Title: Cook County v. Bear Stearns & Co. Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 97022
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: June 3, 2005

Docket No. 97022-Agenda 11-November 2004.
THE COUNTY OF COOK ex rel. ROBERT F. RIFKIN et al.,
Appellants, v. BEAR STEARNS &amp; COMPANY, INC., et al., 							Appellees.
Opinion filed June 3, 2005.
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:
	This case presents questions of whether plaintiffs have standing
to assert a cause of action on behalf of Cook County under article XX
of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/20-101 et seq. (West
1998)), and whether plaintiffs have standing to assert common law
claims on behalf of the County. The circuit court of Cook County
dismissed the complaint, finding article XX unconstitutional to the
extent it conferred authority on private citizens to file derivative
claims on behalf of the County. We allowed plaintiffs' direct appeal
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 302(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 302(a)). We
now affirm and hold: (1) the State's Attorney has the exclusive power
to represent the County in litigation when the County is the real party
in interest; (2) section 20-104(b) of article XX is unconstitutional to
the extent it purports to confer standing on private citizens to sue
when the County is the real party in interest; and (3) plaintiffs'
common law claims do not lie when no claim is made that a public
official is responsible for the alleged injury, and only the State's
Attorney has the authority to assert those claims.

I. BACKGROUND
	In March 2001, plaintiffs, Robert F. Rifkin, Raymond G.
Scachitti, and Patrick J. Houlihan, taxpayers and residents of Cook
County, filed a putative class action seeking to recover, on behalf of
the County, overcharges made by Bear Stearns &amp; Company in
connection with advance refunding bond transactions in 1992. Bear
Stearns was the lead underwriter for the County's issuance of bonds
to refinance, at lower interest rates, certain municipal bonds
previously issued by the County. The case was essentially a reassertion
of pendent state claims dismissed in an earlier suit filed in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. That
dismissal was affirmed on appeal. See Rifkin v. Bear Stearns &amp; Co.,
248 F.3d 628 (7th Cir. 2001).
	An advance refunding bond transaction is a financial investment
vehicle allowing the sale of new bonds and the use of the proceeds to
purchase securities. These securities are then held in a defeasance
escrow to assure future payment of outstanding bonds that cannot
presently be redeemed because the call provisions are for a future
date. According to the complaint, federal law restricts the overall yield
local governments can earn on securities placed in a defeasance
escrow. By charging more than market value, Bear Stearns reduced,
or "burned," the yield on the securities and kept the profit. The
complaint alleges the "burn" violates IRS regulations requiring
securities to be purchased at market value and any profit resulting
from positive arbitrage be paid to the United States Treasury. If this
is not done, the refunding bonds may lose tax-exempt status. The
complaint claims that in the 1992 transaction, Bear Stearns
overcharged the County by approximately $249,000.
	The complaint sought relief against Bear Stearns under sections
20-102 and 20-103 of article XX (735 ILCS 5/20-102, 20-103
(West 1998)). Section 20-102 provides that any person who receives
fraudulently obtained public funds, whether or not that person has
committed the fraud, must refund the money. 735 ILCS 5/20-102
(West 1998). Section 20-103 provides that a person who receives
compensation benefits or remuneration "to which he is not entitled, or
in a greater amount than that to which he is entitled" shall be liable to
repay those amounts and, in addition, is liable for civil penalties,
including treble damages. 735 ILCS 5/20-103 (West 1998). A
common law claim was also asserted against Bear Stearns for
fraudulently representing to the County that it was paying fair market
value for the securities and that the escrow accounts would not
produce positive arbitrage. The complaint also sought consequential
damages against Bear Stearns for breach of its underwriting contract,
or for rescission and restitution.
