Title: State v. Douglas J. Plude
Citation: 2008 WI 58
Docket Number: 2005AP002311-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 10, 2008

2008 WI 58 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP2311-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Douglas J. Plude, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 301 Wis. 2d 746, 731 N.W.2d 382 
(Ct. App. 2007-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 10, 2008   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 31, 2007   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Vilas   
 
JUDGE: 
James B. Mohr   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
BUTLER, JR., J., concurs (opinion filed). 
ZIEGLER, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Stephen D. Willett and Stephen D. Willett, S.C., Phillips, and 
oral argument by Stephen D. Willett. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Maura 
F.J. Whelan, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Willaim C. Gleisner, 
III and the Law Offices of William C. Gleisner III, Milwaukee, 
on behalf of the Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Robert H. Friebert, 
Matthew W. O’Neill, and Friebert, Finerty & St. John, S.C., 
Milwaukee, on behalf of Wisconsin Utilities Association. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Paul E. Benson, Joseph 
Louis Olson, Thomas A. Janczewski, and Michael Best & Friedrich 
 
 
2 
LLP, Milwaukee, on behalf of the Civil Trial Counsel of 
Wisconsin. 
 
 
 
 
 
2008 WI 58
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2005AP2311-CR 
(L.C. No.  2001CF117) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,   
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent   
 
 
v. 
 
Douglas J. Plude,   
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 10, 2008 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded to the circuit court.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   We are asked to review 
a decision of the court of appeals1 that affirmed the circuit 
court's2 order denying Douglas Plude's motion for postconviction 
relief from his conviction of first-degree homicide, contrary to 
Wis. Stat. § 940.01 (2005-06).  Plude's conviction was based on 
the death of his wife, Genell Plude.  He sought to have the 
                                                 
1 State v. Plude, No. 2005AP2311-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2007). 
2 The Honorable James B. Mohr of Vilas County presided. 
No. 2005AP2311-CR 
 
2 
 
jury's verdict set aside and to have the charges dismissed or to 
have a new trial based on two allegations of error.  
¶2 
First, Plude discovered after the completion of his 
trial that one of the State's expert witnesses, Dr. Saami 
Shaibani, who testified that the positions in which Plude said 
he found his wife's body were physically impossible3 for an 
unconscious person to maintain, lied under oath about his 
credentials.  Plude claims this is newly-discovered evidence 
that requires a new trial.  Second, he contends that the State's 
failure to timely provide potentially exculpatory evidence, in 
the form of the content of computer hard drives and a copy of 
his wife's death certificate, deprived him of his constitutional 
right to present a defense.   
¶3 
We conclude that the discovery that Shaibani testified 
falsely about his credentials is newly-discovered evidence that 
gives rise to a reasonable probability that, had the jury heard 
Shaibani's misrepresentation about his credentials, it would 
have had a reasonable doubt as to Plude's guilt.  Accordingly, 
we vacate Plude's conviction and remand to the circuit court for 
a new trial.4 
                                                 
3 Plude's accounts of Genell's position when he found her 
varied.  
4 Because we grant a new trial, we do not consider Plude's 
arguments with respect to the computer hard drives and the death 
certificate. 
No. 2005AP2311-CR 
 
3 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶4 
The State's theory is that Plude murdered Genell by 
poisoning her with Fioricet-codeine and then drowning her in 
toilet bowl water in their home.  Plude contends that Genell 
committed suicide by taking an overdose of drugs, which served 
as a catalyst for a fatal occurrence of pulmonary edema.5  In 
other words, Plude theorizes that Genell drowned in fluids 
created by her own body. 
¶5 
In February, 1999, eight months before Genell's death, 
Genell and Plude began experiencing marital problems.  The 
couple separated for a short time that spring, and Genell went 
to live with her parents in Minneapolis.  The couple soon 
reconciled, however, and Genell again resided with Plude and his 
mother in their shared home in Land O' Lakes, Wisconsin. 
¶6 
Marital strain continued.  On the day before her 
death, Genell told her mother that she had quit her job and that 
she wanted to leave Plude.  Genell arranged for her parents to 
pick her up from her home early the next morning so that she 
could return to Minneapolis to live with them. 
¶7 
On the evening before her death, according to Plude, 
he and Genell went to bed together.  A short time later, Genell 
got up to get medication for a headache.  Plude went to sleep 
and in the hour between 5-6 a.m., Plude noticed that Genell was 
not in bed.  He testified at the medical inquest that after 
                                                 
5 Pulmonary edema is the filling of the lungs with fluid 
created by one's own body.   
No. 2005AP2311-CR 
 
4 
 
calling for Genell he found her in the bathroom slumped over the 
toilet.  He noticed that her hands were blue and her face was in 
the toilet bowl, which contained vomit. 
¶8 
The positions in which Plude claimed he found Genell 
were the subject of much testimony at trial.  He told Officer 
Jennifer Kroschell the morning of Genell's death that he found 
Genell crouched on her knees facing the toilet, with her head 
pitched forward so that her face was in the toilet bowl, and 
with her arms draped loosely at either side.  Officer Kroschell 
testified that Plude was "hysterical" when offering his account.  
Plude described a somewhat different position of Genell's body 
at the medical inquest.  There, Plude described Genell as 
slumped over the bowl, her head cocked to the left, with her 
face and hair in the water.  Her left arm was draped around the 
bowl, with her right arm hanging loosely at her foot.  She was 
situated on her knees.   
¶9 
According to Plude, he noticed vomit in the toilet; 
pulled Genell away from the toilet; screamed for his mother; and 
performed CPR on Genell.  In his panic at her condition, he 
cracked her sternum while performing CPR.  Plude's mother awoke 
and became panicked upon observing the scene.  Her panic 
precluded her from calling 911, so Plude stopped performing CPR 
to do so. 
¶10 Paramedics 
arrived, 
and 
Plude 
assisted 
them 
in 
attending to Genell.6  One of the paramedics, Sid Baake, 
                                                 
6 At one point, Plude had been employed as a paramedic. 
No. 2005AP2311-CR 
 
5 
 
testified that when he arrived at the Plude home, Plude was 
still performing CPR on Genell.  Baake testified that Plude was 
crying, "I think that she is gone.  Help me.  Help me."   
¶11 Genell was conveyed to a hospital, where she was 
pronounced dead.  An attending nurse in the emergency room 
overheard Plude say to Genell's corpse, "I told you not to leave 
me."   
¶12 Investigation of her death uncovered that Genell had 
ingested 40 Fioricet with codeine capsules.  Genell had obtained 
a prescription for the drug some time in 1997. 
¶13 Dr. Kenneth Sullivan, the emergency room doctor who 
attended to Genell, testified at trial.  He concluded that 
Genell drowned because Genell had fluid in her lungs.  Although 
the fluid was consistent with pulmonary edema, he could not 
determine to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty whether 
the fluid came from pulmonary edema or from a source outside her 
body.  Dr. Sullivan also noted a bruise on the side of Genell's 
neck.  He testified that the appearance of the bruise would have 
required "some force" beyond just the weight of her head.   
¶14 Beyond the presence of fluid in her lungs, which may 
have come from the toilet bowl or may have come from her own 
bodily function, the presence of lethally high levels of drugs 
were in Genell's body when she died.  Casey Collins, a 
toxicologist at the Wisconsin State Crime Lab, testified that he 
took blood samples, urine samples, a liver sample, a kidney 
sample, and a stomach content sample from Genell's body.  He 
also took samples of the toilet bowl water.  Genell's body and 
No. 2005AP2311-CR 
 
6 
 
the toilet bowl water showed the presence of the same four 
drugs:  Acetaminophen (Tylenol), codeine (an opiate), butalbital 
(a barbiturate), and caffeine. 
¶15 Collins testified to the lethal levels of each drug, 
and the amount Genell had in her body.  Codeine is lethal at a 
level of 1.6 mg/liter, and Genell had 20 mg/liter in her body.  
Butalbital is lethal at a range of 13-26 mg/liter, and Genell 
had 18 mg/liter in her body.  Acetaminophen is lethal at a level 
of 160 mg/liter, and Genell had 213 mg/liter in her body.  
Moreover, there were only a few milligrams of these drugs left 
in her stomach, indicating that the drugs were almost completely 
absorbed before she vomited. 
¶16 Given the drug doses in Genell's body, Dr. Mitra 
Kalelkar, the Assistant Chief Medical Examiner at the Cook 
County, Illinois Medical Examiner's Office, testified that 
Genell drowned as a result of "combined drug intoxication" that 
caused pulmonary edema.  Dr. Kalelkar testified that the weight 
of Genell's lungs was consistent with pulmonary edema.  He 
testified that the Fioricet-codeine in Genell's body slowed her 
heart rate, which in turn caused her circulation to slow, which 
in turn caused fluid to accumulate in her lungs.  Ultimately, 
Dr. Kalelkar concluded that Genell drowned due to reduced blood 
circulation caused by the presence of drugs in her body. 
¶17 Dr. Kalelkar also testified to Genell's condition at 
her death.  He said that there was no indication that Genell 
inhaled any toilet bowl water.  He said that the bruise on her 
neck was not the result of an outside force pressing her neck 
No. 2005AP2311-CR 
 
7 
 
against the rim of the toilet; rather, the bruise on her neck 
resulted simply from her lying on the rim of the toilet.  In 
addition, he stated that there were no injuries to her neck and 
trachea in places one would expect to find them if her head had 
been forced into the toilet bowl.   
¶18 Moreover, although Dr. Kalelkar concluded that Genell 
died from a drug overdose, he also opined that she did not die 
from a forced overdose.  He testified that the amount of drugs 
found in Genell's body indicates that, if she did not take them 
voluntarily, they would have to have been forcibly administered 
to her; however, her body showed no evidence that she had 
engaged in a struggle.  
¶19 Dr. Kalelkar provided one last item of note.  While 
the nurse in the emergency room found Plude's statement that "I 
told you not to leave me" disturbing, Dr. Kalelkar testified 
that such a statement is not unusual.  He testified that the 
statement was "a manifestation of the anger which is . . . part 
of the grieving process." 
¶20 Dr. Robert Huntington, the pathologist who performed 
Genell's autopsy, added to the cacophony of disparate medical 
opinions regarding the cause of Genell's death.  For instance, 
Dr. Huntington testified that the bruise on Genell's neck was 
the result of "blunt force" administered while Genell was still 
alive.  He also opined that the fluid in Genell's lungs was 
inconsistent with pulmonary edema.  He testified that when 
pulmonary 
edema 
occurs, 
the 
lungs 
fill 
with 
fluid 
in 
concentrated places.  However, the fluid in Genell's lungs was 
No. 2005AP2311-CR 
 
