Title: Washington v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 193, 2009
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: June 5, 2009

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
CHRISTAN K. WASHINGTON,  
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 193, 2009 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0104011899 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: April 27, 2009 
 
 
 
 
Decided:    June 5, 2009 
 
Before HOLLAND, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 5th day of June 2009, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Christan K. Washington, filed an 
appeal from the Superior Court’s March 25, 2009 order adopting the 
Superior Court commissioner’s March 6, 2009 report, which recommended 
that Washington’s second motion for postconviction relief pursuant to 
Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 be denied.1  The plaintiff-appellee, the 
State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the judgment of the Superior Court 
                                                 
1 Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 512(b); Super. Ct. Crim. R. 62. 
 
2 
on the ground that it is manifest on the face of the opening brief that the 
appeal is without merit.2  We agree and affirm. 
 
(2) 
In November 2002, Washington was found guilty by a Superior 
Court jury of two counts of Robbery in the First Degree, one count of 
Reckless Endangering in the First Degree, and three weapon offenses.  He 
was sentenced to a total of 10 years imprisonment at Level V.  Washington’s 
convictions were affirmed by this Court on direct appeal.3  The Superior 
Court’s denial of Washington’s first postconviction motion also was 
affirmed by this Court.4  
 
(3) 
In this appeal from the Superior Court’s denial of his second 
postconviction motion, Washington claims that, at his trial, the prosecutor 
engaged in misconduct by asking him two improper questions on cross 
examination, thereby causing him prejudice and violating his due process 
rights. 
 
(4) 
Before reviewing the merits of a petitioner’s postconviction 
claims, a court must address whether any of the time and procedural bars of 
Rule 61 are applicable.5  Because the record reflects that Washington’s 
conviction became final in November 2003, his present postconviction 
                                                 
2 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
3 Washington v. State, 836 A.2d 485 (Del. 2003). 
4 Washington v. State, Del. Supr., No. 480, 2007, Jacobs, J. (Mar. 17, 2008). 
5 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
 
3 
motion, filed in February 2009, is plainly time-barred.6  Moreover, to the 
extent that his claim was raised in his first postconviction motion, it is now 
barred as formerly adjudicated.7  To the extent that Washington failed to 
raise his claim in his first postconviction motion, it is now procedurally 
defaulted in the absence of any evidence of cause or prejudice.8   
 
(5) 
To the extent that Washington argues that his claim should be 
considered because of a miscarriage of justice,9 that argument also must fail.  
The record reflects that, during trial, the prosecutor asked him two questions 
on cross-examination to which Washington’s attorney objected.  The 
Superior Court ruled at sidebar that the questions were without foundation 
and immediately instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor’s questions 
and Washington’s answers.  Under these circumstances, Washington has 
failed to demonstrate any prejudice as a result of the prosecutor’s questions 
and we, therefore, conclude that his claim of a miscarriage of justice is 
without merit. 
 
(6) 
It is manifest on the face of the opening brief that this appeal is 
without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled by 
                                                 
6 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (1). 
7 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (4). 
8 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (3). 
9 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (5). 
 
4 
settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, 
there was no abuse of discretion. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Supreme 
Court Rule 25(a), the State of Delaware’s motion to affirm is GRANTED.  
The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         Justice