Title: Zemene v. Clarke
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 140719
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: February 26, 2015

Present:  Lemons, C.J., Goodwyn, Millette, Mims, McClanahan, 
and Powell, JJ., and Koontz, S.J. 
 
MICHAEL BERHANE ZEMENE 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 140719 
SENIOR JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
 
 
February 26, 2015 
HAROLD CLARKE, DIRECTOR, 
VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Bruce D. White, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the Circuit Court of 
Fairfax County erred in dismissing Michael Berhane Zemene's 
petition for writ of habeas corpus.  The court dismissed 
Zemene's petition on the ground that he failed to establish 
actual prejudice resulting from his counsel's failure to 
advise him of the collateral consequences upon his immigration 
status of accepting a plea agreement.  See Padilla v. 
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 367 (2010). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Because entitlement to habeas relief is a mixed question 
of law and fact, the habeas court's findings and conclusions 
are not binding upon this Court, but are subject to review to 
determine whether the court correctly applied the law to the 
facts.  Curo v. Becker, 254 Va. 486, 489, 493 S.E.2d 368, 369 
(1997).  Where, as in this case, the habeas court dismissed 
the petition based upon a review of the pleadings without an 
evidentiary hearing, we review the decision to dismiss the 
 
2 
petition de novo.  See Dominguez v. Pruett, 287 Va. 434, 440, 
756 S.E.2d 911, 914 (2014).  "It is also well settled that 
where, as here, the well pleaded allegations of the petition 
are not denied they must be accepted as true."  Morris v. 
Smyth, 202 Va. 832, 833, 120 S.E.2d 465, 466 (1961)(per 
curiam). 
BACKGROUND 
Zemene, a native of Ethiopia, lawfully immigrated to the 
United States on June 29, 2000 at the age of nine.  Zemene's 
immigration status as a "derivative asylee" was based upon his 
father's membership in the All Amhara People's Organization, 
an opposition political group subject to violent repression by 
the government of Ethiopia.  Zemene's immigration status 
changed to "lawful permanent resident" on October 25, 2005.1 
On September 3, 2012, Fairfax County police responded to 
a dispatch advising that a security officer at a grocery store 
was detaining Zemene as a suspect for shoplifting.  Based upon 
a statement taken from the security officer that Zemene was 
apprehended attempting to shoplift beer valued at $33, police 
                     
1 A lawful permanent resident is an immigrant who has "the 
status of having been lawfully accorded the privilege of 
residing permanently in the United States," but has not yet 
become a naturalized citizen.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20).  The 
documentation provided to the immigrant showing his status as 
a lawful permanent resident is commonly known as a "green 
card."  See, e.g., United States v. Guijon-Ortiz, 660 F.3d 
757, 759 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 
3 
arrested Zemene, taking him before a magistrate who issued a 
warrant of arrest for petit larceny in violation of Code § 
18.2-96. 
The original return date on the warrant charging Zemene 
with petit larceny was October 10, 2012.  For reasons not 
fully explained in the record, the case was continued to 
December 5, 2012, and then again at the request of the 
arresting officer to December 19, 2012.  Zemene failed to 
appear on that date, and a bench warrant for his arrest was 
issued.  Zemene was arrested on the bench warrant on January 
8, 2013. 
On January 15, 2013, attorney Laurence Tracy was 
appointed by the Fairfax County General District Court to 
represent Zemene on the petit larceny and failure to appear 
charges.  During their initial interview, Zemene informed 
Tracy that "I was not a U.S. Citizen, but that I did have a 
green card."  The entire interview took less than 30 minutes.   
Zemene unsuccessfully made several attempts to contact Tracy 
during the next month by phone. 
Ultimately, Zemene's trial in the general district court 
was set for February 19, 2013.  On the morning of Zemene's 
trial, Tracy advised Zemene that the Commonwealth had 
"dropped" the failure to appear charge.  Tracy further 
informed Zemene that in exchange for a guilty plea on the 
 
4 
petit larceny charge, the Commonwealth had indicated that 
Zemene would receive a 12 month suspended sentence, which 
would permit Zemene to be released immediately so that he 
would not be incarcerated on his birthday, which was the next 
day.  Tracy advised Zemene that "this was the best deal that 
he could get for me."  Zemene "wanted to consult more with Mr. 
Tracy to see if this truly was a good deal; however, I felt 
very rushed and signed the plea agreement."  At no time did 
Tracy advise Zemene of the collateral consequences of the plea 
and sentence upon Zemene's immigration status.  The general 
district court accepted Zemene's plea of guilty, sentencing 
him in accord with the agreement to 12 months incarceration 
with all time suspended.2 
On June 27, 2013, Zemene received a notice to appear from 
the Department of Homeland Security's Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement division ("ICE").  The notice informed Zemene that 
he was subject to removal from the United States as a result 
of his conviction under "a law relating to a theft offense 
. . . for which a term of imprisonment [of] at least 1 year  
                     
2 The records of the general district court reflect that 
three other misdemeanor charges against Zemene, including the 
charge for failing to appear on December 19, 2012, were 
dismissed by nolle prosequi during the same proceeding. 
 
5 
was imposed."3  See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  Zemene was 
taken into custody and held at the federal Farmville Detention 
Center. 
On November 27, 2013, Zemene filed a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County against 
Harold Clarke, the Director of the Virginia Department of 
Corrections (hereinafter, "the Commonwealth").  Code 
§ 8.01-654.4  Zemene alleged that Tracy had rendered 
ineffective assistance of counsel because Tracy lacked a 
proper understanding of the collateral consequences upon 
Zemene's immigration status that would result from the 
conviction for petit larceny and a sentence of twelve months 
when Tracy negotiated the plea agreement with the 
Commonwealth, and also by failing to inform Zemene of the 
negative impact of the plea agreement on his immigration 
status. 
                     
3 We are cognizant of the recent decision in Omargharib v. 
Holder, ___ F.3d___, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 24289, at *2 (4th 
Cir. Sept. 14, 2014) which concludes that Virginia's grand 
larceny statute, Code § 18.2-95, does not qualify as a 
removable offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G).  
Nonetheless, that case does not alter our analysis of the 
present case because Code § 18.2-96 is not "divisible," and 
Zemene received a one year sentence. 
 
4 Although he was then detained by federal authority, 
Zemene asserted the jurisdiction of the state court under Code 
§ 8.01-654(B)(3), as he was still subject to the terms of his 
suspended sentence. 
 
6 
Zemene alleged that he had been prejudiced by Tracy's 
ineffective assistance of counsel because had Tracy been armed 
with a proper understanding of the immigration consequences, 
he would have likely been able to negotiate a plea agreement 
which avoided the risk of removal.  Zemene further alleged 
that he had been prejudiced by the failure of Tracy to advise 
him of the negative impact of the plea agreement on Zemene's 
immigration status, and that, if he had been made aware that 
accepting the plea agreement would lead to his being subject 
to removal, "he would have gone to trial if he had not been 
offered another deal."  The petition was supported by 
affidavits from Zemene and Tracy.  On these grounds, Zemene 
requested that the circuit court vacate his conviction for 
petit larceny and grant him a new trial. 
On December 5, 2013, the circuit court entered an order 
directing the Commonwealth to file a response to show cause 
why the writ should not issue.  The order further provided 
that Zemene was required to inform the court of any change in 
his status with regard to the request for habeas relief. 
On January 13, 2014, before the Commonwealth filed its 
response, a federal immigration court entered an order 
stripping Zemene of his lawful permanent resident status and 
ordering his removal from the United States.  In that same 
order, the court exercised its discretion to withhold 
 
