Title: Williams v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 54, 2001
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: May 9, 2002

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
TIMOTHY WILLIAMS,
§
§
No. 54, 2001     
Defendant Below,
§
Appellant,
§
Court Below:   Superior Court of 
§
the State of Delaware in and for
              v.
§
Sussex County
§
STATE OF DELAWARE,
§
Cr. A. Nos. IS00-05-0646 through     
                     
§                         IS00-05-0654
Plaintiff Below,
§
        
Appellee.
§                
                                                  
 
Submitted: February 21, 2002
Decided:
May 9, 2002
 Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH, and BERGER, Justices.
Upon appeal from Superior Court.  AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN
PART AND REMANDED.
Bernard J. O’Donnell, Esquire of the Public Defender’s Office, Wilmington,
Delaware, for Appellant.
John Williams, Esquire of the Department of Justice, Dover, Delaware, for
Appellee.
VEASEY, Chief Justice:
The principal issue before us on this appeal is whether a person may be
charged two times with possession of a controlled substance, under the same statute,
even though the offenses occurred at the same time, in the same location and with
one intended purpose.  We hold that this is multiplicitous and violates the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.  Accordingly, we reverse the
defendant’s sentences for two counts of possession with intent to deliver cocaine.
In all other respects we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.  We remand this
case to the Superior Court for sentencing purposes. 
Facts
On May 18, 2000, the Laurel and Delmar police departments obtained a
search warrant for the apartment of Timothy Williams, defendant below and
appellant.  The police had been investigating Williams as a suspect for dealing drugs
since December of 1999.  Williams shared this apartment with his girlfriend,  Mindy
Calloway, and their infant daughter.  
While en route to execute this search warrant the police stopped a car that
Calloway was driving, and in which Williams was a passenger, when the car was
approximately 500 feet from the apartment occupied by Williams and Calloway.
After removing Williams and Calloway from this car, the police found two plastic
bags containing cocaine on the floor behind the driver’s seat.  The bags contained
116 Del. C. § 4753A(a)(2)(a).
216 Del. C. § 4755(a)(5).
316 Del. C. § 4771.
416 Del. C. § 4755(a)(5).
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0.46 and 0.56 grams of cocaine.  The police also found $614 in Williams’
possession and $937 in Calloway’s possession even though neither was employed at
the time.  Both Calloway and Williams were arrested. 
After the police made these arrests, they proceeded to the apartment to execute
the search warrant.  At the apartment the police found three plastic bags of cocaine
in the baby’s room.  The bags contained 10.23, 1.05, and 1.23 grams of cocaine.
The police also found other drug paraphernalia in the kitchen.
The State indicted Williams for two counts of possession with intent to deliver
cocaine,1 one count of maintaining a dwelling for keeping controlled substances,2
one count of possession of drug paraphernalia,3 and one count of maintaining a
vehicle for keeping controlled substances.4  One of the counts of possession was for
the drugs found in the car, and one was for the drugs found in the apartment.  The
jury found Williams guilty of all of the charges against him.  This is Williams’ direct
appeal.
5Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986).
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Issues Raised on Appeal
On appeal, Williams raises four issues.  He argues that the Superior Court
committed the following errors: (1) charging and punishing him twice for possession
with intent to deliver cocaine in violation of the multiplicity doctrine of the Double
Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Delaware Constitutions; (2) admitting
evidence, without objection, of his prior association with drug dealers without
undergoing a formal Getz analysis and without issuing a limiting instruction
regarding this evidence; (3) admitting evidence, without objection, of his crimes of
dishonesty for impeachment purposes without issuing a limiting instruction; and (4)
failing sua sponte to issue a limiting instruction after defense counsel objected to first
person statements in the prosecutor’s rebuttal closing argument.
The Multiplicity Doctrine and the Illegal Possession of Controlled Substances
Williams’ first argument on appeal is that charging him with possession with
intent to distribute cocaine for the drugs found in the car and again for possession
with intent to distribute cocaine for the drugs found in his apartment was plain error5
and multiplicitous because he constructively possessed all the cocaine at the same
6Rashad v. Burt, 108 F.3d 677, 680 (6th Cir. 1997).
7Supr. Ct. R. 8.
