Title: Mucha v. Wagner
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 307PA20
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: August 13, 2021

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
2021-NCSC-82 
No. 307PA20 
Filed 13 August 2021 
MARISA MUCHA 
 
 
v. 
LOGAN WAGNER 
 
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 and on appeal of right 
of a substantial constitutional question pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(1) of a 
unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, 271 N.C. App. 636 (2020), affirming 
orders entered on 13 June 2018 and 27 June 2018 by Judge Debra S. Sasser in District 
Court, Wake County.  
 
Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A., by Erik R. Zimmerman, Andrew R. 
Wagner, and Jazzmin M. Romero, for plaintiff-appellee. 
 
Parrott Law, PLLC, by Robert J. Parrott Jr., for defendant-appellant. 
 
 
EARLS, Justice. 
 
¶ 1 
 
Before the advent of mobile telephone technology and before call forwarding 
was available, a person making a telephone call would know the approximate 
physical location of anyone who answered the phone based on the area code and prefix 
of the telephone number they dialed. However, the number of landlines is rapidly 
dwindling, and a person’s phone number alone no longer provides a reliable indication 
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of that person’s location.1 As a result, it is important to determine whether, and under 
what circumstances, a telephone call to a cell phone can subject the caller to personal 
jurisdiction in the state where the phone happens to be when it is answered.   
¶ 2 
 
Specifically, in this case, we examine whether the District Court, Wake 
County, could exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant, Logan Wagner, in a 
proceeding initiated by the plaintiff, Marisa Mucha, who was seeking to obtain a 
domestic violence protection order (DVPO). The only contact Wagner had with North 
Carolina was a series of phone calls he made to Mucha’s cell phone on the day she 
moved to the State. We conclude that Wagner did not have the requisite minimum 
contacts with North Carolina because he did not purposefully avail himself of the 
benefits and protections of North Carolina’s laws. Therefore, we hold that the trial 
court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over Wagner consistent with the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial 
court’s decision to exercise jurisdiction, and we vacate the trial court’s order for lack 
of personal jurisdiction over Wagner. 
 
                                            
1 According to the National Center for Health Statistics, “[t]he second 6 months of 
2016 was the first time that a majority of American homes had only wireless telephones.” 
Stephen J. Blumberg & Julian V. Luke, Wireless Substitution: Early Release of Estimates 
From the National Health Interview Survey, July-December 2016, U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (May 2017). 
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I. 
Factual Background 
¶ 3 
 
Wagner and Mucha were previously in a romantic relationship for some time. 
After the relationship ended, Mucha—who was attending college in South Carolina— 
told Wagner—who lived in Connecticut—never to contact her again. Wagner did not 
abide by Mucha’s request. While Mucha was living in South Carolina, Wagner sent 
her a letter and a text message. His unwelcome efforts to reach Mucha culminated on 
15 May 2018. That afternoon, unbeknownst to Wagner, Mucha moved from South 
Carolina to North Carolina after finishing her college semester. That evening, Mucha 
received twenty-eight phone calls from an unknown number. When she answered one 
of the calls, Wagner identified himself, and Mucha hung up. Wagner kept calling. 
Mucha picked up again and told Wagner to stop. Wagner left a voice message. When 
Mucha listened to the message, she suffered a panic attack. The next day, she filed a 
pro se complaint and motion for a DVPO in District Court, Wake County.  
¶ 4 
 
Wagner’s attorney entered a limited appearance for the purposes of contesting 
the trial court’s personal jurisdiction and filed a motion to dismiss. According to 
Wagner, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbade the trial 
court from exercising personal jurisdiction over him because he neither “affirmatively 
direct[ed] any phone calls [to] North Carolina” nor “purposefully avail[ed] himself of 
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any protections of the State.”2 Wagner contended that because he did not know or 
have any reason to know Mucha would be located in North Carolina when he called 
her, he lacked “fair warning that he might be required to defend himself there.”  
¶ 5 
 
The trial court denied Wagner’s motion to dismiss and, after a hearing during 
which Mucha and two witnesses testified, entered a DVPO. Wagner appealed solely 
the trial court’s order finding personal jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals 
unanimously affirmed. According to the Court of Appeals, because Wagner “knew 
that [Mucha’s] semester of college had ended and she may no longer be residing [in 
South Carolina] . . . his conduct—purposefully directed at Mucha—was sufficient for 
him to reasonably anticipate being haled into court wherever Mucha resided when 
she received the calls.” Mucha v. Wagner, 271 N.C. App. 636, 637–38 (2020). 
II. 
Personal Jurisdiction Analysis 
¶ 6 
 
