Title: Orbe v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 990363
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: September 17, 1999

Present:  All the Justices 
DENNIS MITCHELL ORBE 
v.   Record Nos. 990363 & 990364       OPINION BY 
     JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA          September 17, 1999 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF YORK COUNTY 
 N. Prentis Smiley, Jr., Judge 
 
 
A jury convicted the defendant, Dennis Mitchell Orbe, 
of four charges in connection with a murder during the 
commission of robbery.  Those convictions are: (1) capital 
murder, in violation of Code § 18.2-31(4); (2) use or 
display of a firearm while committing murder, in violation 
of Code § 18.2-53.1; (3) robbery, in violation of Code 
§ 18.2-58; and (4) use or display of a firearm while 
committing robbery, in violation of Code § 18.2-53.1. 
At the conclusion of the sentencing phase of a 
bifurcated trial, the jury fixed the defendant’s punishment 
at death for the capital murder, 50 years for the robbery, 
and 5 years for each of the firearms offenses.  The jury 
imposed the sentence of death based on its finding of 
future dangerousness under Code §§ 19.2-264.2 and -264.4.  
After reviewing the post-sentence report required by Code 
§ 19.2-264.5, the trial court sentenced the defendant in 
accordance with the jury verdicts. 
The defendant appealed his non-capital convictions to 
the Court of Appeals pursuant to Code § 17.1-406.1  We 
certified that appeal (Record No. 990364) to this Court 
under the provisions of Code § 17.1-409 for consolidation 
with the defendant’s appeal of his capital murder 
conviction (Record No. 990363) and the sentence review 
mandated by Code § 17.1-313. 
On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court’s 
refusal to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses, 
the finding of future dangerousness based on consideration 
of unadjudicated criminal acts, the admission of 
photographic evidence, and the court’s refusal to allow the 
defendant to mail a questionnaire to prospective jurors.  
After considering each of these arguments and conducting 
our statutory review pursuant to Code § 17.1-313, we find 
no error in the defendant’s convictions and sentence of 
death.  Thus, we will affirm the judgments of the circuit 
court. 
I.  FACTS 
A. GUILT PHASE 
                     
1  Title 17.1 became effective on October 1, 1998, 
replacing Title 17.  Although the parties briefed and 
argued this appeal under the provisions of Title 17, we 
will cite Title 17.1 in this opinion since the relevant 
provisions remain unchanged. 
 
 
2
 
The criminal offenses for which the defendant was 
convicted occurred at a gas station and convenience store 
located in York County.  The convenience store was equipped 
with a video camera recording system that monitored three 
areas of the premises, including the check-out counter and 
cash register.  The camera focused on the cash register 
captured the incident that is pertinent to this appeal and 
recorded it on a video tape.  That tape reveals the 
following sequence of events.2
Near 3:38 a.m. on January 24, 1998, the defendant 
entered the convenience store, walked up to the check-out 
counter where Richard Sterling Burnett was working as a 
clerk, and pointed a revolver at Burnett’s chest.3  After 
Burnett opened the cash register drawer, the defendant shot 
him in the chest.  As Burnett was clutching his chest and 
struggling to remain in a standing position, the defendant 
walked around the counter, reached into the cash register 
                     
2 At trial, the Commonwealth introduced the video tape 
recording into evidence and played it for the jury. 
 
3 The defendant had been in the store on two occasions 
on January 23 but had purchased nothing. 
 
 
3
drawer, and removed some money from it.4  He then fled from 
the store. 
A short while later, a customer at the convenience 
store discovered Burnett’s body and called for emergency 
assistance.  F.T. Lyons, an investigator with the York 
County Sheriff’s Office, arrived on the scene about 4:25 
a.m.  Investigator Lyons found Burnett’s body "on the floor 
. . . behind the register."  He collected several items 
from the store for evidentiary purposes, including the 
video tape recording.  He took the video tape to the 
sheriff’s office where he used computer equipment to view 
it "frame by frame."  Lyons captured images from the video 
tape, digitized and saved them, and then printed several of 
the images.  He distributed those printed images to area 
law enforcement agencies and the media. 
The sheriff’s office subsequently received several 
telephone calls from persons who identified the defendant 
as the individual in the pictures that Lyons had 
distributed.  Investigator Lyons then obtained warrants 
                     
4 According to a territorial manager for the gas 
station and convenience store, the sum of $90.65 was 
missing from the cash register drawer. 
 
