Title: Simmons v. Ghaderi
Citation: 44 Cal. 4th 570 original opinion
Docket Number: S147848
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: July 21, 2008

1
Filed 7/21/08  
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
MICHELLE SIMMONS, as Personal 
) 
Representative, etc., et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
) 
 
 
) 
S147848 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/3 B180735 
LIDA GHADERI, 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. BC270780 
___________________________________ ) 
 
Evidence Code section 1115 et seq.1 sets forth an extensive statutory 
scheme protecting the confidentiality of mediation proceedings, with narrowly 
delineated exceptions.  In this breach of contract action arising from a medical 
malpractice suit, plaintiffs sought to enforce an oral settlement agreement 
allegedly formed during mediation.  During pretrial proceedings, the doctor 
stipulated to, and submitted evidence of, events which had occurred during 
mediation, arguing that no enforceable contract was formed during mediation.  For 
the first time at trial, the doctor invoked the mediation confidentiality statutes to 
prevent plaintiffs from introducing evidence relating to the mediation proceedings.  
Over the doctor’s objection, the trial court admitted the evidence.  
                                              
1 
All further statutory references are to the Evidence Code.   
 
2
A majority of the Court of Appeal held that, despite the statutory 
confidentiality protections, the doctor was judicially estopped from arguing that 
evidence of the settlement agreement is statutorily inadmissible; she “placed 
before the trial court the facts of the mediation and sought a legal determination as 
to their effect.”  We conclude that the Court of Appeal improperly relied on the 
doctrine of estoppel to create a judicial exception to the comprehensive statutory 
scheme of mediation confidentiality and that the evidence relating to the mediation 
proceedings should not have been admitted at trial.   
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On March 27, 2002, plaintiffs (the minor son and mother of Kintausha 
Clemmons) filed a wrongful death complaint against defendant Dr. Lida Ghaderi, 
alleging that her medical malpractice caused the death of Kintausha Clemmons.  
Cooperative of American Physicians, Inc./Mutual Protection Trust (CAP-MPT) 
was defendant’s medical malpractice insurance provider.   
On July 9, 2003, the parties attended a mediation with the Honorable 
Robert T. Altman, retired.  Plaintiffs and their counsel appeared.  Defendant was 
present with a CAP-MPT claims specialist, the CAP-MPT attorney, and Cumis 
counsel.2  Under the provisions of her professional liability policy with CAP-
MPT, defendant had the right to withhold her consent to the settlement of any 
third party malpractice claim.  At the request of the mediator, before the beginning 
of settlement discussions, defendant executed a standard consent-to-settlement 
form provided by CAP-MPT.  This document authorized CAP-MPT to negotiate a 
                                              
2 
Cumis counsel refers to independent counsel provided to an insured by an 
insurer contesting coverage, but still providing a defense.  (San Diego Federal 
Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Society, Inc. (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 358, 364; (Civ. 
Code, § 2860.) 
 
3
settlement on defendant’s behalf, with the settlement value limited to $125,000.  
The document also stated that defendant’s consent to settlement could only be 
revoked in writing and would remain in force until a written revocation was 
received by CAP-MPT at its offices.   
The parties then engaged in settlement discussions while defendant waited 
in another room with Cumis counsel.  At one point, CAP-MPT instructed Judge 
Altman to offer plaintiffs $125,000 to settle the matter in exchange for a dismissal 
with prejudice and a waiver of costs.  Plaintiffs orally accepted the offer.  Judge 
Altman then placed the essential terms of the settlement into a document for the 
parties to sign.  When defendant was informed that the case had settled, she 
declared that she was revoking her consent and left the building without signing 
the settlement agreement.  The claims specialist, unsure of how to proceed, 
contacted the CAP-MPT office and learned that CAP-MPT would consider 
defendant’s oral revocation of her consent valid.  Plaintiffs and their counsel 
signed the settlement agreement, but no one signed on behalf of defendant or 
CAP-MPT. 
The following day, plaintiffs’ attorney and CAP-MPT’s attorney appeared 
in court and sought guidance.  Both counsel recounted the facts of the mediation to 
the court, including defendant’s written consent to settle for $125,000, the offer in 
that amount, the acceptance of the offer, and defendant’s departure while the 
settlement was being reduced to writing.  The trial court speculated that there may 
be an enforceable oral settlement agreement.  Accordingly, the trial court vacated 
the trial date and set the matter for an order to show cause why the case should not 
be dismissed.   
On July 16, 2003, defendant sent CAP-MPT a letter formally revoking her 
consent to settle.  
 
