Title: Makis M. v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13476
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: May 7, 2024

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-13476 
 
MAKIS M., a juvenile  vs.  COMMONWEALTH. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     January 8, 2024. - May 7, 2024. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Kafker, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Delinquent Child.  Youthful Offender Act.  Due Process of Law, 
Juvenile delinquency proceeding, Competency to stand trial, 
Substantive rights.  Juvenile Court, Delinquent child.  
Incompetent Person, Criminal charges.  Practice, Criminal, 
Juvenile delinquency proceeding, Defendant's competency, 
Dismissal.  Statute, Construction.  Constitutional Law, 
Judiciary, Separation of powers. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on July 20, 2023. 
 
 
The case was reported by Wendlandt, J. 
 
 
 
Debbie F. Freitas (Cristina F. Freitas also present) for 
the juvenile. 
 
Kristen W. Jiang, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Sarah LoPresti, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
youth advocacy division of the Committee for Public Counsel 
Services, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  Shortly after midnight on April 13, 2021, a 
juvenile was apprehended inside an apartment building with two 
2 
 
guns and ammunition.  He was charged by delinquency complaint, 
indicted, and prosecuted by the Commonwealth for various 
offenses arising out of this incident.  After arraignment as a 
youthful offender, the juvenile was diagnosed with a language-
based learning disorder, among other information-processing 
disorders, and two inquiries were made into his competency to 
stand trial.1 
In March 2022, at the conclusion of his first competency 
proceeding, the juvenile was found not competent to stand trial 
but capable of attaining competency in the foreseeable future.  
The judge also considered whether the juvenile could attain 
competency in the foreseeable future through remediation.  
Remediation in this context refers to interventions designed to 
help the juvenile attain competency, such as special education.  
After being found incompetent, the juvenile twice filed motions 
to dismiss under G. L. c. 123, § 16 (f), the statute governing 
the dismissal of pending charges against incompetent persons.  
Both motions were denied in the fall of 2022. 
In June 2023, the juvenile was again found incompetent to 
stand trial following a second competency proceeding.  However, 
 
1 The juvenile was also diagnosed with borderline 
intellectual impairment, executive dysfunction disorder, 
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, oppositional defiant 
disorder, a language-based learning disability, posttraumatic 
stress disorder, and mood dysregulation. 
3 
 
when asked directly by the juvenile's counsel whether "the court 
[was] finding [the juvenile] able to be remediated," i.e., able 
to attain competency in the foreseeable future, the judge 
declined to make a definite finding.  Although the juvenile 
could "answer some of the questions that are germane to 
competency," the judge found that the competency hearing had not 
"focused on his ability to learn."  She further found that 
"there is no program available in Massachusetts" that could be 
"beneficial to [the juvenile] with regard[] to remediating any 
issues of incompetency."  If there were such a "remediation 
program that was specific to individuals with intellectual 
disabilities" available in the Commonwealth, the judge said, she 
would order the juvenile to attend that program.   
In the meantime, the juvenile remains subject to numerous 
conditions of release and pending delinquency and youthful 
offender charges.  The cases against him cannot move forward 
because he has been found incompetent to stand trial and, in the 
absence of any remediation programming within the Commonwealth, 
is not likely to attain competency in the foreseeable future.2   
This case came before us on reservation and report of a 
single justice to the full court and raises three main issues.  
 
2 This is one of two opinions issued today that relate to 
the Commonwealth's current framework for remediating juvenile 
defendants found incompetent to stand trial.  See Commonwealth 
v. Huacon, 494 Mass.     (2024). 
4 
 
The first issue is whether the mental health code, G. L. c. 123, 
provides for the remediation of incompetent juveniles, 
particularly those incompetent but not mentally ill.  The second 
issue is whether, in the absence of remediation programming 
under the mental health code, the ability to create and mandate 
remediation programming is within the scope of the Juvenile 
Court's inherent authority.  Lastly, this court must decide 
whether the pending charges against the juvenile can be 
dismissed under G. L. c. 123, § 16 (f), "in the interest of 
justice." 
To the first issue, we agree with both parties that G. L. 
c. 123, §§ 15 and 16, do not provide for the remediation of 
juveniles found incompetent for reasons other than mental 
illness.  To the second issue, we reject the Commonwealth's 
contention that the ability to create and mandate remediation 
programming for incompetent juveniles falls within the purview 
of the Juvenile Court's inherent authority.  Rather, the 
creation of remediation programming falls within the purview of 
the Legislature.  To the last issue, that of dismissal under 
G. L. c. 123, § 16 (f), we remand this matter to the Juvenile 
Court for further findings on whether the juvenile poses a 
present danger to the community.3   
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the youth 
advocacy division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services. 
5 
 
1.  Facts.  Our discussion of the facts draws from the 
parties' comprehensive statement of facts, prepared pursuant to 
the reservation and report of the single justice on August 7, 
2023, as well as the record.   
In the early morning hours of April 13, 2021, police 
investigated a breaking and entering at a residential apartment 
building.  At the scene, investigators apprehended the juvenile 
and an adult, who were in possession of a large capacity 
firearm, a loaded firearm with a defaced serial number, and a 
significant amount of ammunition.  
Later that day, the juvenile was charged by delinquency 
complaint with seven offenses:  breaking and entering a building 
in the nighttime to commit a felony, G. L. c. 266, § 16; 
carrying a loaded firearm without a license, G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (n); two counts of possession of a large capacity firearm, 
G. L. c. 269, § 10 (m); possession of ammunition without a 
firearm identification card, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h); defacing a 
firearm serial number, G. L. c. 269, § 11C; and possession of 
burglarious instruments, G. L. c. 266, § 49.  The juvenile was 
arraigned the same day and entered a plea of not delinquent.  At 
his arraignment, the Commonwealth moved for the pretrial 
detention of the juvenile under G. L. c. 276, § 58A, on the 
basis of dangerousness.  Three days later, the judge allowed 
this motion and detained the juvenile. 
6 
 
