Title: Hans Rechsteiner v. Hazelden
Citation: 2008 WI 97
Docket Number: 2006AP001521
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 16, 2008

2008 WI 97 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2006AP1521 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Hans Rechsteiner, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Hazelden, Spooner Health System, Board of 
Directors of Spooner Health System, William 
Stewart, III, Judy Cuskey, Maxine Long and Mike 
Schafer, 
          Defendants-Respondents, 
 
ABC Insurance Company, DEF Insurance Company and 
GHI Insurance Company, 
          Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2007 WI App 148 
Reported at: 303 Wis. 2d 656, 736 N.W.2d 219 
(Ct. App. 2007-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 16, 2008   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 20, 2008   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Washburn   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael J. Gableman   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: BUTLER, JR., J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
James A. Drill, Anne E. Schmiege, and Doar Drill, S.C., New 
Richmond, and oral argument was by James A. Drill. 
 
For the defendants-respondents Spooner Health System, Board 
or Directors of Spooner Health System, William Stewart, III, 
Judy Cuskey, Maxine Long and Mike Shafer, there was a brief by 
Lindsay G. Arthur, Jr., Sally Ferguson, and Arthur, Chapman, 
Kettering, Smetak & Pikala, P.A., Minneapolis, Minn., and oral 
argument by Sally Ferguson. 
 
 
 
2 
For the defendant-respondent Hazelden, there was a brief by 
Louise Dovre Bjorkman, Stephen P. Laitinen, Mark A. Solheim, and 
Larson King, LLP, St. Paul, Minn., and oral argument by Louise 
Dovre Bjorkman. 
 
 
 
 
2008 WI 97
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2006AP1521  
(L.C. No. 
2005CV137) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Hans Rechsteiner, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Hazelden, Spooner Health System, Board of 
Directors of Spooner Health System, William 
Stewart, III, Judy Cuskey, Maxine Long and Mike 
Schafer, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents, 
 
ABC Insurance Company, DEF Insurance Company 
and GHI Insurance Company, 
 
          Defendants. 
FILED 
 
JUL 16, 2008 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.  
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.  This is a review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals,1 which affirmed a judgment and 
order of the Washburn County Circuit Court, Michael J. Gableman, 
                                                 
1 Rechsteiner v. Hazelden, 2007 WI App 148, 303 Wis. 2d 656, 
736 N.W.2d 219. 
No. 2006AP1521 
 
2 
 
Judge.2  The circuit court dismissed Dr. Hans Rechsteiner's (Dr. 
Rechsteiner) suit and granted summary judgment to defendants 
Spooner Health System (Spooner); the Board of Directors of 
Spooner Health System (Board); directors Judy Cuskey, Maxine 
Long, and William Stewart, III; Spooner administrator Mike 
Schafer;3 and Hazelden, an addictionology clinic. 
¶2 
Dr. Rechsteiner has been a general surgeon employed by 
Spooner on a contract basis.  After undergoing diagnosis and 
treatment for alcohol dependence at Hazelden at the behest of 
Spooner, Dr. Rechsteiner brought an action alleging medical 
negligence against Hazelden.  He also filed claims of defamation 
and negligent communication of false information against the 
Spooner defendants for statements made to Hazelden staff about 
Dr. Rechsteiner.  The defendants moved for summary judgment and 
                                                 
2 This case was filed in St. Croix County and transferred to 
Washburn County on September 27, 2005.  Washburn County Circuit 
Judge Eugene D. Harrington was originally assigned to the case, 
but it was reassigned to Burnett County Circuit Judge Michael J. 
Gableman on October 31, 2005. 
3 Defendant Spooner Health System will be referred to 
individually as "Spooner."  Spooner Health System, the Board of 
Directors of Spooner Health System (consisting of Judy Cuskey, 
Maxine 
Long, 
and 
William 
Stewart, 
III), 
and 
Spooner 
administrator Mike Schafer will be referred to collectively as 
"the Spooner defendants."  All individuals will be referred to 
by last name. 
We note the misspelling of Schafer's name in the caption of 
this case in the circuit court and the court of appeals.  This 
court ordered the caption changed to reflect the correct 
spelling.  The record includes a sworn affidavit by Schafer; his 
last name is spelled "Schafer" in the body of the affidavit and 
in the signature block. 
No. 2006AP1521 
 
3 
 
asserted 
statutory 
immunity 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 146.37,4 
Wisconsin's "peer review statute."  Before the hearing on 
summary judgment, Dr. Rechsteiner moved for a continuance to 
allow additional time for discovery. 
¶3 
The circuit court denied Dr. Rechsteiner's motion for 
a continuance, granted the defendants' motions for summary 
judgment, and dismissed Dr. Rechsteiner's complaint on the basis 
that all defendants enjoyed immunity from civil liability under 
Wis. Stat. § 146.37.  Dr. Rechsteiner appealed, and the court of 
appeals affirmed, partly on different grounds.  Rechsteiner v. 
Hazelden, 2007 WI App 148, ¶33, 303 Wis. 2d 656, 736 N.W.2d 219.  
We granted Dr. Rechsteiner's petition for review.   
¶4 
This case presents multiple questions.  Analysis of 
Questions (1), (2), and (3) regarding Hazelden appears in 
section II. C., below.  Analysis of Questions (4) and (5) 
regarding the Spooner defendants appears in section II. D.  
Analysis of Question (6) appears in section II. E.  The 
questions presented, as we see them, together with the answers 
provided, are stated as follows: 
Question (1): Is Hazelden, a third-party addictionology 
center, too removed from the peer review process initiated by 
Spooner to be eligible for immunity under Wis. Stat. § 146.37? 
                                                 
4 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2005-
06 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 2006AP1521 
 
4 
 
Answer (1): No.  Hazelden is eligible for immunity under 
Wis. Stat. § 146.37 because it played an integral role in 
Spooner's medical peer review of Dr. Rechsteiner. 
Question (2): Does Hazelden's diagnosis of Dr. Rechsteiner 
during the medical peer review process qualify for immunity, 
under Wis. Stat. § 146.37, even if its diagnosis is deemed 
negligent? 
Answer (2): Yes.  Hazelden's medical diagnosis of Dr. 
Rechsteiner is immune under Wis. Stat. § 146.37, even if the 
diagnosis is deemed negligent, because Hazelden's diagnosis was 
made in good faith and was central to a requested evaluation of 
Dr. Rechsteiner in peer review. 
Question (3): Does Hazelden's treatment of Dr. Rechsteiner, 
following its diagnosis of his medical condition, qualify for 
immunity under Wis. Stat. § 146.37? 
Answer (3): The court is not required to decide whether 
treatment related to the peer review process qualifies for 
immunity.  If Dr. Rechsteiner's complaint is viewed as focusing 
on Hazelden's treatment of Dr. Rechsteiner, as opposed to its 
diagnosis of Dr. Rechsteiner, his complaint cannot survive a 
motion for summary judgment on the facts of this case. 
Question (4): Do the actions and statements of the Spooner 
defendants qualify for immunity under Wis. Stat. § 146.37? 
Answer (4): Yes.  The actions and words of the Spooner 
defendants are immune under Wis. Stat. § 146.37 because they 
were part of Dr. Rechsteiner's peer review and because the 
Spooner defendants were presumed to be acting in good faith. 
No. 2006AP1521 
 
5 
 
Question (5): Did Dr. Rechsteiner provide evidence to the 
court that raised a genuine issue of material fact about the 
good faith of the Spooner defendants? 
Answer (5): No. 
Question (6): Did the circuit court erroneously exercise 
its discretion in denying Dr. Rechsteiner's motion for a 
continuance? 
Answer (6): No. 
¶5 
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
I. BACKGROUND 
¶6 
Since 1982 Dr. Rechsteiner has been employed as a 
general surgeon by Spooner on a contract basis.  From 1982 until 
July 2003, Dr. Rechsteiner was the only full-time surgeon at 
Spooner and was "on call" 24 hours per day, seven days per week, 
unless he made prior arrangements with other surgeons in the 
region.  An additional surgeon began working at Spooner in July 
2003.  Since then, Dr. Rechsteiner has alternated with the new 
surgeon so that he has been on call every other night.¶7 
Dr. 
Rechsteiner alleges that from the time he was hired by Spooner 
in 1982 until the present, "Spooner Health System has had no 
written 
or 
oral 
policy 
pertaining 
to 
drinking 
alcoholic 
beverages while on call."  During his tenure with Spooner, Dr. 
Rechsteiner admittedly consumed alcoholic beverages while on 
call; however, he claims he "never drank to the point of 
intoxication." 
 
The 
defendants 
assert 
that 
a 
hospital 
No. 2006AP1521 
 
6 
 
administrator complained to Dr. Rechsteiner about his drinking 
in public while on call in 1999. 
¶8 
On March 8, 2003, Dr. Rechsteiner and a family friend, 
Nathan Christner (Christner), were riding snowmobiles on Dr. 
Rechsteiner's property.  Christner was seriously injured in an 
accident, and rescue workers were called to the scene.  After 
Dr. Rechsteiner admitted that he had been drinking while 
snowmobiling, a sheriff's deputy asked Dr. Rechsteiner to submit 
to a breathalyzer test.  Dr. Rechsteiner's blood alcohol content 
registered .06 percent.  Dr. Rechsteiner was the only on-call 
surgeon for Spooner on March 8.  Following the incident, the 
Board received a sheriff's department incident report of the 
snowmobile accident, and the Board met to consider whether an 
evaluation of Dr. Rechsteiner's conduct was necessary.   
¶9 
On March 14, 2003, Spooner advised Dr. Rechsteiner 
that under Spooner's bylaws he either had to go on immediate 
leave or submit to an alcohol assessment and, if necessary, 
treatment.  Spooner further informed Dr. Rechsteiner that his 
"privileges at the hospital would be suspended until [he] 
successfully 
underwent 
the 
assessment 
and 
any 
treatment 
recommended following such assessment."¶10 
From March 16 to 
March 21, 2003, Dr. Rechsteiner underwent an alcohol assessment 
at the Hazelden treatment center in Center City, Minnesota, 
which was arranged and paid for by Spooner.  As part of the 
assessment, 
Hazelden 
agents 
and 
employees 
contacted 
Mike 
Schafer, hospital administrator and CEO of Spooner Health 
System, Inc., and members of the Board "to request information 
No. 2006AP1521 
 
