Title: Clausell v. Hobart Corp.
Citation: 515 So. 2d 1275
Docket Number: 70566
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: December 3, 1987

515 So. 2d 1275 (1987)
Alberto CLAUSELL, et al., Petitioners,
v.
HOBART CORPORATION, Respondent.
No. 70566.

Supreme Court of Florida.
December 3, 1987.
Joel S. Perwin of Podhurst, Orseck, Parks, Josefsberg, Eaton, Meadow &amp; Olin, P.A., and Spence, Payne, Masington, Grossman &amp; Needle, P.A., Miami, for petitioners.
James E. Tribble and Anthony D. Dwyer of Blackwell, Walker, Fascell &amp; Hoehl, Miami, for respondent.
GRIMES, Justice.
We review Clausell v. Hobart Corp., 506 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), to answer three certified questions of great public importance. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. The certified questions are as follows:
Id. at 1160-61. We recently answered the first question in the negative and the second question in the affirmative in Melendez v. Dreis &amp; Krump Manufacturing Co., 515 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 1987).
With reference to the third certified question, Clausell argues that the retroactive application of Pullum to his cause of action violates his right to due process under the United States Constitution. We find this claim unfounded. Several years ago in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 88, 98 S. Ct. 2620, 2638, 57 L. Ed. 2d 595 (1978), the United States Supreme Court noted that "[o]ur cases have clearly established that `[a] person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of the common *1276 law.'" See also Ducharme v. Merrill-National Laboratories, 574 F.2d 1307, 1309 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1002, 99 S. Ct. 612, 58 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1978) ("it is well settled that a plaintiff has no vested right in any tort claim for damages under state law"). More recently, in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 102 S. Ct. 1148, 71 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1982), the Court acknowledged that a cause of action is a species of property but pointed out that the state remained free to create substantive defenses or immunities for use in adjudication.
The Federal District Court in Lamb v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 631 F. Supp. 1144 (S.D.Fla. 1986), rejected the very argument advanced by Clausell when it stated:
631 F. Supp.  at 1149.
Another federal district court reached the same conclusion in Eddings v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 635 F. Supp. 45 (N.D.Fla. 1986), when it said:
Id. at 47.
Section 95.031 provided a defense to a cause of action rather than creating a cause of action. In Battilla the court simply held section 95.031(2) unconstitutional as applied to the facts of that case. When Pullum was decided, the statute became valid ab initio and was restored to its operative force. Since Clausell had no vested right in his cause of action, he suffered no deprivation of due process under the United States Constitution. Consequently, we answer the third certified question in the negative and approve the decision of the district court of appeal.
It is so ordered.
McDONALD, C.J., and OVERTON, EHRLICH, SHAW, BARKETT and KOGAN, JJ., concur.