Title: State v. Hansen
Citation: 215 N.W.2d 249
Docket Number: 56036
State: Iowa
Issuer: Iowa Supreme Court
Date: February 20, 1974

215 N.W.2d 249 (1974) STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Lloyd HANSEN, Appellant. No. 56036. Supreme Court of Iowa. February 20, 1974. James Furey, Carroll, for appellant. Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Fred Haskins, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Thomas R. Eller, County Atty., for appellee. Heard before MOORE, C. J., and RAWLINGS, LeGRAND, REES and REYNOLDSON, JJ. LeGRAND, Justice. The appeal in this case reaches us after a long and stormy history in district court. Although we must reverse the judgment and direct that the indictment upon which it is based be dismissed, we cannot overlook the conduct of defense counsel, which deserves our strongest censure as being dilatory, obstructive, and harassing. Altogether the record shows some 135 filings in the case, almost 100 of them before trial. Many are routine but far too many are petitions, applications, motions endlessly repeated and frequently without any semblance of merit. At the same time counsel was trumpeting for a speedy trial and claiming denial of constitutional rights *250 because the case was so long delayed. We agree with the trial judge one of six who became the object of defendant's carping during the course of the case who said defendant was using delay and hindrance as a ploy to set up a basis for appeal under section 795.2, The Code, in the event of eventual conviction. Perhaps most of our criticism should be directed against Gary R. Hall, defendant's original attorney, but present counsel is not free from blame either. Two judges disqualified themselves after counsel leveled against them serious and unfounded accusations of judicial misconduct. Other judges, too, were compelled to endure exasperating tactics and to deal with an unending barrage of procedural trivia in an effort to reach trial. It would have taken one judge almost full time to satisfy defendant's insatiable demands. We recognize and applaud counsel who is zealous and diligent in protecting his client's rights. But the conduct here went far beyond that criterion. Lawyers are officers of the court, too, and actions which can most charitably be described as pettifoggery have no place in the representation of a client. See ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Approved Draft 1971, "Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function and the Defense Function." Despite what we have said, we nevertheless set aside defendant's conviction and order the indictment dismissed. We are compelled to do so because the indictment was obtained and returned in violation of section 776.1(6), The Code. Defendant was indicted, tried and convicted for having conspired with Timothy Duncan to set fire to an unoccupied dwelling house in Denison. The principal witness before the grand jury was Timothy Duncan, defendant's alleged accomplice. Under section 782.5, The Code, defendant, of course, could not be convicted on Duncan's uncorroborated testimony. Corroboration was exceedingly weak, a matter tacitly admitted by the state. However, we assume it was adequate for our present purposes and point out its weakness only because it has some bearing on what happened during the grand jury's investigation of the case. After a number of witnesses had testified and the grand jury was apparently considering what action to take, the following occurred as shown by the county attorney's statement to the trial court during a hearing in chambers: Since we have been critical of defense counsel, we should not ignore this bit of impropriety on the part of the county attorney. Perhaps the request by the foreman of the grand jury may be excused, but there is no excuse for the county attorney to express his personal opinion as to the veracity of the most important witness for the state on a matter then under investigation. The rule is stated this way in 38 Am.Jur.2d Grand Jury section 33, page 979 (1968): See also State v. Good, 10 Ariz.App. 556, 460 P.2d 662, 665 (1969). It was improper for the county attorney to venture his personal opinion on Duncan's credibility. The matter is of overriding importance because Duncan's is the only testimony which could have resulted in an indictment. However, the evil did not even stop there. After the county attorney told the foreman that Duncan should be believed, Sheriff Donald Stehr and Deputy Larry Popp returned to the jury room. (They had previously testified in this cause but had not given any evidence concerning the polygraph test.) Here is how the county attorney describes this event: "They simply appeared briefly to indicate that one of the witnesses [Duncan] was telling the truth." It was only after this bit of outside assistance in putting before the grand jury information about the polygraph test that an indictment was returned. We believe any fair assessment of the circumstances indicates the grand jury had misgivings about Duncan's credibility. Otherwise there is no plausible reason for the inquiry to the county attorney concerning his truthfulness or the follow-up with the sheriff and his deputy. It is quite clear, too, there could be no indictment unless Duncan was believed. With this background, we consider defendant's motion to quash the indictment under section 776.1(6), The Code. That statute includes this provision: The motion to quash the indictment as originally filed was twice amended, all before entry of a plea. The motion as finally presented contained the following allegations as one basis for dismissing the indictment: It should be noted defendant does not claim any right to have the indictment dismissed because of the county attorney's statement. We have detailed his part in the events to show the circumstances under which Stehr and Popp related the polygraph information. The narrow ground *252 we consider is the appearance of Stehr and Popp together before the grand jury. It is well settled no one may appear before that body except a witness who is called to testify and certain others who are authorized by law to be present for official reasons. 38 Am.Jur.2d, supra, section 34, contains this statement of the principle: Another applicable rule is stated in 41 Am.Jur.2d, Indictments and Informations, section 252, page 1035 (1968): Some jurisdictions demand a showing of prejudice before a violation of such a statute justifies quashing an indictment. Others hold nothing need appear except the violation itself. We believe our cases support the latter view. In State v. Bower, 191 Iowa 713, 715, 183 N.W. 322, 323 (1921), several witnesses remained in the grand jury room after they had concluded their testimony to hear the testimony of other witnesses. We set that indictment aside with this comment: "Not only the ethics of the case, but the mandate of the statute [then section 5319, The Code] required the exclusion of all persons during the investigation of the charge against the defendant, except such as were required or permitted by law; and it may not be said that these persons who were present during the investigation and after their testimony had been given were either required or permitted to be in attendance * * *. In Maley v. District Court, 221 Iowa 732, 737-739, 266 N.W. 815, 818, 819 (1936), we set aside five indictments because of the presence of unauthorized persons during a grand jury investigation. We there approved what we had previously held in the Bower case. Later in Uhl v. District Court, 231 Iowa 1046, 1051, 2 N.W.2d 741, 744 (1942), Maley v. District Court, supra, was overruled on procedural grounds but we again confirmed the substantive holdings in Maley. One of our earlier cases is in conflict with these holdings. See State v. Wood, 112 Iowa 484, 486, 84 N.W. 503, 504 (1900), where we refused to set aside an indictment upon a showing that a father was present in the grand jury room while his daughter was being examined as a witness. At least one other court (People v. Minet, 296 N.Y. 315, 73 N.E.2d 529, 530, 531 (1947)) has attempted to distinguish this case on the rationale that the court found the father's presence was "required" under the statute, relying on this statement for support: However, State v. Wood also flatly says it is not improper to call two witnesses before it at the same time, which is contrary to our holdings in Bower, Maley and Uhl. Additional authority for our conclusion may be found in People v. Minet, supra; Commonwealth v. Harris, 231 Mass. 584, 121 N.E. 409, 410 (1919); United States v. Borys, (D.C.Ala.1959), 169 F. Supp. 366, 367; United States v. Bowdach, (D.C.Fla. 1971), 324 F. Supp. 123, 124; United States v. Carper, (D.D.C.1953), 116 F. Supp. 817, 820, 821; State v. Good, 10 Ariz.App. 556, 460 P.2d 662, 664, 665 (1969); C. Wright, 1 F.Prac. &amp; Proc., sec. 105 (1969); Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 392, 432 (1949). There is little dispute about the facts. It is conceded Stehr and Popp appeared together before the grand jury to "tell them Duncan was telling the truth." Aside from the fact their mission was totally improper because it purported, as did the county attorney's earlier statement, to assure the jury of another's credibility a matter the grand jury must decide itself the joint appearance of these two peace officers demands dismissal of the indictment under the foregoing authorities. It is argued they were called back as witnesses and therefore the statute was not violated. The record is obscure as to whether they came back as witnesses or, as the foreman put his request, to "visit" with the grand jury. It makes no difference to our conclusion. If they were recalled as witnesses, it was error to hear them together; if not, it was error to hear them at all. We conclude that the indictment was returned in violation of section 776.1(6), The Code; that timely motion to quash was made; and that the statute mandates the indictment must be dismissed under such circumstances. It is accordingly ordered that the judgment be reversed and the case remanded for entry of an appropriate order dismissing the indictment against defendant. Reversed and remanded with instructions.