4
charging the defendant with capital murder, robbery, and 
use of a firearm in the commission of murder.5
 
The defendant was not apprehended, however, until 
January 31, 1998, after a high-speed chase through the 
streets of Richmond.  During the police officers’ pursuit, 
the defendant drove his car across a concrete median strip 
and struck a telephone pole, then proceeded to drive on the 
wrong side of the road, and accelerated through a 
roadblock.  Eventually, the defendant jumped out of his 
vehicle and ran on foot until police officers captured him 
at the end of an alley. 
After placing the defendant under arrest, a police 
officer searched the defendant’s person.  During the 
search, the officer found a partially loaded .357 magnum 
revolver in the waistband of the defendant’s pants.6  
Investigator Lyons eventually took possession of the weapon 
recovered from the defendant and submitted it to the 
                     
5 In addition to these three charges, a grand jury 
subsequently indicted the defendant for use of a firearm 
during the commission of robbery. 
 
6 Willis L. Branch, Jr., the defendant’s stepfather, 
testified that, sometime during the first or second week of 
January, he discovered that his .357 magnum revolver was 
missing from the home that Branch shared with the defendant 
and his mother.  At trial, Branch identified the revolver 
recovered from the defendant as having the same serial 
number as the one that was missing from his home. 
 
5
Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Criminal Justice 
Services, Division of Forensic Science, for testing. 
Scott A. Glass, a forensic scientist who works in the 
field of firearm and tool mark identification at the 
Division of Forensic Science, tested the revolver along 
with a "lead semi-wadcutter"7 bullet that had been removed 
from Burnett’s chest during an autopsy.  Based on the 
results of his analysis, Glass concluded that the bullet 
had been fired from the .357 magnum revolver. 
Dr. Elizabeth Kinnison, a pathologist and an Assistant 
Chief Medical Examiner for the Commonwealth of Virginia, 
performed the autopsy on Burnett’s body.  During the 
autopsy, Dr. Kinnison recovered the bullet from the right 
side of Burnett’s back where it was lodged.  According to 
Dr. Kinnison, Burnett had "sustained one gunshot wound to 
the front of the left chest[,]" which was the cause of 
death.  Dr. Kinnison stated that Burnett died "[p]rimarily 
from hemorrhage or bleeding from these wounds" and that 
"[t]he structures that were injured that were vital were 
the heart and the liver and the lung, which all would have 
caused internal bleeding."  She further testified that a 
person sustaining this type of injury "[m]ight have been in 
                     
7 Branch testified that he kept “.357 magnum, 158 
grains semi-wadcutters” as ammunition for his revolver. 
 
6
some pain associated with the skin[,]" would have suffered 
increasing problems with breathing as blood was lost, and 
would have become dizzy and eventually unconscious before 
dying. 
B. SENTENCING PHASE 
 
During the sentencing phase of the trial, the 
Commonwealth presented evidence to prove the defendant’s 
future dangerousness.  The evidence concerned other 
criminal acts that the defendant had committed in three 
separate incidents. 
The first incident occurred on January 21, 1998.  Lois 
Jones testified that when she and her boyfriend, Mark 
Scougal, returned home, Scougal discovered the defendant in 
a bedroom.  The defendant pointed a gun at Scougal and 
ordered Scougal to drive him "somewhere else" because he 
was hiding from the police.  As the defendant was forcing 
Scougal to a car, Jones retrieved a gun from her gun 
cabinet, loaded it, and went out onto the front porch of 
her house in order to stop the defendant.  Although there 
was conflicting testimony about whether Jones then fired 
her gun up into the air, the defendant shot at Jones twice.  
His second shot hit Jones in the calf of her leg and 
shattered the bone.  The defendant then demanded that 
 
7
cougal give him the car keys, but when Scougal refused to 
comply, the defendant fled from the scene. 
 
