Title: Tatum Smaxwell v. Melva Bayard
Citation: 2004 WI 101
Docket Number: 2003AP000098
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 7, 2004

2004 WI 101 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
03-0098 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Tatum Smaxwell, a minor, Tanya Smaxwell  
and Greg Smaxwell,  
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Melva Bayard, Manitowoc County and  
Employers Health Insurance Company,  
          Defendants, 
 
Gloria Thompson and Heritage Mutual  
Insurance Company,  
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  266 Wis. 2d 1062, 668 N.W.2d 563 
(Ct. App. 2003-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 7, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 26, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Manitowoc   
 
JUDGE: 
Patrick L. Willis   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners there were briefs 
by Jordan P. Blad and Alpert & Fellows LLP, Manitowoc, and oral 
argument by Jordan P. Blad. 
 
For the defendants-respondents there was a brief by Jeremy 
T. Gill and Nash, Spindler, Grimstad & McCracken LLP, Manitowoc; 
and Jeffrey T. DeMeuse and Everson, Whitney, Everson & Brehm. 
SC, Green Bay, and oral argument by Jeremy T. Gill and Erik J. 
Pless. 
2004 WI 101 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  03-0098  
(L.C. No. 
01CV246) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Tatum Smaxwell, a minor, Tanya Smaxwell  
and Greg Smaxwell,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants- 
          Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Melva Bayard, Manitowoc County and  
Employers Health Insurance Company,  
 
          Defendants, 
 
Gloria Thompson and Heritage Mutual  
Insurance Company,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 7, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   Tatum Smaxwell, a minor, and her 
parents, Tanya and Greg Smaxwell (collectively "the Smaxwells"), 
appeal from an unpublished court of appeals decision, Smaxwell 
v. Bayard, No. 03-0098, unpublished slip op. (July 30, 2003).  
The court of appeals affirmed an order of the Manitowoc County 
Circuit Court, Patrick L. Willis, Judge, which granted summary 
No. 
03-0098   
 
2 
 
judgment in favor of the defendants, Gloria Thompson (Thompson) 
and her insurer, Heritage Mutual Insurance Company (Heritage 
Mutual),1 and dismissed the Smaxwells' negligence action.   
I. 
ISSUE 
¶2 
The issue presented is whether a landowner, who is 
also a landlord, may be liable on common-law negligence grounds, 
either in her capacity as a landowner or as a landlord, for 
injuries sustained by a person lawfully on her property caused 
by known dangerous dogs exclusively owned and controlled by her 
tenant.  We hold, based on public policy factors, that common-
law liability of landowners and landlords for negligence 
associated with injuries caused by dogs is limited to situations 
where the landowner or landlord is also the owner or keeper of 
the dog causing injury.  While the facts of the case before us 
are egregious, allowing liability in this instance——where the 
defendant landowner/landlord is neither the owner nor the keeper 
of the dogs causing injury——would enter a field that has no 
sensible or just stopping point.  
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶3 
The parties do not dispute the material facts in this 
case.  Thompson, at all times relevant to this action, owned two 
adjacent parcels of land in Manitowoc County.  The larger of the 
two parcels contained Thompson's residence and a former motel 
that she had converted into apartments.  In June of 1999, three 
                                                 
1 When referring to the defendants' arguments on this 
appeal, we refer to Thompson and Heritage Mutual collectively as 
"Thompson." 
No. 
03-0098   
 
3 
 
of the apartment units were occupied.  Thompson rented one unit 
to Melva Bayard and Richard Hines.  Thompson rented the other 
two units to her daughters, Tanya Smaxwell and Nicole Klein.  
Tanya Smaxwell lived with her three children:  Darion, Tatum, 
and Jayme.  Nicole Klein also resided with her children:  Nick 
and Rochelle.   
¶4 
The second, smaller parcel, roughly a quarter acre of 
woods, was located behind the first.  This property was a 
separate parcel located behind the property on which Thompson's 
residence and the converted motel were located.  Thompson 
allowed Bayard to house some of her dogs, including wolf 
hybrids,2 on the second parcel since the early 1990s.  Thompson 
                                                 
2 Wolf hybrids are extremely controversial animals.  See 
generally, Robert A. Willems, The Wolf-Dog Hybrid:  An Overview 
of a Controversial Animal, 5 Animal Welfare Information Center 
Newsletter (National Agricultural Library, Beltsville, MD), 
Winter 
1994/1995, 
available 
at 
http://www.nal.usda.gov/ 
awic/newsletters/v5n4wille.htm.  "A wolf hybrid is the offspring 
of a breeding between a wolf (Canis lupus) and a dog (Canis 
familiaris)."  Id.  Such animals are classified under the 
Federal Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2132, et seq. (2000), as 
domestic animals.  See 9 C.F.R. § 1.1 (2004)  (defining "dogs" 
as "any live or dead dog (Canis familiaris) or any dog-hybrid 
cross").  The regulations define hybrid cross as follows: 
Hybrid cross means an animal resulting from the 
crossbreeding between two different species or types 
of animals.  Crosses between wild animal species, such 
as lions and tigers, are considered to be wild 
animals.  Crosses between wild animal species and 
domestic animals, such as dogs and wolves . . . are 
considered to be domestic animals. 
9 C.F.R. § 1.1 (2004). 
No. 
03-0098   
 
4 
 
allowed Bayard to keep her dogs on the back property on the 
condition that Bayard take care of and secure the dogs.  
Thompson did not charge Bayard any additional rent to keep her 
dogs in the wooded area.  Bayard was in the business of breeding 
and selling her dogs.   
¶5 
Thompson was not aware of the number of dogs Bayard 
kept on the property and she took no active role in caring for 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
Due to genetics and the limitations of technology, it is 
extremely difficult to accurately determine the amount of "wolf" 
or "dog" present in a wolf hybrid.  Robert A. Willems, The Wolf-
Dog Hybrid:  An Overview of a Controversial Animal, 5 Animal 
Welfare Information Center Newsletter (National Agricultural 
Library, 
Beltsville, 
MD), 
Winter 
1994/1995, 
available 
at 
http://www.nal.usda.gov/awic/newsletters/v5n4wille.htm.  A wolf 
hybrid's appearance (either as a wolf or dog) does not 
necessarily correlate to its behavior, which can vary from 
animal to animal depending upon its specific genetic makeup.  
Id.  Thus, the behavioral patterns of the breed as a whole are 
not predictable.  Id.   
Generally speaking, wolves are less aggressive, although 
more predatory, than dogs, and wolves have a general fear of 
humans that dogs do not possess.  Id.  "In some hybrids, the 
timidity of the wolf may be replaced by the aggressiveness of 
the dog, while the predatory contribution from the wolf ancestry 
may remain intact."  Id.  Wolf hybrids can be more or less 
aggressive than dogs and may possess varying degrees of 
predatory instinct, depending upon the percentage of "wolf" the 
animal inherited and the type of dog with which the wolf was 
crossed.  Id.  Therefore, "hybrid attacks on humans can be 
related to both the aggressive tendencies of the dog and the 
predatory nature of the wolf."  Id.  Most hybrid attacks are on 
small children, whom the hybrid may regard as prey, due to some 
unwitting behavior on the part of the child.  Id.  "Hybrids 
having strong natural dominance tendencies may be particularly 
dangerous. . . . " "Many [hybrids] retain the natural tendency 
toward destruction that makes the wolf such a poor house pet."  
Id.  Thus, "[h]ybrids are often unsuitable in the home 
environment."  Id.   
No. 
03-0098   
 
5 
 
or housing the dogs.  However, Thompson did permit Bayard to 
construct a number of kennels on this second parcel of property 
to house the dogs.  Thompson examined the construction of the 
kennels on at least one occasion, but had not inspected the 
conditions under which the dogs were housed since the mid-1990s.  
Thompson exercised no control over the animals but was aware 
that some of the dogs were wolf hybrids.   
¶6 
Since 1992, the Manitowoc County Sheriff's Department 
received over 70 complaints from Thompson's neighbors regarding 
the dogs.  Most of the complainants expressed fear over the 
vicious-looking wolf hybrids and concern over the dogs being 
allowed to run at large.  In 1992 a sheriff's deputy was bitten 
by a German Shepard owned by Bayard.  In 1995 a caller 
complained that the dogs had killed his pigeons in the past.  In 
1999 Bayard admitted that the dogs had killed some of her 
puppies.  None of the other complaints involved Bayard's dogs 
actually attacking another person or animal.  Thompson was aware 
that there had been a number of complaints made to law 
enforcement personnel regarding the dogs and she was aware that 
one of the dogs bit a police officer.  Also, Thompson received a 
citation regarding the dogs sometime in the mid-1990s.  The 
nature and disposition of this citation are not part of the 
record.    
¶7 
On June 15, 1999, Tanya Smaxwell and Nicole Klein, 
along with their children, were visiting Thompson.  The adults 
were preparing to drink coffee on the porch of Thompson's 
residence.  While the adults were preparing the coffee, three-
No. 
03-0098   
 
