Title: Commonwealth v. Fisher
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13340
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: September 20, 2023

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13340 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DERRELL FISHER. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     May 5, 2023. - September 20, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Cypher, Kafker, & Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Felony-Murder Rule.  Constitutional Law, Admissions 
and confessions, Voluntariness of statement.  Evidence, 
Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement, 
Opinion, Identification.  Jury and Jurors.  Practice, 
Criminal, Capital case, Motion to suppress, Admissions and 
confessions, Voluntariness of statement, Jury and jurors, 
Question by jury, Instructions to jury, Argument by 
prosecutor. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on September 15, 2015. 
 
 
Pretrial motions to suppress evidence were heard by Kenneth 
J. Fishman, J., and the cases were tried before Bruce R. Henry, 
J. 
 
 
Chauncey Wood (Caroline Alpert & Danya Fullerton also 
present) for the defendant. 
Christa Elliott, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
Caitlin Glass & Joshua M. Daniels, for Boston University 
Center for Antiracist Research & others, amici curiae, submitted 
a brief. 
2 
 
Anton Robinson, Daniel B. Goldman, & Steven Rivera, of New 
York, & Radha Natarajan, for New England Innocence Project & 
another, amici curiae, submitted a brief.  
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  From the night of July 1, 2015, to the early 
hours of the morning on July 2, Derrell Fisher, the defendant, 
and Epshod Jeune, his codefendant,1 engaged in a scheme to rob 
women they found advertising sexual services on a website 
(Backpage).  After one successful robbery of a victim at a 
Woburn hotel, the defendant and Jeune traveled to a second hotel 
in Burlington (Burlington hotel), where a second victim was shot 
after she began to scream for help.  The defendant was convicted 
of murder in the first degree based on a theory of felony-
murder, among other charges. 
On appeal, the defendant argues that his motion to suppress 
was denied erroneously; the judge erred in dismissing two jurors 
from the venire; a police officer improperly identified the 
defendant in a video recording at trial, which was exacerbated 
by the prosecutor's statements and the judge's instructions; the 
evidence was insufficient for his murder conviction; the judge's 
instructions to the jury in response to a question regarding 
third prong malice was incorrect; and the prosecutor's closing 
argument misstated the evidence.  For these claimed errors, the 
defendant requests that the court reduce his verdict pursuant to 
 
1 The two were tried together but have separate appeals. 
3 
 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E, or order a retrial.  We hold that the 
officer's identification testimony was admitted improperly, but 
that its admission did not prejudice the defendant.  Concluding 
that there was no other error, we affirm the defendant's 
convictions.2 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  i.  The crimes.  Because the 
defendant disputes the sufficiency of the evidence for his 
conviction of murder in the first degree, we recite the facts in 
detail, in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.  
Commonwealth v. Oberle, 476 Mass. 539, 540 (2017). 
 
A.  Sanisha Johnson.  On the evening of July 1, 2015, 
Sanisha Johnson was in her Burlington hotel room.  That night, 
Johnson had posted a listing on Backpage for sexual services, 
which included her cell phone number. 
Sometime after midnight on July 2, a couple staying in room 
116 heard knocking at their door, to which they did not respond.  
Soon after, from a nearby room they heard a woman call out, 
"Help me.  Help me," and a loud bang, followed by silence.  
Other guests also heard cries for help and a loud bang at around 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus briefs filed by the Boston 
University Center for Antiracist Research, Massachusetts 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Felony Murder 
Elimination Project, National Council for Incarcerated and 
Formerly Incarcerated Women and Girls, Kat Albrecht, and The 
Sentencing Project; and by the New England Innocence Project and 
The Innocence Project. 
4 
 
half past midnight, two of whom identified the sound as a 
gunshot. 
A hotel employee, Cherin Townsend, heard a loud bang from 
inside the building on July 2, 2015, between 12:20 and 12:30 
A.M., and received a telephone call informing her that somebody 
heard gunshots.  After several telephone calls from guests, 
Townsend walked to the front desk and called police. 
Sergeant Daniel Hanafin of the Burlington police 
department, the officer in charge on July 2, 2015, at 12:30 
A.M., responded to a telephone call from the hotel, along with 
several other officers.  On entering the hotel, officers spoke 
to individuals gathered in the lobby and to Townsend.  After 
looking through the hallway at issue, officers began calling 
each occupied room in the corridor and asking occupants to come 
out into the hallway.  After knocking on the doors of rooms 
whose residents the officers were unable to connect with by 
telephone, the only room without a response was Johnson's room. 
Hanafin and Sergeant Tim McDonough entered Johnson's room 
to conduct a well-being check.  Immediately, they noticed blood 
droplets on the floor just inside the doorway.  Johnson was 
lying in an odd position on the floor, partially face down and 
on her side, with blood around her.  Hanafin noticed a gunshot 
wound on her side.  Blood smears were located by the telephone 
on the nightstand and on the bedspread.  The telephone cord was 
5 
 
stretched out under Johnson's body.  Officers suspected that 
Johnson was deceased, which was confirmed by emergency medical 
responders. 
After they found Johnson, Detective James Tigges arrived at 
the hotel at around 4 or 5 A.M. and secured the exit and 
entrance at the wing of the building closest to the street.  
Tigges retrieved a wallet found by a guest at the front desk, 
which contained a tissue and a receipt from a store in Florida.  
Tigges also searched Backpage and located Johnson's 
advertisement.  When he called the number listed, Johnson's cell 
phone in the hotel room began to ring.  Upon examining Johnson's 
cell phone records, officers observed a cell phone number ending 
in 9575 was used to contact Johnson at around the time of the 
911 call (9575 number). 
B.  Emily.3  From July 1 to July 2, 2015, Emily was staying 
at a hotel in Woburn (Woburn hotel).  At that time, Emily was 
working as an escort and advertising for her services on 
Backpage.  On July 1, before the shooting of Johnson, she was 
contacted by someone using the 9575 number to ask about her 
availability that evening; she made an appointment to meet with 
 
3 A pseudonym. 
 
6 
 
the caller.4  She received a text message at 11:52 P.M. from the 
9575 number asking for her room number, which she provided. 
Emily heard a knock on her door and looked through the 
peephole in her door to see a young Black man with his hair in 
shoulder-length braids and wearing a baseball cap.  As soon as 
she opened the door to let him in, a second man barged into her 
room along with the first man, pushing Emily into the closet 
area behind the door and grabbing her face.  The second man also 
was Black, had medium-toned skin and big brown eyes, and 
appeared to be very angry.5  At the same time that the second man 
grabbed her, he put a gun to her forehead.  She believed that 
the gun they used was black and not a revolver, and that both 
the men were about her height, five feet, four inches tall.  She 
did not remember seeing tattoos or facial hair on either man.6 
The second man said to Emily, "If you scream, believe me, I 
can scream louder.  Where da money at?  I'm not playin'.  Where 
da money at?"  The first man, who had braids, was standing 
 
4 The 9575 number contacted her at 10:49 P.M. on July 1, 
2015, and they had additional telephone calls at 11:21 and 11:53 
P.M. 
 
5 In comparison, she believed that the first man seemed 
intimidated by the second man and "empathetic" toward her, 
despite the fact that it was clear that the use of the gun was 
apparent to the first man who took her property. 
 
6 The defendant had tattoos on his right arm and a small 
amount of facial hair.  He is approximately six feet tall. 
7 
 
beside the second man at his left.  Emily told them that she 
would give them her money, and the second man kept the gun to 
her side as she went to her dresser.  When she opened a drawer 
to remove her purse, she remembered that she had hidden her cash 
under the table between the two beds.  The gun remained pointed 
at her as she walked toward the table.  The first man was with 
them between the two beds. 
When she went to reach under the table to get the money, 
the second man with the gun moved her away from the area and 
forced her to the front of the bed and to the floor; he directed 
the first man to look for the money while the second man kept 
the gun on Emily.  The first man grabbed the money, in the sum 
of $700. 
They brought her purse over to the bed and looked through 
it.  In her wallet, she had medical, identification, and Social 
Security cards belonging to her and her children, and receipts 
from her neighborhood stores in Florida.  In her purse she had 
two money orders.  When the first man found the money orders, he 
asked the second man whether they should take them, and the 
second man responded, "No.  Leave those."  As the gun was 
trained to her head and she was on the floor, the first man, at 
the direction of the second man, ransacked her room, flipping 
over the mattresses, looking in the bathroom, and trying to get 
into the adjoining room through a locked door.  They took 
8 
 
Emily's marijuana from one of her dresser drawers.  One man 
asked her, "Where da work at?," which she took to be a request 
for cocaine.  She told them that she did not have any.  As they 
were leaving, the second man with the gun told her he would 
"holler at" her.  The men exited to the right, which led her to 
believe they were going out the back entrance to avoid the 
lobby. 
Although she called the front desk immediately after this 
incident, when the clerk answered Emily hung up because she 
needed to continue working.  For that same reason, she did not 
report the incident to police right away.  Later, while still in 
Woburn, she heard about Johnson's murder. 
When she tried to extend her stay, the manager confronted 
her with her Backpage advertisement and told her that she had to 
leave.  She traveled to Maine and had a flight scheduled to 
return to her Florida home on July 4, 2015.  On the evening of 
July 3, she called the Burlington police department and reported 
what had happened to her at the Woburn hotel. 
C.  Sarah.7  From July 1 through July 2, 2015,  Sarah was 
staying at a hotel in Saugus (Saugus hotel).  On July 1, Sarah 
 
7 A pseudonym.  No charges were filed against the defendants 
in relation to the incident involving Sarah, but evidence of its 
occurrence was admitted to show the defendants' state of mind, 
intent, plan, pattern of operation, common scheme, and identity, 
over the defendants' objection.  The judge instructed the jury 
that the evidence was not to be considered for propensity or to 
9 
 
had an advertisement on Backpage, to which she received a 
response.  At 10:55 P.M., there was a call from the 9575 number 
to Sarah's cell phone.  There were two more calls placed from 
the 9575 number to Sarah's cell phone at 11:24 and 11:30 P.M.  
After she told the caller her room number, she went to the door 
to admit him.  When he knocked on the door and she looked 
through the peephole, she said, "I'm sorry, but I don't do Black 
guys."  The man at the door responded, "I'm not Black, I'm 
Spanish."  Sarah testified that the man had braids and wore a 
hat and baggy clothing.  She did not let him in because he "just 
didn't look right to" her. 
 
ii.  The investigation.  In Johnson's room, police did not 
find a shell casing.  They did find her wallet, which contained 
$1,875. 
 
On July 2, 2015, State police Trooper Sean O'Brien returned 
to the Burlington hotel to retrieve its video surveillance.  
Because the video system was unable to play back the footage at 
that time, he went to an office building across the street to 
see whether he could obtain footage from that location.  O'Brien 
discovered that a security camera on the property pointed 
directly at the street and included the hotel entrance.  Aware 
that witnesses heard a loud noise at around 12:20 to 12:25 A.M. 
 
prove that the defendants were of bad character, but only for 
the limited purpose stated. 
10 
 
on July 2, O'Brien watched the video recording backward from 
when police arrived at the hotel.  He observed that at 12:14 
A.M. that day, a light colored, four-door sedan missing a hubcap 
drove toward the hotel.8  At 12:23 A.M., this car took a left 
turn from the hotel parking lot and traveled in front of the 
office building's security camera, revealing that the front 
right quarter panel was a different color from the rest of the 
car. 
 
Later that day, O'Brien was able to view video footage from 
the Burlington hotel.  In the hotel video recording, as viewed 
from the front and side door cameras, a Black man wearing black 
cargo-style pants, a sweatshirt with thick horizontal stripes, 
and a hat with a team logo on the front was seen walking in the 
front door to the lobby and looking at his "smart phone" at 
approximately 12:19 A.M.  At approximately the same time, a man 
wearing a black hooded sweatshirt, a hat, and dark pants or 
jeans walked in the side door and peered in, seemingly waiting 
and watching for something through the glass, and ultimately 
entering less than a minute later.  At approximately 12:23 A.M., 
both men were observed running from the side door.  The man in 
the striped sweatshirt had visible thin braids, approximately 
shoulder length. 
 
8 We have independently reviewed the relevant video footage 
as part of our review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
11 
 
 
There were several text messages and calls between Johnson 
and the 9575 number on July 1, 2015, until 12:19 A.M. on July 2.  
After speaking with Robert Dingess (a hotel resident) and 
looking at his cell phone, police learned that Dingess had been 
friendly with a hotel employee he knew as Remy.  Dingess later 
identified Jeune as Remy.  The original telephone number that he 
had in his contacts for Jeune was the 9575 number.9 
At approximately 12:30 A.M. on July 2, and continuing 
through the early hours that morning, the 9575 number contacted 
Dingess asking what had happened at the hotel, whether someone 
had been shot, and whether news reporters were present.  At 3:07 
A.M., someone using the 9575 number sent Dingess a text message 
to delete that number and the user's messages, that the user 
would send Dingess a text message from a new number the next 
day, and that "shit's going to be hot."  At 4:55 A.M., Dingess 
got a text message from a telephone number ending in 8819, which 
was Jeune's new number. 
As a result of this analysis of the records to determine 
who contacted the 9575 number, officers went to a house on 
Wildmere Avenue in Burlington at 10:40 A.M. on July 3.  O'Brien 
and Burlington police Detective Thomas Carlson both went to the 
Wildmere address in separate, unmarked cars and wearing plain 
 
9 Additionally, a friend of Jeune testified that she had 
used the 9575 number to contact him. 
12 
 
clothes.  Parked in the driveway was a gold-colored four-door 
Toyota Camry that was missing its left rear hubcap and had a 
dark front right quarter panel.  The Camry appeared to be "an 
exact match" to the one that O'Brien had observed in the office 
building security camera video footage.  They learned from 
dispatch that the registered owner of the Camry was Jeune. 
 
Carlson and O'Brien set up surveillance down the street 
from the address with other officers, choosing not to park in 
front of the house so as to avoid detection.  At some point, the 
Camry was driven away without drawing the attention of the 
officers.  After waiting for some time to see whether the Camry 
returned, police put out a "be on the lookout" for the car.  At 
approximately 6 P.M., they learned that the car was in 
Winchester, stopped at a fast-food restaurant drive-through 
window. 
O'Brien took about a minute to arrive; on arrival, he 
observed three Black men in the car.  Approximately five 
uniformed police officers from both Winchester and Woburn were 
in the parking lot when he arrived.  The Woburn officers left 
when O'Brien and Carlson arrived.  As time went on, additional 
detectives arrived, including Sergeant Bruce O'Rourke from the 
State police and McDonough and Tigges. 
O'Brien initially had a conversation with the driver of the 
car, Jeune.  The defendant was the front seat passenger, and 
13 
 
Romane Price was in the right rear seat.  O'Brien informed Jeune 
that they were interested in a car similar to his and told him 
that he was not under arrest and was free to go.  Jeune 
responded that he knew he was free to go, agreed to step out of 
the car, and walked to a grassy curbed area in the parking lot 
to have a discussion with O'Brien.  After being asked where he 
was on July 1 and July 2, Jeune responded that he was at a 
girlfriend's house in Boston; according to him, the Camry was 
parked there all night.  He would not divulge the girlfriend's 
name or address.  During their conversation, Jeune informed them 
that he worked at a hotel in Waltham, and that he previously had 
worked at the Burlington hotel.  Jeune stated that he lived at 
the Wildmere address with his mother and another girlfriend.  
The conversation lasted from three to four minutes. 
O'Rourke approached the car and told the defendant and 
Price that the car matched the description of a car used in a 
serious crime that occurred on Wednesday night, and that the 
occupants of the car might have had nothing to do with that 
crime but that the officers had a need to investigate the car.  
The defendant was asked to step out of the car, and he was pat 
frisked.  When O'Brien approached the defendant, he already was 
out of the car and standing toward the rear of it.  Over 
objection, O'Brien testified that he recognized the defendant to 
be "the Black male who walked in through the front door of" the 
14 
 
Burlington hotel.  The defendant told O'Brien that he lived in 
Boston and worked at Logan Airport.  He said he was working 
there on July 1 from 11 P.M. until 6:30 A.M. on July 2.  Later, 
this was shown to be false; he worked the night before and the 
night after, but not July 1 to July 2.  The defendant provided 
O'Brien with his cell phone number, ending in 0046 (0046 
number).  O'Brien noticed that the defendant's cell phone number 
appeared on the 9575 number records.  O'Brien seized the 
defendant's cell phone as evidence and, after a conversation of 
from three to four minutes, told the defendant that he was free 
to go.10 
The car was seized as evidence and towed to the Burlington 
police department.  After their brief conversations with the 
officers, Jeune, the defendant, and Price went into the 
restaurant to eat.  O'Brien was there for a total of 
approximately forty minutes.  A local freelance photographer 
took photographs of the encounter, which were admitted in 
evidence at trial. 
O'Brien first heard about Emily on the evening of July 3, 
2015, after he had the interaction with the codefendants and 
Price in the parking lot.  Emily spoke with Carlson after the 
stop.  That night, police obtained search warrants for the 
 
10 The defendant's cell phone was not searched until police 
secured a search warrant. 
15 
 
residences of both the defendant and Jeune.  In the early 
morning hours on July 4, officers executing the search warrant 
at the defendant's home seized baseball hats, a sweatshirt, and 
dark colored pants from the defendant's home.  O'Brien testified 
that the hats and the sweatshirt taken from the defendant's home 
were not those seen in the video recording, and that he could 
not say that the pants they seized were the pants in the 
recording with one hundred percent certainty. 
At Jeune's address, in a Jeep registered to Jeune that had 
a flat tire, officers located Social Security cards, health 
cards, debit cards, Medicaid cards, and identification cards 
belonging to Emily and her children.  They also found a bag with 
ammunition in it.11  In Jeune's house, they found a baseball 
team's hat with stickers on the brim, a box for an Alcatel brand 
cell phone, various items of clothing, cash, and a keycard that 
matched the brand of the Burlington hotel. 
When officers searched the Camry, they found, among other 
items, two cell phones (an Alcatel cell phone and a Kyocera 
brand cell phone) and a hotel employee nametag with the name 
"Remy."  Police also did reenactments of the Camry being driven 
 
11 A State police trooper assigned to the firearms 
identification section opined that the spent projectile 
recovered from Johnson's body was .38 caliber.  He testified 
that the ammunition recovered from Jeune's house appeared to be 
.38 special caliber designed for use in a revolver. 
16 
 
to the Woburn hotel and the Burlington hotel, and the video 
recordings of the reenactments were entered in evidence. 
State police Trooper Edward Keefe examined the Alcatel cell 
phone (Alcatel), with a telephone number ending in 9096 (9096 
number), and found that it had been used on July 2, 2015, 
numerous times throughout the day to search for articles about 
the shooting at the Burlington hotel.  Keefe also found that it 
had been used to view Backpage 199 times, including on July 1.  
The Alcatel was used to visit Backpage advertisements for Emily, 
Sarah, and Johnson on July 1 through July 2.  The Alcatel was 
used to send several text messages to Bethzaida Hernandez, a 
worker at the Burlington hotel, the morning after the shooting 
asking about the incident.12  Also on July 2, at around 12:30 
P.M., the Alcatel was used to send a text message to a contact 
named "Mama Bear" stating, "Its on da news now."  The text 
messages continued, "Delete any n all text or phones kalls from 
my flip. N this message."  Right after the Alcatel was used to 
send a text message to Mama Bear, at 12:36 P.M. the user sent a 
text message to the defendant, "Ima kall u in a min.  Its on da 
news."  At 12:37 P.M., the Alcatel was used to send another text 
message to Mama Bear, "I don't wanna be here.  They didn't even 
 
12 Hernandez testified at trial and identified the coworker 
she knew as "Remy" to be Jeune.  She said that he asked about 
the murder during their conversation. 
17 
 
search the room yet."  At 1:40 P.M., the Alcatel was used to 
send a text message to Mama Bear asking, "Did u Google it?"  At 
1:42 P.M., Mama Bear sent a text message to the Alcatel, "I'm 
bout to now."  At 2:28 P.M., Mama Bear sent another text 
message:  "No suspects."13 
Someone using the Alcaltel contacted the defendant's cell 
phone number (listed in the Alcatel's contacts list as "Staxx") 
ninety-eight times.  The defendant's cell phone was used to 
contact the Alcatel (listed in the defendant's contacts list as 
"Eps") at 10:44 and 11:48 A.M. on July 2, and someone using the 
Alcatel called the defendant at 10:59 A.M. that same day.  At 
12:44 P.M., after the Alcatel was used to send the text message 
that the user would call regarding what was on the news, the 
Alcatel was used to call the defendant.  The defendant called 
the Alcatel at 1:08 and 1:09 P.M.  The last contact between the 
Alcatel and the defendant's cell phone was on July 3 at 
approximately 1:14 P.M. 
The defendant's cell phone also received an incoming call 
on July 3 at 2:19 P.M. and was used to make an outgoing call to 
the telephone number ending in 8819 at 2:22 P.M.  This was the 
third telephone number connected to Jeune; Dingess received a 
 
13 There were further text messages between Mama Bear and 
the Alcatel regarding the news throughout the day. 
18 
 
text message from this number stating that it was the new cell 
phone number for "Remy." 
On July 1, 2015, the defendant and the 9575 number had 
contact at 12:08 and 8:48 P.M.  On June 12, the defendant was 
asked by another individual what was "Eps"'s cell phone number:  
the defendant's cell phone was used to send a text message with 
the 9575 number in response to the inquiry.  On July 3, after 
the shooting of Johnson, when the same individual asked the 
defendant for the cell phone number again, the defendant gave 
the 9096 number. 
There was no outgoing activity on the defendant's cell 
phone on July 1, 2015, from 11:56 P.M. to July 2 at 12:09 A.M.  
Again from 12:09 through 12:35 A.M., there was no outgoing 
activity.  State police mapped the available cell site location 
information (CSLI) for the defendant's cell phone.  The CSLI on 
July 1 at 8:54 P.M. put the cell phone and its user at 1010 
Massachusetts Avenue in Boston.  On July 2, just past 1 A.M., 
CSLI placed the cell phone near Hyde Park Avenue in the 
Roslindale section of Boston.  At 1:08 A.M., it placed the cell 
phone on Brookway Road in Roslindale.  At 1:09 A.M., CSLI put 
the cell phone on Hyde Park Avenue, by the Forest Hills transit 
station.  At 1:26 A.M., CSLI showed the cell phone to be near 
the intersection of Morton Street and Blue Hill Avenue in the 
Mattapan section of Boston.  The window of time in between 8:54 
19 
 
P.M. on July 1 and 1 A.M. on July 2 was not produced by the 
defendant's cell phone provider. 
The CSLI for the Alcatel put the cell phone in Saugus at 
11:30 P.M. on July 1, the time at which the Camry was seen at 
the Saugus hotel.  The CSLI jumped ahead to 3:13 A.M. on July 2, 
when the Alcatel used a tower on Massachusetts Avenue in Boston.  
Also at 3:13 A.M., it used a tower on Blue Hill Avenue in Boston 
to receive a text message.  Between 3:30 and 3:45 A.M., the CSLI 
placed the Alcatel near Neponset Avenue in the Dorchester 
section of Boston.  At 5:07, 7:27, 8:46, 9:19, and 9:21 A.M., 
the Alcatel used a tower located on Mountain Road in Burlington. 
According to CSLI, the cell phone associated with the 9575 
number was in the area of 500 Morton Street in Dorchester at 
9:40 P.M. on July 1.  At 9:44 P.M., the 9575 number activated a 
tower on Cummins Highway in Roslindale.  The 9575 number also 
activated towers in Saugus, Woburn, and Burlington at the times 
it was being used to communicate with the cell phones of Sarah, 
Emily, and Johnson.  On July 2, from 12:30 to 12:38 A.M., it 
activated towers in Woburn, Stoneham, and the Charlestown 
section of Boston.  At 12:42 A.M., its CSLI disclosed its 
location in the area of Traveler Street in Boston.  In going 
through the 9575 number records, the last call made from the 
9575 number was at 1:35 A.M. on July 2, 2015. 
20 
 
After the search of the defendant's home, on July 4, 
O'Brien watched video footage from the Woburn hotel from July 1 
to July 2, 2015.14  On July 1, 2015, at approximately 11:52 P.M., 
the video recording showed a car being driven around the parking 
lot.  The car was a light-colored four-door sedan missing its 
left rear hubcap and with a different color gasoline cap cover 
(which he noticed on the Camry during the stop), appearing also 
to be a match to the car in the office building security camera 
video recording.  The car was driven around the hotel several 
times before it stopped, and a Black man got out of the car and 
walked into the hotel at approximately 11:54 P.M.  The man 
walking into the hotel was wearing a hat with a baseball cap 
with an "A's" logo on the front, a black sweatshirt, a white 
shirt with a design on the front, and dark pants.  The man 
walked over to a side door and appeared to manipulate it before 
walking out the front door while using a cell phone.  The car 
then was driven to the side door; two men got out of the car -- 
the same man who previously had manipulated the side door, along 
with a second man who walked to the side door and went into the 
 
14 Also on July 4, Carlson and two other police officers 
picked up Emily in Maine.  When Emily was shown a photographic 
array that included Jeune (and not the defendant), she suggested 
that someone who was not Jeune may have been involved.  She 
identified the wallet and the receipt found by police as having 
been stolen from her. 
21 
 
hotel at approximately 11:58 P.M.15  The second man was wearing a 
striped sweatshirt, black pants, and a hat, and had his hair in 
braids.  The car was parked, and the two men came out of the 
side door at approximately 12:05 P.M. after coming from the side 
stairwell area.  As the car was driven away, the different color 
front quarter panel was visible.  Both men appear to be the same 
men who appeared in the Burlington hotel video recording. 
O'Brien also observed video footage from the Saugus hotel 
where Sarah stayed on July 1 and July 2.  On this video footage, 
he observed the same Camry.  O'Brien observed that the same men 
who appeared in the Burlington hotel and Woburn hotel footage 
were in the Saugus hotel video recording.  O'Brien identified 
the man wearing the striped sweatshirt as the defendant.  At 
approximately 11:32 P.M. on July 1, the man wearing the striped 
sweatshirt walked in the front door of the hotel and to a side 
door, where he let the second man in, and both men ascended the 
stairs.  A little more than five minutes later, the two men came 
out the side door with their hoods up, and the Camry was driven 
away. 
The defendant's girlfriend at the time of the crimes 
testified that she knew Jeune as a friend of the defendant, and 
that Jeune drove a brown or tan car.  She braided the 
 
15 The car then was driven off, suggesting a third 
individual was involved. 
22 
 
defendant's hair at that time, and he had a "bunch" of single, 
chin length "unattached braids."  She had seen the defendant 
with a gun on one occasion in early to mid-May 2015. 
b.  Procedural history.  On July 5, 2015, the defendant 
agreed to accompany officers to the Woburn police station, where 
he was arrested.  The defendant was indicted on charges of 
murder in the first degree, G. L. c. 265, § 1; attempted armed 
robbery, G. L. c. 274, § 6; unlawful possession of a firearm, 
G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a); armed robbery, G. L. c. 265, § 17; home 
invasion, G. L. c. 265, § 18C; and armed assault in a dwelling, 
G. L. c. 265, § 18A. 
 
On July 18, 2016, the defendant filed motions to suppress 
statements of the defendant, evidence recovered during the stop 
of the Camry and from the defendant's home, and Emily's 
identifications of the defendants as she saw them in a news 
article online.  The motion to suppress Emily's identifications 
was allowed, but the other motions to suppress were denied. 
 
A jury trial was held in November 2017.  The defendant was 
found guilty of murder in the first degree on a theory of 
felony-murder and of attempted armed robbery of Johnson, guilty 
of the lesser included offense of unarmed robbery of Emily, and 
not guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm, home invasion, 
and armed assault in a dwelling.  The defendant was sentenced to 
a mandatory term of life in prison for the murder conviction and 
23 
 
a concurrent term of from five to ten years in prison for the 
unarmed robbery conviction. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Motion to suppress statements.  The 
defendant argues that he was in custody when police asked him 
questions about his whereabouts at around the time of the 
crimes; therefore, he should have been given his Miranda 
warnings.  The Commonwealth argues that the defendant was not in 
custody when he was questioned. 
 
We discuss the facts as found by the motion judge, 
supplemented only by uncontroverted evidence from witnesses 
credited by the motion judge.  Commonwealth v. Privette, 491 
Mass. 501, 518 (2023).  The motion judge found that, at 5:58 
P.M. on the day of the stop, Officer Edward Chisholm of the 
Woburn police department parked his cruiser at an angle to 
prevent the Camry from exiting the drive-through and approached 
the passenger's side with his gun in his holster.16  After 
observing Chisholm approach, Woburn police Detective John Walsh 
approached the car with his gun drawn in the "low ready" 
position.  There was no evidence that the defendant, Jeune, or 
 
16 The defendant does not challenge any factual findings by 
the motion judge, except that police never conveyed to the 
defendant that he was a suspect. 
 
24 
 
Price saw Chisholm with his weapon out of his holster.17  
Chisholm "calmly" told the occupants of the car that he needed 
their identifications, and that the car may have been involved 
in a crime; the defendant, Jeune, and Price were cooperative. 
 
O'Brien and Carlson arrived at the fast-food restaurant 
soon after 6 P.M.  There were as many as thirteen officers from 
different agencies at various times, but a large portion of 
these officers left the scene or were standing near the 
perimeter of the parking lot.18  Walsh and Chisholm left the 
scene minutes after O'Brien and Carlson arrived.19 
 
O'Brien asked Jeune to get out of the car and told him that 
he (O'Brien) wanted to speak with him regarding a similar car 
and an investigation in Burlington.  They spoke as Jeune sat on 
a curb in an area away from the car.  O'Rourke was present for 
this conversation, and O'Brien told Jeune he was not under 
arrest and was free to leave, which Jeune acknowledged by 
stating, "I know."  He was not provided with Miranda warnings, 
 
17 Price, who testified at the hearing on the motion to 
suppress, said that the officer approaching the car had his hand 
on his gun, but did not have his gun out. 
 
18 Winchester police stood by on the main street as a 
uniformed presence as the stop was conducted in their 
jurisdiction, but they were not near the car. 
 
19 A photograph taken by a freelance photographer depicted a 
police car leaving the scene while an officer, presumably 
Carlson, stood next to the defendant at the passenger's side 
door. 
25 
 
but ultimately ended the conversation when he was asked whether 
officers could search the car, and he responded in the negative, 
telling the officers, "I think I need a lawyer."  Jeune was then 
told that they would be seizing the car, but that he was free to 
leave. 
 
Carlson, O'Rourke, and O'Brien all noticed that the 
defendant looked similar to the Black male with braids depicted 
in the Burlington hotel surveillance video recording.  O'Rourke 
told the defendant and Price that police were interested in the 
car as it potentially had been involved in a serious crime where 
weapons were used, and the defendant was asked to step out of 
the car.  O'Rourke asked the defendant whether he had any 
weapons on him, and the defendant said that he did not.  
O'Rourke conducted a patfrisk of the defendant at the rear of 
the car; Carlson had his hand on the defendant, and a few other 
officers were off to the left out of arm's reach of the 
defendant.  The defendant was told that he was not under arrest, 
and he was not provided with Miranda warnings.  O'Rourke 
testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress that the 
defendant was not free to leave until the patfrisk was complete, 
and O'Rourke did not tell the defendant that he was free to 
leave after he concluded the patfrisk. 
 
When Carlson and O'Brien spoke to the defendant in a grassy 
area to the right of the pavement near the entrance, however, 
26 
 
they advised him that he was free to leave.  The defendant 
responded, "O.K.," and proceeded to answer the officers' 
questions about his whereabouts on the day of the crime, his 
home address, and his telephone number.  His cell phone was 
seized, and the car was towed.  The defendant, Jeune, and Price 
went into the restaurant and were allowed to leave.  The motion 
judge found that the fact that the defendant and Jeune had 
become suspects was not conveyed to them during the stop.20 
 
Price, the defendant's cousin, testified that he twice 
asked officers whether he could leave, and that he was told in 
response that he could leave when the officers were finished.  
The motion judge found it "noteworthy" that in none of the 
photographs taken of the encounter were officers seen standing 
in the area where Price stood behind the car.21 
 
"In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, we accept 
the judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent clear error 'but 
conduct an independent review of his ultimate findings and 
conclusions of law.'"  Commonwealth v. Medina, 485 Mass. 296, 
 
20 Connolly, who also was present to speak with the 
defendant, testified:  "In my eight years in the police, I do[ 
not] think that I[ have] ever seen a more casual environment for 
considerably such a serious incident." 
 
21 The motion judge rejected Price's testimony that he was 
subjected to a patfrisk. 
27 
 
299-300 (2020), quoting Commonwealth v. Cawthron, 479 Mass. 612, 
616 (2018). 
When a suspect is subjected to custodial interrogation, 
Miranda warnings are required.22  Medina, 485 Mass. at 300.  "A 
person is in custody whenever he is 'deprived of his freedom of 
action in any significant way.'"  Commonwealth v. DePeiza, 449 
Mass. 367, 375 (2007), quoting Commonwealth v. Almonte, 444 
Mass. 511, 517, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1040 (2005).  Two related 
inquiries inform the determination as to whether a suspect was 
"in custody" at the time of questioning:  "first, what were the 
circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given 
those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or 
she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and 
leave."  Medina, supra, quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 
99, 112 (1995). 
"Even where a suspect is temporarily seized, '[n]ot every 
Terry-type investigative stop results in a custodial 
interrogation.'"  Cawthron, 479 Mass. at 617, quoting DePeiza, 
449 Mass. at 375.  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); 
Commonwealth v. Kirwan, 448 Mass. 304, 312 (2007) (defendant not 
in custody, "although the defendant was not free to leave, [the] 
 
22 We agree with the motion judge that asking the defendant 
where he was on the night of the crimes was "designed to elicit 
incriminatory responses from the defendant," and thus 
constituted interrogation for purposes of Miranda. 
28 
 
interrogation was brief and in the nature of a preliminary 
investigation, and the defendant's detention was minimal and 
similar to a Terry-type stop"). 
We recognize that "[t]he custody and seizure inquiries 
. . . are not identical."  Commonwealth v. Evelyn, 485 Mass. 
691, 698 (2020).  The custody inquiry, for Miranda purposes, 
"primarily protects the right against self-incrimination and the 
right to counsel under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights."  Id.  Conversely, the seizure inquiry is 
concerned with "the right to be free from unreasonable seizures 
under the Fourth Amendment and art. 14."  Id.  The inquiries 
each "consider somewhat different questions."  Id.  Under both 
inquiries, however, the totality of the circumstances are 
considered, "limited to the objective circumstances of the 
encounter," to determine whether a person has been compelled to 
engage with the police.  Id. at 698-699.  Here, the defendant 
argues specifically that he was in custody at the time of the 
encounter, rendering his statements unlawfully obtained. 
A court considers, at a minimum, four factors when 
determining whether the circumstances surrounding an encounter 
suggest that a defendant is in custody during an interrogation: 
"(1) the place of the interrogation; (2) whether the 
officers have conveyed to the person being questioned any 
belief or opinion that that person is a suspect; (3) the 
29 
 
nature of the interrogation, including whether the 
interview was aggressive or, instead, informal and 
influenced in its contours by the person being interviewed; 
and (4) whether, at the time the incriminating statement 
was made, the person was free to end the interview by 
leaving the locus of the interrogation or by asking the 
interrogator to leave, as evidenced by whether the 
interview terminated with an arrest." 
 
Commonwealth v. Groome, 435 Mass. 201, 211-212 (2001).  "Rarely 
is any single factor conclusive."  Cawthron, 479 Mass. at 618, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Bryant, 390 Mass. 729, 737 (1984).  The 
Groome factors are not intended to be "a straitjacket," and 
"they do not limit the obligation of a court to consider all of 
the circumstances that shed light on the custody analysis."  
Medina, 485 Mass. at 301.  Applying these factors in the 
circumstances here, the defendant has not met his burden to show 
that he was in custody when he made the incriminating statements 
to the officers.  See Cawthron, supra. 
 
The interrogation took place at around 6 P.M. in a drive-
through and parking lot area of a fast-food restaurant.  This 
environment, in itself, was not coercive.  See Cawthron, 479 
Mass. at 618 ("The detectives questioned the defendant in a 
public parking lot, during the day, and the defendants were 
neither handcuffed nor otherwise physically restrained.  This 
environment was not police-dominated").  The car was blocked 
from exiting the drive-through by a cruiser on its initial stop, 
and officers had firearms visible, although there was no 
30 
 
evidence that they were seen to be drawn.  The defendant was not 
handcuffed, nor was Jeune.  Although the judge found that there 
were as many thirteen officers at the stop at various times, 
many officers left quickly after they arrived, or did not 
interact with the suspects.  See Medina, 485 Mass. at 302 (and 
cases cited) ("Although more officers arrived over the following 
two hours, it does not appear that they meaningfully restricted 
the defendant's freedom of movement within his home").  See also 
Commonwealth v. Alcala, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 49, 54 (2002) 
("Although some ten to fifteen local, State, and Federal police 
and other officers were in the general vicinity, and perhaps six 
or seven 'converge[d]' on the three men at the building, no more 
than two officers were with the defendant when he was 
interrogated"). 
 
That the defendant was moved a short distance to be 
questioned separately does not alter the conclusion.  "[T]he act 
of separating defendants briefly for individual questioning does 
not create an inherently coercive environment."  Cawthron, 479 
Mass. at 619.  Contrast Commonwealth v. Coleman, 49 Mass. App. 
Ct. 150, 154 (2000), quoting Commonwealth v. Gallati, 40 Mass. 
App. Ct. 111, 113 (1996) (situation "isolating and coercive" 
where three police officers were deployed in small room with 
path to closed door "shadowed by the questioner himself").  
Where the questioning was very brief, the separation of the 
31 
 
defendant to the grassy area of the parking lot alone did not 
render the environment a coercive one. 
Whether the defendant was questioned in a police-dominated 
area, given the circumstances mentioned supra, is a close call.  
We assume that he was questioned in such an area for the sake of 
our analysis and move on to discuss the other three Groome 
factors. 
 
We agree with the motion judge that the officers did not 
convey to the defendant that he was a suspect in the murder 
investigation.  Even before being questioned by O'Brien, 
O'Rourke told the defendant and Price that the crime "might have 
nothing to do with you but, if you don't mind, just keep your 
hands on your lap."  The fact that O'Rourke asked the defendant 
to step out of the car and pat frisked him did not on its own 
communicate to the defendant that he was a suspect.  In fact, 
O'Rourke testified that he told the defendant, after asking 
whether he had any weapons on him, "I[ am] going to pat you down 
and make sure.  Is that okay with you?"23  He testified that the 
 
23 The fact that O'Rourke subjectively knew that the 
defendant was not free to leave until he was frisked is not of 
importance because that was not expressly communicated to the 
defendant.  See Medina, 485 Mass. at 303, quoting Commonwealth 
v. Morse, 427 Mass. 117, 123-124 (1998) ("[S]ubjective beliefs 
held by law enforcement officers are irrelevant in the 
determination whether a person being questioned is in custody 
for purposes of the receipt of Miranda warnings, except to the 
extent that those beliefs influence the objective conditions 
surrounding an interrogation"). 
32 
 
defendant responded in the affirmative.  The officers' 
suspicions "remained unexpressed at this point," and there was 
no evidence that they indicated to the defendant his similarity 
to the individual in the video footage.  Medina, 485 Mass. at 
302-303 (police did not signal to defendant he was suspected of 
committing crime even where they explained they received report 
that human remains were in defendant's home).  See DePeiza, 449 
Mass. at 376 (officer "did not imply that the defendant was 
suspected of a crime merely by asking if he was carrying a gun.  
Carrying a firearm is not a crime, and the defendant does not 
suggest any other criminal conduct of which he was 
suspected. . . .  Miranda warnings were not required between the 
announcement of the patfrisk and the frisk itself"). 
Even accepting the motion judge's finding that the 
defendant was "clearly not free to go at" the time of the pat 
frisk, when he spoke with O'Brien afterward, O'Brien explicitly 
told the defendant that he was not under arrest and that he was 
free to go.  These circumstances would not transform the 
encounter into a custodial one.  See Groome, 435 Mass. at 213 
(defendant's fear he might be in custody when in police cruiser 
voluntarily was addressed by officer "when he told the defendant 
that he was not being arrested").  See also Cawthron, 479 Mass. 
at 619 (asking defendant what he had just purchased, when 
detective believed he witnessed drug transaction, did not convey 
33 
 
suggestion defendants were suspects because it could have 
referred to innocent activities). 
 
Moreover, the nature of the interrogation points to a 
conclusion that the defendant was not in custody when he was 
questioned.  The motion judge found that the "questioning was 
not aggressive in any respect."  This conclusion was supported 
by the evidence presented at the hearing on the motion to 
suppress.  The defendant was questioned by two law enforcement 
officers:  O'Brien and Connolly.  "[N]othing in the record 
suggests that they were 'aggressive,' 'persistent,' or 'harsh,' 
which would support a conclusion that the defendants had been 
subject to a custodial interrogation."  Cawthron, 479 Mass. at 
621, quoting Coleman, 49 Mass. App. Ct. at 155.  In fact, Price 
admitted on cross-examination at the hearing on the motion to 
suppress that the officers were polite and courteous.  The 
questions asked by the officers were "investigatory rather than 
accusatory" where there was no indication that they "raised 
their voices, threatened the defendant, or expressed disbelief 
in response to his answers."  Medina, 485 Mass. at 303, quoting 
Kirwan, 448 Mass. at 311. 
 
Finally, the brief questioning terminated with the 
defendant, Jeune, and Price walking around the area and 
congregating among themselves without police supervision.  They 
went into the fast-food restaurant after the encounter and left 
34 
 
the location without being arrested by the officers.  Although 
freedom to leave "may be a critical factor . . . [but] cannot be 
the determinative factor," the fact that the defendant was free 
to leave, acknowledged that he was aware of that, and did leave 
strongly supports a conclusion that a reasonable person in the 
defendant's position would have felt free to leave.  Medina, 485 
Mass. at 304, quoting Cawthron, 479 Mass. at 623. 
 
We conclude, based on the totality of the circumstances, 
that the defendant was not in custody at the time he was 
questioned by the officers because a reasonable person in his 
position would have felt that he was free to leave during the 
questioning.24 
The defendant also asks that the court consider race as a 
factor in considering whether a person such as he would feel 
free to leave a police interaction.  We have held that "the more 
pertinent question is whether an officer has, through words or 
conduct, objectively communicated that the officer would use his 
or her police power to coerce that person to stay."  
Commonwealth v. Matta, 483 Mass. 357, 362 (2019).  We 
acknowledge "that the troubling past and present of policing and 
race are likely to inform how African-Americans and members of 
 
24 The fact that O'Brien characterized the motor vehicle 
stop as a "takedown" in his notes does not transform a 
noncustodial encounter into a custodial one. 
35 
 
other racial minorities interpret police encounters."  Evelyn, 
485 Mass. at 701.  As we determined in Evelyn that other factors 
led to a conclusion that the defendant was seized, we did not 
decide "whether the race of a defendant properly informs the 
seizure inquiry."  Id. at 703.  Similarly, here, where the 
totality of the circumstances discussed supra overwhelmingly 
suggest that the defendant was not in custody for purposes of 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), consideration of his 
race would not tip the scale with respect to whether the 
defendant was in custody in this particular case.  "We do not 
decide constitutional questions unless they must necessarily be 
reached."  Commonwealth v. Raposo, 453 Mass. 739, 743 (2009), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Paasche, 391 Mass. 18, 21 (1984).  Thus, 
we do not answer the question posed here.  Evelyn, supra ("We 
. . . attempt to focus attention on the issue of race, while not 
establishing bright-line rules that potentially could do more 
harm than good"). 
b.  Dismissal of jurors.  The defendant argues that the 
judge's dismissal of two jurors for their ability to understand 
the "legal principles" and "complex issues" in the case was 
structural (and prejudicial) error, and the product of racial 
bias.  The Commonwealth argues that the judge properly excused 
the jurors because they were unable to sufficiently understand 
the judge's instructions on the legal issues.  The Commonwealth 
36 
 
also argues that there is no evidence of racial bias on behalf 
of the judge.  We agree with the Commonwealth that the judge did 
not abuse his discretion in excusing the jurors. 
Juror no. 14 was a twenty-two year old woman who grew up in 
Haiti and, when she was in the eighth grade, moved to the United 
States with her adoptive parents, finishing high school in 
Middleton.  During voir dire, counsel for the defendant asked 
her about her "feelings or understanding [of] the presumption of 
innocence."  She responded, "My feeling is, I don't know, it's 
sad, I would say.  I don't know.  Yeah, but.  That's all I have, 
that's it really sad, but."  After counsel asked her, "What's 
sad?", she responded, "From the basic of the beginning of the 
paper, and like when I read it over again, it's sad to, like, 
read it and listen to it.  But, yeah."  When counsel pressed 
juror no. 14 again on her understanding of the presumption of 
innocence, juror no. 14 answered, "I do not exactly know what it 
means, so I don't think I really have a position here.  It's 
sad." 
Counsel then asked her whether she knew what it meant to be 
innocent.  She replied, 
"Innocent is just, like, if the person, if there's two 
people and then one of the commits something and the other 
one was there but did not really do anything, so I would 
think he or she was innocent. . . .  But I don't know if he 
or she is still going to be affected by just being there.  
But I would call that person innocent." 
 
37 
 
When asked what presumption meant, juror no. 14 stated that she 
did not know.  When the judge asked her whether she understood 
the legal information about the case when he read it to the 
jurors, juror no. 14 responded that she did understand.  The 
Commonwealth asked her whether she would be able to look at each 
defendant individually and determine on the evidence whether the 
case was proved against them beyond a reasonable doubt.  Juror 
no. 14 responded, "Um, I do not know.  No?"  The Commonwealth 
then broke it down for the juror; she understood the defendants 
were charged in a joint venture, and that she had to decide 
their guilt or innocence individually based on the evidence.  
When asked about joint venture, juror no. 14 said, "The words, 
joint venture, that someone, like, I don't know, I don't exactly 
understand that part.  But I think that's the only part that 
maybe, like, bring me down in the question a little."  After the 
Commonwealth read the judge's instructions on joint venture to 
the juror again, she said that she thought she would be able to 
follow them.  Jeune's attorney then asked leading follow-up 
questions of the juror.  Juror no. 14 indicated that she would 
follow the law the way the judge gave it to her. 
 
After asking juror no. 14 to step outside, the judge spoke 
with counsel: 
"I have a concern about her understanding of the legal 
principles, but I'm going to listen. 
 
38 
 
"Her initial response when asked about those aspects did 
not demonstrate that she really did have an understanding.  
I think everybody was trying to get her to that point, but 
I have a concern about her level of understanding. 
 
"So, I'm willing to listen." 
 
Counsel for the defendant stated that her willingness to 
learn and her interest suggested that with "more time and 
experience," she would be fully capable of understanding the 
requisite law.  Jeune's attorney discussed juror no. 14's race 
and said, "of all the people that have come here this morning, 
this is the person that is closest demographically to my 
client."  He noted his concerns about striking jurors "because 
their vocabulary is not the same as our educated vocabulary."  
The Commonwealth stated that juror no. 14 was "a remarkable 
young woman" who had "overcome tremendous obstacles and is 
obviously very bright and very engaged."  Nonetheless, the 
Commonwealth was unsure that juror no. 14 understood the 
presumption of innocence.  Defense counsel admitted that he "was 
a little perplexed [himself] when she said that she was sad by 
it," but he thought her confusion was due to a vocabulary issue. 
The judge told counsel: 
"It is important to me to make sure that we have a fair and 
impartial jury.  It is important to me that, if we can, 
. . . we have some representation on the jury of people 
that have backgrounds and who look like the defendants.  I 
think that's important. 
 
"But it is important to me that we have jurors who can 
understand and who demonstrate an ability to do this.  This 
39 
 
is an extremely serious matter, and I have a concern about 
her ability to understand. 
 
"And we may not know whether she understands a concept.  
The concepts that she was asked about, she did not 
demonstrate a real understanding of. 
 
"So while I'm torn, I'm going to excuse her." 
 
 
At the request of Jeune's attorney, the judge allowed a few 
more questions in voir dire.  Juror no. 14 indicated that she 
did her own research into the word "assumption" or 
"presumption," and said that it meant, "you think or something 
but it's not certainly true.  Like, you think of something but 
you're not exact of whether or not it is true."  When he asked 
her whether she believed that the defendants were innocent 
unless the government could prove them guilty, she said, "I 
don't want to say the wrong thing."  After he told her, 
"legally, these guys are innocent unless the government can 
prove that they're guilty," she said, "Yes." 
 
The defendant's counsel asked juror no. 14 whether she 
looked up "assumption" rather than "presumption," and she said 
she looked up both.  Jeune's attorney asked her whether she 
would like to serve on the jury, and she said, "Um, no.  I don't 
know."  The judge asked her whether she had a concern about her 
ability to disclose her real answer to the questions, and after 
some back and forth, juror no. 14 indicated that she was 
concerned about whether "to say the right thing or not.  I do 
40 
 
not want to go down the wrong way with where to answer the right 
question or not."  She stated that she was concerned about 
making the wrong decision in a case such as this.  When Jeune's 
counsel asked her whether she could figure out the trial, she 
said, "If I get -- I don't know.  If I learn more about it, I 
will say yes."  Over the defendant's objection, the judge 
excused the juror.  Jeune's attorney withdrew his objection. 
 
Later that day, juror no. 65, another Haitian-American 
woman, indicated on the juror questionnaire that she had a 
scheduling problem.  When asked about her problem, she said, 
"Scheduling.  Language."  The judge asked her, as a follow-up, 
whether she had a good reason why she could not serve as a 
juror, and she answered in the negative.  Juror no. 65 indicated 
that English was not her first language, and that she had "just 
[a] little bit" of difficulty understanding the questions.  The 
judge asked her whether she had "some difficulty understanding 
the discussion that we had about some of the law that applies 
here?"  She replied, "Little bit."  The judge asked her whether 
her difficulty with the language would make it difficult for her 
to be a juror.  She first replied, "I don't know," then she 
replied, "No."  Juror no. 65, on her own, offered, "I'm gonna 
try," but then acknowledged that the language would make it 
difficult for her. 
41 
 
When the judge asked about her acknowledgment on the 
questionnaire that there is something that would make it 
difficult for her to participate in the trial, juror no. 65 
said, "Because I'm gonna ask you to repeat for me if I not 
understand very well this question."  When the judge explained 
the question further, juror no. 65 said, "Well, I misunderstood.  
I don't have any problems.  Sorry."  Although she checked off on 
the questionnaire that she knew someone from the district 
attorney's office for Middlesex County or the defense attorneys' 
offices, she told the judge, "No, I don't know anyone."  Over 
objections from both Jeune and defense counsel, the judge 
excused juror no. 65.  Jeune's attorney opined that juror no. 65 
was not given a fair opportunity.  The judge explained that he 
excused her because she mistakenly answered "yes" to all the 
questions stated above.  The judge stated:  "[In] those 
circumstances, I feel that she was not a person who would have 
understood the complex issues in this particular case." 
We review the judge's dismissal of the jurors for an abuse 
of discretion.  Commonwealth v. Grier, 490 Mass. 455, 467 
(2022).  We will only find an abuse of discretion "where 'the 
judge made a clear error of judgment in weighing the factors 
relevant to the decision . . . such that the decision falls 
outside the range of reasonable alternatives.'"  Id. at 467-468, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Grassie, 476 Mass. 202, 214 (2017), 
42 
 
S.C., 482 Mass. 1017 (2019).  "We afford a trial judge a large 
degree of discretion in the jury selection process."  
Commonwealth v. Perez, 460 Mass. 683, 688 (2011), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Vann Long, 419 Mass. 798, 803 (1995). 
It is a trial judge's duty to ensure that a "prospective 
juror will be able to fairly evaluate the evidence and apply the 
judge's instructions on the law."  Commonwealth v. Williams, 481 
Mass. 443, 453 (2019).  Voir dire of jurors, in a criminal case, 
"shall include questions designed to learn whether such juror 
understands that a defendant is presumed innocent until proven 
guilty, that the [C]ommonwealth has the burden of proving guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the defendant need not 
present evidence on the defendant's behalf."  G. L. c. 234A, 
§ 67A.  "If the court finds that such juror does not so 
understand, another juror shall be called in."  Id. 
The judge's questions and the attorneys' inquiry of both 
jurors were designed to ensure understanding of these crucial 
concepts.  As to juror no. 14, despite her clear 
misunderstanding of the quintessential legal principle of 
"presumption of innocence," the judge allowed the attorneys to 
question her extensively, presumably with the hope that she 
would gain an understanding.  The judge explicitly indicated 
that he was sensitive to her similarity in race to the 
43 
 
defendants, but his concern that she could not understand the 
important legal concepts at play resulted in her exclusion. 
Although the attorneys were not permitted to examine juror 
no. 65 as they were juror no. 14, it was clear based on the voir 
dire that juror no. 65 had comprehension problems that likely 
would affect her ability to serve as a juror in this complicated 
trial.  Juror no. 65 herself acknowledged that the language 
barrier would make it difficult for her to serve on the jury.  
When a "person is not able to speak and understand the English 
language," there are grounds for disqualification from jury 
service.  G. L. c. 234A, § 4. 
It is true that, in certain circumstances, "[a] 'lack of 
working knowledge of the vocabulary of criminal law . . . simply 
does not qualify as a valid, race-neutral basis on which to 
exercise a peremptory challenge."  Commonwealth v. Rosa-Roman, 
485 Mass. 617, 637 (2020), quoting Commonwealth v. Benoit, 452 
Mass. 212, 224 (2008) (improper to exercise peremptory challenge 
in response to juror's confusion about word "interest" in 
context of having "stake in the case").  See Benoit, supra 
("juror's slip of the tongue" in her use of term "prosecute" 
rather than "convict" did not qualify as race-neutral basis to 
exercise peremptory challenge).  Nonetheless, lack of 
comprehension is a "legitimate reason[] to doubt [a] juror's 
suitability to serve."  Grier, 490 Mass. at 468. 
44 
 
In Grier, 490 Mass. at 467, a juror who had been seated was 
discovered, following a criminal record check, to have failed to 
disclose several prior arrests and charges when filling out the 
questionnaire.  After an additional voir dire with the juror on 
the next day of jury selection, the judge excused him for cause, 
citing "concerns about comprehension and about candor."  Id.  
Defense counsel objected, as this was the only Black male on the 
jury.  Id.  We held that it was a fair inference that the 
failures to disclose could be explained by either a lack of 
candor or comprehension, which supported the judge's decision to 
excuse him.  Id. at 468.  This conclusion was bolstered by the 
juror's nonresponsive answers to the judge's questions during 
the additional voir dire.  Id. 
Similarly, here, both juror nos. 14 and 65 gave answers 
that illustrated their lack of comprehension, despite both of 
their seemingly genuine efforts to understand.  This did not 
appear to be connected to any heightened standard imposed by the 
judge as to a juror's intelligence, education, or robust 
knowledge of legal vocabulary, but rather appeared to be 
connected to the jurors' minimal understanding of the 
defendant's right to be presumed innocent and their ability to 
follow instructions as given to them by the judge.  Contrast 
Commonwealth v. Robertson, 480 Mass. 383, 396 n.11 (2018) 
(Commonwealth's reason for challenge that "juror did not seem 
45 
 
intelligent" was "insufficient in these circumstances" to 
overcome other considerations in first step of Batson-Soares 
analysis).  In such circumstances, we cannot say that the judge 
abused his discretion in dismissing them. 
Nor can we conclude that the judge's dismissal of the 
jurors was a product of implicit bias, where he had legitimate, 
comprehension-based reasons to excuse them.25  To the contrary, 
at least as to juror no. 14, the judge explicitly acknowledged 
her race in making the difficult determination to excuse her.  
The judge did not improperly "scrub[] [the jury] . . . of a 
group of jurors, representative of a substantial segment of 
society, who might have been particularly sensitive to the 
racial dynamics at play in the case," and did not treat juror 
nos. 14 and 65 differently from non-Black jurors, as alleged by 
the defendant.  Commonwealth v. Alves, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 540, 
548 (2019).  The judge excused several non-Black jurors, 
including Hispanic and white individuals, who expressed a 
failure to comprehend core foundational principles or difficulty 
 
25 See Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 485 Mass. 491, 516 n.1 
(2020) (Lowy, J., concurring), quoting Commonwealth v. Buckley, 
478 Mass. 861, 878 n.4 (2018) ("Multiple studies confirm the 
existence of implicit bias, and that implicit bias predicts 
real-world behavior. . . .  That is, even people who do not 
believe themselves to harbor implicit bias may in fact act in 
ways that disfavor people of color"). 
46 
 
with English during voir dire.26  And just as the judge gave 
juror nos. 6 and 39, for example, an opportunity to explain and 
clarify their answers (partly, as it related to juror no. 6, in 
response to defense counsel's confusingly worded questions), he 
also gave juror no. 14 numerous opportunities to clarify her 
answers, as discussed in detail supra.  As to juror no. 65, the 
transcript and her answers in the questionnaire convey that she 
had a problem understanding the judge's basic questions, without 
even getting into the legal principles in the case.  See 
Williams, 481 Mass. at 457 ("It is the exclusion of prospective 
jurors 'solely by virtue of their membership in, or affiliation 
with, particular, defined groupings in the community' that 
violates a defendant's constitutional right to a fair and 
impartial jury, not excusing prospective jurors for cause 
because the judge believes, after voir dire, that they cannot be 
impartial" [citation omitted]).  There was no error here. 
c.  O'Brien's identification of the defendant.  The 
defendant argues that the admission of O'Brien's identification 
of the defendant as the man depicted in the surveillance video 
recording was improper, and that the error was compounded by the 
 
26 The selected jury were comprised of nine white jurors, 
one Asian juror, two Brazilian-Hispanic jurors, one Black juror, 
one juror who did not reveal race, and two for whom the office 
of jury commissioner lacked data on their race, but whom counsel 
noted to be white. 
47 
 
prosecutor's reference to the "distinctive braids" of the person 
in the video recording and the judge's identification 
instruction.  The Commonwealth argues that the judge properly 
allowed O'Brien to identify the defendant in the surveillance 
footage, that the prosecutor never mentioned the identification 
in closing argument and appropriately responded to defense 
counsel's closing argument by mentioning the braids, and that 
the judge's instruction was proper. 
Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion in limine to 
exclude lay opinion testimony regarding the identity of persons 
in surveillance video recordings.  This motion was denied as to 
O'Brien's identification of the persons in the recordings.  The 
judge wrote: 
"I have reviewed the videos in question and find they are 
generally of good quality, but neither unmistakably clear 
nor hopelessly obscure.  The appearances of the defendants 
as they will be seen in court are different than the 
appearances of the persons in the videos, where hats and 
hooded sweatshirts obscure some of the features.  One of 
the defendants is wearing glasses in court and it is not 
clear that the persons in the video are wearing glasses.  
Finally, the Trooper's familiarity with the defendants 
based on his investigation of this matter is a factor 
weighing in favor of the admissibility of such an 
identification." 
 
As mentioned supra, over objection, O'Brien identified the 
defendant in the surveillance video recording several times 
throughout the trial.  Because the defendant objected to 
O'Brien's identification of the defendant at trial, we review 
48 
 
his identification testimony for prejudicial error.  Grier, 490 
Mass. at 475-476. 
As an expression of opinion, identifying a person from a 
video image "is admissible only where 'the subject matter to 
which the testimony relates cannot be reproduced or described to 
the jury precisely as it appeared to the witness at the time.'"  
Commonwealth v. Wardsworth, 482 Mass. 454, 475 (2019), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Austin, 421 Mass. 357, 366 (1995).  The purpose 
of such lay witness testimony is to "assist the jurors in making 
their own independent identification."  Wardsworth, supra, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Pina, 481 Mass. 413, 429 (2019).  "The 
general rule is that a witness's opinion concerning the identity 
of a person depicted in a surveillance photograph is admissible 
if there is some basis for concluding that the witness is more 
likely to correctly identify the defendant from the photograph 
than is the jury."  Pina, supra at 429-430, quoting Commonwealth 
v. Vacher, 469 Mass. 425, 441 (2014).  In other words, these 
identifications are admissible "when the witness possesses 
sufficiently relevant familiarity with the defendant that the 
jury cannot also possess."  Wardsworth, supra, quoting Vacher, 
supra.  "If the witness lacks such familiarity, it is the 
province of the jury to draw their own conclusions regarding the 
identity of the person depicted without the witness's 
assistance."  Wardsworth, supra, quoting Vacher, supra. 
49 
 
Here, as in Wardsworth, "the jury were able to view the 
same surveillance footage that [O'Brien] watched."  Wardsworth, 
482 Mass. at 475.  Although they were not able to see 
photographs taken of the defendant the night of the murder, or 
the sweatshirt and hat that he presumably was wearing at the 
time of the crimes,27 the jury were provided photographs from the 
stop at the drive-through that occurred a little over a day 
after the crimes and the defendant's booking photographs taken 
three days after the crimes.  The only indications that the 
defendant's appearance changed between the time the video 
recording was made and the time of trial were statements from 
his counsel and the judge's decision on the motion in limine 
that he was wearing glasses at the time of trial.  The defendant 
was not wearing glasses in the photographs taken close in time 
to the crimes that were provided to the jury.  Although we 
recognize that O'Brien watched the video recordings numerous 
times during his investigation of this matter, and that he 
interacted with the defendant at the drive-through, he did not 
possess "sufficiently relevant familiarity with the defendant 
that the jury [could not] also possess."  Wardsworth, supra, 
 
27 The Commonwealth introduced pants recovered from the 
defendant's home, which the prosecutor argued he wore during the 
crime. 
50 
 
quoting Vacher, 469 Mass. at 441.28  "The jury were capable of 
viewing the videotape and drawing their own conclusions 
regarding whether the man in the videotape was the defendant 
without the assistance of [O'Brien's] testimony."  Austin, 421 
Mass. at 366.  Therefore, the admission of his lay testimony 
identifying the defendant in the video recording was error. 
This error, however, does not require reversal.  We 
recognize that there is "increase[d] potential for inappropriate 
prejudice to the defendant stemming from identification 
testimony from a police officer who is so designated" (citation 
omitted).  Wardsworth, 482 Mass. at 476.  Nonetheless, we also 
have determined that no prejudice existed in specific 
circumstances where the evidence against the defendant was 
strong, where the identification was fleeting, or where the 
defendant admitted to being present at the scene.  Id.  See 
Austin, 421 Mass. at 366. 
 
In this case, the defendant did not admit to being at the 
scene.  Despite this, where there was no indication that the 
defendant's appearance at trial markedly differed from his 
 
28 Here, O'Brien gained familiarity with the defendant 
through his repeated review of the video recording and one brief 
interaction with the defendant.  We limit our holding to these 
facts and express no opinion on whether a police officer could 
identify a defendant on a video recording or in a photograph if, 
for example, he specifically had surveilled a defendant over a 
longer period of time. 
51 
 
appearance in the video recording and in photographs taken after 
the crime, the jury were "capable of drawing the same 
conclusion" as O'Brien.29  Vacher, 469 Mass. at 442.  Contrary to 
the defendant's assertion, the jury saw the Burlington hotel 
video recording before O'Brien identified the defendant as one 
of the people in the recording.30  Based on the photographs and 
the recording admitted, the jury could have found that the 
defendant resembled the individual on the recording.  Although 
O'Brien mentioned his identification of the defendant in the 
recording approximately four or five times throughout his 
extensive testimony, no other witness was permitted to identify 
the defendant in the recordings.  Contrast Wardsworth, 482 Mass. 
at 474 (four officers identified defendant in video footage, one 
pointing out similarity to defendant's clothing before jury saw 
video recording). 
Further, although no other witness identified the defendant 
at the scene of the crime, the evidence against the defendant 
was strong.  Aside from the similarity to the man in the video 
footage, on the day following the shooting, the defendant was in 
 
29 The video footage admitted was "neither '. . . 
unmistakably clear or . . . hopelessly obscure.'"  Commonwealth 
v. Pleas, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 321, 325 (2000), quoting United 
States v. Jackman, 48 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1995). 
 
30 The fact that O'Brien told the jury he watched the Saugus 
hotel video footage "dozens and dozens of times" does not alter 
our conclusion here, for the reasons stated infra. 
52 
 
the distinct car shown in the video recording.  The defendant 
lied to the officers about his whereabouts at the time of the 
crimes.  At 12:30 P.M. on July 2, 2015, after several messages 
were found on Jeune's cell phone regarding the murder, Jeune 
sent a text message to the defendant, "Ima kall u in a min.  Its 
on da news."31  There were repeated telephone calls between Jeune 
and the defendant in the days before, on the day of, and in the 
days following the murder.  The defendant was acutely aware of 
Jeune's new cell phone number after the murder:  on June 12, he 
gave an individual the 9575 number when asked for Jeune's cell 
phone number; on July 3, the day after the murder, he gave that 
same individual the 9096 number.  There was no outgoing activity 
on the defendant's cell phone on July 2 from 12:09 to 12:35 
A.M.; the murder happened at approximately 12:20 A.M.  The CSLI 
placed both the defendant's cell phone and the cell phone with 
the 9575 number in Boston before and after the murder.  This 
evidence, connected with the abundance of evidence against 
Jeune, his joint venturer, supports our conclusion.  See Vacher, 
469 Mass. at 442 ("The testimony, brief and fleeting as it was, 
did not overwhelm the other compelling, properly admitted 
evidence against the defendant"); Austin, 421 Mass. at 366 
(admission of identification testimony not reversible error 
 
31 A minute later, Jeune sent a text message to "Mama Bear" 
that "[t]hey didn't even search the room yet." 
53 
 
where, in part, evidence pointing to defendant was 
"overwhelming"). 
Additionally, and most impactful to our determination that 
the admission of the testimony was not prejudicial, the judge 
gave several forceful instructions regarding O'Brien's 
identification of the defendant on the video recording.  During 
O'Brien's testimony, the judge instructed the jury: 
"You've heard some opinion evidence or testimony from this 
witness who has identified various people in the videos 
that you've seen from several hotels.  That evidence, the 
opinion evidence was offered for whatever assistance it may 
provide to you in your own determinations in this case.  
You are not bound to accept that testimony and, indeed, you 
must make your own determinations as to what you see in 
those security videos.  That is your determination and your 
determination alone.  You may consider the testimony of 
Trooper O'Brien regarding the identity of those persons in 
the video, along with all of the other evidence, and you 
may give it whatever weight, if any, that you deem it is 
fairly entitled to receive, but you must remember that you 
must decide for yourselves what those security videos show 
you."  (Emphases added.) 
 
 
Again, as a part of his instructions to the jury at the 
close of evidence, the judge also gave an identification 
instruction, reminding the jury that an identification must be 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  He specifically mentioned 
O'Brien in this instruction: 
"As with any witness, you must determine the credibility of 
a witness identifying a defendant as a participant in the 
crimes charged.  In this case, Trooper Sean O'Brien 
provided some identification evidence.  If you conclude 
that he was not telling the truth regarding the 
identification of the persons in the security videos, you 
must disregard that testimony.  If you conclude that he 
54 
 
intended to tell the truth, you must also consider the 
possibility that the witness made a good faith error in 
identification.  That is, you should consider whether the 
witness could be honestly mistaken in his identification of 
the defendants" (emphasis added). 
 
The judge then went on to discuss why people make mistakes in 
identification, listing factors that the jury should consider 
when determining whether the identification made by O'Brien was 
accurate.  He also instructed the jury, "You may consider that 
the witness and the persons he identified are of different 
races.  Research has shown that people of all races may have 
greater difficulty in accurately identifying members of a 
different race than they do in identifying members of their own 
race."  See Commonwealth v. Bastaldo, 472 Mass. 16, 18 (2015) 
("cross-racial instruction should always be included when giving 
the model eyewitness identification instruction, unless the 
parties agree that there was no cross-racial identification"); 
Commonwealth v. Gomes, 470 Mass. 352, 382 (2015) (Appendix), 
S.C., 478 Mass. 1025 (2018) (appropriate to add jury instruction 
of this nature where witness and offender are of different 
races).  He finished the identification instruction with more 
comments specific to O'Brien's identification: 
"In the end, you must determin[e] for yourselves what the 
security videos show you.  You may give the identification 
testimony of Trooper O'Brien whatever weight you deem it is 
fairly entitled to receive.  If you are not convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt that a person was a person who 
committed or who participated in the commission of the 
crimes charged, that defendant must be found not guilty. 
55 
 
 
"Now, you heard testimony from Trooper O'Brien who 
identified persons that in his opinion were seen in 
security videos from several hotels.  That evidence was 
offered for whatever assistance, if any, that it provided 
to you in your determinations in this case.  You are not 
bound in any way to accept that testimony, and you must 
make your own determinations as to what you see in those 
security videos.  That is your determination and your 
determination alone. 
 
"You may consider the testimony of Trooper O'Brien 
regarding the persons in the security videos, along with 
all of the other evidence, and you may give it whatever 
weight, if any, that you deem it is fairly entitled to 
receive.  But you must remember that you must decide for 
yourselves what those security videos show you."  (Emphases 
added.) 
 
Assuming that the defendant preserved his objection to 
these identification instructions, they closely followed the 
Model Jury Instructions on Eyewitness Identification, 473 Mass. 
1051 (2015).  Although O'Brien was not an "eyewitness" present 
at the scene of the crime, these instructions were appropriate 
where he was a lay witness identifying the defendant as someone 
he saw at the scene of the crime (albeit in a video recording of 
that scene).  Cf. Commonwealth v. Snyder, 475 Mass. 445, 455 
n.24 (2016), citing Commonwealth v. Collins, 470 Mass. 255, 265 
n.15 (2014), (distinction between identification by eyewitness 
at scene of crime and identification by eyewitness who observed 
defendant before or after crime); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 470 
Mass. 389, 396 (2015) ("Because, here, there was no 
identification testimony that significantly incriminated the 
56 
 
defendant, the judge did not abuse his discretion in declining 
to give the modified identification instruction"); Commonwealth 
v. Williams, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 139, 143 (2003) (where eyewitness 
police officers identified defendant, "the jury should have been 
given the choice to conclude that the police officers had not 
lied, but were honestly mistaken in their identifications of the 
defendant").  The insistence of the judge, through these 
instructions, that the jury must determine the identity of the 
men in the video footage on their own commands our conclusion 
that the error in admitting this testimony did not prejudice the 
defendant.  See Commonwealth v. Andrade, 468 Mass. 543, 549 
(2014) ("The jury are presumed to follow the judge's 
instructions"). 
The prosecutor's repeated reference to the defendant's 
"distinctive braids" in closing argument does not alter our 
conclusion.  Where the defendant did not object to this aspect 
of the prosecutor's closing, we review for a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  Commonwealth v. Moffat, 
486 Mass. 193, 201 (2020).  At the outset, it bears mention that 
the defendant's counsel referenced the braids of the individual 
in the video recording, although seemingly to suggest that they 
mean nothing in the context of the perpetrator being the 
defendant.  See Commonwealth v. Fernandes, 478 Mass. 725, 741 
(2018) (prosecutor entitled to point out weaknesses of 
57 
 
defendant's case and reply to defendant's closing argument).  In 
Commonwealth v. Davis, 487 Mass. 448, 469 (2021), S.C., 491 
Mass. 1011 (2023), we recognized that "braided hairstyles are 
not uncommon among Black people," and pointed out that even if 
there were evidence that the length of the defendant's hair were 
similar to that of the perpetrator in the video recording, it 
would have fallen short, in that particular case, of evidence 
from which the jury could have identified the defendant as the 
perpetrator in the recording.  Id. at 469 n.26.  As a result, we 
held that it was improper for the Commonwealth to suggest that 
the jury could identify the defendant based on the recording.  
Id. at 469. 
Here, although the video recordings from the various hotels 
were not clear, they were not altogether "[low] enough 
resolution [or] taken from too far away to be [un]able to 
discern any features of the [defendant's] face," unlike the 
video recording in Davis, 487 Mass. at 469.  On at least two of 
the recordings, a conscientious observer can see that the 
individual alleged to be the defendant has a small amount of 
facial hair, and the individual's face is visible for a short 
period of time, particularly in the Saugus video recording.32  In 
each of the recordings, the individual's chin-length, single 
 
32 In the booking photographs of the defendant, he has a 
small amount of facial hair on his chin and a mustache. 
58 
 
braids are visible.  This comported with the testimony of the 
defendant's former girlfriend, who said that at the time, she 
braided the defendant's single, "unattached," chin-length 
braids, and the booking photographs of the defendant, which 
clearly depict the same style of braids.  Further, the 
prosecutor did not only focus on the braids of the person in the 
video recordings but also pointed out the individual's build and 
the "tapered" cargo pants similar to those recovered by police 
from the defendant's home.  Because the video recordings were of 
sufficient quality to discern other features of the individual 
depicted, the prosecutor did not err in her repeated references 
to the similarity of the braids to those of the defendant. 
Finally, in closing argument, the prosecutor never relied 
on O'Brien's identification of the defendant in the surveillance 
video recordings.33  Rather, the prosecutor implored the jury to 
 
33 The closest the prosecutor came to discussing the 
identification testimony was: 
 
"You see [the defendant's] build and, yes, you see the 
tapered pant leg of the cargo pants described by . . . 
O'Brien as what he observed in that videotape. . . . 
 
". . . 
 
"In this case, you also have the benefit of very good video 
showing [the defendant] walking through at Saugus, as well 
as at Woburn, as well as the [hotel] in Burlington, that 
all show his stride in his walk.  And I'd ask you to look 
carefully at that because it bears out the description 
given by . . . O'Brien, as well as the type of pants that 
police recovered from his home." 
59 
 
compare the photographs in evidence of the defendant with the 
individual seen in the video recordings to make their own 
identification, paying attention to the defendant's "unique 
appearance."  This, as well, contributes to our determination 
that the defendant was not prejudiced by the improper testimony. 
d.  Sufficiency of evidence for felony-murder.  The 
defendant argues that the evidence supporting his conviction of 
murder in the first degree was insufficient in the wake of 
Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass. 805 (2017), cert. denied, 139 
S. Ct. 54 (2018).34  In our review of the denial of a motion for 
a required finding of not guilty, "we consider the evidence 
introduced at trial in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, and determine whether a rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt."  Oberle, 476 Mass. at 547. 
In Brown, a majority of the court held that: 
"a defendant who commits an armed robbery as a joint 
venturer will be found guilty of murder where a killing was 
committed in the course of that robbery if he or she 
knowingly participated in the killing with the intent 
required to commit it -- that is, with the intent either to 
kill, to cause grievous bodily harm, or to do an act which, 
in the circumstances known to the defendant, a reasonable 
person would have known created a plain and strong 
likelihood that death would result" (emphasis added). 
 
 
34 The defendant's trial commenced after this court's 
holding in Brown, 477 Mass. 805. 
60 
 
Brown, 477 Mass. at 832 (Gants, C.J., concurring).  In doing so, 
the court limited the scope of felony-murder "to its statutory 
role under G. L. c. 265, § 1, as an aggravating element of 
murder" where the killing occurs "in the course of a felony 
punishable by life imprisonment."  Id. at 807.  This "eliminated 
the theory of proof of criminal intent by constructive malice."  
Commonwealth v. Dawson, 490 Mass. 521, 531 (2022). 
Where, as in Brown, the predicate felony was attempted 
armed robbery, "the Commonwealth also was required to prove that 
the defendant knew that one of his accomplices possessed a 
firearm."  Brown, 477 Mass. at 812.  "Knowing participation in a 
criminal offense 'may take any of several forms,' and includes 
providing 'aid or assistance in committing the crime.'"  Id. at 
812-813, quoting Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449, 470 
(2009) (Appendix). 
 
Attempted armed robbery is a proper underlying felony to 
support a conviction of murder in the first degree based on a 
theory of felony-murder.  Commonwealth v. Quiles, 488 Mass. 298, 
306 (2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1237 (2022).  "An attempt 
is defined as (1) an intent to commit the underlying crime and 
(2) an overt act towards its commission."  Id. at 308, quoting 
Brown, 477 Mass. at 812 n.5.35 
 
35 To support an armed robbery conviction as part of a joint 
venture, the Commonwealth must prove "that the defendant was 
61 
 
The evidence formed a foundation for the jury to conclude 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, knowing Jeune was 
armed with a firearm, went to the Burlington hotel with the 
intent to rob Johnson at gunpoint.36  After the defendant 
participated in the robbery of Emily, during which he knocked on 
her door to gain entry and took her money and belongings while 
Jeune held a gun to her head, at least at that point, he would 
have been aware that Jeune had a firearm and was prepared to use 
it to carry out the robbery of Johnson.  Indeed, the jury's 
verdict acknowledged as much where the jury convicted the 
defendant of murder in the first degree of Johnson, but 
acquitted him on unlawful possession of a firearm, home 
invasion, and armed assault in a dwelling, and convicted him of 
the lesser included offense of unarmed robbery of Emily.  "Even 
if the defendant had been unaware that [Jeune] possessed a 
weapon in advance, it would be reasonable to conclude that he 
became aware over the course of the" robbery of Emily, "and 
continued to participate" in the attempted robbery of Johnson, 
 
part of a venture in which at least one of the coventurers was 
armed with a dangerous weapon, either applied violence to the 
victim['s] bod[y] or put [her] in fear, and took the victim['s] 
property with the intent to steal it."  Commonwealth v. Rakes, 
478 Mass. 22, 33 (2017). 
 
36 In so holding, we rely on our conclusion that the 
evidence was sufficient for the jury to identify the defendant 
as the man with the braids. 
62 
 
"implicating him in the joint venture."  Commonwealth v. Rakes, 
478 Mass. 22, 33 (2017).  See Commonwealth v. Eagles, 491 Mass. 
210, 219 (2023) (defendant's continued participation in robbery 
after learning of coventurer's use of weapon, combined with his 
failure to render aid to victim, telephone 911, or disassociate 
himself from coventurer, demonstrated necessary intent for armed 
robbery); Commonwealth v. Phap Buth, 480 Mass. 113, 117, cert. 
denied, 139 S. Ct. 607 (2018) ("Where a defendant continues to 
act in furtherance of the joint venture even after learning of a 
coventurer's weapon, we have allowed an inference that the 
coventurer had the requisite intent for the joint venture"). 
 
We reject the defendant's contention that the jury could 
not have found that he carried out "an act which, in the 
circumstances known to the defendant, a reasonable person would 
have known created a plain and strong likelihood that death 
would result" because there was no evidence that he knew Jeune's 
gun was loaded or functional, or that he believed Jeune would 
fire the gun.37  Brown, 477 Mass. at 832 (Gants, C.J., 
concurring).  "Absent proof that the defendant himself was 
armed, proof that he knew his coventurer to be armed suffices to 
satisfy the standard" for attempted armed robbery.  Rakes, 478 
Mass. at 33.  "Where an unarmed felon knows that his accomplice 
 
37 "The Commonwealth was not required to prove who shot the 
victim."  Commonwealth v. Housen, 458 Mass. 702, 708 (2011). 
63 
 
in a robbery is carrying a gun, even if he believes the gun is 
unloaded and his accomplice has no ammunition, that robbery is 
inherently dangerous to human life."  Commonwealth v. Carter, 
396 Mass. 234, 237 (1985).  Even if a gun were unloaded, its use 
"may provoke violent resistance from the intended victim or may 
spur others, such as police officers, to intervene with deadly 
force."  Id. 
 
During the robbery of Emily, while the defendant was in the 
room with Emily and Jeune and standing to the left of Jeune, 
Jeune said to Emily, "If you scream, believe me, I can scream 
louder."  From this, the jury could infer that the defendant was 
aware that Jeune was willing to discharge the weapon if 
necessary to ensure the compliance of their victims.  
Notwithstanding this awareness, the defendant continued to 
participate in the robbery of Emily, and then the attempted 
robbery of Johnson.  That Jeune did not fire the gun during the 
incident involving Sarah (where they were not able to enter her 
room) or the robbery of Emily (where Emily complied with their 
demands) does not convince us otherwise.  Although we 
acknowledge, after Brown, 477 Mass. at 835 (Gants, C.J., 
concurring), that not every killing committed in the course of a 
life felony would constitute felony-murder, the defendant's 
participation in this case does, because in attempting to rob 
Johnson after the robbery of Emily, he committed "an act which, 
64 
 
in the circumstances known to the defendant, a reasonable person 
would have known created a plain and strong likelihood that 
death would result."  Id. at 832 (Gants, C.J., concurring). 
 
That the defendant and Jeune did not take Johnson's money 
after the shooting also does not alter our conclusion, where it 
is the defendant's intent before the shooting, not after, that 
is relevant, and where their failure to take the money may have 
been attributable to their desire to distance themselves from 
the scene of the crime as expeditiously as possible.  That 
Johnson did not act as submissively as they might have hoped 
does not alter their intent on entry to her room.  We disagree 
with the defendant that the evidence "suggests Jeune did not 
intend to shoot Johnson."  The loud bang was heard by guests of 
the Burlington hotel after they heard a woman yelling for help, 
and Johnson was discovered with the telephone cord stretched out 
under her body with blood smears by the telephone, suggesting 
that Johnson was killed to keep her quiet. 
 
We also reject the defendant's contention that the 
defendant could not have anticipated the shooting because "the 
robbers targeted sex workers in hotels because they were trying 
to avoid resistance, violence, and attention."38  To begin, it 
does not inure to the defendant's benefit that he chose victims 
 
38 The defendant's trial counsel made a similar argument in 
closing. 
65 
 
whom he thought were particularly vulnerable.  Doing so does not 
support an argument that he was at all concerned about harming 
the victims.  In any event, that the victims were working as 
escorts equally could have supported an inference that they 
would be armed in preparation for any conflict that might arise 
in the course of their work.  See Phap Buth, 480 Mass. at 117 
n.7 (where defendant argued that victims' characteristics 
supported inference that defendant would not expect coventurers 
to be armed based on need to overcome victim resistance, 
victims' physical characteristics equally supported inference 
that they would be armed). 
Last, the defendant urges that fundamental principles of 
criminal law surrounding proportionality of criminal liability 
to moral culpability require a determination that an accomplice 
must be subjectively aware that his coventurer's actions create 
a plain and strong likelihood of death.  "We consistently have 
rejected the argument that the felony-murder rule is 
unconstitutional, . . . or that it relieves the Commonwealth of 
its obligation to prove a defendant's own moral culpability."  
Brown, 477 Mass. at 823.39  As we held in Brown, supra:  "We 
 
39 The cases of Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), and 
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987), cited by the defendant in 
support, are inapposite.  In Enmund, supra at 797, the United 
States Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment to the 
Federal Constitution did not permit the imposition of the death 
penalty on a defendant who did not himself kill, attempt to 
66 
 
discern no reason . . . to accept the defendant's invitation 
that we abolish the felony-murder rule."40 
 
e.  Jury instructions.  During deliberations, the judge 
received a question from the jury regarding his felony-murder 
jury instructions.  The jury asked whether "intended to do an 
act" referred to "attempted armed robbery or the discharge of a 
firearm."  In the discussions with the judge regarding an 
appropriate answer, defense counsel acknowledged that depending 
on "[the] circumstance[s] in which an attempted armed robbery is 
occurring, [it] may meet third prong malice" for the purposes of 
felony-murder under Brown.  Nonetheless, he asked that the judge 
instruct the jury that "attempted armed robbery cannot be, in 
and of itself . . . the intended act described in element 4(c)," 
 
kill, or intend that a killing take place in his commission of a 
felony.  In so holding, the Court focused on the severity of the 
death penalty.  Id.  In Tison, supra at 154, the Court 
determined that there was an "apparent consensus that 
substantial participation in a violent felony [in] circumstances 
likely to result in the loss of innocent human life may justify 
the death penalty even absent an 'intent to kill.'"  The Court 
held "that major participation in the felony committed, combined 
with reckless indifference to human life, is sufficient to 
satisfy the Enmund culpability requirement."  Id. at 158.  As 
both Enmund and Tison focused on the imposition of the death 
penalty, neither case is pertinent here. 
 
40 Therefore, the jury instruction given by the judge on 
third prong malice, which the defendant admits tracked the Model 
Jury Instructions on Homicide, was accurate. 
67 
 
and that in this case the "act" would be the discharge of a 
firearm.41  The judge's written response to the jury provided: 
"You must determine separately for each defendant from the 
totality of the circumstances which you find occurred 
whether what occurred constitutes an intent to do an act 
which in the circumstances known to the defendant a 
reasonable person would have known created a plain and 
strong likelihood that death would occur."42 
 
 
The defendant argues that this instruction was insufficient 
following Brown, building on his argument that a defendant's 
intent to commit an armed robbery alone could not establish a 
plain and strong likelihood of death, and that the only 
 
41 "Element 4(c)" refers to a portion of the felony-murder 
model jury instruction: 
 
"To prove the defendant guilty of felony-murder in the 
first degree, the Commonwealth must prove the following 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 
 
". . . 
 
"4.  The defendant: 
 
". . . 
 
"c.  intended to do an act which, in the circumstances 
known to the defendant, a reasonable person would have 
known created a plain and strong likelihood that death 
would result." 
 
Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 59-60 (2018). 
 
42 After hearing the written instruction, defense counsel 
asked whether the judge could include "at the moment of the 
discharge of the firearm."  The judge declined to do so but 
noted counsel's objection. 
68 
 
intentional act that could have supported his conviction was the 
act of shooting Johnson.  The defendant's argument is misplaced. 
 
In Brown, contrary to the defendant's contentions, the 
court did not hold that an armed robbery could never be the act 
supporting a finding of third prong malice.  Rather, the court 
held that commission of the crime of armed robbery (or attempted 
armed robbery), in and of itself, is no longer sufficient to 
uphold a conviction of felony-murder; one must look to the 
circumstances known to the defendant at the time he committed 
such an "act."  Brown, 477 Mass. at 832 (Gants, C.J., 
concurring).  The court did not define "act" further.  Analyzing 
Brown, the "act" could be the shooting of a gun.  The "act" 
could also reasonably be the commission of a dangerous attempted 
armed robbery, which a reasonable person would have known 
created a plain and strong likelihood that death would occur.  
As discussed supra, the evidence supported the jury's conclusion 
that the defendant's actions throughout his participation in the 
attempts to rob Sarah, Emily, and Johnson supported the malice 
prong.  There was no error. 
 
The defendant further argues that the judge inappropriately 
instructed the jury: 
"[A]s a general rule you are permitted but not required to 
infer that a person who intentionally uses a dangerous 
weapon on another person intends to kill that person or to 
cause that person grievous bodily harm or intends to do an 
act which in the circumstances known to him a reasonable 
69 
 
person would know creates a plain and strong likelihood 
that death would result." 
 
This instruction comports with the supplemental instructions in 
the Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 105 (2018).  The 
defendant argues that because there was no evidence that the 
defendant knew the gun was loaded or that Jeune intended to 
shoot Johnson, the inference that the defendant acted with 
malice based on his knowledge of Jeune's use of a gun was 
impermissible.  He relies on Commonwealth v. Colas, 486 Mass. 
831 (2021), in making this argument. 
 
In Colas, 486 Mass. at 835, during a confrontation between 
two groups, the defendant raised his hand and pointed a gun 
toward another man.  In response, that man fired four or five 
shots at the defendant, striking two bystanders, one of whom was 
killed.  Id.  In the unique circumstances of Colas, the court 
held that the defendant's pointing of a gun at the man who fired 
his gun in return did not support the jury instruction mentioned 
supra, because it was not "a typical case involving someone 
alleged to have shot, stabbed, or clubbed a victim."  Id. at 
843.  Colas is not helpful to the defendant because the evidence 
suggested, as discussed supra, that Johnson was shot 
70 
 
intentionally as part of the joint venture.  This instruction 
was given properly to the jury.43 
 
f.  Closing argument.  The defendant takes issue with the 
prosecutor's pattern in closing argument of referencing items 
that were used in the crimes as used and possessed by both 
coventurers.  He points to the following sentences in the 
Commonwealth's closing argument: 
"They came with a firearm, a weapon.  They had ammunition 
for that weapon. . . . 
 
"They had a cell phone, . . . that had no subscriber. . . .  
They had a smart phone, the Alcatel, that was found in 
. . . Jeune's car. . . . 
 
"They also had a car, a Toyota Camry, . . . with a 
different color front passenger side quarter panel, a 
missing rear hubcap, a different color gas door opener, and 
a sunroof. . . . 
 
"[T]hey had ammunition for a handgun, .380 caliber class 
ammunition, consistent with the bullet that killed . . . 
Johnson, that was found in the backseat of a Jeep in the 
driveway at . . . Jeune's house." 
 
Where the defendant objected to the prosecutor's repeated use of 
the word "they" at trial, we review for prejudicial error.  
Commonwealth v. Durand, 475 Mass. 657, 670 (2016), cert. denied, 
583 U.S. 896 (2017). 
 
43 In the absence of any evidence that the murder of Johnson 
was an accident, the defendant was not entitled to an 
instruction on accident.  See Commonwealth v. Podkowka, 445 
Mass. 692, 699 (2006) ("Where there is no evidence of accident, 
the issue is not fairly raised and the judge need not give an 
accident instruction"). 
71 
 
 
"Under our case law, '[w]hile prosecutors are entitled to 
argue "forcefully for the defendant's conviction," closing 
arguments must be limited to facts in evidence and the fair 
inferences that may be drawn from those facts.'"  Commonwealth 
v. Alvarez, 480 Mass. 299, 305 (2018), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Rutherford, 476 Mass. 639, 643 (2017).  We examine all the 
statements challenged by the defendant "in the context of the 
entire closing, the jury instructions, and the evidence 
introduced at trial."  Commonwealth v. Kapaia, 490 Mass. 787, 
801 (2022), quoting Commonwealth v. Cheng Sun, 490 Mass. 196, 
217 (2022).  "Although 'counsel may argue the evidence and the 
fair inferences which can be drawn from the evidence,' . . . 'a 
prosecutor should not . . . misstate the evidence or refer to 
facts not in evidence.'"  Kapaia, supra at 804, quoting Cheng 
Sun, supra at 221. 
 
There was no error in the Commonwealth's use of the word 
"they" in the above statements.  The evidence demonstrated that 
as the defendant and Jeune carried out their scheme, they used a 
firearm to subdue their victims.  That firearm evidently 
contained ammunition with which they shot Johnson, and the class 
of ammunition found in Jeune's Jeep could have been used to kill 
Johnson.  Although the statement about the ammunition in Jeune's 
Jeep is a close call, we think the evidence supported the 
prosecutor's statement.  It is irrelevant that there was no 
72 
 
specific evidence that the firearm used during the joint venture 
was in the hands of the defendant.  As the two men used a 
firearm to further the joint venture, the prosecutor's 
statements were accurate.  Similarly, the cell phone with no 
identified subscriber was used to contact the victims, and the 
Alcatel number was used to visit Backpage and communicate with 
the defendant's cell phone about the crime.  The Camry was used 
to drive the defendant and Jeune to each of the crime scenes.  
There need not be evidence regarding the defendant's personal 
use of these devices and the Camry to attribute the items to him 
throughout the joint venture.  "Acts of a joint venturer 
amounting to consciousness of guilt may be attributed to another 
joint venturer if the acts occurred during the course of a joint 
venture and in furtherance of it."  Wardsworth, 482 Mass. at 463 
n.16, quoting Commonwealth v. Mahoney, 405 Mass. 326, 330-331 
(1989).  See Commonwealth v. Braley, 449 Mass. 316, 321-322 
(2007) (actions of joint venturer in disposing of his rifle, 
fleeing, and painting his truck attributable to defendant 
because they were done in furtherance of continuing joint 
venture). 
 
Even if we did hold that the statements were error, any 
error did not prejudice the defendant.  These statements were 
spread out over a span of eight pages of transcript in a closing 
argument that spanned over thirty pages.  Additionally, the 
73 
 
judge instructed the jury that closing arguments are not 
evidence on two separate occasions and explained that he did not 
allow the jurors to have their notebooks during closing 
arguments for that reason.  See Commonwealth v. Lester, 486 
Mass. 239, 249 (2020) (judge's instructions that closing 
arguments not evidence mitigated error where misstatements were 
thirteen words of thirty-three page argument). 
 
g.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Finally, we have 
reviewed the entire record of this case pursuant to G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, including but not limited to the remainder of the 
issues in the defendant's motions to suppress, the admission of 
the Saugus video recording and Sarah's testimony, the 
defendant's past gun possession as a prior bad act, and the 
judge's admission of the grand jury testimony of the defendant's 
former girlfriend where the judge found she was feigning memory 
loss.  We conclude that there is no reason to reduce the 
defendant's sentence on his conviction of murder or to order a 
new trial. 
 
This is not a case such as Brown, 477 Mass. at 824, where 
the defendant was involved in the "remote outer fringes" of the 
attempted armed robbery, robbery, and murder.  The defendant 
went to three different hotels in what the evidence showed to be 
a planned effort to rob escorts at gunpoint with Jeune.  It does 
not move us that Emily testified that the man who did not have 
74 
 
the gun was "empathetic" to her.  As Jeune kept the gun trained 
on Emily, the defendant ransacked her room, grabbing her money, 
wallet, and marijuana, continuing after Jeune threatened to hurt 
Emily if she did not keep quiet.  After the defendant 
participated in this violent encounter, he went to the 
Burlington hotel to do it again, and he was present when the 
shot was fired that killed Johnson.  After Johnson was killed, 
he fled the hotel with Jeune and quickly left in the Camry.  See 
Commonwealth v. Tillis, 486 Mass. 497, 509 (2020) (defendant 
played central role where he identified drug dealer to target, 
coordinated with accomplice, planned robbery, and entered 
apartment building with knife, despite disparity in sentence for 
more culpable accomplice). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.