7 
 
pertaining to [Dr. Rechsteiner's] career and his alcohol use."  
Dr. Rechsteiner contends that Schafer and Board members Cuskey, 
Long, and Stewart communicated false information to Hazelden, 
which forms the basis for his claims of defamation and negligent 
communication 
of 
false 
information 
against 
the 
Spooner 
defendants.    
¶11 After 
an 
assessment, 
Hazelden 
diagnosed 
Dr. 
Rechsteiner with "alcohol dependence."  Hazelden recommended 
that Dr. Rechsteiner undergo 28 days of inpatient treatment, 
which Dr. Rechsteiner completed shortly after the assessment.  
After completing this treatment at Hazelden, Dr. Rechsteiner 
returned to work at Spooner.  Thereafter, Dr. Rechsteiner 
participated in multiple aftercare programs, including a 12-week 
course at 
Luther 
Midelfort, biweekly Alcoholics Anonymous 
meetings, and a two-year aftercare program monitored by the 
Wisconsin Medical Society. 
¶12 While Dr. Rechsteiner was participating in outpatient 
aftercare services at Luther Midelfort, he was told by Scott 
Hansen (Hansen), an Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse (AODA) 
Supervisor, that Hansen believed Dr. Rechsteiner had been 
misdiagnosed with "alcohol dependence."  Hansen performed his 
own assessment and made a diagnosis of "alcohol abuse."  After 
speaking with Hansen regarding this diagnosis, Dr. Rechsteiner 
was evaluated by Paul Sneen (Sneen) of Community Counseling 
Services.  Sneen agreed with Hansen that Dr. Rechsteiner was not 
correctly diagnosed with alcohol dependence.  Afterward, Dr. 
No. 2006AP1521 
 
8 
 
Rechsteiner wrote Hazelden a letter "requesting that they 
reconsider their diagnosis." 
¶13 On August 1, 2003, Jim Atkins (Atkins), Manager of 
Admissions and Case Management at Hazelden, responded to Dr. 
Rechsteiner's letter.  Atkins advised Dr. Rechsteiner that 
Hazelden was amending its diagnosis from that of "alcohol 
dependence" to "alcohol abuse."  However, in his letter Atkins 
informed Dr. Rechsteiner:  
It is important for you to understand that we 
routinely recommend 28 days of inpatient treatment for 
participants in the Residential Evaluation Program who 
meet 
the 
criteria 
for 
Alcohol 
Abuse, 
but 
not 
Dependence, and that we would have done so had your 
original assessment resulted only in a diagnosis of 
Alcohol Abuse without the diagnosis of Dependence. 
¶14 On March 29, 2005, Dr. Rechsteiner filed a complaint 
alleging that Hazelden committed negligence when its agents and 
employees failed to exercise ordinary care in assessing and 
diagnosing him.  Dr. Rechsteiner's complaint also alleged that 
the Spooner defendants defamed him by communicating false 
information to Hazelden.  Dr. Rechsteiner further alleged that 
the Spooner defendants were negligent in their communication of 
false information to Hazelden. 
¶15 For damages, Dr. Rechsteiner contended that he lost 
approximately $125,000 in income as a result of the work he 
missed 
during 
his 
treatment 
at 
Hazelden 
and 
during 
his 
participation in the aftercare programs.  Dr. Rechsteiner 
further alleged that as a result of widespread knowledge of his 
alcohol treatment in the Spooner community, his business 
No. 2006AP1521 
 
9 
 
decreased, leading to a further loss of income.  In his 
complaint, Dr. Rechsteiner claimed that he "suffered damages," 
but he did not claim that he suffered any non-economic injury. 
¶16 On January 6, 2006, the Spooner defendants filed a 
motion for summary judgment.  The Spooner defendants argued that 
the statements made by Spooner representatives to Hazelden staff 
were privileged because they qualified as part of a peer review 
of medical services.  The Spooner defendants asserted that the 
Spooner representatives who made the statements were also 
entitled to conditional immunity.  The Spooner defendants 
contended that the statements were not defamatory "because they 
were not published and they did not lower Dr. Rechsteiner's 
reputation in the community."  Finally, the Spooner defendants 
argued that the Board and individual Spooner representatives 
were shielded from liability through the corporate structure. 
¶17 On March 3, 2006, Hazelden also moved for summary 
judgment.  Hazelden argued that it was immune from civil 
liability under Wis. Stat. § 146.37.  Hazelden asserted that 
even 
if 
Dr. 
Rechsteiner 
were 
misdiagnosed 
with 
"alcohol 
dependence," the treatment provided was proper.  Finally, 
Hazelden contended that Dr. Rechsteiner's consent to assessment 
and treatment and breach of his aftercare contract with the 
Wisconsin Medical Society precluded recovery.  Hazelden also 
contended that public policy concerns should preclude Dr. 
Rechsteiner's recovery of damages. 
¶18 On March 27, 2006, Dr. Rechsteiner moved for a 
continuance 
of 
the 
summary 
judgment 
hearing 
date. 
 
Dr. 
No. 2006AP1521 
 
10 
 
Rechsteiner claimed that the motion for a continuance should be 
granted because the depositions of the Hazelden representatives 
were scheduled to take place in April 2006, as that was the 
earliest date that would accommodate all parties involved.  
Thus, additional time was required for Dr. Rechsteiner to 
complete 
the 
scheduled depositions and additional written 
discovery.  Dr. Rechsteiner also argued that genuine issues of 
material fact existed and should preclude summary judgment for 
the defendants. 
¶19 On April 5, 2006, Dr. Rechsteiner filed a motion to 
compel the Spooner defendants to respond to questions asked 
during discovery and depositions.  His motion to compel 
addressed the fact that counsel for the Spooner defendants 
instructed his clients not to answer certain questions under a 
claim of Wis. Stat. § 146.38 privilege. 
¶20 On April 7, 2006, Judge Gableman held a hearing 
regarding Dr. Rechsteiner's motion for a continuance and the 
defendants' motions for summary judgment.  At the hearing Judge 
Gableman 
orally 
denied 
Dr. 
Rechsteiner's 
motion 
for 
a 
continuance.   
¶21 On May 4 Judge Gableman issued an order addressing 
"[w]hether § 146.37, Wis. Stats., which provides immunity from 
civil liability for those who participate in good faith in a 
health care services review, provides immunity to Defendants?"  
Judge Gableman held that Dr. Rechsteiner offered nothing but 
"conclusory and speculative statements as to the improper 
motives of at least one participant."  The court also found that 
No. 2006AP1521 
 
11 
 
Dr. Rechsteiner failed to support his assumption that the review 
conducted by the defendants must be of the technical aspects of 
medical services to warrant Wis. Stat. § 146.37 immunity.  The 
circuit court considered all facts and found that each defendant 
"was participating in good faith in a review of the services of 
a health care provider."  Dr. Rechsteiner's suit was dismissed, 
and he appealed. 
¶22 On May 22, 2007, the court of appeals affirmed the 
circuit court.  Rechsteiner, 303 Wis. 2d 656, ¶1.  The court 
reviewed Wis. Stat. § 146.37(1g) and concluded that Hazelden "is 
properly considered part of the overall review process."  Id., 
¶12.  The court found that "when a doctor is referred to an 
addictionology center under Spooner's bylaws, that center is 
brought into the review process and will impact the outcome of 
the review."  Id., ¶15.  Thus, the immunity provision is 
"extended to Hazelden for its role in Spooner's peer review of 
Rechsteiner's behavior."  Id., ¶16. 
¶23 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
held 
that 
the 
Spooner 
representatives "enjoy immunity for their comments to Hazelden 
because the center was a participant in the review process."  
Id., ¶17.  The court held that to survive summary judgment Dr. 
Rechsteiner was required to show how the allegedly defamatory 
statements were false, verifiable, and known to be false by 
those who made them.  Id., ¶21.  The court further held that it 
was "not convinced that the character of the statements rises to 
the level of bad faith."  Id., ¶22. 
No. 2006AP1521 
 
12 
 
¶24 The court also noted that the only claim against 
Hazelden was a malpractice claim for misdiagnosis, which the 
court was not convinced Wis. Stat. § 146.37 "is broad enough to 
encompass."  Id., ¶26.  However, the court affirmed the trial 
court's decision because Hazelden offered evidence that Dr. 
Rechsteiner 
"would 
have 
been 
given 
the 
same 
treatment, 
regardless of the diagnosis."  Id., ¶27.  The court explained 
that malpractice "is actionable only if the wrong diagnosis is 
followed by the wrong treatment."  Id., ¶28 (citations omitted).  
Finally, the court of appeals held that the trial court properly 
exercised its discretion when it denied Dr. Rechsteiner's motion 
for a continuance.  Id., ¶33. 
¶25 Dr. Rechsteiner petitioned this court for review, 
which we granted on September 13, 2007.   
II. ANALYSIS 
A. 
Standards of Review 
¶26 Statutory immunity: Statutory interpretation is a 
question of law that we review de novo.  Mallow v. Angove, 148 
Wis. 2d 324, 327, 434 N.W.2d 839 (Ct. App. 1988) (citing Estate 
of Boyle v. Wickhem, Buell, Meier, Wickhem & Southworth, S.C., 
134 Wis. 2d 214, 218, 397 N.W.2d 124 (Ct. App. 1986)). 
¶27 Summary judgment: We review a grant of summary 
judgment de novo.  Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 
304, 315-17, 401 N.W.2d 816 (1987).  Summary judgment is 
appropriate if there are no genuine issues of material fact and 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  
Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).  
No. 2006AP1521 
 
13 
 
¶28 Motion for a continuance: "The decision to grant or 
deny a continuance is a matter within the discretion of the 
trial court."  State v. Wedgeworth, 100 Wis. 2d 514, 520, 302 
N.W.2d 810 (1981) (citations omitted).  A trial court's ruling 
on a motion for a continuance "will be set aside only if there 
is 
evidence 
of 
an 
[erroneous 
exercise] 
of 
discretion."  
Robertson-Ryan & Assocs., Inc. v. Pohlhammer, 112 Wis. 2d 583, 
587, 334 N.W.2d 246 (1983) (citations omitted).  "An [erroneous 
exercise] of discretion exists if the trial court failed to 
exercise its discretion or if there was no reasonable basis for 
its decision."  Id.  (citations omitted).  This court will 
sustain a circuit court's discretionary decision when that 
decision was "the product of a rational mental process by which 
the facts of record and law relied upon are stated and are 
considered together for the purpose of achieving a reasoned and 
reasonable determination."  LaRocque v. LaRocque, 139 Wis. 2d 
23, 27, 406 N.W.2d 736 (1987) (citations omitted). 
B. 
Overview 
¶29 The principal issues in this case involve questions of 
statutory immunity for alleged medical negligence and defamation 
in the context of health care services review under Wis. Stat. 
§ 146.37.  We begin with a brief overview of medical "peer 
No. 2006AP1521 
 
14 
 
review" and the statutory provisions pertaining to it.  The 
parties do not assert that these provisions are ambiguous.5 
¶30 Medical peer review has become the principal method of 
evaluating the quality of patient care.  Kenneth R. Kohlberg, 
The Medical Peer Review Privilege: A Linchpin for Patient Safety 
Measures, 86 Mass. L. Rev. 157, 157 (2002).  Generally speaking, 
"[p]eer review is a process by which physicians analyze 
critically the medical services performed by their colleagues 
for the purpose of decreasing instances of medical malpractice."  
Id. (footnote omitted).  Evaluation is performed "in a variety 
of settings, such as hospital quality assurance programs, 
medical 
societies, 
or 
managed 
care 
organizations." 
 
Id. 
(footnote omitted).  Peer review serves as "one of medicine's 
most effective risk management and quality improvement tools" 
and "provides a safe forum in which medical professionals can 
review the quality of care and work to reduce medical errors."  
Lisa M. Nijm, Pitfalls of Peer Review, 24 J. Legal Med. 541, 541 
(2003) (hereinafter Nijm). 
¶31 Almost every state has adopted a "peer review statute" 
to protect the work of medical peer review committees.  See 
Charles D. Creech, Comment, The Medical Review Committee 
                                                 
5 "The primary source of statutory construction is the 
language of the statute itself, and rules of construction are 
used only to determine the meaning of an ambiguous statute."  
Mallow v. Angove, 148 Wis. 2d 324, 331, 434 N.W.2d 839 (Ct. App. 
1988) (citing Estate of Boyle v. Wickhem, Buell, Meier, Wickhem 
& Southworth, S.C., 134 Wis. 2d 214, 219, 397 N.W.2d 124 (Ct. 
App. 1986)).  Thus, the court will interpret the statute as 
written. 
No. 2006AP1521 
 
15 
 
Privilege: A Jurisdictional Survey, 67 N.C. L. Rev. 179, 179 
(1988).  "State legislatures have attempted to encourage good 
faith peer review by passing various statutes that provide civil 
tort immunity to peer review participants, that grant a peer 
review information privilege in certain judicial proceedings, 
and that require confidentiality on the part of all peer review 
participants."  Nijm, supra, at 542.  "By its very nature, peer 
review may lead to legal action" because "a physician may decide 
to sue the peer review board or the hospital overseeing the 
process."  Id. at 549.  In enacting Wis. Stat. § 146.37, 
Wisconsin 
has 
joined 
the 
ranks 
of 
those 
jurisdictions 
recognizing the critical need for frank, confidential, and 
objective review of health care services.   
¶32 Wisconsin Stat. § 146.37 
is 
entitled 
"Health 
care 
services review; civil immunity."  As noted above, this statute 
is commonly referred to as Wisconsin's "peer review statute."  
See Harris v. Bellin Mem'l Hosp., 13 F.3d 1082, 1086 (7th Cir. 
1994).  Wisconsin Stat. § 146.37(1g) provides in relevant part:  
[N]o person acting in good faith who participates in 
the review or evaluation of the services of health 
care providers . . . is liable for any civil damages 
as a result of any act or omission by such person in 
the course of such review or evaluation.  Acts and 
omissions . . . include, but are not limited to, acts 
or omissions by peer review committees or hospital 
governing bodies in censuring, reprimanding, limiting 
or revoking hospital staff privileges . . . or taking 
any other disciplinary action against a health care 
provider.   
"The clear purpose of [§ 146.37] is to improve the quality of 
health care by encouraging persons to participate in the review 
No. 2006AP1521 
 
16 
 
of health care providers."  Limjoco v. Schenck, 169 Wis. 2d 703, 
711, 486 N.W.2d 567 (Ct. App. 1992).  The statute accomplishes 
this purpose by "freeing such persons from fear of a lawsuit 
through a grant of immunity to those who participate in such a 
review in good faith."  Id.   
¶33 The "good faith" of any person whose actions are 
immune under Wis. Stat. § 146.37(1g) "shall be presumed in any 
civil action."  Wis. Stat. § 146.37(1m).  One seeking to 
overcome this presumption of good faith must do so by "clear and 
convincing evidence."  Id.  Thus, Wisconsin's peer review 
statute affords defendants in cases arising out of medical peer 
review a defense to civil liability when the review was 
conducted in good faith.  See Harris, 13 F.3d at 1086 (citing 
Qasem v. Kozarek, 716 F.2d 1172, 1179 (7th Cir. 1983)).   
¶34 Wisconsin Stat. § 146.38 complements § 146.37 and 
fosters the important policy of maintaining confidentiality in 
the 
review 
of 
health 
care 
services. 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 146.38(1m) states: "No person who participates in the review 
or evaluation of the services of health care providers or 
facilities or charges for such services may disclose any 
information 
acquired 
in 
connection 
with 
such 
review 
or 
evaluation except as provided in sub. (3)."  Subsection 3 of 
§ 146.38 provides that information acquired in conjunction with 
the review and evaluation of health care services may be 
released to the reviewed provider or facility, to another person 
with the consent of the reviewee, to the person requesting the 
review, with limitations, and to an examining or licensing board 
No. 2006AP1521 
 
17 
 
or agency.  § 146.38(3)(a), (b), (c), and (f).  Additionally, 
such information may be revealed in certain court proceedings 
after the issuance of a subpoena.  § 146.38(3) (dm) and (e). 
¶35 The purpose of Wis. Stat. §§ 146.37 and 146.38 is "to 
encourage hospitals to perform quality-control reviews aimed at 
improving, prospectively, their services."  Hofflander v. St. 
Catherine's Hosp., Inc., 2003 WI 77, ¶119, 262 Wis. 2d 539, 664 
N.W.2d 545 (citations omitted).  Sections 146.37 and 146.38 
"were enacted to protect the confidentiality of the peer review 
process, in the hope that confidentiality would encourage free 
and open discussion, among physicians knowledgeable in an area, 
of the quality of treatment rendered by other physicians."  
State ex rel. Good Samaritan Med. Ctr.-Deaconess Hosp. Campus v. 
Moroney, 123 Wis. 2d 89, 98, 365 N.W.2d 887 (Ct. App. 1985).  
Wisconsin Stat. § 146.37 is a statute designed to immunize 
persons involved in the review of medical services and the 
performance of medical service providers while ensuring that the 
professional reputations of evaluated providers are preserved.  
The scheme facilitates a proactive approach to evaluating and 
improving health care services for patients. 
¶36 Wisconsin Stat. § 146.37 is broad in terms of the 
persons entitled to immunity from civil liability for their good 
faith review of medical services.  The statute provides that "no 
person acting in good faith who participates in the review or 
evaluation of the services of health care providers . . . is 
liable for any civil damages as a result of any act or omission 
by such person in the course of such review or evaluation."  
No. 2006AP1521 
 
18 
 
§ 146.37(1g) (emphasis added).  Immunity under the statute is 
extended to good faith acts or omissions of "peer review 
committees or hospital governing bodies," but immunity is "not 
limited to" acts or omissions of these enumerated bodies.  Id.  
The scope of § 146.37(1g) is intentionally broad and not limited 
to "peer" professionals, such as physicians, surgeons, and the 
like.   
¶37 The breadth of Wis. Stat. § 146.37 is evident when 
contrasted with similar provisions from other states that define 
the persons or entities covered by immunity.  For example, the 
Indiana Code provides immunity for review of the performance of 
medical personnel and medical services, but such immunity is 
limited to those bodies falling within the definition of a "peer 
review committee"6 and "an organization, or any other person who, 
                                                 
6 Indiana Code Ann. § 34-6-2-99 (2007) defines "peer review 
committee" for purposes of immunity from civil liability for the 
review of medical services.  A committee must satisfy several 
criteria for its actions to qualify for immunity.   
First, the committee must be organized in one of eight 
enumerated ways, including: by a state, regional, or local 
organization of professional health care providers; by the 
professional staff of a hospital, another health care facility, 
a nonprofit health care organization, or a professional health 
care organization; by state or federal law or regulation; by a 
governing 
board 
of 
a 
hospital, 
a 
nonprofit 
health 
care 
organization, or professional health care organization; as a 
governing board or committee of the board of a hospital, a 
nonprofit health care organization, or professional health care 
organization; by an organization, a plan, or a program described 
in this chapter; as a hospital or a nonprofit health care 
organization medical staff or a section of that staff; or as a 
governing board or committee of the board of a professional 
health care provider.  Ind. Code Ann. § 34-6-2-99(2)(A)(2007). 
No. 2006AP1521 
 
