Title: Coleman v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 192, 2021
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: January 3, 2023

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DEVIN COLEMAN, 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 192, 2021 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§  Cr. ID Nos. 1303012706 (K),  
§  1303004663 (K) 
§  
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: October 19, 2022 
Decided: 
January 3, 2023 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
 
 
ORDER 
 
After consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal, it appears 
to the Court that:   
(1) 
The appellant, Devin Coleman, filed this appeal from a Superior Court 
order finding that he violated the terms of his probation and conditional release.  The 
primary issue on appeal is whether the Superior Court erred in denying Coleman’s 
motion to suppress.  For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the Superior Court’s 
judgment. 
(2) 
In June 2020, Coleman began serving conditional release for a 
possession of a firearm by a person prohibited (“PFBPP”) conviction in Criminal ID 
No. 1303012706 and Level III probation for disregarding a police signal, second-
 
2 
degree conspiracy, and second-degree reckless endangering convictions in Criminal 
ID No. 1303004663.   
(3) 
Coleman, along with others, became the subject of an investigation that 
included a wiretap of his phone.  Probation Officer Ricky Porter was a member of 
the task force conducting the investigation.       
(4) 
On July 21, 2020, another member of the task force investigating 
Coleman, Dover Police Officer Robert Cunningham, advised Porter that Coleman 
had made incriminating statements on a monitored phone call.  Cunningham told 
Porter that he recognized Coleman’s voice on the call and that the monitored phone 
number belonged to Coleman.  According to Porter, Cunningham also told him that, 
during the monitored call, Coleman said that he had purchased firearms and 
possessed those firearms in his hotel room, Room 117 at the Capital Inn.  Coleman 
was a person prohibited from possessing a firearm.   
(5) 
Porter confirmed that Room 117 was the address Coleman had 
identified to Probation & Parole as his address.  Porter had also seen Coleman in the 
doorway of Room 117 a few days earlier.  Porter wanted to act on the information 
provided by Cunningham immediately, but Coleman was in transit and there was not 
a safe opportunity to contact him.   
(6) 
On the morning of July 22, 2020, law enforcement officers conducting 
surveillance observed Coleman, carrying a backpack, enter Room 117.  Porter 
 
3 
promptly contacted his supervisor, Joel Duquette, to obtain permission to conduct 
an administrative search of Coleman’s hotel room.  After Duquette and Porter went 
through the checklist factors in Probation and Parole Procedure 7.19, Duquette 
verbally authorized the search.   
(7) 
Porter, another probation officer, and a Dover police officer then 
approached  Room 117.  Porter smelled marijuana.  After Porter knocked on the 
door, Coleman looked out the window, closed the curtain, and took a long time to 
open the door.  The odor of marijuana became stronger when Coleman opened the 
door.  In addition to Coleman, two women and a man were in the room.  Two bundles 
of what appeared to be heroin were in plain view on the bed.   
(8) 
The probation officers conducted an administrative search of the room.  
Porter found two firearms—a .40 caliber Smith & Wesson and a 9mm Ruger—in a 
backpack on the floor next to the television stand.  There was also mail with 
Coleman’s name on it in the room.  Following the search, Porter electronically filed 
the Procedure 7.19 checklist, which Duquette electronically signed.   
(9) 
Coleman’s probation officer, Christopher Nichols, filed administrative 
warrants for Coleman’s violation of conditional release and probation.  Nichols 
alleged that Coleman had violated his conditional release and probation by 
committing new criminal offenses (PFBPP and Possession of Ammunition by a 
 
4 
Person Prohibited)1 and possessing a firearm without Nichols’ permission.   After 
several continuances of a hearing on the violations, Coleman’s counsel filed a 
motion to suppress on November 23, 2020.  Coleman sought suppression of the 
firearms and other evidence found in the hotel room based on the probation officers’ 
failure to comply with Procedure 7.19.  In its response to the motion to suppress, the 
State included the administrative checklist.  The State explained that the use of 
“confidential source” in the checklist was a temporary means of preventing the 
wiretap from becoming public.   
(10) During a December 8, 2020 conference, the Superior Court discussed 
with counsel the logistics of a combined hearing on the motion to suppress and the 
violations of conditional release and probation.  At the December 11, 2020 hearing, 
Coleman’s counsel advised that Coleman wished to represent himself.  The Superior 
Court conducted a limited colloquy with Coleman, found that Coleman had waived 
his right to proceed with counsel on the motion to suppress and the violations of 
conditional release and probation, and continued the hearing so that Coleman could 
receive the exhibits to the State’s response to the motion to suppress.   
(11) The suppression and violations hearing was scheduled for January 
2021, but then rescheduled for February 2021 because Coleman was unavailable due 
to COVID-19 protocols at the prison.  A pre-hearing conference was scheduled for 
 
