Title: N.M. v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12152
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: October 10, 2017

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SJC-12152 
 
N.M., a juvenile  vs.  COMMONWEALTH. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     March 7, 2017. - October 10, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ.1 
 
 
Youthful Offender Act.  Practice, Criminal, Indictment, 
Interlocutory appeal.  Rape. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on June 15, 2016. 
 
 
The case was considered by Botsford, J. 
 
 
 
Harry C. Mezer (Joseph J. Machera also present) for the 
juvenile. 
 
Ronald E. DeRosa, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Robert E. McDonnell, Vanessa M. Brown, & Joshua 
Silverstein, for Youth Advocacy Division of the Committee for 
Public Counsel Services, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
BUDD, J.  Here we consider whether a juvenile, who has been 
indicted as a youthful offender, is entitled as of right to 
                     
 
1 Justice Hines participated in the deliberation on this 
case prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
 
interlocutory review of a denial of a motion to dismiss that 
indictment.  We also consider whether the youthful offender 
indictment in this case was sufficiently supported by probable 
cause.  We conclude that a juvenile is not entitled to G. L. 
c. 211, § 3, interlocutory review as a matter of right in these 
circumstances.  Nevertheless, we exercise our discretion to 
reach the merits of the petition and conclude that the youthful 
offender portion of the indictment was not sufficiently 
supported by probable cause because the charged conduct did not 
involve the infliction or threat of serious bodily harm.2 
 
Background.  The following facts are taken from the 
testimony and exhibits presented to the grand jury.  In 
December, 2014, or January, 2015, the complainant disclosed to 
her mother that her female cousin, the juvenile, had been 
sexually touching her for the last few years, starting when the 
complainant was age five or six and the juvenile was age 
fourteen or fifteen.  The girls attended weekly dance classes 
together and afterward would spend time in the juvenile's 
bedroom napping or watching movies, away from adult supervision.  
The complainant told her mother that in this setting the 
juvenile had "kissed" her on her breasts, "touched" and 
                     
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the youth 
advocacy division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services. 
 
3 
 
 
"inserted [a] finger" in her vagina, and "instructed" her to 
touch the juvenile's vagina.  The complainant's mother reported 
the sexual activity to police in May, 2015. 
 
Investigators conducted a sexual abuse intervention network 
interview,3 during which time the complainant shared similar 
descriptions of the activities.4  The complainant reported that 
the juvenile would sometimes discuss her sex life with the 
complainant and would "explain what she was doing" to the 
complainant when she touched the complainant.  Sometimes the 
sexual touching "kind of hurt" because the complainant "was 
littler than [the juvenile]."  Sometimes the complainant "did 
want to do it," but other times she (in her mind) did not but 
nevertheless "felt like [she] had to."  In response to a 
question from a member of the grand jury, a detective testified 
that the juvenile had made no threats to the complainant, and 
that the juvenile and the complainant "care[d] a lot" about each 
                     
 
3 The sexual abuse intervention network (SAIN) was 
established to avoid multiple interviews of children who may 
have suffered abuse.  A SAIN interview team is generally made up 
of members of several different agencies, one or more of whom 
interview the child.  See Commonwealth v. Howard, 446 Mass. 563, 
565 n.1 (2006). 
 
 
4 The Commonwealth includes additional arguments based on 
academic studies that were not before the single justice.  We 
decline to consider these materials or the arguments based 
thereon.  G. L. c. 211, § 3.  See, e.g., Tran v. Zoning Bd. of 
Appeals of Provincetown, 439 Mass. 1005, 1006 n.4, cert. denied, 
540 U.S. 1008 (2003), citing Milton v. Boston, 427 Mass. 1016, 
1017 (1998). 
4 
 
 
other.  The juvenile told the complainant to tell her to stop 
the touching if it hurt. 
 
A grand jury returned a youthful offender indictment 
against the juvenile, charging her with rape of a child.5  See 
G. L. c. 119, § 54; G. L. c. 265, § 23.  The juvenile moved to 
dismiss the indictment, citing insufficient evidence to 
establish probable cause to believe that the alleged conduct 
involved the infliction or threat of serious bodily harm.  After 
the denial of that motion, she petitioned for review by a single 
justice of this court pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.  The single 
justice denied the petition, and the juvenile appealed. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Interlocutory review.  In general, "there 
is no right to interlocutory review of the denial of a motion to 
dismiss pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3."  Flood v. Commonwealth, 
465 Mass. 1015, 1016 (2013).  The court's extraordinary power of 
superintendence under G. L. c. 211, § 3, "will not ordinarily be 
exercised to review interlocutory rulings in criminal cases, 
since the rights of criminal defendants are generally fully 
                     
 
5 The seeking of a youthful offender indictment 
differentiates this case from one in which the Commonwealth 
files a complaint for delinquency, the adjudication of which is 
not a criminal proceeding.  G. L. c. 119, §§ 53, 74.  "A 
'delinquent child' is subject to essentially rehabilitative 
penalties and remedies, while a 'youthful offender' is subject 
to penalties ranging from placement in a [Department of Youth 
Services] facility to adult sentences in the State prison."  
Commonwealth v. Mogelinski, 466 Mass. 627, 641 (2013), citing 
Commonwealth v. Connor C., 432 Mass. 635, 645 (2000). 
5 
 
 
protected through the regular appellate process."  Costarelli v. 
Commonwealth, 374 Mass. 677, 679 (1978).  See Jackson v. 
Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 1008, 1009 (2002); Ventresco v. 
Commonwealth, 409 Mass. 82, 83-84 (1991).  Where truly 
extraordinary circumstances are present, however, a defendant 
may obtain review by "demonstrat[ing] both a substantial claim 
of violation of [her] substantive rights and irremediable error, 
such that [she] cannot be placed in statu quo in the regular 
course of appeal."  Morrissette v. Commonwealth, 380 Mass. 197, 
198 (1980).  "In such a case, [a] single justice may decide the 
issues presented, report the matter to the full court, . . . or 
authorize an interlocutory appeal to be taken to the Appeals 
Court for a decision on the merits" (citation omitted).  
Forlizzi v. Commonwealth, 471 Mass. 1011, 1012 (2015). 
 
Here, the juvenile claims a right to interlocutory review 
of the denial of her motion to dismiss under G. L. c. 211, § 3, 
because, she argues, if the Commonwealth proceeds against her as 
a youthful offender, she will lose the protections afforded by 
juvenile proceedings.  These include privacy and confidentiality 
considerations, such as having the record and proceedings 
shielded from public access.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 119, §§ 60A, 
65.  See also Doe v. Attorney Gen. (No. 1), 425 Mass. 210, 212-
213 & n.8 (1997).  Loss of the rights afforded by the protective 
juvenile cloak, she argues, cannot be remedied in the ordinary 
6 
 
 
appellate process because, once her identity is disclosed, there 
would be no way to regain her privacy; if she is convicted and 
sentenced as an adult, she would be sent to an adult prison; and 
the ability to discipline her as a child would be lost.  See 
Felix F. v. Commonwealth, 471 Mass. 513, 514 n.2 (2015). 
 
We acknowledge that the ordinary appellate process will not 
restore the protective nature of juvenile proceedings if it is 
later determined that the juvenile has been erroneously tried as 
a youthful offender.  Nonetheless, her claims are not akin to a 
"right not to be tried," a right we have protected by 
recognizing a very limited exception to the general rule against 
interlocutory appeal for a petition for relief from the denial 
of a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds.  See 
Forlizzi, 471 Mass. at 1013.  "In that circumstance, because the 
double jeopardy right is a right not to be tried, we have held 
that 'appellate review of [the denial of the motion to dismiss] 
after trial and conviction would not provide adequate relief if 
the defendant were to prevail . . . .'"  Flood v. Commonwealth, 
465 Mass. 1015, 1016 (2013), quoting McGuinness v. Commonwealth, 
423 Mass. 1003, 1004 (1996).  See also Gangi v. Commonwealth, 
462 Mass. 158, 160 n.2 (2012) (right not to be tried on sexually 
dangerous person petition).  Otherwise, we have "consistently 
rejected attempts to obtain interlocutory review as a matter of 
right under G. L. c. 211, § 3, of denials of motions to dismiss 
7 
 
 
on other bases that defendants have attempted to analogize to 
double jeopardy claims."  Soucy v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 1025, 
1026 (2015), citing Grand-Pierre v. Commonwealth, 461 Mass. 
1003, 1004 (2011) (challenge to constitutionality of statute 
under which defendant was charged), Garden v. Commonwealth, 460 
Mass. 1018, 1019 (2011) (statute of limitations claim), 
Fitzpatrick v. Commonwealth, 453 Mass. 1014, 1015 (2009) 
(jurisdictional claim), Bateman v. Commonwealth, 449 Mass. 1024, 
1024-1025 (2007) (challenge to sufficiency of evidence before 
grand jury), Cousin v. Commonwealth, 442 Mass. 1046, 1046 (2004) 
(speedy trial claim), King v. Commonwealth, 442 Mass. 1043, 1044 
(2004) (claim of preindictment delay), and Jackson, 437 Mass. at 
1009 (due process challenge to prosecution).  See Brea v. 
Commonwealth, 473 Mass. 1012, 1012-1013 (2015) (prearraignment 
denial of motion to dismiss).  The juvenile's claims in this 
case involve a claimed right to be tried in a different forum, 
not the right not to be tried at all, and the limited exception 
does not apply.  See Watkins v. Commonwealth, 469 Mass. 1006, 
1006 (2014). 
 
Where we do not recognize a right to interlocutory review, 
even the absence of an adequate alternative remedy, as the 
juvenile claims here, does not by itself make review under G. L. 
c. 211, § 3, automatic.  See, e.g., Care & Protection of Zita, 
455 Mass. 272, 278 (2009); Commonwealth v. Cook, 380 Mass. 314, 
8 
 
 
319 (1980).  It remains incumbent on a juvenile in these 
circumstances to demonstrate that his or her claims are suitable 
for consideration under G. L. c. 211, § 3.  Although, as it 
happens, a single justice exercised his discretion in an earlier 
case to review the merits of the denial of a motion to dismiss a 
juvenile's indictment as a youthful offender, see Felix F., 471 
Mass. at 513-514, his decision to do so in that case "does not 
compel us to decide that the single justice should have done so 
in this case, or must do so in every instance."  Esteves v. 
Commonwealth, 434 Mass. 1003, 1004 (2001).  See Watkins, 469 
Mass. at 1006 (decision to transfer proceedings from Juvenile 
Court to Superior Court, pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 74, may be 
reviewed on direct appeal).  In this case, we are satisfied that 
the single justice neither erred nor abused her discretion in 
denying interlocutory review.  The court's power of 
superintendence is exercised sparingly, and the juvenile did not 
demonstrate that any extraordinary circumstance compelled the 
single justice to accord review. 
 
The question whether a juvenile has a right to 
interlocutory review under G. L. c. 211, § 3, of the denial of a 
motion to dismiss a youthful offender indictment was not settled 
at the time we issued our order under S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as 
amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001), allowing this appeal to proceed.  
For that reason we directed the parties to brief both that 
9 
 
 
threshold procedural issue and the substantive merits of the 
judge's underlying ruling on the motion to dismiss.  Although we 
now have concluded that there is no right to review as a matter 
of law, and we therefore would not ordinarily consider the 
merits of the underlying order where the single justice did not 
exercise his or her discretion to allow interlocutory review, 
see Ventresco, 409 Mass. at 83-84, we exercise our discretion to 
reach the merits in this case. 
 
2.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  The juvenile argues that 
the grand jury did not hear sufficient evidence to support her 
indictment as a youthful offender under G. L. c. 119, § 54.  See 
Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 385 Mass. 160, 163 (1982).  We 
consider evidence heard by the grand jury in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth.  Commonwealth v. Moran, 453 Mass. 
880, 885 (2009). 
 
The Commonwealth may pursue a criminal charge against a 
juvenile by indictment only where 
"[the] person is alleged to have committed an offense . . . 
while between the ages of fourteen and [eighteen] which, if 
[she] were an adult, would be punishable by imprisonment in 
the [S]tate prison, and the person has previously been 
committed to the [D]epartment of [Y]outh [S]ervices, or the 
offense involves the infliction or threat of serious bodily 
harm." 
 
G. L. c. 119, § 54.  Here the prerequisites concerning the 
juvenile's age and the nature of the offense are met.  As the 
juvenile has not "previously been committed to the [D]epartment 
10 
 
 
of [Y]outh [S]ervices," the issue remaining is whether "the 
offense involves the infliction or threat of serious bodily 
harm." 
There is no requirement that the infliction or threat of 
serious bodily harm be an element of the crime itself; however, 
where a prosecutor seeks a youthful offender indictment relying 
on the serious bodily harm component of § 54, the conduct 
constituting the offense must involve the infliction or threat 
of serious bodily harm.  Commonwealth v. Quincy Q., 434 Mass. 
859, 863 (2001), citing Commonwealth v. Clint C., 430 Mass. 219, 
225 (1999).  Here, the Commonwealth argues that the evidence 
presented was sufficient for the grand jury to find probable 
cause that the juvenile subjected the complainant to a threat of 
serious bodily harm.6  We disagree. 
 
The youthful offender act does not define the phrase 
"threat of serious bodily harm."  See G. L. c. 119, §§ 52, 54.  
See also Clint C., 430 Mass. at 225.  Generally, this element is 
satisfied when the juvenile defendant makes a communication or 
declaration, explicit or implicit, of an actual threat of 
physical injury.  Felix F., 471 Mass. at 516.  In the specific 
context of child rape, a "juvenile's conduct must be considered 
                     
 
6 The Commonwealth is not proceeding on the theory that 
probable cause existed to establish actual infliction of serious 
bodily harm to the victim. 
11 
 
 
in relation to the effect on the victim."  Id. at 517.  "[T]he 
act of penetrating a child, without more, [does not] satisf[y] 
the threat of serious bodily harm component . . . ."  Id. at 
517-518, citing Commonwealth v. Washington W., 462 Mass. 204, 
210 & n.4 (2012). 
 
The inquiry is fact-intensive.  In Clint C., 430 Mass. at 
226, we said that the juvenile's position of authority over the 
victim as her babysitter, the age difference between the teenage 
juvenile and the six year old victim, and the invasive nature of 
coerced fellatio were together sufficient to support a youthful 
offender indictment.  In Washington W., 462 Mass. at 210, we 
upheld a youthful offender indictment because, in that case, 
"the [juvenile's] act of physically pushing [the victim] to the 
ground to be penetrated carries with it the implied threat of 
bodily harm if the [victim] were to resist."  In contrast, in 
Quincy Q., 434 Mass. at 861, 863, we dismissed a youthful 
offender indictment because the teenage juvenile's conduct of 
touching the toddler victim, to whom he was ostensibly providing 
day care, over ten different occasions on her vagina and 
buttocks was not accompanied by any "evidence that the defendant 
overtly threatened [the complainant] or that serious bodily 
injuries were actually inflicted." 
 
In this case, a grand juror asked if the juvenile 
explicitly threatened the complainant; the detective responded 
12 
 
 
that the juvenile did not and stated further that the juvenile 
and complainant "care[d] a lot" about one another.  The 
Commonwealth argues that, by digitally penetrating a complainant 
who is very young, among other "aggravating" factors, the 
juvenile "implicitly communicated an actual threat of physical 
injury."  We have held otherwise.  See Felix F., 471 Mass. at 
518-519, citing Commonwealth v. Sherry, 386 Mass. 682, 694, 696 
(1982), and Commonwealth v. Chou, 433 Mass. 229, 234 (2001) 
(implied threat found only where victim's failure to resist 
reasonably was caused by fear and apprehension). 
 
Apart from the sexual conduct itself, the juvenile did not 
employ any additional violence or make any threats toward the 
complainant and specifically told the complainant to tell her to 
stop if it hurt.  Contrast Washington W., 462 Mass. 208, 210 
(juvenile accomplished anal intercourse by physically forcing 
victim to ground).  That the complainant sometimes "did not want 
to do it" but nevertheless did "do it" is, in context, not the 
consequence of a fear that the juvenile would otherwise inflict 
serious bodily harm on her.  Given the evidence of the nature of 
the girls' relationship, the complainant was compliant because 
the juvenile was someone about whom the complainant "care[d] a 
lot."7  The grand jury heard nothing to suggest that the 
                     
 
7 For the same reason, the fact that the complainant lied to 
her aunt on the juvenile's behalf about an unrelated incident 
13 
 
 
complainant feared for her safety.  Contrast id. at 208-209 
(victim too "afraid" to tell parents about repeated aggressive 
sexual encounters where juvenile "instructed him not to tell 
anyone"). 
 
To be sure, the charged crime of rape of a child is a 
serious offense.  However, the juvenile's alleged conduct does 
not meet the threshold above which the youthful offender statute 
allows the case to be heard as a criminal matter rather than as 
a complaint for delinquency. 
 
Conclusion.  We remand the case to the county court for 
entry of a judgment allowing the petition for relief under G. L. 
c. 211, § 3, and reversing the Juvenile Court judge's order 
denying the motion to dismiss. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                     
does not constitute evidence that the complainant perceived a 
threat of serious bodily harm from the juvenile.