19 
 
in good faith and as a witness or in some other capacity, 
furnishes records, information, or assistance to a peer review 
committee."  Ind. Code Ann. § 34-30-15-15 to 20 (2007).  Other 
states also expressly limit immunity by defining the types of 
covered entities.  See, e.g., Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.035(1), (2) 
(2007) (defining "peer review committee" for purposes of 
immunity from civil liability); Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-6-219(c) 
(LexisNexis 2004) (defining "medical review committee" and "peer 
review 
committee" 
for 
purposes 
of 
immunity 
from 
civil 
liability). 
¶38 Review or evaluation of the medical services provided 
by a particular physician can come in different forms and 
involve numerous parties.  In 1985 the court of appeals noted 
that "[e]xamples of peer reviews include that done by the 
medical records committee, required by Wis. Admin. Code, sec. H 
24.04(1)(m) to 'review and evaluate the quality of medical care 
given the patient;' by the tissue committee, required by sec. H 
24.04(1)(n) to 'review and evaluate all surgery performed in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Second, at least 50 percent of "peer review committee" 
members must be: (1) individual professional health care 
providers, the governing board of a hospital, the governing 
board of a nonprofit health care organization, or professional 
health care organization, or the governing board or a committee 
of the board of a professional health care provider; or (2) 
individual professional health care providers and the committee 
is organized as an interdisciplinary committee to conduct 
evaluation of patient care services.  Ind. Code Ann. § 34-6-2-
99(2)(B)(2007). 
Wisconsin's immunity statute is broader than Indiana's 
because the Wisconsin scheme does not include a limiting 
definition or the factors noted above. 
No. 2006AP1521 
 
20 
 
hospital;' and by the medical staff at meetings held to 'review, 
analyze, and evaluate the clinical work of its members.' Sec. H 
24.04(1)(o)."  Good Samaritan, 123 Wis. 2d at 98.  Changes to 
Wisconsin's peer review statute over time have expanded its 
scope. 
¶39 In the 1985 case, the court of appeals held that a 
hospital "governing body's consideration of whether to reappoint 
a physician to the hospital staff [was] not a 'review or 
evaluation of the services of a health care provider'" within 
the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 146.38.  Good Samaritan, 123 Wis. 2d 
at 98.7  The Good Samaritan court distinguished the physician 
reappointment decision of a hospital governing body from a 
medical services review aimed at improving the quality of 
treatment.  Id. at 98-99.  In doing so, the court of appeals 
evaluated a hospital's bylaws and noted the governing body in 
question would consider not only the physician's "professional 
competence and clinical judgment," but also the physician's 
"'ethics, 
conduct 
and 
compatibility,' . . . the 
physician's 
cooperation 
with 
hospital 
authorities 
and 
personnel, 
the 
physician's use of hospital facilities for his or her patients, 
the physician's relations with other staff members, and the 
                                                 
7 Both Wis. Stat. §§ 146.37 and 146.38 were created by ch. 
187, Laws of 1975, to address evaluation of the services of 
health care providers.  State ex rel. Good Samaritan Med. Ctr.-
Deaconess Hosp. Campus v. Moroney, 123 Wis. 2d 89, 96, 365 
N.W.2d 887 (Ct. App. 1985).  Wisconsin Stat. § 146.37 grants 
civil 
liability 
immunity 
to 
those 
participating 
in 
an 
evaluation, 
while 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 146.38 
relates 
to 
the 
confidentiality of information relating to an evaluation. 
No. 2006AP1521 
 
21 
 
physician's 'general attitude' toward his or her practice, 
patients, the hospital and the general public."  Id. at 99.  The 
court recognized that "[i]t is apparent that a decision to 
reappoint need not turn on the quality of the treatment provided 
by the physician.  Further, there is no indication that 
improving the quality of that treatment is a goal of the 
reappointment procedure."  Id.  The Good Samaritan court 
concluded that the hospital governing body's decision whether to 
reappoint a physician to its staff was "one step removed from 
the actual peer review"; therefore, the governing body's 
decision-making was not protected by § 146.38.  Id. at 99-100. 
¶40 After Good Samaritan, the legislature amended Wis. 
Stat. § 146.37(1) expansively to include a sentence that reads 
in part: "Acts and omissions to which this subsection applies 
include, but are not limited to, acts or omissions by peer 
review committees or hospital governing bodies."  1985 Wis. Act 
340, § 13t (emphasis added).  The court of appeals subsequently 
recognized that "[t]his amendment specifically extended the 
statutory 
immunity 
to 
acts 
or 
omissions 
by 
peer 
review 
committees or hospital governing bodies."  Mallow, 148 Wis. 2d 
at 330.8  The legislature also added § 146.37(1m) in 1985.  This 
                                                 
8 Mallow involved a question of the applicability of the 
confidentiality 
provisions 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 146.38 
to 
the 
discoverability of certain information regarding the suspension 
of a physician.  Mallow, 148 Wis. 2d at 326-27.  The Mallow 
court interpreted the 1985 amendment to Wis. Stat. § 146.37 and 
concluded that the amendment was not intended to apply to 
§ 146.38.  Id. at 330-31. 
No. 2006AP1521 
 
22 
 
paragraph established a presumption of good faith, which will be 
overcome only by clear and convincing evidence.  1985 Wis. Act 
340, § 14.   
¶41 The court of appeals applied Wis. Stat. § 146.37, as 
revised, in Limjoco, a case involving claims of conspiracy and 
tortious interference with contract.  Limjoco, 169 Wis. 2d at 
707.  The question in Limjoco was whether two surgeons who 
reviewed the work of surgeon Dr. Uriel Limjoco (Dr. Limjoco) 
acted in good faith.  Id.  Drs. Jeffrey and Beth Schenck (the 
Schencks) were enlisted by the Falls Medical Group's (clinic) 
executive committee to review the files of 22 of Dr. Limjoco's 
patients for irregularities.  Id.  Specifically, Dr. Gary 
Stewart (Stewart), the clinic's quality assurance director, 
enlisted the Schencks to provide opinions regarding whether 
certain cases had been handled appropriately.  Id.  After Dr. 
Limjoco resigned from his post with the clinic, he sued Stewart 
and the Schencks and argued that they participated in destroying 
his professional reputation as a surgeon.  Id. at 708.   
¶42 The Schencks moved for summary judgment on the ground 
that Wis. Stat. § 146.37 immunized their participation in the 
good faith review of Dr. Limjoco's medical services.  Id. at 
708-09.  Dr. Limjoco argued that the informal review procedure 
undertaken by the clinic was an "ad hoc investigation" that did 
not have the characteristics of a peer review.  Id. at 709.  Dr. 
Limjoco asserted that the Schencks' investigation had no 
requirements for record keeping, gave him no opportunity to be 
heard, was intended to terminate his association with the clinic 
No. 2006AP1521 
 
23 
 
to increase the earnings of other clinic doctors, and did not 
have a remedial health care objective.  Id. at 710.   
¶43 The court of appeals upheld summary judgment to the 
Schencks on the grounds that they had every right to believe 
they were acting within a legitimate peer review program and 
that there was no triable dispute regarding their good faith.  
Id. at 712-13.  The court held that the purpose of Wis. Stat. 
§ 146.37 would be defeated and would "create a trap for the 
unwary to deny immunity to a good faith participant in medical 
peer review even if the peer review program itself was not 
organized and conducted in the proper manner, if indeed there is 
a 'proper' manner."  Id. at 711-12.   The court of appeals also 
rejected the assertion that the presumption of good faith 
attaches 
only 
when 
the 
review 
committee 
is 
"correctly 
organized."  Id. at 712.  "[A]nyone who has the good faith 
belief that they are participating in a valid peer review 
procedure of a health care provider is entitled to the 
presumption of good faith in sec. 146.37(1g), Stats., and is 
immune from liability, unless the presumption of good faith is 
overcome."  Id. 
¶44 The court next analyzed the good faith of the Schencks 
and concluded that Dr. Limjoco failed to present facts or 
competing inferences that the Schencks' review of his surgeries 
was not in good faith.  Id. at 713-14.  Dr. Limjoco claimed that 
Dr. Jeffrey Schenck held a "grudge" against him, which also 
impacted Dr. Beth Schenck's evaluation.  Id.  Dr. Limjoco also 
argued that the Schencks had an economic motive to see him 
No. 2006AP1521 
 
24 
 
removed from the clinic to further their financial interests.  
Id.  The court of appeals found that Dr. Limjoco's assertions 
could not rebut the presumption of good faith that the Schencks 
enjoyed under Wis. Stat. § 146.37.  Id. at 714-15.  
¶45 The Limjoco case is instructive because it emphasizes 
two vital elements of Wis. Stat. § 146.37: (1) the broad reach 
of the activities and actors that might constitute and perform 
qualified review of medical services subject to immunity from 
civil suit under § 146.37(1g); and (2) the strength of the 
presumption of good faith in § 146.37(1m).  Although Limjoco 
involved what one would think of as traditional "peer review," 
the case also illustrates that actors outside the core medical 
services review committee are often called upon to evaluate the 
competency and characteristics of the medical professional or 
the medical services in question.  Persons outside the review 
committee can become an integral part of the overall review 
process. 
¶46 We now turn to the questions of immunity for Hazelden 
and the Spooner defendants. 
C. 
Statutory Immunity for Hazelden 
¶47 The first issue is whether Hazelden, a third-party 
addictionology center, is too removed from the peer review 
process initiated by Spooner to be eligible for immunity under 
Wis. Stat. § 146.37. 
¶48 Dr. Rechsteiner asserts that Hazelden was not a part 
of the medical peer review process conducted by Spooner and 
should not be granted immunity from civil liability under 
No. 2006AP1521 
 
25 
 
Wis. Stat. § 146.37(1g). 
 
