Title: SMK LLC V DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY (Opinion - Leave Granted)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 146335
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: April 1, 2014

FRADCO, INC v DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY 
 
SMK, LLC v DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY 
 
Docket Nos. 146333 and 146335.  Argued October 9, 2013 (Calendar Nos. 4 and 10).  Decided 
April 1, 2014. 
 
 
Fradco, Inc., filed an appeal on July 28, 2010, in the Tax Tribunal, contesting a final 
assessment issued by the Department of Treasury that disallowed a sales tax deduction following 
an audit.  Through its resident agent, Fradco had requested that the department send all 
information regarding tax matters to the certified public accountant (CPA) that Fradco 
designated.  The department mailed a copy of its January 22, 2009 preliminary decision and 
order of determination to Fradco’s CPA.  It sent the final assessment dated September 17, 2009, 
only to Fradco’s place of business.  Fradco’s CPA inquired about the final assessment and was 
informed in an April 21, 2010 letter that a final assessment had been issued, that no appeal had 
been taken, and that the matter was now subject to collection.  The letter did not include a copy 
of the assessment.  After several requests, Fradco and its CPA received a copy of the final 
assessment on July 20, 2010.  The department sought summary disposition under MCR 
2.116(C)(4) in Fradco’s appeal, arguing that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction because the appeal 
had not been filed within 35 days after the final assessment as required by MCL 205.22(1).  The 
tribunal denied the motion, concluding that MCL 205.8 provides a parallel notice requirement 
whenever a taxpayer properly filed a request that notices be sent to a representative and that 
notice to Fradco alone had not been sufficient to start the 35-day period because notice to 
Fradco’s representative was also required.  Accordingly, the tribunal concluded that it had 
jurisdiction and canceled the final assessment.  The department appealed, asserting that the 35-
day appeal period under MCL 205.22(1) began from the issuance date printed on the face of a 
final assessment, which needed to be sent only to the individual taxpayer.  The Court of Appeals, 
RONAYNE KRAUSE, P.J., and BORRELLO and RIORDAN, JJ., affirmed, reading the relevant 
sections of the revenue collection act in pari materia and holding that MCL 205.8 (requiring 
notice to the taxpayer’s representative) imposed on the department a notice obligation parallel to 
that in MCL 205.28(1)(a) (which requires notice to the taxpayer) and that both requirements 
must be satisfied before the appeal period begins to run.  298 Mich App 292 (2012).  The 
Supreme Court granted the department leave to appeal.  493 Mich 948 (2013). 
 
 
SMK, LLC, filed an appeal on July 29, 2010, in the Tax Tribunal, contesting a final 
assessment issued by the Department of Treasury that disallowed a sales tax deduction following 
an audit.  SMK had hired a CPA and designated him to represent it for purposes of the sales tax 
audit, giving him limited authorization to inspect or receive confidential information, represent 
 
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Syllabus 
 
Chief Justice: 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
 
Justices: 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Stephen J. Markman 
Mary Beth Kelly 
Brian K. Zahra 
Bridget M. McCormack 
David F. Viviano 
This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been  
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 
Reporter of Decisions: 
Corbin R. Davis 
SMK, and receive mail from the department.  The department faxed the CPA a notice on April 
23, 2010, stating that the audit package had been submitted.  It sent a final assessment dated June 
15, 2010, to SMK via certified mail, although SMK claimed that it did not receive the final 
assessment.  The CPA made several inquiries to the department in July 2010, inquiring whether a 
final assessment had been issued, and received no answers from the department.  On July 23, 
2010, five days after the appeal period had allegedly run, the department sent SMK’s CPA the 
final assessment and a letter stating that the deadline for appeal had passed.  Rather than 
responding to SMK’s appeal in the tribunal, the department moved for summary disposition 
under MCR 2.116(C)(4), arguing that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction because the appeal had not 
filed within 35 days after issuance of the final assessment.  SMK opposed the motion on the 
ground that the appeal period had not been triggered because the department failed to give notice 
to its appointed representatives as required by MCL 205.8.  The tribunal denied the motion, 
reaching the same conclusion regarding a parallel notice requirement as it had in Fradco’s 
appeal.  Accordingly, the tribunal canceled SMK’s final assessment.  The department appealed, 
asserting the same argument that it asserted in Fradco’s appeal.  The Court of Appeals, RONAYNE 
KRAUSE, P.J., and BORRELLO and RIORDAN, JJ., affirmed, reaching the same conclusions that it 
had in Fradco’s appeal.  298 Mich App 302 (2012).  The Supreme Court granted the department 
leave to appeal and ordered that the appeals be heard together.  493 Mich 948 (2013). 
 
 
In a unanimous opinion by Chief Justice YOUNG, the Supreme Court held: 
 
 
If a taxpayer has appointed a representative, the Department of Treasury must issue 
notice to both the taxpayer and the taxpayer’s official representative before the taxpayer’s 35-day 
appeal period under MCL 205.22(1) begins to run. 
 
 
1.  The General Sales Tax Act, MCL 205.51 et seq., directs the department to administer 
the sales tax in part pursuant to the revenue collection act, MCL 205.1 to 205.31.  Under the 
latter act, when the department conducts an audit and ultimately issues a final assessment stating 
that a taxpayer owes sales tax, it has two notice obligations.  MCL 205.28(1)(a) requires the 
department to give notice to the taxpayer, and MCL 205.8 requires the department to give notice 
to the taxpayer’s designated representative.  MCL 205.8 is mandatory notwithstanding the 
greater specificity of MCL 205.28(a)(1) with respect to details of service on the taxpayer.  MCL 
205.8 unambiguously directs the department to furnish a taxpayer’s representative copies of 
notices and letters whenever the taxpayer is entitled to receive those documents. 
 
 
2.  MCL 205.22, which dictates procedures surrounding a taxpayer’s appeal, does not 
refer to either MCL 205.8 or MCL 205.28(1)(a).  Rather, MCL 205.22(5) states that the appeal 
period begins to run upon issuance of the assessment, decision, or order.  If the department fails 
to comply with MCL 205.28(1)(a), which requires notice to the taxpayer, issuance does not 
occur.   Because the two notice statutes are on equal footing, issuance likewise does not occur if 
the department fails to comply with MCL 205.8, which requires notice to the taxpayer’s 
representative.  Both notice requirements must be satisfied before issuance of the assessment is 
deemed to have occurred and the appeal period begins.  Because the department delayed issuing 
the notices to the taxpayers’ representatives in both cases, the running of the appeal periods were 
also delayed.  Fradco’s and SMK’s appeals were therefore timely, and the tribunal retained 
jurisdiction. 
 
 
3.  The appeal period begins when the department complies with MCL 205.28(1)(a) by 
giving the taxpayer notice of the final assessment through personal service or certified mail and 
MCL 205.8 by sending a copy of the notice of the final assessment to the representative’s 
address provided by the taxpayer in its written request.  Because MCL 205.28(1)(a) and MCL 
205.8 do not require the department to show that the taxpayer or its representative actually 
received the notice, the Supreme Court vacated portions of the Court of Appeals’ opinions to the 
extent that they could be read to mean that the appeal period begins when a taxpayer’s 
representative receives notice. 
 
 
Court of Appeals’ judgments affirmed in part and vacated in part. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
©2014 State of Michigan 
FILED APRIL 1, 2014 
 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
FRADCO, INC., 
 
 
Petitioner-Appellee, 
 
 
v 
No. 146333 
 
DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, 
 
 
 
Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
SMK, LLC, 
 
 
Petitioner-Appellee, 
 
 
v 
No. 146335 
 
DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, 
 
 
 
Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
 
YOUNG, C.J.  
 
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Opinion 
 
Chief Justice: 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
 
 
Justices: 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Stephen J. Markman 
Mary Beth Kelly 
Brian K. Zahra 
Bridget M. McCormack 
__________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
2
Michigan’s revenue collection act1 provides that, when the Michigan Department 
of Treasury (the department) issues a final assessment of tax deficiency, a taxpayer has 
35 days to appeal that adverse tax decision to the department or 90 days to appeal to the 
Court of Claims.2  The act also requires that the department provide a copy of a notice of 
the final assessment to the taxpayer’s duly appointed representative, if one was 
appointed.3  These companion cases pose the same question: Does the time within which 
a taxpayer must appeal a final assessment of tax deficiency begin to run when the 
department issues the final assessment to the taxpayer as required, but fails to give the 
mandatory statutory notice to a taxpayer’s official representative?  
We hold that, if a taxpayer has appointed a representative, the department must 
issue notice to both the taxpayer and the taxpayer’s official representative to trigger the 
running of the appeal period.  Thus, the taxpayer’s 35-day appeal period does not begin 
to run until the department issues notice to the representative, in addition to the taxpayer.  
Accordingly, we affirm in part and vacate in part the decisions of the Court of Appeals 
panels in each of these companion cases. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Appellees are Michigan corporations that operate convenience stores in Michigan.  
Petitioner Fradco, Inc. (Fradco) is located in Ada, and petitioner SMK, LLC (SMK) is 
                                                 
1 MCL 205.1 et seq. 
2 MCL 205.22(1). 
3 MCL 205.8. 
 
 
 
3
located in Midland.  The parties are unrelated to each other, but the legal issues presented 
in each appeal are identical.   
A.  FRADCO, INC. 
In October 2004, Fradco retained the services of a certified public accountant 
(CPA) to handle its accounting and tax matters.  On October 19, 2004, Fradco’s resident 
agent executed a power of attorney authorization and provided copies thereof to 
respondent department, directing the department to provide the CPA “[a]ll [department] 
billings and payment notices” and allowing the CPA to “receive information and 
represent me (Fradco) in all [department] tax matters.”  The power of attorney remained 
in effect at all times relevant to this case. 
In May 2008, the department completed a sales tax audit of Fradco and disallowed 
a food deduction.  Fradco’s CPA appealed the audit determination at an informal 
conference,4 and provided the power of attorney authorization to the hearing referee.  The 
department issued a preliminary decision and order of determination dated January 22, 
2009, a copy of which was mailed to Fradco’s CPA.  The final assessment was dated 
September 17, 2009 and sent only to Fradco’s place of business via certified mail. 
On April 19, 2010, Fradco’s representative inquired about the final assessment.  
The representative was informed by letter dated April 21, 2010, that “a Final Assessment 
was issued September 17, 2009” and that “[n]o appeal was made with respect to this 
Final Assessment as provided by statute and the matter is now shown as subject to 
collection.”  This letter did not provide a copy of the assessment.  After several requests, 
                                                 
4 See MCL 205.21(2)(b) through (d). 
 
 
 
4
Fradco and its CPA received a copy of the final assessment on July 20, 2010, ten months 
after the date printed on the face of the assessment.  Fradco claims that this was the first 
and only copy received, by it or its representative. 
Fradco filed its appeal with the Tax Tribunal on July 28, 2010—eight days after its 
representative received the final assessment.  The department moved for summary 
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4), arguing that the Tax Tribunal lacked jurisdiction 
because the appeal was not filed within 35 days after issuance of the final assessment. 
B.  SMK, LLC 
In April 2010, the department completed an audit of SMK and disallowed a food 
deduction.  SMK hired Edward Kisscorni, a CPA.  Through a power of attorney 
authorization form executed on March 26, 2010, and provided to the department shortly 
thereafter, SMK designated Kisscorni to represent it for the purposes of the sales tax 
audit and gave him limited authorization to “[i]nspect or receive confidential 
information,” “[r]epresent [SMK] and make oral or written presentation of fact or 
argument,” and “[r]eceive mail from Treasury . . . (includ[ing] forms, billings, and 
notices).”  On April 23, 2010, the department faxed Kisscorni a notice stating that the 
“audit package was submitted.”  A final assessment dated June 15, 2010 was sent to 
SMK via certified mail.  However, SMK claims that it did not receive the final 
assessment. 
According to SMK’s petition, Kisscorni made several phone calls to the 
department in July, inquiring whether a final assessment had been issued.  He received no 
answers from the department.  Thereafter, on July 23, 2010 (five days after the appeal 
 
 
 
5
period had allegedly run), the department sent SMK’s representative the final assessment 
and a letter stating that the deadline for appeal had passed.   
On July 29, 2010, SMK filed an appeal of the final assessment.  As occurred in 
Fradco’s case, rather than responding to the petition before the Tax Tribunal, the 
department filed a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4), arguing that 
the Tax Tribunal lacked jurisdiction because the appeal was not filed within 35 days after 
issuance of the final assessment.  Both Fradco and SMK opposed the respective motions 
on the ground that the appeal period had not been triggered because the department failed 
to give the statutory notice to their appointed representatives as required by MCL 205.8. 
C.  TAX TRIBUNAL AND COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS 
The Tax Tribunal denied the department’s motion for summary disposition in both 
cases, holding that MCL 205.8 provides a parallel notice requirement when a taxpayer 
properly files a written request that notices be sent to a representative.5  Therefore, the 
Tax Tribunal reasoned, notice to the taxpayer alone was not sufficient to initiate the 35-
day appeal period because notice to the taxpayer’s representative was also required.  
Inasmuch as the final assessment was not issued to both the taxpayer and its 
representative, the Tax Tribunal retained jurisdiction over the petitioners’ appeals.  The 
Tax Tribunal then decided petitioners’ appeals on the merits and in each case canceled 
the tax assessments.6   
                                                 
5 Fradco Inc v Dep’t of Treasury, MTT Docket No. 409506 (Mich Tax Jan 20, 2011); 
SMK LLC v Dep’t of Treasury, MTT Docket No. 409504 (Mich Tax Jan 20, 2011). 
6 Fradco Inc v Dep’t of Treasury, MTT Docket No. 409506 (Mich Tax Sept 26, 2011); 
SMK LLC v Dep’t of Treasury, MTT Docket No. 409504 (Mich Tax Sept 26, 2011). 
 
 
 
6
The department appealed by right to the Court of Appeals, asserting that the 35-
day appeal period under MCL 205.22(1) began from the “issuance date” printed on the 
face of a final assessment, which needed only to be sent to the individual taxpayer.  The 
Court of Appeals affirmed the Tax Tribunal in separate opinions dated October 30, 
2012.7  In both cases, the Court held that, reading the relevant sections of the revenue 
collection act in pari materia, MCL 205.8 (notice to the taxpayer representative) imposed 
on the department a notice obligation parallel to MCL 205.28(1)(a) (notice to the 
taxpayer), both of which must be satisfied before the appeal period may begin to run.8  
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Our review of the Tax Tribunal's decisions is limited.  In the absence of fraud, we 
review a Tax Tribunal decision for a misapplication of the law or the adoption of a wrong 
principle.9  We consider the Tax Tribunal’s factual findings conclusive if they are 
“supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record.”10 
Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which we review de novo.11  When 
interpreting a statute, courts must “ascertain the legislative intent that may reasonably be 
                                                 
7 SMK, LLC v Dep’t of Treasury, 298 Mich App 302; 826 NW2d 186 (2012); Fradco, Inc 
v Dep’t of Treasury, 298 Mich App 292; 826 NW 2d 181 (2012). 
8 SMK, 298 Mich App at 308-310; Fradco, 298 Mich App at 299-301. 
9 Mich Bell Tel Co v Dep’t of Treasury, 445 Mich 470, 476; 518 NW2d 808 (1994), 
citing Const 1963, art 6, § 28. 
10 Const 1963, art 6, § 28; Klooster v City of Charlevoix, 488 Mich 289, 295; 795 NW2d 
578 (2011). 
11 In re Investigation of March 1999 Riots in East Lansing, 463 Mich 378, 383; 617 
NW2d 310 (2000). 
 
 
 
7
inferred from the words expressed in the statute.”12  This requires courts to consider “the 
plain meaning of the critical word or phrase as well as ‘its placement and purpose in the 
statutory scheme.’ ”13   
III.  ANALYSIS 
These cases involve appeals of sales tax deficiency assessments, which are 
administered pursuant to the General Sales Tax Act (GSTA).14  The GSTA directs the 
department to in part administer the sales tax pursuant to the revenue collection act.15  
Under this act, when the department conducts an audit and ultimately issues a final 
assessment stating that a taxpayer owes sales tax, it potentially has two notice 
obligations: it must provide notice to the taxpayer and, if the taxpayer has appointed a 
representative, the department must provide the representative with copies of “letters and 
notices regarding a dispute” between the taxpayer and the department.  MCL 205.8. 
MCL 205.28 establishes the department’s notice obligations to the taxpayer: 
(1) The following conditions apply to all taxes administered under 
this act unless otherwise provided for in the specific tax statute: 
                                                 
12 Koontz v Ameritech Servs, Inc, 466 Mich 304, 312; 645 NW2d 34 (2002). 
13 Sun Valley Foods Co v Ward, 460 Mich 230, 237; 596 NW2d 119 (1999), quoting 
Bailey v United States, 516 US 137, 145; 116 S Ct 501; 133 L Ed 2d 472 (1995). 
14 MCL 205.51 et seq. 
15 In administering taxes generally, the department must adhere to MCL 205.21 to 
205.30, “[u]nless otherwise provided by specific authority in a taxing statute.”  MCL 
205.20.  The GSTA is a taxing statute, and it dictates that the department follow the 
revenue collection act, MCL 205.1 to 205.31, in administering the sales tax.  MCL 
205.59(1).   
 
 
 
8
(a) Notice, if required, shall be given either by personal service or by 
certified mail addressed to the last known address of the taxpayer. Service 
upon the department may be made in the same manner.[16] 
MCL 205.8 establishes the department’s notice obligations to the taxpayer’s designated 
representative: 
If a taxpayer files with the department a written request that copies 
of letters and notices regarding a dispute with that taxpayer be sent to the 
taxpayer’s official representative, the department shall send the official 
representative, at the address designated by the taxpayer in the written 
request, a copy of each letter or notice sent to that taxpayer.  A taxpayer 
shall not designate more than 1 official representative under this section for 
a single dispute.[17] 
The department argues that MCL 205.8 is a nonbinding obligation—a mere “courtesy” 
provision, of which the taxpayer is simply the beneficiary.  Alternatively, the department 
argues that MCL 205.8 operates to protect department employees from liability that 
would otherwise befall them if they disclosed a taxpayer’s information to the taxpayer’s 
representative without permission.18   
It is not clear how either of these arguments obviates the department’s obligation 
to provide the notice the statute requires, and the statutory text belies these claims.  The 
Legislature’s use of the word “shall” in both MCL 205.8 and MCL 205.28(1)(a) indicates 
a mandatory and imperative directive.19  The two notice provisions are, by their terms, 
both compulsory, as each states that the department “shall” provide the required notice.  
                                                 
16 MCL 205.28(1)(a) (emphasis added). 
17 MCL 205.8 (emphasis added). 
18 See MCL 205.28(1)(f). 
19 Browder v Int’l Fidelity Ins Co, 413 Mich 603, 612; 321 NW2d 668 (1982). 
 
 
 
9
Further, the GSTA states that the department “shall” administer the sales tax—including 
its assessment of sales tax deficiencies—pursuant to the revenue collection act, which 
encompasses both notice statutes.20   
We conclude that MCL 205.8 is mandatory notwithstanding the greater specificity 
of MCL 205.28(a)(1), which requires personal service or notice by certified mail, because 
that specificity has no bearing on the elements of the statute that impose a mandatory 
obligation to provide notice to a designated taxpayer representative.  Similarly, it is 
irrelevant that MCL 205.8 requires that “copies” of notices and letters be provided to a 
taxpayer’s representative.  Applying the plain meaning of “shall,” there can be no doubt 
that MCL 205.8 unambiguously directs the department to furnish a taxpayer’s 
representative with these documents whenever the taxpayer is entitled to receive the 
same. 
Reading the notice statutes in pari materia with MCL 205.22 confirms the notice 
statutes’ parity.  Statutes that relate to the same subject matter or share a common 
purpose must be read together as constituting one law, even if they contain no reference 
to one another and were enacted on different dates.21  Conflicting provisions of such 
statutes must be read together to produce a harmonious whole and to reconcile any 
                                                 
20 MCL 205.59(1). 
21 Jennings v Southwood, 446 Mich 125, 136; 521 NW2d 230 (1994); Crawford Co v 
Secretary of State, 160 Mich App 88, 95; 408 NW2d 112 (1987). 
 
 
 
10
inconsistencies wherever possible.22  The purpose of this interpretive rule is to give effect 
to the legislative purpose as found in statutes on a particular subject.23   
MCL 205.22, which dictates procedures surrounding a taxpayer’s appeal, does not 
refer to either MCL 205.8 or MCL 205.28(1)(a).  MCL 205.22 merely states that the 
appeal period begins to run upon “issuance of the assessment, decision, or order.”24  Just 
as MCL 205.22 does not refer to either notice requirement, neither of the notice-
requirement statutes refers to MCL 205.22.  Accordingly, there is no statutory indication 
suggesting that we hold MCL 205.8’s taxpayer representative notice requirement in lower 
esteem than the MCL 205.28(1)(a) taxpayer notice requirement.  When notice is required, 
the department must notify the taxpayer and any representative duly appointed by the 
taxpayer. 
Having determined that the Legislature intended MCL 205.8 to apply to the 
department coextensively with MCL 205.28(1)(a), we turn to the relationship between 
notice and issuance of the assessment.  By statute, the appeal period cannot begin to run 
until “issuance of the assessment” occurs.25  The department concedes that if it fails to 
                                                 
22 World Book, Inc v Dep’t of Treasury, 459 Mich 403, 416; 590 NW2d 293 (1999). 
23 Jennings, 446 Mich at 137. 
24 MCL 205.22(5).  Specifically, MCL 205.22(5) states that “[a]n assessment is final, 
conclusive, and not subject to further challenge after 90 days after the issuance of the 
assessment, decision, or order . . . .”  This reflects the outer bound of an appeal’s 
timeliness, as MCL 205.22(1) permits an appeal to the Tax Tribunal within 35 days after 
the assessment or to the Court of Claims within 90 days after the assessment.  In reading 
MCL 205.22 as a whole, it is apparent that both appeal periods begin to run upon 
“issuance” of the assessment. 
25 MCL 205.22(5). 
 
 
 
11
comply with MCL 205.28(1)(a), issuance does not occur.26  Because the two notice 
statutes stand on equal footing, the department’s concession compels the same 
consequence for its failure to comply with MCL 205.8, namely, that issuance does not 
occur.   
Furthermore, MCL 205.21(2)(f) provides a textual link between issuance of the 
final assessment and provision of the required notices.27  Under that section, a final 
assessment of a tax deficiency “is final and subject to appeal as provided in [MCL 
205.22]. The final notice of assessment shall include a statement advising the person of a 
right to appeal.”28  The statute equates “final assessment” with “final notice of 
assessment” by using the terms interchangeably.29  The notice and the assessment are one 
and the same.  It follows that the assessment cannot issue if the notices do not issue.  
Given its plain meaning, “issuance” requires actual distribution; the root word, “issue,” is 
                                                 
26 At oral argument, counsel for the department conceded that if the department does not 
comply with MCL 205.28(1)(a), it does not provide notice, and the consequence of not 
providing notice is that an assessment was never issued. 
27 MCL 205.21(2)(f) reads in full:   
If the taxpayer does not protest the notice of intent to assess within 
the time provided in subdivision (c), the department may assess the tax and 
the interest and penalty on the tax that the department believes are due and 
payable.  An assessment under this subdivision or subdivision (e) is final 
and subject to appeal as provided in section 22.  The final notice of 
assessment shall include a statement advising the person of a right to 
appeal.  [Emphasis added.] 
28 Id. 
29 Indeed, “[i]t was previously the practice of [the department] to use the phrasing ‘notice 
of assessment’ when it issued assessments.”  Fradco, 298 Mich App at 300.  
 
 
 
12
defined as “the act of sending out or putting forth; promulgation; distribution.”30  Thus, in 
addition to our determination that the two statutory notice requirements apply to the 
department with equal force, we further conclude that satisfaction of both notice 
requirements is required before issuance of the assessment is deemed to have occurred, 
starting the appeal period.  Because the department delayed issuing the notices of 
assessment to the taxpayers’ representatives in both cases before us, the running of the 
appeal periods were also delayed.  The taxpayers’ appeals were therefore timely, and the 
Tax Tribunal retained jurisdiction.31 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The Tax Tribunal and Court of Appeals correctly interpreted MCL 205.8 as 
imposing upon the department an obligation to notify a taxpayer’s official representative 
before the time to appeal a final assessment may begin to run.  In both force and effect, 
this obligation applies to the department coextensively with MCL 205.28(1)(a).  
                                                 
30 Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1997). 
31 Although it did not preserve this issue in the Court of Appeals below, the department 
here challenges the validity of the power of attorney forms in both cases.  In Fradco, the 
department argues that the authorization form was invalid because it did not identify a 
specific dispute, as MCL 205.8 allegedly requires.  However, MCL 205.8 only states that 
a taxpayer may not designate more than one representative for a single dispute.  Here, 
Fradco had only one designated representative throughout the dispute.  In SMK, the 
department argues that the form designating Edward Kisscorni as a representative was 
not valid because it was the third authorization form on file.  While it is true that SMK 
had three authorization forms on file, the third form gave Kisscorni limited authorization 
to represent SMK in this tax matter specifically.  Thus, SMK only specifically designated 
one representative for this dispute. 
 
 
 
13
The running of the appeal period is triggered by “issuance of the assessment,” and 
while issuance is not explicitly defined, MCL 205.21(2)(f) demonstrates that notice of the 
assessment is equivalent to the assessment itself.  Thus, the running of the appeal period 
is triggered by issuance of statutory notice.  Further, compliance with MCL 205.28(1)(a) 
is undisputedly a prerequisite to issuance.32  Because MCL 205.8 operates in tandem with 
MCL 205.28(1)(a), we hold that compliance with the department’s statutory obligation to 
notify a taxpayer’s official representative is likewise a prerequisite to issuance.   
However, because MCL 205.28(1)(a) and MCL 205.8 do not require the department to 
show that the taxpayer or its representative actually received the notice, we vacate the 
portions of the Court of Appeals opinions that read, “Because Petitioner filed its appeal 
within 35 days after its representative received notice from respondent, the Tax Tribunal 
had jurisdiction to hear petitioner’s appeal.”33  To the extent that this can be read to mean 
the appeal period begins when a taxpayer’s representative receives notice, we conclude it 
is erroneous.  Instead, the appeal period begins when the department complies with MCL 
205.28(1)(a) by giving the taxpayer notice of the final assessment through personal  
 
 
 
                                                 
32 See note 26 of this opinion. 
33 Fradco, 298 Mich App at 301; SMK, 298 Mich App at 310.  
 
 
 
14
service or certified mail and MCL 205.8 by sending a copy of the notice of the final 
assessment to the representative’s address provided by the taxpayer in its written request.  
In all other respects, we affirm the rulings of the Court of Appeals. 
 
 
 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
 
Stephen J. Markman 
 
Mary Beth Kelly 
 
Brian K. Zahra 
 
Bridget M. McCormack 
 
David F. Viviano