Title: State v. Rodriguez
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2017AP000914-CR, 2017AP000913-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: November 27, 2019

2019 WI 101 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2017AP913-CR & 2017AP914-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Autumn Marie Love Lopez, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
------------------------------------------------ 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Amy J. Rodriguez, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 385 Wis. 2d 482,922 N.W.2d 855 
PDC No:2019 WI App 2 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
November 27, 2019 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 9, 2019 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Green 
 
JUDGE: 
James R. Beer 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
R.G. BRADLEY, J. concurs, joined by KELLY, J. 
(except for footnote 2 and statement in ¶34 that 
she does not join the lead opinion). (opinion 
filed) 
KELLY, J. concurs (except for ¶25-31). (opinion 
filed) 
 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: A.W. BRADLEY, J. dissents, joined by DALLET, J. 
(opinion filed)    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Kelsey Loshaw and Susan E. Alesia, assistant state 
public defenders. There was an oral argument by Kelsey Loshaw. 
 
 
 
2 
For the plaintiff-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Lisa E.F. Kumfer, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral 
argument by Lisa E.F. Kumfer. 
 
 
2019 WI 101
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
Nos.  2017AP913-CR & 2017AP914-CR 
(L.C. Nos. 
2017CF39 & 2017CF40) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Autumn Marie Love Lopez, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
NOV 27, 2019 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Amy J. Rodriguez, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals in two consolidated 
cases, State v. Lopez and State v. Rodriguez, 2019 WI App 2, 385 
Wis. 2d 482, 922 N.W.2d 855, reversing the Green County circuit 
Nos. 2017AP913-CR & 2017AP914-CR   
 
2 
 
court's order.1 The circuit court order dismissed without 
prejudice the criminal complaints against Autumn Marie Love 
Lopez ("Lopez") and Amy J. Rodriguez ("Rodriguez"), which 
charged them with a single count of retail theft of items valued 
at more than $500 and less than $5,000, as parties to a crime, 
contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 943.50(1m)(c) and (4)(bf), and 939.05 
(2015-16).2  The circuit court concluded that the State may not 
charge multiple acts of misdemeanor retail theft as a single 
felony.  The court of appeals reversed and concluded that the 
State may charge multiple acts of retail theft as one continuous 
offense pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 971.36(3)(a).  We affirm the 
court of appeals. 
¶2 
Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 971.36(3), "[i]n any case of 
theft involving more than one theft, all thefts may be 
prosecuted as a single crime" provided certain criteria are 
satisfied.  This court must decide whether the statutory term 
"theft" includes the statutory charge of retail theft.  Lopez 
argues that it does not.  She argues that "theft" includes only 
the five modes of theft described in Wis. Stat. § 943.20, not 
retail theft.  The State argues that "theft" means any type of 
theft, including retail theft. 
¶3 
We conclude that "theft" under Wis. Stat. § 971.36 
includes retail theft under Wis. Stat. § 943.50.  We therefore 
                                                 
1 The Honorable James R. Beer presided. 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
Nos. 2017AP913-CR & 2017AP914-CR   
 
3 
 
conclude that the State has authority to charge multiple retail 
thefts under § 943.50 as one continuous offense pursuant to 
§ 971.36(3).  Thus, we affirm the court of appeals.3   
 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶4 
On February 16, 2017, the State filed criminal 
complaints against Lopez and Rodriguez.  The complaints allege 
that the two women committed a series of retail thefts from Wal-
Mart in Monroe, Wisconsin.  Specifically, the complaints allege 
that between January 10 and January 25, 2017, Lopez and 
Rodriguez together committed seven retail thefts.  Lopez was an 
employee at Wal-Mart.  The State alleges that Lopez pretended to 
assist Rodriguez at a self-check-out register.  Lopez allegedly 
pretended to scan merchandise for Rodriguez, but in reality she 
either did not scan it or voided the scan.  Rodriguez would then 
exit Wal-Mart with her stolen merchandise.  The seven retail 
thefts ranged in individual value from $126.33 to $313.95.  The 
total value of all the stolen merchandise was $1,452.12. 
¶5 
The State could have charged Lopez and Rodriguez each 
with seven separate class A misdemeanor retail thefts, contrary 
to Wis. Stat. § 943.50(1m)(c) and (4)(a).4  Instead, pursuant to 
                                                 
3 Justice Daniel Kelly joins this opinion except paragraphs 
25 through 31.  Curiously, while Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley 
joins our mandate and seemingly agrees with at least a portion 
of the analysis, she nonetheless does not join any part of this 
opinion. 
4 The statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
943.50  Retail theft; theft of services.  . . .  
(continued) 
Nos. 2017AP913-CR & 2017AP914-CR   
 
4 
 
Wis. Stat. §§ 971.36(3)(a)5 and 943.50(4)(bf),6 the State charged 
Lopez and Rodriguez with, as parties to the crime, a single 
class I felony count of retail theft of items valued at more 
than $500 and less then $5,000.  Lopez and Rodriguez each 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1m)  A person may be penalized as provided in 
sub. (4) if he or she does any of the following 
without the merchant's consent and with intent to 
deprive the merchant permanently of possession or the 
full purchase price of the merchandise or property:  
 . . .  
(c) Intentionally transfers merchandise held for 
resale by a merchant or property of a merchant. 
 . . .  
(4)  Whoever violates this section is guilty of:  
(a)   . . . a Class A misdemeanor, if the value 
of the merchandise does not exceed $500. 
Wis. Stat. § 943.50(1m)(c) and (4)(a). 
5 The statute, in pertinent, part provides:  
971.36  Theft; pleading and evidence; subsequent 
prosecutions.  . . .  
(3)  In any case of theft involving more than one 
theft, all thefts may be prosecuted as a single crime 
if:  
(a)  The property belonged to the same owner and 
the thefts were committed pursuant to a single intent 
and design or in execution of a single deceptive 
scheme; . . . . 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 943.50(4)(bf) provides that "[w]hoever 
violates this section is guilty of: . . . A Class I felony, if 
the value of the merchandise exceeds $500 but does not exceed 
$5,000."  
Nos. 2017AP913-CR & 2017AP914-CR   
 
5 
 
separately moved to dismiss the complaints, arguing that the 
State could only charge them with seven misdemeanors. 
¶6 
The circuit court held a hearing on both motions to 
dismiss.  The circuit court granted both motions to dismiss 
without prejudice.  It concluded that "theft" did not include 
retail theft, and the State could not aggregate retail thefts 
under Wis. Stat. § 971.36(3).  The State appealed.  
¶7 
The 
court 
of 
appeals 
reversed. 
 
Lopez, 
385 
Wis. 2d 482, ¶15.  It concluded that "the State has authority 
under § 971.36(3)(a) to charge the multiple alleged acts of 
retail 
theft 
as 
one 
continuous 
offense." 
 
