Title: People v. Philip Morris, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 90185, 90186
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: October 18, 2001

Docket Nos. 90185, 90186-Agenda 38-May 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 
 								PHILIP MORRIS, INC. (Hagen &amp; Berman et al., Appellees).
Opinion filed October 18, 2001.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	The questions presented for review are: (1) does a circuit
court have jurisdiction to adjudicate an attorney's lien against the
proceeds of a settlement where the State of Illinois was the
plaintiff in the underlying action and where the settlement funds
have never come into the possession or control of the state; and (2)
did the circuit court of Cook County abuse its discretion in this
case by establishing an escrow account to hold disputed attorney
fees pending adjudication of an attorney's lien? We answer the
first question in the affirmative. We do not answer the second
question because it is premature.



BACKGROUND
	This cause is before us following a motion to dismiss pursuant
to sections 2-619(a)(1) and (a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure
(735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(1), (a)(9) (West 1998)). In ruling on a
section 2-619 motion to dismiss, the trial court may consider
pleadings, affidavits, and other proof presented by the parties.
Torcasso v. Standard Outdoor Sales, Inc., 157 Ill. 2d 484, 486
(1993); Bloomingdale State Bank v. Woodland Sales Co., 186 Ill.
App. 3d 227, 232 (1989); see generally 4 R. Michael, Illinois
Practice §41.8 (1989). The record contains the following facts.
	In April 1996, the Attorney General of Illinois began to
consider filing a civil lawsuit on behalf of the state against tobacco
companies. Throughout the summer and fall of 1996, the Attorney
General interviewed a number of law firms to represent Illinois in
its suit against the tobacco industry.
	The Attorney General chose the following law firms for the
position of "national counsel," who would supervise tobacco
lawsuits in multiple states: Hagens &amp; Berman, the law offices of
Steven C. Mitchell, Barrett Law Offices, and Lieff Cabraser
Heimann &amp; Bernstein. The Attorney General also chose the firm
of Freeborn &amp; Peters for the position of "local counsel" in Illinois'
suit against the tobacco industry (firms hereafter referred to
collectively as "Illinois Special Counsel" or "ISC"). The ISC were
hired based on their expertise, professional reputations, and their
willingness to represent the state for a contingent fee.
	On September 17, 1996, the Attorney General announced that
Illinois would join other states in suing tobacco companies. The
lawsuit sought to recover Illinois' share of billions of dollars spent
to treat smoking-related illnesses. The Attorney General predicted
a long fight in Illinois courts and conceded that the suit was "not
a dead-bang winner." He wanted to ensure that Illinois would be
included in any possible settlements with tobacco companies. He
explained that his office would attempt to cover the expenses of
the costly suit by, inter alia, "asking private law firms to work on
the case free."
	On September 27, 1996, the Attorney General declared that
Illinois taxpayers would not pay the legal bill for his decision to
sue tobacco companies. He said that the state was looking for
private law firms wiling to "absorb the cost of the suit and eat the
cost if they don't prevail. The taxpayers aren't going to pay for it."
He explained that the other states suing the tobacco industry "used
outside counsel because it's an enormous undertaking. We don't
have the resources within the office to do this alone."
	On October 9, 1996, the Attorney General entered into a
"Contract Agreement for Legal Services" with national counsel
and, on November 12, entered into a similar contract with local
counsel (both contracts hereafter collectively referred to as
"contract"). Under the contract, which the Attorney General
drafted, Illinois Special Counsel were charged with the
responsibility of representing the state in litigation against the
tobacco industry. The Attorney General retained "final authority
over all aspects of the litigation" that affected the state's claims.
Illinois Special Counsel were obligated to "consult and obtain the
prior approval" of a member of the Attorney General's staff
"concerning all policy and other major, substantive issues
affecting the litigation."
