Title: Anthony Welch v. State Of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC06-698
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: September 25, 2008

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC06-698 
____________ 
 
 
ANTHONY WELCH,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[September 25, 2008] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
Anthony Welch appeals his death sentences for the murders of Rufus and 
Kyoko Johnson.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  Because 
the trial court failed to ask the State for a gender-neutral ground when Welch 
timely objected to the State’s peremptory challenge to a female juror as required by 
Melbourne v. State, 679 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1996), we vacate Welch’s death 
sentences and remand the case for a new penalty phase. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Sometime in the morning of December 14, 2000, Anthony Welch arrived at 
the home of Rufus and Kyoko Johnson.  Welch told Kyoko that his car had broken 
down, and Kyoko gave Welch a ride home.  Later in the evening, Welch returned 
to the Johnsons’ home intending to at least rob the Johnsons.  Welch admitted to 
law enforcement that he killed the Johnsons by hitting them with an object or 
objects.  Rufus was found lying on the floor next to a sofa in the living room.  He 
was bruised, cut, and stabbed in the face.  Some of his bones were fractured from 
multiple severe blows to his face and the back of the head.  His throat was deeply 
cut.  Kyoko’s body was found on a bed in the master bedroom.  Kyoko was struck 
and had severe bruising on her face, forehead, neck, hands, arms, legs, and ankles.  
She was also strangled, stabbed in the face, and cut on the throat.  All of Kyoko’s 
wounds were inflicted while she was alive.  The medical examiner testified that it 
took “several minutes” to inflict the wounds on both victims.  
After killing the Johnsons, Welch cleaned himself up in the bathroom and 
took numerous items from the home.  However, before leaving the Johnsons’ 
home, Welch used their telephone to call Lisa Headley, a young woman he was 
dating.  Welch also took Rufus Johnson’s truck.  Around 12:30 a.m. on December 
15, 2000, Welch drove Rufus’s truck to a Wal-Mart where he met Headley.  
Headley testified that Welch was pale and trembling but did not appear intoxicated 
or under the influence.   
 
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On December 19, 2000, the victims’ bodies were discovered by their 
children.  The criminal investigation revealed that Welch pawned some of the 
items stolen from the victims’ home and kept some of the items in his apartment.  
During Kyoko’s autopsy, the medical examiner retrieved a note from her clothing.  
The note instructed Rufus to go to his bank and get money or Kyoko would be 
killed, additionally stating, “I don’t want to kill you John.  I owe you for trying to 
save my brother’s life.”  Police subsequently discovered that Rufus had tried to 
resuscitate Welch’s older brother after he committed suicide in 1995.  In 1995, the 
Welch family, including Anthony Welch, lived next door to the Johnsons.  On 
December 21, 2000, Anthony Welch was arrested by law enforcement and 
subsequently confessed.   
Welch was indicted on charges of (1) first-degree premeditated murder of 
Rufus Johnson; (2) first-degree premeditated murder of Kyoko Johnson; (3) 
robbery with a deadly weapon; (4) dealing in stolen property; and (5) grand theft of 
a motor vehicle.  Welch filed a motion to suppress the admissions he made to the 
police on December 21, 2000.  The trial court granted Welch’s motion to suppress 
with respect to the statements made while en route to the sheriff’s office but denied 
the motion in respect to Welch’s confession at the sheriff’s office.   
Welch subsequently pled guilty to all counts.  During the plea colloquy, 
Welch indicated that he had consulted with his counsel and understood the nature 
 
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and consequences of the charges against him, including the possibility of a death 
sentence.  Welch also indicated that his guilty plea was not influenced by any 
threat or promise.        
 
At the penalty phase, the State introduced physical evidence and witnesses 
to establish the aggravating circumstances.  The jury watched Welch’s videotaped 
confession.  Several of the victims’ relatives and neighbors testified regarding the 
circumstances and details leading up to the discovery of the Johnsons’ murders.  
Furthermore, Agent Terry Laufenberg with the Brevard County Sheriff’s Office 
testified regarding the crime scene.  Additionally, Heather Bartczak, Welch’s 
roommate, and Lisa Headley, Welch’s girlfriend, testified regarding various details 
of Welch’s life surrounding the time of the Johnsons’ murders.   
Welch presented mitigation evidence, including the testimony of two mental 
mitigation experts.      
   
On November 21, 2005, the jury unanimously recommended a sentence of 
death for each of the two murders.  A Spencer1 hearing was held on January 6, 
2006.  On March 7, 2006, Welch was sentenced to death.2   
                                          
 
 
1.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
2.  The trial court found the following aggravating circumstances:  (a) prior 
violent felony (contemporaneous murder)—great weight; (b) committed during a 
robbery—great weight; and (c) heinous, atrocious, or cruel—great weight.  
Additionally, the trial court found three statutory mitigating circumstances:  (a) 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance— little weight; (b) unable to appreciate 
 
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Welch appeals his death sentences, raising multiple claims.3    Because we 
hold that the trial court’s failure to request the State’s reason for peremptorily 
striking a prospective female juror amounts to reversible error and reverse on that 
ground, we address the peremptory strike issue first. 4   
                                                                                                                                        
criminality or substantially impaired—little weight; and (c) age—some weight.  
Nine nonstatutory mitigating circumstances were also found:  (a) alcohol and drug 
abuse—little weight; (b) suicides of brother and uncle—some weight; (c) 
posttraumatic stress syndrome—some weight; (d) bipolar disorder—some weight; 
(e) lack of psychological treatment—little weight; (f) neuropsychological 
abnormalities, including abnormal brain scan—little weight; (g) dissociative 
symptoms—little weight; (h) mental, emotional, and abstract reasoning age of 
fifteen years—little weight in addition to that already given under “statutory 
mitigation” category; and (i) admitted guilt and pled guilty—very little weight.   
 
 
3.  These claims are:  (1) the trial court erred by admitting testimony of 
Welch’s previous rejections of offers of cocaine; (2) the trial court abused its 
discretion by denying Welch’s for-cause challenge; (3) the trial court erred in 
denying Welch’s motion to suppress his confession; (4) the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying Welch’s motion for a mistrial based on the State’s 
impermissible reference to the victim’s birthday and abused its discretion in 
overruling objections regarding other improper comments; (5) the trial court erred 
by refusing to ask the State to provide a gender-neutral reason when Welch 
objected to its peremptory strike of a prospective female juror; (6) the trial court 
abused its discretion by overruling Welch’s objections to the State’s argument 
based on “justice”; (7) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the cold, 
calculated, and premeditated aggravating circumstance; (8) the trial court abused 
its discretion in admitting gruesome photos; (9) Welch’s death sentences were not 
proportional; and (10) Florida’s death sentencing scheme is unconstitutional.   
 
4.  Because we reverse Welch’s death sentences and remand for a new 
penalty phase, we do not reach the proportionality issue or the for-cause challenge 
issue.  For the same reason, we also do not conduct our own sufficiency of the 
evidence analysis, do not discuss specific evidentiary issues that may not arise 
again (issues 1, 4, and 6) and only touch on several of the issues that will be 
 
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ANALYSIS 
Peremptory Strike 
 
Welch claims that the trial court committed reversible error by refusing to 
ask for a gender-neutral basis when the State used a peremptory challenge to strike 
a prospective female juror.  We agree and remand for a new penalty phase.    
During jury selection, the prosecutor struck a prospective female juror.  The 
defense objected and asked for a gender-neutral basis for the State’s peremptory 
challenge.  The colloquy went as follows:  
MR. PARKER [Prosecutor]:  Strike Ms. Napolitano. 
THE COURT:  State accept No. 3? 
MR. MCCARTHY [Defense Counsel]:  Judge, we would challenge -- 
just a second – we would ask Neil, Slappy, and Melbourne for a 
nongender basis for that. 
THE COURT:  This is his very first challenge. 
MR. MCCARTHY:  That’s fine.  Gender is a specific group.  There 
has to be a nongender basis for a peremptory challenge. 
MR. PARKER:  Does there have to be a pattern? 
MR. MCCARTHY:  No, absolutely not.  You don’t need a pattern.  
The first one is as good as the last one. 
THE COURT:  So if he exercised a challenge against a male that 
would be a gender based challenge? 
MR. MCCARTHY:  Actually, there is a case that says that. 
THE COURT:  Show me. 
MR. MCCARTHY:  Thompson v. State, 648 So. 2d. 323. 
Women are – 
THE COURT:  I need to see the case.  I don’t take summaries.  I need 
to see the case. 
                                                                                                                                        
helpful in a retrial; specifically issue 3 regarding the suppression of the confession, 
issue 7 regarding the CCP instruction issue, and issue 8 regarding the photos. 
 
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MR. MCCARTHY:  I don’t have the case.  Every group or every 
person is a -- peremptories are a joke -- every person is a group. 
Member of a group.  There has to be a non-whatever base, basis for. 
MR. PARKER:  Wouldn’t there have to be a basis for making the 
basis such as – 
MR. MCCARTHY:  She’s a female.  That is the basis. 
MR. PARKER:  Such as the defendant is a member of that particular 
group. 
THE COURT:  Or that she is the only female on the jury, which is not 
the case. 
MR. MCCARTHY:  With all due respect, both of those 
pronouncements are simply wrong under the case law. 
.  .  .   
MR. MCCARTHY:  Judge, I don’t have the case in front of me.  It 
doesn’t have the pattern that helps show if there has been a pattern of 
it, it helps whoever is objecting to the peremptories is inappropriate.  
It buttresses the challenge for the peremptory but it is not for – 
THE COURT:  I’m not going to require that on the State’s first strike. 
Defense counsel also cited Abshire v. State, 642 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 1994), a 
case in which this Court held that gender was a valid basis to object and that a 
gender neutral justification cannot be inferred from the composition of the panel.   
In Florida, potential jurors, as well as litigants, have an equal protection right 
to jury selection procedures free from discrimination based on gender, race, or 
ethnicity.  See Abshire v. State, 642 So. 2d 542, 544 (Fla. 1994); Frazier v. State, 
899 So. 2d 1169, 1175 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).  In Melbourne v. State, 679 So. 2d 
759 (Fla. 1996), we set forth the guidelines for resolving a claim of discriminatory 
use of peremptory challenges.  Melbourne, 679 So. 2d at 764; see also Dorsey v. 
State, 868 So. 2d 1192, 1198-99 (Fla. 2003).  Specifically, we stated:        
 
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A party objecting to the other side’s use of a peremptory 
challenge on racial grounds must:  a) make a timely objection on that 
basis, b) show that the venireperson is a member of a distinct racial 
group, and c) request that the court ask the striking party its reason for 
the strike.  If these initial requirements are met (step 1), the court must 
ask the proponent of the strike to explain the reason for the strike. 
At this point, the burden of production shifts to the proponent 
of the strike to come forward with a race-neutral explanation (step 2).  
If the explanation is facially race-neutral and the court believes that, 
given all the circumstances surrounding the strike, the explanation is 
not a pretext, the strike will be sustained (step 3). 
 
Melbourne, 679 So. 2d at 764 (footnotes omitted).  Abshire also states:  
The fact that several women were seated as jurors is of no moment, 
for as we have previously said “number alone is not dispositive, nor 
even the fact that a member of the minority in question has been 
seated as a juror or alternate.” State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18, 21 
(Fla.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219, 108 S. Ct. 2873, 101 L. Ed. 2d 909 
(1988); see also Johans, 613 So. 2d at 1321 (“A [gender-neutral] 
justification for a peremptory challenge cannot be inferred merely 
from circumstances such as the composition of the venire or the jurors 
ultimately seated.”). 
 
Abshire, 642 So. 2d at 544-45. 
In this case, Welch made a sufficient step one objection by objecting to the 
State’s peremptory challenge to Ms. Napolitano, alleging that Ms. Napolitano 
belonged to a specific gender group and requesting the State to provide a gender-
neutral reason for the strike.  See Carrillo v. State, 962 So. 2d 1013, 1016 (Fla. 3d 
DCA 2007) (finding the defense counsel’s statement, “I object.  He’s a man.  She 
wants to get more women on the jury,” sufficient to require an explanation of the 
strike), review denied, 973 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 2007); Thomas v. State, 885 So. 2d 
 
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968 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (finding a sufficient step one objection where the defense 
objected on the ground that the prospective juror was black and a member of a 
distinct racial class and asked for a race-neutral reason).   
The trial court misapplied well-established law by assuming that if there 
were other females on the jury or if the strike was the first such strike, no non-
gender reason need be given.  Simply put, the trial court failed to follow 
Melbourne after Welch made a qualifying step one objection.  Instead of 
requesting the State’s reason for the strike, the trial judge focused on the grounds 
for the defense’s objection.  This failure constitutes reversible error.  See Abshire, 
642 So. 2d at 545 (reversing the defendant’s conviction, vacating his death 
sentence, and remanding the case on the ground that the State’s gender-based 
peremptory challenge violated the prospective juror’s and the defendant’s rights to 
equal protection); Alsopp v. State, 855 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (reversing 
the trial court based on its failure to conduct an inquiry after the defense properly 
put the State’s strike of a prospective juror at issue).  
Since Melbourne, we have repeatedly reaffirmed the viability and value of 
the simplified procedure set forth in that decision.  Moreover, in Dorsey v. State, 
868 So.2d 1192 (Fla. 2003), despite disagreement over steps two and three, the 
Court expressed no disagreement with the simplified first step.  Id. at 1199-1201, 
1203-05. 
 
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The dissent’s argument for receding from Melbourne was recently addressed 
by Justice Pariente in State v. Whitby, 975 So. 2d 1124 (Fla. 2008) (Pariente, J., 
concurring).  We agree with that analysis. There is no need to address it further 
except to specifically quote from the conclusion of Justice Pariente’s concurrence 
in Whitby: 
As the amici [in Whitby] state, “Melbourne establishes a 
simple, precise, and easy-to-administer procedure for challenging a 
litigant’s suspected use of a peremptory challenge to discriminate 
based on race or other impermissible factors.  .  .  .  The ‘simplified 
inquiry’ adopted by this Court recognizes that little is required to 
request, and evaluate, a neutral explanation, but too much is lost if 
discrimination is permitted to remain undetected.”  Brief of Amici 
Curiae at 2. 
There is no perfect solution to the problem of discrimination in 
jury selection.  The values that this Court has sought to protect since 
Neil have been not only the rights of the defendants or other litigants 
but those of the excluded group member, and in the end the promotion 
of the fair and even-handed administration of justice.  For all these 
reasons, I conclude, as does the majority in this case by discharging 
jurisdiction, that there is no compelling reason presented to recede 
from Melbourne. 
975 So. 2d at 1130 (Pariente, J., concurring).  Accordingly, we remand for a 
new penalty phase.  In light of our reversal, we touch briefly on some of the 
remaining claims in order to provide guidance for the new penalty phase.   
Suppression of Confessions 
 
Welch claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the 
incriminating confession he made at the Brevard County Sheriff’s Office.  We do 
 
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not agree.  On December 21, 2000, Sergeant Allie Roberts and Agent Gary Harrell 
took Welch to the sheriff’s office where Agents Howard Wells and Roberts 
conducted an interview with him.  Before the interview began, Roberts read Welch 
his Miranda5 rights.  Welch stated he understood his rights, initialed and signed a 
waiver, and further said he wished to speak with the officers.  Welch, Roberts, and 
Wells spoke for approximately one and a half hours, until Welch stated twice that 
he did not wish to talk anymore.  At this point the questioning stopped.  Before 
leaving the room, Wells arrested Welch and handcuffed him.   
Harrell returned to the interview room to obtain and fill in Welch’s personal 
information on the arrest document.  After Harrell finished obtaining the necessary 
personal information, Welch was left alone for approximately forty-five minutes.  
Welch then knocked on the door, and Harrell went back into the room.  Welch 
requested water.  Before Harrell escorted Welch out of the room and to the water 
cooler, he warned Welch, “If you run, I am going to kill you, okay?  I am a damn 
good shot.  Alright?”  While they were at the water cooler, Welch asked Harrell, 
“What is going to happen to me now?”  Harrell said he expected Welch would be 
tried for the Johnson murders and face a sentence of life or death.  Harrell told 
Welch that the police did not have his side of the story, but based on all of the 
other evidence, Welch could be found guilty.  At that point, Harrell testified that 
                                          
 
 
5.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 
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Welch said he wanted to tell his side of the story.  Harrell told Welch that he would 
speak to him, but only in the presence of another officer, namely Wells.     
Once Welch, Harrell, and Wells were back in the interview room, Harrell 
again advised Welch of his Miranda rights.  He then asked Welch, “What do you 
want to say?” Welch replied, “I don’t know what to say.”  Harrell told Welch to 
“just say it.”  After a few minutes, Welch began speaking to the agents and made 
some incriminating statements. 
At the suppression hearing, Welch testified that he cooperated with law 
enforcement in order to avoid the death penalty.  Welch also testified that he did 
not tell the agents why he was cooperating because he did not think “it would do 
any good to tell them.”  At no time did Welch ask for an attorney. 
Welch argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the 
statements made during the precinct interviews.  Because law enforcement did not 
violate Welch’s constitutional rights in obtaining these statements, the trial court 
did not err in denying Welch’s motion to suppress.   
This Court has explained the standard of review for orders on motions to 
suppress:   
[A]ppellate courts should continue to accord a presumption of 
correctness to the trial court’s rulings on motions to suppress with 
regard to the trial court’s determination of historical facts, but 
appellate courts must independently review mixed questions of law 
and fact that ultimately determine constitutional issues . . . .   
 
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Connor v. State, 803 So. 2d 598, 608 (Fla. 2001).   
 
In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court determined that the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments’ prohibition against self-incrimination requires advising a 
prospective defendant that he has the right to remain silent and also the right to the 
presence of counsel.  384 U.S. at 479; Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 481-82 
(1981).  After being advised of his rights, if an accused indicates that he wishes to 
remain silent, “the interrogation must cease.”  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474; see also 
Edwards, 451 U.S. at 482.  However, even when an accused has invoked the right 
to silence or right to counsel, if the accused initiates further conversation, is 
reminded of his rights, and knowingly and voluntarily waives those rights, any 
incriminating statements made during this conversation may be properly admitted.  
See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045-46 (1983).  
Here, Welch’s statements made during his first interview at the sheriff’s 
office were clearly admissible because they were made pursuant to a voluntary, 
knowing, and intelligent waiver.  The interview only started after Welch was 
advised of his Miranda rights, stated that he understood his rights, and initialed and 
signed the waiver document.  And the interrogation stopped when Welch invoked 
his right to silence.  Therefore, Welch’s statements before his request to stop the 
interview are clearly admissible. 
 
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The critical question here is whether Welch’s self-incriminating statements 
made during the second interview after the trip to the water cooler were 
admissible.  Because (1) Welch initiated the conversation with law enforcement 
and (2) confessed only after being re-Mirandized and making a second voluntary, 
knowing, and intelligent waiver, his confession was admissible.   
First, having been left alone for more than forty-five minutes, Welch 
initiated the conversation with Harrell at the water cooler.  Welch’s unsolicited 
question to Agent Harrell—“What is going to happen to me now?”—triggered the 
conversation that eventually led to his confession.  Under Bradshaw, a suspect’s 
question regarding what would happen to him “evinced a willingness and a desire 
for a generalized discussion about the investigation.”  462 U.S. at 1045-46.   
Second, Welch’s incriminating confession was made after a voluntary, 
knowing, and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights.  Welch was again advised of 
his Miranda rights before law enforcement began the second interview.  The 
interrogating officers did not pressure Welch but waited several minutes in silence 
for Welch to talk after Welch indicated, “I don’t know what to say,” and the officer 
responded, “just say it.”  Together, these facts show that Welch understood his 
rights, knew how to use these rights, had an opportunity to consider the merits of 
silence versus confession, and intelligently decided to confess.   
 
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Where, as here, the accused had invoked his right to silence but later 
initiated a conversation with law enforcement and subsequently exercised a 
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver after being advised of his rights for the 
second time, the resulting confession is admissible under Bradshaw.  Accordingly, 
we find no error in the trial court’s denial of Welch’s motion to suppress his 
confession.      
Instruction on the Cold, Calculated, and Premeditated Aggravator 
 
Next, Welch argues that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on the 
cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP) aggravating circumstance.  Welch 
originally objected to the CCP instruction at the charge conference.  The trial court 
overruled the objection and instructed on CCP.  However, the trial court ultimately 
did not find CCP for either murder, concluding that CCP had not been proved 
beyond all reasonable doubt.   
Because the State presented relevant evidence in support of CCP, the trial 
court did not err in instructing the jury regarding the CCP aggravator.  Although an 
aggravating factor must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, Johnson v. State, 
438 So. 2d 774, 779 (Fla. 1983), a jury instruction on aggravators need only be 
supported by credible and competent evidence.  See Hunter v. State, 660 So. 2d 
244, 252 (Fla. 1995).  The fact that the State does not prove an aggravating factor 
to the court’s satisfaction does not require a conclusion that there was insufficient 
 
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evidence to allow the jury to consider that factor.  Bowden v. State, 588 So. 2d 
225, 231 (Fla. 1991).  Indeed, where evidence of a mitigating or aggravating factor 
has been presented to the jury, an instruction on the factor is required.  Id.; Stewart 
v. State, 558 So. 2d 416, 420 (Fla. 1990).   
 
Cold, calculated, and premeditated without any pretense of moral or legal 
justification means 
that the killing was the product of cool and calm reflection and not an 
act prompted by emotional frenzy, panic, or a fit of rage (cold), and 
that the defendant had a careful plan or prearranged design to commit 
murder before the fatal incident (calculated), and that the defendant 
exhibited heightened premeditation (premeditated), and that the 
defendant had no pretense of moral or legal justification. 
Williams v. State, 967 So. 2d 735, 764 (Fla. 2007) (quoting Buzia v. State, 926 So. 
2d 1203, 1214 (Fla. 2006)), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1709 (2008).  CCP can be 
indicated “by circumstances showing such facts as advance procurement of a 
weapon, lack of resistance or provocation, and the appearance of a killing carried 
out as a matter of course.”  Swafford v. State, 533 So. 2d 270, 277 (Fla. 1988).  
CCP can also be proven with evidence that a defendant had the opportunity to 
leave the crime scene but instead committed the murder.  See Alston v. State, 723 
So. 2d 148, 162 (Fla. 1998); Jackson v. State, 704 So. 2d 500, 505 (Fla. 1997).  
Proof of more time for reflection tends to show heightened premeditation.  See 
Swafford, 533 So. 2d at 277. 
 
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Here, the trial court properly instructed the jury on CCP because the State 
introduced credible and competent evidence in support of the aggravator.  
Specifically, the medical examiner stated it took Welch seven to thirty minutes, 
perhaps longer, to kill the two victims.  This evidence tended to show heightened 
premeditation because Welch had time for reflection and had an opportunity to 
abandon the murders.  Moreover, Welch’s previously prepared handwritten note 
threatening Kyoko’s life supports calculation by implying prearranged design.  
Additionally, the evidence demonstrating that after Welch murdered the victims, 
he cleaned up in the victims’ bathroom, took numerous items from the victims’ 
home, and pawned them tends to show that the murders were committed in a cold 
manner.  Given this credible and competent evidence in support of CCP, the trial 
court did not err in instructing the jury on this aggravator.   
  Admission of Photographs 
Welch also argues that the trial court erred by admitting gruesome and 
inflammatory photos, namely six crime scene photos and the victims’ autopsy 
pictures.  We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting these 
photographs.     
As we have explained,   
“The test for admissibility of photographic evidence is relevancy 
rather than necessity.”  Pope v. State, 679 So. 2d 710, 713 (Fla.1996).  
Crime scene photographs are considered relevant when they establish 
the manner in which the murder was committed, show the position 
 
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and location of the victim when he or she is found by police, or assist 
crime scene technicians in explaining the condition of the crime scene 
when police arrived.  See Looney v. State, 803 So. 2d 656, 669-70 
(Fla. 2001).  This Court has upheld the admission of autopsy 
photographs when they are necessary to explain a medical examiner’s 
testimony, the manner of death, or the location of the wounds.      
However, even where photographs are relevant, the trial court 
must still determine whether the “gruesomeness of the portrayal is so 
inflammatory as to create an undue prejudice in the minds of the 
jur[ors] and [distract] them from a fair and unimpassioned 
consideration of the evidence.”  Czubak v. State, 570 So. 2d 925, 928 
(Fla. 1990) (quoting Leach v. State, 132 So. 2d 329, 331-32 (Fla. 
1961)) (second alteration in original).  In making this determination, 
the trial court should “scrutinize such evidence carefully for 
prejudicial effect, particularly when less graphic are available to 
illustrate the same point.”  Marshall v. State, 604 So. 2d 799, 804 (Fla. 
1992).   
 
Douglas v. State, 878 So. 2d 1246, 1255 (Fla. 2004) (citations omitted).  On 
appeal, this Court reviews the admission of photographs under the abuse of 
discretion standard.  See Davis v. State, 859 So. 2d 465, 477 (Fla. 2003).  “[T]his 
Court has considered the trial court’s preliminary screening as a factor weighing in 
favor of admissibility.”  Anderson v. State, 863 So. 2d 169, 185 (Fla. 2003) 
(quoting Philmore v. State, 820 So. 2d 919, 931 (Fla. 2002)).   
 
The six crime scene pictures were clearly relevant to show the condition of 
the crime scene when the police arrived and the position and location of the bodies 
when they were found by police.  Particularly, the two crime scene pictures that 
show Kyoko’s face and torso were relevant to illustrate the nature and manner of 
 
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Kyoko’s death.  Thus, these photos were clearly admissible.  See Looney, 803 So. 
2d at 669; Brooks v. State, 787 So. 2d 765, 781 (Fla. 2001).   
Moreover, the victims’ autopsy pictures were relevant to show the heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel (HAC) aggravating circumstance.  See England v. State, 940 So. 
2d 389, 399-400 (Fla. 2006) (finding photos of decomposed victim with flesh 
sloughing off and insect larvae in wounds relevant to show, among other things, 
HAC); Willacy v. State, 696 So. 2d 693, 695 (Fla. 1997) (upholding the trial 
court’s admission of photos and videotape depicting the victim’s burned body 
because such evidence was relevant to show the circumstances of the crime and to 
establish HAC and CCP).  Furthermore, although these photographs are 
disconcerting, they are not so shocking in nature that they defeat their evidentiary 
value.  See Bowles v. State, 979 So. 2d 182, 194 (Fla. 2008); England, 940 So. 2d 
at 400.  The trial court also carefully screened the photographs before admitting 
them.  Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
admitting the crime scene and autopsy photographs.   
CONCLUSION 
As discussed above, the trial court’s failure to ask the State to provide a 
gender-neutral ground when Welch objected to the State’s peremptory challenge to 
a female juror constitutes reversible error under Melbourne.  We therefore vacate 
 
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Welch’s death sentences and remand the case to the trial court for a new penalty 
phase proceeding.     
It is so ordered. 
QUINCE, C.J., and ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, and LEWIS, JJ., concur. 
BELL, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which WELLS, 
J., and CANTERO, Senior Justice, concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
BELL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I agree with the majority opinion in all but one respect.  I disagree with the 
majority’s decision to grant Welch a new penalty phase based upon his peremptory 
challenge claim.  As Justice Cantero recently explained in his dissenting opinion in 
State v. Whitby, 975 So. 2d 1124 (Fla. 2008), this Court should join the 
overwhelming majority of other jurisdictions and replace Florida’s procedure for 
addressing the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges with the well-proven 
process the United States Supreme Court laid out more than twenty years ago in 
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 (1986).   
Under Batson, a court must (1) require the party objecting to another party’s 
use of a peremptory strike to offer a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination; 
(2) ask the proponent of the peremptory strike to provide a neutral explanation for 
the strike once the objecting party has met the prima facie burden; and (3) 
 
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determine whether the objecting party has met the burden of proving a 
discriminatory purpose.  Whitby, 975 So. 2d at 1131 (Cantero, J., dissenting) 
(citing Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 168 (2005)).  As Justice Cantero 
pointed out, 
[u]nder federal law, [the first] step “contemplates something more 
than simply establishing the minority status of the defendant and the 
exclusion of a single venire member who happens to be of the same 
race.”  That is, the federal standard requires that the party opposing 
the peremptory strike must object and “show[ ]  that the totality of the 
relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.”   
Whitby, 975 So. 2d at 1131-32 (Cantero, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).     
As the majority correctly holds, under Melbourne v. State, 679 So. 2d 759 
(Fla. 1996), a party objecting to a peremptory challenge need only show that the 
venire member the opponent seeks to remove is either a male or a female (or a 
member of any racial or ethnic group).  The objecting party is not required to make 
any prima facie showing upon which discrimination can be inferred.  As others 
have noted and as clearly established in this case, such a rule leads to unnecessary 
gamesmanship and needless reversals for purely technical reasons.  Here, the 
State’s first peremptory strike was against a female venire member.  There were 
other females on the panel.  Defense counsel objected to the strike and simply 
noted the venire member’s gender as his basis.  He offered no further basis upon 
which discrimination could be inferred because he rightly understood that he was 
not required to do so under our case law.  Not only did the trial judge perceive such 
 
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a procedure to be absurd, defense counsel himself agreed.  In response to the 
court’s inquiry into the basis for the objection, defense counsel observed that 
“peremptories are a joke—every person is [in] a group.”   
 
Defense counsel’s assessment of our law in this area is correct.  The 
majority is vacating an otherwise valid sentence for no reason other than the fact 
that the trial judge, who had absolutely no basis to infer discrimination, failed to 
require the State to give a gender-neutral explanation for its first peremptory strike 
of a female venire member (on a panel that had other females).  Such a result is 
both unnecessary and unjust.   
 
Accordingly, I concur in part and dissent in part.    
WELLS, J., and CANTERO, Senior Justice, concur. 
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Brevard County,  
Tonya B. Rainwater, Judge – Case No. 05-2000-CF-044691-AX 
 
James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Christopher S. Quarles, Assistant Public 
Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Barbara C. Davis, 
Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee