Title: In the Matter of Mark R. McKinney
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 18S00-0905-DI-220
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: June 16, 2011

ATTORNEY FOR THE RESPONDENT 
Kevin P. McGoff 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR THE INDIANA SUPREME COURT  
DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION 
G. Michael Witte, Executive Secretary 
Charles M. Kidd, Staff Attorney 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 18S00-0905-DI-220 
 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MARK R. MCKINNEY, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Respondent. 
_________________________________ 
 
Attorney Discipline Action 
Hearing Officer Steven H. David1 
_________________________________ 
 
 
June 16, 2011 
 
Per Curiam. 
 
We find that Respondent, Mark R. McKinney, while serving as a deputy prosecuting 
attorney, conducted asset forfeiture proceedings in a manner that created a conflict of interest 
between his duties as a public official and the private gain he realized in the forfeiture 
proceedings.  On numerous occasions when the ethics of the asset forfeiture procedures were 
called into question, Respondent turned a blind eye and acted to protect his private interest in his 
continued pursuit of forfeiture property.   For this serious attorney misconduct, we find that 
Respondent should be suspended from the practice of law in this state for 120 days with 
automatic reinstatement.   
                                                 
1 The Honorable Steven H. David was appointed as a Justice to this Court after his service as hearing 
officer in this case.  Justice David is not participating in Supreme Court review of his hearing officer's 
report. 
FILED
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
Jun 16 2011, 10:55 am
 
2 
This matter is before the Court on the report of the hearing officer appointed by this 
Court to hear evidence on the Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission's "Verified 
Complaint for Disciplinary Action," and on the post-hearing briefing by the parties.  The 
Respondent's 1991 admission to this state's bar subjects him to this Court's disciplinary 
jurisdiction.  See IND. CONST. art. 7, § 4.   
 
Background 
 
The salient facts in this case are stipulated by the parties.  Although the parties filed 
briefs on the appropriate sanction, neither party filed a petition for review of the hearing officer's 
findings of fact.  When neither party challenges the findings of the hearing officer, "we accept 
and adopt those findings but reserve final judgment as to misconduct and sanction."  Matter of 
Levy, 726 N.E.2d 1257, 1258 (Ind. 2000). 
 
Charges against Respondent.  The Commission charged Respondent with violating these 
Indiana Professional Conduct Rules prohibiting the following misconduct: 
 
1.7(b) (effective Jan. 1, 1987):  Representing a client (the State) when the 
representation may be materially limited by attorney's own self-interest.   
 
1.7(a)(2) (effective Jan. 1, 2005):  Representing a client when there is a 
concurrent conflict of interest because of a significant risk that the 
representation may be materially limited by attorney's own self-interest. 
 
1.8(l):  While serving as a part-time or deputy prosecutor, representing a client as 
a private attorney in a matter wherein there exists an issue upon which he has 
statutory prosecutorial authority or responsibilities.  (The rule was numbered 
1.8(k) during part of the relevant period.) 
 
8.4(d):  Engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. 
 
Factual basis for the charges of misconduct.  From 1995 through the end of 2006, 
Respondent was a salaried deputy prosecuting attorney ("DPA") employed at the Delaware 
County Prosecutor's Office by Richard Reed, the prosecuting attorney ("Prosecutor Reed").  On 
January 1, 2007, Respondent began serving a term as a salaried elected prosecutor.     
 
 
3 
Respondent prosecuted a variety of criminal cases, including drug offenses.  Respondent, 
while a DPA, worked with the Muncie-Delaware County Drug Task Force ("DTF") and was 
personally involved in drug investigations and many of the resulting criminal cases.  During 
arrests and/or the execution of search warrants, the police seized money and other property from 
drug suspects.  Criminal charges were determined by the DPA assigned to the case, and 
Respondent prosecuted many of the defendants charged with drug crimes.   
 
In addition to his DPA salary, Respondent received attorney fees as a private practitioner 
for bringing suits for the forfeiture of criminal defendants' property, as did other DPAs, including 
Louis Denney.  In 1995 and 2004, Respondent and Prosecutor Reed entered into written fee 
agreements ("Fee Agreements") under which Respondent would receive an amount equal to 25% 
of any judgment entered in a civil forfeiture action Respondent brought under a statute currently 
codified at Indiana Code § 34-24-1-1, et seq.     
 
Prosecutor Reed contemplated that the same DPA would handle both the criminal case 
and the forfeiture case associated with it, and that the criminal case would conclude before any 
resolution of the forfeiture case.  Otherwise, the costs associated with the criminal case would 
not be known.  Respondent and another lawyer were in charge of the civil forfeiture process; 
Prosecutor Reed did not personally oversee it.   
 
Acting pursuant to the Fee Agreements, Respondent filed civil forfeiture actions in 
Delaware County courts on behalf of the State, the DTF, and other local police agencies, seeking 
forfeiture of property, including cash, that police seized from defendants in Delaware Country 
criminal cases that Respondent prosecuted.  In 1996, a private bank account, called the "Asset 
Forfeiture Attorney Fee Account," was opened, with Respondent and DPA Denney as 
signatories, into which their 25 percent share of forfeited funds were deposited and then 
disbursed to them.   
 
Prosecutor Reed interpreted the Fee Agreements to require Respondent to handle 
forfeiture cases outside his duties as a DPA.  Respondent, however, viewed the civil forfeiture 
cases as part of his duties as a DPA and testified that he believed his client was the State in these 
 
4 
matters.  The hearing officer rejected Respondent's interpretation, noting that Respondent's 
invoices for payment were in the name of "Mark R. McKinney, attorney at law," that he pursued 
forfeiture cases for other entities, including Ball State University, and that he stated in a 1999 
memo during an investigation by Judge Richard Dailey (discussed below) that DPAs were hired 
as "Plaintiff's counsel" to pursue the cases for a 25% contingent fee.   
 
Beginning in 2002, Respondent used what he called "Confidential Settlement 
Agreements" ("CSAs") to transfer seized property, including cash, from criminal defendants to 
the City of Muncie, through private agreement by the parties without court supervision or public 
disclosure.  Respondent invoiced the City of Muncie for and collected 25% of the money 
transferred pursuant to any CSA.  Respondent claimed compensation from the CSAs based on 
his interpretation of the Fee Agreements.  The Court finds, however, that this interpretation was 
clearly erroneous.  The Fee Agreements reference forfeitures of "property seized pursuant to I.C. 
34-4-30.1 et seq." and provide for fees of 25 percent of  "any judgment entered in such actions" 
or the fee "allowed by the court in such actions."  Transfers of property pursuant to a CSA were 
accomplished without court review or authorization.2 
 
In many instances, criminal cases were open while related civil forfeiture actions were 
also open or while Respondent engaged in CSA negotiations with criminal defendants.  
Respondent at times engaged in plea agreement negotiations regarding criminal cases with 
criminal defendants before and/or after Respondent also engaged in CSA negotiations or 
settlement negotiations regarding related civil forfeiture actions with the same criminal 
defendants.  Respondent did this knowing that he would receive payment as personal 
compensation equaling 25% of the amount transferred as a result of the action.  There is no 
evidence, however, that Respondent ever explicitly agreed to offer favorable treatment to a 
criminal defendant in exchange for money transferred either by CSA or a civil forfeiture action.  
Respondent did not attempt to conceal his activities concerning his compensation in forfeiture 
cases.   
 
                                                 
2 Prosecutor Reed testified that he did not know about the CSAs until after he left office and questioned 
their legality because they circumvented court supervision.  
 
