Title: State v. Tyrone Booker
Citation: 2006 WI 79
Docket Number: 2004AP001435-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 29, 2006

2006 WI 79 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2004AP1435-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Tyrone Booker, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2005 WI App 182 
Reported at: 286 Wis. 2d 747, 704 N.W.2d 336 
(Ct. App. 2005-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 29, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 23, 2006   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Jeffrey A. Conen 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Sarah K. Larson, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the briefs was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by Jeffrey W. 
Jensen and Jeffrey W. Jensen Law Office, Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by Jeffrey W. Jensen. 
 
 
2006 WI 79
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2004AP1435-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2001CF6756) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Tyrone Booker, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 29, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   The State of Wisconsin 
challenges 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
decision 
reversing 
the 
conviction of Tyrone Booker (Booker) on two counts of exposing a 
child to harmful materials, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.11 
(2003-04).1  The court of appeals concluded that the evidence was 
not sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict because the jury 
did not view the video alleged to be "harmful material," but 
instead heard only the children's and a detective's descriptions 
of what they saw.  We conclude that the testimony that depicted 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2003-04 version unless otherwise noted.  
No. 
2004AP1435-CR   
 
2 
 
the content of the video scenes shown to the children was 
sufficient to support the jury's verdict that Booker violated 
§ 948.11 by exposing children to harmful material.  Accordingly, 
we reverse the decision of the court of appeals in that regard.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
The relevant facts are undisputed.  On December 17, 
2001, Shequila and her two friends, Sabrina and Deana, skipped 
school and went to visit Deana's boyfriend, Donta, at his home.  
At the time, Shequila was 14, and Sabrina and Deana were 12 and 
13, respectively.  When they arrived at Donta's apartment, 
Booker, Donta's mother's boyfriend, let them into the apartment.  
Deana asked Booker where Donta was and he told her Donta had 
left but would return soon.  The girls sat down in the living 
room.  Booker then told them that on a previous night, when 
Deana and Sabrina had visited the apartment, he had taped them 
on video without their knowing it.  He said he would show them 
the tape.  He brought a VCR and a video cassette labeled 
"Robert" from a bedroom to the living room.   
¶3 
The "Robert" video Booker showed the girls was a 
pornographic video of naked women and men engaging in various 
sexual acts.  According to the girls' testimony at trial, Booker 
fast-forwarded through the video, stopping to show various 
scenes depicting naked women performing fellatio on naked men.  
One of the girls asked Booker to stop playing the video, and he 
did. 
¶4 
The girls later explained that parts of the video they 
saw showed scenes of women performing fellatio on men, a scene 
No. 
2004AP1435-CR   
 
3 
 
of a man dressed as a security guard receiving fellatio from 
several women dressed as cheerleaders and a scene of a man and a 
woman having penis-to-vagina intercourse.   
¶5 
Shortly after showing the girls these parts of the 
videotape, Booker got a phone call from Donta's brother's 
daycare.  He told the girls they had to go with him to pick up 
Donta's brother because he could not leave them at home alone.  
The girls went on foot with Booker.  After retrieving the little 
boy from daycare, on the way home, Booker picked up a tree 
branch and told the girls that he would whip the little boy with 
it unless one of the girls danced for him when they returned to 
the apartment.  Amongst themselves, the girls protested that 
they did not want to be the one to do it, but after the little 
boy started crying, Shequila said she would dance.  When they 
arrived back at the house, Booker put on music and told Shequila 
to dance.  Shequila began to dance to the music, and soon after, 
Donta arrived.   
¶6 
The three girls went with Donta into his bedroom.  
Booker came to the bedroom door and said to send Shequila back 
out, because she was not finished dancing.  Shequila obliged, 
and then returned to the bedroom.  Booker again returned to the 
bedroom, this time threatening to call the girls' parents or the 
police to tell them that the girls were skipping school if the 
girls did not leave.  He said he wanted one of the girls to go 
alone in a room with him, and if someone did it, the girls would 
not get in trouble.  Shequila agreed to do it so that the girls 
would not get into trouble, but told him he could not touch her. 
No. 
2004AP1435-CR   
 
4 
 
¶7 When Booker and Shequila were in the bedroom alone, he 
asked her if she "was ready" and reminded her that he was going 
to call "the people" to tell that she had skipped school if she 
did not cooperate.  He asked her if she was going to take off 
her clothes.  Shequila obliged and stripped down to her bra.  He 
told her to lie down, and then he pushed her legs open and 
proceeded to assault her by probing her vaginal area with his 
thumb and mouth.   
¶8 
At trial, Shequila, Sabrina, and Deana all testified 
about the contents of the video that Booker showed them.  The 
investigating detective, who had viewed the entire video, also 
described it in detail.  The witnesses consistently described 
the video as consisting of multiple episodes, all of which 
focused on various sexual acts, as the following excerpts from 
Shequila's 
and 
the 
testifying 
detective's 
testimonies 
illustrate.  Shequila testified as follows: 
Q: 
What did you see? 
Shequila: 
A woman with a man's penis in her mouth. 
Q: 
The woman—— Describe the scene you saw.  
You saw a penis in her mouth; is that 
right? 
Shequila: 
Yes. 
Q: 
Anybody wearing any type of clothing? 
Shequila: 
No. 
Q: 
In that scene nobody was wearing anything? 
Shequila: 
They had took it off. 
Q: 
So the woman is naked? 
No. 
2004AP1435-CR   
 
5 
 
Shequila: 
Yes. 
Q: 
And the man is naked? 
Shequila: 
Yes.   
Q: 
So you see that image on this TV screen; 
is that right?  
Shequila: 
Yes.   
Q: 
And describe what happens then?  
Shequila: 
He stopped it, and he fast-forwarded it to 
another part. 
Q: 
And then what happened? 
Shequila: 
It was a part with the security guard on 
it. 
Q: 
Pardon? 
Shequila: 
It showed a part with a security guard. 
Q: 
And what did you see happening with the 
security guard?  
Shequila: 
A woman.   
Q: 
And what did you see happening with the 
woman?  
Shequila: 
She put his penis in her mouth. 
Q: 
And the woman, what was she dressed like, 
or did she have any clothes on? 
Shequila: 
Like cheerleaders.  
Q: 
When you say "like cheerleaders," do you 
mean like a cheerleading outfit? 
Shequila: 
Yes. 
Q: 
When you say "the woman," did the person, 
the females depicted, did they look—— 
 
. . .  
No. 
2004AP1435-CR   
 
6 
 
Shequila: 
Like in their twenties.   
 
. . .  
Q: 
What else happened with that tape; what 
else did you see?  
Shequila: 
He stopped it and fast-forwarded it to 
another part. 
Q: 
Describe what you saw then?  
Shequila: 
It was another cheerleader.  It was just 
one, and it was a dude in his bedroom.   
Q: 
And what did you see happen in that scene?  
Shequila: 
They took they [sic] clothes off, and she 
start—— she had his penis in her mouth.   
Q: 
What else did you see happen, if anything?  
Shequila: 
He kept stopping it and fast-forwarding it 
to certain kinds of parts.   
Q: 
Did you ever hear any dialogue in this 
film?  
Shequila: 
Yes. 
Q: 
Like what did you hear? 
Shequila: 
Like moaning sounds and stuff. 
 
. . .  
Q: 
Did 
you 
ever 
hear 
people 
having 
a 
conversation? 
Shequila: 
Yes. 
Q: 
Like what were they saying? 
Shequila: 
I don't remember.   
Q: 
You don't remember? 
Shequila: 
No.   
No. 
2004AP1435-CR   
 
7 
 
Q: 
To the best of your memory, did it seem 
like a conversation about sex? 
Shequila: 
Yes. 
The detective then testified: 
Q: 
Let 
me 
ask 
you 
this, 
how 
does 
the 
videotape begin? 
Detective: 
The videotape right from the start depicts 
a male and a female engaged in sexual 
intercourse.   
Q: 
What type of sexual intercourse? 
Detective: 
Oral sex. 
Q: 
Meaning what? 
Detective: 
Penis to—— Penis to mouth intercourse. 
Q: 
Did you watch the entire tape?   
Detective: 
Yes.   
Q: 
How 
many 
different 
scenes—— 
Let 
me 
rephrase 
that. 
 
How 
many 
different 
episodes are on the—— that videotape? 
Detective: 
There are fourteen separate episodes on 
this tape.   
Q: 
And by episodes, what differentiates one 
episode from another? 
Detective: 
Sexual 
interaction 
with 
different 
individuals. 
 
Each 
episode 
contained 
different individuals.  Each episode is 
not repeated acts.   
Q: 
With respect to the first episode, you 
watched it all? 
Detective: 
Yes. 
Q: 
What does it show? 
No. 
2004AP1435-CR   
 
8 
 
Detective: 
It shows naked males and a naked female, 
and there's finger to vagina fondling.  
There's penis to mouth sexual intercourse.  
There is penis to vagina intercourse.  
There is finger to anis [sic] fondling, 
and there is the male masturbating himself 
to the point of ejaculation on the female.   
Q: 
That's the first episode? 
Detective: 
Yes. 
Q: 
You watched fourteen other episodes? 
Detective: 
Yes.  
Q: 
Are they all essentially the same except 
involving different people? 
Detective: 
Yes.   
Q: 
Describe what type of people are—— what 
type, if any, clothing was on any of the 
people during any of these episodes. 
Detective: 
Yes.  The first episode was a male and a 
female.  After that there were variations 
on 
a 
cheerleader 
theme. 
 
There's 
cheerleader auditions, and there was also 
a couple episodes involving a security 
guard, a female dressed as a cheerleader.   
Q: 
And 
in 
the 
episodes, 
for 
example, 
involving 
the 
cheerleader, 
what 
would 
happen?  
Detective: 
There was very little dialogue, but she 
would be asked to start dancing, remove 
her clothes.  At which time the male would 
begin to interact sexually with her. 
Q: 
How would each episode end? 
Detective: 
With the male masturbating himself to the 
point of ejaculation on the female.   
¶9 
The video was entered into evidence but was never 
played for the jury.  Booker never challenged the circuit 
No. 
2004AP1435-CR   
 
9 
 
court's decision to present evidence to the jury through the 
testimonies of the victim-witnesses and the detective who viewed 
the tape.2  
¶10 The jury convicted Booker of two counts of second-
degree sexual assault and two counts of exposing a child to 
harmful materials.  Booker appealed, asserting that there was 
insufficient evidence to convict him under Wis. Stat. § 948.11, 
of exposing a child to harmful materials.3  He alleged that 
because the statute required the jury to find that the video is 
patently offensive and has no artistic value when taken as a 
whole, a jury must actually view the video before it could find 
that the elements of the crime were proved.   
¶11 The court of appeals agreed with Booker's reasoning, 
concluding that there was insufficient evidence to support the 
findings of guilt for exposing a child to harmful materials.  
State v. Booker, 2005 WI App 182, ¶34, 286 Wis. 2d 747, 704 
N.W.2d 336.  It acknowledged that the girls' and the detective's 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 910.02 was mentioned in oral argument, 
although it is not referenced in either party's briefs.  It 
provides: 
To prove the content of a writing, recording or 
photograph, 
the 
original 
writing, 
recording 
or 
photograph is required, except as otherwise provided 
in chs. 901 to 911, s. 137.21, or by other statute. 
We were provided with no argument or citation to authority in 
regard to its application.  Therefore, we do not address 
§ 910.02 further.  
3 Booker's convictions of second-degree sexual assault are 
not before us on this review. 
No. 
2004AP1435-CR   
 
10 
 
testimonies at trial made it clear that the tape depicted nudity 
and sexually explicit conduct.  Id.  However, notwithstanding 
that, the court of appeals concluded that what remained 
unanswered by the evidence presented was:  (1) whether "the tape 
was patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult 
community, taken as a whole, with respect to what is suitable 
for children"; and (2) "whether the tape lacked any literary, 
artistic, 
political, scientific or 
educational 
value" for 
children.  Id.  The decision suggested that because "no expert 
witness was called to assist the jury" in analyzing "the 
prevailing standards in Wisconsin" regarding appropriate viewing 
material for children or whether it "contained serious artistic, 
political, scientific or educational value for children," the 
jury was unable to analyze the tape according to the statute's 
required 
tests. 
 
Id. 
 
Consequently, 
it 
concluded 
that 
insufficient evidence had been presented to find Booker guilty 
of exposing children to harmful materials, and it reversed those 
convictions.  Id.  We review that portion of the court of 
appeals decision. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶12 Our review requires us to apply Wisconsin statutes and 
to review whether evidence presented to a jury was sufficient to 
support the jury's verdict.  Application of a statute to facts 
is a question of law, subject to our independent review.  
Tahtinen v. MSI Ins. Co., 122 Wis. 2d 158, 166, 361 N.W.2d 673 
(1985).  We also review as a question of law whether the 
No. 
2004AP1435-CR   
 
11 
 
evidence presented to a jury is sufficient to sustain its 
verdict.  State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 501, 451 N.W.2d 
752 (1990).     
B. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 948.11   
¶13 Booker 
was 
convicted 
of 
violating 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 948.11(2)4 because of the video he showed to the girls.  We 
begin our discussion by reviewing the definitions set out 
in § 948.11(1).5  There is a difference between § 948.11 and the 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.11(2)(a) provides in relevant part: 
Whoever, with knowledge of the character and 
content of the material, sells, rents, exhibits, 
plays, distributes, or loans to a child any harmful 
material, with or without monetary consideration, is 
guilty of a Class I felony if any of the following 
applies: 
1. 
The person knows or reasonably should know 
that the child has not attained the age of 18 years. 
2. 
The person has face-to-face contact with the 
child before or during the sale, rental, exhibit, 
playing, distribution, or loan. 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.11 states, in pertinent part: 
Exposing a child to harmful material or harmful 
descriptions or narrations.  (1) DEFINITIONS.  In this 
section:  
. . .  
(ar) "Harmful material" means:   
(1) Any picture, photograph, drawing, sculpture, 
motion picture film or similar visual representation 
or image of a person or portion of the human body that 
depicts 
nudity, 
sexually 
explicit 
conduct, 
sadomasochistic abuse, physical torture or brutality 
and that is harmful to children; or  
No. 
2004AP1435-CR   
 
12 
 
"obscene material or performance" statute, Wis. Stat. § 944.21.6  
While some of the language in the two statutes is similar, 
distinctions are central to our analysis in this case. 
                                                                                                                                                             
. . .   
(b) "Harmful to children" means that quality of 
any description, narrative account or representation, 
in 
whatever 
form, 
of 
nudity, 
sexually 
explicit 
conduct, sexual excitement, sadomasochistic abuse, 
physical torture or brutality, when it:  
1. 
Predominantly 
appeals 
to 
the 
prurient, 
shameful or morbid interest of children;  
2. Is patently offensive to prevailing standards 
in the adult community as a whole with respect to what 
is suitable for children; and  
3. Lacks serious literary, artistic, political, 
scientific or educational value for children, when 
taken as a whole. 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 944.21 states, in pertinent part: 
Obscene 
material 
or 
performance. 
 
