Title: State v. Melvin L. Moffett
Citation: 2000 WI 130
Docket Number: 1999AP001768-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: December 19, 2000

2000 WI 130 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-1768-CR & 99-1769-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Melvin L. Moffett, 
 
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Jerrell I. Denson,  
 
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2000 WI App 67 
Reported at:  233 Wis. 2d 628, 608 N.W.2d 733 
(Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
December 19, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
November 2, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Stuart A. Schwartz 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, Melvin 
Moffett, there were briefs by Patrick J. Stangl and Coaty & 
Stangl, S.C., Madison, and oral argument by Patrick J. Stangl. 
 
 
2 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, Jerrell 
I. Denson, there were briefs by Joseph L. Sommers, Madison, and 
oral argument by Joseph L. Sommers. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant the cause was argued 
by David J. Becker, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
1 
2000 WI 130 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 99-1768-CR & 99-1769-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Melvin L. Moffett, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
__________________________________________ 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Jerrell I. Denson,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE.   This is a 
review of a published decision of the court of appeals, State v. 
Moffett, 2000 WI App 67, 233 Wis. 2d 628, 608 N.W.2d 733, 
reversing an order of the Circuit Court for Dane County, Stuart 
A. Schwartz, Circuit Court Judge.  The circuit court granted the 
FILED 
 
DEC 19, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 99-1768-CR & 99-1769-CR 
 
 
2 
defense motion to bar the State from charging Melvin L. Moffett 
and Jerrell I. Denson, the defendants, with being parties to the 
crime of attempted first-degree intentional homicide under Wis. 
Stat. §§  939.32(1)(a)(1997-98)1 and 939.05 (1997-98)2 and with 
                     
1 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.32 (1)(a), entitled "Attempt," 
provides as follows: 
Whoever attempts to commit a felony . . . may be fined 
or imprisoned or both not to exceed one-half the 
maximum penalty for the completed crime; except: 
 
(a) Whoever attempts to commit a crime for which the 
penalty is life imprisonment is guilty of a Class 
B felony. 
 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1997-98 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.05(1), entitled "Parties to crime," 
provides that a person "concerned in the commission of a crime 
is a principal and may be charged with and convicted of the 
commission of the crime although the person did not directly 
commit it." 
Section 939.05(2) states: 
A person is concerned in the commission of the crime 
if the person: 
 
(a) Directly commits the crime; or 
 
(b) Intentionally aids and abets the commission of 
it; or 
 
(c) Is a party to a conspiracy with another to commit 
it or advises, hires, counsels, or otherwise 
procures another to commit it.  Such a party is 
also concerned in the commission of any other 
crime which is committed in pursuance of the 
intended crime and which under the circumstances 
is a natural and probable consequence of the 
intended crime . . . . 
 
No. 99-1768-CR & 99-1769-CR 
 
 
3 
the crime of conspiracy to commit intentional homicide under 
Wis. Stat. § 939.31 (1997-98).3  The circuit court ordered the 
State to amend its information to charge the defendants with one 
or the other of the two crimes  but not both.  The court of 
appeals reversed the order of the circuit court. 
¶2 
The parties present the following question to this 
court: May the State charge the defendants with two crimes, that 
is, with being parties to the crime of attempted first-degree 
intentional homicide and with the crime of conspiracy to commit 
                                                                  
The complaint in the present case does not state, and it 
need not state, how the defendants were "concerned in the 
commission of the crime," that is, the complaint does not state 
whether the defendants' actions fall under § 939.05(2)(a), (b), 
or (c).  The circuit court assumed that the parties came within 
subsection (c) as a party to a conspiracy.  The State notes that 
it has not determined its theory of liability under Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.05 and may prove that the defendants aided and abetted the 
crime of attempted first-degree intentional homicide under Wis. 
Stat. § 939.05(2)(b). 
The concept of conspiracy thus potentially appears in two 
forms in this case: as a conspirator party to the crime of 
attempted first-degree intentional homicide under § 939.05(2)(c) 
and as a participant in the inchoate crime of conspiracy under 
§ 939.31. 
3 The inchoate crime of conspiracy is set forth in Wis. 
Stat. § 939.31 as follows: 
939.31 
Conspiracy. 
 
Except 
as 
provided 
in 
ss. 
940.43(4), 940.45(4) and 961.41(lx), whoever, with 
intent that a crime be committed, agrees or combines 
with another for the purpose of committing that crime 
may, if one or more of the parties to the conspiracy 
does an act to effect its object, be fined or 
imprisoned or both not to exceed the maximum provided 
for the completed crime; except that for a conspiracy 
to commit a crime for which the penalty is life 
imprisonment, the actor is guilty of a Class B felony. 
 
No. 99-1768-CR & 99-1769-CR 
 
 
4 
first-degree intentional homicide  when both crimes had only 
one and the same intended victim?  Stating the question more 
generally, may an accused be charged with both being a party to 
an attempt to commit a crime and a conspiracy to commit the same 
crime?  For the reasons set forth below, we answer this question 
affirmatively.4 
 
I 
 
¶3 
This case comes before us at the pleading stage.  
Accordingly the facts of this case are still very much in 
dispute.  We look to the criminal complaint for the alleged 
facts to put the legal issue presented to this court in context. 
¶4 
According to the criminal complaint, in 1996 Nancy 
Kellogg-Bowman allegedly began to discuss with defendant Melvin 
L. Moffett the possibility of killing her husband for the 
proceeds of his life insurance policy.  Upon Moffett's release 
from prison in April 1998, he and Kellogg-Bowman traveled to his 
mother's house.  There they met with defendant Jerrell I. 
Denson, who is Moffett's nephew, and another individual, known 
as "Zake," later identified as Isaiah Hunter.  Moffett allegedly 
provided Kellogg-Bowman with a gun and instructed her to give it 
to Zake, who would use the gun to kill her husband.  Denson then 
                     
4 This case presents a question of law that this court 
determines independently of the circuit court and court of 
appeals, benefiting from their analyses.  As best the parties 
and the court can determine, the present case is the first 
appellate case to raise this issue. 
No. 99-1768-CR & 99-1769-CR 
 
 
5 
drove Zake to a gas station, so that Zake would not be seen 
leaving the residence with Kellogg-Bowman.  Kellogg-Bowman 
picked Zake up at the gas station and drove him to her home in 
Madison, Wisconsin, carrying the gun in her purse. 
¶5 
After Kellogg-Bowman's husband went to bed, he was 
allegedly awakened by two popping sounds and flashes.  The 
husband allegedly saw Zake standing over him, holding a gun, and 
repeatedly pulling the trigger.  However, the gun only clicked 
four or five times and did not fire.  Zake left the bedroom, 
with the husband following.  Zake again pointed the gun at the 
husband and it clicked two or three more times.  The husband 
then tried to hide in the bathroom, but Zake followed him and 
pushed the door open.  The husband heard the gun click two or 
three more times.  Zake then fled the house, and the husband 
heard what he thought was his wife's vehicle driving away. 
¶6 
While the attack was taking place, Kellogg-Bowman had 
allegedly been driving around the neighborhood.  When she 
returned, Zake came out of the house and told her that the gun 
had jammed and that he would instead use a sharp knife to kill 
the husband.  After Kellogg-Bowman told Zake that there were no 
sharp knives in the house, they drove away together and disposed 
of the gun.  In the meantime, the husband telephoned 911.  The 
husband had been shot in the hand and the right buttock. 
¶7 
The State's information, dated November 10, 1998, 
charged the defendants with one count of being parties to the 
crime 
of 
attempted 
first-degree 
intentional 
homicide, 
in 
violation of Wis. Stat. §§ 940.01(1) (first-degree intentional 
No. 99-1768-CR & 99-1769-CR 
 
 
6 
homicide), 939.32(1)(a) (attempt to commit a crime for which the 
penalty is life imprisonment), 939.63(1)(a)2 (penalties for 
committing a crime while using a dangerous weapon), and 939.05 
(party to a crime), and another count of conspiracy to commit 
intentional homicide in violation of Wis. Stat. § 939.31.  Both 
defendants filed motions to dismiss one of the counts as 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 939.72(2), which states that a person 
shall not be convicted under both § 939.31 for conspiracy and 
§ 939.05 "as a party to a crime which is the objective of the 
conspiracy." 
¶8 
The circuit court granted the defendants' motion.  On 
July 8, 1999, the State filed an amended information, charging 
defendant Moffett with being a party to the crime of attempted 
first-degree intentional homicide and charging defendant Denson 
with conspiracy to commit intentional homicide.  The State also 
filed an appeal with the court of appeals.  The court of appeals 
reversed the order of the circuit court.  The defendants seek 
review in this court of the court of appeals decision. 
 
II 
 
¶9 
The defendants argue that charging them with being 
parties to the crime of attempted first-degree intentional 
homicide and with the crime of conspiracy to commit the same 
first-degree 
intentional 
homicide 
violates 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 939.72(2), which bars convictions for both conspiracy and 
No. 99-1768-CR & 99-1769-CR 
 
 
7 
being "a party to a crime which is the objective of the 
conspiracy."  Section 939.72 provides as follows: 
 
A person shall not be convicted under both: 
 
(1) Section 939.30, 948.35 or 948.36 for solicitation 
and s. 939.05 as a party to a crime which is the 
objective of the solicitation; or 
 
(2) Section 939.31 for conspiracy and s. 939.05 as a 
party to a crime which is the objective of the 
conspiracy; or 
 
(3) Section 939.32 for attempt and the section 
defining the completed crime. 
 
¶10 The defendants argue that the circuit court correctly 
interpreted Wis. Stat. § 939.72(2) as barring a conviction for 
being party to the crime of attempted first-degree intentional 
homicide under Wis. Stat. §§ 939.05 and 939.32 and the crime of 
conspiracy to commit intentional homicide under Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.31.  They further contend that if a conviction under both 
statutes is barred, then charging under both statutes is also 
barred.5 
                     
5 The defendants focus on an anomaly that might arise if an 
offender could not be convicted for the crime of conspiracy and 
a completed crime, but could be convicted for the crime of 
conspiracy and as party to an attempt.  Thus an offender could 
face a lower maximum sentence for a completed crime than for an 
attempted crime and conspiracy to commit a crime.  As the court 
of appeals explained, "a defendant who conspires to commit, and 
then is a party to an attempt to commit, a felony, faces 
potential punishment that is less severe if the attempt succeeds 
and the crime is actually committed than he or she would face if 
the attempt fails."  State v. Moffett, 2000 WI App 67, ¶15, 233 
Wis. 2d 628, 608 N.W.2d 733. 
No. 99-1768-CR & 99-1769-CR 
 
 
8 
¶11 The State argues that Wis. Stat. § 939.72(2) does not 
bar a conviction under both charges in the present case.  The 
objective of the conspiracy, the State explains, was intentional 
homicide, but the defendants were charged with being parties to 
the crime of attempted intentional homicide.  According to the 
State, the defendants were thus not charged with, and will not 
be convicted of, to use the words of § 939.72(2), "a crime which 
[was] the objective of the conspiracy."  Moreover, because 
§ 939.72(2) prohibits only a conviction under both § 939.31 for 
conspiracy and § 939.05 as a "party to a crime which is the 
objective of the conspiracy," the State argues that § 939.72(2) 
does not apply to the present case because this case is only at 
the pleading stage.6 
                                                                  
The State argues that even if such an anomalous result 
might occur under certain circumstances, that would be a matter 
for the legislature, not the courts. 
The issues of conviction under both statutes and the 
possible anomaly are not before us in the present case. 
6 The State took a different approach before the circuit 
court.  The State argued in the circuit court that if the jury's 
verdict was guilty on both counts, the State would move to 
dismiss one of those two counts so that there would be only one 
conviction.  Nevertheless the circuit court concluded that the 
State must drop one of the counts before trial.  The circuit 
court concluded that the charge of conspiracy and the charge of 
party to the crime (as a conspirator) of attempted intentional 
first-degree homicide would lead to jury confusion and an 
inability on the part of the court as well as the parties to 
know what evidence the jury might have relied upon in reaching 
one of its verdicts.  Like the court of appeals, we are not 
persuaded by the jury confusion argument because Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.12(3) provides the possibility of other remedies. 
No. 99-1768-CR & 99-1769-CR 
 
 
9 
¶12 We agree with the State.  Nothing in Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.72 bars the State from charging a defendant with the crime 
of conspiracy and with being a party to the crime that is the 
objective of the conspiracy.  Quite simply, Wis. Stat. § 939.72 
governs only convictions and does not bar the State from 
bringing and proceeding with charges set forth in multiple 
statutes.  The issue under Wis. Stat. § 939.72(2) of whether 
defendants can be convicted of the crime of conspiracy to commit 
intentional homicide and of being parties to the crime of 
attempted first-degree intentional homicide is not before us at 
this juncture of the case. 
¶13 Because we conclude 
that 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.72(2) 
governing multiple convictions is inapplicable to the present 
case, involving pleading and multiple charges, we must consider 
the defendants' other arguments to support their position that 
the State is barred from charging both crimes. 
¶14 The defendants argue that the two counts charged are 
multiplicitous.  Multiple charging based on a single course of 
conduct 
implicates 
the 
federal 
and 
state 
constitutional 
protections against double jeopardy for the same offense.7  
Multiplicity challenges often arise when an accused's repeated 
acts are charged as separate crimes.  In such cases, an accused 
claims the acts are part of a continuous transaction and 
therefore a single crime, while the prosecutor asserts that a 
                     
7 See State v. Kanarowski, 170 Wis. 2d 504, 509, 489 N.W.2d 
660 (Ct. App. 1992). 
No. 99-1768-CR & 99-1769-CR 
 
 
10
particular statute creates several separate offenses rather than 
a single crime that can be accomplished through multiple means.8 
 Another but less common way in which a multiplicity challenge 
arises is when an accused is charged with multiple offenses 
under separate criminal statutes based on the same course of 
conduct.9  The present case falls in this latter category of 
multiplicity cases. 
¶15 The State and the defendants agree that the following 
two-part test applies to a multiplicity challenge:10 (1) are the 
charged offenses identical in law and fact, and (2) if the 
offenses are not identical in law and fact, did the legislature 
intend the multiple charges to be brought as a single charge?11 
¶16 The court of appeals carefully examined the two 
charges in this case and found them to be not identical in law 
and fact.  Defendant Denson agrees with the court of appeals 
analysis of this part of the test.  Defendant Moffett argues 
that the charges in the present case fail this part of the test. 
 He urges this court to compare the elements of the party to a 
crime statute (§ 939.05(2)(c)) with the elements of conspiracy 
                     
8 See, e.g., State v. Derango, 2000 WI 89, ¶27, 236 Wis. 2d 
721, 613 N.W.2d 833; Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel & Nancy 
J. King, Criminal Procedure § 19.3(c), at 776 (2d ed. 1999). 
9 See, e.g., State v. Kanarowski, 170 Wis. 2d 504, 489 N.W.2d 660 (Ct. App. 1992). 
10 Although the two defendants make slightly different 
arguments, we treat their arguments together. 
11 See, e.g., State v. Derango, 2000 WI 89, ¶29, 236 Wis. 2d 
721, 613 N.W.2d 833, and State v. Anderson, 219 Wis. 2d 739, 
746, 580 N.W.2d 329 (1998), describing this two-part test. 
No. 99-1768-CR & 99-1769-CR 
 
 
11
(§ 939.31), 
rather 
than 
compare 
the 
elements 
of 
attempt 
(§ 939.32) with the elements of conspiracy (§ 939.31) as the 
court of appeals did.  We agree with the court of appeals that 
the two charges in this case are not identical in law and fact 
and adopt the court of appeals discussion at 233 Wis. 2d 628 at 
¶¶11-14 as our own at the appendix attached. 
¶17 We therefore turn to the second part of the test.  The 
defendants argue that the legislature did not intend to allow 
the State to charge an accused with conspiracy to commit 
intentional homicide under Wis. Stat. § 939.31 and with being 
parties to the crime of attempted first-degree intentional 
homicide under Wis. Stat. §§  939.32(1)(a) and 939.05.  But the 
only proof of legislative intent is the language and the 
legislative history of § 939.72(2). 
¶18 The defendants argue that Wis. Stat. § 939.72(2) is 
clear evidence of a legislative intent not to charge an accused 
with conspiracy to commit intentional homicide and with being a 
party to the crime of attempted first-degree intentional 
homicide.  We disagree with the defendants.  The clear language 
of Wis. Stat. § 939.72(2) refers to convictions, not charges.  
Nothing in the legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 939.72(2) 
suggests otherwise.12  We agree with the State that by limiting 
                     
12 The comment to 1953 Assembly Bill 100, in which the 
legislature enacted § 339.72, later renumbered as Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.72, and upon which the defendants rely, reads as follows: 
No. 99-1768-CR & 99-1769-CR 
 
 
12
Wis. Stat. § 939.72(2) to convictions and by enacting Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.65 allowing the State to bring multiple charges, the 
legislature has clearly expressed its intent to allow the State 
to proceed with both charges in the present case. 
¶19 Section 939.65 gives prosecutors broad authority to 
charge under multiple statutes and provides that "if an act 
forms the basis for a crime punishable under more than one 
statutory provision, prosecution may proceed under any or all 
such provisions."13  Except for their arguments relating to Wis. 
                                                                  
Like the preceding section, this section treats one 
phase of the double jeopardy problem.  Since under this 
code the inchoate crimes (attempt, conspiracy, and 
solicitation) are considered equally as serious as the 
completed crime in that they demonstrate to the same 
extent the actor's criminal tendencies, and since the 
same penalty is permissible for the inchoate crime as 
for the completed crime, it manifestly would be unfair 
to permit conviction of both. 
This comment refers expressly to "penalty" and "conviction" 
but does not support defendants' contention that the legislature 
intended to prohibit multiple charging. 
13 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.65 provides: 
Except as provided in s. 948.025 (3), if an act forms 
the basis for a crime punishable under more than one 
statutory provision, prosecution may proceed under any 
or all such provisions. 
 
Wisconsin Stat. § 948.025(3), to which § 939.65 refers, is 
entitled "Engaging in repeated sexual acts of sexual assault of 
the same child," and provides: 
The state may not charge in the same action a 
defendant with a violation of this section and with a 
felony violation involving the same child under ch. 
944 or a violation involving the same child under s. 
948.02, 948.05, 948.06, 948.07, 948.08, 948.10, 948.11 
or 948.12, unless the other violation occurred outside 
No. 99-1768-CR & 99-1769-CR 
 
 
13
Stat. § 939.72(2), the defendants offer no justification for not 
applying § 939.65 to the present case.  Thus we conclude that 
the defendants' conduct forms the basis for two different 
offenses under two different statutory provisions and that Wis. 
Stat. § 939.65 permits the State to proceed under both statutory 
provisions.  Section 939.65 is "a clear and unequivocal 
statement of the legislature's intent that multiple charging 
under different statutory provisions is permitted where an act 
forms the basis for a crime under more than one statutory 
provision."14 
¶20 The defendants also argue that the multiple charges in 
the present case are fundamentally unfair.  The court of appeals 
disposed of this argument in State v. Kanarowski, 170 Wis. 2d 
504, 489 N.W.2d 660 (Ct. App. 1992).  The court of appeals 
explained that the first part of the multiplicity test, whether 
the offenses are identical in law or fact, "is not separate from 
a fundamental fairness analysis.  [This test] is the way that 
                                                                  
of the time period applicable under sub. (1).  This 
subsection does not prohibit a conviction for an 
included crime under s. 939.66 when the defendant is 
charged with a violation of this section. 
 
