Title: Oregon v. Nichols
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S063985
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: March 2, 2017

No. 10	
March 2, 2017	
101
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Appellant,
v.
STEVEN P. WAGNER NICHOLS,
Respondent.
(CC 140066CR; SC S063985)
En Banc
On appeal from an order of the Hood River County Circuit 
Court under ORS 138.060(2)(a) and ORAP 12.07.*
Argued and submitted October 13, 2016.
Doug M. Petrina, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, 
argued the cause and filed the briefs for the petitioner on 
review. Also on the briefs were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney 
General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
Anne Fujita Munsey, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, 
argued the cause and filed the brief for the respondent 
on review. Also on the brief was Ernest G. Lannet, Chief 
Defender, Office of Public Defense Services.
BALMER, C. J.
The order of the circuit court is affirmed.
Case Summary: Defendant was indicted for murder and moved to suppress 
statements that he made during a custodial interrogation, citing a violation of 
his right against compelled self-incrimination under Article I, section 12, of the 
Oregon Constitution. The trial court granted defendant’s motion, reasoning that 
defendant had made an equivocal invocation of that right, but the interrogating 
detectives had failed to clarify that invocation, which required suppression of the 
resulting statements. The state appealed directly to the Oregon Supreme Court. 
Held: (1) A reasonable law enforcement officer would have understood that defen-
dant had invoked his right against compelled self-incrimination under Article I, 
section 12; (2) Because defendant unequivocally invoked that right, the detec-
tives were required to cease the interrogation, and their contrary actions violated 
Article  I, section 12; and (3) the trial court therefore did not err in granting 
defendant’s motion to suppress the interview statements that he made following 
his invocation.
The order of the circuit court is affirmed.
______________
	
*  John A. Olson, Judge.
102	
State v. Nichols
	
BALMER, C. J.
	
This case involves the state’s appeal of a pretrial 
order suppressing evidence in a pending murder prosecution, 
ORS 138.060(2)(a). The trial court determined that, near 
the beginning of a custodial interrogation, defendant equiv-
ocally invoked his right against compelled self-incrimination 
under Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution, but 
law enforcement failed to clarify defendant’s intent as to 
that invocation and, instead, continued the interrogation. 
The court concluded that the failure to clarify had violated 
Article I, section 12, and it therefore suppressed defendant’s 
invocation and all the statements that he had made there-
after. We affirm, but on different grounds: We conclude that 
defendant unequivocally invoked his right against com-
pelled self-incrimination and, therefore, the interrogation 
should have ended when defendant made that invocation.
	
The facts are undisputed.1 Defendant’s girlfriend, 
who was also the mother of his then-infant daughter, died 
in 2009 when she fell during a hike with defendant in the 
Columbia River Gorge. The investigation into the cause of 
her fall proceeded slowly. In the meantime, defendant con-
tinued to live in Oregon for several years; he then traveled 
with his daughter to work in China, staying for 18 months.
	
In 2014, while defendant was still in China, pros-
ecutors secured a secret indictment in the Hood River 
County Circuit Court, charging defendant with murder. A 
judge immediately issued a warrant for defendant’s arrest. 
In early 2015, defendant was located and detained at the 
San Francisco International Airport after arriving there 
on an overseas flight from China, en route to Oregon, with 
his daughter. Two detectives from the San Mateo County 
Sheriff’s Office responded and took over the investigation. 
At some point, defendant was handcuffed and remained 
so for several hours. He also had not slept for an extended 
period of time.
	
