Title: State v. Kornelson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 118091
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: July 2, 2020

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 118,091 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
GRADY ALLEN KORNELSON, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
If a district court declares a jury deadlocked and orders a mistrial when the 
defendant does not object or consent to the mistrial, a retrial should be permitted only 
when there was a manifest necessity for the court's action. The contrary holding in State 
v. Graham, 277 Kan. 121, 83 P.3d 143 (2004), is overruled. 
 
2. 
A district court's jury instruction that states, "If you have no reasonable doubt as to 
the truth of each of the claims required to be proved by the State, you should find [the 
defendant] guilty," is legally appropriate. 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed March 15, 2019. 
Appeal from Reno District Court; TRISH ROSE, judge. Opinion filed July 2, 2020. Judgment of the Court 
of Appeals affirming the district court is affirmed. Judgment of the district court is affirmed. 
 
Kai Tate Mann, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, was on the briefs for appellant.  
 
Natasha Esau, assistant district attorney, Keith Schroeder, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, 
attorney general, were on the brief for appellee. 
2 
 
 
 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
BILES, J.:  The second jury to hear his case convicted Grady Kornelson of driving 
under the influence and illegal transportation of liquor. The first trial ended when the 
court declared a mistrial without Kornelson's consent because of a jury deadlock. He 
appeals his convictions, arguing the second trial violated his right against double 
jeopardy as guaranteed by the United States Constitution. He also claims the jury 
instruction on the State's burden of proof improperly discouraged the jury from 
exercising its nullification power. A Court of Appeals panel affirmed. State v. Kornelson, 
No. 118,091, 2019 WL 1213248, at *6 (Kan. App. 2019) (unpublished opinion). We 
agree with the panel's result, although we do so by applying "manifest necessity" to the 
double jeopardy issue, rather than the prosecutorial "goading" standard it used. 
 
We hold "manifest necessity" is the correct measure for declaring a jury 
deadlocked under the United States Supreme Court's double jeopardy caselaw when the 
defendant does not object or consent to the mistrial. The contrary holding in State v. 
Graham, 277 Kan. 121, 83 P.3d 143 (2004), is overruled. We also hold the district court 
appropriately declared a mistrial under the circumstances based on that manifest 
necessity standard. Finally, we reject the jury instruction challenge. See State v. 
Patterson, 311 Kan. 59, 68-69, 455 P.3d 792 (2020). We affirm Kornelson's convictions. 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
As a result of a traffic stop, the State charged Kornelson with felony driving under 
the influence under alternative theories of driving with excessive blood or breath alcohol 
concentration and driving while incapable of safely operating a vehicle because of 
alcohol impairment. See K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 8-1567(a)(2), (3). It also charged him with 
3 
 
 
 
illegally transporting liquor in an open container and operating a vehicle without a 
previously required ignition interlock device. See K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 8-1017(a)(4) 
(operating vehicle without required interlock device); K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 8-1599(b) 
(illegal transportation). Kornelson pled no contest to the ignition interlock charge and 
was ordered to pay a $100 fine and to restart his ignition interlock requirement period. He 
went to trial on the remaining charges.  
 
In the first trial, the evidence was presented in a single afternoon. Shortly after 
4:30 p.m., the court instructed the jury, and the parties presented their arguments. The 
court sent the jury to deliberate, but the record does not reflect what time. The district 
court anticipated the arguments and instructions would last until 5:15 p.m. About an hour 
and 15 minutes after that, the jury sent a note to the court, saying "Count 1 Hung" and 
"Count 2 Hung[.]" Counts 1 and 2 were the alternate DUI charges. The court went back 
on the record with the jury, Kornelson, and the parties' attorneys present: 
 
"The Court:  . . . [M]y court reporter . . . has advised me that you have advised 
her that you feel like you cannot reach a unanimous verdict. . . . Is that an accurate 
statement? 
 
"[Foreperson]:  Yes ma'am, at this point in it.  
 
"The Court:  It is 6:30 at night and everyone is probably kind of weary and you 
could come back in the morning and what I would do is have you convene at 8:30 a.m. 
and as soon as I would be advised you're all present, I would give the go ahead to begin 
deliberating again. I will ask you, [jury foreperson], do you think that that might be a 
fruitful course of action? 
 
 
"[Foreperson]:  Well, on one of the counts— 
 
 
"The Court:  Okay. Now— 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
"[Foreperson]:  That's a yes or no? 
 
 
"The Court:  That's a yes or no. 
 
 
"[Foreperson]:  Um, we will have access to all of the information we had today 
again; is that correct, the evidence? 
 
 
"The Court:  Yes.  
 
"[Foreperson]:  Okay. I guess I would have to ask my team whether or not they 
felt it would be worthwhile. I don't have that much say over that, and I don't want to say 
something that might be incorrect. That's all. Does that make sense? 
 
"The Court:  Would it create a hardship on any of you and if you will just show 
me by hands, if I required you to come back in the morning? [Juror A.], it would? 
 
"[Juror A.]:  I'm down one employee and I'm the only other person so this, yes, it 
is going to be a hardship. 
 
"The Court:  Okay. Alright. Well, you have certainly given it your all. It's a long 
day to be here from nine until 6:30. I'm going to declare what we call a hung jury. That 
sounds kind of harsh. We're not going to do anything to you but I do appreciate your 
service. I realize that is for some of you perhaps a frustrating outcome, and but it is a 
legitimate outcome and sometimes it happens. So I believe you have been given the work 
releases that you need. Those of you, Ms. Potter has them. You are now released from the 
prohibition about talking because the case is done. So if you want to talk to anyone about 
the case, you are free to do that. And you're also free to go with my thanks." 
 
Neither Kornelson nor the State objected to the trial court discharging the jury. 
 
5 
 
 
 
After the second trial, a new jury found Kornelson guilty on both DUI theories and 
the open container charge. The district court sentenced him to 6 months' jail time 
followed by 12 months' probation for the DUI based on excessive blood or breath alcohol 
content. It fined him $100 for the open container. 
 
Kornelson appealed, arguing for the first time to the Court of Appeals that the 
second trial violated his right against double jeopardy because the record did not reflect a 
"manifest necessity" for the mistrial. He also claimed the district court erred by giving a 
reasonable doubt instruction that he believes prohibited the jury from exercising its 
nullification power.  
 
A panel affirmed the convictions. Kornelson, 2019 WL 1213248, at *6. It reached 
the merits of the double jeopardy claim after concluding Kornelson properly invoked 
exceptions to the general rule prohibiting new issues from being raised for the first time 
on appeal. It then rejected the claim on its merits. 2019 WL 1213248, at *3. It held he 
failed to show prosecutorial conduct that "goaded" him into not objecting to the mistrial, 
citing Graham. It also held there was no error in the reasonable doubt instruction. 2019 
WL 1213248, at *6.  
 
Kornelson timely petitioned this court for review of the panel's decisions, which 
we granted. The State did not cross-petition for review of the panel's preservation holding 
on the double jeopardy issue. Jurisdiction is proper. See K.S.A. 20-3018(b) (providing for 
petitions for review of Court of Appeals decisions); K.S.A. 60-2101(b) (Supreme Court 
has jurisdiction to review Court of Appeals decisions upon petition for review). 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
DOUBLE JEOPARDY DOES NOT BAR THE SECOND TRIAL 
 
To decide whether Kornelson's retrial violated double jeopardy when the district 
court held the jury was deadlocked after a brief, inconclusive exchange with two jurors 
and just over an hour of deliberation, two questions must be resolved. First, what test 
applies? And second, did double jeopardy bar Kornelson's second trial under the 
circumstances using that standard?  
  
Standard of review 
 
"Whether a particular criminal defendant's protection against double jeopardy was 
violated is a question of law over which [the court has] unlimited review." State v. 
Morton, 283 Kan. 464, 468, 153 P.3d 532 (2007). 
 
Manifest necessity applies 
 
For its test, the panel required Kornelson to establish "'governmental conduct'" 
"'intended to provoke [him] into seeking a mistrial,'" i.e. "goading," because he did not 
object to the court's jury deadlock determination. Kornelson, 2019 WL 1213248, at *3. 
To justify this, the panel relied on our court's 2004 decision in Graham, 277 Kan. 121, 
which had similar facts. There, the jury informed the district court twice it was 
deadlocked, so the court declared a mistrial. The court did not consult defendant before 
doing so, and defense counsel did not object. The Graham court held the "manifest 
necessity" standard did not apply because defendant did not object at the time. It 
explained this in just two sentences: 
 
"In State v. Wittsell, 275 Kan. 442, 446, 66 P.3d 831 (2003), this court stated:  'The long-
established test applied where the first trial was terminated over objection of the 
defendant is the "manifest necessity" standard. [Citation omitted.] Retrial is 
7 
 
 
 
constitutionally permissible only where a high degree of necessity supports the mistrial.' 
(Emphasis added.) Since Graham did not object to the granting of a mistrial, the 'manifest 
necessity' standard is not applicable." 277 Kan. at 133. 
 
Kornelson argues Graham cannot be reconciled with United States Supreme Court 
precedent interpreting the Double Jeopardy Clause. We agree. 
 
"The United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the United States 
Constitution is controlling upon and must be followed by state courts." State v. Lawson, 
296 Kan. 1084, Syl. ¶ 1, 297 P.3d 1164 (2013). The Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall . . . be subject for the same offence to 
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." It applies to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S. Ct. 2056, 23 L. Ed. 2d 707 (1969). 
Section 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights also contains a protection against 
double jeopardy that is "'equivalent to the protection guaranteed in the United States 
Constitution.'" State v. Wittsell, 275 Kan. 442, 446, 66 P.3d 831 (2003); see State v. 
Miller, 293 Kan. 535, 544, 264 P.3d 461 (2011). 
 
Although double jeopardy protection "unequivocally prohibits a second trial 
following an acquittal," its application is more nuanced when the first trial ends in a 
mistrial. See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503-04, 505, 98 S. Ct. 824, 54 L. Ed. 
2d 717 (1978). The general rule is set out in United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 
579, 6 L. Ed. 165 (1824), in which a defendant argued double jeopardy barred a later 
prosecution after "the jury, being unable to agree, were discharged by the Court from 
giving any verdict upon the indictment, without the consent of the prisoner, or of the 
Attorney for the United States." 22 U.S. at 579; see also United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 
600, 606-07, 96 S. Ct. 1075, 47 L. Ed. 2d 267 (1976) (noting Perez supplies the rule 
8 
 
 
 
when "a mistrial has been declared without the defendant's request or consent"). The 
Perez Court held the defendant could be retried, reasoning: 
 
"We are of opinion, that the facts constitute no legal bar to a future trial. The prisoner has 
not been convicted or acquitted, and may again be put upon his defence. We think, that in 
all cases of this nature, the law has invested Courts of justice with the authority to 
discharge a jury from giving any verdict, whenever, in their opinion, taking all the 
circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of 
public justice would otherwise be defeated. They are to exercise a sound discretion on the 
subject; and it is impossible to define all the circumstances, which would render it proper 
to interfere. To be sure, the power ought to be used with the greatest caution, under 
urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes; and, in capital cases 
especially, Courts should be extremely careful how they interfere with any of the chances 
of life, in favour of the prisoner. But, after all, they have the right to order the discharge; 
and the security which the public have for the faithful, sound, and conscientious exercise 
of this discretion, rests, in this, as in other cases, upon the responsibility of the Judges, 
under their oaths of office." (Emphasis added.) 22 U.S. at 580. 
 
This "manifest necessity" standard simultaneously safeguards two competing 
interests:  "the defendant's 'valued right to have his trial completed by a particular 
tribunal,'" and "the public interest in affording the prosecutor one full and fair opportunity 
to present his evidence to an impartial jury." Washington, 434 U.S. at 503, 505. When 
"the judge, acting without the defendant's consent, aborts the proceeding, the defendant 
has been deprived of his 'valued right to have his trial completed by a particular 
tribunal.'" United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 484, 91 S. Ct. 547, 27 L. Ed. 2d 543 
(1971). But while a second proceeding can cause unfairness to the defendant—including 
increased emotional and financial burden, prolonged stigma, and increased risk of 
convicting despite innocence—"the variety of circumstances that may make it necessary 
to discharge a jury before a trial is concluded" need not create that unfairness. 
Washington, 434 U.S. at 505. When the defendant objects to a mistrial, the balance tips 
9 
 
 
 
toward the public interest only when there is a manifest necessity for it. See 434 U.S. at 
505. 
 
The Court has reaffirmed manifest necessity is required even when a trial court 
dismisses a jury before a verdict sua sponte, without objection from either the prosecutor 
or defense counsel. See Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773-74, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 176 L. Ed. 
2d 678 (2010). In holding a state trial court did not unreasonably apply clearly 
established federal law when it retried defendant after sua sponte declaring the jury 
deadlocked, the Reinco Court cited Perez as supplying the standard by which the trial 
court's decision must be measured. 559 U.S. at 774; see also Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 607 
(reasoning that absent a defense motion, if mistrial is needed for "prosecutorial or judicial 
error," the "doctrine of manifest necessity stands as a command to trial judges not to 
foreclose the defendant's option until a scrupulous exercise of judicial discretion leads to 
the conclusion that the ends of public justice would not be served by a continuation of the 
proceedings"). 
 
The manifest necessity standard does not apply when the defendant requests or 
consents to a mistrial. Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 607. "[O]ne of the principal threads" of the 
double jeopardy protection "is the right of the defendant to have his trial completed 
before the first jury empaneled to try him . . . ." Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 673, 
102 S. Ct. 2083, 72 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1982). So when the defendant makes the request the 
barrier to later prosecution is generally removed. Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 607-08; see 
Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 673. But a "narrow exception" remains. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 673. 
That is because the Double Jeopardy Clause 
 
"protect[s] a defendant against governmental actions intended to provoke mistrial 
requests and thereby to subject defendants to the substantial burdens imposed by multiple 
prosecutions. It bars retrials where 'bad-faith conduct by judge or prosecutor' threatens 
10 
 
 
 
the '(h)arassment of an accused by successive prosecutions or declaration of a mistrial so 
as to afford the prosecution a more favorable opportunity to convict' the defendant. 
[Citations omitted.]" Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 611. 
 
This means that "[o]nly where the governmental conduct in question is intended to 
'goad' the defendant into moving for a mistrial may a defendant raise the bar of double 
jeopardy to a second trial after having succeeded in aborting the first on his own motion." 
Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 676. 
 
In Kornelson's appeal, the panel noted both he and the State agreed the manifest 
necessity standard applied. Kornelson, 2019 WL 1213248, at *2. But it still held the 
goading standard applied based on Graham, observing that it was not free to deviate from 
our precedent. 2019 WL 1213248, at *4 ("So even if Kornelson has a reasonable 
argument that the standard should be different, we are duty bound to follow Kansas 
Supreme Court precedent, absent some indication the Supreme Court is departing from 
its previous position."). We signal our disapproval today by expressly overruling Graham 
on this point. 
 
As noted, the Graham court gave no real analysis to its equating the standard 
applicable to circumstances when a defendant consents to a mistrial to those when a 
mistrial is declared without objection. Graham, 277 Kan. at 133 ("Since Graham did not 
object to the granting of a mistrial, the 'manifest necessity' standard is not applicable. The 
correct standard, where the defendant does not object, is the same standard as if Graham 
had consented to the mistrial."). Indeed, the Graham court cited no authority for its 
holding. And, as explained, six years after Graham, the United States Supreme Court 
decided Renico, which observed that under the "'clearly established Federal law' in this 
area . . . trial judges may declare a mistrial 'whenever, in their opinion, taking all the 
11 
 
 
 
circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity' for doing so." Renico, 559 
U.S. at 773-74. 
 
We hold that when a trial court sua sponte declares a jury deadlocked and orders a 
mistrial when the defendant does not object or consent to the mistrial, retrial should be 
permitted only when there was a manifest necessity for the court's action. Graham's 
holding to the contrary is overruled. 
 
