Title: K.J. v. Superintendent of Bridgewater State Hospital
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13081
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: September 8, 2021

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SJC-13081 
 
K.J.  vs.  SUPERINTENDENT OF BRIDGEWATER STATE HOSPITAL 
& another.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     April 5, 2021. - September 8, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Practice, Civil, Commitment of mentally ill person.  
Constitutional Law, Separation of powers, Severability.  
Commissioner of Correction.  Pretrial Detention.  
Incompetent Person, Commitment.  Mental Health.  Statute, 
Validity, Severability. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on February 3, 2021. 
 
The case was reported by Georges, J. 
 
 
Karen Owen Talley, Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
for the plaintiff. 
Edward J. O'Donnell for the defendants. 
Tatum A. Pritchard, Jennifer Honig, & Martin F. Murphy, for 
Disability Law Center, Inc., & others, amici curiae, submitted a 
brief. 
Patricia Reilly, Assistant District Attorney, for District 
Attorney for the Plymouth District & others, amici curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
 
1 Commissioner of Correction. 
2 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  This is a case about the separation of powers 
concerns implicated by the placement of a pretrial detainee or 
prisoner who is involuntarily committed on account of mental 
illness.  In this context, G. L. c. 123 requires a judge in a 
commitment proceeding to determine first whether the person 
requires involuntary commitment and, if so, whether that 
commitment should take place at the Bridgewater State Hospital 
(Bridgewater) or at a lower security Department of Mental Health 
(DMH) facility.2  See G. L. c. 123, §§ 8, 18 (a).  Giving the 
judge authority not only over the commitment decision, but also 
over whether placement will occur at Bridgewater or a DMH 
facility, is in line with the purpose of c. 123, which the 
Legislature completely revised in 1970 to expand access to 
courts for those committed involuntarily because of mental 
illness, and which also requires that involuntary commitments 
occur in the least restrictive option available.  See 
Commonwealth v. Nassar, 380 Mass. 908, 912 n.5, 917-918 (1980). 
 
The plaintiff, K.J., is a pretrial detainee who was 
previously committed to Bridgewater under G. L. c. 123, 
 
2 Bridgewater State Hospital (Bridgewater) is a medium 
security Department of Correction facility.  It has a secure 
perimeter, composed of a double fence, topped with razor wire.  
Conditions of confinement are more restrictive than at 
Department of Mental Health (DMH) facilities, although DMH 
facilities are also locked. 
3 
 
§ 18 (a), the provision of c. 123 that deals with commitment of 
pretrial detainees and prisoners.  Section 18 (a) also 
incorporates §§ 7 and 8 for subsequent commitment hearings.  
After a hearing on a petition to recommit K.J. to Bridgewater 
for one year, the judge determined that K.J. was mentally ill, 
posed a likelihood of serious harm if not confined, and 
therefore required commitment.  See G. L. c. 123, §§ 8 (a), 
18 (a).  To commit a person3 to Bridgewater, however, a judge 
must additionally find that strict custody is required.  See 
G. L. c. 123, §§ 8 (b), 18 (a).  The judge here found that K.J. 
did not require strict custody and, thus, as the statute 
required him to do, issued an order committing K.J. to a DMH 
facility.  See id. 
 
Despite that order, however, the Commissioner of Correction 
(commissioner) utilized what we call the "commissioner's 
certification" provision in § 18 (a) to retain K.J. at 
Bridgewater.4  We must now determine whether the commissioner's 
 
3 Bridgewater only houses male patients.  G. L. c. 123, 
§ 7 (b). 
 
4 The commissioner's certification provision in G. L. 
c. 123, § 18 (a), states: 
 
"[N]otwithstanding the court's failure, after an initial 
hearing or after any subsequent hearing, to make a finding 
required for commitment to the Bridgewater state hospital, 
the prisoner shall be confined at said hospital if the 
findings required for commitment to a facility are made and 
 
4 
 
exercise of this provision violates art. 30 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights, which, among other things, protects the 
independence of the judiciary by prohibiting other branches from 
overturning court orders.5  We hold that it does.6 
 
Background.  K.J. is an adult man who currently faces 
criminal charges in the Worcester Division of the District Court 
and in the Superior Court.7  K.J. initially was charged in the 
District Court on December 10, 2018, and held on bail.  On 
December 11, 2018, K.J. was committed involuntarily to 
Bridgewater.  In April of 2019, K.J.'s commitment to Bridgewater 
was extended for a period of six months, and then, in December 
of 2019, for an additional period of one year.  See G. L. 
 
if the commissioner of correction certifies to the court 
that confinement of the prisoner at said hospital is 
necessary to insure his continued retention in custody." 
 
 
5 K.J. also argues that his substantive and procedural due 
process rights were violated, and that the statute violates 
equal protection principles.  Because we base our holding on 
art. 30, we do not address these arguments. 
 
6 We acknowledge the amicus letters submitted in this case:  
one by Disability Law Center, Inc., the Mental Health Legal 
Advisors Committee, and the Boston Bar Association; and the 
other by the district attorney for the Plymouth district, joined 
by the district attorney for the eastern district, the district 
attorney for the Bristol district, and the district attorney for 
the middle district. 
 
7 K.J. is charged in the District Court with assault and 
battery on a police officer, G. L. c. 265, § 13D, and in the 
Superior Court with armed assault with intent to murder, G. L. 
c. 265, § 18 (b). 
5 
 
c. 123, §§ 7, 8, 18 (a).  On December 2, 2020, the medical 
director of Bridgewater petitioned to have K.J. again 
recommitted for one year under § 18 (a).  See id. 
The Brockton Division of the District Court, sitting at 
Bridgewater, held a hearing via Zoom video conferencing on 
January 6, 2021.8  In support of its petition, Bridgewater called 
a licensed psychologist as its sole witness.  The psychologist 
testified that K.J. meets the diagnostic criteria for 
schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, and that he currently 
experiences auditory hallucinations, paranoia, and somatic 
delusions.  The psychologist testified that historically the 
exacerbation of K.J.'s symptoms has led to aggressive behaviors 
and serious bodily injury to other people, but that he had not 
engaged in any physical assaults or altercations since July or 
August 2020.  The psychologist also testified that K.J. 
currently was incapable of returning to a penal setting because 
such an environment would not be able to enforce his court-
ordered medication plan and because it could be destabilizing.  
The psychologist testified that a DMH facility would be able to 
enforce K.J.'s medication plan, although a transfer to such a 
 
8 Zoom Video Communications, Inc., is an Internet-based 
video conferencing platform.  See Vazquez Diaz v. Commonwealth, 
487 Mass. 336, 336 (2021). 
6 
 
facility could be destabilizing.  Finally, the psychologist 
testified that K.J. had never attempted to escape. 
 
K.J. testified on his own behalf.  He stated that he knew 
he had a mental illness.  He also testified that he takes all 
his medications as prescribed and has had no signs or incidences 
of violence in more than six months.  K.J. asserted that he 
hoped that he would be recognized for doing well and would have 
the opportunity to transfer to a DMH facility. 
 
After hearing the testimony, the judge ordered that K.J. be 
transferred to a DMH facility.  In the ruling, the judge found 
that K.J. was mentally ill, that failure to retain him in a 
facility would create a likelihood of serious harm, and that 
there was no less restrictive alternative.  Following its 
receipt of the judge's order, Bridgewater filed a certification 
by the commissioner pursuant to § 18 (a).  The one-sentence 
certification stated only that commitment to Bridgewater was 
"necessary to ensure his continued retention in custody." 
 
K.J. then filed a motion to find Bridgewater in contempt of 
a court order, requesting immediate release to a DMH facility, 
which Bridgewater opposed.  The same judge who had issued the 
§ 18 (a) order held a nonevidentiary hearing where he further 
explained his ruling from the prior hearing:  that while there 
was some evidence that K.J. required strict security, it did not 
7 
 
rise to the level of beyond a reasonable doubt.  Moreover, the 
judge noted, there was no evidence that K.J. was a flight risk. 
 
Despite this, the judge ultimately denied K.J.'s motion to 
hold Bridgewater in contempt.  The judge wrote: 
"[T]his court is troubled by [Bridgewater]'s arbitrary 
application of the provisions of [§ 18 (a)] and the clear 
separation of powers issues raised by the certification 
process.  However, the appropriate avenue is a direct 
appeal of the certification process and any other issue(s) 
raised by the hearing on the petition." 
 
 
K.J. filed a petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, 
seeking release from Bridgewater and enforcement of the District 
Court judge's commitment order to a DMH facility.  A single 
justice reserved and reported the case to the full court. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Separation of powers.  "Massachusetts is 
one of only a few States to articulate an explicit separation of 
powers in our Constitution."  Commonwealth v. Cole, 468 Mass. 
294, 301 (2014).  Article 30 is that explicit statement; it 
provides: 
"In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative 
department shall never exercise the executive and judicial 
powers, or either of them:  the executive shall never 
exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of 
them:  the judicial shall never exercise the legislative 
and executive powers, or either of them:  to the end it may 
be a government of laws and not of men." 
 
 
Although we have "recognized that separation of powers does 
not require three 'watertight compartments' within the 
government" (citation omitted), Opinions of the Justices, 372 
8 
 
Mass. 883, 892 (1977), this recognition does not dissipate the 
importance of art. 30.  The limitations of art. 30 must still be 
"scrupulously observed."  Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 432 Mass. 
613, 619 (2000).  Among other ways, the executive and 
legislative branches violate art. 30 where they "impermissibly 
interfere with judicial functions when they purport to restrict 
or abolish a court's inherent powers, or when they purport to 
reverse, modify, or contravene a court order" (citations 
omitted).  Gray v. Commissioner of Revenue, 422 Mass. 666, 671 
(1996). 
 
