Title: Ex parte The Terminix International Co., LP, et al.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1180863
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: October 30, 2020

REL: October 30, 2020
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2020-2021
____________________
1180863
____________________
Ex parte The Terminix International Co., LP, Terminix
International, Inc., and Matthew Cunningham
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Bay Forest Condominium Owners Association, Inc., et
al.
v.
The Terminix International Co., LP, et al.)
(Baldwin Circuit Court, CV-18-900579)
MITCHELL, Justice.
1180863
Birmingham law firm Campbell Law, P.C., represents
consumers 
in 
legal 
proceedings 
against 
pest-control 
companies,
including The Terminix International Co., LP, and Terminix
International, Inc. (hereinafter referred to collectively as
"Terminix").  After Campbell Law initiated arbitration
proceedings against Terminix and Matthew Cunningham, a
Terminix branch manager, on behalf of owners in the Bay Forest
condominium complex ("Bay Forest") in Daphne, Terminix and
Cunningham asked the Baldwin Circuit Court to disqualify
Campbell Law from the proceedings because it had retained a
former manager of Terminix's Baldwin County office as an
investigator and consultant.  The trial court denied the
motion to disqualify.  Terminix and Cunningham ("the
petitioners") now petition this Court for a writ of mandamus,
arguing that the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct require
Campbell Law's disqualification.  We deny the petition.
Facts and Procedural History
In December 1996, the Bay Forest Condominium Owners
Association, Inc. ("the Association"), and Terminix entered
into contracts obligating Terminix to provide termite-
protection services to the four buildings in Bay Forest.  The
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Association renewed the contracts multiple times in the
following years, during which Terminix periodically inspected
and treated the Bay Forest buildings. 
In May 2016, suspected termite damage was discovered in
one of the buildings.  After the Association notified
Terminix, a Terminix representative conducted an inspection
and confirmed that there was termite damage.  The Association
and its members (hereinafter referred to collectively as
"BFCOA") state that Terminix initially agreed to treat and
repair the damaged building but later refused to respond to
telephone calls and never returned to perform the needed
treatment and repairs. 
Steve Barnett was the manager of Terminix's Baldwin
County office when the termite damage was discovered at Bay
Forest.  The extent of Barnett's personal involvement with Bay
Forest is not clear from the materials before us, but, in
January 2017, while the Association was apparently trying to
get Terminix to address the termite damage, Barnett's
employment was terminated.1  Shortly thereafter, Barnett
1Terminix says that Barnett was fired because he was not
properly communicating with customers; Barnett says that he
was fired because he was honest with customers, and, as a
result, the Baldwin County office was paying more damage
3
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approached Campbell Law, which he knew from its involvement
representing parties in previous disputes with Terminix, for
legal advice related to the termination of his employment. 
Barnett ended up not retaining Campbell Law to pursue any
employment-related claims, but, in February 2017, the firm
hired 
him 
as 
an 
independent 
contractor 
to 
provide
investigative and consulting services.  
As part of Barnett's duties, he began attending property
inspections and providing testimony in arbitration and other
proceedings involving pest-control companies, including
Terminix.  In fact, in the same month he was hired by Campbell
Law, Barnett submitted affidavits supporting a discovery
motion that was filed in an arbitration proceeding involving
Terminix and he attended an inspection at a property that was
the subject of another dispute with Terminix.  That prompted
Terminix's national counsel in Chicago to telephone Campbell
Law to question the ethics of the firm's use of Barnett. 
Campbell Law's Thomas Campbell states that he responded by
explaining that Barnett had been instructed not to divulge
privileged or confidential information to anyone at Campbell
claims than it had before he became the manager.
4
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Law.  According to Campbell, the attorney representing
Terminix replied by saying that his law firm would investigate
the ethics of Barnett's employment further.  But Campbell Law
says no further communication was ever received from Terminix
or its counsel concerning Barnett.  Thus, Campbell Law
continued to employ Barnett and use him as a witness in
proceedings against Terminix.
