Title: Adams Outdoor Advertising, Ltd. v. City of Madison
Citation: 2006 WI 104
Docket Number: 2005AP000508
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 13, 2006

2006 WI 104 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP508 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Adams Outdoor Advertising, Ltd. d/b/a Adams 
Outdoor Advertising of Madison, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
City of Madison, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 13, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 26, 2006   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Maryann Sumi   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins the dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant there were briefs by Thomas S. 
Hornig, Margery Mebane Tibbetts, and Brennan, Steil & Basting, 
S.C., Janesville, and oral argument by Thomas S. Hornig. 
 
For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief and oral 
argument by Larry W. O’Brien, assistant city attorney, with whom 
on the brief was Michael P. May, city attorney. 
 
 
 
 
2006 WI 104
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP508   
(L.C. No. 
2003CV777 & 2004CV883) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Adams Outdoor Advertising, Ltd. d/b/a Adams 
Outdoor Advertising of Madison, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
City of Madison, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 13, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Dane 
County, Maryann Sumi, Judge.  Reversed and cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This case is before the court 
on 
certification 
by 
the 
court 
of 
appeals, 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 809.61 (2003-04).1  The circuit court upheld 
the 
City 
of 
Madison's 
(the 
City) 
personal 
property 
tax 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-
04 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2005AP508 
 
2 
 
assessment of Adams Outdoor Advertising, Ltd. (Adams) billboards 
for 2002 and 2003, and Adams appealed.2 
¶2 
Adams presents essentially four challenges to the 
assessments: 
A. 
The City erroneously used the third tier income 
approach to assess Adams' billboards even though evidence of 
comparable sales was available. 
B. 
Assuming the City could use third tier methods to 
assess Adams' billboards, the City improperly relied upon only 
the income approach to assess Adams' billboards, in violation of 
Bischoff v. City of Appleton, 81 Wis. 2d 612, 260 N.W.2d 773 
(1978). 
C. 
Assuming the City could use the third tier income 
approach to assess Adams' billboards, the City erroneously 
applied the income approach by including the value of the 
billboard permits in the assessments even though the permits are 
either intangible personal property or an interest in real 
property. 
D. 
Use of the third tier income approach to assess Adams' 
billboards when almost all other personal property in the City 
is assessed using the cost-less-depreciation approach (the cost 
approach) contravenes the Uniformity Clause of the Wisconsin 
Constitution, article VIII, section 1. 
                                                 
2 We use the term "billboard" generically to refer to all 
the various types of outdoor, off-premises signs owned by Adams.  
An off-premises sign does not advertise the business or activity 
that occurs on the site where the billboard is located. 
No.  2005AP508 
 
3 
 
¶3 
We answer Adams' challenges as follows: 
A. 
The City was entitled to use third tier methods of 
assessment to assess Adams' billboards because there was not a 
recent arms-length sale of the property and Adams did not 
produce evidence of reasonably comparable sales. 
B. 
Although net income from billboard rentals may be a 
factor to consider in a third tier analysis, it cannot be the 
sole controlling factor in determining value.  When the Madison 
City Assessor acknowledged that he considered but rejected all 
other approaches and factors, his assessment contravened long-
standing assessment principles articulated in Waste Management 
of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Kenosha County Board of Review, 184 
Wis. 2d 541, 558, 516 N.W.2d 695 (1994); Bischoff, 81 Wis. 2d at 
619; and State ex rel. I.B.M. Corp. v. Board of Review, 231 Wis. 
303, 311-12, 285 N.W. 784 (1939), as well as the prevailing 
practice for assessing billboards throughout Wisconsin and the 
United States. 
C. 
The City erred by including the value of billboard 
permits in the assessment of Adams' billboards.  Billboard 
permits are not tangible personal property.  For property tax 
purposes, billboard permits constitute an interest in real 
property, as defined by Wis. Stat. § 70.03. 
D. 
Having 
concluded 
that 
the 
City's 
assessment 
is 
improper because it relied on only an income approach and 
because it improperly included the value of billboard permits, 
we do not reach the question of whether the City's use of the 
income approach violates the Uniformity Clause. 
No.  2005AP508 
 
4 
 
¶4 
Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court and remand 
the cause to the circuit court, which is directed to stay 
further proceedings pending reassessment of Adams' billboards by 
the City in a manner consistent with this opinion, or until the 
parties reach a settlement. 
I. BACKGROUND 
¶5 
Adams challenges as excessive the City's personal 
property tax assessments of its billboards for the years 2002 
and 2003.  The City assessed Adams' billboards at $6,022,400 in 
2002 and $5,858,000 in 2003.3  In 2002 and 2003 Adams owned 109 
billboard structures in the City, according to an appraisal 
prepared for Adams.  These structures presented "206 billboard 
faces," according to the Madison assessor.  All billboard 
structures were on leased land. 
¶6 
Adams timely challenged the 2002 and 2003 assessments 
before the City Board of Assessors and then the City Board of 
Review.4  For both years, Adams claimed the fair market value of 
its billboards was $401,984.  Adams' fundamental objection to 
the City's assessments was that they included value attributable 
                                                 
3 Adams' 
personal 
property 
tax 
bill 
for 
2002 
was 
$141,283.10.  Adams' personal property tax bill for 2003 was 
$135,786.10.  The difference in assessment was due to the net 
loss of three billboards between 2002 and 2003. 
4 In 2002 the City's original valuation was $5,815,900.  
When Adams objected, the City Board of Assessors increased the 
assessment of Adams' billboards to $6,022,400.  The City Board 
of Review upheld the Board of Assessors' increase.  In 2003 the 
City Board of Assessors reduced the assessment of Adams' 
billboards from $6,625,000 to $5,858,000, an amount that the 
City Board of Review sustained. 
No.  2005AP508 
 
5 
 
to elements other than tangible personal property, including the 
location of the billboards and the billboard permits.5 
¶7 
After Adams failed to obtain meaningful relief from 
the Board of Review, Adams timely commenced actions against the 
City 
in 
Dane 
County 
Circuit 
Court 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 74.37(3)(d).  The circuit court consolidated the 
2002 and 2003 actions and held a three-day trial July 27-29, 
2004, from which this appeal ensued.  
¶8 
Since 1994 the City has used the income approach to 
value billboards.  Under the income approach, an assessor seeks 
to convert future benefits likely to be derived from property 
into an estimate of present market value.  See Waste Mgmt., 184 
Wis. 2d at 541.  Using the income approach, the assessor first 
determines the net annual income from personal property, such as 
billboards.  This figure is reached by deducting from gross 
income "the leasehold interest in the land," all typical 
operating expenses, and income attributed to something other 
than 
the 
personal 
property. 
 Then 
the assessor sets a 
capitalization rate and applies this rate to the net annual 
income to determine the expected income stream over the economic 
life of the billboards.  Id.; see also 1 Property Assessment 
                                                 
5 A prerequisite to constructing and operating a billboard 
is a permit issued by the City.  Because the City strictly 
limits the number of billboard permits despite increasing demand 
for advertising space, a significant amount of value inheres in 
a permit.  Cf. Ron L. Nations & Donald P. Oehlrich, The 
Valuation of Billboard Structures, Appraisal J. 412, 420 (Oct. 
1999). 
No.  2005AP508 
 
6 
 
Manual for Wisconsin Assessors, ch. 7 at 7-27 to 7-28 and ch.9 
at 9-11 to 9-25 (hereinafter, Property Assessment Manual). 
¶9 
Prior to 1994, the City appraised billboards using the 
cost approach.  Under the cost approach the total cost required 
to reproduce a billboard is determined and from this amount 
depreciation is subtracted.  Vivid, Inc. v. Fiedler, 219 
Wis. 2d 764, 783, 580 N.W.2d 644 (1998); see also 1 Property 
Assessment Manual, ch. 7 at 7-22 to 7-25 and 9-11. 
¶10 The City switched from the cost approach to the income 
approach in 1994 after receiving an appraisal supplied by Adams 
as part of Adams' inverse condemnation lawsuit against the City.  
In the early 1990s, the City began actively restricting the 
number 
of 
billboards 
within 
the 
City 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 84.30. 
 
To 
establish 
its 
damages, 
Adams 
commissioned an appraisal from Ruppert and Ruppert, Inc. (the 
Condemnation Appraisal).  The Condemnation Appraisal used the 
income approach and valued Adams' billboards within the City at 
approximately $5,000,000.   
¶11 The Condemnation Appraisal prompted the City to re-
think how it assessed billboards.  In 1994, using the income 
approach, the City initially assessed Adams' billboards at 
$5,000,000, up from assessments of no more than $2,000,000 in 
the previous three years.6  Since 1994, the City's assessments of 
Adams' billboards have steadily increased using the income 
approach. 
                                                 
6 After Adams contested the assessment, the City eventually 
reduced the 1994 assessment to $3,032,000.   
No.  2005AP508 
 
7 
 
¶12 At trial, Adams emphasized how unusual it is to use 
the income approach to value billboards.  Testimony revealed 
that other than Madison, the only jurisdictions in the nation 
that use the income approach are Sun Prairie and La Crosse.  
Additionally, 
testimony 
revealed 
that 
within 
the 
City, 
billboards are the only personal property assessed using the 
income approach, except certain buildings on leased property.   
¶13 Although the above facts are undisputed, the parties, 
through their expert witnesses, fiercely contest the proper 
assessment methodology.  Consequently, it is necessary to 
briefly summarize the testimony of the parties' experts. 
¶14 The City's Chief Assessor, Michael Kurth (Kurth), 
testified that he appraised Adams' billboards using the income 
approach because there were no recent arms-length sales of the 
billboards and no reasonably comparable sales information.  
Kurth 
explained 
that 
in 
deriving 
the 
amount 
of 
income 
attributable to the billboard structures he determined Adams' 
total income and then subtracted the value of the leasehold 
interest, the income attributable to Adams' art and advertising-
development 
department, 
and 
Adams' 
operating 
expenses.  
According to Kurth, the result of these calculations equaled the 
net income attributable to the billboard structures and the 
billboard permits.  To this figure, Kurth then applied a 
capitalization rate of 14% to calculate the true cash value of 
the billboards.   
¶15 Additionally, Kurth's testimony addressed the cost 
approach.  First, he explained that he rejected the cost 
No.  2005AP508 
 
8 
 
approach because he believed the true cash value of Adams' 
billboards was greater than the cost of its components.  
According to Kurth, the cost to construct a billboard does not 
reflect how the industry calculates the fair market value of 
billboards.  Second, he criticized the calculations of Adams' 
expert (Rodolfo Aguilar) under the cost approach as omitting 
several significant costs, including site procurement costs, 
design 
costs, 
and 
permit 
costs, 
thereby 
significantly 
undervaluing Adams' billboards.   
¶16 Adams 
presented 
three 
expert 
witnesses: 
Rodolfo 
Aguilar (Aguilar), Mark Ulmer (Ulmer), and Donald Sutte (Sutte).  
Adams' experts testified that either the market approach 
(comparable sales) or the cost approach should be used to 
appraise billboards for personal property tax assessments.  None 
of these experts, however, presented evidence of comparable 
sales.  Only Aguilar provided affirmative testimony as to the 
value of Adams' billboards.  Using the cost approach, Aguilar 
valued 
Adams' 
109 
billboard 
structures 
in 
the 
City 
at 
$1,565,100.   
¶17 Aguilar, Ulmer, and Sutte were all critical of the 
City's use of the income approach.  All three concluded that the 
City improperly included the income-producing value of the 
billboard permits——"intangibles," they argued——in the personal 
property tax assessments, thereby overvaluing Adams' billboards.  
All three testified that the cost approach is the preferred 
method to value billboards for purposes of property tax 
assessment.  Nonetheless, the testimony of both Ulmer and Sutte 
No.  2005AP508 
 
9 
 
suggested that the income attributable to just the physical 
structure of the billboards could be determined. 
¶18 Based on this testimony, the circuit court concluded, 
first, that the purpose of an appraisal does not drive which 
valuation method must be used (i.e., the cost approach versus 
the income approach), because the objective when assessing 
property for both condemnation and property tax purposes is to 
determine the property's fair market value.  The court noted, 
however, that regardless of the method used, non-taxable items 
must be excluded from any tangible personal property tax 
assessment.   
¶19 Second, the circuit court concluded that the City's 
use of the income approach was proper because it factored out 
all income attributable to Adams' business value and to the real 
estate leaseholds upon which the billboards are anchored. 
¶20 Third, the court concluded that the City's inclusion 
of the billboard permits and the location of the billboards in 
the assessment was proper, even if permits and location are 
intangible, because the permits and location are inextricably 
intertwined with the physical structure of the billboards.   
¶21 Fourth, the circuit court concluded that use of the 
income approach did not result in double taxation.   
¶22 Finally, the circuit court concluded that use of the 
income approach rather than the cost approach did not violate 
the Uniformity Clause, because both methods are intended to 
achieve the same result, the full fair market value of the 
property. 
No.  2005AP508 
 
10 
 
¶23 Adams appealed, and the court of appeals certified the 
following questions: 
1. 
In the absence of a recent sale of the 
subject 
property 
and 
sales 
of 
other 
reasonably 
comparable properties, does the law require a taxing 
authority to use the "cost less depreciation" method 
instead of the "income" method when valuing an outdoor 
advertising sign for personal property tax purposes? 
2. 
Should the appraisal methods used in eminent 
domain cases be recognized in personal property tax 
assessment cases? 
3. 
Should 
the 
"[inexplicably] 
intertwined" 
approach used in real estate tax assessment cases be 
recognized in personal property tax assessment cases? 
4. 
Is a permit authorizing the location of an 
outdoor advertising sign an "intangible" within the 
meaning of Wis. Stat. § 70.112(1) and therefore an 
exempt factor for purposes of personal property tax 
assessment? 
5. 
Does the Uniformity Clause, article VIII, 
section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution and the 
language of State ex rel. Baker Manufacturing Co. v. 
City of Evansville, 261 Wis. 599, 53 N.W.2d 795 
(1952), require that similar property be assessed 
under the same methodology or merely require that the 
fraction of the value taxed be the same? 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
¶24 This is a review of a circuit court's decision on an 
action commenced under Wis. Stat. § 74.37(3)(d).  When we review 
a claim of an excessive tax assessment under § 74.37(3)(d), we 
review the record made before the circuit court, not the board 
of review.  See Nankin v. Village of Shorewood, 2001 WI 92, ¶25, 
245 Wis. 2d 86, 630 N.W.2d 141; Bloomer Hous. Ltd. P'ship v. 
No.  2005AP508 
 
11 
 
City of Bloomer, 2002 WI App 252, ¶11, 257 Wis. 2d 883, 653 
N.W.2d 309.   
 
¶25 The circuit court may make its determination without 
regard to any determination made at any earlier proceeding, 
Nankin, 245 Wis. 2d 86, ¶25, and without giving deference to any 
determination made at a previous proceeding.  Id.  This court, 
like the circuit court, must give presumptive weight to the 
City's 
assessment. 
 
Wis. Stat. § 70.49(2). 
 
However, 
the 
assessment is presumed correct only if the challenging party 
does not present significant contrary evidence.  Bloomer 
Housing, 257 Wis. 2d 883, ¶11. 
 
¶26 Failure to make an assessment on the statutory basis 
is an error of law.  State ex rel. Boostrom v. Bd. of Review, 42 
Wis. 2d 149, 155-56, 166 N.W.2d 184 (1969).  Whether the City 
followed the statute in making its assessment is a question of 
statutory interpretation that we review de novo.  See State v. 
Waushara County Bd. of Adjustment, 2004 WI 56, ¶14, 271 
Wis. 2d 547, 679 N.W.2d 514.   
¶27 The circuit court conducted a trial that included 
expert testimony.  Where there is conflicting testimony the fact 
finder is the ultimate arbiter of credibility.  "The weight and 
credibility to be given to the opinions of expert witnesses is 
'uniquely within the province of the fact finder.'"  Bloomer 
Housing, 257 Wis. 2d 883, ¶12.  Applying the law to the facts 
presents a question of law that we review independently of the 
circuit court. 
 
No.  2005AP508 
 
12 
 
III. OVERVIEW 
 
¶28 At trial, 
the 
expert witness testimony revealed 
substantial disagreement over the most accurate method to assess 
the true cash value of billboards absent an arms-length sale of 
the subject property or evidence of reasonably comparable sales.  
Adams contends the cost approach must be used, whereas the City 
maintains the income approach is proper and that the cost 
approach does not reflect the true cash value of billboards. 
¶29 The disagreement over how to value billboards is 
reflected in the scholarly literature and appraisal trade 
journals.  However, a recent article, and one of the few 
articles that specifically addresses property tax assessment of 
billboards, notes that "any of the accepted approaches to value, 
income, sales, or cost, may be used[,]" but that the emerging 
trend is to use the cost approach.  Cris K. O'Neall & Bradley R. 
Marsh, Trends in the Property Tax Valuation of Commercial 
Outdoor Advertising Structures, J. of Prop. Tax Assessment & 
Admin. 5, at 7, 11 (Vol. 1, Issue 2, 2004) (emphasis added). 
¶30 Neither the Wisconsin Statutes nor 
the 
Property 
Assessment Manual mandates either the cost approach or the 
income approach.  Nevertheless, we begin with an overview of the 
assessment framework established by the statutes, the Property 
Assessment Manual, and case law. 
 
¶31 Property taxes must be levied upon all real and 
personal property in this state, except property that is exempt 
from taxation.  Wis. Stat. §§ 70.01 and 70.02.  Real property is 
"not only the land itself but all buildings and improvements 
No.  2005AP508 
 
13 
 
thereon, and all fixtures and rights and privileges appertaining 
thereto[.]"  Wis. Stat. § 70.03.  Personal property includes 
"all goods, wares, merchandise, chattels, and effects, of any 
nature or description, having any real or marketable title, and 
not included in the term 'real property,' as defined in s. 
70.03."  Wis. Stat. § 70.04.  Billboards are taxed as personal 
property.  1 Property Assessment Manual, ch. 15 at 15-13. 
 
¶32 Property tax exemptions abound.7  Exemptions are found 
primarily in three statutes, Wis. Stat. §§ 70.11, 70.111, and 
70.112.  One exemption is at issue in the present case.  Section 
70.112(1) exempts: "Money and all intangible personal property, 
such as credit, checks, share drafts, other drafts, notes, 
bonds, stocks and other written instruments."  Adams and the 
City disagree over whether billboard permits fall within the 
intangible personal property exemption. 
 
¶33 There is no dispute that billboards are personal 
property, subject to the personal property tax.  The questions 
presented concern how an assessor should arrive at the value of 
a billboard and what elements of the billboard may be included 
in the assessment.  Wisconsin Stat. § 70.34 provides that "[a]ll 
articles of personal property shall, as far as practicable, be 
                                                 
7 Given the proliferation of exemptions, the legislature has 
sought to limit how the exemptions are interpreted by creating a 
presumption of taxability.  Wis. Stat. § 70.109.  Section 70.109 
states: "Exemptions under this chapter shall be strictly 
construed in every instance with a presumption that the property 
in question is taxable, and the burden of proof is on the person 
who claims the exemption." 
No.  2005AP508 
 
14 
 
valued by the assessor upon actual view at their true cash 
value[,]" and that assessments should be performed in accordance 
with the Property Assessment Manual.8 
 
¶34 The Property Assessment Manual and case law set forth 
a three-tier assessment methodology to ascertain true cash 
value.  See State ex rel. Markarian v. City of Cudahy, 45 
Wis. 2d 683, 686, 173 N.W.2d 627 (1970); 1 Property Assessment 
Manual, ch. 7, at 7-18, ch. 21, at 21.3-16.  Evidence of an 
arms-length sale of the subject property is the best evidence of 
true cash value.  State ex rel. Keane v. Bd. of Review, 99 
Wis. 2d 584, 590, 299 N.W.2d 638 (Ct. App. 1980) (citing State 
ex rel. Geipel v. City of Milwaukee, 68 Wis. 2d 726, 733-34, 229 
N.W.2d 585 (1975)).  If there has been no recent sale of the 
subject property, an assessor must consider sales of reasonably 
comparable properties.  Id.  Only if there has been no arms-
length sale and there are no reasonably comparable sales may an 
assessor use any of the third-tier assessment methodologies.  
Id. 
¶35 Within tier three, an assessor may consider "all the 
factors collectively which have a bearing on value of the 
                                                 
8 The term "true cash value" means the same thing as fair 
market value.  State ex rel. Mitchell Aero, Inc. v. Bd. of 
Review, 74 Wis. 2d 268, 277, 246 N.W.2d 521 (1976); 1 Property 
Assessment Manual, ch. 21, at 21.4-1 (noting "the basis for 
valuing personal property should be same as real property,").  
Thus, the true cash value of the billboards is that which they 
would sell for "upon arms-length negotiation in the open market, 
between an owner willing but not obliged to sell, and a buyer 
willing but not obligated to buy."  Mitchell Aero, 74 Wis. 2d at 
277. 
No.  2005AP508 
 
15 
 
property 
in 
order 
to 
determine 
its 
fair 
market 
value."  
Markarian, 45 Wis. 2d at 686; 1 Property Assessment Manual, ch. 
21, at 21.3-16.  These factors include "cost, depreciation, 
replacement value, income, industrial conditions, location and 
occupancy, sales of like property, book value, amount of 
insurance carried, value asserted in a prospectus and appraisals 
produced by the owner."  State ex rel. Mitchell Aero, Inc. v. 
Bd. of Review, 74 Wis. 2d 268, 278, 246 N.W.2d 521 (1976); see 1 
Property Assessment Manual, ch. 21, at 21.3-16 to 21.3-20, 21.4-
11.  The income approach, which seeks to capture the amount of 
income the property will generate over its useful life, and the 
cost approach, which seeks to measure the cost to replace the 
property, both fit into this analytic framework.  1 Property 
Assessment Manual, ch. 21, at 21.3-16. 
IV. DID THE CITY ERR BY NOT CONSIDERING COMPARABLE SALES? 
 
¶36 Adams does not contend the City should have used the 
first assessment tier.  Adams acquired the majority of its 
billboards in the City in 1987, at a time when the regulatory 
environment in the City was in flux.  The price Adams paid for 
the billboards 15 years earlier is not indicative of their true 
cash value in 2002 and 2003.  Adams does argue, however, that 
the City failed to consider evidence of comparable sales. 
 
¶37 If there were reasonably comparable sales, but the 
City used the income approach, the assessments would be invalid.  
State ex rel. Keane, 99 Wis. 2d at 590; Markarian, 45 Wis. 2d at 
686.  Upon review of the record, we conclude the City did not 
err by using tier three assessment methodology. 
No.  2005AP508 
 
16 
 
¶38 In 
response 
to 
Adams' 
objection 
to 
the 
2002 
assessment, Assessor Kurth filed an Objection Report dated 
November 15, 2002.  The report stated in part: 
There is no sale of the subject property nor are there 
sales of reasonably comparable properties. 
 
. . . .  
The City of La Crosse Assessor has informed me of 
a recent sale of a set of billboards containing eight 
faces.  These eight faces sold for an allocated value 
of $301,200 or $37,650 per face.  
¶39 In 
response 
to 
Adams' 
objection 
to 
the 
2003 
assessment, Assessor Kurth filed an Objection Report dated 
September 17, 2003.  It repeated word-for-word the statements on 
comparable sales from the 2002 Objection Report. 
¶40 On July 20, 2004, Assessor Kurth signed a Supplemental 
Report that elaborated on the 2002 and 2003 objection reports.  
This Supplemental Report was introduced at trial.  The report 
states that "[r]easonably comparable sales do not exist."  The 
report lists six sales, including the billboards Adams purchased 
in Madison in 1987.  Two of the documented sales occurred in 
2001, both less than a year before the first assessment in 2002.9  
The Supplemental Report lists the source of the six sales as the 
City of La Crosse Assessor's Office.     
¶41 The 
Supplemental 
Report 
states: 
"The 
outdoor 
advertising industry and valuation experts indicate in various 
                                                 
9 We note that the reported sales information for the eight 
billboard faces sold in 2001 differs between the 2002 and 2003 
objection reports and the Supplemental Report. 
No.  2005AP508 
 
17 
 
articles and books that the sales comparison approach using a 
gross income multiplier is a relevant approach to determine the 
market value of outdoor advertising signs. . . .   Sales of 
outdoor advertising structures do exist in the State of 
Wisconsin." 
¶42 Kurth went on to list four reasons why he did not 
consider the sales he had cited in the discussion of the sales 
comparison approach to be reasonably comparable sales: (1) the 
sales information was becoming dated; (2) the sales information 
lacked details about the nature of the billboard structures 
sold; (3) the sales were of a comparatively small number of 
billboards, limiting the usefulness of the information; and (4) 
he had concerns about the accuracy of the information and 
calculations used to compute the income produced by the 
billboards.  
¶43 Adams did not present significant contrary evidence to 
overcome the presumptive weight of the assessor's report and 
testimony.  Its experts stressed that comparable sales data was 
available but they failed to provide any comparable sales.10 
                                                 
10 When 
asked 
about 
comparable 
sales, 
Donald 
Sutte 
testified: "I believe——I have not researched, but from my 
understanding, there are sales in Wisconsin that are for both 
permits and land leases."  Sutte never produced evidence of such 
sales. 
Likewise, consultant and attorney Mark Ulmer testified: 
[T]here is an active market out there of purchase and 
sale of billboard structures standing alone as items 
of tangible personal property.  It's typical appraisal 
theory . . . when direct comparable sales exist, that 
No.  2005AP508 
 
18 
 
¶44 We note that at the 2003 City Board of Review hearing, 
Adams' appraiser, Craig Hungerford, testified: "There [are] no 
comparable sales that we're aware of at this time; therefore, 
the cost approach is the most reliable approach."  
¶45 Based 
on 
the 
Supplemental 
Report 
and 
Kurth's 
testimony, the circuit court found that Kurth's reasons for 
dismissing the sales as not reasonably comparable were entitled 
to presumptive weight and concluded the City correctly used the 
income approach, a third tier assessment methodology. 
¶46 Adams' chief complaint on this point is that the City 
did not do enough to actively seek out comparable sales 
information.11  Yet Adams did nothing to provide assistance.  
Adams' own expert, Mark Ulmer, has written: 
                                                                                                                                                             
you don't even go the next step, you don't get to an 
income based approach. 
Ulmer, however, never produced evidence of such sales.  At oral 
argument Adams' attorney confirmed that Adams did not present 
evidence of comparable sales, other than that its experts 
testified that comparable sales existed. 
11 We too have reservations about the City Assessor's 
efforts to discover comparable sales information and his 
willingness to dismiss the information he did have as not 
reasonably comparable.  For instance, we question what efforts 
the City Assessor made to obtain evidence of reasonably 
comparable 
sales; 
whether 
he 
obtained 
the 
other 
sales 
information from the La Crosse Assessor before or after the 2002 
assessment; whether he attempted to obtain details about the 
size, age, illumination, or daily circulation of the signs from 
the La Crosse Assessor or any other source; and why two sales 
within a year of the 2002 assessment were viewed as out of date.  
Adams, however, did not ask these or similar questions of Kurth 
and did not present evidence sufficient to overcome the 
presumption of correctness that attached to Kurth's conclusion 
that the sales were not reasonably comparable. 
No.  2005AP508 
 
19 
 
[B]illboards are commonly erected on leased land; 
consequently, 
when 
billboards 
sell, 
they 
are 
transferred by assignment of lease or bill of sale, 
rather than by warranty deed recorded in the public 
record.  Many appraisers, therefore, are not aware of 
billboard transfers nor do they have ready access to 
sales data for billboard transactions, so they are 
unable to apply the comparable sales approach. 
8A Nichols on Eminent Domain § 23.04[4], at 23-62 (3d ed. 2005); 
see also O'Neall & Marsh, supra at 7 (noting the difficulties 
associated 
with 
relying 
upon 
comparable 
sales); 
Jill 
S. 
Gelineau, Valuation of Billboards in Condemnation, 19 No. 4 
Prac. Real Est. Law. 23, 30 (July 2003) (noting that data on 
billboard values are difficult to obtain). 
 
¶47 An assessor has an obligation to follow the three tier 
assessment 
analysis. 
 
In 
terms 
of 
comparable 
sales 
of 
billboards, 
however, 
neither 
the 
City 
nor 
Adams 
seems 
particularly anxious to use this information.  One insists that 
reasonably comparable sales are not available but makes no 
serious effort to find them; one assures us that the information 
is available but then makes no serious effort to provide it.  
Under the circumstances, we are bound to uphold the decision of 
the circuit court that the City was entitled to rely upon tier 
three valuation methods. 
V. DID THE CITY IMPROPERLY USE ONLY THE INCOME APPROACH? 
 
¶48 On several occasions we have stated that an assessment 
cannot be based solely upon the income approach.  E.g., Waste 
Mgmt., 184 Wis. 2d at 558; Bischoff, 81 Wis. 2d at 619; I.B.M., 
231 Wis. at 312.  This rule reflects the fact that variables 
other than income-generating capability influence fair market 
No.  2005AP508 
 
20 
 
value.  Absent relevant sales information "an assessor must 
determine market value from the best information the assessor 
can 
practicably 
obtain, 
considering 
all 
elements 
which 
collectively have a bearing on the value of the property."  
Waste Mgmt., 184 Wis. 2d at 557; see 1 Property Assessment 
Manual, ch. 21, at 21.4-11.  Elements bearing upon fair market 
value include "cost, depreciation, replacement value, income, 
industrial conditions, location and occupancy, sales of like 
property, book 
value, 
amount 
of 
insurance 
carried, 
value 
asserted in a prospectus, and appraisals procured by the owner."  
Waste Management, 184 Wis. 2d at 557; see I.B.M., 231 Wis. at 
311-12. 
 
¶49 Adams argues that the City used only the income 
approach to value its billboards.  The City does not disagree, 
although it contends that it reached its assessment after 
considering the alternative methods of comparable sales and the 
cost approach and rejecting them. 
¶50 The rule against the exclusive use of the income 
approach originated in Wahl v. H.W. & S.M. Tullgren, Inc., 222 
Wis. 306, 310, 267 N.W. 278 (1936).  See Bldgs. Dev. Co. v. City 
of 
Milwaukee, 
225 
Wis. 
357, 
359, 
274 
N.W. 
298 
(1937) 
(interpreting Wahl as holding that income alone cannot control 
the determination of fair market value).  In Wahl the plaintiff, 
who was interested in securing a low appraisal of an apartment 
building, urged this court to reverse the fair market value 
determined by the circuit court for the reason that the income-
generating capability of the building did not support the 
No.  2005AP508 
 
21 
 
circuit court's finding.  Wahl, 222 Wis. at 309-10.  The court 
rejected the plaintiff's contention, concluding that the fair 
market value based upon the income approach was not consistent 
with the original purchase price or the reproduction cost of the 
building, both of which were much greater.  Id. at 310. 
¶51 Implicit in Wahl is the court's concern that reliance 
upon a single factor in determining fair market value may result 
in skewed appraisals due to aberrant market conditions.  See id.  
The reason the income approach yielded a low valuation of the 
building in Wahl was that it was the middle of the Great 
Depression and monthly rent for apartments was one-third to one-
half the rent obtained prior to the Depression.  Id.  The lesson 
from Wahl and its progeny is that an assessor must consider all 
factors relevant to fair market value to ensure that an 
assessment is not skewed. 
¶52 The Property Assessment Manual reflects the need to 
consider 
all 
factors 
that 
bear 
upon 
fair 
market 
value.  
"Usually, more than one——and often all three——of the approaches 
apply to a given property."  1 Property Assessment Manual, ch. 
7, at 7-18.  "The only limiting factor: whether available and 
appropriate data exists to develop any and all approaches."  Id.   
¶53 There may be situations in which the only information 
available compels an assessor to use a single methodology to 
assess property.  See 1 Property Assessment Manual, ch. 7, at 7-
28.12  In any event, an assessor must have the ability to 
                                                 
12 The Property Assessment Manual, ch. 7, at 7-28 provides: 
No.  2005AP508 
 
22 
 
discount, even disregard, factors that do not really bear on the 
value of a property.  See State ex rel. Kesselman v. Bd. of 
Review, 133 Wis. 2d 122, 129-30, 394 N.W.2d 745 (Ct. App. 1986).  
The Property Assessment Manual directs appraisers to use the 
assessment methodology or methodologies that are most reliable.  
1 Property Assessment Manual, ch. 7, at 7-28.  The Property 
Assessment Manual states: 
The best guidance that can be offered is to review 
market activity for the subject and determine the 
attributes by which the market uses to evaluate 
alternative real estate decisions.  Generally, the 
greatest weight should be placed on the approach for 
which the greatest amount of reliable and appropriate 
data is available that will yield the highest degree 
of confidence.  
1 Property Assessment Manual, ch. 7, at 7-28. 
¶54 Where there is sufficient data to estimate market 
value under both the income and cost approaches, "[a]ssessors 
should select a final estimate of value through the process of 
'reconciliation.'"  Id. at 7-18.  Reconciliation requires an 
assessor to evaluate the data available under the alternative 
                                                                                                                                                             
The appraiser should consider all three approaches 
[sales, cost, and income] when estimating the value of 
a property.  However, all three approaches may not be 
developed in an appraisal because a sufficient amount 
of data may not be available or, due to the specific 
property 
characteristics, 
the 
approach 
may 
be 
considered less reliable in estimating market value.  
If more than one approach is developed in the 
appraisal, the individual value estimates must be 
reconciled into one final value estimate for the 
property. 
No.  2005AP508 
 
23 
 
approaches and decide whether to derive the value from one of 
the approaches or a combination of approaches.  Id. 
¶55 In this case, we think that we would nullify the so-
called Bischoff rule if we permitted the City assessor to reject 
all approaches and factors other than an income approach.  We 
think it extraordinary that the assessor rejected out of hand 
such factors as cost, depreciation, replacement value, and 
insurance carried.  The City assessor concluded, in effect, that 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Vivid (approving cost approach), 
the Wisconsin Department of Revenue in three revenue rulings 
(approving cost approach), the assessors in most communities in 
Wisconsin (using cost approach), and rulings in other states 
approving the cost approach, were simply irrelevant.  Thus, the 
City Assessor deemed unreliable the cost approach, a method that 
nearly all jurisdictions use to assess billboards.13 
¶56 We consider the City assessor's failure to consider 
collectively all the factors, especially cost-less-depreciation, 
                                                 
13 In order to conclude the income approach was proper the 
dissent emphasizes appraisal articles that discredit the cost 
approach as unreliable.  Dissent, ¶¶108-114.  As we have 
recognized, supra, ¶29, there is substantial disagreement over 
how to value billboards.  For every article promoting the income 
approach, there is a contrary article extolling the virtues of 
the cost approach.  See e.g., James Wagner & David Baker, The 
Valuation of Outdoor Advertising Structures: A Mass Appraisal 
Approach, Assessment Digest, July/Aug. 1991, at 4 (concluding 
the cost approach is "justifiable as the best available method 
for 
the 
valuation 
of 
off-premise 
outdoor 
advertising 
structures"); Charles F. Floyd, Outdoor Advertising Signs & 
Eminent Domain Proceedings, Real Est. Appraiser & Analyst, 
Summer 1990, at 11, 14 (concluding "the cost approach is the 
only valid technique for valuing outdoor advertising signs"). 
No.  2005AP508 
 
24 
 
that reasonably affected the value of Adams' billboards a 
failure to follow the Property Assessment Manual and the rulings 
of this court.  No presumption of correctness may be accorded to 
an assessment that does not apply the principles in the Property 
Assessment Manual.  The circuit court upheld that presumption, 
notwithstanding Adams' full-blown appraisal and all of Adams' 
expert testimony.  Under the facts of the present case, the City 
improperly relied upon only the income approach to assess Adams' 
billboards, in violation of Bischoff, 81 Wis. 2d at 619, and in 
contravention of the directive in the Property Assessment Manual 
to reconcile the applicable approaches to value. 
 
VI. DID THE CITY ERRONEOUSLY APPLY THE INCOME APPROACH BY 
INCLUDING THE VALUE OF THE BILLBOARD PERMITS IN ITS ASSESSMENT? 
¶57 This question encompasses three of the questions 
certified by the court of appeals: 
2. 
Should the appraisal methods used in eminent 
domain cases be recognized in personal property tax 
assessment cases?14 
3. 
Should 
the 
"inextricably 
intertwined" 
approach used in real estate tax assessment cases be 
recognized in personal property tax assessment cases? 
4. 
Is a permit authorizing the location of an 
outdoor advertising sign an "intangible" within the 
meaning of Wis. Stat. § 70.112(1) and therefore an 
exempt factor for purposes of personal property tax 
assessment? 
                                                 
14 We agree with Adams' statement during oral argument that 
the thrust of this certified question is better understood as 
asking what property should be included in an assessment for 
purposes of establishing fair market value in an eminent domain 
proceeding as compared to a personal property tax assessment. 
No.  2005AP508 
 
25 
 
A. 
A Billboard Permit is Real Property 
 
¶58 We address the issue of billboard permits first.  
Adams contends that billboard permits are either (1) an interest 
in real property under Wis. Stat. § 70.03 or (2) intangible 
personal property and not taxable as personal property under 
Wis. Stat. § 70.112(1).  Either way, Adams concludes, the result 
is the same: the value of billboard permits cannot be included 
in the assessment of billboards.  In response, the City contends 
the classification of the permits is immaterial, because the 
value attributable to the permits is inextricably intertwined 
with the billboard structures and therefore properly included in 
the assessments of the billboards. 
¶59 We conclude that a billboard permit is a right or 
privilege appertaining to real property and thus falls within 
the definition of "real property" in Wis. Stat. § 70.03.  A 
billboard permit is not tangible personal property within the 
definition of "personal property" in Wis. Stat. § 70.04.  If a 
billboard permit were to be considered personal property, it 
would be exempted from property taxation as an intangible by 
Wis. Stat. § 70.112(1). 
¶60 Whether the City could include the value of the 
billboard permits in its personal property tax assessments is a 
question of statutory interpretation.  As always, "statutory 
interpretation begins with the language of the statute."  State 
ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  When the meaning of a statute 
is plain, the inquiry ordinarily stops.  Id.  We conclude the 
No.  2005AP508 
 
26 
 
statutory scheme established by Wis. Stat. ch. 70 unambiguously 
precludes billboard permits from being taxed as personal 
property. 
¶61 In determining whether a billboard permit can be taxed 
as personal property, the first question is whether permits are 
personal property.  To answer this question we turn to 
Wis. Stat. § 70.04, which states: 
Definition 
of personal property. 
 
The 
term 
"personal property", as used in chs. 70 to 79, shall 
include all goods, wares, merchandise, chattels, and 
effects, of any nature or description, having any real 
or marketable value, and not included in the term 
"real property", as defined in s. 70.03. 
(1) Personal 
property 
also 
includes 
toll 
bridges; private railroads and bridges; saw logs, 
timber and lumber, either upon land or afloat; 
steamboats, ships and other vessels, whether at home 
or abroad; ferry boats, including the franchise for 
running the same . . . . 
Three aspects of § 70.04 demonstrate that a billboard permit, 
which represents an intangible right to use land in a specific 
manner, does not fall within the definition of personal 
property. 
 
¶62 First, Wis. Stat. § 70.04 defines personal property by 
means of a list of general types of property, including "goods, 
wares, merchandise, chattels, and effects," all of which have 
tangible characteristics and have "real or marketable value" 
because of their corporeal existence.  By contrast, the value of 
a billboard permit lies not in the piece of paper qua paper, but 
in the right to construct a billboard upon designated land, 
which the paper represents.  Applying the canon of ejusdem 
No.  2005AP508 
 
27 
 
generis,15 we interpret § 70.04 to include only tangible personal 
property, to the exclusion of intangible property such as 
permits, 
licenses, 
most 
franchises, 
patents, 
copyrights, 
trademarks, and the like. 
 
¶63 Second, 
Wis. Stat. § 70.04(1) 
corroborates 
the 
conclusion that billboard permits do not fall within the 
definition of personal property.  Subsection (1) lists specific 
examples of personal property.  Of the list, only one item is 
not tangible——a ferry boat franchise.  If "personal property" 
included permits, licenses, and "franchises," the statute would 
not have listed a "ferry boat franchise."  To avoid rendering 
this provision surplusage, we interpret the term "personal 
property" (which is subject to property taxation) to exclude 
intangible 
property, 
with 
the 
exception 
of 
ferry 
boat 
franchises. 
 
¶64 Third, Wis. Stat. § 70.04 excludes from the definition 
of personal property anything that falls within the definition 
of real property in Wis. Stat. § 70.03.  In part, § 70.03 
defines real property as "not only the land itself but . . . all 
fixtures and rights and privileges appertaining thereto[.]"  
Because a billboard permit confers a right or privilege to erect 
                                                 
15 "Ejusdem generis is a 'canon of construction that when a 
general word or phrase follows a list of specific persons or 
things, the general word or phrase will be interpreted to 
include only persons or things of the same type as those 
listed.'"  State v. A.S., 2001 WI 48, ¶33 n.4, 243 Wis. 2d 173, 
626 N.W.2d 712 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 535 (7th ed. 
1999)). 
No.  2005AP508 
 
28 
 
and operate a billboard on a designated piece of land and 
because a permit cannot be transferred to a different location, 
we conclude a billboard permit falls within the definition of 
real property.16 
B. 
As a General Rule, a Permit Is Intangible Personal Property 
 
¶65 The fourth certified question asked: "Is a permit 
authorizing the location of an outdoor advertising sign an 
'intangible' within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 70.112(1) and 
therefore an exempt factor for purposes of personal property tax 
assessment?" 
 
¶66 We conclude that a billboard permit should be assessed 
as a right or privilege appertaining to real property under 
Wis. Stat. § 70.03.  As a result, we need not respond to the 
                                                 
16 The Property Assessment Manual helps to explain why a 
billboard permit is real property: 
 
To value real property the assessor must know 
what real property is.  In the process of valuing real 
property, the assessor will encounter the terms "real 
estate" and "real property."  Real estate refers to 
the physical items; the land and any structures and 
improvements located on the land.  Real property is 
the rights, privileges, and benefits of owning the 
real estate.  These two terms are often misused and 
misunderstood used interchangeably.  For assessment 
purposes real property is defined in Section 70.03, 
Stats., as follows: "The terms 'real property', 'real 
estate' . . . shall include not only the land itself 
but all buildings and improvements thereon, and all 
fixtures 
and 
rights 
and 
privileges 
appertaining 
thereto."  Thus, in Wisconsin assessment law real 
property encompasses the definitions of both real 
estate and real property. 
1 Property Assessment Manual, ch. 7, at 7-1. 
No.  2005AP508 
 
29 
 
certified question with a "yes" or "no" answer.  Nonetheless, if 
a failure to comment on intangibles were to leave the impression 
that the answer is "no," we would create a misleading impression 
of Wis. Stat. § 70.112(1) and open the door to argument on 
inextricable intertwinement.   
 
¶67 Wisconsin Stat. § 70.112(1) exempts from personal 
property taxation "all intangible personal property."  "[A]ll 
intangible 
personal 
property" 
is 
an 
exceptionally 
broad 
classification.  Its plain language suggests a clear policy 
choice to exempt "intangible personal property" from personal 
property taxation.  We see no reason on the face of the statute 
to give the term a narrow reading. 
 
¶68 There is a solid historical basis to support this 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. §§ 70.04 and 70.112(1).  A century 
ago personal property was more broadly defined than it is today.  
In 1900 Wis. Stat. § 1036 read as follows: 
 
Personal property defined.  Section 1036.  The 
term "personal property" as used in this title shall 
be construed to mean and include 
 
Toll bridges, 
 
Saw logs, timber and lumber, either upon land or 
afloat; 
 
Steamboats, ships and other vessels, whether at 
home or abroad; 
 
Buildings upon leased lands, if such buildings 
have not been included in the assessment of the land 
on which they are erected; 
 
Ferry-boats, including the franchise for running 
the same; 
No.  2005AP508 
 
30 
 
 
Ice cut and stored for use, sale or shipment; 
 
All debts due from solvent debtors, whether on 
account, note, contract, bond, mortgage or other 
security, or whether such debts are due or to become 
due; 
 
And all goods, wares, merchandise, chattels, 
moneys and effects, of any nature or description, 
having any real or marketable value, and included in 
the term real property as above defined.  (Emphasis 
added.) 
¶69 This text covered some, if not all, intangibles.  In 
State ex rel. Dwinnell v. Gaylord, 73 Wis. 316, 41 N.W. 521 
(1889), this court approved a personal property tax assessment 
on $14,000 of a taxpayer's "moneys" in Nebraska managed for the 
taxpayer by his son-in-law.  In Kingsley v. City of Merrill, 122 
Wis. 185, 99 N.W. 1044 (1904), the court approved the taxation 
of notes and mortgages.  In State ex rel. Milwaukee Street 
Railway Co. v. Anderson, 90 Wis. 550, 63 N.W. 746 (1895), the 
court approved the assessment of a street railway franchise in 
Milwaukee.  Among other things, the court said that "the 
franchises of the street railway company are property."  Id. at 
559.  "Franchises are classed as incorporeal hereditaments."  
Id. at 560.  "We have the general and paramount provision making 
franchises taxable. . . .  [T]he cardinal requirement is that, 
as property, they shall be taxed."  Id. at 562. 
¶70 In a "Report of the Taxation Committee of the 
Wisconsin Legislative Council," December 1950, the Committee 
recounted the history of the personal property tax in Wisconsin.  
The report indicates that the personal property tax had 
consistently been the subject of hostile criticism, in part 
No.  2005AP508 
 
31 
 
because of its uneven administration.  A tax commission set up 
in 1898 
revealed 
that intangibles 
escaped 
taxation 
almost 
entirely.  The formal exemption of intangibles began in 
piecemeal fashion in 1903 with the exemption of mortgages.  A 
1907 Report of the Wisconsin Tax Commission singled out 
intangibles as the class of personal property "for the most 
immediate and drastic action of exemption."  In 1909 Governor 
James O. Davidson advocated the abolition of the personal 
property tax on intangibles and the establishment of an income 
tax. 
¶71 In Chapter 658, Laws of 1911, an income tax was 
created and "all moneys, all debts due or to become due to any 
person, and all stocks and bonds not otherwise specially 
provided for" were exempted. 
¶72 The 1911 statute did not use the word "intangibles."  
That word was added by Chapter 63, Laws of 1949, in legislation 
requested by the Legislative Council.  Chapter 63 created 
Wis. Stat. § 70.112, 
which 
exempted: 
"Money 
and 
Intangible 
Personalty.  Money and all intangible personal property, such as 
credit, 
checks, 
notes, 
bonds, 
stocks 
and 
other 
written 
instruments." 
¶73 The 
1950 
Legislative 
Council 
Report 
made 
two 
significant observations in relation to this case.  First, 
"[t]he Wisconsin personal property tax has been transformed over 
the years from a tax on tangible and intangible, income-
producing and non-income-producing property into a tax wholly on 
tangible and largely on income-producing property."  (Emphasis 
No.  2005AP508 
 
32 
 
added.)  This statement reinforces our interpretation of 
Wis. Stat. § 70.04.  Second, "there seems little doubt that the 
income tax was designed as an eventual replacement for the 
entire personal property tax." 
¶74 With respect to the second point, Wis. Stat. § 70.112 
is now entitled "Property exempted from taxation because of 
special tax."  This title is explained by Rick Olin in a "Study 
of the Treatment of Personal Property Under the Property Tax" 
(Legislative 
Fiscal 
Bureau, 
Sept. 
2002). 
 
Olin 
writes: 
"[S]ection 70.112 . . . exempts certain types of real estate and 
personal property from the property tax because the property is 
subject to another tax or fee . . .  Such property includes 
money and intangibles (income tax) . . . .  In 1911, the 
creation of the state income tax provided a rationale for fully 
exempting intangible property . . . from the property tax."  
Olin, supra, at 3. 
¶75 Black's Law Dictionary 809 (6th ed. 1990) defines 
"Intangible Property."  "As used chiefly in the law of taxation, 
this term means such property as has no intrinsic and marketable 
value, but is merely the representative or evidence of value, 
such 
as 
certificates 
of 
stock, 
bonds, 
promissory 
notes, 
copyrights, and franchises."  "Intangibles" is defined as 
"[p]roperty that is a 'right' such as a patent, copyright, 
trademark, etc., or one which is lacking physical existence; 
such as goodwill."  Black's Law Dictionary 809 (6th ed. 1990). 
¶76 Black's Law Dictionary 1233 (7th ed. 1999) has a 
different definition of "Intangible Property:" "Property that 
No.  2005AP508 
 
33 
 
lacks a 
physical 
existence."  Additionally, 
"Intellectual 
Property" is defined as "1. A category of intangible rights 
protecting 
commercially 
valuable 
products 
of 
the 
human 
intellect. 
 
The 
category 
comprises 
primarily 
trademark, 
copyright, and patent rights . . . ."  Id. at 813. 
¶77 Intangibles have a paramount place in contemporary 
society.  They are integrally related to both the heavily 
regulated and wholly entrepreneurial facets of our modern 
economy.  They include the intellectual property that is 
essential to creativity, branding, and information technology.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 70.112 exempts from personal property taxation 
"all intangible personal property," ranging from patents to 
permits, as well as money substitutes.  (Emphasis added.)  Any 
decision to tax intangible personal property should be made by 
the legislature, not local assessors.17 
C. 
The Inextricably Intertwined Concept Does Not Apply in the 
Context of Personal Property Tax Assessments 
¶78 Regardless of our conclusion that billboard permits 
are real property, the City contends it is permissible to 
                                                 
17 The dissent disagrees with this analysis.  It cites State 
ex rel. Dane County Title Co. v. Board of Review, 2 Wis. 2d 51, 
85 N.W.2d 864 (1957), which determined that title records are 
not "intangible personal property."  The court described the 
records 
in 
an 
abstract 
office 
as 
"a 
completely 
indexed 
collection of authentic notes and memoranda of all public 
records relating to grants, judgments, liens, etc., for use in 
the preparation of abstracts of title or for title-policy 
purposes."  Id. at 60.  These records were obviously tangible in 
that they presented substantial questions of weight and space.  
We have no difficulty in distinguishing tangible title records 
from billboard permits. 
No.  2005AP508 
 
34 
 
include the value of the permits in the personal property tax 
assessments.  The City argues the income attributable to 
billboard permits is inextricably intertwined with the physical 
structure of the billboards, so that it can be included in the 
assessment, just as the management income in ABKA Limited 
Partnership v. Board of Review, 231 Wis. 2d 328, 344, 603 
N.W.2d 217 (1999), and the income attributable to the landfill 
license in Waste Management, 184 Wis. 2d at 568, were included 
in real property assessments.  In short, the City argues permits 
can be included in personal property tax assessments because a 
permit is necessary for a billboard to be operational, meaning 
the permits are inextricably intertwined with the physical 
structure of the billboards. 
¶79 We 
conclude 
that 
the 
City's 
reliance 
upon 
the 
inextricably intertwined concept is misplaced.  The concept of 
inextricable intertwinement allows business value to be included 
within the assessment of real property where the income-
generating capability can be transferred with the real estate.  
ABKA, 231 Wis. 2d at 336; Waste Mgmt., 184 Wis. 2d at 563; State 
ex rel. N/S Assocs. V. Board of Review, 164 Wis. 2d 31, 54, 473 
N.W.2d 554 (Ct. App. 1991).  When business value is transferable 
with the underlying real estate, the business value is appended 
to the real estate rather than attributable to the personal 
skill and expertise of the owner.  ABKA, 231 Wis. 2d at 336; 
Waste Mgmt., 184 Wis. 2d at 563; N/S Assocs., 164 Wis. 2d at 54. 
¶80 A review of the cases leading up to ABKA demonstrates 
that inclusion of business value in a property assessment should 
No.  2005AP508 
 
35 
 
be the exception, not the norm.  See ABKA, 231 Wis. 2d at 344 
(cautioning that for income to be included in an assessment it 
must be attributable primarily to the nature of the property); 
Waste Mgmt., 184 Wis. 2d at 565 (inclusion of business value 
"permissible only in very limited circumstances under sec. 
70.32(1)").  Only business value related "primarily to the 
nature of" the property may be included; business value 
attributable to another source must be excluded from real 
property assessments.  ABKA, 231 Wis. 2d at 344; Waste Mgmt., 
184 Wis. 2d at 566, 570 (requiring income attributable to labor 
and skill to be factored out). 
¶81 In ABKA, Waste Management, and N/S Associates, the 
courts confronted the question whether business value was 
attributable primarily to the underlying real estate or to the 
business skill and acumen of the property owner.  In all three 
cases, the courts determined the value was attributable to the 
underlying real estate.  Integral to the analysis in these cases 
was the conclusion that the income appertained to the real 
property under Wis. Stat. § 70.03, and therefore, was a proper 
element 
to 
include 
in 
the 
real 
estate 
assessment 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1).  See ABKA, 231 Wis. 2d at 344; N/S 
Assocs., 164 Wis. 2d at 55. 
¶82 The conclusions in these cases depend upon the 
definition 
of 
real 
property 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 70.03, 
which 
includes "all buildings and improvements thereon, and all 
fixtures and rights and privileges appertaining thereto[.]"  
(Emphasis added.)  Thus, in ABKA the management income derived 
No.  2005AP508 
 
36 
 
from adjacent real estate could be included in the assessment 
because the physical proximity and interdependency of the real 
estate meant the income was a privilege appertaining to the 
subject real estate, rather than the product of the owner's 
skill and business acumen.  Likewise, in Waste Management, the 
right to generate income from the landfill appertained to the 
nature of the real estate rather than the labor and skill of the 
owner.  Finally, in N/S Associates the right to receive rental 
income appertained to the nature and location of the mall rather 
than to the unique qualities of the mall's ownership. 
¶83 The valuation of Adams' billboards for purposes of a 
personal property tax assessment presents the court with a 
different set of circumstances from those presented in ABKA, 
Waste Management, and N/S Associates.  Rather than a question of 
whether the income is primarily attributable to the real estate 
or the personal business skill and acumen of the real property 
owner, the issue here is whether the income is primarily 
attributable to real property or personal property. 
¶84 We conclude that because billboard permits are real 
property, 
as 
defined 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 70.03, 
the 
income 
attributable to them is properly included in the real property 
No.  2005AP508 
 
37 
 
tax assessment, not the personal property tax assessment.18  Any 
value attributable to the billboard permits is not inextricably 
intertwined with the structure of the billboards.  The primary 
value of the permits is unrelated to the structures; rather, the 
primary value of the permits appertains to the location of the 
underlying real estate. 
¶85 The nature of billboard permits demonstrates the 
correctness of this conclusion.  Billboard permits are valid for 
a designated location only.  A permit terminates when a 
billboard is moved.  Whether value appertains to property 
depends upon the property's inherent capacity to generate 
income.  ABKA, 231 Wis. 2d at 341.  Applying this analysis to 
billboards, it is apparent that business value primarily inheres 
in the permit and the location, which are real property (the 
permit) or features of real property (location).  Value 
primarily inheres in the permit because the City has severely 
restricted the number of permits, artificially driving up their 
value.  Likewise, the value of a billboard is heavily dependent 
upon its location, as demonstrated by the fact that a billboard 
                                                 
18 Our conclusion does not mean that the City can include 
100 percent of the income derived from Adams' billboards in the 
real property tax assessment of the land that is leased to Adams 
and upon which Adams places its billboards.  The amount of 
rental income a property can generate is a proper factor to 
consider when assessing property under the income approach.  See 
Darcel, 
Inc. 
v. 
City 
of 
Manitowoc 
Bd. 
of 
Review, 
137 
Wis. 2d 623, 633 n.7, 405 N.W.2d 344 (1987).   Because the rent 
the underlying landowner can charge Adams is but a fraction of 
Adams' income from the billboards, our decision does not shift 
100 percent of the tax burden from Adams to the landowner. 
No.  2005AP508 
 
38 
 
along a heavily traveled interstate highway can command a much 
greater price for the display of advertising than a billboard in 
a residential neighborhood.  See Vivid, 219 Wis. 2d at 780 
(Bablitch, J., with two justices joining); see also N/S Assocs., 
164 Wis. 2d at 53. 
 
¶86 The City argues that it is immaterial whether the 
billboard permit is considered "tangible" or "intangible."  In 
its brief, the City states that "[t]he City has shown that the 
value of the permit is inextricably intertwined with the 
structure and that its value is transferable to a subsequent 
owner."  (Emphasis added.)  However, if we were to allow the 
permit, which the City concedes is intangible, to be factored 
into an assessment of personal property by means of the 
inextricably 
intertwined 
concept, 
we 
would 
undermine 
the 
legislature's decision to exempt intangible personal property, 
as expressed in Wis. Stat. §§ 70.04 and 70.112(1). 
D. 
The Property Valued in a Personal Property Tax Assessment 
Is More Limited Than the Property Valued for Eminent Domain  
 
¶87 "There are three recognized valuation methods for 
billboards: cost approach, income approach and market approach."  
Vivid, 219 Wis. 2d at 783 (citing 8A Nichols on Eminent Domain 
§ 23.04[4], at 23-51 to 23-59).  These three methods are equally 
applicable to establish fair market value in eminent domain 
cases, id., and to establish true cash value for  personal 
property tax assessments.  Mitchell Aero, 74 Wis. 2d at 279; 
I.B.M., 231 Wis. at 311-12; see also O'Neall & Marsh, supra at 
7.  
No.  2005AP508 
 
39 
 
¶88 Although the same appraisal methods may be used to 
establish fair market value for condemnation purposes as may be 
used to establish true cash value for purposes of personal 
property tax assessments, the property valued differs depending 
upon the purpose.  See 8A Nichols on Eminent Domain § 23.04[3], 
at 23-50 n.7 (3d ed. 2005).  In eminent domain, fair market 
value of a billboard is the price "the aggregate asset——the 
lease, permit and sign——would bring in the marketplace[.]"  
Vivid, 219 Wis. 2d at 780 (Bablitch, J., with two justices 
joining).  Necessarily, this includes the value attributable to 
the location of the billboard.  Id. at 803-04 (Bradley, J., with 
three justices joining) (noting the value of the location is 
included in the value of the leasehold). 
 
¶89 In contrast, an appraisal for personal property tax 
assessment 
purposes 
includes 
only 
the 
value 
of 
personal 
property, and therefore excludes the value of the leasehold and 
billboard permit.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 70.04 and 70.34.  Because 
Adams' experts, Donald Sutte and Mark Ulmer, and the City's 
chief assessor, Michael Kurth, all testified that income 
attributable to the billboard structures could be isolated, we 
conclude that a per se rule against the use of the income 
approach to appraise billboards for property tax assessment is 
No.  2005AP508 
 
40 
 
not necessary.19  In fact, once it is shown that a market 
approach is not available, the income approach "is always a 
proper element to consider[.]"  I.B.M., 231 Wis. at 312 
(emphasis added). 
¶90 Therefore, we conclude the same methods of appraisal 
may be used in eminent domain as are used in appraising personal 
property for tax purposes, provided care is taken to exclude 
from a personal property tax assessment any value attributable 
to elements other than tangible personal property. 
 
VII. DOES THE CITY'S USE OF THE INCOME APPROACH TO VALUE 
BILLBOARDS VIOLATE THE UNIFORMITY CLAUSE? 
 
¶91 Because it is necessary to remand the cause for the 
City to reassess Adams' property, we need not reach Adams' 
constitutional challenge.  Labor & Farm Party v. Elections Bd., 
117 Wis. 2d 351, 354, 344 N.W.2d 177 (1984) ("This court does 
                                                 
19 Creation of a per se rule dictating how billboards should 
be valued smacks of an administrative or legislative decision.  
We leave the decision of whether to adopt a per se rule that the 
cost approach should be the exclusive method to value billboards 
to the Department of Revenue or the legislature, as have other 
states.  See e.g., California State Board of Equalization, 
Property and Special Taxes Dept., Guidelines for the Assessment 
of Billboard Properties, No. 2002/078 at 2 (Dec. 2002), 
available 
at 
http://www.boe.ca.gov/proptaxes/pdf/lta02078.pdf 
(last visited July 10, 2006) (adopting the cost approach); Nev. 
Admin. Code § 361.1305 (2006) (adopting the cost approach); 
State of New Jersey, Dep't of the Treasury, Div. of Taxation, 
Real Property Appraisal Manual for New Jersey Assessors 71.02 
(Feb. 
2005), 
available 
at 
http://www.state.nj.us/treasury/taxation/pdf/lpt/billboardpacket
.pdf (last visited July 10, 2006) (noting the income, market, 
and cost approaches are all available to value billboards). 
No.  2005AP508 
 
41 
 
not normally decide constitutional questions if the case can be 
resolved on other grounds."). 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
¶92 In sum, we conclude as follows: 
A. 
The City was entitled to use third tier methods of 
assessment to assess Adams' billboards because there was not a 
recent arms-length sale of the property and Adams did not 
produce evidence of reasonably comparable sales. 
B. 
Although net income from billboard rentals may be a 
factor to consider in a third tier analysis, it cannot be the 
sole controlling factor in determining value.  When the Madison 
City Assessor acknowledged that he considered but rejected all 
other approaches and factors, his assessment contravened long-
standing assessment principles articulated in Waste Management, 
184 Wis. 2d at 558; Bischoff, 81 Wis. 2d at 619; and I.B.M., 231 
Wis. at 312, as well as the prevailing practice for assessing 
billboards throughout Wisconsin and the United States. 
C. 
The City erred by including the value of billboard 
permits in the assessment of Adams' billboards.  Billboard 
permits are not tangible personal property.  For property tax 
purposes, billboard permits constitute an interest in real 
property, as defined by Wis. Stat. § 70.03. 
D. 
Having concluded the City's assessment is improper 
because it relied on only an income approach and because it 
improperly included the value of billboard permits, we do not 
reach the question of whether the City's use of the income 
approach violates the Uniformity Clause. 
No.  2005AP508 
 
42 
 
¶93 Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court and remand 
the cause to the circuit court, which is directed to stay 
further proceedings pending reassessment of Adams' billboards by 
the City in a manner consistent with this opinion, or until the 
parties reach a settlement. 
By the Court.—The judgment of the circuit court is reversed 
and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
 
 
 
No.  2005AP508.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶94 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  I agree 
with the circuit court's excellent decision.  I conclude, as did 
the circuit court after reviewing all the evidence presented at 
trial, that the City of Madison properly assessed Adams's 
billboards using the income approach, after considering various 
approaches to valuation.  The obvious purpose of an outdoor sign 
is for public display in a desirable location.  As the circuit 
court stated, "A billboard does not generate income sitting in a 
warehouse; its value is a function of its permit and its 
location.  That income-generating capacity is inextricably 
intertwined with the billboard and its value must be captured 
if, as Wisconsin law requires, the property is to be assessed at 
its full market value." 
¶95 Accordingly, the personal property tax assessments 
challenged in the instant case are valid assessments, and I 
therefore dissent. 
I 
¶96 I begin with the method of assessment used by the 
City.  The majority opinion, like the circuit court, correctly 
states the law regarding the various methods of personal 
property tax assessment.  Both the circuit court and the 
majority opinion correctly conclude that the City was entitled 
to use the "third tier" assessment methods to assess the 
billboards.1     
                                                 
1 Majority op., ¶47. 
No.  2005AP508.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶97 The majority opinion is also correct that when 
conducting a third tier assessment, the income approach "cannot 
be considered as the sole controlling factor in determining 
value of either real or personal property."2  "[A]n assessor must 
determine market value from the best information the assessor 
can 
practicably 
obtain, 
considering 
all 
elements 
which 
collectively have a bearing on the value of the property."3  When 
the assessor uses more than one approach to assessment, he must 
reconcile the values determined by the various approaches.  
However, when other approaches are properly rejected and only 
one approach is used, obviously no reconciliation is needed.4   
                                                 
2 Bischoff v. City of Appleton, 81 Wis. 2d 612, 619, 260 
N.W.2d 773 (1978) (quoting State ex rel. I.B.M. Corp. v. Bd. of 
Review, 231 Wis. 303, 312, 285 N.W. 784 (1939)); see majority 
op., ¶48; 1 Property Assessment Manual for Wisconsin Assessors, 
ch. 7, at 7-28 ("The appraiser should consider all three 
approaches when estimating the value of a property.  However, 
all three approaches may not be developed in an appraisal 
because a sufficient amount of data may not be available or, due 
to the specific property characteristics, the approach may be 
considered less reliable in estimating market value." (second 
and third emphasis added)); see also Waste Mgmt. of Wis., Inc. 
v. Kenosha County Bd. of Review, 184 Wis. 2d 541, 558, 516 
N.W.2d 695 (1994) ("Income may never be the sole basis for an 
assessment of property."). 
3 Waste Mgmt., 184 Wis. 2d at 558. 
4 1 Property Assessment Manual, ch. 7, at 7-28 ("If more 
than one approach is developed in the appraisal, the individual 
value estimates must be reconciled into one final value estimate 
for the property. . . . The final value estimate may be the 
value estimate derived from one of the approaches or may be a 
careful reconciliation of the applicable approaches.")  Thus the 
majority opinion's emphasis, ¶54, on reconciliation in the 
instant case is irrelevant. 
No.  2005AP508.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶98 As the majority opinion observes, the purpose of 
requiring assessors to consider all elements that bear on the 
value of property is to prevent "skewed appraisals due to 
aberrant market conditions."5  The majority opinion properly 
recognizes, however, that the limiting factor is that data may 
not be available or appropriate to develop any and all 
approaches.6 According to the majority opinion, "an assessor must 
have the ability to discount, even disregard, factors that do 
not really bear on the value of a property."7  I wholeheartedly 
agree.  And the present case falls right into this situation. 
¶99 Unfortunately, the majority opinion does not apply the 
rules of assessment it espouses.  Indeed, after stating that an 
assessor may disregard factors that do not bear on the value of 
the property, the majority opinion shifts, concluding that the 
rule requiring an assessor to consider all elements that bear on 
the market value would be nullified if the assessor were 
permitted "to reject all approaches and factors other than an 
income 
approach" 
because 
he 
"deemed 
unreliable" 
other 
approaches.8 
¶100 Which is it?  Either the assessor can disregard other 
approaches when they are inappropriate, or he cannot.   
                                                 
5 Majority op., ¶51. 
6 Majority op., ¶¶52-54. 
7 Majority op., ¶53 (emphasis added). 
8 Majority op., ¶55. 
No.  2005AP508.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶101 The record developed in the circuit court is clear 
that the City considered several third tier assessment methods.  
The record demonstrates that after considering a variety of 
approaches, the assessor had a sufficient basis to use the 
income approach for the assessment and to disregard other 
approaches as not reliable and as producing a skewed fair market 
value.  The other approaches were disregarded after careful 
consideration; none was rejected out of hand, as the majority 
opinion states.9  The circuit court opinion details the record 
demonstrating the City's careful analysis in rejecting the cost 
approach. 
 
I 
conclude 
that 
the 
assessor's 
rejection 
of 
approaches and factors that were not reliable in the instant 
case 
comports 
with 
long-standing 
assessment 
principles 
                                                 
9 Majority op., ¶55. 
No.  2005AP508.ssa 
 
5 
 
articulated in the cases and the rule stated in the majority 
opinion.10      
                                                 
10 See, e.g., Waste Mgmt., 184 Wis. 2d at 557 ("[A]n 
assessor must determine market value from the best information 
the assessor can practicably obtain, considering all elements 
which collectively have a bearing on the value of the property.  
Such elements, as identified by various decisions of this court, 
include, among others, cost, depreciation, replacement value, 
income, industrial conditions, location and occupancy, sales of 
like property, book value, amount of insurance carried, value 
asserted in a prospectus, and appraisals procured by the owner." 
(citations omitted)); State ex rel. Kesselman v. Bd. of Review 
for Village of Sturtevant, 133 Wis. 2d 122, 129, 394 N.W.2d 745 
(1986) (same); Rosen v. City of Milwaukee, 72 Wis. 2d 653, 663, 
242 N.W.2d 681 (1976) (same); State ex rel. Park Plaza Shopping 
Center, Inc. v. Bd. of Review for City of Madison, 61 
Wis. 2d 469, 474, 213 N.W.2d 27 (1973) (same); Superior Nursing 
Homes, Inc. v. City of Wausau, Bd. of Review, 37 Wis. 2d 570, 
575, 155 N.W.2d 670 (1968) (same); State ex rel. Garton Toy Co. 
v. Town of Mosel, 32 Wis. 2d 253, 259-260, 145 N.W.2d 129 (1966) 
(same); State ex rel. Mitchell Aero, Inc. v. Bd. of Review of 
City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 268, 277, 246 N.W.2d 521 (1976) 
("The method of valuation generally has been to assess both 
personal and real property on the basis of its fair market 
value; i.e., the amount it will sell for upon arms-length 
negotiation in the open market, between an owner willing but not 
obliged to sell, and a buyer willing but not obliged to buy."); 
Xerox Corp. v. DOR, 114 Wis. 2d 522, 527, 339 N.W.2d 357 (1983) 
(same); State 
ex 
rel. Geipel 
v. 
City of 
Milwaukee, 68 
Wis. 2d 726, 733, 229 N.W.2d 585 (1975) ("Commonly stated, sec. 
70.32(1) requires real estate to be assessed at its fair market 
value which has often been defined as the amount the property 
could be sold for in the open market by an owner willing and 
able but not compelled to sell to a purchaser willing and able 
but not obliged to buy."); State ex rel. Kesselman v. Bd. of 
Review for Village of Sturtevant, 133 Wis. 2d 122, 128-129, 394 
N.W.2d 745 (1986) ("In the absence of such sales, the assessor 
may consider all the factors collectively which have a bearing 
on value of the property in order to determine its fair market 
value.   . . . Among these factors are costs, depreciation, 
replacement value, income, industrial conditions, location and 
occupancy, sales of like property, book value, amount of 
insurance carried, value asserted in a prospectus and appraisals 
procured by the owner."); State ex rel. Markarian v. City of 
Cudahy, 45 Wis. 2d 683, 686, 173 N.W.2d 627 (1970) (same); 
Buildings Development Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 225 Wis. 357, 
No.  2005AP508.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶102 The City determined that there were no recent arms-
length sales.11  Adams did not proffer evidence of reasonably 
comparable sales.12  The majority opinion in effect concedes that 
although the City attempted to use comparable sales, neither the 
City nor Adams offered any at trial.13 
¶103 The two approaches at issue in the instant case are 
the "cost approach" and the "income approach."  The cost 
approach is a measurement of the replacement cost of the 
property.  The income approach is a measurement of the amount of 
income the property will generate over its useful life.14       
                                                                                                                                                             
359-60, 274 N.W. 298 (1937) (quoting State ex rel. North Shore 
Development Co. v. Axtell, 216 Wis. 153, 155-157, 256 N.W. 622 
(1934)) 
("Elements 
besides 
income 
proper 
to 
consider 
in 
assessing property are . . . 'costs, depreciation, replacement 
value, earnings, industrial conditions,' and 'location of the 
property relative to the business section of the city.'"); State 
ex rel. Flambeau Paper Co. v. Windus, 208 Wis. 583, 587, 243 
N.W. 216 (1932) ("[I]n fixing valuation [take] into account 
cost, depreciation, replacement value, earnings, industrial 
conditions, and sales of . . . properties.  These are factors 
entering into sale value, and proper to consider in judging 
it."); Duesterbeck v. Town of Koshkonong, 2000 WI App 6, ¶27, 
232 
Wis. 2d 16, 
605 
N.W.2d 904 
("[Section] 
70.32(1), 
stats., . . . requires assessment based on real estate's fair 
market value, using the most reliable information that the 
assessor can practicably obtain.").  
11 See majority op., ¶38. 
12 See majority op., ¶¶39-47, ¶43 n.10, ¶46 n.11. 
13 Majority op., ¶47.  The comparable sales approach has 
been described as "fraught with numerous difficulties, all of 
which militate against use of this approach for property tax 
valuation of billboards."  Cris K. O'Neall & Bradley R. Marsh, 
Trends in the Property Tax Valuation of Commercial Outdoor 
Advertising Structures, J. of Prop. Tax Assessment & Admin. 5, 7 
(vol. 1, issue 2, 2004). 
14 Majority op., ¶35. 
No.  2005AP508.ssa 
 
7 
 
¶104 The City assessor considered the cost approach and 
determined that it was not a reliable way to determine the fair 
market value.  In the City's supplemental report regarding the 
2002 and 2003 assessments, relying on the Wisconsin Property 
Assessment Manual and citing to expert authority, the City 
describes 
its 
valuation 
methodology 
as 
considering, 
but 
rejecting, the cost approach as follows: 
Due to the lack of complete, accurate cost data, the 
cost approach is not considered a reliable approach to 
value and is not considered in this valuation.  Most 
sources agree that the cost approach does not reflect 
the fair market value of outdoor advertising signs. 
. . . . 
The cost approach is not considered a reliable 
indicator of value for the subject property due to the 
following reasons: 
The age of the improvements and constant maintenance 
and upkeep makes it almost impossible to estimate 
reproduction 
or 
replacement 
cost 
and 
appropriate 
depreciation and obsolescence. 
It is very difficult or almost impossible to estimate 
appropriate soft costs, site procurement costs and 
entrepreneurial profits which are needed to put the 
billboard into productive use as required by the 
Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual. 
All sources reviewed considered the cost approach to 
be the least reliable approach to value for outdoor 
advertising signs, the lowest value indicator, and not 
an accurate reflection of market value. 
The materials of the sign do not influence its value.  
Rather, location is of paramount importance in outdoor 
advertising.  A location of a particular billboard may 
have a value over and above its nuts and bolts value.  
In this sense, in the billboard industry, it is 
virtually impossible to separate location from the 
structure.   
No.  2005AP508.ssa 
 
8 
 
The sign structure and appropriate rights associated 
with the sign structure are inextricably intertwined 
and cannot be properly valued using the cost approach.  
¶105 Thus, the record in the trial court is clear that the 
City did not use the income approach as the sole controlling 
factor in determining the value of personal property, and it is 
clear that the majority opinion is misleading in suggesting that 
the City assessor rejected the cost approach "out of hand."15 
¶106 Other states allow use of the income approach. The 
critics of the income approach recognize that the income 
approach is valid.  The criticisms are primarily that the income 
approach is difficult to implement.16  
¶107 The journal article relied upon by the majority 
opinion to conclude that the cost approach is the emerging trend 
                                                 
15 See majority op., ¶55. 
16 See, e.g., James Wagner & David Baker, The Valuation of 
Outdoor Advertising Structures: A Mass Appraisal Approach, 
Assessment Digest, July/Aug. 1991, at 4 ("Advantages of using 
the cost approach in the valuation of off-premise signs are: (1) 
the ease of application; (2) the ability to determine the value 
of the structure irrespective of location, income, and expenses 
attributable to the business as opposed to the structure; and 
(3) the availability of cost data."); Charles F. Floyd, Outdoor 
Advertising Signs and Eminent Domain Proceedings, Real Estate 
Appraiser & Analyst, Summer 1990, at 16 ("Traditionally, the 
cost approach is the appraisal technique that has been utilized 
to 
value 
outdoor 
advertising 
signs 
in 
eminent 
domain 
proceedings.  It has been accepted by the courts as a valid 
technique, and it has been accepted by most courts as the ONLY 
valid technique for valuing outdoor advertising signs.  The sole 
exception arises when evidence indicates that the sign cannot be 
relocated within the entire market area.  In this situation 
several courts have ruled that some variation of the income 
approach may be used.").   
In the instant case, however, the assessor was able to 
determine the market value of the billboards using the income 
approach and the signs cannot be relocated easily in Madison. 
No.  2005AP508.ssa 
 
9 
 
is totally unconvincing.17  The article has to be read knowing 
that both authors "specialize in representing owners in property 
tax assessment matters."18  They conclude that the cost approach 
is the best approach for tax assessment purposes.19 
¶108 There are several more substantive reasons not to take 
this article very seriously.  The authors' conclusion about any 
emerging trend toward the cost approach is not supported by the 
evidence presented in the article.   
¶109 The authors surveyed a mere six states.20  One of the 
six states was Wisconsin, which is not described as adopting any 
of the three approaches.21  Two of the six states expressly allow 
an income approach.  In California, income value may be used; if 
the cost approach is used a cost new value is given to the 
property, depreciation is subtracted, and the value of land is 
determined (using comparable sales) and added.22  In Ohio, cost 
is prima facie evidence of value unless evidence to the contrary 
is brought by the taxing authority or taxpayer.  
¶110 Regardless, the examples from the six states are 
unconvincing 
because 
four 
of 
the 
six 
states 
discussed, 
California, Ohio, Texas, and North Carolina, provide nothing 
                                                 
17 See majority op., ¶29. 
18 O'Neall & Marsh, supra note 13, at 5. 
19 Id. at 11. 
20 Id. at 8-11. 
21 Id. at 11. 
22 See id. at 8-9, 10. 
No.  2005AP508.ssa 
 
10 
 
more than examples of recommended guidelines by an agency with 
no authority to mandate appraisal approaches.  They do not 
discuss what is actually happening in those states.23   Thus we 
cannot determine from the article the billboard assessment rules 
in the six states or any other states. 
¶111 Furthermore, any normative conclusions reached by the 
authors must be rejected in Wisconsin because the authors' view 
of the proper approach to valuation conflicts with Wisconsin 
law.  The authors reject the "sales approach" as unreliable.24  
In Wisconsin, however, it has long been the rule that the "sales 
approach," valuing the property based on recent or comparable 
sales, is the best approach to valuation.  Only when sales 
information is not available, as in the instant case, may an 
assessor proceed to the third tier approaches.25 
¶112 Moreover, other commentators reject the normative 
conclusions in this article.  A commentator relied upon by the 
majority opinion,26 who is a member of a private law firm and 
apparently represents condemnees rather than condemnors and at 
least one billboard company, concludes that the cost approach is 
appropriate for determining the value of billboards in only rare 
circumstances.  This commentator has observed that there are 
several problems with the cost approach: 
                                                 
23 Id. at 8-9, 10-11. 
24 Id. at 7. 
25 Majority op., ¶¶34, 37. 
26 Majority op., ¶46. 
No.  2005AP508.ssa 
 
11 
 
The 
cost 
approach 
has 
at 
least 
three 
major 
shortcomings: 
-It does not reflect market thinking:  Buyers and 
sellers of outdoor advertising do not consider the 
replacement cost of a sign, minus depreciation, as an 
accurate estimate of value when they purchase signs. 
-Depreciation may be impossible to estimate:  Because 
sign 
companies 
are 
continually 
refurbishing 
sign 
structures, standard methods of estimating physical 
depreciation cannot be applied to outdoor signs.  In 
addition, cost estimating services do not develop age-
life tables for signboards as they do for other 
categories 
of 
real 
estate. 
 
Moreover, 
economic 
obsolescence 
attributable 
to 
negative 
external 
influences is extremely difficult, if not impossible, 
to estimate. 
-Replacement 
cost 
may 
not 
reflect 
value: 
 
The 
replacement cost of a sign can be estimated quite 
readily.  The actual cost to build a sign can be 
determined 
from 
contractors' 
estimates 
or 
bids.  
However, the cost of acquiring the site for sign usage 
must 
also 
be 
reflected 
in 
the 
cost 
estimate.  
Companies continually acquire new sites for outdoor 
advertising. 
 
To 
complicate 
matters 
further, 
associated costs for items such as entrepreneurial 
profit must be estimated. 
Because of these serious shortcomings, use the cost 
approach only in the rarest of circumstances.27 
¶113 The same commentator also espouses the virtue of using 
the income approach for determining the value of billboards, 
contending that the income approach encompasses the full value 
and nature of the billboard: 
                                                 
27 Jill 
S. 
Gelineau, 
Valuation 
of 
Billboards 
in 
Condemnation, 19 No. 4 Practical Real Estate Lawyer 23, 30-31 
(July 2003) (also observing that the value of a billboard is 
tied to location, permit, and physical structure and that 
billboards are arguably real property, not personal property, in 
eminent domain cases). 
No.  2005AP508.ssa 
 
12 
 
The true value of an outdoor advertising sign depends 
on a host of factors.  Many of these characteristics 
make the valuation of billboards similar to the 
appraisal of commercial real estate generally.  Signs 
are purchased for their locations, the signboard 
structures themselves, and the land leases that run 
with the sites on which the signs stand.  These 
interests are similar to the real estate interests 
involved in the purchase of an apartment building, 
office building, or commercial center, which usually 
include the location, the physical structure(s), and 
the right to use the land under the lease agreement.  
Attributes such as advertising potential are related 
to 
locational 
interests. 
Location 
is 
of 
prime 
importance to all real estate assets, whether the real 
estate is residential, commercial, or industrial.  
This is equally true of the interests in outdoor 
advertising signboards. 
The 
similarities 
between 
billboards 
and 
other 
commercial 
property 
interests, 
such 
as 
office 
buildings, restaurants, and the like, suggest that 
billboards are properly viewed as real property.28 
¶114 The 
expert 
opinions 
cited 
by 
the 
City 
in 
its 
supplemental report on the 2002 and 2003 assessments support the 
proposition that the cost approach is unreliable for billboards.  
An article written by one of Adams's expert witnesses explains 
that the income approach appropriately captures the value of a 
billboard because, unlike other businesses, the income-producing 
capacity cannot be separated from the physical structure: 
It is . . . incorrect 
to 
assert 
that 
the income 
approach reflects the "business" value of a billboard.  
The expense data, which include all operating and 
management costs, effectively eliminate the "business" 
component from the income figures.  . . . An outdoor 
advertising structure is not a restaurant or a fast 
food outlet, where a separate and distinct business 
activity is conducted such as selling food and 
beverages.  All activities of a sign owner relate 
                                                 
28 Gelineau, supra note 27, at 27. 
No.  2005AP508.ssa 
 
13 
 
directly to its being rented to a tenant-advertiser, a 
purely real estate related function.29 
¶115 Taking into account the fact that the City considered 
and rejected approaches other than the income approach and the 
fact that the income approach is a proper approach to assessing 
property for tax purposes, I conclude that the City's decision 
to use only the income approach was proper. 
II 
¶116 I must now consider whether the City properly applied 
the income approach.  The circuit court concluded, and I agree, 
that the City properly applied the income approach, including 
the "inextricably intertwined" concept.  I agree with the 
circuit court that the City had eliminated from its income 
approach any elements improper in assessing the billboards as 
personal property.30    
                                                 
29 Rodolfo 
J. 
Aguilar, 
The 
Appraisal 
of 
Off-Premise 
Advertising Billboards, Right of Way, September/October 2000, at 
12 
(publication 
of 
the 
Int'l 
Right 
of 
Way 
Ass'n, 
http://www.irwaonline.org/). 
For further discussion of the relative benefits of the 
income approach compared to the cost approach in determining the 
value of a billboard, see also other authorities cited by the 
City in the supplemental report, Donald T. Sutte, The Appraisal 
of Outdoor Advertising Signs 41 (1994) (stating same reasons as 
Gelineau to explain why cost approach is inappropriate for 
billboards); Ron L. Nation & Donald P. Oehlrich, The Valuation 
of Billboard Structures, The Appraisal Journal, October 1999, at 
412 
(publication 
of 
the 
Appraisal 
Institute, 
http://www.appraisalinstitute.org/) (discussing 
inadequacy of 
cost approach in determining value of billboard). 
30 The majority opinion concludes that "the same methods of 
appraisal may be used in eminent domain as are used in 
appraising personal property for tax purposes, provided care is 
taken to exclude from a personal property tax assessment any 
value attributable to elements other than tangible personal 
property."  Majority op., ¶90. 
No.  2005AP508.ssa 
 
14 
 
¶117 In the real property context, this court has held that 
"certain business value may in fact be 'appended' to the real 
estate rather than personal to the owner."31  This value is 
appended to real property when it is inextricably intertwined 
with the land.32   
¶118 The majority opinion asserts that the "inextricably 
intertwined" 
concept 
is 
not 
applicable 
here 
because 
the 
billboard permit is "a right or privilege appertaining to real 
property and thus falls within the definition of 'real property' 
in Wis. Stat. § 70.03."33  The majority opinion asserts that the 
"inextricably 
intertwined" 
concept 
is 
not 
applicable 
here 
because the billboard permit is an interest in real property and 
the income attributable to the permits is properly included in 
the real property tax assessment, not the personal property tax 
assessment.  Therefore, concludes the majority opinion, the 
permit cannot be inextricably intertwined with personal property 
(the billboard).  
                                                 
31 Waste Mgmt., 184 Wis. 2d at 564. 
32 See ABKA Ltd. P'ship v. Bd. of Review of Village of 
Fontana-On-Geneva-Lake, 
231 
Wis. 2d 328, 
336, 
344, 
603 
N.W.2d 217 (1999); Waste Mgmt., 184 Wis. 2d at 564; State ex 
rel. N/S Assocs. v. Bd. of Review of Village of Greendale, 164 
Wis. 2d 31, 54-55, 473 N.W.2d 554 (Ct. App. 1991). 
33 Majority op., ¶59.  See also majority op., ¶64 ("[A] 
billboard 
permit 
falls 
within 
the 
definition 
of 
real 
property."); ¶66 ("[A] billboard permit should be assessed as a 
right or privilege appertaining to real property under Wis. 
Stat. § 70.03."); ¶79 ("Regardless of our conclusion that 
billboard permits are real property . . . ."); ¶85 ("We conclude 
that because billboard permits are real property, as defined in 
Wis. Stat. § 70.03, the income attributable to them is properly 
included in the real property tax assessment, not the personal 
property tax assessment"). 
No.  2005AP508.ssa 
 
15 
 
¶119 The majority opinion remarkably also explains that a 
billboard permit is both real property and intangible personal 
property.34   
¶120 Although 
the 
cases 
addressing 
the 
inextricably 
intertwined rule are real property cases, I agree with the 
circuit court that the same rationale applies to personal 
                                                 
34 The majority opinion states that it does not want to 
"leave the impression that the answer is 'no'" to the question 
of whether a billboard permit is "'intangible' within the 
meaning of Wis. Stat. § 70.112(1)," that is, whether a billboard 
permit is intangible personal property.   Majority op., ¶¶65-66. 
I assume that because the majority does not want to leave 
the impression that the answer is "no" because it would be 
"misleading," it must conclude that the answer is "yes."   
The explanation in the majority opinion that permits are, 
as a general rule, intangible personal property excluded from 
property taxation is untenable.  See majority op., ¶¶65-77.  
This conclusion does not comport with the text of Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.112(1), defining personal property that is exempt from 
property taxation, or the cases interpreting the statute.   
Wisconsin Stat. § 70.112(1) exempts from property taxation 
"[m]oney and all intangible personal property, such as credit, 
checks, share drafts, other drafts, notes, bonds, stocks and 
other written instruments."  In State ex rel. Dane County Title 
Co. v. Board of Review, City of Madison, 2 Wis. 2d 51, 62, 85 
N.W.2d 864 (1957), this court applied the principle of ejusdem 
generis and concluded that "'written instruments' as used in 
sec. 70.112(1), Stats., refers to writings that evidence rights 
and obligations of things involving money credits."   
The majority opinion does not explain how a permit can be 
classified as a "money credit."  Indeed, in explaining that a 
permit is generally non-taxable intangible personal property 
under § 70.112(1), the majority does not apply Dane County 
Title, the foundational supreme court case interpreting the 
meaning 
of 
the 
phrase 
"intangible 
personal 
property" 
in 
§ 70.112(1). 
No.  2005AP508.ssa 
 
16 
 
property taxation.35  "[T]he 'key to the analysis' . . . 'is 
whether the value is appended to the property, and is thus 
transferable with the property, or whether it is, in effect, 
independent of the property so that the value either stays with 
the seller or dissipates upon sale.'"36   
¶121 It is clear from the case law, from the record in the 
instant case, and from a commonsense perspective that the cash 
value (the fair market value) of a billboard is based on income, 
which is inextricably intertwined with the billboard permit.  In 
Vivid, Inc. v. Fiedler, 219 Wis. 2d 764, 781, 580 N.W.2d 644 
(1998) (an eminent domain case in which no one argued that the 
                                                 
35 Although real property was at issue, in N/S Associates, 
164 
Wis. 2d at 
54, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
discussed 
the 
inextricably 
intertwined 
rule 
as 
applying 
to 
"property" 
generally.  This court cited N/S Associates favorably regarding 
the inextricably intertwined rule in ABKA Limited Partnership, 
231 Wis. 2d at 336. 
Both personal and real property are assessed on the basis 
of fair market value and the same methods of valuation, that is, 
sales, cost, and income, are used for both types of property.    
Another reason to apply the inextricably intertwined rule 
to billboards is that a billboard, though classified in 
Wisconsin as personal property, appears to be like real 
property.  Jill S. Gelineau argues that in eminent domain cases, 
billboards should be valued as real property, not personal 
property.  Gelineau, supra note 27, at 30-31 (observing that the 
value of a billboard is tied to location, permit, and physical 
structure and that billboards are arguably real property, not 
personal property, in eminent domain).  
36 ABKA Ltd. P'ship, 231 Wis. 2d at 337 (quoting N/S 
Assocs., 164 Wis. 2d at 54); see also id. at 336 ("Whether an 
income interest may be captured in a property assessment hinges 
on whether the value appertains to the property.  A value that 
appertains to property is one that is transferable with the 
property.").  
No.  2005AP508.ssa 
 
17 
 
cost approach alone was adequate to evaluate the fair market 
value of the billboard), this court explained that  
the value of the sign is derived largely from the 
location of the sign.  Therefore, "all right, title 
and interest in and to the sign and . . . leasehold 
relating thereto" must include not only the value of 
the sign structure and leasehold value, but also the 
value of the location. 
It is therefore not the permit but the valuation of the location 
encompassed in the permit that is included in the assessment of 
a billboard. 
¶122 The record in the instant case supports the conclusion 
that the value of the physical structure of the billboard is 
inextricably intertwined with the location of the billboard, 
which is governed by the permit.   
¶123 First, as the City's supplemental report stated, the 
materials that make up the billboard do not influence its value.  
Rather, the value is tied to (that is, inextricably intertwined 
with) the location of the billboard and, thus, the permit.  
¶124 Second, on cross-examination, Adams's expert witness 
agreed that the sign permit is inextricably intertwined with the 
purpose of the sign and that the permit is the vehicle by which 
income is derived: 
Q 
So the permit is inextricably, if you will, 
entwined with the existence and intended purpose 
of the sign, wouldn't you say? 
A 
Yes. 
. . . . 
Q 
You can buy and sell sign permits, right? 
A 
Yes. 
No.  2005AP508.ssa 
 
18 
 
Q 
If you were to be the negotiator, the appraiser, 
the whatever you want to call it who is analyzing 
the sale price of that permit, what would you——
you would not look at the dollar value of the 
physical piece of paper, would you? 
A 
Oh, no, I would look at the marketable value of 
the permit. 
¶125 Third, Adams's general manager testified that the 
value of a billboard and the value of a permit are inextricably 
intertwined:  
Q 
If you pay $1,500 for a permit to have a sign in 
Madison, does that get you, your company, more 
than $1,500 worth of value? 
A 
Absolutely 
Q 
Okay.  Explain why. 
A 
Because having a permit is like gold, and when we 
have one we can at that point put up a bulletin 
and make a lot more than $1,500. 
Q 
That's the critical piece of the value of a sign? 
A 
Yeah.  I wouldn't be in business if I didn't have 
any permits. 
Q 
Is the most critical component of a billboard the 
value of the permit? 
A 
Yes. 
Q 
And without a permit is there value to a 
billboard? 
A 
No. 
Q 
With a permit is there value? 
A 
Yes.  
In other words, structures and permits are bought and sold on 
the basis of what income is expected to be generated by the 
billboard with the permit. 
No.  2005AP508.ssa 
 
19 
 
¶126 Adams's general manager further testified that the 
income-producing capacity of billboards is tied to the permit, 
not the physical sign structure, and the permit is transferable 
to a subsequent purchaser. 
Q 
Now, in the billboard industry is there a market 
for just used sign structures? 
A 
Not much of one. 
Q 
Is there a market for billboard leaseholds? 
A 
Absolutely. 
Q 
Do people buy or do companies buy and sell 
billboards leaseholds that don't have billboards 
on them? 
A 
Yes. 
 
 
. . . . 
Q 
Are you in the business, meaning Adams of course, 
do you have a warehouse full of sign parts that 
you sell to others as sign parts on a regular 
basis? 
. . . . 
A 
No, sir. 
¶127 Finally, 
a 
commonsense 
perspective 
supports 
the 
conclusion that the value of a billboard is inextricably 
intertwined with the billboard permit. Without a permit, a 
billboard is nothing more than a pile of metal and wood.  It 
seems implausible that personal property that brings in tens or 
hundreds of thousands of dollars a year in income has a fair 
market value limited to the cost of the pile of metal and wood.  
If Adams were to sell its billboards, it surely would get more 
than the cost of the materials.  How, then, can the market value 
No.  2005AP508.ssa 
 
20 
 
of the billboard be just the cost of the materials?37  I conclude 
that it cannot. 
¶128 I further conclude, as did the circuit court, that the 
City did not err in its assessment of Adams's billboards using 
the income approach and that the City's application of the 
income approach properly subtracted value unrelated to the 
billboards themselves. 
¶129 After following the twists and turns of the majority 
opinion, I conclude that on remand the City can use the income 
method it has used and reach the same result it reached 
previously.       
III 
¶130 I now consider Adams's state constitutional challenge 
to the assessment.   
¶131 Adams contends that the City's use of the income 
approach to assess its billboards, but not other commercial 
properties, violates the Uniformity Clause of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  Adams's contention is without merit. 
¶132 The Uniformity Clause, Wis. Const. art. VIII, § 1, 
provides that "[t]he rule of taxation shall be uniform . . . ."38  
                                                 
37 See Gelineau, supra note 27, at 30-31 (noting problems 
with the cost approach, including the fact that buyers and 
sellers of billboards do not consider replacement cost to 
reflect the value of the billboard). 
Gelineau observes that "the market value of a sign in place 
may be 10 or 15 times the construction cost" and that "the value 
of a billboard lies in its location, permit, and physical 
structure——not the operating business."  Gelineau, supra note 
27, at 30, 31. 
No.  2005AP508.ssa 
 
21 
 
The uniformity clause requires that all property be taxed 
according to the market value of the property.39   
¶133 There is no requirement, however, that a uniform 
method or approach to determining market value be used for all 
property.  The Uniformity Clause does not require that each and 
every property be valued in the same manner.  Rather, it 
requires that, whatever the valuation of the property, the 
fraction of the value to be paid in taxes must be the same:   
                                                                                                                                                             
38 Gottlieb v. City of Milwaukee, 33 Wis. 2d 408, 424, 147 
N.W.2d 633 (1967), distills the guiding principles of the 
Uniformity Clause as follows: 
1. 
For 
direct 
taxation 
of 
property, 
under 
the 
uniformity rule there can be but one constitutional 
class. 
2. All within that class must be taxed on a basis of 
equality so far as practicable and all property taxed 
must bear its burden equally on an ad valorem basis. 
3. All property not included in that class must be 
absolutely exempt from property taxation. 
4. Privilege taxes are not direct taxes on property 
and are not subject to the uniformity rule. 
5. While there can be no classification of property 
for different rules or rates of property taxation, the 
legislature can classify as between property that is 
to be taxed and that which is to be wholly exempt, and 
the test of such classification is reasonableness. 
6. There can be variations in the mechanics of 
property assessment or tax imposition so long as the 
resulting taxation shall be borne with as nearly as 
practicable equality on an ad valorem basis with other 
taxable property.  
(Emphasis added.) 
39 State ex rel. Baker Mfg. Co. v. City of Evansville, 261 
Wis. 599, 609, 53 N.W.2d 795 (1952). 
No.  2005AP508.ssa 
 
22 
 
The 
methods 
of 
determining 
true, 
current 
value 
necessarily differ in the absence of significant 
sales, but when once the true value is arrived at, 
each dollar's worth of one sort of property is liable 
for exactly the same tax as a dollar's worth of any 
other sort of property, and to assess real property at 
a different fraction of the value than personalty is 
error.40 
¶134 This court has explained that "there can be variations 
in the mechanics of property assessment or tax imposition so 
long as the resulting taxation shall be borne with as nearly as 
practicable equality on an ad valorem basis with other taxable 
property."41  
¶135 There 
is 
no 
allegation 
that 
the 
City 
assessed 
different properties at different rates.  Using the income 
approach alone for certain properties and not for others does 
not violate the Uniformity Clause.  This case is about nothing 
more than the proper way in which to determine fair market 
value.  The uniformity clause is not implicated. 
¶136 For the reasons set forth, I would affirm the judgment 
of the circuit court upholding the City's assessment of Adams's 
billboards. I therefore dissent.      
¶137 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
                                                 
40 Id. 
41 Gottlieb, 33 Wis. 2d at 424. 
No.  2005AP508.ssa 
 
 
 
1