Title: WorldWide TechServices, LLC v. Commissioner of Revenue
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12328
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: February 22, 2018

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-12328 
 
WORLDWIDE TECHSERVICES, LLC  vs.  COMMISSIONER OF REVENUE 
& another1 (and three consolidated cases2). 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     November 7, 2017. - February 22, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Taxation, Abatement, Sales and use tax.  Practice, Civil, 
Abatement, Intervention.  Administrative Law, Intervention.  
Due Process of Law, Intervention in civil action. 
 
 
 
 
Appeal from a decision of the Appellate Tax Board. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Edward D. Rapacki for the intervener. 
 
John A. Shope (Michael Hoven also present) for the 
taxpayers. 
                     
 
1 Econo-Tennis Management Corp., intervener, doing business 
as Dedham Health and Athletic Complex. 
 
 
2 BancTec Third Party Maintenance, Inc. vs. Commissioner of 
Revenue & another; QualxServ, LLC vs. Commissioner of Revenue & 
another; and Dell Marketing L.P. vs. Commissioner of Revenue & 
another.  Banctec Third Party Maintenance, Inc., is now known as 
QualxServ Third Party Maintenance, Inc.; and QualxServ, LLC, is 
now known as WorldWide TechServices, LLC. 
2 
 
 
 
Daniel J. Hammond, Assistant Attorney General (Daniel A. 
Shapiro also present) for Commissioner of Revenue. 
 
Ben Robbins & Martin J. Newhouse, for New England Legal 
Foundation, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  Fifteen years and three Supreme Judicial Court 
decisions ago, this protracted case commenced regarding taxes 
imposed on computer service contracts.  The litigation began 
when purchasers of the service contracts filed a putative class 
action against the sellers,3 claiming under G. L. c. 93A that the 
imposition of these taxes was unlawful and an unfair and 
deceptive practice.  The sellers successfully moved to compel 
arbitration pursuant to the terms of the computer service 
contracts, and a judge in the Superior Court eventually 
confirmed the award.  The next chapter in this tax saga, and the 
one we are required to decide today, then ensued. 
 
For the sole and express purpose of hedging their bets in 
response to the class action, the sellers had applied for tax 
abatements from the Commissioner of Revenue (commissioner) 
beginning in 2004.  The commissioner denied the applications, 
and the sellers petitioned the Appellate Tax Board (board).  The 
appellant, Econo-Tennis Management Corp., doing business as 
Dedham Health and Athletic Complex (Dedham Health), one of the 
consumers who purchased these service contracts, moved to 
                     
 
3 We refer to BancTec Third Party Maintenance, Inc., 
QualxServ, LLC, and Dell Marketing L.P., the corporate appellees 
in the present litigation, collectively as the "sellers." 
3 
 
 
intervene in the proceedings, which the board allowed.  
Thereafter, the board, with certain exceptions, reversed the 
decision of the commissioner and allowed the abatements, 
ordering the parties to compute the amounts to be abated.  Taxes 
totaling $215.55 were imposed on the service contracts purchased 
by Dedham Health.4  After the class action litigation on the 
claims under G. L. c. 93A ended in the sellers' favor, the 
sellers withdrew their tax abatement petitions with prejudice.  
Dedham Health moved to strike the withdrawals.  The board denied 
the motion to strike the withdrawals and terminated the 
proceedings, deciding that "any pending or further motions . . . 
[were] moot" and that it would "take no further action on these 
appeals."  Dedham Health now appeals from that order.  We 
transferred Dedham Health's appeal to this court on our motion 
and now conclude that although the board did not err as a matter 
of law in allowing the sellers' withdrawals, the board's 
termination of the proceedings in their entirety, after 
permitting Dedham Health to intervene and allowing the 
abatements, was an error of law.  After the sellers' withdrawals 
were allowed, Dedham Health should have been allowed to proceed 
                     
 
4 The sellers note that the evidence in the record before 
the Appellate Tax Board (board) only reflects that Dedham Health 
paid a total of $45.60, not $215.55.  For the purposes of this 
opinion, we need not address this issue. 
4 
 
 
as an intervener on its own claim to recover the taxes imposed 
on the service contracts it purchased.5 
 
1.  Background.  The instant cases arise out of the same 
tax dispute at issue in Feeney v. Dell Inc., 454 Mass. 192 
(2009) (Feeney I); Feeney v. Dell Inc., 465 Mass. 470 (2013) 
(Feeney II); and Feeney v. Dell Inc., 466 Mass. 1001 (2013) 
(Feeney III).  As we summarized in Feeney I, supra at 194, "Dell 
Catalog Sales Limited Partnership (Dell Catalog) and Dell 
Marketing Limited Partnership (Dell Marketing), wholly owned 
subsidiaries of Dell Inc. (formerly Dell Computer Corporation), 
sold computers and related products to consumers and businesses 
and, in connection with such sales, also sold optional computer 
hardware service contracts under which [the sellers] agreed to 
provide onsite computer repairs to the purchasers."  Dell 
Catalog and Dell Marketing collected tax on the optional service 
contracts from their customers and remitted the tax to the 
Department of Revenue.  Id. at 194 & n.6.  Under these service 
contracts, "BancTech, Inc. . . . ; QualxServ LLC; or Dell 
Marketing agreed to provide onsite computer repairs to the 
purchasers."6  Id. at 194.  Dedham Health was one such consumer 
who purchased Dell computer hardware and the accompanying 
                     
 
5 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the New 
England Legal Foundation in support of the sellers. 
 
 
6 As noted in note 2, supra, the names of two of these 
companies have since changed. 
5 
 
 
service contracts.  Id.  Dedham Health asserted that the tax on 
the optional service contracts was improper.  Id. at 193. 
 
Dedham Health and one other plaintiff who bought Dell 
hardware and service contracts7 commenced a putative class action 
against Dell Computer Corporation (Dell Computer) in 2003, 
alleging that it had improperly collected and remitted tax on 
the service contracts that the plaintiffs purchased, and that 
collecting the tax violated the Massachusetts consumer 
protection act, G. L. c. 93A.  Id. at 193, 196.  "The 'Dell 
Terms and Conditions of Sale' . . . in effect at the time of the 
plaintiffs' purchases contain an arbitration clause compelling 
arbitration of any claim against Dell . . . and mandating that 
any such claims be arbitrated on an individual basis" (emphasis 
in original; footnote omitted).8  Id. at 194-195.  In July, 2003, 
                     
 
7 The other plaintiff was John A. Feeney, now deceased, who 
is not a party to the present litigation. 
 
 
8 The relevant portion of the "Dell Terms and Conditions of 
Sale" provides: 
 
 
"ANY CLAIM, DISPUTE, OR CONTROVERSY (WHETHER IN 
CONTRACT, TORT, OR OTHERWISE, WHETHER PREEXISTING, PRESENT 
OR FUTURE, AND INCLUDING STATUTORY, COMMON LAW, INTENTIONAL 
TORT AND EQUITABLE CLAIMS) AGAINST DELL, its agents, 
employees, successors, assigns or affiliates (collectively 
for purposes of this paragraph, 'Dell') arising from or 
relating to this Agreement, its interpretation, or the 
breach, termination or validity thereof, the relationships 
which result from this Agreement (including, to the full 
extent permitted by applicable law, relationships with 
third parties who are not signatories to this Agreement), 
Dell's advertising, or any related purchase SHALL BE 
6 
 
 
Dell Computer moved to compel arbitration, and a judge in the 
Superior Court allowed the motion.  Id. at 196-197.  "[The 
plaintiffs] each filed a claim of arbitration 'under protest' in 
November, 2004."  Id. at 197.  The arbitrator denied the 
plaintiffs' request for class certification, and ruled in favor 
of the defendants on the merits in 2007.  Id. at 198. 
 
"In February 2008, the plaintiffs moved in the Superior 
Court to vacate the arbitration award," but their motion was 
denied and the case was dismissed with prejudice.  Id.  The 
plaintiffs appealed, and we granted their application for direct 
appellate review.  Id.  In Feeney I, this court held that the 
arbitration clause was void as against public policy, and 
reinstated the Superior Court action.  Id. at 205, 214.  Less 
than two years later, the United States Supreme Court ruled in 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 351-352 (2011), 
that the Federal Arbitration Act precludes invalidating class 
waiver provisions in arbitration clauses on the basis of State 
public policy favoring class actions.  In response to 
Concepcion, we held in Feeney II that "a court may still 
                                                                  
