Title: Berkeley Hillside Preservation v. City of Berkeley
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S201116M
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: May 28, 2015

Filed 5/27/15 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
BERKELEY HILLSIDE 
) 
PRESERVATION et al. 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
) 
 
 
) 
S201116 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 1/4 A131254 
CITY OF BERKELEY et al., 
) 
 
) 
Alameda County 
 
Defendants and Respondents; ) 
Super. Ct. No. RG10517314 
 
 
) 
DONN LOGAN et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Real Parties in Interest and 
) 
 
 
Respondents.  
) 
 
 
 
____________________________________) 
 
ORDER MODIFYING OPINIONS 
 
 THE COURT: 
The majority opinion in this case, filed March 2, 2015, and appearing at 60 
Cal.4th 1086, is modified as follows: 
1.  The first full paragraph of text on page 1098 of 60 Cal.4th and the 
paragraph following it (which carries over to page 1099) are 
modified to read:  
 
 
In addition, we agree with respondents that, under the 
construction of appellants and the concurring opinion, the 
categorical exemptions the Legislature, through the Secretary, has 
established would have little, if any, effect.  CEQA specifies that 
environmental review through preparation of an EIR is required only 
“[i]f there is substantial evidence . . . that the project may have a 
significant effect on the environment.”  (§ 21080, subd. (d).)  As a 
 
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corollary to this principle, CEQA also specifies that, if “[t]here is no 
substantial evidence, in light of the whole record before the lead 
agency, that the project may have a significant effect on the 
environment,” then the proposed project is not subject to further 
CEQA review.  (§ 21080, subd. (c)(1).)  Guidelines section 15061, 
subdivision (b)(3), is similar, specifying:  “Where it can be seen with 
certainty that there is no possibility that the activity in question may 
have a significant effect on the environment, the activity is not 
subject to CEQA.”   
 
 
Under these provisions, where there is no substantial evidence 
a proposed project may have a significant environmental effect, 
further CEQA review is unnecessary; no categorical exemption is 
necessary to establish that proposition.  According to appellants, 
under the unusual circumstances exception, the categorical 
exemptions are inapplicable unless an agency “check[s] its files” and 
finds no “evidence of potentially significant impacts.”  But this is 
similar to the inquiry an agency makes under Guidelines section 
15061, subdivision (b)(3), to determine whether the proposed project 
is subject to CEQA review in the first instance.  (Muzzy Ranch Co. v. 
Solano County Airport Land Use Com. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 372, 387 
(Muzzy Ranch) [under Guidelines, § 15061, subd. (b)(3), agency 
must determine whether the evidence in the administrative record 
shows no possibility the proposed activity may have a significant 
effect on the environment].)  Thus, under appellants’ view, the 
categorical exemptions would serve little purpose; they would 
generally apply only when the proposed project is already outside of 
CEQA review. 
 
2.  The second full paragraph of text on page 1102 of 60 Cal.4th is 
modified to read:   
 
 
The concurring opinion’s attempt to succeed where appellants 
have failed — i.e., to show that the categorical exemptions still have 
some “value” under their construction (conc. opn, post, at 
p. 1127) — is also unpersuasive.  The concurring opinion first 
asserts that proposed projects enjoy “a considerable procedural 
advantage” when an agency finds that they fall within the terms of 
an exempt category.  (Conc. opn., post, at p. 1128.)  As to such 
projects, the concurring opinion notes, an agency “need not follow 
any particular procedure,” “include any written determination,” 
“undertake an initial study, or adopt a negative declaration.”  (Ibid.)  
However, the same is true of proposed projects that fall within the 
 
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terms of Guidelines section 15061, subdivision (b)(3), i.e., projects 
that are “not subject to CEQA” because “it can be seen with 
certainty that there is no possibility that [they] may have a 
significant effect on the environment.”  (See Muzzy Ranch, supra, 41 
Cal.4th at p. 380 [initial study not required where Guidelines, 
§ 15061, subd. (b)(3) applies].)  As already explained, the 
concurring opinion’s discussion of these so-called procedural 
advantages fails to show that, under its interpretation, the categorical 
exemptions have significant independent value. 
 
 
These modifications do not affect the judgment. 
 
The concurring opinion in this case, filed March, 2015, and appearing at 60 
Cal.4th 1086, is modified as follows: 
1. The first full paragraph of text on page 1130 of 60 Cal.4th, and the 
paragraph following it, are modified to read: 
Today’s opinion also contends that under my reading of section 
15300.2(c), a project proponent who claims a categorical exemption 
is in a “similar” position to the proponent of a nonexempt project 
who claims the common sense exemption in Guidelines section 
15061, subdivision (b)(3).  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1098-1099, 
1102.)  But the term “similar” is a fudge.  The court says “similar” 
rather than “equivalent” because it does not and cannot deny that 
there is a difference between the common sense exemption and the 
reasonable possibility standard.  The common sense exemption is 
available only when the agency, based on the record evidence, meets 
its burden of demonstrating “with certainty that there is no 
possibility that the activity in question may have a significant effect 
on the environment.” (Guidelines, § 15061, subd. (b)(3), italics 
added; see Muzzy Ranch Co. v. Solano County Airport Land Use 
Com. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 372, 386–387.)  This exacting requirement 
exceeds an agency’s obligation under section 15300.2(c), before 
applying a categorical exemption, to consider the evidence in its files 
and preliminarily rule out a reasonable possibility of significant 
effects.  This well-established difference in standards undermines the 
court’s claim that a project’s classification as categorically exempt 
has no significant procedural advantage. 
 
 
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Furthermore, an agency may find that a project falls within a 
categorical exemption without first making an express or definitive 
finding that no section 15300.2 exception applies; the burden is on 
the party challenging the categorical exemption to show that an 
exception applies.  (Committee to Save the  Hollywoodland Specific 
Plan v. City of Los Angeles (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1168, 1186–
1187.)  In addition, project proponents seeking to invoke a 
categorical exemption may employ comparative arguments that are 
not available to project proponents seeking to invoke the common 
sense exemption.  Thus, the availability of the common sense 
exemption for projects meeting its narrow standard of “certainty” 
does not negate the advantages that a categorical exemption confers.