Title: Darden v. Meadows
Citation: 68 So. 2d 709
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: November 12, 1953

68 So. 2d 709 (1953)
DARDEN
v.
MEADOWS et al.
5 Div. 555.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
November 12, 1953.
*710 Hines &amp; Hines, LaFayette, for appellant.
R. C. Wallace, LaFayette, for appellees.
MERRILL, Justice.
Appellant has appealed from a decree of the Circuit Court, in Equity, of Chambers County, sustaining demurrers to the original bill and to the bill as amended.
The complainant, Mr. Darden, filed this bill against the heirs at law of his deceased wife, Sarah Carson Darden. After describing the property, the complainant alleges that he purchased it from George H. Lanier and wife on August 1, 1919, and that a deed was executed, delivered and recorded in the probate office of Chambers County.
The next two paragraphs of the bill are as follows:
The bill prayed that the court would decree that complainant is the owner in fee simple of the property, declare that respondents have no interest in said property, and will reform and correct the deed executed by George H. Lanier and wife, and for general relief.
The respondents filed demurrer, assigning as grounds, no equity, laches, prescription and statutes of limitation.
Judge Walton, in a sound and extended opinion and decree, sustained the demurrer on the ground that the complainant was guilty of laches.
Complainant then amended the bill as follows:
Respondents filed the same demurrers and they were again sustained.
If complainant sought to set up mutual mistake as a ground for reformation of the deed, the facts in paragraph 5 are not sufficient.
The case of Lewis v. Belk, 219 Ala. 343, 122 So. 413, enunciates three principles applicable here:
(1) "It requires very great particularity of averment, and very clear proof, to authorize the reformation of a written contract'. Dexter v. Ohlander, 95 Ala. 467, 10 So. 527; Camper v. Rice, 201 Ala. 579, 78 So. 923; Warren v. Crow, 195 Ala. 568, 71 So. 92."
(2) "Reformation is sought solely on the ground of mistake, no fraud intervening. Mutuality of the mistake is essential. Camper v. Rice, supra; Warren v. Crow, supra."
(3) "The bill seeks the reformation of a deed after the passage of more than thirty-five years (here thirty-two years) from the date of its execution. Under the uniform decisions of this Court, it was therefore incumbent upon complainant to aver sufficient excuse for so long delay. Henley v. Masonic Temple Ass'n, 208 Ala. 371, 94 So. 300; Chambless v. Kennamer, 214 Ala. 293, 107 So. 908; Fowler v. Fowler, 205 Ala. 514, 88 So. 648; Gayle v. Pennington, 185 Ala. 53, 64 So. 572; Bellamy v. Pitts, 216 Ala. 40, 112 So. 328; Patterson v. Weaver, 216 Ala. 686, 114 So. 301; Veitch v. Woodward Iron Co., 200 Ala. 358, 76 So. 124."
If complainant intended to allege that there was a resulting trust in favor of complainant paragraph six was not sufficient. See Hooks v. Hooks, 258 Ala. 427, 63 So. 2d 348. Since the parties were husband and wife, the presumption of a resulting trust will not arise when the conveyance is to the wife with purchase by the husband, as he is considered under a legal or moral obligation to make provision for her and a gift will be presumed. Roubicek v. Roubicek, 246 Ala. 442, 21 So. 2d 244; Marshall v. Marshall, 243 Ala. 169, 8 So. 2d 843.
In Banks v. Banks, 253 Ala. 252, 44 So. 2d 10, 12, the Court said:
It is to be observed that relief is sought against a transaction occurring more than thirty years before the filing of this bill, placing the burden upon complainant by this bill to excuse so long a delay. Chambless v. Kennamer, 214 Ala. 293, 107 So. 908, and the question can be raised by demurrer. Ussery v. Darrow, 238 Ala. 67, 188 So. 885; Drummond v. Drummond, 232 Ala. 401, 168 So. 428.
*712 The following statements, omitting cases cited, are found in Salvo v. Coursey, 220 Ala. 300, 124 So. 874, 875:
And as stated in Gayle v. Pennington, 185 Ala. 53, 64 So. 572, 577:
The Court in Hauser v. Foley &amp; Co., 190 Ala. 437, 67 So. 252, 253, said:
The amendment to the bill attempted to excuse or explain away laches. The following quotation from the case of Scruggs v. Decatur Mineral &amp; Land Co., 86 Ala. 173, 5 So. 440, appears in Peters Mineral Land Co. v. Hooper, 208 Ala. 324, 94 So. 606, 612:
Complainant seems to rely upon ignorance as an excuse in the instant case. But, as shown above, ignorance alone does not excuse laches. If facts were apparent to complainant so as to put him on inquiry *713 concerning the names of the grantees in the deed, and he failed to inquire, then this lack of reasonable diligence precludes the availability of this excuse that he did not discover that his wife was a co-grantee until 1950. We regard the following circumstances in their total effect as making it apparent that complainant has not excused himself from the application of the doctrine of laches: construing the allegations most strongly against him, the deed was delivered to him in 1919, he accepted it and placed it in his trunk and in 1947 he "noticed that it was not recorded" and he then had it recorded. We have noticed the outside of the photostatic copy of the deed which was made Exhibit "A" to the amended bill. To us, it is inconceivable that complainant could have noticed that the deed was not recorded and failed to notice his wife's name printed thereon in letters as large as any other printing on that particular page, there being only nine words on the page other than his name and his wife's name. Again the exercise of reasonable diligence at this time would have put him on notice as to the names of the grantees in the deed. But his wife was still living at that time and did not die until August 1948, and complainant avers that he discovered the mistake in 1950.
This Court said in Meeks v. Meeks, 245 Ala. 559, 18 So. 2d 260, 267:
Here death has removed the wife, the most important witness for the respondents. And in Moragne v. Moragne, 234 Ala. 660, 176 So. 455, 456, the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Anderson, said:
The principal foundations of the doctrine of laches are acquiescence and lapse of time. But other circumstances will be taken into consideration. Thus it is a material circumstance that the claim is not made until after the death of him who could have explained the transaction. Salmon v. Wynn, 153 Ala. 538, 45 So. 133.
In discussing a case similar to the one at bar, where the husband sought to have the deed reformed because his deceased wife was a co-grantee, and laches was one of the defenses set up by the heirs of his wife, this Court, in King v. Coffee, 222 Ala. 245, 131 So. 792, 795, said:
The trial court included the following in his opinion:
For a collection of authorities on the question of laches see Oxford v. Estes, 229 Ala. 606, 611, 158 So. 534, 538, paragraphs 6-13.
The allegations in the bill in the instant case are insufficient to bring it within the influence of Zeigler v. Zeigler, 180 Ala. 246, 60 So. 810.
Appellant had two assignments of error, the court's action in sustaining the demurrer to the original bill, and in sustaining the demurrer to the bill as amended. We do not consider the first assignment of error. The decree overruling the demurrer to the original bill was filed March 3, 1952. The decree on demurrer to the bill as amended was dated and filed June 17, 1952. The appeal was taken July 8, 1952. "It is well settled that on an appeal from an interlocutory decree, appellant cannot assign for error interlocutory decrees rendered more than thirty days before the appeal was taken, but may do so from final decree." Woods v. Allison Lumber Co., 258 Ala. 282, 62 So. 2d 229, 231.
We think the lower court was correct in sustaining the demurrer to the bill as last amended, and the decree should be affirmed.
Affirmed.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and SIMPSON, STAKELY, GOODWYN and CLAYTON, JJ., concur.
LAWSON, J., concurs in the result.