Title: In re Morgan
Citation: 50 Cal. 4th 932
Docket Number: S162413
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: August 30, 2010

1 
Filed 8/30/10 (this opn. precedes companion case, S167100, also filed 8/30/10 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
 
) 
In re EDWARD PATRICK MORGAN 
) 
 
 
) 
 
on Habeas Corpus. 
) 
S162413 
 
____________________________________) 
 
 
Thirteen years ago, after he was convicted of capital murder and sentenced 
to death, indigent petitioner Edward Patrick Morgan invoked his statutory right to 
this court‟s appointment of habeas corpus counsel to challenge his conviction and 
his death sentence.  Today, he still lacks such counsel, because of a critical 
shortage of qualified attorneys willing to represent capital prisoners in state habeas 
corpus proceedings.   
Now before us is a cursory one-claim habeas corpus petition, which lacks 
any supporting exhibits.  Petitioner asks us to defer a decision on his petition until 
we appoint habeas corpus counsel and until that attorney has had a reasonable 
opportunity to investigate various factual and legal matters that may lead to 
additional claims for relief, to be presented in an amended petition.  The Attorney 
General opposes the request, urging us to deny the current petition as meritless.  
We grant petitioner‟s request. 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
I 
In 1996, an Orange County jury convicted petitioner of kidnapping Leona 
Wong (Pen. Code, § 207),1 unlawfully penetrating her with a foreign object 
(§ 289), and murdering her (§ 187).  The jury also found true special circumstance 
allegations that defendant committed the murder in the course of committing the 
first two crimes.  (§ 190.2, former subd. (a)(17)(ii), (xi).)  Petitioner‟s appeal to 
this court from the judgment of death was automatic.  (§ 1239, subd. (b).)   
In August 1996, petitioner asked us to appoint counsel to represent him on 
his automatic appeal to this court (§ 1239, subd. (b)), and to appoint counsel to 
prepare a habeas corpus petition on his behalf.  In March 2000, we appointed 
counsel to represent petitioner on appeal.  But today, some 13 and a half years 
after petitioner‟s request for appointed habeas corpus counsel, we still have not 
found qualified counsel willing to accept the appointment.  (The reasons are set 
forth in pt. II, post.) 
In November 2007, this court issued its unanimous opinion in petitioner‟s 
appeal.  We reversed the conviction for kidnapping and the kidnap-murder special 
circumstance but otherwise affirmed the judgment, including the sentence of 
death.  (People v. Morgan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 593.)  In March 2008, the United 
States Supreme Court denied petitioner‟s petition for writ of certiorari. 
In April 2008, the California Appellate Project (CAP),2 which has not been 
appointed as petitioner‟s habeas corpus counsel, filed in this court a petition for 
                                              
1  
Unless otherwise stated, all statutory citations are to the Penal Code. 
2  
On its Web site, CAP gives this description of itself:  “The California 
Appellate Project in San Francisco (CAP-SF) is a non-profit corporation 
established by the State Bar of California in 1983 as a legal resource center to 
implement the constitutional right to counsel for indigent persons facing 
execution.  CAP serves the largest population of condemned individuals in the 
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
3 
writ of habeas corpus on his behalf.  Unlike the typical capital habeas corpus 
petition, this petition is cursory and lacks supporting exhibits.  It alleges just one 
claim:  that trial counsel‟s prejudicially deficient performance violated petitioner‟s 
“right to the effective assistance of counsel and to a fair and reliable 
determination” of his guilt of the crimes charged, of the truth of the special 
circumstance allegations, and of the penalty to be imposed.  Specifically, 
petitioner faults his trial counsel for requesting a standard jury instruction 
(CALJIC No. 4.20) on voluntary intoxication that was allegedly “inapplicable and 
detrimental” to his case.  Petitioner also faults counsel for failing to ask the trial 
court to instruct the jury that CALJIC No. 4.21 (a standard instruction, given by 
the court, stating that the jury may consider a defendant‟s voluntary intoxication 
when relevant to the defendant‟s specific intent) “is an exception to the general 
rule stated in CALJIC No. 4.20.”  The petition also alleges broadly that 
petitioner‟s trial counsel was incompetent because he did not “adequately 
investigate and present additional evidence at the guilt phase in support of the 
partial defense of intoxication,” and because he did not “present expert testimony 
at the guilt phase regarding the intoxicating effects of alcohol, cocaine and 
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
country and is funded primarily by a contract with the Judicial Council of 
California.  [¶]  CAP-SF assists private counsel appointed by the California 
Supreme Court to represent indigent defendants in capital cases challenging their 
convictions and sentences on direct appeal and through habeas corpus 
proceedings, and provides them with professional training and litigation resource 
materials.  In addition, CAP-SF assists unrepresented death row inmates by 
collecting and preserving evidence for their post-conviction claims, and by 
providing advocacy as needed during the period of incarceration before counsel is 
appointed. CAP-SF also consults, at the request of the judiciary, on policy matters 
regarding indigent defense representation in capital cases.”  
( [as of Aug. 30, 2010].) 
 
