Title: In Re Lupola
Citation: 293 So. 2d 354
Docket Number: 44476
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: April 17, 1974

293 So. 2d 354 (1974)
In re Michael L. LUPOLA, Deceased.
Jean Marian LUPOLA (Widow), Petitioner,
v.
LINDSLEY LUMBER COMPANY et al., Respondents.
No. 44476.

Supreme Court of Florida.
April 17, 1974.
Anthony Reinert of Underwood, Gillis &amp; Karcher, Miami, for petitioner.
R.K. Estes of Levenstein, Burke &amp; Associates, Miami, for respondents.
BOYD, Justice.
This cause is before us on petition for writ of certiorari to the Florida Industrial Relations Commission, following the Commission's affirmance of an order of the Judge of Industrial Claims which had dismissed the compensation claim involved. We are of the opinion that the Commission reached the proper result in affirming, and we therefore deny certiorari. In so doing, however, we wish to correct two misstatements of law and fact which appear both in the order of the Judge of Industrial Claims and in the opinion of the Commission. The errors involved in both the former and the latter serve to cancel each other out and, although in this case, as far as the result is concerned, two wrongs have apparently made a right, we feel constrained to issue an opinion to eliminate any *355 confusion. Oral argument has been dispensed with, pursuant to Rule 3.10, subd. e, Florida Appellate Rules, 32 F.S.A.
The facts of the case, as reported by the Commission, are as follows:
More specifically, the Judge of Industrial Claims made the following findings:
In the above order, the Judge of Industrial Claims made two errors. First, he held that:
Section 440.20(10), Florida Statutes, the "washout settlement" statute, upon which the parties' joint petition and stipulation for settlement was based, provides:
On its face, the foregoing statute clearly contemplates that the "washout settlement" is just that, i.e., a "wash-out", releasing the employer/carrier from responsibility for any further or future benefits of any nature under the Workmen's Compensation Act, in return for the present lump sum payment to the employee. In the case sub judice, there is no doubt that both parties understood quite well the import of entering such an agreement. The parties' "Joint Petition for Settlement and Lump Sum Under F.S. 440.20(10)" provided, in pertinent part:
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, we must conclude that the Judge of Industrial Claims erred in holding that the claim for death benefits under Section 440.16 was not "washed-out" by the settlement entered into under Section 440.20(10). It is clear, and we so hold, that a Section 440.20(10) "washout" settlement, freely entered into by both parties, releases the employer/carrier from responsibility for any further or future benefits of any nature under the Workmen's Compensation Act and, more specifically, under Section 440.16.
The Judge of Industrial Claims' second error occurred when he held:
The Judge of Industrial Claims based this finding on the fact that the claimant returned to work on August 1, 1971. We are not of the opinion however, that the mere return of claimant to work, without more, precludes a finding of "continuous disability" under Section 440.16. Indeed, the only medical report entered into evidence, that of Joseph V. Condor, M.D., unequivocally stated:
Thus, the Judge of Industrial Claims' finding that there had been no period of "continuous disability" was not supported by competent substantial evidence, and was in error.
In conclusion, we again point out that although both the Judge of Industrial Claims and the Commission itself made two substantial errors, those two errors have served to cancel each other out. Since the Commission arrived at the correct result in this case, despite the corrections to its opinion indicated herein, the petition for writ of certiorari is denied.
It is so ordered.
ROBERTS, Acting C.J., and McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
ERVIN, J., dissents with opinion.
ERVIN, Justice (dissenting):
It appears to me that there should have been no denial as a matter of law of the widow's claim for death benefits in view of the J.I.C.'s finding of a causal relation of the employee's death to the industrial accident and the majority opinion's correction of the erroneous conclusions of the J.I.C. and the Commission. Emphasis should have been placed upon the "probability of death of the injured employee" as a special circumstance (Section 440.20(10), F.S.) in passing upon the widow's claim by an appropriate evidentiary finding.