Title: Walter E. Fernald Corp. v. The Governor
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11801
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: May 29, 2015

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SJC-11801 
 
WALTER E. FERNALD CORPORATION  vs.  THE GOVERNOR & others.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     February 5, 2015. - May 29, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 
& Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Corporation, Charitable corporation.  Real Property, Ownership. 
Governmental Immunity.  Agency, Public agent. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Land Court Department on 
September 8, 2010. 
 
 
The case was heard by Keith C. Long, J., on a motion for 
summary judgment. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Joseph Callanan, Assistant Attorney General (John M. 
Donnelly, Assistant Attorney General, with him) for the 
defendants. 
 
Thomas J. Frain (C. Alex Hahn with him) for the plaintiff. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  The Walter E. Fernald Corporation (corporation), 
                     
 
1 Department of Developmental Services and Division of 
Capital Asset Management. 
2 
 
established in 1850, is a charitable organization devoted to 
serving the needs of the developmentally disabled.  The 
corporation brought an action in the Land Court, seeking, among 
other things, a declaration under G. L. c. 231A, § 1 
(declaratory judgment act), that it is the owner of certain 
parcels of recorded land.  The parcels are located on Norcross 
Hill in Templeton (Templeton parcels).  As defendants in its 
suit, the corporation named the Governor, the Department of 
Developmental Services, and the Division of Capital Asset 
Management (collectively, the Commonwealth); the Commonwealth 
had asserted ownership of the Templeton parcels by, among other 
things, naming several of them in a statute designating an 
expanse of land for conservation and public recreational 
purposes.  See St. 2002, c. 504. 
 
A judge of the Land Court denied the Commonwealth's motion 
to dismiss the corporation's suit on grounds of sovereign 
immunity.  Subsequently, the judge allowed the corporation's 
motion for summary judgment.  The judge concluded that there 
could be no genuine dispute that, although a school established 
by the corporation became an agency of the Commonwealth in the 
early Twentieth Century, the corporation itself remained 
independent of the Commonwealth, and purchased the Templeton 
parcels on its own behalf.  The judge therefore entered judgment 
declaring the corporation's ownership of the parcels. 
3 
 
 
We affirm, holding that sovereign immunity does not apply 
to the particular type of action brought here and adopting the 
same analysis of the facts taken by the judge below. 
 
1.  Background.  We outline the facts that gave rise to 
this litigation, reserving the details for later discussion. 
 
The corporation was created by a special act of the 
Legislature, at a time when no general framework had been 
enacted for the establishment of corporations.2  See St. 1850, 
c. 150.  The incorporating statute gave the corporation the 
name, unfortunate by today's lights, "the Massachusetts School 
for Idiotic and Feeble-minded Youth."  St. 1850, c. 150, § 1.  
As soon as it was created, the corporation established a school, 
also named "the Massachusetts School for Idiotic and Feeble-
minded Youth" (school).  In addition, the corporation devoted 
resources to conducting and publishing research. 
 
Over the years, the corporation changed its name several 
times.  In 1883, as the school began to accept adults as well as 
children, the corporation took the name "the Massachusetts 
School for the Feeble-Minded."  Other name changes were made in 
1925 ("the Walter E. Fernald State School") and 1987 ("the 
Walter E. Fernald State School Corporation").  The corporation 
assumed its current name ("the Walter E. Fernald Corporation") 
                     
 
2 See Larcom v. Olin, 160 Mass. 102, 104 (1893) (discussing 
subsequent enactment of St. 1851, c. 133). 
4 
 
in 2006.  Walter E. Fernald, for whom the corporation eventually 
was named, served as the school's longtime superintendent in the 
early Twentieth Century. 
 
From the start, the Commonwealth made appropriations to 
help support the school, both annually and for specific 
purposes.  See, e.g., Resolves 1851, c. 44; St. 1901, c. 303.  
In several instances, the Commonwealth provided funding to 
purchase land for the school.  See Resolves 1887, c. 64; 
Resolves 1897, c. 64.  The corporation purchased the Templeton 
parcels with its own money, in a series of transactions 
conducted between 1923 and 1969.  This land was used by the 
school at various times, particularly for farming. 
 
In 2002, the Legislature enacted a statute designating 
enumerated parcels of land for "conservation and public 
recreational purposes."  St. 2002, c. 504.  Five of the six 
Templeton parcels were included among those listed in the 
statute.3  The corporation brought an action in the Land Court, 
seeking, among other things, a declaration that the Templeton 
parcels are owned by the corporation. 
 
