Title: Holcomb v. City of Bloomington
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 19S-PL-00304
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: December 15, 2020

I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 19S-PL-304 
Eric Holcomb, in his official capacity as Governor of 
the State of Indiana, 
Appellant (Defendant), 
–v– 
City of Bloomington, 
Appellee (Plaintiff). 
Argued: January 9, 2020 | Decided: December 15, 2020 
Appeal from the Monroe Circuit Court, 
No. 53C06-1705-PL-1138 
The Honorable Frank M. Nardi, Special Judge 
On Direct Appeal 
Opinion by Justice Goff 
Chief Justice Rush concurs. 
Justice David concurs in result. 
Justice Slaughter dissents with separate opinion in which Justice Massa joins. 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Dec 15 2020, 8:39 am
 
 
 
 
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Goff, Justice. 
In 2017, the legislature passed a statute stopping Bloomington’s 
proposed annexation of several areas of land and prohibiting the city from 
trying to annex the areas for five years. Bloomington, which had been in 
the process of educating and engaging the public about the proposed 
annexation but had not yet sought formal adoption of its plan, challenged 
the constitutionality of the statute in a declaratory judgment action against 
Governor Holcomb. The trial court ultimately found the statute 
unconstitutional. On appeal, the parties present us with two issues: (1) 
whether Bloomington can seek declaratory relief in this case from the 
Governor, and (2) whether the statute is unconstitutional.  
First, we conclude that Bloomington can challenge the statute in this 
declaratory judgment action against the Governor. Because Bloomington 
has suffered an injury, and due to the unique way in which the statute 
was drafted, Bloomington’s suit satisfies the requirements of a declaratory 
judgment action. Prudential concerns further compel us to reach the 
merits of this case.  
Second, we conclude that the statute is unconstitutional special 
legislation in violation of Article 4, Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution 
because the legislature enacted a special law—one that targeted only 
Bloomington—when it could have enacted a law that applied generally 
throughout Indiana. We thus affirm the trial court on these issues. 
Factual and Procedural History 
In early February 2017, Bloomington Mayor John Hamilton announced 
plans for a proposed annexation of several areas of land. He and his team 
then began the regimented, statutory process that they hoped would 
result in the City of Bloomington Common Council formally adopting 
ordinances annexing the land.  
At a February 15 meeting, the City Council considered whether to 
adopt resolutions formally initiating the annexation process. Over the 
course of four hours, the City Council discussed the proposed annexation 
 
 
 
 
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of each area and heard from members of Mayor Hamilton’s team, Monroe 
County officials, and members of the public. The City Council ultimately 
adopted the initiating resolutions. 
As required by statute, city officials then published and mailed notices 
of six public-outreach meetings to be held in March at the Bloomington 
City Hall. Officials were available to answer questions at these “open-
house format” meetings, and members of the public were invited to 
review additional information regarding the proposed annexation. 
On March 29, the City Council considered whether it should formally 
introduce—but not yet adopt—the proposed annexation ordinances. 
Mayor Hamilton spoke in favor of the ordinances and, as at the February 
15 meeting, the City Council also heard from members of the mayor’s 
team, Monroe County officials, and members of the public. All told, the 
City Council spent over six hours at this meeting discussing and 
considering the introduction of the ordinances. It ultimately declined to 
introduce the ordinance proposing to annex an area northeast of 
Bloomington, but it introduced the other annexation ordinances.  
Continuing to move through the steps in the statutory annexation 
process, city officials planned to hold a public hearing on May 31 in a 
high-school gym regarding the introduced annexation ordinances, and 
they hoped that the City Council would officially adopt the ordinances on 
June 30. But legislative developments would eventually put a stop to these 
plans.  
While Bloomington was taking its initial steps toward annexation, the 
General Assembly passed legislation, codified at Indiana Code section 36-
4-3-11.8 (“Section 11.8”), concerning the annexation plan. Section 11.8 cut 
off Bloomington’s proposed annexation and prohibited Bloomington from 
trying to annex the same areas for the next five years. 
In response, the City of Bloomington did not hold the planned public 
hearing on the annexation ordinances but instead brought this suit against 
the Governor, in his official capacity, seeking declaratory and injunctive 
relief. Specifically, Bloomington sought declarations that Section 11.8 
constitutes special legislation that violates Article 4, Section 23 of the 
 
 
 
 
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Indiana Constitution and that Section 11.8 violates Article 4, Section 19’s 
single-subject rule. The Governor sought to dismiss Bloomington’s 
complaint, arguing that he was not a proper defendant because he does 
not enforce the statute, but the trial court denied the motion. Both parties 
eventually sought summary judgment. The trial court reiterated its prior 
finding that the Governor was a proper defendant; declared Section 11.8 
unconstitutional under Article 4, Sections 19 and 23 of the Indiana 
Constitution; and entered summary judgment in favor of Bloomington. 
The Governor filed a direct appeal, over which this Court has 
mandatory jurisdiction pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 4(A)(1)(b). We 
now affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
Standard of Review 
The issues in this case—whether Bloomington can bring this 
declaratory judgment action against the Governor and whether Section 
11.8 is unconstitutional—turn on legal questions such as the proper 
interpretation and application of statutes and constitutional provisions. 
See City of Hammond v. Herman & Kittle Props., Inc., 119 N.E.3d 70, 78 (Ind. 
2019); City of Lawrence Utils. Serv. Bd. v. Curry, 68 N.E.3d 581, 585 (Ind. 
2017). “When ‘the challenge to summary judgment raises questions of law, 
we review them de novo.’” City of Lawrence Utils. Serv. Bd., 68 N.E.3d at 
585 (citation omitted). However, a statute comes “clothed with the 
presumption of constitutionality until clearly overcome by a contrary 
showing.” State v. Buncich, 51 N.E.3d 136, 141 (Ind. 2016). 
Discussion and Decision 
The annexation process generally involves three stages: (1) adoption of 
an annexation ordinance by a municipality’s legislative body; (2) an 
opportunity for affected landowners to object to, or remonstrate against, 
the annexation; and (3) judicial review triggered by remonstrance. Town of 
Fortville v. Certain Fortville Annexation Territory Landowners, 51 N.E.3d 1195, 
1197 (Ind. 2016). See generally Ind. Code ch. 36-4-3 (2017). Before a 
municipality can complete the first stage by adopting an annexation 
 
 
 
 
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ordinance, it must take a series of statutorily prescribed steps that include 
conducting an outreach program, introducing the ordinance, and holding 
a public hearing. I.C. § 36-4-3-1.7, I.C. § 36-4-3-2.1. In this case, 
Bloomington was moving through the steps toward ordinance adoption 
when the legislature passed the budget bill that codified Section 11.8. 
Although the proposed annexation ordinances had not yet been 
adopted, the legislature intervened in the process by enacting Section 11.8 
to stop Bloomington’s—and only Bloomington’s—proposed annexation. 
The legislature achieved this purpose by first limiting the applicability of 
Section 11.8 so that it would apply to Bloomington’s proposed annexation 
alone. See I.C. § 36-4-3-11.8(a)–(d) (limiting its applicability to certain 
annexation ordinances introduced between January 1, 2017 and June 30, 
2017—when Bloomington’s were introduced on March 29—that had not 
been adopted as of the statute’s effective date of April 30, 2017). Then, the 
legislature declared that such an annexation ordinance falling within its 
scope—namely, Bloomington’s—“is void and the annexation action is 
terminated.” I.C. § 36-4-3-11.8(d). It further prohibited a municipality from 
taking “any further action to annex any of the property to which this 
section applies until after June 30, 2022, including introducing another 
annexation ordinance covering some or all of the property covered by this 
section.” Id.  
With Section 11.8 blocking Bloomington from moving forward with its 
proposed annexation, the parties raise the same two issues as before the 
trial court: whether the Governor is the proper defendant and whether 
Section 11.8 is unconstitutional. First, we conclude that, through no fault 
of the Governor’s but because of the way the legislature drafted Section 
11.8 and because of the prudential concerns involved, Bloomington can 
bring its declaratory judgment action against the Governor. Second, we 
conclude that Section 11.8 is unconstitutional special legislation in 
 
