Title: Chavarria v. Industrial Commission
Citation: 409 P.2d 26, 99 Ariz. 314
Docket Number: 8525
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: December 23, 1965

99 Ariz. 314 (1965) 409 P.2d 26 Manuel G. CHAVARRIA, Petitioner, v. The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Arizona and Pima Mining Company, Respondents. No. 8525. Supreme Court of Arizona, En Banc. December 23, 1965. Rehearing Denied January 25, 1966. *315 Goddard, Gin, Hanshaw &amp; Gianas, Tucson, and Peter C. Neumann, Tucson, of counsel, for petitioner. *316 Robert A. Slonaker, Phoenix, for Industrial Commission; Richard J. Daniels, Courtney L. Varner, Merton E. Marks, Glen D. Webster, Dee-Dee Samet, Phoenix, of counsel. STRUCKMEYER, Vice Chief Justice. Manuel G. Chavarria, by certiorari, seeks in this Court to set aside an award of the Industrial Commission of Arizona based on these facts. On May 21, 1960, petitioner suffered an injury to his right foot, arising out of and in the course of his employment with the Pima Mining Company, defendant-employer. The injury involved fractures of the cuboid and osteocuboid bones of the right foot with dislocation of the right fourth and fifth metatarsal phalangeal joints. On July 6, 1961, the Commission found that petitioner's condition was stationary and made an award of permanent partial disability based on five per cent loss of function of the right leg. Petitioner protested the award and on April 6, 1962, the Commission affirmed its previous findings and award. On August 31, 1962, petitioner filed a petition to reopen, asserting a new and additional disability. A Psychiatric Advisory Board was called which, after examination of petitioner, found that his asserted psychoneurotic disabilities were based upon an inadequate personality and recommended that his case be closed. On January 8, 1963, petitioner's petition to reopen was denied. To that, petitioner filed a protest and petition for rehearing. On May 10, 1963, a hearing was had, at which petitioner's expert medical witness, Dr. Lindsay E. Beaton, a qualified physician practicing in psychiatry and neurology, testified that petitioner had a "psychological illness" in which his anxieties about himself were converted into physical symptoms; that petitioner felt that his leg was seriously injured and that he would not be able to return to work; that "his own anxiety, his own hypochondriacal conviction about his disability in essence keeps him from returning to work." On July 19, 1963, the Commission made the following findings of fact: and awarded: *317 This award was not protested and became final. It constituted an adjudication that petitioner suffered a conversion hysteria as the result of the accident of May 21, 1960, since the only new additional or previously undiscovered disability which had not been previously passed on by the Commission prior to the May 10, 1963, hearing was petitioner's psychoneurotic condition. The award, itself, is obviously conditional, being an award of accident benefits and compensation, "if indicated," "until further order of the Commission." Undoubtedly the Commission accepted the view that psychiatric disorders are not necessarily permanent, leaving the door open for further evaluation of petitioner's case. Approximately six months later, on January 17, 1964, petitioner was re-examined by the Commission's Psychiatric Advisory Board. The Board's conclusions were: This resulted, on February 17, 1964, in a classification by the Commission of petitioner's condition as stationary with no greater disability, physical or mental, than that found under the provisions of the award on April 6, 1962. Petitioner duly protested and a hearing was held in Tucson, Arizona, on June 8, 1964, at which Dr. Lindsay E. Beaton again testified that petitioner was totally disabled, "primarily due to psychiatric disease" and that this psychiatric disease was a conversion reaction and a hypochondriacal reaction. In response to the question of whether appellant was consciously malingering, Dr. Beaton stated, "I do not believe there is any malingering in Mr. Chavarria." *318 He identified malingering as the conscious production of symptoms. He stated in response to the question of whether there "should be some potential in this man": The hearing of June 8th was continued to July 13, 1964, when it was resumed. At that time, Dr. William B. McGrath was called, whose specialty is neurology and psychiatry. Dr. McGrath was one of the five psychiatrists who composed the Psychiatric Advisory Board which had examined petitioner on January 17, 1964. He had also examined petitioner on December 24, 1962, at the first psychiatric consultation. Pertinent portions of Dr. McGrath's testimony are set out at length since it is the basis of the award of the Commission which is here under attack. It is apparent from the report of the Psychiatric Advisory Board and Dr. McGrath's testimony that petitioner has a basic personality pattern of the passive dependency type coupled with an anxiety neurosis and that, if he were not dependent *321 for support upon workmen's compensation, he would return to some form of gainful employment. Dr. Beaton and Dr. McGrath are in complete disagreement. Dr. Beaton was of the opinion that petitioner had conversion hysteria caused by the accident. Dr. McGrath and the Psychiatric Advisory Board were of the opinion that petitioner did not have a conversion hysteria and that his asserted disabilities were not caused by the accident. However, as stated, the finding of July 19, 1963, precluded a re-examination of the question of causation at any subsequent time. But, since finding Number Two must be construed as conditional, the award predicated on it must be held to be a temporary disability award authorized by A.R.S. § 23-1045. Therefore, the Commission was at liberty later to determine whether petitioner's psychoneurotic disability was so disabling as to prevent him from returning to work; that is, that it was not disabling to the point of producing a loss of earning capacity. This the Commission did on August 27, 1964, when it found that petitioner's condition was stationary and that he had no greater disability in excess of the provisions of the award of April 6, 1962. It is a well established rule that, where equally honest and experienced expert witnesses reach opposite conclusions, this Court will not say that it was the Industrial Commission's duty to accept the opinion of one over that of another. Condos v. Industrial Commission, 92 Ariz. 299, 376 P.2d 767; Parnau v. Industrial Commission, 87 Ariz. 361, 351 P.2d 643; Hewett v. Industrial Commission, 72 Ariz. 203, 232 P.2d 850. In Condos, we said: We think this case is controlled by these decisions. The Commission could find, as it did on August 27, 1964, "that neither the industrial injury nor any subsequent residual physical or functional disability causally related thereto prevents the applicant from returning to his regular employment." Cf. Murray v. Industrial Commission, 87 Ariz. 190, 349 P.2d 627. It could conclude that the best treatment was to take petitioner off compensation, thereby giving him the incentive to return to regular employment. The award is affirmed. LOCKWOOD, C.J., and BERNSTEIN, UDALL, and McFARLAND, JJ., concurring.