Title: Amick v. Dir. of Revenue
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC93742
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: April 15, 2014

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
Jeffrey S. Amick, 
 
  
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)   
 
 
 
Appellant, 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
vs. 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC93742 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
Director of Revenue, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
Respondent.  
) 
 
Appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Louis County 
Honorable Thomas J. Prebil, Judge 
 
Opinion issued April 15, 2014 
 
 
Jeffrey Amick appeals a judgment dismissing his petition for limited driving 
privileges pursuant to section 302.309.1  Amick asserts that section 302.309.3(6)(b) 
violates the equal protection clause because the statute disqualifies individuals with a 
felony conviction involving a motor vehicle from obtaining limited driving privileges.  
Amick’s equal protection argument is premised on a comparison with section 
302.309.3(9), which allows graduates of, or participants in, statutorily authorized DWI 
court divisions or programs to obtain such privileges.  Amick asserts that the differential 
treatment is unconstitutional.  It is not.  Neither section 302.309.3(6)(b) nor section 
302.309.3(9) violates equal protection because allowing DWI court graduates and 
participants the opportunity to obtain limited driving privileges while denying the same 
                                                 
1 All statutory citations are to RSMo Supp. 2013. 
opportunity to non-participants is rationally related to the legitimate state interest in 
protecting the public from drunken drivers.  The judgment is affirmed. 
FACTS 
 
The St. Louis County circuit court convicted Amick of felony driving while 
intoxicated.  As a result of the felony conviction, the director of revenue suspended 
Amick’s driving privileges for a minimum of 10 years beginning in November 2008.   
 
In August 2013, Amick filed a petition for limited driving privileges.  The director 
filed a motion to dismiss on grounds that Amick’s felony conviction made him statutorily 
ineligible for limited driving privileges pursuant to section 302.309.3(6)(b).   Amick 
denied he was statutorily ineligible.  He further alleged that, if his driving privileges were 
not reinstated, he would argue on appeal that section 302.309.3 violates the equal 
protection clause of the state and federal constitutions.  The circuit court determined that 
Amick was statutorily ineligible for limited driving privileges pursuant to section 
302.309.3(6)(b) due to his felony conviction.  The court dismissed Amick’s petition.   
 
Amick appeals.  He asserts that section 302.309.3 violates equal protection by 
allowing DWI court participants and graduates to obtain reinstatement of limited driving 
privileges while denying a similar opportunity to non-participants.  As established below, 
there is no equal protection violation.  
ANALYSIS  
 
There are two steps to an equal protection analysis.  State v. Young, 362 S.W.3d 
386, 397 (Mo. banc 2012).  The first step requires a court to identify the classification at 
issue to ascertain the appropriate level of scrutiny.  Id.  If the challenged law draws a 
distinction on the basis of a suspect classification, such as race, or curtails the exercise of 
a fundamental right, then strict scrutiny applies.  Id.  If the challenged law makes a 
gender-based classification, it is subject to intermediate scrutiny.  Comm. for Educ. 
Equality v. State, 294 S.W.3d 477, 496, n.4 (Mo. banc 2009).  If there is no suspect 
classification or fundamental right at issue, a court will apply rational-basis review to 
determine whether the challenged law is rationally related to some legitimate end.   
Young, 362 S.W.3d at 397.   
 
The second step of the analysis requires the application of the appropriate level of 
scrutiny to the challenged statute.  Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 211 (Mo. banc 
2006).   Section 302.309.3 does not classify on the basis of race, national origin, gender 
or any other arbitrary personal characteristic.  The statute limits the driving privilege, but 
driving is not a fundamental right.  See Williams v. Schaffner, 477 S.W.2d 55, 57 (Mo. 
banc 1972) (a driver’s license “is a privilege or a qualified right that is subject to 
suspension or revocation as may be provided by law on any ground that would justify a 
refusal to issue a license in the first instance ….”); Stewart v. Director of Revenue, 702 
S.W.2d 472, 475, n.2 (Mo. banc 1986).  Section 302.309.3 does nothing more than 
regulate those individuals who are eligible for driving privileges without reference to any 
suspect classification or limitation on any fundamental right.   Amick’s claim, therefore, 
is subject to rational-basis review. 
 
 When applying rational-basis review, this Court presumes that a statute has a 
rational basis, and the party challenging the statute must overcome this presumption by a 
“clear showing of arbitrariness and irrationality.”  Foster v. St. Louis County, 239 S.W.3d 
 
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599, 602 (Mo. banc 2007) (quoting Fust v. Attorney General for the State of Missouri, 
947 S.W.2d 424, 432 (Mo. banc 1997)).  Rational-basis review does not question “the 
wisdom, social desirability or economic policy underlying a statute,” and a law will be 
upheld if it is justified by any set of facts.  Comm. for Educ. Equality, 294 S.W.3d at 491 
(quoting Mo. Prosecuting Attorneys & Circuit Attorneys Ret. Sys. v. Pemiscot County, 
256 S.W.3d 98, 102 (Mo. banc 2008).  Instead, rational-basis review requires the 
challenger to “show that the law is wholly irrational.”  City of St. Louis v. State, 382 
S.W.3d 905, 913 (Mo. banc 2012) (quoting Treadway v. State, 988 S.W.2d 508, 511 (Mo. 
banc 1999)).   
  
 
The state has a legitimate interest in promoting public safety.  This interest 
includes the regulation of drivers’ licenses on the basis of convictions for driving while 
intoxicated.  See, e.g., Williams,477 S.W.2d at 57 (the state, “under its police power … 
may revoke an operator’s license after a conviction for operating an automobile while 
intoxicated”).  In this case, there is a rational relationship between the state’s legitimate 
interest in promoting public safety and the decision to permit DWI court graduates and 
participants to obtain reinstatement of driving privileges on different terms than non-
participants.  The legislature rationally could determine that DWI court participants are 
less likely to reoffend and, therefore, pose less of a risk to public safety than offenders 
who do not participate.  The legislature also rationally could determine that providing an 
opportunity for reinstatement of driving privileges could incentivize offenders to obtain 
treatment and abstain from driving while intoxicated.  The classification drawn in section 
 
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302.309.3 between DWI court participants and non-participants is rationally related to the 
state’s legitimate interest in promoting public safety.   
 
Amick also argues that the state could achieve its public safety goals by 
establishing other programs or using alternative means, such as ignition devices that 
prevent an intoxicated individual from starting a vehicle.  These measures and many 
others may be effective.  However, “[t]he burden is on the one attacking the legislative 
arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it.”  Bert v. 
Director of Revenue, 935 S.W.2d 319, 321 (Mo. banc 1996) (quoting Madden v. 
Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940)).  Amick’s argument that there are alternative means to 
achieve the state interest in public safety does not undermine the rationality of allowing 
graduates and participants in DWI court programs to obtain limited driving privileges 
while denying that opportunity to non-participants.  Amick has not established that 
section 302.309.3 violates his right to equal protection. 
 
The judgment is affirmed.2   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
______________________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Richard B. Teitelman, Judge  
 
All concur. 
 
2 Amick also asserts that the statutes discriminate on the basis of poverty because he 
could not afford to participate in the DWI court program.  This argument fails because 
Amick’s factual assertions are not in the record that was presented to the trial court.  This 
Court reviews the factual record presented to the trial court.