Manifest necessity justified the mistrial 
 
When confronted with a potential jury deadlock, the trial court has "broad 
discretion in deciding whether or not 'manifest necessity' justifies a discharge of the jury," 
and its "decision to declare a mistrial when [it] considers the jury deadlocked is therefore 
accorded great deference by a reviewing court." Washington, 434 U.S. at 509-10. The 
"especially compelling" reasons for this deference in deadlocked jury cases are that, 
 
"On the one hand, if [the judge] discharges the jury when further deliberations may 
produce a fair verdict, the defendant is deprived of his 'valued right to have his trial 
completed by a particular tribunal.' But if he fails to discharge a jury which is unable to 
reach a verdict after protracted and exhausting deliberations, there exists a significant risk 
that a verdict may result from pressures inherent in the situation rather than the 
considered judgment of all the jurors. If retrial of the defendant were barred whenever an 
appellate court views the 'necessity' for a mistrial differently from the trial judge, there 
would be a danger that the latter, cognizant of the serious societal consequences of an 
erroneous ruling, would employ coercive means to break the apparent deadlock. Such a 
rule would frustrate the public interest in just judgments." 434 U.S. at 509-10. 
 
But the trial court's deference is not absolute: 
 
12 
 
 
 
"'[I]f the record reveals that the trial judge has failed to exercise the "sound discretion" 
entrusted to him, the reason for such deference by an appellate court disappears.' Thus 'if 
the trial judge acts for reasons completely unrelated to the trial problem which purports to 
be the basis for the mistrial ruling, close appellate scrutiny is appropriate.' Similarly, 'if a 
trial judge acts irrationally or irresponsibly, . . . his action cannot be condoned.'" Renico, 
559 U.S. at 775. 
 
See also Washington, 434 U.S. at 510 n.28 ("It should be noted . . . that the rationale for 
this deference in the 'hung' jury situation is that the trial court is in the best position to 
assess all the factors which must be considered in making a necessarily discretionary 
determination whether the jury will be able to reach a just verdict if it continues to 
deliberate."). 
 
Kornelson gives four reasons why he believes there was no manifest necessity to 
discharge his earlier jury. First, while the jury indicated it was hung on the DUI charges, 
it might have been able to reach a verdict on the open container charge. Second, the jury 
was given only about an hour to deliberate. Third, he sees the foreperson's response to the 
court's inquiry as indicating more deliberations might have been productive. And fourth, 
in his view, the court based its decision "primarily on" the potential hardship to the jurors 
instead of whether the jury would be able to reach a verdict. 
 
Federal appellate courts have identified several factors useful in determining when 
jury deadlock justifies a mistrial:  "'the jury's own statements that it cannot agree, the 
length of deliberations, the length of trial, the complexity of the issues presented, the 
jury's communications to the judge, and the impact that further, forced deliberations 
might have on the verdict.'" United States v. Vaiseta, 333 F.3d 815, 818 (7th Cir. 2003); 
see United States v. Gordy, 526 F.2d 631, 635-36 (5th Cir. 1976); see also Renico, 559 
U.S. at 778 (holding state court did not unreasonably deviate from established federal law 
in determining retrial permitted after jury deadlock declaration, noting trial was not 
13 
 
 
 
complex, jury's notes to judge could be read to reflect "substantial disagreement," and 
foreperson told judge jury would not be able to reach a verdict). "[A] statement from the 
jury that it is hopelessly deadlocked" may be "a crucial factor, although a present inability 
to agree is not determinative of the question of whether future deliberations might prove 
helpful." Gordy, 526 F.2d at 636. 
 
In Kornelson's case, the record establishes the required manifest necessity to 
discharge the jury. The jury's note itself showing the deadlock and the simplicity of the 
issues outweigh the problems he identifies. To begin with, the evidence was 
straightforward, even though the jury deliberated for only about an hour. The note 
conveyed the jury was unable to agree on the excess-breath-alcohol DUI charge, which 
the foreperson confirmed. This charge was supported by the breathalyzer results, so the 
only issue for the jury was whether to believe that evidence. And Count 2 involved a 
somewhat more involved—but still straightforward—determination whether the jury 
believed Kornelson could not drive safely. 
 
Kornelson's observation that the first jury had no apparent trouble with the open 
container charge does not affect the analysis. The jury's note shows it believed it was at 
an impasse on the other two charges. And it is at least debatable whether partial verdicts 
are permitted under Kansas law. Compare Tomlin v. State, 35 Kan. App. 2d 398, 402, 130 
P.3d 1229 (2006) ("[T]he status of Kansas law was (and is) that Kansas does not 
recognize partial verdicts, and absent a verdict on all charges in conformity with K.S.A. 
22-3421 a defendant can be retried following a mistrial due to a hung jury."), with Zink v. 
State, No. 95,477, 2007 WL 570197, at *1 (Kan. App. 2007) (unpublished opinion) 
(noting jury acquitted defendant of one of two counts but was hung on the other, district 
court declared mistrial on unresolved charge and the State retried it). Importantly, 
Kornelson does not support his partial verdict argument with any legal authority. 
"[F]ailure to support an argument with pertinent authority or to show why the argument is 
14 
 
 
 
sound despite a lack of supporting authority or in the face of contrary authority is akin to 
failing to brief the issue." State v. Tague, 296 Kan. 993, 1001, 298 P.3d 273 (2013). 
 
Kornelson argues the foreperson's responses indicated more deliberations might 
have been productive, and that the district court veered into improper territory by 
inquiring whether another day's deliberations would be a hardship. But the foreperson's 
unwillingness to speak for the entire jury about further deliberations does not undermine 
the jury's explicit written declaration that it was hung on the DUI counts. And although 
the court shifted the subject to juror hardship as it probed the situation, it did not show the 
mistrial was based on jurors' desire not to continue. To the contrary, the court remarked 
they had "certainly given it [their] all." 
 
Given these circumstances, coupled with the deference and discretion our caselaw 
affords the trial judge making these decisions, we hold the record supports the 
determination that the jury was deadlocked under the manifest necessity standard. The 
second trial did not violate Kornelson's double jeopardy rights. 
 
THE JURY INSTRUCTION WAS LEGALLY APPROPRIATE 
 
Kornelson next argues the jury instruction describing the State's burden of proof 
impermissibly prevented the jury from exercising its nullification power. At Kornelson's 
second trial, the district court instructed the jury without objection that: 
 
"No. 5. The State has the burden to prove Grady Kornelson is guilty. Grady Kornelson is 
not required to prove he is not guilty. You must presume he is not guilty unless you are 
convinced from the evidence that he is guilty. The test you must use in determining 
whether Grady Kornelson is guilty or not guilty is this:  If you have a reasonable doubt as 
to the truth of any of the claims required to be proved by the State, you must find Grady 
Kornelson not guilty. If you have no reasonable doubt as to the truth of each of the claims 
15 
 
 
 
required to be proved by the State, you should find Grady Kornelson guilty." (Emphasis 
added.) 
 
Kornelson claims the jury should have been instructed that it "may" convict him 
absent reasonable doubt. He asserts the instruction given misstated the law. But this 
argument lacks merit. Patterson, 311 Kan. at 68-69. 
 
In Patterson, the court held that a similar reasonable doubt instruction did not 
undermine the jury's nullification power, and, therefore, was legally appropriate. Telling 
the jury it "'should' convict absent reasonable doubt" is appropriate because it is improper 
to tell the jury it may nullify. 311 Kan. at 68-69 (citing State v. Boothby, 310 Kan. 619, 
630, 448 P.3d 416 [2019]). Similarly, the instruction does not "raise the 'directed verdict' 
concerns" underlying the court's disapproval of an instruction that did foreclose 
nullification as a possibility by mandating that the jury "'"will enter a verdict of guilty"'" 
absent reasonable doubt. 311 Kan. at 68-69 (distinguishing State v. Smith-Parker, 301 
Kan. 132, 340 P.3d 485 [2014]). 
 
We hold it was not a misstatement of the law to tell the jury:  "If you have no 
reasonable doubt as to the truth of each of the claims required to be proved by the State, 
you should find Grady Kornelson guilty." 
 
Affirmed. 
 
MICHAEL E. WARD, Senior Judge, assigned.1 
                                            
 
 
1REPORTER'S NOTE:  Senior Judge Michael E. Ward was appointed to hear case No. 
118,091 under the authority vested in the Supreme Court by K.S.A. 20-2616 to fill the 
vacancy on the court by the retirement of Chief Justice Lawton R. Nuss.