Title: P. v. Lynch
Citation: 50 Cal. 4th 693
Docket Number: S026408
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: August 12, 2010

1 
Filed 8/12/10 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S026408 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
 
FRANKLIN LYNCH, 
) 
 
) 
Alameda County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. H-10662 
 
____________________________________) 
 
 
Defendant Franklin Lynch was convicted of the first degree murders of 
Pearl Larson, Adeline Figuerido, and Anna Constantin; the residential burglary of 
Larson, Figuerido, Constantin, Bessie Herrick, and Ruth Durham; and robbery of 
Figuerido, Constantin, Herrick, and Durham.  (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189, 
211, 459.)1  The jury also found true the special circumstance allegations of 
burglary murder and robbery murder as to all three murder victims, the multiple-
murder special-circumstance allegation, and allegations that defendant personally 
inflicted great bodily injury on Herrick and Durham, who were persons 60 years of 
age or older.  (§§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3), (17), former §§ 1203.075, 1203.09, subd. (a), 
12022.7.)  The jury returned a death verdict, and the trial court entered a judgment 
                                              
1  All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 
indicated.   
2 
of death.  This appeal is automatic.  (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 11, subd. (a); § 1239, 
subd. (b).)  For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment.  
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
A. Guilt Phase 
1. Prosecution Evidence 
Between the months of June and August 1987,2 defendant beat and robbed, 
or attempted to rob, five elderly Caucasian women in their homes.  Three of the 
victims died as a result of the attacks.   
a) Death of Pearl Larson 
Late in the evening on June 24, 76-year-old Pearl Larson was found dead in 
her home.  She had lived in a corner house on Wake Avenue in San Leandro with 
her teenage grandson.  Larson was found lying on a bed, with the card holder 
portion of a wallet and some coins next to her.  Her hands were bound with nylon 
stockings.  Her housecoat was pulled up over her head, and she was not wearing 
underwear.  Subsequent investigation revealed no evidence of a sexual assault.  An 
autopsy revealed Larson died by asphyxia caused by a garment that was tied 
around her head, covering her face and part of her neck.  There was bruising on 
her face, particularly around her left eye, caused by blunt trauma.  She had a 
contusion on the back of her head that “went deeply into the skin of the scalp 
down to the bone.”  The skin on her left ring finger was significantly abraded and 
bruised around the area of her ring.   
                                              
 
2  All dates in the discussion of the guilt phase evidence are in 1987 unless 
otherwise indicated.   
3 
Earlier that day, between 11:30 and 11:45 a.m., Jolevia Jones, Larson‟s 
gardener, and his cousin had arrived to work at Larson‟s house.  Jones, who was 
approximately 80 years old, spoke with Larson for a few minutes.  
About 11:00 a.m. on June 24, Jacqueline Brown, who lived across the street 
from Larson, observed Larson‟s grandson leave on a skateboard.  At 11:20 a.m., 
she saw a man, whom she later identified as defendant, standing in Larson‟s yard.  
Defendant walked along the side of the house, went to some bushes and appeared 
to be urinating, and carefully looked around.  He then walked to the front of the 
house and Brown lost sight of him.  Around noon, Brown saw defendant jump 
over the bushes, which were about five feet tall, and run away.  Larson typically 
parked her car under a tree each summer morning to get it out of the sun.  Between 
7:30 and 8:00 p.m. on June 24, Brown observed Larson‟s vehicle still parked 
under the tree.   
Bettie Agliano, a friend of Larson‟s, had plans to meet with her on June 24.  
Agliano called Larson at home at 12:15 p.m., and at various times during the rest 
of the afternoon, but no one answered the telephone.   
b) Death of Adeline Figuerido  
On July 28, 89-year-old Adeline Figuerido was killed in her home.  She 
lived on 143rd Avenue in San Leandro with her two daughters, Marie and Olivia 
Figuerido.  Her house was separated from the next building on the left by an 
undeveloped half-acre lot and Bay Area Rapid Transit tracks.   
Marie and Olivia made lunch for their mother around noon each day.  On 
July 28, they left her at the house around 10:30 a.m. and returned around 11:45 
a.m. to discover their mother‟s body in the dining room.  She was covered with a 
bedspread and her hands were tied behind her back with an electrical cord.  A 
4 
different bedspread was wrapped around her head.  The house had been ransacked, 
and fine jewelry and cash were missing.   
An autopsy revealed numerous blunt trauma injuries to Figuerido‟s face, 
head, and neck.  The bones in her face near and around her right eye, and her 
mandible on the left side, were fractured.  There was extensive hemorrhaging in 
the neck area, indicating sufficient force was applied to stop circulation to the 
brain and to interfere with her breathing.  She died from blunt trauma to the head 
and neck.   
Between about 11:15 and 11:30 a.m. on July 28, Jan Morris, who worked 
across the street from the Figuerido residence, saw a man whom she later 
identified as defendant standing on the Figueridos‟ driveway.  Defendant walked 
down the driveway toward the front of the house, looked in both directions, turned 
around, and walked rapidly to the back of the house.   
On July 27, the day before Figuerido‟s murder, between 11:00 and 11:30 
a.m., Irma Casteel observed a man whom she later identified as defendant walk to 
the end of the dead-end street, stand there, and then turn around and walk back.  
There were two corner houses at the end of the street, one of which was occupied 
by an 89-year-old woman, and the other by a similarly aged couple.  Casteel lived 
about one block from the Figuerido residence.   
c) Death of Anna Constantin 
On August 13, 73-year-old Anna Constantin was attacked in her home.  
Constantin lived with her daughter, Vickie Constantin, in a home at the corner of 
Blossom Way and Bancroft Avenue in San Leandro.  When Vickie arrived home 
from work that evening about 5:45 p.m., she discovered her mother had been 
beaten so severely she was almost unrecognizable.  Some rooms were “messier” 
5 
than others, items were out of place, and the back screen door had been cut.  A 
gold bracelet, gold chains, and cash were missing from the home.   
Constantin was taken to Eden Hospital.  Her treating physician, Dr. Chuc 
Van Dang, testified that her face was swollen and bruised, and she had bruises on 
her shoulders, back, and other parts of her body.  Her left maxilla, or cheek bone, 
and a right rib were fractured.  These facial injuries and bruising were caused by 
blunt trauma.  In addition, Constantin had an open scalp wound two inches long 
that extended down to the skull.  The wound became infected and grew larger over 
time, so that eventually Constantin‟s skull was visible.  Dr. Dang saw Constantin 
about 6:00 p.m. on August 13, and opined that her injuries had been inflicted 
“very recent[ly],” and no more than six hours before 6:00 p.m.   
Adele Manos, who had been driving down Bancroft Avenue around 3:15 or 
3:20 p.m. that day, saw a man, whom she later identified as defendant, come out 
from the hedges about a block from the intersection of Bancroft and Blossom, and 
look around.  The man walked down Bancroft toward Blossom.   
Around 5:00 p.m., defendant sold a bracelet identified as belonging to 
Vickie Constantin to a secondhand dealer.  A few days later, he gave Mackie 
Williams, an acquaintance, two necklaces that were also identified as belonging to 
Vickie Constantin.   
Anna died on September 28 of pulmonary emboli due to deep leg vein 
thromboses or blood clots.  Constantin‟s thromboses were the result of treatment 
for and complications from her August 13 injuries.   
d) Attack on Ruth Durham 
Eighty-eight-year-old Ruth Durham lived alone on Alden Road in 
Hayward.  Her daughter and son-in-law lived next door in a corner house at the 
intersection of Alden Road and Boston Road.  In the late afternoon of August 15, 
6 
Durham left her daughter‟s house and returned home.  She sat down in a chair in 
her living room, and shortly thereafter was struck on both sides of her face.  She 
remembered nothing further about the attack.  About 5:30 p.m., after being alerted 
by a neighbor, Durham‟s son-in-law discovered her sitting bloody and beaten on 
the steps of her front porch.  She was taken to Eden Hospital.  Dr. Kenneth Miller, 
an emergency room physician at the hospital, testified Durham had massive 
swelling deformities of her face.  Both sides of her jaw, and her right maxilla were 
fractured.  Miller opined that Durham‟s injuries were the result of blunt trauma.  
After leaving the hospital, Durham needed to live with her daughter because she 
was no longer capable of caring for herself.   
The screen on Durham‟s back door had been torn just above the handle.  
Her house was ransacked, and cash and personal belongings were missing.  A man 
later identified as defendant had been seen by neighbors at the intersection of 
Alden and Boston Roads across the street from Durham‟s house at about 4:30 p.m. 
on the day of the attack.   
e) Attack on Bessie Herrick  
Around 3:30 p.m. on August 17, 74-year-old Bessie Herrick and her 
husband, Frank Herrick, returned to their home at the corner of Royal and Bartlett 
Avenues in Hayward.  About 10 to 15 minutes later, Frank went outside to water 
the garden.  While engaged in this activity, he observed a man, whom he later 
identified as defendant, jogging on Royal Avenue.  Five minutes later, Frank 
returned to the house, peered inside through a window, and saw defendant hitting 
his wife, who was lying on the floor near the fireplace.  Frank entered the house 
through the garage, but defendant had fled.  Bessie‟s purse was on the floor, and 
her wallet was outside the purse.  An emerald ring kept in a dish in the room was 
missing.   
7 
Bessie was taken to Eden Hospital.  Her treating physician, Dr. Edwin 
Whitman, testified that her nose was broken, her face was swollen, and she had 
puncture wounds around the left eye.  Her orbit and maxilla bones near her left eye 
were also fractured.  She had suffered blunt trauma around the head and neck, and 
had lost nearly half a pint of blood.  She identified defendant as her attacker.   
Eric Hoak, an acquaintance and neighbor of the Herricks‟, was a passenger 
in a vehicle driving on Royal Avenue around 3:00 p.m. that day and observed a 
man, whom he later identified as defendant, standing on the Herricks‟ front porch.  
The man was looking around as if he were nervous.   
John Wulf testified that he was driving down Bartlett Avenue toward Royal 
Avenue around 4:30 p.m. and saw a man, whom he later identified as defendant, 
run at an angle across the street about 50 feet in front of Wulf‟s car.  The jogger 
ran from the side of the street on which the Herricks‟ home was located to the 
other side of the street, looking back over his shoulder toward the house.  Wulf 
proceeded to his destination near the house, and shortly thereafter observed police 
activity at the house.   
f) 
 Other evidence 
Lavinia Harvey, who was in her early 80‟s, lived in a corner house on 
Medford Avenue in Hayward.  Around 3:00 p.m. on August 12, while her husband 
was away from home, Harvey noticed someone walking beneath their window.  
Harvey grabbed an iron rod, went outside, and confronted a man she later 
identified as defendant.  She asked defendant what he wanted, and defendant 
asked, “Was there a Black kid come out this garden?”  Harvey said no, gave 
defendant permission to check a different location in the yard while she observed 
him, and then instructed him to leave.  Defendant did so, and Harvey reported the 
incident to police that day.   
8 
Defendant was apprehended in Los Angeles in October 1987.  In a 
statement to police, defendant denied involvement in these crimes.  He admitted 
selling Constantin‟s bracelet, but claimed he had obtained it in a drug deal.  
Defendant said he fled in August 1987 after he read in the paper that he had been 
connected to the theft of the bracelet.3  He was concerned about going to jail and 
thought the police were trying to kill him.   
2. Defense Evidence 
Kurt Foell, a gemologist-appraiser, testified that the gold bracelet, 
identified as belonging to Vickie Constantin, was a man‟s bracelet mass produced 
in Russia after 1945.4   
Barbara Sullivan testified that around 4:30 p.m. on August 15, the day Ruth 
Durham was attacked, Sullivan saw an approximately 19-year-old Black man, 
wearing a red plaid flannel shirt and brown work boots, walking down the street 
on which Durham lived.  Sullivan was unable to identify the individual she saw on 
the street in either a photo array containing defendant‟s photograph, or a physical 
lineup including defendant.   
Thomas Ivory testified that on July 28, the date of Figuerido‟s murder, he 
saw a Black male walking on 143rd Avenue away from Figuerido‟s house about 
11:45 a.m.  The man tossed an object like a rock or a bottle cap as he walked.  
Ivory was unable to identify the man he saw in a photographic lineup or in a 
physical lineup including defendant.   
                                              
3  On August 19, the police released, and the media broadcast for the first 
time, a photograph of defendant.  
4  At the time of Anna Constantin‟s assault, Vickie Constantin told police 
that the stolen bracelet was about 200 years old.   
9 
Detective Robert Dekas of the San Leandro Police Department testified that 
on August 19 he and Officer Jouvanicot searched the area where Ivory said he saw 
an object tossed.  They found a fingernail file, rocks, and bottle caps.  Jouvanicot 
took the file for laboratory testing.   
Defendant also introduced evidence of inconsistent statements by victim 
Bessie Herrick regarding the circumstances under which she first encountered 
defendant.  The parties stipulated to dates between June 1987 and June 1988 on 
which descriptions of the suspect in the crimes, or photographs or likenesses of the 
suspect or defendant, appeared in the Hayward Daily Review newspaper.   
Sergeant Kitchen of the San Leandro Police Department testified that after 
the murders of Larson and Figuerido, a description of the suspected killer was 
disseminated.  Kitchen also testified that on July 29, Lieutenant Hull of the San 
Leandro Police Department held a press conference to provide information 
regarding these murder cases and descriptions of any suspect.   
Dr. Elizabeth Loftus testified as an expert on eyewitness identification 
regarding certain general limitations on the accuracy of such identification.   
 
B. Penalty Phase 
1. Prosecution evidence 
The prosecution introduced evidence that defendant had been convicted of 
burglary in 1973 and robbery in 1982.  It also introduced evidence of the 
circumstances of the robbery.  On January 18, 1982, about 10:00 a.m., Palo Alto 
police responded to a woman‟s cries for help coming from a residence located on 
Palo Alto Avenue.  Police Agent Jack Schindler noticed a man, whom he later 
identified as defendant, inside the house, and told him to open the door.  
Defendant refused, and broke a window to escape.  After a chase, he was arrested.  
A glove and a woman‟s ring were found in his pocket.  A second glove and a 
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“watchcap-type hat” were found on the chase route.  The victim was Rose Nimitz, 
an approximately 70-year-old Caucasian woman.  She was not wearing a ring, and 
had a cut or abrasion and swelling on her left ring finger.  The ring found on 
defendant was later returned to her.   
The prosecution also introduced evidence of defendant‟s misconduct in jail.  
On June 26, 1988, defendant had two visitors, a woman and a child.  At the 
conclusion of the 15-minute visiting period, Alameda County Deputy Sheriffs 
Stephen Chiabotti and Herb Walters told defendant his time was up.  Defendant 
continued speaking with his visitors.  Chiabotti attempted to handcuff defendant 
for the walk back to his cell.  Defendant told Chiabotti not to handcuff him in front 
of his child.  When Chiabotti persisted in attempting to handcuff defendant, 
defendant pushed Chiabotti in the chest, moving him backward several feet.  
Chiabotti and Walters struggled with defendant for two or three minutes before 
subduing him.  Following the incident, defendant told Walters, “You guys fucked 
up.  You should have killed me when you had a chance.”   
Three days later, on June 29, 1988, Deputy Chiabotti and another officer 
removed defendant from his cell, apparently in preparation for a court appearance.  
Defendant, who was not handcuffed, was carrying an accordion file.  He threw the 
file on the ground and punched Chiabotti several times in the face, knocking him 
into a wall.   
In addition, the prosecution introduced evidence of the unadjudicated 
murder of Agnes George.  George, a Caucasian female in her late seventies, was 
found dead in her Richmond home around noon on October 15, 1987.  She was 
covered with a blanket, and her hands and feet were tied with electrical cord and 
rope.  She had suffered blunt trauma, including a broken jaw and cheekbones, and 
her death resulted from traumatic head and neck injuries.  Her home had been 
ransacked, and a box in which she kept cash was empty.   
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On October 7, 1987, about 1:00 p.m., a neighbor had observed a man she 
later identified as defendant walking very slowly down the street on which George 
lived, and “looking all around the neighborhood.”  On October 15, between 8:30 
and 9:00 a.m., Darlene Fleming, who lived across the street from George and was 
a close friend, heard George‟s front door shut.  About 9:50 a.m., Fleming saw a 
man she later identified as defendant standing next to George‟s house.   
The prosecution also introduced evidence of an unadjudicated battery on 
San Jose Police Officer Michael Rabourn.  Between 6:30 and 6:45 p.m. on January 
4, 1983, Rabourn, who was in uniform, observed a man he later identified as 
defendant walking across several front lawns.  Rabourn approached defendant and 
asked for identification.  Defendant backed away and Rabourn took hold of his 
arm.  Defendant struck Rabourn in the face, knocking him off balance.  Defendant 
ran and, after a brief chase and struggle, was arrested.   
2. Defense evidence 
Defendant presented several character witnesses.  Irish Shepherd testified 
that she and her husband were involved with a gospel singing group in the 1970‟s.  
Defendant was a member of the group from 1974 to 1976, was faithful in 
attending rehearsals and performances, and sang a solo on their record album.   
Billie Rachal testified that she met defendant, who was acquainted with her 
son, when both boys were teenagers.  In 1977, when defendant was 21 years old, 
Rachal‟s husband died.  She experienced financial difficulty, and defendant gave 
her $100 as a gift.  In 1987, defendant stopped Rachal as she got out of her car, 
and asked to borrow $10.  She said she did not have the money.  Defendant 
offered to carry in her groceries, but she declined the offer.   
Defendant‟s mother, father, and brother testified.  Defendant was born on 
July 21, 1955, and had an older brother, who was a program analyst with the 
Internal Revenue Service as well as a minister, and a younger sister.  Defendant‟s 
12 
parents had been married for about 39 years.  His father had been a supervisor in a 
machine shop in Oakland before retiring.  Defendant attended church regularly 
while growing up and was well cared for.  Defendant moved out when he was 
about 17 years old, got married, and had six children.  His parents asked the jury 
to spare his life.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. Pretrial Issues 
1. Asserted absence of counsel at lineup  
Defendant contends that he was deprived of his own counsel at the live 
lineup in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal 
Constitution, and therefore all evidence obtained as a result of the lineup should 
have been suppressed.  We disagree.   
a) Factual background 
On January 22, 1988, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence 
obtained in the November 4, 1987, lineup.  The municipal court held an 
evidentiary hearing on the motion.   
After a complaint against defendant had been filed, and at the time the 
November 4 lineup was scheduled, defendant was represented by the Office of the 
Alameda County Public Defender.  On November 2, however, the public defender 
announced an intention to, and on November 3 filed, a declaration of conflict of 
interest.  Also on November 3, the supervising public defender filed a letter 
requesting that the court appoint two counsel — because of the large number of 
witnesses expected at the lineup — for the limited purpose of attending the lineup.  
Assistant Public Defender Allan Hymer, who had been assigned to defendant‟s 
case, contacted the jail to leave a message for defendant that he would no longer 
be representing him, but he anticipated another attorney would be appointed.   
13 
Thomas Surh, who administered the local bar association‟s court-appointed 
attorneys program, testified that the municipal court called his office on November 
2 to notify it of the public defender‟s conflict, and then again on November 3 to 
request two attorneys for the lineup.  Valerie West and Joseph Stephens were 
appointed for this purpose.  Subsequently, on November 6, Michael Ciraolo was 
appointed to represent defendant.   
Stephens and West met with defendant shortly before the lineup on 
November 4, and informed him that the public defender‟s office no longer 
represented him.  Stephens testified that his role was to “see that the lineup was 
conducted in a fair fashion.”  West testified that had she observed irregularities in 
the lineup she would have noted them in her report.  Both attorneys said that in 
their view they did not represent defendant.5  The lineup was videotaped, and the 
videotape was reviewed by the municipal court.   
The court denied the motion to suppress, finding that the lineup was not 
suggestive or unfair, and there was no violation of defendant‟s Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights.  Defendant later unsuccessfully filed in superior 
court a motion to dismiss the information under section 995 because of his 
asserted lack of counsel at the lineup, and a motion to suppress any identification 
evidence from the lineup at trial.  Both motions relied on the testimony adduced in 
the municipal court evidentiary hearing.   
                                              