1 Those charges are the subject of another appeal, Coleman v. State, No. 83, 2022. 
 
5 
January 27, 2021.  On January 19, 2021, the Superior Court advised the parties that 
Coleman’s counsel for the new criminal case should attend the pre-hearing 
conference because the suppression decision could affect that case.  The court 
advised that if Coleman still wished to represent himself in the combined 
suppression and violations hearing, the court would conduct a more detailed pro se 
colloquy.  The pre-hearing was rescheduled for February 22, 2021. 
(12) On February 22, 2021, the Superior Court discussed with the parties 
and Coleman’s counsel for the new charges the possibility that the suppression 
motion could have an impact on the new charges.  Coleman’s counsel indicated that 
Coleman still wanted to represent himself in connection with the suppression motion 
and violations hearing.  After conducting a colloquy with Coleman, the Superior 
Court found that he had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to 
counsel in the violation of conditional release and probation proceeding.  The court 
then went over the procedures for the combined suppression and violations hearing, 
which would start with the suppression motion and then proceed to the violations of 
conditional release and probation.  Coleman’s counsel for the new charges received 
permission to attend the hearing if he was available. 
(13) On March 16, 2021, April 6, 2021, and April 13, 2021, the parties 
presented evidence regarding the motion to suppress.  On April 13, 2021 and April 
29, 2021, the parties presented evidence regarding the violations of conditional 
 
6 
release and probation.  The Superior Court invited the parties to submit supplemental 
arguments within fourteen days if they wished to do so.  Coleman submitted 
supplemental arguments.  The State did not. 
(14) On May 27, 2021, the Superior Court issued its decision on the motion 
to suppress and the violations of conditional release and probation.2  The Superior 
Court denied the motion to suppress, concluding that Probation and Parole (“P & 
P”) had substantially complied with Procedure 7.19.3  As to the violations of 
conditional release and probation, the Superior Court held that the State had shown 
by a preponderance of the evidence that Coleman had violated his conditional release 
and probation.4   
(15) On June 10, 2021, the Superior Court sentenced Coleman for his 
violations.  As to the PFBPP conviction, the Superior Court revoked Coleman’s 
conditional release and noted that the maximum expiration date of that sentence was 
March 14, 2021.  As to the other convictions, the Superior Court sentenced Coleman 
as follows: (i) for disregarding a police signal, two years of Level V incarceration, 
suspended after one year served under 11 Del. C. § 4204(k) for decreasing levels of 
supervision; (ii) for second-degree conspiracy, two years of Level V incarceration, 
suspended after six months for decreasing levels of supervision; and (iii) for 
 
2 State v. Coleman, 2021 WL 2181428 (Del. Super. Ct. May 27, 2021). 
3 Id. at *5-7. 
4 Id. at *8-9. 
 
7 
disregarding a police signal, two years of Level V incarceration, suspended for 
decreasing levels of supervision.  The Superior Court discharged Coleman from 
probation as unimproved for the second-degree reckless endangering conviction.  
This appeal followed.    
(16) Coleman’s arguments on appeal may be summarized as follows: (i) the 
State violated 11 Del. C. § 2407 by failing to provide an inventory notice of the 
wiretap order and by failing to provide the wiretap order and application; (ii) the 
Superior Court erred in denying Coleman’s request to subpoena his former VOP 
counsel, the former prosecutor for the State, and Cunningham; (iii) the Superior 
Court erred in holding that P & P complied with Procedure 7.19 in conducting the 
administrative search of Coleman’s hotel room; and (iv) the State violated Superior 
Court Criminal Rule 32.1 by failing to produce the audio recording of the call in 
which Coleman indicated he was buying firearms.  
(17) We review the denial of a motion suppress evidence after an evidentiary 
hearing for abuse of discretion.5  To the extent the claim of error implicates questions 
of law, we review de novo.6  We review the Superior Court’s revocation of probation 
for abuse of discretion.7  Unlike a criminal trial, the State is only required to prove a 
 
5 Culver v. State, 956 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 2008). 
6 Id. 
7 Kurzmann v. State, 903 A.2d 702, 716 (Del. 2006). 
 
