Title: Ex Parte Allen
Citation: 825 So. 2d 271
Docket Number: 1002028
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: January 25, 2002

825 So. 2d 271 (2002)
Ex parte Bobby Joe ALLEN.
(In re Bobby Joe Allen v. State of Alabama.)
1002028.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
January 25, 2002.
Bobby Joe Allen, pro se.
Bill Pryor, atty. gen., and Stephen N. Dodd, asst. atty. gen., for respondent.
HOUSTON, Justice.
We granted this petition for the writ of certiorari to address one issue: Whether our caselaw that has adopted the holding enunciated in Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 108 S. Ct. 2379, 101 L. Ed. 2d 245 (1988), that a notice of appeal by an incarcerated pro se appellant is considered "filed" when it is given to prison officials and not when it is received by the court clerk (hereinafter generally referred to as "the mailbox rule"), should be extended to *272 include the filing of motions to amend Rule 32, Ala.R.Crim.P., petitions that have no deadline for filing other than that they must be filed before the entry of a final judgment, as stated in Rule 32.7(b), Ala. R.Crim.P. We decline to extend the mailbox rule to motions to amend Rule 32 petitions, and we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals in this case.
Bobby Joe Allen pleaded guilty to the unlawful breaking and entering of a vehicle in violation of Ala.Code 1975, § 13A-8-11(b). He was sentenced under the Habitual Felony Offender Act to 15 years' imprisonment. Allen's sentence was suspended, and he was placed on two years' probation. Allen did not appeal his conviction. Allen's probation was subsequently revoked, and he was ordered to serve his original sentence. He then filed a Rule 32, Ala.R.Crim.P., petition in the Limestone Circuit Court, seeking postconviction relief. On October 31, 2000, the State filed a motion to dismiss Allen's petition, arguing that his claims were precluded under Rule 32.2(a) Ala.R.Crim.P.
On November 13, 2000, at 1:24 p.m., the circuit court summarily denied Allen's Rule 32 petition, stating that his claims were precluded because they should have been raised on a direct appeal, which Allen chose not to take. Later, that same day, at 1:50 p.m., Allen's response to the State's motion to dismiss and a motion to amend his Rule 32 petition to add additional claims were stamped "filed" by the clerk of the circuit court. The certificate of service attached to Allen's motions was dated November 7, 2000, six days before the circuit court's final order dismissing his petition. The circuit court did not rule on Allen's motion to amend his petition. On November 29, 2000, Allen filed a motion styled "Motion to Amend the Court's Finding and Judgment" (emphasis added), arguing that the circuit court erred in not granting his motion to amend his petition. The circuit court, on December 4, 2000, denied this motion.[1]
The Court of Criminal Appeals unanimously affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. Allen v. State, 825 So. 2d 264 (Ala.Crim.App.2001). On August 20, 2001, Allen sought certiorari review of the Court of Criminal Appeals' affirmance, arguing that the issue whether a motion to amend a Rule 32 petition should be considered as filed on the date it is given to prison officials is a material question of first impression in Alabama.[2]
Alabama courts have held that a pro se incarcerated petitioner/appellant is considered to have "filed" a Rule 32 petition, a notice of appeal, or a petition for a writ of certiorari when those documents are given to prison officials for mailing. Holland v. State, 621 So. 2d 373 (Ala.Crim.App. 1993)(Rule 32 petition); Ex parte Jones, 773 So. 2d 989 (Ala.1998)(notice of appeal); Ex parte Williams, 651 So. 2d 569 (Ala.1992)(petition for certiorari review). Alabama courts have also applied the mailbox rule to a Rule 32 amendment when *273 time deadlines have been imposed by the trial court for filing such an amendment. Miles v. State, [Ms. CR-99-2547, March 2, 2001] ___ So.2d ___ (Ala.Crim.App.2001). However, we have not ruled on whether the mailbox rule applies to supplemental filings associated with Rule 32 petitions where no deadline is imposed on those filings other than that they must be filed before the entry of a final judgment.
Leave to amend a Rule 32 petition is within the discretion of the trial court, and it should be freely granted. Rule 32.7(d) Ala.R.Crim.P.; see, e.g., Talley v. State, 802 So. 2d 1106, 1107 (Ala.Crim.App. 2001). However, Rule 32.7(b) plainly states that amendments are allowed at any time "prior to the entry of judgment." The trial court, in this case, had already entered a final order dismissing Allen's Rule 32 petition when it received Allen's motion to amend; therefore, it no longer had discretion to grant Allen's motion unless Allen's motion was considered filed on the date it was given to prison authorities.
Rule 4(c), Ala.R.App.P., effective September 1, 2000, specifically provides for application of the mailbox rule to pro se incarcerated appellants. Rule 4(c) adopted the mailbox rule as previously enunciated by this court in Williams and Jones. Committee Comments to Adoption of Rule 4(c), Ala.R.App.P. However, no language in the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly applies the mailbox rule to Rule 32 petitions. In applying the mailbox rule to initial filings of Rule 32 petitions and time-sensitive amendments to such petitions, Alabama courts have been cognizant of the policy concerns outlined by the United States Supreme Court in Houston v. Lack, supra. Houston held that under Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, a notice of appeal is considered "filed" when a pro se incarcerated appellant delivers it to prison authorities for forwarding to the court clerk, and not when the court clerk actually receives it. Houston, 487 U.S.  at 270-71, 108 S. Ct. 2379. However, the mailbox rule enunciated in Houston is not constitutionally required. O'Rourke v. State, 782 S.W.2d 808, 809 (Mo.Ct.App.1990); Carr v. State, 554 A.2d 778, 779 (Del.1989); Espinal v. State, 159 Misc.2d 1051, 607 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (N.Y.Ct.Cl.1993). Rather, the holding of Houston is based on federal procedure; thus, it is not necessarily applicable to state rules of procedure. Accordingly, we must consider whether the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure allow application of the mailbox rule in the context of Rule 32 amendments, and whether the policy concerns expressed in Houston are applicable to motions to amend Rule 32 petitions in Alabama where no deadline is given for filing such amendments.
We hold that the mailbox rule does not apply to motions to amend Rule 32 petitions where the trial court has not established a deadline for filing the amendment. We agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals, which stated:
825 So. 2d  at 268.
Additionally, the policy concerns stated in Houston are not as pertinent in the context of amendments to Rule 32 petitions. Those concerns were summarized in Houston:
487 U.S.  at 270-72, 108 S. Ct. 2379.
These concerns may be present when a pro se prisoner files an initial action or is faced with certain, specific time deadlines; however, these concerns are not as likely to be present when a pro se prisoner files a motion to amend a Rule 32 petition because, in addition to the reasons given by the Court of Criminal Appeals quoted above, Rule 32 provides that a court may appoint counsel in certain situations. Rule 32.7(c), Ala.R.Crim.P., states:
Therefore, if a trial court finds that the pro se prisoner asserts meritorious claims, it may appoint counsel and prevent the petitioner from suffering the disadvantages envisioned in Houston. This safeguard *275 provides sufficient protection of the petitioner's right to bring a successful Rule 32 petition without the need to extend the mailbox rule to motions to amend those petitions.
Ultimately we are guided by Rule 1.2 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure:
However, as that rule states, in protecting the individual's rights, we are also concerned with the need for efficiency within the circuit courts. The application of the mailbox rule to motions to amend Rule 32 petitions is unnecessary for the just determination of those proceedings. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.
AFFIRMED.
MOORE, C.J., and LYONS and JOHNSTONE, JJ., concur.
WOODALL, J., concurs in the rationale in part and concurs in the result.
WOODALL, Justice (concurring in the rationale in part and concurring in the result).
I concur in the result in this case and in most of the rationale provided for that result. However, I am not persuaded that Ala.R.Crim.P. 32.7(c) is relevant to the issue presented or that it supports the result reached. Therefore, I do not join in the rationale to the extent that it relies upon Rule 32.7(c).
[1]  Because the reason for the denial of Allen's motion to amend the circuit court's judgment is not stated in the record and because Allen made the same argument in both motions i.e., that he should be granted leave to amend his petitionwe must assume that Allen's second motion was denied because his original motion to amend his Rule 32 petition was not timely filed, making the timeliness of the filing the determinative issue in this case.
[2]  Specifically, Allen argues that the circuit court should have considered his motion to amend his Rule 32 petition as timely filed when it was given to prison officials, i.e., the date on the certificate of service, November 7, 2000, not when it was received by the clerk's office, November 13, 2000, 26 minutes after the circuit court had entered a final order dismissing his Rule 32 petition.