Title: People v. Simpson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 85084, 86926
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: September 27, 2001

Docket Nos. 85084, 86926 cons.-Agenda 1-March 2001. 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 								ROBERT SIMPSON, Appellant.
Opinion filed September 27, 2001.
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:
	Defendant, Robert Simpson, appeals the orders of the circuit
court of Cook County, dismissing his amended post-conviction
petition and his petition for post-judgment relief. Defendant was
sentenced to death for his underlying murder conviction; therefore,
his appeal lies directly with this court. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(a).
We affirm the circuit court's orders.
BACKGROUND
	Defendant's convictions arose from the armed robbery and
murder of Barbara Lindich at the Fairway Food store in Glenwood,
Illinois. This court has previously set forth the evidence presented
at defendant's trial in our opinion on defendant's direct appeal.
People v. Simpson, 172 Ill. 2d 117 (1996). For this reason, we will
discuss only the facts that are necessary to the disposition of the
issues raised in this appeal.
	On May 22, 1992, at approximately 10 a.m., defendant and
Carolyn LaGrone entered the Fairway Food store and robbed it
while Lurlarn Young waited in the car. As defendant emptied the
cash register, Barbara Lindich, a store customer, walked up behind
LaGrone and peered over her shoulder. Defendant turned and shot
Lindich, who later died as a result of the gunshot wound.
Defendant then checked the safe, left the store with LaGrone and
went to the car where Young awaited.
	LaGrone was arrested three days later and gave a statement to
the police that detailed the offense as well as Young and
defendant's involvement. Defendant was thereafter arrested and
placed in a lineup. He was identified by eyewitnesses, including
employees at the Fairway Food store, as the man they saw rob the
store and shoot Lindich.
	At trial, three store employees identified defendant as the man
who was behind the service desk with the gun. Forensic testing
experts stated that the cartridge case recovered from the scene was
fired from one of the pistols recovered from defendant's storage
locker after defendant was arrested.
	During all phases of the pretrial and trial proceedings,
defendant represented himself with the aid of a public defender
acting as standby counsel. Defendant called several witnesses who
were present in the store at the time of the robbery to testify on his
behalf. No defense witnesses contradicted the State's witnesses'
accounts of what occurred in the store. Defendant also called
codefendant Young to testify but she invoked her fifth amendment
right and did not testify. At defendant's request, and against the
trial court's advice, custodial statements of LaGrone and Young
were published to the jury.
	At the close of the evidence, the jury returned a verdict
finding defendant guilty of armed robbery and first degree murder
of Lindich. The jury found defendant eligible for death on the
basis of the murder-in-the-course-of-felony aggravating factor
(720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6) (West 1992)) and the matter proceeded to
the second stage of sentencing. Defendant continued to represent
himself during the sentencing phase.
	The trial court inquired whether defendant intended to call any
witnesses on his behalf in mitigation and defendant responded that
he wanted to call Judges James Bailey, Richard Fitzgerald and
Lloyd Van Duzen as character witnesses. The trial court instructed
defendant's standby counsel to investigate the matter and find out
where the judges were currently located and if they could recollect
knowing defendant.
	At the next court date, the trial court provided defendant with
three transcripts defendant had previously requested. The trial
judge further informed defendant that he had contacted Judges
Fitzgerald and Bailey and that neither judge remembered
defendant. However, the trial court also informed defendant that
both judges would be willing to come to court.
	Defendant informed the trial court that since the judges could
not remember him, he wanted to go to the law library and prepare
certain motions. The trial court admonished defendant that he
should be more concerned because the jury had not made a final
determination as to defendant's sentence. In response, defendant
countered that if the worse case scenario occurred and he was
sentenced to death, that sentence would allow him to "bypass the
Illinois Appellate Court" and go "directly to the Illinois Supreme
Court." The trial court stated, "[Y]ou have your own strategy and
I have told you this before, but I still wouldn't give up on the
jury." Defendant acknowledged the statement but again affirmed
his decision: "I understand, your Honor, but the law indicates if
that does occur, the matter goes directly to the Supreme Court."
	As a last attempt to convince defendant to reconsider his
strategy, the trial judge informed defendant that if he were in
defendant's position he would vigorously present mitigation
evidence to the jury so that it would be inclined not to sentence
defendant to death. Defendant asked if he could have some time
to contact the judges himself. When court resumed, defendant
informed the trial court that after speaking to Judge Bailey, the
judge could not recall defendant. The judge again admonished
defendant that he should not hinge his strategy on post-trial
motions or on an appeal. He also explained to defendant that if one
person on the jury panel disagreed with the imposition of death,
defendant would not be sentenced to death. Despite the trial
court's admonishments, however, defendant decided not to present
any mitigation evidence.
	At the conclusion of the second stage of the sentencing
hearing, the jury found no mitigating factors to preclude
imposition of the death penalty. The trial court appointed counsel
to represent defendant on his post-trial motion. In preparation for
the post-trial hearing, counsel requested defendant's medical file
from the Pontiac Correctional Center, which showed that
defendant suffered from headaches, dizziness, fainting spells, and
bad eyesight and had survived a gunshot wound to the head from
a prior incident. At the post-trial hearing, counsel argued that
defendant was not competent to represent himself during either the
trial or the sentencing phase. The trial court denied the post-trial
motion and sentenced defendant to death for the murder and 30
years' imprisonment for the armed robbery.
	On direct appeal, this court affirmed defendant's conviction
and sentence. People v. Simpson, 172 Ill. 2d 117 (1996). The
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Simpson v.
Illinois, 519 U.S. 982, 136 L. Ed. 2d 334, 117 S. Ct. 436 (1996).
Thereafter, defendant filed a pro se petition for post-conviction
relief and a motion to appoint counsel. Counsel filed a motion to
produce handwritten statements from the Glenwood police
department. The trial court ordered the Glenwood police
department to produce the requested documents. After records
were produced, counsel filed a motion to compel complete
production of the documents and a motion to take depositions. The
trial court denied the motions.
	Prior to the initial court date on defendant's post-conviction
petition, the State filed a motion for clarification of defendant's
competence pursuant to People v. Owens, 139 Ill. 2d 351 (1990).
The State requested that the trial court determine if defendant had
raised a bona fide issue as to his competence. The trial court
determined that defendant's condition had not deteriorated and
that he was coherent and able to understand the proceedings.
	Thereafter, the trial court dismissed defendant's post-conviction petition without an evidentiary hearing. Defendant then
filed a pro se petition for post-judgment relief. 735 ILCS 5/2-1401
(West 1998). The trial court dismissed the petition for post-judgment relief and defendant appealed directly to this court. We
consolidated both matters for purposes of this appeal. We affirm
the trial court's dismissal of defendant's post-conviction and the
dismissal of defendant's petition for post-judgment relief for the
following reasons.

ANALYSIS
	In a post-conviction proceeding, the trial court does not
redetermine a defendant's innocence or guilt, but instead examines
constitutional issues which escaped earlier review. See People v.
Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 89 (1999). To be entitled to post-conviction
relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS
5/122-1 through 122-7 (West 1998)), a defendant must
demonstrate a substantial deprivation of federal or state
constitutional rights in the proceedings that produced the
challenged conviction or sentence. People v. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d 500, 528 (1999).
	A basic tenet of the Act is that the scope of post-conviction
relief is limited by considerations of waiver and res judicata "to
constitutional matters which have not been, and could not have
been, previously adjudicated." People v. Winsett, 153 Ill. 2d 335,
346 (1992). Issues that could have been raised on direct appeal,
but were not, and any issues that were decided by a reviewing
court generally will not be considered in a post-conviction
proceeding. People v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418, 425 (1999).
	At the second stage of a post-conviction proceeding, as in the
present case, the circuit court appoints counsel to represent an
indigent defendant and counsel may file an amended post-conviction petition. See 725 ILCS 5/122-4 (West 1998); People
v. Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d 410, 418 (1996). The State may then file
a motion to dismiss or answer the defendant's post-conviction
petition. 725 ILCS 5/122-5 (West 1998). A defendant is not
entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his post-conviction petition
as a matter of right. People v. Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d 355, 370-71
(1996).
	An evidentiary hearing on a post-conviction petition is
warranted only where the allegations of the petition, supported by
the trial record or accompanying affidavits where appropriate,
make a substantial showing that a defendant's constitutional rights
have been violated. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d  at 528; People v. Towns,
182 Ill. 2d 491, 503 (1998). All well-pleaded facts in the petition
and accompanying affidavits, if any, are taken as true for the
purpose of determining whether to grant an evidentiary hearing.
