Title: In re: P. B. Surf, Ltd. v. Savage
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1111541
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: March 15, 2013

Rel: 03/15/2013
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2012-2013
____________________
1111541
____________________
Ex parte Alamo Title Company
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: P.B. Surf, Ltd.
v.
Guy A. Savage et al.)
(Jefferson Circuit Court, CV-11-904034)
MAIN, Justice.
Alamo Title Company ("Alamo"), a Texas corporation,
petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the
1111541
Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate its order denying Alamo's
motion to dismiss an action filed against it by P.B. Surf,
Ltd. ("P.B. Surf"), a Florida limited partnership, and to
enter an order dismissing the action for lack of personal
jurisdiction.  We grant the petition and issue the writ.
I. Factual Background and Procedural History
This dispute concerns the disbursement of proceeds from
the sale of the San Paloma apartment complex in Houston,
Texas.  According to P.B. Surf, at the time the San Paloma
sale was scheduled to close in late October 2011, a dispute
arose over who was entitled to the net proceeds of the sale
and where the net proceeds were to be deposited after the
closing.  On October 28, 2011, after the closing, Alamo wired
a portion of the net proceeds from the San Paloma sale to a
Birmingham Wells Fargo bank account pursuant to instructions
from several of the sellers.
P.B. Surf filed a verified complaint against Alamo, as
the escrow agent, and several other defendants, alleging,
among other things, conspiracy.  Alamo moved the trial court,
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P., to dismiss P.B.
Surf's claims against it for lack of personal jurisdiction,
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1111541
attaching to its motion the affidavit of David Pitschmann, the
senior vice president and co-general counsel for Alamo. 
Before the trial court ruled on Alamo's motion to dismiss,
P.B. Surf filed an amended complaint, which was not verified,
alleging various claims against Alamo, as the escrow agent,
and several other defendants, including Guy A. Savage, and
G.J. Willem Noltes, who both had an ownership interest in one
of the companies that was involved in the sale of the San
Paloma apartment complex, alleging that there was 
a 
conspiracy
among the defendants in the wiring of funds from Alamo to the
Birmingham Wells Fargo bank account.  In its amended
complaint, P.B. Surf alleged that Alamo was partially
responsible for what it alleged was the improper distribution
of the proceeds among Savage, Noltes, and P.B. Surf.  The
amended complaint contains the following factual averments:
"15.  P.B. Surf is a limited partnership
operated by David A. Brannen and other partners.
"16.  
Investment 
Realty 
Holdings, 
LLC 
is 
jointly
owned by Savage and Noltes, each owning a fifty
percent (50%) interest in the entity.
"17.  P.B. Surf and Investment Realty Holdings,
LLC are the only members of Investment Realty Series
II, LLC ('IRS-II').  P.B. Surf owns a sixty-percent
(60%) interest in IRS-II, and Investment Realty
Holdings, LLC owns the remaining forty-percent (40%)
3
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interest in IRS-II.  P.B. Surf provided the only
capital used to create the entity, investing
approximately $5,900,000.00 in cash.  Investment
Realty Holdings, LLC, Savage and Noltes did not
provide any equity contribution to IRS-II.
"18.  In February 2007, P.B. Surf and Investment
Realty Holdings, LLC entered into an Operating
Agreement to govern the operation of IRS-II.  That
agreement 
controls 
and 
governs 
the 
parties'
relationship with respect to all business matters as
it relates to the operation of the San Paloma
property, the sale of which forms the basis of the
present dispute between the parties.
"19.  The IRS-II Operating Agreement provides
that P.B. Surf made the only cash contribution to
the 
entity. 
Further, 
the 
Operating 
Agreement
provides that, upon the sale of the San Paloma
property, 
which 
is 
considered 
a 
'Capital
Transaction', all monies are to be distributed as
follows: first, an 11% return on its approximate
$5.9 million investment was to be paid to P.B. Surf;
second, P.B. Surf was entitled to a full repayment
of its approximate $5.9 million investment; third,
only after P.B. Surf had been paid both of these
sums, any remaining funds were to be allocated
between P.B. Surf and [Investment Realty Holdings,
LLC,] according to their respective interests in
IRS-II, such that P.B. Surf would receive 60% and 
[Investment Realty Holdings, LLC,] would receive 40%
of any remaining amount.
"20.  IRS-II then entered into a contract with
WCSE San Paloma, LLC whereby they created San Paloma
Investments, LLC. Each entity held a fifty-percent
(50%) interest in San Paloma Investments, LLC.
"21.  San Paloma Investments, LLC then entered
into a partnership agreement with Paloma General
Partner, LLC, creating San Paloma Partners, L.P. San
Paloma Investments, LLC was a ninety-nine percent
4
1111541
(99%) limited partner in the entity, with Paloma
General Partner, LLC acting as a one percent (1%)
general partner.
"22.  San Paloma Partners, L.P. was created to,
and did in fact, purchase, own, and operate certain
real property located in Texas referred to by the
parties as 'San Paloma.'  The sale of this property
in October 2011 and the subsequent distribution of
the sales proceeds are the subject of this lawsuit.
"The Closing of San Paloma
"23.  The San Paloma deal resulted in
substantial financial loss to P.B. Surf, which had
contributed the entire capital amount (approximately
$5.9 million) used to purchase San Paloma.
"24.  On or about July 27, 2011, San Paloma
Partners entered into a purchase and sale agreement
with ISBI San Paloma, LLC, successor-by-assignment
to Francis Property Management, Inc. ('ISBI'),
whereby San Paloma Partners agreed to sell the San
Paloma property to ISBI (the 'San Paloma Sale'). 
P.B. Surf's consent was required to sell the San
Paloma property, as provided for in the IRS-II
Operating Agreement.
"25.  As a result of the San Paloma Sale, P.B.
Surf stood to realize a loss of more than $5
million.
"26.  On October 27, 2011, the San Paloma Sale
was scheduled to close. Over the course of the day,
due to Defendant Noltes, a dispute arose over who
was entitled to the net proceeds of the sale and
where the net proceeds were to be deposited after
the sale closed.
"27.  During the afternoon of October 27, 2011,
P.B. Surf and Savage, through their attorney Patrick
Hayes, consistently maintained that P.B. Surf was
5
1111541
entitled to receive the entire net proceeds from the
San Paloma Sale based on the relevant operating
agreements, as provided above. The sale resulted in
approximately $3.8 million in net proceeds, held in
two portions: (1) $1,561,704.80 was held by
Grandbridge Real Estate Capital, LLC, and is not the
subject of this lawsuit, and (2) $2,277,057.08 was
held in escrow by Alamo Title and is the subject of
this lawsuit. Pursuant to the operating agreement,
P.B. Surf was entitled to 100% of both sums of
money.
"28.  As a result of a dispute created by
Defendant G.J. Willem Noltes during the closing on
October 27, 2011, P.B. Surf, Savage, and Noltes, all
acting through their counsel, agreed that, instead
of wiring the Net Proceeds to a particular person or
entity, Defendant Alamo Title Company (the company
that held approximately $2.3 million of the net
proceeds from the sale) would interplead the Net
Proceeds in Court in Texas so that the proper
distribution of the net proceeds could be determined
by a judge.  Given the dispute over the distribution
of the Net Proceeds, this agreement was required in
order to close the sale of San Paloma.  Absent this
agreement, the sale would not have closed.
"29.  All parties to the present dispute were in
agreement with this proposed course of conduct and,
as of the close of business on October 27, 2011,
P.B. Surf had been informed and believed that the
contemplated Texas interpleader would occur based on
the parties' agreement and written confirmation
delivered to Alamo Title Company, coupled with
Alamo's consent to this arrangement and planned
interpleader action.
"30.  Unbeknownst to P.B. Surf, however, Savage
and Noltes began immediately conspiring to seize
control of the Net Proceeds before Alamo could
interplead the funds into a Texas court. Savage and
Noltes both admitted, under oath, that on the
6
1111541
afternoon and evening of October 27, 2011, Savage
and Noltes discussed ways by which they could obtain
the Net Proceeds from Alamo and prevent P.B. Surf
from obtaining any of the Net Proceeds.  Savage and
Noltes agreed to meet in Birmingham, Alabama on the
following morning, October, 28, 2011, to determine
how they could instruct Alamo to wire the funds to
an account controlled by Savage.
"October 28, 2011
"31.  On the morning of October 28, 2011,
without the knowledge or participation of P.B. Surf,
Savage and Noltes accomplished their plan. On that
morning, Noltes and Savage called Alamo, purporting
to act on behalf of San Paloma Partners.  Noltes and
Savage 
first 
called 
Alamo 
by 
telephone 
and
instructed Alamo to wire the funds into a Wells
Fargo account in Birmingham, Alabama, which was in
the name of San Paloma Partners, L.P. At that time,
Savage was the only signatory on the bank account,
but Noltes insisted later that morning at the Wells
Fargo bank branch that Savage add him as a signatory
that day, which Savage did.  Noltes and Savage
confirmed their verbal instruction to Alamo in
writing, via email, that same morning.
"32.  Neither P.B. Surf, David Brannen, nor
Patrick Hayes (attorney for both P.B. Surf and
Savage) were copied on these October 28, 2011
correspondences from Savage and Noltes to Alamo, nor
otherwise informed of the instructions given to
Alamo. 
 
Savage 
and 
Noltes 
purposefully 
and
admittedly concealed their actions from P.B. Surf,
Brannen, and Hayes.
"33.  That same morning, without consulting or
notifying P.B. Surf, David Brannen or Patrick Hayes,
Alamo wired the Net Proceeds to the Birmingham Wells
Fargo account, to which only Savage and Noltes had
access.  Alamo had actual knowledge that P.B. Surf
claimed an interest in these funds, as Attorney
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1111541
Patrick Hayes had informed Alamo, in writing, the
previous day that the money was due to be paid to
P.B. Surf.  Alamo did not request either a
certificate of incumbency or a formal letter from
Savage or Noltes, nor, presumably, did Alamo consult
with its counsel concerning Savage's and Noltes's
instruction, despite the inconsistency of their
instruction in light of the written agreement
reached just one day earlier between all of the
parties.  Nor did Alamo inform Patrick Hayes or
Noltes's attorney of the instructions given to it by
Savage and Noltes that morning.  Instead, based on
a brief telephone call and email, Alamo simply wired
the funds without informing P.B. Surf or its counsel
of the instructions given to it by Savage and
Noltes.
"34.  Upon the deposit of the funds in the Wells
Fargo 
account, 
Savage 
and 
Noltes 
immediately
withdrew $2.1 million, the vast majority of the
funds, depositing these funds in personal bank
accounts outside the reach of P.B. Surf, and in some
cases, later transferred the funds to bank accounts
outside the jurisdiction of the United States."
In its amended complaint, P.B. Surf sought injunctive and
declaratory relief.  In addition, the counts in the amended
complaint 
alleged 
against 
Alamo 
(1) 
negligence, 
(2)
wantonness, (3) breach of contract, (4) breach of fiduciary
duty, (5) fraud, (6) conversion, and (7) conspiracy, among
others.  In particular, as to conspiracy, P.B. Surf's amended
complaint avers, in pertinent part:
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"COUNT IX: CONSPIRACY
"....
"91.  Defendants conspired among themselves to
wrong, injure, damage, defraud and/or deceive P.B.
Surf, and/or to convert the Net Proceeds.
"92.  
Defendants 
have 
taken 
action 
and 
committed
acts 
in 
furtherance 
of 
said 
conspiracy 
or
conspiracies to the detriment of P.B. Surf.  These
actions include, but are not limited to, the
following:
"(a) Savage and Noltes instructing
Alamo to wire the funds to the Wells Fargo
account;
"(b) Alamo's wiring of the money to
the Wells Fargo account;
"(c) 
Noltes's 
and 
Savage's 
withdrawing
the money from the Wells Fargo account;
"(d) 
Noltes's 
and 
Savage's
transferring 
the 
money 
to 
personal
accounts;
"(e) Noltes, Savage, Kent Suttles
Noltes, Tamela Savage, Investment Realty,
LLC, Power Force, LLC, and/or Power Force
Apparel, LLC spending portions of the Net
Proceeds on personal debts, liabilities,
and/or 
investments 
or 
other 
matters
unrelated to the San Paloma venture;
"(f) Savage, Noltes, Kent Suttles
Noltes, Tamela Savage, Investment Realty,
LLC, Power Force, LLC, and/or Power Force
Apparel, LLC maintaining control of and/or
withholding the money from P.B. Surf.
9
1111541
"93.  Through their conspiracy, Defendants have
caused 
P.B. 
Surf 
to 
suffer 
significant 
and
continuous damage, injury, and loss."
The amended complaint asserted that venue for the action
was proper in Jefferson County, Alabama, because, it stated,
"a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to
the claim occurred in Jefferson County."
  Alamo filed a motion to dismiss P.B. Surf's amended
complaint on the basis that the trial court lacked personal
jurisdiction,  both general and specific, over Alamo.  See
Rule 12(b)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P.   Alamo also filed a supplement
to its motion to dismiss.  Attached to the supplement was the
affidavit of Pitschmann.  The affidavit stated:
"• Alamo has never conducted business, solicited
business, or otherwise engaged in any persistent
course of conduct within the State of Alabama;
"• Alamo has never been registered or qualified to
do business in the State of Alabama, and has never
maintained a registered agent for service of process
in the State of Alabama;
"• 
Alamo 
has 
never 
consented 
to 
personal
jurisdiction in any courts in the State of Alabama,
has never been a litigant in the courts of the State
of Alabama, has never availed itself of the courts
of the State of Alabama, has not received any
financial or other benefits, privileges, subsidies,
incentives, compensation, or protection from the
State of Alabama, and has never paid any taxes in
the State of Alabama;
10
1111541
"• Alamo has never had any offices or facilities of
any kind located within the State of Alabama, and
has never performed any services in the State of
Alabama;
"• Alamo has never had any employees or agents
within the State of Alabama;
"• Alamo has never had any interest in, has never
used, and has never owned any real estate, personal
property, or other assets, including any product or
parts inventory, located in the State of Alabama;
"• Alamo has never maintained any telephones,
computers or servers, fax machines, routers, or
other electronic equipment in the State of Alabama;
"• Alamo has never had any bank accounts located
within the State of Alabama, has never borrowed any
money from any bank located within the State of
Alabama, and has never applied for or guaranteed any
loan from any bank located within the State of
Alabama;
"• 
Alamo 
has 
never 
directed 
any 
marketing,
advertising, 
demonstrations, 
or 
solicitations 
toward
anyone in the State of Alabama;
"• Alamo has never met or communicated with P.B.
Surf in Alabama or in relation to any Alabama
transaction;
"• Alamo has never had any dealings of any kind with
P.B. Surf in Alabama or in relation to any Alabama
transaction;
"• Alamo has never traveled to the State of Alabama
by means of any officer, director or agent in any
way authorized to act or transact business; and
"• Alamo has never paid any taxes or fees in the
State of Alabama; and 
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"• Alamo played no role in the division of the
proceeds 
from 
the 
sale 
of 
the 
San 
Paloma
apartments."
Pitschmann's affidavit also stated:
"5.  Alamo did not conspire with any of the
Defendants, or any other person or entity, to wrong,
injure, damage, defraud, and/or deceive P.B. Surf,
and/or to convert the 'Net Proceeds,' as P.B. Surf
alleges in the Amended Complaint.
"6.  Alamo did not stand to benefit in any way
from the distribution of the Net Proceeds to San
Paloma Partners, LLP ('San Paloma Partners'), Guy
Savage ('Savage'), or Willem Noltes ('Noltes').  It
gained nothing from making the distribution.
"7.  Alamo transferred the Net Proceeds to the
proper entity at the proper bank account. The Net
Proceeds were transferred to the seller San Paloma
Partners' bank account at Wells Fargo; the Wells
Fargo bank account had been recently identified by
Patrick Hayes, an attorney representing Savage and
P.B. Surf's principal David Brannen during the
closing, on the afternoon of October 27, 2011.
"8. 
 
Alamo 
properly 
followed 
Savage 
and 
Noltes's
instructions on the morning of October 28, 2011,
which it was specifically authorized to do. Savage
and Noltes instructed Alamo to distribute the Net
Proceeds Alamo held to the Seller's Wells Fargo bank
account on the morning of October 28, 2011.  Savage
and Noltes had the power to do so because they were
officers of [IRS-II] and because they owned and
controlled IRS-II's managing member Investment
Realty Holdings, LLC. As [P.B. Surf] alleges in its
Amended Complaint, '[i]n February 2007, P.B. Surf
and Investment Realty Holdings, LLC entered into an
Operating Agreement to govern the operation of
IRS-II.  That agreement controls and governs the
parties' relationship with respect to all business
12
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matters as it relates to the operation of the San
Paloma property, the sale of which forms the basis
of the present dispute between the parties.'"
P.B. Surf filed a response to Alamo's motion to dismiss. 
In that response, P.B. Surf argued that its complaint, which
detailed 
the 
real-estate 
services 
provided 
and 
the
disbursement of a portion of the proceeds to two of the
sellers by transferring the funds to an Alabama bank account
and asserted a claim of conspiracy, established personal
jurisdiction.  P.B. Surf did not file an affidavit or other
evidence to substantiate the factual allegations in its
complaint, but it did request the opportunity to conduct
jurisdictional discovery "to determine Alamo's contacts with
Alabama and to challenge the affidavits of David Pitschmann
that Alamo filed in support of its Motion to Dismiss and
Supplement."
On July 20, 2012, the trial court denied Alamo's motions
to dismiss P.B. Surf's amended complaint, stating:
"The Court is satisfied and does hereby find, among
others, that the actions of [Alamo] in causing the
electronic transfer of approximately $2.2 million
net dollars from a Texas bank to an Alabama bank in
direct contravention and violation of the agreement
of the parties made during the closing of a real
estate transaction handled by [Alamo] in Texas, ...
was sufficient to satisfy the minimal contact
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doctrine and place the said ALAMO TITLE COMPANY on
notice that it could reasonably anticipate being
haled into Court in the State of Alabama by [P.B.
Surf] who had made claim to the funds directly to
the ALAMO TITLE COMPANY defendant during the said
closing.  Further, [Alamo] was on notice of the
claims to the funds made by [P.B. Surf] and NOLTES
and SAVAGE which led to the agreement that the funds
would be interpled into Court in Texas for
determination 
of 
the 
ownership 
and 
ultimate
disposition of the same.  But for the uncontroverted
acts of the defendant, ALAMO TITLE COMPANY, it is
more likely than not that these parties would not be
before this Court today. ... [T]his Court hereby
holds 
that 
it 
does 
possess 
the 
requisite
jurisdiction 
over 
the 
defendant, 
ALAMO 
TITLE
COMPANY."
 
(Capitalization in original.) Alamo moved the trial court to
reconsider, arguing that P.B. Surf had not met its evidentiary
burden and that Alamo lacked sufficient contacts with Alabama
to support a finding of personal jurisdiction on the basis of
the conspiracy claim.   Alamo petitioned this Court for a writ
1
of mandamus.
II. Standard of Review
A Rule 12(b)(2) motion tests the court's exercise of
personal jurisdiction over a defendant.  See Rule 12(b), Ala.
R. Civ. P.  "'[A] petition for a writ of mandamus is the
Alamo states that, as of the filing of its mandamus
1
petition, the trial court had not ruled on its motion to
reconsider.
14
1111541
proper device by which to challenge the denial of a motion to
dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction.'  Ex parte Dill,
Dill, Carr, Stonbraker & Hutchings, P.C., 866 So. 2d 519, 525
(Ala. 2003)."  Ex parte McNeese Title, LLC, 82 So. 3d 670, 673
(Ala. 2011).  We review such a petition pursuant to the
following standard of review:
"'"The writ of mandamus is a drastic
and extraordinary writ, to be 'issued only
when there is: 1) a clear legal right in
the petitioner to the order sought; 2) an
imperative duty upon the respondent to
perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so;
3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and
4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the
court.'  Ex parte United Serv. Stations,
Inc., 628 So. 2d 501, 503 (Ala. 1993); see
also Ex parte Ziglar, 669 So. 2d 133, 134
(Ala. 1995)."  Ex parte Carter, [807 So. 2d
534,] 536 [ (Ala. 2001) ].'
"Ex parte McWilliams, 812 So. 2d 318, 321 (Ala.
2001)."
Ex parte Bufkin, 936 So. 2d 1042, 1044 (Ala. 2006).  "'An
appellate court considers de novo a trial court's judgment on
a 
party's 
motion 
to 
dismiss 
for 
lack 
of 
personal
jurisdiction.'"  Ex parte Lagrone, 839 So. 2d 620, 623 (Ala.
2002) (quoting Elliott v. Van Kleef, 830 So. 2d 726, 729 (Ala.
2002)).  But see Allsopp v Bolding, 86 So. 3d 952, 957-58
(Ala. 2011) (recognizing that deference is due to pertinent
15
1111541
trial court factual findings to the extent those findings are
based on evidence received ore tenus).
Additionally, the appropriate analysis and the parties'
respective evidentiary burdens on a personal-jurisdiction
issue are well settled.  "'"The plaintiff has the burden of
proving that the trial court has personal jurisdiction over
the defendant."'"  Ex parte McNeese Title, 82 So. 3d at 674
(quoting Ex parte Excelsior Fin., Inc., 42 So. 3d 96, 103
(Ala. 2010), quoting in turn J.C. Duke & Assocs. Gen.
Contractors, Inc. v. West, 991 So. 2d 194, 196 (Ala. 2008)).
"'"'In considering
a Rule 12(b)(2), Ala.
R. Civ. P., motion to
dismiss 
for 
want 
of
personal jurisdiction,
a court must consider
as true the allegations
of 
the 
plaintiff's
c o m p l a i n t  
n o t
controverted 
by 
the
defendant's affidavits,
Robinson v. Giarmarco &
Bill, P.C., 74 F.3d 253
(11th Cir. 1996), and
C
a
b
l
e
/
H
o
m
e
Communication Corp. v.
Network 
Productions,
Inc., 
902 
F.2d 
829
(11th Cir. 1990), and
"where the plaintiff's
complaint 
and 
the
defendant's affidavits
conflict, the ... court
16
1111541
must 
construe 
all
reasonable 
inferences
in 
favor 
of 
the
plaintiff."  Robinson,
74 F.3d at 255 (quoting
Madara 
v. 
Hall, 
916
F.2d 1510, 1514 (11th
Cir. 1990)).'"
"'Wenger Tree Serv. v. Royal Truck &
Equip., Inc., 853 So. 2d 888, 894 (Ala.
2002) (quoting Ex parte McInnis, 820 So. 2d
795, 798 (Ala. 2001)).  However, if the
defendant makes a prima facie evidentiary
showing that the Court has no personal
jurisdiction, 
"the 
plaintiff 
is 
then
required 
to 
substantiate 
the 
jurisdictional
allegations in the complaint by affidavits
or other competent proof, and he may not
merely 
reiterate 
the 
factual 
allegations 
in
the complaint."  Mercantile Capital, LP v.
Federal Transtel, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 2d
1243, 1247 (N.D. Ala. 2002)(citing Future
Tech. Today, Inc. v. OSF Healthcare Sys.,
218 F.3d 1247, 1249 (11th Cir. 2000)).  See
also Hansen v. Neumueller GmbH, 163 F.R.D.
471, 
474-75 
(D. 
Del. 
1995)("When 
a
defendant files a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2), and
supports that motion with affidavits,
plaintiff is required to controvert those
affidavits with his own affidavits or other
competent evidence in order to survive the
motion.") (citing Time Share Vacation Club
v. Atlantic Resorts, Ltd., 735 F.2d 61, 63
(3d Cir. 1984)).'
"Ex parte Covington Pike Dodge, Inc., 904 So. 2d
226, 229-30 (Ala. 2004)."
Ex parte Excelsior Fin., Inc., 42 So. 3d at 103.
17
1111541
III. Analysis
Alamo essentially makes two arguments for the trial
court's lack of personal jurisdiction over it.  First, Alamo
argues that it showed that the trial court lacked both general
and specific jurisdiction over it and that P.B. Surf did not
satisfy its burden of substantiating the jurisdictional
allegations of its complaint.  In particular, Alamo contends
that it is a Texas corporation with no offices, employees, or
business operations in Alabama and that its only contact with
Alabama came when two defendants in this case, Savage and
Noltes, contacted an Alamo employee and, as authorized
representatives of the seller, instructed Alamo to wire
approximately $2.2 million in sale proceeds to the seller's
bank account in Alabama.  Alamo argues that this limited
one-time transaction and its nominal contact with Alabama are
insufficient to satisfy the due-process requirements of the
Constitution and to justify an Alabama court's exercising
personal jurisdiction over it.  Second, Alamo argues that P.B.
Surf's conspiracy allegations in its amended complaint are
insufficient to establish jurisdiction.  Alamo denies that it
was a part of any conspiracy when it instructed its bank to
wire the net proceeds in its possession to the Wells Fargo
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account in Alabama owned by the seller, San Paloma Partners. 
We consider these arguments in turn.
Rule 4.2(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., permits Alabama courts to
exercise 
personal 
jurisdiction 
over 
an 
out-of-state 
defendant.
It provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
"(b) Basis for Out–of–State Service.  An
appropriate basis exists for service of process
outside of this state upon a person or entity in any
action in this state when the person or entity has
such contacts with this state that the prosecution
of the action against the person or entity in this
state is not inconsistent with the constitution of
this state or the Constitution of the United States
...."
Regarding Rule 4.2(b), this Court has said:
"In accordance with the plain language of Rule
4.2, both before and after the 2004 amendment,
Alabama's long-arm rule consistently has been
interpreted by this Court to extend the jurisdiction
of Alabama courts to the permissible limits of due
process. Duke v. Young, 496 So. 2d 37 (Ala. 1986);
DeSotacho, Inc. v. Valnit Indus., Inc., 350 So. 2d
447 (Ala. 1977).  As this Court reiterated in Ex
parte McInnis, 820 So. 2d 795, 802 (Ala. 2001)
(quoting Sudduth v. Howard, 646 So. 2d 664, 667
(Ala. 1994)), and even more recently in Hiller
Investments Inc. v. Insultech Group, Inc., 957 So.
2d 1111, 1115 (Ala. 2006): 'Rule 4.2, Ala. R. Civ.
P., extends the personal jurisdiction of the Alabama
courts to the limit of due process under the federal
and state constitutions.' (Emphasis added.)"
Ex parte DBI, Inc., 23 So. 3d 635, 643 (Ala. 2009).  See also 
Ex parte McNeese Title, 82 So. 3d at 673.
19
1111541
"'Two types of contacts can form a
basis for personal jurisdiction: general
contacts and specific contacts.  General
contacts, which give rise to general
personal jurisdiction, consist of the
defendant's contacts with the forum state
that are unrelated to the cause of action
and 
that 
are 
both 
"continuous 
and
systematic."  Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414
n. 9, 415, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404
(1984); [citations omitted].  Specific
contacts, which give rise to specific
jurisdiction, consist of the defendant's
contacts with the forum state that are
related to the cause of action.  Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,
472–75, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528
(1985).  Although the related contacts need
not be continuous and systematic, they must
rise to such a level as to cause the
defendant to anticipate being haled into
court in the forum state. Id.' 
"Ex parte Phase III Constr., Inc., 723 So. 2d 1263,
1266 (Ala. 1998) (Lyons, J., concurring in the
result).  Furthermore, this Court has held that, for
specific in personam jurisdiction, there must exist
'a clear, firm nexus between the acts of the
defendant and the consequences complained of.' Duke
v. Young, 496 So. 2d 37, 39 (Ala. 1986).  See also
Ex parte Kamilewicz, 700 So. 2d 340, 345 n. 2 (Ala.
1997).
"In the case of either general in personam
jurisdiction or specific in personam jurisdiction,
'[t]he 
"substantial 
connection" 
between 
the
defendant and the forum state necessary for a
finding of minimum contacts must come about by an
action of the defendant purposefully directed toward
the forum State.'  Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v.
Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102, 112, 107
S.Ct. 
1026, 
94 
L.Ed.2d 
92 
(1987). 
 
This
20
1111541
purposeful-availment requirement assures that a
defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction as
a result of '"the unilateral activity of another
person or a third person."'  Burger King, 471 U.S.
at 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174, quoting Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,
417, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984).
"Only after such minimum contacts have been
established does a court then consider those
contacts in the light of other factors--such as the
burden on the defendant of litigating in the forum
state and the forum state's interest in adjudicating
the dispute, Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476-77, 105
S.Ct. 2174--to determine whether the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant
comports with '"traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice."'  Brooks v. Inlow, 453 So. 2d
349, 351 (Ala. 1984), quoting International Shoe
[Co. v. Washington], 326 U.S. [310] at 316, 66 S.Ct.
154 [(1945)].  See also Burger King, 471 U.S. at
476-77, 105 S.Ct. 2174."
Elliott v. Van Kleef, 830 So. 2d at 730–31.
A defendant is constitutionally amenable to a forum's
specific jurisdiction if it possesses sufficient minimum
contacts with the forum to satisfy due-process requirements
and if the forum's exercise of jurisdiction comports with
"'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'"
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)
(quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).  See Ex
parte Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., 78 So. 3d 959, 972 (Ala.
2011) (quoting Ex parte McInnis, 820 So. 2d at 795, 802–03
21
1111541
(2001)).  This two-part test embodies the controlling due-
process principle that a defendant must have "fair warning"
that a particular activity may subject it to the jurisdiction
of a foreign sovereign.  Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471
U.S. 462, 472 (1985).  See Ex parte Kohlberg Kravis Roberts &
Co., 78 So. 3d at 970.
We first consider Alamo's contention that the trial court
lacked both general and specific jurisdiction over it.  In
response to Alamo's argument, P.B. Surf acknowledges that the
trial court lacked general jurisdiction over Alamo.   The
2
issue before this Court, therefore, is one of specific, not
general, personal jurisdiction.
Over the course of the development of minimum-contacts
analysis following International Shoe Co. and its progeny,
this Court, in Elliott v. Van Kleef, supra, and its progeny,
has essentially formulated a test for ascertaining whether
there are sufficient minimum contacts for a court to exercise
specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant:
In addition, the relevant evidence submitted by Alamo in
2
Pitschmann's affidavits does not support a finding of general
personal jurisdiction.
22
1111541
(1) The nonresident defendant's contacts must be related to
the plaintiff's cause of action or have given rise to it.  Ex
parte Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., 78 So. 3d at 971 (citing
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. at 472).  (2) By its
contacts the nonresident defendant must have purposefully
availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in the
forum state.   Ex parte City Boy's Tire & Brake, Inc., 87 So.
3
In Burger King Corp., the United States Supreme Court
3
explained  that to be purposeful, 
the 
out-of-state defendant's
contacts with the forum state must be deliberate and
substantial, rather than accidental or random:
"This 
'purposeful 
availment' 
requirement 
ensures
that a defendant will not be haled into a
jurisdiction solely as a result of 'random,'
'fortuitous,' or 'attenuated' contacts, Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. [770], at 774
[(1984)]; World–Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. [286,] 299 [(1980)], or of the 'unilateral
activity of another party or a third person,'
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,
466 U.S. [408,] 417 [(1984)].  Jurisdiction is
proper, however, where the contacts proximately
result from actions by the defendant himself that
create a 'substantial connection' with the forum
State.  McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.,
355 U.S. [220], 223 [(1957)]; see also Kulko v.
California Superior Court, supra, 436 U.S. [84], 94
[(1978)].  Thus where the defendant 'deliberately'
has engaged in significant activities within a
State, Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., supra, 465
U.S., 
at 
781, 
or 
has 
created 
'continuing
obligations' between himself and residents of the
forum, Travelers Health Assn. v. Virginia, 339 U.S.
[643], at 648 [(1950)], he manifestly has availed
23
1111541
3d 521, 529 (Ala. 2011).  See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,
253 (1958); see also Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474-75.  (3) The
nonresident defendant's contacts with the forum must be "such
that the nonresident defendant "'should reasonably anticipate
being haled into court'" in the forum state."  Ex parte
Excelsior Fin., Inc., 42 So. 3d at 101 (quoting Burger King
Corp., 471 U.S. at 473, quoting in turn World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980)).  See, e.g.,
Elliott v. Van Kleef, supra.
Considering the minimum-contacts analysis in the context
of specific personal jurisdiction, this Court concludes that
the requisite minimum contacts for the trial court's exercise
of specific jurisdiction over Alamo do not exist.  First, the
allegations in the amended complaint and the evidence before
the court establish that, as a result of the Alamo's
performance as escrow agent in the underlying transaction,
Alamo had telephone and electronic-mail communications with
himself of the privilege of conducting business
there, and because his activities are shielded by
'the benefits and protections' of the forum's laws
it is presumptively not unreasonable to require him
to submit to the burdens of litigation in that forum
as well."
471 U.S. at 475–76 (footnote omitted).
24
1111541
Savage and Noltes.  Alamo, at the direction of Savage and
Noltes, two of several sellers, wired sale proceeds from its
bank account in Texas to a bank account in Alabama.  All 
these contacts with Alabama were for the purpose of completing
the real-estate transaction at issue and form the predicate of
P.B. Surf's cause of action.  Therefore, the first prong of
the 
minimum-contacts 
analysis 
for 
specific 
personal
jurisdiction is satisfied because Alamo's contacts with
Alabama are related to P.B. Surf's cause of action.
However, P.B. Surf's assertion of personal jurisdiction
fails when the second prong of the minimum-contacts analysis
is considered.  "The issue of personal jurisdiction '"stands
or falls on the unique facts of [each] case."'"  Ex parte
Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 15 So. 3d 511, 515 (Ala. 2009)
(quoting Ex parte I.M.C., Inc., 485 So. 2d 724, 725 (Ala.
1986)).  The evidence before this Court gives no indication
that Alamo "purposefully availed" itself of the protection of
the laws of Alabama or that it should reasonably have expected
to be haled into court here.  As previously noted, Alamo had
virtually no contact with Alabama other than telephone and
electronic-mail communications and the wiring of funds from
the Texas bank account to the Alabama bank account in relation
25
1111541
to the real-estate transaction.  See, e.g., Elliott v. Van
Kleef, 830 So. 2d at 731 ("[T]he telephone calls, fax
transmissions, and letters from Kizer and Elliott to Van Kleef
are 
irrelevant to whether personal jurisdiction over Van 
Kleef
exists, because these calls and faxes were 'the unilateral
activity of another person.'" (quoting Burger King Corp., 471
U.S. at 475)), and Kittle Heavy Hauling v. Gary A. Rubel,
Inc., 647 So. 2d 743, 744 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994) ("The use of
an interstate facility (i.e., telephone) is an ancillary
factor and does not, alone, provide the requisite minimum
contacts.").  See also Ex parte No. 1 Steel Prods., Inc., 76
So. 3d 805, 812 (Ala. 2011) ("We have in previous cases
explicitly recognized that a one-time contract for the
purchase 
of 
goods 
is 
an 
insufficient 
basis 
for
jurisdiction."); Vista Land & Equip., L.L.C. v. Computer
Programs & Sys., Inc., 953 So. 2d 1170, 1177 (Ala. 2006)
("[O]ur caselaw does not authorize the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant solely on the basis
of contracts it may have entered into with Alabama parties;
rather, such jurisdiction is authorized when there is an
ongoing contractual relationship supported by the additional
contacts that are incidental to such a relationship.").  Alamo
26
1111541
is 
not incorporated, licensed, registered, or authorized to 
do
business in Alabama.  Alamo does not have offices, agents, or
bank accounts in Alabama, nor does it have officers or
employees located in Alabama.  There is no evidence indicating
that any Alamo employee traveled to Alabama in connection with
this transaction.  Moreover, there is simply no evidence
indicating that Alamo initiated any contact whatsoever with
Alabama concerning the real-estate transaction at issue.  The
evidence establishes that Alamo was contacted in Texas by
Savage and Noltes, two of the sellers involved in this
transaction, who contacted Alamo from Alabama.  Further, none
of the closing documents were executed in or delivered to
Alabama, the escrow funds were not held in Alabama, the real
property was not sold to a purchaser in Alabama, and the real-
estate transaction was not closed in Alabama.  Finally, the
real property, the San Paloma apartment complex, was located
in Texas, not Alabama.  Cf. Bowling v. Founders Title Co., 773
F.2d 1175 (11th Cir. 1985) (finding that Alabama had personal
jurisdiction 
over 
a 
California 
defendant 
who 
made
misrepresentations by telephone and mail to an Alabama
plaintiff regarding a transaction the out-of-state defendant
knew involved the sale of land located in Alabama).
27
1111541
Alabama courts have recognized that, in an appropriate
case, specific jurisdiction can be based upon the purposeful
conspiratorial activity of a nonresident 
defendant aimed at an
Alabama plaintiff.  See Ex parte Reindel, 963 So. 2d 614,
622–24 (Ala. 2007), and Ex parte Barton, 976 So. 2d 438, 443-
44 (Ala. 2007).  To establish personal jurisdiction under a
conspiracy 
theory, 
"'the 
plaintiff 
must 
plead 
with
particularity "the conspiracy as well as the overt acts within
the forum taken in furtherance of the conspiracy."'"  Ex parte
McInnis, 820 So. 2d at 806–07 (quoting Jungquist v. Sheikk
Sultan Bin Khalifa Al Nahyan, 115 F.3d 1020, 1031 (D.C. Cir.
1997)).  The elements of civil conspiracy in Alabama are: (1)
concerted action by two or more persons (2) to achieve an
unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose by unlawful means.  Luck
v. Primus Auto. Fin. Servs., Inc., 763 So. 2d 243, 247 (Ala.
2000).
"'"[I]f the defendant makes a
prima facie evidentiary showing
that the Court has no personal
jurisdiction, 'the plaintiff is
then required to substantiate the
jurisdictional allegations in the
complaint by affidavits or other
competent proof, and he may not
merely 
reiterate 
the 
factual
allegations in the complaint.' 
Mercantile Capital, LP v. Federal
28
1111541
Transtel, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 2d
1243, 1247 
(N.D. 
Ala. 
2002)
(citing Future Tech. Today, Inc.
v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 218 F. 3d
1247, 1249 (11th Cir. 2000)). See
also Hansen v. Neumueller GmbH,
163 F.R.D. 471, 474-75 (D. Del.
1995) ('When a defendant files a
motion to dismiss pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2) [i.e., for
lack of personal jurisdiction],
and supports that motion with
affidavits, plaintiff is required
to controvert those affidavits
with his own affidavits or other
competent evidence in order to
survive the motion.')(citing Time
Share Vacation Club v. Atlantic
Resorts, Ltd., 735 F.2d 61, 63
(3d Cir. 1984))."
"'Ex parte Covington Pike Dodge, Inc., 904
So. 2d 226, 229-30 (Ala. 2004) (footnote
omitted).'
"Ex parte Unitrin, Inc., 920 So. 2d 557, 560-61
(Ala. 2005)."
Ex parte United Ins. Cos., 936 So. 2d 1049, 1053-54 (Ala.
2006).  See also Ex parte Excelsior Fin., Inc., 42 So. 3d at
101.
P.B. Surf's complaint, as amended, alleges that Alamo was
a part of the conspiracy because it wired the net proceeds of
the sale into an Alabama bank account.  In support of its
motion to dismiss, Alamo submitted an affidavit stating (1)
that "Alamo did not conspire with any of the defendants, or
29
1111541
any other person or entity, to wrong, injure, damage, defraud,
and/or deceive P.B. Surf, and/or to convert the 'Net
Proceeds'"; (2) that Alamo followed Savage's and Noltes's
direction on the morning of October 28, 2011, who, as sellers,
had the authority to instruct Alamo; (3) that Alamo
transferred the net proceeds from the real-estate closing to
the proper entity at the proper bank account; (4) that the
Wells Fargo bank account had been recently identified by
Patrick 
Hayes, an attorney representing Savage and P.B. Surf's
principal David Brannen during the closing, on the afternoon
of October 27, 2011; and (5) that Alamo did not stand to
benefit in any way from the distribution of the net proceeds
to San Paloma Partners, L.P., Savage, or Noltes.  This
affidavit testimony was sufficient to shift the burden to P.B.
Surf to present evidence substantiating that jurisdiction
existed over Alamo under a conspiracy theory.  See Excelsior
Fin., 42 So. 3d at 103; Ex parte Covington Pike Dodge, 904 So.
2d 226, 229-30 (Ala. 2004).  However, P.B. Surf did not submit
any affidavits or other evidence to rebut the prima facie
showing made by Alamo.  Consequently, we conclude that the
trial court erred in denying Alamo's motion to dismiss the
action against it for lack of personal jurisdiction.  Thus,
30
1111541
Alamo's petition for a writ of mandamus establishes a clear
legal right to the dismissal of the complaint as to it to the
extent 
that personal jurisdiction was alleged in the 
complaint
to have been based upon a civil conspiracy. 
Considering the quality, nature, and extent of Alamo's
contacts with Alabama, as well as the association between
those contacts and the instant litigation, this Court finds
that none of Alamo's contacts with Alabama can support a
finding of purposeful activity invoking the benefits and
protections 
of Alabama courts.  Although Alamo's contacts 
were
tangentially related to Alabama, this Court finds that the
"'nature and quality and the circumstances of their
commission' create only an 'attenuated' affiliation with"
Alabama.  Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 476 n. 18 (citations
omitted).
In sum, P.B. Surf has acknowledged that Alamo's contacts
with Alabama were not continuous and systematic so as to
support the trial court's exercise of general personal
jurisdiction over Alabama.  This Court concludes, based on an
analysis of minimum-contacts factors, that the trial court's
exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over Alamo is also
unsupported.  Therefore, the petition for a writ of mandamus
31
1111541
filed by Alamo establishes a clear legal right to the
dismissal of the complaint on the basis that the trial court
lacked personal jurisdiction over it.
IV.  Conclusion
For the reasons set out above, we grant the petition for
the writ of mandamus and direct the trial court to vacate its
order denying Alamo's motion to dismiss and to enter an order
dismissing P.B. Surf's claims against Alamo on the basis that
it lacks personal jurisdiction.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Wise, and Bryan, JJ., concur.  
Murdock, J., concurs specially.  
Moore, C.J., dissents.
32
1111541
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur fully in the main opinion.  I write separately
to address the two grounds upon which Chief Justice Moore in
Part II of his dissenting opinion finds mandamus to be an
inappropriate remedy in this case.
A. Rule 5 "Permissive" Appeal as an
Alternative "Adequate Remedy"  
In Part II.A, the dissent concludes that mandamus is
unavailable in a case such as this because Alamo Title Company
("Alamo") could have sought permission to appeal the trial
court's interlocutory order denying its motion for dismissal
based on lack of personal jurisdiction.  In this regard, the
dissent begins by comparing certain standards relating to
mandamus and to Rule 5, Ala. R. App. P., permissive appeals
and concluding that Rule 5 has a "far lower threshold of
review."  ___ So. 3d at ___.  With respect, I submit that the
comparison made is inapt. 
Specifically, 
the 
standard 
referenced 
for 
mandamus 
relief
–- a "clear legal right" to the relief -— is the standard for
actually "winning" relief in the appellate court.  The
standard referenced for Rule 5 -— that there be a controlling
question of law as to which there is "substantial ground for
33
1111541
difference of opinion" -— is merely the standard that must be
met to get one's grievance before the appellate court in the
first place. 
Further, the approach suggested by the dissent would mean
that mandamus relief would be more freely available to
litigants before the Court of Civil Appeals and the Court of
Criminal Appeals, courts in which Rule 5 relief is not
applicable under our rules, than to litigants before this
Court.
More fundamentally, Rule 5 is indeed limited to rulings
involving "questions of law" and, specifically, unsettled
questions for which there is a ground for substantial
difference of opinion.  Such uncertainty simply is not
characteristic 
of 
most 
disputes 
over 
subject-matter 
jurisdiction, in personam jurisdiction, immunity, venue,
discovery, and fictitious-party practice in the context of a
statute-of-limitations concern, all of which are subjects as
to which legal principles are well established and as to which
we repeatedly have held that mandamus relief may be
appropriate.   Instead, the types of disputes listed above 
typically turn, as does the dispute in the present case, on
whether the trial court has exceeded its discretion in
34
1111541
deciding whether the evidence presented justifies factual
findings sufficient to meet a well settled legal standard.  
Finally, but perhaps most importantly, there is no right
to a Rule 5 certification.  Granting "permission" to appeal an
interlocutory order is within the wide discretion of the trial
judge, and a question exists as to whether appellate relief
would even be available on the ground that the trial court
exceeded some measure of discretion.   Even if the trial court
4
gives its consent, this Court must agree to accept the
question certified.  See Rule 5(c), Ala. R. App. P.  I fail to
see how that to which a party has no right can be deemed a
true "remedy."
In Ex parte Liberty National Life Insurance Co., 825
4
So. 2d 758 (Ala. 2002), only three of the eight sitting
Justices agreed that mandamus would lie to direct a trial
court to certify a legal question for interlocutory review
when the trial court had refused to do so.  Two Justices,
Johnstone and Harwood (the author of Ex parte Showers, 812 So.
2d 277 (Ala. 2001), upon which the three Justices in the
plurality relied) wrote separately to explain that a Rule 5
certification was entirely discretionary "in the opinion of
the judge" and that an appellate court simply could not force
a trial court judge to hold any certain opinion.  If Justices
Johnstone and Harwood have correctly assessed the wording in
Rule 5, there is no right to an interlocutory appeal, and,
therefore, a party aggrieved by some interlocutory order of
the trial court has no ability to seek an interlocutory appeal
no matter how unreasonable the trial judge's refusal to
certify the question.
35
1111541
B. "Further Litigation in the Trial Court"
(and Eventually Taking an Appeal)
as an "Adequate Remedy"
In Ex parte L.S.B., 800 So. 2d 574 (Ala. 2001), this
Court held that the standard for whether some remedy other
than mandamus is "adequate" is not whether there simply is
some other remedy, e.g., an eventual appeal, but whether that
other remedy is "adequate to prevent undue injury."  800
So. 2d at 578.  As a result, the Court noted that mandamus
would lie to address certain discovery disputes, to enforce
compliance with the court's mandate, to enforce a right to a
jury trial, and to vacate certain interlocutory rulings in
divorce cases.  Id. at 578.  All of these -— indeed, virtually
any ground for mandamus relief -— could eventually be raised
in an appeal from a final judgment.  Yet we do not consider
this to be an "adequate" remedy in many cases.  
Long before L.S.B. was decided, this Court discussed the
requirement that the alternative remedy be adequate to avoid
the particular harm at issue:
"[T]he appeal must be an adequate remedy[;] it must
be capable of protecting parties from the injury
immediately resulting from the error of the court. 
While the error in refusing a dismissal for want of
security for costs, may be available on error for
the reversal of a judgment, obviously, an appeal is
36
1111541
not an adequate remedy.  The citizen is compelled
into litigation with a non-resident, pending the
further continuance of the suit and the appeal,
without indemnity against the costs, the evil the
statute intends to avoid.  Hence, it has been the
uniform course of decision that mandamus is an
appropriate remedy to compel the dismissal of such
suit."
First Nat'l Bank of Anniston v. Cheney, 120 Ala. 117, 121-22,
23 So. 733, 734 (1898) (citations omitted).  
The view expressed in Cheney is consistent with the view
expressed elsewhere:
"It is the mere inadequacy and not the mere
absence of all other legal remedies, and the danger
of the failure of justice without it, that must
usually determine the propriety of the writ.  Where
none but specific relief will do justice, specific
relief should be granted if practicable, and when a
right is single and specific it usually is
practicable.
"To supersede the remedy by mandamus a party
must not only have a specific, adequate, legal
remedy, but one competent to afford relief upon the
very subject of his application."
2 W.F. Bailey, A Treatise on the Law of Habeas Corpus and
Special Remedies 825-26 (1913) (emphasis added).
In the present case, the position expressed in Part II.B
of the dissent is that mandamus does not lie to remedy the
trial court's failure to dismiss the claims against Alamo for
lack of in personam jurisdiction because Alamo has available
37
1111541
to 
it the following alternative and allegedly adequate 
remedy: 
"'continu[ing] to challenge personal jurisdiction in ...
answers to the complaint and by motions for summary judgment
or at trial'" and, if unsuccessful in all of these, pursuing
an appeal.  ___ So. 3d at ___ (quoting Ex parte United
Insurance Cos., 936 So. 2d 1049, 1056 (Ala. 2006)).  Although
the dissent cites Ex parte United Insurance Cos. for the
proposition that the petitioner can in fact continue to
challenge personal jurisdiction in these ways, that case does
not stand for the proposition that the right to do so in a
case challenging in personam jurisdiction is an "adequate
remedy" that justifies the refusal of the appellate court to
hear a mandamus petition.  
Indeed, the very reason for the limited exceptions we
have carved out to the general rule that interlocutory denials
of motions to dismiss and motions for a summary judgment
cannot be reviewed by way of a petition for a writ of mandamus
is that there are certain defenses (e.g., immunity, subject-
matter 
jurisdiction, 
in 
personam 
jurisdiction, 
venue, 
and 
some
statute-of-limitations defenses) that are of such a nature
that a party simply ought not to be put to the expense and
effort of litigation.  The cases recognizing the availability
38
1111541
of mandamus relief as to such matters are countless.  
5
Further, we have not been asked to overrule any of these
cases. 
Nor do I believe we should consider overruling this
precedent, even in a case in which we might be asked to do so. 
It simply is not an "adequate remedy" -— i.e., as stated in
Ex parte L.S.B., a remedy "adequate to prevent undue injury"
or, as Bailey states, a remedy "competent to afford relief
upon the very subject of his application" -— to say to a party
that has no meaningful contact with the State of Alabama or
who, under our precedents, is protected by sovereign immunity
from even going through litigation much less from liability
that he or she must simply "further litigate" the case and one
day take an appeal.  In a given case, such an approach could
subject a defendant to years of litigation, hundreds of
thousands of dollars in attorney fees and other litigation
Among the many dozens upon dozens of cases that could be
5
cited for the availability of mandamus relief in such cases
are the two referenced by the majority opinion:  Ex parte
McNeese Title, LLC, 82 So. 3d 670, 673 (Ala. 2011), which
quotes Ex parte Dill, Dill, Carr, Stonbraker & Hutchings,
P.C., 866 So. 2d 519, 525 (Ala. 2003), for the principle that 
"'a petition for writ of mandamus is a proper device by which
to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of in
personam jurisdiction.'"
39
1111541
expenses, the time, effort, and expense of traveling to
Alabama from elsewhere in the country for depositions and
hearings (in the case of the party with no contact with the
State),  and a cloud of uncertainty and worry hanging over the
party's business or personal affairs all this time.  I cannot
agree that further litigation and an eventual appeal serves as
an "adequate remedy" that meets these "subjects."
Main, J., concurs.
40
1111541
MOORE, Chief Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the issuance of a writ of
mandamus in this case for two reasons: (1) the contacts of
Alamo Title Company with Alabama are sufficient to establish
personal jurisdiction, and (2) Alamo's failure to apply to the
trial court for a permissive appeal violates a key requisite
for mandamus: the absence of another adequate remedy, e.g., an
appeal.
The threshold for issuing a writ of mandamus is high.
"Mandamus is a drastic and extraordinary writ,
to be issued only where there is (1) a clear legal
right in the petitioner to the order sought; (2) an
imperative duty upon the respondent to perform,
accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of
another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked
jurisdiction of the court."
Ex parte Integon Corp., 672 So. 2d 497, 499 (Ala. 1995). 
Granting Alamo's petition for a writ of mandamus ignores
Alamo's wrongful conduct in transferring to Alabama funds
Alamo knew were, by agreement, to be interpleaded into a court
in Texas, a finding made by the trial court in denying Alamo's
motion to dismiss.
I.
Clear Legal Right to Relief Sought
I begin with a look at certain undisputed facts omitted
from the analysis in the majority opinion, facts that refute
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the picture of Alamo as a merely "accidental" defendant forced
to defend a case in a distant state resulting from a single
random contact.
A.
Omitted Facts
The amended complaint states that on the day of the
closing, October 27, 2011, the plaintiff, P.B. Surf, Ltd., and
defendants Guy A. Savage and G.J. Willem Noltes agreed that
Alamo "would interplead the net proceeds in Court in Texas so
that the proper distribution of the net proceeds could be
determined by a judge." The amended complaint further states:
"All parties to the present dispute were in
agreement with this proposed course of conduct and,
as of the close of business on October 27, 2011,
P.B. Surf had been informed and believed that the
contemplated Texas interpleader would occur based on
the parties' agreement and written confirmation
delivered to Alamo Title Company, coupled with
Alamo's consent to this arrangement and planned
interpleader action."
Nonetheless, the day following the closing, without
informing P.B. Surf, Alamo, at the request of Savage and 
Noltes, wired the closing funds of $2,277,057.08 to a bank
account in Birmingham controlled by 
Alabama 
resident Savage on
which Noltes was a co-signatory. Savage and Noltes then
withdrew the funds from the Birmingham account and deposited
them in accounts beyond the reach of P.B. Surf. According to
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the relevant operating agreement that bound P.B. Surf and
certain entities controlled by Savage and Noltes, P.B. Surf
was entitled to the proceeds of the sale.
On July 3, 2012, the trial court entered a consent
judgment in favor of P.B. Surf and against defendant Savage,
his wife Tamela Savage, and other related entities in the
amount of $2.5 million. In entering the judgment, the court
relied on oral testimony and evidence provided at hearings and
on P.B. Surf's amended complaint.
Additional proceeds of the sale in the amount of
$1,561,704.80 were under the control of Grandbridge Real
Estate Capital, LLC. Savage and Noltes sought to convince
Grandbridge to wire the funds it was holding to them also. The
amended complaint states: "Grandbridge, however, refused to
release the monies it held based on a simple phone call."
Instead it interpleaded the money into the registry of the
United States District Court for the Northern District of
Alabama. 
Savage and Noltes did not copy P.B. Surf on any of their
communications to Alamo. Despite having actual knowledge
confirmed in writing that P.B. Surf claimed an interest in the
sale proceeds it was holding, Alamo did not inform P.B. Surf
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of the communications from Savage and Noltes, but simply
followed their e-mail and telephone instructions to wire the
money to an account at Wells Fargo in Birmingham controlled by
Savage. P.B. Surf did not learn that the funds had been wired
until two or three days later when its attorney contacted
Alamo about the status of the Texas interpleader action.
Savage and Noltes refused to return the proceeds of the sale,
prompting this lawsuit.
B.
Jurisdictional Analysis
1.
Alamo's alleged negligence
Alamo claims in its opening brief that it had no
knowledge of the wrongdoing of Savage and Noltes and that it
was merely an innocent intermediary in an "accidental or
random" contact with an Alabama bank and that its act of
"merely wiring money into an account in the forum state" is
insufficient to support personal jurisdiction. But Alamo does
concede that it "acknowledged and agreed ... to interplead the
proceeds at issue." By completely omitting from its analysis
any mention of the October 27 understanding that Alamo would
interplead the funds, the majority opinion portrays 
the 
wiring
of the funds to Birmingham on October 28 as a simple, routine,
and proper response to directions from Savage and Noltes,
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"who, as sellers, had the authority to instruct Alamo." ___
So. 3d at ___.
Other facts also militate against a ready acceptance of
the portrayal in the majority opinion of Alamo's role. The
trial court has now entered a consent judgment against Savage
for $2.5 million. Grandbridge Real Estate Capital, the other
real-estate-servicing agent in the sale, did interplead $1.5
million of the proceeds. These two acts support P.B. Surf's
contention that Alamo's disbursement of funds was not merely
ministerial but at a minimum constituted negligence. 
As the trial court stated in its order denying Alamo's
motion to dismiss, Alamo's transfer of the sale proceeds was
"in direct contravention and violation of the agreement of the
parties made during the closing." Further, P.B. Surf "had made
claim to the funds" directly to Alamo during the closing.
Finally, Alamo was "on notice" of the competing claims, "which
led to the agreement that the funds would be interpled into
Court in Texas."
Alamo's wiring of the funds in violation of the agreement
to interplead the funds and without any notice to P.B. Surf
resulted, as the trial court found, in Savage and Noltes's
taking "substantial portions of the money so transferred for
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their own personal and business usages." Under these facts
found by the trial court, P.B. Surf's negligence claim against
Alamo had prima facie validity.  In its amended complaint P.B.
6
Surf alleged that Alamo "owed a duty of reasonable care to
P.B. Surf when disbursing the proceeds from the San Paloma
sale, especially given the notice the Defendants, including
Alamo Title Company, received of P.B. Surf's claim to the
disputed funds." As P.B. Surf also alleged:
"Defendants breached the duty owed to P.B. Surf when
it recklessly, carelessly, negligently, and/or
wantonly distributed the proceeds from the San
Paloma sale at Noltes' and Savage's instruction,
without notice to P.B. Surf or its representative,
despite being on notice that the proper distribution
of the funds was in dispute."
Under applicable law, the trial court properly exercised
jurisdiction over Alamo to answer for its alleged negligence.
2.
Applicable law
a.
Assessing the allegations
The plaintiff has the burden of proving that the trial
court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Ex parte
P.B. Surf's amended complaint also alleged conspiracy
6
against Alamo. Because the trial court found jurisdiction
without 
reference to the 
conspiracy allegations, 
the
consideration of those allegations is not essential to this
analysis.
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Covington Pike Dodge, Inc., 904 So. 2d 226, 229 (Ala. 2004).
When considering a Rule 12(b)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to
dismiss for want of personal jurisdiction, "'"a court must
consider as true the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint
not 
controverted 
by the defendant's affidavits, and 'where the
plaintiff's 
complaint 
and 
the 
defendant's 
affidavits 
conflict,
the ... court must construe all reasonable inferences in favor
of the plaintiff.'"'" Id. (quoting Wenger Tree Serv. v. Royal
Truck & Equip., Inc., 853 So. 2d 888, 894 (Ala. 2002) (quoting
other cases)). 
To contradict P.B. Surf's amended complaint, Alamo
supplied the affidavit of its co-general counsel David
Pitschmann. The affidavit explained in detail that prior to
the wiring of the funds in this matter, Alamo had no contact
whatsoever with the State of Alabama. Further, Alamo "played
no role in the division of the proceeds"; it transferred the
proceeds "to the proper entity at the proper bank account";
and it "properly followed Savage and Noltes' instructions on
the morning of October 28, 2011, which it was specifically
authorized to do." These latter statements contradict the
complaint, which alleges that Alamo transferred the funds in
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violation of the agreement to interplead the funds and without
notice to the other seller claiming a right to the funds. 
Insofar as the complaint and Pitschmann's affidavit
conflict, 
the 
court "'"'must 
construe 
all 
reasonable
inferences in favor of the plaintiff.'"'" Covington Pike
Dodge, 904 So. 2d at 229 (quoting Wenger Tree Serv., 853 So.
2d at 894). P.B. Surf's amended complaint adequately pleaded
negligence, a reasonable inference from Alamo's actions. The
trial court was not in error in construing the conflict
between the complaint and Alamo's affidavit in favor of P.B.
Surf. Further, by omitting from its affidavit all mention of
the interpleader agreement, Alamo conceded the correctness of
P.B. Surf's allegations on this point for purposes of the
motion to dismiss. "'[A] court must consider as true the
allegations of the plaintiff's complaint not controverted by
the defendant's affidavits.'" Id.  
7
Because the trial court found in P.B. Surf's favor, it
7
did not address P.B. Surf's request for jurisdictional
discovery on the relationship between Alamo, Savage, and
Noltes. Because this Court has found that the record as it
currently exists does not support jurisdiction over Alamo, it
should merely remand for P.B. Surf to conduct jurisdictional
discovery rather 
than issuing the writ outright. "[C]ourts are
to assist the plaintiff by allowing jurisdictional discovery
unless 
the 
plaintiff's claim is 'clearly frivolous.'" Ex parte
Bufkin, 936 So. 2d 1042, 1048 (Ala. 2006) (citations and some
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By omitting salient facts regarding the agreement to
interplead 
the 
funds, 
the 
majority 
opinion 
improperly 
weighted
the analysis in favor of Alamo. 
b.
Personal-jurisdiction law
Alabama's long-arm rule extends as far as the federal Due
Process Clause permits. Rule 4.2(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. Under
federal precedent, a single tortious act in the forum state
can 
subject 
an 
out-of-state 
defendant 
to 
personal
jurisdiction. "So long as it creates a 'substantial
connection' with the forum, even a single act can support
jurisdiction." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,
475 n.18 (1985). "The 'substantial connection' between the
defendant and the forum State necessary for a finding of
minimum contacts must come about by an action of the defendant
purposefully directed toward the forum State." Asahi Metal
Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102, 112
(1980) (plurality opinion) (citation omitted). The negligent
or wanton wiring of $2.2 million in closing proceeds to a
Birmingham bank account controlled by 
an 
Alabama resident, who
then withdraws the funds to the detriment of a legitimate
internal quotation marks omitted).
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claimant, is an action purposefully directed toward Alabama.
In McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220,
223 (1957), the Court found that execution of a single
contract with an in-state resident sufficed to permit
jurisdiction 
over 
an 
out-of-state 
insurance 
company. 
The 
trial
court reasonably construed the actions of Alamo in this matter
as creating a substantial connection with Alabama. As the
trial court stated: "But for the uncontroverted acts of Alamo,
these parties would not be before this Court today."
An out-of-state defendant's acts must also be such that
the defendant could reasonably foresee being held accountable
in the courts of the forum state. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). Knowing of the agreement
to interplead the closing proceeds and then deliberately
wiring those funds to Alabama rather than into the designated
Texas court, Alamo should have been aware that P.B. Surf could
well challenge its action in the venue to which the proceeds
were sent. "Crucial to the analysis is the element of
foreseeability of the consequences of the defendant's
activities. There must be a clear, firm nexus between the acts
of the defendant and the consequences complained of in order
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to establish the necessary contacts." Duke v. Young, 496 So.
2d 37, 39 (Ala. 1986). That nexus exists here. 
Whether personal jurisdiction exists is a fact-specific
inquiry. A defendant who engages in tortious activity within
this State should not be able to claim a jurisdictional bar to
avoid liability. "We cannot allow a culpable defendant to
manipulate our decisions on in personam due process to effect
a shield against his improper conduct." Shrout v. Thoren, 470
So. 2d 1222, 1225 (Ala. 1985). Although the merits of P.B.
Surf's claim against Alamo were not adjudicated below, the
unrebutted allegations of wrongdoing and the reasonable
inferences arising from conflicting facts are sufficient to
support jurisdiction on a motion to dismiss.
Because the trial court reasonably assumed jurisdiction,
Alamo had no clear legal right to an order of dismissal, and
the petition should be denied.
II.
Other Adequate Remedy
Apart from the merits of P.B. Surf's jurisdictional
arguments, 
mandamus 
relief 
is 
inappropriate 
here 
because 
Alamo
has adequate alternative remedies. "A writ of mandamus will
issue only in situations where other relief is unavailable or
is inadequate, and it cannot be used as a substitute for
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appeal."  Ex parte Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 720 So. 2d
893, 894 (Ala. 1998). 
A.
Permissive Interlocutory Appeal
Because the amount in controversy exceeded $50,000, Alamo
had available the alternative of seeking certification from
the trial court for a permissive appeal.  Such an appeal has
8
a far lower threshold of review. Rather than having to
demonstrate a "clear legal right," the proposed appellant,
apart from urging the efficiency of an immediate appeal, need
only allege the existence of "a controlling question of law as
to which there is substantial ground for difference of
opinion." Rule 5(a), Ala. R. App. P. In this case, the
controlling 
question 
of law would be whether, upon application
of the minimum-contacts 
analysis, the trial court has personal
jurisdiction over Alamo.
Because Rule 5, Ala. R. App. P., is a specific limited
alternative to attacking an interlocutory order by a petition
"A party may request permission to appeal from an
8
interlocutory order in civil actions .... Appeals of
interlocutory orders are limited to those civil cases that are
within the original appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court." Rule 5(a), Ala. R. App. P. All civil cases in which
the amount claimed exceeds $50,000 fall within this category.
See §§ 12-2-7(1) and 12-3-10, Ala. Code 1975.
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for a writ of mandamus, it should logically, when other
requirements for an appeal are met,  be a prerequisite to
9
seeking mandamus relief. See Crawford v. Springle, 631 So. 2d
880, 882 (Ala. 1993) ("Where statutes in pari materia are
general and specific, the more specific statute controls the
more general statute."); Ex parte Ward, 89 So. 3d 720, 727
(Ala. 2011) ("When construing rules, this Court has applied
the rules of construction applicable to statutes. Ex parte
State ex rel. Daw, 786 So. 2d 1134, 1136 (Ala. 2000)."). Both
Rule 5 (permissive appeal) and Rule 21, Ala. R. App. P.
(applications for mandamus and other extraordinary writs),
provide means for appellate review of an interlocutory order.
"Statutes should be construed together so as to harmonize the
provisions as far as practical." Ex parte Jones Mfg. Co., 589
So. 2d 208, 211 (Ala. 1991). Thus, Rule 5 and Rule 21 should
be construed to harmonize their application, the 
specific 
rule
(permissive 
appeal) 
taking 
priority, 
where 
available, 
over 
the
general remedy of mandamus. 
Additionally, such an approach will promote harmony and
efficiency within the judicial system. By requiring a party to
E.g., when the amount in controversy exceeds the
9
jurisdictional amount. See supra note 8.
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initially resort to Rule 5, this Court will demonstrate its
respect for the jurisdiction of the trial courts, reserving
the extraordinary remedy of mandamus for truly extraordinary
situations. When the ordinary remedy of permissive appeal is
accessible, 
the 
extraordinary 
remedy 
of 
mandamus 
should 
abate.
B.
Further Litigation in the Trial Court
Denial of Alamo's motion to dismiss does not limit its
capacity to further challenge jurisdiction pretrial or during
trial. 
"[T]he 
trial 
court's denial of the petitioners' motions
to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is interlocutory
and preliminary only. The petitioners can continue to
challenge personal jurisdiction in their answers to the
complaint and by motions for a summary judgment or at trial." 
Ex parte United Ins. Cos., 936 So. 2d 1049, 1056 (Ala. 2006).
Alamo thus also had the alternative remedy of continuing to
litigate the personal-jurisdiction issue in the trial court.
If it were successful on the merits, the issue would be moot.
Otherwise, absence of personal jurisdiction could be grounds
for an appeal from an adverse final judgment. 
III.
Conclusion
Alamo lacked a clear legal right to the relief sought and
also had other alternative avenues for relief by way of an
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appeal. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the Court's
issuance of a writ of mandamus reversing the trial court's
order.
55