Title: Ex parte Roshell Flowers d/b/a Roshell's Caf and Deli. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: Kimberly R. Sanders, individually and as the personal representative of the estate of Marilyn Ruth Smith Lancaster v. Roshell H. Flowers, individually and d/b/a Roshell's Caf and Deli, a corporation et al.)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1061201
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: March 28, 2008

REL: 3/28/08
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
_________________________
1061201
_________________________
Ex parte Roshell H. Flowers, individually and d/b/a
Roshell's Café and Deli
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  Kimberly R. Sanders, individually and as personal
representative of the estate of Marilyn Ruth Smith Lancaster 
v.
Roshell H. Flowers, individually and d/b/a Roshell's Café
and Deli, a corporation; et al.)
(Mobile Circuit Court, CV-06-2179)
SEE, Justice.
1061201
2
Roshell H. Flowers, individually and doing business as
Roshell's Café and Deli (collectively "Flowers"), petitions
this Court for the writ of mandamus directing the Mobile
Circuit Court to vacate its order compelling Flowers to
produce certain statements taken by Flowers's insurance
carrier, which Flowers asserts are protected by the work-
product privilege.  We grant the petition and issue the writ.
Factual Background and Procedural History
Kimberly R. Sanders alleges that as she and her mother,
Marilyn 
Ruth 
Smith 
Lancaster, 
were 
leaving 
Flowers's
restaurant, "a deluge of water from the defective roof of the
restaurant" poured down on Lancaster, knocking her down and
causing her to break both her legs.  It is further alleged
that Lancaster was subsequently confined to a hospital and
that she eventually died as a result of her injuries.
Sanders, as personal representative of Lancaster's estate,
sued Flowers, alleging that Flowers had negligently and
wantonly operated, maintained, managed, controlled, and/or
failed to maintain the premises of the restaurant.
During the course of discovery, Sanders requested that
Flowers produce the statements of Roshell Flowers and
1061201
3
witnesses Mack Flowers, Jr., and Donna Flowers that were taken
by Flowers's insurance carrier regarding the accident.
Flowers did not respond to the request, and Sanders moved the
trial court to compel Flowers to produce the statements.
Flowers opposed the motion to compel, claiming that the
statements were taken in anticipation of litigation and that
they were therefore protected as work product.  In support of
her opposition to Sanders's motion to compel, Flowers
presented an affidavit from her insurance adjuster, Barbara
Barrett.  Barrett stated in her affidavit that Flowers
forwarded to her a letter from Lancaster's attorney, written
while Lancaster was still alive, that read:
"This is to advise that I represent Marilyn
Lancaster on an action or cause of action which she
may have arising out of an accident on April 6,
2005, at your restaurant, when she suffered severe
injuries for which she was hospitalized and is still
being treated.
"I would request that if you have liability
insurance to cover you in this matter that you turn
my letter over to them so that they can contact me
regarding some possible resolution to this claim.
"If you do not have liability insurance, I would
appreciate you contacting me so that we can discuss
this matter."
1061201
4
Petition, Exhibit 5.  Barrett stated that she thereafter
initiated an investigation, which she believed was in
anticipation of litigation.  Barrett stated that she
anticipated that there would be litigation because "[b]ased on
[her] experience and training as a claims agent, when a
fatality or severe injury occurs in a premises liability
action and the claimant has retained counsel, there is likely
to be litigation regarding the accident." Petition, Exhibit 5.
As part of her investigation she interviewed and took
statements from Roshell Flowers, Mack Flowers, Jr., and Donna
Flowers.
The trial court apparently found that the statements
Barrett took from Roshell Flowers, Mack Flowers, Jr., and
Donna Flowers were not taken in anticipation of litigation,
and it granted Sanders's motion to compel.  Flowers then
petitioned this Court for the writ of mandamus and an
immediate stay of all proceedings.  We stayed the proceedings
pending the disposition of Flowers's petition for the writ of
mandamus.  Sanders moved this Court to rescind its order
staying all proceedings, and we issued a new order staying
only the trial court's order compelling Flowers to produce the
1061201
5
statements.  We now issue the writ of mandamus directing the
trial court to vacate its order compelling Flowers to produce
the statements.  
