Title: PETRITZ v ALBERTSONS INC
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 14837
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: April 6, 1980

No. 14837 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980 MARY PETRITZ , Plaintiff and Respondent, VS. ALBERTSONS, INC. an Idaho corporation, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Second Judicial District, In and for the County of Silver Bow. Honorable James D. Freebourn, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Poore, Roth, Robischon & Robinson, Butte, Montana Donald Robinson argued, Butte, Montana For Respondent: Michael J. McKeon argued, Anaconda, Montana David L. Holland, Butte, Montana Submitted: February 27, 1980 Api~ Decided : i i -19a Filed: -2 5 4 - Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is an action alleging unlawful discharge in employment. Plaintiff-respondent, Mary Petritz, filed a compl-aint. against defendant-appellant, Albertsons, Inc., on August 16, 1977, in the District Court of the Second Judi- cial District, in and for the County of Silver BOW, alleging that she was unlawfully discharged from her employment with Albertsons, Inc., where she was employed as a meat wrapper. The complaint alleged that her discharge was discriminatory, in violation of both the Montana State Constitution and a labor agreement between the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America, Local No. 333, AFL-CIO, of which she was a member. Plaintiff sought back wages, seniority benefits, and general damages. Defendant filed an answer to plaintiff's complaint on December 28, 1977, denying the allegations of the complaint and asserting certain affirmative defenses. On the same day, a pretrial conference was held at which the District Court ordered that, if the parties desired to introduce exhibits in addition to those listed at the pretrial con- ference, they would supply copies of such exhibits to op- posing counsel at least ten days prior to trial. The District Court also entered a similar order with respect to witnesses, requiring that counsel serve a list of any addi- tional witnesses upon opposing counsel at least twenty days before trial. Defendant engaged thereafter in extensive pretrial discovery, taking several depositions. The case was set for a trial by jury on April 3, 1979. ~ i v e days prior to trial, on March 28, 1979, defendant was served with a list of witnesses plaintiff intended to call at the time of trial. The list contained the names of seven people who had not been listed as witnesses at the pretrial conference. Accompanying the list was a notice for the taking of the depositions of two witnesses whose names were supplied at the conference. The time set for the taking of these depositions was April 2, 1979, the day before trial. On March 29, 1979, defendant filed a motion for a directed verdict and a brief in support thereof. Defendant also filed a motion in limine to exclude the testimony of the new witnesses and a motion to quash the taking of the deposition of the two witnesses. Hearings were held with regard to these motions on March 30, 1979. The District Ccurt granted the motion to quash and reserved a ruling on the motion in limine until trial. On the day before trial, April 2, 1979, plaintiff filed a motion for voluntary dismissal of the action without prejudice to her right to refile another action against defendant. The motion was filed pursuant to Rule 41 (a) (2) , M.R.Civ.P. A hearing was held upon the motion. At the hearing, plaintiff argued that the motion for voluntary dis- missal should be granted because new witnesses had been discovered which would support an additional theory of liability against the defendant for wage and sex discrimi- nation. Plaintiff advised the court that these witnesses had not been known prior to ~ p r i l 2 , and that, when they were discovered, their names were immediately served upon counsel for defendant. Defendant opposed the motion for dismissal on the grounds that it had engaged in extensive p r e t r i a l discovery, t h a t t h e motion was being employed as a t a c t i c t o avoid a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t , and t h a t i f t h e t r i a l were delayed, defendant would incur another y e a r ' s l i a b i l i t y f o r back wages i f a v e r d i c t f o r p l a i n t i f f were eventually recovered. The D i s t r i c t Court granted p l a i n t i f f ' s motion and entered an order t h a t t h e a c t i o n be dismissed without prejudice. Defendant t h e r e a f t e r f i l e d a motion t o a l t e r o r amend t h e order, o r t o condition such dismissal upon t h e attachment of c e r t a i n conditions. I n support of i t s motion, defendant f i l e d a f f i d a v i t s of a t t o r n e y f e e s , c o s t s and expenses which it f e l t could n o t be of b e n e f i t i n any f u t u r e a c t i o n . The c o s t s t o t a l e d $881.93. Defendant a l s o