4 
steroids, and their potential effect on an intoxicated person‟s ability to form the 
required specific intent for violating Penal Code section 289 . . .”; the petition, 
however, alleges no specific facts to support these broad allegations.   
Petitioner‟s prayer for relief asks us to “[p]ermit petitioner to amend this 
petition within 36 months after the appointment of habeas corpus counsel to 
include additional claims as determined by habeas corpus counsel [and] [¶] [d]efer 
informal briefing on this petition, should this Court desire such briefing, until 
petitioner has filed the amended petition and provided the Court with all 
reasonably available documentary evidence in support of the allegations in the 
amended petition.”   
As it has done here, CAP has filed a cursory petition on behalf of each 
death row inmate who, upon the finality of the inmate‟s automatic appeal, lacked 
habeas corpus counsel.  Thus far, this court has granted each petition‟s request to 
defer informal briefing and to permit amendment of the petition within 36 months 
of habeas corpus counsel‟s appointment. 
In June 2008, the Attorney General filed in this court a “Respondent‟s 
Motion for Order to Show Cause,” requesting us to promptly consider the current 
petition, to find it lacking in merit, and to summarily deny it.  We issued an order 
construing the Attorney General‟s request as an opposition to petitioner‟s request.  
We asked both parties to submit supplemental briefs on the issue, and we 
scheduled the matter for oral argument so the parties could express their views in 
open court.  (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.54(b)(2) [“On a party‟s request or its 
own motion, the court may place a motion on calendar for a hearing.”].) 
II 
In California, an indigent prisoner who has been convicted of a capital 
crime and sentenced to death has a statutory right to the assistance of court-
appointed counsel not only on appeal (Douglas v. California (1963) 372 U.S. 353, 
 
5 
356-357; § 1240) but also in a habeas corpus proceeding (Gov. Code, § 68662).3  
The latter right is at issue here.  This statutory right to appointed habeas corpus 
counsel “promotes the state‟s interest in the fair and efficient administration of 
justice and, at the same time, protects the interests of all capital inmates by 
assuring that they are provided a reasonably adequate opportunity to present us 
their habeas corpus claims.”  (In re Barnett (2003) 31 Cal.4th 466, 475.) 
Ideally, the appointment of habeas corpus counsel should occur shortly 
after an indigent defendant‟s judgment of death.  An expeditious appointment 
would enable habeas corpus counsel to investigate potential claims for relief and 
to prepare a habeas corpus petition at roughly the same time that appellate counsel 
is preparing an opening brief on appeal.  This would ensure the filing of a habeas 
corpus petition soon after completion of the briefing on the appeal.  (See Cal. 
Supreme Ct., Policies Regarding Cases Arising from Judgments of Death, policy 
3, std. 1-1.1 [a habeas corpus petition “will be presumed to be filed without 
substantial delay if it is filed within 180 days after the final due date for the filing 
of appellant‟s reply brief on the direct appeal”].) 
But our task of recruiting counsel has been made difficult by a serious 
shortage of qualified counsel willing to accept an appointment as habeas corpus 
                                              
3  
Government Code section 68662 provides:  “The [California] Supreme 
Court shall offer to appoint counsel to represent all state prisoners subject to a 
capital sentence for purposes of state postconviction proceedings, and shall enter 
an order containing one of the following:  [¶]  (a)  The appointment of one or more 
counsel to represent the prisoner in postconviction state proceedings upon a 
finding that the person is indigent and has accepted the offer to appoint counsel or 
is unable to competently decide whether to accept or reject that offer.  [¶]  (b)  A 
finding, after a hearing if necessary, that the prisoner rejected the offer to appoint 
counsel and made that decision with full understanding of the legal consequences 
of the decision.  [¶]  (c)  The denial to appoint counsel upon a finding that the 
person is not indigent.” 
 
6 
counsel in a death penalty case.  Quite few in number are the attorneys who meet 
this court‟s standards for representation and are willing to represent capital 
inmates in habeas corpus proceedings.  The reasons are these:  First, work on a 
capital habeas petition demands a unique combination of skills.  The tasks of 
investigating potential claims and interviewing potential witnesses require the 
skills of a trial attorney, but the task of writing the petition, supported by points 
and authorities, requires the skills of an appellate attorney.  Many criminal law 
practitioners possess one of these skills, but few have both.4  Second, the need for 
qualified habeas corpus counsel has increased dramatically in the past 20 years:  
The number of inmates on California‟s death row has increased from 203 in 1987 
to 670 in 2007.  (Cal. Com. on the Fair Admin. of Justice, Final Rep. (2008) p. 121 
(California Commission Final Report).)   
                                              