(1) 
The 
legislature intends that the authority to prosecute 
violations of this section shall be used primarily to 
combat the obscenity industry and shall never be used 
for 
harassment 
or 
censorship 
purposes 
against 
materials or performances having serious artistic, 
literary, political, educational or scientific value.  
The legislature further intends that the enforcement 
of this section shall be consistent with the first 
amendment to the U.S. constitution, article I, section 
3, of the Wisconsin constitution and the compelling 
state interest in protecting the free flow of ideas. 
. . .  
(c) "Obscene material" means a writing, picture, 
film, or other recording that: 
1. The average person, applying contemporary 
community 
standards, 
would 
find 
appeals 
to 
the 
prurient interest if taken as a whole;  
No. 
2004AP1435-CR   
 
13 
 
¶14 Both statutes require the fact-finder to determine (1) 
if the material is offensive as compared with community 
standards and (2) whether the material has literary, artistic, 
political, educational or scientific value.  However, an 
important distinction is that Wis. Stat. § 948.11 specifies that 
these considerations relate to whether the material offends 
community standards regarding what is appropriate for children 
or whether the material has value for children. 
¶15 We 
discussed 
the 
difference 
between 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 948.11 and general obscenity statutes in State v. Thiel, 183 
Wis. 2d 505, 515 N.W.2d 847 (1994).  In Thiel, the defendant was 
convicted of exhibiting harmful material to a child and, among 
other arguments, contended that § 948.11 was overly broad in 
violation of the First Amendment.  Id. at 515.  The defendant 
argued that the statute had the "effect of criminally punishing 
those who exhibit, sell, or view material" protected by the 
First Amendment.  Id. at 520.  We rejected that argument for the 
following reasons:  (1) the overbreadth doctrine is inapplicable 
when a limiting construction will maintain the legislation's 
constitutional integrity (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 
601, 613 (1973)); (2) the statute is rationally related to the 
compelling state interest of protecting the well-being of 
                                                                                                                                                             
2. 
Under 
contemporary 
community 
standards, 
describes or shows sexual conduct in a patently 
offensive way; and  
3. Lacks serious literary, artistic, political, 
educational or scientific value, if taken as a whole. 
No. 
2004AP1435-CR   
 
14 
 
children; and (3) the overbreadth doctrine is employed only as a 
last resort (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 
(1982)).  Thiel, 183 Wis. 2d at 521. 
¶16 In the course of our analysis, wherein we concluded 
that Wis. Stat. § 948.11 was not overly broad, we discussed the 
statute's history, purpose, classification, relationship to 
general obscenity statutes and statutory counterparts in other 
jurisdictions.  Id. at 523-36.  We noted that many states had 
enacted laws banning or restricting the flow of obscene 
materials to minors and that laws prohibiting a person from 
exposing children to materials deemed "obscene to children" are 
"variable obscenity statutes."  Id. at 523-24.  We noted the 
legitimate purpose, as recognized by the United States Supreme 
Court, of variable obscenity statutes:  "to protect the physical 
and psychological well-being of children . . . and to protect 
them from obscenity."  Id. (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756-57).  
As has been done in other states, the Wisconsin legislature 
created § 948.11 by appropriately adopting the obscenity test of 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), to create a variable 
obscenity statute.  Thiel, 183 Wis. 2d at 535.  We also 
established that § 948.11 has a dual purpose:  "(1) to protect 
minors from material harmful to them as a class and (2) to 
protect the rights of parents to supervise the development of 
their children."  Id. at 524 (citations omitted).   
¶17 The import of this analysis for our purposes in the 
immediate case is the clear distinction Thiel makes between the 
statutory elements of harm and value of particular materials in 
No. 
2004AP1435-CR   
 
15 
 
regard to children in a variable obscenity statute when compared 
with elements of harm and value of material to which the general 
obscenity statutes are applied.  We explained how to apply Wis. 
Stat. § 948.11, with regard to the three factors necessary to 
prove materials are "harmful to children."  That test, as 
opposed to the test that is used in the general obscenity 
statute, analyzes a material's value or harmfulness in regard to 
the minor or minors exposed to it: 
Distinct from those cases involving the commercial 
display of materials to a general, consumer audience, 
the 
language 
of 
sec. 
948.11 
focuses 
upon 
the 
affirmative conduct of an individual toward a specific 
minor or minors.  Therefore, an individual violates 
the statute if he or she, aware of the nature of the 
material, knowingly offers or presents for inspection 
to a specific minor or minors material defined as 
harmful to children in sec. 948.11(1)(b). 
In sec. 948.11(1)(b), Stats., the legislature 
adapted the Miller test of obscenity to produce a 
definition of what may be considered harmful to 
children.  The first two prongs of the test——appeal to 
prurient 
interest 
and 
patent 
offensiveness——are 
analyzed by applying contemporary community standards.  
However, the third prong requires a separate analysis:  
does the material have literary, artistic, political, 
or scientific value?  The appropriate standard at this 
point is "whether a reasonable person would find such 
value in the material, taken as a whole."  Therefore, 
the appropriate standard to apply under this statute 
is whether material defined as harmful has any serious 
literary, 
artistic, 
political, 
scientific, 
or 
educational value, when taken as a whole.  Such value 
is assessed by a reasonable minor of like age to the 
minor to whom the material is exhibited. 
Id. at 535-36 (citations omitted; emphasis in original). 
¶18 The question Booker presents is whether the evidence 
presented sufficiently fulfills the test set out in Thiel such 
No. 
2004AP1435-CR   
 
16 
 
that a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the video was "harmful material" as defined in Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.11.  Under Thiel, a jury is required to consider 
contemporary community standards regarding what appeals to the 
prurient interests of children and whether material is patently 
offensive to the adult community's standards of what is 
appropriate for children.  Id. at 535.  The jury also had to 
consider whether the material had some other serious value for 
children, in this case for 12- to 14-year-old children.  Id. at 
535-36.  With the statute's requirements and Thiel's guiding 
principles for applying them in mind, we move on to Booker's 
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence presented to the 
jury.   
C. 
Sufficiency of the Evidence 
 
1. 
Parties' arguments 
¶19 Although it was entered into evidence, the video was 
not shown to the jury.  Booker argues that this omission is 
dispositive because there is no satisfactory substitute for 
having the jury view the video when it is deciding whether it is 
"harmful material" that is "harmful to children."  He contends 
that the jury could not determine whether the video is "patently 
offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a 
whole with respect to what is suitable for children" and whether 
the 
video 
"lacks 
serious 
literary, 
artistic, 
political, 
scientific or educational value for children, when taken as a 
whole" without actually viewing the parts of the video that 
allegedly constitute the "harmful material."  He argues that 
No. 
2004AP1435-CR   
 
17 
 
descriptions of isolated images and sexual acts from the video 
are not sufficient to prove the three factors necessary to make 
the required finding under Wis. Stat. § 948.11.   
¶20 In contrast, the State argues that the plain language 
of the statute does not require that the State prove those 
factors with direct evidence, i.e., by actually showing the 
video to the jury.  It also contends that, as this court 
discussed in Thiel, see id. at 535,7 Wis. Stat. § 948.11 focuses 
on the nature of the materials, which need not be ascertained 
through direct viewing by the fact-finder, but may also be 
ascertained from others' descriptions of the materials.   
¶21 The State also asserts that the "harmful material" 
element of Wis. Stat. § 948.11, i.e., that the material has no 
literary, artistic, political, scientific or educational value 
for children and that the material is "patently offensive to 
prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with 
respect to what is suitable for children," can be met by the 
evidence in this case.  It contends that the jury is the 
                                                 
7 The language of the statute reflects the state's 
compelling interest to protect the well-being of its 
youth by examining the nature of the materials.  Once 
the nature of the materials is deemed to be harmful, 
by application of the Miller test, an individual may 
not——in a pubic or private forum——sell, loan, exhibit, 
or transfer harmful materials to minors.  . . .  
Therefore, an individual violates the statute if he or 
she, aware of the nature of the material, knowingly 
offers or presents for inspection to a specific minor 
or minors material defined as harmful to children in 
sec. 948.11(1)(b).   
State v. Thiel, 183 Wis. 2d 505, 534-35, 515 N.W.2d 847 (1994). 
No. 
2004AP1435-CR   
 
18 
 
appropriate evaluator of whether that element was proved by the 
evidence presented.  Therefore, no expert analysis as to 
community 
standards 
was 
necessary 
to 
prove 
the 
material 
"patently offensive."  Finally, the State emphasizes that Booker 
fast-forwarded through portions of the video to show the girls 
the scenes depicting fellatio and other sexual acts; therefore, 
the material to which the girls were exposed was selected 
specifically 
for 
its 
obscene 
and 
inappropriate 
content.  
Accordingly, 
although 
the 
testifying 
detective 
offered 
a 
description of the entire video, the only evidence necessary to 
sustain a guilty verdict is testimony about the portions of the 
video actually shown to the girls. 
2. 
Application of the law 
¶22 Evidence is insufficient to support a conviction only 
if the evidence, when viewed most favorably to the State, "is so 
insufficient in probative value and force that it can be said as 
a matter of law that no trier of fact, acting reasonably, could 
have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."  Poellinger, 153 
Wis. 2d at 501.  As the court of appeals recently noted in State 
v. Searcy, 2006 WI App 8, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 709 N.W.2d 497, the 
defendant bears a heavy burden in attempting to convince a 
reviewing court to set aside a jury's verdict on insufficiency 
of the evidence grounds.  Id., ¶22 (citing State v. Allbaugh, 
148 Wis. 2d 807, 808-09, 436 N.W.2d 898 (Ct. App. 1989)).  
¶23 In Booker's trial, the girls' and the detective's 
testimonies regarding the content of the tape were admitted to 
prove the "harmful material" element of Wis. Stat. § 948.11.  
No. 
2004AP1435-CR   
 
19 
 
All of the witnesses explained that the video's dominant focus 
was on nudity and explicit sexual acts and suggested that the 
video had no additional plot line, meaningful dialogue or other 
notable qualities or characteristics.  The girls characterized 
it as a "porno" video.  Their descriptions of what they saw 
provided the jury with explicit details of the contents of the 
video that the jury could use to assess the film's appeal to 
children's prurient interests, its offensiveness to community 
standards about what is appropriate for children and its lack of 
other value for 12- to 14-year-olds.  The jury was able to make 
its own decision as to the credibility of the witnesses.  
Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d at 506.  
¶24 The United States Supreme Court, federal courts, and 
Wisconsin courts are uniform in concluding that questions of 
whether material appeals 
to 
prurient 
interests, 
satisfies 
community standards for potentially obscene material or has 
literary, artistic, political, scientific or educational value 
may be appropriately decided by a jury.  See Paris Adult 
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 56 (1973) (holding in an 
obscenity case, it was not "error to fail to require 'expert' 
affirmative evidence that the materials were obscene"); see also 
United States v. Wild, 422 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1969) (holding that 
issues of prurient appeal and offensiveness to contemporary 
community standards were appropriately decided by a jury, 
notwithstanding the lack of expert testimony); State v. Tee & 
Bee, Inc., 229 Wis. 2d 446, 452, 600 N.W.2d 230 (Ct. App. 1999) 
(citing Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 305 (1977)) 
No. 
2004AP1435-CR   
 