The detectives then interviewed defendant, who 
apparently was still handcuffed. At the outset of the 
	
1  We take the facts from the record below and from the trial court’s memo-
randum opinion and order granting defendant’s motion to suppress. 
Cite as 361 Or 101 (2017)	
103
interview, the lead detective, Matsuura, introduced himself 
and the other detective, and stated that defendant was not 
free to leave. Matsuura then read defendant his Miranda 
rights, which defendant indicated that he understood. 
Matsuura began the interview by explaining that the air-
port fell within the jurisdiction of his office and that, when 
individuals are arrested at the airport, his office interviews 
them before lodging them in the county jail. Defendant did 
not respond to that explanation. The following back-and-
forth then ensued between Matsuura and defendant:
“DET. MATSUURA:  * 
* 
* Have you been told why you’re 
in custody?
“[DEFENDANT]:  No.
“DET. MATSUURA:  Okay. You have a warrant for your 
arrest.
“[DEFENDANT]:  From where?
“DET. MATSUURA:  The state of Oregon.
“[DEFENDANT]:  For?
“DET. MATSUURA:  Homicide.
“[DEFENDANT]:  Homicide?
“DET. MATSUURA:  Homicide. Do you have any idea 
what that’s about?
“[DEFENDANT]:  No.
“DET. MATSUURA:  Okay.
“[DEFENDANT]:  What’s the name of the person?
“DET. MATSUURA:  Rhonda.
“[DEFENDANT]:  Rhonda?
“DET. MATSUURA:  * 
* 
* Rhonda Castro. Do you know a 
Rhonda Castro?
“[DEFENDANT]:  That’s * 
* 
* my child’s mom.
“DET. MATSUURA:  Okay. Were you guys dating at all 
or was it just like a one-night stand thing where you guys 
* 
* 
* hooked up?
“[DEFENDANT]:  No.
104	
State v. Nichols
“DET. MATSUURA:  Or were you guys having a 
relationship?
“[DEFENDANT]:  No. We were together for a long time.
“DET. MATSUURA:  Okay. Do you have any idea why 
there’s a warrant for your arrest for a homicide for * 
* 
* the 
mother of your daughter?
“[DEFENDANT]:  I don’t.
“DET. MATSUURA:  None at all?
“[DEFENDANT]:  No.
“DET. MATSUURA:  Well, obviously something hap-
pened. Do you know the circumstances behind her death?
“[DEFENDANT]:  Yeah.
“DET. MATSUURA:  Can you tell me about it?
“[DEFENDANT]:  It’s not something I want to talk about. 
It’s—
“DET. MATSUURA:  Well, I want to make sure I don’t 
have a serial murderer walking into my jail.
“[DEFENDANT]:  I’m not—
“DET. MATSUURA:  You know what I mean.
“[DEFENDANT]:  I’m not a killer.
“DET. MATSUURA:  I—
“[DEFENDANT]:  I’m—
“DET. MATSUURA:  I don’t know that. I don’t know you. 
I can’t make that * 
* 
* decision one way or another. But for 
the safety and security of my facility, I want to make sure 
I don’t have the serial murderer walking into my facility 
without knowing it. Can you see my point?
“[DEFENDANT]:  Yeah.
“DET. MATSUURA:  Okay. I’m not here to draw judgment 
on you one way or the other. I’m just looking for some infor-
mation. So if you can tell me * 
* 
* about the circumstances 
of how she died, that’d be great.”
(Emphases added.) Defendant then told the detective that 
the victim had died about six years earlier after falling 
from a cliff. The interview continued for about three hours, 
Cite as 361 Or 101 (2017)	
105
touching on many subjects. Defendant thereafter was 
booked in the local county jail and later was transported 
back to Oregon and arraigned.
	
Defendant moved to suppress his statements from 
the interview, asserting violations of his state and federal 
constitutional rights against compelled self-incrimination 
when questioning continued after he had stated, “[i]t’s not 
something I want to talk about.”2 Defendant alternatively 
argued that his statement had been either an unequivocal 
invocation, which required the detectives to stop the inter-
view, or an equivocal invocation, which he asserted required 
the detectives, under Article  I, section 12, to clarify his 
intent as to the invocation. The state responded that defen-
dant’s statement did not qualify as an invocation, either 
unequivocal or equivocal. The state continued that, even if 
defendant had made an equivocal invocation, the detectives 
would have been permitted to continue the interview with-
out asking clarifying questions and, therefore, no violation 
of defendant’s Article I, section 12, right against compelled 
self-incrimination had occurred.
	
