Title: Whiteman v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 500, 2003
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: March 25, 2004

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
BENJAMIN F. WHITEMAN, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 500, 2003 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID Nos. 30604628DI and 
§    30901716DI 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: January 30, 2004 
 
 
 
 
  Decided: March 25, 2004 
 
Before BERGER, STEELE, and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 25th day of March 2004, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and 
the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Benjamin Whiteman, filed this appeal from 
the Superior Court’s denial of his motion for correction of sentence.  We find no 
merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
(2) 
The record reflects that Whiteman pled guilty in 1987 to one count of 
second degree burglary.  The 1987 plea agreement provided that the State would 
not recommend a life sentence, but the defendant would admit that his three prior 
felony convictions qualified him as an habitual offender under 11 Del. C. § 
4214(a).  The Superior Court accepted the plea agreement, declared Whiteman to 
 
2
be an habitual offender, and sentenced him to ten years at Level V incarceration, to 
be suspended after serving three years for decreasing levels of supervision.   
(3) 
In 1989, a Superior Court jury convicted Whiteman of third degree 
unlawful sexual penetration.  The Superior Court granted the State’s motion to 
declare Whiteman an habitual offender and sentenced him to life imprisonment in 
accordance with 11 Del. C. § 4214(a).  Since that time, Whiteman has filed 
motions in each case seeking to challenge his status and life sentence as an habitual 
offender on various grounds.  The Superior Court has denied Whiteman’s repeated 
motions, and this Court has affirmed on appeal.1   
(4) 
In this latest appeal, Whiteman asserts a new basis for challenging his 
habitual offender status.  Whiteman argues that, in sentencing him in 1989, the 
Superior Court never revoked or terminated the suspended, probationary portion of 
his 1987 sentence.  Whiteman therefore argues that the 1987 conviction was not 
final and could not serve as a predicate offense in the 1989 habitual offender 
proceedings.  Whiteman did not raise this argument below.  Therefore, we review 
his claim for plain error.2   
(5) 
We find no merit to Whiteman’s latest claim.  This Court previously 
has held that a conviction and sentence, even if the sentence is suspended, 
                                                 
1 E.g., Whiteman v. State, 2003 WL 1965411 (Del. Apr. 22, 2003); Whiteman v. State, 
2001 WL 1329693 (Del. Oct. 23, 2001). 
2 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 8. 
 
3
constitute a prior conviction for purposes of imposing an enhanced penalty under 
11 Del. C. § 4763.3  The same is true under 11 Del. C. § 4214(a).  It would “simply 
beg logic and common sense to say that a person adjudicated guilty of an offense 
who is fined, ordered imprisoned, with execution ‘suspended’. . . has not been 
convicted”4 for purposes of forming a predicate offense under the habitual offender 
statute.   
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Lis v. State, 327 A.2d 746 (Del 1974). 
4 Id. at 748.