Title: OFFICE PLANNING GROUP INC V BARAGA-HOUGHTON-KEWEENAW CHILD DEVELO
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 125448
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: June 8, 2005

Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
OFFICE PLANNING GROUP, INC., 
FILED JUNE 8, 2005 
Plaintiffs-Appellee, 
v 
No. 125448 
BARAGA-HOUGHTON-KEWEENAW 
CHILD DEVELOPMENT BOARD, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
_______________________________ 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
YOUNG, J.   
Plaintiff 
is 
a 
disappointed 
bidder 
that 
seeks 
disclosure from defendant of bid documents under 42 USC 
9839(a), a provision of the federal Head Start Act1 that 
requires Head Start agencies to provide for “reasonable 
public access” to information. 
Defendant Head Start 
agency contends that the act does not create a private 
cause of action to enforce its provisions. 
We hold that 
the Head Start Act does not contemplate a private cause of 
action seeking disclosure of the contested bid documents 
under § 9839(a). 
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of 
1 42 USC 9831 et seq. 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
the Court of Appeals and enter judgment in favor of 
defendant. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Defendant, Baraga-Houghton-Keweenaw Child Development 
Board, Inc., is a private, nonprofit organization that is 
designated as a Head Start2 agency under 42 USC 9836(a).3 
Defendant 
operates 
Head 
Start 
programs 
in 
Baraga, 
Houghton, and Keweenaw counties. 
In January 2001, 
defendant 
solicited 
bids 
for 
office 
supplies 
and 
furniture. 
Plaintiff, a private, for-profit corporation, 
submitted a bid. 
Defendant conducted an open meeting at 
which its building committee reviewed the bids and made a 
recommendation to its board of directors. 
Defendant 
2 See section III(A) of this opinion. 
3 42 USC 9836(a) provides: 
The Secretary [of Health and Human Services]
is authorized to designate as a Head Start agency
any local public or private nonprofit or for­
profit agency, within a community, which (1) has
the power and authority to carry out the purposes
of this subchapter [42 USC 
9831 et seq.] and
perform the functions set forth in section 642
[42 USC 
9837] within a community; and (2) is
determined by the Secretary (in consultation with
the 
chief 
executive 
officer 
of 
the 
State 
involved, if such State expends non-Federal funds
to carry out Head Start programs) to be capable
of 
planning, 
conducting, 
administering, 
and 
evaluating, 
either 
directly 
or 
by 
other 
arrangements, a Head Start program. 
2  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
accepted the lowest bid at the open meeting. 
Rodney 
Liimatainen, 
defendant’s 
executive 
director, 
notified 
plaintiff’s branch manager, Jack Hamm, that plaintiff’s 
bid had exceeded the lowest bid by $10,000. 
Hamm, suspicious that the lower bidders had offered 
lesser-quality merchandise, requested copies of all the 
bids submitted. 
Liimatainen informed Hamm that the 
details of the bids were unavailable for inspection by the 
public because the other bidders did not want the 
information 
disseminated. 
Liimatainen 
acknowledged, 
however, that there might be small discrepancies in 
quality, manufacturer, and type of product among the bids 
submitted. 
In an attempt to compel defendant to disclose 
copies of the bids, Hamm then submitted written requests 
to defendant under the Michigan Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA).4  Defendant refused the requests on the basis that 
it was a private corporation that was not subject to the 
FOIA. 
Plaintiff also requested copies of the submitted 
bids from the Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS), the federal agency responsible for administering 
the Head Start Act. 
4 MCL 15.231 et seq. 
3  
 
 
  
                                                 
 
In April 2001, plaintiff filed an action under the 
FOIA5 demanding a complete copy of each bid. 
Plaintiff 
later filed an amended complaint alleging that it was 
additionally entitled to disclosure of the bid information 
under unspecified “federal legislation which requires 
disclosure of information by parties supplying service 
under the so-called Head Start Program.” 
In subsequent 
motion papers, plaintiff indicated that the federal 
legislation on which it relied was 42 USC 9839(a), which 
provides, in relevant part: 
Each [Head Start] agency shall also provide
for reasonable public access to information,
including public hearings at the request of 
appropriate 
community 
groups 
and 
reasonable 
public access to books and records of the agency
or other agencies engaged in program activities
or operations involving the use of authority or 
funds for which it is responsible. 
After the commencement of the litigation, various HHS 
officials issued memoranda indicating that defendant was 
not required under the FOIA or the Head Start Act to 
provide plaintiff with access to the bid information. 
In 
a letter to defendant, a program officer in the Chicago 
regional office of the HHS advised defendant that Head 
5 
Although 
the 
trial 
court 
treated 
plaintiff’s
complaint as if it contained a claim under the federal
Freedom of Information Act, 5 USC 551 et seq., the parties
agree that plaintiff’s claim was based solely on the
Michigan FOIA. 
4  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
Start grantees are not subject to the FOIA provisions. 
The program officer further noted that, under § 9839(a) 
and its corresponding HHS regulation, 45 CFR 1301.30,6 
defendant 
was 
not 
required 
to 
disclose 
specific 
information regarding the selection of a supplier; rather, 
it was required only to disclose general information such 
as copies of its written procurement procedures. 
Similarly, in a letter to plaintiff’s counsel, the 
director of the HHS Office of Public Affairs, FOI/Privacy 
Acts Division, stated that the FOIA did not apply to 
defendant; however, the director noted that defendant had 
provided plaintiff with a copy of the policy it followed 
in 
conducting 
its 
procurement 
activities 
and 
with 
background documents addressing its source of funding. 
The director also wrote a letter advising defense 
counsel that defendant was not subject to the requirements 
of the federal Freedom of Information Act.7  The director 
6 45 CFR 1301.30 provides: 
Head Start agencies and delegate agencies
shall conduct the Head Start program in an 
effective and efficient manner, free of political
bias or family favoritism. 
Each agency shall
also 
provide 
reasonable 
public 
access 
to 
information 
and 
to 
the 
agency's 
records 
pertaining to the Head Start program. 
[Emphasis
supplied.] 
7 5 USC 551 et seq. 
5  
 
 
further advised counsel that defendant was bound by any 
provisions incorporated into the grant language regarding 
its 
obligations 
to 
make 
information 
concerning 
its 
activities available to the public, but that defendant had 
already complied with those requirements. 
Finally, in a letter written to Congressman Bart 
Stupak, who had apparently come to plaintiff’s aid in 
seeking the bid documents, the director of the HHS Office 
of Family and Child Development stated that defendant had 
reasonably complied with the requirements of § 9839 and 45 
CFR 1301.30 by providing plaintiff with a copy of its 
procurement procedures, and that defendant was under no 
further obligation to provide documents with specific 
commercial information it received through the competitive 
bid process. 
Citing these HHS memoranda, defendant moved for 
summary disposition, arguing that it was not subject to 
the Michigan FOIA or the federal FOIA and that defendant 
had exceeded any obligation it had to supply plaintiff 
with information under 42 USC 9839(a). 
The trial court granted defendant’s motion for 
summary disposition to the extent that plaintiff sought 
6  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
  
relief under the Michigan FOIA and the federal FOIA.8  The 
court, however, sua sponte granted summary disposition in 
favor of plaintiff under MCR 2.116(I)(2) on the ground 
that the requested information was subject to disclosure 
under § 9839(a). 
The court, observing that § 9839(a) 
required that a Head Start agency grant “reasonable public 
access” to its books and records, opined that 
[a] demand that information be provided outside
of working hours would not be reasonable. 
A 
demand that an agency exhaustively search for
something 
that 
the 
requesting 
party 
cannot 
properly identify would not be reasonable. 
As 
recognized by the Michigan Freedom of Information
Act, it would likely not be reasonable to expect
an 
agency 
to 
create 
a 
record, 
such 
as 
a 
compilation or summary, when no such record 
exists. 
And it may well not be reasonable to
demand that an employee’s personnel file or 
disciplinary record be disclosed. 
In the present situation, a denial by the
Plaintiff 
of 
a 
written 
request 
to 
review 
specified, 
existing 
and 
readily 
accessible 
written bids is certainly not compliant with a
requirement 
of 
providing 
reasonable 
public
access. 
That would be true regardless of who
made the request, but the case is even more
compelling when the requesting party has a 
genuine, identifiable reason for the information
sought, as did the Plaintiff. 
In 
summary, 
Defendant’s 
denial 
of 
Plaintiff’s request to review and obtain copies
of the bids in question was in violation of the
Federal requirement that Plaintiff provide for
reasonable 
public 
access 
to 
information,
including reasonable public access to books and 
8 See note 5. 
Plaintiff’s FOIA claims are not at 
issue in this appeal. 
7  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
records of the agency, involving the use of funds
for which the Plaintiff is responsible. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed.9  Noting that the state 
courts shared concurrent jurisdiction to decide a case 
involving the Head Start Act because the act did not 
provide for exclusive federal jurisdiction,10 the panel 
rejected the reasoning of federal case law holding that 
the Head Start Act does not provide a private cause of 
action.11  The panel, citing Long v Chelsea Community Hosp, 
219 Mich App 578; 557 NW2d 157 (1996), and Forster v 
Delton School Dist, 176 Mich App 582, 585; 440 NW2d 421 
(1989), held that a private cause of action could be 
inferred under § 9839(a) because the statute did not 
provide adequate means to enforce its provisions: 
The statute in question, 42 USC 9839(a),
requires 
Head 
Start 
agencies 
to 
provide
reasonable public access to their books and 
records, but it does not provide any means of
enforcing this specific provision. 
Although the
Head Start Act requires agencies to open their 
books and records to the department secretary or
the United States Comptroller General for audit 
9 
Office Planning Group, Inc v Baraga-Houghton-
Keweenaw Child Dev Bd, 259 Mich App 279; 674 NW2d 686
(2003). 
10 Gulf Offshore Co v Mobil Oil Corp, 453 US 473, 478;
101 S Ct 2870; 69 L Ed 2d 784 (1981). 
11 See Johnson v Quin Rivers Agency for Community
Action, Inc, 128 F Supp 2d 332, 336 (ED Va, 2001); Hodder 
v Schoharie Co Child Dev Council, Inc, 1995 US Dist LEXIS
19049 (ND NY, 1995). 
8  
 