To decide the merits of defendant’s motion, the trial 
court considered evidence consisting of an audio recording 
and transcript of the interview, and heard argument at a 
pretrial hearing, but did not hear any witness testimony. 
The court ultimately ruled that suppression was warranted. 
The court first determined that defendant’s statement had 
been ambiguous because it could have been an invocation 
or it could have been defendant’s way of signaling that the 
topic of the victim’s death was still an emotionally charged 
one, although not foreclosing his willingness to discuss it. 
The court thus characterized the statement as an equivocal 
invocation under Article I, section 12, which, in the court’s 
view, required the detectives to ask clarifying questions to 
determine whether defendant was invoking his right against 
compelled self-incrimination. Because the detectives failed to 
do so, the court concluded, defendant’s right under Article I, 
section 12, had been violated, and the resulting interview 
statements must be suppressed. The state appealed to this 
court. See ORS 138.060(2)(a) (if defendant charged with 
	
2  We do not address any federal constitutional question on direct appeal.
106	
State v. Nichols
murder or aggravated murder, state may directly appeal 
trial court order suppressing evidence to this court).
	
On direct appeal, the parties repeat the invocation 
arguments summarized above—focusing first on whether 
defendant made an unequivocal invocation of the right 
against compelled self-incrimination under Article I, section 
12, or, alternatively, whether he made an equivocal invoca-
tion or even any invocation at all. The state also repeats its 
argument that, if defendant made an equivocal invocation, 
the detectives were not required to ask clarifying questions, 
and it urges this court to consider that question anew under 
Article I, section 12. The state in particular argues that this 
court’s case law to date merely assumes that Article I, sec-
tion 12, imposes a duty to clarify, but does not expressly so 
hold, and adds that, by contrast, the Fifth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution imposes no such duty.3 The 
state further contends that, if anything, defendant merely 
demonstrated an intent to not respond to questions about 
certain topics, but not an intent to invoke his right against 
compelled self-incrimination, such that the detectives were 
required to stop the interview.
	
Defendant counters that this court previously has 
held—and should continue to hold—that, if a suspect equivo-
cally invokes the right against compelled self-incrimination, 
law enforcement officers are required to clarify the sus-
pect’s intent as to the invocation before proceeding further. 
Defendant otherwise alternatively responds that he was 
entitled to “selectively invoke” that right as to questions on 
certain topics, and, once he did so, the detectives were pre-
cluded from asking further questions about those topics.
	
We review for error of law—that is, we determine 
as a matter of law whether defendant’s statement amounted 
to an unequivocal invocation or, if not, then whether it 
amounted to an equivocal invocation or no invocation at all. 
State v. Avila-Nava, 356 Or 600, 609, 341 P3d 714 (2014); 
	
3  Compare State v. Meade, 327 Or 335, 340, 963 P2d 656 (1998) (noting obli-
gation of law enforcement to clarify equivocal invocation of derivative right to 
counsel under Article I, section 12), with Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 US 370, 
381-82, 130 S Ct 2250, 176 L Ed 2d 1098 (2010) (suspect must unambiguously 
invoke Fifth Amendment right to remain silent).
Cite as 361 Or 101 (2017)	
107
State v. McAnulty, 356 Or 432, 449, 338 P3d 653 (2014), cert 
den, 136 S Ct 34 (2015). As explained below, we conclude 
that defendant made an unequivocal invocation.4
	
We begin by setting out some familiar principles. 
Article I, section 12, establishes a right against compelled 
self-incrimination.5 To protect that right, police must give 
Miranda warnings to a suspect who is in custody or in other-
wise compelling circumstances. McAnulty, 356 Or at 454. 
If a suspect unequivocally invokes his or her right against 
compelled self-incrimination during a custodial interroga-
tion, then police must honor that request and stop the inter-
rogation. Id. at 455; see also State v. Davis, 350 Or 440, 459, 
256 P3d 1075 (2011) (Article I, section 12, embodies right 
to insist that police refrain from interrogation after per-
son in custody or compelling circumstances invokes right 
to remain silent). A suspect may waive that right, however, 
so long as the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 
under the totality of the circumstances. McAnulty, 356 Or 
at 455. The state bears the initial burden of showing that 
a defendant charged with a crime validly waived the right; 
if the defendant initially waives the right, then the defen-
dant bears the burden to show that he or she later invoked 
it. See State v. James, 339 Or 476, 491, 123 P3d 251 (2005) 
(explaining burden of proof in context of derivative right to 
counsel during interrogation afforded under Article I, sec-
tion 12).
	
In this case, the parties do not dispute that defen-
dant was subject to custodial interrogation; that the detec-
tives provided Miranda warnings advising defendant of 
	
4  In reviewing the trial court’s determination that defendant made an equiv-
ocal invocation, we are bound by the trial court’s findings of historical fact if evi-
dence in the record supports them. State v. James, 339 Or 476, 481, 123 P3d 251 
(2005); see also Avila-Nava, 356 Or at 609 (what transpired during interrogation, 
including what defendant said or did not say, is question of fact; although bound 
by facts supported by evidence in record, appellate court assesses anew whether 
those facts are sufficient to meet constitutional standards). In this case, the trial 
court found that defendant and Matsuura made the statements set out earlier 
in this opinion, and the record supports that finding. The court did not, how-
ever, make any additional finding based on evidence in the record—for example, 
assessing defendant’s or the detectives’ tone or demeanor, or making any related 
credibility determination—relating to the circumstances of the interview.
	
5  Article I, section 12, provides, in part, that “[n]o person shall be * 
* 
* com-
pelled in any criminal prosecution to testify against himself.”
108	
State v. Nichols
his rights under Article I, section 12; and that defendant 
indicated that he understood those warnings. Defendant 
contends as an initial matter that, although he acknowl-
edged the warnings, he did not waive his right against com-
pelled self-incrimination—he argues that the preliminary 
back-and-forth with Matsuura instead showed that he was 
merely trying to understand why he had been arrested. 
The state counters that defendant waived his Miranda 
rights at the outset of the interview, and we agree that 
the record supports the state’s position.6 After indicating 
that he understood his rights, defendant chose to answer 
some initial questions about the victim, and nothing in the 
record suggests a lack of knowledge, consent, or voluntari-
ness about that decision. We conclude that, in choosing to do 
so, defendant initially waived his right against compelled 
self-incrimination under Article I, section 12. See State v. 
Collins, 253 Or 74, 75, 453 P2d 169 (1969) (answering police 
questions following Miranda warnings is evidence of waiver 
of rights under Article I, section 12); State v. Davison, 252 
Or 617, 621, 451 P2d 481 (1969) (unnecessary to articulate 
waiver following warnings; rather, clear and unambiguous 
conduct by person advised of rights that includes willing-
ness to answer questions sufficient to establish waiver).
	
The next question is whether, after initially waiv-
ing his right against compelled self-incrimination under 
Article I, section 12, defendant unequivocally invoked that 
right shortly thereafter, when he responded to Matsuura’s 
request that he tell the detectives about the circumstances 
of the victim’s death by answering, “It’s not something 
I want to talk about.” In ascertaining whether defendant 
made an unequivocal invocation, our task is to consider his 
words “in the context of the totality of circumstances exist-
ing at the time of and preceding their utterance, to deter-
mine whether a reasonable officer would have understood 
that the defendant was invoking that right.” Avila-Nava, 356 
	
6  The trial court did not make any finding or reach any express conclusion 
about defendant’s waiver of Miranda. Our determination that defendant waived 
his Miranda rights is not inconsistent with the trial court’s conclusion on the 
merits, relating to defendant’s subsequent asserted invocation. See generally 
James, 339 Or at 482 n 5 (if trial court made no factual finding about disputed 
fact, appellate court presumes that trial court found facts in a manner consistent 
with its ultimate conclusion).
Cite as 361 Or 101 (2017)	
109
Or at 613. That evaluation may include “preceding words 
spoken by the defendant and the interrogating officer[;] the 
demeanor, gestures, and speech patterns of the defendant[;] 
the demeanor and tone of the interrogating officer[;] and the 
point at which the defendant allegedly invoked the right to 
remain silent.” Id. at 614; see also State v. Charboneau, 323 
Or 38, 55, 913 P2d 308 (1996) (invocation question evaluated 
based on totality of circumstances).
	