	Regarding compensation, the contract provided in pertinent
part that neither the state nor the office of the Attorney General
was "liable for payment of compensation otherwise than from
amounts collected for the State of Illinois" and that compensation
would be contingent upon recovery of monies, whether by
settlement or agreement, from those liable for damages. The
contingent fee would be: "Ten percent (10%) of the total recovery
to the State of Illinois." Also, Illinois Special Counsel would
absorb the costs of the litigation; ISC would be reimbursed only in
the event of a recovery.
	According to Richard Stock, the Attorney General's chief of
staff: "This fee arrangement allowed the State of Illinois to pursue
the tobacco industry without having to risk any taxpayer dollars on
attorneys' fees or costs." At the time of the contract, the 10%
contingent fee "was the lowest agreement of its kind amongst the
states which had brought actions against the industry." Stock
averred: "At the time it was negotiated, I and all who worked on
this issue in my office believed that the ten percent was fair and
reasonable based upon the risk involved."
	On November 12, 1996, Illinois Special Counsel filed a
complaint in the circuit court of Cook County against members of
the tobacco industry. In announcing the suit, the Attorney General
repeated his explanation for employing private law firms based on
a contingent fee. He added: "If they lose they're paid nothing."
	On November 13, 1998, the proposed settlement of the
tobacco litigation was announced. On November 20, the Attorney
General announced that Illinois would join in the settlement. On
November 23, 1998, Illinois entered into the "Master Settlement
Agreement" (MSA). Under the MSA, Illinois is to receive from
the tobacco defendants approximately $9 billion to $360 million
annually for 25 years. Thereafter, the tobacco industry will
continue to make payments in perpetuity based on factors such as
the volume of tobacco products sold and the fiscal health of the
settling private tobacco companies.
	Section 17 of the MSA, with its implementing document
("Illinois Fee Payment Agreement"), provided that the tobacco
defendants pay a liquidated or arbitrated fee to Illinois Special
Counsel to reduce the amount of fees owed. An arbitration panel
awarded ISC $121 million, which would be paid over
approximately 25 years and deducted from their contingent fee.
	On December 8, 1998, the circuit court approved the MSA
and entered a "Consent Decree and Final Judgment" incorporating
the MSA. Under the consent decree, the circuit court retained
jurisdiction over the case, including the settlement funds to be
distributed by the tobacco company defendants. With limited
exceptions not applicable here, section VII of the consent decree
recognized that the circuit court had exclusive jurisdiction to
implement and enforce the decree.
	On September 28, 1999, Illinois Special Counsel served
notice of their attorney's lien pursuant to the Attorneys Lien Act
(770 ILCS 5/1 (West 1998)). Based on their contingent fee
agreement with the Attorney General, they claimed a lien of 10%
of any amount recovered from the tobacco defendants.
	On December 22, 1999, Illinois Special Counsel petitioned
the circuit court to adjudicate its attorney's lien. The State moved
to dismiss the petition; the court denied the motion. Illinois
Special Counsel moved to establish an escrow account. The court
ordered the State and the tobacco defendants to direct that 10% of
all settlement payments be deposited into the account pending a
decision on the merits of the lien petition. In opposing the
attorney's lien petition and the escrow account, the State argued
that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the
entire lien proceeding.
	The State appealed from the circuit court's escrow order
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 307 (188 Ill. 2d R. 307); the
appellate court dismissed the appeal. While that appeal was
pending, the circuit court certified the following question for
permissive interlocutory appeal (see 155 Ill. 2d R. 308):
		"Does the Circuit Court have jurisdiction to adjudicate a
petition under the Attorney's Lien Act brought by counsel
for the State of Illinois, against the proceeds of a
settlement, where the State of Illinois was the plaintiff in
the underlying action and where the settlement funds have
never come into the possession or control of the State?"
The appellate court denied the State's application for leave to
appeal.
	We allowed and consolidated the State's separate petitions for
leave to appeal from the appellate court's: (1) dismissal of the
State's Rule 307 appeal; and (2) denial of the State's Rule 308
appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)). The Coalition for Consumer Rights
and the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association each sought leave to
submit an amicus curiae brief in support of Illinois Special
Counsel, which we now grant (see 155 Ill. 2d R. 345).

