Title: Koppel v. Ochoa
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC16-1474
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: May 17, 2018

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC16-1474 
____________ 
 
DONNA KOPPEL,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
LAURA OCHOA, et al.,  
Respondents. 
 
[May 17, 2018] 
 
QUINCE, J. 
 
We have for review the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in 
Ochoa v. Koppel, 197 So. 3d 77 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016), in which the district court 
certified conflict with Goldy v. Corbett Cranes Services, Inc., 692 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 
5th DCA 1997), regarding whether the filing of a motion under Florida Rule of 
Civil Procedure 1.090 to enlarge the time to accept a proposal for settlement 
automatically tolls the 30-day deadline for accepting the proposal until the motion 
is decided.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  For the reasons 
that follow, we conclude that a motion to enlarge does not toll the time to accept a 
 
 
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proposal for settlement.  Accordingly, we approve the decision of the Second 
District and disapprove the decision of the Fifth District.  
FACTS 
 
The Second District set forth the following facts:  
 
 
On December 9, 2011, Ms. Ochoa was injured in a crash with a 
car driven by Ms. Koppel.  In April 2013, she sued Ms. Koppel, 
alleging negligence and seeking damages to compensate her for her 
injuries. 
 
On September 3, 2013, Ms. Ochoa served Ms. Koppel with a 
proposal for settlement pursuant to section 768.79 and rule 1.442.  
The proposal offered to dismiss the action with prejudice in exchange 
for a lump-sum payment by Ms. Koppel of $100,000.  Rule 
1.442(f)(1) provides that a proposal for settlement is “deemed 
rejected” if not accepted within thirty days after service of the 
proposal, and Ms. Ochoa’s proposal stated that it would be withdrawn 
if not accepted within that time.  On the same day she served the 
proposal, Ms. Ochoa filed a notice that the case was ready for trial. 
 
On October 2, 2013—one day before the thirty-day period to 
accept the settlement proposal expired—Ms. Koppel filed a motion 
seeking to enlarge the time in which to respond to the proposal.  The 
motion cited Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.090, which governs 
enlargements of time, and alleged that Ms. Koppel had not had 
sufficient time to evaluate the proposal because (1) she had recently 
received through discovery a new MRI report bearing on Ms. Ochoa’s 
alleged injuries and (2) the case remained “in its infancy” and Ms. 
Ochoa’s deposition had not been taken.  Ms. Ochoa later filed a notice 
setting a hearing on the motion for December 2, 2013. 
 
Although we do not have a transcript of the hearing, the parties 
agree that the court did not render a decision on December 2 and that 
it instead requested that the parties submit additional authorities on or 
before December 5.  The day after the hearing, on December 3, 2013, 
Ms. Koppel served a notice purporting to accept the proposal for 
settlement.  Two days later, on December 5, 2013, she provided the 
court with the authorities it had requested.  Later that day, the court 
 
 
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entered an order denying Ms. Koppel’s request to enlarge the time in 
which to accept the proposal for settlement. 
 
Ms. Ochoa next filed a motion to strike Ms. Koppel’s notice 
accepting the proposal for settlement on grounds that it was untimely.  
Ms. Koppel opposed the motion and argued that under the Fifth 
District’s decision in Goldy [v. Corbett Cranes Services, Inc., 692 So. 
2d 225 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)], her filing of a motion to enlarge time 
under rule 1.090 tolled the thirty-day period in which she was 
authorized to accept the proposal.  According to Ms. Koppel, the 
period remained tolled until the trial court denied her motion for 
enlargement of time on December 5, 2013.  Ms. Koppel coupled her 
response to the motion to strike with a motion to enforce the 
settlement that she asserted was created by her acceptance of Ms. 
Ochoa’s proposal for settlement. 
 
After a hearing, the trial court agreed that Ms. Koppel’s filing 
of a motion to enlarge time tolled the time she had to accept the 
settlement proposal, denied the motion to strike the notice of 
acceptance, and granted the motion to enforce settlement.  The trial 
court then entered a final judgment dismissing Ms. Ochoa’s case with 
prejudice based upon the proposal and acceptance.  Ms. Ochoa timely 
appealed. 
Ochoa, 197 So. 3d at 78-79.   
 
On appeal, the district court reversed the trial court, finding that the texts of 
rules 1.090 and 1.442 were “unambiguous in that neither contains language that 
could in any way be construed as providing that the time to accept a proposal for 
settlement is tolled when a motion to enlarge the time to do so is filed.”  Id. at 80.  
In rejecting Koppel’s argument that Goldy was controlling, the court stated that the 
Fifth District’s decision “seem[ed] . . . inconsistent with the concept of a strictly 
construed deadline” and certified conflict.  Id. at 83.  
 
 
 
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ANALYSIS 
 
The conflict issue presented is whether the filing of a motion under Florida 
Rule of Civil Procedure 1.090 to enlarge the time to accept a proposal for 
settlement automatically tolls the 30-day deadline for accepting the proposal until 
the motion is decided.  The standard of review in determining whether an offer of 
settlement and purported acceptance comport with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 
1.442 and section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2013), is de novo.  Pratt v. Weiss, 161 
So. 3d 1268, 1271 (Fla. 2015).  Similarly, the standard of review of a court’s 
interpretation of the rules of civil procedure, in this case Florida Rule of Civil 
Procedure 1.090(b), is also de novo.  Strax Rejuvenation & Aesthetics Institute, 
Inc., v. Shield, 49 So. 3d 741 (Fla. 2010).  
Relevant Provisions 
 
Section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2013), governs offers of judgment, and 
“provides a sanction against a party who unreasonably rejects a settlement offer.”  
Willis Shaw Exp., Inc. v. Hilyer Sod, Inc., 849 So. 2d 276, 278 (Fla. 2003).  Section 
786.79 provides, in relevant part:  
 
(1) In any civil action for damages filed in the courts of this 
state, if a defendant files an offer of judgment which is not accepted 
by the plaintiff within 30 days, the defendant shall be entitled to 
recover reasonable costs and attorney’s fees incurred by her or him or 
on the defendant’s behalf pursuant to a policy of liability insurance or 
other contract from the date of filing of the offer if the judgment is 
one of no liability or the judgment obtained by the plaintiff is at least 
25 percent less than such offer, and the court shall set off such costs 
 
 
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and attorney’s fees against the award . . . .If a plaintiff files a demand 
for judgment which is not accepted by the defendant within 30 days 
and the plaintiff recovers a judgment in an amount at least 25 percent 
greater than the offer, she or he shall be entitled to recover reasonable 
costs and attorney’s fees incurred from the date of the filing of the 
demand.  
Rule 1.442 outlines the procedures that must be followed when implementing 
section 786.79.  The rule provides, in relevant part: 
 
(f) Acceptance and Rejection. 
 
(1) A proposal shall be deemed rejected unless accepted by 
delivery of a written notice of acceptance within 30 days after service 
of the proposal.  The provisions of Florida Rule of Judicial 
Administration 2.514(b) do not apply to this subdivision.  No oral 
communications shall constitute an acceptance, rejection, or 
counteroffer under the provisions of this rule. 
Rule 1.090(b) governs the enlargement of time periods established by the civil 
rules.  It provides, in relevant part:  
 
(b) Enlargement. When an act is required or allowed to be done 
at or within a specified time by order of court, by these rules, or by 
notice given thereunder, for cause shown the court at any time in its 
discretion (1) with or without notice, may order the period enlarged if 
request therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally 
prescribed or as extended by a previous order, or (2) upon motion 
made and notice after the expiration of the specified period, may 
permit the act to be done when failure to act was the result of 
excusable neglect, but it may not extend the time for making a motion 
for new trial, for rehearing, or to alter or amend a judgment; making a 
motion for relief from a judgment under rule 1.540(b); taking an 
appeal or filing a petition for certiorari; or making a motion for a 
directed verdict. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Certified Conflict 
 