K.J. alleges that the commissioner's certification causes 
both types of interferences.  Because the judge ordered K.J. to 
be committed to a DMH facility as the statute instructed him to 
do, see G. L. c. 123, § 8 (b), and because the commissioner 
essentially overruled that order by deciding to keep K.J. at 
Bridgewater anyway, we agree with K.J. that the commissioner's 
certification allows the executive branch to "reverse, modify, 
or contravene a court order."  Gray, 422 Mass. at 671.  Thus, it 
violates art. 30.9 
 
a.  Legal principles.  As far back as 1861, we have held 
that an act passed by the Legislature violated art. 30 where it 
 
9 We need not address whether the commissioner's 
certification also "purport[s] to restrict or abolish a court's 
inherent powers."  See Gray v. Commissioner of Revenue, 422 
Mass. 666, 671, (1996) 
9 
 
effectively annulled a court decree in a case properly before 
the court: 
"It is the exclusive province of courts of justice to apply 
established principles to cases within their jurisdiction, 
and to enforce their decisions by rendering judgments and 
executing them by suitable process.  The legislature have 
no power to interfere with this jurisdiction in such manner 
as to change the decision of cases pending before courts, 
or to impair or set aside their judgments, or take cases 
out of the settled course of judicial proceeding. . . .  A 
fortiori, an act of the legislature cannot set aside or 
annul final judgments or decrees.  This is the highest 
exercise of judicial authority. . . .  Indeed it is 
difficult to see how the legislature could more palpably 
invade the judicial department and effectually usurp its 
functions, than to pass statutes which should operate to 
set aside or annul judgments of courts in their nature 
final, and which would otherwise be conclusive on the 
rights of parties."  (Emphases added.) 
 
Denny v. Mattoon, 2 Allen 361, 378-379 (1861).  The same 
principle has been recognized by Federal law for even longer.10  
See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995), 
citing Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792) (Hayburn's 
Case "stands for the principle that Congress cannot vest review 
of the decisions of Article III courts in officials of the 
 
10 "Article 30 is more explicit than the Federal 
Constitution in calling for the separation of powers, but the 
underlying rationale is the same:  to 'diffus[e] power the 
better to secure liberty.'"  Gray, 422 Mass. at 671 n.5, quoting 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring).  See Immigration & Naturalization 
Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) ("With all the obvious 
flaws of delay, untidiness, and potential for abuse, we have not 
yet found a better way to preserve freedom than by making the 
exercise of power subject to the carefully crafted restraints 
spelled out in the Constitution"). 
10 
 
Executive Branch").  See also Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. 
Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113-114 (1948) ("It has also 
been the firm and unvarying practice of Constitutional Courts to 
render no judgments . . . that are subject to later review or 
alteration by administrative action"). 
 
Since deciding Denny, we have made clear that it is a 
fundamental principle of separation of powers that the executive 
and legislative branches cannot overrule a court order.  See, 
e.g., Department of Revenue v. Jarvenpaa, 404 Mass. 177, 184 
(1989) ("The Legislature may not constitutionally enact a law 
that, in effect, vacates final judgments . . ."); Spinelli v. 
Commonwealth, 393 Mass. 240, 241-242 (1984) (statute restoring 
specific dismissed case to active status violated art. 30 
because it nullified court judgment).  To do so would amount to 
usurping the function of the judiciary.  See Opinion of the 
Justices, 234 Mass. 612, 621-622 (1920) ("The judgment of a 
court must stand as final.  It can be reversed, modified or 
superseded only by judicial process.  It is wholly under the 
control of the judicial department of government"). 
 
Although the paradigmatic case of another branch overriding 
a court order is the Legislature's enactment of a law that 
retroactively alters a final judgment, see, e.g., Jarvenpaa, 404 
Mass. at 184; Spinelli, 393 Mass. at 241-242, our cases have 
contemplated analogous ways in which art. 30 could be violated.  
11 
 
For example, in Gray, 422 Mass. at 674, we concluded that the 
Department of Revenue's (department's) seizure of funds from the 
plaintiff to satisfy child support arrearages did not 
unconstitutionally modify a judicial order mandating that the 
plaintiff satisfy the same arrearages.  This was because a 
statute in effect at the time, G. L. c. 119A, § 6, empowered the 
department to enforce the judge's order through such a seizure.  
Id.  Thus, that possibility was incorporated into the judge's 
order.  In reaching this holding, however, we stressed its 
limits.  Had the judge also "order[ed] the department to refrain 
from collection activities," then the statute's effect would 
have been negated and the department's subsequent actions would 
have subjected it to contempt charges.  Id. at 675 n.13.  In 
other words, art. 30 does not allow the Legislature preemptively 
to empower executive officials to overturn court orders that 
otherwise forbid a desired course of action. 
 
This proposition follows from the fact that our focus in 
separation of powers cases is on "the essence of what cannot be 
tolerated under art. 30":  "interference by one department with 
the functions of another."  Gray, 422 Mass. at 671, quoting 
Chief Admin. Justice of the Trial Court v. Labor Relations 
Comm'n, 404 Mass. 53, 56 (1989).  Determining interference is 
nuanced.  The flexibility inherent in art. 30 allows the 
legislative and executive branches to take actions consistent 
12 
 
with a court order or that affect only an ancillary detail.  
See, e.g., Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 10800 v. Sex 
Offender Registry Bd., 459 Mass. 603, 622 (2011) (Doe No. 10800) 
(statute that increased probation supervision fee did not 
violate art. 30 because court's judgment was imposition of 
lifetime probation, and specific amount of fee was "ancillary" 
to this); Ierardi, petitioner, 366 Mass. 640, 650 (1975) (no 
art. 30 violation because executive branch's extradition of 
sentenced prisoner "serves only to postpone" execution of court 
order and did not "nullify or set [it] aside").  This 
flexibility reaches its breaking point, however, when such 
actions "'supersede' a judgment of a court by [an executive 
official's] direct declaration to that effect."  Opinion of the 
Justices, 234 Mass. at 622.  In short, although the legislative 
and executive branches may modify ancillary details of a court 
order, they may not reverse it. 
 
b.  Section 18 (a).  General Laws c. 123, § 18 (a), 
prescribes procedures for civil commitments of pretrial 
detainees and prisoners.  Because declaring a statute to be 
unconstitutional is among "the gravest and most delicate" of our 
duties, Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927), we closely 
detail the framework that governs these subsequent commitment 
decisions.  Given that the proceeding at issue in this case was 
one that considered whether to recommit K.J. on account of his 
13 
 
mental illness rather than whether initially to commit him, we 
focus on the provisions of § 18 (a) that guide a judge's 
determination of whether to recommit and, crucially, where. 
Under § 18 (a), a person may be initially committed for 
examination and observation for up to thirty days.  After that, 
the first longer-term commitment order is valid for six months.  
See G. L. c. 123, § 18 (a) ("An initial court order of 
commitment issued subject to the provisions of this section 
shall be valid for a six-month period . . .").  Subsequent 
commitments thereafter are valid for one year.  See id. ("all 
subsequent commitments . . . shall be valid for one year").  
Section 18 (a) expressly provides that at these subsequent 
commitment hearings, the judge must apply the standards 
contained in §§ 7 and 8.  See G. L. c. 123, § 18 (a) ("all 
subsequent commitments . . . shall take place under the 
provisions of [§§ 7 and 8]"). 
Turning to §§ 7 and 8, a judge must make a series of 
separate findings.  First, the judge must determine whether "(1) 
such person is mentally ill, and (2) the discharge of such 
person from a facility would create a likelihood of serious 
harm."  G. L. c. 123, § 8 (a).  For convenience, we will call 
these the commitment findings.  If the judge finds both that the 
detainee or prisoner is mentally ill and that discharge would 
14 
 
pose a likelihood of serious harm, then the judge shall order 
subsequent commitment.  See id. 
Once the judge has made the commitment findings, the judge 
must again consult § 8 -- this time, § 8 (b) -- to determine 
where the subsequent commitment will take place.  We call this 
determination the placement findings.  In making the placement 
findings, the judge must consider whether the person is not a 
proper subject of commitment to a DMH facility and whether "the 
failure to retain such person in strict custody would create a 
likelihood of serious harm" (emphasis added).  G. L. c. 123, 
§ 8 (b).  If the judge affirmatively finds both elements, then 
the judge orders that the person be recommitted to Bridgewater.  
See id.  But if the evidence does not support making these 
placement findings, then the judge must order the person to be 
committed to a DMH facility.  The language is emphatic:  upon 
making certain findings, "the court shall order the commitment 
of the person" to a DMH facility.  Id. (emphasis added).  A 
judge cannot stop at the crossroads and decline to issue an 
order concerning placement.  To do so would be an abdication of 
the judge's own statutorily imposed duty. 
In sum, when assessing a petition for a subsequent 
commitment under § 18 (a), a judge must do the following: 
• Determine whether subsequent commitment is warranted 
under § 8 (a). 
15 
 
• If it is, the judge must then determine whether 
commitment to Bridgewater is warranted pursuant to 
§ 8 (b). 
• If commitment to Bridgewater is not warranted, then 
the judge must follow the final sentence of § 8 (b) 
and order the person to be recommitted to a DMH 
facility. 
 