 
 
 
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violation of Article 4, Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution.1 We address 
each conclusion in more detail below. 
I. Bloomington can bring this declaratory judgment 
action against the Governor. 
In addressing whether the Governor is the proper defendant in this 
declaratory judgment action, we proceed in three parts. In Part I.A., we 
describe the Governor’s specific argument challenging the justiciability of 
this suit and lay out the standard that controls this case. In Part I.B., we 
consider whether this case is nonjusticiable based on the Governor’s 
argument that he does not enforce Section 11.8. In Part I.C., we determine 
whether this case is nonjusticiable due to prudential concerns. Ultimately, 
based on all this analysis, we conclude that this case is justiciable, and 
Bloomington can bring this declaratory judgment action. 
A. As a threshold matter, we need only consider the 
Governor’s specific justiciability challenge to 
Bloomington’s declaratory judgment action, not broad 
principles of standing. 
The Governor’s preliminary argument that he is not the proper 
defendant is a very specific, narrow attack on the justiciability of this case. 
He does not dispute Bloomington’s injury; indeed, Bloomington has spent 
over $800,000 on the proposed annexation so far, but Section 11.8 
precludes it from completing the annexation process. In fact, the Governor 
does not focus on Bloomington’s ability to bring a suit at all. He instead 
focuses on Bloomington’s ability to seek a declaratory judgment against 
him. Specifically, he argues that Bloomington cannot bring this 
declaratory judgment action against him because he does not enforce 
Section 11.8, so a judgment against him would not help Bloomington. To 
 
1 Because we find Section 11.8 unconstitutional under Article 4, Section 23, we do not consider 
Bloomington’s argument regarding the statute’s constitutionality under Article 4, Section 19. 
 
 
 
 
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address this narrow argument, we must first examine the requirements of 
a declaratory judgment action. 
The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, as relevant here, allows a city 
“whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a statute . . . 
[to] have determined any question of construction or validity arising 
under the . . . statute” via declaratory judgment. I.C. § 34-14-1-2. See also 
I.C. § 34-14-1-13 (including municipal corporations in the definition of a 
person who may obtain declaratory relief). While the Act “is to be liberally 
construed and administered,” I.C. § 34-14-1-12, it does not open the courts 
to resolving theoretical cases; it still “requires a justiciable controversy or 
question.” Ind. Dep’t of Environmental Management v. Twin Eagle, LLC, 798 
N.E.2d 839, 843 (Ind. 2003). To satisfy this requirement, it’s enough that 
the “ripening seeds” of a controversy exist and that the plaintiff has “a 
substantial present interest in the relief sought.” Ind. Educ. Emp’t Relations 
Bd. v. Benton Cmty. Sch. Corp., 365 N.E.2d 752, 755 (Ind. 1977) (quoting City 
of Mishawaka v. Mohney, 156 Ind. App. 668, 297 N.E.2d 858, 860 (1973) 
(quoting Zoercher v. Alger, 202 Ind. 214, 172 N.E. 186, 189 (1930))).  
Here, Bloomington has a substantial present interest in the declaratory 
relief it seeks because a declaration that Section 11.8 is unconstitutional 
would remove the statute as a barrier to its proposed annexation. But, if 
the Governor has no connection to Section 11.8, Bloomington’s declaratory 
judgment action against him would lack even the ripening seeds of a 
controversy and Bloomington could not obtain relief from him. 
Accordingly, our task in addressing the Governor’s argument that 
Bloomington cannot bring this suit against him boils down to one limited 
question: What connection does the Governor have to Section 11.8? 
This case does not turn on broad principles of standing. Justiciability, in 
the context of declaratory judgment actions, merely requires that the 
“ripening seeds” of a controversy exist and that the plaintiff has “a 
substantial present interest in the relief sought.” Id. This relaxed standard 
aligns with the purpose of declaratory judgment actions: “to settle and to 
afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status 
and other legal relations.” I.C. § 34-14-1-12. Here, Bloomington brought its 
declaratory judgment action seeking relief from uncertainty and insecurity 
 
 
 
 
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surrounding Section 11.8, and the Governor has raised a narrow challenge 
to the justiciability of the dispute based on his alleged lack of connection 
with the statute. None of this turns on broad principles of standing. 
Keeping in mind the Governor’s narrow justiciability argument, we 
consider the unique impact of annexation statutes like Section 11.8; 
analyze what the structure and application of Section 11.8 mean for its 
enforcement; and review the potential sources of the Governor’s 
enforcement authority to see what, if any, connection the Governor has to 
the statute.  
B. The legislature drafted Section 11.8 in a unique way 
that vests enforcement authority in the Governor, and 
Bloomington can bring this declaratory judgment action 
against him because of it. 
1. Annexation is a unique area of law primarily dealing 
with public rather than private relations. 
Our annexation statutes, including Section 11.8, represent a unique area 
of law. They provide a detailed process by which municipalities may try 
to expand their boundaries to incorporate adjacent territory with urban 
characteristics. See City of Carmel v. Certain Southwest Clay Township 
Annexation Territory Landowners, 868 N.E.2d 793, 796 (Ind. 2007). When a 
municipality annexes territory, no property changes hands and no private 
rights of landowners are affected. Bradley v. City of New Castle, 764 N.E.2d 
212, 215 (Ind. 2002) (citation omitted). Rather, “the act simply changes the 
property and its owner, in their civil relation to certain public authority.” 
Id. (quoting Stilz v. City of Indianapolis, 55 Ind. 515, 523 (1877)). These 
unique attributes distinguish annexation statutes from statutes that impact 
private rights or that do more than adjust civil relations to public 
authority, which some federal courts have determined cannot be 
challenged in a suit against a governor due to their impact on primarily 
private relations. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Noel, 608 F.2d 208, 212 (1st Cir. 
1979) (citing cases that rejected challenges to statutes that “determine[d] 
 
 
 
 
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the right of one private person to recover from another” or “set[] the 
jurisdictional requirements for divorce,” among others). Since our 
annexation statutes, as a whole, represent a unique area of the law that 
primarily impacts public rather than private relations, the Governor’s 
potential connection to Section 11.8 cannot be dismissed out of hand. This 
is true because of the unique powers and responsibilities vested in the 
office of the Governor by our state constitution. 
2. Unlike other annexation statutes, the legislature did 
not tie Section 11.8’s enforcement to remonstrances. 
While annexations generally deal with public concerns, our annexation 
statutes provide a method—remonstrance—by which owners of property 
within the area to be annexed can challenge the annexation.2 See generally 
I.C. §§ 36-4-3-11, -11.2, -11.3; I.C. § 36-4-3-13. The Governor argues that 
this statutory remonstrance process proves that property owners—not the 
Governor—enforce annexation laws, including Section 11.8. And in most 
cases, this argument would certainly carry the day. However, Section 11.8 
is not and could not be tied to the statutory remonstrance process, so 
neither that process nor property owners control Section 11.8’s 
enforcement. 
On its face, Section 11.8 has no connection with the statutory 
remonstrance process. It contains no provision that conditions its 
application on the filing of a remonstrance petition. Instead, it flatly 
declares that any introduced annexation ordinance falling within its scope 
“is void and the annexation action is terminated.” I.C. § 36-4-3-11.8(d). The 
lack of connection between Section 11.8 and the remonstrance process 
stands in stark contrast to other annexation statutes. The only other 
provision of our annexation law that declares an annexation ordinance 
void does so only if a certain percentage of affected landowners sign a 
written remonstrance petition. I.C. § 36-4-3-11.3(b). Similarly, the 
 
2 There are also other, limited ways to challenge an annexation. See, e.g., I.C. §§ 36-4-3-15.5, -
15.7. But neither party argues, and we do not find, that those methods are relevant here. 
 
