Title: State v. Jermichael James Carroll
Citation: 2010 WI 8
Docket Number: 2007AP001378-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: February 3, 2010

2010 WI 8 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2007AP1378-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Jermichael James Carroll, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2008 WI App 161 
Reported at: 314 Wis. 2d 690, 762 N.W.2d 404 
(Ct. App. 2008-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 3, 2010   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 15, 2009   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Charles F. Kahn, Jr.   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
PROSSER, J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Michael K. Gould, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant the cause was argued by James 
M. Freimuth, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
2010 WI 8
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2007AP1378-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2006CF6568) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Jermichael James Carroll, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 3, 2010 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals1 that reversed an 
order by the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, Judge Charles 
F. Kahn, Jr. presiding, in which the circuit court suppressed 
evidence obtained from the defendant's cell phone pursuant to a 
warrant.  The circuit court based that order on the grounds that 
police, by searching the image gallery in the cell phone, 
illegally obtained the evidence that had formed the basis of 
                                                 
1 State v. Carroll, 2008 WI App 161, 314 Wis. 2d 690, 762 
N.W.2d 404. 
No. 
2007AP1378-CR   
 
2 
 
that warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.  The defendant, Jermichael James Carroll 
(Carroll), was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon.  
The court of appeals reversed the suppression order, ruling that 
untainted evidence that police later obtained provided a valid, 
independent basis for the warrant. 
¶2 
The focus of our inquiry is whether the evidentiary 
basis for the warrant to search the cell phone was tainted such 
that the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, or 
Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution, requires 
suppression of that evidence under the following circumstances:  
(1) an officer who had observed Carroll speeding confronted 
Carroll outside of his vehicle and ordered him to drop an 
unknown object that he held in his hand; (2) upon retrieving 
that object, the officer recognized it as an open cell phone and 
observed on the display screen an image of Carroll smoking what 
appeared to be a marijuana blunt; (3) the officer kept the 
phone, scrolled through its image gallery, and saw other images 
depicting Carroll with illegal items; and (4) the officer 
answered an incoming call pretending to be Carroll, and during 
that conversation, the caller ordered illegal drugs.  The police 
obtained a warrant to search the phone.  With the warrant, the 
police obtained time-stamped digital images from Carroll's cell 
phone.  It is that evidence that Carroll seeks to suppress. 
¶3 
We hold that neither the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution nor Article I, Section 11 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution requires that the evidence be suppressed 
No. 
2007AP1378-CR   
 
3 
 
under the circumstances presented here.  In so holding, we are 
satisfied that the officer was justified in seizing Carroll's 
cell phone and in viewing the marijuana image, which was in 
plain view.  Further, although the officer was also justified in 
continuing to possess the phone, we are satisfied that the 
officer was not justified in opening and browsing through the 
cell phone image gallery at the time that he took such action.  
As such, the evidence that the officer gleaned from that conduct 
was tainted and could not form the basis for a search warrant.  
However, based on exigent circumstances, the officer was 
justified in answering the incoming call to Carroll's phone 
during which the caller ordered illegal drugs.  That evidence 
was an untainted independent source that formed a valid basis 
for the search warrant when combined with the officer's 
knowledge of drug traffickers and Carroll's juvenile record, 
along with the plain view of the image of the marijuana blunt.  
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals. 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
¶4 
On December 6, 2006, Detective Belsha of the Milwaukee 
police department and his partner were conducting surveillance 
on a residence as part of an armed robbery investigation.  They 
observed a white Ford Escort leave that residence, slow down as 
it passed their squad car, and speed away. 
¶5 
The officers attempted to catch the vehicle, which 
reached speeds of 60 miles per hour on residential streets with 
speed limits no higher than 25 miles per hour.  According to 
Belsha's testimony at the suppression hearing, the driver, 
No. 
2007AP1378-CR   
 
4 
 
Carroll, eventually pulled the car to "an abrupt stop" in a gas 
station lot and quickly got out of the car while holding an 
object in his hands.  The officers could not identify what 
Carroll was holding, so Belsha drew his weapon and ordered 
Carroll to drop the object and get on the ground, which Carroll 
did.  The officers then handcuffed Carroll behind his back.   
¶6 
After 
handcuffing 
Carroll, 
Belsha 
retrieved 
the 
dropped object, which was a flip-style cell phone.  The cell 
phone was lying open on the ground and displayed an image of 
Carroll smoking a long, thin, brown cigarlike object ("the 
marijuana image").  Belsha, a member of the High Intensity Drug 
Trafficking Area Drug and Gang Task Force (HIDTA), testified 
that he recognized the object as a marijuana blunt.2 
¶7 
When the officers asked Carroll for identification, 
Carroll did not have any with him but gave the officers his 
name.  The officers ran a "routine check" and learned that he 
was driving with a suspended license.  Carroll also had a record 
                                                 
2 The circuit court observed that when the phone was flipped 
open, the marijuana image appeared with a label above it reading 
"Big Boss Player"; that label eventually faded away, leaving 
only the marijuana image.  Belsha did not testify to observing 
or reading the label. 
No. 
2007AP1378-CR   
 
5 
 
of being adjudicated delinquent for a drug-related felony two 
years earlier as a juvenile.3 
¶8 
Belsha placed Carroll in the back seat of the squad 
car and sat in the front seat with the cell phone, where he 
activated the menus, opened the image gallery, scrolled through 
it, and saw images showing illegal drugs, firearms, and large 
amounts of U.S. currency.  Specifically, Belsha testified that 
he saw an image of Carroll with what appeared to be a gallon-
size bag of marijuana held in his teeth, and "several photos 
depicting firearms," including one showing Carroll holding a 
semiautomatic firearm ("the firearm image"). 
¶9 
While Belsha continued to possess Carroll's cell 
phone, it rang several times and Belsha answered one of those 
calls, pretending to be Carroll.  The caller asked for "four of 
those things; four and a split."  Based on his training, Belsha 
recognized that the caller was attempting to purchase four and a 
half ounces of cocaine. 
¶10 Two days later, on December 8, 2006, Belsha sought a 
search warrant for the cell phone.  In his Affidavit in Support 
                                                 
3 It appears, although it is not clear from the record, that 
the "routine check" did not reveal Carroll's juvenile record.  
In his Affidavit in Support of a Search Warrant, Belsha 
explained that after he had stopped Carroll, "[a] check of 
records with the Wisconsin Department of Transportation revealed 
that the driver[']s license of Carroll was suspended."  Two 
paragraphs later in his affidavit, Belsha explained that "[a] 
review of Milwaukee County Circuit Court Juvenile Records 
reveals that [Carroll] was adjudicated delinquent of a felony 
offense, possession with intent to deliver cocaine[,] on March 
15, 2004."   
No. 
2007AP1378-CR   
 
6 
 
of a Search Warrant, Belsha mentioned the incriminating pictures 
he saw in the image gallery; specifically, he highlighted the 
firearm image as evidence that Carroll was in violation of the 
felon in possession of a firearm statute.  Belsha also described 
the intercepted phone call.  He further stated that drug 
traffickers commonly use cell phones to maintain contact with 
their sources and that the contents of Carroll’s cell phone 
would provide evidence of those contacts as well as evidence 
related to several other offenses, including possession of 
cocaine with intent to deliver and possession of marijuana with 
intent to deliver.  Moreover, Belsha explained that Carroll had 
been previously adjudicated delinquent for a felony, possession 
of cocaine with intent to deliver.  In the affidavit, Belsha did 
not specifically describe or mention the marijuana image that he 
had observed when he first picked up the phone; however, he 
stated in the affidavit that, based on his knowledge and 
experience, drug traffickers commonly personalize their cell 
phones with images of themselves and "property acquired from the 
distribution of drugs." 
¶11 A search warrant was issued by a court commissioner.  
After obtaining the warrant, the police downloaded the data on 
the cell phone, including the firearm image.  Detective McQuown, 
who was trained in the handling of digital evidence, testified 
at a preliminary hearing that each image on the phone had 
attached 
"metadata," 
which 
he 
described 
as 
information 
indicating the date and time at which the image was created.  He 
also testified that the metadata is based on the date and time 
No. 
2007AP1378-CR   
 
7 
 
updates regularly provided through cell phone towers.  According 
to testimony at the hearing, the metadata indicated that the 
firearm image had been created on May 22, 2006.  Carroll was 
charged with possession of a firearm by a felon, Wis. Stat. § 
941.29(2), based on photographic evidence downloaded from the 
cell phone, and the language in Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1)(bm), 
which relates to a person adjudicated delinquent for an act 
that, if committed by an adult, would be a felony. 
¶12 Carroll moved to suppress the evidence obtained 
pursuant to the search warrant.  Milwaukee County Circuit Judge 
Charles F. Kahn, Jr. granted that motion because Belsha's 
warrantless search of the image gallery could not be justified 
as a search incident to arrest.  The circuit court found that 
Carroll was not under arrest at the relevant time.  It further 
held that, even if police had arrested Carroll, that arrest 
would have been questionable given that Carroll had been 
speeding and driving with a suspended license, both noncriminal 
offenses.  Accordingly, the court concluded that the evidence 
Belsha obtained from viewing the image gallery was tainted; that 
absent that evidence, there were insufficient grounds for the 
No. 
2007AP1378-CR   
 
8 
 
issuance of the warrant; and that the evidence obtained pursuant 
to the warrant had to be suppressed.4 
¶13 The State appealed.  The court of appeals, in a 
published decision written by Judge Joan F. Kessler, reversed 
the suppression order.  Because the court of appeals held the 
issue related to untainted evidence was dispositive, it did not 
address whether a police officer may search a cell phone's image 
gallery as part of a search incident to arrest.  However, in its 
conclusion, the court of appeals assumed that Belsha improperly 
scrolled through Carroll's cell phone image gallery without a 
warrant.  It held, as a preliminary matter, that the information 
contained in the phone call that Belsha intercepted provided 
sufficient probable cause for a warrant.  Given that premise, 
the court then assessed whether Belsha legally possessed the 
phone and, if so, whether it was proper for him to answer the 
incoming call.  First, it concluded that Belsha had legal 
possession of the phone because, under the circumstances, 
Carroll was under arrest since "a reasonable person in Carroll's 
position would have considered himself to be 'in custody,' given 
the degree of restraint under the circumstances."  State v. 
Carroll, 2008 WI App 161, ¶26, 314 Wis. 2d 690, 762 N.W.2d 404.  
                                                 
