Title: Allen United Enterprises v. Special Disability Fund
Citation: 288 So. 2d 204
Docket Number: 44197
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: January 9, 1974

288 So. 2d 204 (1974)
ALLEN UNITED ENTERPRISES and/or C.E. Allen &amp; Sons, Inc., and American Mutual Liability Insurance Company, Petitioners,
v.
SPECIAL DISABILITY FUND et al., Respondents.
No. 44197.

Supreme Court of Florida.
January 9, 1974.
*205 Herbert A. Langston, Jr., Orlando, for petitioners.
James H. Smith, St. Petersburg, for respondents.
CARLTON, Chief Justice:
Pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution, F.S.A. we review herein, on petition for writ of certiorari, an order of the Industrial Relations Commission which reversed a recovery of excess compensation benefits from the Special Disability Trust Fund ordered by a Judge of Industrial Claims pursuant to Florida Statutes, Section 440.49(4), F.S.A.
The claimant in this compensation case, while employed by the petitioner (Allen *206 United Enterprises), injured his back in an industrial accident in 1966. This accident was settled by a stipulation wherein it was agreed that the claimant suffered a fifty percent permanent partial disability based on loss of wage earning capacity. The claimant did not work until he was rehired by the same employer two years later. Two months after he was re-hired, he injured his foot in another accident which was also settled by stipulation. The instant action was initiated by the employer against the Special Disability Trust Fund to recover the difference between the amount paid pursuant to the second stipulation and that which would have been paid for the second injury alone. See Special Disability Trust Fund v. Fleet Transport Company, 283 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 1973).
The Judge of Industrial Claims found that the first accident had resulted in a twenty-five percent permanent physical impairment to the claimant's lower back; that the employer had knowledge of the pre-existing permanent physical impairment caused by the first accident; that the claimant had sustained a sixty percent permanent partial impairment to his right foot as a result of the second accident; that the second injury merged with the pre-existing disability to produce a greater resulting disability than would have been caused by the second injury alone; and that the employer was entitled to reimbursement from the Special Disability Trust Fund for the difference between the amount paid by stipulation after the second accident and the amount that would have been due for a sixty percent physical impairment to the right foot. The Judge of Industrial Claims also directed that the Special Disability Trust Fund pay the cost of the proceedings.
On appeal by the Special Disability Trust Fund, the Industrial Relations Commission first held that there was no statutory authority allowing costs to be assessed against the Fund, and the award of costs was reversed. The Commission also reversed the reimbursement to the employer on the ground that there was no evidence that the employer knowingly hired a handicapped man, that is, that there was no evidence that he had actual knowledge of a pre-existing, permanent condition. We agree with the Commission as to the denial of costs, but we reverse as to the award of excess compensation and we remand this cause for reinstatement of that portion of the Judge of Industrial Claims' order.
As to costs, the Commission correctly concluded that there is no provision of the Florida Workmen's Compensation Law which authorizes the assessment of costs against the Special Disability Trust Fund and that there was no other Florida statute applicable. Petitioner contends that the question of costs in this case should be controlled by Florida Statutes, Section 57.041(1), which provides that a "party recovering judgment shall recover all his legal costs and charges", and this Court's decision in Simpson v. Merrill, 234 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 1970), in which we held that the statute authorized the taxation of costs against the State and its agencies in favor of a party recovering judgment. We hold, however, that a "judgment" as contemplated in the statutes does not include an award of benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Law by a Judge of Industrial Claims; nor does it contemplate any other order or award obtained through any "quasi-judicial" administrative agency.
As to the recovery of excess benefits awarded by the Judge of Industrial Claims, there was competent and substantial evidence in the record to support the Judge's finding that the employer had knowledge of the pre-existing permanent physical impairment. In fact, the Judge detailed the evidence upon which he relied:
In reversing, the Industrial Relations Commission stated:
The "record" referred to by the Commission is apparently the testimony of the employer which included many questions and answers similar to, and including, the following:
Thus, while the employer admitted knowledge of the accident, of the settlement, of a back injury, of an extended period of doctor's care, and of a two-year period during which the employee was unable to work, he continually denied knowledge of a "permanent disability". However, the employer's definition of "permanent disability" is not the same as that contained in the Florida Workmen's Compensation Law, as evidenced by the following testimony:
An employer's own personal definitions do not control the application of the Florida Workmen's Compensation Law. Also, it is not knowledge of a disability which is required for a reimbursement of excess compensation benefits, but knowledge of a "permanent physical impairment". Fla. Stat. § 440.49(4)(b), F.S.A., defines "permanent physical impairment" as:
Under that definition, this Court, in Unit Wall Company v. Speh, 133 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 1961), held that it is not necessary that a pre-existing impairment be such as to actually interfere with the employee's work capabilities or efficiency; it simply has to be a pre-existing disease or condition which is permanent, which is known to the employer, and which would reasonably magnify the extent or result of a subsequent injury. For an employer to recover from the Fund under Section 440.49, we stated that,
In the instant case, the evidence showed, and the Judge of Industrial Claims so found, that the employee had a pre-existing permanent condition, as a result of his back injury, which exaggerated the extent of a subsequent compensable injury. The employer testified that he had knowledge of that pre-existing permanent condition. His testimony that he did not consider the condition disabling or a hindrance in any way to the employee's working capabilities was irrelevant. Aside from the employer's testimony, the Judge of Industrial Claims also relied upon the fact that a copy of the Stipulation and Joint Petition settling the claim on the first accident and reflecting a fifty percent loss of wage earning capacity was mailed to the employer. This evidence, alone, would have been sufficient to support the Judge's finding of knowledge of a pre-existing permanent condition.
Therefore, while the order of the Industrial Relations Commission is affirmed insofar as it reverses the Judge of Industrial Claims' taxation of costs against the Special Disability Trust Fund, the order is otherwise reversed. This cause is remanded to the Industrial Relations Commission with directions to reinstate that portion of the order of the Judge of Industrial Claims which was improperly reversed.
It is so ordered.
ROBERTS, ERVIN, BOYD and DEKLE, JJ., concur.