RESOLVED EXCLUSIVELY AND FINALLY BY BINDING ARBITRATION 
ADMINISTERED BY THE NATIONAL ARBITRATION FORUM (NAF) under 
its Code of Procedure then in effect (available via the 
Internet at http://www.arb-forum.com, or via telephone at 
1-800-474-2371).  The arbitration will be limited solely to 
the dispute or controversy between Customer and Dell.  Any 
award of the arbitrator(s) shall be final and binding on 
each of the parties, and may be entered as a judgment in 
any court of competent jurisdiction." 
7 
 
 
invalidate a class waiver" post-Concepcion where, as here, 
"class proceedings are the only viable way for a consumer 
plaintiff to bring a claim against a defendant."  Feeney II, 465 
Mass. at 501-502.  One week later, the United States Supreme 
Court held in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 
570 U.S. 228, 238-239 (2013) (Amex), that an arbitration 
agreement's class waiver is enforceable even if the class waiver 
effectively precludes the plaintiff from vindicating his or her 
Federal statutory rights.  In light of the Supreme Court ruling 
in Amex, we held in Feeney III that the class waiver in the 
present case could not be invalidated for effectively denying 
the plaintiffs a remedy, and remanded the case to the Superior 
Court.  Feeney III, 466 Mass. at 1003. 
 
On remand, the Superior Court granted the sellers' motion 
to confirm the original arbitration award dismissing the 
plaintiffs' claims.  Feeney vs. Dell Inc., Mass. Superior Ct., 
No. 2003-01158 (Middlesex County Oct. 24, 2013).  The Appeals 
Court affirmed in a memorandum and order pursuant to its rule 
1:28, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 1137 (2015), and this court denied the 
plaintiffs' application for further appellate review in October, 
2015, ending the putative class action litigation. 
 
While the putative class action was still ongoing, the 
sellers brought abatement claims against the commissioner for 
the taxes collected on the service contracts.  The sellers 
8 
 
 
indicated in their abatement filings that they only sought 
abatement in the event that the class action litigation resulted 
in a judgment requiring the sellers to refund the taxes to their 
customers.  The sellers' filings stated that if they prevailed 
in the class action, they would withdraw their abatement 
applications. 
 
The commissioner denied the sellers' abatement requests.  
The sellers filed timely petitions with the board challenging 
the commissioner's denial of their abatement requests, and the 
petitions were consolidated.  In their petitions to the board, 
the sellers again emphasized that they sought abatement to 
protect against a possible judgment against them in the putative 
class action litigation. 
 
Dedham Health filed motions to intervene in the sellers' 
petitions before the board, arguing that it and "other similarly 
situated customers" were the "real parties in interest" because 
the customers were entitled to be refunded in the amount of any 
abatement paid out to the sellers.  Dedham Health also asserted 
that the commissioner prohibits customers from pursuing 
abatement claims themselves "where the challenged 'tax' was paid 
to, and remitted by, the seller."  However, Dedham Health did 
not ask for class action certification before the board because, 
as it conceded in its motion, "there is no procedure for 
certifying a class action to the [board]."  The board granted 
9 
 
 
Dedham Health's motions to intervene, concluding that it had 
alleged "sufficient facts . . . to support its claims that the 
parties may not be adequately representing Dedham Health's 
interests" and that Dedham Health had "a substantial interest in 
the subject matter of this litigation."  In allowing Dedham 
Health's intervention, the board noted that it "in no way 
extends or expands the limitations contained in G. L. c. 62C, 
§ 37," the statute that sets forth the procedure for pursuing 
abatement. 
 
The parties submitted a joint statement of facts and a 
joint evidentiary record to the board.  The board ruled in 
December, 2013, that, with certain exceptions, the transactions 
did not fall within the statutory or regulatory framework for 
taxation and thus the sellers had not been required to collect 
the taxes at issue, and were therefore entitled to an abatement 
of all such taxes they had remitted.  The board directed the 
parties to "compute the amounts to be abated based on the 
foregoing findings and rulings."  Because computing the 
abatement amounts would be a complex and expensive task, the 
board granted the sellers' motion to stay the board proceedings 
until all appeals in the putative class action litigation had 
been exhausted.9 
                     
 
9 As grounds for their motion to stay, the sellers cited the 
significant expenses they would incur to compute the abatement 
10 
 
 
 
After the final dismissal of the putative class action in 
favor of the sellers, the sellers withdrew all of their 
petitions before the board.  Dedham Health filed a motion to 
strike the sellers' withdrawals, arguing that allowing the 
withdrawals would leave consumers without a forum to pursue a 
tax refund.  In July, 2016, the board denied Dedham Health's 
motion to strike.  Instead, the board ordered the proceedings 
closed in light of the sellers' withdrawals, ruling that "any 
pending or further motions and discovery are moot."  The board's 
ruling did not include a rationale for its decision.  Dedham 
Health did not request findings and a report, available pursuant 
to G. L. c. 58A, § 13.10 
                                                                  
amounts, particularly in light of the sellers' anticipation that 
the Superior Court litigation would be resolved in their favor, 
at which time they intended to withdraw their petitions. 
 
