Title: STATE v BOUSLAUGH
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13737
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: March 21, 1978

No. 13737 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1978 THE STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, -vs- CARTER BOUSLAUGH, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, Honorable Charles Luedke, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: lloses, Tolliver and Wright, Billin~s, Montana R. Allen Beck argued, Billings, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana J. Mayo Ashley argued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana Harold F. Hanser, County Attorney, argued, Billings, Montana James Walen, Deputy County Attorney, argued, Billings, Montana Submitted: January 26, 1978 ~ecided#RR 2 2 7978 MbL, ,- - ,-?I Filed: M r . Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court: Defendant Carter Bouslaugh was charged i n the D i s t r i c t Court, Yellowstone County, with having committed the crime of aggravated assault on July 18, 1976, in violation of section 94-5-202(1)(b), R.C.M. 1947. Following a jury t r i a l he was convicted and sentenced t o serve 10 years i n the Montana s t a t e prison. Defendant appeals the conviction. The issues presented on appeal are: 1) Whether by refusing t o include an offered instruction on misdemeanor assault, the t r i a l court committed reversible error? 2) Whether by refusing an offered instruction pointing out that a shooting alone is not sufficient to obtain a conviction, the t r i a l court committed reversible error? 3) Whether the t r i a l court committed reversible error i n refusing offered instructions dealing with specific intent and mens rea or criminal intent? O n July 18, 1976, a t a motorcycle hillclimb south of Billings, Montana, defendant Carter Bouslaugh was involved i n a f i s t fight which was precipitated by Don Maxwell who accused defendant of stealing h i s beer cooler. Following a short, one- sided fight between Maxwell and defendant, another fight broke out between Mike Donovan and defendant. After a five t o f i f t e e n minute fight, defendant retreated and attempted t o get into h i s pickup. During t h i s affray, defendant's glasses were knocked off and lost. A t the time defendant t r i e d t o get into h i s pickup, he appeared t o be tired and trying to avoid any further fighting. When Bouslaugh reached h i s pickup and attempted t o get inside, he was hindered by Mike Donovan who slammed defendant's leg i n the door. Bouslaugh then got out of h i s pickup with a .44 magnum p i s t o l i n h i s hand. He shot it i n the a i r and told everyone to leave him alone. This warning deterred Donovan who took off looking for cover. A t t h i s time Bouslaugh could s t i l l not leave the hillclimb s i t e because other vehicles blocked h i s pickup truck. Bouslaugh then went to the rear of h i s vehicle where Ken Boulet and Kerry Loran and other spectators were located. A s Bouslaugh approached, Kerry Loran told him t o put h i s gun down, Bouslaugh pointed the gun a t them and told them t o back off. Nevertheless, Loran stepped toward defendant who turned -toward him, pointed the gun a t him, and pushed it toward him. While pushing the gun toward Loran, the weapon discharged and the b u l l e t struck Kerry Loran i n the chest. Both the victim and Boulet t e s t i f i e d t h a t a t t h i s time they did not believe Bouslaugh was going t o shoot anybody, since he had no reason for doing so. After the victim was shot a group of men attacked Bouslaugh and took the gun from him. In the ensuing struggle three other shots were f i r e d , one h i t t i n g a bystander i n the arm. Defendant contends he had no specific intent to assault Loran and the gun e i t h e r accidently discharged, or discharged due t o ~ o u s l a u g h ' s negligence. It is a fundamental rule t h a t the court's instructions should cover every issue or theory having support i n the evidence. State v. Thomas, 147 Mont. 325, 413 P.2d 315. Here, defendant was charged with aggravated assault i n violation of section 94-5-202, R.C.M. 1947, which provides: I I A person commits the offense of aggravated assault if he purposely or knowingly causes: " ( b ) Boaily injury to another with a weapon." The District Court refused to give a lesser included offense instruction of mtsdemeanor assault. Under section 94-5-201, R.C.M. 1947: " ( 1 ) A person commits the offense of assault if he: " * * * " ( b ) negligently causes bodily injury to another with a weapon * * * . I 1 The difference between aggravated assault and the lesser included offense of misdemeanor assault is the intent of defendant at the time the crime was committed. From a review of the record, it becomes readily apparent there was ample evidence to put into question whether the defendant knowingly or purposely shot the victim, or negligently shot the victim. Montana's standard for determining whether there has been sufficient evidence as to a theory introduced to warrant the granting of an instruction is set forth in State v. Buckley, (1976), Mont . , 557 P.2d 283, 33 St. Rep. 1204, 1207: "* * * the district court's instructions must cover every issue or theory having support in the evidence, and the inquiry of the district court must only be whether or not any evidence exists in the record to warrant an instruction on mitigated deliberate homi- cide .I1 This is the standard to be used when dealing with all lesser included instructions, regardless of the offense. The United States Supreme Court in Keeble v. United States, (1973), 412 U.S. 205, 93 S.Ct. 1993, 36 L ed 2d 844, said that the defendant is entitled to instructions on a lesser in- cluded offense, if evidence would permit the jury rationally to find him guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater. I n the case before us the record i s replete with such evidence. The transcript shows the victim Kerry Loran, a t the time of the shooting,did not believe defendant was going to shoot him. There was also testimony given by various expert witnesses a s t o defendant's vision without h i s glasses, i.e., without h i s glasses Bouslaugh's vision was 401400 or legally blind. Other spectators t e s t i f i e d that defendant had been beaten up substantially and he seemed unstable a t the time he came from the pickup with the gun. It i s clear from the evidence a reasonable inference may be drawn that defendant accidently or negligently shot the victim and therefore it was prejudicial error t o refuse to give the jury an instruction on misdemeanor assault. The s t a t e contends the crime committed was either aggravated assault or no crime a t a l l . In State v. Baugh, (1977), Mont . , 571 P.2d 779, 34 St.Rep. 1315, 1318, the defendant was convicted of deliberate homicide. Defendant argued he was prejudiced by the t r i a l court's refusal t o give a lesser included instruction on mitigated deliberate homicide. I n Baugh there was no evidence of any factors tending t o instigation and t h i s Court held: "' * * * I n many instances, however, the evidence i s such a s t o show that the defendant i s either guilty of the offense charged or is entitled t o an acquittal. I n such cases the court may not be put i n error for refusing or failing t o instruct as t o the lower degree of the included offense.'" 571 P.2d 781. See also: State v. McDonald, (1915), 51 Mont. 1, 16, 149 P. 279. From our record the jury could have found, had it been properly instructed, that defendant was guilty of the lesser included offense of misdemeanor assault. The record indicates: 1) The gun went off while defendant was i n the middle of a sentence. 2) Defendant, who l o s t h i s glasses early i n the fight, is legally blind without them. 3) Defendant by firing the gun in the a i r demonstrated no intent t o harm anyone. 4 ) None of the many witnesses could t e s t i f y they thought defendant intended t o shoot the victim. 5) Defendant appeared t i r e d and unstable. 6 ) Defendant told everyone around him t o stay away. 7) D r . Trunnel t e s t i f i e d that due t o defendant's mental make-up, confusion caused by the fight, and h i s almost t o t a l loss of vision without h i s glasses, he would suffer a decompen- sation function, which means defendant would be very upset and con£ used. The judgment of the t r i a l court is reversed and the sentence i s vacated. The cause is remanded for a new t r i a l , consistent with t h i s opinion. A ' / Justice / W e Concur: \ Chief Justice. Mr. Justice John C. Harrison dissenting: I dissent. The testimony that the witness was not afraid that the appellant would shoot him should have been rejected. The witness's state of mind was neither material to the crime with which appellant was charged, nor relevant to the jury's determination whether the weapon was exhibited in a threatening manner. The purpose of the statute is to make punishable acts that endanger or are likely to endanger other persons without any specific intent to do so. Whether or not he drew the weapon for self- , defense was a fact question to be determined by the jury and here they found contra to the appellant's contentions and in my opin- ion we are bound by their finding. I would affirm the conviction.