esti- mated i t s p o t e n t i a l l i a b i l i t y f o r back wages i n a f u t u r e a c t i o n t o be approximately $17,573.34. Defendant moved f o r an o r d e r t o l l i n g back-pay l i a b i l i t y from t h e day which had been o r i g i n a l l y set f o r t h e t r i a l t o t h e t i m e of t h e e n t r y of a judgment i n any f u t u r e a c t i o n . I n response t o t h e s e motions, t h e D i s t r i c t Court entered an order on A p r i l 24, 1979 amending i t s A p r i l 2 order. That order d i r e c t e d p l a i n t i f f t o pay defendant $85 f o r f i l i n g c o s t s and a t t o r n e y f e e s p r e s e n t l y incurred, i f t h e p l a i n t i f f sought t o i n s t i t u t e another a c t i o n i n t h e f u t u r e . The D i s t r i c t Court refused t o consider, however, t h e t o l l i n g of any back-pay l i a b i l i t y during t h e pendency of any new a c t i o n . On May 18, 1979, p l a i n t i f f f i l e d another s e p a r a t e a c t i o n a g a i n s t defendant and her union i n which she a l l e g e d t h a t she had been unlawfully and d i s c r i m i n a t o r i l y discharged from her employment. I n t h e complaint, p l a i n t i f f sought a l l l o s t wages, s e n i o r i t y b e n e f i t s and general damages. hat a c t i o n i s still pending. Defendant appeals from the r u l i n g of t h e District Court i n i t s A p r i l 2 and A p r i l 24 orders. Three i s s u e s a r e r a i s e d f o r our consideration upon appeal : 1. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n granting plain- t i f f ' s motion t o dismiss without p r e j u d i c e on t h e day before t r i a l ? 2. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n r e f u s i n g t o t o l l back-pay l i a b i l i t y of defendant which w i l l accrue from t h e d a t e o r i g i n a l l y scheduled f o r t r i a l t o t h e d a t e of e n t r y of any judgment recovered i n a p o s s i b l e f u t u r e a c t i o n ? 3 . Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n r e q u i r i n g t h a t , as a condition precedent t o p l a i n t i f f bringing another a c t i o n , p l a i n t i f f pay defendant a sum i n t h e amount of $85 f o r a t t o r n e y f e e s and f i l i n g c o s t s a l r e a d y incurred? The i s s u e s r a i s e d by defendant i n t h i s case r e q u i r e t h i s Court t o i n t e r p r e t Rule 4 1 ( a ) ( 2 ) of t h e Montana Rules of C i v i l Procedure. This r u l e i s i d e n t i c a l i n a l l r e s p e c t s t o Rule 4 1 ( a ) ( 2 ) of t h e Federal Rules of C i v i l Procedure, which has been i n t e r p r e t e d by many a u t h o r i t i e s . The i n t e r - p r e t a t i o n s under t h e f e d e r a l . r u l e have persuasive applica- t i o n t o an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e state r u l e because of t h e i d e n t i c a l language. Rule 41(a), M.R.Civ.P. provides i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : "Voluntary dismissal - e f f e c t thereof. (1) By p l a i n t i f f - by s t i p u l a t i o n . Subject t o t h e provisions of Rule 2 3 ( c ) , of Rule 66, and of any s t a t u t e of t h e state of Montana, an a c t i o n may be dismissed by t h e p l a i n t i f f without order of c o u r t (i) by f i l i n g a n o t i c e of dimissal a t any t i m e before s e r v i c e by t h e adverse p a r t y of an answer o r of a motion f o r summary judgment, which ever f i r s t occurs, o r (ii) by f i l i n g a s t i p u l a t i o n of d i s m i s s a l signed by a l l p a r t i e s who have appeared i n t h e a c t i o n . Unless otherwise s t a t e d i n t h e n o t i c e of dismissal o r s t i p u l a t i o n , t h e d i s m i s s a l i s without prejudice. " (2) By order of court. Except as provided in paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. . . . Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph is without prejudice." It is clear that the granting of a motion for voluntary dismissal under Rule 41 (a) (2) is within the sound discretion of the trial court and is reviewable only for an abuse of discretion. Armstrong v. Frostie Co. (4th Cir. 1971), 453 F.2d 914, 916; La-Tex Supply Co. v. Fruehauf Trailer Divi- sion, Fruehauf Corp. (5th Cir. 1971), 444 F.2d 1366, 1368. It is not a matter of right. In using its discretion, the court should consider the expense and inconvenience that will result to the defendant, other prejudicial consequences, and whether terms and conditions attached to the dismissal may make the defendant reasonably whole. Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, 5912 at 116-117. "It is the prejudice to the defendant, rather the convenience of the court, that is to be considered in passing on a motion for dismissal. If the motion is made at an early stage of the case, before much has happened, it is more like- ly to be granted. Although dismissal may still be allowed at later stages, an especially strong showing is required to warrant voluntary dismis- sal without prejudice after the plaintiff has concluded his evidence or the defendant has moved for a directed verdict or a verdict has been directed for defendant." Wright and Miller, Fed- eral Practice and Procedure, 52364 at 1 6 9 - 1 7 0 7 The general rule is that dismissal should be allowed unless the defendant will suffer some plain legal prejudice other than the mere prospect of a second lawsuit. Moore's Federal Practice, Vol. 5, 1 1 4 1 . 0 5 at 41-72; Wright and Miller, supra, S2364 at 165. It is no bar to a dismissal that the plaintiff may obtain a tactical advantage. Barron and Holtzoff, supra, 5912 at 114; Moore's Federal Practice, supra. The purpose of Rule 41(a) (2) " i s primarily t o pre- vent voluntary d i s m i s s a l s which u n f a i r l y a f f e c t t h e o t h e r s i d e , and t o permit t h e imposition of c u r a t i v e conditions." Wright and M i l l e r , supra. When a t r i a l c o u r t decides t o g r a n t a motion f o r volun- t a r y dismissal under Rule 41(a) ( 2 ) , it is vested with wide d i s c r e t i o n i n determining what conditions may a t t a c h t o t h e dismissal. It may, f o r example, r e q u i r e a p l a i n t i f f t o pay c o s t s and reasonable a t t o r n e y f e e s , o r it may choose t o impose no conditions a t a l l : "The t e r m s and conditions t h a t may be imposed upon t h e g r a n t i n g of a motion f o r voluntary d i s m i s s a l a r e f o r t h e p r o t e c t i o n of a defen- dant, and i n t h e absence of proper o b j e c t i o n s o r showing of proper conditions, t h e c o u r t may dismiss without conditions. Each p a r t y may be required t o pay h i s own c o s t s , b u t o r d i n a r i l y t h e dismissal should be conditioned upon the payment of c o s t s by p l a i n t i f f . " Barron and Holtzoff, supra, 5914 a t 123. P l a i n t i f f contends i n t h i s case t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t abuse its d i s c r e t i o n i n dismissing t h e a c t i o n and awarding defendant $85 f o r c o s t s and a t t o r n e y f e e s . p l a i n - t i f f argues t h a t t h e d i s m i s s a l w a s proper because of r e c e n t l y discovered witnesses and t h e f a c t t h a t defendant had suf- f e r e d no prejudice because t h e t r i a l had n o t y e t commenced. P l a i n t i f f submits t h a t t h e dismissal was n o t sought a s a t a c t i c a l device t o escape t h e motion f o r a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t o r t o avoid t h e requirements of t h e p r e t r i a l order. Defendant contends, however, t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d . Defendant argues t h a t it s u f f e r e d s u b s t a n t i a l preju- d i c e by t h e dismissal--not only had it engaged i n extensive p r e t r i a l discovery, b u t it was faced with increasing back- pay l i a b i l i t y f o r p l a i n t i f f should an unfavorable judgment eventually be recovered. I n considering t h e p o s i t i o n s of t h e p a r t i e s , w e n o t e f i r s t t h a t t h e r e i s supporting f e d e r a l a u t h o r i t y f o r both s i d e s . O n one hand, f e d e r a l c o u r t s have allowed p a r t i e s t o dismiss when they have discovered new evidence late i n t h e proceedings. See, Gold v. Geo. T. Moore Sons, Inc. (1943), 3 F.R.D. 201; Union N a t . Bank of Youngstown v. Superior S t e e l Corp. (1949), 9 F.R.D. 117. The United S t a t e s Supreme Court has a l s o expressed i t s approval of a motion t o dismiss under Rule 4 1 ( a ) ( 2 ) i n t h e s i t u a t i o n where t h e r e has been a motion f o r a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t and t h e c o u r t b e l i e v e s t h a t , although t h e r e i s a t e c h n i c a l f a i l u r e of proof, t h e r e i s nevertheless a meritorious claim. Cone v. W e s t Virginia Pulp & Paper Co. (1947), 330 U.S. 212, 67 S.Ct. 752, 91 L.Ed. 849. On t h e o t h e r hand, f e d e r a l c o u r t s have denied motion f o r voluntary dismissal where an a c t i o n has been pending f o r a long t i m e and a p a r t y was n o t d i l i g e n t i n discovery. Pace v. Southern Express Co. ( 7 t h C i r . 1969), 409 F.2d 331; Paturzo v. Home L i f e I n s . Co. ( 4 t h C i r . 19741, 503 F.2d 333; Shaffer v. Evans (10th C i r . 1958), 263 F.2d 134; Walker v. Spencer (10th C i r . 