Title: ANN E MASKERY V UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 121338
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: July 2, 2003

____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 2, 2003  
ANN E. MASKERY and ROBERT  
MASKERY,  
Plaintiffs-Appellees,  
v 
No. 121338  
BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE  
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
CORRIGAN, C.J.  
We granted leave to appeal to consider whether a  
continuously locked residence hall at a public university was  
“open for use by members of the public” under the public­
building 
exception 
to governmental immunity, MCL 691.1406.  We  
hold that the residence hall was not “open for use by members  
of the public.”  We thus reverse the judgment of the Court of  
Appeals 
and 
reinstate the trial court’s order granting summary  
 
disposition for defendant.  
I. Underlying facts and procedural posture  
Plaintiff’s1 daughter, a college student, resided at the  
Betsy Barbour Residence Hall on the University of Michigan’s  
Ann Arbor campus. The residence hall was locked twenty-four  
hours a day.  A courtesy telephone outside the entrance to the  
building was available for visitors to call a resident and  
request admittance.  The phone is located at the top of a  
short stairway at the building’s entrance.  After using the  
courtesy phone, plaintiff lost her balance and fell down the  
stairs, injuring herself.  
Plaintiff sued the university, claiming that the  
placement of the courtesy phone near a narrow step created a  
dangerous and defective condition.  She attempted to avoid  
governmental immunity on the basis of the public-building  
exception, MCL 691.1406. 
Defendant moved for summary  
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) (“The claim is barred  
because of . . . . immunity granted by law . . . .”).  
Defendant argued that the residence hall was not open for use  
by members of the public.  Defendant presented an affidavit  
establishing that the residence hall was locked twenty-four  
hours a day.  Visitors could gain access only by using the  
1We refer to plaintiff Ann Maskery as “plaintiff.”
Robert Maskery’s claim is derivative of his wife’s claim. 
2  
 
courtesy phone to contact a resident, who then could unlock  
the door to allow entry.  The trial court granted defendant’s  
motion.  
On its initial review, the Court of Appeals affirmed.2  
The Court cited cases holding that public-housing facilities  
were not open for use by members of the public. See Griffin  
v Detroit, 178 Mich App 302; 443 NW2d 406 (1989); White v  
Detroit, 189 Mich App 526; 473 NW2d 702 (1991).  
This Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for  
reconsideration in light of Horace v City of Pontiac, 456 Mich  
744; 575 NW2d 762 (1998).  459 Mich 944 (1999). On remand,  
the Court of Appeals again affirmed3 because the residence  
hall was indistinguishable from the public housing in Griffin  
and White. The Court noted that access to the entire building  
was limited to residents, guests admitted by the residents,  
and maintenance personnel.  The Court also held in light of  
Horace that the steps on which plaintiff fell were not part of  
the residence hall.  
This Court then remanded the case to the Court of Appeals  
a second time for reconsideration in light of Brown v Genesee  
Co Bd of Comm’rs, 464 Mich 430; 628 NW2d 471 (2001), and Fane  
2Unpublished order, entered February 10, 1997 (Docket No.
187738). 
3Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued March 24, 2000
(Docket No. 187738). 
3  
 
v Detroit Library Comm, 465 Mich 68; 631 NW2d 678 (2001). 465  
Mich 806 (2001). On the second remand, the Court of Appeals  
reversed the order granting summary disposition.4  The Court  
discussed the statement in Brown that a jail was open for use  
by members of the public and concluded that the residence hall  
was also open for use by members of the public.  Applying  
Fane, the Court of Appeals concluded that the steps where  
plaintiff fell were part of the residence hall.  
Defendant filed an application for leave to appeal. We  
granted the application “limited to the question of whether  
the university dormitory at which plaintiff was injured is  
‘open for use by members of the public’ within the meaning of  
MCL 691.1406.”5  467 Mich 887 (2002).  
II. Standard of review  
We review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion for  
summary disposition. Hinkle v Wayne Co Clerk, 467 Mich 337,  
340; 654 NW2d 315 (2002). “MCR 2.116(C)(7) tests whether a  
claim is barred because of immunity granted by law, and  
requires consideration of all documentary evidence filed or  
4Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued January 11, 2002
(Docket No. 187738). 
5Defendant did not seek leave to appeal on whether the
steps on which plaintiff fell were part of the public
building. Thus, we do not reach that issue. We also do not 
address whether plaintiff has established a dangerous or
defective condition of a public building. 
4  
 
submitted by the parties.”  Glancy v Roseville, 457 Mich 580,  
583; 577 NW2d 897 (1998).  
III. Discussion  
A. Governmental immunity and the public-building exception  
Absent a statutory exception, a governmental agency is  
immune from tort liability when it exercises or discharges a  
governmental function.  MCL 691.1407(1). 
A governmental  
function is “an activity that is expressly or impliedly  
mandated 
or 
authorized 
by 
constitution, 
statute, 
local 
charter  
or ordinance, or other law.”  MCL 691.1401(f). 
The term  
“governmental function” is to be broadly construed, and the  
statutory exceptions are to be narrowly construed.  Horace,  
supra at 749.  
It is not disputed that defendant has authority to  
construct 
dormitories for student housing.  MCL 390.16 permits  
the Board of Regents of the University of Michigan to “erect  
from time to time, such buildings as are necessary for the  
uses of the university, on the grounds set apart for the same  
. . . .”  
The public-building exception to governmental immunity,  
MCL 691.1406, provides:  
Governmental agencies have the obligation to 
repair and maintain public buildings under their 
control when open for use by members of the public.  
Governmental agencies are liable for bodily injury 
and property damage resulting from a dangerous or 
defective condition of a public building if the  
5  
 
  
governmental agency had actual or constructive 
knowledge of the defect and, for a reasonable time 
after acquiring knowledge, failed to remedy the 
condition or take action reasonably necessary to 
protect the public against the condition. . . . 
[Emphasis added.]  
Thus, “[t]o come within the narrow confines of this  
exception, a plaintiff must prove that (1) a governmental  
agency is involved, (2) the public building in question was  
open for use by members of the public, (3) a dangerous or  
defective condition of the public building itself exists, (4)  
the governmental agency had actual or constructive knowledge  
of the alleged defect, and (5) the governmental agency failed  
to remedy the alleged defective condition after a reasonable  
period or failed to take action reasonably necessary to  
protect the public against the condition after a reasonable  
period.” Kerbersky v Northern Michigan Univ, 458 Mich 525,  
529; 528 NW2d 828 (1998) (emphasis omitted), interpreting MCL  
691.1406.  The second element is at issue here, i.e., whether  
the locked residence hall was open for use by members of the  
public.  
B. Summary of case law  
A review of case law in this area offers guidance.6  In  
Dudek v Michigan, 152 Mich App 81; 393 NW2d 572 (1986), a  
state mental-health facility was being renovated. 
A  
6A helpful summary of case law may also be found in
Kerbersky, supra. 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
construction worker was injured when a cement block fell from  
a building.  The Court of Appeals held that the public­
building exception did not apply because the entire  
construction area was closed off by a fence, and only  
authorized personnel could enter.  
In Griffin, supra, a resident of a public-housing  
facility drowned in her bathtub.  The Court of Appeals held  
that the public-building exception did not apply because the  
dwelling unit “was not open for use by members of the public.  
It was open for use by the decedent as her private residence  
under the lease agreement.” Id. at 306.  
In Taylor v Detroit, 182 Mich App 583; 452 NW2d 826  
(1989), a boy was electrocuted after breaking into a locked  
electrical substation in an abandoned section of a public­
housing project.  The Court of Appeals held that the  
substation was not open for use by members of the public.  
“Here, only authorized personnel were allowed entry into the  
substation; 
the 
structure was neither designed nor intended to  
be accessible to or used by the general public.”  Id. at 588.7  
In White, supra, a resident of a public-housing facility  
was injured on a patio at the facility. 
The plaintiff  
7In Kerbersky, supra, this Court approved the result in
Taylor but noted that “[t]he word ‘general’ is not in the
statute and therefore should not be read into the statute.” 
Id. at 534. 
7  
 
 
attempted to distinguish Griffin on the ground that the  
accident in White occurred in an area accessible to the public  
rather than in a tenant’s private residence.  The Court of  
Appeals rejected that distinction:  
Because the building in the instant case was a 
residential housing facility containing private 
housing units, and was not a building used for 
public offices or for a public purpose, the public 
building exception does not apply.  And the area at  
issue, being adjacent to a nonpublic building, does 
not fall within the exception merely because the 
area may be accessible by the public. [Id. at 529.]  
In Steele v Dep’t of Corrections, 215 Mich App 710; 546  
NW2d 725 (1996), a prison inmate was injured while he was part  
of a work crew renovating a state building.  The Court of  
Appeals concluded that the public-building exception did not  
apply because the building was not open to the public during  
renovations.  
In Kerbersky, supra, a construction worker fell from a  
ladder while renovating a university administration building.  
This Court held that the building was open for use by members  
of the public, even though the specific accident site was  
closed for renovations.  This Court stated, however, that  
where an entire building is closed for renovations, it is not  
open for use by members of the public. This Court therefore  
endorsed the holdings in Dudek and Steele.  
The Kerbersky Court agreed with the result in White  
8  
 
  
 
because areas adjacent to public buildings are not covered by  
the exception.  Also agreeing with the holding in Griffin, the  
Kerbersky Court stated: “A tenant who is present in a city­
owned apartment as the result of an oral or written lease is  
not using the building as a member of the public; rather, such  
a person has a contractual possessory interest in the  
apartment.” Id. at 535 (emphasis added). This Court further  
approved the Taylor holding that the locked electrical  
substation was not open for use by members of the public.  
Next, in Brown v Genesee Co Bd of Comm’rs (After Remand),  
464 Mich 430; 628 NW2d 471 (2001), an inmate injured himself  
in the shower area of a jail.  A majority of this Court  
concluded that a jail inmate is not a member of the public for  
the purposes of the public-building exception to governmental  
immunity as that relates to a jail.  
C. Analysis  
We reaffirm that mere public ownership of a building is  
insufficient to meet the requirements of the public-building  
exception.  
The 
statute makes plain that governmental agencies  
owe a duty to repair and maintain “public buildings under  
their control when open for use by members of the public”  
(emphasis added).  If mere public ownership sufficed, the  
phrase “when open for use by members of the public” would be  
rendered nugatory.  Courts must avoid a construction that  
9  
 
renders part of a statute nugatory.  Brown, supra at 437,  
citing People v Borchard-Ruhland, 460 Mich 278, 285; 597 NW2d  
1 (1999).  
To determine whether a building is open for use by  
members of the public, the nature of the building and its use  
must be evaluated.  The government, of course, controls the  
use that will be made of its buildings.  If the government has  
restricted entry to the building to those persons who are  
qualified on the basis of some individualized, limiting  
criteria8 of the government’s creation, the building is not  
open to the public.  This test arises from the plain statutory  
language.  If access to a building is limited in the manner we  
have described, members of the public may not freely enter,  
and the building is not open for use by members of the  
public.9  
8Such limiting criteria would not include universal
requirements such as possession of a ticket, as for an
athletic or theatrical event, or the need to universally bar
entry to those with weapons, such as at courthouses or other
secure, but public, facilities. 
9The test that we have set forth should not be confused 
with the following discussion of “limited access” in 
Kerbersky: 
As noted in Steele, the public building 
exception can apply to buildings with limited 
access.  For example, this Court’s handling of Bush  
v Oscoda Area Schools, 405 Mich 716; 275 NW2d 268 
(1979), demonstrates that the building in question 
does not have to be open to members of the general 
public to come within the statute.  In Bush, we  
10 
 
This test focuses on whether the government intends to  
limit the public’s access to the building-
-
-a breach of the  
rules limiting entry would not render the building open to the  
public.
 Where a person who is not qualified for entry  
nonetheless gains access, the government remains entitled to  
immunity.  
held that the public building exception applied to 
an injury sustained in a high school chemistry 
class.  Very few people could legitimately have 
been in this classroom. This particular classroom 
was not accessible by members of the general 
public. [Kerbersky, supra at 534.]  
The phrase “limited access” was used in Kerbersky to  
explain that where access to part of a building is limited, 
the public-building exception may still apply if the building 
remains open for use by members of the public.  Here, the 
concept of limited access is used in a different sense, i.e., 
to describe a building in which access to the entire building, 
or the general right of entry, is restricted to persons who 
are qualified to enter.  Where the government has created 
rules that render the building closed except to those who are 
qualified to enter, the building is not open for use by 
members of the public.  The focus of the test is on the  
government’s intended use of the building.  Thus, the test set 
forth in this case should not be confused with the language in 
Kerbersky clarifying that a building may be open to the public 
even though access to a part of the building is limited.  
In other words, the Kerbersky holding and the test we 
announce here address distinct questions that may arise in a 
court’s 
analysis 
under 
the 
public-building 
exception. 
Kerbersky clarifies that a building may be “open for use by 
members of the public” even where a location within the 
building is restricted from public use.  The present case, 
however, involves a building that is not open for use by the 
public because access to the entire building is limited in the 
manner we have described.  Where, as here, the entire building 
is closed to the public, the holding in Kerbersky, concerning 
a building that remains open despite containing a location 
that is restricted to the public, simply is not implicated.  
11  
 
Moreover, the statutory language makes clear that the  
public-building exception applies when the building is open  
for use by members of the public.  A building such as a  
courthouse that is open to the public during business hours  
may nonetheless be closed to the public at other times, such  
as at night or on weekends.  Similarly, a university athletic  
facility may be open to the public during a sporting event,  
but closed to the public at other times.  Because the  
statutory language limits the exception to periods when the  
building is open for use by members of the public, accidents  
that occur when the building is closed to the public do not  
fall within the confines of the exception, and the government  
is entitled to immunity.  
The residence hall in this case was not open for use by  
members of the public.  Members of the public could not enter  
the building without using a courtesy phone to contact a  
resident and asking the resident to unlock the door.  In that  
manner, the university restricted entry to the residence hall  
to those persons who were qualified on the basis of  
individualized, limiting criteria-
-
-in this case, permission  
from a tenant.  Accordingly, the building was not open to the  
public.10  
10The Court of Appeals determined that the delivery of
supplies, mail, and food by nonresidents rendered the 
residence hall open for use by members of the public.  In 
12  
 
 
IV. Conclusion  
The Betsy Barbour Residence Hall was not open for use by  
members of the public.  Accordingly, plaintiff has not  
satisfied the requirements of the public-building exception,  
and defendant is immune from tort liability. We reverse the  
judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial  
court’s order granting summary disposition for defendant.  
Maura D. Corrigan 
Elizabeth A. Weaver  
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman  
CAVANAGH, J.  
I concur in the result only.  
Michael F. Cavanagh  
reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied on dicta 
in Brown discussing deliveries to a jail. The Brown plurality 
opinion should not be read to suggest that mere deliveries are 
sufficient to render a building open for use by members of the 
public.  The Court of Appeals erred in relying primarily on 
this dicta from Brown. 
Instead, as our opinion today 
explains, the appropriate test for determining whether a 
building is open for use by members of the public is whether 
entry to the building has been restricted on the basis of some 
individualized, limiting criteria.  This analysis requires 
consideration of the use of the particular building involved.  
Our dissenting colleague also attempts to apply dicta 
from the Brown plurality opinion to this case and questions 
whether a jail may be open for use by members of the public 
while the residence hall here is not.  The central holding in 
Brown, however, concerned whether an inmate was a member of 
the public.  We decline to revisit issues that are not before  
us.
 We are confident that the test we have set forth is  
derived from the statutory text and supports the result we 
have reached.  
13  
___________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
ANN E. MASKERY and ROBERT  
MASKERY,  
Plaintiffs-Appellees,  
No. 121338  
BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE  
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
KELLY, J. (dissenting).  
I respectfully dissent.  In its decision, the majority  
creates a test that can be used to discern whether a building  
is open for use by members of the public under MCL 691.1406.  
However, I find that the test is unclear.  
Moreover, I believe that the Court of Appeals did not  
clearly err in its decision on remand, given our explicit  
directive to it to apply the holding in Brown. The Court of  
Appeals construed Brown in the only way possible. Also, like  
the Court of Appeals, I am unable to distinguish the residence  
 
  
 
 
 
hall in this case from the jail in Brown when applying the  
Brown test.  
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT CLEARLY ERR  
A brief examination of the cases interpreting MCL  
691.1406 reveals that no adequate method has been established  
to determine when a building is open for use by members of the  
public. 
This is underscored by the fact that the Court of  
Appeals has decided this case three times and, now, for the  
third time, is told it did not correctly interpret § 6.  
A. The Brown decision  
In Brown v Genesee Co Bd of Comm'rs (After Remand),1 the  
Court devoted a few paragraphs to discussing whether a jail is  
open for use by members of the public under § 6:  
Plaintiff claims to have injured himself near 
a shower stall in defendant's jail. 
Under  
Kerbersky, we examine the public's access to the  
jail rather than the shower area. 
[Kerbersky v  
Northern Michigan Univ, 458 Mich 525; 582 NW2d 828 
(1998).]  
Green v Dep't of Corrections, 386 Mich 459; 
192 NW2d 491 (1971), held that a jail falls within 
the scope of the statutory exception.  In other  
decisions, this Court has implicitly assumed as 
much. See, e.g., Wade v Dep't of Corrections, 439  
Mich 158; 483 NW2d 26 (1992).  
We would reaffirm that a jail is open for use 
by members of the public.  Family, friends, and 
attorneys may generally visit inmates. Members of  
the public may also enter a jail for other reasons, 
e.g., to apply for a job or make a delivery.  
1464 Mich 430, 435-436; 628 NW2d 471 (2001). 
2 
  
The fact that public access to a jail is 
limited does not alter our conclusion. Schools fall  
within the exception even though members of the 
public may not enter whenever and wherever they 
please. 
See Sewell v Southfield Public Schools, 
456 Mich 670; 576 NW2d 153 (1998); Bush v Oscoda  
Area Schools, 405 Mich 716; 275 NW2d 268 (1979). 
The public building exception applies to buildings 
with limited access, including schools and prisons. 
Kerbersky, supra at 534; Steele v Dep't of  
Corrections, 215 Mich App 710, 715; 546 NW2d 725  
(1996). [Emphasis in original.]  
Analyzing this discussion, one finds that there are two  
discernible approaches to concluding why a jail is open for  
use by members of the public.  First, the Court could be  
following the analysis suggested in Green. 
However, the  
opinion tells us that it does "not approve the reasoning in  
that decision." Brown, supra at 436 n 4.  
Next, the second paragraph states that a jail might be  
open for use by members of the public because "[f]amily,  
friends, and attorneys may generally visit inmates. Members  
of the public may also enter a jail for other reasons, e.g.,  
to apply for a job or make a delivery." The third paragraph  
tells the reader that "limited access" to a building like a  
jail does not preclude its being open for use by members of  
the public.  
Therefore, the reader is given two possible reasons that  
a jail is open for use by members of the public, then told not  
to rely on the first one.  The logical conclusion is that the  
3  
 
 
second reason given is the reason the jail is "open."  
Notably absent from Brown is any description of the jail  
in question.  Does it have an open lobby that one can enter  
freely?  Is there a checkpoint outside?  Is there a guarded  
gate?
 How is it like other jails? 
The answers to these  
questions are left to the imagination.  The reader is given  
the impression that all jails are open for use by members of  
the public, regardless of their structure or how they limit  
access.  
B. The remand after Brown  
After Brown, the Court remanded this case to the Court of  
Appeals for the second time, for reconsideration in light of  
the new decision.  The Court of Appeals attempted to apply the  
reasoning in Brown.  
Here, the building in question is not a jail, 
but a residence hall.  If a jail is "open for use 
by members of the public" by virtue of the family 
and friends that may visit inmates, it certainly 
follows that a residence hall would also be "open 
for use by members of the public."  Indeed, we 
would suspect that there is more, or at least 
equal, ingress and egress in a residence hall than 
in a jail.  Similarly, a residence hall is likely 
to receive deliveries of supplies, mail, and food 
by nonresidents.  Moreover, if the very limited 
access to a jail is not sufficient to preclude its 
characterization as a public building, the instant 
residence hall's minimal security measures, while 
presumably effective, further justify a finding 
that the residence hall was a public building. 
Thus, we believe that the Brown decision leads only 
to a conclusion that the residence hall was “open 
for use by members of the public."  Therefore, we 
conclude that the residence hall was a public  
4  
 
 
building, as necessary to permit plaintiff’s  
reliance on the public building exception to  
governmental immunity, MCL 691.1406.[2]  
It is apparent that the Court of Appeals extracted the  
only rationale available from Brown, the statements about  
access by friends, family, and attorneys and for job  
applications and deliveries. It then applied that rationale  
to the facts. It is also apparent that the Court reasonably  
concluded that a jail would provide tighter security than a  
residence hall, locked or unlocked.  
C. The majority decision  
Today, the majority reverses the Court of Appeals, even  
though, in light of the brief discussion in Brown, it would be  
difficult to reach another conclusion.  The majority rejects  
the lower court's rationale in its footnote 10, ante at 12-13:  
The Court of Appeals determined that the 
delivery of supplies, mail, and food by non­
residents rendered the residence hall open for use 
by members of the public. 
In reaching this 
conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied on dicta in 
Brown discussing deliveries to a jail.  The Brown  
plurality opinion should not be read to suggest 
that mere deliveries are sufficient to render a  
building open for use by members of the public. 
The Court of Appeals erred in relying primarily on 
this dicta from Brown.  
If the Court of Appeals erred in relying on this dicta  
from Brown, it had no choice but to err; Brown provides  
2Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued January 11, 2002
(Docket No. 187738). 
5  
 
 
nothing else on which to rely.  Because the Court of Appeals  
decision was the only reasonable application of Brown, it was  
not clearly erroneous.  
II. WITHOUT SPECIFIC FACTS, A "JAIL" AND A LOCKED  
RESIDENCE HALL MAY BOTH HAVE RESTRICTED ENTRY  
Today, the majority proposes a two-part test for  
determining whether a government building is open for use by  
members of the public under § 6.  First, there must not be  
"restricted entry to the building of those persons who are  
qualified on the basis of some individualized, limiting  
criteria of the government's creation." Ante at 10. Second  
the building must be open for public use at the time of entry.  
The test is derived from the statute and arguably  
provides a workable framework for deciding when a building is  
"open" under § 6.  However, absent more facts, one cannot  
discern how the majority's fact-intensive inquiry concludes  
that "a" jail is not subject to restricted entry, while this  
locked residence hall is.  
Initially, I would note that the majority's focus seems  
to have shifted from the type of building (a nonspecific  
"jail" in Brown) to the exact building at issue (Betsy Barbour  
Residence Hall, locked twenty-four hours a day). 
Brown  
implied that all jails would be "open" for purposes of § 6,  
without regard to the unique aspects of each.  
6  
 
 
Today, the majority focuses on the specific aspects of  
this locked residence hall.  Presumably, it should not be  
compared to one of the large residence halls at Michigan State  
University that are open for classes and other events during  
the day.  However, the distinction between the generic  
analysis in Brown and the specific analysis here leads to  
confusion, as the majority does not disavow Brown at all. The  
bench and bar would benefit from an explanation of the proper  
focus for the § 6 inquiry.3  
3Even in this case, the majority moves between general
and specific focuses. For example, when discussing Kerbersky 
v Northern Michigan Univ, 458 Mich 525, 534; 528 NW2d 828
(1998), it notes that the Kerbersky Court reaffirmed that the 
public building exception would apply to "an injury sustained
in a high school chemistry class . . . [even though][v]ery few
people could legitimately have been in this classroom." The 
majority explains that this example can be distinguished from
a locked residence hall because: 
The phrase "limited access" was used in  
Kerbersky to explain that where access to part of a  
building is limited, the public-building exception 
may still apply if the building remains open for 
use by members of the public.  Here, the concept of 
limited access is used in a different sense, i.e., 
to describe a building in which access to the 
entire building, or the general right of entry, is 
restricted to persons who are qualified to enter. 
[Ante at 11 n 9 (emphasis in original.]  
Again, the majority generalizes about schools.  It is  
undisputed that in some public schools today access to the 
entire building, not merely to particular classrooms, is 
restricted.  Some high schools have guards who prevent access  
to everyone but employees and students; most do not.  
Nevertheless, it is apparent that one cannot conclude that 
public schools in general are open for use by members of the 
(continued...) 
7  
  
 
 
Next, without some comparison of the two buildings, I  
cannot conclude that the jail in Brown has less restricted  
entry than the residence hall in this case. Unless the jail  
has an open, walk-in lobby that members of the public can  
enter, which is possible, I see no meaningful distinction  
between the levels of restriction on entry.  It seems unlikely  
that a member of the public could enter the interior of the  
jail, or this residence hall, unless he had business inside;  
neither building would appear to permit one to stroll at will  
inside the facility.4  
Again, I emphasize that there may be aspects of the jail  
in Brown that provide for less restricted entry than the  
residence hall in this case.  The difficulty is that the  
majority does not specify what those aspects are.  The reader  
is left wondering, as the Court of Appeals obviously was,  
whether a nondescript jail is subject to fewer restrictions  
than this residence hall.  
3(...continued)
public under the proposed test.  Instead, one must consider
the characteristics of a particular school. 
4The majority notes that "[m]embers of the public could
not enter the building without using a courtesy phone to
contact a resident, and then asking the resident to unlock the
door." Ante at 12.  I imagine that a visitor to a jail would
have to take at least equivalent steps to gain entry, such as
passing through a guarded checkpoint.  Again, this is
conjecture because the jail in Brown is not described. 
8  
III. THE PROPOSED TEST IS NOT CLEARLY SET OUT  
The majority's test is spread out over the two pages of  
analysis.  The reader is left to derive the relevant  
principles and to make sense of them in light of the earlier  
cases.  Because the test announced in this case should be a  
helpful analytic tool, I would prefer that it were more  
clearly articulated.  
IV. CONCLUSION  
I cannot join the majority.  The Court of Appeals made  
the only conclusion that Brown would support, and I find no  
error in it.  
Marilyn Kelly  
9