Title: Commonwealth v. Garrett
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11852
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: November 25, 2015

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SJC-11852 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  RAHEEM B. GARRETT. 
 
 
 
Berkshire.     September 8, 2015. - November 25, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Robbery.  Firearms.  Evidence, Firearm, Exculpatory.  Practice, 
Criminal, Indictment, Instructions to jury, Assistance of 
counsel, Lesser included offense. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 16, 2011. 
 
 
The cases were tried before John A. Agostini, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Michael J. Hickson for the defendant. 
 
John P. Bossé, Special Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
DUFFLY, J.  The defendant was convicted by a Superior Court 
jury on three indictments charging armed robbery with a firearm 
while masked, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 17, the armed 
2 
 
robbery statute.1  To prove that the defendant was armed with a 
"firearm," the Commonwealth relied on evidence that the 
defendant used a BB gun to perpetrate each of the robberies.  
The defendant appealed from his convictions, and we allowed the 
Commonwealth's petition for direct appellate review.  The 
defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support 
his convictions because a BB gun is not a "firearm" within the 
meaning of the armed robbery statute.  The defendant maintains 
also that the indictments were facially invalid, certain errors 
in the jury instructions require reversal, and his trial counsel 
provided constitutionally ineffective assistance in several 
respects. 
Because we conclude that a BB gun does not satisfy the 
statutory requirement of a "firearm" within the meaning of G. L. 
c. 265, § 17, the defendant's convictions of armed robbery by 
means of a firearm cannot stand.  Accordingly, those convictions 
must be vacated, and the matter remanded to the Superior Court 
for entry of judgments of guilt on the lesser included offense 
of unarmed robbery. 
                     
1 The defendant was indicted on seven counts of armed 
robbery with a firearm while masked; two counts of armed assault 
with intent to rob; two counts of armed assault by means of a 
dangerous weapon; and one count of attempt to commit armed 
robbery with a firearm while masked.  The Commonwealth entered 
nolle prosequi on two of the indictments charging armed robbery 
with a firearm while masked.  The defendant was acquitted on 
seven of the indictments. 
3 
 
Background.  We recite the facts the jury could have found, 
reserving certain facts for later discussion of individual 
issues.  In 2011, the defendant was experiencing financial 
difficulties after he and his then live-in girl friend, Laura 
Methe, lost their jobs and were unable to find new employment.  
In an effort to improve their financial circumstances, the 
defendant and Methe robbed stores in the city of Pittsfield.  To 
commit the robberies, the defendant used a BB gun that he and 
Methe had purchased for that purpose at a sporting goods store.2 
The first robbery was of a pizza shop.  The defendant 
entered the store wearing a homemade black mask, pointed at the 
assistant store manager what appeared to him to be a gun, and 
demanded the money from the cash register.  Methe, acting as the 
getaway driver, waited in her white GMC sport utility vehicle 
(SUV).  The two later split the cash.  The second robbery was of 
a convenience store.  Again, the defendant wore a black mask and 
pointed the BB gun at two clerks, one of whom the defendant 
ordered to open the safe and hand him the money.  Approximately 
two months later, the defendant and Methe returned to the pizza 
shop.  The same assistant store manager, who was in the store 
along with another employee, recognized the mask and clothing 
worn by the robber as those worn during the previous robbery, 
                     
2 The sporting goods store offered several types of BB guns.  
No evidence was introduced as to which type was purchased, or 
how the several available types were distinguishable. 
4 
 
and the weapon as the same one the prior robber had brandished.  
The robber demanded that the manager open the cash register and 
give him the money; the manager recognized the robber's voice as 
identical to that of the first robber.  The manager handed over 
the money. 
After the robber left the store, the manager ran outside 
and saw a white SUV, either a GMC Jimmy or a Chevrolet Blazer, 
leaving the parking lot quickly and driving north without any 
headlights.  He telephoned 911 and reported the location of the 
SUV.  A Pittsfield police department sergeant responded to the 
radio dispatch.  With the aid of another officer, he ultimately 
located and apprehended the defendant and Methe, who was 
driving, in her SUV. 
Discussion.  1.  Whether a BB gun is a firearm within the 
meaning of the armed robbery statute.  For the first time on 
appeal, the defendant claims that a BB gun does not meet the 
statutory definition of a "firearm," and therefore that the 
evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.  Although 
the defendant's claim of insufficiency was not preserved, we 
nonetheless consider it because "findings based on legally 
insufficient evidence are inherently serious enough to create a 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice."  Commonwealth v. 
McGovern, 397 Mass. 863, 867-868 (1986).  See Commonwealth v. 
Hinds, 437 Mass. 54, 63 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1205 
5 
 
(2003).  Whether, as a matter of statutory interpretation, a BB 
gun is a "firearm" is a question of law.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Fenton, 395 Mass. 92, 94-95 (1985), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Sampson, 383 Mass. 750, 761 (1981). 
To determine whether a BB gun is a firearm for the purposes 
of the armed robbery statute, we analyze the statutory language 
under the familiar principle of statutory construction that a 
statute is to be interpreted "according to the intent of the 
Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the 
ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in 
connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or 
imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be 
accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be 
effectuated."  Commonwealth v. Galvin, 388 Mass. 326, 328 
(1983), quoting Board of Educ. v. Assessor of Worcester, 368 
Mass. 511, 513 (1975).  Although we begin with the plain 
language of the statute, Commonwealth v. Cory, 454 Mass. 559, 
563 (2009), where the language is not conclusive as to the 
Legislature's intent, we may seek guidance from the legislative 
history and the language of related statutes.  See Commonwealth 
v. Wynton W., 459 Mass. 745, 747 (2011); Commonwealth v. McLeod, 
437 Mass. 286, 290 (2002). 
The armed robbery statute, G. L. c. 265, § 17, contains no 
explicit definition of the term "firearm."  Nor does the statute 
6 
 
incorporate explicitly any definition from another statute.  The 
term "firearm," however, is defined in G. L. c. 140, § 121, a 
part of the statute that governs licensing and regulation of 
firearms.  See G. L. c. 140, §§ 121-131Q.  Under this provision, 
a "firearm" is, with certain exclusions for weapons that 
resemble other objects, defined as a "pistol, revolver or other 
weapon of any description, loaded or unloaded, from which a shot 
or bullet can be discharged and of which the length of the 
barrel or barrels is less than [sixteen] inches or [eighteen] 
inches in the case of a shotgun as originally manufactured."  
See G. L. c. 140, § 121 (gun control act).  This definition, 
which has not been altered significantly since 1934, is the 
foundation for the Legislature's gun control framework; indeed, 
the definition was incorporated virtually unchanged from the 
1934 version of the statute when the Legislature rewrote the gun 
control act in 1998.  See St. 1934, c. 359, § 1; St. 1998, 
c. 180 § 8 ("An act relative to gun control in the 
Commonwealth").3 
The Commonwealth argues that the definition of "firearm" in 
the gun control act may be viewed as the source of the 
definition of a "firearm" in the armed robbery statute and that 
                     
3 In 1934, the Legislature amended the definition to 
substitute "is less than eighteen" inches for "does not exceed 
twelve" inches.  St. 1934, c. 359, § 1. 
 
7 
 
the BB gun at issue here falls within that definition.   We do 
not agree.  Nothing within the framework of the gun control act 
supports an interpretation that the Legislature intended to 
regulate BB guns in the same manner as it regulates firearms.4  
To the contrary, such an interpretation is inconsistent with the 
gun control act, which does not mention BB guns, and with the 
Legislature's long-standing separate regulation of BB guns. 
The statutory regulation of "air rifle[s] or so-called BB 
gun[s]" reflects that the Legislature was responding primarily 
to the risk of misuse of BB guns in the hands of minors.5  See 
G. L. c. 269, § 12A ("Air rifles; sale to minors"); G. L. 
c. 269, § 12B ("Air rifles; possession by minors; shooting").  
These provisions were made part of the General Laws in 1951, by 
an act "regulating the sale and use of air rifles or so-called 
                     
4 General Laws c. 140, §§ 121-131Q, which expressly 
incorporate the definition of a firearm in G. L. c. 140, § 121, 
are all provisions that relate to the regulation, sale, 
transfer, and licensing of guns and firearms.  See, e.g., G. L. 
c. 140, § 122 (fees and procedures for issuance of licenses, 
procedure on refusal of license, and punishment for improper 
issuance); G. L. c. 140, § 125 (forfeiture or suspension of 
license if license holder convicted of felony); G. L. c. 140, 
§ 128B (unauthorized sale of firearms). 
 
5 We have said that, absent indication of contrary 
legislative intent, a BB gun is akin to an "air rifle," and we 
have considered definitions of BB guns, air rifles, and air guns 
as interchangeable.  See Commonwealth v. Fenton, 395 Mass. 92, 
95 (1985) (declining to create legal distinction between air 
gun, air rifle, and BB gun); Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 389 Mass. 
641, 643 (1983) (treating air gun and BB gun as interchangeable 
for legal analysis). 
 
8 
 
BB guns."  See St. 1951, c. 263.6  General Laws c. 269, § 12A, 
regulates the sale of air guns or BB guns to minors.7  General 
Laws c. 269, § 12B, is concerned primarily with the actions of 
minors in possession of BB guns.  It provides: 
"No minor under the age of eighteen shall have an air 
rifle or so-called BB gun in his possession while in any 
place to which the public has a right of access unless he 
is accompanied by an adult or unless he is the holder of a 
sporting or hunting license and has on his person a 
permit . . . granting him the right of such possession.  No 
person shall discharge a BB shot, pellet or other object 
from an air rifle or so-called BB gun into, from or across 
any street, alley, public way or railroad or railway right 
of way, and no minor under the age of eighteen shall 
discharge a BB shot, pellet or other object from an air 
rifle or BB gun unless he is accompanied by an adult or is 
the holder of a sporting or hunting license.  Whoever 
violates this section shall be punished by a fine of not 
more than one hundred dollars, and the air rifle or BB gun 
or other weapon shall be confiscated." 
 
G. L. c. 269, § 12B. 
                     
6 As originally enacted, G. L. c. 269, § 12B, applied to 
minors under the age of sixteen.  See St. 1951, c. 263.  In 
1957, the Legislature amended it, raising the oldest regulated 
age from under sixteen to under eighteen years old.  See St. 
1957, c. 688, § 31.  The remaining provisions did not 
substantively change the nature of the statutory offenses.  In 
1968, the Legislature rewrote the penultimate sentence of that 
section, increasing the maximum amount of the fine that could be 
imposed to one hundred dollars.  See St. 1968, c. 737, § 16.  
The 1996 amendment included a single change, to replace 
"commissioner of public safety" with "colonel of the state 
police."  See St. 1996, c. 151, § 493. 
 
7 "Whoever sells to a minor under the age of eighteen or 
whoever, not being the parent, guardian or adult teacher or 
instructor, furnishes to a minor under the age of eighteen an 
air rifle or so-called BB gun, shall be punished by a fine of 
not less than fifty nor more than two hundred dollars or by 
imprisonment for not more than six months." G. L. c. 269, § 12A. 
9 
 
Notably, adults who possess BB guns are not subject to the 
same restrictions as are minors.  See Commonwealth v. Fenton, 
395 Mass. 92, 95 (1985) (Fenton); Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 389 
Mass. 641, 645 (1983) (Rhodes).  For persons other than minors, 
the Legislature prohibits the discharge of BB guns "into, from 
or across any street, alley, public way or railroad or railway 
right of way," G. L. c. 269, § 12B, and prohibits possession of 
a loaded BB gun in any place where birds or mammals might be 
found, with certain exceptions for hunting.  See G. L. c. 131, 
§ 66.  Since G. L. c. 269, §§ 12A and 12B, were enacted in 1951, 
the Legislature has not amended the statutory scheme to provide 
explicitly that BB guns should be treated in the same manner as 
firearms for purposes of the gun control act. 
The Legislature also has not amended the definition of 
firearm to include air rifles or BB guns since our decision in 
Fenton, supra at 94.  In that case, we concluded that a 
defendant who was in possession of a type of revolver that was 
"within the common lexical definitions of 'air gun'" could not 
be convicted of unlawfully carrying a firearm under G. L. 
c. 269, § 10 (a).8  Fenton, supra.  Indeed, in 1998, with the 
                     
8 A number of dictionary definitions support this view.  See 
Commonwealth v. Fenton, supra at 94 n.5, and definitions cited.  
See, e.g., Black's Law Dictionary 751 (10th ed. 2014) (defining 
"firearm" as "[a] weapon that expels a projectile [such as a 
bullet or pellets] by the combustion of gunpowder or other 
explosive . . . . [a]lso termed gun"); The American Heritage 
10 
 
passage of the gun control act, the Legislature continued its 
disparate treatment of BB guns and firearms.  Notwithstanding 
the act's broad amendment of statutes dealing with firearms and 
guns, the gun control act did not extend the provisions 
concerning BB gun licensing beyond those requiring licensing for 
minors.  Moreover, at the same time that the Legislature revised 
the entire firearms licensing scheme, it also added provisions 
for mandatory criminal sentences whenever a firearm was used in 
the commission of certain crimes, including armed robbery.  See 
St. 1998, c. 180, §§ 50-67.  The term "BB gun" appears nowhere 
in the gun control act.  The term "air rifle" appears only once 
in the eighty sections of St. 1998, c. 180, and then only in the 
context of a requirement that reports of injury be made to the 
commissioner of public health.  See St. 1998, c. 180, § 5.  The 
Legislature's enactment of the gun control act in 1998, which 
does not amend the definition of firearm, reflects the 
legislative intent that BB guns remain subject to their well-
established, separate regulation, rather than becoming subject 
to general gun control act provisions.  See Sheehan v. Weaver, 
                                                                  
Dictionary of the English Language 1804 (4th ed. 2006) (defining 
air rifle as "[a] low-powered rifle, such as a BB gun, that uses 
compressed air or gas to fire pellets"); Webster's New Universal 
Unabridged Dictionary 44 (2003) (defining air gun as "a gun 
operated by compressed air"); Webster's Third New Int'l 
Dictionary 47 (1993) (defining air rifle as "a rifle from which 
a projectile is propelled by air or carbon dioxide compressed 
usu[ally] by a lever and pump system"). 
11 
 
467 Mass. 734, 740-741 (2014) ("the principle that legislative 
approval can be derived from legislative silence carries its 
greatest force when the Legislature has reenacted or amended a 
statute without disturbing the judicial construction placed on 
it"); Commonwealth v. Rivera, 445 Mass. 119, 128 (2005), quoting 
Nichols v. Vaughan, 217 Mass. 548, 551 (1914). 
Additionally, we note that, when the Legislature has 
expanded the definition of "firearm" to reach BB guns and 
similar nonconventional guns, it has done so by expressly 
providing a broad definition of firearm.  For instance, 
G. L. c. 269, § 10 (j), which criminalizes the carrying of a 
firearm near a school, provides that "[f]or the purposes of this 
paragraph, 'firearm' shall mean any pistol, revolver, rifle or 
smoothbore arm from which a shot, bullet or pellet can be 
discharged."  We concluded in Commonwealth v. Sayers, 438 Mass. 
238, 240-241 (2002), that in light of the uniquely broad 
definition in G. L. c. 269, § 10 (j), the term "firearm" there 
includes a BB gun albeit that BB guns are not explicitly named.  
Commonwealth v. Sayers, supra at 241.  That the Legislature did 
not broaden the definition of firearm to include a BB gun when 
it added sentencing enhancement for use of a firearm to the 
armed robbery statute, provides a clear indication that the 
Legislature intended to maintain the distinction between a 
"firearm" and a BB gun. 
12 
 
Any other construction would produce absurd results.  If BB 
guns were construed as firearms, they would be subject to the 
entire gun control act.  Consequently, they would only be able 
to be sold by licensed dealers, G. L. c. 140, § 123; background 
checks would be mandatory before obtaining a license to possess 
a BB gun, G. L. c. 140, § 131; and all BB guns would be required 
to bear serial identification numbers, G. L. c. 269, § 11E.  
Even more troubling, were we to read the gun control act as 
applicable to BB guns, all of the criminal statutes regulating 
the possession and use of firearms would apply to BB guns, and 
to the minors who are authorized to use BB guns under G. L. 
c. 269, § 12B.  For instance, G. L. c. 140, § 131L (a), 
establishes that it is "unlawful to store or keep any 
firearm . . . in any place unless such weapon is secured in a 
locked container or equipped with a tamper-resistant mechanical 
lock so as to render such weapon inoperable by any person other 
than the owner or other lawfully authorized user."  
Bootstrapping BB guns into this requirement would impose a layer 
of regulation, with criminal penalties for any violation, upon 
the proper storage of BB guns.  This potentially would subject a 
broad group of minors to severe adult criminal penalties, with 
the attendant negative consequence of an adult criminal record.  
The Legislature could not have intended such a result.  See 
Galenski v. Erving, 471 Mass. 305, 313-314 (2015) (we view 
13 
 
statutory scheme as whole to give effect to all of its 
provisions). 
In sum, we conclude that a BB gun is not a firearm for 
purposes of the armed robbery statute, G. L. c. 265, § 17.9  The 
rule of lenity also militates in favor of this outcome.  See 
Fenton, supra at 95 ("[a] criminal statute must be sufficiently 
explicit to give clear warning as to proscribed activities"); 
Rhodes, supra at 646-647. 
2.  Validity of indictments.  The defendant maintains also 
that the indictments for the armed robbery charges were invalid 
because they failed to allege a crime.  The defendant did not 
raise this issue before or at trial.  Although a challenge to 
the sufficiency of an indictment ordinarily is deemed waived 
unless raised by a motion to dismiss prior to trial, whether an 
indictment fails to allege an offense is a matter of 
jurisdiction, which may be raised at any time.  See Commonwealth 
v. Senior, 454 Mass. 12, 14 (2009).  The indictments here were 
captioned "Firearm-armed and masked robbery, C 265 § 17," but 
the language of the indictment itself stated that the defendant 
was armed "with a handgun."  The defendant contends that the 
indictments were legally insufficient because they did not 
                     
9 The defendant maintains that his trial counsel provided 
ineffective assistance by failing to raise the issue of whether 
a BB gun was a firearm at trial.  Because of the result we 
reach, we do not reach this claim. 
14 
 
explicitly use the word "firearm."  The "absence of a required 
element in an indictment does not by itself establish that a 
crime is not charged, even if acquittal is required if the 
prosecution were to prove only the allegations in the 
indictment."  Commonwealth v. Canty, 466 Mass. 535, 548 (2013).  
Here, the caption properly identified the statutory violation, 
and the indictment gave "fair notice" to the defendant of the 
crime for which he was charged; in ordinary usage, a handgun is 
understood to be a type of firearm.  See Commonwealth v. 
Sperrazza, 372 Mass. 667, 670 (1977). 
3.  Jury instruction.  The defendant maintains that the 
judge erred by instructing the jury that, to find the defendant 
guilty of armed robbery, 
"It is sufficient if the Commonwealth proves beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant was actually armed with 
a firearm.  A person who uses a replica of a firearm, such 
as a toy gun or other fake firearm, to commit an assault 
may be convicted of assault if the victim reasonably 
believed it to be a real weapon capable of inflicting 
serious injury or death." 
 
 
The defendant challenges that portion of the instruction 
that would permit a jury to find that a replica or toy firearm 
met the statutory requirement of being armed with a firearm, 
claiming that that portion of the instruction is relevant only 
to a charge of being armed with a dangerous weapon, and he was 
not charged with that offense. 
Because a BB gun is not a firearm for purposes of the armed 
15 
 
robbery statute, the judge's instruction was erroneous in so far 
as it related to the offense of armed robbery while being armed 
with a firearm.10  In some circumstances, it is possible that a 
fake or replica weapon might qualify as a dangerous weapon.  
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Powell, 433 Mass. 399, 402 (2001).  
As the defendant was not charged with armed robbery while armed 
with a dangerous weapon, the instruction was improper.  The 
defendant did not object to the instruction at trial, and the 
instruction did not implicate any of the other elements of the 
offense.  Therefore, because of the result we reach on the 
defendant's convictions of armed robbery, the improper 
instruction did not result in a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice. 
4.  Failure to argue that admitted evidence was 
exculpatory.  The defendant maintains that his trial counsel 
provided ineffective assistance in failing to argue that 
admitted deoxyribonucleic (DNA) evidence was exculpatory.  The 
defendant argues expert testimony by the Commonwealth's analyst 
                     
10 The challenged instruction required that, in order to 
convict the defendant of armed robbery, the jury find that the 
defendant was armed with a firearm.  The instruction appears to 
have been based on the particular indictments in this case, 
which charged "firearm- armed & masked robbery . . . while being 
armed with a handgun."  We hasten to add that the instructions 
would not have been appropriate in other circumstances.  The 
Commonwealth may of course indict a defendant on charges of 
armed robbery by means of a dangerous weapon other than a 
firearm.  Here, the defendant was not so indicted. 
 
16 
 
shows that the expert had concluded that it was substantially 
more likely that a Caucasian individual, rather than an African-
American individual, committed the robbery.11  The evidence, 
however, does not support that interpretation.  The expert 
testified that the probability of another randomly selected 
African American having matching DNA was extremely low (1 in 
1.991 million in the African American population versus 1 in 
1.615 million in the Caucasian population), and the defendant's 
DNA was not excluded as a match.  The witnesses to the robberies 
also testified that the robber was a "black male."  Furthermore, 
the defendant was apprehended by police while fleeing from the 
scene of one of the robberies.  Consequently, it is unlikely 
that the argument now suggested by the defendant would have been 
persuasive.  Counsel was not ineffective for failing to make an 
argument that would have had little, if any, chance of success; 
there was no "reasonable probability" that, had the argument 
been made, it might have resulted in a different outcome, see 
Commonwealth v. Mahar, 442 Mass. 11, 15 (2004), quoting 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). 
5.  Unarmed robbery as lesser included offense.  Because we 
conclude that a BB gun is not a firearm within the meaning of 
G. L. c. 265, § 17, the defendant's convictions of armed robbery 
cannot stand.  The jury were not instructed on any lesser 
                     
11 The defendant is African-American. 
17 
 
included offense.  Nevertheless, where, as here, a jury convicts 
a defendant of a crime despite insufficient evidence of a 
required element, but "the remaining untainted elements include 
all the elements of a lesser included offense, we generally 
correct the error by vacating conviction of the greater crime, 
and remanding for entry of conviction of the lesser included 
offense."  See Commonwealth v. Labadie, 467 Mass. 81, 88, cert. 
denied sub nom. Carcieri v. Massachusetts, 135 S. Ct. 257 
(2014).  See also Commonwealth v. French, 462 Mass. 41, 48-49 
(2012), and cases cited (appellate courts have inherent 
authority to order entry of guilt of lesser included offense 
even absent jury instruction). 
In these circumstances, the lesser included offense, 
untainted by the error of finding a BB gun is a firearm, is 
unarmed robbery.12  See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 419 Mass. 716, 
725 n.8 (1995); Commonwealth v. Howard, 386 Mass. 607, 608 n.2 
(1982).  To prove unarmed robbery, the Commonwealth must prove 
that a defendant robbed "by force and violence, or by assault 
                     
