Title: Robert M. Seh Company v. O'Donnell
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 081392
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 17, 2009

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and 
Millette, JJ., and Lacy, S.J. 
 
THE ROBERT M. SEH COMPANY, INC., 
D/B/A BJ POOL & SPA, ET AL. 
 
v.  Record No. 081392 
 
 
OPINION BY SENIOR JUSTICE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    ELIZABETH B. LACY 
DANIEL O’DONNELL, ET AL.  
 
     APRIL 17, 2009 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY 
Lon E. Farris, Judge 
 
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the trial 
court abused its discretion by allowing a juror to remain on the 
jury panel when the juror, during the course of the trial, 
expressed concern about his ability to impartially decide the 
case. 
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
The facts in this case are not in dispute.  In 2003, Daniel 
and Patricia L. O’Donnell contracted with The Robert M. Seh 
Company, Inc., d/b/a/ B.J. Pool & Spa, to install a Fox brand 
swimming pool at the O’Donnells’ residence for $22,895.00.  When 
the pool was not completed to the satisfaction of the 
O’Donnells, they filed suit against the company and its 
president and owner, Robert M. Seh (collectively Seh), asserting 
breach of contract, fraud and violations of the Virginia 
Consumer Protection Act, Code §§ 59.1-200 through -207.  The 
O’Donnells sought compensatory and punitive damages along with 
statutory enhanced damages and attorney’s fees under the 
Consumer Protection Act, Code §§ 59.1-204 and -206.  The 
O’Donnells maintained that Seh failed to install the pool to 
industry standards, and although the contract required the 
installation of a Fox brand pool liner, a Vyn-All brand liner 
was installed despite Seh’s representation that a Fox pool liner 
had been installed.  Seh filed a counterclaim for amounts unpaid 
under the contract. 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the O’Donnells on 
the breach of contract and Consumer Protection Act claims, but 
rejected the fraud claim and Seh’s counterclaim.  The jury also 
found that Seh had willfully violated the Consumer Protection 
Act and awarded damages.  The trial court entered judgment on 
the jury verdict awarding total damages of $66,507.20 for the 
breach of contract claim and Consumer Protection Act claim, 
$1000 in enhanced statutory damages for the willful violation of 
the Consumer Protection Act and attorneys’ fees of $31,049.55.1 
 
We awarded Seh an appeal. 
DISCUSSION 
Seh’s first two assignments of error challenge the trial 
court’s denial of Seh’s motion for a mistrial based on its 
finding that juror Howard Dwight Lyons, Jr. was not biased and 
                                                 
1 The trial court reduced the damage award for violation of 
the Consumer Protection Act from $1500 to $1000 on the agreement 
of the parties based on the correct application of the statutory 
enhancement provision of the Act, Code § 59.1-206. 
 
2
could remain on the jury panel.  We begin by reciting the facts 
relevant to these issues. 
During voir dire, the trial court asked whether any of the 
potential jurors had worked in the swimming pool industry.  
Juror Lyons responded that he had helped his father-in-law who 
owned a swimming pool company with summer pool installations.  
No further questions were asked of Lyons and he was seated as a 
juror without objection. 
In opening statements, Seh’s counsel conceded that the 
liner installed in the O’Donnells’ pool was not the agreed-upon 
Fox liner, but another liner, the Vyn-All liner, which counsel 
characterized as superior to the Fox liner.  After the first 
witness testified, Lyons contacted the bailiff raising a 
question about his continued ability to be impartial.  Out of 
the presence of the rest of the jury, Lyons told the trial court 
that he heard his father-in-law talk about the differences in 
various pool liners.  Lyons remembered a statement made by his 
father-in-law that the Vyn-All liner was of inferior quality.  
Based on this conversation, Lyons told the circuit court that he 
was concerned that he had “developed a bias that says [Seh’s 
counsel] doesn’t know what he’s talking about” because counsel’s 
statement regarding the quality of the Vyn-All liner 
contradicted his father-in-law’s statement. 
 
3
The circuit court asked Lyons if he understood that he was 
to make his decision based on the evidence in the case and Lyons 
replied in the affirmative.  The court then asked counsel if 
they had any questions to ask Lyons.  Neither counsel had any 
further questions but Seh’s counsel expressed concern about 
Lyons’ ability to remain unbiased notwithstanding Lyons’ answers 
to the trial court’s questions.  According to Seh’s counsel, 
Lyons’ recognition of the prior conversations with his father-
in-law about the liners in issue in this case “indicates a 
predisposition, a very strong predisposition of the fundamental 
issue of this case.” 
The trial court explained that it did not think juror Lyons 
“ha[d] a bias” but asked Seh’s counsel what steps counsel wished 
the court to take.  Counsel replied that an alternate juror 
should be brought in.  The trial court responded that all 
alternate jurors had been discharged and that counsel’s choice 
was to proceed with a jury panel of six members or seek a 
mistrial.  Proceeding with Lyons on the jury panel was not 
acceptable to Seh, nor was a six-member jury panel.  The court 
then took the matter under advisement during a lunch break.  
After the break, the trial court again questioned Lyons 
about his conversation with his father-in-law and Lyons’ 
partiality.  Lyons explained that his father-in-law said the 
Vyn-All liner was thicker than the Fox liner and as a result was 
 
4
more brittle than the Fox liner.  In response to a question from 
the trial court, Lyons also stated that he would use any expert 
information introduced in the case regarding the pool liners as 
the basis for his decision, but could not “erase” from his 
“brain” the information he had about the two liners. 
When questioning by the court and counsel concluded, Seh’s 
counsel again argued that Lyons had expressed an opinion on a 
fundamental key issue in the case and therefore “has a built-in 
prejudice and a bias beyond the normal bias” that a person has 
from life experience and that this bias would prejudice Seh.  
The trial court disagreed, finding that Lyons clearly stated 
that he could put aside the statements of his father-in-law and 
decide the case on the evidence presented.  Seh’s motion for 
mistrial was denied.2 
 
The first two assignments of error assert respectively that 
the trial court erred in refusing to strike juror Lyons for 
cause and in denying the motion for a mistrial.  We note that 
the record does not directly support the proposition that the 
trial court refused to strike the juror for cause.  The issue 
arose in the course of the trial and the trial court apparently 
                                                 
2 The O’Donnells argue that the trial court’s decision was 
also based on its holding that Seh waived any challenge to Lyons 
because it did not question Lyons about his experience with 
swimming pool construction during voir dire.  The record does 
not support an alternate holding by the trial court and we do 
not address this argument. 
 
5
would have been willing to replace juror Lyons if an alternative 
juror had been available.3  Nevertheless, the issue is squarely 
presented with regard to the trial court’s denial of the motion 
for mistrial. 
 
A trial court’s ruling denying a motion for mistrial will 
be set aside on appellate review only if the ruling constituted 
an abuse of discretion.  See Westlake Properties, Inc. v. 
Westlake Pointe Property Owners Assoc., 273 Va. 107, 124, 639 
S.E.2d 257, 267 (2007).  We have not previously reviewed the 
relevant factors to be utilized in determining abuse of 
discretion under the circumstances presented in this case.  
However, we have considered other instances in which a challenge 
to the impartiality of a juror arose after voir dire, the 
empanelling of the jury or the commencement of the trial.  In 
Haddad v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 325, 327, 329 S.E.2d 17, 18 
(1985), a juror made the statement to a group of attorneys at 
the lunch break that “his client” was “not going to get off.”  
When the juror’s statements were brought to the attention of the 
trial court, the court asked the juror questions about the 
statement and his ability to give both parties a fair and 
                                                 
3 We reject O’Donnell’s charge that Seh did not acquire leave 
of court to challenge Lyons after the jurors had been empanelled 
and therefore this issue is waived.  See Code § 8.01-352.  The 
trial court considered the challenge to Lyons and therefore 
implicitly granted leave to raise the challenge.  See Hill v. 
Berry, 247 Va. 271, 274, 441 S.E.2d 6, 7 (1994).  
 
6
impartial trial.  Id. at 328, 329 S.E.2d at 19.  The trial court 
concluded that the juror could be fair and impartial and denied 
the defendant’s motion for mistrial.  Id.  
 
On appellate review, this Court, characterizing the juror’s 
statements to the attorneys as juror misconduct, adopted the 
following test: the trial judge in the exercise of discretion, 
must determine whether prejudice might result from the remarks 
made, and the proponent of the mistrial motion has the burden to 
establish the probability of prejudice.  Id. at 330, 329 S.E.2d 
at 20.  The Court concluded that the record showed that the 
juror “probably was impartial no longer” notwithstanding the 
answers given the trial court regarding his ability to maintain 
an open mind on the issues.  Id. at 331, 329 S.E.2d at 20.  The 
Court found that the “facts developed brought into question the 
fairness of the trial and disclosed circumstances that would 
tend to impair public confidence in trial by jury” and that 
denying the motion for mistrial under these circumstances was an 
abuse of discretion.  Id. 
 
In contrast, this Court refused to find an abuse of 
discretion in denying a motion for mistrial when, in a second 
degree murder prosecution, a juror failed to respond during voir 
dire to the question whether any juror or any juror’s family 
member had been a victim of a violent crime but, after the jury 
was empanelled and opening statements delivered, revealed that 
 
7
her husband had been “held up” at gunpoint earlier that year.  
Taylor v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 214, 505 S.E.2d 378 (1998) 
(adopting the Court of Appeals’ reasoning in Taylor v. 
Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 12, 14, 486 S.E.2d 108, 109 (1997)).  
The defendant argued that the juror’s failure to answer the 
question prejudiced his ability to exercise his peremptory 
challenges.  25 Va. App. at 17, 486 S.E.2d at 110. 
In that case this Court agreed with the Court of Appeals 
that, although the juror had not responded in a timely manner to 
the question posed on voir dire, nothing in the record showed 
that the juror did not stand indifferent to the cause.  25 Va. 
App. at 18, 486 S.E.2d at 111.  Therefore, notwithstanding 
impairment of the defendant’s right to peremptory challenges, 
the juror’s presence on the jury did not affect the essential 
fairness of the trial.  Id. 
 
These cases teach that once a jury has been empanelled and 
the impartiality of a juror is subsequently brought into 
question, it is an abuse of discretion to deny a motion for 
mistrial if the proponent of the motion establishes the 
probability of prejudice such that the fairness of the trial is 
subject to question.  Although Haddad and Taylor are criminal 
cases, the standards regarding determinations of juror 
impartiality and probable prejudice are the same for civil and 
criminal cases.  See Edlow v. Arnold, 243 Va. 345, 347, 415 
 
8
S.E.2d 436, 437 (1992).  Accordingly, we find this standard 
appropriate for application in this case. 
 
The record in this case demonstrates that Lyons’ 
understanding of the difference between the two pool liners was 
“the opposite of what [Seh’s] attorney said,” and based on this 
knowledge, Lyons stated that he “developed a bias that says that 
[Seh’s attorney] doesn’t know what he’s talking about.”  This 
statement of bias was never retracted nor questioned and 
directly supports the proposition that retaining Lyons on the 
jury panel presented a high probability of prejudice to Seh that 
would bring the fairness of the trial into question.  
Additionally, although in answer to the trial court’s 
questions Lyons stated that he could decide the case on the 
evidence presented, he continued to refer to his belief that the 
Vyn-All liner was more likely to crack and that he could not 
“erase [his] brain.”  While the respective quality of the liners 
may not have been the cornerstone of the O’Donnells’ claims, 
that factor could have been part of the basis for a finding of 
liability and the award of damages in the Consumer Protection 
claim.  Thus, retaining Lyons on the jury also presented a 
probability of prejudice to Seh in this regard. 
For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court abused 
its discretion in denying Seh’s motion for a mistrial based on 
the lack of impartiality of Lyons.  Accordingly, we will reverse 
 
9
the judgment of the trial court and remand the matter to the 
circuit court for a new trial.4 
Reversed and remanded. 
                                                 
4 In light of this holding, we need not address the remaining 
assignments of error. 
 
10