Title: Christus Lutheran Church of Appleton v. Wisconsin Department of Transportation
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2018AP001114
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: April 1, 2021

2021 WI 30 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2018AP1114 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Christus Lutheran Church of Appleton, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Wisconsin Department of Transportation, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 389 Wis. 2d 600,937 N.W.2d 63 
PDC No:2019 WI App 67 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 1, 2021   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 5, 2020   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Outagamie   
 
JUDGE: 
Carrie A. Schneider   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
KAROFSKY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined. 
ROGGENSACK, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ZIEGLER 
and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, JJ., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Hannah S. Jurss, assistant attorney general; with whom 
on the brief was Joshua L. Kaul attorney general. There was an 
oral argument by Hannah S. Jurss. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Alan Marcuvitz, Smitha Chintamaneni, Andrea Roschke, and Von 
Briesen & Roper, S.C., Milwaukee. There was an oral argument by 
Alan Marcuvitz. 
 
 
 
2 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of American 
Transmission 
Company 
LLC 
and 
its 
corporate 
manager 
ATC 
Management Inc.; Wisconsin Public Service Corporation, Wisconsin 
Electric Power Company, and Wisconsin Gas LLC by Sara K. Beachy 
and Axley Brynelson, LLP, Madison.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
Realtors Association by Cori Moore Lamont and Wisconsin Realtors 
Association, Madison.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Owners’ 
Counsel of America by Joseph C. Niebler, Jr. and Niebler, Pyzyk, 
Carrig, Jelenchick & Hanley, LLP, Menomonee Falls; with whom on 
the brief was Michael W. Ryan and Ryan and Ryan, Rosemont, 
Illinois.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Eminent 
Domain Services, LLC by Erik S. Olsen and Andrew D. Weininger, 
Madison.  
 
 
2021 WI 30 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2018AP1114 
(L.C. No. 
2017CV452) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Christus Lutheran Church of Appleton, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Department of Transportation, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 1, 2021 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
KAROFSKY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined. 
ROGGENSACK, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ZIEGLER 
and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, JJ., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
JILL J. KAROFSKY, J.   In this case, the Wisconsin 
Department of Transportation ("DOT") acquired a portion of land 
owned by Christus Lutheran Church of Appleton ("Christus") 
through eminent domain.  As part of that process, DOT issued a 
jurisdictional 
offer 
to 
purchase. 
 
We 
are 
tasked 
with 
determining the validity of that offer under the requirements of 
Wis. Stat. § 32.05 (2017-18).1 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2018AP1114   
 
2 
 
¶2 
Christus filed the present action asserting that DOT's 
jurisdictional offer was invalid because DOT failed to provide 
"any appraisal upon which the Jurisdictional Offer of $403,200 
is based, as required by Wis. Stat. § 32.05(2)(b) and (3)(e)."  
The parties filed competing summary judgment motions.  The 
circuit court granted DOT's motion and denied Christus' motion, 
holding that DOT's jurisdictional offer was based on the initial 
appraisal.2  The court of appeals disagreed, reversed the circuit 
court's decision, and remanded for further proceedings.3 
¶3 
We uphold the circuit court's grant of summary 
judgment to DOT and conclude that the jurisdictional offer was 
valid because it was "based" "upon" an initial appraisal of "all 
property proposed to be acquired," pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.05(2)(a)-(b), and (3)(e).  Accordingly, we reverse the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
I. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶4 
Christus is a non-profit entity that owns and operates 
a church in Greenville that abuts State Trunk Highway 15.  As 
part of a major project to improve and reconstruct a portion of 
the highway, DOT sought to acquire 5.87 acres of Christus' 
property and obtain a temporary limited easement of 0.198 acres.  
¶5 
DOT began the condemnation process with a letter dated 
October 3, 2016, advising Christus:  "In compliance with 
                                                 
2 The Honorable Carrie A. Schneider of the Outagamie County 
Circuit Court presided. 
3 Christus Lutheran Church of Appleton v. DOT, 2019 WI App 
67, 389 Wis. 2d 600, 937 N.W.2d 63. 
No. 
2018AP1114   
 
3 
 
Wisconsin statutes and federal regulations, you are receiving 
this letter, along with the enclosed appraisal report, to 
initiate negotiations for the acquisition of your property 
and/or property interests."4  In that letter, DOT stated that the 
estimated fair market value of the property to be acquired was 
$133,400, based on a third-party appraisal by Single Source, 
Inc.5  DOT provided Christus with an offer in that amount. 
¶6 
DOT's letter also included an itemized table that 
listed the allocations contained in the appraisal.  The letter 
further informed Christus that if it was not satisfied with the 
appraisal's valuation of the property to be condemned, Christus 
was "eligible to obtain an additional appraisal from a qualified 
appraiser of [its] choice" at DOT's expense within 60 days, by 
December 
5, 
2016, 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.05(2)(b).  
Additionally, DOT called Christus' representative to encourage 
the church to obtain a second appraisal, explaining that "this 
was a complex acquisition and even if the two appraisals were 
                                                 
4 Barbara Halley of MSA Professional Services was DOT's main 
representative 
and 
oversaw 
the 
negotiation 
efforts 
and 
communications with Christus' representative.  However, this 
opinion will refer to "DOT" generally when discussing the 
conversations between the parties and describing DOT employees' 
actions. 
 
Jim 
Borowski 
served 
as 
Christus' 
primary 
representative until Christus retained counsel in late October 
2016.   
5 While DOT uses in-house appraisers on some projects, it 
did not do so here.  The third-party appraiser engaged by DOT in 
this instance was not a DOT employee. 
No. 
2018AP1114   
 
4 
 
close in value, it would give [Christus] assurance that nothing 
had been missed."6 
¶7 
Over the next 60 days, DOT contacted both Christus' 
representative and its attorney and attempted to negotiate, in 
accordance with Wis. Stat. § 32.05(2a).  However, by the time of 
the second-appraisal deadline, Christus had not engaged in 
negotiations, accepted DOT's initial offer, or obtained a second 
appraisal at DOT's expense.  
¶8 
Despite the passing of the 60-day deadline, DOT 
continued in its efforts to negotiate with Christus.  In mid-
December 2016 DOT emailed Christus' attorney asking if "there 
were any sticking points that needed to be worked on" and 
requested a response to the initial offer by the end of the 
year.  
¶9 
When Christus did not respond by January 6, 2017, DOT 
followed up with Christus' attorney to see if there was a 
decision regarding the initial offer.  At that time, DOT also 
reiterated that it was still interested in negotiating.  Three 
days later, Christus' attorney informed DOT that the church 
council would not agree to a voluntary sale. 
¶10 DOT remained concerned about whether the initial 
appraisal accurately reflected, or fully addressed, the total 
impact of the acquisition.  These concerns were exacerbated due 
                                                 
6 DOT and its agents kept a "negotiation diary" which 
"summarize[d] the contacts with the landowner" so that DOT could 
"ensure that the Department ha[d] complied with all of the steps 
necessary to acquiring the property under state law."   
No. 
2018AP1114   
 
5 
 
to the complete lack of negotiations and Christus' choice not to 
obtain a second appraisal.  As a result, DOT emailed Christus' 
attorney:  "This parcel has unique challenges associated with 
the acquisition.  That is why I had encouraged the Church to 
have a second appraisal done.  [A second appraisal] would have 
provided another opinion of the effects of the acquisition."  
Seeking to ensure that Christus would be fairly compensated, DOT 
opted to initiate its internal administrative revision process, 
which involves obtaining additional estimates and information in 
order to review the initial appraisal and offer.  DOT advised 
Christus' attorney that:  (1) it was obtaining estimates to make 
sure Christus was fully compensated; (2) it would be contacting 
Christus with a final offer; and (3) Christus' attorney should 
respond with questions or if there were "any specific matters 
[Christus] would like the DOT to research."  
¶11 In reviewing the initial offer, DOT recognized that 
there "were a number of factors that made this acquisition more 
complex than it might first appear."  DOT focused on three areas 
that the initial appraiser considered, but ultimately did not 
compensate, and "items the original appraisal did not fully 
address," including:  (1) severance damages related to the 
building's increased proximity to the right of way;7 (2) the cost 
to increase the parking lot to replace the loss of 26 parking 
spaces; and (3) the cost of "moving the retention pond."  
                                                 
