Title: Commonwealth v. McBride
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 220715
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: October 19, 2023

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 220715 
JUSTICE STEPHEN R. McCULLOUGH 
 
 
 
October 19, 2023 
DANJUAN ANTONIO McBRIDE 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
 
This appeal presents the question of whether Rule 3A:15 or the Double Jeopardy 
Clause restricts a trial court’s authority to reconsider a motion to strike that the court 
erroneously granted.  We conclude that Rule 3A:15 does not preclude the court from 
reconsidering a motion to strike that was erroneously granted.  As for the Double Jeopardy 
Clause, it certainly imposes some limitations on a trial court’s authority to reconsider a motion 
to strike.  Those limitations, however, do not apply here.  Consequently, we reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
BACKGROUND 
 
Danjuan Antonio McBride was indicted for possession of cocaine with the intent to 
distribute, third or subsequent offense, and possession of heroin and Furanylfentanyl1 with the 
intent to distribute, third or subsequent offense.  Before trial, the Commonwealth filed a 
motion disclosing its intention to introduce into evidence prior convictions from Baltimore, 
Maryland.  It sought a pretrial ruling that these convictions were admissible. 
 
At a hearing on the motion, the Commonwealth explained that it requested records 
from Maryland to establish the defendant’s prior convictions, and, in response, it received a 
 
 
1 Furanylfentanyl is a derivative of the synthetic opioid, Fentanyl. Fentanyl is 80 to 
100 times more potent than morphine, and Furanylfentanyl is slightly less potent than 
Fentanyl.  Commonwealth v. Mulkin, 228 A.3d 913, 915 n.5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2020). 
 
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disc with approximately 250 pages.  The disc was certified by the Maryland State Archives.  
Defense counsel objected on a number of grounds.  The circuit court ruled that the documents 
were admissible, concluding that they were properly authenticated under Virginia law.  The 
Commonwealth observed that “I just want to make sure that I can introduce additional 
documents to the jury if there’s a question about this being a different person.”  The circuit 
court responded, “I guess we will see what comes up.” 
 
At a jury trial, the Commonwealth introduced the records into evidence.  After the 
Commonwealth rested, McBride made a motion to strike the evidence, arguing among other 
things that the Commonwealth failed to establish qualifying prior offenses because the 
evidence did not prove that the defendant was the person listed on the Maryland records.  
Defense counsel pointed out that the records were not consistent on a birth date, and in places 
listed a different name.  The records sometimes list “Tony Brown” as an alias for Danjuan 
McBride, while another record identifies Tony Brown as the defendant.  Some records list 
McBride’s birthdate as March 7, 1979, whereas other records list a birthdate of March 7, 
1980.  The Commonwealth responded that the defendant’s name was somewhat unique and 
that the records contained additional identifiers that linked them to the defendant.  In addition, 
the Commonwealth contended that the discrepancy on the birthdate in the records appeared to 
be a typographical error, and that the defendant’s use of an alias did not change the fact that 
he was the person identified by the Maryland records. 
 
The circuit court stated that it would grant the motion to strike with respect to whether 
the Commonwealth had established the defendant’s two prior convictions.  The 
Commonwealth immediately responded that it had a “strong exception to that ruling.”  It 
argued that it had relied on the trial court’s pre-trial ruling that connected the Maryland 
 
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records to the defendant, that the admissibility of the records was an issue for the court rather 
than the jury, and that the records would not be admissible into evidence unless they were 
sufficient to raise a jury question about the defendant’s identity as the person who was 
convicted of the prior offenses in Maryland.  The Commonwealth noted that it could not 
introduce McBride’s entire criminal record, but that additional records would further establish 
that McBride was the person identified in the Maryland records.  The court then stated that it 
would allow the prosecution to reopen its case to address the issue.  Defense counsel objected. 
 
The Commonwealth proceeded to introduce an additional court record – a 
recognizance form from Fairfax County that contained the same address as the address listed 
on the Maryland records.  The prosecution then rested.  The circuit court explained that there 
appeared to be a “genuine misunderstanding” about the prior records.  The court then stated 
that it was reversing itself on the motion to strike, reasoning that there was sufficient evidence 
in the Maryland records for the jury to conclude that the defendant was the person listed in 
those records.  At that point, the defendant had not presented any evidence or taken any other 
steps such as releasing witnesses. 
 
The jury found the defendant guilty of both charges. 
 