We begin with the words that defendant identifies 
as having amounted to an unequivocal invocation: “It’s not 
something I want to talk about.” Viewed in isolation, those 
words are, at least arguably, ambiguous: A reasonable offi-
cer could have understood that defendant was invoking 
his right under Article I, section 12, or, alternatively, that 
defendant was expressing a desire to not discuss, or at least 
a reluctance to discuss, the circumstances of the victim’s 
death. See generally Avila-Nava, 356 Or at 609 (interpre-
tation required when defendant’s words are ambiguous, as 
ordinary people would understand them).
	
In arguing that those words did not clearly con-
vey any intent to invoke the right against compelled self-
incrimination, the state accurately describes contrasting 
wording from other cases in which this court concluded 
that unequivocal invocations had occurred. See id. at 603, 
617 (defendant who stated, “I won’t answer any questions,” 
unequivocally invoked, when record suggested no language 
barrier or confusion on defendant’s part, or that reasonable 
officer would have understood defendant instead to be ask-
ing a question); McAnulty, 356 Or at 451-52, 456 (defendant’s 
first two invocations—“I don’t want to talk anymore” and 
“I don’t want to talk no more”—unambiguously communi-
cated her desire to no longer speak with detectives); see also 
State v. Acremant, 338 Or 302, 322, 108 P3d 1139, cert den, 
546 US 864 (2005) (defendant’s statement—“I think that 
I do need a lawyer[,] I do”—unambiguously expressed his 
desire to consult with counsel before speaking with detec-
tives); State v. Kell, 303 Or 89, 97, 734 P2d 334 (1987) (citing 
Smith v. Illinois, 469 US 91, 100, 105 S Ct 490, 83 L Ed 2d 
488 (1984), wherein the defendant, upon being advised of 
right to counsel and asked if he understood, answered “Uh, 
yeah[,] I’d like to do that”; Supreme Court concluded that 
110	
State v. Nichols
he unambiguously invoked his derivative right to counsel). 
The unequivocal invocations in those cases all share a com-
monality that this case does not: In each case, the defendant 
expressed his or her intent by first self-identifying as the 
actor (“I”) and then by clearly stating the desired action or 
view relating to the right in question (won’t answer ques-
tions, don’t want to talk, need a lawyer). Simply stated, each 
of those cases involved classic and easily understood words 
of invocation.
	
By contrast, defendant’s statement did not focus on 
defendant as the actor taking an action; rather, it focused on 
the topic of Matsuura’s question (“It’s not something I want to 
talk about.” (Emphasis added.)) That is, on its face, it did not 
directly convey—at least not as clearly as the statements in 
the cases just noted—an intention on defendant’s part to take 
the affirmative action of either invoking his right against 
compelled self-incrimination under Article I, section 12, or 
expressing the desire to do so. As the trial court observed, 
defendant’s words, standing alone, could have been under-
stood by a reasonable officer to be an unequivocal invocation 
or, alternatively, as an equivocal invocation or a reluctance 
to discuss an emotionally charged topic.7 Of course, partic-
ular or precise wording is not required to invoke the right 
in question. See generally Davis v. United States, 512 US 
452, 459, 114 S Ct 2350, 129 L Ed 2d 362 (1994) (to invoke 
derivative right to counsel, criminal suspect not required to 
“speak with the discrimination of an Oxford don”; rather, 
suspect must articulate his or her desire sufficiently clearly, 
such that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances 
would understand the request). Nevertheless, when isolated 
from its context, defendant’s statement plausibly could be 
construed in more than one way.
	
7  At oral argument, the state commented that the trial court had “found” 
that defendant had been expressing reluctance to discuss the topic, but that is 
not correct. Rather, in assessing the ambiguity, the trial court surmised that 
defendant’s words could be construed either as an invocation or as expressing 
a reluctance to answer. Cf. Avila-Nava, 356 Or at 617 (in finding facts relating 
to purported invocation, courts not permitted to draw speculative inferences 
from interrogation circumstances). That is, the trial court’s observation was just 
that—an observation about the nature of the words spoken and a plausible inter-
pretation of those words as they might have shed light on defendant’s intent, not 
a factual finding about what defendant actually intended.
Cite as 361 Or 101 (2017)	
111
	
When we analyze defendant’s statement in the con-
text in which it was made, however, we conclude that defen-
dant unequivocally expressed an intent to invoke his right 
against compelled self-incrimination, which a reasonable 
officer would have understood as an invocation of that right. 
See Avila-Nava, 356 Or at 611, 614 (totality of circumstances 
includes context in which defendant’s words were uttered, 
including preceding circumstances; noting other consider-
ations beyond spoken words). Two aspects of that context 
are significant.
	
First and most notably, defendant made his 
statement—“[i]t’s not something I want to talk about”—in 
response to Matsuura’s request that defendant tell him about 
“the circumstances behind [the victim’s] death.” That is, the 
topic about which defendant unambiguously expressed a 
desire to not speak to the detectives went to the core of the 
entire investigation and the crime for which he had been 
arrested. When defendant clearly expressed a desire not to 
speak about the alleged crime that had prompted his arrest, 
a reasonable law enforcement officer should have under-
stood that defendant was invoking his right against com-
pelled self-incrimination as to the entire interview. That is 
different from the scenario in which—as the state argues 
occurred here—a suspect selectively answers some ques-
tions but declines to answer others. See Kell, 303 Or at 99 
(suspects undergoing interrogation or in otherwise compel-
ling circumstances may “pick and choose what [they] wish[ 
] 
to talk about”). The facts in Kell illustrate the difference. In 
that case, after waiving his Miranda rights, the defendant 
chose to speak freely and at length “about every aspect of 
the case,” except for identifying who had conceived the man-
ner of committing the crime. Id.; see also State v. Smith, 310 
Or 1, 10, 791 P2d 836 (1990) (defendant’s statement during 
interview, “I have nothing to say,” in context of responding 
to hypothetical description of how he might have killed his 
wife, demonstrated that defendant chose to answer some 
questions but not others). By contrast, defendant in this 
case did not decline to answer a question about a particu-
lar or discrete topic. Instead, he answered, “[i]t’s not some-
thing I want to talk about,” in response to a direct question 
about the circumstances of the victim’s death, which was the 
112	
State v. Nichols
underlying basis for the murder charge against defendant, 
the warrant for his arrest, and the interrogation for which 
he had been provided Miranda warnings.8
	
Second, defendant made that statement near the 
beginning of his interview with the detectives, following 
initial back-and-forth about the warrant for his arrest and 
confirmation about the identity of and his relationship with 
the victim. That, again, is different from the context of the 
law enforcement interviews that occurred in Kell and Smith. 
In those cases, by the point in time when the defendants 
made their purported invocations, they had fully partici-
pated in investigatory interviews. Stated another way, the 
interviews in Kell and Smith unfolded in a significantly 
different manner from defendant’s interview; unlike those 
cases, defendant did not first speak on a range of topics and 
then decline to answer a question or otherwise indicate that 
he had nothing to say about one discreet topic. See Smith, 
310 Or at 10 (defendant’s interview ultimately terminated 
because defendant was tired; at one point during interview, 
after detective suggested hypothetical idea about the crime, 
defendant replied, “I have nothing to say”); Kell, 303 Or at 
100 n 3 (defendant “just kept on talking” and stated that 
he would talk, except that he wanted a lawyer in relation 
to questions about whether the crime had been his idea). 
Instead, as soon as Matsuura directly asked defendant 
to discuss the subject of the circumstances of the victim’s 
death, defendant affirmatively and unequivocally stated his 
desire to not do so.9
	
8  The state argues that, in contrast to the statements in Avila-Nava, 356 
Or at 603, and McAnulty, 356 Or at 456, defendant’s statement was not directed 
at ending the interrogation; instead, at most, defendant merely sought to alter 
the course of the interrogation, not end it. We disagree, for the reasons stated 
above: Defendant’s statement responded to a request to tell the detectives about 
the circumstances of the victim’s death—the stated reason for his arrest and the 
interrogation—thus conveying his desire to end the interrogation.
	
9  The state cites another case, People v. Silva, 45 Cal 3d 604, 247 Cal Rptr 
573, 754 P2d 1070 (1988), cert den, 488 US 1019 (1989), to support its argument 
that defendant’s statement merely demonstrated an unwillingness to discuss 
a particular topic. The facts of Silva, however, align with Kell, 303 Or 89, and 
Smith, 310 Or 1, not with the facts of this case. As in Kell and Smith, the defen-
dant in Silva fully participated in an interview with law enforcement, in which 
he provided acknowledgment and information about various circumstances of 
the crime. Then, when asked twice about a factual aspect of the crime and his 
involvement, he responded, “I don’t know. I really don’t want to talk about that.” 
Cite as 361 Or 101 (2017)	
113
	
The state points to additional considerations dis-
cussed in Avila-Nava, such as the speech pattern of the sus-
pect and the tone and demeanor of the interrogating officer. 
356 Or at 614. The state in particular argues that the audio 
recording of defendant’s interview—which the trial court 
listened to before making its ruling—shows that the initial 
exchange between defendant and Matsuura was “low-key.” 
The recording does reveal that defendant spoke in a non- 
animated way, but that manner of speech was consistent 
with the fact that defendant had not slept for an extended 
period of time. Matsuura, in turn, displayed a polite and 
restrained tone toward defendant until defendant stated, 
“[i]t’s not something I want to talk about,” at which point 
Matsuura’s tone became more forceful, as he discussed the 
danger of booking a “serial murderer” in his jail. Nothing 
about defendant’s speech pattern or Matsuura’s tone and 
demeanor alters our analysis of the other contextual cir-
cumstances, in which defendant clearly expressed, at essen-
tially the outset of the interview, a desire not to discuss the 
underlying reason for his arrest and interrogation.
	
In sum, after considering defendant’s statement, in 
the context of the totality of the circumstances existing up 
to and when he made that statement, we conclude that a 
reasonable law enforcement officer would have understood 
that defendant had invoked his right against compelled 
self-incrimination under Article I, section 12. And, because 
defendant unequivocally invoked his right, the detectives 
were required to cease the interrogation. See Avila-Nava, 
356 Or at 612 n  7 (stating principle; contrasting with 
Silva, 45 Cal 3d at 629, 754 P2d at 1083. Citing the principle that a suspect 
may indicate an unwillingness to discuss certain subjects without expressing 
a desire to terminate an interrogation in progress, and considering additional 
circumstances that included the defendant’s vocal inflection when he made his 
statement, the California Supreme Court determined that no constitutional vio-
lation had occurred. Id. 
	
In this case, initially, defendant arguably hinted that he might discuss the 
victim’s death, when he answered “Yeah” in response to Matsuura’s preliminary 
question, “Do you know the circumstances behind [the victim’s] death?” But then, 
he made his statement—“[i]t’s not something I want to talk about”—immediately 
in response to Matsuura’s next, similarly broad, question, directly asking defen-
dant to tell Matsuura about those circumstances. In the totality of the circum-
stances surrounding defendant’s statement, he did not display any willingness, 
at essentially the outset of the interview, to discuss the victim’s death; rather, he 
displayed an intent to invoke his right against self-incrimination.
114	
State v. Nichols
scenario in which a defendant subsequently re-opens dia-
logue with unprompted statements, thus indicating willing-
ness to have generalized discussion). Instead of doing so, 
however, they first continued to press defendant to answer 
and then further questioned him after he relented. Those 
actions violated Article I, section 12, and, accordingly, the 
trial court did not err in granting defendant’s motion to sup-
press all the interview statements that he made following 
his invocation.
	
The order of the circuit court is affirmed.