8 
 
spread over a wide area; therefore, it was his conclusion that 
the fluid likely came from a source outside of her body.7  Dr. 
Huntington also testified that Genell had enough drugs in her 
bloodstream to kill her.  His ultimate conclusion was that 
Genell "died of drug intoxication probably abetted by drowning."  
He testified that Genell's death was either a suicide or a 
homicide, but he could not say to a reasonable degree of 
scientific certainty which had occurred. 
¶21 Dr. Huntington testified that his lack of clarity over 
the manner of Genell's death stemmed from certain facts that he 
could not explain.  For example, he said that he would want the 
neck bruise explained; he would want to know why her limp body 
stayed upright around the rim of the toilet instead of rolling 
back onto the floor; and he did not know what accounted for the 
hemorrhaging in her lungs.   
¶22 Julius Ballanco, a consulting engineer, testified 
regarding the physical mechanics of a toilet.  He testified that 
toilets are designed such that the mouth and the nose cannot be 
submerged accidentally and simultaneously into the toilet bowl 
water, but that it is possible for a person accidentally to 
submerge the forehead and nose into the toilet bowl water.  In 
addition, Ballanco opined that the toilet in the Plude home had 
not been flushed because it contained vomit when Plude found 
Genell.  Ballanco was able to surmise, however, that there had 
                                                 
7 Apparently, no testing was done on the fluid in Genell's 
lungs to see if it was consistent with the water from the toilet 
bowl or with bodily fluid. 
No. 2005AP2311-CR 
 
9 
 
been approximately one pint of water displaced from the toilet.  
He concluded that the displacement of this amount of water would 
have had to come from some force greater than vomiting.   
¶23 We now turn our attention to the testimony of 
Shaibani.  Shaibani, who is not a medical doctor, set forth his 
credentials under oath and in his curriculum vitae admitted as 
an exhibit at trial.  He represented himself as a clinical 
associate professor at Temple University and as a specialist in 
"injury mechanism analysis."8  He said that as part of his duties 
at Temple University he taught physicians and surgeons about 
injury.  He described injury mechanism analysis as a field of 
scientific 
study 
that 
"combines 
physics, 
trauma, 
and 
engineering" "to determine whether or not an injury could have 
been caused by the circumstances involved."  With regard to his 
duties as a clinical assistant professor at Temple University 
and his expertise in injury mechanism analysis, Shaibani 
testified as follows: 
Q: 
Why don't you explain to the jury exactly what 
injury mechanism analysis is? 
. . . . 
A: 
The injury mechanisms analysis is a scientific 
study to determine whether or not an injury could 
have been caused by the circumstances involved.  
It combines physics, trauma, and engineering. 
                                                 
8 Plude claims 
that Shaibani invented this field of 
specialty and that "[n]o other person on the face of the earth 
considers himself or herself an expert in the field of injury 
mechanism analysis."  Pet. Br. at 6.   
No. 2005AP2311-CR 
 
10 
 
Q: 
How do you get to be someone who specializes in 
injury mechanisms analysis? 
A: 
I ask myself that every day, in fact.   
But, basically, you have to have a background in 
each one of those three disciplines that I 
mentioned.   
You need to have a good understanding of physics 
because that's one of the main sciences.   
You need to have a background in trauma because 
that's what injury relates to.   
Then it helps if you have a background in 
engineering, if nothing else, to prove that you 
are a practical animal. 
Q: 
As a clinical professor, what do you consider 
your responsibilities to be? 
A: 
I have two main areas of responsibilities.  I 
teach and I do research.  My teaching is to 
physicians and surgeons, fully qualified medical 
doctors, and I teach them about injury.  It's one 
of those curious things that they don't learn 
about injury in medical school.  So I explain how 
injuries are caused, how they can be prevented, 
how 
they 
can 
be 
treated 
under 
certain 
circumstances. 
Shaibani also testified that he has a Master's Degree in Crystal 
Physics and Metallurgy, a Master's Degree in Science of 
Materials, and a Ph.D. in Material Physics, all from Oxford 
University.   
¶24 Shaibani was received as an expert in the area of 
injury mechanism analysis by the circuit court.  He testified 
regarding the interrelation between the mechanics of the human 
body and the laws of physics.  He explained the effect of the 
interrelation on the positions in which Plude said he found 
No. 2005AP2311-CR 
 
11 
 
Genell's body, and he explained whether she could have lost 
consciousness and drowned herself in the toilet bowl water.   
¶25 Shaibani 
performed a number of experiments with 
various human models having Genell's reported height and weight9 
to replicate the positions in which Plude explained he found 
Genell.  The State's expert, Dr. Huntington, testified that it 
was more likely than not that the fluid in Genell's lungs came 
from toilet bowl water rather than from her own bodily 
processes, i.e., from pulmonary edema.  Shaibani took Dr. 
Huntington's 
conclusion 
further. 
 
He 
testified 
that 
his 
experiments indicated to a reasonable degree of scientific 
certainty that Genell could not have inhaled toilet bowl water 
on her own; that it would have required 60 pounds of pressure to 
the back of her head to get her face in the toilet bowl water 
and keep it there.   
¶26 After 
describing 
his 
experience 
and 
purported 
expertise, Shaibani testified that he used a model to simulate 
the position in which Plude first claimed he found Genell: 
Q: 
What was the first step in the testing that you 
did to answer each of these questions? 
A: 
I began at the beginning.  One of the first 
things that I'm aware of is a statement that the 
defendant made to Deputy Krosschell [sic].  I'm 
reading from that report in which she relates the 
following.  Douglas stated he observed Genell on 
her knees in front of the toilet with her arms 
down to the side and her face in the toilet bowl.  
That's the first statement that he has given to 
                                                 
9 Genell was reported to stand approximately 5 feet, 8 
inches and weigh approximately 140 pounds. 
No. 2005AP2311-CR 
 
12 
 
anyone, so I'm going to begin at the beginning 
and see what the sign says, as far as looking at 
that is concerned. 
Q: 
Why don't you tell the jury what you did in that 
regard.  Could you indicate what exhibit you are 
looking at for the record and how you are going 
to do that for the jury? 
A: 
Yes, sir.  This is State's Exhibit 184.  It has 
the caption, defendant's first story, and there 
is some space on this exhibit for me to show the 
results of the test that I conducted to look at 
this. 
. . . . 
A: 
So if we look at this description given by the 
defendant, that Genell is on her knees, with her 
arms down to the side and her face in the toilet 
bowl, I got somebody of the same height, the same 
weight, and the same gender, with the same toilet 
bowl that you see here, and I asked her to try 
and put her head in the toilet, and, for purposes 
of identification, this is Photograph 2774. 
. . . . 
Q: 
Now, in that position, was the head able to go 
into the water? 
A: 
In some circumstances, the head——and when I say 
"the head," I mean the forehead and the top of 
the head——possibly could, but at no stage could 
the face be in the water.  It's important to make 
that distinction because the defendant says her 
face was in the toilet bowl.  It becomes 
ambiguous as to what part of the bowl you are 
referring to.  Later on, we'll be looking at the 
face in the water. 
¶27 Shaibani then conducted a similar experiment with the 
chosen model in the second position in which Plude explained he 
found Genell: 
Q: 
Let's go to the second set. Again, refer to the 
exhibit, if you would.  This is? 
No. 2005AP2311-CR 
 
13 
 
. . . . 
A: 
Oh, thank you, sir.  Defendant's second story.  
We see a significant change now in how he reports 
the circumstances of how he found Genell. 
Q: 
Go ahead. 
A: 
I've got at least six different occasions where 
he states her face was into the water.  Her face 
was in the water.  Her face was in the water.  
Her face was in the water there.  At least four 
instances that I have just told you where he 
says, again and again, her face, not her head, is 
in the water, not the bowl. 
On other occasions, he talked about her head 
being in the bowl, but now we've got an important 
change that, on four instances, at least that I 
can find, her face was into the water. 
. . . . 
So this is a new development.  Her face is now in 
the water is what the defendant is saying. 
In addition to that, he describes that she was 
cocked to one side, kind of on her hip with her 
left arm on the bowl, her right hand was hanging 
down. 
So now we've got a lot more detail than we had in 
the first story.  No longer the hands on either 
side of the knees that we saw in those first 
photographs.  We've got a completely different 
scenario. 
. . . . 
A: 
. . .  This is interesting because, if your left 
hand is in the position that we think the 
defendant is describing, then, because your arm 
is of a certain length and your body is arranged 
a certain way, if you are five foot eight and a 
half inches and you weigh 140 pounds and you are 
female, 
things 
fit 
together 
a 
certain 
way 
anatomically, and, under the circumstance, for 
this particular interpretation, not all of them, 
No. 2005AP2311-CR 
 
14 
 
but for this particular interpretation, that face 
is clearly not going to be in the water.   
Then you've got your chest getting in the way, 
you've got your neck getting in the way, and 
there is no way, physiologically or anatomically 
under this one way of looking at it, for the face 
to be in the water. 
. . . . 
A: 
What was interesting, when we positioned this 
particular volunteer, with the legs coming to the 
left towards us as we look, is that once you are 
in that position, and I say to the volunteer, let 
your muscles go limp and relax, a very surprising 
thing happened, and that is, she fell out.  You 
can see that I gallantly came to the rescue and 
stopped her head falling on the floor because 
that's my hand there.  So she is falling out.  
She is trying to kind of artificially prop 
herself up there using muscle tone, muscle 
tension.  And the moment I said to her, relax, 
let go, whoops, she was out of there, she was 
gone. 
Q: 
Now, for that set of circumstances and the 
experimenting that you did, is what resulted 
there, would that be the force of gravity that we 
talked about? 
A: 
Yes, sir.  These are experiments.  After we've 
gone through these sequences, I'll then show the 
interpretation of these results analytically. 
Q: 
But, for purposes of that one experiment, is the 
result going to be the same result every time 
that set of circumstances exists, to a reasonable 
degree of scientific certainty? 
A: 
Yes, sir, or a very small variation on the theme.  
It's going to be substantially similar. 
¶28 In summation of how the models depicted the first two 
positions in which Plude claimed he found Genell, Shaibani 
testified that the models could not maintain either position: 
No. 2005AP2311-CR 
 
15 
 
A: 
The issue here is that you can shuffle this 
around any way you want.  The overall result is 
going to be, broadly similar, that gravity will 
take over the body in the first sequence.  
Gravity will take over the body in the second 
sequence and cause the body to slump out and down 
to the right. 
Q: 
Is that your opinion, to a reasonable degree of 
scientific certainty? 
A: 
Yes, sir, it is. 
¶29 From here, Shaibani went on to talk about "force."  
His experiments revealed that his models could not keep their 
heads in the toilet bowl once they relaxed their muscles, 
because the force of gravity caused them to "fall out," down and 
to the right.  So, in order for Genell's head to have been in 
the bowl, as Plude claimed he found her, Shaibani testified that 
her head had to have been kept there by a force, and that force 
would be approximately 60 pounds of pressure: 
A: 
. . .  If you weigh 140 pounds, it turns out that 
nine pounds of your body weight is above your 
neck; sawdust or otherwise between your ears.  
Now, if there are nine pounds on your head, then 
there must be only 131 left over for the rest of 
your body.  So we put a demarcation now of two 
different forces.  We can break the body down as 
far as it pivoting about this fulcrum. 
. . . . 
A: 
So we have to first balance the weight, which is 
divided up into nine pounds on the head and 130 
pounds or 131 pounds on the rest of her body.  
You can see that, if we look at this as a 
fulcrum, then the left-hand side of her body, the 
main part of her body is going to go down and the 
head is going to go up. 
Q: 
Is that principle an opinion to a reasonable 
degree of scientific certainty? 
No. 2005AP2311-CR 
 