4 At the motion hearings, the State argued that Carroll was 
under arrest for speeding and for driving with a suspended 
license, and that Belsha's browsing through the cell phone image 
gallery was justified as a search incident to arrest.  The State 
did not argue any other exceptions that would render the 
warrantless search constitutionally permissible.  Neither party 
presented testimony or arguments to the circuit court regarding 
the significance of Belsha's answering the incoming call. 
No. 
2007AP1378-CR   
 
9 
 
The court of appeals then concluded that it was permissible for 
Belsha to answer the incoming call based on the exigency that 
potential evidence would be lost if he did not.  It observed 
that even if it was unlawful for Belsha to scroll through the 
image gallery before obtaining the warrant, the evidence of the 
intercepted phone call where a person was attempting to purchase 
cocaine provided "independent probable cause" for issuing the 
warrant.  Id., ¶30.  The court of appeals then held that because 
the warrant was lawfully acquired, the evidence obtained 
pursuant to that warrant was admissible.  Accordingly, it 
reversed the suppression order.  Carroll then filed a petition 
for review, which this court granted. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶14 On appeal to this court, Carroll argues that the court 
of appeals erred in reversing the trial court's suppression 
order.  He asserts that it was impermissible for Belsha to 
search his cell phone image gallery.  In his view, the circuit 
court was correct in finding that the officers had not arrested 
him, and, therefore, Belsha's warrantless search could not be 
justified as a search incident to arrest.  Moreover, Carroll 
contends that Belsha's answering the incoming call was also 
illegal, because he lacked probable cause to believe that in 
doing so he would obtain evidence of drug possession.  Because 
the evidence from both the image gallery search and the 
intercepted phone call was tainted, Carroll argues, such 
evidence cannot support the issuance of a valid warrant. 
No. 
2007AP1378-CR   
 
10 
 
¶15 The State contends that the phone call that Belsha 
intercepted, if untainted, provides evidence sufficient to 
establish probable cause for issuance of the warrant.  It 
further argues that Belsha's continued possession of the phone 
and his answering the incoming call were permissible regardless 
of whether Carroll was in custody or not.  Thus, it concludes, 
even assuming that Belsha's investigation of the image gallery 
produced tainted evidence, the intercepted phone call provided 
an untainted, independent source of evidence sufficient to 
justify the warrant being issued.5   
¶16 We agree with the State's approach as follows:  First, 
we assess the legality under the Fourth Amendment of each 
warrantless search or seizure that produced the evidence 
outlined in Belsha's affidavit, namely:  (1) Belsha's initial 
seizure of the cell phone; (2) Belsha's continued possession of 
the phone; (3) Belsha's browsing through the image gallery; and 
(4) Belsha's answering the incoming phone call.  Second, based 
on that analysis, we determine whether the evidence obtained 
from those seizures and described in the affidavit is an 
independent source of untainted evidence justifying the issuance 
of the warrant. 
                                                 
5 The State also puts forth an alternative argument that 
Belsha's browsing through the image gallery was legal because it 
occurred while Carroll was under lawful arrest.  Because the 
State's first argument that the intercepted phone call produced 
an untainted independent source is dispositive on the issues 
presented here, we need not reach the merits of that second 
argument. 
No. 
2007AP1378-CR   
 
11 
 
¶17 The question of whether a search comports with the 
Fourth Amendment is a question of constitutional fact.  We 
uphold the circuit court's findings of evidentiary or historical 
facts unless those findings are clearly erroneous.  We determine 
the 
application 
of 
constitutional 
principles 
to 
those 
evidentiary facts independently of the circuit court and the 
court of appeals, but we benefit from those courts' analyses.  
State v. Sanders, 2008 WI 85, ¶25, 311 Wis. 2d 257, 752 
N.W.2d 713. 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. 
Constitutional Permissibility of the Warrantless Searches 
¶18 We begin by briefly revisiting general principles of 
Fourth Amendment law regarding the legality of warrantless 
seizures and searches.  The Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution, protect "the right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures."  U.S. Const. amend. IV; Wis. Const. 
art. I, § 11.  The United States Supreme Court has viewed 
warrantless seizures of personal property such as containers to 
be per se unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.  United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983). 
¶19 Accordingly, the exclusionary rule requires courts to 
suppress evidence obtained through the exploitation of an 
illegal search or seizure.  Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 
471, 488 (1963).  This rule applies not only to primary evidence 
seized during an unlawful search, but also to derivative 
No. 
2007AP1378-CR   
 
12 
 
evidence acquired as a result of the illegal search, unless the 
State shows sufficient attenuation from the original illegality 
to dissipate that taint.  Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 
536-37 (1988). 
¶20 Of course, the exclusionary rule is not absolute.  The 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
has 
identified 
particular 
circumstances when limited intrusions by law enforcement in a 
person's 
personal 
property 
pass 
muster 
under 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment.  For example, law enforcement agents have limited 
authority to hold temporarily a container where they "have 
probable cause to believe that a container holds contraband or 
evidence of a crime, but have not secured a warrant . . . if the 
exigencies of the circumstances demand it or some other 
recognized exception to the warrant requirement is present."  
Place, 462 U.S. at 701. 
¶21 Among 
the 
established exceptions to the warrant 
requirement that the United States Supreme Court in Place 
referenced, two are pertinent here.  Exigent circumstances, such 
as when there is a danger that evidence will be destroyed or 
lost in the time it would take for law enforcement agents to 
obtain a warrant, may justify a warrantless search.  State v. 
Faust, 2004 WI 99, ¶11, 274 Wis. 2d 183, 682 N.W.2d 371.  
Additionally, under the "plain view" doctrine, an object falling 
within the plain view of an officer who rightfully is in a 
position to have that view is subject to valid seizure and may 
be 
introduced 
into 
evidence. 
 
State 
v. 
Edgeberg, 
188 
Wis. 2d 339, 345, 524 N.W.2d 911 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing State 
No. 
2007AP1378-CR   
 
13 
 
v. Bell, 62 Wis. 2d 534, 540, 215 N.W.2d 535 (1974)).  In light 
of those principles, we examine each of the identifiable 
warrantless searches leading to the issuance of the search 
warrant in this case, namely:  (1) Belsha's initial seizure of 
the cell phone; (2) Belsha's continued possession of the cell 
phone; (3) Belsha's browsing through the image gallery; and (4) 
Belsha's answering the incoming phone call. 
1. 
Belsha's Initial Seizure of the Cell Phone 
¶22 We are satisfied that Belsha's initial seizure of the 
cell phone did not violate Carroll's rights under the Fourth 
Amendment.  Although there appears to be little Wisconsin case 
law regarding an officer's ability to demand that a suspect drop 
an object that the officer believes could be a weapon, such a 
command can be likened to a frisk or pat-down.  Cf. In the 
Matter of J.G.J., 388 A.2d 472, 475 (D.C. 1978) (concluding that 
an order to drop a weapon is tantamount to valid frisk).  The 
approach in Wisconsin for determining whether a pat-down is 
valid has been one of reasonableness.  The court of appeals 
explained: 
A frisk or pat-down of a person being questioned 
during an investigatory stop is reasonable if the stop 
itself is reasonable and if the officer has reason to 
believe that the person might be armed and dangerous.  
This limited form of protective search . . . must be 
confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed 
to discover instruments which could be used to assault 
the officer. 
State v. Allen, 226 Wis. 2d 66, 76, 593 N.W.2d 504 (Ct. App. 
1999) (citations omitted). 
No. 
2007AP1378-CR   
 
14 
 
¶23 Here, Carroll led officers on a high-speed chase in a 
car that the officers had been observing in connection with an 
armed robbery investigation, and exited his car quickly while 
holding an unknown object.  Given that behavior, the officers 
would have been justified——based on the objective belief that 
Carroll could have been holding a weapon——in conducting a frisk 
or pat-down, which would have resulted in Belsha's legal 
possession of the cell phone.  Hence, Belsha's order for Carroll 
to drop the object and his subsequent retrieval of it were 
reasonable actions, and accordingly, his initial seizure of the 
phone was justified. 
¶24 After Belsha legally seized the open phone, his 
viewing of the marijuana image also was legitimate because that 
image was in plain view.  Under Wisconsin case law, a 
warrantless seizure is justified under the plain view doctrine 
where the object is in plain view of an officer lawfully in a 
position to see it, the officer's discovery is inadvertent, and 
the seized object, either in itself or in context with facts 
known to the officer at the time of the seizure, supplies 
probable cause to believe that the object is connected to or 
used for criminal activity.  Sanders, 311 Wis. 2d 257, ¶37. 
¶25 Here, Belsha was in legal possession of the phone and 
thus in a lawful position to view the display screen, which, 
according to Belsha's uncontroverted testimony, was open and 
displayed the marijuana image.  Further, Belsha testified that 
based on his experience working in the HIDTA, he recognized the 
object Carroll was smoking in the image as a marijuana blunt.  
No. 
2007AP1378-CR   
 
15 
 
That, taken in context with other facts known to Belsha at the 
time, namely, that individuals involved in drug trafficking 
often personalize their phones with such images, provided 
sufficient probable cause to believe that the phone was an 
instrument of criminal activity and contained evidence linked to 
that activity.  Under the circumstances, Belsha had probable 
cause to seize the cell phone. 
2. 
Belsha's Continued Possession of the Cell Phone 
¶26 After Belsha seized the phone with the marijuana image 
displayed, he continued to maintain possession of the phone 
after he had placed Carroll in the squad car.  We conclude that 
that continued possession was justified, again following the 
United States Supreme Court's reasoning in Place.  The Court in 
Place addressed the ability of law enforcement agents to seize 
and detain a person's luggage based on reasonable suspicion that 
the luggage contained narcotics and under circumstances where 
that owner was not in custody or under arrest.  The Court went 
on to hold that the agents had narrow authority to detain 
temporarily a container in such circumstances though the agents 
in that case exceeded their authority to do so.  However, in 
reaching its conclusion, the Court explained, 
Where law enforcement authorities have probable cause 
to believe that a container holds contraband or 
evidence of a crime, but have not secured a warrant, 
the Court has interpreted the [Fourth] Amendment to 
permit seizure of the property, pending issuance of a 
warrant to examine its contents, if the exigencies of 
the circumstances demand it or some other recognized 
exception to the warrant requirement is present.   
No. 
2007AP1378-CR   
 
