Title: IN RE GREGORY PETTY
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 121564
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: July 17, 2003

____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 17, 2003  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant/ 
Cross-Appellee,  
v 
No. 121564  
GREGORY PETTY,  
Defendant-Appellee/ 
Cross-Appellant.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE COURT  
CAVANAGH, J.  
A 
jury 
convicted 
defendant 
of 
first-degree 
felony 
murder,  
armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during the  
commission of a felony. Because defendant was a juvenile at  
the time of the offenses, the trial judge held a dispositional  
hearing, as required by MCL 712A.18(1)(n), which was combined  
with defendant’s sentencing hearing.  The judge sentenced  
 
defendant as an adult to a mandatory term of life imprisonment  
for the felony-murder conviction. 
Defendant appealed,  
claiming that the trial judge failed to explicitly consider  
each factor articulated in MCL 712A.18(1)(n), as indicated in  
People v Thenghkam, 240 Mich App 29; 610 NW2d 571 (2000)  
(construing the “automatic waiver” statute, MCL 769.1[3],  
which 
mandates 
an 
inquiry 
nearly 
identical 
to 
MCL  
712A.18[1][n]).  Defendant also argues that he was denied the  
right to allocute before the imposition of his sentence.  The  
Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, but remanded for  
correction of the judgment of sentence and for resentencing.  
In response to the prosecutor’s appeal, we reject the approach  
utilized by Thenghkam, vacate relevant portions of the Court  
of Appeals decision, and remand to the trial court for  
resentencing in accord with this opinion.  
I. Facts and Proceedings  
At 
the 
age 
of 
fifteen, defendant Gregory Petty encouraged  
his twelve-year-old companion to commit armed robbery.  In the  
course of the robbery, the twelve-year-old child shot and  
killed the victim, Calvin Whitlow.  In a statement to the  
police, the younger companion indicated that defendant gave  
him the gun. When asked why he shot the victim, the twelve­
2  
 
year-old stated, “Greg threatened to kill me if I didn’t.”1  
As permitted by MCL 712A.2d, defendant’s case was  
designated for trial in the family division as an adult  
criminal proceeding.  The jury found defendant guilty of  
felony murder, armed robbery, and felony-firearm.  
Following a combined dispositional and sentencing  
hearing,2 the court imposed an adult sentence, one of three  
options available to the court under MCL 712A.18(1)(n).  
Defendant received a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment  
for the felony-murder conviction, MCL 750.316(1)(b), and a  
consecutive two-year term for the felony-firearm conviction,  
MCL 750.227b.  
Before 
imposing 
the 
sentence, 
the 
trial 
judge 
articulated  
his rationale in the following statement:  
The thought of sentencing anyone to life in 
prison without chance of parole takes your breath 
away.  But after you catch your breath it’s very 
clear that we have guidelines.  They’re called  
laws.  And we’re required to follow the law. 
To  
that extent, this Court’s responsibility, this 
Court’s duty is to interpret not only the  
conviction of first degree murder; not only the 
conviction 
for 
armed 
robbery; 
not 
only 
the  
conviction for felony firearm, but to look at how a 
sentence as an adult versus disposition as a 
juvenile will impact the community.  
1Defendant’s 
twelve-year-old 
companion, 
the 
actual 
shooter, accepted an offer to plead guilty of second-degree
murder and received a delayed sentence. 
2The court exercised its discretion and combined the 
dispositional and sentencing hearings into one proceeding. 
3  
 
 
 
The Court has had a chance to hear quite 
eloquently from the family of the victim.  They 
have been consistant [sic] in their appearances 
before the Court throughout this lengthy process. 
I don’t believe there’s any question, in fact it’s 
not controverted, the jury found [defendant] guilty 
of first degree murder.  There is no more serious  
crime.  The jury also found that even though he was 
not the actual person who fired the weapon that 
resulted in the death of Mr. Whitlow, . . . he was 
responsible for that.  
The record of [defendant], the juvenile 
record, certainly reflects a number of contacts.  I  
was a little surprised at some of the testimony 
offered this morning.  
I talked about the law a few moments ago.  The  
law dictates whether people are innocent or guilty 
upon the presentation of evidence and a ruling 
either by a Court or by a judge or by a jury.  To  
read a report that says there was a dismissal or 
there was–there’s insufficient evidence does not  
begin to tell the whole story. What I have though 
based on that information that’s in the file, based 
on these reports is there has been consistant [sic] 
contact with this Court that has resulted in not  
one, but now two convictions.  One for carrying a 
concealed 
weapon 
and 
now 
this 
one, 
which  
includes–actually three convictions for various 
felonies including murder one.  
[Counsel for defendant] argued that there is 
sufficient juvenile programming available to assist 
[defendant]. 
I 
don’t 
really 
think 
that’s  
controverted.  The question is did the witnesses  
come 
forward 
with 
ambiguous 
recommendations  
about–Judge, I think that he ought to be in a 
juvenile system, but I think he probably needs to 
be their [sic] longer than the law allows.  That is  
the crux isn’t it?  It’s what [the] law will allow. 
And if you’re saying that he needs to be in there 
longer than what [the] law will allow for a 
juvenile then you are saying to this Court that the 
only option we have available is the adult  
sentence.
 He’s not been successful in the  
programming requirements relative to this matter.  
4  
 
 
 
At the hearing involving Mr. Moore, the Court 
talked about penalizing the mother if the law would 
allow. Now perhaps that was a little unfair. The  
mother, the father, family, school, court, you name 
it, I think that there’s plenty of blame to go 
around.  But the reality is that when you get 
finished assessing blame it still gets us back to 
what 
[the] 
law 
demands. 
If 
the 
juvenile 
disposition will not be sufficient then from where 
I sit there is no alternative.  As such I will  
sentence [defendant] as an adult.  The law requires 
a mandatory life sentence without parole.  That’s  
all.  
On appeal, defendant alleged several errors, including a  
violation of MCL 712A.18(1)(n), which mandates consideration  
of the enumerated criteria, and a violation of his right to  
allocute before sentencing.  The Court of Appeals affirmed,  
but remanded for resentencing in light of the court’s failure  
to specifically articulate factual findings regarding each  
criterion listed in §§ 18(1)(n)(i)-(vi) and its failure to  
provide defendant with an opportunity to allocute.3
 We  
granted the prosecutor’s application for leave to appeal.  467  
Mich 896 (2002).  
II. Standard of Review  
Because we must clarify the proper interpretation of MCL  
712A.18(1)(n), this issue of law is subject to review de novo.  
In re MCI, 460 Mich 396, 413; 596 NW2d 164 (1999).  
Further, we review de novo the scope and applicability of  
3 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued April 26, 2002
(Docket No. 219348). 
5  
  
the common-law right to allocute, also a question of law.  
People v Petit, 466 Mich 624, 627; 648 NW2d 193 (2002).  
III. The Dispositional and Sentencing Inquiry  
Following a judgment of conviction in a designated case,  
MCL 712A.18(1)(n) provides a judge with the option of imposing  
either a juvenile disposition, an adult sentence, or a blended  
sentence, i.e., a delayed sentence pending defendant’s  
performance 
under 
the 
terms 
provided 
by 
a 
juvenile  
disposition.  To understand the appropriate method of inquiry  
a judge is required to undertake, we must examine the statute,  
MCL 712A.18(1)(n), to determine the Legislature’s intent.  
The first step in discerning legislative intent requires  
review of the statutory text adopted by the Legislature.  
House Speaker v State Administrative Bd, 441 Mich 547, 567;  
495 NW2d 539 (1993).  If unambiguous, the Legislature will be  
presumed to have intended the meaning expressed.  Lorencz v  
Ford Motor Co, 439 Mich 370, 376; 483 NW2d 844 (1992). Should  
reasonable minds differ with respect to a statute’s meaning,  
judicial construction is appropriate. Sam v Balardo, 411 Mich  
405, 418-419 n 9; 308 NW2d 142 (1981).  
MCL 712A.18 provides in part:  
(1) [I]f the court finds that a juvenile is 
within this chapter [i.e., subject to the juvenile 
code], the court may enter any of the following 
orders of disposition that are appropriate for the 
welfare of the juvenile and society in view of the 
facts proven and ascertained:  
6  
 
 
 
* * *  
(n) If the court entered a judgment of  
conviction 
under section 
2d[4] 
of 
this chapter, enter 
any disposition under this section or, if the court 
determines that the best interests of the public 
would be served, impose any sentence upon the 
juvenile that could be imposed upon an adult 
convicted of the offense for which the juvenile was 
convicted.
 If the juvenile is convicted of a 
violation or conspiracy to commit a violation of .  
. . MCL 333.7403,[5] the court may impose the 
alternative sentence permitted under that section 
if the court determines that the best interests of  
the public would be served.  The court may delay 
imposing a sentence of imprisonment under this 
subdivision for a period not longer than the period 
during which the court has jurisdiction over the 
juvenile under this chapter by entering an order of 
disposition delaying imposition of sentence and 
placing the juvenile on probation upon the terms 
and conditions it considers appropriate, including 
any disposition under this section.  If the court  
delays imposing sentence under this section, 
section 18i of this chapter applies. If the court  
imposes sentence, it shall enter a judgment of 
sentence.
 If the court imposes a sentence of 
imprisonment, the juvenile shall receive credit 
against the sentence for time served before  
sentencing. . . .  
The discretionary authority to choose among three  
alternatives is plainly stated in this portion of the statute;  
the court may “enter any [juvenile] disposition,” “impose any  
sentence . . . that could be imposed upon an adult,” or “delay  
imposing a sentence of imprisonment . . . by entering an order  
4MCL 712A.2d prescribes the conditions under which a
juvenile may be tried as an adult. 
5 MCL 333.7403 proscribes the possession of controlled
substances. 
7  
of 
disposition 
delaying imposition of sentence and placing the  
juvenile on probation upon the terms and conditions it  
considers appropriate . . . . ” Id.  
To 
facilitate 
the 
appropriate 
inquiry 
when 
choosing 
among  
the three sentencing options, the Legislature has prescribed  
the relevant considerations in the remaining portion of the  
statute:  
In determining whether to enter an order of 
disposition or impose a sentence under this  
subdivision, the court shall consider all of the 
following factors, giving greater weight to the 
seriousness of the offense and the juvenile's prior 
record:  
(i)  The seriousness of the offense in terms  
of community protection, including, but not limited 
to, the existence of any aggravating factors  
recognized by the sentencing guidelines, the use of 
a firearm or other dangerous weapon, and the impact 
on any victim.  
(ii)  The juvenile's culpability in committing 
the offense, including, but not limited to, the 
level of the juvenile's participation in planning 
and carrying out the offense and the existence of 
any aggravating or mitigating factors recognized by 
the sentencing guidelines.  
(iii)
 
The 
juvenile's 
prior 
record 
of  
delinquency including, but not limited to, any 
record of detention, any police record, any school 
record, or any other evidence indicating prior 
delinquent behavior.  
(iv)
 The juvenile's programming history, 
including, but not limited to, the juvenile's past 
willingness 
to 
participate 
meaningfully 
in  
available programming.  
(v)
 The adequacy of the punishment or  
programming available in the juvenile justice  
8  
  
 
system.  
(vi) The dispositional options available for 
the juvenile. [MCL 712A.18(1)(n).]  
The Court of Appeals has addressed the degree of analysis  
required by the nearly identical inquiry prescribed by MCL  
769.1(3) and concluded that specific findings must be  
articulated with regard to each criterion enumerated in the  
statute. 
Thenghkam at 41. 
Reviewing for clear error, the  
Court of Appeals evaluated the trial court’s ability to “sort  
the logical, reasonable, and believable evidence” from the  
irrelevant information.  Id. at 67. Next, according to the  
Court of Appeals, the trial judge must “consider and balance  
all the factors to decide whether to sentence a defendant as  
a juvenile or adult.” Id. This consideration is subject to  
review for an abuse of discretion.  Id. at 42. 
To justify  
this detailed approach, the Court explained:  
[A]s with all judicial decisions that do not 
rest solely on the law, a trial court deciding 
whether to sentence a defendant as an adult or a  
juvenile must point to the requisite facts to 
justify its decision.  Consequently, and aside from 
the question of clear error, if the trial court 
fails to make findings of fact, it cannot fully 
exercise its discretion by giving proper weight to 
the various factors it must consider to make its  
decision under the sentencing statute. [Id. at 48  
(citations omitted).]  
While we agree with the Thenghkam Court that decisions  
concerning 
a 
juvenile’s future require the most thoughtful and  
reasoned 
solicitude—whether 
the 
family 
division 
must  
9  
automatically waive the juvenile into the circuit court’s  
jurisdiction, MCL 769.1(3), or try the juvenile as an adult in  
a 
“designated 
proceeding,” 
MCL 
712A.18(1)(n)—we 
find 
the 
focus  
of the Court of Appeals analysis misplaced.  Instead of  
concentrating primarily on the sufficiency of the trial  
court’s factual determinations vis-à-vis the criteria listed  
in MCL 712A.18(1)(n)(i)-(vi), a plain reading of the statute  
requires that a court deliberately consider whether to enter  
an order of disposition, impose a delayed sentence, or impose  
an adult sentence in light of the six factors enumerated in  
subsection 1(n)(i)-(vi).  As evidence that it complied with  
the statute, the trial court, on the record, must acknowledge  
its discretion to choose among the three alternatives.  Hence,  
a court should consider the enunciated factors, MCL  
712A.18(1)(n)(i) through (vi), to assist it in choosing one  
option over the others.  A trial court need not engage in a  
lengthy “laundry list” recitation of the factors.  Rather, the  
focus of the hearing should be on the three options, i.e., an  
adult 
sentence, 
a 
blended sentence, or a juvenile disposition,  
as outlined in the recently adopted court rules.6  For this  
reason, we repudiate the Court’s reasoning in Thenghkam to the  
extent it conflicts with this explicit three-part inquiry.  
6See MCR 3.955 specifically addressing these three
options. 
10  
 
As a result, trial courts will no longer be forced to  
undertake a mechanical recitation of the statutory criteria.  
Rather, a court must logically articulate on the record why it  
has chosen one alternative over the other two, in light of the  
criteria articulated in MCL 712A.18(1)(n).  By so doing, a  
court 
performs 
the 
analysis required by the Legislature, while  
establishing an adequate record to permit appellate review.  
In this case, the trial court offered a considered  
rationale for its decision to sentence the defendant as an  
adult. The court reasoned, in part:  
[Counsel for defendant] argued that there is 
sufficient juvenile programming available to assist 
[defendant]. 
I 
don’t 
really 
think 
that’s  
controverted.  The question is did the witnesses  
come 
forward 
with 
ambiguous 
recommendations  
about–Judge, I think that he ought to be in a 
juvenile system, but I think he probably needs to 
be their [sic] longer than the law allows.  That is  
the crux isn’t it?  It’s what the law will allow.  
And if you’re saying that he needs to be in there  
longer than what the law will allow for a juvenile  
then you are saying to this Court that the only  
option we have available is the adult sentence.  
. . .  
If the juvenile disposition will not be  
sufficient then from where I sit there is no  
alternative.  As such I will sentence [defendant]  
as an adult.  The law requires a mandatory life 
sentence without parole.  That’s all. [Emphasis 
added.]  
From this record, it is clear that the trial court was  
aware of its options to impose a juvenile disposition or an  
adult sentence.  What is not clear is whether the trial court  
11  
 
considered and rejected its option to impose a delayed  
sentence once it determined that the juvenile system was  
inadequate.  Therefore, because we cannot be certain that the  
trial court was aware of its discretion to impose a delayed  
sentence, we remand this case for a rearticulation of its  
analysis.
 On the basis of the evidence presented at the  
hearing, the court shall acknowledge its discretion to choose  
among the three options, articulating on the record its  
rationale 
for 
selecting among the alternatives provided by our  
Legislature, 
and 
in 
consideration of the factors prescribed by  
MCL 712A.18(1)(n).  
IV. Juvenile-Allocution Requirements  
Defendant also claims he was denied the opportunity to  
allocute.7  As noted above, a juvenile defendant subject to  
MCL 712A.18(1)(n), having been tried as an adult, may receive  
a juvenile disposition, an adult sentence, or a blended  
sentence. 
A sentencing court’s duty to provide a  
defendant with the opportunity to allocute has been long  
established:  
7According to Blacks Law Dictionary, 7th ed, “allocute”
means “[t]o deliver in court a formal, exhortatory address; to
make an allocution.” “Allocution” generally refers to “[a]n
unsworn 
statement 
from a convicted defendant to the sentencing
judge or jury in which the defendant can ask for mercy,
explain his or her conduct, apologize for the crime, or say
anything else in an effort to lessen the impending sentence.”
Id. 
12  
 
 
 
(2) . . . At sentencing the court, complying 
on the record, must:  
* * *  
(c)
 give the defendant, the defendant's 
lawyer, 
the 
prosecutor, 
and 
the 
victim 
an  
opportunity 
to 
advise 
the 
court 
of 
any 
circumstances 
they 
believe 
the 
court 
should  
consider in imposing sentence[.] [MCR 6.425(D).]  
This 
directive 
permits a defendant to speak in mitigation  
of the sentence.  When interpreting an analogous federal rule,  
the United States Supreme Court underscored the value of this  
opportunity:  
[The] legal provenance [of the federal rule 
providing defendants with an opportunity to speak 
to the court on their own behalf] was the  
common-law right of allocution. As early as 1689, 
it was recognized that the court's failure to ask 
the defendant if he had anything to say before 
sentence was imposed required reversal. . . . 
Taken in the context of its history, there can be 
little doubt that the drafters of [the federal 
rule] intended that the defendant be personally 
afforded the opportunity to speak before imposition 
of sentence. . . .  The most persuasive counsel may 
not be able to speak for a defendant as the 
defendant might, with halting eloquence, speak for 
himself. [Green v United States, 365 US 301; 81 S 
Ct 653; 5 L Ed 2d 670 (1961).]  
In this case, the court—speaking exclusively to defense  
counsel—asked 
if 
counsel 
had 
concluded 
defendant’s  
dispositional presentation. This query immediately preceded  
the court’s articulation of its sentencing rationale. At no  
point did the court provide defendant with an opportunity to  
13  
 
  
allocute.8  
The prosecutor has claimed that defendant could not  
possibly 
have 
been 
adversely affected by this omission because  
the judge had no discretion with regard to sentencing; the  
felony-murder statute, MCL 750.316, requires mandatory life  
imprisonment upon conviction.  However, this conclusion  
ignores the historical foundation of the right to allocute.  
Under English common law, all felony convictions resulted in  
mandatory death sentences.  See 4 Blackstone, Commentaries,  
375-376.  By providing an opportunity to address the court, a  
defendant could pray for an excused or delayed sentence. Id.  
Hence, the mandatory nature of a sentence does not ipso facto  
render the common-law right to allocute inapposite.  
In fact, the right to allocution does much more than  
permit an accused to plead for mercy.  “It . . . ensure[s]  
that 
sentencing 
reflects 
individualized 
circumstances.  
Furthermore, allocution ‘has value in terms of maximizing the  
perceived equity of the process.’”  United States v De Alba  
8 This Court recently clarified the scope of a defendant’s
right to allocute in Petit at 636: “[T]he trial court must
allow the defendant a chance to speak on his own behalf before
being sentenced.  This does not mean that the trial court must 
specifically ask the defendant whether he wishes to allocute,
although this would be the most certain way to ensure that all
defendants who do want to allocute on their own behalf are, in
fact, given the opportunity to do so.” 
14  
 
 
 
Pagan, 33 F3d 125, 129 (CA 1, 1994) (citations omitted).  Even  
when a defendant fails to convince a judge that sentence  
modification is warranted, the opportunity itself serves to  
provide 
a 
defendant 
with an occasion to accept responsibility,  
offering defendants and victims a potentially dignified and  
healing exchange.  
Moreover, a juvenile defendant tried in a  
criminal proceeding should be afforded—at a minimum—the same  
protections available to adults.  To deny a juvenile a  
meaningful opportunity to allocute at the only discretionary  
stage of a combined dispositional and sentencing proceeding  
would seriously affect the fairness and integrity of the  
judicial 
proceeding, 
particularly 
when 
the 
juvenile 
is 
subject  
to an adult criminal proceeding.  Just as we reject the  
Thenghkam Court’s command to create a mechanical list of  
factual findings for each criterion prescribed by the  
Legislature, we must also reject any attempt to transform a  
juvenile defendant’s common-law right to allocute into a  
perfunctory, hollow exercise.  
Because our current court rules do not expressly provide  
juvenile defendants with an opportunity to allocute at  
dispositional hearings, and because this phase of the  
proceeding may be the only opportunity for a court to exercise  
15  
its discretion, we amend MCR 3.9559 due to the need for  
9MCR 3.955 (formerly MCR 5.955) shall now read: 
(A) Determining Whether to Sentence or Impose 
Disposition. If a juvenile is convicted under MCL 
712A.2d, sentencing or disposition shall be made as 
provided in MCL 712A.18(1)(n) and the Crime  
Victim's Rights Act, MCL 780.751 et seq., if 
applicable. In deciding whether to enter an order 
of disposition, or impose or delay imposition of 
sentence, 
the court 
shall 
consider 
all 
the  
following factors, giving greater weight to the 
seriousness of the offense and the juvenile's prior 
record:  
(1) the seriousness of the alleged offense in 
terms of community protection, including, but not 
limited to, the existence of any aggravating 
factors recognized by the sentencing guidelines, 
the use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon, and 
the effect on any victim;  
(2) the culpability of the juvenile in  
committing the alleged offense, including, but not 
limited 
to, 
the 
level 
of 
the 
juvenile's 
participation in planning and carrying out the 
offense and the existence of any aggravating or 
mitigating factors recognized by the sentencing 
guidelines;  
(3) the juvenile's prior record of delinquency 
including, but not limited to, any record of 
detention, any police record, any school record, or 
any other evidence indicating prior delinquent 
behavior;  
(4) 
the 
juvenile's 
programming 
history, 
including, but not limited to, the juvenile's past 
willingness 
to 
participate 
meaningfully 
in  
available programming;  
(5) 
the adequacy 
of 
the 
punishment 
or  
programming available in the juvenile justice  
16  
 
immediate action to require allocution before a court  
determines whether a child will serve a juvenile disposition,  
a blended sentence, or an adult sentence.10  
Therefore, on remand, the trial court shall provide  
defendant with an opportunity to allocute before choosing  
among the three alternatives prescribed in MCL 217A.18(1)(n).  
V  
Defendant was sentenced as an adult to mandatory life for  
first-degree murder.  MCL 712A.18(1)(n). 
For the reasons  
stated above, we repudiate the Court of Appeals analysis in  
Thenghkam, vacate apposite portions of the Court of Appeals  
system; and  
(6) the dispositional options available for 
the juvenile.  
The court also shall give the defendant, the 
defendant's lawyer, the prosecutor, and the victim 
an opportunity to advise the court of any 
circumstances 
they 
believe 
the 
court 
should  
consider in deciding whether to enter an order of 
disposition or to impose or delay imposition of 
sentence.  
(B)-(E) 
[Unchanged.]  
10MCR 1.201(D) provides: 
The Court may modify or dispense with the 
notice requirements of this rule if it determines 
that there is a need for immediate action or if the  
proposed amendment would not significantly affect 
the delivery of justice.  
17  
opinion below, and remand this case to the trial court for a  
rearticulation of its analysis after the court has given  
defendant an opportunity to allocute.  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Elizabeth A. Weaver  
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman  
18