 
   
 
                                                 
 
 
 
and 
examination, 
42 
USC 
9842, 
Congress
specifically provided for public access to the
books and records, not simply to the audits 
prepared by these other entities. 
Therefore, we
conclude an implied private cause of action 
exists.[12] 
The panel concluded that the trial court did not err 
in granting summary disposition for plaintiff because 
defendant had not complied with the “reasonable public 
access” requirement of § 9839(a). 
The panel, noting that 
defendant 
had 
failed 
to 
suggest 
why 
it 
would 
be 
unreasonable to disclose the requested information, held 
that because the information was readily available and 
could be produced on short notice, it was covered by the 
statutory 
directive 
to 
provide 
“reasonable 
public 
access.”13  The panel rejected defendant’s contention that 
the bidders did not have notice that the bids would be 
disclosed, stating that the statute itself provided that 
notice; the panel also rejected defendant’s argument that 
public policy dictated against interpreting the statute to 
require disclosure of the bids.14  Finally, the panel held 
that it was not required to defer to the interpretation of 
§ 9839(a) set forth in the letters written by HHS 
12 259 Mich App at 289-290 (emphasis deleted).  
13 259 Mich App at 290-292.  
14 259 Mich App at 292-295.  
9  
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
  
officials, opining that only a ruling from the “upper 
echelon” of the HHS would be entitled to deference and 
that, in any event, the officials’ interpretation was 
clearly wrong.15 
We granted defendant’s application for leave to 
appeal.16
 Because we conclude that § 9839(a) does not 
provide for a private cause of action, we reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals and enter judgment in 
favor of defendant. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This case presents issues of statutory construction 
and other questions of law. Such questions are subject to 
review de novo by this Court.17
 Similarly, we review a 
trial court's grant of summary disposition de novo.18 
15 259 Mich App at 297. 
16 470 Mich 888 (2004). 
17 Preserve the Dunes, Inc v Dep't of Environmental
Quality, 471 Mich 508, 513; 684 NW2d 847 (2004); Mack v 
Detroit, 467 Mich 186, 193; 649 NW2d 47 (2002); Grand 
Traverse Co v Michigan, 450 Mich 457, 463-464; 538 NW2d 1
(1995). 
18 Mack, supra at 193. 
10  
 
 
 
  
 
   
                                                 
 
 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Head Start Act was enacted for the purpose of 
“promot[ing] school readiness by enhancing the social and 
cognitive development of low-income children through the 
provision, to low-income children and their families, of 
health, 
educational, 
nutritional, 
social, 
and 
other 
services that are determined, based on family needs 
assessments, to be necessary.”19  The secretary of the HHS 
is authorized under 42 USC 9836(a) to designate as a Head 
Start agency “any local public or private nonprofit or 
for-profit agency . . . .” The act further authorizes the 
secretary to provide financial assistance or grants to 
Head Start agencies for the operation of Head Start 
programs.20 
Under 42 USC 9836a, the secretary is directed to 
establish by regulation standards applicable to Head Start 
agencies, including performance standards, administrative 
and financial management standards, and standards relating 
to the conditions and location of agency facilities. 
The 
secretary has promulgated regulations implementing these 
19 42 USC 9831; see also Action for Boston Community
Dev, Inc v Shalala, 136 F3d 29, 30 (CA 1, 1998). 
20 42 USC 9833 to 9835; Community Action of Laramie
Co, Inc v Bowen, 866 F2d 347, 348 (CA 10, 1989). 
11  
 
 
    
 
  
                                                 
 
 
statutory directives.21  The secretary is directed under 42 
USC 9836a(c) and (d) to monitor Head Start agencies for 
compliance with statutory and regulatory standards and to 
take corrective action if necessary. 
If an agency does 
not comply with such standards, the secretary may initiate 
proceedings to terminate the designation of the agency 
unless the agency corrects the deficiency.22 
At issue in this case is § 9839(a) of the act, which 
provides as follows: 
Each 
Head 
Start 
agency 
shall 
observe 
standards 
of 
organization, 
management, 
and 
administration which will assure, so far as 
reasonably possible, that all program activities
are conducted in a manner consistent with the 
purposes of this subchapter [42 USC 
9831 et 
seq.] and the objective of providing assistance
effectively, efficiently, and free of any taint
of partisan political bias or personal or family
favoritism. 
Each such agency shall establish or
adopt rules to carry out this section, which
shall 
include 
rules 
to 
assure 
full 
staff 
accountability 
in 
matters 
governed 
by 
law,
regulations, or agency policy. Each agency shall 
also provide for reasonable public access to
information, including public hearings at the 
request 
of 
appropriate 
community 
groups 
and 
reasonable public access to books and records of
the agency or other agencies engaged in program 
activities or operations involving the use of
authority or funds for which it is responsible.
Each such agency shall adopt for itself and other
agencies using funds or exercising authority for
which it is responsible, rules designed to (1)
establish specific standards governing salaries, 
21 See 45 CFR 1304.1. 
22 42 USC 9836a(d)(1)(C). 
12  
 
 
 
 
 
salary increases, travel and per diem allowances,
and other employee benefits; (2) assure that only
persons capable of discharging their duties with
competence and integrity are employed and that
employees 
are 
promoted 
or 
advanced 
under 
impartial procedures calculated to improve agency
performance and effectiveness; (3) guard against
personal or financial conflicts of interest; and
(4) define employee duties in an appropriate
manner which will in any case preclude employees
from 
participating, 
in 
connection 
with 
the 
performance of their duties, in any form of
picketing, protest, or other direct action which
is in violation of law. [Emphasis supplied.] 
Similarly, Head Start regulation 45 CFR 1301.30 provides 
that “[e]ach agency shall also provide reasonable public 
access 
to 
information 
and 
to 
the 
agency's 
records 
pertaining to the Head Start program.” 
The 
lower 
courts 
concluded 
that 
defendant 
was 
required under the “reasonable public access” provision of 
§ 9839(a) to disclose copies of all bids it received in 
connection with its January 2001 solicitation of bids for 
office supplies and furniture. 
In considering the 
propriety of the lower courts’ rulings, we must first 
determine whether the trial court properly exercised 
jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claim under § 9839(a). 
Next, we must examine whether § 9839(a) allows for 
plaintiff’s private cause of action to enforce the 
disclosure provision. Although we conclude that the state 
courts have jurisdiction over this action, we hold that 
§ 9839(a) does not provide for a private cause of action. 
13  
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
 
B. CONCURRENT JURISDICTION 
Defendant first argues that the state courts lack 
jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claim under the federal Head 
Start Act.23
 We disagree and hold that the state courts 
23 We note initially that defendant, in support of its 
assertion that subject-matter jurisdiction is lacking,
presents a hodgepodge, “shotgun approach” argument that
conflates the concepts of exhaustion of remedies, primary
jurisdiction, “Chevron doctrine” deference, and existence
of a private cause of action under the federal statute at
issue, 
making 
it 
rather 
difficult 
to 
discern 
what 
precisely it is that defendant is arguing. These concepts
are not, in fact, jurisdictional in nature. 
See, e.g.,
Northwest Airlines, Inc v Kent Co, Michigan, 510 US 355,
365; 114 S Ct 855; 127 L Ed 2d 183 (1994) (“The question 
whether a federal statute creates a claim for relief is 
not jurisdictional.”). 
In light of our determination that the Head Start
Act, in the first instance, does not provide for a private
cause of action to enforce the public access requirement
of § 9839(a), it is unnecessary to address defendant’s
assertion that primary jurisdiction over this cause of
action lies with the HHS, see Travelers Ins Co v Detroit 
Edison Co, 465 Mich 185; 631 NW2d 733 (2001), and its
related 
argument 
that 
plaintiff 
failed 
to 
exhaust 
administrative remedies before filing this state-court
action. 
However, we note that this case presents a
straightforward issue of statutory construction involving
the meaning of the simple phrase “reasonable public
access.” 
The interpretation of this particular statutory
language does not require knowledge of sophisticated or
technical terms or the exercise of expert judgment or
discretion. 
Because the “reasonable public access” 
provision 
presents 
a 
matter 
that 
the 
judiciary 
is 
particularly competent to address, rather than a matter
within the “specialized and expert knowledge” of the HHS,
see id. at 198, primary jurisdiction does not lie with
that 
agency. 
Moreover, 
there 
are 
no 
“prescribed
administrative remedies” that plaintiff has failed to
exhaust before seeking relief under § 9839(a) from the
Footnotes continued on following page. 
14 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
courts. McCarthy v Madigan, 503 US 140, 144-145; 112 S Ct
1081; 117 L Ed 2d 291 (1992). 
Defendant’s somewhat cryptic assertion that the state
courts are required to give deference to the HHS’s 
interpretation of § 9839(a) warrants additional comment.
Citing the “Chevron doctrine,” see Chevron USA Inc v 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc, 467 US 837; 104 S
Ct 2778; 81 L Ed 2d 694 (1984), defendant argues that the
state courts are required to give deference to the 
determinations of HHS officials regarding the disclosure
required under the act and that the state courts therefore
lack jurisdiction over this action. 
Again, defendant is
conflating two discrete doctrines. The concept of Chevron 
deference is not jurisdictional; rather, it is a doctrine
that is in the nature of a standard of review, applied by
the 
judiciary 
in 
reviewing 
an 
agency’s 
reasonable 
construction of an ambiguous statute, which recognizes
that any necessary policy determinations in interpreting a
federal statute are more properly left to the agency
responsible for administering the particular statute. See 
Yellow Transportation, Inc v Michigan, 537 US 36, 47-48;
123 S Ct 371; 154 L Ed 2d 377 (2002); United States v Mead 
Corp, 533 US 218, 227-228; 121 S Ct 2164; 150 L Ed 2d 292
(2001), quoting Chevron, supra at 844 (“‘considerable
weight should be accorded to an executive department’s
construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to
administer’”). 
Again, because we have determined that there is no
private 
cause 
of 
action 
to 
enforce 
the 
disclosure 
requirement of the Head Start Act, we need not address
whether the state courts are required, under Chevron and 
Mead, supra, to accord deference to the letters authored
by these HHS officials. 
However, we note in passing that
these letters presumably lack the “force of law” that is
generally 
required 
for 
application 
of 
Chevron-type
deference. See, e.g., Shalala v Guernsey Mem Hosp, 514 US
87, 99; 115 S Ct 1232; 131 L Ed 2d 106 (1995) (noting that
administrative interpretive rules, which do not require
notice and comment, “do not have the force and effect of
law and are not accorded that weight in the adjudicatory
process”); Northwest Airlines, supra at 366-367 (noting
that 
a 
“reasoned 
decision” 
of 
the 
Secretary 
of 
Transportation would be entitled to Chevron-type deference
in a dispute over the meaning of a provision of the Anti-
Head Tax Act, 49 USC 1513); Human Development Corp of 
Footnotes continued on following page. 
15  
 
 
                                                 
 
  
have concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts to 
entertain 
plaintiff’s 
action 
seeking 
relief 
under 
§ 9839(a). 
It has long been established that, so long as 
Congress has not provided for exclusive federal-court 
jurisdiction, state courts may exercise subject-matter 
jurisdiction over federal-law claims “‘whenever, by their 
own constitution, they are competent to take it.’”24  State 
courts possess sovereignty concurrent with that of the 
federal government, “subject only to limitations imposed 
by the Supremacy Clause.”25
 Thus, state courts are 
presumptively competent to assume jurisdiction over a 
Metropolitan St Louis v United States Dep’t of Health &
Human Services, 312 F3d 373, 379 (CA, 8, 2002) (applying
Chevron deference to a final decision of the HHS’s 
Departmental 
Appeals 
Board 
interpreting 
an 
HHS 
regulation); 
see 
also 
Mead, 
supra 
at 
236, 
n 
17;
Christensen v Harris Co, 529 US 576, 586-587; 120 S Ct
1655; 146 L Ed 2d 621 (2000). 
24 Tafflin v Levitt, 493 US 455, 459; 110 S Ct 792;
107 L Ed 2d 887 (1990), quoting Claflin v Houseman, 93 US
130, 136; 23 L Ed 833 (1876). 
25 Tafflin, supra at 458. See US Const, art VI, cl 2
(“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.”). 
16  
 
 
       
   
                                                 
 
 
 
 
cause of action arising under federal law.26  If concurrent 
jurisdiction otherwise exists, subject-matter jurisdiction 
over a federal-law claim is governed by state law.27 
In 
determining 
whether 
our 
state 
courts 
enjoy 
concurrent jurisdiction over a claim brought under federal 
law, it is necessary to determine whether Congress 
intended to limit jurisdiction to the federal courts. 
"In considering the propriety of state-court
jurisdiction over any particular federal claim,
the Court begins with the presumption that state
courts enjoy concurrent jurisdiction. 
Congress,
however, may confine jurisdiction to the federal
courts either explicitly or implicitly. 
Thus,
the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction can be
rebutted by an explicit statutory directive, by
unmistakable 
implication 
from 
legislative
history, or by a clear incompatibility between
state-court 
jurisdiction 
and 
federal 
interests."[28] 
26 Tafflin, supra at 459; Gulf Offshore Co, supra at 
478; Charles Dowd Box Co, Inc v Courtney, 368 US 502, 507­
508; 82 S Ct 519; 7 L Ed 2d 483 (1962). 
27 Gulf Offshore Co, supra at 478. 
28 Tafflin, supra at 459-460, quoting Gulf Offshore 
Co, supra at 478 (citations omitted); see also Peden v 
Detroit, 470 Mich 195, 201 n 4; 680 NW2d 857 (2004).
Although we, of course, must apply these federal-law
principles in determining whether concurrent jurisdiction
exists under the federal statute, we would be remiss if we
failed to note that the use of legislative history in the
search for legislative intent “‘is a perilous venture . .
. [that is] doubly fraught with danger in Michigan which,
unlike Congress, has failed to create an authoritative
legislative record.’” 
Frank W Lynch & Co v Flex 
Technologies, Inc, 463 Mich 578, 587 n 7 (2001), quoting
People v Tolbert, 216 Mich App 353, 360 n 5; 549 NW2d 61
Footnotes continued on following page. 
17 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
           
Defendant does not present a coherent argument that 
the courts of this state lack jurisdiction over the 
parties’ dispute concerning the disclosure of documents 
under § 9839(a). 
Rather, defendant simply contends that 
the “expansive regulatory scheme” of the Head Start Act 
“evidences Congressional intent that the HHS exercise its 
sole discretion over its administration of local Head-
Start agencies through its regulations.” 
Defendant has 
conflated the vesting of discretion in federal agencies 
with the vesting of jurisdiction in the federal courts: 
That a particular agency has discretion to administer a 
federal statute and to implement regulations for the 
enforcement of the statute does not address whether state 
courts have concurrent jurisdiction over a dispute arising 
under that statute. 
Instead, our inquiry is limited to 
whether Congress intended to limit to federal courts 
exclusive jurisdiction over such a dispute and, if not, 
whether state law allows our courts to exercise subject­
matter jurisdiction over the action. 
Defendant concedes that nothing in the Head Start Act 
explicitly confines jurisdiction to the federal courts, 
and defendant does not point to any statutory indication 
(1996). 
18  
 
 
                                                 
 
  
that Congress intended that jurisdiction over a dispute 
under the Head Start Act should lie solely in the federal 
courts. 
We have been unable to locate anything in the 
legislative history of the act demonstrating an intent to 
grant exclusive federal-court jurisdiction, and defendant 
has certainly failed to bring any such information to our 
attention. 
Moreover, there is no “clear incompatibility” 
between state-court jurisdiction and federal interests 
with respect to application of the Head Start Act, 
particularly with respect to a straightforward question of 
statutory construction such as the one presented in this 
case. 
Indeed, as noted in Gulf Offshore Co v Mobil Oil 
Corp, 453 US 473, 478 n 4; 101 S Ct 2870; 69 L Ed 2d 784 
(1981), “[p]ermitting state courts to entertain federal 
causes of action facilitates the enforcement of federal 
rights.” 
Congress has done nothing in the exercise of its 
powers under the Supremacy Clause to “affirmatively divest 
state 
courts 
of 
their 
presumptively 
concurrent 
jurisdiction” over claims brought under the Head Start 
Act.29  Additionally, it is clear that the courts of this 
state have subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute at 
29 Yellow Freight Sys, Inc v Donnelly, 494 US 820,
823; 110 S Ct 1566; 108 L Ed 2d 834 (1990). 
19  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
 
issue, because our Constitution provides that the circuit 
courts of this state have original jurisdiction “in all 
matters not prohibited by law . . . .”30  Accordingly, we 
hold that the courts of this state have properly exercised 
concurrent jurisdiction over plaintiff’s § 9839(a) claim. 
C. PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION TO ENFORCE § 9839(a) 
Defendant next contends that plaintiff’s claim fails 
because § 9839(a) does not provide for a private cause of 
action to enforce the public access requirement. 
We 
agree. 
1.  WHETHER A CAUSE OF ACTION EXISTS IS SOLELY 
A MATTER OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
“‘[T]he fact that a federal statute has been violated 
and some person harmed does not automatically give rise to 
a private cause of action in favor of that person.’”31 
Rather, “[l]ike substantive federal law itself, private 
rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by 
Congress.”32
 Thus, in determining whether plaintiff may 
bring a private cause of action to enforce the public 
30 Const 1963, art 6, § 13. 
31 Touche Ross & Co v Redington, 442 US 560, 568; 99 S
Ct 2479; 61 L Ed 2d 82 (1979), quoting Cannon v Univ of 
Chicago, 441 US 677, 688; 99 S Ct 1946; 60 L Ed 2d 560
(1979). 
32 Alexander v Sandoval, 532 US 275, 286; 121 S Ct
1511; 149 L Ed 2d 517 (2001); see also Touche Ross & Co, 
supra at 578. 
20  
 
 
  
 
                                                 
 
 
    
 
 
access requirement of § 9839(a), we must determine whether 
Congress intended to create such a cause of action.33 
Because the Head Start Act does not evidence an intent to 
create a private remedy for an alleged violation of § 
9839(a), plaintiff’s action must be dismissed. 
Although the United States Supreme Court in the last 
century embraced a short-lived willingness to create 
remedies to enforce private rights,34 the Court “abandoned” 
that approach to statutory remedies in Cort v Ash35 and 
“[has] not returned to it since.”36  In Cort, the Court set 
33 Alexander, supra at 286-287. 
34 See, e.g., Bivens v Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 US 388; 91 S Ct 1999; 29 L Ed 2d
619 (1971) (inferring a private cause of action for
damages to enforce the Fourth Amendment guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures); J I Case Co v Borak,
377 US 426, 433; 84 S Ct 1555; 12 L Ed 2d 423 (1964)
(holding that “it is the duty of the courts to be alert to 
provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective
the congressional purpose” of a federal statute). 
See 
also, generally, Correctional Services Corp v Malesko, 534
US 61, 75; 122 S Ct 515; 151 L Ed 2d 456 (2001) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (noting that “Bivens is a relic of the 
heady days in which this Court assumed common-law powers
to create causes of action—decreeing them to be ‘implied’
by the mere existence of a statutory or constitutional
prohibition”); Note, Section 1983 and implied rights of
action: Rights, remedies, and realism, 90 Mich L R 1062,
1071-1083 (1992) (exploring the evolution of the United
States 
Supreme 
Court’s 
implied 
right 
of 
action 
jurisprudence and its subsequent retreat). 
35 422 US 66; 95 S Ct 2080; 45 L Ed 2d 26 (1975). 
36 Alexander, supra at 287. 
21  
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
forth a test for determining whether a private remedy is 
implicit in a statute that does not expressly provide such 
a remedy: 
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class
for whose especial benefit the statute was 
enacted," . . . that is, does the statute create 
a federal right in favor of the plaintiff?
Second, is there any indication of legislative
intent, explicit or implicit, either to create
such a remedy or to deny one? . . . Third, is it 
consistent with the underlying purposes of the
legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the
plaintiff? 
. . . And finally, is the cause of
action one traditionally relegated to state law,
in an area basically the concern of the States,
so that it would be inappropriate to infer a
cause of action based solely on federal law?[37] 
Post-Cort, 
the 
Court 
has 
become 
increasingly 
reluctant to imply a private cause of action, preferring 
to focus exclusively on the second Cort element, which 
requires indicia of congressional intent to create a cause 
of action. 
For example, as early as Cannon v Univ of 
Chicago,38 although the Court applied each of the Cort 
factors, it characterized the determination whether a 
private remedy existed to enforce a statutory right as a 
matter of “statutory construction.”39
 In Touche Ross & 
37 Cort, supra at 78 (emphasis deleted). 
38 441 US 677, 688; 99 S Ct 1946; 60 L Ed 2d 560
(1979). 
39 
See 
also 
Merrell 
Dow 
Pharmaceuticals 
Inc 
Thompson, 478 US 804, 812; 106 S Ct 3229; 92 L Ed 2d 650 
Footnotes continued on following page. 
22 
v 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
Co,40 the Court declined to even address the remaining Cort 
factors where it was clear that Congress did not intend to 
create a private cause of action to enforce § 17(a) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934:41 
It is true that in Cort v. Ash, the Court
set 
forth 
four 
factors 
that 
it 
considered 
"relevant" 
in 
determining 
whether 
a 
private 
(1986), noting that it would “flout congressional intent
to provide a private federal remedy” for an alleged
violation of the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21
USC 301 et seq.: 
See, e.g., Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox,
464 US 523, 535-536 (1984) ("In evaluating such a
claim, our focus must be on the intent of 
Congress 
when 
it 
enacted 
the 
statute 
in 
question."); Middlesex County Sewerage Authority 
v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U.S., at 13
("The key to the inquiry is the intent of the
Legislature."); 
Texas 
Industries, 
Inc. 
v. 
Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639 
(1981) ("Our focus, as it is in any case 
involving the implication of a right of action,
is on the intent of Congress."); California v. 
Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 293 ("[The] ultimate
issue is whether Congress intended to create a 
private right of action."); Northwest Airlines, 
Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 91 (1981)
("The ultimate question in cases such as this is
whether Congress intended to create the private
remedy."); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. 
v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15 (1979) ("The question
whether a statute creates a cause of action,
either expressly or by implication, is basically
a matter of statutory construction."); Touche 
Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979)
("The question of the existence of a statutory 
cause of action is, of course, one of statutory
construction."). [Merrell, supra at 812 n 9.]    
40 Touche Ross & Co, supra at 575-576. 
41 15 USC 78q(a). 
23  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly
providing one. But the Court did not decide that 
each of these factors is entitled to equal
weight. 
The central inquiry remains whether
Congress intended to create, either expressly or
by implication, a private cause of action. 
Indeed, the first three factors discussed in
Cort—the language and focus of the statute, its
legislative history, and its purpose, see 422
U.S. at 78—are ones traditionally relied upon in
determining 
legislative 
intent. 
Here, 
the 
statute by its terms grants no private rights to
any identifiable class and proscribes no conduct
as unlawful. 
And the parties as well as the
Court of Appeals agree that the legislative
history of the 1934 Act simply does not speak to
the issue of private remedies under § 17 (a). At 
least in such a case as this, the inquiry ends
there: The question whether Congress, either 
expressly or by implication, intended to create a
private right of action, has been definitely
answered in the negative. 
Similarly, in California v Sierra Club,42 the Court, 
noting that “the focus of the inquiry is on whether 
Congress intended to create a remedy,” concluded that 
consideration 
of 
the 
first 
two 
Cort 
factors 
was 
dispositive. 
Because there was no indication that 
Congress intended to create a private remedy to enforce § 
10 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899,43 
the Court held that it was unnecessary to inquire further 
into the remaining factors, because “[t]hese factors are 
42 451 US 287, 297; 101 S Ct 1775; 68 L Ed 2d 101
(1981). 
43 33 USC 403. 
24  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
only of relevance if the first two factors give indication 
of congressional intent to create the remedy.”44 
In Alexander, the Court appears to have abandoned the 
Cort inquiry altogether in favor of a completely textual 
analysis in determining whether a private remedy exists 
under a particular statute. Rather than applying the Cort 
factors, the Alexander Court concluded, solely on the 
basis of the text of 42 USC 2000d-1, that private 
individuals could not sue to enforce disparate-impact 
regulations promulgated under Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964. 
The Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument 
that dispositive weight could be accorded to context shorn 
of text, holding that “legal context matters only to the 
extent it clarifies text.”45
 The Alexander majority 
additionally 
rejected 
the 
dissent’s 
claim 
that 
the 
position adopted “‘blind[ed] itself to important evidence 
of congressional intent,’” noting that the methodology 
44 Sierra Club, supra at 298. 
This Court has also noted the paramount importance of
legislative intent in determining whether a private cause
of action can be founded on an alleged violation of a
statute. 
See Gardner v Wood, 429 Mich 290, 302 n 6; 414
NW2d 706 (1987) (noting that Cort marked “the beginning of
a trend in the federal courts to reserve the creation of 
civil remedies from penal violations only where to do so
[was] clearly consistent with affirmative legislative
intent”). 
45 Alexander, supra at 288. 
25  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
employed in the majority opinion was well established in 
earlier decisions that explained “that the interpretive 
inquiry begins with the text and structure of the statute 
. . . and ends once it has become clear that Congress did 
not provide a cause of action.”46 
2. THE HEAD START ACT DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR A PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION 
With the aforementioned principles in mind, we 
examine the text of the Head Start Act to determine 
46 Id. at 288 n 7. 
Our 
dissenting 
colleagues 
assert 
that 
we 
have 
incorrectly characterized Touche Ross & Co and Alexander 
as representing a departure from the four-factor Cort 
test. 
Post at 3-4. 
Whether the United States Supreme
Court will, in the future, continue to apply the four-part
Cort test is, however, simply irrelevant where it is clear
from the text of the statute at issue that Congress did
not intend to create a private enforcement action. 
Indeed, this case is directly analogous to Touche Ross & 
Co and Alexander.
 As the dissent points out, the 
provisions at issue in Touche Ross & Co and Alexander 
neither conferred rights on individuals nor proscribed
conduct as unlawful. The same can certainly be said of 42
USC 9839(a). 
Similarly, the dissent notes that the
Alexander Court found it quite telling that the statute at
issue expressly empowered governmental agencies to enforce
regulations. 
The Head Start Act does precisely that, by
directing the secretary to establish regulations governing
Head Start agencies and to enforce those regulations, and,
in 42 USC 9839(a), by requiring Head Start agencies to
conduct program activities in conformity with the Head
Start Act and to establish or adopt rules to carry out
that duty. 
We note, in passing, that Justice Weaver’s separate
dissent merely echoes the longer dissent of Justice Kelly.
Accordingly, we respond to both in kind. 
26  
 
 
 
 
 
whether it provides for a private cause of action to 
enforce § 9839(a). 
To date, two federal district courts have considered 
whether 
causes 
of 
action 
existed 
under 
different 
provisions of the Head Start Act. 
Although our Court of 
Appeals cited these cases, it rejected their analyses 
without explanation. 
In Hodder, supra, the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of New York applied the Cort 
factors 
and 
concluded 
that 
the 
plaintiffs, 
former 
employees of a Head Start agency, could not bring a cause 
of action for wrongful discharge under the Head Start Act: 
Turning 
to 
the 
first 
[Cort] 
factor,
plaintiffs are far-removed from the class for
whose special benefit Congress enacted the Head
Start Act. 
The purpose of this Act is to
authorize the appropriation of funds for Project
Head Start's "effective delivery of comprehensive
health, 
educational, 
nutritional, 
social 
and 
other 
services 
to 
economically 
disadvantaged
children and their families." 
42 USC § 9831(a).
Hence, the class for whose special benefit 
Congress passed the Head Start Act is the class
of economically disadvantaged children and their
families who need the specified services, which
do not under any reasonable interpretation of the
Act include employment services. Indeed, a Head
Start agency would likely violate the Act if it
employed the parent of Head Start child. 
See 42 
USC § 9839(a)(3). 
Plaintiffs' assertion that 
"employees of Head Start agencies . . . are
members of a class which is specially addressed 
are protected by the Act and regulations" is
legally unsupported and legally unsupportable.
. . . Congress plainly did not enact the Head 
Start 
Act 
in 
order 
to 
benefit 
Head 
Start 
employees. 
27 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As to the second Cort factor, the Court has
found no indication that Congress intended the
Act or its interpretive regulations to create a 
private right of action for employees who are
terminated from Head Start agencies in a manner 
allegedly 
inconsistent 
with 
those 
rules. 
Plaintiffs admit that the Act lacks any explicit
indication that Congress intended to create a
cause of action for these employees, but argue
that § 9849(b) of the Act "specifically negates
any intent to deny such a cause of action." . . .
Section 9849(b) concerns the application of the
Civil Rights Act to any sexual discrimination
that may occur in connection with Head Start
programs or activities. The last sentence states 
that the section "shall not be construed as 
affecting any other legal remedy that a person
may have if such person is . . . denied 
employment in connection with[] any [Head Start]
program, project, or activity . . . ." 
At 
best, 
this 
sentence 
reveals 
a 
congressional unwillingness to interfere with any
of the state and federal remedies that may be
available to people who are denied jobs at Head
Start agencies; it certainly does not reveal a
congressional intent to create a private right of
action under the Head Start Act for people who
are 
fired 
from 
Head 
Start 
agencies. 
As 
plaintiffs surely realize, if courts inferred
from Congress' failure to prohibit a private
cause of action the congressional intent to 
create a private cause of action, courts would
read into almost every federal statute an implied
right of action. 
In the majority of instances,
this curious interpretive method would undermine
congressional intent rather than effectuate it.
It also runs counter to the Supreme Court's
demonstrated reluctance to infer private causes
of action from federal statutes. . . . 
Plaintiffs fare no better under the third 
Cort factor because implying a private right of 
action from the Head Start Act would do little or 
nothing to further the underlying purposes of the
legislative scheme. . . . 
* * *  
28  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
We now come to the fourth Cort factor. 
Plaintiffs cast their claim as one "based on 
employee 
discharge 
in 
violation 
of 
federal 
policies . . . ." . . . For purposes of 
determining 
the 
existence 
of 
subject 
matter 
jurisdiction, however, the Court considers the
true nature of plaintiffs' action. . . . Although
plaintiffs carefully avoid the phrase in their
complaint, the essence of their claim is breach
of an employment contract. 
Actions of this kind 
are traditionally relegated to state law.  Thus 
the fourth Cort factor, along with the first
three, strongly support the conclusion that the
Head Start Act does not contain an implied
private right of action for people who are 
terminated from Head Start agencies.[47] 
Similarly, in Johnson, supra, the plaintiff alleged 
that the defendants had mismanaged a Head Start program in 
violation of federal regulations. 
The District Court for 
the Eastern District of Virginia held that Congress did 
not intend to provide a private cause of action to enforce 
the federal regulations: 
In 
this 
case, 
the 
applicable 
statutory
scheme is set forth pursuant to the Head Start
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9831-9852a. 
Under the scheme,
the Secretary of the Department of Health and
Human Services is directed to "establish by
regulation standards applicable to Head Start
agencies, 
programs, 
and 
projects 
under 
this 
subchapter," including "minimum levels of overall
accomplishment that a Head Start agency shall
achieve." 
42 U.S.C. § 9836a(a)(1) & (2). 
The 
Secretary is also directed under this section to
monitor the performance of every Head Start 
program and to take appropriate corrective action
when a program fails to meet the performance
standards 
established 
by 
the 
regulations. 
47 Hodder, supra at *11-*16 (citations omitted). 
29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
 
Specifically, the Act requires a full review of
each grantee at least once during each three-year
period, 
review 
of 
new 
grantees 
after 
the 
completion of the first year, follow up reviews
and return visits to grantees that fail to meet
the 
standards, 
and 
"other 
reviews 
as 
appropriate." 
42 U.S.C. § 9836a(c). 
If the 
Secretary determines, on the basis of such a
review, 
that 
a 
grantee 
fails 
to 
meet 
the 
standards described in § 9836a(a), the Secretary
shall, 
inter 
alia, 
institute 
proceedings 
to 
terminate the Head Start grant unless the agency
corrects the deficiency. 42 U.S.C. § 9836a(d). 
All but three of the regulations cited in
plaintiff's 
Second 
Amended 
Complaint 
were 
promulgated pursuant to the Head Start Act. 
See 
45 C.F.R. § 1304.1. There is no provision in the
Head Start Act, however, permitting a private
citizen to enforce its provisions. 
Based on the 
alternative specific remedies mentioned above,
Congress' intent is clear. 
The remedy for 
substandard performance by a Head Start program
is an enforcement action by the Secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Services, not by 
private litigants. 
For these reasons, the Court
dismisses 
with 
prejudice 
plaintiff's 
claims 
alleging violations of statutory and regulatory
provisions relating to the Head Start Act, for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.[48] 
We find Hodder and Johnson to be persuasive and 
similarly conclude, on the basis of the text and structure 
of the Head Start Act, that no private cause of action 
exists to enforce § 9839(a). 
The act, of course, does not expressly provide for a 
private 
cause 
of 
action 
to 
enforce 
the 
disclosure 
requirement of § 9839(a). 
Thus, the question becomes 
48 Johnson, supra at 336-337. 
30  
 
 
 
 
 
 
whether the text of the act demonstrates an implicit 
intent to provide for a private cause of action. 
Again, the stated purpose of the act is to promote 
school readiness by providing services to low-income 
children and their families. 
42 USC 9831. 
The act does 
not contemplate any benefit to private corporations such 
as plaintiff; nor does it indicate any intent that such a 
private corporation may sue to enforce its provisions. 
Where 
the 
intended 
beneficiaries 
are 
specifically 
identified, we are loath to create a private means of 
seeking redress under the act for nonbeneficiaries. 
More important, the act contains a comprehensive 
mechanism 
for 
ensuring 
agency 
compliance 
with 
its 
provisions. 
We agree with the Johnson court that, far 
from demonstrating an intent to allow for a private cause 
of action, the act indicates that the sole remedy for a 
violation of § 9839(a) is an enforcement proceeding by the 
secretary of the HHS and the possible termination of Head 
Start agency status. See 42 USC 9836a. 
In light of this clear indication of congressional 
intent, we are precluded from venturing beyond the bounds 
of the statutory text to divine support for the creation 
of a private claim to enforce § 9839(a).  To do so would 
be to substitute our own judgment for that of Congress and 
31  
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
thus to usurp legislative authority, something that we of 
course decline to do.49 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Because the Head Start Act does not provide for a 
private 
cause 
of 
action 
to 
enforce 
the 
disclosure 
requirement of § 9839(a), plaintiff has failed to state a 
cognizable claim. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals and enter judgment in favor of 
defendant. 
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Clifford W. Taylor
Maura D. Corrigan
Stephen J. Markman 
49 Again, contrary to the assertions of our dissenting
colleagues, we do not miss any “important distinction”
between the statutes at issue in Touche Ross & Co and 
Alexander and the statute at issue in this case, and this
case does not represent the “opposite situation” of the
situations present in those cases. 
Post at 6. 
Rather,
just as the provisions at issue in Touche Ross & Co and 
Alexander, 42 USC 9839(a) “call[s] for oversight by 
governmental agencies.” 
Post at 6. 
Moreover, we wholly
disagree with the dissent’s contention that § 9839(a) 
“specifically confers an individual right on members of
the public to conduct inspections of books and records.”
Post at 6. 
Rather, § 9839(a) imposes on Head Start
agencies a disclosure requirement, and 42 USC 9836a 
explicitly provides a remedy for a violation of that
requirement: corrective action to be initiated by the 
secretary. 
32  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
THE OFFICE PLANNING GROUP, INC., 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 125448 
BARAGA-HOUGHTON-KEWEENAW 
CHILD DEVELOPMENT BOARD, INC., 
Defendant-Appellant. 
WEAVER, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
I concur in the majority opinion to the extent it 
holds that the state courts have concurrent jurisdiction in 
this matter. 
I dissent from the majority holding that 42 USC 
9839(a) of the federal Head Start Act does not permit 
plaintiff to seek disclosure of information relevant to the 
defendant’s decision on competing bids for a contract. 
42 
USC 9839(a) provides, in pertinent part: 
Each [Head Start] agency shall also provide
for reasonable public access to information,
including public hearings at the request of 
appropriate 
community 
groups 
and 
reasonable 
public access to books and records of the agency
or other agencies engaged in program activities
or operations involving the use of authority or
funds for which it is responsible. 
For the reasons stated in Justice Kelly’s dissent, I 
would hold that this statutory language does provide 
 
 
                                                 
 
plaintiff a right to seek “reasonable” disclosure of 
records pertaining to contract bids submitted to a Head 
Start agency. 
I write separately to elaborate on the majority’s 
misreading of the effect of Alexander v Sandoval1 on Cort v 
Ash.2  Specifically, the majority is wrong to suggest that 
Alexander “appears to have abandoned the Cort inquiry 
altogether in favor of a completely textual analysis in 
determining whether a private remedy exists under a 
particular statute.” Ante at 26. 
Cort identified four factors relevant to determining 
whether a federal statute implied a private remedy where 
the statute did not expressly provide one. Cort held: 
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for
whose especial benefit the statute was enacted,"
. . . that is, does the statute create a federal 
right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there
any indication of legislative intent, explicit or
implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny
one? . . . Third, is it consistent with the
underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to
imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? 
. . . And 
finally, is the cause of action one traditionally
relegated to state law, in an area basically the
concern of the States, so that it would be 
1 532 US 275; 121 S Ct 1511; 149 L Ed 2d 517 (2001). 
2 422 US 66; 95 S Ct 2080; 45 L Ed 2d 26 (1975). 
2  
 
 
  
 
 
       
                                                 
 
 
 
inappropriate to infer a cause of action based
solely on federal law?[3] 
Unlike Cort’s focus on whether a cause of action can 
be inferred from a statute, Alexander involved a distinct 
issue: whether a private cause of action could be inferred 
from a regulation that forbids conduct beyond that which 
was forbidden by the statute under which the regulation was 
promulgated.4 
Because 
the 
conduct 
at 
issue 
in 
Alexander 
was 
prohibited by a regulation, but not by the statute pursuant 
to which the regulation was adopted, Alexander held that a 
cause of action alleging conduct in violation of the 
3 Cort, supra at 78. 
4 Alexander involved an interpretation of Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which provides in § 601 that
no person shall, "on the ground of race, color, or national
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity" covered by Title VI. 
42 USC 2000d. 
Section 602 of the statute authorizes federal agencies to
implement the provisions in § 601 by regulations. 
The Department of Justice adopted regulations pursuant
to § 602 that forbid funding recipients from adopting
policies that created a disparate impact on individuals
because of their race, color, or national origin. See 28
CFR 42.104(b)(2) (1999). Claiming that an English-only
policy caused such disparate impacts, the plaintiffs in
Alexander sued to enjoin the policy. 
While the Alexander 
Court assumed that the regulations were valid, the Court
held that there was no private cause of action as a result
of the policy because § 601 did not prohibit disparate
impacts. 
3  
 
 
 
regulation could not be inferred from the statute. 
Given 
this situation, it was unnecessary for Alexander to delve 
deeply into the Cort factors to resolve whether a cause of 
action could be inferred from the statute. 
Though the majority may prefer that Cort’s factors be 
abandoned and a “completely textual” approach be adopted, 
neither 
logic 
nor 
federal 
precedent 
supports 
its 
preference. 
First, it is absurd to advocate a “completely 
textual approach” where the need to examine whether a cause 
of action may be inferred from a statute is engendered by 
the lack of an expressly stated cause of action in the text 
of the statute. 
Further, the majority makes no attempt to 
explain how its “completely textual” approach differs from 
the Cort factors. 
Second, while the majority correctly notes that not 
every federal case involving whether a private cause of 
action may be inferred from a statute has applied all the 
four Cort factors, it is an overstatement to suggest that 
the federal courts have “abandoned the Cort inquiry 
altogether.” 
Even federal cases relied on by the majority 
employ a Cort-based analysis.  For example in Hodder v 
Schoharie Co Child Dev Council, Inc, 1995 US Dist LEXIS 
19049, *10 (ND NY, 1995), the court premised its analysis 
as follows: 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Court may infer a private right of 
action from a federal statute that does not 
expressly create one only if the statute's 
language, 
structure, 
and 
legislative 
history
reveal Congress' intent to create a private right
of action. See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S.
174, 179, 98 L. Ed. 2d 512, 108 S. Ct. 513
(1988); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S.
560, 61 L. Ed. 2d 82, 99 S. Ct. 2479 (1979); Cort 
v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 45 L. Ed. 2d 26, 95 S. Ct.
2080 (1975). Courts normally try to divine 
Congressional intent by applying the four Cort
factors: 1) whether plaintiffs belong to the 
class for whose special benefit Congress passed
the 
statute; 
2) 
whether 
the 
indicia 
of 
legislative intent reveal a congressional purpose
to provide a private cause of action; 3) whether
implying a private cause of action is consistent
with the underlying purposes of the legislative
scheme; and 4) whether the plaintiff's cause of
action concerns a subject that is traditionally
relegated 
to 
state 
law. 
Merrell 
Dow 
[Pharmaceuticals Inc v Thompson], 478 U.S. [804, 
810-811; 106 S Ct 3229; 92 L Ed 2d 650 (1986)]; 
Cort, 422 U.S. at 78. 
Hodder applied each factor from Cort to the provision 
of the Head Start Act at issue in that case. 
That the majority misunderstands Alexander’s effect is 
underscored by a recent United States Supreme Court 
decision, Jackson v Birmingham Bd of Ed, ___ US ___, ___; 
125 S Ct 1497, 1506; 161 L Ed 2d 361, 373 (2005), where the 
Court 
emphasized 
that 
Alexander’s 
holding 
is 
simply 
premised on the fact that the regulations at issue in 
Alexander extended protection beyond the limits of the 
statute at issue in Alexander. 
Describing the holding of 
Alexander, Jackson stated: 
5  
 
 
 
[In Alexander] we rejected the contention 
that the private right of action to enforce 
intentional violations of Title VI encompassed
suits 
to 
enforce 
the 
disparate-impact
regulations. We did so because "it is clear . . .
that the disparate-impact regulations do not 
simply apply § 
601 -- since they indeed forbid
conduct that § 
601 permits -- and therefore
clear that the private right of action to enforce
§ 
601 does not include a private right to
enforce these regulations." [Alexander] at 285,
149 L. Ed. 2d 517, 121 S. Ct. 1511. See also
Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate 
Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U.S. 164, 173, 128 L.
Ed. 2d 119, 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994) (A "private
plaintiff may not bring a [suit based on a 
regulation] against a defendant for acts not 
prohibited by the text of [the statute]"). 
In this case we must necessarily look beyond the text 
of the statute at issue to discern whether Congress 
intended that a private person be able to seek disclosure 
of documents from a Head Start agency.  The text of the 
statute at issue in this case, 42 USC 9839(a), does not 
expressly create a private cause of action to enforce its 
provision regarding public access to information. Thus, it 
is necessary to look beyond the text to determine whether 
Congress intended to create a private cause of action. 
As 
recognized in California v Sierra Club, 451 US 287, 293; 
101 S Ct 1775; 68 L Ed 2d 101 (1981), the four Cort factors 
present the relevant inquiries to pursue in 
answering 
the 
recurring 
question 
of 
implied
causes of action. 
Cases subsequent to Cort have 
explained that the ultimate issue is whether 
Congress intended to create a private right of
action . . . but the four factors specified in 
6  
 
 
  
 
                                                 
Cort remain the "criteria through which this 
intent could be discerned." [Citations omitted.] 
Given the task at hand and the federal precedent by 
which we are bound, it is absurd to suggest that we must 
employ a “completely textual” approach. 
Any inquiry into 
whether a private cause of action may be inferred requires 
consideration of the intent of Congress and Cort is our 
guide. Regardless of the majority’s apparent discomfort 
with Cort’s factors and inferred causes of action, we are 
bound by federal law and five votes have not combined in 
any one case in the United States Supreme Court to declare 
Cort a dead letter.5 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
5 In Thompson v Thompson, 484 US 174; 108 S Ct 513; 98
L Ed 2d 512 (1988), Justice Scalia (concurring in the
judgment) expressed his vigorous disagreement with whether
the 
Court 
should 
reaffirm 
Cort 
and 
whether 
it 
was 
appropriate to infer private causes of action from federal
statutes that do not expressly provide them. 
Justice 
Scalia’s view of Cort and inferred causes of action has not 
yet garnered the requisite five votes. 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
THE OFFICE PLANNING GROUP, INC., 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
No. 125448 
BARAGA-HOUGHTON-KEWEENAW 
CHILD DEVELOPMENT BOARD, INC., 
Defendant-Appellant. 
KELLY, J. (dissenting). 
I agree with the majority that our state courts have 
jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claim under the federal Head 
Start Act, 42 USC 9831 et seq. 
However, I disagree with 
its conclusion that the act, at 42 USC 9839(a), does not 
provide a private cause of action. The statutory language, 
the focus of the legislation, its history, and its purpose 
imply a congressional intent to allow private actions. 
Therefore, I would find such a right and affirm the 
decision of the Court of Appeals. 
Defendant’s Various Jurisdictional Challenges 
Defendant raises a variety of jurisdictional arguments 
on appeal. 
It claims that primary jurisdiction must rest 
with the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
because, otherwise, an “imbalance” would be created in the 
 
 
 
administration of the Head Start Act. This Court explained 
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in Travelers Ins Co v 
Detroit Edison Co, 465 Mich 185; 631 NW2d 733 (2001). 
It 
is based on the principle of separation of powers and is 
concerned with the respect appropriately shown to an 
agency's decisions made in the performance of regulatory 
duties. Id. at 196-197. 
The primary jurisdiction doctrine underscores the 
notion that administrative agencies possess specialized and 
expert knowledge to address the matters they regulate. Id. 
at 198. 
The question of primary jurisdiction arises only 
with respect to matters that Congress has assigned to a 
governmental agency or administrative body. 
Attorney 
General v Diamond Mortgage Co, 414 Mich 603, 613; 327 NW2d 
805 (1982). This case does not concern such matters. 
Moreover, resolution of this case does not require 
specialized knowledge. 
Instead, it involves a straight­
forward question of statutory interpretation. 
This Court 
is well equipped to handle such questions because they do 
not require specialized or expert knowledge outside the 
scope of our general jurisdiction. 
Therefore, the primary 
jurisdiction doctrine simply does not apply to this case. 
Id.; Travelers, supra at 198-199. 
2  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
Defendant complains that, under the Chevron1 doctrine, 
the meaning that HHS has given to “reasonable public 
access” in various letters interpreting 42 USC 9839(a) 
should be definitive. 
Chevron directs that considerable 
weight be accorded an agency’s construction of a statutory 
scheme. Chevron, supra at 844. But this applies only when 
the decision involves reconciling conflicting policies and 
requires more than ordinary knowledge of matters that the 
agency regulates. Id. 
This case does not demand a detailed knowledge of the 
subject matter of the Head Start Act. 
Nor does it concern 
a complicated matter of interagency interaction or policy. 
It does not require detailed knowledge of the workings of 
the Head Start Act. 
Rather, it involves an issue of 
statutory 
construction. 
No 
special 
expertise 
being 
required, the Chevron doctrine does not apply. Id. 
Defendant also argues that we lack jurisdiction 
because plaintiff failed to exhaust all its administrative 
remedies. 
But the United States Supreme Court has ruled 
that “where Congress has not clearly required exhaustion, 
sound judicial discretion governs.” 
McCarthy v Madigan, 
503 US 140, 144; 112 S Ct 1081; 117 L Ed 2d 291 (1992). 42 
1 Chevron USA Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc, 467 US 837; 104 S Ct 2778; 81 L Ed 2d 694 (1984). 
3  
 
 
 
 
USC 9839(a) contains no exhaustion requirements and is 
silent regarding administrative remedies. Therefore, it is 
within our sound discretion to hear this case. 
Given that none of the theories that defendant relies 
on to challenge this Court’s jurisdiction applies here, it 
is appropriate for us to reach the merits of the case. And 
it is appropriate for us to decide whether Congress 
intended a private right of action in 42 USC 9839(a). 
Whether a Private Cause of Action Exists 
Requires a Determination of Legislative Intent 
Congress can create a private right of action in two 
ways. 
It can expressly provide for the right or it can 
imply it. Cannon v Univ of Chicago, 441 US 677, 717; 99 S 
Ct 1946; 60 L Ed 2d 560 (1979). 
Frequently, legislation 
does not clearly express whether a private right was 
intended. 
The growing volume of litigation and the 
complexity of federal legislation increase the need for 
careful scrutiny to ensure what Congress wanted. 
Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc v Curran, 456 US 353, 
377; 102 S Ct 1825; 72 L Ed 2d 182 (1982). 
To assist us in undertaking that scrutiny, the United 
States Supreme Court articulated a four-part test thirty 
years ago in Cort v Ash, 422 US 66; 95 S Ct 2080; 45 L Ed 
2d 26 (1975). 
A court makes four inquiries: 
(1) whether 
the plaintiff is a member of the class for whose benefit 
4  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
the legislative body enacted the statute, (2) whether there 
is any indication that the legislative body intended to 
create or deny such a right of action, (3) whether 
inferring the right of action is consistent with the 
underlying scheme of the legislation, and (4) whether the 
cause of action is one traditionally relegated to state law 
so that it would be inappropriate to base the determination 
solely on federal law. Id. at 78. The key to this inquiry 
is determining the legislative intent in enacting the 
statute. Merrill Lynch, supra at 377-378. 
In Touche Ross & Co v Redington,2 the Court opined that 
the first three factors of Cort should be given greater 
weight than the fourth. The opinion states: 
Indeed, the first three factors discussed in
Cort—the language and focus of the statute, its
legislative history, and its purpose, see 422
U.S., at 78—are ones traditionally relied upon in
determining legislative intent. 
[Id. at 575­
576.] 
The language of the statute in question in Touche Ross3 
did not explicitly create a private remedy. 
Also, the 
legislative history gave no indication that Congress 
intended one. 
The statute neither conferred rights on 
private parties nor proscribed conduct as unlawful. Touche 
2 442 US 560; 99 S Ct 2479; 61 L Ed 2d 82 (1979). 
3 15 USC 78q(a). 
5  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Ross, supra at 569. 
It required that brokers keep certain 
documents 
for 
government 
inspection 
and 
focused 
on 
governmental rights of inspection. 
Id. at 569-570. 
Because the statute did not imply a private right of 
action, the Court found that none existed. Id. at 571. 
The majority contends that, twenty-two years after 
Touche Ross, the United States Supreme Court abandoned the 
Cort analysis and switched to a completely textual analysis 
in Alexander v Sandoval, 532 US 275; 121 S Ct 1511; 149 L 
Ed 2d 517 (2001). 
I disagree. 
In Alexander, the Court 
followed the same reasoning as in Touche Ross and focused 
on the initial Cort factors. 
As in Touche Ross, the Alexander Court stated that, to 
determine legislative intent, it was important to start 
with the language of the statute. Id. at 287-288. In that 
case, it needed to go no further in its inquiry. 
Id. at 
288. 
The reason was that, as in Touche Ross, the statute 
under consideration4 indicated that Congress intended not to 
create a private cause of action. Alexander, supra at 288­
289. 
That statute neither conferred rights on private 
parties nor proscribed conduct as unlawful. 
Instead, it 
empowered governmental agencies to enforce regulations. 
4 42 USC 2000d-1. 
6  
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
 
  
Id. at 289. 
The Court concluded that, by expressly 
providing one method of enforcement, Congress signaled that 
it intended to preclude other methods.5 
Id. at 290. 
Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, a full reading 
of Alexander indicates that the Court did not abandon Cort. 
Instead, Alexander stated that the analysis in that case 
need not extend beyond the first two Cort factors because 
the statute indicated that Congress did not intend a 
private cause of action. 
The Cort factors remain a valid 
and important means of discerning legislative intent. 
The 
Alexander decision provides no basis to conclude the 
contrary. 
Specific Analysis of 42 USC 9839 
Despite espousing a textualist approach, the majority 
never deals with the actual language of 42 USC 9839(a). 
Instead, 
it 
focuses 
on 
tangentially 
related 
federal 
5 The majority points out that 42 USC 9839(a) contains
language like the statutory language that the Supreme Court
analyzed in Alexander. 
Ante at 27 n 46. But the majority
again misses the point. Unlike 42 USC 2000d-1, it contains 
a directive that does not concern the mere internal 
creation of rules. 
42 USC 9839(a) contains language that
is absent in 42 USC 2000d-1 (the statutory language 
analyzed in Alexander). 
42 USC 9839(a) specifically 
mentions the “public” and “appropriate community groups
. . . .”  It allows the public and these groups to request
public hearings and to seek access to books and records.
42 USC 9839(a). 
7  
 
 
 
 
district court cases and the overall purpose of the Head 
Start Act. 
Let us review the actual language in question. 42 USC 
9839(a) provides in part: 
Each 
Head 
Start 
agency 
shall 
observe 
standards 
of 
organization, 
management, 
and 
administration which will assure, so far as 
reasonably possible, that all program activities
are conducted in a manner consistent with the 
purposes of this subchapter [42 USC 9831 et seq.]
and 
the 
objective 
of 
providing 
assistance 
effectively, efficiently, and free of any taint
of partisan political bias or personal or family
favoritism. 
Each such agency shall establish or
adopt rules to carry out this section, which
shall 
include 
rules 
to 
assure 
full 
staff 
accountability 
in 
matters 
governed 
by 
law,
regulations, or agency policy. Each agency shall
also provide for reasonable public access to 
information, including public hearings at the 
request 
of 
appropriate 
community 
groups 
and 
reasonable public access to books and records of
the agency or other agencies engaged in program
activities or operations involving the use of
authority or funds for which it is responsible.
Each such agency shall adopt for itself and other
agencies using funds or exercising authority for
which it is responsible, rules designed to . . .
(3) guard against personal or financial conflicts
of interest . . . . [Emphasis added.] 
This language indicates the intent of Congress to 
maintain open accountability in the use of Head Start 
funds. 
It explicitly provides a right of public access. 
After stating that “[e]ach agency shall also provide for 
reasonable public access to information,” it spells out 
particulars on how to meet this requirement, including 
holding public meetings. 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
The statute specifically confers an individual right 
on members of the public to conduct inspections of books 
and records. The opposite situation existed in both Touche 
Ross and Alexander, where the statutes lacked language 
creating such a right. 
They offered neither the general 
public nor any private individual access to anything. 
The 
oversight they called for was by governmental agencies. 
Alexander, supra at 288-289; Touche Ross, supra at 569-570. 
The majority simply misses this important distinction.6 
It relies on two federal district court cases, Johnson 
v Quin Rivers Agency for Community Action, Inc, 128 F Supp 
2d 332 (ED Va, 2001), and Hodder v Schoharie Co Child Dev 
Council, Inc, 1995 US Dist LEXIS 19049 (ND NY, 1995). 
But 
Johnson and Hodder do not support the conclusion that no 
private cause of action exists and they are inapplicable to 
the case at hand. 
6 The majority states that it “wholly disagree[s]” with
the conclusion that 42 USC 9839(a) confers an individual
right on a member of the public. 
It contends that 42 USC 
9839(a) merely creates a disclosure requirement. 
Ante at 
33 n 49. 
Again, the majority fails to analyze the actual 
language of the statute. 
42 USC 9839(a) mandates public
access, such as public hearings, at the request of 
“appropriate community groups . . . .” 
Only by allowing
enforcement 
of 
this 
public 
inspection 
and 
access 
requirement can we effectuate Congress’s specific goal of
maintaining open accountability in the use of public funds.
The majority simply ignores this clear congressional
intent. 
9  
 
 
 
 
Neither dealt with 42 USC 9839(a). 
Johnson concerned 
claims of discrimination and substandard enforcement of 
Head Start regulations. 
Johnson, supra at 335. 
The Head 
Start provisions in question were 42 USC 9836a(a)(1) and 
(2). Johnson, supra at 336-337.   
Hodder concerned claims of employees terminated from 
Head Start agencies. 
Hodder, supra at *16. 
It dealt with 
42 USC 9849(b). 
Hodder, supra at *12. 42 USC 9839(a) was 
mentioned only in passing. 
The only thing Hodder and Johnson have in common with 
this case is that both involve provisions of the Head Start 
Act. 
But the statutory language scrutinized in Hodder and 
Johnson makes no mention of public access as 42 USC 9839(a) 
does. 
Given that Hodder and Johnson do not deal with 42 
USC 9839(a), they are of no assistance in our resolution of 
this case. 
The majority also bases its decision on the general 
purpose of the Head Start Act. 
It assumes that the only 
purpose worth considering is the act’s overarching goal of 
providing 
services 
to 
low-income 
children 
and 
their 
families. It ignores the congressional intent specifically 
written into 42 USC 9839(a). 
42 
USC 
9839(a) 
specifies 
Congress’s 
goal 
of 
maintaining open accountability in the use of public funds 
and effectuates it by providing a right of public access to
10 
 
 
 
 
books and records. 
By ignoring these specific provisions, 
the majority has effectively substituted its judgment for 
that of Congress. 
In reducing public oversight, it 
frustrates the paramount goals of the Head Start Act by 
facilitating the misuse of federal funds. 
Application of the Cort factors to 42 USC 9839(a) 
Given that the language of the statute does not 
contradict the existence of a private cause of action, it 
is appropriate to apply all the Cort factors. 
The first 
question is whether plaintiff is in the class for whose 
benefit Congress enacted 42 USC 9839(a). 
The statute 
indicates that Congress intended to grant access to the 
public at large. 
Plaintiff is a member of the public. 
Therefore, plaintiff is within the appropriate class. Cort, 
supra at 79. 
The second question, whether there is any indication 
that Congress intended to create or to deny a private right 
of action, has already been discussed. 
The language of 42 
USC 9839(a) indicates a specific intent to create such an 
action. 
There is no legislative history or other material 
contradicting this intent. 
The third question is whether it is consistent with 
the underlying legislative scheme to infer a private right 
of action. Cort, supra at 78. As the majority states, the 
overall purpose of the Head Start Act is to promote school
11 
 
 
 
 
 
readiness. 42 USC 9831. As part of its plan to reach this 
goal, Congress expressed an intent to maintain open 
accountability in the use of public funds in 42 USC 
9839(a). 
In the same section, to effectuate this intent, 
Congress provided the public with a right of access to 
books and records. 
Inferring a right of action to 
implement this right enforces that intent. 
Therefore, 
inferring a right of action is consistent with the 
legislative scheme. 
Finally, there is no indication that this is a cause 
of action traditionally relegated to state law. 
And 
defendant makes no such argument. 
To the contrary, an 
action pursuant to 42 USC 9839(a) is the only means by 
which plaintiff could obtain the information it seeks. 
Therefore, the analysis of this factor, as with the other 
Cort factors, points to the need to recognize a private 
right of action under 42 USC 9839(a). 
Where a Legal Right Exists, so Does a Legal Remedy 
“The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists 
in the right of every individual to claim the protection of 
the laws . . . .” Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 
163; 2 L Ed 60 (1803). 
One of the fundamental tenets of 
the American legal system is that, where there is a legal 
right, there is also a legal remedy. 
Id. 
After it is 
determined that Congress intended a right of action, courts
12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
presume the availability of all appropriate remedies unless 
Congress has expressly indicated otherwise. 
Franklin v 
Gwinnett Co Pub Schools, 503 US 60, 66; 112 S Ct 1028; 117 
L Ed 2d 208 (1992). 
In this case, a private right of action exists under 
42 USC 9839(a). Plaintiff sought the appropriate remedy of 
viewing the records of the bids submitted for office 
supplies and furniture. 
Defendant makes no persuasive 
argument 
that 
viewing 
this 
information 
would 
be 
unreasonable. 
This 
proposed 
remedy 
is 
specifically 
consistent with the language of 42 USC 9839(a), which 
allows for reasonable inspections of books and records. 
Therefore, Congress has not expressly indicated that this 
remedy is inappropriate. 
And the trial court did not err 
in granting it. 
I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
Marilyn Kelly
Michael F. Cavanagh 
13