 
 
 
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provision allowing affected landowners to appeal an annexation to a court 
requires a written remonstrance petition. I.C. § 36-4-3-11.3(c). The 
legislature clearly knows how to provide for enforcement of annexation 
statutes through the remonstrance process, but it did not do so with 
Section 11.8. 
Even if we were to ignore the legislature’s decision not to expressly 
condition enforcement of Section 11.8 on a remonstrance proceeding, 
interpreting Section 11.8 as being enforced through a remonstrance would 
conflict with Section 11.8’s own language. Section 11.8 voids and 
terminates specific annexation ordinances that were introduced but not 
yet adopted. See I.C. § 36-4-3-11.8(b), (c), (d). Because Section 11.8 cuts off 
a proposed annexation before the municipality’s legislative body has 
formally adopted the annexation ordinance, it understandably speaks in 
terms of terminating the annexation action. I.C. § 36-4-3-11.8(d) (declaring 
the introduced ordinance “void” and the annexation action “terminated”). 
But Section 11.8’s focus on terminating an annexation before the ordinance 
has been adopted renders it incompatible with the remonstrance process 
because a remonstrance requires an adopted annexation ordinance. A 
remonstrance petition must include dated signatures of the remonstrators, 
and a remonstrator cannot sign a petition before the municipality’s 
legislative body adopts the annexation ordinance being challenged. See 
I.C. § 36-4-3-11(d); I.C. § 36-4-3-11.2(c)(1), (e)(7); I.C. § 36-4-3-11.1(b), (c). In 
short, Section 11.8 halts a proposed annexation before the annexation 
ordinance has been adopted, precluding a remonstrance proceeding.  
Therefore, we cannot accept the argument that the primary method for 
enforcing Section 11.8 is in a remonstrance proceeding that Section 11.8 
itself precludes. By decoupling Section 11.8 from the remonstrance 
process, the legislature showed that Section 11.8 is different even from the 
related statutes and normal procedures in the unique area of annexation 
law. 
 
 
 
 
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3. The Governor enforces Section 11.8 thanks to the 
combination of his broad constitutional duties and 
the statute’s one-of-a-kind nature, so Bloomington 
can bring this suit. 
Keeping in mind Section 11.8’s uncommon characteristics, we turn to 
the specific question of whether the Governor plays a role in enforcing the 
statute and, thus, whether he can be sued in this declaratory judgment 
action. Bloomington supports its decision to bring its declaratory 
judgment action against the Governor with two main arguments: first, 
prior cases challenging the constitutionality of a statute in Indiana have 
included the Governor as a defendant;3 and, second, the Constitution vests 
the Governor with the executive power of the State and obliges him to 
faithfully execute the law. The Governor disagrees, distinguishing 
precedent and arguing that his broad constitutional duties do not give 
him the ability to enforce Section 11.8. We agree with the Governor that 
the precedent cited by Bloomington does not control here, but we find that 
the Governor does enforce Section 11.8 thanks to the peculiar combination 
of his constitutional authority and the unique nature of Section 11.8. 
As to Bloomington’s first argument, prior cases do not address the 
specific issue here and do not control. Bloomington acknowledges, as it 
must, that Section 11.8 does not expressly confer duties on the Governor 
or any other executive branch officials but that the statutes at the heart of 
the precedent it cites did reference members of the executive branch. Br. of 
Appellee, pp. 30–31 n.10 (discussing Stoffel v. Daniels, 908 N.E.2d 1260, 
 
3 Bloomington primarily relies on the Court of Appeals opinion in Stoffel v. Daniels, 908 N.E.2d 
1260 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). But it also cites six cases from this Court. See Bonney v. Ind. Fin. 
Auth., 849 N.E.2d 473 (Ind. 2006); D & M Healthcare, Inc. v. Kernan, 800 N.E.2d 898 (Ind. 2003); 
State v. Nixon, 270 Ind. 192, 384 N.E.2d 152 (1979); Whitcomb v. Young, 258 Ind. 127, 279 N.E.2d 
566 (1972); Welsh v. Sells, 244 Ind. 423, 192 N.E.2d 753 (1963); Orbison v. Welsh, 242 Ind. 385, 179 
N.E.2d 727 (1962). 
 
 
 
 
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1265, 1272 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)).4 As a result, Bloomington’s cases did not 
involve the Governor as the sole defendant; instead, they primarily 
involved suits against the Governor and other executive branch officials 
referenced in the challenged statute. See, e.g., Bonney v. Ind. Fin. Auth., 849 
N.E.2d 473 (Ind. 2006) (naming Governor Daniels, the Indiana Finance 
Authority, and the Indiana Department of Transportation, among others, 
as defendants). And none of the cases considered whether the Governor, 
specifically, should have been included as a defendant. See, e.g., Stoffel, 908 
N.E.2d at 1271–72 (considering whether the plaintiff properly sued a 
group of defendants, which included Governor Daniels and the Indiana 
Department of Local Government Finance). Ultimately, most of the cases 
Bloomington cites address situations when a plaintiff challenges a statute 
by suing the Governor along with other executive branch officials 
expressly referenced by the statute. But this case does not fit that mold, 
and Bloomington’s precedent provides little help in determining whether 
Bloomington can seek declaratory judgment here. 
So, we move on to Bloomington’s second argument and consider how 
Section 11.8 might implicate the Governor’s general constitutional power 
and authority. A state official’s role in implementing or enforcing a statute 
can arise from the statute itself or the general law. See Ex parte Young, 209 
U.S. 123, 157 (1908) (“The fact that the state officer by virtue of his office 
has some connection with the enforcement of the act is the important and 
material fact, and whether it arises out of the general law, or is specifically 
created by the act itself, is not material so long as it exists.”).5 In most 
 
4 Although Bloomington cited it for support of its suit against the Governor, we exclude 
Whitcomb v. Young from this discussion of Bloomington’s precedent. Young is distinguishable 
for another reason: the plaintiff sued Governor Whitcomb in his capacity as a member of the 
Indiana State Election Board to obtain an interpretation of a constitutional amendment. 258 
Ind. at 130, 279 N.E.2d at 569. Here, by contrast, Bloomington sued the Governor in his official 
capacity as Governor to challenge a statute. 
5 Federal decisions in this area involve requirements that do not apply in Indiana state courts, 
see U.S. Const. art. III, § 2 (providing the case-or-controversy requirement); U.S. Const. amend. 
XI (limiting states’ amenability to suit in federal court), so we cannot import their holdings 
directly into our analysis. However, the more general principles discussed by the federal 
courts apply equally in Indiana. 
 
 
 
 
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situations, the general law provides an insufficient connection between 
the Governor and enforcement of a particular statute to give rise to the 
ripening seeds of a controversy required for a declaratory judgment 
action. See Doe v. Holcomb, 883 F.3d 971, 976 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 139 S. 
Ct. 126 (2018) (quoting Shell Oil Co., 608 F.2d at 211) (stating, under the 
federal standard, that “[t]he mere fact that a governor is under a general 
duty to enforce state laws does not make him a proper defendant in every 
action attacking the constitutionality of a state statute” (emphasis added)). 
But under rare circumstances, unique aspects of the statute combine with 
the general law to provide enforcement or implementation authority to 
the Governor. See, e.g., Allied Artists Picture Corp. v. Rhodes, 679 F.2d 656, 
665–66 n.5 (6th Cir. 1982) (finding Ohio’s governor a proper defendant 
based on the Ohio Constitution and “the substantial public interest in 
enforcing” the challenged legislation despite “the absence of specific state 
enforcement provisions”); HRPT Props. Trust v. Lingle, 715 F. Supp. 2d 
1115, 1127 (D. Haw. 2010) (finding Hawaii’s governor a proper defendant 
based on her constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws). This is one 
such rare case.  
Our Constitution provides that “[t]he executive power of the State shall 
be vested in a Governor” who “shall take care that the laws are faithfully 
executed.” Ind. Const. art. 5, §§ 1, 16. We have described these as broad, 
general provisions of authority and obligation in the Governor. Tucker v. 
State, 218 Ind. 614, 652–53, 656, 35 N.E.2d 270, 284, 286 (Ind. 1941). And 
these broad provisions of power and duty include those incidental powers 
and duties necessary to exercising executive power and carrying out the 
Governor’s duties. Id. at 670–71, 35 N.E.2d at 291 (noting that the power to 
appoint subordinate officers to carry out laws was “a necessary incident to 
the power to execute the laws”). As a result, these provisions have been 
found to support a Governor’s authority and duty to act to ensure the 
proper execution of laws, even absent specific statutory language 
directing the Governor to do so. See Cato v. Chaddock, 175 Ind. App. 514, 
518, 373 N.E.2d 172, 175 (1978) (relying on the Governor’s constitutional 
duty to faithfully execute the laws in affirming Governor Whitcomb’s 
declaration of the effective date of the 1970 Census, despite finding no 
specific statutory authority for him to make such a declaration). 
 
