Title: Davis v. Mullins
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 950757
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 12, 1996

Present: All the Justices 
 
DARRELL ELMO DAVIS 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
v.  Record No. 950757                 January 12, 1996 
 
LEONARD C. MULLINS, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DICKENSON COUNTY 
 
Donald R. Mullins, Judge 
 
 
This dispute over the boundary line of adjoining parcels of 
land in Dickenson County has lingered in the courts of the 
Commonwealth for more than a quarter of a century.  To fully 
understand this case, a recitation of the history of this 
protracted litigation is necessary.  The various pleadings and 
trial court orders in the record provide the factual background of 
this appeal.  Neither a statement of facts nor transcripts of the 
various proceedings have been filed by the parties. 
 
The original parties to the dispute were appellees Leonard C. 
and Pauline Mullins (collectively, the Mullins) and Faye Davis.  
Faye Davis is the mother and predecessor in interest of appellant 
Darrell Elmo Davis (Davis).  On April 29, 1969, the Mullins filed 
a motion for judgment pursuant to Code § 8-836 (now Code § 8.01-
179) to establish the boundary line between their land and the 
adjoining land owned by Faye Davis.  On July 10, 1969, Faye Davis 
responded by filing a combined demurrer, motion for bill of 
particulars, and grounds of defense. 
 
On November 15, 1971, the trial judge at that time,
1 Judge 
                     
     
1As recounted later in the opinion, four judges of the Circuit 
Court of Dickenson County ultimately presided over and entered 
orders in this litigation.  The efficacy of these orders is 
critical to this appeal. 
Glyn R. Phillips, issued an opinion letter recounting the evidence 
and the view of the property he had taken with counsel.  Judge 
Phillips determined that the Mullins had failed to bear their 
burden of proof to establish the boundary line and that "the wire 
fence claimed by [Faye Davis] . . . is the true boundary line 
between [the parcels in question]."  Although the opinion letter 
concluded with the provision that "[a]n appropriate order may be 
drafted in accordance with this opinion and presented to the Court 
for entry," no draft of an order appears in the record of the 
trial court.  Apparently, such an order was never presented to the 
trial court.  In any event, this inexplicable gap in the record is 
but one of many. 
 
Notwithstanding the November 15, 1971 opinion letter facially 
resolving the dispute, the next item in the trial court record is 
a brief filed by the Mullins in support of their motion for 
judgment.  The certificate on this brief indicates that it was 
mailed to counsel for Faye Davis on November 30, 1971.  There is 
no indication of when it was received by the trial court. 
 
Thereafter, the record is silent until October 19, 1976, when 
the trial court appointed a surveyor to prepare a survey of the 
boundary line.  On February 17, 1978, the Mullins filed a motion 
to have evidence taken concerning the survey.  That motion was 
granted and Davis was added as a party to the proceedings by order 
entered on April 3, 1978.  By that order, the trial court also 
referred the matter to a "Special Commissioner in Chancery" to 
consider the evidence and submit a recommended decision to the 
court. 
 
The commissioner filed his report on May 15, 1980.  The 
report, in extensive detail, recounted the history of the parcels 
from the time of their creation in a grant dividing a single tract 
of land.  The commissioner concluded that the Mullins had failed 
to satisfy their burden of proof to establish the boundary line 
and recommended that the trial court's decision be in favor of 
Faye and Darrell Davis.  The Mullins filed exceptions to the 
commissioner's report and the issues were briefed by the parties. 
 On June 17, 1981, Judge Nicholas E. Persin, at that time the 
trial judge, issued an opinion letter holding that the report of 
the commissioner correctly determined the location of the boundary 
line and directing that a final order be prepared to that effect. 
 
The record contains a notice of intent to submit a final 
"Decree" for entry on August 19, 1982 at 1:00 p.m.  On that day 
Judge Persin entered an order styled as a "Final Decree" 
containing a metes and bounds description of the boundary line and 
a provision for payment of the commissioner's fee.  This order was 
endorsed by counsel for Faye and Darrell Davis, and the circuit 
court clerk's attestation shows that it was recorded on August 19, 
1982 at 4:00 p.m. in deed book 271 at page 318.  In addition, 
however, the order contains a marginal notation that it was 
inadvertently omitted from microfilm on August 19, 1982 and 
subsequently microfilmed on February 26, 1991 by order of the 
trial court.
2  This order (hereafter the 1982 order), as will be 
                     
     
2The order also reflects that it was ultimately recorded in 
the trial court's order book 35 at page 352.  Based upon 
subsequent events and court orders, we assume that this occurred 
in 1991 when the order was microfilmed. 
shown, became the focal point of the subsequent continuing 
litigation between the parties. 
 
