Title: Whitfield v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 156, 2004
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: December 29, 2004

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
MUSTAFA WHITFIELD, 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§    No. 156, 2004 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§  
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§   Court Below – Superior Court  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   of the State of Delaware, 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§   in and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   Cr.A. No. 0210009174 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§  
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§  
 
Submitted: November 17, 2004  
   Decided:  December 29, 2004 
 
Before HOLLAND, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Joseph M. Bernstein, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware, for appellant. 
 
 
Elizabeth R. McFarlan, Esquire and Gregory E. Smith, Esquire, 
Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
2
 
The defendant-appellant, Mustafa Whitfield and co-defendants, 
Emmanuel Robinson and Akeem Coleman were jointly indicted on the 
following charges:  (I) Attempted Robbery in the First Degree; (II) 
Possession of a Firearm During Commission of a Felony; (III) Assault in the 
Second Degree; (IV) Possession of a Firearm During Commission of a 
Felony (“PFDCF”); (V) Reckless Endangering in the First Degree; (VI) 
Possession of a Firearm During Commission of a Felony (“PFDCF”); (VII) 
Wearing a Disguise During Commission of a Felony; (VIII) Conspiracy in 
the Second Degree; and (IX) Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person 
Prohibited (“PDWPP”).  Following a joint trial by jury, all of the defendants 
were convicted of all of the charges except Counts II and IX, as to which all 
of the defendants were found “not guilty.” 
Whitfield has raised three issues on appeal.  First, he contends that the 
trial judge should have granted his Motion for Acquittal.  Whitfield argues 
that the offenses of Reckless Endangering and Assault in the Second Degree 
(and the accompanying weapons charges) are “included” in the offense of 
Attempted Robbery in the First Degree and did not constitute separate 
offenses.  Second, Whitfield submits the question whether the offenses of 
Reckless Endangering, Assault in the Second Degree (and the accompanying 
weapons charges) and Attempted Robbery in the First Degree constituted a 
 
3
single offense or separate multiple offenses should have been submitted to 
the jury and that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to instruct 
the jury pursuant to this Court’s decision in Washington v. State.1  Third, 
Whitfield argues that the verdicts returned by the jury were inconsistent and 
amounted to “compromise verdicts” which are invalid as a matter of law. 
 
We have concluded that each of the issues raised by Whitfield is 
without merit.  Therefore, the judgments of the Superior Court must be 
affirmed. 
Procedural History 
 
At the close of the prosecution’s case, Whitfield made an oral and 
then written motion for judgment of acquittal.  The Superior Court reserved 
decision on the motion for judgment of acquittal.  The matter continued to 
the defendants’ case-in-chief.  The jury returned verdicts in which Whitfield 
(as well as his two co-defendants) were found guilty of:  Attempted Robbery 
in the First Degree; Assault in the Second Degree; Wearing a Disguise 
During the Commission of a Felony; two counts of PFDCF; Reckless 
Endangering in the First Degree; and Conspiracy in the Second Degree.  The 
jury acquitted all three co-defendants of PDWPP and one count of PFDCF. 
                                          
 
1 Washington v. State, 836 A.2d 485 (Del. 2003). 
 
4
 
Whitfield moved for a new trial.  That motion alleged one ground for 
relief:  that the jury’s verdicts represented a compromise verdict which was 
the product of coercion and the court’s decision to give the jury an Allen 
charge over the defendants’ objection.  Whitfield’s motion for a new trial 
was denied.   
 
Following a pre-sentence investigation, the Superior Court sentenced 
Whitfield to:  seven years at Level V, suspended after four years for 
decreasing levels of supervision on the count of Attempted Robbery; four 
years at Level V, suspended after one year for decreasing levels of 
supervision on the count of Assault Second; three years at Level V on one 
count of PFDCF; three years at Level V, suspended immediately for 
decreasing levels of supervision on the count of Reckless Endangering; three 
years at Level V on the second count of PFDCF; two years at Level V, 
suspended immediately on the count of Wearing a Disguise During the 
Commission of a Felony; and two years at Level V, suspended immediately 
on the count of Conspiracy.   
Facts 
 
Anthony Meek arrived home at about 11:30 p.m. on October 14, 
2002.  He parked his Chevy Cavalier behind his house.  While parking the 
 
5
car, Meek noticed three black males walking around the corner heading 
toward him.  Two of the males had something wrapped around their faces.   
The three men came around the front of Meek’s car while he was 
getting out of it.  One of the men, the one without anything covering his 
face, was holding a black semiautomatic handgun.  The gunman told Meek 
to “Give up the keys.”  
 
When Meek began arguing, the gunman told one of the other men to 
grab the keys.  Meek was holding the keys in his hand.  As the man grabbed 
for the keys, Meek wrapped his arm around the man’s neck and a struggle 
ensued.  Meek tripped and the two of them fell back on the curb.  The third 
assailant tried to pull his companion off of Meek while telling the gunman to 
shoot. The gunman fired toward Meek and the three would-be robbers took 
off running. 
 
Meek began to chase his assailants.  As they were running down the 
street, the gunman turned and fired at Meek again.  Meek immediately felt 
pain in his foot and gave up the chase.  Meek was subsequently treated at the 
hospital for a gunshot wound to his foot.   
 
At about 11:50 p.m., two Wilmington police officers spotted three 
black males running a few blocks away. As the police approached to 
question the men, two of them jumped over a six-foot high brick wall and 
 
6
ran away.  The third man, Akeem Coleman, was stopped and a black 9mm 
handgun was retrieved from the sidewalk near where Coleman was taken 
into custody.  The shell casings found near Meek’s car were later shown to 
have been fired by that gun.  
 
About five to ten minutes after Coleman was taken into custody, 
police saw two black men, one without a shirt, walking toward an apartment 
complex a few blocks from where the men had gone over the wall.  
Believing it odd that the men were not wearing coats in the cold weather and 
were sweating, the police suspected that these were the two men who had 
fled.  The police stopped the two men who were identified as Mustafa 
Whitfield and Emmanuel Robinson.  A white t-shirt found near Meek’s car 
contained DNA that matched that of Robinson. 
 
At trial, Whitfield testified in his own defense, explaining that he was 
on his way to meet a girl he had met on a chat line at an apartment building 
near where he was detained.  Whitfield said that he had run into Robinson 
shortly before being approached by police.  Coleman and Robinson elected 
not to testify.  
 
Whitfield and his co-defendants were each charged with several 
criminal offenses as a result of their attempt to rob Meek.  At trial, and on 
appeal, Whitfield argues that the Attempted Robbery in the First Degree, 
 
7
Assault in the Second Degree and Reckless Endangerment in the First 
Degree convictions constituted a single offense of Attempted Robbery in the 
First Degree rather than three distinct offenses.  Whitfield also contends that 
all of the related weapons offenses should be merged into the attempted 
robbery offense.   
The Superior Court found that the evidence was sufficient to support 
separate charges for attempted robbery, assault and reckless endangerment.  
The Superior Court also determined that permitting separate convictions for 
the weapons offenses relating to the underlying felony offenses was 
supported by the evidence and the prior decisions of this Court.  We have 
concluded that both of those determinations are correct.   
 
Whitfield submits that his actions on the night of October 14-15 
constitute a continuous course of conduct for which he may properly be 
convicted only once.  It is well-established that “prosecutors may not 
manufacture additional counts of a particular crime by the ‘simple expedient 
of dividing a single crime into a series of temporal or spatial units.’”2 
However, where a defendant’s actions are “sufficiently separated in location 
                                          
 
2 Handy v. State, 803 A.2d 937, 940-41 (Del. 2002) (quoting Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 
161, 169 (1977)). 
 
8
and time” and where the defendant formed “distinct intents,” that conduct 
can constitute distinct criminal acts.3   
Acquittal Motion Properly Denied 
It is unnecessary to address Whitfield’s arguments that these crimes 
would constitute lesser-included offenses if the charges were attributable to 
a single criminal act.  The record reflects that Whitfield and his co-
defendants committed three distinct offenses during a continuum of criminal 
activity.  Therefore, we conclude that Whitfield could properly be charged 
and convicted of all three offenses.   
Whitfield and his co-defendants initially attempted to rob Meek of his 
car.  As the three men approached Meek, Coleman displayed a handgun and 
directed Meek to relinquish the keys to his car.  Accordingly, the record 
reflects the three men attempted to rob Meek by depriving him of his 
property through the threat of force, i.e., Attempted Robbery in the First 
Degree. 
Meek refused to give up his keys and shouted at the would-be robbers.  
Coleman then told one of his confederates to take the keys.  Meek resisted 
and a struggle ensued.  Meek put his arm around the neck of his assailant 
and used the man as a shield.  The third would-be robber separated the 
                                          
 
3 Washington v. State, 836 A.2d 485, 487 (Del. 2003); Feddiman v. State, 558 A.2d 278 
(Del. 1989). 
 
9
struggling men.  Coleman then fired a shot in Meek’s direction.  At this 
point, the State submits, Coleman was no longer trying to rob Meek, but was 
trying to protect his confederates.  The record supports the State’s assertion 
that, when Coleman shot at Meek, it was a distinct act that could properly be 
charged as a separate offense, i.e., Reckless Endangerment in the First 
Degree.   
 
