Title: Dostal v. Strand
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2020AP001943
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: January 26, 2023

2023 WI 6 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2020AP1943 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Lindsey Dostal, Individually and as Special 
Administrator of the Estate of Haeven Dostal, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Respondent-
Petitioner, 
     v. 
Curtis Strand and ABC Insurance Company, 
          Defendants, 
State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, 
          Intervening-Defendant-Respondent-
Cross-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS  
Reported at 399 Wis. 2d 781, 967 N.W.2d 157 
PDC No: 2021 WI App 79 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 26, 2023   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 6, 2022   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Barron   
 
JUDGE: 
James C. Babler    
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the 
Court, in which DALLET, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  
ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ROGGENSACK 
and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, JJ., joined.     
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-appellant-cross-respondent-petitioner, 
there were briefs filed by Michael J. Brose, Mackenzie E. 
Campbell, Morgan A. Richie, and Doar, Drill & Skow, S.C., New 
Richmond. There was an oral argument by Mackenzie E. Campbell.  
 
 
 
2 
For 
the 
intervening-defendant-respondent-cross-appellant, 
there was a brief filed by William L. Moran, Maya H. Digre, and 
HAWS-KM, P.A., St. Paul. There was an oral argument by William 
L. Moran.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Michael J. Cerjak and 
Cannon & Dunphy, S.C., Brookfield, for Wisconsin Association for 
Justice.  
 
 
2023 WI 6 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2020AP1943 
(L.C. No. 
2019CV217) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Lindsey Dostal, Individually and as Special 
Administrator of the Estate of Haeven Dostal, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Respondent-
Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Curtis Strand and ABC Insurance Company, 
 
          Defendants, 
 
State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, 
 
          Intervening-Defendant-Respondent-
Cross-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 26, 2023 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the 
Court, in which DALLET, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  
ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ROGGENSACK 
and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, JJ., joined.    
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, Lindsey Dostal 
(Dostal), both individually and as special administrator of the 
No. 
2020AP1943   
 
2 
 
estate of Haeven Dostal, seeks review of a court of appeals 
decision affirming the circuit court's grant of summary and 
declaratory judgment in favor of State Farm.1  The court of 
appeals 
determined 
that 
Curtis 
Strand's 
conduct 
did 
not 
constitute an "occurrence" covered by the State Farm policy at 
issue because his conviction for second-degree reckless homicide 
established that the death was not the result of an accident. 
¶2 
Dostal contends that Strand's criminal conviction does 
not preclude a finding that Haeven's death was the result of an 
accident.  She further advances that the State Farm policy 
provides coverage for her claims against Strand and that neither 
the resident relative nor the intentional acts exclusion bars 
coverage. 
¶3 
In contrast, State Farm asserts that issue preclusion 
bars relitigation of the issue of whether Haeven's death was the 
result of an accident.  It argues that Strand's criminal 
conviction is dispositive on the issue of available insurance 
coverage under Strand's policy, and that there is no coverage 
for Dostal's claims.  State Farm further contends that the 
policy's resident relative and intentional acts exclusions 
preclude coverage. 
¶4 
We conclude that issue preclusion does not bar Dostal 
from seeking insurance coverage for her claims against Strand.  
The issue of whether Strand's conduct constituted an "accident" 
                                                 
1 Dostal v. Strand, 2021 WI App 79, 399 Wis. 2d 781, 967 
N.W.2d 157 (affirming order of the circuit court for Barron 
County, James C. Babler, Judge). 
No. 
2020AP1943   
 
3 
 
was not actually litigated in the prior criminal proceeding.  
Additionally, we conclude that there are genuine issues of 
material fact regarding the application of the resident relative 
and intentional acts exclusions such that summary judgment is 
inappropriate. 
¶5 
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand to the circuit court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
I 
¶6 
The following facts are undisputed.  Additional facts 
will be set forth as necessary in our analysis. 
¶7 
Dostal and Strand were in an on-and-off relationship 
for 17 years.  Dostal gave birth to Haeven on April 3, 2017, and 
Strand was subsequently adjudicated the father.   
¶8 
On July 11, 2017, Haeven passed away as a result of 
head trauma that occurred while she was in Strand's care.  Law 
enforcement conducted an investigation into Haeven's death.   
¶9 
As part of the investigation, law enforcement spoke 
with 
Strand 
multiple 
times, 
during 
which 
Strand 
gave 
inconsistent accounts of what happened.  In a statement given to 
police on July 10, 2017, Strand said that Haeven fell off of his 
knee and hit the floor as he attempted to burp her.  Strand was 
interviewed again in November of 2017, at which time he stated 
that he was warming a bottle, turned around and hit the kitchen 
island, dropping Haeven to the floor.  In both versions of 
events, Strand put Haeven to bed without seeking medical 
attention.   
No. 
2020AP1943   
 
4 
 
¶10 The State initially charged Strand with first-degree 
reckless homicide2 and resisting or obstructing an officer.3  
After a jury trial, at which Dostal was a witness, the jury 
convicted 
Strand 
of 
second-degree 
reckless 
homicide4 
and 
resisting or obstructing an officer. 
¶11 Dostal subsequently brought this civil action for 
negligence and wrongful death against Strand.  With regard to 
the negligence claim, the complaint alleges that Haeven's 
"injuries 
were 
proximately 
caused 
by 
the 
negligent 
acts 
of . . . Strand, 
including 
but 
not 
limited 
to, 
negligent 
supervision, failing to properly hold or secure Haeven to 
prevent her from falling, [and] failing to contact emergency 
services in a reasonable manner."  As to the wrongful death 
claim, Dostal alleged that she "has sustained damages due to the 
wrongful death of her daughter, loss of the society and 
companionship of her child, and has suffered pecuniary loss and 
will continue to suffer those losses into the future." 
¶12 Strand 
tendered 
the 
matter 
to 
State 
Farm, 
his 
homeowner's insurer, seeking defense and indemnification.  State 
Farm moved to intervene, bifurcate liability and coverage 
                                                 
2 Wis. Stat. § 940.02(1) (2017-18). 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1). 
4 Wis. Stat. § 940.06(1). 
No. 
2020AP1943   
 
5 
 
proceedings, and stay liability proceedings.5  The circuit court 
granted State Farm's motion and went ahead with coverage 
proceedings. 
¶13 State Farm moved for summary and declaratory judgment, 
arguing that its policy did not provide coverage for Dostal's 
claims and that it thus had no duty to defend or indemnify 
Strand.  Specifically, State Farm asserted that there was no 
"occurrence" (defined as an "accident") triggering coverage.  In 
State Farm's view, the fact that Strand was convicted of second-
degree reckless homicide, which required that the jury find that 
Strand created an unreasonable and substantial risk of death or 
great bodily harm and that he was aware of that risk, precluded 
the events at issue "from being labeled a mere 'accident.'"  
State Farm additionally argued that even if there were an 
"occurrence," coverage remains precluded under a "resident 
relative" exclusion and an "intentional acts" exclusion.   
¶14 The circuit court agreed with State Farm and granted 
its motion for summary and declaratory judgment.  It concluded 
that "[t]he criminal recklessness in this case requires more 
than accidental conduct."  With regard to the resident relative 
exclusion, the circuit court determined that "[t]here are 
                                                 
5 See Newhouse by Skow v. Citizens Sec. Mut. Ins. Co., 176 
Wis. 2d 824, 836, 501 N.W.2d 1 (1993) (explaining that "the 
proper procedure for an insurance company to follow when 
coverage is disputed is to request a bifurcated trial on the 
issues of coverage and liability and move to stay any 
proceedings on liability until the issue of coverage is 
resolved"); Elliott v. Donahue, 169 Wis. 2d 310, 318, 485 
N.W.2d 403 (1992). 
No. 
2020AP1943   
 
6 
 
disputed material facts as to whether or not Haeven was a 
resident under the State Farm policy."  Finally, as to the 
intentional acts exclusion, the circuit court concluded that 
this exclusion "also operates to bar coverage in this case 
because Strand's intent can be inferred as a matter of law." 
¶15 Dostal appealed the circuit court's grant of summary 
judgment and declaratory judgment in favor of State Farm.  
Additionally, State Farm cross-appealed from the portion of the 
circuit court's decision finding disputed issues of material 
fact as to the application of the resident relative exclusion. 
¶16 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
decision in a published opinion.  Dostal v. Strand, 2021 WI App 
79, 399 Wis. 2d 781, 967 N.W.2d 157.  Its analysis mirrored that 
of the circuit court.  Namely, the court of appeals determined: 
Under the undisputed facts of this case, we conclude 
that the Policy did not provide coverage for Dostal's 
claims.  A jury in a criminal trial rejected the 
argument that Strand's actions were accidental and 
convicted him of second-degree reckless homicide.  In 
doing so, the jury necessarily found, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that Strand was aware that his 
conduct created an unreasonable and substantial risk 
of harm to Haeven such that her death did not result 
from an accident.  Accordingly, Strand's conduct did 
not 
constitute 
an 
occurrence 
under 
the 
Policy.  
Because we conclude there was no occurrence, the 
Policy provides no coverage for Dostal's claim against 
Strand. 
Id., ¶3.  Because the court of appeals concluded that there was 
no occurrence, it declined to address the resident relative and 
intentional acts exclusions.  Id., ¶3 n.1.  Dostal petitioned 
for this court's review. 
No. 
2020AP1943   
 
7 
 
II 
¶17 We are called upon to review the court of appeals' 
determination that the circuit court properly granted summary 
and declaratory judgment to State Farm.  We review a summary 
judgment 
determination 
independently 
of 
the 
determinations 
rendered by the circuit court and court of appeals, applying the 
same methodology as the circuit court.  MacLeish v. Boardman & 
Clark LLP, 2019 WI 31, ¶22, 386 Wis. 2d 50, 924 N.W.2d 799.  
Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.  Id.   
¶18 The grant or denial of declaratory judgment is 
addressed to the circuit court's discretion, but when the 
exercise of such discretion turns on a question of law, we 
likewise review the question independently of the circuit court 
and court of appeals' determinations.  Olson v. Farrar, 2012 WI 
3, ¶24, 338 Wis. 2d 215, 809 N.W.2d 1.  Where the circuit 
court's 
grant 
of 
declaratory 
judgment 
turns 
upon 
its 
interpretation of an insurance policy, a question of law is 
presented.  Id. 
¶19 In our review, we examine whether issue preclusion 
applies.  "Whether issue preclusion is a potential limit on 
litigation in an individual case is a question of law, on which 
we give no deference to the circuit court's decision."  Mrozek 
v. Intra Fin. Corp., 2005 WI 73, ¶15, 281 Wis. 2d 448, 699 
N.W.2d 54. 
No. 
2020AP1943   
 
8 
 
¶20 Finally, our review requires us to interpret the State 
Farm insurance policy at issue.  The interpretation of an 
insurance policy presents a question of law we review without 
deference to the circuit court or court of appeals.  Shugarts v. 
Mohr, 2018 WI 27, ¶18, 380 Wis. 2d 512, 909 N.W.2d 402.  "A 
policy's terms are interpreted as they would be understood from 
the perspective of a reasonable person in the position of the 
insured."  Id., ¶20. 
III 
¶21 We address first the doctrine of issue preclusion and 
whether it serves as a bar to Dostal's claim for insurance 
coverage in this case.6  Subsequently, we discuss the policy's 
resident relative and intentional acts exclusions. 
A 
¶22 "The doctrine of issue preclusion, formerly known as 
collateral estoppel, is designed to limit the relitigation of 
issues that have been actually litigated in a previous action."  
                                                 
6 As an initial matter, State Farm asserts that Dostal 
forfeited any argument that issue preclusion applies because 
such an argument was not raised in the circuit court or court of 
appeals.  However, even if the circuit court and court of 
appeals did not use the words "issue preclusion," their 
decisions clearly were grounded in the doctrine.  State Farm 
highlights the focus of its argument as "whether insurance 
coverage is available under the terms of the Policy for 
Strand's . . . reckless acts when those very same acts were 
fully litigated and form the basis of his criminal conviction."  
In other words, this is an argument that previous litigation of 
the 
issue 
precludes 
the 
present 
claim, 
or 
that 
"issue 
preclusion" applies.  As Dostal responds, "[t]he preclusive 
effect of Strand's conviction has always been and remains 
central to this dispute."  The issue is therefore not forfeited. 
No. 
2020AP1943   
 
9 
 
Aldrich v. LIRC, 2012 WI 53, 
¶88, 341 Wis. 2d 36, 814 
N.W.2d 433.  A party asserting issue preclusion has the burden 
to establish that it should be applied.  Id.   
¶23 Our analysis of an issue preclusion question proceeds 
in two steps.  We determine (1) whether issue preclusion can, as 
a matter of law, be applied, and if so, (2) whether the 
application of issue preclusion would be fundamentally fair.7  
Id., ¶89.  If the analysis fails on the first prong, there is no 
need to address the second.  Paige K.B. ex rel. Peterson v. 
Steven G.B., 226 Wis. 2d 210, 224-25, 594 Wis. 2d 370 (1999). 
                                                 
7 "The case law has set forth five factors, which are not 
exclusive or dispositive, to aid a circuit court in determining 
whether application of issue preclusion is fundamentally fair."  
Est. of Rille v. Physicians Ins. Co., 2007 WI 36, ¶38, 300 
Wis. 2d 1, 728 N.W.2d 693.  Those factors are as follows: 
Courts may consider some or all of the following 
factors to protect the rights of all parties to a full 
and fair adjudication of all issues involved in the 
action:  (1) could the party against whom preclusion 
is sought, as a matter of law, have obtained review of 
the judgment; (2) is the question one of law that 
involves two distinct claims or intervening contextual 
shifts in the law; (3) do significant differences in 
the quality or extensiveness of proceedings between 
the two courts warrant relitigation of the issue; (4) 
have the burdens of persuasion shifted such that the 
party seeking preclusion had a lower burden of 
persuasion in the first trial than in the second; or 
(5) are matters of public policy and individual 
circumstances 
involved 
that 
would 
render 
the 
application of [issue preclusion] to be fundamentally 
unfair, including inadequate opportunity or incentive 
to obtain a full and fair adjudication in the initial 
action? 
Michelle T. by Sumpter v. Crozier, 173 Wis. 2d 681, 688-89, 495 
N.W.2d 327 (1993). 
No. 
2020AP1943   
 
10 
 
¶24 In the first step of the analysis, we must determine 
whether the issue or fact was actually litigated and determined 
in the prior proceeding by a valid judgment in a previous action 
and whether the determination was essential to the judgment.  
Est. of Rille v. Physicians Ins. Co., 2007 WI 36, ¶37, 300 
Wis. 2d 1, 728 N.W.2d 693.  "An issue is 'actually litigated' 
when it is 'properly raised, by the pleadings or otherwise, and 
is submitted for determination, and is determined.'"  Randall v. 
Felt (In re Est. of Felt), 2002 WI App 157, ¶9, 256 Wis. 2d 563, 
647 N.W.2d 373 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 
cmt. d (1980)).  For issue preclusion to bar relitigation, the 
issue sought to be precluded must have been actually litigated 
previously. 
 
Lindas 
v. 
Cady, 
183 
Wis. 2d 547, 
559, 
515 
N.W.2d 458 (1994).  This stands in contrast to claim preclusion, 
which extends to all claims that either were or could have been 
asserted in the previous litigation.  Id. 
¶25 The insurance policy in this case sets forth that 
coverage is provided for an "occurrence."  An "occurrence," in 
turn, is defined under the policy as an "accident," which 
results in, as relevant here, "bodily injury."  The policy does 
not include a definition for "accident."  In interpreting this 
term, we keep in mind that we read insurance policies from the 
perspective of a reasonable person in the position of the 
insured.  Shugarts, 380 Wis. 2d 512, ¶20.  We have previously 
described an "accident" as an event "occurring by chance or 
arising from unknown or remote causes" and "an event which takes 
place without one's foresight or expectation."  Am. Fam. Mut. 
No. 
2020AP1943   
 
11 
 
Ins. Co. v. Am. Girl, Inc., 2004 WI 2, ¶37, 268 Wis. 2d 16, 673 
N.W.2d 65. 
¶26 State Farm contends that the issue of Strand's fault 
was actually litigated in a prior action, namely the criminal 
case against Strand.  It asserts that the jury's verdict 
convicting 
Strand 
of 
second-degree 
reckless 
homicide 
conclusively determined that, because Strand's conduct was 
reckless, Haeven's death could not have been an "accident" for 
purposes of insurance coverage. 
¶27 The offense of second-degree reckless homicide is set 
forth as follows:  "Whoever recklessly causes the death of 
another human being is guilty of a Class D felony."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.06(1). 
 
