Title: Jason Looney v. State Of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC05-159
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: May 25, 2006

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC05-159 
____________ 
 
JASON LOONEY,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[June 22, 2006] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Jason Brice Looney, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals the circuit 
court’s order denying his motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.851.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  
We affirm the denial of relief. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Jason Brice Looney was convicted of the first-degree murders of Melanie 
King and Robin Keith Spears, burglary of a dwelling while armed with a firearm, 
armed robbery with a firearm, arson of a dwelling, and use of a firearm in the 
commission of a felony.  See Looney v. State, 803 So. 2d 656, 664 (Fla. 2001).  
 
 
- 2 -
The jury, by a vote of ten to two, recommended the death penalty.  See id.  
Following that recommendation, the trial judge sentenced Looney to death for each 
murder.  In its opinion affirming the convictions, this Court detailed the facts 
surrounding the murders of King and Spears, as follows: 
At approximately 11 p.m. on July 26, 1997, Looney and his 
codefendants [Guerry Wayne Hertz and Jimmy Dempsey] left an 
acquaintance’s house on foot within walking distance from the 
victims’ home.  All three men were armed with guns.  A resident who 
lived about 500 yards from the victims testified that Hertz appeared at 
her door at about 2 a.m. asking to use her phone because “his truck 
had broken down.”  When she refused, the trio continued down the 
road towards the victims’ home and, upon seeing the victims’ black 
Mustang, Looney said, “There’s my car right there. That’s the one I 
want.” 
Dempsey and Hertz went to the victims’ front door as a decoy 
and asked if they could use the phone.  King provided them with a 
cordless phone, and Dempsey feigned making a phone call.  When 
Dempsey attempted to return the phone, Hertz pointed his gun at King 
and forced his way in.  Looney then entered and pointed his rifle at 
Spears.  Spears and King were bound and gagged with duct tape and 
placed face down on their bed.  Looney and his codefendants removed 
a significant amount of the victims’ property, including a VCR, a 
television, jewelry, furniture, and CDs, and loaded the victims’ 
belongings into the victims’ two vehicles.  Looney also found 
approximately $1500 of the victims’ money in an envelope, which 
was ultimately divided equally among the three. 
Looney and Hertz concluded that they could leave no witnesses 
and informed Dempsey of their decision.  Dempsey said Looney and 
Hertz then poured accelerants throughout the victims’ home.  All 
three men, still armed, went to the bedroom where the victims were 
bound, side-by-side, face down on their bed.  When they entered the 
back bedroom, King said that she would “rather die being burnt up 
than shot.”  She stated, “Please, God, don’t shoot me in the head.”  
Hertz replied, “Sorry, can’t do that,” and then he proceeded to open 
fire; Looney followed and then Dempsey.  The victims died as a result 
of the gunshot wounds. 
 
 
- 3 -
Subsequent to the shootings, the victims’ home was set ablaze.  
Hertz drove away in the victims’ white Ford Ranger, and Looney 
drove the victims’ black Ford Mustang, with Dempsey as a passenger.  
According to Dempsey, the whole episode at the victims’ home lasted 
about two hours.  The trio proceeded to Hertz’s house and unloaded 
the stolen items and divided up the money.  Two employees at the 
Wal-Mart in Tallahassee testified that the three men made purchases 
at the store at around 5 a.m. the morning of the murders, before 
“showing off” their new vehicles, i.e., a black Mustang and a white 
Ford Ranger, to both of the employees.  A Wal-Mart receipt for a 
clothing purchase was later found in the victims’ Mustang, 
corroborating the employees’ testimony. 
Looney and his codefendants made their way to Daytona Beach 
Shores where, later that day, they were involved in a pursuit and 
shootout with police.  Looney and Dempsey were arrested after 
abandoning and fleeing from the victims’ black Mustang.  Hertz 
abandoned the victims’ Ford Ranger after being shot, and he paid a 
cabdriver $100 to drive him to his aunt’s house in St. Augustine.  
Hertz was arrested that same day in St. Augustine, and victim Spears’ 
.9mm gun was recovered from Hertz’s bag. 
Id. at 662-63.   
The Guilt Phase 
The evidence presented during the guilt phase of Looney’s trial was 
summarized in this Court’s opinion affirming his convictions on direct appeal, as 
follows: 
A firearms expert with FDLE testified that one of the bullets 
recovered from the area of the victims’ burned bed was fired from the 
.380 Lorcin handgun recovered from Looney at the time of his arrest 
in Daytona Beach, i.e., the same handgun owned by Keith Spears and 
used, according to Dempsey, by Hertz to shoot the victims.  The other 
bullet was fired from a .30 caliber carbine rifle, not inconsistent with 
[the] .30 caliber rifle used by Looney to shoot the victims, and later 
recovered in the victims’ Mustang.  A roll of duct tape, Looney’s 
wallet with $464, and Dempsey’s wallet with $380 were also found in 
the Mustang.  A fingerprint analyst with FDLE analyzed latent 
 
