Title: Sahin v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 475, 2009
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: November 5, 2010

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
RAMAZAN SAHIN, 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§  No. 475, 2009 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  Court Below – Superior Court 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  in and for New Castle County 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§  Cr. I.D. 0710019209 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
    Submitted:  September 29, 2010 
 
 
 
 
       Decided:  November 5, 2010 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS and 
RIDGELY, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc. 
 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Nicole M. Walker, Esquire, Office of the Public Defender, 
Wilmington, Delaware, for appellant. 
 
 
Elizabeth R. McFarlan, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, 
Delaware, for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
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The defendant-appellant, Ramazan Sahin (“Sahin”), appeals his 
Superior Court convictions for nine counts of Rape in the First Degree, nine 
counts of Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a 
Felony, and one count of Aggravated Menacing.  Following a bench trial, 
the trial judge convicted Sahin of all of the tried offenses.  The trial judge 
sentenced Sahin to life plus 138 years in prison, followed by six months of 
probation.   
In this direct appeal, Sahin contends that his trial counsel was 
ineffective because his attorney told the trial judge Sahin should have 
accepted a plea offer and that Sahin was untruthful about his need for an 
interpreter.  Sahin submits that the statements made by his defense counsel 
prior to and during the bench trial violated his Sixth Amendment right under 
the United States Constitution to a fair trial and to the effective assistance of 
counsel.   
Generally, we do not consider claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel in a direct appeal.  The reason for that practice, in part, is to develop 
a record on that issue in a Superior Court Rule 61 post-conviction 
proceeding.  We have decided to follow that general practice and not to 
address either Sahin’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel or the denial 
 
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of a fair trial in this direct appeal because those claims are inextricably 
intertwined.   
Facts 
At trial, eight women testified and related similar stories of rape by a 
male perpetrator in 2007.  Seven of the eight women identified Sahin as their 
assailant.  DNA evidence was introduced by the State linking Sahin to two 
of the women.  Sahin’s defense consisted solely of his testimony that he had 
forced some women to engage in sexual acts at knifepoint, but that none of 
them were any of the eight women who testified at his trial.  Accordingly, 
the credibility of the witnesses became the central issue to be decided by the 
fact finder.  
Prior to trial, defense counsel told the trial judge that he encouraged 
Sahin to accept a plea agreement that the prosecution had offered and that 
Sahin was proceeding to trial against the advice of counsel.  During a 
pretrial telephone conference among the defense counsel, the prosecutor and 
the trial judge, defense counsel indicated that an “interpreter may no longer 
be needed.”  During a later conference, defense counsel stated that he: 
. . . met with [Sahin] the last four or five times with no 
interpreter.  We just talked, and today, he . . . needs an 
interpreter. He doesn’t need an interpreter to understand the 
colloquy.  He wants an interpreter to explain things to him, and 
my impression is, in looking at the very minutes of disks, that 
now he decides he wants an interpreter. 
 
4
 
We have to – my opinion, he does not need an interpreter.  He 
understands.   
 
 
Nevertheless, Sahin reiterated his request for an interpreter, and the 
judge ordered the presence of an interpreter.  Defense counsel then stated: 
I’ve met with [Sahin] probably five or six times, recently . . ., 
without an interpreter, and we’ve had really no difficulty in 
communicating about – a problem with language – about the 
concepts and principles and the ideas here. 
 
It was my impression in dealing with him that the necessity of 
an interpreter probably was not – was not – was not required to 
be in attendance, and there’s been no issue raised about that. 
 
 
During the trial, the issue arose of whether an interpreter was needed 
to translate Sahin’s recorded statements to the police during the trial.  
Defense counsel indicated that he didn’t believe a translation of Sahin’s 
recorded statements was necessary.  Defense counsel stated that: 
I’ve met with him – I would say eight times at Gander Hill, 
sometimes alone and sometimes with another member – with an 
assistant of mine, and we have shown him tapes and disks and 
reviewed this matter with him, and I think he is – he is capable 
of understanding, and – and I think there’s a bit – my 
impression, there may be some insecurity on his part.  I don’t 
know that, and I’m not saying he’s a – malingering, but I know 
I’m confident he understands what is going on. 
 
Defense counsel further stated that: 
My impression is that I don’t know.  I don’t think he has 
solicited the help of an interpreter necessarily for his father.  I 
think he does it because he seeks – he seeks some refuge in the 
fact that he is not particularly fluent in English, and he then can 
 
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decide if he doesn’t want to answer me, or he doesn’t want to 
answer the Court, he can play dumb. 
 
I don’t know that.  That’s my opinion from dealing with him, 
and I talked to him a lot . . . . 
 
