Title: Commonwealth v. Buono
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12811
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: March 26, 2020

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SJC-12811 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  REYNOLD BUONO. 
 
 
 
Norfolk.     December 5, 2019. - March 26, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Rape.  Limitations, Statute of.  Grand Jury.  Practice, 
Criminal, Grand jury proceedings, Indictment, Dismissal.  
Evidence, Grand jury proceedings, Indictment, Corroborative 
evidence. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on November 3, 2017. 
 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Thomas A Connors, J., and 
questions of law were reported by him to the Appeals Court. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Marguerite T. Grant, Assistant District Attorney (Lisa 
Beatty, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Inga S. Bernstein for the defendant. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  The defendant, Reynold Buono, taught at Milton 
Academy (school) from 1975 to 1987.  In 2017, a grand jury 
2 
 
 
returned three indictments against him for statutory rape, G. L. 
c. 265, § 23, and three indictments for forcible rape of a 
minor, G. L. c. 265, § 22A, for three crimes he allegedly 
committed against a student during the 1980s.  A Superior Court 
judge allowed the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictments, 
pursuant to G. L. c. 277, § 63.  The Commonwealth filed a motion 
for reconsideration and for reported questions.  The judge did 
not act on the request for reconsideration but reported two 
questions of law to the Appeals Court.  We granted the 
Commonwealth's application for direct appellate review of the 
reported questions, and the case was joined with the 
Commonwealth's appeal from the dismissal of the indictments. 
 
This case concerns certain provisions of G. L. c. 277, 
§ 63, a statute that sets a twenty-seven year statute of 
limitations on sex crimes against children; a requirement of 
corroborating evidence if the crimes are charged after the 
twenty-seven year limitation has expired; and a tolling 
provision.  The issues presented are whether (1) the tolling 
provision in G. L. c. 277, § 63, applies to the requirement that 
child rape charges brought more than twenty-seven years after 
the commission of the alleged crime be supported by 
corroborating evidence; (2) the evidentiary requirement of G. L. 
c. 277, § 63, requires the Commonwealth to present the 
corroborating evidence to the grand jury; (3) the Commonwealth 
3 
 
 
presented sufficient corroborating evidence to the grand jury in 
the present case; and (4) the Commonwealth's evidence 
established probable cause for two separate incidents or three. 
 
We hold that (1) the tolling provision of § 63 does not 
apply to the corroborating evidence requirement; (2) the 
Commonwealth must present the required corroborating evidence to 
the grand jury; (3) here, the Commonwealth presented sufficient 
corroborating evidence to the grand jury; and (4) the 
Commonwealth's evidence established probable cause for only two 
alleged incidents.  Accordingly, we reverse the allowance of the 
motion to dismiss indictments nos. 1782CR00399-001, -002, -004, 
and -005; we affirm the dismissal of indictments nos. 
1782CR00399-003 and -006. 
 
Background.  Beginning in July 2017, the Commonwealth 
presented evidence of the defendant's alleged criminal acts to a 
grand jury.  Two witnesses testified during the proceedings:  
Valter Pires, a detective with the Milton police department, and 
Jerome Pieh, who was the headmaster of the school when the 
defendant was employed there.  The grand jury also was presented 
with documentary evidence.1 
                     
 
1 The documentary evidence presented to the grand jury 
included a 2017 letter sent by the school to the school 
community, a report of an interview with the alleged victim 
conducted by a private investigator, the defendant's personnel 
files, records regarding the school's investigation into the 
4 
 
 
 
We recite the facts as the grand jury could have found 
them, reserving certain details for later discussion.  As 
explained infra, the defendant was indicted for his conduct in 
Norfolk County, but the grand jury heard testimony regarding 
events that occurred both in Norfolk County and elsewhere. 
 
In response to an article in the Boston Globe in 2016, 
school officials sent a letter to the school community regarding 
concerns about allegations of sexual misconduct at the school.  
The alleged victim, whom we shall call Roger, contacted the head 
of the school.  The school engaged a consulting firm, and Roger 
was interviewed as part of their investigation.  A mandatory 
reporter from the school then filed reports with the Department 
of Children and Families pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 51A.  In 
April 2017, Pires and a State police trooper interviewed Roger. 
 
The defendant taught English and, from 1975 to 1987, ran 
the school's theater program.  Separate from his employment at 
the school, the defendant led bicycle trips to Italy during the 
summer months, during which he would travel and stay with the 
participating students. 
 
Roger began attending the school in 1978.  In 1981, in the 
summer before his freshman year, Roger went on one of the 
bicycle trips to Italy.  During the trip, the group stayed at an 
                     
defendant during the 1980s and in 2017, and records regarding 
the school's communication with the defendant. 
5 
 
 
inn.  Roger was assigned to sleep in the same double bed as the 
defendant.  Before turning in for the night, the group went out 
for dinner and wine, with most participants, including Roger, 
drinking alcohol.  During the night, Roger awoke to the 
defendant "snuggl[ing]" with him which caused Roger to feel 
"embarrassed," "confused," and "panicked."  He attempted to roll 
away, but the defendant reached and grabbed Roger's penis.  
Roger was "terrified" and pretended to be asleep, but the 
defendant was "persistent." 
 
The following morning, Roger confided in two other students 
who were on the trip and detailed what the defendant had done.  
One of the students told Roger that he was not surprised by the 
defendant's actions because the defendant had "tried stuff" with 
him.  The student also told Pires, "We all knew that [the 
defendant] was this menace and had previously tried stuff," 
adding that on the bicycle trip the defendant had hugged him 
"and wouldn't let go."  The same day that Roger confided in him, 
the student confronted the defendant, telling him, "Rey, you 
fucked up last night," to which the defendant responded, "I did" 
and "You're right, I did and I won't do it again." 
 
The bicycle trip ended, and the students returned home.  
Roger did not tell his parents what the defendant had done to 
him.  Roger's mother thought the defendant would be a good 
mentor and role model for Roger, so she invited the defendant to 
6 
 
 
the family home on Cape Cod during the summer of 1981.  On 
several occasions while there, the defendant attempted to hug 
Roger and touch Roger's penis, but Roger told him "no" and 
walked away. 
 
The defendant served as Roger's academic advisor during 
Roger's freshman year of high school.  Roger was struggling 
academically, and the defendant began to tutor him.  The 
tutoring sessions took place at the defendant's on-campus 
apartment.  During these sessions, the defendant offered Roger 
beer and dinner and made advances toward him, but Roger, at 
first, would push the defendant away.  The advances progressed 
to the defendant physically touching Roger, including touching 
Roger's penis over his clothing.  Roger alleged that "[o]n two 
or three occasions [the defendant] gave me a blowjob by putting 
his mouth over my penis." 
 
With Roger's permission, the friend in whom Roger had 
confided told his own mother what had happened to Roger in 
Italy.  The friend's mother then told Roger's mother.  In the 
spring of 1982, Roger's mother and the parents of Roger's friend 
informed the school of the abuse.  According to the friend, at 
some point thereafter the defendant told the friend that he was 
dealing with his issues and wanted the friend "to know that it 
7 
 
 
wasn't gonna happen again."2  The school removed the defendant 
from advising and tutoring Roger and told the three parents that 
the defendant would no longer participate in the bicycle trips. 
 
The headmaster approached the defendant with allegations 
that the defendant had rubbed a different student's back and had 
touched Roger's genitals.  The headmaster testified that the 
defendant "did not deny that.  [The defendant] reminded me that 
he had not -- he had stopped always when any student asked him 
to."  The defendant gave the headmaster permission to speak with 
the defendant's therapist, and the therapist "assured [the 
headmaster] that [the defendant] was seriously working on the 
issues that had surfaced on the bike trip and that he felt that 
[the defendant] was serious, that progress was being made."  In 
April 1982, the school reappointed the defendant on probationary 
status and temporarily removed him from on-campus housing. 
 
In June 1987, two years after Roger had graduated, the 
headmaster was notified that earlier that year, the defendant 
had orally raped a freshman boy in the defendant's on-campus 
apartment.  The headmaster and an attorney for the school 
confronted the defendant.  The defendant admitted the incident 
with this boy, and said that the incident occurred in the 
defendant's bed in his on-campus apartment, and that he and the 
                     
 
2 It is unclear from the grand jury transcript whether this 
statement was a direct quote from the defendant. 
8 
 
 
boy performed oral sex on each other, but that only the boy had 
ejaculated.  The school fired the defendant after this incident.  
The defendant left the United States at some point in 1987 and 
was living abroad at the time of the 2017 grand jury 
presentation. 
 
The grand jury indicted the defendant on three counts of 
statutory rape, G. L. c. 265, § 23, and three counts of forcible 
rape of a child under sixteen years of age, G. L. c. 265, § 22A, 
based on three incidents involving Roger occurring on divers 
dates between September 1, 1981, and July 1, 1982, in Norfolk 
County.  A warrant issued for the defendant's arrest.  He was 
arrested in Thailand in May 2018 and extradited to the United 
States. 
 
In October 2018, the defendant moved in the Superior Court 
to dismiss the indictments, pursuant to Commonwealth v. 
McCarthy, 385 Mass. 160, 163 (1982).  After a hearing, a judge 
allowed the defendant's motion to dismiss on the basis that the 
Commonwealth did not present the required corroborating evidence 
pursuant to G. L. c. 277, § 63.  The judge also determined that 
the Commonwealth "presented insufficient evidence to establish 
probable cause of more than two charges of statutory rape under 
G. L. c. 265, § 23." 
 
In January 2019, the Commonwealth filed a motion for 
reconsideration of the dismissal and a motion to report 
9 
 
 
questions of law.  The defendant opposed the motions.  After a 
hearing, the judge invited further briefing.  The Commonwealth 
filed a revised motion to report questions of law, which the 
defendant also opposed.  The judge subsequently reported the 
following two questions of law to the Appeals Court, pursuant to 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 34, as amended, 442 Mass. 1501 (2004): 
1.  "Does the phrase 'any period' in the last sentence of 
the first paragraph of G. L. c. 277, § 63, refer to the 
phrase 'more than [twenty-seven] years' in the second 
sentence of that paragraph? 
 
2.  "Does the provision in the second sentence of G. L. 
c. 277, § 63, that any indictment 'found and filed' beyond 
[twenty-seven] years from the date of the commission of the 
offense alleged be supported by independent evidence 
corroborating the victim's allegation require that such 
evidence be presented to the grand jury, failing which that 
indictment is subject to dismissal prior to trial?" 
 
 
Discussion.  1. G. L. c. 277, § 63.  "We review a question 
of statutory interpretation de novo, without deference to the 
motion judge's conclusion."  Commonwealth v. Perella, 464 Mass. 
274, 276 (2013), quoting Commonwealth v. George W. Prescott 
Publ. Co., 463 Mass. 258, 264 n.9 (2012).  "We focus first on 
the language of the statute . . . ."  Perella, supra, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Millican, 449 Mass. 298, 300 (2007).  We "do not 
look to extrinsic sources to vary the plain meaning of a clear, 
unambiguous statute unless a literal construction would yield an 
absurd or unworkable result."  Perella, supra quoting Millican, 
supra at 300-301.  Moreover, we construe criminal statutes 
10 
 
 
"strictly against the Commonwealth and in favor of the 
defendant."  Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 431 Mass. 241, 250 
(2000). 
 
a.  Tolling provision in G. L. c. 277, § 63.  We start by 
addressing the first reported question of law, whether the 
tolling provision in § 63 applies to the requirement that, where 
a complaint is filed more than twenty-seven years after the 
alleged crime was committed, corroborating evidence of the 
allegation must be presented (corroboration requirement). 
 
The Commonwealth argues that the plain language of the 
statute "mandates that the tolling provision in the last 
sentence of the first paragraph applies to all of that section, 
including the second sentence and the crimes listed in it."  The 
defendant counters that the "tolling provision applies only to 
statutes of limitation, not evidentiary requirements, and is 
therefore inapplicable to sex offenses against children, which 
have no limitations period."  We hold that the tolling provision 
in § 63 does not apply to the twenty-seven year evidentiary 
requirement. 
 
General Laws c. 277, § 63, provides in relevant part: 
"An indictment or complaint for an offense set forth in 
[§ 22A or 23] of chapter 265 . . . may be found and filed 
at any time after the date of the commission of such 
offense; but any indictment or complaint found and filed 
more than [twenty-seven] years after the date of commission 
of such offense shall be supported by independent evidence 
that corroborates the victim's allegation.  Such 
11 
 
 
independent evidence shall be admissible during trial and 
shall not consist exclusively of the opinions of mental 
health professionals. . . .  Any period during which the 
defendant is not usually and publicly a resident within the 
commonwealth shall be excluded in determining the time 
limited. 
 
"Notwithstanding the first paragraph, if a victim of a 
crime set forth in [§ 22A or 23] of chapter 265 . . . is 
under the age of [sixteen] at the time the crime is 
committed, the period of limitation for prosecution shall 
not commence until the victim has reached the age of 
[sixteen] or the violation is reported to a law enforcement 
agency, whichever occurs earlier." 
 
 
Under the plain language of § 63, the corroboration 
requirement is not subject to tolling.  See Commonwealth v. 
White, 475 Mass. 724, 734 (2016).3  The plain language provides 
that child rape offenses "may be found and filed at any time 
after the date of the commission of such offense" (emphasis 
added), G. L. c. 277, § 63, and we previously stated that the 
2006 amendment to the statute, St. 2006, c. 303, § 9, eliminated 
                     
 
3 Although in Commonwealth v. White, 475 Mass. 724 (2016), 
we did not directly address the issue presented here -- whether 
tolling applies to the corroboration requirement -- we 
implicitly concluded that tolling did not apply to the 
corroboration requirement.  Id. at 730-731, 734.  In White, we 
analyzed the tolling of the statute of limitations under a 
previous version of G. L. c. 277, § 63, and the corroboration 
requirement under the current statute.  Id.  We determined that 
the defendant's absence from the Commonwealth had tolled some 
period of the statute of limitations, id. at 730-732, but that 
the "allegations with respect to any incidents taking place 
. . . more than twenty-seven years prior to indictment . . . 
required corroboration by independent evidence."  Id. at 734. 
 
12 
 
 
the statute of limitations for child rape.4  See Commonwealth v. 
White, 475 Mass. 724, 730 n.11 (2016) (St. 2006, c. 303, § 9, 
"lifted entirely" the "limitations period"); Commonwealth v. 
Stevenson, 474 Mass. 372, 379 (2016) (same).  However, for any 
charges filed beyond twenty-seven years after the crime was 
committed, corroborating evidence must be presented.  G. L. 
c. 277, § 63.  And the tolling provision concludes the first 
paragraph of § 63 and provides that "[a]ny period during which 
the defendant is not usually and publicly a resident within the 
commonwealth shall be excluded in determining the time limited" 
(emphasis added).5  G. L. c. 277, § 63.  We conclude that the 
provision that sets forth a limitations period is separate from 
the corroboration requirement, which is an evidentiary 
                     
 
4 Other offenses enumerated in § 63 have specific statutes 
of limitations attached.  G. L. c. 277, § 63. 
 
 
5 A review of the previous versions of the statute support 
our interpretation that the phrase "time limited" applies to the 
statute of limitations.  The versions of the statute from its 
original iteration in 1836 until the version amended in 2006 set 
forth applicable statutes of limitations and a tolling 
provision, but not a corroboration requirement.  See R.S. 1836, 
c. 136, § 16 ("but any period, during which the party charged 
was not usually and publicly resident within this state, shall 
not be reckoned as part of the [six year statute of 
limitation]"); R.L. 1902, c. 218, § 52.  The phrase "time 
limited" first appeared in the 1902 version, R.L. 1902, c. 218, 
§ 52.  It was not until the 2006 amendment that the Legislature 
added the corroboration requirement to the statute.  St. 2006, 
c. 303, § 9.  Thus, the statute's history supports our 
conclusion that the phrase "time limited" refers only to the 
statute of limitations. 
13 
 
 
requirement.  See Black's Law Dictionary 674, 1636 (10th ed. 
2014) (defining "statute of limitations" as "[a] statute 
establishing a time limit for prosecuting a crime, based on the 
date when the offense occurred" and "corroborating evidence" as 
"[e]vidence that differs from but strengthens or confirms what 
other evidence shows").  When it added the corroboration 
requirement, the Legislature did not add language to the tolling 
provision that would extend the reach of the phrase "time 
limited" to include the evidentiary requirement.  Not only does 
the statute not contain language that would make the phrase 
"time limited" apply to the corroboration requirement, but the 
Legislature also separated these two distinct concepts from each 
other by a semicolon, demonstrating a legislative intent to 
separate the two concepts.  See Commissioner of Correction v. 
Superior Court Dep't of the Trial Court for the County of 
Worcester, 446 Mass. 123, 126 (2006) (examining sentence 
structure to aid statutory interpretation). 
 
Moreover, the legislative purpose of G. L. c. 277, § 63, 
supports our conclusion that the corroboration requirement is 
not subject to tolling.  As we detailed in White, 475 Mass. at 
736-737, the corroboration requirement was added to the statute 
to preserve fundamental safeguards of a fair trial that could be 
threatened after the elimination of the statute of limitations.  
The Legislature sought "to give child victims of sexual abuse 
14 
 
 
the time they need to heal, come forward and still have their 
day in court" (citation omitted), but there was concern that 
"memories of childhood abuse, when recalled decades later, may 
not be sufficiently precise to serve as the sole basis for a 
criminal conviction," White, supra at 736-737, and authorities 
cited.  Thus, the Legislature added the corroboration 
requirement for allegations outside the twenty-seven year 
threshold.  See id.  Tolling the evidentiary corroboration 
requirement would not further the Legislature's goal of 
preserving the fundamental safeguards of a fair trial.  See id. 
at 737, quoting State House News Service (July 26, 2006) 
(statement of Rep. Fagan).  Extending tolling to the evidentiary 
requirement would undermine the explicit requirement and purpose 
of corroboration. 
 
Therefore, we conclude that under the plain language of 
G. L. c. 277, § 63, and viewing the statute as a whole and in 
light of its legislative history and purpose, the corroboration 
requirement is not subject to tolling. 
 
b.  Corroborating evidence at the grand jury stage.  We 
next address the second reported question, whether the 
corroborating evidence required in § 63, has to be presented at 
the grand jury stage. 
 
The Commonwealth argues that "[w]hether the defendant's 
admissions corroborate the child rape victim's allegation is a 
15 
 
 
credibility question for a trial jury."  The defendant argues 
that the "plain statutory language compels an affirmative 
answer" to the reported question.  We agree with the defendant. 
 
General Laws c. 277, § 63, provides that "any indictment or 
complaint found and filed more than [twenty-seven] years after 
the date of commission of such offense shall be supported by 
independent evidence that corroborates the victim's allegation.  
Such independent evidence shall be admissible during trial" 
(emphasis added).  G. L. c. 277, § 63.  A plain reading of this 
statutory language is that the corroboration requirement applies 
to "any indictment . . . found and filed more than [twenty-
seven] years after the date of commission of such offense" 
(twenty-seven year threshold).  G. L. c. 277, § 63.  See 
Commonwealth v. LeBlanc, 475 Mass. 820, 821 (2016) ("Clear and 
unambiguous language is conclusive as to legislative intent"); 
Hashimi v. Kalil, 388 Mass. 607, 609 (1983) ("The word 'shall' 
is ordinarily interpreted as having a mandatory or imperative 
obligation"). 
 
Although we have not previously addressed the application 
of § 63 at the grand jury stage, our conclusion finds support in 
the Stevenson case.  In Stevenson, 474 Mass. at 378, we touched 
on the Legislature's effort to remedy a potential issue that 
after the passage of time, "[a]ccurately relaying the 
complainant's memory of . . . details [of the complainant's 
16 
 
 
story] to the grand jury through hearsay testimony can be less 
than perfect."  We stated, 
"The fact that sexual assault cases under these statutes 
are now capable of being prosecuted decades after the 
commission of the crimes may exacerbate concerns regarding 
the reliability of hearsay evidence presented in a 
nonadversary setting such as the grand jury.  But the 
Legislature contemplated the inevitability of such cases 
being brought under G. L. c. 277, § 63, and provided for 
additional protections when such charges are sought.  
Specifically, the statute explicitly provides that 
'indictments . . . filed more than [twenty-seven] years 
after the date of commission of such offense shall be 
supported by independent evidence that corroborates the 
victim's allegation' . . . .  Such corroboration was not 
required here" (citation omitted). 
 
Stevenson, supra at 379.  Because the alleged crimes in 
Stevenson occurred below the twenty-seven year threshold, id. at 
372-374, the implication of our statement that corroboration was 
not required in that case is that corroboration is required at 
the indictment stage where the alleged crimes occurred beyond 
the twenty-seven year threshold. 
 
In addition, the Legislature's explicit limitation of 
corroboration requirements to the trial stage in other statutes 
bolsters our interpretation that § 63 requires the Commonwealth 
to present evidence corroborating a victim's allegation at the 
grand jury stage.  See G. L. c. 272, § 11 ("A person shall not 
be convicted [under G. L. c. 272, §§ 2, 4, and 6,] upon the 
evidence of one witness only, unless his testimony is 
corroborated in a material particular" [emphasis added]); G. L. 
17 
 
 
c. 233, § 20I ("No defendant in any criminal proceeding shall be 
convicted solely on the testimony of, or the evidence produced 
by, a person granted immunity" under G. L. c. 233, § 20E).  The 
lack of similar specific language limiting the corroboration 
requirement of § 63 to the trial stage indicates that the 
Legislature did not intend to limit this requirement. 
 
Furthermore, the Commonwealth's arguments focusing on the 
practical issues that may arise from requiring it to present 
corroborating evidence to the grand jury do not compel a 
different result.  The 2006 amendment to G. L. c. 277, § 63, 
entailed compromising on a challenging issue with competing 
interests at play.  By eliminating the statute of limitations 
for child rape, the Legislature extended the rights of victims, 
and by providing a threshold past which corroborating evidence 
must accompany an allegation at the grand jury stage, the 
Legislature provided protections "against unfounded criminal 
prosecutions."  McCarthy, 385 Mass. at 163, quoting Lataille v. 
District Court of E. Hampden, 366 Mass. 525, 532 (1974).  See 
White, 475 Mass. at 737, quoting St. 2006, c. 303, § 9.  By 
requiring corroborating evidence to be presented at the grand 
jury stage, the Legislature created an exception to the common-
law rule that we generally "will not inquire into the competency 
or sufficiency of the evidence before the grand jury."  
Commonwealth v. Rex, 469 Mass. 36, 39 (2014), quoting 
18 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 373 Mass. 591, 592 (1977).  See Rex, 
supra at 40.  Even assuming, arguendo, that the Commonwealth's 
argument that requiring corroboration at the grand jury stage 
would present practical issues, any such issues do not allow us 
to rewrite the Legislature's work.  See LeBlanc, 475 Mass. at 
824, quoting Commissioner of Revenue v. Cargill, Inc., 429 Mass. 
79, 82 (1999) ("[I]t is the function of the judiciary to apply 
[the statutory language], not amend it"). 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we answer "yes" to the second 
reported question and conclude that the corroboration 
requirement of G. L. c. 277, § 63, requires the Commonwealth to 
present corroborating evidence to the grand jury. 
 
2.  Sufficiency of the corroborating evidence.  We next 
address whether the Commonwealth presented sufficient 
corroborating evidence to the grand jury.  The Commonwealth 
contends that the grand jury had probable cause to corroborate 
the alleged victim's allegation.  As support, the Commonwealth 
points to the defendant's admission to touching students; his 
saying "it" would not happen again, "which the grand jury could 
infer meant sexually assaulting this victim"; and the 
defendant's confession, five years after the incidents at issue 
allegedly occurred, to raping another freshman student in 
"virtually identical circumstances."  The defendant relies, in 
part, on White, 475 Mass. 724, to argue that we should affirm 
19 
 
 
the trial court's dismissal of the indictments because the 
Commonwealth did not present adequate corroborating evidence.  
The defendant contends that under White, the Commonwealth did 
not meet the "high bar" of corroboration as it failed to 
corroborate a "specific testimonial fact" regarding an element 
of the charged offenses.  Id. at 739-740.  We conclude that the 
Commonwealth presented adequate corroborating evidence to meet 
the grand jury's probable cause to indict standard. 
 
"A grand jury may indict when presented with sufficient 
evidence of 'each of the . . . elements' of the charged 
offense."  Commonwealth v. Stirlacci, 483 Mass. 775, 780 (2020), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Moran, 453 Mass. 880, 884 (2009).  
"Probable cause is a 'considerably less exacting' standard than 
that required to support a conviction at trial."  Stirlacci, 
supra, quoting Commonwealth v. O'Dell, 392 Mass. 445, 451 
(1984).  "It requires 'sufficient facts to warrant a person of 
reasonable caution in believing that an offense has been 
committed,' not proof beyond a reasonable doubt."  Stirlacci, 
supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Levesque, 436 Mass. 443, 447 
(2002).  When reviewing the dismissal of an indictment, we 
review the evidence before the grand jury in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth and do not defer to the motion 
judge's factual findings or legal conclusions.  Stirlacci, supra 
at 780-781. 
20 
 
 
 
The incidents alleged to have occurred in the present case 
took place on divers dates between September 1, 1981, and July 
1, 1982, thirty-five years before the return of the true bills 
of indictment.6  Therefore, in accordance with our answers to the 
two reported questions addressed supra, the Commonwealth was 
required to present evidence to the grand jury that corroborated 
the alleged victim's allegations.  See G. L. c. 277, § 63.  To 
address whether the Commonwealth presented sufficient 
corroborating evidence, we look first to the relevant language 
in G. L. c. 277, § 63: 
"[A]ny indictment or complaint found and filed more than 
[twenty-seven] years after the date of commission of such 
offense shall be supported by independent evidence that 
corroborates the victim's allegation.  Such independent 
evidence shall be admissible during trial and shall not 
consist exclusively of the opinions of mental health 
professionals." 
 
                     
 
6 Referring to the fact that although they heard evidence of 
sexual abuse taking place on Cape Cod and in Italy, the 
indictments were sought only for the conduct that took place at 
the school in Norfolk County, the prosecutor gave the grand 
jurors a limiting instruction:  "You have heard reference to 
other acts allegedly committed by [the defendant], which did not 
occur within the jurisdiction of Milton or Norfolk County.  No 
indictments are being sought for those acts.  You are not to 
take any of those references as substitute for proof that . . . 
there's probable cause that [the defendant] committed crimes 
within Milton . . . .  You may only consider the evidence 
pertaining to those other acts as it relates to [the 
defendant's] possible motive, state of mind, patter[n] of 
conduct, the absence of accident, or innocent intent, and as it 
relates to the state of mind of [Roger] and other witnesses." 
21 
 
 
The plain language of this provision provides that the 
corroborating evidence (1) must be something other than the 
alleged victim's allegation; (2) cannot "consist exclusively of 
the opinions of mental health professionals"; and (3) "it must 
be of a sort 'admissible during trial.'"  See G. L. c. 277, 
§ 6336.  In the White case, we interpreted the corroboration 
requirement for the first time in the context of whether the 
victim's trial testimony "was supported by 'independent evidence 
that corroborates [her] allegation.'"  White, 475 Mass. at 735, 
quoting G. L. c. 277, § 63.  We stated that to meet the 
corroboration requirement, "the Commonwealth must present 
corroborating evidence that relates to the specific criminal act 
at issue" and that "evidence of uncharged misconduct . . . does 
not itself suffice."  White, 475 Mass. at 736. 
 
In White, the defendant was convicted of one count of rape 
of a child, G. L. c. 265, § 23, based on an indictment that 
alleged he had raped his daughter on "diverse dates" both below 
and beyond the twenty-seven year threshold set forth in § 63.  
Id. at 725.  We vacated the defendant's conviction where the 
corroborating testimony before the jury came from the victim's 
brother.  He stated that he once walked past the victim's room 
and "saw [the defendant] on top of [the victim], his head in her 
lap, her on the bed" with the victim "laying back" with "her 
pants . . . down."  Id. at 726-727.  We concluded that the 
22 
 
 
brother's account "presented evidence only of uncharged 
misconduct" and "did not provide 'some specific testimonial 
fact,' . . . related to the particular incidents" of alleged 
rape, and as such did not itself suffice to meet the 
corroboration requirement in § 63.  Id. at 740, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Helfant, 398 Mass. 214, 219 (1986).  See White, 
supra at 739-740, quoting Helfant, supra (standard in Helfant 
that "corroborating evidence must relate to the specific 
criminal act at issue and, in particular, that it must consist 
of 'some specific testimonial fact, which, in the context of the 
case, is probative on an element of the crime' . . . especially 
appropriate for defining the corroboration requirement in the 
statute at issue").7 
 
Although our interpretation of the corroboration 
requirement set a "high bar," this bar "is not insuperable," 
White, supra at 740, and in the present case we conclude that 
the Commonwealth's evidence met this standard.  Whereas in White 
we addressed the corroborative value of the testimony of the 
victim's brother regarding uncharged conduct, White, supra at 
                     
 
7 The statute at issue in Commonwealth v. Helfant, 398 Mass. 
214 (1986), G. L. c. 272, § 11, contained the requirement that 
the testimony of a witness must be "corroborated in a material 
particular."  See G. L. c. 272, § 11; Helfant, supra at 218-219 
& n.3.  Although § 63 contains the requirements detailed supra, 
it does not contain the "material particular," or similar, 
language.  See G. L. c. 277, § 63. 
23 
 
 
736, here we are presented with an alleged admission by the 
defendant that "it wasn't gonna happen again."  The Commonwealth 
argues that "it" in this statement related to the charged 
conduct.  The defendant argues that to the extent anything can 
be inferred from this statement, the statement related to the 
events in Italy and not the charged crimes. 
 
The defendant made the alleged admission that "it wasn't 
gonna happen again," at some point in the spring of 1982.  When 
considering the corroborating evidence in the context of Roger's 
statements, the grand jury could have inferred that the alleged 
oral rapes had occurred by the spring of 1982.  Roger told the 
investigator that during the 1981 to 1982 school year, the 
defendant had invited him to the defendant's apartment four to 
six times under the premise of helping Roger study.  It was 
during these visits that the alleged crimes at issue occurred.  
Roger further told the investigator that he believed these 
incidents occurred over several months but did not believe it 
lasted the whole year.  Viewing this evidence in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, we conclude that it was 
reasonable for the grand jury to infer that the "it" in the 
defendant's statement referred to the alleged oral rapes for 
which the defendant was charged, therefore providing the 
24 
 
 
required corroborating evidence.8  See Stirlacci, 483 Mass. at 
780.  See also Commonwealth v. Lewis, 465 Mass. 119, 127 (2013) 
(meaning of defendant's ambiguous statement was question of fact 
for jury).  Therefore, we conclude that the Commonwealth 
presented sufficient corroborating evidence to the grand jury to 
establish probable cause. 
 
3.  Number of incidents.  We turn next to whether the 
Commonwealth's evidence established probable cause for two or 
three separate incidents of rape.  The Commonwealth argues that 
in the light most favorable to it, the "grand jury testimony 
that the defendant raped the victim 'two or three' times showed 
probable cause for crimes committed on three occasions."  The 
defendant counters that, if we reach this issue, the "alleged 
victim's statement, presented to the grand jury through a police 
officer, that he received oral sex from [the defendant] on 'two 
or three occasions' presents reasonably trustworthy information 
to indict for two instances, not three."  We hold that the 
                     
 
8 We focus our analysis on the defendant's alleged admission 
that "it wasn't gonna happen again," but note that we are not 
holding that the other evidence of the defendant's alleged 
misconduct with the victim or other students would not be 
admissible at trial.  See White, 475 Mass. at 739 n.24, citing 
Commonwealth v. King, 387 Mass. 464, 470 (1982) (we previously 
held that "Commonwealth was permitted to present evidence of 
uncharged sexual misconduct; we did not say that such evidence 
would suffice where corroboration is required"). 
25 
 
 
Commonwealth's evidence established probable cause for two 
separate incidents. 
 
Although, in general, a "court will not inquire into the 
competency or sufficiency of the evidence before the grand jury" 
(citation omitted), Rex, 469 Mass. at 39, "[a]t the very least, 
the grand jury must hear enough evidence to establish the 
identity of the accused and to support a finding of probable 
cause to arrest the accused for the offense charged" (footnote 
omitted), id. at 40.  "A grand jury finding of probable cause is 
necessary if indictments are to fulfil their traditional 
function as an effective protection 'against unfounded criminal 
prosecutions.'"  Id., quoting McCarthy, 385 Mass. at 163. 
The grand jury had before it two sources that provided 
context for the number of incidents.  It heard that Roger told 
Pires that "[o]n two or three occasions [the defendant] gave me 
a blowjob by putting his mouth over my penis."  The grand jury 
also had before it an excerpt from the report of the school's 
consultant that documented the consultant's 2016 interview with 
Roger.  This report states that Roger said, "There were several 
times when I allowed [the defendant] to . . . touch me.  I 
allowed him to take off my pants . . . to pull down my underwear 
and perform oral sex on me."  Those two statements were the only 
evidence before the grand jury regarding the specific number of 
26 
 
 
crimes alleged to have occurred in Norfolk County.9  Without 
presenting more information to the grand jury as to the number 
of alleged incidents, the grand jury would have been forced to 
speculate regarding the third incident.  See Rex, 469 Mass. at 
39-40.  Therefore, although the Commonwealth presented 
sufficient evidence to indict the defendant for two incidents, 
it failed to present "sufficient facts to warrant a person of 
reasonable caution in believing that an offense has been 
committed" for the third occasion.  Levesque, 436 Mass. at 447. 
 
Conclusion.  We answer the reported questions as follows: 
 
1.  The tolling provision in the first paragraph of G. L. 
c. 277, § 63, does not apply to the requirement to provide 
corroborating evidence for criminal charges brought beyond the 
twenty-seven year time limitation in the second sentence of that 
paragraph. 
 
2.  The corroboration requirement of G. L. c. 277, § 63, 
for criminal charges brought beyond the twenty-seven year time 
limitation requires the Commonwealth to present corroboration 
evidence to the grand jury. 
                     
 
9 Although the grand jury heard that the alleged victim 
referred to frequent encounters where the defendant would touch 
the alleged victim's genitals, these encounters could not 
provide probable cause for the crimes for which the defendant 
was indicted.  See Commonwealth v. Hackett, 383 Mass. 888, 888 
(1981); Commonwealth v. Gallant, 373 Mass. 577, 584-585 (1977). 
27 
 
 
 
We further conclude that the Commonwealth presented 
sufficient corroborating evidence to the grand jury for two 
incidents.  Accordingly, we reverse the allowance of the motion 
to dismiss indictments nos. 1782CR00399-001, -002, -004, and -
005 but affirm the dismissal of indictments nos. 1782CR00399-003 
and -006 for the third incident. 
So ordered.