Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Mary P. Donovan
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1997AP001770-D
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 1, 1997

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-1770-D 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against: 
 
Mary P. Donovan, 
Attorney at Law. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST DONOVAN 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 1, 1997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
 
 
COUNTY: 
 
 
JUDGE: 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 97-1770-D 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against MARY P. DONOVAN, Attorney at Law. 
FILED 
 
JULY 1, 1997 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
Attorney 
disciplinary 
proceeding. 
 
Attorney’s 
license 
suspended.  
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review the complaint of the Board of 
Attorneys Professional Responsibility (Board) filed June 11, 
1997 
alleging 
that 
Attorney 
Mary 
P. 
Donovan 
engaged 
in 
professional misconduct while acting as assistant city attorney 
for Beloit. With that complaint there was filed a stipulation, 
pursuant 
to 
SCR 
21.09(3m),1 
in 
which 
Attorney 
Donovan 
                     
1 SCR 21.09 provides, in pertinent part: Procedure 
. . . 
(3m) The board may file with a complaint a stipulation by 
the board and the respondent attorney to the facts, conclusions 
of law and discipline to be imposed. The supreme court may 
consider the complaint and stipulation without appointing a 
referee. If the supreme court approves the stipulation, it shall 
adopt the stipulated facts and conclusions of law and impose the 
stipulated 
discipline. 
If 
the 
supreme 
court 
rejects 
the 
stipulation, a referee shall be appointed pursuant to sub. (4) 
and the matter shall proceed pursuant to SCR chapter 22. A 
stipulation that is rejected has no evidentiary value and is 
without prejudice to the respondent’s defense of the proceeding 
or the board’s prosecution of the complaint.  
No. 97-1770-D 
 
2 
acknowledged that she had engaged in professional misconduct in 
those matters and in which she and the Board stipulated that a 
six-month suspension of her license to practice law in Wisconsin 
be imposed as discipline for it. The misconduct consisted of her 
forging a certificate of completion of a deferred prosecution 
program and submitting it to the municipal court to obtain 
dismissal of charges against an acquaintance who had not been 
enrolled in the program and forging a friend’s signature on a 
letter submitted to municipal court requesting a jury trial and 
representing the city on a charge against that friend.  
¶2 
We accept the stipulation of the parties and adopt the 
facts and conclusions set forth therein concerning Attorney 
Donovan’s professional misconduct and the Rules of Professional 
Conduct for Attorneys it violated. Further, we impose the 
discipline to which the parties have stipulated. The seriousness 
of Attorney Donovan’s dishonesty and false representations to a 
court, viewed in light of mitigating circumstances set forth 
below, warrants discipline of that severity.  
¶3 
Attorney Donovan was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin in August, 1992 and served as assistant city attorney 
for Beloit since that time. She voluntarily has refrained from 
the practice of law during the pendency of this proceeding. She 
currently is suspended from practice for failure to comply with 
continuing legal education requirements.  
¶4 
The misconduct to which the parties stipulated is the 
following. In the first matter, an acquaintance of Attorney 
Donovan who worked as a bouncer at a tavern in Beloit was cited 
in December, 
1995 
for 
serving alcohol to 
a 
minor. The 
No. 97-1770-D 
 
3 
acquaintance called Attorney Donovan concerning the citation, 
and she said she would investigate and get back to him. Even 
though the acquaintance had a criminal record, Attorney Donovan 
decided to send him through the deferred prosecution program, 
which would result in dismissal of the citation upon his 
successful completion of it, but she never informed the 
acquaintance of her decision to do so. At the time, it was the 
city attorney’s policy to use the deferred prosecution program 
primarily for shoplifting offenses and only for first offenses.  
¶5 
On the return date in the matter, Attorney Donovan 
told the municipal judge she was sending the matter to the 
deferred prosecution program and asked for a continuance. 
However, the offender was not eligible for the program because 
of his criminal record. The following month, Attorney Donovan 
represented to the court that the case was in the process of 
being sent to the deferred prosecution program.  
¶6 
When she realized the offender had not been referred 
to the program by anyone in the City Attorney’s office, Attorney 
Donovan obtained a copy of a certificate of completion from 
another deferred prosecution case, removed the offender’s name 
and the charges from it, and inserted in their place the 
acquaintance’s name and the charges against him. She then 
submitted the forged certificate to the court, misrepresenting 
that the offender had completed the program. When she earlier 
moved 
for 
dismissal 
and 
when 
she 
submitted 
the 
forged 
certificate to the court, she knew that he never had entered the 
program nor was eligible to do so. Sometime after submitting the 
No. 97-1770-D 
 
