Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Carl J. Schwedler
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2016AP001770-D
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 1, 2017

2017 WI 54 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP1770-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Carl J. Schwedler, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant, 
     v. 
Carl J. Schwedler, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST SCHWEDLER 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 1, 2017 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
      
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
A.W. BRADLEY, J. concurs, joined by ABRAHAMSON, 
J. 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
     
 
 
2017 WI 54
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2016AP1770-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Carl J. Schwedler, Attorney at Law: 
 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Carl J. Schwedler, 
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 1, 2017 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   On September 12, 2016, the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation (OLR) filed a complaint and motion pursuant to 
Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 22.22, requesting this court suspend 
Attorney Carl J. Schwedler's license to practice law in 
Wisconsin for a period of six months, as discipline reciprocal 
to that imposed by the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO).  The OLR asked that we order restitution as described 
herein and impose costs on Attorney Schwedler.  Upon review, we 
No. 
2016AP1770-D   
 
2 
 
agree that it is appropriate to suspend Attorney Schwedler's law 
license for a period of six months.  Consistent with the terms 
of the decision rendered by the USPTO, if Attorney Schwedler 
seeks reinstatement of his license to practice law in Wisconsin, 
reinstatement may require Attorney Schwedler to demonstrate that 
he has made restitution to the client.  We decline to impose 
costs on Attorney Schwedler.  
¶2 
Attorney Schwedler was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 1990.  He was registered as a patent attorney by 
the USPTO on April 19, 1993.  He was admitted to practice law in 
California in 2006 and resides in California.  
¶3 
On October 31, 2009, Attorney Schwedler's Wisconsin 
law license was suspended for failure to pay State Bar of 
Wisconsin dues.  On June 8, 2011, his Wisconsin law license was 
further suspended for failure to comply with continuing legal 
education requirements.  Attorney Schwedler's Wisconsin law 
license remains administratively suspended.  In 2015, the State 
Bar of California transferred Attorney Schwedler to "inactive 
enrollment" for his failure to timely file a response to then 
pending disciplinary charges.  He was subsequently disbarred.  
On March 18, 2015, Attorney Schwedler was administratively 
suspended from practice before the USPTO.  He was later excluded 
from practice before the USPTO.1 
                                                 
1 The OLR advises the court that "exclusion from practice" 
before the USPTO effectively means disbarment.  An attorney 
"excluded from practice" before the USPTO may petition for 
reinstatement no earlier than five years after being "excluded 
from practice." 37 C.F.R. §11.60.   
No. 
2016AP1770-D   
 
3 
 
¶4 
On September 12, 2016, the OLR filed a complaint 
against Attorney Schwedler alleging that, by virtue of the 
public sanction imposed by the USPTO on March 21, 2016, Attorney 
Schwedler is subject to reciprocal discipline in Wisconsin 
pursuant to SCR 22.22.2  On November 30, 2016,3 this court 
                                                 
2 The relevant portions of SCR 22.22 provide: 
(1) 
An 
attorney 
on 
whom 
public 
discipline 
for 
misconduct 
or 
a 
license 
suspension 
for 
medical 
incapacity has been imposed by another jurisdiction 
shall promptly notify the director of the matter. 
Failure to furnish the notice within 20 days of the 
effective date of the order or judgment of the other 
jurisdiction constitutes misconduct. 
(2) Upon the receipt of a certified copy of a judgment 
or order of another jurisdiction imposing discipline 
for misconduct or a license suspension for medical 
incapacity of an attorney admitted to the practice of 
law or engaged in the practice of law in this state, 
the director may file a complaint in the supreme court 
containing all of the following: 
(a) A certified copy of the judgment or order from the 
other jurisdiction. 
(b) A motion requesting an order directing the 
attorney to inform the Supreme Court in writing within 
20 days of any claim of the attorney predicated on the 
grounds set forth in sub. (3) that the imposition of 
the identical discipline or license suspension by the 
Supreme Court would be unwarranted and the factual 
basis for the claim. 
(3) The supreme court shall impose the identical 
discipline or license suspension unless one or more of 
the following is present: 
(a) The procedure in the other jurisdiction was so 
lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to 
constitute a deprivation of due process. 
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP1770-D   
 