On July 1, 2021, an Essex County grand jury indicted the 
juvenile as a youthful offender on two firearms charges, G. L. 
c. 269, § 10 (a).  He was arraigned on July 15, 2021, and 
entered a plea of "not youthful offender."  Again, the 
Commonwealth moved for the pretrial detention of the juvenile 
under § 58A on the basis of dangerousness and, again, the 
juvenile was ordered detained. 
After 140 days of detention, on August 31, 2021, the judge 
released the juvenile under eight conditions, including "home 
lockdown" and the use of global positioning system services to 
track his location.  Two more conditions were added to the 
juvenile's release in October 2021.  However, on November 23, 
2021, a notice of a technical violation of probation was issued 
for the juvenile.  The next day, the juvenile was detained and 
held for another 125 days. 
After counsel for the juvenile raised concerns, two 
inquiries were made into the juvenile's competency.  The 
juvenile was first found incompetent to stand trial on March 28, 
2022, after a series of hearings beginning on February 15, 2022.  
These hearings included the testimony of three expert witnesses, 
two for the juvenile and one for the Commonwealth.  In their 
reports, the experts noted that the juvenile had previously been 
diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, 
oppositional defiant disorder, a language-based learning 
7 
 
disability, posttraumatic stress disorder, and mood 
dysregulation.  They also weighed the juvenile's 
neuropsychological evaluation, which indicated that the juvenile 
had been enrolled in an individualized education program at 
school from a young age and "overall [was] functioning in the 
borderline range cognitively and academically."  Ultimately, the 
judge found the juvenile incompetent, noting that the juvenile 
did not understand the role of the jury.   
In her written findings, the judge further found that it 
was likely the juvenile would attain competency to stand trial 
within a reasonable period of time.  She based this conclusion 
on the report of the Commonwealth's expert, as well as the 
juvenile's neuropsychological evaluation.  The juvenile was 
released the next day with six further conditions added to his 
existing conditions of release.   
After this initial finding of incompetency, the juvenile 
moved to dismiss his pending delinquency charges pursuant to 
G. L. c. 123, § 16 (f), in September 2022.  Given both the March 
2022 finding of incompetency and the implications of his 
impending eighteenth birthday (in late November 2022) on his 
pending delinquency charges, the juvenile requested that his 
next competency hearing be scheduled as soon as possible.  The 
juvenile filed a renewed motion to dismiss his pending 
8 
 
delinquency charges pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 16 (f), in 
November 2022, which was denied later that month. 
The juvenile was found incompetent to stand trial for the 
second time on June 6, 2023, by the same judge, following 
extended competency proceedings that included the testimony of 
the same three experts.  One of the juvenile's experts diagnosed 
him with borderline intellectual impairment and executive 
dysfunction, along with his preexisting diagnoses.  She 
explained that, while the juvenile may be able to "remember 
definitions" or "memorize some of the factual knowledge," it was 
nevertheless "unlikely that his rational understanding and his 
ability to help his attorney is going to change."  In their 
evaluations, the two experts for the juvenile opined that the 
juvenile could not be remediated, and all three experts noted 
deficits in his understanding.  The judge also took judicial 
notice of the fact that the juvenile had been found incompetent 
to stand trial at two prior juvenile matters in May 2018 and 
November 2018.  
At the conclusion of this second proceeding, the judge 
found the juvenile "not competent to stand trial" and focused 
her findings on his ability to remediate.  Although there was a 
"difference of opinions" among the experts as to the juvenile's 
ability to remediate, the judge found that the juvenile "does 
seem to be able to answer some of the questions that are germane 
9 
 
to competency."  In lieu of making any further findings about 
the juvenile's ability to remediate at this juncture, the judge 
found "that he [had not] been assigned the tools that might" aid 
him in attaining competency to stand trial -- in other words, 
"[n]obody is teaching him, for lack of a better way to say it."  
The judge went on to find that there was no program available in 
Massachusetts that may "remediat[e] any issues of competency."  
The judge further stated, "If there was, in Massachusetts, a 
remediation program that was specific to individuals with 
intellectual disabilities, I would be assigning him to that 
program to see if experts at that program found it to be 
beneficial to establishing competency."  Ultimately, the judge 
declined to dismiss without "fully vett[ing] all of the 
opportunities for [the juvenile] to be remediated," reasoning 
that the charges "are of grave concern to public safety and the 
community" and finding the juvenile "to be a danger."4     
On July 20, 2023, the juvenile filed a petition with a 
single justice of this court pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.  He 
challenged the judge's finding of remediability, as well as her 
decision not to dismiss the pending charges against him under 
G. L. c. 123, § 16 (f), and he raised novel questions of law.  
 
4 The same day, the Commonwealth moved to revoke the 
juvenile's release into the community because he had missed 
curfew by one hour.  The Juvenile Court denied the motion but 
added an additional three conditions to the juvenile's release. 
10 
 
The single justice reserved and reported this matter to the full 
court, pairing this case with Commonwealth v. Huacon, 494 
Mass.     (2024), for argument. 
2.  Discussion.  First, we discuss the Commonwealth's 
current statutory framework for assessing competency, G. L. 
c. 123, §§ 15 and 16.  We next determine whether this framework 
empowers the Juvenile Court to create and mandate remediation 
programming.  In the alternative, we consider whether the 
ability to create and mandate remediation programming falls 
within the inherent authority of the Juvenile Court.  Last, we 
determine whether the pending case against this juvenile, who 
has been found incompetent and who may be capable of 
remediation, demands dismissal under G. L. c. 123, § 16 (f).   
a.  Framework for assessing competency.  "It has long been 
the law of this Commonwealth that the 'trial, conviction or 
sentencing of a person charged with a criminal offence while he 
is legally incompetent violates his constitutional rights of due 
process,' . . . whether under the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
Constitution of the United States or under art. 12 of the 
Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of this Commonwealth."  
Commonwealth v. Hill, 375 Mass. 50, 51-52 (1978), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Vailes, 360 Mass. 522, 524 (1971).   
"This prohibition helps to protect the accuracy and 
reliability of criminal and delinquency proceedings by 
ensuring that criminal defendants and juveniles have the 
11 
 
ability and opportunity to communicate information to 
others that may reveal their innocence or lessen their 
degree of guilt.  It also safeguards other constitutional 
rights, 'including the right to effective assistance of 
counsel, the rights to summon, to confront, and to cross-
examine witnesses, and the right to testify on one's own 
behalf or to remain silent without penalty for doing so.'"  
(Citations omitted.)   
 
Matter of a Juvenile, 485 Mass. 831, 835 (2020).  In order to be 
found competent, a criminal defendant must have sufficient 
ability "to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of 
rational understanding" and a "rational as well as factual 
understanding of the proceedings against him."  Commonwealth v. 
Beatty, 492 Mass. 118, 125 (2023), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Russin, 420 Mass. 309, 317 (1995).  The Commonwealth bears the 
burden of proving the defendant's competency by a preponderance 
of the evidence.  Commonwealth v. Robinson, 493 Mass. 718, 724 
(2024). 
Pretrial competency determinations in all "court[s] of 
competent jurisdiction" in Massachusetts, including the Juvenile 
Court, are governed by G. L. c. 123, §§ 15 and 16.  See G. L. 
c. 123, § 15 (f) (applying to "alleged delinquent").  Where 
there is doubt that a defendant can stand trial due to "mental 
illness or mental defect," a judge may order that the defendant 
be examined by a qualified psychologist or physician.  G. L. 
c. 123, § 15 (a).  Following this initial examination, the court 
may then order the defendant to be hospitalized for no more than 
12 
 
forty days for "observation and further examination" to 
determine "whether mental illness or mental defect have so 
affected a person that he is not competent to stand trial."  
G. L. c. 123, § 15 (b).  At the end of this observation period, 
the examining physician or psychologist then must provide the 
court with a written report of findings.  See G. L. c. 123, 
§ 15 (c).  If the defendant is deemed competent, the case 
continues as usual.  See G. L. c. 123, § 15 (d).  If the 
defendant is deemed incompetent, the "trial of the case shall be 
stayed until such time as the defendant becomes competent to 
stand trial, unless the case is dismissed."  Id.  See generally 
Garcia v. Commonwealth, 487 Mass. 97, 106 n.15 (2021) 
(describing initial competency determination process provided by 
G. L. c. 123, § 15). 
If the defendant is deemed incompetent by reason of mental 
illness, specifically, see G. L. c. 123, § 8, the superintendent 
of the examining hospital facility may then petition for the 
incompetent defendant to be civilly committed, pretrial, for up 
to six months.  See G. L. c. 123, § 16 (b).  From there, a 
mentally ill defendant may be civilly committed, again pretrial, 
for additional one-year periods if certain requirements under 
G. L. c. 123, §§ 7 and 8, are met -- i.e., where "the failure to 
hospitalize would create a likelihood of serious harm by reason 
of mental illness."  G. L. c. 123, § 7 (a).  See, e.g., G. L. 
13 
 
c. 123, § 8 (commitment where person is "mentally ill," and 
their discharge would "create a likelihood of serious harm").  
See G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c).  See generally Matter of E.C., 479 
Mass. 113, 117 (2018) (describing process of civil commitment 
under G. L. c. 123, § 8). 
b.  Authority of the Juvenile Court to order remediation.  
Drawing from this statutory framework for assessing juvenile 
competency, the juvenile argues that G. L. c. 123, §§ 15 and 16, 
do not provide for remediation programming in any circumstance.  
The Commonwealth agrees that the statutory framework does not 
currently provide for remediation.  The Commonwealth instead 
advances that the power to create and mandate remediation 
programing falls within the scope of the Juvenile Court's 
inherent authority.  We first address whether the statutory 
framework allows for remediation programming.  Next, we 
determine whether the ability to create and mandate remediation 
programming falls within the inherent authority of the Juvenile 
Court.  In both inquiries, we answer in the negative.  
i.  Statutory authority.  "Our primary duty in interpreting 
a statute is to effectuate the intent of the Legislature in 
enacting it" (quotation and citation omitted).  Sheehan v. 
Weaver, 467 Mass. 734, 737 (2014).  In determining the 
Legislature's intent, we start with the statutory language and 
read for internal consistency.  See Matter of E.C., 479 Mass. at 
14 
 
