Title: State v. Tony Payano
Citation: 2009 WI 86
Docket Number: 2007AP001042-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 21, 2009

2009 WI 86 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2007AP1042-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Tony Payano, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2008 WI App 74 
Reported at: 312 Wis. 2d 224, 752 N.W.2d 378 
(Ct. App 2008-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 21, 2009   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 9, 2008   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Karen E. Christenson   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioners the cause was 
argued by Sarah K. Larson, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by Patrick 
Cavanaugh Brennan and von Briesen & Roper, S.C., Milwaukee, and 
oral argument by Patrick Cavanaugh Brennan. 
 
 
 
 
2009 WI 86
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2007AP1042-CR   
(L.C. No. 
2005CF5732) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Tony Payano, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 21, 2009 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals, State v. Payano, 2008 WI App 
74, 312 Wis. 2d 224, 752 N.W.2d 378, reversing Tony Payano's 
(Payano) convictions for one count of second-degree reckless 
injury while using a dangerous weapon, contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§§ 940.23(2)(a) and 939.63 (2007-08),1 and two counts of second-
degree recklessly endangering safety while using a dangerous 
weapon, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 941.30(2) and 939.63.  Payano 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
2 
 
was convicted by a jury in Milwaukee County Circuit Court, with 
Judge Karen E. Christenson presiding. 
¶2 
The State poses two issues for review: 
(1) Under State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 
576 
N.W.2d 30 
(1998), 
is 
"other 
acts" 
evidence 
admissible for the purposes of providing context and 
rebutting the defendant's self-defense claim, when the 
evidence was relevant to why police were at the 
defendant's door, and when the evidence was also 
relevant to what the defendant knew at that time?[2]   
 
(2) Under 
Sullivan's 
independent 
review 
doctrine, did the court of appeals independently 
search the record for other bases to sustain the 
circuit court's discretionary decision to admit the 
evidence? 
¶3 
After 
carefully 
considering 
the 
facts 
and 
circumstances, we conclude that the circuit court did not err in 
admitting the "other acts" testimony of a confidential informant 
about his observations of the defendant's possession of drugs 
and a handgun in the defendant's apartment on the day before the 
police executed a no-knock search warrant at the apartment.  The 
informant's testimony provided context for an incident in which 
a police officer was shot by the defendant.  It explained why 
the police were at the defendant's apartment, and it provided a 
plausible explanation of why the defendant fired his gun at a 
police officer trying to enter the apartment.  The informant's 
testimony served to rebut the defendant's claim that he was 
                                                 
2 This question ultimately implicates an evaluation of 
relevance under Wis. Stat. § 904.01 and unfair prejudice under 
Wis. Stat. § 904.03. 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
3 
 
acting reasonably in defense of himself and his family.  It 
provided a motive for the shooting.   
¶4 
The circuit court determined that (1) evidence of the 
defendant's very recent involvement with drugs and a gun at the 
place where the shooting occurred was offered for a proper 
purpose under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2); (2) the evidence was 
relevant under Wis. Stat. § 904.01; and (3) the probative value 
of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice under Wis. Stat. § 904.03.  The circuit 
court did not erroneously exercise its discretion because it 
reviewed the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law, 
and using a rational process, reached a reasonable conclusion.  
We believe the circuit court offered a cogent explanation for 
admitting the evidence in the circumstances presented.   
¶5 
Because of our decision on the first issue posed by 
the State, we find it unnecessary to address the second issue. 
¶6 
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY3 
¶7 
This case involves the shooting of a Milwaukee police 
officer during the execution of a no-knock search warrant.  
Payano does not deny shooting the officer.  He asserts that he 
                                                 
3 Unless 
otherwise 
stated, 
all 
facts 
and 
testimony 
referenced in this opinion come from either the parties' briefs 
to this court or the record from Payano's second trial.  We are 
not aware of any material difference between Payano's testimony 
at his first trial and his testimony at his second trial. 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
4 
 
was acting reasonably in self defense and defense of others.  
Thus, the facts in this case are critical. 
¶8 
In 2005, Payano, then 19, lived at 905 West Harrison 
Avenue in Milwaukee.  He lived in Apartment No. 4 on the second 
floor of the building with his mother, Ovidia De Los Santos 
(Ovidia), his father, and his sister.  His uncle, Juan Batista 
(Juan), and his cousin, Joel Batista (Joel), lived in Apartment 
No. 2 on the first floor of the building.  Payano's appellate 
counsel describes Payano as "an immigrant from the Dominican 
Republic with limited English skills."   
¶9 
On the afternoon of October 3, 2005, Payano returned 
home to 905 West Harrison Avenue with Juan and Joel.  He went 
upstairs to Apartment No. 4 while Juan and Joel remained 
outside.  The family members were situated in these positions 
when two unmarked Milwaukee police vehicles pulled up to the 905 
address to execute a no-knock search warrant for weapons and 
narcotics in Apartment No. 4.  Officer Michael Lutz (Officer 
Lutz), Officer Jon Osowski (Officer Osowski), and Officer Rick 
Sandoval (Officer Sandoval) arrived in one unmarked vehicle.  
Sergeant 
Michael Hartert (Sergeant Hartert) and Detective 
Lieutenant Michael Dubis (Lieutenant Dubis) arrived in the other 
vehicle. 
 
Sergeant 
Hartert 
was 
in 
full 
police 
uniform.  
Lieutenant Dubis was dressed in a suit and tie with his badge 
fastened to his belt.  The other three officers, including 
Officer Lutz, were in a "plain clothes capacity," which 
generally means "jeans, a t-shirt, a full duty complement of 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
5 
 
guns, 
ammunition, 
bulletproof 
vest, 
and 
[the] 
badge 
and 
identification hanging around [the] neck."   
¶10 When the police arrived, Joel immediately ran into the 
building and up the stairs to Apartment No. 4.  The officers, 
not knowing whether Joel was the suspect ("Rico") named in the 
search warrant, chased after him.  The officers proceeded with 
weapons drawn.  They claim that they yelled "Police," "Stop, 
search warrant," and "Hands up," both on the street and inside 
the building.  They claim that these commands were made in both 
English and Spanish. 
¶11 In opposition, Payano claims that either he did not 
hear or understand the officers' commands.  Payano testified 
that he was in Apartment No. 4 with his mother, Ovidia, when he 
heard footsteps and screaming outside the door.  Joel then 
rushed 
into 
the 
apartment, 
and 
Payano 
locked 
the 
door.  
According to Payano, Joel expressed fear upon entering the 
apartment, saying over and over, "It's not me," and "They are 
confusing me with someone."  Payano testified that Joel did not 
know how to answer his question: "Who is it?" 
¶12 The officers arrived at Apartment No. 4 and began to 
break down the door while Joel was attempting to hold it shut.  
Payano testified that, as events unfolded, Ovidia was crying and 
screaming hysterically and was unable to comply with Payano's 
request that she call the police.  Payano testified that he was 
paying attention to the door of the apartment, watching Joel 
holding the door.   
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
6 
 
¶13 He was asked at trial: "Did you know that the men on 
the other side of the door were police?"  He answered: "I never 
imagined that." 
¶14 The questions to Payano continued as follows: 
Q. 
There comes a time that you do something to fend 
off these men. 
A. 
Yes. 
Q. 
What did you do? 
A. 
After a few seconds when no one answered and the 
door was breaking on both sides, I ran to get the 
weapon that I had. 
Q. 
And where was that? 
A. 
Under the sofa. 
Q. 
And then what did you do? 
A. 
I ran, and I got near the door. 
Q. 
And at this point, was there still hitting on the 
door? 
A. 
Never stopped hitting the door. 
Q. 
Was Joel saying anything? 
A. 
As far as I remember, "They are going to kill 
us." 
Q. 
And then what did you do? 
A. 
I said, I have no other choice.  I have no other 
solution, and according to the way they were 
breaking the door like that they were not going 
to spare us alive. 
Q. 
So what did you do? 
A. 
I fired. 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
7 
 
According to Payano, neither he, Joel, nor Ovidia "realized that 
the men at the door were, in fact, police officers." 
¶15 Payano's gunshot hit and wounded Officer Lutz.  Lutz 
testified to the following: 
A. 
I proceeded to the door.  I announce "Milwaukee  
police.  Milwaukee police."  I have my gun in my 
right hand extended before me, and I have my left 
hand out to push open the door, and I start 
pushing open the door as I'm yelling, "Milwaukee 
Police." 
Q. 
As you're pushing that door with the one hand and 
holding your weapon in the other hand, what 
happens next? 
A. 
The door gets open approximately 12 inches.  And 
I'm able to see a refrigerator to my left, and I 
see Mr. Payano leaning over the refrigerator 
pointing a gun at me. 
Q. 
What happened then? 
A. 
It happened very quickly.  Just as the door was 
opened and I glanced, I didn't have the time to 
bring my gun over.  I heard one shot fired. 
Q. 
And the shot came from where? 
A. 
Mr. Payano. 
Q. 
Who was partially behind the refrigerator? 
A. 
Yes.  He took concealing in front of the 
refrigerator 
[sic] 
and 
was 
up 
over 
the 
refrigerator. 
Q. 
Over the top of it? 
A. 
Yes. 
Q. 
Was that [a] full height refrigerator or one that 
wasn't a full? 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
8 
 
A. 
It appeared to be a small or medium size 
refrigerator.  It wasn't a full size larger 
refrigerator. 
Q. 
So you could see his head over the top of it? 
A. 
Head and shoulders and arms. 
Q. 
Then one shot.  Where did it go? 
A. 
I didn't know where it hit initially.  I know 
that I was —— I fell backwards and landed on my 
butt.  I was then going to return fire and trying 
to use a two handed grip, and in the moment when 
I brought my gun up, I noticed that my left arm 
wasn't following me.  And when I looked behind, I 
could see it obviously was broken.  It was bent 
back, bent at a very awkward position, and then I 
noticed I was bleeding.   
¶16 Officer Lutz suffered severe damage to his left arm.  
His injuries required three separate surgeries, leaving him with 
very poor muscle strength in his arm.  Officer Lutz was unable 
to return to active duty because of his injuries.   
¶17 Payano testified that, after shooting one time in 
defense of himself and his family, the following transpired: 
A. 
After I fired . . . I heard the gunshots being 
returned.  I fell to the ground because I thought 
I had been shot several times.  
Q. 
How many gunshots did you hear? 
A. 
I heard about five or six. 
Q. 
From the ground then, where did you go? 
A. 
I went to get my mom. 
Q. 
And where was your mom? 
A. 
On the ground screaming nervous without being 
able to speak. 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
9 
 
Q. 
Did you and Joel and your mom then go to the 
bathroom? 
A. 
Yes.  I instructed them to go to the bathroom 
because it was . . . the safest area where we 
could avoid the bullets. 
Q. 
When the three of you got into the bathroom, how 
were you positioned in the bathroom? 
A. 
Well, first I put my mom in the corner, and then 
I got in and then Joel because I said if we were 
standing in front of the door they could shoot. 
Q. 
So you were[,] the three of you[,] in the 
bathtub? 
A. 
Correct. 
Q. 
Did your mom —— [y]ou have the telephone in your 
hand? 
A. 
Yes. 
Q. 
And did you call 911, Tony? 
A. 
Yes. 
. . . . 
 
 
 
(Cassette tape played.)[4] 
. . . . 
Q. 
Mr. Payano, was that you who called 911 and was 
that you on the recording we just heard? 
A. 
Yes. 
Q. 
At some point after you call, you left the 
bathroom? 
A. 
Yes. 
Q. 
Why did you leave the bathroom? 
                                                 
4 Neither the 911 recording nor a transcript of the call are 
included in the record.  
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
10 
 
A. 
Because they knocked on the door and said, 
"Police." 
Q. 
And before you left the bathroom, did you put the 
gun in the toilet tank? 
A. 
Yes. 
Q. 
Why did you do that? 
A. 
Because the police arrived, and I [knew I had 
fired the weapon]. 
¶18 After the shooting had ceased and the police were able 
to secure the premises, Payano, Joel, and Ovidia were each 
arrested.  The police found no evidence of drugs, drug use, or 
drug sales in the apartment; they did locate the handgun Payano 
used in the shooting, which had been placed in the tank of the 
bathroom toilet.  No injuries other than Lutz's injury were 
reported. 
¶19 Joel was "soaking wet" when he was arrested.  At 
trial, he testified, explaining his condition: 
Q. 
How did you get wet? 
A. 
When I heard that they were banging on the door I 
heard [Ovidia] calling me . . . she said come 
over here to the bathroom, to the bathroom.  We 
went into the bathroom, when I got into the 
bathroom and I fell and I hit the faucet. 
Q. 
How did you fall exactly? 
A. 
I fell and I hit it with my elbow like that and 
the shower started going. 
Q. 
What were you doing when you fell? 
A. 
I fell and the water fell on top of me. 
Q. 
What exactly were you doing when you lost your 
balance and fell? 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
11 
 
A. 
I was——we were running towards the bathroom. 
Q. 
Whose idea was it to go into the bathroom? 
A. 
When [Ovidia] said let's go into my room, 
[Payano] said no, so we went over to the 
bathroom. 
. . . .  
Q. 
You accidentally turned on the faucet when you 
fell? 
A. 
Yes. 
Q. 
That is how you got wet? 
A. 
Yes. 
. . . . 
Q. 
Were you the only one in the tub when that 
happened? 
A. 
No. 
Q. 
Who else was in the tub when this happened? 
A. 
The three of us. 
Q. 
But you were the one that got wet? 
A. 
I think [Payano] got wet also and [Ovidia] got 
wet a little bit too but I was looking forward. 
. . . . 
Q. 
Was anybody flushing the toilet when you ran into 
the bathroom? 
A. 
No. 
Q. 
Were any of the faucets already on when you ran 
into the bathroom? 
. . . . 
A. 
No. 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
12 
 