5 
Over the years, there were a number of inquiries and investigations into aspects of 
Delaware County's forfeiture program.  The auditor of the State Board of Accounts ("Board") 
raised the issue with Prosecutor Reed in 1998.  The Board sought a advisory opinion from the 
Indiana Attorney General on the issues of whether various attorneys within a prosecutor's office 
could be paid in excess of their state minimum salary from funds generated by the prosecution of 
forfeiture and other cases; and if so, whether Indiana Code § 36-2-5-14 prohibited such 
compensation in excess of $5,000.  The Attorney General's advisory opinion, dated November 
18, 1998, said that such payments could be made and that the statutory cap applied only to full-
time prosecuting attorneys but not to others, including DPAs.  The opinion did not address any 
conflict of interest issues.   
 
In 1999, Respondent sought guidance from the Indiana Prosecuting Attorneys Council 
regarding the way funds obtained from forfeitures were handled.  He disclosed that court orders 
divided the assets such that 25% went to attorney fees, which was deposited into and disbursed 
from the Asset Forfeiture Attorney Fee Account.  The Council did not alert Respondent to any 
potential ethical problems.  However, Respondent did not fully explain how the procedure 
worked and did not raise any conflict of interest issues.   He made no disclosure of and sought no 
guidance about disposing of cases by "Confidential Settlement Agreements" beginning in 2002 
rather than under the judicial supervision required by the Indiana Code. 
 
In 1999, the Commission on Judicial Qualifications ("CJQ") sent Delaware Circuit Judge 
Richard Dailey a "Notice of Inquiry" regarding use of the Asset Forfeiture Attorney Fee 
Account.  Respondent sent Judge Dailey a memorandum explaining and defending the 
procedure.  Judge Dailey then responded to the CJQ by describing the account and procedure and 
asking for guidance from the CJQ.  In response, the CJQ sent Judge Dailey a letter on April 19, 
1999, expressing concern that forfeited assets were deposited into a private account and, 
apparently sua sponte, "question[ing] the propriety of a practice whereby the deputy prosecutors 
receive a percentage of the fruits of forfeiture actions, which practice appears to give them a 
personal stake in the proceedings."  The CJQ also stated that the matter had been referred to the 
Disciplinary Commission for its review.  (Respondent testified that he did not see the CJQ's 
letter until 2008 when Judge Dailey initiated an investigation, discussed below. )   
 
6 
 
A request for investigation into the forfeiture procedures was filed with the Commission 
on April 19, 1999.  Respondent replied and requested that the case be dismissed.  No charges 
were filed, but the matter was not formally dismissed.   
 
Another request for investigation into the forfeiture procedures, which did not explicitly 
mention a potential conflict of interest, was filed with the Commission by the mayor of Muncie 
on May 19, 2008.  On June 20, 2008, the mayor filed a petition for a special prosecutor to 
investigate the forfeiture procedure.  A special prosecutor was appointed and filed a report that 
focused on the remittance and processing of drug forfeiture monies.  The investigation concluded 
without criminal charges against Respondent.   
 
After the mayor filed her petition for a special prosecutor, Judge Dailey sua sponte 
initiated litigation concerning the forfeiture procedure.  That litigation ended in March 2009 with 
an agreement by the parties that the goals of the investigation were achieved by a new local rule.  
Respondent was not required to make any reimbursement of the fees he had received in 
forfeiture cases, and the State Board of Accounts was able to account for all funds at issue.   
 
The hearing officer's conclusions.  The hearing officer concluded that Respondent 
violated the Professional Conduct Rules as charged.  On numerous occasions, Respondent knew 
or should have known that the ethics of the asset forfeiture program and his management of it 
were called into question.  When such questions arose, Respondent acted to protect his private 
interest in his continued pursuit of forfeiture property.  Respondent did not end the program until 
the conclusion of the civil action concerning the procedure.   
 
Facts in Aggravation and Mitigation.  The hearing officer found the following facts in 
aggravation:  (1) Respondent engaged in misconduct over an extended period of time; and (2) he 
never himself thoroughly investigated concerns and complaints about the forfeiture procedure, 
instead relying on opinions of others based on incomplete information.    
 