Dr. 
Rechsteiner 
contends 
that 
§ 146.37(1g) provides immunity only to persons reviewing or 
evaluating the services of a health care provider, or the 
charges for those services, in connection with specifically 
organized programs, to improve the quality of health care.  Dr. 
Rechsteiner reasons that Hazelden is not immune from his claim 
of medical negligence inasmuch as Hazelden did not evaluate the 
services he provided as a surgeon; it evaluated Dr. Rechsteiner 
personally to determine whether he had an alcohol dependency 
problem.  This, Dr. Rechsteiner asserts, is not the type of 
evaluation covered by § 146.37(1g). 
¶49 By contrast, Hazelden argues that the circuit court 
was correct in concluding that an outside agency enlisted by a 
hospital to assist with peer review is entitled to immunity 
under Wis. Stat. § 146.37.  Hazelden notes that this court 
construed § 146.38 to apply to organizations other than a 
hospital review committee in Hofflander.  Hazelden further 
asserts that Spooner needed to bring in an outside expert to 
assess the care that Dr. Rechsteiner was providing.  Hazelden 
insists that the peer review statute does not apply solely to 
the technical quality of a physician's services because the 
legislature chose not to use such limiting language.  
¶50 Dr. Rechsteiner bases his argument in part on Franzen 
v. Children's Hospital of Wisconsin, Inc., 169 Wis. 2d 366, 485 
N.W.2d 603 (Ct. App. 1992), a case in which the court of appeals 
stated that if a review committee was formed for the purpose of 
monitoring a physician's handling of addictive drugs, the 
No. 2006AP1521 
 
26 
 
activity would be "one step removed from the actual peer 
review."  Id. at 393 (footnote omitted).  Franzen involved an 
action for medical malpractice where the plaintiff sought, and 
was 
denied 
access 
through 
discovery, 
to 
the 
defendant 
physician's "credentials file" that was in the possession of his 
hospital.  Id. at 373-74.  The plaintiff's discovery request was 
denied by the circuit court on the ground that the file was 
generated in the course of peer review and therefore constituted 
privileged information protected from disclosure by Wis. Stat. 
§ 146.38.  Id. at 374.  The court of appeals remanded the 
discovery issue to determine the nature of the committee that 
produced the credentials file to ascertain whether material 
generated was privileged under § 146.38.  Id. at 393. 
¶51 Franzen does not aid Dr. Rechsteiner's argument 
because that case turned on a determination of whether an "ad 
hoc" committee organized to review a physician's compliance with 
the conditions of his reinstatement, namely his handling of 
addictive drugs, was indeed acting to improve the quality of 
health care as contemplated by Wis. Stat. § 146.38.  Id. at 392-
93.  Franzen is distinguishable because the question there 
involved the interpretation of the nature of a reviewing 
committee under § 146.38.  Franzen, 169 Wis. 2d at 377.  As 
noted above, the statutory language of § 146.38 is similar to 
§ 146.37; however, a 1985 amendment to § 146.37 extended 
statutory 
immunity 
to 
acts 
or 
omissions 
by 
peer 
review 
committees or hospital governing bodies.  Mallow, 148 Wis. 2d at 
330.  The immunity afforded to acts or omissions under § 146.37 
No. 2006AP1521 
 
27 
 
appears to be more inclusive than the privilege from civil 
discovery under § 146.38.  Mallow, 148 Wis. 2d at 331.  If 
Franzen had involved a question of civil immunity under 
§ 146.37, the result might have been different. 
¶52 In the case at hand, Dr. Rechsteiner acknowledges that 
Wis. Stat. § 146.37 would "apply to Spooner Health System's 
review 
and 
evaluation 
of 
Rechsteiner's 
services."  
Realistically, however, a review of Dr. Rechsteiner and his 
services would be incomplete if it focused solely on past 
performance. 
 
The 
Spooner 
Board 
convened 
to 
review 
Dr. 
Rechsteiner's ability to perform as an on-call physician in 
light of the March 8, 2003, snowmobile incident.  The Board's 
concern was understandably focused on the surgeon's future 
performance.  The actions of a hospital governing body in 
reviewing the ability of a physician to perform services, 
especially a physician who is frequently on call 24 hours per 
day, qualify for the immunity contemplated by § 146.37(1g).  See 
Mallow, 148 Wis. 2d at 330.  There is no dispute here that the 
Board was evaluating not only Dr. Rechsteiner's past performance 
but also his future ability to perform while on call. 
¶53 Although Spooner qualifies for immunity under Wis. 
Stat. § 146.37, the question remains whether Hazelden's actions 
are also eligible for immunity.  Dr. Rechsteiner asserts that 
Hazelden is "one step removed" from the peer review process.  
See Good Samaritan, 123 Wis. 2d at 99; Franzen, 169 Wis. 2d at 
393.  However, the record provides ample support for the 
conclusion that Hazelden was an integral part of a "review or 
No. 2006AP1521 
 
28 
 
evaluation of the services of [a] health care provider[]," as 
contemplated by § 146.37(1g). 
¶54 The facts concerning Spooner's enlistment of Hazelden 
illustrate the point.  After receiving a sheriff's incident 
report and learning that Dr. Rechsteiner's blood alcohol content 
was .06 percent during a time when he was on call for surgical 
coverage, the Spooner Board informed Dr. Rechsteiner that his 
actions warranted corrective action.  The Board notified Dr. 
Rechsteiner 
by 
letter 
that 
under 
the 
"Corrective 
Action 
Procedures and Fair Hearing Plan Addendum" of Spooner's bylaws, 
a physician may request a voluntary leave of absence or face 
suspension of his clinical privileges until he "successfully 
undergo[es] 
an 
assessment 
process 
through 
a 
recognized 
addictionology 
center 
skilled 
in 
evaluating 
impaired 
professionals, as selected by the Board." 
¶55 According to the letter referencing Spooner's bylaws, 
a physician must successfully undergo an assessment process and 
"demonstrate 
compliance 
with 
any 
follow-up 
recommendations 
issued as a result of that process and [must be] cleared to 
resume practice to the satisfaction of the Medical Staff and 
Board" 
before 
the 
physician 
will 
be 
considered 
for 
reinstatement.  In addition, the letter indicated that Spooner's 
bylaws require that a physician must "authorize Spooner Health 
Systems to release information to the assessment program and 
authorize the assessment program to release its results, any 
recommendations made as a result of the assessment, and 
information on [his] compliance with any recommendations."   
No. 2006AP1521 
 
29 
 
¶56 These 
requirements indicate that once the Board 
selected a "recognized addictionology center"——Hazelden——Dr. 
Rechsteiner was required to successfully undergo an assessment 
process unless he chose to take a voluntary leave of absence.  
The enlistment of Hazelden to evaluate Dr. Rechsteiner is 
analogous to the enlistment of the two reviewing surgeons to 
evaluate Dr. Limjoco.  Limjoco, 169 Wis. 2d at 711-12.  However, 
Spooner did not have "a recognized addictionology center" in 
house.  It had to look beyond its own staff.  We would defeat 
the purpose of Wis. Stat. § 146.37 if we held that the 
participation of an outside entity——enlisted by a reviewing 
committee to perform an assessment of the abilities of a 
physician to perform effectively while on call——is not eligible 
for immunity simply because the outside entity is not part of a 
formal "peer review program."  See id. at 711-12.   
¶57 Although the Board initiated the review process by 
meeting to "consider the [sheriff's incident report] and 
determine what, if any, evaluation of Dr. Rechsteiner's conduct 
was necessary," the review process did not end there.  The 
letter Spooner sent to Dr. Rechsteiner indicated that an 
addictionology center would be brought into the review process 
unless Dr. Rechsteiner chose to take a voluntary leave of 
absence.  By deciding to accept and participate in the 
assessment option, Dr. Rechsteiner effectively approved the 
scope and length of the peer review process with Hazelden.  
Thus, Hazelden became an integral part of the ongoing medical 
No. 2006AP1521 
 
30 
 
services review, and its actions are eligible for immunity from 
civil liability under Wis. Stat. § 146.37. 
¶58 Dr. Rechsteiner contends, however, that if Hazelden is 
eligible for immunity it lost that immunity by acts of medical 
negligence, namely, a misdiagnosis of his condition, resulting 
in damages.  The court of appeals bought into this contention, 
in part, when it concluded that Wis. Stat. § 146.37 is not broad 
enough to immunize a medical malpractice claim.  Rechsteiner, 
303 Wis. 2d 656, ¶26.  Consequently, the court of appeals 
affirmed summary judgment to Hazelden on different grounds.  See 
id., ¶28.  It examined the standard for liability arising from 
misdiagnosis and cited authority for the proposition that 
"[m]alpractice is actionable only if the wrong diagnosis is 
followed by the wrong treatment."  Id. (citing Ehlinger v. 
Sipes, 148 Wis. 2d 260, 265, 434 N.W.2d 825 (Ct. App. 1988), 
aff'd in part and remanded, 155 Wis. 2d 1, 454 N.W.2d 754 
(1990); McManus v. Donlin, 23 Wis. 2d 289, 295, 127 N.W.2d 22 
(1964)). 
¶59 The court of appeals appears to have concluded that 
Wis. Stat. § 146.37 does not immunize medical negligence in any 
form during the peer review process.  See Rechsteiner, 303 
Wis. 2d 656, ¶26.  Our second question tests this conclusion: 
Does Hazelden's diagnosis of Dr. Rechsteiner during the medical 
peer review process qualify for immunity, under Wis. Stat. 
§ 146.37, even if its diagnosis is deemed negligent?  In 
answering this question, our task is merely to decide whether 
No. 2006AP1521 
 
31 
 
Hazelden's actions in this case are immune from civil liability 
under § 146.37. 
¶60 Dr. 
Rechsteiner's 
complaint 
points 
to 
Hazelden's 
alleged negligence in diagnosis.  He claims that a misdiagnosis—
—"alcohol 
dependence" 
instead 
of 
"alcohol 
abuse"——led 
to 
unnecessary treatment that cost him time, money, and reputation. 
¶61 We 
conclude 
that 
Hazelden's 
diagnosis 
of 
Dr. 
Rechsteiner's condition was indistinguishable from Spooner's 
review, evaluation, and analysis of Dr. Rechsteiner's ability to 
perform as an on-call surgeon.  In this case, diagnosis was the 
essence of the peer review process initiated by Spooner.9  Even 
if we were to assume that Hazelden's diagnosis was negligent, it 
was immune because it was central to the peer review process. 
¶62 We would seriously undermine the peer review process 
if we denied immunity to a good faith diagnosis on these facts, 
                                                 
9 We note that diagnosis is an art rather than a science 
when it involves a condition that is not precisely identifiable 
by lab tests or irrefutable markers.  Diagnosing degrees of 
alcoholism is an inexact science because it is subject to so 
many 
variables. 
 
