's
decision in Zells, the respondent argued that accounts receivable, like
goodwill and contingent fees, were part of his future earnings and
were accounted for in his projected income, so that it would be
duplicative to also consider the accounts receivable as a separate asset
in valuing respondent's law practice. Tietz, 238 Ill. App. 3d at 975.
The respondent maintained that the accounts receivable should not be
viewed as marital property subject to distribution, but instead should
be used in determining income for purposes of support and
maintenance. Tietz, 238 Ill. App. 3d at 975.
	The appellate court held that Zells did not apply to accounts
receivable. Tietz, 238 Ill. App. 3d at 976. The court in Tietz noted
that, in addition to goodwill, Zells had also considered whether a
lawyer's contingent fee contracts are subject to valuation, division and
distribution as part of the marital estate. Zells held that the proper
context for the consideration of fees, contingent or otherwise, was in
the determination of income for support and maintenance, so that
future earned fees could be considered if the subject of maintenance
was revisted. Zells, 143 Ill. 2d  at 253. The court in Tietz then
concluded that:
			"Clearly, future earned fees, like contingent fees, are not
marital assets because their value is too speculative and
because they are fees earned in the future. Accounts
receivable, however, are distinguishable because they are
assets already earned with a known value but have not yet
been collected." Tietz, 238 Ill. App. 3d at 977.
The appellate court held that it was not error for the trial court to
value the law partnership by viewing the tangible assets, including
accounts receivable. Tietz, 238 Ill. App. 3d at 977. The court stated
that "[a]ccounts receivable are only 'future income' in the sense they
will be collected in the future. The distinction is these fees have
already been earned and have a known value." Tietz, 238 Ill. App. 3d
at 977.
	Subsequent appellate court decisions have also rejected the claim
that considering accounts receivable in valuing a business results in a
double recovery. See In re Marriage of Steinberg, 299 Ill. App. 3d
603 (1998) (court rejects husband's theory that because accounts
receivable when collected become part of the husband's income upon
which support is based, wife would receive double benefit if marital
estate also was reimbursed for increase in accounts receivable); In re
Marriage of Lee, 246 Ill. App. 3d 628 (1993) (court rejects husband's
claim that trial court considered his "future income" twice, once in
valuing the accounts receivable and again in determining the
proportion of marital assets awarded each party, holding that accounts
receivable are simply past, but not yet collected, income).
	We agree with the appellate court in the preceding cases.
Although accounts receivable have not been collected, they are assets
that have been earned and have a known value and, thus, are
distinguishable from future earnings or income-generating ability.
Because accounts receivable have a known value, a court can properly
consider accounts receivable as assets of the business. As the Tietz
court correctly observed, accounts receivable are future income only
in the sense that they will be collected in the future. Accounts
receivable are not future income in the sense that they are assets
considered by a circuit court in determining a party's income-generating ability for purposes of maintenance or child support
awards. The fact that the accounts receivable may not be collected
until a future date does not transform those assets into speculative or
future income. Consequently, we agree with the appellate court that
the circuit court should have considered the accounts receivable in
valuing Earl's dental practice. We therefore affirm that portion of the
appellate court's order remanding this cause to the circuit court for a
redistribution of marital property which includes accounts receivable,
in addition to cash on hand, cash surrender value of life insurance, and
loans due from officers.
	Finally, Earl argues that if this court affirms the appellate court's
holding that goodwill and/or accounts receivable should be included
in valuing Earl's dental practice, this court must also order the circuit
court to reassess the 67/33 allocation of marital assets. Earl contends
that the addition of personal goodwill and accounts receivable would
increase the marital estate by more than $300,000, resulting in an
unjust allocation of assets if the 67/33 division is allowed to stand.
	Section 503(d) of the Dissolution Act provides that the circuit
court shall divide marital property in "just proportions." 750 ILCS
5/503(d) (West 2000). In order to divide the marital property in just
proportions, the circuit court first must establish the value of the
assets. In re Marriage of Cutler, 334 Ill. App. 3d 731, 736 (2002).
Any conflicts in testimony concerning the valuation of assets must be
resolved by the trier of fact. In re Marriage of Stone, 155 Ill. App. 3d
62, 70-71 (1987). Here, Earl's expert showed adjusted accounts
receivable of $112,000, while Earl stated that the accounts receivable
would amount to $89,000. Jodi's expert discounted the receivables to
$78,550. Consequently, upon remand, the circuit court first must
determine the proper value of the accounts receivable, then it must
include the accounts receivable, cash on hand, cash surrender value of
life insurance and the loans due from officers in the distribution of
marital assets. Because the circuit court has not had an opportunity to
reassess the allocation of marital assets in light of the redistribution,
we will not at this point usurp the circuit court's discretion to
determine whether the 67/33 allocation of assets remains a just
allocation upon redistribution. Rather, we find that it is for the circuit
court to determine whether the 67/33 allocation must be reassessed
once the accounts receivable, cash on hand, cash surrender value of
life insurance and loans due from officers are added to the marital
estate.
	We next consider the issues raised in Jodi's cross-appeal. Jodi
argues that, if this court agrees that goodwill and/or accounts
receivable were properly excluded from the valuation of Earl's dental
practice, this court should find that the circuit court abused its
discretion in failing to sua sponte declare Jodi's waiver of maintenance
unconscionable. In the event that this court declines to include
goodwill and/or accounts receivable in the valuation of the dental
practice, Jodi asks this court to either enter an award of maintenance
or remand to the circuit court for an award of maintenance.
	Earl responds that Jodi should not be allowed to change her
litigation position on appeal. Earl notes that Jodi elected to waive
maintenance at trial in order to seek a disproportionate share of the
marital assets. Based upon Jodi's waiver of maintenance, the circuit
court did in fact award Jodi a disproportionate share of the marital
assets. Jodi should not be allowed to retract her waiver of
maintenance simply because the circuit court did not accept her
valuation of the dental practice.
	We agree with Earl. This court has held that the theory under
which a case is tried in the trial court cannot be changed on review,
and an issue not presented to or considered by the trial court cannot
be raised for the first time on review. Daniels v. Anderson, 162 Ill. 2d 47, 58 (1994). To allow a party to change his or her trial theory on
review would weaken the adversarial process and the system of
appellate jurisdiction, and could also prejudice the opposing party,
who did not have an opportunity to respond to that theory in the trial
court. Daniels, 162 Ill. 2d  at 59. Here, Jodi elected to waive
maintenance in order to request a disproportionate share of the marital
assets. Nonetheless, Jodi now claims that the division of assets was
unconscionable because the valuation of the dental practice did not
include personal goodwill. Jodi, however, cannot claim that she was
unaware that personal goodwill would be excluded from the valuation
because our decisions in Zells and Talty were well established at the
time that Jodi elected to waive maintenance. In addition, although
goodwill was not included in the valuation of the dental practice, the
circuit court considered goodwill, as evinced by Earl's greater ability
to acquire assets in the future, in awarding Jodi 67% of the marital
assets and in setting the amount of child support. We will not allow
Jodi to change her trial strategy on appeal and now seek maintenance
simply because the circuit court did not accept her expert's valuation
of Earl's dental practice.
	In any event, the propriety of a maintenance award is within the
discretion of the trial court and the court's decision will not be
disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Puls, 268
Ill. App. 3d 882, 887 (1994). A trial court abuses its discretion only
where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial
court. Puls, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 888. Moreover, the burden is on the
party seeking reversal concerning maintenance to show an abuse of
discretion. Puls, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 888. Given that Jodi waived
maintenance in order to seek a disproportionate share of the assets,
and did in fact receive a disproportionate share of the assets, we
cannot say that the circuit court's failure to sua sponte reconsider
Jodi's waiver of maintenance amounted to an abuse of discretion.
	Finally, Jodi argues on cross-appeal that circuit and appellate
courts erred in denying her request for contribution of attorney fees
and costs. Jodi claims that the circuit court abused its discretion
because the evidence revealed a gross disparity in income and earning
capacity, as well as Jodi's financial inability to pay her fees.
	Earl contends that Jodi has failed to meet her burden of showing
that the circuit court's finding was an abuse of discretion. Jodi failed
to present any facts or argument with regard to the fee factors,
including complexity, nature of the controversy, or importance of the
subject matter. Jodi also failed to provide this court with a record
reflecting the amount of Earl's fees, which is necessary to an analysis
concerning an award of attorney fees. Earl argues that absent a finding
that the dental practice was undervalued, the circuit court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Jodi's request that Earl pay more than
$67,000 for her attorney and expert fees, in addition to his own fees,
out of the $161,000 that he received in the distribution of marital
assets.
	Section 508 of the Dissolution Act allows for an award of
attorney fees where one party lacks the financial resources and the
other party has the ability to pay. 750 ILCS 5/508 (West 2000). The
party seeking an award of attorney fees must establish her inability to
pay and the other spouse's ability to do so. In re Marriage of Puls,
268 Ill. App. 3d 882, 889 (1994). Financial inability exists where
requiring payment of fees would strip that party of her means of
support or undermine her financial stability. Puls, 268 Ill. App. 3d at
889. In addition, a trial court's decision to award or deny fees will be
reversed only if the trial court abused its discretion. In re Marriage of
Snow, 277 Ill. App. 3d 642, 653 (1996).
	The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's order holding
each party responsible for his and her own attorney fees and costs.
The appellate court noted that the circuit court found both parties
were equally unreasonable, litigious and quarrelsome throughout the
proceedings, resulting in an unnecessarily expensive divorce. In
addition, the circuit court had considered the factors set forth in
section 503 of the Dissolution Act and found it was equitable to hold
both parties responsible for their own attorney fees. The appellate
court further noted that Jodi had failed to show an inability to pay her
own attorney fees. Finally, the appellate court reiterated that Jodi had
been awarded a disproportionate share of the marital assets,
amounting to approximately $326,000.
	We agree with the appellate court that Jodi has failed to establish
that the circuit court abused its discretion in this case. Jodi has not
established her inability to pay or Earl's ability to do so. Jodi also has
not established that requiring payment of fees would strip her of her
means of support or would undermine her financial stability. Although
Jodi claims she is entitled to fees because Earl's dental practice was
worth $650,000, we note that Earl's greater earning capacity was
taken into consideration in awarding Jodi a disproportionate share of
the marital assets and in setting the amount of child support.
Consequently, we affirm the circuit court's order directing each party
to pay his or her own fees and costs.
	For these reasons, we reverse the appellate court's judgment
finding that the circuit court should have included personal goodwill
in the valuation of Earl's dental practice. We affirm the appellate
court's finding that the circuit court should have included accounts
receivable, cash on hand, cash surrender value of life insurance
policies and loans to officers in its valuation of the dental practice, and
remand the cause to the circuit court for a redistribution including
those assets. Finally, we affirm the judgment of the circuit and
appellate courts directing that each party is responsible for his or her
own attorney's fees and costs.
Appellate court judgment affirmed
in part and reversed in part;
circuit court judgment affirmed
in part and reversed in part;
cause remanded with directions.
 
 
1.            Earl does not challenge the appellate court's 
finding that cash on hand, the cash surrender value of life insurance, and loans due from officers should be added to the value of the 
corporation.