 
10 The relevant portion of G. L. c. 58A, § 13, provides: 
 
 
"[T]he board shall make such findings and report 
thereon if so requested by either party within ten days of 
a decision without findings of fact and shall issue said 
findings within three months of the request . . . .  Such 
report may, in the discretion of the board, contain an 
opinion in writing, in addition to the findings of fact and 
decision.  If no party requests such findings and report, 
all parties shall be deemed to have waived all rights of 
appeal to the appeals court upon questions as to the 
admission or exclusion of evidence, or as to whether a 
finding was warranted by the evidence. . . .  The decision 
of the board shall be final as to findings of fact.  
Failure to comply with the time limits, as outlined above, 
shall not affect the validity of the board's decision." 
11 
 
 
 
On appeal, Dedham Health argues that the board (1) 
improperly denied Dedham Health's motion to strike the sellers' 
withdrawals, (2) incorrectly ruled that the withdrawals rendered 
all pending and future motions moot, and (3) violated Dedham 
Health's right to due process by terminating the proceedings.  
We examine each of these arguments in turn. 
2.  Discussion.  Pursuant to G. L. c. 58A, § 13, when the 
board issues a final order without findings of fact, within ten 
days a party may request that the board issue findings of fact 
and a report.  By failing to request findings and a report here, 
Dedham Health has "waived all rights of appeal . . . upon 
questions as to the admission or exclusion of evidence, or as to 
whether a finding was warranted by the evidence."  G. L. c. 58A, 
§ 13.  See Assessors of Lynn v. Zayre Corp., 364 Mass. 335, 338 
(1973).  Our review of the board's decision is therefore limited 
to pure questions of law that were not otherwise waived.  See 
Supermarkets Gen. Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 402 Mass. 
679, 681-682 (1988).  Thus, we can only rule in Dedham Health's 
favor if the board erred as a matter of law.  See id.  We review 
the board's conclusions of law de novo.  Regency Transp., Inc. 
v. Commissioner of Revenue, 473 Mass. 459, 464 (2016).  
"However, because the board is an agency charged with 
administering the tax law and has 'expertise in tax matters,' . 
. . we give weight to its interpretation of tax statutes, and 
12 
 
 
will affirm . . . if [the board's] interpretation is reasonable" 
(citations omitted).  AA Transp. Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 
454 Mass. 114, 119 (2009). 
a.  Withdrawal.  Dedham Health contends that the board 
erred in allowing the sellers to withdraw their petitions for 
abatement.  Dedham Health interprets the board's final order as 
being predicated on the board's assumption that it was required 
as a matter of law to accept the sellers' withdrawals and thus 
had no discretion to strike them.  On the basis of this 
assumption, Dedham Health asserts that the board did have 
discretion to strike the withdrawals, and that the board's 
failure to recognize its own discretion constituted an error of 
law. 
As discussed, the board's final order did not include an 
explanation for its ruling.  Because Dedham Health chose not to 
request findings of fact and a report, we do not know the basis 
for the board's decision.  The board may have either (1) decided 
it had discretion to accept or reject the withdrawals, and 
chosen in the exercise of that discretion to accept the 
withdrawals; or (2) decided it had to accept the withdrawals as 
it lacked discretion to reject them as a matter of law.  We 
cannot assume, in the absence of such findings and report, that 
the board's decision was made on the latter basis, rather than 
the former, as Dedham Health contends.  Having failed to request 
13 
 
 
findings and a report, Dedham Health is left only with the 
argument that the board's decision to accept the withdrawals was 
improper as a matter of law in these circumstances.  See 
Supermarkets Gen. Corp., 402 Mass. at 681-682. 
The board's rules expressly provide for withdrawals in 
certain circumstances: 
 
"When notice of the settlement of a pending appeal is 
received by the clerk from either party, unless a 
withdrawal of the petition or agreement for decision is 
filed forthwith, the clerk shall inform both parties or 
their attorneys by mail that the appeal should be disposed 
of by filing a withdrawal of the petition or agreement for 
decision according to the terms of the settlement" 
(emphasis added). 
 
