Title: A Mississippi Atty. v. Mississippi State Bar
Citation: 453 So. 2d 1023
Docket Number: N/A
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: July 18, 1984

453 So. 2d 1023 (1984) A MISSISSIPPI ATTORNEY, Respondent/Appellant, v. MISSISSIPPI STATE BAR, Complainant/Appellee. Conf. Misc. No. 63. Supreme Court of Mississippi. July 18, 1984. *1024 Fred L. Banks, Banks &amp; Nichols, John L. Walker, Walker &amp; Walker, Jackson, for respondent/appellant. Andrew J. Kilpatrick, Jr., Jackson, for complainant/appellee. EN BANC. SULLIVAN, Justice, for the Court: This is an appeal from a decision of a Mississippi State Bar Complaint Tribunal suspending a Mississippi attorney from the practice of law for 45 days. A complaint was lodged with the Mississippi State Bar against the Mississippi attorney alleging misconduct inside and outside the courtroom of a justice court judge. After investigation, investigatory hearing and further investigation, complaint counsel submitted his finding to the complaints committee. The complaints committee determined that there was a reasonable cause to believe that the Mississippi attorney was guilty of the alleged conduct and that if proven such conduct would warrant disbarment or suspension. The committee authorized complaint counsel to file a formal complaint which the Mississippi attorney answered by denying. A duly designated Complaint Tribunal held a formal hearing after which the Complaint Tribunal declared that the allegations against the Mississippi attorney were supported by clear and convincing evidence and the Mississippi attorney was suspended from the practice for 45 days. He perfects this appeal and assigns as error the following: (1) The findings of the Complaint Tribunal were not supported by clear and convincing evidence; (2) Sufficient weight was not given to the fact that the justice court judge did not find the Mississippi attorney in contempt of court; (3) That it was error not to dismiss the complaint because of violations of his procedural rights; and (4) That the 45 days suspension was excessive. The attorney is charged with violations of rules 1-102(A)(5), 1-102(A)(6), 7-106(C)(6), and 9-101(C). DR 1-102(A)(5) and 1-102(A)(6) read as follows: DR 7-106(C)(6) states that: DR 9-101(C) provides that: The evidence indicates that the Mississippi attorney both outside and inside the courtroom of the justice court judge engaged in a verbal confrontation with the complainant in this cause, who was the opposing party in the litigation before the justice court. That verbal confrontation involved the use of profane language both by the complainant and the Mississippi attorney. When his conduct was repeated inside the courtroom the record reflects that the trial judge threatened the Mississippi attorney with contempt of court, though he was never held in contempt. Outside the courtroom, but in the presence of opposing counsel and the justice court judge, the Mississippi attorney stated that the judge would not have held him in contempt since he helped to get him elected. The record reflects that the justice court judge involved testified on behalf of the Mississippi attorney and that the judge is retired and elderly and could not remember anything about the incident due to extensive cancer treatments. Based on this record, we find that the Complaints Tribunal properly applied in its opinion the "clear and convincing" standard as directed by this Court. Netterville v. Mississippi State Bar, 397 So. 2d 878 (Miss. 1981). Further, we are of the opinion that the conduct, clearly and convincingly shown by the evidence, is a violation of the Disciplinary Rules cited above. The argument presented by the appellant is that the evidence presented by the Bar does not rise to the level of clear and convincing because the testimony of the witnesses against him was both confusing and inconsistent. There are differences in the testimony of the witnesses but they are slight, particularly when viewed through the spectrum of the three years that have passed from the time of this incident. We find no merit to appellant's first assignment of error. This Court has never held that a trial judge's testimony concerning his actions in the presence of misconduct is to be given greater weight than the testimony of other witnesses. In Re Dore, 165 Wash. 225, 4 P.2d 1107 (1931) is cited by the appellant for the proposition that the judge's refusal to cite the lawyer for contempt is conclusive evidence that no misconduct occurred. That appears to be the position taken by the state of Washington and it is contrasted with the position of the state of Kentucky as set forth in Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. Smith, 503 S.W.2d 482 (Appeals Court of Ky. 1973), which holds that although unethical conduct may be condoned by the judge of the police court of condemnation it can be no defense to a disciplinary proceeding. We adopt as the rule in this state that the action of a trial judge in the presence of misconduct shall be considered along with all other evidence by this Court, but shall not of itself be conclusive upon this Court. There is no merit to the appellant's second assignment of error. Investigative hearings and complaints counsel reports are governed by Mississippi Code Annotated § 73-3-317 and Mississippi Code Annotated § 73-3-319 (Supp. 1983). Section 73-3-317 states: Further, section 73-3-319 provides that: A motion hearing was had to dismiss the complaint on the basis that complaints counsel used evidence discovered after the investigatory hearing without giving the Mississippi attorney an opportunity to respond to the evidence in his report to the complaints committee. There was also a motion to strike. These motions were never ruled upon. It is stipulated that at the investigatory hearing neither the complainant nor any of her witnesses appeared. Affidavits of the Mississippi attorney and his witnesses and the trial judge had been submitted prior to the hearing. No evidence was offered on behalf of the complainant at the hearing. Given an opportunity to make a statement at the investigatory hearing, the Mississippi attorney refused, reserving the right to do so in the event the complainant responded. After the investigatory hearing, complaints counsel sought affidavits and they were submitted to him against the Mississippi attorney. The Mississippi attorney was not notified of the phone call of complaints counsel nor was he notified of the affidavits. Thereafter, complaints counsel submitted his report to the complaints committee pursuant to § 73-3-317 and § 73-3-319 in order that they may consider (1) whether to reprimand the Mississippi Attorney publicly or privately or (2) whether to suggest to complaints counsel that sufficient evidence existed for a formal complaint asking for suspension or disbarment. The gist of appellant's argument is that the formal charges brought against him were brought on the basis of evidence to which he was not given an opportunity to respond violating his due process notice rights. He argued at the motion hearing that the procedure used against him violated the rules established by Netterville v. Mississippi State Bar, 397 So. 2d 878 (Miss. 1981). The Complaints Tribunal ruled on the motion that there was no violation of the statutes by continuing investigation after the investigatory hearing. They further ruled that even though the attorney was not notified of the subsequent investigation when it occurred, he received sufficient notice upon receipt of complaint counsel's report that further investigation had been conducted. They further found that the attorney had sufficient time to respond to the complaint counsel report between the time he received his copy and the time formal complaint was filed against him by the Bar, and that the attorney chose not to respond although he had every right to do so. The Tribunal distinguished Netterville, saying that here no final action was taken by the complaints committee on the basis of evidence cited in complaint counsel's report. Instead the committee merely recommended further action. They also found Netterville not to be applicable in any way since it applied only to future disciplinary proceedings and was not retroactive in nature. *1028 While the statute, § 73-3-317 does not preclude continued investigation after the investigatory hearing, the Court in Netterville held: Id. at 884. However, the attorney was given notice of the subsequently obtained affidavits and was afforded a full opportunity to respond. He chose not to do so. Under these circumstances there is no violation of the attorney's procedural due process rights. We therefore find there is no merit to the third assignment of error. It is conceded by the Bar that it has no standard as to what punishment for particular misconduct ought to be and that cases are considered on a case-by-case basis. That is as it should be and we seek to impose no standard here. We held in Mississippi State Bar v. Phillips, 385 So. 2d 943 (Miss. 1980), that on appeal this Court reviews the evidence, the law, the findings and conclusions of the Complaint Tribunal, and then renders such order as the Court may find to be appropriate, based upon the entire record. We find that the 45-day suspension is not appropriate based upon the entire record for the misconduct of which this Mississippi attorney is guilty. The punishment is totally disproportionate to the violation. We, therefore, vacate the 45-day suspension and order that the Mississippi attorney receive a private reprimand. PATTERSON, C.J., WALKER and ROY NOBLE LEE, P.JJ., and BOWLING, HAWKINS, DAN M. LEE, and ROBERTSON, JJ., concur. PRATHER, J., not participating.