Standard of Review
"A petition for the writ of mandamus is the proper means
for obtaining review of the question 'whether a trial court
has abused its discretion in ordering discovery, in resolving
discovery matters, and in issuing discovery orders.'"  Ex
parte Water Works & Sewer Bd. of Birmingham, 723 So. 2d 41, 42
(Ala. 1998) (quoting Ex parte Compass Bank, 686 So. 2d 1135,
1137 (Ala. 1996)).  "Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and
will be granted only when there is '(1) a clear legal right in
the petitioner to the order sought, (2) an imperative duty on
the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so,
(3) the lack of another adequate remedy, and (4) properly
invoked jurisdiction of the court.'"  Ex parte Dillard Dep't
Stores, Inc., 879 So. 2d 1134, 1136 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Ex
parte Alfab, Inc., 586 So. 2d 889, 891 (Ala. 1991)).  However,
regarding the issuance of a writ of mandamus in a discovery
matter, this Court has stated:
"Discovery matters are within the trial court's
sound discretion, and this Court will not reverse a
1061201
6
trial court's ruling on a discovery issue unless the
trial court has clearly exceeded its discretion.
Home Ins. Co. v. Rice, 585 So. 2d 859, 862 (Ala.
1991).  Accordingly, mandamus will issue to reverse
a trial court's ruling on a discovery issue only (1)
where there is a showing that the trial court
clearly exceeded its discretion, and (2) where the
aggrieved party does not have an adequate remedy by
ordinary appeal.  The petitioner has an affirmative
burden to prove the existence of each of these
conditions."  
Ex parte Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 872 So. 2d 810, 813 (Ala.
2003).
"Generally, an appeal of a discovery order is an adequate
remedy"; therefore, "[t]his Court will not issue the writ of
mandamus where the petitioner has '"full and adequate relief"'
by appeal." Ocwen Fed. Bank, 872 So. 2d at 813 (quoting State
v. Cobb, 288 Ala. 675, 678, 264 So. 2d 523, 526 (1972),
quoting in turn State v. Williams, 69 Ala. 311, 316 (1881)).
"In certain exceptional cases, however, review by appeal of a
discovery order may be inadequate, for example, ... when a
privilege is disregarded." Ocwen Fed. Bank, 872 So. 2d at 813.
Further, "'"[u]nder Rule 26(b)(3), [Ala. R. Civ. P.,] the
party objecting to discovery bears the burden of establishing
the elements of the work-product exception."'" Ex parte
Meadowbrook Ins. Group, Inc., [Ms. 1061592, Dec. 21, 2007] ___
1061201
Rule 26(b)(3) provides, in part:
1
"(3) Trial Preparation: Materials. Subject to
the provisions of subdivision (b)(4) of this rule
[concerning expert witnesses], a party may obtain
discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise
7
So. 2d  ___, ___ (Ala. 2007) (quoting Ex parte Cummings, 776
So. 2d 771, 774 (Ala. 2000), quoting in turn Ex parte Garrick,
642 So. 2d 951, 952-53 (Ala. 1994)). 
Analysis
Flowers argues that the statements that are the subject
of the discovery order were taken by Flowers's insurance
carrier in anticipation of litigation and that they therefore
qualify as work product.  Sanders argues, on the other hand,
that the trial court did not exceed its discretion in ordering
Flowers to produce the statements, because, she says, the
trial court did not find Barrett's affidavit to be credible
and, therefore, Flowers did not meet her burden of proving
that the statements are work product.
Documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable,
which are prepared in anticipation of litigation or trial by
or for another party or by or for that other party's
representative, are protected as work product and are not
ordinarily discoverable. See Rule 26(b)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P.1
1061201
discoverable under subdivision (b)(1) of this rule
and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for
trial by or for another party or by or for that
other party's representative (including the other
party's attorney ...) only upon a showing that the
party seeking discovery has substantial need of the
materials in the preparation of the party's case and
that the party is unable without undue hardship to
obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials
by other means.  In ordering discovery of such
materials when the required showing has been made,
the court shall protect against disclosure of the
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal
theories of an attorney or other representative of
a party concerning the litigation."
The dissenting opinion notes that "[t]he importance of
2
the information sought is evident in the fact that the
information could show inconsistent statements concerning the
accident and how it occurred."  It is certainly possible, as
the dissent speculates, that a statement (or any other
documentary evidence) that qualifies as work product under
Rule 26(b)(3) would be useful to opposing counsel for
impeachment 
or 
other 
purposes; 
however, 
notably, 
the
possibility of usefulness to opposing counsel is not a factor
in the initial determination of whether a statement qualifies
as work product. See Ex parte Meadowbrook, ___ So. 2d at ___
(identifying the elements of the work-product exception to the
8
Ex parte Meadowbrook, identifies the elements of the work-
product exception to the general discovery rule as follows:
"'(1) the materials sought to be protected are documents or
tangible things; (2) they were prepared in anticipation of
litigation or for trial; and (3) they were prepared by or for
a party or a representative of that party.'" (quoting Johnson
v. Gmeinder, 191 F.R.D. 638, 643 (D. Kan. 2000)).2
1061201
general discovery rule as "'that (1) the materials sought to
be protected are documents or tangible things; (2) they were
prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial; and (3)
they were prepared by or for a party or a representative of
that party.'" (quoting Johnson v. Gmeinder, 191 F.R.D. at
643)).
9
This Court recognized in Ex parte Norfolk Southern
Railway,  897 So. 2d 290, 295 (Ala. 2004), that a "recorded
statement ...  taken by the claims agent ... can be treated as
protected work product, assuming other applicable [work-
product] criteria ... are satisfied."  It appears undisputed
that the statements made to Flowers's insurance carrier are
"documents" that were "prepared in anticipation of litigation
or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other
party's representative." Rule 26(b)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P.
Therefore, the question is whether the statements of Roshell
Flowers, Donna Flowers, and Mack Flowers, Jr., taken by
Flowers's 
insurance 
carrier 
were, 
in 
fact, 
taken 
in
anticipation of litigation.  See Ex parte Nationwide Mut. Fire
Ins. Co., 898 So. 2d 720, 723 (Ala. 2004) ("A recorded
statement taken from a witness by a claims adjuster can be
treated as protected work product, assuming the insurer
claiming the privilege can show that the statement was taken
in anticipation of litigation.").  Flowers argues that
1061201
10
Barrett's affidavit is sufficient to show that the statements
were taken in anticipation of litigation.  We agree.
In Ex parte Norfolk Southern Railway, a claims agent
testified by affidavit that, at the time he took the recorded
statement of a railroad employee regarding a grade-crossing
accident, "he had investigated the accident made the basis of
the action, that at the time he was investigating the accident
he knew that a death had occurred as a result of the accident,
and that he expected that a wrongful-death claim would be
asserted ...."  897 So. 2d at 291.  The claims agent attested
in his affidavit that he anticipated that litigation would
result because, "based upon his experience and training as a
claims agent, when a fatality or a serious injury occurs in a
grade-crossing accident, there is likely to be litigation
regarding the accident."  897 So. 2d at 295.  This Court
concluded that the statement of the railroad employee was work
product, holding that a recorded statement taken by a claims
agent is work product where "[t]he claims agent testifie[s]
that, based upon his experience and training as a claims
agent, when a fatality or a serious injury occurs in a grade
crossing accident, there is likely to be litigation regarding
1061201
11
the accident." 897 So. 2d at 295.  There is no indication that
an attorney or claimant had yet contacted the railroad in Ex
parte Norfolk Southern Railway; it appears that the claims
agent's anticipation of litigation was based on his knowledge
of the accident and the fact that a fatality had occurred.
897 So. 2d at 291.  
Similarly, in Ex parte Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance
Co., we addressed a statement made by an insured driver to his
claims adjuster, after the claims adjuster was made aware, by
the injured party's insurance agent, that the automobile
accident being investigated resulted in only $300 worth of
bumper damage to the other vehicle, but caused a knee injury
requiring surgery to the occupant of the other vehicle.  898
So. 2d at 723.  Nationwide's claims adjuster testified that he
took the statement of the insured in anticipation of
litigation 
and 
based his conclusion "upon information
indicating to him that [the insured] was free from liability,
that [the other] vehicle had sustained little damage, and that
[the occupant of that other vehicle] had allegedly sustained
a serious knee injury."  898 So. 2d at 723.  We concluded that
"Nationwide made an adequate showing that the statement of its
1061201
12
insured was taken in anticipation of litigation" and that
"'[f]rom the nature of the case, ... [Nationwide's adjuster]
could have reasonably concluded that its insured would be
sued.'" Id. (quoting Ex parte State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
386 So. 2d 1133, 1136 (Ala. 1980)).  As in Ex parte Norfolk
Southern Railway, it appears that the Nationwide agent's
anticipation of litigation was premised on his conversation
with the injured party's insurance agent, his knowledge of the
accident, and the nature of the injuries.  Ex parte
Nationwide, 898 So. 2d at 723.
In 
the 
present 
case, 
Flowers 
argues 
that 
the
circumstances of this case are like those in Ex parte Norfolk
Southern Railway.  Petition at 12.  Barrett, after receiving
a letter written by Lancaster's attorney, took the three
statements.  She testified in her affidavit that, "based on
[her] experience and training as a claims agent, when a
fatality or severe injury occurs in a premises liability
action and the claimant has retained counsel, there is likely
to be litigation regarding the accident."
1061201
Sanders also makes the following argument: 
3
"Under Rule 613(a)[, Ala. R. Evid.], before the
Plaintiff can examine the witness concerning a prior
inconsistent statement, the statement if in writing,
must be shown to the opposing counsel. ... [Sanders]
would respectfully submit that in order to show that
either Donna Flowers or Mack Flowers, Jr. made a
prior statement or a prior inconsistent statement
concerning this accident, the statements must be
shown at least to the opposing counsel."
Sanders's answer brief at 19.  Rule 613(a), Ala. R. Evid.,
provides:
"(a) 
Examining 
Witness 
Concerning 
Prior
Statement. In examining a witness concerning a prior
statement made by the witness, whether written or
not, the statement need not be shown nor its
contents disclosed to the witness at that time, but
on request the same shall be shown or disclosed to
opposing counsel."
Sanders provides no insight into the applicability or
relevance of Rule 613(a) to the discovery of the statements in
question, as contrasted with their use if and when they are
discovered.  In fact, it appears that this rule applies only
to Sanders's potential use of those statements at trial, if
Sanders 
actually 
has 
them, 
if 
they 
actually 
contain
impeachment material, and if Sanders chooses to use the
statements against these witnesses at trial.  See Rule 613(a),
Ala. R. Evid.  This conclusion is supported by the Author's
Statement of the Rule regarding Rule 613(a) in Charles M.
Gamble, Gamble's Alabama Rules of Evidence (1995), which
states that, "[h]enceforth the cross-examining party may ask
about a prior statement without first showing it to the
witness or apprising the witness of its contents.  The
statement, however, must be shown or its contents disclosed to
13
Sanders disagrees.  She argues that Barrett's affidavit
is defective.   
3
1061201
opposing counsel upon request." (Footnotes omitted.)  Rule
613(a) applies only to the use of the statements at trial, not
to the discovery of the statements.
14
Sanders takes issue with Barrett's affidavit.  Sanders
asserts that Barrett's affidavit wholly fails to mention the
statement of a third witness, Paul Conger.  Sanders, in her
original request for production, asked Flowers for "[c]opies
of any and all statements taken by the insurance company or
its 
adjuster 
which 
insures 
these 
defendants 
in 
this
litigation, said statements being taken from Mack Flowers,
Jr., Roshell Flowers, and Donna Flowers."  Sanders's brief,
Exhibit B.  Similarly, in her motion to produce, Sanders moved
the trial court "to order [Flowers] to produce copies of the
statements or recordings of the statements taken by her
insurance carrier of Mack Flowers, Jr., Donna Flowers and
Roshell Flowers ...."  Sanders's brief, Exhibit D.  It is
apparent that Flowers requested only statements the insurance
carrier took from Mack Flowers, Jr., Roshell Flowers, and
Donna Flowers.  There is no evidence indicating that Sanders
ever requested Paul Conger's statement; therefore, Sanders's
argument that Barrett's failure in her affidavit to address
1061201
15
Paul Conger's statement in some way affects her credibility is
without merit.
The trial judge has filed an answer to the petition for
the writ of mandamus.  He contends that Barrett's amended
affidavit 
conflicts 
with 
Roshell 
Flowers's 
deposition
testimony.  Although Barrett originally stated that she had a
statement made by Roshell Flowers, Barrett later amended her
affidavit to reflect that she "could find no evidence of a
recorded statement by Roshell Flowers."  Petition, Exhibit 6.
Sanders and the trial judge, in his answer, assert that this
statement conflicts with the following deposition testimony by
Roshell Flowers:
"Q: [By Mr. Bedsole, Sanders's attorney]: You don't
recall anyone taking a statement from you?
"A: Oh yes, I recall that.
"....
"Q: Were these statements [of Mack Flowers, Jr.,
Donna Flowers, and yours] signed?
"A: I don't remember writing anything.  You mean
writing down what happened?
"Q: Did you write down what happened?
"A: No, sir.
1061201
16
"Q: Was it recorded with any type of recording
device?
"A: Not that I'm aware of.
"Q: Did someone else write down what you told them
and did you sign it?
"A: Not that I'm aware of.
"Q: Do you remember signing any type of statement?
"A: No sir."
Sanders's brief, Exhibit D.  From this exchange, it appears
that 
Roshell 
Flowers 
discussed the incident involving
Lancaster with her insurance carrier.  She does not testify
that she gave a recorded statement to her insurance carrier.
Therefore, Barrett's statement that she could find no such
recorded statement does not conflict with Roshell Flowers's
deposition testimony.  
Moreover, the trial judge's concern in his answer with
the inconsistency between Barrett's original affidavit, in
which Barrett stated that she had a statement given by Roshell
Flowers, and her amended affidavit, in which she stated that
she found no evidence of a recorded statement by Roshell
Flowers, is fully explained by the deposition testimony.
1061201
17
We agree with Flowers that Ex parte Norfolk Southern
Railway and Ex parte Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co. are
persuasive.  As noted above, Barrett testified in her
affidavit that "based on [her] experience and training as a
claims agent, when a fatality or severe injury occurs in a
premises liability action and the claimant has retained
counsel, there is likely to be litigation regarding the
accident."  Petition, Exhibit 5.  We are mindful that just
"[b]ecause a claims agent may state conclusively that [her]
investigation was conducted in 'anticipation of litigation'
will not necessarily make it so." Ex parte State Farm, 386 So.
2d at 1136-37.  However, in light of our decisions in Ex parte
Norfolk Southern Railway and Ex parte Nationwide Mutual Fire
Insurance Co., Barrett's statements, predicated on her
experience and information regarding Lancaster's claim, are
sufficient to establish that the statements were taken in
anticipation of litigation.  We find particularly compelling
the facts that, at the time the statements were taken, Barrett
was 
aware 
that 
Lancaster 
had 
retained 
counsel, 
that
Lancaster's counsel had stated that he represented Lancaster
"on an action or cause of action which she may have" against
1061201
18
Flowers, that Barrett was aware of the nature of the accident
(premises liability), and that Lancaster's attorney had
characterized Lancaster's injuries as "severe," noting that
Lancaster's 
injuries 
were 
severe 
enough 
to 
warrant
hospitalization and ongoing medical treatment.  Furthermore,
it appears that in a letter to Lancaster's attorney, dated the
day before the statements were taken, Barrett notes a
conversation 
between 
her 
and 
Lancaster's 
attorney, 
referencing
the fact that Lancaster was still in "rehab," nearly four
months after the accident. Petition, Exhibit 5.  "From the
nature of the case, ...[Barrett] could have reasonably
concluded that its insured would be sued."  Ex parte State
Farm, 386 So. 2d at 1136. 
Sanders argues, and the trial judge in his answer agrees,
that Flowers's insurance carrier, in fact, took the statements
in the ordinary course of business.  She argues that when
Barrett took the statements, the only document Barrett had
regarding the incident was the letter from Lancaster's
attorney, and, she argues, this was an insufficient basis on
which Barrett could have anticipated litigation.  The trial
judge states in his answer to the petition:
1061201
19
"Although the Affidavits 
state 
in 
several 
places
that Mrs. Barrett took these statements ... in
anticipation of litigation, I feel that this is a
self-serving statement with no foundation.  Based on
my experience on the bench and my practice as a
member of the Bar, I know that when insurance
companies receive a letter notifying them of an
accident, they begin an investigation by taking
statements as a matter of policy and part of their
routine business in investigating the claim.  It is
not done in anticipation of litigation but simply to
find out what witnesses, including its insured, know
about the accident and the injuries in the accident.
I did not accept Mrs. Barrett's assertions that she
could anticipate litigation after receiving one
letter from the Plaintiff's attorney and without any
information from her insured or witnesses that the
accident happened, how it happened and the extent of
the injuries to the Plaintiff.  
"I did not accept the conclusion stated in Mrs.
Barrett's affidavits that any time she gets a letter
from an attorney who states that there are severe
injuries and before she has any other information
concerning liability or the injuries that any
statements that she takes were made in anticipation
of litigation."
Judge McDermott's answer at 4-5.  To similar effect, Sanders
argues that at the time the statements were taken "Barrett
would have no basis for reasoning that there was going to be
litigation simply based on a letter from [Lancaster's]
counsel." Sanders's brief at 15.
First, we agree with Flowers that this Court may not
consider the trial judge's experiences as evidence, because
1061201
20
the judge was not a witness, and those experiences are,
therefore, outside the record.  See Ex parte Baker, 459 So. 2d
873, 876 (Ala. 1984) ("In determining whether the trial court
[exceeded] its discretion, this [C]ourt is bound by the record
and cannot consider a statement or evidence in brief that was
not before the trial court. Wilson v. Crosby Lumber Co., 386
So. 2d 1173 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980); King v. Smith, 288 Ala.
215, 259 So. 2d 244 (1972).  On review by mandamus, we must
look only at those facts before the trial court. See Ex parte
Harrington Mfg. Co., 414 So. 2d 74 (Ala. 1982)."). 
Further, it is not necessary that statements be made
solely in anticipation of litigation to be treated as
privileged work product.  In Ex parte Alabama Department of
Youth Services, 927 So. 2d 805, 808 (Ala. 2005), this Court
held that "[t]he question as to whether the investigative
reports are work-product when there are several motivating
causes, other than anticipated litigation, for preparing them
turns on whether it was reasonable ... to assume, in light of
circumstances, that litigation could be expected."  See also
Ex parte State Farm, 386 So. 2d at 1136 ("From the nature of
the case, a death claim, State Farm's agent could have
1061201
21
reasonably concluded that its insured would be sued.  This was
not the type of fender-bender case where a settlement with the
insured would likely occur without a lawsuit.").  In the case
before us, Barrett was aware that Lancaster allegedly suffered
severe injuries on Flowers's premises and that she was
represented by counsel "on an action or cause of action which
she may have" against Flowers.  As we noted previously,
according to our decisions in Ex parte Norfolk Southern
Railway and Ex parte Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co.,
this knowledge was sufficient to establish that Barrett could
have reasonably foreseen that her insured would be sued.
Conclusion
We conclude that the statements made to Barrett by Donna
Flowers and Mack Flowers, Jr., were taken by Flowers's
insurance carrier in anticipation of litigation; thus, the
trial court exceeded its discretion when it ordered Flowers to
produce the statements.  Therefore, we issue the writ
directing the trial court to vacate its order compelling
Flowers to produce the statements.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
1061201
22
Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin, Parker, and
Murdock, JJ., concur.  
Cobb, C.J., dissents.
1061201
23
COBB, Chief Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.  An examination of the material
submitted with this petition makes plain that the trial court
thoroughly and thoughtfully considered the evidence as to
whether 
the 
statements 
given 
by 
Roshell 
Flowers, 
Mack 
Flowers,
Jr., and Donna Flowers (owners of the premises where the
injury occurred and witnesses to the accident) were, indeed,
taken in anticipation of litigation and concluded that they
were not.  It should be noted that the depositions of Roshell
Flowers, Mack Flowers, Jr., and Donna Flowers had already been
taken by Kimberly R. Sanders's counsel when the request to
produce these statements was made.  Two affidavits were
produced by the insurance agent, Barbara Barrett, to support
the refusal, under the work-product privilege, to produce the
statements.  In its response to the arguments in this
petition, the trial judge filed an answer discussing these
affidavits, which reads as follows:
"In my examination of the Affidavits of Barbara
Barrett, the claims adjustor, I noticed in the first
Affidavit that she stated she had taken statements
from Roshell Flowers, Mack Flowers, Jr. and Donna
Flowers on August 12, 2005, but in the Amended
Affidavit, she stated that she did not have a
recorded statement from Roshell Flowers, but only
1061201
24
from Mack Flowers, Jr. and Donna Flowers. In fact
the Affidavits conflict with the extracts of the
deposition of Roshell Flowers, in that she stated
that she did give a statement to the insurance
company. 
"From her Affidavits it would appear that the
only document that Barbara Barrett had in her
possession when she obtained the statements of Mack
Flowers, Jr. and Donna Flowers on August 12, 2005
was a letter from the Plaintiff's attorney dated May
24, 2005, addressed to Roshell's Café and Deli,
advising that his client had suffered injuries
arising out of an accident which occurred at
Roshell's on April 6, 2005. At this time there was
no fatality involved and she had no information
about the accident and no other information about
the injuries, including hospital bills or medical
information. In fact there is no information in the
Affidavit as to when Mrs. Barrett received the
letter from the Plaintiff's attorney dated May 24,
2005 addressed to her insured, since her first
letter to the Plaintiff's attorney is dated August
11, 2005.
"Although 
the 
Affidavits 
state 
in 
several 
places
that Mrs. Barrett took these statements on August
12, 2005, in anticipation of litigation, I feel that
this is a self-serving statement with no foundation.
Based on my experience on the bench and my practice
as a member of the Bar, I know that when insurance
companies receive a letter notifying them of an
accident, they begin an investigation by taking
statements as a matter of policy and part of their
routine business in investigating the claim. It is
not done in anticipation of litigation but simply to
find out what witnesses, including its insured, know
about the accident and the injuries in the accident.
I did not accept Mrs. Barrett's assertions that she
could anticipate litigation after receiving one
letter from the Plaintiff's attorney and without any
1061201
25
information from her insured or witnesses that the
accident happened, how it happened and the extent of
the injuries to the Plaintiff.
"I did not accept the conclusion stated in Mrs.
Barrett's affidavits that any time she gets a letter
from an attorney who states that there are severe
injuries and before she has any other information
concerning liability or the injuries that any
statements that she takes were made in anticipation
of litigation. Without any of this additional
information she would not even have known whether
she was going to deny or admit the claim. This is
apparent in her correspondence dated August 11, 2005
in which she requested medical information from the
Plaintiff's attorney. She is merely gathering
information on which to deny or admit the claim as
a part of her investigation and not in anticipation
of litigation."
Judge McDermott's answer at 3-5.
The above-quoted answer exemplifies the thoughtful
exercise of the trial court's discretion for the purpose of
determining whether the statements constituted protected
trial-preparation materials under Rule 26(b)(3), Ala. R. Civ.
P.  The importance of the information sought is evident in the
fact that the information could show inconsistent statements
concerning the accident and how it occurred.  Rule 613(a),
Ala. R. Evid., provides that "[i]n examining a witness
concerning a prior statement made by the witness, whether
written or not, the statement need not be shown or disclosed
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to the witness at that time, but on request the same shall be
shown or disclosed to opposing counsel."  I conclude that, in
determining that Flowers had not met her burden of showing
that the statements in question were made in anticipation of
litigation, the trial court was properly exercising its
discretion in ordering Flowers to produce the statements.  
The constraints of the caselaw noted by the majority,
see, e.g., Ex parte Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 879 So. 2d
1134, 1136 (Ala. 2003); Ex parte Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 872 So.
2d 810, 813 (Ala. 2003);  Ex parte Alfab, Inc., 586 So. 2d
889, 891 (Ala. 1991), are simply ignored in favor of an
analysis in which the majority substitutes its discretion for
that of the trial court in weighing the evidence as to whether
the statements constitute materials prepared in anticipation
of litigation.  In the past, this Court has wisely declined to
establish a new interlocutory appellate process based on
second-guessing the trial court's management of discovery
based on the principle that, "[i]n light of the trial court's
broad discretion concerning matters of discovery, we defer to
the trial court's perception of the facts and procedural
posture of the parties ...."  Ex parte Alapati, 826 So. 2d
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792, 798 n. 2 (Ala. 2002)(discussing appellate review of the
trial court's protective orders in matters of discovery).
Because I cannot approve of abandoning this principle, I
respectfully dissent.