Title: Milwaukee City Housing Auth. v. Cobb
Citation: 2015 WI 27
Docket Number: 2013AP002207
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: March 12, 2015

2015 WI 27 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2013AP2207 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Milwaukee City Housing Authority, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Felton Cobb, 
          Defendant-Appellant.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 354 Wis. 2d 603, 849 N.W.2d 920 
(Ct. App. 2014 – Published) 
PDC No: 2014 WI App 70 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 12, 2015 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 9, 2015 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Pedro A. Colon 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J. dissents. (Opinion filed) 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, the cause was 
argued by John J. Heinen, assistant city attorney, with whom on 
the brief was Grant F. Langley, Milwaukee city attorney.  
 
For the defendant-appellant, the cause was argued by 
Jeffery R. Myer, with whom on the brief was April A.G. Hartman, 
and Legal Action of Wisconsin, Inc., Milwaukee. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Lisa L. Walker and 
Housing and Development Law Institute, Washington, D.C., on 
behalf of the Housing and Development Law Institute.  
 
 
 
2 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Heiner Giese and Giese 
& 
Weden, 
S.C., 
Milwaukee, 
on 
behalf 
of 
Association 
of 
Southeastern Wisconsin, Inc., and Wisconsin Association of 
Housing Authorities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 WI 27
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2013AP2207 
(L.C. No. 
2013SC20628) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Milwaukee City Housing Authority,   
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner,   
 
 
v. 
 
Felton Cobb,   
 
 
Defendant-Appellant.   
FILED 
 
MAR 12, 2015 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals, Milwaukee City 
Housing Authority v. Cobb, 2014 WI App 70, 354 Wis. 2d 603, 849 
N.W.2d 920, which reversed the Milwaukee County circuit court's1 
judgment of eviction and restitution order against Felton Cobb 
("Cobb").   
¶2 
Cobb lives in federally subsidized housing.  His 
landlord, 
the 
Milwaukee 
City 
Housing 
Authority 
("Housing 
Authority"), brought an eviction action against him because he 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Pedro Colon presided. 
No. 
2013AP2207   
 
2 
 
violated the terms of his lease by engaging in "drug-related 
criminal activity"2——specifically, he smoked marijuana inside of 
his apartment.  Cobb argues that he may not be evicted because 
he was not given an opportunity, required by Wis. Stat. 
§ 704.17(2)(b) (2011-12),3 to "take[] reasonable steps to remedy 
                                                 
2 The lease defines "drug-related criminal activity" to mean 
"the illegal manufacture, sale, distribution, use or possession 
with intent to manufacture, sell, distribute or use of a 
controlled substance[.]"  Federal housing law uses a nearly 
identical 
definition: 
"[T]he 
term 
'drug-related 
criminal 
activity' means the illegal manufacture, sale, distribution, 
use, or possession with intent to manufacture, sell, distribute, 
or use, of a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of 
title 21)."  42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l).  Cobb does not dispute that 
smoking marijuana is engaging in drug-related criminal activity. 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 704.17(2)(b) provides in full:  
If a tenant under a lease for a term of one year 
or less, or a year-to-year tenant, commits waste or a 
material violation of s. 704.07 (3) or breaches any 
covenant or condition of the tenant's lease, other 
than for payment of rent, the tenant's tenancy is 
terminated if the landlord gives the tenant a notice 
requiring the tenant to remedy the default or vacate 
the premises on or before a date at least 5 days after 
the giving of the notice, and if the tenant fails to 
comply with such notice. A tenant is deemed to be 
complying with the notice if promptly upon receipt of 
such notice the tenant takes reasonable steps to 
remedy the default and proceeds with reasonable 
diligence, or if damages are adequate protection for 
the landlord and the tenant makes a bona fide and 
reasonable offer to pay the landlord all damages for 
the tenant's breach. If within one year from the 
giving of any such notice, the tenant again commits 
waste or breaches the same or any other covenant or 
condition of the tenant's lease, other than for 
payment of rent, the tenant's tenancy is terminated if 
the landlord, prior to the tenant's remedying the 
(continued) 
No. 
2013AP2207   
 
3 
 
the default."4  Cobb does not challenge the Housing Authority's 
right to issue a notice of eviction in this case.  Rather, he 
argues that § 704.17(2)(b) required the notice of eviction to 
provide him with an opportunity to remedy, or "cure," his lease 
violation in order to avoid eviction.    
¶3 
The Housing Authority argues that it need not provide 
Cobb with an opportunity to take reasonable steps to remedy the 
default 
because 
federal 
housing 
law 
preempts 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 704.17(2)(b) 
in 
this 
case. 
 
Specifically, 
the 
Housing 
Authority argues that § 704.17(2)(b) is preempted by 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1437d(l)(6)5 such that no right to cure or remedy exists for a 
tenant who engaged in drug-related criminal activity.  The 
Housing Authority asserts that its preemption argument is 
supported by the fact that § 1437d(l)(6) requires public housing 
                                                                                                                                                             
waste or breach, gives the tenant notice to vacate on 
or before a date at least 14 days after the giving of 
the notice. 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 704.17(2)(b) is sometimes known as a 
"right to cure" statute. 
5 Section 1437d(l)(6) of 42 U.S.C. states: 
 
Each public housing agency shall utilize leases 
which . . . provide that any criminal activity that 
threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful 
enjoyment of the premises by other tenants or any 
drug-related 
criminal 
activity 
on 
or 
off 
such 
premises, engaged in by a public housing tenant, any 
member of the tenant's household, or any guest or 
other person under the tenant's control, shall be 
cause for termination of tenancy[.]   
No. 
2013AP2207   
 
4 
 
authorities to use leases that state that engaging in drug-
related criminal activity is grounds for eviction. 
¶4 
We hold that 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) preempts the 
right-to-remedy provision of Wis. Stat. § 704.17(2)(b) when a 
public housing tenant is evicted for engaging in "drug-related 
criminal activity" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l).6  
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals' decision.   
I. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶5 
Cobb resides in Merrill Park, a publicly subsidized 
housing building operated by the Housing Authority.  The Housing 
Authority is a public body, organized and chartered under Wis. 
Stat. § 66.1201 for the purpose of operating a low-income 
housing program under the United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 
U.S.C. § 1437, et seq.  The Housing Authority receives funding 
from 
the 
United 
States 
Department 
of 
Housing 
and 
Urban 
Development ("HUD").  The Housing Authority's funding from HUD 
is contingent on compliance with federal laws that govern public 
housing.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(j)(4)(A).  One such law requires 
each public housing agency, including the Housing Authority, to 
provide in its lease that "any drug-related criminal activity on 
or off [the housing] premises, engaged in by a public housing 
tenant, . . . shall be cause for termination of tenancy."  42 
                                                 
6 To 
be 
clear, 
we 
do 
not 
hold 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 704.17(2)(b)'s 
right 
to 
remedy 
is 
preempted 
under 
all 
circumstances.  Our holding is limited to a circumstance in 
which drug-related criminal activity provides the basis for a 
public housing eviction action. 
No. 
2013AP2207   
 
5 
 
U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6).  Accordingly, Cobb's lease states that a 
tenant "shall not engage in . . . [a]ny drug-related or violent 
criminal activity, on or off the public housing development's 
property.  Such activity shall be cause for termination of 
tenancy." 
¶6 
On June 5, 2013, Housing Authority public safety 
officer James Darrow ("Officer Darrow") was patrolling the 
hallways of Merrill Park when he smelled the scent of smoked 
marijuana on the fourth floor of the building.  Officer Darrow 
checked several doors and determined that the marijuana odor was 
strongest outside the door of unit 414, where only Cobb resided.  
Officer Darrow knocked on Cobb's door, and Cobb opened the door 
about 12 inches.  The smell of marijuana intensified in the 
hallway after the door was opened.  When Officer Darrow inquired 
about the smell, Cobb initially stated that the odor was from 
bug spray, and minutes later he attributed the smell to his 
cooking.  Cobb refused to allow Officer Darrow to enter the 
apartment.  Officer Darrow did not observe Cobb using or 
possessing marijuana.  Officer Darrow did not contact police to 
investigate further because in his experience, residents usually 
dispose of an illegal substance before police arrive.  However, 
based on his interaction with Cobb and 14 years of experience as 
a public safety officer, Officer Darrow determined that Cobb was 
smoking marijuana. 
¶7 
On June 9, 2013, the Housing Authority notified Cobb 
that he violated the terms of his lease by engaging in illegal 
drug use on June 5.  On June 26, 2013, the Housing Authority 
No. 
2013AP2207   
 
6 
 
provided Cobb with a 14-day notice of eviction for engaging in 
illegal drug use.  This eviction notice did not provide Cobb 
with an opportunity to remedy or cure the lease violation.  Cobb 
concedes that smoking marijuana is grounds for eviction because 
it is "drug-related criminal activity" as defined in his lease.  
Thus, our analysis focuses on whether Cobb has a right under 
Wis. Stat. § 704.17(2)(b) to remedy or cure the violation to 
avoid eviction, not whether a lease violation occurred in the 
first instance. 
II. 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶8 
On July 18, 2013, the Housing Authority filed an 
eviction action against Cobb in Milwaukee County circuit court.  
In his answer to the eviction complaint, Cobb alleged that he 
could not be evicted because he was not given a five-day 
opportunity, required by Wis. Stat. § 704.17(2)(b), to remedy 
the breach of the lease.  Cobb also filed a motion to dismiss 
the eviction action, arguing that the facts alleged in the 
complaint were insufficient to prove that he smoked marijuana.  
On August 20, 2013, the circuit court held a hearing on Cobb's 
motion to dismiss the action to determine whether he in fact 
smoked marijuana.  After hearing testimony from Officer Darrow 
and Cobb, the court found that Officer Darrow was more credible 
than 
Cobb 
and 
that 
the 
Housing 
Authority 
proved 
by 
a 
preponderance of the evidence that Cobb engaged in illegal drug 
activity in violation of his lease.  The court scheduled a 
second hearing to consider whether Cobb had a five-day right 
No. 
2013AP2207   
 
7 
 
under § 704.17(2)(b) to remedy or cure the lease violation to 
avoid eviction. 
¶9 
On September 17, 2013, the circuit court conducted the 
second hearing.  The circuit court held that Cobb had no right 
to remedy his lease violation because federal housing law 
preempted the right to remedy under Wis. Stat. § 704.17(2)(b).  
Relying on Department of Housing and Urban Development v. 
Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002), and Scarborough v. Winn Residential 
L.L.P./Atlantic Terrace Apartments, 890 A.2d 249 (D.C. 2006), 
the court concluded that there "doesn't have to be a cure once 
criminal activity is found."  Further, the court stated that 
"the odor of marijuana . . . can lead to reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity."  The court issued a restitution order and 
writ of eviction. 
¶10 On October 1, 2013, Cobb filed a notice of appeal.7  On 
May 28, 2014, the court of appeals reversed the circuit court's 
eviction judgment and restitution order.  The court of appeals 
held that Cobb had to be given a five-day right to cure his 
lease violation because Wis. Stat. § 704.17(2)(b) was not 
preempted by federal law.  The court of appeals thus held that 
                                                 
7 Cobb also appealed the circuit court's denial of his 
motion for reconsideration.  The motion argued that the circuit 
court should have applied the "clear and convincing evidence" 
burden of proof, rather than the "preponderance of the evidence" 
standard, when determining whether he smoked marijuana.  The 
court of appeals determined that Cobb had not properly appealed 
this issue.  Milwaukee City Housing Authority v. Cobb, 2014 WI 
App 70, ¶1 n.2, 354 Wis. 2d 603, 849 N.W.2d 920.  This issue is 
not before us. 
No. 
2013AP2207   
 
8 
 
Cobb could not be evicted because the circuit court lacked 
competency over the eviction action.  Specifically, the court of 
appeals concluded that Cobb could not be evicted because the 
Housing Authority had filed the eviction action without giving 
Cobb the five days to remedy his lease violation provided by 
§ 704.17(2)(b).   
¶11 On June 26, 2014, the Housing Authority filed a 
petition for review, which we granted on September 18, 2014.  
The sole issue before us is whether 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) 
preempts 
the 
right-to-remedy 
provision 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 704.17(2)(b) when a public housing tenant is evicted for 
engaging in "drug-related criminal activity" within the meaning 
of 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l). 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶12 The present case requires us to determine whether a 
federal law preempts a state statute.  We determine whether 
federal 
law 
preempts 
state 
law 
independently 
of 
the 
determinations made by the circuit court and court of appeals.8  
Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. U.S. Can Co., 
150 Wis. 2d 479, 487, 441 N.W.2d 710 (1989).  Our discussion of 
preemption will require us to interpret statutes.  Statutory 
interpretation presents a question of law that we review de 
novo.  Megal Dev. Corp. v. Shadof, 2005 WI 151, ¶8, 286 
Wis. 2d 105, 705 N.W.2d 645.  "[W]e have repeatedly held that 
                                                 
8 We are not asked to defer to an agency's determination 
regarding preemption. 
No. 
2013AP2207   
 
9 
 
statutory interpretation 'begins with the language of the 
statute. If the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily 
stop the inquiry.'"  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for 
Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 
(citations omitted).  "Statutory language is given its common, 
ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or 
specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or 
special definitional meaning."  Id. (citations omitted).  We 
will also interpret the parties' lease, which we do de novo.  
Walters v. Nat'l Properties, LLC, 2005 WI 87, ¶6, 282 
Wis. 2d 176, 699 N.W.2d 71.   
IV. 
ANALYSIS 
¶13 "Congress' power to pre-empt state law is derived from 
the Supremacy Clause of Art. VI of the Federal Constitution."  
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208 (1985) (citing 
Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824)).  Courts presume that state 
law is not preempted unless preemption was the "'clear and 
manifest purpose of Congress.'"  Miller Brewing Co. v. Dep't of 
Indus., Labor & Human Relations, Equal Rights Div., 210 
Wis. 2d 26, 35, 563 N.W.2d 460 (1997) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. 
v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)) (quotation marks omitted).  
Federal law preempts state law under any of the following 
circumstances: (1) a federal law explicitly provides that it 
preempts state law; (2) the "scheme of federal regulation [is] 
'so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress 
left no room for the States to supplement it'"; (3) federal law 
and state law conflict such that compliance with both statutes 
No. 
2013AP2207   
 
10 
 
is a "'physical impossibility'"; or (4) state law "'stan[ds] as 
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress.'"   Barnett Bank of Marion 
Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31 (1996) (citations and 
quoted sources omitted).  The Housing Authority relies on only 
the fourth form of preemption, arguing that in this case the 
right-to-remedy provision in Wis. Stat. § 704.17(2)(b) stands as 
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of Congress' 
goal and chosen method of providing drug-free public housing.   
¶14 A 
state 
law 
stands 
as 
an 
obstacle 
to 
the 
accomplishment and execution of Congress' objectives if it 
conflicts with Congress' goal or chosen method for achieving 
that goal.  See Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494 
(1987) (citing Mich. Canners & Freezers Ass'n v. Agric. Mktg. & 
Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461, 477 (1984)).  A state law is 
preempted "only 'to the extent that it actually conflicts with 
federal law.'"  Dalton v. Little Rock Family Planning Servs., 
516 U.S. 474, 476 (1996) (citations omitted).  To determine 
whether a state statute conflicts with a federal law, we first 
interpret the laws and then determine whether they conflict.  
Megal Dev. Corp., 286 Wis. 2d 105, ¶38 (citing Perez v. 
Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 644 (1971)). 
A. The Federal and State Provisions 
¶15 We first turn to the purposes and objectives of the 
federal law at issue.  "With drug dealers 'increasingly imposing 
a reign of terror on public and other federally assisted low-
income housing tenants,' Congress passed the Anti–Drug Abuse Act 
No. 
2013AP2207   
 
11 
 
of 1988."  Rucker, 535 U.S. at 127 (quoting § 5122, 102 Stat. 
4301, 42 U.S.C. § 11901(3) (1994 ed.)).  This Act states that:  
Each public housing agency shall utilize leases 
which . . . (6) provide that any criminal activity 
that threatens the health, safety, or right to 
peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other tenants or 
any drug-related criminal activity on or off such 
premises, engaged in by a public housing tenant, any 
member of the tenant's household, or any guest or 
other person under the tenant's control, shall be 
cause for termination of tenancy.  
42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6).  Section 1437d(l)(6) "unambiguously 
requires lease terms that vest local public housing authorities 
with the discretion to evict tenants for the drug-related 
activity of household members and guests . . . ."  Rucker, 535 
U.S. at 130.  "Thus, any drug-related activity engaged in by the 
specified persons is grounds for termination."  Id. at 131.  
However, this "statute does not require the eviction of any 
tenant . . . .  Instead, it entrusts that decision to the local 
public housing authorities . . . ."  Id. at 133-34. 
¶16 "Congress enacted the Anti–Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 
with the objective of reducing drug-related crime in public 
housing and ensuring 'public and other federally assisted low-
income housing that is decent, safe, and free from illegal 
drugs.'"  Boston Hous. Auth. v. Garcia, 871 N.E.2d 1073, 1078 
(Mass. 2007) (quoting Rucker, 535 U.S. at 134).  See also Hous. 
Auth. of City of Norwalk v. Brown, 19 A.3d 252, 258-59 (Conn. 
App. 
2011) 
("Congress 
declared 
that 
th[e] 
purposes 
and 
objectives [of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act] are 'to provide public 
and other federally assisted low-income housing that is decent, 
No. 
2013AP2207   
 
12 
 
safe, and free from illegal drugs.'" (quoting Scarborough, 890 
A.2d at 256)).   
¶17 To achieve public housing that is decent, safe, and 
free from illegal drugs, Congress required public housing 
authorities to retain in their leases the power to evict tenants 
for any drug-related criminal activity.  See Scarborough, 890 
A.2d at 256-57; Boston Hous. Auth., 871 N.E.2d at 1078.  By 
passing that requirement, "Congress enacted a straightforward 
practical method of dealing with a serious public safety 
problem."  City of S. San Francisco Hous. Auth. v. Guillory, 49 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 367, 371 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1995).  At 
issue is whether Wis. Stat. § 704.17(2)(b) is in conflict with 
the accomplishment and execution of the objectives of the 
federal law.   
¶18 The Wisconsin statute at issue provides:  
If a tenant . . . breaches any covenant or condition 
of the tenant's lease, . . . the tenant's tenancy is 
terminated if the landlord gives the tenant a notice 
requiring the tenant to remedy the default or vacate 
the premises on or before a date at least 5 days after 
the giving of the notice, and if the tenant fails to 
comply with such notice. 
Wis. Stat. § 704.17(2)(b).  In its two briefs to this court, the 
Housing 
Authority 
questions 
whether 
the 
right-to-remedy 
provision in § 704.17(2)(b) can apply to drug-related criminal 
activity, even if this provision is not preempted.9  We question 
                                                 
9 In response to questions posed by this court at oral 
argument, 
the 
Housing 
Authority 
argued 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 704.17(2)(b) does not apply to criminal activity, regardless 
of whether it is preempted. 
No. 
2013AP2207   
 
13 
 
whether 
the 
legislature 
intended 
for 
the 
right-to-remedy 
provision to apply to drug-related criminal activity or criminal 
activity in general.  We also question whether past criminal 
activity is capable of being "remedied."  See Brown, 19 A.3d at 
256-59 (holding that Connecticut's statute providing a right to 
"remedy by repair" a lease violation did not apply to drug-
related criminal activity).  However, we need not resolve this 
issue today because we conclude that 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) 
preempts 
the 
right-to-remedy 
provision 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 704.17(2)(b) when a public housing tenant is evicted for 
engaging in "drug-related criminal activity" within the meaning 
of 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l). 
 