20 
 
(holding in an obscenity case that "contemporary community 
standards [can] be applied by juries in accordance with their 
own understanding of the tolerance of the average person in 
their community".   
¶25 When we view the evidence in this case most favorably 
to the State, we conclude that a reasonable "trier of fact, 
acting reasonably, could have found guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt," based on the testimony presented.  First, the jury could 
conclude that the video excerpts, as described, predominantly 
appeal to the prurient interests of children.  "Prurient" is 
defined as "arousing inordinate or unusual sexual desire."  
Black's Law Dictionary 1263 (8th ed. 2004).  The portions of the 
video that Booker showed to the girls were consistently 
described as scene upon scene of sexual acts, with all scenes 
ending with the male masturbating to the point of ejaculation on 
the female.  
¶26 Second, the jury could conclude that the video is 
patently 
offensive 
to 
prevailing 
standards 
in 
the 
adult 
community with regard to what is suitable for children.  Motion 
pictures that depict explicit sexual material harmful to minors 
may not be shown at outdoor theaters if the screen is visible 
from a public street, sidewalk, thoroughfare or other public 
place or from private property where it can be observed by 
minors.  Wis. Stat. § 134.46(2).  Videos with the type of 
content described by the witnesses are not available for rental 
to minor children in Wisconsin.  Videos showing explicit sexual 
acts are commonly rated and restricted so that minor children 
No. 
2004AP1435-CR   
 
21 
 
will not be exposed to them.8  A jury could make a reasonable 
determination based on the testimony presented at trial that the 
video Booker showed the girls is considered by Wisconsin adults 
as unsuitable for children.   
¶27 Third, the jury could conclude that the video excerpts 
lacked serious literary, artistic, political, scientific or 
educational value for 12- to 14-year-olds because nothing was 
shown except episodes with men and women engaging in sexual 
acts.  There was no evidence that the video had merit for 
children of these ages, for any reason.  And, for the same 
reasons that the other parts of the "harmful material" element 
can be met by the evidence presented, a reasonable trier of fact 
could conclude from the testimony that the video was absolutely 
void of serious literary, artistic, political, scientific or 
educational value for children.   
¶28 The parties also discuss State v. Trochinski, 2002 WI 
56, 253 Wis. 2d 38, 644 N.W.2d 891, but they disagree as to its 
relevance to the issues presented in this case.  Trochinski 
centered on a defendant's no contest plea to one count of 
exposing a minor to harmful materials in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.11(2).  Id., ¶1.  "After sentencing, Trochinski filed a 
postconviction motion seeking to withdraw his plea."  Id.  He 
alleged that when he pled, he did not understand the "harmful to 
                                                 
8 See Kids in Mind website, http://www.kids-in-mind.com, 
movie and video ratings in regard to suitability for children 
with content rated for graphic violence, sex/nudity, and 
profanity.  Id. (last visited June 22, 2006). 
No. 
2004AP1435-CR   
 
22 
 
children" element of the offense.  Id.  He said that his trial 
counsel did not advise him that the State would have to prove 
that the photographs he gave to the 17-year-old girl9 were 
"patently offensive to prevailing community standards regarding 
what is suitable" for a child of like age and that the material 
"lacked serious value when taken as a whole," for a child of 
like age.  Id., ¶18.  He argued that "because he did not 
understand how 'harmful to children' would be judged by the jury 
with respect [to the girl to whom he gave the pictures], he did 
not understand the meaning of that element when he entered his 
plea."  Id.   
¶29 We concluded that Trochinski had not established prima 
facie proof that his plea was involuntary or unknowing.  Id., 
¶23.  The record revealed that Trochinski gave a minor nude 
photos of himself, an alleged letter from Playgirl magazine, and 
a letter to the minor asking her to review his nude photos.  We  
concluded that the circuit court did not err in concluding this 
constituted a sufficient factual basis to support Trochinski's 
plea.  Id., ¶32.  
¶30 We conclude that the procedural posture of Trochinski 
causes it to have little relevance.  We upheld the defendant's 
plea in Trochinski.  Trochinski's plea waived the right to have 
a jury determine whether showing the pictures to a child 
                                                 
9 Trochinski also gave similar photographs to a 15-year-old 
girl.  That charge was dropped as part of the plea agreement.  
State v. Trochinski, 2002 WI 56, ¶7 n.3, 253 Wis. 2d 38, 644 
N.W.2d 891. 
No. 
2004AP1435-CR   
 