5  Surh testified that in order to avoid having an attorney who represented a 
client later becoming a witness regarding any irregularities at the lineup, “we 
would not appoint the same attorney to witness a lineup for a particular individual 
and recommend that same attorney to represent the individual.”   
14 
b)  Analysis 
A defendant has a right to counsel at a lineup conducted after the adversary 
judicial process has commenced.  (United States v. Wade (1967) 388 U.S. 218, 
236-237; see Montejo v. Louisiana (2009) 544 U.S. __, __ [129 S.Ct. 2079, 
2085].)  In Wade, the high court observed that in the absence of counsel, an 
accused lacks the ability to effectively “reconstruct at trial any unfairness that 
occurred at the lineup,” and that this inability “ may deprive him of his only 
opportunity meaningfully to attack the credibility of the witness‟ courtroom 
identification.”  (Id. at pp. 231-232; see id. at pp. 236-237.)  Although the court 
left open the question whether “the presence of substitute counsel might not 
suffice where notification and presence of the suspect‟s own counsel would result 
in prejudicial delay,” it also stated that “provision for substitute counsel may be 
justified on the ground that the substitute counsel‟s presence may eliminate the 
hazards which render the lineup a critical stage for the presence of the suspect‟s 
own counsel.”  (Id. at p. 237, fn. 27; see People v. Nichols (1969) 272 Cal.App.2d 
59, 64 [no constitutional violation when a qualified attorney, who could not serve 
at trial, “is appointed by a local judge where a lineup is about to take place”].)   
Indeed, we have observed that “counsel plays only a limited role at the 
lineup itself.”  (People v. Bustamante (1981) 30 Cal.3d 88, 99.)  Thus, “counsel 
„cannot rearrange the personnel, cross-examine, ask those in the lineup to say 
anything or to don any particular clothing or to make any specific gestures.  
Counsel may not insist law enforcement officials hear his objection to procedures 
employed, nor may he compel them to adjust their lineup to his views of what is 
appropriate.‟ ”  (Id. at p. 99, fn. 7.)   
Rather, the “rules requiring the presence of counsel „were adopted for two 
primary reasons:  to enable an accused to detect any unfairness in his 
confrontation with the witness, and to insure that he will be aware of any 
15 
suggestion by law enforcement officers, intentional or unintentional, at the time 
the witness makes his identification.‟ ”  (People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 
312, 368.)  Those purposes were satisfied here.  Stephens and West were present 
at the lineup to detect any unfairness or suggestiveness, and indeed, defendant 
does not assert that any unfairness or suggestiveness occurred.  In sum, 
defendant‟s Sixth Amendment right to counsel at the lineup was not violated.  
Defendant further contends that at the time of the lineup, he was still 
represented by the public defender because no substitution of counsel had been 
approved by defendant or the court.  Not so.  Surh testified that the municipal 
court called his office on November 2 to notify it of the public defender‟s conflict, 
and then again on November 3 to request two attorneys for the lineup.  Under 
these circumstances it is apparent that the court had removed the public defender 
from the case based on the declaration of conflict.  (See Pen. Code, former 
§ 987.2, subd. (a), as amended by Stats. 1986, ch. 1310, § 2, p. 4640; Code Civ. 
Proc., § 284, subd. (2); People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 256.)   
2. Denial of Faretta motions 
Defendant contends the trial court erroneously denied his motions to 
represent himself.  (Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta)).  We 
conclude the trial court properly denied his motions on the basis they were 
untimely.  
a) Factual background 
Defendant appeared for arraignment in municipal court on October 27, 
1987.  On November 6, 1987, Michael Ciraolo was appointed to represent 
defendant, and on November 18, 1987, Michael Berger was appointed as 
cocounsel.  Ciraolo and Berger represented defendant at trial.  James Anderson, 
the prosecutor at trial, also appeared on November 18, 1987.   
16 
The preliminary examination started on December 29, 1987, and was held 
on various dates over the ensuing eight-month period, ultimately concluding on 
August 15, 1988.  
On June 10, 1991, defendant filed a Marsden motion.  (People v. Marsden 
(1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.)  At the June 12, 1991, hearing on the motion, defendant said 
due to limitations on his ability to perform legal research in jail he would need “a 
couple of weeks at the most” to articulate the areas in which he found counsel‟s 
performance inadequate.  The court granted the continuance, and because of the 
court‟s and counsel‟s schedules, the hearing was ultimately held on August 1, 
1991.   
At the August 1 hearing, defendant said that he had been incarcerated for 
nearly four years.  Despite defense counsel‟s statements to defendant when they 
began representing him that they would work closely with him on tactical 
decisions, this had not occurred, and defendant had not been informed of defense 
counsel‟s strategies and preparation.  As a result, defendant lacked confidence 
about proceeding to trial with his present attorneys.  Defendant noted that Mr. 
Ciraolo had only met with him a few times during his nearly four years of 
incarceration, and refused his telephone calls.  Counsel did not adopt defendant‟s 
suggestion made during the preliminary hearing of hiring a Black investigator, 
which he believed would make Black witnesses less reluctant to be interviewed.  
He further observed that at the preliminary hearing defense counsel had failed to 
call any of defendant‟s suggested witnesses or expert witnesses, had not presented 
an affirmative defense despite defendant‟s request to do so, and had failed to 
promptly investigate evidence presented at the hearing which could have resulted 
in “that charge being dropped.”  Defendant further expressed concern that defense 
counsel had refused to let him testify and did not call his other suggested witnesses 
at the section 995 hearing regarding the assistance of counsel at the lineup.  Nor 
17 
had they “exhaust[ed] all avenues on getting that matter resolved” because they 
“felt we were jeopardizing preserving that [issue on] appeal.  But I don‟t expect to 
be convicted of crimes I didn‟t do.”  Ciraolo had told defendant that “if we were to 
start trial we would have about a week[‟s] worth of motions to deal with before 
trial,” but defendant felt “even that is not a sufficient amount of arguments or 
motions to be dealt with in a case . . . such as mine.”  He expressed the view that 
“if there was any concern for me as a client,” Ciraolo would not have told 
defendant he would probably have to withdraw from the case if “the court 
appointed agency doesn‟t agree to pay him more.”  Defendant characterized his 
attorneys as surrogate prosecutors, who appeared to be working against his 
interests.   
Mr. Ciraolo responded that he had been engaged in three capital cases at the 
same time for a long period of time, and had recently completed in the spring of 
1991 a 16-month capital trial with multiple defendants.  He said, “[M]y 
understanding with all my clients, including Mr. Lynch, is that the case that 
occurred first would have the priority.”  Ciraolo said that defendant had been 
informed at the trial setting conferences what the priorities and tentative dates 
were and “had no opposition to those dates and procedures.”  He had met with 
defendant throughout the preliminary hearing, and on three occasions in the nearly 
three years since then.  Ciraolo also noted that the defense case had not been 
presented fully at the preliminary hearing to avoid giving the prosecutor an 
opportunity to negate it at trial, and that defense counsel had been successful in 
having several counts dismissed after the preliminary hearing.  He further 
observed that at the hearing the parties were “dealing with very elderly alleged 
victims and witnesses who for a variety of reasons were not expected to be present 
at the time of trial.”  The prosecution was entitled to and did preserve this 
testimony, a circumstance the defense could not prevent.  Moreover, the 
18 
complexity of the case and the realities of the calendaring system required a 
certain cooperation with the prosecutor.  Cocounsel Mr. Berger said that he met 
with defendant promptly whenever defendant called their office and requested a 
meeting, had written defendant at least twice, and had not been previously aware 
of defendant‟s dissatisfaction with counsel.  The court denied the motion, 
concluding that counsel had properly and adequately represented defendant, and 
observing that most of defendant‟s complaints about counsel related to the 
preliminary hearing, which had concluded nearly three years earlier.  
On September 4, 1991, defendant personally withdrew “his previously-
entered waiver of his right to a speedy trial” and “demand[ed] to be brought to 
trial in this action within sixty days of the filing of this document.”  The matter 
was transferred for trial setting.  On September 11, 1991, the case was assigned to 
Judge Delucchi for trial, or to “such other judge on the team as he may designate.”  
That same day the parties appeared before Judge Delucchi.  Counsel informed the 
court that they had agreed to have the case put over until October 7 for either trial 
setting or reassignment to a different judge.  They also informed the court that the 
statutory time to bring defendant to trial would run on November 1, 1991.6   
                                              
 
6  “A defendant is „brought to trial‟ under section 1382 when the court has 
„committed its resources to the trial, and the parties [are] ready to proceed and a 
panel of prospective jurors [is] summoned and sworn.‟ ”  (People v. Lewis (2001) 
25 Cal.4th 610, 629.)  Under the statute in effect in September 1991, absent good 
cause, dismissal was required “[w]hen a defendant is not brought to trial in a 
superior court within 60 days after the . . . filing of the information . . . except that 
an action shall not be dismissed under this subdivision if it is set for trial on a date 
beyond the 60-day period at the request of the defendant or with the defendant‟s 
consent, express or implied, . . . if the defendant is brought to trial on the date so 
set for trial or within 10 days thereafter.”  (Former § 1382, subd. (b), as amended 
by Stats. 1987, ch. 577, § 1, p. 1889.)  Here, defendant appears to have made a 
general waiver on August 31, 1988, when he waived his right to be brought to trial 
within 60 days of the filing of the information.  The parties appear to have 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
19 
1) Defendant’s first Faretta motion 
On September 27, 1991, defendant filed a typed motion to represent 
himself.  The motion was supported by a memorandum of points and authorities 
and a sworn declaration.  In his declaration, defendant stated he was “knowingly 
and in free will . . . waiving my right to appointed counsel.”  Defendant further 
stated, “I understand the nature of [the] charges and that I am facing the possible 
sentence of death if convicted.”  “I understand . . . I will have to abide by the rules 
of the court, filing motions on a timely basis and having to direct my own 
defense,” and “take action to hire private investigators, co-counsel, [and] ancillary 
defense services . . . .”  “I further understand that I can[]not base an appeal for 
„ineffective assistance of counsel‟ . . . upon my own performance as acting for my 
own counsel, unless circumstances force my „pro-per‟ defense into being 
„ineffective‟ otherwise I am fully responsible for my defense.”  “I believe that as 
the court held in [Faretta], that I do not need to explain my background to the 
court nor is it the court‟s duty to inquire as to why I am electing to exercise my 
right of self-representation. . . . I believe that I only need to fulfill the requirements 
of „knowingly and intelligently‟ doing so.  At this time, I am requesting to have 
the court honor my rights of self-representation. . . . I believe I have met the 
requirements as outlined by Faretta.”  In his memorandum of points and 
authorities, defendant made fewer but similar points, and “pray[ed] to the court to 
grant „Pro-Per Status‟ and to order along with [my] status the use of fif[]teen (15) 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
operated on the assumption that defendant validly waived his speedy trial right in 
1988, and that withdrawal of the waiver meant that trial must be held within 60 
days absent any further waiver of time by defendant.  The parties also appear to 
have operated under the assumption that because 60 days from September 4 was 
November 3, a Sunday, trial had to begin on November 1, or the preceding Friday.     
20 
hours telephone time (non-collect), plus twenty (20) hours use of the typewriter[] 
(both to be per-week).  And all the „Pro-Per‟ privileges accordingly so as to 
facilitate [my] defense as outlined in this motion.”   
On October 7, 1991, the parties appeared for the trial setting or 
reassignment conference, and for defendant‟s Faretta motion.  Judge Delucchi 
stated he would be the trial judge.  At the Faretta hearing in chambers, Judge 
Delucchi said, “Mr. Lynch, you‟ve decided you want to go pro per on your capital 
case[,] correct?”  Defendant replied, “Yes.”  The court read at length from 
defendant‟s declaration, including defendant‟s statements that he requested self-
representation and believed he had met Faretta‟s requirements.  The court further 
recited defendant‟s statements that he believed he needed only to fulfill the 
requirements of a knowing and intelligent exercise of his right of self-
representation, and did not believe he was required to explain his legal or 
educational background to the court or fill out the court‟s self-representation form, 
nor that the court had a duty to inquire as to the reason why defendant was 
exercising his right of self-representation.  The court said, “I assume that‟s still 
your position, Mr. Lynch[,] right?”  Defendant replied, “Yes, it is.”   
The trial court then questioned Mr. Ciraolo about how long he had 
represented defendant, and what work had been performed on the case.  The court 
then asked defendant why he wanted to represent himself.  As defendant began to 
respond, the court interrupted and said, “You know, your life is at stake here, man.  
You know.”  Defendant replied, “Yes, I‟m aware of that.  I‟m also aware of [the] 
charges that I‟m facing.  I‟m also aware of, you know, the consequences that . . . I 
may possibly suffer due to the fact that I . . . represent myself.  But my main 
reason is . . . because I feel that by representing myself, I can sort of somewhat 
guide my case . . . in the direction that I feel it should be going in when . . . 
[defense counsel] Mr. Ciraolo has set up certain strategic . . . ideas or whatever in 
21 
relation to my case.  I‟m not in charge.  He is in charge.”  The court said, “That‟s 
right.”  Defendant continued, “So, therefore, actually, I don‟t have the say-so that I 
feel I should have . . . within my case because, as it is, my life on the line, . . . this 
is what I‟m trying to seek . . . as far as representing myself, exercising my Sixth 
Amendment.”   
The court said, “Now, let me ask you a couple of questions in that regard.  
If you were granted pro per status, I notice here that you were talking about you 
want to take action to hire private investigators.  Correct, you want the Court to 
appoint private investigators in order for you to —.”  Defendant interjected, “I‟m 
not saying that I wouldn‟t use or continue to use the one that I already have.”  The 
court said, “But you need some time; right?”  Defendant said, “Yes.”  The court 
said, “Now, you‟re talking about at least you either want a new private 
investigator or you want to use the one you already have.  So, you want to avail 
yourself of that.  You‟re talking about having co-counsel represent you?”  
Defendant replied, “Possibly, yes.”  The court said, “And you‟re talking about 
ancillary defense service[s].  So, what are you talking about there?  You want the 
pro per privileges in the jail?”  Defendant said, “Of course, yes.”  “You want 
phone calls?”  “Yes.”  “You want a runner?”  Defendant replied that he would like 
“[u]se of [a] typewriter and law library, whatever else is available to a—.”   
The court interjected, “How much time are we talking about here?”  
Defendant said, “Actually, I hadn‟t considered any time as far as . . . how long it 
would take for me to go over . . . some of the . . . evidence and, you know.”  The 
court said, “But [defense counsel] is talking about boxes, boxes of discovery.”  
Defendant said, “That‟s what I‟m saying.”  The court said, “You‟re going to have 
to review all that stuff[,] right?”  Defendant said, “Yes, and there is no way that I 
could say exactly how long that would take.  You know.”  The court said, “You‟re 
talking about months?”  Defendant said, “Yeah.  I‟m not sure.”  The court said, 
22 
“Okay,” and defendant started to speak.  The court said, “Go ahead.  I‟m not 
trying to cut you off.”  Defendant said, “I was just going to say I would like . . . to 
have the right to review or to see for myself what has to be . . . gone over, . . . in 
order to determine . . . the outcome of what . . . I‟m going to do.”  In a question 
apparently directed at defense counsel, the court inquired, “Can you tell me 
roughly how many hours you‟ve spent just reviewing the police reports?”  Mr. 
Ciraolo responded, “Your Honor, I think it would be better if you mention in 
weeks.”  Ciraolo described the prosecution‟s theory that the crimes contained a 
unique modus operandi, and noted that apparently other law enforcement agencies 
had sought to link defendant to similar crimes in their areas.  He stated that there 
were “at least four boxes of reports,” and that review, categorization, and 
consultation with an expert “has been the accumulation of four years of 
preparation.”  The court inquired whether Ciraolo had received the factors in 
aggravation from the district attorney.  He replied that he had not, but that the 
district attorney had informally discussed the subject matter.  Ciraolo was familiar 
with some of the factors, but others were new to him.   
The court asked defendant whether he had seen any of the material 
regarding other cases mentioned by Mr. Ciraolo.  Defendant said “No.”  The court 
said, “So you would need time to review all that stuff, too[,] right?”  Defendant 
said, “Yes.”  The court said that it assumed that once the prosecution filed its 
statement of aggravating factors, defendant would need time to review that also.  
Defendant replied, “Possibly.”  Defendant subsequently added, “But still, after 
reviewing [the] material, then I would be able to . . . say whether or not definitely I 
would need any additional time.”  The court said, “Yeah.  Well, it‟s going to take 
you some time to review the material; right?”  Defendant replied, “I‟m not sure.”  
The court said, “Well, I mean, [defense counsel] spent weeks and weeks reviewing 
it. . . . You can‟t get involved in this case when you‟re talking about your life, Mr. 
23 
Lynch,  . . . just on a shoestring.  Otherwise,  . . . it‟s not a level playing field.  You 
know what I‟m talking about?”  Defendant said, “I understand.  I‟m just 
saying—.”   The court interjected, “I don‟t want to sit up there and have some guy 
just beat you to death because you don‟t know what you‟re doing.  You know 
what I‟m saying?”  Defendant said, “Yeah.”  The court said, “All right.”   
The court then observed the prosecution estimated trial for its case would 
take three to four weeks.  In response to its inquiry, defense counsel said its case 
would take two to three weeks, and that he was not in a position to comment on 
any defense there might be for the penalty phase.   
Defendant said, “What I want to ask you is, I seem to get that everyone 
beside[s] myself is sort of somewhat pushing or ready as of now . . . to go to trial.  
I‟m trying to figure out for what reason are we all of a sudden . . . ready to proceed 
now that, you know, I‟m requesting to exercise my Sixth Amendment rights.”  The 
court replied, “I‟ll give you two reasons.  One, the case is four years old . . . . [¶] 
. . . [¶] . . . Also, you withdrew your time waiver, so you get everybody jumping 
around here putting this case together.  [¶] . . . [¶] . . .  Everybody is ready to go to 
trial now.”  Defendant said, “But, see, actually by me requesting to represent 
myself, that‟s somewhat in a sense requesting to vacate that time waiver.”  The 
court said, “I understand that. . . . [¶] . . . [¶]  Because you‟re going to need more 
time.  I understand that.”  Defendant said, “Because, truthfully, actually, the time 
waiver wasn‟t my idea.  It was my attorney‟s idea because of some strategic move 
or whatever.”  The court said, “Whoever‟s idea it is, . . . when that happens, 
everybody . . . gets ready to go; witnesses start getting subpoenaed; I make time in 
my court, I move cases out of here.  So when you say, hey, I want my trial, we‟ve 
got to give you a trial plan.  So . . . that‟s been started now.  You see?  So this is all 
going toward the trial. . . . [T]his is sent here.  I didn‟t say, send me [defendant]. 
. . .  I didn‟t pick you out of the hat and say, I want to try this guy tomorrow.”   
24 
Defendant responded, “Yeah, well, and actually, also, before now, I‟ve 
tried several times before now to file this motion in the court we [were] in before 
this, and that judge . . . put it off . . . .  So, it‟s just now actually being heard.”  The 
court asked, “When did you try to file this?”  Defendant said, “The last time on 
whatever date, the last time we [were] here, the time before that we [were] in 
Judge —”  The court asked if defendant was referring to Judge Agretelis.  
Defendant said, “I guess that‟s his name.”  Mr. Ciraolo was uncertain if defendant 
had appeared before Judge Agretelis, and wondered if defendant was referring to 
Judge Goodman at the August 1 Marsden hearing.  Defendant did not say whether 
this was correct, but continued, “He says at that time that he didn‟t want to hear 
the particular motion that I was ready to file.”  The court asked if defendant meant 
the September 11, 1991, hearings.  Defendant did not respond.7  The court then 
said, “Okay,” and asked defendant if there was “anything else you want to tell 
me.”  Defendant said, “That about covers it.”   
The court said, “You made it clear you want to rely on this,” apparently 
referring to the Faretta motion.  Defendant said, “Yes.”  When the court asked if 
defendant would refuse to fill out a pro. per. form, defendant said that he would 
review the form, but added that “my motion itself pretty much covers everything 
that‟s in the form.”  The court subsequently inquired, “[Y]ou don‟t think it‟s 
anybody‟s business to inquire as to your past education or legal expertise[,] right?”  
Defendant said, “To a certain degree, yes, to make sure that I‟m competent,  . . . 
and able to understand and conduct myself . . . .”  The court asked, “[H]ave you 
ever represented yourself before?”  Defendant replied, “No I haven‟t.”  The court 
                                              
 
7  The court later noted that according to defendant, “he‟s made an attempt 
to file this pro per motion . . . . in Department One, which would mean it was 
sometime in September of 1991.”   
25 
then asked defense counsel how many Marsden motions had been filed in the case.  
Mr. Ciraolo said “just one,” and added that there might have been one in 
municipal court.8  The court asked, “Now you‟re ready to go to trial[,] right?”  
Ciraolo answered, “We‟re tooled up for it, yes, Your Honor.”   
The remainder of the hearing was held in the presence of the prosecutor.  
The court stated that it had treated defendant‟s “motion as sort of a quasi Marsden 
motion, including a Faretta motion.”  The court added, “I think it‟s apparent that 
he‟s asking that Mr. Ciraolo be removed as attorney and to substitute Mr. Lynch in 
himself as his own attorney.”  After colloquy with the prosecutor, the court 
observed that the waiver of the right to a speedy trial had been withdrawn on 
September 4, 1991, which “requires this Court to bring this case to trial no later 
than” November 1, 1991.  It stated that although the court had pending matters, 
given the “no-time waiver posture,” it was prepared to start pretrial motions on 
October 21, 1991.  The prosecutor observed that he anticipated calling at least 65 
witnesses during the guilt phase.  The  court and the prosecutor discussed the 
circumstance that the surviving victims and certain other witnesses were elderly, 
and the prosecutor observed some witnesses resided outside the San Francisco Bay 
Area.  The prosecutor also stated that more than four years had passed since 
defendant‟s arrest.  He subsequently observed that victim Bessie Herrick and her 
husband Frank had expressed concern about dilatory tactics.  The prosecutor said 
he had assured the Herricks that defense counsel was not engaging in such tactics.  
However, the prosecutor expressed the view that “this eleventh hour request by 
Mr. Lynch is a cruel blow to all the victims in this case.  And I would urge the 
                                              
 
8  The parties do not cite to, and we have not located in the record, a 
Marsden motion before the June 1991 motion filed in superior court.   
26 
Court to deny this motion by him to represent himself and deny him the fruits of 
his dilatory tactic.  Justice delayed is justice denied.”  The prosecutor also 
observed that he had videotaped the testimony of the elderly witnesses at the 
preliminary hearing, and that if trial was delayed, “I‟m not so certain that we 
won‟t be seeing cinema testimony as opposed to live bodies.”  In response to the 
court‟s inquiry as to whether these witnesses were “all available, they are all alert, 
ready to come in and testify,” the prosecutor stated, “They are ready.”   
The court denied defendant‟s Faretta motion.  Citing People v. Frierson 
(1991) 53 Cal.3d 730 (Frierson), it observed that defendant had been represented 
by Mr. Ciraolo for over four years, and that “because of the advanced age of the 
victims,” and “because of the possible delay in the proceedings which might arise 
in the event I granted Mr. Lynch his pro per status, the Court‟s going to rule that 
this motion is not timely made.  We‟re on the eve of the trial.  The trial is to begin 
within two weeks.  There was a time waiver [sic].  The Court‟s made space and 
time available for the trial of this case.  Both sides are prepared to proceed.  And 
so it‟s the Court‟s feeling that it‟s not timely made, so the petition to proceed in 
pro per will be denied for the reasons I‟ve stated on the record.”  The court then 
informed counsel that it expected to begin pretrial motions on October 21, 1991, 
which it understood would take approximately three weeks, and that afterward jury 
selection would begin.   
2) Defendant’s second Faretta motion 
On October 16, 1991, defendant filed a second Faretta motion, which was 
essentially identical to his first motion, discussed above.  He also filed a Marsden 
motion and a motion to disqualify Judge Delucchi.  On October 17, 1991, the 
court denied the disqualification motion as untimely.  It also denied the Faretta 
motion as untimely, noting it had denied defendant‟s earlier Faretta motion on the 
27 
same ground, and “this is even later because we are going to start the pretrial 
motions on Monday in this case.”  After denying the motion, the court said, “Also, 
I think it‟s a dilatory motion.  It doesn‟t have any merit at all except just to 
postpone the proceedings, an attempt to postpone the proceedings further.”  
Regarding the Marsden motion, the court stated that it was defendant‟s third such 
motion, because defendant had filed a motion in June 1991, and defendant‟s 
Faretta motion heard on October 7, 1991, “was essentially a Marsden motion that 
was in conjunction with his Faretta motion.”   
At the in camera hearing on the Marsden motion, defendant expressed 
concern that at the October 7, 1991, hearing on his Faretta motion, “blame was 
shifted to me as far as trying to delay this trial.  I haven‟t been in charge of this 
case for the last four years.”  The court responded, “I shifted it to you.  I said that 
your motion wasn‟t speedy, wasn‟t timely made.”  Defendant said, “You shifted it, 
but after the [district attorney] changed gears . . . . [¶] . . . [¶]  He sat there, and he 
specifically . . . stated that he [was] sure it wasn‟t Mr. Ciraolo‟s dilatory tactics, 
that he‟s trying to imply to delay the trial —.”  The court interjected, “That‟s what  
the [district attorney] said, man.  You believe everything he says?  I made the 
ruling . . . . You‟ve got to understand.  You heard.  You were out there.  You heard 
what the record was.  It‟s too late, man.  These people are old.  You withdrew your 
time waiver[,] right?  You say, I want a trial right now, within 60 days.  [¶] 
. . . [¶] . . . So they assign the case to me.  Right?  It‟s all on the record from last 
time.  I‟m all ready to try this case.  Mr. Ciraolo is ready to try this case.  The 
[district attorney] is ready to try this case.  Now, we‟ve got victims in this case that 
are old people, . . . and they have a right to have a speedy trial, too. . . . All this is 
doing is you‟re trying to do — in my opinion is just to postpone this some more, 
and it‟s not timely made.  There is law on it.  I cited the case, People v. Frierson.”  
Defendant responded, expressing concern that his attorney had not disputed the 
28 
district attorney‟s statement.  He observed, “I haven‟t been in charge of this case 
for the last four years.  It‟s not my fault they‟re just now arriving or coming at a 
trial date.  [¶] . . . [¶]  He‟s been busy with other cases, with other clients.  The 
[district attorney] has been tied up.  So, it‟s not my fault.  It‟s just now that I‟ve 
recently seen that what I have been seeing [makes] . . . me want to exercise my 
Sixth Amendment rights.”  The court said, “And you did.”  Defendant continued, 
“And it wasn‟t untimely.  We haven‟t even started pretrial motions.  We haven‟t 
started selecting the jury.  We haven‟t set a trial date.”  The court said, “If it 
wasn‟t untimely and I made a mistake and you get convicted, we‟ll start all over 
again.”  Defendant said, “I can‟t see how the motion was untimely.”  The court 
said, “Well, there is no point in arguing with you . . . .”  Defendant said, “If you 
bring up the old age clause, you had four years to worry about the old age clause.  
[¶] . . . [¶]  You didn‟t even inquire [into] the fact of why [it is]  . . . that the trial 
is” just now occurring.  The court denied the Marsden motion.9   
3) Judge Sarkisian’s ruling on defendant’s Faretta motion 
On October 23, 1991, Judge Delucchi informed the parties that he had 
reconsidered his earlier ruling, and now found defendant‟s motion to disqualify 
him was timely made.  The court deemed itself disqualified, and as a result set 
aside its October 17, 1991, rulings on defendant‟s second Faretta motion and his 
Marsden motion.  Defendant attempted to withdraw his disqualification motion, 
but the court stated it was too late.   
On October 28, 1991, the parties appeared before Judge Goodman.  The 
court stated its understanding that defendant was “willing to enter a time waiver so 
                                              
 
9  The court also agreed to give defendant a transcript of the October 7, 
1991, hearing on his Faretta motion so that he could challenge the decision in the 
Court of Appeal.   
29 
that this matter can be assigned to Judge Sarkisian for trial with the understanding 
that the trial will commence . . . by way of pretrial motions on November 18 . . . .”  
Mr. Ciraolo said, “That‟s correct,” and that defendant was “willing to give a 
limited time waiver up to and including November 18th.”  Defendant agreed.  The 
court asked defendant if he understood his “time will then start by way of the 
submission of pretrial motions on November 18th or a date sometime before that?”  
Defendant said, “Yes.”   
Also on October 28, 1991, the parties appeared before Judge Sarkisian, who 
eventually presided over the trial.  They stipulated that defendant‟s Faretta and 
Marsden motions would be submitted to Judge Sarkisian “on the transcripts of the 
proceedings that were held before Judge Delucchi.”   
On October 31, 1991, the court denied both motions.  As to the Faretta 
motion, it stated:  “[I]t‟s my independent conclusion from a review of the record[] 
that this request is untimely.  Among the factors that I have considered in 
assessing the defendant‟s request are his prior proclivity to attempt to substitute 
counsel, the stage of the proceedings, and in particular the disruption and the delay 
that might reasonably be expected to follow the granting of his motion.  This 
record indicates that many of the witnesses in this case are elderly.  I will note that 
Mr. Lynch has been represented by present counsel for a number of years.  
Accordingly, in the exercise of my discretion, I am denying the defendant‟s 
motion for self-representation.”  The matter was continued to November 12, 1991, 
for pretrial motions.   
b) Discussion 
A trial court must grant a defendant‟s request for self-representation if the 
defendant unequivocally asserts that right within a reasonable time prior to the 
commencement of trial, and makes his request voluntarily, knowingly, and 
30 
intelligently.  (People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 729; People v. Windham 
(1977) 19 Cal.3d 121, 127-128 (Windham).)  As the high court has stated, 
however, “Faretta itself and later cases have made clear that the right of self-
representation is not absolute.”  (Indiana v. Edwards (2008) 554 U.S. 164, ___ 
[128 S.Ct 2379, 2384]; see Jones v. Barnes (1983) 463 U.S. 745, 751, citing 
Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 806 [“we have held that, with some limitations, a 
defendant may elect to act as his or her own advocate”].)  Thus, a Faretta motion 
may be denied if the defendant is not competent to represent himself (Indiana v. 
Edwards, at p. ___ [128 S.Ct. at p. 2388]), is disruptive in the courtroom or 
engages in misconduct outside the courtroom that “seriously threatens the core 
integrity of the trial” (People v. Carson (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1, 6; see id. at p. 8; 
Faretta, at p. 834, fn. 46), or the motion is made for purpose of delay (People v. 
Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 23 (Marshall)).   
Likewise, we have long held that a self-representation motion may be 
denied if untimely.  (Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d at pp. 127-128.)  Under 
Windham, a motion is timely if made “a reasonable time prior to the 
commencement of trial.”  (Id. at p. 128, fn. omitted.)  “[O]nce a defendant has 
chosen to proceed to trial represented by counsel,” a defendant‟s motion for self-
representation is “addressed to the sound discretion of the court.”10  (Ibid.)  We 
observed that our imposition of a timeliness “requirement should not be and, 
indeed, must not be used as a means of limiting a defendant‟s constitutional right 
                                              
 
10  In assessing an untimely self-representation motion, the trial court 
considers such factors as “the quality of counsel‟s representation of the defendant, 
the defendant‟s prior proclivity to substitute counsel, the reasons for the request, 
the length and stage of the proceedings, and the disruption or delay which might 
reasonably be expected to follow the granting of such a motion.”  (Windham, 
supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 128.)   
31 
of self-representation.”  (Id. at p. 128, fn. 5.)  Rather, the purpose of the 
requirement is “to prevent the defendant from misusing the motion to unjustifiably 
delay trial or obstruct the orderly administration of justice.”  (People v. Burton 
(1989) 48 Cal.3d 843, 852 (Burton).) 
The high court has observed that lower courts generally require a self-
representation motion to be timely, a limitation that reflects that “the government‟s 
interest in ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the trial at times outweighs the 
defendant‟s interest in acting as his own lawyer.”  (Martinez v. Court of Appeal of 
Cal. (2000) 528 U.S. 152, 162.)  Despite this tacit approval of the timeliness 
limitation on the self-representation right, the high court has never delineated 
when a motion may be denied as untimely.  Nor has this court fixed any definitive 
time before trial at which a motion for self-representation is considered untimely, 
or articulated factors a trial court may consider in determining whether a self-
representation motion was filed a reasonable time before trial.    
Along these lines, we have held on numerous occasions that Faretta 
motions made on the eve of trial are untimely.  For example, in Frierson, supra, 
53 Cal.3d at page 742, the case relied on here by the trial court, we held that a self-
representation motion made on September 29, 1986, when trial was scheduled for 
October 1, 1986, was made on “the eve of trial” and was untimely.  (See People v. 
Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 102 [Faretta motion made “moments before jury 
selection was set to begin” deemed untimely]; People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 
1068, 1110 [self-representation motion made on the date scheduled for trial 
untimely]; People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 99-100 (Clark) [case had been 
continued day to day after August 10 “in the expectation that the motions would 
be concluded and jury selection set to begin at any time,” and hence the 
defendant‟s August 13 motion was “in effect the eve of trial” and untimely].)   
32 
Likewise, we have concluded that motions for self-representation made 
long before trial were timely.  (People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 434 
[Faretta motion made seven months before penalty retrial jury selection 
commenced was timely]; People v. Stanley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 913, 932 (Stanley) 
[self-representation motion made one year before the preliminary hearing and 
nearly two years before trial was timely].)11  Nevertheless, our refusal to identify a 
single point in time at which a self-representation motion filed before trial is 
untimely indicates that outside these two extreme time periods, pertinent 
considerations may extend beyond a mere counting of the days between the 
motion and the scheduled trial date.   
Indeed, in People v. Hamilton (1985) 41 Cal.3d 408, 419-420 
(Hamilton I),12 we deemed untimely a self-representation motion made about a 
                                              
 
11  We have also deemed timely motions for self-representation that were 
made in conjunction with a successful motion to relieve defense counsel (People 
v. Joseph (1983) 34 Cal.3d 936, 939-944 [motion made on the day the court had 
relieved defense counsel was timely]), or that immediately followed the dismissal 
of counsel (People v. Dent (2003) 30 Cal.4th 213, 215-217, 221 [motion made on 
the day trial scheduled to begin timely because on that day the court had relieved 
defense counsel and continued the case prior to defendant‟s motion]).   
 
12  In Hamilton I, this court affirmed the judgment of guilt, but set aside the 
special circumstance findings for error under Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 
Cal.3d 131, and accordingly reversed the penalty judgment.  (Hamilton I, supra, 
41 Cal.3d at pp. 413, 431-432.)  The high court granted the Attorney General‟s 
petition for writ of certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case to this 
court for further consideration in light of Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570.  
(California v. Hamilton (1986) 478 U.S. 1017; People v. Hamilton (1988) 45 
Cal.3d 351, 356 (Hamilton II).)   
In Hamilton II, supra, 45 Cal.3d at page 363, we adopted that portion of 
Hamilton I addressing the guilt issues, including the defendant‟s claim that the 
trial court had erred in denying two Faretta motions, as our decision on remand.  
We also discussed the procedural context in which these two motions were made, 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
33 
month before trial.  In Hamilton I, the parties had been engaged in a protracted 
section 1538.5 and section 995 hearing from March 24, 1980, to May 21, 1980.  
(Hamilton II, supra, at p. 363, incorporating Hamilton I, at p. 419.)  At that time, 
trial was scheduled for June 23, 1980.  (Ibid.)  On May 1, 1980, the defendant 
moved for self-representation, but on May 9 he withdrew the motion and sought 
cocounsel status.  That request was granted.  (Ibid.)  On May 20, the defendant 
sought to have his “counsel relieved and new counsel appointed.  [The] 
[d]efendant stated that if that motion were denied, he would then renew his 
motion” for self-representation.  (Ibid.)  Finding that the “defendant did not have 
„a legitimate objection, but [was] only grasping at anything he can think of to 
delay the proceedings,‟ the court denied the motion.”  (Hamilton II, supra, at p. 
366.)  On appeal, we held that the self-representation motion made on May 20 was 
“untimely within the context of this protracted section 1538.5/995 hearing,” and 
the trial court acted within its discretion in denying it.  (Id. at p. 363, incorporating 
Hamilton I, at p. 420.)  Thus, in Hamilton II, we concluded that the defendant‟s 
pretrial self-representation motion, made about a month before trial, was untimely 
in light of the surrounding circumstances.   
Similarly, in People v. Ruiz (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 780, 791, the Court of 
Appeal concluded that a motion made six days before trial was untimely “under 
the circumstances surrounding” the defendant‟s request.  The “motion was made 
on a Friday[,] the hearing was held on the following Monday and trial was 
scheduled to begin Thursday, with both defense and prosecution counsel ready to 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
as well as defendant‟s new claim that the trial court had erred in denying yet 
another Faretta motion made below.  (Hamilton II, at pp. 366-369.)   
34 
proceed and with a serious witness problem at hand.”  (Ibid.)  The prosecutor 
noted he had had “great difficulty” securing the presence of one witness, who was 
under subpoena, and other witnesses had expressed fear of testifying.  (Id. at p. 
785.)  
As Hamilton II and Ruiz demonstrate, timeliness for purposes of Faretta is 
based not on a fixed and arbitrary point in time, but upon consideration of the 
totality of the circumstances that exist in the case at the time the self-
representation motion is made.  An analysis based on these considerations is in 
accord with the purpose of the timeliness requirement, which is “to prevent the 
defendant from misusing the motion to unjustifiably delay trial or obstruct the 
orderly administration of justice.”  (Burton, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 852.)   
Some Ninth Circuit cases contain dicta suggesting that “requests made 
„weeks before trial‟ ” are invariably timely, purporting to divine such a rule from 
Faretta itself.  (E.g., Marshall v. Taylor (9th Cir. 2005) 395 F.3d 1058, 1061.)  It 
is true that the particular request for self-representation in Faretta was made 
“weeks before trial” (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 835), and the high court did 
characterize this as being “[w]ell before the date of trial.”  (Id. at p. 807.)  But 
Faretta nowhere announced a rigid formula for determining timeliness without 
regard to the circumstances of the particular case.  Indeed, the timeliness of the 
request was not even contested in Faretta.  Moreover, the defendant there was 
charged with grand theft (ibid.) — not, as here, with three counts of capital murder 
and two additional counts of attempted murder.  Although of course Faretta 
applies in a capital case, nothing in Faretta or its progeny either expressly or 
implicitly precludes consideration of factors other than the number of weeks 
between the self-representation motion and the trial in determining timeliness in 
this more complex and serious scenario.  Rather, the high court‟s statement in 
Faretta that the defendant‟s motion was “weeks before trial” implies a recognition 
35 
that a motion that interferes with the orderly process of a trial may be denied.  (Id. 
at p. 835; see id. at p. 836 [“forcing Faretta, under these circumstances, to accept 
[counsel] against his will . . . deprived him of his constitutional [self-
representation] right” (italics added)].)   
Indeed, in the related context of the Sixth Amendment right to select 
counsel of one‟s choice, which is also subject to automatic reversal if erroneously 
denied, the high court has “recognized a trial court‟s wide latitude in balancing the 
right to counsel of choice against the needs of fairness [citation], and against the 
demands of its calendar.”  (U.S. v. Gonzalez-Lopez (2006) 548 U.S. 140, 152; see 
Morris v. Slappy (1983) 461 U.S. 1, 11 [“Trial judges necessarily require a great 
deal of latitude in scheduling trials”].)  Thus, a trial court may “make scheduling 
and other decisions that effectively exclude a defendant‟s first choice of counsel.”  
(U.S. v. Gonzalez-Lopez, at p. 152.)  We perceive no principled basis on which to 
deny a trial court the opportunity to similarly consider the needs of fairness and 
the demands of its calendar in ruling on a request for self-representation, or to 
accord the defendant seeking self-representation any greater liberty to do so than 
the defendant seeking to select retained counsel.   
Nor do our prior cases preclude a trial court from considering the totality of 
the circumstances in assessing the timeliness of a request for self-representation.  
Thus, in Marshall, supra, 15 Cal.4th 1, where the defendant‟s self-representation 
motion was made on February 23, 1988, and trial was set to begin on March 28, 
1988, we stated that the high court “has not spoken on the question whether the 
trial court may deny a timely request for self-representation if the motion is 
insincere, ambivalent, or unconsidered . . . .”  (Id. at p. 21.)  We did not decide 
whether this request was timely, however, since we upheld the trial court‟s denial 
of the defendant‟s Faretta motion on the independent ground that the request was 
equivocal.  (Id. at p. 27.)   
36 
In People v. Wilks (1978) 21 Cal.3d 460, 463-464, trial was set for October 
14, 1975, but the prosecutor was not ready to proceed on that date.  The defendant 
moved for self-representation, and the trial judge transferred the case to a different 
department “for hearing „forthwith‟ on the motion regarding representation and for 
trial on November 20th.”  (Id. at p. 464.)  On appeal, we rejected defendant‟s 
claim that the trial court erred in granting his self-representation motion noting, 
“[a] trial court has no discretion to deny an accused‟s valid motion for self-
representation.”  (Id. at p. 467.)  Although it is not clear from our opinion in Wilks 
whether the trial had been scheduled for November 20 before the defendant‟s self-
representation motion, we later stated that “[i]n Wilks . . . the court granted a 
motion for self-representation made over a month before trial was scheduled to 
begin.  [Citation.]  We did not [thereby] establish a hard and fast rule that any 
motion made before trial — no matter how soon before — was timely.”  (Clark, 
supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 99.)  
As noted above, the defendant in Clark filed his motion essentially on “the 
eve of trial.”  (Clark, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 100.)  In distinguishing such a late 
motion from the motion made in Wilks, we did not conclusively determine in 
Clark that a motion made over a month before trial was timely, but merely 
observed that Wilks was not persuasive authority for the defendant‟s eve-of-trial 
motion.  (Id. at p. 99.)     
As can be seen, the high court‟s cases and those of this court guide us to the 
conclusion that a trial court may consider the totality of the circumstances in 
determining whether a defendant‟s pretrial motion for self-representation is timely.  
Thus, a trial court properly considers not only the time between the motion and the 
scheduled trial date, but also such factors as whether trial counsel is ready to 
proceed to trial, the number of witnesses and the reluctance or availability of 
crucial trial witnesses, the complexity of the case, any ongoing pretrial 
37 
proceedings, and whether the defendant had earlier opportunities to assert his right 
of self-representation.   
Here, we conclude the trial court properly denied as untimely defendant‟s 
September 27, 1991, and October 16, 1991, motions for self-representation.  As 
noted above, this case involved three counts of murder and two counts of 
attempted murder.  Each of these counts involved a separate incident.  
Concomitant with these counts were charges of burglary and robbery, allegations 
that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on the elderly attempted 
murder victims, and special circumstance allegations of burglary murder, robbery 
murder, and multiple murder, which if found true subjected defendant to a possible 
death sentence.  The prosecutor anticipated calling at least 65 witnesses at the guilt 
phase.  Discovery was voluminous,13 and trial preparation inherently complex.   
Moreover, this case involved crucial witnesses, as well as victims, who 
were elderly.  The victims and the prosecution had a right to a speedy trial. (Cal. 
Const., art. I, § 29; see Morris v. Slappy, supra, 461 U.S. at p. 14 [“[I]n the 
administration of criminal justice, courts may not ignore the concerns of 
victims”].)  Although the testimony of these witnesses had been preserved on 
videotape, the presentation of live witnesses is the preferred form of evidence.  
(See People v. Reed (1996) 13 Cal.4th 217, 225 [“The fundamental purpose of the 
                                              
 
13  At the time of defendant‟s self-representation motions, former 1054.2 
provided:  “No attorney may disclose or permit to be disclosed to a defendant the 
address or telephone number of a victim or witness . . . unless specifically 
permitted to do so by the court after a hearing and a showing of good cause.”  
(§ 1054.2, added by Prop. 115, approved by voters, Primary Elec. (June 5, 1990).)  
Thus it appears that the addresses and telephone numbers of the victims and 
witnesses would have had to be redacted from the boxes of police reports and 
other material before defendant could have even started reviewing it.   
38 
unavailability requirement is to ensure that prior testimony is substituted for live 
testimony, the generally preferred form of evidence, only when necessary”].)   
In addition, on August 1, 1991, Mr. Ciraolo had informed Judge Goodman 
that there was an October 7 “date to set for trial,” and that the parties‟ 
understanding with the presiding judge was that they would be given a trial date 
about “two weeks of the 7th.”  On September 4, 1991, defendant personally 
withdrew his time waiver and demanded he be brought to trial within 60 days.  At 
the October 7 hearing on defendant‟s first self-representation motion, the defense 
said it was ready for trial.  Pretrial motions were expected to begin two weeks 
later, and trial to commence about three weeks after that.  A case that had endured 
significant delay was finally nearing resolution.   
Although our review of the record demonstrates that the nearly four-year 
delay in this case cannot be attributed to defendant, he did not thereby escape any 
responsibility for timely invoking his right to self-representation.  We note that at 
the August 1 hearing on defendant‟s first Marsden motion, he gave no explanation 
for why he had waited nearly three years to express concern about counsel‟s 
perceived deficiencies at the preliminary hearing; and that defendant inexplicably 
waited until after his disqualification motion had been granted by Judge Delucchi 
to seek to withdraw it.  Similarly, defendant, who had been represented by the 
same counsel nearly since his arrest, gave no explanation at the hearings on his 
self-representation motions why he had waited nearly four years, or until the 
parties were prepared to proceed to trial, to seek self-representation.  He simply 
announced at the October 7, 1991, hearing that because his life was “on the line,” 
he should be in charge.  Clearly this was a circumstance of which he was aware 
well before the filing of his first motion on September 27, 1991, but, at the 
October 17 hearing on his second motion, he offered only the feeble explanation 
that “[i]t‟s just now that I‟ve recently seen that what I have been seeing 
39 
[makes] . . . me want to exercise my Sixth Amendment rights[] [¶] . . . [¶] . . . to 
represent myself.”   
Moreover, at the October 7 hearing on his first self-representation motion, 
defendant did not dispute that he would need time to investigate and prepare, and 
replied both “Yeah” and “not sure” when asked if he was “talking about months” 
of time to do so.  Indeed, he said he needed time to review the discovery and other 
materials before he could tell the court how much additional time he would 
require, expressed confusion that “everyone beside[s] myself is . . . ready as of 
now . . . to go to trial,” and characterized his self-representation motion as 
“vacat[ing]” his recent withdrawal of his time waiver.  The reasonable import of 
these comments is that if the self-representation motion had been granted, 
defendant would have required an undetermined amount of time to investigate and 
prepare for trial.  A trial court may properly consider the delay inherently caused 
by such uncertainty in evaluating timeliness.  (See Morris v. Slappy, supra, 461 
U.S. at p. 11 [“Trial judges necessarily require a great deal of latitude in 
scheduling trials”]; cf. U.S. v. Gonzalez-Lopez, supra, 548 U.S. at p. 152 
[recognizing a “trial court‟s wide latitude in balancing the right to counsel of 
choice against the needs of fairness [citation], and against the demands of its 
calendar”].)   
In light of all these circumstances, defendant‟s self-representation motions 
were properly deemed untimely.  Thus, the trial court had discretion to deny the 
motions, and acted well within its discretion in doing so on the grounds that 
certain witnesses including the surviving victims were elderly, the parties were 
otherwise prepared to proceed, defendant had offered no justification for his 
untimely request to represent himself, and granting the motion was reasonably 
likely to result in substantial delay and disruption of the proceedings.   
 
