Title: Commonwealth v. Cullity
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11728
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: February 24, 2015

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SJC-11728 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  TIMOTHY CULLITY. 
 
 
 
February 24, 2015. 
 
 
 
Controlled Substances.  Evidence, Constructive possession.  
Motor Vehicle.  Search and Seizure, Threshold police 
inquiry, Motor vehicle.  Threshold Police Inquiry.  
 
 
 
 
After a jury-waived trial in the District Court, Timothy 
Cullity was convicted of possession of a class B substance, 
namely, "PCP."  A panel of the Appeals Court concluded that the 
evidence at trial was insufficient to establish constructive 
possession and, in an unpublished decision pursuant to its rule 
1:28, reversed and directed the entry of judgment for Cullity.1  
Commonwealth v. Cullity, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 1121 (2014).  We 
allowed the Commonwealth's application for further appellate 
review, limited to issues concerning the sufficiency of the 
evidence.2  469 Mass. 1106 (2014).  We affirm. 
                     
1 The Appeals Court also ruled that Cullity's motion to 
suppress certain evidence was properly denied and that the 
police had probable cause to arrest him.  We do not disturb 
those rulings. 
 
2 The Commonwealth also argues that, where Cullity did not 
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence either at trial or on 
appeal, the Appeals Court improperly reversed on this ground sua 
sponte without inviting the parties to brief the issue.  While 
it is true that "findings based on legally insufficient evidence 
are inherently serious enough to create a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice," Commonwealth v. Hinds, 437 Mass. 54, 63 
2 
 
 
 
"In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we determine 
'whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found 
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt'" 
(emphasis in original).  Commonwealth v. Romero, 464 Mass. 648, 
652 (2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 
(1979).  "Proof of constructive possession requires the 
Commonwealth to show 'knowledge coupled with the ability and 
intention to exercise dominion and control."  Commonwealth v. 
Gonzalez, 452 Mass. 142, 146 (2008), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Boria, 440 Mass. 416, 418 (2003).  At issue here is the 
sufficiency of the evidence that Cullity intended to exercise 
dominion and control over a bag of PCP found in a vehicle in 
which he was a passenger.3 
 
 
The evidence at trial established the following.  The sole 
witness was State Trooper Nicholas Peter Fiore.  At about 7 P.M. 
on November 5, 2010, Fiore saw a motor vehicle with a broken 
headlight in Chelsea.  He stopped the vehicle, approached the 
driver's side door, and began speaking with the driver.  He 
immediately detected a "very strong odor of something that 
appeared to be . . . a freshly burnt substance" emanating from 
the vehicle.  Fiore requested the driver's license and 
registration; she eventually produced her license.  He also 
asked her about the odor, but she did not respond.  Cullity was 
in the front passenger's seat of the vehicle, without his 
seatbelt.  Fiore observed that he had watery, bloodshot eyes and 
that he appeared lethargic.  Fiore had to request Cullity's 
identification three times before Cullity was able to comply.  
After obtaining both Cullity's and the driver's identification, 
                                                                  
(2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1205 (2003), quoting Commonwealth 
v. Grandison, 433 Mass. 135, 140 n.8 (2001), the Appeals Court 
should not have proceeded in this manner.  Principles of 
fundamental fairness require that the Commonwealth have an 
opportunity to be heard before a conviction is reversed, 
especially where there is not plenary appellate review, and all 
the more so when the reversal is on a basis that does not permit 
retrial.  At a minimum, the Appeals Court should have requested 
supplemental briefing as to the sufficiency of the evidence 
before reversing on this ground. 
 
3 Cullity does not contend that the evidence was 
insufficient as to his knowledge of the contraband and ability 
to control it. 
 
3 
 
Fiore determined that both had suspended licenses.  He returned 
to the vehicle and ordered the driver to get out of it.  She was 
very unsteady on her feet and nearly fell over.  Fiore arrested 
her, placed her into his cruiser, and returned to the vehicle, 
where he saw a partially burnt "handmade cigarette" in plain 
view on the driver's seat.  Fiore ordered Cullity out of the 
vehicle, but had to repeat the order before Cullity complied.  
Fiore pat frisked Cullity for weapons and found none.  Fiore 
searched the vehicle and found numerous items that he believed 
to be related to drug use, including a metallic spoon with 
burned residue on it, cotton swabs, hypodermic needles and caps, 
and a clear plastic bag containing five smaller bags of a brown 
substance, which the parties stipulated was PCP.4  The brown 
substance emitted the same odor as the interior of the vehicle 
and the burnt handmade cigarette.  The clear plastic bag was 
found in the space between the front passenger's seat and the 
driver's seat, within inches of the passenger's seat.  Fiore 
arrested Cullity and advised him of the Miranda rights.  Cullity 
was transported to the State police barracks.  During the 
booking process, Cullity acknowledged having used PCP that 
evening.5 
 
 
In view of this evidence, the trial judge, as finder of 
fact, was amply warranted in finding that Cullity intended to 
exercise dominion and control over the PCP that was found in the 
vehicle.  While Cullity's presence in the vehicle would not be 
sufficient by itself to establish this intention, "presence, 
supplemented by other incriminating evidence, 'will serve to tip 
the scale in favor of sufficiency."  Romero, 464 Mass. at 653, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Albano, 373 Mass. 132, 134 (1977).  This 
is not a case of mere presence.  By Cullity's own admission, he 
had used PCP the evening he was arrested.  There were items in 
the vehicle highly suggestive of recent drug use.  Indeed, 
Fiore's observations of Cullity's appearance and behavior 
strongly suggest that Cullity was under the influence of PCP 
throughout the encounter.  A rational fact finder, including the 
                     
4 An evidence bag containing, among other things, the PCP 
and the partially burnt cigarette found in the vehicle was 
admitted as an exhibit at trial. 
 
5 The Appeals Court stated in its decision that it was 
unclear from the record when Cullity had used PCP.  However, 
Fiore's testimony that Cullity acknowledged having used PCP that 
evening, together with his observations about Cullity's 
condition at the time of the stop, clearly support an inference 
that Cullity had used PCP that evening. 
4 
 
trial judge, permissibly could find on this evidence that 
Cullity intended to use the PCP that was found in the vehicle.  
In sum, Cullity's intent to exercise dominion and control over 
the PCP was established beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
Dara Z. Kesselheim, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Jin-Ho King for the defendant.