See 
American 
Psychiatric 
Association, 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-
TR) § 305.00, at 214 (4th ed., text rev., 2000) (noting: (1) 
that Alcohol Abuse "requires fewer symptoms and, thus, may be 
less severe than Dependence and is only diagnosed once the 
absence of Dependence has been established."; and (2) that 
"[w]hen . . . problems are accompanied by evidence of tolerance, 
withdrawal, or compulsive behavior related to alcohol use, a 
diagnosis of Alcohol Dependence, rather than Alcohol Abuse, 
should 
be 
considered. 
 
However, 
since 
some 
symptoms 
of 
tolerance, 
withdrawal, 
or 
compulsive 
use 
can 
occur 
in 
individuals with Abuse but not Dependence, it is important to 
determine whether the full criteria for Dependence are met."). 
No. 2006AP1521 
 
32 
 
especially when that diagnosis did not make an existing medical 
condition worse. 
¶63 Dr. 
Rechsteiner 
contends 
that 
Hazelden's 
alleged 
misdiagnosis led to unnecessary treatment that caused damages.  
This brings us to the third question: Does Hazelden's treatment 
of Dr. Rechsteiner, following its diagnosis of his medical 
condition, qualify for immunity under Wis. Stat. § 146.37?  To 
the extent Dr. Rechsteiner's claim implicates treatment, we 
decline to examine or decide whether treatment related to the 
peer review process can qualify for immunity. 
¶64 If the focus is shifted from diagnosis to treatment, 
Hazelden 
asserts 
that 
summary 
judgment 
was 
appropriate.  
Hazelden contends that Dr. Rechsteiner would have received the 
same treatment regardless of whether he received a diagnosis of 
"alcohol dependence" or a diagnosis of "alcohol abuse."  It 
claims that Dr. Rechsteiner failed to produce any competent 
evidence 
that 
its 
alleged 
misdiagnosis 
led 
to 
improper 
treatment.  It reasons that Dr. Rechsteiner's claim must fail as 
a matter of law because he expressly agreed to follow Hazelden's 
treatment recommendations, whatever they might be. 
¶65 Dr. Rechsteiner disputes Hazelden's contention that he 
would have received the same treatment regardless of diagnosis.  
He argues that Hazelden was simply trying to protect itself from 
liability by sending him a letter that stated that the treatment 
No. 2006AP1521 
 
33 
 
he received would have been the same if he had received a 
diagnosis of alcohol abuse rather than alcohol dependence.10  
¶66 Dr. Rechsteiner claims that evidence from an expert in 
alcohol treatment, as well as information on Hazelden's own 
website, create a factual issue regarding the effect of 
Hazelden's misdiagnosis.  Dr. Rechsteiner provided evidence from 
Scott Hansen, an AODA Supervisor from Luther Midelfort, who 
conducted an assessment of Dr. Rechsteiner after his assessment 
and treatment at Hazelden.  In a letter to the Wisconsin Medical 
Society, Hansen stated that "[i]n 28 years, I've never seen a 
patient [with] an Alcohol Abuse diagnosis require a 30-day 
inpatient program.  With an Alcohol Abuse diagnosis, I usually 
recommend educational counseling sessions, at most."  Dr. 
Rechsteiner also points to Hazelden's website, which describes 
the possibility of outpatient treatment services for appropriate 
candidates. 
¶67 Here again, if we assume for analysis that Hazelden's 
diagnosis of "alcohol dependence" instead of "alcohol abuse" was 
negligent, Dr. Rechsteiner still failed to claim that his 
treatment was substandard or negligent or aggravated his medical 
condition.  "A misdiagnosis, in and of itself, is not, and 
cannot, be an actionable injury. . . .  The actionable injury 
arises when the misdiagnosis causes a greater harm than existed 
                                                 
10 This assertion is different from an allegation that 
Hazelden did not act in good faith in making its diagnosis. 
No. 2006AP1521 
 
34 
 
at the time of the misdiagnosis."  Paul v. Skemp, 2001 WI 42, 
¶25, 242 Wis. 2d 507, 625 N.W.2d 860. 
¶68 In affirming summary judgment to Hazelden, the court 
of appeals emphasized that Hazelden submitted evidence that 
Hazelden would have given Dr. Rechsteiner the same 28 days of 
inpatient treatment regardless of whether he had been diagnosed 
with "alcohol abuse" or "alcohol dependence."  Rechsteiner, 303 
Wis. 2d 656, ¶27.  As this case played out, there is no genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether Dr. Rechsteiner would have 
received inpatient treatment at Hazelden if he had been 
diagnosed with only "alcohol abuse."    
¶69 The letter from Scott Hansen, which stated that Hansen 
had never seen an individual with a correct diagnosis of 
"alcohol abuse" undergo the type of treatment provided by 
Hazelden, does not create a genuine issue of material fact about 
whether Hazelden failed to satisfy the standard of care with 
regard to treatment of Dr. Rechsteiner.  The letter does not 
assert that there is a specific standard of care for all 
patients diagnosed with alcohol abuse.  It does not rule out 
alternative methods of treatment, including inpatient treatment, 
for patients diagnosed with alcohol abuse.  Moreover, as the 
court of appeals observed, the letter "does not state how this 
patient in this case would be treated, only that he had never 
seen an alcohol abuse patient go through inpatient treatment."  
Rechsteiner, 
303 
Wis. 2d 656, 
¶28. 
 
Hansen's 
letter 
is 
"speculative" in the sense that it invites the court to second-
guess Dr. Rechsteiner's treatment without established standards.  
No. 2006AP1521 
 
35 
 
See id.  Because the evidence presented by Dr. Rechsteiner does 
not create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether 
his treatment at Hazelden would have or should have differed 
with a diagnosis of "alcohol abuse," his claim for medical 
negligence cannot survive summary judgment. 
¶70 We emphasize that our holding regarding Hazelden is 
heavily influenced by the facts and circumstances of this case.  
Like the court of appeals, we are not prepared to say that the 
peer review statute will immunize medical negligence in all 
situations, irrespective of the circumstances. 
¶71 We conclude that the record before us indicates that 
Hazelden is eligible for immunity under Wis. Stat. § 146.37 
because it played an integral role in Spooner's medical peer 
review process.  Hazelden's medical diagnosis of Dr. Rechsteiner 
is immune, even if its diagnosis is deemed negligent, because 
Hazelden's diagnosis was central to its requested evaluation.  
If Dr. Rechsteiner's complaint is viewed as focusing on 
Hazelden's treatment of Dr. Rechsteiner, as opposed to its 
diagnosis of Dr. Rechsteiner, the complaint cannot survive 
summary judgment. 
D. 
Statutory Immunity for the Spooner Defendants 
¶72 Dr. 
Rechsteiner's 
claims 
against 
the 
Spooner 
defendants involve allegations that members of Spooner's Board 
defamed him and negligently communicated false information when 
they made statements about him to Hazelden staff.11   
                                                 
11 An action for defamation is established by proving the 
following elements:  
No. 2006AP1521 
 
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¶73 The 
Spooner 
defendants 
argue 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 146.37(1g) is to be interpreted broadly to protect the 
statements of participants involved in a medical peer review 
process.  They point out that the language of § 146.37(1g) does 
not limit the persons granted immunity and insist that the 
Board, which initiated the peer review of Dr. Rechsteiner, 
constitutes an entity whose actions are immune under § 146.37.  
Furthermore, the Spooner defendants explain that when the Board 
was presented with the sheriff's incident report, it took a 
proactive approach in Dr. Rechsteiner's assessment, which is 
exactly what was envisioned by the legislature to prevent 
patient harm. 
¶74 Dr. Rechsteiner argues that the employees and agents 
of Spooner, including Schafer, Cuskey, Long, and Stewart, are 
not immune from liability because Wis. Stat. § 146.37(1g) does 
not extend beyond the Board's own evaluation of his medical 
services.  Dr. Rechsteiner emphasizes the fact that these 
defendants, who allegedly defamed him, are not surgeons or even 
physicians.  Thus, he argues that they are not qualified to 
discuss the quality of treatment rendered by him.  Furthermore, 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1) a false statement; (2) communicated by speech, 
conduct or in writing to a person other than the 
person 
defamed; 
and, 
(3) 
the 
communication 
is 
unprivileged and tends to harm one's reputation so as 
to lower him or her in the estimation of the community 
or to deter third persons from associating or dealing 
with him or her. 
Torgerson v. Journal/Sentinel, Inc., 210 Wis. 2d 524, 534, 563 
N.W.2d 472 (1997) (citations omitted). 
No. 2006AP1521 
 
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he contends that the statements the Spooner defendants made to 
Hazelden pertained to his personal life, rather than the quality 
of medical services he provides.  Dr. Rechsteiner's assertions 
bring us to the fourth question: Do the actions and statements 
of the Spooner defendants qualify for immunity under Wis. Stat. 
§ 146.37? 
¶75 Wisconsin Stat. § 146.37(1g) states that "no person 
acting in good faith who participates in the review or 
evaluation of the services of health care providers . . . is 
liable for any civil damages."  In enacting this provision, the 
legislature chose not to distinguish between different classes 
of persons who enjoy immunity.  Rather, the legislature extended 
immunity to any participating person acting in good faith.  
§ 146.37(1g).  The good faith of such persons is presumed.  
§ 146.37(1m).  Furthermore, § 146.37(1g) explicitly provides 
that immunity extends to the acts and omissions of "peer review 
committees 
or 
hospital 
governing 
bodies 
in 
censuring, 
reprimanding, limiting or revoking hospital staff privileges."  
§ 146.37(1g); see also Mallow, 148 Wis. 2d at 330. 
¶76 Wisconsin Stat. 146.37(1g) plainly applies to the 
actions of the Spooner Health System, the Spooner Board, its 
individual members (Cuskey, Long, and Stewart), and Spooner 
administrator/CEO Schafer in their review and evaluation of Dr. 
Rechsteiner's services and to any disciplinary action taken 
against him, so long as they were acting in good faith.  As Dr. 
Rechsteiner acknowledges, "disciplinary action taken by a 
governing body will be necessarily linked to the review of the 
No. 2006AP1521 
 
