Title: State v. Blackson
Citation: 245 Neb. 833, 515 N.W.2d 773
Docket Number: 528
State: Nebraska
Issuer: Nebraska Supreme Court
Date: May 6, 1994

515 N.W.2d 773 (1994) 245 Neb. 833 STATE of Nebraska, Appellee, v. Robert C. BLACKSON, Appellant. No. S-93-528. Supreme Court of Nebraska. May 6, 1994. Thomas M. Kenney, Douglas County Public Defender, Thomas C. Riley, and Kelly S. Breen, Omaha, for appellant. Don Stenberg, Atty. Gen., and Donald A. Kohtz, Lincoln, for appellee. Before HASTINGS, C.J., and BOSLAUGH, WHITE, CAPORALE, FAHRNBRUCH and LANPHIER, JJ. BOSLAUGH, Justice. The defendant-appellant, Robert C. Blackson, was convicted of second degree murder, first degree assault, and two counts of using a firearm in the commission of a felony. He was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment for his murder conviction, 6 to 10 years' *774 imprisonment for his assault conviction, and terms of 10 years' imprisonment for each count of using a firearm to commit a felony, such sentences to run consecutively. The appellant now appeals his murder conviction, contending only that the district court erred in overruling his objection to the jury instruction which instructed the jury to consider the lesser offense of manslaughter only after finding that the State failed to prove that the appellant was guilty of second degree murder. The events which led to the appellant's conviction began on the night of December 19, 1992, when the assault victim, George Smith, accompanied the murder victim, Richard Green, to a birthday party. Both Smith and Green were members of the "Crips" street gang. Smith had been at the party earlier in the evening and had then encountered members of the rival "Bloods" street gang. As he returned to the party accompanied by Green, Smith was carrying a loaded gun in his waistband. When Smith and Green arrived at a point near the location of the party, they exited their vehicle and immediately began arguing with members of the Bloods. Smith then pulled his gun from his waistband and returned to the vehicle, placing his gun on the floorboard. Green also returned to the vehicle, but the two could not leave because they could not locate the keys to the vehicle. Although the record contains conflicting testimony as to who fired the initial shots, Smith testified that while looking through the backseat passenger window of the vehicle, he observed the appellant pointing a revolver at him. According to Smith, the appellant shot him and continued shooting while Smith reached down, retrieved his gun, and returned fire. Smith suffered a wound to his neck. Green died from acute blood loss due to hemorrhaging from a gunshot wound to his stomach. In his sole assignment of error, the appellant asserts that the district court erred in overruling his objection to jury instruction No. 6. That instruction, as given to the jury, states: The material elements which the State must prove by evidence beyond a reasonable *775 doubt in order to convict the defendant of the crime of manslaughter are: The appellant argues that jury instruction No. 6 required the jury to reach a unanimous not guilty verdict with respect to the charge of second degree murder before it could consider the lesser offense of manslaughter. The appellant also contends that under State v. Pettit, 233 Neb. 436, 445 N.W.2d 890 (1989), the only distinction between second degree murder, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-304 (Reissue 1989), and manslaughter, Neb.Rev. Stat. § 28-305 (Reissue 1989), with respect to an intentional killing, is that manslaughter contains an additional element, i.e., that the intentional killing occurred "upon a sudden quarrel." With that distinction in mind, he then contends that because the jury was instructed to find him guilty of second degree murder if it found the State had proven each of the elements of that crime, the jury was precluded from considering the lesser offense of manslaughter, which required the additional element that the killing occurred upon a sudden quarrel. In State v. Jones, ante p. 821, 245 Neb. 821, 515 N.W.2d 654 (1994), a case released today that involves a similar jury instruction, this court addressed the issues raised by the appellant. As stated in Jones: Id. at 828, 515 N.W.2d at 658. In addition, Jones overrules Pettit and holds that there is no requirement of an intention to kill in committing manslaughter. As decided in Jones, "[t]he distinction between second degree murder and manslaughter upon a sudden quarrel is the presence or absence of an intention to kill." Id. at 830, 515 N.W.2d at 659. Thus, once a jury finds that a killing is intentional, it cannot reach a manslaughter verdict in lieu of a second degree murder verdict. In this instance, the jury necessarily found that the killing was intentional in order to find the appellant guilty of second degree murder. In State v. Myers, 244 Neb. 905, 510 N.W.2d 58 (1994), this court held that malice is an essential element of second degree murder and that an instruction which failed to include malice as such an element of that offense was plain error and prejudicial. Although the instructions given in this case did not define malice and did not specifically define malice as a necessary element of second degree murder, in instruction No. 6 the jury was advised that if the jury found from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt each of the material elements of murder in the second degree as set out in the instruction, it was the duty of the jury to find the defendant guilty of murder in the second degree "done purposely and maliciously but without deliberation and premeditation, and you shall so indicate by your verdict." A finding that the defendant killed another purposely and maliciously but without deliberation and premeditation and without just cause or excuse satisfies the requirement that the killing was done with malice. The trial court in separate instructions *776 advised the jury as to justification for the use of force by the defendant. The judgment of the district court is affirmed. AFFIRMED. WRIGHT, J., participating on briefs.