Title: Mohns Inc. v. BMO Harris Bank National Ass'n
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2018AP000071
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: February 2, 2021

2021 WI 8 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2018AP71 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Mohns Inc., 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
BMO Harris Bank National Association, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 388 Wis. 2d 475,934 N.W.2d 572 
(2019 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 2, 2021   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 1, 2020   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha   
 
JUDGE: 
Kathryn W. Foster   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion for a 
unanimous Court. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
ZIEGLER and HAGEDORN, JJ., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Michael B. Apfeld, Andrew S. Oettinger, and Godfrey & 
Kahn S.C., Milwaukke; with whom on the brief was Linda T. 
Coberly, pro hac vice, and Winston & Strawn LLP, Chicago, 
Illinois. There was an oral argument by Linda T. Coberly. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
John E. Machulak and Machulak, Robertson & Sodos, S.C., 
Milwaukee. There was an oral argument by John E. Machulak.
2021 WI 8 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2018AP71 
(L.C. No. 
2016CV307) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
: 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Mohns Inc., 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
BMO Harris Bank National Association, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 2, 2021 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion for a 
unanimous Court. 
 
ZIEGLER and HAGEDORN, JJ., did not participate. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed in 
part, reversed in part, and cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   BMO Harris Bank National 
Association seeks review of the court of appeals decision, which 
affirmed the circuit court's order for judgment in favor of 
Mohns, Inc.1  The circuit court granted judgment on liability in 
                                                 
1 Mohns Inc. v. BMO Harris Bank Nat'l Assoc., No. 2018AP71, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. July 24, 2019) (per curiam). 
The Honorable Kathryn W. Foster of Waukesha County Circuit 
Court presided. 
No. 
2018AP71 
 
2 
 
favor of Mohns as a sanction for BMO's discovery violations 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 804.12(2)(a)(2017-18)2 and scheduled a 
jury trial on damages.  A jury awarded compensatory damages to 
Mohns for breach of contract and unjust enrichment as well as 
punitive damages.  The circuit court entered judgment in the 
amount of $831,687.00, plus costs. 
¶2 
BMO argues the court of appeals should have:  (1) 
reversed the circuit court's sanction imposing judgment on 
liability because the circuit court failed to consider whether 
Mohns was prejudiced by BMO's conduct; (2) set aside the damages 
award for unjust enrichment because the jury had already awarded 
damages for breach of contract, and the two are mutually 
exclusive; and (3) overturned the punitive damages award because 
it was tied to Mohns's contract claims, which cannot form the 
basis for a punitive damages award. 
¶3 
We hold:  (1) the circuit court did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion when it imposed judgment on liability as 
a sanction for BMO's discovery violations; (2) because the law 
does not permit recovery of damages for both breach of contract 
and unjust enrichment arising from the same conduct, the award 
of damages for unjust enrichment must be set aside; and (3) the 
punitive damages award must be overturned because it was based 
upon an award of damages for the contract claims, and punitive 
damages are recoverable only in tort.  We affirm the decision of 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2018AP71 
 
3 
 
the court of appeals as to the discovery sanction; however, we 
reverse the decision of the court of appeals on damages and 
remand the matter to the circuit court to modify the order for 
judgment and judgment consistent with this opinion. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶4 
This case arises from a condominium construction 
venture between Paul Bouraxis, the developer; Mohns, the general 
contractor; and BMO (as successor-by-merger to M&I Marshall & 
Ilsley Bank), the bank financing the project, known as the 
Hickory Hills Condominiums.3  Bouraxis secured a commercial 
construction and mortgage loan (initially from M&I) to build 26 
units, each housing four condominiums, on vacant land Bouraxis 
owned in New Berlin, Wisconsin.  As Mohns completed portions of 
the project, it submitted paperwork to the bank's title company 
in order to draw payment from BMO for materials, subcontractors' 
work, 
and 
Mohns's 
own 
work, 
upon 
the 
title 
company's 
confirmation that the work had been completed. 
¶5 
Work on the project progressed from its inception in 
2005 until the economic downturn in 2008.  Mohns paused work on 
the project several times.  In 2010 and 2011, Mohns had concerns 
about whether it would be paid for its work because Mohns's draw 
requests for payment were not being paid promptly. 
¶6 
In 2011, before doing any more work on the project, 
Mohns sought reassurance from BMO banker Patrick Caine.  These 
                                                 
3 BMO and M&I merged in 2011.  For clarity, the opinion uses 
BMO throughout the opinion because BMO assumed all of M&I's 
obligations related to this matter as a part of the merger. 
No. 
2018AP71 
 
4 
 
conversations began in March 2011 and continued through August 
2011.  Although Caine indicated he could not give Mohns any 
specific dollar amounts, Caine assured Mohns that it would be 
paid.  Caine told Bouraxis' manager that $223,000 was available 
to pay Mohns, and the manager shared this information with 
Mohns.  Caine also sent a letter dated July 20, 2011 directly to 
Mohns's materials supplier, indicating that the supplier would 
be paid if it provided the materials to Mohns for the project.  
Based on these assurances, Mohns continued construction and 
submitted paperwork for two draws in July and one in August. 
¶7 
Unbeknownst to Mohns, during this time BMO had been 
working to sell the Bouraxis construction loan along with some 
other loans.  In late July 2011, BMO sold the Bouraxis loan to 
MIL Acquisition Venture, LP.  BMO took a loss on the sale as the 
purchase price was based on the value of the property, which was 
significantly less than the original loan amount.  Mohns learned 
about the sale sometime in August.  BMO banker Caine assured 
Mohns that he would forward the August draw to MIL, the new 
owner of the loan, for payment.  Mohns continued work on the 
property until October 2011. 
¶8 
In July 2013, MIL filed a foreclosure action against 
Bouraxis, with Mohns named as a third-party defendant because of 
Mohns's liens on the property.  See MIL Acquisitions Venture, LP 
v. Bouraxis Properties, No. 2014AP1982, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. May 28, 2015) (per curiam).  Mohns counterclaimed 
against MIL for unjust enrichment and equitable subrogation, 
seeking to recover payment for the work it did in 2011 for which 
No. 
2018AP71 
 
5 
 
it had not been paid.  The circuit court granted summary 
judgment to MIL and the court of appeals affirmed, explaining:  
"While it appears there may be evidence that Mohns continued 
work in reliance on BMO's assurances of payment, Mohns fails to 
direct our attention to evidence supporting a finding that Mohns 
continued work in reliance on any MIL assurances."  Id., ¶23 
(emphasis in original). 
¶9 
In February 2016, Mohns filed a complaint against BMO 
alleging three causes of action:  (1) BMO breached its contract 
to pay Mohns for its work on the condominium project; (2) BMO 
was unjustly enriched by the construction work Mohns provided on 
the condominium project, which increased the value of the loan 
sold by BMO; and (3) BMO misrepresented to Mohns that funds were 
available to pay it for the work it performed on the project, 
which BMO would pay Mohns if it continued constructing the 
condominiums.  The complaint alleged that if Mohns proved the 
misrepresentation "was intentional and/or in reckless disregard 
of Mohns's rights," Mohns should receive punitive damages. 
¶10 BMO filed a motion to dismiss, which the circuit court 
denied. 
 