118.  See also Felix F. v. Commonwealth, 471 Mass. 513, 516 
(2015).  "Ordinarily, where the language of a statute is plain 
and unambiguous, it is conclusive as to legislative intent."  
Matter of E.C., supra, quoting Malloch v. Hanover, 472 Mass. 
783, 788 (2015).  In the absence of statutory definitions, we 
read the words of a statute to have their "plain and ordinary 
meaning."   Matter of E.C., supra.  Where the meaning of 
statutory language is ambiguous, we turn to the legislative 
history to determine the Legislature's intent.  See id.  If we 
determine that statutory language is unknowably ambiguous or 
"faulty or lacks precision, it is our duty to give the statute a 
reasonable construction" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Keefner, 461 Mass. 507, 511 (2012). 
By its plain language, the function of G. L. c. 123, § 15, 
is to provide procedures to determine a person's competency -- 
not to remediate incompetency.  See Commonwealth v. Carson C., 
489 Mass. 54, 57-58 (2022) (competency of "adult or juvenile" 
defendants evaluated under G. L. c. 123, § 15).  See, e.g., 
G. L. c. 123, § 15 (a) (authorizing court to enlist "one or more 
qualified physicians or . . . psychologists" to conduct 
examination to "determin[e] mental competence to stand trial"); 
G. L. c. 123, § 15 (b) (male defendant requiring stricter 
security can be hospitalized "if the court has reason to believe 
that such observation and further examination are necessary in 
15 
 
order to determine whether mental illness or mental defect" 
renders person incompetent [emphasis added]); G. L. c. 123, 
§ 15 (d) (if necessary, court "shall hold a hearing on whether 
the defendant is competent").  In the instant case, the juvenile 
has already been found incompetent.  Because G. L. c. 123, § 15, 
does not provide for observation or examination beyond the point 
of determining whether a defendant is competent, it does not 
provide a vehicle for remediation programming. 
The question then becomes whether G. L. c. 123, § 16 (b), 
allows the Juvenile Court to order the juvenile to be civilly 
committed for purposes of remediation.  Importantly, G. L. 
c. 123, § 16, by reference to G. L. c. 123, § 8, requires that a 
juvenile be "mentally ill" to be civilly committed.  See, e.g., 
Matter of Hernandez, 101 Mass. App. Ct. 856, 860, 869-870 (2022) 
(defendant incompetent by reason of mental illness for purposes 
of civil commitment due to, among other factors, psychosis and 
schizophrenia); Matter of D.K., 95 Mass. App. Ct. 95, 96-97 
(2019) (defendant incompetent by reason of mental illness for 
purposes of civil commitment due to, among other factors, 
schizophrenia, delusions, and perceptual disturbances).  Here, 
the juvenile has been diagnosed with a language-based learning 
disability, among other information-processing disorders, which 
both parties agree are distinct from mental illness as that term 
is defined by regulation.  See 104 Code Mass. Regs. § 27.05(1) 
16 
 
(2021) (defining mental illness for purposes of involuntary 
commitment as "a substantial disorder of thought, mood, 
perception, orientation, or memory which grossly impairs 
judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality or ability to 
meet the ordinary demands of life, but shall not include 
intellectual or developmental disabilities, autism spectrum 
disorder, traumatic brain injury or psychiatric or behavioral 
disorders or symptoms due to another medical condition").5  The 
juvenile is not incompetent by reason of mental illness but, 
rather, by the effect of his numerous diagnoses on his ability 
to understand the role of a jury and otherwise assist his 
attorney, such that the discussion of civil commitment in § 16 
is inapplicable to the issue of remediation here.  Cf. 
Commonwealth v. DelVerde, 401 Mass. 447, 449-450 (1988) (when 
"depression, coupled with [intellectual impairment], severely 
affect[s] . . . behavior and mood," mental condition can qualify 
as mental illness for purposes of civil commitment [emphasis 
added; footnote omitted]).  See generally G. L. c. 123B, § 1 
("no person with [either] a developmental disability [or an 
intellectual disability] shall be considered to be mentally ill 
 
5 The Department of Mental Health promulgated this 
definition pursuant to its authority under G. L. c. 123, § 2, to 
"define the categories of mental illness for the purpose of 
[c. 123]."  See generally District Court Standards of Judicial 
Practice:  Civil Commitment and Authorization of Medical 
Treatment for Mental Illness (rev. Apr. 2019). 
17 
 
solely by reason of the person's developmental [or intellectual] 
disability"). 
Because G. L. c. 123, § 15, only allows for examination of 
a juvenile defendant in order to determine competency, rather 
than to remediate incompetency, and because civil commitment 
under G. L. c. 123, § 16, requires that a juvenile be mentally 
ill, not otherwise impaired, the mental health code provides 
neither for the remediation of incompetent defendants nor for 
the commitment of those incompetent due to reasons other than 
mental illness.  
ii.  Inherent authority.  In the absence of a statute 
providing for remediation, the Commonwealth argues that the 
Juvenile Court is empowered to create and mandate remediation 
programming pursuant to its inherent authority.  However, the 
creation of remediation programming for incompetent 
juveniles strays beyond the bounds of the Juvenile Court's 
inherent authority and is best left to the Legislature.  See 
generally Spinelli v. Commonwealth, 393 Mass. 240, 243 (1984) 
("The Legislature may, in some circumstances, provide a 
legislative remedy where the courts have determined there is no 
judicial remedy").    
Inherent judicial powers flow from the "lofty principles" 
secured by arts. 11 and 29 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights, guaranteeing residents the impartial administration of 
18 
 