831 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.21 (2007) (rule 1.21).  Thus, at least 
where formal settlements are reached, the board expects that 
withdrawals be filed to formally dispose of the petition.  While 
no such formal settlement has been reached and the withdrawals 
here were not filed pursuant to rule 1.21, the sellers 
effectively accepted the tax liability in its entirety, and 
thereby withdrew their petitions for abatement.  Rule 1.21 thus 
provides support for the allowance and the board's acceptance of 
the withdrawals in the instant matter. 
Prior decisions by this court have also recognized 
taxpayers' ability to withdraw and the board's ability to accept 
such withdrawals at various stages of administrative tax 
proceedings.  See D'Errico v. Assessors of Woburn, 384 Mass. 
14 
 
 
301, 309 (1981) ("plaintiff's remedy was to pursue his appeal 
from the decision of the [board], but he withdrew that appeal.  
This withdrawal . . . was perhaps an unfortunate tactical 
decision but not one which this court can undo"); O'Brien v. 
State Tax Comm'n, 339 Mass. 56, 61 (1959) ("Two of these [buses] 
were garaged in Massachusetts but these are not here involved 
for the applications for abatement of the excises with respect 
to them have been withdrawn").  See also AA Transp. Co., 454 
Mass. at 117 n.5.  Nor does Dedham Health argue otherwise; it 
contends only that the board had the discretion to strike the 
withdrawals, and did not recognize that it had such discretion.  
As explained above, Dedham Health waived that argument by not 
requesting findings and a report. 
Without such findings and a report, we cannot conclude as a 
matter of law that the board abused its discretion in allowing 
the sellers' withdrawals in these circumstances.  See O'Connor 
v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 384 Mass. 798, 799 
(1981) ("In the absence of either such a request or an 
indication from the District Court judge that he felt 
constrained to dismiss the notice of appeal because he thought 
such action to be mandatory, we conclude that the judge 
considered the dismissal to be a matter of discretion and 
further conclude that, if such dismissals are indeed 
discretionary, the challenged dismissal would not have amounted 
15 
 
 
to an abuse of discretion").  The proceedings had already gone 
on for thirteen years at that point; the putative class action 
lawsuit had ended in the sellers' favor; there were limited 
amounts of money at stake for individual purchasers; and only 
two plaintiffs had been identified in the class action, one of 
whom had died in the interim.11 
Finally, the board's prior decision allowing Dedham Health 
to intervene on its own behalf lends further support to the 
board's discretion to accept the sellers' withdrawals.  As an 
intervener, Dedham Health had rights separate from the sellers' 
rights.  Thus, the sellers' withdrawal, by itself, did not leave 
Dedham Health without a right or remedy.  We address those 
rights below. 
 
b.  Independent right to abatement.  Dedham Health asserts 
that, as an intervening party, it had an independent right to 
continue to litigate the abatement proceedings even after the 
sellers' withdrawal.  To determine Dedham Health's rights before 
the board, we look both to the statutory scheme of the tax in 
question and the rights the board provided Dedham Health as an 
intervener.  Commissioner of Revenue v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 406 
                     
 
11 We also conclude that it would have been within the 
board's discretion to deny the withdrawals, given the sellers' 
over-all responsibility for collecting and abating the tax, 
which, according to one filing by the commissioner, involved as 
much as $50 million and as many as 7 million to 10 million 
purchasers. 
16 
 
 
Mass. 466, 467-468 (1990) (abatement is created by statute, so 
board only has jurisdiction to extent prescribed by governing 
statute).  This task is made somewhat more complicated by the 
fact that the board never made an explicit finding as to whether 
the taxes at issue were sales taxes, under the purview of G. L. 
c. 64H, or use taxes, under the purview of G. L. c. 64I.12  We 
conclude that in these circumstances both statutory schemes 
place the legal responsibility for collecting and paying the 
taxes and seeking abatement on the sellers, leaving only limited 
rights to Dedham Health as an intervener. 
i.  Statutory rights.  In Massachusetts, sales and use 
taxes are designed as "complementary components of a unitary 
taxing program created to reach all transactions . . . in which 
tangible personal property is sold inside or outside the 
Commonwealth for storage, use, or other consumption within the 
Commonwealth."  Boston Tow Boat Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 366 
Mass. 474, 476-477 (1974).  The sales tax is imposed on retail 
purchases made inside the Commonwealth.  See G. L. c. 64H, § 2.  
The use tax, "designed to prevent loss of sales tax revenue from 
. . . out-of-State retail purchases," is imposed on retail 
purchases made outside the Commonwealth that are stored, used, 
or otherwise consumed in Massachusetts.  D & H Distrib. Co. v. 
                     
