Title: Ex parte Smith Wrecker Service, Inc., and Michael Frey. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: Horace Jackson and Nikko Bizzell v. Smith Wrecker Service, Inc., and Michael Frey)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1061696
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: December 21, 2007

REL: 12/21/2007
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
_________________________
1061696
_________________________
Ex parte Smith Wrecker Service, Inc., and Michael Frey
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  Horace Jackson and Nikko Bizzell
v.
Smith Wrecker Service, Inc., and Michael Frey)
(Wilcox Circuit Court, CV-07-32)
LYONS, Justice.
1061696
The plaintiffs styled their complaint with the name
1
"Niko" Bizzell, but the body of their complaint spells the
name "Nikko" Bizzell. Materials filed in the Supreme Court
carry both spellings.
2
Smith 
Wrecker 
Service, 
Inc., 
and 
Michael 
Frey
(hereinafter collectively referred to as "Smith Wrecker"), the
defendants in an action pending in the Wilcox Circuit Court,
petition this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the
Wilcox Circuit Court to vacate its order denying their motion
to transfer the action to Elmore County and to enter an order
granting the motion, because, Smith Wrecker argues, venue in
Wilcox County is improper.  In the alternative, Smith Wrecker
asks this Court to enter an order transferring this case to
the Elmore Circuit Court pursuant to § 6-3-21.1(a), Ala. Code
1975, the forum non conveniens statute.  We grant the petition
on the basis that venue is improper in Wilcox County and issue
the writ.
I. Factual Background
This action arises from the alleged wrongful acts and
omissions by Smith Wrecker in the sale of a vehicle to an
automobile dealer who then resold the vehicle to Horace
Jackson and Nikko  Bizzell.  Michael Frey, a resident of
1
Elmore County, owns Smith Wrecker Service, Inc., a towing-
1061696
From the materials filed in this Court, it is unclear who
2
purchased the vehicle.  The complaint alleges that Jackson
purchased the vehicle, while the facts as stated in the
petition for the writ of mandamus indicate that Jackson and
Bizzell purchased the vehicle.  Jackson and Bizzell's response
to the petition for the writ of mandamus states that they
3
service company whose sole office is in Elmore County.  On or
about May 17, 2006, the Elmore County Sheriff's Department
asked Smith Wrecker Service, Inc., to tow an abandoned vehicle
from the intersection of Highway 14 and Highway 111 in Elmore
County to the lot operated by Smith Wrecker Service, Inc.
Frey towed the vehicle to the lot, which is located in Elmore
County.  
In an effort to gain information about the vehicle, Smith
Wrecker Service, Inc., submitted an abandoned-motor-vehicle
record request to the State Department of Revenue.  The
Department of Revenue sent Smith Wrecker Service, Inc., a
response, which certified that the Department of Revenue files
reflected no record for the abandoned vehicle.  Smith Wrecker
Service, Inc., later auctioned the vehicle at its place of
business in Elmore County.  A local automobile dealer
purchased the vehicle at the auction and then resold the
vehicle to Horace Jackson and Nikko Bizzell, residents of
Elmore County.  
2
1061696
agree with the assertion of the material facts in the
petition. 
4
A policeman for the City of Pine Hill later pulled over
the vehicle, which Bizzell was driving, in Wilcox County.  A
routine computer search of the vehicle-identification number
indicated that the vehicle was stolen.  The policeman then
arrested Bizzell on a charge of possessing stolen property.
Bizzell was held in the Pine Hill city jail in Wilcox County
for two days.
Jackson and Bizzell brought an action against Smith
Wrecker in Wilcox County, alleging negligence, fraud, and
deceptive trade practices by Smith Wrecker based on Smith
Wrecker's failure to ascertain before selling the vehicle to
a third party that it was a stolen vehicle.  Smith Wrecker
moved to dismiss the claims pursuant to Rules 12(b)(7) and
19(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., for failure to join as an
indispensable party the automobile dealer who sold the vehicle
to Jackson and Bizzell.  In the event the court did not
dismiss the claims, Smith Wrecker also moved to transfer the
case to Elmore County pursuant to Rules 12(b)(3) and 82(d)(1),
Ala. R. Civ. P., arguing that venue is improper in Wilcox
County.  In the alternative, Smith Wrecker argued that the
1061696
5
convenience of the parties and witnesses and the furtherance
of justice require transfer of the action to Elmore County
pursuant to § 6-3-21.2, Ala. Code 1975, the forum non
conveniens statute.  After a hearing on Smith Wrecker's motion
to dismiss or, in the alternative, to transfer the case, the
trial court denied the motion.  Smith Wrecker timely
petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus. 