Portions of the corporation's complaint were dismissed by a 
Land Court judge in an order issued on February 14, 2011.  The 
                     
 
3 Although the sixth parcel was not listed in St. 2002, 
c. 504, the Walter E. Fernald Corporation (corporation) included 
it in its complaint "out of an abundance of caution." 
5 
 
judge determined, in that decision, that the Governor was not a 
necessary or proper party, and that the relief sought by the 
corporation other than declaratory relief was not within the 
Land Court's jurisdiction.  The judge did not, however, agree 
with the Commonwealth that the corporation's suit was barred 
altogether by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 
 
The corporation moved for summary judgment on the balance 
of its complaint.  In another order, issued on December 27, 
2013, the Land Court judge allowed the motion and declared the 
corporation's ownership of the parcels, free of any claims by 
the Commonwealth.  The Commonwealth appealed, arguing that the 
judge erred both in his rejection of the Commonwealth's 
sovereign immunity defense and in his resolution of the merits.  
We transferred the appeal to this court on our own motion. 
 
2.  Standard of review.  We review a grant of summary 
judgment de novo.  See Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n v. Hendricks, 
463 Mass. 635, 637 (2012).  We "need not rely on the rationale 
cited and 'may consider any ground supporting the judgment.'"  
District Attorney for N. Dist. v. School Comm. of Wayland, 455 
Mass. 561, 566 (2009), quoting Augat, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. 
Co., 410 Mass. 117, 120 (1991).  Summary judgment is appropriate 
if, viewed "in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party," 
Fuller v. First Fin. Ins. Co., 448 Mass. 1, 5 (2006), the 
materials properly in the summary judgment record "show that 
6 
 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  
Mass. R. Civ. P. 56 (c), as amended, 436 Mass. 1404 (2002). 
 
3.  Sovereign immunity.  The doctrine of sovereign immunity 
provides that the Commonwealth "cannot be impleaded into its own 
courts except with its consent."  Randall v. Haddad, 468 Mass. 
347, 354 (2014) (Randall), quoting Woodbridge v. Worcester State 
Hosp., 384 Mass. 38, 42 (1981).  Such consent may be provided 
"by statute"; it also may be "implicit[], where 'governmental 
liability is necessary to effectuate the legislative purpose.'"  
Woodward Sch. For Girls, Inc. v. Quincy, 469 Mass. 151, 177 
(2014), quoting Todino v. Wellfleet, 448 Mass. 234, 238 (2007).  
The doctrine applies "both to money judgments and more generally 
to 'interference by the court at the behest of litigants.'"  
Boxford v. Massachusetts Highway Dep't, 458 Mass. 596, 601 
(2010), quoting New Hampshire Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Markem Corp., 
424 Mass. 344, 351 (1997). 
 
Sovereign immunity originated in the ancient notion that 
"[t]he king can do no wrong."  J.A. Sullivan Corp. v. 
Commonwealth, 397 Mass. 789, 793 (1986).  Scholars have for many 
years "suggested that the doctrine is an anachronism in American 
law," given our nation's rejection of the monarchy.  See Morash 
& Sons, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 612, 618 (1973) (Morash 
& Sons), citing K.C. Davis, 3 Administrative Law § 25.01, at 435 
7 
 
(1958).  Many courts and legislatures have agreed; "[t]he courts 
in some jurisdictions have abolished the doctrine of 
governmental immunity entirely," and "[a]ll other jurisdictions 
have eroded the immunity by both statutory exceptions and judge 
made exceptions."  Morash & Sons, supra at 618-619, and cases 
cited.  See H.J. Alperin, Summary of Basic Law § 17.132, at 870 
(4th ed. 2009). 
 
Our own view has been that "there should be limits to 
governmental liability and exceptions to the rule of liability."  
Morash & Sons, 363 Mass. at 623.  Yet we also have recognized 
that an overly comprehensive rule of sovereign immunity is 
"unjust and indefensible as a matter of logic and sound public 
policy."  Whitney v. Worcester, 373 Mass. 208, 209 (1977) 
(Whitney).  We have explained that sovereign immunity creates an 
"inversion of the law," shielding the government from liability 
for wrongs that ordinarily would be redressed.  See Morash & 
Sons, supra at 621.  Although this "inversion of the law," id., 
is financially beneficial to the general public, "it can hardly 
be termed sound public policy that some persons contribute only 
tax revenues to the commonweal while from others additional 
contribution is exacted in the form of uncompensated injuries."  
Whitney, supra at 215. 
 
We have "long recognized that 'sovereign immunity is a 
judicially created common law concept,' . . . and, as such, is 
8 
 
subject to judicial abrogation or limitation."  Randall, 468 
Mass. at 356, quoting Morash & Sons, 363 Mass. at 615, and 
citing Whitney, 373 Mass. at 212.  In 1977, we announced our 
intention to abrogate sovereign immunity in tort cases.  See 
Whitney, supra at 210.  Soon thereafter, the Legislature enacted 
the Tort Claims Act, G. L. c. 258, which permits recovery, 
subject to certain exceptions and limitations, for torts 
committed by the Commonwealth, its subdivisions, and its agents.  
No similar legislative action was needed with regard to actions 
in contract, since the law has long been settled that "a State 
consents to jurisdiction by voluntarily entering into a 
contract."  J.A. Sullivan Corp. v. Commonwealth, 397 Mass. at 
793. 
 
