Title: Ingram v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 617, 2003
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: September 17, 2004

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
NORMAN INGRAM 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 617, 2003 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for Kent County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
)  Cr. ID # 0305008270 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  June 8, 2004 
Decided:  September 17, 2004 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices. 
O R D E R 
 
This 17th day of September 2004, on consideration of the briefs of the 
parties, it appears to the Court that: 
 
1. 
Norman Ingram appeals his conviction in the Superior Court of a 
variety of drug charges, claiming the trial judge erred by denying his motion to 
suppress evidence and that there was insufficient evidence to support his 
conviction for possession with intent to deliver cocaine.  Because we find that 
Ingram’s arrest was supported by independent facts justifying the police officer’s 
conduct, we conclude that the trial judge acted within his discretion by denying the 
motion to suppress.  Furthermore, because we find the testimonial and other 
credible evidence in combination support Ingram’s possession with intent to 
 
2
deliver charge, we hold that the State sufficiently established Ingram’s intent to 
deliver cocaine.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
 
2. 
In May 2003, Officers Mentino DiSilvestro and Brian Talley, 
members of the Governor’s Task Force, stopped Ingram’s vehicle near Dover for 
failing to signal a left turn.  DiSilvestro noticed a “faint odor” of alcohol, and that 
Ingram spoke with a low mumbled voice.  After determining he had a valid license 
and no outstanding warrants, DiSilvestro asked Ingram to step out of the vehicle to 
perform field sobriety tests.  Citing officer safety reasons, DiSilvestro first 
performed a pat-down search, which revealed neither contraband nor any weapons.  
As DiSilvestro began to administer the field tests, he observed two small plastic 
baggies protruding from Ingram’s pocket.   
3. 
Separately, Talley, who intended to on conduct a pat-down search, 
asked Ingram’s passenger, Thomas Cubbage, to step out of the vehicle.  Talley 
discovered cocaine in Cubbage’s pocket.  After learning that Talley had seized 
Cubbage’s cocaine, DiSilvestro suspected that the plastic bags in Ingram’s pocket 
were drug paraphernalia and arrested Ingram.  During a later, more thorough 
search at the police station, officers seized a small bag of marijuana and two bags 
of crack cocaine from Ingram’s person.  The larger bag of cocaine weighed slightly 
over twenty-five grams.  Under the driver’s seat of Ingram’s car, the officers, in a 
 
3
separate search, discovered a digital scale containing cocaine residue, as well as a 
roll of toilet paper in the rear of the hatchback. 
4. 
Shortly before trial in December 2003, Ingram moved to suppress the 
evidence found on his person and in his car.  After conducting a suppression 
hearing, the trial judge denied Ingram’s motion.  Following a bench trial, the judge 
convicted Ingram of several drug-related charges, including Trafficking in Cocaine 
and Possession with Intent to Deliver Cocaine.1 
5. 
On appeal, Ingram challenges the constitutionality of his arrest, 
contending that the trial judge erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence 
and that insufficient evidence exists in the record to support his possession with 
intent to deliver conviction.  We review a trial judge’s denial of a motion to 
suppress evidence for abuse of discretion.2  Our review for insufficient evidence 
requires that we determine whether, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable 
to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt.3 
6. 
Ingram does not contest the legality of the initial stop.  Instead, he 
argues the officers had neither a reasonable suspicion nor probable cause to 
remove him and his passenger from the vehicle and search them.  He insists the 
                                                 
1  
State v. Ingram, Del. Super., I.D. No. 0305008270 (Dec. 2, 2003).   
2  
Purnell v. State, 832 A.2d 714, 719 (Del. 2003). 
3  
Bialach v. State, 744 A.2d 983, 984 (Del. 2000) citing Davis v. State, 453 A.2d 802.803 
(Del. 1982). 
 
4
purpose of the original stop had concluded, and that under Caldwell v. State,4 the 
Cubbage search constituted an additional investigation unsupported by 
independent facts justifying the officers’ conduct.  The Cubbage search was 
significant, Ingram argues, because DiSilvestro used the seizure from Cubbage as 
the basis for Ingram’s arrest.  Thus, Ingram contends, his arrest was 
constitutionally impermissible and the evidence was seized illegally.5 
7. 
Based on the testimony at the suppression hearing, the trial judge 
concluded the traffic stop was lawful.6  He found that the odor of alcohol and the 
perception of muffled speech justified the officer asking Ingram to step out of the 
vehicle for a field sobriety test.  He also found that the officer had probable cause 
to arrest Ingram for drug paraphernalia after seeing the protruding plastic bags and 
learning that Ingram’s passenger possessed cocaine.  The trial judge concluded: 
Since the plastic baggies were observed by the officer in plain view 
sticking out of the defendant’s pocket while the officer was lawfully 
investigating his DUI suspicion, seizure of the baggies was lawful.  
As a result of the defendant’s lawful arrest, [the] subsequent search of 
his person and the vehicle were lawful.7  
 
                                                 
4  
780 A.2d 1037 (Del. 2001). 
5  
Ingram does not, and cannot, contest the constitutionality of the Cubbage search.  See, 
e.g., Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960) (disallowing Fourth Amendment standing 
to those who “claim[] prejudice only through the use of evidence gathered as a consequence of a 
search or seizure directed at someone else.”), overruled on other grounds by United States v. 
Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (U.S. 1980).  Instead, Ingram’s claim focuses on the officers’ decision to 
arrest him only after discovering that Cubbage possessed cocaine. 
6  
Tr. Mot. to Suppress, at 3-6. 
7  
Id. at 6. 
 
 
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The trial judge then denied Ingram’s motion and proceeded to trial. 
8. 
On observing a motor vehicle violation, police officers may stop the 
car and order both driver and passenger out of the vehicle.8  Moreover, officers are 
permitted to conduct a pat-down search of all occupants for safety reasons.9  
DiSilvestro smelled alcohol when he approached Ingram’s vehicle and was 
conducting a lawful DUI investigation when he observed, in plain view, the 
suspicious plastic baggies.  Once the officers learned that Cubbage possessed 
cocaine, that fact, plus Talley’s observation of the plastic bags in plain view, 
constituted probable cause to arrest Ingram.   
9. 
In Caldwell, we held that in the absence of supporting independent 
facts, the duration and intrusiveness of an officer’s conduct must be reasonably 
related to the justification for the initial traffic stop.10  Contrary to Ingram’s 
assertions, Caldwell is inapposite because the totality of circumstances here justify 
the duration and intrusiveness of the traffic stop in this case.  The DUI 
investigation was reasonably related to the initial purpose of the stop, and 
Cubbage’s cocaine possession was an independent fact that justified Ingram’s 
                                                 
8  
See Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 412-14 (1997). 
9  
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
10  
See Caldwell, 780 A.2d at 1050-51 (“In the circumstances of this case, we conclude that 
the duration and intrusiveness of the traffic stop were not reasonably related to the justification 
for the [parking violation] stop . . . and were not supported by independent facts justifying the 
officer's conduct.”) 
 
 
6
arrest.11  Accordingly, we conclude the trial judge acted appropriately within his 
discretion when he denied Ingram’s motion to suppress the drugs. 
 
10. 
Ingram also asserts that the State failed to establish his intent to 
deliver the cocaine.  We have held that “possession, quantity[,] and packaging of 
drugs are not necessarily sufficient, standing alone, to prove intent to deliver.”12  
Intent to deliver, however, may be proven through “expert testimony, an admission 
by the defendant, or some other credible evidence.”13 
 
11. 
The State attempted to establish Ingram’s intent to deliver through the 
testimony of Talley, an experienced narcotics officer.  Ingram maintains, however, 
that Talley’s testimony was insufficient to establish intent to deliver.  He claims 
that Talley focused primarily on the quantity of drugs seized, a characteristic 
legally insufficient to establish intent independently under our holding in Cline v. 
State.14   
12. 
Talley testified that “the amount of drugs and the location, mostly the 
amount, is more than personal use,” leading him to conclude that “the drugs were 
                                                 
11  
Id. 
12  
Cline v. State, 720 A.2d 891, 892 (Del. 1998). 
13  
Id. at 893. 
14  
Id.; see also Corey Caldwell v. State, 770 A.2d 522, 535 (Del. 2001) (“The State cannot 
establish intent to deliver merely by proving possession of a particular quantity of cocaine, but 
[it] may establish intent to sell exclusively through circumstantial evidence.”) (quotation marks 
omitted). 
 
 
 
7
used for delivery or trafficking.”15  Ingram also points to Talley’s admission during 
cross-examination that he (Talley) did not know how the drugs were packaged in 
this case.  Despite any deficiencies in the testimony, however, the other credible 
evidence presented was sufficient to convict Ingram.  The quantity of cocaine, over 
twenty-seven grams; the digital scale containing cocaine residue, found under the 
driver’s seat of Ingram’s vehicle; the partially used roll of toilet paper found in the 
rear area, often used for packaging cocaine; and the $1,000 cash seized from 
Ingram at the time of his arrest all supported an intent to deliver the cocaine.  
Furthermore, Ingram’s passenger had a small amount of cocaine wrapped in tissue 
in his pocket, circumstantial evidence of a recent delivery.  Accordingly, sufficient 
testimonial and other credible evidence supported Ingram’s possession with intent 
to deliver conviction. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice 
 
 
                                                 
15  
Trial Tr. at 70.