Title: Artis v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 294, 2000
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: June 25, 2001

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
HENRY ARTIS,
Defendant Below-
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF DELAWARE,
Plaintiff Below-
Appellee.
§
§
§  No. 294, 2000
§
§
§  Court Below—Superior Court
§  of the State of Delaware,
§  in and for New Castle County
§  Cr.A. Nos. IN95-10-1088
§                   IN95-10-1090
§                   IN95-10-1093
Submitted: May 3, 2001
  Decided:   June 25, 2001
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and STEELE, Justices
O R D E R
This 25th day of June 2001, upon consideration of the briefs on appeal
and the record below, it appears to the Court that:
(1)
The defendant-appellant, Henry Artis, filed this appeal from an
order of the Superior Court denying his motion for postconviction relief
pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  We find no merit to the appeal.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
(2)
In this appeal, Artis claims that: a) his guilty plea was not entered
knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently because the Superior Court conducted
the plea colloquy improperly; b) the Superior Court used an erroneous legal
1This claim encompasses Artis’ Arguments II and IV.
2Murphy v. State, Del. Supr., 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (1993).  In his Rule 61 motion
in the Superior Court, Artis also claimed that: i) his counsel improperly permitted him to
plead guilty, did not move to withdraw the plea and failed to appeal the Superior Court’s
acceptance of the plea; ii) his counsel improperly failed to investigate, prepare and submit
mitigating information to the Superior Court; and iii) his counsel improperly failed to
object to his designation as an habitual offender by the Superior Court and failed to file an
appeal on that basis.
311 Del. C. § 4214(a).
-2-
standard when it held that he was bound by his signed plea agreement in the
absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary;1 c) the Superior
Court erred in failing to properly address his ineffective assistance of counsel
claim; d) his plea agreement should be set aside because it was based upon
misrepresentations by his counsel; and e) an evidentiary hearing should be
held to determine the facts surrounding his counsel’s advice to accept the plea
agreement.  To the extent Artis has not argued other grounds to support his
appeal that were previously raised, those grounds are deemed waived and will
not be addressed by this Court.2
(3)
In February 1996, Artis pleaded guilty to Kidnaping in the First
Degree, Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony
and Assault in the Second Degree.  Artis stated during his plea colloquy that
he understood that, as an habitual offender, he could be given a life sentence.3
4Artis v. State, Del. Supr., No. 270, 1996, Veasey, C.J., 1996 WL 585905 (Oct.
1, 1996) (ORDER).
5Somerville v. State, Del. Supr., 703 A.2d 629, 631 (1997).
-3-
In April 1996, Artis was sentenced as an habitual offender to 30 years
imprisonment at Level V on the kidnaping conviction and to 10 years
imprisonment at Level V on the conviction for possession of a deadly weapon
during the commission of a felony.  On the assault conviction, Artis was
sentenced to 8 years imprisonment at Level V, to be suspended for 8 years of
Level III probation.  The Superior Court’s denial of Artis’ subsequent motion
to correct sentence was affirmed by this Court.4
(4)
Artis’ claim that his guilty plea was not entered knowingly,
voluntarily and intelligently because the Superior Court judge conducted the
plea colloquy improperly is without merit.  There are numerous protections
afforded a defendant who pleads guilty.5  Prior to accepting a guilty plea, the
Superior Court judge must address the defendant in open court and determine
that a) the defendant understands the nature of the charges and the penalties
provided for the charged offenses; b) the defendant understands that the guilty
plea constitutes a waiver of a trial on the charges and a waiver of the
constitutional rights that could have been exercised at trial; and c) the
6Id. at 631-32.
7Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969).
8Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d at 632 (quoting Voytik v. United States, 778 F.2d
1306, 1308 (8th Cir. 1985)).
-4-
defendant’s guilty plea is voluntary—that is, it is not the result of force,
threats or promises apart from the plea agreement.6  We have reviewed
carefully the transcript of the plea colloquy with the Superior Court and
conclude that the Superior Court properly questioned Artis and properly
determined that his guilty plea was knowing, voluntary and intelligent.7  
(5)
Also without merit is Artis’ claim that the Superior Court
erroneously required him to show by clear and convincing evidence that he
should not be bound by his guilty plea.  A defendant’s statements to the
Superior Court during the guilty plea colloquy are presumed to be truthful
and pose a “formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings.”8
The Superior Court properly placed the burden on Artis to show by clear and
convincing evidence that he should not be bound by his guilty plea and, in the
absence of any such evidence, properly denied Artis’ claims. 
(6)
Artis’ claim that the Superior Court erred in failing to properly
address his ineffective assistance of counsel claim is equally unavailing.  This
9Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984).
10Flamer v. State, Del. Supr., 585 A.2d 736, 753 (1990).
-5-
claim is based on Artis’ contentions that his defense counsel did not review
the presentence report with him prior to sentencing or object to certain errors
in the report.  In order to prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, Artis must show that his counsel’s representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings
would have been different.9  Although not insurmountable, the Strickland
standard is highly demanding and leads to a “strong presumption that the
representation was professionally reasonable.”10  Our review of the Superior
Court’s decision reflects that the Superior Court properly applied the
Strickland standard to the facts of this case and properly determined that no
error on the part of counsel resulted in prejudice to Artis. 
(7)
Artis next claims that his guilty plea should be set aside because
it was based upon misrepresentations by his counsel.  Specifically, Artis
contends that he would not have pleaded guilty and would have proceeded to
trial but for his counsel’s representation that he would receive no more than
four to six years imprisonment.  The transcript of the plea colloquy reflects
11Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d at 632. 
-6-
that the Superior Court specifically asked Artis if he understood that, as an
habitual offender, he could receive as much as a life sentence, to which Artis
answered “Yes, sir.”  Artis further acknowledged that his written plea
agreement contained the entire agreement with the prosecution and no
promises regarding the length of his sentence had been made.  In the absence
of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, Artis is bound by his
answers on his guilty plea form and by his sworn testimony prior to the
Superior Court’s acceptance of the guilty plea.11
(8)
Artis’ final claim that an evidentiary hearing should be held
regarding his counsel’s representations to him is also without merit.  Neither
the transcript of the plea colloquy nor Artis’ signed plea agreement suggests
any factual ambiguity that would necessitate an evidentiary hearing.  
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the
Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ E. Norman Veasey
      Chief Justice