Title: Com. v. Mayberry
Citation: 387 A.2d 815, 479 Pa. 23
Docket Number: N/A
State: Pennsylvania
Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Date: June 2, 1978

479 Pa. 23 (1978) 387 A.2d 815 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Ricardo MAYBERRY, Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Submitted May 7, 1976. Decided June 2, 1978. *24 John C. Anderson, Philadelphia, for appellant. *25 F. Emmett Fitzpatrick, Dist. Atty., Abraham J. Gafni, Deputy Dist. Atty., Steven H. Goldblatt, Asst. Dist. Atty., Chief, Appeals Div., for appellee. Before EAGEN, C.J., and O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX, MANDERINO and LARSEN, JJ. O'BRIEN, Justice. Appellant, Ricardo Mayberry, was tried by a judge sitting with a jury and was found guilty of murder of the first degree and firearms violation. Post-verdict motions were denied and appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder conviction and sentence was suspended on the firearms violation. No appeal was taken to Superior Court from the firearms judgment of sentence. A direct appeal was taken to this court from the judgment of sentence entered on the murder conviction.[1] Appellant first argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction of murder of the first degree. We do not agree. In Commonwealth v. Rose, 463 Pa. 264, 267-68, 344 A.2d 824, 825-26 (1975), we articulated our test of sufficiency of the evidence: *26 Reviewing the evidence in the above light, the facts are as follows. Appellant and the victim, Theodore Willis, were members of rival Philadelphia gangs. Approximately one week prior to the incident involved in this appeal, appellant was wounded. He believed that Willis was the person who fired the shotgun that wounded him. On April 11, 1972, appellant was informed that Willis and some companions were in the vicinity and he proceeded to confront Willis. Appellant was joined by another person, nicknamed "Solo", who handed appellant a gun. As appellant and Solo approached Willis and his companions, a shot was fired in the direction of appellant. There is no indication of where the shot was fired from or who fired the shot. Appellant then drew his gun and fired two shots which struck Willis. As a result of the gunshot wounds, Theodore Willis died on April 19, 1972. The above evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth is sufficient to sustain the finding that appellant's shooting was "willful, deliberate and premeditated" and thereby constituted murder of the first degree. See Act of December 1, 1959, P.L. 1621 § 1, formerly 18 P.S. § 4701. Appellant argues that the district attorney in his closing statement to the jury engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by using inflammatory and prejudicial remarks. We agree, and reverse appellant's judgment of sentence and remand for a new trial.[2] The complained-of remarks are as follows: Defense counsel immediately requested a side bar conference. During this conference, defense counsel objected to the closing as containing inflammatory and prejudicial rhetoric and moved for a mistrial. The court denied the motion for a mistrial. See Commonwealth v. Adkins, 468 Pa. 465, 364 A.2d 287 (1976). The court in its charge to the jury gave a short curative instruction admonishing the jury to consider only the evidence. We believe that the giving of a "curative" instruction under these facts could not dissipate the comments of the district attorney. In Commonwealth v. Gilman, 470 Pa. 179, 368 A.2d 253 (1977), we stated: In Commonwealth v. Harvell, 458 Pa. 406, 327 A.2d 27 (1974), this court stated: See also Commonwealth v. Cronin, 464 Pa. 138, 346 A.2d 59 (1975). The A.B.A. Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function provides: A review of the remarks of the district attorney in the instant case reveal multiple violations of this court's decisions concerning prosecutorial conduct and the A.B.A. Standards. The district attorney warned the jury that because of people such as appellant, people were afraid to walk the streets of Philadelphia or send their children to school or play. *31 The district attorney further argued that Theodore Willis was murdered in cold blood and that "he [Willis] will never run, never play basketball, never be seen by his mother, never marry or have children," and that the only way appellant would not be guilty was if Willis would walk through the door. The closing argument of the district attorney in this case was no more than a blatant appeal to prejudice, bias and passions of the jury. This type of argument has been condemned by this court and shall continue to be condemned. There is no excuse for the unprofessional demeanor exhibited in this case. Judgment of sentence reversed and case remanded for a new trial. NIX, J., concurs in the result. [1] This case was assigned to this writer on March 17, 1978. [2] Appellant raises numerous other allegations of error which we need not decide given our resolution of the above issue. Those allegations of error are: (1) That the suppression court erred in failing to suppress appellant's confession. The appellant attacks his confession on four separate grounds: (a) That the police violated appellant's constitutional rights thereby rendering his confession involuntary. (b) That the police failed to comply with this court's decision in Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 290 A.2d 417 (1972). (c) That appellant's arrest was made without probable cause and that the arrest "tainted" appellant's confession as the fruit of the poisonous tree. See Commonwealth v. Whitaker, 461 Pa. 407, 336 A.2d 603 (1975). (d) That he is entitled to the retroactive application of this court's juvenile confession doctrine. Commonwealth v. McCutchen, 463 Pa. 90, 343 A.2d 669 (1975). (e) A general attack on the voluntary nature of his waiver of Miranda rights. (2) That the court below erred in the voir dire of prospective jurors and in the seating of an alternate juror who was the father of two Philadelphia policemen. (3) That the court below erred in admitting the testimony of Josephine Willis, mother of the decedent. Appellant's argument is two pronged: (a) The testimony was not relevant. (b) The court erred in failing to grant appellant's motion for a mistrial when Willis began to weep on the stand. (4) That the court below erred in failing to give a "mutual combat" voluntary manslaughter charge.