Title: Braddy v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC15-404, SC16-481
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: June 15, 2017

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC15-404 
____________ 
 
HARREL FRANKLIN BRADDY,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC16-481 
____________ 
 
HARREL FRANKLIN BRADDY,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
JULIE L. JONES, etc.,  
Respondent. 
 
[June 15, 2017] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Harrel Franklin Braddy, an inmate under sentence of death, appeals an order 
of the circuit court denying his motion for postconviction relief filed under Florida 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  Braddy also petitions this Court for a writ of 
 
 
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habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  For the 
reasons that follow, we affirm the postconviction court’s denial of relief for a new 
guilt phase but grant Braddy a new penalty phase based on the United States 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Hurst v. Florida (Hurst v. Florida), 136 S. Ct. 616 
(2016), and this Court’s opinion on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So. 3d 40 
(Fla. 2016), cert. denied, No. 16-998, 2017 WL 635999 (U.S. May 22, 2017). 
I.  BACKGROUND 
In 2007, Braddy was convicted of first-degree murder, attempted first-degree 
murder, two counts of kidnapping, burglary of a structure with an assault or battery 
therein, child neglect causing great bodily harm, and attempted escape.  Braddy v. 
State, 111 So. 3d 810, 826 (Fla. 2012).  On appeal, this Court set out the facts of 
the crimes: 
The evidence presented at Braddy’s trial revealed the following 
facts.  Shandelle Maycock, mother to then five-year-old Quatisha, 
testified that she first met Braddy and his wife Cyteria through a 
mutual friend from church.  Shortly after their initial meeting, Braddy 
began showing up at Shandelle’s home alone, unannounced, and 
uninvited, staying for short periods of time with no apparent purpose.  
Shandelle testified that she initially thought of Braddy as a “nice 
person” and would occasionally ask him for small favors.  Braddy 
once inappropriately placed his hand between Shandelle’s legs, but 
when Shandelle became angry and threatened Braddy with a knife, 
Braddy left her apartment and later apologized for his actions.  
Shandelle testified that Braddy never again made a sexual advance 
toward her. 
On Friday, November 6, 1998, Braddy picked Shandelle up 
from work and drove her home.  After Braddy left Shandelle’s 
apartment at approximately 5:30 p.m., Shandelle began to call around 
 
 
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looking for a ride to pick up Quatisha, who was being watched by a 
family member.  Shandelle had not found a ride by approximately 10 
p.m., at which time Braddy returned to her apartment in a gold 
Lincoln Town Car that he had rented earlier in the day.  Braddy told 
Shandelle that they needed to talk but agreed to first drive Shandelle 
to pick up Quatisha.  After picking up Quatisha and returning to 
Shandelle’s apartment, Braddy again stated that he needed to talk to 
Shandelle.  Shandelle agreed, but before Braddy could talk to 
Shandelle, the phone rang.  Shandelle answered the phone, had a brief 
conversation, and, after hanging up, told Braddy that he needed to 
leave because she was expecting company.  Shandelle testified that 
this statement had been a lie—she had not been expecting company 
but simply wanted Braddy to leave because it was late and she was 
tired.  Upon being told to leave, Braddy immediately attacked 
Shandelle, threatening to kill her and choking her until she lost 
consciousness.  Shandelle testified that when she regained 
consciousness, she was still in her apartment but Braddy again choked 
her until she passed out. 
Shandelle’s landlord, who occupied the house to which 
Shandelle’s apartment was attached, testified that he heard shouting 
coming from Shandelle’s apartment shortly before midnight.  When 
he looked outside a short time later, the landlord saw Braddy standing 
at the driver-side door of the Town Car and Quatisha standing by the 
passenger-side door.  He did not see Shandelle. 
Shandelle testified that when she awoke for the second time, 
she was in the back seat of a large car parked in her driveway.  
Quatisha was in the front passenger seat, and Braddy was in the 
driver’s seat.  As Braddy began to drive, Shandelle told Quatisha that 
they were going to jump out of the car.  Braddy warned Shandelle not 
to jump, but Shandelle nevertheless pulled Quatisha into the backseat 
and opened the door.  When Braddy saw that they were about to jump, 
he accelerated and turned a corner, causing Shandelle and Quatisha to 
fall out of the car. 
Braddy stopped the car, helped Quatisha back into the car, and 
put Shandelle in the trunk.  Shandelle testified that she remained in 
the trunk for thirty to forty-five minutes while Braddy continued to 
drive, after which time the car stopped and Braddy opened the trunk.  
Braddy pulled Shandelle out of the trunk, threw her to the ground, and 
again choked her until she lost consciousness, all the while 
threatening to kill her and accusing her of using him.  When Shandelle 
 
 
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woke up, it was daylight and she was lying in a remote area 
surrounded by foliage.  Shandelle walked to the road and flagged 
down passing motorists, who called the police. 
Between 1:30 and 2:30 a.m. on Saturday, November 7, Braddy 
returned home in the Town Car.  Cyteria testified that she was 
awakened when Braddy came home and, when she went to the door to 
meet him, saw Braddy wiping down the interior of the Town Car with 
a cloth.  Cyteria also testified that the washing machine was running 
and that when she looked inside the machine, she saw the clothes 
Braddy had been wearing earlier that night. 
On November 7, police spoke to Shandelle at Glades Hospital, 
where she had been taken for treatment after being found on the side 
of the road that morning.  Shandelle gave police her statement, along 
with the names and descriptions of Braddy and Quatisha.  Detectives 
Giancarlo Milito and Juan Murias went to Braddy’s home to 
determine Quatisha’s whereabouts.  Shortly after the detectives 
arrived at Braddy’s house, they observed him exit the house and drive 
away in the Town Car.  The detectives followed Braddy to a gas 
station and approached him as he was pumping gas.  When the 
detectives first asked Braddy about Quatisha, Braddy appeared calm 
and denied any knowledge of the situation.  However, when the 
detectives informed Braddy that Shandelle was alive and had 
implicated him in Quatisha’s disappearance, Braddy turned pale, 
began to sweat, shake, and cry, and claimed to feel faint.  Detective 
Milito testified that at this point, although Braddy was not under 
arrest, he placed Braddy in handcuffs for everyone’s safety because of 
“the history that I had of him.” 
The detectives took Braddy to the Miami-Dade County Police 
Department and sent the Town Car to be processed.  Detectives Otis 
Chambers and Fernando Suco began to question Braddy at 
approximately 9 p.m. on Saturday, November 7.  When the detectives 
asked Braddy if he would consent to giving DNA samples, Braddy 
stated that he knew his rights and wished to be read his rights.  
Detective Suco, the lead investigator in the case, explained Braddy’s 
rights to him pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461 
(1966), through the use of a standard Miranda form, which Braddy 
signed and initialed appropriately.  After Braddy indicated that he 
understood and waived his rights, Detective Suco obtained Braddy’s 
consent to take specimens for DNA samples and to search Braddy’s 
home and the Town Car.  However, because Braddy hesitated before 
 
 
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signing the last consent form, Suco also obtained search warrants for 
Braddy’s house and the Town Car. 
Pursuant to both Braddy’s consent to search and the search 
warrant, police searched the Town Car on Sunday, November 8.  
After being only partially processed, however, the Town Car was 
mistakenly released back to the rental agency, where it remained for 
approximately a day.  Police were able to recover the Town Car 
before it had been cleaned by the rental agency, and pursuant to a 
second search warrant signed on November 10, investigators removed 
the trunk liner for DNA testing.  Shandelle’s blood was found on the 
liner. 
Meanwhile, Braddy’s interview continued early into the 
morning of November 8.  Although Braddy spoke to the detectives—
becoming visibly agitated when talking about Shandelle—he divulged 
no information about Quatisha’s whereabouts.  Feeling that they were 
not making any progress, the detectives took a break from the 
interview just before midnight on November 7.  During the break, 
Detective Suco prepared Braddy’s arrest form and conferred with 
other detectives who were gathering information on the case.  Having 
determined that Braddy was lying to them, based on information 
received from other detectives, the detectives reinitiated the interview 
at approximately 1:15 a.m. on November 8 and confronted Braddy 
about lying.  Braddy responded by saying, “I can’t tell you.  Even if 
I’m found innocent, my family will not talk to me again.”  The 
detectives continued to question Braddy, but although there was some 
interaction, Braddy refused to answer questions about Quatisha and 
mostly “just sat there or . . . would put his head down.” 
At approximately 3 a.m. on November 8, Braddy asked to talk 
to Detective Chambers alone.  The detectives complied, but after 
fifteen to twenty minutes of useless conversation, Detective Chambers 
brought Detective Suco back into the room.  Shortly thereafter, both 
detectives escorted Braddy to the bathroom, which he had asked to 
use.  While walking through the homicide office to and from the 
bathroom, Braddy appeared to be “looking around” and “seeing where 
he was at.”  After returning from the bathroom, the detectives again 
left Braddy in the interview room while the detectives compared 
information with other investigators.  The detectives resumed the 
interview at approximately 3:55 a.m. and again confronted Braddy 
with evidence that contradicted what Braddy had been telling them.  
For the next two hours, Braddy responded to questions but refused to 
 
 
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talk about Quatisha’s whereabouts.  At around 6:15 a.m. on 
November 8, in an attempt to evoke an emotional response and elicit 
information, the detectives lied and told Braddy that his mother had 
suffered a heart attack.  Although Braddy became visibly upset at this 
information, he did not divulge any information about Quatisha. 
Finally, at around 8 a.m. on November 8, Braddy told the 
detectives that he had left Quatisha in the same area where he had left 
Shandelle.  Braddy then stated that he was tired of talking to the 
detectives and said that if they did not believe his story, they could 
take him to jail.  At this point, the detectives stopped the interview, 
relayed Braddy’s confession to their supervisor, and went to breakfast. 
The detectives returned to the interview room at approximately 11:30 
a.m. with breakfast for Braddy.  When Detective Suco walked into the 
interview room, Braddy was standing on a chair in the corner of the 
room with his shoes off.  Braddy immediately jumped to the ground 
and, before Detective Suco could speak, said “I’ll take you to where I 
left her.” 
The detectives drove Braddy north from Miami-Dade County 
on U.S. Highway 27, through Broward County and into Palm Beach 
County, to the site where Shandelle had been found, a scene which 
was already teeming with authorities.  At Braddy’s direction, the 
detectives drove along the dirt roads and through the fields off the 
highway for approximately three hours, with other detectives 
following, but found no trace of Quatisha.  At approximately 2:30 
p.m., after detectives had been led on a vain search by Braddy for 
several hours, Detective Greg Smith physically pulled Braddy out of 
the car and pinned Braddy against the side of the car by placing his 
forearm across Braddy’s throat.  Detective Smith held Braddy in this 
position for approximately fifteen seconds, demanding to know where 
Braddy had left Quatisha.  Braddy gave no response—either verbal or 
physical—to Detective Smith’s use of force and emotional plea.  
Having received no information despite his use of force, Detective 
Smith, along with Braddy and several other detectives, resumed the 
search for Quatisha on foot.  During the foot search, Detective Smith 
engaged Braddy in a general conversation regarding his family and 
hobbies.  At one point, Braddy asked Detective Smith how long it 
would take a body in the water to surface, speculating that although he 
had left Quatisha alive, she might have fallen into the water after he 
left her. 
 
 
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At approximately 4 p.m. on November 8, Braddy admitted to 
Detective Pat Diaz that Quatisha was in fact at a different location.  
Braddy then directed several detectives to a section of Interstate 75 in 
Broward County known as Alligator Alley.  Once at Alligator Alley, 
Braddy told detectives that he had left Quatisha alive on the side of 
the road at a bridge crossing over a canal.  Braddy directed detectives 
to three such bridges—at highway mile markers 28, 30, and 33—but 
could not be sure at which bridge he had left Quatisha.  Braddy gave 
different reasons for having left Quatisha on the side of the road in the 
Everglades in the middle of the night, including that he did so because 
he was angry with Shandelle and because he was worried that 
Quatisha would tell people what he had done to Shandelle.  Braddy 
also admitted that when he left Quatisha, he “knew she would 
probably die” and that when she had not been found by Sunday 
evening, she was probably dead. 
After searching until dark on November 8 and finding no trace 
of Quatisha, detectives escorted Braddy back to the Miami-Dade 
County Police Department.  Detectives took Braddy back to the 
interview room where he had originally been kept—a room that had 
not been touched since Braddy occupied it earlier in the day.  Upon 
entering the room, detectives noticed that a metal ceiling grate in the 
corner of the room—directly above the chair on which Braddy had 
been standing earlier in the day—had been forcibly bent up on both 
ends.  Braddy was taken to a different interview room and again 
questioned by detectives, but Braddy never admitted to killing 
Quatisha.  On the morning of Monday, November 9, two fishermen 
found the body of a child floating in a canal running parallel to 
Alligator Alley, around highway mile marker 34.  The body was 
recovered, taken to the Broward County Medical Examiner’s office, 
and identified as that of Quatisha Maycock. 
Dr. Joshua Perper, the Chief Medical Examiner for Broward 
County, was called to the scene where Quatisha’s body was found.  
He examined the body initially when it was brought out of the canal 
and later performed an autopsy.  Dr. Perper testified that Quatisha’s 
left arm, which was missing when her body was discovered, had been 
bitten off by an alligator after Quatisha had died.  Dr. Perper also 
testified that Quatisha had suffered “brush burn” injuries while she 
was alive, consistent with her having grazed against a hard, flat 
surface, such as falling out of a car and sliding on the road.  
Additionally, Dr. Perper testified that Quatisha had suffered alligator 
 
 
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bites to her torso and head while she was still alive, although he 
concluded that she was probably not conscious at the time she was 
bitten.  Quatisha had also suffered several injuries after she had died 
or while she was very close to death, including more “brush burns” 
and alligator bites, as well as injuries to her lips consistent with fish 
feeding on her corpse.  Dr. Perper concluded that Quatisha’s death 
was primarily caused by blunt force trauma to the left side of her 
head, consistent with her either having fallen from a great distance or 
having been thrown onto a prominent, protruding object, such as the 
jutting rocks along the canal where her body was discovered. 
 
Id. at 822-26 (alteration in original).   
At the penalty phase, the State presented victim impact evidence from three 
relatives or close friends of the victim, including the victim’s mother, Shandelle.  
The State also presented evidence of Braddy’s prior criminal history, including the 
following 1984 crimes: (1) the judgment and sentence from Braddy’s attempted 
first-degree murder, robbery, and kidnapping of Corrections Officer Jose 
Bermudez, as well as of Braddy’s ensuing escape; (2) the arrest affidavit and plea 
colloquy from Braddy’s convictions for armed burglary, robbery, and kidnapping 
related to his crimes against Joseph and Lorrain Cole; and (3) the judgment and 
sentence from Braddy’s burglary, robbery, and kidnapping of Griffin Davis.  The 
defense presented expert testimony regarding Braddy’s ability to adjust to prison 
life.  The defense also presented testimony from Braddy’s family and a close friend 
to establish that Braddy was a good husband and father and that his death would be 
hard on the family.  Id. at 826-27. 
 
 
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The jury recommended the death penalty by a vote of eleven to one, and 
after a Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993), hearing, the trial court 
sentenced Braddy to death.  The trial court found and gave great weight to five 
aggravating factors: (1) the victim of the capital felony was a person less than 
twelve years of age; (2) the capital felony was committed while Braddy was 
engaged in the commission of a felony crime, namely: kidnapping; (3) the capital 
felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or 
effecting an escape from custody; (4) the capital felony was a homicide and was 
committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of 
moral or legal justification (CCP); and (5) Braddy was previously convicted of 
another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to 
another person.  The trial court also considered but gave no weight to the fact that 
the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC).  Braddy 
waived all mitigating factors, with the exception of nonstatutory mitigation.  
Braddy listed a total of sixty-seven nonstatutory mitigating factors in his 
sentencing memorandum, which the trial court then grouped into nine categories 
by topic.  The trial court gave little or moderate weight to eight of the categories: 
(1) Braddy had adjusted well to prolonged confinement in his previous 
incarcerations and might possibly be rehabilitated—little weight; (2) the sentence 
of life imprisonment was available to the court—little weight; (3) Braddy 
 
 
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conducted himself in an appropriate manner at trial—moderate weight; (4) the 
friends in Braddy’s life considered him to be of value—little weight; (5) Braddy’s 
wife and children supported him unconditionally—moderate weight; (6) Braddy’s 
execution would presumably have an extreme impact on his family and friends—
little weight; (7) Braddy’s parents and siblings considered him to be an important 
member of the family and believed that his life could be of value to other members 
of the family—little weight; and (8) Braddy attended church and professed 
dedication to Christian principles and beliefs—little weight.  With respect to the 
remaining category, the trial court considered but gave no weight to the fact that 
Braddy did not sexually molest Quatisha.  Braddy, 111 So. 3d at 827-28. 
Braddy raised thirteen claims on direct appeal: (A) the trial court erred in 
denying Braddy’s motion to suppress evidence obtained in violation of his right to 
remain silent and his right to an attorney; (B) the trial court erred in failing to 
timely rule on and ultimately denying Braddy’s motions to disqualify the trial 
judge; (C) the State failed to establish the venue alleged in the indictment for the 
charges of murder and attempted murder; (D) the trial court erred in admitting into 
evidence the second search warrant for the Town Car and the accompanying 
affidavit; (E) the trial court erred in denying Braddy’s motion for mistrial based on 
Detective Milito’s prejudicial testimony regarding Braddy’s prior criminal history; 
(F) the trial court erred in allowing the State to engage in improper argument 
 
 
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during its guilt phase closing argument; (G) the evidence is legally insufficient to 
support Braddy’s convictions for burglary, child neglect, and attempted escape; 
(H) the trial court erred in allowing the State to engage in improper argument 
during its penalty phase closing argument; (I) the trial court erred in requiring 
Braddy to argue all nonstatutory mitigation as a single mitigating factor; (J) the 
trial court erred in allowing the State to present victim impact evidence that 
Shandelle had contracted Crohn’s disease as a result of the murder; (K) the trial 
court erred in allowing the State to introduce impermissible hearsay evidence to 
prove Braddy’s prior felony convictions; (L) the trial court erred in sentencing 
Braddy to death because Florida’s capital sentencing proceedings are 
unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); and (M) the 
cumulative effect of the above errors deprived Braddy of due process and a reliable 
sentencing proceeding.  Braddy, 111 So. 3d at 828-29.  This Court determined that 
sufficient evidence supported the convictions and denied all of Braddy’s claims.  
Id. at 829-62. 
Capital Collateral Regional Counsel-South (CCRC) was appointed to 
represent Braddy in postconviction proceedings.  On October 2, 2014, Braddy 
timely filed a motion for postconviction relief.  Braddy’s motion asserted: (1) the 
postconviction court’s denial of CCRC’s motion to withdraw violates Braddy’s 
rights to conflict-free counsel, due process, and equal protection; (2) the 
 
 
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postconviction court’s refusal to allow Braddy to represent himself in collateral 
proceedings violates Braddy’s right of self-representation; (3) requiring Braddy to 
file his postconviction motion one year after his conviction became final violates 
Braddy’s rights to due process and equal protection; (4) section 119.19, Florida 
Statutes, and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852 are unconstitutional both 
facially and as applied to Braddy in violation of article I, section 24 of the Florida 
Constitution; (5) Braddy was deprived of his right to a fair and impartial jury; (6) 
Braddy was deprived of his right to a reliable adversarial testing at the guilt phase 
due to ineffective assistance of counsel, the State’s failure to disclose exculpatory 
evidence, and prosecutorial and judicial misconduct; (7) Braddy was denied 
adversarial testing at the penalty phase due to ineffective assistance of counsel 
and/or State misconduct; and (8) Florida’s method of execution by lethal injection 
is unconstitutional. 
On February 19, 2015, the postconviction court entered an order denying 
Braddy’s claims.  State v. Braddy, No. F98-37767 (Fla. 11th Jud. Cir. Feb. 19, 
2015) (Postconviction Order).  On appeal, Braddy argues that: (1) the 
postconviction court’s denial of CCRC’s motion to withdraw and/or failure to hold 
 
 
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Nelson1 hearings on two of Braddy’s pro se motions to discharge CCRC2 violated 
Braddy’s rights to conflict-free counsel, due process, and equal protection; (2) 
section 119.19, Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852 are 
unconstitutional as applied to Braddy in violation of article I, section 24 of the 
Florida Constitution; (3) Braddy was denied adversarial testing at the penalty phase 
due to ineffective assistance of counsel and/or State misconduct; (4) trial counsel 
was ineffective for failing to preserve a challenge to comments made by the 
prosecution during its guilt phase closing argument and penalty phase closing 
argument; (5) Braddy was deprived of his right to a fair and impartial jury; and (6) 
Braddy was deprived of his right to a reliable adversarial testing at the guilt phase 
due to ineffective assistance of counsel, the State’s failure to disclose exculpatory 
evidence, and prosecutorial and judicial misconduct.3  In addition, Braddy filed a 
                                          
 
 
1.  Nelson v. State, 274 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973). 
 
2.  On December 31, 2014, Braddy filed a pro se motion to discharge in this 
Court.  On March 10, 2015, this Court temporarily relinquished jurisdiction for the 
postconviction court to consider Braddy’s pro se motion to discharge, and the 
postconviction court denied it on March 13, 2015.  On March 18, 2015, Braddy 
amended his notice of appeal to include the order denying his pro se motion to 
discharge.  On October 21, 2015, Braddy filed another pro se motion to discharge 
in this Court, which this Court struck as unauthorized. 
 
 
3.  We decline to address, in this postconviction appeal, the order of the 
postconviction court summarily dismissing Braddy’s successive postconviction 
motion on July 24, 2015. 
 
 
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petition for a writ of habeas corpus, asserting that: (1) Braddy is entitled to relief 
under Hurst v. Florida; (2) this Court failed to conduct a proper harmless error 
analysis of errors recognized on direct appeal; and (3) Braddy was deprived of his 
right to a fair and impartial jury.  Because we determine that Braddy is entitled to a 
new penalty phase under Hurst v. Florida and Hurst, we address only Braddy’s 
guilt phase claims and none of the other penalty phase claims. 
II.  MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF 
A.  CCRC’s Motion to Withdraw and Braddy’s  
Pro Se Motions to Discharge 
 
Braddy claims that the postconviction court’s denial of CCRC’s motion to 
withdraw and/or failure to hold Nelson hearings on two of Braddy’s pro se motions 
to discharge CCRC violated his rights to conflict-free counsel, due process, and 
equal protection.  “A court’s decision involving withdrawal or discharge of counsel 
is subject to review for abuse of discretion.”  Weaver v. State, 894 So. 2d 178, 187 
(Fla. 2004).  As explained below, the postconviction court did not err regarding the 
motion to withdraw or the motions to discharge. 
Section 27.703(1), Florida Statutes (2013), “places the responsibility of 
determining whether an actual conflict exists on the [sentencing] court.”  Abdool v. 
Bondi, 141 So. 3d 529, 553 (Fla. 2014) (emphasis added).  The statute provides: 
If, at any time during the representation of a person, the capital 
collateral regional counsel alleges that the continued representation of 
that person creates an actual conflict of interest, the sentencing court 
 
 
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shall, upon determining that an actual conflict exists, designate 
another regional counsel. . . .  An actual conflict of interest exists 
when an attorney actively represents conflicting interests.  A possible, 
speculative, or merely hypothetical conflict is insufficient to support 
an allegation that an actual conflict of interest exists. 
 
§ 27.703(1), Fla. Stat. 
“An actual conflict of interest that adversely affects counsel’s performance 
violates the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.”  McWatters v. 
State, 36 So. 3d 613, 635 (Fla. 2010).  “To prove a claim that an actual conflict of 
interest existed between a defendant and his counsel, the defendant must show that 
his counsel actively represented conflicting interests and that the conflict adversely 
affected counsel’s performance.”  Thompson v. State, 759 So. 2d 650, 661 (Fla. 
2000) (quoting Quince v. State, 732 So. 2d 1059, 1063 (Fla. 1999)); see Cuyler v. 
Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 350 (1980).  “A possible, speculative or merely 
hypothetical conflict is ‘insufficient to impugn a criminal conviction.’ ”  Hunter v. 
State, 817 So. 2d 786, 792 (Fla. 2002) (quoting Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350).  Even 
“[i]f a defendant successfully demonstrates the existence of an actual conflict, the 
defendant must also show that this conflict had an adverse effect upon his lawyer’s 
representation.”  Id.  “[P]rejudice will be presumed only if the conflict has 
significantly affected counsel’s performance—thereby rendering the verdict 
unreliable . . . .”  Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 173 (2002); see State v. 
Larzelere, 979 So. 2d 195, 208 (Fla. 2008) (“Prejudice is presumed where an actual 
 
 
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conflict is shown to have adversely affected a client’s representation.”); State v. 
Coney, 845 So. 2d 120, 133 (Fla. 2003) (“Once a defendant satisfies both prongs 
of the Cuyler test, prejudice is presumed and the defendant is entitled to relief.”). 
On March 7, 2014, CCRC filed a motion to withdraw, claiming a conflict of 
interest: 
Capital Collateral Regional Counsel-South, Neal A. Dupree, 
acting in his capacity as a supervising State Attorney in and for 
Broward County, was a direct supervisor of the prosecutors who 
signed off on Braddy’s guilty plea in Broward County [in 1984].  In 
that case, Mr. Braddy pled guilty to charges of burglary, kidnapping, 
and escape [related to his crimes against Joseph and Lorrain Cole].  
That prior [conviction] was used as an aggravator in the instant case 
ultimately resulting in a judgment of death.  Mr. Braddy has been 
made aware of these circumstances and has informed undersigned 
counsel that it is his wish for CCRC-South to withdraw from further 
representation due to an irreconcilable conflict. 
 
On March 21, 2014, the postconviction court held a hearing on the motion to 
withdraw.  Neil A. Dupree, the appointed CCRC for the South District Region, 
explained at the hearing that he was a felony trial supervisor in Broward County 
from 1983 to 1987.  During that time, Dupree oversaw five felony divisions and 
supervised ten to fifteen attorneys.  In his role as a supervisor, Dupree supervised 
the assistant state attorneys that prosecuted Braddy for his crimes against the 
Coles4 and signed off on the plea agreement in that case.  Dupree’s involvement in 
                                          
 
 
4.  On direct appeal, this Court explained that the trial court found the 
existence of the prior violent felony aggravator—one of five aggravators—based 
 
 
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the prior case was limited to discussing and approving the plea agreement.  Dupree 
stated at the hearing: “I was directly involved in the prosecution of the case” and “I 
do believe that is an actual conflict.”  However, Dupree never suggested that his 
involvement in the prior case would impair his ability to represent Braddy in this 
case.  Dupree also explained at the hearing that he did not even remember 
Braddy’s prior case when it was initially brought to his attention: “Frankly, I didn’t 
realize who Mr. Braddy was, to be honest with you, but when I saw [Braddy’s 
letter referencing the prior case] I went down to the State Attorney[’]s Office and 
had the files pulled out for me and I reviewed the files and everything and I did 
sign off on the plea agreement.” 
Braddy claims that the postconviction court abused its discretion in denying 
CCRC’s motion to withdraw because Dupree had an actual conflict of interest 
based on his role as a supervising attorney in the prior case.  However, even if an 
actual conflict did exist, Braddy has failed to demonstrate that the conflict 
adversely affected Dupree’s representation in postconviction proceedings in this 
case.  See Hunter, 817 So. 2d at 792 (noting that the defendant must satisfy both 
prongs of Cuyler to be entitled to relief).  Braddy claims that “the adverse effect is 
that collateral counsel has not been able to establish a relationship of trust with 
                                          
 
on Braddy’s 1984 crimes against the Coles, Davis, and Bermudez.  Braddy, 111 
So. 3d at 860. 
 
 
- 18 - 
Braddy as a direct result of the conflict.”  However, the Supreme Court has 
“reject[ed] the claim that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a ‘meaningful 
relationship’ between an accused and his counsel.”  Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 
14 (1983); see Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988) (explaining that 
“in evaluating Sixth Amendment claims, ‘the appropriate inquiry focuses on the 
adversarial process, not on the accused’s relationship with his lawyer as such’ ” 
(quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 n.21 (1984))).  As this Court 
has explained, “General loss of confidence or trust standing alone will not support 
withdrawal of counsel.”  Schoenwetter v. State, 931 So. 2d 857, 870 (Fla. 2006).  
Moreover, this record does not demonstrate that “the attorney-client relationship 
had deteriorated to the point where counsel could no longer give effective aid in 
the fair representation of the defense.”  Id.  Braddy asserts that “[i]n the Sixth 
Amendment context, prejudice to a defendant is presumed based on the affirmative 
representation by counsel of a conflict.”  However, that is simply not the case.  
See, e.g., Mickens, 535 U.S. at 173; Larzelere, 979 So. 2d at 208; Coney, 845 So. 
2d at 133.  Although Braddy claims that he “is, at the very least, entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing on his claim that an actual conflict is present,” Braddy did not 
request the opportunity to present any evidence at the hearing held on the motion 
to withdraw.  Instead, he relied on the allegations in the motion and Dupree’s 
statements as an officer of the court.  Braddy thus invited any error regarding the 
 
 
- 19 - 
postconviction court’s failure to hold an evidentiary hearing.  See Pope v. State, 
441 So. 2d 1073, 1076 (Fla. 1983) (“A party may not invite error and then be heard 
to complain of that error on appeal.”). 
Braddy claims that the postconviction court erred in failing to hold Nelson 
hearings on two of Braddy’s pro se motions to discharge filed in this Court on 
December 31, 2014,5 and October 21, 2015.  This claim lacks merit.  “This Court 
has consistently found a Nelson hearing unwarranted where a defendant presents 
general complaints about defense counsel’s trial strategy and no formal allegations 
of incompetence have been made.”  Morrison v. State, 818 So. 2d 432, 440 (Fla. 
2002).  “Similarly, a trial court does not err in failing to conduct a Nelson inquiry 
where the defendant merely expresses dissatisfaction with his attorney.”  Id.  A 
review of the first motion to discharge shows that Braddy’s complaints primarily 
concerned the conflict alleged in CCRC’s motion to withdraw, his counsel’s 
communication with him, and his disagreements with counsel regarding strategic 
decisions.  Moreover, the record reflects that the postconviction court had already 
heard from Braddy regarding his position on the motion to withdraw and his 
                                          
 
 
5.  In his appellate briefs, Braddy refers to a pro se motion to discharge 
purportedly filed by Braddy in this Court on March 3, 2015.  However, the docket 
in this case contains no such motion.  We therefore conclude that Braddy is 
actually referring to the pro se motion to discharge filed by Braddy in this Court on 
December 31, 2014. 
 
 
- 20 - 
dissatisfaction with CCRC during the numerous hearings it held regarding the 
motion to withdraw and Braddy’s desire to represent himself.  The record further 
reflects that this is the same motion to discharge that the postconviction court had 
already denied on January 7, 2015.  Therefore, the postconviction court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying the first motion to discharge without holding a 
Nelson inquiry.  The postconviction court had no jurisdiction to hold a Nelson 
inquiry on the second motion to discharge because it was filed in this Court after 
this Court had assumed jurisdiction over this matter.  Therefore, the postconviction 
court did not err in failing to hold a hearing when it had no jurisdiction. 
B.  Section 119.19, Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of  
Criminal Procedure 3.852 
 
Braddy claims that section 119.19, Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.852 are unconstitutional as applied to Braddy in violation of 
article I, section 24 of the Florida Constitution because he has been denied access 
to public records.  Within this claim, Braddy argues that the postconviction court 
erred in denying him access to public records under section 119.19 and rule 3.852, 
namely: (1) certain materials in sealed box 6202 that were purportedly claimed to 
be exempt by the Miami-Dade State Attorney under the work product exemption in 
section 119.071(1)(d)1., Florida Statutes, and (2) the personnel and internal affairs 
files of the police and “criminalists” who testified against him at trial.  This Court 
reviews constitutional challenges to statutes de novo, Jackson v. State, 191 So. 3d 
 
 
- 21 - 
423, 426 (Fla. 2016), and the denial of public records requests for an abuse of 
discretion, Pardo v. State, 108 So. 3d 558, 565 (Fla. 2012).  As explained below, 
nothing within this record demonstrates that the postconviction court erred in 
denying Braddy’s claim regarding the public records requests. 
 
Article I, section 24 of the Florida Constitution, and chapter 119, Florida 
Statutes, guarantee access to public records.  See State v. City of Clearwater, 863 
So. 2d 149, 151 (Fla. 2003).  Rule 3.852 governs the procedure to obtain public 
records for use in capital postconviction litigation.  See Abdool, 141 So. 3d at 550 
(“[F]lorida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852 . . . governs capital postconviction 
public records production . . . .”); Sims v. State, 753 So. 2d 66, 69 (Fla. 2000) 
(“This rule is a discovery rule for public records production ancillary to 
proceedings pursuant to rules 3.850 and 3.851.” (quoting Amends. to Fla. R. of 
Crim. Pro., 754 So. 2d 640, 643 (Fla. 1999))).  This Court has repeatedly rejected 
constitutional challenges to the requirements of rule 3.852.  See, e.g., Howell v. 
State, 133 So. 3d 511, 515-16 (Fla. 2014); Wyatt v. State, 71 So. 3d 86, 110-11 
(Fla. 2011). 
 
Section 119.071(1)(d)1., Florida Statutes (2014), provides the following 
exemption from public records disclosure: 
A public record that was prepared by an agency attorney 
(including an attorney employed or retained by the agency or 
employed or retained by another public officer or agency to protect or 
represent the interests of the agency having custody of the record) or 
 
 
- 22 - 
prepared at the attorney’s express direction, that reflects a mental 
impression, conclusion, litigation strategy, or legal theory of the 
attorney or the agency, and that was prepared exclusively for civil or 
criminal litigation or for adversarial administrative proceedings, or 
that was prepared in anticipation of imminent civil or criminal 
litigation or imminent adversarial administrative proceedings, is 
exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), Art. I of the State Constitution 
until the conclusion of the litigation or adversarial administrative 
proceedings.  For purposes of capital collateral litigation as set forth in 
s. 27.7001, the Attorney General’s office is entitled to claim this 
exemption for those public records prepared for direct appeal as well 
as for all capital collateral litigation after direct appeal until execution 
of sentence or imposition of a life sentence. 
 
“[A]ny exemption under this section exists only until the conclusion of the 
litigation or, in the case of public records prepared for an appeal or postconviction 
proceedings, only until the execution of the sentence.”  Lightbourne v. McCollum, 
969 So. 2d 326, 332 (Fla. 2007); see State v. Kokal, 562 So. 2d 324, 327 (Fla. 
1990) (“[W]e further hold that ‘the conclusion of litigation’ with respect to a 
criminal conviction and sentence occurs when that conviction and sentence have 
become final.”). 
However, not all materials are “public records” within the meaning of 
chapter 119, Florida Statutes: 
To give content to the public records law which is consistent 
with the most common understanding of the term “record,” we hold 
that a public record, for purposes of section 119.011(1), is any 
material prepared in connection with official agency business which is 
intended to perpetuate, communicate, or formalize knowledge of some 
type.  To be contrasted with “public records” are materials prepared as 
drafts or notes, which constitute mere precursors of governmental 
“records” and are not, in themselves, intended as final evidence of the 
 
 
- 23 - 
knowledge to be recorded.  Matters which obviously would not be 
public records are rough drafts, notes to be used in preparing some 
other documentary material, and tapes or notes taken by a secretary as 
dictation.  Inter-office memoranda and intra-office memoranda 
communicating information from one public employee to another or 
merely prepared for filing, even though not a part of an agency’s later, 
formal public product, would nonetheless constitute public records 
inasmuch as they supply the final evidence of knowledge obtained in 
connection with the transaction of official business. 
It is impossible to lay down a definition of general application 
that identifies all items subject to disclosure under the act.  
Consequently, the classification of items which fall midway on the 
spectrum of clearly public records on the one end and clearly not 
public records on the other will have to be determined on a case-by-
case basis. 
 
Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Assoc., Inc., 379 So. 2d 633, 640 (Fla. 
1980) (emphasis added).  This Court has explained that “pretrial materials which 
include notes from the attorneys to themselves designed for their own personal use 
in remembering certain things or preliminary guides intended to aid the attorneys 
when they later formalize their knowledge are not within the term ‘public 
record.’ ”  Lopez v. State, 696 So. 2d 725, 728 (Fla. 1997) (citing Kokal, 562 So. 
2d at 327).  Likewise, “notes of the State Attorney’s investigations” and “annotated 
photocopies of decisional law” do not constitute public records.  Atkins v. State, 
663 So. 2d 624, 626 (Fla. 1995); see Scott v. Butterworth, 734 So. 2d 391, 393 
(Fla. 1999) (holding that “handwritten notes and drafts of pleadings” are not 
subject to public records disclosure). 
 
 
- 24 - 
Braddy claims that the postconviction court erred as a matter of law in 
denying him access to certain materials in sealed box 6202—fourteen manila 
envelopes pertaining to attorney work product and notes—that were purportedly 
claimed to be exempt by the State Attorney under the work product exemption in 
section 119.071(1)(d)1., Florida Statutes.  Braddy correctly argues that the work 
product exemption in section 119.071(1)(d)1. is inapplicable to the materials 
because Braddy’s conviction and sentence have become final.  The postconviction 
court concluded that the materials “were either work product not subject to 
disclosure or documents which had already been provided to [Braddy].”  It thus is 
apparent that the postconviction court misunderstood the scope of the exemption 
for work product.  The record in this case further indicates that the State Attorney 
did not claim that the statutory work product exemption applied to the materials.  
The State Attorney specifically asserted in a transmittal notice to the public 
repository that the materials were not public records under Shevin, Kokal, and 
Atkins. 
We conclude that the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying Braddy access to the vast majority of the materials in sealed box 6202 
pertaining to attorney work product and notes.  The materials primarily consist of 
handwritten attorney notes, draft documents, and annotated copies of decisional 
law, which do not constitute public records.  It is not clear from this record whether 
 
 
- 25 - 
Braddy has been denied access to a small number of the materials—inter-office 
memoranda, intra-office memoranda, and e-mails—which constitute public 
records.  Regardless, none of the materials in sealed box 6202 pertaining to 
attorney work product and notes contain any material that is exculpatory or 
otherwise pertaining to a postconviction claim. 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852(i)(2) requires production of 
additional public records upon a finding of the following: 
(A)  collateral counsel has made a timely and diligent search of 
the records repository;  
(B)  collateral counsel’s affidavit identifies with specificity 
those additional public records that are not at the records repository;  
(C)  the additional public records sought are either relevant to 
the subject matter of a proceeding under rule 3.851 or appear 
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; 
and  
(D)  the additional records request is not overly broad or unduly 
burdensome. 
 
This Court has “consistently held that a defendant bears the burden of 
demonstrating that the records sought relate to a colorable claim.”  Twilegar v. 
State, 175 So. 3d 242, 250 (Fla. 2015).  “As this Court has emphasized, rule 3.852 
‘is not intended to be a procedure authorizing a fishing expedition for records 
unrelated to a colorable claim for postconviction relief.’ ”  Valle v. State, 70 So. 3d 
530, 549 (Fla. 2011) (quoting Moore v. State, 820 So. 2d 199, 204 (Fla. 2002)).  
“Accordingly, where a defendant cannot demonstrate that he or she is entitled to 
relief on a claim or that records are relevant or may reasonably lead to the 
 
 
- 26 - 
discovery of admissible evidence, the trial court may properly deny a public 
records request.”  Twilegar, 175 So. 3d at 250 (quoting Mann v. State, 112 So. 3d 
1158, 1163 (Fla. 2013)). 
Braddy claims that the postconviction court abused its discretion in denying 
him access to the personnel and internal affairs files of the police and 
“criminalists” who testified against him at trial.  However, the postconviction court 
did not abuse its discretion in denying Braddy’s request for such additional 
records.  At a hearing held on September 2, 2014, the postconviction court denied 
all of Braddy’s requests for additional public records from the Miami-Dade Police 
Department, except for the internal affairs file of Detective Smith, the officer who 
inappropriately used force against Braddy during the search for Quatisha.  See 
Braddy, 111 So. 3d at 832.  The postconviction court found that Braddy failed to 
demonstrate that the personnel and internal affairs files of the other police and 
criminalists who testified against him at trial were “relevant” to a colorable claim.  
A review of the transcript from the hearing held on Braddy’s requests supports the 
postconviction court’s conclusion.  For example, Braddy’s counsel conceded at the 
hearing that not all of the personnel and internal affairs files sought by Braddy 
were relevant:   
I mean, I think it’s a fair question.   
Why do we want this?  Well, I don’t know, but it’s our job to 
look at every single piece of paper that might be relevant in this case.  
We can’t know what’s out there until we see what’s out there. . . .   
 
 
- 27 - 
So it’s true, I don’t know what the impeachment might be, but I 
know why I want the [commendations, training certificates, and 
school diplomas]. . . .   
Well, I think -- I believe that the 1990 [use of force complaint] 
would be outside of the [relevant] time frame that the court has 
limited us to, your Honor.  
  
Although Braddy argued “that the personnel and internal affairs files might contain 
impeachment material,” Braddy failed to identify at the hearing any incident that 
would even potentially be admissible as impeachment.  Given that the 
postconviction court ordered the production of Detective Smith’s internal affairs 
file, Braddy’s speculative request for the other files “was nothing more than a 
fishing expedition.”  Dennis v. State, 109 So. 3d 680, 699 (Fla. 2012). 
Braddy claims that section 119.19 and rule 3.852 were unconstitutionally 
applied to his case because he has been denied access to public records.  We reject 
this claim because Braddy has not clearly been denied access to records to which 
he is entitled under section 119.19 or rule 3.852. 
C.  Ineffective Assistance of Guilt Phase Counsel Claims 
1.  Prosecutor’s Comments 
Braddy claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve a 
challenge to comments made by the prosecution during its guilt phase closing 
argument.  As explained below, the postconviction court did not err in denying 
Braddy’s ineffective assistance of guilt phase counsel claim. 
 
 
- 28 - 
In order to obtain relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, “a 
defendant must establish deficient performance and prejudice.”  Gore v. State, 846 
So. 2d 461, 467 (Fla. 2003).  Under the first prong, “the defendant must show    
that . . . counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 
‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”  Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  Under the second prong, “[t]he defendant 
must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.”  Id. at 694.  “Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said 
that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary 
process that renders the result unreliable.”  Id. at 687.  “This Court has held that 
counsel’s failure to object to improper comments cannot prejudice the outcome if 
the comments were raised on direct appeal and do not rise to the level of 
fundamental error.”  Rogers v. State, 957 So. 2d 538, 550 (Fla. 2007); see Lowe v. 
State, 2 So. 3d 21, 37-38 (Fla. 2008); Chandler v. State, 848 So. 2d 1031, 1045-46 
(Fla. 2003). 
Braddy argues that trial counsel’s failure to object to comments made by the 
prosecution during its guilt phase closing argument was deficient performance.  
Braddy further argues that he was prejudiced because the result of his direct appeal 
 
 
- 29 - 
would have been different had his trial counsel objected during the guilt phase to 
such comments.  However, Braddy’s ineffectiveness claim lacks merit because he 
is unable to show prejudice.  On direct appeal, Braddy challenged several 
comments made during the State’s guilt phase closing argument that were not 
preserved for appeal.  This Court considered the issue of whether those allegedly 
improper comments constituted fundamental error and found that they did not, 
either individually or cumulatively: 
Braddy challenges a number of comments made during the 
State’s closing argument.  Several of the comments, however, were 
not preserved for appeal because Braddy either failed to object on the 
specific legal grounds that he now asserts or because, after having 
made objections that the trial court sustained, Braddy failed to move 
for a mistrial.  None of the unpreserved comments rises to the level of 
fundamental error, nor does the cumulative effect of those 
unpreserved comments in which we identify possible error constitute 
fundamental error.  Moreover, the comments that Braddy did preserve 
for appeal were properly ruled on by the trial court.  Accordingly, 
having considered the State’s guilt phase closing argument as a whole, 
paying specific attention to the objected-to and unobjected-to 
comments, we deny Braddy’s claim. 
 
Braddy, 111 So. 3d at 837-38 (emphasis added).  Because this Court found no 
fundamental error as to any of the unpreserved comments on direct appeal, Braddy 
fails to demonstrate that counsel’s failure to preserve a challenge to the comments 
resulted in prejudice sufficient to undermine the outcome of the trial under 
Strickland. 
2.  Reliable Adversarial Testing 
 
 
- 30 - 
Braddy claims that he was deprived of his right to a reliable adversarial 
testing at the guilt phase due to ineffective assistance of counsel.  Specifically, 
Braddy claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to retain: (1) an expert 
in police practices or police misconduct to challenge the voluntariness of Braddy’s 
statements to the police; (2) a crime scene or forensic expert to challenge the chain 
of custody of DNA evidence found in the trunk of the gold Lincoln Town Car 
driven by Braddy; and (3) a forensic pathologist to challenge the State’s theory 
regarding Quatisha’s death.  As explained below, the postconviction court did not 
err in denying this claim. 
Braddy’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to retain an 
expert in police practices or police misconduct to challenge the voluntariness of 
Braddy’s statements to the police is insufficiently pleaded because Braddy fails to 
explain how the presentation of this testimony would have created a reasonable 
probability of a different result at trial, that is, a reasonable probability that the 
result of the proceeding would have been different.  See Ey v. State, 982 So. 2d 
618, 623 (Fla. 2008) (“To raise a facially sufficient claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel, a defendant must allege specific facts meeting both of Strickland’s 
prongs.”).  Braddy merely alleges that the presentation of this testimony would 
have resulted in the suppression of his statements prior to trial, or a reasonable 
probability that the jury would have discounted his statements. 
 
 
- 31 - 
Regardless, Braddy could not demonstrate prejudice because there is no 
reasonable probability that the suppression of Braddy’s statements to the police 
would have created a different result at trial.  “The evidence at trial established that 
Braddy took both Shandelle and Quatisha from their home after getting into a fight 
with Shandelle and choking her unconscious.”  Braddy, 111 So. 3d at 861.  “The 
evidence further established that, after Braddy took Shandelle out of the trunk and 
choked her unconscious on a desolate road, Shandelle never saw Quatisha alive 
again.”  Id.  The jury heard Shandelle’s eyewitness account of the crimes.  Id. at 
822-23.  Shandelle’s landlord confirmed that Braddy had been seen with Quatisha 
shortly before midnight, next to the Town Car, the night she disappeared.  Id. at 
823, 861.  Within a few hours thereafter, Cyteria saw “Braddy wiping down the 
interior of the Town Car with a cloth” and “the clothes Braddy had been wearing 
earlier that night” in the washing machine.  Id. at 823.  DNA testing confirmed that 
Shandelle’s blood was found on the trunk liner of the Town Car.  Id. at 824.  The 
jury heard testimony that “when the detectives informed Braddy that Shandelle 
was alive and had implicated him in Quatisha’s disappearance, Braddy turned pale, 
began to sweat, shake, and cry, and claimed to feel faint.”  Id. at 823.  Quatisha’s 
body was found by two fishermen, independent of the police and Braddy.  Id. at 
825-26.  Quatisha suffered brush burns while she was alive consistent with her 
“having grazed against a hard, flat surface, such as falling out of a car and sliding 
 
 
- 32 - 
on the road.”  Id. at 826.  Dr. Perper, the Chief Medical Examiner for Broward 
County, “concluded that Quatisha’s death was primarily caused by blunt force 
trauma to the left side of her head, consistent with her either having fallen from a 
great distance or having been thrown onto a prominent, protruding object, such as 
the jutting rocks along the canal where her body was discovered.”  Id.  “[T]he 
evidence established that the primary cause of Quatisha’s death was severe trauma 
to her head, consistent with either being thrown or having fallen with some force 
onto the rocks that lined the canal where Quatisha was found.”  Id. at 861.  Given 
the overwhelming evidence of Braddy’s guilt, he cannot demonstrate prejudice 
such that our confidence in the outcome is undermined. 
Likewise, Braddy’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
retain a crime scene or forensic expert to challenge the credibility and reliability of 
the DNA evidence collected from the Town Car is insufficiently pleaded because 
Braddy fails to explain how the presentation of this testimony would have created a 
reasonable probability of a different result at trial.  Braddy merely alleges that the 
presentation of this testimony would have challenged the credibility and reliability 
of the DNA evidence at trial. 
Regardless, Braddy could not demonstrate prejudice because there is no 
reasonable probability that challenging the credibility and reliability of the DNA 
evidence collected from the Town Car would have created a different result at trial.  
 
 
- 33 - 
Even if the DNA evidence had not been introduced, the jury still would have heard 
Braddy’s incriminating statements and the testimony of Shandelle, Shandelle’s 
landlord, Cyteria, and Dr. Perper.  Furthermore, Quatisha’s body was found by two 
fishermen, independent of the DNA evidence.  Given the overwhelming evidence 
of guilt presented, Braddy cannot demonstrate prejudice such that our confidence 
in the outcome is undermined. 
Similarly, Braddy’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
retain a forensic pathologist to challenge the State’s theory regarding Quatisha’s 
death is insufficiently pleaded because Braddy fails to explain how the presentation 
of this testimony would create a reasonable probability of a different result at trial.  
Braddy merely alleges that the presentation of this testimony would have 
challenged Dr. Perper’s theory about when Quatisha’s injuries were sustained and 
shown that Quatisha died before she was left in the Everglades. 
Once again, Braddy could not demonstrate prejudice because there is no 
reasonable probability that challenging Dr. Perper’s testimony as to the timing of 
Quatisha’s death would have created a different result at trial.  The evidence 
supports the conclusion that Quatisha was alive when Braddy left her to die in the 
Everglades because Braddy confessed “that he had left Quatisha alone out in the 
Everglades in the middle of the night” and “he knew when he left her that she 
would probably die.”  Id.  Moreover, even if Quatisha died before she was left in 
 
 
- 34 - 
the Everglades, Braddy would still be guilty of felony murder based on the 
kidnapping of Quatisha.  See id. at 861-62. 
Braddy complains that he was deprived of his right to a reliable adversarial 
testing due to the State’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence and prosecutorial 
and judicial misconduct.  But Braddy fails to make any argument regarding these 
claims on appeal.  Accordingly, Braddy has waived any issue on appeal regarding 
these claims.  See Duest v. Dugger, 555 So. 2d 849, 852 (Fla. 1990) (“The purpose 
of an appellate brief is to present arguments in support of the points on appeal.  
Merely making reference to arguments below without further elucidation does not 
suffice to preserve issues, and these claims are deemed to have been waived.”). 
D.  Fair and Impartial Jury 
Braddy claims that he was deprived of his right to a fair and impartial jury.  
Braddy argues that Juror Ravelo committed juror misconduct by failing to disclose 
that he was the subject of a criminal investigation during voir dire or the guilt 
phase.  This claim is procedurally barred because “it could have and should have 
been raised on direct appeal.”  Troy v. State, 57 So. 3d 828, 838 (Fla. 2011) 
(quoting Elledge v. State, 911 So. 2d 57, 77 n.27 (Fla. 2005)).  In any event, 
Braddy’s claim is refuted by the trial record because Juror Ravelo was not 
permitted to continue to serve on the jury after he came under prosecution.  The 
guilt phase ended on July 17, 2007.  Juror Ravelo—one of the jurors who sat on 
 
 
- 35 - 
Braddy’s guilt phase jury—was arrested for a third degree felony for littering on 
August 23, 2007.  Thereafter, Juror Ravelo called the trial court and informed the 
bailiff that he had been arrested since he began serving on the jury.  On August 28, 
2007, before the penalty phase began, the trial court questioned Juror Ravelo 
outside the presence of the jury regarding the arrest and discharged him.  Although 
Juror Ravelo was arrested “[a]lmost one month after some pictures were taken by 
someone,” nothing within the trial record indicates that Juror Ravelo was under 
prosecution prior to his arrest. 
This Court has also held with respect to claims of juror nondisclosure that 
(1) “the complaining party must establish that the information is relevant and 
material to jury service in the case,” (2) “the juror concealed the information 
during questioning,” and (3) “the failure to disclose the information was not 
attributable to the complaining party’s lack of diligence.”  Lugo v. State, 2 So. 3d 
1, 13 (Fla. 2008) (quoting De La Rosa v. Zequeira, 659 So. 2d 239, 241 (Fla. 
1995)).  Braddy’s claim equally lacks merit under this standard.  Braddy’s claim 
that Juror Ravelo concealed information during voir dire or the guilt phase that he 
was under criminal investigation for littering is pure speculation.  Moreover, 
Braddy was not diligent in pursuing this claim at the trial level.  When given the 
opportunity to question Juror Ravelo, Braddy did not ask him whether he was 
aware of the criminal investigation prior to his arrest. 
 
 
- 36 - 
Braddy suggests that the State withheld Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 
(1963), material from the defense.  However, Braddy has failed to establish a 
Brady violation.  “To establish a Brady violation, the defendant has the burden to 
show that: (1) the evidence was either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the evidence 
was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State; and (3) because the 
evidence was material, the defendant was prejudiced.”  Davis v. State, 136 So. 3d 
1169, 1184 (Fla. 2014).  Braddy has not shown that information regarding Juror 
Ravelo’s prosecution would exculpate Braddy regarding any crime or impeach any 
witness. 
Braddy complains that Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 4-3.5(d)(4) 
prohibited Braddy’s counsel from interviewing Juror Ravelo.  But Braddy fails to 
make any argument regarding this rule on appeal.  Therefore, Braddy has waived 
any issue on appeal regarding rule 4-3.5(d)(4). 
Braddy complains that the postconviction court denied his requests for 
additional public records concerning jurors.  But Braddy fails to argue on appeal 
that the postconviction court erred in denying his requests.  Accordingly, Braddy 
has waived any issue on appeal regarding these additional public records requests. 
III.  PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
A.  Hurst v. Florida 
 
 
- 37 - 
Before Braddy petitioned this Court for a writ of habeas corpus, the United 
States Supreme Court issued its decision in Hurst v. Florida in which it held that 
Florida’s former capital sentencing scheme violated the Sixth Amendment because 
it “required the judge to hold a separate hearing and determine whether sufficient 
aggravating circumstances existed to justify imposing the death penalty” even 
though “[t]he Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact 
necessary to impose a sentence of death.”  Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. at 619.  On 
remand in Hurst we held that  
before the trial judge may consider imposing a sentence of death, the 
jury in a capital case must unanimously and expressly find all the 
aggravating factors that were proven beyond a reasonable doubt, 
unanimously find that the aggravating factors are sufficient to impose 
death, unanimously find that the aggravating factors outweigh the 
mitigating circumstances, and unanimously recommend a sentence of 
death.   
Hurst, 202 So. 3d at 57. 
Hurst v. Florida and Hurst apply retroactively to defendants in Braddy’s 
position who were sentenced under Florida’s former, unconstitutional capital 
sentencing scheme after the United States Supreme Court decided Ring in 2002.  
Mosley v. State, 209 So. 3d 1248, 1283 (Fla. 2016).  And in light of the 
nonunanimous jury recommendation to impose a death sentence, it cannot be said 
that the failure to require a unanimous verdict here was harmless.  See Franklin v. 
State, 209 So. 3d 1241, 1248 (Fla. 2016) (“In light of the non-unanimous jury 
 
 
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recommendation to impose a death sentence, we reject the State’s contention that 
any Ring- or Hurst v. Florida-related error is harmless.”), petition for cert. filed, 
No. 16-1170 (U.S. Mar. 23, 2017).  We therefore conclude that Braddy is entitled 
to a new penalty phase. 
B.  This Court’s Prior Review 
Braddy claims that this Court failed to conduct a proper harmless error 
analysis of errors recognized on direct appeal.   Specifically, Braddy claims that 
this Court erroneously affirmed the trial court’s denial of Braddy’s motion to 
suppress and erroneously found that any improper comments made during the 
State’s guilt phase closing argument were harmless error.  This claim is 
procedurally barred because “habeas corpus petitions are not to be used for 
additional appeals on questions which could have been, should have been, or were 
raised on appeal or in a rule 3.85[1] motion.”  Wyatt, 71 So. 3d at 112 n.20 
(quoting Hardwick v. Dugger, 648 So. 2d 100, 105 (Fla. 1994)).  “This Court has 
consistently held that habeas claims wherein the defendant challenges this Court’s 
previous standard of review in the case are procedurally barred.”  Bottoson v. 
State, 813 So. 2d 31, 35 (Fla. 2002). 
C.  Fair and Impartial Jury 
Braddy claims that he was deprived of his right to a fair and impartial jury.  
This claim is procedurally barred because Braddy raised it in his postconviction 
 
 
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motion.  See England v. State, 151 So. 3d 1132, 1141 (Fla. 2014).  Regardless, as 
explained previously, the postconviction court did not err in denying Braddy’s 
claim regarding Juror Ravelo. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the postconviction court’s denial of relief 
for a new guilt phase, and we also deny the claims in Braddy’s petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus with the exception of his claim for relief under Hurst v. Florida.  
Accordingly, we vacate the death sentence and remand this case for a new penalty 
phase. 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur. 
LAWSON, J., concurs specially with an opinion.  
CANADY, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which 
POLSTON, J., concurs. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
LAWSON, J., concurring specially. 
 
 
See Okafor v. State, No. SC15-2136, slip op. at 15 (Fla. June 8, 2017) 
(Lawson, J., concurring specially). 
CANADY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
I agree with the decision to affirm the denial of relief on Braddy’s guilt 
phase claims.  But I disagree with the decision to vacate Braddy’s death sentence 
 
 
- 40 - 
and to remand for a new penalty phase.  As I have previously explained, Hurst v. 
Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), should not be given retroactive effect.  See Mosley 
v. State, 209 So. 3d 1248, 1285-91 (Fla. 2016) (Canady, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  I would also reject Braddy’s other penalty phase claims.  The 
postconviction court’s denial of all relief should be affirmed.  The habeas petition 
should be denied in full. 
POLSTON, J., concurs. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Miami-Dade County,  
Ariana Fajardo Orshan, Judge - Case No. 131998CF0377670001XX 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus  
 
Neal A. Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, William M. Hennis, III, 
Litigation Director, and Jessica Houston, Staff Attorney, Office of the Capital 
Collateral Regional Counsel, Southern Region, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Lisa A. Hopkins, Assistant Attorney 
General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
for Appellee/Respondent