justice.  First Justice of the Bristol Div. of the Juvenile 
Court Dep't v. Clerk-magistrate of the Bristol Div. of the 
Juvenile Court Dep't, 438 Mass. 387, 396-397 (2003).  See Bower 
v. Bournay-Bower, 469 Mass. 690, 698 (2014), quoting Sheriff of 
Middlesex County v. Commissioner of Correction, 383 Mass. 631, 
636 (1981) ("We have long recognized that courts in this 
Commonwealth possess certain inherent powers whose exercise is 
'essential to the function of the judicial department, to the 
maintenance of its authority, or to its capacity to decide 
cases'").  The judiciary's inherent authority is to be invoked 
only when established methods fail, Brach v. Chief Justice of 
the Dist. Court Dep't, 386 Mass. 528, 536 (1982), and its scope 
is concurrent with its purpose:  "to allow judges to perform 
core functions necessary for the proper administration of 
justice," Campatelli v. Chief Justice of the Trial Court, 468 
Mass. 455, 476 (2014) (includes supervisory authority over 
personnel within judicial system).  See Commonwealth v. 
Teixeira, 475 Mass. 482, 483 (2016) (includes authority to order 
prehearing discovery); Gray v. Commissioner of Revenue, 422 
Mass. 666, 672-673 (1996) (includes authority to grant change of 
venue, to use contempt proceedings, to appoint guardian ad 
litem, to impound files, and to revoke judgment obtained by 
fraud); Chief Admin. Justice of the Trial Court v. Labor 
Relations Comm'n, 404 Mass. 53, 57 (1989) (includes authority to 
19 
 
control court room proceedings); O'Coin's, Inc. v. Treasurer of 
the County of Worcester, 362 Mass. 507, 510 (1972) (includes 
rulemaking and administrative authority, as well as authority to 
commit fiscal resources to operation of court system).  
The establishment of pretrial remediation programming for 
incompetent juveniles strays beyond the bounds of the "internal 
functioning of the judiciary" and therefore beyond the scope of 
the court's inherent authority.  Commonwealth v. Dodge, 428 
Mass. 860, 866 (1999) (ability to impose conditions on pretrial 
release is not essential to judicial function and therefore is 
beyond scope of inherent authority).  A similar issue arose in 
Department of Mental Retardation v. Kendrew, 418 Mass. 50, 54-55 
(1994).6  There, a District Court judge was confronted with a 
criminal defendant who was incompetent to stand trial by reason 
of intellectual impairment.  Id.  While the District Court could 
not commit the defendant under G. L. c. 123, § 16, as she was 
not mentally ill, the trial judge instead used his authority to 
place the defendant in a long-term residential treatment 
program.  See id. at 54.  On review, we acknowledged that 
although "courts of the Commonwealth have certain inherent and 
implied powers," this "legislative 'gap' or 'crack' was not 
 
6 The department has since been renamed the Department of 
Developmental Services.  See Judge Rotenberg Educ. Ctr., Inc. v. 
Commissioner of the Dep't of Developmental Servs., 492 Mass. 
772, 778 n.8 (2023). 
20 
 
within a court's [inherent] power to fill."  Id. at 55.  Because 
the order was neither "authorized by a necessary and inevitable 
implication of the court's power to decide criminal cases and 
impose penalties" nor "an ancillary function in the nature of 
rule-making or judicial administration," it strayed beyond the 
bounds of the District Court's authority.  Id. at 55-56.  
Accordingly, we vacated the trial judge's order.  See id. at 57. 
Again here, crafting remediation programming for juveniles 
goes beyond the court's inherent authority and requires a level 
of policy-making typically reserved for the Legislature.  See 
Kendrew, 418 Mass. at 55-56.  See also Hancock v. Commissioner 
of Educ., 443 Mass. 428, 466-467 (2005) (Cowin, J., concurring) 
(separation of powers demands "that the judiciary stay out of 
the business of educational policy").  The existence of "gap[s]" 
in G. L. c. 123, §§ 15 to 16, such that the statutes fail to 
provide for the remediation of incompetent juveniles and provide 
for the civil commitment only of the mentally ill, does not 
empower Juvenile Court judges to take matters into their own 
hands in the name of resolving criminal cases efficiently.  
Kendrew, supra.  See Matter of a Juvenile, 485 Mass. at 835 
(prohibition on trying incompetent defendants central to 
"accuracy and reliability of criminal and delinquency 
proceedings").   
21 
 
Indeed, as recently as 2023, the Legislature proposed a 
bill specifically addressing the remediation of incompetent 
juveniles.  See House Bill No. 1554, § 4 (Jan. 20, 2023) (would 
add new section, G. L. c. 123, § 15A, providing that if juvenile 
is incompetent but capable of remediation, "the court shall stay 
the proceedings and order the youth to receive services designed 
to achieve competence").  See generally Commonwealth v. Clerk of 
the Boston Div. of the Juvenile Court Dep't, 432 Mass. 693, 699 
(2000), quoting School Comm. of Worcester v. Worcester Div. of 
the Juvenile Court Dep't, 410 Mass. 831, 834 (1991) ("[j]uvenile 
courts, like all the courts of the Commonwealth, except the 
Supreme Judicial Court, are creatures of the Legislature and 
derive their powers, other than those powers that are inherent 
in all courts . . . from the Legislature").  The proposed bill 
would, inter alia, repeal part of G. L. c. 123, § 15, and insert 
a new section following it, in order to, among other goals, 
provide additional guidance for initial competency 
determinations, vest courts with the authority to order 
remediation programming, and offer different routes to dismissal 
for irremediable juveniles based upon their different predicate 
offenses.  See House Bill No. 1554, §§ 3, 4.7  
 
7 We note that the bill would repeal a portion of G. L. 
c. 123, § 15, and add a new § 15A to "reform[] juvenile offender 
law."  See House Bill No. 1554 (titled "An Act reforming 
juvenile offender law").  It is noteworthy that this proposed 
22 
 
Our Legislature would not be alone in acting on the issue 
of juvenile incompetency and remediation -- rather, remediation 
programs across the country have begun with State legislatures 
and reflect the complex policy considerations involved.  For 
instance, States differ as to whether remediation programming is 
crafted by the court on a defendant-by-defendant basis, see, 
e.g., Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 709(g)(2) ("court may make any 
orders necessary to assist with the delivery of remediation 
services in an alternative setting to secure confinement"), or 
simply ordered by the court and then provided by a predetermined 
agency within the State, see, e.g., Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 15, 
§ 3318-B (juvenile court shall "refer the juvenile to the 
 
legislation from the 2023 session is not the first of its kind.  
See House Bill No. 1665 (Feb. 18, 2021).   
 
Material here, if a juvenile is ultimately found not 
competent but capable of remediation, the court would be 
empowered under the proposed law to stay proceedings, order the 
juvenile to receive services, and review his or her progress 
every 180 days.  See House Bill No. 1554, § 4 (proposed G. L. 
c. 123, § 15A [d]).   
 
From there, the bill varies the procedure for dismissal by 
predicate offense.  For instance, misdemeanor charges are to be 
dismissed if the juvenile has not remediated after 180 days, but 
felony charges would only be dismissed if the juvenile has not 
remediated within two years.  See House Bill No. 1554, § 4 
(proposed G. L. c. 123, § 15A [e]-[f]).  In the case of a 
juvenile charged with murder, the court would retain 
jurisdiction for five years or until the juvenile reaches 
twenty-one years of age, and only then would the pending charges 
be subject to dismissal if the juvenile remains not competent.  
See House Bill No. 1554, § 4 (proposed G. L. c. 123, § 15A [g]).   
23 
 
Commissioner of Health and Human Services for evaluation and 
treatment"); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2401.4(g) (effective Jan. 1, 
2025) ("The Division [of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention of the Department of Public Safety] shall be 
responsible for the provision of psychoeducation remediation 
programming . . ."); Utah Code Ann. § 80-6-403(1) (if juvenile 
determined not competent, "the juvenile court shall notify the 
[Department of Health and Human Services]" and "allow the 
department [thirty] days to develop an attainment plan for the 
minor").  Regardless of approach, State statutes on this topic 
provide courts and agencies alike with the necessary authority 
and guidance to proceed.  See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 12.47.110 
(allowing court to commit incompetent defendants to State 
agency, providing timelines for remediation, and discussing how 
dismissal is affected by severity of predicate offense).   
Altogether, the power to create and mandate remediation 
programming for juveniles found incompetent to stand trial falls 
beyond the scope of the Juvenile Court's inherent authority, 
such that this responsibility is best left to the Legislature. 
c.  Application and appropriate remedy.  Pending 
delinquency charges are not currently subject to dismissal under 
G. L. c. 123, § 16 (f).  See Sharris v. Commonwealth, 480 Mass. 
586, 594 (2018) ("G. L. c. 123, § 16 (f), implicitly excludes 
dismissal of charges" that would "never be eligible for 
24 
 
parole").  See also Abbott A. v. Commonwealth, 458 Mass. 24, 39 
n.16 (2010) (delinquency charges involve neither criminal 
sentencing nor parole).  The juvenile therefore argues that 
fundamental fairness and due process require that G. L. c. 123, 
§ 16 (f), allow for the dismissal of pending delinquency 
charges.  In opposition, the Commonwealth relies on the public 
safety threat posed by the juvenile.  
i.  General Laws c. 123, § 16 (f).8  The mental health code 
provides two avenues to dismissal under G. L. c. 123, § 16 (f), 
"[i]f a person is found incompetent to stand trial," such as the 
juvenile here.  See Sharris, 480 Mass. at 593 ("General Laws 
c. 123, § 16 (f), is intended to ensure that [persons] who are 
incompetent to stand trial are not left facing the indefinite 
pendency of criminal charges").  First, the case against an 
 
8 General Laws c. 123, § 16 (f), provides: 
 
"If a person is found incompetent to stand trial, the court 
shall send notice to the department of correction which 
shall compute the date of the expiration of the period of 
time equal to the time of imprisonment which the person 
would have had to serve prior to becoming eligible for 
parole if he had been convicted of the most serious crime 
with which he was charged in court and sentenced to the 
maximum sentence he could have received, if so convicted.  
For purposes of the computation of parole eligibility, the 
minimum sentence shall be regarded as one half of the 
maximum sentence . . . .  On the final date of such period, 
the court shall dismiss the criminal charges against such 
person, or the court in the interest of justice may dismiss 
the criminal charges against such person prior to the 
expiration of such period."   
25 
 
incompetent person can be dismissed after the expiration of half 
of the time it would have taken for the defendant to become 
eligible for parole had they received the maximum possible 
sentence.  See G. L. c. 123, § 16 (f); Foss v. Commonwealth, 437 
Mass. 584, 585 (2002).  In the alternative, charges against a 
person found incompetent to stand trial can be dismissed "in the 
interest of justice."  G. L. c. 123, § 16 (f).  We have 
discussed the "in the interest of justice" prong of G. L. 
c. 123, § 16 (f), in two main cases:  Commonwealth v. Calvaire, 
476 Mass. 242, 247 (2017); and Sharris, 480 Mass. at 601-602.   
In Calvaire, 476 Mass. at 243-246, we held that a pending 
case against an incompetent person can be dismissed "in the 
interest of justice" under the second prong of G. L. c. 123, 
§ 16 (f), "even before the maximum parole eligibility date has 
been reached" under the first prong of G. L. c. 123, § 16 (f).  
We explained that the "interest of justice" language of § 16 (f) 
provides a "safety valve" for dismissal where it is unlikely 
that a defendant will regain competency for trial -- for 
example, where "the defendant's chances of being restored to 
competency are slim."  Id. at 247.  In this way, the provision 
"safeguard[s]" the two compelling State interests served by the 
statute:  (1) protecting incompetent persons from indefinitely 
pending criminal charges and (2) protecting the public from 
potentially dangerous persons.  Id. at 246.  In deciding whether 
26 
 
to dismiss "in the interest of justice," we explained that 
judges are empowered to consider factors outside of the 
statutory framework of G. L. c. 123.  Id.  For instance, we 
weighed in favor of dismissal the fact that the defendant was 
"deemed incompetent for more than half of the time since the 
charge was brought in [his] case."  Id. at 247 n.13. 
The following year, in Sharris, 480 Mass. at 593-595, this 
court ordered the dismissal of pending charges "in the interest 
of justice" even where the defendant was not eligible for parole 
and therefore "implicitly exclude[d]" from dismissal under G. L. 
c. 123, § 16 (f).  Because "a defendant's liberty interests 
during the pendency of a criminal trial are fundamental rights," 
we undertook a substantive due process analysis and applied 
strict scrutiny.  Id. at 597.  When we analyzed the two 
compelling State interests identified in Calvaire, 476 Mass. at 
246, we looked to whether the defendant posed a present danger 
to public safety, rather than considering his history of 
violence.  See Sharris, supra at 599.  Ultimately, we held that 
G. L. c. 123, § 16 (f), satisfies substantive due process "only 
insofar as it is understood to allow the dismissal of charges, 
in the interest of justice, in circumstances such as these, 
where the defendant will never regain competency and does not 
pose a risk to public safety."  Id. at 602.  In our analysis, we 
emphasized that "allowing charges that can never be resolved at 
27 
 
a trial to remain pending indefinitely is inconsistent with [the 
defendant's] right to substantive due process," particularly 
when it was "undisputed that the defendant [would] never become 
competent" to stand trial.  Id. at 601-602.   
As these cases demonstrate, to decide the issues before us 
today we must first assess whether a juvenile offender is 
eligible for parole.  See Sharris, 480 Mass. at 593-595; 
Calvaire, 476 Mass. at 243-246.  The first prong of the statute 
explicitly calculates a dismissal date using the defendant's 
parole eligibility, and the second prong allows for dismissal 
"in the interest of justice . . . prior to the expiration of 
such period [calculated under the first prong]."  G. L. c. 123, 
§ 16 (f).  Here, the juvenile faces both delinquency and 
youthful offender charges.  As noted supra, delinquency charges 
are "implicitly exclude[d]" from dismissal under G. L. c. 123, 
§ 16 (f), because they involve neither criminal sentencing nor 
parole.  See Sharris, supra at 594.  See also Abbott A., 458 
Mass. at 39 n.16.  Youthful offender charges, on the other hand, 
can be sentenced in one of three ways:  the juvenile can be 
sentenced as an adult, the juvenile can be committed to the 
Department of Youth Services until the age of twenty-one, or the 
juvenile can receive a "combination sentence" of commitment to 
the Department of Youth Services followed by probation and an 
adult sentence.  G. L. c. 119, § 58 (a)-(c).  See Commonwealth 
28 
 
v. Terrell, 486 Mass. 596, 599-600 (2021).  There is no way to 
know which avenue the judge would have taken in sentencing here 
and, importantly for purposes of G. L. c. 123, § 16 (f), whether 
the juvenile's sentence would have involved parole.   
Therefore, because the juvenile is not eligible for 
dismissal of his delinquency charges and may not be eligible for 
dismissal of his youthful offender charges, depending on 
sentencing, "[w]e analyze his claim on substantive due process 
grounds."  Sharris, 480 Mass. at 594.  Where indefinitely 
pending charges burden a fundamental liberty interest, we apply 
strict scrutiny.  See id. at 595-602 ("a defendant's liberty 
interests during the pendency of a criminal trial are 
fundamental rights," triggering strict scrutiny).  See 
Commonwealth v. Weston W., 455 Mass. 24, 35 (2009) (for statute 
to satisfy strict scrutiny, it "must be narrowly tailored to 
further a legitimate and compelling governmental interest and be 
the least restrictive means available to vindicate that 
interest"). 
ii.  Substantive due process.  A.  Liberty interest.  
Although the juvenile is in the community, he claims his liberty 
is impaired by "his many conditions of release and the continued 
pendency of the [youthful offender and delinquency] charges 
against him."  In both Calvaire, 476 Mass. at 243, and Sharris, 
480 Mass. at 587, the defendant was subject to civil commitment.  
29 
 