Sovereign immunity remains in place in other areas of the 
law.  See Randall, 468 Mass. at 357.  We have identified three 
"reasons of justice and public policy" (citation and quotation 
omitted), id. at 358-359, that, in some contexts, support 
continued application of the doctrine:  sovereign immunity may 
serve "to protect the discretionary functions of a public 
official, . . . or to prevent the unauthorized actions of a 
public official, . . . or to shield the public fisc from the 
specter of virtually unlimited liability" (citations omitted).  
Id., quoting Bates v. Director of the Office of Campaign & 
Political Fin., 436 Mass. 144, 174 (2002) (Bates).  We have 
9 
 
indicated our reluctance to apply the sovereign immunity 
doctrine where it would not serve these goals.  See Randall, 
supra at 358-359 (purposes of sovereign immunity not served 
where, in violation of court order, public employee deposited 
funds in State retirement account); Bates, supra (purposes not 
served where Legislature failed to appropriate funds to effect 
law enacted by ballot measure).  See also Morash & Sons, 363 
Mass. at 619. 
 
The Commonwealth's argument that the surviving portion of 
the corporation's complaint is barred by sovereign immunity 
rests largely on our one-half century old decision in Executive 
Air Serv., Inc. v. Division of Fisheries & Game, 342 Mass. 356 
(1961) (Executive Air).  There, the Commonwealth purchased two 
parcels of registered land and obtained certificates of title 
from the Land Court.  Id. at 357.  The Commonwealth's deeds were 
subject to leases held by the plaintiff, which operated an 
airport on the land.  Id.  The plaintiff sought a declaratory 
judgment invalidating the Commonwealth's deeds and certificates 
of title.  Id.  The theory put forth by the plaintiff, so far as 
our brief opinion reveals, was that the enactment of the 
declaratory judgment act ended the Commonwealth's immunity as to 
any suit brought under that act.  See id. at 358.  We rejected 
that view, stating that the declaratory judgment act "relates to 
procedure," and that, as other jurisdictions have held, 
10 
 
"sovereign immunity is not affected by declaratory judgment 
procedure."  Id. at 357-358. 
 
We since have reiterated that the Legislature did not 
intend to waive sovereign immunity for the universe of actions 
brought under the declaratory judgment act.  See, e.g., Sullivan 
v. Chief Justice for Admin. & Mgmt. of the Trial Court, 448 
Mass. 15, 24 (2006) (declaratory judgment act "includes only a 
limited waiver of sovereign immunity").  See also Fathers & 
Families, Inc. v. Chief Justice for Admin. & Mgmt. of the Trial 
Court, 460 Mass. 508, 509-510 (2011) (judicial department is not 
subject to declaratory judgment procedure).  That is to say, we 
have continued to maintain that a plaintiff cannot sidestep the 
common-law shield of sovereign immunity, to the extent that that 
shield remains intact, by using the procedural device of an 
action for declaratory judgment. 
 
We now hold, however, that our common-law sovereign 
immunity doctrine does not reach the specific type of suit at 
issue here, namely, one in which a plaintiff asserts its own 
ownership of specified parcels of recorded land.4  This brand of 
suit differs in two important ways from the one addressed in 
                     
 
4 As discussed infra, if a plaintiff seeking to vindicate 
its ownership of recorded land were to initiate land 
registration proceedings, those proceedings would in any event 
bind the Commonwealth.  See G. L. c. 185, § 45 (judgment of 
registration "shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, 
including the [C]ommonwealth"). 
11 
 
Executive Air:  the plaintiff here asserts its own ownership of 
the land, rather than the ownership of a third party, and the 
land at issue here is not registered to the Commonwealth.  See 
Executive Air, 342 Mass. at 357.  We do not now reexamine our 
conclusion in Executive Air that the suit brought there was 
barred by sovereign immunity. 
 
Our reasons for holding that sovereign immunity does not 
encompass actions by which a plaintiff seeks to vindicate its 
ownership of specified parcels of recorded land are the 
following.  First and foremost, actions of this type do not 
implicate the concerns that support the continued application of 
sovereign immunity.  Disputes concerning a plaintiff's ownership 
of specified parcels of recorded land do not tend to concern 
"the discretionary functions of a public official."  Randall, 
468 Mass. at 358, quoting Bates, 436 Mass. at 174.  In other 
words, these actions are unlikely to be rooted in conduct 
"characterized by the high degree of discretion and judgment 
involved in weighing alternatives and making choices with 
respect to public policy and planning," Whitney, 373 Mass. at 
218, where judicial inquiry "might 'jeopardiz(e) the quality and 
efficiency of government itself.'"  Id., quoting Spencer v. 
General Hosp., 425 F.2d 479, 481 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
 
