Title: Hunter v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 186, 2016
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: August 1, 2016

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
MARION HUNTER, 
 
 
   § 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   § 
No. 186, 2016 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
   § 
Appellant,  
 
 
   § 
Court Below:  Superior Court  
 
 
 
 
 
   § 
of the State of Delaware 
v. 
 
 
 
 
   § 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   § 
Cr. ID No. 1211023687 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
   § 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   § 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
   § 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
   § 
 
 
 
Submitted: May 18, 2016 
Decided: 
August 1, 2016 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VAUGHN, and SEITZ, Justices. 
 
      ORDER 
 
This  1st  day of August 2016, upon consideration of the appellant’s opening 
brief, the appellee’s motion to affirm, and the Superior Court record,1 it appears to 
the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The appellant, Marion Hunter, filed this appeal from the Superior 
Court’s order dated March 29, 2016, summarily dismissing his motion for 
postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  The State has filed a 
motion to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on 
                                          
 
1 On June 9, 2016, the appellant filed a motion seeking leave to respond to the motion to affirm. 
Under Supreme Court Rule 25(a), no response to a motion to affirm is permitted unless requested 
by the Court.  The Court did not request a response to the motion to affirm in this case and finds 
no reason to request a response after considering the appellant’s motion. 
2 
 
the face of Hunter’s opening brief that the appeal is without merit.  We agree and 
affirm. 
 
(2) 
Following his arrest in 2012, Hunter was indicted in 2013 on charges 
of Rape in the First Degree, Sexual Abuse of a Child by a Person in a Position of 
Trust, Strangulation, Assault in the Third Degree, and Terroristic Threatening.  On 
November 13, 2013, the first day of trial, the trial judge requested that Hunter’s 
rejection of a guilty plea offered by the State be placed on the record.  During the 
court’s colloquy with Hunter, a recess was taken to allow Hunter to speak with his 
defense counsel (“Defense Counsel”).  Following the discussion with his Defense 
Counsel, Hunter decided to accept the State’s plea offer. 
 
(3) 
Under the plea agreement, Hunter pled guilty to Rape in the Second 
Degree as a lesser included offense of Rape in the First Degree, and the State 
dismissed the other charges in the indictment.  Also, the State agreed to 
recommend no more than ten years of imprisonment, the minimum mandatory 
period of incarceration for Rape in the Second Degree, and to forego seeking to 
have Hunter declared and sentenced as a habitual offender under 11 Del. C. § 
4214.  After conducting the required guilty plea colloquy, the Superior Court 
accepted the guilty plea as knowing, intelligent, and voluntary and sentenced 
Hunter to twenty years at Level V incarceration suspended after ten years for ten 
years at Level IV suspended after two years for two years at Level III probation.  
3 
 
(4) 
On November 25, 2013, twelve days after the guilty plea proceeding 
and sentencing, Hunter filed a motion for postconviction relief, claiming that his 
guilty plea was coerced due to the ineffectiveness of his Defense Counsel.  The 
Superior Court appointed counsel to represent Hunter in the postconviction 
proceeding.  Counsel reviewed the existing record, which at the time did not 
include a transcript of the November 13 guilty plea hearing, and filed a motion to 
withdraw, asserting that he could find no grounds to raise in a postconviction 
motion.  The Superior Court denied counsel’s motion and instructed that new 
counsel be assigned to represent Hunter in the postconviction proceeding.  
Hunter’s new counsel (“Postconviction Counsel”) arranged for preparation of a 
transcript of the guilty plea hearing. 
(5) 
After reviewing the complete record, Postconviction Counsel filed a 
motion to withdraw and supporting memorandum.  Hunter filed responses raising 
additional claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, which Postconviction 
Counsel addressed in a reply.  Defense Counsel filed an affidavit denying the 
allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel raised in Hunter’s postconviction 
motion, and the State filed a response in opposition to the motion, arguing that the 
claims were without merit or were waived by the guilty plea.  Hunter then filed a 
response to each of those submissions. 
4 
 
(6) 
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in the 
context of a guilty plea, a defendant must demonstrate that his counsel’s 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the defendant would not have 
pled guilty but would have insisted on going to trial.2  In this case, the Superior 
Court concluded that Hunter’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was 
without merit and summarily dismissed the postconviction motion and granted 
Postconviction Counsel’s motion to withdraw.3  This appeal followed.       
 
(7) 
  On appeal, Hunter argues that his Defense Counsel was ineffective 
when he failed or refused to file a pretrial motion to dismiss.  Hunter’s ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim is based in part on an underlying claim that the State 
lacked the evidence to convict him of the charges in the indictment.  The record 
reflects that Hunter raised the insufficient evidence claim in a pro se motion to 
dismiss, which the Superior Court denied as without merit at final case review on 
August 26, 2013.4   
 
(8) 
The record belies Hunter’s claim that Defense Counsel was 
ineffective for failing to file a motion to dismiss based on lack of evidence or for 
any other reason.  Hunter also has not demonstrated a reasonable probability that, 
                                          
 
2 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 58-60 (Del. 1988) (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-60 
(1985)). 
3 State v. Hunter, 2016 WL 1424398 (Del. Super. Mar. 29, 2016).  
4 Case Review Tr. at 8-14 (Aug. 26, 2013).   
5 
 
but for the alleged errors of his Defense Counsel, he would not have pled guilty but 
would have insisted on going to trial.5  Given the possibility of a life sentence 
Hunter faced if he went to trial, it is clear that Hunter received a substantial benefit 
from the plea agreement negotiated by his Defense Counsel.      
 
(9) 
A valid guilty plea waives any right to challenge the strength of the 
State’s evidence and events preceding entry of the plea.6  In this case, during the 
guilty plea colloquy on November 13, 2013, Hunter stated that he understood he 
was waiving certain trial rights, including the right to a speedy and public trial, the 
right to hear and question witnesses, and the opportunity to present evidence in his 
own defense. Hunter also stated that he was satisfied with his Defense Counsel’s 
representation.  Absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, Hunter is 
bound by those representations.7  
  
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is 
GRANTED, and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Justice 
                                          
 
5 Supra note 2. 
6 Brown v. State, 108 A.3d 1201, 1202 (Del. 2015). 
7 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997).