7 
proceeding with the removal on the ground that "it is more 
likely than not that [Zemene] would be persecuted on account 
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
social group, or political opinion upon removal to" Ethiopia.  
See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2). 
On January 16, 2014, Zemene filed a revised petition for 
writ of habeas corpus in the circuit court including details 
of the actions taken by the immigration court.  Zemene 
maintained that, despite the decision to withhold further 
proceedings on his removal, he had suffered actual prejudice 
as the result of Tracy's ineffective assistance of counsel 
because the loss of his green card meant that he was no longer 
able to seek employment and also because the order of the 
immigration court imposed certain travel restrictions on him.  
Moreover, because the withholding order could be lifted at any 
time, Zemene remained subject to removal as a result of the 
February 19, 2013 conviction for petit larceny. 
On January 22, 2014, the Commonwealth filed a motion to 
dismiss Zemene's petition for writ of habeas corpus.  Without 
expressly conceding that Tracy's representation of Zemene had 
not met an objective standard of reasonableness for effective 
representation of a criminal defendant, the Commonwealth 
asserted that Padilla "addressed only the performance part of 
the two-part Strickland[v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)] 
 
8 
test" with respect to the failure to advise a client of the 
collateral immigration consequences that could result from a 
conviction.  The Commonwealth maintained that the mere fact 
that the client was unaware of these consequences on his 
immigration status was not sufficient to prove that he had 
been prejudiced by counsel's ineffective representation. 
Rather, to establish that he had been prejudiced by 
Tracy's failure to advise him of the immigration consequences 
of accepting the plea, the Commonwealth, quoting Padilla, 559 
U.S. at 372, maintained that Zemene was also required to 
"convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain 
would have been rational under the circumstances."  The 
Commonwealth maintained that Zemene had failed to allege facts 
sufficient to establish prejudice under this standard because 
his "self-serving statement [is] unaccompanied by any claim of 
innocence or articulation of any plausible defense he could 
have raised had he gone to trial."  Moreover, the Commonwealth 
asserted that in accepting the plea Zemene's "focus was on 
being released by his birthday; his concern was not 
[removal]." 
The Commonwealth further asserted that Zemene "offered no 
evidence to show that had he gone to trial, he would have been 
found not guilty of the larceny or that Commonwealth's 
Attorney Robert McClain would have asked for anything less 
 
9 
than a 12 month sentence on the larceny offense."  Continuing, 
the Commonwealth also asserted that Zemene had not shown that 
the general district court "would have been willing to impose 
a sentence of less than 12 months had [Zemene] gone to trial."  
Thus, the Commonwealth contended that Zemene had "failed to 
show a substantial likelihood of a different result had he 
gone to trial." 
Responding to the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss his 
petition for writ of habeas corpus, Zemene contended that the 
Commonwealth's position failed to address the question of 
prejudice objectively.  Thus, quoting United States v. 
Akinsade, 686 F.3d 248, 255 (4th Cir. 2012)(quoting Ostrander 
v. Green, 46 F.3d 347, 356 (4th Cir. 1995)), Zemene maintained 
that "[e]ven when 'the prosecution's evidence "proved to be 
more than enough" for a guilty verdict,' prejudice may still 
be present."  Given that he was unaware of the immigration 
consequences of accepting the plea agreement at the time Tracy 
advised him to do so, Zemene maintained that he need only show 
that it was objectively reasonable that a properly advised 
defendant in his circumstances would have sought a better plea 
agreement or chosen to go to trial and risk incarceration in 
order not to lose his status as a lawful resident and be 
returned to a country where he faced certain reprisal and 
possible death at the hands of the government.  These 
 
10 
consequences pale in comparison to his alleged desire to be 
released from jail in order to celebrate his birthday and have 
another minor charge dismissed. 
Zemene supported his opposition to the motion to dismiss 
with an affidavit further detailing his life history, his 
strong ties to his family and community in the United States, 
and the likely consequences of his being subject to reprisals 
if forced to return to Ethiopia.  He also asked the circuit 
court to take notice of Commonwealth v. Mohamed, 71 Va. Cir. 
383 (2006), an opinion of the Circuit Court of Arlington 
County showing that the court under a plea agreement had 
reduced a two year sentence for grand larceny to less than one 
year upon a showing that the defendant had not been advised by 
his attorney of the negative consequences of the plea 
agreement on the defendant's immigration status. 
The circuit court entered a final order dated February 6, 
2014 sustaining the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss the 
petition for writ of habeas corpus.  In doing so, the court 
elected to address only the issue of prejudice, see, e.g., 
Jerman v. Director, Dept. of Corrections, 267 Va. 432, 438, 
593 S.E.2d 255, 258 (2004), in order to determine whether 
Zemene's petition had sufficiently alleged that he was 
entitled to habeas relief. 
 
