Title: Leverton v. Laird
Citation: 190 N.W.2d 427
Docket Number: 54369
State: Iowa
Issuer: Iowa Supreme Court
Date: September 17, 1971

190 N.W.2d 427 (1971) Ivan Gary LEVERTON and Marjorie N. Leverton, Appellees, v. Larry L. LAIRD and Charlotte L. Laird, Appellants. No. 54369. Supreme Court of Iowa. September 17, 1971. *428 Mosier, Thomas, Beatty, Dutton &amp; Braun, Waterloo, for appellants. Swisher &amp; Cohrt, Waterloo, for appellees. BECKER, Justice. The land in question is a vacated street in the city of Waterloo, Iowa. The street was formed by the filing of two separate plats in 1948 (Hilltop Place) and 1950 (Holmes Addition) respectively. The plats subdivided contiguous properties in such manner as to allow 30 feet from each plat to make up the full sixty-foot width of Meadow Lane. The dedication of the two subdivisions contains numerous restrictions *429 which are so similar that restrictions referred to herein will be considered to appear in both dedications unless otherwise noted. The plat provided with the abstract shows the location of the disputed property. The shaded area in question was vacated by the city of Waterloo. *430 Holmes Addition lies immediately south of Hilltop Addition. Lot 1 of Holmes Addition adjoins the now vacated portion of Meadow Lane and is owned by plaintiffs herein. The vacated portion of Meadow Lane is now owned by defendants. Dedication of each of the two subdivisions contained the following clauses: On July 7, 1964 the city counsel passed the following ordinance: Subsequently the city deeded the vacated street to Gertrude M. Small, owner of contiguous Lot 7 in Hilltop Place Addition, by a quitclaim deed which contained the restriction noted in paragraph 2 of the ordinance. In 1964, Small deeded to Orrin W. Hall, Jr., et ux, with the same restriction. On June 17, 1968, the Smalls, as husband and wife attempted to release the restriction contained in their deed to the Halls. Similarly, on November 12, 1968, the City of Waterloo by resolution attempted to remove the restriction against building on the vacated street. The Halls deeded the property to Mr. and Mrs. Laird, defendants herein, on June 21, 1968. The Lairds sold Lot 7 on August 8, 1969 and commenced preparations for building a house on the vacated street. *431 On August 12, 1969 plaintiffs notified defendants that any use of the vacated street "in any manner which violates the terms of the vacation thereof" would be resisted "even to the extent of bringing suit in the district court." Defendants proceeded to commence construction and had made considerable progress with the basement when this action halted further progress about the middle of October, 1969. The trial court found the language in the two plat dedications created an implied restrictive covenant against erection of a building on a vacated street in the addition. Defendants cite this action as a basis for reversal and add that even if such restriction were created by implication the restriction would be illegal and void. Defendants also contend trial court erred in finding the equities were with plaintiffs. Two other issues, i. e., whether the city could restrict use in the manner it first attempted and whether it could remove such restriction at a later date, need not be here decided in light of our disposition of the other three issues. I. Do the restrictions set forth in the dedication of the two subdivisions apply by necessary implication to the vacated street? In this review de novo we hold they do. The trial court's decision was right. The rules governing construction of instruments containing implied covenants in connection with real estate must be reviewed. In Stockdale v. Lester, 158 N.W.2d 20, 22 (Iowa 1968), we said: While it would appear from the first paragraph of the above quotation that implied covenants are entirely prohibited, the last paragraph recognizes intention of the parties as the determinative force. The latter principle is strengthened by the more liberal approach to construction of covenants found in other recent Iowa cases. In Beeler Development Co. v. Dickens, 254 Iowa 1029, 1033, 1034, 120 N.W.2d 414, 416 (1963), we refused to be bound by the strictness of construction heretofore insisted on in some cases: A like move to regard restrictive covenants with greater favor is found in Thodos v. Shirk, 248 Iowa 172, 180, 79 N.W.2d 733, 738 (1956): Defendant cites 21 C.J.S. Covenants § 9, p. 888, as the general rule regarding implied covenants: The trial court found the restriction "one house to a lot" necessarily implies that no house shall be constructed except on the lots. When the entire dedication and plat are examined together we are constrained to agree. The filing of restrictive covenants with subdivision plats is a common practice designed to protect all of the property in the subdivision. When relatively large lots are laid out and precaution is taken to restrict building to no more than one house per lot, the clear intent of the subdivider is to provide uniformly large lots for the mutual protection of each owner. In this case 38 of the 40 lots in the two subdivisions have frontages of 100 feet or more. The two exceptions are 90 feet in width. Clearly the restrictions are designed to prevent building on plats smaller than 90 to 100 feet. Vacation of a 60-foot street creates a parcel which is only two thirds or less the size of the others lots in the subdivision. On this 60-foot parcel defendant proposes to place a home which will take up 50 feet of the frontage, leaving a 5-foot yard on each side. This is the very situation the platting was designed to prevent. Jones v. Haines, Hodges &amp; Jones Bldg. &amp; Develop. Co., 371 S.W.2d 342, 344 (Mo. App.1963), presents an analogous situation but the restriction in that case is somewhat better worded. In deciding the case the Missouri Court of Appeals said: The City of Waterloo recognized this when it placed a restriction in its deed to Mrs. Small. The Smalls continued the recognition when they deeded Lot 7 and the vacated street to the Halls. The Halls sold both parcels to defendants. They sold Lot 7 and were left with an undersized lot for a houseif they could get by the restrictions. The Smalls quitclaimed a release of the deed restriction to the Halls on the same date that the deed from Halls to defendant was filed. The city was later prevailed upon to release its prior restriction. Enough has been said to show we regard this plan as a clear violation of the plain intent of the original restrictions. II. We need not determine whether the Smalls and the city could effectively release the restrictions placed in their original deeds. Except as to the releasing parties themselves, the releases could not affect *433 the rights created by the dedication. Beeler Development Co. v. Dickens, 254 Iowa 1029, 120 N.W.2d 414, 417 (1963) states: Thodos v. Shirk, 248 Iowa 172, 182, 79 N.W.2d 733, 739 (1956), states: III. Defendants' second proposition amounts to this. Since the city vacated the street as empowered by section 368.39, Code, 1971, it owned the plat free of restrictions. The city acquires fee simple title of land dedicated for street use. Code, 1971, § 409.13; Kelroy v. City of Clear Lake, 232 Iowa 161, 5 N.W.2d 12, 16 (1942). But when land is dedicated with limitations on the dedication and the city accepts the plat as dedicated, such action is not void and the limitations have been recognized. Jochimsen v. Johnson, 173 Iowa 553, 561, 562, 156 N.W. 21, 24 (1916), we said: Louden v. Starr, 171 Iowa 528, 539, 154 N.W. 331, 334 (1915) states: In Carson v. State, 240 Iowa 1178, 1189, 38 N.W.2d 168, 175 (1949) we considered a city's power to convey land already publicly owned. Although there are distinctions to be made the holding is apropos: Here each lot owner is presumed to have bought with notice of and in reliance on the material in the plat dedication. Private rights have arisen. The restrictions survive public ownership by the city and are applicable to its grantees. The city paid nothing for the street in the first place. Having determined the street is not needed it may dispose of it. But in doing so it should not be allowed to destroy the original scheme of restrictive covenants applicable to all of the other land. IV. Finally defendants contend the court erred in finding the equities are with plaintiffs. We agree with the trial court. Defendants knew the restrictions were in the dedication and also knew of the prior position of Mrs. Small and the city. They were also clearly warned that plaintiffs would fight the matter in court if there was an attempt to build on the undersized parcel. Defendants' reliance on section 368.40, Code, 1971, is misplaced. Even if we were to hold that the 1968 attempted release of the restriction in the 1964 city deed was a "disposal of property", which we do not, the case in fact turns on rights created in the dedication and is not controlled by the city's later attempted nullification of the restriction. Declaratory judgment action was available to settle the parties' rights. However, defendants elected to go ahead with their building despite plaintiffs' protest. Plaintiffs' action in equity was reasonably prompt thereafter. Affirmed. All Justices concur.