In 
turn, 
the 
statutes 
define 
criminal 
recklessness, as relevant here, to mean "that the actor creates 
an unreasonable and substantial risk of death or great bodily 
harm to another human being and the actor is aware of that 
risk."  Wis. Stat. § 939.24(1).   
¶28 Accordingly, 
in 
a 
prosecution 
for 
second-degree 
reckless homicide, the State has the burden to show beyond a 
reasonable doubt that two elements were present.  See State v. 
Neumann, 2013 WI 58, ¶91, 348 Wis. 2d 455, 832 N.W.2d 560.  The 
relevant jury instruction sets forth those elements as follows: 
1. The defendant caused the death of (name of victim). 
"Cause" 
means 
that 
the 
defendant's 
act 
was 
a 
substantial factor in producing the death. 
2. The defendant caused the death by criminally 
reckless conduct. 
No. 
2020AP1943   
 
12 
 
"Criminally reckless conduct" means: 
 the conduct created a risk of death or great 
bodily harm to another person; and 
 the risk of death or great bodily harm was 
unreasonable and substantial; and 
 the defendant was aware that (his)(her) conduct 
created the unreasonable and substantial risk of 
death or great bodily harm. 
Wis JI——Criminal 1060 (2015). 
¶29 We are asked to discern whether being aware of the 
risk that something might happen necessarily means that when 
that thing happens, it is not an "accident."  Dostal asserts 
that this question should be answered in the negative.  She 
contends that none of the elements of second-degree reckless 
homicide that the jury found would preclude a determination that 
Haeven's death was an accident.   
¶30 State Farm, on the other hand, advances that in this 
analysis we should focus on the conduct itself and not the 
result of the conduct in determining whether conduct was an 
accident.  In other words, State Farm points the court's 
attention to the "injury-causing event" and not the injury.  See 
Schinner v. Gundrum, 2013 WI 71, ¶66, 349 Wis. 2d 529, 833 
N.W.2d 685.  Under this theory, even if Haeven's death was 
unintentional, Strand's conduct that led to the death was still 
not accidental because he was aware of the risk of death, and 
that is where our focus should be for purposes of coverage. 
No. 
2020AP1943   
 
13 
 
¶31 In beginning our analysis of this issue, we observe 
that there is no Wisconsin case law directly on point.8  Thus, we 
may look to case law of other states for guidance.  See Russ ex 
rel. Schwartz v. Russ, 2007 WI 83, ¶34 n.9, 302 Wis. 2d 264, 734 
N.W.2d 874.   
¶32 We find particularly informative two cases in which 
there was a conviction for a reckless crime and a later question 
of the preclusive effect of that conviction.  The first of these 
cases is the New York court of appeals'9 decision in Allstate 
Insurance Co. v. Zuk, 574 N.E.2d 1035 (N.Y. 1991).  In that 
case, Zuk was cleaning and loading a shotgun in a hunting lodge 
                                                 
8 The dissent asserts that our analysis begins on the "wrong 
foot" because it does not focus on Wisconsin's direct action 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 632.24.  Dissent, ¶69.  The suggested 
preeminence of a direct action statute is perplexing because 
such focus is ultimately unnecessary. 
As the dissent states, pursuant to the direct action 
statute "the liability to which the insurer is exposed is 
predicated upon the liability of the insured."  Kranzush v. 
Badger State Mut. Cas. Co., 103 Wis. 2d 56, 75, 307 N.W.2d 256 
(1981).  In other words, Dostal's right to recover from State 
Farm depends on Strand's right to indemnification from State 
Farm.  So the question becomes:  when is State Farm required to 
indemnify Strand?  According to the policy, the answer is:  when 
there is an occurrence.  And when is there an occurrence?  When 
there is an accident, which as we determine, is an argument that 
is not precluded in this case.  The direct action statute, 
following a more circuitous route, thus leads to an examination 
of whether there could be an "accident" here, the very same 
question this opinion already addresses.  Consequently, it does 
not affect our analysis.   
9 Following a different naming scheme than the court system 
in Wisconsin, the court of appeals in New York is that state's 
highest court.  See State v. Brownson, 157 Wis. 2d 404, 411, 459 
N.W.2d 877 (Ct. App. 1990). 
No. 
2020AP1943   
 
14 
 
and accidentally shot and killed his friend, Smith.  Id. at 
1036.  Zuk was charged and convicted of second degree 
manslaughter.  Id.  Smith's estate subsequently brought a 
wrongful death action against Zuk and Zuk sought defense and 
indemnification from Allstate, his homeowner's insurer.  Id. 
¶33 Allstate argued that Zuk's conviction for second 
degree manslaughter established as a matter of law that Zuk 
reasonably expected that his acts would cause Smith's death, and 
that this finding in the criminal proceeding should be given 
preclusive effect in the subsequent civil action.  Id. at 1037.  
The court rejected Allstate's argument, concluding that "Zuk's 
criminal conviction does not collaterally block the civil 
litigation of the issue whether Smith's death could 'reasonably 
be expected to result' from Zuk's acts.  Under this policy 
provision, in the factual context of this dispute and procedural 
framework, that issue cannot be resolved as a matter of law."  
Id. at 1036.   
¶34 In arriving at this determination, the court observed 
that "Zuk's conviction of second degree manslaughter was 
necessarily based on a finding that he recklessly caused Smith's 
death."  Id. at 1037.  It therefore cited the definition of 
criminal recklessness under New York law, which is substantially 
similar to that under Wisconsin law:   
A person acts recklessly, in a criminal context, when 
that person is aware of and consciously disregards a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk of a result, where 
the risk is of such a nature and degree that to 
disregard it constitutes a gross deviation from the 
standard of conduct of a reasonable person. 
No. 
2020AP1943   
 
15 
 
Id. at 1037-38.   
¶35 But the fact that the jury determined that Zuk was 
reckless 
did 
not 
necessarily 
mean 
that 
his 
conduct 
was 
reasonably to be expected to result in Smith's death as the 
policy exclusion's language required:  "A person may engage in 
behavior that involves a calculated risk without expecting——no 
less reasonably——that an accident will occur.  Such behavior, 
which may be reckless for criminal responsibility purposes, does 
not necessarily mean that the actor reasonably expected the 
accident to result."  Id. at 1038.  The Zuk court thus 
ultimately determined that "the issue whether Smith's death 
could 'reasonably be expected to result' from Zuk's acts was not 
necessarily determined in the criminal proceeding and was not 
identical to the issues that were determined there."  Id. 
¶36 Additional guidance comes from the Illinois appellate 
court's decision in Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance 
Co. v. Pittington, 841 N.E.2d 413 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).10  There, 
                                                 
10 The dissent contends that the Illinois appellate court 
declined to follow Pittington in Allstate Indemnity Co. v. 
Hieber, 24 N.E.3d 139 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014).  Dissent, ¶81.  But 
nothing in the Hieber decision indicates that Pittington is no 
longer good law.  All the Hieber court determined is that the 
facts of that case were more analogous to those in American 
Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Savickas, 739 N.E.2d 445 (Ill. 
2000), than to Pittington.  Hieber, 24 N.E.3d at 144 ("We 
believe 
this 
case 
is 
more 
analogous 
to 
Savickas 
than 
Pittington.")  Savickas has no application here because in that 
case, the insured at his criminal trial testified that "the gun 
did not go off accidentally" and that he "intentionally pointed 
the gun . . . and pulled the trigger while the gun was so 
aimed."  Savickas, 739 N.E.2d at 382. 
No. 
2020AP1943   
 
16 
 
Pittington pleaded guilty to reckless conduct after shooting a 
man named Harrison.  Id. at 414.  Harrison's estate filed a 
negligence action against Pittington.  Id.  The insurer, 
Metropolitan, filed a declaratory judgment action asserting that 
any damages stemming from the shooting were not covered.  Id. at 
415. 
¶37 The 
court 
addressed 
the 
preclusive 
effect 
of 
Pittington's guilty plea in light of the policy language that 
excluded from coverage injuries that were "in fact expected, 
anticipated or intended."  Id. at 418.  In concluding that there 
was no preclusive effect, the court observed that "[i]n pleading 
guilty to reckless conduct, Pittington admitted he performed an 
act that caused the harm or endangered the safety of Harrison 
with 'conscious disregard' of a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk."  Id.  However, such a plea was "in no way an admission 
that he expected, anticipated or intended to cause bodily harm 
to Harrington."  Id.  Although the Pittington court focused on 
the nature of a plea, and not a finding by a jury as was the 
situation in the present case, this distinction is immaterial 
for our purposes. 
¶38 Zuk and Pittington are both factually and analytically 
analogous to the present case, and we find the approaches of 
those 
courts 
persuasive. 
 
Additionally, 
several 
other 
jurisdictions that have "considered the issue of whether 
reckless conduct bars indemnification under similar insurance 
policies . . . have found coverage when the insured's conduct is 
reckless."  Royal Indem. Co. v. Love, 630 N.Y.S.2d 652, 654 
No. 
2020AP1943   
 
17 
 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995); see, e.g., Vappi & Co. v. Aetna Cas. & 
Sur. Co., 204 N.E.2d 273, 276 (Mass. 1965) ("Unintended or 
unforeseen consequences of reckless or negligent acts . . . may 
be within the definition of 'accident.'"); White v. Smith, 440 
S.W.2d 497, 507 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969) ("But neither policy nor 
principle excludes from the category of damages 'caused by 
accident' for which coverage is afforded by a liability 
insurance policy, even damage which might be, for other 
purposes, regard[ed] as constructively intentional or damage 
resulting from wanton and reckless conduct."). 
¶39 In particular, the Zuk court's statement that "[a] 
person may engage in behavior that involves a calculated risk 
without expecting——no less reasonably——that an accident will 
occur" is instructive here.  Zuk, 574 N.E.2d at 1038.  The court 
continued to explain that "[s]uch behavior, which may be 
reckless 
for 
criminal 
responsibility 
purposes, 
does 
not 
necessarily mean that the actor reasonably expected the accident 
to result."  Id.  So it is here.  State Farm provides us with no 
authority compelling the conclusion that a reckless act can 
never be an "accident," and the analysis of the Zuk court, 
echoed in Pittington, persuasively concludes that the opposite 
is true.   
¶40 Thus, in the context of this case, the issue of 
whether Strand's conduct was an "accident" was not actually 
litigated in the prior criminal proceeding.  The jury here was 
presented with a question of guilty or not guilty and did not 
make a determination of what events actually occurred.  It was 
No. 
2020AP1943   
 
18 
 
not asked to return a special verdict and made no specific 
factual findings aside from finding that the elements of the 
crime charged were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  Strand 
gave inconsistent accounts of the events leading to Haeven's 
death.  We do not know if the jury accepted either of his 
explanations, or if it rejected both.11 
                                                 
11 We acknowledge that the jury in Strand's criminal case 
was given an instruction referencing an "accident," but this 
fact does not alter our analysis.  Specifically, the circuit 
court instructed the jury regarding what it needed to find to 
support a guilty verdict on the state-of-mind element of the 
reckless homicide offense as follows: 
Second, the defendant caused the death by what is 
called 
criminally 
reckless 
conduct. 
 
Criminally 
reckless conduct is defined as conduct that creates a 
risk of death or great bodily harm to another person, 
and the risk of death or great bodily harm was 
unreasonable and substantial, and that the defendant 
was aware that his conduct created an unreasonable and 
substantial risk of death or great bodily harm. 
The defendant, Mr. Strand, contends that he was not 
aware that his conduct created an unreasonable and 
substantial risk of death or great bodily harm, but 
that what happened was an accident. 
If the defendant did not act with an awareness 
required for this crime, he is not guilty of this 
crime. 
This reference to an "accident" does not affect our 
analysis for two reasons.  First, the circuit court's reference 
to an accident was made in the context of explaining what 
Strand's argument was.  It did not indicate that "accident" was 
inconsistent with recklessness, but only specified that Strand 
argued that his conduct was an accident.  Second, this reference 
does not address the same question as the definition of 
"accident" for purposes of insurance coverage as espoused in our 
case law, which takes into account an element of foreseeability 
of the result of an act.  See Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. 
Girl, Inc., 2004 WI 2, ¶37, 268 Wis. 2d 16, 673 N.W.2d 65. 
No. 
2020AP1943   
 
19 
 
¶41 Likewise, if the jury rejected both of Strand's 
explanations, we do not know what alternative explanation it 
embraced.  The jury additionally heard testimony from the 
State's expert that although a fall can result in a skull 
fracture as occurred in this case, "we also know from the 
literature 
from 
short 
falls . . . that 
children 
do 
not 
typically, or the vast majority do not incur any kind of brain 
injury from a short fall."  Another expert testified:  "I don't 
think hitting the counter and falling from that height would 
have resulted in those injuries." 
¶42 Further, we do not know what act committed by Strand 
(if it accepted either of his explanations) was determined by 
the jury to be reckless.  The jury heard testimony both that 
Strand dropped Haeven (whether it was from his knee while trying 
to burp her or when he turned and hit the kitchen island) and 
that he put her to bed without seeking medical attention.  It 
could have concluded that the first act (dropping Haeven, 
however it happened) was an accident, but that it was reckless 
for Strand to put her directly to bed without first seeking 
medical care.  In such a scenario, there would be an "accident" 
covered by the State Farm policy.12   
                                                 
12 Nowhere does the dissent claim to know exactly what took 
place, nor could it.  Its conclusion that Strand's conviction of 
a reckless crime precludes an "accident" completely disregards 
the possibility that Strand committed two acts, one accidental 
and one reckless.  The jury's verdict gives no insight into 
whether this was the case, and the dissent reads far too much 
into the verdict to reach its conclusion.  
No. 
2020AP1943   
 
20 
 
¶43 Additionally, we recognize that our conclusion is 
consistent with the reading of the word "accident" by a 
reasonable insured.  See Shugarts, 380 Wis. 2d 512, ¶20.  The 
term is not defined in the policy, but under a common 
understanding of "accident," it would seem that even if one 
engages in reckless conduct, a resulting injury can still be, in 
the common parlance of the word, "accidental."  See Sheehan v. 
Goriansky, 72 N.E.2d 538, 543 (Mass. 1947) (determining that 
wanton or reckless conduct, "which is only constructively 
intentional does not, for that reason alone, fall outside the 
category of an injury 'caused by accident'" because "[t]o the 
ordinary mind such a distinction would be wholly artificial").   
¶44 For example, if a person is driving 90 miles per hour 
on a city street, such conduct would no doubt be reckless, but 
that doesn't mean it isn't an "accident" if the driver 
unintentionally hits a pedestrian.  Such an event may still 
occur "by chance" or "without one's foresight or expectation."  
See Am. Girl, 268 Wis. 2d 16, ¶37; cf. Fetherston v. Parks, 2014 
WI App 2, ¶15, 352 Wis. 2d 472, 842 N.W.2d 481 (concluding that 
an intentional acts exclusion did not apply to bar coverage 
where "Parks did not intend to injure the Fetherstons when he 
operated his vehicle in a reckless manner").13 
                                                 
13 This 
conclusion 
is 
additionally 
supported 
by 
an 
illustration included in the comments to the Restatement 
(Second) of Judgments.  Specifically, comment f to Restatement 
(Second) of Judgments § 85, which addresses the effect of a 
criminal judgment in a subsequent civil action, contains the 
following example (illustration 10):   
No. 
2020AP1943   
 
21 
 
¶45 We therefore conclude that issue preclusion does not 
bar Dostal from seeking insurance coverage for her claims 
against 
Strand. 
 
The 
issue 
of 
whether 
Strand's 
conduct 
constituted an "accident" was not actually litigated in the 
prior criminal proceeding.   
B 
¶46 Having concluded that Dostal's claim for insurance 
coverage is not barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion, we 
                                                                                                                                                             
D inflicts a blow on X as a result of which X dies.  D 
is 
convicted 
of 
intentional 
homicide. 
 
P, 
administrator of X's estate, brings an action against 
D for wrongful death, alleging D's act was negligent.  
I 
had 
previously 
issued 
a 
policy 
of 
liability 
insurance to D, insuring liability for D's negligent 
acts but excluding intentional acts.  In P's action 
against D, P is not precluded by the criminal 
conviction from showing that D's act was negligent 
rather than intentional. 
Although the conviction here was for reckless homicide 
rather than intentional, the same principle holds.  The dissent 
incorrectly claims that this illustration says nothing about 
insurance recovery.  See dissent, ¶68.  Indeed, the illustration 
states that "P is not precluded by the criminal conviction from 
showing that D's act was negligent rather than intentional."  If 
an act is negligent rather than intentional, it may be a covered 
"occurrence" pursuant to the insurance policy referenced earlier 
in the illustration. 
No. 
2020AP1943   
 
22 
 
turn next to address the resident relative and intentional acts 
exclusions in the policy.14 
¶47 We begin with the resident relative exclusion.  This 
exclusion in the policy excludes coverage for "bodily injury to 
you or any insured within the meaning of part a. or b. of the 
definition of insured."  In turn, the policy defines "insured" 
as "you and, if residents of your household:  a. your relatives; 
and b. any other person under the age of 21 who is in the care 
of a person described above." 
¶48 Case law sets forth the inquiry for determination of 
whether a person is a "resident of your household."  "A 
determination of residency in a household is fact specific to 
each case."  Seichter v. McDonald, 228 Wis. 2d 838, 845, 599 
N.W.2d 71 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing Schoer v. West Bend Mut. Ins. 
Co., 473 N.W.2d 73, 76 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991)).   
¶49 Such an analysis "requires a thorough examination of 
all relevant facts and circumstances."  Londre by Long v. Cont'l 
W. Ins. Co., 117 Wis. 2d 54, 57, 343 N.W.2d 128 (Ct. App. 1983).  
                                                 
14 While our analysis is of course based on the exclusions 
that are present in the policy, we observe at the outset that 
the State Farm policy does not include an exclusion precluding 
coverage for all criminal acts.  Such criminal acts exclusions 
are included in some policies.  See West Bend Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Ixthus Med. Supply, Inc., 2019 WI 19, ¶38, 385 Wis. 2d 580, 923 
N.W.2d 550; L.L. v. Med. Protective Co., 122 Wis. 2d 455, 463, 
362 N.W.2d 174 (Ct. App. 1984).  If State Farm had included such 
a policy exclusion, this case likely would not be before us.  
State Farm chose not to include a criminal acts exclusion here, 
and is thus left to rely on the exclusions it did write in this 
policy. 
No. 
2020AP1943   
 
23 
 
The factfinder must consider whether the person and the named 
insured are: 
(1) living under the same roof; (2) in a close, 
intimate and informal relationship, and (3) where the 
intended duration of the relationship is likely to be 
substantial, 
where 
it 
is 
consistent 
with 
the 
informality of the relationship, and from which it is 
reasonable to conclude that the parties would consider 
the relationship in contracting about such matters as 
insurance or in their conduct in reliance thereon. 
Id. at 57-58.  In conducting this analysis, the factfinder 
additionally considers (1) the age of the person, (2) whether a 
separate residence is established, (3) the self-sufficiency of 
the person, (4) the frequency and duration of the stay in the 
family home, and (5) intent to return.  Seichter, 228 Wis. 2d at 
845.  "Personal possessions remaining in the home and that the 
home continues to be the mailing address may be considered but 
are not dispositive."  Id. (citing Schoer, 473 N.W.2d at 76). 
¶50 State 
Farm 
contends 
that 
the 
resident 
relative 
exclusion applies to bar coverage here.  In State Farm's view, 
Haeven was a "resident" of Strand's household as a matter of 
law.  It points to facts in the record indicating that the 
paternity court had ordered Strand "frequent" physical placement 
of Haeven, that Strand physically cared for Haeven, and that 
Strand intended the duration of his relationship with Haeven to 
be substantial such that he would consider her when contracting 
about insurance. 
¶51 However, 
contrary 
to 
State 
Farm's 
argument, 
an 
examination of Dostal's deposition in this case indicates that 
No. 
2020AP1943   
 
24 
 
Haeven's "residency" with Strand is disputed.  According to 
Dostal's deposition testimony, Strand only cared for Haeven 
without Dostal present four times, a count which includes two 
overnight stays.  Dostal further testified that there was no 
formal schedule for placement and that Strand "was usually too 
busy or didn't have time for the baby or didn't want her over 
there."  Given this testimony, we cannot conclude that Haeven 
was a resident relative of Strand as a matter of law.   
¶52 The determination of whether one is a resident 
relative for insurance purposes is highly fact specific.  Id.  
Here, the parties' submissions demonstrate that there are 
genuine issues of material fact as to the question of whether 
Haeven was a resident relative of Strand.  Accordingly, summary 
judgment is inappropriate on this issue. 
¶53 We turn next to the intentional acts exclusion in the 
policy, which sets forth that the coverage does not apply to 
"bodily injury or property damage . . . which is either expected 
or intended by the insured." 
¶54 For purposes of an intentional acts exclusion, intent 
to injure may be inferred where injury is substantially certain 
to result from an insured's intentional conduct.  K.A.G. by 
Carson v. Stanford, 148 Wis. 2d 158, 163, 434 N.W.2d 790 (Ct. 
App. 1988).  If the conduct is intentional and if the conduct is 
substantially certain to cause injury, we can infer intent to 
injure only "if the degree of certainty that the conduct will 
cause injury is sufficiently great to justify inferring intent 
to injure as a matter of law."  Id.   
No. 
2020AP1943   
 
25 
 
¶55 We cannot, however, "infer intent to injure as a 
matter of law merely because the insured's intentional act 
violated the criminal law."  Loveridge v. Chartier, 161 
Wis. 2d 150, 171, 468 N.W.2d 146 (1991).  Conviction of a crime 
gives rise to an inference that an insured intended injury as a 
matter of law in two circumstances only:  (1) if intent to 
injure is an element of the crime, and (2) if the crime in 
question involves the insured committing an intentional act that 
carries with it a substantial risk of injury or death.  Id. at 
172 (citing Poston v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 107 Wis. 2d 215, 
219, 320 N.W.2d 9 (Ct. App. 1982); Raby v. Moe, 153 Wis. 2d 101, 
114, 450 N.W.2d 452 (1990)). 
¶56 Intent is plainly not an element of a reckless crime.  
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 939.24(1), 
940.06(1). 
 
Thus, 
if 
the 
intentional acts exclusion is to apply, the crime must involve 
the insured committing an intentional act that carries a 
substantial risk of injury or death.  As analyzed above, a 
determination that Strand's conduct was reckless does not 
preclude a finding that his conduct was an accident for purposes 
of insurance coverage.  If his conduct was indeed an "accident," 
such a determination would compel the additional conclusion that 
his conduct was surely not "intentional" so as to indicate that 
the exclusion applies.   
¶57 There are therefore genuine issues of material fact 
regarding whether Strand's conduct was "intentional" such that 
the intentional acts exclusion applies.  Accordingly, summary 
judgment is inappropriate on this issue. 
No. 
2020AP1943   
 
26 
 
IV 
¶58 In sum, we conclude that issue preclusion does not bar 
Dostal from seeking insurance coverage for her claims against 
Strand.  The issue of whether Strand's conduct constituted an 
"accident" was not actually litigated in the prior criminal 
proceeding.  Further, we conclude that there are genuine issues 
of material fact regarding the application of the resident 
relative and intentional acts exclusions such that summary 
judgment is inappropriate. 
¶59 Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand to the circuit court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court. 
 
No.  2020AP1943.akz 
 
1 
 
 
¶60 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J.   (dissenting).  I 
dissent because 12 jurors at Strand's criminal trial unanimously 
decided beyond a reasonable doubt that Haeven's death was not an 
"accident," and this precludes relitigating the issue of 
Strand's coverage.  Because the jury's verdict is controlling in 
this case and cannot be relitigated, that ends the analysis as 
to Strand——he has no coverage under his policy with State Farm, 
which grants coverage for bodily injury caused by an "accident."  
Since Strand has no claim against State Farm, as his causing 
Haeven's death was beyond a reasonable doubt not an accident, 
Dostal is also precluded from making a claim against State Farm 
under Strand's policy.  Dostal has no independent claim against 
State Farm, and she cannot recover under Strand's policy any 
more than Strand could.  
¶61 Strand's conviction for his act of reckless homicide, 
killing his own child Haeven, precludes Strand from claiming 
that Haeven's death was an accident.  In other words, because 12 
jurors concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Strand's actions 
caused Haeven's death and that Strand was "aware" that he 
"create[d] an unreasonable and substantial risk" of her death, 
Wis. Stat. § 939.24(1), Haeven's death was not an unforeseen 
"accident" under Strand's insurance policy, and he is precluded 
from claiming coverage.  As a result, because Strand has no 
insurance coverage, Dostal cannot claim that he does.  
¶62 Dostal attempts to circumvent this determination that 
Strand's conduct was not an accident by suing State Farm under 
No.  2020AP1943.akz 
 
2 
 
Wisconsin's direct action statute, Wis. Stat. § 632.24 (2021-
22).1  However, if Strand has no claim——which he does not because 
his conviction for second-degree reckless homicide determined 
beyond a reasonable doubt that this was not an "accident"——then 
Dostal can have no claim direct or otherwise against State Farm 
under Strand's policy.  While she may have a claim against 
Strand for his criminally reckless killing of Haeven, this is 
not a risk for which Strand purchased insurance.  Strand's 
insurance contract does not provide Dostal with more coverage 
than it would provide its own insured.  The circuit court and 
court of appeals therefore correctly concluded that State Farm 
was entitled to summary judgment and declaratory judgment on the 
issue of coverage. 
¶63 The majority contorts its analysis in order to reach a 
result of coverage in this very sad and unfortunate case.  It 
ignores the facts of this case and the law of our state, instead 
reaching out to foreign authorities to create insurance that was 
never provided by contract.  As we have interpreted the term 
"accident" in insurance contracts, Strand's act of "criminal 
recklessness" cannot be an "accident" under his insurance policy 
with State Farm because Strand was "aware" that he created an 
"unreasonable and substantial" risk of Haeven's death.  Wis. 
Stat. § 939.24(1).  Strand's prior conviction for second-degree 
reckless homicide therefore precludes him from asserting that 
Haeven's death was an "accident" for which he is granted 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-
22 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2020AP1943.akz 
 
3 
 
coverage.  The majority mistakenly frames the issue as whether 
issue preclusion binds Dostal when the issue is actually whether 
it binds Strand.  Because Strand has no claim against State Farm 
and cannot relitigate that issue, Dostal has no claim either.   
¶64 The issue of whether Strand's killing of Haeven was an 
"accident" was fully litigated and unanimously decided beyond a 
reasonable doubt in Strand's criminal trial, and precluding 
Strand from relitigating that issue comports with fundamental 
fairness.  Issue preclusion therefore prevents Strand from 
asserting he has coverage under his policy with State Farm for 
recklessly killing his own daughter, and Dostal cannot create 
coverage that does not otherwise exist by suing State Farm under 
the direct action statute.  I dissent. 
I 
¶65 Strand seeks relitigation of this issue through 
Dostal's suit under Wisconsin's direct action statute.  However, 
Dostal cannot recover on Strand's policy with State Farm because 
Strand has no coverage as a matter of law.  Wisconsin's direct 
action statute permits Dostal to sue State Farm directly as 
opposed to first suing Strand and then Strand filing a claim.  
Dostal can only recover what Strand would be able to by filing a 
claim——in this case, nothing.  
¶66 Dostal brought her claim against State Farm under 
Wisconsin's direct action statute:  
Any bond or policy of insurance covering liability to 
others for negligence makes the insurer liable, up to 
the amounts stated in the bond or policy, to the 
persons entitled to recover against the insured for 
the death of any person or for injury to persons or 
No.  2020AP1943.akz 
 
4 
 
property, irrespective of whether the liability is 
presently established or is contingent and to become 
fixed or certain by final judgment against the 
insured. 
Wis. Stat. § 632.24.  "The direct action statute generally 
endeavors to save litigation and reduce expense by determining 
the rights of all parties in a single action involving the 
insurance carrier . . . ."  Hull v. Glewwe, 2019 WI App 27, ¶38, 
388 Wis. 2d 90, 931 N.W.2d 266 (citing Est. of Otto v. 
Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 2008 WI 78, ¶36 n.21, 311 
Wis. 2d 84, 751 N.W.2d 805).  In cases under the direct action 
statute, the plaintiff "steps into the shoes of the tortfeasor 
and can assert any right of the tortfeasor against the insurer."  
7A Couch on Insurance § 104:13 (3d ed. 2022) (emphasis added).  
Accordingly, "the liability to which the insurer is exposed is 
predicated upon the liability of the insured."  Kranzush v. 
Badger St. Mut. Cas. Co., 103 Wis. 2d 56, 75, 307 N.W.2d 256 
(1981).  In other words, a plaintiff bringing a direct action 
cannot recover against a tortfeasor's insurer unless the 
tortfeasor would himself be able to recover. 
¶67 The implication for this case is that Dostal steps 
into Strand's shoes.  Having no claim against State Farm 
independent from Strand and his policy, Dostal can recover from 
State Farm only if Strand could do so.  Therefore, the question 
in this case is not whether Dostal is precluded from claiming 
there was an accident.  The question is whether Strand is 
precluded from doing so.  Because issue preclusion applies 
against Strand, Strand has no coverage for Dostal to claim.   
No.  2020AP1943.akz 
 
5 
 
¶68 This conclusion does not prevent Dostal from bringing 
a claim against Strand and holding him personally liable for 
Haeven's 
death. 
 
It 
merely 
prevents 
Strand 
from 
being 
indemnified by his insurer for his criminally reckless acts.  
This distinction is clearly lost on the majority.  The majority 
cites an example in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 85 
comment f as support.  Majority op., ¶44 n.13.  That example 
only says that a plaintiff in Dostal's position would not be 
precluded from bringing a claim against the tortfeasor, limiting 
the 
discussion 
to 
"[plaintiff's] 
action 
against 
[the 
tortfeasor]."  Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 85 cmt. f.  
It says nothing about whether the tortfeasor would be able to 
recover under his insurance policy.   
¶69 Surely Dostal can still sue Strand and recover against 
him personally, but that does not mean Strand——and, through the 
direct action statute, Dostal——is entitled to payment by State 
Farm.  Strand has no coverage under his policy with State Farm 
for his criminally reckless acts.  Dostal cannot create coverage 
that would not otherwise exist simply by suing under the direct 
action statute.  The majority's failure to recognize the 
importance of the direct action statute leads the majority to 
start off its analysis on the wrong foot.   
II 
¶70 Strand's criminal trial conclusively determined that 
Haeven's death was not an "accident."  Twelve jurors heard 
evidence and argument regarding the circumstances surrounding 
Haeven's death.  Strand argued that he was not "aware" that he 
No.  2020AP1943.akz 
 
6 
 
"create[d] an unreasonable and substantial risk of [Haeven's] 
death, 
but 
instead 
that 
her 
death 
was 
an 
"accident."  
Relitigation of this issue is therefore precluded.  Whether 
Strand caused Haeven's death by "accident" was decided before a 
jury——under the high standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt" 
rather that the lower civil "preponderance of the evidence" 
standard——and 12 jurors unanimously decided to reject Strand's 
defense.  Thus, the first requirement for issue preclusion to 
apply is satisfied because the issue of whether Strand's killing 
of Haeven was an "accident" was "actually litigated and 
determined" by the jury in his criminal trial.  Aldrich v. LIRC, 
2012 WI 53, ¶97, 341 Wis. 2d 36, 814 N.W.2d 433 (quoting Est. of 
Rille v. Physicians Ins. Co., 2007 WI 36, ¶37, 300 Wis. 2d 1, 
728 N.W.2d 693).   
¶71 A jury of 12 unanimously found Strand guilty, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, of second-degree reckless homicide contrary to 
Wis. Stat. § 940.06(1).  As the majority correctly notes, 
"criminal recklessness" is defined by statute to mean "that the 
actor creates an unreasonable and substantial risk of death or 
great bodily harm to another human being and the actor is aware 
of that risk."  Wis. Stat. § 939.24(1) (emphasis added).  In 
contrast, mere "criminal negligence" is defined as "conduct that 
the actor should realize creates a substantial and unreasonable 
risk of death or great bodily harm to another."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.25(1) 
(emphasis 
added). 
 
The 
defining 
feature 
of 
recklessness making it a higher degree of culpability is the 
actor's actual awareness of the risk.   
No.  2020AP1943.akz 
 
7 
 
¶72 However, the majority's analysis of our state law 
stops there.  Notably absent from the majority's analysis is any 
recognition of the fact that we have previously interpreted the 
terms "occurrence" and "accident" as used in insurance policies.  
We have said that an "accident" is "an event which takes place 
without one's foresight or expectation.  [An undesirable] 
result, though unexpected, is not an accident; the means or 
cause must be accidental."  Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Girl, 
Inc., 2004 WI 2, ¶37, 268 Wis. 2d 16, 673 N.W.2d 65 (emphasis 
added) (quoting Accident, Black's Law Dictionary 15 (7th ed. 
1999)).  For a particular action to qualify as an "accident," 
the resulting injury must have been "unexpected" or "unforeseen" 
from the standpoint of the insured.  Schinner v. Gundrum, 2013 
WI 71, ¶71, 349 Wis. 2d 529, 833 N.W.2d 685 (holding injuries 
resulting from providing alcohol to underage persons were not 
accidents).  
¶73 The jury in Strand's criminal trial unanimously 
concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Strand was aware that 
his actions created an unreasonable and substantial risk to 
Haeven.  The jury concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Strand was "aware of that risk."  Wis. Stat. § 939.24(1).  If 
the risk of Haeven's death were unexpected or unforeseen to 
Strand, such a finding would not be possible.  This is clear 
from the circuit court's instructions to the jury:  
The defendant, Mr. Strand, contends that he was 
not aware that his conduct created an unreasonable and 
substantial risk of death or great bodily harm, but 
that what happened was an accident.   
No.  2020AP1943.akz 
 
8 
 
If the defendant did not act with an awareness 
required for this crime, he is not guilty of this 
crime. 
(Emphasis added.)   
¶74 The majority dismisses the circuit court's use of the 
term "accident" because it "was made in the context of 
explaining what Strand's argument was" and "did not indicate 
that 'accident' was inconsistent with recklessness."  Majority 
op., ¶40 n.11.  In other words, the majority reads the circuit 
court's 
use 
of 
the 
term 
"accident" 
as 
consistent 
with 
"recklessness."  This is a tortured reading of the circuit 
court's instruction.  If an accident were consistent with a 
criminally reckless act, Strand's argument that he committed 
only an accident would be akin to an admission of guilt.  The 
circuit court obviously used the term "accident" understanding 
that reckless conduct is not accidental. 
¶75 The majority also argues the circuit court's use of 
"accident" while instructing the jury "does not address the same 
question as the definition of 'accident' for purposes of 
insurance coverage as espoused in our case law, which takes into 
account an element of foreseeability of the result of an act."  
Majority op., ¶40 n.11.  This entirely ignores what the circuit 
court was explaining when it used the term "accident."  The 
court was instructing the jury that a guilty verdict required 
finding that Strand was "aware that his conduct created an 
unreasonable and substantial risk of death or great bodily harm" 
(emphasis 
added)——that 
is, 
the 
harm 
had 
to 
have 
been 
foreseeable.  The circuit court used the term "accident" in a 
manner consistent with our precedent and the term's common 
No.  2020AP1943.akz 
 
9 
 
understanding, and the jury found, unanimously and beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that Haeven's death was not an accident.   
¶76 As 
the 
terms 
are 
defined 
in 
our 
statutes 
and 
precedent, the definitions of "criminal recklessness" and 
"accident" are inconsistent with each other.  The circuit court 
understood 
this 
and 
instructed 
the 
jury 
accordingly, 
as 
Wisconsin courts have done before.  See, e.g., Wis. JI—Criminal 
772 (2005) (instruction on "accident" defense); State v. Grant, 
No. 2010AP2272-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶11 (Wis. Ct. App. 
Sept. 3, 2011) (per curiam) ("A defendant on trial for a crime 
involving reckless conduct may offer the defense of accident to 
defeat the mental state of awareness of risk necessary to prove 
guilt.").  In finding Strand guilty of recklessly killing 
Haeven, the jury explicitly rejected the possibility that her 
death was an "accident."  Strand's prior criminal proceeding 
therefore resolved the issue of whether there was an accident, 
and 
this 
determination 
"was 
essential 
to 
the 
judgment," 
satisfying the first requirement of issue preclusion.2  Aldrich, 
341 Wis. 2d 36, ¶97.  
¶77 The 
majority 
nonetheless 
concludes 
the 
jury 
in 
Strand's criminal trial did not determine whether Haeven's death 
was an accident, making no attempt whatsoever to resolve this 
case under Wisconsin law.  Instead, the majority summarily 
                                                 
2 The majority criticizes my analysis because I do not 
"claim to know exactly what took place" when Haeven died.  
Majority op., ¶42, n.12.  The majority misses the point.  The 
jury at Strand's criminal trial determined beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Strand's actions causing Haeven's death were not an 
accident regardless of what those actions were.   
No.  2020AP1943.akz 
 
10 
 
concludes, "we observe that there is no Wisconsin case law 
directly on point.  Thus, we may look to case law of other 
states for guidance."  Majority op., ¶31.  None of the 
authorities the majority identifies make its conclusion more 
persuasive.  
¶78 Instead of turning to Wisconsin law, the majority 
first looks to the New York Court of Appeals' decision in 
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Zuk, 574 N.E.2d 1035 (N.Y. 1991).  
Majority op., ¶32.  The majority finds the following statement 
from Zuk particularly persuasive:  "A person may engage in 
behavior that involves a calculated risk without expecting——no 
less reasonably——that an accident will occur.  Such behavior, 
which may be reckless for criminal responsibility purposes, does 
not necessarily mean that the actor reasonably expected the 
accident to result."  Zuk, 574 N.E.2d at 1038; majority op., 
¶35.  The majority also relies on a similar holding by Illinois' 
intermediate appellate court in Metropolitan Property & Casualty 
Insurance Co. v. Pittington, 841 N.E.2d 413 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2005); majority op., ¶36.  That court concluded that an 
admission of criminal recklessness was "in no way an admission 
that he expected, anticipated or intended to cause" the 
resulting harm.  Pittington, 841 N.E.2d at 418.   
¶79 This explanation is quite transparently nonsensical.  
The jury found that Strand caused Haeven's death while "aware" 
that he "create[d] an unreasonable and substantial risk" of her 
"death or great bodily harm."  Wis. Stat. § 939.24(1).  The 
majority concludes it is somehow possible that Strand was 
No.  2020AP1943.akz 
 
11 
 
"aware" that he "create[d] an unreasonable and substantial risk" 
of Haeven's death but "reasonably" did not expect it.  Id.  The 
jury at Strand's criminal trial concluded Strand was aware he 
created a risk to Haeven that was "unreasonable."  The majority 
offers no explanation as to how——under Wisconsin law——the jury 
could have found that Strand was both aware of, but reasonably 
did not expect, an unreasonable risk.  The jury's unanimous 
finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Strand was "criminally 
reckless" means that Strand was aware of and therefore expected 
the risk he created, and he unreasonably disregarded that risk.   
¶80 Furthermore, 
the 
majority's 
reliance 
on 
foreign 
authorities treats this issue as if it were settled.  That is 
not the case.  Several courts in other jurisdictions have come 
out on the opposite side, concluding that reckless conduct is 
not accidental.  See, e.g., Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mutrie, 105 
A.3d 595, 599 (N.H. 2014) ("[W]e conclude that because a 
reasonable person in Mutrie's position would know that some harm 
would result from her alleged knowing, reckless, and wanton 
support and facilitation of her son's criminal drug activity, 
Mutrie's conduct was inherently injurious, and, therefore, 
cannot be considered accidental.  Therefore, her conduct does 
not constitute an 'occurrence' as is necessary to trigger 
coverage."); Russ v. Great Am. Ins. Cos., 464 S.E.2d 723, 726 
(N.C. Ct. App. 1995) (holding "a showing that the defendant 
acted with 'reckless indifference to the likelihood' that his or 
her acts 'will cause severe emotional distress'" precluded 
coverage); Jim Barna Log Sys. Midwest, Inc. v. Gen. Cas. Ins. 
No.  2020AP1943.akz 
 
12 
 
Co. of Wis., 791 N.E.2d 816, 830 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) 
(concluding a claim requiring proof of "knowledgeable or 
reckless conduct" "does not arise from an 'accident' and, thus, 
is not the result of an 'occurrence'"); Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. 
Terrace Enters., Inc., 260 N.W.2d 450, 452 (Minn. 1977) (quoted 
source omitted) ("If the single insured is allowed through 
intentional or reckless acts to consciously control the risks 
covered by the policy, a central concept of insurance is 
violated.").   
¶81 As a matter of fact, following the Appellate Court of 
Illinois' decision in Pittington, upon which the majority 
relies, that court has since declined to follow Pittington.  In 
Allstate Indemnity Co. v. Hieber, 24 N.E.3d 139, 144 (Ill. Ct. 
App. 2014), the Appellate Court of Illinois concluded that an 
insured's conviction for criminally reckless conduct precluded 
the insured from later arguing the resulting bodily injury was 
not "reasonably [] expected."  In so holding, that court 
rejected the dissent's argument which "draws a distinction 
between an injury resulting from criminally reckless conduct and 
one 'expected' by the insured," id. at 144-45, the same 
reasoning the majority relies upon in this case.3   
                                                 
3 Though the majority disputes the degree to which Allstate 
Indemnity Co. v. Hieber, 24 N.E.3d 139 (Ill. Ct. App. 2014), 
actually 
departed 
from 
Metropolitan 
Property 
& 
Casualty 
Insurance Co. v. Pittington, 841 N.E.2d 413 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2005), it nonetheless fails to contend with the more important 
fact that Allstate Indemnity Co. repudiates the majority's 
reasoning.  See majority op., ¶36 n.10. 
No.  2020AP1943.akz 
 
13 
 
¶82 The majority's reliance on foreign authorities without 
any real analysis is a clear attempt to avoid the result 
compelled under Wisconsin law:  the jury's unanimous conclusion 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Strand recklessly caused Haeven's 
death precludes a finding that there was an "accident" under his 
insurance policy.  Neither logic nor legal authority supports 
the majority's holding. 
III 
¶83 Strand has no coverage under his policy with State 
Farm for his criminally reckless conduct.  The jury in his 
criminal trial concluded this beyond a reasonable doubt, and it 
"comports with principles of fundamental fairness" to prevent 
Strand from relitigating this issue.  Aldrich, 341 Wis. 2d 36, 
¶98.  Both requirements of issue preclusion are therefore met, 
and Strand cannot relitigate whether he has coverage for killing 
his daughter under his policy with State Farm.  Because Strand 
has no claim against State Farm under his policy, neither does 
Dostal. 
¶84 Issue preclusion requires consideration of fundamental 
fairness 
because 
the 
doctrine 
binds 
nonparties 
to 
prior 
litigation.  See Kruckenberg v. Harvey, 2005 WI 43, ¶57, 279 
Wis. 2d 520, 694 N.W.2d 879 (explaining the difference between 
issue 
preclusion 
and 
claim 
preclusion). 
 
In 
this 
case, 
fundamental fairness is not a concern because Strand's criminal 
trial is not binding any nonparties to that trial.  It only 
binds Strand by precluding him from claiming that his criminally 
No.  2020AP1943.akz 
 
14 
 
reckless act was a covered "accident" absolving him of liability 
to Dostal. 
¶85 Established factors for assessing fundamental fairness 
weigh in favor of precluding Strand from claiming Haeven's death 
was an "accident."   
Courts may consider some or all of the following 
factors to protect the rights of all parties to a full 
and fair adjudication of all issues involved in the 
action:  (1) could the party against whom preclusion 
is sought, as a matter of law, have obtained review of 
the judgment; (2) is the question one of law that 
involves two distinct claims or intervening contextual 
shifts in the law; (3) do significant differences in 
the quality or extensiveness of proceedings between 
the two courts warrant relitigation of the issue; (4) 
have the burdens of persuasion shifted such that the 
party seeking preclusion had a lower burden of 
persuasion in the first trial than in the second; or 
(5) are matters of public policy and individual 
circumstances 
involved 
that 
would 
render 
the 
application of collateral estoppel to be fundamentally 
unfair, including inadequate opportunity or incentive 
to obtain a full and fair adjudication in the initial 
action? 
Paige K.B. v. Steven G.B., 226 Wis. 2d 210, 220-21, 594 
N.W.2d 370 
(1999) 
(quoting 
Michelle 
T. 
v. 
Crozier, 
173 
Wis. 2d 681, 688-89, 495 N.W.2d 327 (1993)).  Strand was a party 
to his own criminal trial and had plenty of opportunity to 
litigate the issue, including the opportunity to appeal the 
judgment against him.  There is no evidence that Strand's trial 
was inadequate in any particular way.  The jury found beyond a 
reasonable doubt——a higher standard than the "preponderance of 
the evidence" standard Strand would have to satisfy in a claim 
against his insurer——that Strand recklessly killed Haeven.  
No.  2020AP1943.akz 
 
15 
 
Finally, Strand had plenty opportunity and incentive to fully 
litigate his case and avoid criminal penalty.   
¶86 The fundamental fairness factors therefore weigh in 
favor of precluding Strand from relitigating the issue of 
whether his actions were accidental rather than criminally 
reckless.  If Strand were to file a claim under his policy with 
State Farm, he would be precluded from asserting that Haeven's 
death was an "accident" and receive no coverage.  Through the 
direct action statute, Dostal steps into Strand's shoes.  
Because Strand cannot recover under his own policy with State 
Farm, neither can Dostal. 
IV 
¶87 The jury in Strand's criminal trial conclusively 
determined, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Strand caused 
Haeven's death and that he was "aware" that his actions created 
a "unreasonable and substantial" risk of her death.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.25(1).  The jury's verdict foreclosed Strand from later 
arguing that Haeven's death was an "accident."  Because Strand 
has no coverage under State Farm's policy, Dostal cannot recover 
against State Farm either.   
¶88 The majority avoids this inevitable conclusion by 
ignoring the law of our state and blindly relying on foreign 
authorities.  It makes no effort to scrutinize the cases it 
cites and summarily labels them "persuasive."  As a result, the 
majority interprets Strand's homeowner's insurance policy as 
providing 
"Reckless 
Homicide 
Insurance," 
indemnifying 
policyholders 
for 
their 
decisions 
to 
disregard 
known 
No.  2020AP1943.akz 
 
16 
 
"unreasonable and substantial risk[s] of death or great bodily 
harm."  Wis. Stat. § 939.25(1).  This is absurd.  
¶89 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶90 I am authorized to state that Justices PATIENCE DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY join this dissent. 
 
No.  2020AP1943.akz 
 
 
 
1