16 
 
A: 
Yes, it is.  But we haven't finished what we are 
doing here because I've got only two forces.  
What about the force on the knee, the hands, and 
the feet?  We've got to include those.  So the 
hands were one inch in front of the fulcrum; 
there was a force there of five pounds.  The 
knees, we had a force of about 90 pounds going 
up.  The feet, we had a force of about 25 pounds 
going up.  Then, one final force is 20 pounds on 
that part of the upper body.  So each one of 
these forces is going to try and make Genell go 
down and rotate her clockwise into the bowl or 
they are going to rotate her counterclockwise out 
of the bowl.  If you add up all of these forces 
and take into account the distances which we saw 
were 
important 
in 
our 
seesaw 
demonstration 
[omitted from this excerpt], then overwhelmingly 
her body wants to come out.  There is just too 
much weight outside the toilet, even though it 
has been supported at the knees and at the feet.  
There is still too much weight pulling her down, 
down, down, out, out, out, away, away, away from 
that water.  So that says, well, what would you 
have to do to get her head into the water? 
Q: 
Her face into the water? 
A: 
Her face into the water.  If you want her face 
into the water, and the laws of physics tell us 
that the body is rotating out, you have to 
counteract that.  You have to apply an external 
force at some attack distance to make sure that 
the head stays down as opposed to going out.  
This is an external force. 
All of these other forces deal with what Genell 
is doing with the floor supporting her.  These 
are the only things she has control over and she 
is going to go out of that toilet, down and away.  
The only way her head can go down is if there is 
an external force applied. 
. . . . 
Q: 
Were you able to calculate how much force would 
be required to get Genell's face into that bowl 
and suspend it there? 
No. 2005AP2311-CR 
 
17 
 
A: 
Yes.  You can do that with the laws of physics.  
For over 300 years, what that external force is 
at, that attack distance, consistent with her 
body, and that result is on the order of 60 
pounds, if you wanted to pick a typical value. 
Q: 
Now, I want you to look at the defendant over 
there.  Would somebody about that big in height 
be able to exert that kind of outside force? 
A: 
Very easily, sir, yes. 
Q: 
What kind of force would it take to keep the head 
there? 
A: 
Once you've got it down and the body is moving, 
it's easier to keep something moving than it is 
to start it moving.  So once you've got it down, 
you can maintain that force with relatively 
little effort. 
. . . . 
Q: 
I have nothing further.   
And——one question:  Is that to a reasonable 
degree of scientific certainty; that opinion? 
A: 
Yes, sir, it is. 
¶30 The jury convicted Plude of first-degree homicide, and 
he was sentenced to life in prison.  After the verdict, Plude 
discovered that Shaibani had lied on the witness stand, and he 
moved for postconviction relief.10  The circuit court concluded 
that even though the State had stipulated that Shaibani was not 
a clinical professor at Temple University, there was no evidence 
that his false statements "concerning his curriculum vitae made 
his 
opinions 
unreliable, 
therefore, 
no 
prejudice 
to 
the 
                                                 
10 Plude 
states 
that 
he 
discovered 
that 
Shaibani 
misrepresented 
himself when Shaibani attempted to testify 
untruthfully before a North Carolina court. 
No. 2005AP2311-CR 
 
18 
 
defendant has been shown."  The circuit court did not evaluate 
whether a reasonable probability existed that a different result 
would be reached at a new trial if the jury knew that Shaibani 
misrepresented his credentials.  The court of appeals affirmed 
the circuit court's denial of a new trial based on newly-
discovered evidence because it concluded that "Plude intimated 
he 
was 
only 
challenging 
Shaibani's 
credibility, 
not 
his 
qualifications to testify as an expert."  State v. Plude, No. 
2005AP2311-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶28 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 
2007).  Plude petitioned for review, which we granted.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶31 Plude requests a new trial through his contention that 
the 
discovery 
of 
Shaibani's 
misrepresentations 
constitutes 
newly-discovered evidence.  The decision to grant or deny a 
motion for a new trial based on newly-discovered evidence is 
committed to the circuit court's discretion.  State v. Boyce, 75 
Wis. 2d 452, 457, 249 N.W.2d 758 (1977).  A circuit court 
erroneously 
exercises 
its 
discretion 
when 
it 
applies 
an 
incorrect legal standard to newly-discovered evidence.  State v. 
McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d 463, 474, 561 N.W.2d 707 (1997). 
No. 2005AP2311-CR 
 
19 
 
B. 
Newly-Discovered Evidence11 
1. 
General principles 
¶32 In order to set aside a judgment of conviction based 
on newly-discovered evidence, the newly-discovered evidence must 
be sufficient to establish that a defendant's conviction was a 
"manifest injustice."  State v. Krieger, 163 Wis. 2d 241, 255, 
471 N.W.2d 599 (Ct. App. 1991).  When moving for a new trial 
based 
on 
the 
allegation 
of 
newly-discovered 
evidence, 
a 
defendant must prove:  "(1) the evidence was discovered after 
conviction; (2) the defendant was not negligent in seeking the 
evidence; (3) the evidence is material to an issue in the case; 
and (4) the evidence is not merely cumulative."  McCallum, 208 
Wis. 2d at 473.  If the defendant is able to prove all four of 
these criteria, then it must be determined whether a reasonable 
probability exists that had the jury heard the newly-discovered 
evidence, it would have had a reasonable doubt as to the 
defendant's guilt.  Id.   
¶33 "A reasonable probability of a different outcome 
exists if 'there is a reasonable probability that a jury, 
                                                 
11 Based on Shaibani's misrepresentations, Plude seeks to 
have his conviction vacated and a new trial ordered on three 
separate bases:  (1) Shaibani's false testimony violated his 
right to due process of law; (2) Shaibani's testimony is 
incredible as a matter of law; and (3) Shaibani's false 
testimony, which the State acknowledges constitutes newly-
discovered evidence, is such that there is a reasonable 
probability that if a jury heard of Shaibani's misrepresentation 
of his credentials, the outcome at trial would have been 
different.  Because we determine that Plude is entitled to a new 
trial on the last basis, we do not consider his first two 
contentions. 
No. 2005AP2311-CR 
 
20 
 
looking at both the [old evidence] and the [new evidence], would 
have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt.'"  State v. 
Love, 2005 WI 116, ¶44, 284 Wis. 2d 111, 700 N.W.2d 62 (citation 
omitted).  A court reviewing newly-discovered evidence should 
consider whether a jury would find that the newly-discovered 
evidence had a sufficient impact on other evidence presented at 
trial that a jury would have a reasonable doubt as to the 
defendant's guilt.  McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d at 474.  This latter 
determination is a question of law.  See id.  Manifest injustice 
has been shown and a new trial must be ordered when:  (1) the 
four factors of newly-discovered evidence are established; and 
(2) a court determines that had a jury heard the newly-
discovered evidence, it would have had a reasonable doubt as to 
the defendant's guilt.  See Krieger, 163 Wis. 2d at 255. 
2. 
The parties' positions 
¶34 The State concedes that with the revelation that 
Shaibani lied under oath, Plude has satisfied the four criteria 
for proving newly-discovered evidence of the type that may cause 
the ordering of a new trial.  However, the State argues those 
criteria are not sufficient to warrant a new trial here because 
Shaibani's false testimony does not give rise to a reasonable 
probability that a different verdict would have been reached at 
trial.  The State admits that if Shaibani's false testimony 
about his fictitious professorship at Temple University had been 
revealed during Plude's trial, the revelation would have 
unquestionably diminished Shaibani's credibility in the eyes of 
the jury.  However, the State nonetheless argues that Shaibani's 
No. 2005AP2311-CR 
 
21 
 
credibility would not have been tarnished to the degree that the 
jury would have found his testimony unreliable and found Plude 
not guilty, because the evidence marshaled against Plude at 
trial was overwhelming.   
¶35 Plude counters the State's arguments by contending 
that there is a reasonable probability that Shaibani's testimony 
sealed the jury's verdict of guilty.  Plude asserts that it was 
Shaibani's testimony that cast doubt on Plude's descriptions of 
the positions in which he found Genell's body. This was 
significant to Plude's defense that Genell committed suicide by 
a drug overdose.  It was also significant to the State's theory 
that Genell drowned in water from the toilet bowl rather than in 
her own bodily fluid.  Plude asserts that if he had been able to 
impeach Shaibani, three results would have followed:  (1) 
Shaibani's overall credibility as an expert witness would have 
been attacked effectively;12 (2) the methods Shaibani used to 
support his testimony that Genell could not have been found in 
the positions Plude described would have been discredited; and 
(3) Shaibani's conclusion that Genell could not have drowned in 
toilet bowl water unless her head was forced into the toilet 
bowl would have been undermined.  Accordingly, Plude maintains 
that Shaibani's false testimony no doubt affected the jury's 
                                                 
12 Although Plude did not object to Shaibani being admitted 
as an expert at trial, once he discovered that Shaibani lied 
about his teaching post at Temple University, he objected to 
Shaibani's admission as an expert.  In his post-conviction 
motion, Plude argued that Shaibani was no longer qualified to 
testify to the mechanics of the human body. 
No. 2005AP2311-CR 
 
22 
 
verdict because Shaibani played the preeminent role in linking 
Plude to the inculpatory testimony of Dr. Huntington, who opined 
that Genell drowned in toilet bowl water, rather than from 
pulmonary edema.   
3. 
Reasonable probability   
¶36 We conclude that in a trial rife with conflicting and 
inconclusive medical expert testimony about a case the circuit 
court observed was based on "circumstantial evidence," there 
exists a reasonable probability that, had the jury discovered 
that Shaibani lied about his credentials, it would have had a 
reasonable doubt as to Plude's guilt.  Our conclusion is based 
on 
Shaibani's 
testimony 
as 
a 
quasi-medical 
expert 
notwithstanding his lack of a medical education and on the link 
that Shaibani's testimony provided to other critical testimony 
that related to the manner of Genell's death.   
¶37 Shaibani testified that based on his knowledge about 
the mechanics of the human body, Genell's body could not have 
been found in the positions that Plude described and that her 
nose and mouth could not have submerged in toilet bowl water 
without someone forcing her face under the water.  Because 
Shaibani had no medical education where the human body would 
have been studied, he lent support to his opinions about the 
human body by the description of his work as a clinical 
professor at Temple University.  He said that at Temple 
University he taught "physicians and surgeons, fully qualified 
medical doctors, and I teach them about injury [to the body]," 
even though he had no medical degree.  He specifically opined 
No. 2005AP2311-CR 
 
23 
 
that Genell could not have inhaled toilet bowl water on her own; 
that it would have required 60 pounds of pressure, pressure that 
he said Plude "very easily" could have exerted, to the back of 
her head to get her face in the toilet bowl water and keep it 
there.  
¶38 Plude cites Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 
(1972), as support for his position.  However, Giglio was driven 
by a violation of due process, rather than, as here, by newly-
discovered evidence that does not implicate a violation of due 
process.13  However, just as in Giglio, Shaibani's diminished 
credibility as an expert due to his misrepresentation may have 
affected the reliability of his testimony as well because only 
an expert witness could testify as to the opinions he gave.   
¶39 In 
Giglio, 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
reversed 
Giglio's 
conviction for passing forged money orders because the State did 
not disclose that its key witness, a co-conspirator with Giglio, 
was promised immunity in exchange for his testimony.  Id. at 
150-53.  The co-conspirator had testified at trial that he did 
not have an immunity agreement with the government, and the 
prosecuting attorney confirmed this in closing argument.  Id. at 
151.  Even though the prosecuting attorney was unaware that an 
immunity agreement had been made, the court attributed the 
                                                 
13 A defendant's due process rights are violated when the 
newly-discovered evidence is evidence that the government knew 
about, but did not disclose.  Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 
150 (1992); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).   
No. 2005AP2311-CR 
 
24 
 
knowledge of the agreement to the prosecuting attorney.  Id. at 
154.    
¶40 As part of its analysis of whether Giglio should be 
granted a new trial, the Supreme Court observed that a new trial 
is required if there exists a reasonable likelihood that the 
false testimony of a witness affected the judgment of the jury: 
When the "reliability of a given witness may well be 
determinative of guilt or innocence," nondisclosure of 
evidence 
affecting 
credibility 
falls 
within 
this 
general rule.  . . .  A new trial is required if "the 
false 
testimony 
could 
. . . 
in 
any 
reasonable 
likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury." 
Id. at 154 (citations omitted). 
¶41 In much the same way, Shaibani's misrepresentation may 
have been determinative of Plude's guilt or innocence.  For 
example, Dr. Kenneth Sullivan, the emergency room doctor, 
concluded that Genell drowned, and that her drowning could have 
been due to pulmonary edema or to inhalation of toilet bowl 
water.  He did not testify to either possibility to a reasonable 
degree of scientific certainty.  However, Dr. Sullivan concluded 
that the bruise on Genell's neck would have required "some 
force" other than the weight of her head. 
¶42 On the other hand, Dr. Kalelkar, of the Cook County 
Medical Examiner's Office, concluded that Genell died of 
"combined drug intoxication" that led to her drowning in her own 
bodily fluid, i.e., due to pulmonary edema.  He explained that 
the weight of Genell's lungs was consistent with pulmonary 
edema; that the drugs caused her heart rate to slow, which 
caused her lungs to fill with her own bodily fluid.  In contrast 
No. 2005AP2311-CR 
 
25 
 
to Dr. Sullivan, Dr. Kalelkar concluded that there was no 
indication that Genell inhaled any toilet bowl water.  Further, 
he testified that the bruising on her neck resulted from the 
weight of her head resting over the rim of the toilet bowl.  He 
also said that there was no injury to her neck and trachea of 
the type that one would expect to find if her head had been 
forced into the toilet bowl. 
¶43 Meanwhile, 
Dr. 
Huntington, 
the 
pathologist 
who 
performed Genell's autopsy, concluded that the fluid in her 
lungs was inconsistent with pulmonary edema, but he did not 
opine to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty that she 
drowned from inhaling toilet bowl water.  He also concluded that 
she had enough drugs in her body to kill her, as had Dr. 
Kalelkar.  Dr. Huntington's ultimate conclusion was that she 
died of "drug intoxication probably abetted by drowning."  Dr. 
Huntington opined Genell's death was either a suicide or a 
homicide, but he could not say which had occurred.  Moreover, he 
concluded that the bruise on her neck came from "blunt force."  
¶44 Although Ballanco's testimony may be perceived as 
inculpatory because he testified that toilet bowls are designed 
so that one cannot accidentally submerge both the nose and mouth 
under the water, Ballanco also testified that it was possible 
accidentally to submerge the forehead and nose in the water.  
His two conclusions would have been insufficient for the jury to 
convict Plude because they did not rebut Plude's theory that 
Genell drowned as a result of pulmonary edema, rather than as a 
result of forced drowning. 
No. 2005AP2311-CR 
 
26 
 
¶45 The expert medical testimony also does not rule out 
the possibility that Genell drowned as a result of pulmonary 
edema.  Accordingly, Ballanco's testimony, in contrast to 
Shaibani's testimony, does not directly implicate Plude in 
Genell's drowning.  For example, Ballanco said nothing about the 
force necessary to submerge Genell's nose and mouth under the 
water in the toilet bowl, but Shaibani did.  Ballanco also said 
nothing about the credibility of Plude's descriptions of the 
position of Genell's body when he found her, but Shaibani did.  
Ballanco's testimony leaves open the question of whether Genell 
drowned due to pulmonary edema caused by the effect of drugs on 
her bodily functions.  Shaibani's opinion testimony sets out 
facts that cause Plude's credibility to be questioned.  In so 
doing, it raised the probability that forced drowning occurred, 
and by inference, it lowered the probability that drowning due 
to pulmonary edema occurred.     
¶46 In sum, with the exception of Dr. Kalelkar's opinion, 
which was exculpatory of Plude, the medical expert opinions with 
regard to Genell's manner of death were inconclusive.  Dr. 
Kalelkar concluded to a reasonable scientific certainty that 
Genell drowned from pulmonary edema; Dr. Sullivan concluded that 
it was likely, but not a reasonable scientific certainty, that 
Genell drowned from pulmonary edema; Dr. Huntington concluded 
that it was likely, but not a reasonable scientific certainty, 
that Genell drowned from inhaling toilet bowl water.  Shaibani 
affirmed Dr. Huntington's opinion and linked Plude to Genell's 
No. 2005AP2311-CR 
 
27 
 
inhalation 
of 
toilet 
bowl 
water. 
 
Therefore, 
Shaibani's 
testimony was a critical link in the State's case.  
¶47 Wisconsin law has long held that impeaching evidence 
may be enough to warrant a new trial.  Birdsall v. Fraenzel, 154 
Wis. 48, 142 N.W.2d 274 (1913). In commenting on the discovery 
that a trial witness could read and write English after he 
testified to the contrary, we stated:  "It may well be that 
newly discovered evidence impeaching in character might be 
produced so strong as to constitute ground for a new trial; as 
for example where it is shown that the verdict is based on 
perjured evidence."  Id. at 52 (emphasis added). 
¶48 Our conclusion that Shaibani's false testimony about 
his credentials is a significant link to establishing unassisted 
drowning in water from the toilet bowl as a cause of Genell's 
death is distinguishable from the court of appeals' conclusion 
in State v. Sprosty, 2001 WI App 231, 248 Wis. 2d 480, 636 
N.W.2d 213.  In Sprosty, the court of appeals concluded that 
there was no reasonable probability that false testimony by a 
witness, who misrepresented his credentials, would lead to a 
different outcome because the witness maintained his expertise 
in spite of the false testimony and another expert corroborated 
his substantive testimony.  Sprosty, 248 Wis. 2d 480, ¶34.  
Here, Shaibani's credentials were not maintained subsequent to 
his misrepresentation and no expert corroborated his substantive 
testimony.  
¶49 The inconclusive inculpatory medical expert testimony 
at Plude's trial leads us to conclude that Shaibani's quasi-
No. 2005AP2311-CR 
 
28 
 
medical expert testimony creates a reasonable probability that 
the jury hearing of Shaibani's false testimony about his 
credentials would have had a reasonable doubt as to Plude's 
guilt.  The circuit court did not apply the legal standard of 
whether there is a reasonable probability that the jury hearing 
of Shaibani's false testimony would have had a reasonable doubt 
as to Plude's guilt.  Failing to apply the proper legal standard 
is an erroneous exercise of discretion.  McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d 
at 473.  Accordingly, the circuit court erroneously exercised 
its discretion when it did not order a new trial for Plude.14  
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶50 We conclude that the discovery that Shaibani testified 
falsely about his credentials is newly-discovered evidence that 
gives rise to a reasonable probability that had the jury heard 
of Shaibani's misrepresentation about his credentials, it would 
have had a reasonable doubt as to Plude's guilt.  Accordingly, 
we vacate Plude's conviction and remand to the circuit court for 
a new trial.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court. 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 The concurring opinion suggests that our opinion may be 
read to grant a new trial to a defendant as a matter of course 
whenever an expert witness falsely represents his or her 
credentials.  See Justice Ziegler's concurrence, ¶¶90, 97.  We 
do not create such a per se rule. 
No.  2005AP2311-CR.lbb 
 
1 
 
¶51 LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   (concurring).  I join the 
majority opinion.  I write separately because I also agree with 
Justice Ziegler that this matter can be reversed pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 751.06, discretionary reversal, as the real 
controversy has not been fully tried.  I therefore respectfully 
concur. 
 
 
 
No.  2005AP2311-CR.akz 
 
1 
 
¶52 ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND 
ZIEGLER, 
J.   (concurring). 
 
I 
concur with the majority opinion because I cannot condone the 
conduct of an expert who was called to refute the defendant's 
credibility but then that expert falsified his testimony before 
the jury.  In a case such as this, where it is largely 
circumstantial and credibility is critical, a jury should be 
entitled to reach its conclusions based on evidence that is not 
derived from a witness who fabricates his credentials.  Here, a 
serious question exists as to whether the interests of justice 
were served.   
¶53 Even beyond the information known to the circuit court 
about Dr. Shaibani misrepresenting his affiliation with Temple 
University, it has been subsequently alleged that Shaibani was 
not employed at Virginia Tech, never worked for the U.S. 
Department of Justice, never worked for or contracted with the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, never worked for Conemaugh 
Memorial Medical Center, and was never officially recognized as 
the "scientific advisor" for a violent crimes response team in 
Bedford, Virginia.1  These new allegations, coupled with the 
existing misrepresentations by Shaibani presented to the circuit 
court, lead me to the conclusion that the real controversy was 
not fully tried and, thus, reversing in the interest of justice 
is warranted.  
                                                 
1 Plude's counsel sent a letter to the Wisconsin Department 
of Justice (DOJ) in January 2006 alleging these facts.  The 
letter and the DOJ's response is found in the appendix of 
Plude's reply brief, which may be obtained at the Wisconsin 
State Law Library, Madison, Wisconsin.   
No.  2005AP2311-CR.akz 
 
2 
 
¶54 I write separately because I respectfully disagree 
with the majority's conclusion to decide this case on the basis 
of newly-discovered evidence.  I do not believe that the circuit 
court erroneously exercised its discretion, as the majority 
concludes.  I have concerns over the development of the law and 
how the majority's decision squares with existing precedent and 
longstanding jurisprudence.  I am concerned that we are not 
providing clear direction to the users of the courts.  My 
preference would be to remand for a new trial in the interest of 
justice or to remand to the circuit court so it could consider 
whether a 
new trial should be conducted given the new 
allegations of misrepresentations, whether Shaibani would still 
qualify as an expert, and the theory of "newly-discovered 
evidence" advanced by the majority.  Accordingly, I respectfully 
concur.   
I. INTEREST OF JUSTICE 
¶55 I respectfully disagree with the majority's decision 
to decide this case on the theory of newly-discovered evidence.  
Instead, this case should be decided pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 751.06, "Discretionary reversal."  That section provides this 
court with unique, discretionary authority to order a new trial 
when we conclude that the real controversy has not been fully 
tried or when there is a probable miscarriage of justice.  
"[T]he court of appeals, like this court, has broad power of 
discretionary reversal."  Vollmer v. Luety, 156 Wis. 2d 1, 19, 
456 N.W.2d 797 (1990).  When the discretionary reversal power is 
invoked on the grounds that the real controversy has not been 
No.  2005AP2311-CR.akz 
 
3 
 
fully tried, "it is unnecessary for an appellate court to first 
conclude that the outcome would be different on retrial."  Id.  
However, 
under 
the 
newly-discovered 
evidence 
theory, 
the 
majority must, and it does, reach the conclusion that the 
outcome would likely be different.  See majority op., ¶49.  In 
light of the evidence presented at trial, I am not so certain.   
¶56 In this case, Shaibani was called as a witness to 
prove that Plude was not truthful.  Plude described to the 
police how he found his wife slumped over the toilet with her 
face in the toilet bowl.  He gave at least three different 
versions of how he found her, but each account included her face 
being in the toilet.  Dr. Shaibani was called as a witness to 
refute those statements. 
¶57 Shaibani was an important witness because he assisted 
the jury in making an inferential step towards guilt.  Shaibani 
was the only expert who tested Plude's statements of how he 
found Genell, and Shaibani was the only witness who directly 
attacked Plude's credibility.  Simply stated, given the findings 
from Shaibani's injury mechanism analysis testing, Plude's 
statements to the police could not be true.   
¶58 The 
majority 
spends 
much 
time 
discussing 
how 
Shaibani's testimony takes Dr. Huntington's2 testimony that 
                                                 
2 Dr. Huntington testified as the State's pathologist. 
No.  2005AP2311-CR.akz 
 
4 
 
Genell drowned in the toilet bowl a critical step further.3  I 
disagree.  Either Shaibani or Julius Ballanco's4 testimony could 
serve that purpose.  No other witness, however, went to the 
heart of Plude's credibility like Shaibani.  Here, if the jury 
believed Shaibani, the jury could not believe Plude.  Under the 
facts of this case, because Shaibani's testimony was offered to 
tarnish the defendant's credibility and Shaibani lied to the 
jury, the matter was not fully tried.  Shaibani's reprehensible 
misrepresentations lead me to conclude that the real controversy 
was not fully tried, and it is in the interest of justice that 
the matter be retried.   
II. MAJORITY OPINION 
¶59 I believe we should reverse in the interest of 
justice.  The majority, on the other hand, reverses on a theory 
of newly-discovered evidence.  This, however, produces five 
points of concern that preclude me from joining the majority.  
First, I disagree with how the majority opinion views the theory 
of the case, both for the State and the defense.  Second, Plude 
never argued the newly-discovered evidence theory set forth by 
the majority, and thus, the circuit court could not have 
                                                 
3 If we are to weigh the testimony that relates to the 
elements of the offense, we would typically be evaluating the 
sufficiency of the evidence.  Here, in my view, when considering 
the sufficiency of the evidence as to the ultimate question of 
guilt, there was sufficient evidence.  I depart from the 
majority's focus on the idea that Shaibani took Dr. Huntington's 
testimony further as to the theory of involuntary drowning 
because I believe that analysis comes dangerously close to a 
sufficiency of the evidence determination. 
4 Julius Ballanco testified as the State's consulting 
engineer. 
No.  2005AP2311-CR.akz 
 
5 
 
erroneously exercised its discretion.  Third, the newly-
discovered evidence theory does not dictate reversal in this 
case.  Fourth, I do not believe the majority explains why this 
case is different from other cases where an expert lied about 
his or her credentials.  As a result, I believe the majority 
opinion may be viewed as contrary to precedent.  I, however, 
find this case distinguishable from other Wisconsin precedent.  
Fifth, I fear the majority opinion could be viewed as decreasing 
the circuit court's role in evaluating expert testimony. 
A. Theory of the case  
¶60 The majority believes that the State's theory of the 
case was that Plude murdered Genell by poisoning her and then 
drowned her in the toilet bowl water.  See majority op., ¶4.  
The majority opinion thus focuses on Shaibani's testimony as it 
relates to possible forced drowning.  However, the State's 
theory was not that Plude drowned Genell, but rather, that he 
caused her death by giving her an overdose.  The defense's 
theory was that she committed suicide by an overdose.5   
¶61 The 
majority, 
in 
relying 
on 
the 
substance 
of 
Shaibani's testimony to conclude that the jury found Plude 
guilty because he drowned his wife, in my view, misses the 
point.  Shaibani's testimony was only relevant for the purpose 
of attacking Plude's statements to the police.  He was not 
introduced in support of the theory that Plude drowned his wife 
because that was not the State's theory of the case.  If, as the 
                                                 
5 To ascertain the theories of the case, I rely primarily on 
the 
criminal 
complaint, 
opening 
statements, 
and 
closing 
arguments. 
No.  2005AP2311-CR.akz 
 
6 
 
majority does, we assume that the State's theory was not that 
which was charged or argued to the jury, but instead was one of 
forced drowning, then there is other sufficient evidence to 
support drowning.  The jury could have relied on either Shaibani 
or 
Ballanco for that determination.  Even if the jury 
disregarded Shaibani's testimony all together, there still would 
be sufficient evidence upon which to convict.  However, what is 
critical 
here 
is 
the 
fact 
that 
Shaibani 
single-handedly 
destroyed Plude's credibility by explaining to the jury why 
Plude's statements to the police could not be true.  In a case 
such as this, the fact that Shaibani lied to the jury creates 
error. 
¶62 The jury decided that Plude committed first-degree 
intentional homicide of his wife Genell.  Shaibani's testimony 
was offered to rebut Plude's three versions of how he found 
Genell in the bathroom.6  In other words, that testimony was 
offered to attack Plude's credibility.  We know that the 
theories advanced by the parties related to whether Genell 
committed suicide by overdose or whether she was a homicide 
victim who was given a lethal dose of prescription medication.  
We, however, do not know whether the jury decided that Plude 
caused the overdose of his soon to be "separated-from" wife as 
urged by the State, or whether the jury found that he drowned 
her in the toilet, or whether the jury considered a combination 
                                                 
6 The circuit court concluded that Shaibani was utilized by 
the State "to contradict the defendant's inquest testimony that 
[Plude] found [the victim] with her face suspended in the water 
of the toilet bowl, suggesting death by suicide." 
No.  2005AP2311-CR.akz 
 
7 
 
of those acts.  The jury did, nonetheless, conclude that Plude 
was guilty.  
¶63 Because of Shaibani's testimony, the jury, rather than 
requiring the State to meet its burden of proof as to each 
element of the offense charged, may have concluded that since 
Plude cannot be believed, he must be guilty.  However, 
Shaibani's testimony was relevant only as it related to the 
truthfulness of Plude's statements to the police, not as it 
related to a theory of guilt, which was neither forwarded by the 
State nor defended by Plude.  As a result, I must depart from 
the majority's analysis. 
B. Erroneous exercise of discretion   
¶64 We must keep in mind that it is the circuit court that 
presided over this two-week trial and heard nearly 40 witnesses.  
The 
majority, 
however, 
concludes 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously exercised its discretion even though the "newly-
discovered evidence" theory relied on by the majority was not 
presented to the circuit court, and it is not even clearly 
before this court.7  I would not conclude that the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion because the theory relied 
on by the majority today was not squarely before the court, and 
                                                 
7 Plude does not make the argument that the majority relies 
on——neither to the circuit court nor to this court.  In fact, 
Plude does not really assert a newly-discovered evidence theory 
to this court.  Rather, Plude argues that this court should find 
a constitutional violation under Giglio v. United States, 405 
U.S. 150 (1972); however, this court concludes no due process 
violation has occurred.  Plude also argues that this court 
should adopt the Daubert standard, but this is not addressed by 
the majority. 
No.  2005AP2311-CR.akz 
 
8 
 
it never decided the issue.  Rather, Plude argued to the circuit 
court that, in light of Shaibani's misrepresentations, Shaibani 
was no longer qualified as an expert, he was a fraud on the 
court, and Plude argued the outdated doctrine of "falsus in 
uno."8   
¶65 Specifically, Plude argued to the circuit court that 
the newly-discovered evidence rendered Shaibani's testimony 
inadmissible because he was no longer qualified as an expert.  
Plude supported his newly-discovered evidence theory by arguing 
that as a result of Shaibani's misrepresentation, "Shaibani 
[was] not a qualified expert."  Plude asserted: 
[i]n light of the facts surrounding Mr. Shaibani's 
testimony and his false testimony supplied at trial, 
the court must grant a new trial.  
. . . It is within the trial court's discretion 
to determine whether or not a person is qualified as 
an expert.  In re the Commitment of Larry J. Sprosty, 
248 Wis. 2d 480, 636 N.W.2d 213 (Wis. [Ct.] App. 
2003).   
¶66 The circuit court, however, specifically concluded 
that Shaibani, based on his experience, was still a qualified 
expert and stated, "[h]ere, there is no evidence that Dr. 
Shaibani's inaccurate testimony concerning his curriculum vitae 
                                                 
8 Falsus in uno doctrine: 
"'[T]here is an old maxim 'falsus in uno, falsus in 
omnibus' (false in one thing, false in all), which is 
often much overemphasized by counsel, though it is 
recognized by many courts in their charges to the 
jury.  But this is only primitive psychology, and 
should be completely discarded.'"  John H. Wigmore, A 
Students' Textbook of the Law of Evidence 181 (1935). 
Black's Law Dictionary 620 (7th ed. 1999).   
No.  2005AP2311-CR.akz 
 
9 
 
makes his opinions unreliable.  The Court allowed Dr. Shaibani 
to testify because of his experience in the field, prior work in 
this area, education and background, and not because he claimed 
to be a clinical professor at Temple University."  In the State 
of Wisconsin, whether an expert is qualified has always fallen 
squarely within the discretion of the circuit court. 
¶67 The circuit court acknowledged the State's stipulation 
that Shaibani misrepresented his status with Temple University, 
but the court stated, "[h]owever, there has been little else 
argued that Dr. Shaibani did not have the scientific, technical, 
or other knowledge to testify concerning the facts of this case 
that would assist the trier of fact."  The circuit court 
concluded:  
Given 
Dr. 
Shaibani's 
education, 
training, 
teaching background, and knowledge, the [circuit] 
[c]ourt allowed Dr. Shaibani to testify, giving the 
jury the ability, as it must, to judge the value of 
and the credibility of the testimony.  The defense has 
not suggested any facts other than the inaccurate 
curriculum vitae in question that was untrue or 
misleading to the jury. 
¶68 The circuit court then concluded that Plude's reliance 
on Sprosty was misplaced and stated:  
Here, there is no evidence that Dr. Shaibani's 
inaccurate testimony concerning his curriculum vitae 
makes his opinions unreliable.  The [circuit] [c]ourt 
allowed Dr. Shaibani to testify because his experience 
in his field, prior work in the area, education and 
background, and not because he claimed to be a 
clinical professor at Temple University.  No prejudice 
to the defendant has been shown, and I cannot grant a 
new trial based only on the one inaccuracy in Dr. 
Shaibani's curriculum vitae. 
No.  2005AP2311-CR.akz 
 
10 
 
(Emphasis added.)  The circuit court did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion in making these findings, given what it 
knew. 
¶69 In addition to arguing that Shaibani was not qualified 
to be an expert, Plude, relying on Johnson v. Johnson9 and on 
Sprosty, argued that "Shaibani's testimony perpetrated a plain 
case of fraud upon the court, which in itself requires a new 
trial."10  Plude asserted that because Shaibani perpetrated fraud 
upon the court——i.e., he misrepresented his credentials——all of 
his testimony should be discredited.  As stated above, the 
circuit 
court 
disagreed 
and 
concluded 
that 
despite 
the 
misrepresentations, Shaibani was still a qualified expert.  
However, the circuit court, in so ruling, did not know of the 
subsequent allegations that Shaibani had possibly falsified 
other qualifications. 
¶70 Plude also argued to the circuit court that because 
Shaibani lied about one thing, he should be deemed to have lied 
about all things——i.e., he argued "falsus in uno."  In Plude's 
                                                 
9 Johnson 
v. 
Johnson, 
157 
Wis. 2d 490, 
497-98, 
460 
N.W.2d 166 (Ct. App. 1990). 
10 Plude argued fraud upon the court based upon what he 
asserted as (1) the State being constructively aware that 
Shaibani would give "expert testimony about something he really 
did not know about"; (2) the court relied on Shaibani's title to 
qualify him; and (3) the court relied upon Shaibani's testimony 
because no comparable witness existed.  
No.  2005AP2311-CR.akz 
 
11 
 
post-conviction brief dated March 14, 2005,11 he asserted that 
the jury's verdict should be set aside because "[n]ewly 
discovered evidence shows that the State's sole expert witness, 
Mr. Shaibani, testified in falsus in uno," i.e., false in one 
thing, false in all.  Plude asserted this doctrine, even though 
the 
doctrine 
is 
outdated 
and 
its 
use 
has 
been 
highly 
criticized.12  
¶71 The majority's decision today, may appear to revive 
the doctrine of "falsus in uno"——false in one thing, false in 
all——despite the fact that the doctrine fell out of favor long 
ago.  See Falsus in Uno Wis JI——Criminal 305, Comment (stating 
that this instruction is not favored); see also Black's Law 
Dictionary 620 (7th ed. 1999) (citing to John H. Wigmore, A 
Students' Textbook of the Law of Evidence 181 (1935) (stating 
that the doctrine should be completely discarded)).  I do not 
believe that it is this court's intent to revive the doctrine by 
its decision today, and I conclude that this doctrine should 
have no impact in this case. 
¶72 In sum, I respectfully disagree with the majority's 
determination that the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
                                                 
11 He asserted three reasons to set aside the verdict, but 
this court has decided this case based on a newly-discovered 
evidence theory.  Plude also alleged a discovery violation, and 
he alleged that when the circuit court ruled that the cause of 
death was an overdose, it ruled as a matter of law that the 
State failed to carry its burden.   
12  See Falsus in Uno Wis JI——Criminal 305, which states "USE 
OF THIS INSTRUCTION IS NOT FAVORED."  See id. Comment (stating 
that "this instruction should not be routinely given" and is 
only appropriate where there is a sufficient evidentiary basis 
to show "there was willful false swearing"). 
No.  2005AP2311-CR.akz 
 
12 
 
discretion when considering the arguments.  The circuit court 
should not be required to search for arguments that are not 
presented, especially when competent counsel represents the 
defendant.  In an oral decision on August 9, 2005, and a written 
memorialization of that oral decision filed on August 26, 2005, 
the circuit court properly exercised its discretion when 
considering the issues before it and the allegations made at 
that time.  At the oral decision, the circuit court stated, "I 
would, [] note that at times [the] defendant used a shotgun 
approach for relief.  I find only the three arguments addressed 
by the Court that were fully developed for review.  I reject any 
other arguments not fully developed for review."   
¶73 Today the majority concludes that the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion because "[t]he circuit 
court did not evaluate whether a reasonable probability existed 
that a different result would be reached at a new trial if the 
jury knew Shaibani misrepresented his credentials."13  Majority 
op., ¶¶30, 49.  However, the circuit court did not consider 
whether a jury would come to a different result had it known 
Shaibani misrepresented his credentials because Plude never 
                                                 
13 It should be noted that generally in a case where a 
defendant was denied an opportunity to impeach a witness because 
the impeaching information was unknown at the time of trial, the 
witness in question is likely going to testify at the retrial.  
Thus, the defendant will have an opportunity to impeach that 
witness and the jury can properly consider the witness's 
testimony and the impeaching information.  However, in the case 
at hand, Shaibani likely will not even testify at a subsequent 
trial because his testimony was unnecessary in light of 
Ballanco's testimony.  
No.  2005AP2311-CR.akz 
 
13 
 
argued that to the circuit court.  Thus, I depart from the 
majority and conclude that the circuit court did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion. 
C. Newly-discovered evidence theory does not dictate reversal in 
this case 
¶74 The majority concludes that if Plude knew that 
Shaibani was misrepresenting his status at Temple University, 
Plude 
could 
have 
impeached 
Shaibani 
and 
discredited 
his 
testimony, which, in the eyes of this court, gives rise to "a 
reasonable probability that a jury hearing of Shaibani's false 
testimony under oath would reach a different result."  See 
majority op., ¶¶35, 37, 40, 46.  However, even assuming that 
Shaibani was impeached and the jury disregarded everything he 
had to say, the jury would then have been in a position to weigh 
the remaining testimony against Plude's defense of how he came 
to find Genell, slumped over, face in the toilet, and that she 
committed suicide by overdose.  How does the majority conclude 
that there would have been a different result with respect to 
the theory of the case advanced by the parties——Plude overdosed 
Genell?  Why does the majority not engage in a sufficiency of 
the evidence analysis?  From the decision today, it is unclear 
when 
a 
court 
should 
apply 
the 
newly-discovered 
evidence 
analysis, a Sprosty analysis, or a sufficiency of the evidence 
analysis.  
¶75 In 
addition, 
what 
impact 
this 
newly-discovered 
evidence may have at a new trial calls for speculation.  Unlike 
most "newly-discovered evidence," where the new evidence would 
No.  2005AP2311-CR.akz 
 
14 
 
be introduced at a subsequent trial,14 or go to an element of the 
offense, there is absolutely no assurance that Shaibani will 
testify at the new trial or that his misstatements will have any 
bearing on a new trial.  Typically, newly-discovered evidence 
would have significant impact at a new trial.  Here, however, 
the State could hire a new expert.  The State may just conclude 
that Shaibani's testimony was cumulative and unnecessary.  The 
State may decide it will not call someone who lied under oath.  
Clearly, the State had no idea that Shaibani presented false 
testimony until after the trial.  Thus, the "newly-discovered 
evidence" here is really stale, impeachment evidence, which is 
not likely to be introduced at a new trial.  The impact of this 
                                                 
14 See, e.g., State v. Clarke, 36 Wis. 2d 263, 279, 153 
N.W.2d 61 (1967) (newly discovered testimony from a janitor that 
defendant was not the man he saw at the scene not sufficient to 
award a new trial because no reason to believe that the jury 
would have accorded more weight to janitor's testimony than that 
of the other eye witnesses); State v. Chabonian, 50 Wis. 2d 574, 
584-85, 185 N.W.2d 289 (1971) (newly discovered evidence of the 
presence of an ornament in defendant's store, which would 
disprove his testimony that he never saw the missing ornament, 
not enough to warrant a new trial because a different result 
upon retrial not likely); State v. Boyce, 75 Wis. 2d 452, 457-
63, 249 N.W.2d 758 (1977) (in theft by fraud prosecution, court 
did not abuse its discretion because the court concluded that 
expert testimony regarding handwriting analysis would not change 
the outcome of the trial); State v. Bembenek, 140 Wis. 2d 248, 
251-58, 409 N.W.2d 432 (Ct. App. 1987) (polygraph examination 
that showed the defendant did not murder the victim would not be 
admissible at trial, so it does not constitute "newly discovered 
evidence" and jail-house confession also not admissible at trial 
so not type of "newly discovered evidence" that warrants a new 
trial); State v. Eckert, 203 Wis. 2d 497, 515-17, 553 N.W.2d 539 
(Ct. App. 1996) (newly discovered eyewitness testimony as to 
defendant's whereabouts during homicide does not warrant a new 
trial because unlikely that it would lead to a different 
result).  
No.  2005AP2311-CR.akz 
 
15 
 
newly-discovered evidence at a new trial is speculative at best.  
On the other hand, the impact of Shaibani's testimony at the 
trial here, where it directly gutted Plude's credibility, is 
significant and quantifiable.  If the jury believed Shaibani's 
injury mechanism analysis, they could not believe Plude. 
¶76 Moreover, in order for evidence to qualify as "newly-
discovered evidence," it must not be cumulative.  To the extent 
that Shaibani's testimony relates to a likelihood of accidental 
drowning in the toilet, his testimony is cumulative because 
another expert witness, Julius Ballanco, essentially testified 
to the same information.  In short, Shaibani's testimony is 
cumulative to that of Ballanco with respect to taking Dr. 
Huntington's testimony a step further.15  
¶77 Specifically, Shaibani was not and is not a necessary 
trial witness because Ballanco testified at trial that a victim 
could not drown in a toilet without another person forcing the 
victim's face into the water.  Therefore, even excluding 
Shaibani's testimony, a reasonable jury could still reach the 
same conclusion.   
¶78 Moreover, Shaibani's testimony should be placed in 
context.  The State's case-in-chief consisted of nine days of 
testimony beginning on December 3, 2002, and continued through 
three-quarters of the day on December 11, 2002.  Shaibani 
testified on December 11, 2002, and, based on time stamps in the 
transcript, it likely encompassed less than two hours of 
                                                 
15 The State concedes that Dr. Shaibani is not cumulative.  
However, the State——in my view——inappropriately concedes that 
the newly-discovered evidence in this case was not cumulative.  
No.  2005AP2311-CR.akz 
 
16 
 
testimony; his testimony consisted of approximately 63 pages out 
of approximately 1,479 pages of trial testimony, not excluding 
discussions outside of the presence of the jury included in the 
transcripts.  Shaibani was one of 35 witnesses that appeared 
during the State's case-in-chief, let alone the defense case.  
Shaibani was also briefly called during rebuttal in order to 
contradict the defense's expert in biomedical engineering, but 
this consisted of less than 30 pages of trial transcript.       
¶79 As the court of appeals concluded, "there were 
multiple other pieces of evidence that would support Plude's 
conviction, 
diminishing 
any 
likelihood 
Shaibani's 
misrepresentation could have affected the jury's judgment."16 
                                                 
16 The court of appeals wrote: 
For example, Plude gave varying descriptions of the 
position in which he found Genell's body.  Genell had 
an internal bruise on her neck, sustained while she 
was still alive, that could not be explained by CPR 
but was consistent with her neck being forced against 
the toilet rim. 
Moreover, a "consulting engineer" who specialized 
in plumbing testified that the particular toilet in 
question is designed to prevent accidental drowning 
and that he knew of no case where an adult drowned in 
a toilet bowl absent force.  He also estimated the 
volume of water displaced from the bowl.  Because it 
contained vomit, it was evident the toilet had not 
been 
flushed, 
but 
the 
approximate 
one 
pint 
of 
displaced 
water was not explained by vomiting--
something more forceful had to have caused the 
displacement.  [State's] expert testified that, based 
on Plude's first version of how he found Genell, she 
could not have had her mouth and nose in the water. 
Genell had planned to have her mother pick her up 
on the day of her death and was going to return with 
her mother to Minnesota.  From there, Genell had 
planned to move to Texas.  Her coworkers testified she 
No.  2005AP2311-CR.akz 
 
17 
 
¶80 In many ways, the majority decision today looks like 
it should undertake a sufficiency of the evidence analysis.  
Typically, when evaluating evidence as it relates to the 
ultimate conclusion of guilt, the court will look to see if 
there is other evidence to support the verdict.  Here, the 
majority determines that Shaibani's testimony furthered the 
testimony of the State's pathologist, Dr. Huntington, as to the 
ultimate question of guilt.  The majority reasons that if the 
jury knew of Shaibani's false credentials, the jury may not have 
convicted Plude.  However, I am not so certain.  Dr. Huntington 
did testify that it was more likely than not that the fluid in 
the victim's lungs came from the toilet bowl rather than from 
pulmonary edema.  Majority op., ¶20.  Shaibani did testify that 
                                                                                                                                                             
was looking forward to a new life and had been 
secretly saving money for the move. 
Plude exhibited unusual behavior the day of 
Genell's death.  He evidently said to her, "I told you 
not to leave me."  He then checked with her supervisor 
about her last paycheck and insurance policy and later 
insisted that Genell be cremated immediately. 
The crime scene was also quite clean despite 
approximately forty capsules of Fioricet having been 
opened.  Genell's thumbprint was on only one capsule 
and the pill bottle.  Plude's fingerprints were 
nowhere, despite his having used the Fioricet before. 
Further, the computer searches that Plude claims 
are exculpatory are only minimally so.  Whoever 
performed 
the 
search 
on 
Genell's 
computer 
only 
examined the first page of various results--no page 
with dosing information was ever displayed on the 
computer.  
State v. Plude, No. 2005AP2311-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶¶46-51 
(Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2007).  
No.  2005AP2311-CR.akz 
 
18 
 
"his experiments indicated to a reasonable degree of scientific 
certainty that Genell could not have inhaled toilet bowl water 
on her own," but rather that it would take 60 pounds of pressure 
to the back of Genell's head in order to get her face in the 
water and keep it there.  Majority op., ¶25.  Shaibani also 
testified that the laws of physics would not allow Genell to 
keep her face in the water without someone else forcing her face 
into the water.  In other words, the testimony supported the 
notion that without assistance, the laws of physics would pull 
the unconscious person's head out of the toilet bowl and 
therefore, prevent drowning.  This testimony, however, does not 
stand alone or unsupported. 
¶81 If one could conclude that Shaibani's testimony took 
Dr. Huntington's testimony further and drove the conviction 
here, one could equally determine that it was the testimony of 
Ballanco that took Dr. Huntington's testimony further and drove 
the conviction.  The record reveals sufficient evidence on that 
point.  Like Shaibani, Ballanco testified that toilets are 
No.  2005AP2311-CR.akz 
 
19 
 
designed in such a way that a person cannot drown in a toilet 
unless someone else forces his or her face into the water.17  
¶82 When asked whether drowning was a concern for the 
plumbing industry, Ballanco testified that it was a major 
concern.  Ballanco stated: 
Yes, drowning is.  One of, one of the things that 
we [are] always evaluating is any time that you have a 
body of water there is potential for drowning.  And 
one of the concerns with drowning is two fold.  Small 
children, especially babies and also, [] we call the 
bar 
lounge 
outrageous 
restaurant 
phenomena 
where 
people tend to vomit in the water closet.  And we 
don't want them to go in to vomit and then drown in 
the water closet if they passed out. 
¶83 With regard to the particular model of toilet in this 
case, Ballanco testified that he was familiar with this toilet.  
He stated, "Yes, that is a Mansfield water closet.  Mansfield is 
based in Ohio.  Their chief engineer is a good friend, Burt 
Preston."  Ballanco inspected this particular toilet and 
testified that this toilet, including the water level, was in 
                                                 
17 Julius Ballanco graduated from Stevens Institute of 
Technology with a degree in mechanical engineering fluid flow 
heat and power.  He is a registered professional engineer in six 
states, holds a master plumbers license, teaches training 
programs across the country regarding codes and standards, and 
teaches 
plumbing 
engineering 
basics 
and 
advance 
plumbing 
engineering 
at 
Howlin 
Washington 
College. 
 
Mr. 
Ballanco 
participates in the design and development of toilets, has 
conducted extensive research regarding plumbing fixtures and 
safety of toilets, and serves on a number of committees such as 
those charged with developing new standards for toilets, 
regulating water quality, and regulating plastic pipes and 
fittings used in plumbing.  In addition, Mr. Ballanco has been a 
guest speaker at the world plumbing conference, publishes 
columns every month for "PM Magazine," (plumbing and mechanical) 
and "PM Engineer" and has written seven books including 
"Ballanco on Plumbing."   
No.  2005AP2311-CR.akz 
 
20 
 
compliance with all standards.  In short, the toilet was working 
properly.   
¶84 When asked whether this "bowl [was] designed to 
prevent both nose and mouth emersion [], without contortion," 
Ballanco testified: 
It is not specifically designed.  It is [a] 
secondary effect of the design so that the mouth and 
nose cannot come in contact if someone passes out.  It 
is just the nature of how the bowl came into being.  
It is something that we look at.  But, actually, it 
was because of other factors that, you know, that you 
get secondary effects from the primary design factors.  
The prosecutor then asked: 
 
Well, let's talk about that.  If that person were 
to go unconscious, lets assume that person is a female 
between-—approximately 
the 
age 
28, 
weighed 
approximately 110 to 140 pounds, five foot eight in 
height, would it be possible for parts of that 
person's head or face, okay, to fall into the water 
and remain in that position unassisted? 
[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]: 
Objection 
[as 
to 
the 
unassisted part]. . . . 
 
[THE COURT]: Yes, sustained. 
 
[THE PROSECUTOR]: Having-—removing the unassisted 
part of that hypothetical, could you give us an 
opinion to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty 
whether that could occur? 
 
[MR. BALLANCO]: One could, if one passed out they 
could get their forehead and nose under water. 
 
[THE PROSECUTOR]: Okay. 
 
[MR. BALLANCO]: Not their mouth. 
 
[THE PROSECUTOR]: Not their mouth? 
 
[MR. BALLANCO]: Right. 
No.  2005AP2311-CR.akz 
 
21 
 
¶85 The prosecutor subsequently asked Ballanco whether he 
had knowledge of "a single case of a person with [] their face 
suspended in the water of a water closet."  Ballanco replied, 
"None."  However, Ballanco did testify that there are cases in 
which someone has drowned in a toilet.  He testified: 
[T]he typical cases we have are small children, babies 
falling in and drowning. 
 . . . .  
Well, it happens when the bowl is not properly 
protected.  And children do strange things. . . . They 
have a small enough body that they can fully submerge 
themselves.  They don't have the shoulder width to 
block them out. . . . 
¶86 However, when Ballanco was asked if he was aware of 
any adult cases of drowning, Ballanco testified that he was not 
aware of any adult drowning cases.  The prosecutor then asked 
Ballanco if he was aware of any adult drowning cases where force 
was used.  Ballanco replied, "Yes."  He testified: "[w]ell, 
unfortunately, there have been instances of somebody's head 
being held into the water closet and them drowning."  The 
prosecutor then inquired what would be required for someone to 
drown in this toilet by use of force.  Ballanco answered, "if 
you held the head and put enough force behind, and of course you 
would have to hold it in place all the way down in the water, 
you can get the head completely submerged in water and the nose 
and mouth completely covered." (Emphasis added.) 
¶87 The prosecutor then asked Ballanco, through a series 
of questions, whether this particular toilet contained a device 
No.  2005AP2311-CR.akz 
 
22 
 
known as a "trap."  Ballanco replied that this toilet does have 
a "trap" and he explained: 
If you put a mass in the bowl or in any trap, 
what happens is that you're exerting a force and water 
being a fluid it will move on both sides.  And once 
you put a mass in there the water will start to flow 
over the weir of the trap on the opposite side.  And 
that will in effect lower the water level in the trap 
when the mass is removed. 
The prosecutor then showed a crime scene photo of the toilet to 
Ballanco, which Ballanco had also viewed in preparation for his 
testimony, and the prosecutor asked if there was anything about 
this "photograph in relation to water displacement."  Ballanco 
testified: 
[W]hat I noticed is, if you look at that photograph, 
there is a mark in the water or on the tank on the 
bowl, excuse me, and in the back of the bowl.  That 
would indicate the normal water level.  Because what 
happens is the water leaves that in an unclean bowl, 
actually starts to form a line.  And most people 
understand that they experience that in their life.   
Um, what you see on this bowl is the water, 
itself, in the bowl is, I estimate, approximately a 
quarter of an inch below that level.  So the water 
level had dropped. 
Ballanco then testified to a reasonable degree of scientific 
certainty that approximately 16 ounces of water had been 
displaced from the toilet. 
¶88 Accordingly, regardless of whether the laws of physics 
will allow someone's head to remain inside the toilet once 
unconscious, a person still could not drown in a toilet because 
the toilet design precludes drowning unless force is used.  If 
Shaibani's credentials were discredited at trial, the parties or 
the court could have asked the jury to disregard his testimony 
No.  2005AP2311-CR.akz 
 
23 
 
entirely.  However, the State still could have secured a 
conviction, if drowning was its theory based upon Mr. Ballanco's 
testimony and Dr. Huntington's testimony.     
¶89 One could easily conclude that Shaibani's testimony 
regarding 
forced 
drowning 
was 
not 
useful 
at 
all, 
given 
Ballanco's testimony that the toilet bowl design prevents 
drowning absent another person forcing a victim's face into the 
water.  However, it is Shaibani's testimony regarding injury 
mechanism analysis that picked apart the credibility of Plude's 
statement to the police and the jury did not know that Shaibani 
had lied to them.  The relevancy of Shaibani's testimony most 
directly bears on Plude's credibility, rather than on the theory 
of conviction, and on that score, it is not cumulative. 
D. Precedent governing a deceitful expert 
¶90 While misrepresenting one's credentials is extremely 
troubling, decisions from appellate courts in this state and 
others have not automatically ordered a new trial upon the 
discovery that an expert falsified his or her credentials.  If 
this precedent is to change in this state, we should clearly 
articulate the rule of law.  I point out that this decision may 
be viewed as contrary to precedent and could create confusion to 
the lower courts, which must apply the analysis.   
¶91 I would distinguish this case from other Wisconsin 
precedent because Shaibani was not called to testify about 
evidence that established an element of the offense.  Rather, he 
was called to refute the credibility of the statements that 
Plude gave to the police.  How do we know that?  The theory of 
No.  2005AP2311-CR.akz 
 