8 
violation of probation by a preponderance of the evidence.8  The same standards 
apply to a violation of conditional release.   
(18) Coleman first argues that the Superior Court should have excluded all 
evidence derived from the wiretap because the State violated 11 Del. C. § 2407(g)(4) 
and (h).  Section 2407(g)(4) provides: 
Within a reasonable time but not later than 90 days after the termination 
of the period of an order or extensions thereof, the issuing judge shall 
cause to be served, on the persons named in the order and the other 
parties to intercepted communications as the judge may determine in 
that judge’s discretion that is in the interest of justice, an inventory that 
shall include notice of: 
 
a. The fact of the entry of the order; 
b. The date of the entry of the order and the period of authorized 
interception; and, 
c. The fact that during the period, wire, oral or electronic 
communications were or were not intercepted. 
 
The judge, upon the filing of a motion, shall make available to the 
person or the person’s counsel for inspection, portions of the 
intercepted communications, applications and orders pertaining to that 
person and the alleged crime. 
 
Section 2407(h) provides: 
Prerequisites to use of contents of communication as evidence.—The 
contents of any intercepted wire, oral or electronic communication or 
evidence derived therefrom may not be received in evidence or 
otherwise disclosed in any trial, hearing or other proceeding in the 
courts of this State unless each party, not less than 10 days before the 
trial, hearing or proceeding, has been furnished with a copy of the court 
order and accompanying application under which the interception was 
authorized.  
 
8 Id.  
 
9 
 
 
(19) Coleman did not raise either of these provisions until the last day of the 
combined suppression and violations hearing.  The Superior Court did not address 
Coleman’s reliance on Section 2407(g), but rejected  his reliance on Section 2407(h) 
because the motion to suppress did not put the court or State on fair notice of the 
wiretap issue.9  The court also found that Coleman waived receipt of the wiretap-
derived evidence by not invoking Section 2407(h) until the last day of the hearing.10  
Finally, the Superior Court relied on the prosecutor’s representation that he had 
provided the wiretap application and order to defense counsel (which included 
Coleman’s counsel) in the new criminal case on April 12, 2021.11    
(20) We agree that Coleman did not raise Section 2407 in a timely manner.  
As Coleman points out, he could not include Section 2407 in his November 23, 2020 
motion to suppress if he was not aware of the wiretap at that time.  But Coleman and 
his counsel were aware of the wiretap by December 2020.   The State referred to the 
wiretap in its December 7, 2020 response.  Coleman sent correspondence to the court 
with references to the wiretap by the end of December 2020.   
 
9 Coleman, 2021 WL 2181428, at *7. 
10 Id. at *8. 
11 Id.  In that criminal case, Coleman joined in a co-defendant’s motion to suppress arguing that 
the probable cause affidavits supporting the wiretap warrants did not demonstrate the necessity of 
the warrants.  State v. Mack, 2021 WL 4848230, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 18, 2021).  The Superior 
Court denied the motion.  Id. at *5-9.  The motion to suppress conceded that the affidavits provided 
probable cause to support the wiretaps. Id. at *5.   
 
10 
(21) Yet Coleman did not file an amended motion to suppress based on the 
wiretap.  Coleman did not, as he suggests, need a Section 2407(g) inventory to do 
so.  By December 2020, Coleman had sufficient information—that there was a 
wiretap of his phone in effect on July 21, 2020, and that his July 21, 2020 call 
discussing his purchase of weapons was intercepted—to challenge the wiretap and 
the admissibility of evidence derived from it.  He did not invoke Section 2407 until 
the last day of the combined suppression and violations hearing, more than a month 
after Porter had testified about the search of his hotel room.  Coleman’s references 
to the wiretap in his numerous letters to the Superior Court about access to the prison 
law library, scheduling, and other matters did not put the Superior Court or the State 
on fair notice of his Section 2407 claims.  The Superior Court did not err in finding 
that Coleman had waived those claims.     
(22) Coleman next contends that the Superior Court erred in denying his 
request to subpoena his former VOP counsel, the former State prosecutor involved 
in his VOP, and Cunningham.  Coleman requested seven additional witnesses in the 
trial court, but does not make any arguments concerning those witnesses in his 
opening brief.  He is deemed to have waived any arguments as to those witnesses.12   
 
12 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 14(b)(vi)(3) (“The merits of any argument that is not raised in the body of the 
opening brief shall be deemed waived and will not be considered by the Court on appeal.”). 
 