People v. Brisbon, 164 Ill. 2d 236, 244-45 (1995).
	This court reviews a trial court's determination regarding the
sufficiency of allegations in a post-conviction petition de novo.
People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 388-89 (1998). With these
basic principles in mind, we turn to defendant's first contention.

I. Errors at Post-Conviction Proceeding
	Before considering the allegations raised in defendant's post-conviction petition, we first consider defendant's contention that
the trial court erred during the post-conviction proceeding when it
failed to grant defendant's discovery request, improperly made
certain factual and credibility determinations, and ruled that
defendant was competent to proceed with the post-conviction
process.
	Defendant maintains that the post-conviction court erred in
denying his request for the discovery depositions from four
witnesses who wrote out information after the incident at the
request of one of the police officers, Sergeant DiMare. Defendant
alleges that there exists a conflict between DiMare's trial
testimony as to what he told the four witnesses to write down after
the incident, an affidavit that DiMare prepared for the post-conviction proceeding, and the witnesses' own testimony.
	 At trial, all four witnesses testified that DiMare gave them
pencil and paper and requested that they write out notes about the
incident. DiMare testified that he gave all of the witnesses pencils
and paper so that they could write out notes about the incident. In
an affidavit DiMare prepared for the post-conviction proceeding,
he stated that the statements he received contained general
information about the crime, which he incorporated into the police
report. He further stated that the notes were destroyed once the
police report was completed. Defendant argues the trial court
should have ordered discovery depositions from the four witnesses
in order to ascertain what their statements actually contained.
	Although neither the civil nor the criminal discovery rules
apply to post-conviction proceedings, a circuit court nonetheless
has inherent discretionary authority to order discovery in post-conviction proceedings. People ex rel. Daley v. Fitzgerald, 123 Ill. 2d 175, 183 (1988); People v. Fair, 193 Ill. 2d 256, 264 (2000). A
circuit court should allow discovery only if the moving party has
demonstrated "good cause" for the discovery request. Fair, 193 Ill. 2d  at 264-65. A discovery request will be denied where it amounts
to a "fishing expedition." People v. Enis, 194 Ill. 2d 361, 415
(2000). A circuit court's denial of a request for discovery in a post-conviction proceeding will not be reversed absent an abuse of
discretion. Fair, 193 Ill. 2d  at 265.
	Upon review, we find that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying defendant's discovery requests. Despite
defendant's contention to the contrary, the conflict between
DiMare's testimony and his affidavit is not apparent from the
record. The witnesses testified that DiMare asked them to write
down information about the incident and that he provided pencils
and paper for them to do so. Similarly, DiMare testified that he
told the witnesses to write down their names and addresses "and
if they had anything that they want to keep a note of they could."
In his affidavit, DiMare stated, "I asked the witnesses to write their
names, addresses, telephone number, where they were in the store
at the time of the shooting, and other such information, on a piece
of paper." There is no inconsistency between these two statements,
nor has defendant demonstrated that there existed a good cause for
the trial court to order discovery depositions of the four witnesses.
As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
request.
	Defendant next maintains that the circuit court incorrectly
made findings of fact and determinations of credibility regarding
Brady material and the testimony of LaGrone. We find defendant's
argument as to both contentions unpersuasive.
	In his post-conviction petition, defendant argued that DiMare
deliberately withheld statements that were given to him by four
witnesses. Defendant argues that in reaching its determination to
dismiss defendant's petition, the trial court made improper factual
and credibility findings. The record shows, however, that the trial
court simply restated the contents of DiMare's affidavit.
	 We note that in restating the contents of the affidavit, the trial
court incorrectly used the term res judicata instead of waiver. This
error, however, is de minimus. It is clear from the trial court's
order that the dismissal rested on the fact that the Brady violation
could have been brought up on direct appeal and was, therefore,
waived. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court did not make
any factual or credibility determinations.
	Defendant further contends that the trial court made factual
findings as to his allegation that LaGrone was instructed by the
State to lie about her drug usage on the day of the arrest. The trial
court noted that although defendant attached an affidavit from an
investigator stating that LaGrone told him she was instructed to
lie, defendant did not submit an affidavit from LaGrone herself.
The trial court also noted that during the trial LaGrone was
extensively cross-examined about her drug use. She denied that
she used drugs on the day of her arrest but admitted that she was
a drug user and was receiving treatment for her drug addition.
Thus, the trial court properly concluded that defendant's
allegations lacked legal sufficiency.
	Defendant's final argument concerns his competency to
proceed with the post-conviction proceedings. The record shows
that upon the State's request, the trial court made an initial
determination of whether a bona fide doubt existed as to
defendant's competency. See People v. Owens, 139 Ill. 2d 351
(1990). The trial judge decided the issue after hearing arguments
from the defendant, defendant's post-conviction counsel and the
prosecutor. The trial court concluded,
		"This court listened to the petitioner at length and heard
the various legal arguments he advanced as to why a
psychiatric examination should not be ordered. This court
also listened to petitioner's appointed counsel and
arguments advanced by the assistant state's attorney. It is
clear to this court that petitioner's condition had not
deteriorated and that he is coherent and able to understand
the proceedings."
	A defendant is presumed to be fit to stand trial, to plead, and
to be sentenced. 725 ILCS 5/104-10 (West 1998). A defendant is
also presumed to be fit at the time of post-conviction proceedings.
Owens, 139 Ill. 2d  at 362. When a bona fide doubt of a
defendant's fitness to proceed with post-conviction proceedings is
raised, the court may order a psychological evaluation of the
defendant and consider the matter at an evidentiary hearing.
Owens, 139 Ill. 2d  at 365.
	Because the trial court is in the best position to observe a
defendant's conduct, whether a bona fide doubt of fitness to
proceed exists is a matter that lies within the discretion of that
court. People v. Johnson, 191 Ill. 2d 257, 269 (2000). A defendant
is considered unfit to proceed with the post-conviction process
when, because of a mental condition, he cannot communicate his
allegations of constitutional deprivations to counsel, thus
frustrating his entitlement, under the Act, to a reasonable level of
assistance. Johnson, 191 Ill. 2d  at 269, citing Owens, 139 Ill. 2d  at
359-65. If a defendant is competent to communicate allegations of
constitutional violations to counsel, that defendant is competent to
participate in post-conviction proceedings.
	Here, the circuit court found that no bona fide doubt of
defendant's fitness existed. In fact, the trial court noted that the
differences between defendant and his post-conviction counsel
centered around legal matters and procedures. This conflict about
legal strategy does not rise to the level of mental incompetency on
defendant's part. The trial court further found that defendant's
mental condition had not deteriorated since the last court date and
that defendant's post-conviction counsel was able to incorporate
some of defendant's pro se arguments into the amended petition.
All of these factors together demonstrate that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in ruling that defendant was competent to
proceed with the post-conviction proceedings.

II. Use of Perjured Testimony
	We now consider the allegations of defendant's post-conviction petition. Defendant first claims that Sergeant DiMare,
"in a calculated effort to convict" defendant, presented false
testimony to the grand jury, at hearing on defendant's motion to
suppress and at trial. Before reaching the merits of defendant's
perjury claims, however, we must address the State's contention
that review of these claims was forfeited when defendant failed to
raise them on direct appeal. A post-conviction petition is a
collateral attack upon a prior conviction and sentence, not a
substitute for or an addendum to a direct appeal. People v. West,
187 Ill. 2d 418 (1999). Consequently, any issues which could have
been raised on direct appeal are forfeited. West, 187 Ill. 2d  at 425.
	We agree with the State that defendant's claim as to DiMare's
grand jury testimony, his testimony at the suppression hearing and
his testimony at trial were all contained in the record on direct
appeal. As such, each of these claims could have and should have
been raised on direct appeal. See West, 187 Ill. 2d  at 425. Thus,
these claims are waived.
	The application of the waiver rule is not, however, a
jurisdictional or absolute bar to review of procedurally defaulted
claims, but is rather a rule of administrative convenience. People
v. Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d 355, 371 (1996); see also People v.
Owens, 129 Ill. 2d 303, 317 (1989). Thus, the strict application of
waiver will be relaxed " 'where fundamental fairness so
requires.' " Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d  at 371, quoting People v.
Gaines, 105 Ill. 2d 79, 91 (1984). In order to satisfy the
requirements of invoking the fundamental fairness exception, the
defendant must satisfy a "cause and prejudice" test by objectively
showing that defense counsel's efforts to raise the claim on direct
review were impeded and that the error so infected the entire trial
that the defendant's conviction violates due process. People v.