 
 
 
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The two unique aspects of Section 11.8 discussed in Parts I.B.1. and 
I.B.2. above bring the Governor’s executive authority and his faithful-
execution duty into play here. First, as an annexation statute, Section 11.8 
deals with citizens’ “civil relation to certain public authority” rather than 
specific private rights. Bradley, 764 N.E.2d at 215 (quoting Stilz, 55 Ind. at 
523). In other words, Section 11.8 impacts citizens’ civil relationship to 
counties, cities, towns, and the like—all subdivisions of the State. See, e.g., 
I.C. §§ 36-1-2-10, -11, -13, -23 (providing that counties, cities, and towns 
are political subdivisions); City of Huntington v. N. Ind. Power Co., 211 Ind. 
502, 519, 5 N.E.2d 889, 896 (1937) (“[A] municipal corporation is a 
subordinate branch of the domestic government of the state . . . .”); 
Applegate v. State ex rel. Pettijohn, 205 Ind. 122, 125, 185 N.E. 911, 912 (1933) 
(“Counties are but subdivisions of the state . . . .”). As the constitutional 
officer vested with the executive power of the State and the duty to 
oversee the faithful execution of its laws, the Governor has an interest in 
these relationships between the public and the State’s subdivisions.  
Second, the legislature drafted Section 11.8 to apply to proposed 
annexations before an annexation ordinance had been adopted, 
preventing the use of the standard method of enforcing annexation law—
remonstrances. When remonstrances are available to enforce annexation 
statutes, the Governor sees that the annexation laws as a whole (including 
the provisions setting out annexation requirements and the remonstrance 
provisions) are faithfully executed by allowing the remonstrance process 
to play out. But the Governor cannot take this route when, as here, the 
legislature precludes using the statutory remonstrance process to enforce 
an annexation statute. In short, the legislature drafted Section 11.8 to 
impact public rather than private relations at a chosen moment before 
anyone could remonstrate to enforce the statute, and it created a situation 
where the Governor was uniquely situated to exercise his executive power 
and enforce the statute. Thus, under these extraordinary circumstances, 
the Governor had enforcement authority under Section 11.8. 
Based on this analysis, the Governor is a proper defendant here. The 
unique features of Section 11.8 show that the Governor enforces the 
statute pursuant to his general executive power and his duty to take care 
that the laws are faithfully executed. Because the Governor enforces 
 
 
 
 
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Section 11.8 under these rare circumstances, a judgment in Bloomington’s 
favor here will provide redress to the city by removing the statute as a 
barrier to its proposed annexation.6 Therefore, Bloomington’s suit against 
the Governor easily presents the ripening seeds of a controversy that our 
Declaratory Judgments Act requires. We emphasize, however, that the 
Governor’s argument will win in most cases—his general constitutional 
powers and duties will not establish enough of a connection to a statute to 
allow a suit like this one under most circumstances. But, given the one-of-
a-kind statute involved, the Governor’s constitutional authority and duty, 
the significant injury suffered by Bloomington, and the ability to afford it 
redress through declaratory judgment, we must reach this unusual result.  
C. Prudential concerns involved in the Governor’s 
argument do not render this case nonjusticiable but, 
instead, compel us to reach the merits.  
Notwithstanding our conclusions that the Governor enforces Section 
11.8 and that Bloomington has satisfied the requirements of our 
Declaratory Judgments Act, we have stated that “prudential concerns may 
render a dispute nonjusticiable by the courts.” Berry v. Crawford, 990 
N.E.2d 410, 417 (Ind. 2013). So, we continue our analysis of the Governor’s 
justiciability argument and consider the prudential concerns involved in 
this case.  
Prudential concerns involving justiciability often arise in connection 
with our separation-of-powers doctrine, and we have cited these concerns 
to find an issue nonjusticiable in two recent cases. See Citizens Action Coal. 
of Ind. v. Koch, 51 N.E.3d 236, 241–243 (Ind. 2016) (declining to define 
 
6 Since the Governor enforces the statute and is a party to this lawsuit, he will be bound by 
this Court’s judgment. If we declare Section 11.8 unconstitutional here, the Governor will be 
barred from enforcing it—even without an injunction. See Dep’t of Fin. Insts. v. Gen. Fin. Corp., 
227 Ind. 373, 86 N.E.2d 444, 447 (1949) (citation omitted) (“When the law is settled it will be 
obeyed. It is therefore immaterial whether the proper proceeding is an application for a 
restraining order or a petition for a declaratory judgment. A final interpretation of the law in 
either form of proceeding would be binding upon these parties.”). 
 
 
 
 
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legislative “work product” for purposes of Indiana’s Access to Public 
Records Acts because doing so would have interfered with the internal 
workings of the legislative branch); Berry, 990 N.E.2d at 417–20 (declining 
to weigh in on the House of Representatives’ discipline of some of its 
members because doing so would have interfered in the internal workings 
of the legislative branch). But prudential concerns need not be limited to 
those related to separation of powers. They may also relate to judicial 
economy and awareness of the pitfalls of a suggested course of action or 
its alternatives.7 And here, we find four specific prudential concerns 
relevant, which, rather than rendering the case nonjusticiable, actually 
compel us to reach the merits.  
First, requiring Bloomington to sue a different defendant would result 
in substantial delay and cost to taxpayers, but we would ultimately reach 
the same result as we do here: Section 11.8 would remain unconstitutional 
special legislation. In such a case, Bloomington and the Attorney General 
would present the same arguments regarding Section 11.8’s 
constitutionality. See I.C. § 34-33.1-1-1; I.C. § 34-14-1-11. But everyone 
would just have to wait longer to have the dispute resolved, and, in the 
meantime, the Governor, Attorney General, Bloomington, and the courts 
would continue devoting scarce public resources to the dispute. In the 
end, with the same arguments before us, we would come to the same 
conclusion we do below—that Section 11.8 is unconstitutional special 
legislation—but only after everyone involved spent more time and public 
funds on the case. 
 
7 To be sure, the Berry Court held that “prudential concerns may render a dispute 
nonjusticiable by the courts.” 990 N.E.2d at 417 (emphasis added). But it does not necessarily 
follow, as the dissent concludes, that prudence is strictly “a ground for withholding merits 
relief in cases otherwise within a court’s jurisdiction.” Post, at 7. Our consideration of 
prudential concerns is necessary to determine whether judicial action is required here. And, 
unfortunately, it is. The actions of the General Assembly stood in clear violation of the plain 
language of the Indiana Constitution. Those actions injured Bloomington. And a refusal on 
our part to address this injury—effectively creating a blueprint for the legislature to enact 
allegedly unconstitutional laws beyond judicial review—would do lasting damage to our 
system of government. Put differently, it would not be prudent. 
 