 
In Goldy, the conflict case, the plaintiff submitted an offer of judgment to 
the defendant.  692 So. 2d at 226.  In accordance with rule 1.442, the offer was set 
to expire in 30 days, on March 6.  Id.  The plaintiff then granted the defendant a 
gratuitous extension of time.  Id.  Under the extension, the offer would expire on 
March 29.  Id.  On March 14, the defendant filed a motion pursuant to rule 1.090 to 
enlarge the time to respond to the offer.  Id.  In response, the plaintiff directed a 
letter to the defendant stating that the offer would be withdrawn and no longer 
effective after March 29.  Id.  The motion to extend was never heard by the trial 
court in view of the plaintiff’s absolute withdrawal.  Id.  
 
The jury verdict exceeded the plaintiff’s settlement offer by 125%.  Id. at 
226.  Following the verdict, the plaintiff filed a motion for sanctions against the 
defendant.  Id.  The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the 
request for sanctions, finding that the plaintiff’s offer was withdrawn and rendered 
void in the March 25 letter.  Id.  On appeal, the Fifth District agreed with the trial 
court, which held that the defendant’s motion to extend time “effectively tolled the 
responsive period until the motion could be heard.”  Id. at 228.  Thus, the offer did 
not expire on March 29 and instead was withdrawn on March 29.  Id.  
Consequently, the district court found that the plaintiff was not entitled to sanctions 
under a settlement offer that had not yet expired but instead had been withdrawn.   
 
 
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In support of its conclusion, the district court in Goldy quoted with approval 
the trial court’s order, which relied on Morales v. Sperry Rand Corp., 601 So. 2d 
538 (Fla. 1992), and Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Holmes, 352 So. 2d 
1233 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), two cases that also involved time periods that were to 
be strictly construed.  Id.  In Morales, we held that a motion seeking to extend the 
period within which to serve an adverse party with initial process only needed to 
be filed, not ruled on, within the 120-day period in order to avoid dismissal of the 
suit.  601 So. 2d at 540.  In Nationwide, the Fourth District Court of Appeal held 
that a motion seeking to extend the period within which to substitute a party 
following the death of a party only needed to be filed within the 90-day period 
following suggestion of death, not ruled on, in order for the suit to avoid automatic 
dismissal.  351 So. 2d at 1234.  Based on these cases, the district court agreed with 
the trial court’s statement that it was “logical then to conclude that a motion to 
enlarge the period within which to respond to an Offer of Judgment would 
effectively toll the responsive period provided that the motion [was] filed before 
the period had otherwise expired.”  Goldy, 692 So. 2d at 228.    
 
Judge Griffin concurred in part and dissented in part in Goldy.  Id. at 228-29.  
She expressed concern with the court’s holding that “the mere filing of a motion to 
extend the deadline for response to an offer of judgment tolls the time for its 
expiration.”  Id. at 228.  Instead, she believed that “[t]he deadline must be extended 
 
 
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before the expiration occurs. . . . [O]therwise, any offer of judgment could be 
stymied in this way.”  Id.  Despite this, she was not troubled by the outcome due to 
the plaintiff’s use of the word “withdrawn.”  Id. at 229.  Because the “rules and 
statutes should be strictly complied with,” the judge believed that any 
misunderstanding regarding the effect of the word “withdrawn” on the offer should 
still disfavor an award.  Id.  
 
In this case, the plaintiff submitted an offer of judgment to the defendant.  
The offer was set to expire on October 3.  197 So. 3d at 78.  On September 3, the 
plaintiff provided the defendant with an MRI report and a neurosurgical evaluation 
not previously disclosed.  On October 2, the defendant filed a motion to enlarge the 
time to respond to the offer.  Id. at 79.  The defendant argued that she had not had 
the opportunity to review the offer of judgment in light of the new medical 
information disclosed and the fact that the plaintiff’s deposition had not been 
taken.  Id.  The plaintiff later filed a notice setting a hearing on the motion for 
December 2.  Id.  
 
The trial court heard the motion on December 2 and ordered additional 
authorities from the parties.  Id.  On December 3, the defendant accepted the offer 
and on December 5, the defendant provided the court with the additional 
authorities it had requested and the trial court entered an order denying the motion 
to enlarge time.  Id.  The plaintiff then filed a motion to strike the defendant’s 
 
 
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acceptance of the offer, arguing that the defendant’s acceptance on December 3 
was untimely.  Id.  The defendant opposed the motion and argued that under Goldy 
the motion to extend tolled the time to accept the offer.  Id.  The trial court agreed, 
and granted the motion to enforce the settlement.  Id.   
 
In reversing the trial court’s order to enforce the settlement, the district court 
found that the texts of rules 1.090 and 1.442 were unambiguous and could not be 
construed in any way to provide for tolling once a motion to enlarge had been 
filed.  Id. at 80.  The court stated that holding otherwise “grants a party a de facto 
enlargement of time—without the judicial supervision, exercise of discretion, and 
substantive showings rule 1.090 requires—until the motion is decided.”  Id. at 81.  
Because the court could not “reconcile the Fifth District’s holding with the 
requirement that civil rules be interpreted in accord with ordinary principles of 
statutory construction,” the court certified conflict with Goldy.  Id. at 82.   
Interpretation 
 
“It is well settled that the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure are construed in 
accordance with the principles of statutory construction.”  Saia Motor Freight 
Line, Inc., v. Reid, 930 So. 2d 598, 599 (Fla. 2006).  “[W]hen the language of the 
statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is 
no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation.”  Holly v. Auld, 
450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984) (quoting A.R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 137 So. 
 
 
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157, 159 (Fla. 1931)); accord Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control 
Dist., 604 So. 2d 452, 454 (Fla. 1992).  If, however, the language of the rule is 
ambiguous and capable of different meanings, this Court will apply established 
principles of statutory construction to resolve the ambiguity.  See, e.g., Gulfstream 
Park Racing Ass’n, Inc. v. Tampa Bay Downs, Inc., 948 So. 2d 599, 606 (Fla. 
2006).  
 
Neither party argues that rules 1.090 and 1.442 are ambiguous.  Despite this, 
Petitioner contends that this Court should look to rule 1.010 to construe the 
provisions.  Rule 1.010 provides that the “rules shall be construed to secure the 
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.”  However, this is the 
direction only if a rule needs interpretation.  Here, the language is clear and 
unambiguous.  Accordingly, there is no need to resort to the rules of statutory 
interpretation, which would require us to consider the purpose of the rules as 
outlined in rule 1.010. 
 
Instead, it is clear from the plain language that neither rule contains language 
that would provide for tolling once a motion to enlarge is filed.  Rule 1.442 does 
not address the computation of time.  In regards to accepting an offer for 
settlement, the rule states that (1) delivery of a written notice within 30 days is 
required, (2) Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.154(b) does not apply, and 
(3) oral communication cannot serve as an acceptance, rejection, or counteroffer.  
 
 
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Rule 1.090 allows for the time period set forth in rule 1.442 to be enlarged, but this 
enlargement is at the trial court’s discretion if the motion was filed before 
expiration of the time period and cause has been shown.  After the time period has 
expired, the trial court still has discretion to enlarge the time period if the moving 
party can demonstrate excusable neglect in addition to cause.  Nowhere does the 
rule allow additional time to accept by simply filing the motion to enlarge.  This 
seems consistent with the rule, which provides for additional time only after cause 
has been shown.   
 
Petitioner argues that this Court should agree with the Fifth District’s 
reasoning because it is consistent with the goals behind the Florida Rules of Civil 
Procedure and the public policy in favor of settlements.  Petitioner contends that if 
rule 1.090 does not allow for automatic tolling upon filing, offerors will be able to 
surprise offerees with new discovery that offerees may not have time to consider 
before the 30-day window for acceptance closes.  Additionally, if the motion must 
be heard before the offer expires, Petitioner worries that offerees in busier circuits 
will be disadvantaged if they are unable to secure a hearing on the motion to 
enlarge before the period to accept ends.   
 
While these are valid concerns, it is apparent from the text of the rule that 
motions to enlarge are not granted without a showing of cause before the trial 
judge.  As noted by Judge Griffin, and repeated by the Second District in Ochoa, 
 
 
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allowing the time to accept an offer of settlement to toll once a motion to enlarge 
has been filed would appear to provide an automatic period of enlargement and 
seems to undermine the rule as it is currently written.  Without a showing of cause, 
an offeree could extend the offer indefinitely, all while the offering party continues 
to incur costs related to the case.  In this case, the offeree did not extend the period 
indefinitely, but instead filed the motion to enlarge a day before it was set to 
expire.  The court did not hear the motion until two months later, at which point 
the offeree accepted a day before the court denied the motion.  Ultimately, the 
offeree accepted the offer 90 days after it was made without permission from the 
offeror or the trial court.  The rules do not support this outcome. 
 
Petitioner also argues that this Court should allow Goldy to stand because it 
has been the controlling law in Florida for the past 19 years.  However, district 
courts have not agreed that rule 1.090 provides for tolling once a motion has been 
filed.  The Second District first addressed this issue in Donohoe v. Starmed 
Staffing, Inc., 743 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), released two years after the 
Fifth District’s decision in Goldy.  In Donohoe, the defendants made an offer of 
settlement to the plaintiff and the plaintiff requested extra time to complete two 
depositions.  743 So. 2d at 624.  The defendants refused to agree to an extension, 
and the plaintiff filed a motion to enlarge that was never set for hearing.  Id. at 625.  
After trial, the defendants sought to recover their attorney’s fees and costs, which 
 
 
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the trial court denied.  Id.  On review, the Second District reversed the trial court, 
finding the motion to enlarge did not toll the time to accept the offer and that 
Goldy was distinguishable because there the offer had been withdrawn.  Id.  
 
The Third District Court of Appeal came to a similar conclusion more 
recently in Three Lions Construction, Inc. v. Namm Group, Inc., 183 So. 3d 1119 
(Fla. 3d DCA 2015).  There, the district court ruled that a corporation’s motion for 
extension of time to accept a proposal for settlement was ineffective to toll the time 
for acceptance where the opposing party did not agree to the extension and the 
corporation did not obtain a hearing prior to the expiration of time.  Three Lions, 
183 So. 3d at 1119-20.  Both Donohoe and Three Lions are more similar to the 
instant case, where Petitioner filed a motion to extend the time but did not set the 
motion for hearing before the period of time expired.   
 
The Second District was correct in its conclusion that the filing of a motion 
to enlarge pursuant to rule 1.090 does not toll the time to accept an offer of 
settlement made under section 768.79.  Accordingly, we approve the Second 
District’s decision in Ochoa and disapprove the Fifth District’s decision in Goldy.   
Prospective Application 
 
Petitioner argues that if we approve the Second District, this decision should 
be applied prospectively and not retroactively.  In support of this position, 
Petitioner relies on Florida Forest & Park Service v. Strickland, 18 So. 2d 251 
 
 
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(Fla. 1944), International Studio Apartment Assn., Inc. v. Lockwood, 421 So. 2d 
1119 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), Green Tree Servicing, LLC v. McLeod, 15 So. 3d 682 
(Fla. 2d DCA 2009), and Aronson v. Congregation Temple De Hirsch, 123 So. 2d 
408 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960).  However, none of these cases allows for a prospective 
application our holding in this case.   
 
Judicial decisions in the area of civil litigation have retrospective as well as 
prospective application.  Lockwood, 421 So. 2d at 1120.  This includes decisions of 
a “court of last resort overruling a former decision . . . unless specifically declared 
by the opinion to have a prospective effect only.”  Strickland, 18 So. 2d at 253.  
The exception Petitioner claims is based on case law construing judicial 
construction of a statute.  Such construction will ordinarily be deemed to: 
[R]elate back to the enactment of the statute, much as though the 
overruling decision had been originally embodied therein.  To this 
rule, however, there is a certain well-recognized exception that where 
a statute has received a given construction by a court of supreme 
jurisdiction and property or contract rights have been acquired under 
and in accordance with such construction, such rights should not be 
destroyed by giving to a subsequent overruling decision a 
retrospective operation. 
Id. (emphasis added).  However, the Second District is not a “court of last resort” 
or the court of supreme jurisdiction referred to in Strickland or Lockwood.  In 
Lockwood, the court also analyzed federal precedent because the decision declaring 
the statute at issue unconstitutional emanated from the United States Supreme 
 
 
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Court rather than this Court.  Lockwood, 421 So. 2d at 1121-22.  Such precedent 
has no application to this case.   
 
In this case, the “court of last resort” is this Court, to which the Second 
District certified its conflict with Goldy.  See Nat’l Ins. Underwriters v. Cessna 
Aircraft Corp., 522 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988); Cassidy v. Firestone Tire & 
Rubber Co., 495 So. 2d 801, 802 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).  Likewise, the Second 
District’s decision did not qualify as an “overruling decision” as described in 
Strickland and Lockwood.  The Second District did not overrule or overturn any 
“prior decision” that was controlling in the district.  Instead, the Fifth District 
issued its Goldy decision, which the Second District had no authority to overrule.  
The Second District recognized this by certifying conflict to this Court, which does 
have that authority.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.; Fla. R. App. P. 
9.030(a)(2)(A)(vi).   
 
Petitioner’s reliance on Green Tree is misplaced.  In that case, the Second 
District receded from an earlier decision and had to determine whether “application 
of the rule that we adopt today to the facts of this case would be fundamentally 
unfair to Green Tree.”  Green Tree, 15 So. 3d at 694.  That did not occur in this 
case.  Similarly, Aronson has no application to this case.  There, the Third District 
receded from one of its earlier decisions construing the appellate rules and the 
deadline for filing a notice of appeal.  Aronson, 123 So. 2d 411.  Because the 
 
 
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court’s recent decision which shortened the time period had not yet been published 
when Aronson filed his notice of appeal, the court held that fairness required the 
newer decision to apply prospectively from the date of publication.  Id.  That is not 
the issue in this case.  
 
Rules 1.090 and 1.442 do not, and did not, provide for tolling of the time 
periods by the filing of a motion for extension and are applicable to this and all 
other cases.   
CONCLUSION 
 
The Second District correctly ruled that the filing of a motion to enlarge the 
time to accept a proposal for settlement does not automatically toll the 30-day 
period for accepting the proposal.  Thus, it correctly held that the trial court erred 
in ruling that Respondent’s proposal for settlement had been validly accepted by 
Petitioner.  Accordingly, we approve the Second District, disapprove the Fifth 
District, and remand the case to the trial court for reinstatement of Respondent’s 
negligence action. 
 
It is so ordered.  
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, POLSTON, and 
LAWSON, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions  
 
 
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Second District - Case No. 2D14-1866  
 
 
(Pinellas County) 
 
Anthony J. Russo of Butler Weihmuller Katz Craig LLP, Tampa, Florida; and Paul 
U. Chistolini of Smoak, Chistolini & Barnett, PLLC, Tampa, Florida,  
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
George A. Vaka and Nancy A. Lauten of Vaka Law Group, Tampa, Florida,  
 
 
for Respondent Laura Ochoa