The second episode, also on January 21, 1998, involved 
Charles Powell and William Bottoms, two elderly gentlemen.  
While Powell and Bottoms were sitting in the front yard of 
Bottoms’ Richmond home, the defendant approached the two 
men and ordered them to walk to the rear of the house.  The 
defendant displayed a weapon to the men and stated that he 
"[had] nothing to lose."  After questioning both men about 
the location of their cars, keys, and wallets, the 
defendant took Powell’s car and left in it. 
 
Karen Glenn and Patricia Tuck testified about the 
third incident, which occurred on January 30, 1998.  After 
Glenn, Tuck, and another woman arrived at a private 
residence in New Kent County to perform cleaning services, 
the defendant, who was already inside the house, approached 
the women, brandished a handgun, and yelled, "Bitches, get 
down."  As they were starting to "get down," the defendant 
hit Tuck between her shoulder blades with the gun.  He then 
ordered the three women to crawl on their stomachs to a 
bedroom.  Once the women were in the bedroom, the defendant 
made them go into a closet.  He then nailed a piece of 
plywood across the closet door.  The women were trapped 
inside the closet for approximately four and one-half 
 
8
hours, until the homeowner returned and found them.  During 
this ordeal, the defendant proclaimed, "I’m Dennis Orbe, 
I’m wanted for murder, and it doesn’t matter what I do."  
He also directed the women to empty their pockets and took 
money, checks, and other valuables, including the keys to 
Glenn’s car, from them.  He stole the car. 
 
In accordance with Code § 19.2-264.4(B), the jury also 
heard evidence "in mitigation of the offense."  The 
defendant’s mother and step-father testified about the 
defendant’s troubled childhood and his problems with 
alcohol abuse.  One of his friends described a change in 
the defendant’s behavior shortly before the incidents in 
January 1998, and the administrator of a regional jail, 
where the defendant had been incarcerated, testified that 
he had received only one minor complaint with regard to the 
defendant’s behavior during his confinement. 
 
The defendant also presented testimony from Dr. Thomas 
A. Pasquale, a clinical psychologist who had evaluated the 
defendant for purposes of mitigation and risk assessment 
regarding the defendant’s future dangerousness.  Dr. 
Pasquale testified that the defendant had exhibited 
suicidal intentions at least a year prior to the events 
that transpired in January 1998 and that the defendant was 
depressed, in part, over his perceived failure as a father 
 
9
and husband.  Dr. Pasquale further reported that the 
defendant drank heavily and had an impulse control 
dysfunction. 
 
During his evaluation, Dr. Pasquale learned that the 
defendant’s father had abandoned the defendant at an early 
age.  Consequently, Dr. Pasquale opined that the defendant, 
who had recently located his father, might have wished to 
visit his father again and that he had decided to obtain 
money illegally to accomplish that purpose.  According to 
Dr. Pasquale, the defendant thus "reasoned his way to 
intrude into a number of individuals’ lives by way of 
robbery, home invasion, weapons discharge[,] . . . 
brandishing and general intimidation." 
 
In conclusion, Dr. Pasquale testified that he did not 
perceive the defendant as being a future danger in a prison 
setting unless he was able to access alcohol inside the 
prison, was abused by those within the prison system, or 
was placed under conditions of duress while incarcerated.  
However, Dr. Pasquale stated that, if the defendant escaped 
from a penitentiary, it would be a "very dangerous, very 
risky" situation. 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. INSTRUCTIONS ON LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES 
 
10
In his first argument,8 the defendant asserts that his 
death sentence was imposed under the influence of passion, 
prejudice, or other arbitrary factors.  Specifically, he 
contends that the circuit court erred in refusing to grant 
an instruction on first degree murder and an instruction on 
determining the grade of the offense of homicide.9  The 
defendant makes the same argument on appeal but also 
asserts that the instructions should have been given to the 
jury because the question whether the defendant acted 
                     
8 The defendant’s first argument encompasses numbers 1, 
10, and 11 of his assignments of error.  All references to 
the defendant’s assignments of error are to those that he 
originally filed rather than to the assignments of error as 
the defendant renumbered them in his brief. 
 
Although the defendant filed 17 assignments of error 
in this Court, he argued on brief only 10 of them.  The 
assignments of error that he did not argue, and that we 
will therefore not consider, are numbers 6, 8, 9, 12, 15, 
16, and 17.  See Quesinberry v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 364, 
370, 402 S.E.2d 218, 222, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 834 
(1991)(holding assignments of error not argued on brief are 
waived for purposes of appeal). 
 
9 Although the defendant stated at trial that he was 
not requesting an instruction on second degree murder, one 
of his proffered instructions included not only the 
elements of first degree murder but also those of second 
degree murder and voluntary manslaughter.  His other 
instruction advised the jury that, if a reasonable doubt 
exists as to the grade of the offense, the jury must 
resolve that doubt in favor of the defendant. 
 
 
11
maliciously was disputed.10  We do not agree with the 
defendant’s argument. 
 
It is well-established in Virginia that jury 
instructions “are proper only if supported by the evidence, 
and that more than a scintilla of evidence is necessary to 
support a lesser-included offense instruction requested by 
the defendant.”  Commonwealth v. Donkor, 256 Va. 443, 445, 
507 S.E.2d 75, 76 (1998).  We have also recognized that 
“evidence showing a murder ‘to have been deliberate, 
premeditated and wilful could be so clear and 
uncontroverted that a trial court could properly refuse to 
instruct on the lesser included offenses.’”  Buchanan v. 
Commonwealth, 238 Va. 389, 409, 384 S.E.2d 757, 769 (1989), 
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1063 (1990)(quoting Painter v. 
Commonwealth, 210 Va. 360, 366, 171 S.E.2d 166, 171 
(1969)). 
                     
10 During oral argument, the defendant posited that the  
testimony elicited from Scott Glass, the forensic expert, 
during cross-examination supported the defendant’s 
contention that the shooting of Burnett was “accidental.”  
Glass acknowledged that the weapon used to kill Burnett was 
a double-action revolver, meaning that the amount of 
“trigger pull” (the force necessary to work the firing 
mechanism or cause the hammer to fall) required to fire the 
gun is less when the hammer is cocked than when the hammer 
is not in that position.  But, Glass also testified that 
the gun was equipped with a safety mechanism called a 
“hammer block rebound system,” which means that, even when 
the hammer is cocked, “the trigger has to be pulled and 
 
12
 
The evidence in the present case does not support the 
defendant’s proffered instructions.  An instruction on 
first degree murder was not warranted because the video 
tape clearly established that Burnett was shot in the chest 
during the commission of armed robbery at the convenience 
store.  See Bennett v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 448, 470, 374 
S.E.2d 303, 317 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1028 (1989) 
(holding first degree murder instruction not warranted 
because defendant adduced no evidence that victim was not 
murdered during commission of robbery).  Thus, the sole 
issue was whether the defendant was the person who killed 
Burnett, i.e., was he “guilty or innocent of the capital 
offense.”  Frye v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 370, 389, 345 
S.E.2d 267, 281 (1986).  Also, the record does not contain 
a scintilla of evidence that the defendant acted without 
premeditation or malice so as to justify an instruction on 
second degree murder or voluntary manslaughter, 
respectively.  See Donkor, 256 Va. at 445, 507 S.E.2d at 
76.  Accordingly, we find no error in the circuit court’s 
judgment refusing to grant these two instructions. 
B. FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS BASED ON  
UNADJUDICATED CRIMINAL ACTS 
 
                                                             
held in the most rearward position” in order for the gun to 
fire. 
 
