Title: Commonwealth v. Fredericq
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12572
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: April 24, 2019

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SJC-12572 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  STANLEY FREDERICQ.1 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     November 5, 2018. - April 24, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Cellular Telephone.  Controlled Substances.  Constitutional Law, 
Search and seizure, Standing to question constitutionality, 
Privacy.  Privacy.  Search and Seizure, Expectation of 
privacy, Fruits of illegal search, Consent.  Practice, 
Criminal, Motion to suppress, Standing. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on August 22, 2008. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Thomas 
J. McGuire, Jr., J. 
 
 
An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory 
appeal was allowed by Lenk, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court 
for the county of Suffolk, and the appeal was reported by her to 
the Appeals Court.  After review by the Appeals Court, the 
Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate 
review. 
 
 
 
Jason Benzaken for the defendant. 
                                                          
 
 
1 The defendant's name is spelled in various court documents 
as "Fredericq" or "Frederico."  In accordance with our usual 
practice, we will use the spelling as it appears in the 
indictment. 
2 
 
 
Patrick Levin, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
Committee for Public Counsel Services. 
 
Jessica L. Kenny, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  After the defendant was indicted by a grand 
jury for trafficking cocaine in violation of G. L. c. 94C, 
§ 32E (b), he moved to suppress the cocaine and cash seized 
during a warrantless search of his residence on the third floor 
of a multiunit house, commencing the nearly decade-long 
procedural journey that brought this case to our doorstep.  The 
Superior Court judge who last ruled on this motion held that the 
cocaine and cash must be suppressed, concluding that they were 
the fruits of the unlawful police tracking of a cellular 
telephone through which the police obtained cell site location 
information (CLSI) without a search warrant based on probable 
cause.2 
 
We conclude that the defendant has standing to challenge 
the Commonwealth's warrantless CSLI search because, by 
monitoring the telephone's CSLI, the police effectively 
                                                          
 
 
2 The term "CSLI" refers to "a cellular telephone service 
record or records that contain information identifying the base 
station towers and sectors that receive transmissions from a 
[cellular] telephone" (quotations and citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230, 231 n.1 (2014), S.C., 
470 Mass. 837 (2015) and 472 Mass. 448 (2015).  It may be used 
to identify the approximate location of the cellular telephone 
based on the telephone's communication with a particular cell 
site.  See id. at 238. 
3 
 
monitored the movement of a vehicle in which he was a passenger.  
We further conclude that, under the circumstances here, the 
seizure of the cocaine and cash was the direct result of 
information obtained from the illegal CSLI search; that, under 
the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine of the exclusionary 
rule, it is irrelevant whether the defendant had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the crawl space where the cocaine was 
found; and that the Commonwealth has failed to meet its burden 
of proving that the seizure was sufficiently attenuated from the 
illegal search such that it should not be deemed a forbidden 
fruit of the poisonous tree.  Specifically, we conclude that the 
defendant's consent to a search of his residence did not purge 
the seizure from the taint of the illegal CSLI search, where the 
consent was obtained through the use of information obtained 
from that search.  For these reasons and as discussed more fully 
infra, we affirm the order granting the defendant's motion to 
suppress.3 
 
Background.  The complex procedural history of this case is 
ably described in the Appeals Court opinion.  Commonwealth v. 
Fredericq, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 19, 20-26 (2018).  Suffice it to 
say that the defendant's motion to suppress was initially denied 
by one Superior Court judge, remanded by a single justice of the 
                                                          
 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Committee 
for Public Counsel Services. 
4 
 
county court for an evidentiary hearing, denied again by another 
motion judge, remanded again by the single justice, and allowed 
by a third motion judge. 
 
We summarize the facts as found by the third motion judge, 
who relied on the facts found by the first two motion judges at 
the prior evidentiary hearings.  We accept the judges' 
subsidiary findings of fact, which we do not find to be clearly 
erroneous.  See Commonwealth v. Scott, 440 Mass. 642, 646 (2004) 
("In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, we accept the 
judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent clear error . . .").  
Where necessary and appropriate, we supplement these findings 
with uncontradicted witness testimony that the motion judges 
implicitly credited.  See Commonwealth v. Jones-Pannell, 472 
Mass. 429, 431 (2015). 
 
On June 26, 2008, a grand jury indicted Josener Dorisca for 
the murder of Bensney Toussaint, and a warrant issued for 
Dorisca's arrest.  In attempting to locate Dorisca, Detective 
Kenneth Williams of the Brockton police department spoke with 
Dorisca's best friend, Cassio Vertil.4  Cassio admitted that he 
had spoken with Dorisca within a day of the homicide.  After 
Cassio gave his cellular telephone number to the police, 
Williams examined records connected to the telephone, which 
                                                          
 
 
4 We refer to Cassio and Kennel Vertil by their first names 
because they share a surname. 
5 
 
confirmed that calls had indeed been made after the shooting to 
a cellular telephone belonging to Dorisca. 
 
Williams recognized Cassio from a videotape recorded months 
before the homicide that showed Cassio and another person 
discussing the movement of drugs from Florida to Massachusetts.  
Williams testified that "the tape clearly displays [Cassio] 
. . . engaged in what seems to be very lucrative drug dealings 
. . .  And bragging and boasting of going to Florida to obtain 
more drugs.  And they're flashing tens of thousands of dollars 
on this tape." 
 
On July 2, 2008, Williams spoke with Cassio's brother, 
Kennel, who said that Cassio was now using a different cellular 
telephone and provided Williams with the new telephone number.  
Kennel also stated that Cassio was traveling to New York in a 
brown Toyota RAV-4 motor vehicle with individuals nicknamed 
"Paco" and "Paquito."  Williams knew that Paco was the defendant 
in this case and that Paquito was Stephen Allonce.  State 
troopers also learned from a confidential informant that Cassio 
was traveling to Florida in the brown Toyota to purchase 
narcotics.  There was little information offered at the hearings 
regarding the reliability or veracity of this confidential 
informant.  State police Trooper Eric Telford testified that he 
had not used this informant in the past, but Williams 
6 
 
characterized the informant as "reliable," without explaining 
the basis of this characterization. 
 
That same day, July 2, the Commonwealth sought and obtained 
a court order, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2006), to 
require the cellular service provider to produce records for the 
cellular telephone that Cassio was now using.  Under § 2703(d), 
a court may order a telephone company to produce records, 
including CSLI records, "if the governmental entity offers 
specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that the . . . records or other information 
sought . . . are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal 
investigation."  In addition to subscriber information, the 
court order required, for the period from July 1 through July 6 
(later extended to July 8), the production of records of cell 
sites utilized for telephone calls, toll records for calls made 
or received, and "updates on the phone's location every fifteen 
. . . minutes." 
 