After the shot was fired, the fight broke up. The three would-be 
robbers fled the scene.  Meek began to chase them.  As all four men were 
running down the street, Coleman turned and fired at Meek, hitting him in 
the foot.   This shot was separated by several minutes and occurred some 
distance away from the scene of the original attempted robbery.   
The State submits that wounding Meek was a separate offense.  The 
record supports the State’s position.  Coleman had to consciously decide to 
stop and shoot at Meek, with an intention of inflicting physical injury.  At 
that point, the attempted robbery was over.  The keys to Meek’s car were 
lying on the street.  When Coleman fired the second shot that hit Meek in the 
foot, the record reflects that it was a separate and distinct criminal act, i.e., 
Assault in the Second Degree.   
 
The Superior Court properly concluded “there’s a perfectly logical 
basis, in fact, for the three separate charges.”  Under the facts of this case, 
 
10
the two shots fired by Coleman constituted two additional criminal offenses 
and should not be merged with the attempted robbery offense.  The record 
reflects that the three charged offenses of attempted robbery, reckless 
endangering and assault were all separate and distinct criminal actions.   
Jury Instruction Discretionary 
 
Whitfield’s second argument is that, as a result of this Court’s 
decision in Washington,4 he was entitled to a jury instruction permitting the 
jury to determine whether the counts of Attempted Robbery in the First 
Degree, Assault in the Second Degree, and Reckless Endangering in the 
First Degree were separate offenses or part of the same conduct.  In 
Washington, this Court stated that “[i]f the trial judge makes an independent 
determination that sufficient evidence has been submitted to support separate 
convictions, defense counsel can ask for a jury instruction on those factual 
issues or the trial judge may sua sponte decide to give such an instruction.”5  
Whitfield’s trial attorney made such a request, which the trial judge denied. 
 
In denying Whitfield’s motion for a judgment of acquittal, the 
Superior Court explained why it was exercising its discretion to deny 
Whitfield’s request for a jury instruction based upon the Washington 
decision: 
                                          
 
4 Washington v. State, 836 A.2d 485, 491-92 (Del. 2003). 
5 Id. at 491-92. 
 
11
With regard to this motion for judgment of acquittal, I think 
that the defendants misread Washington.  The judgment of 
acquittal on Assault Second and Reckless Endangering on the 
grounds that the crimes were a single course of conduct, not 
distinct acts, which permitted multiple counts.  The testimony 
of the victim provides separate convictions of Robbery First 
and Assault Second. The Robbery First allegedly occurred near 
the victim’s car.  When he was told to give up his keys, he 
resisted, a scuffle ensued and a firearm was discharged. The 
three perpetrators could not have foreseen the victim would 
chase them.   
 
Consequently, no perpetrator formed the state of mind a second 
time until the situation arose.  When the victim gave chase – the 
victim gave chase and one of the perpetrators turned and fired a 
second time. 
 
It is the second firing which forms the basis for the charge of 
Assault in the Second Degree. 
 
There’s a factual issue as to whether the victim was injured at 
that final time or at the time of the first shot or at the time of the 
second shot. 
 
He said he didn’t feel any pain in his foot – until the second 
shot was fired, but he had been able to run until that point. . . .  
 
There was a separation of the two incidents between time and 
some place. There’s also a factual basis for a separate intent for 
the intent to shoot a second time, which could not have been 
formed until the victim undertook to pursue the perpetrators. 
 
I’m not going to give any instruction that’s related to the 
Washington case. . . . 
 
So I think that there’s a perfectly logical basis, in fact, for the 
three separate charges. 
 
There’s reason here.  There’s no double jeopardy issue[s].  And 
really the simplest explanation that the State argued is this isn’t 
 
12
multiple counts of the same crime. These are different crimes.  
It is not this scenario where there are multiple acts of rape or 
multiple acts of robbery, such as the Washington case was. 
 
Our holding in Washington did not mandate giving the jury 
instructions at issue whenever a request is made by defense counsel.6  In this 
case, the Superior Court provided a logical legal and factual basis for 
denying Whitfield’s requested jury instruction.  That instruction was not 
required by our holding in Washington and, under the facts of this case, the 
Superior Court’s decision to deny Whitfield’s request constituted a proper 
exercise of its discretion. 
Jury’s Verdicts Reflect Lenity 
Whitfield submits the verdicts that were returned in this case were 
impermissible “compromise verdicts;” that is verdicts which result “from the 
surrender by some jurors of their conscientious convictions in return for 
some like surrender by the others.”7  Such verdicts are invalid.8  
In examining “compromise verdict” claims, this Court conducts a 
two-part analysis.  First, we must determine whether the jury verdicts are 
inconsistent as a matter of law.  Second, if the verdicts are legally 
                                          
 
6 Washington v. State, 836 A.2d 485 (Del. 2003).  Compare Weber v. State, 547 A.2d 
948, 959 (Del. 1988) (holding that “in every case when a defendant is charged with 
kidnapping in conjunction with an underlying crime, a specific instruction requiring the 
jury to find that the movement and/or restraint is independent of and not incidental to the 
underlying crime is mandatory.”). 
7 Wilson v. State, 305 A.2d 312, 317 (Del. 1973).  
8 Id.  
 
13
inconsistent, we must determine whether the outcome could have been the 
result of jury lenity, in which case the verdicts will remain undisturbed.9 
 
The jury found all three defendants guilty of Attempted Robbery in 
the First Degree.  To do so, the jury necessarily had to find that the 
defendants “threatened the immediate use of force upon Meek with intent to 
prevent or overcome resistance to the taking of property” or that they 
displayed what appeared to be a deadly weapon.  The evidence that Coleman 
displayed a gun was not disputed.  Thus, the State’s evidence established the 
elements of Attempted Robbery in the First Degree.  It is not logical for the 
jury to find that the elements of Attempted Robbery in the First Degree had 
been proved, yet to find the defendants “not guilty” of possessing the same 
handgun during the commission of Attempted Robbery in the First Degree, 
as charged in Count II.   
Although the jury found the defendants “not guilty” as to Count II, the 
jury found the defendants “guilty” of two counts of PFDCF in Counts IV 
and VI.  Nevertheless, the jury found all of the defendants “not guilty” of 
PDWPP in Count IX, even though it was undisputed that all of the 
defendants were under the age of 18.  The “not guilty” verdicts as to Counts 
                                          
 
9 See Davis v. State, 706 A.2d 523, 525 (Del. 1998). 
 
14
II and IX are not logical in light of the guilty verdicts as to Counts IV and 
VI. 
 
Whitfield argues that “the only logical explanation for the verdict is 
that some of the jurors traded votes.  They agreed to vote ‘guilty’ as to some 
or all of the charges in which guilty verdicts were returned in exchange for 
‘not guilty’ votes on the remaining charges.  By definition, that is a 
compromise verdict which must be set aside.”   
 
The State acknowledges apparent inconsistencies in the jury’s 
verdicts.  Nevertheless, the State submits that the Superior Court properly 
concluded the logical inconsistencies in the jury’s verdicts did not invalidate 
the remaining convictions because the judgments of acquittal constituted a 
demonstration of jury lenity. This Court has recognized the phenomenon of 
jury lenity and has upheld convictions that are part of arguably logically 
inconsistent judgments of acquittal.  
In Brown v. State,10 for example, the jury convicted the defendant of 
PFDCF but acquitted him of the underlying felony, robbery.11  In affirming 
the weapons conviction this Court held that no requirement existed that a 
defendant be convicted of the underlying felony in order to uphold a firearm 
                                          
 
10 Brown v. State, 729 A.2d 259 (Del. 1999). 
11 Id. at 266. 
 
15
offense.12  In support of the proposition that a defendant may be convicted of 
one crime while the jury simultaneously acquits him of another logically 
connected crime, we relied upon prior decisions of this Court and the United 
States Supreme Court addressing the issue of jury lenity.13 
In Davis,14 this Court considered legally inconsistent jury verdicts in 
which a defendant was convicted of delivery and distribution of a narcotic 
within one thousand feet of a school, but was acquitted of possession with 
intent to deliver.15  In Davis, we attempted to reconcile the incongruous 
verdicts, but concluded that regardless of the logical inconsistencies, when a 
jury’s verdicts can be explained by jury lenity the conviction will be 
sustained.16  “Even if a defendant is convicted of a compound offense 
predicated upon a lesser offense, of which the defendant is acquitted, the 
verdict will stand so long as there was sufficient evidence in the record to 
support a conviction of the lesser offense.”17 
Our holdings in Brown and Davis both relied upon this Court’s 
decision in Tilden.18  The State charged the defendant in Tilden with two 
                                          
 
12 Id.  
13 Id. (citing Tilden v. State, 513 A.2d 1302 (Del. 1986), and United States v. Powell, 469 
U.S. 57 (1984)). 
14 Davis v. State, 706 A.2d 523 (Del. 1998). 
15 Id. at 525.  
16 Id.  
17 Id.  
18 Tilden v. State, 513 A.2d 1302 (Del. 1986). 
 
16
counts of Robbery in the First Degree and two counts of PFDCF.19 The jury 
convicted the defendant of both weapons charges, but then convicted only of 
the lesser-included offense of Robbery in the Second Degree.20  In affirming 
Tilden’s inconsistent convictions, this Court determined that the Superior 
Court had properly considered the verdicts to be an exercise of jury lenity.21   
 
In Whitfield’s case, the jury had deliberated for approximately three 
hours when they came back into the courtroom and began a recitation of its 
verdicts that started with a response of “hung” as to the first charge.  The 
Superior Court then provided an approved Allen charge in which it 
specifically directed the jurors not to surrender their conscientious 
convictions.  Approximately one hour-and-a-half later, the jury returned with 
its verdicts.  In denying the defendants’ motion for new trial, the Superior 
Court stated: 
[I]t seemed to me there was enough language in our standard 
instruction against any coercive effect, did not suggest to me 
there was any coercive effect, did not suggest to me there was 
any coercive effect or vote trading when it took them another 
hour and a half before they reached a verdict.  This case was 
relatively simple. The most complicated thing about the case 
was there were three defendants, but the evidence was very 
strong, the State’s evidence, because the individual, three 
defendants, were found in relatively close proximity to the 
                                          
 
19 Id. at 1305. 
20 Id.  
21 Id. at 1307.  
 
17
events, shortly after they occurred.  And there w[ere] certainly 
other factors that implicated each of them. 
 
The facts in Whitfield’s case are analogous to the proceedings 
reviewed by this Court in Wilson.  In Wilson, the jury reported that they 
were unable to reach a verdict.22  The trial judge instructed the jurors to 
return to their deliberations, but simultaneously emphasized that no juror 
should surrender his or her conscientious convictions.23  In Wilson, the jurors 
then spent an additional hour deliberating and returned a verdict of guilty as 
to one count of Conspiracy, but failed to render a unanimous verdict on 
remaining count.24  In rejecting the claim that the verdicts represented a 
compromise, this Court concluded that “[t]his speculation [regarding the 
inconsistency of the verdict] is useless, however; the pertinent point is that 
their verdict shows a finding that all three appellants participated in planning 
the attack.”25 
In Tilden, this Court held that “the controlling standard for testing a 
claim of inconsistent verdicts is the rule of jury lenity now approved coupled 
with the sufficiency of evidence standard.”26  In Whitfield’s case, the 
prosecution presented sufficient evidence to support each of the charges of 
                                          
 
22 Wilson v. State, 305 A.2d 312, 317 (Del. 1973).   
23 Id.  
24 Id. 
25 Id.  
26 Tilden v. State, 513 A.2d 1302,1307 (Del. 1986).  
 
18
which the jury convicted Whitfield.  Since the State presented sufficient 
evidence to establish the basis for the crimes of which the jury found 
Whitfield guilty, the convictions will stand despite their apparent 
inconsistency with the verdicts acquitting Whitfield on other charges.27   
The record reflects that the inconsistent verdicts can be explained as a 
product of jury lenity.  Therefore, contrary to Whitfield’s assertion, the 
jury’s verdicts did not amount to an illegal compromise.28  The Superior 
Court correctly denied Whitfield’s motion for a new trial.   
Conclusion 
 
The judgments of the Superior Court are affirmed. 
 
                                          
 
27 Id. 
28 See Wilson v. State, 305 A.2d 312, 317 (Del. 1973).