At some point, BFCOA retained Campbell Law to represent
it in its dispute with Terminix.  BFCOA then petitioned the
Baldwin Circuit Court to appoint an arbitrator to hear their
dispute.2  After the trial court granted that petition and
appointed an 
arbitrator, 
BFCOA 
initiated 
arbitration by 
filing
a statement of claims against Terminix and Cunningham,
Barnett's successor as the manager of Terminix's Baldwin
County office.3  About three months later, the petitioners
2Some of the contracts executed by the Association and
Terminix contained an arbitration provision, but the arbitral
forum named in those contracts has since ceased to offer
consumer-arbitration services.  Under § 5 of the Federal
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., a trial court may
appoint a replacement arbitrator if the arbitrator designated
in the arbitration agreement is unavailable. See, e.g.,
Robertson v. Mount Royal Towers, 134 So. 3d 862, 869 (Ala.
2013).
3Campbell Law had named Barnett as a defendant in other
proceedings involving Terminix's Baldwin County office before
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moved the trial court to disqualify Campbell Law from
representing BFCOA in the Bay Forest dispute because, they
alleged, Campbell Law's employment of Barnett violated the
Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct.  Campbell Law denied
the existence of an ethical problem and argued that, in any
event, the petitioners had waived their right to object
because they had known about Barnett's hiring since shortly
after it occurred but failed to formally object in any other
proceeding in which Campbell Law was representing a party
against Terminix.  Following a hearing, the trial court denied
the motion to disqualify without stating its rationale.  The
petitioners sought mandamus relief.
Standard of Review
"A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy,
and is appropriate when the petitioner can show
(1) a clear legal right to the order sought; (2) an
imperative duty upon the respondent to perform,
accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of
another adequate remedy; and (4) the properly
invoked jurisdiction of the court. Ex parte
Inverness Constr. Co., 775 So. 2d 153, 156 (Ala.
2000)."
his employment with Terminix was terminated.  It appears
Barnett has been dismissed from those proceedings since
leaving Terminix and being hired by Campbell Law.
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Ex parte BOC Grp., Inc., 823 So. 2d 1270, 1272 (Ala. 2001). 
A petitioner bears the burden of proving all four of these
elements before a writ of mandamus will issue.  Ex parte State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., [Ms. 1180451, April 24, 2020] ___ So. 3d
___ (Ala. 2020).  
In Ex parte Taylor Coal Co., 401 So. 2d 1, 3 (Ala. 1981),
this Court recognized that rulings on a motion to disqualify
counsel are within the discretion of the trial court.  While
noting that mandamus review is typically not available to
review a trial court's discretionary decisions, the Taylor
Coal Court concluded that such review was appropriate in that
case because of the "serious charges" leveled against the
attorneys involved and the potential for the underlying
proceedings to be tainted if the alleged ethical issues were
not resolved before trial.  Id.  This Court later confirmed
that a trial court's ruling on a motion to disqualify can be
reviewed only by mandamus.  See Ex parte Central States Health
& Life Co. of Omaha, 594 So. 2d 80, 81 (Ala. 1992) ("To avoid
future problems with incorrect filings and to 
provide specific
instructions to the Bar as to the correct method for seeking
review of a lower court's ruling on a motion to disqualify an
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attorney, this Court holds that review of such a ruling is by
a petition for writ of mandamus only.").
Analysis
 It is well established that a trial court has the
authority to disqualify counsel for violating the Alabama
Rules of Professional Conduct.  See Ex parte Utilities Bd. of
Tuskegee, 274 So. 3d 229, 232 (Ala. 2018).  Nonetheless, this
Court has explained that a "common-sense approach" should
guide the trial court when considering motions to disqualify
and that a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct does
not require disqualification in every instance.  See, e.g., Ex
parte Wheeler, 978 So. 2d 1, 7 (Ala. 2007) (concluding that
counsel's disqualification was inappropriate even though he
had violated Rule 1.11, Ala. R. Prof. Cond.).  In sum, the
decision of whether to disqualify counsel who has violated the
Rules of Professional Conduct falls squarely within the sound
discretion of the trial court.  Taylor Coal, 401 So. 2d at 3. 