7 The church was situated 147 feet from the highway prior to 
the partial taking.  However, after the taking, the church would 
be roughly nine feet away from the right of way.   
No. 
2018AP1114   
 
6 
 
¶12 As to severance damages, which the appraisal defined 
as "the loss in value to the portion of the larger parcel 
remaining after the taking and construction of the public 
improvement," the appraisal explicitly considered whether to 
allocate compensation for them, but did not do so.  The 
appraiser reasoned that: 
The church market is very small in Wisconsin due to 
the special use nature of the property.  We have 
researched church sales in the market and could not 
delineate any type of proximity damage to improvements 
based on available market information.  Due to the 
lack of relevant sales and few market participants we 
were unable to determine any severance damages to 
church 
properties 
based 
on 
proximity 
damages.  
Therefore, we have determined that no severance 
damages are caused by the closer proximity to the 
State Trunk Highway 15 right of way in the after 
condition.  
(emphasis added).  As to the loss of the 26 parking spaces, the 
appraisal concluded that "after the acquisition more than ample 
parking remains to service the existing church facility," so 
additional compensation was unnecessary.  Finally, as to the 
pond, the appraiser acknowledged that Christus would lose a 
"small surface pond with a surrounding gravel foot path and 
native prairie plantings," but did not provide additional 
analysis of that loss or whether a new pond would be necessary.  
¶13 During the internal administrative revision process, 
DOT obtained estimates and received new information regarding 
the original construction of the pond and parking lot on the 
property.  On February 13, 2017, Christus' representative spoke 
to DOT about the parking lot and the pond.  Christus' 
No. 
2018AP1114   
 
7 
 
representative advised DOT that the landscaping pond was not a 
retention pond and indicated that, because of the changes to the 
parking lot, a new retention pond would be necessary.  As a 
result of these new estimates and its conversations with 
Christus' representatives, DOT increased the amount of its 
offer.  By letter dated March 24, 2017, DOT rescinded its 
initial offer and provided a "final offer" in the amount of 
$403,200.  The letter included the following table with line-by-
line comparisons showing the change in valuation from DOT's 
initial offer based on the internal review: 
 
No. 
2018AP1114   
 
8 
 
¶14 Most of the allocations in the final offer were either 
identical or close to the initial appraisal valuation.8  DOT did 
not decrease any of the allocations.  The final offer contained 
compensation for the three previously mentioned items that DOT 
had reviewed through the internal administrative revision 
process:  (1) severance damages based on the church's proximity 
to the new right of way (approximately $160,000); (2) the cost 
to replace 26 lost parking spaces (approximately $30,000); and 
(3) the cost to add a retention pond on the property 
(approximately $45,000).  DOT advised Christus that if it did 
not sign and return the enclosed agreement by April 5, 2017, DOT 
                                                 
8 The revised offer included increased allocations for the 
land acquired, site improvements for landscaping, and paved 
parking. 
No. 
2018AP1114   
 
9 
 
would proceed with a jurisdictional offer to purchase, as 
provided in Wis. Stat. § 32.05(3).  On March 31, 2017, Christus' 
representative told DOT to proceed with a jurisdictional offer 
to purchase.  
¶15 On April 11, 2017, DOT sent Christus a letter stating 
that due to failed negotiations, "it is now necessary for WisDOT 
to provide you with the enclosed Jurisdictional Offer to 
Purchase . . . it is WisDOT's last attempt to reach a settlement 
with you."  DOT clarified that "[i]f there is no response from 
you by 05/01/2017[9], WisDOT will presume that this offer is 
rejected."  Christus did not respond to the letter, and on May 
9, 2017, DOT advised Christus that it was acquiring the property 
through the eminent domain process by issuing an award of 
damages pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 32.05(7).  DOT provided 
Christus with a check for $403,200 and a copy of the award of 
damages filed with the Outagamie County Register of Deeds.  
After DOT sent the award of damages for recording, Christus 
hired a new attorney who communicated with DOT and indicated 
that the church was interested in starting negotiations.  At 
that point, however, it was too late since the jurisdictional 
offer had expired and the check had already been mailed. 
¶16 In response, Christus commenced an action pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 32.05(5), alleging that DOT violated the statutory 
requirement that a jurisdictional offer be "based" "upon" the 
                                                 
9 Christus had 20 days to either accept or reject the 
$403,200 
jurisdictional 
offer, 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.05(6).   
No. 
2018AP1114   
 
10 
 
appraisal of the property, as required by § 32.05(2)(b) and 
(3)(e).  The parties filed competing motions for summary 
judgment.  The circuit court granted summary judgment to DOT, 
concluding that the "jurisdictional offer was 'based upon' the 
appraisal because the valuation of core line items retained a 
similar valuation."  The circuit court explained that DOT "was 
able to revise its offer as part of the negotiation process 
without 
obtaining 
a 
new 
appraisal 
because 
its 
staff 
is 
experienced in real estate valuation, and it made efforts to 
fairly evaluate to [sic] the new line items."   
¶17 The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's 
decision, reasoning that "the jurisdictional offer in this case 
was not sufficiently based on the appraisal" as required by Wis. 
Stat. § 32.05(2)(b) and (3)(e) because it included a new line 
item for severance damages, which the initial appraisal did not 
contain.  Christus Lutheran Church of Appleton v. DOT, 2019 WI 
App 67, ¶2, 389 Wis. 2d 600, 937 N.W.2d 63.  The court of 
appeals denied DOT's reconsideration motion.  We granted DOT's 
petition for review. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶18 "We review a grant of summary judgment independently, 
applying the same methodology as the circuit court."  Pinter v. 
Vill. of Stetsonville, 2019 WI 74, ¶26, 387 Wis. 2d 475, 929 
N.W.2d 547.  Summary judgment shall be granted where the record 
demonstrates "that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law."  Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2). 
No. 
2018AP1114   
 
11 
 
¶19 This case requires us to interpret several provisions 
of Wis. Stat. ch. 32, which presents a question of law that we 
review de novo.  Noffke ex rel. Swenson v. Bakke, 2009 WI 10, 
¶9, 315 Wis. 2d 350, 760 N.W.2d 156.  The purpose of statutory 
interpretation is to "determine what the statute means so that 
it may be given its full, proper, and intended effect."  State 
ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.   
III. ANALYSIS 
¶20 We 
begin 
our 
analysis 
by 
outlining 
Wisconsin's 
statutory condemnation procedures.  Then we discuss Otterstatter 
v. City of Watertown, 2017 WI App 76, 378 Wis. 2d  697, 904 
N.W.2d 396, which the parties agree establishes the framework 
for evaluating whether a jurisdictional offer is "based" "upon" 
an appraisal, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 32.05(2)(b) and (3)(e).10  
Finally, in light of Otterstatter, we address the parties' 
arguments regarding the validity of the jurisdictional offer and 
the new requirement enunciated in the court of appeals' 
decision.  
A. Statutory Condemnation Procedures 
¶21 This appeal concerns the condemnation of property for 
transportation use, which is governed by the procedures set 
                                                 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 32.05(3)(e) uses the language "based" 
"on" 
rather 
than 
the 
"based" 
"upon" 
language 
found 
in 
§ 32.05(2)(b).  However, neither party has argued that this 
distinction is of import to our decision here. 
No. 
2018AP1114   
 
12 
 
forth in Wis. Stat. § 32.05.11  Pursuant to § 32.05, a condemnor 
is required to: 
 "cause at least one, or more in the condemnor's 
discretion," appraisal to be made of "all property 
proposed to be acquired," § 32.05(2)(a);  
 "provide the owner with a full narrative appraisal 
upon which the jurisdictional offer is based and a 
copy of any other appraisal made under par. (a)," 
§ 32.05(2)(b);12 
                                                 
11 Wisconsin Statutes divide condemnation procedures into:  
(1) 
"quick-take" 
procedure 
for 
transportation 
and 
sewer 
projects, Wis. Stat. § 32.05; and (2) "slow-take" procedure used 
for other takings, Wis. Stat. § 32.06.  See Waller v. Am. 
Transmission Co., LLC, 2013 WI 77, ¶¶56-57, 350 Wis. 2d 242, 833 
N.W.2d 764.  This case involves the quick-take procedure. 
12 Creating an argument on behalf of Christus, the dissent 
asserts that Wis. Stat. § 32.05(2)(a) and (2)(b) describe 
different appraisals.  But see Serv. Emp. Int'l Union, Local 1 
v. Vos, 2020 WI 67, ¶24, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946 N.W.2d 35 ("We do 
not step out of our neutral role to develop or construct 
arguments for parties; it is up to them to make their case.").  
According to the dissent, § 32.05(2)(b) requires "a more 
particularized appraisal than an initial appraisal made under 
§ 32.05(2)(a)" 
because 
the 
§ 32.05(2)(b) 
appraisal 
is 
distinguished from "any other appraisal made under par. (a)" and 
because § 32.05(2)(b) uses the term "full narrative appraisal."  
Dissent, ¶62.  The dissent's analysis defies logic.  The 
legislature was simply acknowledging in § 32.05(2)(b) that there 
could be more than one appraisal since § 32.05(2)(a) says "one, 
or more."   
No. 
2018AP1114   
 
13 
 
 inform the owner of his or her right to obtain an 
appraisal at the condemnor's expense, § 32.05(2)(b); 
and 
 attempt to 
negotiate personally with the owner, 
§ 32.05(2)(a).13 
                                                                                                                                                             
The dissent also fails to recognize that "narrative 
appraisal" is a term of art in the real estate context.  Rather 
than rely upon real estate-related sources for a definition or 
explanation, the dissent looks to an ordinary dictionary 
definition of "narrative," and concludes that § 32.05(2)(b) 
requires an appraisal "that gives all of the particulars of the 
taking for which the appraisal was made."  Dissent, ¶56.  
However, the Appraisal Institute's Appraisal of Real Estate at 
609, 612 (15th ed. 2020) instructs that "[i]n a narrative 
appraisal report, the most detailed and customizable format for 
reporting appraisal conclusions, an appraiser provides support 
and rationale for his or her opinions and conclusions . . . " 
and that "[n]arrative appraisal reports will vary in content and 
organization, depending on the needs of the client and other 
intended users . . . ."  Similarly, the Dictionary of Real 
Estate Appraisal defines "narrative report" as "[a] written 
communication of the results of a valuation or review assignment 
presented to the client in narrative style rather than on a form 
or orally."  Narrative Report, The Dictionary of Real Estate 
Appraisal (6th ed. 2015).  With this context in mind, it is 
clear that when the term "narrative" qualifies the appraisal in 
§ 32.05(2)(b) it is describing form and style, rather than 
substance, and that § 32.05(2)(b) does not describe a different 
appraisal than that described in § 32.05(2)(a). 
13 This attempt at negotiation on the part of the condemnor 
is 
a 
jurisdictional 
requirement 
to 
proceed 
with 
the 
condemnation. 
 
Arrowhead 
Farms, 
Inc. 
v. 
Dodge 
Cnty., 
21 Wis. 2d 647, 652, 124 N.W.2d 631 (1963).  We have recognized 
that public policy "encourages the settlement of controversies 
without resort to litigation," and that the legislature has made 
"attempt at negotiation compulsory in the field of eminent 
domain."  Connor v. Mich. Wis. Pipe Line Co., 15 Wis. 2d 614, 
624, 113 N.W.2d 121 (1962). 
No. 
2018AP1114   
 
14 
 
¶22 If negotiations fail to produce a voluntary sale, the 
condemnor may acquire the property by: 
 sending the property owner a jurisdictional offer to 
purchase the property, Wis. Stat. § 32.05(3);14  
 giving the property owner 20 days to accept or reject 
the jurisdictional offer, § 32.05(6); and   
 (assuming the jurisdictional offer is not accepted) 
making an award of compensation "which shall be an 
amount 
at 
least 
equal 
to 
the 
amount 
of 
the 
jurisdictional 
offer," 
§ 32.05(7)(a), 
the 
"just 
compensation" requirement.15 
¶23 Wisconsin Stat. § 32.05 provides two methods for 
landowners to challenge a condemnation once damages have been 
awarded:  (1) a right-to-take action, § 32.05(5), and (2) a just 
compensation 
proceeding, 
§ 32.05(9)-(12). 
 
A 
right-to-take 
action, which Christus filed, is used "to contest the right of 
the 
condemnor 
to 
condemn 
the 
property 
described 
in 
the 
jurisdictional offer, for any reason other than that the amount 
of compensation offered is inadequate" and is the "only manner 
in 
which 
any 
issue 
other 
than 
the 
amount 
of 
just 
                                                 
14 That offer must outline several items enumerated in Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.05(3)(a)-(i), 
including 
a 
statement 
"that 
the 
appraisal or one of the appraisals of the property on which 
condemnor's offer is based is available for inspection at a 
specified place by persons having an interest in the lands 
sought to be acquired."  § 32.05(3)(e). 
15 The just compensation requirement is mandated by the 
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution. 
No. 
2018AP1114   
 
15 
 
compensation . . . may be raised pertaining to the condemnation 
of 
the 
property 
described 
in 
the 
jurisdictional 
offer."  
§ 32.05(5).  The second method, a just compensation proceeding, 
is "when a property owner challenges the amount of compensation 
in a just compensation trial after an award of damages has been 
recorded" and is "directed to defects in the procedure for 
determining just compensation . . . ."  Otterstatter, 378 Wis. 
2d 697, ¶¶35-36 (alteration in original). 
¶24 Here, Christus' challenge is related to the right of 
DOT to condemn its property.  Christus asserts that the 
jurisdictional offer is void because it was not "based" "upon" 
an appraisal, as required by Wis. Stat. § 32.05(2)(b) and 
(3)(e); and that the appraisal did not value "all property 
proposed to be acquired," pursuant to § 32.05(2)(a). 
B. Otterstatter 
¶25 The circuit court, court of appeals, and the parties 
all agree that Otterstatter establishes the framework for 
evaluating whether the jurisdictional offer was sufficiently 
based upon DOT's initial appraisal, so we provide a brief 
overview of that decision. 
¶26 
When 
the 
City 
of 
Watertown 
sought 
to 
acquire 
Otterstatter's property by eminent domain as part of an airport 
expansion project, it initially appraised the value of his land 
at $240,000.  Otterstatter, 378 Wis. 2d 697, ¶5.  The City sent 
Otterstatter the appraisal and an initial offer for $240,000, 
which he rejected as "too low."  Id.  Additionally, the City 
informed Otterstatter that he had the right to obtain his own 
No. 
2018AP1114   
 
16 
 
appraisal at the City's expense.  Id.  Otterstatter declined to 
do 
so, 
and 
remained 
unsatisfied 
with 
the 
City's 
offer, 
ultimately sending an email that described the offer as "an 
embarrassment."  Id., ¶6.  In light of Otterstatter's comments 
and a subsequent review of the initial offer, the City increased 
its offer by $30,000.  Id., ¶7.  The City also continued to try 
to negotiate with Otterstatter; when he refused, the City sent 
him a formal jurisdictional offer for $270,000.  Id., ¶¶7-8.  In 
response to the jurisdictional offer, Otterstatter filed a 
right-to-take action under Wis. Stat. § 32.05(5) alleging, among 
other complaints, that the jurisdictional offer was not "based" 
"upon" the appraisal, as required by § 32.05(2)(b), because it 
did not equal the appraisal amount.  Id., ¶10. 
¶27 The Otterstatter court noted that "Wisconsin Stat. ch. 
32 does not contain a definition of the phrase 'based' 'upon.'"  
Id., ¶24.  The court, relying on dictionary definitions, 
concluded that the meaning of "based" "upon" is that "the 
appraisal must be a supporting part or fundamental ingredient of 
the jurisdictional offer."  Id.  The court of appeals concluded 
that Otterstatter did not show that "the $30,000 increase 
deviated so substantially from the $240,000 appraisal that the 
appraisal can no longer be said to be a supporting part or 
fundamental ingredient of the $270,000 jurisdictional offer."  
Id., ¶25.   
¶28 The Otterstatter court rejected the argument that a 
jurisdictional offer must equal the appraisal on which the offer 
is based and "decline[d] to insert such a matching requirement 
No. 
2018AP1114   
 
17 
 
into the statute."  Id., ¶27.  The court of appeals also noted 
that chapter 32 "explicitly establishes a process of required 
opportunity for negotiation" and that the City "was not required 
to stick with its initial offer based on its appraisal, but 
rather was required to negotiate to see if that number was too 
low."  Id., ¶28.  In short, the court rejected Otterstatter's 
challenges to the validity of the jurisdictional offer.  Id., 
¶4.  With the Otterstatter framework in mind, we turn to 
Christus' arguments and the validity of DOT's jurisdictional 
offer. 
 
C. 
The Jurisdictional Offer Was Valid Under Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.05(2)(a)-(b), and (3)(e) 
¶29 Christus first asserts that DOT's jurisdictional offer 
was not "based" "upon" an appraisal, as required by Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.05(2)(b) and (3)(e), because the jurisdictional offer 
contained several new line items, including severance damages, 
not found in the appraisal.  Further, Christus claims that the 
appraisal failed to satisfy § 32.05(2)(a)'s "all property" 
requirement.  Christus' arguments fail.  
1. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 32.05 (2)(b) and (3)(e) 
¶30 To begin, we adopt and reiterate the Otterstatter 
court's conclusion that a mere difference in dollar amounts 
between the initial appraisal and jurisdictional offer does not 
mean the jurisdictional offer was not "based" "upon" the 
appraisal, as required by Wis. Stat. § 32.05(2)(b) and (3)(e).  
Otterstatter, 378 Wis. 2d 697, ¶27.  That is, "based" "upon" 
does not mean "equal to."  This conclusion by the Otterstatter 
No. 
2018AP1114   
 
18 
 
court is further buttressed when we analyze § 32.05(2)(b) and 
(3)(e) 
in 
context. 
 
See 
Kalal, 
271 
Wis. 
2d 
633, 
¶46 
("[S]tatutory language is interpreted in the context in which it 
is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to 
the 
language 
of 
surrounding 
or 
closely-related 
statutes . . . .").  While the legislature did not use the term 
"equal to" in § 32.05(2)(b) or (3)(e), it did use the term 
"equal to" in a different subsection of § 32.05:  "The award 
shall also state the compensation for the taking which shall be 
an amount at least equal to the amount of the jurisdictional 
offer." § 32.05(7)(a) (emphasis added).  Had the Legislature 
wanted to use the term "equal to" in § 32.05(2)(b) or (3)(e), it 
would have done so.  See Pawlowski v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 
2009 WI 105, ¶22, 322 Wis. 2d 21, 777 N.W.2d 67 ("When the 
legislature chooses to use two different words, we generally 
consider each separately and presume that different words have 
different meanings.").  To summarize, just because there is a 
monetary difference between the initial appraisal and the 
jurisdictional offer does not mean the jurisdictional offer is 
not "based" "upon" the appraisal under § 32.05(2)(b) and (3)(e). 
¶31 Otterstatter's definition of "based" "upon" as "a 
supporting part or fundamental ingredient" is further bolstered 
by Black Law Dictionary's definition of the verb "base" as "[t]o 
make, form, or serve as a foundation for."16  Base, Black's Law 
                                                 
16 See also "Base," Merriam Webster Online Dictionary 
(2021), 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/base 
(defining the verb "base" as "to find a foundation or basis for" 
and "to make, form, or serve as a base for"). 
No. 
2018AP1114   
 
19 
 
Dictionary 185 (11th ed. 2019).  Applying these definitions, it 
is evident that DOT's jurisdictional offer was based upon the 
initial appraisal and satisfies Wis. Stat. § 32.05(2)(b) and 
(3)(e). 
 
The 
initial 
appraisal 
discussed 
and 
considered 
severance damages,17 the loss of 26 parking spaces,18 and the loss 
of the current pond on the property,19 despite not allocating 
compensation for these items.  A side-by-side comparison shows 
that no allocation decreased between the initial appraisal and 
jurisdictional offer.  As the circuit court properly noted, most 
of the allocations "are relatively close in value," if not 
"actually identical in both offers."  The significant changes 
between the initial appraisal and the jurisdictional offer, as a 
result of DOT's internal administrative revision process, 
                                                 
17 The 
third-party 
appraiser 
specifically 
considered 
severance damages, but was unable to make the determination 
based on the data it had: 
Due to the lack of relevant sales and few market 
participants we were unable to determine any severance 
damages to church properties based on proximity 
damages.  Therefore, we have determined that no 
severance damages are caused by the closer proximity 
to the State Trunk Highway 15 right of way in the 
after condition. 
18 While the appraisal acknowledged the loss of the 26 
parking spaces, it concluded that "after the acquisition more 
than ample parking remains to service the existing church 
facility."   
19 As to the pond, the appraiser acknowledged that Christus 
would lose a "small surface pond with a surrounding gravel foot 
path and native prairie plantings," but the realization that 
Christus would need a retention pond on the property arose 
during later conversations with Christus' representative. 
No. 
2018AP1114   
 
20 
 
included increased allocations for:  (1) severance damages 
because 
of 
the 
proximity 
of 
the 
new 
right 
of 
way; 
(2) compensation for the cost to replace the 26 lost parking 
spaces; and (3) compensation to add a retention pond.  Adding 
these new amounts to the initial appraisal valuation does not 
make the initial appraisal something other than a foundation for 
the jurisdictional offer.  To the contrary, the fact that most 
of the allocations remained unchanged from the beginning to the 
end of the process demonstrates that the appraisal served as the 
foundation for the offer.    
¶32 While Christus and the court of appeals chided DOT for 
relying upon its internal administrative review process to re-
examine its initial offer, DOT employed the process in order to 
ensure that it fully and fairly compensated Christus.  Like in 
Otterstatter, DOT initially offered Christus the same amount as 
the initial appraisal, $133,400.  When Christus decided against 
obtaining its own appraisal at DOT's expense, despite DOT 
repeatedly urging it to do so and referring to the project as a 
"complex acquisition," DOT reassessed the initial appraisal to 
ensure 
Christus 
would 
receive 
full 
compensation. 
 
See 
Otterstatter, 378 Wis. 2d  697, ¶28 (reasoning that the City 
"was not required to stick with its initial offer based on its 
appraisal, but rather was required to negotiate to see if that 
number was too low"). 
¶33 Consistent 
with 
its 
statutory 
responsibility 
to 
provide just compensation to landowners, and despite Christus' 
failure to take an active role in the process, DOT reconsidered 
No. 
2018AP1114   
 
21 
 
three losses that were identified, but not compensated or fully 
addressed, in the initial appraisal.  DOT would have been remiss 
had it not diligently reviewed the initial appraisal given the 
acquisition's complexity and then revised its offer to reflect 
the full value of the property it sought to condemn.  See id. 
(noting the lack of statutory language "that would prevent a 
condemnor . . . from offering more than the appraised amount as 
part of the [negotiation] effort it is required to make").  To 
summarize, DOT's actions in re-examining and reassessing several 
items that were considered but not fully addressed in the 
initial appraisal do not mean the jurisdictional offer is not 
"based" "upon" the appraisal under Wis. Stat. § 32.05(2)(b) and 
(3)(e). 
2. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 32.05(2)(a) 
¶34 Next, Christus adopts the court of appeals' analysis 
and asserts that the appraisal failed to satisfy Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.05(2)(a)'s "all property" requirement.  Sidestepping the 
question of whether the jurisdictional offer was "based" "upon" 
the initial appraisal pursuant to Otterstatter and § 32.05(2)(b) 
and 
(3)(e), 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
concluded 
that 
the 
jurisdictional offer "fails for a more basic reason——namely, the 
DOT failed to obtain an appraisal that valued 'all property 
proposed to be acquired,' contrary to Wis. Stat. § 32.05(2)(a)."  
Christus, 389 Wis. 2d 600, ¶24.  According to the court of 
appeals, because the jurisdictional offer included compensation 
for severance damages not found in the initial appraisal, the 
No. 
2018AP1114   
 
22 
 
appraisal failed to satisfy § 32.05(2)(a).20  In reaching this 
conclusion, the court of appeals conflated "property" and 
"damages."  The focus of § 32.05(2)(a) is the appraisal of 
property.  The statute dictates that a condemnor "shall cause at 
least one, or more in the condemnor's discretion, appraisal to 
be made of all property proposed to be acquired."  § 32.05(2)(a) 
(emphasis added).  Chapter 32 defines "property" as "includ[ing] 
estates in lands, fixtures and personal property directly 
connected with lands."  § 32.01(2).  Damages are not included in 
chapter 32's definition of "property" and we do not "read into 
the statute words the legislature did not see fit to write."  
Dawson v. Town of Jackson, 2011 WI 77, ¶42, 366 Wis. 2d 318, 801 
N.W.2d 316.  Ultimately Christus failed to identify any portion 
of its property, as defined in chapter 32, that the initial 
appraisal 
excluded, 
and 
therefore 
the 
offer 
satisfies 
§ 32.05(2)(a).21 
                                                 
20 The court of appeals declined to address the additional 
compensation provided in the jurisdictional offer for the 
retention pond and the replacement of lost parking spaces, 
reasoning that "the parties have not focused individually on the 
addition of these line items of damages, nor has Christus 
Lutheran directly argued their inclusion constitutes a violation 
of the Wis. Stat. § 32.05(2)(a) 'all property' requirement."  
Christus, 389 Wis. 2d 600, ¶25 n.11. 
21 Additionally, 
the 
argument 
that 
the 
"statutorily 
enumerated items" of damage or loss listed in the just 
compensation statute, Wis. Stat. § 32.09, are "property" and 
must appear in the appraisal is misplaced.  There is no 
reference to § 32.09 or "damages" in § 32.05(2)(a)'s "all 
property" requirement.  Instead, § 32.09(6) dictates that those 
items must be "giv[en] effect" in the just compensation 
determination, which is not at issue since Christus filed a 
right-to-take action. 
No. 
2018AP1114   
 
23 
 
3. 
The Court of Appeals' New Requirement 
¶35 Finally, we must explicitly reject the new requirement 
that the court of appeals enunciated in its opinion:  "if the 
DOT, based solely upon its independent review of an appraisal, 
believes additional statutory items of just compensation warrant 
inclusion in the jurisdictional offer, it must obtain a new 
appraisal that substantiates that belief and provides an opinion 
as to the value of those interests."  Christus, 389 Wis. 2d 600, 
¶32.  Not only does this requirement find no support in the 
statutory text,22 it also raises a multitude of ethical concerns.  
The only way for condemnors like DOT to "obtain a new appraisal 
that substantiates [a particular] belief" would be for DOT 
either to improperly direct or to coerce its in-house appraisers 
or third-party appraisers into acting in accordance with DOT's 
instructions rather than making independent assessments.  Yet, 
Wisconsin appraisers must comply with the Uniform Standards of 
Professional Appraisal Practice ("USPAP"), pursuant to Wis. 
Admin. Code §§ SPS 85.110-115, 86.01(1) (May 2019).  USPAP 
ethics rules outline an appraiser's ethical obligation to be 
independent, impartial, and objective and forbids appraisers 
from "agree[ing] to perform an assignment that includes the 
reporting of predetermined opinions and conclusions."  See The 
                                                 
22 In fact, it creates a mandatory requirement for multiple 
appraisals despite the statutory language being discretionary.  
See Wis. Stat. § 32.05(2)(a) ("The condemnor shall cause at 
least one, or more in the condemnor's discretion, appraisal to 
be made of all property proposed to be acquired" (emphasis 
added).)   
No. 
2018AP1114   
 
24 
 
Appraisal 
Foundation, 
Uniform 
Standards 
of 
Professional 
Appraisal Practice 7 (2020-21 ed.).  Therefore, any appraiser 
who provides an estimate or opinion based on DOT's directive 
would be in violation of her ethical code.   
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
¶36 We uphold the circuit court's grant of summary 
judgment to DOT and conclude that the jurisdictional offer was 
valid because it was "based" "upon" an initial appraisal of "all 
property proposed to be acquired," pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.05(2)(a)-(b), and (3)(e). 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
No.  2018AP1114.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶37 PATIENCE 
DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK, 
C.J.   (dissenting).  
Condemnation is an extraordinary power.  Properly exercised, 
condemnation permits the State to take private property for 
public use in a constitutionally permissible manner.   
¶38 In order to comply with the Wisconsin Constitution's 
criteria necessary to taking private property for public use, 
Wisconsin has enacted detailed statutory procedures that protect 
owners' interests in their property.  When the Department of 
Transportation (DOT) is the state agency wielding condemnation 
powers, it must strictly comply with procedures set out in Wis. 
Stat. § 32.05.  Standard Theatres, Inc. v. DOT, 118 Wis. 2d 730, 
742, 349 N.W.2d 661 (1984) (explaining that the rule of strict 
construction is to be applied to a condemnor's power). 
¶39 Because 
DOT 
failed 
to 
comply 
with 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 32.05(2) 
and 
(3), 
it 
ignored 
fundamental 
statutory 
obligations necessary to its jurisdiction to condemn Christus 
Lutheran Church of Appleton's property and therefore, DOT lacked 
jurisdiction.  Jurisdictional errors cannot be overlooked.  
Accordingly, I would affirm the court of appeals.  Because the 
majority opinion misses the interconnection among § 32.05(3), 
Wis. Stat. § 32.09 and § 32.05(2)(b) it erroneously interprets 
§§ 32.05(2) and (3), misreads Otterstatter v. City of Watertown, 
2017 WI App 76, 378 Wis. 2d 697, 904 N.W.2d 396 and creates 
facts to excuse DOT's failures to comply with its statutory 
obligations, I respectfully dissent.  
No.  2018AP1114.pdr 
 
2 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶40 In 2016, DOT decided to upgrade State Highway 15.  A 
part of the planned improvements abut Christus Lutheran's 
property.  To facilitate Highway 15 improvements, DOT sought 
5.87 acres in fee and .198 acres as a temporary easement from 
church property. 
¶41 DOT had an appraisal of the property it sought to 
condemn prepared by Single Source, Inc.  Single Source appraised 
the value of DOT's entire taking at $133,400.  This appraisal, 
dated September 30, 2016, was presented to Christus Lutheran on 
October 3, 2016, together with DOT's $133,400 offer to purchase 
all 
property 
necessary 
to 
facilitate 
the 
Highway 
15 
improvements.  Christus Lutheran's congregation refused to sell. 
¶42 The DOT also conducted an internal assessment of the 
$133,400 appraisal it had tendered to Christus Lutheran and 
arrived at a new ad hoc valuation for the property it sought.1  
DOT's ad hoc valuation contained items that were not listed and 
increased valuations for items that were listed in the Single 
Source appraisal.   
¶43 In March 2017, DOT offered to purchase Christus 
Lutheran's property for $403,200.  This was a $269,800 increase 
in DOT's original $133,400 offer to purchase, which offer DOT 
supported with Single Source's appraisal.  DOT asserts that it 
increased the valuation of the taking without obtaining another 
appraisal, but rather, based on its own internal review.   
                                                 
1 The record does not reflect whether DOT evaluated the 
Single Source appraisal before or after it offered to purchase 
the church's property for $133,400.   
No.  2018AP1114.pdr 
 
3 
 
¶44 Part of DOT's increased valuation was the addition of 
$159,574 in severance damages, for which Single Source's 
appraisal had allocated nothing.2  The record shows that prior to 
condemnation, the side of the church building was located 
"approximately 147.7 feet" from the Highway 15 right-of-way.3  
After DOT's acquisition, the side of the church would be located 
only 9 feet from the highway right-of-way.4  In addition, a 
minimum of 12 foot side yard setback was required by local 
zoning.5  Furthermore, Wis. Adm. Code § Trans 233.08, which 
contains DOT's administrative rules about setbacks from highway 
right-of-ways, should have been addressed by a knowledgeable 
appraiser.    
¶45 DOT also increased Single Source's valuation by 
$30,321 for 26 parking spaces that DOT's condemnation would 
take.  Again, the Single Source appraisal allocated nothing for 
taking 26 parking spaces.  Single Source did so after concluding 
that the church "had more than ample parking" remaining for its 
275-seat church.6   
                                                 
2 In support of awarding no amount for severance damages, 
the appraisal explained, "Due to the lack of relevant sales and 
few market participants we were unable to determine any 
severance damages to church properties based on proximity 
damages.  Therefore, we have determined that no severance 
damages are caused by the closer proximity to the State Trunk 
Highway 15 right of way in the after condition."  Single Source 
appraisal, 12. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id., 11, 12.   
No.  2018AP1114.pdr 
 
4 
 
¶46 DOT further increased Single Source's valuation by 
$45,000 for a retention pond that had not been included in the 
Single Source appraisal.  DOT's addition of $159,574 for 
severance damages, $30,321 for condemned parking spaces and 
$45,000 for a necessary retention pond totaled $234,895, all for 
items that were given no value in Single Source's appraisal.   
¶47 DOT further increased values for items listed in the 
Single Source appraisal that were drastically undervalued, e.g., 
an $18,075 increase for landscaping, including a decorative pond 
that was taken, and $14,675 for land acreage.  All in all, DOT's 
internal review increased the value of the property it sought by 
$269,800 to a total of $403,200, for which DOT made a second 
offer to purchase.  This was a 202% increase over DOT's $133,400 
initial offer to purchase, which was based on the Single Source 
appraisal.  Once again, Christus Lutheran's congregation refused 
to sell.   
¶48 On April 11, 2017, DOT made a $403,200 jurisdictional 
offer 
based 
on 
its 
internal 
valuation.7 
 
However, 
the 
jurisdictional offer stated that the "purchase price is based 
upon an appraisal of the owner's property of which a copy of the 
appraisal report has been provided to the owner."8  The Single 
Source appraisal for $133,400 was the only appraisal provided to 
Christus Lutheran.9  
                                                 
7 R. at 17-2. 
8 Id.   
9 DOT asserts that it increased Single Source's appraisal 
valuation without the benefit of another appraisal, but based 
solely on its internal review.   
No.  2018AP1114.pdr 
 
5 
 
¶49 On May 15, 2017, Christus Lutheran sued the DOT 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 32.05(5), claiming that DOT did not 
have the right to condemn its property.  Both parties moved for 
summary judgment, and the circuit court granted summary judgment 
to DOT.  Christus Lutheran appealed, and the court of appeals 
reversed, concluding that the jurisdictional offer was not based 
on the appraisal DOT provided as § 32.05(2)(a) and (b) and Wis. 
Stat. § 32.09(6)(e) require.  Christus Lutheran Church of 
Appleton v. DOT, 2019 WI App. 67, ¶2, 389 Wis. 2d 600, 937 
N.W.2d 63.  DOT petitioned for review, which we granted.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶50 The summary judgments issued in this case turn on the 
interpretation and application of Wis. Stat. §§ 32.05(2) and (3) 
and Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6)(e).  Statutory interpretations and 
their 
applications 
to 
undisputed 
material 
facts 
present 
questions of law that we review independently, while benefitting 
from previous court discussions.  Voces De La Frontera, Inc. v. 
Clarke, 2017 WI 16, ¶12, 373 Wis. 2d 348, 891 N.W.2d 803.  
B.  Statutory Interpretation General Principles 
¶51 Statutory interpretation begins with the language of 
the statute.  If the meanings of the terms chosen by the 
legislature are plain, generally we stop our inquiry.  Id., ¶14.  
"Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted 
meaning, except that technical or specially-defined words or 
phrases are given their technical or special definitional 
meaning."  State ex rel Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 
No.  2018AP1114.pdr 
 
6 
 
2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  We interpret 
statutory terms in the context in which they are used, not in 
isolation.  Id., ¶46.  Therefore, surrounding or closely related 
statutes are important in our plain meaning review.  Id.   
¶52 However, if a statute is capable of being understood 
by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more ways, then 
the statute is ambiguous.  Id., ¶47.    
C.  DOT Statutory Framework 
¶53 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 32.05 
provides 
the 
statutory 
framework that is to be followed when DOT wields the power of 
condemnation.  DOT must fit its actions within that statutory 
framework if it is to have jurisdiction to condemn.  Warehouse 
II, LLC v. DOT, 2006 WI 62, ¶1, 291 Wis. 2d 80, 715 N.W.2d 213 
(requiring DOT to negotiate with the property owner before 
issuing a jurisdictional offer because prior negotiation is "a 
fundamental, statutory requirement").  The statutes provide that 
notice of a jurisdictional offer, the parameters of which are 
set out in § 32.05(3), is "a jurisdictional requisite to a 
taking by condemnation."  § 32.05(4).   
¶54 The question then becomes, how does DOT construct a 
statutorily sufficient jurisdictional offer.  The DOT begins by 
obtaining one or more appraisals of all property to be acquired 
for its highway improvement.  For example, an appraisal may be 
made pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 32.05(2)(a), which states, "The 
condemnor shall cause at least one, or more in the condemnor's 
discretion, appraisal to be made of all property proposed to be 
acquired."  The description of appraisals made pursuant to 
No.  2018AP1114.pdr 
 
7 
 
§ 32.05(2)(a) is brief.  Those appraisals require only that "all 
property proposed to be acquired" be valued in the appraisal.  
Paragraph (2)(a) does not say how that property should be 
described.   
¶55 By contrast, Wis. Stat. § 32.05(2)(b) specifically 
describes the type of appraisal that is necessary to support a 
jurisdictional offer:  "The condemnor shall provide the owner 
with a full narrative appraisal upon which the jurisdictional 
offer is based."  § 32.05(2)(b).  The legislature has used 
different words to describe appraisals in § 32.05(2)(a) and 
(2)(b); therefore, rules of statutory construction require us to 
presume we are independently to interpret the difference in 
words as defining different types of appraisals.  See Pawlowski 
v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2009 WI 105, ¶22, 322 Wis. 2d 
21, 777 N.W.2d 67 (explaining that basic rules of statutory 
construction require us to give independent meaning to each word 
so that none is superfluous).   
¶56 "Narrative" is not a defined term in Wis. Stat. ch. 
32.  However, as we have done so often in the past, I employ a 
common and approved definition found in a dictionary.  State v. 
DeLain, 2005 WI 52, ¶17, 280 Wis. 2d 51, 695 N.W.2d 484.  A 
common meaning of narrative is "the process of telling the 
particulars."  Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1503 (1961).  
"Narrative" is modified by the word, "full" in Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.05(2)(b).  Accordingly, I conclude that a "full narrative 
No.  2018AP1114.pdr 
 
8 
 
appraisal" is one that gives all of the particulars of the 
taking for which the appraisal was made.10   
¶57 In addition, Wis. Stat. § 32.05(2)(b) distinguishes 
the type of appraisal sufficient to support a jurisdictional 
offer from a § 32.05(2)(a) appraisal because both appraisals are 
addressed at the time a jurisdictional offer is made.  Paragraph 
(2)(b) provides that in addition to a full narrative appraisal, 
the DOT also must provide "a copy of any other appraisal made 
under par. (a)."  § 32.05(2)(b).  Clearly, the legislature was 
talking about two different appraisals, if the first appraisal 
was made under paragraph (2)(a) rather than under paragraph 
(2)(b).   
¶58 It is important to note that there is a statutory 
connection among what a jurisdictional offer must contain, which 
is set out in Wis. Stat. § 32.05(3), the "damages" listed in 
Wis. Stat. § 32.09 and an appraisal pursuant to § 32.05(2)(b) 
upon which a jurisdictional offer is based.   
¶59 Wisconsin Stat. § 32.05(3) sets out all the items of 
which the jurisdictional offer must give notice.  Section 
32.05(3)(d) requires that a jurisdictional offer "[s]tat[e] the 
amount of compensation offered, itemized as to the items of 
damage set forth in s. 32.09."  In so doing, § 32.05(3) reaches 
                                                 
10 The majority opinion chaffs at my use of a dictionary 
definition for "narrative."  Majority op., ¶21 n.12.  It refers 
to a definition from the Appraisal Institute that defines a 
narrative appraisal as "the most detailed and customizable 
format for reporting appraisal conclusions."  Id.  That 
definition sounds ok to me too.  Under either definition, a 
full, detailed description of what is being appraised is 
required.   
No.  2018AP1114.pdr 
 
9 
 
back into Wis. Stat. § 32.09, which is applied during a just 
compensation proceeding, to require that the jurisdictional 
offer include items of "damage" listed in § 32.09 when they are 
relevant to the particular taking at issue.  
¶60 One of the provisions of Wis. Stat. § 32.09 that is 
relevant to these proceedings is found in subsection (6), which 
addresses partial takings.11  Subsection (6) recognizes that in a 
partial taking, the property condemned may need to be valued by 
more than one item of damage to fully compensate the owner.  For 
example, § 32.09(6)(e) requires that "Damages resulting from 
actual 
severance 
of 
land 
including 
damages 
resulting 
from . . . proximity 
damage 
to 
improvements 
remaining 
on 
condemnee's land" must be valued.  Therefore, the acreage value 
may not be the total value of the land that has been taken.  
Compensation may be required in the jurisdictional offer because 
the land taken also may have provided a buffer for the remaining 
property and the taking removes that buffer.  Paragraph 
32.09(6)(e) values such a buffer as severance damages, which is 
a component of the value of the property taken.  Because a 
jurisdictional offer is required to include severance damages 
when they occur and because the jurisdictional offer must be 
based on a full narrative appraisal, severance damages must be a 
component of that full narrative appraisal when they occur.  
D.  The Taking of Christus Lutheran's Property 
                                                 
11 DOT's condemnation of church property is a partial 
taking.   
No.  2018AP1114.pdr 
 
10 
 
¶61 Christus Lutheran contends that DOT did not make a 
jurisdictional offer sufficient to satisfy necessary statutory 
requirements and therefore, it lacks the right to condemn its 
property.  I agree, for a number of reasons.   
¶62 First, DOT did not provide Christus Lutheran with an 
appraisal sufficient to comply with the directive of Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.05(2)(b).12  A plain reading of § 32.05(2)(b) makes apparent 
that a "full narrative appraisal upon which the jurisdictional 
offer is based" is a more particularized appraisal than an 
initial appraisal made under § 32.05(2)(a).13  This is so because 
of the way in which a (2)(b) appraisal is described, "a full 
narrative appraisal upon which the jurisdictional offer is 
based," and because a § 32.05(2)(b) appraisal is distinguished 
from "any other appraisal made under par. (a)."   
¶63 That there is a difference in appraisal types is also 
supported by the statutory requirement that both Wis. Stat. 
32.05(2)(b) and (2)(a) appraisals are required to be provided to 
the property owner when the jurisdictional offer is made if both 
have been completed.  § 32.05(2)(b).   
¶64 Second, the Single Source appraisal is not a full 
narrative appraisal upon which the jurisdictional offer was 
                                                 
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 32.05(2)(b) provides:  "The condemnor 
shall provide the owner with a full narrative appraisal upon 
which the jurisdictional offer is based and a copy of any other 
appraisal made under par. (a) and at the same time shall inform 
the owner of his or her right to obtain an appraisal under this 
paragraph."   
13 Wisconsin Stat. § 32.05(2)(a) provides:  "The condemnor 
shall cause at least one, or more in the condemnor's discretion, 
appraisal to be made of all property proposed to be acquired."  
No.  2018AP1114.pdr 
 
11 
 
based because it failed to value at least one item of property 
that is included in the $403,200 jurisdictional offer and of 
which the jurisdictional offer was required to give notice 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 32.05(3)(d).   
¶65 To explain further, Wis. Stat. § 32.05(3)(d) provides 
that the jurisdictional offer must state "the amount of 
compensation offered, itemized as to the items of damage as set 
forth in s. 32.09."  And, Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6)(e) requires the 
inclusion of severance damages in a partial taking when there 
are "damages resulting from severance of improvements or 
fixtures and proximity damage to improvements remaining on 
condemnee's land."  Because a jurisdictional offer is required 
to include severance damages which occurred here and because the 
jurisdictional 
offer 
must 
be 
based 
on 
a 
full 
narrative 
appraisal, severance damages must be a component of that full 
narrative appraisal.   
¶66 The majority opinion concludes that totally missing 
severance damages is no problem because DOT is required to pay 
just compensation for "property," which is different from 
"damages."14  The majority opinion asserts that the court of 
appeals conflated 'property' and 'damages.'"15  It then relates 
that the definition of "property" found in Wis. Stat. § 32.01(2) 
does not include the word, "damages," even though "property" as 
defined in § 32.01(2) includes "estates in lands."16   
                                                 
14 Majority op., ¶34.   
15 Id.   
16 Id.   
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¶67 This 
reasoning 
misses 
that 
in 
order 
to 
constitutionally 
take 
property 
of 
another 
the 
DOT 
must 
compensate for all items of value that the property taken had 
provided to the owners and that those items are described as 
"damages" in condemnation parlance.  Wis. Town House Builders, 
Inc. v. City of Madison, 37 Wis. 2d 44, 54, 154 N.W.2d 232 
(1967) (explaining that Wis. Stat. § 32.05(3)(d) "requires an 
itemization 
of 
damages, 
[which] 
is 
not 
directional 
but 
mandatory").  The legislature understands this itemization 
requirement and has enacted statutes that recognize all items of 
value for property taken.  For example, acreage valuation is one 
item of value of the land taken; severance damage is another 
item of value for the same land.  Severance damages recognize 
the buffer from the highway right-of-way that the land taken had 
provided to the property remaining with the owner.   
¶68 To explain further, before condemnation, Christus 
Lutheran's church building had a 147.7 foot side yard buffer 
from the Highway 15 right-of-way.17  After condemnation, the 
church building would be only 9 feet from Highway 15's right-of-
way.18  Certainly, having trucks rumble-by only 9 feet from where 
church services are being conducted removed a significant sound 
buffer and safety barrier that the land DOT is taking had 
provided to religious service participants.   
¶69 This item of the property's value is called "damages" 
in part because Wis. Stat. § 32.05(3)(d) requires that in a 
                                                 
17 Single Source appraisal, 12.   
18 Id.   
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jurisdictional offer "the amount of compensation offered, [is] 
itemized as to the items of damages as set forth in s. 32.09."  
Wisconsin Stat. § 32.09(6)(e) addresses an item of value in the 
land taken during a partial taking because of subsequent 
proximity of improvements that are on the property remaining 
with the owner, e.g., the proximity of Christus Lutheran's 
church building to the Highway 15 right-of-way.  Therefore, the 
term "damages" is a statutory term for items of value that are 
within the property DOT takes.  Id.   
¶70 The majority opinion also creates facts to excuse the 
Single Source appraisal's failure to include any value for 
severance damages, parking replacement or a retention pond and 
its gross undervaluation for landscaping and acreage taken.  It 
does so in part by repeatedly misstating facts.  For example, 
the majority opinion says:  "Most of the allocations in the 
final offer were either identical or close to the initial 
appraisal valuation."19  "[T]he fact that most of the allocations 
remained unchanged from the beginning to the end of the process 
demonstrates that the appraisal served as the foundation for the 
offer."20   
¶71 I do not agree that $159,574 is "identical or close 
to" the $0.00 that Single Source allocated for severance 
damages.  And, the numbers tell us that the facts did change 
                                                 
19 Majority op., ¶14; this factual creation is repeated at 
¶31.   
20 Majority op., ¶31.   
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during a process that started with a $133,400 initial offer to 
purchase and was followed by a $403,200 jurisdictional offer.  
¶72 The record shows that all totaled, Single Source 
valued 
the 
property 
taken 
at 
$269,800 
less 
than 
DOT's 
jurisdictional offer.  Notwithstanding the 202% increase in the 
jurisdictional offer over the Single Source appraisal, the 
majority opinion says that is ok given its interpretation of 
Otterstatter.21  The majority opinion misreads Otterstatter. 
¶73 Otterstatter involved a jurisdictional offer that was 
$30,000 higher than the $240,000 appraisal that the City had 
provided to Timothy Otterstatter.  Otterstatter, 378 Wis. 2d 
697, ¶1.   This was a 12.5% increase in the jurisdictional offer 
amount over the appraisal amount.  Otterstatter contended, among 
other things, that given the difference in the amount of the 
jurisdictional offer and the amount set out in the appraisal, 
the jurisdictional offer was invalid.  Id., ¶2.  He relied on 
Wis. Stat. § 32.05(2)(b), saying that the jurisdictional offer 
was not "based" "upon" the appraisal.  Id., ¶24.   
¶74 The 
Otterstatter 
court 
disagreed, 
reasoning 
that 
"there is no dispute that the meaning of 'based' 'upon' is that 
the 
appraisal 
must 
be 
a 
supporting 
part 
or 
fundamental 
ingredient of the jurisdictional offer."  Id.  The Otterstatter 
court said, "We see nothing in the record that undermines the 
City's 
position 
that 
the 
February 
2015 
appraisal 
was 
a 
supporting part or fundamental ingredient of its jurisdictional 
offer."  Id., ¶25.   
                                                 
21 Majority op., ¶¶24–32. 
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¶75 Otterstatter also argued that the jurisdictional offer 
was not based upon the appraisal because they were not equal.  
Id., ¶26.  The Otterstatter opinion found no statutory language 
"that the jurisdictional offer must equal the appraisal on which 
the offer is based."  Id., ¶27.   
¶76 I have no problems with Otterstatter given the facts 
set forth therein, but Otterstatter does not control the outcome 
in the case before us.  The facts and the focus of the court's 
inquiry in Otterstatter were entirely different from what we 
review here.  All of the items of property to which a value was 
attached for the jurisdictional offer were valued in the 
appraisal in Otterstatter.  It was a full narrative appraisal.  
By contrast, all items of Christus Lutheran's property were not 
valued in the Single Source appraisal.  Specifically, severance 
damages under Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6)(e) were not included in the 
Single Source appraisal and Wis. Stat. § 32.05(3)(d) requires 
that they be included if the taking causes severance damages.   
¶77 To explain further, Wis. Stat. § 32.05(3) describes 
what must be included in the "Jurisdictional Offer to Purchase."  
Section 32.05(3)(d) requires that the jurisdictional offer give 
notice of "the amount of compensation offered, itemized as to 
the items of damage set forth in s. 32.09."  Section 
32.05(3)(d)'s reference to Wis. Stat. § 32.09 requires the 
jurisdictional offer to reach back into § 32.09(6)(e) to include 
severance damages when they exist.  The statutes require that 
the jurisdictional offer be based upon an appraisal that has 
been given to the property owner.  § 32.05(3)(e) ("appraisal of 
No.  2018AP1114.pdr 
 
16 
 
the property on which condemnor's offer is based is available 
for inspection") and § 32.05(2)(b) ("a full narrative appraisal 
upon which the jurisdictional offer is based").  Because 
severance damages must be in the jurisdictional offer when they 
exist, § 32.05(3)(d), and because the appraisal given to the 
owner must be the document on which the jurisdictional offer is 
based, §§ 32.05(3)(e) and 32.05(2)(b), severance damages must be 
part of the appraisal as well.  When they should have been but 
were not, the jurisdictional offer cannot be based upon the 
appraisal as the statutes require.  
¶78 The 
difference 
between 
the 
appraisal 
and 
the 
jurisdictional offer in Otterstatter was $30,000, a 12.5% 
increase in valuation.  The difference between the Single Source 
appraisal of $133,400 and the DOT jurisdictional offer of 
$403,200 was $269,800, a 202% increase in valuation.  
¶79 That the majority opinion sees no legal difference 
when interpreting "based upon" between a 12.5% increase of the 
appraised valuation where all items were valued, as was present 
in Otterstatter, and the 202% increase of the appraised 
valuation that excluded a required value for severance damages 
is quite extraordinary.  I agree with the court of appeals that 
the jurisdictional offer was not based upon the appraisal that 
DOT provided.  The jurisdictional offer was based upon DOT's own 
internal review.22  
                                                 
22 One could argue that because DOT significantly increased 
the value of the taking over Single Source's appraisal that 
should be the end of it.  I disagree.  First, the legislature 
has required DOT to provide a full narrative appraisal so that 
the property owner would have the particulars for the values set 
No.  2018AP1114.pdr 
 
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¶80 The majority opinion also repeats and repeats that 
Christus Lutheran was told it had the right to get its own 
appraisal for which DOT would pay.23  However, that Christus 
Lutheran did not obtain an appraisal has nothing to do with 
whether DOT complied with its statutory obligations to "provide 
the owner with a full narrative appraisal upon which the 
jurisdictional offer is based."  Wis. Stat. § 32.05(2)(b).   
¶81 When a statute requires that an act be done and the 
power of condemnation cannot be exercised without that act, its 
omission is a fundamental defect in the DOT's attempt to obtain 
condemnation jurisdiction.  See Waller v. Am. Transmission Co., 
LLC, 2013 WI 77, ¶6, 350 Wis. 2d 242, 833 N.W.2d 764 (explaining 
that when a condemnor does not include an uneconomic remnant in 
a partial taking, a right-to-take action will lie).  DOT was 
required to provide Christus Lutheran with a "full narrative 
appraisal upon which the jurisdictional offer is based and a 
                                                                                                                                                             
out in the appraisal.  In the condemnation before us, the 
property owner has been given no explanation about why DOT chose 
$159,574 as the amount of severance damages when Single Source 
chose $0.00.  Further, Single Source's appraisal is not "full."  
It does not include all that the DOT is taking.  Second, after 
condemnation, the church building will be only 9 feet from 
Highway 15's right-of-way.  It is possible that Christus 
Lutheran's congregation may be required to move the church 
building to another location on the property in order to 
continue to use it for religious services.  Wisconsin Adm. Code 
§ Trans 233.08 (Setback requirements and restrictions) indicate 
moving the church building should have been a concern that the 
appraisal addressed.  Perhaps DOT valued such a possibility, but 
perhaps not.  We don't know, and neither does Christus Lutheran.  
DOT cannot substitute its internal valuation for a full 
narrative appraisal.   
23 Majority op., ¶¶6, 32.  
No.  2018AP1114.pdr 
 
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copy of any other appraisal made under par. (a)."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.05(2)(b).  Because the jurisdictional offer here was 
required to include severance damages, the Single Source 
appraisal that contained no severance damages was not an 
appraisal on which the jurisdictional offer was based.  DOT's 
failure to provide such an appraisal is a fundamental defect in 
its attempted jurisdiction to condemn Christus Lutheran's 
property.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶82 Because 
DOT 
failed 
to 
comply 
with 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 32.05(2) 
and 
(3), 
it 
ignored 
fundamental 
statutory 
obligations necessary to its jurisdiction to condemn Christus 
Lutheran's property and, therefore, DOT lacks jurisdiction.  
Jurisdictional errors cannot be overlooked.  Accordingly, I 
would affirm the court of appeals.  Because the majority opinion 
misses the interconnection among § 32.05(3), Wis. Stat. § 32.09 
and § 32.05(2)(b) it erroneously interprets §§ 32.05(2) and (3), 
misreads Otterstatter and creates facts to excuse DOT's failures 
to comply with its statutory obligations, I respectfully 
dissent. 
¶83 I am authorized to state Justices ANNETTE KINGSLAND 
ZIEGLER and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY join this opinion. 
 
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