11 
The court, citing Padilla, acknowledged that whether 
prejudice resulted from Tracy's failure to advise Zemene of 
the negative consequences of accepting the plea agreement 
turned on whether "a decision to reject the plea bargain would 
have been rational under the circumstances" when objectively 
viewed.  Nonetheless, departing from this standard the circuit 
court, following the argument of the Commonwealth, began its 
analysis of that question by observing that Zemene made no 
"claim of actual innocence or articulation of any plausible 
defense" and "show[ed] no concern for [removal]" at the time 
he accepted the plea agreement.  Stating its belief that "it 
is highly likely [Zemene] would have been found guilty and it 
[is] highly unlikely [Zemene] could demonstrate leniency in 
sentencing," the court concluded that Zemene had failed to 
establish that he suffered any prejudice as a result of 
Tracy's failure to make Zemene aware of the negative 
consequences on his immigration status of accepting the plea 
agreement.  In dismissing the petition, the court did not 
address Zemene's further claim that he had been prejudiced by 
Tracy's failure to address the immigration issue in 
negotiating the plea agreement with the Commonwealth. 
DISCUSSION 
We awarded Zemene an appeal from the judgment of the 
circuit court on the following assignment of error: 
 
12 
The circuit court erred by utilizing an 
inappropriate standard to determine whether or not 
the prejudice prong under Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668 (1984) was met in the context of a plea 
agreement. 
 
Before addressing the merits of Zemene's assignment of 
error, we begin by briefly addressing two procedural issues 
raised by the Commonwealth.  First, the Commonwealth contends 
that Zemene's assignment of error is deficient because it does 
not identify a specific ruling of the circuit court that, if 
reversed, would entitle Zemene to the relief he requests of a 
remand to the circuit court for further proceedings including 
an evidentiary hearing.  We disagree. 
As we have recently explained, "it is the duty of an 
appellant's counsel to lay his finger on the error in his 
assignment of error, and not to invite an appellate court to 
delve into the record and winnow the chaff from the wheat."  
Findlay v. Commonwealth, 287 Va. 111, 115-16, 752 S.E.2d 868, 
871 (2014)(internal quotation marks, alteration, and citations 
omitted).  Zemene's assignment of error "lays a finger" 
precisely on the alleged error of the circuit court by stating 
that the court applied the wrong standard in analyzing the 
prejudice prong of the Strickland test. 
Next, the Commonwealth contends that because the 
immigration court has withdrawn its order of removal against 
Zemene, "his current claim is too speculative to conclude he 
 
13 
suffered prejudice under Strickland."  Again, we disagree.  
Zemene has already lost a significant interest because his 
status as a lawful permanent resident has been revoked by ICE.  
Moreover, the withdrawal of the order of removal does not 
eliminate the possibility of Zemene's eventual removal, but 
merely leaves the issue to the continuing discretion of the 
immigration court.  There is nothing speculative about the 
actual and potential loss of civil liberties that Zemene faces 
as a result of his conviction and sentence for petit larceny. 
We now turn to the merits of Zemene's appeal.  In 
Strickland, the United States Supreme Court established a two-
pronged test to assess whether an attorney's representation 
was ineffective.  466 U.S. at 687.  To prevail on an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the petition must 
satisfy both the "performance" prong and the "prejudice" prong 
of the Strickland test.  Id.  To satisfy the first prong, "the 
defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below 
an objective standard of reasonableness."  Id. at 688. 
As indicated above, the Commonwealth did not directly 
contest that Tracy's performance fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness, and the circuit court elected not 
to address the issue at all.  Nonetheless, we will address 
this issue in order to determine whether the dismissal of 
Zemene's petition was error. 
 
14 
It is abundantly clear from Tracy's own affidavit that, 
despite being made aware that Zemene was not a citizen of the 
United States in their initial meeting, Tracy undertook no 
effort to learn the precise nature of Zemene's immigration 
status.  Nor did Tracy determine if there were potential 
negative consequences to Zemene's immigration status arising 
from a conviction for petit larceny and a sentence of twelve 
months, and he did not broach this subject with the 
Commonwealth during plea negotiations.  Finally, Tracy did not 
discuss with Zemene the likelihood that accepting the plea 
agreement would lead to Zemene's loss of his lawful permanent 
resident status and subject him to removal proceedings.  
Accordingly, we hold that the allegations of the petition for 
writ of habeas corpus were sufficient to satisfy the 
"performance" prong of Strickland. 
The final and dispositive issue in this appeal is whether 
the circuit court erred by applying an improper standard in 
reaching the conclusion that the allegations of Zemene's 
petition for writ of habeas corpus failed adequately to allege 
facts in support of the "prejudice" prong of the Strickland 
test.  Zemene contends that the circuit court erred by 
focusing its analysis on whether the outcome of the 
proceedings in the general district court would have resulted 
in his acquittal or in his receiving a sentence which would 
 
15 
not have triggered the ICE removal proceeding.  He contends 
that in doing so, the court failed to apply the standard 
applicable to a petitioner seeking habeas relief in a Padilla 
immigration context, which when considered objectively shows 
"that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been 
rational under the circumstances."  Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372.  
A finding of prejudice in this context depends on the specific 
circumstances of each case.  Id.; Kovacs v. United States, 744 
F.3d 44, 52 (2d Cir. 2014)("[E]ach case is a context-specific 
application of Strickland directed at a particular instance of 
unreasonable attorney performance."). 
In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985), the Supreme 
Court of the United States required the petitioner to 
establish prejudice by showing that there was a reasonable 
probability he would have insisted on going to trial rather 
than pleading guilty.  More recently the Court has clarified 
that a proven desire to go to trial is not the only context in 
which prejudice may occur where a defendant has accepted a 
plea agreement upon improper and inadequate advice of counsel.  
Missouri v. Frye, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1409-10 
(2012). 
Zemene contends that the circuit court erred by applying 
the standard from Hill to conclude that rejection of the plea 
agreement would have been rational only if Zemene was assured 
 
16 
of an acquittal or of receiving a more favorable sentence had 
he gone to trial.  Zemene asserts that in a Padilla context, 
unlike in Hill, it was only necessary for the petitioner to 
show that in rejecting the plea agreement he would have had a 
reasonable probability of obtaining a result that would not 
affect his immigration status, even if an active jail sentence 
would have been avoided by accepting the plea agreement.  Cf. 
Laster v. Russell, 286 Va. 17, 24-25, 743 S.E.2d 272, 275-76 
(2013). 
Zemene contends that his petition and its supporting 
documents establish that had Tracy been adequately prepared 
with knowledge of the immigration consequences of the plea 
agreement and advised him accordingly, Zemene not only would 
have rejected the plea agreement, but would have had a 
reasonable probability of obtaining a new plea agreement which 
would have avoided those consequences.  Failing that 
circumstance, Zemene further contends that there was a 
reasonable probability that, contrary to the statement by the 
circuit court, he would have received a more lenient sentence 
had he chosen to go to trial because Tracy could have 
presented the immigration consequences to the general district 
court as a factor to be considered in sentencing. 
The Commonwealth responds that other courts that have 
addressed the issue have held that a habeas petitioner "cannot 
 
17 
make that showing merely by telling [the Court] now that [he] 
would have gone to trial then if [he] had gotten . . . . 
accurate advice."  Pilla v. United States, 668 F.3d 368, 373 
(6th Cir. 2012).  "All courts require something more than [a] 
defendant's subjective, self-serving statement that, with 
competent advice, he would not have pled guilty and would have 
insisted on going to trial."  Bahtiraj v. State, 840 N.W.2d 
605, 611 (N.D. 2013)(internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted); see also Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 881 (9th 
Cir. 2002); United States v. LaBonte, 70 F.3d 1396, 1412-13 
(1st Cir. 1995), rev'd on other grounds, 520 U.S. 751 (1997).  
Accordingly, the Commonwealth maintains that it was proper for 
the circuit court to first look to the weight of the evidence 
against Zemene. See, e.g., Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, ___, 
131 S. Ct. 733, 744 (2011). 
Thus, the Commonwealth contends that because Zemene 
articulated no defenses to his crime and did not challenge the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support his guilty plea, the 
circuit court correctly relied upon the absence of possible 
defenses and the strength of the Commonwealth's case in 
determining whether it would have been rational for Zemene to 
choose to go to trial. See United States v. Fugit, 703 F.3d 
248, 260 (4th Cir. 2012).  But see United States v. Orocio, 
645 F.3d 630, 643 (3d Cir. 2011)(holding that the Supreme 
 
18 
Court "has never required an affirmative demonstration of 
likely acquittal . . . as the sine qua non of prejudice").  
Clearly, had Zemene gone to trial he would have faced 
prosecution for at least one other offense and, contrary to 
his apparent desire not to be incarcerated on his birthday, 
potentially would have received an active jail sentence.  
Accordingly, the Commonwealth contends that the court's 
conclusion that Zemene would not have received a more lenient 
sentence was supported by the evidence and, thus, established 
that rejection of the plea agreement which avoided these 
consequences would not have been rational. 
For purposes of this case, in advancing a claim of 
prejudice due to defense counsel's failure to advise him of 
the immigration consequences when entering a plea agreement, 
Zemene need not demonstrate a likelihood of acquittal at 
trial.  Rather, the question is "whether counsel's 
constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome 
of the plea process."  Hill, 474 U.S. at 59 (emphasis added).  
As the Supreme Court observed in Padilla, an alien defendant 
might rationally decide that "[p]reserving [his] right to 
remain in the United States may be more important . . . than 
any potential jail sentence."  559 U.S. at 368.  In such 
cases, the correct inquiry is whether the defendant would have 
"gone to trial in the first place" because he "might 
 
19 
rationally be more concerned with removal than with a term of 
imprisonment."  Orocio, 645 F.3d at 643.  If this is the 
defendant's sentiment, "the threat of removal provides [a] 
powerful incentive to go to trial" even if the evidence 
against him is strong.  Id. at 645. 
In short, when reviewed under the proper standard for a 
habeas corpus proceeding alleging a violation of the 
principles recognized in Padilla, the court's consideration of 
the rationality of a decision whether to accept or reject a 
plea agreement must include a properly advised defendant's 
desire to avoid a negative impact on his immigration status.  
Here, Zemene stated in his petition that had he been properly 
advised by Tracy, he would have rejected the plea agreement 
and either instructed Tracy to seek a new agreement that 
avoided the negative immigration consequences or, failing 
that, he would have gone to trial in an effort to avoid those 
consequences.  Indeed, when objectively viewed, it is 
difficult even to imagine that Zemene would not have done so 
and especially in light of the fact that with respect to his 
immigration status he faced no worse consequence by going to 
trial and stood to gain a significant benefit if he obtained a 
sentence of even a single day less than the maximum.  The 
dismissal of the other misdemeanor charges afforded him no 
benefit in regard to his immigration status because 
 
20 
convictions for those offenses would not have triggered 
removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1227.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that the petition for habeas corpus adequately 
alleged that Zemene was prejudiced by Tracy's ineffective 
assistance. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we hold that the circuit court applied 
an incorrect standard for determining whether prejudice 
resulted from Tracy's failure to advise Zemene of the adverse 
consequences on his immigration status of accepting the plea 
agreement.  Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the 
circuit court dismissing Zemene's petition for writ of habeas 
corpus.  The case is remanded for an evidentiary hearing 
regarding the factual allegations in Zemene's petition, and 
entry of an appropriate order consistent with the views 
expressed in this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded.