Title: STATE v FIFE
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 14900
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: March 27, 1980

N o . 14900 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1980 STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, vs. H A R O L D MELVIN FIFE, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable C. B. Sande, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Calvin J. Stacey argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana For Respondent : Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Mark Murphy argued, A s s i s t a n t Attorney General, Helena, Montana Harold Hanser, County Attorney, B i l l i n g s , Montana W. Corbin Howard argued, Deputy County Attorney, B i l l i n g s , Montana C '/ . F i l e d : ' ' - - Submitted: February 2 1 , 1980 Decided: , *> M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. O n January 15, 1979, an information w a s f i l e d i n t h e Thirteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t of t h e S t a t e of Montana, in and f o r t h e County of Yellowstone, charging defendant and Robert C. Rodgers, a/k/a Robert G. Lee, with robbery. Defendant entered a p l e a of n o t g u i l t y . O n A p r i l 17, 1979, a f t e r severance of t h e cases, t r i a l i n t h i s matter was had. The c o u r t sat with a jury, which returned a v e r d i c t of g u i l t y . Defendant appeals from t h e f i n a l judgment and a d e n i a l of h i s motion f o r a new t r i a l . Defendant and Rodgers were charged with a robbery a t t h e home of M r . and M r s . C u r t i s Workman of Laurel, Montana, on December 1 4 , 1978. M r s . Workman t e s t i f i e d t h a t on t h e n i g h t i n question, two men, armed with guns and a k n i f e , f o r c i b l y entered her home. Both men w e r e wearing dark s k i caps with nylon stock- i n g s over t h e i r f a c e s and conversed using t h e names of " B i l l y Boy" and "George." M r s . Workman s t a t e d t h a t t h e two men t a l k e d during t h e robbery and t h a t she had a good look a t "George's" f a c e and physical s t a t u r e . The two men took cash and various o t h e r i t e m s including a p l a s t i c jug used by M r s . Workman's brother, Dale Wolford, t o s t o r e coins. The Workmans' residence i s next door t o an apartment rented by Vernal Miller, h i s common-law wife Roxana Clymore, and defendant. On January 9 , 1979, a search warrant w a s i s s u e d f o r M i l l e r ' s apartment and during i t s execution, a p l a s t i c jug was recovered from t h e top of a d r e s s e r i n M i l l e r and Clymore's bedroom. Dale Wolford, who resided with t h e Workmans, t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e p l a s t i c jug w a s t h e one taken by t h e two robbers. H e a l s o s t a t e d t h a t on a p r i o r occasion he had shown Clymore and M i l l e r h i s coin c o l l e c t i o n . Mrs. Workman indicated that there was a strong pos- sibility she would be able to identify the individual known as "George" if he appeared in a lineup. A lineup was held, and Mr. and Mrs. Workman were given the opportunity to view defendant and others wearing the exact clothing worn by "George." The persons in the lineup also repeated the words "George" had uttered during the robbery. Mrs. Workman, however, failed to identify defendant as "George." About three months after defendant's arrest, some pantyhose were found behind the seat of defendant's pickup. The pantyhose were discovered when the police stopped Vernal Miller, who was driving the pickup. Miller testified that he had used defendant's pickup on various occasions. There was testimony that Roxanna Clymore and Thomas ~ightmeir, defendant's brother-in-law, had also used the pickup since defendant's arrest. Roxanna Clymore testified that defendant and Rodgers were at her apartment the night of the robbery. She stated she saw two men force their way into the Workmans' residence that evening. She also stated that defendant made certain remarks to her about the robbery. She also testified that the plastic jug belonging to Wolford was found by the police in her bedroom. Defendant testified and denied that he had participated in the robbery. The following issues are presented for consideration on appeal : 1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion by denying defendant's motion for continuance so that a material subpoenaed witness could be brought to court and present testimony in support of the defense? In the alternative, did the District Court err by not allowing the defense to read into the record the statement of the absent witness? 2. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court err by allowing i n t o evi- dence, over defendant's objection, testimony and e x h i b i t s r e l a t i n g t o Lee, a/k/a Rodgers, thus confusing t h e jury with i r r e l e v a n t and p r e j u d i c i a l evidence n o t linked t o t h e defen- d a n t o r t h e i s s u e s presented i n t h i s case? 3. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court err by preventing t h e defen- d a n t from i n q u i r i n g i n t o a p o s s i b l e motive t h a t t h e witness Clymore may have had t o f a b r i c a t e a s t o r y a g a i n s t t h e defen- dant? 4. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court err by f a i l i n g t o suppress a s evidence t h e pantyhose and the p l a s t i c jug? 5. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court err by r e f u s i n g t o give defendant's proposed i n s t r u c t i o n nos. 7, 12 and 14? Defendant contends t h e D i s t r i c t Court abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n by denying h i s motion f o r continuance near t h e end of h i s case-in-chief. The continuance w a s requested because a c r u c i a l defense witness, Russell Brohaugh, under subpoena by defense f a i l e d t o respond as d i r e c t e d . I n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e , t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d by n o t allowing a p o r t i o n of Brohaugh's statement t o t h e p o l i c e t o be read i n t o t h e record by t h e defense i n l i e u of Brohaugh's testi- mony. The r u l e f o r continuances i n Montana i s set o u t i n s e c t i o n 46-13-202, MCA, and i n S t a t e v. DiGiallonardo (1972), 160 Mont. 379, 503 P.2d 43. The f a c t s i n t h i s case p r e s e n t no reasons why a continuance should n o t have been granted. See, S t a t e v. Valmoja (1975), 56 Haw. 452, 540 P.2d 63; Salazar v. S t a t e (Alaska 1976), 559 P.2d 66. During t r i a l a s i t u a t i o n developed where it became necessary, i f p o s s i b l e , f o r t h e defense t o demonstrate t h a t defendant was n o t t h e robber "George," b u t r a t h e r v e r n a l M i l l e r was. Defendant urged t h a t a p o l i c e r e p o r t f i l e d by one Russell Brohaugh was c r u c i a l t o h i s defense i n t h i s regard and would b o l s t e r t h e defense theory t h a t Vernal Miller was t h e robber "George." The defense moved f o r a continuance so t h a t Brohaugh might be located, o r , i n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e , t h a t t h e p e r t i n e n t p o r t i o n of t h e p o l i c e r e p o r t be read t o t h e jury. I n Montana, motions f o r continuance i n criminal t r i a l s a r e provided f o r by s e c t i o n 46-13-202, MCA, which states: " (1) The defendant o r t h e s t a t e may move f o r a continuance. I f t h e motion i s made more than 30 days a f t e r arraignment o r a t any t i m e a f t e r t r i a l has begun, t h e c o u r t may r e q u i r e t h a t it be supported by a f f i - d a v i t . " (2) The c o u r t may upon t h e motion of e i t h e r p a r t y o r upon t h e c o u r t ' s own mo- t i o n order a continuance i f t h e i n t e r e s t s of j u s t i c e s o require. " (3) A l l motions f o r continuance are ad- dressed t o t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e t r i a l c o u r t and s h a l l be considered i n t h e l i g h t of t h e d i l i g e n c e shown on t h e p a r t of t h e movant. This s e c t i o n s h a l l be construed t o t h e end t h a t criminal cases are t r i e d with due d i l i g e n c e consonant with t h e r i g h t s of t h e defendant and t h e state t o a speedy t r i a l . " Since subsection (3) r e q u i r e s t h a t such motions be d i r e c t e d t o t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e trial c o u r t , w e must consider whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s treatment of t h i s matter was an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . S t a t e v. DiGiallonardo, 503 P.2d a t I n DiGiallonardo, t h i s Court adopted g u i d e l i n e s which I l l i n o i s had e s t a b l i s h e d i n People v. Hudson (1968), 97 Ill.App.2d 362, 240 N.E.2d 156, t o determine whether t h e r e was an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . These g u i d e l i n e s were: 1. Reasonable expectation o r prospect of obtaining t h e presence of the absent witnesses; 2. Whether the absent witnesses' testimony would help the defense; and, 3. Whether the absent witnesses would testify. In DiGiallonardo, the absent witnesses were alleged to be co-participants in the crime. We held that the trial court acted properly in denying defendant's motion because: (1) the transcripts indicated appellants had no knowledge of the whereabouts of the missing witnesses; (2) the probative value of their testimony was speculative; and (3) there was a question as to whether the missing witnesses could be compelled to testify. 160 Mont. 382-384. Defendant here seeks to distinguish DiGiallonardo and argues that in the instant case, the missing witness was a resident property owner in Laurel, Montana, who would there- fore be easy to find and could not avail himself of Fifth Amendment protections. Further, the defense demonstrated by the police record that Brohaugh's testimony was crucial to the defense of the case. Defendant has suggested further that this Court apply the standards set forth in Salazar v. State, supra. In Salazar, the Alaskan court set out the following factors to be considered in granting a motion for continuance: ". . . (1) whether the testimony is material to the case; (2) whether the testimony can be eli- cited from another source; (3) whether the testi- mony is cumulative; (4) probability of securing the absent witness in a reasonable time; (5) whether the requesting party was diligent and acting in good faith; (6) the inconvenience to the court and/or others; and (7) the likelihood that the testimony would have affected the jury's verdict. . ." 559 P.2d at 72. The State focuses on the specific language of section 46-13-202, MCA, which requires that the movant demonstrate his diligence prior to the consideration of any of the other f a c t u a l issues. The S t a t e submits t h a t i f t h i s Court f i n d s t h a t defendant attempted with due d i l i g e n c e t o have Brohaugh t e s t i f y , then t h i s Court should look t o t h e f a c t o r s s t a t e d i n Salazar t o determine i f t h e t r i a l c o u r t abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n . There i s nothing i n t h e record t o i n d i c a t e t h a t defendant f a i l e d t o a c t d i l i g e n t l y i n attempting t o secure t h e testimony of Brohaugh. He was properly subpoenaed. There i s nothing i n t h e record t o i n d i c a t e he would n o t show up u n t i l a s h o r t time before he was c a l l e d t o t h e stand and f a i l e d t o appear. I n f a c t , t h e record does n o t d i s c l o s e t h a t t h e c o u r t s o much a s issued a bench warrant t o a r r e s t t h e intended witness. Both p a r t i e s here seek t o extend t h e g u i d e l i n e s set o u t by t h i s Court i n DiGiallonardo by use of t h e Salazar f a c t o r s . I n reviewing t h e evidence, however, it becomes apparent t h a t under e i t h e r s e t of g u i d e l i n e s t h e D i s t r i c t Court acted a r b i t r a r i l y i n denying defendant's motion f o r continuance, o r n o t working o u t a method t o admit a p o r t i o n of t h e p o l i c e record. I t appears Brohaugh could have been found without unreasonable delay, a f a c t o r which i s n o t e n t i r e l y c l e a r from t h e record, b u t o r a l argument revealed t h e case went t o t h e jury around 5:00 p.m. and a continuance u n t i l t h e follow- i n g day would have prejudiced no one. These f a c t s w e r e n o t disputed. Brohaugh had f i l e d a p o l i c e r e p o r t on another t h e f t and i n some manner i d e n t i f i e d t h e p r e s e n t defendant i n t h e company of a companion of whom he reported: "They c a l l e d him George." The word "him" would have r e f e r r e d t o Vernal Gary M i l l e r . Defendant argues t h a t h i s statement was a c r u c i a l f a c t o r i n h i s defense theory t h a t would tend t o l i n k M i l l e r t o t h e robber "George." It was argued with some justification that there were problems with this testimony and therefore the quality came under attack by the State in terms of how much help it would be to the defense. This is a hard question and one of fact. Defendant's effort was in good faith; the testimony was not cumulative; the testimony was material; the court would not allow any consideration of an alternate hearsay source; the delay would have been minimal and no one would have been inconvenienced thereby; and, of course, the value, as stated above, is a close question which should have been resolved in favor of defendant, assuring him a fair trial. Conversely, without the testimony a conviction resulted. The District Court abused its discretion when it failed to grant some kind of relief or continuance to defendant when a subpoenaed witness material to the defense failed to appear and testify. If the evidence remains the same at a new trial, then defendant's proposed instruction no. 7 on circumstantial evidence must be given. The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial. r We concur: 2'dA~lbWwpe~ Chief Justice M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d i s s e n t i n g : I must r e s p e c t f u l l y d i s s e n t . I n o r d e r t o r e v e r s e a case on t h e i s s u e of whether t h e t r i a l judge abused h i s d i s c r e t i o n i n denying the a p p e l l a n t ' s motion f o r a continuance, w e must look t o t h e s t a t u t e s and t h e case a u t h o r i t i e s e s t a b l i s h e d by t h i s Court. I do n o t f i n d an abuse here. Controlling t h i s m a t t e r i s s e c t i o n 25-4-501, MCA, which provides : "Motion t o postpone t r i a l f o r absence of testi- mony. motion t o postpone a t r i a l o n g r o u n d s of t h e absence of evidence s h a l l only be made upon a f f i d a v i t showing t h e m a t e r i a l i t y of t h e evidence expected t o be obtained and t h a t due d i l i g e n c e has been used t o procure i t . " This language i s mandatory and must be construed as such. See S t a t e v. Radi (1975), 168 Mont. 320, 325, 542 P.2d 1206. H e r e , a p p e l l a n t d i d n o t f i l e an a f f i d a v i t demonstrating t h e m a t e r i a l i t y o r t h a t he had used due d i l i g e n c e t o g e t t h e witness involved. I n view of a p p e l l a n t ' s f a i l u r e t o comply with t h e s t a t u t e , s e c t i o n 25-4-501, MCA, how can it be s a i d t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court abused its d i s c r e t i o n i n denying a motion f o r a continuance. See, S t a t e v. Pascgo (1977), 173 Mont. 121, 566 P. 2d 802; S t a t e v. Harvey (1979), Mont. The d e n i a l of a motion f o r continuance is within t h e sound d i s c r e t i o n of t h e D i s t r i c t Court, and it cannot, i n m y opinion, be e r r o r t o deny such a motion u n l e s s t h e r e i s a c l e a r abuse of t h a t d i s c r e t i o n . See, S t a t e v. Olsen (1968), 152 Mont. 1, 445 P.2d 926; s e c t i o n 46-13-202, MCA. Since t h e above s e c t i o n places t h e f i l i n g of an a f f i - d a v i t within t h e sound d i s c r e t i o n of t h e t r i a l c o u r t and no a f f i d a v i t w a s required i n t h e case, an examination of t h e facts and the circumstances surrounding the denial of the motion should be looked to to determine whether the court abused its discretion. Appellant relies on Salazar v. State (Alaska 1976), 559 P.2d 66, which outlines certain considerations that may be weighed in determining if the denial of the continuance is an abuse of discretion. The factual issues as stated in Salazar were: ". . . (1) whether the testimony is material to the case; (2) whether the testimony can be elicited from another source; (3) whether the testimony is cumulative; (4) probability of securing the absent witness in a reasonable time; (5) whether the requesting party was diligent and acting in good faith; (6) the inconvenience to the court and/or others; and (7) the likelihood that the testimony would have affected the jury's verdict. . ." It should be noted that the very language of section 46-13- 202, MCA, requires that the movant demonstrate his diligence prior to the consideration of any of the other factual issues. Here, appellant had the clerk of the court issue a subpoena for Russell Brohaugh on April 11, 1979. That subpoena was served by counsel for appellant, Mr. Stacey, on April 15, 1979. The subpoena directed Brohaugh to appear at the Yellowstone County Courthouse at 9:00 a.m. on April 18, Brohaugh was not called to the stand until after the afternoon recess. There is no showing in the transcript prior to the time Brohaugh was called that the court was informed that he had failed to appear as ordered in the subpoena. Nowhere in the record did Mr. Stacey, counsel for appellant, request from the court a bench warrant for Brohaugh. See, section 45-7-309(c), MCA. Nowhere in the record did counsel r e q u e s t t h e c o u r t t o order t h e s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e t o go and pick up Brohaugh as required by s e c t i o n 26-2-106, MCA. There i s no i n d i c a t i o n i n t h e record t h a t Stacey attempted t o c o n t a c t Brohaugh between 9:00 a.m. and t h e t i m e Stacey c a l l e d Brohaugh t o t h e stand. The S t a t e does n o t deny t h a t a p p e l l a n t up t o t h e time of t r i a l ackeG. d i l i g e n t l y , b u t fr3m t h z very t i m e t h a t counsel discovered Brohaugh had f a i l e d t o appear a s i n s t r u c t e d by t h e subpoena u n t i l he c a l l e d Brohaugh t o t h e stand, a p p e l l a n t exercised no d i l i g e n c e whatsoever. Under these circumstances, I would f i n d t h a t t h e c o u r t exercised i t s sound d i s c r e t i o n i n denying t h e motion f o r a continuance. I would a f f i r m t h e judgment below.