6 
 
year-old Tatum was allowed to play outside with her five-year-
old cousin Nick.  Before the adults finished preparing the 
coffee, Nick ran into the house screaming that the dogs had 
attacked Tatum.  Three of Bayard's wolf hybrid dogs, each 
weighing over 70 pounds, were attacking Tatum.  Although 
Thompson and Tanya were able to free Tatum from the attacking 
dogs, Tatum sustained serious injuries.  The attacks occurred on 
the larger of the two parcels owned by Thompson——the parcel upon 
which her residence and the converted motel were located.  It is 
undisputed that the dogs were loose because Bayard neglected to 
latch the kennel the previous night.   
III. PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶8 
On July 2, 2001, the Smaxwells filed suit against 
Bayard, Thompson, Heritage Mutual, and Manitowoc County for 
common-law negligence.3  The Smaxwells also joined Employers 
Health Insurance Company, k/n/a Humana, the insurer who made 
medical payments on behalf of Tatum.  Humana later filed a 
subrogation counterclaim against Heritage Mutual.  Bayard did 
not file an answer and did not appear in any of the proceedings.   
¶9 
Following 
discovery, 
Thompson 
moved 
for 
summary 
judgment on the ground that as a matter of law she was not 
                                                 
3 All of the Smaxwells' claims against Thompson involve 
allegations of direct negligence on the part of Thompson.  That 
is, while some of the Smaxwells' claims allege that Thompson 
failed to control or supervise Bayard, all of the Smaxwells' 
claims arise out of the alleged action and/or inaction of 
Thompson.  The Smaxwells do not assert that there is any basis 
for vicarious liability on the part of Thompson for the conduct 
of Bayard. 
No. 
03-0098   
 
7 
 
responsible for Tatum's injuries either as a landowner or 
landlord.  Manitowoc County moved for summary judgment on the 
ground of discretionary immunity.  Heritage Mutual moved for 
summary judgment on the ground that Thompson had no personal 
liability and that if she did, its policy did not provide 
coverage.  Heritage Mutual and the Smaxwells moved for summary 
judgment against Humana on the ground that Humana's subrogation 
counterclaim was barred under federal law.   
¶10 On October 25, 2002, the circuit court rendered a 
decision and order on the various motions for summary judgment.  
The circuit court concluded that "Thompson's conduct, even if 
negligent, cannot form the basis for liability under the current 
state of the law in Wisconsin."  The circuit court noted that 
the law does not impose liability on negligent landlords or 
landowners for injuries caused by nonowned dogs on their 
property.  Therefore, the circuit court granted Thompson and 
Heritage Mutual's motions for summary judgment against the 
Smaxwells and dismissed the Smaxwells' claims against Thompson 
and Heritage Mutual.  The circuit court also granted Manitowoc 
County's 
motion 
for 
summary 
judgment 
and 
dismissed 
the 
Smaxwells' claim against Manitowoc County.  In addition, the 
circuit court granted Heritage Mutual's motion for summary 
judgment against Humana and dismissed Humana's cross-claim 
against Heritage Mutual.  The court denied the Smaxwells' motion 
for summary judgment against Humana and dismissed Humana's 
cross-claim against Thompson, Manitowoc County, and Heritage 
Mutual.   
No. 
03-0098   
 
8 
 
¶11 The Smaxwells appealed the portion of the circuit 
court order granting summary judgment and dismissing their 
negligence action against Thompson and Heritage Mutual.  The 
court of appeals held that under Wisconsin law only an owner or 
keeper of 
an 
animal may 
be held 
liable 
for 
common-law 
negligence.  Smaxwell, No. 03-0098, unpublished slip op., ¶11.  
The court of appeals reasoned that because a landlord normally 
does not exercise control over a tenant's dog and is not 
normally the owner or keeper of the dogs, the landlord is not 
liable under common-law negligence for any injuries caused by 
the dog.  Id.  In addition, the court of appeals stated that a 
landlord is under a duty to exercise ordinary care only with 
respect to defects in and maintenance of the premises and that 
this rule does not extend to dog bite claims.  Id., ¶15.  
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶12 We review a circuit court's grant of summary judgment 
independently, applying the same methodology as the circuit 
court.  Town of Delafield v. Winkleman, 2004 WI 17, ¶15, 269 
Wis. 2d 109, 675 N.W.2d 470.  Summary judgment "shall be 
rendered 
if 
the 
pleadings, 
depositions, 
answers 
to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law."  Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2)(2001-02).4  
                                                 
4 All citations to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-02 
version unless otherwise noted.   
No. 
03-0098   
 
9 
 
We view the summary judgment materials in the light most 
favorable 
to 
the 
nonmoving 
party. 
 
Torgerson 
v. 
Journal/Sentinel, Inc., 210 Wis. 2d 524, 537, 563 N.W.2d 472 
(1997).  Summary judgment should not be granted, "unless the facts 
presented conclusively show that the plaintiff's action has no 
merit and cannot be maintained."  Goelz v. City of Milwaukee, 10 
Wis. 2d 491, 495, 103 N.W.2d 551 (1960).  Where the material 
facts are not disputed, the court is presented solely with a 
question of law, subject to de novo review.  Town of Delafield, 
269 Wis. 2d 109, ¶16.   
V. 
ANALYSIS 
¶13 In this case, we are called upon to determine whether 
Thompson may be liable, either in her capacity as a landlord or 
landowner, for injuries sustained by a person lawfully on her 
property caused by known dangerous dogs exclusively owned and 
controlled by her tenant.  Thus, this case involves the 
intersection of three areas of negligence law:  landowner 
liability for injuries occurring on the property, landlord 
premises liability, and liability for the acts of known 
dangerous dogs.  In order to provide the reader with context for 
the parties' respective arguments, we briefly summarize the 
principal cases upon which they rely.   
¶14 In Gonzales v. Wilkinson, 68 Wis. 2d 154, 155, 227 
N.W.2d 907 (1975), the plaintiff, a one and a half-year-old 
child, wandered from home onto an adjacent yard where a duplex 
was located and was bitten on the head by a basset hound owned 
by the duplex owner's tenant.  The plaintiff sued both the 
No. 
03-0098   
 
10 
 
landlord and tenant under an attractive-nuisance theory.  Id. at 
155-56.  With respect to the landlord, the complaint alleged, 
inter alia, that he was negligent in "failing to adequately 
enclose the yard in which said vicious dog was located[,]" 
"failing to provide someone to watch over the said vicious dog 
when the dog was in the yard where the incident occurred[,]" and 
"allowing his tenant . . . to maintain occupancy rights with 
respect to the duplex and its grounds while knowing that he 
maintained a vicious animal."  Id. at 156.   
¶15 The majority in Gonzales concluded that the plaintiff 
could not maintain an action for attractive nuisance because a 
dog does not constitute an artificial condition that is 
dangerous to children.  Id. at 157.  The majority reasoned:  
"[a]lthough such a condition need not be permanently erected 
upon the land, it must be 'artificially construed.'"  Id.  The 
majority also disagreed with the dissent's assertion that the 
complaint, liberally construed, alleged a cause of action in 
negligence:   
In examining the complaint we find no allegation 
that [the landlord] was either the owner or the keeper 
of the dog, nor is it alleged that he in any way had 
any dominion over the dog.  There is an allegation 
that he knew his tenant . . . maintained a vicious dog 
on the premises but the law does not require him, as 
the owner of the building, to be an insurer for the 
acts of his tenant.  Under the allegations of this 
complaint, we hold that the ownership and control of 
the premises created no duty on the part of the owner 
of the premises to the plaintiffs.   
Id. at 158. 
No. 
03-0098   
 
11 
 
¶16 The next term, in Antoniewicz v. Reszczynski, 70 
Wis. 2d 836, 839, 236 N.W.2d 1 (1975), this court abolished the 
common-law distinction between a landowner's duty to licensees 
and invitees.5  In Antoniewicz, the plaintiff went to the home of 
the defendant for the purpose of giving the defendant's daughter 
a ride to a friend's home.  Id. at 840.  While at the 
defendant's residence, the plaintiff slipped on a patch of ice 
on the back porch that was known to the defendant but unknown to 
the plaintiff.  Id.  The defendant argued that he owed no duty 
to warn the plaintiff of hidden dangers because the plaintiff 
was merely a social invitee.  This court concluded that the 
circuit court properly imposed the standard of ordinary care 
upon the landowner in overruling his demurrer.  Id. at 857-58.  
In doing so, we abolished the distinction between the duty a 
landowner owes to licensees and invitees and held:   
The duty toward all persons who come upon property 
with the consent of the occupier will be that of 
ordinary care.  By such standard of ordinary care, we 
mean the standard that is used in all other negligence 
cases in Wisconsin. . . .  Under that test, as we have 
repeatedly stated, negligence is to be determined by 
ascertaining whether the defendant's exercise of care 
foreseeably created an unreasonable risk to others.  
That test is to be applied at the negligence phase of 
the analysis to the world at large and not to the 
particular plaintiff.     
Id. at 857.   
                                                 
5 The court, however, refused to abrogate the immunities 
that a landowner enjoys in relation to trespassers.  Antoniewicz 
v. Reszczynski, 70 Wis. 2d 836, 839, 236 N.W.2d 1 (1975).   
No. 
03-0098   
 
12 
 
¶17 Four years later, this court continued the trend of 
abrogating common-law immunities by abolishing the general cloak 
of immunity enjoyed by landlords.  Pagelsdorf v. Safeco Ins. Co. 
of Am., 91 Wis. 2d 734, 735, 284 N.W.2d 55 (1979).  In 
Pagelsdorf, the plaintiff was assisting a neighbor in vacating 
her apartment.  Id. at 736-37.  While moving a box spring, a 
rotted balcony railing gave way, and the plaintiff fell to the 
ground, sustaining injuries.  Id. at 737.  The issue on appeal 
was whether the circuit court erred in failing to instruct the 
jury that the landlord owed the plaintiff a duty to exercise 
ordinary care in maintaining the premises.  Id. at 738.   
¶18 At the time, the general common-law rule was that a 
landlord was not liable for injuries to his tenants and their 
visitors sustained as a result of unknown defects in the 
premises.  Id. at 740.  This rule did not apply, however, where 
the landlord negligently made repairs to the property.  Id. at 
741.  The court noted that this rule was distinct from the rule 
governing a landowner's duty to invitees and licensees at issue 
in Antoniewicz because the rule relating to landlords was 
derived from the concept of a lease as a conveyance and the 
premise that a landlord relinquished control and possession of 
the property when it was leased.  Id. at 740.   
¶19 The court abandoned the then-existing common-law rule 
relating to landlord liability, relying, in part, on the modern 
view of a lease as a contract, id. at 743, and held that "a 
landlord is under a duty to exercise ordinary care in the 
maintenance of the premises."  Id. at 741.  The court noted that 
No. 
03-0098   
 
13 
 
although the Antoniewicz decision was not dispositive of the 
question before it, much of the rationale from Antoniewicz 
supported the rejection of the old common-law rule relating to 
landlord liability.  Id. at 742-45.  The court concluded: 
[A] landlord owes his tenant or anyone on the premises 
with the tenant's consent a duty to exercise ordinary 
care.  If a person lawfully on the premises is injured 
as 
a 
result 
of 
the 
landlord's 
negligence 
in 
maintaining the premises, he is entitled to recover 
from the landlord under general negligence principles.  
Issues of notice of the defect, its obviousness, 
control of the premises, and so forth are all relevant 
only insofar as they bear on the ultimate question:  
Did the landlord exercise ordinary care in the 
maintenance 
of 
the 
premises 
under 
all 
the 
circumstances?   
Id. at 745.   
¶20 Returning to the dog bite arena, in Pattermann v. 
Pattermann, 173 Wis. 2d 143, 147-48, 496 N.W.2d 613 (Ct. App. 
1992), the plaintiff was at a family reunion at her fiancé's 
mother's home when, while standing in the doorway, she was 
bitten by a dog owned by the mother's adult son.  The plaintiff 
sued 
the 
homeowner, 
alleging 
strict 
liability 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 174.02 and common-law negligence.  Id. at 148.  The 
court of appeals first concluded that the homeowner was not 
liable under § 174.02 because the homeowner was not a harborer 
or keeper of the dog.  Id. at 149-51. 
¶21 Addressing the common-law negligence claim, the court 
of appeals stated:  "Even if [the defendant] were not the owner 
or keeper of the animal, as the landowner she may be liable for 
negligence associated with a known dangerous dog allowed on her 
No. 
03-0098   
 
14 
 
premises."  Id. at 151 (citing Klimek v. Drzewiecki, 352 
N.W.2d 361 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984)).  However, the court of 
appeals stated that the plaintiff could not recover because she 
failed to put forth any evidence that the dog had dangerous 
propensities.  Id. at 151-52.   
¶22 Similar to the case at bar, in Malone v. Fons, 217 
Wis. 2d 746, 749, 580 N.W.2d 697 (Ct. App. 1998), a minor child 
was bitten by a dog owned by the defendant's tenant.  The child 
was standing in a driveway adjacent to the defendant's property 
when the tenant's dog broke free from a leash held by the 
tenant's daughter and bit the plaintiff.  Id. at 750.  The 
plaintiff, through her guardian ad litem and her parents, sued 
the landlord 
under 
various 
theories, 
including 
common-law 
negligence and strict liability under § 174.02.  Id. at 750-51.   
¶23 Regarding the common-law claim, the court of appeals 
rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the language in Gonzales 
regarding a landlord's liability for injuries caused by his 
tenant's dog was dicta.  Id. at 753-54.  The court of appeals 
held that under Gonzales a landlord who is not the owner or 
keeper of his tenant's dog and who exercises no dominion or 
control over the dog cannot be held liable under common-law 
negligence for acts of his tenant's dog.  Id. at 755.  The court 
of appeals also noted that the Gonzales rule is consistent with 
the general common law relating to dog injuries, which holds 
only the owner or keeper liable for such injuries.  Id. at 755-
56 (citing Wis JI-Civil 1391).  The court of appeals reasoned 
No. 
03-0098   
 
15 
 
that Gonzales merely extended this common-law rule into the 
landlord-tenant context.  Id. at 757.   
¶24 Next, the court of appeals rejected the plaintiffs' 
arguments that Pattermann and Pagelsdorf had overruled Gonzales, 
or at least undermined much of its rationale.  Id. at 757-62.  
The court of appeals distinguished Pattermann, noting that the 
decision did not discuss the duties of a landlord.  Id. at 758.  
Further, the court of appeals noted that the statements in 
Pattermann regarding common-law liability of a landowner for 
injuries caused by a nonowned dog could not be regarded as law, 
as the Pattermann court merely assumed that the plaintiff had 
correctly stated the law and such statements were inconsistent 
with this court's opinion in Gonzales.  Id. at 758-59.   
¶25 Discussing the Pagelsdorf decision, the court of 
appeals 
explained 
that 
the 
rule 
in 
Pagelsdorf, 
while 
groundbreaking, was limited to defects in the premises and 
property maintenance issues.  Id. at 759-61.  Thus, the court of 
appeals stated that Pagelsdorf did not overrule Gonzales.  Id. 
at 760.  Further, the court of appeals in Malone noted that the 
plaintiffs had cited to no authority for the proposition that a 
tenant's dog could be considered a "defect" in the premises.  
Id. at 762.  The court of appeals concluded that the circuit 
court correctly granted summary judgment and dismissed the 
plaintiffs' negligence claims against the landlord.  Id.  
¶26 In the present case, the Smaxwells make arguments 
substantially similar to those made by the plaintiffs in Malone.  
First, they argue that as a landowner, Thompson owed a duty of 
No. 
03-0098   
 
16 
 
care to avoid exposing her guests to unreasonable risks of harm 
on the property.  Relying on Pattermann, the Smaxwells argue 
that a landowner may be liable in negligence when she fails to 
warn guests of a known dangerous dog on the property or fails to 
take precautions to protect guests on her property from known 
dangerous animals, regardless of whether the landowner is the 
owner or keeper of the animal.  The Smaxwells assert that the 
issue here is not whether a landlord is liable for the acts of 
her tenant's dog, but rather, whether a landowner can be liable 
for failure to maintain her property by allowing known dangerous 
dogs to run at large on the property.   
¶27 Second, the Smaxwells argue that the Gonzales decision 
is no longer good law, as it was chiefly concerned with whether 
a dangerous dog could constitute an attractive nuisance and its 
discussion of negligence law was based upon the outdated notion 
of "duty."  The Smaxwells assert that a landowner's duty towards 
those lawfully on his property was greatly expanded by the 
Antoniewicz and Pagelsdorf decisions and a landowner's duty of 
ordinary care was not recognized when Gonzales was decided.  In 
addition, they argue that Pattermann established that landowners 
may be liable under common-law negligence for injuries caused by 
nonowned dogs permitted on the property.  The Smaxwells contend 
that Pattermann established that a dangerous dog may be a 
condition on the land, sufficient to give rise to a duty of 
ordinary care.  Also, the Smaxwells contend that Malone may be 
distinguished on its facts because the injury there did not 
occur on the landowner's property.   
No. 
03-0098   
 
17 
 
¶28 Finally, the Smaxwells argue it is inappropriate to 
preclude liability based on public policy.  They assert that any 
public policy determination in this case would be premature 
because under Alvarado v. Sersch, 2003 WI 55, ¶27, 262 
Wis. 2d 74, 662 N.W.2d 350, a negligence case should be tried to 
a jury before public policy may be applied to preclude 
liability.  In the alternative, the Smaxwells argue that public 
policy should not preclude liability in this case because public 
policy supports exposing landowners to liability for dangerous 
animals on their property.  The Smaxwells proclaim that "[t]he 
time has come for all Wisconsin Courts to recognize that dog 
owners should not be the only parties responsible for protecting 
citizens from the risks posed by known dangerous animals."  
Pet'r Br. at 21.  
¶29 In contrast, Thompson contends that under common law, 
only owners and keepers of dogs are liable for injuries that the 
animals might cause.  Adopting the rationale of Malone, Thompson 
asserts that Gonzales simply extended this common-law rule to 
the landlord-tenant context.  In addition, Thompson argues that 
she had no duty to protect her guests from dogs running at large 
on the property because a landowner's liability extends only to 
dangerous conditions on the property and a dog is not a 
dangerous condition.  Thompson asserts that the language upon 
which the Smaxwells rely from Pattermann was merely dicta 
because the Pattermann court merely assumed, without deciding, 
that the plaintiff there correctly stated the law.  Further, she 
No. 
03-0098   
 
18 
 
asserts that even if the language from Pattermann was not dicta, 
the court of appeals was without the power to overrule Gonzales.   
¶30 In any event, Thompson contends that the issue here is 
not whether a landowner may be liable for injuries caused by 
dogs running at large on the property; rather the issue is 
whether a landlord may be liable for injuries caused by a dog 
owned and controlled by her tenant.  Thompson argues that while 
Gonzales referred to a landlord's duty, what it really was doing 
was proclaiming that as a matter of public policy a landlord 
should not be liable for the acts of a tenant's dog.  Thompson 
notes that it was well established by the time of Gonzales that 
in Wisconsin everyone owed a duty of ordinary care to everyone 
else.  Further, she maintains that the holding in Pagelsdorf was 
limited to cases involving defects in rental property and did 
not extend a landlord's liability for the acts of her tenant's 
dogs.  Thompson asserts that a tenant's dog is not a "defect" in 
the premises. 
¶31 Finally, Thompson asserts that public policy should 
preclude liability in this case.  She contends that a landlord 
should not be liable for acts of a nonowned dog over which she 
has no control or dominion.  Further, she maintains that the 
legislature has established a clear policy of holding only 
owners and keepers of dogs liable for dog injuries under 
Wis. Stat. § 174.02, 
Wisconsin's 
"dog-bite 
statute." 
 
She 
maintains that it has been well established under Gonzales and 
Malone that landlords are not liable for injuries caused by 
their tenants' dogs and only owners or keepers of dangerous 
No. 
03-0098   
 
19 
 
animals are liable for their injuries.  Thompson asks us to hold 
that as a matter of public policy landowners, including 
landlords, are not liable for injuries caused by nonowned dogs.   
¶32 In order to address the parties' respective arguments, 
we turn now and briefly review Wisconsin's general principles of 
negligence:  
To establish a negligence claim, a plaintiff must 
prove:  (1) the existence of a duty of care on the 
part of the defendant, (2) a breach of that duty of 
care, (3) a causal connection between the defendant's 
breach of the duty of care and the plaintiff's injury, 
and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the 
injury. 
Gritzner v. Michael R., 2000 WI 68, ¶19, 235 Wis. 2d 781, 611 
N.W.2d 906.  Wisconsin has rejected the "no-duty" approach of 
the majority opinion in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 
162 N.E. 99, 99-101 (N.Y. 1928).  Gritzner, 235 Wis. 2d 68, ¶20 
n.3.  As we have previously explained: 
In this state all persons have a duty of 
reasonable care to refrain from those acts that 
unreasonably threaten the safety of others.  This duty 
arises "when it can be said that it was foreseeable 
that his act or omission to act may cause harm to 
someone."  Thus, the existence of a duty hinges upon 
foreseeability.   
Antwaun A. v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., 228 Wis. 2d 44, 55-56, 596 
N.W.2d 456 (1999)(citations omitted)(quoting A.E. Inv. Corp. v. 
Link Builders, Inc., 62 Wis. 2d 479, 483-84, 214 N.W.2d 764 
(1974)).  "'A party is negligent when he commits an act when 
some harm to someone is foreseeable.'"  Rockweit v. Senecal, 197 
Wis. 2d 409, 420, 541 N.W.2d 742 (1995) (quoting Rolph v. EBI 
Cos., 159 Wis. 2d 518, 520, 464 N.W.2d 667 (1991)).  "At the 
No. 
03-0098   
 
20 
 
very least, every person is subject to a duty to exercise 
ordinary care in all of his or her activities."  Gritzner, 235 
Wis. 2d 781, ¶20.   
Thus, when determining the existence of a duty, the 
primary question we ask is not whether the defendant 
has a duty to take (or refrain from) certain actions, 
but whether the defendant's actions (or lack thereof) 
were consistent with the general duty to exercise a 
reasonable degree of care under the circumstances.   
Stephenson v. Universal Metrics, Inc., 2002 WI 30, ¶16, 251 
Wis. 2d 171, 641 N.W.2d 158.   
¶33 Therefore, in Wisconsin, "the determination to deny 
liability is essentially one of public policy rather than of 
duty . . . ."  Rockweit, 197 Wis. 2d at 425.  See also Gritzner, 
235 Wis. 2d 781, ¶24 ("Wisconsin courts address public policy 
concerns directly, rather than asking whether the defendant owed 
a 'duty' to the particular victim."); Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. 
Cas. Co., 183 Wis. 2d 627, 644, 517 N.W.2d 432 (1994)("In 
Wisconsin, the doctrine of public policy, not the doctrine of 
duty, limits 
the 
scope 
of 
the defendant's 
liability.").6  
Therefore, in Wisconsin, negligence is a distinct concept from 
liability. 
                                                 
6 But see Johnson v. Blackburn, 227 Wis. 2d 249, 257-58, 595 
N.W.2d 676 (1999)("As a general matter, a landlord owes a 
tenant, as well as guests of a tenant, the duty to exercise 
ordinary care.  A landlord's duty to trespassers, however, is to 
refrain from willful and intentional injury."); Rockweit v. 
Senecal, 197 Wis. 2d 409, 421, 541 N.W.2d 742 (1995)("Although 
individuals generally owe a duty of ordinary care to all 
persons, we recognize that limitations do exist with respect to 
the imposition of a legal duty in some cases.").  
No. 
03-0098   
 
21 
 
¶34 As noted supra, this case involves the application of 
Wisconsin's general negligence principles in three distinct 
areas:  landowner liability, landlord liability, and liability 
for the acts of known dangerous dogs.  In other words, the issue 
presented here is whether Thompson may be liable for the acts of 
nonowned dangerous dogs either in her capacity as a landowner or 
landlord.  We begin by addressing the duty of landowners in 
general and landlords in particular.  
¶35 It is clear under Antoniewicz and its progeny that 
Thompson, as a landowner, owed a general duty to exercise 
ordinary care to all those who legally came upon her property.  
As previously discussed, this court in Antoniewicz held that a 
landowner owes a duty to exercise reasonable care to all those 
who come upon her property with consent.  Antoniewicz, 70 
Wis. 2d at 857.  While the injury in Antoniewicz was caused by a 
defect in the physical premises (a patch of ice on the porch), 
id. at 840, this court has since clarified that a landowner's 
duty is not limited to defects in or conditions on the physical 
premises:   
[T]he duty of the owner or possessor of land toward 
persons who come upon property with the consent of the 
owner or possessor does not relate solely to defects 
or conditions which may be on such premises.  Rather, 
the duty of an owner or possessor of land toward all 
persons who come upon property with the consent of the 
owner or occupier is that of ordinary care.   
Shannon v. Shannon, 150 Wis. 2d 434, 443, 442 N.W.2d 25 (1989).  
Thus, it is unnecessary to address the Smaxwells' contention 
that a dog may be a "condition" on the premises.   
No. 
03-0098   
 
22 
 
¶36 However, it is unclear whether a landlord's duty 
extends beyond defective conditions in the leased premises.  In 
Pagelsdorf, the injury occurred because of a rotted railing on 
the leased premises.  Pagelsdorf, 91 Wis. 2d at 737.  Thus, the 
issue in Pagelsdorf specifically concerned a landlord's duty to 
maintain the physical premises and keep it free from defects.  
Id. at 738.  Indeed, in abrogating the old common-law immunity 
of landlords, the Pagelsdorf court was chiefly concerned with 
landlords who failed to keep the physical premises in good 
repair and rented "'tumble-down'" housing.  Id. at 744 (quoting 
Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 595-96, 111 N.W.2d 409 
(1961)).  As such, the Pagelsdorf court specifically framed the 
issue as follows:  "We dispose of this appeal by addressing the 
single issue of the scope of a landlord's duty toward his 
tenant's invitee who is injured as a result of defective 
premises."  Id. at 735 (emphasis added).  In addition, the court 
framed its holding in regard to the physical premises leased by 
the 
landlord: 
 
"We . . . abolish 
the 
general 
common 
law 
principle of nonliability of landlords toward persons injured as 
a result of their defective premises."  Id. at 744 (emphasis 
added).   
¶37 Since Pagelsdorf, there is no case that has extended a 
landlord's duty of reasonable care beyond defects in the 
physical premises.  That is, no case has specifically extended 
Pagelsdorf 
as 
Shannon 
extended 
Antoniewicz. 
 
There 
is 
conflicting case law as to whether a landlord's duty of 
reasonable care is limited to defects in and maintenance of the 
No. 
03-0098   
 
23 
 
leased premises, or whether the landlord's duty of reasonable 
care is of a general nature.7  In Alvarado, 262 Wis. 2d 74, ¶27, 
                                                 
7 Compare Shannon v. Shannon, 150 Wis. 2d 434, 445-46, 442 
N.W.2d 24 (1989)(recognizing that the court in Pagelsdorf v. 
Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 91 Wis. 2d 734, 745, 284 N.W.2d 55 
(1979), imposed a duty upon landlords to "'exercise ordinary 
care in the maintenance of the premises")(quoting Pagelsdorf, 91 
Wis. 2d at 745); Malone v. Fons, 217 Wis. 2d 746, 760, 580 
N.W.2d 697 (Ct. App. 1998)(concluding that "Pagelsdorf's rule is 
limited to situations dealing with property maintenance issues 
and defects in the premises"); Jacobs v. Karls, 178 Wis. 2d 268, 
273, 504 N.W.2d 353 (Ct. App. 1993)(noting that in Pagelsdorf, 
this court "adopted a rule that a landlord is under a duty to 
exercise ordinary care in the maintenance of the premises"); 
Couillard v. Van Ess, 141 Wis. 2d 459, 462, 415 N.W.2d 554 (Ct. 
App. 1987)(noting that the Pagelsdorf decision "extended a 
landlord's duty to exercise ordinary care to maintain leased 
premises and abrogated any prior common law immunity") with 
Antwaun A. v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., 228 Wis. 2d 44, 55-56, 596 
N.W.2d 456 (1999)(Wisconsin's "general principles of negligence 
are 
fully 
applicable 
in 
the 
landlord 
and 
tenant 
context.")(citing Pagelsdorf, 91 Wis. 2d at 742-43); Johnson, 
227 Wis. 2d at 257 ("As a general matter, a landlord owes a 
tenant, as well as guests of a tenant, the duty to exercise 
ordinary care."); Rockweit, 197 Wis. 2d at 422 (stating that 
Pagelsdorf imposed upon a landlord a general duty to exercise 
ordinary care); Maci v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 105 
Wis. 2d 710, 714, 314 N.W.2d 914 (Ct. App. 1981) (noting the 
issue in Pagelsdorf was whether landlords should continue to 
enjoy immunity from liability in maintaining demised portions of 
the premises but stating that the Pagelsdorf court determined 
that a landlord owes his tenant and others on the property with 
consent a general duty to exercise ordinary care), abrogated on 
other grounds by Rockweit, 197 Wis. 2d at 422-23. 
We also note that the Wisconsin Civil Jury Instruction 
regarding the duty of property owners towards nontrespasser 
users combines the duties of landowners and landlords.  See Wis 
JI-Civil 8020.  The jury instruction provides that an owner of 
property must use ordinary care to manage, construct, and 
maintain his or her premises to avoid exposing those lawfully on 
the premises to an unreasonable risk of harm.  The instruction 
provides:   
No. 
03-0098   
 
24 
 
a majority of this court recently rejected the assertion of the 
defendant landlord that it did not owe a duty to exercise 
reasonable care to a janitorial employee who was injured while 
cleaning an apartment, noting "everyone owes a duty of ordinary 
care to all persons."  Yet, the facts of Alvarado fell within 
the "defect in the premises" ambit of Pagelsdorf, as the 
                                                                                                                                                             
(An owner)(A possessor) of property must use 
ordinary care under the existing circumstances to 
(construct)(manage)(maintain) his or her premises to 
avoid exposing persons on the property with consent to 
an unreasonable risk of harm.  
"Ordinary care" is the degree of care which the 
great mass of people ordinarily uses under the same or 
similar circumstances.  A person fails to use ordinary 
care when, without intending to do any wrong, he or 
she 
does 
an 
act 
or 
omits 
a 
precaution 
under 
circumstances 
in 
which 
a 
person 
of 
ordinary 
intelligence and prudence should reasonably foresee 
that the act or omission will subject another person 
or property of another to an unreasonable risk of 
injury or damage. 
In performing this duty, (an owner) (a possessor) 
of premises must use ordinary care to discover 
conditions or defects on the property which expose a 
person to an unreasonable risk of harm.  If an 
unreasonable 
risk 
of 
harm 
existed 
and 
the 
(owner)(possessor) was aware of it, or, if in the use 
of ordinary care (he)(she) should have been aware of 
it, then it was (his)(her) duty to either correct the 
condition or danger or warn other persons of the 
condition 
or 
risk 
as 
was 
reasonable 
under 
the 
circumstances. 
Wis JI-Civil 8020.  In light of Shannon, 150 Wis. 2d at 443, the 
instruction incorrectly states the law as far as a landowner's 
duty is concerned.  
 
No. 
03-0098   
 
25 
 
plaintiff in Alvarado was injured due to the failure of the 
landlord to discover a "'strange looking candle'" during his 
routine inspection of the premises after the tenant vacated.  
Id., ¶¶2-5.   
¶38 Despite this inconsistency regarding how courts have 
interpreted Pagelsdorf's holding, all of the cases in Wisconsin 
involving landlord liability under the Pagelsdorf rule concerned 
actual 
defects 
in 
the 
leased 
premises. 
 
Alvarado, 
262 
Wis. 2d 74, 
¶¶2-5 
(firework 
resembling 
candle 
left 
in 
apartment); Antwaun A., 288 Wis. 2d at 57 (lead paint in 
apartments); Johnson v. Blackburn, 227 Wis. 2d 249, 252, 595 
N.W.2d 676 (1999) (smoke detector allegedly located in improper 
location); Pagelsdorf, 91 Wis. 2d at 736-37 (rotted wooden 
railing on tenant's balcony); Jacobs v. Karls, 178 Wis. 2d 268, 
273, 504 N.W.2d 353 (Ct. App. 1993)(failure to make repairs to 
premises when landlord contracted to do so); Couillard v. Van 
Ess, 141 Wis. 2d 459, 461, 415 N.W.2d 554 (Ct. App. 1987)(seven-
square-foot hole in factory floor); Maci v. State Farm Fire & 
Cas. Co., 105 Wis. 2d 710, 718, 314 N.W.2d 914 (Ct. App. 1981), 
(faulty rain gutter allowing rain to fall on only path between 
garage and residence), abrogated on other grounds by Rockweit, 
197 Wis. 2d at 422-23.  
¶39 We need not decide today whether a dangerous dog may 
constitute a "defect" in the rental premises or whether a 
landlord's duty of ordinary care extends beyond defects in or 
maintenance of the physical premises because we ultimately 
conclude, on public policy grounds, that common-law liability of 
No. 
03-0098   
 
26 
 
landowners and landlords for negligence associated with injuries 
caused by dogs is limited to situations where the landowner or 
landlord is also the owner or keeper of the dog causing injury.  
That is, for the purposes of this decision, we assume that 
Thompson's conduct constituted actionable negligence either in 
her capacity 
as a landowner in 
general 
or 
landlord in 
particular.  As noted supra, in Wisconsin, even if all the 
elements for a claim of negligence are proved, or liability for 
negligent conduct is assumed by the court, the court nonetheless 
may 
preclude 
liability 
based 
on 
public 
policy 
factors.  
Stephenson, 251 Wis. 2d 171, ¶42.   
¶40 A public policy analysis is separate and distinct from 
determining whether a duty exists in a particular case.  Id., 
¶41.  Whether public policy precludes liability is a matter of 
law that is decided by this court de novo.  Id.  Public policy 
may bar recovery against the negligent tortfeasor if this court 
determines any of the following: 
(1) the injury is too remote from the negligence; (2) 
the injury is too wholly out of proportion to the 
tortfeasor's culpability; (3) in retrospect it appears 
too highly extraordinary that the negligence should 
have brought about the harm; (4) allowing recovery 
would place too unreasonable a burden upon the 
tortfeasor; (5) allowing recovery would be too likely 
to open the way to fraudulent claims; or (6) allowing 
recovery would have no sensible or just stopping 
point.  
Id., ¶43. 
¶41 Liability may be denied solely on the basis of one of 
these factors.  Rieck v. Med. Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 
No. 
03-0098   
 
27 
 
518, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974).  This court has stated that 
generally the "better practice is to submit the case to the jury 
before determining whether the public policy considerations 
preclude liability."   Alvarado, 262 Wis. 2d 74, ¶18.  "However, 
where the facts presented are simple and the question of public 
policy is fully presented by the complaint and the motion for 
summary judgment, this court may make the public policy 
determination."  Sawyer v. Midelfort, 227 Wis. 2d 124, 141, 595 
N.W.2d 423 (1999).  Thus, "[t]he assessment of public policy 
does not necessarily require a full factual resolution of the 
cause of action by trial.  This court can, and has, decided such 
public 
policy 
questions 
on 
demurrer." 
 
Stephenson, 
251 
Wis. 2d 171, ¶42 (citations omitted).  Ultimately, "[a] finding 
of nonliability made in terms of public policy is a question of 
law which the court alone decides."  Rockweit, 197 Wis. 2d at 
425.   
¶42 We begin our public policy analysis by noting that 
traditionally, Wisconsin's common law subjected only owners and 
keepers of animals to liability for their injurious acts:   
At common law the owner or keeper of a dog was 
not liable for the vicious or mischievous acts of the 
dog unless he had prior knowledge of the vicious or 
mischievous propensities of the dog or unless the 
injury was attributable to the negligence of the owner 
or keeper.   
No. 
03-0098   
 
28 
 
Chambliss v. Gorelik, 52 Wis. 2d 523, 528, 191 N.W.2d 34 (1971).8  
The common-law rule regarding liability for the acts of a dog 
was explained in White v. Leeder, 149 Wis. 2d 948, 955-56, 440 
N.W.2d 557 (1989):    
The common-law rule first requires the owner or keeper 
to 
use 
ordinary 
care 
in 
controlling 
the 
characteristics 
normal 
to 
the 
animal's 
class. . . . The common-law rule further allows the 
plaintiff to show that the individual animal had 
vicious or mischievous propensities, and that the 
owner or keeper knew or should have known of them.   
(Emphasis added.)  Thus, "[t]he liability of an owner or keeper 
is predicated upon the failure to exercise ordinary care in the 
restraint and control of the animal."  Id. at 958.9   
                                                 
8 See also Nelson v. Hansen, 10 Wis. 2d 107, 113, 103 
N.W.2d 251 (1960)("In this state at common law the owner was not 
liable for damages resulting from the vicious act of his dog 
unless he had prior knowledge of its vicious propensities, or 
the injury was attributable to some negligence on the part of 
the owner[.]")(citations omitted); Malone, 217 Wis. 2d at 756 
(noting that "only an owner or keeper of an animal can be held 
liable for common-law negligence").   
We reject the Smaxwells' contention that the court of 
appeals' decision in Pattermann v. Pattermann, 173 Wis. 2d 143, 
152, 496 N.W.2d 613 (1992), established that a landowner could 
be liable under a common-law negligence theory for injuries 
caused by a known dangerous dog allowed on her premises.  The 
Pattermann court made this proclamation with no substantive 
analysis, despite the fact that no other Wisconsin court had 
held as such, and cited only to a court of appeals decision from 
Michigan.  See id. (citing Klimek v. Drzewiecki, 352 N.W.2d 361 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1984)).  Further, because a landlord may also be 
a landowner, this statement from Pattermann arguably conflicts 
with our decision in Gonzales v. Wilkinson, 68 Wis. 2d 154, 155, 
227 N.W.2d 907 (1975). 
9 The common-law rule is summarized in Wis JI-Civil 1391, 
Liability of Owner or Keeper of Animal: 
No. 
03-0098   
 
29 
 
¶43 It was with this understanding of the common law 
relating to injuries by animals that the Gonzales court rejected 
the dissent's assertion that the plaintiff's complaint alleged a 
cause of action against the defendant landlord in negligence:  
In examining the complaint we find no allegation 
that [the defendant] was either the owner or the 
keeper of the dog, nor is it alleged that he in any 
way had any dominion over the dog.  There is an 
allegation that he knew his tenant, [the plaintiff], 
maintained a vicious dog on the premises but the law 
does not require him, as the owner of the building, to 
be an insurer for the acts of his tenant.  Under the 
allegations of this complaint, we hold that the 
ownership and control of the premises created no duty 
on the part of the owner of the premises to the 
plaintiff.  
Gonzales, 68 Wis. 2d at 158 (emphasis added).   
¶44 We agree with the court in Malone that although 
Gonzales 
was 
primarily 
an 
attractive-nuisance 
case, 
this 
language was not dicta, as the majority intentionally took up, 
discussed, and decided this issue in response to the dissent.  
Malone, 217 Wis. 2d at 754 (citing State v. Taylor, 205 
                                                                                                                                                             
An owner (keeper) of a(n) (note:  insert name of 
animal) is deemed to be aware of the natural traits 
and habits which are usual to a(n) (animal) and must 
use ordinary care to restrain and control the animal 
so that it will not in the exercise of its natural 
traits and habits cause injury or damage to the person 
or property of another.   
In addition, if an owner (keeper) is aware or in 
the exercise of ordinary care should be aware that the 
animal possesses any unusual traits or habits that 
would be likely to result in injury or damage, then 
the owner (keeper) must use ordinary care to restrain 
the animal as necessary to prevent the injury or 
damage. 
No. 
03-0098   
 
30 
 
Wis. 2d 664, 670, 556 N.W.2d 779 (Ct. App. 1996)).  As the 
Malone court noted, this question was germane to the controversy 
in Gonzales, because the case was before the court on a motion 
to dismiss and had the majority of the court adopted the 
dissent's position, it would have been necessary to sustain the 
complaint.  Malone, 217 Wis. 2d at 754.  
¶45 We do agree with the Smaxwells that the language 
Gonzales utilized in reference to the defendant's "duty" is 
outdated.  As noted supra, in Wisconsin "all persons have a duty 
of reasonable care to refrain from those acts that unreasonably 
threaten the safety of others."  Antwaun A., 228 Wis. 2d at 55 
(citing Klassa v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 273 Wis. 176, 77 
N.W.2d 397 (1956)).  See also Gritzner, 235 Wis. 2d 781, ¶20 
("At the very least, every person is subject to a duty to 
exercise ordinary care in all of his or her activities.").  
Thus, the decision to preclude liability should normally be 
based on public policy, rather than the notion of duty.  Id., 
¶24.   
¶46 Yet, the Gonzales court's choice of words does not 
diminish the significance of the decision.  The Gonzales court 
opined that a landlord should not become the insurer for the 
acts of his tenant simply by virtue of owning the premises.  
Gonzales, 68 Wis. 2d at 158.  This sentiment, no doubt, was 
based on the fact that common-law liability for the acts of dogs 
was premised on ownership and control over the animal.  However, 
the concern that landlords should not become insurers for their 
tenants' acts is not premised on a question of duty; rather, it 
No. 
03-0098   
 
31 
 
is a policy decision that only those who have dominion or 
exercise control over an animal should be liable for its 
injuries.10  As the Malone court noted, limiting the liability of 
landlords to those who exercise control or dominion11 over dogs——
                                                 
10 The common law provides that an owner or keeper of a dog 
breaches his duty of care when he fails to restrain or control 
the animal.  See Wis-JI Civil 1391. 
11 Case law has established that "dominion over a dog" is 
synonymous with control and custody over the dog, and whether 
one exercises 
"dominion 
over a dog" 
is 
relevant 
to an 
individual's status as a "keeper" of the dog.  Thus: 
It is apparent that the keeper of a dog may or may not 
be the owner of the dog.  Where the keeper is not the 
owner, it may be assumed, as a general proposition, 
that the dominion or authority of the keeper over the 
dog is a limited one, subject to be terminated at any 
time by the owner.  In the absence of special 
circumstances, the owner may terminate the dominion of 
the keeper over the dog at any time and remove the dog 
from the custody of the keeper.  The moment that is 
done, the dual authority theretofore exercised over 
the dog by the owner and the keeper is merged in the 
owner, and at that very moment the keeper's rights and 
responsibilities concerning the dog are at an end.   
Janssen v. Voss, 189 Wis. 222, 224, 207 N.W. 279 (1926)(emphasis 
added).  In other words, once the individual ceases to exercise 
dominion over the dog, that is, once he ceases to have custody 
and control of the dog, the individual is no longer a "keeper."  
See also Black's Law Dictionary 502 (7th ed. 1999)(defining 
"dominion" as "[c]ontrol; possession").   
No. 
03-0098   
 
32 
 
owners and keepers——"'promotes the salutary policy of placing 
responsibility where it belongs, rather than fostering a search 
for a defendant whose affluence is more apparent than his 
culpability.'"  Malone, 217 Wis. 2d at 767 (quoting Clemmons v. 
Fidler, 791 P.2d 257, 260 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990)).12  The heart of 
                                                                                                                                                             
The Janssen court defined "keeper" as "one 'who keeps, one 
who watches, guards, etc.; one having custody.'"  Janssen, 189 
Wis. at 224 (citation omitted).  Another authority has defined 
"keeping" as follows:  "'Keeping' has a proprietary aspect, and 
is often defined as caring for, or having custody or control of 
the 
animal." 
 
Danny 
R. 
Veilleux, 
Annotation, 
Landlord's 
Liability to Third Person for Injury Resulting From Attack on 
Leased Premises by Dangerous or Vicious Animal Kept by Tenant, 
87 A.L.R. 4th 1004, 1015 (1991).  This definition comports with 
how Wisconsin courts have defined "keeper" for purposes of the 
"dog bite statute."  See Wis. Stat. §§ 174.001(5) & 174.02.  For 
example, this court in Armstrong v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 202 
Wis. 2d 258, 267, 549 N.W.2d 723 (1996), relying on Janssen, 189 
Wis. 2d at 224, held that to be a keeper "the person in question 
must exercise some measure of custody, care or control over the 
dog."   
In any event, "the Smaxwells completely agree that Thompson 
didn't actually do anything to exercise control or dominion over 
the dogs."  Pet'r Reply Br. at 5 (emphasis added).  "All of the 
parties agree that Thompson did not exercise any control over 
these animals."  Pet'r Br. at 11.  The circuit court 
specifically noted in its decision for summary judgment that 
"Thompson took no active role in caring for the dogs."  Both the 
circuit court and court of appeals precluded liability here 
based on the common-law rule that only owners and keepers of 
dogs may be liable for injuries caused by the dogs.  The 
Smaxwells have not once contended that Thompson was a "keeper" 
of Bayard's dogs.  Indeed, the Smaxwells readily admit that the 
lack of any control or dominion over Bayard's dogs on the part 
of Thompson forms "the very basis for the Smaxwells' negligence 
claims."  Pet'r Reply Br. at 5-6.   
12 We note that in Malone, 217 Wis. 2d at 750, the plaintiff 
was injured by a dog owned by the defendant's tenant in a 
driveway adjacent to the defendant's property.   
No. 
03-0098   
 
33 
 
this sentiment is a policy determination, not an evaluation of 
duty.   
¶47 Framing the issue in modern parlance, we conclude that 
allowing recovery against landowners or landlords who are 
neither the owners nor keepers of dogs——that is, landowners or 
landlords who do not have control over or custody of dogs——
causing injury to someone on or around their property would 
simply have no sensible or just stopping point.13  "When 
analyzing a cause of action under the sixth factor, we must 
determine if there will be a sensible point at which a line can 
be drawn if liability is imposed in the present case.  This 
analysis presupposes that we anticipate the extent of liability 
in future cases."  Stephenson, 251 Wis. 2d 171, ¶50 n.6 
(emphasis added)(internal citation omitted).14  Thus, regardless 
                                                 
13 Contrary to what the dissent asserts, we do not avoid a 
fact 
intensive 
inquiry 
in 
making 
our 
public 
policy 
determination.  Dissent, ¶74.  The key facts, which are 
undisputed, are that Thompson did not have custody of Bayard's 
dogs and did not control the animals.  In short, she was not an 
owner or keeper of the animal.  We do not employ a blanket 
limitation as the dissent suggests.  Id.  Rather, we conclude 
that allowing liability where the landlord/landowner does not 
have custody of or control over the dog causing injury——that is, 
where the defendant is neither the owner or keeper of the dog——
would enter a field that has no sensible or just stopping point.  
The determination of whether a landowner or landlord actually 
had custody or control over the dog at the time of the injury 
will usually be a jury question.  However, here the parties 
agree that Thompson did not have custody over Bayard's dogs and 
did not exercise control over them. 
14 Essentially, we conclude that were we to allow liability 
in the present case under general negligence principles, we 
would expose landowners to liability in cases that "involve the 
wanderings of a run-of-the-mill neighborhood dog."  Dissent, 
¶75.   
No. 
03-0098   
 
34 
 
of the egregiousness of the facts of the case before us, we must 
contemplate less egregious circumstances under which liability 
may be imposed.   
¶48 Allowing recovery against landowners or landlords who 
are neither the owners nor keepers of dogs under general 
negligence principles would have profound consequences regarding 
both landowner and landlord liability.  To begin with, exposing 
landowners to such liability would essentially force them to 
fence in their property.  Imagine a homeowner whose neighbor 
allows his dog to run at large.  The dog often comes onto the 
homeowner's property and the homeowner complains to the neighbor 
on several occasions, but to no avail.  One day the homeowner 
has guests over and, unbeknownst to him, his neighbor's dog 
again enters upon his land and bites his guest.  Under the 
Smaxwells' proposed rule, this homeowner could be potentially 
liable.   
¶49 Indeed, the Smaxwells' brief in opposition to the 
defendants' motions for summary judgment in the circuit court 
opens with the following statement:  "The time has come for 
Wisconsin Courts to recognize that dog owners should not be the 
only parties responsible for protecting citizens from the risks 
posed 
by 
known 
dangerous 
animals. 
 
Landlords, 
neighbors 
 . . . can all have a duty to help protect others from known 
dangerous animals."  (Emphasis added.)  The problem is that 
there simply would be no just stopping point to liability were 
we to accept the Smaxwells' proposed rule.  When pressed at oral 
argument as to where liability for landowners would end, counsel 
No. 
03-0098   
 
35 
 
for the Smaxwells could not identify any such point, as there 
would always be a jury question as to whether the landowner knew 
or should have known that a known dangerous dog was on his 
premises.  Even if the landowner did warn his guests of a known 
dangerous animal on his property, there would always be a jury 
question as to whether the landowner's actions satisfied the 
duty of ordinary care under the specific circumstances.  In 
short, there is nothing a landowner could do, short of erecting 
a fence around his property, to ensure that he would not be 
exposed to liability for injuries caused by a dog that he does 
not own or keep.   
¶50 That landowners would be forced to fence in their 
property is evident from the Michigan court of appeals decision 
relied upon by Pattermann when it summarily concluded that 
landowners could be liable for the injurious acts of nonowned 
dogs on the property.  Pattermann, 173 Wis. 2d at 151.  In 
Klimek, the plaintiff and her mother were social guests at the 
defendant's home when the plaintiff was bitten by a neighbor's 
dog that was loose and unsupervised.  Klimek, 352 N.W.2d at 363.  
The complaint alleged that the defendant knew the dog was loose 
and had previously bitten someone.  Id.  In holding that the 
complaint was sufficient to state a cause of action, the court 
ruled:  "a loose, unsupervised and dangerous dog either on 
defendant's land or in close proximity to defendant's land 
without any obstacle to prevent it from entering defendant's 
land 
is 
a 
'condition 
on 
the 
land[.]'" 
 
Id. 
(emphasis 
added)(citation omitted).   
No. 
03-0098   
 
36 
 
¶51 Moreover, allowing such liability would conflict with 
the legislative policy enacted in Wis. Stat. § 174.02, which 
imposes strict liability for injuries caused by a dog.15  Under 
the statute, liability is limited to owners, a category that 
includes keepers and harborers.  Wis. Stat. §§ 174.001(5) & 
174.02(1).16  The statute states that the penalties imposed 
therein "are in addition to any other liability imposed on the 
owner of a dog."  Wis. Stat. § 174.02(2)(c)(emphasis added).   
¶52 In addition, exposing landlords to liability would 
have similar consequences.  While it may seem reasonable to 
impute knowledge of a tenant's vicious dog to a landlord who 
rents a duplex or a relatively small converted motel, many urban 
landlords rent multiunit apartment complexes to dozens, if not 
hundreds, of tenants.  However, a plaintiff injured by a 
tenant's dog could always make the argument that a landlord 
should have known of the presence of the tenant's dog or should 
have known of its dangerous propensities.  Charging these 
landlords with constructive knowledge of the propensities and 
behavioral history of each tenant's dog and exposing them to 
liability would have drastic results.  As the Malone court 
explained, subjecting landlords who are neither owners nor 
                                                 
15 "[I]t is also appropriate to look at the [public policy] 
factors 
in 
light 
of 
relevant 
legislative 
enactments."  
Stephenson v. Universal Metrics, Inc., 2002 WI 30, ¶43, 251 
Wis. 2d 171, 641 N.W.2d 158.  
16 For the purposes of chapter 174, "'Owner' includes any 
person 
who 
owns, 
harbors, 
or 
keeps 
a 
dog."  
Wis. Stat. § 174.001(5). 
No. 
03-0098   
 
37 
 
keepers of dogs to liability would result in individuals who do 
not own their own homes being unable to own dogs:  "Landlords 
and their insurance carriers would be reluctant to allow tenants 
to keep any dogs for fear of liability . . . .  Such a 
development would deprive those who are unable to afford their 
own homes of the many positive benefits of dog ownership."  
Malone, 217 Wis. 2d at 766-67.   
¶53 Finally, as one authority has noted, in general, 
"[t]he purpose of bringing an action against a party who is 
neither the owner nor the keeper of the dog is primarily related 
to the need for the plaintiff to reach a deep pocket . . . ."  2 
Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d Landlord's Liability for Injury By 
Tenant's Dog 393, 399 (1988).  We agree with the court of 
appeals' sentiment in Malone that limiting the liability of 
landlords when they are neither owners nor keepers of dogs 
causing injury on or around their property fosters the sound 
policy of ensuring that liability is placed upon the person with 
whom it belongs rather than promoting the practice of seeking 
out the defendant with the most affluence.  Malone, 217 
Wis. 2d at 767.17   
¶54 Therefore, 
we 
conclude, 
based 
on 
public 
policy 
factors, that common-law liability of landowners and landlords 
for negligence associated with injuries caused by dogs is 
                                                 
17 Interestingly, the dissent agrees that Thompson should 
not be responsible for the conduct of dogs she neither owns nor 
keeps, but nevertheless would allow liability in this case.  
Dissent, ¶¶57, 81.   
No. 
03-0098   
 
38 
 
limited to situations where the landowner or landlord is also 
the owner or keeper of the dog causing injury.18     
VI. CONCLUSION   
¶55 We hold, based on public policy factors, that common-
law liability of landowners and landlords for negligence 
associated with injuries caused by dogs is limited to situations 
where the landowner or landlord is also the owner or keeper of 
the dog causing injury.  While the facts of the case before us 
are egregious, allowing liability in this instance——where the 
defendant landowner/landlord is neither the owner nor keeper of 
the dogs causing injury——would enter a field that has no 
sensible or just stopping point. 
¶56 By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
All work on this opinion was completed on or before June 
30, 2004.  Justice Diane S. Sykes resigned on July 4, 2004. 
 
                                                 
18 We note that we do not create a blanket rule that only 
owners and keepers of dogs are liable in negligence for injuries 
caused by dogs.  We merely hold a landlord or landowner may not 
be liable in his capacity as a landowner or landlord unless he 
is also the owner or keeper of the dog causing injury.   
No.  03-0098.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶57 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.  (dissenting).  I agree with the 
majority that Gloria Thompson cannot be held responsible for the 
conduct of her tenant.  I also agree that she cannot be held 
responsible for the conduct of the wolf hybrid dogs.  Unlike the 
majority, however, I believe that both the law and public policy 
support the conclusion that she can be held responsible for her 
own conduct.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
¶58 The facts of this case are troublesome.  On June 15, 
1999, three-year-old Tatum Smaxwell was attacked by three wolf 
hybrids.  That morning, Tatum, her mother, and her aunt, were 
visiting her grandmother's home.  The three adults were inside 
and Tatum was allowed to go outside with her five-year-old 
cousin Nick, who offered to watch her.   
¶59 After a short time, Nick came running back into the 
house, screaming that the dogs were hurting Tatum.  Three of the 
wolf hybrids, each weighing approximately 75 pounds, were on top 
of Tatum attacking her.  The adults succeeded in getting Tatum 
away from the dogs, but not before she sustained serious 
injury.19 
¶60 The assault took place on property that Thompson owned 
and on which she resided.  She also owned the adjacent lot that 
                                                 
19 The complaint alleges that as a result of being mauled by 
the wolf hybrids, Tatum sustained injuries as follows: 
[M]ultiple bites to her face and body, an open wound 
to her cheek, and [sic] open wound to her forehead and 
eyebrow, open wounds to her face, neck, hip, thigh, 
and back, and a contusion to her eyelid and periocular 
and lacera eyelid fold . . . . 
No.  03-0098.awb 
 
2 
 
Melva Bayard, the dogs' owner, used for a wolf hybrid breeding 
enterprise.  Thompson let Bayard kennel the dogs there without 
charging her any rent for the use of that property. 
¶61 Prior to the attack, there had been more than 70 
complaints from neighbors about Bayard's dogs.  Many of the 
complaints expressed fear over the threatening nature of the 
dogs and concern over the dogs being allowed to run at large.   
¶62 Although Thompson did not know the exact number of 
dogs kept on the property, she was aware of the complaints and 
knew that several of the dogs were wolf hybrids.  Thompson was 
also aware that law enforcement personnel had made several 
visits concerning the dogs, and that one of the dogs had bitten 
a police officer.   
¶63 Thompson received a citation in connection with the 
dogs in the mid-1990s.  The record reflects that the tenant, 
Bayard, received a number of citations regarding the dogs.  Many 
of the citations she received involved not maintaining a proper 
kennel and allowing the dogs to run at large.    
 
¶64 The majority concedes that the facts of this case are 
egregious.  Majority op., ¶2.  Nevertheless, it holds, based on 
public policy factors, that common-law liability of landowners 
and landlords for negligence associated with injuries caused by 
dogs is limited to situations where the landowner or landlord is 
also the owner or keeper of the dog causing injury.  Id.  
Contrary to the majority, I would not immunize Thompson from 
responsibility for her own conduct. 
No.  03-0098.awb 
 
3 
 
 
¶65 As the majority correctly recognizes, Thompson, as a 
landowner, owed a general duty to exercise ordinary care to all 
those who legally came upon her property.  Id., ¶35. Holding 
landowners responsible for their own conduct is deeply embedded 
in our common law. 
¶66 In Antoniewicz v. Reszczynski, 70 Wis. 2d 836, 856-57, 
236 N.W.2d 1 (1975), this court abolished some of the common-law 
immunities available to landowners.  There, the plaintiff had 
gone to the home of the defendant to give the defendant's 
daughter a ride.  Id. at 840.  While at the residence, he 
slipped on some ice, which was known to the defendant but 
unknown to the plaintiff.  Id.  The defendant maintained that he 
owed no duty to warn the plaintiff of hidden dangers because the 
plaintiff was a licensee.  Id.   
¶67 The circuit court in Antoniewicz determined that, 
although the existing law precluded the plaintiff from recovery, 
that law was archaic and had no rational basis for denying 
liability.  Id. at 839.  This court agreed, concluding that the 
required duty of the land occupier be one of ordinary care under 
the circumstances.  Id.  It explained: 
The duty toward all persons who come upon property 
with the consent of the occupier will be that of 
ordinary care.  By such standard of ordinary care, we 
mean the standard that is used in all other negligence 
cases in Wisconsin. . . .  Under that test, as we have 
repeatedly stated, negligence is to be determined by 
ascertaining whether the defendant's exercise of care 
foreseeably created an unreasonable risk to others. 
Id. at 857. 
No.  03-0098.awb 
 
4 
 
 
¶68 In Shannon v. Shannon, 150 Wis. 2d 434, 443, 442 
N.W.2d 25 (1989), this court extended the Antoniewicz framework 
beyond the physical premises.  The circuit court had concluded 
that without a showing that the plaintiff's injury was related 
to a defect or condition on the defendants' property, the 
defendants were entitled to summary judgment.  Id. at 442. This 
court disagreed, observing that the duty of a landowner was not 
limited to defects or conditions on the premises: 
Contrary to the circuit court's conclusion, the duty 
of the owner or possessor of land toward persons who 
come upon property with the consent of the owner or 
possessor does not relate solely to defects or 
conditions which may be on such premises.  Rather, the 
duty of an owner or possessor of land toward all 
persons who come upon property with the consent of the 
owner or occupier is that of ordinary care.  
Id. at 443. 
 
¶69 Accordingly, in Wisconsin, a landowner's duty to 
exercise reasonable care is not limited to defects in or 
conditions on the physical premises.  Rather, a landowner must 
always use ordinary care under the existing circumstances unless 
specifically limited by law.  Applying this principle to the 
facts of this case, I conclude that summary judgment was 
erroneously granted on the issue of Thompson's common-law 
negligence.  
 
¶70 Here, Thompson had a duty to maintain her property in 
a reasonably safe condition and protect guests on her property 
from unreasonable risk of harm.  She knew about the dangerous 
wolf hybrids and that they were periodically running at large on 
her property.  Moreover, it had become clear that Bayard was not 
No.  03-0098.awb 
 
5 
 
going to take action to control her dogs.  Yet, Thompson did 
nothing to protect her three-year-old granddaughter from harm.   
¶71 I believe that a jury could determine that it was 
reasonably foreseeable that her failure to act would cause harm 
to her grandchild.  Thus, summary judgment should not have been 
granted.  The question of negligence should have gone to a jury.  
¶72 The majority, however, does not allow the case to go 
to a jury.  Instead, it assumes negligence and precludes 
liability on the basis of public policy.  Majority op., ¶39.  
The majority reasons that allowing liability where the landowner 
or landlord is neither the owner nor keeper of the dogs causing 
injury would enter a field that has no sensible or just stopping 
point.  Id., ¶2. 
¶73 I conclude that the majority errs in employing public 
policy considerations to arrive at its blanket rule of immunity 
from liability.  Properly applied, public policy considerations 
should not limit liability here, but rather public policy should 
encourage holding landowners responsible for their own acts of 
negligence. 
¶74 Limitation of liability based on public policy is a 
fact-intensive inquiry.  A variation in the facts can render a 
different public policy conclusion.  Yet, the majority employs a 
blanket limitation, which by definition eschews the fact- 
intensive inquiry that normally attends the limitation of 
liability analysis. 
¶75 I am not persuaded by the majority's fear that there 
would be no just stopping point to liability were Smaxwell to 
No.  03-0098.awb 
 
6 
 
prevail.  The majority contends that exposing landowners to such 
liability would essentially force all landowners to fence in 
their property.  Id., ¶48.  This concern is overstated.  This 
case did not involve the wanderings of a run-of-the-mill 
neighborhood dog.  Rather, this involved a unique danger, of 
which Thompson was aware.  It emanated from within the confines 
of the property where she resided.   
¶76 There were a number of measures Thompson could have 
taken to protect others short of erecting a fence to enclose her 
entire property.  For example, she could have required her 
grandchildren to play in her already fenced-in backyard. She 
could have evicted Bayard from the premises for her repeated 
citations.  She could have prohibited such a large kennel 
enterprise in the first place.  Finally, she could have warned 
her guests against allowing children to play outside unattended.   
¶77 Similarly, I am not persuaded of the need for a 
blanket 
rule 
of 
immunity 
based 
on 
the 
majority's 
other 
hypotheticals.  I am mindful that it may be necessary to 
preclude liability in some cases on grounds of public policy.  
For instance, preclusion based on public policy may be proper in 
the case of a landlord renting multiunit apartment complexes to 
hundreds of tenants.  Id., ¶52.  Likewise, public policy may be 
used in appropriate cases to preclude a landowner's liability as 
No.  03-0098.awb 
 
7 
 
a neighbor.  Id., ¶48.20  In some cases, to impose liability on 
the landlord could place too unreasonable a burden.  But those 
are not the facts here.    
¶78 This is a case about a woman who knowingly permitted 
on 
her 
property 
a 
poorly-managed 
wolf 
hybrid 
breeding 
enterprise.  To hold Thompson liable need not result in the 
parade of horribles the majority invokes.   
¶79 A proper public policy analysis in this case would not 
result in Thompson fencing in her property.  Rather, it would 
result in Thompson taking the necessary measures to prevent 
dangerous wolf hybrids from running at large on her property 
when her young grandchildren are outside, unsupervised, at play.  
The majority's blanket rule would deter rather than encourage 
responsible behavior.  
¶80 We have previously stated that "[t]he cases in which a 
causally negligent tort-feasor has been relieved of liability 
are infrequent and present unusual and extreme considerations."  
Stewart v. Wulf, 85 Wis. 2d 461, 479, 271 N.W.2d 79 (1978).  
This case does not fit into that narrow category.  Although we 
have a list of factors upon which we preclude liability, the 
                                                 
20 This court has grappled with line drawing determinations 
in other contexts involving the liability of a neighbor.  In 
Physicians Plus Ins. Corp. v. Midwest Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 WI 80, 
254 Wis. 2d 77, 646 N.W.2d 777, we were required to determine 
upon which, if any, of several parties liability might be 
imposed.  "Because responsibility is strictly based on the facts 
of this case . . .," we rejected the argument that no sensible 
or just stopping point could be found.  Id., ¶51.  Indeed, we 
later noted that public policy considerations precluded the 
imposition of liability on a neighbor in that case, who merely 
had notice of the dangerous condition.  Id., ¶63, n. 34.  
No.  03-0098.awb 
 
8 
 
decision to impose liability requires that a court exercise fair 
judgment given the unique circumstance of each case. 
¶81 I conclude that holding Thompson immune for negligence 
associated with her own conduct goes against public policy.  
This decision encourages landowners to turn a blind eye toward 
the presence of dangerous wolf hybrids on their property.21  In 
doing nothing, a reasonable jury could conclude that Thompson 
failed to exercise ordinary care under the circumstances.   
¶82 In sum, this case is not about holding Thompson 
responsible for the conduct of her tenant or her tenant's wolf 
hybrids.  Rather, it is about holding Thompson responsible for 
her own conduct.  Because I believe that both the law and public 
policy support Thompson's exposure to liability, I respectfully 
dissent. 
¶83 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this opinion.   
 
                                                 
21 Counsel for Thompson acknowledged at oral argument that 
the issue here is a narrow one and applies to dogs only——not to 
dangerous animals in general. 
No.  03-0098.awb 
 
 
 
1