4  
Our rules of court provide:  “An attorney appointed as lead or associate 
counsel to represent a person in death penalty related habeas corpus proceedings 
must have at least the following qualifications and experience:  [¶]  (1)  Active 
practice of law in California for at least four years.  [¶]  (2)  Either:  [¶]  (A)  
Service as counsel of record for a defendant in five completed felony appeals or 
writ proceedings, including one murder case, and service as counsel of record for a 
defendant in three jury trials or three habeas corpus proceedings involving serious 
felonies; or  [¶]  (B)  Service as counsel of record for a defendant in five 
completed felony appeals or writ proceedings and service as supervised counsel in 
two death penalty related habeas corpus proceedings in which the petition has 
been filed. . . .  [¶]  (3)  Familiarity with the practices and procedures of the 
California Supreme Court and the federal courts in death penalty related habeas 
corpus proceedings.  [¶]  (4)  Within three years before appointment, completion 
of at least nine hours of Supreme Court approved appellate criminal defense or 
habeas corpus defense training, continuing education, or course of study, at least 
six hours of which address death penalty habeas corpus proceedings. . . .  [¶]  (5)  
Proficiency in issue identification, research, analysis, writing, investigation, and 
advocacy . . . .”  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.605(e).)  This court may appoint an 
attorney who does not meet certain of these requirements if we find that the 
attorney has other equivalent experience and the attorney can consult with an 
attorney designated by the court.  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.605(f).) 
 
7 
California does have a Habeas Corpus Resource Center (HCRC), which the 
California Legislature established in 1998 to represent indigent capital inmates in 
postconviction habeas corpus matters.  (See Gov. Code, § 68661.)  But, as has 
been observed, “the number of cases the HCRC can accept is limited both by a 
statutory cap on the number of attorneys it may hire and by available fiscal 
resources.”  (Alarcon, Remedies for California’s Death Row Deadlock (2007) 80 
So.Cal. L.Rev. 697, 739.)   
Although hundreds of indigent death row inmates already have been 
provided with appointed habeas corpus counsel, approximately 300 of these 
inmates still lack such counsel.  The search for qualified counsel can take eight to 
10 years or longer.  (Cal. Com. Final Rep., supra, at p. 122.)  Here, petitioner still 
does not have habeas corpus counsel after 13 years on death row.5   
In filing a cursory one-claim habeas corpus petition now rather than 
awaiting this court‟s appointment of habeas corpus counsel who could file a more 
thorough petition at some future date, petitioner‟s apparent purpose is to preserve 
his right to seek habeas corpus relief in the federal courts.  Remedies in state court 
must be exhausted (see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A)) before a state prisoner can 
seek habeas corpus relief in the federal courts, which require that the habeas 
corpus petition be filed within one year from “the date on which the judgment 
became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 
seeking such review” (28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)).  A judgment of death is “final” 
                                              
5  
The concurring and dissenting opinion asserts that our practice of deferring 
consideration of cursory habeas corpus petitions filed by unrepresented defendants 
“eliminates any urgency to secure counsel” (conc. & dis. opn. of Corrigan, J., post, 
p. 1) as a result of which “capital inmates may languish without representation for 
several years” (ibid.).  This practice should have no effect on the urgency of our 
efforts to recruit qualified habeas corpus counsel to represent death row inmates, 
and it has not had such effect. 
 
8 
upon the United States Supreme Court‟s denial of a capital inmate‟s petition for 
writ of certiorari after our affirmance of the judgment, or upon expiration of the 
time in which the inmate may seek certiorari in the federal high court.  (Bowen v. 
Roe (9th Cir. 1999) 188 F.3d 1157, 1159-1160.)  To permit the inmate to exhaust 
state remedies as to claims that must be raised in a habeas corpus petition rather 
than on appeal, the federal statute of limitations is tolled while there is pending in 
state court a “properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral 
review.”  (28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).)6   
If consideration of the current habeas corpus petition is deferred as 
petitioner has requested, and if that petition is ultimately denied in this court, 
presumably petitioner will then seek habeas corpus relief in federal court 
challenging his state court conviction and judgment of death, and asserting the 
tolling of the federal statute of limitations during the pendency of his current 
petition in our court.  To date, no published federal court decision has addressed 
this specific tolling issue under federal law.  We express no view on this issue, 
observing only that a denial of the current habeas corpus petition, a result 
advocated by the Attorney General, would immediately stop the tolling of the 
federal statute of limitations.   
III 
Relying primarily on this court‟s decision in In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 
750 (Clark), the Attorney General argues that in light of “longstanding state 
                                              
6  
Title 28 United States Code, section 2244(d)(2) provides:  “The time during 
which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral 
review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be 
counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.” 
 
9 
precedent,” we should not defer consideration of the current habeas corpus 
petition.   
We stated in Clark:  “The law mandates prompt disposition of habeas 
corpus petitions (§ 1476), and the interest of the state in the finality of judgment 
weighs heavily against delayed disposition of pending petitions.”  (Clark, supra, 5 
Cal.4th at p. 782.)  Accordingly, this court “must and will assume . . . that a 
petition for writ of habeas corpus includes all claims then known to the petitioner.  
Summary disposition of a petition which does not state a prima facie case for relief 
is the rule.”  (Id. at pp. 780-781.)   
Clark further stated:  “The inclusion in a habeas corpus petition of a 
statement purporting to reserve the right to supplement or amend the petition at a 
later date has no effect.  The court will determine the appropriate disposition of a 
petition for writ of habeas corpus based on the allegations of the petition as 
originally filed and any amended or supplemental petition for which leave to file 
has been granted.”  (Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 781, fn. 16; see also In re 
Haygood (1975) 14 Cal.3d 802, 805.)  This court will not “routinely delay action 
on a filed petition to permit amendment and supplementation of the petition.”  
(Clark, supra, at p. 781.)  The purpose of these habeas corpus rules is to enable 
this court, whenever possible, to consider all of a petitioner‟s claims 
simultaneously and expeditiously, rather than piecemeal. 
It is not a practice of this court to routinely defer a decision on a habeas 
corpus petition and to permit its amendment so additional claims can be raised.  
(Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 781.)  But an exception is called for because of the 
critical shortage of qualified counsel willing to accept appointment as habeas 
corpus counsel in a capital case.  As explained earlier, in California an indigent 
prisoner who is under a court judgment of death has a statutory right to the 
assistance of appointed counsel to pursue habeas corpus relief.  Here, petitioner 
 