23 
 
violated Wis. Stat. § 948.11.  Therefore, our discussion in 
Trochinski 
focused 
on 
his 
knowing 
and 
voluntary 
waiver.  
Furthermore, although both cases involve the application of 
§ 948.11, Trochinski involved a plea, a child of a different age 
and a few still-life photos, rather than a jury verdict, 12- to 
14-year-old children and a video showing actual fellatio, sexual 
intercourse, masturbation to the point of ejaculation, and 
sexual fondling of various types.   
¶31 Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence submitted 
to the jury was such that a reasonable jury could have found 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Booker violated Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.11.10 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶32 We conclude that the testimony that depicted the 
content of the video scenes shown to the children was sufficient 
to support the jury's verdict that Booker violated Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.11 by exposing children to harmful material.  Accordingly, 
we reverse the decision of the court of appeals in that regard. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
                                                 
10 This opinion does not address whether the video would 
contravene the adult obscenity statute, Wis. Stat. § 944.21. 
No.  2004AP1435-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶33 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I agree 
that the conviction should be affirmed.  I write separately 
because two subjects raised by the majority opinion require 
further discussion.  First, I discuss State v. Trochinski, 2002 
WI 56, 253 Wis. 2d 38, 644 N.W.2d 891, and its relevance to the 
instant case.  Second, I discuss the original writing rule. 
I 
¶34 The parties discuss the Trochinski case at length and 
debate its applicability to the case at hand.   
¶35 In Trochinski, this court addressed the defendant's 
motion to withdraw a no contest plea.  A no contest plea is 
treated for criminal law purposes the same as a guilty plea.   
¶36 When an accused pleads guilty and admits guilt, the 
circuit court must determine whether a sufficient factual basis 
exists for the guilty plea.1  At a hearing on a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea after sentencing, an accused has the 
                                                 
1 State v. Thomas, 2000 WI 13, ¶14, 232 Wis. 2d 714, 605 
N.W.2d 836.  The purpose of this rule is to make sure that when 
a defendant is pleading guilty, he understands the charges 
against him and is not pleading guilty on facts insufficient to 
support the charges.  White v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 485, 491, 271 
N.W.2d 97 (1978) (quoting McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 
459, 467 (1969)). 
See also Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1) (2003-04), which states: 
(1) Before the court accepts a plea of guilty or no 
contest, it shall do all of the following: 
. . . . 
(b) Make such inquiry as satisfies it that the 
defendant in fact committed the crime charged. 
No.  2004AP1435-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
burden of showing "manifest injustice" by clear and convincing 
evidence.  One of the grounds for finding manifest injustice is 
that no factual basis for the plea exists.  In other words, an 
accused has the burden to show by clear and convincing evidence 
that no factual basis exists to support the conclusion that the 
conduct an accused admits actually falls within the charge.  
White v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 485, 491, 271 N.W.2d 97 (1978).  
¶37 It is within the discretion of the circuit court to 
determine whether an accused should be permitted to withdraw a 
guilty plea.2  Therefore, an appellate court will reverse a 
circuit court's denial of an accused's request to withdraw a 
guilty plea only if the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion.3  Upon review of a circuit court's denial of a motion 
to withdraw a guilty plea, an appellate court is required to 
determine whether the circuit court's order was based on the 
facts and on a correct interpretation and application of the 
law.  
¶38 Trochinski was charged with showing a set of ten nude 
photographs of himself to a girl who was 17 years and three 
months old.  In addition, the defendant gave the 17-year-old a 
questionable copy of a letter from Playgirl indicating that his 
nude photos would be published, and a letter to the 17-year-old 
inviting her to review the photos.4  The information charged 
                                                 
2 White, 85 Wis. 2d at 491. 
3 Id.; Hatcher v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 559, 564, 266 N.W.2d 320 
(1978). 
4 State v. Trochinski, 2002 WI 56, ¶5, 253 Wis. 2d 38, 644 
N.W.2d 891. 
No.  2004AP1435-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
Trochinski with the same offense with a 15-year-old girl.  
Pursuant to a plea agreement, (1) Trochinski pleaded no contest 
to the one charge relating to the 17-year-old; (2) the State 
dismissed the count relating to the 15-year-old; and (3) the 
count relating to the 15-year-old was to be read into the record 
for purposes of sentencing.5  At the plea hearing, the circuit 
court concluded, without looking at the photographs, that there 
was sufficient evidence to support the plea of no contest to the 
charge relating to the 17-year-old.6 
¶39 This court concluded in Trochinski (1) that the 
circuit court could properly impliedly conclude without seeing 
the photos that the facts were sufficient to support the plea; 
and (2) that after viewing the nude photos this court could 
conclude as a matter of law that the facts were sufficient to 
support the plea.  Thus, this court concluded that the circuit 
court had not erred.7  
                                                 