Id., 
¶5.  
Specifically, the court of appeals concluded that the statute 
"refers generally to 'theft,'" is not limited to theft under 
Wis. Stat. § 943.20, and applies to retail theft under Wis. 
Stat. § 943.50.  Id., ¶12. 
¶8 
Lopez7 filed a petition for review in this court.  We 
granted the petition. 
 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶9 
This case requires this court to interpret Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.36 to determine whether the statutory term "theft" 
                                                 
7 State v. Lopez and State v. Rodriguez, 2019 WI App 2, 385 
Wis. 2d 482, 922 N.W.2d 855, were consolidated for appeal and 
remain so before this court.  Although Rodriguez did not file a 
petition for review, she has informed this court that she wishes 
to join Lopez's arguments before this court.  We need not 
determine whether she has complied with appellate procedure in 
so doing.  Because these cases remain consolidated, she is bound 
by our determination in this case. 
Nos. 2017AP913-CR & 2017AP914-CR   
 
6 
 
includes the charge of retail theft.  "The interpretation and 
application of a statute present questions of law that this 
court reviews de novo while benefitting from the analyses of the 
court of appeals and circuit court."  State v. Alger, 2015 WI 3, 
¶21, 360 Wis. 2d 193, 858 N.W.2d 346 (citing State v. Ziegler, 
2012 WI 73, ¶37, 342 Wis. 2d 256, 816 N.W.2d 238).  Thus, we 
review de novo whether "theft" includes retail theft.  
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Statutory Interpretation 
¶10 We begin our analysis with the language of the 
relevant statute, Wis. Stat. § 971.36.  State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
681 N.W.2d 110.  The purpose of statutory interpretation is to 
give the statute "its full, proper, and intended effect."  Id., 
¶44.  If the statutory language is plain, we end the inquiry and 
give the language its "common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, 
except [we give] technical or specially-defined words or 
phrases . . . their technical or special definitional meaning."  
Id., ¶45.  
¶11 This court also analyzes the context and structure of 
a statute to determine its meaning.  Statutory language "is 
interpreted in the context in which it is used; not in isolation 
but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of 
surrounding or closely-related statutes . . . ."  Id., ¶46.  "A 
statute's purpose or scope may be readily apparent from its 
plain language or its relationship to surrounding or closely-
Nos. 2017AP913-CR & 2017AP914-CR   
 
7 
 
related statutes——that is, from its context or the structure of 
the statute as a coherent whole."  Id., ¶49. 
¶12 If analyzing a statute's language in context "yields a 
plain, clear statutory meaning, then there is no ambiguity" and 
we end the inquiry.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 (quoting Bruno 
v. Milwaukee Cty., 2003 WI 28, ¶20, 260 Wis. 2d 633, 660 
N.W.2d 656) (internal quotations omitted).  We conclude that the 
plain meaning of Wis. Stat. § 971.36 is unambiguous.  We base 
that conclusion on the language of the statute and confirm that 
conclusion using traditional tools of statutory construction. 
1.  Wisconsin Statute § 971.36 
¶13 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.36, which is found in the 
criminal procedure chapter of the statutes, is entitled "Theft; 
pleading and evidence; subsequent prosecutions."  It provides, 
in relevant part, as follows: 
(1) In any criminal pleading for theft, it is 
sufficient to charge that the defendant did steal the 
property (describing it) of the owner (naming the 
owner) of the value of (stating the value in money).  
 . . .  
(3) In any case of theft involving more than one 
theft, all thefts may be prosecuted as a single crime 
if:  
(a) The property belonged to the same owner and 
the thefts were committed pursuant to a single intent 
and design or in execution of a single deceptive 
scheme; . . . .  
¶14 Subsection (1) addresses how to properly draft a 
criminal pleading for theft.  Subsection (3) addresses the 
State's authority to charge multiple thefts as a single crime.  
Nos. 2017AP913-CR & 2017AP914-CR   
 
8 
 
Put simply, the State may charge multiple thefts as one theft if 
they are all from the same owner and committed together with the 
same intent and design, or in the same scheme.  Section 971.36 
does not define "theft," but the word "theft" appears elsewhere 
in the Wisconsin Statutes. 
2.  Theft-related statutes 
¶15 The word "theft" appears in ten criminal statute 
titles in Chapter 943 "Crimes Against Property."  The chapter 
sets forth multiple criminal theft offenses.  First is the 
general theft statute.  Then the chapter sets forth other fact-
specific theft offenses, one being retail theft.  See Wis. Stat. 
§§ 943.20 ("Theft"); 943.205 ("Theft of trade secrets"); 943.45 
("Theft of telecommunications service"); 943.455 ("Theft of 
commercial mobile service"); 943.46 ("Theft of video service"); 
943.47 ("Theft of satellite cable programming"); 943.50 ("Retail 
theft; 
theft 
of 
services"); 
943.61 
("Theft 
of 
library 
material"); 943.74 ("Theft of farm-raised fish"); and 943.81 
("Theft from a financial institution").   
¶16 Lopez argues that retail thefts under Wis. Stat. 
§ 943.50 cannot be aggregated under Wis. Stat. § 971.36.  A 
person commits retail theft under § 943.50 "if he or she 
[commits any mode of retail theft] without the merchant's 
consent and with intent to deprive the merchant permanently of 
possession or the full purchase price of the merchandise or 
property."  § 943.50(1m).  The eight modes of commission are: 
intentionally altering merchandise prices; intentionally taking 
and 
carrying 
away 
merchandise; 
intentionally 
transferring 
Nos. 2017AP913-CR & 2017AP914-CR   
 
9 
 
merchandise; intentionally concealing merchandise; intentionally 
retaining possession of merchandise; intentionally removing 
theft detection devices from merchandise; using or possessing 
with intent to use a theft detection shielding device to shield 
merchandise; and using or possessing with intent to use a theft 
detection device remover to remove a theft detection device from 
merchandise.  § 943.50(1m)(a)-(h). 
¶17 Lopez argues that the only crimes that can be 
aggregated under Wis. Stat. § 971.36(3) are theft crimes under 
Wis. Stat. § 943.20.8   Section 943.20 defines five modes of 
committing theft.  They can be summarized as: theft of movable 
property; theft of money, negotiable security, instrument, 
paper, or negotiable writing by one in possession; theft of 
property from one with a superior interest; theft by fraud; and 
theft by failure to return property after expiration of a lease 
or rental agreement.  § 943.20(1)(a)-(e).  Thus, in Wisconsin, 
"theft" is used to describe a variety of theft crimes.  
 
3.  "Theft" includes retail theft under Wis. Stat. § 943.50. 
¶18 Since the legislature has used "theft" to describe a 
variety of crimes, the parties in this case disagree on what the 
word "theft" in Wis. Stat. § 971.36 means.  Lopez argues that 
"theft" includes only theft crimes under Wis. Stat. § 943.20, 
entitled "Theft."  Specifically, she argues that: (1) "theft" is 
a term of art defined by its elements in § 943.20; (2) "theft" 
                                                 
8 Section 943.20, while entitled "Theft," does not contain 
the word "theft" in the text of the statute. 
Nos. 2017AP913-CR & 2017AP914-CR   
 