10 
invoked that right some 13 years ago.  Due to circumstances beyond our control 
(see pp. 6-7, ante), we have not yet been able to find a qualified attorney willing to 
accept appointment as habeas corpus counsel for petitioner.  Had there been 
reasonably prompt compliance with petitioner‟s request, presumably he could 
have filed a timely habeas corpus petition in this court and, if that petition was 
denied, he could have filed a timely habeas corpus petition in federal court.7   
The Attorney General characterizes the current petition that CAP has filed 
on petitioner‟s behalf as nothing more than a “shell petition,” filed solely to toll 
the federal statute of limitations, and he urges us to compel petitioner to file a “real 
habeas petition in a genuine effort to exhaust state remedies.”  It would be grossly 
unfair, however, to impose this difficult task on petitioner himself, an indigent 
death row inmate who is untrained in the law and statutorily entitled to appointed 
habeas corpus counsel.  The advantages of having an experienced attorney prepare 
and file a habeas corpus petition were succinctly summed up in a prior decision of 
                                              
7  
According to the concurring and dissenting opinion, this court‟s practice of 
deferring consideration of cursory habeas corpus petitions filed by unrepresented 
petitioners is “essentially a gesture of largesse from this court” (conc. & dis. opn. 
of Corrigan, J., post, p. 1) that “serve[s] no state interest” (id., p. 6).  To the 
contrary, California‟s “state interest” in providing death row inmates with 
qualified habeas corpus counsel is reflected in its statutory scheme (Gov. Code, 
§ 68662), and our practice of deferring consideration of cursory habeas corpus 
petitions is an attempt to remedy a consequence of this court‟s inability, due to 
circumstances beyond our control, to timely provide such inmates with the legal 
representation that is theirs by right.  
 
The concurring and dissenting opinion asserts that this court‟s practice of 
deferring consideration of cursory habeas corpus petitions filed by unrepresented 
petitioners “will inevitably contribute to the lengthy delays our state experiences 
in resolving capital cases.”  (Conc. & dis. opn. of Corrigan, J., post, p. 5.)  What is 
causing the delay, however, is not that practice but this court‟s inability so far to 
recruit qualified habeas corpus counsel for each of the hundreds of death row 
inmates.  
 
 
11 
this court:  “[W]ith their formal legal training, professional experience, and 
unrestricted access to legal and other resources, counsel possess distinct 
advantages over their inmate clients in investigating the factual and legal grounds 
for potentially meritorious habeas corpus claims and in recognizing and preparing 
legally sufficient challenges to the validity of the inmates‟ death judgments.”  (In 
re Barnett, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 477.)   
As noted earlier, the current one-claim petition was prepared and filed by 
CAP, which is not acting in the capacity of appointed habeas corpus counsel, but 
is performing its task of “providing advocacy as needed during the period of 
incarceration before counsel is appointed.”  (CAP Web site, supra; see fn. 2, ante.)  
In light of CAP‟s limited resources, the current petition is by necessity quite 
cursory.  
The Attorney General argues that federal habeas corpus proceedings are 
“costly, disruptive, and counter-effective to the enforcement of state law” and that 
therefore this court should not defer consideration of the petition now before us.  
But whether federal habeas corpus proceedings are, as the Attorney General 
contends, detrimental to the enforcement of state law is not at issue here.  At issue 
is whether this court should defer consideration of petitioner‟s incomplete habeas 
petition (filed without the assistance of appointed counsel) to avoid potential 
prejudice to his right to seek federal habeas corpus relief in the federal courts.  The 
source of this potential prejudice is this court‟s lengthy but unavoidable delay in 
recruiting qualified counsel willing to accept an appointment as habeas corpus 
counsel for petitioner, a death row inmate.   
In light of the unusual circumstances presented, we grant petitioner‟s 
request to defer a decision in this matter until we have appointed habeas corpus 
counsel and until that attorney has had a reasonable opportunity to investigate 
various factual and legal matters for potentially meritorious claims to be presented 
 