 
7 
The hearing officer found the following facts in mitigation: (1) Respondent has no prior 
history of disciplinary action; (2) he has been an active member of the Indiana legal community; 
and (3) he has been a leader in various community organizations.   
 
Discussion 
 
The parties stipulate that the narrow issue in this case is whether there is a conflict of 
interest when a deputy prosecutor contracts privately to do what the elected prosecutor could 
properly contract with private counsel to handle.3  At this point in these proceedings, the parties 
do not dispute the hearing officer's findings of fact or his conclusion that Respondent violated the 
rules as charged.  The only issue the parties briefed was what discipline is appropriate.   
 
Although Prosecutor Reed set up and approved the procedure under which  Respondent 
retained 25% of civil forfeiture judgments, the conflict of interest created by this system of 
compensation when he was also prosecuting the criminal action should have been apparent to 
Respondent.  At no time did he undertake an independent assessment of the procedure.  Had 
Respondent at any time taken a critical look at the system, he should have been able to see that a 
DPA's representation of the State could have been materially limited by the DPA's personal 
financial interest in the CSAs or the outcomes of civil forfeiture actions.  Respondent essentially 
turned a blind eye to these now-conceded ethical violations for well over a decade.    
 
It is apparent that Respondent had still not critically examined his conflict of interest even 
by the time of the hearing in this case.  He testified that the Fee Agreements made the pursuit of 
forfeiture cases part of his duties as a DPA.  However, the Fee Agreements specifically required 
that pursuit of forfeiture cases was not to interfere with Respondent's duty as a DPA, Prosecutor 
Reed testified unequivocally that pursuit of forfeiture cases was ancillary to the duties of a DPA, 
and Respondent billed and received payment for the forfeiture cases as a private attorney.4   
                                                 
3 The propriety of Respondent's use of the Asset Forfeiture Attorney Fee Account, his accounting of 
funds, his use of CSAs to effect forfeitures without court supervision or public disclosure, and his 
misinterpretation of the Fee Agreement to apply to CSAs are not at issue in this disciplinary proceeding, 
although the first three were major issues in some of the other investigations of the forfeiture procedure. 
 
 
8 
 
In addition to the aggravating facts found by the hearing officer, we find that Respondent 
has been not been entirely forthcoming and cooperative with the various investigations into the 
forfeiture procedure.  Respondent failed in prior investigations to reveal fully the details of the 
forfeiture procedure that may have raised the conflict of interest issue at an earlier point.  As 
noted by the hearing officer, after being elected prosecutor, he rejected an inquiry by the mayor 
of Muncie about the membership of the DTF.  He attempted, without success, to procure an 
order from this Court removing Judge Dailey from the litigation he initiated to investigate the 
forfeiture procedure.  See State ex rel. McKinney v. Delaware Cir. Ct., 18S00-0806-OR-345 
(Ind.  July 7, 2008). 
 
 As a deputy prosecutor, Respondent "served a public trust to enforce the law and the 
state was entitled to his undivided loyalty."  Matter of Ryan, 824 N.E.2d 687, 689 (Ind. 2005). 
 
Attorneys charged with law enforcement responsibilities must conduct themselves 
at all time in a manner that promotes public confidence in the justice system.  
Prosecutors are not simply advocates, but they are also . . .  ministers of justice . . 
. .   As such, we hold prosecutors to a high standard of ethical conduct.  
  
 
Matter of Winkler, 834 N.E.2d 85, 90 (Ind. 2005) (citations and internal quotations omitted).    
 
In some cases, the Court has given public reprimands to DPAs who have committed an 
isolated violation of the rules prohibiting conflicts of interest.  See Matter of Barce, 849 N.E.2d 
1145 (Ind. 2006); Matter of Tyler, 823 N.E.2d 277 (Ind. 2005).  More serious, ongoing 
violations, however, have resulted in suspension from practice.  In Ryan, we imposed a 
suspension of nine months without automatic reinstatement on a DPA who reduced traffic 
charges against defendants who obtained international driver's licenses from a business operated 
by the DPA and his wife.   
 
                                                                                                                                                             
4 To be clear, the Court is not penalizing Respondent for asserting a defense to the charges against him 
and proceeding to a hearing.  The Court notes only his continuing failure to evaluate critically the 
forfeiture compensation procedure.   
 
9 
As a deputy prosecutor, respondent served a public trust to enforce the law and 
the state was entitled to his undivided loyalty.  Respondent's conduct breeds 
mistrust and lack of confidence in the judicial system.  He used his position 
as a deputy prosecutor to obtain a significant financial windfall for himself.  
By serving both as prosecutor and as intermediary for those seeking a favorable 
plea agreement, respondent gave the impression that justice could be bought.  As 
a public officer charged with the administration of justice, respondent's behavior 
had the capacity to bolster or damage the public's perception of the criminal 
justice system.  Unfortunately, respondent chose to follow a path that damaged 
the perception of the administration of justice.  By conducting a business that 
impacted upon his resolution of traffic violations, respondent violated the public's 
trust.  This is serious misconduct, which cannot be ignored.    
 
Id. at 689 (emphasis added, citations omitted).    
 
 
In Matter of Curtis, 656 N.E.2d 258 (Ind. 1995), we imposed a 30-day suspension with 
automatic reinstatement on a part-time elected prosecutor who represented a client in small 
claims matters while also representing the State in a criminal matter involving the client's 
delinquent taxes.   
 
Respondent's conduct, if anything, frustrates our hope that all prosecutors 
routinely exercise full prosecutorial discretion, because concurrent representation 
of this sort threatens to impede its full exercise.  Thus, our holding today is 
meant to preserve and foster the exercise of prosecutorial discretion by 
ensuring an optimum environment in which to do so. 
 
Id. at 260 (emphasis added). 
 
Although there is no evidence in this case that Respondent made any explicit quid pro 
quo offer of favorable treatment to any criminal defendant in exchange for the forfeiture of 
property from which Respondent would be compensated, it would doubtless be evident to such a 
defendant, and to his or her attorney if represented, that prosecutorial discretion in how to 
proceed with the criminal case was held by one who stood to reap personal financial gain if the 
defendant agreed to the forfeiture of his or her assets.  Respondent's misconduct created an 
environment in which, at the very least, the public trust in his ability to faithfully and 
independently represent the interests of the State was compromised.       
 
 
10 
For these reasons, we conclude that a period of suspension with automatic reinstatement 
is warranted. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Court concludes that Respondent violated the Indiana Professional Conduct Rules by 
representing the State when the representation could have been materially limited by his own 
self-interest in receiving compensation as a private attorney from property forfeited in civil 
forfeiture actions and under CSAs.     
 
For Respondent's professional misconduct, the Court suspends Respondent from the 
practice of law for a period of 120 days, beginning July 28, 2011.  Respondent shall not 
undertake any new legal matters between service of this order and the effective date of the 
suspension, and Respondent shall fulfill all the duties of a suspended attorney under Admission 
and Discipline Rule 23(26).  At the conclusion of the period of suspension, provided there are no 
other suspensions then in effect, Respondent shall be automatically reinstated to the practice of 
law, subject to the conditions of Admission and Discipline Rule 23(4)(c).   
 
The costs of this proceeding are assessed against Respondent.   
 
The Clerk of this Court is directed to give notice of this opinion to the hearing officer, to 
the parties or their respective attorneys, and to all other entities entitled to notice under 
Admission and Discipline Rule 23(3)(d).  The Clerk is further directed to post this opinion to the 
Court's website, and Thomson Reuters is directed to publish a copy of this opinion in the bound 
volumes of this Court's decisions. 
 
All Justices concur, except Rucker, J., who concurs in part and dissents in part, and David, J., 
who did not participate. 
 
Agreeing with the recommendation of the hearing officer that a public reprimand is appropriate 
in this case, Justice Rucker dissents to the sanction imposed by the majority. Otherwise he 
concurs in the majority opinion.