B. Whether Wis. Stat. § 704.17(2)(b) Conflicts  
with Federal Law 
¶19  Cobb argues that Wis. Stat. § 704.17(2)(b) is not 
preempted.  He argues that federal housing law does not conflict 
with § 704.17(2)(b).  He contends that a right to remedy drug-
related criminal activity is consistent with Congress' goal of 
providing drug-free public housing because a tenant must cease 
such activity in order to remedy it.  He also contends that 
compliance with both federal law and § 704.17(2)(b) is possible 
and that the required termination notices under both laws are 
consistent.  He identifies several statements of federal policy 
that, he contends, demonstrate that Congress did not intend 
preemption in the present case.  Cobb further argues that his 
lease requires the Housing Authority to follow § 704.17(2)(b). 
No. 
2013AP2207   
 
14 
 
Specifically, Cobb concedes that illegal drug use may be a basis 
for termination, but he argues that the termination provisions 
under § 704.17(2)(b) must be followed and that those provisions 
give Cobb the right to cure his lease violation to avoid 
eviction.   
¶20 Cobb relies on Housing Authority of Covington v. 
Turner, 295 S.W.3d 123 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009), a split decision 
from a Kentucky intermediate appellate court.  In that case, a 
public housing tenant was evicted because her nephew, who stayed 
with 
her 
every 
other 
weekend, 
stored 
cocaine 
and 
drug 
paraphernalia in the room where he kept his belongings.  Turner, 
295 S.W.3d at 124.  The tenant forwarded an "innocent tenant" 
defense and argued that the housing authority had not met its 
burden of proof.  Specifically, the tenant testified that she 
was unaware that drugs were being kept in her apartment.  Id.  A 
provision in her lease mirrored the language of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1437d(l)(6) and stated that she could be evicted if any guest 
or member of her household engaged in drug-related criminal 
activity.  Id. at 125.  The tenant argued that she could not be 
evicted because she was not given an opportunity, required by a 
Kentucky statute, to remedy the lease violation.  Id. at 124-25.  
The landlord argued that the statute was preempted, but the 
court unanimously concluded that the landlord had failed to 
adequately 
demonstrate 
that 
it 
had 
weighed 
the 
policy 
considerations behind the federal statute.  Id. at 125, 128. 
¶21 In a 2:1 decision, the Kentucky Court of Appeals 
concluded that the state statute was not preempted.  Id.  One 
No. 
2013AP2207   
 
15 
 
objective of the federal Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 is to 
"discourage[e] illegal drug use on public housing premises."  
Id. at 127.  Two judges concluded that a right to remedy illegal 
drug activity is consistent with that objective because a tenant 
who has "'been given the opportunity to remedy may be among the 
most likely of tenants to prevent the situation from recurring, 
thereby furthering the purposes of and objectives of the 
[federal] law.'"  Id.  A concurring judge refused to join the 
two-judge majority opinion concerning preemption.  Id. at 128 
(Moore, J., concurring).  The judge ultimately concurred with 
the majority opinion's result, however, because the housing 
authority had failed to demonstrate that it weighed the policy 
considerations behind the federal statute.  Id. at 129-30 
(Moore, J., concurring).    
¶22 Regarding preemption, the concurring judge concluded 
that "there is no doubt" that the state statute is preempted by 
the federal law.  Id. at 128 (Moore, J., concurring).  She 
reasoned that the right to remedy provided by the state statute 
is contrary to the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, which clearly allows 
tenants to be evicted for any drug-related criminal activity.  
Id. (Moore, J., concurring).  The judge then listed several 
congressional findings to support the federal law's "'one-
strike' policy," which was designed to eradicate illegal drug 
activity in public housing.  Id. at 128-29 (Moore, J., 
concurring) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 11901).  The judge concluded 
that Congress' intent behind the Act was "to look out for the 
best 
interests 
of 
all 
residents 
in 
housing 
developments 
No. 
2013AP2207   
 
16 
 
receiving federal funding.  All tenants should be able to feel 
secure in their homes and live in decent and safe housing, 
without the fear of drug-related crimes often associated with 
public housing."  Id. at 128 (Moore, J., concurring).  Cobb 
urges this court to adopt the reasoning of the Kentucky 
intermediate appellate court's two-judge majority opinion and 
conclude that the right to remedy is not preempted by federal 
law. 
¶23 On the other hand, the Housing Authority argues 
federal housing law preempts the right to remedy a lease 
violation under Wis. Stat. § 704.17(2)(b) in the present case.  
The Housing Authority contends that it has the power under 
federal law to evict Cobb for engaging in any drug-related 
criminal activity.  According to the Housing Authority, a right 
to remedy illegal drug activity would "severely frustrate" 
Congress' requirement that the Housing Authority retain the 
power to evict a tenant for engaging in such activity.  The 
Housing Authority also argues that the goal of the Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act is to provide drug-free public housing.  A right to 
remedy drug-related criminal activity, the Housing Authority 
argues, would frustrate Congress' goal of providing drug-free 
public housing.  The Housing Authority relies heavily on 
Scarborough and Boston Housing Authority, in which the high 
courts 
of 
the 
District 
of 
Columbia 
and 
Massachusetts, 
respectively, held that federal housing law preempted statutes 
that provided defenses against eviction.   
No. 
2013AP2207   
 
17 
 
¶24 In Scarborough, a tenant was evicted for engaging in 
"'criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right 
to peaceful enjoyment of the premises . . . .'"10  Scarborough, 
890 A.2d at 251, 252 n.1.  The tenant's criminal activity was 
possession 
of 
two 
unregistered 
firearms 
and 
unregistered 
ammunition in her apartment.11  Id. at 251-52 & n.2, 257.  The 
tenant argued that she could not be evicted because she was not 
given a 30-day opportunity, provided by a District of Columbia 
code, to cure the lease violation.  Id.    
¶25 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals unanimously 
held that the right to cure was preempted because "application 
of the District's cure opportunity for criminal violations that 
threaten the safety or peace of other tenants would 'stand as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
                                                 
10 Although the tenant in Scarborough was not evicted for 
drug activity, both she and Cobb received eviction notices for 
violating a lease term that mirrored 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6).  
Scarborough v. Winn Residential L.L.P./Atl. Terrace Apartments, 
890 A.2d 249, 255-56 (D.C. 2006).  Section 1437d(l)(6) requires 
a public housing lease to "provide that any criminal activity 
that threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful 
enjoyment of the premises by other tenants or any drug-related 
criminal activity on or off such premises, engaged in by a 
public housing tenant, . . . shall be cause for termination of 
tenancy."  42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6).  Thus, that section 
associates drug-related criminal activity with criminal activity 
that breaches the peace.   
11 The tenant's boyfriend had used a firearm to fatally 
shoot someone in her apartment.  Scarborough, 890 A.2d at 252.  
However, the tenant was evicted for possessing unregistered 
firearms and ammunition, not for the shooting.  Id. at 251-52 & 
n.2. 
No. 
2013AP2207   
 
18 
 
purposes and objectives of Congress.'"  Id. at 255.  Congress 
intended to provide "'federally assisted low-income housing that 
is decent, safe, and free from illegal drugs.'"  Id. at 256 
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 11901(1)).  To that end, Congress required 
public housing authorities to use leases that provide that 
"[a]ny criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or 
right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other residents" 
is grounds for eviction.  Id.  An opportunity to cure the 
criminal 
activity 
"would 
substitute 
for 
the 
landlord's 
discretion a mandatory second-strike opportunity for a tenant to 
stay eviction by discontinuing, or not repeating, the criminal 
act . . . ." 
 
Id. 
at 
257. 
 
Therefore, 
a 
second-strike 
opportunity "would frustrate the purpose of an anticrime 
provision 
that 
permits 
eviction 
for 
'any' 
criminal 
activity [that threatens the safety or peace of other tenants]."  
Id.  
¶26 In 
Boston 
Housing 
Authority, 
a 
public 
housing 
authority sought to evict a tenant because two of her adult sons 
who lived with her were arrested for possessing marijuana.  
Boston Hous. Auth., 871 N.E.2d at 1075-76.  Mirroring 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1437d(l)(6), the tenant's lease stated that she could be 
evicted if any member of her household engaged in drug-related 
criminal activity.  Id. at 1075.  The tenant tried to defend 
against the eviction action by relying on a Massachusetts 
statute that provided an "innocent tenant" defense against 
eviction.  Id. at 1075-76.  She argued that she was an "innocent 
No. 
2013AP2207   
 
19 
 
tenant" because she was unaware of and could not control her 
sons' drug-related criminal activity.  Id. at 1076.   
¶27 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court unanimously 
held that federal housing law preempted the state statute's 
"innocent tenant" defense.  Id. at 1078.  Congress enacted the 
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 to ensure that public housing would 
be "'decent, safe, and free from illegal drugs.'"  Id. at 1078 
(quoting Rucker, 535 U.S. at 134).  To that end, Congress 
"required that housing authorities use clauses in their leases 
that permit the termination of a tenant's lease for crimes 
committed by household members, even where a tenant had no 
knowledge of and was not at fault for a household member's 
criminal activity."  Id.  Allowing the "innocent tenant" 
statutory defense to override a housing authority's discretion 
to evict "would run afoul of and substantially interfere with 
the congressional objective.  It is therefore preempted."  Id.   
¶28 We hold that Wis. Stat. § 704.17(2)(b) is preempted in 
the present case because it "'stan[ds] as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives 
of Congress.'"  See Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 31 (quoting Hines 
v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).  We agree with the 
No. 
2013AP2207   
 
20 
 
reasoning of Scarborough and Boston Housing Authority.12  A right 
to cure a lease violation that constitutes drug-related criminal 
activity conflicts with the federal Anti-Drug Abuse Act in two 
related respects.  First, a right to cure past illegal drug 
activity is counter to Congress' goal of providing drug-free 
public housing.  Second, a right to cure past illegal drug 
activity is in conflict with Congress' method of achieving that 
goal by allowing eviction of tenants who engage in drug-related 
criminal activity. 
¶29 Permitting Cobb to avoid eviction by promising to 
cease his illegal drug use "would run afoul of and substantially 
interfere with the congressional objective" of providing drug-
free public housing.  See Boston Hous. Auth., 871 N.E.2d at 
1078.  Tenants will have an incentive not to use illegal drugs 
in the first instance if they can be evicted for, and given no 
right to cure, drug-related criminal activity.  The potential to 
be evicted for any drug-related criminal activity, including a 
                                                 
12 We disagree with Cobb that Boston Housing Authority is 
distinguishable because it did not involve a right-to-remedy 
statute.  Courts have held that the Anti-Drug Abuse Act preempts 
a variety of state laws that allow tenants to avoid eviction for 
drug-related criminal activity.  E.g., Ross v. Broadway Towers, 
Inc., 228 S.W.3d 113, 123-24 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that 
state "estoppel" defense against eviction is preempted); City of 
S. San Francisco Hous. Auth. v. Guillory, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 367, 
371-72 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1995) (holding that state 
statute that created a "reasonable cause" standard for eviction 
is preempted); Hous. Auth. & Urban Redevelopment Agency of City 
of Atl. City v. Spratley, 743 A.2d 309, 313-14 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1999) (holding that state statute that prohibits 
eviction of "blameless tenants" is preempted). 
No. 
2013AP2207   
 
21 
 
first offense, provides a powerful incentive to avoid such 
activity.  See Rucker, 535 U.S. at 134 (citing Pacific Mut. Life 
Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 14 (1991)) ("Strict liability 
maximizes deterrence . . . .").  By contrast, if a landlord were 
required to give a "free pass" on a tenant's first drug offense, 
tenants would have little incentive not to use illegal drugs 
because if they are caught, they can just promise not to do it 
again.  For the other tenants of the building, this after-the-
fact promise is far from a remedy for completed criminal 
activity and "'stan[ds] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.'"  
See Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 31 (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 
67).  The objective of Congress is to provide safe, drug-free 
public housing, not to provide housing that allows criminal drug 
activity so long as the offender promises not to do it again. 
¶30 Cobb's argument to the contrary is unpersuasive.  Cobb 
argues that an opportunity to remedy a first-offense drug 
violation is consistent with Congress' goal of drug-free public 
housing, because a tenant remedies a drug offense by ceasing to 
engage in drug-related activity.  Simply stated, Cobb suggests 
that a tenant helps to achieve drug-free housing by ceasing 
drug-related activity.  The Kentucky Court of Appeals' two-judge 
majority opinion in Turner used similar reasoning in holding 
that its right-to-remedy statute was not preempted.  Turner, 295 
S.W.3d at 127.  This line of reasoning is flawed because it 
ignores the fact that a tenant who ceases drug-related activity 
has already been caught engaging in such illegal activity.  
No. 
2013AP2207   
 
22 
 
Congress did not merely intend to prevent repeat drug offenses 
in public housing.  Congress intended to eliminate all drug-
related criminal activity in public housing, which includes 
first-time or repeat drug offenses.  See 42 U.S.C. § 11901(1) 
(expressing intent to provide public housing that is "free from 
illegal drugs") (emphasis added).  An opportunity to avoid 
eviction for a first-offense drug violation conflicts with that 
congressional intent.13  
¶31 In addition to conflicting with Congress' goal of 
providing drug-free public housing, a right to remedy drug-
related criminal activity conflicts with Congress' chosen method 
of achieving that goal: allowing public housing authorities to 
evict 
tenants 
for 
engaging 
in 
any 
drug-related 
criminal 
activity.  This additional conflict militates in favor of 
preemption.  See Int'l Paper Co., 479 U.S. at 494 (citation 
omitted) ("A state law also is pre-empted if it interferes with 
the methods by which the federal statute was designed to reach 
[Congress'] goal.").   
¶32 The Anti-Drug Abuse Act "unambiguously requires lease 
terms that vest local public housing authorities with the 
discretion to evict tenants for the drug-related activity of 
household members and guests . . . ."  Rucker, 535 U.S. at 130.  
                                                 
13 In fact, the right to cure statute could, depending on 
the circumstances, allow a tenant to engage in drug-related 
criminal activity multiple times.  Thus, the right to cure 
statute frustrates Congress' goal of providing drug-free public 
housing. 
No. 
2013AP2207   
 
23 
 
A 
right 
to 
remedy 
drug-related 
criminal 
activity 
"would 
substitute for the landlord's discretion a mandatory second-
strike 
opportunity 
for 
a 
tenant 
to 
stay 
eviction 
by 
discontinuing, or not repeating, the criminal act . . . ."  
Scarborough, 890 A.2d at 257.  If the Housing Authority were 
required to provide a tenant with an opportunity to remedy a 
first-offense drug violation, the Housing Authority "would thus 
have lost the ability to terminate a tenant who violated her 
lease by . . . engaging in drug related criminal activity, an 
ability 
Congress 
intends 
to 
preserve 
for 
housing 
authorities . . . ."  Boston Hous. Auth., 871 N.E.2d at 1078.  
The right to cure under state law removes the Housing 
Authority's discretion to evict afforded under federal law and 
instead requires that the Housing Authority allow a tenant a 
second chance.  Simply stated, Wis. Stat. § 704.17(2)(b)'s right 
to cure undermines the federal law's intent to vest the power to 
evict in the Housing Authority.  Section 704.17(2)(b)'s right to 
cure is thus preempted in the present case.  See id. 
¶33 Cobb argues that the right to cure has a "minimal" 
effect on a public housing authority's power to evict tenants 
who engage in drug-related criminal activity.  For support, he 
contends that a tenant who receives a notice to remedy-or-vacate 
must either cease the lease-breaching behavior within five days 
or vacate the premises.  He further contends that a tenant may 
be evicted for a second breach of the lease without being given 
an opportunity to cure the second breach.  Cobb's argument 
appears to mean that the right to cure is not preempted because 
No. 
2013AP2207   
 
24 
 
it does not substantially interfere with Congress' objectives.  
See Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 33-34 (explaining that a state 
statute 
is 
not 
preempted 
if 
it 
"does 
not 
prevent 
or 
significantly interfere with" the exercise of federal power).  
We disagree.  A right to remedy drug-related criminal activity 
would significantly interfere with Congress' objectives because 
it would allow a tenant to avoid an eviction and run counter to 
the objective of providing drug-free public housing.  See 
Scarborough, 890 A.2d at 257-58 (holding that a tenant's right 
to avoid eviction by curing criminal activity "would stand as a 
pronounced obstacle to" and "undermine" congressional intent); 
Boston Hous. Auth., 871 N.E.2d at 1078 (holding that an 
"innocent tenant" defense against eviction for drug-related 
activity "would run afoul of and substantially interfere with" 
congressional intent).   
¶34 To highlight the significance of allowing users of 
illegal drugs to avoid eviction, we note the findings that 
Congress made when adopting the Anti-Drug Abuse Act.  "[P]ublic 
and other federally assisted low-income housing in many areas 
suffers from rampant drug-related or violent crime."  42 U.S.C. 
§ 11901(2).  "[D]rug dealers are increasingly imposing a reign 
of terror on public and other federally assisted low-income 
housing tenants."  Id. at § 11901(3).  "[T]he increase in drug-
related and violent crime not only leads to murders, muggings, 
and other forms of violence against tenants, but also to a 
deterioration 
of 
the 
physical 
environment 
that 
requires 
substantial government expenditures."  
Id. at § 11901(4).  
No. 
2013AP2207   
 
25 
 
Congress' efforts to eliminate those serious problems would be 
significantly obstructed if a tenant who engages in drug-related 
criminal activity could avoid eviction by exercising a right to 
cure past illegal drug activity.   
¶35 Cobb argues that Wis. Stat. § 704.17(2)(b) does not 
conflict with federal law because the Housing Authority could 
have complied with both laws.  Cobb's reasoning is that federal 
housing law allows, but does not require, the Housing Authority 
to evict him.  See Rucker, 535 U.S. at 133-34.  Thus, Cobb 
argues, the Housing Authority would not violate federal law by 
giving him an opportunity to remedy his lease violation.  This 
argument is unpersuasive because it conflates two separate 
grounds for preemption.  See supra ¶13.  A state law is 
preempted if it stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of Congress' objectives, even if compliance with both 
state and federal law is possible.  Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 
31; Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 
154-56 (1982).  Moreover, while federal law does not require 
eviction, Cobb recognizes that it certainly provides for 
eviction.  42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6).  As Cobb also recognizes, 
federal law endows the Housing Authority with the discretion to 
promptly evict a tenant who engages in drug-related criminal 
activity.  Id. at § 1437d(l)(4)(A)(ii).  As we discussed 
earlier, the right to cure is preempted partly because it 
thwarts that discretion by obliging a public housing authority 
to provide an opportunity to cure past drug-related criminal 
No. 
2013AP2207   
 
26 
 
activity regardless of how heinous the offense was.  See supra 
¶¶31-32.   
¶36 Cobb further contends that the termination notice 
requirements under Wis. Stat. § 704.17(2)(b) and federal law are 
not in conflict.  Cobb argues that § 704.17(2)(b) requires a 
termination notice of five days, which is well within the 
applicable federal requirement of any reasonable length of time 
not to exceed 30 days.14  See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(4)(A)(ii).  
However, even if those time limits do not necessarily conflict, 
§ 704.17(2)(b)'s  right to remedy conflicts with federal law in 
the present case for the reasons already stated.   
¶37 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1437d(l)(6) preempts the right-to-remedy provision of Wis. 
Stat. § 704.17(2)(b) when a public housing tenant is evicted for 
engaging in "drug-related criminal activity" within the meaning 
of 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l). 
C. Cobb's Remaining Arguments 
                                                 
14 Cobb's argument relies on Meier v. Smith, 254 Wis. 70, 35 
N.W.2d 452 (1948), in which this court held that a Wisconsin 
statute requiring six months' notice prior to eviction did not 
conflict with a federal statute requiring at least 60 days' 
notice.  We reasoned that the federal statute required a minimum 
amount of notice and the Wisconsin statute did not go below that 
minimum.  Meier, 254 Wis. at 74-75.  We also reasoned that the 
Wisconsin statute "does not take any right from the landlord to 
possession of property granted by [federal law]."  Id. at 79.  
Meier thus hurts Cobb's position.  A right to remedy his lease 
violation would deprive the Housing Authority of its right under 
42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) to evict Cobb and take possession of his 
housing unit. 
No. 
2013AP2207   
 
27 
 
¶38 Cobb makes several arguments in addition to his 
argument that the right to remedy does not conflict with 42 
U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6).  Although we have already determined that 
the right to remedy conflicts with § 1437d(l)(6) in the present 
case, we nevertheless briefly address these remaining arguments.   
¶39 Cobb argues that his lease provides a right to remedy 
his drug use.  He relies on section 9.C. of his lease, which 
requires the Housing Authority to provide termination notices in 
accordance with Wis. Stat. § 704.17(2).  Section 9.C. has 
several express exceptions, including section 9.C.2., which 
states that the Housing Authority "shall give written notice of 
termination of the Lease as of:  . . . 2. A reasonable time 
commensurate with the exigencies of the situation (not to exceed 
30 
days) 
in 
the 
case 
of . . . any 
drug-related 
criminal 
activity . . . ."  Cobb argues that section 9.C.2. does not 
eliminate the right to remedy but rather extends the five-day 
notice period under § 704.17(2) to up to 30 days.  However, 
other lease provisions belie Cobb's argument.  Section 6.J. of 
the lease states that the Housing Authority will provide one 
"written warning prior to a proposed termination of tenancy, 
except . . . in the case of a violation of 5.Q. or a termination 
per 9.C.2."  Section 5.Q., which uses language that closely 
follows 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6), prohibits a tenant from 
engaging in "[a]ny activity that threatens the health, safety or 
right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises . . . " or "[a]ny 
drug-related or violent criminal activity. . . .  Such activity 
shall be cause for termination of tenancy."  Thus, sections 6.J. 
No. 
2013AP2207   
 
28 
 
and 5.Q. plainly state that a written warning——i.e., a right to 
remedy——does not apply to drug-related criminal activity. 
¶40 Cobb relies on several statements of federal policy 
for the proposition that the right to remedy is not preempted.  
We find these arguments unpersuasive.  Cobb points to the 
preamble to a HUD rule, which amended HUD regulations to 
strengthen public housing authorities' ability to evict tenants 
who engaged in illegal drug use or other criminal activity.  
Screening and Eviction for Drug Abuse and Other Criminal 
Activity, 66 Fed. Reg. 28776-01 (May 24, 2001).  The preamble 
states that "[t]his final rule does not . . . preempt State law 
within the meaning of Executive Order 13132."  Id. at 28791.  
However, that statement sheds no light on whether 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1437d(l)(6) preempts state law.15   
¶41 Cobb also relies on a HUD regulation that states that 
"a notice to vacate which is required by State or local law may 
be combined with, or run concurrently with, a notice of lease 
termination 
under . . . this 
section." 
 
24 
C.F.R. 
§ 966.4(l)(3)(iii).  However, this regulation does not indicate 
                                                 
15 An earlier, proposed version of this rule stated that 
federal housing policy created a "one strike" policy with 
respect to illegal drug use.  One–Strike Screening and Eviction 
for Drug Abuse and Other Criminal Activity, 64 Fed. Reg. 40262-
01 (proposed July 23, 1999).  The final version of this rule 
does not use the phrase "one strike."  Cobb argues that HUD's 
omission of that phrase from the final version of this rule 
further indicates that HUD did not intend for this rule to 
preempt state law.  However, 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) preempts 
state law regardless of whether this HUD rule does as well.  
No. 
2013AP2207   
 
29 
 
whether a state law may require a public housing authority to 
provide an opportunity to remedy drug-related criminal activity.   
¶42 Cobb relies on a letter issued in response to Rucker 
by 
then-HUD 
Secretary 
Mel 
Martinez, 
which 
states 
that 
"[e]viction should be the last option explored . . . ."  Letter 
from Mel Martinez, HUD Secretary, to Public Housing Directors 
(Apr. 16, 2002).  However, this letter does not shed any light 
on whether a statutory right to cure may limit a public housing 
authority's power to evict once it explores that option.  See 
Boston Hous. Auth., 871 N.E.2d at 1078-79 & n.14. 
¶43 Finally, Cobb relies on a HUD guidance that provides, 
"State or local law governing eviction procedures may give 
tenants procedural rights in addition to those provided by 
federal law.  Tenants may rely on those state or local laws so 
long as they have not been pre-empted by federal law."  HUD 
Directive No. 96–16, Notice PIH 96–16(HA) (April 12, 1996); see 
also 24 C.F.R. § 247.6(c).  Cobb argues that Wis. Stat. 
§ 704.17(2)(b)'s right to cure is a procedural right allowed 
under that HUD guidance.  However, that HUD guidance expressly 
states that local or state law cannot provide rights that are 
preempted by federal law.  We have already determined that 
federal law preempts the right to cure in the present case.  See 
also 
Scarborough, 
890 
A.2d 
at 
258 
(holding 
that 
"[a] 
'procedural' right to a second chance to refrain from criminal 
activity endangering other tenants would conflict fundamentally 
with" federal housing law).  
No. 
2013AP2207   
 
30 
 
¶44 In sum, for the reasons previously set forth as well 
as those briefly addressed above, we reject Cobb's additional 
arguments that Wis. Stat. § 704.17(2)(b)'s right to cure is not 
preempted in the present case. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
¶45 We hold that 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) preempts the 
right-to-remedy provision of Wis. Stat. § 704.17(2)(b) when a 
public housing tenant is evicted for engaging in "drug-related 
criminal activity" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l).   
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals' decision.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
No.  2013AP2207.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶46 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   (dissenting). 
 
The 
Milwaukee City Housing Authority is attempting to evict Felton 
Cobb, a disabled 62-year-old public housing tenant, because Cobb 
smoked marijuana in his apartment.  In deciding whether to 
effectuate this eviction, the court must be mindful of two 
important, sometimes conflicting, interests. 
¶47 On the one hand, the goal of public and subsidized 
housing programs is to provide low-income individuals with 
"housing that is decent, safe, and free from illegal drugs."1  
Eliminating drug-related criminal activity is a critical element 
of pursuing that goal. 
¶48 On the other hand, "federal law does not provide for 
mandatory summary eviction [for drug-related criminal activity] 
but vests in local authorities the discretion" to evict.2  In 
exercising such discretion, local housing authorities are "to be 
guided by compassion and common sense."3 
¶49 Thus, public housing evictions based on drug-related 
criminal activity require the court to engage in a difficult 
balancing act.  "[T]he Congressional intent is not to be overly 
harsh on tenants . . . but to look out for the best interests of 
                                                 
1 Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 134 
(2002) (citation omitted). 
2 Housing Auth. of Covington v. Turner, 295 S.W.3d 123, 126 
(Ky. Ct. App. 2009). 
3 This quote comes from a letter issued to local housing 
authorities by Mel Martinez, the former Secretary of the United 
States Department of Housing and Urban Development.  The letter, 
dated April 16, 2002, was filed as an exhibit in support of 
Cobb's motion to dismiss. 
No.  2013AP2207.ssa 
 
2 
 
all 
residents 
in 
housing 
developments 
receiving 
federal 
funding."4 
¶50 I write separately to explain how I would balance the 
significant interests at stake in the present case. 
¶51 The 
instant 
case 
was 
briefed 
and 
argued 
as 
a 
preemption case.  Cobb asserts a right under a state law that 
the Housing Authority claims is preempted.  The majority opinion 
rules in favor of the Housing Authority.  I would rule in favor 
of Cobb. 
¶52 Even assuming that the state law at issue is preempted 
(despite the presumption against preemption), I conclude that 
Cobb's eviction is contrary to federal law.  Federal law confers 
on the Housing Authority the discretion to evict Cobb under the 
circumstances presented in the instant case; it does not mandate 
that the Housing Authority evict everyone who engages in drug-
related criminal activity. 
¶53 Because the record before the court contains no 
evidence that the Housing Authority exercised discretion in 
evicting Cobb and because the parties did not argue the 
discretion issue, I would remand the cause to the circuit court 
to decide whether Cobb's eviction was a legitimate exercise of 
the Housing Authority's discretion to evict on the basis of 
drug-related criminal activity. 
¶54 I briefly state the relevant facts. 
                                                 
4 Turner, 295 S.W.3d at 128 (Moore, J., concurring). 
No.  2013AP2207.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶55 The Housing Authority filed an eviction action against 
Cobb based on Cobb's violation of a lease provision prohibiting 
drug-related 
criminal 
activity. 
 
The 
Housing 
Authority 
determined that Cobb was engaged in drug-related criminal 
activity after a public safety officer reported smelling 
marijuana coming from Cobb's apartment and reported that the 
smell became stronger when Cobb opened his door. 
¶56 It is undisputed that Cobb did not receive notice from 
the Housing Authority providing Cobb with five days to either 
remedy the lease violation or vacate the premises.  Such notice 
is required under Wis. Stat. § 704.17(2)(b) (2011-12), which I 
refer to as the five-day notice statute.5 
¶57 Cobb contends that he cannot be evicted without 
receiving the notice required by the five-day notice statute.  
The Housing Authority disagrees, arguing that the five-day 
notice statute is preempted insofar as it requires local housing 
authorities to give tenants an opportunity to remedy drug-
related criminal activity. 
¶58 The 
Housing 
Authority's 
preemption 
argument 
is 
premised on an alleged conflict between 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) 
and the five-day notice statute. 
¶59 42 
U.S.C. 
§ 1437d(l)(6) 
requires 
local 
housing 
authorities to utilize leases that provide that "any drug-
related criminal activity . . . shall be cause for termination 
of tenancy."  This provision was enacted as part of a larger 
                                                 
5 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2013AP2207.ssa 
 
4 
 
effort to "provide public and other federally assisted low-
income housing that is decent, safe, and free from illegal 
drugs."6 
¶60 Importantly, 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) does not mandate 
eviction when a local housing authority determines that a tenant 
is engaged in drug-related criminal activity.  Instead, as the 
Housing Authority acknowledges in the instant case, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1437d(l)(6) gives local housing authorities discretion to 
evict on the basis of drug-related criminal activity. 
¶61 The Housing Authority maintains that the five-day 
notice statute is at odds with its discretion to evict on the 
basis of drug-related criminal activity.  Requiring the Housing 
Authority to give tenants an opportunity to remedy drug-related 
criminal activity, the Housing Authority reasons, would enable 
tenants to avoid eviction regardless of whether a discretionary 
determination has been made that eviction is appropriate under 
the circumstances. 
¶62 For purposes of this dissent, I assume that 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1437d(l)(6) preempts the five-day notice statute.  I therefore 
assume that the Housing Authority has discretion to evict Cobb 
for drug-related criminal activity without giving him an 
opportunity to remedy his lease violation. 
¶63 I conclude, however, that the record before the court 
contains no evidence that the Housing Authority exercised 
                                                 
6 Rucker, 535 U.S. at 134 (citation omitted). 
No.  2013AP2207.ssa 
 
5 
 
discretion in the present case.  On the contrary, Cobb's 
eviction appears to be "a blind application of the law."7 
¶64 Under United States Supreme Court precedent and 
federal regulations, blind application of the law does not 
constitute a legitimate exercise of the discretion conferred by 
42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6).  Thus, in my view, Cobb's eviction is 
contrary to the federal law that the Housing Authority insists 
is controlling. 
¶65 I briefly review the federal regulation and the United 
States Supreme Court opinion that inform my position. 
¶66 The 
federal 
regulation 
set 
forth 
at 
24 
C.F.R. 
§ 966.4(l)(5)(vii)(B) 
clarifies 
that 
although 
drug-related 
criminal activity "shall be cause for termination of tenancy,"8 
eviction will not always be necessary or appropriate when drug-
related criminal activity is discovered.  Rather, local housing 
authorities may consider the circumstances of the particular 
case to decide whether eviction will further the objectives 
underlying 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6).   
¶67 The relevant text of this federal regulation is as 
follows: 
[Local 
housing 
authorities] 
may 
consider 
all 
circumstances relevant to a particular case such as 
the seriousness of the offending action, the extent of 
participation by the leaseholder in the offending 
action, the effects that the eviction would have on 
family members not involved in the offending activity 
and the extent to which the leaseholder has shown 
                                                 
7 See Turner, 295 S.W.3d at 129 (Moore, J., concurring). 
8 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6). 
No.  2013AP2207.ssa 
 
6 
 
personal responsibility and has taken all reasonable 
steps to prevent or mitigate the offending action.9 
¶68 In Department of Housing & Urban Development v. 
Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002), the United States Supreme Court 
discussed and applied both 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) and 24 C.F.R. 
§ 966.4(l)(5)(vii)(B). 
 
The 
Court 
stated 
that 
42 
U.S.C. 
§ 1437d(l)(6) "does not require the eviction of any tenant" who 
engages in drug-related criminal activity.10  Rather, the Court 
explained, the federal law  
entrusts that decision to the local public housing 
authorities, who are in the best position to take 
account of, among other things, the degree to which 
the housing project suffers from "rampant drug-related 
or violent crime," "the seriousness of the offending 
action," and "the extent to which the leaseholder 
has . . . taken all reasonable steps to prevent or 
mitigate the offending action."11 
¶69 I agree with the concurring opinion of Judge Moore in 
Housing Authority of Covington v. Turner, 295 S.W.3d 123, 129 
(Ky. Ct. App. 2009), that "[w]hile much discretion rests with 
the local Housing Authority, Rucker does require some thresholds 
to be met or facts to be taken into consideration for the 
eviction of a tenant under 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6)."  As Judge 
Moore so aptly put it:  "[D]iscretion must be exercised, rather 
than a blind application of the law[,] because 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1437d(l)(6) does not require evictions."12 
                                                 
9 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(l)(5)(vii)(B). 
10 Rucker, 535 U.S. at 133-34. 
11 Id. (citations omitted). 
12 Turner, 295 S.W.3d at 129 (Moore, J., concurring). 
No.  2013AP2207.ssa 
 
7 
 
¶70 The record before the court contains no evidence that 
the Housing Authority exercised discretion in deciding to evict 
Cobb.  In other words, no evidence was presented to show "that 
the Housing Authority weighed anything in its decision to evict" 
Cobb.13 
¶71 The eviction action was filed shortly after a public 
safety officer determined that Cobb was smoking marijuana in his 
apartment.  There is no evidence that any further investigation 
took place in the interim.  There is no evidence that the 
particular housing project in which Cobb resides "suffers from 
'rampant drug-related or violent crime.'"14  There is no evidence 
that Cobb has previously engaged in drug-related criminal 
activity or any other lease violations.  Finally, with regard to 
"the seriousness of the offending action,"15 the circuit court 
observed that the drug-related criminal activity Cobb engaged in 
"is the lowest of criminal activities." 
¶72 I conclude, as did Judge Moore, that "reliance on 42 
U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) alone is insufficient where the local 
housing authority has not made a showing of evidence that it 
weighed the policy considerations behind evictions in drug-
related cases in public housing."16  In the present case, the 
Housing Authority has made no such showing. 
                                                 
13 Id. 
14 Rucker, 535 U.S. at 133-34. 
15 Id. 
16 Turner, 295 S.W.3d at 129 (Moore, J., concurring) 
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¶73 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
 
 
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