13
Next, the defendant challenges the imposition of the 
death penalty based on the finding that “he would commit 
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a 
continuing serious threat to society” pursuant to Code 
§ 19.2-264.4(C).  The defendant’s attack with regard to 
this issue is threefold.  He first asserts that the 
evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to establish 
future dangerousness because he “had no prior history of 
significant violent offenses.”  He next contends that the 
trial court applied an incorrect legal standard in 
determining future dangerousness.  Finally, he argues that 
the introduction into evidence of unadjudicated criminal 
acts violates the Constitution of the United States and the 
Constitution of Virginia because there is no requirement 
that such acts be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.11  We do 
not agree with any of the defendant’s arguments. 
 
As to the first prong of the defendant’s attack, we 
find sufficient evidence of future dangerousness to support 
the imposition of the death penalty.  During the month of 
January 1998, the defendant committed numerous criminal 
acts in three separate episodes, in addition to the robbery 
and murder of Burnett.  On January 21, he entered Jones’ 
                     
11 These three arguments cover numbers 2, 3, 13, and 14 
of the defendant’s assignments of error. 
 
14
home while no one was present and then shot Jones in the 
leg when she attempted to stop the defendant’s abduction of 
Scougal.  That same day, the defendant used a firearm to 
rob Powell.  Then on January 30, the day before the 
defendant was apprehended, he abducted and robbed three 
women, again using a firearm, and left them in a small 
closet after nailing the door shut.  This evidence 
establishes beyond a reasonable doubt “a probability that 
the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that 
would constitute a continuing serious threat to society.”  
Code § 19.2-264.2; see also § 19.2-264.4(C).  Thus, the 
trial court did not err in refusing to strike the 
Commonwealth’s evidence with regard to the defendant’s 
future dangerousness. 
The defendant’s next argument is that the trial court 
adopted the wrong legal standard when it used the phrase 
“sufficient probable cause” in the following statement, 
which the court made while overruling the defendant’s 
motion to strike the Commonwealth’s evidence at sentencing: 
“The matter of future dangerousness, again, the evidence — 
there is evidence before the Court and before this jury and 
the jury will make the determination as to whether there is 
sufficient probable cause — probability that the Defendant 
 
15
is guilty of any future dangerousness.”  We do not agree 
with the defendant’s contention for two reasons. 
First, we believe that the court’s use of that phrase 
was a misstatement because the court immediately corrected 
itself by using the term “probability.”  The term 
“probability” is part of the criteria set forth in Code 
§ 19.2-264.4(C) for determining future dangerousness: “The 
penalty of death shall not be imposed unless the 
Commonwealth shall prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
there is a probability based upon evidence of the prior 
history of the defendant . . . that he would commit 
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a 
continuing serious threat to society.”  (Emphasis added.)  
See also Code § 19.2-264.2.  Furthermore, the court 
properly instructed the jury in accordance with this 
statutory provision.  Thus, we conclude that the trial 
court decided the motion to strike on the issue of future 
dangerousness under the appropriate standard. 
We also find no merit in the third aspect of the 
defendant’s argument regarding future dangerousness.  The 
defendant asserts that the Commonwealth used unadjudicated 
criminal acts that had not been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt to establish future dangerousness.  However, most of 
the criminal acts about which the jury heard evidence had 
 