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physician's services by others knowledgeable in the same area of 
medicine."  The Spooner defendants' actions in temporarily 
suspending Dr. Rechsteiner's privileges until he completed the 
required assessment and treatment with Hazelden fit squarely 
within 
the 
underlying 
objective 
of 
§ 146.37, 
namely 
"to 
encourage hospitals to perform quality-control reviews aimed at 
improving, prospectively, their services."  Hofflander, 262 Wis. 
2d 539, ¶119 (citations omitted).  The Spooner defendants' 
statements to Hazelden staff helped Hazelden perform its duty to 
assist Spooner in reviewing and prospectively improving the 
performance of its on-call surgeon. 
¶77 Dr. Rechsteiner next contends that defendants Schafer, 
Cuskey, Long, and Stewart did not act in good faith when making 
statements to Hazelden.  This implicates the fifth question: Did 
Dr. Rechsteiner provide evidence to the court that raised a 
genuine issue of material fact about the good faith of the 
Spooner defendants?  Dr. Rechsteiner concedes that there is a 
presumption that a person participating in a peer review process 
is acting in good faith, but he argues that he should survive 
the 
defendants' 
motions 
for 
summary 
judgment 
because 
he 
presented facts that showed a triable dispute.  Dr. Rechsteiner 
insists that the good faith analysis is a question of fact for a 
jury. 
¶78 Two subsections of Wis. Stat. § 146.37 address the 
nature of "good faith" for purposes of immunity from civil 
liability, without actually defining the term.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 146.37(1m) provides: "The good faith of any person specified 
No. 2006AP1521 
 
39 
 
in subs. (1g) and (3) shall be presumed in any civil action.  
Any person who asserts that such a person has not acted in good 
faith has the burden of proving that assertion by clear and 
convincing evidence."  Wisconsin Stat. § 146.37(2) provides:   
In determining whether a member of the reviewing 
or evaluating organization or the medical director has 
acted in good faith under sub. (1g), the court shall 
consider whether the member or medical director has 
sought to prevent the health care provider or facility 
and its counsel from examining the documents and 
records used in the review or evaluation, from 
presenting witnesses, establishing pertinent facts and 
circumstances, questioning or refuting testimony and 
evidence, 
confronting 
and 
cross-examining 
adverse 
witnesses or from receiving a copy of the final report 
or recommendation of the reviewing organization or 
medical director. 
¶79 We must keep in mind that this case comes to us on 
review of summary judgment.  "At summary judgment . . . [a 
plaintiff] must demonstrate only that a rational jury could find 
that [the plaintiff] had demonstrated lack of good faith by 
clear and convincing evidence."  Harris, 13 F.3d at 1086.12  In 
Harris, the Seventh Circuit interpreted Wis. Stat. § 146.37 and 
recognized that the legislature did not define "good faith" in 
the peer review statute.  Id.  It noted that "[o]ther courts 
interpreting peer review statutes similar to Wisconsin's have 
also held that 'good faith' is at least in part a subjective 
inquiry."  Id. at 1087 (citations omitted). 
                                                 
12 See also Limjoco v. Schenck, 169 Wis. 2d 703, 713, 486 
N.W.2d 567 (Ct. App. 1992) ("At the summary judgment stage, [the 
plaintiff] simply ha[s] to present facts or alternate competing 
inferences sufficient to convince the trial court that there was 
a triable dispute regarding the [defendants'] good faith.").   
No. 2006AP1521 
 
40 
 
¶80 The 
immunity 
granted 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 146.37 
anticipates unvarnished candor in the course of medical services 
review.  Protecting candor is necessary to the full and open 
review envisioned by the statute.  To protect this candor, 
§ 146.37(1m) creates a presumption of good faith for peer review 
participants.  "Any person who asserts that [one covered by 
§ 146.37(1g)] has not acted in good faith has the burden of 
proving that assertion by clear and convincing evidence."  
§ 146.37(1m). 
¶81 Dr. Rechsteiner asserts that the statements made by 
the defendants13 were false and easily verifiable as false, 
permitting an inference that the defendants lacked good faith.  
For example, Dr. Rechsteiner argues that a comment that his 
"wife was terminated from her position at Spooner due to issues 
with Rechsteiner's alcohol usage was easily verifiable as false 
by the Spooner Board member making the statement."  Dr. 
Rechsteiner argues that allegedly defamatory statements referred 
to his personal life and personality rather than the quality of 
his medical services.  He suggests that the nature of the 
statements demonstrates bad faith on the part of the Spooner 
defendants. 
¶82 We conclude that Dr. Rechsteiner has failed to present 
facts that overcome the presumption of good faith established by 
                                                 
13 Dr. Rechsteiner's complaint alleges that the Spooner 
defendants made defamatory statements regarding his relationship 
with his wife, his finances, his state of well-being, his mental 
state, the state of his career, and the alleged existence of 
lawsuits against Dr. Rechsteiner for malpractice.   
No. 2006AP1521 
 
41 
 
Wis. Stat. § 146.37(1m).14  Dr. Rechsteiner failed to present 
facts that show that the defendants' statements made to Hazelden 
personnel 
were 
indisputably 
false 
and 
defamatory. 
 
Dr. 
Rechsteiner made conclusory assertions about the allegedly false 
nature of the statements. 
¶83 More important, Dr. Rechsteiner failed to present 
facts that demonstrate that the Spooner defendants were not 
acting in good faith.  For example, he did not show that the 
Spooner defendants knew that their statements were false.  He 
did not allege that any of the Spooner defendants made 
statements to anyone other than Hazelden personnel——that is, 
that they made statements to people outside the peer review 
process.  This sort of evidence is critical because when a 
person in Dr. Rechsteiner's position accuses one or more 
participants in a peer review process of defamation, he must 
demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether the alleged statements were made in good faith.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 146.37(1m).   
¶84 Dr. Rechsteiner's assertions are similar to those 
proffered by the plaintiff in Limjoco.  In Limjoco the plaintiff 
argued that the deposition testimony of one of the defendants 
                                                 
14 Dr. Rechsteiner presented an affidavit from his attorney 
that had appended to it transcripts of depositions of some of 
the Spooner defendants.  Dr. Rechsteiner himself signed an 
affidavit that recounted the course of events leading to and 
including his treatment at Hazelden.  Neither of these sworn 
affidavits included assertions regarding the falsity of the 
alleged 
defamatory 
statements 
or 
the 
Spooner 
defendants' 
knowledge regarding the falsity of the statements. 
No. 2006AP1521 
 
42 
 
revealed that he held a grudge against the plaintiff because he 
stated that "he thought Limjoco had misdiagnosed a case which 
resulted in a lawsuit being initiated against [the defendant]."  
Limjoco, 169 Wis. 2d at 713.  The court of appeals determined 
that the plaintiff failed to make the defendants' good faith a 
disputed issue of fact "because [Limjoco] offer[ed] only 
conclusory statements about the grudge. . . .  He [did] not 
present established facts from which inferences of bad faith 
could be drawn."  Id. at 714-15. 
¶85 In our view, Dr. Rechsteiner offered less evidence 
than the plaintiff in Limjoco who failed to meet the burden of 
demonstrating a triable issue of fact regarding the good faith 
of the defendants.  Dr. Rechsteiner's conclusory statements do 
not permit his claims to survive summary judgment.   
¶86 Dr. Rechsteiner asserts that the personal nature of 
the statements has nothing to do with the quality of the medical 
services he provided Spooner Health System.  However, insight 
into a physician's social and personal behavior is relevant to 
an inquiry of alleged alcohol abuse.  It was reasonable for 
Hazelden to gather information on Dr. Rechsteiner's personal 
life to discern whether alcohol influenced his behavior and 
daily functioning.  Since Spooner was concerned about Dr. 
Rechsteiner's use of alcohol during periods when he was on call, 
it was reasonable for Hazelden to gather information to 
determine whether his past behavior revealed the influence of 
alcohol on his personality.  The defendants' statements to 
No. 2006AP1521 
 
43 
 
Hazelden in this regard do not serve as proof that the 
defendants did not act in good faith. 
¶87 Lastly, Dr. Rechsteiner contends that the refusal of 
the defendants to answer questions during their depositions on 
the basis of a Wis. Stat. § 146.3815 privilege also supports the 
conclusion that the Spooner defendants did not act in good 
faith.  He argues that "under the plain language of § 146.37, 
this fact is unquestionably evidence of bad faith that renders 
summary judgment inappropriate."  Dr. Rechsteiner points to the 
portion of § 146.37(2) that allows the court to inquire into the 
extent to which members of the reviewing committee seek to 
prevent the physician from obtaining information during the 
review process.  Dr. Rechsteiner claims that the defendants 
improperly asserted a privilege in refusing to answer his 
questions during their depositions, which demonstrates a lack of 
good faith. 
¶88 We disagree.  As the Seventh Circuit recognized, good 
faith under Wis. Stat. § 146.37 "is at least in part a 
subjective inquiry."  Harris, 13 F.3d at 1087.  Thus, even if 
the Spooner defendants asserted an incorrect privilege, this 
alone is not per se proof of a lack of good faith.  Refusing to 
answer a question during a deposition on the advice of counsel 
                                                 
15 Wisconsin Stat. § 146.38(1m) provides in relevant part: 
"No person who participates in the review or evaluation of the 
services of health care providers or facilities or charges for 
such 
services 
may 
disclose 
any 
information 
acquired 
in 
connection with such review or evaluation." 
No. 2006AP1521 
 
44 
 
does not create a genuine issue of material fact that rebuts the 
presumption of good faith in § 146.37(1m).   
¶89 We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 146.37 applies to the 
actions of the Spooner defendants and immunizes them from civil 
liability for Dr. Rechsteiner's claims of defamation and 
negligent communication of false information.  Dr. Rechsteiner 
has failed to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether the Spooner defendants were acting 
in good faith. 
E. 
Dr. Rechsteiner's Motion for a Continuance 
¶90 Finally, we come to the sixth question: Did the 
circuit court erroneously exercise its discretion in denying Dr. 
Rechsteiner's motion for a continuance?  Dr. Rechsteiner asserts 
that the circuit court erred when it denied his motion for a 
continuance.  He contends that the circuit court abused its 
discretion because he had not yet deposed certain persons before 
the summary judgment hearing.  Dr. Rechsteiner asserts that he 
did not get the chance to depose representatives of Hazelden due 
to scheduling conflicts and that he was prevented from taking 
full depositions of the Spooner defendants due to their claims 
of privilege under Wis. Stat. § 146.38.  At the time of the 
summary judgment hearing on April 7, 2006, Dr. Rechsteiner's 
motion to compel the witnesses to answer all deposition 
questions was pending before the court.  As a consequence, Dr. 
Rechsteiner contends that his ability to demonstrate a lack of 
good faith of the individual Spooner defendants was hampered by 
his inability to complete discovery prior to the summary 
No. 2006AP1521 
 
45 
 
judgment hearing.  Thus, Dr. Rechsteiner argues that the court 
of appeals' refusal to reverse the circuit court's denial of his 
motion for a continuance was inequitable and inappropriate. 
¶91 Dr. Rechsteiner also stresses that, as a practical 
matter, there were several months left before the discovery 
deadline of November 10, 2006, when the circuit court denied his 
motion.  Dr. Rechsteiner also argues that granting his motion 
for a continuance would not have prejudiced the defendants 
because there were several months before the scheduled trial 
date of December 11, 2006.   
¶92 "It 
is 
well 
established 
in 
Wisconsin 
that 
a 
continuance is not a matter of right."  Robertson-Ryan, 112 Wis. 
2d at 586 (citations omitted).  The decision to deny a 
continuance is within the discretion of the trial court.  Id. at 
587.  A circuit court's ruling on a motion for a continuance 
"will be set aside only if there is evidence of an [erroneous 
exercise] of discretion."  Id.  "An [erroneous exercise] of 
discretion exists if the trial court failed to exercise its 
discretion or if there was no reasonable basis for its 
decision."  Id.   
¶93 Several 
factors 
are 
to 
be 
balanced 
in 
the 
discretionary 
decision 
whether 
to 
grant 
a 
continuance, 
including: (1) the length of the delay requested; (2) whether 
the lead counsel has associates prepared to act in his absence; 
(3) whether other continuances had been requested and received; 
(4) the convenience or inconvenience to the parties, witnesses, 
and the court; and (5) whether the delay seems to be for 
No. 2006AP1521 
 
46 
 
legitimate reasons.  Mogged v. Mogged, 2000 WI App 39, ¶14 n.9, 
233 Wis. 2d 90, 607 N.W.2d 662 (citing Wedgeworth, 100 Wis. 2d 
at 521). 
¶94 If we consider the Mogged factors, Dr. Rechsteiner 
appears to base his arguments on the fourth and fifth factors.  
He asserts that the circuit court and the parties would not have 
been inconvenienced by the granting of a continuance because the 
discovery deadline was November 10, 2006, and the trial date was 
scheduled for December 11, 2006.  Dr. Rechsteiner implies that a 
continuance would not have forced the court to reschedule these 
dates.  He also suggests that the delay was for legitimate 
reasons because several discovery matters were pending. 
¶95 Although 
the 
scheduled 
court 
dates 
and 
Dr. 
Rechsteiner's pending discovery were relevant to the court's 
decision, Dr. Rechsteiner has failed to illustrate how the 
circuit court's exercise of discretion was erroneous.  The 
circuit court demonstrated a reasonable exercise of discretion 
on the record.  The court explained:   
I think given the longstanding nature of this 
complaint, 
the 
fact 
that 
plaintiff 
actively 
participated in the scheduling of summary judgment, 
and . . . the fact that there appears . . . to the 
court nothing remaining but legal issues to decide, 
that the time is ripe for summary judgment motion, 
especially given the scheduling order that is in 
place.  I will hear the motions for summary judgment.  
And the motion for continuance is denied. 
¶96 The expanse of time between the commencement of this 
action and its resolution by summary judgment was significant.  
Dr. Rechsteiner filed his complaint on March 29, 2005.  On 
No. 2006AP1521 
 
47 
 
November 18, 2005, the Spooner defendants filed a motion for 
summary judgment.  A hearing on this summary judgment motion was 
scheduled for February 7, 2006.  However, that hearing was 
rescheduled for April 7, 2006, by the parties' agreement to a 
scheduling order filed January 9, 2006.  On January 16, 2006, 
Dr. Rechsteiner's attorney deposed the Spooner defendants.  
During those depositions, the defendants' attorney asserted 
privilege under Wis. Stat. § 146.38.  Dr. Rechsteiner did not 
file a motion to compel discovery at that time.  He waited to 
file a motion to compel until April 5.   
¶97 Taking into consideration the course of events noted 
above and weighing the relevant Mogged factors, we conclude that 
the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in denying 
Dr. Rechsteiner's motion for a continuance.  Considering the 
first factor, the length of the delay requested, Mogged, 233 
Wis. 2d 90, ¶14 n.9, the fact that the summary judgment hearing 
had already been rescheduled once by agreement of the parties 
during the scheduling conference indicates that Dr. Rechsteiner 
had already received adequate time to prepare his case.  This 
evidence also relates to the third factor——whether other 
continuances had been requested and received.  Id.  Finally, 
since Dr. Rechsteiner delayed filing his motion to compel 
discovery until immediately before the summary judgment hearing, 
the circuit court could reasonably have concluded that granting 
the continuance motion would unnecessarily inconvenience the 
court and the parties and create unnecessary delay (Mogged 
factors four and five).  Id.  Considering these factors, Dr. 
No. 2006AP1521 
 
48 
 
Rechsteiner has failed to demonstrate that the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion in denying his motion for a 
continuance. 
¶98 There is another valid reason why the circuit court's 
denial of Dr. Rechsteiner's motion was reasonable.  It was 
logical for the circuit court to hear the summary judgment 
motion as scheduled because if there were no triable issues of 
fact the request for a continuance would be moot.  In Jorgensen 
v. Water Works, Inc., 218 Wis. 2d 761, 582 N.W.2d 98 (Ct. App. 
1998), the court of appeals recognized that a decision to take 
up summary judgment early on would be "based on a reasonable 
preference for conserving judicial resources."  Id. at 773. 
¶99 In 
Jorgensen 
the 
plaintiffs 
failed 
to 
conduct 
discovery because they were waiting for the court to grant their 
request for the appointment of a receiver to conduct discovery.  
Id. at 771.  The defendants were granted summary judgment, and 
the plaintiffs appealed, claiming the court should have denied 
the motion or ordered a continuance to permit discovery.  Id. at 
771-72.  The circuit court decided that it made sense to hear 
the summary judgment motion first, because if there were no 
triable issues of fact on the claims that the Jorgensens 
asserted, the request for the appointment of a receiver would be 
moot.  Id. at 773.  The court of appeals affirmed the decision 
as reasonable.  Id.   
¶100 The court of appeals noted that the scheduling order 
"specifically stated that the motion for summary judgment would 
be heard before the motion for dissolution and appointment of a 
No. 2006AP1521 
 
49 
 
receiver."  Id. at 772.  Thus, the court concluded that the 
Jorgensens and their counsel "had ample notice that they should 
be prepared to oppose the motion for summary judgment before 
their motion was decided."  Id.   
¶101 In this case, the January 6, 2006, scheduling order 
set the summary judgment hearing date for April 7, 2006, three 
months in the future.  Dr. Rechsteiner was on notice that any 
discovery motions required to oppose a motion for summary 
judgment should be completed before the April date.  In fact, 
the scheduling order specified that "all motions for summary 
judgment or other dispositive motions filed by March 7, 2006, 
will be heard on April 7, 2006 at 10:00 a.m."  However, Dr. 
Rechsteiner's counsel chose to wait until April 5 to file a 
motion to compel discovery.  On these facts, we conclude that it 
was reasonable for the circuit court to deny Dr. Rechsteiner's 
motion for a continuance; therefore, the circuit court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion. 
III. CONCLUSION 
¶102 The questions presented, as we see them, together with 
the answers provided, are stated as follows: 
Question (1): Is Hazelden, a third-party addictionology 
center, too removed from the peer review process initiated by 
Spooner to be eligible for immunity under Wis. Stat. § 146.37? 
Answer (1): No.  Hazelden is eligible for immunity under 
Wis. Stat. § 146.37 because it played an integral role in 
Spooner's medical peer review of Dr. Rechsteiner. 
No. 2006AP1521 
 
50 
 
Question (2): Does Hazelden's diagnosis of Dr. Rechsteiner 
during the medical peer review process qualify for immunity, 
under Wis. Stat. § 146.37, even if its diagnosis is deemed 
negligent? 
Answer (2): Yes.  Hazelden's medical diagnosis of Dr. 
Rechsteiner is immune under Wis. Stat. § 146.37, even if the 
diagnosis is deemed negligent, because Hazelden's diagnosis was 
made in good faith and was central to a requested evaluation of 
Dr. Rechsteiner in peer review. 
Question (3): Does Hazelden's treatment of Dr. Rechsteiner, 
following its diagnosis of his medical condition, qualify for 
immunity under Wis. Stat. § 146.37? 
Answer (3): The court is not required to decide whether 
treatment related to the peer review process qualifies for 
immunity.  If Dr. Rechsteiner's complaint is viewed as focusing 
on Hazelden's treatment of Dr. Rechsteiner, as opposed to its 
diagnosis of Dr. Rechsteiner, his complaint cannot survive a 
motion for summary judgment on the facts of this case. 
Question (4): Do the actions and statements of the Spooner 
defendants qualify for immunity under Wis. Stat. § 146.37? 
Answer (4): Yes.  The actions and words of the Spooner 
defendants are immune under Wis. Stat. § 146.37 because they 
were part of Dr. Rechsteiner's peer review and because the 
Spooner defendants were presumed to be acting in good faith. 
Question (5): Did Dr. Rechsteiner provide evidence to the 
court that raised a genuine issue of material fact about the 
good faith of the Spooner defendants? 
No. 2006AP1521 
 
51 
 
Answer (5): No. 
Question (6): Did the circuit court erroneously exercise 
its discretion in denying Dr. Rechsteiner's motion for a 
continuance? 
Answer (6): No. 
¶103 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
¶104 LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J., did not participate. 
No. 2006AP1521 
 
 
 
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