11 
(23) As to his former VOP counsel and the former State prosecutor, 
Coleman argues, as he did below, that their testimony would be relevant because a 
transcript of a November 12, 2020 office conference reflects that the prosecutor told 
Coleman’s counsel that there was no Procedure 7.19 documentation or checklist for 
the administrative search of his hotel room.  Coleman claims that this means the 
testimony of these witnesses would be relevant to his theory that the Procedure 7.19 
checklist was created long after the administrative search.  After reviewing the 
November 12, 2020 transcript, the Superior Court denied Coleman’s request, finding 
that the prosecutor made it clear at the hearing that he was not at liberty at that time 
to discuss certain items, which included sealed indictments.  Coleman had therefore 
not shown that the testimony of either witness would be relevant to the proceedings 
or necessary to his defense. 
(24) We agree.  At the November 12, 2020 conference, the prosecutor 
requested a 48-hour continuance of the VOP hearing scheduled for November 16, 
2020.13  The prosecutor stated that one of the reasons for the request was the 
existence of “compartmentalized information” he could not use and things he could 
not say on the 16th (but could say on the 18th) because “it would risk lives.”14  After 
 
13 The hearing was ultimately rescheduled for December 11, 2020. 
14 November 12, 2020 Transcript at 3.  The Superior Court docket for Coleman’s new criminal 
case reflects that the indictment and warrant application were filed on November 17, 2020.  State 
v. Coleman, Cr. ID No. 2010012644A&B, D.I. 1. The Court may take judicial notice of the records 
of any State court.  D.R.E. 202(d)(1)(C). 
 
12 
Coleman’s counsel stated that he understood that there was no Procedure 7.19 
checklist and a motion on the administrative search might be necessary, the 
prosecutor indicated that some of the issues would be clarified when he could release 
“some of the compartmentalized information.”15  With the December 7, 2020 
response to the motion to suppress, the State attached the Procedure 7.19 checklist 
and stated that the phrase “confidential informant” had been used to temporarily 
prevent the wiretap from becoming public.   
(25)   Contrary to Coleman’s contentions, the statements of his former VOP 
and the former prosecutor at the November 12, 2020 hearing do not support his 
theory that the Procedure 7.19 checklist was created long after the administrative 
search.  The statements only reflect that the State, for a period of time, was trying to 
prevent the existence of the wiretap from becoming public.  Coleman has not shown 
that his former VOP counsel or the former prosecutor would have any testimony 
relevant to the proceedings.  The Superior Court did not err therefore in denying his 
request to subpoena those witnesses.   
(26) As to Cunningham, Coleman argued below that all the police officers 
identified in a police report as necessary witnesses, including Cunningham, were 
likely to have relevant information.  He did not otherwise explain why Cunningham 
was a relevant witness.  The Superior Court denied Coleman’s request, finding that 
 
15 Id. at 6. 
 
13 
none of the witnesses were necessary based on Coleman’s limited proffer.  On 
appeal, Coleman describes Cunningham as a material witness, who would have 
relevant information about the monitored phone call that led to the administrative 
search.   
(27) The Superior Court did not err in denying Coleman’s request to 
subpoena Cunningham.  Coleman offered almost no explanation for why 
Cunningham was a relevant witness in the proceedings below.  He now emphasizes 
that Cunningham heard the phone call leading to the administrative search, but 
Porter testified as to what hold Cunningham told him.  Hearsay is admissible in 
suppression hearings and VOP hearings.16  Coleman had the opportunity to cross-
examine, and did cross-examine, Porter about what Cunningham told him.  The 
central issue during the motion to suppress hearing was whether Porter had a 
reasonable articulable suspicion of illegal activity,17 not Cunningham’s actions or 
beliefs.  Coleman has not shown any error in the Superior Court’s handling of his 
request for subpoenas directed to his former VOP counsel, the former prosecutor, 
and Cunningham.  
(28) Coleman next argues that the Superior Court erred in concluding that P 
& P substantially complied with Procedure 7.19 in conducting the administrative 
 
16 Houston v. State, 251 A.3d 102, 113-14 (Del. 2021); Kurzmann, 903 A.2d at 716-17. 
17 Pendleton v. State, 990 A.2d 417, 419 (Del. 2010). 
 
14 
search of his hotel room.  A probation officer may conduct an administrative  search 
as long as he has reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity.18  Procedure 
7.19, promulgated under 11 Del. C. § 4321, sets out the procedural requirements for 
administrative searches.19  Under Rule 7.19, a probation officer must have a 
conference with his supervisor before the search and gain his supervisor’s approval 
for the search.20  The officer must discuss the following factors with his supervisor: 
1. The officer has knowledge or sufficient reason to believe the offender 
possesses contraband; 
2. The officer has knowledge or sufficient reason to believe the offender 
is in violation of probation or parole; 
3. There is information from a reliable informant indicating the offender 
possesses contraband or is violating the law; 
4. The information from the informant is corroborated; and 
5. Approval for the search has been obtained from a Supervisor, a 
Manager, or the Director. If approval is not obtained prior to the search, 
list the exigent circumstances on the Search Checklist requiring you to 
proceed with the search.21 
 