The reason Wagner’s phone calls to Mucha brought him into contact with 
North Carolina is because Mucha had traveled here, just hours before Wagner made 
the calls to her cell phone. Although Wagner may have known or had reason to know 
that Mucha would be leaving South Carolina at the end of her semester, there is 
nothing in the record to support the inference that Wagner knew or had any reason 
                                            
2 Wagner failed to preserve his challenge to the trial court’s jurisdiction as exceeding 
the scope of North Carolina’s long-arm statute, N.C.G.S. § 1-75.4, which he attempted to raise 
for the first time on appeal. Therefore, we assume for purposes of resolving this case that the 
trial court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction was authorized by the long-arm statute. 
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to know that Mucha was present in North Carolina.3 Both the trial court and the 
Court of Appeals ignored this distinction. In doing so, the courts below failed to 
adhere to the fundamental due-process principle that there is no personal jurisdiction 
over a defendant who has not initiated “certain minimum contacts with [the forum 
state].” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).  
¶ 7 
 
In examining a defendant’s connection to the forum state, the Due Process 
Clause “requires a forum-by-forum, or sovereign-by-sovereign, analysis.” J. McIntyre 
Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 884 (2011). Here, Wagner’s only connection 
with the State of North Carolina resulted from “random, isolated, or fortuitous” 
events. Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984). Under these 
circumstances, the Due Process Clause does not permit a North Carolina court to 
exercise personal jurisdiction over Wagner.  
A. Personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause 
¶ 8 
 
“The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause limits a state court's power 
to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant.” Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. 
Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1024 (2021). “The primary concern of the Due Process Clause as 
it relates to a court’s jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is the protection of ‘an 
                                            
3 Mucha’s argument to the contrary is that Wagner “had reason to know that Mucha 
had recently moved” because she was a college student, “[s]pring semesters at college 
typically end by mid-May[,] . . . [a]nd many college students move to other states during the 
summer.” At most, this supports the inference that Wagner should have known Mucha might 
not be located in South Carolina, but it does not support the inference that Mucha had reason 
to know where specifically Mucha had travelled. 
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individual’s liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum 
with which he has established no meaningful contacts, ties, or relations.’ ” Beem USA 
Ltd.-Liab. Ltd. P'ship v. Grax Consulting LLC, 373 N.C. 297, 302 (2020) (cleaned up) 
(quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471–72 (1985)).  
¶ 9 
 
In order for a state court to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant who is not 
subject to general jurisdiction in the forum state4 and who is not present in the forum 
state, the defendant must “have certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] 
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 
311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). Although this canonical formulation has been tested over 
the years, the United States Supreme Court has continued to emphasize that the due 
process inquiry is “focused on the nature and extent of ‘the defendant’s relationship 
to the forum State.’ ” Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1024 (emphasis added) (quoting 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of California, San Francisco Cnty., 137 S. Ct. 
1773, 1779 (2017)). Courts must not “improperly attribute a plaintiff's forum 
connections to the defendant and make those connections decisive in the 
                                            
4 There is no disputing that Wagner is not subject to general jurisdiction in North 
Carolina because his “affiliations with the State are [not] so ‘continuous and systematic’ as 
to render [him] essentially at home in the forum State.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 
S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317). Instead, we 
consider only whether Wagner is subject to specific jurisdiction, because the proceeding at 
issue “aris[es] out of or relate[s] to the defendant's contacts with the forum.” Helicopteros 
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415 (1984). 
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jurisdictional analysis.” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 289 (2014) (quoting Rush v. 
Savchuk, 444 U.S. 230, 332 (1980)). 
¶ 10 
 
To ascertain whether a defendant’s contacts are of the frequency and kind 
necessary to surpass the “minimum contacts” threshold, courts must first examine 
whether the defendant has taken “some act by which [he or she] purposefully avails 
[himself or herself] of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State.” 
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 255, 253 (1958). To establish that a defendant has 
purposefully availed himself or herself of the benefits and protections of the laws of a 
forum state, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant “deliberately 
‘reached out beyond’ its home—by, for example, ‘exploit[ing] a market’ in the forum 
State or entering a contractual relationship centered there.” Ford Motor Co., 141 S. 
Ct. at 1025 (second alteration in original) (quoting Walden, 571 U.S. at 285). The 
focus on the defendant’s conduct reflects one of the core concerns underpinning 
personal jurisdiction doctrine and the Due Process Clause, “treating defendants 
fairly.” Id. at 1025. Due process requires “that individuals have fair warning that a 
particular activity may subject them to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign,” so that 
they may “structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to 
where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.” Burger King Corp., 
471 U.S. at 472 (cleaned up) (first quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977); 
then quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 297 (1980)). 
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¶ 11 
 
Under the “purposeful availment” test, the absence of any evidence suggesting 
Wagner had any reason to know Mucha was in North Carolina at the time he called 
her is dispositive. In prior cases where this Court has found a defendant’s one-time 
contacts sufficient to create specific personal jurisdiction in North Carolina, the 
defendant knew or reasonably should have known that by undertaking some action, 
the defendant was establishing a connection with the State of North Carolina. This 
awareness—whether actual or imputed—is what permits a court in North Carolina 
to exercise judicial authority over the nonresident defendant.  
¶ 12 
 
For example, in Tom Togs, Inc. v. Ben Elias Indus. Corp., the defendant was a 
clothing distributor with its principal place of business in New York who entered into 
a contract to purchase clothes from a North Carolina manufacturer. 318 N.C. 361, 
362–63 (1986). When a dispute regarding the contract arose, the plaintiff sued the 
defendant in a North Carolina court, and the defendant moved to dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction, which the trial court denied. Id. at 364. On appeal, this Court 
concluded that the defendant had purposefully availed itself of the benefits and 
protections of the laws of North Carolina when it entered into the contract with the 
clothing manufacturer. Id. at 367. Yet it was not the existence of the defendant’s 
contract with a North Carolina resident which alone sufficed to “establish the 
necessary minimum contacts with this State.” Id. at 367. It was the fact that the 
defendant had “made an offer to [a] plaintiff whom defendant knew to be located in 
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North Carolina.” Id. (emphasis added). Because the defendant “was told that the 
shirts would be cut in North Carolina, and defendant also agreed to send its personal 
labels to plaintiff in North Carolina for plaintiff to attach to the shirts[, d]efendant 
was thus aware that the contract was going to be substantially performed in this 
State.” Id.  
¶ 13 
 
Similarly, in Beem, we held that it was permissible for a North Carolina court 
to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident corporate defendant because the 
defendant’s “sole representative came to North Carolina to open a bank account on 
behalf [of] the partnership that [it] subsequently used for [  ] business activities [with 
the plaintiff], and he also traveled to this state on three separate occasions to discuss 
[business].” Beem USA Ltd.-Liab. Ltd. P’ship, 373 N.C. at 306. Thus, in both Tom 
Togs and Beem, it was fair to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant 
because there was evidence indicating the defendant knew (or should have known) 
that conduct directed at the plaintiff was conduct directed at the State of North 
Carolina. 
¶ 14 
 
The significance of a defendant’s awareness of the connection between the 
conduct the defendant chooses to engage in and the forum state is also reflected in 
United States Supreme Court precedent. The Due Process Clause requires evidence 
indicating that a defendant was on notice he or she could be subjected to suit in the 
specific state in which the plaintiff seeks redress, not merely in any state besides the 
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one in which the defendant is domiciled. For example, in Keeton, the fact that the 
defendant “produce[d] a national publication aimed at a nationwide audience” did 
not, on its own, necessarily give rise to personal jurisdiction in every state in the 
nation. Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. at 781. Instead, the New Hampshire 
court seeking to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant could do so because 
the defendant had “continuously and deliberately exploited the New Hampshire 
market,” as evidenced by the “substantial number of copies . . .  regularly sold and 
distributed” in the state. Id.  There was “no unfairness in calling [the defendant] to 
answer for the contents of that publication” in a jurisdiction it had purposefully 
sought to enter into. Id. 
¶ 15 
 
The United States Supreme Court’s more recent “stream of commerce” 
decisions also support Wagner’s position. These cases have drawn a distinction 
between conduct targeted at states generally and conduct targeted at the specific 
forum state seeking to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant. Thus, the Court has 
held that a forum state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant who 
“delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will 
be purchased by consumers in the forum State,” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 
U.S. at 297–98 (emphasis added), but not over a defendant who “directed marketing 
and sales efforts at the United States” without “engag[ing] in conduct purposefully 
directed at [the forum state].” J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd., 564 U.S. 885–86. 
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¶ 16 
 
Concurring separately in J. McIntyre, Justice Breyer explained that 
jurisdiction did not arise even when the defendant “kn[ew] or reasonably should 
[have] know[n] that its products [we]re distributed through a nationwide distribution 
system that might lead to those products being sold in any of the fifty states.” Id. at 
891 (Breyer, J., concurring) (cleaned up) (quoting Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., 
Ltd., 201 N.J. 48, 76–77 (2010)). Rather, the defendant must have targeted the forum 
state specifically. Finding personal jurisdiction without evidence that the defendant 
intentionally targeted the forum state would “abandon the heretofore accepted 
inquiry of whether, focusing upon the relationship between ‘the defendant, the forum, 
and the litigation,’ it is fair, in light of the defendant’s contacts with that forum, to 
subject the defendant to suit there.” Id. (quoting Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 204). 
¶ 17 
 
These cases establish two important principles. First, conduct directed at a 
person is not necessarily the same as conduct directed at a forum state. Second, a 
defendant’s knowledge that a plaintiff could be somewhere other than the state in 
which the plaintiff typically resides is not sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction 
in any state where the plaintiff happens to be. Applying these principles to this case, 
Wagner has not purposefully availed himself of the benefits and protections of the 
laws of North Carolina. While Wagner purposefully directed conduct at Mucha, he 
had no way of knowing that in doing so he was establishing any connection with the 
State of North Carolina. There is no evidence in the record to support the conclusion 
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that he could have “reasonably anticipate[d] being haled into court” in North 
Carolina. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 297. 
¶ 18 
 
In the alternative, Mucha asserts that “purposeful availment” is not the proper 
test for determining personal jurisdiction when the defendant is accused of 
committing an act of domestic violence, which Mucha analogizes to an intentional 
tort. As she correctly notes, many of the cases applying the purposeful availment test 
“involved business-related claims and conduct,” such as those arising from contract 
disputes or allegedly defective products. Mucha argues that instead of the “purposeful 
availment” test, the right standard is “purposeful direction” because Wagner has 
undertaken an intentional course of conduct which violated North Carolina law. 
According to Mucha, the purposeful direction standard differs from the purposeful 
availment test because “the question is not whether an intentional tortfeasor availed 
himself of the forum state’s laws. It is whether he obstructed the forum state’s laws 
by directing his tortious conduct at the forum.”  
¶ 19 
 
Even if the “purposeful direction” standard applies—and assuming “purposeful 
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direction” and “purposeful availment” impose distinct requirements5—Mucha still 
cannot prevail. Mucha’s argument, in essence, is that a defendant is subject to 
personal jurisdiction in a state whenever (1) he intentionally engages in conduct, (2) 
which “obstructs” the laws of the forum state, and (3) injures someone in the forum 
state. This proposed test overlooks the requirement that the defendant himself have 
established minimum contacts with the forum state, which necessitates the 
defendant having some reason to know his conduct will bring him into contact with 
the particular forum state, a requirement which is found in numerous cases resolving 
intentional tort claims. See, e.g., Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 706 (7th Cir. 
2010) (holding that there was personal jurisdiction because defendants “specifically 
aimed their tortious conduct at [plaintiff] and his business in Illinois with the 
knowledge that he lived, worked, and would suffer the brunt of the injury there”) 
(cleaned up).  
¶ 20 
 
For jurisdiction to vest in a particular forum state under the purposeful 
direction test, the defendant must “expressly aim” his or her conduct at that state. 
                                            
5 It is not clear that they do. In Burger King, which involved a tortious interference 
claim, the Court explained that the Due Process Clause’s “ ‘fair warning’ requirement is 
satisfied if the defendant has ‘purposefully directed’ his activities at residents of the forum, 
and the litigation results from alleged injuries that ‘arise out of or relate to’ those activities.” 
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472–73 (1985) (citations omitted) (first quoting 
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984); then quoting Helicopteros 
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A., 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984)). The Court then proceeded to analyze 
whether the defendant had maintained the requisite “minimum contacts” with the forum 
state. Id. at 474. This suggests that “purposeful availment” and “purposeful direction” are 
largely interchangeable.  
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Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984). This requirement demands proof the 
defendant had some reason to foresee which state’s laws would be obstructed and 
where harm would occur when choosing to engage in the conduct purporting to vest 
the forum state’s courts with jurisdiction. See Walden, 571 U.S. at 290 (“[M]ere injury 
to a forum resident is not a sufficient connection to the forum. . . . The proper question 
is not where the plaintiff experienced a particular injury or effect but whether the 
defendant's conduct connects him to the forum in a meaningful way.”); Marten v. 
Godwin, 499 F.3d 290, 297–98 (3d Cir. 2007) (“To establish that the defendant 
expressly aimed his conduct [at the forum state], the plaintiff has to demonstrate the 
defendant knew that the plaintiff would suffer the brunt of the harm caused by the 
tortious conduct in the forum.” (cleaned up) (quoting IMO Indus. v. Kiekert AG, 155 
F.3d 254, 265–66 (3d Cir. 1998)); Dole Food Co. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (interpreting Calder to “require[ ] that the defendant allegedly have (1) 
committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm 
that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state.”) (emphasis 
added). 
¶ 21 
 
The act of calling a cell phone number registered in one state does not 
automatically vest jurisdiction in any state where the recipient of the call happens to 
be located at the time the call is made. For example, in Long v. Vitkauskas, the 
Mississippi Supreme Court held that a Mississippi trial court lacked personal 
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jurisdiction over a defendant in an alienation of affection action when the only 
evidence establishing a connection between the defendant and the state was “an 
extensive log of telephone calls and text messages between [the defendant] and [a 
Mississippi resident].” 287 So. 3d 171, 174 (Miss. 2019). Even though the defendant 
did not dispute that he had made phone calls to a Mississippi resident who was 
located in Mississippi when she received the calls, the court was found to lack 
jurisdiction because the Mississippi resident had a cellphone number registered in 
Tennessee and there was no other evidence the defendant was aware of her 
Mississippi residency. Id.; see also Hood v. Am. Auto Care, LLC, No. 18-CV-02807-
PAB-SKC, 2020 WL 1333091, at *4 (D. Colo. Mar. 23, 2020) (holding that a Colorado 
court lacked personal jurisdiction over a telemarketing company who called a 
Colorado resident on a cell phone with a Vermont area code in the absence of 
“evidence that would allow the Court to infer that defendants knew that his Vermont 
phone number was associated with a Colorado resident”). 
¶ 22 
 
Finally, Mucha argues that due process permits “a lesser showing of minimum 
contacts than would otherwise be required” to establish personal jurisdiction in a 
business dispute given the State’s significant interest in protecting its residents 
against domestic violence. See Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 477. No one disputes 
the magnitude of the State’s interest in enabling its residents to live free from 
harassment, abuse, and violence. To be sure, DVPOs implicate very different 
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governmental interests than the need for orderly resolution of contract disputes. 
Nevertheless, other state courts examining personal jurisdiction claims in the context 
of domestic violence orders have not jettisoned the purposeful availment 
requirement. See Fox v. Fox, 2014 VT 100, ¶ 30, 197 Vt. 466, 106 A.3d 919 (concluding 
that Vermont trial court lacked personal jurisdiction to enter protective order because 
“defendant did not avail himself of any benefits or protections of Vermont's laws, or 
subject himself to the authority of Vermont's courts”); Shah v. Shah, 184 N.J. 125, 
139, 875 A.2d 931, 940 (2005) (concluding that the trial court lacked personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant who “has not ‘purposefully availed’ himself of the laws 
of New Jersey”).  
¶ 23 
 
Indeed, under similar circumstances, a Florida intermediate appellate court 
concluded its courts lacked personal jurisdiction to enter a protective order against a 
defendant who sent voice and text messages to the plaintiff’s cellphone while she was 
located in Florida, because the plaintiff had a Maryland number and “there [was] 
nothing in the petition . . . alleging that [the defendant] knew [the plaintiff] was 
present in Florida at the time he left the messages on her cellular phone.” Becker v. 
Johnson, 937 So. 2d 1128, 1131 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). While these decisions are 
not binding on this Court, they are instructive as to how other courts have given 
meaning to Due Process Clause protections. We conclude that even taking into 
account the nature of the important governmental interest in preventing domestic 
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violence, minimum contacts are required for personal jurisdiction to vest over a 
nonresident defendant, and there are not sufficient minimum contacts absent proof 
that the defendant purposefully established a connection with the forum state. 
¶ 24 
 
 Under the Due Process Clause, the “constitutional touchstone” is always 
“whether the defendant purposefully established ‘minimum contacts’ in the forum 
State.” Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. 462 at 474 (emphasis added) (quoting Int’l Shoe 
Co., 326 U.S. at 316). To hold that the magnitude of the State’s interest justifies an 
exercise of personal jurisdiction in the absence of proof the defendant “purposefully 
availed” himself of or “expressly aimed” his conduct towards North Carolina would 
necessarily “offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” Int’l Shoe 
Co., 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken, 311 U.S. at 463). It would also open the door 
to the abandonment of due process protections in other settings where the State’s 
interest is also compelling.   
¶ 25 
 
Our decision in this case addresses a unique situation characterized by a 
crucial fact: Wagner lacked any reason to know or suspect that Mucha had moved to 
and was present in North Carolina. Further, it also appears from the record that 
neither Mucha nor Wagner had any ties to North Carolina at all prior to Mucha 
moving to the state. In another case, it would likely alter the jurisdictional analysis 
if the defendant had called the plaintiff in North Carolina on a phone number linked 
to a physical address in North Carolina, see, e.g., Hughs ex rel. Praul v. Cole, 572 
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N.W.2d 747, 751 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (concluding Minnesota court had personal 
jurisdiction because “[t]he record indicates [the defendant] made repeated telephone 
calls to respondent’s home” in Minnesota while maintaining a relationship with his 
son who lived there), if the defendant had reason to anticipate that the plaintiff would 
travel to or “seek refuge” in North Carolina, Becker, 937 So. 2d at 1131, or if the prior 
relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff began in or significantly 
involved the State of North Carolina. 
¶ 26 
 
Having determined that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over 
Wagner, we now consider Mucha’s argument that the trial court did not need to have 
personal jurisdiction over Wagner to enter a DVPO against him. 
B. The “status exception” to personal jurisdiction 
¶ 27 
 
Mucha next argues that even if Wagner did not establish minimum contacts 
with the State of North Carolina, the trial court could permissibly bind him through 
entry of the DVPO by applying the “status exception” doctrine. As we recently 
explained, 
The Supreme Court of the United States has long 
recognized that some cases warrant an exception to the 
traditional due process requirements. Specifically, the 
Court has held that ‘cases involving the personal status of 
the plaintiff, such as divorce actions, could be adjudicated 
in the plaintiff's home State even though the defendant 
could not be served within the State.’ Shaffer v. Heitner, 
433 U.S. 186, 202, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977) 
(citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733–35, 24 L.Ed. 565 
(1878)). The Court's recognition of the status exception 
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implies that minimum contacts are not required in status 
cases because jurisdiction is established by the status of 
the plaintiff, rather than the location of the defendant. 
In re F.S.T.Y., 374 N.C. 532, 538 (2020). Thus, in In re F.S.T.Y., we concluded that 
the State’s interest in protecting the welfare of children residing in North Carolina, 
combined with the procedural protections afforded to litigants in termination 
proceedings (including the right to appointed counsel), justified allowing a North 
Carolina court to enter an order terminating the parental rights of an out-of-state 
parent of a resident child, even though the parent lacked “minimum contacts” with 
this State. Id. at 541. The Court of Appeals has also recognized the status exception 
in divorce cases. See, e.g., Chamberlin v. Chamberlin, 70 N.C. App. 474, disc. review 
denied, 312 N.C. 621 (1984). According to Mucha, “[b]ecause th[is] case focuses on the 
status of the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, as opposed to 
focusing on the defendant alone, the plaintiff’s connection to the forum state is itself 
enough to justify the exercise of jurisdiction as a matter of due process.”  
¶ 28 
 
Although some state courts have chosen to recognize the status exception in 
the domestic violence context, see, e.g., Bartsch v. Bartsch, 636 N.W. 2d. 3 (Iowa 2001), 
we decline Mucha’s invitation to do so here for two reasons. First, there is a significant 
conceptual 
distinction 
between 
termination-of-parental-rights 
and 
divorce 
proceedings on the one hand and a domestic violence proceeding on the other. When 
a trial court terminates an individual’s parental rights or a marriage, the court acts 
MUCHA V. WAGNER 
2021-NCSC-82 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
to dissolve an extant legal relationship. An order dissolving an individual’s legal 
identity as a parent or spouse is not itself the source of new rights or duties—it is 
merely “a declaration of status.” Fox, 2014 VT at ¶ 17.  By contrast, when a trial court 
enters a DVPO, the court creates a “status” which did not previously exist and then 
invokes that newly-created status to “prohibit[ the defendant] from engaging in 
behavior that would be entirely legal but for the court's order.” Id. at ¶ 19. Mucha 
concedes as much when she asserts that a DVPO “grants the plaintiff a protected 
status vis-à-vis the defendant.” This distinction between dissolving a legal status that 
already exists and creating a new status with new legal consequences is a significant 
one, which explains why a court may find jurisdiction in the absence of minimum 
contacts to accomplish the former but not the latter. 
¶ 29 
 
Second, as the Court of Appeals explained in Mannise v. Harrell, “the issuance 
of a [DVPO] implicates substantial rights of [d]efendant[s].” 249 N.C. App. 322, 332 
(2016). When a trial court enters a DVPO, the court may, in addition to prohibiting 
the defendant from engaging in future acts of domestic violence, impose various 
obligations on the defendant, such as requiring the defendant to vacate his or her 
home and granting the complainant possession of any shared residences or personal 
property. N.C.G.S. § 50B-3(a)(2), (5) (2019). The trial court may restrain the 
defendant from exercising his or her constitutional rights, including the right to 
MUCHA V. WAGNER 
2021-NCSC-82 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
purchase a firearm, N.C.G.S. § 50B-3(a)(11).6 In addition, “[t]he entry of a North 
Carolina [DVPO] involves both legal and non-legal collateral consequences,” which 
cannot easily be undone. Mannise, 249 N.C. App. at 332.  
¶ 30 
 
The fact that a DVPO creates significant legal consequences is, of course, not 
an accident. These consequences are precisely what the General Assembly has 
deemed are necessary to protect victims of domestic violence from further 
harassment, abuse, or worse. But the power and reach of a DVPO also heighten the 
fairness concerns which arise when a trial court chooses to act outside of the typical 
boundaries imposed by the Due Process Clause. For these reasons, we conclude that 
the status exception should not be extended to this case.  
¶ 31 
 
Although our decision deprives Mucha of one avenue for obtaining protection 
against further harassment, she is not without a remedy. She may seek a DVPO in 
any court with personal jurisdiction over Wagner, including his home state of 
Connecticut, which if granted would be fully enforceable in North Carolina. See 18 
U.S.C. § 2265(a). In addition, we note that upon receiving notice of Mucha’s filing in 
North Carolina, Wagner became aware Mucha was residing in this State. 
Accordingly, in a subsequent proceeding if the alleged harassment continued, it is 
doubtful Wagner could successfully defeat the trial court’s exercise of personal 
                                            
6 Under federal law, it is unlawful for any person subject to a DVPO to purchase or 
possess a firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). 
MUCHA V. WAGNER 
2021-NCSC-82 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
jurisdiction on the same grounds as asserted in the proceedings below. 
III. 
Conclusion 
¶ 32 
 
“[T]raditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” require something 
more than proof that an out-of-state defendant has directed conduct at an individual 
who happened to be located in North Carolina. Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting 
Milliken, 311 U.S. at 463). At a minimum, there must be some evidence from which 
the court can infer that in undertaking an act, the defendant purposefully established 
contacts with the State of North Carolina specifically. The question is not, as the 
Court of Appeals framed it, whether Wagner should have reasonably understood the 
risk that Mucha would be located somewhere other than South Carolina when he 
chose to dial her cellphone number. The question is whether Wagner had “followed a 
course of conduct directed at the society or economy existing within” North Carolina, 
such that a North Carolina court “has the power to subject the defendant to judgment 
concerning that conduct.” J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd., 564 U.S. at 884. Because the 
requisite minimum contacts between Wagner and North Carolina are not present in 
this case, we conclude that the Due Process Clause forbids the trial court from 
exercising personal jurisdiction over him to enter a DVPO. Therefore, we reverse the 
Court of Appeals decision in this case and vacate the trial court’s order for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
REVERSED.