On July 2, the cellular service provider furnished Williams 
with records showing that the defendant was the subscriber for 
this cellular telephone, and that the defendant resided in an 
apartment in Brockton (residence).  The cellular service 
provider used "ping" technology to send radio signals to the 
cellular phone and record the approximate location of the cell 
sites or cell towers with which the telephone communicated, and 
7 
 
sent the resulting CSLI records by e-mail to Williams.  Those 
records indicated that the telephone had traveled south from 
Randolph and eventually had come to a stop in Sunrise, Florida. 
 
Williams then requested the assistance of the local police 
in Florida, who used the CSLI data to track down the brown 
Toyota vehicle and observed Cassio, the defendant, and Allonce 
staying together at a motel.  The local police did not identify 
any of the men as Dorisca. 
 
On July 7, 2008, the CSLI records indicated that the 
cellular telephone was traveling north toward Massachusetts.  In 
response, the police began surveillance at the defendant's 
residence and also at Cassio's home in Randolph.  At 
approximately 2:15 P.M. on July 8, the police observed the brown 
Toyota vehicle parked at the defendant's residence and saw 
Cassio standing outside with another person who appeared to 
match the description of Dorisca.  Cassio then drove away in the 
vehicle with Allonce as a passenger.  Two State police troopers 
followed them and stopped the vehicle after it had traveled a 
few blocks; they observed that the vehicle contained clothing, 
luggage, and a cooler.  Cassio told the troopers that he had 
just left Paco's house and was heading to the police station in 
Brockton to meet with Williams regarding the homicide.  Cassio 
and Allonce then drove to the Brockton police station; the last 
report of the cellular service provider regarding the cellular 
8 
 
telephone's location at approximately 3:47 P.M. that day 
indicated that the telephone was located inside the vehicle at 
the Brockton police station. 
 
The State police troopers returned to the residence to look 
for Dorisca and speak to the defendant.  After approaching the 
building, they encountered two residents of the first-floor 
apartment.  The troopers stated that they were looking for a 
homicide suspect, and the residents consented to a search of 
their unit.  After the troopers looked through the unit, they 
left through a back door into a rear entry area and walked up 
the stairs to the second floor.  The resident of that unit also 
consented to a search of her unit.  The troopers then continued 
up the rear stairway to the third floor, which led to an open 
landing area with several doors that led to two bedrooms, a 
storage area, and a crawl space.  All but one of the doors were 
open. 
 
The troopers knocked on the closed door and the defendant 
answered, identifying himself as "Paco."  He stated that he 
resided in one of the third-floor bedrooms and paid $400 per 
month in rent to use that space.  Trooper Francis Walls informed 
the defendant that police were investigating a homicide and that 
the murder suspect might be in the building.  He also said that 
the investigation involved illegal narcotics. 
9 
 
 
Telford advised the defendant of his Miranda rights and 
explained that they were looking for a homicide suspect, and had 
information that the defendant "had just gone down to Florida 
and purchased a large amount of narcotics and . . . [was] 
possibly storing it there."  The defendant said that he had just 
driven back from Florida with some friends, denied possessing 
drugs, and signed a form giving his consent for a search.  
During that search, the police found $2,200 in cash in the 
defendant's bedroom and, after the arrival of a narcotics-
trained dog, a pillowcase in the attic crawl space across from 
the defendant's bedroom containing two "bricks" of cocaine.  
After the defendant was indicted, he moved to suppress the 
fruits of the search. 
 
The third motion judge determined that the defendant had 
standing to challenge the CSLI tracking of the cellular 
telephone because, although the telephone was used by Cassio, 
the police knew that the defendant was traveling with Cassio, 
and "[t]hey intended to track the movements of all three 
occupants of the vehicle because they had information that the 
purpose of the trip was to obtain cocaine for distribution in 
Massachusetts."  The judge also concluded that the cocaine 
seized during the search of the defendant's residence "was found 
as a result of the unlawful electronic tracking," and "[t]he 
search and seizure was not attenuated from the unlawful tracking 
10 
 
by lapse of time, intervening circumstances or by another 
legitimate police purpose in conducting the search."  The judge 
therefore ruled that the evidence obtained during the search 
must be suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree." 
 
A single justice of this court granted the Commonwealth's 
motion for an interlocutory appeal and reported the appeal to 
the Appeals Court pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 15 (a) (2), as 
appearing in 422 Mass. 1501 (1996).  The Appeals Court agreed 
with the motion judge's conclusions on both standing and 
attenuation, but ultimately held that the warrantless search of 
the crawl space where the cocaine was found was permissible 
because the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in that area.  Fredericq, 93 Mass. App. Ct. at 30-31.  On this 
ground alone, the Appeals Court reversed the allowance of the 
motion to suppress with respect to the cocaine, and affirmed it 
in all other respects.  Id. at 32.  We granted the defendant's 
motion for further appellate review. 
 
Discussion.  In reviewing a judge's decision on a motion to 
suppress, we "make an independent determination of the 
correctness of the judge's application of constitutional 
principles to the facts as found."  Scott, 440 Mass. at 646. 
 
The police may obtain subscriber information and toll 
records pursuant to a court order issued under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2703(d), but under art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
11 
 
Rights, the police may not use CSLI for more than six hours to 
track the location of a cellular telephone unless authorized by 
a search warrant based on probable cause.5  See Commonwealth v. 
Estabrook, 472 Mass. 852, 858 (2015); Commonwealth v. Augustine, 
467 Mass. 230, 254-255 (2014), S.C., 470 Mass. 837 (2015) and 
472 Mass. 448 (2015).  See also Carpenter v. United States, 138 
S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018) (government acquisition of CSLI records 
constitutes "a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment 
[to the United States Constitution]").  The Commonwealth 
concedes that the CSLI tracking of the cellular telephone in 
this case was unlawful because it was not authorized by a search 
warrant.  But the Commonwealth argues that the motion to 
suppress should nonetheless have been denied because (1) the 
defendant had no standing to challenge the tracking of a 
cellular telephone that was registered in his name, but used 
solely by Cassio; (2) as the Appeals Court concluded, the 
cocaine was not seized during a constitutional search because 
the defendant lacked any expectation of privacy in the crawl 
space where it was found; and (3) the evidence obtained during 
the search was sufficiently attenuated from the illegal tracking 
                                                          
 
 
5 Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights 
states in relevant part:  "Every subject has a right to be 
secure from all unreasonable searches, and seizures, of his 
person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions." 
12 
 
because of the defendant's consent to the search, thus "purging" 
the search of its taint.  We will discuss these issues in turn. 
 
1.  Standing.  A defendant has standing to challenge a 
search and seizure under art. 14 if he or she "has a possessory 
interest in the place searched or in the property seized or if 
[he or she] was present when the search occurred."  Commonwealth 
v. Williams, 453 Mass. 203, 208 (2009).  Here, the defendant was 
the subscriber of the cellular telephone, but the third motion 
judge found that Cassio was the person who was using that 
telephone.  The defendant claims that he has standing on three 
separate and distinct grounds:  first, because he was a 
passenger in the vehicle whose location was being tracked 
through the CSLI monitoring of the cellular telephone; second, 
because he was the registered owner of the telephone, and 
therefore had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
location of that telephone; and third, because he had a property 
interest in the telephone that was interfered with when the 
police pinged the telephone, thereby drawing power from its 
battery.  We need not address whether the second and third 
grounds independently would suffice to grant standing, because 
we conclude that the defendant has standing as a passenger of 
the vehicle whose location was effectively being continually 
tracked through CSLI monitoring of the target telephone. 
13 
 
 
In Commonwealth v. Rousseau, 465 Mass. 372, 382 (2013), we 
declared that "under art. 14, a person may reasonably expect not 
to be subjected to extended [global positioning system (GPS)] 
electronic surveillance by the government, targeted at his 
movements, without judicial oversight and a showing of probable 
cause."  We thus held that a passenger with no possessory 
interest in a vehicle has standing to challenge the extended GPS 
surveillance of the vehicle as an invasion of his or her own 
reasonable expectation of privacy.  Id.  See United States v. 
Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415-416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
("GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a 
person's public movements . . . [and] evades the ordinary checks 
that constrain abusive law enforcement practices."); 
Commonwealth v. Connolly, 454 Mass. 808, 833 (2009) (Gants, J., 
concurring) ("the appropriate constitutional concern is not the 
protection of property but rather the protection of the 
reasonable expectation of privacy"). 
 
With respect to the defendant's reasonable expectation of 
privacy, the CSLI tracking of the cellular telephone in this 
case implicates the same constitutional concerns as the GPS 
surveillance of the vehicle in Rousseau.  See Augustine, 467 
Mass. at 254.  Indeed, in Augustine, we noted that the type of 
prospective CSLI tracking that largely took place here -- as 
opposed to historical CSLI tracking -- is even more closely akin 
14 
 
to direct GPS surveillance.6  Id. at 254 n.36.  The CSLI search 
was "targeted at [the defendant's] movements," much as the GPS 
search was targeted at the passenger defendant in Rousseau, 
because the police knew when they obtained the § 2703(d) order 
that the defendant was traveling out of State with Cassio in the 
same vehicle.  Rousseau, 465 Mass. at 382.  They then sought and 
obtained updates on the vehicle's location every fifteen minutes 
for at least six consecutive days.  For all practical purposes, 
the CSLI monitoring of the cellular telephone tracked the 
defendant's location when he was in the vehicle in much the same 
way as would GPS tracking of that vehicle.  Accordingly, the 
defendant here has standing to challenge the CSLI search and any 
resulting fruits of that search. 
 
2.  The search of the crawl space as fruit of the poisonous 
tree.  Under what has become known as the "fruit of the 
poisonous tree" doctrine, the exclusionary rule bars the use of 
evidence derived from an unconstitutional search or seizure.  
                                                          
 
 
6 Historical CSLI refers to information that has already 
been generated when the data are requested.  Augustine, 467 
Mass. at 240 n.24.  Prospective CSLI "refers to location data 
that will be generated sometime after the order authorizing its 
disclosure."  Id.  Here, the CSLI search was effectively 
conducted in "real time" because the cellular telephone was 
being "pinged" every fifteen minutes, and its location, derived 
from CSLI rather than a global positioning system in the 
cellular telephone itself, was being timely reported by the 
cellular service provider to the police who were conducting the 
surveillance. 
15 
 
See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-488 (1963) 
(defining "fruit of the poisonous tree" as evidence that "has 
been come at by exploitation of" unlawful search or seizure); 
Commonwealth v. Damiano, 444 Mass. 444, 453 (2005).  In 
determining whether evidence derived from an illegal search or 
seizure must be suppressed, "the issue is not whether 'but for' 
the prior illegality the evidence would not have been obtained, 
but 'whether . . . the evidence . . . has been come at by 
exploitation of [that] illegality or instead by means 
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary 
taint.'"  Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Bradshaw, 385 Mass. 244, 
258 (1982).  "It is the Commonwealth's burden to establish that 
the evidence it has obtained and intends to use is sufficiently 
attenuated from the underlying illegality so as to be purged 
from its taint."  Damiano, supra at 454.  "[T]he attenuation 
doctrine is not an exception to the exclusionary rule, but 
rather a test of its limits."  R.G. Stearns, Massachusetts 
Criminal Law:  A District Court Prosecutor's Guide 172 (38th ed. 
2018). 
 
The Commonwealth contends, and the Appeals Court concluded, 
see Fredericq, 93 Mass. App. Ct. at 30-31, that the cocaine 
found in the crawl space should not be suppressed even if it has 
failed to meet its burden of proving attenuation because the 
defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the crawl 
16 
 
space.  We disagree.  Evidence may be suppressed as fruit of the 
poisonous tree even if it is found in a place where the 
defendant has no reasonable expectation of privacy.  This 
principle is as old as the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine 
itself.  In Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 474, 486-487, the defendant 
made statements to the police indicating that a codefendant had 
drugs at his home.  The United States Supreme Court held that 
those statements should have been suppressed because they arose 
out of an unlawful arrest and that their admission would thus 
violate the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.  Id. at 484, 
486-487.  The Court further concluded that the drugs found at 
the codefendant's home should have been suppressed, even though 
the defendant did not suggest that he had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the codefendant's home, because the 
drugs were the fruit of a poisonous tree -- the unlawful arrest.  
Id. at 487-488.  The only relevant factor that the Court 
considered was whether the police "exploit[ed]" the "illegality" 
of the unlawful arrest; that alone was sufficient to require the 
suppression of the drugs.  Id. at 488.  See id. at 487 ("The 
prosecutor candidly told the trial court that 'we wouldn't have 
found those drugs except that [the defendant] helped us to'"). 
 
Other courts interpreting the Fourth Amendment have arrived 
at the same conclusion.  See United States v. Olivares-Rangel, 
458 F.3d 1104, 1117-1118 (10th Cir. 2006) ("the law imposes no 
17 
 
separate standing requirement regarding the evidence which 
constitutes the fruit of [the] poisonous tree"); United States 
v. Green, 275 F.3d 694, 699 (8th Cir. 2001) (although defendant 
lacked possessory or property interest in searched motor 
vehicle, "he may still . . . seek to suppress evidence as the 
fruit of his illegal detention"); Jones v. United States, 168 
A.3d 703, 722-723 (D.C. 2017) (defendant's expectation of 
privacy in another person's purse "not a material consideration 
in the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree analysis").  See generally 6 
W.R. LaFave, Search and Seizure:  A Treatise on the Fourth 
Amendment § 11.4, at 325-326 (5th ed. 2012) (LaFave) ("If the 
defendant does have standing with respect to the poisonous tree, 
that alone suffices" to challenge admissibility of its fruits). 
 