These types of actions also do not typically stem from 
"unauthorized actions of a public official," Randall, 468 Mass. 
12 
 
at 358, quoting Bates, 436 Mass. at 174, namely, attempts to 
circumvent the ordinary procedures by which the Commonwealth 
expends its funds.  See George A. Fuller Co. v. Commonwealth, 
303 Mass. 216, 119-220, 222-224 (1939) (sovereign immunity 
successfully asserted to bar building contractor's suit for 
payment approved ultra vires by emergency public works 
commission).  And the adjudication of a plaintiff's ownership of 
specified parcels of recorded land would not subject the public 
fisc to a "specter of virtually unlimited liability."  Randall, 
supra, quoting Bates, supra.  The Commonwealth's potential 
liability in such cases is, rather, limited to losing control of 
properties that it does not truly own.  In sum, in the words of 
the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, the type of action we 
consider here "implicates none of the modern day considerations 
that would justify the State's invocation of sovereign 
immunity."  Welch v. State, 853 A.2d 214, 216 (Me. 2004). 
 
As in Randall, 468 Mass. at 356 n.21, we need not decide 
here whether our common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity is 
unconstitutional, in whole or in part.  Nevertheless, in drawing 
the boundaries of that doctrine, we recognize that it strains 
against constitutionally protected values.  Article 1 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights protects "the right of . . . 
acquiring, possessing and protecting property."  The Declaration 
of Rights provides also that the "officers of government . . . 
13 
 
are at all times accountable to [the people]," art. 5, and that 
"[e]very subject of the commonwealth ought to find a certain 
remedy, by having recourse to the laws, for all injuries or 
wrongs which he may receive in his person, property, or 
character," art. 11.  Sovereign immunity diminishes the degree 
to which our laws protect property rights, provide recourse to 
legal proceedings, and hold government officers accountable to 
the people.5  See Welch v. State, 853 A.2d at 217 (constitutional 
protections of property and due process "would lose considerable 
meaning if the doctrine of sovereign immunity prohibited the 
people from bringing quiet title actions to settle ownership 
disputes with the State"); GAR Assocs. III, L.P. v. State ex 
rel. Texas Dep't of Transp., 224 S.W.3d 395, 401 (Tex. App. 
2006) (inferring waiver of sovereign immunity from takings 
provision of Texas Constitution). 
 
The Commonwealth suggests that its claim to sovereign 
immunity in the present circumstances is supported by Block v. 
North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 461 U.S. 273 
(1983) (Block), a case concerning a land dispute between a State 
and the Federal government.  Under the Federal Quiet Title Act 
                     
 
5 As a matter of degree, this is true in the current context 
even though, as discussed infra, a plaintiff engaged in a 
dispute with the Commonwealth over recorded land could turn also 
to the relatively onerous process of land registration.  See 
note 4, supra. 
14 
 
of 1972, 28 U.S.C. § 2409a (2012), actions to quiet title 
against the United States are subject to various restrictions, 
including a twelve-year statute of limitation.  See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2409a(g) (2012).  The United States Supreme Court held in 
Block, supra at 281, 284-285, that a plaintiff cannot circumvent 
this limitation by directing its suit against Federal officials 
rather than the Federal government.  The Commonwealth points out 
that the process of land registration, under G. L. c. 185, 
§§ 26-45, binds the Commonwealth.  See G. L. c. 185, § 45.  
Proposing an analogy to Block, supra, the Commonwealth asserts 
that "the availability of a land registration action reinforces 
the conclusion that the Commonwealth is immune from [declaratory 
judgment act] claims."  This argument admits of at least two 
readings, neither of which persuades us that it would be 
appropriate for sovereign immunity to apply here. 
 
First, the Commonwealth may be asserting that the 
Legislature did not endeavor, in the declaratory judgment act or 
the land registration statute, to waive its common-law sovereign 
immunity in cases like the current one.  This premise does not, 
however, compel the conclusion that sovereign immunity bars the 
corporation's suit, because we have long disclaimed the notion 
that the Commonwealth "cannot be sued without legislative 
consent."  Morash & Sons, 363 Mass. at 619.  To the contrary, as 
we have explained both here and previously, because sovereign 
15 
 
immunity is "a judicially created common law concept," it is 
subject to judicial limitations of the kind we describe today.  
See Randall, 468 Mass. at 356, quoting Morash & Sons, supra at 
615.  See also Bates, 436 Mass. at 173 n.33; Whitney, 373 Mass. 
at 212. 
 
Alternatively, the Commonwealth may be suggesting that, by 
enacting the land registration statute, the Legislature replaced 
common-law sovereign immunity with a statutory scheme that 
funnels all land disputes involving the Commonwealth to land 
registration proceedings.  In this vein, in Block, 461 U.S. at 
285-286, the United States Supreme Court described the Federal 
Quiet Title Act as "a precisely drawn, detailed statute" 
intended by Congress "to provide the exclusive means by which 
adverse claimants could challenge the United States' title to 
real property."  We do not think that our land registration 
statute likewise seeks to "preempt[] more general remedies."  
See id. at 285.  The Quiet Title Act was created specifically 
for the purpose of defining the parameters within which actions 
for title to land may be brought against the United States.  See 
id. at 282-284.  By contrast, "[t]he intent of [our land 
registration] statute was to simplify land transfer and to 
provide bona fide purchasers with conclusiveness of title."  
Kozdras v. Land/Vest Properties, Inc., 382 Mass. 34, 43 (1980).  
The rule that a judgment of registration "shall be conclusive 
16 
 
upon and against all persons, including the [C]ommonwealth, 
whether mentioned by name in the complaint, notice or citation, 
or included in the general description 'to all whom it may 
concern,'" G. L. c. 185, § 45, is one among myriad provisions 
devoted to achieving conclusiveness of title.  We discern no 
indication that this provision was intended to displace our 
traditional doctrine of common-law sovereign immunity.  This 
second version of the Commonwealth's argument by analogy from 
Block, supra, is therefore equally unavailing. 
 
Having concluded that sovereign immunity should not bar 
actions in which a plaintiff asserts ownership of specified 
parcels of recorded land, we are not constrained to defer 
"judicial action . . . to provide an inducement to the 
Legislature to abrogate the immunity on its own."  See Randall, 
468 Mass. at 358, quoting Bates, 436 Mass. at 174.  It is true 
that, as discussed supra, we refrained for a time from 
abrogating sovereign immunity in the tort law setting, even 
after we had determined that the existing doctrine was 
"indefensible."  See Morash & Sons, 363 Mass. at 619.  But the 
jurisprudential shift that we anticipated in that context was 
complex in its doctrinal detail and far-reaching in its 
practical effect.  Consequently, we reasoned that "comprehensive 
legislative action was preferable to judicial abrogation 
followed by an attenuated process of defining the limits of 
17 
 
governmental liability through case by case adjudication."  See 
Whitney, 373 Mass. at 209, and cases cited.  By contrast, where 
we have held only that sovereign immunity does not reach a 
narrow, well-defined type of suit, we have applied those 
holdings without delay.  See Randall, supra; Bates, supra; 
Morash & Sons, supra.  We follow the same course today. 
 
4.  Ownership of the parcels.  We thus arrive at the 
merits.  As mentioned, the Templeton parcels were purchased by 
the corporation in a series of transactions between 1923 and 
1969.  The Commonwealth argues that, by the time of these 
transactions, the corporation had become a State agency.  The 
Commonwealth itself obtained title to the parcels, in its view, 
by virtue of St. 1980, c. 579, § 10, which transferred "[t]itle 
to real property held in the name of a state agency . . . to the 
name of [the C]ommonwealth."  The Land Court judge disagreed, 
determining, based on facts not in genuine dispute, that the 
corporation had at all times remained an entity separate from 
the Commonwealth. 
 
The history of the corporation and the school that it 
founded is not easy to parse.  As the Commonwealth has conceded, 
the corporation and the school came into being separately from 
each other.  But the school was essentially the corporation's 
raison d'être for many years; it was only natural, therefore, 
that the corporation's reports and other records did not in 
18 
 
every instance draw careful distinctions between the 
undertakings and achievements of the school and those of the 
corporation itself.  To further confuse matters, for most of the 
life of the corporation, the law did not require that a 
corporation's name contain a term identifying it as such (as 
G. L. c. 156D, § 4.01 [a] [1], does today).  As a result, the 
three names borne by the corporation from 1850 through 1987 were 
identical to the school's names at the corresponding times.  It 
is sometimes difficult to identify whether documents using one 
of these names intended to refer to the corporation or to the 
school. 
 
In the face of these challenges, the Land Court judge 
conducted a thorough and thoughtful examination of the documents 
in the record.  On our independent review of the documents, we 
agree with his analysis and conclusions. 
 
a.  Early years.  There is no dispute that, when the 
corporation was originally created, it was an entity independent 
of the Commonwealth, with the capacity to acquire and hold its 
own property.6  The incorporating statute subjected the 
                     
 
6 The Commonwealth asserts that the corporation was 
established as a "public charitable corporation."  See McDonald 
v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432, 432 (1876), 
overruled on another ground by Colby v. Carney Hosp., 356 Mass. 
327 (1968).  We need not dwell on this assertion, as it carries 
little, if any, significance as to the question whether the 
corporation eventually became a State agency. 
19 
 
corporation to the laws then in effect concerning both 
corporations in general and "manufacturing corporations" in 
particular.  See St. 1850, c. 150, § 1, referencing Rev. Stat. 
cc. 38, 44 (1835).  The provisions concerning "manufacturing 
corporations" envisage commercial entities that, among other 
things, pay dividends to their stockholders and limit their 
liability.  See Rev. Stat. c. 38, §§ 23, 26.  By comparison, at 
least some civic-minded corporations founded contemporaneously 
were subjected only to the laws concerning corporations in 
general.  See, e.g., St. 1850, c. 95 (Charitable Association of 
Roxbury Fire Department); St. 1850, c. 166 (Tremont Street 
Medical School).  Recognizing the corporation's status as an 
independent body, a resolve of the Legislature in 1855 spoke of 
it as "[a]n incorporated institution . . . enjoying the 
patronage of the Commonwealth."  Resolves 1855, c. 58 (emphasis 
added). 
 
Fifty-nine years after the corporation was created, in 
1909, its status as an independent entity was reaffirmed by the 
Legislature.  A statute enacted that year overhauled the laws 
concerning treatment of the "insane, feeble-minded and 
epileptic, and . . . persons addicted to the intemperate use of 
narcotics or stimulants."  St. 1909, c. 504, § 1.  Such 
individuals were to be cared for by both "public and private 
institutions," all of which were to be overseen by the State 
20 
 
Board of Insanity.  See St. 1909, c. 504, §§ 2, 7.  The chapter 
of the statute devoted to the "feeble-minded" addressed two 
institutions:  the Massachusetts School for the Feeble-Minded -- 
then the name of both the corporation and the school -- and the 
Wrentham State School.  See St. 1909, c. 504, §§ 59-65.  The 
statute also contained a list of "state institutions"; this list 
included the Wrentham State School, but not the corporation or 
the school.  See St. 1909, c. 504, § 14. 
 
b.  Later developments.  The Commonwealth argues that the 
corporation became a State agency as a result of events that 
took place from 1917 through 1921.  This history is as follows. 
 
The corporation's board of trustees had always been 
composed of twelve members.  The trustees' responsibilities 
encompassed both the "subscriptions, donations and bequests to 
the corporation" and "all the interests and concerns of the 
school."  During the first decades of the corporation's 
existence, several of the trustees -- originally eight, later 
six -- were elected by the corporation's members, i.e., its 
general assembly.  The rest of the trustees were appointed by 
the Governor and Council.  See Resolves 1851, c. 44; 
Resolves 1861, c. 26. 
 
In 1917, the "anti-aid amendment" to the Massachusetts 
Constitution was passed.  This amendment prohibited the 
appropriation of public money for "maintaining or aiding any 
21 
 
school . . . which is not publicly owned and under the exclusive 
control, order and superintendence of public officers or public 
agents authorized by the Commonwealth."  Art. 46, § 2, as 
amended by art. 103 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts 
Constitution.  In order for the school to be eligible to receive 
public funding after the anti-aid amendment, the trustees 
petitioned for legislation providing that each trustee "on the 
part of the corporation" would "hold office" as trustee of the 
school only after being "confirmed by the [G]overnor and 
[C]ouncil."  The Legislature granted the trustees' request.  See 
St. 1918, Special Acts c. 119 (1918 statute). 
 
Subsequently, in 1919, the Legislature established the 
Department of Mental Diseases.  See St. 1919, c. 350, § 79.  The 
"state institutions" to be controlled by that department were 
listed in a provision of the first edition of the General Laws, 
enacted in 1921.  This time, the "Massachusetts school for the 
feeble-minded," still the name both of the school and of the 
corporation, was named as a "state institution."  G. L. c. 123, 
§ 25 (1921 ed.). 
 
As the Land Court judge perceived, the developments of 1917 
through 1921, while modifying the management of the school, did 
not diminish the status of the corporation as an independent 
entity.  To begin with, it is true that the 1918 statute granted 
the Governor and Council the power to approve the corporation's 
22 
 
trustees before they could serve the school.  But the 
corporation and the trustees had long recognized the trustees' 
separate functions in service of the corporation, on the one 
hand, and the school, on the other.  The corporation's bylaws of 
1907, for instance, drew detailed distinctions between the 
powers and duties of the trustees concerning the corporation and 
those concerning the school (also referred to as the 
"institution"), stating that the trustees 
 
"shall have power to take any measures which they may 
deem expedient for encouraging subscriptions, donations and 
bequests to the corporation; to take charge of all the 
interests and concerns of the school; to enter into and 
bind the corporation by such compacts and engagements as 
they may deem advantageous . . . . [A]t every annual 
meeting they shall make a report in writing on the accounts 
of the treasurer of the corporation and of the treasurer of 
the institution, and of the general state of the 
institution . . . and an inventory of all the real and 
personal estate of the corporation." 
 
(Emphasis added.)  The 1918 statute did not purport to disturb 
the role of the trustees in service of the corporation.  Indeed, 
it was only the school, rather than the corporation, that needed 
to maintain eligibility for funding from the Commonwealth in the 
wake of the anti-aid amendment; while the Legislature's 
appropriations had always been dedicated to the needs of the 
school, the corporation, as it stated in a 1917 report, had its 
own "private funds . . . consist[ing] of carefully invested sums 
received from time to time from friends of the school." 
23 
 
 
Similarly, the historical record reveals, particularly in 
the corporation's annual reports, that the "Massachusetts school 
for the feeble-minded" named as a "state institution" in 1921 
was the school, not the corporation.  The corporation and the 
school had had separate treasurers since 1907.  From 1917 
onward, each of the corporation's annual reports, among those in 
the summary judgment record, contains an accounting prepared by 
the treasurer of the corporation, listing the corporation's 
income, expenditures, and assets; and a separate accounting 
prepared by the treasurer of the school.  The school, but not 
the corporation, was reported to receive much of its income from 
the treasury of the Commonwealth.  This entire system of 
accounting would have been senseless if the corporation had by 
then become a State agency. 
 
The substance of the trustees' reports, too, details their 
sometimes discrete decision-making concerning the finances of 
the corporation, alongside their supervision of the school.  For 
instance, in a 1929 report, in addition to recounting news of 
the school, the trustees wrote that they had "passed a 
resolution that it is their policy to increase the principal of 
the Corporation Funds . . . having due regard to the emergency 
needs of the Institution, to the end that the income of the 
Funds may be available for research purposes." 
24 
 
 
There is no question that the Commonwealth was aware of the 
corporation's understanding that its corporate status and 
finances were separate from those of the school; each of the 
trustees' annual reports was addressed "To the Corporation, His 
Excellency the Governor, the Legislature, and the Department of 
Mental Diseases." 
 
Thus, the corporation remained an entity independent of the 
Commonwealth notwithstanding the tumult that 1917 to 1921 
brought to the school.  After 1921, the administrative 
structures of both the school and the corporation remained 
unchanged until 1987.  Control of the school was then 
transferred to the Department of Mental Retardation, and the 
Governor was charged with appointing all of the school's 
trustees.  See St. 1986, c. 599, § 9.  That the corporation 
remained independent of the Commonwealth throughout the period 
from 1921 to 1987 is illustrated by the following incident.  In 
1978, after the last of the Templeton transactions had taken 
place, an attorney requested an opinion from the Attorney 
General as to whether his law firm permissibly could perform 
services in connection with two contracts that were planned to 
be made between the corporation and agencies of the 
Commonwealth.  See Attorney General Conflict of Interest Opinion 
25 
 
No. 829 (1978).7  These contracts would not have been envisioned 
if the Commonwealth had then regarded the corporation as a State 
agency. 
 
The history and character of the corporation are materially 
different from those of corporations that our past decisions 
have characterized as agencies of the Commonwealth.  See, e.g., 
Trustees of Worcester State Hosp. v. Governor, 395 Mass. 377, 
380-381 (1985) (discussing hospital established as State 
entity).  See St. 1832, c. 163, and St. 1833, c. 95); Spence v. 
Boston Edison Co., 390 Mass. 604, 607-608 (1983) (discussing 
housing authority, defined by G. L. c. 121B, § 3, as "[a] public 
body politic and corporate," notwithstanding certain 
"characteristics" of private corporation); Benton v. Trustees of 
City Hosp. of Boston, 140 Mass. 13, 17 (1885) (discussing city 
hospital).8  We agree with the Land Court judge, in short, that 
                     
 
7 The attorney was a trustee of the corporation and of the 
school.  On the facts described to him, the Attorney General 
concluded that the law firm was permitted to provide the 
services in question, because the corporation was "not a 'state 
agency,'" and its anticipated contracts were "not within [the 
attorney's] official responsibility as a trustee of [the 
school]." 
 
 
8 We decline the Commonwealth's invitation to address the 
conditions that may cause a charitable corporation to be viewed 
as a State agency.  Suffice it to say that, as already 
discussed, although the school established by the corporation 
was supported largely by Commonwealth funds and was subject to 
some control by the Governor, the same was not true of the 
corporation. 
 
26 
 
the summary judgment record does not support the Commonwealth's 
theory that the corporation, at some point, became a State 
agency. 
 
c.  Purchases.  The Templeton parcels were last conveyed in 
the following transactions:  (a) in 1923, the "Cowick" parcel 
was granted, by three separate deeds, to the "Massachusetts 
School for the Feeble-Minded, a corporation"; (b) in 1929, the 
"Dyer" parcel was granted to the "Walter E. Fernald State 
School, a Massachusetts corporation"; (c) that same year, the 
"Thompson" parcel was granted to the "Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts";9 (d) also that same year, the "Norcross" parcel 
was granted to the "Walter E. Fernald State School"; (e) in 
1939, the "Gardner Savings Bank" parcel was granted to the 
"Walter E. Fernald State School"; and (f) in 1969, the 
                                                                  
 
 
9 The Thompson parcel was not named in the corporation's 
complaint.  The Land Court judge explained, however, that both 
parties had addressed that parcel in their summary judgment 
briefs, and that the Commonwealth had reproduced the deed to the 
parcel in its record appendix.  The judge therefore determined 
that the parcel presented an "issue[] not raised by the 
pleadings [but] tried by express or implied consent of the 
parties," which, by rule, is to be "treated in all respects as 
if [it] had been raised in the pleadings."  Mass. R. Civ. P. 
15 (b), 365 Mass. 761 (1974).  We discern no error in that 
decision. 
27 
 
"Doucette" parcel was granted to the "Walter E. Fernald State 
School, a Massachusetts corporation."10 
 
Each of these parcels was purchased with the corporation's 
own funds.  The trustees were openly cognizant of the fact that 
they were using the corporation's funds rather than drawing on 
those of the Commonwealth.  When they contemplated purchasing 
the Norcross parcel, for instance, the trustees wrote that "due 
to the biennial session of the Legislature and our small 
appropriation the State could do nothing," and that, therefore, 
"it was voted to have the Corporation acquire said land." 
 
After the parcels were purchased, they were listed in the 
corporation's reports as assets of the corporation, not the 
school.  By contrast, when, on earlier occasions, the 
Legislature had provided funds for the purpose of purchasing 
land for the school, the appropriating enactments stated that 
the land would be purchased "in the name and on behalf of the 
Commonwealth," Resolves 1897, c. 64, or that the deed to the 
land would be "deliver[ed] to the treasurer of the 
Commonwealth," St. 1897, c. 98, § 2. 
                     
 
10 The deeds to these six parcels are recorded in the 
Worcester County registry of deeds at book 2289, pages 336-337 
(three deeds to Cowick parcel); book 2487, page 188 (Dyer 
parcel); book 2487, page 59 (Thompson parcel); book 2499, page 
475 (Norcross parcel); book 2746, page 399 (Gardner Savings Bank 
parcel); and book 4952, page 389 (Doucette parcel).  The 
corporation, in its brief, mistakenly counts seven parcels, for 
reasons that are apparent but unimportant here. 
28 
 
 
For purposes of our analysis, the deeds to the parcels fall 
into three categories.  First, the deeds to the Cowick, Dyer, 
and Doucette parcels explicitly name the "corporation" as 
grantee.  Given our conclusion that the corporation was not a 
State agency, there remains no question that these deeds bestow 
title on the corporation only. 
 
The second category of deeds contains those to the Norcross 
parcel and to the Gardner Savings Bank parcel.  These deeds did 
not state specifically that the grantee was a "corporation"; but 
the grantee named in them, the "Walter E. Fernald State School," 
was the corporation's formal name when the deeds were made.  The 
meaning of a deed "is to be ascertained from the words 
used . . . construed when necessary in the light of the 
attendant circumstances."  Patterson v. Paul, 448 Mass. 658, 665 
(2007), quoting Sheftel v. Lebel, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 175, 179 
(1998).  The circumstances surrounding these deeds reveal that 
the corporation was the intended grantee.  The funds used for 
these purchases belonged to the corporation; the Commonwealth 
did not reimburse the corporation for the purchases; the 
corporation never expressed an intent to make a gift of the land 
to the Commonwealth; and, after each parcel was conveyed, it was 
listed in the corporation's reports as an asset of the 
corporation. 
29 
 
 
The same circumstances attended the third category of 
deeds, which includes only the deed to the Thompson parcel.  
Although that deed names the Commonwealth as grantee, the 
Thompson parcel, too, was purchased by the corporation with its 
own funds, and it, too, thereafter was counted among the 
corporation's assets in the corporation's annual reports.  In 
the absence of any suggestion that the corporation intended to 
gift this land to the Commonwealth, we agree with the Land Court 
judge that the deed's reference to the Commonwealth as grantee 
can only have been inadvertent.11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
                     
 
11 The Commonwealth argues that, even if we determine that 
the corporation holds title to all of the parcels, further 
proceedings are necessary to determine the character of that 
title, and specifically whether the corporation holds the 
parcels in trust for the Commonwealth.  We deem the argument 
waived, as it was not made below.  See Weiler v. PortfolioScope, 
Inc., 469 Mass. 75, 86 (2014), citing Canton v. Commissioner of 
Mass. Highway Dep't, 455 Mass. 783, 795 n.18 (2010).  Although 
the case was decided on the corporation's motion for "partial" 
summary judgment, that motion was partial -- as the Land Court 
judge explained -- only insofar as portions of the complaint had 
been dismissed on the defendants' motion.