Title: State v. Montoya
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 34,500
State: new-mexico
Issuer: new-mexico Supreme Court
Date: June 30, 2016

This decision was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of non-precedential dispositions. Please also note that this electronic decision may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Supreme Court. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 Filing Date: June 30, 2016 2 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 3 Plaintiff-Appellee, 4 v. NO. S-1-SC-34500 5 JONATHAN MONTOYA, 6 Defendant-Appellant. 7 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OTERO COUNTY 8 James Waylon Counts, District Judge 9 Law Works LLC 10 John A. McCall 11 Albuquerque, NM 12 for Appellant 13 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 14 M. Victoria Wilson, Assistant Attorney General 15 Santa Fe, NM 16 for Appellee 17 DECISION 18 CHÁVEZ, Justice. 19 2 {1} Defendant Jonathan Montoya, who was eighteen years old and had an IQ of 69, 1 confessed to shooting a gun from inside a car, which resulted in Victim’s death. 2 Victim was shot in both legs, and the heavy blood loss ultimately resulted in her dying 3 from cardiac arrest. Defendant appeals his conviction of felony murder contrary to 4 NMSA 1978, Section 30-2-1(B) (1994), and shooting from a motor vehicle contrary 5 to NMSA 1978, Section 30-3-8(B) (1993). The issues on appeal comprise three 6 groups. The first group involves issues relating to Defendant’s confession. Defendant 7 contends that his confession should have been suppressed because given his age, 8 learning disability, and the circumstances of his confession, he did not knowingly, 9 intelligently, and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights. He also contends that the jury 10 question regarding the voluntariness of his statement should have been bifurcated 11 from the guilt phase of the trial and that the district court incorrectly instructed the 12 jury regarding the voluntariness of his confession. In the second group, Defendant 13 contends that the felony-murder conviction is invalid because the felony of shooting 14 from a motor vehicle cannot be the predicate felony for felony murder, and the State 15 did not prove the requisite mens rea for second-degree murder. In the third group, 16 Defendant challenges the district court’s exclusion of a portion of the opening 17 statement by a prosecutor to a jury in the trial of a co-defendant, the court’s admission 18 of a 15-minute long video of Victim bleeding heavily at the scene of the shooting, and 19 3 the court’s refusal to admit Defendant’s entire confession under the rule of 1 completeness. Consistent with State v. Marquez, 2016-NMSC-___, ¶ ___, ___ P.3d 2 ___ (No. 34,418, June 30, 2016), we hold that the first-degree felony-murder 3 conviction must be vacated. The felony of shooting from a motor vehicle—an 4 elevated form of aggravated battery or assault—cannot be a predicate felony for a 5 felony-murder conviction because shooting from a motor vehicle does not require a 6 felonious purpose that transcends danger to the victim. Defendant’s remaining issues 7 are without merit. We remand to the district court to vacate the felony-murder 8 conviction and conviction for shooting at or from a motor vehicle, and to resentence 9 Defendant for second-degree murder. Defendant’s other convictions are affirmed. 10 I. BACKGROUND 11 {2} Around midnight on June 8, 2011, in Ruidoso Downs, New Mexico, Defendant 12 met two women, Melissa Mathis and Alexias Torres, at a house where Defendant’s 13 cousin, Daniel Franco, was present. Mathis was distraught because she and Victim, 14 who was her girlfriend, had broken up recently. Torres admitted to taking 15 methamphetamine and oxycodone during this time period and stated that she and 16 Mathis had also consumed alcohol. 17 {3} After meeting, the three of them drove toward Alamogordo, New Mexico. 18 Defendant did not want to travel to Alamogordo but Franco insisted, presumably to 19 4 keep the women safe. Before leaving, Defendant handed Torres a revolver. 1 Defendant told Torres that he had the gun because Franco insisted he take it, but 2 neither Defendant nor Torres wanted it, and therefore they kept the gun between them 3 in the car. 4 {4} Defendant, Mathis, and Torres eventually arrived at a Burger King restaurant 5 where Mathis noticed Victim in the parking lot. Victim refused to renew her 6 relationship with Mathis, despite Torres’s encouraging Victim to do so. During this 7 exchange, Mathis allegedly said, “just show her,” which Torres assumed meant the 8 gun. At that time, Defendant allegedly had the gun in his possession. 9 {5} The situation escalated as Mathis became excited and uttered profanities. Torres 10 instructed Defendant to display the revolver in response to Mathis’s repeated 11 insistence that the gun be shown, hoping that Mathis could be placated. Torres then 12 heard gunshots. Defendant would later confess to firing these shots. 13 {6} Victim received four gunshot wounds, two in each leg. She fell to the ground 14 and was pulled into the Burger King by a co-worker. Deputy Hal Alton testified that 15 he arrived on the scene and attempted to administer aid. Victim later died from her 16 wounds. 17 {7} Defendant was taken to the Alamogordo Department of Public Safety, where 18 he was placed in an interview room and handcuffed to a wall. Defendant was 19 5 questioned by Sheriff Israel Valdez and Officer James Watts. During this videotaped 1 interrogation, Defendant was read his Miranda rights. Defendant was then 2 interrogated by Detective Mark Esquero while Detective Roger Schoolcraft took 3 notes. During the second interrogation, which was also recorded, Defendant was 4 again given his Miranda rights, and he subsequently signed a waiver form. After 5 signing the waiver form, Defendant confessed to the shooting. 