Title: State v. Beatty
Citation: 347 N.C. 555
Docket Number: 255A97
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: February 6, 1998

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 255A97
FILED: 6 FEBRUARY 1998
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
EDWARD RONALD BEATTY
Appeal by defendant pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2)
from the unpublished decision of a divided panel of the Court of
Appeals, 126 N.C. App. 225, 491 S.E.2d 564 (1997), finding no
error in a jury trial that resulted in judgments of imprisonment
entered on 25 May 1995 by Steelman, J., in Superior Court,
Mecklenburg County.  Heard in the Supreme Court 17 December 1997.
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Ellen B.
Scouten, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the
State.
Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender, by
Danielle M. Carman and Daniel R. Pollitt, Assistant
Appellate Defenders, for defendant-appellant.
WHICHARD, Justice.
On 23 May 1994 a Mecklenburg County grand jury indicted
defendant Edward Ronald Beatty for robbery with a dangerous
weapon, assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill
inflicting serious injury, felonious breaking and entering,
safecracking, first-degree kidnapping, two counts of second-
degree kidnapping, and possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon.  The trial court severed the charge of possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon and later dismissed the charge of
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safecracking.  The remaining charges were tried during the 22 May
1995 Mixed Session of Superior Court, Mecklenburg County.
The jury found defendant guilty as charged, except that
assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill was reduced to
assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury, and
breaking and entering was submitted and found as entering only. 
The trial court arrested judgment on the conviction for first-
degree kidnapping and sentenced defendant to imprisonment of
thirty years for the robbery with a dangerous weapon, ten years
for felonious assault, ten years for entering, and fifteen years
for each of the second-degree kidnappings, all sentences to be
served consecutively.
Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals asserting,
inter alia, that his kidnapping convictions should be vacated
because there was insufficient evidence of restraint separate and
apart from that inherent in the crime of robbery with a dangerous
weapon to support those convictions.  The Court of Appeals
majority disagreed.  Judge Wynn dissented in part on the ground
that “the restraint in this case was an inherent and inevitable
feature of the commission of the armed robbery” and thus could
not support a conviction for second-degree kidnapping.  Defendant
appeals based upon Judge Wynn’s dissent.  For reasons that
follow, we affirm with regard to defendant’s conviction for the
second-degree kidnapping of victim Koufaloitis, and we reverse
with regard to defendant’s conviction for the second-degree
kidnapping of victim Poulos. 
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The State’s evidence tended to show that on 19 March
1994 defendant met a group of men at a party.  They decided to
rob South 21, a drive-in restaurant in Charlotte, North Carolina. 
When they approached the restaurant, the owner, Nicholas Copsis,
stood just outside near an open door.  The robbers approached
this door, put a gun to Copsis’ head, and told him to go inside
and open the safe.  
Once inside, the robbers saw restaurant employees
Hristos Poulos and Tom Koufaloitis.  Poulos was on his knees
washing the floor at the front, and Koufaloitis stood three to
four feet from the safe cleaning the floor in the back.  One
robber put a gun to Poulos’ head and stood beside him during the
robbery.  An unarmed robber put duct tape around Koufaloitis’
wrists and told him to lie on the floor. 
Copsis did not open the safe on his first attempt.  One
robber said, “Let’s go.  We’re taking too long.  Hurry up.” 
Another shot Copsis twice in the legs.  Copsis then opened the
safe.  The robbers took more than $2,000 and fled.  The robbery
took approximately three to four minutes.
Defendant contends that his convictions for second-
degree kidnapping must be vacated because the State presented
insufficient evidence of restraint separate from that inherent in
the robbery.  He asserts that such evidence is necessary to
satisfy the requirements of N.C.G.S. § 14-39, the kidnapping
statute, as interpreted by this Court in State v. Fulcher, 294
N.C. 503, 523, 243 S.E.2d 338, 351 (1978).  See also State v.
Irwin, 304 N.C. 93, 282 S.E.2d 439 (1981) (applying Fulcher
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interpretation of N.C.G.S. § 14-39 in the context of a robbery
with a dangerous weapon). 
N.C.G.S. § 14-39(a) provides in pertinent part that a
person is guilty of kidnapping if he or she
shall unlawfully confine, restrain, or remove
from one place to another, any other person
16 years of age or over without the consent
of such person . . . if such confinement,
restraint or removal is for the purpose of:
. . . . 
(2) Facilitating the commission of any
felony or facilitating flight of any
person following the commission of a
felony . . . . 
N.C.G.S. § 14-39(a) (1993) (amended 1994).  In Fulcher this Court
recognized that certain felonies, such as robbery with a
dangerous weapon, cannot be committed without some restraint of
the victim; and it held that “restraint, which is an inherent,
inevitable feature of such other felony,” could not form the
basis of a kidnapping conviction.  Fulcher, 294 N.C. at 523, 243
S.E.2d at 351.  The Court stated that the legislature did not
intend N.C.G.S. § 14-39 “to permit the conviction and punishment
of the defendant for both crimes.”  Id.  The Court further noted
that “[t]o hold otherwise would violate the constitutional
prohibition against double jeopardy.”  Id.  
The State contends that Fulcher was based upon a now-
outmoded understanding of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
United States Constitution.  It argues that under modern double
jeopardy analysis, this Court's interpretation and application of
N.C.G.S. § 14-39 in Fulcher is unnecessary and should be
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overruled.  This Court did not decide Fulcher solely on
constitutional grounds, however.  Rather, it interpreted the
kidnapping statute under the “cardinal principle of statutory
construction . . . that the intent of the Legislature is
controlling,” id. at 520, 243 S.E.2d at 350, stating:
We are of the opinion, and so hold, that G.S.
14-39 was not intended by the Legislature to
make a restraint, which is an inherent,
inevitable feature of such other felony, also
kidnapping so as to permit the conviction and
punishment of the defendant for both crimes.
Id. at 523, 243 S.E.2d at 351 (emphasis added).  The
interpretation of a criminal statute by the highest court of the
state that enacted it is generally regarded as an integral part
of the statute.  See Gupton v. Builders Transp., 320 N.C. 38, 43-
44, 357 S.E.2d 674, 678 (1987).  This Court’s long-standing
interpretation in Fulcher of legislative intent in the enactment
of N.C.G.S. § 14-39 has become an integral part of the kidnapping
statute, and it thus remains the appropriate focus for analysis
of the kidnapping convictions here. 
As noted, under N.C.G.S. § 14-39 as construed and
applied in Fulcher, a person cannot be convicted of kidnapping
when the only evidence of restraint is that “which is an
inherent, inevitable feature” of another felony such as armed
robbery.  Fulcher, 294 N.C. at 523, 243 S.E.2d at 351.  “The key
question . . . is whether the kidnapping charge is supported by
evidence from which a jury could reasonably find that the
necessary restraint for kidnapping ‘exposed [the victim] to
greater danger than that inherent in the armed robbery itself.’” 
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State v. Pigott, 331 N.C. 199, 210, 415 S.E.2d 555, 561 (1992)
(quoting Irwin, 304 N.C. at 103, 282 S.E.2d at 446).  Here, the
robbers, including defendant, restrained two victims, Koufaloitis
and Poulos, and defendant was convicted of one count of second-
degree kidnapping for each restraint.  We address each in turn.
The evidence of defendant’s restraint of victim
Koufaloitis supports a finding that the robbers, including
defendant, put duct tape around the victim's wrists, forced him
to lie on the floor, and kicked him in the back twice.  Because
the binding and kicking were not inherent, inevitable parts of
the robbery, these forms of restraint “exposed [the victim to a]
greater danger than that inherent in the armed robbery itself.” 
Irwin, 304 N.C. at 103, 282 S.E.2d at 446; see also Pigott, 331
N.C. at 210, 415 S.E.2d at 561 (holding that when the defendant
bound the victim’s hands and feet, he exposed the victim to a
greater danger than that inherent in the armed robbery and
therefore upholding the defendant’s kidnapping conviction);
Fulcher, 294 N.C. at 524, 243 S.E.2d at 352 (holding that binding
of victims’ hands was not an inherent and inevitable feature of
rape and therefore upholding the defendant’s kidnapping
convictions based upon that restraint).  When defendant bound
this victim's wrists and kicked him in the back, he increased the
victim's helplessness and vulnerability beyond what was necessary
to enable him and his comrades to rob the restaurant.  See
Pigott, 331 N.C at 210, 415 N.C. at 561.  Such actions
constituted sufficient additional restraint to satisfy the
restraint element of kidnapping under N.C.G.S. § 14-39, and the
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Court of Appeals properly found no error in defendant’s
conviction for the second-degree kidnapping of victim
Koufaloitis.
With regard to victim Poulos, the evidence shows only
that one of the robbers approached the victim, pointed a gun at
him, and stood guarding him during the robbery.  The victim did
not move during the robbery, and the robbers did not injure him
in any way.  In order to commit a robbery with a dangerous weapon
under N.C.G.S. § 14-87(a), defendant had to possess, use, or
threaten to use a firearm while taking personal property from a
place of business where persons were in attendance.  The only
evidence of restraint of this victim was the threatened use of a
firearm.  This restraint is an essential element of robbery with
a dangerous weapon under N.C.G.S. § 14-87, and defendant’s use of
this restraint exposed the victim to no greater danger than that
required to complete the robbery with a dangerous weapon.  We
thus hold that threatening victim Poulos with a gun was an
inherent, inevitable feature of the robbery and is insufficient
to support a conviction for kidnapping under N.C.G.S. § 14-39. 
The Court of Appeals therefore erred in finding no error in
defendant’s conviction for the second-degree kidnapping of victim
Poulos. 
For the reasons stated, we affirm the Court of Appeals
with regard to defendant’s conviction for the second-degree
kidnapping of victim Koufaloitis, and we reverse the Court of
Appeals with regard to defendant’s conviction for the second-
degree kidnapping of victim Poulos.  We remand the case to the
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Court of Appeals for further remand to the Superior Court,
Mecklenburg County, for entry of an order arresting judgment on
defendant's conviction for the second-degree kidnapping of victim
Poulos.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART.