Title: STATE v TROPF
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 12750
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: January 23, 1975

No. 12750 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1974 T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, -vs - DUARD TROPF, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: District Court of the Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Paul G. Hatf i e l d , Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Thomas A. Budewitz, Assistant Attorney General, Appeared, Helena, Montana J. Fred Bourdeau, County Attorney, Great F a l l s , Montana Norman L. Newhall, I11 Deputy County Attorney, argued, Great F a l l s , Montana For Respondent : Ralph T. Randono argued, Great F a l l s , Montana Submitted : September 17, 1974 Decided: jAhi23 1975 Filed : JR h. B 3 195 Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from an order of the district court, Cascade County, suppressing the state's evidence and refusing to allow the state to either amend or dismiss and refile the Information. On October 5, 1973, a complaint and an affidavit for a search warrant, with duplicate originals, were prepared on standard forms of the county attorney's office. The forms are headed "IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASCADE1' and contain a signature line at the bottom of each form, under which is the designation "DISTRICT JUDGE. " On the day in question there were no district judges present at the courthouse. The complaint and affidavit were submitted to H. William Coder, police judge of the city of Great Falls, who, upon hearing sworn testimony in support of the complaint and affi- davit, signed the search warrant in duplicate and certified the duplicate complaint and affidavit. A search was then made of defendant Duard ~ropf's house. In searching the premises police officers discovered numerous plastic bags containing marihuana residue, some marihuana seeds, and drug use paraphernalia. By following a path from the back door of the premises into the back yard, the officers found an old board covering a hole in the ground which contained a duffle bag, which in turn , held approximately three pounds of marihuana. Thereafter a return of the items seized upon execution of the search warrant was made of record before a district judge. At that time, the state maintains, one of the duplicate originals of the search warrant was left with the clerk of the district court. This is disputed and the records before this Court fail to reveal any such filing with the clerk. The other duplicate original of the search warrant and one duplicate original of the complaint and affidavit were retained by a detective of the Great Falls police department. The remaining duplicate original of the complaint and a f f i d a v i t were not f i l e d w i t h the c l e r k of t h e court and are un- accounted for. The s t a t e maintains t h e duplicate o r i g i n a l s of the complaint and a f f i d a v i t i n possession of the Great F a l l s police detective were subsequently f i l e d with the c l e r k of t h e d i s t r i c t court. This i s disputed by defendant and, again, t h e records before t h i s Court do not reveal t h a t these documents were f i l e d . On October 16, 1973, an Information containing two counts was f i l e d i n the d i s t r i c t court. "Count I: * * * possession c e r t a i n dangerous drugs, to-wit: Marihuana i n excess of 60 grams, i n viola- t i o n of Section 54-133, R.C.M. 1947, as amended". Evidence i n support of Count I was acquired by a search of defendant's premises conducted pursuant t o the search warrant issued by H. William Coder, police Judge of the c i t y of Great F a l l s . "count 11: * * * on o r about t h e 5 t h day of October, A.D. 19/3, and before the f i l i n g of t h i s Information, the s a i d defendant then and there being, did then and there w i l f u l l y , wrongfully, unlawfully and feloniously 7- , a s amended". (Emphasis added). Evidence i n support of Count I1 was acquired (1) by a statement given by defendant's roommate t o the county attorney t h a t on October 2, 1973, he observed the defendant s e l l dangerous drugs t o one Ron Paulson a t defendant's apartment a t 904 6th St. S.W., Great F a l l s ; (2) from the sworn testimony of Ron Paulson given i n a proceeding t o declare him a juvenile delinquent which t e s t i - mony confirmed the f a c t of such s a l e ; and (3) from a t h i r t e e n page police department statement given by the same informant. Defendant was arraigned October 18, 1973, and entered a plea of not guilty. Various motions were interposed by defendant and t h e matter s e t f o r t r i a l on January 28, 1974, by order dated Decem- ber 21, 1973. O n January 8, 1974, defendant under section 95-1803(d), R.C.M. 1947, gave notice of h i s defense of a l i b i and l i s t e d s i x witnesses. On January 23, 1974, the s t a t e by consolidated motions moved f o r leave t o amend Count I1 of the Information t o charge: "* * * on o r about the 2nd day of October, 1973, * * * defendant * * * did * * * s e l l a c e r t a i n dangerous drug, t o w i t : Hashish, t o Ronald Paulson i n violation of 54-132, R.C.M. 1947 a s amended. " The s t a t e alleged the proposed amendment was only i n form and not substance and did not charge an additional o r d i f f e r e n t offense and no r i g h t s of defendant w e r e prejudiced. I n the a l t e r - native, i t asked dismissal of the Information pursuant t o section 95-1706, R.C.M. 1947, on the ground t h a t a mistake was made i n charging t h e proper offense and t h a t the dismissal be without prejudice t o f i l e a new Information. A l l motions pending before the court were briefed and the court heard o r a l argument January 24, 1974. The court then suppressed the evidence i n support of Count I a s i l l e g a l l y seized because the search warrant was f a t a l l y defective f o r these reasons: (1) The person signing the warrant was without lawful authority t o issue a warrant out of the d i s t r i c t court of the eight j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t i n t h a t he i s not a d i s t r i c t judge of t h a t court. (2) The a f f i d a v i t and complaint on which the warrant was issued was not retained by the judge a s is required by section 95-706, R.C.M. 1947. The court further s t a t e d t h a t the s t a t e ' s motion t o amend Count 1 1 o r i n the a l t e r n a t i v e t o dismiss and r e f i l e a new Information, constituted an amendment a s t o substance r a t h e r than as t o form and was i n violation of section 95-1505, R.C.M. 1947; and, t h e a f f i d a v i t f o r leave t o f i l e Count 1 1 did not support the f a c t u a l allegations i n Count 11. The court denied the s t a t e ' s motions and dismissed Counts I and 11. The s t a t e argues t h a t the term "Judge" a s defined i n section 95-206, R.C.M. 1947, together with section 95-704, R.C.M. 1947, authorizes a police judge t o issue search warrants. Section 95-704, R.C.M. 1947, s t a t e s : 1 I Any judge may issue a search warrant * * *. I' Judge i s defined i n section 95-206, R.C:M., 1947, as: "'Judge' means a person who is invested by law with t h e power t o perform j u d i c i a l functions and includes court, j u s t i c e of the peace o r police magistrate c u l a r context so requires. '' (Emphasis adde This is a qualified definition to give judicial stature to our entire court system but is qualified so as not to be taken as conferring jurisdiction where none exists merely because other statutes use the term "judge". It is well founded in Montana law that the police courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and such courts have only such authority as is expressly conferred upon them. State ex rel. Marquette v . Police Court, 8 6 Mont. 297, 283 P.430; State ex rel. McIntire v. City Council of the City of Libby, 107 Mont. 216, 82 P.2d 587; City of Billings v . Herold, 130 Mont. 138, 296 P.2d 263; State ex rel. City of Libby v . Haswell, 147 Mont. 492, 414 P.2d 652. The subject matter jurisdiction of the police court of the city of Great Falls is defined by section 11-1602, R.C.M. 1947 and Section 1-27-11 of the Municipal Code of the City of Great Falls. Section 11-1602, R.C.M. 1947, provides: "Jurisdiction of police courts. The police court has con- current jurisdiction with the justice of the peace of the following public offenses committed within the county: " ( 1 ) Theft where the value of the stolen property does not exceed one hundred fifty dollars ($150)- " ( 2 ) Assault and battery, not charged to have been committed upon a public officer in the discharge of his official duty, or with intent to kill. " ( 3 ) Breaches of the peace, riots, affrays, committing willful injury to property, and all mis- demeanors punishable by fine not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500), or by imprisonment not ex- ceeding six ( 6 ) months, or by both fine and impri- s onmen t . " ( 4 ) Proceedings respecting vagrants, lewd, or disorderly persons. Such offenses must be prosecuted in the name of the state of Montana. I I ( 5 ) Possession of beer or liquor by persons under the age of eighteen (18) years in violation of section 94-35-106.2 [94-5-6101. tt ( 6 ) Selling, giving away or disposing of in- toxicating liquors to minors in violation of section 94- [3]5-106 [94-5-609 I. II The police court shall have no jurisdiction of any civil cause, except as otherwise provided by law. II Section 1-27-11 of the Municipal Code of the City of Great Falls, provides: " ( A ) Of all public offenses committed within the City over which police courts are expressly granted the "(B) Of all proceedings for the violation of any laws or ordinances of the City, both civil and criminal, which must be prosecuted in the name of the City. I1 (Emphasis added) . Since police magistrates have never been given authority by the legislature to issue search warrants, the word "~udge" used in section 95-704, R.C.M. 1947, does not require the inclusion of a police magistrate as a person authorized to issue search warrants. Therefore, the search warrant issued in the instant case was void. The district court correctly suppressed the evidence obtained under the authority of that search warrant. We need not proceed further to evaluate arguments advanced by the state in regard to the search warrant itself or the pro- cedure used in its issuance, execution and return, other than to clarify some misconceptions and the weight to be given State v . Meidinger, 160 Mont. 310, 319, 502 P.2d 58. The state admits the affidavit, complaint and warrant were entitled incorrectly as "IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY I1 OF CASCADE", but asserts There is no requirement under the law, however, that the warrant contain any heading specifying the court in which application is made." The state relies on section 95-717, R.C.M. 1947, which reads in pertinent part: 18 When search and seizure not illegal. No search and seizure, whether with or without warrant, shall be held to be illegal as to a defendant if: " * * * " ( b ) No right of the defendant has been infringed by the search and seizure, or, " ( c ) Any irregularities in the proceedings do not affect the substantial rights of the accused." The state also relies on Meidinger for support alleging the "highly technical" defect in Meidinger was more serious than that presently before this Court. Section 95-703, R.C.M. 1947, by definition directs that a search warrant "is an order i n writing, i n the name of the state". This would contemplate, a s i n a l l other criminal matters and particularly i n matters that pertain t o the authorizing instrument t o search a person's home, that notice t o the person subject t o the process concerning the origin of the process and t o whom he may address h i s grievances i n response for an inventory (section 95-712, R.C.M. 1947) a r e matters of due process and not technical irregularities. Omissions i n t h i s regard would be substantive and infringe on the rights of the person whose residence i s being searched and would necessarily be prejudicial error. The d i s t r i c t court condemned failure t o comply with section 95-706, R.C.M. 1947, which requires: "The application on which the warrant i s issued s h a l l be retained by the judge but need not be f i l e d with the clerk of the court nor with the court i f there is no clerk, u n t i l the warrant has been executed or has been returned 'not executed "'. Again the s t a t e r e l i e s on section 95-717, R.C.M. 1947, and alleges that one of the duplicate originals of the application was retained by a detective of the Great Falls police department and i n i t s brief states: ''It i s submitted that h i s [police] agency relationship t o the Police Judge i s a s binding as that of the Clerk of Court t o the District Judge and accordingly, Detective Hall's retention of the Application constitutes defacto retention by the Police Judge of the Application * * *." Thus the s t a t e contends the requirements of section 95-706,R.C.M. 1947, were substantially complied with. This reasoning i s not valid and w i l l not be pursued i n depth but i n passing w e w i l l comment that there can be no agency relation- ship between the executive and judicial branches of government by virtue of the separation of powers doctrine. The d i s t r i c t court was not i n error. Returning to sections 95-717 and 95-703, R.C.M. 1947, involved i n Meidinger; Section 95-703 heretofore cited i n definition of a search warrant, also requires that the warrant be "directed t o a peace officer" and i n Meidinger t h e warrant w a s addressed t o 11 any peace o f f i c e r of t h i s state". The f a c t s i n Meidinger were not similar nor was the defect i n the warrant a matter of substance, a s we f i n d here. The formal defect i n t h a t case could i n no way have infringed on the r i g h t s of t h e defendant and was not prejudicial. The Court, i n Meidinger, was not moved t o a l t e r the s t r i c t applica- t i o n of search warrant procedures and s t a t e d : "While t h i s Court does find t h a t the search warrant w a s defective because i t was not directed t o a p a r t i c u l a r police o f f i c e r , we do not approve t h i s type of search warrant and recommend t h a t such practices be discontinued. I I This was not a license t o erode the process but an admonition t o recognize t h a t the procedures i n t h i s area a r e t o be s t r i c t l y applied, very simply because they deal with an exception t h a t permits t h e sovereign t o e n t e r upon a constitutionally protected area. The s t a t e ' s second argument i s t h a t i t should have been allowed t o e i t h e r amend i t s Count I1 of the Information t o con- form with the a f f i d a v i t f o r f i l i n g d i r e c t , o r i n the a l t e r n a t i v e , the court should have dismissed Count I1 and allowed the s t a t e t o r e f i l e t h e Information. Section 95-1505, R.C.M. 1947, provides: "Amending the charge. (a) A charge may be amended i n matters of substance a t any t i m e before t h e d e f e n d a n r pleads, without leave of court. "(b) The court may permit any charge t o be amended a s t o form a t any time before verdict or finding i f no additional o r d i f f e r e n t offense i s charged and i f the substantial r i g h t s of the defendant a r e not prejudiced. "(c) N o charge s h a l l be dismissed because of a formal defect which does not tend t o prejudice a sub- s t a n t i a l r i g h t of t h e defendant." (Emphasis added.) It is, therefore, l e f t t o the discretion of the d i s t r i c t judge whether o r not the information can be amended a f t e r pleading. S t a t e v. Heiser, 146 Mont. 413, 416, 407 P.2d 370. Here, there i s no showing i n t h i s respect t h a t the d i s t r i c t court abused i t s discretion. This Court stated i n Heiser: I1 The function of an information i s two-fold: (1) t o give jurisdiction t o the court; and (2) t o notify a defendant of h i s offense, thereby giving him an opportunity t o defend. 11 See also: State v. Straight, 136 Mont. 255, 263, 347 P.2d 482. Here, defendant a f t e r pleading not guilty t o the Information, prepared h i s defense of a l i b i and furnished the names of the witnesses who would t e s t i f y a s t o the veracity of h i s a l i b i . To then allow the s t a t e t o change the date, t.he elements of the crime, and the drug involved would destroy that defense and would i n substance charge a different offense. The d i s t r i c t court correctly refused the motion t o amend the Information. The d i s t r i c t court was also correct i n i t s ruling that t o dismiss because of a mistake i n the substance of the charge, admittedly not i n conformity with the affidavit, with leave t o r e f i l e would be tantamount t o granting the motion t o amend a s t o a matter of substance. The order of the d i s t r i c t court i s affirm 2 7 ' / Justice P ,Chief Justice i _' ................................... Justices. Mr. Justice Wesley Castles dissenting: I dissent as to both the authority of a judge, in this case a police court judge, to issue a search warrant; and, the refusal of the district court to permit amendment or refiling. Suffice it to say that I feel that the majority opinion has interpreted the statutes much too narrowly.