Franklin, 167 Ill. 2d 1, 20 (1995); see also People v. Mahaffey,
194 Ill. 2d 154, 173 (2000). We find that defendant has failed to
satisfy either prong of this "cause and prejudice" test and has
failed, thus, to show that the fundamental fairness exception
should be invoked.
	 It is well established that the State's knowing use of perjured
testimony in order to obtain a criminal conviction constitutes a
violation of due process of law. People v. Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d 326,
345 (1997). A conviction obtained through the knowing use of
perjured testimony must be set aside. Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d  at 345,
citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678-80, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481, 492, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3381-82 (1985). Where the State allows
false testimony to go uncorrected, the same principles apply.
Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d  at 345. However, the State's obligation to
correct false testimony does not amount to an obligation to
impeach its witnesses with any and all evidence bearing upon their
credibility. People v. Pecoraro, 175 Ill. 2d 294, 312-14 (1997).
	Contrary to defendant's claim, we find no evidence in the
record that DiMare committed perjury. Defendant first argues that
DiMare presented false testimony when he stated to the grand jury
that defendant used a gun to strike Katherine Koszut but that in his
report he stated that he was told that defendant hit her with his
other hand. The record, however, fails to support this claim.
DiMare's report states,
			"Mrs. Koszut asked the black man if she could help him
at which time he held up what she thought to be a paper
with a barrel of a gun sticking out, and said 'this is a stick
up.' *** [T]he suspect then grabbed Mrs. Koszut by the
back collar of her shirt and with his other hand struck her
in the rear of the head driving her to the floor of the
service booth."
The statement that defendant hit Koszut "with his other hand"
does not distinguish whether that was the hand that held the gun
or not. Thus, this statement does not contradict DiMare's
testimony that defendant hit Koszut with the gun. Moreover, as the
State points out, even if DiMare incorrectly testified that defendant
hit Koszut with the gun, the aggravated battery and armed violence
counts stemming from this action were dismissed by the State
prior to jury selection. Thus, because the jury never heard the
allegedly false testimony and did not know of the armed violence
and aggravated battery counts, its verdict would not have been
affected.
	Defendant also claims that DiMare gave false testimony at the
hearing on the motion to suppress when he testified that one of the
witnesses, Helen Gair, identified defendant at a lineup. The State
counters that defendant fails to show the falsity of DiMare's
statement at the suppression. However, Gair's affidavit, attached
to the petition, states that she could not positively identify anyone
at the police lineup and that she informed the police of this fact.
	Nonetheless, defendant does not show that his conviction was
obtained through the knowing use of perjured testimony. The
record shows that at trial Gair did not testify. Instead, defendant
and the State agreed upon two stipulations concerning Gair's
testimony. Notably, there is no mention of any pretrial
identification or lack of identification in either of these two
stipulations, nor is there any indication that DiMare testified at
trial regarding the pretrial identification. The jury was never made
aware of any pretrial identification as far as Gair was concerned.
Thus, assuming the falsity of DiMare's testimony at the motion to
suppress hearing, this testimony did not impact the jury's verdict
at trial.
	Defendant further claims that DiMare falsely testified as to
what he asked the four witnesses to write down at the time of the
incident. Defendant argues that DiMare's testimony varies with his
statement in the affidavit. As stated earlier in this opinion,
however, there is no significant variance between DiMare's
testimony and his affidavit. The gist of DiMare's statement to the
four witnesses was the same at both the trial and in his affidavit.
	Finally, defendant claims that DiMare committed perjury
when he "implied to the jury" that Kimberly Knight, an occurrence
witness, had described defendant as the offender. The record
shows that defendant called DiMare during his case in chief and
asked DiMare if he wrote down Knight's description of the
offender in the supplemental report or in any report. DiMare
answered, "None that I recall." Upon further questioning by
defendant, DiMare stated, "[W]e [the police] come up with a
physical description after talking to all of the witnesses."
	Defendant's argument that DiMare improperly "implied" that
Knight's description of the offender matched defendant's
description is not supported by the record. In fact, the nature of
defendant's questions implied that DiMare did not conduct a full
and complete investigation and did not write down all of the
information that the various witnesses, including Knight, had
given him.
	 In sum, defendant's allegations that the state knowingly used
perjured testimony are not supported by the record and his claim
of a due process violation fails.

III. Brady Violation
	Defendant further contends that the State committed
prosecutorial misconduct under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,
10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963). We note that defendant
incorporates the same perjury claims previously discussed in
addition to raising new claims. Specifically, defendant claims
Brady violations existed where (1) DiMare presented false
testimony to the grand jury; (2) defendant was not advised that
Gair had been hypnotized in an effort to enhance her memory of
the events she alleged in her affidavit; (3) DiMare's affidavit and
his trial testimony differ as to what he asked the witnesses to write
down at the time of the incident; (4) DiMare's testimony implied
that Knight had described an offender that was defendant; and (5)
the State failed to tender interview notes and a tape of a witness
statement made to an investigator regarding the occurrence.
	The general rule, as set forth in Brady, provides that "the
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to the guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Brady, 373 U.S.  at 87,
10 L. Ed. 2d  at 218, 83 S. Ct.  at 1196-97. A defendant is not
entitled to relief under Brady, however, unless he can establish
that the evidence improperly withheld was both favorable to the
defense and material.
	Evidence is "material" only if "there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense,
the result of the proceeding would have been different." United
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481, 494, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3383 (1985). A reasonable probability that the result of
the proceeding would have been different is a "probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Bagley, 473 U.S.  at 682, 87 L. Ed. 2d  at 494, 105 S. Ct.  at 3383; People v.
Page, 193 Ill. 2d 120 (2000).
	In the present case, defendant's claims, together or separately,
do not establish a constitutional violation. We briefly review each
of the claims raised. With regards to defendant's first claim that
DiMare committed perjury before the grand jury regarding
Koszut's statement, as previously noted, we find no evidence in
the record to indicate that DiMare committed perjury.
Nonetheless, even if defendant's allegations were supported by the
record, the record makes clear that the armed violence and
aggravated battery counts stemming from defendant's act of
striking Koszut with a gun were dismissed by the State. Thus,
there is no reasonable likelihood that the allegedly false testimony
could have affected the jury's verdict. See Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d 326.
	Next, defendant claims that he was not informed that Gair was
hypnotized to assist her memory of the events. Defendant fails,
however, to explain how this information would have been
material to the defense. Aside from simply stating that evidence of
the hypnosis was withheld from him, defendant fails to articulate
any reason as to how these factors establish Brady violations. Gair
did not personally testify at the trial nor did she identify defendant.
The only evidence concerning Gair came in through two
stipulations, neither of which involves identification of defendant
by her, with hypnosis or without hypnosis. Defendant does not
show how this information, had it been disclosed to the defense
prior to trial, would have yielded a different result in the
proceeding.
	Defendant's next two assignments of error concern DiMare's
request of four witnesses to write down information about the
incident. We will not revisit this argument, as we already found
that the record does not show there exists a discrepancy between
DiMare's testimony and the information contained in his affidavit.
	Defendant next argues that DiMare committed perjury when
he intimated to the jury that Kimberly Knight described an
offender that was the defendant. Contrary to defendant's claim,
however, we find no evidence in the record that DiMare
committed perjury because, according to defendant, he "implied"
that Knight described an offender that was the defendant. Once
again, defendant has failed to articulate a legitimate Brady
violation and has failed to show how this "implication," even if
true, affected the jury's verdict.
	Finally, defendant argues that the State committed a Brady
violation when it failed to tender interview notes and a tape of a
witness statement from Kimberly Knight made to an insurance
investigator. With reference to the interview notes, it appears that
defendant is again raising the issue of the notes from the four
witnesses written at DiMare's request. DiMare stated that he
combined the contents of the four witnesses' notes in the police
report he generated before destroying the notes. DiMare was
further extensively cross-examined about the notes, their content
and the fact that they were later destroyed. Defendant has failed to
show that there is a reasonable probability that a different outcome
would have resulted had defendant had the notes from the four
witnesses.
	Defendant also argues that the State committed a Brady
violation by failing to tender to defendant a tape of Knight's
statement made to an insurance investigator regarding the incident.
	Defendant maintains that with the statement he would have
been able to show the inconsistencies in the testimony of other
witnesses and that, as a result, the proceedings would have been
different. Defendant's argument, however, is unpersuasive.
