Title: Boyd v. Hubbell
Citation: 392 P.2d 664
Docket Number: 20264
State: Colorado
Issuer: Colorado Supreme Court
Date: June 8, 1964

392 P.2d 664 (1964) Diane Dee BOYD, Minor, by her next friend, Margaret Boyd, and Wayne Boyd, Plaintiffs in Error, v. Harold E. HUBBELL, Jr., and Edward L. Hubbell, d/b/a Imperial Lanes, Defendants in Error. No. 20264. Supreme Court of Colorado. In Department. June 8, 1964. Bernard D. Morley, Denver, for plaintiffs in error. Wood, Ris &amp; Hames, Thomas T. Crumpacker, Denver, for defendants in error. HALL, Justice. The parties appear here in the same order as in the trial court. We refer to them by name or as plaintiffs and defendants. In the trial court Diane Boyd, age six, sought to recover damages for injuries to the index and ring fingers of her left hand. In her complaint she alleges that on July 19, 1960, she was an invitee of the defendants at their bowling alley, and as she was seeking to replace in the ball rack a too-heavy bowling ball for a lighter one, she slipped and fell on a melted pile of ice cream located on an approach or landing to the alleys, and suffered the injuries for which she sought damages. She further alleged that the defendants were negligent in that they knew of the presence of the ice cream or, by the exercise of reasonable care, could have discovered the same and remedied the dangerous condition created by the presence of the ice cream. The plaintiff Wayne Boyd, the father of Diane, sought reimbursement for hospital and medical expenses incurred in connection with Diane's injuries. The defendants answered; denied generally the allegations of negligence and *665 pleaded the defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk and unavoidable accident. Trial was to a jury. At the close of plaintiffs' case the defendants moved for dismissal because of (1) lack of proof that there was any ice cream on the landing, and (2) a total lack of proof of knowledge, either actual or constructive on the part of the defendants. The trial judge reserved ruling on this motion "until all of the evidence is in." The defendants called witnesses to prove the allegations of their answer. Plaintiffs produced no rebuttal testimony. After all of the evidence was in the defendants renewed their motion for dismissal or, in the alternative, a directed verdict. The trial judge sustained this motion and directed the jury to return its verdict in favor of the defendants. Motion for a new trial was dispensed with and judgment entered in favor of the defendants. Plaintiffs here seek reversal and urge only one ground, namely, that the matter should have been submitted to the jury under proper instructions. In ruling on the motion the trial judge stated: The evidence presented in an effort to prove the presence of ice cream on the landing was sketchy, contradictory, and very unsatisfactory. However, the trial judge apparently felt that there was some proof that ice cream was on the landing and that Diane stepped in it and, as a consequence, slipped and fell, suffering the injuries of which she complains. *666 From the record it clearly appears that if there were any ice cream on the landing, it had to have been lodged there between 9:00 A.M. (the time the bowling alley was opened) and 9:30 A.M., at the time Diane fell. There is nothing in the record to indicate that it was there for one minute, twenty-nine minutes, ten minutes, or for some other period of time before the fall. There is a total lack of proof of the alleged fact Diane does not contend that there was anything structurally wrong with the premises or that the defendants had any actual notice of the presence of the ice cream. She predicates her case entirely on the contention that the evidence was sufficient to warrant submission of the matter to the jury. Colorado cases hold to the contrary. The general rule governing these so-called slip and fall cases is stated in 38 Am.Jur. 798, Negligence, § 136: In Woolworth v. Peet, 132 Colo. 11, 284 P.2d 659, the trial judge denied a motion for dismissal at the close of plaintiff's evidence and submitted the matter to the jury, resulting in a verdict for plaintiff. Motions for new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict were filed and denied. On review by writ of error, this court stated: See, also, Denver, etc., Co. v. Pender, 128 Colo. 281, 262 P.2d 257. To have denied the defendants' motion in this case would have been to ignore the general rule of law and numerous decisions of this court which uniformly hold that there must be proof of actual or constructive notice of the existence and presence of the foreign substance. Lack of such proof necessitated dismissal of the action. The judgment is affirmed. MOORE and DAY, JJ., concur.