Title: Smith v. Victor
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 593, 2010
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: October 11, 2010

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
SUSAN SMITH,1   
 
Petitioner Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
COLIN VICTOR,  
 
Respondent Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 593, 2010 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Family Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  File No. CN00-06798 
§  Petition Nos. 10-03824 
§                        10-10431 
§                        10-03234 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: September 29, 2010 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: October 11, 2010 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 11th day of October 2010, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
On September 16, 2010, the petitioner-appellant, Susan Smith 
(“Mother”), filed a notice of appeal in this Court from the Family Court’s 
September 2, 2010 order finding her in contempt for interfering with 
respondent-appellee Colin Victor’s (“Father’s”) visitation with the parties’ 
minor children.   
 
(2) 
On September 20, 2010, the Clerk of the Court issued a notice 
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 29(b) directing Mother to show cause why 
                                                 
1 The Court sua sponte assigned pseudonyms to the parties by Order dated September 17, 
2010.  Supr. Ct. R. 7(d). 
 
2 
this appeal should not be dismissed for her failure to comply with Rule 42 
when taking an appeal from an apparent interlocutory order.2  On September 
29, 2010, Mother filed a response to the notice to show cause.  In the 
response, she stated that Father’s motion for reargument was filed in the 
Family Court after she filed her appeal and, for that reason, the Court should 
not dismiss her appeal.  On that same date, Father filed a reply to Mother’s 
response.  In the reply, Father stated that, although the appeal was untimely 
when filed, he had no objection to the appeal going forward because the 
Family Court had now decided the motion for reargument and the motion for 
fees and costs.     
 
(3) 
Absent compliance with Rule 42, the jurisdiction of this Court 
is limited to the review of final judgments of trial courts.3  An order is 
deemed to be final if the trial court has clearly declared its intention that the 
order be the court’s “final act” in the case.4  Following the appeal in this 
case, a timely motion for reargument as well as a motion for fees and costs 
was filed in the Family Court.  As such, the Family Court’s September 2, 
                                                 
2 The Family Court docket reflected that a timely motion for reargument and a timely 
motion for fees and costs had been filed in the Family Court on September 13, 2010 and 
September 17, 2010, respectively, and had not yet been ruled upon. 
3 Julian v. State, 440 A.2d 990, 991 (Del. 1982). 
4 J.I. Kislak Mortgage Corp. v. William Matthews, Builder, Inc., 303 A.2d 648, 650 (Del. 
1973). 
 
3 
2010 order was not a final order for purposes of an appeal to this Court.5  
Moreover, the jurisdictional defect is not cured by Father’s agreement to 
permit the appeal to proceed.  This Court has long held that parties may not 
by agreement convert an otherwise interlocutory order into a final order.6  
We conclude, therefore, that this appeal must be dismissed. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the appeal is 
DISMISSED.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
   
 
                                                 
5 Lipson v. Lipson, 799 A.2d 345, 348-49 (Del. 2001). 
6 Stroud v. Milliken Enterprises, Inc., 552 A.2d 476, 482 (Del. 1989). 
7 Mother’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is hereby denied as moot.