	At trial, during cross-examination by defendant, defendant
questioned Knight as to the amount of money that was missing
after the robbery. Knight replied, "I don't know the exact dollar
figure. You would have to meet with the insurance adjuster." She
further stated that an insurance adjuster spoke to her and taped the
conversation of what happened in the store on the day of the
robbery for insurance purposes. At the hearing on defendant's
post-trial motion, defendant argued the issue of the missing
insurance adjuster tape interview along with various other Brady
claims. Defendant requested that the tape be located and
subpoenaed. The trial court directed the State to locate the tape if
it still existed. On February 15, 1994, the State tendered a
transcript of an interview of Kimberly Knight conducted on June
8, 1992, by an insurance investigator.
	Initially, we note that it is clear that the issue of the taped
interview is one that was raised both during trial and in the post-trial motion. As such, this issue should have been raised on direct
appeal and is therefore waived. Although the objective of finality
must yield in circumstances where fundamental fairness so
requires (Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d at 369), in this case, defendant has
failed to satisfy the "cause and prejudice" test that will excuse a
defendant's procedural default. See People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264 (1992).
	Defendant has failed to establish how the taped conversation,
by a person who was not an agent of the State, was both favorable
to the defense and material. Although defendant characterizes the
State's failure to tender the tape as egregious, defendant
completely fails to articulate how the taped interview would have
helped his case. He does not state which witnesses, if any, would
have been impeached by this taped interview or how the result of
the proceedings would have been any different had this
information been known and made available to defendant during
trial. Once the existence of the tape was disclosed, the State made
efforts to locate it and tender it to defendant. There is no evidence
in the record to suggest that the State knew of, or should have
known of, the existence of the tape until Knight testified.
	In essence, defendant creates a laundry list of perceived errors
but fails to show how these alleged errors would have undermined
confidence in the outcome of the trial. As such, defendant has
failed to establish a Brady violation with regard to any of the
above evidence.

IV. Waiver of Right to Counsel
	Defendant next maintains that he did not knowingly and
voluntarily waive his right to counsel at trial and sentencing and
argues that he was not competent to proceed pro se during trial or
during post-conviction proceedings. In support of these arguments,
defendant attaches affidavits in his post-conviction petition from
three mitigation specialists and three psychologists who, in
essence, state that defendant's demeanor and conduct is consistent
with some type of mental defect-most likely, attention deficit
disorder or attention deficit disorder with hyperactivity.
	On direct review, this court addressed defendant's
competency to represent himself at trial. A post-conviction
petitioner may not avoid the bar of res judicata simply by
rephrasing, as defendant has done in this case, issues previously
addressed on direct appeal. People v. Williams, 186 Ill. 2d 55, 62
(1999); People v. Franklin, 167 Ill. 2d 1, 23 (1995); People v.
Emerson, 153 Ill. 2d 100, 106-07 (1992).
	 Defendant concludes that the affidavits show that "the trial
court simply did not adequately address trial competency and
competency to waive the right to counsel." This precise issue,
however, was raised before this court on direct appeal. This court
stated,
		"The record indicates the defendant was literate,
responsive and understanding. Defendant, age 39, had an
extensive criminal history. He had demonstrated a
familiarity with the judicial process and, according to the
trial judge, had waived counsel and represented himself
on a prior occasion. Further, defendant filed numerous
motions and actively presented his defense. He
demonstrated, in the words of the trial judge, that '[he]
knew what he was doing' when he waived his right to
counsel and chose to represent himself." Simpson, 172 Ill. 2d  at 134.
	This court carefully considered and rejected each of
defendant's claims after a lengthy analysis. We concluded that
defendant was competent to represent himself at trial and
sentencing and that his decision to waive the right to counsel was
knowingly and voluntarily made. Simpson, 172 Ill. 2d  at 134.
Therefore, we hold that defendant's claim that he was not
competent to waive the right to counsel is barred by res judicata.
	Nonetheless, defendant maintains that the affidavits from the
experts are new evidence that show there was a legitimate doubt
as to defendant's mental capacity to participate in the proceedings.
As such, argues defendant, the limitation of res judicata does not
apply.
	Guided by principles of fundamental fairness, a court will
relax the customary doctrine of res judicata when appropriate.
People v. King, 192 Ill. 2d 189, 193 (2000); People v. Neal, 142 Ill. 2d 140, 146 (1990). However, the fundamental fairness
exception will not be applied where the defendant has failed to
meet the requirements of the "cause and prejudice" test. In this
case, defendant has failed to establish that the alleged error so
prejudiced him that his conviction violates due process. See
Franklin, 167 Ill. 2d  at 15; see also Mahaffey, 194 Ill. 2d  at 173.
	For new evidence to be sufficient to warrant a new trial, it
must be of such conclusive character that it will probably change
the result upon retrial. People v. Patterson, 192 Ill. 2d 93, 124
(2000); People v. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d 404, 449 (1998).
Furthermore, evidence must be material and not merely
cumulative. People v. Molstad, 101 Ill. 2d 128, 134 (1984). It must
also be discovered since the trial and be of such character that it
could not have been discovered prior to trial by the exercise of due
diligence. Molstad, 101 Ill. 2d  at 134.
	Assuming that the evidence from the experts is new evidence,
we conclude, nonetheless, that the affidavits are not of such
conclusive character that they would change the result upon retrial.
See Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d  at 449. At most, the experts agree that
defendant may suffer from an attention deficit disorder. Notably,
only one of the experts stated that defendant's decision to "waive"
his right to counsel resulted from a compulsion rather than an
intelligent decision and that his ability to defend himself was
impaired. The other experts stated that defendant's mannerisms
and speech were consistent with attention deficit disorder,
impulsive decisionmaking and "poor judgment."
	All of the experts also agreed that defendant was
uncooperative during the interviews, thus inhibiting a full
evaluation. In addition, none of the experts reviewed the
transcripts in this case in reaching a decision as to defendant's
competence. As we stated in the direct appeal, defendant actively
participated in his defense from the time of jury selection all the
way through to the sentencing phase. These are factors that were
not considered by the experts in reaching their determination. We
find that the fundamental fairness exception to res judicata need
not be applied, as defendant cannot establish that he suffered
prejudice.
	Defendant also claims that he was not competent to proceed
during the post-conviction proceeding. Despite defendant's
assertion, however, the record shows that upon the State's request,
the trial court carefully determined whether there was a bona fide
doubt of defendant's competency to proceed with the post-conviction proceedings at a hearing. For the reasons articulated
earlier in this discussion, the trial judge did not abuse his
discretion in finding defendant competent to proceed with the
post-conviction proceedings.

V. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
	Defendant's next contention reduces itself to a question of
whether standby counsel was ineffective in aiding defendant
during the trial. Specifically, defendant contends that counsel
failed to adequately investigate the existence of possible
mitigation evidence and that appellate counsel failed to raise an
ineffectiveness claim on appeal.
	At the outset, we note that the crux of defendant's argument
is that an attorney acting as standby counsel for a capital defendant
has a higher duty to aid that defendant during the trial and
sentencing phase. Defendant urges this court to extend the duties
of standby counsel to encompass preparation of a legal defense
and mitigation even when the defendant opts to assert his
constitutional right to self-representation. We decline to adopt
such a position.
	The right of self-representation does not carry with it a
corresponding right to legal assistance; one choosing to represent
himself must be prepared to do just that. People v. Gibson, 136 Ill. 2d 362, 383 (1990). Standby counsel may assist a pro se defendant
"in overcoming routine procedural or evidentiary obstacles to the
completion of some specific tasks, such as introducing evidence
or objecting to testimony, that the defendant has clearly shown he
wishes to complete" and may also help "ensure the defendant's
compliance with basic rules of courtroom protocol and procedure."
McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 79 L. Ed. 2d 122, 104 S. Ct. 944 (1984). The trial court has broad discretion to appoint counsel
for these advisory or other limited purposes and to determine the
extent and nature of standby counsel's involvement. People v.
Redd, 173 Ill. 2d 1, 38 (1996).
	In the direct appeal of this case, we discussed the extent of
standby counsel's role in this case as one in which counsel would
aid defendant during trial and assist him in investigating matters
defendant believed would be necessary to his defense. Standby
counsel's role, however, was not one of active participation in
preparing or presenting defendant's legal defense nor was
defendant under this belief. Simpson, 172 Ill. 2d  at 136.
	The trial court described the role of standby counsel and
repeatedly admonished defendant that he could not proceed pro se
and also be represented by counsel. The trial court further directed
standby counsel to proceed at defendant's direction and perform
certain investigative tasks. Defendant understood that standby
counsel's role was to carry out an investigatory function as well as
his regular standby duties.