Accordingly, the trial court's denial of the motion to
disqualify must be affirmed unless it is established that the
ruling "is based on an erroneous conclusion of law" or that
the trial court "has acted arbitrarily without employing
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conscientious judgment, has exceeded the bounds of reason in
view of all circumstances, or has so far ignored recognized
principles of law or practice as to cause substantial
injustice."  Edwards v. Allied Home Mortg. Capital Corp., 962
So. 2d 194, 213 (Ala. 2007).  
The petitioners argue that the trial court erred by
concluding that Campbell Law did not violate Rules 4.2(a),
1.6(a), 1.9, and 4.4, Ala. R. Prof. Cond., and that, based on
the circumstances of those violations, the trial court
exceeded its discretion by denying the motion to disqualify. 
We analyze each of the rules that the petitioners say Campbell
Law violated, in the order presented by them in their
petition.
A. Rule 4.2(a)
Rule 4.2(a) provides that, when representing a client, "a
lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the
representation with a person the lawyer knows to be
represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer
has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to
do so."  The Comment to Rule 4.2(a) further explains:
"In the case of an organization, this Rule
prohibits communications by a lawyer for one party
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concerning the matter in representation with persons
having a managerial responsibility on behalf of the
organization, and with any other person whose act or
omission in connection with that matter may be
imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or
criminal liability or whose statement may constitute
an admission on the part of the organization."4 
The petitioners argue that, while Rule 4.2(a) expressly
applies to only current employees of an organization, its
application 
should 
be 
expanded 
to 
cases 
in 
which
communications have been received from a former employee.  The
petitioners insist that because Barnett acquired confidential
knowledge about Terminix while he was employed by Terminix,
under Rule 4.2(a), "Campbell Law had a duty to seek Terminix's
consent before contacting Barnett and before hiring him to be
an investigator and consultant."  Petition, at p. 14.  We
disagree.
This Court has explained that the words in the rules
adopted by the Court must be interpreted according to their
plain meaning.  Ex parte Jett, 5 So. 3d 640, 643 (Ala. 2007). 
By 
its 
terms, 
Rule 
4.2(a) 
prohibits 
a 
lawyer 
from
communicating with a person only if the lawyer knows the
4Although the Comment to a rule sheds light on the meaning
of the rule, "the text of each Rule is authoritative," and
Comments "do not add obligations to the Rules."  Scope, Ala.
R. Prof. Cond. 
10
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person "to be represented by another lawyer in the matter." 
As the Comment to Rule 4.2 indicates, by virtue of being an
employee with "managerial responsibility," Barnett was
effectively "represented" by counsel for Terminix while he 
was
employed by Terminix; Rule 4.2 therefore generally prohibited
Campbell Law from communicating with Barnett while he was a
Terminix employee.  
But there is no allegation that Campbell Law had any
communication with Barnett while he was employed by Terminix. 
Rather, Barnett initiated his communication and eventual
relationship with Campbell Law after his employment with
Terminix was terminated and he ceased to have any managerial
responsibility.  And Campbell has testified that Barnett was
never personally served in actions initiated against Terminix
while he was a Terminix employee and that Barnett never agreed
to be represented by Terminix's lawyers.  The petitioners cite
no evidence to refute Campbell's statements.
Although the petitioners acknowledge the limits of the
text of Rule 4.2(a), they nonetheless argue that an ethics
opinion issued by the Alabama State Bar Disciplinary
Commission ("the Commission") in 1993 supports its position. 
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In ethics opinion RO-93-05, the Commission responded to a
lawyer's question about the ethics of contacting the former
employees of a factory that had closed and was alleged to have
polluted surrounding properties.  The Commission concluded
that "Rule 4.2, Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct, does
not prohibit plaintiff's counsel from contacting former
employees of a corporate defendant," but further explained
that there "might be" an exception for "those employees who
occupied a managerial level position and were involved in the
underlying transaction."  The petitioners argue that Barnett
is such an employee and that Rule 4.2 should therefore apply. 
We decline this invitation to expand Rule 4.2.  As the
American Bar Association Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility ("the Committee") explained in an
advisory 
opinion 
concerning Model 
Rule 
of 
Professional 
Conduct
4.2 –– on which Alabama's Rule 4.2 is based –– there may be
sound policy arguments that support expanding Rule 4.2 in the
way the petitioners now urge, but doing so would be
inconsistent with the text of the rule:
"While the Committee recognizes that persuasive
policy arguments can be and have been made for
extending the ambit of Model Rule 4.2 to cover some
former corporate employees, the fact remains that
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the text of the Rule does not do so and the comment
gives no basis for concluding that such coverage was
intended.  Especially where, as here, the effect of
the 
Rule 
is 
to 
inhibit 
the 
acquisition 
of
information about one's case, the Committee is
loath, given the text of Model Rule 4.2 and its
comment, to expand its coverage to former employees
by means of liberal interpretations."
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof. Resp., Formal Op. 91-359 (March
1991).  
The majority of states that have interpreted a rule
derived from Model Rule 4.2 have likewise concluded that it
applies only to current employees.  The petitioners have
identified one state that has rejected the Committee's view of
Model Rule 4.2, see Lang v. Superior Court of Maricopa Cnty.,
170 Ariz. 602, 607, 826 P.2d 1228, 1233 (Ct. App. 1992)
(concluding that Rule 4.2 prohibits ex parte communications
with former employees in 
some circumstances), but the majority
of jurisdictions that have considered the issue have followed
the Committee's text-based approach and concluded that Rule
4.2 has no field of operation as it relates to former
employees.  See, e.g., H.B.A. Mgmt., Inc. v. Estate of
Schwartz, 693 So. 2d 541, 544 (Fla. 1997) (concluding that
Rule 4.2 does not bar communication with "former employees of
defendant-employers who can no longer speak for or bind the
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organization"); State ex rel. Charleston Area Med. Ctr. v.
Zakaib, 190 W. Va. 186, 190, 437 S.E.2d 759, 763 (1993) ("[A]
majority of jurisdictions that have had occasion to consider
whether Rule 4.2 restrictions are applicable to former
employees have concluded that they are not."); Strawser v.
Exxon Co., U.S.A., 843 P.2d 613, 622 (Wyo. 1992) ("[T]he
overwhelming recent trend has been for courts to find that
Rule 4.2 does not generally bar ex parte contacts with former
employees.").  Because we apply Court rules in accordance with
the plain meaning of their text, Jett, 5 So. 3d at 644, we
join those jurisdictions that have limited the application of
Rule 4.2 to current employees.  Accordingly, Campbell Law did
not violate Rule 4.2 by communicating with and retaining
Barnett once he was no longer employed by Terminix.
B. Rules 1.6(a) and 1.9(b)
Rules 1.6(a) and 1.9(b) both concern the unauthorized
disclosure of information obtained from clients.  Rule 1.6(a)
provides that, with limited exceptions not applicable here,
"[a] lawyer shall not reveal information relating to
representation of a client unless the client consents after
consultation."  And Rule 1.9(b) prohibits, again with limited
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exceptions not applicable here, a lawyer "who has formerly
represented a client in a matter" from "us[ing] information
relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the
former client."  The petitioners do not allege that Campbell
Law has directly revealed information protected by 
Rule 1.6(a)
or Rule 1.9(b) but argue that under Rule 5.3(c), Ala. R. Prof.
Cond., Campbell Law is responsible for the acts of Barnett,
who, the petitioners allege, has revealed confidential
information he obtained from Terminix.  See Rule 5.3(c)
(explaining that a lawyer may be responsible for acts of a
nonlawyer 
employee 
that 
would 
violate 
the 
Rules 
of
Professional Conduct if that employee was a lawyer).  
In support of their argument, the petitioners rely almost
exclusively on an unreported decision of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, Grant
Heilman Photography, Inc. v. McGraw-Hill Global Education
Holdings, LLC, No. 17-694, May 2, 2018 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (not
reported in F. Supp.), in which a federal district court
granted a motion to disqualify plaintiff's counsel after they
retained a former employee of the defendant who "was deeply
involved 
in 
discovery 
management 
and 
other 
litigation 
support"
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as a consultant to assist with litigation against the
defendant.  The federal district court concluded that, "once
a non-lawyer possessing material confidential information
'switches sides' on the same case, a presumption attaches to
the new employer that such information will be improperly
shared."  Id.  Because there was no evidence indicating that
plaintiff's counsel had taken measures to avoid the improper
sharing of confidential information, the court disqualified
plaintiff's counsel.  The petitioners argue that Campbell
Law's hiring of Barnett is analogous to plaintiff's counsel's
hiring of the consultant in Grant Heilman and contend that
Campbell Law should likewise be disqualified.  We disagree.
The federal district court's decision to disqualify
plaintiff's counsel in Grant Heilman was centered on the
failure of plaintiff's counsel to take any steps to ensure
that the former employee did not share privileged and
confidential information in spite of the obvious potential for
that to occur based on her job duties while employed by the
defendant.  The federal district court explained that "[t]he
appearance of impropriety, and [counsel's] lack of 
controls in
ensuring compliance with the Rules, dictates that the proper
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result is disqualification."  Id.  In contrast, the materials
before this Court indicate that Campbell Law took affirmative
steps to ensure that Barnett did not disclose privileged and
confidential information that he may have obtained while
working for Terminix.  In an affidavit submitted to the trial
court, Campbell described the instructions he gave Barnett
when he was hired:
"I have never received confidential information
about Terminix from Steve Barnett.  I admonished him
when consulting me about his potential employment
claims and, later, when discussing his proposal to
work 
with 
us 
as 
an 
independent-contractor
investigator that he should not reveal attorney-
client privileged information or work product.  I
explained [and] defined privileged and work product
information.  I also explained that he could never
share confidential information.
"....
"I explained to Barnett that some Terminix
information was confidential and could never be
divulged either directly or indirectly to me, any
employee of the firm, others working for the firm,
or its clients.  For example, I knew that as branch
manager Barnett would know some customers with good
claims and some with claims that allowed Terminix to
make repairs that would have been partial in keeping
with its practice of failing to make all the
necessary repairs needed to find the end of
infestations.  I explained that he could not
identify those customers, solicit them, or have
anyone else solicit them.  I explained carefully
that when it came to ethical duties we had as
lawyers that he could not violate those and that one
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'cannot do through the back door what you cannot do
through the front door.'
"....
"Barnett has never shared privileged, work-
product or privileged information."
Barnett has confirmed under oath the points made in
Campbell's affidavit.  Barnett has testified that Campbell
gave him instructions along these lines when he was hired. 
Barnett has also stated that, after his employment with
Terminix was terminated, he asked Terminix for copies of any
confidentiality agreements that applied to him; he said he
received no response from Terminix.5  He further stated that,
although he originally retained possession of some Terminix
documents after his termination, he disposed of them "after
Mr. Campbell informed me that I could not provide him any
documents I may have received while at Terminix."
In the absence of evidence indicating that Barnett
actually provided confidential Terminix information to
Campbell Law, the petitioners say this Court "must presume
5Terminix submitted a copy of a "Confidentiality/Non-
Compete Agreement" that Barnett executed in May 2008 with the
motion to disqualify Campbell Law.  But the effect of that
agreement and any issues related to Barnett's compliance with
it are outside the scope of this petition.
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that Barnett shared with Campbell Law all of the confidential
information he had obtained as Terminix's highest manager in
Baldwin County."  Petition, at p. 20.  The petitioners
emphasize that Barnett acknowledged having a box 
of 
materials,
including Terminix's confidential "Aspire Service Manual,"
after leaving Terminix. But as discussed above, Barnett said
that he disposed of those materials after being told by
Campbell that he could not share them with Campbell Law. 
Given the evidence indicating that Campbell Law clearly
instructed Barnett that he could not disclose any privileged
and confidential information that he had obtained from
Terminix and the absence of any evidence indicating that
Barnett violated that instruction, we cannot conclude that
Rules 1.6(a) and 1.9(b) have been violated. 
C. Rule 1.9(a)
Like Rule 1.9(b), Rule 1.9(a) concerns a lawyer's duty to
former clients.  It provides that a lawyer "who has formerly
represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter ...
represent another person in the same or a substantially
related matter in which that person's interests are 
materially
adverse to the interests of the former client, unless the
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former client consents after consultation."  As one leading
treatise summarizes, Rule 1.9(a) "prevents the disloyal act 
of
switching sides in the same or a related matter."  Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering § 1.9:103
(1990).  The petitioners argue that, under Rule 5.3(c),
Campbell Law is responsible for Barnett's actions and that,
because Barnett has effectively switched from the "Terminix
side" to the "Campbell Law side" of the Bay Forest dispute
(and other proceedings in which Campbell Law represents
parties against Terminix), Campbell Law has violated Rule
1.9(a) and should be disqualified.  
Again, the petitioners rely almost entirely upon Grant
Heilman.  In that unreported case, it was undisputed that the
former employee was intimately involved in the litigation
process while in her former job.  There was testimony
indicating that she assisted in collecting information for
discovery and in witness preparation and, crucially, that she
was a participant in conversations in which litigation
strategy 
was 
discussed 
between 
her 
employer's 
in-house 
counsel
and outside counsel.  In sum, the former employee had
knowledge not only of information about her former employer's
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operations that the employer desired to keep 
confidential, but
also of specific privileged information about her former
employer's strategy for the litigation against her new
employer.  
In this case, by contrast, there is no indication that
the extent of Barnett's involvement in any legal proceedings
rose to the level of the former employee in Grant Heilman. 
The petitioners emphasize generally that Barnett was the
highest-ranking Terminix employee in Baldwin County while he
was manager and that he was therefore responsible for all
Terminix operations there, including the handling of termite-
damage claims.  Barnett was also responsible for managing the
Baldwin County office's compliance with Alabama Department of
Agriculture and Industries ("ADAI") regulations and for
completing reports notifying the corporate office when ADAI
was investigating services that had been provided to a
customer.  
But when we drill down to the particulars, it is clear
that Barnett's involvement in legal matters was limited. 
Barnett has testified that he could recall "two or three"
lawsuits that were filed while he was Terminix's manager in
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Baldwin County.  On a separate occasion, he testified that
there was only one time when he actually spoke to a Terminix
lawyer about a case.6  Barnett also stated under oath that his
discretion in dealing with termite-damage claims was limited
–– that, in fact, he had no authority over the process for
handling claims and no authority to settle claims exceeding
$3,000.  And while Barnett was Terminix's Baldwin County
manager when termite damage was discovered at Bay Forest, it
is not clear from the materials before us that he was even
involved in handling BFCOA's eventual claim.  It is clear
though, that by the time BFCOA formally initiated proceedings
against the petitioners in May 2018, Barnett had not been
working for Terminix for well over a year.  These facts
distinguish Barnett from the former employee in 
Grant Heilman,
who "was deeply involved in discovery management and other
litigation support" for her former employer, including the
specific dispute in which plaintiff's counsel was involved.  
As Campbell Law notes in its response to the mandamus
petition, the Supreme Court of Texas has recognized that there
is a meaningful distinction between lawyer employees who
6Barnett testified that he has not shared information
about that telephone call with Campbell Law.
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"switch sides" and non-lawyer employees who do the same.7  In
In re RSR Corp., 475 S.W.3d 775, 776 (Tex. 2015), that court
held that a trial court erred by disqualifying a law firm for
hiring an opposing party's former finance manager as a
consultant.  Explaining that the finance manager's position
"existed independently of litigation and [that] he did not
primarily report to lawyers," the court concluded that the
finance manager was essentially a fact witness and that the
ethical considerations that apply to "a side-switching
paralegal" therefore did not apply.  Id.  We are persuaded by
this analysis.  Based on the evidence of Barnett's limited
involvement in Terminix's legal affairs generally and the Bay
Forest matter in particular, we agree with the trial court
that there has been no violation of Rule 1.9(a) by Campbell
Law in this case.
