Title: Tyson v. DIST. COURT FOR FOURTH JUD. DIST.
Citation: 891 P.2d 984
Docket Number: 94SA351
State: Colorado
Issuer: Colorado Supreme Court
Date: March 6, 1995

891 P.2d 984 (1995) Robert Long TYSON and Barbara Germaine Whitehorn Tyson, Petitioners, v. The DISTRICT COURT FOR the FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, EL PASO COUNTY, STATE OF COLORADO, and the Honorable Gilbert A. Martinez, one of the Judges thereof, Respondents. No. 94SA351. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. March 6, 1995. *985 Melat, Pressman, Ezell &amp; Higbie, Bernard R. Baker, Colorado Springs, for petitioners. John W. Suthers, Dist. Atty., Robert D. Jones, Deputy Dist. Atty., Fourth Judicial Dist., Colorado Springs, for respondents. Justice VOLLACK delivered the Opinion of the Court. The petitioners-defendants, Robert Long Tyson and Barbara Germaine Whitehorn Tyson, have filed this original proceeding pursuant to C.A.R. 21, challenging an order of the El Paso County District Court. We issued a rule directing the respondent, the El Paso County District Court, to show cause why the defendants should be prohibited from having their retained counsel represent both their interests. Because we hold that the district court's order deprived the defendants of the right to counsel of their choice, we now make the rule absolute and direct the district court to vacate its August 22, 1994 order. By indictment, the defendants, Robert Tyson and Barbara Germaine Whitehorn Tyson, husband and wife, were charged with felony menacing, § 18-3-206, 8B C.R.S. (1986); prohibited use of a weapon, § 18-12-106, 8B C.R.S. (1986); criminal mischief, § 18-4-501, 8B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.); reckless endangerment, § 18-3-208, 8B C.R.S. (1986); reckless driving, § 42-4-1203, 17 C.R.S. (1993); possession of marihuana, § 18-18-106, 8B C.R.S. (1986); second-degree assault, § 18-3-203, 8B C.R.S. (1986 &amp; 1994 Supp.); and illegal discharge of a firearm, § 18-12-107.5, 8B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.), in connection with a drive-by shooting on the interstate highway. The defendants retained the same attorney to represent them in defending against these charges. At the preliminary hearing in July 1994, the El Paso County District Court determined that no conflict of interest existed by both defendants' being represented by the same attorney, based on all the attendant facts and circumstances. During the course of this hearing, the following colloquy ensued between the district court and the defendants: THE COURT: Do you understand that I have had many people stand in front of me and say, "We're going to trial, we're not going to have a plea bargain", but lo and behold, the closer you get to trial, they do reach a plea bargain? For example, the District Attorney could offer you a misdemeanor offense, with no jail, with probation, and no fine, and let you on out of here with nothing basically, with the *987 exception of a misdemeanor, and you are precluding yourself from doing that? DEFENDANT ROBERT TYSON: Yes. We discussed that with [our attorney], Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. And is it your intention to have [your attorney] represent both of you? District Judge Martinez additionally appointed advisory counsel for each defendant in order for the court to further assess the representation issue. Each court-appointed attorney interviewed his respective party separately for the limited purpose of ascertaining the existence of a conflict. Following the completed interviews, the district court gleaned what had transpired between the advisory counsel and each defendant. The advisory counsel expressed to the court that both of the defendants remained intent on having their attorney represent them: [ADVISORY COUNSEL FOR ROBERT TYSON]: ... I met with my client.... We talked at length ... [about] the same topics as [the other advisory *988 counsel] discussed with his client; differences in culpability, differences in the appropriateness of a plea, the differences between husband and wife concerning the appropriateness of a plea agreement, differences concerning who should testify and not testify, and how a jury might perceive the difference between joint representation and representation by separate attorneys. The court thereafter received signed affidavits from both defendants waiving any conflict of interest and engaged in the following exchange: Based upon this comprehensive questioning, the district court ruled as follows: After the preliminary hearing was concluded, the district court, at the request of the district attorney, agreed to revisit this ruling. On August 22, 1994, the district court reconvened and Judge Martinez reversed his initial ruling. The district court concluded that a conflict existed with the two defendants' being represented by the same attorney and therefore the attorney could not represent either defendant. The court took into consideration several factors: (1) the nature of the defenses; (2) the fact that the evidence is stronger against one person than it is against another person; (3) the fact that a plea agreement has been made to one of the defendants which entails testifying against the co-defendant; and (4) the fact that both defendants have said, "I'm not going to take any deals." The district court reasoned as follows: The Court previously made a decision that [the defendants' retained attorney] could represent both Defendants, and went through the whole process of making sure there was an appropriate waiver, and making sure the Defendants understood what they were doing, had them sign a waiver of *989 counsel, put on the record numerous times, including at preliminary hearing, stopping the preliminary hearing, and advising the Defendants that indeed there is a conflict, and I allowed [the defendants' retained attorney] to stay on the case. Quite frankly, I wasn't real comfortable doing that. And the Court's going to reverse its position at this time and, in fact, find that [the defendants' retained attorney] cannot represent either of these Defendants. The Tysons contend that their right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment and the Colorado Constitution, Article II, Section 16, has been violated by the district court's ruling precluding their retained attorney from representing them. In contrast, the People assert that the trial court correctly ruled that a conflict of interest exists by the retained attorney's representing the co-defendants in a criminal proceeding. The United States Supreme Court addressed this issue in a factual context different from the present case in Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 108 S. Ct. 1692, 100 L. Ed. 2d 140 (1988). There, a defendant charged with participation in a drug distribution conspiracy filed a motion to substitute counsel two days before his trial, requesting representation by the same attorney representing two of his two co-defendants. In response to the government's assertion of a conflict of interest, Wheat asserted his right to choose counsel of his choice and proffered the waivers of the right to conflict-free counsel on behalf of himself and his two co-defendants. Id. at 156, 108 S. Ct. at 1695. The district court denied Wheat's motion to substitute counsel because of the potential conflict existing in substitute counsel's representation of two of petitioner's co-conspirators, notwithstanding Wheat's waiver of the *990 right to conflict-free assistance of counsel. Id. at 157, 108 S. Ct. at 1696. The Supreme Court held that there is a presumption in favor of a defendant's choice of counsel, but the presumption may be overcome by the showing of either a conflict of interest or a serious potential for a conflict of interest. When a defendant seeks to be represented by retained counsel of the defendant's choice, and that representation may result in a conflict of interest, the Supreme Court held that the trial court must balance the right to be represented by counsel of one's choice against the right to have a defense conducted by an attorney who is free of any conflict of interest. Id. at 163-64, 108 S. Ct. at 1699-1700. The Supreme Court determined that, under the facts of that case, the balance was struck in the appropriate way. Accordingly, the Supreme Court upheld the district court's ruling, disallowing Wheat from being represented by the same attorney retained by the two co-defendants. The Supreme Court has additionally held that defendants who wish to be represented by the same attorney may waive the right to conflict-free representation, even though the attorney is burdened by a conflict of interest. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 483, 98 S. Ct. 1173, 1178, 55 L. Ed. 2d 426 (1978). A waiver of the right to conflict-free representation must "not only ... be voluntary but must be [a] knowing, intelligent act[] done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1469, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747 (1970). It has additionally been recognized that the prerogative of waiving the right to conflict-free representation is itself buttressed by another Sixth Amendment protection: the right to retain counsel of one's choice. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1938); United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272 (5th Cir.1975); Fitzgerald v. United States, 530 A.2d 1129, 1134 (D.C.App.1987). In Rodriguez v. District Court, 719 P.2d 699 (Colo.1986), we adopted the following guidelines for a trial court to consider in weighing the public's confidence in the integrity of the judicial process against the defendant's interest in being represented at trial by counsel of choice, even though the attorney may have a conflict of interest. Id. at 706-07. This balancing test requires a trial court to assess the defendant's preference for particular counsel, the nature of the conflict, and the public's interest in maintaining the integrity of the judicial process. Based upon our evaluation of these factors, we concluded that the defendants' willingness to waive conflict-free representation prevented the disqualification of the public defender's office from representation. Id. at 708. In People v. Martinez, 869 P.2d 519 (Colo.1994), we held that the trial court properly accepted the defendant's waiver of his right to conflict-free counsel in light of the fact that defendant's primary interest was accelerating his case to trial and that he was uninterested in the conflict's potential effect on his attorney's ability to negotiate a plea bargain. We reasoned as follows: Id. at 528. A defendant must voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive the right to conflict-free representation. Armstrong v. People, 701 P.2d 17, 19 (Colo.1985). "The record must affirmatively show that the trial court fully explained the nature of the conflict and the difficulties defense counsel faced in his effective advocacy for the defendant." Martinez, 869 P.2d at 525; see also People v. Castro, 657 P.2d 932, 945-46, 946 n. 10 (Colo.1983) ("A valid waiver is shown only if the prosecution establishes that the defendant was aware of the conflict and its likely effect on the attorney's ability to offer effective representation and that the defendant thereafter voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently relinquished his right to conflict-free representation[;]" "[i]f the court, upon inquiry of the defendant, is satisfied that he understandingly *991 (voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently) waives all conflicts that are reasonably foreseeable under the circumstances, then it may accept the waiver, even though it views the defendant's decision as an improvident one."). Turning now to the facts in our case, the trial record establishes that the trial judge fully apprised the defendants of the nature of the conflict and the specific ways in which the conflict may affect the ability of defendants' retained attorney to advocate on behalf of each defendant at various stages of the pending litigation. See Castro, 657 P.2d at 946. The district court appointed advisory counsel for the Tysons to further ensure that the defendants understood the potential conflict of interests, the possible consequences of joint representation, and the consequences of waiving their right to conflict-free representation. Further, the defendants' attorney argued to the court that he had discussed the possible conflicts of interest with the defendants and that they were satisfied with his dual representation. The Tysons expressed to the court that they had been advised about the circumstances surrounding dual representation but nevertheless desired having their retained attorney represent them both. Both defendants signed waivers, and the record demonstrates that the Tysons voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived their right to conflict-free representation. Based upon the district court's full disclosure and the defendants' signed waivers and affidavits, which indicated the trial court's advisement of a potential conflict of interest and evinced defendants' intent to have their retained attorney represent both their interests, we conclude that the district court's order directing their retained attorney to represent neither defendant deprived the Tysons of the right to counsel of their choice. We further hold that, by waiving their right to conflict-free representation, the defendants have waived their right to later assert a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel as caused by the conflict of interest.[1] Several cases from other jurisdictions are factually similar to the instant case in involving dual representation of blood relatives, and lend further support for our conclusion. In United States v. Laura, 500 F. Supp. 1347 (E.D.Pa.1980), aff'd 667 F.2d 365 (3d Cir.1981), the defendant was not entitled to withdraw her guilty plea on the ground that there was a conflict of interest in the dual representation of her and her husband by the same counsel. The court determined that, although the defendant had identified an actual conflict of interest, the record demonstrated that the defendant had executed a knowing and intelligent waiver of her right to separate counsel, and the trial judge played a positive role in ensuring that the defendant's choice was made intelligently. Id. at 1352. Further, in State v. Yelton, 87 N.C.App. 554, 361 S.E.2d 753 (1987), a father and son were charged with narcotics-related offenses and retained the same attorney to represent them. The trial court determined that: Id. 361 S.E.2d at 757. In United States v. Cirrincione, 780 F.2d 620, 628 (7th Cir.1985), the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's finding of the defendants' affirmative waiver of their right to conflict-free representation where the testimony of one of the defendants at the grand jury was not direct evidence against his co-defendant, who was the defendant's father. The Seventh Circuit additionally considered that the direct evidence was amply buttressed by the testimony of other witnesses, the defendants were aware that they had made contradictory statements that would be admitted against each other, and there was no allegation that their joint attorney was faced with a conflict of interest in representing the interests of both defendants. See also United States v. Lowry, 971 F.2d 55, 62 (7th Cir.1992) (concluding that there was a valid waiver of the right to conflict-free representation because the defendant had sufficient information to weigh the risks created by the conflict of interest against the benefit of counsel's experience); United States v. Plewniak, 947 F.2d 1284, 1287-88 (5th Cir.1991) (holding that there was a valid waiver of defendant's right to conflict-free representation despite the court's failure to inform the defendant of the existence of a potential conflict of interest since the defendant was well aware of the factual basis which created the conflict), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1120, 112 S. Ct. 1239, 117 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1992); Duncan v. Alabama, 881 F.2d 1013, 1017-18 (11th Cir.1989) (holding that the defendant validly waived right to conflict-free representation where the defendant knew a conflict existed, its effect on his defense, and his right to have other counsel appointed); Bridges v. United States, 794 F.2d 1189, 1194 (7th Cir.1986) (determining that an accused may waive his right to independent counsel by knowingly and intelligently proceeding with the challenged counsel).[2] We conclude that the district court's order directing their retained attorney to represent neither defendant deprived the Tysons of the right to counsel of their choice. We further hold that, by waiving their right to conflict-free representation, the defendants have waived their right to later assert a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel as caused by the conflict of interest. Accordingly, we make the rule absolute and direct the district court to vacate its August 22, 1994 order. ERICKSON, J., dissents, and LOHR and MULLARKEY, JJ., join in the dissent. Justice ERICKSON dissenting: I dissent because the majority unnecessarily limits the discretion of a trial judge to disqualify a lawyer from representing a defendant when an obvious and actual conflict of interest exists that would deprive the defendant of the right to effective assistance of counsel. On July 14, 1994, the alleged victim testified at the defendants' preliminary hearing. The alleged victim stated that, on March 4, *993 1994, she was traveling south on Interstate 25 toward her home in Pueblo, Colorado. She looked in her rearview mirror and saw a car rapidly approaching her back bumper. The car was swerving and honking and kept on her tailgate. She heard something hitting her car and thought the occupants of the car were throwing rocks at her. She concluded "they're not throwing rocks at me, they're shooting at me." The alleged victim then saw the car pull to her right, and she noticed something hitting the bottom of her car, as if she "was [driving] on gravel...." While the car passed her on the right, a man's arm held a gun out the window. The man's arm waved the gun at her. Once the car passed her, she pulled over to the side of the highway. However, she recognized the car as a Mercedes and memorized its license plate number. After reaching a gas station, she asked the cashier to call the state patrol. A deputy of the state patrol (deputy) testified that he arrived and made sure the alleged victim was "okay." Through the coordinated efforts of the deputy and the Pueblo County Sheriff's Department, the defendants were found and arrested. The defendants' vehicle matched the description given by the alleged victim, and the license plate numbers corresponded to her observations. The deputy found a 7.65 caliber semi-automatic pistol between the front seats of the Mercedes. The Mercedes was occupied by Barbara Germaine Whitehorn Tyson and Robert Long Tyson, the defendants, who are also married. The occupants were charged with the offenses enumerated in the majority opinion. A mechanic found bullet holes in the alleged victim's tires. Another deputy of the state patrol collected the tires along with the bullet fragments. A ballistics test indicated that the bullet fragments from her tires were probably fired from the pistol found in the Mercedes. The deputy also testified he found a marihuana concentrate during his search of the Mercedes. Throughout the defendants' proceedings, the trial judge expressed his concern that both defendants were represented by the same attorney. At the preliminary hearing the trial judge told both defendants that, under the facts, representation by the same lawyer raised a conflict of interest. The trial judge emphasized "[i]t's not a potential conflict, it is a conflict." On August 22, 1994, the trial judge ordered the defendants' retained counsel not to represent either of the defendants. The trial judge stated: Also, the trial court set forth that the prosecution made an offer for disposition to one of the defendants. As mentioned by the majority, the offer was "for probation, no jail, and testimony against the co-Defendant." The defendants contend their right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution[3] and Article II, Section 16, of the Colorado Constitution[4] was violated. The reason for "providing assistance of counsel `is simply to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial.' " Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159, 108 S. Ct. 1692, 1697, 100 L. Ed. 2d 140 (1988) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)). The main purpose for providing assistance of counsel "is to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers." Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159, 108 S. Ct. at 1697. While joint representation does not per se violate the right to effective assistance of counsel, a court faced with a possible conflict of interest "must take adequate *994 steps to ascertain whether the conflicts warrant separate counsel." Id. at 160, 108 S. Ct. at 1697 (emphasis added) (citing Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 482, 98 S. Ct. 1173, 1177-78, 55 L. Ed. 2d 426 (1978)); see also Armstrong v. People, 701 P.2d 17, 19 (Colo.1985). The majority holds that the waivers presented to the trial judge by both defendants solve any problem created by the multiple representation. See Wheat, 486 U.S. at 160, 108 S. Ct. at 1697. However, the presumption in favor of assistance by counsel of one's own choice does not infer such a "flat rule." Id. The right to counsel does not guarantee "an absolute right to counsel of choice in all cases." Rodriguez v. District Court, 719 P.2d 699, 706 (Colo.1986). The issue is the extent of a trial judge's discretion to protect the adversarial process when there has been a waiver of conflict-free counsel. In Rodriguez, we stated: Id. at 707-08; see also Wheat, 486 U.S. at 160, 108 S. Ct. at 1697-1698 ("Not only the interest of a criminal defendant but the institutional interest in the rendition of just verdicts in criminal cases may be jeopardized by unregulated multiple representation."). To protect the public's interest in the integrity of the judicial system, the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure require the trial judge to investigate the facts of multiple representation. See Wheat, 486 U.S. at 161, 108 S. Ct. at 1698. Crim.P. 44(b)[5] provides in relevant part: In the present case, the trial judge investigated the multiple representation and, exercising his independent duty to ensure a fair trial, ordered that both defendants could not be represented by the same counsel. See Wheat, 486 U.S. at 161, 108 S. Ct. at 1698. Faced with a no-win situation,[6] the trial judge, after reviewing the rights of the defendants to effective assistance of counsel, entered an order protecting both defendants' right to a fair trial.[7] Without such an order the public's confidence in the integrity of the judicial process would be severely tested. As the trial judge observed, it would be virtually impossible for the attorney to "effectively represent" both defendants. In Wheat, the Court granted trial judges "substantial latitude in refusing waivers of conflicts of interest" by allowing trial courts to exercise their discretion in cases of potential conflict. See id. at 163, 108 S. Ct. at 1699. Here, the trial court found an actual conflict which intensified after the prosecution offered *995 the defendant wife probation and no jail time in exchange for her testimony. Presented with this conflict, the trial judge would be derelict in his duties if he took any other steps. The trial judge's order rested well within the confines established by Wheat. Accordingly, I would find that the defendants were not denied their right to counsel and the trial judge acted within his discretion by entering the order prohibiting both defendants from being represented by the same counsel. LOHR and MULLARKEY, JJ., join in this dissent. [1] In United States v. Rodriguez, 982 F.2d 474 (11th Cir.) (concluding that the defendant, who was informed of the possible conflict, and who nonetheless indicated that he wanted the attorney to represent him who was also representing his two brothers, consented to joint representation, waiving any ineffectiveness of counsel claim caused by the alleged conflict of interest), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 275, 126 L. Ed. 2d 226 (1993); Martinez, 869 P.2d at 524 ("Although ineffective assistance of counsel may be asserted by a defendant when his counsel has been found to have a conflict of interest, it will not be found if the defendant waived his right to conflict-free representation, and if such waiver is made with full knowledge of the actual conflict."); In re Noday, 125 Cal. App. 3d 507, 521, 178 Cal. Rptr. 653, 660 (1981) (holding that, because the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to separate counsel in light of the court's unambiguous advisement that joint representation could "present a very substantial conflict so far as his defense is concerned," the defendant was precluded from claiming ineffective assistance of counsel due to the conflict of interest that ultimately developed). [2] But cf. United States v. Swartz, 975 F.2d 1042, 1049 (4th Cir.1992) (finding that the defendant did not validly waive her right to conflict-free representation when the defendant waived her right at the arraignment and was unaware of the serious nature of the conflict of interest that later developed at sentencing); United States v. Martin, 965 F.2d 839, 843-44 (10th Cir.1992) (per curiam) (holding that the defendant did not validly waive his right to conflict-free representation where the district court inadequately advised the defendant of the risks of multiple representation); Hamilton v. Ford, 969 F.2d 1006, 1010 n. 4 (11th Cir.1992) (determining that there was no valid waiver of right to conflict-free representation where the defendant was never informed, prior to trial, of the potential conflict of interest nor of his right to obtain alternative counsel), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. 1625, 123 L. Ed. 2d 183 (1993). [3] The Sixth Amendment provides "[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy ... the assistance of counsel for his defense." [4] Article II, Section 16 states, "[i]n criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel...." [5] Colorado Crim.P. 44(b) parallels Fed.R.Crim.P. 44(c). [6] The United States Supreme Court noted: If a district court agrees to the multiple representation, and the advocacy of counsel is thereafter impaired as a result, the defendant may well claim that he did not receive effective assistance. On the other hand, a district court's refusal to accede to the multiple representation may [also] result in a challenge.... Wheat, 486 U.S. at 161, 108 S. Ct. at 1698 (citation omitted). [7] Without passing judgment on the attorney seeking to represent both defendants, I invoke two ethical concepts. First, the comment to Rule 1.7 of the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct (Conflicts of Interest) states "when a disinterested lawyer would conclude that the client should not agree to the representation under the circumstances, the lawyer involved cannot properly ask for such agreement or provide representation on the basis of the client's consent." The present case illustrates a situation when a lawyer cannot properly ask each client to waive the conflict. Second, the Standard for Criminal Justice 4-1.6 requires that "[c]lient interests [be] paramount." The standard insists a lawyer "represent the client's legitimate interests...."