Title: The Florida Bar v. Scot Strems
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC20-806
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: December 22, 2022

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC20-806 
____________ 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR, 
Complainant, 
 
vs. 
 
SCOT STREMS, 
Respondent. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC20-842 
____________ 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR, 
Complainant, 
 
vs. 
 
SCOT STREMS, 
Respondent. 
 
December 22, 2022 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
In these consolidated cases, we have for review two referee 
reports recommending that Respondent, Scot Strems, be found 
guilty of professional misconduct and suspended for two years for 
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the gross mismanagement of his law firm (Case No. SC20-806) and 
receive a public reprimand for failing to communicate with a client 
(Case No. SC20-842).1 
As discussed below, we approve the referee’s findings of fact in 
both cases, with one exception.  We also approve in part and 
disapprove in part the referee’s recommendations as to guilt and 
findings in mitigation and aggravation in both cases.  Last, we 
disapprove the referee’s recommendations as to discipline; instead, 
we disbar Strems based on his cumulative misconduct. 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
Case No. SC20-806 
 
Strems was the sole partner and owner of the Strems Law 
Firm, P.A. (SLF), and the firm’s caseload grew significantly from its 
inception.  By 2016, the firm had only three litigation attorneys, 
with each managing approximately 700 cases.  SLF’s inadequate 
staffing and lack of sufficient office procedures resulted in client 
neglect, case dismissals, frustrated judges, and costly sanctions on 
a near weekly basis. 
 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const. 
- 3 - 
 
 
To deal with these growing pains, Strems hired a litigation 
managing attorney, Christopher Aguirre.  Aguirre drafted policies 
and procedures to improve SLF’s efficiency, and he kept Strems up 
to date on firm metrics, such as deadlines for discovery, proposals 
for settlement, and deposition requests.  But, despite Aguirre’s best 
efforts, SLF continued to neglect client matters and accrue court 
sanctions that ranged from $5,000 to $15,000 weekly. 
Indeed, between 2016 and 2018, and because of SLF 
attorneys’ willful violation of court deadlines and procedural rules, 
many SLF clients had their cases dismissed pursuant to Kozel v. 
Ostendorf, 629 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1993), which established a set of 
factors a trial court must consider in determining whether dismissal 
with prejudice is warranted where an attorney has failed to adhere 
to filing deadlines and other procedural requirements. 
In one client’s case, an SLF attorney, Orlando Romero, failed 
to discuss a counteroffer with the client, Carlton McEkron, prior to 
making the offer at mediation.  Further, in another case, when an 
SLF attorney failed to appear at a summary judgment hearing, the 
judge called SLF to speak with the attorney but was placed on hold 
for more than fifteen minutes before the judge ultimately hung up 
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and proceeded with the hearing without an SLF attorney.  
Moreover, two judges submitted affidavits describing their 
colleagues’ frequent meetings about SLF’s failure to comply with 
court orders and rules of procedure. 
Strems knew from the Kozel dismissals and weekly sanctions 
that there were issues with the management of his firm, but he took 
insufficient action to rectify the situation.  Rather than focus on his 
then-current clients and reduce the caseload SLF attorneys were 
expected to manage, SLF continued to accept 20 to 50 new cases 
per week, and Strems questioned slowdowns in accepting new 
cases. 
Further, SLF or its clients were sanctioned under section 
57.105, Florida Statutes, in some instances where SLF filed cases 
with unsupported claims.  For example, in Mora v. United Property 
& Casualty Insurance Co., No. 2017-010198-CA-01, order at 5 (Fla. 
11th Cir. Ct. Aug. 25, 2020), in what was referred to as “a textbook 
example of the appropriateness of [section] 57.105, [Florida 
Statutes], to punish and discourage the unfettered pursuit of 
frivolous lawsuits,” the court granted a motion for sanctions against 
plaintiffs and SLF, stating that they knew or should have known 
- 5 - 
 
that the plaintiff’s claim was “so devoid of merit on the face of the 
record that there was little to no prospect that it would succeed.”  
And in Mojica v. United Property & Casualty Insurance Co., No. 
CACE 16-011382, order at 6-7 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. June 22, 2020), 
the court sanctioned Mojica after finding his deposition testimony, 
sworn answers to interrogatories, and responses to requests for 
admissions regarding repairs made to the property to be untruthful.  
Although the court found SLF negligent for failing to verify its 
client’s testimony and allegations, it did not find that SLF’s conduct 
rose to the level necessary for the court to impose sanctions. 
On top of mismanaging his firm, Strems also submitted false 
or misleading affidavits in two cases where he had attempted to 
negotiate settlements.  Specifically, Strems attached to an affidavit 
a purported email chain between himself and opposing counsel, but 
he failed to include seven emails from opposing counsel that 
directly conflicted with statements in his affidavit. 
 
Based on these facts, the referee recommends that Strems be 
found guilty of violating the following provisions of the Rules 
Regulating The Florida Bar (Bar Rules):  4-1.4(a) (Communication – 
Informing Client of Status of Representation); 4-3.1 (Meritorious 
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Claims and Contentions); 4-3.2 (Expediting Litigation); 4-3.3(a) 
(Candor Toward the Tribunal – False Evidence; Duty to Disclose); 4-
3.3(b) (Candor Toward the Tribunal – Criminal or Fraudulent 
Conduct); 4-3.4(a) (Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel (lawyer 
must not unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence)); 
4-5.1(a) (Responsibilities of Partners, Managers, and Supervisory 
Lawyers – Duties Concerning Adherence to Rules of Professional 
Conduct); 4-5.1(b) (Responsibilities of Partners, Managers, and 
Supervisory Lawyers – Supervisory Lawyer’s Duties); 4-5.1(c) 
(Responsibilities of Partners, Managers, and Supervisory Lawyers – 
Responsibility for Rules Violations); 4-8.4(c) (Misconduct (lawyer 
shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation)); and 4-8.4(d) (Misconduct (lawyer shall not 
engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice)). 
Further, the referee found the following four aggravating 
factors:  (1) a pattern of misconduct; (2) multiple offenses; (3) 
submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive 
practices during the disciplinary process; and (4) substantial 
experience in the practice of law.  Additionally, the referee found six 
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mitigating factors:  (1) absence of a prior disciplinary record; (2) 
absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; (3) timely good faith effort 
to make restitution or to rectify the consequences of the 
misconduct; (4) character or reputation; (5) interim rehabilitation; 
and (6) remorse.  As a sanction, the referee recommends that 
Strems be suspended for two years, followed by one year of 
probation with special conditions, that Strems successfully 
complete the Bar’s Ethics and Professionalism School, and that 
Strems pay the Bar’s costs. 
Strems seeks review of the referee’s findings of fact; 
recommendations as to guilt, except as to rules 4-5.1(a) and 4-
5.1(b); findings regarding aggravating and mitigating factors; and 
recommended sanction.  The Bar also seeks review of the referee’s 
recommended sanction and urges this Court to permanently disbar 
Strems. 
Case No. SC20-842 
SLF represented 84-year-old client Margaret Nowak in a claim 
against her insurer for damages sustained from a hurricane.  She 
executed a contingency fee agreement that included the following 
provision: 
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2. Attorney’s Fees: Litigation: Client hereby authorizes 
Attorney to file suit against Client’s insurance carrier or 
other responsible party should they deny, reject, or 
under-pay Client’s claim.  If the payment of attorney’s 
fees is required to be determined by the Court, or if 
settlement is achieved via negotiations with the 
responsible party, attorney shall be entitled to receive all 
of such attorney’s fees, including any and all contingency 
risk factor multipliers awarded by the Court.  If a 
settlement includes an amount for attorney’s fees, 
attorney shall be entitled to receive all of its expended 
and/or negotiated fees.  In all cases whether there is a 
recovery of court-awarded fees or not, by contract or 
statute, the fee shall be thirty percent (30%) or the 
awarded amount, whichever is greater.  Pursuant to 
627.428, Florida Statute, the Insurance Company is 
responsible to pay for the Client’s attorney’s fees when 
and if, the Client prevails against the Insurance 
Company.  NO RECOVERY, NO FEE. 
 
Nowak initially informed SLF that she was willing to accept 
$30,000 as her prelitigation bottom line, with Nowak receiving 
$22,500 and SLF receiving $7,500 in attorney’s fees under the 
contingency fee agreement (which entitled the attorney to 25% of a 
prelitigation recovery).  However, SLF attorney Carlos Camejo was 
unable to obtain an acceptable settlement offer from the insurer in 
prelitigation, and Nowak authorized SLF to file suit. 
After suit was filed, the insurer offered to settle the case for 
$30,000.  When informed of this offer, Nowak stated that she would 
have accepted this offer if she would receive $22,500 and SLF 
- 9 - 
 
would receive $7,500 in attorney’s fees, but SLF’s attorney’s fees 
under the fee agreement would have prevented Nowak from 
receiving $22,500, since suit had been filed.  Thus, Camejo and 
Nowak agreed that Camejo would try to obtain a higher settlement 
offer. 
At this point, Strems took over the settlement negotiations.  
Strems failed to follow up and see if Nowak would still accept 
$22,500 as her bottom line.  However, the file that Strems reviewed 
before commencing negotiations indicated that Nowak sought a 
higher recovery than her prelitigation bottom line, as evidenced by 
Nowak’s emails with Camejo stating she had since had to replace 
an expensive tarp on the roof several times, and a mold issue arose 
due to the insurer’s delay in settling the case.  But Strems agreed to 
settle the case with the insurer’s counsel, Matthew Feldman, for 
$45,000, without Nowak’s knowledge or consent.  Feldman then 
emailed Strems to confirm that they “reached a global settlement 
agreement” and requested that SLF provide him with the settlement 
check breakdown.  Strems emailed Feldman with directions to pay 
$22,500 to Nowak and $22,500 to SLF.  Additionally, Strems wrote 
an internal memorandum stating that he relied on Nowak’s 
- 10 - 
 
settlement authority of $22,500 given to Camejo, and he then 
negotiated $22,500 for SLF’s statutory attorney’s fees and costs. 
The referee found that Strems failed to communicate this 
settlement offer to Nowak, who learned of it only when SLF sent the 
settlement documents two months later.  Nowak objected to SLF 
receiving half the insurer’s settlement offer in attorney’s fees, 
believing SLF was entitled to receive no more than 30% in attorney’s 
fees pursuant to their fee agreement, and being mistaken as to the 
applicability of the fee-shifting statute incorporated into the 
agreement.  Nowak emailed SLF requesting an explanation of the 
settlement breakdown and informed SLF that she would not be 
signing the documents. 
Relying on expert testimony, the referee did not find the 
contingency fee agreement to be illegal or prohibited, nor did she 
find SLF’s fees to be unreasonable or clearly excessive.  Thus, the 
referee recommends that Strems be found not guilty of violating 
rules 4-1.2 (Objectives and Scope of Representation), 4-1.5 (Fees 
and Costs for Legal Services), and 4-1.7 (Conflict of Interest; 
Current Clients).  However, the referee recommends that Strems be 
- 11 - 
 
found guilty of violating rule 4-1.4 (Communication) based on his 
failure to communicate the settlement offer to Nowak. 
In recommending discipline, the referee found three 
aggravating factors:  (1) prior disciplinary offenses, (2) vulnerability 
of victim, and (3) substantial experience in the practice of law.  As 
to mitigation, the referee found the following:  (1) absence of a 
dishonest or selfish motive, (2) timely good faith effort to make 
restitution or to rectify the consequences of the misconduct, and (3) 
character or reputation.  As a sanction, the referee recommends 
that Strems receive a public reprimand and pay the Bar’s costs. 
The Bar seeks review of the report of referee, challenging the 
referee’s recommendations of no guilt as to rules 4-1.2, 4-1.5, and 
4-1.7, findings as to aggravating and mitigating factors, and the 
recommended sanction.  The Bar asks this Court to consider 
Strems’ cumulative misconduct and permanently disbar him. 
II. 
ANALYSIS 
A. 
Findings of Fact and Recommendations as to Guilt 
To the extent a party challenges the referee’s findings of fact, 
the Court’s review of such matters is limited, and if a referee’s 
findings of fact are supported by competent, substantial evidence in 
- 12 - 
 
the record, this Court will not reweigh the evidence and substitute 
its judgment for that of the referee.  See Fla. Bar v. Alters, 260 So. 
3d 72, 79 (Fla. 2018) (citing Fla. Bar v. Frederick, 756 So. 2d 79, 86 
(Fla. 2000)).  To the extent a party challenges the referee’s 
recommendations as to guilt, the Court has repeatedly stated that 
the referee’s factual findings must be sufficient under the applicable 
rules to support the recommendations as to guilt.  See Fla. Bar v. 
Patterson, 257 So. 3d 56, 61 (Fla. 2018) (citing Fla. Bar v. Shoureas, 
913 So. 2d 554, 557-58 (Fla. 2005)).  Ultimately, the party 
challenging the referee’s findings of fact and conclusions as to guilt 
has the burden to demonstrate that there is no evidence in the 
record to support those findings or that the record evidence clearly 
contradicts the conclusions.  Fla. Bar v. Germain, 957 So. 2d 613, 
620 (Fla. 2007).  
Case No. SC20-806 
We first address Strems’ challenge to the referee’s findings of 
fact and recommendation that he be found guilty of violating Bar 
Rule 4-5.1(c) (Responsibilities of Partners, Managers, and 
Supervisory Lawyers – Responsibility for Rules Violations).  Under 
rule 4-5.1(c), a lawyer is responsible for another lawyer’s violation of 
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the Bar Rules if the lawyer “orders the specific conduct or, with 
knowledge thereof, ratifies the conduct involved” or “is a partner or 
has comparable managerial authority in the law firm in which the 
other lawyer practices or has direct supervisory authority over the 
other lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a time when its 
consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take 
reasonable remedial action.” 
Strems failed to responsibly manage SLF and hire enough 
attorneys to handle the mounting case load.  Additionally, he failed 
to ensure that SLF lawyers complied with rules regarding 
reasonable diligence and promptness, which led to multiple Kozel 
dismissals.  Strems’ failure to take reasonable remedial action, 
given the substantially growing firm, was, in essence, ratification of 
his associates’ actions.  His attempts to resolve the case and office 
management issues were ineffective, and he continued to take on 
new cases rather than focus on the problems consistently plaguing 
SLF.  Further, when the sanction orders were brought to Strems’ 
attention, he admonished and spoke with the attorneys involved, 
but the sanctions did not stop.  We reject Strems’ argument that he 
should not be held vicariously responsible for his associates’ 
- 14 - 
 
unproven violations because under rule 4-5.1(c), as the sole partner 
at SLF, Strems is responsible for what would constitute misconduct 
by other SLF attorneys, whether it be due to Strems’ deficient firm 
structure or SLF’s general practices.  Therefore, the referee’s 
findings of fact are supported by competent, substantial evidence 
and are sufficient to support the recommendation as to guilt, and 
we find Strems guilty of violating Bar Rule 4-5.1(c). 
Next, under Bar Rule 4-3.2 (Expediting Litigation), a lawyer 
shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with 
the interests of the client, and under Bar Rule 4-8.4(d) 
(Misconduct), a lawyer shall not engage in conduct in connection 
with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice.  Strems failed to have measures in place to prevent the 
eight Kozel dismissals, as well as the weekly sanction orders.  
Strems was aware that there was not enough staff at SLF to handle 
the volume of cases for more than two years, yet he failed to rectify 
the problem.  Further, the record demonstrates that SLF had a 
larger pattern of consistently failing to adhere to deadlines and 
disregarding court orders.  In several of the Kozel cases, for 
example, SLF failed to comply with numerous court orders and 
- 15 - 
 
violated multiple Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, and defendants 
had to file motions to compel due to SLF’s late or insufficient 
discovery responses.  Additionally, the affidavits of two trial court 
judges referred to SLF’s “blatant obstruction of justice in virtually 
every case where he and his firm enter an appearance.”  In the 
judges’ experience, SLF “engages in dilatory tactics in virtually every 
case” by “refus[ing] to participate in discovery, fail[ing] to attend 
properly notice [sic] hearings, violat[ing] court orders resulting in 
additional litigation and hearing time before the Court.”  Therefore, 
the referee’s findings are supported by competent, substantial 
evidence and are sufficient to support the recommendations as to 
guilt.  We find Strems guilty of violating both Bar Rules 4-3.2 and 
4-8.4(d). 
We now turn to Bar Rule 4-3.1(Meritorious Claims and 
Contentions), which provides that a lawyer shall not bring or defend 
a proceeding unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that 
is not frivolous.  The referee found that SLF brought a frivolous case 
in Mora, as evidenced by the sanction order stating that plaintiffs 
and their counsel knew or should have known that plaintiffs’ claim 
lacked merit.  As an initial matter, we reject Strems’ argument that 
- 16 - 
 
consideration of Mora violates his due process rights because it was 
not referenced in the Bar’s petition and was added as an exhibit 
shortly before trial, because the conduct was “clearly within the 
scope of the Bar’s accusations,” and Strems was aware of “the 
nature and extent of the charges pending against [him].”  Fla. Bar v. 
Nowacki, 697 So. 2d 828, 832 (Fla. 1997); see also Fla. Bar v. 
Fredericks, 731 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 1999).  Also, we reject his 
argument that Mora should not have been considered by the referee 
because it was on appeal, because referees in Bar disciplinary 
proceedings are “authorized to consider any evidence . . . that they 
deem relevant in resolving the factual question.”  Fla. Bar v. Rood, 
620 So. 2d 1252, 1255 (Fla. 1993).  Further, because SLF 
voluntarily dismissed its appeal, and the sanction order was not 
considered by the district court, much less reversed, Strems has 
not demonstrated how consideration of the case has harmed him. 
With respect to Strems’ claim that he was not involved in 
Mora, the record demonstrates that Strems was responsible for all 
settlement negotiations; thus, he presumably was involved in the 
case prior to suit being filed, and as sole partner of SLF, Strems 
was aware of all cases in the litigation stage.  Moreover, after the 
- 17 - 
 
defendant in Mora served the section 57.105 motion for sanctions 
on SLF, which was brought to Strems’ attention, SLF failed to 
dismiss the case during the safe harbor period.  Accordingly, the 
referee’s findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence 
and are sufficient to support the recommendation as to guilt.  We 
find Strems guilty of violating Bar Rule 4-3.1. 
Strems next challenges the findings of fact and 
recommendation that he be found guilty of violating Bar Rule 4-
3.4(a) (Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel), which provides in 
part that a lawyer must not unlawfully obstruct another party’s 
access to evidence.  The referee, relying on the orders in Mora and 
Mojica, found that Strems failed to provide information to opposing 
counsel regarding the plaintiffs’ misrepresentations.  As discussed 
above, we are unpersuaded by Strems’ assertions that 
consideration of the cases violates his due process rights and that 
the referee did not find that he was involved in or had knowledge of 
the cases.  Accordingly, the referee’s findings are supported by 
competent, substantial evidence and sufficient to support her 
recommendation as to guilt, and we find Strems guilty of violating 
Bar Rule 4-3.4(a). 
- 18 - 
 
Furthermore, Bar Rule 4-3.3(a) (Candor Toward the Tribunal – 
False Evidence; Duty to Disclose) provides that a lawyer shall not 
knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal.  
Additionally, Bar Rule 4-8.4(c) (Misconduct) provides that a lawyer 
shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation.  The referee found that Strems submitted false 
or misleading affidavits in two circuit court cases based on 
transcripts and orders from those cases.  Contrary to Strems’ claim 
that the referee cannot rely on judges’ statements that are not 
incorporated into final orders, referees are authorized to consider 
any evidence they deem relevant to resolving factual questions.  See 
Rood, 620 So. 2d at 1255.  And the trial court, in one of the cases, 
acknowledged the doctored affidavit and Strems’ removal of multiple 
emails from the email chain in its order granting the defendant’s 
motion for summary judgment as well as in a separate order 
directing the defendant to report Strems to the Bar.  Thus, because 
the referee’s findings of fact are supported by competent, 
substantial evidence and are sufficient to support the 
recommendations as to guilt, we find Strems guilty of violating Bar 
Rules 4-3.3(a) and 4-8.4(c). 
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Additionally, Strems challenges the referee’s findings and 
recommendation that he be found guilty of violating Bar Rule 4-
3.3(b) (Candor Toward the Tribunal – Criminal or Fraudulent 
Conduct), which provides that a lawyer who represents a client and 
who knows that a person intends to engage in criminal or 
fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding shall take reasonable 
remedial measures.  The referee found that SLF knew that the client 
in Mora engaged or intended to engage in fraudulent conduct.  
Although Strems asserts he had no knowledge of the case, “[a] 
person’s knowledge may be inferred from circumstances.”  R. 
Regulating Fla. Bar ch. 4 pmbl.  Among other things, the trial judge 
in Mora found that SLF:  (1) “knew that the property had preexisting 
and ongoing damage to the same area of the property claimed in 
this lawsuit”; (2) “represented Plaintiffs in a prior action and had 
documents in their possession at least two years before the reported 
date of loss” that depicted preexisting damage at the property; and 
(3) “concealed these documents or failed to make any reasonable 
inquiry of their own.”  Mora v. United Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., order at 
4-5.  Further, SLF had multiple opportunities to dismiss the case 
but refused despite the plaintiffs having admitted there was 
- 20 - 
 
preexisting damage.  The motion for sanctions was presumably 
brought to Strems’ attention, yet he failed to take corrective 
measures, such as directing his subordinates to dismiss the case, 
and SLF continued to argue before the trial judge that the damage 
was covered under the policy.  Thus, the referee’s findings that 
Strems failed to take remedial measures when his client made a 
fraudulent claim are supported by competent, substantial evidence 
and are sufficient to support the recommendation that he be found 
guilty of violating Bar Rule 4-3.3(b). 
Next, Bar Rule 4-1.4(a) (Communication – Informing Client of 
Status of Representation) provides in relevant part that a lawyer 
shall reasonably consult with the client about how the client’s 
objectives will be accomplished.  The referee found Strems guilty 
based on the case of Carlton McEkron, where SLF attorney Romero 
failed to discuss a settlement counteroffer with the client.  However, 
we disapprove the referee’s recommendation that Strems be found 
guilty of Bar Rule 4-1.4(a). 
Assuming that Romero’s conduct constitutes a violation of the 
rule, under Bar Rule 4-5.1(c), a lawyer shall be responsible for 
another lawyer’s violation of the rules if:  (1) the lawyer orders the 
- 21 - 
 
specific conduct or, with knowledge thereof, ratifies the conduct; or 
(2) the lawyer is a partner and knows of the conduct at a time when 
its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take 
reasonable remedial action.  Strems was not present at the 
mediation in the McEkron case, and there is no record evidence 
that he had knowledge of Romero’s failure to consult with McEkron 
about the counteroffer, or that he ordered or ratified Romero’s 
failure to consult.  Thus, we disapprove the referee’s 
recommendation and find Strems not guilty of violating Bar Rule 4-
1.4(a). 
Case No. SC20-842 
The Bar first challenges the referee’s recommendation that 
Strems be found not guilty of violating Bar Rule 4-1.2 (Objectives 
and Scope of Representation), which states that a lawyer must 
abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of 
representation and, as required by rule 4-1.4, must reasonably 
consult with the client as to how they are to be pursued.  We agree 
that the referee erred in recommending that Strems be found not 
guilty.  Nowak clearly sought a higher recovery due to additional 
expenses that resulted from the delay in settling the case.  Strems 
- 22 - 
 
reviewed the file prior to commencing settlement negotiations and 
was presumably aware that the client wanted more money, but he 
failed to follow up with Nowak to see if her prelitigation bottom line 
had changed.  When the insurer offered a higher settlement, Strems 
attempted to give Nowak her prelitigation bottom line, which did not 
include the additional expenses she had since incurred, and put the 
difference towards his attorney’s fees.  These facts do not support a 
finding that Strems abided by Nowak’s objectives of representation.  
We therefore disapprove the referee’s recommendation and find 
Strems guilty of violating Bar Rule 4-1.2. 
Next, the Bar challenges the referee’s recommendation that 
Strems be found not guilty of violating Bar Rules 4-1.5(a) (Fees and 
Costs for Legal Services – Illegal, Prohibited, or Clearly Excessive 
Fees and Costs)2 and 4-1.7 (Conflict of Interest; Current Clients).  
Bar Rule 4-1.5(a) prohibits an attorney from entering an agreement 
 
 
2.  The Bar also asks this Court to expressly disapprove and 
prohibit contingency fee agreements, like that used by SLF, “that 
allow the lawyer to pick the fee structure that benefits him at the 
expense of his client.”  Initial Brief at 36.  We reject that 
characterization of SLF’s fee agreement, and our analysis instead 
focuses on Strems’ application of the agreement to the facts of this 
case. 
- 23 - 
 
for, charging, or collecting an illegal, prohibited, or clearly excessive 
fee or cost.  Bar Rule 4-1.7 prohibits a lawyer from representing a 
client if the representation creates a conflict of interest, especially if 
there is a substantial risk that the representation will be materially 
limited by the lawyer’s own personal interests.  See R. Regulating 
Fla. Bar 4-1.7(a)(2) cmt. (“The lawyer’s own interests should not be 
permitted to have adverse effect on representation of a client.”)  We 
agree with the Bar that the referee erred in recommending that 
Strems be found not guilty of violating both rules while representing 
Nowak. 
The referee relied on Strems’ expert witness, who concluded 
that SLF’s attorney’s fees were not unreasonable or clearly excessive 
under the rule, and the fact that Nowak signed SLF’s fee agreement, 
which communicated the basis or rate of the fees and costs, in 
finding that Strems’ fee was not excessive under the fee agreement.  
And the referee found that there was no conflict of interest between 
Nowak and Strems.  But these findings are contrary to the record 
evidence. 
First, at the final hearing, Feldman, the attorney representing 
the insurer, disputed Strems’ claim of a bifurcated settlement, 
- 24 - 
 
stating that all his settlements with SLF were resolved on a global 
basis and he would “never” negotiate indemnity and then negotiate 
attorney’s fees unless there was a fee hearing.  A July 30, 2018, 
email from Feldman to SLF stated that his client granted him 
additional settlement authority up to $30,000 and that he hoped to 
reach “a global resolution” in the case.  After receiving this offer, 
Camejo told Nowak that he would try to obtain a higher settlement 
so that attorney’s fees would be exclusive and Nowak would receive 
more, but there was no indication that Strems would only be 
negotiating attorney’s fees. 
After negotiating with Strems, Feldman emailed him to confirm 
that they “reached a global settlement agreement” and requested 
that SLF provide him with the settlement check breakdown.  
Feldman would not have referred to a “global settlement” and asked 
Strems for the settlement breakdown if they had discussed the 
bifurcated settlement referenced in Strems’ internal memorandum.  
Considering all the circumstances, the referee’s determination that 
this was a bifurcated settlement is contradictory to the record 
evidence. 
- 25 - 
 
 
Thus, under the terms of the contingency fee agreement, SLF 
was entitled to either a 30% contingency fee or a court-awarded 
amount.  We reject Strems’ argument that any amount supposedly 
negotiated with Feldman is equivalent to court-ordered attorney’s 
fees.  See Fla. Bar v. Kavanaugh, 915 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 2005).  We 
also reject the notion that the relevant inquiry is whether a $22,500 
fee would have been reasonable in light of the fee-shifting statute 
and the work performed on the case.  Like the respondent in 
Kavanaugh, Strems attempted to collect attorney’s fees exceeding 
an amount that is allowed under his contingency fee agreement.  
We therefore disapprove the referee’s recommendation and find 
Strems guilty of violating Bar Rule 4-1.5. 
Moreover, since Strems reviewed the file prior to commencing 
negotiations with Feldman, he was clearly on notice of Nowak’s 
desire for a higher settlement.  However, Strems sought to limit 
Nowak’s recovery to her prelitigation bottom line, while attempting 
to triple his attorney’s fees.  Thus, the record demonstrates that 
there was a clear conflict of interest, with Strems unilaterally 
seeking to take a higher percentage of the global settlement, entirely 
- 26 - 
 
at his client’s expense.  Accordingly, we disapprove the referee’s 
recommendation and find Strems guilty of violating Bar Rule 4-1.7. 
B. 
Discipline 
Lastly, we address the referee’s recommendations of a 
suspension and a public reprimand as the appropriate sanctions in 
these two cases.  Prior to making a recommendation as to 
discipline, referees must consider the Standards for Imposing 
Lawyer Sanctions, which are subject to aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances, and this Court’s existing case law.  See, e.g., Fla. 
Bar v. Abrams, 919 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 2006); Fla. Bar v. Temmer, 753 
So. 2d 555, 558 (Fla. 1999).  In reviewing a referee’s recommended 
discipline, this Court’s scope of review is broader than that afforded 
to the referee’s findings of fact because, ultimately, it is the Court’s 
responsibility to order the appropriate sanction.  See Fla. Bar v. 
Kinsella, 260 So. 3d 1046, 1048 (Fla. 2018); Fla. Bar v. Anderson, 
538 So. 2d 852, 854 (Fla. 1989); see also art. V, § 15, Fla. Const. 
Additionally, the Court, in its discretion, can impose a 
combined sanction for all cases and “determine the appropriate 
discipline from the totality of the conduct as though all of the 
charges had been presented to [the Court] in one proceeding.”  Fla. 
- 27 - 
 
Bar v. Greenspahn, 396 So. 2d 182, 183 (Fla. 1981) (considering 
cumulatively the alleged misconduct in two complaints).  Given the 
severity of Strems’ misconduct, we conclude that the referee’s 
recommended disciplines are not supported, and disbarment is the 
appropriate sanction for these consolidated cases. 
Most of the Standards relied on by the referee fail to account 
for the more troubling aspects of Strems’ misconduct, particularly 
his submission of false affidavits, his inability to adequately manage 
SLF and prevent its ongoing failure to comply with court orders and 
procedural requirements, and the conflict of interest he created 
with Nowak.  We conclude that the most relevant Standards are 
Standards 4.3(a)(1) (“Disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer 
causes serious or potentially serious injury to the client and, 
without the informed consent of the affected client[] . . . engages in 
representation of a client knowing that the lawyer’s interests are 
adverse to the client’s with the intent to benefit the lawyer or 
another . . . .”); 6.1(a)(1) (“Disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer 
. . . with the intent to deceive the court, knowingly makes a false 
statement or submits a false document . . . .”); 6.2(a) (“Disbarment 
is appropriate when a lawyer causes serious or potentially serious 
- 28 - 
 
interference with a legal proceeding or knowingly violates a court 
order or rule with the intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or 
another and causes serious injury or potentially serious injury to a 
party.”); and 7.1(b) (“Suspension is appropriate when a lawyer 
knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a 
professional and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the 
public, or the legal system.”).  When the Standards are considered 
collectively, they provide for disbarment. 
Strems’ argument in Case No. SC20-806 that only Standard 
6.2(c), supporting a public reprimand, is applicable lacks merit, 
since he was not merely negligent in managing his firm.  Standard 
1.2(c)-(d) defines “negligence” as “the failure of a lawyer to heed a 
substantial risk that circumstances exist or that a result will 
follow,” and “knowledge” as “the conscious awareness of the nature 
or attendant circumstances of the conduct but without the 
conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result.”  
Strems mishandled numerous cases that resulted in weekly court 
sanctions, case dismissals, and neglected clients.  Rather than 
focusing on his then-current clients and the high caseloads his 
attorneys were inadequately managing, SLF continued to accept 
- 29 - 
 
new cases.  Strems knew from the Kozel dismissals and weekly 
sanctions that there were issues with his firm, but he consciously 
chose not to take appropriate steps. 
Further, in Case No. SC20-842, the referee only considered 
the provisions regarding a suspension or public reprimand under 
Standard 7.1 (Deceptive Conduct or Statements and Unreasonable 
or Improper Fees) based on her recommendation that Strems only 
be found guilty of violating Bar Rule 4-1.4.  However, Standards 
7.1(b) and 4.3(a) are applicable, because Strems knew Nowak 
wanted to obtain a higher net settlement when he limited her 
recovery to her prelitigation bottom line while tripling his attorney’s 
fees, and it is incredulous to believe Strems did not know this 
constituted a conflict of interest of his own making. 
We now turn to consider the referee’s findings as to the 
mitigating and aggravating factors.  “Like other factual findings, a 
referee’s findings in mitigation and aggravation carry a presumption 
of correctness and will be upheld unless clearly erroneous or 
without support in the record.  A referee’s failure to find that an 
aggravating factor or mitigating factor applies is due the same 
- 30 - 
 
deference.”  Fla. Bar v. Germain, 957 So. 2d 613, 621 (Fla. 2007) 
(citation omitted).   
In Case No. SC20-806, we disapprove the referee’s finding in 
mitigation of a dishonest or selfish motive under Standard 3.3, and 
we instead find a dishonest or selfish motive as an aggravating 
factor under Standard 3.2.  Although the referee based her finding 
on Strems’ representation that his goal was to provide good legal 
counsel for clients, this finding is unsupported by the record.  If 
Strems’ goal was to provide good legal counsel, he would not have 
let the problems that plagued SLF continue for four years.  Rather 
than hiring an adequate number of attorneys to handle the 
voluminous caseload, he continued to take on between twenty and 
fifty new cases each week and questioned slowdowns in the 
acceptance of new cases.  Strems’ focus on bringing in new cases 
rather than implementing sufficient measures to handle SLF’s 
volume of cases demonstrates his selfish motive. 
As to Case No. SC20-842, we disapprove the referee’s finding 
in mitigation of timely good faith effort to make restitution, because 
nearly sixteen months passed before Strems agreed to accept 30% 
in attorney’s fees under the fee agreement.  We also disapprove the 
- 31 - 
 
referee’s finding of absence of a dishonest or selfish motive.  
Although the referee found that there was no evidence that Strems 
would benefit personally in Nowak’s matter, as the sole owner of 
SLF, Strems benefited personally from all fees generated by the 
firm.  Further, his settlement negotiation of attorney’s fees 
amounting to 50% of the settlement offer without providing a higher 
amount for Nowak was clearly selfish.  We also disapprove the 
referee’s failure to find in aggravation that Strems committed 
multiple offenses.  Strems committed several distinct types of 
misconduct—failing to communicate the settlement offer to Nowak, 
attempting to collect an excessive fee, failing to abide by the client’s 
objectives, and engaging in a conflict of interest.  See Fla. Bar v. 
Patterson, 330 So. 3d 519 (Fla. 2021) (finding multiple offenses as 
an aggravating factor where attorney’s misconduct was not limited 
to multiple rule violations based on a single act but several distinct 
types of misconduct). 
In both cases, we approve the remainder of the referee’s 
findings as to mitigation and aggravation that are not challenged by 
either party. 
- 32 - 
 
We now consider the relevant case law.  In Florida Bar v. 
Shoureas, 892 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 2004), we suspended a lawyer for 
three years for agreeing to represent clients, accepting fees, and 
then taking little or no significant action and not responding to 
client inquiries.  Significantly, “[a]lthough the referee did not 
specifically find that Shoureas ‘knowingly’ failed to perform the 
agreed-upon services, the fact that she failed to respond to repeated 
inquiries indicates that she was aware of, or reasonably should 
have been aware of, her inaction.”  Id. at 1008.  Additionally, in 
Florida Bar v. Adorno, 60 So. 3d 1016 (Fla. 2011), we suspended a 
lawyer for three years for violating Bar Rules 4-1.5, 4-1.7, and 4-8.4 
based upon Adorno’s negotiating to the detriment of other class 
members when he settled for named plaintiffs in an amount 
“grossly disproportionate to the value of their individual claims” and 
received a $2 million fee for his firm.  Id. at 1024.   
Further, Florida Bar v. Kane, 202 So. 3d 11 (Fla. 2016), is 
somewhat factually similar to Case No. SC20-842.  In Kane, the 
Court disbarred three attorneys who secretly negotiated a 
settlement that created conflicts of interest between lawyers and 
clients, abandoned clients’ claims in favor of greater attorney’s fees 
- 33 - 
 
for themselves, and withheld from clients information about the 
settlement to further their own interests.  The Court approved the 
referee’s finding of the following aggravating factors:  (1) pattern of 
misconduct over several years, (2) multiple offenses, (3) false 
statements during the disciplinary proceedings, (4) refusal to 
acknowledge the wrongful nature of conduct, (5) substantial 
experience in the practice of law, and (6) indifference to making 
restitution.  202 So. 3d at 26. 
 
As in Kane, there are multiple aggravating factors present in 
Case No. SC20-842, including a dishonest or selfish motive.  
However, Strems’ failure to disclose the settlement to Nowak was 
not based on secret negotiations, nor did he abandon his client’s 
claims; rather, he created a conflict with his client by negotiating a 
larger settlement but limiting Nowak’s recovery to her bottom line 
and interpreting his fee agreement as permitting him to take nearly 
half the offer for his attorney’s fees. 
We have also considered that in excessive fee cases, the Court 
has previously imposed ninety-one-day suspensions.  See, e.g., Fla. 
Bar v. Carlon, 820 So. 2d 891, 899 (Fla. 2002); Fla. Bar v. 
Richardson, 574 So. 2d 60, 63 (Fla. 1990).  And in conflict-of-
- 34 - 
 
interest cases, the Court has imposed an eighteen-month 
suspension and a one-year suspension.  Fla. Bar v. Herman, 8 So. 
3d 1100, 1108 (Fla. 2009); Fla. Bar v. Patterson, 257 So. 3d 56 (Fla. 
2018).  Thus, Strems’ misconduct in Case No. SC20-842 alone 
warrants a rehabilitative suspension of at least one year. 
Also, Florida Bar v. Springer, 873 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 2004), is 
instructive as to both cases.  In Springer, an attorney was disbarred 
for numerous instances of gross misconduct, spanning over five 
years, including:  (1) failing to provide competent representation; (2) 
failing to act with reasonable diligence; (3) failing to keep his clients 
reasonably informed; (4) providing falsified copies of documents to 
clients; (5) failing to file pleadings that led to a default judgment 
entered against his client; and (6) failing to comply with court 
orders regarding discovery. 
Strems’ cumulative misconduct in both cases, which ranged 
from 2016 to the time of his emergency suspension in 2020, is 
similarly worthy of disbarment.  For example, Strems failed to 
communicate with Nowak regarding the settlement offer in her case 
prior to accepting the insurer’s offer and then attempted to keep the 
amount offered that was above Nowak’s bottom line as SLF’s 
- 35 - 
 
attorney’s fees.  Additionally, multiple clients’ cases were dismissed 
with prejudice pursuant to Kozel after SLF failed to comply with 
court filing deadlines and procedural requirements.  Also, Strems 
submitted false affidavits, and SLF should have known that the 
clients’ claims in Mora and Mojica were fraudulent.  More 
significantly, Strems failed to fully address the underlying issues 
facing SLF that resulted from continuing to take on new cases 
weekly rather than focus on the firm’s already substantial caseload. 
When all the violations are considered together, the totality of 
Strems’ misconduct warrants disbarment, which would achieve the 
three purposes of attorney discipline.  See Fla. Bar v. Dupee, 160 
So. 3d 838, 853 (Fla. 2015) (“The purposes of attorney discipline 
are:  (1) to protect the public from unethical conduct without undue 
harshness towards the attorney; (2) to punish misconduct while 
encouraging reformation and rehabilitation; and (3) to deter other 
lawyers from engaging in similar misconduct.”)  First, the public 
needs to be protected from Strems’ unethical conduct, evidenced by 
what appears to be SLF’s practice of interpreting an ambiguously 
drafted fee agreement in its favor, as well as its then-ongoing failure 
to comply with court orders and procedures.  Second, Strems must 
- 36 - 
 
be disciplined for his misconduct, which continued into the 
disciplinary proceedings.  Third, other lawyers must be deterred 
from engaging in similar misconduct.  Disbarring Strems will place 
other lawyers on notice that this Court will not tolerate similar 
misconduct. 
Regarding the Bar’s request that Strems be permanently 
disbarred, Strems’ misconduct in the instant cases does not 
warrant such a sanction.  Although he has certainly engaged in 
ethically questionable behavior, he has not demonstrated that he is 
not amenable to rehabilitation.  Permanent disbarment is 
warranted only where an attorney’s conduct indicates he or she 
engages in a persistent course of unrepentant and egregious 
misconduct and is beyond redemption.  See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Norkin, 
183 So. 3d 1018 (Fla. 2015); Fla. Bar v. Behm, 41 So. 3d 136 (Fla. 
2010). 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
Accordingly, Scot Strems is hereby disbarred from the practice 
of law in the State of Florida.  Because Strems is currently 
suspended, this disbarment is effective immediately.  Strems shall 
fully comply with Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-5.1(h).  Strems 
- 37 - 
 
shall also fully comply with Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-6.1, 
if applicable. 
Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson 
Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from 
Scot Strems in the amount of $45,563.34, for which sum let 
execution issue. 
 
It is so ordered. 
MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, POLSTON, LABARGA, COURIEL, and 
GROSSHANS, JJ., concur. 
FRANCIS, J., did not participate. 
 
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER 
THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS DISBARMENT. 
 
Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar 
 
Joshua E. Doyle, Executive Director, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, 
Florida, Patricia Ann Toro Savitz, Staff Counsel, The Florida Bar, 
Tallahassee, Florida, and John D. Womack, Bar Counsel, The 
Florida Bar, Miami, Florida; and Chris W. Altenbernd of Banker 
Lopez Gassler, P.A., Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Complainant 
 
Benedict P. Kuehne and Michael T. Davis of Kuehne Davis Law, 
P.A., Miami, Florida; Kendall Coffey of Burlington, P.L., Miami, 
Florida; Mark Kamilar of Law Office of Mark A. Kamilar, Coconut 
Grove, Florida; Scott K. Tozian and Gwendolyn H. Daniel of Smith, 
Tozian, Daniel & Davis, P.A., Tampa, Florida; and Nelson David 
Diaz of LNL Law Group, PLLC, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent