Title: Commonwealth v. Jacobs
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-10590
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: October 19, 2021

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SJC-10590 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ROBERT O. JACOBS. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     April 9, 2021. - October 19, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Firearms.  Constitutional Law, Assistance of counsel. 
Evidence, Alibi, Expert opinion.  Witness, Expert.  Jury 
and Jurors.  Practice, Criminal, Assistance of counsel, 
Jury and jurors, Conduct of juror, Capital case. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on March 17, 2006. 
 
The cases were tried before Barbara A. Dortch-Okara, J., 
and a motion for a new trial, filed on June 21, 2016, was heard 
by Robert C. Cosgrove, J. 
 
 
 
Janet Hetherwick Pumphrey for the defendant. 
 
Carolyn A. Burbine, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
GEORGES, J.  In February of 2006, fifteen year old Jerard 
Rogers was shot to death after a party in Brockton.  The 
defendant, then eighteen year old Robert O. Jacobs, was indicted 
on charges of murder in the first degree and unlawful possession 
2 
 
of a firearm in connection with the victim's death.  At trial in 
September of 2008, the Commonwealth proceeded on theories of 
deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty.  The 
defendant was convicted by a Superior Court jury of both charges 
and based on both theories of murder.  After the defendant's 
motion to reduce the verdict of murder in the first degree was 
denied, he entered his appeal in this court.  His motion for a 
stay of appeal was allowed so that he could pursue a motion for 
a new trial in the Superior Court.  In this subsequent motion, 
the defendant argued that trial counsel provided ineffective 
assistance because counsel did not call three alibi witnesses 
and did not introduce testimony by a crime scene reconstruction 
expert.  A Superior Court judge, who was not the trial judge, 
conducted an evidentiary hearing and denied the motion. 
 
We consolidated the defendant's appeal from the denial of 
his motion for a new trial with his direct appeal, in which he 
argues that a new trial is required because the trial judge 
should have declared a mistrial due to juror misconduct.  We 
discern no error in the trial judge's decision to deny the 
motion for a mistrial, nor any reason to grant relief under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Accordingly, we affirm the defendant's 
convictions and the order denying his motion for a new trial. 
 
Background.  We summarize the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, reserving certain details for 
3 
 
later discussion.  See Commonwealth v. Chalue, 486 Mass. 847, 
849 (2021). 
 
On the evening of February 18, 2006, the defendant and the 
victim attended a party hosted by a high school classmate of the 
victim.  The defendant was driven to the party by his close 
friend, Reaksmy Ke.  Ke's sister, Soryear Ke, and Soryear's 
coworker, Carmen Velazquez, who was the victim's girlfriend, 
were passengers in the vehicle.1  During the drive, Velazquez saw 
the defendant pull "a little silver gun" from his waistband and 
play with it for a few seconds.  The victim arrived at the party 
separately, later that evening. 
 
A degree of animosity had existed between the victim and 
the defendant prior to the party.  The origin of the dispute 
appeared to be an incident in which the defendant had spat on 
the victim from an upper floor of a District Court court house, 
leading to a brief verbal altercation.  The animosity continued 
during the party.  At one point, the defendant and a friend of 
the victim engaged in a confrontation in which the defendant 
warned, "You and your friends are going to get it after the 
party, get away from me," while lifting his shirt to display a 
firearm.  The party ended around midnight, and the remaining 
partygoers congregated in front of the house, where a fight 
 
1 Because Reaksmy Ke and Soryear Ke share a surname, we 
refer to each by their first names. 
4 
 
ensued.2  Gunshots rang out, either immediately before the fight 
ended or shortly thereafter, and the partygoers fled in multiple 
directions.  Three of the partygoers -- Shaquan Berry, Aaron 
Tobey, and Brian Jean-Pierre -- testified to having seen the 
defendant wearing a "gray hoodie" and shooting into the air 
during the first round of shots.3  Tobey also testified that the 
defendant was standing "in the middle of" a nearby hill at that 
point. 
 
In the aftermath of the gunshots, Velazquez encountered the 
victim and Soryear together at the top of the hill.  Soryear 
spoke with them briefly before she began walking toward the 
bottom of the hill, leaving Velazquez and the victim together 
behind her.  At that point, another round of gunshots was fired, 
four of which struck the victim.  The victim knocked Velazquez 
to the ground before ultimately succumbing to his injuries at 
the scene.  Five shell casings were found near the scene, with 
another two located together about one hundred yards away from 
 
2 All of the witnesses who testified to having observed the 
fight said that neither the victim nor the defendant was 
involved. 
 
3 Shaquan Berry, Aaron Tobey, and Brian Jean-Pierre 
identified the defendant as the person who fired the first round 
of shots, and their out-of-court identifications were introduced 
substantively.  Given Tobey's inability or unwillingness to 
testify about his prior identification of the defendant, Tobey's 
identification testimony before the grand jury was introduced 
substantively, over objection. 
5 
 
the victim, in a parking area.  Soryear told police that, during 
the second round of shots and as she turned and began walking 
down the hill, she saw the defendant standing on the hill, 
shooting the victim from "within five or six feet" away.4  
Soryear said that the defendant's sweatshirt hood was "off," 
such that she had a "full view" of his face.  She later 
identified the defendant as the shooter in a photographic array. 
 
Discussion.  On appeal, the defendant principally focuses 
on the asserted errors by the motion judge in the denial of the 
motion for a new trial; we address those arguments first and 
then turn to the defendant's claim of juror misconduct that he 
asserted in his direct appeal. 
 
1.  Motion for a new trial.  a.  Standard of review.  "'[A] 
motion for a new trial is addressed to the sound discretion of 
the trial judge,' who may grant a new trial 'if it appears that 
justice may not have been done'" (citations omitted).  
 
4 Before the grand jury, Soryear identified the defendant as 
having shot the victim.  At trial, however, she denied having 
seen the shooter or having identified the defendant as such.  
Soryear's prior identification was admitted substantively 
through the testimony of one of the police officers who 
interviewed her following the shooting.  See Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 801(d)(1)(C) (2021) (declarant's prior statement not hearsay 
if "[t]he declarant testifies and is subject to cross-
examination about a prior statement, and the statement . . . 
identifies a person as someone the declarant perceived 
earlier").  See also Commonwealth v. Cong Duc Le, 444 Mass. 431, 
439-440 (2005) (permitting substantive use of pretrial 
identification evidence where witness denies having made 
identification). 
6 
 
Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 471 Mass. 664, 672 (2015), S.C., 478 
Mass. 189 (2017).  We review a decision on a motion for a new 
trial for an abuse of discretion, meaning we consider whether 
the motion judge's decision resulted from "a clear error of 
judgment in weighing the factors relevant to the decision such 
that the decision falls outside the range of reasonable 
alternatives" (quotation and citation omitted).  L.L. v. 
Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014).  Where a judge 
conducts an evidentiary hearing, we "accept the [judge's] 
findings where they are supported by substantial evidence in the 
record."  Commonwealth v. Velez, 487 Mass. 533, 540 (2021).  
"When, as here, the motion judge did not preside at trial, we 
defer to that judge's assessment of the credibility of witnesses 
at the hearing on the new trial motion, but we regard ourselves 
in as good a position as the motion judge to assess the trial 
record."  Commonwealth v. Perkins, 450 Mass. 834, 845 (2008), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 307 (1986). 
The defendant maintains that his trial counsel was 
constitutionally ineffective in several respects, which we 
discuss infra.  In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel in a case of murder in the first degree, we apply the 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice standard, 
Velez, 487 Mass. at 539, and "consider whether there was an 
error in the course of the trial (by defense counsel, the 
7 
 
prosecutor, or the judge) and, if there was, whether that error 
was likely to have influenced the jury's conclusion," 
Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 682 (1992), S.C., 469 
Mass. 447 (2014).  Where the asserted error is based on a 
tactical or strategic decision by trial counsel, we consider 
whether counsel's decision was manifestly unreasonable when 
made.5  Velez, supra at 540.  See Commonwealth v. White, 409 
Mass. 266, 272 (1991) ("In cases where tactical or strategic 
decisions of the defendant's counsel are at issue, we conduct 
our review with some deference to avoid characterizing as 
unreasonable a defense that was merely unsuccessful"). 
The manifestly unreasonable test is made up of two 
considerations.  Velez, 487 Mass. at 540.  First, "we evaluate 
the [strategic or tactical] decision at the time it was made, 
and make every effort . . . to eliminate the distorting effects 
of hindsight."  Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Holland, 476 Mass. 
801, 812 (2017).  Second, substantively, "[o]nly strategy and 
tactics which lawyers of ordinary training and skill in criminal 
law would not consider competent" are manifestly unreasonable.  
Velez, supra, quoting Holland, supra. 
 
5 Such deference is required "because, ultimately, counsel 
alone has the benefit of the full factual picture that dictates 
the choice of those matters to be revealed to the fact finder 
and those that are better left unexposed to court room 
scrutiny."  Kolenovic, 471 Mass. at 673. 
8 
 
b.  Failure to call witnesses.  The defendant argues that 
his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing 
to call putative alibi witnesses Reaksmy, Vanessa Franklin, and 
Christina Jacobs,6 who would have testified that they were with 
the defendant (either at the time of the gunshots or immediately 
thereafter) and had not seen him shoot a gun or with a gun in 
his possession.  The defendant also argues that counsel provided 
ineffective assistance by failing to call a crime scene 
reconstruction expert to opine that, given the eyewitness 
testimony and the physical evidence, the shooting took place in 
an area where no witness testified to having seen the defendant. 
i.  Alibi witnesses.  Reaksmy, Franklin, and Christina 
testified at the hearing on the motion for a new trial.  Reaksmy 
said that when the first round of shots was fired, the defendant 
was standing next to him and was not holding anything in his 
hand.  Reaksmy also said that, during that first round of shots, 
he saw flashes of light approximately fifteen to twenty feet 
away from where he was standing.  He and the defendant then ran 
toward the street, but he did not see the specific direction in 
which the defendant went.  Reaksmy was not with the defendant 
when the second round of shots was fired. 
 
6 Because the defendant and Christina Jacobs share a last 
name, we refer to the latter hereafter by her first name. 
9 
 
Franklin, the defendant's "god sister,"7 testified that she 
also attended the house party that night and that she was 
standing next to the defendant when the first round of shots was 
fired.  She and the defendant then left the area and began 
walking up the hill toward a convenience store on an adjacent 
street.  While they were walking, Franklin heard a second round 
of shots.  The defendant's sister, Christina, picked them up 
about "two minutes" after they reached the store.  Similarly, 
Christina testified that during the early morning hours of 
February 19, 2006, she received a telephone call from Franklin, 
picked up Franklin and the defendant from the corner store, and 
drove them home. 
All three alibi witnesses said that they had been asked by 
defense counsel to attend the defendant's trial and to sit 
outside the court room, which they did for the duration of the 
trial, on the assumption that they would be called to testify, 
although ultimately none of them was called.  Rather, at trial, 
defense counsel said that he did not intend to call either 
Christina or Franklin "because after hearing everything [he had] 
heard here, [he did not] think that they would bring anything to 
the jury that would be helpful to anybody."  Counsel expressed 
slight hesitancy but ultimately determined he would not call 
 
7 Franklin identified the defendant as her "god brother," 
explaining that Franklin's mother is the defendant's godparent. 
10 
 
Reaksmy because counsel did not "know what else he could bring 
to the table" and was "reluctant to expose [Reaksmy] to . . . 
vicious cross-examination."8 
The decision "[w]hether to call a witness is a strategic 
decision."  Commonwealth v. Morales, 453 Mass. 40, 45 (2009).  
Counsel is not ineffective for failing to call an alibi witness 
whose credibility is in question and who may harm the defense's 
case.  See Commonwealth v. McMaster, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 722, 735-
736 (1986).  We have previously acknowledged that defense 
counsel's decision not to introduce cumulative testimony does 
not rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel.  See 
Commonwealth v. Watt, 484 Mass. 742, 764 (2020), citing 
Commonwealth v. Vaughn, 471 Mass. 398, 414 (2015). 
 
8 Trial counsel explained his hesitations to the trial judge 
in calling Reaksmy as a witness:  "I have discussed this matter 
with the defendant, and in view of the testimony of other 
witnesses to the effect that Mr. Ke was observed, along with 
others, including the defendant, near his car at the time of the 
first shots.  I don't know what else [Reaksmy] could bring to 
the table.  He was going to be called because he would testify 
that he was with the defendant at the time the first shots were 
fired, and that the defendant did not fire those shots."  Trial 
counsel explained:  "I wouldn't hesitate, except there's always 
a down side to that, . . . you know, and I don't know what that 
down side is."  After discussing the issue with the defendant, 
counsel informed the judge that Reaksmy would not be called, as 
"the defendant has agreed that I should make the call, and I'm 
making the call.  I will not call the witness [Reaksmy] to 
testify."  The trial judge then conducted a colloquy with the 
defendant to ensure that the defendant had spoken with counsel 
and understood the risks of choosing not to call a witness in 
his defense, and the defendant asserted that he did not wish to 
call Reaksmy. 
11 
 
"The burden to prove ineffective assistance remains on the 
defendant even if memories have faded and rendered his task more 
difficult," Commonwealth v. Hudson, 446 Mass. 709, 715 (2006), 
which was certainly the case here.  Although defense counsel 
offered some contemporaneous explanation during the trial for 
his decision not to call the alibi witnesses, intervening 
adverse health issues precluded him from fully testifying to his 
specific decision-making process at the evidentiary hearing a 
decade after the trial.9  Nevertheless, given the available 
information regarding counsel's motives for declining to call 
these potential alibi witnesses -- such as defense counsel's 
testimony at the evidentiary hearing and his submitted 
affidavits -- we conclude that the decision was not manifestly 
unreasonable.  Counsel reasonably could have concluded that 
calling these witnesses, about whose other testimony counsel was 
uncertain, had the potential to harm the defendant's case more 
than doing so would have helped it.10  See Commonwealth v. 
 
9 Four or five years before the evidentiary hearing, defense 
counsel suffered a stroke that significantly diminished his 
memory.  Defense counsel recalled representing the defendant, 
but could not identify him on sight at the evidentiary hearing. 
 
10 The defendant argues that trial counsel's ineffectiveness 
is further evidenced by his interviews with the alibi witnesses 
before trial, in which he informed at least two of them of the 
importance of their testimony.  This argument is unavailing.  
After considering the case put forth by the Commonwealth, 
counsel reasonably might have changed his mind about the value 
 
12 
 
Little, 376 Mass. 233, 242 (1978) ("Counsel could sensibly 
conclude that putting [all available alibi witnesses] on the 
stand would do more harm than good"). 
At trial, counsel made clear that, in light of the 
testimony put forth by the Commonwealth, he did not believe that 
either Franklin or Christina would provide any new, credible, 
and material information to the jury.  He also explained that, 
although Reaksmy might have been able to testify that he had 
been standing next to the defendant when the first round of 
shots were fired, the jury already had heard evidence to that 
effect, and thus he was reluctant to expose Reaksmy to 
potentially vigorous cross-examination merely to introduce 
cumulative evidence. 
Moreover, trial counsel made these strategic decisions 
after the close of the Commonwealth's case, which was replete 
 
of the alibi testimony.  It is the choice of the defendant, and, 
indeed, the responsibility of defense counsel, to modify or even 
abandon an initial defense plan and to adapt to create a more 
effective strategy for the defense.  See Ouber v. Guarino, 293 
F.3d 19, 28 (1st Cir. 2002) ("[O]n the eve of trial, a 
thoughtful lawyer may remain unsure as to whether to call the 
defendant as a witness.  If such uncertainty exists, however, it 
is an abecedarian principle that the lawyer must exercise some 
degree of circumspection").  See, e.g., Felts v. State, 354 
S.W.3d 266, 284-285 (Tenn. 2011), and cases cited 
("[D]evelopments in the course of a trial will often prompt, 
indeed necessitate, legitimate changes in strategy").  We 
decline to hold that defense counsel's decision to change 
strategies after hearing the Commonwealth's case-in-chief 
necessarily demonstrates or, by itself, is evidence of counsel's 
ineffectiveness. 
13 
 
with conflicting testimony.  Although there were some points of 
general agreement among the Commonwealth's witnesses with 
respect to the shooting itself, such as their description of the 
shooter's clothing and hair, the number of shots fired, and the 
time of the shooting, the testimony regarding the location and 
the identity of the shooter differed.11  In such circumstances, 
it was not manifestly unreasonable for trial counsel to conclude 
that the risk of putting the alibi witnesses on the stand, and 
subjecting them to cross-examination, potentially could cause 
more harm than good to the defense's case.  See Commonwealth v. 
Fuller, 394 Mass. 251, 261 (1985), S.C., 419 Mass. 1002 (1994) 
(failure to call witness not manifestly unreasonable where 
counsel interviewed potential defense witness but good cause 
existed to be wary and counsel reasonably could have concluded 
that calling witness would do more harm than good).  Here, trial 
counsel reasonably could have concluded that the better course 
of action was to emphasize the conflicting testimony among the 
Commonwealth's key witnesses and to argue the presence of 
reasonable doubt as a result. 
 
11 For example, Soryear testified that the shooter was 
standing toward the top of the hill, but later contradicted 
herself.  Tobey testified that he viewed the shooter, whom he 
identified as the defendant, running away from the scene, but 
later stated that he was unable to identify the shooter. 
14 
 
This is true especially considering the defendant's 
relationships with Reaksmy, Franklin, and Christina:  Reaksmy, 
the defendant's very close friend; Franklin, his close "god 
sister" for most of his life; and Christina, the defendant's 
biological sister.  Counsel could have concluded that the jury 
would view these relationships as supplying strong motivations 
for the witnesses to fabricate an alibi for the defendant and 
that, if so, the testimony would in fact increase the jury's 
focus on the strengths of the Commonwealth's case.  See Hudson, 
446 Mass. at 725-726 (inherent weakness of alibi testimony of 
family member exacerbated by witness's failure to disclose 
immediately defendant's alibi); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 429 
Mass. 146, 153 (1999) ("Common sense and the case law dictate 
that the testimony of a blood relative of the defendant is 
inherently less credible than the testimony of other 
witnesses"). 
The reasonableness of defense counsel's strategic decision 
not to call these witnesses is further buttressed by the motion 
judge's finding that Reaksmy and Franklin contradicted each 
other regarding important details concerning the evening's 
events when testifying at the hearing on the motion for a new 
trial.  Specifically, Reaksmy testified that he drove to the 
party with the defendant and that he did not recall Franklin's 
presence at the party.  Reaksmy further testified that he was 
15 
 
with the defendant when the first round of shots was fired.  
Franklin testified, however, not only that she was at the party, 
but also that the defendant was standing "right next to" her 
during the first round of gunshots.  During cross-examination, 
Franklin then contradicted herself and denied having been with 
the defendant when she heard the first round of gunshots.  Given 
these key contradictions, trial counsel's misgivings about 
Franklin's and Reaksmy's capabilities as witnesses reasonably 
could have led him to conclude that their testimony could 
indicate to the jury that they either had difficulty remembering 
the details of the evening or were fabricating their testimony, 
and that it was better for the defendant's case not to call them 
as witnesses. 
This is not a case where counsel failed to investigate, 
identify, or interview potentially key defense witnesses.  
Contrast Commonwealth v. Hampton, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 162, 166-167 
(2015) (counsel ineffective for failure to investigate witness 
testimony).  See generally Commonwealth v. Denis, 442 Mass. 617, 
629-630 (2004).  To the contrary, the record reflects that trial 
counsel was aware of these witnesses, had interviewed them (in 
some cases several times), knew the substance of what they had 
16 
 
to say,12 and subsequently made a deliberate and strategic 
decision not to call them.  These actions were not manifestly 
unreasonable. 
ii.  Expert witness.  The defendant contends that trial 
counsel was ineffective because he did not retain an expert 
witness to testify regarding the likely location of the shooter.  
The absence of expert testimony constitutes ineffective 
assistance where such testimony could provide a substantial 
ground of defense or is necessary to rebut critical expert 
testimony relied upon by the Commonwealth.  See Commonwealth v. 
Millien, 474 Mass. 417, 429-434 (2016). 
At the hearing on his motion for a new trial, the defendant 
called Peter Massey, a crime scene reconstruction expert, to 
testify.  Massey testified that, despite several of the 
Commonwealth's witnesses testifying to having seen the gunman 
standing at the approximate midpoint of the hill, if an 
individual were walking uphill while firing a gun at a fixed 
object, one would expect to "find a trail of [shell] casings at 
 
12 At the evidentiary hearing on the defendant's motion for 
a new trial, a number of trial counsel's documents were admitted 
by stipulation of the parties, including the "trial file" 
(consisting of copies of the indictments, reports, grand jury 
transcripts, and trial motions) and several memoranda to file.  
Following trial counsel's testimony at the hearing, "well over 
one hundred pages" of other electronically stored documents 
relating to the defendant's trial, such as portions of trial 
counsel's notes, were discovered and subsequently admitted as 
evidence by stipulation. 
17 
 
distances determined by the firing of the firearm," rather than 
the close grouping of shell casings that was found at the top of 
the hill.  The location where the casings were recovered was 
significant to Massey because, in his opinion, the path of the 
bullets through the victim's body was inconsistent with the 
shooter having fired from partway up the hill.  Massey explained 
that, based on the locations of the casings, the shooting had to 
have taken place "in very close proximity to where the victim's 
body was found," and that "the muzzle of the firearm . . . and 
the victim were all on the same plane."  The defendant argues 
that, had Massey's testimony been presented to the jury, it 
would have influenced the jury toward acquittal, as it would 
have demonstrated that the defendant could not have been the 
shooter.  We disagree. 
The defendant's argument misconstrues Massey's testimony at 
the evidentiary hearing.  Essentially, Massey opined that the 
victim, the shooter, and the muzzle of the gun all had been "on 
the same plane," and that the shooter was in very close 
proximity to the victim when he fired the fatal shots.  We agree 
with the motion judge that Massey's testimony that the victim, 
the shooter, and the muzzle of the gun were all "on the same 
plane" and in very close proximity did "nothing to contradict" 
Soryear's testimony that she saw the defendant shoot the victim 
18 
 
from about five to six feet away.13  Accordingly, we conclude 
that trial counsel's decision not to retain an expert on crime 
scene reconstruction was not manifestly unreasonable. 
 
2.  Claim of juror misconduct on direct appeal.  The 
defendant also argues in his direct appeal that he is entitled 
to a new trial or a reduction of the verdict of murder due to 
juror misconduct. 
After the jury began deliberations, a court officer noticed 
one of the jurors copying something from his cell phone onto a 
piece of paper.  When the officer confronted the juror, the 
juror revealed that he was writing down a definition of the term 
"reasonable doubt" that he had retrieved from a webpage, 
Legal.com.  The juror said that he had mentioned to other 
members of the jury the day before that he wanted to search an 
external source for more information on the subject of 
reasonable doubt, but that he did not believe that any of the 
other jurors could see what he was writing, as he had been "in 
 
13 We emphasize that, although Soryear denied seeing the 
shooter or identifying the defendant as such when testifying at 
trial, the Commonwealth was permitted to introduce Soryear's 
earlier, positive identification of the defendant as the shooter 
through the testimony of Sergeant Scott Warmington of the State 
police as substantive evidence.  See Cong Duc Le, 444 Mass. at 
432 (allowing substantive use of pretrial identification 
evidence, even if witness testifies that he or she did not make 
such identification).  Therefore, the jury could have found 
Soryear's prior testimony and identification of the witness 
persuasive and in line with Massey's conclusions, mitigating the 
usefulness of Massey's testimony. 
19 
 
the corner" of the room and was not reading aloud as he wrote.  
The judge conducted a separate voir dire of each juror asking 
whether the juror witnessed the interaction in the deliberation 
room that morning or had seen what the juror was writing.  The 
judge sought to determine whether any other jurors had sought 
out extraneous information, had been exposed to extraneous 
information, or no longer were able to follow the judge's 
instructions. 
During these interviews, the judge learned that, the 
previous evening, another juror had used the Internet to read 
about "reasonable doubt," but had not spoken to any other juror 
about the subject.  After completing the interviews, the judge 
dismissed the two tainted jurors but denied the defendant's 
motion for a mistrial.  The judge determined that dismissal of 
the two jurors was sufficient to protect the impartiality of the 
jury, given that the remaining jurors had not spoken with the 
two tainted jurors and either did not notice one of the juror's 
act of writing, only saw the writing upside down, or only saw 
the title of "reasonable doubt."  Each of the remaining jurors 
expressed the belief that he or she could remain impartial, 
would continue to follow the judge's instructions, and would not 
seek out extraneous information.  After replacing the two 
excused jurors with two alternate jurors, the judge instructed 
the jury to begin their deliberations anew. 
20 
 
 
"Article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and 
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantee 
a criminal defendant the right to a trial before an impartial 
jury."  Commonwealth v. Philbrook, 475 Mass. 20, 30 (2016).  To 
safeguard this right, a trial judge is obliged to avoid 
extraneous influences on jurors.  See Commonwealth v. Colon, 482 
Mass. 162, 167 (2019).  "An extraneous matter is one that 
involves information not part of the evidence at trial and 
raises a serious question of possible prejudice."  Id., quoting 
Commonwealth v. Guisti, 434 Mass. 245, 251 (2001), S.C., 449 
Mass. 1018 (2007).  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fidler, 377 Mass. 
192, 194 (1979) (during deliberations, juror stated information 
not presented at trial).  "[N]ot all extraneous jury 
discussion[, however,] compromises a defendant's right to a fair 
trial, and the presence of an extraneous influence does not 
necessarily require a mistrial."  Colon, supra at 168. 
 
When a trial judge learns that the jury were exposed to an 
extraneous influence, the judge is required to determine whether 
the jurors are able to remain impartial.  See Philbrook, 475 
Mass. at 30-31.  A trial judge has "discretion in addressing 
issues of extraneous information on jurors discovered during 
trial."  Commonwealth v. Trapp, 423 Mass. 356, 362, cert. 
denied, 519 U.S. 1045 (1996).  "A reviewing court 'will not 
disturb a judge's findings of impartiality,' or a judge's 
21 
 
finding that a juror is unbiased, 'absent a clear showing of an 
abuse of discretion or that the finding was clearly erroneous.'"  
Colon, 482 Mass. at 168, quoting Commonwealth v. McCowen, 458 
Mass. 461, 493-494 (2010).  "Where a judge conducts individual 
voir dire of each juror, excuses all influenced jurors, and 
determines that the remaining jurors are impartial, a 
defendant's right to an impartial jury has not been violated."  
Colon, supra. 
 
Here, the trial judge was informed immediately by a court 
officer that the jury potentially had been exposed to an 
extraneous definition of "reasonable doubt."  The judge 
conducted a comprehensive, individual voir dire of each juror to 
determine the information to which he or she had been exposed, 
and whether the juror was able to remain impartial and to decide 
the case based on the evidence presented at trial.  During these 
colloquies, the judge found two jurors who explained that they 
had conducted external research about the meaning of "reasonable 
doubt," concluded that those jurors could not remain impartial, 
and dismissed them.  The remaining jurors stated that they had 
not conducted any of their own research and had not seen the 
definition of reasonable doubt the juror had attempted to write 
on paper in the deliberation room.  At most, the remaining 
jurors said that they had seen only the words "reasonable" or 
"reasonable doubt."  Accordingly, we conclude that the trial 
22 
 
judge did not err in declining to declare a mistrial on the 
basis of this juror misconduct, and the defendant's right to an 
impartial jury was not violated. 
 
3.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have reviewed the 
entire record pursuant to our responsibilities under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, and discern no basis to reduce the conviction of 
murder in the first degree to a lesser degree of guilt or to 
order a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed. 
Order denying motion for 
  a new trial affirmed.