10 
 
in § 971.36 should be read narrowly because "any" modifies 
"case," and not "theft"; (3) other theft crimes have their own 
aggregation statutes, tending to show that the legislature did 
not intend retail theft to be aggregated; and (4) retail theft 
is different from "theft" because it requires proof that the 
owner was a merchant and the items were merchandise held for 
sale.  
¶19 The State argues that "theft" is not limited to theft 
crimes under Wis. Stat. § 943.20, and includes retail theft 
under Wis. Stat. § 943.50.  Specifically, the State argues that: 
(1) Wis. Stat. § 971.36 uses broad language and applies to "any 
case of theft"; (2) the legislature meant "theft" to include 
retail theft because the legislature designated it a theft 
crime; and (3) the legislature could have explicitly excluded 
retail theft from "theft" under § 971.36 by stating it applied 
only to § 943.20 or by drafting a separate aggregation statute 
for retail theft, but failed to do so.  We agree with the State 
and conclude that "theft" under § 971.36 is not limited to theft 
under § 943.20. 
¶20 To begin, Wis. Stat. § 971.36(3) applies "[i]n any 
case 
of 
theft 
involving 
more 
than 
one 
theft . . . ." 
§ 971.36(3).  The plain language of the statute makes clear that 
the legislature's plain meaning applies broadly, to "any case of 
theft involving more than one theft."  Id.  Lopez would have 
this court read the phrase "any case" in isolation.  But that 
argument ignores the plain language of the statute.  The plain 
Nos. 2017AP913-CR & 2017AP914-CR   
 
11 
 
language of § 971.36(3) applies to "any case of theft involving 
more than one theft."  Id. (emphasis added.) 
¶21 Furthermore, there is no limiting language in the 
statute.  The legislature could have written, "In any case of 
theft [under s. 943.20] involving more than one theft, all 
thefts may be prosecuted as a single crime . . . ."  But it did 
not.  In contrast, the legislature did include limiting language 
in the three aggregation statutes that follow § 971.36.  See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 971.365(1)(a) 
("In 
any 
case 
under 
s. 
961.41(1)(em), 1999 stats., or s. 961.41(1)(cm), (d), (e), (f), 
(g) or (h) involving more than one violation, all violations may 
be prosecuted as a single crime . . . ."); 971.366 ("In any case 
under s. 943.201 or 943.203 involving more than one violation, 
all violations may be prosecuted as a single crime . . . ."); 
and 971.367 ("In any case under s. 946.79 involving more than 
one violation, all violations may be prosecuted as a single 
crime . . . .").  When the legislature does not include limiting 
language in a statute, we decline to read any into it.  State v. 
Kozel, 2017 WI 3, ¶39, 373 Wis. 2d 1, 889 N.W.2d 423 ("'We will 
not read into the statute a limitation the plain language does 
not evidence.'") (quoting Cty. of Dane v. LIRC, 2009 WI 9, ¶33, 
315 Wis. 2d 293, 759 N.W.2d 571).  The legislature did not limit 
§ 971.36(3) to theft under § 943.20.  Thus, we decline to read 
Lopez's requested limitation into the statute. 
¶22 Lopez argues that because retail theft does not have 
its own specific aggregation statute the legislature did not 
intend retail theft to be aggregated.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 971.366 
Nos. 2017AP913-CR & 2017AP914-CR   
 
12 
 
and 971.367 (aggregating other fact-specific theft offenses).  
We disagree.  The fact that other aggregation statutes exist 
does not demonstrate that the legislature excluded retail theft 
from aggregation under Wis. Stat. § 971.36.  Rather, the absence 
of 
any 
limiting 
language 
in 
§ 971.36(3) 
shows 
that 
the 
legislature did not exclude retail theft from aggregation under 
that section.  Contrary to Lopez's argument, the legislature 
endowed prosecutors with the authority to aggregate retail theft 
under § 971.36(3). 
¶23 Lopez also argues that retail theft under Wis. Stat. 
§ 943.50 does not qualify as "theft" under Wis. Stat. § 971.36 
because it requires proof that the owner was a merchant and the 
items taken were merchandise held for sale.  But even when a 
theft is of merchandise taken from a merchant, it nonetheless is 
a "theft."  Thus, we find Lopez's argument unpersuasive.  
¶24 We conclude that "theft" under Wis. Stat. § 971.36(3) 
includes retail theft under Wis. Stat. § 943.50.  Thus, we 
conclude that the State may charge multiple retail thefts under 
§ 943.50 as one continuous offense pursuant to § 971.36(3).  
This conclusion is based on the plain meaning of the statute.  
We confirm this plain meaning conclusion by looking at the 
context of the statute. 
¶25 The parties argue that statute titles are permissive 
indicators of meaning in this case.  Lopez argues titles matter 
because "Theft" is the title of Wis. Stat. § 943.20 (the only 
theft statute which predates Wis. Stat. § 971.36(3)) and "theft" 
is the word the legislature used in § 971.36(3).  The State 
Nos. 2017AP913-CR & 2017AP914-CR   
 
13 
 
argues that titles matter because "theft" is the word the 
legislature used in § 971.36(3) and the word "theft" appears in 
ten statute titles in Chapter 943.  Statute titles are not 
dispositive.  To the extent that we may consider statute titles 
as part of the context in which we interpret statutory meaning, 
here the titles provide further confirmation for our plain 
meaning analysis.  
¶26 "Context is important to meaning."  Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.  In fact, a statute's "title and headings are 
permissible indicators of meaning."  Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. 
Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 221 
(2012); see also id. at 21-24 ("Title-and-Headings Canon").  
This court has previously concluded that "reference to [a 
statute's] title is appropriate" in statutory interpretation.  
State v. Dorsey, 2018 WI 10, ¶30, 379 Wis. 2d 386, 906 
N.W.2d 158.  "The titles . . . of the statutes . . . are not 
part of the statutes."  Wis. Stat. § 990.001(6).  But the titles 
are part of a statute's context and can be relevant to statutory 
interpretation.  See Dorsey, 379 Wis. 2d 386, ¶30; see also 
Aiello v. Vill. of Pleasant Prairie, 206 Wis. 2d 68, 73, 556 
N.W.2d 697 
(1996) 
("Although 
titles 
are 
not 
part 
of 
statutes, . . . they may be helpful in interpretation."). 
¶27 A statute's title is not part of the statute, but it 
is language approved by the legislature.  The legislature adopts 
the statute's title.  Scalia & Garner, supra ¶26, at 221.  When 
the legislature adopts non-statutory language in titles, that 
Nos. 2017AP913-CR & 2017AP914-CR   
 
14 
 
language has meaning and reflects a decision of the legislature.  
The United States Supreme Court has said: 
[The] heading is but a short-hand reference to the 
general subject matter involved . . . . [H]eadings and 
titles are not meant to take the place of the detailed 
provisions of the text.  Nor are they necessarily 
designed to be a reference guide or a synopsis . . . . 
For interpretive purposes, they are of use only when 
they shed light on some ambiguous word or phrase.  
They are but tools available for the resolution of a 
doubt.  But they cannot undo or limit that which the 
text makes plain. 
Id. (quoting Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio 
R.R., 331 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1947)). 
¶28 And this court has said:  
Titles to sections of a statute are not part of 
the statute.  Sec. 990.001(6), Stats.  However, such 
titles may be resorted to in order to resolve a doubt 
as to statutory meaning.  Federal Rubber Co. v. 
Industrial Comm., [185 Wis. 299, 301, 201 N.W. 261 
(1924)].  However, the converse of the latter rule is 
also true that titles should not be resorted to in 
order to create a doubt where none would otherwise 
exist. 
Wisconsin Valley Imp. Co. v. PSC, 9 Wis. 2d 606, 618, 101 
N.W.2d 798 (1960).  In short, a statute's title may not be used 
to contradict its text or to create ambiguity where its meaning 
is plain.  But the title may be used to confirm a statute's 
meaning. 
¶29 Although we do not rely on the relevant statutes' 
titles to interpret meaning here, we note that this court has 
previously relied on a statute's title as context to interpret 
its meaning.  For example, in State v. Matasek, we concluded 
that the phrase "at the time of sentencing" in Wis. Stat. 
Nos. 2017AP913-CR & 2017AP914-CR   
 
