Title: State v. Moran
Citation: 400 So. 2d 1359
Docket Number: 80-K-1884
State: Louisiana
Issuer: Louisiana Supreme Court
Date: July 2, 1981

400 So. 2d 1359 (1981) STATE of Louisiana v. Douglas MORAN. No. 80-K-1884. Supreme Court of Louisiana. July 2, 1981. *1360 Michael W. Shannon, Alexandria, for defendant-relator. William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Edwin O. Ware, Dist. Atty., J. Edward Hines, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-respondent. LEMMON, Justice.[*] We granted defendant's application for certiorari to review his conviction of criminal neglect of family in violation of R.S. 14:74. Defendant's primary contention, insufficiency of evidence to support the conviction, is based on the assertion that the trial judge imputed support payments, made during February through May, 1980, to defendant's debt for support payments due in 1979 under a judgment in a civil suit (see C.C. art. 2166) and found as a matter of law that defendant had not made any support payments in 1980. Defendant and his wife were married on July 3, 1970. One son was born of the marriage. The parties subsequently separated, and the judgment of separation, rendered on August 30, 1979, ordered defendant to pay $200 per month for the support of his minor son. At the trial of the charge now under consideration defendant testified that he was unable to pay support until December, 1979 because he was out of work, first because of a strike and then because of an injury. He further testified that he divided with his wife $600 in disability benefits received in December, 1979; that he sold the family home in January, 1980 and divided with his wife the sum of $14,000, which remained from the net proceeds of the sale after payment of bills amounting to $6,000; and that he used his half of the net proceeds to pay other community debts. Defendant began making child support payments in February 1980. He paid $100 on February 2, $50 on February 29, $150 on March 21, $150 on April 11, and $100 on May 23, 1980. During that period of time he was earning net monthly wages of about $900. On May 21, 1980 defendant's wife lodged a complaint with the district attorney, asserting that no support payments had been made since April 11 and that her former husband had stated he would not make any *1361 payments during the summer months. On June 16, 1980 the district attorney filed a bill of information charging that between April 11, 1980 and May 21, 1980 defendant violated R.S. 14:74 in that he intentionally failed to provide support for his minor son, who was then in necessitous circumstances. The case was tried on July 30, 1980. Following the close of evidence and arguments by counsel, the trial judge conscientiously reviewed all of the evidence presented. Noting that defendant was in arrears on his civil support judgment, the trial judge imputed the 1980 support payments to the debt due beginning in September, 1979 and accordingly concluded that no payments were made during 1980. In rendering and explaining his verdict of guilty, the trial court stated: We granted certiorari to review this ruling. 392 So. 2d 1055 (La. 1980). In order to convict a parent under R.S. 14:74 A(3), the state must prove that a parent intentionally failed to support his child, that the parent had financial means or ability to provide support, and that the child was in destitute or necessitous circumstances.[2] Defendant contends that the state had to prove all of these essential elements and failed to prove any. Under the statute which prohibits desertion or nonsupport of minor children an intentional failure to perform constitutes the crime. R.S. 14:8 (1). The purpose of the statute is to compel performance when the accused is capable but unwilling to perform and not merely to punish for nonperformance.[3] The usual defense to a charge under the statute is that the parent is willing but unable to perform (or that the child is not in necessitous circumstances). In the present case, however, the parent did perform his support obligation to some extent, and the question is whether that performance, in the light of the record proof of the parent's means and ability and the child's necessitous circumstances, is sufficient to escape criminal culpability. The trial judge in this case erred in imputing defendant's February through May contributions to his child's support to *1363 his antecedent debt under a civil judgment. We could set aside the conviction based on trial error and remand for a new trial, at which the same evidence and additional evidence can be introduced. However, the record is complete, and the facts are not in dispute. Since defendant's assignment of error is sufficiency of evidence, which is an issue of law, the issue can be decided by this court just as well as by the trial court, without the necessity of a remand.[4] We note first that the amount of support required by R.S. 14:74 is not necessarily coextensive with the amount of support which may be (or may have been) fixed under different standards applicable to the determination of a civil obligation for child support.[5] Thus, while evidence of a parent's partial or total failure to discharge his civil obligation is admissible, that evidence is not alone determinative of his guilt of criminal neglect of family. See State v. Guillot, 389 So. 2d 68 (La. 1980). But whatever defendant's civil obligation is in this case under C.C. art. 227 or under the civil judgment ordering payment of $200 per month, the determination of defendant's criminal liability depends upon proof of the elements of the crime listed in the criminal statutes.[6] Under the facts established in this record (with the payments viewed as made on the actual dates of payment), we hold that the state has failed to establish intentional nonsupport. Defendant provided his wife with half of his disability benefits and half of the net proceeds of the sale of the family home. When he returned to work, he provided approximately $150 per month, (1/6 of his net monthly wages) for the support of one child, in addition to paying $50 per month for the support of an illegitimate child. We simply cannot conclude that this evidence proves criminal nonsupport beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly since the mother also earned approximately $420 net per month and the record contained virtually no proof of the child's necessitous circumstances.[7] The judgment is reversed, and the matter is remanded with instructions to grant a judgment of acquittal. [*] Judges Frederick S. Ellis, Luther F. Cole and J. Louis Watkins of the First Circuit Court of Appeal participated in this decision as associate justices ad hoc, joined by Chief Justice Dixon and Associate Justices Marcus, Watson and Lemmon. [1] Even if the civil law were applicable, the imputation is arguably incorrect. C.C. art. 2166 requires imputation of the debt which the debtor at the time of payment had most interest in discharging. Since a parent is subject to criminal sanctions for current failure to support his child, it must be presumed that defendant had most interest in discharging his current support obligation in order to avoid criminal penalties. [2] R.S. 14:74 A(3) provides: "A. Criminal neglect of family is the desertion or intentional nonsupport: * * * * * * "(3) by either parent of his minor child who is in destitute or necessitous circumstances when such parent has the financial means or ability to provide support, there being a duty established by this Section for either parent to support his child." [3] Indeed, the penalty portion of the statute accords the trial judge the additional authority to order future periodic payments in lieu of, or in addition to, fine or imprisonment. One purpose of this additional authority is to enable a spouse or a child (through the proper representative) to obtain support when no suit for divorce or separation has been filed. [4] Prior to the decision in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979) sufficiency of evidence was frequently considered to be an issue of fact and therefore not reviewable by this court in a criminal case. See, for example, State v. Austin, 374 So. 2d 1252 (La. 1979). However, sufficiency of evidence is now recognized as an issue of law and subject to review in a criminal case under the Jackson standard. See, for example, State v. Byrd, 385 So. 2d 248 (La. 1980). [5] Evidence introduced by either side need not be limited to the period stated in the bill of information. Either side may present evidence relating to dates before or after the dates stated in the bill, in order to show patterns of contribution or needs, and the bounds of relevancy are to be determined by the trial judge. [6] In State v. Galjour, 41 So. 2d 215 (La. 1949) and State v. Austin, above, this court recognized the distinction between the obligation imposed by the Civil Code and the affirmative duty imposed by the criminal statutes. [7] A parent's duty under the criminal law to support his child involves more than salvation from destitution. Proper considerations are requirements for food, shelter, clothing, health, education and comfort, determined in the light of the circumstances of all persons involved.