Q. 
Anybody flushing drugs when you ran into the 
bathroom? 
A. 
What drugs, we didn't have any. 
Q. 
Did you flush any drugs when you ran into the 
bathroom? 
A. 
No, I have never dealt with drugs. 
¶20 Payano was charged with three offenses: one count of 
first-degree reckless injury while armed, a Class D Felony, in 
violation of Wis. Stat. §§ 940.23(1)(a) and 939.63, and two 
counts of first-degree recklessly endangering safety while 
armed, a Class F Felony, in violation of Wis. Stat. §§ 941.30(1) 
and 939.63.   
¶21 Payano's first trial began on February 13, 2006, and 
lasted through February 20.  Payano never denied shooting and 
injuring Officer Lutz.  Instead, he asserted an affirmative 
defense, arguing that his shooting was motivated by self-defense 
and the defense of others, specifically Joel and Ovidia.  
Payano's counsel summarized the issue to the circuit court 
during the final pre-trial proceedings before Payano's first 
trial: 
I think essentially this [comes] down to a factual 
issue, the factual issue being whether at the time the 
nonuniform police officers were in the process of 
breaking down the door to the apartment where the 
Defendant was located, they did or did not properly 
and adequately announce themselves as police officers 
such that when he fired the shot, he knew their 
identity or whether he reasonably believed that they 
were, as [Joel] advised him, unknown persons wielding 
guns threatening to kill him.  I believe in sum and 
substance, that is the essence of the case.   
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
13 
 
¶22 Ultimately, the outcome of the trial turned on whether 
the jury believed Payano's version of the story——that he was 
acting in self-defense and the defense of others——or whether it 
believed the prosecution's version——that Payano fired the gun to 
"buy" extra time so he could flush any evidence of drugs, which 
according to the search warrant were believed to be present in 
the apartment.   
¶23 The jury deliberated from 1:00-5:20 p.m. on Friday, 
February 17, 2006, and it returned on Monday morning, February 
20, at 8:30 a.m.  At 1:20 p.m., the jury informed the circuit 
court that it was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on any of 
the charges.  Judge Christenson declared a mistrial and 
adjourned the matter for further future proceedings.   
¶24 In June 2006, Payano was retried for the same three 
offenses in a jury trial with Judge Christenson presiding.  
Although there was no newly discovered evidence, the prosecution 
changed its trial strategy and asked that the circuit court 
admit other acts evidence that it had not used in the first 
prosecution.  Specifically, the prosecution asked the court to 
admit into evidence the testimony of a confidential informant, 
Jason Kojis (Kojis), and the information he provided to Officer 
Lutz that was the basis for the no-knock search warrant. 
¶25 On June 20, 2006, after the jury was impaneled but 
before opening statements, the court conducted a Sullivan5 
hearing in chambers to determine whether the other acts evidence 
                                                 
5 State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 576 N.W.2d 30 (1998). 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
14 
 
proffered by the prosecution should be admitted, and if so, for 
what purpose.   
¶26 In making its offer of proof, the prosecution revealed 
a lot about Kojis.  First, the prosecution noted that Kojis was 
a convicted criminal who had "a working relationship" with 
Officer Lutz and that he had provided Officer Lutz with 
information in exchange for money on several past occasions.  
The prosecution then questioned Kojis in detail about what he 
had reportedly witnessed on October 2, 2005, the day before the 
shooting incident at 905 West Harrison Avenue. 
¶27 Kojis explained that his presence in Apartment No. 4 
was not drug related.  He had gone to the apartment with a 
friend who was involved in a personal dispute.  Kojis was asked 
the following: 
Q. 
Do you remember which apartment? 
A. 
Yes. 
Q. 
Okay.  Which apartment? 
A. 
I don't know the exact number, but I know like if 
you go up the stairs. 
Q. 
Okay.  And you described which apartment when you 
later talked to Officer Lutz? 
A. 
Yes. 
Q. 
When you got into that apartment who, if anyone, 
was present in the apartment? 
A. 
Mr. Payano. 
Q. 
Okay.  And have you identified Mr. Payano in some 
formal way for the Milwaukee Police Department? 
A. 
Yes. 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
15 
 
Q. 
And did you do that by a photo lineup? 
A. 
Today, yes. 
Q. 
Okay.  And in terms of the photo lineup, that was 
just done this morning? 
A. 
Yes. 
Q. 
Is the person that you've referenced as Tony 
Payano, did you know his name back in October? 
A. 
Not as Tony Payano. 
Q. 
And is that person that you've referenced as Tony 
Payano present in the Chambers here today? 
A. 
Yes. 
¶28 Kojis said he saw Payano in the kitchen of the 
apartment: 
Q. 
What, if anything, did you notice that was in the 
kitchen? 
A. 
Mounds of dope packaged up and a handgun. 
Q. 
Dope? 
A. 
Cocaine.  And a handgun. 
Q. 
And you could tell it was cocaine? 
A. 
Yeah.  Well, anybody that's been on the streets 
can look and see what it is. 
Q. 
Approximately what kind of amount did you think 
you saw in the residence at that time? 
A. 
Numerous——numerous small packages and one big 
chunk. 
. . . . 
Q. 
Did you have any estimate as to how much total 
you saw on the kitchen table? 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
16 
 
A. 
From my experience on the streets, I'd say 
anywhere from like two to three, maybe more than 
that.  At least two to three ounces. 
. . . . 
Q. 
Did Mr. Payano and you speak at all between the 
two of you? 
A. 
No.  He spoke to the friend that I had went with. 
Q. 
Did you get a good look at the gun that was on 
the table? 
A. 
Yes. 
Q. 
Did you notice anything about the gun, I mean 
what type of gun it was? 
A. 
I knew it was a small caliber.  I assumed it was 
a 380 because I seen it and I know my sizes.  And 
I described it to Officer Lutz when I called him 
to tell him about it the next day. 
. . . . 
Q. 
About how long total were you in Mr. Payano's 
kitchen that morning or that afternoon? 
A. 
I'd say about maybe like five to ten minutes, 
give or take. 
. . . . 
Q. 
And how long did you wait before you let Officer 
Lutz know what you had seen at 905 West Harrison? 
A. 
The next morning. 
. . . . 
Q. 
What's the next relevant thing that happened or 
that you observed on that Monday, October 3, the 
same day you gave the information to Officer 
Lutz? 
A. 
Well, that morning we . . . rode by there and I 
pointed the suspect out. And then I went—— 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
17 
 
Q. 
Who did you point him out to? 
A. 
Officer Lutz and the partner that was with him at 
the time. 
Q. 
And you did that so Officer Lutz would know who 
you were talking about? 
A. 
Exactly. 
Q. 
And who did you point out to Officer Lutz on the 
morning of Monday, October 3[]? 
A. 
Mr. Payano. 
Q. 
And where was he when you pointed him out to 
Officer Lutz? 
A. 
Standing next to the house. 
After answering questions from the prosecution, the defense, and 
the court, Kojis was dismissed from chambers. 
¶29 The prosecution then set forth its justification for 
the admission of Kojis's testimony and the information he 
provided to Officer Lutz: 
Judge, I guess the most succinct way I can put this 
is . . . it goes directly to the defense in this case.  
If this were a situation where Mr. Payano's defense 
was ["]I wasn't the shooter, I never fired a shot, I 
did not commit this crime,["] then I would not be 
offering this.  It would be improper other acts and it 
would be very clear. 
 
What makes it different is that the defense in 
this case is that he fired the shot through the door, 
that he did so because he had a lack of knowledge that 
it was the police.  He says he did not ever hear them 
identify themselves as police, ever see any uniform, 
ever see any badge, ever hear any yelling about search 
warrants.  And that is a factual dispute that the jury 
has to sort out. 
 
. . . [I]n this case the Court has an unusually 
clear picture of exactly where this fits in because 
we've done the trial once.  And the court will recall 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
18 
 
that, not only was it the privilege of self-defense 
that was the defense in this case, but also that the 
defense used the lack of any drugs as one of its 
primary weapons to defeat the case, that and the 911 
tape.  So you have a situation where the person is 
claiming 
reasonable 
self-defense. 
 
And 
that 
instruction 
of 
course 
hinges 
on 
objective 
reasonableness and the lack of any drugs. 
 
In fact, 
Mr. Brennan [Payano's first trial 
counsel] did a very aggressive and effective job of 
pointing out that in this case, if any, they took 
every step possible to find any residue, talked to 
them about the tests to find residue [of drugs] and 
all this stuff.  And very effectively pointed out that 
no drugs were recovered. 
 
The fact that on the day before the entry 
occurred Mr. Payano was seen packaging drugs with the 
same 380 on the kitchen table in his own kitchen is 
not being offered to show that he is "a drug dealer" 
and, therefore, should be found guilty.  It is 
strictly being offered to rebut the defense of 
reasonable self-defense, defense of others. 
. . . . 
 
And it is specifically statutorily an exception 
to [Wis. Stat. §] 904.04 to rebut a defense.  The 
defense has made it an issue.  And that's why it 
should be admitted.  It's not unduly prejudicial 
because it focuses on the defense.  And the limiting 
instruction —— in this case the limiting instruction 
will be much more effective than it is in so many 
"other acts" cases because that instruction can be 
written to direct the jury's attention that this 
evidence is only to be construed when weighing the 
defense of self-defense. 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
19 
 
 
And . . . we can limit it and reduce greatly any 
possibility or risk of unfairness by emphasizing to 
the jury that the only reason that the evidence was 
admitted and the only relevance of Mr. Kojis'[s] 
testimony is when you weigh self-defense.  And it can 
be limited to that purpose.  And we can greatly 
minimize any risk of undue influence.  But it is as 
relevant as any evidence I can imagine to rebut self-
defense. 
(Emphasis added.)  
¶30 Following 
this offer of proof, Payano's defense 
counsel, Heather Pantoga, voiced her vigorous objection to the 
admission 
of 
Kojis's 
testimony 
or 
any 
reference 
to 
the 
information he provided Officer Lutz.  Specifically, Payano's 
defense counsel argued that the evidence was "wholly irrelevant" 
because it "doesn't have anything to do with this defense which 
is what was Tony Payano's . . . state of mind when he fired that 
shot."  Defense counsel continued as follows: 
Now, in order to claim——and I think even this is 
a stretch——but to claim that it goes to the theory of 
defense is to make a presumption about some archetype 
of drug dealers and how they behave.  There's no 
foundation for that.  It's improper. 
 
And, further . . . Mr. Kojis testified he saw 
drugs on the table. . . .   [H]e testified there was 
no drug dealing.  Nobody bought drugs that day.  He 
didn't buy drugs.  His friend didn't buy drugs.  There 
w[ere] drugs on the table.  He did testify that Tony 
Payano was touching those drugs.  Nobody else was 
touching those drugs.  He didn't hear any conversation 
revolving around drugs.  It's irrelevant. 
 
And even if this Court decided that it were 
relevant, although I think it is not relevant, it is 
evidence of other acts. 
 
And it's highly prejudicial.  If the State wants 
to bring Tony Payano in and paint him as a drug dealer 
in the backdoor way, they should have charged him with 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
20 
 
possession or distribution of drugs in the first place 
and had [Mr. Kojis] testify in that trial.  This is 
not about that. 
¶31 After listening to the arguments, Judge Christenson 
explained why she would allow the prosecution to submit Kojis's 
testimony and the information he provided Officer Lutz as 
evidence.  Judge Christenson said the following: 
It is not about Mr. Payano's being a drug dealer.  But 
having listened to the testimony in the last case, the 
jury clearly was left with the impression because of 
pretrial rulings and because of agreements between 
attorneys . . . . 
 
The jury, I believe, was left with the impression 
that this search warrant was somehow arbitrary, based 
on nothing, that the police came storming into a place 
with no basis really for doing that, that it may have 
been somehow a violation of Mr. Payano's rights, that 
Mr. Payano was a sometime beautician or hair cutter, 
that his English was not good, and that he had no 
reason to expect the police to be coming.  And in that 
context, I think self-defense is framed somewhat 
differently. 
 
Self-defense is, as defined in [Wis. Stat. §] 
939.48, a person who is privileged to intentionally 
use 
force 
against 
another 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
preventing or terminating what the person reasonably 
believes to be an unlawful interference with his or 
her person.  And by extension, it goes to the 
protection of others. 
 
The jury clearly has to be able to deal with what 
is 
reasonable 
under 
those 
circumstances 
for 
a 
reasonable person.  I think that the testimony from 
Mr. Kojis, which clearly places into context what the 
police were doing there and what Mr. Payano was 
observed with on the day before, helps the jury to 
assess reasonability.  It does provide, I think, a 
somewhat different understanding for the jury about 
what was going on. 
 
It does not obviously give the jury the answer 
about what was in Mr. Payano's mind or what he 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
21 
 
understood.  Those issues are still for them to deal 
with. 
 
The State will not be allowed to suggest that Mr. 
Payano is a drug dealer.  I think Mr. Kojis should 
clearly testify that he didn't go there looking for 
drugs, that neither he nor his friend bought drugs, 
that there was no drug transaction going on.  But I 
think it is testimony that places into context the 
entire situation.  And I think it is important to the 
jury to be able to struggle with what Mr. Payano 
reasonably believed at the time the search warrant was 
executed. 
¶32 Attorney Pantoga sought to persuade the court that it 
should 
exclude 
all 
evidence 
of 
drugs 
from 
either 
side.  
Assistant District Attorney Thomas L. Potter replied as follows: 
 
[T]he major issue in this case[ ] is why did Tony 
Payano fire the shot?  Did he fire the shot through 
the door because he was innocent, had no clue at all 
that this was the police executing the search warrant 
and was merely trying to protect his mother in the 
middle of the day from armed thugs with sledgehammers 
who are trying to break down his door in the middle of 
the day?  That's the defense version. 
The State's version is no, no.  He needed to buy 
a few minutes of time to flush the drugs.  And the 
jury has to pick between those competing motivations 
for firing the shot. 
¶33 The court responded with the following: 
I do think that the context and the testimony of this 
witness is something that the jury should hear for a 
very narrow point.  And I certainly will instruct the 
jury that they are to consider this only on the issue 
of whether or not Mr. Payano reasonably believed that 
it was armed thugs that were attacking his door. 
With that explanation, the court permitted the State to use 
Kojis's testimony and the information he provided Officer Lutz 
as evidence against Payano. 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
22 
 
¶34 Kojis's testimony and the information he provided 
Officer Lutz were both referenced multiple times during Payano's 
second trial, but there is no indication that the evidence was 
used for any purpose outside the narrow scope defined by the 
circuit court.6  See Payano, 312 Wis. 2d 224, ¶¶31, 35.  After 
evaluating the evidence and receiving instructions, the jury 
returned a guilty verdict against Payano on all three counts 
after about eight hours of deliberations.  The court sentenced 
Payano to 12 years and 6 months of initial confinement and 5 
years of extended supervision on the count of second-degree 
reckless injury while armed and two concurrent terms of 3 years 
confinement and 2 years of extended supervision on the two 
counts of second-degree recklessly endangering safety while 
armed.  The sentences on counts two and three were made 
concurrent to the sentence in count one. 
¶35 Payano appealed his convictions to the court of 
appeals, arguing that the circuit court erroneously exercised 
its 
discretion 
by 
admitting 
Kojis's 
testimony 
and 
the 
information he provided to Officer Lutz.  See Payano, 312 
Wis. 2d 224, ¶1.  He also asserted that such error was not 
harmless.  See id.  Following the three-step analysis set forth 
in Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 772-73, a unanimous court of appeals 
agreed with Payano.  It reversed his convictions and remanded 
                                                 
6 According to our review of the record, it does not appear 
that the circuit court issued a cautionary instruction as it 
said it would; however, neither party formally requested such an 
instruction.  See infra, ¶102 n.24. 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
23 
 
the matter for a new trial.  Payano, 312 Wis. 2d 224, ¶1.  The 
court of appeals held the following: (1) the other acts evidence 
offered by the prosecution was not relevant evidence as defined 
by Wis. Stat. § 904.01, id., ¶¶23-25,  and (2) in the 
alternative, the other acts evidence offered by the prosecution 
presented a "danger of unfair prejudice [that] outweighed [its] 
probative value," id., ¶¶26, 28, 31-32.7 
¶36 In terms of relevance, the court of appeals stated 
that it was "not persuaded that Kojis'[s] testimony regarding 
the presence of cocaine and a gun at Payano's residence the day 
before supports the inference urged by the State, i.e., that 
Payano would reasonably have known the police had a search 
warrant."  Payano, 312 Wis. 2d 224, ¶24.  Instead, the court 
agreed with Payano: 
[T]he 
alleged 
presence of cocaine at [Payano's] 
residence the day before the shooting no more supports 
the proposition that he thus believed that the men 
attempting to break down his door were police, than it 
does the notion that Payano believed they were 
hoodlums seeking to harm him, his mother, and his 
cousin, and steal the cocaine.  
Id. (internal quotation omitted).  Because the court of appeals 
ruled that the other acts evidence was not relevant, it declared 
                                                 
7 The court of appeals agreed with the State's assertion 
that the other acts evidence was offered for a proper purpose 
under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2) when it argued that the evidence 
was being offered to provide context and to rebut Payano's claim 
of self-defense.  See State v. Payano, 2008 WI App 74, ¶¶17-19, 
312 
Wis. 2d 224, 
752 
N.W.2d 378; 
see 
also 
Sullivan, 
216 
Wis. 2d at 783.   
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
24 
 
that the circuit court erred in admitting such evidence.  Id., 
¶25.  
¶37 Beyond declaring that the other acts evidence was not 
relevant, the court of appeals concluded that the evidence's 
unfair prejudice substantially outweighed its probative value.  
See id., ¶¶26-32.  In weighing the unfair prejudice against the 
probative value, the court began by noting that it had already 
determined the other acts evidence was not relevant, and thus, 
the court stated that the probative value of the evidence, "if 
any, is negligible."  Id., ¶28.  The court of appeals then 
decided that the evidence caused Payano unfair prejudice because 
"the logical inference for the jury to draw" from the other acts 
evidence is "that Payano was a drug dealer."  Id., ¶¶31-32.  
Therefore, the court of appeals concluded that the circuit court 
"erroneously exercised its discretion in admitting the other 
acts evidence."  Id., ¶32. 
¶38 After determining that the circuit court's exercise of 
discretion was erroneous and that the other acts evidence 
submitted by the State should not have been admitted, the court 
of appeals held that the circuit court's error was not harmless 
because the evidence "'created a definite risk that the 
conviction might be based on that evidence.'"  Id., ¶37 (quoting 
State v. Spraggin, 77 Wis. 2d 89, 101-02, 252 N.W.2d 94 (1977)).  
Ultimately, the court concluded that it could not say with any 
degree of certainty that the circuit court's decision to admit 
the other acts evidence "did not influence the jury or had such 
[a] slight effect as to be de minimus."  Id., ¶36 (internal 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
25 
 
quotation and citations omitted).  Consequently, the court of 
appeals ordered that Payano's convictions be reversed and that 
his case be remanded for a new trial. 
¶39 We granted the State's petition for review on July 28, 
2008.   
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW  
¶40 This case requires us to determine whether the circuit 
court erroneously exercised its discretion when it allowed the 
admission of other acts evidence against Payano.  See Sullivan, 
216 Wis. 2d at 780-81; see also State v. Davidson, 2000 WI 91, 
¶53, 236 Wis. 2d 537, 613 N.W.2d 606; State v. Pharr, 115 
Wis. 2d 334, 342, 340 N.W.2d 498 (1983).   
¶41 In these circumstances, we are to determine whether 
the circuit court "reviewed the relevant facts; applied a proper 
standard of law; and using a rational process, reached a 
reasonable conclusion."  Davidson, 236 Wis. 2d 537, ¶53 (citing 
Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 780-81); see also State v. Hunt, 2003 
WI 81, ¶34, 263 Wis. 2d 1, 666 N.W.2d 771.  If, for whatever 
reasons, the circuit court failed to delineate the factors that 
influenced its decision, then it erroneously exercised its 
discretion.  Hunt, 263 Wis. 2d 1, ¶34; see also Sullivan, 216 
Wis. 2d at 
781; 
Pharr, 
115 
Wis. 2d at 
342-43. 
 
However, 
"[r]egardless of the extent of the trial court's reasoning, we 
will uphold a discretionary decision if there are facts in the 
record which would support the trial court's decision had it 
fully exercised its discretion."  State v. Shillcutt, 116 
Wis. 2d 227, 238, 341 N.W.2d 716 (Ct. App. 1983) (citing Hammen 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
26 
 
v. State, 87 Wis. 2d 791, 800, 275 N.W.2d 709 (1979)); see also 
Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 781; Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d at 343. 
III. DISCUSSION 
¶42 The State contends that the circuit court correctly 
admitted the other acts evidence and that the court's decision 
should not have been disturbed by the court of appeals.  
According to the State, the court of appeals erred by applying 
the wrong standard of review.  In particular, the State alleges 
that, "[w]hile setting forth the appropriate standard of review—
—review for an erroneous exercise of discretion"——the court of 
appeals failed to "seek[] reasons to sustain the circuit court's 
reasonable decision."  Instead, it claims, "the court of appeals 
reversed the circuit court seemingly because it did not agree 
with the circuit court's ruling."  The State argues that the 
circuit court should have been upheld because it "undertook a 
reasonable inquiry, and a reasonable judge could have made this 
ruling."   
¶43 The State supports its position by employing the 
three-part test set forth in Sullivan.  First, the State 
declares that the purposes for which the other acts evidence was 
offered——to provide context and to rebut Payano's self-defense 
claim——are proper purposes under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2).  See 
Payano, 312 Wis. 2d 224, ¶¶17-19.  In this regard, it does not 
differ from the court of appeals.  Id. 
¶44 Second, the State claims that its other acts evidence 
was highly relevant for both rebutting the reasonableness of 
Payano's self-defense claim and providing context.  In terms of 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
27 
 
rebutting Payano's claim of self-defense and defense of others, 
the 
State 
argues 
that, 
"[u]nder 
the 
low 
threshold 
for 
relevance," the court of appeals should have sustained the 
circuit court's ruling because the other acts evidence "made it 
more likely that Payano knew (or should have known) at the time 
the search warrant was executed, that it was the police, not 
armed thugs, who were at his door."  As to context, the State 
asserts that the court of appeals "ignored the context purpose 
for which the evidence was highly relevant."  According to the 
State, its proffered other acts evidence was relevant to context 
because it would assist the jury in understanding what the 
police were doing at 905 West Harrison Avenue on October 3, 
2005.  In short, "it 'filled in the gaps' as to why the police 
were at Payano's residence to begin with." 
¶45 Finally, the State argues that the danger of unfair 
prejudice from the admission of the other acts evidence in this 
case does not substantially outweigh the probative value of that 
evidence.  The State claims that the court of appeals erred in 
the following ways: (1) it "set the prejudice standard too high, 
because if it had considered the evidence in terms of the 
context purpose . . . it would have concluded . . . that the 
probative value of the evidence was equal or close to its 
prejudicial effect, thereby rendering the evidence admissible"; 
(2) it did not appreciate the value of the other acts evidence 
as it related to Payano's claim of self-defense, thus unfairly 
depriving the State of its ability to prove its case, because 
that evidence was the only way for the State to prove, beyond a 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
28 
 
reasonable doubt, the objective unreasonableness of the self-
defense claim; and (3) it "disregarded the facts of the case 
when it found that the circuit court's limitations on the 
evidence and the parties' admonitions to the jury did not 
suffice to mitigate the prejudicial effect" of the other acts 
evidence.  Thus, according to the State, the probative value of 
the other acts evidence was greater than, or at least equal to, 
the danger it presented for unfair prejudice. 
¶46 As an alternative, the State argues that, if this 
court should find that the circuit court committed error by 
admitting 
the 
other 
acts 
evidence, 
the 
error 
should 
be 
considered harmless and Payano's conviction should be upheld.  
The State claims that the untainted evidence presented at trial, 
which included testimony from Officer Lutz and the other 
officers 
who 
attempted 
to 
execute 
the 
search 
warrant, 
established beyond a reasonable doubt that Payano knew or should 
have known that it was the police at the apartment door and that 
his actions were intended to wound or kill one of the officers.  
¶47 Payano disagrees strenuously.  He claims that the 
court of appeals' decision was correct when it scrupulously 
applied Sullivan to reverse the circuit court's erroneous 
ruling.  Payano argues that the other acts evidence was not 
admissible because it lacked relevancy and because its danger of 
unfair prejudice far exceeded any probative value the evidence 
may have had.  In particular, Payano states that the other acts 
evidence "did not actually relate to any fact consequential to 
either the charges or [his] defenses" but did unfairly prejudice 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
29 
 
him because it painted him as a drug dealer "even though he was 
not charged with or tried on any drug-related crime."  
¶48 Although Payano concedes that the State offered the 
other acts evidence for a proper purpose, he claims that the 
evidence was "wholly irrelevant" to any consequential fact in 
the case.  Payano supports his irrelevancy argument with the 
following comment: "Here, it is not more likely that Payano 
lacked a reasonable belief that he and his family members were 
in danger on October 3, 2005, simply because he was allegedly 
observed packaging cocaine in his residence on October 2, 2005."   
¶49 Finally, Payano states that the other acts evidence 
was unfairly prejudicial because it created the perception that 
he was a drug dealer.  According to Payano, the admission of the 
other acts evidence "created an opportunity for the jury to 
conclude, impermissibly . . . that [he] fired the shot not in 
self-defense or in defense of others, but because he was a 'drug 
dealer.'"  In fact, Payano claims, his case "presents a classic 
example of how 'other acts' evidence can unfairly prejudice a 
defendant" by improperly influencing the jury.  Payano then 
asserts that the danger of unfair prejudice from the other acts 
evidence "clearly and substantially outweighed any possible 
probative value" associated with the evidence. 
¶50 Payano emphasizes that the admission of the evidence 
was not harmless error.  Payano agrees with the court of appeals 
that the error was not harmless because the evidence portrayed 
him as an armed drug dealer.  Id., ¶¶35-37.  As Payano sees it, 
"The erroneous admission of this powerful evidence certainly 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
30 
 
affected [his] substantial right to proffer legitimate legal 
defenses to the charged counts without the interference of 
irrelevant 
and 
impermissible 
'other 
acts' 
evidence."  
Consequently, Payano asks that we affirm the court of appeals' 
decision and remand the case for a new trial. 
¶51 In our review, the ultimate question "is not whether 
this court would have admitted the other [acts] evidence, but 
whether the trial court exercised its discretion in accordance 
with accepted legal standards and in accordance with the facts 
of record."  Davidson, 236 Wis. 2d 537, ¶53 (internal quotations 
and citations omitted); see also Hunt, 263 Wis. 2d 1, ¶42; 
Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d at 342.  Evidence in the record should 
demonstrate "that discretion was in fact exercised and the basis 
of that exercise of discretion should be set forth."  Hunt, 263 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶42 (internal quotations and citations omitted).  The 
reasons stated in the record need not be exhaustive.  "It is 
enough that they indicate to the reviewing court that the trial 
court undertook a reasonable inquiry and examination of the 
facts and the record shows that there is a reasonable basis for 
the . . . court's 
determination." 
 
State 
v. 
Jeske, 
197 
Wis. 2d 905, 912, 541 N.W.2d 225 (Ct. App. 1995) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted) (ellipsis in original).  The 
circuit court's decision will be upheld "unless it can be said 
that no reasonable judge, acting on the same facts and 
underlying law, could reach the same conclusion."  Id. at 913.   
¶52 We conclude that, because the circuit court made its 
ruling using the appropriate legal standards under Sullivan, 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
31 
 
sufficiently explained its rationale on the record, and came to 
a reasonable conclusion, we must affirm its decision to admit 
the other acts evidence against Payano.  The circuit court's 
decision was not a decision that no reasonable judge could make.  
See Hunt, 263 Wis. 2d 1, ¶42; Davidson, 236 Wis. 2d 537, ¶53; 
Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d at 342; Jeske, 197 Wis. 2d at 912-13. 
A. 
Overview of Other Acts Evidence 
¶53 For many years, character evidence,8 such as evidence 
of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, was admissible only when it 
                                                 
8 Although sometimes referred to as "propensity evidence," 
we use the term "character evidence" throughout this opinion 
when 
referring 
broadly to "[e]vidence regarding someone's 
personality traits; evidence of a person's moral standing in a 
community."  Black's Law Dictionary 576 (7th ed. 1999).  One 
category of character evidence is "other acts" evidence, which 
is governed in Wisconsin by Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2).  See 7 
Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin Practice Series: Wisconsin Evidence 
§ 404.1 at 145-46 (3d ed. 2008).  Professor Blinka defines other 
acts evidence as follows: 
"Other acts" embrace a wide variety of human conduct.  
Wis[consin] Stat. § 904.04(2) applies to "crimes, 
wrongs, or acts" that occurred at some time and place 
other than the event being litigated.  Most often the 
"act" is a discrete event, occurring at a particular 
time and place, yet it may also be largely verbal in 
character (e.g., a threat to kill).  The incident need 
not have resulted in a criminal conviction or a civil 
judgment.  Nor must it constitute a "bad" act 
(although it often is).  The "other" act may have 
occurred before or after the event which is being 
litigated, provided it is relevant.  Moreover, the 
other act may be that of a party, a witness or a third 
person.  The key is relevance: What is it being 
offered to prove, and does it have any tendency to 
make that proposition more or less likely? 
Blinka, supra, § 404.6 at 173-75 (internal footnotes omitted). 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
32 
 
directly proved an element of the crime, such as "guilty 
knowledge" or "specific intent."  See Paulson v. State, 118 
Wis. 89, 98-99, 94 N.W. 771 (1903).  Evidence of "other acts" 
was inadmissible if it was offered "for the purpose of proving 
general character, criminal propensity or general disposition on 
the issue of guilt or innocence."  Whitty v. State, 34 
Wis. 2d 278, 291-92, 149 N.W.2d 557 (1967) ("[S]uch evidence, 
while having probative value, is not legally or logically 
relevant to the crime charged.").   
¶54 In Whitty, the court recognized four separate bases 
for excluding other acts evidence: 
(1) The 
overstrong 
tendency 
to 
believe 
the 
defendant guilty of the charge merely because he is a 
person likely to do such acts; (2) the tendency to 
condemn not because he is believed guilty of the 
present charge but because he has escaped punishment 
from other offenses; (3) the injustice of attacking 
one who is not prepared to demonstrate the attacking 
evidence is fabricated; and (4) the confusion of 
issues which might result from bringing in evidence of 
other crimes. 
Id. at 292; see also Hunt, 263 Wis. 2d 1, ¶30; Sullivan, 216 
Wis. 2d at 782-83.  Over time, however, courts permitted the 
admission of other acts evidence when it was probative for some 
other specified purpose.  Whitty noted that "evidence of prior 
crimes [other acts] is admissible when such evidence is 
particularly probative in showing elements of the specific crime 
charged, intent, identity, system of criminal activity, to 
impeach credibility, and to show character in cases where 
character is put in issue by the defendant."  Whitty, 34 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
33 
 
Wis. 2d at 292.  The court explained as follows: "The admission 
of evidence of prior crimes [other acts] for such purposes is 
not forbidden because such evidence would not be admissible 
under the general character rule."  Id.  
 
¶55 In 1973, following the Whitty decision, the supreme 
court adopted the Wisconsin Rules of Evidence, which were 
submitted to the court by the Wisconsin Judicial Council.  59 
Wis. 2d R1 (1973).  The rules included Wis. Stat. § 904.04, 
entitled "Character evidence not admissible to prove conduct; 
exceptions; other crimes."  Id. at R75.  The rule was modeled on 
Rule 404 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.  The evidence 
admissible under subsection (2) of § 904.04 is sometimes 
referred to as Whitty evidence.  See Holmes v. State, 76 
Wis. 2d 259, 266, 251 N.W.2d 56 (1977); see also State v. Veach, 
2002 WI 110, ¶46, 255 Wis. 2d 390, 648 N.W.2d 447 (referring to 
other acts evidence under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2) as "Whitty 
evidence"); 7 Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin Practice Series: 
Wisconsin Evidence § 404.1 at 146 (3d ed. 2008) ("Wis[consin] 
Stat. § 904.04 governs the admissibility of character evidence 
as 
circumstantial 
evidence 
of 
conduct 
as 
well 
as 
the 
admissibility of 'other acts' to prove something other than 
character, such as intent, knowledge, or identity."). 
¶56 Today, Wis. Stat. § 904.049 is divided into two 
subsections.  Subsection (1) is a restriction on the use of 
                                                 
9 904.04 Character evidence not admissible to prove 
conduct; exceptions; other crimes.  (1) CHARACTER EVIDENCE 
GENERALLY.  Evidence of a person's character or a trait 
of the person's character is not admissible for the 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
34 
 
general character evidence as circumstantial proof "that the 
person acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion."  
Wis. Stat. § 904.04(1).  Subsection (2) is a prohibition on the 
use of specific character evidence——"other crimes, wrongs, or 
acts"——to prove the character of a person "in order to show that 
the 
person 
acted 
in 
conformity 
therewith." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 904.04(2).  Subsection (2) then continues as follows: "This 
subsection does not exclude the evidence when offered for other 
                                                                                                                                                             
purpose of proving that the person acted in conformity 
therewith on a particular occasion, except: 
 
(a) Character 
of 
accused. 
 
Evidence 
of 
a 
pertinent trait of the accused's character offered by 
an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same; 
 
(b) Character of victim. . . .  
 
(c) Character of witness. . . .  
 
(2) OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS.  (a) Except as 
provided in par. (b), evidence of other crimes, 
wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show that the person 
acted in conformity therewith.  This subsection does 
not exclude the evidence when offered for other 
purposes, 
such 
as proof of motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident. 
 
(b) In 
a 
criminal 
proceeding 
alleging 
a 
violation 
of 
s. 940.225(1) [first degree sexual 
assault] or 948.02(1), sub. (1) and par. (a) [first 
degree sexual assault of a child] do not prohibit 
admitting evidence that a person was convicted of a 
violation 
of 
s. 
940.225(1) 
or 
948.02(1) 
or 
a 
comparable offense in another jurisdiction, that is 
similar to the alleged violation, as evidence of the 
person's character in order to show that the person 
acted in conformity therewith. 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
35 
 
purposes, such as [1] proof of motive, [2] opportunity, [3] 
intent, [4] preparation, [5] plan, [6] knowledge, [7] identity, 
or [8] absence of mistake or accident."  Id. (emphasis added). 
¶57 To be admissible, other acts evidence offered for a 
proper purpose also must be relevant according to Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.01.  Even when relevant and offered for a proper purpose, 
the other acts evidence "may be excluded if its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence."  Wis. Stat. § 904.03.  See 
Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 772-73; Blinka, supra, § 404.6 at 170, 
179-88.   
¶58 This framework for the admission of other acts 
evidence was set forth in Sullivan as a comprehensive, three-
step analysis10 "that governs other act evidence in all cases."  
Blinka, supra, § 404.6 at 169, 179 ("The court's analysis should 
be closely followed in all cases . . . regardless of which party 
is proposing or opposing the evidence.").   
B. 
Sullivan and the Admissibility of Other Acts Evidence  
                                                 
10 Prior to Sullivan, some courts phrased the test as a two-
part inquiry, asking whether the evidence was offered for a 
proper statutory purpose and whether the evidence's probative 
value was substantially outweighed by its danger of unfair 
prejudice.  The question of relevancy was folded into the first 
inquiry of whether the evidence was offered for a proper 
purpose.  See, e.g., State v. Speer, 176 Wis. 2d 1101, 1114, 501 
N.W.2d 429 (1993); State v. Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d 334, 343-44, 340 
N.W.2d 498 (1983); see also Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 771 n.3; 
Blinka, supra, § 404.6 at 170 n.3 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
36 
 
¶59 In 1998, this court took the opportunity to "reaffirm 
the vitality of Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.04(2) and Whitty" in 
response to concerns that the case law had steadily "chipped 
away" at the rule.  Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 775; Blinka, supra, 
§ 404.6 at 170.  Today, Sullivan's three-part inquiry has become 
"the definitive approach governing the admissibility of other 
act evidence."  Blinka, supra, § 404.6 at 179. 
¶60 Specifically, 
Sullivan 
set 
forth 
the 
following 
"analytical framework" for courts to follow when determining the 
admissibility of such evidence: 
(1) Is the other acts evidence offered for an 
acceptable 
purpose 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ (Rule) 
904.04(2), such as establishing motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident? 
 
(2) Is 
the 
other 
acts 
evidence 
relevant, 
considering the two facets of relevance set forth in 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.01?  The first consideration 
in assessing relevance is whether the other acts 
evidence relates to a fact or proposition that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action.  The 
second consideration in assessing relevance is whether 
the evidence has probative value, that is, whether the 
other acts evidence has a tendency to make the 
consequential fact or proposition more probable or 
less probable than it would be without the evidence. 
 
(3) Is the probative value of the other acts 
evidence substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair 
prejudice, 
confusion 
of 
the 
issues 
or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence?  See Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.03. 
Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 772-73 (internal footnote omitted); see 
also Blinka, supra, § 404.6 at 170.  Because "[t]he admission of 
other acts evidence is one of the most commonly litigated issues 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
37 
 
in criminal cases,"11 the Sullivan framework and its attending 
principles have become "familiar and well established" in 
Wisconsin jurisprudence.  Davidson, 236 Wis. 2d 537, ¶¶34-35.   
 
1. 
Proper Purpose 
¶61 The first step in the Sullivan analysis is to 
determine whether the other acts evidence has been offered for a 
proper purpose.  Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 772, 783; Davidson, 
236 Wis. 2d 537, ¶35.   
¶62 Wisconsin Stat. § 904.04(2) prohibits the use of other 
acts evidence for the purpose of proving an individual's 
character as circumstantial proof that the person acted in 
conformity therewith on a particular occasion.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.04(2); Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 782 ("[Section] 904.04(2) 
forbids a chain of inferences running from act to character to 
conduct in conformity with the character."); State v. Speer, 176 
Wis. 2d 1101, 1113-15, 501 N.W.2d 429 (1993); Blinka, supra, 
§§ 404.1 at 146, 149-50, 404.6 at 172.  However, if other acts 
evidence is offered for a purpose not associated with proving an 
individual's character and propensity to act in conformity 
therewith, the evidence is not prohibited by Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.04(2). 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 904.04(2); 
Sullivan, 
216 
Wis. 2d at 783 ("[Section 904.04(2)] permits the admission of 
other acts evidence if its relevance does not hinge on an 
                                                 
11 Wis JI——Criminal 275 at 3 (2003).  All subsequent 
references to the Wisconsin Criminal Jury Instructions are to 
the 2003 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
38 
 
accused's propensity to commit the act charged."); Speer, 176 
Wis. 2d at 1113-15.   
¶63 Wisconsin Stat. § 904.04(2) performs dual functions: 
(1) it acts as an exclusionary rule that "precludes the use of a 
person's character as circumstantial evidence of conduct"; and 
(2) it acts as an inclusionary rule that allows "other act 
evidence [to] be used to prove something other than the 
forbidden propensity inference."  Blinka, supra, § 404.6 at 171-
72.  The proponent of other acts evidence must demonstrate a 
proper purpose by a preponderance of the evidence.  Blinka, 
supra, § 404.1 at 149, § 404.6 at 180.  As long as the proponent 
identifies one acceptable purpose12 for admission of the evidence 
that is not related to the forbidden character inference, the 
first step is satisfied.  See Hunt, 263 Wis. 2d 1, ¶29 (quoting 
State v. Hammer, 2000 WI 92, ¶29 n.4, 236 Wis. 2d 686, 613 
                                                 
12 As noted, Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2) lists several purposes 
for which other acts evidence may be offered, including "proof 
of motive, opportunity, identity, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
intent, or absence of mistake or accident."  The purposes listed 
are not mutually exclusive, "and the same evidence may fall into 
more than one exception."  State v. Hunt, 2003 WI 81, ¶29, 263 
Wis. 2d 1, 666 N.W.2d 771 (quoting State v. Hammer, 2000 WI 92, 
¶29 n.4, 236 Wis. 2d 686, 613 N.W.2d 629); Wis JI——Criminal 275 
at 4; Wis JI——Criminal 275.1 at 2 (1990).   
Moreover, "[t]his list is not complete . . . and is meant 
only to be illustrative."  State v. Clemons, 164 Wis. 2d 506, 
514, 476 N.W.2d 283 (Ct. App. 1991); see also State v. 
Shillcutt, 116 Wis. 2d 227, 236, 341 N.W.2d 716 (Ct. App. 1983) 
(citing United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127, 134 (4th Cir. 
1973)); Blinka, supra, § 404.6 at 173 ("The rule does not 
require that courts pigeonhole (or, more accurately, 'jam') the 
other act evidence into one of these categories.").   
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
39 
 
