Title: McEwen v. McEwen
Citation: 203 Or. 460, 280 P.2d 402
Docket Number: N/A
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: March 2, 1955

Appeal dismissed March 2, 1955.
*461 P.J. Gallagher, Ontario, argued the cause for appellants. On the briefs were Gallagher &amp; Gallagher, Ontario.
Harold Banta, Baker, argued the cause for plaintiffs-respondents. On the briefs were Lytle, Kilpatrick &amp; Schroeder, Vale, and Hallock, Banta, Silven &amp; Horton, Baker.
E. Otis Smith, Ontario, argued the cause and filed a brief for defendant-respondent.
Before LATOURETTE[*], Chief Justice, and WARNER[**], LUSK, BRAND, TOOZE and PERRY, Justices.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
PER CURIAM.
This is a proceeding for a declaratory judgment to determine the existence and extent of an alleged partnership, for a dissolution of the partnership and an accounting, and for other equitable relief, brought by William M. McEwen and Eleanor McEwen, his wife, *462 as plaintiffs, against James M. McEwen and Jamima McEwen, his wife, Walter T. McEwen, and James L. Turnbull, as Executor of the estate of Thomas Turnbull, deceased, as defendants. The trial court entered an interlocutory decree in favor of plaintiffs and defendant James L. Turnbull, as Executor of the estate of Thomas Turnbull, deceased. Defendants James M. McEwen and Jamima McEwen, his wife, and Walter T. McEwen appeal.
Plaintiff William M. McEwen and defendant James M. McEwen are brothers, and their respective wives are sisters and nieces of Thomas Turnbull, deceased. Walter T. McEwen is the son of James M. and Jamima McEwen.
In the year 1918 William M. McEwen and his brother James M. McEwen entered into a partnership involving land and livestock. Their farming and livestock operations were conducted under this partnership arrangement until the early days of September, 1939, at which time the sheep and the cash were divided equally between the partners but there was no settlement or adjustment of the cattle, horses and land transactions.
In the meantime, and while these brothers were operating as partners, Thomas Turnbull, on February 19, 1935, contracted to sell them approximately 13,640 acres of land, including a 320-acre tract known as the Swamp Creek ranch.
On October 25, 1939, Thomas Turnbull conveyed the 320-acre Swamp Creek ranch to the defendant Walter T. McEwen. This conveyance was without consideration, and in truth in trust for certain purposes unnecessary to detail herein. The contract between Thomas Turnbull and the McEwen brothers was in full force *463 and effect; in fact, it was in full force and effect at the time of the hearing of this suit.
In their complaint in this suit, plaintiffs prayed for a decree setting aside the afore-mentioned conveyance to defendant Walter T. McEwen and for an accounting to the partnership for the rents and profits thereof while said Walter T. McEwen was in possession of the same.
A trial was had upon the issues made by the pleadings of the respective parties. The transcript of the evidence and proceedings upon the trial consist of 1,440 typewritten pages, together with a large number of exhibits. On August 19, 1953, the trial court entered a "Judgment and Decree establishing rights, status and legal relations," as follows:
It is from the foregoing decree that defendants have appealed to this court. It is manifest that this is not a final decree. Winters v. Grimes, 124 Or 214, 264 P 359.
1. The right of appeal in this state is purely statutory, and the procedure is governed by statute. ORS 19.010 provides:
2. There is but one kind of interluctory decree in a suit from which the statute authorizes an appeal, namely, an interlocutory decree in a suit for the partition of real property defining the rights of the parties to the suit and directing a sale or partition. Froman v. Jones, 141 Or 42, 44, 16 P2d 21.
*470 3. Under the decree in the instant case, the parties are directed to account. A further hearing and determination by the court upon such accounting is necessary. Until the accounting is had and finally settled by the court the decree cannot become final. Robertson v. Henderson, 181 Or 200, 202, 179 P2d 742; Muellhaupt v. Strowbridge Estate Co., 136 Or 99, 298 P 186.
4, 5. Whether a right of appeal exists is a jurisdictional question. Unless an appeal is authorized by the statute, this court has no jurisdiction to consider it. Jurisdiction of the supreme court cannot be conferred by consent, agreement or waiver of the parties litigant. Liimatainen v. State Industrial Accident Commission, 118 Or 260, 277, 246 P 741; Catlin v. Jones, 56 Or 492, 494, 108 P 633.
6. When want of jurisdiction appears at any stage of the proceedings it is the duty of the court, on its own motion, to refuse to proceed further. Ehrstrom v. Baum, 159 Or 299, 300, 79 P2d 991; Spokane Merchants' Association v. Gollihur, 122 Or 146, 257 P 812; Dippold v. Cathlamet Timber Co., 98 Or 183, 193 P 909; Rynearson v. Union Co., 54 Or 181, 184, 102 P 785.
7. The mere fact that, as a part of the decree, the trial court set aside the conveyance of the 320-acre tract of land to defendant Walter T. McEwen, and in that respect the decree is final, does not alter the situation. The decree is considered as a whole, and the incidental relief respecting the 320-acre tract of land does not make the decree a final decree from which an appeal may be taken. The rule is well stated in 4 CJS 191, Appeal and Error, § 95 b, as follows:
In 2 Am Jur 860, Appeal and Error, § 22, it is stated:
See also In re Norton's Estate, 175 Or 115, 151 P2d 719, 156 ALR 617; Abrahamson v. Northwestern Pulp &amp; Paper Co., 141 Or 339, 17 P2d 1117; Watkins v. Mason, 11 Or 72, 4 P 524.
No motion was filed in this court to dismiss this appeal. However, it clearly appearing that the decree as a whole is interlocutory and not final, this court is without jurisdiction to review the proceeding. In such circumstances, it is the duty of the court to dismiss the appeal on its own motion.
Appeal dismissed.
[*]  Chief Justice when case was argued.
[**]  Chief Justice when decision was rendered.