4 
forged certificate, Attorney Donovan told the acquaintance that 
his citation had been dismissed.  
¶7 
The charge against the acquaintance was reopened the 
following month. After he failed to appear for a trial date, a 
default forfeiture judgment was ordered in the amount of 
$209.50, which he fulfilled by serving time in the county jail. 
In July, 1996, when a police officer confronted her, Attorney 
Donovan immediately admitted her conduct in this matter. On 
August 26, 1996, she was convicted in Rock county circuit court 
of misdemeanor forgery.  
¶8 
The parties stipulated that by forging the certificate 
of completion of the program and submitting it to the municipal 
court in order to obtain dismissal of the charges for an 
acquaintance who had not completed or even enrolled in the 
deferred prosecution program, Attorney Donovan committed a 
criminal 
act 
reflecting 
adversely 
on 
her 
honesty, 
trustworthiness or fitness as lawyer, in violation of SCR 
20:8.4(b).2  
¶9 
The second matter to which the parties stipulated 
concerned a former boyfriend of Attorney Donovan who was 
ticketed in January, 1996 for operating after revocation –- a 
criminal charge prosecuted by the district attorney’s office –- 
                     
2 SCR 20:8.4 provides, in pertinent part: Misconduct  
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:  
. . . 
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the 
lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in 
other respects.  
No. 97-1770-D 
 
5 
and failing to report an accident –- an ordinance violation 
prosecuted by the city attorney’s office. Attorney Donovan 
represented the city in the matter.  
¶10 Some time prior to the February 22, 1996 return date 
on the citations, Attorney Donovan prepared a letter requesting 
a trial on the failure to report an accident citation, signed 
the friend’s name to it, and submitted it to the municipal 
court. On the return date, she moved to dismiss the citation, 
based on her prosecutorial discretion, believing that the 
criminal prosecution for operating after revocation, with its 
more severe penalties in criminal court, was an adequate penalty 
and that the ordinance prosecution by the city would not be 
justified. The municipal court dismissed the matter.  
¶11 In early April, 1996, when the municipal judge became 
aware of the circumstances of the case, he told Attorney Donovan 
there was at least an appearance of a conflict when a prosecutor 
moves for dismissal of a citation against her former boyfriend, 
and he suggested the matter be reopened. Attorney Donovan wrote 
the friend acknowledging that she had a conflict and informing 
him that the case was being reopened. The friend pleaded no 
contest and was convicted of the ordinance violation. At the 
same time she was convicted of the forgery in the preceding 
matter, Attorney Donovan was convicted of misdemeanor forgery in 
this matter.  
¶12 The parties stipulated that Attorney Donovan’s forging 
her former boyfriend’s signature on a letter submitted to the 
municipal court constituted a criminal act reflecting adversely 
on her honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer, in 
No. 97-1770-D 
 
6 
violation of SCR 20:8.4(b). Further, by representing the city on 
a charge against her former boyfriend when that representation 
was materially limited by her own interests and when she had 
neither determined that she could represent the city without 
adversely affecting its interests nor obtained its consent to 
the representation, she violated SCR 20:1.7(b).3  
¶13 The stipulation of the parties included the following 
factors in mitigation of the seriousness of the misconduct and 
the severity of discipline to be imposed for it. Attorney 
Donovan is an inexperienced attorney, having been admitted to 
practice in 1992, and her job with the City Attorney’s office 
was her first position as a lawyer. She has not been the subject 
of a prior disciplinary investigation or proceeding or any 
criminal charge. She did not benefit financially from the 
conduct that led to her misdemeanor convictions. When confronted 
with her conduct, she immediately admitted to wrongdoing, fully 
cooperated with the Board’s investigation in this proceeding, 
                     
3 SCR 20:1.7 provides, in pertinent part: Conflict of 
interest: general rule 
. . . 
(b) 
A lawyer 
shall 
not 
represent a 
client if the 
representation of that client may be materially limited by the 
lawyer’s responsibilities to another client or to a third 
person, or by the lawyer’s own interests, unless: 
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will 
not be adversely affected; and 
(2) the client consents in writing after consultation. When 
representation of multiple clients in a single matter is 
undertaken, the consultation shall include explanation of the 
implications of the common representation and the advantages and 
risks involved.  
No. 97-1770-D 
 
7 
accepted 
full 
responsibility 
for 
her 
actions 
and 
their 
consequences, and voluntarily refrained from the practice of law 
during 
these 
proceedings, 
thus, 
in 
the 
parties’ 
words, 
demonstrating remorse and resolving to conduct herself ethically 
in the future.  
¶14 We adopt the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
to which the parties have stipulated. We impose the six-month 
license suspension to which they agreed, having determined that, 
in 
light 
of 
the 
mitigating 
factors, 
it 
constitutes 
the 
appropriate 
discipline 
for 
Attorney 
Donovan’s 
professional 
misconduct.  
¶15 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Mary P. Donovan to 
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of six 
months, commencing the date of this order.  
¶16 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order Mary P. Donovan pay to the Board of Attorneys 
Professional Responsibility 
the costs 
of this 
proceeding, 
provided that if the costs are not paid within the time 
specified and absent a showing to this court of her inability to 
pay the costs within that time, the license of Mary P. Donovan 
to practice law in Wisconsin shall remain suspended until 
further order of the court.  
¶17 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mary P. Donovan comply with 
the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a person 
whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been suspended.  
 
 
 
No. 97-1770-D 
 
8 
 
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