DISCUSSION
	The purpose of a motion to dismiss under section 2-619 of
the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 1998)) is
to afford litigants a means to dispose of issues of law and easily
proved issues of fact at the outset of a case, reserving disputed
questions of fact for a trial. Section 2-619(a)(1) allows dismissal
when "the court does not have jurisdiction of the subject matter of
the action," and subsection (a)(9) allows dismissal when "the
claim asserted *** is barred by other affirmative matter avoiding
the legal effect of or defeating the claim." 735 ILCS
5/2-619(a)(1), (a)(9) (West 1998). Specifically, a section
2-619(a)(9) motion to dismiss admits the legal sufficiency of the
plaintiff's action much in the same way as a section 2-615 motion
to dismiss admits a complaint's well-pleaded facts. Review is de
novo. Kedzie &amp; 103rd Currency Exchange, Inc. v. Hodge, 156 Ill. 2d 112, 115-17 (1993).

I. Attorney's Lien
	Illinois circuit courts have original jurisdiction over all
justiciable matters. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §9.
	The Attorneys Lien Act provides in pertinent part:
			"Attorneys at law shall have a lien upon all claims ***
which may be placed in their hands by their clients for
suit or collection *** for the amount of any fee which
may have been agreed upon by and between such
attorneys and their clients ***. To enforce such lien, such
attorneys shall serve notice in writing *** upon the party
against whom their clients may have such suits ***
claiming such lien and stating therein the interest they
have ***. Such lien shall attach to any verdict, judgment
or order entered and to any money or property which may
be recovered *** from and after the time of service of the
notice. On petition filed by such attorneys or their clients
any court of competent jurisdiction shall, on not less than
5 days' notice to the adverse party, adjudicate the rights of
the parties and enforce the lien." 770 ILCS 5/1 (West
1998).
The Act sets forth the requirements for effective liens. The
attorney must have been hired by a client to assert a claim. The
attorney must then perfect the lien by serving notice, in writing,
upon the party against whom the client has the claim. The lien
attaches from and after the time of the service of the statutory
notice. Rhoades v. Norfolk &amp; Western Ry. Co., 78 Ill. 2d 217, 227
(1979).
	The Act "creates new rights which have heretofore not been
recognized in this State." Standidge v. Chicago Rys. Co., 254 Ill. 524, 533 (1912). Since the attorney's lien is a creature of statute,
the Act must be strictly construed, both as to establishing the lien
and as to the right of action for its enforcement. Attorneys who do
not strictly comply with the Act have no lien rights. Haj v.
American Bottle Co., 261 Ill. 362, 366 (1913); DeKing, 155 Ill.
App. 3d at 597; Unger v. Checker Taxi Co., 30 Ill. App. 2d 238,
241-42 (1961).
	Once the attorney's lien is perfected, upon petition "any court
of competent jurisdiction" may adjudicate the lien. 770 ILCS 5/1
(West 1998). This includes the circuit court that heard the
underlying matter (Standidge, 254 Ill. at 533), or the circuit court
that has jurisdiction over the money recovered (McCallum v.
Baltimore &amp; Ohio R.R. Co., 379 Ill. 60, 68 (1942)).
	In this case, the State chose to sue the tobacco defendants in
the circuit court. The State hired private attorneys and sent those
attorneys into the circuit court to litigate its cause. After two years
of litigation in the circuit court, the State agreed to settle its
dispute with the tobacco defendants. The State then requested the
circuit court to approve the settlement. The court approved the
settlement that created the proceeds upon which the lien was
perfected. Illinois Special Counsel complied with the Attorneys
Lien Act. They perfected the lien and petitioned the circuit court
to adjudicate it. The circuit court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the
lien, either because it heard the underlying matter, or because it
has jurisdiction over the settlement proceeds.