P & P is not required to complete a physical copy of the pre-search checklist to 
satisfy Procedure 7.19.22 
(29) The Superior Court carefully reviewed each factor and the relevant 
evidence.  As to the first factor, Porter testified that he learned from Cunningham, a 
 
18 Id. 
19 Culver, 956 A.2d at 7. 
20 Coleman, 2021 WL 2181428, at *5 (citing Delaware Department of Corrections Bureau of 
Community Corrections Probation and Parole Procedure No. 7.19 (“DOC BCC 7.19”) § 
VII(A)(5)(a)). 
21 Id. (citing DOC BCC 7.19 § VII (e)). 
22 Pendleton, 990 A.2d at 420. 
 
15 
law enforcement member of the same task force investigating Coleman, that 
Coleman talked about buying firearms and having those firearms in his hotel room, 
Room 117 at the Capital Inn, on a phone number belonging to Coleman.  As to the 
second factor, Porter knew that Coleman was on probation and was a convicted felon 
who could not legally possess a firearm.   
(30) As to the third factor, the source of Porter’s information was a police 
officer who was a member of the same task force investigating Coleman.  
Cunningham was part of the team monitoring phone calls, while Porter was involved 
in surveillance.  Contrary to Coleman’s suggestion, Duquette could approve the 
search without knowing that it was Cunningham who told Porter what Coleman said 
on the wiretap.  Duquette understood that the source of the information Porter 
received was the ongoing wiretap of Coleman’s phone.  As to the fourth factor, 
Porter confirmed that Coleman had identified the Room 117 address to P & P as his 
address.  Porter had personally seen Coleman in the doorway of Room 117 several 
days earlier.   
(31) Coleman argues that the State failed to show that Porter and Duquette 
held a case conference before the July 22, 2020 search.  His reliance on post-July 
22, 2020 dates that appear on P & P paperwork, including the completed Procedure 
7.19 checklist, to make this argument is misplaced.  As both Porter and Duquette 
credibly testified: (i) they discussed each of the Procedure 7.19 factors on the phone 
 
16 
the morning of July 22, 2020; (ii) Duquette approved the search on that call; (iii) 
Porter conducted the search; (iv) Porter prepared all of the paperwork, including the 
Procedure 7.19 checklist that he had previously reviewed with Duquette on the 
phone, after the search; and (v) Duquette electronically approved the checklist on 
July 23, 2020.   Coleman has not shown that Porter and Duquette failed to hold a 
conference before Duquette approved the search.  The Superior Court did not err in 
finding that P & P substantially complied with Procedure 7.19. 
(32) Finally, Coleman argues that the State was required to produce the 
wiretap recordings under Rule 32.1(a)(1)(B).  This rule provides that a person 
subject to revocation of probation shall receive “[d]isclosure of the evidence against 
him.”23  As the State notes, Coleman made various arguments concerning the 
recordings below, but did not argue that the State was required to produce the 
recordings under Rule 32.1(a)(1)(B) until this appeal.  We review this claim for plain 
error.24  “[P]lain error is limited to material defects which are apparent on the face 
of the record; which are basic, serious and fundamental in their character, and which 
clearly deprive an accused of a substantial right, or which clearly show manifest 
injustice.”25   
 
23 Super. Ct. Crim. R.  
24 Supr. Ct. R. 8.  
25 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986). 
 
17 
(33) This Court reads “Rule 32.1 as requiring disclosure of the evidence the 
State plans to present at the hearing.”26  A “defendant is entitled to disclosure of the 
evidence to be used against him,” but “is not entitled to discovery in a VOP 
proceeding.27  The State’s response to the motion to suppress referred to the 
existence of recorded phone calls.  In December 2020, the prosecutor and Coleman’s 
counsel discussed with the court whether the State would be offering the recordings 
at the hearing or relying on witness testimony about the June 21, 2020 call.  The 
State ultimately chose to rely on witness testimony and did not present the recordings 
at the hearing.  Under Rule 32.1(a)(1)(B), the State was not required to produce 
recordings that it did not present or use at the hearing.  Coleman has not shown plain 
error.  Having considered the parties’ positions on appeal and the record below, we 
conclude that the Superior Court did not err in denying the motion to suppress and 
finding that Coleman violated his conditional release and probation. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
BY THE COURT: 
/s/ Gary F. Traynor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
 
26 Thompson v. State, 192 A.3d 544, 550 (Del. 2018). 
27 Id. at n.12.