Title: RILEY v CARL
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 80-128
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: January 16, 1981

No. 8C-128 IN THE SUPREPiE COUR'I' OF THE STA7'E O F ' M 0 P I T A F : A 1980 TOM RILEY AND PATRICIA RILEY, Plaintiffs and Respondents, -vs- FRED G . CARL, JAMES L. LEE, COUNTY OF MISSOULA, WILLIAM WILLS, a/k/a BILL and WILLS, INC. , Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, In and for the County of Missoula, The Honorable John S. Henson, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Boone, Karlberg & Haddon, Missoula, Montana Robert L . Deschamps, 111, County Attorney, Missoula, Montana l&k&t?+~iekl- -Bale -.& Eye, Missoula, Montana For Respondent: Balyeat, Kzmmerer & Rodli, Missoula, Montaya \ $ 1 fi Y i \. ~ - , ? : l / n , ~ ~ . * , j l ~ j - Q-4 4 ~ i + l , g L 2 - - l f )/;- d f ~ - Crr JQP L i Submitted on Briefs: September 11, 1980 Decided : JBF 1 " 1981 Filed: m ! 1 ' 1587 M r . Chief J u s t i c e Frank I . Haswell d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t . Defendants W i l l s and Missoula County appeal from an o r d e r of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l District Court, Missoula County, d e c l a r i n g B l i x i t Creek Road a county road s u b j e c t to t h e d u t y of main- t e n a n c e by Missoula County. B l i x i t Creek Road is l o c a t e d n e a r Potomac, Montana, i n Missoula County. The road was f i r s t a s s i g n e d a county road number i n 1965, and w a s c o n t i n u o u s l y maintained by t h e county from t h a t t i m e u n t i l January, 1977. Missoula County f o r m a l l y a c c e p t e d t h e road f o r maintenance i n 1974 because it had been p l a t t e d and i n e x i s t e n c e p r i o r t o 1960. U n t i l 1978, William W i l l s , as an i n d i v i d u a l , and W i l l s I n c . o f which W i l l i a m W i l l s was a c o r p o r a t e o f f i c e r , owned t h e l a n d t r a v e r s e d by B l i x i t Creek Road. W i l l s w a s aware of and m a t e r i a l l y b e n e f i t t e d from Missoula County I s maintenance of t h e road and a p p a r e n t l y acquiesced i n t h e g e n e r a l p u b l i c ' s use of t h e road u n t i l 1976. I n 1976 W i l l i a m W i l l s e r e c t e d p r i v a t e road s i g n s on B l i x i t Creek Road. Missoula County ceased its maintenance o p e r a t i o n s on t h e road i n p a r t because of t h e p r e s e n c e of t h e s i g n s . T h i s s u i t r e s u l t e d from t h e s u b s e q u e n t d e t e r i o r a t i o n of t h e r o a d ' s con- d i t i o n i n t h e s p r i n g of 1978. I n August, 1977, Tom and P a t r i c i a R i l e y purchased land a c c e s s i b l e o n l y v i a B l i x i t Creek Road. The R i l e y ' s p l a n s to b u i l d a home on t h e land t h e f o l l o w i n g s p r i n g were f r u s t r a t e d by t h e i m p a s s i b i l i t y of t h e road. The R i l e y s t h e r e f o r e i n i t i a t e d t h i s a c t i o n on March 29, 1978. P l a i n t i f f I s complaint w a s twice amended. W i l l s , I n c . w a s f i r s t named as a p a r t y d e f e n d a n t under t h e second amended c o m p l a i n t f i l e d August 1 8 , 1978. W i l l s , I n c . had p r e v i o u s l y t r a n s f e r r e d its i n t e r e s t s i n t h e a f f e c t e d p r o p e r t y by deeds r e c o r d e d March 2, 1978. The r e s u l t i n g owners of an undivided e i g h t y p e r c e n t i n t e r e s t i n t h e p r o p e r t y have n o t been joined and a r e n o t p a r t i e s t o t h i s a c t i o n . The complaint i n its f i n a l form a l l e g e d breach of c o n t r a c t and m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a g a i n s t s e l l e r s C a r l and L e e ; a s t a t u t o r y d u t y to m a i n t a i n and e s t o p p e l from c e s s a t i o n of roadway maintenance a g a i n s t t h e County of Missoula; and a p r e s c r i p t i v e easement a g a i n s t W i l l i a m W i l l s a/k/a B i l l W i l l s and W i l l s I n c . The sellers i n t u r n f i l e d a cross-complaint a g a i n s t W i l l s , a l l e g i n g t h e c o u n t y ' s p r e s c r i p t i v e t i t l e to t h e road and e s t o p p e l a g a i n s t W i l l s , and s e e k i n g indemnity. The m a t t e r came t o h e a r i n g on motions f o r summary judgment. The District Court found from t h e undisputed f a c t s a l l e l e m e n t s n e c e s s a r y t o e s t a b l i s h p r e s c r i p t i v e county t i t l e t o B l i x i t Creek Road, and t o e s t o p t h e County of Missoula and W i l l s from denying s a i d county ownership. Based on its f i n d i n g s , t h e D i s t r i c t Court denied Missoula County's motion f o r summary judgment; g r a n t e d s e l l e r ' s motion f o r summary judgment d e c l a r i n g B l i x i t Creek Road a county road; and g r a n t e d W i l l s ' motion f o r summary judgment as t o t h e complaint and t h e indemnity a s s e r t i o n of s e l l e r ' s c r o s s - c o m p l a i n t . A p p e l l a n t s a t t a c k on appeal t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d e n i a l o f t h e c o u n t y ' s motion f o r summary judgment and g r a n t i n g o f sellers' motion f o r summary judgment. W e n o t e a t t h e o u t s e t t h a t t h e d e n i a l of t h e c o u n t y ' s motion f o r summary judgment is p r o p e r l y reviewable a t t h i s t i m e . Although t h e o r d e r denying t h e motion was i n t e r l o c u t o r y , a f i n a l judgment h a s been rendered and nonappealable i n t e r m e d i a t e o r d e r s are reviewable on a p p e a l from t h a t f i n a l judgment. Brown v. Midland N a t i o n a l Bank ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 150 Mont. 422, 429, 435 P.2d 878, 882. The p r i n c i p l e s governing summary judgment under Rule 5 6 ( c ) , M.R.Civ.P., are set f o r t h i n Harland v. Anderson ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 169 Mont. 447, 450, 451, 548 P.2d 613, 615. The m v a n t h a s t h e i n i t i a l burden of e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e absence of any genuine i s s u e of material f a c t , and when movant does s o , t h e p a r t y opposing t h e motion must come forward w i t h s u b s t a n t i a l evidence r a i s i n g a - 3 - genuine i s s u e of m a t e r i a l f a c t . The c o u n t y ' s motion was founded s o l e l y on p l a i n t i f f s ' ina- b i l i t y t o d e m o n s t r a t e t h e i r p e r s o n a l r e l i a n c e on county main- t e n a n c e o r on W i l l s ' a c q u i e s c e n c e i n county maintenance, where t h e county had ceased its maintenance o p e r a t i o n s sometime b e f o r e p l a i n t i f f s purchased t h e i r l a n d . Absent r e l i a n c e , t h e county a r g u e s t h a t p l a i n t i f f 's e s t o p p e l t h e o r y f a i l s and summary judgment i n its f a v o r is a p p r o p r i a t e . N e i t h e r t h e county nor W i l l s p r e s e n t e d e v i d e n c e to r e f u t e p r e s c r i p t i v e p u b l i c easement or r e l i a n c e by t h e s e l l e r s , C a r l and Lee, upon t h e a c t i o n s of t h e county and W i l l s a l t h o u g h both i s s u e s were r a i s e d by t h e p l e a d i n g s . I n l i g h t of a p p e l l a n t s ' f a i l u r e t o even a d d r e s s , much less r e f u t e t h o s e genuine i s s u e s , t h e movant's i n i t i a l burden was not c a r r i e d . Conversely, t h e sellers p r e s e n t e d e v i d e n c e i n s u p p o r t of t h e i r motion a l l e g i n g t h e p r e s e n c e of a l l n e c e s s a r y e l e m e n t s f o r b o t h p r e s c r i p t i v e p u b l i c easement and f o r e s t o p p e l a g a i n s t t h e c o u n t y and W i l l s . The movants t h u s m e t t h e i r burden of e x c l u d i n g any real doubt as t o t h e e x i s t e n c e of any g e n u i n e i s s u e of m a t e r i a l f a c t . Kober v. S t e w a r t ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 148 Mont. 117, 122, 417 P.2d 476, 478. The opponents, a g a i n , c h a l l e n g e d n e i t h e r p r e s c r i p t i o n n o r e s t o p p e l based on t h e sellers' r e l i a n c e , b u t r a t h e r argued c o n c l u s i v e l y t h a t B l i x i t Creek Road is n o t a county road. N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e p a r t y opposing a motion h a s a s t a n d a r d of proof a b o u t e q u a l to t h a t imposed on t h e movant; and must p r e s e n t f a c t s i n p r o p e r form, n o t merely c o n c l u s i o n s of l a w . Harland, 1 6 9 Mont. a t 451, 548 P.2d a t 615. P l a i n t i f f s and t h e sellers, C a r l and L e e , demonstrated t h a t t h e r e e x i s t e d no genuine i s s u e s a s t o any m a t e r i a l f a c t r e l a t i n g t o s e l l e r s ' motion f o r summary judgment. W i l l s and t h e County of Missoula f a i l e d to meet t h a t same burden r e g a r d i n g t h e i r motion. The motions were t h u s r e s p e c t i v e l y p r o p e r l y g r a n t e d and denied by t h e District Court. Rule - 4 - 5 6 ( c ) , M.R.Civ.P. Judgment affirmed. - , - - - - - - , , , - - - - - - - - - - - - A - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Chief Justice Ju t ces v