Title: New Jersey v. Desir
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: February 9, 2021

New Jersey v. Desir Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary In this appeal, the issue presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's consideration was whether defendant Herby Desir was entitled to discovery regarding the controlled purchase of narcotics by a confidential informant (CI). Defendant was not charged in connection with that controlled purchase; however, the purchase formed the probable cause for issuance of a search warrant for defendant’s home, and execution of the search warrant led to charges against defendant for multiple drug and weapons offenses. The Appellate Division reversed the denial of defendant’s motion to compel discovery and remanded for further proceedings, thus permitting defendant, after receiving discovery, “either to withdraw his plea and proceed to trial . . . or to accept his earlier conviction and sentence.” The Appellate Division found that, under provisions of Rule 3:13-3(b)(1), the State should have automatically given defendant the laboratory report -- along with any police reports and video and sound recordings -- once the indictment was filed. The Supreme Court held a defendant seeking discovery in connection with a "Franks" hearing may -- in the trial court’s discretion and on showing a plausible justification that casts reasonable doubt on the veracity of the affidavit -- be entitled to limited discovery described with particularity that is material to the determination of probable cause. The Court affirmed and modified the Appellate Division’s judgment and remanded to the trial court for consideration under the standard adopted in this decision. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUSThis syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized. State v. Herby V. Desir (A-43-19) (083584)Argued October 13, 2020 -- Decided February 9, 2021SOLOMON, J., writing for the Court. In this appeal, the Court considers whether defendant Herby Desir is entitled to discovery regarding the controlled purchase of narcotics by a confidential informant (CI). Defendant was not charged in connection with that controlled purchase; however, the purchase formed the probable cause for issuance of a search warrant for defendant’s home, and execution of the search warrant led to charges against defendant for multiple drug and weapons offenses. The affidavit submitted by a detective from the Union County Prosecutor’s Office (UCPO) in support of the search warrant application stated that a CI, who had previously provided reliable information that led to arrests, had contacted the detective and claimed defendant stored and sold Methylenedioxy-N-ethylcathinone (sometimes referred to as Molly) at his home. According to the affidavit, the detective intercepted two phone calls between the CI and defendant and overheard them discuss the sale of Molly and firearms. The affidavit stated that, during the second call, defendant told the CI to come to his house. The detective followed the CI to defendant’s residence and monitored the home until after the CI exited. Afterward, the detective and the CI met at a pre-arranged location, where the CI gave the detective a substance obtained from defendant. The affidavit stated that the “suspected 'Molly’ obtained from [defendant] was submitted to the [UCPO] Laboratory where it . . . tested positive for [Molly,] a Schedule I controlled dangerous substance.” The affidavit did not state that the detective provided the CI with “buy money” with which to purchase the drugs. Based solely on that affidavit, a judge granted a no-knock search warrant for defendant’s home. Defendant moved to suppress the contraband seized during the execution of the warrant and for a Franks hearing, which is a hearing to challenge the veracity of an affidavit upon which a facially valid search warrant is based. Counsel asserted that defendant did not sell Molly from his home. Five months after filing his motion to suppress and for a hearing, defendant moved to compel discovery, seeking the initial investigation report, any proof of money provided to the CI for the controlled buy, laboratory reports, and a transcript or audio recording of the intercepted calls. 1 The trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress and for a Franks hearing. Six months later, a different judge considered and denied defendant’s motion to compel discovery. Defendant pled guilty to possession of Molly with intent to distribute, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motions. The Appellate Division reversed the denial of defendant’s motion to compel discovery and remanded for further proceedings. 461 N.J. Super. 185, 187 (App. Div. 2019). The court permitted defendant, after receiving discovery, “either to withdraw his plea and proceed to trial . . . or to accept his earlier conviction and sentence.” Id. at 194. Even though the indictment did not charge defendant with the sale of narcotics to the CI, the Appellate Division found that, under provisions of Rule 3:13-3(b)(1), the State should have automatically given defendant the laboratory report -- along with any police reports and video and sound recordings -- once the indictment was filed. Id. at 193. The Court granted certification. 240 N.J. 553 (2020).HELD: A defendant seeking discovery in connection with a Franks hearing may -- in the trial court’s discretion and on showing a plausible justification that casts reasonable doubt on the veracity of the affidavit -- be entitled to limited discovery described with particularity that is material to the determination of probable cause. The Court affirms and modifies the Appellate Division’s judgment and remands to the trial court for consideration under the standard adopted in this decision.1. Rule 3:13-3(b)(1) codifies the criminal defendant’s right to automatic post-indictment discovery of the evidence the State has gathered in support of its charges, including “exculpatory information or material” and a list of other “relevant material[s].” To qualify as “relevant material,” the evidence must have a tendency in reason to prove or disprove a fact of consequence to the determination of the action. Courts have the inherent power to order discovery beyond the automatic discovery provisions of Rule 3:13-3(b) when justice so requires. But the discovery process is not a fishing expedition or an unfocused, haphazard search for evidence. One significant limit on defendants’ discovery rights is the chilling and inhibiting effect that discovery can have on material witnesses. Recognizing that CIs play an indispensable role in police work, New Jersey has a privilege against disclosing the identity of the informant. (pp. 12-14)2. Defendants seeking to challenge the basis of a search warrant must make an evidentiary showing before a hearing will be granted: they must first establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the allegedly false statement in the affidavit was made either deliberately or in reckless disregard of the truth. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 , 155-56 (1978). In State v. Howery, the Court adopted and repeated the principles of Franks. 80 N.J. 563, 567 (1979). Under the Franks/Howery standard, a defendant’s “attack must be more than conclusory,” “supported by more than a mere desire to cross- examine,” and “accompanied by an offer of proof.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 171. (pp. 15-20) 2 3. In People v. Luttenberger, the California Supreme Court “adopt[ed] a preliminary showing requirement . . . that is somewhat less demanding than the” showing Franks requires “for purposes of discovery motions” challenging warrant affidavits “based on statements of an unidentified informant.” 784 P.2d 633 , 646 (Cal. 1990). Specifically, the Luttenberger court held that, “[t]o justify in camera review and discovery, preliminary to a subfacial challenge to a search warrant, a defendant must offer evidence casting some reasonable doubt on the veracity of material statements made by the affiant.” Ibid. The court noted that, like requests for a Franks hearing, such discovery requests “should include affidavits supporting defendant’s assertions of misstatements or omissions in the warrant affidavit. Further, a defendant should, if possible, specify the information he seeks, the basis for his belief the information exists, and the purpose for which he seeks it.” Ibid. The Luttenberger court applied those requirements separately to discovery requests and motions for hearings, id. at 647, and then described what steps a trial court should take after a preliminary showing has been made, id. at 648. The Luttenberger court provided guidance about when, and, after redactions, what materials should be disclosed to defendants, to “assure the defendant of a judicial check on possible police misrepresentations, while preventing both unfounded fishing expeditions and inadvertent revelations of the identity of confidential police informants.” See ibid. (pp. 20-25)4. The Court adopts the Luttenberger standard and will require a defendant to describe with reasonable particularity the information sought in discovery, sustained by a plausible justification “casting a reasonable doubt on the truthfulness of statements made in the affidavit.” Id. at 647. The discovery request should be buttressed by support for assertions of misstatements or omissions in the search warrant affidavit that are material to the determination of probable cause, the basis for believing that the information exists, and the purpose for which the information is sought. Application of this standard and the determination of whether it has been met in an individual case rest in the sound discretion of the trial judge, who will review the appropriately redacted discovery in camera. Only after such in camera review will the judge determine whether the discovery sought contradicts material facts set forth in the affidavit, should therefore be disclosed, and to what limitations or redactions the discovery might be subject. (pp. 26-28)5. Applying that standard here, the Court first notes that the requested materials do not pertain to the “determination” of the charges against defendant, but rather to uncharged conduct; they are therefore not “relevant” within the meaning of Rule 3:13-3(b)(1), nor are they exculpatory. As a result, the materials were not subject to automatic disclosure under Rule 3:13-3(b)(1). (pp. 28-30)6. The Court thus considers whether, to ensure the fairness of judicial proceedings, materials identified with reasonable particularity that fall beyond the scope of Rule 3:13- 3(b)(1), but may call into question the validity of a search warrant affidavit, are discoverable to defendants who have shown a plausible justification for requesting the materials. Defendant clearly met the standard of reasonable specificity as to the lab 3 report, which was described in the affidavit. Defendant barely met the standard of plausible justification, given the importance of the lab report to the warrant affidavit, the dependence of the charges on the execution of that warrant, and the affiant’s omission of any mention of “buy money” in the affidavit. In contrast, the other requested materials were broadly categorized, would not be amenable to necessary redactions, and were not identified with reasonable specificity. And the only justification offered in support of those materials was defendant’s blanket denial, which is not sufficient. The Court stresses, moreover, that defendant’s preliminary showing as to the lab report does not mean he is guaranteed access to that information. Rather, the court will have to review the report in camera. The ultimate discovery decision resides in the discretion of the trial court. The Court underscores its adherence to the Franks/Howery framework and reemphasizes the importance of preserving the confidentiality of informants. (pp. 30-35)7. The Court acknowledges the error of the trial court in hearing defendant’s motion to compel discovery six months after hearing his motion to suppress evidence. The Court urges counsel to file these motions together and courts to schedule these motions close in time. The Court relies on the trial courts to hold defendants to the proofs required by the preliminary standard adopted in this decision and, when defendants make that requisite showing, to exercise their discretion, after an in camera review, in determining whether, and in what manner, discovery should be allowed. (p. 35) The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED. JUSTICE ALBIN, dissenting, agrees that defendant is entitled to discovery as set forth in Luttenberger but finds that the majority violates the essential tenets of that standard, citing the majority’s announcement that a defendant’s sworn statement contradicting averments in a warrant affidavit will not be sufficient to cast “reasonable doubt” on the veracity of the affidavit and therefore to entitle him to an in camera hearing. That pronouncement, Justice Albin notes, presupposes that the averments in a police officer’s affidavit will always be truthful and that the averments in a defendant’s affidavit will always be false -- a notion soundly rejected by other courts. Unlike the Luttenberger court, Justice Albin adds, the majority also requires the defendant to have telepathic powers -- to always be able to identify the specific items of discovery withheld from him. Crafting an illusory particularity requirement that defendants cannot reasonably meet will throttle meritorious claims for discovery, in Justice Albin’s view. Justice Albin would remand to the trial court for application of the Luttenberger standard as it is and would require as a prerequisite to defendant’s discovery request that he support his claim by sworn statements in an affidavit or certification. Justice Albin would also make clear that a pre-Franks discovery motion must always be resolved before a court considers whether a defendant is entitled to a Franks hearing.CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON and FERNANDEZ- VINA join in JUSTICE SOLOMON’s opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a dissent, in which JUSTICES LaVECCHIA and PIERRE-LOUIS join. 4 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 43 September Term 2019 083584 State of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Herby V. Desir, a/k/a Johnathan Desir, Defendant-Respondent. On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 461 N.J. Super. 185 (App. Div. 2019). Argued Decided October 13, 2020 February 9, 2021Steven A. Yomtov, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Steven A. Yomtov, of counsel and on the briefs).Alicia J. Hubbard, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Alicia J. Hubbard, of counsel and on the briefs).Patrick F. Galdieri, II, Assistant Middlesex County Prosecutor, argued the cause for amicus curiae County Prosecutors Association of New Jersey (Angelo J. Onofri, Mercer County Prosecutor, President, attorney; Patrick F. Galdieri, II, of counsel and on the brief). 1 Elyla Huertas argued the cause for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation, attorneys; Elyla Huertas, Alexander Shalom, and Jeanne LoCicero, on the brief). JUSTICE SOLOMON delivered the opinion of the Court. A confidential informant (CI) made a controlled purchase of narcoticsfrom defendant. That purchase formed the probable cause for issuance of asearch warrant for defendant’s home. Execution of the search warrant led tocharges against defendant for multiple drug and weapons offenses. Defendantwas not charged with the underlying narcotics sale to the CI. Defense counsel filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized fromdefendant’s home pursuant to the search warrant and for a Franks hearing1because defendant claimed he never sold Methylenedioxy-N-ethylcathinone1 Named for the case in which the United States Supreme Court first ordered such a hearing, a Franks hearing is an evidentiary proceeding in which a defendant, upon a certain showing discussed later in this opinion, may challenge the veracity of an affidavit upon which a facially valid search warrant was based. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 , 171-72 (1978); see also State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 7 (2009) (stating that when “a defendant challeng[es] the veracity of the allegations contained in an affidavit in support of a warrant . . . 'if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the defendant’s request’” (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 156)). 2 (sometimes referred to as Molly) from his house. Five months later, defendantfiled a motion to compel discovery. Defendant sought items related to theuncharged sale by defendant to the CI, including a laboratory report mentionedin the search warrant affidavit, any police paperwork, and recordings of thephone calls between defendant and the CI. The State did not provide therequested discovery. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress and for a Frankshearing, and months later denied his motion to compel discovery. Defendantthen pled guilty to second-degree possession of Methylenedioxy-N-ethylcathinone with intent to distribute. Defendant appealed. The Appellate Division determined that defendantwas entitled to the discovery he requested and remanded to the trial court sothat the defendant could elect to either withdraw his guilty plea or accept hisearlier conviction and sentence. The issue in this appeal is whether defendant is entitled to discoveryregarding the uncharged purchase of narcotics by the CI. We determine that adefendant seeking discovery in connection with a Franks hearing may -- in thetrial court’s discretion and on showing a plausible justification that castsreasonable doubt on the veracity of the affidavit -- be entitled to limiteddiscovery described with particularity that is material to the determination of 3 probable cause. We therefore affirm and modify the Appellate Division’sjudgment and remand to the trial court for consideration under the standardadopted herein. I. A. We derive the facts of this case from the trial and appellate records,including the affidavit submitted by a detective from the Union CountyProsecutor’s Office in support of the search warrant application. That affidavit stated that a CI, who had previously provided reliableinformation that led to arrests, had contacted the detective and claimeddefendant stored and sold Molly at his home. According to the affidavit, thedetective acted on that tip by conducting two consensual interceptions oftelephone conversations between the CI and defendant, and he overheard thetwo discuss the sale of Molly and firearms. The affidavit stated that, duringthe second call, defendant told the CI to come to his house. The detectivefollowed the CI to defendant’s residence and monitored the home until afterthe CI exited. Afterward, the detective and the CI met at a pre-arrangedlocation, where the CI gave the detective a substance obtained from defendant. The affidavit stated that the “suspected 'Molly’ obtained from[defendant] was submitted to the Union County Prosecutor’s Office Laboratory 4 where it was analyzed and tested positive for [Molly,] a Schedule I controlleddangerous substance.” The affidavit did not state that the detective providedthe CI with “buy money” with which to purchase the drugs. Based solely on that affidavit, a judge granted a no-knock search warrantfor defendant’s home, where the police recovered 125 ounces of Molly, ahandgun, hollow point bullets, currency, and drug paraphernalia. B. A Union County grand jury thereafter indicted defendant on thefollowing drug possession charges relating to Methylenedioxy-N-ethylcathinone: third-degree possession, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1); second-degree possession with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(4); third-degree possession with intent to distribute within1,000 feet of a school, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7; and second-degree possession withintent to distribute within 500 feet of a public housing facility, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1. The grand jury also charged defendant with second-degree possession ofa firearm in the course of committing a drug offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1(a);and fourth-degree possession of hollow point bullets, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(f). Defendant filed a motion to suppress the contraband seized by policeduring the execution of the search warrant and for a Franks hearing. Defensecounsel argued that the search warrant affidavit “was so defective and/or made 5 with reckless disregard for truth that the judge who signed the warrant couldnot possibly have fairly evaluated the existence of probable cause.” In supportof his motion for a Franks hearing, counsel asserted that, contrary to theallegations in the search warrant affidavit, defendant did not sell Molly fromhis home. Five months later, defendant filed a motion to compel discoverypursuant to Rule 3:13-3(b), seeking the detective’s initial investigation report,any proof of money provided to the CI for the controlled buy, laboratoryreports, and a transcript or audio recording of the consensual intercept ionsbetween defendant and the CI. Defendant reiterated his denial that he wasselling Molly out of his home and argued he was not on a “fishing expedition”to determine the identity of the CI. The trial court first heard argument on defendant’s motion to suppressand for a Franks hearing. The court denied the motion, finding defendant hadfailed to meet his burden of demonstrating that any of the statements in thesearch warrant affidavit were untrue. Six months later, a different judge considered and denied defendant’smotion to compel discovery. The judge found defendant’s discovery request tobe a fishing expedition to uncover the identity of the CI. Relying in part onthe previous denial of defendant’s motion for a Franks hearing, the judge 6 concluded that further discovery relating to the validity of the warrant wouldbe irrelevant to the charges defendant faced. Defendant pled guilty to second-degree possession of Methylenedioxy-N-ethylcathinone with intent to distribute. He reserved his right to appeal thedenial of his motions to suppress and compel discovery. The trial courtsentenced defendant to a seven-year prison term with three-and-one-half yearsof parole ineligibility. The remaining counts of the indictment were dismissed. C. The Appellate Division reversed the denial of defendant’s motion tocompel discovery and remanded for further proceedings. State v. Desir, 461 N.J. Super. 185, 187 (App. Div. 2019). The Appellate Division concludedthat, because defendant was not able to investigate anything in the detective’s affidavit by obtaining routine discovery that should have been automatically provided to him, defendant did not have a fair opportunity to pursue his motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search authorized by the warrant or to obtain a Franks hearing. [Id. at 194.]The Appellate Division permitted defendant, after receiving discovery, “eitherto withdraw his plea and proceed to trial . . . or to accept his earlier conviction 7 and sentence.” Ibid. (omission in original) (quoting State v. Cummings, 184 N.J. 84, 100 (2005)). The Appellate Division decided that defendant needed access to the labreport to “mount a viable attack on the validity of the search warrant.” Id. at192. Thus, “the timing of the court’s consideration of the motion [to suppress]unduly prejudiced defendant.” Ibid. Acknowledging a defendant’s alreadyheavy burden under Franks, the Appellate Division found the burden for thisdefendant “even more onerous because the State had still not responded todefendant’s request for specific information about the warrant application,including a copy of the laboratory report.” Id. at 190. The Appellate Divisiontherefore held that considering the motion to compel discovery after denyingthe motion to suppress “did nothing to remedy the prejudice defendant hadalready suffered.” Id. at 192-93. Even though the indictment did not charge defendant with the sale ofnarcotics to the CI, the Appellate Division found that, under Rule 3:13-3(b)(1)(C), the State should have automatically given defendant the laboratoryreport -- along with any police reports, R. 3:13-3(b)(1)(E) and (H), and videoand sound recordings, R. 3:13-3(b)(1)(A) -- once the indictment was filed. 461 N.J. Super. at 193. As to the contention that defendant sought discoverysolely to determine the identity of the informant, the Appellate Division noted 8 that “defendant did not object to receiving redacted versions” of the records.Ibid. Finally, the Appellate Division distinguished State v. Broom-Smith,2noting that Broom-Smith involved a confirmatory drug analysis, while in thiscase, the detective had no first-hand knowledge that the item he received wasMolly. Ibid. We granted certification. 240 N.J. 553 (2020). We also granted amicuscuriae status to the County Prosecutors Association of New Jersey (CPA) andthe American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (ACLU). II. The State asserts that the Appellate Division’s decision is contrary toFranks and State v. Howery3 since defendant did not meet the standard tochallenge the veracity of the search warrant affidavit. The State also claimsthat Rule 3:13-3 does not entitle defendant to the information he seeks,redacted or otherwise, because the information is not relevant to the chargesagainst him. The State further claims the Appellate Division’s holding risksdisclosure of the identity of confidential informants and will therefore have achilling effect on their use. The State relies on Broom-Smith for support and2 406 N.J. Super. 228 (App. Div. 2009), aff’d, 201 N.J. 229 (2010). 3 80 N.J. 563, 571 (1979) (prospectively adopting the Supreme Court’s holding in Franks). 9 argues its result controls here. Finally, the State asks this Court to followstates which hold that when the credibility of an informant is at issue, but thejudicial officer has been found truthful, the defendant’s interest in disclosure isless compelling. Amicus CPA reiterates many of the State’s arguments but emphasizesthe importance of confidential informants and the “informer’s privilege.” TheCPA contends that redaction and in camera review do not protect confidentialinformants because even general information may allow a seasoned drugdealer to deduce the informant’s identity. The CPA argues that the need forinformation in this case cannot outweigh the importance of protecting theidentity of the confidential informant. Defendant argues for affirmance of the Appellate Division’s decisionand expresses concern that a contrary result would mean “no one can holdaccountable to the law those entrusted with the power to enforce the law,”because false affidavits could be presented to a magistrate without recourse.Defendant contends that the Franks standard is so high that defendants cannotchallenge affidavits without full and complete discovery. Furthermore,defendant points to examples of discovery that must be provided “to allow thedefense to . . . examine the veracity of the State’s witnesses’ . . . accounts.”Defendant therefore challenges the State’s reliance on the Franks/Howery 10 framework, arguing that existing case law allows “affidavits to exist in animpenetrable tower of secrecy.” Lastly, defendant claims that the informationhe seeks is relevant to the validity of the search warrant and challenges theState’s reliance on Broom-Smith, emphasizing that the failure to conduct afield test of the drugs in this case is a key distinction. Amicus ACLU supports defendant’s arguments and emphasizes that thecourt’s failure to permit him full discovery before proceeding with a hearin gon the evidentiary issue denied defendant a fair trial. The ACLU also arguesthat remedies such as in camera review of evidence and redactions can protectthe rights of both CIs and defendants. III. The issue presented by this appeal is whether defendant is entitled todiscovery regarding the underlying search warrant affidavit, even though hewas not charged with the narcotics transaction referred to in that affidavit.Answering that question requires review of our rules governing criminaldiscovery generally, as well as applicable federal and New Jersey case law,including Franks, Howery, and Broom-Smith. We begin with our rules fordiscovery in criminal cases. 11 A. “In New Jersey, an accused has a right to broad discovery after thereturn of an indictment in a criminal case.” State v. Hernandez, 225 N.J. 451,461 (2016). Our “open-file approach to pretrial discovery in criminal matterspost-indictment” aims “[t]o advance the goal of providing fair and justcriminal trials.” State v. Scoles, 214 N.J. 236, 252 (2013). Rule 3:13-3(b)(1) codifies the criminal defendant’s “right to automaticand broad discovery of the evidence the State has gathered in support of itscharges.” State v. Stein, 225 N.J. 582, 594 (2016) (quoting Scoles, 214 N.J. at 252). That Rule “obligates the State to provide full discovery . . . when anindictment is returned or unsealed,” State v. Robinson, 229 N.J. 44, 72 (2017),“[e]xcept for good cause shown,” R. 3:13-3(b)(1). Full discovery, under Rule3:13-3(b)(1), “shall include exculpatory information or material.” The Rulethus explicitly renders automatic the turnover of exculpatory evidencemandated by the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Brady v.Maryland.44 373 U.S. 83 , 87 (1963) (holding that “suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution”). 12 Significantly, the Rule further provides that post-indictment discovery“shall also include, but is not limited to, [a list of] relevant material[s] .” R.3:13-3(b)(1). “Relevance is measured in terms of the opportunity of thedefendant to present a complete defense.” Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J.Court Rules, cmt. 3.2 on R. 3:13-3 (2020). “To qualify as 'relevant material,’the evidence must have '“a tendency in reason to prove or disprove [a] fact ofconsequence to the determination of the action.”’” State v. Richardson, 452 N.J. Super. 124, 132 (App. Div. 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting State v.Gilchrist, 381 N.J. Super. 138, 146 (App. Div. 2005)). The kinds of itemslisted as discoverable include video and audio recordings, police reports, andlab reports. See R. 3:13-3(b)(1)(A), (C), (E), and (H). Further, a court’s “power to order discovery is not limited to the expressterms of the automatic discovery provisions of Rule 3:13-3(b).” Richardson, 452 N.J. Super. at 132. Indeed, “courts have 'the inherent power to orderdiscovery when justice so requires.’” Ibid. (quoting State ex rel. A.B., 219 N.J. 542, 555 (2014)). “While discovery in criminal cases is broad,” however, “it is notunlimited.” Hernandez, 225 N.J. at 463. The discovery process is not “afishing expedition.” State v. Broom-Smith, 406 N.J. Super. 228, 239 (App.Div. 2009), aff’d, 201 N.J. 229 (2010). It is not “an unfocused, haphazard 13 search for evidence.” State v. D.R.H., 127 N.J. 249, 256 (1992). And one“significant limitation on defendants’ discovery rights is the chilling andinhibiting effect that discovery can have on material witnesses who aresubjected to intimidation, harassment, or embarrassment.” Ibid. As an example, New Jersey “recognize[s] that informants play 'anindispensable role in police work’ and that, in consequence, the privilegeagainst disclosing the identity of the informant 'has long been consideredessential to effective enforcement of the criminal code.’” State v. Williams, 356 N.J. Super. 599, 603 (App. Div. 2003) (quoting State v. Milligan, 71 N.J. 373, 381 (1976)). New Jersey law therefore protects the identity ofconfidential informants from disclosure in criminal proceedings by allowing awitness “to refuse to disclose the identity of a person who has furnishedinformation purporting to disclose a violation of a provision of the law[] . . . toa representative of the State or the United States.” N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-28;N.J.R.E. 516. Here, defendant’s discovery request, which pertains to a transaction withthe CI, implicates those concerns as well as our recognition of the fundamentalimportance of broad discovery to the fairness of criminal proceedings. But theultimate focus of defendant’s request -- his desire to challenge an alleged drugtransaction that served as the basis for a search warrant but was not itself the 14 subject of any criminal charge -- raises additional considerations. Underfederal and state case law, defendants seeking to challenge the basis of asearch warrant must make an evidentiary showing before a hearing will begranted. We now turn to that case law, beginning with the United StatesSupreme Court’s decision in Franks v. Delaware. B. In Franks, officers took the defendant into custody for the assault of afifteen-year-old girl. 438 U.S. at 156. At the same time, officers wereinvestigating the sexual assault at knifepoint of another woman, CynthiaBailey, who provided a detailed description of her assailant, including theclothes he wore. Ibid. Officers prepared an affidavit purportedly supportingprobable cause to search the defendant’s residence. Id. at 157. The affidavitasserted that information provided by personnel at defendant’s workplaceconfirmed his “normal dress” to be consistent with the clothing worn by Ms.Bailey’s attacker. Ibid. A search warrant was issued, and a search of thedefendant’s residence revealed the described clothing and a knife. Ibid. Before trial, the defendant’s counsel filed a motion to suppress theclothing and knife seized, claiming that “the warrant on its face did not showprobable cause and that the search and seizure were in violation of the Fourthand Fourteenth Amendments.” Id. at 157-58. At the hearing on the motion to 15 suppress, defense counsel attacked the veracity of the warrant affidavits,claiming the purported sources of information in the affidavits never spoke tothe affiants “and that, although they might have talked to another policeofficer, any information given by them to that officer was 'somewhat different’from what was recited in the affidavit.” Id. at 158. Defense counsel offered toproduce the supposed sources of the affidavits’ information at the hearing onthe motion to suppress. Ibid. The State of Delaware objected, asserting “thatthe court must decide petitioner’s motion 'on the four corners’ of theaffidavit.” Id. at 160. The trial judge agreed and admitted the evidence at thedefendant’s trial for both assaults. Ibid. The jury convicted the defendant, andthe Delaware Supreme Court affirmed. Ibid. The United States Supreme Court granted the defendant’s petition forcertiorari to consider “whether the trial court had erred in refusing to considerhis allegation of misrepresentation in the warrant affidavit.” Id. at 161. TheCourt reversed the defendant’s conviction, holding that where the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the defendant’s request. [Id. at 155-56.] 16 Thus, according to the holding in Franks, a defendant who requests ahearing to challenge a search warrant affidavit must first establish by apreponderance of the evidence that the allegedly false statement in theaffidavit was made either deliberately or in reckless disregard of the truth.Ibid. Then, “with the affidavit’s false material set to one side, [if] theaffidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, thesearch warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to thesame extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit.” Id.at 156. While Franks was pending before the United States Supreme Court, thisCourt granted the defendant’s petition in State v. Howery, 80 N.J. 563, 566(1979). In that case, the defendant, Richard Howery, challenged a searchwarrant affidavit based on information supplied by a cooperating witness andevidence lawfully seized from a second cooperator’s residence. Id. at 572.The defendant pointed out two errors in the affidavit: (1) a reference to two“bundles” of heroin in a note signed by “Richie,” when the note was actuallysigned by “Rich” and did not mention “bundles,” which is a term used to“specify a quantity of heroin”; and (2) a statement attributed to a cooperatorthat the defendant stored heroin at his house when, in fact, the cooperator toldthe detective that it was stored by Jimmy Howery, the defendant’s brother. Id. 17 at 573-74. Relying on Franks, we affirmed the defendant’s conviction forheroin possession and distribution, concluding that both errors were mistakesrather than “the type of bad-faith, perjurious misconduct which wouldnecessitate excision of the challenged paragraph from the affidavit.” Id. at575. In affirming the defendant’s conviction, this Court recognized thesignificant limitations and burdens Franks places upon defendants. Id. at 567.In Howery, we adopted and repeated the principles of Franks, stating that a“defendant must make a 'substantial preliminary showing’ of falsity in thewarrant.” Ibid. (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 170). We reiterated that adefendant must first allege that the false statements in the warrant were madedeliberately or in “'reckless disregard for the truth,’” ibid. (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 170), and we explained that the defendant must “point[] out withspecificity the portions of the warrant that are claimed to be untrue ,” ibid. Weadded that the defendant should support those allegations with “an offer ofproof including reliable statements by witnesses.” Ibid. We also noted thatthe defendant’s allegations “must be proved by a preponderance of theevidence” and that the false statements in the affidavit “must be material to theextent that when they are excised from the affidavit, that document no longercontains facts sufficient to establish probable cause.” Id. at 568. 18 The Appellate Division later relied upon Howery in deciding Broom-Smith, 406 N.J. Super. at 241, which is cited by the State here. The defendantin Broom-Smith challenged the municipal judge’s authority to issue a searchwarrant that relied upon an affidavit attesting to uncharged sales of cocaine toa confidential informant. Id. at 231-32, 234. The defendant sought discoveryregarding the investigation “leading up to the warrant application,” includingdocuments relating to chain of custody of the drugs seized, reports ofinvestigators, and “notes of communications with the confidential informant.”Id. at 232. Counsel claimed in his motions for discovery and for a Frankshearing that the discovery sought would explain why investigators applied tothe municipal judge for a search warrant and would support the defendant’schallenge to the court’s jurisdiction to issue the warrant. Id. at 232, 235. The trial court denied the defendant’s motions, concluding, in part, thatthe defendant’s “broad demand” for discovery “was a veiled attempt to learnthe identity of the confidential informant.” Id. at 240. The defendant pledguilty to first-degree possession with the intent to distribute cocaine and theAppellate Division affirmed, stating that “a Franks hearing is not directed atpicking apart minor technical problems with a warrant application; it is aimedat warrants obtained through intentional wrongdoing by law enforcementagents.” Id. at 230-31, 240. The appellate court also concluded that 19 documents relating to chain of custody after the drugs seized tested positivefor cocaine were “irrelevant to the validity of the warrant.” Id. at 240. Those cases reveal that while the standard imposed by Rule 3:13-3(b)(1)is low -- the State must automatically turn over to defendants exculpatory orotherwise relevant information -- a defendant’s burden under Franks andHowery is high -- a defendant’s allegations of deliberately or recklessly falsematerial statements in the warrant affidavit must be pointed out withspecificity and supported by an offer of proof, “including reliable statementsby witnesses.” Howery, 80 N.J. at 567. We repeat that to earn a hearing underthe Franks/Howery standard, a defendant’s “attack must be more thanconclusory,” “supported by more than a mere desire to cross-examine,” and“accompanied by an offer of proof.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 171. C. This Court has not previously considered the interplay of our discoveryrules and the showing required to obtain discovery of materials that mightenable a defendant to make the showing required to obtain a Franks hearing,but the Supreme Court of California confronted a similar issue in People v.Luttenberger, 784 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1990). In Luttenberger, the defendant was indicted for sellingmethamphetamine after officers executed a search warrant for the defendant’s 20 home and found drugs, drug paraphernalia, money, and a loaded handgun. Id.at 636. The affidavit of probable cause supporting the search warrantapplication relied on information supplied by a purportedly reliableconfidential informant, but it did not describe the basis for the officer’sassertion of the informant’s reliability. Ibid. Pointing to that deficiency, the defendant sought to challenge thewarrant. See ibid. Like defendant here, the defendant in Luttenberger “did notcontend the affidavit was facially insufficient to establish probable cause forissuing a search warrant. Instead, he sought information to support a . . .challenge [to] the veracity of statements made in the affidavit.” Ibid. Tomount his challenge to “the accuracy of [those] statements,” id. at 635, thedefendant sought the court’s “in-camera review of any information disclosedor discoverable . . . as to the informant’s past experiences with dangerousdrugs, any police reports of incidents [filed] against [informant],” anyvouchers reflecting pay “for [informant’s] services to the police department,[and] any [promises or] representations . . . that were made to” the informant,id. at 636 (alterations in original). The magistrate who heard the defendant’s motion denied his request, butthe superior court reversed and dismissed the charges against the defendant for 21 failure to provide the discovery requested. Id. at 636-37. The intermediateappellate court affirmed the order of dismissal. Id. at 636. The California Supreme Court, in turn, reversed the judgment of theappellate court, vacated the order of dismissal, and remanded for furtherproceedings. Id. at 648. In so doing, the court reviewed both state and federalcase law and “adopt[ed] a preliminary showing standard, which a defendantmust satisfy to obtain in camera examination and discovery of informationregarding police informants.” Id. at 636. The Luttenberger court reviewed Franks and ultimately found a keydistinction between that case and the one before it: The search warrant affidavit at issue in Franks differed from that in the present case in a crucial respect: it relied not on information from a confidential informant, but on statements attributed to two named sources, whom the defendant had been able to contact. . . . [T]he high court did not need to, and did not, reach the proper procedure or preliminary showing required in cases involving confidential informants. The court expressly reserved “the difficult question whether a reviewing court must ever require the revelation of the identity of an informant once a substantial preliminary showing of falsity has been made.” It noted only that due process “did not require the State to expose an informant’s identity routinely, upon a defendant’s mere demand, when there was ample evidence in the probable-cause hearing to show that the informant was reliable and his information credible.” The court also pointed out that it was permitting impeachment of only the affiant, not of any nongovernmental informant. 22 [Id. at 638-39 (quoting Franks, 483 U.S. at 170).] While stressing the distinct concerns raised when discovery is sought inconnection with information purportedly provided by an informant, theLuttenberger court noted that “Franks did not restrict, either explicitly orimplicitly, a defendant’s right to discovery prior to the evidentiary veracityhearing.” Id. at 643. The Luttenberger court further stated, “[w]e do notbelieve that by its formulation of the preliminary showing, the Franks courtintended effectively to bar challenges to warrant affidavits based onconfidential informants’ tips.” Ibid. The California court thus declined to“require[] a defendant to meet the Franks preliminary showing standard beforeobtaining limited discovery relevant to the truthfulness of the warrantaffidavit” -- a requirement the court stressed that even “Franks itself” did notimpose. Id. at 644. Ultimately, the Luttenberger court “adopt[ed] a preliminary showingrequirement . . . that is somewhat less demanding than the 'substantial showingof material falsity’ required by Franks, 438 U.S. 154 ,” “for purposes ofdiscovery motions” challenging warrant affidavits “based on statements of anunidentified informant.” Id. at 646. Specifically, the court held that, “[t]ojustify in camera review and discovery, preliminary to a subfacial challenge toa search warrant, a defendant must offer evidence casting some reasonable 23 doubt on the veracity of material statements made by the affiant.” Ibid. Thecourt indicated that, like requests for a Franks hearing, such discovery requests“should include affidavits supporting defendant’s assertions of misstatementsor omissions in the warrant affidavit. Further, a defendant should, if possible,specify the information he seeks, the basis for his belief the information exists,and the purpose for which he seeks it.” Ibid. Applying those requirements separately to discovery requests andmotions for hearings, the Luttenberger court explained that, [f]or purposes of obtaining discovery, a defendant need not show that the alleged inaccuracies of the affidavit resulted from the affiant’s bad faith. . . . [C]asting a reasonable doubt on the truthfulness of statements made in the affidavit will suffice, regardless of the defendant’s ability to show bad faith or trace the inaccuracy directly to misrepresentations by the affiant. To obtain an in camera hearing, however, the defendant must raise a substantial possibility that the allegedly untrue statements were material to the probable cause determination. . . . After its in camera examination of the materials requested by the defendant, the court may then order production of only those documents that are relevant to the material inaccuracies asserted by the defendant. Materiality will depend in part on how vital the information attributed to the unnamed sources is to a showing of probable cause. [Id. at 647.] 24 The Luttenberger court then described what steps a trial court should take aftera preliminary showing has been made. See id. at 648. If the documents thedefendant seeks, when viewed in camera, “do not support defendant’s chargesof misrepresentation, the court should report only this conclusion to thedefendant, and should not order production of any of the reviewed materials.”Ibid. Conversely, if the trial court finds that the “documents containinformation that tends to contradict material representations made in theaffidavit, or constitute material omissions from it, then it should orderdisclosure of the documents to defendant,” subject to redaction. Ibid. The court thus provided guidance about when, and, after redactions,what materials should be disclosed to defendants, to “assure the defendant of ajudicial check on possible police misrepresentations, while preventing bothunfounded fishing expeditions and inadvertent revelations of the identity ofconfidential police informants.” See ibid. The Luttenberger court then applied its new test to the record before itand concluded that “the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying [the]defendant’s motion for in camera review and discovery” because that “motionwas based entirely on conclusory assertions, unsupported by affidavits, an d[the defendant] failed to raise any doubt regarding the truthfulness of thewarrant affidavit.” Ibid. 25 IV. We find persuasive the Luttenberger court’s detailed and nuancedbalancing of the disparate considerations raised in that case, which aremirrored in the case before us. As that court found, broad discovery rules mustat times yield before countervailing considerations like the recognized need toprotect confidential informants when a challenge is posed to a presumptivelytruthful warrant affidavit that relies on assertions about uncharged conduct. Atthe same time, the exacting standard set forth in Franks does not factor in thedifficulties faced by a defendant who seeks to challenge an allegation by aconfidential informant and the concerns of fairness raised by those difficulties;nor does it consider discovery requests in their own right, as distinct fromhearing requests. The California Supreme Court’s standard in Luttenberger generallyserves New Jersey’s interests in cases such as this by protecting both theidentity of confidential informants and a defendant’s right to discovery. Inapplying that standard, we will require a defendant to describe with reasonableparticularity the information sought in discovery, sustained by a plausiblejustification “casting a reasonable doubt on the truthfulness of statements madein the affidavit.” Id. at 647. The discovery request should be buttressed bysupport for defendant’s assertions of misstatements or omissions in the warrant 26 affidavit that are material to the determination of probable cause, the basis forbelieving that the information exists, and the purpose for which theinformation is sought. Application of this standard and the determination of whether it has beenmet in an individual case rest in the sound discretion of the trial judge, seeHernandez, 225 N.J. at 461, who will review the appropriately redacteddiscovery in camera. Only after such in camera review will the trial judgedetermine whether the discovery sought contradicts material facts set forth inthe search warrant affidavit, should therefore be disclosed, and to whatlimitations or redactions the discovery might be subject. We find that such astandard strikes a fair balance. “[O]ur system of the administration of justice suffers when any accusedis treated unfairly.” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. And at their core, our “rules ofdiscovery . . . are designed to accomplish fairness.” State v. Bellamy, 329 N.J.Super. 371, 376 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting State v. Kearney, 109 N.J. Super. 502, 505 (Law Div. 1970)). “Indeed, '[t]he principal purpose of our discoveryrules is to assure the parties every legitimate avenue of inquiry prior to trial toenhance the search for the truth.’” Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting Statev. Burnett, 198 N.J. Super. 53, 58 (App. Div. 1984)). It is the notion of 27 fairness in our system of criminal justice as expressed in Brady and ourdiscovery rules that we import here. V. A. We now apply that standard to defendants’ discovery requests andmotion for a Franks hearing. We begin with a brief review of defendant’srequested discovery and the showing he has made in support of his requests. Defendant claims that he did not sell Molly from his home, contrary tothe allegations in the search warrant affidavit. Because those allegations formthe entire basis of the search warrant that led to the charges against him, heargues, any evidence seized as a result of that warrant must be suppressed. Defendant has not supported his assertion 5 with affidavits or statementsof witnesses. Rather, he points to the search warrant affidavit’s failure tomention “buy money” -- money provided to the CI to fund the CI’s allegedcontrolled drug purchase from defendant. Defendant sought discoverypertaining to the uncharged sale of Molly to the CI to seek proof of hiscontentions. Specifically, defendant requested the lab report mentioned in thewarrant affidavit, as well as any additional police reports and audio and video5 For purpose of this appeal, we treat the representations of defendant’s counsel as defendant’s certification or affidavit. 28 recordings of interactions with the CI. Defendant claims that without thediscovery requested, it would be impossible for him to disprove the State’sclaim that the CI exited defendant’s home and gave the detective Molly he hadobtained from defendant. B. To determine whether defendant is entitled to discovery of the requestedmaterials, we first consider Rule 3:13-3(b)(1), which requires the automaticdisclosure of evidence that is exculpatory or otherwise relevant. If the materials were directly relevant to the charges that defendant faced-- if they had “a tendency in reason to prove or disprove a fact of consequenceto the determination of the action,” Richardson, 452 N.J. Super. at 132(quotation and alteration omitted) -- they would have been subject to automaticdisclosure under Rule 3:13-3(b)(1). Here, however, the materials do notpertain to the “determination” of the charges against defendant, but rather touncharged conduct; they are therefore not “relevant” within the meaning ofRule 3:13-3(b)(1). Similarly, the materials requested are not exculpatory-- defendant has not been charged for the underlying narcotics sale to the CI,and any evidence disproving the sale would not be material to the drugs and 29 weapons offenses he faces under the indictment. As a result, the materialswere not subject to automatic disclosure under Rule 3:13-3(b)(1). The question thus presents whether, to ensure the fairness of judicialproceedings, see Bellamy, 329 N.J. Super. at 376, materials identified withreasonable particularity that fall beyond the scope of Rule 3:13-3(b)(1), butmay call into question the validity of a search warrant affidavit, arediscoverable to defendants who have shown a plausible justification forrequesting the materials, see Richardson, 452 N.J. Super. at 132. In order forthat standard -- which is higher than that imposed by Rule 3:13-3(b)(1) butlower than that required for a Franks hearing -- to successfully balance thecompeting considerations, it must be applied strictly. Here, for example, the charges defendant faces all arise out of what wasfound during the execution of the search warrant. Thus, to the extent thatdiscovery sought would substantiate defendant’s claim that the sale of Mollyto the CI never happened, it has the potential to void the search warrant andresult in suppression of the contraband upon which the indictment is based. Ifthat sale never occurred, “the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient toestablish probable cause, [and] the search warrant must be voided and thefruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause waslacking on the face of the affidavit.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 156. But vague 30 claims of conceivable or potential support for defendant’s argument are notenough. To prevent a fishing expedition and to respect the presumption ofvalidity that attaches to a warrant affidavit, the materials identified withreasonable specificity must be plausibly connected to invalidating the warrantaffidavit. Applying that standard here, we find that only defendant’s request forthe lab report meets that two-part test. First, the report was identified withinthe warrant affidavit itself as a unique, concrete document. Indeed, the labreport was the evidentiary pillar on which the warrant affidavit was built. Theaffidavit states that the “suspected 'Molly’ obtained from [defendant] wassubmitted to the Union County Prosecutor’s Office Laboratory where it wasanalyzed and tested positive for [Molly,] a Schedule I controlled dangeroussubstance.” If that statement is supported by the lab report, it would disprovedefendant’s claims. But if the lab report does not exist or contradicts the affidavit in amaterial way, defendant may be entitled to a Franks hearing. This is not likeBroom-Smith, 406 N.J. Super. at 240, where a field test confirmed thechallenged sale of cocaine to a confidential informant. Here, the validity ofthe warrant affidavit hinges on the contents of the lab report. Further, whilewe consider the affidavit’s failure to mention “buy money” likely a clerical 31 mistake, and not “the type of bad-faith, perjurious misconduct which wouldnecessitate excision of the challenged paragraph from the affidavit,” Howery, 80 N.J. at 575, the omission lends some support to defendant’s claim that theCI did not purchase Molly from him. Accordingly, with respect to the lab report, defendant meets thepreliminary standard we have set forth above. First, he has clearly met thestandard of reasonable specificity as to the report, which was described in theaffidavit. He has also barely met the standard of plausible justification, giventhe importance of the lab report to the warrant affidavit, the dependence of thecharges on the execution of that warrant, and the affiant’s omission of anymention of “buy money” in the affidavit. Of course, but for that omission,defendant would not meet the standard of plausible justification. The contents of the lab report may strike at the heart of defendant’sindictment and his prosecution. Fairness in our system of criminal justicetherefore obliges in camera review of the properly redacted report, which willprotect the CI’s identity. 6 The determination of what happens next -- whether6 We stress that, even though defendant has made the requisite showing as to the lab report, he is not guaranteed access to that information. Rather, the court will have to review the report in camera and consider whether it contradicts representations in the affidavit and, if so, whether it is amenable to necessary redaction, or whether it would pose too great a risk of jeopardizing 32 a Franks hearing should be granted -- would depend on what the reportreveals7 and lies in the discretion of the trial court. 8 We have a different view with respect to the other materials defendantsought to discover. The Appellate Division allowed discovery of “copies ofany police reports prepared in connection with the case . . . and any video andsound recordings,” including recordings of conversations between the policeand the CI. Desir, 461 N.J. Super. at 193 (emphases added). Those broadlycategorized materials would not be amenable to necessary redactions and havethe informant’s identity. We reiterate that the ultimate discovery decision resides in the discretion of the trial court. 7 This Court received a letter from the State verifying that the lab report revealed that the substance did test positive as Molly. The lab report’s contents affect the relief to which defendant is entitled but do not affect the analysis of the discoverability of the lab report. The analysis we provide by way of guidance above shows how trial courts should assess similar discovery requests in the future. 8 The timeline we sketch out here casts light on the inappropriateness of the timing of the consideration of defendant’s motions in this case. Defendant’s motions to compel discovery and to suppress evidence should have been heard, if not at the same time, then as close in time as possible -- and definitely not six months apart. Defendant contributed to that problem by filing his motion to compel discovery five months after filing his motion to suppress. The better practice is to make both requests at the same time. Furthermore, it was inappropriate for the trial court to rely on the denial of the motion to suppress in denying the motion to compel discovery. As we have stated, while a defendant’s burden under Franks and Howery is high, the required showing for discovery purposes is different and, necessarily, lower. 33 not been identified with reasonable specificity. Nor is the request for thosematerials backed by a plausible justification. All we have as to them in thiscase is defendant’s blanket denial, which we do not consider sufficient. 9 Also,to the extent the materials exist, they might have no impact on the affidavit.Therefore, as to those materials, the record before the trial court and on appealbefore us does not satisfy the preliminary showing required to warrant an incamera review. We underscore our adherence to the Franks/Howery framework andreemphasize the importance of preserving the confidentiality of informants. Ina case like this, even a laboratory report could place the CI at risk because ofinformation such as dates on the report, packaging of the substance tested, or9 We do not embrace the eighteen-year-old California intermediate appellate court decision, People v. Estrada, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 589 (Ct. App. 2003), the dissent cites. In that case, the defendant sought discovery regarding whether “the confidential informant(s) . . . made the controlled buy described in the affidavit in support of the search warrant.” Id. at 592. The defendant offered only the search warrant affidavit and his own affidavit in support of his motion, which consisted of a blanket denial of culpability. Id. at 593, 598. In any event, the court did not compel in camera disclosure of the discovery sought, but remanded, finding the trial court “should have exercised discretion utilizing the Luttenberger . . . standard” and noting that, “[d]efendant’s motion requested that the informant’s identity be revealed but did not otherwise explain how that was to happen. If [the] defendant is unable to identify with greater specificity what he desires the trial court to do, it remains free to deny the motion.” Id. at 599. 34 other seemingly innocuous details. Redaction and protection againstdisclosure of identifying details are required. In reaching our decision, we acknowledge the error of the trial court inhearing defendant’s motion to compel discovery six months after hearing hismotion to suppress evidence. We urge counsel to file these motions togetherand courts to schedule these motions close in time. We rely on our trial courtsto hold defendants to the proofs required by the preliminary standard we adopttoday and, when defendants make that requisite showing, to exercise theirdiscretion, after an in camera review, in determining whether, and in whatmanner, discovery should be allowed in order to balance the importantconcerns of fairness and protection of confidential informants. VI. For the reasons set forth above, we affirm and modify the judgment ofthe Appellate Division by limiting defendant’s discovery only to the redactedlab report. We remand to the trial court for consideration under the standardadopted herein. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON and FERNANDEZ-VINA join in JUSTICE SOLOMON’s opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a dissent, in which JUSTICES LaVECCHIA and PIERRE-LOUIS join. 35 State of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Herby V. Desir, a/k/a Johnathan Desir, Defendant-Respondent. JUSTICE ALBIN, dissenting. In this case, an affidavit in support of a search warrant, relying in part onthe veracity of a confidential informant (CI), averred that the CI purchased acontrolled dangerous substance, commonly known as Molly, from defendant indefendant’s residence. Defendant claims that he never sold Molly from hishome and that the averments in the affidavit asserting otherwise wereknowingly or recklessly made false statements. Defendant sought a Frankshearing1 to challenge the validity of the search warrant and the evidence seizedfrom his home pursuant to the warrant. The issue is what discovery, if any, isdefendant entitled to as part of his request for a Franks hearing. It bears1 Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). 1 mentioning that defendant does not object to the redaction of reports and doesnot seek disclosure of the CI’s identity. I agree with the majority that defendant is entitled to discovery as setforth in People v. Luttenberger, 784 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1990). I dissent becausethe majority opinion, although adopting the Luttenberger standard in name,violates the essential tenets of that standard as applied by California courts anddoes so in a way that will render a discovery request illusory. Having established a new discovery standard, the majority does not takethe simple step of remanding to the trial court to permit defendant to satisfythat standard. Instead, the majority misapplies the Luttenberger standard whenit announces that a defendant’s sworn statement contradicting averments in asearch warrant affidavit will not be sufficient to cast “reasonable doubt” on theveracity of a warrant affidavit and therefore to entitle him to an in camerahearing. That pronouncement evidently presupposes that the averments in apolice officer’s affidavit will always be truthful and that the averments in adefendant’s affidavit will always be false -- a notion soundly rejected byCalifornia courts and other courts. Unlike the Luttenberger court, the majority also requires the defendantto have telepathic powers -- to always be able to identify the specific items ofdiscovery withheld from him. Notwithstanding the majority’s particularity 2 requirement, the majority does not find sufficient specificity in defendant’sdiscovery request that -- subject to redaction -- the prosecution provide “proofof buy money,” audio recordings or transcripts of call intercepts, and relevantpolice reports. Crafting an illusory particularity requirement that defendantscannot reasonably meet will undoubtedly throttle meritorious claims fordiscovery. I would remand to the trial court for application of the Luttenbergerstandard as it is. Following the Luttenberger standard, I would allow the trialcourt, in an in camera hearing, to determine what, if any, relevant discoveryshould be made available to defendant -- without the advance restrictions themajority has set in place, which limit defendant to only a redacted laboratoryreport. Luttenberger does not restrict the scope of relevant discovery that thetrial court may review in camera. I would require as a prerequisite to defendant’s discovery request that hesupport his claim by sworn statements in an affidavit or certification. Ifdefendant is willing to make averments under oath, subjecting himself to thecriminal sanction of perjury, then the trial court should conduct an in camerareview to determine the validity of the discovery request, keeping in mind theimportance of safeguarding the CI’s identity. I am not averse to allowing the 3 State to redact portions of the discovery that might reveal the identity of theCI, even before submission to the court. Because the majority does not follow the standard that it purportedlyadopts, I respectfully dissent. I. In this case, defendant has moved to suppress drugs and a weapon seizedfrom his home pursuant to a search warrant. That warrant was secured by adetective who filed an affidavit averring, among other things, that a CI hadpurchased Molly from defendant in defendant’s home. Defendant has deniedthat this uncharged drug transaction occurred. At defendant’s trial, the Statedoes not intend to present evidence of the CI’s drug transaction with defendant-- the transaction that formed the probable cause for the issuance of thewarrant. The majority holds that defendant’s challenge to the veracity of thewarrant affidavit in this scenario does not trigger open discovery under Rule3:13-3(b) and instead adopts the more restrictive standard in Luttenberger. Iagree with that approach. But that is where my agreement ends because themajority fails to follow Luttenberger. In Luttenberger, the California Supreme Court held that “[t]o justify incamera review and discovery, preliminary to a subfacial challenge to a search 4 warrant, a defendant must offer evidence casting some reasonable doubt on theveracity of material statements made by the affiant.” 784 P.2d at 646. Inparticular, “the defendant must raise some reasonable doubt regarding eitherthe existence of the informant or the truthfulness of the affiant’s report” beforea court orders in camera review. Ibid. To meet his burden, the defendant“should include affidavits supporting [his] assertions of misstatements oromissions in the warrant affidavit” and “if possible, specify the information heseeks, the basis for his belief the information exists, and the purpose for whichhe seeks it.” Ibid. (emphasis added). The defendant may satisfy the requiredshowing by “mak[ing] factual allegations contradicting statements in thewarrant affidavit, or rais[ing] inconsistencies on the face of the affidavit,”though the “defendant need not show that the alleged inaccuracies of theaffidavit resulted from the affiant’s bad faith.” Id. at 647. In the wake of Luttenberger, the California Court of Appeals held that adefendant’s sworn declaration denying the warrant affidavit’s assertion that acontrolled drug buy occurred is sufficient to “'cast[] some reasonable doubt onthe veracity of material statements’ appearing in the search warrant affidavit.”People v. Estrada, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 589, 597 (Ct. App. 2003) (quotingLuttenberger, 784 P.2d at 646). In Estrada, the defendant was charged withdrug and weapons offenses arising out of the execution of a search warrant. 5 Id. at 591-92. The police had secured the warrant based on an affidavit thatalleged that the police witnessed a CI “make a controlled purchase of cocainefrom [the defendant].” Id. at 593. The defendant moved to suppress the seizedevidence, requested discovery and an in camera hearing pursuant toLuttenberger, and requested a Franks hearing to challenge the validity of thewarrant. Id. at 592-94. The Estrada court held that the trial court abused its discretion indenying defendant’s request for an in camera hearing on discovery in light ofhis sworn declaration that he “did not meet and sell or provide cocaine orcocaine base to an individual at a location or to any person at any locationduring the time period mentioned in [the investigating detective’s] affidavit.”Id. at 593, 596-97. The court reasoned that the defendant’s sworn denial metthe Luttenberger test because it “contradict[ed] the affiant’s allegations” by“indicat[ing] that the informant, the affiant, and, by inference, the otherdetectives had fabricated the entire drug transaction scenario which served asthe sole basis for the Fourth Amendment justification for the search.” Id. at597. In short, defendant’s averment cast in doubt “the entire justification forthe search.” Id. at 598. In responding to the concern expressed “that accused drug traffickerswill fabricate declarations in order to force the holding of in camera hearings ,” 6 the Estrada court indicated that “[t]here is no empirical data that, in otherjurisdictions where the Luttenberger rule has been adopted, including here inCalifornia, accused drug traffickers have routinely filed false blanket denialsof culpability.” Ibid. The court further reasoned that significant disincentivesexist to deter defendants from abusing the process. Id. at 598-99. The courtnoted that a defendant would subject himself to a perjury prosecution bymaking false declarations or giving false testimony and that such sworn falsestatements, if the defendant were convicted, might be taken into account atsentencing. Ibid. Other jurisdictions likewise have concluded that a defendant’s sworndeclarations may be credited at the pre-Franks stage. See, e.g.,Commonwealth v. Douzanis, 425 N.E.2d 326 , 331 (Mass. 1981) (“[A] judgewould not abuse his discretion in deciding to hold . . . a Franks-type hearingwhere, as here, a defendant under oath on the basis of personal knowledgechallenges the truth of material statements attributed to the informant, and healso asserts . . . that there could have been no informant at all.”); State v.Casal, 699 P.2d 1234 , 1239 (Wash. 1985) (“A more reasonable rule requiresthe trial court to exercise its discretion to order an in camera hearing where thedefendant’s affidavit casts a reasonable doubt on the veracity of material 7 representations made by the affiant. Corroboration of the defendant’s story ishelpful, but not necessary.”). II. A. In the case before us, the majority stated that it would “treat therepresentations of defendant’s counsel as defendant’s certification oraffidavit,” ante at ___ n.5 (slip op. at 29 n.5), and then concluded thatdefendant’s assertion that he never sold Molly in his home -- an assertion thatdirectly contradicted the averments in the warrant affidavit, ante at ___ (slipop. at 28) -- “would not meet the standard of plausible justification” necessaryfor discovery, ante at ___ (slip op. at 32). That dismissive attitude toward adefendant’s averments, one that blindly accepts the truthfulness of thepurported CI and police officer affiant, is squarely at odds with Luttenbergerand its progeny. The majority hinges the right to pre-Franks discovery not on defendant’saverment that the sale of Molly to the CI never occurred in his home asrepresented in the warrant affidavit, but rather on the affidavit’s failure tomention that the investigating detective gave the CI “buy money,” a failurethat the majority characterizes as “likely a clerical mistake.” Ante at ___ (slipop. at 32). In the majority’s view, even defendant’s sworn averment that the 8 sale of Molly to the CI never happened would not entitle him to an in camerareview of the laboratory report -- “the evidentiary pillar on which the warrantaffidavit was built.” See ante at ___ (slip op. at 31). By preemptivelyexcluding potentially relevant information from the scope of discovery, themajority not only departs from the Luttenberger standard, but also evidentlyexpresses a lack of confidence in the remand court to conduct a proper incamera review. In a finding seemingly inconsistent with Luttenberger, the majoritydenies potential access to discovery, determining that defendant’s request forrelevant police reports and call recordings are not “identified with reasonablespecificity.” Ante at ___ (slip op. at 34). Moreover, without having reviewedthe reports or recordings (if they exist), the majority speculates that those“materials would not be amenable to necessary redactions.” Ante at ___ (slipop. at 34). The majority does not provide any good explanation for granting incamera review of the laboratory report but not the police reports identified bydefendant -- reports that might contradict (or support) the detective’s claim inthe warrant affidavit that he observed the CI enter defendant’s residence.Indeed, Luttenberger itself contemplated that a trial court, under propercircumstances, would conduct an “in camera examination of the police recordsspecified by the defendant.” 784 P.2d at 648 (emphasis added). 9 B. Over forty years ago, the United States Supreme Court in Franksrecognized that the warrant requirement “would be reduced to a nullity if apolice officer was able to use deliberately falsified allegations to demonstrateprobable cause, and, having misled the magistrate, then was able to remainconfident that the ploy was worthwhile.” 438 U.S. at 168; accordCommonwealth v. Ramirez, 617 N.E.2d 983 , 990 (Mass. 1993) (“[T]he publicinterest in deterring police misconduct requires the trial judge to exercise hisor her discretion to order an in camera hearing where the defendant byaffidavit asserts facts which cast a reasonable doubt on the veracity of materialrepresentations made by the affiant concerning a confidential informant.”(quoting Commonwealth v. Amral, 554 N.E.2d 1189 , 1196 (Mass. 1990))). That warning remains true today. As Franks indicates, we are nothelpless to deter police misconduct at the warrant stage. In addressing the issue before us, we should not embrace sweepinggeneralities about the truthfulness of police officers or defendants. I have nodoubt that most police officers are honest. But the reality is that not all policeofficers tell the truth and not all criminal defendants lie.2 Courts have a role to2 Both courts and journalists have chronicled instances, however infrequent, where police officers have fabricated the existence of a CI to support a search 10 play in ensuring the integrity of the criminal justice process. That rolerequires that courts exercise oversight of the warrant process and have in placereasonable measures to expose judicially issued warrants that are procuredthrough false affidavits. 3 Such oversight is not inconsistent with the need toprotect from disclosure the identity of a CI. However, search warrants issuedbased on knowing lies or recklessly made false statements are an affront and athreat to our judicial system. Restrictions on a trial court’s authority to reviewin camera relevant discovery, when the validity of a search warrant is properlychallenged, will not promote confidence in the warrant process or our systemof justice.warrant. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lewin, 542 N.E.2d 275 , 278, 284-85 (Mass. 1989) (holding that a finding that a CI existed was “clearly erroneous” based on the sworn repudiation of the CI’s existence by three officers and an investigation that revealed thirty-one applications for search warrants by the same officer within a ten-month period relying on the same fictitious CI); St. John Barned-Smith et al., HPD Chief Acevedo Says Narcotics Cop Committed Likely Crime by Lying in Affidavit for Deadly Raid, Houston Chron. (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Houston-police- shooting-affidavit-confidential-13620120.php; Jenny Jarvie, Officer Convicted in Coverup, L.A. Times (May 21, 2008), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la- xpm-2008-may-21-na-atlanta21-story.html. 3 Notably, the representative of the County Prosecutors Association of New Jersey, at oral argument before this Court, stated that even if the warrant affidavit averred that the CI purchased Molly from defendant but the corresponding laboratory report revealed that the substance was really flour, the State would have no obligation to disclose that misrepresentation made to a judge to defendant and presumably to a reviewing court. 11 III. In our adversarial system, access to discovery -- discovery reasonablyrelated to a contested issue -- levels the playing field, allowing defendants theability to secure a fair trial. The majority now requires that defendantsidentify documents with the type of hyper-technical precision that will defeatalmost any discovery request. The request for relevant police reports orrecordings will not meet the majority’s particularity requirement. That is notthe Luttenberger standard. Compare 784 P.2d at 646, with ante at ___ (slip op.at 27). In contrast to Luttenberger, the majority has erected an almostinsurmountable bar to discovery in cases involving an affidavit based onpurported information from a CI or a purported drug sale to a CI. SeeLuttenberger, 784 P.2d at 646-47 (“[I]n cases involving confidentialinformants the defendant may be hindered in providing such specifics . . . .”);People v. Lucente, 506 N.E.2d 1269 , 1275 (Ill. 1987) (“If an informant’sidentity -- or very existence -- is unknown, a defendant obviously lacks thevery information necessary to determine the source of the false statements.”). Defendant should be given the opportunity of presenting evidence tomeet the Luttenberger standard. I would remand and allow the trial court --without preconditions -- to determine whether defendant has met the thresholdfor an in camera review of discovery. 12 IV. I also would make clear what should be obvious -- that a pre-Franksdiscovery motion must always be resolved before a court considers whether adefendant is entitled to a Franks hearing. In the case before us, one trial judgedenied his request for a Franks hearing and then later another judge decidedthat his discovery request was moot. The absurdity of that scenario speaks foritself. V. Because the majority opinion does not faithfully adhere to theLuttenberger standard, I respectfully dissent. 13