Title: Nastatos v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 620, 2006
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: October 11, 2007

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ANTHONY NASTATOS, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 620, 2006 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID 0604000217 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: August 2, 2007 
  Decided: October 11, 2007 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER, and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 11th day of October 2007, upon consideration of the appellant's 
Supreme Court Rule 26(c) brief, his attorney's motion to withdraw, the 
State's response thereto, and the parties’ respective supplemental 
memoranda, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Anthony Nastatos, was found guilty 
of attempted second degree burglary, criminal mischief, offensive touching, 
and noncompliance with a no contact order following a bench trial in the 
Superior Court.  The Superior Court sentenced Nastatos to a total period of 
three years at Level V incarceration to be suspended after serving one year 
for probation.  Nastatos filed this direct appeal. 
 
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(2) 
Nastatos’ counsel on appeal filed a brief and a motion to 
withdraw pursuant to Rule 26(c).  Counsel asserted that, based upon a 
complete and careful examination of the record, there are no arguably 
appealable issues.  By letter, Nastatos’ attorney informed him of the 
provisions of Rule 26(c) and provided Nastatos with a copy of the motion to 
withdraw and the accompanying brief.  Nastatos also was informed of his 
right to supplement his attorney's presentation.  Nastatos raised five issues 
for this Court's consideration.  The State responded to Nastatos’ points, as 
well as the position taken by Nastatos’ counsel, and moved to affirm the 
Superior Court's judgment.  After considering their respective submissions, 
the Court directed the parties, in light of our recent holding in Dolan v. 
State,1 to address the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial to support 
Nastatos’ conviction on the attempted second degree burglary charge. The 
parties have addressed that issue, and the case is now ripe for decision. 
(3) 
The standard and scope of review applicable to the 
consideration of a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under 
Rule 26(c) is twofold:  (a) this Court must be satisfied that defense counsel 
has made a conscientious examination of the record and the law for arguable 
claims; and (b) this Court must conduct its own review of the record and 
                                                 
1 925 A.2d 495 (Del. 2007). 
 
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determine whether the appeal is so totally devoid of at least arguably 
appealable issues that it can be decided without an adversary presentation.2 
(4) 
The State’s evidence at trial fairly established the following 
version of events:  In the early morning of April 2, 2006, Anne Herrington 
was returning from Philadelphia when she received a phone call from 
Anthony Nastatos.  Herrington did not want to see Nastatos, so she lied and 
told him she wouldn’t be coming home that evening.  Nastatos grew upset 
and told Herrington that he was at her house and was too intoxicated to 
leave.  Herrington was alarmed by Nastatos’ behavior and called a friend, 
Torin Morgan, to come to her home. 
(5) 
Herrington arrived home and saw Nastatos sitting on her back 
deck.  She asked him to leave.  He refused.  Shortly thereafter, Morgan 
arrived and attempted to calm Nastatos and convince him to leave.  Nastatos 
attempted several times to force his way into Herrington’s house by 
ramming the door.  A struggle ensued, during which Nastatos struck 
Herrington in the face.  Nastatos also broke the outer pane of the dual pane 
sliding glass into Herrington’s house before police arrived.  He was charged 
with attempted second degree burglary, criminal mischief, offensive 
touching, and noncompliance with a no contact order.  After a one-day 
                                                 
2 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of 
Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
 
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bench trial, during which Nastatos testified in his own defense and disputed 
the State’s version of events, the Superior Court found him guilty on all 
counts. 
(6) 
In his opening brief on appeal, Nastatos raises five discernible 
points for the Court’s consideration.  First, he contends that the arresting 
officer never gave him Miranda warnings.  Second, he argues that he was 
never provided with the evidence against him.  Third, he asserts that he 
never intended to harm Herrington.  Fourth, he contends that the prosecutor 
made certain improper comments in her closing argument.  Finally, he 
asserts that his attorney was ineffective for telling him that he could not call 
witnesses at trial.   
(7) 
With respect to Nastatos’ first issue regarding the lack of 
Miranda warnings, the testimony at trial reflected that the Officer Jemel 
Johnson, one of the officers who responded to the call of a domestic dispute, 
did not give Nastatos Miranda warnings because he determined that 
Nastatos was too intoxicated.  Officer Johnson further testified that while 
questioning other witnesses, Nastatos was making voluntary statements that 
were not in response to any questioning by police.  Johnson testified that 
Nastatos stated that he was trying to get in the residence, that he wanted his 
money, that he had been paying Herrington’s bills, and that he was trying to 
 
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hit her.  Defense counsel did not object to this testimony at trial, and on 
appeal, we find there was no basis for an objection.  Nastatos was not being 
interrogated by police at the time he made the statements testified to by 
Officer Johnson.  Consequently, even absent Miranda warnings, Nastatos’ 
statements were admissible against him at trial.3 
(8) 
Nastatos’ next claim is that the prosecution never provided him 
with the evidence against him.  Essentially, Nastatos claims that, because he 
thought that Herrington was not going to testify against him, he believed the 
case would be dismissed and he was not prepared for trial. Having failed to 
raise any alleged discovery violations at trial, we review this claim on appeal 
for plain error. 4 In order to be plain, the error complained of must be so 
clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to have jeopardized the integrity of 
the trial.5  The burden of demonstrating prejudice is on Nastatos.6  Nastatos, 
however, does not specify any evidence that the State failed to provide to 
him.  Accordingly, we conclude that he has failed to carry his burden of 
demonstrating plain error on appeal. 
                                                 
3 Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 (1980); Tolson v. State, 900 A.2d 639, 
643-44 (Del. 2006). 
4 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 8. 
5 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986). 
6 Brown v. State, 729 A.2d 259, 265 (Del. 1999). 
 
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(9) 
Next, Nastatos claims that he never intended to harm 
Herrington.  Nastatos testified to that same effect at trial, and his counsel 
argued in closing that the State had failed to prove the element of intent 
sufficient to sustain a conviction for attempted second degree burglary. After 
Nastatos filed his opening brief on appeal, this Court issued its decision in 
Dolan v. State, which clarified that, to establish the crime of second degree 
burglary, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
formulated the intent to commit a crime either before or at the time the 
defendant entered or remained unlawfully in another’s dwelling.7  In light of 
the holding in Dolan, we directed the parties to address the sufficiency of the 
evidence in the record to establish that Nastatos had intended to commit the 
crime of offensive touching before or at the time that he attempted to enter 
her home. 
(10) In finding Nastatos guilty of attempted second degree burglary, 
the trial judge stated: 
The issue of whether the defendant is guilty of Burglary Second 
Degree or Criminal Trespass First Degree depends on whether the 
defendant intended to commit a crime in the residence.  I find, beyond 
a reasonable doubt, that he intended to commit the offense of 
Offensive Touching.  I conclude that, based on his actual conduct, 
first, in not leaving when he was asked to do so, and secondly, in 
coming into contact with Ms. Herrington.  It’s also based on the 
                                                 
7 Dolan v. State, 925 A.2d at 499. 
 
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statements made by the defendant, as reported by Officer Johnson, by 
Mr. Ripple and by the perception reported by Torin Morgan. 
 
(11) Although the trial judge did not specifically articulate when 
Nastatos formulated the intent to commit the crime of offensive touching, 
we conclude, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State,8 
that there was sufficient evidence for the trial judge to conclude that 
Nastatos intended to commit the crime of offensive touching prior to or at 
the time he attempted to enter Herrington’s home.  Specifically, the 
testimony of Herrington’s neighbor, Mr. Ripple, established that Nastatos 
was banging on Herrington’s residence and shouting that he wanted to kill 
her.  Moreover, Officer Johnson testified that Nastatos stated that he was 
trying to hit Herrington.  Under these circumstances, we find the evidence 
was sufficient to support the trial judge’s verdict of guilty on the charge of 
attempted second degree burglary. 
(12) Nastatos next complains about several statements made by the 
prosecutor during her closing argument.  Namely, Nastatos claims that the 
prosecutor incorrectly recounted a witness’ testimony stating that Nastatos 
had made a fist in attempting to strike Herrington and that the prosecutor 
                                                 
8 In determining whether there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction, this 
Court on appeal must determine “whether any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the State, could find the defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt.” Seward v. State, 723 A.2d 365, 369 (Del. 1999) 
 
8
also incorrectly stated that Nastatos admitted to wanting to strike Herrington.  
Having reviewed the record, however, it is clear that neither statement was 
improper because both statements were reasonable inferences that could be 
drawn from the testimony adduced at trial.9  Accordingly, we find no merit 
to Nastatos’ claim of prosecutor misconduct. 
(13) Finally, Nastatos argues that his trial counsel was ineffective 
for not informing Nastatos to bring his own witnesses.  Claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, however, will not be considered by this Court for the 
first time on direct appeal.10 
(14) This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded 
that Nastatos’ appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably 
appealable issue.  We also are satisfied that Nastatos’ counsel has made a 
conscientious effort to examine the record and the law and has properly 
determined that Nastatos could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal. 
                                                 
9 Hooks v. State, 416 A.2d 189, 204 (Del. 1980). 
10 Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 829 (Del. 1994). 
 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is 
GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  The 
motion to withdraw is moot. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/ Carolyn Berger 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice