Title: Gilmore v. Little Jack's Steak House
Citation: 292 N.W.2d 14
Docket Number: 50358
State: Minnesota
Issuer: Minnesota Supreme Court
Date: April 18, 1980

292 N.W.2d 14 (1980) Francis J. GILMORE, Respondent, v. LITTLE JACK'S STEAK HOUSE, et al., Relators, Shieks, Inc., et al., Defendants, Dyckman Hotel, Inc., et al., Respondents. No. 50358. Supreme Court of Minnesota. April 18, 1980. Lasley, Gaughn, Reid &amp; Stich, Minneapolis, for relators. Gary L. Manka, Minneapolis, for Gilmore, for respondent. Considered and decided by the court en banc without oral argument. ROGOSHESKE, Justice. The Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals found that employee had contracted *15 the occupational disease of contact dermatitis of his hands on November 5, 1976, that he had been totally disabled thereby for 8 weeks, and that he was permanently unable to return to his occupation as a bartender and therefore in need of retraining. Based upon those findings, the court awarded employee compensation for 8 weeks' temporary total disability and retraining benefits for a period not to exceed 156 weeks, the duration of a program in accounting and business administration for which he was certified by the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation. The employer-insurer seek review, contending that even if employee is in need of retraining they are not liable for payment of retraining benefits. The issue raised by their claim is whether the court of appeals correctly construed Minn.Stat. § 176.101, subd. 7 (1976). Having concluded that it did, we affirm. The statute in question provides in pertinent part: In this court the employer-insurer claim, as they did below, that the "permanent disability" referred to in this provision means scheduled permanent partial disability. Employee did not sustain such disability. They argue also that, since he sustained temporary total disability only for 2 months, he did not sustain an injury which either did or was liable to produce "indefinite and continuous disability in excess of 26 weeks." Thus, they argue that they should not be required to pay for retraining benefits. The court of appeals disagreed. Judge Reischel, writing for himself and Judge McCarthy, stated: We believe that Judge Reischel correctly construed "permanent disability" and "continuous disability in excess of 26 weeks" to mean the inability of an employee who has suffered a compensable injury caused by an occupational disease to return to his occupation by reason thereof, either permanently or for a period in excess of 26 weeks. We are not persuaded that the legislature intended the construction of § 176.101, subd. 7, for which relators argue, since it would result in a determination that an employee admittedly in need of retraining and unable to resume the occupation which had caused his disablement would nevertheless be denied retraining benefits. Relators' argument fails to give meaning to the language which modifies "permanent disability," i. e., permanent disability "which will prevent the employee from adequately performing the duties of the occupation which he held at the time of injury." Nor does § 176.101, subd. 7, define "indefinite and continuous disability in excess of 26 weeks" as temporary total disability. In light of the meaning given "permanent disability," we believe that "indefinite and continuous disability in excess of 26 weeks" also means inability to return to the employee's occupation for such a period of time. It is thus clear that the legislature recognized two categories of disability preventing employees from returning to an occupation and provided retraining benefits for an employee sustaining either kind of disability if retraining is needed to reduce unemployability following upon such disability. Obviously, an employee's inability to return to the occupation for which he has training and experience may cause him to be in as much need of retraining as a permanent partial or temporary total disability would. It is also clear that when the employee is determined to be eligible for retraining benefits, the sole liability therefor is imposed on his most recent employer, whether or not prior employment for others may have contributed to the employee's inability to return to this occupation. Although the fairness of that legislative decision should perhaps be reexamined, the courts cannot interfere with it. Cf. Robin v. Royal Improvement Co., 289 N.W.2d 76 (Minn.1979). Employee is awarded attorneys fees of $400. Affirmed. [1] Section 176.011, subd. 16 (1976), defines "personal injury" to include "personal injury caused by occupational disease," while § 176.66 provides that "[t]he disablement of an employee resulting from an occupational disease shall be regarded as a personal injury within the meaning of the worker's compensation law."