Notwithstanding § 939.65, the State does not have unlimited 
power in charging multiple offenses under separate statutory 
provisions.  For example, the State recognizes that when one of 
the offenses is a lesser-included offense of the other, both the 
offense and the lesser-included offense cannot be charged.  See 
State v. Kennedy, 134 Wis. 2d 308, 324, 396 N.W.2d 765 (Ct. App. 
1986). 
14 State v. Kanarowski, 170 Wis. 2d 504, 515, 489 N.W.2d 660 
(Ct. App. 1992) (Nettesheim, P.J., concurring). 
No. 99-1768-CR & 99-1769-CR 
 
 
14
courts in this state have attempted to apply fundamental 
fairness concerns to charging decisions."  Kanarowski, 170 
Wis. 2d at 514. 
¶21 In conclusion, we hold that the State may properly 
charge the defendants with being parties to the crime of 
attempted first-degree intentional homicide and with conspiracy 
to commit first-degree intentional homicide of one intended 
victim. 
¶22 For the reasons set forth, we affirm the decision of 
the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
1 
APPENDIX 
In ¶16 above, we adopt the following paragraphs from State 
v. Moffett, 2000 WI App 67, 233 Wis. 2d 628, 608 N.W.2d 733.  
The paragraphs are set forth here: 
¶11. To determine whether charges are multiplicitous, we 
apply a two-part test.  State v. Lechner, 217 Wis. 2d 392, 402-
03, 576 N.W.2d 912 (1998).  Using the "elements-only" test of 
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), we first 
determine whether each offense requires proof of an additional 
element that the other does not.5  Lechner at 405.  The inquiry 
focuses on the statutes defining the offenses and has been 
codified in Wis. Stat. § 939.66(1), which provides that a 
defendant "may be convicted of either the crime charged or an 
included crime, but not both," and defines "included crime" as 
one "which does not require proof of any fact in addition to 
those which must be proved for the crime charged."  State v. 
Johnson, 178 Wis. 2d 42, 49, 503 N.W.2d 575 (Ct. App. 1993).  
Thus, under the test, 
 
an offense is a "lesser included" one only if all of 
its statutory elements can be demonstrated without 
proof of any fact or element in addition to those 
which must be proved for the "greater" offense. . . .  
[A]n offense is not a lesser-included one if it 
contains an additional statutory element. 
 
                     
5 Under the rule, multiple punishments are permissible only 
if each offense requires proof of an additional element or fact 
which the other offense or offenses do not.  State v. Sauceda, 
168 Wis. 2d 486, 501 485 N.W.2d 1 (1992).  If the offenses are 
identical in law and fact, multiple punishment is barred.  Id. 
 
 
2 
Johnson, 178 Wis. 2d at 49.  If the Blockburger test is met, we 
presume that the legislature intended to permit cumulative 
punishments for both offenses, State v. Kuntz, 160 Wis. 2d 722, 
755, 467 N.W.2d 531 (1991), and the question becomes whether 
other 
factors 
exist 
which 
clearly 
indicate 
a 
contrary 
legislative intent.  State v. Rabe, 96 Wis. 2d 48, 63, 291 
N.W.2d 809 (1980). 
¶12. We begin by comparing the statutes defining the two 
offenses.  The crime of attempt is defined as follows in Wis. 
Stat. § 939.32(3): 
 
An attempt to commit a crime requires that the actor 
have an intent to perform acts and attain a result 
which, if accomplished, would constitute such crime 
and that the actor does acts toward the commission of 
the crime which demonstrate unequivocally, under all 
the circumstances, that the actor formed that intent 
and would commit the crime except for the intervention 
of another person or some other extraneous factor.  
 