4
At the July 29, 2003, dismissal hearing, defendant spoke with the trial 
court.  The court stated on the record that defendant was unwilling to consent to 
the settlement, but then suggested that plaintiffs move to enforce the settlement 
under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6.3   
On August 15, 2003, plaintiffs moved to enforce the settlement on the 
ground that an oral agreement had been reached with CAP-MPT while CAP-MPT 
had defendant’s consent to settle the action.  Plaintiffs supported their motion with 
a copy of defendant’s signed consent to settle, the written settlement agreement 
prepared by Judge Altman and signed only by plaintiffs and their counsel, and 
declarations from plaintiffs’ attorney and the mediator setting forth the events at 
the July 9 mediation. 
In opposing plaintiffs’ motion to enforce, defendant did not dispute their 
factual representations regarding the mediation.  Instead, arguing the legal effect 
of those facts, she claimed that the settlement could not be enforced because it did 
not meet the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6.  Defendant 
argued that no agreement had been consummated; she had not signed the written 
settlement agreement and had withdrawn her consent, and therefore CAP-MPT 
had no authority to execute a settlement agreement on her behalf.  The trial court 
denied the motion to enforce settlement.  It found that, because neither defendant 
nor CAP-MPT had signed the written agreement, the requirements of Code of 
Civil Procedure section 664.6 had not been met.  However, it noted there might be 
                                              
3 
Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 states, “If parties to pending 
litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the 
court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the 
court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If 
requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to 
enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.”  
 
5
an enforceable oral contract and suggested plaintiffs amend their complaint to 
allege breach of contract.  
Following the trial court’s suggestion, plaintiffs amended their complaint to 
add a cause for breach of contract and alleged that defendant breached an oral 
settlement agreement reached during mediation.  Plaintiffs served a request for 
admissions on defendant and deposed her.  In response to this discovery and in her 
motion for summary adjudication of the breach of contract cause, defendant did 
not dispute the events that had occurred during the mediation.  Indeed, in a 
declaration appended to her motion, defendant proffered that she had signed a 
written consent for CAP-MPT to settle, her counsel had made a $125,000 
settlement offer to plaintiffs, and she had revoked her consent without executing 
the settlement agreement. 
The trial court denied defendant’s motion for summary adjudication of the 
breach of contract cause of action and granted plaintiffs’ motion to sever the 
breach of contract and medical malpractice claims.  The case proceeded to trial 
only on the breach of contract cause.   
On October 6, 2004, nearly 15 months after the mediation, defendant filed 
her trial brief.  For the first time, she asserted that the mediation confidentiality 
statutes precluded plaintiffs from proving the existence of an oral settlement 
agreement.  Defendant’s trial brief raised no other issue.   
At a bench trial, over defendant’s objection, plaintiffs submitted the 
following documents relating to the mediation:  (1) the consent to settlement 
signed by defendant; (2) the settlement agreement prepared by Judge Altman; (3) 
defendant’s letter revoking her consent to settlement; (4) defendant’s deposition 
testimony; (5) the deposition testimony of the CAP-MPT claims specialist; and (6) 
a declaration from Judge Altman.  The parties agreed to almost everything that had 
occurred at the mediation, except what the CAP-MPT claims specialist did once 
 
6
defendant had refused to sign the document.  Over defendant’s objection, the 
CAP-MPT claims specialist testified about the events of the mediation.   
The trial court concluded that plaintiffs and defendant’s agent, acting 
within his authority as evidenced by defendant’s signed consent agreement, had 
entered into a valid, enforceable oral contract before defendant withdrew her 
consent.  It ordered specific performance of the agreement and entered judgment 
in favor of plaintiffs for $125,000, plus prejudgment interest.   
In a two-to-one decision, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s 
judgment.  The majority held that a valid oral agreement had been reached during 
mediation.  It further held that, because defendant had presented evidence of the 
occurrences at the mediation and failed to object to plaintiffs’ use of these facts 
during pretrial motions, she was estopped from asserting mediation 
confidentiality.  In his dissent, Justice Aldrich maintained that the mediation 
confidentiality statutes prevented plaintiffs from proving the existence of an oral 
settlement agreement, that the majority’s focus on estoppel was “a veiled attempt 
at relabeling waiver as estoppel,” and that a party cannot impliedly waive 
mediation confidentiality through litigation conduct. 
We granted defendant’s petition for review to determine if she could be 
estopped from objecting to the admission of evidence proving the existence of an 
oral settlement agreement reached during mediation proceedings.   
II. DISCUSSION 
Defendant contends that the Court of Appeal majority improperly relied on 
the doctrine of estoppel to create a judicial exception to the statutory requirements 
of confidentiality of mediation proceedings.  (§ 1115 et. seq.)  As explained 
below, we agree.   
 
7
1.  The Mediation Confidentiality Statutes 
In 1997, the Legislature adopted the California Law Revision 
Commission’s (Commission) recommendations and revised the mediation 
confidentiality statutes.  (Fair v. Bakhtiari (2006) 40 Cal.4th 189, 194-196 (Fair).)  
It enacted section 1115 et seq., creating an extensive statutory scheme governing 
mediation confidentiality and its exceptions.  (Fair, supra, at pp. 194-196.) 
“California’s Legislature has a strong policy favoring mediation as an 
alternative to litigation.  Because mediation provides a simple, quick, and 
economical means of resolving disputes, and because it may also help reduce the 
court system’s backlog of cases, it is in the public interest to encourage its use.  
[Citation.]”  (Doe 1 v. Superior Court (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1165.)  The 
Legislature designed the mediation confidentiality statutes to “promote ‘a candid 
and informal exchange regarding events in the past . . . .  This frank exchange is 
achieved only if the participants know that what is said in the mediation will not 
be used to their detriment through later court proceedings and other adjudicatory 
processes.’  [Citations.]” (Foxgate Homeowners’ Assn., Inc. v. Bramalea 
California, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1, 14 (Foxgate).)  “[C]onfidentiality is essential 
to effective mediation . . . .”  (Ibid.)   
Section 1119 governs the general admissibility of oral and written 
communications made during the mediation process.  It “prohibits any person, 
mediator and participants alike, from revealing any written or oral communication 
made during mediation.”  (Foxgate, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 13.)  Section 1119, 
subdivision (a) states, in pertinent part, that:  “Except as otherwise provided in this 
chapter:  [¶]  (a) No evidence of anything said or any admission made for the 
purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation . . . is admissible or 
subject to discovery, and disclosure of the evidence shall not be compelled, in 
any . . . civil action . . . .”   
 
8
Similarly, section 1119, subdivision (b) states, in pertinent part, that:  
“Except as otherwise provided in this chapter:  [¶] . . . [¶]  No writing . . . that is 
prepared for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation or a 
mediation consultation, is admissible or subject to discovery, and disclosure of the 
writing shall not be compelled, in any . . . civil action. . . .”  Section 1119, 
subdivision (c) further mandates that “All communications, negotiations, or 
settlement discussions by and between participants in the course of a 
mediation . . . shall remain confidential.” 
Sections 1122 and 1124 specifically lay out exceptions for the admission of 
evidence produced during mediation.  As relevant here, section 1122, subdivision 
(a)(1) provides that “[a] communication or a writing . . . that is made or prepared 
for the purpose of, or in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation or a mediation 
consultation, is not made inadmissible, or protected from disclosure, by provisions 
of this chapter if . . . the following condition[] is satisfied:  [¶]  (1) All persons 
who conduct or otherwise participate in the mediation expressly agree in writing, 
or orally in accordance with Section 1118, to disclosure of the communication, 
document, or writing.” 
Section 1124 specifies that an oral agreement made in the course of, or 
pursuant to, a mediation is not made inadmissible, or protected from disclosure, if 
certain conditions involving section 1118 are satisfied.4  Oral agreements in 
                                              
4 
Section 1124 states: 
 
“An oral agreement made in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation is not 
made inadmissible, or protected from disclosure, by the provisions of this chapter 
if any of the following conditions are satisfied: 
 
“(a) The agreement is in accordance with Section 1118. 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
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accordance with section 1118 occur when:  (a) the oral agreement is recorded by a 
court reporter, tape recorder, or other reliable means of sound recording; (b) the 
terms of the oral agreement are recited on the record in the presence of the parties 
and the mediator, and the parties express on the record that they agree to the terms 
recited; (c) the parties to the oral agreement expressly state on the record that the 
agreement is enforceable or binding or words to that effect; and (d) the recording 
is reduced to writing and the writing is signed by the parties within 72 hours after 
it is recorded. 
The legislative scheme also provides rules for the use of written settlement 
agreements produced during mediation.  Section 1123 protects the confidentiality 
of any written agreement made during mediation unless the parties expressly agree 
to disclosure or the agreement is used to show fraud, duress, or illegality.5   
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
 
“(b) The agreement is in accordance with subdivisions (a), (b), and (d) of 
Section 1118, and all parties to the agreement expressly agree, in writing or orally 
in accordance with Section 1118, to disclosure of the agreement. 
 
“(c) The agreement is in accordance with subdivisions (a), (b), and (d) of 
Section 1118, and the agreement is used to show fraud, duress, or illegality that is 
relevant to an issue in dispute.” 
 
5 
Section 1123 reads: 
 
“A written settlement agreement prepared in the course of, or pursuant to, a 
mediation, is not made inadmissible, or protected from disclosure, by provisions of 
this chapter if the agreement is signed by the settling parties and any of the 
following conditions are satisfied: 
 
“(a) The agreement provides that it is admissible or subject to disclosure, or 
words to that effect. 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
10
Further, statements made during mediation and mediation materials are 
confidential not only during the mediation, but also after the mediation ends.  
Section 1126 clarifies that “[a]nything said, any admission made, or any writing 
that is inadmissible, protected from disclosure, and confidential under this chapter 
before a mediation ends, shall remain inadmissible, protected from disclosure, and 
confidential to the same extent after the mediation ends.” 
In addition to the unambiguous language of the mediation confidentiality 
statutes, the Commission’s comments further demonstrate that the Legislature 
intended to apply confidentiality broadly and to limit any exceptions to 
confidentiality to narrowly prescribed statutory exemptions.  (Fair, supra, 40 
Cal.4th at p. 195 [the “Commission’s official comments are deemed to express the 
Legislature’s intent”].)  The Commission’s comment to section 1124 states 
explicitly that the section sets forth specific circumstances under which mediation 
confidentiality is inapplicable to an oral agreement reached through mediation.  
Except in those circumstances, sections 1119 and 1124 codify the rule of Ryan v. 
Garcia (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1006 (Ryan) (mediation confidentiality applies to 
oral statement of settlement terms) and reject the contrary approach of Regents of 
the University of California v. Sumner (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1209 (Regents) 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
 
“(b) The agreement provides that it is enforceable or binding or words to 
that effect. 
 
“(c) All parties to the agreement expressly agree in writing, or orally in 
accordance with Section 1118, to its disclosure. 
 
“(d) The agreement is used to show fraud, duress, or illegality that is 
relevant to an issue in dispute.” 
 
 
11
(mediation confidentiality does not protect oral statement of settlement terms).  
(Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 29B pt. 3 West’s Ann. Evid. Code (2008 supp.) 
(hereafter Cal. Law Rev. Com.) foll. § 1124, p. 257.) 
 
As noted in the Commission’s comment, with section 1124 the Legislature 
created a specific mechanism for the admission of evidence regarding oral 
settlement agreements made during mediation.  This mechanism was created in 
reaction to two conflicting Court of Appeal decisions, Ryan and Regents.     
 
In Ryan, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at page 1013, the Court of Appeal  held that 
under former section 1152.5 (now section 1119), evidence offered to prove the 
terms of an oral settlement agreement reached during mediation was inadmissible 
because it did not meet statutory requirements.  In Ryan, the parties went to 
mediation, agreed to a compromise, and orally recited the terms of the agreement.  
(Id. at pp. 1008-1009.)  The agreement, however, was never reduced to writing, 
and the defendant later contested the terms of the settlement.  (Ibid.)  The plaintiffs 
amended their complaint to add a cause of action to enforce the oral settlement.  
(Id. at p. 1009.)  Over defendant’s objections, the trial court admitted evidence of 
the oral recitation of the settlement terms to prove the existence of an agreement.  
(Ibid.)  The court reasoned that once the mediator announced the compromise, 
statements made thereafter were not produced in the course of mediation and were 
not protected under section 1152.5.  (Ryan, at p. 1009.)   
 
The defendant appealed, claiming the statements concerning the existence 
and terms of the settlement agreement were part of the mediation and therefore 
inadmissible.  (Ryan, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 1010.)  Noting that former 
section 1152.5 should be broadly interpreted to ensure confidentiality, the Court of 
Appeal held that the oral statements made after the announced compromise were 
made in “the course of mediation.”  (Ryan, at p. 1013.)  The court rejected the 
plaintiffs’ argument that such interpretation of the statutory scheme would divest 
 
12
mediation of its intended usefulness, and it noted that the statutes provided a 
procedural mechanism to protect confidentiality and simple and clear means for 
enforcement of agreed-upon settlements.  (Id. at p. 1012.) 
 
Subsequently, in Regents, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th 1209, the Court of Appeal 
declined to follow Ryan and held that former section 1152.5 did not bar 
introduction of oral statements evidencing a settlement made after a compromise 
had been achieved.  Although the Court of Appeal acknowledged its decision 
contradicted Ryan, it nonetheless concluded that a trial court could admit evidence 
of oral statements made after a compromise had been reached.  (Regents, supra, 42 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1213.)  
 
The Regents rule, however, was expressly rejected by the Legislature when 
it revised the mediation confidentiality statutes.  The Commission’s comment to 
section 1124 provides that, except when the requirements expressly laid out in 
sections 1124 and 1118 are met, sections 1119 and 1124 together codify the rule 
of Ryan and reject Regents.  (Cal. Law Rev. Com., supra, foll. § 1124, p. 257.)  
Section 1119 is more expansive than its predecessor, former section 1152.5.  
Section 1119, subdivision (a), extends to oral communications made for the 
purpose of or pursuant to a mediation, not just oral communications made in the 
course of the mediation.  (Cal. Law Rev. Com., supra, foll. § 1119, p. 241.)  It also 
explicitly applies in a subsequent arbitration or administrative adjudication, as 
well as in any civil proceeding.  (Ibid.)  Recognizing both the breadth and clarity 
of the mediation confidentiality statutes, we have concluded that the legislative 
scheme is clear and unambiguous, and that the Legislature intended for mediation 
confidentiality to apply according to the statutory rules.  (Foxgate, supra, 26 
Cal.4th at p. 14.)  Thus, mediation confidentiality now clearly applies to prohibit 
admissibility of evidence of settlement terms made for the purpose of, in the 
 
13
course of, or pursuant to a mediation unless the agreement falls within express 
statutory exceptions.  (§ 1119, subd. (a).) 
 
In the present case, an oral agreement may have been reached between 
defendant’s insurer and plaintiffs during the mediation; however, the parties did 
not follow the statutory procedures that would have made this agreement 
admissible.  Specifically, no form of recordation of the oral agreement exists, nor 
is there a written agreement signed by both parties.  (§§ 1118, 1122, 1124.)  The 
agreement as memorialized by Judge Altman is similarly inadmissible under 
sections 1119, 1122, and 1123, as there was no express agreement that it  
could be disclosed, and it was not signed by defendant or her attorneys.  The Court 
of Appeal and the parties do not dispute that evidence of the oral settlement 
agreement was inadmissible under the statutory requirements.   
2.  Judicially Created Exceptions to Mediation Confidentiality 
 
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal majority relied on the doctrine of 
estoppel to “prevent a litigant from tardily relying on mediation confidentiality to 
shield from the court facts which she had stipulated to be true and had extensively 
litigated without raising such bar.”  The dissenting opinion noted, however, that, 
“[b]y focusing on estoppel, the majority in essence is attempting to create a new 
exception to the comprehensive scheme.”  We agree with this latter 
characterization.   
 
On limited occasions, courts have crafted exceptions to mediation 
confidentiality and compelled mediators to testify in civil actions.  However, those 
instances are very limited.  In Rinaker v. Superior Court (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 
155, 167, the court compelled a mediator to testify because it found that a minor’s 
due process right to confrontation of witnesses outweighed the statutory right to 
mediation confidentiality.  In Olam v. Congress Mortgage Co. (N.D.Cal. 1999) 68 
 
14
F.Supp.2d 1110, 1118-1119, 1129, the parties themselves expressly waived 
confidentiality.  Because of this waiver, the court found that the policy driving 
mediation confidentiality had appreciably less force.  (Id. at p. 1133.)  
 
Except in cases of express waiver or where due process is implicated, we 
have held that mediation confidentiality is to be strictly enforced.  In Foxgate, we 
addressed the general validity of judicially crafted exceptions to mediation 
confidentiality.  (Foxgate, supra, 26 Cal.4th 1.)  There, the Court of Appeal found 
an exception to section 1119 that would allow a mediator to report a party’s failure 
to participate in good faith in the mediation process.  (Foxgate, supra, 26 Cal.4th 
at p. 9.)  We held that the Court of Appeal erred in judicially creating an exception 
to section 1119.  Distinguishing Rinaker and Olam, we noted that where a 
supervening due process right is not implicated or where no express waiver of 
confidentiality exists, judicially crafted exceptions to mediation confidentiality are 
not appropriate.  (Foxgate, at pp. 15-17.)  To this end, we announced that in order 
“[t]o carry out the [legislative] purpose of encouraging mediation by ensuring 
confidentiality, the statutory scheme . . . unqualifiedly bars disclosure of 
communications made during mediation absent an express statutory exception.”  
(Id. at p. 15, fn. omitted.)  Further, judicial construction of unambiguous statutes is 
appropriate only when literal interpretation would yield absurd results.  (Id. at p. 
14.)   
 
In deciding whether a judicial exception was appropriate to carry out the 
Legislature’s goals, we observed that with the enactment of the mediation 
confidentiality statutes, the Legislature contemplated that some behavior during 
mediation would go unpunished.  (Foxgate, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 17.)  The 
Legislature was also presumably aware that general sanctions statutes permit 
punishing bad faith conduct.  Considering this, we reasoned we were bound to 
respect the Legislature’s policy choice to protect mediation confidentiality rather 
 
15
than create a procedure that encouraged good faith participation in mediation.  
Thus, we held that evidence of a party’s bad faith during the mediation may not be 
admitted or considered.  (Ibid.)   
 
We subsequently reaffirmed that the mediation confidentiality statutes 
unqualifiedly bar disclosure of certain communications and writings produced in 
mediation absent an express statutory exception.  (Rojas v. Superior Court (2004) 
33 Cal. 4th 407 (Rojas).)  In Rojas, the Court of Appeal concluded that, like work 
product, certain derivative materials exchanged during mediation were 
discoverable on a good cause showing.  (Id. at p. 414.)  Rejecting this conclusion, 
we noted that section 2018 of the Code of Civil Procedure codified the good cause 
exception to the work product doctrine; the Legislature clearly knew how to enact 
a statutory good cause exception to the mediation confidentiality statutes, but it 
chose not to do so.  (Rojas, at p. 423.)  Furthermore, the Legislature has enacted 
other statutory exceptions to mediation confidentiality.  “ ‘Under the maxim of 
statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, if exemptions are 
specified in a statute, [courts] may not imply additional exemptions unless there is 
a clear legislative intent to the contrary.  [Citation.]’ ”  (Id. at p. 424.)  Finding no 
such intent, we concluded that judicial exceptions should not be read into 
Evidence Code section 1119.  (Rojas, at p. 424; Fair, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 194 
[reaffirming the disapproval of judicially crafted exceptions to the mediation 
confidentiality statutes].) 
 
Like Foxgate and Rojas, the present case does not implicate any due 
process right equivalent to the right bestowed by the confrontation clause of the 
United States Constitution, nor have the parties executed express waivers of 
confidentiality.  Thus, Rinaker and Olam are distinguishable, and their rationale 
inapplicable.  Instead, by creating fixed procedures that allow only certain 
evidence produced at mediation to be admitted in later civil proceedings, the 
 
16
Legislature was undeniably aware that some agreements made during mediation 
would not be enforceable.  The statutes thus reflect a policy judgment made by the 
Legislature when weighing the value of confidentiality.  Creating exceptions to 
admit evidence that does not meet statutory requirements would run contrary to 
legislative intent.  
 
3.  Estoppel 
 
Despite the clear legislative intent, the Court of Appeal majority 
nonetheless estopped the defendant from invoking mediation confidentiality 
because she herself used and did not object to plaintiffs’ use of evidence 
describing the events of mediation.  
 
The estoppel cases on which the Court of Appeal relied are inapt.  The 
majority concluded that, “once a party voluntarily declares certain facts to be true, 
stipulates that she does not dispute them and extensively litigates the legal effect 
of such facts, she is estopped to later claim that the court must disregard those 
facts based upon a belated assertion of mediation confidentiality.”  To support this 
statement, the majority opinion relied on Gee v. American Realty & Construction, 
Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1414, and Conservatorship of Kevin M. (1996) 
49 Cal.App.4th 79, 92.  These cases involved estoppel to contest jurisdiction.  That 
doctrine provides that when a court has subject matter jurisdiction over an action, 
“a party who seeks or consents to action beyond the court’s power as defined by 
statute or decisional rule may be estopped to complain of the ensuing action in 
excess of jurisdiction.”  (In re Griffin (1967) 67 Cal.2d 343, 347.)  
 
As Justice Aldrich noted in his dissent, defendant does not contest the 
jurisdiction of the court over the breach of contract matter.  Similarly, she did not 
use or initiate a procedure and then argue against its use in court.  Here, estoppel 
to contest jurisdiction does not apply; defendant never asked the court to act in 
 
17
excess of its jurisdiction and then argued that the court had no power to act as it 
did.  Instead, defendant consistently invoked the court’s jurisdiction throughout 
the litigation proceedings, maintaining that there was no enforceable settlement 
agreement either because substantively such agreement did not occur or because 
plaintiffs could not procedurally prove its existence.   
 
Like estoppel to contest jurisdiction, equitable estoppel also does not apply.  
A valid claim for equitable estoppel requires:  (a) a representation or concealment 
of material facts; (b) made with knowledge, actual or virtual, of the facts; (c) to a 
party ignorant, actually and permissibly, of the truth; (d) with the intention, actual 
or virtual, that the ignorant party act on it; and (e) that party was induced to act on 
it.  (13 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Equity, § 191, pp. 527-528.)  
There can be no estoppel if one of these elements is missing.  (Id. at p. 528.)  Here, 
plaintiffs were never ignorant of the facts, nor did they change their position in 
reliance on defendant’s position.  Thus, estoppel principles do not apply.   
 
4.  Waiver 
 
The Court of Appeal dissenting opinion more accurately portrays the 
substance of this case when it characterizes the majority’s decision as “a veiled 
attempt at relabeling waiver as estoppel.”  The facts of this case reveal that the real 
issue is whether a party can impliedly waive mediation confidentiality through 
litigation conduct.  Indeed, plaintiffs now argue in this court that defendant waived 
mediation confidentiality through her litigation conduct.   
 
Civil Code section 3513 makes the doctrine of waiver applicable to all 
rights and privileges that a person is entitled to, including those conferred by 
statute, unless otherwise prohibited by specific statutory provisions.  (OutBoard 
Marine Corp. v. Superior Court (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 30, 41.)  Thus, whether or 
 
18
not implied waiver applies to mediation confidentiality is ultimately an issue of 
statutory interpretation.   
 
In arguing that defendant impliedly waived mediation confidentiality, 
plaintiffs refer to language in Regents, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at page 1213, and 
Foxgate, supra, 26 Cal.4th at page 10, footnote 7.  In Regents, the court held that a 
party may waive mediation confidentiality through conduct.  In Foxgate, we 
simply described the Regents holding in a footnote without endorsing the Regents 
decision.  In revising the mediation confidentiality statutes, the Legislature cast 
doubt on Regents when it specifically rejected its holding.  Thus, these cases do 
not provide support to plaintiffs.  
 
Indeed, when interpreting the current mediation confidentiality statutes, at 
least one court has held that mediation confidentiality cannot be impliedly waived 
through conduct.  (Eisendrath v. Superior Court (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 351, 360-
365 (Eisendrath).)  In Eisendrath, a husband (plaintiff) and wife (defendant) 
agreed to undergo mediation of their divorce pursuant to the statutory rules set 
forth in section 1115 et seq.  (Eisendrath, at p. 354.)  The trial court entered 
judgment pursuant to the settlement reached at mediation, and the plaintiff filed a 
motion to correct or reform the judgment after both parties remarried.  (Id. at p. 
355.)  The defendant then sought to depose the mediator, and the plaintiff 
opposed, citing mediation confidentiality.  (Id. at p. 356.)  The trial court held that 
the plaintiff impliedly waived confidentiality by raising a claim about the 
agreement in court and revealing communications that had occurred at the 
mediation in his declaration.  (Id. at pp. 356-357.)  The plaintiff appealed.  (Id. at 
p. 357.) 
 
19
 
On appeal, the defendant argued that mediation confidentiality is akin to the 
evidentiary privileges laid out in section 910 et seq., privileges that section 912 
states may be waived by conduct.6  (Eisendrath, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 
357.)  Because the plaintiff raised the issue with his suit and in supporting 
declarations, the defendant argued he could not claim confidentiality.  (Ibid.)  The 
Court of Appeal concluded that the implied waiver provisions in section 910 et 
seq., by their plain language, are limited to the particular privileges enumerated 
therein and therefore do not extend to mediation confidentiality.  (Eisendrath, at p. 
363.) 
 
A court may not extend waiver provisions beyond their statutory existing 
limits.  (See Roberts v. City of Palmdale (1993) 5 Cal.4th 363, 373.)  Furthermore, 
courts may not add to statutory privileges except as required by federal and state 
constitutional law; nor may a court imply exceptions to existing statutory 
privileges.  (Ibid.)  Accordingly, Eisendrath correctly concludes that section 912 
cannot be expanded beyond its express limits. 
 
We must still determine whether the mediation confidentiality statutes 
themselves permit implied waiver.  Section 1122, the section dealing expressly 
with waiver, states that a communication made during mediation is not 
inadmissible if “[a]ll persons who conduct or otherwise participate in the 
mediation expressly agree in writing, or orally in accordance with Section 1118, to 
disclosure . . . .”  (§ 1122, subd. (a)(1), italics added.)  Furthermore, the 
Commission’s comments provide, “[s]ubdivision (a)(1) [of section 1122] states the 
                                              
6 
Such privileges include the lawyer-client privilege (§ 954); the privilege for 
confidential marital communications (§ 980); the physician-patient privilege (§ 
994); the psychotherapist-patient privilege (§ 1014); the clergymember-penitent 
privilege (§§ 1033, 1034); the sexual assault victim-counselor privilege 
(§ 1035.8); and the domestic violence victim-counselor privilege (§ 1037.5). 
 
20
general rule that mediation documents and communications may be admitted or 
disclosed only upon agreement of all participants, including not only parties but 
also the mediator and other nonparties attending the mediation . . . .  Agreement 
must be express, not implied.”  (Cal. Law Rev. Com., supra, foll. § 1122, p. 252, 
italics added.)  The comment continues, “For exceptions to Section 1122, see 
Sections 1123 (written settlement agreements reached through mediation) and 
1124 (oral agreements reached through mediation).”  (Ibid.)   
 
Because the language of section 1122 unambiguously requires express 
waiver, judicial construction is not permitted unless the statutes cannot be applied 
according to their terms or doing so would lead to absurd results, thereby violating 
the presumed intent of the Legislature.  (Foxgate, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 14.)  
Moreover, because the Legislature provided express exceptions to section 1119, 
“ ‘[u]nder the maxim of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius, . . . we may not imply additional exemptions unless there is a clear 
legislative intent to the contrary.  [Citation.]’ ”  (Rojas, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 
424.) 
 
Plaintiffs argue that allowing defendant to assert mediation confidentiality 
after litigating various pretrial motions would produce absurd results.  In 
Eisendrath, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at pages 363-364, the Court of Appeal 
concluded that judicial modification of the mediation confidentiality scheme was 
not required to prevent absurd results or to fulfill legislative intent.  On the facts of 
that case, the result was not absurd because without express waivers, neither the 
plaintiff nor the defendant could introduce evidence of what had happened at 
mediation.  (Ibid.)  However, the court also found that the result was not absurd on 
a more general level; the court remarked that Foxgate recognized that the 
mediation confidentiality statutes effectively give control over evidence of certain 
misconduct to the party engaged in the misconduct.  (Eisendrath, at p. 365.)  
 
21
Nonetheless, in Foxgate, we found it dispositive that “none of the confidentiality 
statutes currently make an exception for reporting bad faith conduct . . . when 
doing so would require disclosure of communications . . . .”  (Foxgate, supra, 26 
Cal.4th at p. 17.)  Accordingly, the Eisendrath court concluded, “[f]ollowing the 
Foxgate court, we assume that the Legislature considered these limitations on the 
presentation of evidence when it enacted the statutory scheme.”  (Eisendrath, 
supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 365.) 
 
Here, the clear language of the statutory scheme and other indications of 
legislative intent reflect that disallowing an implied waiver would not produce 
absurd consequences, but was rather an intended consequence.  First, as the court 
in Eisendrath noted, section 1119 sweeps broadly and renders all communications 
and writings made during mediation inadmissible except as otherwise specified in 
the statutes.  (Eisendrath, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 364.)  Section 1122 plainly 
states that mediation communications or writings may be admitted only on 
agreement of all participants.  Such agreement must be express, not implied.  We 
recognized that the Legislature intended section 1122 to give litigants control over 
whether a mediation communication will be used in subsequent litigation.  (See 
Rojas, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 423.)  However, the section does not limit this 
control other than as stated through sections 1123 and 1124.  (Cal. Law Rev. 
Com., supra, foll. § 1122, p. 252.)  Thus, the language of the statutory scheme 
reflects that it was intended to be complete. 
 
Section 912, regarding the waiver of privileges, further shows that the 
Legislature did not intend for implied waiver to apply to mediation confidentiality.  
Section 912 existed when the Legislature drafted section 1115 et seq.  In Foxgate, 
we noted that Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5 allowed a court to sanction 
bad faith behavior.  (Foxgate, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 17.)  Yet, we observed that 
no confidentiality statute made an exception for reporting bad faith conduct 
 
22
through the disclosure of mediation communications.  (Ibid.)  Similarly, the 
Legislature is capable of drafting statutes that allow for implied waivers of 
confidentiality through conduct, but it did not do so in section 1122 or anywhere 
within the mediation confidentiality statutes.  The Legislature is assumed to have 
considered the limitations on the presentation of evidence when it enacted the 
statutory scheme.  (See Foxgate, at p. 17.) 
 
Section 1115’s placement within the Evidence Code further supports the 
conclusion that implied waiver does not apply to mediation confidentiality.  
Unlike the privileges subject to implied waiver that are found in division 8, 
entitled “Privileges,” the Legislature placed section 1115 et seq. in division 9, 
entitled “Evidence Affected or Excluded by Extrinsic Policies.”  This placement 
reflects that the Legislature considered the specific limitations placed on the 
admissibility of evidence by the mediation confidentiality statutes and endorsed 
those limitations to encourage mediation as a matter of public policy. 
 
Finally, the legislative history of the mediation confidentiality statutes as a 
whole reflects a desire that section 1115 et seq. be strictly followed in the interest 
of efficiency.  By laying down clear rules, the Legislature intended to reduce 
litigation over the admissibility and disclosure of evidence regarding settlements 
and communications that occur during mediation.  (Recommendation on 
Mediation Confidentiality (Jan. 1997) 26 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1996) p. 
424.)  Allowing courts to craft judicial exceptions to the statutory rules would run 
counter to that intent.   
 
Both the clear language of the mediation statutes and our prior rulings 
support the preclusion of an implied waiver exception.  The Legislature chose to 
promote mediation by ensuring confidentiality rather than adopt a scheme to 
ensure good behavior in the mediation and litigation process.  The mediation 
statutes provide clear and comprehensive rules reflecting that policy choice.   
 
23
 
Here, the mediation confidentiality statutes made inadmissible all evidence 
of an oral contract between plaintiffs and defendant during mediation.  Thus, there 
was no evidence to prove plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim, and defendant was 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  However, plaintiffs may still pursue their 
medical malpractice cause of action before the trial court.   
III. DISPOSITION 
 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand the case to 
that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Simmons v. Ghaderi 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 143 Cal.App.4th 410 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S147848 
Date Filed: July 21, 2008 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Richard L. Fruin, Jr. 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Morrison & Foerster, Shirley M. Hufstedler, Sarvenaz Bahar; Reback, McAndrews & Kjar, Robert C. 
Reback and Melanie Shornick for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Law Office of Ivan K. Stevenson and Ivan K. Stevenson for Confidential Mediation & Dispute Resolution 
and Southern California Mediation Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
James R. Madison; Farbstein & Blackman and John S. Blackman for California Dispute Resolution 
Council as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Law Offices of James Aaron Pflaster, Martin R. Berman, Stephanie C. Pflaster and James Aaron Pflaster 
for Plaintiffs and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Shirley M. Hufstedler 
Morrison & Foerster 
555 West Fifth Street, Suite 3500 
Los Angeles, CA  90013-1024 
(213-892-5200 
 
Martin R. Berman 
Law Offices of James Aaron Pflaster 
11835 West Olympic Boulevard, Suite 1235 East 
Los Angeles, CA  90064 
(310) 445-3381