Finally, § 18 (a) contains the provision that gave rise to 
this case:  the commissioner's certification.  Once the judge 
has issued his or her order concerning placement, the 
commissioner's certification provision allows the commissioner, 
notwithstanding the judge's lack of finding that commitment to 
Bridgewater is necessary and the judge's affirmative 
determination and order that the person is to be placed at a DMH 
facility, to "certif[y] to the court that confinement of the 
[pretrial detainee or] prisoner at [Bridgewater] is necessary to 
insure his continued retention in custody."  G. L. c. 123, 
§ 18 (a).  If the commissioner does so certify, she may then 
retain the person at Bridgewater.  In other words, even when the 
judge has issued an order that recommitment must take place at a 
DMH facility, § 18 (a) allows the commissioner to send the 
person to -- or, as in this case, keep the person at -- 
Bridgewater instead. 
16 
 
c.  Application.  Section 18 (a) violates art. 30 because 
it allows the executive branch to reverse a court order.  By 
explicitly referencing and directing the judge to follow § 8 (b) 
in any recommitment proceeding, § 18 (a) empowers a judge to 
order that a person be recommitted to a DMH facility.  This is 
what the judge did here:  after determining that the strict 
custody of Bridgewater was unnecessary, the judge ordered the 
commissioner to transfer K.J. from there to a DMH facility.  
Despite this determination and court order, § 18 (a) also 
empowers the executive branch to send the same person to 
Bridgewater.  This, too, happened here, as the commissioner 
utilized the commissioner's certification to retain K.J. at 
Bridgewater.  Therein lies the art. 30 problem. 
To highlight how § 18 (a) violates art. 30, consider a 
hypothetical framework that likely would not pose any separation 
of powers problems.  Under this approach, the commissioner's 
certification would be a document that the commissioner would be 
entitled to submit to the court, advising that in the 
commissioner's opinion, the person should be placed at 
Bridgewater because the person presented a flight risk.  The 
commissioner could set out reasons in the document for this 
opinion and put in evidence on this issue in any hearing.  The 
judge could then consider the commissioner's filing when 
determining whether strict custody was required.  This kind of 
17 
 
provision would both allow input from the commissioner and 
respect art. 30, as the commissioner would have no authority to 
ignore the court's order regarding placement. 
Section 18 (a), on the other hand, gives two branches the 
authority to send the same person to two different places, with 
the executive branch possessing a final veto over the judiciary.  
This statutory authority does more than allow the commissioner 
to alter an ancillary detail of the order.  Compare Doe No. 
10800, 459 Mass. at 622; Ierardi, petitioner, 366 Mass. at 650.  
The judge's decision to send a person to Bridgewater is one 
based on statutorily defined and requisite findings and is 
governed by a judicially required quantum of proof.11  See G. L. 
c. 123, § 8 (b); Superintendent of Worcester State Hosp. v. 
Hagberg, 374 Mass. 271, 272 (1978) (proof beyond reasonable 
doubt required for §§ 7 and 8 commitments).  Yet the statute 
essentially treats the court order as an advisory opinion.  The 
executive branch may follow the court order if it deems doing so 
 
 
11 Additionally, we disagree with the dissent's contention 
that the commissioner and the judge are making wholly different 
findings.  If a prisoner poses a likelihood of serious harm to 
himself or others if not committed to DMH or Bridgewater, and is 
likely to attempt to escape, flight risk is a legitimate 
consideration for a judge when deciding whether to commit the 
prisoner to a DMH facility or Bridgewater.  As explained by the 
parties, DMH facilities and Bridgewater provide different levels 
of security.  Although flight risk is certainly not the only 
reason that strict custody may be necessary to avoid a 
likelihood of serious harm, it is a factor that a judge may and 
presumably often does consider. 
18 
 
to be appropriate, and disregard the order if it does not.  
Stripped to its basics, the statute mandates that the judge 
specifically order X, and then the same statute allows the 
commissioner to do not-X instead.12  This is precisely what art. 
30 forbids. 
In reaching the opposite conclusion, the dissent relies on 
Sheehan, petitioner, 254 Mass. 342, 344-346 (1926).  That case 
is inapposite.  Sheehan dealt with the execution of criminal 
sentences, which we have repeatedly said is a core function of 
the executive branch.  See Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs. v. 
Chief Justice of the Trial Court (No. 1), 484 Mass. 431, 451, 
S.C., 484 Mass. 1029 (2020) (execution of criminal sentences is 
executive function); Cole, 468 Mass. at 302 ("Once a sentence is 
imposed, the executive branch holds the power and responsibility 
of executing it"); Sheriff of Middlesex County v. Commissioner 
of Correction, 383 Mass. 631, 636 (1981) ("Statutory directions 
concerning the place where a particular criminal defendant is to 
serve his sentence involve no legislative encroachment on the 
court's constitutional authority"); Sheehan, petitioner, supra 
 
 
12 To harken back to a previous example, it would be as if 
the judge in Gray had ordered the department to cease its 
collection activities and the department, pointing to G. L. 
c. 119A, § 6, nevertheless continued with them.  See Gray, 422 
Mass. at 675 n.13. 
19 
 
at 345 ("The execution of sentences according to standing laws 
is an attribute of the executive department of government"). 
Civil commitments are different.  Unlike criminal 
sentences, where, as soon as the sentence is handed down, the 
power to execute the sentence is within the executive branch, 
both G. L. c. 123 in general, and subsequent commitments under 
§ 18 (a) in particular, require the judiciary to make findings 
and issue an order concerning placement.  This is in line with 
the purpose of c. 123, which was enacted in part to expand 
access to courts for those subject to civil commitments.  See 
Nassar, 380 Mass. at 912 n.5 (noting that Legislature completely 
rewrote c. 123 in 1970, and that prior law was thought to be 
"confusing, inconsistent and inadequate, and the civil rights of 
the mentally ill [were] not properly protected" [citation 
omitted]).  Moreover, requiring a judge to determine whether the 
strict security of Bridgewater is required is in line with one 
of the core concerns of c. 123:  ensuring that commitments take 
place in the least restrictive environment.  See id. at 917-918 
(detailing how c. 123 imposes least restrictive alternative 
requirement). 
Once the Legislature has properly directed the judiciary to 
issue an order, that order must be respected by the coequal 
branches.  Cf. Gray, 422 Mass. at 675 n.13 (ignoring explicit 
court order may subject executive official to contempt charge).  
20 
 
In such cases, there is no room in art. 30 for a provision that 
allows executive officials to undo what the court has ordered to 
be done.  Consequently, the commissioner's certification 
provision of § 18 (a) violates art. 30.13 
 
13 The dissent's proposed solution that the plaintiff seek 
redress either by means of a civil action in the nature of 
certiorari pursuant to G. L. c. 249, § 4, or under G. L. c. 123, 
§ 9 (b), does not resolve the art. 30 violation. 
 
Section 9 (b) does not adequately protect a civil 
committee's rights because on a § 9 (b) petition, the committee 
bears a much higher burden than at the original § 18 (a) 
proceeding.  See Andrews, petitioner, 449 Mass. 587, 595 (2007) 
("an applicant under § 9 [b] bears the burden of proving by a 
fair preponderance of the evidence that his situation has 
significantly changed since last his confinement was reviewed 
judicially, whether on the basis of new factual developments or 
new evidence, so as to justify his discharge or transfer").  
Practice guides reflect this point.  See Committee for Public 
Counsel Services, Mental Health Proceedings in Massachusetts 
§ 6.13.2 (Mass. Cont. Legal Educ. 7th ed. 2020), https://www 
.publiccounsel.net/mh/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/Chapter-06-
CE_LE-Final-DRAFT-March-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/TPV7-PPA2] 
("While a client may file [a § 9 (b)] petition at any time, 
counsel should advise that the Superior Court is likely to 
dismiss the petition if filed too soon after the court 
hearing").  At the original § 18 (a) proceeding, in contrast, 
the superintendent bears a burden of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
 
Neither is certiorari review under G. L. c. 249, § 4, 
appropriate.  "To obtain certiorari review of an administrative 
decision, the following three elements must be present:  (1) a 
judicial or quasi judicial proceeding, (2) from which there is 
no other reasonably adequate remedy, and (3) a substantial 
injury or injustice arising from the proceeding under review."  
Frawley v. Police Comm'r of Cambridge, 473 Mass. 716, 726 
(2016).  The commissioner's certification is a unilateral move 
absent any hearing, written findings, or record of any kind.  It 
is not "judicial or quasi judicial" in nature and, even if it 
 
21 
 
 
2.  Severability.  "When part of a statute is held 
unconstitutional, 'as far as possible, [we] will hold the 
remainder to be constitutional and valid, if the parts are 
capable of separation and are not so entwined that the 
Legislature could not have intended that the part otherwise 
valid should take effect without the invalid part.'"  Cole, 468 
Mass. at 308, quoting Peterson v. Commissioner of Revenue, 444 
Mass. 128, 137–138 (2005).  Severability entails a two-step 
examination in which we determine, first, whether the invalid 
portion of the statute is "capable of separation" and, second, 
whether "upholding the statute as severed would frustrate the 
legislative purpose."  Chambers v. RDI Logistics, Inc., 476 
Mass. 95, 104 (2016).  We conclude that the commissioner's 
certification provision is severable from the remainder of 
§ 18 (a). 
 
was, there would be no record for a judge to review to determine 
whether error had occurred. 
 
To take a step back, the procedural mechanics are less 
important.  Assuming that proper judicial review of the 
commissioner's certification was available, it would only help 
satisfy procedural due process problems presented by the 
provision.  No amount of review, however, can save the 
commissioner's certification from violating art. 30.  The 
commissioner's certification still runs contrary to the 
principle that judicial decisions cannot be "subject to later 
review or alteration by administrative action."  Chicago & 
Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 
114 (1948).  See also Opinion of the Justices, 234 Mass. 612, 
621-622 (1920) (court orders are "wholly under the control of 
the judicial department of government"). 
22 
 
 
First, "[a] statute is capable of separation where, as 
here, the severed provision 'is not so connected with and 
dependent upon other clauses of the act as to constitute an 
essential factor of the whole'" (citation omitted).  Chambers, 
476 Mass. at 104.  The commissioner's certification provision 
operates independently from the judicial determination.  Indeed, 
the problem with the certification is that it provides the 
commission an independent override of the judicial 
determination.  Thus, the provision is capable of separation. 
 
Second, we must determine "whether upholding the statute as 
severed would frustrate the legislative purpose of the 
. . . statute."  Chambers, 476 Mass. at 104.  As to all statutes 
in the Commonwealth, the Legislature has announced its own 
preference in favor of severability:  "The provisions of any 
statute shall be deemed severable, and if any part of any 
statute shall be adjudged unconstitutional or invalid, such 
judgment shall not affect other valid parts thereof."  G. L. 
c. 4, § 6, Eleventh.  Further, as detailed supra, c. 123 was 
enacted to protect the rights of the mentally ill, replacing the 
prior law that had only "vague and loosely drawn standards of 
commitability."  F.N. Flaschner, The New Massachusetts Mental 
Health Code -- A "Magna Carta" or a Magna Maze, 56 Mass. L.Q. 
49, 50 (1971).  It would not frustrate the legislative purpose 
to retain the provisions of § 18 (a) that allow for a judicial 
23 
 
order of whether a person should be committed to Bridgewater, 
but to sever the portion that provides that the executive branch 
may override that decision absent any standards or procedural 
protections. 
Severing the commissioner's certification provision and 
retaining the remainder of § 18 (a) would also not frustrate the 
executive branch's statutory responsibility to retain control of 
detainees and sentenced prisoners.  See G. L. c. 124, § 1 (b) 
(noting commissioner is responsible for, among other things, 
maintaining security and preventing escapes).  See also G. L. 
c. 125, § 12 ("All persons sentenced to any of the correctional 
institutions of the commonwealth shall be held in accordance 
with the sentences or orders of the courts and the rules and 
regulations of the commissioner").  The parties represent that 
all inpatient units at DMH facilities are locked, and current 
DMH policy states that such patients may not have unsupervised 
privileges outside of locked areas.  Finally, should safety 
concerns nonetheless occur, the statute contains a stop-gap 
provision allowing for patients to be temporarily transferred 
from DMH facilities to Bridgewater due to those concerns pending 
a judicial hearing.  G. L. c. 123, § 13. 
Conclusion.  The commissioner's certification provision of 
G. L. c. 123, § 18 (a), violates art. 30.  The remainder of 
§ 18 (a) is capable of separation, and thus remains intact.  The 
24 
 
matter is remanded to the county court for entry of a judgment 
allowing the defendant's petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, 
and ordering that K.J. be released immediately from Bridgewater 
and transferred to a DMH facility, pursuant to the District 
Court judge's § 18 (a) order. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
GAZIANO, J. (dissenting, with whom Wendlandt, J., joins).  
The court today concludes that the "commissioner's 
certification" provision in G. L. c. 123, § 18 (a), the statute 
that allows for the involuntary hospitalization of mentally ill 
prisoners, is constitutionally unsound.  Until now, this 
provision has allowed the Commissioner of Correction 
(commissioner) to decide that a prisoner who has been committed 
to a Department of Mental Health (DMH) facility by a judge 
instead should be held at the more secure setting of Bridgewater 
State Hospital (Bridgewater) in order to ensure the prisoner's 
"retention in custody."  The court now holds that this 
arrangement, adopted by the Legislature more than fifty years 
ago as part of a comprehensive reform of the Commonwealth's 
mental health system, see Foss v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 584, 
587-589 (2002), violates the principle of separation of powers 
in art. 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. 
I of course share the court's concern that the limitations 
of art. 30, "though sometimes difficult of application, must be 
scrupulously observed."  Opinion of the Justices, 302 Mass. 605, 
622 (1939).  But in its zealous defense of the prerogatives of 
our own branch, the court disregards the well-established rule 
that "[t]he constitutionality of a statute should be sustained 
in absence of evidence clearly to the contrary."  See Ellis v. 
Assessors of Acushnet, 358 Mass. 473, 477–478 (1970).  This rule 
2 
 
reflects appropriate judicial respect for actions taken by the 
elected representatives of the people.  "[W]hen we overstep our 
role in the name of enforcing limits on [the Legislature], we do 
not uphold the separation of powers, we transgress the 
separation of powers."  See United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 
2319, 2337 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
A statute violates art. 30 when it "unduly restrict[s] a 
core function of a coordinate branch" (quotation omitted).  
Atwater v. Commissioner of Educ., 460 Mass. 844, 855 (2011), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 432 Mass. 613, 619 (2000).  
As this court long has recognized, however, art. 30 does not 
require the three branches of government to be "watertight 
compartments."  See Gonsalves, supra, quoting Opinion of the 
Justices, 372 Mass. 883, 892 (1977).  See Opinion of the 
Justices, 365 Mass. 639, 641 (1974) ("an absolute division of 
the three general types of functions is neither possible nor 
always desirable").  Under the arrangement put in place by the 
Legislature, a judge's decision that an individual must be 
committed to DMH under G. L. c. 123, § 18 (a), anticipates and 
leaves room for possible further action by the executive branch 
in a traditional area of executive concern.1 
 
 
1 While commitment to a mental health facility is not a 
sentence, the Department of Correction's authority with respect 
to the placement of convicted prisoners is instructive.  See, 
 
3 
 
In accord with this view of the executive's role, we have 
held that "statutes in effect at the time of sentencing which 
give the executive branch certain authority over the terms of 
the confinement must be read into the court's sentence," such 
that subsequent "actions taken by the Executive Department 
pursuant to that authority . . . do not infringe on the powers 
of the judiciary."  Ierardi, petitioner, 366 Mass. 640, 650 
(1975).  We therefore discerned no violation of the separation 
of powers when a juvenile whom a judge had committed to a 
training school was transferred to the Massachusetts Reformatory 
after several attempts at escape and commission of other crimes.  
Sheehan, petitioner, 254 Mass. 342, 343, 346-347 (1926).  The 
statute in effect at the time allowed the board that managed the 
training school to make transfers to the more restrictive 
institution.  Id. at 343-344.  We reasoned that this was "not an 
infringement of the powers of the judiciary . . . because the 
liability to such transfer upon specified conditions was a part 
of the original sentence."  Id. at 346. 
 
e.g., Jackson v. Commissioner of Correction, 388 Mass. 700, 703 
(1983) (commissioner has "broad discretion . . . to transfer and 
to place inmates confined within the Massachusetts correctional 
system . . . for varied reasons such as security, convenience, 
and rehabilitation"); G. L. c. 124, § 1 (b) (commissioner shall 
"maintain security, safety and order at all [S]tate correctional 
facilities" and shall "utilize the resources of the [Department 
of Correction] to prevent escapes from any such facility"). 
4 
 
Rather than scrutinizing whether the commissioner's 
certification provision allows one branch to "interfere with the 
functions of another," which we have identified as the "critical 
inquiry" for challenges under art. 30 (citation omitted),  
Chelmsford Trailer Park, Inc. v. Chelmsford, 393 Mass. 186, 194 
(1984), the court today relies on an overly rigid test based on 
whether an executive action can in any way be read as 
conflicting with a judicial order.  With respect to G. L. 
c. 123, § 18 (a), however, the substance of the judge's and the 
commissioner's determinations focuses on distinct issues that 
need not conflict.  As in any involuntary commitment proceeding, 
the judge must decide whether confinement other than in "strict 
custody" would create a "likelihood of serious harm," and 
whether "such person is not a proper subject for commitment to 
any facility of [DMH]."  G. L. c. 123, § 8 (b).  Although this 
latter consideration might include as a factor a prisoner's 
likelihood of escape, a judge need not make a specific finding 
with respect to this risk, whereas the commissioner explicitly 
is required to do so by G. L. c. 123, § 18 (a).  To the extent 
that some overlap between the two determinations does occur, in 
5 
 
these specific circumstances, there is no constitutional 
violation.2 
I agree that, in general, a court's final judgment "can be 
reversed, modified or superseded only by judicial process."  
Opinion of the Justices, 234 Mass. 612, 621 (1920).  But as the 
court concedes, the cases enunciating this principle all 
involved a statute that retroactively invalidated a decision 
that already had been issued, as opposed to creating in advance 
a scheme in which the judiciary and the executive cooperate.  
See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 213, 240 
(1995) (invalidating statutory provision requiring Federal 
courts to reopen final judgments); Department of Revenue v. 
Jarvenpaa, 404 Mass. 177, 178, 183-184 (1989) (invalidating 
statute allowing Commonwealth to relitigate issues in paternity 
actions from before its enactment); Spinelli v. Commonwealth, 
393 Mass. 240, 241 (1984) (striking down statute restoring one 
specific case to active status after dismissal).  The 
 
2 I agree that the commissioner's determination that the 
plaintiff posed an escape risk is not supported by any evidence 
in the record before us.  But this court should not distort 
art. 30 jurisprudence because of its displeasure with a single 
arbitrary decision by the commissioner.  Rather, I would allow 
the plaintiff to seek judicial redress either by a civil action 
in the nature of certiorari under G. L. c. 249, § 4, or under 
G. L. c. 123, § 9 (b), which permits petitions for the release 
of an individual detained at Bridgewater. 
6 
 
commissioner's certification provision is not such an ex post 
facto attack on specific final judgments. 
As the court recognizes, declaring a Legislative enactment 
unconstitutional is "the gravest and most delicate duty" that 
courts undertake.  Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) 
(Holmes, J.).  Yet today, the court exercises this power without 
sufficient consideration of the judiciary's obligation to 
respect coordinate branches by "constru[ing] statutory 
provisions, when possible, to avoid unconstitutionality."  
Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 427 Mass. 156, 167 
(1998).  Because a reading of the commissioner's certification 
provision as in line with this court's past decisions on art. 30 
is available, I respectfully dissent.