Title: Sandra Frosti v. Laverne Creel, Etc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC07-122
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: March 20, 2008

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC07-122 
____________ 
 
SANDRA FROSTI, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
LAVERNE CREEL, etc., 
Respondent. 
 
[March 20, 2008] 
 
WELLS, J. 
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Second 
District Court of Appeal in Frosti v. Creel, 943 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006).  
The district court certified that its decision is in direct conflict with the decision of 
the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Mills v. Martinez, 909 So. 2d 340, 344 (Fla. 
5th DCA 2005).  The conflict issue is whether a motion for attorney fees and costs 
predicated upon a rejected proposal for settlement must be denied where the 
proposal was filed in the trial court prior to entry of judgment.  We have 
jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  We hold that a motion for attorney 
fees and costs made pursuant to Florida’s offer of judgment statute need not be 
denied because the underlying proposal for settlement was filed in the trial court 
before the judgment was entered. 
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
 
On February 24, 2000, Sandra Frosti filed a complaint against William H. 
Houk, seeking damages from an automobile accident that occurred on or around 
February 27, 1996.  On March 22, 2001, Frosti served on Houk a proposal for 
settlement in the amount of $17,999.  On June 3, 2004, Frosti served a second 
proposal for settlement.  This proposal specified that $1 was demanded to settle the 
punitive damages claim and that the $1 punitive damage offer was contingent upon 
acceptance of the total offer of $24,999 to settle all claims.  Neither proposal was 
accepted.  A jury trial was held August 9-12, 2004.  On August 12, 2004, the jury 
returned a verdict in favor of Frosti, awarding $20,670.66 in compensatory 
damages and $73,800 in punitive damages, for a total verdict of $94,470.66. 
On August 19, 2004, Frosti filed her proposals for settlement in the trial 
court.  On September 13, 2004, she filed a motion for judgment in accordance with 
the jury verdict and a motion for attorney fees and costs.  The motion for fees and 
costs argued that Frosti was entitled to attorney fees and costs pursuant to section 
768.79, Florida Statutes (2001), and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 because 
 
- 2 -
Houk had rejected her proposals for settlement.1  On September 20, 2004, the trial 
court entered a judgment for Frosti in the amount of $94,470 and reserved 
jurisdiction to determine attorney fees and costs. 
On December 10, 2004, Frosti filed a motion for relief from judgment 
because Frosti and her counsel were not informed of the trial court’s judgment 
until November 30, 2004.  Frosti also filed a motion for extension of time in which 
to file a motion for attorney fees and costs.  On December 23, 2004, the trial court 
denied by an order Frosti’s motion for attorney fees.  However, on March 22, 
2005, the trial court granted Frosti’s motion for relief from judgment and vacated 
both its September judgment and its December order denying Frosti’s motion for 
attorney fees.  On April 6, 2005, the trial court entered an amended judgment for 
Frosti in the amount of $94,470.66 and again reserved jurisdiction to determine 
attorney fees and costs.  On April 12, 2005, Frosti filed a renewed motion for 
attorney fees and costs, founded upon the rejected proposals for settlement. 
On June 21, 2005, the trial court denied Frosti’s motion for attorney fees 
because it found that her proposals for settlement and her motion for attorney fees 
                                          
 
1.  Section 768.79(1), Florida Statutes (2001), provides that in any civil 
action for damages “[i]f a plaintiff files a demand for judgment which is not 
accepted by the defendant within 30 days and the plaintiff recovers a judgment in 
an amount at least 25 percent greater than the offer, she or he shall be entitled to 
recover reasonable costs and attorney’s fees incurred from the date of the filing of 
the demand.”  Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 (“Proposals for Settlement”) 
codifies the procedural aspects of section 768.79. 
 
 
- 3 -
and costs were filed prematurely.  Frosti v. Houk, No. 00-1365-CI-13 (Fla. 6th Cir. 
Ct. order dated June 21, 2005) (Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Fees).  The 
trial court found, on the basis of the Second District’s decisions in Bottcher v. 
Walsh, 834 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), and Browning v. Scott, 884 So. 2d 
298 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), that the proposals were filed prematurely.  On the basis 
of the Second District’s decision in Lyn v. Lyn, 884 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 2d DCA 
2004), the trial court further found that the motion for fees and costs was filed 
prematurely. 
Frosti appealed to the Second District the trial court’s order denying her 
motion.  The Second District affirmed the trial court’s decision to deny the motion 
for attorney fees and costs because Frosti’s proposals for settlement were 
prematurely filed.  Frosti, 943 So. 2d at 1023-24.2  The Second District relied on 
its decision in Bottcher, which held that a motion for attorney fees and costs 
pursuant to rule 1.442 and section 768.79 should be denied where the party seeking 
fees and costs prematurely filed its proposal for settlement.  Bottcher, 834 So. 2d 
185.  The Second District certified conflict with 
at 
Mills, in which the Fifth District 
held that the premature filing of a proposal for settlement was an “immaterial 
matter” that did not merit the denial of a motion for attorney fees and costs 
predicated upon the proposal for settlement.  Mills, 909 So. 2d at 344.  The Second 
                                          
 
 
2.  Houk died while this case was pending in the Second District.  LaVerne 
Creel, the personal representative of his estate, became the named party. 
 
- 4 -
District did not comment on the timeliness of Frosti’s motion for attorney fees and 
costs. 
Frosti now appeals the Second District’s decision to this Court, arguing that 
the Second District erred in denying on the basis of Bottcher her timely motion for 
attorney fees and costs.  Creel contends that the Second District correctly denied 
Frosti’s motion for attorney fees and costs because Frosti filed her proposals for 
settlement before judgment was entered.  Creel also argues that Frosti is not 
entitled to attorney fees and costs because she did not obtain a judgment that meets 
the statutory threshold for an award.  These are legal issues subject to de novo 
review.  See Campbell v. Goldman, 959 So. 2d 223, 225 (Fla. 2007). 
ANALYSIS 
 
As for the certified conflict issue, Frosti is correct that neither rule 1.442 nor 
section 768.79 delineates a specific period within which to file a proposal for 
settlement.  Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442(d) provides that a “proposal 
shall be served on the party or parties to whom it is made but shall not be filed 
unless necessary to enforce the provisions of this rule.”  Section 768.79(3), Florida 
Statutes (2001), provides that the “offer shall be served upon the party to whom it 
is made, but it shall not be filed unless it is accepted or unless filing is necessary to 
enforce the provisions of this section.”  No decision from this Court or a district 
court of appeal has defined “necessary to enforce” as it is used in rule 1.442 or 
 
- 5 -
section 768.79.  In Bottcher and Mills, the district courts found that it was 
“undisputed” that the proposals for settlement were prematurely filed and therefore 
did not reach the issue of when the proposals should have been filed.  Bottcher, 
834 So. 2d at 185; Mills, 909 So. 2d at 343; see also Browning, 884 So. 2d at 298 
(reversing award of attorney fees where moving party “admitted below and on 
appeal” that his proposal for settlement was filed prematurely). 
After reviewing rule 1.442 and section 768.79, we find no basis to deny a 
party’s motion for attorney fees and costs because the underlying proposal for 
settlement was filed before judgment was entered.  Neither the rule nor the statute 
states that a proposal for settlement may not be filed prior to the filing of a 
judgment or unambiguously defines when a proposal for settlement should be 
filed.  Any grievance with the timing of the filing of a proposal for settlement can 
be addressed by filing a motion to strike, and the proper remedy where a court 
finds that a proposal is filed unnecessarily is to strike the proposal from the record, 
with leave to refile the proposal if and when it becomes necessary to enforce an 
entitlement to attorney fees and costs. 
Based on the foregoing, we hold that the trial court erred in denying Frosti’s 
motion for attorney fees and costs on the basis that she prematurely filed her 
proposals for settlement.  We further hold that the trial court erred in denying 
Frosti’s motion for attorney fees and costs on the basis that her motion was 
 
- 6 -
premature.  This Court recently held that the version of Florida Rule of Civil 
Procedure 1.525 that was in effect when Frosti filed her motions for attorney fees 
and costs in 2004 and 2005 did not create a thirty-day window following the filing 
of the judgment within which to serve a motion for attorney fees and costs.  Rather, 
the rule established an outside deadline of thirty days after the filing of the 
judgment for service of motions for attorney fees and costs.  See Barco v. Sch. Bd. 
of Pinellas County, 33 Fla. L. Weekly S87, S90 (Fla. Feb. 7, 2008).  Thus, Frosti’s 
September 13, 2004, original motion for attorney fees and costs and her April 12, 
2005, renewed motion were both timely. 
Because we hold that Frosti is not precluded from recovering attorney fees 
and costs due to the timing of the filing of her proposals for settlement or of her 
motions for attorney fees, it is necessary to consider whether she obtained a 
judgment sufficient to merit an award of attorney fees and costs.  Creel argues that 
Frosti is not entitled to an award of fees and costs pursuant to section 768.79 
because the portion of her judgment attributable to compensatory damages is not 
twenty-five percent greater than either of her offers to settle the compensatory 
damages claim.  We find no merit in Creel’s argument. 
Section 768.79(6), Florida Statutes (2001), provides that a plaintiff shall be 
awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs where the plaintiff serves a proposal 
for settlement which is not accepted by the defendant and obtains a judgment that 
 
- 7 -
is at least twenty-five percent greater than the amount of the offer to settle.  The 
statute defines “judgment obtained” as “the amount of the net judgment entered.”  
§ 768.79(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001).  Case law has emphasized that a party’s 
entitlement to fees turns on the total judgment obtained and that “[t]he ‘judgment 
obtained’ should not be equated with the jury’s verdict.”  Anderson v. King, 817 
So. 2d 1102, 1104 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (citing White v. Steak & Ale of Fla., Inc., 
816 So. 2d 546, 550 (Fla. 2002)).  In the instant case, the jury returned a verdict 
that differentiated between compensatory and punitive damages.  The judgment 
recited these individual awards but then stated that the total recovery of $94,470.66 
shall bear interest commencing on August 12, 2004.  The net judgment entered is 
the total award of $94,470.66, which far exceeds 125% of the amount offered in 
either of Frosti’s proposals for settlement.  Frosti has satisfied the statutory 
requirements and is entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs.  The right to 
attorney fees pursuant to section 768.79 applies to fees incurred on appeal.  Disney 
v. Vaughen, 804 So. 2d 581, 583 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); Westfield Ins. Co. v. 
Mendolera, 647 So. 2d 223, 224 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated in this opinion, we quash the Second District’s 
decision that affirmed the trial court’s denial of Frosti’s motion for attorney fees 
and costs.  We hold that a motion for attorney fees and costs predicated upon a 
 
- 8 -
 
- 9 -
valid, rejected proposal for settlement need not be denied because the proposal was 
filed with the trial court before judgment was entered.  We remand this case to the 
district court and direct that this case be remanded to the trial court for a 
determination of reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred by Frosti through this 
appeal.  We approve the Fifth District’s decision in Mills on the issue of the 
premature filing of the proposal for settlement. 
 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, C.J., and ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., 
concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Second District - Case No. 2D05-3270 
 
 
(Pinellas County) 
 
William J. Capito, Lutz, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Scot E. Samis, Jennifer J. Card, and Jeffrey M. Adams of Abbey, Adams, Byelick, 
Kiernan, Mueller and Lancaster, LLP, St. Petersburg, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent