Title: John Richard Marek v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC09-1080
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: July 16, 2009

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
_____________ 
 
No. SC09-1080 
_____________ 
 
JOHN RICHARD MAREK, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
[July 16, 2009] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
John Richard Marek, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals the 
postconviction court‘s orders denying his third and fourth successive motions for 
postconviction relief, which were filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.851.  We have jurisdiction.  Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the 
reasons stated below, we affirm the postconviction court‘s orders denying relief. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Marek was convicted of first-degree murder, kidnapping, attempted 
burglary, and battery in the 1983 murder of Adella Marie Simmons and was 
sentenced to death.  We affirmed the murder conviction and death sentence on 
 
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direct appeal.  Marek v. State, 492 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. 1986).  The procedural history 
of Marek‘s postconviction challenges to his conviction and sentence is set out in 
this Court‘s recent opinion, which affirmed the postconviction court‘s denial of 
Marek‘s second successive motion for postconviction relief.  See Marek v. State, 8 
So. 3d 1123 (Fla. 2009). 
On April 20, 2009, Governor Charlie Crist signed Marek‘s death warrant.  
On May 1, 2009, while the appeal of the denial of Marek‘s second successive 
postconviction motion was pending, Marek filed a third successive postconviction 
motion in the circuit court.  The motion raised three claims.  
In his first claim, Marek contended that newly discovered evidence in the 
form of an affidavit from Michael J. Conley, a former cellmate of Marek‘s 
codefendant Raymond Wigley, demonstrates that Marek‘s conviction and sentence 
are constitutionally unreliable.  In his affidavit, Conley averred that when he and 
Wigley were incarcerated together in 1996 or 1997, Wigley confessed to strangling 
the victim after raping her.  In his second claim, Marek asserted that Florida‘s 
clemency process and the manner in which the Governor determined that a third 
death warrant should be signed for Marek was arbitrary and capricious, in violation 
of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.  In 
his third claim, Marek alleged that during his initial postconviction proceeding, 
 
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Judge Stanton S. Kaplan engaged in ex parte communications with the State 
regarding the drafting of the order denying postconviction relief. 
On May 4, 2009, Marek filed a motion for leave to supplement the first 
claim.  He sought to submit an affidavit by Jessie Bannerman, who had been 
incarcerated with Wigley.  In the affidavit, Bannerman averred that he had heard 
Wigley state that ―he had killed‖ and believed ―he would kill again.‖  On May 5, 
2009, Marek filed an emergency motion for a writ of habeas corpus to have 
another inmate, Robert Pearson, transported to the evidentiary hearing on his 
postconviction motion, but Marek did not attach an affidavit or any statement from 
Pearson to the motion. 
The postconviction court conducted an emergency evidentiary hearing on 
May 6-7, 2009.  At the beginning of the hearing, Marek filed a motion to 
disqualify the postconviction judge.  After hearing argument from the attorneys, 
the postconviction court denied the motion to disqualify.  On May 8, 2009, the 
postconviction court issued an order denying Marek‘s third successive 
postconviction motion.  Marek appealed.  In addition to challenging the 
postconviction court‘s denial of his postconviction claims, Marek argued that the 
postconviction court erred in treating his motion for judicial disqualification as 
successive and in denying the facially sufficient motion to disqualify. 
 
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On May 11, 2009, this Court issued an order staying Marek‘s execution and 
scheduling oral argument for May 20, 2009.  After oral argument, we concluded 
that the postconviction court erred by treating the motion to disqualify as a 
successive motion and by denying the motion.  Accordingly, we issued an order 
reversing and remanding to the Circuit Court of the Seventeenth Circuit with 
directions that a new judge preside over the proceeding with respect to Marek‘s 
postconviction claims.  The order noted that the stay of execution remained in 
effect.  On June 1-2, 2009, Judge Jeffrey R. Levenson conducted a new evidentiary 
hearing on Marek‘s third successive motion for postconviction relief.  (The 
evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing is discussed in the analysis that 
follows.) 
On June 12, 2009, Marek filed a fourth successive postconviction motion, 
raising two claims.  In his first claim, Marek argued that he is entitled to relief due 
to the prejudice against Marek of Judge Kaplan, the judge in the initial 
postconviction proceedings in 1988, and due to Judge Kaplan‘s relationship with 
defense trial counsel Hilliard Moldof.  In support of this claim, Marek relied on 
Caperton v. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (U.S. 2009).  In his second claim, 
Marek argued that trial counsel Moldof‘s testimony at the June 1-2, 2009, 
evidentiary hearing included newly discovered evidence that Marek did not receive 
effective assistance of counsel during his penalty phase. 
 
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On June 19, 2009, the postconviction court issued orders denying Marek‘s 
third and fourth successive motions for postconviction relief.  As for the third 
successive motion, after concluding that Marek was attempting to relitigate his 
prior claim that ―Wigley was the murderer, and because Wigley was sentenced to 
life, he should be too,‖ the postconviction court found Marek‘s first claim (newly 
discovered evidence regarding statements made by codefendant Wigley) to be 
procedurally barred.  Alternatively, the postconviction court denied the claim on 
the merits, finding that the evidence did not qualify as newly discovered; the 
testimony about Wigley‘s statements would not be admissible in the guilt phase; 
and even if the evidence were newly discovered and admissible, it would not 
probably produce an acquittal or a life sentence on retrial.  The postconviction 
court rejected Marek‘s second claim (denial of due process in the clemency 
process) on the basis that the clemency process is a function of the executive 
branch, not a judicial function.  Finally, the postconviction court rejected Marek‘s 
third claim (ex parte communications in the initial postconviction proceeding) on 
the basis that it was procedurally barred, speculative, and legally insufficient.  With 
regard to Marek‘s fourth successive motion, the postconviction court summarily 
denied the motion, reasoning that both claims (prejudice of the initial 
postconviction judge and ineffective assistance in the penalty phase) had 
previously been litigated and thus were procedurally barred. 
 
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Marek now appeals the postconviction court‘s denial of his third and fourth 
successive postconviction motions.  Marek also challenges the postconviction 
court‘s order denying his motion to correct the transcript of the evidentiary hearing 
testimony of Leon Douglass describing Wigley as a black male and the 
postconviction court‘s failure to rule on his ―Motion to Get the Facts‖ about the 
assignment of Judge Levenson to this case.  Below, we address each of Marek‘s 
motions in turn and conclude that Marek is entitled to no relief. 
II.  THIRD SUCCESSIVE POSTCONVICTION MOTION 
On appeal from the denial of his third successive postconviction motion, 
Marek raises three claims.  He argues that newly discovered evidence demonstrates 
(A) that both his murder conviction and death sentence are constitutionally 
unreliable; (B) that he was denied due process in the clemency process; and (C) 
that he was denied due process in his initial postconviction proceedings.  We begin 
our analysis of these issues by discussing the standard applicable to all. 
To obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, a defendant must 
meet two requirements.  First, the evidence must not have been known by the trial 
court, the party, or counsel at the time of trial, and it must appear that the defendant 
or defense counsel could not have known of it by the use of diligence.  Second, the 
newly discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would probably produce 
an acquittal on retrial.  See Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512, 521 (Fla. 1998) (Jones 
 
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II).  Newly discovered evidence satisfies the second prong of the Jones II test if it 
―weakens the case against [the defendant] so as to give rise to a reasonable doubt 
as to his culpability.‖  Jones II, 709 So. 2d at 526 (quoting Jones v. State, 678 So. 
2d 309, 315 (Fla. 1996)).  If the defendant is seeking to vacate a sentence, the 
second prong requires that the newly discovered evidence would probably yield a 
less severe sentence.  See Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911, 915 (Fla. 1991) (Jones I).
 
In determining whether the evidence compels a new trial, the postconviction 
court must ―consider all newly discovered evidence which would be admissible‖ 
and must ―evaluate the weight of both the newly discovered evidence and the 
evidence which was introduced at the trial.‖  Id. at 916.  This determination 
includes 
whether the evidence goes to the merits of the case or whether it 
constitutes impeachment evidence.  The trial court should also 
determine whether this evidence is cumulative to other evidence in the 
case.  The trial court should further consider the materiality and 
relevance of the evidence and any inconsistencies in the newly 
discovered evidence.  
Jones II, 709 So. 2d at 521 (citations omitted). 
 
When, as in this case, the postconviction court rules on a newly discovered 
evidence claim after an evidentiary hearing, this Court ―review[s] the trial court‘s 
findings on questions of fact, the credibility of witnesses, and the weight of the 
evidence for competent, substantial evidence.‖  Green v. State, 975 So. 2d 1090, 
 
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1100 (Fla. 2008).  In addition, ―we review the trial court‘s application of the law to 
the facts de novo.‖  Id.  
A.  Wigley’s Statements 
 
At the time of Marek‘s trial, codefendant Wigley had given a sworn 
statement.  In that statement, Wigley said that after he and Marek beat and raped 
the victim, he saw Marek tie a bandanna—which was used as a ligature—around 
the victim‘s neck.  Wigley said that he did not ―use‖ the bandana on the victim but 
indicated that Marek had done so.  Wigley also stated that Marek offered the 
victim and her friend a ride to a phone booth but that he ―didn‘t offer them 
nothing.‖  The postconviction evidentiary hearing testimony that Wigley made 
statements contradicting his sworn statement did not exist at the time of trial and 
could not have been discovered except by casting a wide investigatory net.  For 
purposes of our analysis here, we assume that Marek‘s counsel could not have 
presented the witnesses previously through the exercise of due diligence and focus 
on whether the evidence probably would result in an acquittal or life sentence on 
retrial. 
1.  Evidence 
In determining whether newly discovered evidence would probably result in 
an acquittal or a lesser sentence, the new evidence must be viewed in conjunction 
with the evidence presented at trial.  Thus, the Court evaluates all the admissible 
 
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newly discovered evidence, including any admissible newly discovered evidence 
presented in prior postconviction proceedings, and compares it with the evidence 
that was introduced at trial.  Marek erroneously contends that the Court also must 
consider all of the evidence he presented in his prior postconviction proceedings in 
an effort to establish ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  See Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (holding that to establish a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that counsel was 
constitutionally deficient and, as a result, defendant was prejudiced).  Marek 
overlooks that throughout the extensive postconviction litigation of his case, his 
counsel has never been found deficient.  Marek‘s claims of ineffective assistance 
of counsel have been denied because he has failed to establish deficiency or 
because they were procedurally barred.  Where the prior claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel have not satisfied the deficiency prong of Strickland or have 
been found to be procedurally barred, this Court need not reconsider evidence 
previously submitted in support of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  See 
Kight v. State, 784 So. 2d 396, 403 (Fla. 2001) (rejecting Kight‘s contention that 
the court must consider all of the evidence that was not presented at trial, including 
all evidence presented in any postconviction proceedings); Jones II, 709 So. 2d at 
522 n.7 (―We reject Jones‘ argument that we must consider all testimony 
previously heard at the 1986 and 1992 evidentiary hearings, even if the testimony 
 
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had previously been found to be barred or not to qualify as newly discovered 
evidence.‖). 
This Court recited the relevant evidence adduced at trial in its opinion 
affirming the conviction and sentence on direct appeal.  Marek, 492 So. 2d 1056-
58.  The evidence showed that at approximately 11:30 p.m., June 16, 1983, Marek 
and Wigley stopped by the victim‘s car on the turnpike, where the victim and her 
friend were stranded.  Marek worked on the car for over forty minutes and engaged 
the women in conversation; Wigley never spoke and only briefly exited his truck.  
Eventually, Marek offered to take one, not both, of the women to a service station.  
At approximately 3:35 a.m. the following day, officers found the codefendants‘ 
pickup truck at Dania Beach, and when the codefendants appeared, Marek spoke to 
the police and joked with them, while Wigley remained silent.  Several hours later, 
the victim‘s beaten and bruised body was found in the nearby lifeguard shack, and 
the evidence indicated that she was strangled to death with a ligature at 
approximately 3:00-3:30 a.m.  Marek‘s fingerprint was found inside the lifeguard 
shack. 
Wigley did not testify at Marek‘s trial, but Marek did testify.  He claimed 
that he fell asleep as soon as the victim was in the truck.  He awoke later and asked 
Wigley where the victim was, and Wigley, who was driving, responded that he had 
already dropped her off at a service station.  They continued to drive, and Marek 
 
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went back to sleep.  He awoke hours later and found Wigley at the lifeguard shack.  
He climbed up into the shack and was there for fifteen or more minutes, but he 
never saw the victim‘s body because it was dark.  During the penalty phase, the 
sole witness was a deputy from the jail who testified that Marek was polite and 
never caused problems when she was on duty.  Marek did not testify in the penalty 
phase.  
Marek was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death.  In his 
separate trial, Wigley was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life in 
prison.  In affirming Marek‘s death sentence on direct appeal and denying Marek‘s 
challenge to his disparate sentence, this Court outlined the basis for its 
determination as follows: 
The evidence in this case clearly established that appellant, not 
Wigley, was the dominant actor in this criminal episode.  Both 
appellant and the victim‘s traveling companion testified that appellant 
talked to the two women for approximately forty-five minutes after he 
stopped, purportedly to aid them.  During most of this conversation, 
Wigley remained in the truck.  When Wigley got out of the truck to 
join appellant, he remained silent.  Appellant, not Wigley, persuaded 
the victim to get in the truck with the two men.  That evidence was 
reinforced by the testimony of three witnesses who came into contact 
with the appellant and Wigley on the beach at approximately the time 
of the murder, which indicated that appellant appeared to be the more 
dominant of the two men.  Finally, only appellant‘s fingerprint was 
found inside the observation deck where the body was discovered.  
This evidence, in our view, justifies a conclusion that appellant was 
the dominant participant in this crime. 
Marek, 492 So. 2d at 1058.  
 
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The newly discovered evidence in this case consists of statements Wigley 
made to other prisoners while he was serving his life sentence. 
Jessie Bannerman testified that Wigley spoke about the murder on two 
occasions, once while they were drinking moonshine and once while smoking 
marijuana.  In sum, Wigley told Bannerman that he was convicted for killing a 
woman and that he had choked her to death out of fear she would identify him.  
Bannerman said that he believed Wigley because of the details, but he also said 
that he thought Wigley was boasting about his heterosexuality and dangerousness 
to keep other inmates from pursuing him for homosexual sex. 
Robert Pearson, who was an inmate law clerk, testified that he spoke to 
Wigley in that capacity.  Pearson said that Wigley‘s story concerning the murder 
changed each time Wigley told it and that Wigley told him ―three or four different 
versions.‖  Wigley reportedly said the victim laughed at him for failing to achieve 
an erection, whereupon Wigley—depending on the account—choked her to death 
or passed out and awoke to find her dead.  Pearson explained that 
[Wigley would] fluctuate, at one point he‘d talk to me about it and 
he‘d be solid that he choked her, he pretty much killed her, and then 
the next version he would tell me is that he passed out and he didn‘t 
remember anything, but when he woke up she was there. . . .  He was 
just always . . . adding stuff or taking stuff away. 
Wigley also reportedly told Pearson that Wigley, not Marek, spoke with the victim 
and her friend and convinced the victim to get into the truck with Wigley. 
 
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Carl Mitchell testified that he overheard Wigley threaten John Blackwelder, 
Wigley‘s homosexual lover (who subsequently killed Wigley, see Blackwelder v. 
State, 851 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 2003)), saying, ―Don‘t make me kill you ‘cause I 
already got—I already killed somebody else.‖  Mitchell attributed no meaning to 
this comment because it was his belief that a lot of prison inmates say things like 
this out of anger or fear, and Wigley and Blackwelder argued all the time. 
William Green testified that he frequently overheard his cellmate 
Blackwelder talking to Wigley and thus knew that Wigley was convicted of 
murder.  He testified that Blackwelder told Wigley he would kill Wigley if Wigley 
cheated on him.  Wigley responded, ―I killed before, I‘ll kill again, so it don‘t 
matter.‖  Green said the pair were not fighting, ―they‘re just two lovers talking, it 
was normal‖ and that such talk is normal in prison.  Green stated that Blackwelder 
and Wigley often made such comments to each other. 
Leon Douglass said he spoke to Wigley in his capacity as an inmate law 
clerk at Columbia Correctional Institution (Columbia).  Douglass said that Wigley 
claimed to have killed the victim by strangling her and was angry with Marek for 
some unnamed but unforgiveable wrong Marek did to him.  Douglass testified that 
he was transferred to Columbia in August 2000, but the State admitted records 
from the Department of Corrections (DOC) that showed that Douglass was not sent 
to Columbia until November 2000.  Either way, Douglass could not have had a 
 
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conversation with Wigley in Columbia because Wigley was killed on May 6, 2000.  
When cross-examined concerning the time and place of his claimed conversation 
with Wigley, Douglass testified that perhaps the conversation occurred at Martin 
Correctional Institution (Martin).  However, DOC records show that Wigley and 
Douglass were never housed at Martin or any other facility at the same time.  
Moreover, when asked to describe Wigley, Douglass erroneously said he was a 
black man.  (As discussed below, Marek contends that this statement in the 
transcript of the evidentiary hearing is the result of error by the court reporter.) 
Finally, Michael Conley‘s testimony from the prior evidentiary hearing on 
Marek‘s third successive postconviction motion was admitted by stipulation.  
During that hearing, Conley testified that in the mid-1990s he spoke with Wigley 
about Wigley‘s case.  Wigley broached the topic with Conley because Conley‘s 
wife worked for a law firm and Wigley hoped to obtain pro bono legal assistance.  
Conley described the conversation as follows: 
 
So, he said, well, he said, I was involved in a murder, you know 
that. 
 
We met a lady on the Florida Turnpike.  We took her and 
wound up having sex with her along the way, on the Florida Turnpike, 
forcing her and beating her and took her to someplace in Florida . . . it 
was a lifeguard station or something. 
I said, well, what happened? 
He said, we repeatedly raped her. 
I said, you know, who? 
He said, me and the other guy that‘s on death row. 
I said, well how come you‘re not on death row? 
He said, well, I got a life sentence. 
 
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I said, Ray—I looked him right in the eye—I said, Raymond, 
did you kill [that] woman, and he said, no.  I said, Ray, again, did you 
kill that woman?  He said, no.  Then he said—I said to him, I said, 
Ray, I‘m not going to help you. 
He said, I killed the woman, Mike.  I strangled her.  
I said to him, how did you strangle her? 
He said with a scarf or a handkerchief, I believe.  It‘s been so 
long. 
Knowing Raymond Wigley—I told you I‘m going to be honest 
about this—he was a wimp, a real wimp, and it was hard for me to 
visualize him killing anybody.  But in the Department of Corrections, 
wimps are the ones you got to watch out for.  They‘ll kill you first 
before they get killed, and so whether he killed her or not, I don‘t 
know.   That‘s up to the supreme court to decide.  I can only tell you 
what he told me. 
He was crying when he told me that, so, I tended to believe him 
or he was a heck of an actor, one or the other. 
 
Before proceeding with the analysis, we observe that even if we assume that 
the witnesses accurately recounted what Wigley had said to them, this newly 
discovered evidence is of minimal value because there is no reason to believe that 
Wigley was being truthful when he made the statements which lessened the 
culpability of Marek.  Certain of Wigley‘s statements are vague statements (―I‘ve 
killed before‖) that have no express connection with the murder of Ms. Simmons.  
Other statements which are connected with Simmons‘ death reveal specific details 
that Wigley would have known by virtue of his being present at the crime for 
which he was convicted (e.g., the victim was strangled).  Furthermore, most of the 
witnesses considered Wigley‘s statements to have been boasting or otherwise self-
interested, rather than unadulterated expressions of guilt.  The testimony suggests 
 
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that Wigley‘s acquaintances did not necessarily believe Wigley, and the evidence 
showed that Wigley‘s statements were either calculated to garner favor or were 
―tough talk‖ for prison as a means of self-protection, intimidation, or braggadocio.  
The testimony that Wigley was a small, ―wimpy‖ man was uncontradicted, and 
several witnesses suggested that he may have made the claims for his own personal 
protection.  Wigley made the statements in situations in which he was being 
questioned about his sexual orientation and thus felt a need to brag, was arguing or 
talking to his lover, or was under the influence of alcohol or drugs.  Even his 
statements to Conley—which contain the admission that Wigley strangled the 
victim—were made after he had denied killing the victim and feared that Conley 
would not help him obtain legal assistance to challenge his murder conviction.  In 
addition, when speaking to Pearson, Wigley equivocated about whether he 
remembered strangling the victim.  Given the inconsistencies in Wigley‘s 
statements and the strong inference that the statements constituted prison ―tough 
talk‖ and were calculated by Wigley to obtain some advantage for himself, the 
probative value of the testimony recounting Wigley‘s statements is negligible. 
2.  Guilt Phase 
Newly discovered evidence will not be ―of such nature that it would 
probably produce an acquittal on retrial,‖ as required by Jones II, 709 So. 2d at 
521, if it would not be admissible in a new trial.  Marek acknowledges that the 
 
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evidence recounting Wigley‘s statements is hearsay but argues that the testimony 
would be admissible pursuant to the statements against interest hearsay exception 
or as a matter of due process under Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973).  
Marek‘s arguments are without merit.  The postconviction court correctly 
determined that this evidence would not be admissible during the guilt phase of 
trial and that, as a result, the evidence would not probably produce an acquittal on 
retrial. 
First, Marek has failed to demonstrate that the testimony about Wigley‘s 
statements would be admissible in the guilt phase as a statement against interest 
pursuant to section 90.804(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2008).  Section 90.804(2)(c) 
provides that where the declarant is unavailable as a witness, there is a hearsay 
exception for statements against the declarant‘s interest: 
Statement against interest.—A statement which, at the time of 
its making, was so far contrary to the declarant‘s pecuniary or 
proprietary interest or tended to subject the declarant to liability or to 
render invalid a claim by the declarant against another, so that a 
person in the declarant‘s position would not have made the statement 
unless he or she believed it to be true.  A statement tending to expose 
the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused 
is inadmissible, unless corroborating circumstances show the 
trustworthiness of the statement. 
Marek fails to show that Wigley‘s statements were within the scope of this hearsay 
exception. 
 
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Wigley‘s statements that he killed before or that he strangled the victim were 
not ―so far contrary to the declarant‘s pecuniary or proprietary interest‖ that ―a 
person in the declarant‘s position would not have made the statement unless he or 
she believed it to be true.‖  § 90.804(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2008).  At the time of his 
statements to Conley, Bannerman, Pearson, and Blackwelder (as overheard by 
Mitchell and Green), Wigley was serving a life sentence for the first-degree murder 
of Simmons.  He could not be retried for that crime as a result of confessing to 
being the person who actually strangled Simmons.  In addition, this Court has held 
that where an inmate recants trial testimony many years after trial, he would not 
reasonably believe that he could be prosecuted for perjury.  See Lightbourne v. 
State, 644 So. 2d 54, 57 (Fla. 1994).  Finally, Wigley‘s statements would not have 
exposed him to civil liability for the intentional torts committed against Simmons.  
A civil suit must be brought within the applicable statute of limitations, which 
would be either two or four years, depending on the cause of action asserted.  See § 
95.11(3)(o), Fla. Stat. (1983) (establishing four-year statute of limitations for 
actions based on intentional torts); § 95.11(4)(d), Fla. Stat. (1983) (establishing 
two-year statute of limitations for wrongful death actions).  Simmons was 
murdered in June 1983.  Thus, Wigley‘s statement to Bannerman, made sometime 
after they encountered one another in Union Correctional Institution in 1987, likely 
occurred after the statue of limitations had run.  Wigley‘s statements to Conley in 
 
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the mid-1990s, his statements to Pearson, which occurred sometime in 1999 or 
2000, and his statements to Blackwelder, which were overheard by Mitchell and 
Green no earlier than 1998, would not have exposed Wigley to civil liability 
because the statute of limitations had expired. 
Second, Marek has failed to demonstrate that any of the testimony about 
Wigley‘s confessions is admissible pursuant to Chambers, where the United States 
Supreme Court held that in some circumstances, due process requires the bending 
of technical rules of evidence regarding confessions by third parties.  Chambers 
was limited to ―the facts and circumstances of th[at] case‖ in which the excluded 
testimony ―bore persuasive assurances of trustworthiness and thus was well within 
the basic rationale of the exception for declarations against interest.‖  410 U.S. at 
302-03.  This Court has repeatedly explained that Chambers provides for the 
admission of hearsay only where the confession sought to be admitted bears indicia 
of reliability.  See, e.g., Grim v. State, 841 So. 2d 455, 464 (Fla. 2003) (―Grim‘s 
claim relies upon Chambers . . . ; however, he fails to recognize that in Chambers, 
the court held that the hearsay statements of a third person who orally confessed to 
the murder should have been admitted because the statements‘ reliability was 
clearly established.‖).  As discussed above, Marek has not shown that Wigley‘s 
statements were reliable.  Accordingly, Marek has not demonstrated that testimony 
about Wigley‘s confession would be admissible in the guilt phase of a retrial. 
 
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Based on the foregoing, the postconviction court did not err in concluding 
that Marek is not entitled to a new guilt phase.  
3.  Penalty Phase 
Section 921.141(1), Florida Statutes (2008), expressly provides for the 
admission of hearsay testimony in the penalty phase of a death case: 
In the [penalty phase] proceeding, evidence may be presented as to 
any matter that the court deems relevant to the nature of the crime and 
the character of the defendant and shall include matters relating to any 
of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances enumerated in [the 
statute].  Any such evidence which the court deems to have probative 
value may be received, regardless of its admissibility under the 
exclusionary rules of evidence, provided the defendant is accorded a 
fair opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements.  However, this 
subsection shall not be construed to authorize the introduction of any 
evidence secured in violation of the Constitution of the United States 
or the Constitution of the State of Florida. 
(Emphasis added.)  This statute provides ―wide latitude . . . in admitting penalty-
phase evidence.‖  Rutherford v. State, 727 So. 2d 216, 221 (Fla. 1998).  The 
admissibility of hearsay, however, is not unlimited.  The statute clearly conditions 
the admission of hearsay by the State on whether the defendant has a fair 
opportunity to rebut it.  Further, we have held that the same condition applies to the 
admission of hearsay evidence presented by the defendant.  Blackwood v. State, 
777 So. 2d 399, 411-12 (Fla. 2000) (―[T]he statute clearly states that the defendant 
must have an opportunity to fairly rebut the hearsay evidence in order for it to be 
admissible. . . .  This rule applies to the State as well.‖); see Hitchcock v. State, 
 
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578 So. 2d 685, 690 (Fla. 1990) (―While the rules of evidence have been relaxed 
somewhat for penalty proceedings, they have not been rescinded.  We find no 
merit to Hitchcock‘s claim that the state must abide by the rules but that defendants 
need not do so.‖).  Accordingly, because in this case we assume that the due 
diligence prong was met, Wigley‘s statements to the six witnesses would be 
admissible in a new penalty phase only if the State would have a fair opportunity to 
rebut the evidence.  As explained below, the State has ample, admissible rebuttal 
evidence; thus, Wigley‘s statements would be admissible. 
Having determined that Wigley‘s statements are admissible, the next 
question is whether introduction of Wigley‘s statements in the penalty phase would 
probably yield a less severe sentence.  Kormondy v. State, 983 So. 2d 418, 437-38 
(Fla. 2008) (citing Jones I, 591 So. 2d 911).  To make this determination, we must 
consider in a cumulative analysis the testimony of the witnesses reporting Wigley‘s 
statements along with the evidence presented at Marek‘s trial and penalty phase 
that we outlined above. 
For the reasons discussed previously, we conclude that Wigley‘s statements 
would not be credited by either the jury or the trial court.  Through cross-
examination, the State could readily demonstrate that most of the witnesses did not 
credit Wigley‘s statements.  For the most part, the witnesses attributed Wigley‘s 
―admissions‖ to the kind of ―tough talk‖ necessary for self-protection or simply 
 
- 22 - 
everyday parlance in prison.  Further, some of Wigley‘s statements contradicted 
his own previous statements and others conflicted with otherwise unchallenged 
trial testimony, such as his claim that he—not Marek—talked the victim into 
getting into the truck.  In addition, under section 921.141, the State could submit 
the sworn statement Wigley made shortly after the murder.  In it, Wigley detailed 
what both he and Marek did with the victim from the time she got in the truck until 
they left her brutalized and lifeless body some three hours later.  Wigley admitted 
his participation in the crimes and implicated Marek as the dominant actor. 
When considered in context, the newly discovered evidence does not 
significantly undermine the evidence of Marek‘s dominant role in the crime.  
Marek was charged in the alternative with premeditated and felony first-degree 
murder, and in opening and closing arguments, the State‘s theory of prosecution 
was explained to the jury in the alternative as well.  That is, either Marek killed 
Simmons, or Wigley killed her and Marek was a principal to the premeditated 
murder or a participant in the felony murder.  Based on the evidence we recited 
above, the jury found him guilty of first-degree murder.  Other than the jail 
deputy‘s testimony that Marek was a well-behaved prisoner, no other testimony or 
evidence was adduced in the penalty phase.  Accordingly, in finding Marek guilty 
and in recommending a sentence of death (by a vote of ten to two), the jury clearly 
did not believe Marek‘s trial testimony that he slept through the entire criminal 
 
- 23 - 
episode and never saw the victim even as he walked around for a quarter of an 
hour inside the small lifeguard shack where the body of Adella Simmons lay. 
In imposing the death sentence, the trial court found four aggravators and no 
mitigation.  Marek, 492 So. 2d at 1057.  One of those aggravators was 
subsequently stricken; thus, the sentence rests on the aggravators that the murder 
was (1) especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC); (2) committed in the course 
of attempted burglary with the intent to commit a sexual battery and in the course 
thereof an assault was committed; and (3) committed for pecuniary gain.  See 
Marek v. Singletary, 626 So. 2d 160, 161-62 (Fla. 1993) (noting that this Court 
previously affirmed the postconviction court‘s striking of the prior violent felony 
aggravator).  None of these aggravators rests on a determination that Marek was 
the actual killer, and none of the aggravating factors are undermined by the newly 
discovered evidence. 
 
Although this Court has previously held that a codefendant‘s life sentence 
precluded a death sentence for the other defendant, we have held otherwise when 
the codefendant sentenced to death is found to be the dominating force in the 
crime.  See Stein v. State, 995 So. 2d 329, 341 (Fla. 2008) (―However, the 
triggerman has not been found to be the more culpable where the non-triggerman 
codefendant is ‗the dominating force‘ behind the murder.‖).  In Henyard v. State, 
992 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 2008), for example, the defendant brought a similar claim to 
 
- 24 - 
this Court, relying on newly discovered evidence that while his codefendant 
awaited trial, another inmate overheard him brag that he was a ―killa.‖  Henyard 
and his codefendant kidnapped a woman and her two children from a parking lot, 
raped and shot the woman, and killed the two children.  This Court held that even 
assuming the statement was admissible as newly discovered evidence, the 
admission of this statement would not probably yield a lesser sentence.  Id. at 126.  
We found that the State‘s case at trial ―relied on [Henyard‘s] dominant role in the 
entire criminal episode and unrefuted evidence of his close proximity to the child 
victims at the time of their deaths.‖  Id.  The identity of the actual killer was 
unimportant in light of ―Henyard‘s substantial culpability.‖  Id. 
We reach the same conclusion in this case.  In affirming Marek‘s death 
sentence in light of Wigley‘s life sentence, we cited evidence and determined that 
Marek, ―not Wigley, was the dominant actor in the criminal episode.‖  Marek, 492 
So. 2d at 1058.  Wigley‘s statements are not credible.  They would have no effect 
on the previous determination that—without regard to the identity of the actual 
killer—Marek‘s death sentence is appropriate due to his dominant role in the entire 
criminal episode. 
Wigley‘s statements do not undermine Marek‘s convictions for first-degree 
murder, kidnapping, attempted burglary, and battery.  Nor do they undermine the 
evidentiary basis for the three aggravating factors supporting the death sentence.  
 
- 25 - 
They do not call into question the conclusion that Marek played the dominant role 
in this murder.  When considered in context with the other evidence from Marek‘s 
guilt and penalty phases, Wigley‘s post-trial statements—which were made years 
after the crime and in circumstances which provide no indication of reliability—
lack both weight and credibility.  Accordingly, we hold that their admission in the 
penalty phase would not probably result in a lesser sentence. 
B.  Clemency 
In his next claim of newly discovered evidence, Marek contends that 
Florida‘s clemency process and the manner in which the Governor signed his death 
warrant are unconstitutional.  The postconviction court did not err in denying this 
claim. 
Marek argues that Florida‘s clemency process, particularly the Governor‘s 
authority to sign warrants, is unconstitutional because it does not provide sufficient 
due process to the condemned inmate.  He asserts that public records documenting 
that the Governor reviewed Marek‘s case in September 2008 without input from 
Marek demonstrate that he was denied due process.  Marek contends that because 
he did not obtain the public records until April 27, 2009, he could not have raised 
this claim in a prior proceeding.  However, Marek did raise this claim in his second 
successive postconviction proceeding.  In that proceeding, Marek analogized the 
Governor‘s decision to sign his death warrant to a lottery and contended that 
 
- 26 - 
Florida‘s clemency process was one-sided, arbitrary, and standardless.  This Court 
rejected Marek‘s challenges as meritless.  See Marek, 8 So. 3d at 1129-30 
(rejecting constitutional challenge to Florida‘s clemency process and declining to 
―second-guess‖ the application of the exclusive executive function of clemency).  
The current claim raises the same legal challenge this Court previously considered. 
The April 27, 2009, public records do not affect this Court‘s prior decision.  
This Court did not dispute Marek‘s factual assertion that he was not informed of 
the Governor‘s request for information about him in September 2008 but, rather, 
decided that as a matter of law we would not ―second-guess‖ the executive 
clemency process.  Marek has not provided any authority holding that he must be 
provided notice before a death warrant is signed or that the Governor may not sign 
the death warrant of an individual whose death sentence is final and who has had 
the benefit of a clemency proceeding.  In Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 
523 U.S. 272 (1998), five justices of the United States Supreme Court concluded 
that some minimal procedural due process requirements should apply to clemency 
proceedings.  But none of the opinions in that case required any specific 
procedures or criteria to guide the executive‘s signing of warrants for death-
sentenced inmates.  Accordingly, Marek has not provided any reason for this Court 
to depart from its prior decision. 
C.  Ex Parte Order 
 
- 27 - 
In his third claim of newly discovered evidence, Marek contends that during 
his initial postconviction proceeding, Judge Kaplan engaged in ex parte 
communications with the State regarding the drafting of the order denying 
postconviction relief.  Marek‘s counsel asserted that while preparing the initial 
brief in the appeal of Marek‘s second successive postconviction motion, he noticed 
that the type and style of Judge Kaplan‘s order denying Marek‘s motion was the 
same as the State‘s reply to Marek‘s motion.  Marek‘s counsel also realized that 
the prosecutor who drafted the answer to Marek‘s initial postconviction motion 
was the same prosecutor who was found to have engaged in ex parte 
communications in Rose v. State, 601 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1992), and Smith v. State, 
708 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 1998).  From the similarities in the documents and the identity 
of the prosecutor, Marek‘s counsel infers that an ex parte communication must 
have occurred during the initial postconviction proceeding.  We agree with the 
postconviction court that this claim is procedurally barred. 
Marek has not established that the facts and law underlying this claim were 
not previously discoverable through due diligence.  Since 1988, the order and the 
State‘s reply to Marek‘s postconviction motion were readily available for 
comparison.  Moreover, the record from Marek‘s initial postconviction hearing 
suggests that Marek was aware that the prosecutor could be drafting an order ex 
parte denying relief.  At the conclusion of the initial postconviction proceedings in 
 
- 28 - 
1988, Judge Kaplan told the State that he would postpone issuing a final ruling on 
all of the claims and specifically told Marek‘s counsel, ―I will rule Monday.  I‘ll let 
you know Monday or I‘ll let Mr. [Paul] Zacks know and maybe you can call.‖  In 
response to Judge Kaplan‘s comments, Zacks (the prosecutor) then said, ―Yes, sir.  
I‘ll let everybody know the second I hear from you.‖  Given this record, Marek has 
failed to establish how this claim is not barred.  Accordingly, the postconviction 
court did not err in denying this claim. 
III.  FOURTH SUCCESSIVE POSTCONVICTION MOTION 
On appeal from the denial of his fourth successive postconviction motion, 
Marek raises two claims.  He argues that newly discovered evidence demonstrates 
(A) that—based on the United States Supreme Court‘s recent decision in 
Caperton—Marek‘s right to due process was violated when Judge Kaplan presided 
over Marek‘s 1984 sentencing and the 1988 evidentiary hearing on his initial 
motion for postconviction relief; and (B) that he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel during the penalty phase.  The postconviction court summarily denied 
these claims without holding a case management conference or an evidentiary 
hearing. 
Even if we assume that the postconviction court should have held a case 
management conference pursuant to rule 3.851(h)(6), any error was harmless.  The 
failure to hold a hearing on a successive postconviction motion that is legally 
 
- 29 - 
insufficient on its face is harmless error.  See Davis v. State, 736 So. 2d 1156, 1159 
n.1 (Fla. 1999); see also Groover v. State, 703 So. 2d 1035, 1038 (Fla. 1997) 
(―[E]ven if a Huff[v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993),] hearing had been required 
in the instant case, the court‘s failure to do so would be harmless as no evidentiary 
hearing was required and relief was not warranted on the motion.‖).  As explained 
below, Marek‘s fourth successive postconviction motion was legally insufficient 
on its face and without merit. 
The postconviction court summarily denied the two claims Marek raised in 
his fourth successive postconviction motion.  ―Postconviction claims may be 
summarily denied when they are legally insufficient, should have been brought on 
direct appeal, or are positively refuted by the record.‖  Connor v. State, 979 So. 2d 
852, 868 (Fla. 2007).  Because a postconviction court‘s decision whether to grant 
an evidentiary hearing on a rule 3.851 motion is ultimately based on written 
materials before the court, its ruling is tantamount to a pure question of law, 
subject to de novo review.  See State v. Coney, 845 So. 2d 120, 137 (Fla. 2003). 
A.  Caperton Claim 
Marek argues that his constitutional right to due process was violated under 
Caperton when Judge Kaplan presided over Marek‘s 1984 sentencing and the 1988 
evidentiary hearing on his initial motion for postconviction relief.  Marek raised a 
substantially similar claim in his recent appeal, arguing that when Caperton was 
 
- 30 - 
issued, it would apply to his claim.  In our previous opinion, we agreed with the 
postconviction court that Marek‘s due process claim was legally insufficient and 
meritless, and we found it likely that any decision in that case would be irrelevant 
to Marek‘s case.  Marek, 8 So. 3d at 1131.  In Caperton, the Supreme Court 
determined on the basis of extraordinary facts regarding a litigant‘s campaign 
contributions to a state supreme court justice that the Constitution required the 
justice to grant the opposing party‘s motion to disqualify him in the case.  
Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257.  Now that Caperton is final, we are certain that it is 
irrelevant to Marek‘s case.  The claim is procedurally barred.  See Fla. R. Crim. P. 
3.851(d).  Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying this claim in Marek‘s 
fourth successive postconviction motion. 
B.  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim 
Marek contends that the postconviction court erred in failing to grant an 
evidentiary hearing on his claim that newly discovered evidence reveals that his 
trial counsel, Hilliard Moldof, provided ineffective assistance of counsel.  Marek‘s 
claim is based on the State‘s cross-examination of Moldof during the most recent 
evidentiary hearing.  At the hearing, Moldof expressed the opinion that his 
performance during Marek‘s penalty phase was deficient.  Marek is not entitled to 
relief on this claim. 
 
- 31 - 
We have previously explained that trial counsel‘s own admission that he or 
she was ineffective is not evidence of counsel‘s performance and thus fails to form 
the basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  See Breedlove v. State, 
692 So. 2d 874, 877 n.3 (Fla. 1997) (noting that ―an attorney‘s own admission that 
he or she was ineffective is of little persuasion‖ in determining whether trial 
counsel was ineffective); Routly v. State, 590 So. 2d 397, 401 n.4 (Fla. 1991); 
Kelley v. State, 569 So. 2d 754, 761 (Fla. 1990)).  Moreover, in this claim, Marek 
wholly fails to address how Moldof‘s opinion could possibly establish the 
prejudice prong of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  Accordingly, the 
postconviction court did not err in summarily denying this claim. 
IV.  OTHER CLAIMS 
Marek challenges the postconviction court‘s denial of his motion to correct 
the transcript, and he requests that this Court relinquish jurisdiction to the 
postconviction court for the purpose of conducting an evidentiary hearing on how 
Judge Levenson came to be assigned to this proceeding.  Marek is not entitled to 
relief on either point. 
A.  Motion to Correct Transcript 
 
The official transcript of the June1-2, 2009, evidentiary hearing indicates 
that when asked to described Wigley, Leon Douglass stated that ―[h]e was a black 
male, kind of skinny, brownish/blackish hair, dark-colored hair, if you will, five-
 
- 32 - 
foot-seven, -eight.‖  Marek‘s counsel filed a motion to correct the transcript, 
asserting that he did not hear Douglass describe Wigley—who was white—as a 
black male and requesting a hearing to address the accuracy of the transcript.  The 
postconviction court denied the motion, finding that the transcript was not in error.  
The postconviction court explained that it had ―a specific recollection that Mr. 
Douglass described Raymond Wigley as a black man.‖  On appeal, the defense 
contends that the postconviction court erred in denying the motion to correct 
―without allowing the parties an opportunity to listen to the backup tape of the 
testimony.‖  Yet, defense counsel also asserts that the court reporter who 
transcribed the hearing stated ―that he did not recall Mr. Douglass describing 
Raymond Wigley as a black male, but that was what it soundly [sic] like Mr. 
Douglass said on the backup tape.‖  On this record, we cannot say that the 
postconviction court erred.  Cf. Matson v. State, 445 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. 5th DCA 
1984) (relinquishing jurisdiction for trial court to conduct evidentiary hearing on 
motion to correct transcript where court reporter averred that she erroneously 
transcribed her notes).  In any event, given the context of all the evidence at the 
evidentiary hearing and the negligible probative value of Douglass‘s testimony, 
any error with respect to this motion was necessarily harmless. 
B.  Motion to Get the Facts 
 
- 33 - 
Finally, Marek requests that this Court relinquish jurisdiction to the 
postconviction court for the purpose of conducting an evidentiary hearing on how 
Judge Levenson came to be assigned to this proceeding.  We hereby deny Marek‘s 
motion to relinquish. 
The record indicates that after this Court issued an order reversing and 
remanding the prior order denying Marek‘s third successive postconviction 
motion, the clerk of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit Court assigned the 
postconviction proceeding on remand to Judge Levenson.  Meanwhile, on May 21, 
2009, the State sent a notice to Chief Judge Tobin of the Seventeenth Circuit, 
informing him of this Court‘s order.  The notice requested that Chief Judge Tobin 
assign a new judge to preside over the proceedings on remand as ordered by this 
Court.  Chief Judge Tobin assigned a judge to the case but later rescinded this 
assignment upon learning that the clerk had assigned the case to Judge Levenson. 
During the June 1-2, 2009, evidentiary hearing, defense counsel asked Judge 
Levenson about the order assigning a judge other than Judge Levenson to the case 
and the order rescinding that assignment.  Judge Levenson explained that after this 
Court‘s remand order issued, the circuit court clerk‘s office randomly assigned the 
case to Judge Levenson using its standard procedure but that ―[i]ndependent of 
that, Chief Judge Tobin received the same directive from the Supreme Court and 
took it upon himself to assign it specifically to an administrative judge.‖  Judge 
 
- 34 - 
Levenson stated that because ―we all felt that the proper procedure was to have it 
done randomly, we abided by the procedure followed by the constitutional officer, 
the Clerk of Courts.‖  Judge Levenson asked defense counsel if he had any 
objections, and defense counsel raised no objection.  
On June 24, 2009, defense counsel filed in the postconviction court a 
document titled ―Motion to Get the Facts,‖ asserting that the defense had not been 
timely informed of the State‘s notice to Chief Judge Tobin and requesting that the 
postconviction court conduct an evidentiary hearing about how this proceeding 
was assigned to Judge Levenson.  The postconviction court did not rule on the 
motion.  On appeal, defense counsel asks this Court to relinquish jurisdiction for an 
evidentiary hearing and continues to assert that he was not aware of the State‘s 
contact with Chief Judge Tobin until after the evidentiary hearing.  The State 
contends that it emailed defense counsel a copy of the notice on May 21, 2009. 
Contrary to Marek‘s claim that an evidentiary hearing is required to 
determine how Judge Levenson was assigned to this proceeding, the record 
establishes that the clerk randomly assigned the case to Judge Levenson.  Defense 
counsel does not dispute this fact.  The defense does not allege that the case was 
assigned to Judge Levenson by a nonstandard procedure.  Nor does defense 
counsel allege any impropriety or appearance of impropriety by Judge Levenson.  
The only disputed factual issue is whether the State in fact emailed defense counsel 
 
- 35 - 
on May 21, 2009, to inform defense counsel of its notice of remand sent to Chief 
Judge Tobin.  No evidentiary hearing is needed to resolve this factual issue 
because it is immaterial.  There is no allegation that the State engaged in any ex 
parte communication with the judge who presided over Marek‘s hearing.  The 
State‘s notice sent to Chief Judge Tobin pertains to a ―strictly administrative 
matter[] not dealing in any way with the merits of the case.‖  Rose v. State, 601 So. 
2d 1181, 1183 (Fla. 1992) (emphasis removed) (prohibiting judges from engaging 
in any conversation about a pending case with one party outside the presence of the 
other party but excluding conversations about administrative matters from this 
prohibition).  Because the defense has not presented any legal issue that requires 
the resolution of a disputed material factual question, we deny Marek‘s request that 
this Court relinquish jurisdiction to conduct an evidentiary hearing. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the postconviction court‘s orders 
denying Marek‘s third and fourth successive motions for postconviction relief.  We 
also affirm the postconviction court‘s order denying Marek‘s motion to correct the 
transcript and deny his motion to relinquish jurisdiction. 
No motion for rehearing will be entertained by this Court.  The mandate 
shall issue immediately.  We hereby lift the stay imposed by this Court on May 11, 
2009. 
 
- 36 - 
 
It is so ordered. 
QUINCE, C.J., and PARIENTE, CANADY, POLSTON, LABARGA, and 
PERRY, JJ., concur. 
LEWIS, J., concurs in result only. 
 
NO MOTION FOR REHEARING WILL BE ALLOWED. 
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Broward County,  
Jeffrey R. Levenson, Judge – Case No. 83-7088-CF-10B 
 
Martin J. McClain of McClain and McDermott, P.A., Wilton Manors, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Carolyn M. Snurkowski, Assistant Attorney 
General, Tallahassee, Florida,  
 
 
for Appellee