Title: Commonwealth v. Kapaia
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12454
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: November 17, 2022

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12454 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  FRANKLIN KAPAIA. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     September 12, 2022. - November 17, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, & Wendlandt, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Evidence, Identity.  Practice, Criminal, Opening 
statement, Argument by prosecutor, Capital case. 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on April 11, 2013. 
 
The case was tried before Richard J. Chin, J. 
 
 
Andrew S. Crouch for the defendant. 
Mary Nguyen, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  After a jury trial in the Superior Court, the 
defendant, Franklin Kapaia, was convicted of murder in the first 
degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty.  He appeals 
from his conviction, arguing that (1) there was insufficient 
evidence to convict him, (2) errors in the Commonwealth's 
opening statement and closing argument warrant reversal, and (3) 
2 
 
we should reduce the verdict of murder in the first degree 
pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We affirm. 
 
Background.  We recite the facts the jury could have found 
in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, reserving some 
details for later discussion of specific issues.  See 
Commonwealth v. Brown, 490 Mass. 171, 172 (2022), citing 
Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979). 
 
The victim, Eric Dillard, lived with his girlfriend, Helena 
Ellis, and their three children in an apartment located in a 
multiunit building at the intersection of Montello Street and 
Lawrence Street in Brockton.  At the time of the shooting, the 
victim's cousin, Michael Myers, also was staying at the 
apartment.  The victim's apartment was on the first floor, and a 
small hallway led from the apartment to the building's Lawrence 
Street entrance.  The victim sold "crack" cocaine and marijuana, 
while Ellis sold marijuana to her friends, including Shauna 
Matthews. 
 
Matthews was the defendant's girlfriend.  At the time of 
the shooting, Matthews lived in an apartment in Brockton and the 
defendant's longtime friend, Michael McNicholas, lived next 
door.  The defendant and McNicholas had been acquainted for over 
a decade by the time of trial.  McNicholas and the defendant 
would "h[a]ng out" and smoke marijuana together, often at 
Matthews's apartment.  Additionally, McNicholas would buy 
3 
 
marijuana from Roy Mitchell, who lived in the same apartment 
building as the victim and Ellis.  While Mitchell never had sold 
marijuana to the defendant, Mitchell had met the defendant and 
had observed him to have light facial hair, specifically, "a 
little mustache." 
 
On March 6, 2013, the defendant and McNicholas smoked 
marijuana together during the afternoon.  While the two were 
smoking, the defendant told McNicholas that he had "to go run a 
mission" but did not provide McNicholas with further details. 
Later that evening, the defendant and Matthews drove around 
looking for marijuana.  They stopped at two places near the 
victim's apartment where the defendant previously had bought 
marijuana.  The first stop proved unsuccessful.  At the second 
stop, the defendant got out of Matthews's car and walked away.  
According to Matthews, the defendant, who is a dark-skinned man, 
was wearing a black, puffy coat and a winter hat..  Matthews was 
"not sure" whether the defendant had a mustache on the night of 
the shooting. 
That evening, the victim and Ellis were home with their 
three children and Myers.  At 5:45 P.M., Matthews sent a text 
message to Ellis stating that she was "going to come grab a bag" 
of marijuana.  Ellis responded to Matthews's message at 6:02 
P.M., stating that she was out of marijuana.  The doorbell to 
the apartment then rang almost immediately after the exchange of 
4 
 
text messages.  The victim opened the door, entered the hallway, 
and closed the door behind him.  The sounds of a struggle caught 
the attention of both Ellis and Myers.  Ellis opened the door, 
and as a result, both she and Myers could see into the hallway.  
Ellis saw "a gun pulled out" and described "a lot of bullets 
flying."  She did not see the face or body of the person holding 
the firearm nor how many people were in the hallway.1  Myers2 saw 
a tall "dark skinned male" who "may have had a mustache," 
wearing a black "hoodie," standing over the victim and holding a 
gun.  The shooter made eye contact with Myers, looked back at 
the victim, and shot the victim again. 
Wounded, the victim crawled back into his apartment.  He 
was gasping for air and told Ellis to call 911.  Ellis did so, 
 
1 Ellis was unequivocal at trial that she did not see how 
many people were in the hallway.  Her testimony was impeached by 
means of prior inconsistent statements where she previously had 
indicated that there were two people in the hallway in addition 
to the victim.  Additionally, there was testimony from Ellis 
that she heard three voices in the hallway, one of them being 
the victim; she did not recognize the other voices.  We 
acknowledge that this testimony was present and there was no 
request for a limiting instruction.  See Commonwealth v. Ashley, 
427 Mass. 620, 627-628 (1998) ("Where there is no objection 
. . . and no request for a limiting instruction," prior 
inconsistent statements introduced at trial "may be considered 
as substantive evidence" [citation omitted]).  However, we 
review the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bonner, 489 Mass. 268, 
275 (2022). 
 
2 Myers was deemed unavailable at trial, and his prior 
statements were introduced through his grand jury testimony and 
State police Trooper Joseph Kalil's testimony. 
5 
 
and emergency personnel were dispatched to the apartment at 6:04 
P.M.  They arrived at the scene a few minutes later and found 
the victim lying on the kitchen floor with multiple gunshot 
wounds; he was not breathing and had a faint pulse.  He died 
soon thereafter. 
When the defendant returned to Matthews's car, "[h]e just 
had a look of just aggravation" and his nose was "a little 
flared."  Matthews told the defendant that Ellis had responded 
to the text message indicating that she was out of marijuana.  
Later that night, the defendant again smoked marijuana with 
McNicholas during which McNicholas told the defendant that 
Mitchell's "neighbor got shot."  At that point, the defendant 
told McNicholas that he had killed Mitchell's neighbor. 
An autopsy revealed that the victim sustained a significant 
number of gunshot wounds to both the front and back of his body, 
specifically, three graze wounds, nine entrance wounds, and six 
exit wounds.  The gunshot wounds were determined to be the 
victim's cause of death.  The defendant was on probation at the 
time of the shooting and wore a global positioning system (GPS) 
ankle monitor.  As part of the investigation, police obtained 
GPS data from the defendant's ankle monitor, which was admitted 
at trial.  The evidence at trial showed that the location data 
from the device was ninety percent accurate within a radius from 
thirty to thirty-six feet of the point that appears on the map.  
6 
 
The GPS data showed the defendant moving toward the victim's 
apartment building just prior to the shooting.  The data then 
showed the defendant stationary at the intersection where the 
victim's apartment was located at 6:02 P.M.  The data from one 
minute later showed the defendant traveling away from the 
victim's apartment building at three miles per hour and then 
twenty miles per hour.3 
 
Discussion.  1.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  The 
defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the 
theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty.  The defendant had moved 
for a required finding of not guilty at the close of the 
Commonwealth's case, arguing that the evidence was insufficient 
to support a conviction of murder in the first degree.  The 
motion was denied.4  He reaffirms this argument on appeal, 
asserting that the admitted evidence is insufficient to prove 
 
3 The monitoring device updates GPS data points every minute 
that the bracelet is in motion. 
 
4 As relevant here, the defendant moved for a required 
finding of not guilty on the ground that the Commonwealth had 
not presented sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction of 
murder in the first degree.  The judge allowed the motion as to 
felony-murder, and the case went to the jury on theories of 
deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty.  The 
defendant was convicted on the theory of extreme atrocity or 
cruelty.  In addition to the murder charge, the defendant had 
been indicted on charges of attempted armed robbery, unlawful 
possession of a firearm, and carrying a loaded firearm without a 
license.  The judge allowed the defendant's motion for required 
findings of not guilty on those charges. 
7 
 
his identity as the shooter.  Specifically, he argues that 
inconsistent descriptions of the shooter and himself on the 
night of the shooting, the imprecision of the GPS data, and the 
inconsistencies and unreliability of McNicholas's and Ellis's 
testimony prevented the Commonwealth from proving his identity 
as the shooter.  We disagree. 
"In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider 
'whether, after viewing the evidence the light most favorable to 
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'"  
Commonwealth v. Davis, 487 Mass. 448, 462 (2021), quoting 
Latimore, 378 Mass. at 677.  Ultimately, "[t]he denial of a 
motion for a required finding of not guilty will be affirmed if 
the Commonwealth's evidence, together with reasonable inferences 
from that evidence, is sufficient to persuade a rational jury of 
the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt" (quotation and 
citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Paige, 488 Mass. 677, 679 
(2021).  "Proof of the essential elements of the crime may be 
based on reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence, . . . 
and the inferences a jury may draw need only be reasonable and 
possible and need not be necessary or inescapable" (quotation 
and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. West, 487 Mass. 794, 800 
(2021).  "The relevant question is whether the evidence would 
permit a jury to find guilt, not whether the evidence requires 
8 
 
such a finding" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Norris, 483 
Mass. 681, 685 (2019). 
"At the time of the defendant's trial, to convict a 
defendant of murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme 
atrocity or cruelty, the Commonwealth was required to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed an 
unlawful killing with malice aforethought,[5] . . . and with 
extreme atrocity or cruelty . . . ."  Commonwealth v. Melendez, 
490 Mass. 648, 665 (2022). 
Here, there was overwhelming evidence that the shooting at 
issue was an intentional killing committed with malice 
aforethought and with extreme atrocity or cruelty.  In brief, 
the evidence showed that the victim was killed by repeated 
gunshots to both the front and back of his body while he was in 
the hallway of his apartment after the assailant rang the 
doorbell and the victim stepped into the hallway.  Moreover, 
during the shooting, the assailant looked one of the witnesses 
in the eye and then turned to the already-wounded victim and 
shot him again.  See Commonwealth v. Bonner, 489 Mass. 268, 276 
(2022) ("conviction of murder in first degree on theory of 
 
5 Malice is "an intent to cause death, to cause grievous 
bodily harm, or to do an act which, in the circumstances known 
to the defendant, a reasonable person would have known created a 
plain and strong likelihood that death would follow" (citation 
omitted). Commonwealth v. Melendez, 490 Mass. 648, 665 (2022). 
9 
 
extreme atrocity or cruelty requires evidence that defendant 
caused victim's death by method that surpassed cruelty inherent 
in taking life").  See also Commonwealth v. Robinson, 482 Mass. 
741, 744-747 (2019). 
As to the shooter's identity, the issue on which the 
defendant focuses his argument on appeal, the evidence that the 
defendant was the shooter was compelling.  And while the pieces 
of evidence outlined infra might not individually "be sufficient 
to sustain a conviction, together they formed a 'mosaic' of 
evidence such that the jury could [reasonably] conclude, beyond 
a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was the shooter" 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Jones, 477 Mass. 307, 317 
(2017). 
The defendant told McNicholas that he needed to "go run a 
mission," after which he and Matthews drove around looking for 
marijuana.  The defendant was aware that McNicholas had 
previously purchased marijuana from the victim's upstairs 
neighbor, Mitchell.  And the defendant's girlfriend, Matthews, 
specifically reached out to the victim's girlfriend, Ellis, to 
purchase marijuana mere minutes before the killing.  Put simply, 
on the same night that the defendant was out looking for 
marijuana with his girlfriend, multiple people who potentially 
could provide him with marijuana lived in the victim's apartment 
building. 
10 
 
Also, during the defendant's and Matthews's search for 
marijuana, the defendant got out of the car at a stop near the 
victim's apartment and walked away.  As to what happened when 
the defendant was out of the car, the evidence at trial 
established a tight timeline of events.  Ellis responded to 
Matthews's text message at 6:02 P.M., and emergency personnel 
were dispatched to the victim's apartment at 6:04 P.M.  The 
shooting itself occurred within those two minutes.  The data 
from the defendant's ankle monitor showed the defendant 
approaching the victim's apartment building in the minutes 
immediately before the shooting, present at the victim's 
apartment at 6:02 P.M., and fleeing one minute later.  When 
considered together and in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, this is compelling evidence that the defendant was 
present at the time of the shooting and "permit[s] the 
reasonable inference that the defendant was the shooter."6  
Davis, 487 Mass. at 462-464 (GPS data establishing defendant's 
 
6 The defendant's argument that the GPS data "showed that 
[the defendant] was present on Lawrence Street next to the 
sidewalk . . . near but not inside the house" and moving away 
from the apartment before the shooting is inaccurate.  The 
evidence at trial was that the GPS data was ninety percent 
accurate within a radius of between thirty and thirty-six feet.  
That the GPS point for 6:02 P.M. appears just outside the 
apartment building does not demonstrate conclusively that the 
defendant could not have been the shooter.  Rather, the 
defendant could have been standing anywhere within a radius of 
from thirty to thirty-six feet of that point, which encompasses 
the victim's apartment building. 
11 
 
location and speed before, during, and after shooting helped 
permit reasonable inference that defendant was shooter).  See 
Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 477 Mass. 658, 667 (2017) (GPS data 
placing defendant at scene contributed to sufficiency). 
Furthermore, the defendant's appearance and clothing were 
similar, albeit not identical, to Myers's description of the 
shooter.  See Jones, 477 Mass. at 318 ("similarity between [the 
defendant's] clothing and the clothing worn by the sole person 
seen fleeing the scene" contributed to sufficiency).  And 
perhaps most significantly, McNicholas testified at trial that 
the defendant admitted to killing the victim on the night of the 
shooting. 
While the defendant describes witness testimony and various 
pieces of evidence as inconsistent or unreliable, "[i]t does not 
matter that some of the evidence could be characterized as 
equivocal or contradictory," Commonwealth v. James, 424 Mass. 
770, 785 (1997), quoting Commonwealth v. Ruci, 409 Mass. 94, 97 
(1991), as "[c]redibility is a question for the jury to decide; 
they may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony 
presented to them" (citation omitted), Norris, 483 Mass. at 686.  
Put another way, the defendant's claim that certain witnesses 
were unreliable or that the testimony from some witnesses was 
inconsistent with the testimony from others and therefore 
insufficient to sustain a conviction "is nothing more than an 
12 
 
issue of credibility, an issue that is solely within the 
province of the jury."  Id., quoting James, supra. 
 
2.  Commonwealth's opening statement and closing argument.  
The defendant makes several arguments relating to the 
Commonwealth's opening statement and closing argument.  
Specifically, he contends that the prosecutor impermissibly 
appealed to the jurors' sympathy and misstated the expected 
evidence in the opening statement; he further argues that the 
prosecutor7 once again misstated the evidence and improperly 
vouched for a witness during the closing argument.  Finally, he 
argues that these errors collectively warrant reversal.  We 
address each argument in turn. 
 
a.  Opening statement.  The defendant first contends that 
the prosecutor improperly appealed to the jurors' sympathy by 
repeatedly referencing the personal characteristics of the 
victim and his family members and "by making detailed 
descriptions of the 'horrific final memories'" that the family 
had of the victim.  He also argues that the prosecutor 
impermissibly misstated the anticipated GPS evidence. 
"The proper function of an opening is to outline in a 
general way the nature of the case which the counsel expects to 
 
7 Two prosecutors represented the Commonwealth during the 
trial.  One gave the Commonwealth's opening statement, and the 
other delivered the Commonwealth's closing argument. 
13 
 
be able to prove or support by evidence" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Fazio, 375 Mass. 451, 454 (1978).  "[A] claim of 
improper [opening statement] by the prosecutor must be judged in 
light of the entire [statement], the judge's instructions to the 
jury, and the evidence actually introduced at trial."  Barbosa, 
477 Mass. at 669, quoting Commonwealth v. Jones, 439 Mass. 249, 
260-261 (2003).  "Because defense counsel did not object to the 
Commonwealth's opening statement . . . , we determine whether 
any error created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice."  Commonwealth v. Cheng Sun, 490 Mass. 196, 210 (2022).  
"For an error to have created a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice, it must have been likely to have 
influenced the jury's conclusion."  Id., quoting Commonwealth v. 
Wilson, 486 Mass. 328, 333 (2020).  We agree that the 
prosecutor's emphasis on the victim's family members' final 
memories of the victim and statements regarding the precision of 
the GPS evidence were improper, but we conclude that they did 
not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
i.  Appeals to sympathy.  As to the defendant's first 
argument, "[t]he prosecutor is entitled to tell the jury 
something of the person whose life ha[s] been lost in order to 
humanize the proceedings" (citation omitted).  Cheng Sun, 490 
Mass. at 209.  But "the prosecutor must refrain, when personal 
characteristics are not relevant to any material issue, . . . 
14 
 
from so emphasizing those characteristics that it risks 
undermining the rationality and thus the integrity of the jury's 
verdict" (quotations and citation omitted).  Id.  Moreover, and 
particularly relevant here, the prosecutor "must avoid 
slip[ping] into emotionally provocative argument" (quotation and 
citation omitted).  Id.  "[W]here a prosecutor chooses to 
provide background information about a victim, he or she must 
take care not to cross the line from permissibly humanizing the 
proceedings to making an improper appeal to sympathy 'to ensure 
that the verdict was "based on the evidence rather than sympathy 
for the victim and [his] family."'"  Id. at 209-210, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Mejia, 463 Mass. 243, 253 (2012). 
 
Here, the prosecutor directed the jury's attention not only 
to the horrendous nature of the scene and victim's injuries but 
also to the victim's age, his status as a father, and his 
relationship with Ellis.  The prosecutor also repeatedly focused 
on the "horrific final memories" that Ellis and his children 
would have of the victim.  Undoubtedly, the prosecutor was 
allowed to tell the jury about the scene and the extent of 
victim's injuries so as prove extreme atrocity or cruelty.  See 
Commonwealth v Alemany, 488 Mass. 499, 511 (2021) ("A prosecutor 
may use the opening to set the scene . . . even if that scene is 
unfavorable to the defendant").  Cf. Commonwealth v. Henley, 488 
Mass. 95, 131-132 (2021) (no error in prosecutor's opening and 
15 
 
closing where "[a]lthough . . . evidence may have been 
upsetting, it was 'inherent in the odious . . . nature of the 
crime[] committed'" [citation omitted]).  Moreover, he was 
entitled to tell the jury something about the victim, his age, 
and his family "to humanize the proceedings" (citation omitted).  
Cheng Sun, 490 Mass. at 209.  Furthermore, as the prosecution 
was proceeding on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty, the 
prosecutor permissibly could discuss "the presence of the 
victim's [family] and the viciousness of the crime . . . because 
this evidence was relevant to the determination whether the 
defendant's actions constituted extreme atrocity or cruelty."8  
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 429 Mass. 745, 748 (1999).  See 
Commonwealth v. Murphy, 426 Mass. 395, 402 (1998) ("evidence 
. . . victim's young son was in the [room] and possibly 
witnessed her assault and death was relevant to establish the 
 
8 "The defendant's trial occurred in February 2017, before 
our decision in Commonwealth v. Castillo, 485 Mass. 852, 865-867 
(2020), prospectively changed the requirements of finding 
extreme atrocity or cruelty."  Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 488 
Mass. 827, 834 (2022).  "Under our case law as it existed at the 
time of the defendant's trial, a verdict could be sustained by a 
finding of the presence of at least one Cunneen factor."  Id.  
"These include[d] the '[1] indifference to or taking pleasure in 
the victim's suffering, [2] consciousness and degree of 
suffering of the victim, [3] extent of physical injuries, [4] 
number of blows, [5] manner and force with which delivered, [6] 
instrument employed, and [7] disproportion between the means 
needed to cause death and those employed.'"  Id., quoting 
Cunneen v. Commonwealth, 389 Mass. 216, 227 (1983). 
16 
 
victim's own emotional suffering").  See also Commonwealth v. 
Gonsalves, 488 Mass. 827, 834 (2022). 
But the opening statement here went beyond humanizing the 
proceedings and setting the stage; rather, the prosecutor 
slipped into impermissible "emotionally provocative argument" 
(citation omitted).  Cheng Sun, 490 Mass. at 209.  Broadly 
speaking, the inflammatory rhetoric regarding the nature of the 
scene and the family's memories of the victim was a predominant 
theme of the prosecutor's opening, particularly during the early 
part.  Ultimately, the repetitive use of emotionally provocative 
language, focusing the jury's attention on the victim's family's 
last memories of the victim, constituted an erroneous appeal to 
the jurors' sympathy.  See id. at 209, 211-212.  Cf. 
Commonwealth v. Bois, 476 Mass. 15, 34 (2016) (five references 
to defendant as "monster[] that come[s] out at night" in closing 
was error). 
"Having determined that there was error, we consider, in 
the context of the arguments and the case as a whole, whether 
the [unobjected to] improper statement[s] . . . created a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice" (quotations 
and citation omitted).  Cheng Sun, 490 Mass. at 212.  The 
defendant relies heavily on Commonwealth v. Niemic, 472 Mass. 
665 (2015) (Niemic I), and Commonwealth v. Niemic, 483 Mass. 571 
(2019) (Niemic II), in support of his position that the 
17 
 
prosecutor's appeals to sympathy and emotion created a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  Admittedly, 
in both Niemic I and Niemic II, we scrutinized similar appeals 
to sympathy in the context of the prosecutor's closing argument.9  
In Niemic I, we explained that "[w]e [had] serious concerns 
about the effect of the improprieties in the prosecutor's 
closing argument on the jury's deliberations."  Niemic I, supra 
at 677.  And in Niemic II, we explained that the prosecutor's 
improper comments in closing argument "went to the very heart of 
the case . . . [,] struck impermissibly . . . at the defendant's 
sole defense, and sought to impeach his only witnesses."  Niemic 
II, supra at 598.  While both Niemic cases are instructive, they 
are also distinguishable. 
Most notably, reversal in the Niemic cases was not based 
solely on the prosecutor's improper appeals to sympathy.  In 
Niemic I, we addressed concerns with the prosecutor's closing 
argument but did not decide whether the errors "created a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice."  Niemic I, 
472 Mass. at 677.  Rather, we concluded that defense counsel's 
 
9 We recognize that Niemic II referenced improper appeals to 
sympathy in the prosecutor's opening statement.  See Niemic II, 
483 Mass. at 587 n.29, 590 & n.31.  And while we categorized 
some of the language used in the prosecutor's opening as "highly 
improper, emotionally charged discussion," id. at 590 n.31, 
quoting Niemic I, 472 Mass. at 675, we did not determine whether 
the appeals to sympathy in the opening statement alone created a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
18 
 
failure to request a reasonable provocation instruction "in 
combination with the errors in the prosecutor's closing 
argument[] require[d] a new trial."  Id.  In Niemic II, our 
conclusion that the closing argument constituted reversible 
error was based on "the confluence of the asserted errors in 
closing," including improper appeals to sympathy and the misuse 
of evidence admitted for a limited purpose.  Niemic II, 483 
Mass. at 596. 
Here, the prosecutor's repeated references to the impact of 
the shooting on the family's final memories of the victim were 
improper, but the other claims of error raised by the defendant, 
and discussed in detail infra, were isolated and less 
consequential than the numerous significant errors that 
contributed to our conclusions in Niemic I and Niemic II.  To 
the extent that we indicated reversal was warranted solely on 
the prosecutor's improper appeals to sympathy in Niemic II, it 
is significant that defense counsel in Niemic II objected to the 
prosecutor's appeals to sympathy.  See Niemic II, 483 Mass. at 
596, 598-599.  By contrast, here, no objection was lodged to the 
Commonwealth's opening statement or to the closing argument.  
Therefore, the appeals to sympathy at issue in Niemic II were 
reviewed under a standard that is more favorable to the 
defendant than our standard of review in this case.  See 
Commonwealth v. Murphy, 442 Mass. 485, 508-509 (2004) (where 
19 
 
defendant objects, he or she receives more favorable standard of 
review of prejudicial error rather than review for substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice).  See also Commonwealth 
v. Burgos, 470 Mass. 133, 143 n.8 (2014) (describing substantial 
likelihood of miscarriage of justice as less favorable to 
defendant than prejudicial error); Commonwealth v. Linton, 456 
Mass. 534, 560 n.19 (2010), S.C., 483 Mass. 227 (2019) 
(prejudicial error is "standard more generous to a defendant 
than the substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice 
standard"). 
Additionally, unlike in Niemic II, where the prosecutor's 
improper comments in closing argument "went to the very heart of 
the case . . . [,] struck impermissibly . . . at the defendant's 
sole defense, and sought to impeach his only witnesses," Niemic 
II, 483 Mass. at 598, here the defendant's defense was one of 
identity.  And while the prosecutor's repeated references to the 
impact of the crime on the victim's family were improper, those 
statements did not go to the heart of the case or strike 
impermissibly at the defendant's defense that he was not the 
shooter.  Indeed, the improper comments were unrelated to any 
contested issue at trial.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Lutskov, 480 
Mass. 575, 581 (2018), quoting Commonwealth v. Gabbidon, 398 
Mass. 1, 5 (1986) (in context of erroneous jury instructions, 
"no harm accrues to a defendant if an error does not relate to 
20 
 
an issue actively contested at trial"); Commonwealth v. Rogers, 
459 Mass. 249, 266, cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1080 (2011) (no 
prejudicial error where erroneous testimony by substitute 
medical examiner was not relevant to any contested issue). 
In addition to being distinguishable from the Niemic cases, 
other aspects of the trial bolster our conclusion that the 
prosecutor's appeals to sympathy did not create a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  Those reasons include 
the trial judge's instructions to the jury and the lack of 
objection from defense counsel. 
The first reason is grounded in the trial judge's role in 
guiding the jury during the trial and providing them with 
instructions.  "The parties are entitled to have a jury 
appropriately guided at all stages by the trial judge, whose 
proper participation is essential to fair trial by jury."  
Commonwealth v. Rollins, 354 Mass. 630, 638 (1968).  "It is the 
judge's function to act as the 'guiding spirit and controlling 
mind at a trial'" (citation omitted).10  Commonwealth v. Rivera, 
441 Mass. 358, 368 (2004). 
 
10 Former Supreme Judicial Court Justice Henry T. Lummus, 
"whose treatise all trial judges would be well advised to study 
. . . described the responsibility of the trial judge at trial" 
as follows:  "The judge who discharges the functions of his 
office [is] . . . the directing and controlling mind at the 
trial, and not a mere functionary to preserve order, and lend 
ceremonial dignity to the proceedings."  Agnes, Guided 
Discretion in Massachusetts Evidence Law:  Standards for the 
21 
 
During jury empanelment, the judge specifically discussed 
the importance of the legal presumption of the defendant's 
innocence with the venire and explained that the presumption 
cannot "be discarded or disposed of . . . by caprice, passion or 
prejudice."  Additionally, both before the opening statements 
and before jury deliberations, the judge gave the jury detailed 
instructions on opening statements.  He instructed before 
opening statements that "opening statements are not evidence," 
and instructed after closing arguments that "[t]he opening 
statements and the closing arguments of the attorneys are not a 
substitute for the evidence" but are meant "only . . . to assist 
[the jury] in understanding the evidence."  Also, before the 
opening statements, he outlined what was permissible evidence 
and stated that if the jury "try the issues without fear or 
prejudice, or bias or sympathy, [it] will arrive at a true and 
just verdict."  He likewise instructed on permissible evidence 
in the final charge and stated: 
"You should determine the facts based solely on a fair 
consideration of the evidence.  You are to be completely 
fair and impartial.  You are not to be swayed by prejudice, 
by sympathy, or any personal likes or dislikes towards 
either side."11 
 
Admissibility of Prior Bad Acts against the Defendant, 13 
Suffolk J. Trial & App. Advoc. 1, 5 n.18 (2008), quoting H.T. 
Lummus, The Trial Judge 19 (1937).  See Whitney v. Wellesley & 
Boston St. Ry., 197 Mass. 495, 502 (1908). 
 
11 That defense counsel critiqued the Commonwealth's appeal 
to sympathy in his closing argument serves to further mitigate 
22 
 
 
Because there was no objection from defense counsel, these 
instructions were not tailored specifically to correct the 
prosecutor's appeals to sympathy.  However, even standard 
instructions, such as those given in this case, contribute to 
mitigating the harm created by improper appeals to sympathy.  
See Commonwealth v. Gonzales, 465 Mass. 672, 680-681 (2013) 
("Both before the opening statements and after the closing 
arguments of counsel, the judge instructed the jury that opening 
statements . . . are not evidence. . . .  The jury are presumed 
to follow [the] instructions").  Contrast Commonwealth v. 
Santiago, 425 Mass. 491, 501 (1997), S.C., 427 Mass. 298 and 428 
Mass. 39, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1003 (1998) (instruction not 
sufficient to remedy prosecutor's error where judge failed to 
mention sympathy).  On this record, the judge fulfilled his role 
as the "directing and controlling mind at the trial," see 
Whitney v. Wellesley & Boston St. Ry., 197 Mass. 495, 502 
(1908), and in doing so his numerous instructions helped to 
mitigate the effect of the prosecutor's repeated references to 
the impact of the crime on the victim's family. 
 
any prejudice created by the opening, because to the extent that 
it reminded the jurors of the error, it likewise reminded them 
that appeals to sympathy are improper.  The improper nature of 
the prosecutor's repeated references to the impact of the crime 
on the victim's family was reinforced shortly thereafter by the 
judge's explicit instruction that the case was not to be decided 
on prejudice or sympathy. 
23 
 
Second, in addition to the judge's instructions, which the 
jury are presumed to follow, see Commonwealth v. Roy, 464 Mass. 
818, 829 (2013), the lack of an objection from defense counsel 
regarding the opening statement provides "some indication that 
the tone, manner, and substance of the now challenged aspect[] 
of the [prosecutor's opening] [was] not unfairly prejudicial."  
Commonwealth v. Moore, 489 Mass. 735, 754 (2022), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Maynard, 436 Mass. 558, 570 (2002). 
Ultimately, we conclude that "although portions of the 
prosecutor's opening statement . . . were improper, when 
considered in the context of the whole case, the errors did not 
create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice."  
Cheng Sun, 490 Mass. at 213. 
 
ii.  Misstating anticipated evidence.  The defendant next 
takes issue with the prosecutor's description of GPS data and 
its accuracy, specifically, the prosecutor's statement that the 
GPS evidence would be "so specific and so accurate, it's going 
to show . . . that this defendant was facing in, looking in the 
hallway, from outside Lawrence [Street].  We are going to put 
the defendant right there." 
"A prosecutor's opening statement may reference anything 
that he or she reasonably believes in good faith will be proved 
by evidence introduced during the course of the trial."  
Commonwealth v. Copeland, 481 Mass. 255, 261 n.5 (2019), quoting 
24 
 
Commonwealth v. DePina, 476 Mass. 614, 627 (2017).  "Absent a 
showing of bad faith or prejudice . . . the fact that certain 
evidence fails to materialize is not a ground for reversal" 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Sylvia, 456 Mass. 182, 188 
(2010). 
 
We agree with the defendant that the statement at issue 
misstated the accuracy of GPS data and that the prosecutor 
reasonably should have known as much.  Against the backdrop of 
the entire case, however, we conclude that this error did not 
create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
Here, the GPS evidence did put the defendant at the scene 
of the shooting.  While not presented by means of GPS data, 
there also was evidence that put the shooter in the Lawrence 
Street hallway, specifically eyewitnesses.  Additionally, the 
statement suggesting that the GPS data would place the defendant 
"looking in the hallway," although erroneous, was made once in 
the opening statement and was not repeated during closing 
argument.  Moreover, as noted supra, the judge properly 
instructed the jury twice that opening statements are not 
evidence, and we presume the jury follow these instructions.  
See Commonwealth v. Salazar, 481 Mass. 105, 118 (2018).  See 
also Cheng Sun, 490 Mass. at 213 ("the judge's instructions 
[that the jury determine evidence and what conclusions to draw] 
25 
 
were sufficient to mitigate the impact of the prosecutor's 
improper statements"). 
Admittedly, the GPS data was an important piece of the 
Commonwealth's case, but our conclusion that there was no 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice is further 
buttressed by the lack of an objection from defense counsel and 
by the strength of the GPS evidence that was permissibly 
admitted and argued.  Cf. Davis, 487 Mass. at 463-464 (GPS 
evidence establishing defendant's location and speed "helped to 
establish his identity as the shooter by matching his movements 
to those of . . . the shooter"); Commonwealth v. Holley, 476 
Mass. 114, 127 (2016) ("The lack of objection to this statement, 
the judge's earlier charge explaining that opening statements 
are not evidence, and the detailed expert testimony on random 
match statistics made the prosecutor's imprecise phrasing of the 
random match probability relatively inconsequential in the 
context of the entire trial"); Commonwealth v. Lally, 473 Mass. 
693, 705-708 (2016) (prosecutor's assertion in opening statement 
regarding deoxyribonucleic acid [DNA] evidence was inconsistent 
with DNA evidence elicited at trial; reversal not required where 
"trial counsel did not object, the judge's instructions 
mitigated the errors, and the comments were not likely to 
influence the jury's conclusion where . . . [the] case did not 
hinge on the DNA evidence" [citation omitted]).  See 
26 
 
Commonwealth v. Toro, 395 Mass. 354, 360 (1985); Commonwealth v. 
Oliveira, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 49, 56 (2009), citing Toro, supra. 
b.  Closing argument.  The defendant also argues that 
several reversible errors occurred during the prosecutor's 
closing argument.  The defendant contends that the prosecutor 
improperly vouched for McNicholas's credibility and improperly 
attributed a statement to the defendant.  "We examine [all] the 
challenged statements 'in the context of the entire closing, the 
jury instructions, and the evidence introduced at trial.'"  
Cheng Sun, 490 Mass. at 217, quoting Commonwealth v. Wilkerson, 
486 Mass. 159, 180 (2020).  Where there was no objection to the 
prosecutor's closing argument, we review the challenged 
statements for error and, if they constitute error, for a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Commonwealth v. Fernandes, 478 Mass. 725, 742 (2018). 
 
i.  Vouching.  "It is improper for an attorney to vouch for 
a witness's credibility."  Cheng Sun, 490 Mass. at 219.  
"However, it is permissible to comment and draw inferences 
regarding the evidence at trial" (citation omitted).  Id.  
Improper vouching need not be explicit; it "includes suggestions 
that the prosecutor has personal knowledge of the veracity of a 
witness's testimony or knowledge about the case independent of 
the evidence before the jury."  Commonwealth v. Silvelo, 486 
Mass. 13, 20 (2020).  And "[w]hile a prosecutor may not vouch 
27 
 
for the truthfulness of a witness's testimony, . . . where the 
credibility of a witness is an issue, counsel may 'argue from 
the evidence why a witness should be believed'" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Brewer, 472 Mass. 307, 315 (2015).  
Indeed, "an advocate can 'provide the jury with the reasons why 
they should find a witness's observations to be accurate, but 
she cannot tell the jury that the witness speaks the truth'" 
(citation omitted).  Gonsalves, 488 Mass. at 841. 
 
In the statement the defendant challenges, the prosecutor 
asserted: 
"Counsel wants you to believe that the police threatened 
[McNicholas], scared him, and drew guns at him.  But I ask 
you again, does that make sense?  According to the 
defense's theory, the police threaten him the first time 
they meet him.  And they coerced him into saying that the 
defendant said:  I killed him.  They convinced him to say 
that.  Then he comes here to testify before the grand jury 
and he decides:  Oh, I'm not so scared anymore.  And 
changes his story, then goes through all of that again and 
having the police threaten him and intimidate him again.  
Would someone who has anxiety, just keep having the police 
harass him and beat him into submission of what they want 
to hear?  Or would he just stick to the story if that's 
really what happened. 
 
"How about his friend of at least ten years, confessed to 
murder to him, to somebody who has anxiety and bipolar and 
PTSD?  I would suggest that would be rather traumatic." 
 
 
As an initial matter, defense counsel put McNicholas's 
credibility at issue both during cross-examination and closing 
argument.  Defense counsel's cross-examination of McNicholas 
included questions about inconsistencies in McNicholas's 
28 
 
statements, his marijuana use, his mental health conditions, the 
medications he was taking, and alleged threats by police.  
During closing argument, defense counsel dedicated a significant 
portion of his time to discrediting McNicholas on those bases.  
In fact, he emphatically told the jury multiple times, "Don't 
believe McNicholas" and "McNicholas epitomizes the witness [the 
jury] should not believe." 
 
"We have often stated that defense counsel's trial tactics 
are not immune from comment in a prosecutor's closing argument 
provided the comment is based on evidence heard by the jury."  
Commonwealth v. Cohen, 412 Mass. 375, 388 (1992).  "Because 
defense counsel had placed [McNicholas's] credibility at issue 
both during his cross-examination of [him] and in his closing 
argument, the prosecutor was entitled to respond within the 
limits of the evidence and to provide the jury with reasons for 
believing [him]."  Gonsalves, 488 Mass. at 842, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Sanders, 451 Mass. 290, 297 (2008).  "[T]he 
prosecutor's statements that the jury should find [McNicholas] 
credible were made in the context of the defendant's vehement 
attack on [McNicholas's] credibility during his own closing 
argument."  Commonwealth v. Kebreau, 454 Mass. 287, 304 (2009).  
On this record, the prosecutor was not impermissibly injecting 
outside knowledge regarding McNicholas's mental health; rather, 
she was critiquing the inferences articulated in defense 
29 
 
counsel's closing and suggesting an alternate competing basis 
for McNicholas's inconsistencies and why his testimony should be 
believed.  See Cohen, supra at 384 ("If he speaks with propriety 
on matters on the record before the jury, a prosecutor may 
properly comment on the trial tactics of the defence and on 
evidence developed or promised by the defence").  See also 
Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 428 Mass. 852, 857 (1999) 
(prosecutor's use of phrase "I suggest," viewed squarely in 
proper context, did not imply prosecutor had personal knowledge 
or was stating personal belief). 
 
"In sum, we conclude that the prosecutor's remarks at issue 
did not vouch for [McNicholas's] credibility by stating or 
implying that the government has special knowledge by which it 
can verify [McNicholas's] testimony" (quotation and citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Grier, 490 Mass. 455, 471 (2022).  
See Kebreau, 454 Mass. at 304-305 (no vouching where defense 
counsel made extensive statements concerning witness's lack of 
credibility, including calling witness "liar" and arguing 
witness "twisted," "turned," and "sp[un]" events; "prosecutor 
was entitled to respond to these statements with a forceful 
argument, based on the evidence and the jury's common sense 
understanding of the events").  "Last, the judge's careful and 
clear instructions concerning the role of the closing arguments 
and how to determine the credibility of witnesses adequately 
30 
 
offset any semblance of impropriety, were we to determine that 
one occurred."12  Brewer, 472 Mass. at 315. 
 
ii.  Statement not in evidence.  The defendant next 
contends that the prosecutor made a misstatement of evidence 
during her closing when she stated, "in the defendant's own 
words, he executed [the victim]."  "Although 'counsel may argue 
the evidence and the fair inferences which can be drawn from the 
evidence,' . . . 'a prosecutor should not . . . misstate the 
evidence or refer to facts not in evidence'" (citations 
omitted).  Cheng Sun, 490 Mass. at 221.  Such arguments are 
improper.  Id.  "References to facts not in the record or 
misstatements of the evidence have been treated as serious 
errors where the misstatement may have prejudiced the defendant" 
(citation omitted).  Id. 
Here, there can be no doubt that the statement attributed 
to the defendant was that he "killed" the victim, not that he 
"executed" the victim.  As such, the prosecutor misstated the 
evidence.  Because the prosecutor's statement was improper, "we 
 
12 The defendant also claims the prosecutor's statement in 
closing argument that defense "[c]ounsel wants you to believe 
that the police . . . drew guns at [McNicholas]" was not 
supported by the evidence.  We disagree.  The prosecutor's 
statement was a fair response to defense counsel's trial 
strategy.  See Henley, 488 Mass. at 131 ("A prosecutor [is] 
permitted to comment on the defense strategy and tactics, and 
even to argue that the strategy was intended to confuse" 
[quotations and citation omitted]). 
31 
 
are guided by the following factors when deciding whether" the 
error created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice:  "[(1)] whether defense counsel seasonably objected to 
the arguments at trial . . . [(2)] whether the judge's 
instructions mitigated the error . . . [(3)] whether the errors 
in the arguments went to the heart of the issues at trial or 
concerned collateral matters . . . [(4)] whether the jury would 
be able to sort out the excessive claims made by the prosecutor 
. . . and [(5)] whether the Commonwealth's case was so 
overwhelming that the errors did not prejudice the defendant" 
(quotations and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Teixeira, 
486 Mass. 617, 635 (2021).13 
 
13 These factors are a nonexclusive list of considerations 
for evaluating an error created during closing arguments and its 
impact on the case.  We have considered these same factors in 
cases involving various standards of review.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Harris, 443 Mass. 714, 732-733 (2005) 
(substantial risk of miscarriage of justice); Maynard, 436 Mass. 
at 570 (substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice); 
Santiago, 425 Mass. at 500 (prejudicial error).  Moreover, the 
exact words used to outline the factors have not been the same 
in every case dealing with an error in closing argument.  See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Rutherford, 476 Mass. 639, 647 (2017).  We 
take this opportunity to clarify that the factors, irrespective 
of the specific language used, are merely a list that may be 
considered in all cases where errors occur in closing argument, 
regardless of the applicable standard of review.  While the 
factors remain relevant considerations, no one factor is 
dispositive and the reviewing court's ultimate focus must be on 
the harm created by a purported error through the lens of the 
appropriate standard of review. 
32 
 
While the prosecutor's statement was improper, we conclude 
that it did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage 
of justice.  Given the manner in which the victim was killed, 
the prosecutor permissibly could have described the killing as 
an execution;14 she just could not attribute the word "executed" 
to the defendant.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Camacho, 472 Mass. 
587, 589-590, 608-609 (2015) (shooting permissibly could be 
labeled execution where defendant fired gun at victim's group 
inside club, chased group out of club, and shot victim two more 
times in back while he lay on floor).  Here, the statement 
misattributing the word "executed" to the defendant happened 
only once in the prosecutor's thirteen-page closing argument.  
Additionally, defense counsel did not object, see Maynard, 436 
Mass. at 570, and the judge instructed the jury that closing 
arguments are not evidence and that, to the extent an attorney's 
statement conflicts with their memory, it is the jury's memory 
that controls.  See Salazar, 481 Mass. at 118 (where judge 
properly instructed jury that closing arguments were not 
evidence, brief isolated statement was "not egregious enough to 
infect the whole of the trial").  Furthermore, "[w]e ascribe a 
certain level of sophistication to the jury, and, [on this 
record], have little doubt that they would not have been swayed 
 
14 We note that defense counsel explicitly stated that the 
victim had been executed twice in his closing argument. 
33 
 
by this [misstatement]" (quotation and citation omitted).  
Wilkerson, 486 Mass. at 181.15 
 
3.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  "The defendant has 
asked us to reduce the verdict in consideration of the fact that 
he was [nineteen] years old at the time of the shooting."  
Commonwealth v. Gamboa, 490 Mass. 294, 311 n.13 (2022).  Put 
differently, "the defendant asks us to consider his youth and 
immaturity in mitigation of his sentence."  Commonwealth v. 
Denson, 489 Mass. 138, 154 (2022).  "However, we have never held 
that a defendant over the age of eighteen could not be convicted 
of murder in the first degree," Gamboa, supra, "and there is 
nothing in the record that indicates a reduction in the verdict 
on this basis is warranted."  Denson, supra.  Having reviewed 
the entire record, pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we discern 
no basis to set aside or reduce the verdict or to order a new 
trial. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
15 "The defendant [also] argues that his conviction requires 
reversal because of the cumulative effect of the errors at 
trial.  Given our conclusions, there was no risk that any error 
requires reversal."  Commonwealth v. Roy, 464 Mass. 818, 836 
(2013).  Here, "the cumulative [effect of the] errors . . . were 
no more prejudicial than any individual errors, which had 
minimal impact, if any."  Commonwealth v. Duran, 435 Mass. 97, 
107 (2001).