Title: State v. Henderson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S52749
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: August 17, 2006

FILED: August 17, 2006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
LISA ANN HENDERSON,
Respondent on Review.
(C200201536B; CA A119000; SC S52749)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted March 10, 2006.
Rolf C. Moan, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the
cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review.  With him on
the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H.
Williams, Solicitor General.
Jamesa J. Drake, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the
cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.  With her on
the brief were Peter A. Ozanne, Executive Director, Office of
Public Defense Services, and Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender.
BALMER, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
*Appeal from Lane County Circuit Court, Gregory G. Foote,
Judge. 200 Or App 225, 113 P3d 944 (2005).
BALMER, J.
This case requires us to determine the validity of a
search warrant that police officers used to search defendant's
home for stolen property.  The Court of Appeals held that the
warrant was invalid because, in that court's view, the evidence
in the supporting affidavit was insufficient to allow the
magistrate to find probable cause to issue the warrant.  State v.
Henderson, 200 Or App 225, 113 P3d 944 (2005).  We allowed the
state's petition for review and, for the reasons set out below,
reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
We take the facts from the Court of Appeals opinion and
from the record.  On November 7, 2001, Detective Robert Carpenter
of the Roseburg Police Department submitted an affidavit
requesting a warrant to search defendant's home.  The affidavit
specifically described the premises that Carpenter wished to
search as:
"The residence located at 1238 M Street[,]
Springfield[,] Lane County, Oregon.  The search is to
include the residence of 1238 M Street[,]
Springfield[,] Lane County, Oregon, as well as any
vehicles registered to or under the control of
[defendant], outbuildings, travel trailers, tents, and
curtilage properties."
In the affidavit, Carpenter explained that he had been
investigating a theft of two purses that had contained, among
other things, two diamond rings.  One ring was a diamond
solitaire, and the other was a platinum setting with five
diamonds.  Witnesses had told Carpenter that a woman named
McCorquodale, who had been in the Roseburg area at the time of
the theft, had been attempting to sell rings of that description. 
Carpenter's affidavit stated that he had located McCorquodale in
Sutherlin, that she had admitted stealing the rings, and that she
had told him that within the last three weeks she had given the
rings to defendant in payment of a methamphetamine debt. 
According to the affidavit, McCorquodale had traveled to
Springfield with Carpenter and pointed out defendant's residence
to him.  Carpenter then had verified with the local police that
defendant lived at that residence.  Carpenter also had verified
with Driver and Motor Vehicle Services that the vehicle parked in
the driveway was registered in the name of the man that
McCorquodale had identified as defendant's domestic partner.
Carpenter's affidavit described Carpenter's education
and professional training and his experience investigating
thefts, including a listing, in generic terms, of where persons
"often times" or "sometimes" keep stolen property.  That listing
included the following possible locations: at the person's
residence, in the person's vehicles, in the soil near the
person's residence, in a travel trailer or outbuilding on the
person's residence, on the person, and on third parties at the
place to be searched.  The affidavit also stated that, based on
Carpenter's experience and training, he knew that persons who
possess stolen property often will convert it to their own use.
After examining Carpenter's affidavit, the magistrate
issued a search warrant authorizing Carpenter to search for the
two diamond rings at the location that Carpenter had described. 
The warrant echoed the request in the affidavit, allowing police
to search
"[t]he residence located at 1238 M Street[,]
Springfield[,] Lane County, Oregon.  The search is to
include the residence of 1238 M Street[,] Springfield,
Lane County, Oregon, as well as any vehicles registered
to or under the control of [defendant], outbuildings,
travel trailers, tents, and curtilage properties."
Carpenter and several other police officers executed
the warrant the day that the magistrate issued it.  The search
initially revealed two glass pipes, one of which appeared to have
been used for smoking marijuana and the other for smoking
methamphetamine.  After the officers found the pipes, defendant
also showed the officers where she kept the rings.  When the
officers threatened to get another warrant to search for more
evidence of illegal drugs, defendant's domestic partner showed
the officers a hiding place in a metal shed on the premises that
contained methamphetamine.
After defendant was charged with possession of a
controlled substance and two counts of endangering the welfare of
a minor, (1) she moved to suppress all the evidence that the
police had found in their search.  Defendant contended, in part,
that Carpenter's affidavit had not established probable cause to
support the issuance of the warrant because it had provided
insufficient information from which a judge could conclude that
defendant had placed the rings at her residence or, if she had
placed them there, that they still were there three weeks after
McCorquodale had given them to her.  Defendant based those
arguments on the statutes governing issuance of a search warrant,
ORS 133.525 to 133.703; Article I, section 9, of the Oregon
Constitution; and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution.  The trial court denied the motion to
suppress, determining that there had been probable cause to issue
the warrant because, in addition to Carpenter's asserted
knowledge and experience, the magistrate also had been permitted
to rely on the corroboration of the address and the description
of the rings provided by McCorquodale and on Carpenter's
independent verification of the address.  
Defendant was convicted following a stipulated facts
trial.  She appealed, and, as noted, the Court of Appeals
reversed.  In its opinion, the court agreed with defendant that
the affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause to
believe that the rings had been in defendant's home. (2)   The
court's primary reason for that conclusion was its concern that
the affidavit had listed "myriad and diverse locations" where the
rings might be found and that, in so doing, it had "diffus[ed]"
the probability that the rings might be in any one of those
locations.  Henderson, 200 Or App at 237.  As noted, the state
filed a petition for review, which we allowed. 
On review, the state argues that the affidavit
established probable cause to believe, first, that the rings had
been in defendant's residence and, second, that the rings were in
defendant's residence three weeks after defendant had received
them.  We turn to the relevant statutes and constitutional
provisions, and to this court's well-established precedents, to
address those issues. (3)
ORS 133.545 and ORS 133.555 govern the issuance of
search warrants.  ORS 133.545 provides that an application for a
search warrant "shall be supported by one or more affidavits
particularly setting forth the facts and circumstances tending to
show that the objects of the search are in the places, or in the
possession of the individuals, to be searched."  ORS 133.545(4). 
A judge reviewing the application and supporting affidavit shall
issue a search warrant if "there is probable cause to believe
that the search will discover things specified in the application
* * *."  ORS 133.555(2).  In addition to the statutory
requirements just described, Article I, section 9, of the Oregon
Constitution provides that "no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, supported by oath, or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person
or thing to be seized." (4)
When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of an
affidavit supporting a magistrate's issuance of a warrant, this
court asks (1) whether there is reason to believe that the facts
stated are true, and (2) whether the facts and circumstances
described in the affidavit are sufficient to establish probable
cause to search.  State v. Goodman, 328 Or 318, 324-25, 975 P2d
458 (1999); State v. Villagran, 294 Or 404, 408, 657 P2d 1223
(1983).  We analyze the affidavit in a common-sense manner, State
v. Moylett, 313 Or 540, 552, 836 P2d 1329 (1992), and allow the
magistrate to make reasonable inferences from the facts stated
therein.  State v. Ingram, 251 Or 324, 326, 445 P2d 503 (1968). 
While adhering to the probable cause requirement, we resolve
doubtful or marginal cases in favor of the preference for
warrants.  State v. Tacker, 241 Or 597, 602, 407 P2d 851 (1965).
"Probable cause" for purposes of ORS 133.555(2) exists
when the facts set out in the warrant "'lead a reasonable person
to believe that seizable things will probably be found in the
location to be searched.'"  Goodman, 328 Or at 325 (quoting State
v. Anspach, 298 Or 375, 381, 692 P2d 602 (1984)).  That statutory
definition also embodies the constitutional requirement of
probable cause.  Anspach, 298 Or at 380.
We now consider whether the issuance of the warrant in
this case met the standard described above, i.e., based on the
affidavit, did the magistrate have a reasonable basis for
believing that there was probable cause to search defendant's
home for the rings?  As explained below, we conclude that he did.
Carpenter's affidavit stated that defendant had
possessed the rings at some point in the preceding three weeks. 
The affidavit also described where defendant lived, how Carpenter
had learned that information, and the steps that he had taken to
verify it.  The affidavit included statements based on
Carpenter's experience that it is common for persons who possess
stolen property to hide that property in or around their homes
and vehicles or to convert that property to personal use. 
Moreover, and even without Carpenter's statements about his
experience, we think that the magistrate could rely on his own
common sense and draw reasonable inferences from Carpenter's
information about the rings and about defendant.  The rings were
nonperishable items of high value that would be easy to conceal,
that retain their value, and that some people might find
attractive to keep for personal use. (5)  On the basis of all
the information discussed above, we conclude that the evidence
before the magistrate supported the conclusion that there was
probable cause to search defendant's residence.  
That conclusion also compels us to reject defendant's
argument that the evidence was too stale to support probable
cause.  If, as described above, the magistrate reasonably
concluded that the nature of the rings -- valuable, nonperishable
items suitable for personal use -- permitted the inference that
defendant would have wanted to retain them, then it also is
reasonable to conclude that defendant could have retained them
for as long as three weeks, if not longer.  It obviously is true
that, in some cases, the passage of time may render formerly
sound information stale.  See, e.g., State v. Ingram, 251 Or 324
(information that individual possessing heroin was present in
particular house on January 9 did not provide probable cause to
support search of house on February 6).  But this is not such a
case.
For the above-stated reasons, we conclude that the
magistrate's issuance of the warrant was proper and that the
trial court correctly denied defendant's motion to suppress the
evidence obtained pursuant to that warrant.  In reaching that
conclusion, we necessarily disagree with the Court of Appeals'
determination that the warrant was insufficient because it had
described "myriad and diverse locations" where the evidence might
have been found.  As we stated above, based on the information in
the affidavit, the warrant authorized the police to search "[t]he
residence located at 1238 M Street[,] Springfield[,] Lane County,
Oregon.  The search is to include the residence of 1238 M
Street[,] Springfield, Lane County, Oregon, as well as any
vehicles registered to or under the control of [defendant],
outbuildings, travel trailers, tents and curtilage properties." 
That statement describes a location to be searched.  It is true
that the warrant is prolix concerning particular places within
that location, but the fact that the affidavit and the warrant
contained descriptions of multiple, specific places within the
identified location does not detract from the conclusion that
there was probable cause to search the location itself.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
1. The charge of endangering the welfare of a minor was
based on defendant's alleged possession and use of controlled
substances in the home she shared with her domestic partner and
their two young children.
2. Because it decided the case on that ground, the Court
of Appeals did not address whether the information concerning
defendant's receipt of the rings had become "stale" and therefore
insufficient to establish probable cause, in the three weeks
between defendant's receipt of the rings and Carpenter's
affidavit.
3. The Court of Appeals expressly did not reach
defendant's alternative argument that the search violated ORS
133.575(3).  See Henderson, 200 Or App at 238 n 9 (noting that
court did not need to and therefore did not address defendant's
argument under ORS 133.575(3)).  That statute provides that,
"before undertaking any search or seizure pursuant to the
warrant, the executing officer shall read and give a copy of the
warrant to the person to be searched, or to the person in
apparent control of the premises to be searched."  ORS
133.575(3).  Defendant maintained that the police officers
violated ORS 133.575(3) by failing to read the warrant to
defendant before beginning their search and that such a violation
required that the evidence be suppressed.  The trial court
concluded that a technical violation of ORS 133.575(3) had
occurred because the reading of the warrant had occurred
contemporaneous with, rather than before, the search, but that
such a violation did not rise to the level of a constitutional
issue.  We, too, reject defendant's argument, because, unless the
violation has constitutional dimensions, a statutory violation
ordinarily cannot serve as a basis for suppression.  See ORS
136.432 (relevant and admissible evidence generally cannot be
excluded based on statutory violation). 
4. Although the requirements of the warrant statutes and
Article I, section 9, may not always be coextensive, the parties
in this case make no argument that those provisions have
different requirements in this case.  Therefore, we discuss the
requirements of those provisions together.
5. Defendant argues, as a competing characterization, that
defendant might have considered the rings a fungible substitute
for currency -- that was how she reportedly had gained possession
of them in the first place -- or might have wanted to dispose of
the rings quickly lest they be discovered.  Those interpretations
are plausible, but the fact that there is another plausible way
of thinking about the rings is irrelevant to our analysis here. 
As described above, this court's standard of review does not
require us to determine the most likely place where the rings
were, but only whether the information in the affidavit supported
the conclusion that the rings "probably" would be found in the
location to be searched.