Title: Mills v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 56, 2007
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: December 3, 2007

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
EDWARD J. MILLS, JR., 
§ 
 
 
§ 
No.  56, 2007    
 
Defendant Below, 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court of  
 
 
§ 
the State of Delaware in and for 
              v. 
 
§ 
New Castle County 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
§  
Cr. I.D. No. 0605003575 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
§ 
 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted:  October 24, 2007 
 
 
 
          Decided:      December 3,  2007 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
 
This 3rd day of December 2007, upon consideration of the briefs of the 
parties and the record in this case, it appears to the Court that: 
 
1. 
The defendant-below appellant, Edward J. Mills, Jr. (“Mills”), appeals 
from a Superior Court final judgment of conviction.  A jury convicted Mills of 
possession with the intent to deliver a narcotic schedule II controlled substance, 
assault in the second degree, offensive touching, criminal impersonation, resisting 
arrest, failure to signal, and spinning tires.  On appeal, Mills claims that the 
Superior Court erred and/or abused its discretion in:  (1) denying Mills’ motion for 
a judgment of acquittal; (2) failing to remedy the prosecution’s improper and 
unduly prejudicial statements to the jury during closing argument; (3) not 
 
2
suppressing drug evidence obtained during a Terry search;1 (4) admitting medical 
records into evidence; and (5) denying Mills’ request for a continuance.  We find 
no merit to Mills’ claims and affirm. 
 
2. 
On May 3, 2006, Probation and Parole Officers William DuPont 
(“DuPont”) and Malcolm Stoddard (“Stoddard”), and Detective David Rosenblum 
(“Rosenblum”), while on patrol as part of a task force in Wilmington, observed a 
car stopped in the middle of the street with a radio playing at “an extremely high 
volume.”  After the driver spun the car’s tires and made a turn without using a turn 
signal, the officers pulled the car over.  Stoddard approached the vehicle and 
requested Mills, the driver, to present license, registration, and proof of insurance.  
Mills did not immediately respond, and had difficulty locating the car’s 
registration.  After Mills admitted not having a license, Stoddard asked him for his 
name and date of birth.  Mills responded that his name was Omar Gibbs.  
Suspicious of the name given, and because Mills was being evasive and speaking 
quietly, Stoddard asked Mills to step out of the car so that he could conduct a Terry 
search for weapons. 
 
3. 
As Stoddard began his search, Mills pushed off the vehicle into 
Stoddard, who grabbed Mills’ shirt.  Mills then started flailing and punching 
randomly.  Rosenblum approached the scene and was struck by Mills in the face.  
                                                 
1 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 
3
DuPont then tackled Mills, and during the struggle, Mills bit DuPont.  When 
DuPont pulled back, Mills reached into his pocket, and attempted to dispose of 
“several small rocks of an off-white chunky substance.”2  In all, five grams of 
crack cocaine, in chunks, were recovered by the police.3 
 
4. 
On the morning of trial, Mills requested a continuance to obtain private 
counsel.  Mills told the trial judge that his first meeting with his public defender 
had taken place only the week before the trial, that he was looking for a job so that 
he could afford to retain counsel, and that his grandmother was going to help him 
pay the new counsel.  Mills did not present a precise timeframe for retaining 
substitute counsel, stating vaguely that he would need “weeks.”  The Superior 
Court denied the continuance request. 
 
5. 
At trial, Detective Rosenblum testified as an expert witness and  
explained that the amount of crack cocaine found with Mills was greater than the 
amount a user would have on his person.  Rosenblum also testified that the crack 
cocaine being in chunks and the absence of drug paraphernalia represented 
evidence of someone possessing with intent to deliver, as distinguished from 
possessing for personal use.   
                                                 
2 App. to Appellant’s Opening Br., at A-10. 
 
3 Id. at A-18. 
 
 
4
 
6. 
During his testimony about the struggle with Mills, Rosenblum stated 
that when Mills punched him in the face, that aggravated a previous neck injury.  
Rosenblum testified that he was prescribed painkillers at the hospital, and that he 
was still being treated for his injury.  When the State moved to introduce Detective 
Rosenblum’s medical records, the defense objected on hearsay grounds, 
specifically because there was no custodian of record to authenticate.  The Superior 
Court overruled the objection and admitted the medical records. 
7. 
During his closing argument, the prosecutor stated, in referring to 
potential danger to law enforcement officers during traffic stops “I told you in my 
opening that this is an example of just how the streets are dangerous.”  The 
prosecutor also mentioned Detective Rosenblum’s testimony about his training and 
observations about drug dealers, and explained that the officers’ job was to 
investigate such incidents and to testify about them.  Lastly, the prosecutor stated 
that “it [is] the State’s position that the evidence will lead you to conclusion [sic] 
that the defendant is guilty of all the charges.”4 
8. 
The jury convicted Mills of (among other offenses) possession with the 
intent to deliver a narcotic schedule II controlled substance.  Mills moved for a 
judgment of acquittal on that conviction.  The motion was denied. 
                                                 