	Defendant claims that his standby counsel was ineffective for
failing to investigate certain mitigation evidence. Claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel are analyzed under the two-prong
test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). Under Strickland a defendant
must prove that defense counsel's performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness and that this substandard
performance created a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's errors, the trial result would have been different. People
v. Alvine, 173 Ill. 2d 273, 293 (1996). With regard to mitigating
evidence, defense counsel has a duty to make a reasonable
investigation into the mitigating evidence he will present at a
defendant's capital sentencing hearing, or he must have a sound
reason for failing to make a particular investigation. People v.
Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d 500, 541 (1999). Nonetheless, courts
reviewing trial counsel's decisions regarding the presentation of
mitigating evidence are highly deferential. People v. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d 491, 513-14 (1998).
	An informed decision by defense counsel, however, not to
present certain mitigating evidence can be a valid strategic choice,
entitled to judicial deference, where the evidence is potentially
damaging to the defendant. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at 514. Where the
lack of mitigating evidence presented at a defendant's trial is not
attributable to strategy, but instead to counsel's failure to properly
investigate mitigating evidence and to prepare a defense, such
deference is not warranted. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at 514.
	Here, as we pointed out in the direct appeal, counsel was not
under a duty to actively participate in preparing defendant's legal
defense. Rather, counsel was there for a limited purpose: to aid
defendant in an investigatory capacity. Simpson, 172 Ill. 2d  at 136-37. The responsibility of preparing a legal defense and mitigation
remained on defendant throughout the trial and sentencing.
	Defendant was informed by the trial court that he should be
prepared to proceed with mitigation evidence at the sentencing
hearing if he was found guilty. When the time came for mitigation
evidence to be presented, defendant sought to call three judges to
testify on his behalf. However, the judges were unable to
remember defendant. The trial judge, at defendant's request,
contacted each of the judges, on a few occasions. The trial court
informed defendant that at least two of the three judges would be
willing to come to court but that neither judge could remember
defendant. Defendant contacted one of the judges himself, in an
effort to help the judge remember him. Defendant also requested
various transcripts from witnesses, all which were provided for
him.
	During this time, the trial judge repeatedly advised defendant
that he should present some other mitigation evidence in an effort
to sway the jury not to impose death. Ultimately, defendant made
a strategic choice not to present any mitigation evidence because,
according to defendant, he wanted the case to be directly reviewed
by this court should he receive the death penalty. The trial judge
questioned defendant's prudence in choosing such a strategy, but
the record shows that defendant was adamant in his decision.
Thus, defendant chose not to present any mitigation evidence.
	Defendant argues that standby counsel had received a medical
file while preparing defendant's post-trial motion that disclosed
that defendant suffered from frequent and severe headaches,
dizziness, fainting spells, bad eyesight and an old gunshot wound
to the head. Defendant suggests that this information, had it been
presented during mitigation, would have yielded a different result.
Defendant cannot, however, avoid the principle that a person
proceeding pro se may not later complain that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel. The duty to present mitigation
evidence remained with defendant throughout the sentencing
phase.
	The record shows that defendant was familiar with the judicial
process and that he actively sought information, such as
transcripts, subpoenas and documents from the trial court in an
effort to prepare for the aggravation/mitigation phase of
sentencing. Defendant himself made the final determination not to
present any mitigation evidence, despite the trial court's
admonishment to the contrary. Nothing in either the record or
defendant's brief suggests that defendant requested that standby
counsel investigate additional mitigation evidence, such as
defendant's medical file. Further, nowhere does defendant explain
in what way the conduct of his standby counsel prevented him
from introducing evidence in mitigation.
	To succeed on a claim of this nature, defendant should be
required to establish that the actions of standby counsel prevented
defendant from accomplishing something he otherwise intended
to accomplish or would have been able to accomplish if standby
counsel had not prevented him from doing so, either through
unreasonable advice or direct action. In other words, to prevail on
an ineffectiveness claim, defendant should show how standby
counsel's actions fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness with respect to the level of guidance standby
counsel was required to offer. To suggest otherwise would mean
that standby counsel would have to do, in advance and without
direction from the pro se defendant, additional preparation of the
case in order to present this evidence to the defendant, who would
then determine whether or not he would use it. This level of
preparation is beyond the scope of a standby counsel's duty.
	Here, defendant seeks to avoid the consequences of his
decision to represent himself during the second stage of the
sentencing hearing. As such, we decline to find that standby
counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness with respect to providing mitigation evidence to
defendant.
	Defendant further argues that appellate counsel was
ineffective for failing to raise the ineffectiveness of standby
counsel. Again, we reject this argument on the basis that defendant
acted as his own counsel and standby counsel did not have an
obligation to prepare defendant's case for him.
	The two-prong Strickland test applies to claims of ineffective
appellate counsel. People v. Caballero, 126 Ill. 2d 248, 269-70
(1989). A defendant who claims that appellate counsel was
ineffective for failing to raise an issue on appeal must allege facts
demonstrating such a failure was objectively unreasonable and that
counsel's decision prejudiced defendant. Enis, 194 Ill. 2d  at 377.
If the underlying issue is nonmeritorious, the defendant has
suffered no prejudice. Enis, 194 Ill. 2d  at 377; People v. Childress,
191 Ill. 2d 168, 175 (2000). Normally, appellate counsel's choices
concerning which issues to pursue are entitled to substantial
deference. People v. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d 525, 532-33 (1995).
	In the present case, the underlying issue of the duty of standby
counsel to prepare mitigation evidence has no merit. Therefore, defendant suffered no prejudice by the failure of his appellate
counsel to raise this issue on direct appeal.
VI. Constitutionality of Death Penalty Statute
	In his last assignment of error defendant argues that the
Illinois sentencing system is unconstitutionally applied. Defendant
maintains that the Illinois statutory scheme impermissibly places
a burden on the defendant unauthorized by the legislature.
	In his direct appeal defendant raised a similar claim.
Defendant argued that the death penalty statute violates the eighth
amendment by providing for the death penalty where evidence in
mitigation is not sufficient to preclude it. As such, according to
defendant, the statute precludes a meaningful consideration of
mitigating evidence.
	Although defendant's claim in the amended post-conviction
petition is framed slightly differently, the doctrine of res judicata
still applies. As this court has emphasized, the Act was not
intended to be used as a tool to gain access to another hearing
upon a claim of denial of constitutional rights when there had
already been a full review of this issue raised. People v. Cox, 34 Ill. 2d 66, 67-68 (1996). Defendant in this case cannot circumvent
the purpose of the Act by framing the issue in different terms.
Therefore, defendant's claim is barred by res judicata.

VII. New Supreme Court Rules
	In an effort to ensure the highest degree of legal competency
in capital cases, we have formulated a comprehensive set of rules
to govern death penalty cases. See 188 Ill. 2d Rs. 3.8, 43, 411,
412, 416, 417, 701, 714.
	In April 1999, this court appointed a 17-member special
committee on capital cases to assess the way the death penalty
system is administered in Illinois. This committee was created as
a forum for debate and the dissemination of constructive and
critical comment regarding our criminal justice process. In re
Special Supreme Court Committee on Capital Cases, M.R. 15833
(April 6, 1999).
	The committee's goal was to research and identify the best
procedures for enhancing the administration of justice in our
capital cases. In October 1999, the committee issued its first report
on its findings. It further conducted public hearings in Springfield
and Chicago. Following the public hearings, the committee issued
a new supplemental report containing its findings and
recommendations. Central to its findings was a recommendation
to establish a Capital Litigation Trial Bar. 
	The recommendation to establish the Capital Litigation Trial
Bar was based on the committee members' unanimous finding that
"reasonable, minimum standards for training and experience,
consistently applied as a condition of trial bar admission, are the
only way to ensure significant, systemwide improvement in the
quality of advocacy in capital trials." 188 Ill. 2d R. 714,
Committee Comments, at cxiii. The Capital Litigation Trial Bar
was created to ensure that capital defendants receive fair and
impartial trials and sentencing hearings, to minimize the
occurrence of error to the maximum extent feasible, and to identify
and correct with due promptness any error that may occur. 188 Ill.
2d R. 416 &amp; Committee Comments, at lxxii.
	Under the new rules, all defense counsel and assistant
prosecutors appearing as lead or co-counsel in capital cases must
be members of the Capital Litigation Trial Bar. Attorneys who fail
to meet the specific requirements may not appear in capital cases
without receiving a waiver directly from our court. 188 Ill. 2d R.
714(d). Further, indigent defendants are entitled to be represented
by two attorneys with the requisite qualifications. 188 Ill. 2d R.
416(d). Finally, mandatory educational programs are required for
trial judges who may be called to preside over capital cases. 188
Ill. 2d R. 43.
	Additionally, the new rules extend criminal discovery rules to
capital sentencing hearings (188 Ill. 2d R. 411); impose on the
State the duty to make a good-faith effort to identify material or
information which tends to negate the guilt of the accused or
reduce his punishment (188 Ill. 2d R. 412(c)); require the State to
give notice of its intention to seek the death penalty (188 Ill. 2d R.
416(c)); authorize discovery depositions (188 Ill. 2d R. 416(e));
mandate case management conferences (188 Ill. 2d R. 416(f)); and
impose new pretrial disclosure rules with respect to DNA evidence
(188 Ill. 2d R. 417). The new rules also clarify the duty of
prosecuting attorneys. Specifically, they state that "the duty of a
public prosecutor or other government lawyer is to seek justice,
not merely to convict." 188 Ill. 2d R. 3.8(a).
	Although the court unanimously adopted the new rules, the
dissents and majority disagree as to their effect on capital cases
which were pending before this court at the time of adoption.
Chief Justice Harrison, in his dissent, maintains that this court
should automatically vacate all capital convictions that were
obtained without the benefit of the new rules. To support this
position, the Chief Justice makes two arguments. First, he
contends that without the new rules, "no capital conviction or
sentence can be deemed reliable." Slip op. at 34 (Harrison, C.J.,
dissenting); People v. Hickey, No. 87286, slip op. at 36
(September 27, 2001) (Harrison, C.J., dissenting). Further, because
the new rules impose stringent standards on attorneys and judges
regarding their qualification to participate in capital trials, the
Chief Justice finds it untenable that a defendant, such as the one
in this case, should be allowed to represent himself. Thus, the
Chief Justice suggests (as does Justice Kilbride in his dissent) that
in capital cases, pursuant to the new rules, this court should reject
a defendant's right to self-representation because a pro se
defendant can never meet the rigid standards set out in the rules.
We disagree as to both points.
	The Chief Justice would create a bright-line rule to vacate all
convictions and sentences decided without the benefit of the new
rules. Slip op. at 34 (Harrison, C.J., dissenting); People v. Hickey,
No. 87286, slip op. at 36 (September 27, 2001) (Harrison, C.J.,
dissenting). Such a rule would ignore the multitude of cases that
were tried by competent attorneys, adjudicated by experienced
judges and carefully reviewed on the merits by this court.
	Further, the Chief Justice's conclusion that death cases tried
prior to our adoption of the new rules are per se unreliable
presupposes that the new rules were intended to set a
constitutional standard rather than a procedure to enhance the
quality of justice in future capital cases. The new rules were
established to maximize fairness to the defendant, compliance
with ethical responsibilities and the proper administration of
justice. 188 Ill. 2d R. 701, Committee Comments, at cvi. To accept
the Chief Justice's conclusion, we would have to assume that in all
previous cases the performance of the trial attorneys was
constitutionally inadequate regardless of what the record might
reveal. This assumption would be inappropriate. Prior to the
adoption of these rules, it was recognized that capital cases were
frequently tried by competent and professional attorneys. Findings
and Recommendations of the Special Supreme Court Committee
on Capital Cases 7, 9, 14, 20, 23 (October 28, 1999).
	In adopting the new rules we never intimated that all cases
tried prior to the new rules were lacking in reliability. The new
rules emerged because we became cognizant of the fact that the
outcome of some, not all, cases was flawed. We assigned lack of
experience and training as the cause of those flaws. Fair and
accurate results in a capital trial are the result of quality advocacy
by both the prosecution and the defense. 188 Ill. 2d R. 714,
Committee Comments, at cxiii. Thus, the new rules were designed
to minimize the possibility of inaccuracy or unfairness occurring
in capital cases.
	Nevertheless, the committee recognized that capital cases
tried without the benefit of the new rules were frequently tried by
competent defense and prosecuting attorneys. Specifically, in
formulating the new rules, the committee members agreed that
assistant State's Attorneys in Illinois perform in a fair and
professional manner in the "overwhelming majority" of capital
cases. Findings and Recommendations of the Special Supreme
Court Committee on Capital Cases 7 (October 28, 1999). The
committee members further noted that, on the whole, prosecutors
try capital cases "fairly and competently." Findings and
Recommendations of the Special Supreme Court Committee on
Capital Cases 9 (October 28, 1999).
	In addition, the committee members found that the "vast
majority of private attorneys meet their obligation to provide
competent assistance of counsel." Findings and Recommendations
of the Special Supreme Court Committee on Capital Cases 14
(October 28, 1999). Also, the consensus of the committee was that
the quality of representation provided by public defenders in
capital cases is "generally very good." In fact, committee members
agreed that capital case representation provided by the larger
public defender offices is "excellent," with Cook County and some
other jurisdictions having persons or units specifically assigned to
capital defense. Findings and Recommendations of the Special
Supreme Court Committee on Capital Cases 20 (October 28,
1999). Applying the Capital Litigation Trial Bar requirements to
prosecutors and defense attorneys will help to assure that these
standards are met in all capital cases.
	This court has always carefully evaluated capital cases on a
case-by-case basis with an overriding goal towards adherence to
the law, fairness and accuracy. Our responsibility to review cases
in this manner is unchanged by the new rules. It was never the
intent of this court that the new rules be applied retroactively.
Following the committee's recommendations and findings, this
court announced that most of the new rules governing capital trials
would take immediate effect on March 1, 2001. See 188 Ill. 2d Rs.
3.8, 43, 714. These rules were to go into effect "except when ***
the application of the new rules in a particular case pending at the
time *** would not be feasible or would work an injustice." 188
Ill. 2d R. 416; see also 188 Ill. 2d Rs. 411, 412, 417. The only
rules that did not immediately take effect were those that required
all attorneys in death penalty cases to be certified as a members of
the Capital Litigation Trial Bar and those that required judges to
have attended a Capital Litigation Seminar. We set an effective
date of March 1, 2002, for those rules. 188 Ill. 2d Rs. 43, 701. We
note that all of the new rules, and their respective effective dates,
were created in an effort to improve the quality of advocacy in
capital cases (188 Ill. 2d R. 714, Committee Comments, at cxiii),
not as a basis to vacate all cases decided prior to their effective
date.
	The dissents further argue that, pursuant to the rules,
defendant should not have been allowed to represent himself. The
Chief Justice writes: "[Defendant] did not have two competent
lawyers to represent him. He did not have even one competent
attorney to represent him." Slip op. at 34 (Harrison, C.J.,
dissenting). The Chief Justice concludes that this court "must
reject the fiction that this defendant was competent to represent
himself." Slip op. at 34 (Harrison, C.J., dissenting). Under the new
rules, according to the Chief Justice, a capital defendant "never
will be" competent to represent himself. Slip op. at 34 (Harrison
C.J., dissenting). This assertion raises the important issue of
whether the new rules create a standard that overrules a
defendant's constitutional right to self-representation. Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, 95 S. Ct. 2525 (1975).
Slip op. at 35 (Kilbride, J., dissenting).
	In Faretta, the Supreme Court held that the sixth amendment
right to counsel (U.S. Const., amend. VI) implicitly provides for
the right to self-representation in criminal proceedings and that a
criminal defendant has a constitutional right to refuse state-provided counsel and proceed without representation if he
voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so. Faretta, 422 U.S.  at
820-21, 45 L. Ed. 2d  at 573-74, 95 S. Ct.  at 2533-34.
	The Court further explained:
		"The language and spirit of the Sixth Amendment
contemplate that counsel, like the other defense tools
guaranteed by the Amendment, shall be an aid to a willing
defendant-not an organ of the State interposed between
an unwilling defendant and his right to defend himself
personally. To thrust counsel upon the accused, against
his considered wish, thus violates the logic of the
Amendment." Faretta, 422 U.S.  at 820, 45 L. Ed. 2d  at
573, 95 S. Ct.  at 2533.
	The Illinois Constitution has a similar provision that
guarantees an accused the right to self-representation in criminal
proceedings. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §8. In People v. Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d 509 (1995), this court decided whether the demands of
increased reliability in capital trials required that the accused be
represented by counsel notwithstanding his own desire to proceed
pro se. Citing to Faretta with approval, we expressly rejected the
defendant's argument and held that the heightened need for
reliability in capital cases does not justify forcing the accused to
accept representation by counsel. Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d  at 545.
	The dissents would have us depart from this established
precedent in light of the new rules. We decline to do so. The new
rules are not intended to overrule well-established constitutional
guarantees. Instead, the new rules are intended to provide a
mechanism to achieve fair and accurate results in capital trials.
They are rules of procedure. They do not set a new constitutional
standard.
	Despite the degree to which a trial judge may question the
wisdom of a defendant who exercises his constitutional right to
represent himself during a capital trial, the new rules do not
eradicate that right once a defendant makes a voluntary and
intelligent decision to proceed without assistance of counsel. In
this case, defendant chose to represent himself at all stages of the
the trial proceedings. He made that decision voluntarily and
intelligently. We cannot ignore a defendant's established
constitutional right to represent himself. Therefore, we decline to
hold that this right is overruled by the creation of the new rules.
	We share the dissents' concern that innocent people may be
placed on death row when fairness and accuracy yields to poor
training and lack of experience. The new rules were established to
improve the overall reliability of capital trials and lessen the
possibility of the occurrence of errors. The most important
safeguard of the fairness and accuracy of capital trials is the
competence, professionalism, and integrity of the attorneys who
try those cases. 188 Ill. 2d R. 714, Committee Comments, at cxiii.
We emphasize, however, that the new rules create neither a
constitutional standard that overrules established constitutional
rights nor invalidate prior decisions upholding those rights.
	In affirming defendant's conviction, we have found that
defendant did not suffer a deprivation of federal or state
constitutional rights despite the fact that he represented himself
during all phases of the trial. Other than noting that defendant
exerted his constitutional right to represent himself, the dissents do
not point to any deprivation of either federal or state constitutional
rights in defendant's trial, conviction or sentence that would
mandate post-conviction relief. Thus, defendant is not entitled to
post-conviction relief.

CONCLUSION
	For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of
Cook County dismissing defendant's post-conviction petition
without an evidentiary hearing is affirmed. Additionally, we affirm
the dismissal of defendant's pro se petition for post-judgment
relief (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 1998)), as it raises the same
issues as defendant's post-conviction petition, is also affirmed.
	We hereby direct the clerk of this court to enter an order
setting Wednesday, January 16, 2002, as the date on which the
sentence of death entered by the circuit court of Cook County is to
be carried out. The defendant shall be executed in a manner
provided by law (725 ILCS 5/119-5 (West 2000)). The clerk of
this court shall send a certified copy of the mandate in this case to
the Director of Corrections, to the warden of Tamms Correctional
Center, and to the warden of the institution where defendant is
now confined.

Affirmed.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN, specially concurring:
	I agree with the court in all respects and join fully in the
opinion affirming the orders of the circuit court. I write separately
only to express my views on a portion of Chief Justice Harrison's
dissent to which the court today does not respond.
	I note that the Chief Justice takes the same position here that
he did in People v. Hickey, No. 87286 (September 27, 2001), i.e.,
that the new supreme court rules addressing capital litigation serve
to provide relief to a defendant even if no other basis exists to
reverse the case. Having set forth the legal reasoning for his
position, the Chief Justice states:
		"If our experience with capital cases over the past few
years has taught us anything, it is that we must view
everything that occurs at capital trials with heightened
skepticism. When we surrender that skepticism, disaster
follows. Just ask Ronald Jones, Joseph Burrows, or
Anthony Porter. We found ways to uphold each of their
convictions and sentences when their cases first came
before us, only to discover later that they were actually
innocent." Slip op. at 34 (Harrison, C.J., dissenting).
In my view, these remarks need to be addressed because they
unfortunately call into question the integrity of the court.
	The names listed in the dissent are some, but not all, of the
men released from death row in Illinois when new evidence later
was uncovered which cast doubt on the guilty verdicts rendered in
each of their capital trials. I specifically take issue with the Chief
Justice's comment that "we found ways" to uphold the convictions
in these cases. When a fellow justice states that his court, as a
body, has "found ways" to uphold convictions, that justice is
saying his colleagues in these cases intentionally overlooked, got
around, put to one side, ignored, or otherwise dismissed out of
hand, something important that should have caused a reversal,
whether that something was a legal argument or exculpatory
evidence. The Chief Justice's remark, even if nothing more than
rhetorical flourish, reaches well beyond mere disagreement with
the legal reasoning of the other members of the court. Rather, it
constitutes a serious charge of unprofessional and unethical
judicial conduct. Because the Chief Justice's statement is untrue
and impugns the integrity of the court, I wish to comment on the
facts underlying the cases of the men noted in the dissent.
	Although this court affirmed Ronald Jones' convictions and
sentence on direct review, what occurred in this court after that
initial appeal deserves mention. After the completion of the direct
review proceedings, a vaginal swab containing DNA evidence was
discovered. This evidence was not presented at defendant's initial
trial and was therefore not a part of the record on direct review.
During the ensuing post-conviction proceedings, Jones' attorneys
unsuccessfully argued in the circuit court of Cook County that the
vaginal swab containing the newly discovered DNA evidence
should be tested. Jones' lawyers, however, won a victory in this
court when we directed the circuit court to release the evidence to
Jones' attorney for the purpose of conducting DNA testing. After
the testing was completed, it was revealed that Jones could not
have been the perpetrator. This court then issued the following
order:
			"The order of the Circuit Court of Cook County
denying the petition for post-conviction relief is vacated.
This cause is remanded to the circuit court with directions
to allow defendant's petition for post-conviction relief,
vacate defendant's conviction and grant defendant a new
trial."
At the subsequent proceedings on remand, the State dismissed the
charges against Jones in light of the DNA evidence. In view of
these facts, it seems incredible to me that any member of this court
could state that this court "found ways" to uphold the convictions
in this case.
	With respect to Joseph Burrows, this court affirmed his
convictions and death sentence on direct review in 1992. People
v. Burrows, 148 Ill. 2d 196 (1992). After the completion of the
direct review proceedings, Burrows filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that, subsequent to his trial,
evidence had come to light that the State's two principal witnesses
against him had committed perjury, and that one of those
witnesses had later admitted to being the killer. The circuit court
granted defendant's post-conviction petition by vacating the
convictions and ordering a new trial. The State appealed directly
to this court, asking that we reverse the order of the circuit court
and reinstate the convictions and death sentence. We rejected the
State's argument and upheld the trial court's grant of a new trial.
See People v. Burrows, 172 Ill. 2d 169 (1996) (Burrows II). I note
that the trial court's decision to vacate the prior convictions was
based largely on this court's opinion in People v. Washington, 171 Ill. 2d 475 (1996), in which we recognized that a claim of newly
discovered evidence of actual innocence presents a constitutional
question cognizable under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. As in
the Jones case, the evidence that exonerated Burrows was not
available during the original trial. Nevertheless, this court did not
hesitate to affirm the circuit court's order vacating the convictions
when that evidence was brought to light.
	Finally, with respect to the case of Anthony Porter, I
acknowledge that this court upheld Porter's convictions and death
sentence both on direct and collateral review. Indeed, the Chief
Justice joined fully in the court's opinion affirming the denial of
post-conviction relief. See People v. Porter, 164 Ill. 2d 400
(1995). This court did, however, later order Porter's execution
stayed in order to review claims that Porter was mentally retarded
and that, as a result, he lacked the mental capacity to be executed.
During the period of the stay, new evidence came to light which
was later used to exonerate him. Nothing in the opinions of the
court or in the court's handling of the case supports the assertion
raised by the Chief Justice that this court, he included, somehow
"found ways" to uphold the Porter convictions.
	The Chief Justice's deeply held position against the death
penalty does not give him the license to ignore the facts. The death
penalty is a highly charged, emotional area of the law that is very
much in the public consciousness. Honorable people can and do
disagree over whether the state should have a death penalty.
However, by misrepresenting the past actions of this court, the
Chief Justice does little more than fan the flames of sensationalism
and denigrate this court in the eyes of the public.
	JUSTICE McMORROW joins in this special concurrence.
	During the pendency of Simpson's appeal, our court adopted
a comprehensive set of new rules governing the conduct of cases
in which the State is seeking the death penalty. One of the most
significant features of the new rules is their inclusion of rigorous
standards governing the qualifications of individuals eligible to try
capital cases.
	Recognizing the indispensable role of competent trial counsel
where the State is seeking the death penalty, our court has
determined that such cases may only be handled by those attorneys
who possess extensive experience and specialized training in the
field. With limited exceptions, only attorneys who have become
members of the Capital Litigation Trial Bar may appear as lead or
co-counsel in capital cases. That restriction applies to both counsel
for the State and counsel for the defense. 188 Ill. 2d Rs. 416(d),
701(b).
