Title: Layton v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 173, 2010
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: August 3, 2010

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
SAMUEL LAYTON,   
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 173, 2010 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for Sussex County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0205011859 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: June 24, 2010 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: August 3, 2010 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This third day of August 2010, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Samuel Layton, filed an appeal from 
the Superior Court’s March 12, 2010 order denying his second motion for 
postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  The 
plaintiff-appellee, the State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the Superior 
 
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Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face of the opening 
brief that the appeal is without merit.1  We agree and affirm. 
 
(2) 
The record reflects that, in December 2002, Layton was found 
guilty by a Superior Court jury of four counts of Rape in the First Degree, 
six counts of Unlawful Sexual Contact in the Second Degree, and one count 
of Continuous Sexual Abuse of a Child.  He was sentenced to a total of 
seventy-two years of Level V incarceration.  This Court affirmed Layton’s 
convictions on direct appeal.2  Layton, through counsel, filed his first 
postconviction motion on the grounds of multiple instances of ineffective 
assistance of counsel at trial and on direct appeal.  The Superior Court 
denied the motion and this Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment.3 
 
(3) 
In this appeal from the Superior Court’s denial of his second 
postconviction motion, Layton claims that the Superior Court a) abused its 
discretion when it refused to conduct an evidentiary hearing on various 
issues alleged in his motion; and b) committed legal error when it denied his 
various contentions of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
 
(4) 
When considering a postconviction motion, the Superior Court 
must apply the procedural requirements of Rule 61 before reaching the 
                                                 
1 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
2 Layton v. State, Del. Supr., No. 74, 2003, Jacobs, J. (Aug. 4, 2003). 
3 Layton v. State, Del. Supr., No. 55, 2007, Berger, J. (Sept. 7, 2007). 
 
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merits of the claims.4  Layton’s convictions became final approximately 
seven years ago.5  As such, his claims are clearly time-barred.6  To the extent 
that Layton’s claims have previously been adjudicated, they are procedurally 
barred in this proceeding.7  To the extent that his claims were not raised in 
his previous postconviction motion, they are barred as repetitive.8  To the 
extent that his claims were not raised in the proceedings leading to the 
judgment of conviction, they are procedurally defaulted.9  Finally, to the 
extent that Layton fails to raise claims in this appeal that were raised below, 
any such claims are waived and will not be considered in this appeal.10  
Moreover, Layton has failed to demonstrate a miscarriage of justice with 
respect to any of his claims that would overcome the time and procedural 
bars.11  
 
(5) 
Even viewing Layton’s claims on the merits, they are 
unavailing.  The decision whether to hold an evidentiary hearing in the 
context of a postconviction proceeding is within the discretion of the 
                                                 
4 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
5 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(m)(2). 
6 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1). 
7 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4). 
8 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2). 
9 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3). 
10 Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del. 1993). 
11 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5). 
 
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Superior Court.12  There is no evidence that the Superior Court abused its 
discretion by not holding a hearing in this case.  Layton also claims that the 
Superior Court committed legal error when it denied his allegations of 
ineffective assistance.  However, our review of the Superior Court’s legal 
analysis reveals no error.  We agree with the Superior Court’s determination 
that Layton’s conclusory allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel fail 
to demonstrate any actual prejudice.13      
 
(6) 
It is manifest on the face of the opening brief that this appeal is 
without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled by 
settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, 
there was no abuse of discretion. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
 
                                                 
12 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(h)(1) and (3). 
13 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990).