In 
September 
2016, 
Mohns 
served 
BMO 
with 
interrogatories, requests to admit, and a request for production 
of documents.  BMO served responses in October 2016, but in lieu 
of producing any documents, stated that all documents had been 
previously produced in the 2014 MIL lawsuit.  BMO's responses to 
the interrogatories and request for admissions contained more 
objections than answers.  BMO also objected to producing the 
No. 
2018AP71 
 
6 
 
loan 
sale 
agreement, 
claiming 
it 
was 
subject 
to 
a 
confidentiality agreement between BMO and MIL. 
¶11 In December 2016, Mohns served BMO with a notice for a 
deposition of a corporate representative who could explain BMO's 
discovery responses.  On January 6, 2017, BMO filed a motion for 
summary judgment.  On January 11, 2017, BMO produced Patrick 
Caine for the corporate representative deposition.  Caine could 
not explain BMO's responses to discovery.  He could not answer 
questions related to the merger, or topics listed in the 
deposition notice regarding the sale of the loan.  Caine 
testified he did not know on July 20, 2011 that the loan was 
being sold to MIL despite multiple June 2011 emails discussing 
the sale of the loan, including a June 16, 2011 email indicating 
Caine knew the loan would be sold. 
¶12 On January 26, 2017, Mohns filed a motion to compel 
discovery and a request for discovery sanctions against BMO.  
Mohns's brief in support of the motion said its attempt to 
narrow the issues for trial via written discovery requests had 
been thwarted by BMO's "evasive responses" and by its refusal to 
produce a corporate representative who had any knowledge about 
the topics relevant to Mohns's claims or who could explain BMO's 
evasive responses.  Mohns argued:  "BMO should not be entitled 
to interpose defenses to Mohns's action and then frustrate 
discovery calculated to examine those defenses."  Mohns asserted 
that BMO should not be able to seek summary judgment when it 
refused to produce discovery that would defeat the motion for 
summary judgment. 
No. 
2018AP71 
 
7 
 
¶13 In February 2017, the circuit court held a hearing on 
pending motions, including Mohns's motion to compel and BMO's 
motion for summary judgment.  The circuit court found BMO in 
violation of discovery rules and granted Mohns's motion to 
compel because Mohns certainly had the right to ask for "who 
knew what when" and "not get the runaround."  The circuit court 
ordered: 
 Another corporate deposition of someone to be produced by 
BMO with firsthand knowledge of all the things Mohns 
requested 
or 
who 
could 
obtain 
that 
knowledge 
in 
preparation; 
 BMO to provide specificity as to what was being denied in 
its responses to Mohns's request to admit that were 
"admitted in part and denied in part"; 
 The two attorneys to "work out" "what documents will be 
exchanged";  
 BMO to provide to Mohns an unredacted copy of the loan 
sale agreement and all of its addenda in their entirety. 
¶14 The circuit court found redaction would be unnecessary 
with a protective order, particularly since the confidentiality 
of the loan sale agreement runs exclusively in favor of BMO as 
the seller.  The circuit court expressed frustration at BMO's 
handling of discovery, believing BMO was "stalling" or "playing 
a form of a legal shell game."  For example, in the request to 
admit that "BMO is the successor-by-merger to M&I Marshall & 
Ilsley Bank," BMO responded:  "Admitted in part, denied in part.  
BMO is the successor-by-merger to M&I Bank as expressly provided 
No. 
2018AP71 
 
8 
 
in the applicable merger documents and agreements and applicable 
law, and BMO denies it otherwise assumed any obligations of M&I 
Bank."  After much discussion, BMO ultimately stipulated during 
the hearing that:  "BMO assumes responsibility for the alleged 
conduct of M&I" asserted in Mohns's Complaint. 
¶15 The circuit court took Mohns's request for sanctions 
under advisement and postponed ruling on BMO's motion for 
summary judgment until discovery could be completed.  The 
circuit court expected the additional discovery would "occur by 
April 7th, if not sooner" and gave the parties deadlines to file 
supplemental briefs, with the intent of recalling the matter by 
May 12th. 
¶16 On March 2, 2017, the parties appeared in court on the 
summary judgment motion of Bouraxis, who had been impleaded by 
BMO as a third-party defendant.  After the circuit court granted 
summary judgment to Bouraxis, the circuit court asked BMO and 
Mohns whether they wanted it to address BMO's motion for summary 
judgment then or wait until after discovery was completed.  Both 
sides agreed to have the circuit court decide BMO's motion for 
summary judgment immediately.  The circuit court denied the 
motion, specifically noting "that the shortcomings of the 
plaintiff's case related to intentional misrepresentation are a 
result of [BMO's] violation of the discovery rule."  After 
denying BMO's motion for summary judgment, the circuit court 
warned BMO that if it did not "alleviate[]" the discovery 
violation "in the next couple months," it would grant summary 
No. 
2018AP71 
 
9 
 
judgment for Mohns on liability as a sanction for BMO's 
discovery violation and send only damages to the jury. 
¶17 The circuit court extended the discovery deadline 
until May 5th, indicating it wanted to give BMO "every 
opportunity to comply" and ordered BMO to produce a corporate 
representative for deposition "who can speak knowledgeably" 
about the matter.  When BMO's lawyer protested that "the most 
knowledgeable people are former employees" whom "[w]e can't 
make . . . show up," the circuit court reminded BMO that "a 
subpoena works for non-employees the same as employees."  The 
circuit court's written order denied BMO's motion for summary 
judgment 
and 
found 
BMO 
in 
violation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 804.05(2)(e); the order directed BMO "to produce a corporate 
representative 
in 
compliance 
with 
§ 804.05(2)(e)" 
or 
"be 
sanctioned by the [c]ourt as stated on the record." 
¶18 After the hearings, BMO produced a complete copy of 
the loan sale agreement and a copy of the confidentiality 
agreement, but no other documents.  On March 17, 2017, Mohns's 
lawyer sent a letter to BMO's lawyer acknowledging receipt of 
the loan sale and confidentiality agreements, pointing out that 
the confidentiality agreement does not apply, and requesting to 
schedule the corporate representative for deposition on March 
29th, April 4th, or April 5th.  Mohns's lawyer specifically 
requested BMO to "actively review" its "document production," 
identifying several examples of documents mentioned but not 
produced.  BMO's lawyer responded on March 23, 2017, disputing 
several points from the March 17th letter, asserting he is 
No. 
2018AP71 
 
10 
 
"working with BMO to review the efforts that have been 
undertaken to search for responsive documents" which will be 
produced "promptly" if located, and advising that he would "be 
in touch about scheduling the deposition as soon as possible." 
¶19 On March 29, 2017, Mohns's lawyer wrote back to BMO's 
lawyer and refuted BMO's position set forth in its March 23rd 
letter, asserting: 
 BMO had still "not identified, let alone produced, [an] 
appropriate corporate representative" as ordered by the 
court; 
 BMO failed to produce any documents, instead relying on 
documents it produced in the 2014 case involving MIL, 
many of which were redacted; 
 An appraisal and other documents were missing; and 
 BMO misrepresented to the circuit court that it needed a 
waiver from MIL on the confidentiality agreement, even 
though the language of the confidentiality agreement 
proved otherwise. 
Mohns's lawyer closed the letter by asking again for dates for 
the corporate representative deposition. 
¶20 Eventually, the corporate deposition was scheduled for 
May 2, 2017.  On Friday, April 26, 2017, BMO's lawyer notified 
Mohns's lawyer by email that BMO had just located "several 
thousand documents that are potentially responsive" to Mohns's 
discovery requests.  The email provided a link and a password 
that would let Mohns's lawyer access these documents.  When 
Mohns's lawyer tried to access the documents, however, the 
No. 
2018AP71 
 
11 
 
password did not work.  Mohns's lawyer contacted BMO's lawyer, 
who, the next morning, provided the correct password——allowing 
Mohns's lawyer to review the newly-disclosed 975 pages of 
documents.  Mohns's lawyer notified BMO's lawyer on May 1, 2017 
that he would be ready to proceed with the May 2nd corporate 
representative deposition as scheduled.  When BMO's lawyer said 
he found "thousands" of additional discovery documents that his 
corporate designee would need additional time to review, Mohns's 
lawyers agreed to delay the deposition until May 9, 2017. 
¶21  Shortly before 5:00 p.m. on Friday, May 5, 2017, 
BMO's lawyer sent Mohns's lawyer a link to access the additional 
documents, which contained 4,185 pages.  BMO produced Natalie 
Johnson, a Relationship Manager on Special Assets, for the 
corporate representative deposition on May 9th.  Johnson had not 
been involved in the loan sale, had not read any of the emails 
contained in the newly-produced documents, and could not answer 
many of the questions asked of her during the deposition. 
¶22 In August 2017, the circuit court held an additional 
hearing on pending motions, during which it addressed Mohns's 
"motion to compel continuing" and BMO's "continuing motion for 
summary judgment."  The circuit court, which had read Johnson's 
entire deposition, found that BMO failed to comply with the 
prior discovery order.  It said: 
 Johnson did not have the knowledge the circuit court had 
required, finding "so many questions in [Johnson's 
deposition] transcript . . . [to be] nonresponsive." 
No. 
2018AP71 
 
12 
 
 "I have had root canals that were less painful than 
reading Ms. Johnson's transcript." 
 Johnson reviewed only 20 documents in preparation and 
what she had not reviewed "seemed to be very, very 
germane." 
 "Ms. Johnson was in as much of the dark as a lot of other 
people." 
The circuit court found that based on the recently produced 
documents, Patrick Caine lied during his deposition, which the 
circuit 
court 
characterized 
as 
"a 
pretty 
significant 
misrepresentation to the [c]ourt and to plaintiff's counsel."  
The 
circuit 
court 
found 
BMO's 
discovery 
response 
"disingenuous[]" and "egregious[]" and that BMO had given Mohns, 
its lawyer, and the circuit court "the runaround."  The circuit 
court found Mohns made straightforward discovery requests to 
which BMO had not provided proper responses——suggesting BMO 
withheld the documents because they revealed BMO's "guilt." 
¶23 Most significantly, the circuit court found BMO 
"blatant[ly] disregard[ed]" its orders both as to producing the 
corporate representative and otherwise complying with its 
discovery order.  It said BMO "egregiously ignor[ed]" its 
obligations, and BMO had previously withheld a document that was  
"as close to a smoking gun as I have seen in a long time in a 
misrepresentation claim."  Based on "the egregious behavior of 
the defendants in violating this [c]ourt's order in not being 
responsive 
to 
the 
plaintiff's 
simple 
direct 
request 
for 
discovery," the circuit court denied BMO's motion for summary 
No. 
2018AP71 
 
13 
 
judgment and, as a sanction, granted summary judgment to Mohns.  
The circuit court stated:  "So when we have a trial in October, 
it is going to be on damages and punitive damages[.]"  The 
circuit court noted that it had not "granted a summary judgment 
motion based on a discovery violation in the past, but [it 
couldn't] think of a more appropriate [case] than the one before 
[it]."  The circuit court made its "decision with every 
confidence that [it] is the appropriate and legal sanction for 
what has been presented here," and noted that it had re-read all 
earlier transcripts, which confirmed the circuit court had "been 
more than generous to the defense to get [its] act together." 
¶24 In its August 29, 2017 written order, the circuit 
court: 
 Reaffirmed its earlier ruling denying BMO's summary 
judgment motion; 
 Granted Mohns's requests for discovery sanctions; 
 "[G]rant[ed] judgment to the plaintiff Mohns, Inc., as to 
the liability of the defendant BMO Harris Bank National 
Association, including the defendant's liability for 
intentional misrepresentation"; 
 "[B]ecause of BMO['s] conduct regarding discovery and 
disregard of the [c]ourt's orders . . . , grant[ed] 
judgment to the plaintiff Mohns[] for its attorneys' fees 
in an amount to be determined by the [c]ourt." 
 Kept the case "scheduled for trial beginning on October 
3, 2017," but stated that "the issues to be tried will be 
No. 
2018AP71 
 
14 
 
the damages and punitive damages to be assessed against 
the defendant BMO[]." 
¶25 BMO filed a motion asking the circuit court to 
reconsider its discovery sanction decision.  The circuit court 
denied the motion in a written order, explaining: 
 BMO failed to produce pertinent documents until days 
before the second corporate representative deposition and 
then produced over 4,000 pages of documents, including a 
particularly relevant email from Patrick Caine; 
 The circuit court warned BMO about the possibility of a 
sanction in the form of summary judgment but despite that 
warning, BMO failed to produce a representative who could 
provide meaningful testimony; 
 Wisconsin Stat. § 804.12(2) authorizes the sanction 
imposed by the circuit court, which is "commensurate with 
BMO's misconduct" and supported by the record. 
¶26 The case proceeded to trial in October 2017 as 
scheduled.  The special verdict form contained seven questions.  
Because of the circuit court's sanction, the special verdict 
form submitted to the jury already had the first three questions 
on liability answered "YES," leaving questions 4-7 to be 
answered by the jury.  The special verdict questions sent to the 
jury appeared as follows: 
 
 
 
No. 
2018AP71 
 
15 
 
1. Did BMO Harris Bank National Association breach an 
agreement to pay Mohns Inc. for labor and materials 
which Mohns Inc. furnished for the Hickory Hills 
Condominiums project? 
Answer: YES 
 
   Yes or No 
2. Was 
BMO 
Harris 
National 
Association 
unjustly 
enriched by labor and materials which Mohns Inc. 
furnished the Hickory Hills Condominiums project? 
Answer:  YES 
 
    Yes or No 
3. Did BMO Harris National Association make an untrue 
representation of fact, knowing it was untrue, or 
recklessly without caring whether it was untrue, and 
with the intent to deceive and induce Mohns Inc. to 
act upon it? 
Answer:   YES 
 
 
Yes or No 
4. What sum of money, if any, will fairly and 
reasonably compensate Mohns Inc. for its damages in 
the following regards: 
(a) 
Draw 1  
 
 
 
 
$_____________ 
(b) 
Draw 2  
 
 
 
 
$_____________ 
(c) 
Draw 3  
 
 
 
 
$_____________ 
(d) 
Interest on Draws 
 
 
 
$_____________ 
(e) 
For Lost Profits and Work Completed 
After the Draw Applications 
 
$_____________ 
 
    
Regardless of how you answered question 4 and without 
duplicating amounts from question 4, answer this 
question: 
No. 
2018AP71 
 
16 
 
5. What sum of money, if any, will fairly and 
reasonably compensate Mohns Inc. for the unjust 
enrichment 
experienced 
by 
BMO 
Harris 
National 
Association? 
$______________ 
If you awarded damages to any component of question 4 
or question 5, then answer this question: 
6. Did 
BMO 
Harris 
Bank 
National 
Association 
act 
maliciously toward Mohns Inc. or in an intentional 
disregard of the rights of Mohns Inc.? 
Answer:_________ 
 
  Yes or No 
If you answered "yes" to question 6, answer this 
question: 
7. What sum, if any, do you award against BMO Harris 
Bank National Association as punitive damages? 
¶27 The jury answered question 6 "Yes" and inserted total 
dollar amounts on questions 4, 5, and 7 as follows: 
question 4: $106,581;  
question 5: $132,668;  
question 7: $1,000,000. 
¶28 In November 2017, the circuit court heard BMO's post-
verdict motions seeking judgment notwithstanding the verdict or 
a new trial based in part on law that precludes an unjust 
enrichment award when a plaintiff receives damages for breach of 
contract.  BMO also challenged the jury's punitive damages 
award, both because it was not based on a tort and because the 
award violated the statutory cap in Wis. Stat. § 895.043.  At 
the hearing, Mohns opposed BMO's motions and requested an award 
No. 
2018AP71 
 
17 
 
of attorney's fees the circuit court previously indicated it 
would impose as a sanction for BMO's discovery violations. 
¶29 The circuit court denied BMO's motions and awarded 
Mohns attorney's fees of $113,940 as part of the discovery 
sanctions.  The circuit court reviewed eight of Mohns's requests 
to admit, finding that BMO lied in its responses.  The circuit 
court noted: 
Consistent with the behavior in this case, BMO 
continues to thumb its nose at the rules of discovery 
in civil proceedings in this case.  Lie, lie, lie, 
shift blame on somebody else, anybody else but 
themselves, and say, nope, didn't happen, when the 
evidence is in their computer system, in their files, 
it is in the minds of their employees who aren't 
produced for deposition, who aren't made available to 
speak the truth. 
¶30 The circuit court did, however, reduce the jury's 
punitive damages award to two times the amounts listed in 
questions 4 and 5, awarding punitive damages in the amount of 
$458,484.  Shortly after the hearing, the circuit court entered 
a final written order for judgment. 
¶31 BMO appealed the circuit court's order to the court of 
appeals, which affirmed the circuit court.  The court of appeals 
ruled the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in 
imposing judgment on liability against BMO as a discovery 
sanction based on BMO's egregious conduct, but the court of 
appeals did not address the merits of BMO's arguments on 
contract and unjust enrichment claims being mutually exclusive 
or the punitive damages awarded resting entirely on contract.  
In its view, BMO failed to adequately raise or brief these 
No. 
2018AP71 
 
18 
 
issues.  Mohns Inc. v. BMO Harris Bank Nat'l Assoc., No. 
2018AP71, unpublished slip op., ¶¶21, 28, 30 (Wis. Ct. App. July 
24, 2019) (per curiam).  BMO petitioned this court for review, 
which we granted. 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
¶32 BMO believes the court of appeals erred in affirming 
the circuit court, and seeks reversal on three grounds:  (1) the 
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in imposing 
discovery sanctions; (2) Wisconsin law does not permit a 
plaintiff to recover damages for both breach of contract and 
unjust enrichment; and (3) the punitive damages award must be 
overturned because it was based on contract rather than tort.  
We hold:  (1) Wis. Stat. § 804.12 permits the discovery 
sanctions imposed in this case and the record demonstrates the 
circuit court acted within its discretion; (2) when a contract 
exists and the jury awards damages for its breach, the plaintiff 
cannot also collect damages for unjust enrichment based on the 
same underlying conduct or subject matter; and (3) because 
compensatory damages were awarded for the breach of contract 
claims but not the tort claim, the punitive damages award must 
be set aside.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court 
of 
appeals 
permitting 
the 
circuit 
court's 
imposition 
of 
discovery sanctions, but we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals on damages and remand the matter to the circuit court to 
amend the order for judgment and judgment consistent with this 
opinion.  Mohns may recover the amount the jury awarded for 
No. 
2018AP71 
 