40 
3. Excusing prospective jurors for cause due to their views 
concerning the death penalty  
Defendant contends the trial court erroneously excused four prospective 
jurors because of their views regarding the death penalty in violation of his rights 
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution.  We 
disagree.   
a) Factual background 
1) Excusal of Prospective Juror K.M.   
In Prospective Juror K.M.‟s questionnaire, when asked her feelings about 
the death penalty, she wrote, “If the crime was of the nature to warrant the death 
penalty I believe it should be done.”  During voir dire, the court inquired whether 
K.M. would “automatically vote for the death penalty regardless of what evidence 
might be presented” at the penalty phase.  She responded, “I do believe in the 
death penalty, but I don‟t know if I could be the person who says, okay, this is it, 
you have to decide whether this person gets it or not.  I don‟t know if I could 
really do it.”  The court subsequently inquired, “I want you to assume that you, 
personally, have decided that the factors in aggravation are so substantial that you 
personally do believe in your heart that the death penalty is the appropriate 
punishment. . . .  [¶] . . . [¶]  If that was your decision, the law then would require 
you to come down into this courtroom, sit where you are and, basically, say so, 
yes, that is my decision, it is my decision that death is the appropriate penalty 
under all of the circumstances.  Could you do that?”  K.M. responded, “I think so. 
[¶]  [¶] There would have to be absolutely elimination of everything to the point 
that that is the only thing left to do.”  The court asked what she meant by 
“elimination of everything?”  K.M. responded, “[A]ny other thoughts, thinking 
there is a chance that he should have life rather than death.  I would have to just 
clear it out in my mind completely.”   
41 
The prosecutor asked K.M., “If you think the death penalty is 
appropriate, . . . you are going to have to come down and announce in open court, 
in front of Mr. Lynch, in front of his defense attorneys, Judge Sarkisian, in front of 
me and maybe a packed courtroom, that you, [K.M.], are voting to impose the 
death penalty, knowing that that is going to be the first step which leads to his 
execution by lethal gas, strapped in a chair in the gas chamber in San Quentin 
sometime in the future, do you understand that?”  K.M. responded, “Yes, I do.”  
The prosecutor then asked, “Your vote for death, you are one-twelfth of the thing 
that‟s going to put him in that gas chamber, you realize that?”  K.M. said, “Yes.”  
The prosecutor said, “Okay.  My question to you is:  Can you do that?  Can you be 
part and parcel of a panel of people which sends somebody to their death?”  K.M. 
responded, “No, I honestly cannot give a direct answer to that because I don‟t 
know how I could live with myself.  Can I actually be part of a group that would 
say this man has to die?”  After further colloquy, the prosecutor said, “We have to 
know.  Can you do it?”  K.M. responded, “[W]hen you think something in your 
mind one way and then when it comes right down to it, like you say, I don‟t know, 
so I guess the answer would have to be, no, wouldn‟t it?”   
In response to questioning by defense counsel, K.M. said, “I don‟t want to 
be . . . the final person to say, okay, do it.”  K.M. also agreed with defense 
counsel, however, that there were circumstances in which she could return a death 
penalty verdict, and that she would keep an open mind and hear all of the facts and 
circumstances before she decided.   
The court told K.M. that she “sounded like a different person” when she 
answered defense counsel‟s questions than when she answered the prosecutor‟s 
questions, but explained, “I have to make sure I understand your views.  My sense 
of your views are — and I want you to correct me if I am wrong — that you do 
believe in the death penalty, and you think there are certain cases that warrant the 
42 
death penalty, but that your views are such that even if you personally determined 
that death was the appropriate penalty under all of the circumstances in this case, 
you could not come down into open court, face Mr. Lynch, and announce that that 
is your vote, knowing that that is going to cause him to be put to death in the gas 
chamber, . . . am I correct?”  K.M. responded, “Yes.”   
The prosecutor challenged K.M. for cause.  Defense counsel opposed the 
challenge.  The trial court sustained the challenge, stating:  “I was carefully 
listening to her answers.  I was carefully observing her demeanor as she answered 
the questions.  She gave, at least arguably, I think more than arguably, inconsistent 
or equivocal answers, and I‟m satisfied that her views on capital punishment 
would prevent or substantially impair the performance of her duties as a juror in 
accordance with the court‟s instructions and her oath.”   
2) Excusal of Prospective Juror O.C.   
In Prospective Juror O.C.‟s questionnaire, when asked her feelings about 
the death penalty, she wrote, “I feel that the death penalty should be imposed on 
certain individual[s] but not all.  Also I‟m not against or in favor of it.”  On voir 
dire, the court asked O.C. whether the crimes in this case were “serious enough 
where the death penalty is a possibility or not?”  It observed that some individuals 
would say that “this type of crime, it‟s terrible, but it‟s not so terrible that I would 
. . . ever vote for death, life in prison is always going to be fine.”  O.C. responded, 
“I would say probably life in prison.”  The prosecutor challenged her.   
Defense counsel inquired whether O.C. would vote for the death penalty if 
it were on the ballot.  She said, “I don‟t know.  I don‟t believe so.  I don‟t think.”  
Defense counsel also asked whether the facts and circumstances of this case were 
such that she could vote for the death penalty.  O.C. responded, “Possibility.”  
Defense counsel asked, “Think about it and do it?”  She said, “Possibility, yes.”  
43 
“Do you think you could?”  “Probably so.”  Defense counsel then opposed the 
challenge.  
The prosecutor asked O.C., “Do you think you could ever personally vote 
to send somebody to die in the gas chamber?”  O.C. responded, “I don‟t think so.”  
The prosecutor said, “Because if you sit in judgment in this case, you and the other 
jurors are going to have to make that choice.  And if you think that the death 
penalty is appropriate, you are going to come down here in open court and you are 
going to have to say I, [O.C.] [am] voting to send that man at the end of the table 
to die in prison, in the gas chamber, could you do that?”  O.C. responded, “I don‟t 
believe so.”   
The trial court sustained the challenge, stating:  “I have been observing this 
prospective juror, her demeanor and listening to her responses, . . . and I‟m 
satisfied that her views on capital punishment would prevent or substantially 
impair the performance of her duties as a juror in accordance with her instructions 
and her oath.”   
3) Excusal of Prospective Juror L.K.   
In Prospective Juror L.K.‟s questionnaire, when asked her feelings about 
the death penalty, she wrote, “I do believe in the death penalty if warranted.”  On 
voir dire, in response to the trial court‟s question regarding whether L.K. would 
invariably vote for the death penalty, L.K. stated, “[T]o be perfectly honest, I don‟t 
know exactly what kind of verdict I would give.  I don‟t feel comfortable with 
either penalty. . . .  I don‟t want to have to be put in the position to make that 
decision.  If I‟m going to have to, I‟m going to have to.  But I‟d rather not say at 
this point.”  The trial court assured L.K. that “[n]o one is going to ask you this 
afternoon which punishment you would vote for.”  L.K. subsequently responded 
“Yes,” when asked by the court if she honestly believed that she would be “open 
44 
to the possibility of voting for either punishment, depending upon the totality of 
the evidence presented.”   
The prosecutor asked L.K. to explain her statement that she was not 
comfortable with either penalty.  L.K. responded, “I‟m not comfortable making a 
decision for somebody else.  That‟s all.”  He also asked, “Let‟s assume you and 
the 11 others . . . feel the death penalty is warranted.  You are going to have to 
come down to open court and announce that verdict in open court that you are 
voting for the death penalty.  You realize that?”  L.K. responded in the affirmative.  
The prosecutor then asked, “Do you know what the ramifications of that death 
penalty vote are going to be?”  “No.  I don‟t understand.”  “Well, if you vote for 
the death penalty, you and 11 others, you are going to be one-twelfth, you, 
yourself, are one-twelfth of a panel of people which are recommending that Mr. 
Lynch be put to death in the gas chamber, you realize that?”  L.K. responded, 
“Yes.”  The prosecutor said, “And if you vote for death, it‟s going to happen 
sometime in the future.”  L.K. said, “Yes.”  The prosecutor subsequently described 
individuals who said they believed in the death penalty if it was called for, but 
then were unable to choose the death penalty as a verdict even though they 
believed the defendant deserved that penalty.  He asked L.K., “Do you have any 
feelings as to that?”  She responded, “Yeah.  That‟s why I say I‟m not comfortable 
in making the decision.  I believe that, but like I said, I‟m not comfortable in 
making the decision.”   
The court inquired whether L.K. could come into court and announce her 
decision if she were to conclude that death was the appropriate penalty under all 
the circumstances.  L.K. responded, “It‟s hard to say, to tell you the truth.”  The 
court said, “Well, if that was your vote, the jury would be polled, and you would 
be asked if it was your decision to vote for the death penalty.  And if that was your 
decision, it would be your duty to answer „Yes.‟  Are you telling me that you don‟t 
45 
think you can do that or you are not sure that you could do that if you personally 
determined upstairs that death was the appropriate punishment after this 
determining process?”  L.K. responded, “No, I don‟t.”  The prosecutor challenged 
L.K., defense counsel said, “Submitted,” and the trial court sustained the 
challenge.  The court stated:  “I will indicate I‟ve been carefully listening to the 
juror‟s responses, and it‟s my view that her views are such that . . . they would 
prevent or substantially impair the performance of her duties as a juror in 
accordance with the court‟s instructions and oath.”   
4) Excusal of Prospective Juror R.P.   
In Prospective Juror R.P.‟s questionnaire, when asked her feelings about 
the death penalty, she appeared to write, “fine.”  On voir dire by the court, she 
responded, “No,” when asked if she would invariably impose the death penalty.  
The court then asked whether she felt that the crimes in this case were “serious 
enough where the death penalty could possibly apply?”  R.P. responded, “Well, if 
the second trial is evidence, you know, warrants it or I think maybe it proves up to 
a certain point, yes, that — that could be possible.”  The court subsequently said, 
“So I take it from your answers that if at the end of the case you thought that the 
death penalty was the appropriate punishment, if you felt the aggravating 
circumstances were so bad, and death was really the appropriate punishment that 
you could vote for the death penalty, am I correct?”  R.P. responded, “I guess so.”  
At the end of voir dire by the court, it inquired whether there was anything else 
R.P. “would like to tell us concerning your views on the death penalty . . .?”  R.P. 
responded, “Well, it was [sic] just have to be so horrible, you know, beyond 
wildest imagination, before I could just say somebody got to die.”  The court said, 
“Well, you have heard . . . the general descriptions of what you will have decided 
happened.  If we ever reach a penalty trial.  And let me just again ask you 
46 
preliminarily, are those crimes serious enough where the death penalty could 
possibly apply?”  R.P. responded, “No, not really.”  The prosecutor challenged 
R.P., defense counsel submitted the matter, and the court sustained the challenge.  
The court stated:  “I have been carefully observing [R.P.] and listening to her 
responses.  While there might be arguably inconsistent or equivocal responses, it is 
my conclusion that her views on capital punishment would prevent or substantially 
impair the performance of her duty in accordance with her instructions and oath.”   
b) Analysis 
“The federal constitutional standard for dismissing a prospective juror for 
cause based on his or her views of capital punishment is „ “[w]hether the juror‟s 
views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a 
juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.” ‟ ”  (People v. Friend 
(2009) 47 Cal.4th 1, 56 (Friend), quoting Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 551 U.S. 1, 7.)  
“The standard of review of the court‟s ruling regarding the prospective juror‟s 
views on the death penalty is essentially the same as the standard regarding other 
claims of bias.  If the prospective juror‟s statements are conflicting or equivocal, 
the court‟s determination of the actual state of mind is binding.  If the statements 
are consistent, the court‟s ruling will be upheld if supported by substantial 
evidence.”  (People v. Horning (2004) 34 Cal.4th 871, 896-897.)   
No error appears in excusing these prospective jurors for cause.  The record 
here, set forth above, demonstrates that the prospective jurors equivocated with 
respect to their ability to follow the law concerning imposition of the death 
penalty.  The trial court was in a position, which we are not, to view their 
demeanor, and its determination of their state of mind is binding.  “Deference to 
the trial court is appropriate because it is in a position to assess the demeanor of 
the venire, and of the individuals who compose it, a factor of critical importance in 
47 
assessing the attitude and qualifications of potential jurors.”  (Uttecht v. Brown, 
supra, 551 U.S. at p. 9.)   
Defendant contends that the responses of Prospective Juror R.P. do not 
support her removal for cause.  As set forth above, the prosecutor challenged R.P. 
after voir dire by the court.  Defense counsel did not question R.P., or object to the 
prosecutor‟s challenge, but merely submitted the matter.  “Hence, as a practical 
matter, he „did not object to the court‟s excusing the juror, but . . . also refused to 
stipulate to it.‟ ”  (People v. Schmeck (2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 262 (Schmeck), 
quoting People v. Cleveland (2004) 32 Cal.4th 704, 734.)  Although this court has 
concluded that a failure to object does not forfeit the Witherspoon-Witt issue on 
appeal, the high court has recognized that a reviewing court “nevertheless take[s] 
into account voluntary acquiescence to, or confirmation of, a [prospective] juror‟s 
removal.”  (Uttecht v. Brown, supra, 551 U.S. at p. 18; see Wainwright v. Witt 
(1985) 469 U.S. 412, 434-435 [in light of defense counsel‟s failure to question the 
prospective juror or object to her excusal for cause, “it seems that . . . no one in the 
courtroom questioned the fact that her beliefs prevented her from sitting”]; 
Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510; Cleveland, at pp. 734-735 [defense 
counsel‟s failure to object suggests “counsel concurred in the assessment that the 
juror was excusable”].)  Moreover, “[b]y failing to object, the defense did not just 
deny the conscientious trial judge an opportunity to explain his judgment or 
correct any error.  It also deprived reviewing courts of further factual findings that 
would have helped to explain the trial court‟s decision.”  (Uttecht v. Brown, supra, 
551 U.S. at p. 18.)  Under these circumstances, defendant has little cause to 
challenge the excusal of Prospective Juror R.P. on the ground that the record does 
not clearly demonstrate her bias.  Moreover, we defer as we must to the trial 
court‟s evaluation of the prospective juror‟s demeanor, which the court expressly 
stated it had carefully observed, together with her responses.  The trial court was 
48 
entitled to credit Juror R.P.‟s statement that she would not consider death as a 
potential penalty in this proceeding.     
Defendant contends the prosecutor‟s description of what Prospective Jurors 
K.M., O.C., and L.K. would be required to do if they chose death as the 
punishment was misleading, and intentionally invoked “graphic images, and 
inflammatory language to cause [the prospective jurors] to recoil and shrink from 
the task at hand.”  Not so.  The prosecutor simply inquired whether the jurors 
would be able to affirm in open court a vote for a death verdict.  We recently 
rejected a similar challenge in People v. Bramit (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1221, in which 
the prosecutor asked on voir dire:  “ „Is there anyone who feels they could not 
return [a death verdict] if justice demanded it and say, “Yes, I voted for the death 
of this person.” ‟ ”  We concluded that the “predicate of the question was sound” 
because “[j]urors must be prepared to affirm their verdicts.”  (Id. at p. 1235, citing 
§§ 1149, 1163, fn. omitted.)  Likewise, in People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 
795, 853, we rejected a claim the prosecutor committed misconduct when he 
inquired of prospective jurors “whether, if polled after returning a sentence of 
death, they could „stand up and tell‟ defendant or „look at the defendant‟ and tell 
him that their verdict was death.”  We observed:  “By its choice of questions, the 
prosecution evidently sought to shed light upon the prospective jurors‟ views of 
capital punishment in order to enforce their appreciation of the gravity of the 
decision regarding a sentence of death.  The prosecution‟s use of such phrases as 
„look at the defendant‟ was an acceptable means of impressing upon each 
prospective juror that the verdict of death would affect a real person who would be 
in the courtroom at that time, and sought to elicit whether, under these 
circumstances, the prospective juror nevertheless would be able to vote for death.  
The inquiry therefore was directed toward ascertaining whether each prospective 
juror‟s views concerning capital punishment would „ “ „ “prevent or substantially 
49 
impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions 
and his oath.” ‟ ” ‟ ”  (Ibid.)  
Defendant further contends that this court “has taken a wrong turn” in 
deeming as binding a trial court‟s finding of substantial impairment when the juror 
has equivocated in his or her responses with respect to an ability to follow the law 
concerning imposition of the death penalty.  We have repeatedly rejected this 
claim, and the “high court‟s most recent ruling on this subject reaffirms that 
deference to the trial court is appropriate when the prospective juror‟s remarks are 
ambiguous or equivocal.”  (People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 483, referring 
to Uttecht v. Brown, supra, 551 U.S. at p. 9; see e.g., Schmeck, supra, 37 Cal.4th 
at pp. 262-263.) 
In sum, we conclude that the trial court did not err in excluding the four 
prospective jurors for cause. 
4. Failure to sever counts  
Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his pretrial motion to 
sever the counts, in violation of his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution and parallel state 
constitutional provisions,14 in that the evidence was not cross-admissible on the 
issue of identity.  We disagree.   
                                              
 
14  In this and certain other appellate claims defendant contends the asserted 
error infringed upon his constitutional rights.  “In those instances where he did not 
present constitutional theories below, it appears that either (1) the appellate claim 
is one that required no objection to preserve it, or (2) the new arguments are based 
on factual or legal standards no different from those the trial court was asked to 
apply, but raise the additional legal consequence of violating the Constitution.  „To 
that extent, defendant‟s new constitutional arguments are not forfeited on appeal.‟  
(People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 441, fn. 17.)  No separate constitutional 
discussion is required, or provided, when rejection of a claim on the merits 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
50 
Defendant concedes that the charged offenses here were of the same class, 
and accordingly joinder was permissible under section 954.  “Where the statutory 
requirements for joinder are met, the defendant must make a clear showing of 
prejudice to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion.”  (People v. 
Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1128 (Zambrano).)   
“In determining whether a trial court abused its discretion under section 
954 in declining to sever properly joined charges, „we consider the record before 
the trial court when it made its ruling.‟ ”  (People v. Soper (2009) 45 Cal.4th 759, 
774 (Soper), quoting Alcala v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1205, 1220 
(Alcala).)  “The relevant factors are whether (1) the evidence would be cross-
admissible in separate trials, (2) some charges are unusually likely to inflame the 
jury against the defendant, (3) a weak case has been joined with a strong case, or 
with another weak case, so that the total evidence may unfairly alter the outcome 
on some or all charges, and (4) one of the charges is a capital offense, or joinder of 
the charges converts the matter into a capital case.”  (Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th 
at pp. 1128-1129.)  “[I]f evidence underlying the offenses in question would be 
„cross-admissible‟ in separate trials of other charges, that circumstance normally is 
sufficient, standing alone, to dispel any prejudice and justify a trial court‟s refusal 
to sever the charged offenses.”  (Alcala, supra, at p. 1221; see Zambrano, supra, at 
p. 1129.)  “[A] jury may consider properly admissible „other crimes‟ evidence so 
long as it finds „by a preponderance of the evidence‟ that the defendant committed 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
necessarily leads to rejection of any constitutional theory or „gloss‟ raised for the 
first time here.”  (People v. Loker (2008) 44 Cal.4th 691, 704, fn. 7.) 
51 
those other crimes.”  (Alcala, supra, at p. 1224, fn. 14; see Soper, supra, at p. 
778.)   
We have explained that “there exists a continuum concerning the degree of 
similarity required for cross-admissibility, depending upon the purpose for which 
introduction of the evidence is sought:  „The least degree of similarity . . . is 
required in order to prove intent.  [Citation.]  . . .  In order to be admissible [for 
that purpose], the uncharged misconduct must be sufficiently similar to support the 
inference that the defendant “ „probably harbor[ed] the same intent in each 
instance.‟ ” ‟ ”  (Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 776, italics omitted, quoting People 
v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 402 (Ewoldt).)  “By contrast, a higher degree of 
similarity is required to prove common design or plan, and the highest degree of 
similarity is required to prove identity.”  (Soper, at p. 776, fns. omitted.)   
“For identity to be established, the uncharged misconduct and the charged 
offense must share common features that are sufficiently distinctive so as to 
support the inference that the same person committed both acts.  [Citation.]  „The 
pattern and characteristics of the crimes must be so unusual and distinctive as to be 
like a signature.‟ ”  (Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 403.)  The inference of identity, 
however, “need not depend on one or more unique or nearly unique common 
features; features of substantial but lesser distinctiveness may yield a distinctive 
combination when considered together.”  (People v. Miller (1990) 50 Cal.3d 954, 
987 (Miller).)  Moreover, “the likelihood of a particular group of geographically 
proximate crimes being unrelated diminishes as those crimes are found to share 
more and more common characteristics.”  (Id. at p. 989.)     
In Soper, two homicides occurred within four months of each other at 
campsites that were easy walking distance from each other, forensic evidence tied 
the defendant to each crime scene, and witnesses linked the defendant to each 
victim close to the time of death.  (Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 778, fn. 14.)  We 
52 
agreed with the People that this evidence appeared to be cross-admissible on the 
issue of identity.  (Id. at p. 779.)  Likewise, in Alcala, we concluded that evidence 
that each of the five homicide victims was a young, single, Caucasian female who 
was discovered unclothed or nude from the waist down, all of the homicides 
involved blunt-force facial trauma and appeared to involve a sexually sadistic 
motive, and the offenses occurred within a 19-month period, supported a 
conclusion by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was the 
perpetrator in each homicide.  (Alcala, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1224.) 
In Miller, we found numerous common features among four murders and 
four attempted murders, including that all of the victims were homosexual, and 
most were attacked “shortly after leaving gay bars.”  (Miller, supra, 50 Cal.3d at 
p. 988.)  These two features were the most distinctive, and “by themselves 
create[d] at least a reasonable suspicion that the crimes [were] related . . . .”  
(Ibid.)  We further found additional common features, which viewed in the 
aggregate, were “highly significant because of their number.”  (Ibid.)  These 
included the circumstances that “all but one of the crimes occurred in West 
Hollywood”; “all the attacks occurred on a weekend or holiday” and around 
midnight; “all but one of the attacks occurred near the curb on a quiet side street”; 
“all the victims were attacked with a blunt instrument” and received blows to the 
head; a car similar to the defendant‟s “was seen in the vicinity of at least two of 
the murders”; all four murder victims and one attempted murder victim were 
“found without wallet, money, or identification”; “offers of marijuana, or evidence 
of possible marijuana use, were present in a number of the crimes”; and the attacks 
apparently occurred without warning.  (Ibid.)  Taken together, these common 
characteristics logically operated to set the murders and attempted murders “apart 
from other crimes of the same general variety and, in so doing, tend[ed] to 
53 
strongly suggest that defendant was the perpetrator of all eight crimes.”  (Id. at p. 
989.) 
Here, the evidence produced at the preliminary hearing, which was 
substantially similar to the evidence later presented at trial and described ante, at 
pages 2-7, was cross-admissible on the issue of identity.  All of the attacks 
occurred within a two-month period in the nearly adjacent communities of San 
Leandro and Hayward.  All of the victims were Caucasian elderly women who 
were attacked in their homes.  Three of the victims lived in corner houses; Durham 
lived next to and had regular access to her daughter‟s corner house; and 
Figuerido‟s house was separated from the next building on the left by an empty 
one-half acre.  All of the victims suffered blunt trauma to the head, and either were 
robbed or robbery was attempted.  Figuerido, Constantin, Herrick, and Durham 
were attacked during the day, and the jury could reasonably infer Larson‟s death 
also occurred during the day, based on the circumstance that she did not answer 
her telephone during the afternoon, even though she had plans to meet with a 
friend, and that she failed to move her car.  Defendant was identified at or near the 
victim‟s house for each incident, and in the case of Constantin, he sold jewelry 
belonging to Vickie Constantin the same afternoon her mother was attacked, and 
gave away more jewelry taken from that residence to an acquaintance several days 
later.  As in Soper, Alcala, and Miller, this evidence supports a conclusion by a 
preponderance of the evidence that defendant was the perpetrator in each crime.   
For these same reasons we reject defendant‟s further claim that even if the 
trial court‟s denial of the severance motion was correct when made, it produced in 
hindsight “ „ “a gross unfairness . . . such as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial 
or due process of law.” ‟ ”  (Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1130.)  Indeed, the 
jury found defendant not guilty of the attempted murders of Bessie Herrick and 
54 
Ruth Durham, and the robbery of Pearl Larson, demonstrating it carefully 
reviewed the evidence for each individual count.   
 
B. Guilt Phase Issues 
1. Removal of Juror R.A.  
Defendant contends the trial court erred in removing Juror R.A. for cause in 
violation of section 1089 and defendant‟s rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution and article I, sections 15-17 of 
the state Constitution.  We disagree. 
a) Factual background 
On February 24, 1992, one of the jurors informed the court by telephone 
that Juror R.A. had smelled of alcohol during the trial the previous week.  The 
following morning, the court and counsel met in chambers with the juror who had 
made the allegation, and, at the end of the day, with Juror R.A.  The court said to 
R.A., “It has been brought to my attention that one or more members of the jury 
may have consumed alcoholic beverages during the course of one or more of the 
court days last week . . . . I am going to talk to other people, but I need to ask you 
a question or two. . . . Have you or to your knowledge have any other members of 
the jury had anything alcoholic to drink during the course of the court day itself?”  
R.A. replied, “No way.”  The court said, “All right,” thanked R.A., and ordered 
him not to speak to any person about their discussion.  After further exchange 
between the court and Juror R.A., R.A. said he had been involved in a number of 
arbitrations, and had been told at the outset, “no way you guys go out and 
consume alcohol in an arbitration case.  This is the first time I ever heard of 
something going on in a superior court.”  The court responded, “This may well be 
something not going on.  I‟ll tell you, in all candor, we talked to others, [we] may 
be talking to other people.  That‟s why we try to do it individually and without 
55 
disrupting things, and we‟re not singling out any individuals . . . .  That‟s why we 
wanted to be somewhat discreet about it.”  After further colloquy between the 
court and R.A., the court thanked him once again, said they would see him in the 
morning, and R.A. said, “Okey dokey.”   
After Juror R.A. left, the court said Juror R.A. appeared shocked at the 
allegation, and appeared “cold stone sober.”  It also noted that it had observed 
R.A. throughout the day, and at one point during the playing of a video stood next 
to him, and “observed nothing out of the ordinary. . . . As far as I‟m concerned, 
there is absolutely nothing or no basis at this stage that I can see whereby I could 
find that he is unable to perform his duties or just anything other than to accept his 
statement that he is not drinking.”  The court concluded, “From everything I have 
been able to see, he‟s at least as attentive as others.  As far as I‟m concerned, this 
is the end of the matter.”  Neither party disagreed.   
On February 26, the morning following the conference in chambers, Juror 
R.A. told the bailiff “he was somewhat upset about the subject” of the conference, 
and noted “he had felt some embarrassment and was concerned about that.”  The 
court immediately notified counsel, and the decision was made to speak with R.A. 
the next day.   
The following morning, at the conference in chambers with Juror R.A., the 
court told him that it wanted to “assure you that there wasn‟t, and there is no intent 
on my part to embarrass you or any other member of the jury, nor is there any 
intent to suggest in any way that I, or anybody else, thinks for a single minute that 
you cannot continue to serve as a trial juror in this case.  I am sure you can 
understand I have a duty to make an inquiry when I receive certain information, 
even though that information proves to be completely inaccurate.  These things 
happen all the time, and you were not the only juror to whom we spoke. . . . I and 
all counsel have every confidence that you will continue to follow the oath that 
56 
you took, and that you will be able to render a just verdict on this case, based 
solely on the evidence presented in accordance with the court‟s instructions.”  The 
court reminded R.A. not to speak to anyone concerning the matter, thanked him, 
and apologized “for any confusion or embarrassment that I may have caused you.”  
It then said, “We‟re now going to recess this proceeding and reconvene in open 
court.”   
Juror R.A. said, “Do you mean I don‟t have a say?”  The court said, “What 
would you like to say?”  R.A. responded:  “When I left your chambers Tuesday, I 
was furious, I was furious.  Someone made an allegation against me, I don‟t know 
who it was.  The thing I was most concerned with was the fact that in the — in the 
past, when it came to serving any type of jury trial, I felt that if the defendant did 
not want to get up on the stand, and look his accuser in the eye and say, „I did not 
do it,‟ I was prejudiced against him.  That automatically made me think, if he did 
not want to get up here and do it, I automatically thought it was, you know, I 
would be prejudiced against the case.  And here, something had occurred, I don‟t 
know when, where, how, but somebody, in my mind, made an accusation against 
me.  And I cannot look that same person in the eye and say, „Hey, wait a minute, 
this, you know, this did not occur and I want to know why you‟re making these 
allegations against me.‟  And it‟s really kind of shaken my faith as far as, I guess, 
proceedings down here in this building.  I have been called for jury trial in the past 
15 years, I guess.  And this is the first time that I have felt that I wouldn‟t be able 
to serve — well, objectively, without any, you know, prejudices or anything else, 
this is one of the first cases.  And to be honest with you, I really am kind of shaken 
by this.”   
The court asked Juror R.A., “Feeling as you do, can you think of any reason 
why you wouldn‟t be able to continue to participate as a member of the jury?”  
R.A. replied:  “I don‟t know if someone in that jury room upstairs made these 
57 
comments — but I don‟t know if it was, you know, a member of counsel. I don‟t 
know if it was a member of the clerk, or bailiffs.  I don‟t know who made this 
comment, but I am — I am shaken by this, I really am.”  The court assured R.A. it 
was no one in the room, “but beyond that, as I say, you‟re not the only person we 
talked to.”  After further comments, it said, “The important point is that you have 
to be able to focus in on your oath that you took earlier, and you have to be able to 
participate as a member of this jury, listen to the evidence, whatever is presented.”  
It delineated a juror‟s obligations at trial, including deliberating with the other 
jurors.  R.A. said, “That‟s the entire point.  I have to sit with eleven other people 
and one person that I don‟t know or know of, made these allegations.  And that‟s 
the tough point about it.”  The court subsequently asked, “[W]hy should what has 
happened prevent you from carrying out your role as a trial juror in this case?”  
R.A. responded, “Maybe one of those eleven people up there that I am serving 
with has some kind of comment or allegation against me personally, I know did 
not occur.  And I just, I could not — boy.”  The court asked, “Well, let me ask you 
this, do you think this is going to cause you to perhaps not, you know, not decide 
this case based just on the evidence?”  R.A. replied, “It may possibly be so.”   
After further colloquy between the court and Juror R.A., and comments by 
defense counsel, defense counsel said, “[M]y bottom-line question is, when you 
get in deliberations, whatever may or may not have occurred, whatever your 
feelings may or may not be, could you decide what the facts are and apply them to 
the law, based on your own independent judgment here in court?”  R.A. replied, 
“Regarding Mr. Lynch‟s trial, yes, I could.  But as stated earlier, there‟s some sort 
of a thing going on here now.”   
After a comment by defense counsel to Juror R.A., the court observed, 
“Your job is to decide [defendant‟s] guilt or innocence of these charges.”  R.A. 
said, “I realize that, your honor but — I am just being honest with you, that‟s all.  I 
58 
just wanted to let you know there is something there that does just not set right 
with me, okay?”  The court said, “I can understand why you are upset.  I can 
understand why you feel you were embarrassed and humiliated by this accusation.  
You can understand why we had to take the action we took.  But the question now 
is, can you put that behind you and can you focus in on your duty as a juror, or is it 
going to prevent you from doing so?  I need your assurance, we all need your 
assurance that you will be able to focus on your oath, and that you will be able to 
make a determination as to the appropriate verdict in this case, based only on the 
evidence, and that you‟re not going to let this experience interfere with that.”  R.A. 
responded, “You mentioned the „focus‟ part, and that is this thing I don‟t think I 
would be able to do.”  The court said, “I don‟t want to put words in your mouth, 
but are you saying this experience is somehow going to be . . . of such a nature it 
will prevent you from paying attention to the evidence?”  R.A. replied, “Once 
again, the word „focus.‟ ”  The court said, “Can you assure us that you will be able 
to render a verdict in this case based solely on the evidence that‟s presented?”  
R.A. responded, “I‟d make it my utmost to try, utmost attempt, but I would want 
both counsel to know that I do harbor a lot of resentment right now at this time, 
not at either counsel.  I just want to let it be known that I, in these proceedings, I 
do harbor a lot of resentment.”  The court asked, “[I]s that resentment going to 
interfere with your duty as a juror as you understand it?  You‟re the only one who 
can answer that question.”  R.A. responded, “Once again, I would make the utmost 
attempt not to let it occur.”  After further colloquy with the court, R.A. said, “I 
would like to know.  I realize it can‟t be done, okay.  That‟s a tough thing for me, 
it does not sit well.”  The court inquired whether there was anything else R.A. 
would like to say, specifically with regard to “whether or not you would be able to 
continue as a trial juror in the case?”  R.A. responded that he was “rather shaken” 
by the February 25 in-chambers conference.  He added, “I did not think things like 
59 
that would actually occur.”  The court responded that such situations were not 
unusual, gave examples, and said, “We have done everything we can to not single 
out anybody.”   
Juror R.A. referred to his experience in labor negotiations, noting, “I know 
the rules, they were very clear back then.  And that‟s what is most upsetting to me, 
that someone accused me of violating those rules.”  The court said, “I am not 
going to even indicate that anything rises to the level of an accusation against you 
or any individual juror. . . . All I can tell you is that I received certain information 
that I shared with you.  That information triggered a query on my part.  We have 
talked to you.  You‟re not the only person we have talked to.  It has embarrassed 
you.”  The court mentioned they had waited 24 hours to speak with R.A. so that he 
could calm down, “[b]ut here we are. . . . [T]he concern is whether you will be 
able to continue to serve as a juror.  It would be my expectation that you would do 
so.”  R.A. responded, “Gentlemen, I just want to let you both know that . . . as far 
as the case that we are hearing right now, I will still try to be as fair and subjective 
[sic] as possible.  But I just want both counsel to know that I just feel a bit tainted, 
okay.”  The court assured R.A. he should not feel that way, and said, “[T]he 
bottom line . . . is whether you will be able to participate and listen to this 
evidence and then make a decision as to what did or didn‟t happen.”  R.A. 
responded, “I give it one hundred percent.  That‟s all I could say.”   
Defense counsel assured Juror R.A. he thought he would be fair and 
impartial.  The prosecutor agreed that absent R.A. telling them he could not 
proceed, he saw no reason to disqualify him.  After further comments by the court 
as to why they were speaking to R.A. a second time, the court asked if he had 
anything else to say.  R.A. said, “Well, I guess the bottom line is my integrity, I 
felt, was compromised greatly, and that‟s the only thing I‟ve got.  I don‟t have 
kids, I don‟t have property, and that‟s the only thing I‟ve got left . . . . [¶] . . . [¶] 
60 
. . . [I]f [my job] is here a year from now, I would be greatly surprised.  So, that‟s 
the way I feel. . . . [M]y integrity is the only thing I have and I feel it was 
compromised.”  The court assured him no one in the room felt that way, and they 
had the “utmost confidence” he could continue as a juror.  “The only thing that we 
wanted to be sure of was that this . . . challenge to your integrity, as you view it, 
because that is what is important, your view of the situation, does not take on a life 
of its own, so it overshadows your job as a trial juror.”  R.A. said, “That was my 
concern, and why I made comments to [the bailiff] yesterday.”  The court said, 
“We want to be sure you will be able to give both sides in this trial a fair trial, 
notwithstanding this incident.”  R.A. said, “I will give it one hundred percent, 
gentlemen.”   
After Juror R.A. left, the prosecutor said, “We can talk all the platitudes we 
want with him here, but I am getting a little concerned.”  The court responded, “It 
concerns the court, as well.”  The prosecutor continued, “I mean, he said 
something along the line[s] [of] if Lynch doesn‟t take the stand, he will be 
prejudiced.”  Defense counsel said, “That scared the daylights out of me.”  The 
prosecutor said, “I don‟t know how to take that attitude, plus the fact he might not 
focus.  I am very close to asking him to be replaced, seriously.”  Defense counsel 
subsequently noted that he did not anticipate that defendant would testify in the 
guilt phase.   
The court suggested counsel reflect on the matter, and the prosecutor stated 
that he wanted to review a transcript of the hearing before deciding whether to 
make a challenge.  The court also noted Juror R.A.‟s comments might be “of 
concern to a defendant who is not going to testify.”  Defense counsel said, “I think 
that‟s valid, your honor.  I want to consider it.”  He observed, however, that R.A. 
was one of three Black jurors, and “with the cross-racial identification issues,” that 
was also a factor he had to consider.  “So, I am not in a position to make a motion 
61 
or give an answer at this time, either.”  The court stated that as far as it was 
concerned, the matter was closed unless “brought to my attention either by way of 
a challenge or stipulation.”   
On March 3, the prosecutor challenged Juror R.A. for cause.  The 
prosecutor recounted some of R.A‟ s statements at the February 27 hearing.  He 
also stated R.A. appeared uninterested the afternoon of February 27 because he 
had his head down and eyes closed for six minutes during defense counsel‟s cross-
examination of a witness.  Defense counsel stated that he had not observed the 
juror because he was conducting the cross-examination, but agreed the prosecutor 
had immediately brought the matter to his attention.  Defense counsel also noted 
that R.A. had seen defendant in chains and shackles on one occasion.  Defense 
counsel stated he had discussed the matter at some length with defendant and 
cocounsel, and was “very personally concerned” with R.A.‟ s comments on the 
Fifth Amendment.  Defendant, however, had instructed defense counsel, who 
found “no reason to quarrel,” that he was not to join in a stipulation to the 
challenge.  Counsel also noted R.A.‟s statements that he would be fair and give it 
100 percent, and the benefit of having a Black juror when there was an issue of 
cross-racial identification.  He objected to the challenge.   
The trial court sustained the prosecutor‟s challenge, stating:  “[T]he juror 
was shaken and furious at this inquiry concerning possible misconduct.  He said 
that he possibly suspected another juror of being the source of this, and indicated 
some doubt as to whether or not he‟d be able to trust a person in that situation.  He 
did, as the district attorney pointed out, say that he might be unable to decide the 
case solely on the evidence.  He does not think that he would be able to focus 
solely on the evidence in reaching a verdict.  He harbors lots of resentment, 
although he did say he‟d try to be as fair as possible to this.  And to this record 
must be added the court‟s observation of his demeanor both in and out of 
62 
chambers.  While in chambers, he appeared very upset and visibly shaken and 
angry.  It had been my hope and my intention at the time of the second session 
with him in chambers simply to reassure him that no one thought him guilty of 
misconduct.  Frankly, I hoped it was going to be a monologue, but he would not 
let go.  I think his words were something to the effect: „Don‟t I get to say 
anything?‟  When I, in effect, asked him to return to the jury room, and at that 
point, we were off and running.  As I feared, this incident has taken on a life of its 
own.  During sessions in court following the second in camera with him, he, at 
times, did not appear to be paying attention.  Rather, he would sit with his arms 
folded and stare straight ahead not looking at the witness who was testifying or at 
counsel as they asked questions.  At other times, he appeared to have his head 
down.  In fairness, most of the time during the presentation of evidence he did 
seem to act appropriately.  In conclusion, I‟m satisfied that cause exists to excuse 
[Juror R.A.] in that his state of mind is such that I have grave concerns and doubts 
that he will be able to act with entire impartiality and without prejudice to the 
substantial rights of either party.  Accordingly, the challenge is allowed.”  The 
court and parties agreed R.A. would be removed at the end of the day.15   
b) Analysis 
“Section 1089 authorizes the trial court to discharge a juror at any time 
before or after the final submission of the case to the jury if, upon good cause, the 
juror is „found to be unable to perform his or her duty.‟ ”16  (People v. Bennett 
                                              
 
15  Juror R.A.‟s removal does not appear in the record, but on the morning 
of March 5, 1992, which was the next day after March 3 that the jury was in court, 
an alternate juror was directed to join the jury in his place.   
16  Section 1089 provides in relevant part, and at the time of trial provided 
in substantively similar language:  “If at any time, whether before or after the final 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
63 
(2009) 45 Cal.4th 577, 621.)  “A juror‟s inability to perform „ “must appear in the 
record as a „demonstrable reality.‟ ” ‟ ”  (Ibid.; see People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 
Cal.4th 1038, 1052-1053.)  We review the trial court‟s decision for abuse of 
discretion.  (Barnwell, at p. 1052.) 
Here, the trial court promptly and thoroughly investigated reports first that 
Juror R.A. smelled of alcohol, and then that he was embarrassed and upset as a 
result of the trial court‟s inquiry regarding the allegations of alcohol use.  At the 
second in camera hearing following the report of R.A.‟s negative emotional state, 
the court assumed its initial comments to Juror R.A. — telling him there was no 
intent to embarrass him, these types of investigations are commonplace, and that 
the court and counsel had complete confidence he was a qualified juror — would 
allay his concerns.  When this assumption failed, it exhaustively examined R.A. 
regarding his capacity to set aside the incident and focus on defendant‟s case.  
R.A.‟s responses indicated that although he would make his best effort, he 
nevertheless “harbor[ed] a lot of resentment,” was concerned he would not be 
objective and would have difficulty focusing on his oath and on his duty as a juror, 
and said he felt “tainted,” “shaken,” and that his integrity had been “compromised 
greatly.”  Moreover, although the trial court deliberately waited one day to speak 
with R.A. so that he would have an opportunity to regain his composure, at the 
hearing he “appeared very upset and visibly shaken and angry.”  Then, at court 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
submission of the case to the jury, a juror dies or becomes ill, or upon other good 
cause shown to the court is found to be unable to perform his or her duty, or if a 
juror requests a discharge and good cause appears therefor, the court may order the 
juror to be discharged and draw the name of an alternate, who shall then take a 
place in the jury box, and be subject to the same rules and regulations as though 
the alternate juror had been selected as one of the original jurors.”   
64 
sessions after the second hearing, R.A. appeared at times to the court to be 
disengaged from the proceedings.  Under these circumstances, the trial acted 
within its discretion in finding Juror R.A. was unable to perform his duty as a 
juror.  (See People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 845-846 [no abuse of 
discretion in discharging a juror on whose behalf the district attorney‟s office had 
refused to intercede regarding a speeding ticket, when the juror said the ticket if 
upheld would cost him his job, and that he would feel distracted and “ „wonder 
where justice was at‟ ” if the ticket were not dismissed]; People v. Lucas (1995) 12 
Cal.4th 415, 489 [no abuse of discretion in discharging a juror who stated 
cancellation of her vacation would not affect her performance as a juror, but 
whose behavior and demeanor demonstrated the contrary].)   
 
2. Defendant’s absence from certain proceedings  
Defendant contends he was absent from 14 proceedings in violation of 
sections 977 and 1043, and his rights under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the federal Constitution.  Four occasions primarily involved jury 
selection procedures, as well as brief discussions of an exhibit for any renewed 
change of venue motion, the effect of a recent decision by this court, and an 
observation that the trial court had signed an order releasing two exhibits to the 
prosecutor‟s investigator.  Two occasions involved in-chambers hearings to 
discuss counsel‟s concerns that the media were creating a distraction while 
witnesses were testifying.  Four occasions involved the in-camera hearings 
regarding Juror R.A.  Defendant was absent from proceedings on March 4, 1992, 
which involved the admission of trial exhibits, discussion of the guilt jury 
instructions, argument on the admissibility of a television interview with the 
Herricks, and argument on the motion for judgment of acquittal.  Defendant was 
also absent from a March 24, 1992, in-chambers discussion that was never 
65 
reported, but apparently involved discussion of the verdict on the counts involving 
Pearl Larson‟s death, and the penalty jury instructions.  Finally, defendant was 
absent from an in-chambers conference held in response to a jury question during 
guilt phase deliberations and a hearing in which penalty jury instructions and 
exhibits were discussed.  On all of these occasions, defense counsel expressly or 
impliedly waived defendant‟s presence.   
“Under the Sixth Amendment, a defendant has the right to be personally 
present at any proceeding in which his appearance is necessary to prevent 
„interference with [his] opportunity for effective cross-examination.‟ ”  (People v. 
Butler (2009) 46 Cal.4th 847, 861 (Butler), quoting Kentucky v. Stincer (1987) 482 
U.S. 730, 744-745, fn. 17.)  In addition, a defendant has a due process right “to be 
present at any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome if his 
presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure.”  (Kentucky v. Stincer, 
at p. 745.)  “Neither the state nor the federal Constitution, nor the statutory 
requirements of sections 977 and 1043, require the defendant‟s personal 
appearance at proceedings where his presence bears no reasonable, substantial 
relation to his opportunity to defend the charges against him.”  (Butler, at p. 861.)   
Here, as to three of the four hearings involving Juror R.A., defendant 
merely asserts that had he attended the first hearing at which the court and counsel 
discussed an allegation that Juror R.A. smelled of alcohol, he could have assisted 
in the process by “watching the juror, observing his conduct and reporting back to 
trial counsel.”  At the second hearing, when the court questioned Juror R.A. as to 
whether he was aware of any alcohol use by the jury, defendant asserts “[h]aving 
someone of [R.A.‟s] own race present might very well have helped [R.A.] feel less 
threatened by what he later perceived to be an accusation which he took 
personally.”  Finally, at the third hearing, in which the court and counsel explored 
Juror R.A.‟s reaction to the allegation of alcohol use, defendant asserts that had he 
66 
been “[g]iven the opportunity to express his feelings about the juror immediately, 
[defendant] would have arguably had a greater influence on his attorney when the 
time came to make the case for retaining [R.A.] on the jury.”  For all of the 
remaining challenged hearings, defendant makes only conclusory assertions that 
“many of the hearings from which [defendant] was excluded[] were ones where 
his presence would have been useful, and both a benefit to himself and to his 
counsel,” or that he “could have played an active role by offering his views, 
participating in the process and influencing the outcome of the decisions.”  None 
of these assertions amount to “more than speculation.” (People v. Harris (2008) 43 
Cal.4th 1269, 1307.)   
Nor, having examined the proceedings, do we see any basis for concluding 
that defendant‟s personal presence was necessary for an opportunity for effective 
cross-examination, would have contributed to the trial‟s fairness, or bore a 
reasonably substantial relation to the fullness of his opportunity to defend the 
charges against him.  (Butler, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 865 [voir dire procedures are 
“not a critical stage for purposes of a defendant‟s constitutional and statutory 
rights to be present”]; People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1191-1192 [there 
was no constitutional or statutory violation from the defendant‟s absence at 
hearings involving legal argument on evidentiary questions]; People v. Riel (2000) 
22 Cal.4th 1153, 1196 [the defendant‟s presence at discussions of television 
coverage, jury instructions, or which exhibits to send to the jury “would neither 
have contributed to the fairness of the procedure nor have affected the fullness of 
his opportunity to defend against the charges”]; People v. Waidla (2000) 22 
Cal.4th 690, 741-742 [the defendant had no right to be personally present at 
hearings involving procedural, evidentiary, and housekeeping matters, and a 
discussion of jury instructions]; People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 602-603 
[the defendant‟s personal presence was not required to ensure a fair and impartial 
67 
trial at hearings in which a juror was questioned concerning a conversation she 
had with a former district attorney‟s office employee, another juror was questioned 
regarding his attendance at a planned retirement dinner for a prosecution witness, 
and on two occasions to discuss possible responses to notes from the jury].) 
3. Asserted evidentiary errors 
a) Admission of Anna Constantin’s Statements  
Defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting the statements of 
Anna Constantin to her daughter Vickie Constantin17 as a spontaneous utterance.  
(Evid. Code, § 1240.)18  We conclude the trial court erred in admitting the 
statements, but that there was no prejudice under any standard.   
1) Factual background 
As recounted above, on August 13, 1987, about 5:45 p.m., Anna was 
discovered by her daughter Vickie and taken to the hospital.  In Vickie‟s taped 
interview with police the following day, on which the trial court relied in ruling 
that Anna‟s statements to Vickie were spontaneous, Vickie said her mother was 
“very lucid” when Vickie discovered her.  Vickie asked her mother “[W]hat 
happened,” and Anna told Vickie she had been beaten.  Vickie asked how, and 
Anna said he “came from behind and hit me . . . he put something over my head 
                                              
 
17  Because Anna and Vickie Constantin shared the same surname, for 
clarity we refer in this part of the opinion to these individuals by their first names.   
 
18  Evidence Code section 1240 provides:   
 
 
“Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay 
rule if the statement: 
 
 
“(a)  Purports to narrate, describe, or explain an act, condition, or 
event perceived by the declarant; and 
 
 
“(b)  Was made spontaneously while the declarant was under the 
stress of excitement caused by such perception.” 
68 
and he beat me up.”  On the ride to the hospital, Anna was in too much pain to say 
anything.  At the hospital, Anna further described the attack to Vickie, noting she 
had taken out one bag of garbage, and then a second bag, decided to feed the dogs, 
and then to water the front yard while the dogs were eating.  After 10 to 15 
minutes of watering the lawn, Anna heard the dogs barking.  She locked the dogs 
in the kitchen, and returned downstairs.  As she approached the utility room 
downstairs, she was hit from behind.  The assailant then tripped her and she fell.  
The man kept striking her, and put his foot on her neck.  He obtained a heavy 
object, sat on Anna‟s back, and started beating her again.  He spoke rapidly, but 
she did understand “fuck you “ and “I‟m going to kill you.”  The assailant threw a 
blanket over Anna‟s head and tied her hands.  He then ransacked the house.  Anna 
was not tied up when Vickie discovered her.  Vickie told police, “She . . . got 
untied and she crawled to the door.”  Anna died on September 28, 1987.   
At the preliminary hearing, which occurred after Anna‟s death, the 
prosecutor sought to question Vickie regarding Anna‟s statements to her on 
August 13, 1987, the day Anna was attacked.  Defendant objected on hearsay 
grounds.  Vickie testified in limine that she spoke with her mother by telephone at 
noon on the day of her attack.  She also observed that her mother generally took 
the garbage out after 2:00 p.m., and that the garbage had been taken out on that 
day.  In addition, her mother fed the dogs every day at 4:00 p.m.   
About 5:45 p.m., Vickie arrived home from work and discovered her 
mother badly beaten.  She called 911.  Vickie attempted to question her mother in 
the ambulance, but Vickie said Anna was in too much pain to answer and told her, 
“I will talk to you later.”  Vickie described her mother as not “crying, but she was 
making little noises,” which she characterized as “moaning, groaning.”  After 
arriving at the hospital, Vickie questioned her mother regarding how she sustained 
her injuries.  The municipal court sustained defense counsel‟s objection to Anna‟s 
69 
responses because the evidence merely established the attack occurred sometime 
within a three-hour-45-minute time period before the statements were made, and 
this was insufficient to permit the court to find the statements had been made 
without the opportunity to reflect.   
Dr. Chuc Van Dang, Anna‟s treating physician at the hospital, testified that 
when he examined Anna about 6:00 p.m. on August 13, she was “dazed,” but able 
to indicate to him where she was experiencing pain.  He opined that based on 
information provided apparently by Vickie, which was not described, and Anna‟s 
lowered blood count, her injuries had been inflicted one to two hours before she 
was examined; based solely on his observations, he opined that they were inflicted 
two to six hours before.   
At trial, the prosecutor again moved to introduce Anna‟s statements under 
Evidence Code section 1240.  Defendant opposed the motion.  At the hearing on 
the motion, the prosecutor asked the court to take judicial notice of the preliminary 
hearing testimony of Dr. Dang, who treated Anna at the hospital.  The parties also 
referred to, and the court was familiar with, Vickie‟s August 14, 1987, statement 
to the police recounted above.  The trial court ruled:  “[T]he statements to the 
victim‟s daughter were made some time after she was attacked, between one and 
two hours according to the statement of Dr. Dang.  I‟ve considered the timing of 
the statements, as well as the fact they were the result of the daughter‟s questions 
about what happened.  I‟ve considered all of the circumstances as shown in the 
moving papers.  In the court‟s view, the statements to her daughter at the hospital 
by this victim were made at a time when [Anna] was under the influence of the 
attack.  She‟d been moaning and groaning in the ambulance on the way to the 
hospital.  She was not merely an uninjured witness whose excitement might wane 
and would thus be in a position to fabricate the answers.  The responses were not 
self-serving.  In the exercise of my discretion, I‟m satisfied the People have met 
70 
their burden and will be able to establish a foundation for the admission of the 
statements at trial.”   
During trial on February 27, 1992, but before Vickie Constantin testified, 
defense counsel, “out of an abundance of caution,” observed that the court had 
previously ruled that Vickie could testify to what her mother said to her on August 
13, 1987.  Counsel expressed concern that Vickie might testify regarding 
statements her mother made in a later interview on September 2, 1987.  In order to 
ensure that Vickie would be recounting statements made by her mother on August 
13, not September 2, the court had her testify in limine.   
On voir dire, Vickie said that after discovering her mother and calling 911, 
she asked her mother what happened.  Anna said, apparently in Russian, that “she 
was attacked by a man and beaten savagely.”  Vickie asked her, “[H]ow did it 
happen?”  According to Vickie, Anna said that when “she heard the dogs 
barking, . . . she remembered that she had left the back door open, but the screen 
closed.  So, she went downstairs to shut the back door, and as she went downstairs 
into the utility room to shut the back door, she was attacked from behind.”  The 
prosecutor asked how Anna described the attack.  Vickie said, “She was hit on the 
back of the head with something very heavy, very painful.  She did not go down 
immediately.  As a result, this person kicked, tried to kick the back of her legs to 
get her down and then more punching and more hitting.”  The prosecutor asked, 
“Did your mother ever tell you she eventually fell to the floor?”  Vickie said, 
“Yes.”  The prosecutor asked, “Did she ever say what happened to her while she 
was on the floor?”  “She said she tried to get up and she tried to look around at her 
attacker.  At that point, she said that he put a foot with his shoe on her neck and 
face, to keep her from looking at him.”  The prosecutor asked, “Did she ever say 
anything as to what this attacker of hers was saying at the time, if anything?”  
Vickie said, “He talked very rapidly.  The words she understood w[ere], excuse 
71 
me, „Fuck you, bitch, I‟ll kill you.‟ ”  The prosecutor asked, “Did your mother 
ever tell you that she could recognize the voice or accent of the person as to his 
race?”  Over defense counsel‟s objection, Vickie answered, “My mother said it 
was her opinion that this person was Afro-American, because of his accent and his 
voice.”   
The prosecutor established that at some point emergency personnel arrived 
and transported Anna to the hospital.  Vickie testified that at the hospital, Anna 
finished the story of what had happened to her.  “She said while she was down and 
being beaten, for quite a long time, very viciously, she kept asking „Why, why,‟ 
and that provoked more savagery.  After that, she said that he got up — he actually 
sat on her because she still kept trying to get up, and he sat on her and proceeded 
to pound against her head and her face.  He got up after, when she stopped 
struggling, went over and got . . . a blanket and put it over her head or over her.  
Then he got an electrical cord and tied up her hands.”  The prosecutor asked, “Did 
she say what she could hear happening in the house at this point?”  Vickie said, 
“At that point he went upstairs and was ransacking the house, looking around.”  
The prosecutor then asked, “Did she ever indicate whether or not this attacker of 
hers came back to her?”  Vickie said, “He left by the back door.  As he was 
leaving, she said that, I am not quite sure if she made a movement or whatever, but 
he beat her some more on the way out.”   
On cross-examination, Vickie was asked, “[W]hat you told us here, were 
these exact, verbatim translations of what your mother said to you?”  Vickie 
answered, “Yes.”  Defense counsel asked, “Your mother specifically used the 
words „Afro-American?‟ ”  Vickie said, “She used „Black.‟ ”  Defense counsel 
subsequently asked, “Did she say she was aware it was electrical cord that was 
being wrapped around her, or is that something you surmised?”  Vickie responded, 
“That is what I found lying by her.”  Defense counsel said, “My questions, Ms. 
72 
Constantin, deal with what exactly your mother told you in the conversation.  Did 
your mother tell you she was bound by an electrical cord?”  Vickie answered, “If 
that is what I said in the testimony, then that is what I meant to say.  That is what 
she told me.”   
At the end of the hearing, the court inquired, “I just want to make sure I 
understood your testimony.  The statements of your mother that you have testified 
to this afternoon were statements that were made upon your discovery of her at 
your home and that same evening at the emergency room?”  Vickie said, “Yes.”  
The court ruled, “I will permit the witness to testify.  Again, I believe that the 
People, we‟re anticipating by the way, Dr. [] Dang‟s testimony as part of this,[19] 
and I am satisfied the People will be able to establish the foundation for the 
admission of this testimony under [section] 1240, so she will be allowed to 
testify.”  Defense counsel noted his “continuing objection to what the court has 
ruled upon as a spontaneous declaration.”   
Later that day in front of the jury, Vickie testified to similar details as she 
had on voir dire, but now said that nearly all of the statements by her mother, most 
or all of which were in Russian, were made while they were still at the house.  At 
the hospital, Vickie testified that Anna merely said that after the assailant beat her 
a second time, he went upstairs and ransacked the house, she heard the dogs trying 
to fight him, he came downstairs, beat her some more, and left.  In addition, while 
discussing the statements made while the Constantins were still at home, Vickie 
related statements by her mother that were not in her earlier in limine testimony.  
                                              
 
19  This presumably is a reference to Dr. Dang‟s opinion testimony at the 
preliminary hearing that based on information provided apparently by Vickie, 
which was not described, and Anna‟s lowered blood count, her injuries were 
inflicted one to two hours before she was examined.   
73 
These included her mother‟s statements that after taking out the garbage twice, she 
had fed the dogs.  While the dogs were eating, she went outside to water the front 
yard.  She then heard the dogs barking ferociously, and so she locked them 
upstairs.  In addition, the prosecutor asked, “After the person had come back . . . 
and began beating her some more, did your mother ever indicate what she was 
struck with at that point?”  Vickie responded, “She believed she was struck with 
the iron, the clothes iron.”  The prosecutor also asked, “Did your mother ever say 
anything with respect to a paint can?”  Vickie responded, “I asked her . . . was that 
blood on her or paint and she said it was both.”  He also asked, “Did your mother 
ever tell you how she got untied [¶] . . . [¶] . . . from the electric cord?”  Vickie 
answered, “Yes, she said she untied herself.”  Finally, the prosecutor asked her, 
“You said that the dogs were fed.  Is there a time every day when the dogs were 
fed?”  Vickie ultimately responded, “3:30.”   
2) Analysis 
Evidence Code section 1240 provides that “[e]vidence of a statement is not 
made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement” “[p]urports to narrate, 
describe, or explain an act, condition, or event perceived by the declarant” and 
“[w]as made spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement 
caused by such perception.”  “[T]he basis for the circumstantial trustworthiness of 
spontaneous utterances is that in the stress of nervous excitement, the reflective 
faculties may be stilled and the utterance may become the instinctive and 
uninhibited expression of the speaker‟s actual impressions and belief.”  (People v. 
Farmer (1989) 47 Cal.3d 888, 903 (Farmer).)   
“To be admissible, „(1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to 
produce . . . nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and 
unreflecting; (2) the utterance must have been before there has been time to 
74 
contrive and misrepresent, i.e., while the nervous excitement may be supposed still 
to dominate and the reflective powers to be yet in abeyance; and (3) the utterance 
must relate to the circumstance of the occurrence preceding it.‟ ”  (People v. 
Washington (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1170, 1176; Farmer, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 903 
[“ „spontaneous‟ ” describes “actions undertaken without deliberation or 
reflection”].)  We review the trial court‟s ruling admitting statements as 
spontaneous for abuse of discretion.  (People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 
708 (Ledesma).)   
Because the second admissibility requirement, i.e., that the statement was 
made before there was “ „time to contrive and misrepresent,‟ ” “relates to the 
peculiar facts of the individual case more than the first or third does [citations], the 
discretion of the trial court is at its broadest when it determines whether this 
requirement is met.”  (People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 318-319 (Poggi).)  
In considering admissibility under this requirement, the court considers a variety 
of factors to determine the mental state of the declarant.  (Farmer, supra, 47 
Cal.3d at p. 903 [the “crucial element in determining whether a declaration is 
sufficiently reliable to be admissible” is not the “nature of the statement but the 
mental state of the speaker”].)  These factors include the length of time between 
the startling occurrence and the statement, whether the statement was blurted out 
or made in response to questioning, how detailed the questioning was, whether the 
declarant appeared excited or frightened, and whether the declarant‟s “physical 
condition was such as would inhibit deliberation.”  (People v. Raley (1992) 2 
Cal.4th 870, 894 (Raley); see Ledesma, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 709; Farmer, at 
pp. 903-904.)   
Here, defendant contends that the “circumstances surrounding the 
statements Vickie purportedly obtained from her mother did not support a finding 
that the statements were sufficiently reliable to be admitted against” defendant.  
75 
He relies on the length and detail of Anna‟s statements, which he asserts “belie[] 
the state of „nervous excitement‟ required for a spontaneous declaration.”  He also 
notes that Vickie‟s account of what Anna said, and where she said it, varied each 
time Vickie made a statement to police or testified, and contends an excited 
utterance is “brief and simple enough that a person hearing the statement” can 
recall exactly what was said.   
We have upheld the admission of statements containing more detail than 
that which would be precisely recollected when other factors suggest the 
statements were made while the declarant was in an excited state.  Thus, in 
Farmer, we concluded that the trial court did not err in admitting both a shooting 
victim‟s statement to a police dispatcher and his subsequent conversation with a 
police officer at his home.  (Farmer, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 904.)  The officer 
found the victim, who had been shot three times in the mouth and stomach, 
bleeding but conscious and talking on the telephone.  (Id. at pp. 902-903.)  He 
knew his assailant, but could not remember his name.  In response to specific 
questions — which were interrupted “moment to moment” because of the 
“victim‟s obvious pain” — the declarant described “the man‟s race, weight, 
height, and age,” and said that he was a customer of his roommate.  He also 
described how the shooting occurred.  (Id. at p. 903.)  The victim died several 
hours later.  (Id. at p. 899.)   
Although we noted in Farmer that “we have rarely held the answers to such 
extensive questioning to be spontaneous utterances,” we concluded that in that 
case there was “no doubt” that the declarant was “excited, or perhaps more 
accurately, distraught and in severe pain.”  (Farmer, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 904.)  
In addition, his “responses were not self-serving,” nor were “the questions 
suggestive.”  (Ibid.)  “While he was being questioned, the intense pain of his 
gunshot wounds and the concern he rightfully had about his survival no doubt 
76 
preoccupied him so that he could not have contemplated spinning a false tale.  In 
sum, he had so little opportunity and incentive to deliberate that under these 
unusual circumstances we can dispense with the testimonial requirements of an 
oath and cross-examination.”  (Ibid.)   
Likewise, in Poggi, supra, 45 Cal.3d 306, the declarant was questioned by 
police in her home about a half hour after she was attacked.  (Id. at pp. 315-316.)  
When the officer arrived, the declarant “expressed a belief that the perpetrator 
might still be in the house.”  (Id. at p. 316.)  She was in a “very excited state” and, 
although apparently attempting to recount what had happened to her, “rambling 
and incoherent.”  (Id. at p. 315.)  Because of her lack of clarity, the officer 
attempted to “draw information from her by asking what happened; she showed 
him that she was bleeding profusely from several wounds to her chest; during 
questioning she remained excited and several times had to be told to slow down 
and to become calm; his questioning lasted between 15 and 20 minutes — almost 
all of it while paramedics were attempting to treat her wounds.”  (Id. at p. 316.)  
She told the officer that the “perpetrator was a stranger; he came into her home; he 
had a knife; he took about $90; he beat her up; he raped her in her son‟s bedroom; 
he forced her to fill the bathtub, said he was going to drown her, and attempted to 
do so; they fought in the tub, and he was unsuccessful; he then said, „I gotta stab 
you.  You gotta die,‟ and he stabbed her; she first identified her attacker as Black 
or very dark complected and subsequently answered yes to a question whether he 
could be Mexican.”  (Ibid.)   
On appeal, we upheld the admission of these statements as spontaneous 
under Evidence Code section 1240.  (Poggi, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 317-318.)  We 
observed, “First, although [the declarant] made the statements at issue about 30 
minutes after the attack, it is undisputed that she was still under its influence.  
Second, it is also undisputed that she remained excited as she made the statements, 
77 
even though she had become calm enough to speak coherently.  Finally, the fact 
that the statements were delivered in response to questioning does not render them 
nonspontaneous.”  (Id. at pp. 319-320.)  We noted that with one exception, the 
questions were simple and nonsuggestive.  (Id. at p. 320.)  As to the question 
whether the attacker could be Mexican, we held that in view of the declarant‟s 
“emotional and physical state — she was excited and bleeding profusely from 
multiple and ultimately fatal stab wounds to the chest — we cannot say that the 
questions rendered her response „reflective.‟ ”  (Ibid.)   
Here, as in Farmer and Poggi, Vickie‟s questions do not appear suggestive, 
or Anna‟s responses self-serving.  Nevertheless, unlike in these cases, Anna‟s 
description of the attack is far more comprehensive, and inclusive of detailed 
descriptions of such nonessential matters as her engagement in routine household 
chores.  (See People v. Ramirez (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1512, 1525 [the 
“narrative style as well as the quantity, detail and content of [the declarant‟s] 
statements suggest that they were not spontaneous statements . . . but rather, that 
they were made after [the declarant] had engaged in a deliberative or reflective 
process”].)  Nor does it appear Anna blurted out the statements, but rather made 
them in response to questioning.  Moreover, it appears Anna made the statements 
an hour or two after receiving her injuries.  Most critically, no testimony by Vickie 
or Anna‟s attending physician demonstrates that, like the victims in Farmer and 
Poggi, Anna was excited or frightened when she spoke, or that her physical 
condition at the time of her statements precluded deliberation.  (Ledesma, supra, 
39 Cal.4th at p. 709 [the trial court‟s conclusion that the declarant was under the 
“stress of the event at the time he made the statements” was supported by 
observations that he “seemed nervous” and “sounded scared”]; Raley, supra, 2 
Cal.4th at pp. 893-894 [noting that the physical condition of the declarant  — a 
“young woman who had been bleeding for 18 hours” and was unconscious for part 
78 
of this period, “suffered a traumatic head injury,” and who was close to death — 
“was such as would inhibit deliberation”].)  Although none of these factors in 
isolation deprive Anna‟s statements of spontaneity, they collectively appear to 
demonstrate that her mental state while describing the attack was thoughtful and 
reflective.  The trial court therefore abused its discretion in admitting the 
statements as a spontaneous utterance under Evidence Code section 1240.20   
We further conclude that this error was harmless under any standard.  
Although in her statement Anna identified her attacker as “Black,” and said he had 
covered her with a blanket and tied her hands, apparently with electrical cord, 
circumstances common to Figuerido‟s murder, and said that she had fed the dogs, 
a circumstance that tied the attack to a particular time period, other evidence 
linked defendant to the crime.  Thus, about 3:15 to 3:20 p.m. on the afternoon of 
Anna‟s attack, defendant was seen coming out of the hedges about a block from 
the intersection of Bancroft Avenue and Blossom Way where Anna‟s house was 
                                              
20  Defendant further contends that Anna‟s statements at the hospital violate 
Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 because they were made to a police 
officer, and therefore are testimonial.  The Attorney General states that a “police 
detective was present and attempted to record the conversation between Anna and 
Vickie.”   
Although a police report contained in the clerk‟s transcript states that an 
officer interviewed Anna about a half hour after she arrived at the hospital, and the 
unsuccessfully taped interview was conducted with Anna speaking in Russian, and 
Vickie translating for the officer, the prosecutor in the municipal court appeared to 
state that he was not seeking admission of these statements.  Indeed, Vickie never 
testified that an officer was present when her mother made the statements Vickie 
recounted.  In the absence of such evidence, and because defendant does not assert 
that any statements Anna made to Vickie outside the presence of law enforcement 
personnel were testimonial, no Crawford claim appears.  (See People v. Gutierrez 
(2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, 813 [the “statement of a three-year-old declarant made to 
his aunt is more like „a casual remark to an acquaintance‟ and is therefore not a 
testimonial statement under Crawford”].)   
79 
located, looking around, and then walking towards Anna‟s house.  In addition, 
about 5:00 p.m. that afternoon, defendant sold a Russian bracelet stolen from the 
Constantin residence and, several days later, gave an acquaintance two necklaces 
that were also identified as belonging to Vickie Constantin.  Moreover, even 
without Anna‟s statement, this attack bore common features with the four other 
attacks with respect to the time period and community in which it occurred, the 
race and age of the victim, its occurrence in the victim‟s home (which was located 
on a corner) during the day, the infliction of blunt trauma to her head, and the 
commission of robbery.  Likewise, although Anna‟s statement recounted callous 
statements and actions by defendant, the jury could reasonably draw an inference 
of callousness based on the description of Anna‟s injuries by Vickie, the attending 
physician, and the pathologist, and the circumstance that Anna, an elderly woman, 
had been left alone following their infliction.   
b) Exclusion of evidence of third party culpability  
Defendant contends the trial erred in precluding admission of Steven 
Berger‟s testimony concerning individuals he observed following the attack on 
Ruth Durham, in violation of his rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the federal Constitution, and article I, sections 7 and 15 of the 
state Constitution.  We disagree.   
In his offer of proof, defense counsel said Berger “was the gentleman who 
first observed Mrs. Durham on her front porch.  He assisted her and notified her 
son-in-law.”  When police asked Berger “if he had made any unusual 
observations . . . he indicated that he saw a van driving around with three male 
Blacks.  They were laughing, or he felt they were unusual.  My recollection is 
that . . . he observed the van either shortly after he came upon Mrs. Durham or 
80 
while the initial officers were to the scene.”  Although other individuals had seen 
the van, defense counsel said he did not intend to call them.   
The trial court found the evidence had “little, if any, relevance and doesn‟t 
seem to be capable of raising a reasonable doubt of the defendant‟s guilt.  There 
doesn‟t appear to be anything that links these people to the actual perpetrator of 
the crimes.”  Under Evidence Code section 352, the court found that “any 
probative value that evidence has is substantially outweighed by the possibility of 
confusing the jury.”   
“ „[T]o be admissible, evidence of the culpability of a third party offered by 
a defendant to demonstrate that a reasonable doubt exists concerning his or her 
guilt, must link the third person either directly or circumstantially to the actual 
perpetration of the crime.  In assessing an offer of proof relating to such evidence, 
the court must decide whether the evidence could raise a reasonable doubt as to 
defendant‟s guilt and whether it is substantially more prejudicial than probative 
under Evidence Code section 352.‟ ”  (People v. McWhorter (2009) 47 Cal.4th 
318, 367-368.)  
Here, evidence that three Black males, who were laughing (or who Berger 
believed otherwise appeared unusual) and were “driving around” in a van shortly 
after Berger found Durham injured on her porch, failed to demonstrate any link 
between the individuals in the van and the Durham attack, much less evidence that 
would raise a reasonable doubt as to defendant‟s guilt.  Hence the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence.    
c) Asserted erroneous admission of evidence of defendant’s 
conduct at Harvey residence  
Defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his 
conduct at the home of Lavinia Harvey in violation of Evidence Code section 
81 
110121 and his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution.  
(See ante, at p. 7.) 
At trial, defense counsel moved in limine to exclude Harvey‟s testimony 
under Evidence Code section 1101.  He asserted that the evidence was dissimilar 
to the charged crimes because defendant merely trespassed on Harvey‟s property, 
and did not enter Harvey‟s home or injure her.  The trial court denied the motion.   
“Subdivision (a) of section 1101 prohibits admission of evidence of a 
person‟s character, including evidence of character in the form of specific 
instances of uncharged misconduct, to prove the conduct of that person on a 
specified occasion.  Subdivision (b) of section 1101 clarifies, however, that this 
rule does not prohibit admission of evidence of uncharged misconduct when such 
evidence is relevant to establish some fact other than the person‟s character or 
disposition,” such as identity.  (Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 393, fn. omitted; 
see id. at p. 403.)  
                                              
 
21  Evidence Code section 1101 provides: 
 
 
“(a)  Except as provided in this section and in [other sections], 
evidence of a person‟s character or a trait of his or her character (whether in the 
form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his 
or her conduct) is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a 
specified occasion. 
 
 
“(b)  Nothing in this section prohibits the admission of evidence that 
a person committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act when relevant to prove some 
fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 
absence of mistake or accident. . .) other than his or her disposition to commit such 
an act. 
 
 
“(c)  Nothing in this section affects the admissibility of evidence 
offered to support or attack the credibility of a witness.”   
 
82 
Here, evidence of the Harvey incident was relevant to prove a material fact 
other than defendant‟s criminal disposition, i.e., identity, because the common 
features of that incident and the charged crimes were “sufficiently distinctive so as 
to support the inference that the same person committed both acts.”  (Ewoldt, 
supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 403.)  Evidence of the Harvey incident was admissible on 
the issue of identity for the same reasons we previously concluded that evidence of 
the murders and nonfatal attacks was cross-admissible on that issue.  (See ante, at 
pp. 53-54.)  Thus, Harvey and the victims in the charged crimes were Caucasian 
elderly women.  The Harvey incident and Figuerido, Constantin, Herrick, and 
Durham attacks occurred during the day, and the jury could reasonably infer 
Larson‟s death also occurred during the day.  In addition, the Harvey incident and 
the charged crimes occurred within the same two-month period in the neighboring 
communities of San Leandro and Hayward.  The victims were attacked in their 
homes, and the jury could reasonably infer that absent Harvey‟s confrontation with 
defendant, she too would have been attacked inside her home.  Harvey and three 
of the victims lived in corner homes; Durham lived next to and had regular access 
to her daughter‟s corner home; and Figuerido‟s home was separated from the next 
building on the left by an empty half-acre lot.  Defendant was identified at or near 
Harvey‟s home and each victim‟s home for each incident.   
Nor did the evidence contravene Evidence Code section 352.  (People v. 
Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 602; People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 371; 
Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 404.)  The tendency of the evidence to show 
identity, as set forth above, was strong.  (See Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 404.)  
Moreover, Harvey‟s account was independent of the evidence of the charged 
crimes.  (Id. at pp. 404-405.)  She initially investigated defendant‟s presence on 
her property because she thought he was a child about to steal tools from the open 
garage.  Nothing in her testimony indicated that when she spoke with police the 
83 
same day she encountered defendant she was aware that elderly Caucasian women 
in her area were being attacked in their corner homes.  Nor was the probative 
value of this testimony substantially outweighed “by the circumstance that 
defendant‟s uncharged acts did not result in criminal convictions.”  (Id. at p. 405.)  
Harvey‟s testimony describing defendant‟s conduct was far less inflammatory than 
the testimony concerning the charged offenses, which involved brutal assaults.  In 
addition, the jury was properly instructed on the purposes for which it could 
consider her testimony.  (Kipp, at p. 372.)   
In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Harvey‟s 
testimony.   
 
4. Denial of motion for judgment of acquittal  
At the end of the prosecution‟s case-in-chief, defendant unsuccessfully 
moved for acquittal on the attempted murder, residential burglary, and robbery 
counts stemming from the attack on Ruth Durham.  (§ 1118.1.)22  Defendant 
contends the trial court erred in denying his motion in violation of his rights under 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution and article I, 
sections 7 and 17 of the state Constitution.  We disagree.   
In making his motion, defense counsel stated, “As I recall the testimony on 
[those] count[s], Mrs. Durham was injured, did not know what happened, claimed 
the loss to be some sweaters, and the only evidence the prosecution has 
introduced . . . is Pat Armstrong believes she saw a person that she identified as 
                                              
 
22  Section 1118.1 provides in relevant part: “In a case tried before a jury, 
the court on motion of the defendant or on its own motion, at the close of the 
evidence on either side and before the case is submitted to the jury for decision, 
shall order the entry of a judgment of acquittal of one or more of the offenses 
charged in the accusatory pleading if the evidence then before the court is 
insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses on appeal.” 
84 
the defendant . . . walking down the street.  I think, as a matter of law, it takes 
more than having a person walking down the street during a gross approximation 
of the time of the offense to be sufficient to sustain a conviction. . . . [T]his man 
was not doing anything, was not perspiring, was not running, just an ordinary 
citizen walking down the street.”  The prosecutor responded, “[I]f you just take the 
Durham incident standing by itself, I would be in agreement with counsel.”  The 
prosecutor asserted, however, that the common features between the Durham 
attack and the other charged crimes and uncharged conduct were “almost like a 
fingerprint.”  The trial court denied the motion.   
“ „The standard applied by a trial court in ruling upon a motion for 
judgment of acquittal pursuant to section 1118.1 is the same as the standard 
applied by an appellate court in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support a conviction, that is, “whether from the evidence, including all reasonable 
inferences to be drawn therefrom, there is any substantial evidence of the 
existence of each element of the offense charged.” ‟  [Citation.]  „The purpose of a 
motion under section 1118.1 is to weed out as soon as possible those few instances 
in which the prosecution fails to make even a prima facie case.‟  [Citations.]  The 
question „is simply whether the prosecution has presented sufficient evidence to 
present the matter to the jury for its determination.‟  [Citation.]  The sufficiency of 
the evidence is tested at the point the motion is made.  [Citations.]  The question is 
one of law, subject to independent review.”  (People v. Stevens (2007) 41 Cal.4th 
182, 200.)  
Here, as recounted above, at the time defendant‟s motion was made, the 
prosecution had introduced evidence that all of the victims in the charged crimes 
were elderly Caucasian women who were attacked in their homes, and that all of 
the attacks occurred within a two-month period in the neighboring communities of 
Hayward and San Leandro.  Durham, Figuerido, Constantin, and Herrick were 
85 
attacked during the day, and there was evidence from which a jury could 
reasonably infer Larson‟s death also occurred during the day.  Three of the victims 
lived in corner homes; Durham lived next to and had regular access to, her 
daughter‟s corner home; and Figuerido‟s home was separated from the next 
building on the left by an empty half-acre lot.  All of the victims suffered blunt 
trauma to the head, and either were robbed or robbery was attempted.  Defendant 
was identified at or near the victim‟s home for each incident, and in the case of 
Constantin, he sold jewelry belonging to Vickie Constantin the same afternoon her 
mother was attacked, and gave away more jewelry taken from that residence to an 
acquaintance several days later.  Moreover, at the time of defendant‟s motion, the 
prosecution had introduced evidence of the incident involving Lavinia Harvey, an 
elderly Caucasian woman who lived in a corner house.  This incident also 
occurred during the day, and during the same two months and in the same 
geographic area as the charged crimes.  Harvey identified defendant as the 
individual she encountered on her property.  This evidence collectively supported 
a prima facie case that defendant was the perpetrator in the Durham incident.   
 
5. Asserted prosecutorial misconduct  
During his closing argument, the prosecutor said, “Isn‟t it strange that after 
Mr. Lynch fled our county, there has been no other cases —”  Defense counsel 
objected.  Before the court ruled on the objection, the prosecutor continued, “— 
not one scintilla of evidence —”  The court said, “Just a moment.  Limit yourself 
to the evidence, Mr. Anderson.  Please move on.  Thank you.”  The prosecutor 
turned to a different topic.   
“A prosecutor commits misconduct when his or her conduct either infects 
the trial with such unfairness as to render the subsequent conviction a denial of 
due process, or involves deceptive or reprehensible methods employed to persuade 
86 
the trier of fact.”  (People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 711 (Avila).)  Even 
assuming the prosecutor here ran afoul of the prohibition against referring to 
evidence outside the record, no prejudice is apparent under any standard.  The 
court immediately admonished the prosecutor, and the jury had been instructed at 
the beginning of trial to “Please remember that what the attorneys say is not 
evidence.”  Likewise, later on the same day that the prosecutor made his 
challenged comment, the court again instructed the jury, “Statements made by the 
attorneys during the trial are not evidence . . . .”  We presume the jury followed 
these instructions.  (Id. at p. 719.)   
6. Asserted instructional error  
a) Refusal to give special instruction  
Defendant contends the trial court erred in declining to instruct the jury in 
the language of his proposed special instruction in violation of his rights under the 
Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution, and article 
I, sections 7, and 15-17 of the state Constitution.  Not so.   
The trial court instructed the jury in the language of CALJIC No. 17.02:  
“Each count charges a distinct crime.  You must decide each count separately.  
The defendant may be found guilty or not guilty of any or all of the crimes 
charged.  Your finding as to each count must be stated in a separate verdict.”  The 
trial court refused to give defendant‟s proposed instruction that stated: “Each 
count charges a distinct crime. You must decide each count separately.  The 
defendant may be found guilty or not guilty of any or all of the crimes charged, 
but your consideration of the evidence as to one count should not be influenced by 
the fact that other counts have been charged.  For any count which has not on its 
own and independently of other charges been proven beyond a reasonable doubt 
you must find the defendant not guilty.”  The court stated that the topic was 
87 
“adequately covered by 17.02,” and the proposed instruction “could be 
confusing.”   
This ruling was correct.  We have previously concluded a trial court 
properly refused to give a similar proposed instruction when the evidence, as in 
this case, was cross-admissible, and the jury was instructed in the language of 
CALJIC No. 17.02.  (People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 153; see People v. 
Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 578-579.)  Moreover, here, as noted above, the jury 
clearly did consider each crime separately, because it acquitted defendant of the 
attempted murders of Durham and Herrick, and the robbery of Larson.   
b) Instructing on consciousness of guilt 
Defendant contends the trial court erred in instructing the jury in the 
language of CALJIC Nos. 2.03 (willfully false or misleading statements), 2.06 
(attempt to suppress evidence), and 2.52 (flight) in violation of his rights under the 
Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution, and article 
I, sections 7, and 15-17 of the state Constitution.  We have repeatedly rejected his 
claims that these instructions are partisan and argumentative, permit the jury to 
irrationally infer guilt, or undermine the reasonable doubt requirement.  (Friend, 
supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 52-53 [rejecting arguments that CALJIC Nos. 2.06 and 
2.52 are argumentative and allow the jury to draw irrational inferences]; People v. 
Whisenhunt (2008) 44 Cal.4th 174, 220-221 [rejecting argument that CALJIC No. 
2.03 violated the defendant‟s right “not to be convicted of a crime on a standard of 
less than beyond a reasonable doubt”]; People v. Kelly (2007) 42 Cal.4th 763, 792 
[CALJIC No. 2.52 does not impermissibly undermine and dilute the requirement 
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt]; Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1159 
[rejecting argument that CALJIC No. 2.06 “diluted the presumption of innocence, 
reduced the prosecution‟s burden of proof, and created a mandatory conclusive 
88 
presumption of guilt”]; People v. Nakahara (2003) 30 Cal.4th 705, 713 [rejecting 
claim that CALJIC No. 2.03 is “impermissibly argumentative and improperly 
allowed the jury to make irrational inferences regarding his mental state during the 
commission of the offenses”].)  Defendant offers no persuasive reason for us to 
reconsider these conclusions.   
 
7. Refusal to strike robbery-murder special-circumstance allegation  
The jury found defendant guilty of the murder of Pearl Larson and the 
burglary of her home, predicated on entry with intent to commit theft,23 and found 
true the robbery-murder and burglary-murder special-circumstance allegations.  It 
found defendant not guilty of robbery.  Following this verdict, defendant moved to 
strike the robbery-murder special-circumstance finding on the ground that it was 
inconsistent with the jury‟s not guilty verdict on robbery.24  The trial court denied 
the motion, stating, “it could well be that the jury decided there was an attempted 
robbery rather than a robbery, which would be consistent with the finding of the 
special circumstance, even though they found the defendant not guilty of the 
robbery.”  Defendant contends the trial court‟s failure to strike the robbery-murder 
                                              
 
23  The jury was instructed that “[e]very person who enters any building 
with the specific intent to steal, take and carry away the personal property of 
another of any value and with the further specific intent to deprive the owner 
permanently of such property, is guilty of the crime of burglary in violation of 
section 459.  It is immaterial whether the intent with which the entry was made 
was thereafter carried out.  In order to prove such crime, each of the following 
elements must be proved:  1) A person entered the building; 2) At the time of 
entry, such person had the specific intent to steal and take away somebody else‟s 
property, and intended to deprive the owner permanently of such property.”   
 
24  Defendant‟s crimes were committed in 1987, and hence section 1385.1, 
which was adopted in 1990 and precludes a trial court from striking or dismissing 
a special circumstance found true by the jury, is inapplicable.  (Ledesma, supra, 39 
Cal.4th at p. 745, fn. 29.)   
89 
special-circumstance finding violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution.  Not so.   
The jury was instructed here that to find the robbery-murder special-
circumstance allegation true, it must be proved:  “That the murder was committed 
while the defendant was engaged in the commission or attempted commission of a 
robbery; or the murder was committed during the immediate flight after the 
commission or attempted commission of a robbery by the defendant; and the 
murder was committed in order to carry out or advance the commission of the 
crime of robbery or to facilitate the escape therefrom or to avoid detection.  In 
other words, the special circumstance referred to in these instructions is not 
established if the robbery was merely incidental to the commission of the murder.”  
There was evidence that the skin on Larson‟s left ring finger was significantly 
abraded and bruised around her ring.  In addition, the credit card holder portion of 
a wallet and some coins were lying on the bed next to Larson.  From this evidence 
the jury reasonably could have inferred that defendant unsuccessfully attempted to 
remove the ring or other personal property and killed Larson while engaged in this 
attempt.   
Defendant contends, however, that because the jury was never instructed in 
the language of CALJIC No. 6.00,25 which defines attempt, it had “no basis upon 
                                              
 
25  CALJIC No. 6.00 provides:  “An attempt to commit a crime consists of 
two elements, namely, a specific intent to commit the crime, and a direct but 
ineffectual act done toward its commission.  [¶]  In determining whether this act 
was done, it is necessary to distinguish between mere preparation, on the one 
hand, and the actual commencement of the doing of the criminal deed, on the 
other.  Mere preparation, which may consist of planning the offense or of devising, 
obtaining or arranging the means for its commission, is not sufficient to constitute 
an attempt.  However, acts of a person who intends to commit a crime will 
constitute an attempt where those acts clearly indicate a certain, unambiguous 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
90 
which to make a determination as to whether there had been an attempted 
robbery.”  He contends that the word “attempt” in our jurisprudence “embodies 
long-recognized principles that go well beyond a simple dictionary definition of 
the word „attempt.‟ ”   
Even assuming the trial court was required to instruct the jury on the 
definition of attempt with respect to the robbery-murder special-circumstance 
allegation, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  (People v. Prieto 
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 256-257; People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 44.)  As 
noted above, the robbery-murder special-circumstance allegation required the jury 
to find that “the murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in the 
commission or attempted commission of a robbery.”  In Cain, the trial court did 
not instruct on the definition of attempt, and the jury found the defendant not 
guilty of rape, but found true an attempted rape-murder special-circumstance 
allegation.  (Cain, at p. 44.)  We concluded that CALJIC No. 6.00 “merely restates 
the common meaning of „attempt,‟ ” which is “to „try‟ or „endeavor to do or 
perform‟ the act.”  (Cain, at p. 44.)  Here, as in Cain, defendant could not “try” to 
rob Larson without intending to do so and doing an act towards the robbery‟s 
commission.  (Ibid.)  Indeed, in convicting defendant of burglary, the jury found 
he entered Larson‟s home with a “specific intent to steal.”  Thus, in finding 
defendant attempted or tried to rob Larson, “the jury . . . necessarily considered 
and found to be true the elements set forth in CALJIC No. 6.00.”  (Ibid.)  
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
intent to commit that specific crime.  These acts must be an immediate step in the 
present execution of the criminal design, the progress of which would be 
completed unless interrupted by some circumstance not intended in the original 
design.”  
91 
Moreover, the jury was instructed on the definition of “attempt” with respect to 
attempted murder.  “Under these circumstances, we conclude omission of the 
attempt instruction did not contribute to the verdict obtained; the jury necessarily 
made the requisite findings necessary to hold defendant liable for this special 
circumstance.”  (Ibid.)  
For these reasons, we reject defendant‟s further contention that even if the 
jury found Larson‟s murder was committed while defendant was engaged in the 
attempted commission of robbery, the murder could not have been committed to 
“carry out or advance the commission of the crime of robbery or to facilitate the 
escape therefrom or to avoid detection” within the meaning of the special 
circumstance instruction.  Defendant claims that because this portion of the 
instruction refers only to robbery, it does not apply to the attempted commission of 
robbery.  This assertion is meritless.  When one attempts to commit robbery, one 
by definition “advance[s] the commission of the crime of robbery” within the 
meaning of the special circumstance.  (Stanley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 956 
[observing that this clarifying clause of the special circumstance instruction 
explains to the jury that in order for the “special circumstance to apply, the murder 
must be committed while the defendant was engaged in robbery or attempted 
robbery”].)   
Defendant also contends that the burglary conviction must be reversed, and 
the burglary-murder special circumstance vacated, because they are supported by 
insufficient evidence.  In order to convict him of burglary, defendant argues the 
jury was required to find that he entered with the intent to steal, and “[t]here was 
no such evidence.”  Nor, for this same reason, he contends, is there evidence to 
support the special circumstance allegation that the “murder was committed while 
the defendant was engaged in the commission or attempted commission of a 
burglary.”  To the contrary, the jury reasonably could infer in light of the abrasions 
92 
and bruising to Larson‟s ring finger, the presence of the credit card holder and 
coins adjacent to her body, and “the modus operandi involved” in the other crimes, 
that defendant‟s “intent was, . . . in part, to commit theft.”  (People v. Prince 
(2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1256.)   
 
C. Penalty Phase Issues  
1. Asserted instructional error  
a) Challenges to CALJIC No. 8.85  
Defendant asserts his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the federal Constitution, and article I, section 7 of the state 
Constitution, were violated when the trial court instructed the jury in the language 
of CALJIC No. 8.85, reiterating section 190.3.  We have repeatedly rejected 
similar arguments, and defendant offers no persuasive basis on which to revisit our 
conclusions.   
Thus, contrary to defendant‟s assertion, the trial court was not required to 
delete inapplicable mitigating factors from the instruction.  (People v. Watson 
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 652, 701.)  Moreover, because the instruction was properly 
given, the prosecutor was free to argue that certain mitigating factors did not apply 
to defendant.  Use of the adjectives “extreme” and “substantial” in section 190.3, 
factors (d) and (g), and reiterated in CALJIC No. 8.85, is constitutional.  (People 
v. Valencia (2008) 43 Cal.4th 268, 311.)  Use of the phrase “ „at the time of the 
offense‟ in the list of potential mitigating factors does not impermissibly restrict 
the jury‟s consideration of evidence in mitigation or otherwise result in an 
arbitrary or capricious penalty determination.”  (People v. Rundle (2008) 43 
Cal.4th 76, 198.)  Nor was the trial court required to instruct the jury that the 
“absence of a particular mitigating factor could not be weighed as an aggravating 
circumstance.”  (People v. Jackson (2009) 45 Cal.4th 662, 694-695.)   
93 
b) Refusal to give defendant’s special instruction  
Defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing to give his proposed 
instruction in violation of his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the federal Constitution.  Not so.   
The proposed instruction provided:  “If the mitigating evidence gives rise to 
compassion or sympathy for the defendant, the jury may, based upon such 
sympathy or compassion alone, reject death as a penalty.  [¶]  A mitigating factor 
does not have to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to be considered.  You may 
find that a mitigating factor exists if there is any substantial evidence to support it.  
[¶]  Moreover, the law does not require that you find the exist[e]nce of any 
mitigating fact before you choose life without the possibility of parole over death.  
You may find, even in the absence of mitigating evidence, that the aggravating 
evidence is not compar[a]tively substantial enough to warrant death.”   
The jury was instructed on the definition of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances.26  The jury was also instructed in the language of CALJIC No. 
8.85 which allowed consideration of “[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates 
the gravity of the crime” and “any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant‟s 
character or record.”  In addition, the jury was instructed that “sympathy and 
mercy for the defendant are proper considerations.  If a mitigating circumstance or 
an aspect of the defendant‟s background or his character, as shown by the 
                                              
26  
The jury was instructed: “An aggravating factor is any fact, condition or 
event attending the commission of a crime which increases its guilt or enormity or 
adds to its injurious consequences which is above and beyond the elements of the 
crime itself.  A mitigating circumstance is any fact, condition or event which as 
such, does not constitute a justification or excuse for the crime in question, but 
may be considered as an extenuating circumstance in determining the 
appropriateness of the death penalty. . . . You are free to assign whatever moral or 
sympathetic value you deem appropriate to each and all of the various factors you 
are permitted to consider.” 
94 
evidence, or your observation of the defendant, arouses sympathy or compassion 
such as to persuade you that death is not the appropriate penalty, you may act in 
response thereto and impose a punishment of life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole on that basis.”  Thus, the proposed defense instruction was 
properly refused to the extent it duplicated other instructions given.  (People v. 
Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 659.)  “Moreover, a trial court is not required to 
instruct the jury that mitigating evidence need not be proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”  (Avila, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 722.)  Nor must it instruct the jury that it 
may return a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole even 
in the absence of mitigating evidence.  (See People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 
1, 52.)   
2. Constitutionality of California’s death penalty statute  
Defendant contends that California‟s death penalty statute is constitutionally 
invalid in numerous respects.  We have repeatedly rejected similar claims, and do 
so again here.  
“[T]he California death penalty statute is not impermissibly broad, whether 
considered on its face or as interpreted by this court.”  (People v. Dykes (2009) 46 
Cal.4th 731, 813 (Dykes).)  We further “reject the claim that section 190.3, factor 
(a), on its face or as interpreted and applied, permits arbitrary and capricious 
imposition of a sentence of death.”  (Ibid.; see Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 
U.S. 967, 975-976, 978.)   
Contrary to defendant‟s assertion, the death penalty statute does not lack 
safeguards to avoid arbitrary and capricious sentencing or deprive defendant of the 
right to a jury trial, because it does not require written findings, unanimity as to 
the truth of aggravating circumstances, or findings beyond a reasonable doubt that 
an aggravating circumstance (other than section 190.3, factor (b) or (c) evidence) 
95 
has been proved, that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors, or 
that death is the appropriate sentence.  (Dykes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 814; Avila, 
supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 724.)  The jury may properly consider a defendant‟s 
unadjudicated criminal activity.  (People v. Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 968.)  
Nor, contrary to defendant‟s alternative claims, is a preponderance of the evidence 
standard of proof compelled for the findings that an aggravating factor exists, that 
the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors, and that death is the 
appropriate sentence, nor is the trial court required to instruct the jury that there is 
no burden of proof.  (People v. Taylor (2009) 47 Cal.4th 850, 899; Avila, supra, 
46 Cal.4th at p. 724; see Tuilaepa v. California, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 979.)   
“The failure to require intercase proportionality does not guarantee 
„arbitrary, discriminatory, or disproportionate impositions of the death penalty,‟ or 
violate the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.”  (Stevens, supra, 41 
Cal.4th at p. 212.)  Moreover, “capital and noncapital defendants are not similarly 
situated and therefore may be treated differently without violating constitutional 
guarantees of equal protection of the laws or due process of law.”  (People v. 
Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 590.)   
3. Asserted violation of international law  
Defendant contends that his death sentence violates international law and 
therefore his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal 
Constitution.  Defendant points to no authority that “prohibit[s] a sentence of 
death rendered in accordance with state and federal constitutional and statutory 
requirements.”  (People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 511.) 
96 
4. Effect of any reversal of convictions or special circumstance 
findings  
Defendant contends that if any of his convictions are reversed, or special 
circumstance findings vacated, his death judgment must be reversed.  We have 
neither reversed any convictions nor vacated any special circumstances.   
5. Asserted cumulative error  
Defendant contends that cumulative guilt and penalty phase error requires 
reversal.  Where we have found or assumed error, we have found no prejudice, nor 
do we discern cumulative prejudice.   
III.  DISPOSITION 
The judgment is affirmed.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSENTING OPINION BY MORENO, J. 
In this death penalty case, the majority concludes that the trial court 
properly denied defendant‟s motions for self-representation made pursuant to 
Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta), because the motions were 
untimely.  I disagree.  In Faretta, the high court explained that it was error to deny 
the defendant‟s otherwise valid motion for self-representation made “weeks before 
trial.”  (Id. at p. 835.)  We have  explained that “in order to invoke the 
constitutionally mandated unconditional right of self-representation a defendant in 
a criminal trial should make an unequivocal assertion of that right within a 
reasonable time prior to the commencement of trial.”  (People v. Windham (1977) 
19 Cal.3d 121, 127-128, fn. omitted (Windham).)  “Erroneous denial of a Faretta 
motion is reversible per se.  (McKaskle v. Wiggins (1984) 465 U.S. 168, 177, fn. 
8.)”  (People v. Dent (2003) 30 Cal.4th 213, 217 (Dent).)  Defendant made his 
initial Faretta motion roughly four weeks before pretrial motions were scheduled 
to begin, and over one month before pretrial motions actually began.  The 
determination of whether a Faretta motion is timely should depend, not upon a 
totality of the circumstances as the majority suggests, but upon the only relevant 
factor — time.  Because defendant‟s Faretta motions were otherwise proper, and 
because they were made “weeks before trial” as in Faretta, the trial court erred by 
denying the motions as untimely.  This error mandates reversal; accordingly, I 
dissent. 
2 
 
 
I briefly review the pertinent facts to highlight the relevant timeline.  
Defendant appeared for arraignment in October 1987.  Defendant‟s preliminary 
examination spanned an eight-month period, ultimately concluding in August 
1988.  Defendant remained incarcerated for the next three years while numerous 
continuances were granted.  As defendant explained, this delay was due both to his 
counsel being “busy with other cases, with other clients,” as well as the district 
attorney being “tied up.”  Finally frustrated with the slow progression of his case, 
and troubled by his lack of participation in his defense, defendant sought to 
substitute counsel.  Failing at this endeavor, defendant decided to represent 
himself.   
 
As the majority acknowledges, defendant‟s initial Faretta request was not 
made for dilatory purposes.  Defendant had not made numerous such requests, or 
requests to substitute counsel pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, 
during the four-year period he spent awaiting trial.  (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 38 
[“the nearly four-year delay in this case cannot be attributed to defendant”].)  It is 
also undisputed that defendant‟s request was unequivocal.   Nonetheless, 
defendant‟s motion was denied on timeliness grounds.  Certain that the trial 
court‟s decision was erroneous, defendant renewed his motion for self-
representation, and the trial court again denied the motion on grounds of 
timeliness.   
Faretta explains that a defendant possesses the right to conduct his or her 
own defense provided that he or she knowingly, voluntarily, intelligently, and 
unequivocally asserts that right in a timely fashion, and is not acting with the 
purpose of delay.  (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at pp. 835-836; see also Windham, 
supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 128.)  The high court has repeatedly affirmed a criminal 
defendant‟s right to waive counsel and proceed by way of self-representation.  
(See, e.g., Indiana v. Edwards (2008) 554 U.S. 164, ___ [128 S.Ct. 2379, 2383-
3 
 
2384] [“the Court‟s foundational „self-representation‟ case, Faretta, held that that 
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments include a „constitutional right to proceed 
without counsel when‟ a criminal defendant „voluntarily and intelligently elects to 
do so.‟ [(]422 U.S. [at p.] 807 (emphasis in original)[)]”]; U.S. v. Gonzalez-Lopez 
(2006) 548 U.S. 140, 150-151 [holding that the trial court‟s erroneous deprivation 
of the defendant‟s Sixth Amendment right to choice of counsel entitled him to 
reversal of his conviction]; McKaskle v. Wiggins, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 174 
[holding that the United States Constitution “implies a right in the defendant to 
conduct his own defense”].) 
Following the high court‟s decision in Faretta, we were called upon to 
examine whether a midtrial motion for self-representation was timely.  (Windham, 
supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 124.)  We concluded that the right to self-representation was 
unconditional if asserted unequivocally, voluntarily, and intelligently “within a 
reasonable time prior to the commencement of trial.”  (Id. at p. 128.)  Once trial 
commences, however, we concluded that it is within the “sound discretion of the 
court” to determine whether a defendant may proceed by way of self-
representation.  (Ibid.)   
Here, it is undisputed that defendant‟s request to represent himself was 
knowing, voluntary, intelligent, unequivocal, and not made for the purpose of 
delay.  The sole question for this court‟s consideration is whether defendant‟s 
motions for self-representation, made “weeks before trial” as in Faretta, were 
untimely.  (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 835.)  
As the majority acknowledges, we have held that an otherwise proper 
Faretta motion made within a reasonable time prior to the commencement of trial 
must be granted.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 29-30; Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 
128.)  The majority explains that “the high court has never delineated when a 
motion may be denied as untimely.  Nor has this court fixed any definitive time 
4 
 
before trial at which a motion for self-representation is untimely . . . .”  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 31.)  The majority explains that there are two lines of cases, one of 
which concludes that Faretta motions made on the eve of or during trial are 
untimely, and the other of which explains that Faretta motions made days or 
weeks in advance of trial are unquestionably timely.  From these two lines of 
cases, the majority draws the conclusion that “our refusal to identify a single point 
in time at which a self-representation motion filed before trial is untimely indicates 
that outside these two extreme time periods, pertinent considerations may extend 
beyond a mere counting of the days between the motion and the scheduled trial 
date.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 32.) 
The majority‟s reasoning suffers from two flaws.  First, and most 
significantly, the instant motions were made months before trial began, and 
therefore do not fall within the gray area between certainly untimely and certainly 
timely motions for self-representation.  The majority cites two cases — People v. 
Joseph (1983) 34 Cal.3d 936, 944 and Dent, supra, 30 Cal.4th at page 217 — for 
the proposition that Faretta motions made days or months before the 
commencement of trial are timely.  Although the majority endeavors to distinguish 
this authority as examples of undeniably timely Faretta motions, the cases share 
striking similarity to the one at bar.  In Dent, the defendant‟s Faretta motion was 
made on the day trial had been scheduled to begin, but was continued through no 
fault of the defendant‟s.  (Dent, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 215-216.)  We concluded 
that “since no trial was imminent, and did not in fact occur for over four months, 
the motion appears timely.”  (Dent, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 221.)  In Joseph, we 
held that “[t]he record establishes that appellant‟s Faretta motion was timely 
proffered. The request was made some five months before trial and almost two 
months before any pretrial motions were heard.”  (Joseph, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 
944.)   Similarly, here, defendant‟s Faretta motions were made weeks before 
5 
 
pretrial motions began and nearly five months before the jury was empanelled.  
We concluded in Joseph that because “an unequivocal assertion of appellant‟s 
desire to proceed pro se was made well in advance of trial . . . the denial of that 
motion constituted error.  Since the erroneous denial of a timely proffered Faretta 
motion is reversible per se, the judgment of conviction must be set aside.”  
(Joseph, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 939.)  That same result is compelled here. 
 
The second flaw with the majority‟s reasoning is its conclusion that factors 
other than time may be considered when determining whether a Faretta motion is 
timely.  The majority explains that a court should consider “not only the time 
between the motion and the scheduled trial date, but also such factors as whether 
trial counsel is ready to proceed to trial, the reluctance or availability of crucial 
trial witnesses, the complexity of the case, any ongoing pretrial proceedings, and 
whether the defendant had earlier opportunities to assert his right of self-
representation.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 36-37.)  As support for its position, the 
majority points out the potential pitfalls associated with the Ninth Circuit‟s view 
that a Faretta motion made any time prior to the commencement of trial is timely 
(see, e.g., Marshall v. Taylor (9th Cir. 2005) 395 F.3d 1058, 1061, fn. 17; Avila v. 
Roe (9th Cir. 2002) 298 F.3d 750, 753 [Faretta request is timely if made before 
jury empanelment unless it is shown to be a tactic to secure delay]; Savage v. 
Estelle (9th Cir. 1990) 924 F.2d 1459, 1463, fn. 7 [a Faretta motion made one 
week prior to commencement of voir dire was timely]; accord, Armant v. Marquez 
(9th Cir. 1985) 772 F.2d 552, 555) — suggesting that the Ninth Circuit approach 
is myopic because “nothing in Faretta or its progeny either expressly or implicitly 
precludes consideration of factors other than the number of weeks between the 
self-representation motion and the trial in determining timeliness in this more 
complex and serious scenario [of a capital case].” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 34.)    
6 
 
 
This case does not demand a new test be developed to ascertain the 
timeliness of a Faretta motion.  We need not articulate a bright line test consistent 
with the Ninth Circuit‟s that a Faretta motion made even one day prior to 
commencement of trial is timely.  Here, defendant‟s motions were made weeks 
before pretrial proceedings began, and months prior to jury empanelment.  But just 
as we need not develop a bright line test, we are also not called upon here to go 
beyond our holding in Windham that an otherwise proper Faretta motion must be 
granted if made “within a reasonable time prior to the commencement of trial.”  
(Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 128, italics added.)  Indeed, we noted that our 
“reasonable time” requirement should “not be used as a means of limiting a 
defendant‟s constitutional right of self-representation,” but rather to limit a 
defendant‟s ability to cause delay or obstruct the orderly administration of justice.  
(Id. at p. 128, fn. 5.)   
 
Ignoring this admonition, the majority adopts a test for timeliness that 
examines the time between a defendant‟s Faretta motion and the commencement 
of trial, as well as trial counsel‟s readiness, witness availability, and other pretrial 
proceedings.  In Windham, we crafted a test to determine whether a trial court 
should exercise its discretion to grant a defendant‟s untimely motion for self-
representation that addressed, among other factors, “the quality of counsel‟s 
representation of the defendant, the defendant‟s prior proclivity to substitute 
counsel, the reasons for the request, the length and stage of the proceedings, and 
the disruption or delay which might reasonably be expected to follow the granting 
of such a motion.”  (Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 128.)   In the wake of this 
decision, trial courts will be placed in the confusing position of assessing similar 
factors to determine both whether a pretrial Faretta motion is timely, and whether 
a midtrial, untimely, Faretta motion should be granted.   
7 
 
To reach this result, the majority relies on our decisions in People v. 
Hamilton (1985) 41 Cal.3d 408, 419-420 (Hamilton I) and the decision 
subsequently affirming it, People v. Hamilton (1988) 45 Cal.3d 351 (Hamilton II) 
(collectively, Hamilton), in which we concluded that a Faretta motion made about 
one month before trial, but in the midst of an extensive Penal Code sections 
1538.5 and 995 hearing, was “ „untimely within the context of this protracted . . . 
hearing,‟ and the trial court acted within its discretion in denying it.  ([Hamilton 
II,] at p. 363, incorporating Hamilton I, at p. 420.)  Thus, in Hamilton II, we 
concluded that the defendant‟s pretrial self-representation motion, made about a 
month before trial, was untimely in light of the surrounding circumstances.”  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 33.)   
The majority‟s reliance upon Hamilton is misplaced.  Hamilton addressed 
the unique circumstance of how to treat a defendant‟s Faretta motion made during 
a protracted (in that case, two-month-long) pretrial hearing.  We concluded that 
such a motion should be treated as an untimely midtrial motion, and the Windham 
factors should be applied.  In so doing, we concluded that “the court properly 
exercised its discretion under Windham in denying the motion on the ground that 
defendant had not stated a valid reason for relieving counsel and was grasping at 
anything to delay the proceedings.”  (Hamilton I, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 420.)  
Here, in contrast, no protracted hearing complicated the assessment of whether 
defendant‟s Faretta motion was timely, and the majority acknowledges that the 
motion was not made for purposes of delay.  Hamilton is inapt, and does not 
compel or support the adoption of a totality of the circumstances test to assess the 
timeliness of a Faretta motion. 
 
Even assuming, arguendo, that a totality of the circumstances test ought to 
be conducted, it is not clear to me that the trial court properly denied the motion in 
light of all of the circumstances.  The majority acknowledges that although the 
8 
 
litigation had been proceeding for approximately four years at the time defendant 
made his Faretta motions, the delay was not defendant‟s fault.  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 38.)  The majority suggests that defendant does “not thereby escape any 
responsibility for timely invoking his right to self-representation” (ibid.), 
suggesting a proper factor for the court to consider is whether defendant could 
have but did not make a self-representation motion earlier in the proceedings.  
(Maj. opn., ante at pp. 37, 38.)  The majority further contends that the complexity 
of the issues, the age of witnesses, the potential for further delays, and the 
readiness of the parties support the trial court‟s denial of the motion.  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at pp. 38-39.)  An examination of each of these concerns suggests that they 
are not, individually or collectively, sufficient to deny defendant‟s constitutional 
right to represent himself.   
Complexity of the issues is ever present in a capital proceeding, but this 
court has unambiguously concluded that the right to self-representation attaches 
even in such cases.  (See People v. Stansbury (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1017, 1062; People 
v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1223; People v. Teron (1979) 23 Cal.3d 103, 
113.)  Indeed, in our recent decision in People v. Butler (2009) 47 Cal.4th 814, 
827, we acknowledged the obstacle presented by the defendant‟s numerous 
disciplinary infractions while incarcerated, which limited his ability to fully 
research his defense.  The trial court revoked his pro se status shortly before the 
beginning of trial, and we concluded that this revocation was erroneous.  (Ibid.)  
We explained that, while the trial court may have reasoned that it did not make 
sense to allow the defendant to proceed by way of self-representation because his 
ability to research and investigate his defense was limited, the trial court‟s 
decision was nonetheless “inconsistent with the requirements of Faretta and its 
progeny” and was therefore erroneous.  (Id. at p. 828.)  Here, defendant faces no 
similar limitation with respect to his ability to conduct his own defense, and the 
9 
 
fact that his case is a capital one is certainly not a sufficient justification for 
denying his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation. 
The age of the witnesses is irrelevant to a consideration of the propriety of a 
motion for self-representation, particularly where, as here, the testimony of the 
elderly witnesses had been videotaped at defendant‟s preliminary hearing.  To the 
extent that witnesses available in October 1991 might not later be able to provide 
live testimony, such a consideration should not weigh against granting a Faretta 
motion.  Although live testimony is certainly preferred, it is not the case here, 
where the testimony has been preserved, that the evidence provided by those 
witnesses would be lost.  Moreover, four years passed between defendant‟s 
arraignment and the commencement of trial, and numerous continuances were 
granted at the behest of both defense counsel and the district attorney; if age and 
availability of witnesses constituted an overriding concern, this delay should not 
have been tolerated.  It should not now justify the denial of defendant‟s timely 
invocation of his right to self-representation, particularly where it is unclear that 
defendant‟s exercise of that right would have caused any further delay or 
otherwise impacted the ability of the witnesses to testify. 
The potential for delay is another factor cited by the majority in support of 
its conclusion that a trial court may apply a totality of the circumstances test to 
determine whether a pretrial Faretta motion is timely.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 39.)  
The majority places weight on the fact that defendant replied “yeah” and “not 
sure” when asked by the court whether he was “talking about months” of time 
needed to prepare his case for trial.  The majority indicates that a trial court may 
properly consider whether further delay will be caused in determining whether the 
invocation of the right to self-representation is timely, explaining that “[t]he 
reasonable import of [defendant‟s] comments is that if the self-representation 
10 
 
motion had been granted, defendant would have required an undetermined amount 
of time to investigate and prepare for trial.”  (Ibid.)   
The majority‟s reasoning is deficient in two respects.  First, it conflates two 
separate, independent grounds for denying a Faretta motion —whether the motion 
was timely and whether it was made for dilatory purposes.  As the majority notes, 
“a Faretta motion may be denied if . . . the motion is made for purpose of delay[.]  
(People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 23[].)”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 30.)  Thus, 
the majority is correct that a trial court may assess the potential for delay in 
deciding whether to deny a Faretta motion because it was made for a dilatory 
purpose, but it may not make that assessment under the guise of determining 
whether a Faretta motion is timely.  We are mindful of the high court‟s concern 
that “[t]rial judges necessarily require a great deal of latitude in scheduling trials” 
(Morris v. Slappy (1983) 461 U.S. 1, 11; maj. opn., ante, at p. 39), but that concern 
is better addressed by an analysis of whether a Faretta motion is made for dilatory 
purposes, not whether it is timely. 
Second, even if the trial court properly could have assessed the potential for 
delay in evaluating the timeliness of defendant‟s Faretta motion, it is not clear in 
this case that delay would have resulted had the trial court granted defendant‟s 
motion.  The majority does not dispute that defendant did not seek a continuance 
in conjunction with his Faretta motion.  When asked by the court whether one 
would be necessary, and if so for how long, defendant indicated that he was “not 
sure.”  Although the court expressed concern that defendant might require a 
continuance to prepare for trial, defendant never raised this concern.  Moreover, 
defense counsel and the prosecution could have — and did — request necessary 
continuances in the course of preparing for trial; there is no principled reason why 
a self-represented defendant should be denied that same privilege.   
11 
 
The majority places weight on the fact that defendant‟s initial Faretta 
hearing occurred on October 7, 1991, and pretrial motions could have begun as 
early as October 21, 1991, apparently suggesting that defendant may not have had 
sufficient time to prepare his case.  Although the majority correctly points out that 
“defendant did not dispute that he would need time to investigate and prepare” 
(maj. opn., ante, at p. 39), the majority fails to persuade me that needing such time 
would have required continuances.  In fact, pretrial motions did not commence 
until October 31, 1991 — several weeks after defendant‟s hearing and over one 
month after defendant made his initial request to represent himself.  The motions 
took weeks to complete, and jury selection began in early December and did not 
conclude until mid-February 1992.  In light of the prosecution‟s initial estimate 
that its guilt phase case would take between three and four weeks to complete, 
defendant could have expected he would have several months to prepare his case 
without needing to request a single continuance.  Indeed, between the time 
defendant made his first Faretta request on September 27, and the time the 
prosecution completed its case, over five months had elapsed — which might well 
have been ample time for defendant to have prepared his case without needing to 
request a single continuance.  Assuming that a trial court may consider the 
potential for delay in assessing the timeliness of a Faretta motion, it is not clear 
here that delay would have resulted had the trial court granted defendant‟s request 
to represent himself. 
Finally, the readiness of counsel and defendant‟s apparent lack of 
justification for requesting self-representation do not validate the denial of 
defendant‟s motion.  The test for self-representation is not whether invocation of 
the right is reasonable or logical (which it arguably is not in a case such as this 
where counsel spent weeks reviewing voluminous files), but whether denial of the 
motion is “inconsistent with the requirements of Faretta and its progeny.”  
12 
 
(People v. Butler, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 828.)  “The defendant, and not his lawyer 
or the State, will bear the personal consequences of a conviction.  It is the 
defendant, therefore, who must be free personally to decide whether in his 
particular case counsel is to his advantage.  And although he may conduct his own 
defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be honored out of „that 
respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.‟  Illinois v. Allen 
[(1970)] 397 U.S. 337, 350-351 (Brennan, J., concurring).”  (Faretta, supra, 422 
U.S. at p. 834.)  Regardless of counsel‟s readiness and defendant‟s poor or 
excellent reasons for wishing to invoke his right to provide his own representation, 
so long as the right is invoked voluntarily, intelligently, knowingly, unequivocally, 
in a timely fashion, and without the purpose of causing delay, a trial court lacks 
discretion to deny it.  (Id. at p. 836.) 
I see no reason to stray from our long-standing rule that “in order to invoke 
the constitutionally mandated unconditional right of self-representation a 
defendant in a criminal trial should make an unequivocal assertion of that right 
within a reasonable time prior to the commencement of trial. Accordingly, when a 
motion to proceed pro se is timely interposed, a trial court must permit a defendant 
to represent himself upon ascertaining that he has voluntarily and intelligently 
elected to do so, irrespective of how unwise such a choice might appear to be. 
Furthermore, the defendant‟s „technical legal knowledge‟ is irrelevant to the 
court‟s assessment of the defendant‟s knowing exercise of the right to defend 
himself.”  (Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d at pp. 127-128, fn. omitted.)  Defendant‟s 
motions here were timely under any formulation; accordingly, I believe that the 
trial court erred by failing to grant defendant‟s motions for self-representation, 
mandating reversal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MORENO, J.
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Lynch 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S026408 
Date Filed: August 12, 2010 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Alameda 
Judge: Philip V. Sarkisian 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Michael J. Hersek, State Public Defender, under appointment by the Supreme Court, Jay Colangelo and 
Denise Kendall Assistant State Public Defenders, Ellen J. Eggers and Alison Bernstein, Deputy State 
Public Defenders, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson and Dane R. Gillette, 
Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Ronald S. Matthias and Gerald A. Engler, Assistant Attorneys General, 
for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Ellen J. Eggers 
Deputy State Public Defender 
221 Main Street, 10th Floor 
San Francisco, CA  94105 
(415) 904-5600 
 
Gerald A. Engler 
Assistant Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-1361 
(415) 703-1361