Title: Thomas H. Provenzano v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC99-32
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: May 25, 2000

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC99-32
____________
THOMAS H. PROVENZANO,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[May 25, 2000]
PER CURIAM.
Thomas H. Provenzano appeals an order entered by the circuit court finding
him competent to be executed.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section
3(b)(1) of the Florida  Constitution.  For the reasons expressed below, we affirm the
circuit court’s order.
In June of 1999, the Governor signed a death warrant for Provenzano and set
the execution for Wednesday, July 7, 1999.  On Monday, July 5, 1999, Provenzano
submitted filings to the Governor, wherein he claimed that he was incompetent to be
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executed.  As required by statute, the Governor stayed the execution on Tuesday,
July 6, 1999 (the day before the execution was to take place), and appointed a
commission of three psychiatrists to examine Provenzano.  After receiving the report
of the commission, the Governor determined that Provenzano had the mental
capacity to understand the nature of the death penalty and the reasons why it was
imposed upon him.  The Governor lifted the stay and reset the execution for
Wednesday, July 7, 1999.  
Subsequently, Provenzano filed a motion for a hearing on his incompetency
claim in the circuit court pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.811.  In
order to give the circuit court time to consider the motion, this Court stayed
Provenzano's execution until Friday, July 9, 1999.  On Wednesday, July 7, 1999, the
circuit court denied Provenzano's motion without a rule 3.812 hearing.  On
Thursday, July 8, 1999, this Court granted a stay of execution and directed the
parties to submit briefs concerning the constitutionality of the electric chair and the
procedures for obtaining a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.812 hearing.  The
question regarding the constitutionality of the electric chair has since been resolved. 
See Provenzano v. Moore, 744 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1999) (holding that electrocution is
not unconstitutional); Ch. 00-2, §§ 1-2, Laws of Fla. (providing inmates with a
choice between lethal injection and electrocution) (signed into law by the Governor
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on Jan. 14, 2000); Sims v. State, 25 Fla. L. Weekly S128 (Fla. Feb. 16, 2000)
(holding that the retroactive application of the choice statute did not violate the Ex
Post Facto clauses of the state and federal constitutions).
In Provenzano v. State, 751 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 1999), this Court reversed the
circuit court’s July 7, 1999, order and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the
issue of Provenzano’s competency to be executed, pursuant to rule 3.812.  The
circuit court subsequently held a rule 3.812 hearing, but refused to grant Provenzano
a continuance in order to allow Dr. Patricia Fleming, a key mental health expert, the
opportunity to testify.  Therefore, in Provenzano v. State, 750 So. 2d 597 (Fla.
1999), this Court again remanded this case to the circuit court in order to allow Dr.
Fleming a reasonable opportunity to testify. 
As a result of this Court’s most recent remand, the circuit court held further
proceedings.  Dr. Fleming was given the opportunity to testify, as well as other
witnesses from both the State and the defense.  In fact, at the close of all the
evidence, counsel for Provenzano stated on the record that he had presented
everything that he had to offer on behalf of Provenzano.  Thereupon, the circuit
court entered an order finding Provenzano competent to be executed.  That order is
the subject of this appeal.
The Unites States Supreme Court has concluded that the death penalty serves
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two important purposes:  retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective
offenders.  See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183-86 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
“[A] state can only execute a condemned prisoner if it contributes to these [two
purposes].”  Martin v. Dugger, 686 F. Supp. 1523, 1569 (S.D. Fla. 1988), aff’d, 891
F.2d 807 (11th Cir. 1989).  In Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986), the
Supreme Court held that the execution of a defendant who becomes incompetent
after conviction is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.  The Court did not set forth the standard for determining
incompetency.  However, Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, did provide
guidance: 
Florida requires the Governor to stay executions of those
who "d[o] not have the mental capacity to understand the
nature of the death penalty and why it was imposed" on
them.  A number of States have more rigorous standards,
but none disputes the need to require that those who are
executed know the fact of their impending execution and
the reason for it.  
Such a standard appropriately defines the kind of
mental deficiency that should trigger the Eighth
Amendment prohibition.  If the defendant perceives the
connection between his crime and his punishment, the
retributive goal of the criminal law is satisfied.  And only
if the defendant is aware that his death is approaching can
he prepare himself for his passing.  Accordingly, I would
hold that the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution
only of those who are unaware of the punishment they are
about to suffer and why they are to suffer it.
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477 U.S. at 421-22 (Powell, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (footnote omitted). In
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), a majority of the Court subsequently
agreed with the minimal standard articulated by Justice Powell.  See id. at 333
(stating that defendants who are “unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer
and why they are to suffer it” cannot be executed) (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477
U.S. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring)).  In Martin, Judge King offered additional
guidance:
   
Similar to th[e] retributive purpose analysis, the
execution of a prisoner without an appreciation of the
connection between his crime and punishment would be a
disservice to the deterrence aspect of capital punishment. 
The essence of this deterrence purpose is the rational
concept that if you do this act society considers heinous
you will be killed;  that is, society will make you an
example to others so that their acts conform to the
accepted standards of humanity.  The execution of a
person who cannot appreciate the connection between his
crime and punishment would be tantamount to an act of
inhumanity. . . .
If both purposes behind the death penalty are to be
served, and, therefore, the sentence is to be carried out in
accordance with the eighth amendment, the defendant
must at least appreciate the connection between his crime
and punishment.
686 F. Supp. at 1570.
Florida has adopted the Eighth Amendment standard announced by Justice
Powell in Ford.  See rule 3.812(b) (“whether the prisoner lacks the mental capacity
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to understand the fact of the pending execution and the reason for it”).  In its order,
the circuit court found that despite his delusional belief that he is Jesus Christ,
Provenzano has a factual and rational understanding of “the details of his trial, his
conviction, and the jury’s recommendation by a vote of seven to five that he be
sentenced to death” and of “the fact that in accordance with the jury’s
recommendation, he was sentenced to death for the murder of Bailiff Arnie
Wilkerson, and that he will die once he is executed.”  Thus, the circuit court
concluded that Provenzano is competent to be executed.  
In Medina v. State, 690 So. 2d 1255, 1256 (Fla. 1997),  this Court applied the
competent, substantial evidence standard of review to the trial court’s order
pursuant to a rule 3.812 hearing.  Applying that standard of review to the present
case, we find that the record contains competent, substantial evidence to support the
circuit court’s order.  State experts Dr. Harry McClaren, Dr. Leslie Parsons, and Dr.
Alan J. Waldman all testified that Provenzano is competent to be executed.  
As indicated by the circuit court, this case is troubling because there is
evidence that Provenzano has “mental health problems of some degree.”  The circuit
court acknowledged these problems in its findings of fact and concluded that
Provenzano suffers from mental illness, but because he also exaggerates symptoms
and utilizes deception, it is difficult to determine Provenzano’s exact mental status. 
     1Regardless of the outcome of these proceedings it is apparent that the proceedings conducted
by Judge Bentley, including the preparation of the order announcing and explaining his decision, were
conducted under the highest standards of judicial review.
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However, in this context, the Eighth Amendment only requires that defendants be
aware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it.  See
Ford, 477 U.S. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring).  The circuit court found that
Provenzano “does not lack the mental capacity to understand the fact of his pending
execution and the reason for it”; therefore, both the Ford standard and the purposes
behind death penalty have been met in this case.  The record contains competent,
substantial evidence to support this determination.  Accordingly, we affirm the order
of the circuit court finding Provenzano competent to be executed.
It is so ordered.
HARDING, C.J., and WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
ANSTEAD, J., dissents with an opinion, in which SHAW, J, concurs.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF
FILED, DETERMINED.
ANSTEAD, J., dissenting.
In his order, Judge Bentley1 found as fact by clear and convincing evidence
that Provenzano has a delusional belief that he is Jesus Christ, and this belief
predates the tragic episode involved herein by several years; and, further, there is
clear and convincing evidence establishing that Provenzano has a delusional belief
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that the real reason he is being executed is because he is Jesus Christ:
Thomas Provenzano has, for over twenty years on
occasion, believed that he is Jesus Christ.  In conjunction
with this delusional belief, Provenzano believes that he is
not going to be executed because he murdered another
human being, but that he really will be executed because
he is Jesus Christ.  
In other words we have a judicial finding that Provenzano not only has long suffered
from a serious mental illness, but also that Provenzano’s illness has caused him to
be out of touch with reality in that he has long believed he is Jesus Christ and he is
being put to death because of who he is, not because of anything he did.
In determining whether Provenzano is incompetent under rule 3.812, Judge
Bentley struggled with the proper test to be applied:
     What does the standard for competency to be executed
and specifically rules 3.811 and 3.812 mean?  Is a rational
acceptance of the reasons for execution necessary?  No. 
Many defendants, without mental health problems,
maintain their innocence though, under the facts, such a
position is irrational.  This can be said to be a fairly
normal human reaction.  The standard does not require
this.
     Going one step further, we have a situation in which
Provenzano’s rejection is based on a delusional belief. 
The Court finds that the acceptance of the reasons for
sentencing, whether rational, irrational, or delusional, is
not part of the current standard for competency to be
executed.  In other words, under the current standard,
acceptance of the reasons is a separate issue from a
rational understanding of the process.  The present
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standard is a minimal standard.  If the Court has wrongly
interpreted the present legal standard, the ultimate finding
of this Order will be in error.
In Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986), the United States Supreme
Court held that the execution of a defendant who becomes incompetent after
conviction is violative of the Eighth Amendment.  The Court did not set forth the
standard for determining incompetency.  However, Justice Powell, the controlling
swing vote for the decision, provided guidance in his concurring opinion: “I would
hold that the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution only of those who are
unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it.” 
Id. at 422.  Justice Powell added that the defendant must be able to connect the
execution to the crime for which he or she was convicted.  See id. at 423.  Although
Justice Powell’s standard was not controlling at the time Ford was released, a
majority of the Court subsequently agreed that the Eighth Amendment bars
execution of prisoners who are “unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer
and why they are to suffer it.”  Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 333 (1989).  Many
courts have referred to this standard as the “cognitive” test.  See, e.g., Singleton v.
State, 437 S.E. 2d 53, 56 (S.C. 1993).  Thus, the Eighth Amendment requires that
the defendant recognize not only the punishment but also the reason for the
punishment being applied to her.
     2American Bar Association Criminal Justice Mental Health Standard 7.5-6 (1989) provides:
     (a)  Convicts who have been sentenced to death should not be executed if they
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Several courts have articulated standards for determining whether a defendant
is incompetent to be executed.  Many of these courts have relied on Justice Powell’s
cognitive test from Ford.  See Barnard v. Collins, 13 F.3d 871, 876 n.2 (5th Cir.
1994); Rector v. Clark, 923 F.2d 570, 572 (8th Cir. 1991); Billiot v. State, 655 So.
2d 1, 16 (Miss. 1995) (“He must comprehend the reasons for the penalty and its
implications, he must understand ‘the penalty’s existence and purpose,’ and in order
for the retributive goal of the criminal law to be satisfied, he must ‘perceive the
connection between his crime and his punishment,’ and be ‘aware that his death is
approaching [so] he can prepare himself for his passing.’”); Van Tran v. State, 6
S.W.3d 257, 266 (Tenn. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1728 (2000); Ex parte
Jordan, 758 S.W. 2d 250, 254 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (“whether applicant was
capable of comprehending the nature, pendency, and purpose of his execution”); see
also Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4021(B) (West Supp.1998); Ga. Code Ann. §
17-10-60 (1997); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 431.213 (Michie Supp.1999); N.Y. Correct.
Law § 656(1) (McKinney Supp.2000); Tex. Crim. P. Code Ann. § 46.04(h) (West
Supp.2000); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-901(a)(v) (Michie 1999).  Other states have
adopted the ABA standard of incompetency,2 which seems to encompass Justice
are currently mentally incompetent.  If it is determined that the condemned convict
is currently mentally incompetent, execution should be stayed.
     (b)  A convict is incompetent to be executed if, as a result of mental illness or
mental retardation, the convict cannot understand the nature of the pending
proceedings, what he or she was tried for, the reason for the punishment, or the
nature of the punishment.  A convict is also incompetent if, as a result of mental
illness or mental retardation, the convict lacks sufficient capacity to recognize or
understand any fact which might exist which would make the punishment unjust or
unlawful, or lacks the ability to convey such information to counsel or the court.  
(Emphasis supplied.)
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Powell’s cognitive prong.  See Singleton, 437 S.E. 2d at 55-56 (adopting a modified
version of the ABA standard); see also Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-57(2)(b) (1999);
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 552.060(1) (Supp.2000); State v. Harris, 789 P. 2d 60, 66 (Wash.
1990). 
Unfortunately, few courts have provided a detailed analysis regarding the
requirement that a prisoner understand the reason for his execution.  However, in
Martin v. Dugger, 686 F. Supp. 1523 (S.D. Fla. 1988), aff’d, 891 F.2d 807 (11th
Cir. 1989), Judge King offered a thorough analysis on the issue:
     In order for the just-desserts theory to be fulfilled, a
defendant must appreciate the connection between his
crime and punishment.  An essential part of the
punishment society imposes on a defendant is to make the
defendant realize and live with the concept that he will die
for what he did.  In many respects, the execution of a
prisoner who does not have this appreciation is a lesser
punishment than society intended to give.  Accordingly, if
retribution is to be served by the death of a condemned
prisoner, the prisoner must at least have this realization. 
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Under the previous analysis, therefore, if a prisoner does
not have this realization, and the state executes him, the
eighth amendment is violated.
     . . . .
     If [the retributive and deterrence] purposes behind the
death penalty are to be served, and, therefore, the
sentence is to be carried out in accordance with the eighth
amendment, the defendant must at least appreciate the
connection between his crime and punishment.  This
appreciation consists of both a subjective and objective
part.  The subjective part is nothing more than the
defendant's perception of the connection between his
crime and punishment.  A defendant must understand the
fact he committed his crime and the fact that he will die at
a specific time and place.  A defendant must also
understand the basic and fundamental logical proposition
that because he has committed an act that society and all
civilized humanity finds heinous he is to be killed.  The
objective aspect of this realization test is relatively
straightforward.  This concept determines whether the
defendant's subjective understanding is grounded in
reality; that is, is rational.  
     [Note 20:] At first, this concept may appear more
psychological than philosophical, but that is not the case. 
This objective determination is fairly cut and dry.  A court
must determine whether the defendant's logic behind this
connection is reasonable;  that is, whether the defendant's
rationale is consistent with the ordinary experience of
human beings.  In essence, a judge must sit as a jury
would in a negligence action to determine whether the
defendant's understanding is rational.  As the court
analysis indicates infra, a similar requirement exists in the
Dusky context. [End of note 20.]
     This appreciation of the connection between crime and
punishment is very similar to Justice Powell's "perceives
the connection" requirement.  The terms "perception" and
"appreciation" necessarily imply a similar understanding. 
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Moreover, while appreciation and perception are
inherently subjective terms, when an individual perceives
or appreciates a cognitive connection between two factual
concepts, a small objective understanding develops.
Id. at 1569-70 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).  As pointed out by Judge King,
in order for the retributive purpose of the death penalty to be served, the defendant
“must realize and live with the concept that he will die for what he did.”  Id. at
1569.  If a defendant does not have this realization, and that defendant is executed,
the Eighth Amendment is violated.  See id.  This is similar to the articulation of the
standard by the Mississippi Supreme Court that the defendant “must perceive the
connection between his crime and his punishment.”  Billiot v. State, 655 So. 2d at
16 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring)).   
It is impossible to conclude in this case that Provenzano has a rational
understanding of the reason he is to be executed when we have a judicial finding
based upon clear and convincing evidence that Provenzano genuinely believes as a
matter of fact that he “really will be executed because he is Jesus Christ.”  Due to
Judge Bentley’s finding of fact that Provenzano believes that he will be executed
because he is Jesus, Provenzano has met his burden under rule 3.812 to establish
that he is incompetent to be executed; Provenzano does not rationally understand
the reason the death penalty is being imposed upon him.  Indeed, under the trial
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court’s findings, should he be put to death he will go to his death believing he is
being killed because he is Jesus Christ.
SHAW, J., concurs.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Bradford County,
Hon. E. Randolph Bentley, Senior Judge - Case No. 99-286CFA
Michael P. Reiter, Chief Assistanht CCRC, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel-
Middle Region, Tampa, Florida,
for Appellant
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Carolyn M. Snurkowski, Assistant Deputy
Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Carol M. Dittmar and Kenneth S.
Nunnelley, Assistant Attorneys General, Tampa, Florida, 
for Appellee