Title: Commonwealth v. Penn
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-10503
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: September 9, 2015

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SJC-10503 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  LUIS PENN. 
 
 
 
Essex.     May 8, 2015. - September 9, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Cordy, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Firearms.  Constitutional Law, Public trial.  
Identification.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Public 
trial, Assistance of counsel, Instructions to jury, 
Argument by prosecutor, Sentence. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on May 5, 2004. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Howard J. Whitehead, J., and a 
motion for a new trial, filed on October 29, 2010, was heard by 
him. 
 
 
 
Dana Alan Curhan for the defendant. 
 
Kenneth E. Steinfield, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant 
of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate 
2 
premeditation for the killing of the victim, Aneury Guzman.1  The 
critical issue in the case was whether the victim had been shot 
by the defendant or by the defendant's friend, Benjamin Serrano, 
who minutes before the shooting had confronted the victim with a 
firearm, handed the firearm to the defendant, and then engaged 
in a fist fight with the victim. 
 
On appeal, the defendant claims that he is entitled to 
reversal of the murder conviction because the evidence was 
insufficient as a matter of law.2  Alternatively, he claims that, 
even if the evidence were legally sufficient, the court should 
exercise its authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to vacate the 
conviction, order a new trial, or reduce the conviction to 
murder in the second degree because the verdict was contrary to 
the weight of the evidence and not consonant with justice.  In 
addition, he claims that the murder conviction should be vacated 
or a new trial ordered because his right to a public trial was 
violated by the unconstitutional closure of the court room 
during jury selection; because the jury were not instructed 
about the risk of honest, but mistaken, eyewitness 
identification; and because the prosecutor vouched for the 
accuracy of the key eyewitness and expressed her personal belief 
                                                          
 
 
1 The defendant was also convicted of carrying a firearm 
without a license in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a). 
 
2 The defendant does not challenge his conviction on the 
firearm indictment on appeal. 
 
3 
in the defendant's guilt during closing argument.  Finally, the 
defendant claims that, even if his murder conviction were to be 
affirmed, he is entitled to a reduction in sentence to life with 
the possibility of parole where he was seventeen years old at 
the time of the killing.  We affirm the defendant's conviction 
of murder in the first degree, but order the case remanded for 
resentencing in accordance with Diatchenko v. District Attorney 
for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655, 671-674 (2013), S.C., 471 
Mass. 12 (2015). 
Background.  Because the defendant challenges the 
sufficiency of the evidence, we recite the evidence in the 
Commonwealth's case-in-chief in detail and in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth.  See Commonwealth v. Labadie, 467 
Mass. 81, 93-94, cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 257 (2014).3  Because 
the defendant additionally claims that the verdict is contrary 
to the weight of the evidence, we also summarize the other 
relevant evidence, including the defendant's trial testimony.  
See Commonwealth v. Franklin, 465 Mass. 895, 896 (2013). 
                                                          
 
 
3 In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we must 
also consider, in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 
"the evidence at the close of all the evidence to determine 
whether the Commonwealth's position as to proof had deteriorated 
since it had closed its case."  Commonwealth v. Brown, 51 Mass. 
App. Ct. 702, 709 (2001), quoting Commonwealth v. Basch, 386 
Mass. 620, 622 n.2 (1982).  Here, however, the only evidence 
following the close of the Commonwealth's case was the 
defendant's testimony, which, viewed in the light most favorable 
to the Commonwealth, the jury were entitled not to credit. 
 
4 
1.  Commonwealth's case-in-chief.  Serrano had dated 
Jennifer Suarez "on and off" for approximately four years when 
she ended her relationship with Serrano and began dating the 
victim in January, 2004.  Serrano told Suarez that "he didn't 
want [her] with [the victim]," and that she was "his girl and 
[was] always going to be with him."  Serrano also threatened the 
victim, telling Suarez that "he's going to kill" the victim, and 
"[w]atch when he catches him." 
On the evening of April 1, 2004, Serrano knocked on the 
apartment door of Suarez's cousin, Vicky Gonzalez, who resided 
in a three-story multifamily building in Lawrence near the 
corner of Haverhill Street and Oxford Street.  Gonzalez 
"cracked" open the door and saw Serrano, whom she knew, dressed 
in a "brown down coat."  Serrano's jacket had a hood, but he did 
not "have it on."  Just behind Serrano was a man she did not 
know, who was dressed "all in black":  "[b]lack sneakers, black 
pants, [and a] black jacket."  The man had his "hood" on, and 
his face was "totally covered" with "what must have been a mask 
or something."  Serrano asked for Suarez, and pushed the door, 
trying to look into the apartment.  Gonzalez told him to leave, 
and Serrano said, "I want Jennifer and I know she's here."  
Gonzalez told him that she would call the police if he did not 
leave, and he and the other man left. 
5 
Unknown to Serrano, the victim was in the apartment when 
Serrano tried to enter.  Minutes earlier, the victim had come to 
the apartment in an automobile with his friends, Johan Abreu and 
Santo Suarez,4 and they were waiting for the victim in the 
automobile in a parking lot off of Oxford Street outside the 
entrance to Gonzales's apartment.  When Serrano walked outside, 
he banged on the hood of the automobile.5  After Abreu asked 
Serrano what he was doing there, Serrano pulled out a gun from 
his waistband and told them "it's not with you" and "to get 
. . . out of here."  As this was happening, the victim came out 
of the apartment building and stepped between Serrano and his 
friends, facing Serrano.  Serrano pointed the gun at the 
victim's face and said, "Look where I found him," "this is the 
way I want[ed] to catch you."  He asked, "Who's a bigger man 
with a gun?"  Abreu screamed at Serrano to put down the gun and 
fight with his hands.  The victim told Serrano, "Do what you got 
to do."  Serrano struck the victim with his free hand and called 
for "Fifty" to come out, at which point the defendant came out 
from an alley alongside the apartment building.6  Serrano said he 
                                                          
 
 
4 Santo Suarez is Jennifer Suarez's brother.  Because they 
share a last name, we shall refer to him by his first name. 
 
 
5 Johan Abreu testified that Serrano was wearing "a jacket 
with a hoodie," and that the hoodie was "up" rather than "down." 
 
 
6 The defendant, who was known as "Fifty," was wearing a 
jacket and had "a hoodie on" when he emerged from the alley.  
6 
wanted to fight the victim, and handed the defendant his gun.  
Serrano and the victim started "scuffling," and then "wrestling, 
trying to throw each other down to the ground."7  The defendant, 
who was pointing the gun at the victim, said, "Fuck these 
dudes," and Santo ran.  Abreu saw the victim "trying to cut 
loose," and Abreu ran, thinking the victim was going to run 
behind him.  Abreu ran "faster than a cat" up Haverhill Street, 
and then down an alley back towards the entrance to Gonzalez's 
apartment.  As he was running down the alley, he heard a 
gunshot.  He then ran back to the corner of Haverhill Street and 
Oxford Street, where he found the victim "[l]aying down" on the 
sidewalk.  He did not see who had fired the gunshot. 
The medical examiner concluded that the victim died from a 
single bullet wound at the top and towards the rear of the 
victim's head.  From the nature of the wound, he offered the 
opinion that the barrel of the gun was against the victim's 
scalp, and that the path of the bullet was "downward." 
The only witness to the shooting was Jose Estrella, who was 
at a gasoline station on Haverhill Street on the opposite side 
of the street from where the shooting occurred, pumping gasoline 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Abreu identified the defendant from a photographic array as the 
person Serrano called "Fifty" who was holding the gun during the 
fight, and also identified him at trial. 
 
 
7 Abreu testified that Serrano's hoodie "came down" as they 
were "scuffling." 
 
7 
into his car on the street side of the pump.  From that vantage 
point, he saw a man, later identified as the victim, run north 
on Oxford Street and turn left on Haverhill Street.  The victim 
suddenly stopped on Haverhill Street and turned around to face 
in the direction of the corner with Oxford Street.  He saw a 
second man running right behind the victim, who stopped "right 
on the corner" after the victim stopped, and who then began to 
walk towards the victim.  The victim raised both hands above his 
waist and said something to the second man, who said something 
back.  The second man continued to approach, getting so close to 
the victim that he was "breathing on [his] face."  The second 
man then lifted his right hand upwards over his head, "swinging" 
it around and pointing it downward towards the head of the 
victim.  Estrella heard a gunshot, and the victim immediately 
fell to the ground.  The second man walked back in the direction 
from which he had come, and then began to run. 
Estrella noted that it was dark and drizzling when he saw 
the shooting.  From his vantage point, Estrella was between 178 
and 230 feet from the location of the shooting.  Estrella saw 
that the shooter was wearing a black or dark-colored winter 
coat, with a hood over his head.  Estrella testified that the 
second man was taller than the victim, and that he could see 
8 
when they came close together that the second man's chin nearly 
touched the center of the victim's forehead.8 
The victim was five feet, six inches tall; Serrano is five 
feet, five inches tall; the defendant is five feet, eleven 
inches tall. 
 
During the examination of the crime scene, next to a 
bloodstain on the sidewalk the police found a Virgin Mary 
medallion that belonged to Serrano, a single .22 caliber shell 
casing, and a closed pocket knife.  Nearby, they found a Jesus 
medallion that belonged to the victim, and a jacket that 
belonged to the victim.9,10 
 
The first 911 call reporting the shooting was made at 
approximately 9:00 P.M.  Approximately twenty minutes later, 
                                                          
 
 
8 Jose Estrella testified that the victim was standing 
"straight up" during the encounter, and denied that he was 
"crouched down." 
 
 
9 The Jesus medallion was found on the street at the corner 
of Haverhill Street and Oxford Street.  The victim's jacket was 
found partially on the sidewalk and in the street.  The other 
items were found on the sidewalk.  Neither of the medallions was 
found with a chain. 
 
 
10 Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing revealed that the 
blood on the knife came from two persons, with the DNA of the 
victim matching the "major DNA profile."  The DNA from the 
handle of the knife was a mixture of at least three individuals' 
DNA, with the DNA of the victim again matching the "major DNA 
profile."  The defendant was excluded as the source of both the 
blood and the "handler DNA."  Serrano was excluded as a source 
of the blood on the knife, and it was inconclusive whether he 
was a source of the "handler DNA," that is, he could be neither 
included nor excluded as a source. 
 
9 
Officer Jamie Adames conducted an investigative stop of Serrano 
in the Essex Street projects, which is approximately "three 
intersections" from the location of the shooting.  Serrano was 
wearing a black "bubble" jacket.  The jacket had a hood, but 
Serrano was not wearing the hood, even though it was "pouring" 
rain.  Officer Adames conducted a patfrisk of Serrano, but found 
no weapons. 
 
On the evening of April 3, after speaking by telephone with 
the defendant, Stephanie Bertone traveled by taxicab to a motel 
in Middleton, where the defendant was now staying.11,12  The 
defendant told her that "there were people after him."  They 
stayed for "a couple of days" at the motel, and then traveled to 
Shamokin, Pennsylvania, where they stayed with a friend of the 
defendant's mother.  While in Pennsylvania, Bertone asked the 
defendant why they had left and why they were there.  The 
defendant told her that he was driving around with "Benji" in 
Benji's motor vehicle when Benji saw "some kid that he had a 
problem with and they stopped the car."  Benji got out of the 
vehicle and "started arguing with the kid and he ended fighting 
                                                          
 
 
11 Stephanie Bertone testified that, at this time, the 
defendant was an "ex-boyfriend." 
 
 
12 The defendant had resided with his mother at an apartment 
in Lawrence.  When the police gained entrance to the apartment 
on April 6, 2004, there was no furniture or clothing in the 
apartment, but only some "old mail."  State police Trooper 
Brandon Arakelian testified, "The place was cleaned out." 
 
10 
with him."  When the kid had Benji down on the ground, Benji 
told the defendant to get out of the vehicle and bring him the 
gun that Benji had in it.  The defendant walked over to "where 
Benji and the other kid were fighting," and the defendant "went 
to hand" Benji the gun.  The defendant then paused, and Bertone 
asked him what happened.  He responded, "You can guess what 
happened." 
 
The defendant was arrested in Shamokin on April 14, and 
State police Trooper Brandon Arakelian interviewed him in the 
library of the county jail on April 15, in the presence of 
Lawrence police Detective Victor Morales and Officer William 
Miner of the Shamokin police department.  After the defendant 
was advised of his Miranda rights and waived them, the defendant 
provided a signed written statement in which he said that on the 
evening of April 1, he was home from 6 P.M. to after midnight 
with his friend, "David Domingoes," and his girl friend, 
"Melanie."  Domingoes left to go home but returned at around 
1 A.M.  The defendant left with Domingoes in Domingoes's 
mother's automobile and were traveling on Basswood Street, near 
the corner of Juniper Street, when someone in another vehicle 
with four people inside "shot at" the automobile in which the 
defendant was traveling.  Two persons stepped out of that 
vehicle, walked over to Domingoes's automobile, and fired "a 
couple of shots" at the driver's side of it, putting holes in 
11 
the windows.  The defendant stayed at his home that night but 
the next day went to the home of his mother's friend "because 
[he] got shot at."  After one night there, he went to stay at 
the motel.  He called Bertone and "told her that [they] needed 
to bounce."  He did not learn that the victim had been killed 
until after he arrived in Pennsylvania.  The defendant also said 
in his statement that he knew "Benji from the area" and knew 
that Benji "had problems" with the "kid who got shot . . . over 
a girl." 
 
The defendant gave a cellular telephone number for 
Domingoes, but Trooper Arakelian was unable to reach Domingoes 
at the number and was never able to locate him.  Trooper 
Arakelian also asked the defendant for Melanie's last name and 
street address, but the defendant provided neither.  The trooper 
also determined that there were no reports of shots fired in the 
area of Basswood and Juniper Streets on the night of April 1, or 
the day that preceded and the day that followed that night.  In 
fact, the only report of gunfire in that timeframe in Lawrence 
was the report of the shot that killed the victim. 
 
After this police interview, the defendant asked to speak 
with Officer Miner alone.  The officer explained to the 
defendant that the best thing the defendant could do was tell 
the other officers the truth.  The defendant "took a breath" and 
told Officer Miner, "I was there; I had the gun."  The defendant 
12 
then paused and added, "Things just got crazy."  After another 
pause, he said, "I just don't know what to do." 
 
2.  Defendant's trial testimony.  The defendant testified 
in his own defense.13  He said that he had known Serrano for 
about one and one-half months before the shooting.  On April 1, 
at approximately 8 P.M., he was at a barber shop and saw 
Serrano, who told him he was going to see his girl friend.  He 
stood behind Serrano, on the stairs, when Serrano knocked on an 
apartment door and learned that "Jennifer" was not home.  The 
defendant told Serrano he was going to go home.  Serrano passed 
him on the stairs and approached an automobile that was parked 
outside.  Two men got out of the vehicle, and Serrano asked, 
"Where is he?"  One of the men said he did not know.  A "kid" 
then came down the same set of stairs that Serrano and the 
defendant had just descended.  Serrano saw the kid, pulled out a 
gun and said, "This is the way I wanted to catch you."  Until 
that moment, the defendant had not seen the gun and did not know 
that Serrano was carrying a gun. 
 
Serrano pointed the gun at the top of the kid's head, with 
the wrist aimed downward, and asked, "Who's the man now?"  After 
the kid told him, "Do what you have to do," Serrano punched the 
kid in the face with his left hand, and said he was going to 
                                                          
 
 
13 The defendant called no other witnesses to testify. 
 
13 
fight him first.  Serrano then said, "Yo Fifty," and the 
defendant stepped out to where they were standing.  Serrano 
handed him the gun, which the defendant pointed toward the sky.  
The two men who had been in the automobile ran away.  The kid 
placed Serrano in a bear hug, lifted him up, slammed him on the 
ground, and began punching him in the face and stomach.  Serrano 
twice told the defendant to "give me my gun," but the defendant 
refused.  The kid then got off the ground, threw his jacket over 
his shoulder, and walked quickly out of the parking lot. 
 
Serrano, still lying on the ground, told the defendant he 
was "a fucking punk," and asked him, "Why you let him beat me up 
like that?"  The defendant told him he should have defended 
himself.  Serrano then got up off the ground, said, "Give me my 
fucking gun," and pulled the gun away from the defendant's hand.  
The defendant walked north up Oxford Street, crossed Haverhill 
Street, and went down Railroad Street, heading home.  He looked 
back, and he saw "Benji coming around the corner towards" where 
the kid was standing on Haverhill Street.  The defendant "kept 
walking," thinking to himself that "this ain't my problem" and 
that "everything was over."  As he was walking towards the other 
end of Railroad Street, he heard "a pop" but ignored it -- 
because he "didn't know what it was" -- and continued on to his 
mother's house.  The next morning, his mother woke him at 5 A.M. 
14 
and told him that someone had called her and that she needed to 
get him out because "they were going to kill" him.14 
 
He admitted that he lied to Trooper Arakelian but said he 
did so because he was "scared" and "didn't want to get charged 
with something [he] did not do."  The defendant maintained that 
false alibi even after Trooper Arakelian told the defendant that 
he knew the defendant was there, because the defendant "didn't 
want to rat on Benji." 
 
 Discussion.  1.  Sufficiency and weight of the evidence.  
The defendant moved for a required finding of not guilty based 
on the insufficiency of the evidence at the close of the 
prosecution's case and at the close of all the evidence.  The 
defendant claims that the judge erred in denying these motions, 
and that he is entitled to reversal of the murder conviction. 
 
The defendant challenges the appellate standard that 
reviews a claim of insufficiency of the evidence.  Under that 
standard, we determine whether, "after viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier 
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt" (emphasis in original).  Commonwealth 
                                                          
 
 
14 During cross-examination, the defendant claimed not to 
have known why anyone wanted to kill him, and he denied thinking 
that it had anything to do with the events of the night of April 
1.  Although he went to stay at the motel in Middleton on 
Friday, April 2, he testified that he did not know that the 
victim had been killed until Saturday, April 3. 
 
15 
v. St. Hilaire, 470 Mass. 338, 343 (2015), quoting Commonwealth 
v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979).  See Jackson v. 
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-319 (1979).  The defendant argues 
that we should instead determine whether the essential elements 
of the crime could have been found beyond a reasonable doubt by 
"a reasonable jury."  The defendant cites in support of his 
position a law review article by then-Chief Judge Jon Newman of 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, who 
feared that "the word 'any' and the wholly gratuitous and 
potentially misleading underscoring of that word . . . can 
subtly shift an appellate court's attention from the correct 
construct of the reasonable jury to the quite incorrect 
construct of just one out of a distribution of reasonable 
juries."  Newman, Beyond "Reasonable Doubt," 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
979, 992 (1993).  Judge Newman's concern was that appellate 
courts under the "any rational trier of fact" formulation might 
"examine a record to satisfy themselves only that there is some 
evidence of guilt and . . . not conscientiously assess whether 
the evidence suffices to permit a finding by the high degree of 
persuasion required by the 'reasonable doubt' standard" 
(emphasis in original).  Id. at 993. 
 
The "any rational trier of fact" standard was stated by the 
United States Supreme Court in Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 
immediately after the Court stated that "the critical inquiry on 
16 
review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal 
conviction must be . . . to determine whether the record 
evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt."  Id. at 318.  In Latimore, 378 Mass. at 677, 
we quoted both of these standards.  Neither the Supreme Court in 
Jackson nor this court in Latimore suggested that these two 
standards are substantively different.15  We decline to 
characterize them now as different in substance.  We regard them 
simply as alternative formulations of the same appellate 
standard.  We note that we have used the alternative to the "any 
rational trier of fact" formulation in earlier cases without 
intending any difference in the standard of review.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Rivera, 460 Mass. 139, 141 (2011) ("we review 
the evidence . . . to determine whether the evidence, viewed in 
the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, was sufficient for 
a reasonable jury to infer the existence of each essential 
element of the crime charged, beyond a reasonable doubt"); 
Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 384 Mass. 13, 15 (1981) ("we must 
                                                          
 
 
15 Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Burger and 
Justice Rehnquist, concurred in the judgment in Jackson v. 
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 339 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring in 
judgment), because he saw no need for the Court to establish 
what he characterized as a "gratuitous directive to our 
colleagues on the federal bench" concerning a standard of review 
regarding the sufficiency of the evidence.  He did not call for 
a reasonable jury standard rather than an "any rational trier of 
fact" standard. 
 
17 
determine whether [the] evidence, considered in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, was sufficient to permit a jury 
reasonably to infer the existence beyond a reasonable doubt of 
each essential element of the crime charged").  Under both 
formulations of the appellate standard, "it is not enough . . . 
to find that there was some record evidence, however slight, to 
support each essential element of the offense."  Latimore, 
supra.  Rather, the evidence must be sufficiently strong to 
permit a reasonable jury to find that each essential element of 
the charged offense was proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  See 
cases cited, supra. 
 
Applying that standard, we conclude that the evidence in 
this case was sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find the 
defendant guilty of the premeditated murder of the victim.  It 
is true, as the defendant argues, that Serrano had the stronger 
motivation to kill the victim, and that the medallion found at 
the scene of the killing belonged to Serrano, not the defendant.  
But the jury were reasonably entitled to credit Estrella's 
eyewitness testimony that the shooter's chin was level with the 
center of the victim's forehead, which would make the defendant, 
not Serrano, the shooter, where the defendant was five inches 
taller than the victim and the victim was one inch taller than 
Serrano.  Also, where the defendant was seen wearing a hood when 
he pointed the gun at the victim during the fight, the jury 
18 
reasonably could have credited Estrella's observation that the 
shooter wore a hood on his head, and inferred that Serrano, 
whose hood was off his head before the shooting, would not 
likely have put his hood on had he given chase to the victim.16  
Although Serrano, not the defendant, had threatened the life of 
the victim for dating the woman who had been Serrano's girl 
friend, the jury reasonably could have inferred that Serrano 
brought the defendant to the encounter to assist Serrano in 
doing harm to the victim.  After receiving the gun from Serrano, 
the defendant pointed it at the victim, and the jury reasonably 
could have inferred that part of the defendant's purpose in 
doing so was to prevent the victim from getting away.  Thus, the 
jury reasonably could have inferred that, when the victim fled 
the scene, the defendant was the person who gave chase, 
especially where the defendant was holding the gun during the 
fight and the gunshot was heard within moments after Abreu ran 
from the scene of the fight.  The jury also reasonably could 
have inferred that the victim pulled off Serrano's Virgin Mary 
medallion while he was wrestling with Serrano, and dropped it, 
along with the knife he was carrying, when he was shot. 
                                                          
 
 
16 In fact, when Serrano was stopped by Officer Adames 
twenty minutes after the shooting, Serrano was not wearing a 
hood, even though it was raining hard at that time. 
 
19 
 
The consciousness of guilt evidence also points to the 
defendant as the shooter.  The jury reasonably could infer that, 
regardless whether it was arrest or retaliation that he feared, 
he went to the motel and later left for Pennsylvania because he 
had shot and killed a person on the evening of April 1.  Had he 
not been the shooter, it is unlikely that he would have felt the 
same need to flee.  The jury could also reasonably have inferred 
that the closest he came to speaking the truth was when he told 
Officer Miner, "I was there," "I had the gun," and "Things just 
got crazy."  This explanation is consistent with the defendant 
acting instinctively to chase the victim while he "had the gun," 
and shooting the victim because "[t]hings just got crazy."  
Although this evidence, viewed in its totality, does not 
eliminate the possibility that Serrano, not the defendant, was 
the shooter, the evidence is sufficient to permit a reasonable 
jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, 
not Serrano, was the shooter.  See Commonwealth v. Russell, 470 
Mass. 464, 477 (2015) ("Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not 
mean proof beyond all possible doubt, for everything in the 
lives of human beings is open to some possible or imaginary 
doubt"). 
Having reviewed the entire record in this case pursuant to 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we also address the defendant's contention 
that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.  Section 
20 
33E "does not . . . convert this court into a second jury, which 
must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of a 
defendant . . . without the advantage of seeing and hearing the 
witnesses."  Franklin, 465 Mass. at 916, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Jefferson, 416 Mass. 258, 265 (1993).  "[F]or this court under 
the statute . . . to grant a new trial on the ground that the 
verdict was against the weight of the evidence, it must appear 
that the verdict . . . would work a miscarriage of justice 
. . . .  It is not enough that the judge or judges, if on the 
jury, would have felt a reasonable doubt which the jury did not 
share."  Franklin, supra, quoting Jefferson, supra at 266.  In 
evaluating the weight of the evidence, we do not view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, and are 
free to consider the defendant's testimony at trial.  See 
Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 470 Mass. 163, 163 (2014); Jefferson, 
supra at 267 (under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we consider "the thrust 
of the evidence"). 
It is reasonable to conclude that the defendant's version 
of what happened after the fight ended between Serrano and the 
victim is not credible for various reasons.  It is not credible 
that the victim simply walked away from the fight, where the 
defendant was pointing a gun at him.  Nor is it credible that, 
after the victim left the scene of the fight, the defendant 
walked away and got as far as he said he did past the corner of 
21 
Haverhill and Oxford Streets when he heard the gun shot behind 
him at that corner; the victim had not run far from the scene of 
the fight before he suddenly turned to face the person chasing 
after him, and their encounter was brief before the shooting.  
Nor is it credible that he ignored the "pop" sound he admits he 
heard, or that he did not recognize the meaning of the "pop."  
Nor is it credible that he fled his home early on the morning of 
April 2 for reasons unrelated to what had happened at 
approximately 9 P.M. on April 1.  In short, the weight of the 
evidence supports the jury's finding that the defendant, rather 
than Serrano, was the shooter. 
 
2.  Court room closure.  After being convicted, the 
defendant moved for a new trial on the grounds that the court 
room had been improperly closed during jury empanelment, and 
that his trial counsel had been ineffective in failing to object 
to the closure.  Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial 
judge concluded that "the defendant's mother and a friend of 
hers were excluded from the courtroom during the jury 
[e]mpanelment," and that "the [c]ourt itself, from the bench in 
open court, directed that the courtroom be cleared of spectators 
before the prospective jurors entered."17  Defense counsel 
                                                          
 
17 The judge noted that this was "consistent with what then 
had been a longstanding practice in the Lawrence Superior 
Court," and that nothing in the record "suggest[ed] that, if 
22 
"advised [the two spectators] that they would have to remain 
outside until [e]mpanelment was complete," which they did.  He 
did not object to the closure and, after the jury were 
empaneled, stated that "the accused [was] satisfied with" the 
empanelment process.18  Based on these facts, the judge denied 
the defendant's motion for a new trial, concluding that the 
defendant both waived his right to a public trial during jury 
selection and procedurally waived the claim of a violation of 
that right. 
The defendant's right to a public trial under the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution applies to jury 
empanelment proceedings, and the violation of that right is 
structural error where the claim of error is properly preserved.  
See Commonwealth v. Cohen (No. 1), 456 Mass. 94, 105-106 (2010).  
See also Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 213 (2010).  But 
"[w]here counsel fails to lodge a timely objection to the 
closure of the court room" -- as happened in this case -- "the 
defendant's claim of error is deemed to be procedurally waived."  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
pressed, the [c]ourt would have been unable to make an 
accommodation for the seating of the two women." 
 
 
18 The judge determined that the defendant had been aware of 
the court room closure, but the defendant's affidavit attested 
that it "did not occur" to him during trial that the public had 
been excluded from the court room; his attorney "never made 
[him] aware that . . . [he] had a right to a public and fair 
trial"; and he "did not waive [his] rights to a public trial." 
 
23 
Commonwealth v. LaChance, 469 Mass. 854, 857 (2014), petition 
for cert. filed, 83 U.S.L.W. 3768 (Mar. 20, 2015), citing 
Commonwealth v. Morganti, 467 Mass. 96, 102, cert. denied, 135 
U.S. 356 (2014), and Commonwealth v. Lavoie, 464 Mass. 83, 87-88 
& n.8, cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2356 (2013).  Having waived his 
claim of error regarding the denial of his right to a public 
trial during jury selection, the defendant after conviction may 
claim that his attorney provided ineffective assistance of 
counsel for failing to object to the closure of the court room.  
See LaChance, supra at 858; Morganti, supra at 103.  However, 
even if a defendant were to show that his or her attorney was 
deficient for failing to make a timely objection, the defendant 
would be entitled to relief in a murder case only if he or she 
can show that a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice arose from the court room closure.  See Commonwealth v. 
Jackson, 471 Mass. 262, 269 (2015).19  "The structural nature of 
the underlying error does not automatically excuse the defendant 
from showing prejudice when advancing an unpreserved claim."  
LaChance, supra at 857.  Here, the defendant has not claimed 
                                                          
 
 
19 Where the defendant has not been convicted of murder in 
the first degree and is not entitled to review under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, the defendant would need to show a substantial 
risk of a miscarriage of justice arising from counsel's failure 
to object to the closure of the court room during jury 
selection.  See Commonwealth v. LaChance, 469 Mass. 854, 857 
(2014). 
 
24 
that the closure of the court room during jury selection was 
likely to have had any effect on the judgment.  See id. at 859, 
quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984) 
("jury empanelment closed to spectators [other than jurors] and 
the defendant's family . . . will rarely have an 'effect on the 
judgment'").  Therefore, the defendant's public trial right 
claim fails because it was procedurally waived, and his claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel fails because he has made no 
showing of prejudice.20 
 
3.  Absence of instruction regarding honest mistake in 
identification.  The defendant also contends that he is entitled 
to a new trial because the trial judge did not instruct the jury 
of the possibility that an eyewitness who observed the shooting 
may have made an honest but mistaken observation of the shooter. 
 
The defendant requested a five-part jury instruction on 
"mistaken observation," which the judge and defense counsel 
                                                          
 
20 We note that the United States Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit in United States v. Negrón-Sostre, 790 F.3d 295, 
300-306 (1st Cir. 2015), ordered a new trial where defendants 
failed to object to the closure of the court room during jury 
empanelment and did not make any showing that the closure had 
any effect on the verdict.  The court concluded that the closure 
of the court room during the entirety of voir dire was "a plain 
and obvious error that, as a structural error, affected the 
defendants' substantial rights and seriously impaired the 
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings."  
Id. at 306.  However, the court noted that "the government did 
not argue that the failure to object constitutes waiver."  Id. 
at 301 n.7. 
 
25 
characterized as an "amplification" of the instruction regarding 
eyewitness identification that this court approved in 
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 378 Mass. 296, 310-311 (Appendix) 
(1979), S.C., 419 Mass. 1006 (1995).  The judge declared that he 
was not inclined "to do the amplification," but was inclined to 
give "the straight Rodriguez instruction," fearing that the 
additional detail in the amplified instruction would put him 
"more in the role of advocate than [he] ought to be."  The judge 
agreed to defense counsel's request that his objection be noted 
for the record, even though defense counsel added that "there is 
no legal basis" for the objection "other than looking for an 
expansion." 
 
At the charge conference that followed the close of 
evidence at trial, the judge said that he no longer thought that 
the Rodriguez instruction was appropriate because that 
instruction provides guidance regarding "an actual 
identification" and there was no identification of the shooter 
in this case.  The judge said he would draft an instruction that 
would make clear to the jury that there was no identification of 
the shooter but there was testimony from Estrella regarding the 
"physical characteristics and attire" of the shooter, and set 
forth the factors the jury might use in assessing that 
testimony.  Defense counsel agreed that "that would be 
appropriate." 
26 
 
The judge instructed the jury regarding eyewitness 
identification as he had promised.21,22  Defense counsel did not 
object to this instruction or to any of the judge's jury 
instructions.  The judge, however, did not include a jury 
                                                          
 
21 The judge told the jury: 
 
"The threshold fact that the Commonwealth must prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt . . . is that the defendant was the one 
who actually shot [the victim]. . . .  The Commonwealth has 
not presented you with . . . any witness who has both 
testified that he saw the shooting and has identified the 
defendant as the shooter.  Rather, . . . [t]he Commonwealth 
has presented you with a witness, Mr. Estrella, . . . who 
has testified that he saw the shooting.  He gave an account 
of how it occurred, as well as an account of the physical 
appearance and dress of the shooter.  In determining the 
reliability of that account, you consider all . . . that 
I've already mentioned as appropriate to consider in 
assessing the credibility and reliability of witness 
testimony in general and you will remember that, among 
those factors, you consider the opportunity of the witness 
to observe the relevant events.  In that regard you 
consider in particular:  how far or close Mr. Estrella was 
to the shooting; how long or short the time was that he had 
to observe the shooting; the lighting conditions; consider 
the presence or absence of obstruction to his vision; 
consider the extent to which Mr. Estrella focused his 
attention on the shooting and the shooter in 
particular. . . .  Considering the reliability of witness 
testimony . . . you consider all of the evidence in the 
case, in determining whether in fact the defendant was the 
person who shot [the victim]." 
 
22 By giving a modified eyewitness identification 
instruction, the judge acted in accordance with the guidance we 
gave six years later in Commonwealth v. Franklin, 465 Mass. 895, 
912 (2013), where we declared that a trial judge, if so 
requested, should provide the jury with a modified eyewitness 
identification instruction where "eyewitnesses have provided a 
physical description of the perpetrator or his clothing," even 
if no eyewitness positively identified the defendant. 
 
27 
instruction regarding the possibility of an honest but mistaken 
identification, even though the defendant had sought such an 
instruction in the fifth part of his proposed five-part jury 
instruction.23 
 
In Commonwealth v. Pressley, 390 Mass. 617, 620 (1983), we 
declared that where "[i]dentification [is] crucial to the 
Commonwealth's case . . . [f]airness to a defendant compels the 
trial judge to give an instruction on the possibility of an 
honest but mistaken identification when the facts permit it and 
when the defendant requests it."  Here, where the facts 
permitted such an instruction and the defendant requested it, 
the judge should have instructed the jury about the risk of an 
honest but mistaken observation even in the absence of a 
positive eyewitness identification.  See Franklin, 465 Mass. at 
                                                          
 
 
23 The fifth part of the instruction sought by the defendant 
provided as follows: 
 
"In assessing the testimony of any witness relied upon by 
the Commonwealth to attempt to prove that [the defendant] 
committed a crime, you must consider the possibility of 
'good faith error' by the witness.  That is, in addition to 
assessing the credibility of the witness, you must also 
consider whether the witness is honestly mistaken in his or 
her observations.  Even if you find that the witness is 
sincere and honest in his or her belief in what they 
observed, you must still return a verdict of not guilty 
unless you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
observations testified to are reliable and accurate.  The 
burden is on the Commonwealth to prove[] beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the witness'[s] observations, however 
honest, [are] correct." 
 
28 
912.  The defendant, however, did not object to the judge's jury 
instructions at trial, and therefore failed to alert the judge 
of the need for such an instruction.24  Where the objection was 
not preserved, we consider whether the error produced a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Smith, 449 Mass. 12, 17 (2007).  We conclude 
that there was no such risk in this case because, even without 
the instruction, the jury reasonably would have understood that 
they needed to consider whether Estrella made a good faith, 
honest error in his observations of the shooting.  The defendant 
never suggested that Estrella was lying; nor was there any 
evidence that Estrella had any motive to lie.  The possibility 
that Estrella's testimony was based on an honest mistake was the 
focus of the defendant's cross-examination of Estrella and his 
                                                          
 
 
24 The defendant argues that the error should be treated as 
preserved where the defendant earlier in the trial objected to 
the judge's decision not to give the defendant's proposed five-
part instruction and the judge noted the objection.  That 
objection focused on the judge's unwillingness to give an 
"amplification" of the instruction regarding eyewitness 
identification in Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 378 Mass. 296, 310-
311 (Appendix) (1979), S.C., 419 Mass. 1006 (1995), and his 
inclination to give a "straight" Rodriguez instruction, an 
inclination the judge later revised when he learned there was no 
positive identification of the defendant as the shooter.  Where 
the Rodriguez instruction is silent as to the possibility of an 
honest but mistaken identification, defense counsel's objection 
to the judge's disinclination to give an amplified Rodriguez 
instruction would not reasonably have alerted the judge that the 
defendant objected to the absence of an honest, but mistaken, 
identification instruction. 
 
29 
closing argument.25  Given this context, the jury would have 
known what the missing instruction would have told them. 
Therefore, "we are substantially confident that, if the error 
had not been made, the jury verdict would have been the same."  
Commonwealth v. Ruddock, 428 Mass. 288, 292 n.3 (1998). 
 
4.  Closing argument.  In her closing argument, the 
prosecutor told the jury that the defendant "can't tell you the 
truth because the truth doesn't help [the defendant].  The truth 
is . . . that [the defendant] was the shooter."  She later said 
that Estrella "[has] no reason to come in here and tell you 
anything but the truth.  And that's exactly what he did."  She 
concluded, "The defendant is the trigger man.  That is the truth 
. . . .  It was the defendant who murdered [the victim]."  The 
defendant argues that, in making these statements, the 
prosecutor improperly vouched for the accuracy of Estrella's 
testimony and improperly expressed her personal opinion as to 
the defendant's guilt.  Where, as here, the defendant did not 
object to these closing argument statements at trial, we 
determine whether the statements created a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice that requires a new 
trial.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sanders, 451 Mass. 290, 296 
(2008) (where there was no objection to closing argument 
                                                          
 
 
25 In closing argument, defense counsel referred to Estrella 
as a "[g]ood man [who] cares about the neighborhood." 
30 
statements in first-degree murder case, "we review to determine 
whether the statements were improper, and, if so, whether they 
created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice"). 
We agree with the defendant that the statements were 
improper.  A prosecutor is free to provide the jury with the 
reasons why they should find a witness's observations to be 
accurate, but she cannot tell the jury that the witness speaks 
the truth.  See id. at 297 ("[T]he prosecutor [may not] suggest 
that he has personal knowledge of, or vouch for, the credibility 
of a witness . . . [but may] state logical reasons why a 
witness's testimony should be believed").  See also Mass. G. 
Evid. § 1113(b)(3)(B) (2015) (impermissible in closing argument 
"to state a personal opinion about the credibility of a 
witness").  A prosecutor is also free to harness the key 
evidence and provide the jury with the reasons why they should 
conclude that a defendant was the shooter, but she cannot tell 
the jury that she knows it to be true that he was the shooter.  
See Sanders, supra at 296-297 ("A prosecutor may not express his 
personal belief in the testimony or suggest that he has 
knowledge independent of the evidence at trial . . . [but] may 
comment on and draw inferences from the evidence at trial").  
See also Mass. G. Evid. § 1113(b)(3)(B) (impermissible in 
closing argument "to state a personal opinion about . . . the 
ultimate issue of guilt"). 
31 
We conclude, however, that the prosecutor's statements in 
this case, although improper, did not create a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  A prosecutor's vouching 
for the truth of a witness's testimony or of the defendant's 
guilt is improper because it might suggest to the jury that the 
prosecutor has special knowledge, apart from the evidence 
presented at trial, that enables her to know that the witness is 
telling the truth or that the defendant committed the crime.  
See Commonwealth v. Ciampa, 406 Mass. 257, 265 (1989), and cases 
cited.  But there was little danger that the jury would make 
that inference here because the prosecutor argued the reasonable 
inferences from the evidence at trial and did not suggest that 
she came to the "truth" based on anything other than the 
evidence at trial.  See Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 52 Mass. 
App. Ct. 831, 834 (2001), quoting Commonwealth v. Murchison, 418 
Mass. 58, 60-61 (1994) ("prosecutor's assertions that the 
defendant was lying[] generally were accompanied by the words 
'the evidence establishes,' and thus were 'expressed as a 
conclusion to be drawn from the evidence and not as a personal 
opinion'").  The prosecutor's statement that Estrella was 
telling the truth was made immediately after the statement that 
Estrella had "no reason" to do anything but tell the truth, and 
immediately before the prosecutor argued based on Estrella's 
testimony that the shooting was uniquely memorable for Estrella.  
32 
And immediately after the prosecutor's statement that "[t]he 
truth is . . . that [the defendant] was the shooter," the 
prosecutor said, "[T]he evidence tells us so."  Because a 
reasonable jury would have understood the prosecutor's 
assertions of the "truth" to be based on the evidence at trial, 
there was no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
 
5.  Resentencing as a juvenile.  The defendant was 
seventeen years old at the time of the crime.  After conviction, 
he received the mandatory sentence for murder in the first 
degree under G. L. c. 265, § 2 -- life in prison without the 
possibility of parole.  The defendant was sentenced in 2007, 
prior to Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012), in 
which the United States Supreme Court held that the mandatory 
imposition of a sentence of life without the possibility of 
parole on an offender under the age of eighteen violates the 
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and prior to 
Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 
at 671 & n.16, in which we held that the imposition of a 
sentence of life without the possibility of parole on an 
offender under the age of eighteen violates art. 26 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  Because we give the "new" 
rules announced in Miller and Diatchenko retroactive effect, see 
Diatchenko, supra at 666, the defendant is entitled to be 
resentenced on his murder conviction to life in prison with the 
33 
possibility of parole.  See Commonwealth v. Ray, 467 Mass. 115, 
140 (2014) (remanding case to Superior Court "for resentencing 
consistent with Diatchenko").26 
6.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have reviewed the 
entire record in this case pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to 
consider whether the interests of justice would be served by 
ordering a new trial or reducing the defendant's sentence.  
Where the verdict is not contrary to the weight of the evidence, 
and where the defendant is entitled to have his sentence for 
murder in the first degree reduced to life in prison with the 
possibility of parole in light of Diatchenko because he was 
                                                          
 
26 The Commonwealth concedes that the defendant must be 
resentenced to life with the possibility of parole on his murder 
conviction.  But in addition to murder in the first degree, the 
defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm in 
violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), and sentenced to one year 
in a house of correction, to run concurrently with the life 
sentence for murder in the first degree, and with credit for 
time served, which at the time of sentencing was already 1,001 
days.  We have not addressed the issue whether a convicted 
offender entitled to resentencing under Diatchenko v. District 
Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655, 671-674 (2013), 
S.C., 471 Mass. 12 (2015), may also be resentenced on 
convictions in which he did not receive life in prison without 
the possibility of parole.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Costa, 472 Mass. 
139, 143-146 (2015) (at resentencing of juvenile defendant who 
had been convicted of two murders and sentenced to two 
consecutive life terms without the possibility of parole, judge 
may revisit whether sentences should be consecutive or 
concurrent).  We need not address that issue here, because the 
Commonwealth at oral argument indicated that it would not seek 
resentencing on the firearms conviction, and because the 
defendant has already completed his sentence on the firearms 
conviction. 
34 
under the age of eighteen at the time of the shooting, we 
decline to exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
Conclusion.  We affirm the defendant's convictions of 
murder in the first degree and carrying a firearm without a 
license, and affirm the order denying the defendant's motion for 
a new trial, but remand for resentencing consistent with 
Diatchenko. 
So ordered.