Nor is the exclusionary rule under art. 14 limited in scope 
to contraband or evidence seized in a place where the defendant 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy; art. 14's protection 
against unreasonable searches and seizures forbids the 
introduction of all evidence "sufficiently intimate" with those 
unlawful acts.  See Damiano, 444 Mass. at 453-454, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Sylvia, 380 Mass. 180, 183 (1980).  For that 
reason, we have repeatedly held that persons subjected to an 
illegal seizure were entitled to suppress the fruits of that 
seizure even where the evidence was discovered in places where 
it is indisputable that the person in question did not have a 
18 
 
reasonable expectation of privacy.  See Commonwealth v. 
Rodriguez, 456 Mass. 578, 587 (2010) (concluding that even 
though "[n]o one has a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
items retrieved from the ground on a public park," evidence of 
drugs dropped in park could nonetheless be "suppressed as the 
fruit of an unconstitutional seizure . . . if [a] stop were not 
supported by reasonable suspicion").  See also Commonwealth v. 
Warren, 475 Mass. 530, 533, 540 (2016) (vacating denial of 
motion to suppress where firearm found in yard following 
unlawful seizure of defendant nearby without reasonable 
suspicion); Commonwealth v. O'Laughlin, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 998, 
998-1000 (1988) (reversing denial of motion to suppress where 
defendant abandoned jacket containing narcotics in parking 
garage while being pursued by police without reasonable 
suspicion for stop). 
 
We conclude, therefore, that to spare the cocaine from 
suppression, the Commonwealth bears the burden of proving 
attenuation even if the defendant did not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the crawl space of his residence where 
the cocaine was found.7 
                                                          
 
 
7 Because we conclude infra that the Commonwealth has not 
met its burden of proving attenuation, we need not decide 
whether the defendant in fact had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in that crawl space.  Accordingly, we do not consider 
whether the Appeals Court's legal analysis was consistent with 
19 
 
 
3.  Attenuation.  The Commonwealth contends that it has met 
its burden to establish sufficient attenuation because the 
causal chain between the illegal CSLI search -- the "poisonous 
tree" -- and the subsequent discovery of the cocaine -- the 
"fruits" -- was broken by the defendant's consent to the search 
of his residence.  We agree that, under certain circumstances, a 
defendant's voluntary consent to a search of his residence may 
be an intervening event that constitutes adequate attenuation, 
thus allowing the evidence found during the search to be 
admitted in evidence.  For instance, in Damiano, 444 Mass. at 
456, 459, where the defendant voluntarily consented to a search 
of his home after he learned that the police had secured the 
premises with his wife and child present and that the police 
intended to obtain a search warrant, we concluded that the 
consent was an intervening event that sufficed to prove adequate 
attenuation from the illegal interception of the defendant's 
communications by a private citizen. 
 
But a defendant's consent to search, like a defendant's 
consent to waive his or her right to silence after being given 
Miranda warnings, does not automatically attenuate the taint of 
                                                          
 
our opinion in Commonwealth v. Leslie, 477 Mass. 48, 54 (2017), 
where we held that "in cases involving a search in a multifamily 
home, the validity of the search [does not turn] on the 
defendant's exclusive control or expectation of privacy in the 
area searched" (emphasis added). 
20 
 
an illegality.  See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602-603 
(1975) ("If Miranda warnings, by themselves, were held to 
attenuate the taint of an unconstitutional arrest, . . . the 
effect of the exclusionary rule would be substantially 
diluted").  A defendant's consent to a search cannot constitute 
adequate attenuation where the consent itself is tainted by the 
illegality because it was obtained through exploitation of the 
fruits of the illegal search.  See Commonwealth v. Midi, 46 
Mass. App. Ct. 591, 595 (1999) ("When consent to search is 
obtained through exploitation of a prior illegality, 
particularly very close in time following the prior illegality, 
the . . . compromised consent has been thought to be tainted and 
inadmissible").  See also Brown, supra at 603 (where defendant 
made admissions after unlawful arrest, attenuation depends on 
whether defendant "act[ed] of [his or her] free will unaffected 
by the initial illegality"); Estabrook, 472 Mass. at 864-865 
(where defendant was confronted with evidence obtained from CSLI 
in close proximity to illegality, statements made in direct 
response must be suppressed); Commonwealth v. Fielding, 371 
Mass. 97, 113 (1976) (defendant's statements may be "fatally 
infected" where "the connection between the illegality and the 
making of the statements is sufficiently intimate"). 
 
In determining whether the Commonwealth has met its burden 
of proving that the defendant's consent was not tainted by 
21 
 
evidence obtained from the illegal CSLI search, we consider 
three factors:  (1) the amount of time that elapsed between the 
defendant being confronted with the illegally obtained CSLI 
evidence and his grant of consent; (2) the presence of any 
intervening circumstances during that time period;8 and (3) "the 
purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct."  See Damiano, 
444 Mass. at 455, citing Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 633 
                                                          
 
 
8 The attenuation analysis regarding whether a defendant's 
consent is tainted by an illegal search must differ somewhat 
from the analysis regarding whether a defendant's postarrest 
statements are tainted by an illegal arrest.  See United States 
v. Crawford, 372 F.3d 1048, 1054 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc), 
cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1057 (2005) ("The analysis that applies 
to illegal detentions differs from that applied to illegal 
searches").  The potential taint arising from an illegal arrest 
generally comes from the custody arising from the arrest, so the 
temporal proximity consideration focuses on the time that has 
elapsed between the arrest and the statements at issue, and any 
intervening circumstances that occurred between those two 
events.  See Commonwealth v. Fielding, 371 Mass. 97, 114 (1976) 
(three-hour period between arrest and confession, during which 
defendant decided against assistance of counsel, sufficient to 
attenuate confession from unlawful arrest).  And the giving of 
Miranda warnings is designed to diminish the coercive effect of 
custodial questioning.  Commonwealth v. Simon, 456 Mass. 280, 
290, cert. denied, 562 U.S. 874 (2010) (recognizing that Miranda 
warnings serve to "counteract[] the coercion inherent in 
custodial interrogation").  In contrast, the potential taint 
arising from an illegal search generally comes from the 
defendant being confronted with the information derived from the 
illegal search, which may influence what the defendant says and 
his or her willingness to consent to a search.  See United 
States v. Shetler, 665 F.3d 1150, 1158 (9th Cir. 2011).  
Therefore, the temporal proximity consideration in the context 
of this case focuses on the time that elapsed between the 
defendant being confronted with the information illegally 
derived from the CSLI search and the defendant's statements or 
consent, and any intervening circumstances that occurred between 
these two events. 
22 
 
(2003) (per curiam).  See also Commonwealth v. Tuschall, 476 
Mass. 581, 589 (2017); United States v. Shetler, 665 F.3d 1150, 
1159 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 
As to the first and second factors, the defendant's consent 
was obtained immediately after Telford informed him that the 
police knew he "had just gone down to Florida and purchased a 
large amount of narcotics and . . . [was] possibly storing it 
there" (emphasis added), information that was intimately 
intertwined with the information gleaned from the unlawful CSLI 
tracking.  The temporal proximity between the trooper 
confronting the defendant with information obtained through the 
illegal CSLI tracking and the defendant's grant of consent to 
search, and the absence of intervening events between that 
confrontation and his consent, weigh heavily in favor of the 
motion judge's conclusion that the Commonwealth has failed to 
meet its burden of proving that it did not exploit the illegally 
obtained information in obtaining the consent to search.  See 
Estabrook, 472 Mass. at 865 (finding no attenuation between 
illegal CSLI search and defendant's statement because "there 
were no intervening circumstances between the police questions 
based on the CSLI and [defendant's] responses thereto"); 
Shetler, 665 F.3d at 1159 (concluding that there was "causal 
connection between the illegal searches and [defendant's] 
statements, particularly because [government] agents may have 
23 
 
confronted [defendant] with illegally seized evidence during the 
interview").  Although we can never know the reason why the 
defendant consented to the search, we cannot eliminate the 
possibility that the grant of consent was influenced by the 
information Telford had just told him, which might have caused 
him to believe that the refusal to consent would be futile 
because it would simply trigger an application for a search 
warrant of his home.  See Shetler, supra at 1158 ("the answers 
the suspect gives to officials questioning him may be influenced 
by his knowledge that the officials had already seized certain 
evidence").  See generally LaFave, supra at § 11.4(c), at 401 
("Confronting a suspect with illegally seized evidence tends to 
induce a confession by demonstrating the futility of remaining 
silent" [citation omitted]). 
 
The Commonwealth argues that the defendant's consent was 
not influenced by the fruits of the illegal CSLI search because 
the police had independently learned -- apart from the CSLI 
tracking -- that the defendant lived at the residence and that 
he had just returned from a drug deal in Florida.  It contends 
that the police knew from Kennel that the defendant was going to 
New York in the brown Toyota vehicle with Cassio, knew from a 
confidential informant that Cassio was traveling to Florida to 
purchase drugs, knew from stopping the vehicle after the 
defendant had just been dropped off at his residence that they 
24 
 
had just returned from an extended trip, and knew from the 
defendant that he had been in Florida. 
 
But nothing about Kennel's statement to the police 
suggested that the defendant was going beyond New York.  And the 
confidential informant's tip did not mention the defendant and 
gave the police no information about when Cassio would return.  
The police began to monitor the defendant's residence only when 
they learned from the CSLI that the vehicle in which he was 
riding was about to enter Massachusetts.  They stopped the 
vehicle only because the physical surveillance -- triggered by 
what the police learned from the CSLI -- spotted Cassio and a 
person they thought might be Dorisca leaving the residence.  And 
the police entered the multiunit house and sought the 
defendant's consent to search his residence only because they 
knew from the CSLI that Cassio and the defendant had just 
returned from Florida and that the defendant might be in 
possession of the drugs that he and Cassio were believed to have 
purchased.  See United States v. Finucan, 708 F.2d 838, 843 (1st 
Cir. 1983) (government "impermissibly exploited illegally seized 
material" when it "relied upon information obtained from the 
seized documents in guiding [its] investigation").  Therefore, 
we conclude that Telford's statement to the defendant that the 
police knew he "had just gone down to Florida and purchased a 
large amount of narcotics and . . . [was] possibly storing it 
25 
 
there" was derived from the poisonous CSLI tree and was not 
independently derived information. 
 
As to the third factor -- "the purpose and flagrancy of the 
official misconduct" -- we recognize that the illegal police 
misconduct here was neither purposeful nor flagrant.  The police 
obtained judicial approval for the CSLI search pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 2703(d) in 2008, six years before our decision in 
Augustine declared that CSLI could be obtained only through a 
search warrant supported by probable cause.  We declared in 
Augustine, 467 Mass. at 257, that "this opinion clearly 
announces a new rule," noting that "neither the statute, 18 
U.S.C. § 2703(d), nor our cases have previously suggested that 
police must obtain a search warrant in addition to a § 2703(d) 
order before obtaining an individual's CSLI from his or her 
cellular service provider." 
 
Although this factor favors the Commonwealth, it is not 
dispositive.  See Tuschall, 476 Mass. at 589 (concluding that 
"[t]he balance of the [attenuation] factors . . . favors the 
defendant" in suppression analysis even though "there was no 
misconduct" by police).  We do not recognize a "good faith" 
exception to either the exclusionary rule or the attenuation 
26 
 
doctrine.9  See Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 456 Mass. 528, 533 
(2010) ("We have not adopted the 'good faith' exception [to 
exclusionary rule] for purposes of art. 14 . . ."); Commonwealth 
                                                          
 
 
9 Justice Cypher, in concurring in part and dissenting in 
part, contends that we should abandon our long-standing 
precedent and adopt the good faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule.  We will not here address the merits of that argument 
because the Commonwealth did not argue it below or on appeal and 
it is therefore waived.  See Commonwealth v. Alexis, 481 Mass. 
91, 101 (2018) ("the Commonwealth waived any argument . . . 
raised neither below nor on appeal"); Commonwealth v. 
Bettencourt, 447 Mass. 631, 634 (2006) ("Our system is premised 
on appellate review of that which was presented and argued 
below"). 
 
 
Justice Cypher errs where she states that the issue of the 
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule "was adequately 
raised by the Commonwealth when it discussed attenuation."  Post 
at note 5.  The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule is 
substantively different from the consideration of police 
misconduct in determining attenuation.  Under a good faith 
exception, evidence is admissible even if it is 
unconstitutionally obtained, so long as the police acted in good 
faith.  See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984) 
(fruits of search admissible where police prove that they acted 
"in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently 
invalidated search warrant"); United States v. Diehl, 276 F.3d 
32, 43 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 834 (2002) (applying 
good faith exception where officer mistakenly invaded curtilage 
of home to obtain drug evidence).  In the attenuation analysis, 
however, the "purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct" 
is simply one factor of several to be considered.  Commonwealth 
v. Damiano, 444 Mass. 444, 455 (2005).  The absence of police 
misconduct is not determinative of attenuation.  See 
Commonwealth v. Tuschall, 476 Mass. 581, 589-590 (2017).  
Recognizing these considerations, the Commonwealth, citing 
Damiano, referenced the lack of police misconduct as only one 
factor in its broader discussion of attenuation.  Therefore, the 
Commonwealth cannot be said to have raised the issue whether to 
adopt a good faith exception, and the issue must be deemed 
waived.  See Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460, 469 (2000) 
("issues must be raised in lower courts in order to be preserved 
as potential grounds of decision in higher courts"). 
27 
 
v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363, 370 & n.5 (1985) (G. L. c. 276, §§ 1, 
2A, and 2B, "bar any judicial consideration of admitting 
evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant issued without a 
showing of probable cause, even if the officer executing the 
warrant was proceeding in objectively reasonable reliance on the 
warrant").  In Estabrook, 472 Mass. at 854, 864-865, where the 
CSLI also was obtained before our Augustine decision, we 
suppressed a defendant's statements to police where the 
statements were made "in close proximity to the illegality, and 
there were no intervening circumstances between the police 
questions based on the CSLI and [the defendant's] responses 
thereto."  The facts of this case compel the same result.  
Contrast Damiano, 444 Mass. at 458 (where illegal interception 
was done by private citizen rather than police in violation of 
Federal wiretap statute, "the complete lack of police 
involvement in the underlying illegal interception is not an 
insignificant fact in assessing the necessary reach of the 
exclusionary rule and the adequacy of the attenuating 
circumstances"). 
 
In sum, we agree with the motion judge that the 
Commonwealth has failed to meet its burden of proving that it 
did not exploit the illegally obtained CSLI in obtaining the 
defendant's consent to search, where that consent was intimately 
intertwined -- both temporally and causally -- with the 
28 
 
information gleaned from the unlawful CSLI tracking and was 
obtained immediately after Telford confronted the defendant with 
that information. 
 
Conclusion.  The order of the Superior Court judge granting 
the defendant's motion to suppress is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J. (concurring).  While the court's outcome is 
legally correct under present law, I appreciate the call, in 
Justice Cypher's opinion concurring in part and dissenting in 
part, for Massachusetts to recognize a good faith exception to 
the exclusionary rule.  As Justice Cypher's opinion emphasizes, 
"The primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter future 
police misconduct by barring, in a current prosecution, the 
admission of evidence that the police have obtained in violation 
of rights protected by the Federal and State Constitutions."  
Commonwealth v. Santiago, 470 Mass. 574, 578 (2015).  See Davis 
v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236-237 (2011); United States v. 
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909 (1984).  There is no deterrent value in 
suppressing evidence "when the police act with an objectively 
'reasonable good-faith belief' that their conduct is lawful."  
Davis, supra at 238, quoting Leon, supra.  On the other hand, 
there is value in the certainty that a constitutional violation 
will have consequences. 
 
However, since Massachusetts has never recognized the "good 
faith" exception, Commonwealth v. Valerio, 449 Mass. 562, 569 
(2007), adopting this exception to the exclusionary rule would 
be a significant departure from our present jurisprudence.  Such 
a departure, in my opinion, should not be made in a situation 
where neither party raised the issue, either below or before 
this court.  So although I recognize the potential benefits to 
2 
 
adopting a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in the 
Commonwealth, such a major question would be best answered after 
both sides to the argument are presented to the court and we 
determine whether to adopt or reject such a change after due 
consideration. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
The Commonwealth concedes that the cell site location 
information (CSLI) tracking of Cassio Vertil's (Cassio's) 
cellular telephone (cell phone) was unlawful because it was not 
authorized by a search warrant.  It argues, however, that the 
defendant did not have standing to challenge the unlawful 
tracking.  I agree with the court that under Commonwealth v. 
Rousseau, 465 Mass. 372, 382 (2013), the defendant has standing 
to challenge the search of Cassio's cell phone because his 
movements were tracked for six days.1  Because the electronic 
                                                          
 
 
1 In Commonwealth v. Rousseau, 465 Mass. 372, 382 (2013), we 
concluded that "under art. 14 [of the Massachusetts Declaration 
of Rights], a person may reasonably expect not to be subjected 
to extended [global positioning system] electronic surveillance 
by the government, targeted at his movements, without judicial 
oversight and a showing of probable cause."  We did not decide 
how broadly such an expectation might reach and to what extent 
it may be protected.  Id.  However, the fact that police 
monitored Rousseau over a thirty-one-day period was sufficient 
to establish that he had standing to challenge the validity of 
the warrant. 
 
 
Here, the defendant was targeted for substantially less 
time -- six days -- than the defendant in Rousseau.  The court 
does not recognize any distinction between the two time frames.  
I too think it is difficult to do so without creating an 
arbitrary time frame.  The length of time must be considered on 
a case-by-case basis. 
 
 
I also think it is important to emphasize that while the 
passenger here and in Rousseau were both "targets" of the 
tracking, we have not yet adopted "target" standing in 
Massachusetts.  See Commonwealth v. Santiago, 470 Mass. 574, 
577-578 (2015).  However, we have indicated that 
"[u]nconstitutional [searches of] small fish intentionally 
2 
 
tracking of the cell phone was ongoing while police searched the 
defendant's apartment and there was no temporal break between 
the unlawful police activity and the search of the defendant's 
apartment, I also agree that the defendant's consent to search 
his apartment was not attenuated from the police's illegal 
conduct.  See Commonwealth v. Gentile, 466 Mass. 817, 831 
(2014).  And I agree, albeit not based on the Massachusetts 
support cited by the court, that the fruits of that search -- 
the cocaine -- must be suppressed, even though the defendant had 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in the crawl space.2  See 
                                                          
 
undertaken in order to catch big ones may have to be discouraged 
by allowing the big fish, when caught, to rely on the violation 
of the rights of the small fish, as to whose prosecution the 
police are relatively indifferent" (citation omitted).  Id.  
That is clearly not the case here, or in Rousseau.  It is 
important to understand the distinction between "target 
standing," which permits a criminal defendant who is the 
"target" of a search, i.e., the big fish, to contest the 
legality of that search and object to the admission at trial of 
evidence obtained as a result of the search, see id., and the 
standing recognized in Rousseau and by the court here, which 
emphasizes that a person who is specifically tracked for an 
extended period of time has standing to contest that search.  I 
would not necessarily conclude that an incidental passenger in a 
car that was being tracked would have standing to challenge a 
search. 
 
2 The court does not reach the issue of whether the 
defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the crawl 
space where the cocaine was discovered.  See ante at note 7.  
The court states, "[W]e do not consider whether the Appeals 
Court's legal analysis was consistent with our opinion in 
Commonwealth v. Leslie, 477 Mass. 48, 54 (2017), where we held 
that 'in cases involving a search in a multifamily home, the 
validity of the search [does not turn] on the defendant's 
3 
 
Jones v. United States, 168 A.3d 703, 722-723 (D.C. 2017).  See 
generally 6 W.R. LaFave, Search and Seizure:  A Treatise on the 
Fourth Amendment § 11.4, at 325-326 (5th ed. 2012) ("If the 
                                                          
 
exclusive control or expectation of privacy in the area 
searched'" (emphasis added).  Ante at note 7.  Leslie, supra, 
instructs that we apply the same curtilage analysis to multiunit 
homes as we do to single-family homes, where in the past we have 
held that a tenant does not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in a "common area" in an apartment building, see 
Commonwealth v. Thomas, 358 Mass. 771, 774-775 (1971). 
 
If I were not constrained to conclude that the cocaine must 
be suppressed as fruit of the illegal search of the cell phone, 
and if I were to decide the crawl space issue, I would conclude 
that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the crawl space.  Applying the four-factor test 
introduced in United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987), 
which we adopted in Leslie, 477 Mass. at 55, I would conclude 
that the crawl space was not "so intimately tied to the 
[defendant's apartment] itself that it should be placed under 
the [apartment's] 'umbrella' of Fourth Amendment protection."  
Id., quoting Dunn, supra.  See Commonwealth v. Fernandez, 458 
Mass. 137, 142 (2010) ("In the context of a curtilage 
determination, we undertake our independent review cognizant 
that there is no finely tuned formula that demarcates the 
curtilage in a given case" [quotation and citation omitted]). 
 
I do not read the Leslie decision as granting multiunit 
apartment buildings the same broad protection as a single-family 
home.  Although the court in Leslie expanded the protection that 
may be given curtilage in such circumstances, the facts must 
still be analyzed.  Otherwise, an overly broad interpretation 
may lead to results that are inconsistent with the over-all 
framework of our search and seizure jurisprudence.  For example, 
the broadest reading of Leslie would require us to conclude that 
a tenant on the first-floor apartment has the same 
constitutional protections in his own apartment as he does in a 
separate apartment on the second floor.  Although the crawl 
space is enclosed within the four walls of the apartment 
building, it does not necessarily warrant the same protections 
as the areas enclosed inside the four walls of a single-family 
home.  The Dunn factors were applied in Leslie.  I would apply 
them here. 
4 
 
defendant does have standing with respect to the poisonous tree, 
that alone suffices" to challenge admissibility of its fruits). 
 
I dissent because I think that it is time that we adopt a 
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in circumstances, 
such as here, where at the time the police sought judicial 
permission to track the cell phone, they were properly complying 
with the law, namely, the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2703(d) (2006) (SCA). 
 
1.  Reasonable expectation of privacy in the crawl space.  
I start by briefly highlighting that we have never articulated 
that any fruit, even those fruits in areas where the defendant 
does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy, must be 
suppressed if its discovery flows from an illegal search.  The 
court concludes that the tracking of Cassio's CSLI was illegal, 
the defendant's consent to search his apartment did not remove 
the taint of the initial illegality, and therefore all evidence 
against the defendant must be suppressed.  The court determines 
that we need not address whether the defendant had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the crawl space where the cocaine was 
found because "we have repeatedly held that persons subjected to 
an illegal seizure were entitled to suppress the fruits of that 
seizure even where the evidence was discovered in places where 
it is indisputable that the person in question did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy."  See ante at    .  To 
5 
 
support this proposition, the court cites three cases.  See 
Commonwealth v. Warren, 475 Mass. 530, 533, 540 (2016); 
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 456 Mass. 578, 587 (2010); 
Commonwealth v. O'Laughlin, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 998, 998-999 
(1988).  These three cases all are inapposite to the facts and 
circumstances of the present case and do not fully support the 
broad proposition that any fruit, even those fruits in areas 
where the defendant does not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, must be suppressed if its discovery flows from an 
illegal search.3 
 
The court does point to Federal law, however, in support of 
its position.  See United States v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 
1104, 1117 (10th Cir. 2006) ("While the fruit of the poisonous 
                                                          
 
 
3 In Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 456 Mass. 578, 587 (2010), 
we stated that if a defendant drops contraband on the ground in 
a public park after he was stopped in the constitutional sense, 
the drugs could be suppressed as fruits of an unlawful seizure 
if the stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion.  Both 
Commonwealth v. Warren, 475 Mass. 530, 533 (2016), and 
Commonwealth v. O'Laughlin, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 998, 999 (1988), 
are cases in which the defendant discarded contraband while 
fleeing from police.  In those cases, we suppressed the evidence 
because police did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the 
defendant.  See Warren, supra at 540; O'Laughlin, supra at 999-
1000.  The results in these cases flow from our decision in 
Commonwealth v. Stoute, 422 Mass. 782, 789 (1996), in which we 
held that art. 14 provides more protection than the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution in defining the 
moment at which a person's personal liberty has been 
significantly restrained by the police, so that he or she may be 
said to have been seized within the meaning of art. 
14.  Contrast California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 629 (1991).  
Thus, we did not use an attenuation framework in these cases. 
6 
 
tree doctrine applies only when the defendant has standing 
regarding the Fourth Amendment violation which constitutes the 
poisonous tree, . . . the law imposes no separate standing 
requirement regarding the evidence which constitutes the fruit 
of that poisonous tree"); United States v. Green, 275 F.3d 694, 
699 (8th Cir. 2001).  Historically, we have often granted 
greater protections to defendants under art. 14 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights than the protections 
provided under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  See Commonwealth v. Alexis, 481 Mass. 91, 98-99 
(2018), and cases cited.  For this reason, I am inclined to 
think that although we have never specifically stated it, we 
would come to the same conclusion as the Federal courts and 
declare that fruits, such as the cocaine here, should be 
suppressed. 
 
2.  The exclusionary rule.  The Commonwealth obtained CSLI 
from Cassio's cell phone in 2008 pursuant to an SCA order that 
the Commonwealth properly sought and obtained.  Under the SCA, a 
court may order a telephone company to produce records, 
including CSLI records, "if the governmental entity offers 
specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that the . . . records or other information 
sought . . . are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal 
investigation."  18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).  In 2014, six years after 
7 
 
the Commonwealth lawfully obtained the CSLI, we held that the 
government must secure a warrant before accessing CSLI records.  
Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230, 254-255 (2014), S.C., 
470 Mass. 837 and 472 Mass. 448 (2015).  Four years after 
Augustine, the United States Supreme Court held that the 
government acquisition of CSLI records constitutes "a search 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."4  Carpenter v. 
United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018). 
 
In any consideration of police conduct, we must be 
cognizant that "[r]easonableness [is] the 'touchstone'" of art. 
14 and the Fourth Amendment.  Commonwealth v. Roland R., 448 
Mass. 278, 281 (2007), quoting Commonwealth v. Gaynor, 443 Mass. 
245, 256 (2005).  The contours of reasonableness are drawn by a 
consideration of the nature of the intrusion into the privacy 
interest at play, Commonwealth v. Feyenord, 445 Mass. 72, 86 
(2005) (Greaney, J., concurring), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1187 
(2006), and the nature of the law enforcement interest at stake.  
"The primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter future 
                                                          
 
 
4 In Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230, 232, 254-255 
(2014), S.C., 470 Mass. 837 and 472 Mass. 448 (2015), because 
there was no Federal or Massachusetts decision regarding whether 
obtaining CSLI data was a search in the constitutional sense, we 
remanded the case to the Superior Court to determine whether the 
application pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) established probable 
cause.  Here, I agree with the Appeals Court and conclude that a 
remand is not necessary because the application in 2008 cannot 
establish probable cause. 
8 
 
police misconduct by barring, in a current prosecution, the 
admission of evidence that the police have obtained in violation 
of rights protected by the Federal and State Constitutions."  
Commonwealth v. Santiago, 470 Mass. 574, 578 (2015).  "[W]here 
'the exclusionary rule does not result in appreciable 
deterrence, then, clearly, its use . . . is unwarranted.'"  
Commonwealth v. Wilkerson, 436 Mass. 137, 142 (2002), quoting 
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976).  Another 
consideration is the protection of judicial integrity through 
the dissociation of the courts from unlawful conduct.  See 
Commonwealth v. Ford, 394 Mass. 421, 433 (1985) (Lynch, J., 
dissenting).  Where those purposes are not furthered, rigid 
adherence to a rule of exclusion can only frustrate the public 
interest in the admission of evidence of criminal activity.  
Commonwealth v. Brown, 456 Mass. 708, 715 (2010). 
 
The Supreme Court recognizes a "good faith" exception to 
the exclusionary rule where the government "act[s] with an 
objectively reasonable good-faith belief that their conduct is 
lawful" (quotation and citation omitted).  Davis v. United 
States, 564 U.S. 229, 238 (2011).  We have not adopted the good 
faith exception to the exclusionary rule, yet we have never 
specifically articulated why art. 14 might prohibit us from 
doing so.  Instead, where the good faith exception has been 
addressed and not reflexively dismissed, our cases have focused 
9 
 
on whether the violations are substantial and prejudicial.  See 
ante at    .  See Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 456 Mass. 528, 533 
(2010); Commonwealth v. Rutkowski, 406 Mass. 673, 677 (1990).  
We have said that "the mere fact that an unlawful search and 
seizure has occurred should not automatically result in the 
exclusion of any illegally seized evidence."  Commonwealth v. 
Gomes, 408 Mass. 43, 46 (1990).  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Holley, 478 Mass. 508, 525 (2017) (warrant did not comply with 
particularity requirement or limit scope of search, but 
defendant "suffered no prejudice"); Hernandez, supra; 
Commonwealth v. Beldotti, 409 Mass. 553, 559 (1991). 
Using the standard that has been articulated to determine 
whether to exclude evidence obtained as a result of an illegal 
search or seizure, we balance (1) the degree to which the 
violation undermined the principles underlying the governing 
rule of law, and (2) the extent to which exclusion will tend to 
deter such violations from being repeated in the future.  Gomes, 
408 Mass. 46.  See Hernandez, 456 Mass. at 532 (exclusion is 
deterrent to abuse of official power based on application of 
State legal principles); Wilkerson, 436 Mass. at 142; 
Commonwealth v. Benoit, 382 Mass. 210, 216 (1981), S.C., 389 
Mass. 411 (1983) (exceptions to strict application of 
exclusionary rule are justified when deterrence rationale is 
outweighed by competing societal interest in convicting guilty).  
10 
 
Where we have allowed the introduction at trial of evidence that 
was obtained through an illegality, it has usually turned on 
whether there was a technical error in procuring a warrant, not 
whether the police conduct was legal at the time the warrant was 
procured.  See Holley, 478 Mass. at 525-526; Rutkowski, 406 
Mass. at 677. 
 
With the touchstone of art. 14 in mind, I think that it is 
time we adopt the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule 
in circumstances, such as here, where the police had an 
objectively reasonable good faith belief that their conduct was 
lawful at the time they applied for the SCA order.  See Illinois 
v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 350 (1987) ("Penalizing the officer for 
the [legislature's] error, rather than his own, cannot logically 
contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations" 
[citation omitted]). 
 
Here, police fully complied with the terms of § 2703(d), 
which authorized the release of CSLI.  Police acted in good 
faith in seeking the SCA order and in relying on what they (and 
the judge issuing the order) reasonably understood was the 
existing law at the time.  In 2008, no precedent -- whether 
Federal or in the Commonwealth -- indicated that the use of 
§ 2703(d) to obtain CSLI was unconstitutional.  There was 
nothing to suggest to the government that it reasonably could 
not rely on the statutory scheme set forth in § 2703(d).  
11 
 
Therefore, I would hold that the fact that Augustine 
subsequently invalidated any means of obtaining CSLI without 
probable cause and a warrant does not require suppression of 
CSLI obtained six years earlier in 2008.  See Brown, 456 Mass. 
at 715 ("Judicial integrity . . . is hardly threatened when 
evidence properly obtained under Federal law, in a federally run 
investigation, is admitted as evidence in State courts.  To 
apply the exclusionary rule in these circumstances . . . would 
plainly frustrate the public interest disproportionately to any 
incremental protection it might afford").  See also United 
States v. Adkinson, 916 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 2019); United 
States v. Goldstein, 914 F.3d 200, 203 (3d Cir. 2019) (even 
though collection of evidence violated Fourth Amendment, 
prosecutors relied on objectively good faith belief that 
obtaining defendant's data was legal under § 2703[d]); United 
States v. Curtis, 901 F.3d 846, 849 (7th Cir. 2018) ("though it 
is now established that the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant 
for the type of cell-phone data present here, exclusion of that 
information was not required because it was collected in good 
faith"); United States v. Zodhiates, 901 F.3d 137, 143 (2d Cir. 
2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1273 (2019) (good faith 
exception to exclusionary rule applies to CSLI, obtained prior 
to Supreme Court's decision in Carpenter, pursuant to § 2703[d] 
because search was made in "objectively reasonable reliance on 
12 
 
appellate precedent existing at the time of the search").  See 
generally Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 100, 106 
(2016). 
 
Because the SCA order was sought and issued on an informed 
understanding of State constitutional principles in place in 
2008 and because there is no suggestion of misconduct by any 
agent of the Commonwealth, the suppression of the evidence 
obtained pursuant to the order would disserve the enduring 
deterrent rationale of the exclusionary rule.  See Hernandez, 
456 Mass. at 532; Gomes, 408 Mass. at 46.  Accordingly, even if 
obtained in violation of art. 14, the CSLI at issue should be 
admitted.5 
                                                          
 
 
5 The court does not reach the issue of the good faith 
exception on the ground that the issue was not raised.  I think 
the issue was adequately raised by the Commonwealth when it 
discussed attenuation.  The court notes that "the good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule is substantively different 
from the consideration of police misconduct in determining 
attenuation."  See ante at note 9.  I disagree.  While police 
misconduct is but one factor in our attenuation analysis, that 
factor is sufficiently intertwined, in this case, with the 
question whether the police acted in good faith that I do not 
see a meaningful distinction.  See Davis v. United States, 564 
U.S. 229, 238 (2011) (good faith exception to exclusionary rule 
applies where police "act with an objectively reasonable good-
faith belief that their conduct is lawful").  That being said, I 
recognize that the two concepts are not one and the same.  I 
agree with the court that the defendant's consent was not 
attenuated from the search of his cell phone, mainly because the 
search was ongoing while the police approached the defendant's 
door.  However, I reiterate that whenever we discuss the 
exclusionary rule, whether it be in the purview of attenuation 
or good faith, the touchstone of art. 14 is reasonableness.  The 
                                                          
 
Commonwealth argued that the police acted in good faith under 
Commonwealth v. Damiano, 444 Mass. 444, 455 (2005).  Keeping in 
mind the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule -- to deter 
police misconduct -- I would give the Commonwealth the benefit 
in applying that reasoning to the overarching theme of the good 
faith exception.  See Santiago, 470 Mass. at 578.