4 
 
directed Attorney Schwedler to inform the court in writing 
within 20 days of any claim by him, predicated upon the grounds 
set forth in SCR 22.22(3), that the imposition of discipline 
reciprocal to that imposed by the USPTO would be unwarranted, 
and of the factual basis for any such claim.  Attorney Schwedler 
did not file a response.  On March 23, 2017 this court issued an 
order directing the OLR to respond to a series of questions 
regarding this matter.  The OLR filed a response on April 6, 
2017. 
¶5 
 We first observe that the USPTO, a federal agency 
with 
its 
own 
licensing 
and 
disciplinary 
proceedings, 
is 
                                                                                                                                                             
(b) There was such an infirmity of proof establishing 
the misconduct or medical incapacity that the Supreme 
Court could not accept as final the conclusion in 
respect to the misconduct or medical incapacity.  
(c) The misconduct justifies substantially different 
discipline in this state. 
(4) 
Except 
as 
provided 
in 
sub. 
(3), 
a 
final 
adjudication in another jurisdiction that an attorney 
has engaged in misconduct or has a medical incapacity 
shall 
be 
conclusive 
evidence 
of 
the 
attorney's 
misconduct or medical incapacity for purposes of a 
proceeding under this rule. 
3 Some delay ensued as the OLR sought to accomplish proof of 
service.  The OLR served Attorney Schwedler pursuant to 
SCR 22.13(1), sending, by certified mail, an authenticated copy 
of the complaint and motion and the order to answer to the most 
recent address Attorney Schwedler had furnished to the State Bar 
of Wisconsin.  These documents were not returned to the OLR.  
The OLR also sent authenticated copies of the documents to an 
address on file with the State Bar of California and the USPTO, 
again without response. 
No. 
2016AP1770-D   
 
5 
 
appropriately considered "another jurisdiction" for purposes of 
our reciprocal discipline rule, SCR 22.22(1). See In Re 
Discipline of Peirce, 122 Nev. 77, 78, 128 P.3d 443, 443 (2006), 
reinstatement granted sub nom. In re Reinstatement of Peirce, 
No. 62091, 2014 WL 4804214 (Nev. Sept. 24, 2014); People v. 
Hartman, 744 P.2d 482 (Colo. 1987); People v. Bode, 119 P.3d 
1098, 1100 (Colo. O.P.D.J. 2005); In Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Lapine, 2010-Ohio-6151, ¶¶12-14, 128 Ohio St.3d 87, 89-90, 942 
N.E.2d 328, 330-31. 
¶6 
Accordingly, we consider the following facts, which 
are taken from the OLR's complaint and from the certified 
documents attached to the OLR's complaint relating to the 
underlying disciplinary proceeding.  
¶7 On October 6, 2015, the United States Office of 
Enrollment 
and 
Discipline 
(OED) 
for 
the 
USPTO 
filed 
a 
disciplinary complaint against Attorney Schwedler.  Attorney 
Schwedler failed to respond and the OED eventually sought a 
default judgment.  On March 21, 2016, the USPTO issued an order 
finding Attorney Schwedler in default, such that he was deemed 
to have admitted the allegations in the OED's complaint.  The 
USPTO then sanctioned Attorney Schwedler for numerous violations 
of the USPTO Rules of Professional Conduct.  Essentially, 
Attorney Schwedler undertook to represent a client, G.Y., in a 
patent application, accepted a $1,500 retainer, and then 
abandoned the client and the patent application, failing to take 
any action on the client's behalf.  The Administrative Law Judge 
No. 
2016AP1770-D   
 
6 
 
(ALJ) concluded that Attorney Schwedler violated USPTO Rules of 
Professional Conduct, as follows: 
1. C.F.R §11.103 proscribes failing to act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a 
client. 
 