12 
in an amended habeas corpus petition.  If we ultimately deny the petition, any 
issue pertaining to the adequacy of petitioner‟s compliance with the federal statute 
of limitations governing habeas corpus petitions is for the federal courts to decide. 
DISPOSITION 
We grant petitioner‟s request to defer consideration of his current habeas 
corpus petition pending the appointment of habeas corpus counsel by this court 
and the filing of an amended petition within 36 months of counsel‟s appointment.  
The Attorney General‟s motion in opposition to that request is denied. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
I concur in the disposition of this case and In re Jimenez (Aug. __, 2010, 
S167100) __ Cal.4th __, because it appears the petitions were filed in reliance on 
this court‟s informal practice of accepting them.  However, I strongly believe we 
should no longer allow the filing of “shell” habeas corpus petitions.  Shell 
petitions are not true petitions at all, but merely placeholders designed to toll the 
federal statute of limitations.  Further, shell petitions serve no state interest.  
California‟s obligation to ensure due process for capital defendants is addressed by 
our state‟s established appellate and habeas corpus procedures.  Perversely, the 
practice of accepting shell petitions ill serves both defendants and the public.  
Because it eliminates any urgency to secure counsel, capital inmates may languish 
without representation for several years.  The practice also burdens this court and 
adds greatly to the long delays in death penalty proceedings.  It is our obligation to 
find qualified counsel for capital habeas cases.  We should seriously consider how 
we are discharging that obligation in light of the delays the majority describes.  It 
is not, however, our proper role to help one class of convicted inmates evade a 
federal statute of limitations.  I therefore dissent from the majority‟s holding 
approving shell petitions. 
I. 
Background 
 
Congress‟s enactment of a one-year statute of limitations for federal habeas 
corpus petitions created special problems for death row inmates in California.  
Although capital inmates have a statutory right to counsel for both their state 
(Gov. Code, § 68662) and federal (18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2)) habeas claims, it has 
 
2 
typically taken many years, even after the judgment is final on appeal, before a 
lawyer can be found who will represent a capital inmate in state post-conviction 
proceedings.  This delay does not compromise the inmate‟s state habeas petition, 
because we presume such a petition to be timely so long as it is brought within 
three years after the appointment of habeas counsel.  (Cal. Supreme Ct., Policies 
Regarding Cases Arising from Judgments of Death, policy 3-1-1.1.)  However, the 
short limitations period mandated for federal habeas petitions by AEDPA1 differs 
from California‟s substantially more generous timeliness rules.  Because of 
endemic delays in our state‟s appointment of capital habeas counsel, the federal 
statute of limitations can expire before an inmate can “stop the clock” with a 
properly filed state habeas petition.  (28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (section 2244(d)(2)) 
[providing that the federal limitations period is tolled during the time “a properly 
filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review” is pending].)  
When AEDPA was first passed, California‟s capital inmates who wished to 
preserve their federal remedies faced a difficult choice.  They could either file a 
state habeas petition without the benefit of counsel, to stop the federal clock, or 
file a timely federal habeas petition but risk its dismissal for the failure to exhaust 
all claims in state court.  (See Rose v. Lundy (1982) 455 U.S. 509.)2 
 
The first shell petition filing was allowed in December 2001, in the case of 
In re Taylor, S102652.  Taylor‟s habeas counsel had withdrawn relatively late in 
the proceedings, and the Habeas Corpus Resource Center (HCRC) refused to 
accept an appointment unless we allowed it to file a shell petition.  After informal 
                                              
1  
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (110 Stat. 1214; see 
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)). 
2  
The federal courts have since resolved this dilemma by adopting a stay and 
abeyance procedure.  Rather than dismissing a petition containing unexhausted 
claims, the district court now has discretion to stay action on it while the petitioner 
returns to state court to exhaust all remedies.  (See Rhines v. Weber (2005) 544 
U.S. 269.) 
 
3 
discussions with HCRC and with no input from the Attorney General, we agreed 
to accept a placeholder, or “shell,” petition in that one case.  The sole purpose of 
the shell petition was to toll the federal statute of limitations while HCRC 
investigated and prepared a substantive state habeas petition.  The shell petition 
procedure thus originated as an informal accommodation made to secure 
representation under the unusual circumstances of that single case.  It was adopted 
after discussions with only one side, and it has never been approved in a formal 
rule.  Nevertheless, the practice of filing shell petitions has become almost routine 
in capital cases.  We have accepted more than 50 shell habeas petitions in the 
ensuing nine years.  Yet, of all these shell petitions, only two have been litigated to 
conclusion in this court.  Our habeas docket has become the extended home for an 
increasing number of capital cases, and the problem is likely to worsen.  Michael 
Laurence, Executive Director of HCRC, stated at oral argument that there are 
currently 322 capital inmates in California without habeas corpus counsel.  Two-
thirds of these cases are advancing toward finality because a lawyer has been 
appointed for the direct appeal. 
II. 
The Shell Petition Procedure Disserves California’s Interests 
 
This court does continue to have great difficulty finding counsel to 
represent capital inmates in habeas matters.  However, allowing capital inmates to 
delay federal post-conviction consideration through a sham procedure is not an 
appropriate response.  The shell petition procedure not only puts an unreasonable 
strain on this court, it also undermines California‟s strong interest in the finality of 
its judgments.  Furthermore, it runs directly contrary to our own well-established 
precedent. 
 
Our cases have long emphasized that habeas corpus is an extraordinary 
remedy “and that the availability of the writ properly must be tempered by the 
necessity of giving due consideration to the interest of the public in the orderly and 
reasonably prompt implementation of its laws and to the important public interest 
in the finality of judgments.”  (In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 778; see also 
 
4 
In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 764.)  We have developed a variety of 
procedural rules governing proper use of the writ to serve these important public 
interests and to “protect[] the integrity of our own appeal and habeas corpus 
process.”  (In re Robbins, at p. 778, fn. 1, italics omitted.)  One such rule is this 
court‟s longstanding refusal to consider successive petitions, whether they raise 
claims previously urged or state new grounds for relief that were known when a 
previous petition was filed.  (In re Clark, at pp. 769-770; In re Horowitz (1949) 33 
Cal.2d 534, 546-547.) 
 
As Justice Baxter explained for the majority in Clark, the rule against 
successive petitions is grounded in considerations of fundamental importance:  
“When a habeas corpus petition is denied on the merits, the court has determined 
that the claims made in that petition do not state a prima facie case entitling the 
petitioner to relief.  A successive petition presenting additional claims that could 
have been presented in an earlier attack on the judgment is, of necessity, a delayed 
petition.  [There is] no persuasive reason for routinely permitting consideration of 
the merits of such claims.  Were we to do so we would sanction a practice which 
unreasonably delays execution of judgment and imposes undue burdens on the 
state both in responding to claims made in delayed petitions and in marshalling 
stale evidence when retrial is necessary.  Successive petitions also waste scarce 
judicial resources as the court must repeatedly review the record of the trial in 
order to assess the merits of the petitioner‟s claims and assess the prejudicial 
impact of the constitutional deprivation of which he complains.  [¶]  Willingness 
by the court to entertain the merits of successive petitions seeking relief on the 
basis of the same set of facts undermines the finality of the judgment.  Moreover, 
such piecemeal litigation prevents the positive values of deterrence, certainty, and 
public confidence from attaching to the judgment.  The values that inhere in a final 
judgment are equally threatened by petitions for collateral relief raising claims that 
could have been raised in a prior petition.”  (In re Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at 
p. 770.) 
 
5 
 
A corollary of the rule against successive petitions is the rule that all known 
claims must be brought in a single, timely habeas corpus petition.  (In re Clark, 
supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 780-782, 797.)  A petitioner cannot delay, then seek to add 
claims to a petition at a later date.  We explained in Clark that, if a petitioner “is 
aware of facts adequate to state a prima facie case for habeas corpus relief,” the 
petition should include a claim based on these facts “even if the claim is not fully 
„developed.‟ ”  (Id. at p. 781.)  Nor should a petitioner expect the court to delay 
action on a petition to permit future amendment.  “The court must and will assume 
. . . that a petition for writ of habeas corpus includes all claims then known to the 
petitioner.”  (Id. at pp. 780-781.)  Further, we expressly cautioned in Clark that 
“[t]he inclusion in a habeas corpus petition of a statement purporting to reserve the 
right to supplement or amend the petition at a later date has no effect.”  (Id. at 
p. 781, fn. 16, italics added.) 
 
The shell petition procedure is in obvious conflict with these important 
rules.  It was created and has been perpetuated to benefit only one side, in post-
conviction litigation in a different forum.  It is even more remarkable for the court 
to exempt death row inmates from the long-standing rule against successive 
habeas petitions, considering that these are the prisoners with the most incentive to 
delay. 
 
Shell petitions will inevitably contribute to the lengthy delays our state 
experiences in resolving capital cases.  Petitioners advised this court that 
Louisiana has also adopted a shell petition procedure for tolling the AEDPA 
statute of limitations.  (See State ex rel. Weary v. State (La. 2009) 12 So.3d 968, 
969 fn. 3.)  Notably, however, two justices of the Louisiana Supreme Court 
recently complained of excessive delays and urged the state to reconsider its use of 
the shell procedure.  They wrote:  “The delays caused in post-conviction 
proceedings by filing „shell‟ applications and the granting of continuances have 
unreasonably delayed the finality of death penalty cases.  This practice has 
effectively stopped the State from carrying out the sentence in capital cases at 
 
6 
great expense to the State.  It appears our courts have had little effect in 
discouraging these delaying techniques.  It is probably appropriate now for the 
Legislature to address this aspect of post-conviction proceedings if this State is 
going to continue to have capital sentences.”  (Id. at p. 970 (conc. & dis. opn. of 
Knoll, J.).) 
 
Not only do shell petitions exacerbate delay, they serve no state interest.  
The Legislature has granted capital inmates a right to counsel.  (Gov. Code, 
§ 68662.)  This court has adopted generous rules for compensating these attorneys 
and generous timelines for them to litigate state habeas petitions.  (See Cal. 
Supreme Ct., Payment Guidelines for Appointed Counsel Representing Indigent 
Criminal Appellants in the California Supreme Court, guideline 2.)  According to 
our internal estimates, the average cost to pay private counsel for handling the 
direct appeal in a capital case ranges from $180,000 to $250,000.  In the rare 
instances when an attorney handles both the appeal and the habeas corpus petition, 
the median fixed-fee compensation is around $283,000, with an additional 
$50,000 provided to reimburse investigation expenses.  The typical cost to pay a 
second private attorney for preparing a separate state habeas petition ranges from 
$230,000 to $250,000 in fixed-fee compensation, or up to $300,000 in hourly 
compensation.  Thus, when different attorneys handle the appeal and state habeas 
petition, their compensation can easily reach or exceed $500,000. 
 
Shell petitions do nothing whatsoever to promote the state‟s interest in 
providing counsel to habeas corpus petitioners, nor its interest in having all capital 
habeas claims decided first by California courts.3  Moreover, the United States 
Supreme Court has made clear that a state‟s delay in appointing state habeas 
counsel does not make the state accountable for an inmate‟s failure to satisfy the 
                                              
3  
Even if the conflicting timeliness rules required capital prisoners to file 
habeas petitions in federal court first, federal exhaustion rules would still ensure 
that the claims were first addressed in a state forum. 
 
7 
statute of limitations for seeking federal habeas relief.  In Lawrence v. Florida 
(2007) 549 U.S. 327, 336-337, a capital prisoner argued he was entitled to 
equitable tolling because an attorney who was appointed and supervised by the 
state courts had miscalculated the federal limitations period.  The Supreme Court 
rejected this argument, noting that the petitioner had not alleged the state 
prevented him from hiring his own attorney or representing himself.  (Id. at 
p. 337.)4  The court observed:  “[A] State‟s effort to assist prisoners in 
postconviction proceedings does not make the State accountable for a prisoner‟s 
delay. . . .  It would be perverse indeed if providing prisoners with postconviction 
counsel deprived States of the benefit of the AEDPA statute of limitations.”  
(Lawrence, at p. 337, italics added.) 
 
The shell procedure is essentially a gesture of largesse from this court.  Its 
sole purpose is to help capital inmates preserve their ability to launch additional 
collateral attacks on their convictions in federal court.5  It is true that the AEDPA 
                                              
4  
The court assumed without deciding that 28 U.S.C. section 2244(d) permits 
equitable tolling.  (Lawrence v. Florida, supra, 549 U.S. at p. 336.)  Recently, the 
court confirmed that the AEDPA statute of limitations is subject to equitable 
tolling.  (Holland v. Florida (2010) __ U.S. __ [130 S.Ct. 2549].) 
5  
We do not even know if the gambit will be successful.  It remains uncertain 
whether federal courts will ultimately construe a shell petition to be “properly 
filed” for purposes of statutory or equitable tolling.  (Compare Voravongsa v. Wall 
(1st Cir. 2003) 349 F.3d 1, 7 [under Rhode Island law, pro se prisoner‟s 
application for appointment of counsel in state habeas proceedings was not a 
“properly filed application” sufficient to toll the AEDPA statute of limitations], 
with Isley v. Ariz. Dept. of Corrections (9th Cir. 2004) 383 F.3d 1054, 1055-1056 
[under Arizona law, prisoner‟s filing of a “Notice of Post-Conviction Relief,” 
which invoked the right to counsel, was sufficient to toll the federal statute of 
limitations], overruled on a related point in Summers v. Schriro (9th Cir. 2007) 
481 F.3d 710; see also Jihad v. Hvass (8th Cir. 2001) 267 F.3d 803 [holding that 
the inability to retain counsel is not an extraordinary circumstance justifying 
equitable tolling].)  Although the federal courts will likely defer to our state rules 
in determining whether a petition has been properly filed (see Artuz v. Bennett 
(2000) 531 U.S. 4), a capital habeas petition is not considered “pending” under 
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
8 
statute of limitations puts unrepresented capital inmates in a difficult position.  
However, California already provides its own more generous system for habeas 
review.  The federal government is free to regulate its own system, and, in fact, the 
federal courts have developed their own procedural solution to the problem at 
hand. 
III. 
The Federal “Stay and Abeyance” Procedure Is Preferable 
 
Shortly after AEDPA went into effect, Justice Stevens identified the 
procedural conflict created by the intersection of AEDPA‟s one-year statute of 
limitations and the high court‟s holding in Rose v. Lundy, supra, 455 U.S. 509, 
that habeas petitions containing any unexhausted claims must be dismissed 
without prejudice to refiling after the claims have been exhausted.  (Duncan v. 
Walker (2001) 533 U.S. 167, 182-183 (conc. opn. of Stevens, J.).)  Because the 
court in Duncan held that the limitations period is not tolled while a petition is 
pending in federal court, by the time a federal district court determined that some 
claims required exhaustion, a petitioner could find that the AEDPA statute of 
limitations had expired, precluding federal review of any of his claims.  (Id. at 
p. 182.)  Justice Stevens remarked, “[I]n our post-AEDPA world, there is no 
reason why a district court should not retain jurisdiction over a meritorious claim 
and stay further proceedings pending the complete exhaustion of state remedies.  
Indeed, there is every reason to do so . . . .”  (Id. at pp. 182-183.)  When 
confronted with this precise problem four years later, the Supreme Court 
unanimously approved the stay and abeyance procedure.  In Rhines v. Weber, 
supra, 544 U.S. 269, the court held that when a state prisoner files a “mixed” 
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
federal law unless it seeks an adjudication on the merits.  (Woodford v. Garceau 
(2003) 538 U.S. 202, 206-207.)  Shell petitions do not satisfy this requirement 
because they seek only to delay an adjudication on the merits. 
 
