Title: WORLEY v. PURCELL NURSING HOME
Citation: 15 P.3d 496, 2000 OK 77, 71OBJ2587
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: October 10, 2000

WORLEY v. PURCELL NURSING HOME Annotate this Case WORLEY v. PURCELL NURSING HOME 2000 OK 77 15 P.3d 496 71 OBJ 2587 Case Number: 90792 Decided: 10/10/2000 Modified: 11/07/2000 Mandate Issued: 12/29/2000 Supreme Court of Oklahoma WANDA LEE WORLEY, Petitioner v. PURCELL NURSING HOME and the WORKERS' COMPENSATION COURT, Respondents ON CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIV. IV ¶0 In separate claims against two employers - Purcell Nursing Home and Noble Health Care Center, Inc. - which were consolidated for hearing, claimant sought to be compensated for on-the-job injuries. The Workers' Compensation Court, James S. Porter, trial judge, disposed of each claim by a separate order. It determined the Purcell case in claimant's favor and the Noble claim in Noble's favor. Purcell appealed to the three-judge panel, which vacated the award. From her claim's denial against Noble, the claimant sought no corrective relief. The Court of Civil Appeals vacated the three-judge panel's order and remanded the cause for further proceedings against both Purcell and Noble. On certiorari previously granted upon Purcell's petition, THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION IS VACATED AND THE CLAIM RETRANSFERRED TO THAT COURT FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ITS REVIEW TO BE MADE UPON THE RECORD DEVELOPED IN COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE TRIAL JUDGE WITH DIRECTIONS TO DETERMINE IF THERE IS COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE DECISION BY THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION COURT'S PANEL IN FAVOR OF PURCELL. Jack F. Tracy, Purcell, Oklahoma, for the petitioner Donald A. Bullard, Steven E. Hanna, Bullard & Hoehner, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for respondent, Purcell Nursing Home 1 [15 P.3d 497] ¶1 The critical issue on certiorari is whether there was error in the Court of Civil Appeals' [COCA's] disposition of this compensation proceeding by its failure to consider and decide whether there was competent evidence to support the three-judge panel's order that vacates the award and denies the claim against the employer. We answer in the affirmative and once again transfer the cause to COCA's division whence it came on certiorari with directions that reconsideration of its review be confined to the claim against Purcell Nursing Home [Purcell]. I THE ANATOMY OF LITIGATION The Antecedent Compensation Claims ¶2 The 1995 Compensation Claim Against Purcell ¶3 Worley returned to work as a nurse's aide for Purcell where she was employed from August 1994 until January 1995. On 13 December 1994 she experienced back pain when lifting a resident. She brought another compensation claim on 16 February 1995,3 alleging aggravation of a prior back condition [15 P.3d 498] and new injuries to her hips and both legs.4 Purcell denied that Worley sustained on-the-job injuries. On 10 October 1996 - after Worley had left her employment with Purcell in January 1995 and went to work for Noble Health Care Center, Inc. [Noble]5 in August 1995 - Purcell added as an affirmative defense that Worley's later episode at Noble on 19 September 1995 was an "intervening event" that insulated it entirely from compensation liability.6 The 1996 Compensation Claim Against Noble ¶4 While working as a nurse's aide for Noble, Worley experienced intense back pain on 19 September 1995 when lifting a resident. Following that incident, Noble filed a first notice of injury. Worley brought a claim against Noble over a year later in November 1996.7 Noble's response denied the existence of a new injury, reinjury or of aggravation of a pre-existing condition. On Noble's motion, the two claims - against it and Purcell - were consolidated "for purposes of hearing and disposition."8 The Trial Judge's Separate Dispositions In The Claims Against Purcell and Worley ¶5 After hearing the consolidated claims the trial judge on 11 January 1997 entered a separate order in each of the two cases. In the Purcell case, the judge (a) found that claimant sustained an accidental personal injury (aggravation of a pre-existing condition) to the back with radiculopathy to the hips and legs which arose out of and in the course of her employment; (b) determined that claimant's employment with Noble (and the 19 September 1995 incident there) did not "cause, aggravate, or exacerbate" her December 13 injury at Purcell; (c) found that as a result of the December 13 injury claimant has been (and is now) temporarily totally disabled and in need of further medical attention; (d) reserved for future consideration the issue of permanent disability and (e) directed that Purcell furnish claimant with (reasonable and necessary) medical treatment and pay all (reasonable and necessary) medical expenses. From the compensation award against Purcell the latter brought an appeal to the three-judge panel. ¶6 In the case against Noble, the trial judge denied the claim, finding that Worley did not sustain an on-the-job injury with that employer. From her claim's denial against Noble Worley sought no corrective relief. The Three-Judge Panel's Vacation of the Award Against Purcell ¶7 In its appeal to the three-judge panel Purcell argued that the trial judge's award (against it) is "against the clear weight of the evidence and contrary to fact and law." According to Purcell, the trial judge erred in finding that (a) Worley, while working at Noble, neither sustained a subsequent injury nor aggravated, accelerated or exacerbated her previously sustained condition, (b) she suffered an injury arising out of and in the course of her employment with Purcell and (c) her present need for surgery was occasioned by harm sustained at Purcell. Agreeing with Purcell's position, the three-judge panel vacated the trial judge's award. COCA's Vacation of the Three-Judge Panel's Order ¶8 The Court of Civil Appeals [COCA] vacated the three-judge panel's order and remanded the case to that tribunal for further proceedings against both Purcell and Noble. COCA held that (a) the panel's order could not be disturbed unless it lacked support in competent evidence or was [15 P.3d 499] contrary to law,9 (b) the claimant sustained an undisputed on-the-job injury, and (c) the panel must only decide which of the multiple parties employer is liable for compensation and medical care. According to COCA, the panel erred by failing either (a) to review the entire "consolidated trial court case" and determine which employer (Purcell or Noble) was liable for the compensation and medical expenses or (b) to return the cause to the trial judge for that determination. COCA declined Worley's invitation to determine whether the panel correctly applied the clear-weight-of-the-evidence standard for its review of the trial judge's award against Purcell.10 ¶9 On certiorari granted upon Purcell's petition, we now vacate COCA's opinion and retransfer the cause to that court for reconsideration of its review by applying the Parks-approved standard of scrutiny.11 II THE ARGUMENTS ON CERTIORARI The Employer's Theory ¶10 Purcell argues on certiorari that COCA (a) predicated its opinion on a mistaken belief that the claimant's alleged on-the-job injury was undisputed and (b) ignored competent proof that her injuries were occasioned either by an earlier claim against Sunset Manor, which had already been settled by joint petition, or by the later injury at Noble. According to Purcell, COCA's legally flawed analysis - that the Workers' Compensation Court must only determine which of the two employers (Purcell or Noble) should be liable for the claim - disregards the disputed evidence tendered to the three-judge panel. Moreover, Purcell urges, because the order denying the claim against Noble had become final for want of Worley's timely appeal, the decision favoring Noble was now beyond COCA's reviewing cognizance. The Claimant's Theory ¶11 According to Worley's argument (a) there is no competent evidence to support the three-judge panel's vacation of the award against Purcell and (b) all expert evidence as well as lay testimony show that her injuries occurred during her employment at Purcell. After the two cases were consolidated, Worley argues, the panel was duty-bound to consider each of the two separate orders entered, so that her work-related injury can be attributed either to her employment at Purcell or at Noble. She urges this court to depart from its commitment to the Parks12 standard of review and determine whether the three_judge panel's vacation of the Purcell award is supportable when tested by the clear-weight-of-the-evidence standard of review. III THE LIMITED NATURE OF CONSOLIDATION ¶12 The separate claims against Purcell and Noble were consolidated pursuant to Rule 27(B) of the Workers' Compensation Court.13 Its terms authorize consolidation of [15 P.3d 500] cases having the same claimant "for hearing purposes only." Any claims so consolidated must "maintain individual case numbers" and "remain subject to a separate filing fee and costs."14 In contrast, cases affecting the same claim are subject to consolidation under the "lowest case number."15 ¶14 By its separate orders disposing of the claims against both employers (Noble and Purcell), the trial judge, acting in conformity to Rule 27, clearly gave the consolidated hearing the limited effect that was co-extensive with the sweep of the Rule 27(B) text. The separate cases were treated not as a single cause but as two separate claims whose consolidation stood confined for convenience to but a stage in the process. IV FOR WANT OF CLAIMANT'S TIMELY APPEAL FROM THE TRIAL JUDGE'S ADVERSE DISPOSITION OF THE NOBLE CLAIM, NOBLE CEASED TO BE A PARTY IN THE THREE-JUDGE PANEL REVIEW STAGE ¶15 Purcell's appeal to the three-judge panel was from the trial judge's disposition of the Purcell claim. Because at the consolidated hearing before the trial judge each case retained its separate identity, ¶16 In sum, COCA erred by treating Noble as if it had continued as a viable respondent after its exoneration by the trial judge and exclusion from further process. V COCA MUST RE-EXAMINE THE RECORD TO MAKE THE REQUISITE DETERMINATION ABOUT THE PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE PANEL'S VACATION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE'S ORDER AGAINST PURCELL ¶17 The sole task for COCA to perform was to decide whether the order exonerating Purcell stands supported by competent evidence. ¶18 Though COCA correctly invoked the any-competent-evidence standard for its review of the panel's Purcell order, it failed to re-examine the record for competent evidence to support the panel's critical fact resolutions. Instead, COCA incorrectly assumed that (a) Worley sustained an undisputed on_the_job injury and (b) Noble was a party affected by the Worley-brought review proceeding. ¶19 We hence hold that COCA erred in (a) assuming that a critical fact stood undisputed- that of the existence of claimant's compensable injury - and (b) failing to determine whether the three-judge panel's vacation of the Purcell award is supported by competent evidence. VI SUMMARY ¶20 Because Noble was erroneously considered as a viable party respondent before the intermediate court and COCA failed to ascertain whether the three-judge panel's vacation of the Purcell award is supported by competent evidence, this cause is retransferred to COCA for that court's sine qua non reconsideration. As a predicate for its vacation of the panel's Purcell decision COCA must identify some vitiating legal error. Failing that, the panel's order must be sustained. Noble may not be adversely affected. The order of its exoneration from compensation liability lies beyond COCA's reviewing cognizance ¶21 On certiorari previously granted upon the petition by Purcell, the Court of Civil [ 15 P.3d 502 ] Appeals' opinion is vacated and the claim retransferred to that court for reconsideration of its review to be made upon the record developed in course of proceedings before the trial judge with directions to determine if there is competent evidence to support the decision by the Workers' Compensation Court's panel in favor of Purcell. ¶22 ALL JUSTICES CONCUR. FOOT