Title: Johnson v. American Cyanamid Co.
Citation: 243 Kan. 291, 758 P.2d 206
Docket Number: 61,438
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: June 3, 1988

243 Kan. 291 (1988)
758 P.2d 206
ORLETHA JOHNSON, Executor of the Estate of Emil Johnson, deceased, Appellant,
v.
AMERICAN CYANAMID COMPANY and LEDERLE LABORATORIES, et al., Appellees.
No. 61,438

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed June 3, 1988.
Jerry W. Hannah, of Hamilton &amp; Hannah, of Topeka, argued the cause and Gerald L. Michaud, of Michaud &amp; Hutton, of Wichita, argued the cause and was on the brief, and Marlys A. Marshall, of the same firm, was on the brief for appellant.
Donald Patterson, of Fisher, Patterson, Sayler and Smith, of Topeka, argued the cause, and Steve R. Fabert, of the same firm, and Ronald J. Greene, of Wilmer, Cutler &amp; Pickering, of Washington, D.C., and Carl Willner, of the same firm, were with them on the brief for appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
McFARLAND, J.:
This is an appeal of the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion to vacate the judgment entered in Johnson v. American Cyanamid Co., 239 Kan. 279, 718 P.2d 1318 (1986). The motion was brought on the ground the appellate judgment was obtained as a result of fraud on the part of counsel for defendant. The district court held that the alleged fraud was not material to the appellate decision.
*292 On May 31, 1984, a Sedgwick County District Court jury returned a ten million dollar verdict in favor of Emil Johnson against American Cyanamid (Cyanamid) in his product liability suit against Cyanamid. Judge Nicholas Klein presided over the case. The precise nature of the claims asserted against Cyanamid, the evidence introduced at trial, and the issues raised in the appeal, as well as our disposition thereof, are thoroughly reported in Johnson v. American Cyanamid Co., 239 Kan. 279, and need not be repeated herein. The judgment of the district court was reversed on appeal. Thereafter, plaintiff filed an action in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas (No. 86-1943-K) against Cyanamid and the members of this court alleging that our decision in Johnson v. American Cyanamid Co. had violated her civil rights. The federal case was dismissed on April 10, 1987, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On May 12, 1987, plaintiff filed a motion in the Sedgwick County District Court seeking to vacate the appellate judgment under K.S.A. 60-260(b)(3) alleging the same had been procured by Cyanamid's fraud upon this court. The motion was heard and denied by Judge Ron Rogg. Plaintiff appeals from the district court's denial of her motion.
In order to understand the allegation of fraud and the district court's denial of the motion to vacate, the procedural events following the return of the jury verdict must be set forth in detail. The trial of this case extended over some two months with the verdict being returned on May 31, 1984. The following day, June 1, 1984, two events occurred. Judge Klein filed an entry of judgment form and plaintiff filed a journal entry of judgment (the latter was not presented to or signed by counsel for Cyanamid as required by Rule 170 [1987 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 90]). Judge Klein mailed copies of the entry of judgment form to counsel. Counsel for Dr. Branson, a codefendant, received their copy on June 2 and plaintiff's counsel received their copy on June 4. These copies were presumably mailed on June 1, 1984, although this is the subject of certain disputed affidavits to be discussed in detail later. We do not know when counsel for Cyanamid received their copy from the court. On June 4, 1984, Mark Hutton, one of plaintiff's counsel, sent the following letter to counsel for Cyanamid:
"Re: Johnson v. Lederle
"Dear Larry:
On June 11, 1984, the following order was signed by Judge Klein and filed:
"ORDER
"IT IS SO ORDERED.
The order was approved by Larry Wall and Susan P. Selvidge on behalf of Cyanamid and by Mark B. Hutton on behalf of plaintiff. Cyanamid's motions for a new trial, directed verdict, *294 and for a remittitur were filed on June 21, 1984. Plaintiff's lead counsel, Gerald Michaud, took an extended vacation after the trial and was out of the country during these post-trial activities. Cyanamid's motions were heard and overruled on July 20, 1984. On August 16, 1984, Cyanamid filed its notice of appeal.
On October 11, 1984, codefendant Branson (against whom the jury had found zero fault) filed a motion to dismiss Cyanamid's appeal. The thrust of this motion was that he had not been a party to the 10-day extension of time granted on June 11, 1984, to Cyanamid to file post-trial motions, hence the clock for filing such motions and appealing was not stopped by the entry of the extension order. On October 19, 1984, plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the appeal which is best described as a "me, too" duplicate of Branson's motion. On October 25, 1984, Cyanamid filed a response to Branson's motion. The response recited the sequence of events following the return of the verdict mentioning Mr. Michaud's extended absence and the fact that the complex motion for new trial required the assistance of Cyanamid's New York corporate counsel. Attached to and made a part of the response was an affidavit of Susan Selvidge dated October 25, 1984, which states:
"AFFIDAVIT
The affidavit was properly subscribed and a copy of the response and affidavit were mailed to plaintiff's counsel on October 25, 1984. Cyanamid's response to the plaintiff's motion to dismiss incorporated the response to the Branson motion. This affidavit lies at the heart of plaintiff's present claim of fraud as will be more fully discussed later.
*295 On December 6, 1984, the motions to dismiss filed by plaintiff and Branson were denied by this court with leave to renew at the time of oral argument. They were so renewed and in our opinion, filed May 19, 1986, we stated:
Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration was denied on July 2, 1986. Plaintiff's federal civil rights action, previously mentioned, was filed on December 3, 1986, and was dismissed by the federal court on April 10, 1987. The dismissal was not appealed.
On May 12, 1987, the motion to vacate involved herein was filed. Plaintiff contends that the reversal of the district court's judgment in the original case was the result of fraud by counsel for Cyanamid. What was the fraud? The affidavit of Susan Selvidge. Plaintiff obviously had been aware of the affidavit since October of 1984 when the same was filed and served on her counsel. Plaintiff contends that the falsity of the affidavit was only discovered on or about March 2, 1987, in a conversation with Judge Klein. Attached to the motion to vacate is the following affidavit from Judge Klein:
"AFFIDAVIT
"FURTHER AFFIANT SAITH NOT.
(Note: There is some inconsistency in the dates as the Klein affidavit sets the "discovery" date earlier than Michaud's affidavit concerning discovery of the fraud  but this is not significant to any issue herein.) Plaintiff contends that the Selvidge affidavit offers the only possible legal basis for our conclusion that we had jurisdiction in the original appeal and hence was a fraud upon this court mandating vacation of our judgment. The district court, with approval of counsel for both plaintiff and Cyanamid, entered an order on June 11, 1984, granting a ten-day extension for the filing of post-trial motions. When, or if, Cyanamid had received a copy of the entry of judgment form had nothing to do with the extension granted. The allegedly fraudulent Selvidge affidavit did not come into being until October 1984. Judge Klein states in his 1987 affidavit that he mailed a copy of the entry of judgment form to Cyanamid on June 1, 1984. Let us assume that he did and that the same was received either on Saturday, June 2, 1984, or Monday, June 4, 1984. The order extending the time was filed on June 11, 1984  within ten days of the entry of judgment itself without any additional time being added for service of the copy by mail. Plaintiff argues that failure to receive the copy of the entry of judgment promptly after its entry is the only valid reason for granting the extension and stopping the clock on the running of the time for appeal. For support she relies upon K.S.A. 60-2103(a), which states in part:
In denying defendant's motion to vacate herein, the district court ruled that the issue of fraud did not control this court's decision to grant the appeal in the underlying case, reasoning as follows:
We have recently had an opportunity to discuss the "unique circumstances" doctrine in some detail and apply the same in the case of Schroeder v. Urban, 242 Kan. 710, 750 P.2d 405 (1988). By virtue of its great significance to the issue before us, it is worthwhile to include much of that opinion herein as follows:
In Schroeder the 30-day period for filing an appeal was about to expire when the district judge extended the time therefor. Although not stated in the opinion, counsel for the appellee opposed the extension, although not on jurisdictional grounds. In the case before us, the extension did not come into being to extend, directly, the time for filing an appeal, but rather the ten-day period for filing post-trial motions. Had the court denied the motion, Cyanamid would still have had several days to appeal from the judgment by anyone's calculation of precisely when the 30-day period commenced to run. Counsel for plaintiff not only did not object to the extension, he approved of it. The district court was presented with an order extending the time which was approved by the plaintiff, who now argues it was an invalid order of no force and effect. Yet, clearly, Cyanamid reasonably and in good faith relied upon the order extending the time for the filing of the post-trial motions. Within the time frame of the extension, Cyanamid filed its post-trial motions (June 21, 1984). The original 30-day appeal time from the entry of judgment had not yet expired when these motions were filed, but Cyanamid, in reliance on the extension, did not appeal until after its post-trial motions had been denied. The unique circumstances doctrine is particularly applicable to the facts herein.
Our original opinion in Johnson v. American Cyanamid Co., 239 Kan. 279, was a lengthy opinion involving complex issues on the merits. With the wisdom of hindsight, it is unfortunate that we did not extend that opinion even further by a full recitation therein of the complex procedural facts following the entry of judgment which have been included in this opinion, and specifically stated our reliance on the doctrine of unique circumstances in finding we had jurisdiction of the appeal.
We conclude that the district court did not err in denying plaintiff's motion to vacate on the basis that the alleged fraud was not material to our original opinion.
By virtue of the result reached herein, it is unnecessary to determine the issues raised by Cyanamid.
The judgment is affirmed.
*302 LOCKETT, J., concurring:
I remain firm in my belief that the adoption of the "unique circumstances" doctrine to extend the time for appeal is a usurpation of legislative power. See Schroeder v. Urban, 242 Kan. 710, 714, 750 P.2d 405 (1988) (Lockett, J., dissenting). However, since the majority has determined that this is the law, I concur in the result.