McBride appealed to the Court of Appeals.  By published opinion, a panel of that court 
reversed the convictions.  The Court of Appeals concluded that, once a court grants a motion 
to strike, Rule 3A:15 requires the court to enter an order of acquittal and the court is 
foreclosed from reconsidering its decision.  McBride v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. App. 556, 
572-77 (2022).  We awarded the Commonwealth an appeal from this decision. 
 
 
 
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ANALYSIS 
 
I. 
RULE 3A:15 DOES NOT PREVENT A COURT FROM RECONSIDERING ITS RULING ON 
 
 
A MOTION TO STRIKE. 
 
 
We review the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the rules of this Court de novo.  
LaCava v. Commonwealth, 283 Va. 465, 471 (2012).  At the time of McBride’s trial, Rule 
3A:15 provided in relevant part: 
Motion to Strike Evidence. – After the Commonwealth has 
rested its case or at the conclusion of all the evidence, the court 
on motion of the accused may strike the Commonwealth’s 
evidence if the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to 
sustain a conviction . . . .  
. . . . 
 
Judgment of Acquittal or New Trial. – The court shall enter a 
judgment of acquittal if it strikes the evidence or sets aside the 
verdict because the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to 
sustain a conviction.  The court shall grant a new trial if it sets 
aside the verdict for any other reason.2 
  
 
In construing this rule, we note that courts commonly consider background principles 
when interpreting rules or statutes, even if those principles are not mentioned in the rule or 
statute.  To cite but a few examples, we rely on the rule of lenity when interpreting a criminal 
statute, even though the statute does not mention the rule.  Morgan v. Commonwealth, 301 
Va. 476, 483 (2022).  We presume that the legislature did not repeal a statute by implication.  
Sexton v. Cornett, 271 Va. 251, 257 (2006).  We also presume that a statute is not to be given 
retroactive effect “unless a contrary legislative intent is manifest.”  Berner v. Mills, 265 Va. 
408, 413 (2003).  And we examine a local government’s powers to enact an ordinance through 
 
 
2 After McBride’s trial, this Court amended a number of rules, including Rule 3A:15, 
to replace the word “shall” with the word “must” as part of an effort to clarify the use of the 
word “shall.”  The change was intended as a clarifying amendment and does not alter the 
meaning of the rules. 
 
5 
the lens of Dillon’s Rule.  City of Richmond v. Confrere Club of Richmond, Virginia, Inc., 239 
Va. 77, 79-80 (1990). 
 
One of these background principles is the recognized authority of a court to reconsider 
an erroneous or flawed decision.  Lewis v. Commonwealth, 295 Va. 454, 467 n.3 (2018) (trial 
court may reconsider its judgment of conviction “as it may reconsider any ruling” provided 
that it does so within the time permitted by the rules); see also Everett v. Tawes, 298 Va. 25, 
35 (2019) (noting the power of a court to correct interlocutory orders).  The power to 
reconsider is often described as an inherent power of a court.  The United States Supreme 
Court has observed that “[i]t is a power inherent in every court of justice so long as it retains 
control of the subject-matter and of the parties, to correct that which has been wrongfully 
done by virtue of its process.”  United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183, 197 (1939) (cleaned 
up).3  The power to decide carries with it the power to reconsider as a necessary adjunct.  That 
power, of course, can be constrained by rules or statutes that limit its timing or scope. 
 
Rules of evidence and procedure commonly instruct a court that it must do something.  
Those rules are almost always silent about a court’s ability to reconsider.  The power to 
reconsider nevertheless remains present, even if it is not mentioned in the text of the rule. 
 
 
3 State courts have echoed this view of judicial power.  See, e.g., Steele v. Stonington, 
622 A.2d 551, 553 n.4 (Conn. 1993) (“[I]t is the inherent authority of every court, as long as it 
retains jurisdiction, to reconsider a prior ruling . . . . If a court is not convinced that its initial 
ruling is correct, then in the interests of justice it should reconsider the order, provided it 
retains jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties.”); People v. Mink, 565 N.E.2d 975, 
978 (Ill. 1990) (“A court in a criminal case has inherent power to reconsider and correct its 
own rulings, even in the absence of a statute or rule granting it such authority.”); Melnick v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 1105, 1107 (N.M. 1988) (a trial court “has the 
inherent authority to reconsider its interlocutory orders, and it is not the duty of the trial court 
to perpetuate error when it realizes it has mistakenly ruled”); State v. Davis, 991 N.W.2d 491, 
498 (Wis. 2023) (“[I]t is firmly established in Wisconsin law that a circuit court has the 
inherent authority to reconsider its own rulings during ongoing proceedings.”). 
 
6 
 
Rule 3A:15 is typical of our rules in that it instructs a court to take a particular action 
without expressly addressing the power of a court to reconsider.  The language of Rule 3A:15, 
which provides that a court “must enter a judgment of acquittal if it strikes the evidence,” 
presupposes a final decision granting a motion to strike, not an initial ruling that the court then 
reconsiders.  A court may misspeak, or it may misapprehend the law or the evidence, and on 
that basis render a flawed ruling on a motion to strike.  When a court has concluded that its 
earlier ruling on a motion to strike was erroneous or flawed, it may timely reconsider its 
decision to grant (or deny) a motion to strike, just as it may reconsider other decisions. 
 
The language of the Rule requiring a court to enter an order of acquittal flows from 
principles of Double Jeopardy.  “[I]n pleading double jeopardy, the burden is on the defendant 
to establish the identity of the offenses.”  Low v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 48, 50 (1990).  
Ordinarily, a defendant will meet this burden by producing “the record or transcript of the 
initial trial.”  Id.  Transcripts are not always prepared, particularly if the defendant pleads 
guilty.  Orders of the court, however, are preserved.  See Code § 17.1-124 (addressing circuit 
court order books); Code § 16.1-69.55 (addressing general district court retention of records).  
The requirement of Rule 3A:15 that a court “shall enter a judgment of acquittal if it strikes the 
evidence reflecting the judgment of acquittal” ensures an accurate record and thus protects a 
defendant from future jeopardy.  It is not meant to cabin the discretion of a judge to promptly 
reconsider an erroneously granted motion to strike. 
 
It is settled law in Virginia that an order is final when it “disposes of the entire action 
and leaves nothing to be done except the ministerial superintendence of execution of the 
judgment.”  Super Fresh Food Mkts. of Va., Inc. v. Ruffin, 263 Va. 555, 560 (2002); see also 
Rule 1:1(b) (“Unless otherwise provided by rule or statute, a judgment, order, or decree is 
 
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final if it disposes of the entire matter before the court, including all claim(s) and all cause(s) 
of action against all parties, gives all the relief contemplated, and leaves nothing to be done by 
the court except the ministerial execution of the court’s judgment, order, or decree.”).  A 
verbal pronouncement from the bench granting a motion to strike is not a final judgement 
under this longstanding definition.  Moreover, under Rule 1:1(a): 
All final judgments, orders, and decrees, irrespective of terms of 
court, remain under the control of the trial court and may be 
modified, vacated, or suspended for twenty-one days after the date 
of entry, and no longer . . . . The date of entry of any final 
judgment, order, or decree is the date it is signed by the judge 
either on paper or by electronic means in accord with Rule 1:17. 
 
If a trial court can modify, within time limits, a final order, a fortiori it can modify a non-final 
verbal pronouncement from the bench. 
 
In short, Rule 3A:15 does not preclude a trial court from timely reconsidering a motion 
to strike.  Furthermore, here the trial court could exercise its discretion to permit the 
Commonwealth to introduce additional evidence concerning the Maryland court records.  See, 
e.g., Hargraves v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 604, 608 (1978). 
 
Unlike Rule 3A:15, however, the Double Jeopardy Clause does impose restrictions on 
a court’s authority to revisit a granted motion to strike.  We turn to that question next. 
 
II. 
THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE RESTRICTS A COURT’S AUTHORITY TO  
 
 
RECONSIDER A MOTION TO STRIKE BUT THOSE STRICTURES ARE NOT IMPLICATED 
 
 
HERE. 
 
 
Both the United States Constitution and the Constitution of Virginia contain a Double 
Jeopardy Clause.  U.S. Const., amend. V; Va. Const., art. I, § 8.4  The Double Jeopardy 
Clause “protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; it protects 
 
 
4 The scope of the Double Jeopardy provision of the Constitution of Virginia is not at 
issue in this case. 
 
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against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and it protects against 
multiple punishments for the same offense.”  Stephens v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 58, 62 
(2002) (cleaned up and citations omitted).  The Clause prevents “the State with all its 
resources and power” from making “repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged 
offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to 
live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that 
even though innocent he may be found guilty.”  Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 
(1957). 
 
The United States Supreme Court addressed the question of a court’s power to revisit 
an earlier decision to acquit in Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462 (2005).  In Smith, after 
the prosecution had presented its evidence, a Massachusetts court originally granted a motion 
for an acquittal on one particular charge.  Id. at 465.  At that point, “[t]he prosecutor did not 
make or reserve a motion for reconsideration, or seek a continuance that would allow him to 
provide the court with favorable authority.”  Id. at 470.  The defense then presented its case on 
the defendant’s other charges and rested.  Id. at 465.  Afterwards, during a recess that occurred 
before closing arguments, the prosecution presented the court with additional authority 
showing that the court had erred in granting the motion for acquittal on the particular charge 
that had been dismissed.  Id.  The trial court reversed its judgment of acquittal on that charge 
and the jury convicted the defendant on that charge.  Id. 
 
In determining whether the trial court’s reconsideration of its earlier acquittal violated 
the prohibition against double jeopardy, the Supreme Court concluded that, under 
Massachusetts law, the court’s ruling granting the motion for acquittal was final, i.e., the trial 
court could not, as a matter of state law, reconsider its decision to grant the motion for 
 
9 
acquittal.  Id. at 470.  The Court acknowledged that “state law may prescribe that a judge’s 
midtrial determination of the sufficiency of the State’s proof can be reconsidered.”  Id.  The 
Court further explained that the Double Jeopardy Clause forecloses reconsideration of a 
motion for acquittal when the defendant has suffered the possibility of prejudice.  Id. at 
471-72.  The possibility of prejudice existed in Smith because the defendant had presented his 
evidence.  Id. 
 
The Supreme Court in Smith was closely divided.  A four Justice dissent, authored by 
Justice Ginsburg, argued that the defendant’s double jeopardy rights were not violated by the 
trial court’s decision to reconsider.  Id. at 475-80.  Regardless of this disagreement, however, 
as the dissent noted, the majority and the dissent unanimously agreed that the Double 
Jeopardy Clause does not “bar the States from allowing trial judges to reconsider a midtrial 
grant of a motion to acquit on one or more but fewer than all counts of an indictment.”  Id. at 
475.  There was also no dispute between the majority and the dissent that “[a] State may 
provide for such reconsideration . . . by legislation or by judicial rule, common-law decision, 
or exercise of supervisory power.”  Id. 
 
In this instance, Virginia law allows a trial court to reconsider a previously granted 
motion to strike.  Under Virginia law, the circuit court’s verbal pronouncement to grant the 
motion to strike was not final.  The circuit court retained the authority to revisit its earlier 
ruling, so long as doing so did not offend Double Jeopardy.  Moreover, the prosecution here 
did what the prosecution in Smith had not done, which is to immediately object to the trial 
court’s decision to grant the motion to strike.  In this case, the trial court promptly reversed 
itself, before the defendant presented any evidence or released any of its witnesses, further 
distinguishing this case from Smith.  The double jeopardy bar does not apply here. 
 
10 
 
Evans v. Michigan, 568 U.S. 313 (2013), cited by the defendant, does not compel a 
different outcome.  The issue in that case was “whether retrial is barred when a trial court 
grants an acquittal because the prosecution had failed to prove an ‘element’ of the offense 
that, in actuality, it did not have to prove.”  Id. at 317.  The United States Supreme Court 
answered that question in the affirmative, holding that once a court enters a judgment of 
acquittal, even on a flawed legal basis, the defendant cannot be retried.  Id. at 330.  The Court 
explained that its decision was rooted in existing precedent.  The Court expressly declined the 
invitation to revisit past precedent, including its prior decision in Smith v. Massachusetts.  See 
Evans, 568 U.S. at 318, 327-28.  In the case before us, the defendant is not being subjected to 
a retrial.  Rather, the issue before us involves the power of a trial court, as a matter of state 
law, to revisit an erroneous resolution of a motion to strike and at what point such a 
reconsidered ruling might offend Double Jeopardy.  Evans does not purport to address that 
issue because it was not before the Court.  Instead, Smith v. Massachusetts provides the rule of 
decision on the double jeopardy aspect of this case. 
 
In the present case, the trial court promptly reconsidered its granting of a motion to 
strike, and it did so before the defendant presented any evidence or altered his strategy by, for 
example, releasing witnesses.  Consequently, the defendant suffered no Double Jeopardy 
violation.5 
 
 
 
5 Other courts have reached this conclusion.  See United States v. Hill, 643 F.3d 807, 
865-67 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that jeopardy did not attach when the district court orally 
granted a motion for judgment of acquittal and then reversed its ruling after a lunch break); 
Quintanilla v. State, 496 S.W.3d 861, 867 (Tex. Ct. App. 2016) (“Because the trial court 
reconsidered its oral ruling and denied the motion for directed verdict before any further trial 
proceedings took place, we conclude that no double-jeopardy violation occurred.”). 
 
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CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and final 
judgment is entered for the Commonwealth. 
Reversed and final judgment.