Title: Parrish v. Faulk
Citation: 304 So. 2d 194
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: December 5, 1974

304 So. 2d 194 (1974)
Hilton R. PARRISH
v.
Wamon D. FAULK et al., as County Commissioners of Houston County, Alabama, and R. J. Stembridge, Judge of Probate of Houston County, Alabama.
SC 969.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
December 5, 1974.
*195 J. Hubert Farmer, Dothan, for appellant.
Wm. G. Hause, Dothan, for appellees Wamon D. Faulk and Mark F. Tatum.
Jere C. Segrest, Dothan, for appellees A. A. Middleton, Harlie Halstead, Ed Tolar, Dorman Frith and Jack Wise.
COLEMAN, Justice.
Plaintiff appeals from an adverse decree in action for declaratory judgment.
Plaintiff seeks to have Act No. 779, approved September 5, 1973, declared void because it is a local act and was not passed in accord with the provisions of Section 106 of the Constitution of 1901.
Act No. 779 creates the office of commissioner of licenses in Houston County and provides for the method of issuing all licenses except marriage licenses.
As here pertinent, Section 106 provides as follows:
In the Journal of the House of Representatives, in the published notice, Section 2 of the proposed act recites as follows:
In the act as passed by the Legislature and approved by the Governor, Section 2 recites as follows:
The issue presented is whether Act No. 779 violates Section 106 of the Constitution because of the variance between Section 2 of the act as advertised and Section 2 of the act as passed.
The trial court held that the act did not violate Section 106, and plaintiff appeals.
It is apparent that the version of Section 2 in the published notice informed the public that the holder of the office of commissioner of licenses would be chosen and appointed by the appointing board named in Section 2, and the commissioner of licenses so chosen and appointed would hold office *196 "... at the pleasure of the appointing' board ..."
In the act as passed and approved, it is provided that the commissioner of licenses "... shall be elected at the next general election ... and shall take office for a term of four years ... " beginning on a specified day.
Between Section 2 as published and Section 2 as passed, there is a difference in the authority by whom the office of commissioner of licenses is to be filled and in the length of time the commissioner is to hold the office. In the published version, he is to be chosen by the appointing board composed of three named officials and is to hold office for an unspecified time at the pleasure of the appointing board. In the bill as passed, he is to be elected at the next general election for state officers. The act does not specify by whom he is to be elected. It appears to be assumed by the parties that the commissioner of licenses would be elected by the qualified voters of Houston County, but the act does not so specify. The act refers to the "... next general election for any state officers..."
Between the published and enacted versions of Section 2, there is a change in the length of time the commissioner of licenses is to hold office. In the published notice, he is to hold office for an unspecified term at the pleasure of the appointing board. In the act as passed, he is to hold office for a fixed term of four years.
In the published version of Section 2, any vacancy in the office is to be filled by the appointing board. In the enacted version of Section 2, filling a vacancy is not mentioned.
Of less significance perhaps is the difference in the published version and the enacted version with respect to fixing the salary of the commissioner. Both versions provide that the salary of the commisioner of licenses shall be fixed "... by the appointing board ..." at $10,500.00 annually. The published version of Section 2 names three officers who are to constitute the appointing board, but the enacted version of Section 2 does not name any officers or persons who are to constitute the appointing board. A hiatus is thus created.
Plaintiff contends that the differences between the published and enacted provisions of Section 2 are substantial and render the act unconstitutional. Defendants contend that the differences are not such a material variance as to violate Section 106 of the Constitution.
In brief, appellees cite State v. Brooks, 241 Ala. 55, 1 So. 2d 370, wherein this court held that Section 106 of the Constitution was violated in the passage of a local act in that the published notice of the act failed to give notice of its substance. In Brooks, this court cited Wallace v. Board of Revenue of Jefferson County, 140 Ala. 491, 37 So. 321, wherein in 1903, and for the first time, Section 106 was construed. In Wallace, this court, in considering the notice required by Section 106, among other things, said:
In State v. Allen, 219 Ala. 590, 123 So. 36, this court held invalid a local act wherein the act as passed was different in several respects from the act as published. This court said:
In Allen, in the published draft, one of the judges of the municipal court was named as judge of the new court, and his successors were to be elected by the judges of the circuit court. The act as passed provided that the judge and his successors shall be appointed by the governor. In respect *199 to such difference, Allen has some similarity to the instant case where the authority to fill the office in the published notice is placed in an appointing board, and in the act as passed, the authority to fill the office is placed in those voting at the general election.
In 1920, in Leonard v. Lyons, 204 Ala. 615, 87 So. 99, this court considered the constitutionality of Act No. 298, Local Acts of 1919, page 115, which established a Board of Revenue for Shelby County and abolished the court of county commissioners which had been established by an earlier act, No. 134, Local Acts of 1911, page 154. Section 2 of the 1911 act provided that the president and the four members of the board of revenue shall be appointed by the governor. The 1919 act amended Section 2 to provide that the president of the board shall be elected by the qualified electors of the county and one member shall be elected by the qualified voters of each of four districts as then constituted by authority of a still earlier act of 1890-91, Section 1, page 354.
The appellant contended that the act of 1919 was passed in violation of Section 106 of the Constitution because the published notice of the act was not sufficient in the particular next mentioned.
As here pertinent the published notice recites:
As stated above, the 1919 act as passed provided that the president of the board be elected by the electors of the county and one member of the board be elected by the voters of each of the four districts.
With one justice dissenting, this court held the 1919 act constitutional and said:
In 1945, on inquiry from the governor, the justices of this court expressed an advisory opinion with respect to a local act abolishing a court of county commissioners and creating a board of revenue as the county governing body. The opinion of the justices said that the act was unconstitutional because it is in violation of Section 106 of the Constitution. The justices said:
*200 The issue in the instant case is whether the difference in the authority to fill the office as published, and in the act as passed, is a matter of substance. None of the cases cited or found are directly in point.
The designation of the authority to select the license commissioner and to fill the office is a matter which rests in the discretion of the Legislature and not in the judgment of this court. This court does have the duty, however, to determine whether the published notice stated the substance of the act as passed.
The published notice informed the public that the office would be filled by an appointing board composed of three designated officials. The act as passed provided that the office would be filled by qualified electors, presumably the voters of Houston County. The term of office stated in the published notice was at the pleasure of the appointing board. The term of office stated in the act as passed is a fixed term of four years.
Consider this. What would the situation be if, in the published notice, it had been provided that the commissioner would be elected by the qualified voters of the county for a term of four years, and, in the act as passed, it was provided that the commissioner would be appointed by a board composed of the Chairman of the County Governing Body, the County Revenue Commissioner, and the Judge of Probate, and hold office at the pleasure of the appointing board? In the supposed situation, could it be said that the public had not been misled into thinking that the qualified voters would fill the office of license commissioner, and had acquiesced in passage of the act without investigation or protest? Could it be said that the designation of the authority to fill the office of license commissioner by the qualified voters was a mere detail and not a matter of substance?
If changing the authority for filling the office of license commissioner from an appointing board to election by the qualified voters (which is the change made in the instant case) is a mere matter of detail which need not conform to the published notice, then the reverse would be true and changing the authority for filling the office from election by the qualified voters to an appointing board would also be a mere matter of detail which need not conform to the published notice. If publishing notice that the authority will be a three-man appointing board and actually passing a law providing that the authority will be the qualified voters does not mislead and deceive the interested citizens of the county, then publishing notice that the authority to fill the office will be the qualified voters, and actually passing a law providing that the authority shall be a three-man appointing board, would not mislead and deceive the citizens of the county. It would be difficult to sustain the latter proposition that the public had not been deceived. The citizen would be likely to say, "They deceived me because they told me that I would be able to vote for the license commissioner but changed the law so that I cannot vote for him. They misled me because they said the office would be filled by election and they changed the bill so that he would be appointed and took away my right to vote for him or against him." It is not likely that many voters would regard the loss of their anticipated right to vote for the commissioner as immaterial.
We are of opinion that the citizens of the county would have been misled in a matter of substance if the notice had informed them that the office of license commissioner would be filled by election by the qualified voters, and the act as passed had provided that the office would be filled by appointment by the appointing board composed of three named officials. The converse is also true where the notice has informed the public that the office would be filled by the appointing board, *201 and the act as passed has provided that the office shall be filled by election by the qualified voters.
In brief, the defendants say:
We do not question the correctness of appellees' argument that filling an office by election by the qualified voters is better for the public interest than filling an office by appointment by one or a few persons, but that is not the question before us. We are persuaded that the filling of the office of license commissioner of Houston County is important, and that the authority designated to fill the office is a matter of substance and not merely a detail which can be changed from the authority designated in the published notice to a different authority not designated in the published notice.
Accordingly, we hold that Act No. 779 was not passed in compliance with Section 106 of the Constitution.
Reversed and remanded.
HEFLIN, C. J., and MERRILL, HARWOOD, BLOODWORTH, McCALL, FAULKNER and JONES, JJ., concur.
MADDOX, J., dissents.