Title: Keller v. INDEPENDENT SCH. DIST. NO. 742
Citation: 224 N.W.2d 749
Docket Number: 44757
State: Minnesota
Issuer: Minnesota Supreme Court
Date: December 20, 1974

224 N.W.2d 749 (1974) Susan M. KELLER, Appellant, v. INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 742, Respondent. No. 44757. Supreme Court of Minnesota. December 20, 1974. *750 Oppenheimer, Wolff, Foster, Shepard &amp; Donnelly and Richard H. Murray and Robert R. Reinhart, Jr., St. Paul, for appellant. Howard I. Donohue, St. Cloud, for respondent. Considered and decided by the court without oral argument. TODD, Justice. Appeal from an order issued on October 26, 1973, by the Stearns County District Court upholding the order of the school board of Independent School District No. 742 terminating appellant's teaching contract. We affirm. Appellant has been continuously employed by respondent school district as a speech clinician since the 1970-1971 school year. During the 1972-1973 school year, the district employed seven full-time and three part-time clinicians. Four of the full-time clinicians were paid out of the state and district funds and three were paid out of Title I funds.[1] During the 1972-1973 school year, the district received several indications that the use of Title I funds would be severely restricted to specific programs in the future. The 1972-1973 guidelines of the Minnesota Department of Education prohibited the use of Title I funds for state mandated programs that require the expenditure of local funds, which funds then generate special reimbursement funds from the state. One example cited in the guidelines was the mandatory special education program required by Minn.St. 120.17.[2] On March 22, 1972, Jack W. Hanson, Federal programs administrator of the Minnesota Department of Education, sent a memorandum to all local Title I directors and superintendents. The thrust of this memorandum was to reiterate the prohibition of the state guidelines. Superintendent of schools for respondent, Kermit L. Eastman, received a further communication from the Title I office indicating that respondent must alter its funding pattern of the speech handicap program. As a result, a survey was conducted by Dr. James E. Henning, respondent's director of the special education program, to determine respondent's needs with respect to speech handicapped students. On the *751 basis of the survey, Dr. Henning recommended the employment of six full-time clinicians. This recommendation was rejected. On February 15, 1973, the board of education adopted a resolution discontinuing three full-time speech clinician positions. On the same date, the board adopted a resolution to terminate the contract of appellant. On February 16, 1973, the board notified appellant of the proposed termination, calling her attention to her right to a hearing. The notice stated: Appellant requested a hearing, which was held on March 22, 1973. Although there was testimony to the contrary, Dr. Henning testified that four full-time clinicians could adequately care for those children requiring intensive clinical services the following year. On March 30, 1973, the board issued its written findings and order. The board made the following findings: The board unconditionally terminated appellant's position effective at the end of the 1972-1973 school year. On October 26, 1973, the Stearns County District Court affirmed the decision and order of the board, finding: In its memorandum, the court stated: Appellant challenges the district court's order on the grounds that an improper standard of review was applied in review of the school board's action and that the evidence does not support the board's findings. The leading case in Minnesota interpreting the statutory procedure for termination based on discontinuance of position is State ex rel. Ging v. Board of Education, 213 Minn. 550, 7 N.W.2d 544 (1942). In that case, we emphasized that discontinuance of position did not abrogate the hearing requirement: However, we further recognized that the jurisdiction conferred upon the courts by way of certiorari is narrowly defined: In its order the district court indicated that it had reviewed the board's action for each of these factors and had found the proceedings to be regular in all aspects. We have also carefully reviewed the record and concur in the district court's findings. In reviewing the board's decision to terminate appellant's contract, we must consider that Minn.St. 125.12 was enacted to protect teachers from arbitrary discharge. However, this legislation was not intended to place an unreasonable restriction on the powers which a school board must possess to effectively administer the operation of the public schools. In Foesch v. Independent School District No. 646, Minn., 223 N.W.2d 371, 375 (filed August 2, 1974), we stated: Affirmed. [1] The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub.L. 89-10, Title I, 79 Stat. 27. [2] Minn.St. 120.17, subd. 1, provides in part: "Every district and unorganized territory shall provide special instruction and services for handicapped children of school age who are residents of the district and who are handicapped as set forth in section 120.03, subdivisions 1, 2 and 3 * * *." Minn.St. 120.03, subd. 1, provides in part: "Every child who * * * has defective speech * * * so that he needs special instruction and services, but who is educable, * * * is a handicapped child."