16 
 
Place, 462 U.S. at 701.  In other words, law enforcement agents 
are justified in seizing and continuing to hold a container if 
(1) there is probable cause to believe that it contains evidence 
of a crime, and (2) if exigencies of the circumstances demand 
it. 
¶27 As an initial matter, although the "containers" 
discussed in Place were pieces of luggage, it is reasonable to 
analogize the cell phone in this case to the luggage in Place.  
The underlying concern with the agents' detention of the luggage 
in Place was that Place had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the contents of his bags.  So, too, here, the concern is 
protecting a person's reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
contents of his or her cell phone.  Other courts, in assessing 
the validity of a search without a warrant, have likened a 
person's privacy expectations in cell phones and electronic 
devices to that of closed containers in his or her possession.  
See, e.g., United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259-60 (5th 
Cir. 2007) (holding that the defendant had a sufficient privacy 
interest in his cell phone call records to challenge the search 
therein); United States v. Ortiz, 84 F.3d 977, 984 (7th Cir. 
1996) (holding that the owner of a pager has the same reasonable 
expectation of privacy in its data as if it were a closed 
container); United States v. Wurie, 612 F. Supp. 2d 104, 109 (D. 
Mass. 2009) ("It seems indisputable that a person has a 
subjective expectation of privacy in the contents of his or her 
No. 
2007AP1378-CR   
 
17 
 
cell phone.").  Accordingly, in this situation, the analogy to a 
closed container appears to be appropriate.6 
¶28 As to the question of whether Belsha had probable 
cause to believe that the phone contained evidence of illegal 
drug activity, Carroll argues that, having viewed the marijuana 
image, Belsha had probable cause only to believe that Carroll 
had possessed illegal drugs, not to believe that he was a 
trafficker or that the phone contained evidence of trafficking.  
We disagree.  To establish probable cause to search, the 
evidence must indicate a "fair probability" that the particular 
place contains evidence of a crime.  State v. Hughes, 2000 WI 
24, ¶21, 233 Wis. 2d 280, 607 N.W.2d 621 (quoting Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)).  An officer's knowledge, 
training, and experience are germane to the court's assessment 
of probable cause.  Wurie, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 108.  Cf. United 
States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 270-71 (2002) (considering an 
officer's subjective interpretation of facts as part of the 
totality of circumstances in assessing reasonable suspicion, a 
determination 
that 
is 
closely 
akin 
to 
a 
probable 
cause 
assessment).   
¶29 Here, Belsha legally viewed the marijuana image; we 
consider that fact along with his testimony that he knew, based 
on his training and experience, that drug traffickers frequently 
                                                 
6 We note, however, that that analogy is limited to 
circumstances like those presented here and should not be taken 
as a general holding that cell phones are to be treated as 
closed containers in all search contexts, such as, for example, 
a search incident to arrest or an inventory search. 
No. 
2007AP1378-CR   
 
18 
 
personalize their cell phones with images of themselves with 
items acquired through drug activity.  Furthermore, it is those 
personalized cell phones on which drug traffickers commonly make 
many of their transactions.  Carroll did not introduce evidence 
suggesting that Belsha's testimony in that regard was inaccurate 
or not credible, and we see no reason to discount it.  We are 
satisfied, under all of the circumstances here, that that 
information, taken as a whole, gave Belsha probable cause to 
believe that the phone contained evidence of illegal drug 
activity. 
¶30 Two additional points are worth noting.  First, to 
clarify, 
our 
assessment 
goes 
to 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances that, taken as a whole give rise to probable 
cause.  We recognize that cell phones can be common tools used 
not only in illegal activities but also in legal activities.  
Here, Belsha's testimony, taken in context with the plain view 
of the marijuana image and how it appeared on the phone, 
provides sufficient evidence of probable cause. 
¶31 Second, the State argues that the fact that Belsha 
observed Carroll leaving a location that police suspected to 
contain evidence of an armed robbery also adds significant 
weight supporting probable cause in this situation.  We note 
that the record here does not clearly establish a nexus between 
the crimes of armed robbery and drug trafficking.   
¶32 Given that Belsha had probable cause to believe that a 
search of the phone would produce evidence of illegal drug 
activity, his continued possession of the phone while he sought 
No. 
2007AP1378-CR   
 
19 
 
a warrant was permissible.  The same reasons that permitted 
Belsha to seize the phone in the first instance permitted him to 
continue to possess it in the short time after Carroll was 
secured.  Exigent circumstances further justify that continued 
possession.  Had Belsha returned the phone to Carroll and 
released him, Carroll could have deleted incriminating images 
and data, such as phone numbers and calling records stored in 
the phone.  Hence, Belsha's continued possession of the phone 
was permissible. 
3. 
Belsha's Browsing Through the Image Gallery and Answering 
the Incoming Call 
¶33 Next, two things happened as Belsha continued to 
possess the phone legally.  First, he opened and browsed through 
the cell phone's image gallery.  Second, he answered an incoming 
call.  As an initial matter, the image gallery search clearly 
seems to be contrary to the holding in Place because there were 
no exigent circumstances at the time requiring him to review the 
gallery or other data stored in the phone.  That data was not in 
immediate danger of disappearing before Belsha could obtain a 
warrant.  Moreover, the United States Supreme Court in Place 
invoked Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), as support for 
its rule.  Place, 462 U.S. at 701 & n.3.  In Sanders, officers 
with probable cause to believe a suitcase contained contraband 
were justified in seizing that suitcase, but the Fourth 
Amendment precluded their immediate search of the case without a 
warrant.  442 U.S. at 761, 766.  Again, we note that the court 
of appeals assumed that Belsha's browsing through the image 
No. 
2007AP1378-CR   
 
20 
 
gallery on Carroll's phone without a warrant was improper.  We 
need not make the same assumption.  Rather, we are satisfied 
that that search was indeed improper and that the evidence 
obtained from that search at that time was tainted.  In so 
holding, we are adhering to the holding of the United States 
Supreme Court in Place, 462 U.S. at 701, and in Sanders, 442 
U.S. at 761, 766. 
¶34 However, Belsha's answering the incoming call was 
justified.  We again apply the standard from Place, which 
requires that the officer had probable cause to believe that the 
device 
contains 
evidence 
of 
a 
crime 
and 
that 
exigent 
circumstances justify a warrantless search.  462 U.S. at 701.  
Here, as explained above, Belsha had probable cause to believe 
that the cell phone was a tool used in drug trafficking based on 
the plain view of the marijuana image and his knowledge that 
such images are typically found on drug traffickers' phones.  
That evidence shows more than a fair probability that an 
incoming call to such a phone would contain evidence of illegal 
drug activity.  In short, the probable cause requirement in 
Place is satisfied here. 
¶35 Moreover, exigent circumstances permitted Belsha's 
answering the call.  The test for whether exigent circumstances 
are present focuses on whether the officer reasonably believes 
that the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the 
circumstances, threatens the destruction of evidence.  Faust, 
274 Wis. 2d 183, ¶11.  We are not aware of any Wisconsin case 
that expressly addresses whether an officer's interception of an 
No. 
2007AP1378-CR   
 
21 
 
incoming call on a seized cell phone is an exigent circumstance. 
However, several federal cases address whether an officer may, 
based on exigent circumstances, access data or answer incoming 
calls on an electronic device that the officer had legally 
seized.7  Those cases, which we explore in detail herein, provide 
persuasive guidance. 
¶36 In the foundational case, United States v. Ortiz, 
officers seized an electronic pager incident to Ortiz's arrest 
for distribution of heroin.  84 F.3d at 982.  While continuing 
to search Ortiz and his vehicle for evidence, one of the agents 
pushed a button on the pager that revealed the numeric codes 
that the pager previously had received.  The district court 
denied Ortiz's motion to suppress that evidence.  The Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that denial based on the risk 
that the data would be destroyed or lost if agents were required 
to first obtain a warrant:   
Because of the finite nature of a pager's electronic 
memory, incoming pages may destroy currently stored 
telephone numbers in a pager's memory. . . . Thus, it 
is imperative that law enforcement officers have the 
authority 
to 
immediately 
"search" 
or 
retrieve, 
                                                 
7 In those federal cases, the agents had legal possession of 
the electronic devices pursuant to a search incident to arrest.  
We acknowledge that here, we are not basing our holding on 
whether there was a search incident to arrest.  However, those 
cases nonetheless provide persuasive guidance because the fact 
of the valid arrest was relevant only to whether the agent 
legally possessed the electronic device in question.  As to the 
question of whether an agent in legal possession of a device 
could access data contained within it, those courts assessed 
whether exigent circumstances——not the fact of the arrest——
justified that aspect of the search. 
No. 
2007AP1378-CR   
 
22 
 
incident to a valid arrest, information from a pager 
in order to prevent its destruction as evidence. 
Ortiz, 84 F.3d at 984.   
¶37 In subsequent cases, other courts have adopted that 
rationale when evaluating an officer's ability to search a 
seized cell phone incident to arrest, and have permitted law 
enforcement to conduct a warrantless search of a phone's stored 
data, such as records of calls received and made, so long as the 
other requirements of the search incident to arrest exception 
were satisfied.  See, e.g., Finley, 477 F.3d at 259-60 (holding 
that a search of a cell phone's stored text messages and call 
records was permissible); Wurie, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 110 (holding 
that a search of a cell phone was permissible); United States v. 
Deans, 549 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1094 (D. Minn. 2008) (holding that 
officers may search any data contained in a cell phone lawfully 
seized). 
¶38 To 
be 
sure, 
cell 
phones 
and 
pagers 
are 
not 
interchangeable.  Indeed, the court in United States v. Wall, 
2008 WL 5381412, *4 (S.D. Fla. 2008), observed that while 
exigent circumstances could justify a warrantless search of a 
cell phone, 
[t]he differences in technology between pagers and 
cell phones cut to the heart of this issue [of whether 
an officer's reading of stored text messages within a 
cell 
phone 
was 
justified 
based 
on 
exigent 
circumstances].  The technological developments that 
have occurred in the last decade, since Ortiz was 
decided, are significant.  Previously, there was 
legitimate concern that by waiting minutes or even 
seconds to check the numbers stored inside a pager an 
officer ran the risk that another page may come in and 
destroy the oldest number being stored.  This was 
No. 
2007AP1378-CR   
 
23 
 
based on a platform of first-in-first-out storage of 
numbers used for pagers.  Text messages on cell phones 
are not stored in the same manner. . . . [I]f a text 
message is not deleted by the user, the phone will 
store it. 
¶39 In Wall, the court concluded that the government 
failed to demonstrate an exigency justifying the agent's search 
of the defendant's text messages.  There, the government put 
forth no evidence of the danger of the text messages being 
destroyed; to the contrary, it acknowledged that such messages 
generally remain stored in the phone unless a user actively 
deletes them.  Given that, the court concluded that the 
officers' review of the text messages was purely investigatory 
and evidence obtained from that review was therefore tainted. 
¶40 Significantly, at least one court has concluded that 
when a government agent lawfully possesses a phone and there is 
probable cause to believe it is used in illegal drug activity, 
the agent can answer incoming calls if the calls arrive in a 
period when it is impracticable for the agent to obtain a 
warrant first.  See United States v. De La Paz, 43 F. Supp. 2d 
370, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).  In De La Paz, agents had lawfully 
seized a cell phone incident to an arrest.  While the agents 
were processing the defendant's arrest, the defendant's phone 
rang nine times and the agents answered it each time.  The 
defendant unsuccessfully sought to have evidence of those phone 
calls suppressed.  The court concluded that it was reasonable 
under the circumstances for the agents to answer the cell phone 
of a suspected drug dealer in the time between the arrest and 
arraignment, given both the impossibility of timely obtaining a 
No. 
2007AP1378-CR   
 
24 
 
warrant allowing agents to answer incoming calls and the risk of 
losing evidence by leaving those calls unanswered.  As the De La 
Paz 
court 
observed, 
in 
those 
circumstances, 
"the 
Fourth 
Amendment does not require . . . agents to ignore potential 
evidence that might disappear."  Id. at 375-76. 
¶41 The consistent approach taken in these cases is that 
the courts scrutinized the nature of the evidence obtained, 
i.e., numeric codes on a pager, stored text messages, and 
incoming phone calls, and balanced that with an inquiry into 
whether the agent reasonably believed that the situation 
required a search to avoid lost evidence.  Based on that 
assessment, it appears that the courts then reserved the exigent 
circumstances exception for searches directed at the type of 
evidence that is truly in danger of being lost or destroyed if 
not immediately seized.  That approach is consistent with 
Wisconsin case law addressing exigent circumstances.  See Faust, 
274 Wis. 2d 183, ¶12 (stating that the rule for determining 
whether exigent circumstances are present requires an inquiry 
into whether the officer reasonably believed that the delay 
necessary 
to 
obtain 
a 
warrant, 
under 
the 
circumstances, 
threatened the destruction of evidence).   
¶42 Hence, we are satisfied that exigent circumstances 
justified Belsha's answering Carroll's cell phone.  The fleeting 
nature of a phone call is apparent; if it is not picked up, the 
opportunity to gather evidence is likely to be lost, as there is 
no guarantee——or likelihood——that the caller would leave a voice 
mail or otherwise preserve the evidence.  Given these narrow 
No. 
2007AP1378-CR   
 
25 
 
circumstances, Belsha had a reasonable belief that he was in 
danger of losing potential evidence if he ignored the call.  
Thus, the evidence obtained as a result of answering that phone 
call was untainted. 
B. 
Independent Source Doctrine 
¶43 Having determined that the warrantless seizure and 
subsequent viewing of the image gallery on Carroll's phone 
produced tainted evidence, we turn our attention to the question 
of whether the resulting warrant is nonetheless valid.  We 
conclude, for the reasons set forth below, that the phone call 
Belsha answered is an untainted independent source of evidence 
to support the search warrant, that the untainted evidence, 
which is combined, as noted previously, with the officer's 
knowledge of drug traffickers and Carroll's juvenile record, 
provides sufficient probable cause to issue the warrant, and 
that as a result, the warrant is valid. 
¶44 The independent source doctrine derives from the 
principle 
that 
"'[w]hen 
the 
challenged 
evidence 
has 
an 
independent source, exclusion of such evidence would put the 
police in a worse position than they would have been in absent 
any error or violation.'"  Murray, 487 U.S. at 537 (quoting Nix 
v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984)).  As applied to 
circumstances where an application for a warrant contains both 
tainted and untainted evidence, the issued warrant is valid if 
the untainted evidence is sufficient to support a finding of 
probable cause to issue the warrant.  See id. at 542; State v. 
O'Brien, 70 Wis. 2d 414, 424, 234 N.W.2d 362 (1975).  Indeed, 
No. 
2007AP1378-CR   
 
26 
 
"[s]o long as a later, lawful seizure is genuinely independent 
of an earlier, tainted one . . . there is no reason why the 
independent source doctrine should not apply."  Murray, 487 U.S. 
at 542.  Thus, our next task is to determine whether the 
untainted evidence——i.e., evidence Belsha obtained from the 
incoming phone call——is "genuinely independent" of the earlier 
tainted evidence——here, Belsha's viewing of the image gallery. 
¶45 For courts determining whether untainted evidence 
provides an independent source, the United States Supreme Court 
in Murray set forth a standard requiring the state to bear the 
burden of "convincing a trial court that no information gained 
from the illegal entry affected either the law enforcement 
officers' decision to seek a warrant or the magistrate's 
decision to grant it."  487 U.S. at 540.  The court of appeals 
has articulated the test to be a two-pronged approach:  First, 
the court determines whether, absent the illegal entry, the 
officer would have sought the search warrant.  Second, it asks 
if information illegally acquired influenced the magistrate's 
decision to authorize the warrant.  State v. Lange, 158 
Wis. 2d 609, 626, 463 N.W.2d 390 (Ct. App. 1990).   
¶46 Moreover, the court of appeals in State v. Herrmann, 
2000 WI App 38, 233 Wis. 2d 135, 608 N.W.2d 406, applied the 
independent source doctrine in a similar situation involving a 
search warrant based on both tainted and untainted evidence.  
Although the court in Herrmann did not invoke Murray or Lange in 
its analysis, we are satisfied that the analysis in Herrmann is 
consistent with the principles set forth in those cases. 
No. 
2007AP1378-CR   
 
27 
 
¶47 In Herrmann, officers were executing a valid search 
warrant on an apartment in a multi-unit building when they found 
a door leading to a storage room of a separate apartment 
although that fact was not immediately apparent.  The officers 
discovered marijuana plants in the storage room's closet before 
moving on to other rooms.  They then realized that they were in 
a second apartment not covered by the warrant, but they 
nevertheless improperly obtained other evidence of illegal drug 
activity that they used, along with the evidence of the plants 
in the storage room closet, to apply for a warrant to search the 
second apartment.  Id., ¶7. 
¶48 The court of appeals concluded that the untainted 
evidence of the plants in the storage room closet was a source 
independent from the tainted evidence police later acquired.  It 
further concluded that the discovery of the plants in the 
storage room closet alone was sufficient to establish probable 
cause that the apartment contained other related contraband.  
Id., ¶23.  Thus, it upheld the search warrant and reversed the 
circuit court's order suppressing the evidence obtained pursuant 
to the warrant. 
¶49 With that case in mind, we apply the circumstances 
here to the first inquiry set forth in Murray:  whether 
information obtained from the illegal search affected the law 
enforcement officers' decision to seek a warrant.  Like the 
evidence obtained from the storage closet in Herrmann, the 
untainted evidence from the incoming phone call here was 
genuinely independent of the tainted viewing of the image 
No. 
2007AP1378-CR   
 
28 
 
gallery.  As explained above, Belsha's answering the incoming 
call was justified:  He legally possessed the phone, he had 
viewed the marijuana image that was in plain view, his training 
and experience informed him that drug traffickers typically 
employ such phones in their illegal activities, and, based on 
those circumstances, he was not required to ignore the incoming 
call and risk losing evidence of illegal activity.  The caller 
then provided Belsha with evidence that Carroll was a drug 
dealer by placing an order.  In short, Belsha did not need the 
tainted evidence he had obtained from the image gallery to 
justify answering the call or applying for a search warrant.  
Just as the officers' missteps in Herrmann did not operate to 
place them in a worse position after having legally discovered 
the marijuana plants in the storage room closet, Belsha's 
improper viewing of the image gallery should not operate to 
penalize the police where they legally obtained the evidence 
from the phone call.  That conclusion is wholly consistent with 
the independent source doctrine's foundational policy "that, 
while the government should not profit from its illegal 
activity, neither should it be placed in a worse position than 
it otherwise would have occupied."  Murray, 487 U.S. at 542. 
¶50 It is worth noting that in Lange, the court of appeals 
remanded based on the first prong of the test, for an explicit 
finding as to whether the law enforcement agents would have 
sought the warrant absent the tainted evidence.  Lange, 158 
Wis. 2d at 627-28; see also Murray, 487 U.S. at 543.  We 
acknowledge that here, the circuit court did not make the 
No. 
2007AP1378-CR   
 
29 
 
explicit findings that the court of appeals had asked the 
circuit court to consider making on remand in Lange.  However, 
we are satisfied that the circuit court's failure to do so in 
this case does not require remand.  In Murray, 487 U.S. at 543, 
the United States Supreme Court indicated that, absent an 
explicit finding, a clear inference could compel the conclusion 
that law enforcement agents would have sought a warrant had they 
not obtained tainted evidence.   
¶51 We are satisfied, based on our analysis above, that 
the circumstances here permit such an inference to be drawn from 
which we can conclude that Belsha, despite the improper viewing 
of the image gallery, would have sought the warrant.  First, we 
can reasonably infer that Belsha would have sought the warrant 
based on his plain view of the marijuana image, combined with 
his knowledge acquired from his training and experience that 
drug traffickers commonly use such images to personalize their 
cell phones.  Second, we can reasonably infer that Belsha would 
have sought the warrant based on the information that he 
intercepted when he answered the phone call, coupled with his 
knowledge of Carroll's juvenile record.  In short, these 
circumstances compel us to conclude that a clear inference can 
reasonably be determined to exist here that Belsha would have 
No. 
2007AP1378-CR   
 
30 
 
sought the warrant even if he had not browsed through the image 
gallery.8 
¶52 We also conclude that the second part of the Murray 
analysis, 
that 
the 
illegal 
evidence 
did 
not 
affect 
the 
magistrate's decision to grant the warrant, is satisfied 
inasmuch as the untainted evidence provides sufficient probable 
cause to issue a warrant.  In reviewing whether probable cause 
supports the issuance of the search warrant, the reviewing court 
applies a totality of the circumstances standard and asks 
whether 
the 
facts 
set 
forth 
in 
the 
affidavit 
establish 
sufficient probable cause to believe that police are likely to 
find items related to the commission of a crime in the place 
designated to be searched.  State v. Kerr, 181 Wis. 2d 372, 378, 
511 N.W.2d 586 (1994) (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39).  In 
the context of a search warrant, "probable cause is not a 
technical or legalistic concept, but rather, is a flexible, 
common-sense 
measure 
of 
the 
plausibility 
of 
particular 
conclusions about human behavior."  Id. at 379.   
¶53 Here, Belsha included the following information in his 
affidavit:  (1) drug traffickers frequently use cell phones to 
communicate and facilitate most of their illegal activities; (2) 
                                                 
8 We respectfully disagree with the dissent's argument that 
neither Murray nor the record supports this inference.  In our 
view, the facts here support the clear inference that Murray 
demands, and that clear inference is consistent with that case's 
language and underlying rationale.  See Murray, 487 U.S. at 542 
(observing tension between forbidding law enforcement from 
benefitting from illegal behavior and not placing it in a worse 
position than it otherwise would have occupied). 
No. 
2007AP1378-CR   
 
31 
 
drug traffickers often personalize their phones with images of 
themselves with drugs and paraphernalia; (3) Carroll had been 
adjudicated delinquent as a juvenile for a felony, possession 
with intent to deliver cocaine; (4) the cell phone gallery 
contained images of Carroll with a firearm; (5) Belsha pretended 
to be Carroll when he answered an incoming call, during which 
the caller ordered drugs; and (6) Belsha saw photos of Carroll 
holding a semiautomatic gun, along with photos of Carroll "with 
what appears to be a quantity of marijuana, photos of what 
appears to be cocaine, as well as photos of drugs, money, and a 
revolver." 
¶54 As stated above, we are satisfied that the evidence 
that Belsha viewed while scrolling through the image gallery was 
tainted and cannot form the basis for the warrant.  Thus, of the 
above 
facts 
in 
the 
affidavit, 
the 
following 
are 
proper 
considerations in assessing whether to authorize the warrant: 
the first and second, setting forth Belsha's knowledge of the 
typical ways in which drug dealers personalize and use their 
cell phones, such as displaying an image like the marijuana 
image that Belsha saw in plain view;9 the third, explaining that 
Carroll had been adjudicated delinquent for a felony, possession 
of cocaine with intent to deliver; and the fifth, detailing the 
incoming phone call and the order for drugs. 
                                                 
9 Belsha did not specifically mention the marijuana image 
that he saw in plain view in the warrant affidavit.  However, 
that fact speaks to Belsha's understanding of drug trafficker 
practices and how that understanding informed his actions. 
No. 
2007AP1378-CR   
 
32 
 
¶55 We conclude that that evidence, like the untainted 
storage closet evidence observed in Herrmann, is sufficient to 
find probable cause to authorize the warrant.  The incoming call 
was an untainted source of evidence independent of the tainted 
evidence obtained from browsing through the cell phone image 
gallery.  Based on the information provided in that incoming 
call, taken in context with the other untainted evidence that in 
Belsha's experience Carroll's phone bore the indicia of a drug 
trafficker, there was probable cause to believe that the phone 
would contain evidence pertaining to the illegal drug trade.  
Accord O'Brien, 70 Wis. 2d at 424-25 (concluding that mention of 
tainted evidence in an affidavit "added nothing that was 
required for the issuance of the search warrant").  Hence, the 
warrant was valid; as a result, the evidence obtained pursuant 
to 
that 
warrant, 
including 
the 
firearm 
image 
and 
its 
accompanying 
metadata 
indicating 
when 
it 
was 
taken, 
is 
admissible, and that evidence should not have been suppressed by 
the circuit court.  The court of appeals did not err in 
concluding as much. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
¶56 We hold that neither the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, nor Article I, Section 11 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution, requires that the evidence be suppressed 
under the circumstances presented here.  In so holding, we are 
satisfied that the officer was justified in seizing Carroll's 
cell phone and in viewing the marijuana image, which was in 
plain view.  Further, although the officer was also justified in 
No. 
2007AP1378-CR   
 
33 
 
continuing to possess the phone, we are satisfied that the 
officer was not justified in opening and browsing through the 
cell phone image gallery at the time that he took such action.  
As such, the evidence that the officer gleaned from that conduct 
was tainted and could not form the basis for a search warrant.  
However, based on exigent circumstances, the officer was 
justified in answering the incoming call to Carroll's phone, 
during which the caller ordered illegal drugs.  That evidence 
was an untainted independent source that formed a valid basis 
for the search warrant, when combined with the officer's 
knowledge of drug traffickers and Carroll's juvenile record, 
along with the plain view of the image of the marijuana blunt.  
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No.  2007AP1378-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶57 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  I agree 
with much of the majority's analysis but I believe the law 
requires that the cause be remanded to the circuit court for a 
factual determination of (1) whether any information gained from 
the phone call or the illegal search of the image gallery 
affected the law enforcement officers' decision to seek a 
warrant; and (2) whether any information gained from the phone 
call or the illegal search of the image gallery affected the 
magistrate's decision to grant the application. 
¶58 I agree with the majority opinion that both Carroll 
and his phone were lawfully seized by Detective Belsha.  
Majority op., ¶22. 
¶59 I agree with the majority opinion that Detective 
Belsha's viewing of the "marijuana image" was lawful because the 
image was in "plain view."  Majority op., ¶¶3, 24. 
¶60 I agree with the majority opinion that the Detective's 
browsing through the cell phone "image gallery" violated the 
Fourth Amendment.  Majority op., ¶¶3, 33. 
¶61 Even if I agreed with the majority both that the 
"marijuana image" provided probable cause to apply for a warrant 
to search the contents of the cell phone1 and that exigent 
                                                 
1 There are significant problems with the majority opinion's 
evaluation of probable cause on this basis.   
No.  2007AP1378-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
circumstances2 existed that justified the Detective's answering 
the cell phone (without a warrant)3 to get information about drug 
                                                                                                                                                             
Detective Belsha did not even mention the "marijuana image" 
in his application for a search warrant.  This "marijuana image" 
showed only Carroll smoking a "blunt," an ordinary cigar 
hollowed out and filled with marijuana.  If his training and 
experience had led him to conclude that the marijuana image by 
itself gave probable cause to believe that Carroll was involved 
in drug trafficking and that the cellular phone was an 
instrument of the drug trade, then his failure to mention this 
photo in the warrant affidavit is inexplicable.  He also ignored 
several incoming calls while browsing the image gallery.   
These facts cannot be reconciled with the theory that the 
Detective's "training and experience" by themselves supported an 
inference drawn from the "marijuana photo" that the phone 
itself, or any incoming call, would contain evidence of drug 
trafficking.  Rather, the obvious implication is that the 
Detective thought the initial photo relatively inconsequential, 
and the decision to answer the later call was motivated by the 
photos he had already viewed in the image gallery. 
2 "Exigent circumstances" refers "in legal jargon, because 
our profession disdains plain speech," United States v. Collins, 
510 F.3d 697 (7th Cir. 2007), simply to one of several well-
established categories of emergency situations in which it would 
be impracticable for police to obtain a warrant, and so none is 
required.  See, e.g., State v. Richter, 2000 WI 58, ¶29, 235 
Wis. 2d 524, 612 N.W.2d 29 ("There are four well-recognized 
categories of exigent circumstances that have been held to 
authorize a law enforcement officer's warrantless entry into a 
home.").  Here the espoused "exigency" is the possible loss of 
evidence.  Majority op., ¶21. 
Notably, 
Detective 
Belsha 
himself 
never 
espoused 
an 
"exigent 
circumstances" rationale for answering the call.  
Rather, he believed that he was proceeding pursuant to a valid 
search "incident to arrest," a conclusion that the circuit court 
and the majority opinion now set aside. 
No.  2007AP1378-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
trafficking,4 the information relating to drug trafficking from 
the call still cannot be the basis for the search warrant 
because on this record we cannot determine whether answering the 
phone 
call, 
and 
the 
information 
obtained 
from 
it, 
were 
"genuinely independent" from the unlawful warrantless search of 
the image gallery.5   
                                                                                                                                                             
3 The theory of the majority's "exigent circumstances" 
rationale——that if the call went unanswered, important evidence 
would be lost——is at odds with the Detective's decision to 
ignore previous incoming calls, all equally likely to contain 
incriminating evidence.  See majority op., ¶40 (discussing 
United States v. De La Paz, 43 F. Supp. 2d 370, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 
1999) (exigent circumstances rationale justified where agents 
answered every one of nine incoming calls)).  The far more 
likely explanation, which it is the State's burden to disprove, 
is that Detective Belsha did not have sufficient reason to 
believe the phone contained evidence of drug trafficking until 
after he began to view the image gallery. 
4 Carroll argues that the "marijuana image"——that is, the 
image of Carroll smoking a "blunt"——at most raises a reasonable 
suspicion that he was smoking marijuana, not probable cause to 
believe that he was selling drugs. 
The Detective also stated in his affidavit, as part of the 
litany of his experience, that drug dealers personalize their 
cell phones with photos.  It is not clear, however, from the 
Detective's affidavit that the "marijuana image" constituted the 
relevant "personalizing" of the phone, when the officer made no 
reference to this image.  It is at least as likely that it was 
the "image gallery," whose contents the Detective detailed, that 
constituted the relevant "personalizing" of the phone. 
5 "The exclusionary rule has traditionally barred from trial 
physical, tangible materials obtained either during or as a 
direct result of an unlawful invasion."  Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963). 
The "independent source" and "attenuation" doctrines may 
avoid the suppression of evidence even though a Fourth Amendment 
violation has taken place. 
The Supreme Court has recognized two exclusionary rule 
exceptions that are based upon the circumstances 
No.  2007AP1378-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶62 The 
sequence 
in 
which 
law 
enforcement 
obtained 
evidence and information is important in the present case.  On 
December 6, law enforcement first lawfully obtained Carroll's 
cell phone with the "marijuana image" in plain view.  Lawful 
search and seizure!  The Detective then almost immediately 
viewed the "image gallery" photos on the cell phone.  Majority 
op., ¶8.  Unlawful search!  The question then is what is the 
time sequence of viewing the "image gallery" and the Detective's 
answering the phone, after not answering several other calls.  
See majority op., ¶¶8, 9, 33. 
¶63 Except for the Detective's affidavit in support of the 
search warrant, nothing in the circuit court record refers to 
the Detective's answering the cell phone.  Although the majority 
now relies on this phone call evidence, at the circuit court it 
                                                                                                                                                             
surrounding the unconstitutional discovery of the 
evidence.  The "independent source" exception allows 
the government to use illegally obtained evidence if 
the government also discovered the evidence by means 
independent of 
its misconduct.  The attenuation 
exception, in contrast, permits the use of evidence 
discovered through the government's misconduct if the 
connection between the misconduct and the discovery of 
the evidence is sufficiently weak.   
Brent D. Stratton, The Attenuation Exception to the Exclusionary 
Rule: A Study in Attenuated Principle and Dissipated Logic, 75 
J. Crim. L. & Criminology 139, 140-41 (1984). 
The doctrine of "attenuation" applies a totality of the 
circumstances analysis but has evolved to apply a three-factor 
test: (1) the temporal proximity between the Fourth Amendment 
violation and the subsequent basis for acquiring the evidence; 
(2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the 
purpose and flagrancy of any official misconduct.  See Brown v. 
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975). 
No.  2007AP1378-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
simply was not discussed.  Therefore the record does not 
demonstrate precisely when the Detective answered the call.  
What is clear from the record, however, is that the Detective 
examined the "image gallery" in the squad car almost immediately 
after he recovered the phone and placed Carroll in the squad 
car.  Majority op., ¶8.  The time of the phone call is unknown 
but appears to be after the Detective viewed the "image 
gallery."  According to the State's brief, "the cell phone call 
necessarily came in within four hours after the detective had 
seized the cell phone." 
¶64 Two days later, the Detective sought a warrant to 
obtain the "image galley" photos, the very same evidence he had 
already viewed unlawfully.6  The affidavit in support of the 
application for a search warrant did not even mention the 
critical evidence on which the majority relies, namely the 
"marijuana image," which law enforcement had lawfully obtained.  
The affidavit relied on the information law enforcement obtained 
from the phone call, on the unlawful examination of the "image 
gallery," on Carroll's juvenile record and 2004 criminal 
complaint, 
and 
on 
the 
Detective's 
experience 
with 
drug 
trafficking. 
¶65 The affidavit for the warrant to search the cell phone 
includes a section titled "Basis for the Request for the Search 
                                                 
6 Part of the information obtained pursuant to the warrant 
was the "metadata" embedded in the digital photo files that 
indicates the time and date when the photos were taken.  There 
is no indication that the Detective obtained this more detailed 
information prior to receiving the search warrant. 
No.  2007AP1378-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
Warrant," which details that as a result of Detective Belsha's 
training, experience, and discussions with other experienced law 
enforcement officers, he is familiar with the methods of 
distribution and communication devises used by drug traffickers 
(listed in ¶¶1(b) through 1(k)), including "(i) Drug traffickers 
frequently 
take, 
or 
cause 
to 
be 
taken, 
photographs 
of 
themselves, their associates in the drug trade, property 
acquired from the distribution of drugs and photographs are 
often kept in their residences and/or places of business; and 
personalize cellular telephones with such information" (emphasis 
added).  This statement in the affidavit is the only reference 
to personalizing cell phones. 
¶66 The affidavit then lists (in ¶¶3(a) through 3(e)) 
matters relating specifically to Carroll to justify the issuance 
of a search  warrant:  3(a) a 2004 criminal complaint in which 
Carroll was observed to be involved in drug trafficking; 3(b) 
the details of the traffic stop; 3(c) a search of the cell phone 
that revealed images of Carroll with a firearm; 3(d) a juvenile 
court record showing that Carroll was adjudicated delinquent of 
a felony offense, possession with intent to deliver cocaine; and 
3(e) an incoming call on Carroll's cell phone from someone 
seeking to buy drugs and an examination of the phone "incident 
to Carroll's arrest" that revealed numerous photographs of 
Carroll with a firearm and "photos of Carroll with what appears 
to be a quantity of marijuana, photos of what appears to be 
cocaine, as well as a photo of drugs, money, and a revolver." 
No.  2007AP1378-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
¶67 To determine whether the warrant issued on this basis 
was "genuinely independent" of the earlier tainted "image 
gallery" evidence, I apply the teachings of Murray v. United 
States, 
487 
U.S. 
533 
(1988), 
and 
State 
v. 
Lange, 
158 
Wis. 2d 609, 626, 463 N.W.2d 390 (Ct. App. 1990).7  According to 
Murray, the State has the burden of "convincing a trial court 
that no information gained from the illegal entry affected 
either the law enforcement officers' decision to seek a warrant 
or the magistrate's decision to grant it."  Murray, 487 U.S. at 
540, quoted at majority op., ¶45.  See also Lange, 158 
Wis. 2d at 626.8 
                                                 
7 For 
an 
excellent discussion of the numerous cases 
involving a search as the fruit of a prior illegal search, 
including the Murray case, 487 U.S. 533 (1988), see 6 Wayne R. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment 
§ 11.4(f) (4th ed. 2004). 
The 
majority 
opinion applies an "independent source" 
analysis, not an attenuation analysis.  Neither the State nor 
the majority opinion has attempted to argue that the alternative 
basis for admitting the evidence derived from interception of 
the call to the cell phone is "attenuated" from the unlawful 
search of the image gallery or that its taint has been 
"dissipated."  If such analysis were made, it would plainly 
fail: the call was intercepted at the same time that the illegal 
search was taking place, in immediate connection with the images 
being viewed, and without an intervening event.  The connection 
between the two occurrences was direct.  See Brown v. Illinois, 
422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975), discussed supra n.5. 
8 In State v. Lange, 158 Wis. 2d 609, 463 N.W.2d 390 (Ct. 
App. 1990), the warrant application relied on aerial and open 
field observations acquired legally before investigators made an 
illegal entry into defendant's marijuana field.  Only the last 
piece of evidence on which the warrant relied was impermissible, 
yet the court of appeals, following Murray, remanded the cause 
for the factual determination of whether the warrant application 
would have been made even without that last piece of the 
evidence. 
No.  2007AP1378-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
¶68 Adhering to Murray and Lange,9 I would remand the cause 
to the circuit court for a factual determination (1) whether any 
information gained from the phone call or the illegal search of 
the image gallery affected the law enforcement officers' 
decision to seek a warrant; and (2) whether any information 
gained from the phone call or the illegal search of the image 
gallery 
affected 
the 
magistrate's 
decision 
to 
grant 
the 
application.  See majority op., ¶45.  The burden of proving that 
the evidence is lawfully obtained is on the state.  Majority 
op., ¶19. 
¶69 I reach this conclusion first by examining the facts 
and holding of Murray.  In Murray, the federal agents had 
investigated the criminal activity and had obtained sufficient 
evidence to show probable cause that the accused were engaged in 
an extensive drug trafficking conspiracy.  None of this evidence 
violated the Fourth Amendment.  Only this untainted evidence was 
presented on the application for a search warrant. 
¶70 The problem in Murray was that after legally obtaining 
this evidence, the federal agents illegally entered a warehouse 
without a warrant and observed numerous bales of marijuana 
inside.  Murray, 487 U.S. at 536.  The agents exited the 
warehouse without disturbing the evidence.  Then the agents 
applied for a warrant. 
                                                 
9 State v. Herrmann, 2000 WI App 38, 233 Wis. 2d 135, 608 
N.W.2d 406, on which the majority relies, is not, in my opinion, 
relevant to this case.  As the majority acknowledges, Herrmann 
did not apply the Murray framework on which the majority opinion 
depends. 
No.  2007AP1378-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
¶71 In the warrant application for a search of the 
warehouse in Murray, the federal agents made no mention 
whatsoever of the illegal search or of the observations made 
inside the warehouse.  The search warrant was issued only on the 
basis of lawfully obtained evidence obtained prior to the 
illegal entry.  Murray, 487 U.S. at 535-36.  The district court 
denied the defendants' suppression motion and the Court of 
Appeals affirmed.  Murray, 487 U.S. at 536. 
¶72 The Murray Supreme Court10 reversed and remanded to the 
district court.  Although the federal court of appeals had 
observed that "this is as clear a case as can be imagined where 
the [evidence illegally observed] . . . was totally irrelevant" 
to the issuance of the warrant, 487 U.S. at 543, the Supreme 
Court was not convinced that the information in the warrant was 
genuinely independent of the illegal search of the warehouse.  
The Supreme Court was concerned that the agents' decision to 
seek the warrant was prompted by what they had seen during the 
unlawful entry into the warehouse.  The Supreme Court also was 
concerned that if the information obtained during that unlawful 
entry had been presented to the magistrate, the unlawfully 
obtained information might have affected his decision to issue 
the warrant.  Murray, 487 U.S. at 542. 
¶73 The Supreme Court remanded the cause to the district 
court because the district court had "not . . . explicitly 
                                                 
10 Murray was decided 4-3, with Justices Brennan and Kennedy 
not participating.  487 U.S. at 544. 
No.  2007AP1378-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
[found] that the agents would have sought a warrant if they had 
not earlier entered the warehouse."11 
¶74 In contrast to the remand for explicit factual 
findings required both in Murray and in Lange, here the majority 
opinion finds a "clear inference" that Detective Belsha "would 
have sought" the warrant, even without the tainted evidence.  
Majority op., ¶51.  The inference seems to be based on the 
court's post hoc legal rationalization that because Detective 
Belsha "could have" been granted a warrant on the basis of 
untainted evidence, he surely would have sought a warrant, which 
surely would have been granted.  The inference is unsupported by 
law or by the record. 
¶75 As the Wisconsin court of appeals observed in Lange, 
158 Wis. 2d at 627, "we do not make factual findings."  Murray 
simply does not contemplate that, in the absence of any relevant 
fact-finding by a trial court, an appellate court can reach its 
own "inference" about whether the law enforcement officers 
sought the warrant on the basis of evidence that is genuinely 
independent of the unlawfully obtained evidence.  
¶76 Justice Scalia's opinion in Murray demands a record 
from which the inference is "clear enough to justify the 
conclusion that the District Court's findings amounted to a 
determination of independent source."12  And the facts in Murray 
                                                 
11 Murray, 487 U.S. at 543. 
12 Id.  The only instance in the Murray opinion in which 
Justice Scalia discussed an inference is as follows: 
To be sure, the District Court did determine that the 
purpose of the warrantless entry was in part "to guard 
No.  2007AP1378-CR.ssa 
 
11 
 
provided a much stronger justification for an inference of 
"genuine independence" than in the present case.   
¶77 In Murray, the only evidence set forth in the 
application for the warrant was evidence lawfully obtained 
before the agents unlawfully obtained additional evidence that 
was then omitted from the warrant application.  In Murray, the 
district court and court of appeals refused to suppress the 
evidence.  In contrast, in the present case the circuit court 
suppressed the evidence.  If any inference could be drawn from 
the circuit court's record in the present case, it must be that 
the evidence from the phone call was tainted. 
¶78 The record in this case falls short of providing the 
bases for determining (1) whether any information gained from 
the phone call or the illegal search of the image gallery 
affected the law enforcement officers' decision to seek a 
warrant; and (2) whether any information gained from the phone 
call or the illegal search of the image gallery affected the 
magistrate's decision to grant the application.  What is plainly 
required, and not present in this record, is for the State to 
establish as a matter of fact——not as a matter of speculation——
that the unlawfully obtained "image gallery" evidence affected 
                                                                                                                                                             
against 
the 
destruction 
of 
possibly 
critical 
evidence," and one could perhaps infer from this that 
the agents who made the entry already planned to 
obtain that "critical evidence" through a warrant-
authorized search.  That inference is not, however, 
clear enough to justify the conclusion that the 
District Court's findings amounted to a determination 
of independent source.   
Murray, 487 U.S. at 543. 
No.  2007AP1378-CR.ssa 
 
12 
 
neither "the decision to seek the warrant," nor the "decision to 
issue the warrant."  Murray, 487 U.S. at 542. 
 
¶79 The majority opinion reaches a conclusion of law——
whether the affidavit stripped of the unlawful "gallery images" 
is genuinely independent of the unlawfully obtained evidence——by 
impermissibly making a factual inference about the Detective's 
decision to seek the warrant and the magistrate's decision to 
issue it. 
¶80 The majority opinion's logic permits an officer who 
has already obtained sufficient evidence for a search warrant to 
proceed nevertheless without one, confirming that the suspected 
evidence actually exists and thus avoiding the need to apply for 
a warrant until the suspicions have already been confirmed.  In 
my opinion, the majority ignores the underlying deterrence 
rationale of the exclusionary rule.  The exclusionary rule "is 
calculated to prevent, not to repair.  Its purpose is to deter——
to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only 
effectively 
available 
way——by 
removing 
the 
incentive 
to 
disregard it."  Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 
(1960).  This court should not support a "'search first, warrant 
later' mentality,"13 and should not fabricate a "post hoc 
                                                 
13 Murray, 487 U.S. at 540 n.2. 
No.  2007AP1378-CR.ssa 
 
13 
 
justification for using information that had already been 
illegally obtained."14 
                                                 
14 United States v. Taheri, 648 F.2d 598, 600 (9th Cir. 
1981).  Where police first impermissibly opened a package and 
seized drugs to perform a chemical drug test, then used a drug-
sniffing dog to alert on the package and afterwards sought a 
warrant only on the basis of the dog's alert, the court reasoned 
that  
[t]he government's position cannot be reconciled with 
the policy behind the exclusionary rule: the effective 
deterrence 
of 
unlawful 
searches 
and 
seizures. . . . [Such argument would be] no more than 
a post hoc justification for using information that 
had already been illegally obtained.  To permit 
evidence to be admitted under these circumstances 
would encourage police officers to ignore the dictates 
of 
the 
fourth 
amendment 
in 
conducting 
initial 
investigations. . . . [M]echanical application of the 
traditional Wong Sun "independent source" analysis 
where a search warrant is subsequently commissioned 
albeit supported by an affidavit that relies upon 
No.  2007AP1378-CR.ssa 
 
14 
 
¶81 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
independent evidence, would allow police officers to 
treat the warrant requirement as merely an ex post 
facto formality.   
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
No.  2007AP1378-CR.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶82 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).  The issue in 
this case is whether a cell phone photo of the defendant holding 
a semi-automatic weapon, and other cell phone photos depicting 
firearms, should be suppressed as evidence.  There is no dispute 
that the defendant had been adjudicated delinquent as a juvenile 
for a drug-related felony.  There is also no dispute that the 
defendant unlawfully possessed a firearm after his felony 
conviction.  The question here is whether law enforcement 
obtained evidence of this crime in conformity with the Fourth 
Amendment.  Because I have serious reservations about police 
procedure in obtaining the pivotal evidence, I respectfully 
dissent. 
I 
¶83 The facts are as follows.  On Wednesday, December 6, 
2006, a Milwaukee police detective and an FBI special agent were 
conducting surveillance of a house in the area of 21st and West 
Brown Streets in the City of Milwaukee.  It was approximately 8 
p.m.  The law enforcement officers were investigating an armed 
robbery and, in that connection, they were monitoring a vehicle 
near the house.  The suspect vehicle was a white Ford Escort.  
Although the house in question may have been the house occupied 
by the defendant's aunt, there is no evidence in the record that 
either the defendant or the defendant's aunt has ever been 
charged in connection with a robbery or with the receipt of 
stolen property from a robbery. 
¶84 The white Ford Escort "left the location" of 21st and 
Brown Streets, driving south on 21st to Vine Street, then west 
No.  2007AP1378-CR.dtp 
 
2 
 
on Vine to 24th Street, then south on 24th to Lisbon Avenue, 
then west on Lisbon to 27th Street, where it turned into a gas 
station on the northeast corner of 27th and Lisbon. 
¶85 Detective 
John 
Belsha 
of 
the 
Milwaukee 
Police 
Department testified that the Ford Escort drove slowly by his 
vehicle on 21st Street, then quickly speeded up.  The officers 
gave chase.  The Ford consistently exceeded the speed limit, 
traveling as fast as 60 miles per hour on Lisbon Avenue, with 
the officers in hot pursuit.  The record does not indicate 
whether the officers were in a marked squad car or flashed their 
overhead lights as they pursued the defendant's car. 
¶86 At the gas station, the defendant "exited the driver's 
seat very quickly . . . .  He had something in his hand," so 
that Detective Belsha drew his service weapon and ordered the 
defendant "to drop what was in his hand and get down on the 
ground." 
¶87 The defendant dropped the object, which turned out to 
be a U.S. Cellular Audiovox cell phone.  The cell phone was a 
"flip phone with a camera on the front.  It [had] a clock on it, 
a little display with a clock on it." 
¶88 Detective 
Belsha 
later 
testified 
that 
when 
the 
defendant dropped the phone, it was either open or flipped open 
when it hit the ground.  The detective, who did not know 
defendant Carroll, handcuffed him, briefly examined his cell 
phone, then asked him to identify himself.  The defendant gave 
his name but did not have identification with him.  After the 
defendant gave his name, the officers ran "a routine wanted 
No.  2007AP1378-CR.dtp 
 
3 
 
check" on him and "it came up with a suspended status for 
driver's license." 
¶89 When Detective Belsha picked up the cell phone, he 
noticed on the display screen a picture of the defendant 
"smoking what's commonly referred to as a blunt, a marijuana 
cigarette." 
¶90 The defendant was taken into custody and placed in the 
back of the police vehicle.  Detective Belsha sat in the front 
seat of the vehicle and activated a photo gallery in the phone.  
At that point he observed pictures of illegal drugs, a large 
amount of currency, and firearms, including a picture of the 
defendant holding a semi-automatic weapon.  He also encountered 
a picture of the defendant holding what appeared to be a gallon 
size baggie of marijuana in his teeth. 
¶91 While Detective Belsha was in his vehicle, the 
defendant's cell phone rang more than once.  On one occasion, 
the detective answered the phone and heard what he interpreted 
as a request to buy cocaine.  The caller asked for "4 of those 
things; 4 and a split." 
II 
¶92 A suppression hearing on the firearm photos was held 
in two sessions, on March 9 and March 23, 2007, before Milwaukee 
County Circuit Judge Charles F. Kahn, Jr.  At the second 
session, Judge Kahn examined the defendant's cell phone, which 
had been retrieved from the police department property room, and 
he described the phone for the record.  He then stated the issue 
as whether Detective Belsha had the legal authority, after 
No.  2007AP1378-CR.dtp 
 
4 
 
viewing the cell phone display picture of the defendant smoking 
a blunt, "to go further and look at the other pictures 
electronically saved in the cell phone itself." 
¶93 The State argued that "a further search of the phone 
was justified incident to the arrest of the defendant."  
Carroll's arrest, it said, was based not only on driving (e.g., 
speeding and suspended license) but also on "the observations of 
the officer in terms of the contents of the phone." 
¶94 The 
defendant 
asserted 
that 
Detective 
Belsha's 
activation of the cell phone menu to expose pictures in the 
photo gallery was "a search for evidence, not an inventory 
search," and thus required a search warrant. 
¶95 Judge Kahn concluded that the cell phone posed no 
danger to officers and that "because there was no arrest made 
until 
after the search of the cell phone, the private 
information on the cell phone . . . which formed the basis for 
[a subsequent] search warrant [for the phone] was obtained 
illegally" and could not properly be considered by the court 
commissioner reviewing the affidavit for the search warrant. 
¶96 It should be noted that the search warrant and the 
affidavit supporting it were part of the record at the 
suppression hearing.  The affidavit makes reference to Detective 
Belsha's interception of the phone call after reviewing the 
pictures in the photo gallery.  There was, however, no testimony 
about this interception at the suppression hearing, and the 
State did not refer to the interception in its argument at the 
suppression hearing. 
No.  2007AP1378-CR.dtp 
 
5 
 
¶97 Judge Kahn identified the nub of this dispute when he 
asked whether Detective Belsha could rely on a single cell phone 
photo of the defendant smoking a blunt, and the other known 
circumstances at the time, as justification to search the photo 
gallery within the phone without obtaining a warrant.  A related 
question is whether the single cell phone photo of the 19-year-
old defendant smoking a blunt, together with other known 
circumstances, was sufficient to give the detective authority to 
begin answering the defendant's cell phone calls. 
¶98 In short, did the totality of the evidence available 
at the gas station give the police probable cause to search the 
defendant's cell phone for photos and intercept his calls 
without first obtaining a search warrant? 
¶99 The majority concludes that searching the cell phone 
photo gallery on this evidence was unlawful, and I agree.  But 
the majority then goes on to conclude that the single display 
photo of the defendant smoking a blunt was enough to permit 
police 
interception 
of 
defendant's 
calls 
to 
avoid 
the 
destruction of drug evidence.  This analysis was not argued to 
the trial court, nor considered by the trial court.  It is 
inconsistent with this court's ruling on the photo gallery and, 
in my view, at odds with the privacy of citizens. 
III 
¶100 The defendant had a U.S. Cellular Audiovox cell phone.  
When this phone is flipped open, it reveals a liquid crystal 
display (LCD) screen at the top and a keypad to activate the 
multiple functions of the phone at the bottom.  Normally, a 
No.  2007AP1378-CR.dtp 
 
6 
 
flip-type 
phone 
is 
not 
open 
unless 
it 
is 
being 
used.  
Consequently, the photo of the defendant smoking a blunt would 
normally not be in plain view, as it was to Detective Belsha.  
The defendant makes no claim that the detective flipped the 
phone open to see the photo on the LCD screen. 
¶101 At the same time, the defendant's photo on the LCD 
screen——a photo of critical significance in the majority 
opinion——is never mentioned in the detective's six-page police 
report.  It is not mentioned in the affidavit supporting the 
application for a search warrant.  It is not mentioned in the 
criminal complaint.  And it is not mentioned in the transcript 
of the preliminary hearing.  There is no reference to the blunt 
photo in the record until the State filed its response to the 
motion to suppress.  I find it curious that the majority 
attributes such significance to a cell phone photo that this 
court has never seen and that the key officer in this case did 
not highlight until three months after the defendant's arrest. 
¶102 At the suppression hearing, the State took the 
position that the officer could examine the contents of the cell 
phone——i.e., conduct a search of the phone——incident to the 
defendant's arrest.  The circuit court found, however, that 
while the defendant was in custody when he was placed in the 
back of the police car, he was not under arrest until after the 
officer's search of the phone.  In any event, the majority 
concludes that activating the photo menu was not lawful when the 
activation was based principally on the blunt photo. 
No.  2007AP1378-CR.dtp 
 
7 
 
IV 
 
¶103 Detective Belsha's affidavit in support of a search 
warrant for the cell phone reads in part: 
[A]n examination of said phone incident to the arrest 
of Jermichael Carroll revealed numerous photographs, 
several of the photos including firearms.  Jermichael 
Carroll is in possession of a firearm in one of the 
photographs, with a separate photo of only the same 
firearm in another photo.  Your affiant states that 
based upon your affiant[']s training and experience, 
and the examination of the photo, it appears to your 
affiant to be 
an actual semi-automatic firearm.  
Additionally, there are photos of Carroll with what 
appears to be a quantity of marijuana, photos of what 
appears to be cocaine, as well as a photo of drugs, 
money, and a revolver. 
¶104 According to the majority opinion, none of these 
statements should have been included in the affidavit.  The only 
statement about photo evidence that the detective was entitled 
to cite in the affidavit was that he observed a photo of 
Jermichael Carroll smoking a marijuana cigarette, in plain view 
on the display screen of Carroll's cell phone.  But such a 
statement was not included in the affidavit. 
¶105 Of course, Detective Belsha did offer additional 
information in the affidavit.  He said that while he possessed 
the defendant's cell phone, 
said phone continued to ring; your affiant answered 
one of the calls made to said phone on December 6, 
2006 and pretended to be Jermichael Carroll.  Your 
affiant states that the caller asked your affiant for 
"4 of those things; 4 and a split," which based upon 
your 
affiant's 
training 
and 
experience 
in 
investigations 
related 
to 
the 
distribution 
of 
controlled substances is a slang, requesting the 
purchase of a 4 1/2 ounce quantity of cocaine, 
consistent with drug trafficking. 
No.  2007AP1378-CR.dtp 
 
8 
 
¶106 This evidence is quite compelling.  If an affidavit 
for a warrant to search a person's cell phone were to assert 
that the person has been convicted of possession with intent to 
deliver cocaine (a felony), that the person's cell phone 
features a picture of the person smoking a marijuana cigarette, 
and that the affiant intercepted a call to the person's cell 
phone from a probable cocaine purchaser, the affidavit would 
contain probable cause to search the person's cell phone.  The 
critical question is whether Detective Belsha was entitled to 
intercept the call to the defendant's cell phone and then use 
the resulting information in his affidavit. 
¶107 It is quite clear from the testimony that Detective 
Belsha did not answer the defendant's phone and impersonate the 
defendant until after he had examined all the pictures inside 
the 
phone.  
The 
photos provided grounds to answer the 
defendant's phone, but the detective could not lawfully examine 
those photos without a warrant. 
¶108 Thus, the question is whether Detective Belsha was 
entitled to intercept the defendant's phone call on only the 
following information: 
(1) An unknown person turned up in the location of a house 
under surveillance in connection with a robbery. 
(2) The person was speeding after he left the area of 
surveillance, possibly trying to evade a car that he may or may 
not have known was a police car. 
(3) The person's license to drive was suspended. 
No.  2007AP1378-CR.dtp 
 
9 
 
(4) The person's cell phone showed a picture of him 
smoking a marijuana cigarette. 
(5) Drug traffickers frequently take, or cause to have 
taken, photographs of themselves with illegal drugs and then 
personalize their cell phones with those pictures. 
¶109 The syllogism that the majority appears to rely on is 
as follows: 
(1) Drug traffickers frequently personalize their cell 
phones with pictures of themselves possessing illegal drugs. 
(2) The defendant's cell phone shows him smoking a 
marijuana cigarette. 
(3) Therefore, 
the 
defendant 
is 
probably 
a 
drug 
trafficker. 
¶110 Then the majority adds that because the defendant is 
probably a drug trafficker, the police are entitled to intercept 
his telephone calls without a warrant so that they will not lose 
evidence of drug dealing. 
¶111 To my mind, this analysis does not hold up or justify 
a search by warrantless interception of the defendant's phone 
calls.  The facts here do not establish exigent circumstances 
permitting the police to dispense with a warrant. 
¶112 The officers did not know who Carroll was and did not 
know of his felony conviction at the time Detective Belsha 
intercepted the call.  Carroll did post a picture of himself 
smoking marijuana on his phone, but he could have been an 
occasional marijuana user instead of a drug trafficker.  The 
internet features many pictures of marijuana that people can 
No.  2007AP1378-CR.dtp 
 
10 
 
employ as "wallpaper" on their cell phone display screens.  
After this decision, will an impersonal picture of illegal drugs 
on a cell phone provide probable cause for a search of the phone 
without a warrant? 
¶113 There is no evidence in the record that Carroll has 
been charged with any offense other than being a felon in 
possession of a firearm.  Thus, the drug pictures did not lead 
to additional drug evidence or drug-related charges. 
¶114 Law enforcement may have been able to obtain a search 
warrant without reliance on the photos in the photo gallery or 
reference to the intercepted telephone call.  If not, they 
should not have been able to intercept the phone call without a 
warrant. 
¶115 This case is different from United States v. Finley, 
477 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2007).  Finley was the driver of a drug 
seller's vehicle during a controlled drug buy.  Id. at 253.  The 
authorities had evidence that he was a drug user as well as a 
participant in an illegal drug transaction at the time they 
searched his cell phone without a warrant.  Id. at 254-55.  In 
United States v. De La Paz, 43 F. Supp. 2d 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), 
the defendant was arrested following a three-month investigation 
into alleged drug dealing activities.  A federal agent answered 
the defendant's cell phone as he was being booked.  These cases 
are different from this case, where the only evidence of 
Carroll's personal involvement with drugs at the time his call 
was intercepted was his cell phone photo smoking a blunt.  
Consequently, one does not have to disagree with either Finley 
No.  2007AP1378-CR.dtp 
 
11 
 
or De La Paz to distinguish them from this case.  I note that 
the Ohio Supreme Court recently took a restrictive view of 
warrantless cell phone searches.  See State v. Smith, No. 2008-
1781, 2009 WL 4826991 (Ohio, Dec. 15, 2009) (citing United 
States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573 (N.D. Cal. May 
23, 2007)). 
V 
¶116 Detective Belsha's affidavit to support the search 
warrant is problematic for several reasons.  First, it should 
not have contained discussion of the pictures in the photo 
gallery.  Second, in my view, it should not have relied upon the 
intercepted phone call.  Third, it did not refer to the blunt 
photo on the display screen.  Fourth, the affidavit is very 
heavy in boilerplate paragraphs that have nothing to do with the 
search of a cell phone.  Fifth, the affidavit seriously misleads 
the reader when it says: "A search of the Carroll [sic] revealed 
a cellular telephone."  This passage immediately follows a 
discussion of the Carroll vehicle and mistakenly implies that 
the cell phone was taken from the Carroll vehicle.  Sixth, the 
affidavit states: "Your affiant attaches and incorporates into 
this affidavit a criminal complaint dated May 22, 2006 in which 
the target . . . was observed to be involved in activity 
consistent with drug trafficking."  The affidavit fails to 
acknowledge that this complaint was dismissed before the 
affidavit was filed and that the complaint involved guns, not 
"drug trafficking."  The unspoken implication is that a person 
No.  2007AP1378-CR.dtp 
 
12 
 
is acting "consistent with drug trafficking" if the person 
possesses a gun. 
¶117 For all these reasons, the photos of the defendant 
with a firearm should be suppressed, or, at a minimum, this case 
should be remanded to the circuit court for a hearing to 
determine whether the information gathered from illegal searches 
and other misleading information in the affidavit improperly 
tainted the court commissioner's decision to issue the warrant.  
See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988). 
¶118 For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
 
 
No.  2007AP1378-CR.dtp 
 
1