 
12 The interlocutory order of the board concluding that the 
taxes were unlawful refers to the taxes collectively as "sales 
and use taxes." 
17 
 
 
Commissioner of Revenue, 477 Mass. 538, 540 (2017).  See G. L. 
c. 64I, § 3.  The sales tax and the use tax are mutually 
exclusive, and the tax rate is identical.  Regency Transp., 
Inc., 473 Mass. at 462. 
Vendors are responsible for collecting and remitting the 
sales tax and therefore are the party entitled to seek 
abatement.  See G. L. c. 64H, § 3; First Agricultural Nat'l Bank 
of Berkshire County v. State Tax Comm'n, 353 Mass. 172, 179 
(1967), rev'd on other grounds, 392 U.S. 339 (1968).  By 
contrast, purchasers are generally responsible for payment of 
the use tax.  See G. L. c. 64I, § 3.  However, in practice 
purchasers "seldom remit use tax of their own volition, and are 
not likely even to be aware of the requirement."  D & H Distrib. 
Co., 477 Mass. at 540.  Rather, for applicable purchases outside 
Massachusetts from a vendor who conducts business in 
Massachusetts, the vendor is required to collect and remit the 
use tax, as it would a sales tax.  See G. L. c. 64I, § 4.13  See 
also G. L. c. 64H, § 3.  More specifically: 
                     
 
13 General Laws c. 64I, § 4, provides, in relevant part: 
 
 
"Every vendor engaged in business in the commonwealth 
and making sales of tangible personal property or services 
for storage, use or other consumption in the commonwealth 
not exempted under this chapter, shall at the time of 
making the sales, or, if the storage, use or other 
consumption of the tangible personal property or services 
is not then taxable hereunder, at the time the storage, use 
or other consumption becomes taxable, collect the tax from 
18 
 
 
"Vendors 'engaged in business in the commonwealth' who sell 
tangible personal property or services 'for storage, use or 
other consumption in the commonwealth' are required to 
collect the tax from the purchaser and give the purchaser a 
receipt, unless the 'storage, use, or other consumption' is 
not 'taxable' at the time of sale, in which case vendors 
are required to collect the tax when storage, use, or other 
consumption 'becomes taxable.'" 
 
Town Fair Tire Ctrs., Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 454 Mass. 
601, 606 (2009), quoting G. L. c. 64I, § 4.  In such instances 
where the vendor is required to collect the use tax, if the 
vendor fails to do so, the tax is "owed by the vendor to the 
commonwealth."  G. L. c. 64I, § 4.  See Town Fair Tire Ctrs., 
Inc., supra.14 
                                                                  
the purchaser and give the purchaser a receipt therefor in 
the manner and form prescribed by the commissioner.  The 
tax required to be collected by the vendor shall constitute 
a debt owed by the vendor to the commonwealth.  Such vendor 
shall collect from the purchaser the full amount of the tax 
imposed by this chapter, or an amount equal as nearly as 
possible or practicable to the average equivalent thereof; 
and such tax shall be a debt from the purchaser to the 
vendor, when so added to the sales price, and shall be 
recoverable at law in the same manner as other debts." 
 
 
14 Under both tax schemes, when added to the sales price, 
the amount taxed becomes a "debt from the purchaser to the 
vendor."  See G. L. c. 64H, § 3; G. L. c. 64I, § 4.  Both 
schemes include a "bad debt" provision, wherein "any vendor who 
has paid to the commissioner a tax for a sale on credit is 
'entitled' to reimbursement if the account 'is later determined 
to be worthless.'"  Household Retail Servs., Inc. v. 
Commissioner of Revenue, 448 Mass. 226, 229 (2007).  However, 
this provision is a mere "statutory courtesy," as the vendor is 
still legally responsible for paying the tax.  Id. at 230.  See 
Continental-Hyannis Furniture Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 366 Mass. 
308, 309 (1974) (prior to enactment of bad debt provision, 
vendor remained liable for sales tax even in instances where 
purchaser did not tender payment for tax). 
19 
 
 
Thus, where the vendor has collected and remitted the use 
tax, such that it mirrors the implementation of the sales tax, 
the vendor is legally responsible for the tax and becomes the 
party entitled to seek abatement.15 
Here, the taxes at issue were collected and remitted by the 
sellers, not Dedham Health.  Therefore, regardless of whether 
the taxes at issue were sales taxes or use taxes, the sellers 
were the party statutorily responsible for the payment of the 
tax and statutorily entitled to seek abatement, not Dedham 
Health.  This is true even though the economic burden of the 
taxes at issue were passed along to Dedham Health.  See First 
Agricultural Nat'l Bank of Berkshire County, 353 Mass. at 180 
("There is no necessary inconsistency between imposing the legal 
incidence of a tax upon the vendor, yet recognizing a statutory 
right in the vendor to shift the tax to the purchaser").  
Placing the legal responsibility for the tax on vendors is also 
in accord with the purpose of the tax scheme.  By making the 
vendors responsible, the Legislature adopted "what it believed 
to be the most efficacious method of ensuring the payment" of 
the tax.  Baker Transport, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 371 Mass. 
                                                                  
 
 
15 When abatement is sought for either tax, the vendor who 
collected the tax cannot, however, receive a refund until he or 
she demonstrates that "he [or she] has repaid to the purchaser 
the amount for which the application for refund is made."  G. L. 
c. 62C, § 37. 
20 
 
 
872, 875-876 (1977) (Legislature's decision to require tax 
payment prior to issuance or transfer of vehicle registration 
was intended to ensure taxes paid on all taxable sales of motor 
vehicles).  See First Agricultural Nat'l Bank of Berkshire 
County, supra at 178 ("practical considerations necessitate its 
collection and remission to the State by the vendor").  Because 
the vendor is already collecting the tax from the purchasers, 
placing the legal responsibility for collecting, paying, and 
abating the tax on the vendor is a logical way of administering 
the tax burden, such that the State does not have to pursue 
individual purchasers for payment. 
ii.  Intervener rights.  Although Dedham Health was not 
statutorily entitled to seek abatement here, the board allowed 
Dedham Health to intervene in the proceedings before the board.  
The sellers argue that such intervention violated the statutory 
scheme.  See A.W. Chesterton Co., 406 Mass. at 467-468, quoting 
Assessors of Boston v. Suffolk Law Sch., 295 Mass. 489, 492 
(1936) ("Since the remedy by abatement is created by statute 
[the board] has no jurisdiction to entertain proceedings for 
relief by abatement begun at a later time or prosecuted in a 
different manner than is prescribed by the statute").  We 
disagree. 
The board properly allowed the intervention in accordance 
with its own procedures.  Under 831 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.37 
21 
 
 
(2007), the "practice and procedure before the [b]oard shall 
conform to that heretofore prevailing in equity causes . . . 
prior to the adoption of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil 
Procedure."16  Prior to the adoption of the Massachusetts Rules 
of Civil Procedure in 1973, an intervener needed a "substantial 
interest in the subject matter of the original litigation" to 
intervene in an equity claim.  See D.J. Doyle & Co. v. Darden, 
328 Mass. 288, 290 (1952); Check v. Kaplan, 280 Mass. 170, 178 
(1932).  Here, the board determined that "Dedham Health has 
alleged sufficient facts relating to the subject matter of these 
appeals to support its claims that the parties may not be 
adequately representing [Dedham Health's] interests and 
therefore [Dedham Health has] a substantial interest in the 
subject matter of this litigation."  The board also correctly 
cited controlling authority in its order allowing Dedham Health 
to intervene.  See Check, supra. 
In these circumstances, where the board ordered an 
abatement, but where the sellers indicated they would withdraw 
from the abatement proceedings if the putative class action were 
dismissed, allowing Dedham Health to intervene was appropriate.  
The board correctly recognized that Dedham Health, as the 
purchaser whose money was used to pay the tax, had a substantial 
                     
 
16 This provision of the Code of Massachusetts Regulations 
also states that "substance and not form shall govern" in these 
proceedings.  831 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.37 (2007). 
22 
 
 
interest in the abatement and that the sellers had no intention 
or incentive to protect that interest.  Intervention was an 
appropriate means of protecting Dedham Health's substantial 
interest, while also respecting the statutory structure and the 
expertise of the board.  See Raytheon Co. v. Commissioner of 
Revenue, 455 Mass. 334, 337 (2009); French v. Assessors of 
Boston, 383 Mass. 481, 482 (1981) ("We have long recognized the 
board's expertise in tax matters"). 
As an intervener, Dedham Health became a party to the 
abatement proceedings entitled to protect its interest in the 
abatement.  See Spence v. Boston Edison Co., 390 Mass. 604, 611 
(1983); American Hoechest Corp. v. Department of Pub. Utils., 
379 Mass. 408, 410 (1980); Check, 280 Mass. at 178.  Cf. Mass. 
R. Civ. P. 24, 365 Mass. 769 (1974); Massachusetts Fed'n of 
Teachers, AFT, AFL-CIO v. School Comm. of Chelsea, 409 Mass. 
203, 205 (1991) (specifying conditions under which party has 
right to intervention); May v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 
553 F.2d 1207, 1208 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) ("Intervention 
in a proceeding before [the Tax Court] has been held to be 
within the sound discretion of the Tax Court").  Indeed, the 
board expressly rejected attempts to limit Dedham Health's role 
to that of an amicus allowed only to brief and argue before the 
board. 
23 
 