8Wainwright, 504 A.2d at 1100.
9See Fuller v. State, 2002 Del. LEXIS 13, at *8 (Del. Supr.); McCane v. State, 2001 Del. LEXIS 336, at *7
(Del. Supr.); Winston v. State, 1993 Del. LEXIS 17, at *5 (Del. Supr.).
10U.S. Const. amend. V.
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time, in the same relative location and with one “unifying intent to distribute” the
drugs.6  
We agree that these charges violated the multiplicity doctrine of the Double
Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Delaware Constitutions.  Williams first
raised this issue on appeal.  Issues that are not fairly raised to the trial court are
reviewed for plain error.7  Under Delaware law, plain error occurs when an “error
[is] so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and
integrity of the trial process. . . .[and is a] material defec[t] which [is] apparent on
the face of the record [and is] basic, serious and fundamental. . . .”8  We conclude
that this was plain error.9  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Superior
Court on this issue and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution states that no
“. . . person [shall] be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb . . . .”10  The Delaware Constitution similarly states that “no person shall
11Del. Const. art. I, § 8.
12Shiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 229-30 (1994) (holding that the “Double Jeopardy Clause . . . protects against
a second prosecution of the same offense after acquittal [and] conviction”) (citations omitted). This principle of double
jeopardy, however, is not applicable to this case because Williams was only prosecuted once.
13Blockburger v. United States, 248 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).  In Blockburger, the Supreme Court articulated the
same-elements test to determine whether double jeopardy has been offended when a person is charged with violating
two statutes as a result of one act.  “[T]he question is whether, both sections being violated by the same act, the accused
committed two offenses or only one.”  Id.  The standard used in Blockburger is “whether each [statutory] provision
requires proof of a fact which the other does not.”  Id.  This principle of double jeopardy, however, is not applicable
here because this case addresses only one statute.
14United States v. Forman, 180 F.3d 766, 769 (6th Cir. 1999) (“The issue in Rashad was whether the defendant
had committed one as opposed to two discrete violations of the same statute, not whether the defendant was charged
twice for the same violation.”).  Clearly, this is the exact issue addressed in this case because Williams was charged
twice with violating the same statute.
15Feddiman v. State, 558 A.2d 278, 288 (Del. 1989).  Feddiman and other Delaware caselaw on the multiplicity
doctrine concern factual situations involving sexual assault. Cintron v. State, 2000 Del. LEXIS 43, at *4 (Del. Supr.)
(holding that each charge in the indictment represented a “separate instance of prohibited conduct” even though they
violated the same statute); Morrisey v. State, 620 A.2d 207, 212 (Del. 1993) (holding that each sexual assault on a victim
is punishable as a “separate and distinct act” even though there has been a violation of only one statute); Feddiman, 558
A.2d at 288.  Feddiman’s definition of multiplicity, however, is applicable to other factual situations such as this one.
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be for the same offense [be] twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”11  Double
jeopardy, as a constitutional principle, provides the following protections: (1) against
successive prosecutions;12 (2) against multiple charges under separate statutes;13 and
(3) against being charged multiple times under the same statute.14  In Williams’ case
the only applicable principle is whether charging someone multiple times under the
same statute violates double jeopardy and the doctrine of multiplicity.  Multiplicity
is “the charging of a single offense in more than one count of an indictment.”15
Dividing one offense into “multiple counts of an indictment violates the double
16Feddiman, 558 A.2d at 288.
17 108 F.3d 677, 680 (6th Cir. 1997).  Although the Sixth Circuit criticized Rashad in United States v. Williams,
155 F.3d 418 (6th Cir. 1998), for being “inconsistent with a wealth of Supreme Court authority,” id. at 420-21, there
is ample evidence that this concern is inapplicable to this case.  In Williams, the defendant was being prosecuted twice
under different statutes.  Id. at 420.  In Williams the two charges were “conspiracy to retaliate against Governmental
witnesses and murder in aid of racketeering.”  Id.  Under those facts, Blockburger and the same-elements test would
clearly be operative and controlling, which would make Rashad clearly inapplicable.  In Rashad and in the instant case,
however, the defendant is being prosecuted twice under the same statute, a situation that highlights a different principle
encompassed in the Double Jeopardy Clause.  This distinction was squarely articulated by the Sixth Circuit in Forman,
180 F.3d at 769.  In Forman, the court stated that “[t]he issue in Rashad was whether the defendant had committed one
as opposed to two discrete violations of the same statute, not whether the defendant was charged twice for the same
violation.”  Id. (italics added).  The court in Forman also emphasizes the vitality of Rashad by stating: 
Although some of the language in Rashad would seem to endorse the "same evidence" test outside
of situations where the concern is whether the prosecution has impermissibly divided defendant’s
conduct so that it may bring repeated prosecutions under the same statute, it is clear from the Rashad
opinion that the referenced language is to be limited in its application to circumstances such as were
present in that case.
Id. at 770.  Additionally, other courts have chosen to follow Rashad even after Williams.  E.g. Commonwealth v. Rabb,
725 N.E.2d 1036, 1041 (Mass. 2000); In re Personal Restraint of Davis, 977 P.2d 630, 631 (Wash. App. 1999).  Hence,
the double jeopardy principle articulated in Rashad, in which the concern is whether the state has impermissibly divided
one unit of conduct into two or more units of conduct for purposes of charging someone under the same statutory
provision, will control in the instant case.
18Rashad, 108 F.3d at 680.
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jeopardy provisions of the constitutions of the State of Delaware and of the United
States.”16 
Williams relies on, and we adopt, the rationale used by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Rashad v. Burt17 in determining that the
two counts of possession with intent to deliver cocaine are multiplicitous on these
facts.  In Rashad the defendant was charged with two counts of possession with
intent to deliver cocaine, as was Williams here.18  The question in Rashad, as in this
case, was whether one violation of a single statute or two discrete violations of that
19Id.
20Id.
21Id. at 678.
22Id. at 679.
23Id. at 681.
24Id.  The term single transaction has caused some confusion in this area of the law.  The United State Supreme
Court in Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773 (1985), held that the Court “steadfastly refuse[s] to adopt a single
transaction view of the double jeopardy clause . . . .”  Id. at 790.  This was in the context of two statutes, thus
implicating Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.  For example, in Garrett the same facts were being used to prosecute someone
for violating two separate statutes, one of which was a lesser included offense of the other.  Garrett, 471 A.2d at 790.
As a result, the test articulated in Rashad does not offend the rule set forth in Garrett rejecting the single transaction
approach to double jeopardy.  Id.  
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same statute had occurred.19  In Rashad, as in this case, the police found cocaine in
the defendant’s house and in a car of his that was on the premises.20  In Rashad,
however, the police did not discover the cocaine in the car until one week after the
car had been impounded.21  The defendant was tried in two separate proceedings and
convicted twice.22  
The Court of Appeals held this to be a violation of the multiplicity doctrine
of double jeopardy because Rashad “possessed the full amount of cocaine with the
same intent of distributing it at whatever future times, and in whatever amounts best
suited him.”23  The court also went on to state that “[a]bsent evidence of separate
and distinct dedications of the two caches, his possession was a single and undivided
transaction,” regardless of the one week time gap.24  Additionally, the court
articulated the following test: “[I]f the possessions are sufficiently differentiated by
25Rashad v. Burt, 108 F.3d 677, 681 (6th Cir. 1997) (italics added).  This test does not offend the same-elements
test set forth in Blockburger.  Supra note 13. 
26See Briscoe v. United States, 528 A.2d 1243, 1247 (D.C. App. 1987).  In Briscoe, the police found marijuana
in the kitchen and the bedroom of the defendant’s apartment while executing a search warrant.  Id.  The court held that
this factual scenario gave rise to a single criminal act, punishable only once.  Id.
27Rashad, 108 F.3d at 679.
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time, location or intended purpose,” then there is no double jeopardy violation for
convicting someone for possession of the same substance.25  This test consists of
factors a court may use in determining, under the circumstances, whether two
violations of same statute have occurred.  
First, all the drugs in the Williams case were found at the same time and
during the same police confrontation.26   In Rashad, by contrast, the police did not
find the drugs in the vehicle until one week after the initial seizure.27  Thus, this is
an a fortiori case for a double jeopardy violation under this factor.