 
- 4 -
fingerprints taken from the Mustang and concluded that Hertz and his 
codefendants had all touched the car.  The chemist found evidence of 
various accelerants on items of clothing found in the Mustang.  In 
addition, a law enforcement investigator with the State Fire Marshal’s 
Office testified that the kind of damage that was done by the fire does 
not happen unless an accelerant is used. 
The state medical examiner testified that the bodies were 
severely burned.  He graphically detailed the condition of the bodies 
as depicted in the photographs: the legs were burned off below the 
knees, the hands were burned to nubs, the bones of the arms were 
fractured by the fire, and the skulls were burned partially away.  The 
victims had to be positively identified by dental records.  The medical 
examiner also testified that there could have been other injuries that 
were not detected due to the extensive burns. 
King was shot at least two times in the head, which caused her 
death.  However, the medical examiner was not able to trace the path 
of the bullet because the skull was burned away.  He testified that it 
was possible that other bullets struck the body, which could not be 
determined because of the fire.  King lived one to two minutes after 
she was shot.  However, there was no soot in the trachea, indicating 
that she was not alive when the fire started.  Spears was shot at least 
one time in the head, which caused his death.  The bullet went in the 
back of the neck and exited above the right eye.  Spears also lived one 
to two minutes after he was shot, and again, no soot was discovered in 
his trachea, meaning that he was dead at the time of the fire.  
The defense did not present any evidence. 
Id. at 663-64.   
The Penalty Phase 
At the penalty phase, the State presented two witnesses relevant to defendant 
Looney.1  Karen King and Janet Spears, the mothers of victims Melanie King and 
                                          
 
 
1.  The State’s first witness, Reginald Byrd, was a probation officer who 
testified that codefendant Hertz was in violation of his probation on the date of the 
murders. 
 
 
- 5 -
Keith Spears, respectively, both read previously prepared victim impact statements 
into the record. 
The defense presented four witnesses:  Robert Kendrick, Looney’s probation 
officer, Andrew Harris, an incarcerated felon, and Looney’s birth mother and 
grandmother.  Robert Kendrick testified that Looney was an average probationer 
and was not in violation of his probation on the date of the murders.  Andrew 
Harris testified that in conversations in jail with Jimmy Dempsey, the third 
codefendant, Dempsey stated that Looney was only the lookout during the murders 
and that Dempsey should have shot Looney because he was the one most likely to 
testify against the other two.  Looney’s birth mother and grandmother presented 
evidence related to the circumstances surrounding Looney’s birth, his removal 
from their care and placement with his eventual adoptive family at the age of 
eighteen months, and the limited contact with his grandmother from that point 
forward. 
In sentencing Looney to death, the trial judge found six individual 
aggravating factors:  (1) that the defendant was previously convicted of another 
capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person 
(substantial weight); (2) that the murders were committed while the defendant was 
engaged in the commission of a burglary, arson, and robbery (great weight); (3) 
that the murders were committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a 
 
 
- 6 -
lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody (great weight); (4) that the 
murders were committed for financial gain (merged with second aggravator); (5) 
that the murders were especially heinous, atrocious or cruel (“HAC”) (great 
weight); and (6) that the murders were committed in a cold, calculated, and 
premeditated manner without pretense of moral or legal justification (great 
weight).  See id. at 664.  
In mitigation, the trial court found only one statutory mitigator, based on 
Looney’s age at the time of the murders, which was given moderate weight.  See 
id.  With respect to nonstatutory mitigation, the trial court found: (1) Looney’s 
troubled childhood (significant weight); (2) Looney had no significant criminal 
history (marginal weight); (3) Looney was remorseful (moderate weight); (4) that 
society would be adequately protected by the imposition of a life sentence (some 
weight); and (5) that codefendant Dempsey was given a life sentence (significant 
weight).  See id.     
In imposing the sentence of death, the trial judge noted that “[a] review of all 
the evidence causes the evidence of mitigation to pale into insignificance 
considering the enormity of the proven and appropriately considered aggravating 
factors.” 
Direct Appeal 
 
 
- 7 -
 
On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Looney’s murder convictions and 
death sentences, denying all of Looney’s claims,2 none of which are relevant to the 
instant postconviction appeal.  See Looney, 803 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 2001).  In June 
2002, certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court.  See Looney v. 
Florida, 536 U.S. 966 (2002). 
Rule 3.851 Proceedings 
                                          
 
 
2.  In its opinion affirming the convictions, this Court detailed Looney’s 
direct appeal claims as follows: 
 
(1) The trial court improperly excused for cause a venire member 
whose opposition to the death penalty did not prevent or substantially 
impair her ability to perform her obligations as a juror; (2) the details 
of the collateral crimes in Volusia county became a feature of the trial 
causing prejudice that substantially outweighed the probative value of 
the evidence; (3) the trial court erred by admitting gruesome 
photographs of the bodies at the crime scene and the autopsy; (4) the 
trial court erred by refusing to grant a mistrial after the State’s witness 
testified about the hearsay statement by a nontestifying codefendant 
which incriminated Looney; (5) the evidence was insufficient as a 
matter of law to sustain the convictions; (6) the trial court erred in 
denying the defense motion to require a unanimous verdict; (7) the 
statute authorizing the admission of victim impact evidence is an 
unconstitutional usurpation of the Court’s rulemaking authority under 
article V, section 2, of the Florida Constitution, making the admission 
of such testimony unconstitutional and reversible error; (8) four of the 
seven aggravating factors upon which the jury was instructed and 
which the trial court found are legally inapplicable and their 
consideration was not harmless error; and (9) the death sentence in 
this case is disproportionate. 
Looney, 803 So. 2d at 664 n.2. 
 
 
 
- 8 -
 
On June 30, 2003, Looney filed a rule 3.851 motion for post conviction 
relief.3  On March 9, 2004, Looney filed an amended rule 3.851 motion which 
elaborated on his original ineffectiveness claim and alleged that penalty phase 
counsel was ineffective for failing to present all available mental health mitigation.  
On March 11, 2004, the trial court held a Huff4 hearing to determine whether an 
evidentiary hearing on any of Looney’s claims was warranted.5 
                                          
 
 
3.  This motion raised the following claims: (1) Florida’s death penalty 
violates the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and 
the corresponding provisions of the Florida Constitution because of principles 
announced in the United States Supreme Court decisions in Ring v. Arizona, 536 
U.S. 584 (2002), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); (2) penalty 
phase counsel was ineffective for asserting as nonstatutory mitigation issues which 
should have been asserted as statutory mitigation; (3) trial counsel failed to object 
to inadmissible evidence, allowed damaging evidence to be introduced by hearsay, 
allowed damaging evidence and testimony to be introduced without proper 
foundation, failed to present relative and critical testimony during the guilt phase, 
failed to prepare and properly preserve argument for a directed verdict, failed to 
consult with and advise the defendant of his trial rights, and was generally 
ineffective in his representation; and (4) counsel was ineffective for failing to 
proceed with a motion for a venue change of a high profile case in a small county.     
 
 
4.  Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993). 
 
 
5.  Looney withdrew his original claim four, regarding the venue change.  
Looney and the State stipulated that the only claim requiring an evidentiary 
hearing was the issue raised in the amended rule 3.851 motion pertaining to the 
ineffectiveness of trial counsel during the penalty phase for failing to present 
extant mental health mitigation.  In the order denying the rule 3.851 motion, the 
trial court summarily denied all of Looney’s claims except the claim relating to the 
mental health mitigation presented during the penalty phase, which is the subject of 
the current appeal.  
 
 
- 9 -
At a July 28, 2004, evidentiary hearing, Looney presented Dr. Bill Mosman, 
a forensic psychologist, who, among other points, testified that there was extant 
statutory and nonstatutory mental health mitigation which was either not presented 
or was presented in an ineffective manner during the penalty phase at trial.  Dr. 
Mosman’s testimony focused on the failure of Looney’s defense counsel to use a 
mental health expert as a witness during the penalty phase.  However, cross-
examination revealed that Dr. Mosman had neither reviewed the guilt phase trial 
transcripts nor contacted Looney’s trial counsel to determine why trial counsel 
chose not to use a mental health expert witness during the penalty phase.  
Subsequent to the evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Looney’s claims for 
postconviction relief based in large part on credibility factors that the trial court did 
not find Dr. Mosman to be a convincing witness.  This appeal followed. 
ANALYSIS 
Following the United States Supreme Court’s requirements outlined in 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), this Court has held that 
[a] claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, to be considered 
meritorious, must include two general components.  First, the claimant 
must identify particular acts or omissions of the lawyer that are shown 
to be outside the broad range of reasonably competent performance 
under prevailing professional standards.  Second, the clear, substantial 
deficiency shown must further be demonstrated to have so affected the 
fairness and reliability of the proceeding that confidence in the outcome 
is undermined.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Downs 
v. State, 453 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 1984).  A court considering a claim of 
ineffectiveness of counsel need not make a specific ruling on the 
 
 
- 10 -
performance component of the test when it is clear that the prejudice 
component is not satisfied. 
 
Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986).  The alleged ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim is a mixed question of law and fact, subject to plenary 
review based on Strickland.  See Stephens v. State, 748 So. 2d 1028, 1032 (Fla. 
1999).  Under this standard, the Court conducts an independent review of the trial 
court’s legal conclusions, while giving deference to the trial court’s factual 
findings.  See id. at 1032-33. 
 
The deference given to the trial court’s factual findings when undertaking an 
ineffective assistance of counsel analysis in this context is related to the trial 
court’s determination of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to give the 
evidence.  This Court recently explained that “[s]o long as the [trial court’s] 
decisions are supported by competent, substantial evidence, this Court will not 
substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on questions of fact and, likewise, 
on the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to the evidence.”  
Arbelaez v. State, 898 So. 2d 25, 32 (Fla. 2005) (quoting Sochor v. State, 883 So. 
2d 766, 781 (Fla. 2004)).  This deference is a recognition of “the trial court’s 
superior vantage point in assessing the credibility of witnesses and in making 
findings of fact.”  Porter v. State, 788 So. 2d 917, 923 (Fla. 2001).   
  
There is a presumption that trial counsel’s performance was not 
 
 
- 11 -
ineffective.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.  A fair assessment of attorney 
performance requires that efforts be made to eliminate the distorting effects of 
hindsight, to reasonably reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged 
conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.   See 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.  The defendant carries the burden to overcome the 
presumption of effective assistance:  “[T]he defendant must overcome the 
presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be 
considered sound trial strategy.’ ”  Id. at 689.  “Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s 
performance must be highly deferential.”  Id.  
The Additional Statutory Mitigation 
Looney asserts that Cummings was ineffective because he failed to properly 
present the statutory age mitigator because Cummings did not emphasize that the 
mitigator is intended to encompass a defendant’s emotional and mental age as well 
as chronological age.  Dr. Mosman testified at the evidentiary hearing that 
although he could not give a specific number to Looney’s mental age, he was of 
the opinion that Looney’s mental and emotional age was somewhere in the early- 
to mid-teen years.  In its order denying Looney’s postconviction motion, the trial 
court stated: 
With respect to the asserted nonpresented statutory mitigation 
of the defendant’s emotional and social age deficits that he felt were 
not presented in the appropriate manner, apart from his chronological 
age, Dr. Mosman testified vaguely and without any specific 
 
 
- 12 -
delineation of any emotional or social deficits of the defendant. On 
cross examination, although he acknowledged that his IQ testing of 
the defendant reflected a full scale IQ of 120, in the upper ten percent, 
Dr. Mosman was reticent to give any specific mental, emotional or 
social age for the defendant preferring a band of “mid adolescence.” 
Looney additionally asserts that Cummings was ineffective because he failed 
to present evidence of the statutory mitigator of extreme emotional disturbance.  
Dr. Mosman testified that there was data that could have been presented on the 
extreme emotional disturbance mitigator which was part of the context of these 
particular crimes.  He proceeded to discuss the traumatic abuse that Looney 
suffered at the hands of his natural grandfather as a baby and the subsequent 
revelation to him of that incident at age sixteen, the rigidity of Looney’s adoptive 
home, and the depression and other emotional factors that were in play at the time 
of the crime.  In the order denying Looney’s motion for postconviction relief, the 
trial Court stated with regard to this subject matter:  
There is no evidence in the record to support that any emotional 
or cognitive disturbance mental health mitigator asserted by Dr. 
Mosman, as either statutory or nonstatutory, contributed to the 
defendant’s actions in committing his crimes.   
With respect to both lines of testimony, the trial court stated: 
[Dr. Mosman’s] asserted additional statutory mitigators are without 
basis in the record and clearly conflict with the evidence of 
defendant’s conduct and behavior presented during trial.  He was not 
familiar with the significant facts and circumstances or the evidence 
presented during the guilt phase and his parsing and teasing of the 
mitigation was strained and conjectural.  Dr. Mosman’s testimony 
 
 
- 13 -
likely would have been entitled to insignificant weight had it been 
presented in the penalty phase.    
This Court has established that it will not substitute its judgment for that of a trial 
court on the credibility of witnesses if the trial court’s judgment is supported by 
“competent, substantial evidence.”  Arbelaez, 898 So. 2d at 32 (quoting Sochor, 
883 So. 2d at 781).  The trial court’s order describes that the cross-examination of 
Dr. Mosman revealed that he  
had not talked to trial counsel concerning the presentation of 
defendant’s mitigation . . . .  He also admitted that he had not read the 
guilt phase trial transcripts, but had read only the penalty phase . . . . 
Dr. Mosman had no knowledge of the details of the criminal events or 
the episode or the interactions between the criminal participants 
involved in the crimes. 
These circumstances support the trial court’s determination that Dr. Mosman’s 
testimony would have been given insignificant weight even if it had been presented 
at trial.  
Further, there is no indication in the record that defense counsel Cummings 
was ever alerted to the fact that either Looney’s mental age or his extreme 
emotional disturbance were potential mitigating factors in the instant matter.  The 
mental health expert at the time of trial never mentioned these subjects to trial 
counsel.  This Court has stated that “[c]ounsel cannot be deemed ineffective . . . 
simply because he relied on what may have been less than complete pretrial 
psychiatric evaluations.”  State v. Sireci, 502 So. 2d 1221, 1223 (Fla. 1987).  
 
 
- 14 -
Therefore, even if Dr. Mosman’s finding as to Looney’s mental age and emotional 
disturbance were undeniable truths, Cummings still would not have been 
ineffective for relying on Dr. Partyka’s assessment which did not include such 
findings.  
Cummings relied on the evaluation by the mental health expert at the time of 
trial, which did not include findings of either of the alleged additional statutory 
mitigators.  Additionally, the trial Court found Dr. Mosman’s testimony 
unconvincing and concluded that there was not evidence in the record to support 
these mitigators.  Based on the foregoing, we find that defense attorney Cummings 
was not ineffective for failing to present this alleged additional statutory mitigation 
and that Dr. Mosman’s unconvincing testimony does not undermine our 
confidence in the proceedings below. 
Nonstatutory Mitigation 
 
Looney asserts that Cummings was also ineffective because he failed to 
present evidence of available and relevant nonstatutory mitigation.  Specifically, 
Looney alleges that Cummings failed to present evidence on the following twelve 
issues:  (1) Looney’s natural mother was a teenager at the time she conceived him, 
was a runaway, abused drugs and alcohol, earned money as a stripper, and left 
Looney with her parents at eighteen months of age; (2) Looney was removed from 
the custody of his natural mother and grandparents at age eighteen months based 
 
 
- 15 -
on allegations of sexual and physical abuse; (3) the grandparents’ home was 
dysfunctional, the grandfather was an alcoholic, there were allegations of sexual 
abuse of two other children, and the grandfather later committed suicide; (4) there 
were problems with abuse in Looney’s adoptive home; (5)  the environment in the 
adoptive home led Looney into severe depression and the exhibition of self-
destructive behavior; (6) when Looney was fifteen, his adoptive mother informed 
him that his natural grandfather had committed suicide, and that when he was a 
baby he had been raped by his natural grandfather; (7) Looney began self-
medicating with alcohol; (8) the only support Looney was given during this period 
was a brief period in alcohol rehabilitation, which failed; (9) Looney ran away to 
escape the environment of his adoptive home; (10) at the time of the offense, 
Looney was on his own, depressed, lonely, and angry about his upbringing; (11) 
clinical testing revealed that Looney did not have an antisocial personality disorder 
but, instead, suffered from significant clinical depression, anxiety, and self-
destructive behavior; and (12) the crimes in the instant matter occurred while 
Looney was under a great deal of stress.  As the State correctly asserts, Cummings 
presented evidence on virtually all of these issues, and those for which no evidence 
was presented were unknown to him at the time of trial. 
 
With respect to the traumatic incidents surrounding Looney’s removal from 
the custody of his natural mother and grandparents by a child services department 
 
 
- 16 -
in Texas, defense counsel did in fact present evidence of these events at trial.  
Looney’s natural mother, Susan Podgers, testified at trial that Looney was born 
when she was seventeen and that she lost custody of him at the age of eighteen 
months based on allegations of sexual and physical abuse.  Glenda Podgers, 
Looney’s natural grandmother, testified that Looney was raped at the age of 
eighteen months, was subsequently removed from her custody, and that she had 
discovered the rape after leaving Looney alone with her husband for the day while 
she went shopping.  She also revealed that Looney’s adoptive home was a very 
rigid and controlling environment.  She testified that Looney had been informed by 
his adoptive mother at the age of fifteen that his grandfather had raped Looney 
when he was a baby, and later committed suicide.  She testified that after this 
information was related to Looney, he was given no support by his adoptive family 
to deal with these emotionally difficult issues.  She confirmed that Looney stopped 
visiting with her after the traumatic circumstances surrounding his removal from 
the custody of his natural mother and grandparents were revealed to him. 
 
Looney argues extensively that Cummings was ineffective for failing to 
present evidence that his adoptive home was an abusive environment.  Dr. 
Mosman testified that the adoptive home was once investigated for possible abuse 
when marks were discovered on one of the girls in the home, but that the 
investigation was not pursued.  He also mentioned that there were allegations of 
 
 
- 17 -
physical abuse made by a brother, Mark Looney, an adoptive sibling of defendant 
Looney whom Dr. Mosman had contacted.  Although the trial judge sustained a 
hearsay objection to Dr. Mosman’s testimony regarding Mark Looney’s 
statements, and the precise content of the conversation between Dr. Mosman and 
Mark Looney cannot be determined from the record, Looney asserts on appeal that 
Cummings was ineffective for failing to locate Mark Looney to present a full 
background of Looney’s life for fifteen years in his adoptive home.   
 
Evidence of the controlling, rigid environment in the adoptive home was 
presented through the testimony of Glenda Podgers, Looney’s natural 
grandmother.  She testified that Looney’s adoptive mother, Mrs. Looney 
was extremely controlling.  She had to control everything . . . .  [S]he 
had it planned from the time he [defendant Looney] was three that he 
was going to be the next Billy Graham and nothing, nothing, was 
going to change that. 
Cummings testified at the evidentiary hearing that he did not have Looney’s 
adoptive mother testify because when he had contacted her during his investigation 
[s]he was very angry at what [Looney] had done and been charged 
with, and almost seemed like a reflection on her.  She didn’t give a 
darn about what happened to [Looney] from that point on. 
Cummings also established that Mrs. Looney gave every indication that Looney’s 
adoptive family would not cooperate in assisting Looney at trial.  The trial mental 
health expert, Dr. Partyka, testified that Looney provided no indication during any 
interview that he had suffered abuse at the hands of his adoptive parents.  
 
 
- 18 -
Additionally, Cummings received no indication from Looney nor did his own 
investigation reveal that Looney was ever abused in his adoptive home.  
Cummings also testified that Looney never identified his adoptive siblings as 
possible witnesses, although Looney had directed Cummings to other potential 
witnesses.  Based on Mrs. Looney’s indication that the adoptive family was not 
going to assist or testify on Looney’s behalf and that Cummings had absolutely no 
indication that the adoptive home was abusive, it was not unreasonable that 
Cummings did not attempt to locate other members of the adoptive household for 
assistance during the penalty phase.  
 
Looney further asserts that Cummings was ineffective because he failed to 
present evidence as to his “self-medicating” with alcohol starting at the age of 
sixteen.  Cummings testified that although there was an indication of alcohol abuse 
at an earlier date, there was no indication that the use of alcohol by Looney or his 
codefendants was related to any behavior or conduct or with regard to the crimes.  
Thus, it does not appear that Looney’s “self-medication” is truly relevant to 
mitigation in the instant matter.      
As to the mitigation with regard to Looney’s mental state at the time of the 
crimes, which Looney asserts Cummings was ineffective for failing to present, 
Cummings was given no indication by the trial mental health expert that these 
circumstances were present.  Dr. Mosman testified at the evidentiary hearing that 
 
 
- 19 -
Looney was depressed, lonely, feeling adrift and angry at the way he had been 
raised at the time of these murders.  Dr. Partyka testified during the evidentiary 
hearing, contrary to Dr. Mosman’s conclusion with regard to Looney’s flight from 
his adoptive home, that defendant Looney had left his prior home as an impulsive 
act, a need for change, an indication of an issue of boredom and a need for 
stimulation more than anything else.  Dr. Partyka added that Looney’s impulsivity 
and the desire to travel the country was typical behavior for psychopaths and 
consistent with his conclusion that defendant Looney was a psychopath.  This 
Court has established that defense counsel is entitled to rely on an evaluation 
conducted by a mental health expert for trial, even if, in retrospect, that evaluation 
is less than perfect.  See Sireci, 502 So. 2d at 1223.  Even if Dr. Mosman’s 
conclusion that Looney was in a state of emotional disturbance at the time of these 
crimes is accurate, Cummings still would not have been ineffective for relying on 
Dr. Partyka’s assessment, which did not reach a similar conclusion. 
Cases Looney advanced to support his assertion that Cummings was 
ineffective because he failed to discover and present extant mitigation are factually 
distinguishable because defense counsel in those cases conducted far less thorough 
investigations into mitigation than did Cummings in the present case.  See State v. 
Lewis, 838 So. 2d 1102, 1113 (Fla. 2002) (“[C]ounsel did not spend sufficient time 
to prepare for mitigation . . . .”); Rose v. State, 675 So. 2d 567, 572 (Fla. 1996) 
 
 
- 20 -
(“[C]ounsel never attempted to meaningfully investigate mitigation . . . .”); 
Hildwin v. Dugger, 654 So. 2d 107, 109 (Fla. 1995) (“Trial counsel’s sentencing 
investigation was woefully inadequate.”); Heiney v. State, 620 So. 2d 171, 172 
(Fla. 1993) (concluding that counsel “totally fail[ed] to investigate potential 
mitigating factors”).  Here, on the other hand, the trial court stated in the order 
denying post conviction relief that  
[c]ounsel did conduct a reasonable investigation of mental health 
mitigation prior to trial and made a strategic and reasonable decision 
not to present this information through a mental health expert.  He did 
not fail to investigate potential mitigating evidence and he did not fail 
to obtain an adequate mental health evaluation. 
Failure to Use a Mental Health Expert 
 
Looney alleges that Cummings was ineffective for failing to present the 
testimony of a mental health expert during the penalty phase to, in Dr. Mosman’s 
words, “[tie] all of the disparate pieces of information in the record together 
through a mental health lens.”  With regard to the conclusions of Dr. Partyka, a 
mental health expert consulted by defense counsel, the trial court stated that 
[f]rom his battery of testing, extensive interviews and review of the 
Texas records, he concluded that the defendant had no schizophrenia 
or psychotic illnesses, had some antisocial tendencies and an IQ full 
scale of 114.  His ultimate diagnosis was that the defendant was a 
psychopath who typically display social maladjustments or socially 
unacceptable behavior traits such as lack of remorse, criminal 
behavior, superficial charm, grandiose sense of self worth, the need 
for stimulation, pathological lying, manipulativeness, shallow 
emotions, difficulty with lasting relationships, impulsivity, poor 
behavior control, lack of empathy, etc.  When asked for an example of 
 
 
- 21 -
a person who was a psychopath he responded “the one that comes to 
most peoples’ mind would be Ted Bundy.”  
. . . Dr. Partyka further noted that the defendant’s crimes were 
impulsive but not panic or anxiety driven . . . .  
During the evidentiary hearing, Dr. Partyka testified that Cummings chose not to 
have Dr. Partyka testify during the penalty phase because: 
My recommendation was basically that Mr. Looney has had a very 
difficult life; however, that I was not going to be able to bring that out 
without bringing out information that would hurt Mr. Looney, such as 
my view that he was a psychopath.  So it would be more advantageous 
for Mr. Looney to not have me testify, but to have other people testify 
as to other mitigating issues in this case. 
Defense counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that he did not present 
the testimony of Dr. Partyka at the penalty phase because he did not want Dr. 
Partyka’s finding that defendant Looney was a psychopath with antisocial 
tendencies to be revealed to the jury.  This Court has noted that a diagnosis as a 
psychopath is a mental health factor viewed negatively by jurors and is not really 
considered mitigation.  See Dufour v. State, 905 So. 2d 42, 57-58 (Fla. 2005) 
(holding that defense counsel made a reasonable strategic decision not to present 
mental health mitigation testimony at the penalty phase because it would have 
opened the door to mental health expert’s finding that defendant was a sociopath); 
Reed v. State, 875 So. 2d 415, 437 (Fla. 2004) (“[T]his Court has acknowledged in 
the past that antisocial personality disorder is ‘a trait most jurors tend to look 
disfavorably upon.’ ”) (quoting Freeman v. State, 852 So. 2d 216, 224 (Fla. 2003)).  
 
 
- 22 -
Trial counsel’s strategic decision on this point is endorsed even by Looney, whose 
brief acknowledges that “[n]ot calling Dr. Partyka would have been wise.”   
Despite this acknowledgment, Looney asserts that Cummings was 
ineffective for not finding another mental health expert to testify during the penalty 
phase.  Cummings revealed at the evidentiary hearing that he intentionally did not 
call some other psychiatric expert because in his view if another expert testified it 
would open the door to the opinions of other experts who had examined Looney, 
which would have included Dr. Partyka.  This Court has stated that “[t]rial counsel 
is not deficient where he makes a reasonable strategic decision not to present 
mental health mitigation testimony during the penalty phase because it could open 
the door to other damaging testimony.”  Griffin v. State, 866 So. 2d 1, 9 (Fla. 
2003); see also Dufour, 905 So. 2d at 57 (citing Griffin).  Therefore, Cummings 
was not ineffective for failing to find another mental health expert. 
Cummings simply was not ineffective for failing to seek another mental 
health expert’s evaluation of defendant Looney after Dr. Partyka concluded that 
Looney was a psychopath.  This Court has held that defense counsel is not 
ineffective for deciding not to seek an additional mental health evaluation after 
receiving an extremely unfavorable evaluation such as occurred here.  See DuFour, 
905 So. 2d at 56 (“[T]rial counsel was not ineffective simply because after 
receiving an initial unfavorable report from Dr. Gutman they did not proceed 
 
 
- 23 -
further to seek additional experts for mental mitigation evidence.”).  Cummings 
was not ineffective in relying on Dr. Partyka’s assessment of the defendant and in 
choosing not to present a mental health expert at the penalty phase in light of that 
assessment.  
As recognized by the trial court, defense counsel Cummings “made a 
strategic and reasonable decision not to present [mitigation] through a mental 
health expert.”  Therefore, Cummings was not ineffective in failing to present the 
testimony of a mental health expert at the penalty phase, and his decision not to do 
so does not undermine our confidence in the proceedings below. 
Failure to Present Mitigation Convincingly 
Looney asserts that Cummings was ineffective for failing to present the 
available mitigation in an effective manner.  He argues that Cummings did not 
specifically mention any statutory mitigator in his opening or closing statements to 
the jury at the penalty phase.  Looney also stresses that the State enumerated six 
aggravating factors during its opening statement at the penalty phase that it 
intended to present to the jury.  Looney alleges that Cummings should have 
enumerated each mitigator individually and secured a jury instruction on each of 
them in that manner so as to have presented a picture of more mitigators than the 
aggravators advanced by the State. 
 
 
- 24 -
 
In the order denying postconviction relief, the trial court addressed the issue 
of enumerating the mitigators and concluded:  
Even if the mitigation evidence presented had been enumerated 
as argued on postconviction relief, it has been repeatedly held by 
appellant [sic] majorities that a laundry list of enumeration of 
mitigation aspects or factors relating to a defendant’s character, record 
and background is not required to supplant the standard Section 
941.141(6)(h) approved jury instruction form.  As has been indicated 
such a specific enumeration may create real risk of misleading a jury 
into not considering some mitigation aspect with respect to a 
defendant’s background, character, or record that it has heard because 
it has not been included in any enumeration.  The mitigation presented 
would not have been provided any more impact or weight for its 
consideration if it had been teased or parsed into tiny bits and given 
multiple enumeration for multiplicative matching purposes against the 
State’s aggravators.  The jury was not left with the impression that the 
mitigation they could consider was limited nor that mitigation not 
specifically designated as statutory could not impact or be weighed 
against the State’s statutory aggravators.  Contrary to defendant’s 
assertions that his case went to the jury with no statutory mitigators 
and only a grouping of nonstatutory mitigation, his case went to the 
jury with two statutory mitigators and a host of further nonstatutory 
mitigation.  Furthermore, counsel made it clear and ably argued that 
any mitigator could outweigh all of the aggravators argued by the 
State. 
 
With respect to Looney’s general argument regarding the method in which 
trial counsel presented mitigation, the methods Cummings selected would be 
considered trial strategy.  This Court has established that “strategic decisions do 
not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been 
considered and rejected and counsel’s decision was reasonable under the norms of 
professional conduct.”  Howell v. State, 877 So. 2d 697, 703 (Fla. 2004) (quoting 
 
 
- 25 -
Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1048 (Fla. 2000)).  Cummings testified at the 
evidentiary hearing that he attempted to convey Looney’s sad background through 
the witness testimony available to him.  Explaining his decision to present 
Looney’s background in this manner, Cummings testified that he presented the 
mitigation as he did “[t]o try to paint the picture the best we could of what Jason 
had been through with the individuals that were willing to cooperate.”  After 
weighing all the postconviction testimony, the trial court did not find Cummings’ 
performance ineffective and we agree. 
CONCLUSION 
 
Looney has failed to meet his burden under Strickland.  All of the additional 
mitigators that Looney asserts were not presented during the penalty phase were 
either presented or not presented because defense counsel had no indication that 
the mitigating factor might apply to Looney’s case.  Defense attorney Cummings 
reasonably relied on the evaluation of the mental health expert in making a 
strategic decision not to call a mental health expert as a witness.  Additionally, 
even if the mitigation had been presented in the manner proposed by Dr. Mosman 
during his testimony at the evidentiary hearing, the trial court found Dr. Mosman 
to be an unconvincing witness.  Based on the foregoing, Cummings provided 
effective assistance of counsel and none of the testimony presented by Looney at 
the postconviction evidentiary hearing undermines our confidence in the 
 
 
- 26 -
proceedings below.  Therefore, we affirm the denial of Looney’s postconviction 
motion under rule 3.851. 
 
It is so ordered.    
PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and 
BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Wakulla County,  
N. Sanders Sauls, Judge - Case No. 97-215-CF 
 
Baya Harrison, III, Monticello, Florida and Frank E. Sheffield, Tallahassee, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General and Carolyn M. Snurkowski, Assistant 
Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida 
 
 
for Appellee