 
Both the sellers and the commissioner contend that Dedham 
Health has no right to recover the taxes it paid, as an 
intervener or otherwise, because Dedham Health did not file a 
request for abatement on its own.  They make this argument 
despite recognizing that such a request would have been denied 
and was thus futile.  See Sullivan v. Brookline, 435 Mass. 353, 
355 n.1 (200l) (where no administrative remedy exists, plaintiff 
is "not subject to any exhaustion requirement"); Massachusetts 
Bay Transp. Auth. v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 425 Mass. 253, 258 
(1997) (exhaustion not required where it would be futile).  
Indeed, the commissioner concedes that he would deny any such 
application, as would the board, because neither the 
commissioner nor the board recognizes a purchaser's right to 
seek abatement independently.  In other words, Dedham Health's 
other avenue of relief was to chase a separate ostensible 
"remedy" that would be denied as soon as it was pursued.  We do 
not find this argument compelling. 
The commissioner also suggests that Dedham Health could 
instead sue the sellers, relying on G. L. c. 64H, § 3 (a).  The 
commissioner's interpretation of G. L. c. 64H, § 3 (a), however, 
runs contrary to the plain meaning of this provision.  General 
Laws c. 64H, § 3 (a), requires the purchaser to reimburse the 
vendor for the sales tax that the vendor is statutorily required 
to remit to the Commonwealth.  It is designed to protect the 
24 
 
 
vendor by imposing a reimbursement requirement on the purchaser.  
As explained by the amicus:  "Nowhere does G. L. c. 64H, § [3 
(a),] mention or even suggest any right of action by the 
purchaser against the vendor." 
We recognize that Dedham Health's rights as an intervener 
were limited.  It did not have the same statutory powers and 
responsibilities as the sellers, and thus could not seek to 
displace the sellers or play an equivalent role in the abatement 
process.  The intervention order itself expressly stated that it 
"in no way extends or expands the limitations contained in G. L. 
c. 62C, § 37."  Dedham Health's rights were appropriately 
limited to defending its own interest in the abatement that 
applied to its own transactions.  It was not allowed or entitled 
to step into the sellers' shoes or to intervene, as Dedham 
Health suggests, as to the entirety of the sellers' tax 
abatement claims. 
Although these rights were limited, we conclude that their 
existence could not be entirely contingent on the sellers' 
decision whether to continue the abatement process, once it had 
begun.  In the instant cases, the board made this exact legal 
error.  It decided Dedham Health had a substantial interest in 
the abatement and a limited right to intervene to defend that 
interest, but as soon as the sellers filed their withdrawals, 
the board terminated the proceedings, eliminating both the 
25 
 
 
interest and the right.  In these circumstances, where the board 
had already found that the taxes were improperly imposed, it 
could not simply terminate the proceedings and leave Dedham 
Health without a remedy.  See Spence, 390 Mass. at 611; American 
Hoechest Corp., 379 Mass. at 410; Check, 280 Mass. at 178.  Cf. 
Mass. R. Civ. P. 24.  Dedham Health should have been permitted 
to proceed after the sellers' withdrawal to recoup the tax 
payment the board found had been unlawfully imposed on Dedham 
Health.  We therefore conclude that the board erred as a matter 
of law by instead choosing to terminate the proceedings after 
the sellers' unilateral withdrawal. 
c.  Due process.  Dedham Health also contends that 
terminating the abatement proceedings over its objection 
violates its constitutional right not to be deprived of property 
without due process of law.  Because we conclude that the board 
erred as a matter of law where it allowed Dedham Health to 
intervene and then took away that right and remedy when the 
sellers filed their withdrawals, we need not address this 
argument.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Disler, 451 Mass. 216, 228 (2008) 
("It is, of course, our duty to construe statutes so as to avoid 
such constitutional difficulties, if reasonable principles of 
interpretation permit it [citation and quotations omitted]); 
Textron Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 435 Mass. 297, 307 
(2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 986 (2002) ("As head of the 
26 
 
 
agency charged with administering the corporate excise tax 
statutes, the commissioner has lawful discretion . . . to 
interpret a statute in a manner that avoids potential 
constitutional issues"). 
3.  Conclusion.  For the reasons discussed above, we 
reverse the final order of the board and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.