6 II. ISSUES REGARDING DEFENDANT’S CONFESSION 7 A. Whether There Was a Valid Waiver of Miranda Rights 8 {8} Defendant argues that he did not validly waive his Miranda rights, and 9 therefore his statements to law enforcement should be suppressed. Under Miranda 10 v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966), law enforcement must advise a suspect during 11 custodial interrogation that “he [or she] has a right to remain silent, that any statement 12 he [or she] does make may be used as evidence against him [or her], and that he [or 13 she] has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.” Before 14 questioning a suspect, law enforcement must obtain a knowing, intelligent, and 15 voluntary waiver of the aforesaid rights. Id. 16 {9} The State has the burden of demonstrating “by a preponderance of the 17 evidence” that a waiver was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. State v. 18 Martinez, 1999-NMSC-018, ¶ 14, 127 N.M. 207, 979 P.2d 718. Specifically, “[t]he 19 6 State must demonstrate that the waiver . . . was the product of a free and deliberate 1 choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception and that it was made with a full 2 awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the 3 decision to abandon it.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In 4 determining whether the State has met its burden, we consider the “totality of the 5 circumstances” and contemplate facts such as “the mental and physical condition, 6 background, experience, and conduct of the accused, as well as the conduct of the 7 police.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We also indulge 8 “[e]very reasonable presumption against waiver.” Id. (internal quotation marks and 9 citation omitted). 10 {10} On appeal, the factual findings of the district court are accepted unless they are 11 “clearly erroneous.” Id. ¶ 15 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The 12 evidence is “view[ed] . . . in the light most favorable to the district court’s ruling.” Id. 13 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, “[t]he ultimate 14 determination of whether a valid waiver of Fifth Amendment rights has occurred . . . 15 is a question of law which we review de novo.” Id. First we will address whether 16 Defendant’s waiver of his Miranda warnings was knowing and intelligent. 17 {11} A knowing and intelligent waiver is one that is “made with a full awareness of 18 both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to 19 7 abandon it.” State v. Gutierrez, 2011-NMSC-024, ¶ 13, 150 N.M. 232, 258 P.3d 1024 1 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Defendant argues that he did not 2 make a knowing and intelligent waiver because he was a sleep-deprived eighteen- 3 year-old with an IQ of 69 when he was interrogated. 4 {12} Defendant’s age alone is not enough for us to conclude that he did not 5 knowingly and intelligently waive his rights. “[A] person who has reached the age of 6 eighteen is considered an adult for most purposes.” State v. Aguirre, 7 1978-NMCA-029, ¶ 4, 91 N.M. 672, 579 P.2d 798 (discussing the voluntariness of 8 a confession); see also id. ¶¶ 2-9. In New Mexico persons under the age of eighteen 9 are entitled to heightened criminal procedure protections. See NMSA 1978, § 10 32A-1-4(B) (2009) (defining a child as “a person who is less than eighteen years 11 old”); NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-14 (2009) (enumerating the basic rights of children 12 within the context of criminal procedure under the Delinquency Act of the Children’s 13 Code). “The capacity to waive Fifth Amendment rights is assumed for children over 14 fifteen and for adults.” State v. DeAngelo M., 2015-NMCA-019, ¶ 8, 344 P.3d 1019, 15 aff’d in part, re’vd in part, 2015-NMSC-033, 360 P.3d 1151. Thus, under New 16 Mexico law, persons of eighteen years or older are not deemed to have diminished 17 capacity to knowingly and intelligently waive their Miranda rights simply because 18 they were eighteen years old during a custodial interrogation. 19 8 {13} Defendant’s argument that his low IQ prevented him from knowingly and 1 intelligently waiving his Miranda rights requires closer scrutiny. “[S]ubnormal 2 intelligence” is “a . . . significant factor” in considering whether a defendant 3 knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. See Aguilar v. State, 1988- 4 NMSC-004, ¶ 12, 106 N.M. 798, 751 P.2d 178. However, even where defendants 5 present evidence that they suffer from conditions and disorders which affect their 6 cognitive abilities, they must also present evidence that they lacked sufficient 7 intelligence to understand their rights and the repercussions of waiving those rights. 8 See State v. Setser, 1997-NMSC-004, ¶¶ 14-15, 122 N.M. 794, 932 P.2d 484 (holding 9 that a sixteen-year-old defendant suffering from mental conditions and disorders that 10 affected her cognitive abilities who was also alleged to be mentally and emotionally 11 disabled nonetheless gave a voluntary confession after validly waiving her Miranda 12 rights). 13 {14} In this case, Defendant’s expert testified that Defendant is not mentally 14 retarded, but he has a learning disability, likely with low verbal abilities, as well as 15 low reading comprehension. Defendant’s expert opined that these deficits impede 16 Defendant’s ability to understand Miranda rights. The expert concluded that 17 Defendant did not understand the Miranda rights that were provided to him, given his 18 mental state (i.e., he was stressed and tired) and lack of verbal fluency. The expert 19 9 also stated that Defendant did not understand the consequences of abandoning his 1 Miranda rights because the explanations of rights that Defendant received were 2 “rushed.” 3 {15} However, Defendant’s expert also opined that Defendant was able to 4 understand communications that were given slowly and repeatedly, and the record 5 reveals that the Miranda warnings were given to him repeatedly. During the first 6 interview before reading Defendant his rights, Officer Valdez asked Defendant if he 7 understood his Miranda rights and Defendant responded that he did, reciting the right 8 to remain silent. Officer Valdez next read Defendant his rights, and after Defendant 9 said that he understood his rights, Officer Valdez asked Defendant to sign a waiver 10 of rights form, which Defendant did. 11 {16} Similarly, during the second interview, Detective Esquero read the advice of 12 rights to Defendant, had Defendant read the rights himself, and then asked Defendant 13 if he understood the rights, to which Defendant answered that he did. The repeated 14 Miranda warnings, along with Defendant’s own statements, support the inference that 15 Defendant understood the Miranda rights he waived. Defendant had opportunities to 16 notify law enforcement that he did not understand his rights, but stated that he knew 17 his Miranda rights. Defendant’s expert admitted that Defendant has some “basic” 18 understanding of Miranda rights because he had received Miranda warnings in the 19 10 past and was able to recite the right to remain silent as an aspect of his rights. The 1 district court did not err in concluding that Defendant made a knowing and intelligent 2 waiver. See State v. Garcia, 2013-NMCA-064, ¶ 48, 302 P.3d 111 (upholding a 3 district court denial of a motion to suppress and concluding that a knowing and 4 intelligent waiver was made, in part because the defendant had opportunities to 5 express a lack of understanding of Miranda rights and did not do so). We conclude 6 that Defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda warnings. We next 7 turn to whether his waiver was voluntary. 8 {17} When analyzing whether Defendant voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, it 9 must be kept in mind that involuntary actions necessarily involve coercive police 10 conduct. State v. Fekete,1995-NMSC-049, ¶ 35, 120 N.M. 290, 901 P.2d 708. Under 11 the totality of the circumstances, there must be an element of police overreaching to 12 warrant a conclusion that a person’s waiver of his or her rights was involuntary. State 13 v. Munoz, 1998-NMSC-048, ¶ 21, 126 N.M. 535, 972 P.2d 847. 14 {18} Defendant argues that his Miranda waiver was involuntary because the totality 15 of the circumstances show that he was “detained and interrogated for close to six 16 hours” when the police intentionally interrogated him while he was in a sleep- 17 deprived state, so that the police could take advantage of his suggestibility due to his 18 youth and learning disabilities. Defendant also alleges that the police induced him to 19 11 waive his rights by misrepresenting to him that he could return home if he spoke with 1 them. 2 {19} Defendant’s arguments are without merit because he cannot establish the 3 necessary element of law enforcement coercion. First, the district court found that the 4 “[l]ength of detention was not unreasonable.” Defendant’s detention was prolonged 5 because law enforcement needed “time to respond to the dispatch, and conduct some 6 preliminary investigation of the shooting before interviewing the suspects.” In New 7 Mexico, courts consider “both the length of the detention and the manner in which it 8 is carried out” when determining whether the detention is lawful. State v. 9 Funderburg, 2008-NMSC-026, ¶ 23, 144 N.M. 37, 183 P.3d 922 (internal quotation 10 marks and citations omitted). Thus, Defendant’s length of detention is not by itself 11 evidence of law enforcement coercion. 12 {20} Second, Defendant’s contention that he was sleep-deprived does not avail him. 13 “While a finding that officers took advantage of a defendant’s fatigue or weakened 14 mental state might be relevant, the fact that a defendant was tired does not in itself 15 resolve the issue of whether a confession was voluntary.” State v. Lobato, 2006- 16 NMCA-051, ¶ 11, 139 N.M. 431, 134 P.3d 122. Defendant was not intentionally 17 sleep-deprived by law enforcement; he was allowed to nap during his detention, which 18 suggests that law enforcement was not trying to deprive him of sleep. Moreover, 19 12 Defendant does not argue that the officers took advantage of his fatigue, and in any 1 event there is no evidence that they did, so his Miranda waiver was not coerced. Id. 2 {21} Third, the district court found that although Defendant’s learning disabilities 3 favored the position that his Miranda waiver was not voluntary, Defendant was given 4 his Miranda rights multiple times, which favored the State’s position that the waiver 5 was valid. The court then concluded that Defendant voluntarily waived his right to 6 remain silent and voluntarily provided statements to law enforcement. These are not 7 clearly erroneous findings. Indeed, the fact that Defendant received Miranda 8 warnings multiple times would indicate that law enforcement was not trying to take 9 advantage of his mental state. 10 {22} Fourth, law enforcement did not make any inappropriate promises to Defendant 11 that induced him to waive his Miranda rights. “New Mexico cases seem to divide 12 promises into four categories: express promises, implied promises, collateral 13 promises and adjurations to tell the truth.” State v. Tindle, 1986-NMCA-035, ¶ 23, 14 104 N.M. 195, 718 P.2d 705. Each category requires a corresponding analytical 15 approach in determining whether a statement was made to law enforcement 16 involuntarily. See id. ¶¶ 23-31. 17 {23} In this case, Defendant had asked under what circumstances he could go home, 18 and law enforcement informed Defendant that his full cooperation was prerequisite 19 13 to any possibility of him going home. When Defendant made this inquiry, law 1 enforcement was under the impression that he was merely a passenger in the car; 2 consequently, law enforcement told Defendant that there was a chance he may go 3 home. The district court found under these facts that there was no “express promise 4 to Defendant of release from custody in exchange for confession.” 5 {24} The district court did find that during Defendant’s first interrogation, there was 6 “certainly an implied promise of some degree of leniency, or at least [a] promise that 7 [Defendant] could go home.” Nevertheless, the district court found that the harmful 8 effect of this implied promise was offset by the fact that Defendant was read his 9 Miranda rights again during his second interrogation. 10 {25} An implied promise exists when “the accused could reasonably have inferred 11 a promise going to the punishment for the crime to be confessed.” State v. 12 Talayumptewa, 2015-NMCA-008, ¶ 5, 341 P.3d 20 (internal quotation marks and 13 citations omitted). The exchange between Defendant and law enforcement merely 14 indicates that law enforcement informed Defendant of the possibility that he could be 15 allowed to go home if he disclosed information that absolved him of culpability in 16 Victim’s shooting. At no point did law enforcement even imply that a confession 17 would absolve Defendant, in whole or in part, of any crimes he committed. The facts 18 of this case do not support a finding that an implied promise was made. See, e.g., 19 14 Lobato, 2006-NMCA-051, ¶ 20 (officer’s repeated statement that the defendant should 1 confess to get treatment was not likely to be even an implied promise of leniency). 2 {26} However, even assuming that the district court’s finding of an implied promise 3 is proper, the voluntariness of Defendant’s Miranda waiver was clearly not destroyed. 4 In this case, the alleged implied promise was made during the first interrogation. 5 However, Defendant was read his Miranda rights again before his second 6 interrogation, and it was only after the second explanation of his rights that Defendant 7 signed the waiver of rights form. Defendant confessed to shooting at Victim after he 8 acknowledged that he understood his rights and waived his rights in writing. The 9 chronological gap between the first and second interrogations supports a finding that 10 Defendant was not induced to confess by an implied promise made during the first 11 interrogation. We affirm the district court’s conclusion that Defendant’s waiver was 12 voluntary and affirm the admission of Defendant’s statement as evidence. 13 B. The Voluntariness Issue Was Not Required to Be Bifurcated from the 14 Guilt Phase of the Trial 15 {27} Defendant argues that “it was improper for the trial court to submit the issue of 16 voluntariness of the confession by the Defendant to the jury that determined his guilt.” 17 Defendant’s argument is inapposite to our jurisprudence and is without merit. 18 {28} New Mexico applies the “Massachusetts procedure” for admitting allegedly 19 1For a thorough discussion of the difference between the “New York procedure” 18 and the “Massachusetts procedure” and their differences, see Jackson v. Denno, 378 19 U.S. 368, 377-80, 378 n.8, 394 (1964). 20 15 involuntary confessions into evidence, see Tindle, 1986-NMCA-035, ¶ 21, which was 1 followed in this case.1 Under the Massachusetts procedure, “to introduce a confession 2 into evidence, the state must make a prima facie showing of voluntariness.” Id. The 3 State does so “by establishing that the confession was not extracted by fear, coercion, 4 hope of reward or any other improper inducement.” Id. “If the State fails to prove 5 voluntariness by the preponderance of the evidence, the trial court must rule that the 6 confession was involuntary as a matter of law.” Id. “If . . . the court finds, by a 7 preponderance of the evidence, that the confession was voluntary, then the question 8 of voluntariness goes to the jury.” Id. ¶ 22. The district court held a pretrial hearing 9 to determine whether Defendant’s confession was voluntary and concluded that it was 10 before ultimately submitting the issue to the jury. The court also properly instructed 11 the jury that it could not consider Defendant’s statement for any purpose unless they 12 first determined that Defendant voluntarily gave the statement—that it was freely 13 made and not induced by promises or threats. The district court did not err in 14 submitting the issues of voluntariness of confession and of guilt to the same jury. 15 2The Jackson Court analyzed the constitutionality of a New York procedure for 15 admitting allegedly involuntary confessions into evidence. Under New York law at 16 the time, the trial judge was required to: 17 [M]ake a preliminary determination regarding a confession offered by 18 the prosecution and exclude it if in no circumstances could the 19 confession be deemed voluntary. But if the evidence presents a fair 20 question as to its voluntariness, as where certain facts bearing on the 17 issue are in dispute or where reasonable men could differ over the 18 inferences to be drawn from undisputed facts, the judge must receive the 19 confession and leave to the jury, under proper instructions, the ultimate 20 determination of its voluntary character and also its truthfulness. 21 378 U.S. at 377 (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 22 Under this procedure it was “impossible to discover whether the jury found the 23 confession voluntary and relied upon it, or involuntary and supposedly ignored it,” 24 because the jury was only required to return a general verdict upon the ultimate 25 question of guilt or innocence. Id. at 379. Whether the jury made a decision on the 26 issue of the voluntariness of the confession or decided the defendant’s guilt on the 27 basis of an involuntary confession could not be known. Id. at 380. 28 16 Defendant essentially asks us to apply the New York procedure,2 which we refuse to 1 do, as it is settled in our jurisdiction that New Mexico applies the Massachusetts 2 procedure. See, e.g., Tindle, 1986-NMCA-035, ¶ 21. 3 C. Whether the District Court Erred in Denying Defendant’s Requested Jury 4 Instruction that Modified the Uniform Jury Instruction 5 {29} Defendant contends that jury instruction 6,which is UJI 14-5040 NMRA, did 6 not conform to the law based on the facts of this case. Jury instruction 6 provides that: 7 Evidence has been admitted concerning a statement allegedly made by 8 the defendant. Before you consider such statement for any purpose, you 9 17 must determine that the statement was given voluntarily. In determining 1 whether a statement was voluntarily given, you should consider if it was 2 freely made and not induced by promise or threat. 3 Defendant tendered a modified version of UJI 14-5040, which reads: 4 Evidence has been admitted concerning a statement allegedly made by 5 the defendant. Before you consider such statement for any purpose, you 6 must determine that the statement was given voluntarily. In determining 7 whether a statement was voluntarily given, you should consider if it was 8 freely made and not induced by promise, threat or hope of reward. In 9 determining whether the defendant voluntarily gave the statement, you 10 are to consider the defendant’s mental capacity. 11 (Emphasis added.) Defendant argues that because Aguilar, 1988-NMSC-004, ¶ 13 12 held that “implied threats and promises, especially when knowingly made to a 13 defendant with diminished mental capacity, rendered [a] confession involuntary as a 14 matter of law,” the jury instructions should clearly reflect Aguilar’s holding. (Internal 15 quotation marks and citation omitted.) 16 {30} The question we must address is “whether a reasonable juror would have been 17 confused or misdirected by the jury instruction.” State v. Benally, 2001-NMSC-033, 18 ¶ 12, 131 N.M. 258, 34 P.3d 1134 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 19 A juror may suffer from confusion or misdirection “through omission or misstatement 20 [if the instruction] fail[s] to provide the juror with an accurate rendition of the relevant 21 law.” Id. Conversely, a jury instruction does not need to include all of the 22 circumstances the jury may consider, as long as the jury instruction fairly and 23 18 adequately states the law. See State v. McFerran, 1969-NMCA-084, ¶ 64, 80 N.M. 1 622, 459 P.2d 148. 2 {31} The instruction given by the district court was Uniform Jury Instruction 14- 3 5040, which as a uniform jury instruction approved by this Court is presumed to be 4 a correct statement of the law. State v. Wilson, 1994-NMSC-009, ¶ 5, 116 N.M. 793, 5 867 P.2d 1175. The jury was instructed to determine whether Defendant’s statements 6 were voluntary, and in making that determination, the jurors were to consider whether 7 the statement was freely made and not induced by promise or threat. We conclude 8 that the jury instruction fairly and adequately states the law. The jury instruction did 9 not need to include all of the circumstances that might be relevant as to whether 10 Defendant’s statements were the product of promises or threats. The details could and 11 should be left to the argument of counsel. In addition, during closing argument in this 12 case, Defendant thoroughly discussed how mental capacity may impact a finding of 13 voluntariness. Thus, a jury instruction that further highlighted Defendant’s arguments 14 would have given undue emphasis to Defendant’s perspective. See State v. Sanders, 15 2000-NMSC-032, ¶ 23, 129 N.M. 728, 13 P.3d 460. Therefore, we conclude that the 16 district court properly gave the jury an unmodified version of UJI 14-5040. 17 III. ISSUES REGARDING DEFENDANT’S FELONY-MURDER 18 CONVICTION 19 19 A. Whether Defendant Is Entitled to a Directed Verdict on the Felony- 1 Murder Charge 2 {32} Defendant contends that he was entitled to a directed verdict on the first-degree 3 felony-murder charge for two reasons. First, Defendant argues that the crime of 4 shooting at or from a motor vehicle contrary to Section 30-3-8(B) cannot serve as the 5 predicate felony for felony murder. Second, Defendant argues that he did not have the 6 requisite mens rea for a felony-murder conviction. 7 1. Shooting at or from a Motor Vehicle Cannot Serve as a Predicate Felony for 8 Felony Murder 9 {33} Defendant relies on State v. Pierce, 1990-NMSC-027, ¶ 22, 109 N.M. 596, 788 10 P.2d 352, modified by State v. Ortega, 1991-NMSC-084, ¶¶ 21, 24, 26, 28, 112 N.M. 11 554, 817 P.2d 1196, to argue that shooting at or from a motor vehicle cannot be a 12 predicate felony for felony murder. Pierce provides that “[w]here the felony 13 supporting felony murder is inherently dangerous, and where it is independent of the 14 act causing the death of the victim, it may be used to support an alternative count of 15 felony murder against a defendant . . . .” Id. (emphasis added). The requirement that 16 the predicate felony be independent of the act that caused the death of a victim is part 17 of the collateral-felony doctrine. See State v. Campos, 1996-NMSC-043, ¶ 8, ¶ 8 n.1, 18 122 N.M. 148, 921 P.2d 1266 (discussing the collateral-felony doctrine). Defendant 19 argues that “shooting from the motor vehicle was not independent of the act causing 20 20 the death of the victim” because the shooting directly caused Victim’s death, and 1 therefore “under Pierce, such [a] felony cannot support felony murder.” We agree 2 with Defendant that shooting from a motor vehicle cannot be the predicate felony for 3 a felony-murder conviction under the collateral-felony doctrine. See Marquez, 2016- 4 NMSC-___, ¶ 52. 5 {34} In Campos, this Court addressed the collateral-felony doctrine in some detail. 6 New Mexico’s felony-murder rule is unique because “New Mexico does not abandon 7 the mens rea requirement for murder, nor does it create a presumption that a defendant 8 had intended to kill whenever a homicide occurs during the course of a felony.” 9 1996-NMSC-043, ¶¶ 16-17. Instead, “[o]ur felony-murder rule only serves to raise 10 second-degree murder to first-degree murder when the murder is committed in the 11 course of a dangerous felony.” Id. ¶ 17. The elevation of a second-degree murder into 12 a first-degree murder occurs when the Legislature evinces an intent that certain crimes 13 are serious enough to merit elevated punishment. Id. ¶ 18. Circumstances that merit 14 the application of the felony-murder rule include “the commission of a first-degree 15 felony or a lesser-degree felony that is itself inherently dangerous or is committed 16 under circumstances that are inherently dangerous.” Id. 17 {35} In light of the above, “the main concern in applying the felony-murder doctrine 18 in New Mexico is that the prosecution may be able to elevate improperly the vast 19 21 majority of second-degree murders to first-degree murders by charging the underlying 1 assaultive act as a predicate felony for the felony-murder doctrine.” Id. ¶ 19. To 2 address this concern, the collateral-felony doctrine in New Mexico precludes use of 3 a felony that is a lesser-included offense of second-degree murder as a predicate 4 felony for felony murder. Id. Whether a felony is a lesser-included offense requires 5 application of the strict-elements test. Id. ¶ 22. 6 {36} Under the strict-elements test, 7 [A] court would find an offense to be a lesser-included offense of 8 another only if the statutory elements of the lesser offense are a sub-set 9 of the statutory elements of the greater offense such that it would be 10 impossible ever to commit the greater offense without also committing 11 the lesser offense. 12 Id. ¶ 20 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Campos Court noted that 13 forms of aggravated assault and aggravated battery “would always be deemed to be 14 non-collateral even though, under some statutory definitions, aggravated battery and 15 aggravated assault include one or more statutory elements that are not elements of 16 second degree murder.” Id. ¶ 23. 17 {37} Recently in Marquez we clarified that the collateral-felony doctrine requires 18 courts to consider the elements of a dangerous crime in the abstract, and only if the 19 dangerous felony has a purpose independent of the purpose of assaulting or injuring 20 the victim may the dangerous felony be used as a predicate for felony murder. We 21 22 concluded that shooting at or from a motor vehicle does not qualify as a predicate 1 felony because the essence of the felony is assaulting or injuring a person, which is 2 a form of aggravated assault or battery. 2016-NMSC-___, ¶¶ 23-25. Therefore, we 3 remand to the district court to vacate Defendant’s conviction for first-degree murder. 4 Whether the judgment and sentence should be amended to reflect a conviction for 5 second-degree murder or shooting from a motor vehicle resulting in great bodily 6 injury—both of which carry a sentence of fifteen years, see NMSA 1978, § 7 31-18-15(A)(4) (2007)—turns on whether there was sufficient evidence to support the 8 mens rea requirement for second-degree murder. 9 2. Whether the Requisite Mens Rea for Second-Degree Murder Was Established 10 {38} Defendant contends that the mens rea requirement for second-degree murder 11 was not established because he “did not know the nexus between the lethal act and 12 strong probability of death.” New Mexico requires that suspects possess the mens rea 13 of second-degree murder to be convicted of felony murder. Campos, 14 1996-NMSC-043, ¶¶ 16-17. The mens rea element for second-degree murder is that 15 the defendant “intended to kill or knew that his acts created a strong probability of 16 death or great bodily harm.” State v. Griffin, 1993-NMSC-071, ¶ 23, 116 N.M. 689, 17 866 P.2d 1156. The jury was correctly instructed regarding the mens rea requirement 18 for felony murder. 19 23 {39} When determining whether the district court erred in not directing a verdict, we 1 look at both the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence 2 in the light most favorable to the verdict. State v. Garcia, 1980-NMSC-141, ¶ 3, 95 3 N.M. 260, 620 P.2d 1285. A directed verdict is warranted only if there are no 4 reasonable inferences from which the requisite intent may be found. Id. A 5 defendant’s intent is seldom susceptible to proof by direct evidence, yet we have 6 consistently held that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove the requisite intent. 7 See, e.g., State v. Flores, 2010-NMSC-002, ¶ 19, 147 N.M. 542, 226 P.3d 641. 8 {40} In this case, Defendant admitted that he shot the gun from inside the car, 9 asserting that he did so as a warning to those who were outside the car. Torres 10 testified that she pulled the car up to where a group of people were standing outside 11 the Burger King. She told Defendant to show the gun to Victim when multiple shots 12 were fired by Defendant. In addition, the video recording from the lapel camera of 13 one of the police officers showed the entry and exit wounds to Victim’s legs, from 14 which the jury could draw the reasonable inference that Defendant shot directly at 15 Victim and not warning shots, as he asserted. See State v. Astorga, 2015-NMSC-007, 16 ¶ 57, 343 P.3d 1245 (“[A] jury is free to reject [the defendant’s] version of the facts.” 17 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 18 {41} The jury could reasonably find that Defendant knew that there was a strong 19 24 probability that someone might die or experience great bodily harm when he 1 discharged his gun toward Victim. Accord State v. Varela, 1999-NMSC-045, ¶ 21, 2 128 N.M. 454, 993 P.2d 1280 (noting that a jury could permissibly infer the mens rea 3 for second-degree murder when the defendant shot at a dwelling that he knew to be 4 occupied). We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of the directed verdict 5 motion. On remand, the district court should amend the judgment and sentence to 6 reflect a jury conviction of second-degree murder because all of the elements of 7 second-degree murder were found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt when the 8 jury found Defendant guilty of felony murder. See State v. Tafoya, 2012-NMSC-030, 9 ¶ 34, 285 P.3d 604 (where the predicate felony is not appropriate if the record 10 supports Defendant’s conviction of second-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt, 11 this Court should remand to the district court to vacate the felony-murder conviction 12 and for entry of judgment for second-degree murder). 13 IV. ISSUES REGARDING THE DISTRICT COURT’S EVIDENTIARY 14 RULINGS 15 A. Whether the District Court Abused Its Discretion in Excluding the 16 Introduction of a Prosecutor’s Opening Statement from Another Trial 17 {42} Defendant argues that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to allow 18 him to use a portion of the State’s opening statement in Mathis’s trial which 19 concerned the testimony of witness Carrie D’Urbano. According to Defendant, 20 25 D’Urbano told law enforcement that (1) Mathis said that Victim was “going to get it,” 1 and (2) Mathis asked Torres to show D’Urbano that they had a gun. For Defendant, 2 this testimony “cast[s] doubt on whether Defendant had possession of the gun which 3 was allegedly used to shoot victim and whether Defendant was implicated in the plan 4 to harm victim.” 5 {43} The district court ruled that the opening statement was hearsay within hearsay 6 because Defendant sought to admit into evidence what the prosecutor during a 7 different trial said that another person (D’Urbano) said she heard others say. In 8 addition, because D’Urbano is not a party-opponent, the statement was inadmissible. 9 On appeal, Defendant asserts that the opening statement is admissible under Rule 10 11-801(D)(2)(b) NMRA, which concerns statements made by an opposing party, in 11 this case, the State. 12 {44} A hearsay statement consists of an out-of-court statement offered to prove the 13 truth of the matter asserted. Rule 11-801(C). “An out-of-court statement is 14 inadmissible unless it is specifically excluded as non-hearsay under Rule 11-801(D) 15 or falls within a recognized exception in the rules of evidence, see, e.g., Rule 11-803 16 NMRA . . ., or is otherwise made admissible by rule or statute.” State v. 17 McClaugherty, 2003-NMSC-006, ¶ 17, 133 N.M. 459, 64 P.3d 486 (ruling on the 18 interpretation of Rule 11-802 NMRA), overruled on other grounds by State v. 19 26 Tollardo, 2012-NMSC-008, ¶ 37 n.6, 275 P.3d 110. The relevant opening statement 1 is as follows: 2 [T]hey [referring to Mathis, Torres, and Defendant] stop at the house of 3 a Carrie D’Urbano, who you will learn is a friend of . . . [Victim] and 4 Ms. Mathis both. And you will hear that . . . Ms. Mathis, at that point 5 was driving her car, and tells Ms. D’Urbano, pulls out a revolver, a 22 6 caliber revolver, says “we’re going to go take care of [Victim]” . . . . 7 Defendant’s argument is without merit because the prosecutor did not have personal 8 knowledge of what either Mathis or D’Urbano stated. See Rule 11-602 NMRA (“A 9 witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a 10 finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove 11 personal knowledge may consist of the witness’s own testimony.”). In this case, the 12 prosecutor was simply alerting the jury about what it would hear when D’Urbano 13 testified about statements she heard Mathis make (Mathis was being prosecuted in 14 another case) about Mathis’s, Torres’s, and Defendant’s plans to harm Victim. The 15 prosecutor’s opening statement to the jury was not an obvious admission of fact that 16 might have constituted an admission of a party opponent. See State v. Doe, 1977- 17 NMCA-078, ¶¶ 12-13, 91 N.M. 92, 570 P.2d 923. The district court’s refusal to allow 18 a portion of the prosecutor’s opening statement in the Mathis trial to be admitted as 19 an admission of a party opponent in Defendant’s (Montoya’s) trial was not erroneous. 20 B. Whether the District Court Abused Its Discretion in Allowing the 21 27 Admission of a 15-Minute Long Videotape of Victim Bleeding to Death 1 {45} Defendant next argues that the district court abused its discretion when it 2 admitted a “fifteen minute videotape of the victim bleeding to death” that was 3 “sensational” such that Defendant was unfairly prejudiced. Defendant asserts that the 4 video “was not relevant to a contested issue as it was not contested that [Victim] was 5 shot and bled.” The video in question was taken from a law enforcement officer’s 6 lapel camera and depicts the officer’s encounter with Victim at Burger King. Defense 7 counsel objected to the admission of this evidence because it allegedly contained 8 statements made by Victim that were inadmissible hearsay. The State responded by 9 arguing that the statements made by Victim were admissible as either excited 10 utterances or dying declarations. The district court agreed with the State and held that, 11 at the very least, the statements made by Victim were admissible excited utterances. 12 Defense counsel did not object on the basis that the lapel camera video was unfairly 13 prejudicial under Rule 11-403 NMRA. 14 {46} In light of the above, Defendant failed to preserve the issue of unfair prejudice 15 for appeal. “To preserve an issue for review on appeal, it must appear that appellant 16 fairly invoked a ruling of the trial court on the same grounds argued in the appellate 17 court.” Woolwine v. Furr’s, Inc.,1987-NMCA-133, ¶ 20, 106 N.M. 492, 745 P.2d 717 18 (emphasis added). Therefore, Defendant failed to preserve the issue of unfair 19 28 prejudice. Rule 12-216(A) NMRA. 1 {47} In the alternative, Defendant argues that the admission of the video is 2 fundamental error. However, “[f]undamental error only applies in exceptional 3 circumstances when guilt is so doubtful that it would shock the judicial conscience to 4 allow the conviction to stand.” State v. Gallegos, 2009-NMSC-017, ¶ 27, 146 N.M. 5 88, 206 P.3d 993 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Here, Defendant 6 confessed to the shooting, and there is corroborative evidence of his confession. 7 Witness testimony indicates that he had possession of a gun immediately prior to the 8 shooting and that he was instructed to display this gun to threaten Victim. Moreover, 9 Victim was in fact shot and died from her wounds. Defendant contended that he only 10 fired warning shots; however, the video provides evidence that at least one of the 11 bullets that entered Victim’s leg was a straight shot, which would allow the reasonable 12 inference that Defendant did not fire warning shots, but instead fired directly at 13 Victim. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the video 14 evidence. 15 C. Whether the District Court Abused Its Discretion in Denying Defendant’s 16 Request that His Entire Statement Be Shown to the Jury 17 {48} Defendant contends that the video of his interrogation by Detective Esquero 18 should have been admitted in its entirety on the basis of the rule of completeness. See 19 29 Rule 11-106 NMRA (providing the rule of completeness). Apparently the State had 1 edited out certain portions of the video because they concerned (1) Defendant’s prior 2 bad acts, (2) potential sentencing, and (3) self-serving statements made by Defendant. 3 The State excised these portions because it feared a mistrial, and it did not want to put 4 on Defendant’s self-serving statements. The district court decided that the exclusion 5 of the video’s excised portions was proper because the excised portions do not provide 6 additional context to what the State was showing through the video. 7 {49} Rule 11-106 provides that “[i]f a party introduces all or part of a writing or 8 recorded statement, an adverse party may require the introduction, at that time, of any 9 other part—or any other writing or recorded statement—that in fairness ought to be 10 considered at the same time.” (Emphasis added.) In interpreting Rule 11-106, we 11 have explained that “[t]he primary purpose behind the rule of completeness is to 12 eliminate misleading or deceptive impressions created by creative excerpting.” State 13 v. Guerra, 2012-NMSC-014, ¶ 41, 278 P.3d 1031 (internal quotation marks and 14 citation omitted). The party invoking Rule 11-106 must show that the portion of the 15 recording he or she seeks to introduce “is relevant to the issue in dispute and qualifies 16 or explains the subject matter of the portion of the [recording that was just] admitted.” 17 State v. Barr, 2009-NMSC-024, ¶ 36, 146 N.M. 301, 210 P.3d 198, overruled on other 18 grounds by Tollardo, 2012-NMSC-008, 275 P.3d 110. In this case, Defendant does 19 30 not explain how the excised portions further provide context for the admitted portions 1 of Detective Esquero’s interrogation. Therefore, Defendant’s argument is without 2 merit and the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to admit the 3 remainder of the recorded statement under the rule of completeness. 4 V. CONCLUSION 5 {50} We remand to the district court to vacate the felony-murder conviction and the 6 conviction for shooting at or from a motor vehicle and to resentence Defendant for 7 second-degree murder. Defendant’s other convictions are affirmed. 8 {51} IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 ___________________________________ 10 EDWARD L. CHÁVEZ, Justice 11 WE CONCUR: 12 ___________________________________ 13 CHARLES W. DANIELS, Chief Justice 14 ___________________________________ 15 PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice 16 31 ___________________________________ 1 BARBARA J. VIGIL, Justice 2 JUDITH K. NAKAMURA, Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part 3 37 NAKAMURA, Justice (concurring in part, dissenting in part) 1 {52} For the reasons articulated in my dissenting opinion in State v. Marquez, 2016- 2 NMSC-____, ¶¶ 62-81, ___ P.3d ____ (Nakamura, J., dissenting), I believe that 3 shooting at or from a motor vehicle, a violation of NMSA 1978, § 30-3-8(B) (1993), 4 is a collateral felony and, thus, may serve as a predicate felony for felony murder. 5 Accordingly, I do not agree that Defendant’s first-degree felony-murder conviction 6 must be vacated. For this reason, I respectfully dissent. I concur, however, with the 7 majority that the remainder of the issues Defendant raises on appeal are without merit 8 and that Defendant’s other convictions should be affirmed. 9 ______________________________ 10 JUDITH K. NAKAMURA, Justice 11