Title: State v. Berger
Citation: 148 N.W.2d 331
Docket Number: 341
State: north-dakota
Issuer: north-dakota Supreme Court
Date: December 27, 1966

148 N.W.2d 331 (1966) STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Lucas BERGER, Defendant and Appellant. Cr. No. 341. Supreme Court of North Dakota. December 27, 1966. Rehearing Denied February 14, 1967. *332 Helgi Johanneson, Atty. Gen., Bismarck, and William C. Kelsch, State's Atty., Mandan, for plaintiff and respondent. Sperry &amp; Schnell, Bismarck, for defendant and appellant. *333 MURRAY, Judge. This is a criminal case. The defendant was charged with the crime of uttering a forged instrument. The information reads in part as follows: Defendant later moved for a new trial upon the grounds that the verdict was clearly against the evidence and upon newly discovered evidence. Said motion for new trial has been previously dismissed. All that is before us now is the appeal from the judgment of conviction. In order to fully understand this action, we hereby quote verbatim the entire text of Section 12-39-23, N.D.C.C.: To summarize the facts, they are approximately as follows: Defendant is involved, with other members of his family, in the business of trucking cattle. In connection with this cattle hauling business, certain cattle were hauled for one Starck. On one trip, a calf died. An insurance check was written November 10, 1965, from the Hartford Insurance Group, in the amount of $66.50, which was received by the defendant in the mail one or two days after that date. On November 13, 1965, the defendant, in the company of another man, came into the Mirror Bar in Mandan, North Dakota. At that time defendant cashed this check, which then bore the name of "Lynn Stark" [the forger did not spell the name correctly; it is "Starck"] on the back thereof as an endorsement. It is undisputed that this eridorsement was a forgery, because, not only does the transcript reflect this, but appellant so calls it in his statement of facts in his brief. The defendant acknowledges that he received the check payable to Lynn Starck and also containing the defendant's name thereon, as trucker. Defendant claims that he gave the check to a person called "Gary Mason", who was at the time a former employee of the Berger Brothers Trucking Company, along with $66.50 in cash, to take out to Lynn Starck to have Lynn Starck. endorse the check. Defendant claims that Mason returned the check to him with Starck's name thereon and told the defendant that he had given the money to Starck. The defendant signed his name beneath the name of Stark [sic], and cashed the check as aforesaid. Responding to his inquiry, Starck received a letter from the insurance company asking if he had received payment, and he wrote back that he had not. The company then sent him State's Exhibit No. 4, a letter and photostatic copy of the check, whereupon Starck signed a complaint on January 26, 1966, against Lucas Berger. On the trial, one Mary T. Barnes, who apparently also uses the name Mary Berger, testified. In the record she identified herself as defendant's bookkeeper and babysitter. She said that Mason came to the Berger residence where she was and asked her to sign Starck's name and she did so, thinking that it was an insurance claim. *334 Mason never appeared as a witness for either side, and defense testimony reflects the fact that he is allegedly in custody for some unspecified offense in some southern State. There was no showing of any effort by anyone to have him appear as a witness. The State's Attorney, in cross-examining Mary T. Barnes, did question her, in what we characterize as a mild and polite manner, about her relationship with the defendant. He specifically asked her about an occasion in which she pled guilty in Bismarck, North Dakota, to the offense of illegal registration, in that she registered with the defendant at a motel as his wife. In order to show that the State's Attorney's cross-examination of this defense witness was not especially vicious or aggressive, we quote the following, which reproduces the strongest cross-examination used by the State's Attorney in this case: Q. And you made this out at his house ? At this point we note that trial counsel, through the course of this cross-examination, as well as elsewhere, objected frequently and sought to rehabilitate the witness on redirect examination. The following specifications are set forth by the appellant here: With respect to the first specification above stated, this has no merit. We quote from a North Dakota case directly in point: The circumstances in the McGahey case were remarkably close to those in instant case. In this case, State v. McGahey, 3 N.D. 293, 55 N.W. 753, 757, we quote from the body of the opinion, the above quotation being from the syllabus by the court. See also Underhill's Criminal Evidence (4th Ed.) 906, et seq. Therefore, it was clearly allowable and clearly proper cross-examination, for the purpose of showing interest and bias, for the State's Attorney to examine Mary T. Barnes as he did. With respect to Specification No. (2), pertaining to alleged error in the court's instruction, timely objections were not made to such instruction although opportunity was offered to examine and except to such instruction. The rule in this State is as follows: Approximately one hour was allowed to the attorneys to examine the instructions. No additional time was asked for. In response to inquiry by the court, defense counsel said: Under State v. Carroll, supra, defendant thereby waived objection to said instructions. However, defendant contends that an hour's time to consider the instructions is not a reasonable time and that, therefore, the rule in Carroll does not apply. We have examined the instructions to determine their length and the degree of their complexity. With respect to these particular instructions, we find no merit in this contention. The third specification of error relates to the sufficiency of the evidence, and this cannot be raised by defendant inasmuch as there is no motion for new trial before the court. The correct rule is stated in State v. McClelland, 72 N.D. 665, 10 N.W.2d 798, which is as follows: Specification of Error No. (4) relates to the court's alleged error in denying the motion for new trial. Said motion for *337 new trial is not before us, having been previously dismissed. Counsel for appellant are not the counsel who tried the case in the court below. Counsel on appeal have made frequent reference to the alleged mistakes of trial defense counsel in this case. In oral argument, appellate counsel denied, in response to a specific question by a member of this court, that they alleged incompetency on the part of trial counsel. Also, in appellate counsel's own brief we find the following: Nonetheless, there is a persistent theme in appellate counsel's brief dealing with the inexperience of trial defense counsel and, despite the disavowal of an allegation of incompetency, certain authorities cited by appellate counsel do deal with incompetency of counsel. In this connection we are confronted by a statement, found in the judgment roll, to wit: in the order denying motion for new trial, by the district judge who presided over the trial of this case: The district judge who presided over the trial of this case was himself a trial attorney of wide and varied experience, both in civil and criminal law, before he went on the bench a few years ago. We have no reason to doubt his judgment in this matter, he having observed the trial. The burden of proof to show inadequacy or incompetency of counsel lies upon appellant and defendant here, and this burden he has failed to carry, since a close examination of the record does not show such inadequacy or presumed incompetency of counsel. An attorney is an officer of the court. In this case the defense attorney in the court below was court-appointed, but his status as an officer of the court is thereby emphasized as he was presumably paid from State funds. Therefore we note the provisions of Section 31-11-03, N.D.C.C., the pertinent part being: Evidence is required to overcome this presumption, and this had not been presented to this court, nor does it appear in a careful review of the record. We also quote Sections 4 and 5, Canons of Professional Ethics, American Bar Association, having emphasized the pertinent parts: The inference reflecting upon this competent young attorney, who defended appellant in this difficult case, we intend to dispel by this opinion. Affirmed. KNUDSON, STRUTZ and ERICKSTAD, JJ., concur. TEIGEN, C. J., did not participate in the decision in this case.