Respondent 
agreed 
to 
take 
over 
the 
representation of a Client on a [patent] application 
and told the Client that he would file a response to 
the 
June 
10, 
2013, 
Final 
Office 
Action 
before 
September 10, 2013. Respondent failed to file that 
response allowing the [patent] application to become 
abandoned. 
After 
the 
[patent] 
application 
became 
abandoned, Respondent made no efforts to revive it. 
These lapses constitute violations of 37 C.F.R. 
§11.103. 
2. 37 C.F.R. §11.104(a)(3) proscribes failing to keep 
the client reasonably informed about the status of a 
matter. Respondent agreed to submit the appropriate 
filings to the USPTO by September 10, 2013, but failed 
to do so. This resulted in the [patent] application 
becoming abandoned. Respondent did not inform the 
Client of this development or that Respondent had not 
filed the response. It was only after the Client was 
notified by Respondent's former firm of the status 
that 
Respondent 
resumed 
communications 
with 
the 
Client. Such conduct constitutes a violation of 37 
C.F.R. §11.104(a)(3).   
3. 37 C.F.R. §11.104(a)(4) proscribes failing to 
promptly 
comply 
with 
reasonable 
requests 
for 
information. As noted [above], Respondent did not 
resume communications with the Client until after the 
Client's son began to ask about the status of the 
[patent] application. The Client's inquiries into the 
status of the [patent] application were reasonable, 
especially in light of the fact that the Client was 
notified that the application had become abandoned. 
However Respondent's responses, though prompt, were 
not 
compliant 
with 
the 
Client's 
requests 
for 
information, because Respondent purposely gave the 
Client's son incorrect information by indicating that 
'everything is normal here' when in fact the [patent] 
application had become abandoned.   
No. 
2016AP1770-D   
 
7 
 
4. 37 C.F.R §11.115(d) proscribes failing to promptly 
deliver to a client any funds or property that the 
client is entitled to receive. After the Client 
informed 
Respondent 
that 
responsibility 
for 
the 
prosecution of the [patent] application had been 
transferred to another registered practitioner, the 
Client requested that the prototype for the invention 
be returned to the Client. Respondent, however, did 
not return the prototype to Respondent [sic] as 
requested. Accordingly, Respondent violated 37 C.F.R. 
§11.115(d).   
5. 37 C.F.R §11.116(d) proscribes failing to surrender 
papers and property to which the client is entitled 
and to refund any advance payment of fee or expense 
that has not been earned or incurred upon termination 
of the practitioner-client relationship. The Client 
agreed to pay Respondent $1,500 in advance for patent 
legal services to be rendered. Respondent sent a 
retention letter noting the $1,500 fee to the Client, 
who promptly paid the fee.  Respondent also sent the 
Client a September 18th invoice for $1,500, and 
described in the September 18th invoice the services 
rendered for the [patent] application as follows:  
'Response to Office Action from USPTO and filing 
continued prosecution application.' However Respondent 
never earned this fee, because he never performed the 
services agreed to, and described by, the September 
18th invoice. After the Client informed Respondent 
that his responsibility for the prosecution of the 
[patent] application had been transferred to another 
registered practitioner, Respondent did not return the 
$1,500 fee that the Client prepaid. Accordingly, 
Respondent violated 37 C.F.R §11.116(d).   
6. 37 C.F.R. §11.804(c) proscribes conduct involving 
dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit, 
or 
misrepresentation.  
Respondent agreed to represent the Client and file a 
response to the June 10, 2013, Final Office Action.  
He did not do so.  Yet, Respondent sent the Client an 
invoice suggesting that he had filed the response and 
was 
continuing 
with 
the 
prosecution 
of 
the 
application.  Then after the Client's son contacted 
Respondent regarding the status of the [patent] 
application, Respondent sent an e-mail to the son 
stating, 'I have everything in order for filing the 
response' when in fact, the [patent] application had 
No. 
2016AP1770-D   
 
8 
 
become abandoned. Such statements were misleading and 
constitute 
conduct 
involving 
dishonesty 
and 
misrepresentation 
in 
violation 
of 
37 
C.F.R. 
§11.804(c).   
7. 37 C.F.R. §11.801(b) proscribes knowingly failing 
to respond to lawful demands for information from a 
disciplinary authority. The OED sent Respondent an RFI 
that 
was 
never 
answered 
despite 
two 
subsequent 
communications prompting Respondent that his response 
to the RFI was due. The OED has provided documentation 
indicating that Respondent received all three pieces 
of correspondence. By failing to respond to the RFI 
and subsequent demands for a response, Respondent 
violated 37 C.F.R. §11.801(b).   
8. 37 C.F.R. §11.804(d) proscribes conduct that is 
prejudicial 
to 
the 
administration 
of 
justice.  
Respondent failed to respond to the RFI.  Respondent's 
conduct undermines the public's confidence in the 
profession's ability to regulate itself and is, 
therefore, 
prejudicial 
to 
the 
administration 
of 
justice in violation of 37 C.F.R. §11.801(d).   
¶8 
The USPTO decision deemed Attorney Schwedler's actions 
"knowing and intentional" and stated that they caused "actual 
injury" to the client and warranted "a severe sanction."  
Attorney Schwedler was excluded from practice before the USPTO 
in patent, trademark, and other non-patent cases or matters.  
See In the Matter of Carl J. Schwedler, Proc. No. D2015-38 
(USPTO Dir. Mar. 21, 2016).  As noted, "exclusion from practice" 
is effectively disbarment from practice before the USPTO.  The 
order 
states 
that 
if 
Attorney 
Schwedler 
were 
to 
seek 
reinstatement, 
it 
may 
be 
conditioned, 
inter 
alia, 
upon 
restitution to the client. 
¶9 
The OLR's complaint against Attorney Schwedler alleges 
the following counts of misconduct: 
No. 
2016AP1770-D   
 
9 
 
Count One:  By virtue of the OED public sanction, 
Attorney Schwedler is subject to reciprocal discipline 
in Wisconsin pursuant to SCR 22.22. 
Count Two:  By failing to notify the OLR of his OED 
public sanction for professional misconduct within 20 
days of the effective date of its imposition, Attorney 
Schwedler violated SCR 22.22(1). 
¶10 We conclude that the facts of record demonstrate that 
Attorney Schwedler violated SCR 22.22(1) by failing to notify 
the OLR of his suspension within 20 days of the effective date 
of its imposition. 
¶11 Under SCR 22.22(3), in reciprocal discipline matters, 
this court shall impose the identical discipline unless one or 
more of the exceptions enumerated in the rule is shown.  
Attorney Schwedler has not made any claim or showing that any of 
the exceptions to the imposition of reciprocal discipline set 
forth in SCR 22.22(3) apply to this case.  The OLR acknowledges 
that "identical" discipline cannot be imposed here because 
SCR 21.16(1m) does not include "exclusion" from practice before 
a court as a form of discipline available in Wisconsin.   
¶12 The 
OLR 
also 
asserts 
that 
a 
six-month 
license 
suspension is a proper level of discipline to impose for 
Attorney Schwedler's misconduct.  The OLR seeks a six-month 
suspension, rather than license revocation, because it believes 
that Attorney Schwedler's misconduct justifies a substantially 
different 
discipline 
in 
Wisconsin, 
as 
authorized 
by 
SCR 
22.22(3)(c). Attorney Schwedler's misconduct involved neglect, 
misrepresentation, and failure to refund fees.  The OLR asserts 
that 
in 
Wisconsin, 
such 
misconduct 
warrants 
a 
six-month 
No. 
2016AP1770-D   
 
10 
 
suspension.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hooker, 
2012 WI 100, 343 Wis. 2d 397, 816 N.W.2d 310 (imposing six-month 
suspension in reciprocal discipline case for practicing without 
a license, and for neglect and lack of competence in a 
bankruptcy proceeding); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Coplien, 2010 WI 109, 329 Wis. 2d 311, 788 N.W.2d 376 (imposing 
six-month suspension in reciprocal matter for failing to act 
with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a 
client, failing to keep a client reasonably informed about the 
status of a matter, failing to make reasonable efforts to 
expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client, 
failing to respond to a lawful demand for information from a 
disciplinary 
authority, 
conduct 
prejudicial 
to 
the 
administration of justice, and conduct that tends to defeat the 
administration of justice or to bring the courts or the legal 
profession into disrepute); In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Ring, 168 Wis. 2d 817, 484 N.W.2d 336 (1992) (imposing 
six month suspension in reciprocal discipline case for failure 
to file an appellate brief and failure to keep the client 
informed, and lack of candor rising to dishonesty, deceit or 
misrepresentation).   
¶13 The 
OLR 
emphasizes 
that 
a 
six-month 
suspension 
requires a formal reinstatement proceeding before the suspended 
attorney can be reinstated to the practice of law.   
¶14 We agree that identical discipline is not an option in 
this case so a different sanction must be imposed.  It is 
apparent from the language in the USPTO's decision that Attorney 
No. 
2016AP1770-D   
 
11 
 
Schwedler's misconduct was serious.  The sanction imposed by the 
USPTO requires a reinstatement proceeding.  Attorney Schwedler 
has not responded in this matter and has not challenged the 
OLR's recommended sanction.  Accordingly, we accept the OLR's 
assertion that a six-month license suspension is appropriate and 
we suspend Attorney Schwedler's Wisconsin law license for six 
months as discipline reciprocal to that imposed by the USPTO. 
¶15 The OLR initially asked this court to order Attorney 
Schwedler to pay restitution in the amount of $1,500 to G.Y.  In 
its April 6, 2017 filing, the OLR revised its recommendation and 
asks the Court to condition Attorney Schwedler's reinstatement 
upon making payment to the client in the amount of $1,500, 
consistent with the terms of the USPTO disciplinary order.  We 
agree and direct that Attorney Schwedler's reinstatement may be 
conditioned upon payment of restitution to G.Y.  
¶16 Finally, we decline to impose the costs of this 
proceeding on Attorney Schwedler. See In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Hooker, 2012 WI 100, ¶26, 343 Wis. 2d 397, 
816 N.W.2d 310 (noting that in reciprocal discipline cases where 
a referee is not appointed, costs are generally not imposed as 
there are no referee expenses and the proceedings are less 
involved).4  
                                                 
4 The OLR inadvertently requested appointment of a referee, 
but later rescinded that request. 
No. 
2016AP1770-D   
 
12 
 
¶17 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Carl J. Schwedler to 
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of six 
months, effective the date of this order.  
¶18 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, to the extent he has not 
already done so, Carl J. Schwedler shall comply with the 
provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a person whose 
license to practice law in Wisconsin has been suspended.  
¶19 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all 
conditions of this order, compliance with all conditions of the 
disciplinary order imposed on him by the United States Patent 
and Trade Office, In the Matter of Carl J. Schwedler, Proc. No. 
D2015-38 (USPTO Dir. Mar. 21, 2016), and a showing that Carl J. 
Schwedler has paid restitution to G.Y. may be required for 
reinstatement.  See SCR 22.29(4)(c). 
¶20 IT 
IS 
FURTHER 
ORDERED 
that 
the 
administrative 
suspension of Carl J. Schwedler's license to practice law in 
Wisconsin, due to his failure to pay mandatory bar dues and 
failure to comply with continuing legal education requirements, 
will remain in effect until each reason for the administrative 
suspension has been rectified, pursuant to SCR 22.28(1). 
 
No.  2016AP1770-D.awb 
 
1 
 
¶21 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  I agree with 
the court's mandate but I write separately to state my 
disagreement with the court's statement in ¶14 of the opinion 
which states, "We agree that identical discipline is not an 
option in this case so a different sanction must be imposed."  
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) excluded 
Attorney Carl J. Schwedler from practice.  The Office of Lawyer 
Regulation (OLR) has advised this court that "exclusion from 
practice" before the USPTO effectively means disbarment for five 
years.  Majority op., fn 1.   
¶22 We could indeed impose identical discipline.  We could 
revoke Attorney Schwedler's license to practice law in Wisconsin 
under SCR 21.16(1m)(a).  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Peiss, 2017 WI 49, ¶24, ___Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, 
(Abrahamson, J. concurring, stating that "disbarment in Illinois 
appears to be identical to license revocation in Wisconsin.") 
Rather, in this case we exercise our discretion and opt to 
impose a lesser sanction in the form of a six-month suspension 
of Attorney Schwedler's law license.  For the reasons set forth, 
I write separately. 
¶23 I am authorized to state that Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this concurrence. 
 
No.  2016AP1770-D.awb 
 
 
 
1