5 Id., ¶¶8-9.   
6 Id., ¶50 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting).    
7 I dissented in Trochinski, concluding that the circuit 
court committed an error of law that the facts were sufficient 
to support the plea.  Trochinski, 253 Wis. 2d 38, ¶¶51-58 
(Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting) ("The complaint and Statement of 
Probable 
Cause 
simply 
state 
that 
the 
defendant 
showed 
photographs of himself nude to a young woman who was then 
seventeen years and three months of age.  That's it.  Not all 
nude photos shown to a person over the age of seventeen but 
below the age of eighteen violate the statute.").  On reviewing 
the entire record, I further concluded that the facts were not 
sufficient to support the plea.  Id., ¶¶58-63 (Abrahamson, C.J., 
dissenting).  I still disagree with the result in Trochinski. 
No.  2004AP1435-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶40 The instant case involves a guilty verdict.  The parts 
of the videotape described in the testimony were of a more 
offensive nature than the photos in Trochinski and the minors 
were younger than the 17-year-old who was the basis of the 
charge to which Trochinski pleaded no contest.  In the instant 
case the minors were 12, 13, and 14 years old.   
¶41 An appellate court reviews the jury verdict to 
determine whether the evidence was sufficient to support the 
verdict.  When an appellate court reviews the sufficiency of the 
evidence in support of a jury guilty verdict, "the test is not 
whether this court is convinced of the guilt of the defendant 
beyond a reasonable doubt but whether this court can conclude 
the trier of facts could, acting reasonably, be convinced beyond 
reasonable doubt of such guilt from the evidence it had a right 
to believe and accept as true. . . . [The] evidence, when 
considered most favorably to the state, must be so insufficient 
in probative value that it can be said that no trier of facts, 
acting reasonably, could be convinced of the guilt of the 
defendant beyond reasonable doubt."8  
¶42 The State argues that the video in the present case 
was at least as offensive as the photographs at issue in 
                                                 
8 State v. Richardson, 44 Wis. 2d 75, 77, 170 N.W.2d 775 
(1969).  See also State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 507-08, 
451 N.W.2d 752 (1990). 
No.  2004AP1435-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
Trochinski and is sufficient to sustain a conviction.9  I agree 
with the State.  
¶43 As I see it, if the defendant in Trochinski could not 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that a description of the 
nude photos was insufficient to satisfy the elements of the 
variable obscenity statute in the context of a guilty plea, the 
defendant 
in 
the 
instant 
case could 
not 
show 
that the 
descriptions of the video, viewed most favorably to the State, 
are so lacking in probative value that no reasonable trier of 
fact could be convinced beyond reasonable doubt that the 
elements of the variable obscenity statute were met.   
¶44 Even without the Trochinski decision, I conclude that 
the evidence in the instant case was sufficient to support the 
guilty verdict reached by the jury. 
II 
¶45 I also conclude that the original writing rule (Wis. 
Stat. ch. 910) may apply to the videotape in the instant case, 
though the circuit court might have reasonably concluded that 
there is a valid exception to the rule had it considered the 
issue. 
                                                 
9 The court of appeals concluded that without the whole 
tape, its literary, artistic, and educational value could not be 
ascertained.  "Had the statute required only a finding that the 
tape contained offensive sexually explicit conduct, then perhaps 
the evidence would have been sufficient."  State v. Booker, 2005 
WI App 182, ¶34, 286 Wis. 2d 747, 704 N.W.2d 336.  I do not 
address the interpretation and application of the statute when 
only explicitly sexual material (not the whole tape) is shown to 
the victim. 
No.  2004AP1435-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶46 In the instant case, the defendant did not object to 
the testimony regarding the videotape based on the best evidence 
rule.  The original writing rule was not raised on appeal, but 
was raised by this court.10    
¶47 I write to remind counsel and the bench that Wisconsin 
does indeed have an original writing rule, even though the rule 
has not appeared in any recent appellate cases.11  For a 
discussion and explanation of chapter 910, see the Judicial 
Council Committee's and Federal Advisory Committee's Notes 
printed at 59 Wis. 2d R350-366.  
¶48 Under Wis. Stat. § 910.02, "[t]o prove the content of 
a writing, recording or photograph, the original writing, 
recording or photograph is required, except as otherwise 
provided in chs. 901 to 911, s. 137.21, or by other statute."  A 
videotape is a photograph for the purposes of chapter 910.12 
                                                 
10 See majority op., ¶9 n.2. 
11 7 
Daniel 
D. 
Blinka, 
Wisconsin 
Practice: 
Wisconsin 
Evidence § 1001.1 (2006), discusses the "myth of the best 
evidence rule" and points out that neither Wisconsin nor federal 
law establishes a general hierarchy of evidence.  Professor 
Blinka explains, however, that various provisions in chapter 910 
of the statutes establish a rule of preference with regard to 
original writings, recordings, and photographs.  He predicts 
that technological advances may create difficulties with this 
rule in the near future. 
For further discussion of the original document rule, see 2 
John W. Strong, McCormick on Evidence ch. 23 (5th ed. 1999).     
12 Wis. Stat. § 910.01(2) ("'Photographs' include still 
photographs, X-ray films, and motion pictures.").  A videotape 
is a form of motion picture.  See 7 Blinka, supra note 11, 
§ 1001.3.  A videotape is also, presumably, a recording. 
No.  2004AP1435-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
¶49 The original writing rule seems applicable in the 
instant case because the State sought to prove the content of 
the videotape.  That is, the State was required to prove the 
content of the videotape and that the content is harmful to 
minors as defined in Wis. Stat. § 948.11(1)(b).  I need not, and 
do not, resolve the question of whether the voluminous records 
exception or any other exception to the original writing rule 
would have applied in the instant case.  See Wis. Stat. § 910.06 
(content of voluminous writings, recording, or photographs may 
be presented in summary form).  
¶50 In sum, I write separately to expand upon the majority 
opinion's discussion of the Trochinski case and to write about 
the original writing rule, a rule that may have been forgotten 
as we mouth the generally accepted proposition that Wisconsin 
does not have a "best evidence rule." 
No.  2004AP1435-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
1