Title: HARGRAVE v. TULSA BD OF ADJUSTMENT
Citation: 2002 OK 73, 55 P.3d 1088
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: September 24, 2002

HARGRAVE v. TULSA BD OF ADJUSTMENT Annotate this Case HARGRAVE v. TULSA BD OF ADJUSTMENT 2002 OK 73 55 P.3d 1088 Case Number: 97474 Decided: 09/24/2002 Mandate Issued: 10/17/2002 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA [55 P.3d 1088] CARTER R. HARGRAVE, Plaintiff/Appellant v. TULSA BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT, Defendant/Appellee ¶0 After the Tulsa Board of Adjustment denied Carter R. Hargrave's request for a special zoning exception, Hargrave appealed to the district court of Tulsa County. The district court, Honorable P. Thomas Thornbrugh, dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Hargrave then appealed to this Court. We previously granted Hargrave's motion to retain the appeal. APPEAL RETAINED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. Jon R. Patton, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff/Appellant Martha Rupp Carter, Tulsa City Attorney, and Patrick T. Boulden, Sr. Assistant Tulsa City Attorney, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendant/Appellee. BOUDREAU, Justice: ¶1 We retained this appeal to decide whether the statutory requirements for perfecting an appeal from a decision of a municipal board of adjustment to the district court, set forth in I. FACTS ¶2 On June 26, 2001, the Tulsa Board of Adjustment (Board) conducted a hearing on Carter R. Hargrave's (Hargrave) request for a special zoning exception. At the conclusion of the hearing the Board denied Hargrave's request. On July 6, 2001, within ten days of the Board's denial, Hargrave filed a Notice of Appeal (NOA) in the district court of Tulsa County, Oklahoma. On that day he also mailed, by certified mail, return receipt requested, a copy of his NOA to the Board and to the Tulsa City Clerk. The Board received its copy of Hargrave's NOA on July 12, 2001. The Tulsa City Clerk did not receive a copy of Hargrave's NOA in the mail since Hargrave had inadvertently mailed it to the wrong address. Nevertheless, since the same attorney represents the Board and the Tulsa City Clerk, the Tulsa City Clerk became aware of Hargrave's NOA and transmitted the record of the Board's proceedings to the clerk of the district court of Tulsa County on August 6, 2001. On the Board's motion, the district court dismissed Hargrave's appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction since Hargrave had not timely filed his NOA with the Board and the Tulsa City Clerk. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶3 The dispositive facts are undisputed. The issues presented are issues of law and are reviewed de novo. In conducting a de novo review we claim plenary, independent and non-deferential authority to examine a trial court's legal rulings. Manley v. Brown, III. APPEALS FROM A MUNICIPAL BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT ARE GOVERNED BY 11 O.S. 2001 § 44-110. ¶4 Title 11, Section 44-110 of the Oklahoma Statutes governs appeals from a municipal board of adjustment. ¶6 Subsection D requires the district court to conduct a trial de novo. The district court has the same power and authority as the board of adjustment to grant or deny a variance or special exception. Vinson v. Medley, IV. THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS FOR PERFECTING AN APPEAL FROM A DECISION OF A MUNICIPAL BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT ARE MANDATORY. ¶7 We have never expressly addressed in the context of a decision of a municipal board of adjustment whether the statutory requirements for perfecting an appeal are mandatory. We have, however, addressed this issue in the context of a decision of the Board of Review of the Oklahoma Employment Security Commission. See Oklahoma Employment Security Commission v. Carter, ¶8 The statutory requirements for perfecting an appeal from a decision of the Board of Review of the Oklahoma Employment Security Commission (OESC) are set forth in 40 O.S. 2001 § 2-610: Within the ten (10) days after the day a notice of decision of the Board of Review is mailed ... the Commission, or any party to the proceedings before the Board of Review, may obtain judicial review thereof by filing in the district court ... a petition for review of such decision, against the Board of Review. In such petition for review all other parties to the proceeding before the Board of Review and the Commission shall be made co-defendants .... In Carter, supra, the claimant, Lori Earls, timely filed her petition for review but named only her previous employer and the "Board of Review of the OESC." She did not separately name the OESC. The OESC specially appeared and objected to jurisdiction due to Earls' failure to name it as a defen-[55 P.3d 1091]dant. Earls then sought, and the district court granted, leave to amend her petition to add the OESC as a defendant. We reversed, rejecting Earls' argument that the district court properly allowed her to amend her petition since there was no showing OESC would be prejudiced. We held that strict compliance with § 2-610 is mandatory, saying: "When the ten-day appeal period provided in [§ 2-610] has run without all necessary parties being named, the district court is without jurisdiction." Id. at 871. V. WE REJECT HARGRAVE'S ARGUMENTS CONCERNING SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE, VENUE AND ESTOPPEL. ¶10 Hargrave argues that he substantially complied with the statutory filing requirements, that failing to file his NOA with the Board and the Tulsa City Clerk is a matter of filing in the wrong venue only, and that the Board should be estopped from challenging the manner in which he filed his NOA. ¶11 Hargrave first argues that his appeal should not have been dismissed since he substantially complied with the ten-day statutory time limitation by mailing his NOA on July 6, 2001, to the Board and to the Tulsa Municipal Clerk (although to the wrong address). We reject this argument. Hargrave has not cited, and our research has not revealed, any case in which we have applied the substantial compliance rule to a statutory time limitation for perfecting an appeal. See, e.g., In re Transfers of Students, ¶12 Hargrave argues the statutory filing requirements are "an issue of venue, not jurisdiction." Hargrave's appeal was not dismissed for improper venue. It was dismissed because Hargrave failed to comply with the statutory filing requirements set forth in Section 44-110(B) for perfecting his appeal. ¶13 Hargrave also argues the Board should be estopped from asserting his failure to timely file his NOA because he followed the advice of the Board's attorney and followed the procedures in a pamphlet provided by the Board. We have examined the language in Hargrave's and his attorney's affidavits and in the Board's pamphlet titled "How to Apply to the Board." In essence, the language relied on by Hargrave merely indicates that the appeal is to the district court and is heard de novo. The language does not prescribe the statutory requirements for perfecting the appeal. Although we do not decide whether estoppel may ever [55 P.3d 1092] be applied to toll the statutory time limitation for perfecting an appeal from a board of adjustment, the board's conduct in this case does not rise to the level of equitable estoppel. ¶14 Finally, one of the issues listed in Hargrave's Petition in Error is: "Does 11 O.S. § 44-110 give jurisdiction to both the district court and city?" A review of the record reveals Hargrave did not raise this issue before the trial court. He cannot raise it for the first time on appeal. Great Plains Federal S&L Assoc. v. Dabney, VI. CONCLUSION ¶15 We hold the statutory requirements set out in APPEAL RETAINED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. ¶16 Watt, V.C.J., Hodges, Lavender, Opala, Kauger, Boudreau, Winchester, JJ., concur. ¶17 Summers, J., concurs in result. ¶18 Hargrave, C.J., disqualified. [ 55 P.3d 1093 ] FOOT