However, physical detention is not necessary to show that a 
juvenile's liberty interest has been burdened -- indeed, "the 
United States Supreme Court has determined that a defendant's 
liberty interest may be restricted simply by the pendency of 
criminal changes, even where the defendant is not held in 
custody."  Sharris, supra at 597.   
The fact that the juvenile is subject to indefinitely 
pending charges further establishes the burden upon his liberty 
and triggers a substantive due process analysis.  See Jackson v. 
Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 740 (1972) ("denial of due process 
inherent in holding pending criminal charges indefinitely over 
the head of one who will never have a chance to prove his 
innocence").9  Three main factors render the charges against the 
juvenile indefinite.  First, the juvenile is incompetent and, 
because there is no remediation programming available in the 
Commonwealth, cannot be expected to attain competency and stand 
trial in the foreseeable future.  See Kendrew, 418 Mass. at 55-
56.  Second, because the Juvenile Court retains jurisdiction 
over the juvenile "pending final adjudication," and because the 
juvenile's case cannot be finally adjudicated while the juvenile 
remains incompetent, the juvenile cannot age out of these 
 
9 Because the juvenile focuses on the pending delinquency 
charges and the second prong of G. L. c. 123, § 16 (f), we limit 
our analysis to these issues. 
30 
 
proceedings.  G. L. c. 119, § 72 (a) ("The divisions of the 
juvenile court department shall continue to have jurisdiction 
over children who attain their eighteenth birthday pending final 
adjudication of their cases . . .").  See generally Commonwealth 
v. Cole C., 92 Mass. App. Ct. 653, 659 (2018) (G. L. c. 119, 
§ 72, "recognized that the Juvenile Court retains jurisdiction 
over cases that were pending when the juvenile turns eighteen").  
Third, the pending delinquency charges against the juvenile 
cannot be dismissed by reason of the juvenile's incompetency, as 
they do not involve parole and are therefore "implicitly 
exclude[d]" from dismissal under G. L. c. 123, § 16 (f).  
Sharris, 480 Mass. at 594.  See Abbott A., 458 Mass. at 39 n.16.  
For all the foregoing reasons, although the juvenile is not 
civilly committed and is currently living in the community, his 
liberty is constrained by living under indefinitely pending 
charges.  See Jackson, supra; Sharris, supra at 597. 
B.  Two compelling State interests served by indefinitely 
pending charges.  I.  Protecting incompetent persons from facing 
indefinitely pending charges.  Presently, charges have been 
pending against the juvenile for over two years since he was 
initially found incompetent in March 2022, more than half of the 
time since charges were first brought against him.  See 
Calvaire, 476 Mass. at 247 n.13 (fact that defendant had "been 
deemed incompetent for more than half of the time since the 
31 
 
charge was brought" favored dismissal).  Because no remediation 
programming exists within the Commonwealth, supra, we conclude 
on this record that the juvenile is not likely to attain 
competency to stand trial in the foreseeable future.   
In light of this fact, we hold that maintaining indefinite 
charges against the juvenile is not narrowly tailored to the 
State's interest of protecting incompetent persons from facing 
indefinitely pending charges.  See Foss, 437 Mass. at 589 
(mental health code was promulgated, in part, to "eliminat[e] 
the indefinite pendency of criminal charges" against incompetent 
defendants "awaiting their unlikely restoration to competency").  
The rehabilitative goals of the juvenile justice system, which 
include minimizing interactions between juveniles and the 
justice system, support this conclusion.  See G. L. c. 119, § 53 
("as far as practicable, [delinquent children] shall be treated, 
not as criminals, but as children in need of aid, encouragement 
and guidance").  See also Carson C., 489 Mass. at 63 (juveniles 
have "significant" interest in avoiding interaction with justice 
system, even as early as arraignment, due to "the ramifications 
of criminal and delinquency records").  Cf. Abbott A., 458 Mass. 
at 40-41 (rule of reasonableness does not allow for incompetent 
juvenile's pretrial detention where it "fails to result in 
progress toward achieving competency or has become unreasonable 
in duration").   
32 
 
II.  Protecting the public from potentially dangerous 
persons.  The other compelling State interest served by 
maintaining pending charges against the juvenile is protecting 
the public from potentially dangerous persons.  See Calvaire, 
476 Mass. at 246.  In Sharris, 480 Mass. at 599-600, this court 
analyzed the threat to public safety posed by a defendant 
declared incompetent to stand trial for murder in the first 
degree.  Regardless of the "defendant's history of violence," 
both before the murder and during his subsequent civil 
commitment, we focused our discussion on the threat posed by the 
defendant in the "now."  Id. at 599 (considering medical 
condition and concluding that "the defendant is now too 
physically weak to pose a danger to public safety"). 
 
Here, the judge did not make findings on the present threat 
to public safety posed by the juvenile.  In her analysis, she 
found the juvenile to be a "danger" because "[t]he charges here 
are of grave concern to public safety and the community."  
However, the judge made her findings in June 2023, and the 
charges arose from the April 2021 incident, marking a roughly 
two-year gap.  At the time of the June 2023 hearing, the 
juvenile had been living in the community since March 2022 under 
extensive conditions of release and had accrued no further 
criminal charges in the interim.  Neither of these factors was 
included in the judge's findings as to the juvenile's present 
33 
 
dangerousness.  Because the judge did not look to the present 
danger posed by the juvenile and instead focused on the 
underlying offense, see Sharris, 480 Mass. at 599, we remand for 
further findings on the juvenile's present dangerousness.      
3.  Conclusion.  The current statutory framework for 
assessing competency, G. L. c. 123, §§ 15-16, does not provide 
for the remediation of incompetent juveniles.  The task of 
establishing and mandating remediation programming falls outside 
the scope of the Juvenile Court's inherent authority and is more 
appropriately left to the Legislature.  Finally, regarding 
dismissal under G. L. c. 123, § 16 (f) ("in the interest of 
justice"), we remand for further findings on whether the 
juvenile poses a present danger to the public safety. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.