Section 939.31 defines the crime of conspiracy. 
 
Except as provided in ss. 940.43 (4), 940.45 (4) and 
961.41 (1x), whoever, with intent that a crime be 
committed, agrees or combines with another for the 
purpose of committing that crime may, if one or more 
of the parties to the conspiracy does an act to effect 
its object, be fined or imprisoned or both not to 
exceed the maximum provided for the completed crime; 
except that for a conspiracy to commit a crime for 
which the penalty is life imprisonment, the actor is 
guilty of a Class B felony.  
 
¶13. The language of the two statutes indicates quite 
plainly, we think, that neither offense includes the other.  
Each requires proof of an element which the other does not.  To 
 
 
3 
convict a person of attempt, the State must prove that he or she 
did "acts toward the commission of the crime which demonstrate 
unequivocally, under all the circumstances, that [he or she] 
formed that intent and would commit the crime except for the 
intervention of another person or some other extraneous factor." 
 The crime of conspiracy doesn't require any such act.  It 
attaches at an earlier stage, requiring only "an act to effect 
[the] object [of the conspiracy]"  and there is no requirement 
that that act must demonstrate unequivocally that the defendant 
formed an intent and would have committed the crime but for an 
extraneous intervening factor.  The crime is complete when there 
is an agreement and an initial overt act in furtherance of the 
agreement. 
¶14. These same preparatory acts, however, would not be 
sufficient to convict either the actor or his or her co-
conspirators for attempt  a crime that is complete only at the 
latest possible stage before commission of the ultimate offense, 
and thus one requiring proof of an element or elements beyond 
those which would justify a conviction for conspiracy.  By the 
same token, conspiracy requires proof of an element  an 
agreement or combination for the purpose of committing a crime  
 
 
4 
that attempt (a crime which, as the State notes, may be 
committed by an individual) does not.6 
 
 
 
 
                     
6 We recognize that the definition of conspiracy used in the 
jury instruction for the crime of conspiracy (Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.31) and the "agreement" or "conspiracy" element of the 
party-to-the-crime statute (Wis. Stat. § 939.05(2)(c)) is the 
same.  See Wis JI - Criminal 570 and 410.  Noting that fact, the 
trial court concluded that because "proof of the conspiracy 
would be included in the party to a crime liability for 
attempted murder under the conspiracy theory . . . [i]t does not 
then appear that each statute requires proof of an additional 
fact which the other does not."  We disagree.  That conclusion 
ignores the fact that, although the description of a "member of 
a conspiracy" is the same under both sections, conspiracy under 
§ 939.05(2)(c), as a party to the crime, cannot be considered in 
isolation when employing the "elements-only" test; it must be 
analyzed in conjunction with the crime of attempt  for the 
actual crime charged in this case was being a party to the crime 
of attempted first-degree intentional homicide.  And, as we have 
said, when the two are read together, an attempt still requires 
proof of an additional fact which the crime of conspiracy does 
not  an "act[] toward the commission of the crime which 
demonstrate[s] unequivocally, under all the circumstances, that 
the [defendant] formed that intent and would commit the crime 
except for the intervention of another person or some other 
extraneous factor."  Wis. Stat. § 939.32(3).  Additionally, as 
we also have noted  and as the State emphasizes in its reply 
brief  a charge of being a party to the crime does not alter 
the nature of the underlying offenses; and proof of the acts 
which can support liability as a party to a crime is separate 
and distinct from proof of the underlying criminal act.  See 
[State v. Horenberger, 119 Wis. 2d 237, 243, 349 N.W.2d 692 
(1984)].  
 
 
 
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