Title: BROWN v NORTH AMERICAN MFG CO
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13706
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: February 9, 1978

No. 13706 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1977 DEANE BROWN, Plaintiff and Respondent, NORTH AMERICAN YANUFACTURING COMPANY, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, Honorable Robert Sykes, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Murphy, Robinson, Heckathorn and Phillips, Kalispell, Montana I. James Heckathorn argued, Kalispell, Montana For Respondent: Morrison, Hedman and Trieweiler, Whitefish, Montana Frank B. Morrison, Jr. argued, Whitefish, Montana McGarvey, Lance and Heberling, Kalispell, Montana Submitted: September 28, 1977 Decided: F E B 9 - 1 9 7 8 - Filed: F E B 9 - 1978 M r . Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court : Plaintiff Deane Brown l o s t h i s l e f t leg i n the auger of a self-unloading feed wagon known as a "Grain-0-Vator", manu- factured by defendant North American Manufacturing Co., an Iowa corporation. In h i s original complaint, plaintiff specified negligence and s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y in t o r t as theories supporting a damage recovery. The t r i a l of the cause ultimately proceeded on the s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y theory alone. Discovery consisted of depositions of the parties and certain anticipated witnesses for p l a i n t i f f . The case was tried before a jury in the D i s t r i c t Court, Flathead County, beginning October 19, 1976. The jury returned a verdict for p l a i n t i f f in the amount of $318,167 and judgment was entered thereon. Defendant then f i l e d motions for judgment notwith- standing the verdict or alternatively, for a new t r i a l . The District Court denied both motions. Defendant appeals from the judgment and denial of its post-trial motions. For reasons s e t forth i n t h i s opinion, we find no errors were committed requiring either reversal of the judgment, a new t r i a l o r imposition of judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The facts are: I n November 1970, plaintiff Deane Brown purchased a piece of farm equipment known as a Grain-0-Vator. The feed machine was approximately one year old a t the time of purchase. The machine was manufactured by defendant North American Manufacturing Co. During the next three years, the equipment was operated and serviced by p l a i n t i f f ' s son, Calvin Brown. Plaintiff used the machine a few times prior t o the accident involved here. The central function of the Grain-0-Vator i s feed unloading and distribution. The feed contained i n a large bin drops through an opening into a transfer auger, and is moved t o an area where it is picked up and expelled through a spout. A t - tached t o the bin, just over the transfer auger, is a curved metal door known a s an "excess door". The door was hinged a t the bottom on the particular model owned by p l a i n t i f f , and was held closed a t the top by two springs. The purpose of the excess door was t o provide a "relief valve". When excess feed pressure is exerted against the transfer auger, the door is forced open, and the excess feed pressure relieved. The feeder is operated by a power-take-off system, when attached t o a tractor. Just prior to the accident p l a i n t i f f , an experienced farmer/rancher, 51 years of age, was operating the feeder. The feed had ceased coming out of the spout. Plaintiff descended from the tractor and l e f t the power-take-off system-running, to observe i f any mechanical problem existed. H i s intent was t o f i r s t view the interior of the bin. There w a s no ladder o r other means provided on the machine for access t o a view of the bin. The height of the bin had been increased by extension boards furnished by defendant. Plaintiff mounted the machine by f i r s t placing h i s right foot on an iron reinforcement bar t o the side of the transfer auger; then placed h i s l e f t foot on the excess door covering the transfer auger. For h i s third step, he placed h i s right foot on a "gusset" just above and t o the right of the excess door, with h i s l e f t foot i n the a i r above the excess door. Plaintiff ob- served feed i n the bin, stepped down with h i s l e f t foot, without looking down, intending t o again place it on the excess door. The excess door had come open and, as a result, plaintiff stepped directly into the transfer auger. His l e f t leg was pulled in and amputated by the mechanism. Plaintiff was alone and remained caught in the machine for some time before he was taken out and given medical aid. A t t r i a l , plaintiff testified that during his prior limited experience with the machine, the excess door had not come open. Whtle recognizing the area surrounding the excess door would be dangerous i f the excess door were open, he stated he had no expectation the door would simply "come open'' and f e l t that the auger area, as covered, was not dangerous. Plaintiff further testified that no warning concerning the excess door appeared anywhere on the Grain-0-Vator. Carlton Zink was the plaintiff's expert witness. H e has a Bachelor of Science degree i n agricultural engineering from the University of Nebraska. Later he served for 12 years i n charge of the tractor testing labratory in Lincoln, Nebraska. From 1950 t o 1968, he worked for John Deere Company and a f t e r 1952 he "took on the responsibility for product safety for John Deere as a corporate representative i n product safety." H e worked with the National Safety Council on "farm safety'' and was a president of the Farm Conference. H e was a member of the National Institute for Farm Safety, the American Society of Agricultural Engineers, the Society of Automotive Engineers and the National Safety Council. From 1952 to 1968, he was involved with the development of safety design for John Deere Company. Zink testified the American Society of Agricultural Engineers recognized the need t o effectually shield augers as early as 1964 o r even 5 years earlier. Further, the Grain-0-Vator i n question * i l e d t o conform t o accepted safety design require- ments i n three particulars,r- the equipment unreasonably dangerous t o the user: 1) The lack of effective shielding of the transfer auger because of the excess door being hinged a t the bottom, and much more susceptible t o entry when open. 2) N o ladder or other means was provided for gaining visual access t o the bin. 3) N o danger warnings appeared on the equipment o r i n the instruction manuel. A n expert called by defendant was of the opinion the Grain-0-Vator was not defectively designed. The owner and principal officer of defendant, Elmer K. Hanson, t e s t i f i e d he had designed the excess door. He in- dicated that prior t o 1958, the door had been hinged a t the top, but the design was modified so the door was hinged a t the bottom i n l a t e r models for added u t i l i t y . He further stated that a t the present time, the Grain-0-Vator is marketed with the excess door bolted on firmly and it cannot come open without manual removal. H e admitted the Grain-0-Vator dis- played no warnings, and no ladder or other access t o a view of the i n t e r i o r of the bin was provided. However, he con- s i s t e n t l y maintained the machine was nondefective, and s a t i s - fied industry safety standards. Various exhibits were admitted throughout the course of the t r i a l consisting primarily of pictures and diagrams of the Grain-0-Vator, and a movie introduced by plaintiff demon- strating the steps taken by plaintiff as he mounted and attempted t o dismount the Grain-0-Vator, a s portrayed by h i s son Calvin. The jury was also afforded an opportunity t o view the particular Grain-0-Vator involved i n the accident. A t the close of the testimony and ensuing arguments, a jury ver- dict was returned i n plaintiff's favor. W e summarize the issues raised on this appeal: 1) W a s there sufficient evidence t o support a finding the product was in a "defective condition unreasonably danger- ous t o the user or consumer?" 2) W a s there sufficient evidence t o support a finding that an unreasonable danger or hazard existed which required a warning? 3) W a s there sufficient evidence to support a finding that the alleged defective condition was a proximate cause of injury t o plaintiff? 4) Did plaintiff, by h i s actions, assume the risk as a matter of law? 5) Did the District Court e r r i n giving its instruction on the law of assumption of the risk? 6) Did the District Court e r r i n giving its instruction concerning the elements of proof in a s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y action? 7). Did the District Court e r r i n admitting into evidence the movie prepared and offered by plaintiff? Issue 1. Defendant contends the evidence adduced a t the t r i a l failed to satisfy the elements of a s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y action as s e t forth i n 2 Restatement of Torts 2d, 5402A. Rather, it is maintained, the sole conclusion supported by the evidence is that the danger was "open and obvious'' to plaintiff and therefore a complete bar t o recovery. In support of the l a t t e r contention, defendant relies on the holding of cases from certain jurisdic- tions that a product is not "defective" or "unreasonably danger- ous" i f the danger occasioned by its use is open and obvious to the user. Tomicich v. Western-Knapp Engineering Company, (9th C i r . 1970), 423 F .2d 410; Morrow v. Trailmobile Inc., (1970), 12 Ariz.App. 578, 473 P.2d 780; Zahora v. Harnischfeger Corp., (7th C i r . 1968), 404 F.2d 172; Halpern v. JAD Const. CoPp., This Court, i n Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., (1973), 162 Mont. 506, 513, 513 P.2d 268, adopted the core definition of the doctrine of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y , s e t forth i n 2 Restatement of Torts 2d, 5402A: " ' (1) One who s e l l s any product i n a defective condition unreasonably dangerous t o the user or consumer or to his property is subject to l i a b i l i t y for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, i f "'(a) the s e l l e r is engaged i n the business of selling such a product, and "' (b) it is expected t o and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change i n the condi- tion i n which it is sold. ' (2) The rule stated i n Subsection (1) applies a 1 though " ' (a) the s e l l e r has exercised a l l possible care i n the preparation and sale of his product, and " ' ( b ) the user or consumer has not bought the product or entered into any contractual relation with the seller. '" 162 Mont. 513. In order to establish a prima facie case i n s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y , based upon the above definition, a plaintiff must prove the following elements : (1) The product was i n a defective condition, unresonably dangerous t o the user or consumer; (2) The defect caused the accident and injuries com- plained of; and (3) The defect is traceable t o the defendant. Following the well-established rule i n t h i s regard, t h i s Court has stated that a defect in a products l i a b i l i t y case may be shown by circumstantial as well a s direct evidence. Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., supra; Pierce v. Ford Motor Co., (1951), 190 F.2d 910, cert-denied 342 U.S. 887, 72 S.Ct. 178, 96 L ed 666; Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Inc., (1960), 32 N. J. 358,16% A.2d 69, 75 ALR2d 1. In such a case, the defect might well be established through proof of the c i r - cumstances of the accident, a prior history of occupational difficulties, similar occurrences under certain circumstances, and elimination of alternative causes, including p l a i n t i f f ' s o w n conduct. The reasoning behind imposition upon a plaintiff of the more flexible standard of proof was recognized i n Branden- burger : "The essential rationale for imposing the doctrine of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y i n t o r t is that such imposition affords the consuming public the maximum protection from dangerous defects i n manufactured products by requiring the manufacturer to bear the burden of injuries and losses enhanced by such defects i n its products. I f this be so, it requires l i t t l e imagina- tion to see that i f a s t r i c t rule of direct evidence was required, the supposed benefit of the theory of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y would be lost t o the consuming public." 162 Mont. 517. Recognition of a more flexible rule of evidence does not thereby convert s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y into absolute l i a b i l i t y . Ordinarily, a plaintiff w i l l not sustain h i s burden of proof by merely establishing the fact of the occurrence of an accident. Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 I11.2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401 (1969). Imposition upon a plaintiff of the burden of showing a traceable defect, causation and damage or injury assures an appropriate limitation to a manufacturer's liability. Defendant here advances the "open and obvious dangert' or "patent-latent" rule as a bar to plaintiff ' s recovery under the theory of s t r i c t liabflity. W e reject such a rule. Recent authorities i n other jurisdictions that previously adopted the rule have now abolished it in persuasive, well reasoned opinions. The "open and obvious danger" rule is not contained i n 2 Restatement of Torts 2d, 5402A nor i n the comments thereto. It derives from the N e w York case Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950), and thereafter found acceptance i n various jurisdictions. S t r i c t l i a b i l i t y cases relying on the "open and obvious danger1' rule have typically done so upon the express authority of Campo. See: Morrow v. Trailmobile, Inc., supra. However, the N e w York Court of Appeals has recently abandoned the "pa tent-la tent" distinction. Micallef v. Miehle Co., Div. of Miehle-Goss Dexter, Inc., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E. 2d 571 (1976). Arizona has rejected the authority of Morrow, relied on by defendant. Byrns v. Riddell, Inc., 113 Ariz. 264, 550 P.2d 1065 (1976). In so doing, the Arizona Supreme Court stated: "* * * W e do not subscribe to t h i s 'patent-latent' distinction i n the context of a manufacturer's s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y i n tort. Its only function is t o encourage patent design defects." 550 P.2d 1068. In Dorsey v. Yoder Company, (E.D.Pa. 1971), 331 F.Supp. 753, the plaintiff suffered injuries to h i s hand when he placed it upon a piece of metal near the unshielded opening of a metal s l i t t e r , and was accidentally propelled into the machine. The defendant argued, i n part, that plaintiff be barred from recovery due t o the open and obvious character of the danger. The Dorsey court, a f t e r discussing the s p l i t of authority on the issue, rejected the "open and obvious danger" rule, holding: 'I* * * Therefore, w e hold that even though the danger of unguarded rotary blades was obvious to plaintiff, this does not ips0 facto preclude recovery." 331 F.Supp. 759. W e note the Ninth Circuit case Tomicich v. Western-Knapp Engineering Co., supra, relied on by defendant, does not i n fact deny recovery on the basis of the "open and obvious danger" rule. In Tomicich, Judge Russell E . Smith, while referring to various decisions supporting the "open and obvious danger" rule, including Campo, and noting that this Court has made no specific ruling on the question, suggests this Court might well be im- pressed with the criticism voiced against the rule. Liability was clearly denied on other grounds. W e reject any rule which would operate t o encourage m i s - design. The fact that a danger is patent does not prevent a finding the product is i n a defective condition, unreasonably dangerous to the particular plaintiff. Rather, the obvious character of a defect or danger i s but a factor to be considered i n determining whether the plaintiff in fact assumed the risk. The evidence i n the instant case, however, tends to support a finding that the danger was hidden, rather than open and obvious, a s it was concealed below the excess door. Plain- t i f f testified he seldom used the Grain-0-Vator and had never personally serviced the equipment. PBH-icularly revealing i n t h i s regard is the following testimony of plaintiff, given upon direct examination: Q . Did you realize that door and the auger there a s being a dangerous area? A. No. "Q. You did not? A. No. "Q. W h y not? A. Because it was dovered. "Q. Did you know prior to this accident, was the l i d on t h i s thing bolted down or whether it flipped up or anything about it? A. No. "Q. Prior to the time of the accident, did you know how the l i d fastened to the machine? A . I knew it was hinged. "Q. Did you know whether it was bolted a t the top or latched a t the top or anything about that? A. No. "Q. N o what? A. I did not know whether it was or whether it wasn't." Further, plaintiff's expert, Carlton Zink, testified the hazard or danger was, i n h i s opinion, hidden. Defendant's reliance on the "open and obvious danger'' rule is thus m i s - placed. Here, plaintiff testified the fact the auger was shielded prevented him from expecting the injurious potential of the auger. It is unclear as to how the excess door came open. However, the salient fact remains the excess door did come open, i n such a manner and under such conditions as t o expose plaintiff t o an unreasonable danger. The jury was presented with ample evidence of design defects which rendered the Grain-0-Vator unreasonably dangerous. Carlton Zink enumerated three specific design defects, based upon industry safety standards: (a) failure t o hinge the excess door a t the top, (b) failure t o warn of the hazard, and (c) failure t o provide steps or other access for mounting the equipment. When asked for his opinion a s t o whether the effect of the defects was t o render the machine unreasonably dangerous, the expert responded i n the affirmative. W e hold plaintiff clearly met the burden of proof for a s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y action, i n proving a defect rendering the product unreasonably dangerous. plaintiff's evidence, while t o some extent i n conflict with certain evidence offered by defendant, was sufficient for submission to the jury. W e refuse t o disturb the jury's findings i n this respect. Issue 2. In accordance with its prior argument, defendant also asserts it was not under a duty to warn of any danger associated with use of the Grain-0-Vator. In support of t h i s contention, defendant advances the position there i s no duty t o warn of a danger which is obvious or of which the user has knowledge. A s pointed out heretofore, the evidence strongly supports the conclusion the danger was in fact hidden, and plaintiff had no subjective knowledge or awareness of the particular dan- ger. Plaintiff's expert in fact listed the failure t o warn as a defect i t s e l f . Given such evidence, it was well within the power of the jury to conclude the danger was hidden and unknown to plaintiff, and a warning should have been given. Defendant also contends the product was not defective or unreasonably dangerous because it was functioning precisely as intended a t the time of the accident. This contention is without merit. It has been held that' a failure t o warn of an injury causing risk associated with use of a technically pure and f i t product can render such product unreasonably dangerous. Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., (9th C i r . 1968), 399 F.2d 121. In further expending the application of the Davis rule, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Jacobson v. Colorado Fuel & Iron Corporation, (9th C i r . 1969), 409 F.2d 1263, stated: "* * * Davis d i s t i l l s the essence of the rule to be that the manufacturer is under a duty to warn of dangers i n 'non-defective' but potentially harmful products. * * * i f the product is unreasonably dangerous and a warning should be given, but is not given, then the product is automatically 'defective' * * *." 4 0 9 F.2d 1271. Issues 3 and 4 . Defendant next contends there was in- sufficient evidence that the alleged defect' was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. Rather, it is maintained the evidence demonstrates plaintiff's own conduct was the proximate cause of his injuries, such that plaintiff assumed the risk as a matter of law. We disagree. A showing of proximate cause is a necessary predicate to plaintiff's recovery in strict liability. Strict liability is, of course, not complete "liability without fault" in the sense that it is absolutely immune to considerations of plaintiff's conduct, That character of plaintiff's behavior which breaks the chain of causation and operates- to bar recovery is described in 2 Restatement of Torts 2d, §402A, Comment ( n ) : "* * * Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when such negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in the product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence. On the other hand the form of contributory negligence which consists in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger, and commonly passes under the name of assumption of risk, is a defense under this Section as in other cases of strict liability, If the user or consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product and is injured by it, he is barred from recovery." of We find the above standard/conduct of the plaintiff as related to the injury must be considered under the Montana case law. on'the assumption of risk when applied to strict liability cases. In the past Montana cases have not been consistent in distinguishing between the subjective standard required in the defense of assumption of risk, and the objective standard necessary to a contributory negligence defense, As Judge Jameson held in Deeds v . United States, 306 F.Supp. 348, "While the defense of assumption of risk i s usually asserted i n employer-employee cases, i n Montana the defense has been extended t o 'relation- ships independent of the master-servant relation- ship' . Cassaday v. City of Billings, 1959, 135 Mont. 390, 392, 340 P.2d 509, 510 and cases there cited. Assumption of risk is governed by the subjective standard of the plaintiff rather than the objective standard of the reasonable man. * * *'I Henceforth, in product l i a b i l i t y cases the defense of 3 assumption of risk. w i l l be based on a subjective standard rather than that of the reasonable man t e s t . The attributes of the defense of assumption of the risk i n the context of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y are intelligently phrased and developed in Dorsey v. Yoder Company, supra: "* * * In addition to realizing the existence of the defect or danger and voluntarily doing an act which exposes him to it, the plaintiff must per- ceive and appreciate the risk involved, i.e., the probability of harm. * * *" 331 F.Supp. 765. Quoting 2 Restatement of Torts 2d, §496D, Comment (c) , the court i n Dorsey continued: "'The standard to be applied is a subjective one, of what the particular plaintiff i n fact sees, knows, understands and appreciates. In t h i s it differs from the objective standard which is applied to contri- butory negligence. * * * I f by reason of age or lack of information, experience, intelligence or judgment, the plaintiff does not understand the risk involved i n a known situation, he w i l l not be taken to assume the risk, although it may be found that his conduct is contributorily negligent because it does not conform t o the conrmunfty standard of the reasonable man.'" 331 F.Supp. 765. The Ninth Circuit has also followed the rule that the 2 Restatement of Torts 2d, 5402A version of assumption of the risk requires a showing of knowledge of the danger which is subjective, conscious and personal t o the plaintiff. Jackson v. Coast Paint and Lacquer Company, (9th C i r . 1974), 499 F.2d B y the foregoing, w e do not intend to impose a burden upon the defendant which is virtually impossible to discharge. The defendant need not and, i n the usual case, cannot prove the subjective requisites of the assumption of the risk defense by direct evidence. Seldom would a products l i a b i l i t y plaintiff admit through his own testimony that he had knowledge of the danger and appreciated the r i s k involved. Therefore a defendant, i n a given case, m a y effectively discharge h i s burden i n t h i s regard through proof of the subjective elements by circumstantial evidence. Sperling v. Hatch, 10 Cal.App.3d 54, 88 Cal.Rptr. 704 (1970). Turning t o the record i n the instant case, it is manifest there is no evidence whatsoever plaintiff had subjective know- ledge the excess door would open as it did, exposing the blades of the transfer auger. It further appears, and the jury could well have found, that plaintiff did not realize the r i s k asso- ciated with the product relative to his use of it a t the time of the accident. Defendant maint%ns that plaintiff , a knowledgeable and experienced farmer/rancher, assumed the r i s k of injury by knowingly and voluntarily climbing onto the machine while leaving the power-take-off system i n operation. While plain- t i f f ' s act of climbing upon the Grain-O-Vator t o inspect the bin was obviously voluntary, these questions remain: (1) W a s it unreasonable for plaintiff t o act a s he did? (2) W a s the danger actually known and appreciated by plaintiff? Under the evidence, plaintiff may be guilty a t most of failing to discover the defect or guard against its possible existence. While p l a i n t i f f ' s actions may have amounted t o some contributory negligence, it cannot be said he assumed the r i s k as a matter of law. The question is not whether plaintiff should - have realized the risk, but whether in fact he - did realize the risk involved. Defendant, in failing to establish plaintiff's actual knowledge and appreciation of the danger, did not discharge its affirmative burden of proof of the defense. The evidence, to the contrary, sufficiently supports the conclusion that plaintiff's injury was a direct result of the defective design, failure to warn, and failure to provide safe access to the bin. Plaintiff satisfied the burden, under the standard of proof outlined in Brandenburger, of showing the defect was the proximate cause of his injuries. Issue 5 . The trial court gave as Court's Instruction No. 10 an instruction on the defense of assumption of the risk: "You are instructed that assumption of risk is voluntarily placing oneself in a position to chance known hazards. If a person has assumed the risk, he cannot recover for any injury or damage sustained by him. In determining whether or not the plaintiff assumed a risk, you are not to consider whether or not the plaintiff exercised due care for his own safety, but must find the following factors existed: "1. That he had knowledge, actual or implied, of the particular condition. "2. That he appreciated the condition as dangerous. "3. Voluntarily remaining or continuing in the face of the known dangerous condition. " 4 . Injury resulting as the usual or probable consequence of this dangerous condition. "If you find all four of the above factors did exist at the time of the plaintiff's injury, he cannot recover . ' I This instruction is drawn primarily from the Montana Jury Instruction Guide ( M J I G ) . However here the MJIG approved in- struction was modified by inclusion of the language, "you are not to consider whether or not the plaintiff exercised due care for his own safety1'. Defendant contends the instruction as modified is an inLorrect statement of the law, confusing and misleading to the jury and therefore it was error to give it. Defendant urges its proposed instruction No. 7, taken from the 1975 Revision of the California Jury Instructions (Civil), was a correct statement of the law of assumption of the risk, and should have been given. The scope of our review in this case is well defined. This Court held in numerous cases, including Fox v . Fifth West, Inc., ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 153 Mont. 95, 101, 454 P.2d 612, that: "* * * instructions'must be considered in their en- tirety, and to determine whether instructions were properly given or refused this Court will read them in connection with other instructions given and consider them in the light of the evidence introduced." 153 Mont. 101. Similarly, an error in any instruction considered in isolation may be cured by reviewing the charge as a whole. Northern Pac. R . Co. v . Lynch, 79 F. 268, 173 U . S . 701, 19 S . C t . 878, 43 L.Ed. 1185 ( 1 8 9 9 ) . A review of the instruction finds it improperly inserts into the case elements of contributory negligence that could cause jury confusion. Therefore in the interests of clarifi- cation, we disapprove of its use in future cases. As previously noted herein, in an instruction on assumption of risk, the subjective standard will be used and the words "actual" or "implied" will not be used. See: Prosser, Law of Torts, 4th ed., 568 Assumption of Risk, pp. 445-452. The giving of Instruction No. 10 as to this defendant does not constitute reversible. error. ~efendant's burden of proof was clearly reduced due to the deficiency of the instruc- tion. Under the given instruction, defendant could have argued plaintiff had implied knowledge, creating a measure for plain- tiff's behavior based upon the standard of the "reasonable manr' as an alternative to a showing of actual, subjective knowledge. Such a standard is inconsistent with the defense of assumption of the risk in the context of strict liability theory, as previously noted. If anything, the error as discussed enured to the benefit of defendant in this case. An error in an instruction which is favorable to the objecting party is harmless error. Harding v. H. F. Johnson, Inc., (1952), 126 Mont. 70, 244 P.2d 111; Broberg v . Northern Pac. Ry. Co., (1947), 120 Mont. 280, 182 P.2d 851. The trial court's refusal to give defendant's proposed instruction on assumption of the risk was not prejudicial error, as defendant was not thereby deprived of the potential defense. Wollan v. Lord, (1963), 142 Mont. 498, 385 P . 2 d 102. In fact, defendant was able under the given instruction to introduce evidence and argue the defense under a burden significantly reduced in com- parison to the standard established above. Any error resulting from inclusion of the phrase con- cerning "due care" is also harmless, in view of the evidence negating the defense of assumption of the risk altogether, and the charges taken as a whole. Fox v . Fifth West, Inc., supra. Defendant has demonstrated no real prejudice in this regard. Issue 6 . Defendant also alleges as error the trial court's refusal of its proposed instruction No. 5 concerning the elements of proof in a strict liability action. Defendant's proposed instruction, in essence, sets forth the elements of proof required by Brandenburger. However, the proposed instruction includes the following additional elements as matters which must be affirmatively established by plaintiff: "First: The defendant placed the Grain-0-Vator i n question on the market for use, and the defendant knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, that the particular Grain- 0-Vator would be used without inspection for de- fects i n the particular part, mechanism or design which is claimed to have been defective, "Third: The plaintiff was unaware of the claimed defect." Defendant admits the "inspection for defects" matter is not an element of the law of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y as set forth in 2 Restatement of Torts 2d, 5402A. The rule has i t s origin in the landmark products l i a b i l i t y case Greemnan v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., (1962), 27 Cal.Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897, and is generally limited i n application to subsequent California cases. W e conceive of no policy which would justify imposing an increased burden of proof upon a products l i a b i l i t y plaintiff. The manufacturer is sufficiently insulated from absolute l i a - b i l i t y by a plaintiff's required adherence t o the burden of proof heretofore outlined i n this opinion. N o error could result from refusal t o instruct as t o an element of proof not imposed by the governing law. Further, p l a i n t i f f ' s lack of awareness of a defect cannot be. considered an element plaintiff must affirmatively establish. Rather, plaintiff's awareness of the defect is a matter going t o the affirmative defense of assumption of the risk. A s such, the burden of alleging and proving "awareness" is upon the defendant. The t r i a l court cannot be placed in error for instructing as it did regarding the essential elements of strict liability. Issue 7 . Finally, defendant advances error in the trial court's admission, over objection, of plaintiff's offered movie exhibit. The movie, offered as demonstrative evidence intended to illustrate plaintiff's testimony, depicts plaintiff's son mounting the Grain-0-Vator involved in the accident and taking the precise steps plaintiff asserts he took at the time of the accident. For purposes of illustration, the springs were removed from the excess door. As plaintiff's son stepped down towards the excess door, it was pulled open by way of a thin line. Defendant contends that the circumstances of the demon- stration differed radically from those at the time of the accident, causing it to appear to the jury as if the excess door would suddenly snap and remain open. However, defendant ignores the fact the jury was cautioned the film was intended as demonstrative evidence only, and was instructed in detail as to the changes in conditions between the actual occurrence and the demonstration. The exhibit was offered after a reading of the following statement to the jury: "This movie is intended to illustrate how the plaintiff, Deane Brown, thinks this accident happened. The machine had no feed in it when the movie was taken. At the time of the accident, the lid over the auger had springs attached to it and they are not on the machine in the movie. The lid over the auger is hinged like it was at the time of the accident, that is, the lid was hinged at the bottom and swung open from the top as shown in the movie. During the movie, the lid is pulled open with fish line to demonstrate how it could move from its point of pivot. This of course is not intended to show you what caused it to open at the time of the accident, nor is the jury to use the film in any way in deciding what caused the lid to open at the time of the accident. Again, the purpose of the movie is only to illustrate how the plaintiff be- lieves the accident happened." The movie was admitted through plaintiff's own testimony, with counsel establishing additional foundation elements of identification and accuracy. Generally, allowing demonstrative evidence is within the discretion of the trial judge, and is subject to review only upon a showing of a manifest abuse of discretion. Gunderson v . Brewster, ( 1 9 7 0 ) , 154 Mont. 405, 466 P.2d 589. Particularly as regards movies of reconstructions, it has been held that such movies are admissible if shown to be accurate and relevant, and any change in conditions is adequately explained. Greenich v . Southern Pacific Company, 189 Cal.App.2d 100, 11 Cal.Rptr. 235 ( 1 9 6 1 ) , 29 Am Jur 2d Evidence, 5801. The trial court is imbued with wide discretion in admitting any diagram, map or photograph. Recently this Court in State Mont . v . Sharbono, (1977) , , 563 P.2d 61, 34 St.Rep. 196, considered a similar objection to the use of a ''burn film" offered by the defense. Issue was taken to the trial court's refusal to allow the showing of the film, and the trial court's ruling was upheld by this Court citing Gobel v . Rinio, (1948), 122 Mont. 235, 200 P . 2 d 700, and Leary v. Kelly Pipe Co., (1976), Mon t . 9 549 P . 2 d 813, 33 St.Rep. 413. We conclude the judgment of the District Court entered upon the verdict of the jury was correct, and it is affirmed. We Concur: Justices. Mr. Justice Frank I. Haswell, specially concurring: I concur in the result but not in all that is said in the foregoing opinion. My principal disagreement concerns the discussion of Issue 5 relating to the defense of assumption of risk. As pointed out in the majority opinion contributory negligence is not a defense to a products liability case,but assumption of risk is a com- plete bar to recovery in such a case. The court's Instruction No. 10 read: "You are instructed that assumption of risk is voluntarily placing oneself in a position to chance known hazards. If a person has assumed the risk, he cannot recover for any injury or damage sustained by him. In determining whether or not the plaintiff assumed a risk, you are not to consider whether or not the plaintiff exercised due care for his own safety, but must find the following factors existed: "1. That he had knowledge, actual or implied, of the particular condition. "2. That he appreciated the condition as dangerous. "3. Voluntarily remaining or continuing in the face of the known dangerous condition. " 4 . Injury resulting a s the usual o r probable consequence of t h i s dangerous condition, "If you find a l l four of the above factors did exist a t the time of the p l a i n t i f f ' s injury, he cannot recover. 11 I n m y view t h i s instruction is a correct statement of the law. The instruction is the standard WIG instruction used i n the t r i a l courts of t h i s s t a t e for many years excepting that the phrase "you are not t o consider whether or not the p l a i n t i f f exercised due care for h i s own safety" has been added. This addition conforms t o existing law -and makes clear t o the jury that it is not t o judge p l a i n t i f f ' s conduct by contributory negligence standards. A s the United States District Court observed i n Deeds v. United States, (D.Montana 1969), 306 F.Supp. 348, 362: "* * * Contributory negligence a r i s e s from a lack of due care. Assumption of r i s k w i l l bar recovery regardless of the f a c t that plaintiff may have acted with due care. I' I have no objection t o striking the words "actual or implied" from the instruction i n the future i n the interest of c l a r i t y . It may be that jurors a r e confusing "implied" knowledge with "constructive" knowledge which w i l l not support the defense of assumption of risk. There is also other language i n the discussion of Issue No.4 that improperly injects contributory negligence into the case, egg., "(1) Was it unreasonable for p l a i n t i f f t o a c t a s he did?" p- Justice. M r . Justice Daniel J. Shea specially concurring: I agree with the result reached by the majority and with most of i t s conclusions. However, scattered throughout the opinion there is loose language that could cause some confusion. I w i l l confine my remarks t o that which I believe might cause future confusion. Language i n several places implies the plaintiff must prove both that the product was "defective" and "unreasonably dangerous1'. It is virtually impossible t o define "defective" i n the context of the various kinds of products l i a b i l i t y cases. Moreover, a careful reading of 2 Restatement of Torts 2d, $402 A and the comments thereto, leads m e t o believe that they are not sep-- arate elements. The thrust of the doctrine of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y is stated i n Comment g. which provides i n pertinent part: "The rule [of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y ] stated i n t h i s Section applies only where a product i s , a t the time it leaves the s e l l e r ' s hands, i n a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer which w i l l be unreasonably dangerous t o him." (Emphasis added. ) Comment j. provides i n pertinent part: "In order t o prevent the product from being unreasonably dangerous, the s e l l e r may be re- quired t o give directions o r warning, on the container, as to its use." (~mphasis added). I emphasize the above language because I believe that depending on the nature of the products l i a b i l i t y claim, it may be confusing t o the jury t o speak both of "defective" products and "unreasonably dangerous" products. The basic thrust of 5 402 A, 2 Restatement of Torts 2d, can be maintained by con- centrating on the "unreasonably dangerous" condition of the product . I concur with t h i s Court's opinion stating that recovery is allowed where the condition complained of is open and obvious a s well as latent. However, because of the confining language of the Restatement, care must be taken i n instructing the jury. A close reading of 2 Restatement of Torts 2d, 5 402 A and the comments thereto, reveals only silence a s t o whether an open and obvious condition can give r i s e t o a s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y claim. The definition of "unreasonably dangerous" contained i n Comment i . of 5 402 A , is made i n the context of situations where the condi- tion complained of is latent,' it states: 11 i. Unreasonably dangerous. * * * The a r t i c l e sold must be dangerous t o an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common t o the community a s t o its characteristics. * * *I1 I n the present case the danger was l a t e n t , and the instruc- tion may have been appropriate. However, it would not be appro- priate i n a situation where the danger was one that was open and obvious. I believe the above instruction given i n a situation where the danger is open and obvious, would be tantamount t o t e l l i n g the jury t o return a verdict for the defendant, thereby effectively precluding any r e a l i s t i c hope of recovery. Accord- ingly, i n such situations, the t r i a l courts should adopt a different instruction. I agree with the overall position taken by the Court on the question of assumption of risk. However, concerning the Instruction questioned by the defendant, I f e e l that i n most cases it is best t o refrain from giving negative instructions t o the jury. The inserced language concerning contributory negli- gence was negative i n character, i.e., t e l l i n g the jury what did not have t o be proved. I n most cases, I believe, it is sufficient t o s e t out what each party must prove t o sustain its burden of proof, and t o refrain from t e l l i n g the jury what each party does not have t o prove. I n any event, I f a i l t o see i n what way the defendant was prejudiced because the statement of law was accurate. There is language i n the opinion that implies the subjective t e s t of assumption of r i s k is being confined t o s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y cases only. The opinion states: "Henceforth, in product l i a b i l i t y cases the defense of assumption of r i s k w i l l be based on a subjective standard rather than that of the reasonable man t e s t ." It has been m y understanding that, a t l e a s t since D'Hoodge v. McCann,(1968), 151 Mont. 353, 363, 443 P.2d 747, we have applied the subjective t e s t t o assumption of risk. There, we held assumption of r i s k "is governed by the subjective standard of the plaintiff himself rather than the objective standard of the reasonable man * * *." The problem was not with the t e s t we adopted, but with the Instruction given t o the jury which allowed it t o find that plaintiff could have the knowledge required by assumption of r i s k , i f the knowledge was either actual o r implied. The word "implied" does ring of constructive knowledge as noted by Justice Haswell i n h i s concurring opinion, and I agree it should be deleted. However, these words should be eliminated from a l l instructions where assumption of r i s k i s asserted as a defense, and not solely i n s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y cases. A defendant is not bound by the p l a i n t i f f ' s testimony simply because the words "or implied" are eliminated from the definition of assumption of risk. Even though a p l a i n t i f f t e s t i f i e s he was not aware of the particular condition involved o r did not appreciate the danger, circumstantial knowledge may show the p l a i n t i f f had the actual (subjective) knowledge. I f the facts a r e such that would lead a jury t o believe that the plaintiff did not t e l l the truth, the jury is free t o reject the p l a i n t i f f ' s testimony simply by applying the standard instructions on credibility of witnesses and weighing the evidence. It i s one thing t o argue the jury should disbelieve the plaintiff where he t e s t i f i e s that he did not have knowledge of the particular condition; it i s yet another t o argue that a reasonable man should have known of the particular condition involved. The knowledge that a man "should have had'' has no place i n the doctrine of assumption of r i s k where the cornerstone of the doctrine is p l a i n t i f f ' s consent. To allow it comes dangerously close t o permitting a defendant t o argue contributory negligence under the guise of assumption of risk. I also do not agree with the statement i n the majority opinion that "seldom would a products l i a b i l i t y p l a i n t i f f admit through h i s own testimony that he had knowledge of the danger and appreciated the r i s k involved." Certainly the human nature of p l a i n t i f f s i n general has not been shown t o be so dishonest that it is customary f o r them t o l i e i n support of their claims. Furthermore, even i f a plaintiff admitted he had knowledge of the danger and appreciated the r i s k involved, it s t i l l would not defeat h i s claim. W e have adopted the definition of assumption of r i s k a s contained i n 2 Restatement of Torts 2d, 5 402 A , Comment n. which provides i n pertinent part: "* * * I f the user o r consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the danger, and neverthe- l e s s proceeds unreasonably t o make use of the product and is injured by it, he i s barred from recovery .'I (Emphasis added.) Accordingly, recovery would s t i l l be allowed i f the p l a i n t i f f did not proceed unreasonably t o make use of the product. n