Second, the drugs were in the same general location because the car was in
close proximity to the apartment. All the cocaine was within Williams’ reasonable
control because he was in the vehicle at the time the cocaine was found.  Regardless
of whether the drugs were in the apartment or in the car 500 feet from the
apartment, this possession represented a single instance of possession, with two
hiding places for the drugs. 
28Id. at 682.
29See, e.g., United States v. Rowland, 1995 WL 42276, at *4 (E.D. Pa.) (holding that when a defendant is
prosecuted twice, one in a state and one in a federal court for possession with intent to deliver methamphetamines based
on drugs found in the defendant’s car and in the defendant’s home, “separate and distinct instances of criminal conduct”
occurred and double jeopardy was not violated); United States v. Maldonado, 849 F.2d 522, 524 (11th Cir. 1988)
(holding that when a defendant possessed cocaine in two different locations, a car and a home, and in two different
counties, two offenses have occurred); United States v. Palacios, 835 F.3d 230, 233-34 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that
“[b]ecause the distribution of the sample [of counterfeit bills] and the possession of the remainder did not occur ‘at the
same time [and] in the same place . . . separate convictions and punishments for these two violations are appropriate”);
United States v. Blakeney, 753 F.2d 152, 155 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that when a defendant possesses marijuana at
home and at the workplace at two separate times, “two separate and distinct possessions” have occurred).
30See, e.g., United States v. Palafox, 764 F.2d 558, 562 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that when “each offense [was]
committed at virtually the same time, in the same place and with the same participants the punishment should not be
compounded”); United States v. Williams, 480 F.2d 1204, 1205 (6th Cir. 1973) (holding that a defendant who possessed
four bags of heroin at the same place and at the same time committed one offense, not four).
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Finally, Williams’ possession of cocaine shows that he “displayed a single
intent and goal—distribution.”28  Williams had one intended purpose for all of the
drugs confiscated during this police confrontation: to distribute them.    There is no
evidence that indicates more than one intent to distribute cocaine.  Moreover, the
separate packaging supports an inference of a unified intent to distribute all the
cocaine in Williams’ possession.  The packaging tends to show that Williams
formulated a single intent to distribute his entire stash of cocaine and separated the
cocaine into a mobile cache and a non-mobile cache. Williams possessed all the
cocaine for one purpose:  delivery. 
Other federal cases have used a standard similar to Rashad, some finding no
multiplicity violation29 and some finding a violation.30  In United States v. Rodriguez-
Ramirez the defendant delivered a small cache of heroin to an undercover police
31 777 F.2d 454, 457-58 (9th Cir. 1985).
32Id.
33Id.
34Id.
35108 F.2d at 680.
36Cintron v. State, 2000 Del. LEXIS 43, at *4 (Del. Supr.); Morrisey v. State, 620 A.2d 207, 212 (Del. 1993).
- 10 -
officer at one location, and the State construed that as one crime—intent to distribute
a controlled substance.31  Two days later, the police found a much larger cache of
heroin at a different location and charged the defendant with a separate
crime—possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance.32  The defendant
argued that he should have been charged once because there was a “continuous
course of conduct.”33  The court, however, looked at the time and place of
distribution and possession, and determined that two violations had occurred.34 
Although in this case a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause was not found, the
analysis in Rodriguez-Ramirez is consistent with Rashad.35  
Adopting Rashad's test is consistent with Delaware case law regarding
multiplicity.36  For example, in Feddiman v. State, this Court held that a person
could be punished for "separate and distinct act[s]" that violate the same statute as
long as the defendant formulated a separate intent each time the statute was
37558 A.2d 278, 289 (Del. 1989).
38Id.
39538 A.2d 726, 730 (Del. 1988); D.R.E. 404(b). 
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violated.37  Feddiman dealt with separate and distinct acts of sexual assault where,
accordingly, the defendant formulated the intent to commit each assault and
separately violated the same statute numerous times during one continuous attack of
the victim.38  Williams, on the other hand, did not formulate two separate intents to
distribute cocaine even though he separated the cocaine into different caches.
Accordingly, the multiplicity doctrine applies.  
Admission of Prior Bad Acts
Williams’ second contention on appeal is that it was plain error for the
Superior Court to admit testimony regarding his prior association with drug dealers
because it was evidence of a prior bad act.  As evidence of a prior bad act, Williams
argues that this evidence necessitated a relevance review under Getz v. State, and
that the court committed error by not issuing sua sponte a limiting instruction when
counsel failed to request one.39  
On direct examination of the arresting officer the Superior Court admitted in
evidence Williams’ admission that he had prior interactions with drug dealers six
months before his arrest.  Williams’ counsel did not make a timely objection to the
40538 A.2d at 730, 734.
41Id. at 731.  In Getz, we determined that an “inclusionary construction” should be used to interpret the
language in D.R.E. 404(b).  The inclusionary approach states that “the proponent is allowed to offer evidence of
uncharged misconduct for any material purpose other than to show a mere propensity or disposition on the part of the
defendant to commit the charged crime.”  Id. at 731 (emphasis added).
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admission of this evidence.  In fact, Williams’ counsel did not object to this evidence
until the State again referred to it while cross-examining Williams.  The Superior
Court sustained this objection and held that these statements were relevant only for
the limited purpose of showing access to a source of supply of drugs and not to show
that Williams was a bad person for associating with drug dealers.  The court did not
sua sponte issue a limiting instruction on the previously admitted evidence to which
there was no objection. 
We hold that Williams’ argument is without merit.  Williams’ testimony was
relevant under Getz to show that he had an immediate source of contraband drugs.
Although a limiting instruction should have been given, the lack of a limiting
instruction, on these facts, was not plain error and did not jeopardize the fairness
and integrity of Williams’ trial.
Generally, pursuant to Getz, a court may not admit evidence solely to support
an inference of bad character or criminal disposition.40  Nevertheless, “[e]vidence
of prior misconduct is admissible when it has ‘independent logical relevance,’” or
when it is relevant under one of the enumerated reasons41 in D.R.E. 404(b) such as
42Id. at 730.
43Id.
44547 A.2d 948, 955 (Del. 1988) (noting that "Weber objected to the admission of these statements").
45Id. at 956 (quoting Commonwealth v. Claypool, 495 A.2d 176, 179 (Pa. 1985)).
46Milligan v. State, 761 A.2d 6, 10 (Del. 2000).
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“proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan [or] knowledge.”42  This
Court in Getz also articulated the guidelines for admissibility of this type of
evidence.  The guidelines are as follows:
(1) evidence . . . must be material to an issue or ultimate fact in dispute
. . .; (2) admissible . . . [under D.R.E.] 404(b); (3) . . . proved by
"plain, clear and conclusive" [evidence]; (4) not . . . too remote in time
from the charged offense; (5) [not] unfairly prejudicial as required by
D.R.E. 403; [and] (6) admitted for a limited purpose . . . [with]
instruct[ion].43
This Court held in Weber v. State, under the circumstances of  that case where
there had been a timely objection,44 that because evidence of this nature “‘must be
accompanied by a cautionary instruction which fully and carefully explains to the
jury the limited purpose for which that evidence [is being] admitted’ . . . the failure
to give such an instruction [is] reversible error.”45  Failure to give an instruction is
reversible error because “the trial court’s failure to limit the jury’s consideration of
the evidence allows them to speculate well beyond the very limited findings the trial
court makes in its decision to admit the evidence in the first instance.”46
47D.R.E. 801(d)(2). 
48D.R.E. 403. 
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Even though the Superior Court did not go through a formal Getz analysis this
statement, when analyzed, satisfies five out of the six Getz factors.  First, the
statement that Williams personally knew the leader and members of a “drug
distribution organization” was material to show that he had the opportunity to obtain
large quantities of drugs for potential distribution.  Second, opportunity to commit
a crime is one of the enumerated factors in D.R.E. 404(b), and this statement clearly
reflected an opportunity to possess drugs with an intent to distribute.  Third,
Williams made an admission against interest.47  Williams' statement that he
associated with drug dealers has the indicia of believability because it was against
his interest.  Fourth, because the police had been investigating Williams for
approximately one year before his arrest, a six-month time gap between the time
Williams was charged and his last communication with these drug dealers does not
make the statement too remote.  Fifth, the prejudice Williams would suffer from
admission of this statement would not substantially outweigh the probative value48
of showing Williams’ opportunity to commit the crime.  The State already had a
strong case against Williams using the physical evidence presented at trial. 
49Dickerson v. State, 1998 Del. LEXIS 4, at *5 (Del. Supr.); Baker v. State, 1993 Del. LEXIS 486, at *14 (Del.
Supr.) (holding that the “absence of a limiting instruction concerning the uncharged drug-related evidence, which was
presented without objection, does not constitute grounds for reversal”); Wooters v. State, 1993 Del. LEXIS 206, at *5
(Del. Supr.) (distinguishing between the requirement to give a limiting instruction regarding evidence of other crimes
and discretion to give a limiting instruction regarding the admission of evidence concerning wrongs or acts which are
not necessarily crimes); Scott v. State, 521 A.2d 235, 242 (Del. 1987) (holding that it is not “plain error [when] a
limiting instruction on the relevancy of defendant’s convictions [is not given] without request for a limiting instruction
by counsel”).
50Supra note 44.
51Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986).
52D.R.E. 609(a)(2). 
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Finally, we address the fact that the Superior Court did not sua sponte give a
limiting instruction.  We do not find this omission to be plain error.  We have held
that a trial court generally does not commit plain error if it fails to give a limiting
instruction, sua sponte, when evidence of prior bad acts is admitted.49  Therefore,
we hold that Weber is distinguishable because it involved a timely objection.50
Accordingly, the failure to give an instruction sua sponte does not rise to the level
of plain error.51
Declarant’s Admission to a Prior Crime of Dishonesty
Williams’ next contention on appeal is that, although his crime of dishonesty
was properly admitted for the purpose of impeaching him at trial,52 the Superior
Court committed plain error by not sua sponte issuing a limiting instruction
regarding this evidence.  We hold that, even though the judge erred in failing to
issue a limiting instruction, this error does not rise to the level of plain error.
53Id.; Gregory v. State, 616 A.2d 1198, 1203 (Del. 1992).
54D.R.E. 609(a)(2).
55Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986).
56Nelson v. State, 2001 Del. LEXIS 188, at *5-6 (Del. Supr.); Trump v. State, 753 A.2d 963, 965 (Del. 2000);
Burke v. State, 1997 Del. LEXIS 95, at *6 (Del. Supr.); Baker v. State, 1993 Del. LEXIS 486, at *14-16 (Del. Supr.);
O’Conner v. State, 1990 Del. LEXIS 151, at *8-11 (Del. Supr.).
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Under D.R.E. 609(a), it is permissible to attack the credibility of a witness
by admitting crimes of dishonesty without balancing the prejudicial effect of the
conviction against its probative value.53  On the other hand, character evidence is not
admissible to show that the witness acted in conformity therewith.  This is because
there is a possibility that the jury may use the impermissible inference rather than
the permissible evidence to convict the defendant.54  
In Williams’ trial, the State confronted Williams during cross-examination
regarding his convictions for crimes of dishonesty.  Williams admitted to one of the
convictions.  Plain error is a “material defec[t] which [was] apparent on the face of
the record, which [was] basic, serious and fundamental in . . . character, and which
clearly deprive[d] an accused of a substantial right or which clearly show[ed]
manifest injustice” occurred.55  This Court has previously ruled that the lack of a
limiting instruction, in the context of prior crimes, is not plain error.56  Accordingly,
the fact that the jury heard of Williams’ prior crime of dishonesty is not plain error
- 17 -
because it did not deprive Williams of a substantial right or jeopardize the fairness
of his trial.
Prosecutorial Misconduct During Closing Arguments
Williams’ final contention in this appeal is that the prosecutor made two
statements during closing arguments that alluded to the prosecutor’s belief in
Williams’ credibility as a witness, thus unfairly prejudicing him and compromising
his right to a fair trial.  Also, Williams contends that the Superior Court should have
sua sponte issued a limiting instruction regarding these statements.  We review this
claim for plain error.
The statements made by the prosecutor in Williams’ case were as follows: (1)
“I find it funny that [Williams] says it is real important that he didn’t own this car”
in reference to the drugs being found in Calloway’s car; and (2) “I find these things
strange that [Williams] does these kinds of things” in reference to Williams’
testimony about the procedure he took while detailing Calloway’s car a few days
before the drugs were found in the car.
Under Delaware law, a prosecutor should avoid using the term “I” during
closing argument because it “serves to emphasize for the jury that the prosecutor
57Brokenbrough v. State, 522 A.2d 851, 859 (Del. 1987).
58Clayton v. State, 765 A.2d 940, 942 (Del. 2001).
59Sexton v. State, 397 A.2d 540, 544 (Del. 1979) (cited by Brokenbrough, 522 A.2d at 855).
60Trump, 753 A.2d at 968 (quoting Hughes v. State, 437 A.2d 559, 571 (Del. 1981)).
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. . . personally believes the point that is being submitted to the jury.”57 Prosecutors
may not express their personal opinions or beliefs about the credibility of witnesses
or about the truth of testimony.58  Thus, the prosecutor’s comments were improper.
This Court has repeatedly noted, however, that “[n]ot every improper remark
by a prosecutor requires reversal, but only that which prejudicially affects substantial
rights of the accused.”59  This Court first held in Hughes v. State and reaffirmed in
Trump v. State that when “evaluating whether improper prosecutorial remarks have
prejudiced the substantial rights of the accused this Court analyzes three factors:
‘the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the [alleged] error,
and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error.’”60
This case was not close because there was ample evidence to support an
inference that Williams was a drug dealer.  The evidence in favor of Williams’
possession with intent to deliver cocaine was as follows: (1) there was a large
quantity of cocaine in the apartment where he allegedly lived; (2) the police found
large quantities of money on Williams when they arrested him, even though he was
6116 Del. C. § 4701(28).  This rule states that “‘[p]ossession,’ in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes
location in or about the defendant’s person, premises, belongings, vehicle or otherwise within the defendant’s reasonable
control."  Id. 
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unemployed at the time; (3) the cocaine in the vehicle and in the apartment was
within Williams’ “reasonable control”61 because he had keys to the apartment and
was a passenger in the car; and (4) Calloway, his girlfriend, testified at trial that she
witnessed Williams complete a drug sale to one Hope Fogg in the apartment where
the drugs were found while the police were executing the search warrant.  Williams
attempted to rebut this evidence with the fact that he had lost his job a few days
before his arrest, a fact he claims plausibly accounts for the large quantity of money
on his person when he was arrested.  A fellow inmate of Calloway with a prior
conviction of a crime of dishonesty also testified that Calloway had admitted that the
drugs were hers.  The evidence in support of the inference that Williams was dealing
drugs, therefore, far outweighs Williams’ rebuttal evidence.
We find that the Superior Court’s efforts in this case were sufficient to
mitigate any prejudicial effects from the prosecutor’s comments.  Although the
Superior Court did not issue a curative instruction sua sponte regarding the
prosecutor’s improper statements, it took indirect steps to mitigate the effects of any
prejudice from the statements by instructing the jury before deliberations that “it is
62Trump, 753 A.2d at 968.
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not proper for an attorney to state his . . . personal opinion as to the truth or falsity
of any testimony.” 
The central issue in Williams’ case was whether he intended to sell the drugs.
Williams presented in his defense the testimony of a fellow inmate of Calloway that
implicated Calloway, as well as Williams' own testimony that he did not intend to
sell the drugs and that Calloway was the seller.  The prosecutor’s improper
statements challenged Williams’ credibility.  Therefore, the prosecutor’s improper
comments directly affected a central issue in this case.  Because the Hughes test is
conjunctive and these statements did not satisfy all the elements of the test, we find
that the prosecutor’s statements, although improper, did not prejudicially affect
Williams’ right to a fair trial and did not require reversal.  
Although the improper closing remarks in this case did not result in a reversal,
we continue to admonish prosecutors not to push the envelope by engaging in such
improper conduct in the apparent hope that defense counsel will not object or that
the court will not find plain error.  Likewise we admonish defense counsel to be
vigilant and to object in these circumstances.62
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Conclusion
Because we find that charging Williams twice for possession with intent to
distribute cocaine was multiplicitous and violated the constitutional prohibition
against double jeopardy, we reverse his sentence for one of the possession charges
and remand to the Superior Court for re-sentencing.  We affirm the remainder of the
judgment and sentence of the Superior Court.