1941), 123 F.2d 347. W e a l s o note t h a t t h e r e appears t o be no w e l l - s e t t l e d r u l e with r e s p e c t t o t h e i s s u e of whether a p a r t y ' s lia- b i l i t y may be t o l l e d and attached a s a condition i n t h e granting of a voluntary dismissal. While a c o u r t i s gener- a l l y given wide d i s c r e t i o n i n imposing conditions under Rule 4 1 (a) ( 2 ) , and such conditions a r e n o t merely l i m i t e d t o t h e payment of money, c a s e s which have addressed a defendant's continuing l i a b i l i t y f o r p o s s i b l e f u t u r e a c t i o n s have reached opposite r e s u l t s . See, Union Nat. Bank of Youngstown v. s u p e r i o r S t e e l Corp., supra; ~ h i l a d e l p h i a Gear works v. Kerotest Mfg. Co. (D.C. Pa. 1951), 101 F.Supp. 820. I n union Nat. -- Bank, an a c t i o n f o r infringement upon p a t e n t s , t h e c o u r t refused t o a t t a c h as a condition t o t h e voluntary dismissal p l a i n t i f f ' s agreement n o t t o a s s e r t a g a i n s t defendant any c l a i m s which w e r e based upon o t h e r p a t e n t s which p l a i n t i f f might have possessed during t h e pendency of t h e complaint. Y e t , i n Philadelphia Gear Works, another p a t e n t infringement s u i t , t h e motion t o dismiss was granted on t h e condition t h a t p l a i n t i f f would n o t a s s e r t a claim a g a i n s t defendant o r h i s vendees o r successors i n t i t l e . A u t h o r i t i e s i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e s e cases a l s o adopt p o s i t i o n s t h a t vary. While one a u t h o r i t y phrases t h e general r u l e by s t a t i n g t h a t a c o u r t "may condition dismissal on p l a i n t i f f ' s agreement n o t t o a s s e r t c e r t a i n claims i n another a c t i o n , " another states t h a t " t h e c o u r t w i l l o r d i n a r i l y refuse" such conditions. Wright and M i l l e r , supra, 82366 a t 181; Barron and Holtzoff, supra, 8914 a t 125-26. I n t h i s case, what weighs most heavily i n our judgment i s t h e e x t e n t t o which t h e defendant was prejudiced, i f any, by t h e dismissal and whether, i f s u b s t a n t i a l prejudice d i d occur, t h e defendant could have been made reasonably whole by t h e imposition of any c u r a t i v e conditions attached t o t h e dismissal. Where such conditions may be attached, t h e general r u l e favoring t h e granting of t h e motion should be followed. The f a c t t h a t defendant may s u f f e r t h e prospect of a second lawsuit o r t h a t p l a i n t i f f may o b t a i n some tac- t i c a l advantage by t h e dismissal should n o t bar granting t h e motion. Barron and Holtzoff, supra. H e r e , w e f i n d t h a t defendant s u f f e r e d s u b s t a n t i a l p r e j u d i c e by t h e granting of the motion and t h a t t h i s preju- d i c e could have been cured by imposing conditions. I n view of t h e u n s e t t l e d s t a t e of t h e l a w with r e s p e c t t o t o l l i n g l i a b i l i t y i n f u t u r e a c t i o n s , however, we d e c l i n e t o say whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t should have attached t h e t o l l i n g of any l i a b i l i t y f o r p l a i n t i f f ' s back pay a s a condition t o t h e dismissal. W e leave t h i s matter f o r t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s con- s i d e r a t i o n i n t h e t r i a l of t h e second a c t i o n . W e do f i n d , however, i n view of t h e l a t e n e s s of p l a i n - t i f f ' s motion f o r d i s m i s s a l , and t h e extensive preparation on t h e p a r t of t h e defense, t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t should have attached a s a condition t o t h e dismissal a more reasonable award of c o s t s and a t t o r n e y fees. I t i s well s e t t l e d t h a t an award of a t t o r n e y f e e s be based upon competent evidence. F i r s t S e c u r i t y Bk. of Bozeman v. Tholkes (1976), 169 Mont. 422, 429, 547 P.2d 1328, 1331; Phennicie v. Phennicie (1979), Mont. , 604 P.2d 787, 791, 36 St.Rep. 2378, 2383. Here, t h e D i s t r i c t Court awarded defendant $10 f o r c o s t s and $75 f o r a t t o r n e y f e e s . Despite t h i s f a c t , defendant sub- mitted d e t a i l e d documentation t o t h e c o u r t t h a t it had expended $881.93 i n c o s t s and l e g a l f e e s . The record does n o t r e v e a l whether p l a i n t i f f disputed t h e amount o r descrip- t i o n s of t h e s e r v i c e s and expenses. Nor does t h e r e appear any r a t i o n a l e by t h e t r i a l c o u r t f o r t h e award o r any con- s i d e r a t i o n of p l a i n t i f f ' s f i n a n c i a l a b i l i t y t o pay. The award appears t o be nothing more than an a r b i t r a r y f i g u r e t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court s e l e c t e d . There i s l i t t l e from which an a p p e l l a t e c o u r t could review t h e reasonableness of the award. I n view of t h e documents and e x h i b i t s submitted i n t h e record, w e f i n d t h a t a more reasonable award of c o s t s and a t t o r n e y f e e s i s proper, and w e d i r e c t t h e c o u r t t o hold a hearing regarding t h e determination of c o s t s and reasonable a t t o r n e y f e e s . Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed in part. The court is directed to hold a hearing and award a reasonable figure with respect to costs and attorney fees. We concur: Justices &