Apparently because the order was not endorsed by counsel for 
the Mullins and to ensure that the record reflected that counsel 
was properly advised of the circumstances of its entry, Judge 
Persin sent a letter to counsel on August 19, 1982, advising that 
the court had waited until "11:30 a.m." on that day for him to 
appear to oppose entry of the order.  The letter contained the 
specific admonition that: "If you still oppose entry of the Order 
you should appear at the Clerk's office immediately and make your 
motion before the Order is filed."  The Mullins' counsel responded 
on August 23, 1982 by filing a "Motion to Vacate Final Order." 
 
The Mullins asserted in this motion that, although no formal 
notice had been received, counsel had been informed by telephone 
by opposing counsel that the order would be submitted in a hearing 
at 1:30 p.m. on August 19.  The motion further asserted that 
counsel had in turn informed the trial judge by telephone that the 
Mullins intended to oppose entry of the order at that time, but 
that the judge had entered the order at 11:30 a.m. on August 19.  
Although a notice of an August 25, 1982 hearing on the motion to 
vacate also appears in the record, there is no indication that the 
hearing took place, nor was an order vacating or suspending the 
judgment of the 1982 order entered at that time or within 21 days 
of the entry of the judgment. 
 
Approximately eight months later on April 8, 1983, Judge 
Persin entered another order styled as a "Final Decree" (hereafter 
the 1983 order) which purports to dismiss with prejudice the 
original motion for judgment on the ground that the Mullins failed 
to meet their burden of proof as to the location of the disputed 
boundary line.  This order was endorsed by counsel for both 
parties.  Nevertheless, the litigation over this boundary line was 
not at an end. 
 
On May 9, 1989, Davis instituted a new proceeding by filing a 
bill of complaint for an injunction and damages, asserting that 
the Mullins had interfered with his use of his land by cutting the 
fence and commanding him to abandon the disputed portion of the 
property.  Davis asserted that the 1982 order had established the 
boundary line between the two parcels, and that the action of the 
Mullins violated his property rights as established by that order. 
 Judge Donald R. McGlothlin, Jr. granted a temporary injunction on 
May 10, 1989.  That injunction set out the metes and bounds 
description of the property that appeared in the 1982 order. 
 
On May 23, 1989, the Mullins filed a motion to dismiss Davis' 
action, asserting that the 1983 order superseded the 1982 order.  
They further asserted that the 1983 order merely dismissed the 
original 1969 motion for judgment without establishing a boundary 
line between the parcels, thus providing no basis for Davis' 
claims and the injunction. 
 
Subsequently the present trial judge, then presiding in the 
matter, issued a final order on July 6, 1990 granting a permanent 
injunction against interference by the Mullins with Davis' use of 
the property based upon the boundary line established by the 1982 
order.  The trial judge specifically found that the 1983 order was 
a nullity because it had been entered after the court had lost 
jurisdiction to do so.  The Mullins filed a notice of appeal of 
this decision, but failed to perfect that appeal. 
 
Again, however, the litigation did not end with this failure 
to perfect an appeal from the July 6, 1990 order.  Rather, on 
August 24, 1990, the Mullins filed a motion to reinstate the 
original proceeding arising out of their April 29, 1969 motion for 
judgment seeking an order nunc pro tunc to vacate the 1982 order. 
 Thereafter on February 18, 1992, Judge Persin ordered the matter 
reinstated and, nunc pro tunc, vacated the 1982 order in favor of 
the 1983 order.  Counsel for Davis objected but did not appeal 
this decision. 
 
Armed with Judge Persin's February 18, 1992 order, the 
Mullins then filed a motion dated April 3, 1992 to dissolve the 
prior injunction granted in favor of Davis on July 6, 1990.  They 
asserted that "[w]ithout the requisite [1982 order], there is no 
basis for the continuation of the injunctive relief entered in 
this cause . . . ." 
 
By final order entered on January 30, 1995, the present trial 
judge, specifically referencing Judge Persin's February 18, 1992 
order, determined that the 1982 order was void, the 1983 order was 
valid, and consequently there was no basis for the court's prior 
injunction entered on July 6, 1990.  Accordingly, the injunction 
was dissolved.  The order further directed that the record of the 
original 1969 action be made a part of the record of the 1989 
action for purposes of appeal.  We awarded Davis an appeal from 
the trial court's January 30, 1995 order. 
 
The crux of the issue on appeal is the validity of the 1982 
order and the power of the court to modify it by vacating it in 
1992.  We must first consider whether the order was in fact valid 
despite the lack of an endorsement by the Mullins' counsel.  Rule 
1:13 provided in 1982, as it does today, as follows: 
 
 
Drafts of orders and decrees shall be endorsed by 
counsel of record, or reasonable notice of the time and 
place of presenting such drafts together with copies 
thereof shall be served by delivering or mailing to all 
counsel of record who have not endorsed them. Compliance 
with this rule . . . may be modified or dispensed with 
by the court in its discretion. 
 
This rule is designed to protect parties without notice.  State 
Hwy. Comm'r v. Easley, 215 Va. 197, 201, 207 S.E.2d 870, 873 
(1974).  However, the mere fact that an order may have been 
entered without endorsement of counsel of record does not 
automatically render it void.  The last sentence of Rule 1:13 
authorizes the trial court in its discretion to modify or dispense 
with the requirement of endorsement of counsel.  Thus, we have 
held 
that 
endorsement 
of 
counsel 
is 
unnecessary 
under 
circumstances where "counsel are present in court when the ruling 
is made orally and are fully aware of the court's decision; 
preparation and entry of an order in standard form is all that 
remains to be done to end the case in the trial court."  Smith v. 
Stanaway, 242 Va. 286, 289, 410 S.E.2d 610, 612 (1991). 
 
Here, the record shows that the Mullins' counsel was fully 
aware of the court's decision through its opinion letter and that 
opposing counsel had been directed to prepare an order consistent 
with that decision for entry.  All that remained to be done was 
the preparation and entry of the order to end the case in the 
trial court.  Moreover, counsel was aware that such an order would 
be presented for entry on August 19, and he communicated to the 
court his objection to the order the day before its entry. 
 
Concededly, the time of day at which the order was to be 
presented for entry on August 19 was the subject of confusion or 
misunderstanding between counsel.  Nonetheless, the record is 
clear that the trial court was aware of these circumstances and 
counsel's objection to the order.  Consequently, exercising its 
discretion to dispense with the requirements of counsel's 
endorsement, the court promptly informed counsel of its action and 
provided him with an ample opportunity to make an objection.  
Indeed, counsel acted to make such objection by filing a motion to 
vacate well within the time period that the court entertained 
jurisdiction 
over 
the 
matter. 
 
Accordingly, 
under 
the 
circumstances of this particular case, the order was properly 
entered by the trial court. 
 
Having determined that the 1982 order was valid under Rule 
1:13, we now consider the effect of counsel's motion to vacate 
that order.  It is the firmly established law of this Commonwealth 
that a trial court speaks only through its written orders.  
Cunningham v. Smith, 205 Va. 205, 208, 135 S.E.2d 770, 773 (1964). 
 Furthermore, "orders speak as of the day they were entered,"  
Vick v. Commonwealth, 201 Va. 474, 476, 111 S.E.2d 824, 826 
(1960), and an order of the court becomes final 21 days after its 
entry unless vacated or suspended by the court during that time.  
Rule 1:1. 
 
Neither the filing of post-trial or post-judgment 
motions, nor the court's taking such motions under 
consideration, nor the pendency of such motions on the 
twenty-first day after final judgment is sufficient to 
toll or extend the running of the 21-day period 
prescribed by Rule 1:1 . . . . The running of time under 
[Rule 1:1] may be interrupted only by the entry, within 
the 21-day period after final judgment, of an order 
suspending or vacating the final order. 
 
School Bd. of Lynchburg v. Caudill Rowlett Scott, Inc., 237 Va. 
550, 556, 379 S.E.2d 319, 323 (1989) (citations omitted). 
 
No order suspending or vacating the 1982 order within 21 days 
of its entry appears in the record.  Accordingly, that order 
became final on September 9, 1982.  After that date, the trial 
court, pursuant to Rule 1:1, was divested of jurisdiction and 
every action of the court thereafter to alter or vacate that 
order, including the entry of the 1983 order, was a nullity unless 
one of the limited exceptions to the preclusive effect of Rule 1:1 
applies. 
 
One such exception is provided by Code § 8.01-428(B) which 
permits the trial court to correct at any time "[c]lerical 
mistakes in all judgments or other parts of the record and errors 
therein arising from oversight or from an inadvertent omission."  
Code § 8.01-428(B); see also Lamb v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 161, 
165, 279 S.E.2d 389, 392 (1981).  In addition, in Council v. 
Commonwealth, 198 Va. 288, 292, 94 S.E.2d 245, 248 (1956), we 
adopted the majority view that the trial court has the inherent 
power, independent of statutory authority, to correct errors in 
the record so as to cause its acts and proceedings to be set forth 
correctly.  In short, the court has the inherent power, 
independent of the statute, upon any competent evidence, to make 
the record "speak the truth."  Netzer v. Reynolds, 231 Va. 444, 
449, 345 S.E.2d 291, 294 (1986). 
 
When acting nunc pro tunc, the court does not reacquire 
jurisdiction over the case.  See Dixon v. Pugh, 244 Va. 539, 543, 
423 S.E.2d 169, 171 (1992).  Rather, the trial court merely 
corrects the record by entry of an order nunc pro tunc, under the 
accepted fiction that the order relates back to the date of the 
original action of the court "now for then."  Nonetheless, we have 
carefully noted that "[t]he power to amend should not be 
confounded with the power to create.  While the power is inherent 
in the court, it is restricted to placing upon the record evidence 
of judicial action which has actually been taken, and presupposes 
action taken at the proper time."  Council, 198 Va. at 292, 94 
S.E.2d at 248 (citation omitted).  Similarly, the statutory power 
granted by Code § 8.01-428 is to be narrowly construed and 
applied.  McEwen Lumber Co. v. Lipscomb Bros. Lumber Co., 234 Va. 
243, 247, 360 S.E.2d 845, 848 (1987). 
 
To permit a trial court, either under the statute or by its 
inherent power, to consider at any time what judgment it might 
have rendered while it still retained jurisdiction over a case and 
then to enter that judgment nunc pro tunc would render meaningless 
the mandate of Rule 1:1 and would do great harm to the certainty 
and stability that the finality of judgments brings.  Thus, 
without competent evidence that the trial court actually attempted 
timely to vacate the 1982 order and failed to do so only by error, 
oversight or omission, the finality of that order could not be 
vacated nunc pro tunc. 
 
Here, the record does not contain an order vacating the 1982 
order within 21 days of its entry and is devoid of competent 
evidence that the trial court attempted to enter such an order 
while it retained jurisdiction over the matter.  Similarly, the 
record is devoid of competent evidence that the Mullins timely 
pursued the entry of an order, pursuant to their motion, to vacate 
the 1982 order.  While the delay in recording that order and the 
subsequent proceeding before the trial court in 1983 may suggest 
that the parties and the court treated the 1982 order as having 
been vacated, nothing in the record suggests that an order doing 
so was in fact entered.  Accordingly, the 1983 order was a 
nullity, and the February 18, 1992 order was issued in error, the 
court having no authority to enter the latter order nunc pro tunc. 
 As a result, the January 30, 1995 order dissolving the injunction 
on the basis of the February 18, 1992 order was also issued in 
error, as the July 6, 1990 injunction to enforce the provision of 
the 1982 order was properly granted. 
 
In summary, we hold that the 1982 order remains valid and 
established the boundary line between the parties' property, and 
Davis is entitled to the protection of the July 6, 1990 injunction 
enforcing the effect of the 1982 order.  Thus we will reverse the 
trial court's January 30, 1995 decree, reinstate the injunction, 
and enter final judgment in favor of Davis. 
 
Reversed and final judgment.