7Like 
the 
Alabama 
Rules 
of 
Professional Conduct, 
the 
Texas
Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct are "based on the
American 
Bar 
Association 
Model 
Rules 
of 
Professional 
Conduct." 
Board of Law Exam'rs v. Stevens, 868 S.W.2d 773, 777 (Tex.
1994).  See also In re Whitcomb, 575 B.R. 169, 172 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. 2017) (explaining that "the ABA Model Rules and
Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct parallel one
another regarding attorney use of confidential information").
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D. Rule 4.4
The petitioners' final argument is that Campbell Law
violated Rule 4.4 by improperly obtaining evidence from
Barnett.  Subsection (a) of Rule 4.4 provides that "a lawyer
shall not ... use methods of obtaining evidence that violate
the legal rights of [a third] person," while subsection (b)
generally sets forth the procedure a lawyer should follow when
he or she "receives a document that on its face appears to be
subject to the attorney-client privilege or otherwise
confidential."  Rule 4.4(b) expressly provides that a lawyer
in receipt of such privileged or confidential information
should "notify the sender."  The petitioners argue that
Campbell Law violated Rule 4.4(b) by obtaining and using
privileged and confidential information from Barnett without
notifying Terminix and that Campbell Law should therefore be
disqualified.  In support, the petitioners rely on Harris
Davis Rebar, LLC v. Structural Iron Workers Local Union No. 1,
Pension Trust Fund, 17-C-6473, February 5, 2019 (N.D. Ill.
2019) (not reported in F. Supp.), an unreported decision in
which the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois sanctioned –– but did not disqualify –-
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defense counsel after it concluded that they had violated
Illinois's Rule 4.4 by failing to disclose that the plaintiff-
company's former employee had given them over 3,000 internal
e-mails, including confidential documents and privileged
communications 
between 
the 
plaintiff-company 
and 
its
attorneys.  
Harris Davis Rebar is distinguishable.  As discussed,
while the petitioners have generally alleged that Barnett
shared privileged and confidential Terminix information with
Campbell Law, they have not identified any specific document
or information that was allegedly shared.  At most, the
petitioners point to the fact that Barnett may have retained
a copy of its confidential Aspire Service Manual following his
departure from Terminix.  But Campbell Law has rebutted any
allegation that Barnett improperly shared that document by
submitting Barnett's testimony that he disposed of all
Terminix materials that he had in his possession without
sharing them with Campbell Law.  Campbell Law further states
that Terminix knows that the firm has already received
multiple copies of the Aspire Service Manual in other
proceedings –– and that Terminix has even asserted in other
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cases that it should not be required to produce that manual
again because it had already done so.  Without any evidence
indicating that Barnett actually shared privileged or
confidential information with Campbell Law, the petitioners
have failed to show that the trial court exceeded its
discretion by declining to disqualify Campbell Law for an
alleged violation of Rule 4.4.
Conclusion
The petitioners moved the trial court to disqualify
Campbell Law from representing BFCOA based on the firm's
hiring of Terminix's former manager Barnett as an 
investigator
and 
consultant.  The petitioners argued that Barnett possessed
privileged and confidential information related to disputes
between Terminix and parties represented by Campbell Law and
that Campbell Law had therefore violated Rules 4.2(a), 1.6(a),
1.9, and 4.4, Ala. R. Prof. Cond.  After the trial court
denied the motion to disqualify, the petitioners sought
mandamus relief.  As explained above, the petitioners have not
shown that Campbell Law has violated the Rules of Professional
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Conduct.8  Thus, the petitioners have not established that
they have a clear legal right to the relief they seek.
PETITION DENIED.
Parker, C.J., and Bolin, Shaw, Wise, Bryan, Sellers,
Mendheim, and Stewart, JJ., concur.
8It is unnecessary to consider Campbell Law's alternative
argument that the petitioners waived any right to seek the
disqualification of Campbell Law by failing to timely object
to Barnett's employment.
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