4 App. to Appellant’s Opening Br., at A-23-28. 
 
 
5
9. 
Mills first challenges the Superior Court’s denial of his motion for 
judgment of acquittal on the charge of possession with intent to deliver.  Mills 
claims that the State failed to prove intent to deliver and that his conviction should 
have been reduced to unlawful possession.  We review the Superior Court’s denial 
of a motion for judgment of acquittal de novo, to determine “whether any rational 
trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could 
find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of all the elements of the crime.  
For the purposes of this inquiry, this Court does not distinguish between direct and 
circumstantial evidence of [a] defendant’s guilt.”5 
10. To convict of possession with intent to deliver, the State must prove 
that the defendant intended to deliver the drugs.6  To prove intent, the State cannot 
rely solely on the quantity and/or packaging of drugs in the defendant’s possession.  
Additional evidence must be provided to show that the drugs were not possessed 
merely for personal consumption.7  Here, the police recovered five grams of crack 
cocaine from Mills.  There is also evidence that the cocaine was in chunks and had 
                                                 
5 Hardin v. State, 844 A.2d 982, 989 (Del. 2004) (quoting Cline v. State, 720 A.2d 891, 892 (Del. 
1998)). 
 
6 The elements of possession with intent to deliver are: (1) the substance is cocaine; (2) the 
defendant must know it is cocaine; (3) the defendant must possess the cocaine actually or 
constructively; and (4) the defendant must intend to deliver the cocaine.  See Guardarrama v. 
State, 2006 WL 2950494, at *2 n.4 (Del. Supr.) (citing 16 Del. C. § 4753A9A(a)(2)). 
 
7 Hardin, 844 A.2d at 989 (such additional evidence may be in the form of detective’s expert 
testimony that, based on his experience, the quantity of drugs found in defendant’s possession 
and the packaging material evidenced that the drugs were intended for sale).  See also 
Guardarrama, 2006 WL 2950494, at *3.  
 
6
no packaging.  The State provided additional evidence of intent to deliver, through 
expert testimony.  Detective Rosenblum testified that the quantity found on Mills 
was greater than what would normally be possessed by a user.  Rosenblum further 
testified that dealers carry the drugs in chunks and do not wrap them, so that the 
drugs may be quickly disposed of by throwing them on the ground and stepping on 
them.  Finally, Rosenblum testified that the absence of drug paraphernalia was a 
significant indication that the drugs were not for personal consumption.   
11. Because the evidence presented by the State amply supports the jury 
finding that Mills had intent to deliver, the Superior Court did not err in denying 
Mills’ motion for judgment of acquittal. 
12. Next, Mills claims, for the first time on appeal, that the prosecutor made 
“improper and unduly prejudicial statements to the jury” during his closing 
argument.  “[W]here defense counsel fails to raise any objection at trial to alleged 
prosecutorial misconduct and the trial judge fails to intervene sua sponte,” 8 we 
review claims of prosecutorial misconduct on appeal for plain error.   A plain error 
is one so “clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and 
integrity of the trial process.”9   
                                                 
8 Baker v. State, 906 A.2d 139, 151 (Del. 2006). 
 
9 Mays v. State, 815 A.2d 349 (Del. 2003) (citing Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 
(Del. 1986)). 
 
 
7
13. Mills first challenges the prosecutor’s statement during his closing 
argument that:  “I told you in my opening that this is an example of just how the 
streets are dangerous.”  A prosecutor is not only an advocate, but also a “minister 
of justice,” and must therefore avoid improper suggestions, insinuations, and 
assertions of personal knowledge.10  However, using the pronoun “I” during a 
prosecutor’s closing argument is not per se improper, and must be considered in 
the context in which the statement was made. 11   Viewed in context, the 
prosecutor’s statement does not reflect a personal belief about the testimony or 
other evidence touching on Mills’ guilt. 12   The challenged statement, which 
referred to the potential for violence against police officers during traffic stops, 
was general and impersonal,13 and did not improperly interject the prosecutor’s 
personal belief about Mills’ guilt.  Therefore, there was no plain error because the 
statement did not jeopardize the fairness of the trial. 
                                                 
10 See Baker, 906 A.2d at 152 (with this responsibility come “specific obligations to see that the 
defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided on the basis of sufficient 
evidence.”)  
 
11 Id. (finding that the words “we know” and “we caught” were not used as statements of the 
prosecutor’s belief or opinion about the truthfulness of any testimony or evidence). 
 
12 See Pennell v. State, 602 A.2d 48 (Del. 1991) (citing United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18 
(1985)) (arguments reflecting the prosecutor’s personal belief about the defendant’s guilt should 
be avoided to prevent any impression that there was evidence supporting the charges against the 
defendant that the prosecutor was aware of, but that was not presented to the jury). 
 
13 See Booze v. State, 919 A.2d 561 (Del. 2007) (holding that prosecutor did not cross the line 
between a proper and an improper argument when comments were impersonal and a reasonable 
response to defendant’s contemptuous language). 
 
 
8
14. The other statements challenged by Mills occurred when the prosecutor 
made references to the officers’ testimony.  Those references were: (1) Detective 
Rosenblum’s testimony addressing his experience on the streets of Wilmington and 
activity in which he sees drug dealers engage; (2) the officers’ job being to testify 
and investigate incidents such as the incident at trial; and (3) the evidence 
submitted through the officers’ testimony supporting a verdict of conviction.  Mills 
claims that these statements amounted to improper vouching.   
15. Improper vouching occurs when the prosecutor implies some personal 
superior knowledge, beyond that logically inferred from the evidence at trial, that 
the witness has testified truthfully. 14  Here, however, there was no improper 
vouching because, in a closing argument, prosecutors are “allowed and expected” 
to make and explain inferences from the evidence that support the prosecution’s 
theory that the defendant is guilty.15  The prosecutor did not suggest that he was 
aware of evidence not presented to the jury that would bolster the officers’ 
testimony, nor did the prosecutor’s statements corroborate or tend to make the 
officers’ testimony more credible.  
                                                 
14 See White v. State, 816 A.2d 776, 779 (Del. 2003) (citing Miller v. State, 2000 WL 313484, at 
*4 (Del. Supr.)). 
 
15 See Booze, 919 A.2d at 561 (citing Johnson v. State, 711 A.2d 18, 31 (Del. 1998)). 
 
 
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16. Because the prosecutor did not make improper statements to the jury 
when he spoke in the first person or referred to the officers’ testimony in his 
closing argument, there is no plain error. 
 
17. Mills also claims, for the first time on appeal, that the drugs recovered 
during the Terry search should have been suppressed from evidence.  Under 
Superior Court Criminal Rule 12(b)(3), motions to suppress must be made before 
trial.16  Failure to file a motion to suppress before trial “shall constitute a waiver 
thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant relief from the waiver.” 17  
Because Mills did not file a pretrial motion to suppress in the Superior Court, no 
suppression hearing was held or ruled upon.  This Court has held that in the 
absence of a motion to suppress and a pretrial suppression hearing, “there is not an 
adequate record upon which to conduct an appellate review of [the suppression] 
claim.” 18   Moreover, under Supreme Court Rule 8, “[o]nly questions fairly 
presented to the trial court may be presented for review.”    
 
18. D.R.E. 103(d) does, however, allow this Court to take notice of “plain 
errors affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of 
                                                 
16 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 12(b)(3). 
 
17 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 12(f). 
 
18 Jones v. State, 2005 WL 2473789, at *1 (Del. Supr.) (citing Tricoche v. State, 525 A.2d 151, 
154 (Del. 1987)).   
 
 
10
the court.”19  Plain errors are “material defects” apparent on the face of the record, 
which are “basic, serious and fundamental in their character,” and which “clearly 
deprive an accused of a substantial right, or … show manifest injustice.”20  The 
record in this case does not evidence plain error by the Superior Court.  Stoddard 
testified that Mills:  (i) admitted to not having a driver’s license, (ii) was speaking 
quietly and acting evasive, and (iii) when asked his name, he gave a name that 
made Stoddard suspicious.  Under the plain error test, those elements justified the 
Terry search.  Therefore, any drugs discovered by the officer during that search 
were not the “fruit of the poisonous tree” and were properly admitted into 
evidence. 
 
19. Mills next claims that the Superior Court erred by admitting into 
evidence Detective Rosenblum’s medical records.  A Superior Court decision to 
admit evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion.21  Regularly kept business 
records are admissible as evidence “because the regularity of the record keeping 
provides an indicium of trustworthiness usually lacking in hearsay testimony.”22  
                                                 
19 D.R.E. Rule 103(d).  See also Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1110 (Del. 1986); Jones v. 
State, 2005 WL 2473789, at *1; Jackson v. State, 1994 WL 397558, at *3 (Del. Supr.). 
 
20 Jones v. State, 2005 WL 2473789, at *1 (citing Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d at 1110). 
 
21 See Cooper v. State, 608 A.2d 726 (Del. 1992) (citing Lampkins v. State, 465 A.2d 785, 790 
(Del. 1983)). 
 
22 Dorman v. Plummer, 2001 WL 32645, at *2 (Del. Ch.). 
 
 
11
D.R.E 803(6) authorizes the admission of business records if a custodian of the 
records or “other qualified person” testifies as to the regular practice of keeping the 
records in order to lay a proper foundation.23  Because Rosenblum was not a 
custodian of the records or a person qualified to testify about the regularity and 
practice of keeping those records, the requirements of Rule 803(6) were not met.  
Therefore, the Superior Court improperly admitted the medical records as 
evidence.   
 
20. In our view, however, the error was harmless.  Harmless errors are 
those that do not constitute significant prejudice to the adversely affected party that 
would operate to deny that party a fair trial.24  Detective Rosenblum testified that 
as a result of his physical encounter with Mills, he sustained a neck injury, which 
aggravated a previous injury.  Rosenblum also testified that he was prescribed 
painkillers, and that he was still being treated by a chiropractor and another 
medical agency as a result.  The information in the medical records was merely 
corroborative of the detective’s testimony, and was not essential for the State to 
show that there was physical injury to a law enforcement officer.25   Therefore, the 
erroneous admission of the medical records was harmless. 
                                                 
23 D.R.E. 803(6); Cooper, 608 A.2d at 726. 
 
24 See Barrow v. Ambramowicz, 2007 WL 2254526, at *4 (Del. Supr.). 
 
25 See 11 Del. C. § 612(a)(3) (defining assault in the second degree). 
 
 
12
 
21. Finally, Mills challenges the Superior Court’s denial, on the morning of 
trial, of his motion for a continuance in order to retain private counsel.  A trial 
court’s decision to deny a continuance is reviewed for abuse of discretion.26  
 
22. The Sixth Amendment grants a defendant the right to chose and retain 
private counsel.  That right, however, is not absolute.  It must be weighed against 
the substantial governmental interest in a prompt and efficient prosecution.27  A 
defendant should not be able to assert his Sixth Amendment right to retain private 
counsel in a way that interferes with the court’s “inherent power to control and 
oversee the administration of justice.”28  We have held that no abuse of discretion 
occurs if the trial court denies a continuance request for a change of counsel made 
on the eve of trial where: “(1) there had been no previous complaint about counsel; 
(2) defendant had a prior opportunity to obtain substitute counsel; and (3) 
obtaining substitute counsel was uncertain and appeared to be a dilatory tactic.”29 
 
23. Here, Mills never complained about his court-appointed attorney before 
the morning of the trial when he requested the continuance.  At that time, Mills 
                                                 
26 Hicks v. State, 434 A.2d 377, 381 (Del. 1981) (holding that “[u]nless it is based on clearly 
unreasonable or capricious grounds, a discretionary ruling on a motion for continuance will not 
be disturbed by this Court.”). 
 
27 See Ketchum v. State, 1989 WL 136970, at *2 (Del. Supr.) (citing Wheat v. United States, 487 
U.S. 153, 158-59 (1988)). 
 
28 Id. (citing United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 
1069 (1979)). 
 
29 Id. (citing Riley v. State, 496 A.2d 997, 1018 (Del. 1985)). 
 
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simply stated that he had met with the public defender for the first time only the 
week before trial.  Additionally, Mills had ample opportunity to retain substitute 
counsel before the date of his request for a continuance.  Although he had been 
released from incarceration two months before the trial, he took no step to retain 
new counsel during that time.  Moreover, the retention of new counsel was 
uncertain and a continuance would have unnecessarily delayed the proceedings.  
Mills was uncertain about how he was going to obtain the funds to pay the new 
attorney, and did not present a precise timeframe for retaining substitute counsel, 
stating only that he would need “weeks.”  In these circumstances, the Superior 
Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mills’ request for a continuance.   
 
NOW, THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED that the judgments of the Superior 
Court are AFFIRMED. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                  Justice