24 
 
the State's case was based on whether Plude caused Genell to 
overdose, and the defense's theory was that she overdosed on her 
own; the fundamental issue was not whether she drowned.  The 
fluid in her lungs was apparently never even tested.  Why not?  
Presumably, it was not tested because the State's theory was not 
that she drowned, but rather, that she was administered an 
overdose by Plude.  
¶92 The sufficiency of the evidence, however, is not 
discussed by the majority.  The majority leaves uncertainty as 
to when a court should engage in a newly-discovered evidence 
analysis, instead of a sufficiency of the evidence analysis.  
When should a court undertake the analysis of Sprosty?  We 
cannot be sure.  Instead, the majority relies on a newly-
discovered evidence theory, as it relates to a theory not 
advanced by the parties.  Without clearly explaining why, and in 
so doing, it transcends Shaibani's testimony from that which 
related to Plude's credibility, to that which dictated a finding 
of guilt by forced drowning.  If the majority concludes that 
Shaibani's testimony relates to an element of the offense, it 
ought to also discuss sufficiency of the evidence.  To me, it is 
because Shaibani's testimony was a direct attack of Plude's 
truthfulness, in this circumstantial case where credibility was 
critical, that the sufficiency of the evidence analysis does not 
save the verdict.  Simply stated, unlike in Sprosty, other 
sufficient evidence as to the elements of the offense do not 
reinstate the defendant's credibility.   
No.  2005AP2311-CR.akz 
 
25 
 
¶93 In Sprosty, our court of appeals concluded that even 
though the State's expert had given inaccurate testimony 
regarding his job titles and the length of time that he held a 
particular job, reversal of the commitment order was not 
required.  In re Commitment of Sprosty, 2001 WI App 231, ¶¶27-
33, 248 Wis. 2d 480, 636 N.W.2d 213.  The expert testified about 
sexually violent persons and whether Sprosty should be placed on 
supervised release.  Id., ¶¶10, 28.  Sprosty argued that the 
expert:  
(1) lied about his credentials, which was contrary to 
the ethical standards of the American Psychological 
Association, and had been terminated from his current 
position 
because 
of 
it; 
(2) 
lied 
about 
the 
circumstances 
surrounding 
his 
termination 
from 
a 
former job; (3) altered two Wis. Stat. ch. 980 
reexamination reports (unrelated to Sprosty) without 
knowledge of the original authors; and (4) made an 
unauthorized deposit of state money. 
Id., ¶31.   
¶94 Nonetheless, the court of appeals concluded that the 
expert was still qualified and that his testimony was not 
incredible as a matter of law.  Id., ¶32.  The court reasoned 
that the misrepresentations did not undermine the expert's basic 
qualifications to give an expert opinion, and moreover, his 
opinion was corroborated by another expert.  Id.  Accordingly, 
the commitment order was upheld.  In other words, even though 
the expert's credentials were inaccurate, that was not enough to 
require a new trial in Sprosty. 
No.  2005AP2311-CR.akz 
 
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¶95 Similarly, in Ricco v. Riva, the court of appeals 
concluded that even though the expert misrepresented his 
credentials, his testimony was not incredible as a matter of 
law.  Ricco v. Riva, 2003 WI App 182, ¶¶13-17, 266 Wis. 2d 696, 
669 N.W.2d 193.  The expert improperly referred to himself as a 
"Master Home Inspector" and that he was a graduate of the 
Milwaukee School of Engineering.  Id., ¶5.  The expert testimony 
was used to establish that the homeowners knew or should have 
known that there was a defect.  Id., ¶7.  The court stated, 
while the expert's "claims regarding some of his credentials are 
suspect and likely untrue," he was still a qualified expert 
because he was a "'licensed home and building inspector,' who 
has 'inspected thousands of homes in the Milwaukee area,' and [] 
he is 'familiar with construction standards, building defects, 
and problems relating to home construction.'"  Id., ¶16.   
¶96 The court of appeals concluded that "[i]f the more 
aggravated conduct in Sprosty did not warrant striking the 
expert witness's testimony, it surely follows that the conduct 
in this case does not warrant that sanction."  Id.  The court of 
appeals reasoned:  
We 
share 
the 
trial 
court's 
concerns 
about 
[expert] Wantz playing fast and loose with his 
qualifications.  But we part ways with the trial court 
on its holding that Wantz's specious claims about his 
credentials render his testimony incredible as a 
matter of law.  In order to make that statement, we 
would have to hold that Wantz's testimony would be in 
conflict with the uniform course of nature or with 
fully established or conceded facts.  Wantz's inflated 
estimation of himself and his credentials, while 
obnoxious to us, does not satisfy this test.  The 
weight and credibility to be given to the opinions of 
No.  2005AP2311-CR.akz 
 
27 
 
expert witnesses are uniquely within the province of 
the 
fact 
finder. 
Here, 
as 
in 
Sprosty, 
Wantz's 
misleading 
testimony 
as 
to 
certain 
of 
his 
qualifications does not render his opinion as to 
defects in the Riccos' property incredible as a matter 
of law.  
Id., ¶17 (citations omitted).  Again, despite an expert making 
untrue representations as to his qualifications, the court of 
appeals did not reverse.   
No.  2005AP2311-CR.akz 
 
28 
 
¶97 Precedent outside of Wisconsin has been consistent 
with Sprosty and Ricco.18  Accordingly, appellate courts in this 
                                                 
18 State v. Glouser, 226 N.W.2d 328, 331-32 (Neb. 1975) 
(concluding that the newly discovered evidence that the expert 
lied about his degree and training was not sufficient to 
establish that a different result would have occurred if the 
expert could have been discredited; the expert was still a 
qualified expert); Stevenson v. State, 473 A.2d 450, 451, 453 
(Md. 1984) (concluding that even though newly discovered 
evidence established that the expert lied about graduating from 
the Illinois School of Technology, his false testimony was not 
material to the outcome of the case because the evidence of 
guilt was overwhelming and thus the conviction was upheld); 
People v. Yoli, 541 N.Y.S.2d 609 (A.D.2d 1989) (concluding that 
even though newly discovered evidence established that the 
expert lied about his credentials in other trials, a new trial 
was not warranted because the testimony was cumulative, would 
have only impeached the credibility of the witness, and he did 
not falsify his credentials in this case); People v. Irvin, 580 
N.Y.S.2d 388, 389-90 (A.D.2d 1992) (concluding that no reason to 
vacate judgment even though the expert, who linked the saliva 
and 
semen 
to 
the 
defendant, 
lied 
about 
his 
educational 
background; there was overwhelming evidence of the defendant's 
guilt and the forensic evidence was merely cumulative and 
inconsequential); Correll v. State, 698 So. 2d 522, 525 (Fla. 
1997) (newly discovered evidence that blood spatter expert 
misstated her credentials was purely collateral because even if 
her credentials were diminished, she still would have qualified 
as an expert); People v. Drake, 684 N.Y.S.2d 102 (A.D.4th 1998) 
(concluding 
that 
even 
though 
newly 
discovered 
evidence 
established that the expert lied about his credentials, there is 
no reasonable probability that the verdict would have been 
different had the evidence been available to the defendant and 
used to impeach the expert); Howard v. State, 945 So. 2d 326, 
370-71 (Miss. 2006) (concluding no reasonable likelihood that 
the false statements made by the expert affected the judgment of 
the 
jury 
because 
the 
statements 
concerned 
the 
expert's 
background and competence as an expert and were not to his 
ultimate conclusions that the defendant's dental molds matched 
the bite marks on the victim); United States v. Price, 357 
F. Supp. 2d 63, 68-69 (D.D.C. 2004) (concluding that even though 
the detective lied when stated he was a board certified 
pharmacist, the § 2255 motion was denied because his testimony 
was based on his experience with the street narcotics trade 
rather than experience potentially gained as a pharmacist). 
No.  2005AP2311-CR.akz 
 
29 
 
state 
and 
others, 
as well as federal courts, have not 
automatically reversed convictions or orders because an expert 
witness misrepresents his or her credentials, especially when 
the expert's testimony is corroborated by other evidence.  If 
this 
precedent 
is 
to 
change, 
this 
court 
should 
clearly 
articulate the new rule of law. 
E. Circuit court's role in evaluating expert testimony 
¶98 The majority's decision today may seem to call into 
question 
the 
circuit 
court's 
role 
in 
evaluating 
expert 
testimony.  The majority opinion essentially concludes that 
Shaibani cannot be deemed an expert——despite the fact that the 
circuit court decided that he still was an expert.  In this 
state, circuit court judges have always been vested with great 
discretion 
in 
determining 
the 
admissibility 
of 
expert 
testimony.19  If we are adopting a standard more consistent with 
Daubert,20 which focuses on the reliability of an expert, instead 
of the circuit court's gatekeeper function in determining 
relevancy, we should so specifically state.  I write to point 
out that the majority's decision may appear to diminish a 
circuit court judge's discretionary authority to decide the 
admissibility of expert testimony.    
                                                 
19 For a thorough treatment of expert testimony in the state 
of Wisconsin and a consideration of the Daubert standard, see 7 
Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin Evidence §§ 702.1-702.4 (West Supp. 
2007); id. at § 702.3 (discussing the Daubert standard); see 
also Daniel D. Blinka, Expert Testimony and the Relevancy Rule 
in the Age of Daubert, 90 Marq. L. Rev. 173 (2006). 
20 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 
(1993). 
No.  2005AP2311-CR.akz 
 
30 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
¶99 An expert who misrepresents his or her credentials is 
reprehensible, and I do not condone such behavior.  This concern 
is particularly valid when that expert's purpose is to defeat 
the credibility of a defendant in a circumstantial case wherein 
credibility is critical.  If Shaibani had not lied, this case 
would not be on review at the supreme court and justice would 
not be delayed or denied.  Here, the majority points out that 
Plude may not have received a fair trial because a critical 
witness lied.  I am not so convinced that this witness was 
critical to any element of the offense, but once he was 
introduced as a witness to attack Plude's credibility, his lies 
became critical.   
¶100 Fairness is fundamental to our system of justice.  
While I concur with this court's result, I do so pointing out 
that this decision potentially conflicts with precedent and 
longstanding jurisprudence.  I do not conclude that the circuit 
court erroneously exercised its discretion; rather, it applied 
the law to the known facts and the arguments.  I am concerned 
that the majority decision convolutes the distinction between an 
expert who testifies about an element of the offense versus an 
expert who is called to refute the defendant's credibility.  The 
decision today does not provide clear direction as to how a 
court should analyze this issue in the future.  Clearly the 
misrepresentation of an expert's credentials is extremely 
troubling, but decisions from appellate courts in this state and 
others have not automatically reversed a conviction upon the 
No.  2005AP2311-CR.akz 
 
31 
 
discovery that an expert falsified his or her credentials——even 
if that witness was important to the trial and especially when 
that testimony is corroborated by other evidence.   
¶101 While I join in the decision today because of the 
egregious behavior of this expert, who was directly called to 
rebut the credibility of the defendant, I point out that the 
majority opinion may create uncertainty in its application.   
¶102 Accordingly, I respectfully concur. 
No.  2005AP2311-CR.akz 
 
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