Title: Commonwealth v. Epps
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 060607
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: March 2, 2007

Present:  All the Justices 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
v.  Record No. 060607 
 OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
March 2, 2007 
GEORGE M. EPPS 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether a judge is a "victim" 
of contempt of court as contemplated by Code § 19.2-271. 
I. 
Facts and Proceedings Below 
 
This controversy arises over security at the Circuit 
Court for the City of Petersburg (the "courthouse").  Judge 
Pamela S. Baskervill and Judge James F. D'Alton, Jr. met with 
the Sheriff of the City of Petersburg, George M. Epps 
("Sheriff Epps"), to discuss certain concerns regarding, among 
other things, court security.  Thereafter, the court entered 
an order detailing the steps Sheriff Epps had agreed to take 
to remedy the court's concerns.  Relevant to this appeal, the 
order contained a provision that stated:  "The main court 
building, which has a public law library and conducts the 
court's business, shall have a deputy at the front entrance at 
all times during business hours of 8:00 a.m. and 4:30 p.m. 
Monday through Friday."  Fourteen months later in a letter to 
the clerks of the several courts for the City of Petersburg, 
Sheriff Epps wrote that due to lack of funding, he would no 
longer be able to "have deputies remain with the court 
 
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building once court [had] concluded."  Sheriff Epps also wrote 
a letter to Judge D'Alton stating that "the reduction in the 
Sheriff's Office budget for FY04 will require some personnel 
changes which are directly related to maintaining the present 
state of readiness for our courts." 
 
Shortly thereafter, Sheriff Epps ordered the deputy at 
the front desk to leave the courthouse once the court was no 
longer in session.  The court administrator later informed 
Judge Baskervill that the deputy had left the courthouse.  
Judge Baskervill had a sign posted on the courthouse door 
stating that the courthouse was temporarily closed due to lack 
of security.  The sign provided a number to call to gain entry 
to the courthouse.  Upon learning of this sign, Sheriff Epps 
removed it from the door.  Judge Baskervill then directed that 
another sign be posted on the courthouse door along with a 
court order stating: 
It appearing to the Court that the Sheriff 
of the City of Petersburg has ceased to provide 
security for the Courthouse when Court is not 
in session, it is ORDERED that in such times 
when security is not provided, the Courthouse 
shall be locked.  Entrance shall be had only by 
calling 733-2423.  The Clerk of this Court is 
directed to post a copy of this Order on the 
front door of each Courthouse. 
Sheriff Epps removed both the second sign and the order from 
the courthouse door. 
 
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Based on information she had received, Judge Baskervill 
went to the sheriff's office to speak with Sheriff Epps.  She 
directed Sheriff Epps to give her the papers that had been 
posted on the courthouse door.  Sheriff Epps' response was 
that Judge Baskervill had no right to post papers on the 
courthouse door because he was in charge of courthouse 
security.  Judge Baskervill again demanded that Sheriff Epps 
return the papers to her.  Sheriff Epps refused because he 
"want[ed] to read them."  After reading the papers, Sheriff 
Epps stated that the order was inaccurate and that Judge 
Baskervill had no right to post it.  Sheriff Epps then 
returned the sign, but refused to return the court order.  
Judge Baskervill demanded that Sheriff Epps return the order, 
and he refused.  Judge Baskervill then left the office. 
 
Sheriff Epps later testified that he removed the order 
because he "found it to be erroneous."  He also testified that 
based upon his 16 years with the police department and based 
upon his training, he considered both the signs to be 
inappropriate because it was "like sending an invitation to 
people that want to do harm to anyone that maybe [sic] inside 
the building." 
 
Judge Baskervill subsequently signed an affidavit 
outlining the events that had transpired.  Based upon the 
affidavit, Judge Robert G. O'Hara entered an order directing 
 
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Sheriff Epps to show cause why he should not be held in 
contempt of court pursuant to Code § 18.2-456.  After the rule 
to show cause was served upon Sheriff Epps, the order that 
Sheriff Epps had taken off the courthouse door was returned to 
Judge Baskervill. 
 
At trial, Sheriff Epps maintained that Judge Baskervill 
could not testify as a witness in the contempt proceedings.  
While acknowledging that, under Code § 19.2-271, a judge who 
is a victim of a crime may testify, Sheriff Epps maintained 
that, if a contempt took place, it was the court as an 
institution that was a "victim" of contempt not the judge 
personally.  Judge Baskervill was permitted to testify over 
Sheriff Epps' objection.  At the conclusion of trial, the 
court found Sheriff Epps guilty of criminal contempt for:  
"the July 2, 2003 removal of Court Order and sign from the 
Courthouse door," "the July 1, 2003 leaving the Petersburg 
Courthouses without security and without notice to the Court," 
and "the July 2, 2003 removal of Court Order from the 
Courthouse door and subsequent refusal to return said Order."  
Additionally, the court found Sheriff Epps guilty of civil 
contempt "for violation of the Court Order of April 16, 2002 
by not having security at the doors of the Courthouses on July 
1, 2003 and July 2, 2003." 
 
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Sheriff Epps appealed his conviction to the Court of 
Appeals.  Both a panel of the Court of Appeals and the full 
court upon rehearing en banc held that the trial court erred 
in permitting Judge Baskervill to testify because she was "not 
a victim of a crime committed by Sheriff Epps" as required 
under Code § 19.2-271.  Epps v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 687, 
708, 626 S.E.2d 912, 922 (2006) (en banc); Epps v. 
Commonwealth, 46 Va. App. 161, 181, 616 S.E.2d 67, 77 (2005).  
We granted the Commonwealth an appeal from the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals upon one assignment of error:  "The Court of 
Appeals erred in holding that Judge Baskervill was not a 
victim of Epps' contempt, and thus was incompetent to testify 
at his trial for contempt." 
II. Analysis 
 
Code § 19.2-271 states in relevant part that: "No judge 
shall be competent to testify in any criminal or civil 
proceeding as to any matter which came before him in the 
course of his official duties."  However, Code § 19.2-271 
provides an exception which states that: "Notwithstanding any 
other provision of this section, any judge . . . who is the 
victim of a crime, shall not be incompetent solely because of 
his office to testify in any criminal or civil proceeding 
arising out of the crime."  The Commonwealth only assigns 
 
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error to the "holding that Judge Baskervill was not a victim 
of Epps' contempt, and thus was incompetent to testify." 
 
The Court of Appeals did not err in holding that Judge 
Baskervill was not a "victim" under Code § 19.2-271.  Epps v. 
Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 687, 708, 626 S.E.2d 912, 922 
(2006).  The General Assembly did not provide a specific 
definition of "victim" under Code § 19.2-271 nor has this 
Court previously articulated such a definition under this 
statute.  Black's Law Dictionary, 1598 (8th ed. 2004), defines 
"victim" as "[a] person harmed by a crime, tort, or other 
wrong."  Judge Baskervill, individually, did not suffer any 
harm as a result of Sheriff Epps' actions.  Any harm in this 
case was suffered by the court as an institution, not by Judge 
Baskervill personally.  It is well-established that the court 
as an institution bears the harm of contemptuous behavior.  
Potts v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 855, 859, 36 S.E.2d 529, 530 
(1946) ("It is elementary that any act which is calculated to 
embarrass, hinder, or obstruct the court in the administration 
of justice is contempt.") (emphasis added). 
 
The Commonwealth did not assign error to the trial 
court's ruling that this matter "came before" Judge Baskervill 
"in the course of [her] official duties," Code § 19.2-271.  We 
note that the dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals 
argues that by "using the language 'came before,' . . . the 
 
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legislature manifested its clear intent that the judge must 
have considered the 'matter' in his or her judicial capacity."  
Epps, 47 Va. App. at 721, 626 S.E.2d at 928 (Humphreys and 
Felton, JJ., dissenting).  The dissenting opinion further 
maintains: 
Although the statute does not indicate that the 
judge must have formally presided over the 
matter during a trial or hearing, I believe the 
language "came before," when narrowly 
construed, indicates that the matter must have 
been presented to the judge in a manner 
involving some form of a deliberative process.  
Said differently, the matter must have "come 
before" the judge when she was in a position to 
actually pass judgment on that particular 
issue. 
Id. at 722, 626 S.E.2d at 928.  Because the Commonwealth did 
not assign error to the Court of Appeals' holding that "all of 
the relevant matter about which Judge Baskervill testified 
did, in fact, '[come] before [Judge Baskervill] in the course 
of [her] official duties' as contemplated by Code § 19.2-271."  
Epps, 47 Va. App. at 705, 626 S.E.2d at 920, we will not reach 
this issue on appeal. 
III. Conclusion 
 
Because Judge Baskervill was not a "victim" pursuant to 
Code § 19.2-271 and that question is the only issue before 
this Court, the judgment of the Court of Appeals will be 
affirmed. 
Affirmed.