Title: Apitz v. Dames
Citation: 205 Or. 242, 287 P.2d 585
Docket Number: N/A
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: September 9, 1955

Reversed and remanded September 9, 1955.
*243 Ervin B. Hogan and Philip B. Lowry, of Medford, argued the cause for appellant. On the brief were Neff, Frohnmayer &amp; Lowry, of Medford.
Robert B. Duncan, of Medford, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were McAllister, Duncan &amp; Brophy, of Medford.
Before WARNER, Chief Justice, and TOOZE, LUSK, BRAND, LATOURETTE and PERRY, Justices.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
BRAND, J.
The plaintiff brings this action as executor of the estate of Esther C. Joss, deceased, against the defendant as administrator, with the will annexed, of the estate of Forest G. Joss, deceased, who was the husband of Esther C. Joss. Forest G. Joss wrongfully and intentionally shot and killed his wife Esther Joss, and *244 shortly after her death, killed himself. Upon the basis of these facts the plaintiff, as executor for the benefit of the estate, seeks to recover damages in the sum of $15,000, under the provisions of the Oregon Wrongful Death Statute. Esther C. Joss and her husband both died on the 7th of December 1951. Esther C. Joss left surviving her no dependents. The complaint adequately sets forth the murder of the wife, the suicide of the husband, the damage to the wife's estate, and the absence of any dependents of the deceased wife. To this complaint a demurrer was sustained. The plaintiff refused to plead further and the cause was dismissed. The plaintiff appeals.
The question presented upon this appeal is one of first impression in this state and is of great importance to the profession. We have this day decided the case of Smith v. Smith, wherein the plaintiff wife sued her husband for damages occasioned by the alleged grossly negligent conduct of her husband in the operation of an automobile, wherein the plaintiff was a guest. By that decision it has been determined that a wife can not sue her husband for negligent or grossly negligent conduct.
In the pending case we must determine whether the same rule of nonliability for tort applies when intentional injury is done by the husband to the person of the wife, amounting in this case to murder, and the action is for the benefit of the estate of the wife. It is the contention of the plaintiff that the common-law doctrine of immunity to liability has no application to actions for personal injury between husband and wife based upon a wilful and malicious tort. The plaintiff alleges that the shooting of the deceased wife was intentional and we shall consider the issue presented as bearing upon liability for intentional harm to the person. *245 As a second string to his bow, the plaintiff contends that the Oregon Wrongful Death Statute creates a new and independent cause of action and is not a survival statute. He therefore argues that an action for wrongful death may be maintained by the executor of the deceased wife against the husband or his representative, irrespective of any immunity which might have existed had the wife survived, since, he contends, the disability of the wife to sue her husband is personal to her and does not extend to the new and independent action created by the Wrongful Death Statute. If we hold that the law of Oregon gives to a wife cause of action against her husband for an intentional tort, or that the Death Statute gives such a right to her representative, a further question is presented by the record under the terms of the Death Statute.
The wife died leaving no dependents, but she did die leaving a husband who murdered her. The question for consideration, therefore, is whether under the terms of the statute the executor of the estate of the deceased wife can bring this action for the benefit of the estate, when the statute names the "widower" as a beneficiary and provides that the action shall be brought for the benefit of the estate only if there "is no widow or widower." The plaintiff contends that where a husband murders his wife, and the wife leaves no surviving dependents, the cause of action for her wrongful death vests immediately upon her death in her personal representative for the benefit of her estate. The defendant, on the contrary, contends that a wrongful death action for the benefit of the estate may be maintained only if there is no widower or dependents who survive the decedent. The question then is, whether the fact that the husband who killed his wife survived her for a few moments or hours renders impossible *246 an action by the executor for the benefit of the estate. The statutes in force at the time of the murder provided, in part, that
1. It is true, as contended by the plaintiff, that the Death Statute creates a new right and a new liability. It is not a survival statute. Perham v. Portland Electric Co., 33 Or 451, 53 P 14. However, the statute sets forth a condition precedent to the right to bring the action. It may be brought if the former (the wife) might have maintained an action, had she lived, against the latter (the husband) for an injury done by the same act or omission.
There are plausible and somewhat persuasive cases which would tend to support recovery under the Death Statute even if we were to hold that a living wife can not sue her husband for an intentional injury to the person. In Deposit Guaranty Bank &amp; Trust Co. v. Nelson, 212 Miss 335, 54 So2d 476 (1951), the husband shot and killed his wife. The daughter of the deceased brought action against the murderer under the provisions of the Mississippi Death Statute, which provided in part as follows:
The defendant contended that the wife, if she had lived, could not have recovered from her husband under Austin *248 v. Austin, 136 Miss 61, 100 So 591, 33 ALR 1388 (1924) and that therefore, the statutory beneficiary also had the same disability. Answering this contention, the court said:
The court also said:
It was held that the plaintiff might maintain action for the death of her mother, although the mother would not have been able to maintain an action against her husband if she had lived.
Rodney v. Staman, 371 Pa 1, 89 A2d 313, 32 ALR2d 976, strongly supports the ruling in Deposit Guaranty *249 Bank &amp; Trust Co. v. Nelson, supra. Husband and wife were traveling by automobile in Ohio. In an accident both were instantly killed. The administrator of the wife's estate, on behalf of two surviving children, sued the husband's estate in Pennsylvania for the mother's wrongful death. The controlling Ohio statute declared that the act causing the death must be "such as would have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, if death had not ensued." As in the preceding case, the defendant contended that in Ohio the personal disability arising from the marital relationship barred action under the Death Statute. The Pennsylvania court then cited Ohio decisions demonstrating that its Wrongful Death Statute gives rise to an independent action accruing only upon death.
The court said:
The same rule under a statute similar to our own was applied in Welch v. Davis, 410 Ill 130, 101 NE2d 547, wherein it was said:
There are other cases tending to support the view that an action may be maintained under the Death Statute, even though the wife, if living, could not have sued her husband. They are somewhat weakened by the fact that the Death Statute did not contain a provision that recovery may be had "if the party injured might have maintained the action had he lived." Russell v. Cox, 65 Idaho 534, 148 P2d 221; Kaczorowski v. Kalkosinski, supra, 321 Pa 438, 184 A 663.
In Johnson v. Ottomeier, 45 Wash2d 419, 275 P2d 723 (1954), the husband murdered the wife and committed suicide. The question was whether the wife's personal representative had a cause of action against the husband's estate under the Death Statute. The *251 statute did not expressly make the right to sue dependent upon the right of the deceased to have maintained the action had she lived, but the Washington court had twice held that such condition was implied. The court said:
The Washington court, in harmony with our own decisions, held that the Death Statute creates a new cause of action. But it went on to say that the cause is derivative only in the sense that it derives from the wrongful act causing the death rather than from the person of the deceased. The court said that the wife's disability to sue is personal to her "and does not inhere in the tort itself" and necessarily disappears with her death. The court observed that the provision for recovery "where the deceased might have maintained an action had he lived * * *" was previously a part of the statute but was no longer a part thereof. The court said:
The Washington court apparently recognized that there may be a fallacy in the reasoning of those courts which first hold to the ancient common-law rule that a wife can not sue her husband for tort during her lifetime, but that under Death Statutes similar to the one in Oregon recovery may be had.
Whether the cases which would deny to a living wife the right of action against her husband for intentional injury and yet would at the same time affirm the right of the representative of a deceased wife to sue under the Death Statute are right or wrong, they do manifest a growing anxiety on the part of the courts to find a remedy by some process of reasoning for the named beneficiaries when a wife has been killed by her husband. In our opinion these cases are not in harmony with the better-reasoned cases in which a death statute similar to our own was the subject of construction. We think that the Oregon Death Statute means exactly what it says and that the remedy thereby given is available only if the "former" (the deceased wife) might have maintained an action, had she lived, against the "latter" (the guilty husband) for an injury done by the same act.
The Washington court argued that the disability "does not inhere in the tort itself", but the question is whether there is any tort when husband assaults wife. To be sure, there is a crime, but the question remains whether the disability was merely procedural or whether under the ancient common-law rule there was no substantive right, i.e., whether there was any "tort".
*253 In a careful review of the early common-law rule, the Supreme Court of Mississippi said:
To the same effect see the well-considered case of Wilson v. Brown, Tex Civ App, 154 SW 322, where it was directly held that there could be no recovery under the death statute unless the deceased could have maintained an action had he not died.
The following cases indicate that the early common-law rule did not merely disable the wife to sue her husband for tort. It went further and held that actions which between strangers would be tortious, were not torts when committed by husband against wife. That is to say  disability was not procedural only. The wife at ancient common law had no cause of action on which to sue. Harvey v. Harvey, 239 Mich 142, 214 NW 305; Wright v. Davis, 132 WVa 722, 53 SE2d 335; Thompson v. Thompson, 218 US 611; Libby v. Berry, 74 Me 286; Drake v. Drake, 145 Minn 388, 177 NW 624; Kennedy v. Camp, 14 NJ 390, 102 A2d 595; Conley v. Conley, 92 Mont 425, 15 P2d 922; McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations, 43 Harv L Rev 1030, 1044.
2. In Cowgill, Adm'r v. Boock, Adm'r, 189 Or 282, 218 P2d 445, the plaintiff as administrator of the estate of Billie Parker, deceased, brought an action under *254 the Death Statute against the administrator of the estate of George W. Parker who was Billie's father. The cause was based upon the alleged gross negligence of the father in operating an automobile. Both father and minor son were killed in the wreck. This court, by an in banc decision, affirmed judgment for the plaintiff. It was held that the Death Statute, OCLA, § 8-903:
This, we take it, amounted to a construction of the Death Statute, and a holding under that statute, not merely that there must have been an act which would have constituted a tort if committed between strangers, but that there must have been an act on which the "former [the deceased] might have maintained an action had he lived." The case will receive further consideration in another connection.
In Wright v. Davis, supra, 132 WVa 722, 53 SE2d 335, husband and wife were living apart. The wife sued her husband for divorce. Thereupon the husband murdered his wife and then killed himself. The administrator of the wife sued the administrators of the husband under a death statute similar to our own. The decision is adverse to the contention of the plaintiff that a wife can sue her husband for intentional injury, but it directly supports our conclusion that a death action can not be maintained under our statute unless *255 the deceased could have maintained an action if death had not ensued. The court said:
We now proceed to the consideration of the principal question in the case, namely; could the wife have sued the husband for intentionally shooting her if the result had not been fatal. If it be determined by judicial decision that the wife could have sued her husband, then we recognize that the same rule would apply for the benefit of either husband or wife if attacked by the other, for no statute has given to either husband or wife the right to bring such an action, and at early common law neither could sue the other for intentional tort. Roberts v. Roberts, 185 NC 566, 118 SE 9, 29 ALR 1479; 27 Am Jur, Husband and Wife, § 589, p 191. The cause of action, if found to exist, must be grounded upon common-law principles equally applicable to husband or wife. See Smith v. Smith, 205 Or 286, 287 P2d 572.
As we demonstrated in Smith v. Smith, supra, many decisions favoring the right of a wife to sue her husband for tort have arrived at that conclusion, in part at least, by the process of statutory construction. However, the same courts have not hesitated to support the right of recovery upon common-law principles, especially when dealing with intentional torts.
In Brandt v. Keller, 413 Ill 503, 109 NE2d 729, recovery was allowed on the basis of the Married Women's Act (dissimilar to ours), but the court condemned *256 the common-law doctrine that tort actions would destroy "domestic tranquillity", and said:
Brandt v. Keller was an action for "wilful and wanton tort."
In Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla 385, 87 P2d 660, the court held that a wife might sue her husband for negligent tort. But the court quoted with approval from Schultz v. Schultz, 27 Hun 26, the following pertinent observation concerning actions for intentional wrongs:
In Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn 42, 89 A 889, plaintiff wife sued her husband for assault and battery. The Connecticut court considered the general effect of the Married Women's Acts and concluded that the legal *257 identity of husband and wife had been destroyed and that she might sue. But the court also supported its decision on common-law principles. We quote:
Again the court said:
Brown v. Gosser (Ky) 262 SW2d 480 (1953) was a damage action by a wife against her husband for negligent operation of an automobile, committed before coverture. The action was commenced before the parties were married. Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed. The court recognized that the weight of authority supported the old common-law rule of nonliability and admitted that in Kentucky stare decisis "supports his [the defendant's] position", but it then quoted words of Justice Brandeis in State of Washington v. Dawson &amp; Co., 264 US 219, as follows:
The Kentucky court then said:
For reasons stated by us in Smith v. Smith, we are not now prepared to adopt the minority rule in *258 cases of negligent operation of a motor vehicle. But the reasoning in Brown v. Gosser, supra, and other similar cases applies with far greater force in cases involving an intentional personal injury. Furthermore, Brown v. Gosser may be supported consistently with our decision in Smith v. Smith, because at the time action was brought the plaintiff was single when injured and had acquired a substantive right of action of which she should not be deprived by a statute which operated upon her only after her right had been acquired.
In Johnson v. Johnson, 201 Ala 41, 77 So 335, the wife sued her husband for assault and battery. Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed. The court said:
See also, Harris v. Harris, 211 Ala 222, 100 So 333. In that case a wife recovered damages against her husband for assault and battery.
In Fiedler v. Fiedler, 42 Okla 124, 140 P 1022, the defendant husband was held liable in damages for shooting his wife. Recovery was allowed on the authority of statute. The court then proceeded on principle to condemn the ancient common-law rule of nonliability. We quote:
In Crowell v. Crowell, 180 NC 516, 105 SE 206, a wife sued her husband for assault and battery committed by infecting her with a venereal disease. The court construed the statute as permitting the action, but also supported recovery upon common-law grounds. We quote:
In Steele v. Steele, 65 F Supp 329, a wife sued her husband for assault committed after a decree of divorce but before the decree became effective. The court felt itself bound by the majority opinion in Thompson v. Thompson, 218 US 611, in which it was held that a wife could not sue her husband for tort. The decision in the Thompson case was severely criticized and the court said:
The court added:
The court then proceeded to distinguish the Thompson case, and held that although the marriage was not entirely dissolved, yet the status of husband and wife lacked its original character. It was therefore held that the defendant's motion for summary judgment be denied. It should be noted that in Thompson v. Thompson, supra, the Supreme Court supported the ancient common-law rule, but there was a momentous dissent by Justices Harlan, Holmes and Hughes.
In Franklin v. Wills, 217 F2d 899 (Tenn 1954), recovery was allowed by the Federal Court in an action brought by the wife for damages on account of negligent operation of an automobile by her husband. The court made it clear that no unity of the marriage state could be affected here for the reason that the union had been dissolved by the death of the husband. The action was, of course, brought against the administrator of the estate of the husband.
In Davis v. Smith, (Pa 1954) 126 F Supp 497, the minor son of the deceased and the widow of the deceased husband, brought action against the administrator of the estate of the deceased husband for damage resulting from his negligent operation of an automobile. *261 The court held that the decision was controlled by the law of Pennsylvania where the doctrine of interfamily unity had prevailed. The court reviewed the authorities and then said:
It was held that:
A similar ruling was made concerning the right of the widow to sue the estate of her deceased husband. The court concluded as follows:
The erosion of the common-law rule is well-illustrated in Lorang v. Hays, 69 Idaho 440, 209 P2d 733. In that case the plaintiff wife sued her husband and others for assault and false imprisonment. The parties were living apart at the time of the assault and thereafter were divorced, before the action for damages was brought. Obviously there is no validity to the argument that the domestic felicity of the home would be destroyed by the action. The court said:
Another well-considered case supporting the right of a wife to sue her husband for tort is Damm v. Elyria Lodge No. 465, 158 Ohio St 107, 107 NE2d 337.
It is undoubtedly true, as indicated by the court, that there is a two-fold basis for the common-law rule of immunity; first, the technical effect of the unity of husband and wife; and second, ancient concepts of public policy inherited from the feudal era whereby it was held that actions between husband and wife must not be permitted because they would destroy the domestic peace and felicity of the home. When it is recognized that the ancient concept of the legal unity of husband and wife has been eroded beyond recognition, *263 and when the facts are such that there remains no domestic peace and felicity to be protected, we are impelled to inquire whether it may not be within the function of a common-law court to hold that the basis for the rule of immunity having been removed, the rule itself must fall.
A numerical check of the decisions undoubtedly shows that the weight of authority still denies the right of either spouse to sue for negligent tort, and perhaps for intentional wrong, and it further appears that those courts which have broken away from the common-law rule have relied, ostensibly at least, upon construction of the many and varied married women's acts, although they have also supported recovery on principle. Cases supporting the majority rule of nonliability are listed in Brown v. Gosser, supra, Ky, 262 SW2d 480, and even in the case of intentional harm, the ancient rule has been supported. See Thompson v. Thompson, supra; Keister's Adm'r v. Keister's Ex'rs., 123 Va 157, 96 SE 315 (murder); Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal 32, 103 P 219 (wife shot husband); Strom v. Strom, 98 Minn 427, 107 NW 1047 (assault during coverture and suit after divorce); Wright v. Davis, 132 WVa 722, 53 SE2d 335 (murder and suicide); Schultz v. Christopher, 65 Wash 496, 118 P 629 (venereal disease; infection during coverture; action after divorce.) The cases last-cited do not appeal to our sense of justice.
Turning to the authority of learned treatises, we find a different situation. Prosser sets forth the common-law theory of the legal (though not necessarily factual) unity of husband and wife, and the theory of nonliability based on the protection and harmony of the home. He suggests as the basis for the rule "a mixture of the Bible and mediaeval metaphysics, *264 the position of the father in Roman law, * * * or the property law of feudalism." We quote:
Other learned writers broadly support the right of recovery, particularly for intentional torts. From McCurdy, *265 Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 Harv L Rev 1030, 1082, we quote:
Speaking on the doctrine based on peace and harmony of the home, he says:
In this connection we observe that as to intentional torts, and especially where one spouse shoots the other, there is no danger of domestic collusion. Again, we quote from McCurdy:
See also, E.F. Albertsworth, 10 Cal L Rev 480; Farage, Recovery for Torts Between Spouses, 10 Ind Law Journal 290; 10 Cornell Law Quarterly 61; 6 NYULQ Rev 53; 22 Yale LJ 250; 23 Yale LJ 613; 23 Ill L Rev 174.
We next consider the effect of the Oregon decisions. The courts of this state have not been required to decide this issue, but certain of our decisions are nevertheless highly relevant.
In Kosciolek v. Portland Ry., L. &amp; P. Co., 81 Or 517, 160 P 132, an action against a third party for loss of consortium, it was held that a widow could not at common law maintain such an action and that the statute, OCLA, § 63-202 did not confer upon the wife any new right of action. The rule of the Kosciolek case was approved and applied in Sheard v. Oregon Electric Ry. Co., 137 Or 341, 2 P2d 916. The statute was amended by Oregon Laws 1941, chapter 228, and *267 the right of action for loss of consortium was expressly granted. The decisions and the statute are discussed in Smith v. Smith, supra, decided of even date herewith. The right of a wife to sue her husband for intentional tort was not involved in either of these cases, although the ancient common-law doctrine concerning the status of a wife was expounded.
We have previously considered Cowgill, Adm'r v. Boock, Adm'r, 189 Or 282, 218 P2d 445, in another connection. We now consider it for its bearing upon the right of a living son to sue his father and, by analogy, the right of the living wife to sue her husband for an intentional injury. In that case the court expressly conceded that the father did not intend to kill his son, but the majority of the court found substantial evidence of gross negligence and intoxication and that the father was guilty of manslaughter and of wilful misconduct. Wilful misconduct was defined as involving the intentional doing of something, either with the knowledge that it is likely to result in serious injury, or with the wanton and reckless disregard of its possible consequences. While disavowing an intentional killing, the majority found that the father's acts involved "more than ordinary or gross negligence." Having thus arrived at judicial appraisal of the legal character of the father's conduct, the majority proceeded to consider whether the son could have sued the father if the injury had not been fatal. The conclusion of the court in the Cowgill case is of profound significance for the decision of the pending action. The court then reviewed but refused to approve the following cases in which recovery had been denied for an intentional injury (not merely an intentional act resulting in injury): Hewellett v. George, 68 Miss 703, 9 So 885; McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn 388, 77 *268 SW 664; Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash 242, 79 P 788, 68 LRA 893, 3 Ann Cas 1, 107 Am St Rep 805.
The majority in the Cowgill case correctly stated that there was a mass of authority supporting the nonliability rule. It then cited authorities of high character which had subjected the rule to severe criticism. It acknowledged that the peace and tranquillity of the home was the foundation upon which our government rests, and it said further:
But the court continued:
See also, Rozell v. Rozell, 281 NY 106, 22 NE2d 254.
We have not overlooked the dictum concerning actions for tort between husband and wife. The court said:
*269 The quoted pronouncement concerning the right of action between husband and wife was not necessary to the decision, nor was it based upon any serious consideration of the authorities upon that subject, but it does indicate that the majority believed that, at least in cases of wilful or malicious torts, a wife might sue her husband. The decision of the majority was supported by the concurring opinions of Justices ROSSMAN and LATOURETTE. Both paid tribute to the view that "The law must keep pace with life and develop with the expanding enlightenment of the age." From the opinion of Justice ROSSMAN we quote a portion which is relevant to the case at bar. Speaking of the denial of liability in Hewellett v. George, supra, he said:
In the same opinion various exceptions were made to any general rule of liability. Three judges of this court dissented from the majority decision. The dissenting opinions expressed concern by reason of the difficulty of drawing a line for this kind of case which lies somewhere between simple negligence on the one hand, and intentional harm on the other. The opinion of Mr. Justice LUSK, however, indicates that if the line were drawn so as to allow recovery only for intentional wrongs, the situation might be different. We quote:
From the dissent of BRAND, J., we quote the following:
Thus was established in Oregon a rule in which all appear to have agreed that, at least in the case of torts in which personal injury was intended, a minor child may sue his father, and consequently the administrator of the minor child may sue the executor of the father, under the Death Statute.
3, 4. While the traditional relationship between parent and child differs in some respects from that between husband and wife, nevertheless the same rule of public policy was established at common law in both situations. We think that both the majority and minority opinions in the Cowgill case indicate a sense of judicial duty to modify the ancient rule of immunity by judicial decision and to eliminate the injustices which were inherent in that rule as to parent and child. By strong analogy, the case also applies as to husband and wife. We conclude that our duty in the pending case is clear. We must hold that if the wife had survived the rifle blast which took her life she would have had a right of action for damages against her husband, or against his representatives. It is the virtue of the common *271 law that as mores change, the law will also change. An old rule is eroded and a new rule attaches to the body of the law by accretion. The process is best accomplished by gradual change as justice may require in the individual case. For that reason we limit this holding to the facts in the instant case. Sufficient unto the day are the problems thereof.
5. We hold that when a husband inflicts intentional harm upon the person of his wife, the peace and harmony of the home has been so damaged that there is no danger that it will be further impaired by the maintenance of an action for damages and she may therefore maintain an action.
We have demonstrated that the wife, had she survived, might have sued her husband for intentionally shooting her, and we therefore conclude that an action might lie, under the Death Statute. But that act provides that the personal representative of the former (the wife) may maintain an action for the benefit of the widow or widower and dependents, and in case there is no widow or widower or surviving dependents, then for the benefit of the estate. The defendant contends that the wife's administrator can not bring this action for the benefit of the estate because she died leaving surviving her a husband, who is to be deemed "her widower". The statute, on its face, does of course provide that when there are no dependents of the deceased, the action shall be brought for the benefit of the "widower". In the ordinary case and, undoubtedly in the situation contemplated by the Legislature, the action would be brought by the administrator for the benefit of the widower. This court has several times stated that the action will not lie for the benefit of the estate if the preferred beneficiary is "in existence". Anderson, as Administrator v. Clough et *272 al., 191 Or 292, 230 P2d 204; Hansen v. Hays, 175 Or 358, 154 P2d 202; Ross v. Robinson, 174 Or 25, 147 P2d 204. But in none of the cases in which that rule was laid down was the court considering a situation in which the husband was the one who killed his wife and against whom, if he had lived long enough, the action would have been brought. The language used in those cases must be read in the light of its context.
The real party in interest in an action under the Death Statute is the beneficiary appointed to take. Was it intended by the Legislature that the murderer should, in legal effect, be both plaintiff and defendant? Here, the husband and wife died on the same day. The statute does not name the heirs or representatives of a "widower" as preferred beneficiaries. Their right, if any, in the ordinary case, would necessarily be dependent on the fact that the "widower" was legally the beneficiary prior to his death. If the widower had no right before he died, then his heirs or representatives would have no right after he died. Let us assume for a moment that the wrongful death was caused by a third party and that the husband became a widower in the usual way, without felonious activity on his part. It would seem clear that the heirs or representatives of such a widower would have no standing as beneficiaries in an action for death unless, before he died, he was a preferred beneficiary under the statute. To hold that an action under the Death Statute could be maintained against the man who murdered his wife, for the benefit of that same man, would, in our opinion, be preposterous. We find no case which holds that the processes of the courts could be perverted to such a use. Nor does the defendant contend that an action could have been brought by the administrator for the benefit of the husband for his own wrongful act.
*273 In Dishon's Administrator v. Dishon's Administrator, 187 Ky 497, 219 SW 794, the husband murdered his wife and then died. The question was whether the Death Statute gave a cause of action to the administrator of the wife against the administrator of the husband. The statute made the husband the beneficiary in actions for death of the wife caused by wrongful act. It was held that the wrong-doer was, in effect, both plaintiff and defendant, which resulted in the conclusion that the real parties in interest were not beneficially interested, and the case was moot. The court held that no one could profit by the action except the attorneys.
In Robinson's Administrator v. Robinson, 188 Ky 49, 220 SW 1074, the same court, in an opinion by the same justice who had written the Dishon case, considered litigation in which the husband murdered his wife and her administrator brought action against him under the Death Statute. In that case the wife was survived by children as well as by husband. It was held that the case was not moot and the administrator could recover for the children the share given them by statute, but the husband could not share in the recovery.
The defendant cites the case of Davenport v. Patrick, 227 NC 686, 44 SE2d 203. In that case the death of the wife was caused by the negligence of the husband in operating a motor vehicle. In the case at bar we are concerned only with intentional injuries to the person of the wife. However, the Death Statute provided that the sum recovered shall be distributed as provided in the case of intestacy. The wife was survived by her husband and by her father and mother. The court said that the husband was the sole beneficiary of her estate under the law and of any recovery that might *274 be obtained for her wrongful death. This was not a case in which various classes were named in order of priority. There was only one class, and the husband was its only member. The court said:
See Perry v. Strawbridge, 209 Mo 621, 108 SW 641; Box v. Lanier, 112 Tenn 409, 79 SW 1045; Riggs v. Palmer, 115 NY 511, 22 NE 190.
6, 7. The plaintiff cites the following portion from Wharton on Homicide, which supports the generally recognized doctrine of the common law that no person shall be permitted to profit by his own criminal act:
We consider it clear beyond question that the husband could not profit by his own criminal act.
An Oregon statute provides as follows:
It is true that this statute does not, in express words, bar recovery by a murderer under the Death Statute, *276 but it does by clearest language establish the public policy of the state in harmony with the common-law rule that a criminal shall not profit by his own crime. The United States Supreme Court has shown us the way in cases of this kind:
The provisions of our Death Statute should be read in the light of the common-law rule, and of the statutory declaration of the public policy of the state, and that policy should be applied to bar any action under the Death Statute for the benefit of one who killed his wife.
The defendant has not asserted the contrary. He does assert that it is "completely immaterial" whether or not an action could have been brought for the benefit of the surviving spouse, and he argues, in substance, that the right of the administrator to sue for the benefit of the estate is dependent upon the "nonexistence" of the surviving spouse regardless of whether *277 such existing spouse is disqualified as a beneficiary. We are unable to follow this reasoning. We think it is material to the decision of this case to determine whether an action could have been brought for the benefit of the husband. Our reasons will appear.
A careful consideration of the provisions of OCLA, §§ 8-902 and 8-903 clearly indicates an intention on the part of the Legislature that there shall be a cause of action in the administrator for the benefit of some beneficiary. The classes of preferred beneficiary, as defined in OCLA, § 8-903, are first, the widow or "widower" and dependents; and second, if there is no widow or "widower", then for the surviving dependents; and third, if there are none of these beneficiaries, then for the benefit of the estate. The difficult position in which the defendant finds himself is this: Since, by reason of the public policy of this state, there can be no recovery for the benefit of the husband who killed his wife, it follows that the defendant's contention must be that there is no recovery for the benefit of any person. Such a construction would defeat the entire purpose of the Death Statute. The courts have met this problem in a number of different ways which clearly evidence the fact that they appear to be impelled to find some remedy in accordance with the real intention of the Legislature.
In behalf of the plaintiff it is argued that Forest Joss was not the "widower" of the deceased within the meaning of the statute. It is asserted that a widower is a man who has "lost" his wife and has not married again, (Webster's New International Dictionary) and that it is implicit in the word "lost" that some inadvertent, unlooked-for or unsolicited event occurred. He suggests that it can not be said that a person who intentionally disposes of a thing has lost *278 a thing. We find this theory supported in the authorities.
In Lytle v. Southern Railway  Carolina Div., 171 SC 221, 171 SE 42, 90 ALR 915, action was brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The administrator of the estate of Alf Lytle sued the Southern Railway  Carolina Division for the wrongful death of the deceased who was an employee of the railroad engaged in interstate commerce. The action was brought for the benefit of the deceased's mother, the only surviving parent. It was alleged that the deceased left no children and that his wife had deserted him and had eloped with an adulterer. The defendant demurred upon the ground that the complaint failed to show a cause of action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act for the benefit of the mother, there being, as alleged in the complaint, a living widow. The Federal Act provided that:
The court held that it was the policy of the law to give the unfaithful wife no rights or legal status as a widow.
It was held that since the statute did not determine who are to constitute members of the classes named therein, the question must be decided by state law.
The court said:
It was held that
In conclusion, the court said:
In Perry v. Strawbridge, 209 Mo 621, 108 SW 641, the court stated the question for decision as follows:
That statute provided that
The court gave a learned and exhaustive review of the authorities bearing upon the duty of the courts in cases of this kind to construe the statute in the light of the common-law rule stated by Wharton, supra. In conclusion, the court said:
Our own court has quoted with approval the substance of the foregoing passage. See In re Norton's Estate, 175 Or 115, 125, 151 P2d 719.
The defendant seeks to avoid the damaging effect of the Strawbridge case by pointing out that no benefit is being sought for the estate of Forest Joss, and furthermore that the Strawbridge case involved a construction of the statute of Descent and Distribution and not of a death statute. We do not cite the case merely to show that the murderer could not inherit. Above and beyond this, the Strawbridge case stands as a strong authority for the rule that the word "widower" shall not be construed to include one whose wife is dead by reason of his felonious act. If a man who feloniously kills his wife is not a "widower" under a statute of descent and distribution, a fortiori, he is not a "widower" under a death statute. In the Descent and Distribution statute the husband was prima facie the heir of his deceased wife. In a death statute there is no prima facie right on the part of a person to be both plaintiff and defendant in the same case. Of course, the logical application of the Strawbridge case in the pending litigation is that since the felonious husband was not her widower, the statute would operate which provides that in case there is no widower, the action shall lie for the benefit of the estate.
In Folk v. United States, 102 F Supp 736, action was brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act for wrongful death under sections 411 and 412 of the Code of Laws of South Carolina. It was held that:
The case was subsequently reversed upon other grounds but the ruling in the portion quoted was not changed. The Oregon court arrived at a similar conclusion by a different process.
In re Norton's Estate, supra, 175 Or 115, 151 P2d 719, Minnie Norton, Administratrix of the Estate of Mary Norton, deceased, brought an action against Claude Harold Norton and others to determine the heirs and distributees of the estate. The named defendant, Claude Harold Norton, filed a cross petition and cross complaint, claiming the entire estate. The son of Mary Norton murdered her. Claude Harold Norton was the grandson of the decedent and the only child of Clarence H. Norton who feloniously killed Mary Norton. Under the statute, Clarence H. Norton had lost his right to inherit from Mary Norton. On the first appeal this court cited Perry v. Strawbridge, supra, for the proposition that the term "widower" means one who has been reduced to that condition by the ordinary and usual vicissitudes of life, and not one who by felonious act has himself created that condition. (175 Or at 125.) It was held that neither the murderer nor his son could inherit. The case was again before this court, 177 Or 342, 162 P2d 379. Proceedings were instituted to determine heirship in the matter of the estate of Mary Norton, deceased. In this case the parties were Clarence H. Norton, son of the intestate, Claude Harold Norton, son of Clarence and the executrix of the estate of Emma Gardner, deceased. Emma was a sister of the intestate. This court considered the provisions of OCLA, § 16-101 pertaining *283 to the descent of property in event of intestacy and held that the words of the statute "If the intestate shall leave no lineal descendants" refer to lineal descendants qualified to succeed to the estate of the intestate. We held that if it was determined that Clarence H. Norton took his mother's life, the executrix of the estate of Emma Gardner would succeed to the estate.
8. In the pending case it is of no especial consequence whether we say that Forest G. Joss was not the "widower" or say that he was not "a widower qualified to take" as the beneficiary under the Death Statute. In either case he was not a preferred beneficiary and under OCLA, § 8-903 as amended, we find that there was no widower or no widower qualified as a beneficiary, and therefore, there being no dependents, the personal representatives of the deceased may maintain an action "for the benefit of the estate".
Other cases supporting our opnion by analogy are: Parker v. Potter, 200 NC 348, 157 SE 68; Garner v. Phillips, 229 NC 160, 47 SE2d 845; Weaver v. Hollis, 247 Ala 57, 22 So2d 525; McDonald, Adm'r v. Mutual Life Insurance Co., 178 Iowa 863, 160 NW 289; Price v. Hitaffer, 164 Md 505, 165 A 470; Garwols v. Banker's Trust Co., 251 Mich 420, 232 NW 239.
The defendant relies upon Wenker v. Landon et al., 161 Or 265, 88 P2d 971. The case is clearly distinguishable. In that case it was held that one who feloniously killed his spouse nevertheless becomes owner of property held by them as tenants by the entirety. The decision is based on the proposition that the survivor in such a tenancy takes no new interest in the estate. Each owner held the entirety before death of one.
9. There is another consideration which tends to support our conclusion. In Smith v. Smith, decided of *284 even date herewith, we considered the effect of Article I, section 10 of the Oregon Constitution, which provides that:
We held that such provision did not create any rights, but only guaranteed "recognized" rights, consequently, the constitutional provision did not of itself give a wife the right to sue her husband when there was no such right "recognized" at common law. We adhere to that view. But in the pending case we have held that the common law does give to a wife a cause of action against her husband by reason of his intentional tort, and that consequently, the statute gave to her executor a cause of action under the Death Statute. Thus, in the pending case there was an "injury" done to the person of the wife. A substantive right had been violated upon which a statutory right was ingrafted by the Death Statute. In view of constitutional principle, we think that it should be inferred that some remedy by due course of law was vested in the executor for the benefit of some person or persons and that such was the intent of the Legislature. The statute clearly states that if there was no widower or dependent, a right of recovery was vested in the executor for the benefit of the estate. We think that the Legislature did not intend that the executor for the benefit of the estate should be deprived of all remedy merely because a certain man who could not himself benefit, because of his felonious act, was alive (in existence) for a time after the death of his wife.
In a carefully prepared opinion, the learned trial judge concluded that the wife could have maintained *285 an action against her husband had she lived. He considered "abhorrent" the idea that a husband can slay his wife and then benefit from his wrongful act. He intimated that the husband could "probably not" profit by his own wrong, but he concluded that in any event "a cause of action vested in the husband immediately upon the death of the wife", and he therefore dismissed the complaint. It is at this point that we must express disagreement. If, as we have indicated, the authorities hold that he was not a "widower" within the meaning of the statute, by reason of his felonious act, then he was not a beneficiary named therein, and no cause of action ever "vested" in him. It is suggested that such an interpretation would require the court to "prejudge" the facts as to whether the husband killed his wife and was therefore one "not qualified" under the statute. The answer appears to be that no fact need be prejudged in this case, for the complaint which is tested by demurrer, establishes the fact of the murder and disqualification. It is always necessary when the facts are not admitted for the court to determine from the evidence whether a person who claims to be a widower is one, or as stated in the Norton case, whether the person was a "widower qualified" to take. We hold that under the admitted facts no right of action ever vested in the husband.
Because of the importance and novelty of the issues, we have laboriously examined the briefs and authorities cited. The case upon both sides has been presented with extraordinary ability. The complaint stated a good cause of action.
Judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings conformable to this opinion.
Justice PERRY did not participate in the decision.