15 
 
§ 973.015 (2011-12) includes the disposition of probation.9  2014 
WI 27, ¶¶34, 39, 353 Wis. 2d 601, 846 N.W.2d 811.  In support of 
that conclusion, we stated, "The probation statute is part of 
chapter 973 of the statutes, which is entitled 'Sentencing.'"  
Id., ¶37 (emphasis added).  The court did the same in Dorsey.  
In that case, we interpreted Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(b)(1).  We 
concluded, "In the context of its title, 'Greater latitude,' we 
interpret subd. (2)(b)(1). as adopting the common law greater 
latitude rule to permit the admission of other, similar acts of 
domestic abuse with greater latitude."  Dorsey, 379 Wis. 2d 386, 
¶31 (emphasis added).10   
                                                 
9 Probation is not a sentence.  State v. Horn, 226 
Wis. 2d 637, 647, 594 N.W.2d 772 (1999).  But the disposition of 
probation occurs "at the time of sentencing."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.015. 
10 Furthermore, in Wisconsin we have come to know the names 
of certain crimes by the statute title rather than the elements 
outlined in the statute language.  See State v. Davison, 2003 WI 
89, 263 Wis. 2d 145, 666 N.W.2d 1 (referring to aggravated 
battery, not "caus[ing] substantial bodily harm to another by an 
act done with intent to cause bodily harm to that person . . . " 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.19(2)); State v. Asboth, 2017 WI 
76, 376 Wis. 2d 644, 898 N.W.2d 541 (referring to robbery, not 
"with the intent to steal, tak[ing] property from the person or 
presence of the owner" by "threatening the imminent use of force 
against the person of the owner" with a "dangerous weapon" 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 943.32(1)(b), (2)); State v. Arberry, 
2018 WI 7, 379 Wis. 2d 254, 905 N.W.2d 832 (referring to retail 
theft, not taking merchandise "without the merchant's consent 
and 
with 
intent 
to 
deprive 
the 
merchant 
permanently 
of 
possession or the full purchase price of the merchandise . . . " 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 943.50(1m)). 
Nos. 2017AP913-CR & 2017AP914-CR   
 
16 
 
¶30 In 
sum, 
statute 
titles 
historically 
have 
had 
significance in Wisconsin case law.  Courts have indeed observed 
titles to confirm statutory interpretation or even to resolve an 
ambiguity.  Titles may provide context.  Thus, we conclude that 
we may here consult statute titles to confirm our interpretation 
of the plain meaning of the statutes at issue.  
¶31 The plain language of Wis. Stat. § 971.36(3) refers to 
"theft" generally.  That same word——"theft"——is found in the 
title of Wis. Stat. § 943.50, "Retail theft; theft of services."  
The "Retail theft" portion of the title provides context for and 
confirms our interpretation of the word "theft" in § 971.36(3).  
We conclude that the general reference to "theft" in § 971.36(3) 
includes retail theft under § 943.50.  Thus, we conclude that 
the State may charge multiple retail thefts under § 943.50 as 
one continuous offense pursuant to § 971.36(3).11   
¶32 The court of appeals concluded that the State properly 
exercised its Wis. Stat. § 971.36(3) authority in this case 
because the merchandise "belonged to the same owner," Wal-Mart, 
and "the thefts were committed pursuant to a single intent and 
                                                 
11 The State argued, in the alternative, that it has 
discretionary authority to charge multiple retail thefts as one 
single felony.  Because we conclude the State has statutory 
authority pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 971.36(3), we do not address 
whether it has discretionary authority.  Lopez argued that the 
State does not have discretionary authority to charge multiple 
retail thefts as one single felony because the charge would be 
improperly duplicitous.  Because we do not address the State's 
discretionary authority argument, and because we determine this 
case is properly aggregated under § 971.36, we need not address 
Lopez's duplicity argument.  
Nos. 2017AP913-CR & 2017AP914-CR   
 
17 
 
design or in execution of a single deceptive scheme."  Wis. 
Stat. § 971.36(3)(a); Lopez, 385 Wis. 2d 482, ¶14.  We do not 
disturb that conclusion.  
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶33 We conclude that "theft" under Wis. Stat. § 971.36 
includes retail theft under Wis. Stat. § 943.50.  We therefore 
conclude that the State has authority to charge multiple retail 
thefts under § 943.50 as one continuous offense pursuant to 
§ 971.36(3).  Thus, we affirm the court of appeals.  
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
No.  2017AP913-CR & 2017AP914-CR.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶34 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  I join the 
mandate of the lead opinion1 affirming the decision of the court 
of appeals.  I agree that under a plain meaning analysis, the 
word "theft" used in Wis. Stat. § 971.36(3) includes retail 
theft; therefore, the State can aggregate the seven instances of 
retail thefts into one charge.  I cannot, however, join the lead 
opinion's analysis because it improperly relies on sources 
beyond the unambiguous text of the statute we interpret.2 
¶35 As a preliminary matter, the lead opinion should have 
more thoroughly explained why Amy J. Rodriguez, who did not 
participate in the appeal before this court, nevertheless 
appears in the caption.  The State brought criminal complaints 
against Autumn Marie Love Lopez and Rodriguez separately in the 
circuit court.  Both women filed separate motions to dismiss, 
which the circuit court granted.  Both women appealed to the 
court of appeals, at which point the State filed a motion asking 
the court of appeals to consolidate the two cases for purposes 
of briefing and disposition.  The court of appeals granted the 
                                                 
1 I refer to Justice Ziegler's opinion as the "lead opinion" 
because Section III.G.4. of the court's internal operating 
procedures provides that "[i]f . . .  the opinion originally 
circulated as the majority opinion does not garner the vote of a 
majority of the court, it shall be referred to in separate 
writings as the 'lead opinion' unless a separate writing garners 
the vote of a majority of the court." 
2 Although the lead opinion correctly concludes that "theft" 
under Wis. Stat. § 971.36(3) includes retail theft, the lead 
opinion's reliance on statutory titles to inform its analysis of 
the text permeates the lead opinion's reasoning to the extent 
that I cannot join the opinion. 
No.  2017AP913-CR & 2017AP914-CR.rgb 
 
2 
 
State's motion.  As a result, the captions from Lopez's and 
Rodriguez's cases were joined into one consolidated caption. 
¶36 Only Lopez filed a petition for review of the court of 
appeals decision.  Rodriguez declined to ask this court to 
review the decision of the court of appeals adverse to her.  
Rodriguez never filed a petition for review nor did she file a 
letter saying she joins the petition for review filed by Lopez. 
¶37 Although Attorney Tristan Breedlove represented Lopez 
in the court of appeals, Attorneys Susan Alesia and Kelsey 
Loshaw represent Lopez before this court.  On June 10, 2019, 
Attorneys Alesia and Loshaw filed the first brief on behalf of 
Petitioner Lopez.  On June 28, 2019, the State filed its 
response brief.3  On July 10, 2019, Rodriguez's attorney filed a 
letter stating: 
I must correct my previous letter from today.  I 
represent Defendant-Respondent Amy J. Rodriguez.  The 
State has filed its brief.  I expect that Defendant-
Respondent-Petitioner Autumn Marie Love Lopez, by 
Attorney Tristan Breedlove, will be filing a response 
brief setting forth the same positions she presented 
to the court of appeals.  I expect the issues to be 
discussed in 
Attorney Breedlove's brief will be 
identical to the issues existing in my client's case.  
I do not intend to file a brief on my client's behalf 
and do not intend to participate in oral argument.  My 
client will be joining Attorney Breedlove in her 
argument. 
(Emphasis added.)  Rodriguez's attorney's letter includes some 
factual errors, both with respect to who represents Lopez 
(Breedlove was no longer Lopez's lawyer; Attorneys Alesia and 
                                                 
3 The State's brief erroneously lists both Lopez and 
Rodriguez as petitioners.  As noted, only Lopez is a petitioner. 
No.  2017AP913-CR & 2017AP914-CR.rgb 
 
3 
 
Loshaw were) and with regard to which briefs had been filed 
(Lopez filed the first brief and the State filed the response).  
Further, Rodriguez's attorney told the court he would not be 
filing a brief on his client's behalf or giving oral argument, 
but Rodriguez would join "Breedlove in her argument."  Clearly, 
Rodriguez could not have filed a brief in this court or 
participated in oral argument because she was not a petitioner.4  
Moreover, Breedlove did not make any argument in this court so 
Rodriguez could not "join" Breedlove's argument. 
¶38 Although the lead opinion acknowledges that Rodriguez 
did not file a petition seeking review in this court, it 
nevertheless notes that Rodriguez "join[s]" Lopez's arguments 
before us.  See lead op., ¶8 n.7.  Because Rodriguez never filed 
a petition for review, Rodriguez could not participate in this 
matter at all without requesting leave of the court to do so.5  
Instead of allowing a non-party to skirt the rules of appellate 
procedure and "join" the petitioner's argument, the lead opinion 
instead should have indicated that, having elected not to file 
her own petition, Rodriguez is bound by the court's decision 
with respect to Lopez's petition.  By allowing a non-party to 
"join" a petitioner's "argument," the lead opinion suggests the 
rules of appellate procedure need not be followed. 
                                                 
4 Rodriguez's caption remained consolidated with Lopez's 
because once the cases are consolidated on appeal, the captions 
remain together unless a court orders otherwise. 
5 See Wis. Stat. § 809.62(1r) providing the rules governing 
the petition for review process and declaring that "Supreme 
court review is a matter of judicial discretion, not of 
right[.]" 
No.  2017AP913-CR & 2017AP914-CR.rgb 
 
4 
 
¶39 As far as the reasoning underlying the court's 
decision, the lead opinion should have relied solely on the 
statutory text instead of attempting to divine legislative 
"intent" or elevating the importance of statutory titles in 
ascertaining the meaning of a law.  Despite its conclusion that 
the plain text of the statute is unambiguous, the lead opinion 
nevertheless 
agrees 
with 
the 
State's 
argument 
that 
"the 
legislature meant 'theft' to include retail theft" and says "the 
legislature's plain meaning applies broadly."  Lead op., ¶¶19-
20.  An interpretation based on what the legislature intended a 
statute to mean is improper.  "'[W]e do not inquire what the 
legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means.'"  State 
ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶39, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (quoted source omitted).  Courts 
disregard what the legislature may have "intended" when it 
passed a law and instead ascertain the meaning of the words the 
legislature actually enacted because "[i]t is the enacted law, 
not the unenacted intent, that is binding on the public."  Id., 
¶44; see also Winebow, Inc. v. Capitol-Husting Co., 2018 WI 60, 
¶40, 381 Wis. 2d 732, 914 N.W.2d 631 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, 
J., dissenting) ("[L]egislative intent behind enactment of a 
law . . . cannot govern statutory interpretation.  Rather, our 
analysis must focus on the statutory language itself[.]"); State 
v. Grandberry, 2018 WI 29, ¶55, 380 Wis. 2d 541, 910 N.W.2d 214 
(Kelly, J., concurring) ("[W]e give effect only to what the 
legislature does, not what it tried to do.").  The legislature's 
intent should play no role in the court's analysis; we analyze 
No.  2017AP913-CR & 2017AP914-CR.rgb 
 
5 
 
the text of the statute in ascertaining its meaning.  See 
Antonin 
Scalia 
& 
Bryan 
A. 
Garner, 
Reading 
Law: 
 
The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts, 391-396 (2012) ("[C]ollective 
intent is pure fiction because dozens if not hundreds of 
legislators have their own subjective views on the minutiae of 
bills they are voting on[.]"); see also Robert E. Keeton, Keeton 
on Judging in the American Legal System 210-11 (Lexis Pub. 1999) 
("'[L]egislative intent' . . . is a legal fiction.  Only a 
natural person can have a state of mind such as intent.  No 
legal entity such as a legislature can have an 'intent' in a 
strictly factual sense."). 
¶40 The lead opinion acknowledges that if the statutory 
language is plain and unambiguous, we end our inquiry into its 
meaning.  Lead op., ¶¶10, 12.  The lead opinion correctly 
concludes that the plain meaning of Wis. Stat. § 971.36 is 
unambiguous.  Lead op., ¶12.  The lead opinion should have 
stopped there.  Instead, the lead opinion devotes nearly half of 
its analysis to a discussion of statutory titles, lending 
unwarranted 
significance 
to 
their 
role 
in 
statutory 
interpretation. 
¶41 Titles are not part of the statute's text.  The 
legislature itself says so in Wis. Stat. § 990.001(6):  "The 
titles to subchapters, sections, paragraphs and subdivisions of 
the statutes and history notes are not part of the statutes."  
While titles have been employed as "permissible indicators of 
No.  2017AP913-CR & 2017AP914-CR.rgb 
 
6 
 
meaning"6 we have for over half-a-century limited their use to 
resolving doubt or ambiguity in the text.  Wisconsin Valley 
Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 9 Wis. 2d 606, 618, 101 
N.W.2d 798 (1960) ("[T]itles may be resorted to in order to 
resolve a doubt as to statutory meaning."); Pulsfus Poultry 
Farms, Inc. v. Town of Leeds, 149 Wis. 2d 797, 806, 440 
N.W.2d 329 (1989) ("Titles may be used to resolve doubts as to 
ambiguous statutory meaning even though they are not part of the 
law."); State v. Black, 188 Wis. 2d 639, 645, 526 N.W.2d 132 
(1994) ("In the face of such plain and unambiguous language we 
must disregard the title of the statute.  Consideration of a 
statutory title may be used only to resolve doubt as to the 
meaning of the statute.") (internal citation omitted). 
¶42 The 
lead 
opinion 
recites 
these 
longstanding 
principles, but does not apply them.  The lead opinion 
explicitly holds the applicable statute in this case is plain 
and not ambiguous.  Nevertheless, the lead opinion relies 
heavily on statutory titles in order to support its conclusion.  
Doing so weakens it by suggesting the text itself is not enough 
to answer the question presented. 
¶43 The danger of employing statutory titles as part of 
the court's reasoning is not trivial.  Employing such tools in a 
manner contrary to fundamental rules of textual interpretation 
risks "undo[ing] or limit[ing] that which the text makes plain."  
Scalia & Garner, Reading Law at 221 (quoting Brotherhood of R.R. 
                                                 
6 Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:  The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts, 221 (2012). 
No.  2017AP913-CR & 2017AP914-CR.rgb 
 
7 
 
Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528-29 
(1947)).  For example, in State v. Dorsey,7 the lead opinion 
misused a statutory title to read in "evidentiary preconditions 
wholly absent from the text."  Id., 379 Wis. 2d 386, ¶73 
(Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring).  Although in this case 
the lead opinion does not use statutory titles to read something 
into the statutory text, its extensive and unnecessary reliance 
on titles in its reasoning signals a willingness to bend if not 
altogether 
rewrite 
longstanding 
principles 
of 
statutory 
interpretation.  The lead opinion seems to give titles the same 
interpretive significance as the text, which flies in the face 
of the cardinal rule that the "text must control over title."  
Aiello v. Vill. of Pleasant Prairie, 206 Wis. 2d 68, 73, 556 
N.W.2d 697 (1996). 
¶44 The lead opinion could have applied Wisconsin cases 
that recognize titles as nothing more than "tools available for 
the resolution of a doubt" and confine their use to "shed light 
on some ambiguous word or phrase."8  Doing so would have ended 
                                                 
7 2018 WI 10, 379 Wis. 2d 386, 906 N.W.2d 158. 
8 Scalia & Garner, Reading Law at 221 (quoting Brotherhood 
of R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 
528-29 (1947)). Notably, and unlike Wisconsin, the United States 
Code contains no provision expressly excluding titles from the 
statutes, which explains federal courts' reliance on titles to 
ascertain statutory meaning in the presence of ambiguity.  
Recognizing 
that 
many 
state 
legislatures 
address 
titles 
differently, the authors of Reading Law advise the interpreter 
to check the statutes for the legislature's directives regarding 
the use of titles.  Scalia & Garner, Reading Law at 224. Given 
the Wisconsin legislature's declaration that titles "are not 
part of the statutes," titles should not be used even to resolve 
an ambiguity.  Wis. Stat. § 990.001(6). 
No.  2017AP913-CR & 2017AP914-CR.rgb 
 
8 
 
the analysis after construing the plain meaning of the statute 
without resort to sources extraneous to the text.  Because the 
lead opinion did not apply the unadulterated canons of statutory 
interpretation or the legislature's directive that titles are 
not part of the statutes, I respectfully concur. 
¶45 I am authorized to state that Justice DANIEL KELLY 
joins this concurrence except for footnote 2 and the statement 
in ¶34 that I do not join the lead opinion. 
 
No.  2017AP913-CR & 2017AP914-CR.dk 
 
1 
 
¶46 DANIEL KELLY, J.   (concurring).  I join the majority 
opinion except for ¶¶25-31; I also join Justice Rebecca Grassl 
Bradley's concurrence except for footnote 2 and her statement 
that she does not join the lead opinion in ¶34. 
No.  2017AP913-CR & 2017AP914-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶47 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  
When the 
legislature writes the word "theft" in a statute, it means theft 
and only theft.  It does not mean "theft of trade secrets,"1 
"theft of farm-raised fish"2 or "retail theft."3 
¶48 We presume that the legislature chooses its statutory 
language "carefully and precisely" to express its desired 
meaning.  Industry to Indus., Inc. v. Hillsman Modular Molding, 
Inc., 2002 WI 51, ¶19 n.5, 252 Wis. 2d 544, 644 N.W.2d 236.  
"Theft" is a word with a precise meaning set forth in the 
statutes.4 
¶49 Yet the majority/lead opinion5 ignores the precise 
meaning the legislature has afforded the term and instead 
                                                 
1 See Wis. Stat. § 943.205. 
2 See Wis. Stat. § 943.74. 
3 See Wis. Stat. § 943.50. 
4 See Wis. Stat. § 943.20. 
5 Justice Ziegler's opinion observes that Justice Kelly 
joins 
the 
opinion 
"except 
paragraphs 
25 
through 
31."  
Majority/lead op., ¶3 n.3.  Thus, I refer to Justice Ziegler's 
opinion as the "majority/lead" opinion throughout this dissent 
because the opinion in its entirety is not joined by a majority 
of the court.  The opinion is a "majority" except with respect 
to paragraphs 25 through 31, which discuss the use of statutory 
titles in interpreting a statute.  These paragraphs represent 
the rationale of only three justices and thus constitute a lead 
opinion. 
The only reference to "lead opinions" in our Internal 
Operating Procedures (IOPs) states that if during the process of 
circulating and revising opinions, "the opinion originally 
circulated as the majority opinion does not garner the vote of a 
majority of the court, it shall be referred to in separate 
writings as the 'lead opinion' unless a separate writing garners 
the vote of a majority of the court."  IOP III.G.4.   
(continued) 
No.  2017AP913-CR & 2017AP914-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
broadly stretches its application.  The majority/lead opinion's 
interpretation of the theft aggregation statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.36, employs a heretofore unrecognized "plain meaning" 
analysis which belies the plain text of the statute, the larger 
statutory context, and the statute's history.   
¶50 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶51 This case arises from charges filed against Autumn 
Marie Love Lopez and Amy Rodriguez related to a string of seven 
retail thefts that took place over a period of a little over two 
weeks in January of 2017.  Majority/lead op., ¶4.  The State 
alleges that Lopez, a Wal-Mart employee, would pretend to assist 
Rodriguez at a self-check-out register, but would not actually 
properly scan merchandise.  Id.  Rodriguez was then able to walk 
out with the stolen merchandise.  Id. 
¶52 The value of the merchandise taken using this method 
ranged from $126.33 to $313.95 per occurrence, and the value of 
everything taken was $1,452.12 in total.  Id.  Rather than 
charging Lopez and Rodriguez with seven separate class A 
misdemeanor retail theft counts, the State sought to charge each 
                                                                                                                                                             
For further discussion of our procedure regarding lead 
opinions, see Koss Corp. v. Park Bank, 2019 WI 7, ¶76 n.1, 385 
Wis. 2d 261, 922 N.W.2d 20 (Ann Walsh Bradley, J., concurring).  
See also two prior certifications from the court of appeals that 
have asked us to reexamine our lead opinion procedure.  State v. 
Dowe, 120 Wis. 2d 192, 192-93, 352 N.W.2d 660 (1984) (per 
curiam); 
State 
v. 
Hawley, 
No. 
2015AP1113-CR, 
unpublished 
certification, 2-3 (Nov. 21, 2018); see also State v. Lynch, 
2016 WI 66, ¶145, 371 Wis. 2d 1, 885 N.W.2d 89 (Abrahamson and 
Ann Walsh Bradley, JJ., concurring in part, dissenting in part).   
No.  2017AP913-CR & 2017AP914-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
of them with a single class I felony count.  Id., ¶5; see Wis. 
Stat. § 943.50(4)(a) & (bf) (providing that one who commits 
retail theft is guilty of a class A misdemeanor if the value of 
the merchandise does not exceed $500 and a class I felony if the 
value of the merchandise exceeds $500 but does not exceed 
$5,000).  
¶53 Making no distinction between the crimes of theft and 
retail theft, the State cited Wis. Stat. § 971.36(3)(a) as 
authority for an aggregation of retail theft charges.  The 
statute provides that "[i]n any case of theft involving more 
than one theft, all thefts may be prosecuted as a single crime 
if . . . [t]he property belonged to the same owner and the 
thefts were committed pursuant to a single intent and design or 
in execution of a single deceptive scheme . . . ."  Lopez and 
Rodriguez moved to dismiss the complaints against them, arguing 
that "theft" as used in § 971.36 does not encompass retail 
theft. 
¶54 Agreeing with Lopez and Rodriguez, the circuit court 
dismissed the charges without prejudice.  On appeal, the court 
of appeals reversed.  Purporting to engage in a "plain meaning" 
analysis, a majority of this court6 now affirms the court of 
appeals, transforming misdemeanor charges into a felony.   
                                                 
6 Justice 
Ziegler's 
majority/lead 
opinion 
and 
Justice 
Rebecca Grassl Bradley's concurrence both ultimately approve of 
the aggregation of charges in this case.  Although in this 
dissent I largely address the majority/lead opinion, the 
concurrence likewise does not base its conclusion on the 
particular meaning of "theft" set forth in Wis. Stat. § 943.20. 
No.  2017AP913-CR & 2017AP914-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
II 
¶55 The majority/lead opinion correctly identifies this 
case as presenting an issue of statutory interpretation.  
However, its analysis quickly goes astray.  The issue before the 
court is discrete——whether "theft" as utilized in Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.36(3)(a) includes the crime of "retail theft."  The 
majority/lead opinion responds in the affirmative, applying a 
heretofore unrecognized plain meaning analysis that belies the 
theft aggregation statute's plain language.   
¶56 As 
noted, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.36(3)(a), 
the 
theft 
aggregation statute, provides:  "[i]n any case of theft 
involving more than one theft, all thefts may be prosecuted as a 
single crime if . . . [t]he property belonged to the same owner 
and the thefts were committed pursuant to a single intent and 
design or in execution of a single deceptive scheme . . . ."   
¶57 The majority/lead opinion purports to apply our 
established statutory interpretation methodology.  Its analysis 
and conclusion rely heavily on the use of statutory titles.  
Indeed, a substantial part of the analysis is spent justifying 
its use of statutory titles as part of a plain meaning analysis—
—but to no avail.  See majority/lead op., ¶¶25-30. 
¶58 Although the majority/lead opinion declares over and 
over again that it is engaging in a "plain meaning" analysis, it 
apparently fails to recognize that under the established 
statutory interpretation methodology, it cannot do what it 
purports to do. 
No.  2017AP913-CR & 2017AP914-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
¶59 The legislature has clearly declared that a title is 
not part of a statute.  Wis. Stat. § 990.001(6).  The title of a 
statute can never be used to establish a statute's plain 
meaning.  Rather, once ambiguity is found, reference to a 
statute's title is permissible to relieve ambiguity.  State v. 
Dorsey, 2018 WI 10, ¶30, 379 Wis. 2d 386, 906 N.W.2d 158.   
¶60 Nevertheless, the majority/lead opinion asserts that 
titles are part of a statutory plain meaning analysis because 
"titles are part of a statute's context . . . ."  Majority/lead 
op., ¶26.  We have previously described a statute's context as 
"including the language and structure of surrounding or closely 
related statutes . . . ."  Bostco LLC v. Milwaukee Metro. 
Sewerage Dist., 2013 WI 78, ¶46, 350 Wis. 2d 554, 835 N.W.2d 160 
(citations omitted).   
¶61 The majority/lead opinion's contention that something 
that is not part of the statutes can now be included when 
examining a statute's context is both novel and unsupportable.  
Resting upon such a faulty foundation, the majority/lead 
opinion's analysis cannot be sustained. 
¶62 In short, the majority/lead opinion's use of title as 
part of a plain meaning statutory analysis finds no mooring in 
the law.  The very cases cited by the majority/lead opinion as 
authority supporting such a premise, upon closer examination, 
either are distinguishable or actually undermine the premise.  
See, e.g., Dorsey, 379 Wis. 2d 386, ¶30 (explaining that a 
statutory title is a permissible indicator of meaning when 
resolving ambiguity); Wisconsin Valley Imp. Co. v. Pub. Serv. 
No.  2017AP913-CR & 2017AP914-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
Comm'n, 9 Wis. 2d 606, 618, 101 N.W.2d 798 (1960) (same).  For a 
more extensive discussion of this fundamental flaw in the 
majority/lead opinion's analysis, see Justice Rebecca Grassl 
Bradley's concurrence, ¶¶40-42.  
¶63 With 
the 
above 
discussion 
of 
the 
majority/lead 
opinion's analytical infirmities out of the way, I turn to what 
actually 
is 
the 
established 
statutory 
interpretation 
methodology.  Our interpretation of a statute should begin with 
the language itself.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane 
Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  If the 
meaning of the statute is plain, we need not inquire further.  
Id.  We are to give statutory language its "common, ordinary, 
and accepted meaning, except that technical or specially-defined 
words 
or 
phrases 
are 
given 
their 
technical 
or 
special 
definitional meaning."  Id. 
¶64 Consistent with Kalal, Wis. Stat. § 990.01(1) provides 
that "[a]ll words and phrases shall be construed according to 
common and approved usage; but technical words and phrases and 
others that have a peculiar meaning in the law shall be 
construed according to such meaning."  Although Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.36 does not define "theft," a "peculiar meaning in the 
law" is not far away.  Namely, Wis. Stat. § 943.20 prohibits the 
crime of "theft," setting forth five different modes of 
commission for theft.7  Accordingly, pursuant to § 990.01(1), 
                                                 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 943.20(1) provides: 
(1) Acts.  Whoever does any of the following may be 
penalized as provided in sub. (3): 
(continued) 
No.  2017AP913-CR & 2017AP914-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
(a) Intentionally takes and carries away, uses, 
transfers, conceals, or retains possession of movable 
property of another without the other's consent and 
with intent to deprive the owner permanently of 
possession of such property. 
(b) By virtue of his or her office, business or 
employment, or as trustee or bailee, having possession 
or custody of money or of a negotiable security, 
instrument, paper or other negotiable writing of 
another, intentionally uses, transfers, conceals, or 
retains 
possession 
of 
such 
money, 
security, 
instrument, paper or writing without the owner's 
consent, contrary to his or her authority, and with 
intent to convert to his or her own use or to the use 
of any other person except the owner.  A refusal to 
deliver 
any 
money 
or 
a 
negotiable 
security, 
instrument, paper or other negotiable writing, which 
is in his or her possession or custody by virtue of 
his or her office, business or employment, or as 
trustee or bailee, upon demand of the person entitled 
to receive it, or as required by law, is prima facie 
evidence of an intent to convert to his or her own use 
within the meaning of this paragraph. 
(c) Having a legal interest in movable property, 
intentionally and without consent, takes such property 
out of the possession of a pledgee or other person 
having a superior right of possession, with intent 
thereby to deprive the pledgee or other person 
permanently of the possession of such property. 
(d) Obtains title to property of another person by 
intentionally deceiving the person with a false 
representation which is known to be false, made with 
intent to defraud, and which does defraud the person 
to whom it is made. "False representation" includes a 
promise made with intent not to perform it if it is a 
part of a false and fraudulent scheme. 
(e) 
Intentionally 
fails 
to 
return 
any 
personal 
property which is in his or her possession or under 
his or her control by virtue of a written lease or 
written rental agreement after the lease or rental 
agreement has expired.  This paragraph does not apply 
to a person who returns personal property, except a 
motor vehicle, which is in his or her possession or 
(continued) 
No.  2017AP913-CR & 2017AP914-CR.awb 
 
8 
 
when the legislature refers to "theft" it refers to the 
particular meaning set forth by the elements of § 943.20.  There 
is no other meaning of "theft" in our statutes for us to apply.8 
¶65 Further, the statute's syntax supports the view that 
"theft" in Wis. Stat. § 971.36(3) is limited to "theft" and does 
not encompass "retail theft."  To explain, § 971.36(3) applies 
"[i]n any case of theft" (emphasis added).  "Any" modifies 
"case," not "theft."  If the statute were written to apply "in a 
case of any theft" the result may be different.  However, this 
is not the language the legislature chose.   
¶66 This narrow interpretation of "theft" is consistent 
with the larger statutory context in which the theft aggregation 
statute lies.  Several other aggregation provisions are very 
near to Wis. Stat. § 971.36, and each of these statutes 
specifically, by statute number, states the crimes to which it 
applies.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 971.366 ("In any case under s. 
943.201 or 943.203 involving more than one violation . . . ") 
                                                                                                                                                             
under his or her control by virtue of a written lease 
or written rental agreement, within 10 days after the 
lease or rental agreement expires. 
8 See 
Wis 
JI——Criminal 
1441 
(theft——Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 943.20(1)(a)), 1444 (theft by employee, trustee, or bailee 
(embezzlement)——§ 943.20(1)(b)), 1450 (theft by one having an 
undisputed interest in property from one having superior right 
of 
possession——§ 943.20(1)(c)), 
1453A 
(theft 
by 
fraud: 
representations made to the owner, directly or by a third 
person——§ 943.20(1)(d)), 1453B (theft by fraud:  representations 
made to an agent——§ 943.20(1)(d)), 1453C (theft by fraud:  
failure to disclose as a representation——§ 943.20(1)(d)), 1455 
(theft by failure to return leased or rented property——
§ 943.20(1)(e)) (2019). 
No.  2017AP913-CR & 2017AP914-CR.awb 
 
9 
 
(emphasis added), 971.367 ("In any case under 946.79 involving 
more than one violation . . . ") (emphasis added).   
¶67 Had the legislature wanted Wis. Stat. § 971.36(3) to 
apply to retail theft under Wis. Stat. § 943.50, it certainly 
could 
have 
said 
so. 
 
These 
other 
aggregation 
statutes 
demonstrate that the legislature knew how to specifically 
delineate the application of an aggregation statute, yet chose 
not to in this instance.   Instead, it used the word "theft," a 
word with a "peculiar meaning in the law." 
¶68 Viewing the majority/lead opinion in conjunction with 
the other aggregation statutes raises more questions than it 
answers with regard to the breadth of the majority/lead 
opinion's determination.   
¶69 Is the majority/lead opinion concluding that Wis. 
Stat. § 971.36(3) applies to all "theft offenses?"  See 
majority/lead op., ¶15.  Are "theft offenses" those that have 
the word "theft" in their titles only?  See id., ¶¶25-30.  What 
about, for example, the crimes of unauthorized use of an 
individual's personal identifying information or documents under 
Wis. Stat. § 943.201 and unauthorized use of an entity's 
identifying information or documents under Wis. Stat. § 943.203?  
Courts have referred to such charges as "identity theft."  See 
State v. Stewart, 2018 WI App 41, ¶26, 383 Wis. 2d 546, 916 
N.W.2d 188.   
¶70 The majority/lead opinion creates confusion regarding 
the application of aggregation statutes to these crimes.  Each 
has its own specific aggregation provision.  See Wis. Stat. 
No.  2017AP913-CR & 2017AP914-CR.awb 
 
10 
 
§ 971.366.  Yet, the majority/lead opinion is unclear as to 
whether its holding extends to "identity theft" charges.         
¶71 Further, the history of the theft aggregation statute 
indicates that its provisions were intended to apply to Wis. 
Stat. § 943.20 only.  The modern versions of both the theft and 
theft aggregation statutes were enacted in 1955.  Wis. Stat. § 
943.20 (1955-56); Wis. Stat. § 955.31 (1955-56); see L. 1955, c. 
696.9  At this time, § 943.20 was the only theft-titled statute.  
All 
other 
"fact-specific 
theft 
offenses" 
cited 
by 
the 
majority/lead opinion came later.10  See majority/lead op., ¶15.  
Consequently, "any case of theft" under the theft aggregation 
statute clearly referred to only § 943.20 at the time of the 
statute's passage.   
                                                 
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 955.31 was renumbered to Wis. Stat. § 
971.36 in 1969.  The substance of the statute did not change.  
L. 1969, c. 255, § 63.  
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 943.45 ("Theft of telecommunications 
service," 
originally 
entitled 
"obtaining 
telecommunications 
service by fraud") was enacted in 1961.  L. 1961, c. 248.  
Section 943.205 ("Theft of trade secrets") was enacted in 1965.  
L. 
1965, 
c. 
438. 
 
Section 
943.50 
(originally 
entitled 
"shoplifting," now "retail theft; theft of services") was 
enacted in 1969.  L. 1969, c. 254.  Wisconsin Stat. § 943.61 
("Theft of library material") was enacted in 1979 as Wis. Stat. 
§ 943.60.  L. 1979, c. 245, § 4.  Both Wis. Stat. § 943.46 
(currently entitled "Theft of video service") and Wis. Stat. 
§ 943.47, ("Theft of satellite cable programming") were enacted 
in 1987.  1987 Wis. Act 345, §§ 2-3.  Wisconsin Stat. § 943.455 
(currently entitled "Theft of commercial mobile service," 
originally entitled "Theft of cellular telephone service") was 
enacted in 1991.  1991 Wis. Act 39, § 3619m.  Section 943.74 
("Theft of farm-raised fish") was enacted in 2001.  2001 Wis. 
Act 91, § 3.  Lastly, Wis. Stat. § 943.81 ("Theft from a 
financial institution") was enacted in 2005.  2005 Wis. Act 212, 
§ 8. 
No.  2017AP913-CR & 2017AP914-CR.awb 
 
11 
 
¶72 It should be observed that under the majority/lead 
opinion's argument, retail theft charges could not have been 
aggregated under Wis. Stat. § 971.36 at the time the retail 
theft statute was enacted.  Wisconsin Stat. § 943.50 was 
originally titled "shoplifting," and not "retail theft."  See 
Wis. Stat. § 943.50 (1969-70).11  The majority/lead opinion's 
reliance on the statutory title would thus have provided no 
support for the proposition that § 943.50 denominates a "theft" 
offense.  See majority/lead op., ¶31.  "Shoplifting" is not the 
crime of "theft," just as "retail theft" is not "theft." 
¶73 In sum, the majority/lead opinion's interpretation of 
the theft aggregation statute rests upon an unsupportable plain 
meaning analysis, which runs counter to established principles 
of statutory interpretation.  It betrays the statute's text, the 
statute's context, and the statutory history.   
¶74 For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully 
dissent. 
¶75 I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA FRANK 
DALLET joins this dissent. 
 
                                                 
11 See L. 1981, c. 270, § 2 (amending title of § 943.50 from 
"Shoplifting" to "Retail theft"). 
No.  2017AP913-CR & 2017AP914-CR.awb 
 
1