	The eligibility standards for membership in the Capital
Litigation Trial Bar are substantial. Lead counsel, for example,
must have at leave five years of criminal litigation experience;
have prior experience as lead or co-counsel in no fewer than eight
felony jury trials which were tried to completion, at least two of
which were murder prosecutions; and have complete certain
specified training requirements. The qualifications for co-counsel
are comparable. 188 Ill. 2d R. 714(b). Attorneys who fail to meet
the specified requirements may not appear in capital cases without
receiving a waiver directly from our court (188 Ill. 2d R. 714(d)),
and indigent defendants are entitled to representation by not one
but two attorneys with the requisite qualifications (188 Ill. 2d R.
416(d).
	Now that our court has adopted these stringent new rules, I
fail to see how it can continue to sanction proceedings such as the
one before us today. This defendant certainly did not have two
competent lawyers to represent him. He did not have even one
competent attorney to represent him. The trial court permitted him
to proceeded pro se, despite serious questions as to the soundness
of his judgment and his ability to reason.
	Promulgation of the new rules is equivalent to a determination
by this court that even a lawyer is not competent to handle a death
case unless he has special training and experience. To be
consistent with that determination, the court must reject the fiction
that this defendant was competent to represent himself. He was
not. Under the standards we have now imposed, he never will be.
No legitimate purpose will be served by pretending otherwise. If
our experience with capital cases over the past few years has
taught us anything, it is that we must view everything that occurs
at capital trials with heightened skepticism. When we surrender
that skepticism, disaster follows. Just ask Ronald Jones, Joseph
Burrows or Anthony Porter. We found ways to uphold each of
their convictions and sentences when their cases first came before
us, only to discover later that they were actually innocent.
	The procedures contained in the new rules we have adopted
may not be perfect. They may not eliminate all of the
constitutional defects in the present death penalty law. Without
those rules, however, no capital conviction or sentence can be
deemed reliable. People v. Hickey, No. 87286, slip op. at 36
(September 27, 2001) (Harrison, C.J., dissenting). Because
Simpson was tried, convicted and sentenced without the benefit of
the new rules, his conviction and sentence should therefore be
vacated, and the cause should be remanded to the circuit court for
a new trial.
	Even if Simpson were not entitled to avail himself of the new
rules, his sentence of death could not stand. For the reasons set
forth in my partial concurrence and partial dissent in People v.
Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), the Illinois death penalty law is void
and unenforceable because it violates the eighth and fourteenth
amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const.,
amends. VIII, XIV) and article I, section 2, of the Illinois
Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2). Absent the new rules,
there is no basis for altering that conclusion. At a minimum,
Simpson's sentence of death should therefore be vacated, and the
cause should be remanded to the circuit court for imposition of a
sentence of imprisonment. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(j) (West 1992).
	For the reasons set forth in my dissent in People v. Hickey,
No. 87286, slip op. at 39-43 (September 27, 2001), I agree with
Chief Justice Harrison's conclusion that the new supreme court
rules governing capital cases should be applied retroactively. At a
minimum, I again state that the issue of retroactivity should have
been more fully addressed by this court following the submission
of supplemental briefs.
	The majority concludes in this case that Faretta conclusively
settles the issue of self-representation in all criminal cases,
including capital cases. Slip op. at 28. I disagree and contend that
Faretta remains an open question with respect to capital cases.
Not only was Faretta decided at a time when the United States
Supreme Court considered the death penalty unconstitutional, but
the Court has recognized that the right to self-representation is not
absolute. See Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, Fourth
Appellate District, 528 U.S. 152, 161, 145 L. Ed. 2d 597, 607, 120 S. Ct. 684, 691 (2000); see also United States v. Farhad, 190 F.3d 1097, 1101-09 (9th Cir. 1999) (Reinhardt, J., specially concurring)
(criticizing Faretta).
	In Martinez, the Court characterized the Faretta rationale as
a balance between the right of self-representation and competing
governmental interests. Martinez, 528 U.S.  at 162, 145 L. Ed. 2d 
at 607, 120 S. Ct.  at 691. In considering those interests, Martinez
stated that "[e]ven at the trial level, *** the government's interest
in ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the trial at times
outweighs the defendant's interest in acting as his own lawyer."
(Emphasis added.) Martinez, 528 U.S.  at 162, 145 L. Ed. 2d  at
607, 120 S. Ct.  at 691.
	Equally important, Faretta does not trump the mandatory
minimum requirements of our capital rules because the "status of
the accused defendant, who retains a presumption of innocence
throughout the trial process, changes dramatically when a jury
returns a guilty verdict." Martinez, 528 U.S.  at 162, 145 L. Ed. 2d 
at 607, 120 S. Ct.  at 691. In a capital case, the death penalty phase
is sought only after the return of a guilty verdict. Thus, Martinez
recognizes that the Faretta right of self-representation may well
yield to other governmental interests after a guilty verdict,
including the same interests espoused by our rules to ensure
reliability and fundamental fairness in capital cases. 188 Ill. 2d Rs.
3.8, 43, 411, 412, 416, 417, 701, 714. Accordingly, in view of
Martinez, we should examine carefully the right to self-representation during the aggravation-mitigation phase. See also
E. Rieder, Note, The Right of Self-Representation in the Capital
Case, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 130, 152-54 (1985).
	In his concurring opinion in Martinez, Justice Breyer cites a
Ninth Circuit judge's observation that the right of self-representation frequently conflicts squarely with the constitutional
right to a fair trial. Martinez, 528 U.S.  at 164, 145 L. Ed. 2d  at
608-09, 120 S. Ct.  at 692 (Breyer, J., concurring), citing Farhad,
190 F.3d  at 1101-09 (Reinhardt, J., specially concurring).
Specifically, Justice Breyer notes Judge Reinhardt's observation
that "the Court has never directly addressed the argument of the
Faretta dissenters [Justice Blackmun, joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Rehnquist] that the Sixth Amendment right to
self-representation would lead to unfair trials and unjust
convictions." Farhad, 190 F.3d  at 1101 (Breyer, J., concurring).
	In Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160, 100 L. Ed. 2d 140, 149, 108 S. Ct. 1692, 1697-98 (1988), the Supreme Court
clarified that, under certain circumstances, individual sixth
amendment rights must yield to society's interests in assuring fair
trials. The Supreme Court rejected a defendant's attempt to waive
a sixth amendment right because "the institutional interest in the
rendition of just verdicts in criminal cases may be jeopardized."
Wheat, 486 U.S.  at 160, 100 L. Ed. 2d  at 149, 108 S. Ct.  at 1698.
	Hence, Wheat raises the open question of the extent of the
conditional nature of the right of self-representation. For example,
this court has an overriding obligation to protect a defendant's
rights. That obligation almost certainly goes unfulfilled when, as
is often the case, a pro se defendant presents a lacking and inept
defense. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 77 L. Ed. 158, 170-01, 53 S. Ct. 55, 64 (1932) (discussing the typical quality
of self-representation). Fundamental fairness prevents a court from
imposing the ultimate sentence of death when the court lacks the
ability to discern exculpatory or mitigating facts due to inadequate
self-representation. Without expressing an opinion on the
propriety of the death penalty, I believe that, at a bare minimum,
justice requires that we ensure that capital punishment is imposed
only under appropriate circumstances.
	This case represents the exact kind of capital defendant whom
we should not allow to represent himself. Defendant suffered from
frequent and severe headaches, dizziness, and fainting spells. After
his conviction, it came to light that defendant has a lodged bullet
in his head. It was similarly learned that defendant suffered long-term psychological conditions and deficits.
	We need not conclude that defendant's state of mind allowed
for a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his
constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel.
Defendant's failure to present existing mitigating evidence during
the sentencing phase amply demonstrates the potential
destructiveness of self-representation. Despite strong admonitions
from the trial court, defendant capriciously effected his own
inevitable death sentence.
	Faretta allowed the waiver of counsel conditioned upon a trial
court's determination that a defendant's waiver is made with
" 'eyes open.' " Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, 582, 95 S. Ct. 2545, 2541 (1975), quoting Adams v.
United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 87 L. Ed. 268,
274, 63 S. Ct. 236, 242 (1942). Toward that end, we must not
allow capital defendants to undertake self-representation in
conflict with this court's constitutional duties to assure a fair trial
for every defendant. See Farhad, 190 F.3d  at 1102 (Reinhardt, J.,
specially concurring). In short, I again urge that our new
mandatory rules eliminate the right of self-representation in a
capital case.
	For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. I express no opinion
regarding the propriety of the death penalty, nor do I express any
opinion in relation to the other issues raised by Chief Justice
Harrison's dissent in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998).