N.W.2d 629 (citing Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 772, and State v. 
Alsteen, 108 Wis. 2d 723, 729, 324 N.W.2d 426 (1982))); Blinka, 
supra, § 404.6 at 180.  Consequently, this "first step is hardly 
demanding."  Blinka, supra, § 404.6 at 180 (emphasis added). 
¶64 In this case, the State argues that it proffered the 
other acts evidence for two proper purposes, namely: (1) to 
provide the jury greater context for the shooting "in order to 
give the State's case a complete presentation"; and (2) to rebut 
Payano's claim of self-defense.13  The circuit court agreed that 
both purposes were permissible under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2).  
See Payano, 312 Wis. 2d 224, ¶¶17-19.  The circuit court 
determined that Kojis's testimony placed into context what the 
police were doing at Payano's apartment and what Payano was seen 
doing there the day before.  This testimony helped the jury 
assess the reasonableness of Payano's claim of self-defense.  
See supra, ¶¶31-33.   
                                                 
13 The Wisconsin Jury Instructions define evidence relating 
to "context or background" as "provid[ing] a more complete 
presentation of the evidence relating to the offense charged."  
Wis JI——Criminal 275 at 2; see also Clemons, 164 Wis. 2d at 514; 
Blinka, supra, § 404.7 at 198-99.  In other words, the 
information is "necessary to fully understand the context of the 
case."  Shillcutt, 116 Wis. 2d at 237; see also Blinka, supra, 
§ 404.7 at 198-99.   
Although rebutting the defendant's theory of defense is not 
explicitly mentioned in Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2), precedent firmly 
establishes that it is an acceptable purpose.  See Sullivan, 216 
Wis. 2d at 784 ("Evidence of other acts may be admitted if it 
tends to undermine an innocent explanation for an accused's 
charged 
criminal 
conduct."); 
State 
v. 
Kourtidias, 
206 
Wis. 2d 574, 582, 557 N.W.2d 858 (Ct. App. 1996) ("[T]his other 
acts evidence was very relevant to this theory of defense.").  
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
40 
 
¶65 The question that inevitably occurs to an outsider 
looking at this shooting is why Payano shot at the door.  This 
implicates Payano's claim of self-defense.  It also implicates 
his motive and knowledge.  Motive and knowledge are both 
enumerated purposes for the admission of other acts evidence 
under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2). 
¶66 Payano has never asserted that the other acts evidence 
was not offered for a proper purpose.  In fact, in his brief to 
this court, Payano explicitly acknowledges that "these are 
acceptable purposes for offering 'other acts' evidence."  The 
circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion on the 
issue of purpose.  
2. 
Relevance 
¶67 The second step in the Sullivan analysis is to assess 
whether the evidence is relevant as defined by Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.01.  Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 772, 785; Davidson, 236 
Wis. 2d 537, ¶35; Blinka, supra, § 404.6 at 170, 180-83.  
Because other acts evidence is inherently relevant to prove 
character and therefore a propensity to behave accordingly, "the 
real issue is whether the other act is relevant to anything 
else."  Blinka, supra, § 404.6 at 181 (emphasis added); see also 
State v. Johnson, 184 Wis. 2d 324, 337 n.1, 516 N.W.2d 463 (Ct. 
App. 1994) (quoting Daniel D. Blinka, Evidence of Character, 
Habit, and "Similar Acts" in Wisconsin Civil Litigation, 73 
Marq. L. Rev. 283, 304 n.66 (1989)).  
¶68 "'Relevant 
evidence' 
means 
evidence 
having 
any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
41 
 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or 
less probable than it would be without the evidence."  Wis. 
Stat. § 904.01 (emphasis added).  Stated differently, for 
evidence to be relevant, the following questions must be 
answered affirmatively: "(1) is the proposition for which the 
evidence is offered of 'consequence to the determination of the 
action' and (2) does the evidence have probative value when 
offered for that purpose?"14  Blinka, supra, § 404.6 at 181; see 
also Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 772 (stating the two relevancy 
considerations as follows: "whether the other acts evidence 
relates to a fact or proposition that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action," and "whether the evidence has 
probative value, that is, whether the other acts evidence has a 
tendency to make the consequential fact or proposition more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence"); Blinka, supra, § 404.6 at 170 (quoting Sullivan, 216 
Wis. 2d at 772). 
¶69 Answering the first question of whether the evidence 
is offered in relation to any fact or proposition that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action, the court must 
focus its attention on the pleadings and contested issues in the 
case.  Blinka, supra, § 404.6 at 181.  "The pleadings set forth 
the elements of the claims, charges, or defenses.  Unless 
parties stipulate or fail to contest them, all such elements as 
                                                 
14 The proponent bears the burden of proving relevance by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  Hunt, 263 Wis. 2d 1, ¶53 (citing 
Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 774); Blinka, supra, § 404.6 at 181. 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
42 
 
well as any propositions tending to establish them are fairly in 
dispute."  Id.; see also Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 785-86 ("The 
substantive law determines the elements of the crime charged and 
the ultimate facts and links in the chain of inferences that are 
of consequence to the case.").  "The relevancy requirement is 
not met if the issue on which the evidence is offered . . . is 
not in dispute in the case . . . ."  Wis JI——Criminal 275.1 at 2 
(1990) (citing Alsteen, 108 Wis. 2d at 730).15   
¶70 The second question relating to probative value——
whether the consequential fact or proposition for which the 
evidence was offered becomes more or less probable than it would 
be without the evidence——"is a common sense determination based 
less on legal precedent than life experiences."  Blinka, supra, 
§ 404.6 at 181; see also Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d at 344 ("The issue 
of relevancy 'must be determined by the trial judge in view of 
                                                 
15 This general statement must be qualified by the fact that 
"in criminal cases the State 'must prove all elements of a 
crime, even elements the defendant does not dispute.'"  Blinka, 
supra, § 404.6 at 184 (quoting State v. Veach, 2002 WI 110, 
¶121, 255 Wis. 2d 390, 648 N.W.2d 447); see also Veach, 255 
Wis. 2d 390, ¶¶118-21 ("[W]ith the exception of stipulations to 
a defendant's status, the state and the court are not obligated 
to accept stipulations to elements of a crime even if the 
stipulations are offered in compliance with [Wisconsin law]."); 
Hammer, 236 Wis. 2d 686, ¶25 ("If the state must prove an 
element of a crime, then evidence relevant to that element is 
admissible, even if a defendant does not dispute the element.") 
(citing State v. Plymesser, 172 Wis. 2d 583, 594-95, 493 
N.W.2d 367 (1992)); State v. Davidson, 2000 WI 91, ¶65, 236 
Wis. 2d 537, 613 N.W.2d 606 ("The state must prove all the 
elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt, even if the 
defendant does not dispute all of the elements . . . .") 
(internal 
quotations 
and 
citations 
omitted) 
(ellipsis 
in 
original).  
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
43 
 
his 
or 
her 
experience, 
judgment 
and 
knowledge 
of 
human 
motivation and conduct.'" (quoting United States v. Williams, 
545 F.2d 47, 50 (8th Cir. 1976) (citing C. McCormick, Handbook 
of The Law of Evidence, § 185 at 438 (Hornbook Series 2d ed. 
1972)))).  Although some other acts cases focus "on the other 
incident's nearness in time, place and circumstances to the 
alleged crime or to the fact or proposition sought to be 
proved," Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 786 (citing Whitty, 34 
Wis. 2d at 294), Blinka, supra, § 404.6 at 181, "'[s]imilarity' 
and 'nearness' are not talismans.  Sometimes dissimilar events 
will be relevant to one another."  Blinka, supra, § 404.6 at 
181-82; see also Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d at 346 ("Relevancy is not 
determined by resemblance to, but by the connection with, other 
facts.") (internal quotations and citations omitted).   
¶71 Here, the other acts evidence, Kojis's testimony and 
the 
information 
he 
provided 
Officer 
Lutz 
regarding 
his 
observations of drugs and a gun at Payano's apartment, was 
timely and was deemed relevant by the circuit court for the 
following reasons: 
The jury [in the first trial], I believe, was left 
with the impression that this search warrant was 
somehow arbitrary, based on nothing, that the police 
came storming into a place with no basis really for 
doing that, that it may have been somehow a violation 
of Mr. Payano's rights, that Mr. Payano was a sometime 
beautician or hair cutter, that his English was not 
good, and that he had no reason to expect the police 
to be coming.  And in that context, I think self-
defense is framed somewhat differently. 
 
Self-defense is, as defined in [Wis. Stat. §] 
939.48, a person who is privileged to intentionally 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
44 
 
use 
force 
against 
another 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
preventing or terminating what the person reasonably 
believes to be an unlawful interference with his or 
her person.  And by extension, it goes to the 
protection of others.[16] 
 
The jury clearly has to be able to deal with what 
is 
reasonable 
under 
those 
circumstances 
for 
a 
reasonable person.  I think that the testimony from 
Mr. Kojis, which clearly places into context what the 
police were doing there and what Mr. Payano was 
observed with on the day before, helps the jury to 
assess reasonability.  It does provide, I think, a 
somewhat different understanding for the jury about 
what was going on. 
 
. . . . 
                                                 
16 Self-defense and defense of others is defined by Wis. 
Stat. § 939.48 (1) and (4), respectively, as follows: 
(1) 
A 
person 
is 
privileged 
to 
threaten 
or 
intentionally 
use force against another for the 
purpose of preventing or terminating what the person 
reasonably believes to be an unlawful interference 
with his or her person by such other person.  The 
actor may intentionally use only such force or threat 
thereof as the actor reasonably believes is necessary 
to prevent or terminate the interference.  The actor 
may not intentionally use force which is intended or 
likely to cause death or great bodily harm unless the 
actor reasonably believes that such force is necessary 
to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to 
himself or herself. 
 
. . . . 
 
(4) A person is privileged to defend a 3rd person 
from real or apparent unlawful interference by another 
under the same conditions and by the same means as 
those under and by which the person is privileged to 
defend himself or herself from real or apparent 
unlawful 
interference, 
provided 
that 
the 
person 
reasonably believes that the facts are such that the 
3rd person would be privileged to act in self-defense 
and that the person's intervention is necessary for 
the protection of the 3rd person.  
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
45 
 
 
. . .  But I think it is testimony that places 
into context the entire situation.  And I think it is 
important to the jury to be able to struggle with what 
Mr. Payano reasonably believed at the time the search 
warrant was executed. 
 
. . . . 
 
But I do think that the context and the testimony 
of this witness is something that the jury should hear 
for a very narrow point.  And I certainly will 
instruct the jury that they are to consider this only 
on the issue of whether or not Mr. Payano reasonably 
believed that it was armed thugs that were attacking 
his door.  
(Emphasis added.) 
¶72 As the circuit court's ruling makes clear, the central 
dispute at trial was whether Payano acted reasonably in self-
defense and defense of others when he shot Officer Lutz——whether 
he knew or should have known it was the police at the apartment 
door when he shot the gun.  In other words, as the State argued, 
"the jury needed to decide between two competing motives for the 
shooting: to protect his family, as Payano argued; or to buy 
time to hide drug evidence, as the State argued."  (Emphasis 
added.)  Payano's entire defense theory was premised on the fact 
that he acted reasonably to protect himself and his family when 
he shot Officer Lutz.  Hence, what Payano knew or reasonably 
believed at the time of the shooting was paramount to the 
"determination of the action."  Wis. Stat. § 904.01; Sullivan, 
216 Wis. 2d at 772; see also Wis. Stat. § 939.48 (1) and (4).   
¶73 In terms of context, the other acts evidence provided 
the 
jury 
with 
a 
greater 
understanding 
of 
the 
alleged 
circumstances that led to Officer Lutz being shot.  The context 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
46 
 
in which the shooting took place was of consequence in this case 
because the circumstances leading up to the shooting were 
pertinent factors for the jury to consider when it determined 
the reasonableness of Payano's actions.  See State v. Clemons, 
164 Wis. 2d 506, 514-15, 476 N.W.2d 283 (Ct. App. 1991) (finding 
the other acts evidence offered by the State relevant and 
admissible because it "g[a]ve the State's case a complete 
presentation"); Shillcutt, 116 Wis. 2d at 236-237 (finding the 
other acts evidence offered by the State relevant and admissible 
because it "was necessary to fully understand the context of the 
case"); see also United States v. Edwards, 159 F.3d 1117, 1129 
(8th Cir. 1998) (completes the story of the crime); United 
States v. Bettelyoun, 892 F.2d 744, 746-47 (8th Cir. 1989) 
(integral part of immediate context); Carter v. United States, 
549 F.2d 77, 78 (8th Cir. 1977) (completes the story of the 
crime on trial by proving its immediate context).  
¶74 In terms of rebutting Payano's defense, the other acts 
evidence was offered in relation to proving the State's theory 
of the case beyond a reasonable doubt, which entailed disproving 
Payano's claim of self-defense and defense of others beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Proving the State's theory and disproving the 
defendant's theory were consequential to whether Payano acted 
reasonably, and ultimately, to whether he was guilty of the 
crimes charged.  See Davidson, 236 Wis. 2d 537, ¶65 ("The State 
must prove all the elements of a crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt . . . .") (internal quotations and citations omitted); 
Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 784 (stating that other acts evidence 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
47 
 
"may 
be 
admitted 
if it tends to undermine an innocent 
explanation"); State v. Kourtidias, 206 Wis. 2d 574, 582, 557 
N.W.2d 858 (Ct. App. 1996) ("[T]his other acts evidence was very 
relevant to this theory of defense.").   
¶75 In sum, Kojis's testimony and the information he 
provided to Officer Lutz was offered by the State to undermine 
Payano's claim of self-defense and defense of others by offering 
an alternative theory of the case, that Payano's shooting of 
Officer Lutz was criminal rather than privileged.  Consequently, 
the State's other acts evidence satisfies the first prong of the 
relevancy analysis because it was offered to help prove a "fact 
[or proposition] that is of consequence to the determination of" 
Payano's guilt or innocence.  Wis. Stat. § 904.01. 
¶76 The other acts evidence satisfies the second prong of 
the relevancy test as well, because its admission made the 
State's claim——that Payano shot the gun to deter the police from 
entering the apartment so that he would have time to get rid of 
drugs——more probable than it would have been without the 
evidence, and it made Payano's claim——that he shot the gun to 
protect himself and his family——less probable than it would have 
been without the evidence.  See Wis. Stat. § 904.01; Sullivan, 
216 Wis. 2d at 772; Blinka, supra, § 404.6 at 181; see also 
Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 784 ("Evidence of other acts may be 
admitted if it tends to undermine an innocent explanation for an 
accused's 
charged 
criminal 
conduct."); 
Kourtidias, 
206 
Wis. 2d at 582 ("[T]his other acts evidence was very relevant to 
this theory of defense."). 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
48 
 
¶77 For instance, offering the other acts evidence as a 
contextual aid provided the jury a more complete explanation as 
to why the police descended on 905 West Harrison Avenue and 
broke in the door of Apartment No. 4 on October 3, 2005.  The 
evidence allowed the jury to hear the complete story of the 
crime from the State's perspective.17  Payano claims, in essence, 
either that the police did not identify themselves, or that he 
did not hear them, understand them, or believe them.  When asked 
whether he knew that the men on the other side of the door were 
police, Payano answered, "I never imagined that."  This 
testimony is more plausible absent the Kojis testimony.  Without 
that testimony, it was more probable that the jury would 
perceive Payano as a victim, a regular citizen defending his 
home against unprovoked attack.  With the Kojis evidence, 
however, it was more probable that the jury would perceive 
Payano as a criminal actor trying to eliminate evidence of his 
crime.  The other acts evidence offered by the State was 
relevant because it made Payano's claim of self-defense and 
defense of others less probable than it would have been without 
                                                 
17 See Clemons, 164 Wis. 2d at 514 ("One basis upon which 
evidence of other crimes [or acts] may be admitted is if the 
evidence provides an aspect of the crime charged or is required 
in order to give a complete presentation of the case at 
trial."); Shillcutt, 116 Wis. 2d at 236 ("[W]e hold that an 
accepted basis for the admissibility of evidence of other [acts] 
arises when such evidence furnishes part of the context of the 
crime 
or 
is 
necessary 
to 
a 
full 
presentation 
of 
the 
case . . . .") 
(internal 
quotations 
and 
citation 
omitted) 
(ellipsis in original).   
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
49 
 
the evidence.  See Wis. Stat. § 904.01; Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 
772; Blinka, supra, § 404.6 at 181. 
¶78 Moreover, offering the other acts evidence as a direct 
rebuttal to Payano's claim of self-defense gave the jury an 
alternative explanation for why Payano would have shot the gun 
knowing that the police were at the apartment door.  The 
evidence is relevant because it directly contradicted Payano's 
defense theory and made it more probable than it would have been 
without the evidence that Payano shot the gun intending to move 
the police away from the door so that he could have time to get 
rid of the drugs that were allegedly in the apartment.  See 
Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 784 ("Evidence of other acts may be 
admitted if it tends to undermine an innocent explanation for an 
accused's charged criminal conduct.").  Without this testimony, 
the State had no real evidence to support its theory that Payano 
shot Officer Lutz on purpose to hide or eliminate drugs.  
Therefore, "this other acts evidence was very relevant to this 
theory of defense."  Kourtidias, 206 Wis. 2d at 582.  
¶79 The 
State 
offered 
Kojis's 
testimony 
and 
the 
information he provided Officer Lutz to undercut Payano's claim 
of self-defense and defense of others.  Because that evidence 
made Payano's version of the story less probable than it would 
have been without the evidence, it was relevant.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.01; Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 772; Blinka, supra, § 404.6 
at 181.  The circuit court did not erroneously exercise its 
discretion on the issue of relevance. 
3. 
Probative Value and Unfair Prejudice 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
50 
 
¶80 When other acts evidence is relevant and offered for a 
proper purpose, the evidence is admissible under Sullivan unless 
the 
opponent18 
demonstrates 
that 
"its 
probative 
value 
is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence."  Wis. Stat. § 904.03 
(emphasis 
added); 
Sullivan, 
216 
Wis. 2d at 
772-73, 
789; 
Davidson, 236 Wis. 2d 537, ¶35; Blinka, supra, § 404.6 at 170, 
183-88.  "The term 'substantially' indicates that if the 
probative value of the evidence is close or equal to its unfair 
prejudicial effect, the evidence must be admitted."  Speer, 176 
Wis. 2d at 1115 (emphasis added).     
¶81 The 
evidence's 
probative 
value 
"largely 
turns 
on the relevancy 
analysis" 
from 
step 
two 
under 
Sullivan.  
Blinka, supra, § 404.6 at 183.  Essentially, probative value 
reflects the evidence's degree of relevance.  Evidence that is 
highly relevant has great probative value, whereas evidence that 
is only slightly relevant has low probative value.  See id. 
("The more attenuated its relevancy, the lower its probative 
                                                 
18 Hunt, 263 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶53, 69 ("[I]t is the opponent of 
the admission of the evidence who must show that the probative 
value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by unfair 
prejudice."); Speer, 176 Wis. 2d at 1114 ("If relevancy for an 
admissible purpose is established, the evidence will be admitted 
unless the opponent of the evidence can show that the probative 
value of the other crimes [or acts] evidence is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice.") (internal 
citation omitted). 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
51 
 
value . . . .").  The main consideration in assessing probative 
value of other acts evidence "is the extent to which the 
proffered proposition is in substantial dispute"; in other 
words, "how badly needed is the other act evidence?"  Id.; see 
also Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d at 348-49; Johnson, 184 Wis. 2d at 338-
40. 
¶82 For example, in Pharr, the defendant was charged with 
and convicted of attempted first-degree murder, party to a 
crime, for his part in the shooting of a Wisconsin state 
trooper.  Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d at 336, 337-38.  On October 18, 
1980, the defendant and two accomplices set out from Madison to 
rural Rock County intending to commit armed robbery at a private 
residence.  Id. at 337.  After completing the robbery, the three 
headed back to Madison.  Id.  Their vehicle was stopped by a 
state trooper who observed it cross the center line of the 
highway.  Id.  The defendant was a passenger in the vehicle.  
Id.  When the trooper approached the vehicle, he noticed a gun 
on the front seat, whereupon the driver, who had exited the 
vehicle, reached in the window, grabbed the gun, and fired 
several shots at the trooper.  Id. at 337-38.   
¶83 Following the shooting, the driver jumped back into 
his vehicle and sped off down the highway.  Id. at 338.  The 
trooper gave chase and radioed for assistance.  Id.  A second 
state trooper received the report and began to pursue the 
vehicle as well.  Id.  As the second trooper was following the 
vehicle, the defendant reached out the passenger window and 
fired at least one shot at the police cruiser, shattering its 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
52 
 
windshield.  Id.  Eventually, the getaway vehicle was stopped 
and all three people inside were arrested.  Id. 
¶84 Although the defendant admitted his involvement in the 
robbery and that he shot at the second trooper's vehicle, he 
denied that he encouraged or participated in shooting at the 
first trooper, an offense for which he had been charged as a 
party to the crime.  Id.  Prior to his trial, the defendant made 
a motion in limine seeking to exclude any evidence related to a 
previous unrelated robbery and any evidence regarding his 
shooting at the second trooper's vehicle.  Id.  The circuit 
court granted the motion with respect to the unrelated robbery, 
but it denied the motion with respect to the second shooting.  
Id. at 339.  The circuit court agreed with the prosecution that 
the shooting "evidence was admissible to show the defendant's 
state of mind to escape at all costs."  Id.  The defendant was 
convicted.  On appeal, he argued that it was error for the 
circuit court to admit evidence related to his shooting at the 
second trooper's vehicle.  Id. at 341. 
¶85 The court of appeals affirmed the conviction and 
concluded "that any unfair prejudice resulting from this 
evidence [did] not substantially outweigh its probative value."  
Id. at 349.  The court of appeals noted that, although the 
defendant claimed he did not participate in shooting at the 
first trooper, when the other acts evidence was considered, "an 
alternative explanation of the defendant's involvement" in the 
shooting was evident.  Id. at 348.  The court continued, "In 
order to establish that part of the plan included a successful 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
53 
 
escape which was to be effectuated at all costs, the [S]tate 
needed to introduce [the other acts] evidence showing the 
defendant's active participation in the events incident to the 
escape phase of the robbery."  Id. (emphasis added).  The other 
acts evidence was properly admitted in Pharr because the 
evidence was necessary to the prosecution's theory of the case, 
and it provided an alternative explanation to the defendant's 
claimed innocence.  See id. at 348; see also Johnson, 184 
Wis. 2d at 339-41; Blinka, supra, § 404.6 at 183.  Because the 
other acts evidence was so important to the resolution of the 
case, the court could not say that its probative value was 
substantially outweighed by its danger of unfair prejudice.  See 
Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d at 348-49; see also Wis. Stat. § 904.03; 
Johnson, 184 Wis. 2d at 339-41; Blinka, supra, § 404.6 at 183. 
¶86 Johnson is another case that demonstrates the high 
level of probative value attached to evidence that is necessary 
for the resolution of the case.  See Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d at 348-
49; Blinka, supra, § 404.6 at 183.  In Johnson, the defendant 
was convicted of battery and second-degree reckless endangerment 
as a repeater, based on allegations by the defendant's former 
live-in girlfriend that he physically assaulted her on at least 
one occasion.  Johnson, 184 Wis. 2d at 333-34.  The defendant 
maintained that the incident never occurred and that his ex-
girlfriend fabricated the story so that he would be arrested and 
she would have an opportunity to misappropriate certain items of 
his property while he was in custody.  Id. at 334. 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
54 
 
¶87 On appeal, the defendant argued that the circuit court 
erred by refusing to admit other acts evidence that his ex-
girlfriend, within days of his arrest, attempted to gain access 
to certain items of his property that were in storage.  Id. at 
338.  The court of appeals determined that it was error for the 
circuit court to deny admission of this evidence because it was 
"directly linked to the criminal events charged."  Id. 338-39.  
The court explained its decision as follows: 
If [the defendant] truly owned the disputed 
property and if [the ex-girlfriend] truly attempted to 
gain 
possession 
of 
the 
property 
following 
her 
accusation 
against 
him 
and 
his 
resultant 
incarceration, the credibility of [the defendant]'s 
theory of defense is obviously enhanced.  We conclude 
that the rejected evidence was highly probative to 
[the defendant]'s theory of defense. 
. . . . 
Although other witnesses testified, this case 
essentially turned on the jury's assessment of the 
credibility issue drawn between [the ex-girlfriend] 
and [the defendant].  [The defendant]'s proffered 
evidence, if believed, offered a plausible scenario as 
to why [the ex-girlfriend] might have falsely accused 
him. . . .  
. . . In most instances, as the probative value 
of relevant evidence increases, so will the fairness 
of its prejudicial effect.  Thus, the standard for 
unfair prejudice is not whether the evidence harms the 
opposing party's case, but rather whether the evidence 
tends to influence the outcome of the case by 
"improper 
means." 
 
We 
fail 
to 
see 
how 
[the 
defendant]'s 
proffered 
evidence 
constitutes 
an 
improper means to influence the outcome.  
Id. at 339-41 (first, second, and fourth emphasis added) 
(internal footnote and citation omitted).  Because the other 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
55 
 
acts evidence was central to the litigation and necessary for 
the defendant's arguments, the evidence carried great probative 
value to overcome any prejudicial effect the evidence may have 
caused.  Id.; see also Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d at 348-49; Blinka, 
supra, § 404.6 at 183. 
¶88 As for unfair prejudice, in Whitty, this court stated 
that, to ensure a defendant's right to a fair trial, the circuit 
court must "carefully consider whether the prejudice of other-
crimes [or other acts] evidence is so great as compared with its 
relevancy and the necessity for its admission in the particular 
case as to require its exclusion."  Whitty, 34 Wis. 2d at 295.  
The determination of unfair prejudice must be made with great 
care because "[n]early all evidence operates to the prejudice of 
the party against whom it is offered. . . .  The test is whether 
the resulting prejudice of relevant evidence is fair or unfair."  
Johnson, 184 Wis. 2d at 340 (citing Christensen v. Econ. Fire & 
Cas. Co., 77 Wis. 2d 50, 61-62, 252 N.W.2d 81 (1977)).   
¶89 In Sullivan, the court defined unfair prejudice as 
follows: 
Unfair 
prejudice 
results 
when 
the 
proffered 
evidence has a tendency to influence the outcome by 
improper means or if it appeals to the jury's 
sympathies, arouses its sense of horror, provokes its 
instinct to punish or otherwise causes a jury to base 
its decision on something other than the established 
propositions in the case. 
Sullivan, 
216 
Wis. 2d at 
789-90; 
see 
also 
Johnson, 
184 
Wis. 2d at 340 ("[T]he standard for unfair prejudice is not 
whether the evidence harms the opposing party's case, but rather 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
56 
 
whether the evidence tends to influence the outcome of the case 
by 'improper means.'" (citing Christensen, 77 Wis. 2d at 61)); 
Blinka, supra, § 404.6 at 185 ("In this context, 'unfair 
prejudice' refers to the danger that the jury will draw the 
forbidden propensity [or character] inference regardless of a[] 
limiting 
instruction."). 
 
The 
specific 
danger 
of 
unfair 
prejudice when using other acts evidence "is the potential harm 
in a jury's concluding that because an actor committed one bad 
act, he necessarily committed the crime with which he is now 
charged."  State v. Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d 247, 261-62, 378 
N.W.2d 272 (1985) (citing State v. Tarrell, 74 Wis. 2d 647, 657, 
247 N.W.2d 696 (1976)).  The circuit court's job is to ensure 
that the jury will not "prejudge a defendant's guilt or 
innocence in an action because of his prior bad act."  Id. at 
262. 
¶90 The situation in which unfair prejudice is most likely 
to occur is when one party attempts to put into evidence other 
acts allegedly committed by the opposing party that are similar 
to the act at issue in the current case.  For example, in State 
v. McGowan, 2006 WI App 80, ¶¶1, 23-24, 291 Wis. 2d 212, 715 
N.W.2d 631, the court of appeals found reversible error where 
the circuit court allowed the prosecution to present other acts 
evidence against the defendant that was highly inflammatory.  In 
McGowan, the defendant was charged with four counts of first-
degree sexual assault of a child stemming from several incidents 
involving himself and his cousin ten years earlier (when he was 
18 and she was 8).  Id., ¶¶1-2.  During trial, the prosecution 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
57 
 
was allowed to introduce evidence suggesting that the defendant 
had assaulted a different female cousin when he was 10 and she 
was 5.19  Id., ¶¶9-10.  After being convicted, the defendant 
argued to the court of appeals that the circuit court had erred 
by admitting the other acts evidence.  Id., ¶¶1, 13.   
¶91 The court of appeals summarized its reasoning for 
reversing the conviction: 
 
Here, 
the 
offered 
evidence . . . undoubtedly 
aroused the jury's "sense of horror" and "provoke[d] 
its instinct to punish."  See Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 
789-90. 
 
Revulsion 
as 
to 
this 
conduct 
is 
not 
significantly 
mitigated 
by 
the 
fact 
that 
[the 
defendant] was only ten years old at the time and the 
event was an isolated incident.  Given the obvious 
probable prejudice to the defendant, the probative 
value of the evidence to prove a legitimate fact of 
consequence——which is not proof of the defendant's 
character——should be strong indeed.  The slim reeds of 
probative value identified . . . crumble here under 
the weight of prejudice to the defendant. 
Id., ¶23 (emphasis added).  The court of appeals was concerned 
that the jury, after hearing evidence of another heinous sexual 
assault of a young child, would decide to punish the defendant 
based on that fact alone rather than the facts comprising the 
current charges.  See id.; see also Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d at 
261-62 (citing Tarrell, 74 Wis. 2d at 657). 
¶92 In the present case, the circuit court was fully 
engaged in the issues surrounding the admissibility of the other 
                                                 
19 The other acts evidence included the allegation that the 
defendant forced his cousin "to perform oral sex on him and [he] 
urinated in her mouth."  State v. McGowan, 2006 WI App 80, ¶9, 
291 Wis. 2d 212, 715 N.W.2d 631. 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
58 
 
acts evidence.  It had presided over the defendant's first 
trial, and it listened to the well-made respective arguments.  
Although the court determined that the probative value of the 
evidence was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial 
effect when it admitted the evidence, it did not make express 
findings to this effect.  In these circumstances, an appellate 
court should independently review the record "to determine 
whether there is any reasonable basis for the trial court's 
discretionary decision."  Davidson, 236 Wis. 2d 537, ¶53 (citing 
Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 781); State v. Gray, 225 Wis. 2d 39, 
51, 590 N.W.2d 918 (1999).  We conclude that there is. 
¶93 There is no denying that the other acts evidence 
regarding a gun and a large amount of cocaine being present at 
Payano's apartment the day before the shooting may have caused 
the "the jury [to] draw the forbidden propensity [or character] 
inference."  Blinka, supra, § 404.6 at 185.  It is certainly 
plausible that some members of the jury may have decided to 
convict Payano based on "improper means" upon hearing the other 
acts evidence.  See Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 789-90; Johnson, 
184 Wis. 2d at 340 (citing Christensen, 77 Wis. 2d at 61).   
¶94 Having said that, this is not a classic case of unfair 
prejudice, like McGowan, where the other acts evidence is so 
similar in nature to the charged act that there is danger the 
jury will simply presume the defendant's guilt in the current 
case.  See McGowan, 291 Wis. 2d 212, ¶¶1-2, 9-10, 23.  Moreover, 
the danger of unfair prejudice is not as great as it would be if 
the other acts evidence were used to prove Payano's identity or 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
59 
 
that he committed the charged offense.  Cf. Whitty, 34 
Wis. 2d at 294 ("[T]he standards of relevancy should be stricter 
when prior-crime [or other acts] evidence is used to prove 
identity or the doing of the act charged than when the evidence 
is offered on the issue of knowledge, intent or other state of 
mind.  McCormick, Evidence (hornbook series), p. 331, sec. 
157.").  Although we cannot say that the other acts evidence 
presented no danger of unfair prejudice to Payano, the danger 
was not exceptionally high given the nature of the evidence 
compared with the nature of the charged offense. 
¶95 Instead, similar to the other acts evidence offered in 
Pharr and Johnson, the evidence offered by the State in this 
case is directly linked and necessary to the determination of 
Payano's guilt.  See Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d at 348-49; Johnson, 184 
Wis. 2d at 338-41.  Kojis's testimony and the information he 
provided Officer Lutz of what he saw the day before the shooting 
in Payano's apartment was the foundation upon which the State's 
case rested.  Using the words of the Pharr court, "the [S]tate 
needed to introduce [the] evidence."  Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d at 348 
(emphasis added).  The evidence offered a plausible explanation 
as to why Payano might have shot his gun knowing that it was the 
police at the apartment door.  See Johnson, 184 Wis. 2d at 340.  
Without that evidence, it was not possible for the State to 
connect the shooting with its theory of why the shooting took 
place.  See id. at 339 ("[T]he . . . evidence was highly 
probative to [the defendant]'s theory of defense."); see also 
Kourtidias, 206 Wis. 2d at 582 ("[T]his other acts evidence was 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
60 
 
very relevant to this theory of defense.").  Without that 
connection, the State's case would have lacked credibility 
because it would have been supported only by the State's bald 
assertion that Payano must have shot at the officer to buy time 
to hide or destroy drugs.  Therefore, the other acts evidence in 
this case is extremely probative because the resolution of "this 
case 
essentially 
turned 
on 
the 
jury's 
assessment 
of . . . credibility" between the State's theory and Payano's 
theory.  Johnson, 184 Wis. 2d at 340. 
¶96 The other acts evidence offered by the State presented 
"an alternative explanation of [Payano]'s involvement [in the] 
shooting[, which became evident only] when the entire course of 
conduct [wa]s reviewed."  Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d at 348.  In other 
words, "the evidence was highly probative to [Payano]'s theory 
of defense."  Johnson, 184 Wis. 2d at 339; see also Kourtidias, 
206 Wis. 2d at 582 ("[T]his other acts evidence was very 
relevant to this theory of defense.").  Consequently, because 
the other acts evidence was absolutely essential to the State's 
case, its probative value was compelling.  See Johnson, 184 
Wis. 2d at 339-41; see also Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d at 348-49; 
Blinka, supra, § 404.6 at 183. 
¶97 Weighing the high degree of probative value against 
the danger of unfair prejudice, we cannot say that the probative 
value of the other acts evidence is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice.  See Wis. Stat. § 904.03; 
Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 772-73, 789; Davidson, 236 Wis. 2d 537, 
¶35; Blinka, supra, § 404.6 at 170, 183-88.  In our view, the 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
61 
 
probative value of the evidence substantially outweighs the 
danger of unfair prejudice.  Therefore, the circuit court's 
decision to admit the other acts evidence was not erroneous.  It 
was not a decision "that no reasonable judge, acting on the same 
facts and underlying law, could reach."  See Jeske, 197 
Wis. 2d at 913. 
¶98 In considering the State's motion to admit the other 
acts evidence, the court was told by defense counsel that the 
defendant would not "contest and dispute the search warrant."  A 
defendant is likely to be prejudiced by the fact that a jury 
will be told that a court has issued a no-knock warrant 
authorizing police to break down a defendant's door.  A jury is 
likely to speculate on the basis for that warrant.  Providing 
the jury with the information about that basis for the warrant 
may be more harmful to the defendant than speculation, but the 
inevitable harm is a matter of degree.  Not advising the jury 
about the warrant would mislead and confuse the jury. 
¶99 If evidence does carry the danger of unfair prejudice, 
the circuit court can mitigate that danger and lessen the unfair 
prejudicial effect by utilizing any of the following: (1) 
"stipulations"; 
(2) 
"editing the evidence"; (3) "limiting 
instructions"; and (4) "restricting argument."  Blinka, supra, 
§ 404.6 at 186; see also id., § 106.1 at 46 ("Limited 
admissibility is enforced through two procedural means, namely, 
restrictions on arguments and jury instructions.").  In fact, 
precedent suggests that cautionary jury instructions can go a 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
62 
 
long way in limiting the unfair prejudice that may result from 
the admission of other acts evidence.20 
                                                 
20 See 
Hunt, 
263 
Wis. 2d 1, 
¶¶72-73 
("[C]autionary 
instructions help to limit any unfair prejudice that might 
otherwise result. . . .  [T]he circuit court offered proper 
cautionary 
instructions 
on 
the 
other-acts 
evidence.  
Accordingly, any unfair prejudicial effect caused by the 
admittance 
of 
the 
other-acts 
evidence 
was 
substantially 
mitigated 
by 
the 
circuit 
court's 
cautionary 
instructions . . . ." (citing Plymesser, 172 Wis. 2d at 596-
97)); Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 791 ("[A] cautionary instruction, 
even if not tailored to the case, can go far to cure any adverse 
effect attendant with the admission of the [other acts] 
evidence.") (internal quotations and citations omitted) (second 
alteration in original); Shillcutt, 116 Wis. 2d at 238 ("[T]he 
cautionary instruction read to the jury prior to introduction of 
[other acts] testimony sufficiently tempered the prejudicial 
effect of this evidence so as to allow its admissibility.  If an 
admonitory instruction is properly given by the court, prejudice 
to a defendant is presumed erased from the jury's mind."); see 
also Blinka, supra, § 404.6 at 186-87. 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
63 
 
¶100 Although cautionary jury instructions are preferred21 
and should normally be provided when admitting other acts 
evidence, they are not required unless requested.22  See Wis. 
                                                 
21 We set forth note 1 from Criminal Jury Instruction 275 in 
its entirety as a reminder to counsel and to the courts the best 
course of action for dealing with cautionary instructions for 
other acts evidence. 
Whenever evidence has been admitted for a limited 
purpose, 
§ 901.06 
provides 
that 
a 
cautionary 
instruction must be given upon request. 
 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that the 
trial 
judge 
is 
under 
no 
obligation 
to 
give 
a 
cautionary instruction in the absence of a request by 
the defendant.  Hough v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 807, 817, 
235 N.W.2d 534 (1975).  The basis for the decision in 
Hough was a recognition that it may have been a 
tactical decision by the defense not to request an 
instruction, out of a desire not to call further 
attention to the prior act.  However, the absence of a 
curative or limiting instruction has been considered 
by the court in finding that admission of other acts 
evidence constituted reversible error.  State v. 
Spraggin, 77 Wis. 2d 89, 101, 252 N.W.2d 94 (1977).  
It may be desirable, therefore, for the trial judge to 
inquire 
of 
the 
defense 
whether 
a 
cautionary 
instruction is requested and, if the defendant's 
tactical decision is not to request the instruction, 
to make a record of that decision.  The trial judge 
may also wish to consider giving the instruction, or a 
variation thereof, at the time the other acts evidence 
is admitted in addition to the instruction given at 
the close of the case.  
Wis JI——Criminal 275 at 3 (emphasis added). 
22 We do recognize that in some cases the defendant or the 
defendant's counsel may not want the cautionary instruction 
given "because such instructions often just underscore the 
forbidden purpose" the defendant wishes to avoid.  Blinka, 
supra, § 106.1 at 46-47; see also Hough, 70 Wis. 2d at 817 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
64 
 
Stat. § 901.06 ("When evidence which is admissible as to one 
party or for one purpose but not admissible as to another party 
or for another purpose is admitted, the judge, upon request, 
shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the 
jury accordingly.")23 (emphasis added); Wis JI——Criminal 275 at 3 
("[T]he trial judge is under no obligation to give a cautionary 
instruction in the absence of a request by the defendant." 
(citing Hough v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 807, 817, 235 N.W.2d 534 
(1975))) (emphasis added); Blinka, § 404.6 at 186 ("Other act 
evidence normally should be accompanied by an admonitory or 
limiting instruction precisely because the evidence is being 
introduced for only a limited purpose.") (emphasis added).  
However, the absence of a cautionary instruction can be 
considered in weighing the evidence's danger of unfair prejudice 
against its probative value.  Wis JI——Criminal 275 at 3 ("[T]he 
absence 
of 
a 
curative 
or 
limiting 
instruction 
has 
been 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
The problem for this court when no such request 
for instruction is made is to determine, from the 
record, whether it may have been a trial tactic on the 
part 
of 
the 
defense 
not 
to 
ask 
for 
such 
an 
instruction, out of a desire, for example, not to call 
further attention to the prior act.  This court has 
consistently held that no sua sponte instruction need 
be given under circumstances where failure of a 
defendant to request an instruction may reasonably be 
part of a trial tactic, recently in the case of Watson 
v. State (1974), 64 Wis. 2d 264, 219 N.W.2d 398. 
23 "Contrary to the suggestion in the Judicial Council 
Committee's Note to Wis. Stat. § 901.06, an instruction is not 
mandatory unless the opponent requests that it be given."  
Blinka, supra, § 106.1 at 47 n.12. 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
65 
 
considered by the court in finding that admission of other acts 
evidence constituted reversible error." (citing Spraggin, 77 
Wis. 2d at 101)); cf. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 791 (finding an 
overbroad cautionary instruction ineffective in mitigating the 
danger of unfair prejudice). 
¶101 Regardless of whether a cautionary instruction is 
provided to the jury, "counsel may only argue the evidence for 
its proper purpose, as delimited by the trial judge's ruling."  
Blinka, supra, § 106.1 at 47.  Otherwise, as in Sullivan, the 
court may find that the probative value of the other acts 
evidence is substantially outweighed by its danger of unfair 
prejudice.  Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 791-92 ("[T]he prosecutor 
referred to the other acts evidence extensively in both the 
opening and closing statements and urged the jury to consider 
what the evidence revealed about the defendant's character."). 
¶102 In the present case, the circuit court judge did not 
provide the jury with a cautionary instruction.24  However, she 
did firmly admonish the attorneys to limit their arguments 
regarding the other acts evidence to the purposes delineated by 
the prosecution.  The court stated the following: 
The State will not be allowed to suggest that Mr. 
Payano is a drug dealer.  I think Mr. Kojis should 
clearly testify that he didn't go there looking for 
drugs, that neither he nor his friend bought drugs, 
that there was no drug transaction going on. 
 