	However, the State invokes the principle of sovereign
immunity. "In the United States, sovereign immunity has been
justified as a rule which embodies a policy that protects the State
from interference in its performance of the functions of
government and preserves its control over State coffers." S.J.
Groves &amp; Sons Co. v. State of Illinois, 93 Ill. 2d 397, 401 (1982).
	The 1970 Illinois Constitution abolished the common law
doctrine of sovereign immunity "[e]xcept as the General Assembly
may provide by law." Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIII, §4. The legislature
has provided that "the State of Illinois shall not be made a
defendant or party in any court," except as provided in the Court
of Claims Act. 745 ILCS 5/1 (West 1998). Section 8 of the Court
of Claims Act provides in pertinent part that the Court of Claims
shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine "[a]ll
claims against the State." 705 ILCS 505/8(a), (b) (West 1998).
	The State contends that jurisdiction to adjudicate the
attorney's lien of Illinois Special Counsel lies not with the circuit
court, but rather with the Illinois Court of Claims. That body "was,
and continues to be, a part of the legislative branch of State
Government." Pub. Act 83-865, §1, eff. September 26, 1983. The
Court of Claims is not a court within the meaning of the judicial
article of our state constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI); its
function is not to adjudicate cases. Rather, the General Assembly
established the Court of Claims to receive and resolve claims
against the state. Rossetti Contracting Co. v. Court of Claims, 109 Ill. 2d 72, 78 (1985); see generally S.J. Groves &amp; Sons, 93 Ill. 2d 
at 401-02. "It is in essence the legislature-the body called upon to
fund any awards-that is deciding through the Court of Claims the
merits of the claims before it." S.J. Groves &amp; Sons, 93 Ill. 2d  at
405.
	The State contends that, for several reasons, the lien petition
of Illinois Special Counsel constitutes "a claim against the State."
Therefore, according to the State, the Court of Claims has
exclusive jurisdiction thereof. "The determination of whether an
action is in fact a suit against the State turns upon an analysis of
the issues involved and the relief sought, rather than the formal
designation of the parties." Currie v. Lao, 148 Ill. 2d 151, 158
(1992).
	We cannot accept the State's contention that ISC's lien
petition constitutes a claim against the State of Illinois. In its
arguments, the State misapprehends the nature of an attorney's lien
under the Attorneys Lien Act.
	The State first argues that the attorney's lien petition of
Illinois Special Counsel "is, in substance, a breach of contract
action against the State." However, it is quite settled that an
attorney's lien under the Act "is a lien upon the proceeds, only, of
the litigation or settlement of the claim." Baker v. Baker, 258 Ill. 418, 421 (1913). The attorney's only interest is in the proceeds of
the litigation or its settlement. Process Color Plate Co. v. Chicago
Urban Transportation District, 125 Ill. App. 3d 885, 891 (1984).
This court explained long ago:
		"By serving the notice claiming a lien the attorney in
effect becomes a joint claimant with his client *** in the
proceeds of any settlement that may be made by the client,
and to the extent of the amount of his fee has the same
interest in such proceeds *** as his client and is entitled
to his pro rata share thereof." Baker, 258 Ill.  at 421.
Indeed, it is settled that, outside of the Act, attorneys can still sue
their clients to recover for their services. Baker, 258 Ill.  at 421;
DeKing, 155 Ill. App. 3d at 597.
	Further, once an attorney serves proper notice of the lien on
the client's adversary, that party bears responsibility for respecting
the lien. If the underlying defendant does not respect the lien, then
the defendant becomes liable for the attorney fees. Sutton v.
Chicago Rys. Co., 258 Ill. 551, 553 (1913); Process Color Plate,
125 Ill. App. 3d at 890. A petition under the Attorneys Lien Act is
not a contract action against the attorney's client. This
distinguishes the present case from cases such as People ex rel.
Manning v. Nickerson, 184 Ill. 2d 245 (1998), which involved
claims "against the State."
	The State contends that the attorney's lien petition of Illinois
Special Counsel constitutes "a claim against the State" for several
additional reasons. The State argues that adjudication of the
attorney's lien would threaten to subject the state to liability and
would control the actions of the state. A suit will be considered a
claim against the state if a judgment in favor of the plaintiff could
operate to control the actions of the state or subject it to liability.
Currie, 148 Ill. 2d  at 158.
	The State argues that the circuit court's adjudication of
Illinois Special Counsel's lien subjects the state to liability.
However, our discussion of the Attorneys Lien Act shows that it
does not infringe on the state's statutory sovereign immunity. The
defendants in the underlying litigation are charged with honoring
the lien, not the state. Under no circumstances can the general
funds of the state be reached to satisfy this obligation of the
tobacco defendants. See Graham v. Illinois State Toll Highway
Authority, 182 Ill. 2d 287, 297 (1998), quoting People v. Illinois
Toll Highway Comm'n, 3 Ill. 2d 218, 227 (1954).
	Also, the State argues that the circuit court's adjudication of
the attorney's lien would control the actions of the state.
According to the State, a circuit court adjudication of the lien
"would force the State to pay those settlement funds to [ISC]
without any legislative appropriation." Again, however, the state
is not appropriating any money whatsoever. The tobacco
defendants, and not the state, will pay the attorney fees. This was
understood and repeatedly acknowledged from the inception of the
litigation.
	Indeed, the whole point of contingent fee agreements is to
remove from the client's shoulders the risk of being out-of-pocket
for attorney fees upon a zero recovery. Instead, the lawyer assumes
that risk and is compensated for it by charging what is in effect an
insurance premium. See 1 G. Hazard &amp; W. Hodes, The Law of
Lawyering §8.6, at 8-15, 8-16 (3d ed. 2001); T. Schneyer, Legal-Process Constraints on the Regulation of Lawyers' Contingent
Fee Contracts, 47 De Paul L. Rev. 371, 374-78 (1998).
	The State next argues: "Resolution of this dispute necessarily
requires a determination of the State's interest in the disputed
settlement funds, an inquiry that implicates the State's sovereign
immunity." When property of the state is involved, the state
becomes directly and adversely affected by the suit and the action
must be held to be one against the state. Sass v. Kramer, 72 Ill. 2d 485, 491 (1978); Hollander &amp; Hollander v. Kamenjarin, 201 Ill.
App. 3d 799, 801 (1990).
	We cannot at this juncture consider the tobacco settlement to
be state funds. First, whether the payment of ISC's attorney fees
would be a money judgment against the state can be determined by
examining the source from which the attorney fees would be paid.
See Shell Oil Co. v. Department of Revenue, 95 Ill. 2d 541, 547-48
(1983). In this case, the source of the attorney fees is not the
state's general revenue fund, but rather is "the bank or other entity
with which the fund was invested." See Shell Oil Co., 95 Ill. 2d  at
548.
	Second, the withholding of funds from the state treasury does
not automatically render a case a suit against the state. Saltiel v.
Olsen, 85 Ill. 2d 484, 492 (1981), quoting City of Springfield v.
Allphin, 74 Ill. 2d 117, 126 (1978). In this case, the tobacco
settlement funds, which have never been in the state's hands, are
not "state funds" until after ISC's attorney fees are paid and the
funds go into the state treasury. See Saltiel, 85 Ill. 2d  at 491-93.
The courts of other states that participated in the tobacco
settlement have reached this conclusion. See Philip Morris Inc. v.
Glendening, 349 Md. 660, 681, 709 A.2d 1230, 1240-41 (1998);
accord Conant v. Robins, Kaplan, Miller &amp; Ciresi, 603 N.W.2d 143, 149 (Minn. App. 1999).
	We note the State's attempt to show that the State of Illinois,
and not the tobacco defendants, is "the true target" of Illinois
Special Counsel's attorney's lien. The State points to sections 3
and 4 of the Illinois Fee Payment Agreement, which provide
essentially that ISC waive all future claims against the tobacco
defendants in exchange for the attorney fees received pursuant to
the agreement. The State reasons: "If [ISC] are correct, however,
and their claim for attorneys' fees pursuant to their attorney's lien
is truly a claim against the Tobacco Defendants, then that lien
must be dismissed with prejudice because [ISC] irrevocably
waived that claim under IFPA §§3 and 4." (Emphasis omitted.)
ISC counters that, pursuant to section 5 of the agreement, their
arbitrated fee has no effect on their contingent fee contract with
the State.
	This is an issue for the circuit court at the adjudication of
ISC's attorney's lien, not for this court in the present appeal. We
conclude that the circuit court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the
attorney's lien of Illinois Special Counsel. Accordingly, we answer
the certified question in the affirmative.

II. Escrow Order
	The circuit court established an escrow account and ordered
that 10% of all settlement payments be deposited there until
further order. The State appealed from the circuit court's order
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1), which allows
interlocutory review of an order "granting, modifying, refusing,
dissolving, or refusing to dissolve or modify an injunction." 188
Ill. 2d R. 307(a)(1). The appellate court dismissed the State's
interlocutory appeal.
	Before this court, the State initially contends that since the
circuit court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate Illinois Special
Counsel's attorney's lien, then the court necessarily lacked
jurisdiction to enter the escrow order. However, our above-stated
answer to the certified question disposes of this contention.
	The State next characterizes the escrow order as injunctive in
nature. Based on that characterization, the State contends that the
circuit court abused its discretion in entering the escrow order
because Illinois Special Counsel did not satisfy the requirements
for a preliminary injunction.
	"To determine what constitutes an appealable injunctive order
under Rule 307(a)(1) we look to the substance of the action, not its
form. *** Actions of the circuit court having the force and effect
of injunctions are still appealable even if called something else."
In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d 247, 260 (1989). "Ministerial" or
"administrative" orders of the circuit court, i.e., orders that
regulate only the procedural details of litigation before the court,
cannot be the subject of an interlocutory appeal. Such orders do
not affect the relationship of the parties in their everyday activity
apart from the litigation and, therefore, are distinguishable from
traditional forms of injunctive relief. In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d  at
262.
	A majority of the cases ruling on the question have held that
an order directing the payment of money into court is not
appealable. The most common reason for denying an appeal from
such orders is that they are merely interim orders, designed to
preserve a fund until rights to it can be established; they are not
orders establishing such rights. In re Estate of Basile, 32 Ill. App.
3d 618, 620 (1975), citing Annotation, Appealability of Order
Directing Payment of Money Into Court, 15 A.L.R.3d 568, 570
(1967).
	In the present case, the record shows that this was the circuit
court's view of the escrow order. The court reasoned: "I think an
escrow should be established because it would simplify the
process here." The court further noted: "Nobody won here today,
nobody lost here today, it's just a simple matter of bookkeeping
and accounting, as far as I'm concerned." We hold that the
appellate court did not err in dismissing the State's interlocutory
appeal of the circuit court's escrow order.



CONCLUSION
	In sum, Illinois Special Counsel's lien proceeding is not a
claim against the State of Illinois. Rather, it is a statutory claim
against a fund of monies to be paid by private defendants. The
circuit court may adjudicate the claim against the fund. Further,
because the source of the fund at issue is not the state treasury,
sovereign immunity is not implicated. Accordingly, the circuit
court, and not the Court of Claims, is the proper forum to
adjudicate the attorney's lien.
	For the foregoing reasons, the question certified by the circuit
court of Cook County is answered in the affirmative. We do not
address the propriety of the trial court's escrow order, as it is
premature. The cause is remanded to the circuit court of Cook
County for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Certified question answered;
cause remanded.
	JUSTICE McMORROW took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.