 
 
 
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Second, even if a hypothetical suit against someone else could bring 
some benefit, there is no other defendant to sue. A potential lawsuit 
against the suggested alternative defendants—landowners in the 
proposed annexation areas, the Monroe County Auditor, or the Monroe 
County Surveyor—would not be ripe because the proposed annexation 
ordinances have merely been introduced, not adopted. At this stage, it’s 
unclear which, if any, of the proposed ordinances might have been 
adopted or what changes might have been made to them before adoption. 
Indeed, the City Council rejected the introduction of one proposed 
ordinance, and the majority of the ordinances that were introduced faced 
opposition from some council members. These uncertainties show that a 
suit against landowners or county officials would not have presented the 
required ripening seeds of a controversy.  
Third, with no other defendant, Bloomington was forced to choose 
between (a) bringing this declaratory judgment action against the 
Governor, (b) violating the express terms of Section 11.8 by moving 
forward with its annexation, or (c) accepting that the legislature may have 
violated the Constitution in terminating the proposed annexation but that 
there was nothing Bloomington could do about it. We cannot approve of 
options (b) and (c). We share the concerns of our federal colleagues on the 
Sixth Circuit that, “[w]ere this action unavailable to [Bloomington], [it] 
would be unable to vindicate the alleged infringement of [its] 
constitutional rights without first violating an [Indiana] statute . . . .” See 
Allied Artists Picture Corp., 679 F.2d at 666 n.5. Such an outcome would not 
only leave an alleged constitutional violation unaddressed but also create 
a blueprint for the legislature to enact allegedly unconstitutional laws 
beyond judicial review. Option (a), which Bloomington chose, and which 
we find permissible under these circumstances, is the only way forward 
here. 
Fourth, and most importantly, having concluded that Bloomington’s 
suit satisfies the requirements of our Declaratory Judgments Act, 
 
 
 
 
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separation-of-powers principles compel us to reach the merits of this case.8 
The dissent seems to view separation of powers as almost exclusively a 
prohibition on action—a command that we stay out of our co-equal 
branches’ spheres. We wholeheartedly agree that this command is an 
extremely important part of our separation-of-powers doctrine. See Boehm 
v. Town of St. John, 675 N.E.2d 318, 322 (Ind. 1996) (citation omitted) 
(noting the risk that this Court could exceed the limits of its constitutional 
power in trying to keep another branch within its limits). But that’s only 
half the story. While separation of powers requires restraint in many 
cases, it mandates judicial action in others.  
As we’ve said before, “[t]he separation of powers provision exists not 
only to protect the integrity of each branch of government, but also to 
permit each branch to serve as an effective check on the other two.” State 
v. Monfort, 723 N.E.2d 407, 413 (Ind. 2000). See also Horner v. Curry, 125 
N.E.3d 584, 589 n.4 (Ind. 2019) (noting that separation of powers “works 
both ways” in terms of restraint and action). Thus, “in exercising the 
judicial function of government,” the judiciary has the power and “the 
inevasible duty” in cases such as these “to declare legislative enactments 
void when that body has, in such an enactment, gone beyond or outside of 
the power granted to it.” Ellingham v. Dye, 178 Ind. 336, 387, 391, 99 N.E. 1, 
19, 21 (1912). Accord Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176–78 
(1803) (noting that the federal legislature’s powers are limited by the 
United States Constitution, “that an act of the legislature, repugnant to the 
constitution, is void,” and that the judiciary has an obligation in cases and 
controversies before it to declare unconstitutional laws as such). In fact, 
the ability of an independent judiciary to check the other branches and 
declare statutes unconstitutional “was one of the central principles 
underlying the thinking of the framers of the Indiana Constitution and 
also the Constitution of the United States.” Monfort, 723 N.E.2d at 413 
 
8 Article 3, section 1 of the Indiana Constitution provides that the “powers of Government are 
divided into three separate departments; the Legislative, the Executive including the 
Administrative, and the Judicial” and, thus, supplies the basis for our separation-of-powers 
doctrine. See State v. Monfort, 723 N.E.2d 407, 411 (Ind. 2000). 
 
 
 
 
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(relying on The Federalist No. 78, at 426, 428–29 (E.H. Scott ed., 1894), and 
Noble Cnty. Council v. State ex rel. Fifer, 234 Ind. 172, 181–82, 125 N.E.2d 
709, 714 (1955)). And the ability of the judiciary to enforce separation of 
powers by checking the other branches is even more important in a case—
such as this one—where a party alleges that a statute is unconstitutional 
special legislation because preventing special legislation “was the most 
potent argument” for adopting our current Constitution. See Herman & 
Kittle Props., Inc., 119 N.E.3d at 80. Cf. Berry, 990 N.E.2d at 416–17 (relying 
on cases from other jurisdictions finding questions to be justiciable when 
legislative power granted in a constitution—as relevant here, the power to 
legislate—is limited by other constitutional provisions—as relevant here, a 
limitation on special laws).  
In the end, while this Court exercises cautious restraint in checking the 
other branches under separation-of-powers principles, “we do not permit 
excessive formalism to prevent necessary judicial involvement. Where an 
actual controversy exists we will not shirk our duty to resolve it.” Boehm, 
675 N.E.2d at 322 (citation omitted). Bloomington’s declaratory judgment 
action presents an actual controversy, and prudential concerns compel us 
to resolve it. 
II. Section 11.8 is unconstitutional special legislation. 
Article 4, Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution places limits on special 
legislation, “which is a law that ‘pertains to and affects a particular case, 
person, place, or thing, as opposed to the general public.’” Herman & Kittle 
Props., Inc., 119 N.E.3d at 78 (citation omitted). In relevant part, it provides 
that “in all . . . cases where a general law can be made applicable, all laws 
shall be general, and of uniform operation throughout the State.” Ind. 
Const. art. 4, § 23. Bloomington contends that Section 11.8 violates Article 
4, Section 23 because the legislature enacted Section 11.8 as a special law 
when it could have enacted a general law. The Governor admits that 
Section 11.8 is special legislation, but he defends Section 11.8’s 
constitutionality, arguing that a general law could not be made applicable 
here given certain aspects of Bloomington’s proposed annexation. In 
resolving this disagreement, we first review the framework for 
 
 
 
 
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determining a law’s constitutionality under Article 4, Section 23, and then 
we apply that framework to the facts here. 
A. We recently clarified the framework for determining 
whether a statute violates Article 4, Section 23. 
Just last year we examined the development of our Article 4, Section 23 
jurisprudence and clarified the broad framework applicable to challenges 
under that provision. See generally Herman & Kittle Props., Inc., 119 N.E.3d 
at 79–85. Under that framework, we begin our analysis by determining 
“whether the law is general or special.” Id. at 82. Our next step depends on 
the answer to that initial question: “if the law is general, we decide 
whether it is applied generally throughout the State; but if the law is 
special, we decide whether the law is nevertheless constitutionally 
permissible.” Id. As we move through this framework, we keep in mind 
the “overarching presumption that the statute is constitutional.” Id. at 84. 
Since the parties here agree that Section 11.8 is special legislation, we focus 
the remainder of our review of this framework on the specific analysis 
involved in determining whether a special law is constitutional.  
“[T]he constitutionality of special legislation hinges on the uniqueness 
of the identified class and the relationship between that uniqueness and 
the law.” Id. A special law is permissible “when an affected class’s unique 
characteristics justify the differential treatment the law provides to that 
class.” Id. But a special law is not permissible “when there are no unique 
circumstances of an affected class that warrant the special treatment—
meaning that a general law could be made applicable.” Id.  
Once a law is determined to be special, the parties bear alternating 
burdens in connection with the question of the law’s constitutionality. 
Initially, the proponent of the law must “clear a low bar” by 
demonstrating a link between the alleged unique characteristics of the 
class covered by the law and the legislative fix—i.e., the law’s special 
treatment of that class. Id. If the proponent shows such a link, “then the 
opponent of the legislation must show why the specified class’s 
characteristics are not defining enough to justify the special legislation,” 
 
 
 
 
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essentially challenging the uniqueness of the class covered by the special 
law. Id. at 85. 
While the parties acknowledge this framework, they disagree as to 
whether it controls here or whether we announced a rule approving of 
special legislation regarding local government structure in Dortch v. Lugar, 
255 Ind. 545, 266 N.E.2d 25 (1971). See Br. of Appellant, p. 30 (relying on 
Dortch for the argument that “the legislature can enact special laws 
directly affecting the structure of local governments”). Reading Dortch to 
control this case with a bright-line rule overextends its holding and 
overstates its position in our Article 4, Section 23 jurisprudence. Rather 
than announcing a bright-line rule, Dortch rejected a special-law challenge 
to the Unigov legislation, which affected only Indianapolis and Marion 
County, because the population-based limitation to the law’s applicability 
had a rational relationship to the legislature’s goal in passing the law. 255 
Ind. at 552–53, 266 N.E.2d at 31–32. And, although we’ve noted that Dortch 
came to the correct result, see Mun. City of S. Bend v. Kimsey, 781 N.E.2d 
683, 693 (Ind. 2003), its focus on the rationality or reasonableness of a 
law’s population-based limitation on applicability has been “replaced by a 
more fine-tuned approach,” Herman & Kittle Props., Inc., 119 N.E.3d at 81. 
See also Kimsey, 781 N.E.2d at 688–89 (noting Dortch’s position in a line of 
cases focusing on this reasonableness inquiry but stating that “neither the 
‘per se’ nor ‘reasonableness’ view of population categories is 
determinative of constitutionality”). Thus, Dortch does not control this 
case, and we apply the standard Article 4, Section 23 framework here. 
B. Bloomington’s proposed annexation presents no unique 
circumstances justifying Section 11.8’s special 
treatment. 
The parties agree that Section 11.8 is special legislation, so our task is to 
determine whether it is nevertheless constitutional. As the proponent of 
the law, the Governor offers two aspects of Bloomington’s attempted 
annexation as unique characteristics justifying Section 11.8’s special 
treatment: (1) the speed of the process despite opposition to the proposed 
annexation; and (2) Bloomington’s consideration, in drawing the 
 
 
 
 
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annexation areas, of waivers that precluded property owners from 
remonstrating against the annexation. We address each of these aspects in 
turn. 
The first characteristic offered to support Section 11.8’s constitutionality 
is the speed of Bloomington’s proposed annexation, despite the opposition 
of some members of the community. This characteristic is linked to 
Section 11.8’s legislative fix by the argument that the statute “allows for 
additional time to discern, plan, and implement any restructuring of local 
governments in Monroe County.” Br. of Appellant, pp. 36–37. While this 
may be a sufficient link for our purposes here, Bloomington shows that its 
situation was not unique.  
Had everything gone according to plan, Bloomington would have 
completed the statutory annexation process in 133 days. This length of 
time would have been in line with the detailed annexation schedule 
provided by statute, which allows annexations to take place in 120 days. 
See I.C. §§ 36-4-3-1.7, -2.1. Bloomington’s 133-day schedule also would 
have been consistent with the City of Boonville’s 2017–2018 annexations, 
which took 154 days. The speed of Bloomington’s proposed annexation 
was not unique. 
Similarly, opposition to Bloomington’s proposed annexation did not 
render the situation unique. Bloomington presented evidence that affected 
landowners commonly oppose proposed annexations. The legislature has 
recognized this fact by providing for the statutory remonstrance process. 
See generally I.C. §§ 36-4-3-11, -11.2, -11.3, -13. And our caselaw shows that 
landowners do not shy away from challenging annexations. See, e.g., Town 
of Brownsburg v. Fight Against Brownsburg Annexation, 124 N.E.3d 597 (Ind. 
2019). Bloomington’s proposed annexation was not unique because some 
members of the community opposed it.  
Because Bloomington’s situation was not unique, the legislature could 
have enacted a general law that “allows for additional time to discern, 
plan, and implement any restructuring of local governments,” Br. of 
Appellant, pp. 36–37, by increasing the statutory minimum amount of 
time before an annexation can occur. In fact, the legislature has done it 
before. See Pub. L. No. 248-1999, § 1, 1999 Ind. Acts 1722 (amending 
 
 
 
 
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Indiana Code section 36-4-3-2.1 and adding 90 days to the statutory 
minimum amount of time for an annexation). The pace of and opposition 
to Bloomington’s proposed annexation does not support the 
constitutionality of this special legislation. 
The second characteristic of the proposed annexation advanced to 
justify Section 11.8’s special treatment is Bloomington’s consideration of 
waivers of remonstrance, some of which were old and unrecorded,9 in 
drawing its annexation areas to minimize opposition. The link presented 
between this characteristic and the legislative fix is that the legislature 
could have concluded that Bloomington was misusing the process and 
decided to halt the proposed annexation. But Bloomington again shows 
that its situation was not unique. Bloomington presented evidence that 
“remonstrance waivers are commonly discussed and incorporated into 
determining which areas are suitable to annex by the city or town.” 
Appellant’s App. Vol. XX, p. 186, ¶ 7. And Boonville’s 2017–2018 
annexation included many properties subject to waivers of remonstrance, 
some of which were old and long unrecorded. Because Bloomington’s use 
of waivers of remonstrance was not unique, the legislature could have 
regulated the use of such waivers with a general law. Again, the 
legislature itself provides us with an example. See Pub. L. 257-2019, § 112, 
2019 Ind. Acts 3419 (amending Indiana Code section 36-4-3-11.7 to limit 
the use of old and unrecorded waivers of remonstrance). Bloomington’s 
use of waivers of remonstrance does not support Section 11.8’s 
constitutionality.  
In short, “there are no unique circumstances of [Bloomington’s 
proposed annexation] that warrant the special treatment—meaning that a 
general law could be made applicable.” Herman & Kittle Props., Inc., 119 
N.E.3d at 84. If the legislature were truly concerned with the pace and 
mood of Bloomington’s proposed annexation or Bloomington’s use of 
 
9 Under certain circumstances when extending sewer lines to property, a municipality must 
obtain a waiver of the right to remonstrate that runs with the property by binding successors 
in title of the property owner. I.C. § 36-9-22-2(c). This can sometimes lead to complications in 
the record-keeping process. 
 
 
 
 
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remonstrance waivers, that concern would have applied equally across 
Indiana. But the legislature did not pass a law prohibiting such activity by 
every municipality in the state. Instead, it singled out Bloomington. Under 
the circumstances here, that special treatment doled out by Section 11.8 is 
unconstitutional. 
Conclusion 
This declaratory judgment action involves the following two issues: 
whether Bloomington properly sought declaratory relief from the 
Governor, and whether Section 11.8 is unconstitutional. We find that the 
Governor, in light of his constitutional authority and duty, does enforce 
Section 11.8 and Bloomington can bring its declaratory judgment action 
against him here because of the unique way in which the legislature 
drafted the statute, and because prudential concerns compel us to reach 
the merits. We also find that the legislature drafted Section 11.8 as a 
special law when a general law could have been made, so Section 11.8 
violates Article 4, Section 23’s limitation on special laws. Accordingly, we 
affirm the trial court’s order granting summary judgment and declaratory 
relief to Bloomington and ruling that Section 11.8 constitutes 
impermissible special legislation in violation of Article 4, Section 23 of the 
Indiana Constitution.  
Rush, C.J., concurs. 
David, J., concurs in result. 
Slaughter, J., dissents with separate opinion in which Massa, J., joins. 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LA N T  
Curtis T. Hill, Jr. 
Attorney General of Indiana 
Thomas M. Fisher 
Solicitor General 
 
 
 
 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-PL-304 | December 15, 2020 
Page 25 of 25 
Kian J. Hudson 
Deputy Solicitor General 
Julia C. Payne 
Deputy Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LE E  
Michael Rouker 
City Attorney 
Larry D. Allen 
Assistant City Attorney 
Bloomington, Indiana 
Slaughter, J., dissenting. 
Rejecting Governor Holcomb’s argument that he is the wrong 
defendant in this declaratory-judgment suit, the Court holds that broad 
principles of standing do not apply here but prudential considerations do. 
I respectfully disagree on both points and would not give our state 
constitution’s separation-of-powers mandate such short shrift under either 
doctrine. Our constitution confines courts to deciding cases over which 
they have jurisdiction. A justiciable case—one suitable for judicial 
resolution—has essential constitutional requirements like standing and 
nonessential considerations like prudence. Today’s decision conflates the 
essential with the nonessential and thus erodes separation of powers. 
When a plaintiff lacks standing, any court action exceeds our 
constitution’s grant of judicial power. Prudence, in contrast, presumes 
standing and permits a court to skirt a case over which it has jurisdiction. 
It does not authorize a court to proceed where jurisdiction is lacking. 
Simply put, Bloomington lacks standing here, which means the courts lack 
jurisdiction, and prudential considerations cannot fix this fatal flaw. 
Although the Court invokes prudential concerns as an independent 
basis for reaching the merits, what animates the Court’s analysis is its 
finding that the City has standing. Standing requires a plaintiff to prove 
injury, causation, and redressability in all cases, including actions for 
declaratory relief. The Court’s contrary decision contravenes both our case 
law on declaratory judgments and our constitution’s structural limits on 
judicial power. And the Court’s rationale that a declaratory judgment 
against the governor on this record will redress the City’s injury depends 
on a view of executive power that is deeply flawed. Under the Court’s 
conception, the governor’s duty to “take care” that the laws are faithfully 
executed is subject to judicial and legislative meddling. This interpretive 
approach to Article 5, Section 16 purports to empower the governor to 
enforce statutes over which he claims no authority when the courts say 
so—thus requiring that he defend unwelcome lawsuits—yet leaves him 
vulnerable to having his inherent powers rescinded or reassigned when 
the legislature says so. I cannot subscribe to a view of executive power in 
which the governor’s “take care” authority serves as neither his shield nor 
his sword. 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-PL-304 | December 15, 2020 
Page 2 of 8 
I 
Our constitution divides governmental powers among the legislative, 
executive, and judicial departments and forbids any official in one 
department from exercising the functions of another, except as the 
constitution expressly permits. See Ind. Const. art. 3, § 1. In allocating 
these powers, the constitution charges courts with exercising the “judicial 
power”, id. art 7, § 1, which confides in courts the power to “resolv[e] real 
controversies”. Pence v. State, 652 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. 1995). Stated 
differently, judicial power “is the power to resolve actual disputes 
between adverse parties by issuing binding decrees that pronounce the 
parties’ rights and responsibilities and afford meaningful relief to the 
prevailing party.” Seo v. State, 148 N.E.3d 952, 969 (Ind. 2020) (Slaughter, 
J., dissenting); see also Pence, 652 N.E.2d at 488 (contrasting “real cases” 
with “abstract speculation”). 
Standing protects separation of powers by preventing courts from 
deciding matters properly left to the executive or the legislature. Horner v. 
Curry, 125 N.E.3d 584, 589 (Ind. 2019) (“[Standing] is a vital element in the 
separation of powers”.); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (Standing 
is “built on a single basic idea—the idea of separation of powers.”). By 
requiring the plaintiff to prove actual injury, causation, and redressability, 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992), standing “limits 
the judiciary to resolving concrete disputes between . . . litigants”. Horner, 
125 N.E.3d at 589; Seo, 148 N.E.3d at 969 (“[S]tanding . . . ensures that a 
judicial decree redresses an actual injury attributable to the defendant’s 
wrong.”). These requirements are especially important where, as here, the 
legal challenge concerns the constitutionality of another branch’s act. 
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819–20 (1997) (describing “especially 
rigorous” standing analysis when a court decides whether action by 
another branch of government is unconstitutional). A rigorous approach 
to standing does not abdicate judicial duties but acknowledges the 
important though limited role of courts in our constitutional system. 
Employed correctly, standing confines courts to their proper role and thus 
protects the delicate balance among the three co-equal departments of 
state government. 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-PL-304 | December 15, 2020 
Page 3 of 8 
Although the Court attempts to frame this issue as the Governor’s 
“very specific, narrow attack on the justiciability of this case”, ante, at 6, 
his litigation approach affects neither the outcome nor the analysis. 
Standing is a jurisdictional question. Pence, 652 N.E.2d at 488; Steel Co. v. 
Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 86, 103–04 (1998). Thus, we can, and 
should, raise questions of standing ourselves before reaching the merits. 
Horner, 125 N.E.3d at 592 (recognizing standing as a “threshold matter”); 
Pence, 652 N.E.2d at 487 (providing that “threshold question of standing” 
precedes merits discussion); see Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 91–93 (discussing 
well-established duty to raise constitutional standing questions sua 
sponte). Despite the Court’s proclamation that “broad principles of 
standing” do not apply here, the opposite is true. Broad standing 
principles apply in every case. 
The Court shrugs off standing by invoking a view of the Declaratory 
Judgment Act that requires only a plaintiff’s “substantial present interest 
in the relief sought” and the “ripening seeds of a controversy”. Ante, at 7. 
Yet the Act speaks only to a court’s ability to determine the legal rights 
between parties: “Courts . . . have the power to declare rights, status, and 
other legal relations”. Ind. Code § 34-14-1-1. The Act is not an independent 
basis for exercising judicial power outside our limited constitutional role. 
And we have held as much. “To invoke the jurisdiction of the court under 
the declaratory judgment statute, there must be an actual, existing 
justiciable controversy between the parties”. City of Mishawaka v. Mohney, 
156 Ind. App. 668, 673, 297 N.E.2d 858, 860 (1973) (cleaned up). 
A 
Standing’s first requirement is that the plaintiff suffer an injury. 
Without injury, there is no proper plaintiff, no actual controversy, and no 
jurisdiction. See Pence, 652 N.E.2d at 488. In a typical case, the injury has 
already occurred. But the Declaratory Judgment Act contemplates 
declaring parties’ rights anticipatorily if the likelihood of breach and 
resulting injury, though not fully matured, are imminent—or, in the 
words of the Act, “whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.” 
I.C. § 34-14-1-1. Shortly after the Act took effect, we explained that courts 
can adjudicate claims under the Act while staying within their 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-PL-304 | December 15, 2020 
Page 4 of 8 
constitutional mandate by hearing cases where “an actual controversy 
exists between parties”. Rauh v. Fletcher Sav. & Tr. Co., 207 Ind. 638, 642, 
194 N.E. 334, 336 (1935). And this was true although no wrong had yet 
occurred. Id. at 335. Thus, a plaintiff facing an imminent breach can bring 
a declaratory-judgment suit to define each party’s rights before a breach 
occurs. And our Court, recognizing that breach and injury can be 
anticipatory, has refined our standing requirements for such suits but not 
eliminated them. Thus, Rauh explains that a plaintiff’s claim under the Act 
requires the “ripening seeds” of a controversy, along with the plaintiff’s 
“substantial present interest” in the relief sought. Id. at 335. 
We used these very terms to discuss the plaintiff’s injury in Indiana 
Education Employment Relations Board v. Benton Community School 
Corporation, 266 Ind. 491, 496–97, 365 N.E.2d 752, 754–55 (1977). Benton 
involved a school corporation’s constitutional challenge to a statute 
permitting public employees to organize for collective-bargaining 
purposes, and the named defendants included executive-branch officials 
charged with enforcing the statute. Id. at 753. A labor union intervened 
and argued the school district was “neither injured” nor threatened “with 
injury sufficient to pose a justiciable controversy”. Id. at 754. On appeal, 
we rejected the labor union’s arguments and, on the merits, held the 
statute invalid. Id. at 760. In the process, we said that a plaintiff meets the 
injury requirement by showing the “ripening seeds of a controversy” in 
which it has a “substantial present interest”. Id. at 754–55. 
Here, the parties and the Court agree that the injury element is satisfied 
because the challenged statute prevents the City from carrying out its 
proposed annexation. Thus, the issue of the statute’s constitutionality 
presents a sufficiently ripened controversy in which the City has a 
substantial present interest. But these two aspects of injury, while 
necessary, are not sufficient for courts to exercise jurisdiction under the 
Act. We must ask not only whether we have the correct plaintiff, but also 
whether we have the correct defendant. 
B 
Standing’s other two requirements—causation and redressability—
focus on the defendant. Causation and redressability are, to be sure, 
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distinct elements, but they are two sides of the same coin. Taken together, 
they require that the plaintiff’s injury be “fairly traceable to the 
defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the 
requested relief.” Allen, 468 U.S. at 751. 
Without explanation, the Court ignores causation and holds that a 
declaratory judgment here will redress the City’s injury. It is not clear why 
the Court discusses redressability at all if it believes standing in 
declaratory-judgment actions requires only an injury. The Court offers no 
answer. But its analysis, in any event, fails as a matter of logic and law. 
Without knowing whether the defendant caused the harm, a court cannot 
determine whether the relief sought against the defendant will likely 
redress the plaintiff’s harm. The Court’s reliance on Benton does not 
support today’s conclusion that general standing requirements of injury, 
causation, and redress do not apply to declaratory-judgment suits. We 
limited our discussion in Benton to injury not because it is the only 
requirement for maintaining a declaratory-judgment suit, but because 
injury was the only requirement at issue there. No one in Benton disputed 
that the named defendants enforced the statute or that a favorable 
judgment against them would redress the plaintiff’s complained-of injury. 
Elsewhere, we have rejected the view that some lawsuits have one set 
of justiciability criteria and declaratory-judgment suits have another, 
expressly requiring causation and confirming the necessity of a proper 
defendant in a declaratory-judgment suit. See Bd. of Comm’rs of Union 
Cnty. v. McGuinness, 80 N.E.3d 164, 168 (Ind. 2017). In McGuinness, we 
applied our “general rule of standing”, which includes the requirement of 
a “direct injury as a result of the [defendant’s] complained-of conduct”, 
and affirmed the dismissal of Union County’s request for declaratory 
relief for lack of standing. Id. (emphasis added). What we held in 
McGuinness remains true today: the general requirements of standing—
including causation—apply in declaratory-judgment suits. 
The Act itself underscores the importance of the causation element. It 
speaks of “legal relations”, I.C. § 34-14-1-1, and is concerned with 
“controversy between the parties”. Mishawaka, 297 N.E.2d at 860. 
Declaring the legal relations between parties presupposes that one party 
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has caused, or is about to cause, harm to another party. Without a link 
between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury, the parties 
would have nothing of legal import between them for a court to 
adjudicate. Thus, the Act does not displace causation but rests on it. 
C 
Questions of causation and redressability here turn on whether the 
governor enforces the disputed statute. If he does not enforce it, he cannot 
cause the resulting injury, and a judgment against him will not provide 
redress. The Court addresses enforcement in connection with the 
supposed “uniqueness” of both the governor’s constitutional role and the 
disputed statute. Yet the disputed statute mentions neither the governor 
nor any subordinate official accountable to him. The Court nevertheless 
holds that the statute somehow gives the governor a special, one-time-
only enforcement power, relying on the statute’s structure and the 
governor’s constitutional duty to “take care that the laws are faithfully 
executed.” Ind. Const. art. 5, § 16. The plainest reading of “the laws” is 
that it means all the laws, including the disputed annexation law. I agree 
with the Court that the governor enjoys inherent powers beyond those the 
legislature has conferred expressly. But the Court’s application fails to 
embrace a robust view of this principle. To the contrary, the Court says 
today’s “unusual result” is prompted by the “one-of-a-kind statute 
involved”. Ante, at 15. In other words, the take-care clause is the expedient 
by which the Court makes the governor a defendant of last resort. 
The implications of the Court’s view are both troubling and far-
reaching. Under the Court’s conception, a governor’s take-care power is 
not durable but fleeting. It exists only if the legislature has not stripped it 
from him. The governor has such authority, in other words, only if the 
legislature lets him keep it. If the legislature elects to confer enforcement 
authority in someone else—remonstrators, the attorney general, some 
other “enforcer”—then the governor has no such power. But that cannot 
be right. A constitutional power—one conferred by our organic law—is 
not subject to the legislature’s whim. Just as constitutional rights are 
inviolable and not subject to legislative abrogation, the same is true of the 
constitutional powers conferred upon coordinate branches of state 
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government. The legislature can no more rescind or rewrite the governor’s 
take-care power than the governor can repeal the legislature’s power of 
the purse. 
II 
The Court’s final foray into separation of powers holds that prudential 
concerns compel the Court to reach the merits of the City’s claim. Yet 
invoking prudential concerns to justify awarding relief to the City has 
things backward. Justiciability presupposes that jurisdiction is secure and 
asks whether courts should nevertheless decline to reach the merits 
because of other policy considerations, like comity to another branch. As 
we have held, “prudential concerns may render a dispute nonjusticiable 
by the courts.” Berry v. Crawford, 990 N.E.2d 410, 417 (Ind. 2013). 
“Prudence”, then, is a ground for withholding merits relief in cases 
otherwise within a court’s jurisdiction; it is not a basis for awarding relief 
in cases over which a court lacks jurisdiction. Prudence does not counsel 
that where jurisdiction is absent due to lack of standing, we should reach 
the merits anyway because the case is sufficiently important. The Court 
does not acknowledge this key difference, despite citing only cases where 
prudence rendered issues nonjusticiable. Ante, at 15–16. The problem with 
the Court’s view of justiciability is that by throwing off the structural 
shackles that limit judicial power, we no longer confine ourselves to 
resolving actual disputes. Instead, we suffer the predictable mission creep 
of expanding our portfolio by issuing advisory opinions, in violation of 
separation-of-powers principles that keep courts—and all departments of 
state government—in their place. 
Despite this threat to our constitutional structure, the Court says that 
separation-of-powers principles “compel us” to decide the merits of the 
City’s claim. Ante, at 19. The Court also commends itself for its “cautious 
restraint” in enforcing these principles. Ibid. But there is nothing 
“restrained” about today’s decision, which is a full-throated exercise of 
judicial power. Despite the Court’s assurance that the duty to “stay out of 
our co-equal branches’ spheres … is an extremely important part of our 
separation-of-powers doctrine”, it justifies today’s decision by observing 
that judicial self-restraint is only “half the story”. Ante, at 18. That is 
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certainly true, and I do not quarrel with the Court’s view that the story’s 
other half is that the judiciary has an affirmative duty to curb unlawful 
action by the other branches. But our affirmative duty to ensure other 
branches stay within the law comes with its own set of principles—the 
first of which is to ensure that a case is properly before us. That is what 
separation of powers means. It is not a blank check giving courts 
unfettered authority to ensure other branches toe the line. We have our 
own, independent obligation to heed that line ourselves. Unfortunately, 
we cross that line today. 
*          *          * 
Under my proposed framework, the governor might well be a proper 
defendant in a declaratory-judgment action if his enforcement of an 
unconstitutional statute were actual or imminent. I could accept this 
outcome if required by a faithful application of our standing principles—
all of them—and a fair reading of the take-care clause. The Court’s 
approach, however, is neither. The Court says our standing requirements 
do not apply. And it fails to adopt a straightforward reading of the take-
care clause. In one fell swoop, the Court assumes the power to hold the 
governor accountable for laws as it sees fit while hobbling the governor’s 
exercise of his own take-care power. 
Because our decision cannot be reconciled with the structural limits on 
judicial power compelled by Article 3, Section 1, and the governor’s grant 
of power under Article 5, Section 16, I respectfully dissent. 
Massa, J., joins.