Title: Gibson v. State Land Com'r
Citation: 374 So. 2d 212
Docket Number: 50834
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: September 5, 1979

374 So. 2d 212 (1979) Mrs. Juanita GIBSON v. STATE LAND COMMISSIONER, Board of Supervisors and Board of School Trustees of Lauderdale County, et al. No. 50834. Supreme Court of Mississippi. February 28, 1979. As Corrected On Denial Of Rehearing September 5, 1979. Bourdeaux &amp; Jones, Thomas D. Bourdeaux, Corey &amp; Corey, Lyle V. Corey, Meridian, for appellant. William E. Ready, Meridian, A.F. Summer, Atty. Gen., by William James Cole, III, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, William B. Compton, Meridian, for appellee. Before ROBERTSON, WALKER and LEE, JJ. ROBERTSON, Presiding Justice, for the Court: Complainant, Mrs. Juanita Gibson, filed her bill of Complaint in the Chancery Court of Lauderdale County for confirmation of title to 100 acres of 16th section land. She named as defendants the State Land Commissioner *213 of Mississippi, the Board of Supervisors and Board of School Trustees of Lauderdale County, private individuals, "and any and all persons having or claiming any interest, legal or equitable" in the described property. A Special Demurrer was interposed by the State Land Commissioner as to the 80 acres of 16th section land not covered by deed, and both General and Special Demurrers were interposed by the Board of Supervisors of Lauderdale County and the Lauderdale County Board of Education. The principal ground of the special demurrers was that the complainant's deraignment of title was defective as to the 80 acres because it did not show a divestiture out of the sovereign and, therefore, established "no color of title or claim of title or right upon which the statutory presumption complainant relies upon can be made ..." The court reserved its ruling on the demurrers and heard testimony. When both sides rested, the court sustained the demurrers and dismissed the bill of complaint. These are the principal questions involved on this appeal: On April 24, 1802, the State of Georgia ceded to the United States lands which later became the States of Mississippi and Alabama, with this proviso: that each 16th section of land would be set aside in trust for school purposes. When Mississippi became a State, its first Constitution adopted August 15, 1817, contained this provision: However, when this Constitution was replaced by the 1832 Constitution, the new Constitution contained no reference to 16th section lands, nor did any subsequent Constitution until that of 1890. On May 19, 1852, the United States Congress passed an Act, providing: On February 25, 1854, the Mississippi Legislature passed an Act to authorize the Board of School Commissioners of Lauderdale County, Mississippi, to sell the school lands in that county. Chapter 331, Laws of Mississippi, 1854, provided: Pursuant to the authority contained in this Act, Joseph Lowry, President of the Board of School Commissioners of Lauderdale County, on behalf of the Board, executed a deed, conveying the NE 1/4 of Section 16, Township 8, Range 14 East, Lauderdale County, to O.S. Mason, he being described in the deed as the "highest last and best bidder and purchaser of the aforesaid land for the sum of $100.00." Twenty acres (S 1/2 of the SE 1/4 of the NE 1/4) of this 160 acres was included in the Gibson bill of complaint to confirm title. Eighty acres (E 1/2 of the SE 1/4 of Section 16, Township 8, Range 14 East) was also included in the bill of complaint to confirm title. The deraignment of title in the bill of complaint as to this 80 acres says: B.C. Crenshaw, the complainant's grandfather, acquired 60 acres (NE 1/4 of SE 1/4, and S 1/2 of SE 1/4 of NE 1/4 of Sec. 16, T. 8, R. 14 East) from W.R. Hand and Esta Hand by deed, dated November 14, 1904. On November 19, 1907, H.W. Hand and wife, R.J. Hand, executed a deed of conveyance to B.C. Crenshaw conveying 40 acres (SE 1/4 of SE 1/4 of Section 16, Township 8, Range 14 East). On November 2, 1966, three of Mrs. Gibson's aunts, Lillie, Minnie and Janie Crenshaw, executed a warranty deed to her conveying "all of our right, title and interest" in the 100 acres. The first error assigned is stated in the form of a question: This Court, in W.B. Jones v. Madison County, 72 Miss. 777, 18 So. 87 (1895), after discussing the United States Congress' Act of May 19, 1852, said: This ruling in Jones has been consistently followed by this Court ever since. In Alabama v. Schmidt, 232 U.S. 168, 34 S. Ct. 301, 58 L. Ed. 555 (1913), the Supreme Court of the United States again stated its position: The Act of the Mississippi Legislature (Chapter 331, Laws of Mississippi, 1854) approved February 25, 1854, authorizing the Board of School Commissioners for the County of Lauderdale to sell the school lands in said County, was a valid Act of the Legislature, and the deed from Joseph Lowry, President of the Board of School Commissioners of Lauderdale County, executed on August 8, 1854, pursuant to the provisions of said Act, effectively divested title out of the County and State, and vested a good, legal and equitable title in O.S. Mason, to the NE 1/4 of Section 16, Township 8, Range 14 East, Lauderdale County. The trial court should not have sustained demurrers to the bill of complaint and should not have dismissed the bill of complaint as to the 20 acres described as the S 1/2 of the SE 1/4 of the NE 1/4 of Section 16, Township 8, Range 14 East, Lauderdale County. The next questions raised on this appeal are: The close relationship between "Presumption of Lost Grant" and "Adverse Possession" is mentioned by this Court in Itawamba County v. Sheffield, 195 Miss. 359, 13 So. 2d 649 (1943): In Volume 2A C.J.S. Adverse Possession § 317, page 107, it is stated: Both Presumption of Lost Grant and Adverse Possession are also closely linked to the principle of a limitation of actions. Statutes of limitation have the beneficent purpose of stabilizing and quieting land titles and generally barring the assertion of stale claims. *216 However, Mississippi has a specific constitutional provision that declares: The apparent reason for this provision is that the body politic should not suffer because of the neglect or procrastination of its public servants in promptly asserting and protecting the rights and interests of the general public in civil matters. Inasmuch as the doctrines of Presumption of Lost Grant and Adverse Possession are so indissolubly linked, Assignments of Error II and III will be discussed together. Appellant Gibson contends that the doctrine of Presumption of Lost Grant should be applied against the state because of long adverse possession by private individuals of public trust lands (16th Section lands), even though admittedly it took a specific Act of Congress and a subsequent specific Act of the Mississippi Legislature to authorize any sale or conveyance of these public trust lands set aside specifically for the use and benefit of the public schools of the state. In support of her position, Mrs. Gibson cites the cases of Caruth v. Gillespie, et al., 109 Miss. 679, 68 So. 927 (1915), and Jones v. Gulf Refining Company, 202 Miss. 705, 32 So. 2d 435, 34 So. 2d 735 (1947). These cases are clearly distinguishable from the case at bar. Caruth was an ordinary adverse possession case between private individuals not involving sixteenth section (public trust) lands. Caruth brought suit to confirm his title to 150 acres of land in Pike County, claiming under a patent from the State issued in 1907, the state's title being based on a sale to it on June 3, 1872, for delinquent 1871 taxes. Gillespie, et al., claimed that, because of long continued adverse possession and because the Pike County Court-house burned in 1882 and all land records before 1882 had been destroyed by fire, it should be presumed that the state had parted with any title it had prior to the 1907 forfeited tax land patent. The 1884 and 1890 deeds, conveying title to appellees' predecessor in title, under which the appellees claim, were both of record in the office of the Chancery Clerk of Pike County. The appellees claimed as heirs at law of Eli Varnado, deceased, who died while he and his family were living in their home on these lands. The Chancellor dismissed Caruth's original bill of complaint to confirm title based on the forfeited tax land patent, and granted the prayer of the cross-bill confirming title in the appellees and cancelling Caruth's claim of title. This Court affirmed, saying, among other things: In Jones v. Gulf Refining Company, supra, which did involve sixteenth section lands, this Court first summarized the facts: In reversing and remanding this case, this Court said: Thus in Jones there was a forfeited tax land patent containing no words of limitation and with the recited grant being to the grantee and "his heirs and assigns forever." Jones based his claim of right on this patent and also asserted that it constituted color of title in fee simple. In the case at bar, Mrs. Gibson has no grant, deed or patent, nor any written evidence of any kind from the state on which to base her claim. She only has adverse possession to support her argument that she is entitled to "a presumption of lost grant." The special Act of the Legislature approved February 25, 1854, authorizing the Board of School Commissioners of Lauderdale County to sell school lands in the county upon 40 days published notice contained this caveat: The reason that there was no grant, deed or patent to the 80 acres in question (E 1/2 of SE 1/4 of Section 16, T.8, R. 14 E.) could very well be because a petition against the sale was filed by "a majority of the inhabitants" of the township in which this 80 acres was situated. This reasoning is supported by the fact that other portions of this particular 16th Section surrounding this 80 acres were promptly sold under the special provisions of the Act of 1854. The NE 1/4 of Section 16, Township 8, Range 14 East, was sold at public auction on July 17, 1854, to O.S. Mason, and the deed executed on August 9, 1854, was promptly filed for record on August 23, 1854. In our opinion, there should be no presumption of lost grant under the facts of this case. There being no presumption of lost grant and no written instrument evidencing a claim or color of title in Mrs. Gibson or her predecessors in title to this 80 acres of 16th Section land, Section 29-3-7, Mississippi Code Annotated (1972), (the 25-year adverse possession statute), would not be applicable and could not be invoked against the State. If there be any conflict between Section 104, Mississippi Constitution of 1890, which provides: and Section 29-3-7 (we do not think there is any), there would be no question as to which takes precedence. Our latest pronouncement on this subject was made in Newell v. State, 308 So. 2d 71 (Miss. 1975): The chancellor was also correct in sustaining "the objection to the offer of introduction into evidence of the deeds to other (16th section) lands ...". The decree sustaining the demurrers as to the 80 acres is affirmed, but the decree sustaining demurrers and dismissing the bill of complaint as to the 20 acres is reversed and this cause remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED. PATTERSON, C.J., SMITH, P.J., and SUGG, WALKER, BROOM, LEE, BOWLING and COFER, JJ., concur.