 
II. Standard of Review
"In Ex parte National Security Insurance Co.,
727 So. 2d 788, 789 (Ala. 1998), this Court
described the manner of obtaining review of the
denial of a motion for a change of venue in a civil
action and the scope of this Court's review:
"'The proper method for obtaining
review of a denial of a motion for a change
of venue in a civil action is to petition
for the writ of mandamus.  Lawler Mobile
Homes, Inc. v. Tarver, 492 So. 2d 297, 302
(Ala. 1986).  "Mandamus is a drastic and
extraordinary writ, to be issued only where
there is (1) a clear legal right in the
petitioner to the order sought; (2) an
imperative duty upon the respondent to
perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so;
(3) the lack of another adequate remedy;
and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of
the court."  Ex parte Integon Corp., 672
So. 2d 497, 499 (Ala. 1995).  "When we
consider a mandamus petition relating to a
venue ruling, our scope of review is to
determine if the trial court [exceeded] its
discretion, i.e., whether it exercised its
discretion in an arbitrary and capricious
1061696
6
manner."  Id.  Our review is further
limited to those facts that were before the
trial court.  Ex parte American Resources
Ins. Co., 663 So. 2d 932, 936 (Ala.
1995).'"
Ex parte ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., 933 So. 2d 343, 344-45 (Ala.
2006).  
III. Analysis
Smith Wrecker's contention that Wilcox County is an
improper venue cannot be sustained unless venue in Wilcox
County is improper as to both Frey and Smith Wrecker Service,
Inc.  If venue in Wilcox County is proper as to either one of
them, then, under the concept of pendent venue, venue is
proper as to both of them.  See Rule 82(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.
("Where several claims or parties have been joined, the suit
may be brought in any county in which any one of the claims
could properly have been brought.").  We address the issues in
light of § 6-3-2, Ala. Code 1975 ("Venue of actions -- Against
individuals"), § 6-3-7, Ala. Code 1975 ("Venue of actions --
Against foreign and domestic corporations"), and § 8-19-10(c),
Ala. Code 1975 (venue of actions alleging deceptive trade
practices). 
1061696
7
A. § 6-3-2, Ala. Code 1975 ("Venue of Actions -- Against
Individuals")
Smith Wrecker argues that venue in Wilcox County is
improper as to Frey under § 6-3-2(a), Ala. Code 1975.  Section
6-3-2(a) establishes venue for a civil action against an
individual:
"(a) In proceedings of a legal nature against
individuals:
"(1) All actions for the recovery of
land, of the possession thereof or for a
trespass thereto must be commenced in the
county where the land or a material part
thereof lies.
"(2) All actions on contracts, except
as may be otherwise provided, must be
commenced in the county in which the
defendant or one of the defendants resides
if such defendant has within the state a
permanent residence.
"(3) All other personal actions, if
the defendant or one of the defendants has
within the state a permanent residence, may
be 
commenced 
in 
the 
county 
of 
such
residence or in the county in which the act
or omission complained of may have been
done or may have occurred."
We agree with Smith Wrecker's contention that, so far as the
claims against Frey are concerned, only § 6-3-2(a)(3) applies,
because negligence and fraud claims are classified as personal
1061696
Jackson and Bizzell did not allege in their complaint
3
that 
Bizzell 
had 
suffered 
any 
"bodily 
injury" 
while
incarcerated in Wilcox County.  However, in their reply to
Smith Wrecker's motion to transfer, they assert that "injury
from false imprisonment is an injury to the person and does
constitute bodily injury" and that venue in Wilcox County is
therefore proper.
8
actions when determining proper venue. See Ex parte Mitchell,
690 So. 2d 356, 358 (Ala. 1997).  Smith Wrecker argues that
under § 6-3-2(a)(3) venue in Wilcox County is improper because
Frey is a resident of Elmore County and all the alleged acts
and omissions complained of in the negligence, fraud, and
deceptive-trade-practices claims against Frey occurred in
Elmore County.  Smith Wrecker asserts that Frey had no contact
with Wilcox County and that his only act related to Jackson
and Bizzell's claims was towing the abandoned vehicle from the
shoulder of a highway in Elmore County to the lot operated by
Smith Wrecker Service, Inc., in Elmore County.
Jackson and Bizzell argue that venue is proper as to Frey
in Wilcox County under § 6-3-2(a)(3) because, they say, Frey's
alleged wrongful acts and omissions caused "bodily injury" to
Bizzell in Wilcox County.    Jackson and Bizzell rely on Ex
3
parte Haynes Downard Andra & Jones, LLP, 924 So. 2d 687, 693
(Ala. 2005).  They argue that this Court in Ex parte Haynes
1061696
9
Downard "interpreted the wrongful 'act or omission' of the
Ala. Code § 6-3-2(a)(3)" and then, in a quote attributed to Ex
parte Haynes Downard, recite: "'In personal injury actions
where the defendant's wrongful act or omission causes bodily
harm to the plaintiff, the injury occurs in the county where
the bodily harm occurs.'"  Response to petition, p. 8 (quoting
Ex parte Haynes Downard, 924 So. 2d at 693).  However, in Ex
parte Haynes Downard this Court did not consider § 6-3-
2(a)(3).  The quotation in Jackson and Bizzell's response to
the petition dealing with venue in personal-injury actions and
attributed to Ex parte Haynes Downard appears in Ex parte
Haynes Downard only as a portion of a longer quotation from Ex
parte Graham, 634 So. 2d 994, 997 (Ala. 1993).  In Ex parte
Graham, this Court dealt with the precursor statute to §
6-3-7, Ala. Code 1975, which governs venue in actions against
corporations.  It provided: "[A]ll actions against a domestic
corporation for personal injuries must be commenced in the
county where the injury occurred or in the county where the
plaintiff resides if such corporation does business by agent
in the county of the plaintiff's residence." (Emphasis added.)
Suffice it to say that Jackson and Bizzell's argument is based
1061696
10
upon what can charitably be described as at least an
inaccurate representation of this Court's holding in Ex parte
Haynes Downard.
The complaint does not charge Smith Wrecker with
participating in Bizzell's arrest and the seizure of the
vehicle in Wilcox County; those acts are described only as
consequences of the acts or omissions that took place in
Elmore County.  Therefore, none of the alleged acts or
omissions of Smith Wrecker occurred in Wilcox County, and
venue is improper in Wilcox County as to Frey under § 6-3-
2(a)(3).  See Ex parte Pikeville Country Club, 844 So. 2d
1186, 1189 (Ala. 2002) ("Insofar as Green [an individual as to
whom venue was governed by § 6-3-2(a)(3)] is concerned, it
would be illogical and inconsistent to conclude that his 'act
or omission' occurred anywhere other than in Marion County,
from where he mailed the letter made the basis of this action.
Hugghins's alleged reliance on that letter in Covington County
is not the 'act or omission' of Green.").  
B. § 6-3-7, Ala. Code 1975 ("Venue of Actions -- Against
Foreign and Domestic Corporations")
1061696
11
Smith Wrecker argues that venue in Wilcox County is
improper as to Smith Wrecker Service, Inc., under § 6-3-7(a),
Ala. Code 1975.  Section 6-3-7(a) sets forth venue for a civil
action against corporations:
"(a) All civil actions against corporations may
be brought in any of the following counties:
"(1) 
In 
the 
county 
in 
which 
a
substantial part of the events or omissions
giving rise to the claim occurred, or a
substantial part of real property that is
the subject of the action is situated; or
"(2) 
In 
the 
county 
of 
the
corporation's principal office in this
state; or
"(3) In the county in which the
plaintiff resided, or if the plaintiff is
an entity other than an individual, where
the plaintiff had its principal office in
this state, at the time of the accrual of
the cause of action, if such corporation
does business by agent in the county of the
plaintiff's residence; or
"(4) If subdivisions (1), (2), or (3)
do not apply, in any county in which the
corporation was doing business by agent at
the time of the accrual of the cause of
action."
Smith Wrecker argues that Wilcox County does not fall
within any of these four categories because, it says, (1) the
sale of the vehicle in Elmore County gave rise to all of
1061696
12
Jackson and Bizzell's claims, (2) the sole office of Smith
Wrecker Service, Inc., is in Elmore County, (3) Jackson and
Bizzell are Elmore County residents, and (4) Smith Wrecker
Service, Inc., does not conduct, and has not conducted,
business in Wilcox County.  In Ex parte Suzuki Mobile, Inc.,
940 So. 2d 1007, 1009-10 (Ala. 2006), this Court noted that
under § 6-3-7, "the inquiry is not the location of the injury,
but the location of the events or omissions giving rise to the
claim."  As we explained in Ex parte Suzuki:
"Frennea's argument focuses on the fact that his
son's injuries occurred in Choctaw County.  Under §
6-3-7, as it read before an amendment effective July
24, 1999, that fact would have been dispositive.2
Now, however, the inquiry is not the location of the
injury, but the location of the events or omissions
giving rise to the claim.  Applying our holding in
Ex parte Pikeville Country Club, 844 So. 2d 1186
(Ala. 2002), to the facts of this case, we conclude
that the events or omissions giving rise to
Frennea's claim did not occur in Choctaw County, as
is necessary for venue to be proper there under §
6-3-7(a)(1).
__________
"Before the 1999 amendment, the relevant part
2
of the statute stated that 'all actions against a
domestic corporation for personal injuries must be
commenced in the county where the injury occurred
....'"
Id.  Smith Wrecker asserts that Smith Wrecker Service, Inc.,
did not engage in any of the acts or omissions in Wilcox
1061696
Section 6-3-7(c) provides: 
4
"Anything to the contrary in Rule 82(c) of the
Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure notwithstanding, in
any action against a corporation, venue must be
proper as to each and every named plaintiff joined
in the action, unless the plaintiffs shall establish
that they assert any right to relief jointly,
severally, or arising out of the same transaction or
occurrence and that the existence of a substantial
number of questions of law or material fact common
to all those persons not only will arise in the
action, but also: (1) that such questions will
predominate over individualized 
questions 
pertaining
to each plaintiff; (2) the action can be maintained
more efficiently and economically for all parties
than if prosecuted separately; and (3) that the
interest of justice supports the joinder of the
parties as plaintiffs in one action. If venue is
improper for any plaintiff joined in the action,
then the claim of any such plaintiff shall be
severed and transferred to a court where venue is
proper. In the event severance and transfer is
mandated and venue is appropriate in more than one
court, 
a 
defendant 
sued 
alone 
or 
multiple
defendants, by unanimous agreement, shall have the
right to select such other court to which the action
shall be transferred and, where there are multiple
13
County that gave rise to Jackson and Bizzell's claims and that
Bizzell's alleged injuries in Wilcox County are not material
to a determination of venue.
Jackson and Bizzell do not rebut Smith Wrecker's
assertion that venue in Wilcox County is improper under § 6-3-
7(a).  Instead, Jackson and Bizzell argue that venue is proper
in Wilcox County under § 6-3-7(c)  to all of their claims
4
1061696
defendants who are unable to agree upon a transferee
court, the court in which the action was originally
filed may transfer the action to any such other
court. Transfer of the action and notice thereof
shall be in accord with Section 6-3-22."
14
because venue is proper in Wilcox County to Bizzell's claims
of bodily injury.  However, as we determined above, venue in
Wilcox County is improper as to Bizzell's claims; therefore,
we do not reach the effect of bodily injury.
We conclude that venue in Wilcox County is improper under
§ 6-3-7(a) because the event giving rise to Jackson and
Bizzell's claims -- the sale of the vehicle -- occurred in
Elmore County, and it is undisputed that Smith Wrecker has
conducted no business in Wilcox County.
C.  § 8-19-10(c), Ala. Code 1975 (Venue of Actions Alleging
Deceptive Trade Practices)
Smith Wrecker also asserts that Elmore County is the only
proper venue for Jackson and Bizzell's deceptive-trade-
practices claim because it conducts business only in and
around Elmore County.  Section 8-19-10(c), Ala. Code 1975,
provides that a deceptive-trade-practices claim "may be
brought in the circuit court for the county in which the
defendant resides, has his/her principal place of business, is
1061696
15
doing business, or committed the unlawful act or practice."
Because it is undisputed that Michael Frey is a resident of
Elmore County, the sole office of Smith Wrecker Service, Inc.,
is in Elmore County, Smith Wrecker Service, Inc., has not
conducted business in Wilcox County, and that any act by Smith
Wrecker occurred in Elmore County, we conclude that Wilcox
County is an improper venue for Jackson and Bizzell's
deceptive-trade-practices claim.
IV. Conclusion
Because Jackson and Bizzell filed the action in Wilcox
County, an improper venue, and because Elmore County, the
venue proposed by Smith Wrecker, is a proper venue, we
conclude that Smith Wrecker has demonstrated a clear legal
right to the requested relief.  Because of our holding on the
venue issue, we need not reach the question whether Smith
Wrecker was also entitled to the transfer on the basis of
forum non conviens.  We grant Smith Wrecker's petition and
issue the writ of mandamus, directing the trial court to
vacate its order denying Smith Wrecker's motion to transfer
this case from the Wilcox Circuit Court to the Elmore Circuit
1061696
16
Court and to enter an order transferring the case to the
Elmore Circuit Court.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Cobb, C.J., and Stuart, Bolin, and Murdock, JJ., concur.