	The complaint sought common law relief against the accounting
firm Ernst &amp; Young (Ernst), engaged to verify the accuracy of the
escrow account for the County. Plaintiffs allege Ernst breached its
contract by submitting a false or recklessly inaccurate verification and
that it committed accountant malpractice by failing to exercise
reasonable care or competence while completing its verification,
resulting in a misstatement of the yield on the securities in the escrow
fund.
	Common law breach of contract claims were also asserted against
Public Sector Group, Inc. (PSG), and Seaway National Bank of
Chicago (Seaway). PSG and Seaway were engaged by the County to
provide financial advisory services in connection with the refunding
bonds. The complaint alleged they failed to monitor and verify the
accuracy of the amounts charged to the County for services and
securities, and failed to disclose to the County that it paid more than
fair market value for securities purchased for the defeasance escrow.
	The complaint also asserted a common law breach of fiduciary
duty claim against all defendants, alleging that as investment advisors
to the County, all defendants were, as a matter of law, fiduciaries to
the County. Plaintiffs claim defendants violated their fiduciary duties
by failing to monitor and inform the County of markups on the
securities issued in the advanced refunding transaction.
	The complaint did not allege that the County or any County
official was in any way complicit in the alleged misrepresentations or
fraud. On the contrary, plaintiffs alleged that defendants' fraudulent
concealment of the marked-up price of the securities "was intended to,
and did in fact, prevent the County from knowing either that it had
claims against the Defendants or the true facts underlying those
claims."
	In their prayer for relief, plaintiffs sought class certification,
compensatory and treble damages, rescission of contracts and
restitution, attorney fees and expenses, and equitable relief, including
imposing a constructive trust on or otherwise restricting defendants'
assets to ensure plaintiffs an effective remedy.
	On March 23, 1999, prior to filing the original suit in federal
court, plaintiffs' counsel sent by certified mail a letter to the Cook
County State's Attorney, giving notice of his intent to file suit, as
required by section 20-104(b) of article XX (735 ILCS 5/20-104(b)
(West 1998)), for overcharges incurred by Cook County in connection
with the 1992 bond issue, and demanding that the State's Attorney
pursue any and all claims stemming from overcharges in the bond
issue transactions. Section 20-104(b) provides:
			"Notwithstanding any other provision in this Section, any
private citizen residing within the boundaries of the
governmental unit affected may bring an action to recover the
damages authorized in this Article on behalf of such
governmental unit if: (a) the citizen has sent a letter by
certified mail, return receipt requested, to the appropriate
government official stating his intention to file suit for
recovery under this Article and (b) the appropriate
government official has not, within 60 days of the date of
delivery on the citizen's return receipt, either instituted an
action for recovery or sent notice to the citizen by certified
mail, return receipt requested, that the official has arranged
for a settlement with the party alleged to have illegally
obtained the compensation or that the official intends to
commence suit within 60 days of the date of the notice. A
denial by the official of the liability of the party alleged liable
by the citizen, failure to have actually arranged for a
settlement as stated, or failure to commence a suit within the
designated period after having stated the intention in the
notice to do so shall also permit the citizen to commence the
action.
			For purposes of this subsection (b), 'appropriate
government official' shall mean (1) the Attorney General,
where the government unit alleged damaged is the State; (2)
the corporation counsel where the government unit alleged
damaged is a municipality with a population of over 500,000;
and (3) the chief executive officer of any other local
government unit where that unit is alleged damaged.
			Any private citizen commencing an action in compliance
with this subsection which is reasonable and commenced in
good faith shall be entitled to recover court costs and
litigation expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees, from
any defendant found liable under this Article." 735 ILCS
5/20-104(b) (West 1998).
	Article VII, section 4(b), of the Illinois Constitution of 1970
designates the president of the Cook County board as the chief
executive officer of the County. The notice was not sent, in the
manner required by the statute, to John H. Stroger, Jr., who was then
the president of the Board of Commissioners of Cook County.
	The State's Attorney did not respond to the notice, and plaintiffs
filed suit in federal court, asserting a federal claim as well as all the
state claims later presented in the circuit court of Cook County. The
County appeared in the lawsuit, but did not originally file any pleading
attacking the complaint. The defendants filed motions to dismiss,
asserting, inter alia, the notice was defective because it was not
addressed to the chief executive officer of Cook County as required
by the statute. When the motion was called for hearing, the State's
Attorney appeared on behalf of the County and sought leave to join
in the request for dismissal. The district court denied the defendants'
motion, but did not rule on the County's request. Ultimately, the
federal claims and the pendent state claims were dismissed for failure
to allege an injury sufficient to establish standing under article III,
section 2, of the United States Constitution. After the dismissal was
affirmed on appeal (Rifkin, 248 F.3d 628), plaintiffs filed the state
court lawsuit, but did not give any further notice to the chief executive
officer of the County.
	All defendants and the County, in its capacity as a nominal
plaintiff, filed motions to dismiss, raising both the issue of the
sufficiency of the presuit notice and the issue of plaintiffs' lack of
standing. The trial court dismissed the common law claims on June 19,
2003, finding that plaintiffs lacked standing to assert common law
causes of action on behalf of the County. The court also denied
plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint to assert article XX claims
against Ernst, PSG and Seaway, finding those defendants would be
prejudiced by the amendment and that no sufficient excuse was
offered to explain the failure to include article XX claims against those
defendants in the original complaint. On August 20, 2003, the court
dismissed all remaining counts of the complaint with prejudice, finding
section 20-104(b) of article XX unconstitutional to the extent it
authorized persons other than the State's Attorney to file actions on
behalf of the County in cases when the County is the real party in
interest. The court did not rule directly on the issue of plaintiffs'
noncompliance with the statutory presuit-notice requirement. This
appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS
	Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in finding section
20-104(b) of article XX unconstitutional because article XX allows
citizens to sue on behalf of the County when the County is the real
party in interest. Plaintiffs also assign as error the dismissal of their
common law claims and the trial court's refusal to allow them to file
an amended complaint.
	Whether a statute is unconstitutional is a question of law
reviewed de novo. People ex rel. Sherman v. Cryns, 203 Ill. 2d 264,
290 (2003). An order dismissing a complaint for lack of standing also
presents a question of law reviewed de novo. Lyons v. Ryan, 201 Ill. 2d 529, 534 (2002). A trial court's denial of a motion for leave to
amend a pleading is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.
Loyola Academy v. S&amp;S Roof Maintenance, Inc., 146 Ill. 2d 263,
273-74 (1992).

A. Article XX Claims
	In Fuchs v. Bidwill, 65 Ill. 2d 503, 510 (1976), we determined
that the Attorney General, as the constitutionally designated legal
officer of the state, is the only person authorized to represent the state
in matters when the state is the real party in interest. In Lyons, we
reaffirmed this holding and held that section 20-104(b) of article XX
is unconstitutional to the extent it confers on private citizens standing
to commence and prosecute actions on behalf of the state when the
state is the real party in interest, thus improperly usurping the
constitutional powers of the Attorney General. Lyons, 201 Ill. 2d  at
541. As we said in Lyons, "the 'real party in interest' has an actual and
substantial interest in the subject matter of the action, as distinguished
from one who has only a nominal, formal, or technical interest in, or
connection with, the case." Lyons, 201 Ill. 2d  at 534. The plaintiffs in
Lyons brought their case as a taxpayer derivative action. We held that
because only the state would be entitled to the benefits of a successful
action, the state was the real party in interest. Lyons, 201 Ill. 2d  at
535. Here, only the County would benefit from a successful
prosecution of the common law and article XX claims. Therefore, the
County is the only real party in interest.
	Like the Attorney General, a State's Attorney is a constitutional
officer. The 1870 Illinois Constitution provided that there "be elected
a state's attorney in and for each county in lieu of the state's attorneys
now provided by law." Ill. Const. 1870, art. VI, §22. This court has
held that the State's Attorney is a State officer under the 1870
Constitution. Hoyne v. Danisch, 264 Ill. 467, 470-73 (1914). The
1970 Illinois Constitution contains a similar provision: "A State's
Attorney shall be elected in each county in 1972 and every fourth year
thereafter for a four year term." Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §19. In
Ingemunson v. Hedges, 133 Ill. 2d 364, 369-70 (1990), we reaffirmed
the holding in Hoyne, noting that the debates of the Sixth Illinois
Constitutional Convention of 1970 indicate the drafters of the 1970
Constitution agreed that State's Attorneys should be classified as
state, rather than county, officers.
	This court has consistently held that the powers of the State's
Attorney are derived from the constitution. In People ex rel. Courtney
v. Ashton, 358 Ill. 146, 150-51 (1934), we observed that the State's
Attorney is a constitutional officer whose powers may not be stripped
or transferred to others by a legislative body. See also Ashton v.
County of Cook, 384 Ill. 287, 296-97 (1943).
	 In People ex rel. Kunstman v. Nagano, 389 Ill. 231 (1945), we
considered the question of whether the legislature could
constitutionally empower a private citizen to bring an action for
forfeiture of an alien's real estate. In that case, a private citizen sought
to enforce a provision of the Aliens Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, ch. 6,
par. 1 et seq.) requiring forfeiture of title to lands in this state held for
more than six years by an alien over the age of 21 years. The State's
Attorney was empowered to enforce the Act to compel a sale of the
property by a court-appointed officer and required payment of the
proceeds of the sale to the county treasurer. As required by the Aliens
Act, the plaintiff, a private citizen, first gave notice to the State's
Attorney that an alien was holding title to the land in question. The
State's Attorney took no action, and the plaintiff, as permitted by the
Act, then filed suit. The alien moved to dismiss, claiming the Cook
County State's Attorney and the Illinois Attorney General are the sole
representatives of the state in proceedings by the state affecting a
public interest, and that the provision in the Aliens Act allowing a
private citizen to bring the suit was unconstitutional. The trial court
dismissed the suit, and a direct appeal was taken to this court. We
affirmed, determining that the forfeiture proceeding was a matter
affecting a public interest. Nagano, 389 Ill.  at 250. We held the
State's Attorney is a constitutional officer with rights and duties
"analogous to or largely coincident with the Attorney General, though
not identical, and the one to represent the county or People in matters
affected with a public interest." Nagano, 389 Ill.  at 249. Accordingly,
we held section 2 of the Aliens Act, providing the right of a private
citizen to sue if the State's Attorney neglected or refused to proceed,
was unconstitutional. Nagano, 389 Ill.  at 252. We rejected the
plaintiff's argument that the statute does not entirely strip the State's
Attorney of the privilege to conduct the proceedings, as a citizen
could only sue if the State's Attorney failed to act within 30 days. We
reasoned that the State's Attorney and the Attorney General are the
only officers who could constitutionally prosecute such a suit at any
time and that the State's Attorney's constitutional powers "cannot be
placed" with persons not having the responsibility of the office.
Nagano, 389 Ill.  at 252. We observed:
		"It is presumed that [the State's Attorney] will act under such
a heavy sense of public duty and obligation for enforcement
of all our laws that he will commit no wrongful act. If he
does, the remedy must be by other well known means."
Nagano, 389 Ill.  at 252.
	The holding in Lyons reaffirming the exclusive right of the
Attorney General to represent the state in all matters when the state
is the real party in interest echoes the reasoning and the holding in
Nagano. Plaintiffs argue that Nagano is no longer viable because a
provision in the 1870 Constitution describing performance of duties
by the State's Attorney in language similar to the provision creating
the office of Attorney General no longer exists. Under the present
constitution, the Attorney General "shall be the legal officer of the
State, and shall have the duties and powers that may be prescribed by
law." Ill. Const. 1970, art. V, §15. By contrast, the provision creating
the office of State's Attorney only sets out the manner of election and
the qualifications for the office. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §19. It
contains no reference to the powers and duties of the office. Under the
1870 Constitution, prior to the 1964 amendment to the judicial article,
section 32 of the judicial article provided that "[a]ll officers *** shall
perform such duties and receive such compensation as is or may be
provided by law." Ill. Const. 1870, art. VI, §32. This section was
removed when the amendment to article VI was adopted in 1964. It
does not appear in the 1970 Constitution.
	This court in both Courtney and Nagano referred to the quoted
language in section 32 of the 1870 Constitution in analyzing the
derivation of the State's Attorney's powers. See Courtney, 358 Ill. at
150-51; Nagano, 389 Ill.  at 248-49.
	In Courtney, this court said the State's Attorney was a
constitutional officer who may not be stripped of any powers by a
legislative body. Courtney, 358 Ill.  at 151. In Nagano, this court
observed that "we have always viewed a State's Attorney as a
constitutional officer with rights and duties analogous to or largely
coincident with the Attorney General." Nagano, 389 Ill.  at 249. Citing
Nagano, we said in In re C.J., 166 Ill. 2d 264, 269 (1995), that "[t]he
State's Attorney is a constitutional officer who represents the people
in matters affected with a public interest." It is because the office of
State's Attorney was created by the constitution and functions like the
Attorney General in his or her own county that the State's Attorney
is deemed to have constitutional powers similar to those of the
Attorney General.
	Furthermore, certain powers and duties of the State's Attorney
are defined by section 3-9005 of the Counties Code (55 ILCS
5/3-9005 (West 2002)). We have stated that these powers and duties
may be revised by statute. People v. Izzo, 195 Ill. 2d 109, 117 (2001).
It does not follow, however, that the legislature can reduce a State's
Attorney's constitutionally derived power to direct the legal affairs of
the county. In the case of the Attorney General, we have held that the
duties of that office are prescribed by law and include those powers
traditionally held at common law. Lyons, 201 Ill. 2d  at 541. The
legislature may add to those powers, but it cannot reduce the Attorney
General's common law authority in directing the legal affairs of the
state. Lyons, 201 Ill. 2d  at 541. The State's Attorney's powers are
analogous to and largely coincident with those of the Attorney
General and it follows, therefore, that the legislature may not usurp
those constitutionally derived powers. Accordingly, as section
20-104(b) of article XX purports to give private citizens the right to
exercise a power lodged exclusively in the State's Attorney, it is
unconstitutional as applied in this case.
	As plaintiffs cannot assert article XX claims on behalf of the
County, we need not consider the sufficiency of the presuit notice.
Nor need we review the order denying leave to amend the complaint
to assert article XX claims against PSG, Ernst and Seaway, as
plaintiffs have no standing to assert those claims on behalf of the
County.

B. Common Law Claims
	The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' common law claims
against PSG, Ernst, and Seaway, finding that resolution of the
question of plaintiffs' standing to assert those claims was controlled
by the decision of the appellate court in City of Chicago ex rel.
Scachitti v. Prudential Securities, Inc., 332 Ill. App. 3d 353 (2002).
In that case, the same plaintiffs who brought the present action
asserted, on behalf of the City of Chicago, derivative common law
claims nearly identical to those in the case before us. The case was
consolidated with another similar suit brought on behalf of the County
of Du Page. Those claims also arose out of advance refunding bond
transactions resulting in yield burning. As in the present case, the
plaintiffs asserted standing as taxpayers affected by the City's and the
County's alleged losses. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of
the common law claims, holding the allegations in the complaint did
not support common law taxpayer standing because there was no
claim of a breach of duty by a public officer. Like the case before us,
the Scachitti complaints "cast the City and the County as the
unknowing victims of private third parties" with no claim that the third
parties benefitted from any breach of duty by a public officer.
Scachitti, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 370. The court reasoned that this court
has only authorized suits in equity by taxpayers to enjoin the
misappropriation or waste of public funds by public officials (Reid v.
Smith, 375 Ill. 147 (1940)) and suits to impose a public trust against
third parties that benefit from a public officer's breach of fiduciary
duty (People ex rel. Daley v. Warren Motors, Inc., 114 Ill. 2d 305
(1986)). Scachitti, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 369.
	Plaintiffs argue Scachitti was wrongly decided. They argue that
taxpayer standing is based on their increased burden of taxation
resulting from the misapplication of public funds, citing Fergus v.
Russel, 270 Ill. 304 (1915). We said in that case:
			"We have repeatedly held that tax-payers may resort to a
court of equity to prevent the misapplication of public funds,
and that this right is based upon the tax-payers' equitable
ownership of such funds and their liability to replenish the
public treasury for the deficiency which would be caused by
the misappropriation. [Citations.]" Fergus, 270 Ill.  at 314.
	The action in Fergus was, however, a proceeding against the
state Treasurer and the Auditor of Public Accounts to enjoin the
alleged misappropriation of public funds from the state treasury. The
taxpayer plaintiffs claimed the legislation appropriating funds for
salaries of state officers was unconstitutional because the provision
appeared in an omnibus bill referencing more than a single subject,
contrary to article IV, section 16, of the 1870 Constitution. The suit
sought relief against the state Treasurer and the Auditor of Public
Accounts. No claims were asserted against private, third-party
wrongdoers. Thus, Fergus is inapplicable here.
	Plaintiffs also note that we allowed a taxpayer derivative action
against a parking meter company for charging for the service of
parking meters actually buried in the snow. City of Chicago ex rel.
Konstantelos v. Duncan Traffic Equipment Co., 95 Ill. 2d 344 (1983).
In that case, the plaintiffs sued pursuant to the authority of section
1-5-1 of the Illinois Municipal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 24, par.
1-5-1) and sought relief against the Chicago deputy commissioner of
streets and sanitation in his official capacity, alleging he illegally
approved false invoices for meter inspections submitted by the parking
meter company vice president, who had contributed to the
commissioner's political organization. Thus, the basis for the action
was clearly the misconduct of a public official. No official misconduct
is claimed in the case before us, and Konstantelos is thus inapplicable
here.
	We note plaintiffs have cited no case where this court permitted
a common law taxpayer suit to proceed absent some breach of duty
by a public official. Defendants contend that this is a recognition of the
likelihood that a public officer who has committed a breach of duty
may be unable or unwilling to make an objective, dispassionate
decision about bringing suit and, in fact, may be able to prevent the
public body involved from filing an appropriate action. In those
circumstances, a taxpayer suit may provide the only means of
remedying official misconduct. On the other hand, when there has
been no breach of duty by a public officer, the appropriate public
officials will be reasonably certain to pursue claims for injuries to the
public treasury, thus rendering a taxpayer suit unnecessary.
	 We agree with defendants' reasoning. As we said in Lyons, " '[i]t
is presumed that a public official "performs the functions of his office
according to law and that he does his duty." ' " Lyons, 201 Ill. 2d  at
539, quoting Fuchs v. Bidwill, 65 Ill. 2d 503, 510 (1976), quoting
People ex rel. Hoyne v. Newcomer, 284 Ill. 315, 324 (1918). There is
no reason to assume that the State's Attorney's decision to oppose
plaintiffs' right to maintain their action in this case is ill-considered,
unfounded, or improperly motivated. If the voters are unsatisfied with
the State's Attorney's manner of discharging his duties, they have a
remedy every four years in the election booth.
	Further support for our holding may be found in the Counties
Code, where it is provided:
			"It shall be the duty of the county boards of each of the
counties of this State to take and order suitable and proper
measures for the prosecuting and defending of all suits to be
brought by or against their respective counties ***." 55 ILCS
5/1-6003 (West 1998).
	The Counties Code further provides that the State's Attorney
shall "commence and prosecute all actions, suits, indictments and
prosecutions, civil and criminal, in the circuit court for his county, in
which the people of the State or county may be concerned." 55 ILCS
5/3-9005(a)(1) (West 1998).
	In Ashton, 384 Ill. 287, this court applied earlier, substantively
identical versions of these two statutes in determining that the county
board lacked authority to employ private counsel to perform legal
services for the County. This court held that by law the State's
Attorney is "the attorney and legal adviser of the county officials in all
matters pertaining to the official business of the county." Ashton, 384 Ill.  at 297. The Counties Code neither expressly nor implicitly
authorized the county board to employ private attorneys. Ashton, 384 Ill.  at 299. Therefore, the court held that private counsel could not
enforce his contingent fee contract to perform legal services for the
County, as the contract was wholly void. Ashton, 384 Ill.  at 301.
	Applying the holding in Ashton, the appellate court held in
McKay v. Kusper, 252 Ill. App. 3d 450 (1993), that taxpayers lacked
standing to sue on behalf of Cook County. In that case, following the
State's Attorney's refusal to proceed, the taxpayers asserted a
derivative action on behalf of the County against the former and
present county clerks and a bank for violations of public funds
investment statutes. The trial court dismissed the suit for lack of
standing, and plaintiffs appealed. The appellate court rejected the
taxpayers' argument that they had an equitable right to bring suit to
protect their interest in public funds, noting that unlike the Illinois
Municipal Code, the Counties Code contains no authority for filing
private taxpayer actions. McKay, 252 Ill. App. 3d at 457. The court,
relying on Ashton, held that derivative taxpayer actions on behalf of
the County are prohibited. McKay, 252 Ill. App. 3d at 457-58.
	We agree that the McKay court correctly applied Ashton to
defeat the taxpayer's standing argument. Unlike the Municipal Code,
the Counties Code does not authorize taxpayer derivative actions.
Under the Counties Code, the State's Attorney has exclusive authority
to prosecute all actions on behalf of the County. In the case before us,
as in McKay, the State's Attorney has elected not to proceed. There
is no statutory authority for the taxpayer to proceed, and no authority
arises by implication.
	Plaintiffs argue that this construction of the Counties Code denies
taxpayers due process because it might impinge their fundamental
right to protect a property interest. No authority is cited for this
argument as required by Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7) (188 Ill. 2d
R. 341(e)(7)). Moreover, that assertion is illogical when a successful
prosecution of the common law claims would confer no direct benefit
at all on the plaintiffs, who have asserted "only a generalized injury
shared by all taxpayers of Cook County" that is legally insufficient to
establish standing. Rifkin, 248 F.3d  at 632. Only the County would
benefit from any recovery, and only the State's Attorney may assert
those claims on behalf of the County. Therefore, the common law
counts against all defendants were properly dismissed.

III. CONCLUSION
	The article XX claims were properly dismissed because the
purported grant of authority to private citizens to prosecute suits on
behalf of the County is unconstitutional as applied in this case. The
State's Attorney, as a constitutional officer whose duties are
analogous to and coincident with those of the Attorney General, is the
only person empowered to represent the County in matters when, as
here, the County is the real party in interest. Therefore, plaintiffs lack
standing to assert article XX claims.
	Plaintiffs also lack standing to assert common law taxpayer claims
when no claim is made that the alleged injury resulted from the act of
any public official. Further, taxpayer derivative claims asserted on
behalf of the County are foreclosed because there is no authority in
the Counties Code for bringing such actions by any person other than
the State's Attorney.
	For the foregoing reasons, the orders of the circuit court
dismissing all claims with prejudice are affirmed.

Circuit court judgment affirmed.