16
been adjudicated.  The record shows that, before the 
sentencing hearing in this case, the defendant had been 
found guilty, based on his guilty pleas, of the offenses 
that he committed on January 21 in the City of Richmond and 
those that he committed on January 30 in New Kent County. 
As to those criminal acts that were unadjudicated on 
the date of the sentencing hearing in the present case, we 
have previously construed Code § 19.2-264.4(C) “to permit 
the admission into evidence of unadjudicated misconduct.”  
Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 295, 317, 384 S.E.2d 785, 
799 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990).  Moreover, 
we specifically held in Walker v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 54, 
66, 515 S.E.2d 565, 572 (1999), that evidence of each 
unadjudicated criminal act admitted to show a defendant’s 
future dangerousness is not subject to the reasonable doubt 
standard.  Rather, the finding of future dangerousness must 
be supported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. The 
defendant has offered no reason why we should depart from 
these precedents.  Accordingly, we will not disturb the 
circuit court’s judgment on this issue. 
C. ADMISSION INTO EVIDENCE OF PHOTOGRAPHS OF VICTIM 
The defendant contends that the circuit court erred in 
overruling a pretrial motion in limine to exclude 
photographs of the victim, including autopsy photographs, 
 
17
from being introduced into evidence at trial.12  The 
defendant argues that, since he had stipulated that Burnett 
was killed by a single gunshot wound to the chest, the 
Commonwealth offered the photographs solely to arouse the 
sympathy of the jury for the victim and to prejudice it 
against him. 
Over the defendant’s objections, the trial court 
admitted into evidence photographs exhibiting the following 
images: (1) the open cash register drawer and the victim 
slumped on the floor behind the check-out counter; (2) a 
closer view of Burnett’s body sitting on the floor; (3) a 
small bruise on Burnett’s back where Dr. Kinnison found the 
bullet; (4) the entry wound in Burnett’s chest; (5) the 
victim’s condition upon arrival for the autopsy and his 
blood-stained shirt; (6) Burnett with some of his friends; 
and (7) Burnett sitting at a sound booth in his church. 
These photographs accurately depict the crime scene and the 
victim, and are therefore not rendered inadmissible simply 
because they may be gruesome or shocking.  Walker, 258 Va. 
at 69, 515 S.E.2d at 574 (citing Walton v. Commonwealth, 
256 Va. 85, 92, 501 S.E.2d 134, 138, cert. denied, ___ U.S. 
___, 119 S.Ct. 602 (1998)).  The photographs are relevant 
                     
12 This argument addresses numbers four and seven of 
the defendant’s assignments of error. 
 
18
to show “motive, intent, method, malice, premeditation and 
the atrociousness of [the defendant’s] crimes.”  Chichester 
v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 311, 326, 448 S.E.2d 638, 648 
(1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1166 (1995)(quoting Spencer, 
238 Va. at 312, 384 S.E.2d at 796).  Any prejudice to the 
defendant resulting from the admission of the photographs 
is outweighed by the photographs’ probative value.  See Coe 
v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 83, 87, 340 S.E.2d 820, 823 (1986) 
(holding probative value of evidence must be balanced 
against any prejudicial effect).  On appeal, we will not 
disturb a trial court’s exercise of discretion in balancing 
those competing considerations absent a clear abuse of 
discretion.  Id. 
Furthermore, the defendant’s stipulation with regard 
to the cause of Burnett’s death does not preempt the 
introduction of the photographs into evidence.  See Mackall 
v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 240, 253, 372 S.E.2d 759, 767-68 
(1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 925 (1989) (holding autopsy 
photograph of victim was admissible even if defendant 
stipulated identity of victim).  Thus, we conclude that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 
photographs.  See Clagett v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 79, 87, 
472 S.E.2d 263, 268 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1122 
(1997) (“The admission into evidence of photographs of the 
 
19
body of a murder victim is left to the sound discretion of 
the trial court and will be disturbed only upon a showing 
of a clear abuse of discretion.”). 
D.  INDIVIDUAL VOIR DIRE AND JUROR QUESTIONNAIRES 
 
Finally, in assignment of error number five, the 
defendant claims that he was prejudiced by the court’s 
refusal to permit him to mail a questionnaire to each 
prospective juror.  On brief, the defendant also argues 
that he was denied a full and fair opportunity to examine 
the venire because the circuit court did not allow him to 
conduct individual voir dire.  The defendant did not 
include the issue regarding individual voir dire in an 
assignment of error.  Therefore, we will not consider it.  
Rule 5:17(c).  As to the issue properly preserved, we find 
no error in the circuit court’s judgment. 
 
The manner in which voir dire is conducted lies within 
the trial court’s discretion, and its decisions concerning 
voir dire will not be disturbed absent an abuse of 
discretion.  Fisher v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 403, 410-11, 
374 S.E.2d 46, 50 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1028 
(1989).  We have previously decided that a trial court did 
not abuse its discretion by refusing to allow a defendant 
to send a questionnaire to prospective jurors.  Hedrick v. 
Commonwealth, 257 Va. 328, 337, 513 S.E.2d 634, 639 (1999); 
 
20
Strickler v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 482, 489-90, 404 S.E.2d 
227, 232, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 944 (1991).  Such a 
practice “would detract from the trial judge’s ‘opportunity 
. . . to observe and evaluate . . . prospective jurors 
first hand.’”  Id. at 490, 404 S.E.2d at 232 (quoting Pope 
v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 114, 124, 360 S.E.2d 352, 358 
(1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1015 (1988)).  “[T]he 
opportunity to see and hear the veniremen, when questioned 
during voir dire, is crucial to the effective discharge of 
the trial judge’s responsibility.”  Strickler, 241 Va. at 
490, 404 S.E.2d at 232.  Thus, we conclude that the circuit 
court did not abuse its discretion.13
III. PASSION, PREJUDICE, AND PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW 
                     
13 After the time limit for filing assignments of error 
had expired, the defendant filed a motion in this Court for 
leave to file an additional assignment of error in this 
appeal.  In the new assignment of error, he asserted that 
the trial court gave the jury a verdict form that was 
inconsistent with the penalty phase jury instructions.  The 
defendant based his motion on the recent decision of this 
Court in Atkins v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 160, 510 S.E.2d 
445 (1999).  This Court denied the defendant’s motion on 
May 10, 1999.  Nevertheless, he argued, both on brief and 
orally, this issue concerning the verdict form.  Because 
the defendant failed to preserve an objection to the 
verdict form at trial, the defendant is procedurally barred 
from raising the issue on appeal.  Rule 5:17(c).  
Furthermore, we specifically denied his motion to file an 
additional assignment of error.  Although we rely on the 
defendant’s procedural default to resolve this issue, we 
note that the verdict form in this case did not have the 
problem addressed in Atkins. 
 
21
 
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-313(C)(1), we must determine 
whether the death sentence in this case was imposed under 
the influence of passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary 
factors.  Upon careful review of the record, we find no 
evidence that any such factor was present or influenced 
either the jury’s or the trial court’s sentencing decision.  
The defendant’s only contention with regard to this issue 
is that the sentence of death was imposed under the 
influence of prejudice because the trial court did not 
instruct the jury on lesser included offenses.  We have 
already addressed that question. 
 
Code § 17.1-313(C)(2) requires us to determine whether 
the sentence of death in this case is “excessive or 
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, 
considering both the crime and the defendant.”  Pursuant to 
Code § 17.1-313(E), we have accumulated the records of all 
capital murder cases reviewed by this Court.  The records 
include not only those capital murder cases in which the 
death penalty was imposed, but also those cases in which 
the trial court or jury imposed a life sentence and the 
defendant petitioned this Court for an appeal.  Whitley v. 
Commonwealth, 223 Va. 66, 82, 286 S.E.2d 162, 171, cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 882 (1982). 
 
22
 
 In complying with the statutory directive to compare 
this case with “similar cases,” we have specifically 
focused on cases in which an employee was murdered at a 
business establishment during the commission of robbery and 
the death penalty was imposed solely on the future 
dangerousness predicate. 14  See, e.g. Peterson v. 
Commonwealth, 225 Va. 289, 302 S.E.2d 520, cert. denied, 
464 U.S. 865, reh’g denied, 464 U.S. 1004 (1983)(accountant 
murdered during armed robbery of store; defendant had prior 
convictions for armed robbery, two of which occurred within 
three weeks of the capital murder); Townes v. Commonwealth, 
234 Va. 307, 362 S.E.2d 650 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 
971 (1988)(female employee murdered during robbery of 
store; defendant had 22 prior convictions for forgery and 
uttering, 4 convictions for robbery, and convictions for 
maiming, felony escape, and use of a firearm); Mackall, 236 
Va. 240, 372 S.E.2d 759 (gas station cashier killed during 
                     
14 This Court compiled a list of cases involving 
capital murder during the commission of robbery and a 
finding of future dangerousness in Yeatts v. Commonwealth, 
242 Va. 121, 143, 410 S.E.2d 254, 267-68 (1991), cert. 
denied, 503 U.S. 946 (1992).  We supplemented that 
compilation in Chichester, 248 Va. at 332-33, 448 S.E.2d at 
652; and in Roach v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 324, 351, 468 
S.E.2d 98, 113, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 951 (1996).  Since 
the last supplementation, we have decided Jackson v. 
Commonwealth, 255 Va. 625, 499 S.E.2d 538 (1998), cert. 
denied, __ U.S. __, 119 S.Ct. 796 (1999); and Walton, 256 
Va. 85, 501 S.E.2d 134. 
 
23
armed robbery; defendant’s criminal history included 
larcenies, burglaries, threats of violence to correctional 
officers, and possession of deadly weapon while 
incarcerated); Dubois v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 260, 435 
S.E.2d 636 (1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1012 (1994)(store 
employee murdered during armed robbery; defendant 
previously convicted of grand larceny, assault, and 
possession of firearm as a convicted felon); Chichester, 
248 Va. 311, 448 S.E.2d 638 (employee killed during armed 
robbery of restaurant; defendant previously convicted of 
carrying concealed weapon; and nine days before capital 
murder offense, defendant robbed another restaurant); 
Joseph v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 78, 452 S.E.2d 862, cert. 
denied, 516 U.S. 876 (1995) (employee murdered during armed 
robbery of restaurant; defendant had assaulted police 
officer, had been in possession of loaded revolver and 
crack cocaine, and had participated in abduction of two 
store clerks during armed robbery).  We have also reviewed 
cases in which the defendant received a life sentence, 
rather than the death penalty, for capital murder during 
the commission of robbery.  See, e.g. Johnson v. 
Commonwealth, 221 Va. 736, 273 S.E.2d 784, cert. denied, 
454 U.S. 920 (1981); Bowling v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 
166, 403 S.E.2d 375 (1991); Wilkins v. Commonwealth, appeal 
 
24
denied, No. 840142 (Va. Oct. 10, 1984); Freeman v. 
Commonwealth, appeal denied, No. 830290 (Va. Jan. 25, 
1984). 
The purpose of our comparative review is to reach a 
reasoned judgment regarding what cases justify the 
imposition of the death penalty.  We cannot insure complete 
symmetry among all death penalty cases, but our review does 
enable us to identify and invalidate a death sentence that 
is “excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in 
similar cases.”  Code § 17.1-313(C)(2); see Tennessee v. 
Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 665 (Tenn. 1997), cert. denied, ___ 
U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 1536 (1998)(The court’s “function in 
performing comparative review is not to search for proof 
that a defendant’s death sentence is perfectly symmetrical, 
but to identify and invalidate the aberrant death 
sentence.”).  The defendant has not argued that the 
sentence of death in his case is disproportionate, and 
based on our review of this case and “similar cases,” we 
conclude that the defendant’s sentence of death is not 
excessive or disproportionate to sentences generally 
imposed in this Commonwealth for capital murders comparable 
to the defendant’s murder of Burnett. 
 
For these reasons, we find no error either in the 
judgments of the circuit court or in the imposition of the 
 
25
death penalty.  Therefore, we will affirm the judgments of 
the circuit court. 
Record No. 990363--Affirmed. 
Record No. 990364--Affirmed. 
 
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