. . . . 
                                                 
24 According to the record, neither party requested an 
instruction. 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
66 
 
 
But I do think that the context and the testimony 
of this witness is something that the jury should hear 
for a very narrow point.   
(Emphasis added.) 
¶103 The court limited the use of the evidence to "a very 
narrow point"——namely, as proof that Payano shot the gun, 
knowing that the police were at the door, so that he could get 
rid of drugs——and there is no suggestion that the evidence was 
used for any reason beyond that "very narrow point."  In fact, 
the court of appeals makes mention in two different paragraphs 
of its opinion that the State did not use the evidence for any 
improper purpose.  See Payano, 312 Wis. 2d 224, ¶¶31, 35 ("[T]he 
prosecutor 
complied 
with 
the 
trial 
court's 
restriction . . . ."). 
¶104 Although the lack of a cautionary instruction may be 
the deciding factor in some cases of whether the evidence is 
admissible under Wis. Stat. § 904.03, see Wis JI——Criminal 275 
at 3, that is not the situation here because the probative value 
of the evidence far outweighed its danger of unfair prejudice, 
with or without a limiting instruction, see supra, ¶¶93-98.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶105 After 
carefully 
considering 
the 
facts 
and 
circumstances, we conclude that the circuit court did not err in 
admitting the "other acts" testimony of a confidential informant 
about his observations of the defendant's possession of drugs 
and a handgun in the defendant's apartment on the day before the 
police executed a no-knock search warrant at the apartment.  The 
informant's testimony provided context for an incident in which 
No.  2007AP1042-CR 
 
67 
 
a police officer was shot by the defendant.  It explained why 
the police were at the defendant's apartment, and it provided a 
plausible explanation of why the defendant fired his gun at a 
police officer trying to enter the apartment.  The informant's 
testimony served to rebut the defendant's claim that he was 
acting reasonably in defense of himself and his family.  It 
provided a motive for the shooting.   
¶106 The circuit court determined that (1) evidence of the 
defendant's very recent involvement with drugs and a gun at the 
place where the shooting occurred was offered for a proper 
purpose under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2); (2) the evidence was 
relevant under Wis. Stat. § 904.01; and (3) the probative value 
of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice under Wis. Stat. § 904.03.   The circuit 
court did not erroneously exercise its discretion because it 
reviewed the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law, 
and using a rational process, reached a reasonable conclusion.  
We believe the circuit court offered a cogent explanation for 
admitting the evidence in the circumstances presented.   
¶107 Because of our decision on the first issue posed by 
the State, we find it unnecessary to address the second issue. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
 
No.  2007AP1042-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶108 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  Without even 
laying eyes on a piece of evidence that the prosecutor referred 
to as "the heart of this case," the majority purports to balance 
the probative value of Kojis' other acts testimony and its 
prejudicial effect.   
¶109 I refer to a tape of the 911 call Payano placed after 
he fired the shot that injured the officer and before he was 
apprehended in his bathroom.  It is difficult to imagine a piece 
of evidence more probative of Payano's mental state than an 
audio recording of that call.  Yet, where is the tape?  What was 
said during that call?  The majority notes that the tape is not 
in the record and it moves on, untroubled.1   
¶110 Balancing probative value and prejudicial effect is an 
extremely fact-specific process.  Yet, here, the majority 
engages in a balance without weighing essential evidence that 
was repeatedly played to the jury and permeated the testimony in 
various phases of the trial.  At a minimum, the court should 
supplement the record with the 911 tape before conducting this 
balance.   
¶111 If this tape is unavailable, however, and I were 
required to evaluate an incomplete record, I would agree with a 
unanimous court of appeals that the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion when it admitted Kojis' testimony.  
"[T]he 
probative 
value 
of 
Kojis' 
testimony, 
if 
any, 
is 
negligible" and if believed, it could readily provoke the jury 
                                                 
1 A transcript of the tape was marked as an exhibit.  It, 
too, is missing from the appellate record. 
No.  2007AP1042-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
to punish Payano due to a perception that he was a drug dealer 
rather than for the crime charged.  State v. Payano, 2008 WI App 
74, ¶¶28, 30, 312 Wis. 2d 224, 752 N.W.2d 378.  Accordingly, I 
respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶112 The issue for us upon review is whether the circuit 
court erred in admitting other acts evidence of Payano's drug 
activity that occurred the day before he fired the shot.  The 
majority concludes that the evidence is relevant to provide 
context and to rebut Payano's theory of self defense.  After 
conducting a balancing test, the majority determines that the 
evidence was properly admitted because the probative value of 
the evidence outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice. 
¶113 There was no question at trial that Payano shot a 
police officer.  Rather, the essential issue that the jury was 
required to decide was what Payano believed at the time of the 
shooting.  Did he knowingly shoot at the officer behind the door 
in order to buy time and destroy evidence?  Or did he shoot at 
the door to protect himself and his family, believing that the 
people behind the door were trying to hurt him?  
¶114 The tape from Payano's 911 call was entered into 
evidence during both trials and repeatedly played to the jury.  
Both the defense and the prosecutor attempted to use the tape to 
bolster their arguments about Payano's claim of self-defense.  
Nevertheless, the tape is not part of the record on appeal.  See 
majority op., ¶17 n.4.    
No.  2007AP1042-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
¶115 Certainly, Payano's own words during that phone call 
would have been extremely probative of his belief at the time.  
During his closing arguments, the prosecutor stated: "The best 
thing that the defense has going for it clearly is the 911 tape, 
and that's why it's played over and over.  I don't blame them."   
¶116 Defense counsel argued that the tape demonstrated that 
Payano thought that he had shot at someone who was breaking in 
to kill him rather than a police officer.  In his opening 
statement, he said: "And the State will have you believe that 
this person, Tony Payano, who called 911 is the same person who 
intentionally fired upon a police officer.  So I ask you to ask 
yourselves is that behavior consistent with somebody who 
believes they have just committed a crime?" 
¶117 During closing arguments, defense counsel argued:  
"Seconds after that chaotic scene [when Payano shot at the 
door], 
Tony 
Payano 
made 
that 
call, 
in 
a 
matter 
of 
seconds . . . .  And you can hear Tony, somebody shooting, 
somebody shooting, and [his mother] screaming, she's in the 
background, 
oh, 
my 
God, 
over 
and 
over. . . . [A]nd 
most 
important here, why is a guy who knows he fired against a cop, 
why would his first instinct be to call 911?  Is that the 
conduct of somebody who knows that they fired on a cop?  No, of 
course not.  That is the conduct of somebody who is acting to 
protect his mother and his cousin and himself from people 
breaking down his door, when he thought they were going to kill 
him."  
No.  2007AP1042-CR.awb 
 
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 ¶118 
The prosecutor asserted that Payano made the call 
in order to falsely create evidence of his innocence: "Now I 
don't know for sure whether or not Tony Payano deserves an 
Academy Award for his performance on that day, but . . . unlike 
every other piece of evidence in this case, that piece of 
evidence was created by the defendant who is on trial[.]"   
¶119 Balancing probative value and prejudicial effect is an 
extremely fact-intensive inquiry.  Yet, the majority attempts to 
perform the balance without reviewing the most important piece 
of evidence in the record.  Rather than performing the balance 
in a vacuum, the majority should supplement the record with the 
evidence that is at "the heart of this case"——the 911 tape.   
II 
¶120 On this record, however, the majority concludes that 
the other acts evidence was properly admitted.  Kojis, a paid 
informant, testified at trial that the day before the arrest, he 
walked into Payano's kitchen and saw him "bagging up cocaine."  
According to Kojis, who said he was familiar with the sale of 
cocaine because he "grew up in that environment," this was no 
small amount of cocaine for personal use.  Rather, it was "a 
bunch of bagged packages of cocaine along with large chunks." 
¶121 He testified that he was familiar with the "packaging 
that people in the City and County of Milwaukee use for cocaine" 
and explained to the jury how cocaine is bagged, the terminology 
used, and the quantities in which it is sold.  It was Kojis' 
opinion that Payano had a "relatively large amount." 
No.  2007AP1042-CR.awb 
 
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¶122 After testifying about the presence of the drugs, 
Kojis turned his attention to the gun which he observed on the 
kitchen table next to Payano.  He told the jury that he had 
"experience around pistols" and that this gun was a "semi 
automatic."  After further questioning, he identified it as a 
"380," whereupon the prosecutor displayed to the jury either the 
gun or a picture of the gun and asked several more questions 
about it.   
¶123 The State argued, and the majority agrees, that the 
evidence was relevant to show context——that the officers were 
legitimately at the door in the first place.  The circuit court 
accepted this rationale: "The jury [in the first trial], I 
believe was left with the impression that this search warrant 
was somehow arbitrary, based on nothing, that the police came 
storming in a place with no basis really for doing that, that it 
may 
have 
been 
somehow 
a 
violation 
of 
Mr. 
Payano's 
rights . . . ." 
¶124 The problem with the context argument is that it is 
used to admit evidence that is not relevant to the elements of 
the charged offense.  The circuit court accepted the context 
argument to admit evidence to defend the actions of the police 
officers rather than evidence relevant to Payano's actions.  As 
the court of appeals noted, "[t]his case does not center on the 
police officers' conduct in executing the no-knock search 
warrant" and the circuit court's rationale "is not pertinent to 
our relevancy determination."  Payano, 312 Wis. 2d 224, ¶25.     
No.  2007AP1042-CR.awb 
 
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¶125 The State also argued, and the majority agrees, that 
the evidence was relevant to rebut Payano's claim of self 
defense because it would show that Payano would be more likely 
to expect police officers at his door.  Like the court of 
appeals, I am not persuaded that Kojis' testimony about the 
presence of cocaine and a gun at Payano's residence supports the 
inference that Payano would reasonably have known that it was 
the police at his door.   
¶126 Instead, I agree that "the alleged presence of cocaine 
at his residence the day before the shooting no more supports 
the proposition that he thus believed that the men attempting to 
break down his door were police, than it does the notion that 
Payano believed they were hoodlums seeking to harm him, his 
mother, and his cousin, and steal the cocaine."  Id., ¶24. 
¶127 The probative value of evidence largely depends on the 
degree of its relevance.  See Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin 
Practice Series: Wisconsin Evidence § 404.6, at 183 (3d ed. 
2008).  The other acts evidence here is probative of little if 
anything other than Payano's character as a drug dealing 
criminal and the inference that he will behave accordingly.  
Ultimately, like the court of appeals, I conclude that the 
probative value of Kojis' testimony is negligible, if at all.   
¶128 On the other hand, testimony tending to show that 
Payano was a drug dealer presents the classic danger of unfair 
prejudice.  Notably, no cocaine, cocaine residue, or drug 
paraphernalia was found at Payano's residence, and Payano was 
not charged with any drug-related crime.  Yet, Kojis' testimony 
No.  2007AP1042-CR.awb 
 
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clearly left the impression that Payano was a dangerous drug 
dealer.   
¶129 Compounding the prejudice here is that the circuit 
court failed to give a limiting instruction, even though it had 
earlier explained that it intended to give such an instruction 
in order to reduce the danger of unfair prejudice.  See majority 
op., ¶34, n.6.  Thus, the jury was not instructed about the 
limited legal purpose for which the other acts evidence was 
admitted.  This left the jury unguided and free to draw legally 
impermissible inferences from the other acts evidence.  I 
conclude that Kojis' testimony had a tendency to influence the 
outcome of the trial by improper means by arousing the jury's 
sense of horror and provoking its instinct to punish or 
otherwise base its decision on something other than the crime 
charged.  See State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 789-90, 576 
N.W.2d 30 (1998).  
¶130 Here, the balance is clear.  As discussed above, the 
probative value of the evidence was negligible——if at all.  By 
contrast, the danger of unfair prejudice was extremely high.  
Like the court of appeals, I conclude that the probative value 
was far outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.   
¶131 For 
the 
reasons discussed above, I respectfully 
dissent. 
¶132 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent.   
 
 
No.  2007AP1042-CR.awb 
 
 
 
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