Title: Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc. v. Valloze
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1111378, 1111368, 1111337, 1111335
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: September 27, 2013

REL: 09/27/2013
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2013
____________________
1111335
____________________
Ex parte John Valloze et al.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc.
v.
John Valloze et al.)
____________________
1111337
____________________
Ex parte Freightliner Custom Chassis Corporation et al.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc.
v.
John Valloze et al.)
(Proceedings from Franklin Circuit Court, CV-12-005)
____________________
1111368
____________________
Ex parte State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc.
v.
State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company et al.)
____________________
1111378
____________________
Ex parte Freightliner Custom Chassis Corporation
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc.
v.
State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company et al.)
(Proceedings from Franklin Court, CV-12-0026)
2
1111335, 1111337, 1111368, and 1111378
MURDOCK, Justice.
John and Judith Valloze and Nationwide Mutual Insurance
Company ("Nationwide"); State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance
Company 
("State 
Farm"); 
Freightliner 
Custom 
Chassis
Corporation 
("Freightliner"); 
Freightliner, 
Allison
Transmission, Inc. ("Allison Transmission"); and Cummins
Atlantic, LLC ("Cummins"), separately petition this Court for
writs of mandamus directing the Franklin Circuit Court to
dismiss 
the 
declaratory-judgment 
actions 
filed 
against 
them 
by
Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc. ("Tiffin").  We grant the petitions
and issue the writs.
I.  Facts and Procedural History
Tiffin manufactures and sells custom-made motor homes. 
Its principal place of business is Red Bay, Franklin County,
Alabama.  Before us are four petitions for a writ of mandamus
regarding two declaratory-judgment actions filed by Tiffin in
the Franklin Circuit Court.  The first action concerns a motor
home purchased from Tiffin by the Vallozes, case no. CV-12-005
("the Valloze action"), and the second concerns a motor home
purchased from Tiffin by Karen Katnich, case no. CV-12-0026
("the Katnich action").
3
1111335, 1111337, 1111368, and 1111378
In its complaint in the Valloze action, Tiffin alleged
that the Vallozes, who reside in Florida, purchased from
Tiffin in Florida a Tiffin Allegro Red motor home that was
manufactured by Tiffin in Red Bay.  The sales contract between
the Vallozes and Tiffin contained a forum-selection clause,
which provided that the Vallozes and Tiffin 
"agree that exclusive jurisdiction of any proceeding
hereunder shall be in the state court of general
jurisdiction in and for Franklin County, Alabama, or
in the Federal District Court Division that includes
Franklin County, Alabama. [The Vallozes] and Tiffin
agree to submit themselves, in any legal action or
proceeding between them relating to this limited
warranty or otherwise to the state or federal court
for Franklin County, Alabama, and consent that any
action or proceeding shall be brought in such
courts, and hereby waive any objection that each may
now or hereafter have to the venue of any action or
proceeding in any such court."  
On October 1, 2011, in or near the City of Summerton,
Clarendon County, South Carolina, the Vallozes' motor home
caught fire and was declared a total loss.  Nationwide insured
the Vallozes' motor home, and it paid the Vallozes $212,188.54
plus towing charges for their loss.  On October 5, 2011,
Nationwide subrogation specialist Kathleen Styer sent Tiffin
a letter that stated, in pertinent part:
"Please be advised that Nationwide is the
insurance carrier for the above-named insured, who
4
1111335, 1111337, 1111368, and 1111378
sustained fire damage to his motorhome on the above
date of loss.  Our preliminary investigation reveals
that this fire may have resulted from a defect in
the unit[;] therefore we are placing you on notice
of a potential claim against you, as well as
providing you with the opportunity to inspect the
same.
"Please contact the undersigned upon receipt of
this notice to advise your intentions regarding
attendance of a joint inspection of the motorhome."
On January 5, 2012, Tiffin filed a complaint in the
Franklin Circuit Court against the Vallozes, Nationwide,
Freightliner, Allison Transmission, and Cummins.  The
complaint described Allison Transmission and Cummins as
manufacturers 
of 
component 
parts 
for 
Tiffin, 
"specifically 
the
engine/mechanical portion of the motor home where the fire at
issue is alleged to have originated."  The complaint stated
that Freightliner sold Tiffin the chassis used in the subject
motor home.  Tiffin alleged that all of these corporations are
foreign corporations that have sufficient minimum contacts
with the State of Alabama so that including them as defendants
comports with due process.  In the complaint, Tiffin noted
that "Nationwide has put Tiffin on written notice of a
potential claim in this matter arising from the subject fire
loss."  As a result of this notice, Tiffin alleged that "[a]
5
1111335, 1111337, 1111368, and 1111378
real, present justiciable controversy exists between the
parties to this action as to the issues of the cause and
origin of the subject fire, which party or parties is at fault
and liable for the subject fire loss, and the amount of
damages arising from said fire loss."  Tiffin requested that
the trial court "take jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to
the Alabama Declaratory Judgment Act" and that it "proceed to
adjudicate the respective rights and liabilities of all the
parties hereto."  
On February 15, 2012, Cummins filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint as to it in the Valloze action.  On March 15,
2012, the Vallozes and Nationwide filed a motion to dismiss. 
On the same date, Allison Transmission filed a motion to
dismiss.  Freightliner filed a motion to dismiss on March 21,
2012.  All of those motions were based on an allegation of a
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on the basis, they
asserted, that a "bona fide justiciable controversy" did not
exist because no action had been filed by Nationwide against
any defendant based on the subject fire loss.  On May 9, 2012,
the Vallozes and Nationwide filed an amended motion to dismiss
in which they argued, in addition to the ground stated in
6
1111335, 1111337, 1111368, and 1111378
their first motion, that the trial court lacked in personam
jurisdiction over the Vallozes because the Vallozes lacked
sufficient minimum contacts with the State of Alabama.  
Tiffin filed a response to these motions on May 9, 2012,1
in which it contended that "a present and real controversy
clearly exists" in this case because "Nationwide and Valloze
would have immediate standing to file suit against [Tiffin]
for the subject fire loss, in which case [Tiffin] would have
immediate standing to bring in its suppliers."  It argued that
"Tiffin does not have to stand by and wait to be sued in order
to create a justiciable controversy."  
The trial court held a hearing on the motions on June 7,
2012.  The following day the trial court entered orders
denying the motions to dismiss filed by Nationwide, the
Vallozes, Cummins, and Allison Transmission.  On June 21,
2012, the trial court entered an order denying Freightliner's
motion to dismiss.  The trial court did not provide reasons
for its rulings.  
Tiffin did not respond to Nationwide and the Vallozes'
1
contention 
that 
the 
trial 
court 
lacked 
in 
personam
jurisdiction over them.  
7
1111335, 1111337, 1111368, and 1111378
In its complaint in the Katnich action, Tiffin alleged
that Karen Katnich purchased a 2011 Tiffin Phaeton motor home
from Tiffin in Virginia.  On June 1, 2011, in or near the city
of Dudley, North Carolina, the motor home caught fire and
allegedly suffered a total loss.  The sales contract between
Tiffin and Katnich contained a forum-selection clause
identical to the one in the Vallozes' sales contract.  On
January 23, 2012, an attorney for State Farm sent Tiffin a
letter that states, in pertinent part:
"This office represents State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company in connection with an
incident in which Karen Katnich's 2011 Phaeton motor
home caught fire in Dudley, North Carolina on
June 1, 2011. I believe that you are aware of this
situation and have been dealing with Rob McGraw, an
engineer retained by State Farm, concerning the
matter.
"I am writing first to place Tiffin on notice
that State Farm intends to commence litigation if
this matter cannot be resolved.  All of the evidence
we have seen shows that the motor home caught fire
due to a defect in its manufacture, for which Tiffin
would be liable. The motor home has been preserved
and can be made available for joint destructive
examination.
"However, State Farm believes that this dispute
might be best resolved through means other than
litigation.  At the time of the fire Ms. Katnich's
Phaeton had been driven approximately 1,600 miles.
State Farm proposes that Tiffin purchase the vehicle
from State Farm, which is now its owner as the motor
8
1111335, 1111337, 1111368, and 1111378
home was declared a total loss, for the vehicle's
market 
value 
immediately 
before 
the 
fire.
Alternatively, State Farm would be willing to allow
Tiffin to repair the motor home at Tiffin's own
expense, and to reimburse State Farm the difference
in value the motor home would have on the market due
to its having been declared a total loss.
"We believe that litigation of this matter will
be expensive and time-consuming for all concerned,
and that these alternatives would best serve Tiffin
and State Farm. Please consider whether this
proposal suits your company's interests.  Otherwise,
we will schedule a destructive examination in North
Carolina and provide notice to Tiffin and other
potentially responsible parties, and commence suit
within the next sixty days."
On February 14, 2012, Tiffin filed a complaint in the
Franklin Circuit Court against State Farm, Custom Automated
Services, Inc. ("Custom"), Waterway, Inc. ("Waterway"), ABC
Warehouse 
("ABC"), 
Maxzone 
Auto 
Parts 
Corporation 
("Maxzone"),
and Freightliner.  Tiffin alleged that Custom, ABC, and
Maxzone had furnished component parts that were used in the
"tail light apparatus on the motorhome, which was then
installed on the motorhome by Defendant Waterway.  Said tail
light apparatus is the location on the motorhome at which the
fire is presently believed to have originated."  In the
complaint, Tiffin noted that "State Farm has put Tiffin on
written notice of a potential claim in this matter arising
9
1111335, 1111337, 1111368, and 1111378
from the subject fire loss."  As a result of the notice,
Tiffin 
alleged 
that 
"[a] 
real, 
present 
justiciable 
controversy
exists between the parties to this action as to the issues of
the cause and origin of the subject fire, which party or
parties is at fault and liable for the subject fire loss, and
the amount of damages arising from said fire loss."  Tiffin
requested that the trial court "take jurisdiction of this
matter pursuant to the Alabama Declaratory Judgment Act" and
that it "proceed to adjudicate the respective rights and
liabilities of all the parties hereto."  
On March 20, 2012, Freightliner filed a motion to dismiss
Tiffin's complaint in the Katnich action.  Custom filed a
motion to dismiss on March 26, 2012, adopting Freightliner's
motion to dismiss.  On April 6, 2012, State Farm filed a
motion to dismiss.  All of those motions were based on an
allegation of a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because,
the movants asserted, a "bona fide justiciable controversy"
did not exist since no action had been filed by State Farm
against any defendant based on the subject fire loss.  
On June 7, 2012, Tiffin filed a response to the motions
to dismiss the Katnich action that tracked almost verbatim its
10
1111335, 1111337, 1111368, and 1111378
response to the motions to dismiss filed in the Valloze
action.  
The trial court entered an order on June 8, 2012, in the
Katnich action in which it denied the defendants' motions to
dismiss.  The trial court did not provide reasons for its
ruling.  
Nationwide and the Vallozes filed a petition for a writ
of mandamus with this Court (case no. 1111335) asking that we
order the trial court to vacate its order denying their motion
to dismiss the complaint filed against them by Tiffin. 
Freightliner, Allison Transmission, and Cummins also have
filed a mandamus petition in the Valloze action (case no.
1111337).  State Farm filed a mandamus petition asking that we
order the trial court to vacate its order denying its motion
to dismiss the complaint filed by Tiffin in the Katnich action
(case no. 1111368).  Freightliner also has filed a mandamus
petition in the Katnich action (case no. 1111378).  
On August 9, 2012, Tiffin filed motions in the trial
court 
to 
dismiss 
defendants 
Freightliner, 
Allison
Transmission, and Cummins in the Valloze action 
and 
defendants
Freightliner, Custom, Waterway, ABC, and Maxzone in the
11
1111335, 1111337, 1111368, and 1111378
Katnich action.  Subsequently, this Court ordered answers and
briefs to the four petitions, and we ordered a stay of all
proceedings in both actions in the trial court.  The trial
court granted Tiffin's motions to dismiss certain defendants
in the two actions, but then set aside those orders when it
became aware of the stays issued by this Court.
II.  Analysis
This Court has stated that "[f]or a declaratory-judgment
action to withstand a motion to dismiss there must be a bona
fide justiciable controversy that should be settled."  Harper
v. Brown, Stagner, Richardson, Inc., 873 So. 2d 220, 223 (Ala.
2003).  "'If no justiciable controversy exists when the suit
is commenced, then the court lacks jurisdiction.'" Gulf Beach
Hotel, Inc. v. State ex rel. Whetstone, 935 So. 2d 1177, 1182
(Ala. 2006) (quoting Durham v. Community Bank of Marshall
County, 584 So. 2d 834, 835 (Ala. 1991)).   
2
2
"We have construed Art. VI, § 139, Ala. Const.
of 1901 (as amended by amend. no. 328, § 6.01,
vesting the judicial power in the Unified Judicial
System), to vest this Court 'with a limited judicial
power that entails the special competence to decide
discrete 
cases 
and 
controversies 
involving
particular parties and specific facts.'  Alabama
Power Co. v. Citizens of Alabama, 740 So. 2d 371,
381 (Ala. 1999).  See also Copeland v. Jefferson
12
1111335, 1111337, 1111368, and 1111378
The petitioners argue that no bona fide justiciable
controversy exists in these cases because the respective
insurance companies, Nationwide and State Farm, have not 
filed
actions against Tiffin for the subject fire losses.  Both
Nationwide and State Farm note that Tiffin admitted in its
complaints that the insurance companies had notified 
Tiffin 
of
"a potential claim."  Each insurer insists that it has not
decided whether to pursue its subrogation rights against
Tiffin and other possible responsible parties.  The
petitioners note that this Court has repeatedly stated that
"'"[d]eclaratory judgment proceedings will not lie for an
'anticipated controversy.'"'"  Surles v. City of Ashville, 68
So. 3d 89, 93 (Ala. 2011) (quoting Bedsole v. Goodloe, 912 So.
2d 508, 518 (Ala. 2005), quoting in turn Creola Land Dev.,
Inc. v. Bentbrooke Housing, L.L.C., 828 So. 2d 285, 288 (Ala.
2002), quoting in turn City of Dothan v. Eighty-Four West,
Inc., 738 So. 2d 903, 908 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999)). 
County, 284 Ala. 558, 226 So. 2d 385 (1969) (courts
decide only concrete controversies between adverse
parties)."
Pharmacia Corp. v. Suggs, 932 So. 2d 95, 97 n. 4 (Ala. 2005).
13
1111335, 1111337, 1111368, and 1111378
The petitioners further note that this Court has stated
that "'[a] controversy is justiciable where present "legal
rights are thwarted or affected [so as] to warrant proceedings
under the Declaratory Judgment statutes."'"  Harper, 873
So. 2d at 224 (quoting Creola Land Dev., 828 So. 2d at 288,
quoting in turn Town of Warrior v. Blaylock, 275 Ala. 113,
114, 152 So. 2d 661, 662 (1963)).  The petitioners contend
that Tiffin's rights have not been thwarted or affected in any
way because, they assert, there is no right to be free from
the mere possibility of a lawsuit. According to the
petitioners, the fact that Tiffin did not state any injury it
had sustained or request any damages underscores the fact that
Tiffin's rights have not been affected. 
Tiffin rejoins that all the facts necessary for a dispute
already have occurred in each case: the subject motor homes
sustained fire damage, the insurers reimbursed their insureds
for their losses, investigations have preliminarily concluded
that the fires were caused by manufacturing defects, and the
insurers informed Tiffin and other potential defendants of
their 
potential 
subrogation 
claims. 
 
Tiffin 
particularly 
notes
that State Farm's letter explicitly stated that State Farm
14
1111335, 1111337, 1111368, and 1111378
would commence litigation unless Tiffin agreed to terms
offered by State Farm to settle its claim.  
Tiffin also argues that the petitioners misunderstand the
purpose of a declaratory-judgment action.  It contends that
"[i]f litigation must be commenced before a bona
fide controversy can be said to exist, then no
declaratory judgment [action] could ever be properly
filed by a party which was potentially liable for a
loss.  By definition, all such declaratory judgment
actions would be subject to dismissal as either
premature or moot.  The proposition that no
controversy can be considered ripe until a suit is
filed is circular and is nowhere supported by case
law."  
Tiffin's brief, p. 9.  
It is true that "declaratory-judgment actions are
designed to be preemptive," but this is because they seek to
"'set controversies to rest before they lead to repudiation of
obligations, invasion of rights, and the commission of
wrongs.'"  Carey v. Howard, 950 So. 2d 1131, 1134 (Ala. 2006)
(quoting Harper, 873 So. 2d at 224).  Tiffin has not
highlighted how any of its obligations will be impaired or any
of its rights invaded if it cannot obtain declaratory relief. 
Simply relieving a party of the apprehension of legal action
and potential liability is not the purpose of a declaratory-
judgment action. 
15
1111335, 1111337, 1111368, and 1111378
"This Court has recognized that a purpose of the
Declaratory Judgment Act, codified at §§ 6-6-220
through -232, Ala. Code 1975, is 'to enable parties
between whom an actual controversy exists or those
between whom litigation is inevitable to have the
issues 
speedily 
determined 
when 
a 
speedy
determination would prevent unnecessary injury
caused 
by 
the 
delay 
of 
ordinary 
judicial
proceedings.'  Harper v. Brown, Stagner, Richardson,
Inc., 873 So. 2d 220, 224 (Ala. 2003)...."
Gulf Beach Hotel, 935 So. 2d at 1183 (emphasis omitted). Even
if we could assume that "litigation is inevitable" between
Nationwide and Tiffin or between State Farm and Tiffin, Tiffin
has not shown how either insurer's "delay" in invoking
judicial proceedings injures Tiffin.  The harm giving rise to
the insurers' subrogation rights -- the fire damage to the
subject motor homes -- has already occurred.  Whatever
Tiffin's liability might be as a result of that damage already
exists.  A "speedy determination" of liability by way of a
declaratory-judgment action does nothing to prevent Tiffin
from repudiating some obligation on its part or incurring some
further liability, nor will it prevent some harm to Tiffin or
some invasion of Tiffin's rights. 
Furthermore, it is not a given that "litigation is
inevitable" between these parties.  No "actual controversy"
exists between Nationwide and Tiffin or State Farm and Tiffin
16
1111335, 1111337, 1111368, and 1111378
because neither insurer has elected to pursue a claim based
upon its alleged subrogation rights.  It is still possible
that both insurers or either insurer could determine that it
has no such rights, that for any number of reasons its best
interests would 
not be served pursuing judicial 
enforcement 
of
whatever rights it might have, or that Tiffin is not a party
to be held responsible for the damage that gave rise to those
rights.  In any event, the subrogation rights belong to
Nationwide and State Farm, and Tiffin cannot use a
declaratory-judgment action to force the insurers to embark
upon a judicial testing of the insurers' rights and the rights
of the owners of the motor homes.
Tiffin claims that the petitioners' position is not
supported in the law, but in fact it is Tiffin's use of
declaratory relief in this context that lacks 
legal 
authority.
None of the cases cited by Tiffin in support of its position
involved the use of a declaratory-judgment action to obtain a
determination of potential tort liability.  Indeed, our own
research has failed to turn up a single Alabama case
suggesting that declaratory relief was intended to be used for
such a purpose.  Although this Court has not had occasion to
17
1111335, 1111337, 1111368, and 1111378
address the issue, courts in other jurisdictions repeatedly
have denied the use of declaratory relief for this purpose. 
See, e.g., Cunningham Bros., Inc. v. Bail, 407 F.2d 1165, 1167
(7th Cir. 1969) 
(concluding that "to compel potential personal
injury plaintiffs to litigate their claims at a time and in a
forum chosen by the alleged tort-feasor would be a perversion
of the Declaratory Judgment Act"); United Ins. Co. of America
v. Harris, 939 F. Supp. 1527, 1531 (M.D. Ala. 1996) (stating
that courts "have almost uniformly concluded that tort claims
are ill-suited for declaratory relief"); Sun Oil Co. v.
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 108 F. Supp. 280, 282
(E.D. Pa. 1952) (stating that "it is not one of the purposes
of the declaratory judgment acts to enable a prospective
negligence action defendant to obtain a declaration of
non-liability" (footnote omitted)); Ryder Truck Rental, Inc.
v. Rollins, 246 Neb. 250, 256, 518 N.W.2d 124, 128 (1994)
(observing that "the majority of state jurisdictions which
have addressed this question have ... held that a trial court
should not exercise jurisdiction over a suit for declaration
of nonliability by a potential or, in some instances, actual
defendant," citing several cases in support and noting it
18
1111335, 1111337, 1111368, and 1111378
found only one state case to the contrary); Averitt v.
PriceWaterhouseCoopers L.L.P., 89 S.W.3d 330, 333-34 (Tex.
App. 2002) (concluding that "[a] potential defendant may not
... use a declaratory judgment action to determine potential
tort liability. ...  The Act was not intended to deprive a
potential tort plaintiff of the right to decide whether, when,
and where to sue."); Township of Ewing v. Trenton, 137 N.J.
Eq. 109, 110, 43 A.2d 813, 814 (N.J. Ch. 1945) (stating that
declaratory relief was not "intended to be utilized
defensively to bag in advance an imminent and impending law
suit"); and 10B Charles Allen Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary
Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2765 (3d ed. 1998)
(noting that "[t]he courts ... have held that it is not one of
the purposes of the declaratory judgments act to enable a
prospective 
negligence 
action 
defendant 
to 
obtain 
a
declaration of nonliability").  
We agree with the conclusion of the overwhelming majority
of other jurisdictions that declaratory-judgment actions are
not intended to be a vehicle for potential tort defendants to
obtain a declaration of nonliability.  The "plaintiff [has a]
right to choose a forum."  Ex parte Integon Corp., 672 So. 2d
19
1111335, 1111337, 1111368, and 1111378
497, 500 (Ala. 1995).  Using declaratory relief in the manner
employed by Tiffin in these cases deprives tort plaintiffs of
this right.  It also deprives such plaintiffs, within the
confines of the applicable statute of limitations, of the
ability to elect the timing for bringing such an action, which
may 
affect 
a plaintiff's preparation for litigation.  Further,
such use of declaratory relief "reverse[s] the roles of the
parties" in a way that "would jeopardize those procedures
which the law has traditionally provided to injured parties by
which to seek judicial relief."  Cunningham Bros., 407 F.2d at
1168.  In short, declaratory-judgment actions are ill suited
to resolving tort claims.  
III.  Conclusion
Because a bona fide justiciable controversy does not
exist in the Valloze action or the Katnich action and because
a declaratory-judgment action is not intended to permit a
potential tort defendant to obtain a declaration of non-
liability, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying
the petitioners' motions to dismiss Tiffin's complaints.   As
3
Our conclusion pretermits the need to discuss Nationwide
3
and the Vallozes' argument that the trial court lacks
in personam jurisdiction over the Vallozes.
20
1111335, 1111337, 1111368, and 1111378
we noted at the outset of our analysis, "'[i]f no justiciable
controversy exists when the suit is commenced, then the court
lacks jurisdiction.'"  Gulf Beach Hotel, 935 So. 2d at 1182. 
Therefore, we direct the Franklin Circuit Court to dismiss the
Valloze action and the Katnich action.
1111335 -- PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
1111337 -- PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
1111368 -- PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
1111378 -- PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Bolin, Main, Wise, and Bryan, JJ., concur.
21