Ineffective Assistance Standards 
 
In Strickland v. Washington,1 the United States Supreme Court held 
that to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant 
must show that (1) “counsel’s representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness,” i.e., “deficient performance” and (2) “there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 
results of the proceeding would have been different,” i.e., “prejudice”.2  
When there is a breakdown in the adversarial system of justice, however, 
prejudice is presumed.3  
A breakdown in the adversarial system compels an application of the 
Cronic exception to the Strickland prejudice test for ineffective assistance of 
counsel.4  In United States v. Cronic, the United States Supreme Court 
explained that ineffective assistance of counsel may be presumed in three 
circumstances: (1) where there is a complete denial of counsel; (2) where 
                                          
 
1 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 668, 694. 
2 Id. at  669, 688, 694. 
3 United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. at 693-696). 
4 Id. at 659-60 
 
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counsel is asked to provide assistance in circumstances where competent 
counsel likely could not; and (3) where counsel entirely fails to subject the 
prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.5   
 
Sahin argues that this case falls within the Cronic exceptions to the 
Strickland prejudice test.  We have concluded that none of the three 
circumstances listed in Cronic is directly applicable to the facts of Sahin’s 
case.  Nevertheless, the comments by Sahin’s attorney are very troubling and 
give rise to great concern, because Sahin elected to have a bench trial.   
Counsel’s Comments 
When Sahin rejected the State’s plea offer, the defense attorney 
should have simply stated that fact.  Instead, the defense attorney stated that 
Sahin’s rejection of the State’s plea offer and decision to have a trial was 
against the advice of counsel.  That not only divulged a confidential 
communication but also indicated the defense attorney’s belief in either the 
strength of the State’s case, or the weakness of the only defense evidence 
(Sahin’s testimony), or both. 
 
The statements by Sahin’s attorney about not needing an interpreter 
were based upon his personal assessment of his ability to engage in 
                                          
 
5 Cooke v. State, 977 A.2d 803, 848 (Del. 2009) (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 
at 659-62). 
 
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confidential communications, unless Sahin decided to “play dumb.”  Sahin’s 
attorney told the trial judge that, in the attorney’s opinion, Sahin did not 
need an interpreter.  The attorney advised the trial judge on several 
occasions that Sahin was not credible when he said he needed an interpreter.  
Sahin’s entire defense, however, was related to his credibility as a witness. 
Credibility Central Issue 
 
It is well settled in Delaware that “a victim’s testimony concerning 
alleged sexual contact alone is sufficient to support a jury’s guilty verdict.  
There is no requirement that such testimonial evidence be corroborated 
either by physical evidence or corrobating testimony.”6  In Watson7 and 
Baker,8 this Court has held that in a “he said, she said” rape case “when 
credibility becomes the ultimate issue in a case, it is unfairly prejudicial for 
the fact finder to learn of any unrelated facts that might potentially affect the 
defendant’s credibility.”9  In Sahin’s case, as in Watson and Baker, the 
witnesses’ credibility was the central issue for the trial judge to determine. 
                                          
 
6 Hardin v. State, 840 A.2d 1217, 1224 (Del. 2003). 
7 Watson v. State, 934 A.2d 901 (Del. 2007). 
8 Baker v. State, 906 A.2d 139 (Del. 2006). 
9 Watson v. State, 934 A.2d at 907 (explaining the holding in Baker v. State, 906 A.2d 
139 (Del. 2006)). 
 
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Present Record Inadequate 
 
In Sahin’s case, the reasons for the actions of his defense attorney are 
unknown.  The record does not reflect why Sahin’s attorney told the trier of 
fact that Sahin’s rejection of the State’s plea offer and decision to have a 
trial was against the advice of counsel.  Nor does the record reflect why 
Sahin’s attorney told the trier of fact that Sahin’s request for an interpreter 
was not credible.  In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, these actions 
appear to fall below an objective standard of reasonable representation under 
the first part of the Strickland test.  If there is no satisfactory explanation for 
the actions of Sahin’s trial attorney, the prejudice issue under the second part 
of Strickland will be whether the ineffective assistance of counsel deprived 
Sahin of his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial.   
We have no doubt that the trial judge did her best to give Sahin a fair 
trial.  Unfortunately, the trial began with a breach of the attorney/client 
privilege when the judge was told that Sahin’s decision to go to trial was 
against the advice of counsel.  It is equally unfortunate that throughout the 
trial, every time the issue of an interpreter was raised, Sahin’s credibility 
was undermined by his attorney.  The issue of prejudice that those actions 
caused will not be determined by the subjective good faith efforts of the trial 
judge to be fair but by whether the actions by Sahin’s attorney created an 
 
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objective “stigma surrounding the appearance of an inability to assess 
credibility fairly.”10 
The issue of an objective appearance of prejudice should not be 
decided by the judge who presided over Sahin’s bench trial.  Therefore, in 
the event that Sahin files a Rule 61 motion for post-conviction relief, it 
should be assigned to another judge.  If there is a subsequent proceeding, the 
judge who presided at Sahin’s trial shall not appear or be compelled to 
appear as a witness.11 
Conclusion 
Despite the troubling questions raised by the present record, that 
record is insufficient for this Court to determine Sahin’s claim that he was 
denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel.  
The judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed without prejudice to the 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim being raised in a timely filed Rule 61 
motion for post-conviction relief, at which a complete record can be 
developed.  
                                          
 
10 Id. at 908.   
11 See Evans v. Justice of the Peace Court No. 19, 652 A.2d 574, 577 (Del. 1995); 
McCool v. Gehret, 657 A.2d 269, 278-81 (Del. 1995).