12 Armed robbery can be committed with a dangerous weapon, 
or with a firearm; committing the offense with either form of 
weapon, while masked, results in an enhanced penalty.  See G. L. 
c. 265, § 17.  The defendant was not indicted for, and thus 
cannot be convicted of, armed robbery with a dangerous weapon.  
See Commonwealth v. Bright, 463 Mass. 421, 445 (2012) ("no one 
may be convicted of a crime . . . without first being indicted 
for that crime by a grand jury" [citation omitted]); 
Commonwealth v. Smith, 459 Mass. 538, 543-544 (2011) (indictment 
for crime required for conviction of that crime). 
18 
 
and putting in fear."  G. L. c. 265, § 19 (b).  To prove that a 
robbery was committed "by assault and putting in fear," the 
Commonwealth must establish actual fear or apprehension on the 
part of the victim.  Commonwealth v. Joyner, 467 Mass. 176, 187 
(2014).  Here, the jury could have found that the defendant 
committed unarmed robbery by assault and putting in fear:  the 
BB gun had been spray painted to look like a real gun, and the 
victims of each of the three robberies testified they felt 
afraid during the robberies.  The jury thus could have found all 
of the elements of the lesser included offense of unarmed 
robbery. 
6.  Conclusion.  The judgments of conviction of armed 
robbery are vacated and set aside.  The matter is remanded to 
the Superior Court for entry of judgments of guilt on the lesser 
included offense of unarmed robbery. 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
GANTS, C.J. (concurring, with whom Spina and Cordy, JJ., 
join).  I agree with the court's conclusions and reasoning, but 
write separately to diminish the risk that the peculiar manner 
in which the Commonwealth chose to draft the armed robbery 
indictment in this case may invite confusion regarding our 
holding. 
 
Under G. L. c. 265, § 17, "[w]hoever, being armed with a 
dangerous weapon, assaults another and robs, steals or takes 
from his person money or other property which may be the subject 
of larceny shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison 
for life or for any term of years."  Under § 17, where a 
defendant commits armed robbery "while masked" or "while armed 
with a firearm," the defendant "shall" be sentenced to no less 
than five years in prison for a first offense. 
 
Had the Commonwealth drawn its indictment to allege the 
crime of armed robbery with a dangerous weapon, the defendant 
would properly have been found guilty of armed robbery because 
the BB gun in this case was a dangerous weapon, which under our 
case law includes a weapon that appears to be a firearm, even if 
not actually a firearm.  See Commonwealth v. Powell, 433 Mass. 
399, 400-401, 404 (2001) (affirming conviction for armed robbery 
with dangerous weapon where defendant used fake shotgun and it 
was reasonable for victim to believe that weapon was real).  If 
the Commonwealth had sought a mandatory minimum sentence, it 
2 
 
could also have alleged two separate sentence enhancements in 
the indictment, one alleging that the defendant had committed 
the armed robbery while masked and the other alleging that he 
was armed with a firearm.  Had it done so, the Commonwealth 
could have obtained the sentence enhancement arising from the 
commission of the armed robbery while masked.  For the reasons 
given by the court, the Commonwealth was not entitled to the 
sentence enhancement arising from the commission of the armed 
robbery with a firearm, because a BB gun is not a firearm. 
 
The evidence in support of the armed robbery indictment in 
this case is insufficient only because the Commonwealth alleged 
that the defendant committed the robbery "while being armed with 
a handgun," rather than while being armed with a dangerous 
weapon.  As a result of this charging decision, the armed 
robbery indictment may stand only if the defendant was armed 
with a handgun, which he was not.  It is for this reason that we 
affirm only the conviction of the lesser included offense of 
unarmed robbery.  In short, the Commonwealth in this case 
unnecessarily chose to make conviction of armed robbery rest on 
the defendant being armed with a firearm, when it need only have 
rested on his being armed with a dangerous weapon.