Title: Bohan v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 66, 2012
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: June 15, 2012

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
CHARLES BOHAN,  
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
 
           Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 66, 2012 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0804025609 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted:  June 8, 2012 
Decided:  June 15, 2012 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 15th day of June 2012, upon consideration of the briefs of the 
parties and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Charles Bohan, filed an appeal from 
the Superior Court’s January 11, 2012 order adopting the November 23, 
2011 report of the Superior Court Commissioner,1 which recommended that 
Bohan’s first motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court 
                                                 
1 Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, §512(b); Super. Ct. Crim. R. 62. 
 
2
Criminal Rule 61 be denied.2  We find no merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, 
we affirm. 
 
(2) 
The record reflects that, in March 2009, Bohan was found 
guilty of two counts of Aggravated Menacing, Possession of a Firearm 
During the Commission of a Felony and Possession of a Firearm By a 
Person Prohibited.  He was sentenced to a total of 17 years of Level V 
incarceration, to be suspended after 8 years for decreasing levels of 
supervision.  Bohan’s convictions were affirmed by this Court on direct 
appeal.3 
 
(3) 
In this appeal, Bohan claims that the Superior Court abused its 
discretion by a) admitting into evidence certain prejudicial crime scene 
photographs; b) failing to declare a mistrial when a witness, whom the jury 
was told by the defense would exculpate the defendant, was unavailable to 
testify; and c) admitting a witness statement into evidence without a proper 
foundation under Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §3507.  Although not expressly 
designated as such, Bohan also asserts claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  He alleges that his trial counsel a) failed to subpoena an important 
defense witness, resulting in prejudice to him; and b) failed to properly 
                                                 
2 Because this was Bohan’s first postconviction motion and claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel were asserted, his trial counsel’s affidavit was requested.  Horne v. 
State, 887 A.2d 973, 975 (Del. 2005); Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(g) (1) and (2).   
3 Bohan v. State, 990 A.2d 421 (Del. 2010). 
 
3
impeach a witness for the State in connection with the witness’s §3507 
statement. 
 
(4) 
Bohan’s first claim is that the Superior Court erred by admitting 
a number of crime scene photographs into evidence.  Bohan contends that he 
had no connection to the crime scene depicted in the photographs and that 
the probative value of the photographs outweighed their prejudicial effect.4  
The record before us reflects that the photographs were of a parking lot 
where Bohan pointed a gun at police, Bohan’s car and the motel room where 
the gun was found.  There was, therefore, a connection between the 
photographs and Bohan.  Moreover, it was for the trial judge to determine 
whether the probative value of the photographs outweighed their possible 
prejudicial effect.5  We find no abuse of discretion on the part of the 
Superior Court in ruling as it did.  We, therefore, conclude that Bohan’s first 
claim is without merit. 
 
(5) 
Bohan’s second claim is that the Superior Court erred when it 
failed to declare a mistrial when an important defense witness was 
unavailable to testify.  The record reflects that this claim was raised by 
Bohan in his direct appeal and decided against him by this Court.6  As such, 
                                                 
4 D.R.E. 403. 
5 Williams v. State, 494 A.2d 1237, 1241 (Del. 1985). 
6 Bohan v. State, 990 A.2d at 423-24. 
 
4
it is procedurally barred as previously adjudicated.7  While such a claim may 
be reconsidered in the interest of justice,8 our review of the record in this 
case does not reveal any such basis for reconsideration of the claim.  As 
such, we conclude that Bohan’s second claim of error on the part of the 
Superior Court is unavailing. 
 
(6) 
Bohan’s third claim is that the Superior Court erred by 
admitting a statement into evidence without the proper foundation under 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §3507.  The record reflects that this claim was raised 
neither at trial nor on direct appeal.  Therefore, Bohan must demonstrate 
cause for the procedural default and resulting prejudice.9  Bohan does 
neither.  Nor does he demonstrate a miscarriage of justice that would 
overcome the procedural bar.10  The record reflects that the prosecutor 
established the proper foundation for admission of the witness statement.11  
Moreover, the situation that presented itself at Bohan’s trial---i.e. where a 
witness testifies that he does not recall what he said in his previous 
statement---is precisely the situation that §3507 was designed to address.12  
                                                 
7 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (4). 
8 Id. 
9 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (3)(A) and (B). 
10 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (5). 
11 Gomez v. State, 25 A.3d 786, 795 (Del. 2011). 
12 Johnson v. State, 338 A.2d 124, 127 (Del. 1975). 
 
5
In the absence of any error on the part of the Superior Court, we conclude 
that Bohan’s third claim also is without merit. 
 
(7) 
Bohan’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims are governed 
by the Strickland standard.13  Under that standard, a defendant must 
demonstrate that his counsel’s representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness and that, but for his counsel’s unprofessional 
errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings 
would have been different.14  Although not insurmountable, the Strickland 
standard is highly demanding and leads to a strong presumption that the 
representation was professionally reasonable.15   
 
(8) 
Bohan’s first ineffectiveness claim is that his counsel failed to 
subpoena a crucial defense witness, thereby prejudicing his case.  The record 
reflects that the individual in question was actually in custody in Delaware 
and was available to be called as a witness.  Defense counsel interviewed 
him and ascertained that he would not offer testimony favorable to the 
defense and, in fact, would have directly implicated Bohan as the one who 
pointed the gun at police.  Because the witness was available and apparently 
willing to testify, no subpoena was necessary.  Because his testimony would 
                                                 
13 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). 
14 Id. 
15 Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990). 
 
6
have been harmful to the defense, however, counsel properly declined to call 
him as a witness.   
 
(9) 
As for Bohan’s second claim that his counsel failed to impeach 
a witness regarding his prior §3507 statement, this claim, too, is unavailing.  
The record reflects that, contrary to the assertions of Bohan, defense counsel 
thoroughly cross-examined the witness regarding his prior statement to 
police, establishing for the jury that Bohan was not personally present in the 
hotel room depicted in the photographs and that the witness was on Xanax at 
the time of his statement, all of which was helpful to the defense.  In the 
absence of any evidence of error on the part of counsel resulting in prejudice 
to Bohan, we conclude that his ineffectiveness claims are without merit.16   
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice 
     
     
 
                                                 
16 To the extent that Bohan advanced additional ineffectiveness claims in the Superior 
Court that have not been presented in this appeal, any such claims have been waived and 
we decline to address them.  Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del. 1993).