Title: People v. Juarez
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S219889
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: March 17, 2016

1 
Filed 3/17/16 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
S219889 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 4/3 G049037 
GERARDO JUAREZ, 
) 
 
) 
Orange County 
 
Defendant and Respondent. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 12CF3528 
 
____________________________________) 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 4/3 G049038 
EMMANUEL JUAREZ, 
) 
 
) 
Orange County 
 
Defendant and Respondent. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 12CF3528 
 
____________________________________) 
 
Penal Code section 1387 generally permits a felony charge to be dismissed 
and refiled once, but not twice.1  Two dismissals “bar . . . any other prosecution 
for the same offense.”  (§ 1387, subd. (a).)  Here, charges that defendants 
committed attempted murder were dismissed twice.  The People then charged 
them with conspiracy to commit murder based on the same underlying facts as the 
twice-dismissed charges.  The Court of Appeal held that conspiracy to commit 
                                              
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
 
2 
murder is not the “same offense” as attempted murder under section 1387, and 
thus the statute does not bar prosecution for that crime.  The court expressed 
unease with this conclusion but believed that a recent opinion from this court 
compelled it.  (People v. Traylor (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1205 (Traylor).) 
We conclude that Traylor does not govern this situation.  Because, as 
pleaded, the conspiracy charges contain all of the elements of the twice-dismissed 
attempted murder charges, they are the same offenses under section 1387. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
We adopt the Court of Appeal‟s summary of the factual and procedural 
history. 
“In June 2011, the People filed their initial complaint against defendants 
Gerardo Juarez and Emmanuel Juarez, alleging, among other things, two counts of 
attempted murder against each defendant.  In November 2011, the court held a 
preliminary hearing that disclosed the following evidence. 
“This case arises from an incident in which defendant Emmanuel fought 
with victim John Doe.  Prior to the fight, Emmanuel handed a gun to defendant 
Gerardo.  During the fight, Gerardo handed the gun back to Emmanuel.  
Emmanuel then shot John Doe.  John Doe‟s companion, Jane Doe, attempted to 
flee, but defendants caught up to her and Gerardo shot her in the thigh. 
“After defendants were held to answer, the People filed an information 
alleging two counts of attempted murder (§§ 664, subd. (a), 187, subd. (a)) against 
both defendants, and one count of possession of a firearm by a felon (former 
§ 12021, subd. (a)(1)) against Gerardo.  Nearly eight months later, in June of 
2012, the People filed an amended information that added counts for assault with a 
firearm (§ 245, subd. (b)).  For reasons not disclosed in the record, in July 2012 
the court granted the People‟s motion to dismiss the case. 
 
3 
“That same day, the People refiled the same charges.  In November 2012, 
the People were not ready to proceed to trial and requested a continuance.  The 
court granted the continuance to December 10, 2012, but warned that December 
10 would be day 10 of 10.  On December 10, the People were again not ready to 
proceed, so the court dismissed the case in its entirety. 
“The People then filed a third case against defendants, this time alleging 
two counts of conspiracy to commit murder.  The facts recited in the complaint 
indicate the charges were based on the same incident as the previous complaints. 
“Defendants moved to dismiss this complaint under section 1387.  The 
magistrate denied the motion without comment. 
“Defendants then petitioned the superior court for a writ of mandate or 
prohibition, which the court treated as a petition for writ of habeas corpus.  During 
oral argument, the court posed the following questions to the People:  „Where is 
the limit in regard to your theory of refiling?  [¶]  If we take assaultive conduct 
like attempted murder, you could have two dismissals for an assault with a deadly 
weapon, and then you could have two dismissals for an attempted vol[untary 
manslaughter], and then you could have two dismissals for assault by force likely 
to produce great bodily injury, and then you could have two dismissals for a 
[section] 243[, subdivision (d)] battery causing great bodily injury.  Where would 
it end?‟  The court later granted the petition without further comment and 
dismissed the case.  The People timely appealed.”  (Fns. omitted.) 
The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment dismissing the case and 
directed the trial court to reinstate it.  Relying on this court‟s interpretation of 
section 1387 in Traylor, supra, 46 Cal.4th 1205, it held that conspiracy to commit 
murder is not the “same offense” as attempted murder under section 1387, and 
thus section 1387 does not bar filing the third complaint.  It “recognize[d] the 
result we reach is counterintuitive, and generally not in keeping with the policies 
 
4 
section 1387 is supposed to represent,” but it believed its “hands [were] tied.”  
“Ultimately,” the court said, “we are bound by our Supreme Court.  And while we 
believe the trial court has raised a legitimate concern, that concern is properly 
directed to our Supreme Court‟s narrow interpretation of the term „same 
offense.‟ ” 
We granted defendants‟ petitions for review to decide how to apply section 
1387 in this situation. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
Section 1387, subdivision (a), provides:  “An order terminating an action 
pursuant to this chapter, or Section 859b, 861, 871, or 995, is a bar to any other 
prosecution for the same offense if it is a felony or if it is a misdemeanor charged 
together with a felony and the action has been previously terminated pursuant to 
this chapter, or Section 859b, 861, 871, or 995, or if it is a misdemeanor not 
charged together with a felony, except in those felony cases, or those cases where 
a misdemeanor is charged with a felony, where subsequent to the dismissal of the 
felony or misdemeanor the judge or magistrate finds any of the following:  
[circumstances not relevant here] . . . .”  (Italics added; see Burris v. Superior 
Court (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1012, 1016 (Burris).) 
In Burris, we described this “108-word, 13-comma, no period subdivision 
[as] hardly pellucid.”  (Burris, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1018.)  But here, the 
statutory question is quite straightforward.  Everyone agrees this case is a felony, 
and that the original action was terminated twice within the meaning of section 
1387.  Thus, section 1387 bars another prosecution “for the same offense.”  The 
question here is whether the most recent complaint, charging defendants with 
conspiracy to commit murder, is for the same offense as the previous action, 
which charged defendants with attempted murder. 
 
5 
Describing the statutory question as straightforward does not mean it is 
easy.  It is actually quite difficult.  What the Legislature means by “same offense” 
is far from clear.  Obviously, if the new matter charges precisely the same offense 
as the twice-terminated action, section 1387 would bar further prosecution.  But 
what if the new charge is slightly different?  Is it still the same offense?  Can the 
prosecution continually refile felony charges (twice each) as long as it finds 
different penal provisions to charge?  If not, how different must the new charge be 
to not be the same offense? 
The district attorney argues that attempted murder and conspiracy to 
commit murder are not the same offense under section 1387 because they contain 
different elements.  They do, indeed, contain different elements.  Conspiracy to 
commit murder requires an agreement to commit murder and an overt act by one 
or more of the conspirators.  (People v. Smith (2014) 60 Cal.4th 603, 616.)  
Attempted murder requires the intent to kill and a direct but ineffectual act toward 
accomplishing the intended killing.  (People v. Superior Court (Decker) (2007) 41 
Cal.4th 1, 7.)  Because an agreement to commit murder necessarily includes an 
intent to kill (People v. Swain (1996) 12 Cal.4th 593, 607), both crimes require an 
intent to kill.  But attempted murder does not require an agreement.  Conspiracy 
does not require an ineffectual act toward accomplishing the killing.  Instead, it 
requires only an overt act, which might merely be preparatory to committing the 
crime and need not itself constitute a criminal attempt.  (People v. Johnson (2013) 
57 Cal.4th 250, 259.)  But whether the charges have identical elements is only part 
of the question. 
We have grappled with section 1387 twice in recent years.  In Burris, 
supra, 34 Cal.4th 1012, a misdemeanor complaint was dismissed, followed by a 
felony charge based on the same conduct.  We held that, although the 
misdemeanor could not be recharged, the case could be recharged as a felony, 
 
6 
which is barred only after two terminations.  (Id. at p. 1015.)  Because this case 
has always been prosecuted as a felony, and the earlier matter was dismissed 
twice, Burris does not address the precise question here.  But it helps guide the 
analysis. 
We are trying to discern legislative intent.  “ „And that intent is critical.  
Those who write statutes seek to solve human problems.  Fidelity to their aims 
requires us to approach an interpretive problem not as if it were a purely logical 
game, like a Rubik‟s Cube, but as an effort to divine the human intent that 
underlies the statute.‟ ”  (Burris, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1017, quoting J.E.M. AG 
Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred (2001) 534 U.S. 124, 156 (dis opn. of Breyer, J.).) 
To divine the meaning of the term “same offense,” “we must consider the 
human problems the Legislature sought to address in adopting section 1387 — 
„ “the ostensible objects to be achieved [and] the evils to be remedied.” ‟ ”  
(Burris, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1018.)  “Section 1387 implements a series of 
related public policies.  It curtails prosecutorial harassment by placing limits on 
the number of times charges may be refiled.  [Citations.]  The statute also reduces 
the possibility that prosecutors might use the power to dismiss and refile to forum 
shop.  [Citations.]  Finally, the statute prevents the evasion of speedy trial rights 
through the repeated dismissal and refiling of the same charges.”  (Ibid.) 
By providing that a single dismissal of a misdemeanor bars further 
prosecution for the same offense but requiring two dismissals for felonies, 
“[s]ection 1387 reflects a legislative judgment that because of the heightened 
threat to society posed by serious crimes, more filings should be permitted for 
serious crimes than for minor ones.”  (Burris, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1019, fn. 
omitted.)  “As further proof of this intent, while two filings are allowed for most 
felonies, section 1387.1 carves out the most serious category of felonies, violent 
felonies, and allows a third filing for these crimes under certain circumstances.”  
 
7 
(Id. at p. 1019, fn. 6.)  “Indeed, until 1975, the interest in prosecuting felonies was 
considered so much greater that, while a one-dismissal rule applied to 
misdemeanors, felony charges could be refiled ad infinitum.  [Citations.]”  (Id. at 
p. 1019.) 
We considered the proper interpretation of section 1387‟s words, “same 
offense,” in Traylor, supra, 46 Cal.4th 1205, the case a reluctant Court of Appeal 
believed compelled its conclusion in this case.  In Traylor, the original complaint 
charged the defendant with vehicular manslaughter with gross negligence.  After 
the preliminary hearing, the magistrate found the evidence insufficient to support a 
finding of gross negligence but sufficient to support a misdemeanor charge of 
negligent vehicular manslaughter.  Thereafter, the complaint was dismissed.  
Later, after consulting with the California Highway Patrol Multidisciplinary 
Accident Investigation Team, the prosecution filed a new complaint charging 
defendant with the misdemeanor of negligent vehicular manslaughter.  (Id. at pp. 
1210-1211.)  The defendant argued section 1387 barred the second complaint 
because a single dismissal of a misdemeanor bars further prosecution for the same 
offense. 
For several reasons, we concluded that section 1387 did not bar the new 
misdemeanor prosecution.  First, citing Burris, supra, 34 Cal.4th 1012, we noted 
that two crimes having the same elements are the same offense under section 
1387.  But because the misdemeanor charge did not require gross negligence, “the 
felony and misdemeanor charges did not include the identical elements.”  
(Traylor, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1208.)  Then, again following Burris‟s lead, we 
considered the meaning of “same offense” by trying to divine the intent behind the 
statute.  (Id. at pp. 1208-1209.) 
After noting section 1387‟s purposes (protecting a defendant against 
harassment and the denial of speedy trial rights resulting from repeated dismissals, 
 
8 
and guarding against prosecutorial forum shopping), we explained that “the statute 
was not intended to penalize the People when, following a magistrate‟s dismissal 
of a first felony complaint on the grounds the evidence supports only a lesser 
included misdemeanor, they elect to refile that lesser charge rather than exercise 
their undoubted statutory right to refile the felony.  Under such circumstances, 
prosecutors do not abuse, but actually promote, the statutory purposes.”  (Traylor, 
supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1209.)  “Under these circumstances, we conclude[d], the 
filing and dismissal of the originally charged felony, followed in immediate 
succession by the filing of a lesser misdemeanor charge that lacked elements 
essential to the felony, did not constitute successive filings „for the same 
offense.‟ ”  (Ibid.) 
We explained in greater detail that under the circumstances of the case, 
“section 1387[, subdivision] (a)‟s fundamental aims are not contravened by a 
conclusion that, following the dismissal of a greater felony charge, the statute 
permits the subsequent filing of a lesser misdemeanor charge that lacks the 
element or elements the magistrate found wanting.  In such a case, the subsequent 
misdemeanor filing does not indicate a prosecutorial attempt to delay or harass, or 
to „forum shop‟ the same weak charges until a receptive magistrate is found.  
Instead, it represents an ameliorative effort to charge a different offense that 
conforms to the actual evidence.  [¶]  By the same token, where, as here, the 
dismissal of a prior felony charge does not imply an absence of probable cause to 
support conviction of a lesser misdemeanor offense, section 1387[, subdivision] 
(a) should not operate to leave the People with a Hobson‟s choice between once 
again overcharging the same felony, thereby risking a justified second and final 
dismissal, or abandoning all effort to prosecute the offender as a misdemeanant for 
a lesser crime the evidence does support.”  (Traylor, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 1214-
1215.) 
 
9 
We rejected the defendant‟s argument that section 1387 should 
automatically “apply to all charges arising from the same conduct or behavior of 
the defendant.”  (Traylor, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1213, fn. 6.)  In language the 
Court of Appeal cited, we contrasted section 1387‟s use of the term “same 
offense” with section 654‟s language barring a prosecution for the “same act or 
omission” following an acquittal or conviction on earlier charges.  We noted that 
section 654 provides “broader protection against multiple prosecutions after the 
defendant has been convicted or acquitted of, or placed in jeopardy for, offenses 
arising from the same course of criminal conduct.”  (Traylor, at p. 1213, fn. 6.)  
We said that “for purposes of section 1387[, subdivision] (a), an „offense‟ is 
defined not by conduct, but by its particular definition as such in the Penal Code.”  
(Ibid.) 
We discussed and distinguished, but did not disagree with, Dunn v. 
Superior Court (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 1110 (Dunn), which held that a subsequent 
prosecution was for the same offense as a twice-dismissed matter even though the 
crimes‟ statutory elements were not identical.  (Traylor, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 
1215-1218.)  Finally, we concluded that “[u]nder those circumstances, the People 
properly could, following the first felony dismissal, file a second complaint 
alleging the lesser included misdemeanor.”  (Id. at pp. 1219-1220.)  But we 
stressed that “we have carefully limited our holding to the situation in which an 
initial felony charge, having been dismissed by a magistrate on grounds that the 
evidence supports only a lesser included misdemeanor, is followed by the filing of 
a second complaint charging that misdemeanor offense.”  (Id. at p. 1220, fn. 10.)  
We offered no opinion regarding “how section 1387[,subdivision] (a) should apply 
when dismissed felony charges are followed by one or more new complaints 
charging lesser included felonies . . . .”  (Ibid.) 
 
10 
The Court of Appeal interpreted, and the district attorney cites, Traylor, 
supra, 46 Cal.4th 1205, as holding that when a new charge does not have the same 
statutory elements as the twice-dismissed charge, it is never the same offense 
under section 1387.  Because conspiracy to commit murder does not contain the 
same elements as attempted murder, they conclude, it is not the same offense 
under section 1387.  They read too much into Traylor.  We stated what is clearly 
correct, namely, that when the later offense contains the same elements as the 
twice-dismissed charge, it is the same offense.  But we did not say the converse — 
that a later charged offense that contains different elements than the earlier charge 
is never the same offense under section 1387.  The circumstance that the later 
charged misdemeanor had different elements than the dismissed felony was a 
necessary part of, but was not the sole reason for, our conclusion in Traylor.  Our 
holding turned on the specific circumstances, including, above all, that in practical 
effect, the misdemeanor offense had never been dismissed because the magistrate 
had found the evidence insufficient for the felony but sufficient for the 
misdemeanor. 
Traylor, supra, 46 Cal.4th 1205, and Burris, supra, 34 Cal.4th 1012, make 
clear that in interpreting what is and what is not the “same offense” under section 
1387, courts must consider the statute‟s purposes.  In Traylor, prohibiting the 
prosecution from charging the misdemeanor that the magistrate had found the 
evidence supported would have furthered none of those purposes.  Here, because 
no magistrate has found an evidentiary insufficiency, guarding against forum 
shopping is not implicated.  But the purposes of protecting a defendant against 
harassment and the denial of speedy trial rights that repeated filings cause are very 
much implicated. 
The Penal Code and the penal provisions of other codes define many 
crimes, some of which are similar, although not identical, to other crimes.  Under 
 
11 
the district attorney‟s position, repeated filings would be permissible whenever 
possible future charges are held in reserve.  As the superior court noted, for 
assaultive conduct, several possible crimes come readily to mind.  And the number 
of possible filings would be double the number of possible crimes (or triple, if 
section 1387.1 comes into play).  Only the prosecution‟s creativity and the size of 
the Penal Code and penal provisions in other codes would limit the number of 
possible filings.  Permitting such repeated filings would subvert, not further, 
section 1387‟s purposes.  It cannot be what the Legislature had in mind in enacting 
section 1387. 
As explained, the statutory elements of conspiracy to commit murder do not 
include all of the elements of attempted murder.  But examining the statutory 
elements is not the only method to determine whether one crime is included in 
another.  In many circumstances where we are seeking to identify a lesser and 
necessarily included relationship, “we apply either the elements test or the 
accusatory pleading test.  „Under the elements test, if the statutory elements of the 
greater offense include all of the statutory elements of the lesser offense, the latter 
is necessarily included in the former.  Under the accusatory pleading test, if the 
facts actually alleged in the accusatory pleading include all of the elements of the 
lesser offense, the latter is necessarily included in the former.‟ ”  (People v. 
Shockley (2013) 58 Cal.4th 400, 404; cf. People v. Reed (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1224, 
1229 [for purposes of § 954, only the statutory elements test applies].) 
We see no reason not to apply the accusatory pleading test in this situation.  
Indeed, Dunn, supra, 159 Cal.App.3d 1110, has already done so.  Applying that 
test, Dunn held that a robbery charge was the same offense under section 1387 as a 
previously dismissed automobile theft charge.  The court reasoned that the term 
“same offense” was broad enough to include both greater and necessarily included 
lesser offenses.  (Dunn, at pp. 1117-1118.)  It explained that, “[a]lthough every 
 
12 
robbery does not include an auto theft, the concept of necessarily included 
offenses permits reference to the facts in the accusatory pleading. . . .  Here, the 
essence of the auto theft and robbery is the same since the robbery was specifically 
alleged to be the taking of the same automobile.”  (Id. at pp. 1118-1119.)  In 
Traylor, we cited this analysis with approval and stated that Dunn‟s conclusion 
“comports with the fundamental statutory purpose.”  (Traylor, supra, 46 Cal.4th at 
p. 1218.)  We thus conclude respecting multiple felony offenses that if, as pleaded, 
either charge is necessarily included in the other charge, the new charge is the 
same offense under section 1387. 
Applying this test, the conspiracy to commit murder charges, as pleaded, 
are the same offenses as the previously dismissed attempted murder charges.  The 
element of attempted murder that is missing from conspiracy to commit murder is 
a direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended killing.  The felony 
complaint in this case alleged several overt acts regarding each conspiracy charge, 
including actually shooting the intended victim of each alleged conspiracy.  
Alleging an actual shooting of the intended victim necessarily also alleges a direct 
act toward accomplishing the intended killing.  Accordingly, as pleaded, the 
conspiracy charges include all of the elements of the previous attempted murder 
charges, thus making them the same offenses as the previous charges. 
We recognize that applying the accusatory pleading test, as we do to 
resolve this case, will not solve all problems that might arise in other cases.  We 
do not suggest that the accusatory pleading test is the only basis on which to find 
that a new charge containing different statutory elements is the same offense as an 
earlier charge.  Instead, we leave it to future courts — considering section 1387‟s 
language and purposes, and bearing in mind that the rationale of Traylor, supra, 
46 Cal.4th 1205, is limited to its situation — to determine whether a new charge is 
or is not the same offense in other circumstances. 
 
13 
The district attorney argues that, in this case, there is “no evidence of 
prosecutorial malfeasance” or “attempts to harass or evade speedy trial rights.”  
Even if factually correct, the argument misses the mark.  Except as affected by 
section 1387.1, section 1387 provides a clear rule barring further prosecution for 
the same felony offense that has been twice dismissed.  No finding of malfeasance 
or additional investigation into the prosecutor‟s motivation in the specific case is 
required or warranted. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand the matter to 
that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
CHIN, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J.  
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J.
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Juarez 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 227 Cal.App.4th 1138 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S219889 
Date Filed: March 17, 2016 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Orange 
Judge: Gregg L. Prickett 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Tony Rackauckas, District Attorney, and Brian F. Fitzpatrick, Deputy District Attorney, for Plaintiff and 
Appellant. 
 
Frank Davis, Alternate Public Defender, and Antony C. Ufland, Deputy Alternate Defender, for Defendant 
and Respondent Gerardo Juarez. 
 
John F. Schuck, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Respondent Emmanuel 
Juarez. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Brian F. Fitzpatrick 
Deputy District Attorney 
Post Office Box 808 
Santa Ana, CA  92702 
(714) 347-8789 
 
Antony C. Ufland 
Deputy Alternate Defender 
600 W. Santa Ana Boulevard, #600 
Santa Ana, CA  92701 
(714) 568-4160