Title: Heyne v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC09-2323
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: April 19, 2012

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC09-2323 
____________ 
 
JUSTIN CURTIS HEYNE,  
Appellant/Cross-Appellee, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee/Cross-Appellant. 
 
[April 19, 2012] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
Justin Curtis Heyne appeals his convictions for the first-degree murders of 
Benjamin Hamilton, Sarah Buckoski, and Ivory Hamilton, and his sentence of 
death for the murder of Ivory.1  For the reasons stated below, we affirm his 
convictions and sentence. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
On March 30, 2006, Sarah Buckoski returned to her home with her five-
year-old daughter, Ivory Hamilton, to find Heyne and Ivory‟s father, Benjamin 
Hamilton, engaged in a verbal dispute.  The dispute centered on money Heyne 
                                         
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. 
 
 
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owed to Benjamin and took place in the master bedroom, a 12- by 13-foot room in 
which law enforcement later discovered drug paraphernalia and several pounds of 
marijuana.  Heyne worked with Benjamin and was temporarily residing with 
Benjamin, Sarah, and Ivory in Titusville, Florida.  Heyne was 24 years old.  
Benjamin and Sarah were 26 and 24, respectively. 
As the argument escalated, Heyne began to feel disrespected.  He started to 
walk away when he heard Benjamin cock a 9-mm gun.  Heyne left, retrieved a .38 
Special from his room, and then returned to the master bedroom to continue the 
argument with Benjamin.  The two argued while holding their respective guns but 
did not point them at one another while arguing.  Heyne pushed Benjamin onto the 
bed.  At some point during the dispute, Ivory entered the room, prompting 
Benjamin to drop the 9-mm.  Heyne picked up Benjamin‟s 9-mm.  Benjamin told 
Ivory to leave the room, and she turned to walk out. 
In its sentencing order, the trial court detailed the shootings as follows: 
Benjamin Hamilton was shot at a distance of no more than four 
or five feet.  At that point, Sarah Buckoski dove to the floor on the far 
side of the bed near the wall and started screaming.  The defendant 
shot her next.  She was shot one time, but the bullet passed through 
her arm before it entered the center of the back of the head.  At that 
point, Ivory began to pull on the defendant‟s shorts and the defendant 
shot her one time in the head at point blank range.   
When law enforcement arrived on the scene, Benjamin was struggling for air 
on the bed, Sarah was on the floor next to the bed in a fetal position screaming, and 
 
 
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Ivory was lying on the floor without a pulse.  An autopsy revealed that just prior 
her death, Ivory was slapped in the face in a manner violent enough to cause a 
rupture of the blood vessel beneath the skin.  A bullet fired from Heyne‟s .38 
Special was found in her skull. 
After the shooting, Heyne ran out of the back door with his gun in a 
pillowcase and with marijuana and cocaine he took from the master bedroom.  
Heyne called a friend, Roxanne Larabie, and asked her to pick him up.  Larabie 
testified that Heyne admitted to shooting Benjamin and Sarah and that when she 
asked about Ivory, Heyne “just looked at me and said she was gone.”  Larabie 
helped Heyne obtain new clothes identical to the ones he was wearing.  When they 
arrived at Larabie‟s house, Heyne washed the new clothes in an effort to make 
them appear worn.  He removed his old shoes and clothes, wrapped up his gun in 
the pillowcase, and put all of the items in a box in Larabie‟s attic.  Law 
enforcement retrieved the items and discovered bloodstains matching Benjamin‟s 
DNA profile on Heyne‟s pants and the pillowcase. 
Heyne was apprehended and questioned regarding the murder, and a 
videotape of the interrogation was played for the jury at trial.  Initially, Heyne 
denied that he was at the house at the time of the murder.  But when an 
investigating officer interrupted the interrogation with news that Heyne‟s gun, 
bloodied clothing, and pillowcase were discovered in a box in Larabie‟s attic, 
 
 
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Heyne confessed to shooting Benjamin and Sarah and acknowledged seeing Ivory 
“go down.”  At the time, Heyne could not remember shooting Ivory and repeatedly 
denied that he would have shot her on purpose.  However, he acknowledged 
shooting both the 9-mm and the .38 Special and directed the interrogating officer 
as the officer drew a diagram of the room depicting the placement of Heyne and all 
three victims during the shootings.  Heyne said that his argument with Benjamin 
began as a non-violent confrontation in which Benjamin never threatened him or 
pointed his gun in Heyne‟s direction.  
At trial, Heyne advanced the theory that he shot Benjamin and Sarah in self-
defense, specifically suggesting in closing arguments that Sarah may have been 
trying to access a shotgun under the bed.  As for Ivory, Heyne argued that the 
evidence supported an accidental shooting.  The prosecution attempted to foreclose 
the possibility of self-defense and accident, relying heavily on the diagram drawn 
during Heyne‟s interrogation to show that the relative positioning of Heyne and the 
victims precluded either scenario.  Ultimately, the jury found Heyne guilty of first-
degree premeditated murder of all three victims. 
At the penalty phase, Heyne presented mitigation testimony from former 
educators, family members, and evaluating psychologists.  His former educators 
attested to Heyne‟s status as a special education student, and his family members 
testified that he was a caring but difficult child.  Dr. Joseph Wu testified that 
 
 
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imaging from a PET scan showed damage to Heyne‟s temporal and parietal lobes, 
evidencing learning difficulties, causing problems regulating aggression and 
impulse, and making addiction to alcohol and drugs more likely.  Dr. Wu also 
testified that imaging was consistent with a history of traumatic brain injuries and 
specifically noted two concussions Heyne suffered as a child, another head injury 
when Heyne was incarcerated in 2004, and a slow processing speed relative to his 
IQ score of 88.  Dr. William Riebsame diagnosed Heyne with ADHD and possible 
bipolar disorder—one or both of which caused Heyne to have impulse control 
disorder—as well as cocaine and alcohol use and dependence at the time of the 
offense.  Dr. Riebsame also discussed Heyne‟s history of impulsivity, including 
two documented suicide attempts.  Dr. Riebsame revealed that Heyne had 
confessed to shooting Ivory, whom Heyne said was crying and pulling on his 
shorts after he shot Benjamin.   
The jury recommended life imprisonment for the murder of Benjamin, the 
death penalty for the murder of Sarah by a vote of eight to four, and the death 
penalty for the murder of Ivory by a vote of ten to two.   
The trial court followed the jury‟s recommendation of death for the murder 
of Ivory but sentenced Heyne to life imprisonment for the murders of Benjamin 
and Sarah.  For the murder of Ivory, the trial court found three aggravators:  (1) 
Heyne was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence  
 
 
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(great weight); (2) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) 
(great weight); and (3) the victim was less than twelve years of age (great weight).  
The trial court found the following mitigators:  (1) Heyne suffers from a mental 
illness (great weight); (2) Heyne has brain damage and brain deficits (great 
weight); (3) Heyne had a problem with substance abuse and dependence (moderate 
weight); (4) Heyne had an impaired capacity to appreciate the criminality of his 
conduct or conform it to the requirements of law (moderate weight); (5) Heyne was 
under the influence of a mental or emotional disturbance (little weight); (6) Heyne 
was a good, caring father to a handicapped son (very little weight); (7) Heyne 
cared for and helped elderly neighbors when he was a child (very little weight); (8) 
Heyne gave his flannel jacket to a homeless person (very little weight); (9) Heyne 
protected younger, weaker children when he was a child (very little weight); (10) 
Heyne played football and other sports as a child and was devastated when he 
could no longer play (very little weight); (11) Heyne was recommended to receive 
in-patient psychiatric treatment at age five but did not receive treatment (moderate 
weight); (12) Heyne has a history of suicide attempts and self-destructive behavior 
(moderate weight); and (13) Heyne exhibited good behavior during trial (some 
weight). 
 
 
 
 
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II.  ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL 
Heyne raises four issues on appeal:  (A) the trial court erred in denying his 
motion for judgment of acquittal; (B) the trial court erred in finding the HAC 
aggravator for the murder of Ivory; (C) the trial court erred in assessing the mental 
health mitigating evidence; and (D) the death sentence is not proportionate.2  None 
of these claims warrant relief. 
A. Denial of Motion for Judgment of Acquittal 
Heyne argues that the trial court erred in denying the motion for judgment of 
acquittal at the conclusion of the prosecution‟s guilt-phase case because the 
evidence of premeditation was circumstantial and did not disprove every 
reasonable hypothesis of innocence.  For the reasons that follow, we disagree. 
This Court has defined premeditation as “a fully formed conscious purpose 
to kill that may be formed in a moment and need only exist for such time as will 
allow the accused to be conscious of the nature of the act he is about to commit and 
the probable result of that act.”  Miller v. State, 42 So. 3d 204, 228 (Fla. 2010) 
(quoting Asay v. State, 580 So. 2d 610, 612 (Fla. 1991)), cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 
935 (2011).  “Circumstantial evidence of premeditation can include the nature of 
                                         
 
2.  Heyne also claims that his sentence is unconstitutional under Ring v. 
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  Yet Ring does not apply to cases where, as here, 
the prior violent felony aggravator exists.  See Hodges v. State, 55 So. 3d 515, 540 
(Fla. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 164 (2011). 
 
 
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the weapon used, the presence or absence of adequate provocation, previous 
difficulties between the parties, the manner in which the homicide was committed, 
and the nature and manner of the wounds inflicted.”  Pearce v. State, 880 So. 2d 
561, 572 (Fla. 2004). 
A trial court‟s determination on the sufficiency of evidence to prove 
premeditation is guided by the following principles: 
Premeditation is a factual issue for the jury, Asay[, 580 So. 2d at 612], 
and several standards of review are applicable.  The following 
standard applies where the evidence of premeditation is direct, 
whether in whole or in part:  as with other factual findings, a jury‟s 
finding of premeditation will be sustained if supported by competent, 
substantial evidence in the record.  See, e.g., Wheeler v. State, 4 So. 
3d 599, 605 (Fla.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 178 (2009).  Where the 
evidence of premeditation is wholly circumstantial, on the other hand, 
the following standard applies:  not only must the evidence be 
sufficient to support the finding of premeditation, but the evidence, 
when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, must also be 
inconsistent with any other reasonable inference.  Cochran v. State, 
547 So. 2d 928, 930 (Fla. 1989).   
Twilegar v. State, 42 So. 3d 177, 190 (Fla. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1476 
(2011).   
This Court reviews de novo the trial court‟s denial of a motion for judgment 
of acquittal.  Delgado v. State, 71 So. 3d 54, 65 (Fla. 2011).  “Where the State has 
presented competent, substantial evidence of the crimes charged, the trial court 
does not err in denying a motion for judgment of acquittal and submitting the case 
to the jury.”  McDuffie v. State, 970 So. 2d 312, 332 (Fla. 2007). 
 
 
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Here, even assuming the wholly circumstantial test applies to all three 
murders, the trial court did not err in finding sufficient evidence of premeditation 
because the evidence is inconsistent with any other reasonable inference.  See 
McWatters v. State, 36 So. 3d 613, 631 (Fla. 2010).  We address each murder in 
turn. 
1.  Benjamin 
The evidence concerning the shooting of Benjamin was sufficient to support 
a finding of premeditation and was inconsistent with any other reasonable 
inference.  Specifically, the prosecution presented the following evidence, much of 
which derives from Heyne‟s statement to law enforcement:  (1) Heyne and 
Benjamin were arguing, and Benjamin treated Heyne in a manner that made Heyne 
feel disrespected; (2) Heyne heard Benjamin cock his gun and then went to his 
room to retrieve his own gun; (3) Heyne returned to the room with his gun and 
continued to argue with Benjamin; (4) the two continued to argue while holding 
their respective guns, but Benjamin neither pointed his gun at Heyne nor waved it 
around; (5) Heyne pushed Benjamin onto the bed, yet an autopsy revealed no 
additional signs of a struggle between the two; (6) before any shots were fired, 
Benjamin voluntarily relinquished his gun, and Heyne picked it up; and (7) Heyne 
admitted to pointing his gun at Benjamin and firing it in his direction.  This 
evidence provided a basis for the jury to conclude that Heyne had time to reflect 
 
 
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and form the intent to kill Benjamin because it demonstrated that Heyne left in the 
middle of the argument to deliberately select a deadly weapon, then returned to 
shoot Benjamin even after Benjamin disarmed himself.  See Floyd v. State, 850 So. 
2d 383, 397 (Fla. 2002) (“Floyd‟s deliberate selection and transportation of a gun 
to the victim‟s home is clearly inconsistent with his theory that he argued with the 
victim and simply shot her in a moment of uncontrolled rage without having fully 
formed a conscious purpose to kill.”). 
Because the evidence was sufficient to support a finding of premeditation 
and was inconsistent with any other reasonable inference, we affirm the trial 
court‟s denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal as to the first-degree murder 
of Benjamin. 
2.  Sarah 
Likewise, the evidence concerning the shooting of Sarah was sufficient to 
support a finding of premeditation and was inconsistent with any other reasonable 
inference.  First, Heyne‟s statement provided evidence that (1) Sarah ran into the 
bedroom after Heyne shot Benjamin, and she “panicked and got on the floor” on 
the opposite side of the bed; (2) Heyne was motivated to shoot Sarah “because she 
was screaming”; (3) Heyne also shot Sarah because it crossed his mind that she 
could have served as a witness to the shooting of Benjamin.   
 
 
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Second, the prosecution presented evidence inconsistent with Heyne‟s 
suggestion at closing argument that he shot Sarah in a panic because she was 
accessing a shotgun underneath the bed.  See Henry v. State, 574 So. 2d 73, 74 
(Fla. 1991) (holding that physical evidence inconsistent with Henry‟s hypothesis of 
innocence provided “enough evidence to present a jury question on the issue of 
premeditation”).  On this point, the prosecution presented evidence that (1) the 
latched case housing the shotgun had not been accessed when it was found 
underneath the bed; (2) Sarah had come from a room in which Heyne knew there 
to “always” be a loaded firearm; (3) Heyne shot Sarah when she had her arm up 
and her head turned, possibly in an attempt to protect herself; (4) Sarah was on the 
side of the bed opposite Heyne when shot but was shot in the back of the head, 
making it unlikely that she was facing toward and reaching underneath the bed; 
and (5) there were no bullet holes through the mattress, eliminating the possibility 
that her head was turned from Heyne because it was under the bed. 
Because the prosecution presented evidence that was sufficient to support a 
finding of premeditation and was inconsistent with any other reasonable inference, 
we affirm the trial court‟s denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal as to the 
first-degree murder of Sarah. 
 
 
 
 
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3.  Ivory 
 
Finally, although Heyne repeatedly denied that he purposefully shot Ivory, 
the circumstantial evidence surrounding the shooting of Ivory was sufficient to 
support a finding of premeditation and was inconsistent with any other reasonable 
inference.  Specifically, the prosecution presented evidence that (1) Heyne told law 
enforcement that he remembered Ivory pulling on his shorts after he shot her father 
and that he remembered firing at least two more shots; (2) Heyne had time to see 
that Ivory appeared to be “in shock” after he shot Benjamin; (3) Ivory was five 
years old and posed no physical threat to Heyne; (4) Ivory was violently slapped in 
the face just prior to her death, likely by a man; (5) the muzzle of the gun was less 
than two feet from Ivory‟s face when it was fired; and (6) according to Heyne‟s 
diagram of the room, Heyne and Ivory were positioned in the room in a way that 
Heyne would have had to walk around the bed in order to slap Ivory and then shoot 
her from a distance less than two feet. 
 
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court‟s denial of Heyne‟s motion for 
judgment of acquittal. 
B. HAC Aggravator 
 
Heyne argues that the trial court erred in finding the HAC aggravator 
because there was no evidence that Ivory experienced terror and fear prior to her 
death.  We disagree. 
 
 
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The HAC aggravator applies when “[t]he capital felony was especially 
heinous, atrocious, or cruel.”  § 921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (2009).  Additionally, this 
Court has held “that for this factor to apply, the murder must be conscienceless or 
pitiless and unnecessarily torturous to the victim.”  Diaz v. State, 860 So. 2d 960, 
966 (Fla. 2003).  In determining whether the victim experienced such fear, the trial 
court views the circumstances “from the unique perspective of the victim,” Banks 
v. State, 700 So. 2d 363, 367 (Fla. 1997), and “in accordance with a common-sense 
inference from the circumstances.”  Allred v. State, 55 So. 3d 1267, 1280 (Fla. 
2010) (quoting Swafford v. State, 533 So. 2d 270, 277 (Fla. 1988)), cert. denied, 
132 S. Ct. 181 (2011).  “[F]ear, emotional strain, and terror of the victim during the 
events leading up to the murder may make an otherwise quick death especially 
heinous, atrocious, or cruel.”  Lynch v. State, 841 So. 2d 362, 369 (Fla. 2003) 
(quoting James v. State, 695 So. 2d 1229, 1235 (Fla. 1997)).   
When this Court reviews the sentencing court‟s finding of an aggravator,  
“[I]t is not this Court‟s function to reweigh the evidence to 
determine whether the State proved each aggravating circumstance 
beyond a reasonable doubt—that is the trial court‟s job.”  Willacy v. 
State, 696 So. 2d 693, 695 (Fla. 1997).  Rather, “[i]n reviewing an 
aggravating factor challenged on appeal, this Court‟s task „is to 
review the record to determine whether the trial court applied the right 
rule of law for each aggravating circumstance, and, if so, whether 
competent substantial evidence supports its finding.‟ ”  Hernandez v. 
State, 4 So. 3d 642, 667 (Fla. 2009) (quoting Douglas v. State, 878 So. 
2d 1246, 1260-61 (Fla. 2004)). 
Serrano v. State, 64 So. 3d 93, 113-14 (Fla. 2011). 
 
 
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Here, the trial court applied the right rule of law, and there is competent, 
substantial evidence to support the trial court‟s finding that the victim experienced 
fear and terror prior to her death.  In its sentencing order, the trial court recognized 
that, because “[d]eath by gunshot is generally instantaneous,” a finding of HAC 
does not usually follow “unless the shooting is accompanied by additional acts 
resulting in mental or physical torture to the victim.”  Here, the trial court found 
that Ivory, who was five years old, witnessed the murder of her father and her 
mother prior to her own death, all within the same room.  The trial court then 
determined that Ivory was crying and pulling on Heyne‟s shorts and “experienced 
terror and fear no five year old child should ever experience in those brief 
moments” leading up to the murder.   
Accordingly, because the trial court applied the correct rule of law and 
because the HAC aggravator was supported by competent, substantial evidence, 
we affirm the trial court‟s finding. 
C. Mental Health Mitigating Evidence 
Next, Heyne argues that the trial court erred in rejecting expert testimony 
introduced to establish both statutory mental health mitigators.  However, we 
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when rejecting the 
proposed statutory mitigators. 
 
 
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This Court has established several broad principles applicable to the trial 
court‟s evaluation of proposed mitigators: 
A trial court must find as a mitigating circumstance each proposed 
factor that has been established by the greater weight of the evidence 
and that is truly mitigating in nature.  However, a trial court may 
reject a proposed mitigator if the mitigator is not proven or if there is 
competent, substantial evidence to support its rejection.  Even expert 
opinion evidence may be rejected if that evidence cannot be 
reconciled with other evidence in the case.  Finally, even where a 
mitigating circumstance is found a trial court may give it no weight 
when that circumstance is not mitigating based on the unique facts of 
the case. 
Coday v. State, 946 So. 2d 988, 1003 (Fla. 2006).   
When this Court reviews a trial court‟s finding on a mitigator, it operates 
under the following standards of review:  
Where it is clear that the trial court has considered all evidence 
presented in support of a mitigating factor, the court‟s decision as to 
whether that circumstance is established will be reviewed only for 
abuse of discretion.  See Harris v. State, 843 So. 2d 856, 868 (Fla. 
2003); Foster v. State, 679 So. 2d 747, 755 (Fla. 1996).  The trial 
court‟s findings will be upheld where there is competent, substantial 
evidence in the record to support each finding.  See Lebron v. State, 
982 So. 2d 649, 660 (Fla. 2008).  The weight assigned to an 
established mitigating circumstance is also reviewed for abuse of 
discretion.  Id. 
. . . However, a trial court‟s findings on mitigation are also 
subject to review for harmless error, and this Court will not overturn a 
capital appellant‟s sentence if it determines that an error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Lebron, 982 So. 2d at 661; Singleton 
v. State, 783 So. 2d 970, 977 (Fla. 2001). 
 
Ault v. State, 53 So. 3d 175, 186-87 (Fla. 2010).   
The proposed statutory mitigators are addressed in turn. 
 
 
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1.  Impaired capacity mitigator 
 
Here, Dr. Riebsame testified that, because of Heyne‟s mental disorders—
ADHD and possible bipolar disorder—and self-reported drug and alcohol use at 
the time of the shootings, Heyne‟s capacity to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law was substantially impaired.   The trial court partially rejected 
this expert testimony, finding that Heyne did have an impaired capacity but that the 
impairment was less than substantial.   This finding was based in part on a separate 
finding that Heyne used drugs on the day of the murders but that the drugs did not 
hinder his ability to obtain a murder weapon, fire it with fatal accuracy, contact 
Larabie, or conceal incriminating evidence.  The trial court gave moderate weight 
to the mitigator of impaired (but less than substantially impaired) capacity.   
The trial court‟s finding on the impaired capacity mitigator was not an abuse 
of discretion because it was supported by competent, substantial evidence.  See 
Ault, 53 So. 3d at 187.  Therefore, we affirm the trial court‟s finding. 
This Court has held that competent, substantial evidence supports the 
rejection of expert testimony in support of the substantially impaired capacity 
mitigator where other evidence concerning the defendant‟s capacity conflicts with 
the expert testimony.  See Coday, 946 So. 2d at 1003 (“Even expert opinion 
evidence may be rejected if that evidence cannot be reconciled with the other 
evidence in the case.”); see also Williams v. State, 37 So. 3d 187, 204 (Fla. 2010) 
 
 
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(“[T]he rejection of expert testimony must have a rational basis, such as conflict 
with other evidence . . . .”) (emphasis added).  Under similar reasoning, “[t]his 
Court has previously upheld rejection of this statutory mitigating factor where a 
defendant „took logical steps to conceal his actions from others.‟ ”  Zommer v. 
State, 31 So. 3d 733, 750 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Nelson v. State, 850 So. 2d 514, 531 
(Fla. 2003) (quoting trial court‟s order)).  Evidence of “logical steps” conflicts with 
expert testimony on this mitigator because they constitute “purposeful actions . . . 
indicative of someone who knew those acts were wrong and who could conform 
his conduct to the law if he so desired.”   Hoskins v. State, 965 So. 2d 1, 18 (Fla. 
2007) (quoting Nelson, 850 So. 2d at 531).   
In this case, the record includes evidence that conflicts with the expert 
testimony, specifically, Heyne‟s “purposeful actions . . . indicative of someone 
who knew those acts were wrong and who could conform his conduct to the law if 
he so desired.”   Id. (quoting Nelson, 850 So. 2d at 531).  Following the shootings, 
Heyne took one of the murder weapons and placed it in a pillowcase, ran from the 
house, contacted an ex-girlfriend, and went back to her house.  In an effort to 
conceal his involvement, Heyne took a shower, obtained replacement clothing 
identical to the clothing he wore when he committed the murders, washed the 
replacement clothing to make it look worn, hid the murder weapon and bloody 
clothes in the attic, and then lied to police about his involvement in the murder. 
 
 
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Additionally, there was a conflict in the evidence regarding Heyne‟s self-
reported drug use on the day of the murder, a factor vital to the experts‟ evaluation 
of Heyne‟s impulse control.  In its sentencing order, the trial court observed that if 
Heyne was intoxicated on the day of the shooting, his intoxication was not so 
significant that it limited his ability to obtain a weapon, fire it accurately, contact 
Larabie, and then conceal the murder weapon, clothing, and drugs.  See Zommer, 
31 So. 3d at 750 (“[A]lthough Zommer may have had some drugs in his system at 
the time of the murder, the evidence does not support a finding that those drugs 
substantially impaired his capacity . . . .”).  Additional conflicting evidence not 
referenced in the sentencing order included the observations of the officers, who 
said that Heyne did not appear intoxicated later that day, and the toxicology report 
showing an absence of cocaine in Benjamin, with whom Heyne claimed to have 
used cocaine earlier that day.   
Therefore, we affirm the trial court‟s finding on impaired capacity. 
2.  Emotional disturbance mitigator 
 
Dr. Riebsame testified that the combination of Heyne‟s mental disorders and 
self-reported intoxication at the time of the shootings placed him under the 
influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance.  He clarified on cross-
examination, however, that his opinion on extreme emotional disturbance would be 
different absent intoxication.  Dr. Joseph Wu also testified that Heyne was under 
 
 
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the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance, but in questioning Dr. 
Wu, defense counsel asked the expert to assume intoxication in forming his 
opinion.  As with the impaired capacity mitigator, the trial court partially rejected 
this expert testimony, finding that Heyne was under an emotional disturbance that 
was less than extreme.   Again, the trial court referenced the separate finding on 
drug use at the time of the murder.  Still, the evidence on Heyne‟s less-than-
extreme emotional disturbance was treated as a nonstatutory mitigator and was 
given little weight. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion because its finding on the 
emotional disturbance mitigator was supported by competent, substantial evidence.  
Therefore, we affirm. 
“[E]xpert testimony alone does not require a finding of extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance.”  Foster, 679 So. 2d at 755.  Instead, the trial court may 
disregard expert opinion where it determines that the opinion is unsupported by the 
facts or conflicts with other evidence.  See, e.g., Ault, 53 So. 3d at 189 
(determining that evidence of a planned attack conflicted with a finding of extreme 
emotional disturbance).  More specifically, we have held that testimony from lay 
witnesses concerning the defendant‟s condition on the day of the murder may serve 
as competent, substantial evidence to support rejection of expert testimony on the 
extreme emotional disturbance mitigator.  See, e.g., Nelson, 850 So. 2d at 530; 
 
 
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Rose v. State, 787 So. 2d 786, 803 (Fla. 2001) (holding that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in rejecting expert testimony regarding intoxication where two 
law enforcement officers testified that the defendant appeared to be sober and a 
bartender testified that he did not see the defendant at the bar he claimed to have 
visited).   
Here, the trial court‟s finding was based on competent, substantial evidence.  
Dr. Riebsame expressly stated that his opinion on the extreme emotional 
disturbance circumstance would be different if Heyne was not intoxicated on the 
day of the murder, yet the sole source of Dr. Riebsame‟s belief that Heyne was 
intoxicated was Heyne‟s self-report.  Heyne‟s second expert, Dr. Wu, was asked 
by the defense to assume intoxication in rendering his opinion.  Meanwhile, the 
prosecution presented testimony from law enforcement officers in close contact 
with Heyne on the day of the murder who said that they observed no sign of 
alcohol or cocaine intoxication.  A toxicology report indicated that Benjamin had 
no cocaine in his system just hours after the shooting, contrary to Heyne‟s report 
that they used cocaine together that day.  Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in finding that the disturbance was something short of “extreme.”  See 
Foster, 679 So. 2d at 756 (“It is clear from the sentencing order that the trial court 
gave some weight to nonstatutory mitigation; however, the trial court did not find 
 
 
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that it rose to the level of this statutory mitigator.  Accordingly, we find that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion . . . .”). 
In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in assessing the mental 
health mitigating evidence.  The trial court‟s findings were supported by 
competent, substantial evidence.    
D.  Proportionality 
Heyne argues that his sentence of death is not proportionate.  For the reasons 
that follow, we disagree.  
 
This Court is required to review the proportionality of a death sentence “in 
order to prevent the imposition of unusual punishments under the Florida 
Constitution.”  Phillips v. State, 39 So. 3d 296, 305 (Fla. 2010), cert denied, 131 S. 
Ct. 520 (2010).  However, in analyzing proportionality, “[t]his Court‟s function is 
not to reweigh the mitigating factors against the aggravating factors; that is the 
function of the trial judge.”  Id. (quoting Blake v. State, 972 So. 2d 839, 846 (Fla. 
2007)).  Instead, “[i]n deciding whether death is a proportionate penalty, this Court 
considers the „totality of the circumstances in a case‟ and compares the case with 
other capital cases.”  Id. (quoting Sliney v. State, 699 So. 2d 662, 672 (Fla. 1997)).  
As it compares the case with others, this Court performs “a two-pronged inquiry . . 
. to „determine [whether] the crime falls within the category of both (1) the most 
aggravated, and (2) the least mitigated of murders.‟”  Ault, 53 So. 3d at 196 
 
 
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(quoting Almeida v. State, 748 So. 2d 922, 933 (Fla. 1999)).  The review is “a 
qualitative review by this Court of the underlying basis for each aggravator and 
mitigator rather than a quantitative analysis.”  Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411, 416 
(Fla. 1998).  In other words, “comparison is not simply a calculation of the number 
of aggravators and mitigators.”  Lebron, 982 So. 2d at 668. 
In this case, the jury recommended death for the murder of Ivory by a ten to 
two vote.  The trial court found three aggravators and gave them all great weight:  
(1) prior violent felony; (2) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel 
(HAC); and (3) the victim was less than twelve years of age.  “[T]he heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel aggravator is one of the „most serious aggravators set out in the 
statutory sentencing scheme.‟ ”  Aguirre-Jarquin v. State, 9 So. 3d 593, 610 (Fla. 
2009) (quoting Larkins v. State, 739 So. 2d 90, 95 (Fla. 1999)).  And “the prior 
violent felony aggravator is considered one of the weightiest aggravators.”  Silvia 
v. State, 60 So. 3d 959, 974 (Fla. 2011).  The trial court found thirteen mitigators:  
(1) Heyne suffers from a mental illness (great weight); (2) Heyne has brain damage 
and brain deficits (great weight); (3) Heyne had a problem with substance abuse 
and dependence (moderate weight); (4) Heyne had an impaired capacity to 
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform it to the requirements of law 
(moderate weight); (5) Heyne was under the influence of a mental or emotional 
disturbance (little weight); (6) Heyne was a good, caring father to a handicapped 
 
 
- 23 - 
son (very little weight); (7) Heyne cared for and helped elderly neighbors when he 
was a child (very little weight); (8) Heyne gave his flannel jacket to a homeless 
person (very little weight); (9) Heyne protected younger, weaker children when he 
was a child (very little weight); (10) Heyne played football and other sports as a 
child and was devastated when he could no longer play (very little weight); (11) 
Heyne was recommended to receive in-patient psychiatric treatment at age five but 
did not receive treatment (moderate weight); (12) Heyne has a history of suicide 
attempts and self-destructive behavior (moderate weight); and (13) Heyne 
exhibited good behavior during trial (some weight).   
This Court has found the death sentence proportionate in similar cases.  See, 
e.g., Lynch, 841 So. 2d 362 (death sentence proportionate in double homicide 
where, for the murder of the child victim, the trial court found aggravators of HAC, 
prior violent felony, and commission in the course of a felony; statutory mitigation 
of no significant criminal history; and nonstatutory mitigation of mental or 
emotional disturbance, impaired capacity, mental illness, and alcohol abuse); Ocha 
v. State, 826 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 2002) (death sentence proportionate with aggravators 
of HAC and prior violent felony and nonstatutory mitigators including learning 
disability, post-traumatic stress disorder, intoxication on the night of the offense, 
psychiatric disturbance, and “extensive history” of substance abuse); Rogers v. 
State, 783 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 2001) (death sentence proportionate with aggravators of 
 
 
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HAC and pecuniary gain; statutory mitigation of impaired capacity; and 
nonstatutory mitigators including alcohol use on the day of the offense); Singleton 
v. State, 783 So. 2d 970 (Fla. 2001) (death sentence proportionate with aggravators 
of HAC and prior violent felony; statutory mitigators of extreme disturbance, 
impaired capacity, and age; and nonstatutory mitigators including alcoholism, mild 
dementia, and intoxication at the time of the offense). 
Accordingly, we find the death penalty proportionate here. 
III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
This Court independently reviews the record of a death penalty case to 
determine whether the evidence is sufficient to support the murder conviction.  See 
Winkles v. State, 894 So. 2d 842, 847 (Fla. 2005).  Here, there is competent, 
substantial evidence to support the murder convictions.  See Durousseau v. State, 
55 So. 3d 543, 559-60 (Fla. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 149 (2011).  
In his confession, Heyne described a verbal dispute he had with Benjamin, 
during which Heyne retrieved a gun from his room and returned to continue the 
argument with Benjamin.  Heyne admitted that Benjamin dropped the gun and that 
he picked up Benjamin‟s gun before pointing a gun at Benjamin and shooting.  
Blood found on Heyne‟s clothing and pillowcase matched Benjamin‟s DNA 
profile.  He then admitted to shooting Sarah “because she was screaming” and 
because she could have served as a witness against him in the murder of Benjamin.  
 
 
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As for Ivory, Heyne initially said that he could not remember shooting Ivory, but 
the evidence at the guilt phase demonstrated that Ivory was violently slapped in the 
face and then shot at close range with the same gun Heyne admitted to using in the 
murder and then hiding in Larabie‟s attic.  Heyne admitted seeing Ivory “go down” 
prior to leaving the scene and told his ex-girlfriend after the murder that Ivory was 
“gone.”  He later admitted to his psychologist that he shot Ivory.     
Because there is competent substantial evidence to support the murder 
convictions, we affirm.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons expressed above, we affirm Heyne‟s convictions and 
sentence of death for the murder of Ivory Hamilton.3 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, 
and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Brevard County,  
O.H. Eaton, Jr., Judge - Case No. 05-2006-CF-019237-AX 
 
                                         
 
3.  The State cross-appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in rejecting the 
aggravator of commission for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest 
for the murder of Ivory.  Because we affirm the death sentence for the murder of 
Ivory, we need not address the State‟s cross-appeal. 
 
 
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James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and George D.E. Burden, Assistant Public 
Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Cross-Appellee 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Kenneth S. 
Nunnelley, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Cross-Appellant