Title: Prieto v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 110632
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 13, 2012

1 
 
PRESENT:  Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette, McClanahan, 
and Powell, JJ., and Lacy, S.J. 
 
ALFREDO ROLANDO PRIETO 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
 v.  Record No. 110632 
JUSTICE LEROY F. MILLETTE, JR. 
 
 
 
January 13, 2012 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Randy I. Bellows, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal of right, we review two death sentences 
imposed upon Alfredo Rolando Prieto.  On September 18, 2009, we 
upheld two capital murder convictions against Prieto arising 
from the deaths of Rachael Raver and Warren Fulton III, as well 
as convictions for rape, grand larceny, and two counts of 
felonious use of a firearm.  We remanded for resentencing based 
on a finding of error in the penalty phase of the trial.  On 
November 5, 2010, following a new penalty phase, a jury 
unanimously found both aggravating factors of future 
dangerousness and vileness, either of which provides sufficient 
grounds for the imposition of the death penalty in the 
Commonwealth under Code § 19.2-264.2, and again recommended two 
death sentences.  On December 16, 2010, the circuit court 
entered a final order imposing the death penalty.  For the 
reasons that follow, we find no error in the circuit court's 
judgment and thus will affirm.  
 
 
2 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
A Fairfax County grand jury indicted Prieto in 2005 in 
connection with the deaths of Raver and Fulton.  Prieto was 
charged with two counts of capital murder, one count of rape, 
two counts of use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, 
and one count of grand larceny.  The factual and procedural 
history of the case until the time of the prior appeal was 
thoroughly recounted in our earlier review and is incorporated 
herein.  Prieto v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 366, 682 S.E.2d 910 
(2009) [hereinafter, Prieto I].1  While upholding the convictions 
in the guilt phase, we found the verdict forms defective in that 
they failed to make clear that the jury must be unanimous in 
finding vileness or future dangerousness or both aggravating 
factors in order to impose a sentence of death.  The forms also 
failed to include an explicit life-without-parole option even if 
the jury found one or both of those aggravating factors.  
Accordingly, we remanded for resentencing.  Id. at 418, 682 
S.E.2d at 938. 
 
During the resentencing proceeding, the Commonwealth 
presented victim impact testimony from the family members of the 
deceased, as well as testimony regarding a prior adjudicated 
                     
 
1 In the first reported decision, we designated the two 
separate trials conducted by the circuit court, the first of 
which resulted in a mistrial as recounted in the initial appeal, 
as Prieto I and Prieto II.  We now refer to the first reported 
decision as Prieto I and designate this appeal as Prieto II. 
3 
 
rape and murder by Prieto in California and another alleged but 
unadjudicated rape and murder by him in Virginia.  The jury also 
heard mitigating evidence presented by Prieto, including 
testimony as to the conditions of his traumatic upbringing 
during a civil war in El Salvador and his exposure to gang 
violence as a teenager in California.  Because the evidence 
presented during the resentencing proceeding was extensive, we 
will specifically recount only those portions relevant to 
preserved assignments of error as addressed in the Discussion, 
infra. 
After the presentation of aggravating and mitigating 
evidence, the jury unanimously found both aggravating factors of 
future dangerousness and vileness and recommended two death 
sentences.  The trial judge declined to set aside the jury 
verdict and imposed the death penalty, which was subsequently 
stayed for these proceedings. 
 
Prieto now appeals to this Court with 195 assignments of 
error.  We will first dispose of those issues that were 
previously addressed by the Court in Prieto I, were not properly 
preserved at trial, or lacked accompanying argument as required 
by this Court.  We then discuss more thoroughly the properly 
preserved issues:  (1) whether Judge Randy I. Bellows erred in 
refusing to recuse himself; (2) whether the circuit court erred 
in allowing impermissible victim impact statements; (3) whether 
4 
 
the circuit court erred in not excluding evidence of various 
unadjudicated acts; (4) whether the circuit court erred in its 
verdict forms and jury instructions pertaining to aggravating 
and mitigating evidence and impermissibly limited mitigating 
testimony; (5) whether the circuit court erred in denying 
Prieto's motion to bar Dr. Stanton E. Samenow as the 
Commonwealth's mental health expert; (6) whether the circuit 
court violated Prieto's right against self-incrimination in 
permitting Dr. Samenow to inquire about the charged offenses and 
other convictions in his evaluation, permitting him to report 
that Prieto failed to cooperate, and permitting the Commonwealth 
to state in closing that Prieto never expressed remorse; (7) 
whether the circuit court erred in denying Prieto's motion for a 
jury view of the state prison; (8) whether the circuit court 
erred in denying Prieto's motions to strike Virginia's vileness 
aggravating factor and declare it so arbitrary and unclear so as 
to be unconstitutional; and (9) whether the circuit court erred 
in denying Prieto's request for access to grand jury and petit 
jury information and his motion to strike the jury pool.  
Finally, we conduct the statutorily mandated review as to 
whether the death sentences were imposed under the influence of 
passion, prejudice, and other arbitrary factors, or are 
excessive or disproportionate. 
 
5 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Assignments of Error Waived 
In accordance with Rule 5:22(c), Prieto listed 195 
assignments of error.2  On brief, Prieto only raised and argued a 
portion of them.  Prieto failed to provide arguments for 
assignments of error 1, 2, 10, 13, 15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 22, 23, 
25, 27, 31, 32, 33, 39, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 
52, 53, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 
69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 80, 92, 97, 98, 99, 100, 
108, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 122, 125, 
126, 128, 129, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 
145, 146, 147, 148, 150, 154, 155, 156, 157, 161, 162, 163, 165, 
167, 168, 169, 170, 181, 183, 184, 187, 188, 189, 190, and 194.  
Therefore, those assignments of error have been waived and will 
not be considered in this opinion.  Rule 5:27(d); Andrews v. 
Commonwealth, 280 Va. 231, 252, 699 S.E.2d 237, 249 (2010) 
("Lack of an adequate argument on brief in support of an 
assignment of error constitutes a waiver of that issue."), cert. 
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2999 (2011); Prieto I, 278 Va. 
at 381, 682 S.E.2d at 917. 
In his brief, Prieto lists assignments of error that he 
contends are addressed in some of his arguments.  A review of 
                     
 
2 The assignments of error are designated by the number 
Prieto has given them. 
6 
 
those arguments, however, demonstrates that they do not address 
the assignments of error Prieto claims they do.  As a result, 
assignments of error 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 38, 54, 87, 106, 109, 
123, 124, 132, 133, 153, and 179 have been waived because of 
Prieto's failure to properly brief them.  Rule 5:27(d); Andrews, 
280 Va. at 252, 699 S.E.2d at 249; Prieto I, 278 Va. at 381, 682 
S.E.2d at 917. 
Prieto addresses assignments of error 86 and 95 in footnote 
5 on page 25 of his brief by merely stating the facts from the 
sentencing hearing upon which the assignments of error are 
based.  Prieto provides no argument in support of either 
assignment of error.  Thus, they have also been waived.  Rule 
5:27(d); Andrews, 280 Va. at 252, 699 S.E.2d at 249. 
For assignments of error 36 and 193, Prieto's argument 
merely reiterates the assignments of error themselves.  We have 
previously held that such reiteration is not a sufficient 
argument and will not support the assignment of error.  Teleguz 
v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 458, 473, 643 S.E.2d 708, 718 (2007), 
cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1191 (2008).  Because Prieto has failed 
to argue these assignments of error, they are considered waived.  
Rule 5:27(d); Andrews, 280 Va. at 252, 699 S.E.2d at 249; Prieto 
I, 278 Va. at 382, 682 S.E.2d at 917. 
 
 
7 
 
B.  Assignments of Error Defaulted 
In assignment of error 14, Prieto contends that Virginia 
statutes regarding victim impact testimony are unconstitutional 
as applied because "[they] require[] trial courts to allow 
statutory victims to testify," which takes away the discretion 
of trial courts to weigh the probative and prejudicial value of 
such testimony.  Prieto also argues that the statutes and the 
decisions of this Court have permitted trial courts to allow 
testimony that goes beyond just a glimpse of the victim's life 
or the loss to the family of the victim, instead allowing 
testimony that is prejudicial and cumulative. 
In the argument accompanying assignments of error 81, 82, 
and 90, Prieto argues that his constitutional rights to a fair 
trial under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments were 
violated by the introduction of unnecessarily cumulative and 
inflammatory victim impact testimony leading to a fundamentally 
unfair sentencing proceeding and the risk that the death 
sentences were imposed in an arbitrary and capricious manner. 
In assignments of error 85 and 139, Prieto contends that 
the circuit court erred in allowing the prosecutor to make 
improper arguments based on facts not in evidence and that the 
court further erred by not instructing the Commonwealth to 
refrain from arguing facts not in evidence. 
8 
 
In assignments of error 93, 101, 185, and 186, Prieto 
contends that the circuit court erred in admitting photographs 
of victims of a prior crime.  The only argument Prieto presents, 
which can be found in footnote 6 on page 25 of his brief, is 
that the photograph in question should have been excluded "on 
materiality grounds and under Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4 as 
interpreted by this Court in Andrews." 
In assignments of error 130 and 131, Prieto argues that his 
rights were violated by statements made by the Commonwealth 
during closing arguments that it was speaking for the victims in 
asking for the death penalty.  Prieto contends that these 
statements lead to a fundamentally unfair sentencing proceeding 
and the risk that the death sentences were imposed by the jury 
in an arbitrary and capricious manner. 
In assignment of error 172, Prieto argues that the circuit 
court erred in permitting Richard Barna, Juanita Anders, Anthony 
Anders, Elizabeth Raver, Matthew Raver, Veronica Raver, and Dr. 
John Fulton to testify about the effects the murders had on 
other family members because Code §§ 19.2-264.4(A1) and -299.1 
only allow for victim impact testimony to be about the effect of 
the crime on the person testifying. 
A review of the record demonstrates that Prieto never 
raised any of the above arguments at the resentencing 
proceeding.  Thus, they are all procedurally defaulted and will 
9 
 
not be considered on appeal.  Rule 5:25; Prieto I, 278 Va. at 
382, 682 S.E.2d 917-18; Teleguz, 273 Va. at 470, 643 S.E.2d at 
716. 
C.  Issues Previously Decided 
 
Prieto assigns error to a number of issues that have 
previously been decided and rejected by this Court.  As there is 
no reason to revisit these issues, we reject the following 
arguments based on our prior rulings. 
1.  Indictment and Aggravating Factors 
In assignment of error 4, Prieto argues that, had the grand 
jury intended to indict him for a crime for which he would be 
subject to the death penalty, then it needed to include the 
aggravating factors in the two capital indictments.  By failing 
to do so, he contends, the most that he should have been 
sentenced to was life imprisonment.  We have previously 
considered and rejected this argument.  Jackson v. Warden, 271 
Va. 434, 450, 627 S.E.2d 776, 790 (2006) ("There is no 
constitutional requirement that a capital murder indictment 
include allegations concerning aggravating factors."), cert. 
denied, 549 U.S. 1122 (2007); Muhammad v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 
451, 494, 619 S.E.2d 16, 40 (2005) ("We hold that aggravating 
factors are not constitutionally required to be recited in a 
capital murder indictment."), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1136 
(2006). 
10 
 
2.  Constitutionality of Virginia's Death Penalty Statutes 
In assignment of error 12, Prieto argues that Virginia's 
death penalty statutes are unconstitutional because: 
(a) The death penalty statutes fail to adequately direct the 
jury regarding how to evaluate the aggravating factors 
of vileness or future dangerousness or mitigating 
factors so as to prevent the arbitrary and capricious 
imposition of the death penalty. 
(b) Unadjudicated criminal acts can be considered for the 
finding of future dangerousness. 
(c) Hearsay in the post-sentence report can be considered. 
(d) The sentence of death is unable to be set aside upon a 
showing of good cause. 
(e) The proportionality and the passion/prejudice review 
conducted by this Court are not consistent with the 
Eighth Amendment and other federal or state 
constitutional provisions. 
 
We rejected these same arguments in numerous prior opinions as 
set forth in our decision addressing Prieto's previous appeal 
and, therefore, will not review them again.  Prieto I, 278 Va. 
at 415-16, 682 S.E.2d at 937. 
3.  Reference to General Public for Future Dangerousness 
In assignment of error 34, Prieto argues that the circuit 
court erred when it permitted the Commonwealth to refer to his 
future dangerousness to the general public when the only 
"society" he would ever be a part of if convicted would be 
prison society.  We have previously rejected the argument that 
the only society that the jury should consider is prison 
society.  Schmitt v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 127, 149-50, 547 
S.E.2d 186, 201-02 (2001) (citing Lovitt v. Commonwealth, 260 
11 
 
Va. 497, 516-17, 537 S.E.2d 866, 878-79 (2000), cert. denied, 
534 U.S. 815 (2001)), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1094 (2002). 
4.  Prieto's California Death Sentence 
In assignments of error 35 and 105, Prieto argues that the 
circuit court erred in admitting two certified copies of his 
capital convictions from California because they showed he had 
been sentenced to death.  Prieto contends that admitting this 
evidence violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments because it undercuts the responsibility the jury 
should feel in sentencing a person to another death sentence.  
We already addressed this issue in Prieto's first appeal and 
found that there was no error in the admission of such evidence.  
Prieto I, 278 Va. at 413-15, 682 S.E.2d at 936. 
D.  Recusal of Judge Bellows 
 
On January 29, 2010, Prieto filed a motion for recusal of 
Judge Bellows on the grounds that Judge Bellows "presided over 
all stages of the [second of the two trials encompassed by 
Prieto I], which resulted in a capital murder conviction and 
death sentence" and his "involvement in – and statements made 
during – that trial and sentencing create a reasonable 
appearance of bias against the defendant."  Judge Bellows denied 
this motion.  Prieto alleges that this denial was in error. 
 
Under Canon 3E(1) of the Canons of Judicial Conduct, "A 
judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in 
12 
 
which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, 
including but not limited to instances where . . . [t]he judge 
has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party."  We have 
stated that "in making the recusal decision, the judge must be 
guided not only by the true state of his impartiality, but also 
by the public perception of his fairness, in order that public 
confidence in the integrity of the judiciary may be maintained."  
Wilson v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 19, 28, 630 S.E.2d 326, 331 
(2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  The 
burden of proving a judge's bias or prejudice lies with the 
party seeking recusal.  Commonwealth v. Jackson, 267 Va. 226, 
229, 590 S.E.2d 518, 519-20 (2004).  We employ an abuse-of-
discretion standard to review recusal decisions.  Wilson, 272 
Va. at 28, 630 S.E.2d at 331. 
 
Prieto alleges that Judge Bellows' statements and demeanor 
at the previous sentencing provide a reasonable appearance of 
bias.  Specifically, he states that Judge Bellows was overly 
emotional in explaining his reasoning for entering the death 
sentences in Prieto's prior sentencing, at times "appear[ing] to 
become so over-wrought that he was forced to pause and regain 
composure before continuing."  Prieto quotes Judge Bellows' 
"highly emotional description of the victims and the crime": 
On the night you murdered — you executed these 
children and that is what they were, children.  They 
were just coming out of college with the brightest of 
13 
 
prospects.  They are in love with each [other] and 
with their lives.  They had barely begun to experience 
and enjoy the pleasures and satisfactions of life. 
 
On the night you executed them, you turned the 
final moments of their lives on this earth into what 
can only be described as a living hell.  It is simply 
beyond the powers of human comprehension to imagine 
the desperation, horror and sheer terror that you 
inflicted on Ms. Raver and Mr. Fulton in the very last 
moments of their young lives. 
 
As to the impact of your crimes on the survivors 
of the children you slaughtered, the families they 
left behind, one does not need to imagine what your 
killings did to them for they have borne witness in 
this courtroom to the devastation you've left in your 
wake.  
 
Finally, Prieto alleges that Judge Bellows "entirely discounted" 
Prieto's mitigating evidence.  Prieto argues that these factors 
combine to permit a reasonable perception of bias against him in 
resentencing. 
 
Judge Bellows outlined his reasons for declining to recuse 
himself in what can only be described as a thoughtful and 
thorough 35-page memorandum decision.  He emphasized holdings by 
this Court clarifying instances that are not legitimate grounds 
for recusal, including the previous imposition of the death 
penalty against a given defendant, Justus v. Commonwealth, 222 
Va. 667, 673, 283 S.E.2d 905, 908 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 
983 (1982), and the formation or expression of an opinion as to 
the guilt of the accused based on information acquired during 
14 
 
judicial proceedings.  Slayton v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 371, 
376, 38 S.E.2d 485, 488 (1946). 
Additionally, Judge Bellows' written discussion of these 
issues notes that, "in examining the question of whether a trial 
judge has exhibited personal bias or prejudice, courts almost 
always require proof that the judge was influenced by . . . an 
extrajudicial source."  See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 
U.S. 563, 583 (1966).  When, however, the recusal motion is 
based on comments occurring in the record, Judge Bellows 
correctly recognized that those comments must be taken in the 
context of the record as a whole.  Thus, "a judge should recuse 
himself or herself whenever a reasonable person, with knowledge 
of all the facts of the case, would question the judge's 
impartiality."  United States v. Mikalajunas, No. 91-5119, 1992 
U.S. App. LEXIS 21054, at *6 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing Liljeberg 
v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 860 (1988)). 
 
Judge Bellows accurately characterized the prevailing law 
in his memorandum decision, and it is clear that his refusal to 
recuse himself was not an abuse of discretion.  See, e.g., 
Grattan v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 602, 620, 685 S.E.2d 634, 644 
(2009) (stating that a review for abuse of discretion "includes 
review to determine that the discretion was not guided by 
erroneous legal conclusions," and finding no abuse of discretion 
where the trial judge's decision reflected proper application of 
15 
 
governing legal principles).  Prieto offered no evidence or even 
allegation of extrajudicial influence that would suggest bias.  
In the course of his judicial duty to evaluate the jury's death 
sentences, Judge Bellows was required by the laws of this 
Commonwealth to consider the vileness of the crime.  Given the 
task set before him, it is neither surprising nor inappropriate 
that the record contains emotional language.  It is not required 
nor desired that judges of the Commonwealth possess the ability 
to utterly set aside all human emotion while discharging their 
duties. 
 
Finally, the record does not support Prieto's allegation 
that Judge Bellows entirely discounted Prieto's mitigating 
evidence as being of no value in the analysis.  To the contrary, 
the record states that Judge Bellows "carefully considered" that 
evidence but found that it did not warrant a reduction in 
penalty.  
 
Judge Bellows discussed each of these issues exhaustively 
in his memorandum decision, which represents a fair construction 
of the law of the Commonwealth and interpretation of the facts.  
We accordingly conclude that he did not abuse his discretion in 
refusing to recuse himself.  See, e.g., Grattan, 278 Va. at 620, 
685 S.E.2d at 644. 
 
 
16 
 
E.  Victim Impact Statements 
Prieto argues via multiple assignments of error that the 
circuit court erred in permitting victim impact testimony that 
was beyond the scope of Code § 19.2-264.4(A1) or was unduly 
prejudicial or irrelevant.  As discussed in Part B, supra, his 
arguments addressing the victim impact testimony generally – 
that the testimony was cumulative and that it exceeded the 
allowable scope of victim impact testimony by referring to the 
impact on family members — were not preserved at trial and thus 
are procedurally defaulted.  He additionally assigns error to 
the testimony of three specific witnesses, Major Deidre Raver, 
Lisa Barajas, and Velda Jefferson, whose testimony we will 
address in turn. 
1.  Testimony of Major Deidre Raver 
 
Prieto alleges that victim impact statements made by 
Rachael Raver's sister, Major Deidre Raver, herself an alleged 
victim of an unreported rape many years prior, were improper and 
highly prejudicial.  In particular, he objected to the following 
testimony by Major Raver: 
[L]ook at me, I'm 50 years old, I never got married.  
I don't think I ever will, and I'm not — it's one of 
those things where I don't think I'm capable of having 
a relationship after that. 
 
I mean, I myself was a rape survivor when I was 
very young, and I watched that — that guy got away 
with it.  So now I have my sister who dies.  
 
17 
 
 
Prieto moved for a mistrial, arguing that the testimony 
implied "that this jury should give retribution for her personal 
victimization" from crimes committed by another individual.  The 
circuit court, after temporarily excusing the jury to hear 
argument, instructed Major Raver that she could not testify to 
the circumstances of her own rape but could discuss any 
psychological injury that she suffered as a result of what she 
described as survivor's guilt following her sister's attack.  
The jurors returned, and the circuit court instructed them to 
"disregard Major Raver's statement that the person who raped her 
got away with it and give it no further consideration in this 
trial or in your deliberations." 
 
Major Raver then further explained her psychological 
injury: 
Basically, you know, as a rape survivor myself, I had 
a lot of feelings of just guilt that my sister got 
murdered because I wasn't there to save her. . . . 
[B]eing a survivor yourself and a victim, and then you 
have a family member who is a victim, and they're 
younger than you, and you're not there to protect them 
and save them, the amount of guilt, it just — it makes 
it impossible to grieve. 
 
 
Prieto argues that the circuit court erred in two ways:  
first, that the curative instruction was insufficient given the 
prejudicial nature of Major Raver's remarks and the time the 
jury had to ruminate over the remarks while they were dismissed 
from the courtroom; and second, that Major Raver's psychological 
18 
 
testimony related to fallout from another crime not alleged to 
have been committed by Prieto and should not have been admitted.  
Prieto does not contend that Raver's comments subsequent to the 
curative instruction exceeded the scope of the circuit court's 
ruling.  Thus, the issues before us are (1) whether the scope of 
her testimony concerning the psychological harm that she 
suffered was proper, and (2) whether the curative instruction 
was sufficient so as not to require a mistrial. 
Generally, this Court has held and continues to hold that 
"victim impact testimony regarding a capital offense is 
admissible because it is probative of the depravity of mind 
component of the vileness predicate."  Andrews, 280 Va. at 291-
92, 699 S.E.2d at 272 (citing Weeks v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 
460, 476, 450 S.E.2d 379, 389-90 (1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 
829 (1995)).  Code § 19.2-264.4 provides that: 
A.  Upon a finding that the defendant is guilty 
of an offense which may be punishable by death, a 
proceeding shall be held which shall be limited to a 
determination as to whether the defendant shall be 
sentenced to death or life imprisonment. . . . 
 
A1.  In any proceeding conducted pursuant to this 
section, the court shall permit the victim, as defined 
in § 19.2-11.01, . . . to testify in the presence of 
the accused regarding the impact of the offense upon 
the victim.  The court shall limit the victim's 
testimony to the factors set forth in clauses (i) 
through (vi) of subsection A of § 19.2-299.1. 
 
Code § 19.2-11.01(B) defines a victim as a person "who has 
suffered physical, psychological or economic harm as a direct 
19 
 
result of the commission of a felony" and the "spouse, parent, 
sibling, or legal guardian of such a person who . . . was the 
victim of a homicide," among others. 
 
Virginia law is in accord with the decisions of the Supreme 
Court of the United States, holding that a " '[s]tate may 
legitimately conclude that evidence about the victim and about 
the impact of the murder on the victim's family is relevant to 
the . . . decision as to whether or not the death penalty shall 
be imposed.' "  Beck v. Commonwealth, 253 Va. 373, 381, 484 
S.E.2d 898, 903 (1997) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 
808, 827 (1991)), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1018 (1997).  "So long 
as [the] prejudicial effect does not outweigh its probative 
value, such evidence is beneficial to the determination of an 
individualized sentence as is required by the Eighth Amendment."  
Beck, 253 Va. at 382, 484 S.E.2d at 904 (citing Payne, 501 U.S. 
at 825). 
 
Because of its relevance to the vileness aggravating factor 
only, this Court has held that victim impact testimony must be 
confined to the crime for which the defendant is being 
sentenced.  Andrews, 280 Va. at 291-92, 699 S.E.2d at 272.  As 
we explained in Andrews, "[v]ictim impact testimony regarding 
unadjudicated criminal conduct . . . is not relevant to the 
vileness predicate because the testimony concerns an offense 
20 
 
unrelated to the capital offense upon which the defendant is 
being sentenced."  Id. at 292, 699 S.E.2d at 272. 
Prieto argues that this Court should consider Major Raver's 
own rape to be an unadjudicated act under Andrews and, 
accordingly, should find it irrelevant to the vileness 
aggravating factor and therefore inadmissible.  We disagree.  
Andrews pertains to instances in which there is some allegation 
that the defendant being sentenced also committed and should be 
held responsible for the unadjudicated act.  No reasonable juror 
could conclude from Major Raver's testimony that she was 
attempting to implicate Prieto in her own rape in any way. 
Major Raver's victim impact testimony as a family member of 
the deceased is permitted under Code §§ 19.2-11.01(B) and 19.2-
264.4.  The proper scope of Major Raver's testimony must 
therefore be evaluated as any other victim impact statement.  
The scope of testimony in the sentencing phase is wide, and the 
standard for exclusion of relevant evidence is whether the 
prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value.  
Teleguz, 273 Va. at 482, 643 S.E.2d at 723.  This is a matter of 
discretion for the circuit court and is properly reviewed under 
an abuse of discretion standard.  Id. 
Here, the circuit court directed the witness to narrow the 
scope of her testimony to the impact that her sister's murder 
had on her own life.  Her own previous experiences were raised 
21 
 
in the context of this discussion.  This testimony, however, was 
not "so far removed from the victims as to have nothing of value 
to impart" about the impact of the murder, Beck, 253 Va. at 385, 
484 S.E.2d at 906, and the circuit court did not abuse its 
discretion in allowing the testimony. 
 
Additionally, we must consider whether Major Raver's 
original statement that her rapist "got away with it" was so 
prejudicial as to warrant a mistrial.  In this evaluation, we 
review whether the jury was "promptly, explicitly and carefully 
instructed" to disregard the inappropriate testimony, Lewis v. 
Commonwealth, 211 Va. 80, 84, 175 S.E.2d 236, 238 (1970), and 
consider the nature of the arguably inflammatory material in 
relation to the rest of the evidence in the case.  Fowlkes v. 
Commonwealth, 52 Va. App. 241, 252, 255, 663 S.E.2d 98, 103, 105 
(2008). 
 
There is no question that the trial judge's instruction was 
explicit and careful.  Prieto argues that it was not prompt in 
that it was not immediate because the jury was dismissed while 
the circuit court heard oral argument on the matter, leaving the 
jurors with time to ruminate on Major Raver's statement.  Judges 
routinely abide by this practice, however, when considering 
issues of consequence.  Indeed, judges must be given the 
opportunity, when necessary, to hear thorough argument on an 
evidentiary issue before ruling.  We find that the circuit 
22 
 
court's proper and prompt curative instruction upon the jury's 
return immediately after hearing oral argument was appropriate 
and sufficient to meet the standard set forth in Lewis.  As we 
have stated in the past, "[a] jury is presumed to have followed 
the instructions of the trial court."  Muhammad, 269 Va. at 524, 
619 S.E.2d at 58.  We therefore have no basis from which to 
conclude that a mistrial was necessary. 
 
Finally, when the nature of the challenged testimony is 
viewed in light of the context and other incidents of the case, 
it becomes clear that the trial judge did not abuse his 
discretion in refusing to grant a second mistrial.  No 
accusation was ever made that Prieto had any connection with 
Major Raver's rape.  Despite having had time to ruminate over 
her statement, in the situation presented, no reasonable juror 
would assume that he or she was implicitly invited, as Prieto 
alleges, to levy additional retribution upon him arising from 
unrelated crimes committed long ago against Major Raver.  We 
accordingly find that the circuit court did not abuse its 
discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial or bar subsequent 
testimony from Major Raver. 
2.  Testimony of Lisa Barajas 
 
Lisa Barajas testified to events that took place in 
California in 1990 in which she, her mother Emily Devila, and 
Yvette Woodruff were kidnapped and raped by Prieto and two other 
23 
 
men, and Yvette was murdered.  Prieto was convicted of "(1) one 
count of first degree murder with a robbery-murder, a 
kidnapping-murder, and a rape-murder special circumstance; (2) 
two counts of attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated 
murder; (3) two counts of attempted robbery; (4) two counts of 
robbery; (5) three counts of kidnapping for robbery; (6) three 
counts of forcible rape; and (7) one count of possession of a 
firearm by a felon."  People v. Prieto, 66 P.3d 1123, 1130-31 
(Cal.) (internal citations omitted), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1008 
(2003). 
 
"The use of prior criminal convictions and prior 
unadjudicated criminal conduct as evidence of [the] 'future 
dangerousness' [predicate of a capital offense] has been 
consistently approved" by this Court.  Watkins v. Commonwealth, 
238 Va. 341, 352, 385 S.E.2d 50, 56 (1989), cert. denied, 494 
U.S. 1074 (1990).  The scope of testimony regarding prior acts, 
as probative of future dangerousness, is limited to the actual 
events and does not extend to the impact of the events on the 
victims. 
Prieto has two primary objections.  The first is that 
Barajas' testimony addressed the actions of Prieto's codefendant 
rather than Prieto himself and is therefore irrelevant and 
prejudicial.  The second is that portions of the testimony 
constitute victim impact statements, which are not admissible 
24 
 
for crimes other than the one for which the defendant is being 
sentenced. 
 
The first issue arises in part because California law does 
not distinguish convictions between principal actors and agents 
in the second degree or aiders and abettors.  See Prieto, 66 
P.3d at 1140 ("[D]efendant could be found guilty if the charged 
crime was the natural and probable consequence of another crime 
that he intentionally aided and abetted.").  The record 
indicates that each man was the primary rapist of a different 
woman, and Barajas made clear throughout her testimony that 
Prieto was not her physical rapist.  Prieto seeks, therefore, to 
exclude her testimony as irrelevant to his future dangerousness. 
Barajas' testimony, however, was highly relevant to Prieto.  
Barajas indicated that the three men worked together in a 
coordinated effort to commit the offenses.  Although she 
mentioned her own rape and that she was bitten during it, a 
review of her testimony reveals that it was narrowly tailored to 
describing the general events and Prieto's involvement in the 
crimes.  In fact, the most inflammatory remarks, during which 
she described lying in the dirt pretending to be dead waiting to 
be stabbed, are in fact those most directly related to Prieto:  
she recounted him having a conversation with her rapist and 
asking her primary attacker whether he had killed her yet.  Her 
testimony was thus highly probative as to the future 
25 
 
dangerousness aggravating factor, and it cannot be said that the 
circuit court abused its discretion in allowing the testimony. 
 
Prieto also argues that Barajas' testimony strayed into 
impermissible "victim impact" territory when describing seeing 
"Yvette, like sitting, slumped up against the tree."  A review 
of the testimony shows that this argument is baseless.  Barajas 
did not elaborate on the impact of the trauma on her life; she 
merely described the events as they occurred and explained her 
location in relation to Yvette.  The circuit court was well 
within its discretion in admitting this testimony as relevant to 
the future dangerousness aggravating factor. 
3.  Testimony of Velda Jefferson 
 
Prieto argues that the circuit court erred in allowing 
victim impact testimony arising from unadjudicated acts.  
Unadjudicated acts are admissible in the sentencing phase of a 
capital trial in Virginia, but only as to the issue of future 
dangerousness.  Stockton v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 192, 209, 402 
S.E.2d 196, 206, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 902 (1991).  Victim 
impact testimony addresses the vileness of a crime and so is 
only appropriate in the context of the offense for which the 
defendant is being sentenced. 
 
The testimony in dispute is that of Velda Jefferson, the 
mother of Veronica Jefferson.  Veronica was found dead and 
partially naked in a school yard in 1988 at the age of 28, an 
26 
 
apparent victim of rape and murder.  In 1999, a DNA profile 
implicated Prieto.  Detectives and forensic officers were 
brought forward to testify to the actual circumstances of the 
murder and the discovery of DNA evidence from a vaginal swab of 
Veronica.  In addition, Velda testified briefly:  her testimony 
spanned only about eleven pages of transcript, about half of 
which encompassed argument between counsel over objections about 
the scope of the testimony. 
 
Prieto's only timely objection relating to victim impact 
testimony concerned Velda's statements that Veronica was in a 
committed relationship with her boyfriend.  At sidebar, the 
Commonwealth clarified that the mother's testimony was offered 
not as victim impact testimony but rather to show that it was 
unlikely that any sexual contact with Prieto was consensual.  It 
was certainly within the purview of the circuit court to admit 
this factual testimony. 
 
Prieto also assigns error to other aspects of Velda's 
testimony, such as the last time she spoke to Veronica.  There 
was no contemporaneous objection that this constituted 
inadmissible victim impact testimony.  Accordingly, as discussed 
in Part B, supra, these assignments of error are defaulted under 
Rule 5:25. 
F.  Unadjudicated Acts Arising from the 
Murder of Veronica Jefferson 
 
27 
 
 
Prieto further alleges that, even if it did not constitute 
victim impact testimony, the circuit court erred in admitting 
testimony of unadjudicated acts arising from Veronica 
Jefferson's murder.  Specifically, Prieto argues (1) that if 
unadjudicated acts are to be admitted, they require a high 
threshold of reliability which is absent here, and (2) that due 
to the decades of time elapsed since the commission of the 
unadjudicated act, it is not indicative of future dangerousness 
as required by Virginia law. 
 
This Court has previously held evidence of unadjudicated 
acts to be admissible in sentencing as probative of future 
dangerousness.  Stockton, 241 Va. at 209, 402 S.E.2d at 206.  We 
have rejected Prieto's argument that evidence of an 
unadjudicated crime is not reliable.  Beaver v. Commonwealth, 
232 Va. 521, 529, 352 S.E.2d 342, 347, cert. denied, 483 U.S. 
1033 (1987).  Indeed, we have said that " 'a trier of fact 
called upon to decide whether . . . to impose the death penalty 
is entitled to know as much relevant information about the 
defendant as possible.' "  Quesinberry v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 
364, 379, 402 S.E.2d 218, 227 (omission in original) (quoting 
Beaver, 232 Va. at 529, 352 S.E.2d at 347), cert. denied, 502 
U.S. 834 (1991).  We have also rejected the argument that such 
testimony is inherently prejudicial.  Gray v. Commonwealth, 233 
28 
 
Va. 313, 346-47 & n.8, 356 S.E.2d 157, 175-76 & n.8, cert. 
denied, 484 U.S. 873 (1987). 
The Supreme Court of the United States has rejected the 
argument that specific prior unadjudicated acts must be 
established beyond a reasonable doubt to be admissible.  See 
generally Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 690 n.7 
(1988) ("[T]he trial court neither weighs credibility nor makes 
a finding that the Government has proved the conditional fact by 
[even] a preponderance of the evidence.  The court simply 
examines all the evidence in the case and decides whether the 
jury could reasonably find [that the prior act took place].").  
See also Pavlick v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 219, 227, 497 
S.E.2d 920, 924 (1998) (holding that the Huddleston standard for 
proof that a prior bad act took place is in accord with Virginia 
law).  With respect to the sentence phase of a capital murder 
trial, this Court has specifically rejected the argument that 
individual unadjudicated acts require an elevated degree of 
reliability, requiring only that the evidence on the whole must 
be sufficient to permit a jury to make the ultimate finding of 
future dangerousness or vileness beyond a reasonable doubt in 
order to impose the death penalty.  Walker v. Commonwealth, 258 
Va. 54, 64-66, 515 S.E.2d 565, 571-72 (1999), cert. denied, 528 
U.S. 1125 (2000). 
29 
 
 
Prieto argues that his due process rights were violated 
because the evidence of unadjudicated acts was not accompanied 
by evidence suggesting its predictive reliability.  The 
Commonwealth did not provide expert testimony discussing the 
predictive nature of events occurring decades prior to trial.  
It does not appear that this Court has ever specifically 
addressed whether the Commonwealth bears a burden, in proving 
future dangerousness beyond a reasonable doubt, to present 
expert witnesses to draw a nexus between past and future 
behavior. 
It is true that, in some previous capital cases, the 
Commonwealth provided this sort of nexus.  In Beaver, for 
example, the prosecution presented an expert witness who 
testified that the defendant's psychological profile was "a 
highly consistent profile reflecting personality traits of long 
duration.  It is not likely to change much with time . . . . 
Treatment or rehabilitation programs tend not to be very 
successful for individuals with this profile type."  232 Va. at 
532, 352 S.E.2d at 348-49 (emphasis omitted). 
On the other hand, neither this Court nor the Supreme Court 
of the United States has ever specifically required expert 
testimony providing this nexus, stating instead that the jury 
was entitled to as much information as possible in the 
sentencing phase so as to make an informed decision based on the 
30 
 
individual in question.  Payne, 501 U.S. at 821.  Thus, there is 
no support for the argument that the law places such a burden on 
the prosecution.  Certainly, the defense had the opportunity to 
refute both the accuracy and the predictive nature of this 20-
year-old allegation.  Prieto failed to do so at trial. 
G.  Mitigation Instructions and Testimony 
1.  Mitigation "of the Offense" 
 
Prieto alleges that the circuit court erred, both in 
instructing the jury and in the verdict forms, by including the 
allegedly limiting term "of the offense" following "aggravation 
and mitigation."  Specifically, the jury verdict forms stated 
that "We the jury . . . having considered all the evidence in 
aggravation and mitigation of the offense. . . ."  Prieto argues 
that this erroneously narrowed the jurors' focus to the offense 
at hand and would lead them to believe that they could not 
consider the larger mitigating evidence of his early life. 
 
This argument is without merit.  The language on the 
verdict forms tracks the statutory language from Code § 19.2-
264.4 and is consistent with Virginia law.  In addition, the 
jury instructions given by the circuit court repeatedly refer 
generally to evidence in mitigation without the phraseology "of 
the offense."  Finally, the jury's deliberation followed days of 
mitigating evidence not directly related to the offense, with no 
limiting instruction from the circuit court.  A reasonable jury 
31 
 
would not have gathered from the circuit court's instructions 
and the circumstances of the trial that it was compelled to 
discount any of the evidence presented.  Instead, the 
instructions referred to consideration of all the mitigating 
evidence. 
2.  Limitations on Mitigating Testimony 
 
Prieto argues that the circuit court erred in unduly 
limiting mitigating evidence in testimony from Dr. James 
Garbarino, Teodora Alvarado, and Yolanda Loucel.  But a review 
of the record clearly shows that objections sustained during the 
questioning pertained to the method of questioning, such as 
leading the witnesses or posing vague questions.  In all 
instances the circuit court allowed counsel the opportunity to 
rephrase the questions to obtain the desired information.  
Although the scope of admissible mitigating evidence is wide, it 
is in the sound discretion of the circuit court to supervise the 
presentation of witnesses.  See, e.g., Williams v. Commonwealth, 
248 Va. 528, 542, 450 S.E.2d 365, 374 (1994) (stating that the 
determination of the permissible scope of witness testimony is 
"committed to the sound discretion of the trial court"), cert. 
denied, 515 U.S. 1161 (1995).  Here, there is no evidence that 
the circuit court abused its discretion or that its rulings were 
prejudicial to Prieto in any way. 
H.  Appointment of the Commonwealth's Mental Health Expert 
32 
 
 
Prieto contends that the circuit court erred in appointing 
Dr. Samenow as the Commonwealth's mental health expert under 
Code § 19.2-264.3:1(F).  We disagree. 
 
Code § 19.2-264.3:1 provides that, in the event of a 
conviction, a defendant charged with capital murder intending to 
present expert testimony to support a claim in mitigation 
relating to his history, character, or mental condition, may be 
subject to evaluation by one or more of the Commonwealth's own 
mental health experts.  The expert appointed must be "(i) a 
psychiatrist, a clinical psychologist, or an individual with a 
doctorate degree in clinical psychology who has successfully 
completed forensic evaluation training as approved by the 
Commissioner of Behavioral Health and Developmental Services and 
(ii) qualified by specialized training and experience to perform 
forensic evaluations."  Code § 19.2-264.3:1(A), (F). 
 
Prieto does not dispute that Dr. Samenow satisfied these 
professional requirements.  Instead, Prieto argues that Dr. 
Samenow was not qualified for appointment because he "has 
exhibited significant bias" throughout his career "against the 
possibility of mitigating evidence based on a defendant's 
history or background." 
 
To support this claim, Prieto first relies on Dr. Samenow's 
opinions, expressed in a book and newspaper article, that 
criminals think differently, that sociological and physiological 
33 
 
determinism merely provides excuses to criminals, and that 
criminals freely choose their way of life.  See Stanton E. 
Samenow, Inside the Criminal Mind (2004); Stanton E. Samenow, 
"Psyching Out Crime Excuses," The Washington Times, Aug. 25, 
2004.  Next, Prieto cites an opinion from the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in which one judge 
noted:  "Dr. Samenow's professed and public views make him 
incompetent to aid a defendant in finding and presenting 
mitigating factors at a defendant's sentencing phase."  Ramdass 
v. Angelone, 187 F.3d 396, 411 n.1 (4th Cir. 1999) (Murnaghan, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Lastly, Prieto 
points to Dr. Samenow's testimony that Prieto was "superficially 
polite," uncooperative, and remorseless during the examination. 
 
Even if Dr. Samenow is biased against mitigating evidence 
as Prieto alleges, we fail to see how that bias disqualified Dr. 
Samenow from being appointed as the Commonwealth's mental health 
expert under Code § 19.2-264.3:1(F).  Unlike the circumstances 
presented in Ramdass, Dr. Samenow was not appointed in this case 
to "assist the defense in the preparation and presentation" of 
mitigating evidence.  Code § 19.2-264.3:1(A).  Instead, he was 
appointed to assist the prosecution in rebutting such evidence.  
Code § 19.2-264.3:1(F).  Thus, because there is no question that 
Dr. Samenow satisfied the professional requirements for 
appointment set out in Code § 19.2-264.3:1(A), we conclude that 
34 
 
the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in appointing him 
as the Commonwealth's mental health expert under Code § 19.2-
264.3:1(F). 
I.  Right Against Self-incrimination 
 
Prieto asserts that the circuit court violated his Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination by: (1) allowing Dr. 
Samenow to question him about the circumstances of the 
underlying offenses, (2) allowing Dr. Samenow to testify that he 
was uncooperative, and (3) allowing the Commonwealth to argue 
that it had "waited in vain to hear an ounce of remorse" from 
him.  We address these arguments in turn. 
1.  Questions About Underlying Offenses 
 
Prieto claims that the circuit court erred in allowing Dr. 
Samenow to question him about the underlying offenses during the 
evaluation.  "[W]here a defendant limits his proposed mitigation 
evidence to his history and character and invokes his right to 
remain silent regarding the criminal charges against him," 
Prieto argues, "the Commonwealth cannot force the defendant to 
choose between his constitutional right to remain silent and his 
constitutional right to present relevant mitigating evidence."  
Accordingly, Prieto maintains, the Commonwealth should have been 
"barred from forcing [him] to answer questions about his 
offenses when his mental state is not at issue." 
35 
 
 
We rejected a similar argument in Savino v. Commonwealth, 
239 Va. 534, 391 S.E.2d 276, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 882 (1990).  
There, the defendant claimed that Code § 19.2-264.3:1 violated 
(among other things) his Fifth Amendment rights.  Id. at 543-44, 
391 S.E.2d at 281.  We disagreed, holding that when a defendant 
gives notice of his intention to use a mental health expert's 
evaluation as mitigating evidence in accordance with Code 
§ 19.2-264.3:1(E), he waives his right against the introduction 
of psychiatric testimony.  Id. at 544, 391 S.E.2d at 281.  We 
have since applied Savino's rationale to hold that Code § 19.2-
264.3:1(F) "do[es] not limit the scope of the expert's 
examination to matters of mitigation" and that therefore the 
Commonwealth's mental health expert may evaluate a defendant's 
future dangerousness.  Stewart v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 222, 
243, 427 S.E.2d 394, 408, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 848 (1993). 
 
In light of these holdings, we believe that the circuit 
court did not err in allowing Dr. Samenow to question Prieto 
about the underlying offenses, because Prieto waived his Fifth 
Amendment rights when he gave notice of his intention to use his 
mental health expert's evaluation as mitigating evidence. 
2.  Prieto's Failure to Cooperate 
 
Prieto contends that Dr. Samenow's testimony that he was 
uncooperative during the evaluation was not only false, but it 
was also "punishment . . . for [his] legitimate exercise of his 
36 
 
constitutional right[]" to remain silent.  He thus submits that 
it should have been excluded by the circuit court.  We disagree.  
First, as noted above, a defendant waives his Fifth Amendment 
rights when he gives notice of his intention to use his mental 
health expert's evaluation as mitigating evidence.  Second, the 
record fully supports the circuit court's finding that "there 
was a partial failure to cooperate" on Prieto's part during Dr. 
Samenow's evaluation.  Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit 
court did not err in allowing Dr. Samenow to testify about 
Prieto's "refusal to cooperate" during the evaluation, in 
accordance with Code § 19.2-264.3:1(F)(2). 
3.  Commonwealth's Comment on Prieto's Lack of Remorse 
 
Prieto claims that "[t]he Commonwealth exploited [his] 
silence in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights and in 
violation of Article 1, Section 8 of the Virginia Constitution, 
when [it] argued in closing argument that it ha[d] 'waited in 
vain to hear an ounce of remorse leak out anywhere, but there 
was none."  We disagree. 
 
To determine whether a prosecutor's comment violates a 
defendant's right to remain silent, we have set forth the 
following test:  "[W]hether, in the circumstances of the 
particular case, the language used was manifestly intended or 
was of such character that the jury would naturally and 
necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of the 
37 
 
accused to testify."  Hines v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 905, 907, 
234 S.E.2d 262, 263 (1977) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  Here, as the Commonwealth points out, 
several witnesses, including mental health experts, were asked 
during the resentencing proceeding whether Prieto had expressed 
any remorse, and they said "no."  We therefore conclude that, as 
the circuit court found, the Commonwealth's comment on Prieto's 
lack of remorse was not "a comment on his failure to testify," 
but rather a comment on the evidence that had been presented. 
J.  Jury View of Red Onion State Prison 
 
Prieto asserts that the circuit court erred in denying his 
motion for a jury view of Red Onion State Prison under Code 
§ 19.2-264.1.  Quoting our decision in P. Lorillard Co. v. Clay, 
127 Va. 734, 744, 104 S.E. 384, 387 (1920), he submits that "[a] 
view should be granted when it would be 'of substantial aid to 
the jury in reaching a correct verdict.' "  He advances three 
reasons why a view of Red Onion would have been a "substantial 
aid" to the jury in reaching a correct verdict in his case.  
First, it "would have enabled the jury to correctly decide 
whether [he] would be a future danger to the prison society — 
the inmates and correctional officers — at Red Onion, given its 
conditions as a 'super max' facility."  Second, "it would have 
prevented jury speculation on [his future dangerousness], as 
living within a super max facility is outside the common 
38 
 
experience of the typical juror."  Third, it "would have enabled 
the jury to assess the credibility of trial witnesses testifying 
on the issue of [his] future dangerousness." 
 
As we have previously held and as discussed in Part II.C.3, 
supra, the future dangerousness aggravating factor refers not to 
the prison population but to society as a whole.  The 
circumstances of Red Onion were, therefore, irrelevant and would 
not have been an aid to the jury in their evaluation of Prieto's 
future dangerousness. 
Under Code § 19.2-264.1, "[t]he jury in any criminal case 
may . . . be taken to view the premises or place in question, or 
any property, matter or thing relating to the case, when it 
shall appear to the court that such view is necessary to a just 
decision."  " 'The question of the propriety of ordering a 
view,' " we have said, " 'lies largely in the discretion of the 
trial court which should only grant it when it is reasonably 
certain that it will be of substantial aid to the jury in 
reaching a correct verdict and whose decision will not be 
reversed unless the record shows that a view was necessary to a 
just decision.' "  P. Lorillard Co., 127 Va. at 744, 104 S.E. at 
387 (quoting Abernathy v. Emporia Mfg. Co., 122 Va. 406, 424, 95 
S.E. 418, 423 (1918)). 
 
We do not believe that a view of Red Onion was necessary to 
a just decision on Prieto's future dangerousness.  We have 
39 
 
consistently held that there is no constitutional limitation to 
the circuit court's authority  
to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence not bearing on the 
defendant's character, prior record, or the 
circumstances of his offense.  Thus, the relevant 
inquiry is not whether [Prieto] could commit criminal 
acts of violence in the future but whether he 
would. . . .  Accordingly, the focus must be on the 
particular facts of [Prieto's] history and background, 
and the circumstances of [the] offense. . . .  
Evidence regarding the general nature of prison life 
in a maximum security facility is not relevant to [the 
determination of future dangerousness], even when 
offered in rebuttal. 
 
Burns v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 307, 339-40, 541 S.E.2d 872, 893 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted), cert. denied, 
534 U.S. 1034 (2001).  Since evidence on the general nature of 
prison life in a maximum-security facility was not even relevant 
to the determination of Prieto's future dangerousness, we fail 
to see how a view of such a facility was necessary to a just 
decision on that issue.  Consequently, we hold that the circuit 
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Prieto's motion 
for a view of Red Onion. 
K.  Vileness Aggravating Factor 
 
Prieto asserts that the circuit court erred in denying his 
motion to declare the vileness aggravating factor in Code 
§ 19.2-264.2 unconstitutional.  Under that statute, an offense 
is "outrageously or wantonly vile" if "it involved torture, 
depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to the victim."  
40 
 
Prieto submits that torture, depravity of mind, and aggravated 
battery are elements of the vileness aggravating factor.  Thus, 
he contends, under Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813 
(1999), "a Virginia capital jury considering the vileness 
aggravating factor must unanimously agree upon which elements of 
vileness form the basis of its finding of vileness." 
 
Prieto further claims that, "[b]ecause Richardson compels 
recognition of Virginia's vileness sub-elements as offense 
elements, Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), requires the 
jury to find at least one of the three vileness elements beyond 
a reasonable doubt."  "To satisfy Ring," he argues, "Virginia's 
capital sentencing scheme must require that at least one 
specific vileness element be proven beyond a reasonable doubt 
and agreed upon unanimously by the jury."  Since it does not so 
require, he maintains that it "cannot be applied consistent with 
the federal constitution." 
 
We find Prieto's contention unpersuasive.  To begin with, 
in Clark v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 201, 257 S.E.2d 784 (1979), 
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 104 (1980), we rejected the argument that 
a jury must identify the element or elements of the vileness 
aggravating factor that it relied on in reaching its decision.  
Id. at 213, 258 S.E.2d at 791-92.  And just a few years ago, we 
determined that our decision in Clark was unaffected by 
41 
 
Richardson.  Jackson v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 423, 587 S.E.2d 
532 (2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 842 (2004). 
 
In Jackson, the defendant argued that, under Richardson, 
"due process requires unanimity not only as to the aggravating 
factor of vileness but also to one or more of its composite 
elements."  Id. at 434, 587 S.E.2d at 541.  We disagreed, 
stating: 
 
The Supreme Court [of the United States] 
explained in Richardson that, for example, the jury 
must unanimously find force as an element of the crime 
of robbery, but whether the force is created by the 
use of a gun or a knife is not an element of the crime 
and therefore does not require jury unanimity.  In 
this case, the element the jury was required to find 
unanimously to impose the death sentence was the 
aggravating factor of vileness, which requires the 
defendant's actions be outrageously or wantonly vile, 
horrible, or inhuman.  Depravity of mind, aggravated 
battery, and torture are not discrete elements of 
vileness that would require separate proof but rather 
are several possible sets of underlying facts [that] 
make up [the] particular element.  Neither Clark nor 
Richardson, therefore, requires juror unanimity on 
these points. 
 
Id. at 434-35, 587 S.E.2d at 541 (alterations in original) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 
This reasoning is unaffected by Ring.  That case involved 
Arizona's capital-sentencing scheme, which mandated that a judge 
— not a jury — determine the presence or absence of certain 
aggravating factors necessary to impose a sentence of death.  
Ring, 536 U.S. at 588.  The Supreme Court of the United States 
held that the capital-sentencing scheme was unconstitutional 
42 
 
because defendants "are entitled to a jury determination of any 
fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their 
maximum punishment."  Id. at 589.  In reaching this conclusion, 
the Supreme Court said nothing about unanimity in state-court 
verdicts, and for good reason:  The Sixth Amendment "does not 
require a unanimous jury verdict in state criminal trials."  
McDonald v. City of Chicago, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 
3035 n.14 (2010); see also Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 406 
(1972).  Moreover, we have previously found that Virginia's 
capital-sentencing scheme "do[es] not suffer from the same 
issues that were addressed in Ring because the aggravating 
factors are submitted for the jury to determine."  Porter v. 
Commonwealth, 276 Va. 203, 265, 661 S.E.2d 415, 447 (2008) 
(citing Muhammad v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 451, 491, 619 S.E.2d 
16, 39 (2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1136 (2006)), cert. 
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1999 (2009). 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court did not err 
in denying Prieto's motion to declare the vileness aggravating 
factor in Code § 19.2-264.2 unconstitutional. 
L.  Request for Grand Jury Information 
 
Before the resentencing proceeding, Prieto sought to 
challenge the composition of the grand jury that indicted him in 
2005.  To that end, he moved for information on each grand jury 
from January 2003 through November 2005.  The circuit court 
43 
 
denied the motion, concluding (1) that "the request for grand 
jury information ha[d] been waived because it was not raised 
prior to trial," as required by Rule 3A:9(c), and (2) that no 
good cause had been shown to grant relief from the waiver. 
 
Under Rule 3A:9(b)(1), "[d]efenses and objections based on 
defects in the institution of the prosecution or in the written 
charge upon which the accused is to be tried . . . must be 
raised by motion made within the time prescribed by paragraph 
(c) of this Rule."  Paragraph (c), in turn, provides that "[a] 
motion referred to in subparagraph (b)(1) shall be filed or made 
before a plea is entered and, in a circuit court, at least 7 
days before the day fixed for trial."  Rule 3A:9(c).  Failure to 
comply with these requirements constitutes a waiver.  Rule 
3A:9(b)(1).  For good cause, however, relief from any waiver may 
be granted under Rule 3A:9(d). 
 
Prieto contends that the circuit court erred in finding 
that he waived his request for grand jury information under Rule 
3A:9(b)(1), because he filed his motion more than 7 days before 
his resentencing proceeding.  We disagree. 
 
Rule 3A:9(c), as just noted, requires not only that a 
motion challenging an indictment be filed 7 days before trial, 
but also that it be filed "before a plea is entered."  (Emphasis 
added.)  A resentencing proceeding is not a "trial."  There was 
no reversible error found in the guilt phase of Prieto's first 
44 
 
conviction, all convictions were affirmed, and only the two 
sentences of death were reversed and remanded to the circuit 
court for a new penalty proceeding on the capital murder 
convictions.  Prieto I, 278 Va. at 418, 682 S.E.2d at 938.  But 
even assuming, arguendo, that a resentencing proceeding is a 
"trial" and that therefore Prieto complied with the first of 
Rule 3A:9(c)'s requirements by filing his motion more than 7 
days before that proceeding, there can be no doubt that he 
failed to comply with the second because his motion was filed 
years after he entered a plea. 
 
We have long held to the rule that a defendant's objection 
to the grand jury must be made before a plea is entered.  In 
Curtis v. Commonwealth, 87 Va. 589, 13 S.E. 73 (1891), for 
instance, the defendant's first-degree murder conviction was set 
aside by the circuit court.  On retrial, the defendant moved to 
quash the indictment "on the ground that it did not 
affirmatively appear from the record that a venire facias had 
been issued to summon the grand jury by which the indictment had 
been found."  Id. at 591, 13 S.E. at 74.  The circuit court 
denied the motion, and we affirmed that ruling.  In doing so, we 
stated that 
it is well settled that objections to the mode of 
summoning a grand jury, or to the disqualifications of 
particular jurors, must be made at a preliminary stage 
of the case, that is, before a plea to the merits; 
45 
 
otherwise they will be considered as waived unless, 
indeed, the proceeding be void ab initio. 
 
Id. at 592, 13 S.E. at 74. 
 
In a more recent decision, Bailey v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 
814, 71 S.E.2d 368 (1952), we rejected the defendant's claim 
that, because racial discrimination in the selection of grand 
jurors is prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment, the right to 
object to it at any time cannot be waived.  Although a defendant 
has "a constitutional right to a fair and impartial grand jury 
from which members of his race had not been intentionally 
excluded," we explained, "that does not mean that there is no 
limitation of time, mode or circumstance upon his right to 
object to the grand jury which returned the indictment against 
him."  Id. at 820-21, 71 S.E. at 371. 
 
There are many important interests served by placing such 
limitations on a defendant's right to object to the composition 
of the grand jury.  Those interests, as the Supreme Court of the 
United States has observed, include: 
the possible avoidance of an unnecessary trial or of a 
retrial, the difficulty of making factual 
determinations concerning grand juries long after the 
indictment has been handed down and the grand jury 
disbanded, and the potential disruption to numerous 
convictions of finding a defect in a grand jury only 
after the jury has handed down indictments in many 
cases.  
 
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 745-46 (1991). 
46 
 
 
Because Prieto failed to raise his challenge to the 
composition of the grand jury before he entered a plea, as Rule 
3A:9(c) and our precedents require, we conclude that the circuit 
court did not err in finding that his request for grand jury 
information was waived. 
 
Prieto further argues that, even if he waived his request 
for grand jury information, the circuit court nonetheless erred 
in denying his motion because good cause was shown to grant 
relief from the waiver under Rule 3A:9(d).  He does not say, 
however, what that good cause was; rather, he submits that he 
should have been excused from the waiver because "death is 
different."  While we acknowledge that death is the ultimate 
punishment, that is not itself reason enough to grant him relief 
from the waiver, for we have routinely found waiver in capital 
cases.  See, e.g., Schmitt v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 127, 148, 
547 S.E.2d 186, 201 (2001) (refusing to address the merits of a 
number of the defendant's arguments because timely objections 
were not made in the circuit court), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1094 
(2002). 
 
Since Prieto failed to show good cause why he should be 
excused under Rule 3A:9(d) from the waiver of his right to 
challenge the composition of the grand jury, we hold that the 
circuit court did not err in denying his motion for grand jury 
information. 
47 
 
M.  Request for Petit Jury Information 
 
To mount a Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section challenge to 
Fairfax County's jury selection process, Prieto moved for petit 
jury information, including master jury lists, for the 2008, 
2009, and 2010 terms.  The circuit court granted him access to 
information for the 2010 term, but denied him access to 
information for the 2008 and 2009 terms.  He argues that the 
circuit court erred in denying him access to information for the 
2008 and 2009 terms because he was entitled to that information 
"to ensure constitutional compliance of the jury selected for 
his trial." 
 
Under Code § 8.01-347, after a master jury list is created, 
"the commissioners shall cause all the names thereon to be 
fairly written, each on a separate paper or ballot . . . and 
shall deposit the ballots with the list in a secure box," which 
"shall be locked and safely kept . . . and opened only by the 
direction of the judge."  In Archer v. Mayes, 213 Va. 633, 640, 
194 S.E.2d 707, 712 (1973), we said that there was nothing in 
Code § 8-184 (§ 8.01-347's predecessor) that "deprives the judge 
of the court [of] discretion, where good cause is shown, to 
permit an examination of the jury list."  We further explained: 
But it cannot be inferred that the jury list shall be 
opened for inspection to members of the bar or private 
citizens without assigning good and sufficient reasons 
therefor.  The proper administration of justice 
requires that the jury list be kept secret until the 
48 
 
jurors are drawn for service, unless good cause be 
shown.  The jury list is in no sense a public record to 
be exposed to the general public.  Exposure of the list 
to the public could lead to tampering with and 
harassment of potential jurors and seriously affect 
their impartiality and the proper administration of 
justice.  Even when good cause is shown, the inspection 
of the list shall be permitted only under the "watchful 
eye" of the court, and copying or photostating the list 
is not to be permitted. 
 
Id. at 640-41, 194 S.E.2d at 712. 
 
Prieto contends that the good-cause standard enunciated in 
Archer does not apply to the disclosure of an expired jury list 
because there is no risk that its release will affect the proper 
administration of justice.  Even if that standard does apply, he 
continues, it was met here, since the circuit court granted him 
access to the jury list for the 2010 term. 
 
The disclosure of an expired jury list does not raise the 
same tampering or harassment concerns that the disclosure of a 
current jury list does, but it still raises privacy concerns.  A 
jury list contains sensitive information that should be 
protected.  We thus believe that a good-cause standard is 
appropriate for the release of both a current and expired jury 
list. 
 
The Commonwealth does not dispute that Prieto satisfied the 
good-cause standard for the disclosure of the jury list for the 
2010 term, for we have previously held that good cause is shown 
when a defendant seeks access to the jury list from which his 
49 
 
venire will be selected "for the purpose of determining whether 
the jury selection procedures required by law and by the 
Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of 
Virginia [are] complied with."  Eccles v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 
679, 680, 187 S.E. 2d 207, 207 (1972).  But it contends that he 
did not do so for the release of the jury lists for the 2008 and 
2009 terms because "any alleged violation in the composition of 
[his] jury could only occur in the process used to select the 
master list for 2010, from which his sentencing jury would be 
drawn." 
 
We disagree with the Commonwealth that the jury lists for 
the 2008 and 2009 terms were irrelevant to Prieto's 
investigation into whether Fairfax County's jury selection 
process violated his Sixth Amendment right to be tried by an 
impartial jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community.  
The lists could have been used to show that any constitutionally 
significant underrepresentation of a distinctive group on 
Fairfax County's venires was due to systematic exclusion, rather 
than chance.  As discussed below, however, we find that Prieto 
was not prejudiced by not having access to the lists because he 
failed to establish that there was any constitutionally 
significant underrepresentation of a distinctive group in the 
venire from which his jury would be selected.  Without such 
underrepresentation, Prieto could not make a claim of systematic 
50 
 
exclusion.  For this reason, we conclude that the circuit court 
did not err in denying Prieto access to the lists. 
N.  Fair-Cross-Section Claim 
 
Prieto asserts that the circuit court erred in denying his 
motion to strike the qualified jury list because Fairfax 
County's jury selection process systematically excluded African-
Americans and Hispanics, in violation of his Sixth Amendment 
right to an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross section of 
the community.  We disagree. 
 
"To establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-
section requirement," the Supreme Court of the United States has 
instructed, "a defendant must prove that:  (1) a group 
qualifying as 'distinctive' (2) is not fairly and reasonably 
represented in jury venires, and (3) 'systematic exclusion' in 
the jury selection process accounts for the 
underrepresentation."  Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. ___, ___, 130 
S.Ct. 1382, 1392 (2010) (quoting Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 
357, 364 (1979)).  The circuit court found that Prieto satisfied 
the first element because "African-Americans and Hispanics are 
clearly distinctive groups in the community."  But it determined 
that he did not meet the second element because the alleged 
disparities between the African-American and Hispanic 
populations in Fairfax County and the number of African-
51 
 
Americans and Hispanics in the venire did not rise to the level 
of unfair or unreasonable. 
 
According to Prieto's expert, Dr. Andrew A. Beveridge, by 
an "absolute disparity" measure,3 African-Americans and Hispanics 
were underrepresented by 1.98% and 2.36% in Fairfax County's 
venires.  And by a "comparative disparity" measure,4 African-
Americans and Hispanics were underrepresented by 22.05% and 
31.51%.5  The Supreme Court has not specified which of these 
measurements should be used in analyzing a fair-cross-section 
claim and has recently observed that both are imperfect because 
they "can be misleading when, as here, 'members of the 
distinctive group comp[ose] [only] a small percentage of those 
eligible for jury service.' "  Berghuis, 559 U.S. at ___, 130 
S.Ct. at 1393 (alterations in original) (quoting People v. 
Smith, 615 N.W.2d 1, 2-3 (Mich. 2000)).  We need not resolve 
                     
 
3 "Absolute disparity" is determined by subtracting the 
percentage of a distinctive group in the jury pool from the 
percentage of that group in the jury-eligible population.  
Berghuis, 559 U.S. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 1390. 
 
4 "Comparative disparity" is determined by dividing the 
absolute disparity of a distinctive group by the percentage of 
that group in the jury-eligible population.  Berghuis, 559 U.S. 
at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 1390. 
 
5 For purposes of our analysis, we accept Dr. Beveridge's 
underrepresentation figures.  We note, however, that there is 
considerable doubt as to their accuracy.  For instance, Dr. 
Beveridge did not know whether the census data he used included 
the towns of Herndon and Vienna, which are part of Fairfax 
County.  He also acknowledged that the census data he used did 
include the city of Falls Church, which is not part of Fairfax 
County. 
52 
 
today which measurement should be used in evaluating such a 
claim in the Commonwealth because neither the absolute nor 
comparative disparities in this case are constitutionally 
significant. 
 
The absolute disparities here (1.98% and 2.36%) fall well 
short of the percentages in cases in which the Supreme Court 
determined that a prima facie fair-cross-section violation had 
been made out.  See, e.g., Duren, 439 U.S. at 365-66 (39% 
absolute disparity); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 486-87 
& n.7 (1977) (40% absolute disparity); Jones v. Georgia, 389 
U.S. 24, 24 n.* (1967) (14.7% absolute disparity).  What is 
more, courts have upheld jury selection procedures with higher 
absolute disparities.  See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 502 
F.3d 931, 950 (9th Cir. 2007) (4.15%); United States v. Orange, 
447 F.3d 792, 798-99 (10th Cir. 2006) (3.57%); United States v. 
Royal, 174 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir 1999) (2.97%); United States v. 
Clifford, 640 F.2d 150, 155 (8th Cir. 1981) (7.2%); United 
States ex rel. Barksdale v. Blackburn, 639 F.2d 1115, 1126-27 
(5th Cir. 1981) (11.5%).  Indeed, "[c]ourts addressing the 
question of whether a given absolute disparity constitutes 
'substantial underrepresentation' have held that absolute 
disparities between 2.0% and 11.5% do not constitute substantial 
underrepresentation."  Ramseur v. Beyer, 983 F.2d 1215, 1232 (3d 
Cir. 1992) (footnote omitted).  Similarly, courts have upheld 
53 
 
jury selection procedures with higher comparative disparities 
than those asserted in this case (22.05% and 31.51%).  See, 
e.g., Orange, 447 F.3d at 798 (ranging from 38.17% to 51.22%); 
United States v. Weaver, 267 F.3d 231, 243 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(ranging from 40.01% to 72.98%); United States v. Chanthadara, 
230 F.3d 1237, 1257 (10th Cir. 2000) (ranging from 40.89% to 
58.39%); Royal, 174 F.3d at 10 n.10 (60.9%). 
 
Because neither the absolute nor comparative disparities 
presented here establish the second element of a prima facie 
fair-cross-section claim, we conclude that the circuit court did 
not err in denying Prieto's motion to strike the qualified jury 
list. 
O.  Statutory Review 
 
Under Code § 17.1-313(C), we are required to conduct a 
review to determine (1) "[w]hether the sentence of death was 
imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other 
arbitrary factor," and (2) "[w]hether the sentence of death is 
excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar 
cases, considering both the crime and the defendant."  This 
review is undertaken to "'assure the fair and proper application 
of the death penalty statutes in this Commonwealth and to 
instill public confidence in the administration of justice.'"  
Morva v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 329, 354, 683 S.E.2d 553, 567 
(2009) (quoting Akers v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 358, 364, 535 
54 
 
S.E.2d 674, 677 (2000)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 
97 (2010). 
1.  Passion, Prejudice, or Any Other Arbitrary Factor 
 
Even though Prieto does not assign error or provide any 
argument for this portion of the statutory review, we must still 
conduct the review.  Gray v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 290, 303, 645 
S.E.2d 448, 456 (2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1151 (2008).  
Based on our review of the record and consideration of the 
arguments presented, we find no basis to conclude that the jury 
was influenced by passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary 
factor in sentencing Prieto to death. 
2.  Excessive or Disproportionate Sentence 
 
As for this portion of the statutory review, Prieto simply 
argues that his death sentences were excessive and 
disproportionate based on "the incredible mitigation evidence" 
he presented, "the dubiousness of guilt," and "the 
Commonwealth's improper demand for justice in its closing 
argument."  In light of our discussion above and our previous 
holding that "the evidence [was] sufficient to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Prieto was the immediate perpetrator of 
the murders of Raver and Fulton," Prieto I, 278 Va. at 401, 682 
S.E.2d at 928, we find no merit in Prieto's contention. 
 
This does not end our statutory review, however, for we 
must still "determine whether other sentencing bodies in this 
55 
 
jurisdiction generally impose the supreme penalty for comparable 
or similar crimes, considering both the crime and the 
defendant."  Lovitt, 260 Va. at 518, 537 S.E.2d at 880 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  This review "is not 
designed to [e]nsure complete symmetry among all death penalty 
cases."  Porter v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 203, 267, 661 S.E.2d 
415, 448 (2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), 
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1999 (2009).  "Rather, the 
goal of the review is to determine if a sentence of death is 
aberrant."  Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 
In undertaking this review, we have looked at similar cases 
in which, after a finding of both aggravating factors of future 
dangerousness and vileness, a death sentence was imposed (1) for 
the willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of a person 
during the commission of, or subsequent to, a rape (Code § 18.2-
31(5)), see, e.g., Hedrick v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 328, 513 
S.E.2d 634, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 952 (1999); Payne v. 
Commonwealth, 257 Va. 216, 509 S.E.2d 293 (1999); Swisher v. 
Commonwealth, 256 Va. 471, 506 S.E.2d 763 (1998), cert. denied, 
528 U.S. 812 (1999); Barnabei v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 161, 477 
S.E.2d 270 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1224 (1997), and (2) 
for the willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of more 
than one person as part of the same act or transaction (Code 
§ 18.2-31(7)).  See, e.g., Juniper v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 362, 
56 
 
626 S.E.2d 383, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 960 (2006); Winston v. 
Commonwealth, 268 Va. 564, 604 S.E.2d 21 (2004), cert. denied, 
546 U.S. 850 (2005); Hudson v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 29, 590 
S.E.2d 362 (2004) (guilty plea entered); Zirkle v. Commonwealth, 
262 Va. 631, 553 S.E.2d 520 (2001) (guilty plea entered); 
Bramblett v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 263, 513 S.E.2d 400, cert. 
denied, 528 U.S. 952 (1999); Goins v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 442, 
470 S.E.2d 114, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 887 (1996); Burket v. 
Commonwealth, 248 Va. 596, 450 S.E.2d 124 (1994), cert. denied, 
514 U.S. 1053 (1995); Stewart v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 222, 427 
S.E.2d 394, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 848 (1993).  We have also 
reviewed those cases in which similar convictions occurred but a 
sentence of life imprisonment was imposed.  Based on this 
review, we find that Prieto's capital sentences were neither 
excessive nor disproportionate to sentences imposed in capital 
murder cases for comparable crimes. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we find no reversible error in 
the judgment of the circuit court.  Furthermore, we find no 
reason to commute or set aside the sentences of death.  We thus 
will affirm the circuit court's judgment. 
Affirmed.