19 
 
breach of contract, but cannot recover for unjust enrichment or 
receive punitive damages.4 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶33 A 
discovery 
sanction 
represents 
a 
discretionary 
determination of the circuit court and is examined under the 
erroneous exercise of discretion standard of review.  See 
Industrial Roofing Serv. v. Marquardt, 2007 WI 19, ¶41, 299 
Wis. 2d 81, 726 N.W.2d 898.  If the circuit court "examined the 
relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law, and, using a 
demonstrated rational process, reached a conclusion that a 
reasonable judge could reach," we uphold the circuit court's 
decision.  Id.  We affirm a circuit court's factual findings 
unless they are clearly erroneous.  Wis. Stat. § 805.17(2).  Our 
review of whether a party may recover damages for both breach of 
contract and unjust enrichment and whether the punitive damages 
award is permitted in this case present questions of law we 
review de novo.  
Miller v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 219 
Wis. 2d 250, 259, 580 N.W.2d 233 (1998); Brown v. Maxey, 124 
Wis. 2d 426, 431, 369 N.W.2d 677 (1985); Jacque v. Steenberg 
Homes, Inc., 209 Wis. 2d 605, 614, 563 N.W.2d 154 (1997). 
B.  Discovery Sanctions 
¶34 BMO believes the circuit court erred in imposing the 
sanction of judgment as to liability both because of the 
                                                 
4 BMO does not challenge the attorney's fees award, which 
the circuit court ordered as part of the sanction for BMO's 
discovery violations; therefore, the attorney's fees award 
stands and is not affected by the decision of this court. 
No. 
2018AP71 
 
20 
 
severity of the sanction as well as the absence of a specific 
finding that Mohns was prejudiced by BMO's violations.  We 
disagree. 
1.  Prejudice to Mohns is Not Required 
¶35 BMO contends the circuit court's sanction was improper 
because it was imposed without making an explicit finding that 
Mohns was prejudiced by BMO's discovery violations.  Relying on 
Split Rock Hardwoods, Inc. v. Lumber Liquidators, Inc., 2002 WI 
66, 253 Wis. 2d 238, 646 N.W.2d 19, BMO asserts a circuit court 
must explicitly assess prejudice before imposing the extreme 
sanction of default judgment.  Split Rock, however, does not 
apply. That case addressed prejudice in the context of a 
defendant timely serving the plaintiff with its answer to the 
plaintiff's complaint, but not simultaneously filing the answer 
with the circuit court.  Id., ¶¶8-9.  When the clerk of courts 
notified Split Rock that the circuit court had not received an 
answer to Split Rock's Complaint, Split Rock filed a motion 
under Wis. Stat. § 806.02 to strike the defendant's answer and 
enter default judgment.  Id., ¶9.  The Split Rock circuit court 
granted the motion on the basis that there had been no "joinder 
of issue under 806.02."  Id., ¶10.  This court reversed, 
concluding that when considering "default judgment as a sanction 
for failure to file [an answer] promptly," prejudice should be 
considered.  Id., ¶33. 
¶36 In contrast, this case involves BMO's failure to 
comply with the circuit court's discovery orders under Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 804.12(2). 
 
Wisconsin 
cases 
involving 
discovery 
No. 
2018AP71 
 
21 
 
sanctions require a circuit court to make a finding of 
"egregious conduct" or "bad faith" without a "clear and 
justifiable excuse" before dismissing a plaintiff's case or 
granting default judgment, but do not require an explicit 
finding of prejudice.  See Brandon Apparel Grp. Inc. v. Pearson 
Prop., Ltd., 2001 WI App 205, ¶11, 247 Wis. 2d 521, 634 
N.W.2d 544; Garfoot v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 228 Wis. 2d 707, 
731, 599 N.W.2d 411 (Ct. App. 1999); Smith v. Gold, 224 
Wis. 2d 518, 526, 592 N.W.2d 287 (Ct. App. 1999).  These 
heightened findings are required because utilizing § 804.12(2)'s 
most serious sanctions of dismissal or default judgment are 
"drastic penalt[ies] that should be imposed only where such 
harsh measures are necessary."  Hudson Diesel, Inc. v. Kenall, 
194 Wis. 2d 531, 542, 535 N.W.2d 65 (Ct. App. 1995). 
¶37 We have specifically declined to require prejudice to 
the offended party when default judgment is imposed as a 
discovery 
sanction. 
 
See 
Industrial 
Roofing 
Serv., 
299 
Wis. 2d 81, 
¶43; 
Johnson 
v. 
Allis 
Chalmers 
Corp., 
162 
Wis. 2d 261, 282, 470 N.W.2d 859 (1991) (overruled in part on 
other grounds by Industrial Roofing Serv.).  As a result of 
their behavior, parties acting egregiously or in bad faith 
"significant[ly] prejudice" "the circuit court's ability to 
efficiently 
and 
effectively 
administer 
judicial 
business."  
Johnson, 162 Wis. 2d at 282.  Each time a court's order is 
ignored, "the administration of justice suffers because the 
court's time is misused to accommodate the noncomplying party's 
dilatoriness at the expense of the other party and all other 
No. 
2018AP71 
 
22 
 
litigants awaiting the court's attention."  Id.  "[I]n some 
cases the need to punish and deter the flagrant disobedience of 
court orders requires the circuit court to impose greater 
sanctions than monetary ones."  Id. at 286.  As a prerequisite 
to imposing default judgment as a discovery sanction, a circuit 
court must find the sanctioned party engaged in egregious or bad 
faith conduct, without a clear and justifiable excuse, but need 
not determine the opposing party was prejudiced thereby. 
2.  Exercise of Discretion Analysis 
¶38 The circuit court did not erroneously exercise its 
discretion when it imposed the sanction of judgment on liability 
against BMO because it found that BMO's actions were egregious 
and without a clear and justifiable excuse, applied a sanction 
authorized 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 804.12(2), 
and 
reached 
a 
reasonable determination.  There is no question that the law 
permits this sanction.  Wisconsin Stat. § 804.12(2) provides 
that "the court in which the action is pending may make such 
orders in regard to the failure as are just," and authorizes: 
1. An order that the matters regarding which the 
order was made or any other designated facts shall be 
taken to be established for the purposes of the action 
in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining 
the order; 
2. An order refusing to allow the disobedient 
party to support or oppose designated claims or 
defenses, or prohibiting the disobedient party from 
introducing designated matters in evidence; 
3. An order striking out pleadings or parts 
thereof, or staying further proceedings until the 
order 
is 
obeyed, 
or 
dismissing 
the 
action 
or 
No. 
2018AP71 
 
23 
 
proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a 
judgment by default against the disobedient party; 
4. In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in 
addition thereto, an order treating as a contempt of 
court the failure to obey any orders except an order 
to 
submit 
to 
a 
physical, 
mental 
or 
vocational 
examination. 
(Emphasis added.)  The circuit court acted under this statute 
and thus applied the correct law.  Our focus then turns to 
whether the circuit court considered the pertinent facts, made 
the required findings, and rendered a reasonable determination. 
¶39 The circuit court found BMO's actions to be egregious, 
disingenuous, designed to bury documents and hide a "smoking 
gun" email, and in violation of its discovery order.  Those 
findings are not clearly erroneous as the record contains 
evidence supporting them.  "[F]ailure to comply with circuit 
court 
scheduling 
and 
discovery 
orders 
without 
clear 
and 
justifiable excuse is egregious conduct."  Industrial Roofing 
Serv., 299 Wis. 2d 81, ¶43 (quoted source omitted).  Conduct, 
even if unintentional, that is "extreme, substantial and 
persistent" fits the definition of egregiousness.  Hudson 
Diesel, Inc., 194 Wis. 2d at 543. 
¶40  As demonstrated by the foregoing recitation of the 
facts, BMO engaged in a persistent pattern of avoidance, delay, 
and disregard of the circuit court's discovery order.   The 
record demonstrates that BMO initially refused to produce any 
documents at all, instead claiming that all relevant documents 
had already been turned over in the MIL case in 2014.  BMO's 
responses to interrogatories and requests to admit were evasive 
No. 
2018AP71 
 
24 
 
at best and contained outright lies at worst.  BMO produced for 
deposition two corporate representatives who had little-to-no 
relevant knowledge of the topics identified for discovery, 
despite 
the 
circuit 
court's 
direct 
order 
to 
produce 
an 
individual with the requisite knowledge. 
¶41 After insisting that all relevant documents had been 
turned over in 2014, BMO "discovered" thousands of documents——
over 4,000 pages——at the last hour, days before the second 
corporate deposition.  BMO delayed further in making those 
documents available to Mohns's lawyer by giving him a password 
that did not work.  Within that batch of thousands of documents 
was the "smoking gun" email. 
¶42 BMO's non-compliance infected the hearing on Mohns's 
motion to compel and every motion hearing thereafter.  The 
circuit court warned BMO, both orally and in its written order, 
that it would impose sanctions if BMO did not alter its conduct.  
It specifically threatened default judgment as a sanction.  BMO 
continued to stall, disregarded the circuit court's explicit 
warnings, and as the circuit court described:  "thumb[ed] its 
nose at the rules of discovery" from the beginning to the very 
end. 
¶43 The circuit court found BMO's acts to be egregious and 
disingenuous.  It described BMO's actions as "stonewalling," 
"playing a legal shell game," and giving Mohns and the circuit 
court the "runaround."  The circuit court's comments suggest BMO 
was intentionally withholding documents and witnesses to avoid 
liability.  The circuit court said BMO had "no excuse" and 
No. 
2018AP71 
 
25 
 
expressed its belief that BMO tried to get the case dismissed 
quickly on summary judgment without turning over the very 
documents which would have precluded the motion from being 
granted. 
¶44 The circuit court found BMO "blatantly disregarded" 
its order and "egregiously ignored" its discovery obligations.  
It gave BMO every opportunity to comply, even extending the 
deadline imposed for discovery.  When BMO still refused to 
comply with the circuit court's order, the circuit court imposed 
the sanction about which it had previously cautioned BMO——it 
entered judgment on liability. 
¶45 The circuit court expressed that it had never before 
granted judgment "based on a discovery violation" but it could 
not "think of a more appropriate one than the one before [it] 
today."  The circuit court explained that its decision to grant 
default judgment against BMO was being made "with every 
confidence that that is the appropriate and legal sanction for 
what has been presented here." 
¶46 Based on the circuit court's warnings, its findings of 
egregiousness, BMO's refusal to obey the order, and the 
availability of this sanction under Wis. Stat. § 804.12(2), the 
circuit court's decision to impose the sanction of default 
judgment was a reasoned determination that a reasonable circuit 
court could make.  Accordingly, the circuit court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion, and we affirm the court of 
appeals decision regarding the discovery sanctions. 
A.  Contract and Unjust Enrichment 
No. 
2018AP71 
 
26 
 
¶47 BMO argues the court of appeals erred in upholding the 
jury's verdict, which awarded damages to Mohns for both breach 
of contract and unjust enrichment.  BMO cites cases barring 
recovery under the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment when 
the parties entered into a contract.  Mohns contends that 
because BMO failed to object on this basis in the circuit court, 
Schwigel v. Kohlmann, 2002 WI App 121, 254 Wis. 2d 830, 647 
N.W.2d 362, permits the multiple awards, particularly because 
liability in this case is based upon a discovery sanction.  The 
law supports BMO's position. 
¶48 Under Wisconsin law, a plaintiff may not recover 
damages for both breach of contract and unjust enrichment based 
on the same conduct.  See Meyer v. The Laser Vision Inst., LLC, 
2006 WI App 70, ¶26, 290 Wis. 2d 764, 714 N.W.2d 223.  Unjust 
enrichment is an equitable claim that cannot coexist with a 
breach of contract claim.  Id., ¶28.  If the parties entered 
into a valid, enforceable contract, then unjust enrichment does 
not apply.  Continental Cas. Co. v. Wisconsin Patients Comp. 
Fund, 164 Wis.2d 110, 118, 473 N.W.2d 584 (Ct. App. 1991).  The 
availability of damages for unjust enrichment presupposes that a 
contract does not exist, necessitating an equitable remedy.  See 
Meyer, 
290 
Wis. 2d 764, 
¶¶26, 
28; 
Watts 
v. 
Watts, 
137 
Wis. 2d 506, 530, 405 N.W.2d 303 (1987).  Because the circuit 
court found a contract existed and the jury awarded damages for 
BMO's breach of the contract, the award for damages based on 
unjust enrichment must be set aside.  Allowing both to stand 
would create the legal equivalent of the Schrödinger's cat 
No. 
2018AP71 
 
27 
 
paradox.5  Just as a cat cannot be both dead and alive at the 
same time, a contract cannot both exist and not exist 
simultaneously.  A contract either exists, or it doesn't.  If a 
contract exists, a plaintiff can recover damages for its breach.  
Only if a contract does not exist may a party recover damages in 
equity. 
¶49 The circuit court recognized this longstanding legal 
principle during the jury instruction conference: 
I believe that in the end damages cannot be awarded 
for both a breach [of contract] and unjust enrichment.  
There can't be a double reward. 
 
 . . . . 
Well it occurs to me that we have instructions in 
there 
for 
contract 
right 
now, 
not 
for 
unjust 
enrichment . . . I think the Plaintiff can elect, and 
that is usually the way I have seen it and I have 
imposed on Plaintiffs to pick one or the other once we 
get to the jury.  If you want to elect unjust 
enrichment and forego basic contract damages, you can 
do that.  And if that is the amount you want to argue 
for, I guess that is your election. 
 . . . . 
 
But I think then we have to go back, if we are 
going to do unjust enrichment then that is the 
instruction I am going to give the jury and not the 
two on contract. 
Then the circuit court asked Mohns:  "You want to just go with 
the 
conventional 
contract 
damages 
and 
not 
the 
unjust 
                                                 
5 https://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/Schrodingers-cat 
(explaining 
Nobel 
Prize-winning 
Austrian 
physicist 
Erwin 
Schrödinger's thought experiment presenting the paradox of a cat 
being both dead and alive at the same time, as a critique of a 
particular interpretation of quantum mechanics). 
No. 
2018AP71 
 
28 
 
enrichment[?]"  The circuit court, however, confused the 
principle 
of 
election 
of 
remedies 
with 
pleading 
in 
the 
alternative. 
¶50 "The election of remedies doctrine is an equitable 
principle barring one from maintaining inconsistent theories or 
forms of relief."  Head & Seemann, Inc. v. Gregg, 104 
Wis. 2d 156, 159, 311 N.W.2d 667 (Ct. App. 1981) (emphasis 
added). "[In] [t]he classic application of the election of 
remedies doctrine . . . a defrauded party has the election of 
either 
rescission 
or 
affirming 
the 
contract 
and 
seeking 
damages." 
 
Id. 
(citation 
omitted). 
 
"[This] 
choice 
is 
forced . . . because of inconsistency of both rescinding and 
affirming the contract."  Id. (citation omitted).  Rescission is 
an equitable remedy allowing the defrauded party to cancel the 
contract, while affirming the contract allows the defrauded 
party to seek damages.  "The election of remedies doctrine 
requires a litigant to choose a remedy, where the remedies 
sought are inconsistent with one another."  Wickenhauser v. 
Lehtinen, 2007 WI 82, ¶16, 302 Wis. 2d 417, 34 N.W.2d 855 
(citation omitted). 
¶51 As this court has previously explained, the election 
of remedies doctrine applies only to remedies, not claims for 
relief.  For example, "[a] claim for relief in tort and a claim 
for relief in contract are not 'remedies' to which the election 
of remedies doctrine applies.  A remedy is the relief that is 
applied to a successful claim."  Id., ¶16 n.2 (citation 
omitted).  Accordingly, the election of remedies doctrine does 
No. 
2018AP71 
 
29 
 
not apply to a claim for relief in equity, such as unjust 
enrichment, or a claim for relief in contract because claims are 
not remedies. 
¶52 A 
party 
may 
plead 
claims 
for 
relief 
in 
the 
alternative, 
as 
Mohns 
did 
in 
this 
case. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 802.02(5)(b).6  Specifically, Mohns claimed the existence of a 
contract that was breached by BMO, for which Mohns sought 
damages.  Mohns also sought damages under the equitable doctrine 
of unjust enrichment, a claim for relief available only if a 
contract was never formed or was legally invalid.  Both of 
Mohns's claims were based on the labor and materials Mohns 
supplied for the Hickory Hills Condominium construction project.  
Claims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment arising out 
of the same conduct or subject matter are inconsistent with each 
other, one being premised on the existence of a contract and the 
other available only in the absence of a contract.  Under 
§ 802.02(5)(b), however, "claims pleaded in the alternative need 
not be consistent with one another."  Read v. Read, 205 Wis. 2d 
558, 575, 556 N.W.2d 768 (Ct. App. 1996) (Fine, J., dissenting).  
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 802.02(5)(b) provides:  "A party may set 
forth 2 or more statements of a claim or defense alternatively 
or hypothetically, either in one claim or defense or in separate 
claims or defenses.  When 2 or more statements are made in the 
alternative and one of them if made independently would be 
sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient by the 
insufficiency of one or more of the alternative statements.  A 
party may also state as many separate claims or defenses as the 
party has regardless of consistency and whether based on legal 
or equitable grounds.  All statements shall be made subject to 
the obligations set forth in s. 802.05." 
No. 
2018AP71 
 
30 
 
Nevertheless, the plaintiff may recover under only one of the 
claims.  If there is a contract between the parties, the 
plaintiff may recover in contract but not in equity.  In this 
case, the circuit court expressly found the existence of a 
contract between Mohns and BMO, answering the following question 
on the special verdict in the affirmative:  "Did BMO Harris Bank 
National Association breach an agreement to pay Mohns Inc. for 
labor and materials which Mohns Inc. furnished for the Hickory 
Hills Condominium project?" 
¶53 Ultimately, and over the objection of BMO,7 the circuit 
court opted to let the jury award damages on both contract and 
unjust enrichment by attempting to frame the verdict questions 
to prevent overlapping damages.  This was error, as the law does 
not permit an award for both legal and equitable damages based 
on the same conduct.  Meyer, 290 Wis. 2d 764, ¶¶26, 28; 
Continental Cas. Co., 164 Wis. 2d at 118. 
¶54 While a verdict form could include jury questions 
related to both breach of contract and unjust enrichment, if the 
jury finds a contract existed, unjust enrichment will not apply.  
Only if the jury finds that no contract existed may it award 
damages for unjust enrichment.  The circuit court departed from 
                                                 
7 Mohns argues BMO's objections to this issue were deficient 
in the circuit court.  We disagree.  The record shows BMO's 
lawyer strongly objected, asserting:  "[I]t is inconsistent in a 
case 
to 
have 
both 
a 
breach 
of 
contract 
and 
unjust 
enrichment . . . as a matter of law you either have a contract, 
in which case you are entitled to damages, or you have – flowing 
from that breach, or if you don't have a contract you can have 
unjust enrichment to measure those damages." 
No. 
2018AP71 
 
31 
 
black letter law governing breach of contract and unjust 
enrichment when the circuit court, as a matter of law, found 
that BMO "breached an agreement to pay Mohns Inc. for labor and 
materials Mohns Inc. furnished for the Hickory Hills Condominium 
project" and that BMO was "unjustly enriched by labor and 
materials 
which 
Mohns 
Inc. 
furnished 
the 
Hickory 
Hills 
Condominium project."  The circuit court erred in granting 
judgment on liability for both breach of contract and unjust 
enrichment, and in awarding both legal and equitable damages 
based on the same conduct.  The two are mutually exclusive.  See 
Continental Cas. Co., 164 Wis. 2d at 118. 
¶55  Mohns's reliance on Schwigel, 254 Wis. 2d 830, is 
inapposite.  In that case, the court of appeals concluded that 
"the verdict improperly asked a single damage question on 
Schwigel's breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation and 
unjust enrichment claims" but the availability of recovery under 
claims for both breach of contract and unjust enrichment was not 
an issue before the court.  Id., ¶2.  Regardless, Schwigel is 
distinguishable from Mohns's case because Schwigel involved 
multiple acts arising from a course of conduct, including the 
sharing of production space, storage of equipment, purchase of a 
machine, 
production 
of 
motor 
shafts, 
defendant's 
alleged 
conversion of equipment, and the loss of the plaintiff's 
customers and, ultimately, his business.  Id., ¶¶3-8.  While the 
facts of a particular case could support both causes of action 
if certain conduct was governed by contract and other conduct 
was independent of the contractual relationship, in this case, 
No. 
2018AP71 
 
32 
 
the contract and unjust enrichment claims asserted against BMO 
were 
both 
based 
on 
the 
same 
underlying 
conduct——Mohns's 
provision of labor and materials on a construction project, for 
which it was not paid.  Under Wisconsin law, if there was a 
contract, Mohns could recover contract damages for its breach.  
Only if there was no contract could Mohns receive the value of 
the benefit conferred on BMO as a result of the labor and 
materials Mohns supplied. 
¶56 Black letter law precludes Mohns from collecting 
unjust enrichment damages based on the same conduct for which he 
received contractual damages, irrespective of the court's 
liability determination arising in the form of a sanction.  
Because the circuit court explicitly found that BMO breached an 
agreement to pay Mohns for its labor and materials, the damages 
awarded for unjust enrichment must be set aside. 
B.  Punitive Damages 
¶57 BMO argues the punitive damages award must be set 
aside because it is not based upon tort liability.  We agree.  
The jury awarded compensatory damages only for breach of 
contract and unjust enrichment, neither of which supports an 
award of punitive damages. 
¶58 Under 
Wisconsin 
law, 
punitive 
damages 
are 
not 
available as a remedy in a breach of contract action.  
Entzminger v. Ford Motor Co., 47 Wis. 2d 751, 757, 177 N.W.2d 
899 (1970) ("Punitive damages are not allowed for a mere breach 
of contract[.]"); Hansen v. Texas Roadhouse, Inc., 2013 WI App 
2, ¶29, 345 Wis. 2d 669, 827 N.W.2d 99 ("[P]unitive damages are 
No. 
2018AP71 
 
33 
 
not available as a remedy for breach of contract[.]"); Autumn 
Grove Joint Venture v. Rachlin, 138 Wis. 2d 273, 279, 405 N.W.2d 
759 (Ct. App. 1987).  A jury's award of punitive damages must be 
based 
upon 
a 
finding 
of 
tort 
liability. 
 
Hansen, 
345 
Wis. 2d 669, ¶29.  The punitive damages awarded in this case 
were not based on tort liability, but rather on breach of 
contract and quasi-contract and therefore must be set aside. 
¶59  The tort liability involved in this case stemmed from 
BMO's misrepresentation, for which the circuit court granted 
judgment in favor of Mohns.  The only question on the special 
verdict regarding misrepresentation was question 3, which asked 
whether BMO made "an untrue representation of fact, knowing it 
was untrue, or recklessly without caring whether it was untrue, 
and with the intent to deceive and induce Mohns Inc. to act upon 
it" to which the circuit court itself answered "YES" as part of 
the discovery sanctions.  The special verdict did not contain 
any question asking the jury to determine a damage award for 
misrepresentation. 
¶60 Although the circuit court entered judgment against 
BMO for misrepresentation as a discovery sanction, the jury was 
asked to award damages (if any) only under the contract claims.  
While discussing the jury instructions with counsel for each 
party, the circuit court decided to omit any damages question 
with respect to the misrepresentation claim:  "As far as the 
misrepresentation I think that goes to attorney fees, and so we 
are not going to muddy the waters because the damages aren't 
No. 
2018AP71 
 
34 
 
going to be any different on any of those."  Mohns did not 
object. 
¶61 The punitive damages questions did not reference tort 
liability whatsoever.  Instead, the punitive damages questions 
were explicitly dependent upon the jury's responses to question 
4, which asked the jury what sum would compensate Mohns for 
damages arising from breach of contract, and question 5, which 
asked the jury what sum would compensate Mohns for damages 
arising from the quasi-contract claim of unjust enrichment.8  The 
special verdict form instructed the jury:  "If you awarded 
damages to any component of question 4 or question 5, then 
answer this question" with question 6 immediately after:  "Did 
BMO Harris Bank National Association act maliciously toward 
Mohns Inc. or in an intentional disregard of the rights of Mohns 
Inc.?"  The special verdict form then instructed the jury to 
answer the following question 7 only if it answered "yes" to 
question 6:  "What sum, if any, do you award against BMO Harris 
Bank National Association as punitive damages?"  The punitive 
damages awarded by the jury were based on the amounts it 
inserted on the special verdict form for BMO's breach of 
contract and for the quasi-contractual unjust enrichment claim——
neither of which support an award for punitive damages.  
                                                 
8 "Because no express or implied in fact agreement exists 
between the parties, recovery based upon unjust enrichment is 
sometimes referred to as 'quasi contract,' or contract 'implied 
in law' rather than 'implied in fact.'  Quasi contracts are 
obligations created by law to prevent injustice."  Watts v. 
Watts, 137 Wis. 2d 506, 530, 405 N.W.2d 303 (1987). 
No. 
2018AP71 
 
35 
 
Accordingly, the punitive damages award must be overturned and 
we reverse the decision of the court of appeals on this issue. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶62 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 804.12 
permits 
the 
discovery 
sanction 
imposed 
by 
the 
circuit 
court 
and 
the 
record 
demonstrates the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its 
discretion when it granted judgment against BMO on liability.  
We affirm the court of appeals decision on the discovery 
sanction.  However, Wisconsin law does not permit a plaintiff to 
recover simultaneously for breach of contract and unjust 
enrichment based on the same conduct or subject matter.  Because 
the circuit court determined that BMO breached an agreement to 
pay Mohns for its labor and materials, for which the jury 
awarded Mohns damages, the jury's award of damages for unjust 
enrichment based upon the labor and materials supplied by Mohns 
must be set aside.  Additionally, Wisconsin law only permits a 
punitive damages award to be based upon a tort, not a contract.  
Because the special verdict form based the punitive damages on 
contract, not tort——for which no compensatory damages were 
sought or awarded——the punitive damages award must also be set 
aside.  We reverse the decision of the court of appeals on 
damages and remand the matter to the circuit court to amend the 
order for judgment and judgment consistent with our opinion. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the cause remanded to 
the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
No. 
2018AP71 
 
36 
 
¶63 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER and BRIAN HAGEDORN, JJ., did 
not participate. 
 
No. 
2018AP71 
 
 
 
1