9 
habeas corpus petition in federal court containing some claims that have been 
exhausted and some that have not, the district court has discretion to stay 
proceedings on the mixed petition and hold it in abeyance while the petitioner 
returns to state court to litigate the unexhausted claims.  Although mixed petitions 
should not be stayed indefinitely, particularly in capital cases where petitioners 
have a strong incentive to delay, the court warned that “it likely would be an abuse 
of discretion for a district court to deny a stay and to dismiss a mixed petition if 
the petitioner had good cause for his failure to exhaust, his unexhausted claims are 
potentially meritorious, and there is no indication that the petitioner engaged in 
dilatory litigation tactics.”  (Id. at p. 278.) 
 
The stay and abeyance procedure approved by the Supreme Court offers 
California‟s capital inmates an established means of preserving their federal 
habeas claims.  A federal statute created the timeliness problems these prisoners 
face, and the federal courts have crafted a solution.  Rather than unilaterally 
inventing our own special procedures that may or may not allow capital inmates to 
evade the AEDPA statute of limitations, we should end the shell petition practice 
and direct these inmates to follow the federal stay and abeyance path. 
 
This approach would require capital inmates to file a habeas petition in 
federal district court within one year after their conviction is final.  Our difficulty 
finding attorneys to represent these prisoners in habeas matters would not 
necessarily be an obstacle to this filing because capital inmates have a statutory 
right to counsel in federal post-conviction proceedings.  (18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2).)  
This right to counsel attaches before the filing of a federal habeas petition, and it is 
invoked when a capital prisoner files an application in federal court seeking 
appointment of an attorney.  (McFarland v. Scott (1994) 512 U.S. 849, 856-857.)  
The legal obligation would therefore be on the federal system to appoint counsel 
in time to prepare the federal habeas petition. 
 
For a petitioner to benefit from the stay and abeyance procedure, the federal 
petition would have to contain a mixture of exhausted and unexhausted claims.  In 
 
10 
addition to exhausted claims, which were litigated to conclusion on direct appeal, 
petitioners would have to allege the factual basis for possible unexhausted claims 
they might wish to litigate in federal habeas proceedings.  New claims for relief in 
an amended petition do not relate back to the original petition, thus making them 
timely, unless they arise from the same “ „conduct, transaction or occurrence‟ ” set 
forth in the original petition.  (Mayle v. Felix (2005) 545 U.S. 644, 649.)  
Certainly, it might be difficult to identify all potential new claims within a year 
after an inmate‟s conviction has become final on appeal.  Indeed, the time frame 
may be even shorter if the district court is slow to appoint counsel.  But these 
limits on the availability of the federal writ were imposed by Congress and the 
federal courts.  It is remarkable that we would formally adopt a procedure 
designed solely to help capital prisoners evade them.  Further, we should be 
mindful that capital cases take years to litigate in the trial court and many more 
years to resolve by direct appeal.  It is not unreasonable to expect that a capital 
defense team at least contemplate potential habeas claims during this lengthy 
period. 
IV. 
Conclusion 
 
If California‟s system worked as intended, habeas counsel would be 
appointed for capital defendants during the litigation of their direct appeals.  Such 
counsel would have ample time to investigate, prepare, and file state habeas 
petitions within a year after conclusion of the appellate process, thus tolling the 
deadline for filing a federal habeas petition under section 2244(d)(2).  That should 
continue to be our goal. 
 
Our rules do not penalize pre-filing delays in capital habeas proceedings.  
Because a state habeas petition is presumed timely if it is filed within six months 
after filing of the appellant‟s reply brief or three years after the appointment of 
habeas counsel, whichever is later (Cal. Supreme Ct., Policies Regarding Cases 
Arising from Judgments of Death, policy 3, std. 1-1.1), capital inmates have little 
incentive to demand an expeditious appointment of habeas counsel.  Perhaps the 
 
11 
time has come to change this aspect of our rules.  However, we should resist the 
suggestion that this court is somehow obligated to help capital prisoners delay the 
federal limitations period because we have had difficulty appointing counsel for 
their state habeas petitions.  Congress created clear consequences for delay when 
it enacted AEDPA‟s one-year statute of limitations for federal habeas petitions.  
Nevertheless, without authorization by statute or rule of court, the majority now 
approves of an informally adopted procedure designed expressly to thwart this 
Congressional aim.  This court should not abandon its general rules and fashion a 
sham procedure solely to enable a small set of habeas petitioners to evade federal 
law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
I CONCUR: 
BAXTER, J.   
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion In re Morgan 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding XXX 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S162413 
Date Filed: August 30, 2010 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: 
County: 
Judge: 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Michael G. Millman for Petitioner Edward Patrick Morgan. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. 
Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Holly D. Wilkens, Randall D. Einhorn and Ronald S. Matthias, 
Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent State of California. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Michael G. Millman 
California Appellate Project 
101 Second Street, 6th Floor 
San Francisco, CA  94105 
(415) 495-0500 
 
Dane R. Gillette 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 703-5858