Title: Jackson v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC19-1624, SC21-502
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: June 30, 2022

Supreme Court of Florida 
____________ 
 
No. SC19-1624 
____________ 
 
KIM JACKSON, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC21-502 
____________ 
 
KIM JACKSON, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
RICKY D. DIXON, etc., 
Respondent. 
 
June 30, 2022 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Kim Jackson appeals the circuit court’s order denying 
numerous guilt-phase claims raised in his postconviction motion 
filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and petitions 
 
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this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.1  For the reasons that follow, 
we affirm the circuit court’s order and deny the habeas petition. 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
Debra Pearce was brutally stabbed to death at her home in 
Jacksonville.  Responding law enforcement found Pearce’s bloody 
and bruised body face-down in the kitchen. 
Michael Knox, a crime scene investigator, observed that Pearce 
had been stabbed multiple times in the neck and chest.  One stab 
wound was partially covered by a five-inch-long knife that remained 
plunged in Pearce’s chest.  Upon further examination, Knox 
discovered a detached hair on the back of Pearce’s right calf and a 
small folding pocketknife under her body.  Both items were later 
submitted to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) for 
DNA testing.  Additionally, Knox noticed a bloody fingerprint on the 
kitchen sink, which was located right above Pearce’s body.  Knox 
processed and photographed the fingerprint, and law enforcement 
removed the sink from the home. 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const; 
see also Smith v. State, 330 So. 3d 867, 875 n.2 (Fla. 2021) 
(determining that Court has jurisdiction despite circuit court 
ordering a new penalty phase in postconviction proceeding). 
 
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Law enforcement also sought to find witnesses, but none had 
observed the crime or the events surrounding it.  Consequently, the 
investigation, led by Detective Craig Waldrup, focused on the 
physical evidence. 
Michelle Royal, a fingerprint examiner with the Jacksonville 
Sheriff’s Office, analyzed the sink fingerprint and determined that it 
was not of value, meaning that it would not be useful in identifying 
a suspect.  Detective Waldrup sought additional analysis from 
another sheriff’s office.  However, that further analysis did not 
result in any leads. 
Meanwhile, almost two years after the murder, Leigh Clark—a 
DNA analyst for the FDLE—tested the hair found on Pearce’s leg.  
She extracted a full DNA profile from it and later uploaded the 
profile to the CODIS2 database.  The submitted profile matched the 
known DNA profile of Jackson, who was then serving a lengthy 
prison sentence in Georgia. 
 
2.  CODIS stands for “Combined DNA Index System[,] [which] 
connects DNA laboratories at the local, state, and national level.”  
Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 444 (2013). 
 
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Having learned of the DNA match, Detective Waldrup then 
asked the FBI to compare Jackson’s known prints with the sink 
fingerprint.  An FBI analyst concluded that the fingerprint matched 
Jackson’s right ring finger. 
Based on these two leads, Detective Waldrup interviewed 
Jackson at the Georgia prison where he was housed.  During the 
interview, Detective Waldrup asked Jackson if he knew Pearce or 
had ever been to her house.  In conjunction with these questions, 
Detective Waldrup showed him pictures of Pearce, her home, and 
the surrounding area.  Jackson denied ever knowing or seeing 
Pearce.  Nor, according to him, had he ever been to the home.  
Jackson would later concede that these statements were false. 
Ultimately, almost four years after the murder, the State 
charged Jackson with first-degree murder in connection with 
Pearce’s death, later filing a notice of intent to seek the death 
penalty.  Though Jackson challenged the lawfulness of the death 
penalty, he did not seek dismissal of the first-degree-murder 
charge. 
At Jackson’s trial, the State called a number of witnesses, 
including Detective Waldrup, Knox, Clark, and two fingerprint 
 
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experts.  Clark testified that the detached hair found on Pearce’s leg 
was a full marker match with Jackson’s known DNA.  She further 
opined that the hair was not naturally shed, briefly alluding to 
“several published papers in the Journal of Forensic Sciences.”  She 
also gave testimony on the pocketknife, indicating that she obtained 
a mixed profile from blood on it.  Pearce was a contributor, but 
Jackson was not.  DNA samples were also obtained from inside 
Pearce’s vehicle, specifically the steering wheel cover.  As for a 
mixed sample obtained from that cover, Clark indicated that 
Jackson—as a male—could not be excluded as a minor contributor. 
The State’s two fingerprint experts offered opinion testimony 
on the sink fingerprint, both stating that it matched a known print 
from Jackson’s right ring finger.  Moreover, both agreed that 
Jackson’s right ring finger was coated in something wet at the time 
he created the print on the sink.  When asked on cross-examination 
whether blood could preserve a preexisting print, one of the experts 
opined that she had not observed such a situation “in her training 
and experience.” 
After the State rested, Jackson requested a judgment of 
acquittal.  He argued that the State presented a wholly 
 
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circumstantial case, which failed to rebut his reasonable hypothesis 
of innocence—namely that he was not present for the murder and 
that his hair had been become detached while he was inside 
Pearce’s home prior to the murder and later came to rest on her leg.  
Rejecting that argument, “[t]he trial court ruled the evidence, when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the State, negated all 
reasonable hypotheses of innocence, and denied the motion.”  
Jackson v. State, 180 So. 3d 938, 950 (Fla. 2015).  In particular, the 
court relied on the evidence of the bloody fingerprint as establishing 
Jackson’s presence in the home for the murder. 
Jackson then presented his case, which primarily consisted of 
evidence in support of an alibi defense.  Jackson and four other 
witnesses—his father, his wife (Deborah Jackson), his sister (Penny 
Williams), and a friend (Rose Franklin)—testified that Jackson had 
been in Georgia celebrating his birthday during the period of time 
encompassing the murder.  In addition, Jackson sought to explain 
the incriminating answers given to Detective Waldrup during the 
prison interview.  Jackson also called as a witness Michelle Royal, 
the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office analyst who determined the sink 
fingerprint to be of no value.  On cross-examination, she testified 
 
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that “even prints of no value can be used to exclude suspects, . . . 
Jackson could not be excluded as the individual who left the sink 
fingerprint, and . . . similarities existed between the sink fingerprint 
and the known print of Jackson.”  Id. at 944. 
Ultimately, the jury found Jackson guilty of first-degree 
murder, and, following the penalty phase, it recommended a 
sentence of death by a vote of 8 to 4.  Accepting that 
recommendation, the trial court sentenced Jackson to death. 
Jackson appealed, raising five issues for our review.3  
Rejecting his arguments, we affirmed on all issues.  Id. at 949-64.  
Jackson then filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the United 
States Supreme Court, which was denied.  Jackson v. Florida, 578 
U.S. 979 (2016). 
 
3.  Jackson argued that (1) the State presented insufficient 
evidence to establish that (a) he killed Pearce, (b) the murder was 
premeditated, or (c) he was an active participant in the murder; (2) 
the prosecutor made improper comments during closing argument 
rising to the level of fundamental error; (3) the trial court erred in 
finding that the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator had been 
proven; (4) his death sentence was disproportionate; and (5) Ring v. 
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), rendered Florida’s death-penalty 
statute constitutionally infirm. 
 
 
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Less than a year later, Jackson filed a postconviction motion 
in circuit court, which, as later amended, raised over twenty claims 
for relief.  The circuit court ruled that Jackson was entitled to a new 
penalty phase based on Hurst v. State,4 granted an evidentiary 
hearing on six guilt-phase claims,5 and denied or reserved ruling on 
the balance of the claims.  After the hearing, the court entered an 
order denying the pending claims, and, consistent with its prior 
ruling, vacated Jackson’s death sentence under Hurst.  Jackson 
now appeals and seeks a writ of habeas corpus. 
 
4.  Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016). 
 
5.  Those claims included the following: trial counsel was 
ineffective in investigating and challenging the State’s DNA evidence 
(claim seven); trial counsel was ineffective in investigating the 
fingerprint evidence (claim eight); trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to adequately prepare Jackson to testify at trial (claim ten); 
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a pretrial motion to 
dismiss based on the preindictment and prearrest delays (claim 
eleven); trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly and 
timely investigate the alibi defense (claim twelve); trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to properly prepare Deborah Jackson 
(Jackson’s wife) for her trial testimony (subclaim of claim twelve). 
 
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II. 
ANALYSIS 
 
A. 
Postconviction Appeal 
 
Jackson argues that the circuit court erred in denying his 
claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  We disagree and 
explain below why his arguments lack merit. 
Ineffectiveness claims are governed by the standard set forth 
by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984).  See Nelson v. State, 73 So. 3d 77, 84 (Fla. 2011).  We have 
recently described that standard as follows: 
Under Strickland v. Washington, a defendant alleging that 
he received ineffective assistance of counsel has the 
burden to demonstrate that counsel’s performance fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness.  In order 
to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 
defendant must show both that trial counsel’s 
performance was deficient and that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defendant.  Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 687.  “Both prongs of the Strickland test present 
mixed questions of law and fact.”  Johnson v. State, 135 
So. 3d 1002, 1013 (Fla. 2014).  “In reviewing a trial 
court’s ruling after an evidentiary hearing on an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, this Court defers 
to the factual findings of the trial court to the extent that 
they are supported by competent, substantial evidence, 
but reviews de novo the application of the law to those 
facts.”  Id. (quoting Mungin v. State, 932 So. 2d 986, 998 
(Fla. 2006)). 
 
As to the first prong, the defendant must establish 
“that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was 
 
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not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant 
by the Sixth Amendment.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.  
A court reviewing the second prong must determine 
whether “there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.”  Id. at 694.  
“A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome.”  Id.  “[T]here is no 
reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance 
claim . . . to address both components of the inquiry if 
the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.”  
Id. at 697. 
 
Smith, 330 So. 3d at 875 (some citations omitted). 
We now consider each ineffectiveness claim as ruled on by the 
circuit court. 
1. Fingerprint Evidence 
Jackson argues that the circuit court erred in denying his 
claim that counsel was ineffective in challenging the State’s 
fingerprint evidence.  According to him, counsel was ineffective for 
presenting inconsistent arguments to the jury as to the fingerprint 
evidence and for not objecting to certain testimony from the State’s 
fingerprint experts and to the prosecutor’s improper closing 
argument denigrating his fingerprint expert, Michelle Royal.  His 
arguments lack merit. 
 
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As for the inconsistent-theories argument, the State properly 
observes that Jackson failed to raise it in his postconviction motion.  
Accordingly, he has failed to timely raise this specific argument, 
and it has been waived.  State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 487, 494 (Fla. 
2020) (failure to timely raise specific argument results in waiver).  
However, even had this argument been properly preserved, it would 
not support relief.  Trial counsel conceded during opening 
statement that the sink fingerprint was Jackson’s but later called 
Royal who indicated that the print had no value.  Though the 
concession might be at odds to some extent with portions of Royal’s 
testimony, Jackson has cited no case law which holds counsel 
deficient merely for presenting alternative theories to the jury.  And 
we decline to so hold here. 
Jackson’s failure-to-make-objection argument fares no better.  
During their testimony, the State’s fingerprint experts made various 
references to nontestifying examiners to which trial counsel did not 
object.  According to Jackson, counsel should have objected on the 
ground that such testimony was irrelevant, improperly bolstered in-
court testimony, and violated his confrontation rights under the 
Sixth Amendment.  However, Jackson’s argument is undeveloped 
 
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and conclusory.  See Sheppard v. State, 47 Fla. L. Weekly S65, S70-
S71 (Fla. Mar. 10, 2022) (affirming on subclaim where appellant 
presented vague and conclusory argument (citing Hannon v. State, 
941 So. 2d 1109, 1139 (Fla. 2006))); Rivera v. State, 260 So. 3d 920, 
929 (Fla. 2018).  Thus, Jackson has not demonstrated entitlement 
to relief based on this argument. 
As for the prosecutor’s criticism of Royal—including referring 
to her as “old school”—we conclude that Jackson has failed to 
establish deficiency.  Specifically, he has not demonstrated that 
counsel lacked a reasonable strategic reason for not objecting.  
Notably, as part of the comments on Royal, the prosecutor praised 
Royal in certain respects.  Thus, viewing the comments in their 
entirety, counsel may have determined that the negative aspects 
were not so unfavorable as to warrant an objection.  Sheppard, 47 
Fla. L. Weekly at S68 (recognizing that defendant bears burden to 
“overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the 
challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial 
strategy’ ” (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689)). 
 
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In sum, Jackson has not demonstrated entitlement to relief as 
to this claim.6 
2. Preparation to Testify 
 
Jackson argues that the circuit court erred in denying his 
claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to properly prepare him 
to testify at trial.  According to Jackson, his attorneys gave him 
conflicting advice on whether he should or should not testify, failed 
to warn him about the hazard of appearing selfish and callous 
toward Pearce, and miscalculated the number of felonies for which 
he had been convicted.  Jackson is not entitled to relief as to this 
claim either. 
For starters, Jackson has failed to preserve his conflicting-
advice argument as he did not seek relief or assert ineffectiveness 
on this basis in his motion below.  See Poole, 297 So. 3d at 494.  
 
6.  Jackson appears to suggest that defense counsel was 
deficient for not presenting additional evidence undermining the 
State’s proof that he was the source of the sink fingerprint.  To the 
extent he is making this argument, it has no merit.  At the hearing, 
Jackson presented no evidence undermining that proof.  
Accordingly, he has failed to meet his evidentiary burden under 
Strickland.  See Lynch v. State, 2 So. 3d 47, 70 (Fla. 2008) (“[T]he 
burden is on the defendant to affirmatively satisfy both prongs of 
the Strickland framework.”). 
 
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But, even if the issue had been preserved, it would not support 
relief.  Jackson has supplied no authority requiring all attorneys on 
a defense team to be in agreement on the defendant’s decision to 
testify.  See Brown v. Artuz, 124 F.3d 73, 78 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(“[T]he ultimate decision regarding whether to testify belongs to the 
defendant.”).  Here, counsel offered sensible views on the benefits 
and drawbacks of testifying—giving Jackson the benefit of both 
perspectives but leaving the ultimate decision to him.  See Brant v. 
State, 197 So. 3d 1051, 1076 (Fla. 2016) (“Trial counsel did not 
perform deficiently by explaining all of Brant’s options to him, 
including the positives and the negatives of those options, and then 
allowing Brant to make the decision on his own.”).  We find no 
deficient performance in so doing. 
Jackson’s failure-to-advise argument fares no better.  
Specifically, he argues that counsel failed to instruct him to avoid 
looking selfish and insensitive before the jury.  However, he 
identifies no case finding counsel deficient for failing to offer advice 
on something that is quite obvious, i.e., that it may be beneficial to 
present oneself positively to the jury.  Perhaps more importantly, 
Jackson improperly discounts the advice counsel actually gave to 
 
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him.  Specifically, counsel offered advice on the following topics: (1) 
the testimony he should give, (2) subjects to be avoided—like past 
crimes, (3) “the specifics of defense[s],” and (4) the need to be 
honest and answer all questions unless an objection has been 
sustained.  Given the facts of this case, we find that counsel’s 
advice meets objective standards of reasonable performance.  See 
Taylor v. State, 3 So. 3d 986, 996-97 (Fla. 2009). 
Jackson’s wrong-number-of-convictions argument also fails.  
At trial, Jackson testified to having been convicted of five felonies.  
He correctly notes—consistent with the State’s concession just prior 
to the penalty phase—that the actual number of felonies was four.  
However, Strickland does not provide relief for all errors or 
omissions.  See Patrick v. State, 302 So. 3d 734, 740 (Fla. 2020).  
Rather, a defendant must demonstrate a “serious” error or 
omission, meaning an error showing that the defendant’s counsel 
was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment.  Id.  Overcalculating—by one—the number of felonies 
was an error.  But it was not a serious one in light of the fact that 
Jackson had four other felony convictions.  The difference for 
impeachment purposes of five felonies versus four is not significant.  
 
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What is more, Jackson’s credibility had already been sharply 
undermined by his dishonesty with Detective Waldrup during the 
interview.  Thus, based on these specific facts, we conclude that 
this miscalculation was not “so serious that counsel was not 
functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
Finally, to the extent Jackson is arguing that one of his 
attorneys persuaded him to testify against his better judgment, that 
argument is inconsistent with the record.  At trial, during a lengthy 
colloquy, Jackson affirmed to the court that he had sufficient time 
to speak with his attorneys on the issue of testifying.  He indicated 
that he wanted to testify, and he made that decision freely, 
voluntarily, and without coercion.  See Reynolds v. State, 99 So. 3d 
459, 485 (Fla. 2012) (relying on transcript to reject claim that court 
failed to adequately question defendant on his decision to testify); 
Johnson v. State, 22 So. 3d 840, 844 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (finding 
record refuted claim that counsel forced defendant to accept plea 
deal). 
Accordingly, Jackson has not shown error in the circuit 
court’s denial of this claim. 
 
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3. Alibi 
Jackson also challenges the circuit court’s denial of his claim 
that counsel was deficient for failing to properly investigate and 
present his alibi defense.  We affirm that ruling. 
Jackson first contends that counsel was ineffective for failing 
to bring out additional facts from Penny Williams.  At trial, Penny 
Williams gave testimony in support of Jackson’s alibi defense, i.e., 
that Jackson was celebrating his birthday in Georgia with his family 
when the murder occurred.  Later, at the evidentiary hearing, 
Williams revealed that she had just lost her job and that the loss of 
employment solidified in her mind that this birthday visit was in 
2004—the same year in which Pearce was murdered.  According to 
Jackson, failing to bring out that evidence constitutes deficient 
performance.  This subclaim lacks merit for two reasons. 
First, Jackson failed to timely raise this argument below.  
Accordingly, this specific argument has not been preserved for 
appeal.  See Poole, 297 So. 3d at 494.  Second, the argument fails 
on the merits.  The State properly observes that Penny Williams did 
provide a plausible real-world reason for recalling Jackson’s trip to 
Georgia and the record supports the State’s point.  When asked 
 
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during trial if Williams was certain she saw Jackson that weekend 
in 2004, she stated, “Yes, cause I seen his -- he brought his 
daughter to see me.  That was the only time I could see her . . . .”  
In light of this evidence presented at trial, Jackson cannot show 
that defense counsel was deficient for refraining from introducing 
additional, comparable evidence.  See Wheeler v. State, 124 So. 3d 
865, 881 (Fla. 2013). 
Jackson further claims that counsel was ineffective for failing 
to bring out the fact that his birthday in 2004 was his last one 
before the Georgia incarceration.  This fact, according to him, would 
have further bolstered his alibi defense. 
At trial, the alibi witnesses avoided this topic, doing so at the 
urging of counsel.  Later, at the evidentiary hearing, counsel 
provided a strategic reason for deciding to avoid the topic.  Defense 
counsel testified that he did not want to highlight the fact that 
Jackson was serving a lengthy sentence for a serious crime.  We 
agree with the circuit court that this strategic decision was 
reasonable under the circumstances.  Of note, Jackson committed 
this serious crime around the same time as the murders.  We 
 
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further stress that avoiding calling attention to his incarceration did 
not preclude the presentation of a coherent alibi defense. 
Finally, Jackson contends that counsel’s 17-month delay in 
investigating the alibi defense was patently unreasonable.  That 
unreasonable delay, he says, resulted in the loss of evidence 
exonerating him.  However, as the circuit court properly noted, 
Jackson only speculates as to what evidence might have been lost 
as a result of the delay.  Thus, Jackson has failed to carry his 
evidentiary burden on this point and the circuit court correctly 
rejected this claim.  See Lynch, 2 So. 3d at 70. 
4. Deborah Jackson 
In addition, Jackson argues that the circuit court erred in 
denying his claim that counsel was deficient for failing to properly 
prepare Deborah Jackson to testify at trial and for failing to bring 
out testimony that would have ameliorated the effect of 
impeachment evidence.  We disagree. 
At the evidentiary hearing, Deborah Jackson testified that 
counsel spent only 15 minutes with her in preparation for her trial 
testimony.  In Jackson’s view, that amount of time was simply too 
short to meaningfully prepare her.  However, Jackson has 
 
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marshalled no case showing that 15 minutes of trial preparation 
necessarily falls below objective standards of reasonable 
performance in all circumstances.  And, based on our review of the 
record, we conclude that Jackson has not demonstrated that the 
advice given was unreasonable under Strickland.  For one thing, 
Deborah Jackson’s trial testimony involved telling the jury a 
straightforward account as to Jackson’s whereabouts during the 
relevant time frame.  For another, Jackson does not identify what 
additional testimony she could have given if counsel had simply 
spent more time with her or given her more thorough advice. 
Jackson also cannot demonstrate error in the court’s rejection 
of his subclaim pertaining to counsel’s not bringing out 
ameliorating circumstances surrounding Deborah Jackson’s bad-
check conviction.  That conviction was used to impeach her during 
trial.  At the evidentiary hearing, Deborah Jackson testified that the 
conviction resulted from conduct occurring over 15 years before the 
trial.  She also indicated that she wrote the bad check during a 
difficult time in her life and did so without any fraudulent intent. 
We agree with the circuit court that Jackson failed to show 
deficient performance or prejudice.  Though Jackson is likely 
 
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correct that defense counsel could have brought out some 
circumstances that he deems ameliorating, the State properly notes 
that it would have been able on recross-examination to emphasize 
the elements of the crime—including the mens rea of “intentional 
dishonesty.”  Cf. Wilcox v. State, 143 So. 3d 359, 373 (Fla. 2014) 
(noting that prosecutor may refute “false impression” witness gives 
about conviction (citing Fotopoulos v. State, 608 So. 2d 784, 791 
(Fla.1992))); Rogers v. State, 964 So. 2d 221, 223 (Fla. 4th DCA 
2007) (discussing circumstances when prosecutor may bring out 
details about crime).  Thus, if counsel had done what Jackson 
claims should have been done, the jury would likely have heard not 
only ameliorating circumstances but also additional evidence 
undermining her credibility.  In light of the strong possibility that 
the State would have brought out additional evidence damaging her 
credibility, Jackson cannot show that “no competent counsel” 
would have refrained from eliciting the ameliorating evidence under 
the circumstances of this case.  See Hammond v. Hall, 586 F.3d 
1289, 1324 (11th Cir. 2009). 
Thus, Jackson is not entitled to relief as to this claim. 
 
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5. Motion to Dismiss Charges 
Jackson argues that the circuit court erred in denying his 
claim that trial counsel was deficient for failing to file a motion to 
dismiss the murder charge on the basis of prosecutorial delay.  In 
denying this claim, the circuit court ruled that a motion to dismiss 
for pretrial delay would have been meritless.  We agree that Jackson 
is not entitled to relief.  In so deciding, we reconsider our case law 
on the due process standard for preindictment delay. 
In Rogers v. State, 511 So. 2d 526, 531 (Fla. 1987), we 
adopted, without significant discussion, a balancing test to 
determine if preindictment delay violated due process.  That test 
traced back to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States v. 
Townley, 665 F.2d 579 (5th Cir.1982)).  We described the Townley 
test as follows: 
When a defendant asserts a due process violation based 
on preindictment delay, he bears the initial burden of 
showing actual prejudice. . . .  If the defendant meets this 
initial burden, the court then must balance the 
demonstrable reasons for delay against the gravity of the 
particular prejudice on a case-by-case basis.  The 
outcome turns on whether the delay violates the 
fundamental conception of justice, decency[,] and fair 
play embodied in the Bill of Rights and fourteenth 
amendment. 
 
 
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Rogers, 511 So. 2d at 531 (citing Townley, 665 F.2d at 581-82). 
Since we decided Rogers, the Fifth Circuit has receded from 
the Townley balancing test.  United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497 
(5th Cir. 1996).  In doing so, the Fifth Circuit cogently explained the 
flaws in the Townley balancing test, reasoning: 
The Townley test purports to weigh or balance the 
extent or degree of the actual prejudice against the extent 
to which the government’s “good faith reasons” for the 
delay deviate from what the court believes to be 
appropriate.  However, what this test seeks to do is to 
compare the incomparable.  The items to be placed on 
either side of the balance (imprecise in themselves) are 
wholly different from each other and have no possible 
common denominator that would allow determination of 
which “weighs” the most.  Not only is there no scale or 
conversion table to tell us whether eighty percent of 
minimally adequate prosecutorial and investigative 
staffing is outweighed by a low-medium amount of actual 
prejudice, there are no recognized general standards or 
principles to aid us in making that determination and 
virtually no body of precedent or historic practice to look 
to for guidance.  Inevitably, then, a “length of the 
Chancellor’s foot” sort of resolution will ensue and judges 
will necessarily define due process in each such weighing 
by their own “ ‘personal and private notions’ of fairness,” 
contrary to the admonition of [United States v. Lovasco, 
431 U.S. 783 (1977)]. 
 
Apart from the above difficulty, grounding a due 
process violation on the basis of good faith but 
inadequate, ineffective, or insufficient governmental 
personnel or management leading to preindictment delay 
runs counter to two basic constitutional principles.  In 
the first place, “[h]istorically, this guarantee of due 
 
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process has been applied to deliberate decisions of 
government officials to deprive a person of life, liberty, or 
property,” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986), 
and hence “the Due Process Clause . . . is not implicated 
by the lack of due care of an official causing unintended 
injury to life, liberty or property.”  Davidson v. Cannon, 
474 U.S. 344, 347 (1986).  Contrary to these principles, 
however, the Townley test would find a due process 
violation where the government acted in good faith and 
did not deliberately seek to prejudice the party ultimately 
accused. 
 
Finally, serious separation of powers concerns are 
implicated.  Here, for example, the panel concluded that 
the reasons for the delay—“lack of manpower and the low 
priority which this investigation was assigned”—were 
“insufficient to outweigh the actual prejudice to Crouch 
and Frye.”  [United States v. Crouch, 51 F.3d 480, 483 
(5th Cir. 1995) (vacated panel decision)].  Finding these 
reasons “insufficient” is in substance determining that 
greater manpower should generally have been allocated 
to investigation and prosecution in that jurisdiction, and 
that a higher priority should have been assigned to this 
particular investigation.  Yet those decisions are ones 
essentially committed to the legislative and executive 
branches, and the case for judicial second guessing is 
particularly weak where it is directed at preindictment 
conduct and is supported not by any specific 
constitutional guaranty or by any long-established 
tradition of judicial oversight, but only by the general 
contours of the due process clause. 
 
Crouch, 84 F.3d at 1512-13 (footnotes omitted) (some citations 
omitted). 
For additional support, the Fifth Circuit looked to the United 
States Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 
 
- 25 - 
51, 58 (1988) (holding in related context of destruction of evidence 
that due process is not violated unless loss of evidence resulted 
from bad faith on part of police).  Crouch, 84 F.3d at 1511, 1513 
n.17.  The Fifth Circuit further observed that its disapproval of 
Townley was consistent with the majority rule in the federal circuit 
courts.  Id. at 1511. 
 
Based on these persuasive justifications, we conclude that the 
Rogers balancing test is clearly erroneous.  Having so concluded, we 
now consider whether there is any reason for us not to recede from 
it.  See Poole, 297 So. 3d at 507 (providing stare decisis framework).7 
Jackson has not made that showing.  He does not claim to 
have relied on the Rogers balancing test at all.  See id. (“The critical 
consideration ordinarily will be reliance.”); cf. State v. Maisonet-
Maldonado, 308 So. 3d 63, 69-70 (Fla. 2020) (noting that defendant 
did not claim to have relied on rule of criminal liability from which 
Court was receding).  Instead, Jackson claims that the Rogers 
balancing test has been workable for decades.  Even if that were so, 
 
7.  We summarily reject Jackson’s argument that the Poole 
stare decisis framework does not apply. 
 
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we conclude that this reason alone is insufficient for retaining the 
clearly erroneous balancing test. 
Thus, based on the analysis above, we recede from the Rogers 
balancing test.  We now align ourselves with the majority of federal 
circuit courts and hold that a due process claim for preindictment 
delay requires a showing of substantial prejudice to the defendant 
and bad faith on the part of the State.  E.g., United States v. Stokes, 
124 F.3d 39, 47 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Stierwalt, 16 F.3d 
282, 285 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Foxman, 87 F.3d 1220, 
1223 (11th Cir. 1996). 
Application of this standard here supports the circuit court’s 
denial of Jackson’s claim.  There is simply no evidence in the record 
that the length of time from the murder to the indictment was the 
product of bad faith on the part of the State.  And Jackson does not 
claim otherwise.  Accordingly, without evidence of bad faith, 
Jackson cannot establish a due process violation for preindictment 
delay; and, as a consequence, he cannot establish the prejudice 
 
- 27 - 
necessary to succeed on an ineffectiveness claim.  See Lockhart v. 
Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369-72 (1993).8 
6. DNA Evidence 
Jackson also argues that he is entitled to a new trial because his 
counsel was deficient in multiple respects in investigating and 
challenging the State’s DNA evidence.  He is wrong. 
At trial, Clark testified that the DNA profile developed from the 
detached hair on Pearce’s leg was a full marker match to Jackson’s 
known DNA, that the hair had not been naturally shed based on the 
fact that she was able to develop a full profile from it, and that 
Jackson could not be excluded as a minor donor to a mixed profile 
recovered from the steering wheel cover in Pearce’s van. 
Later, at the evidentiary hearing, Jackson presented the 
testimony of two DNA experts to demonstrate that trial counsel was 
ineffective in challenging Clark’s trial testimony.  Both experts 
testified that Clark did not fully comply with all FDLE protocols as 
 
8.  We reject Jackson’s assertion that we must remand to the 
circuit court so that he has an opportunity to develop evidence 
pertaining to the bad-faith requirement.  Even under the former 
standard in Rogers, Jackson had reason to introduce evidence of 
bad faith, but he failed to do so. 
 
 
- 28 - 
to certain samples.9  One expert asserted that Jackson should have 
been excluded as a possible source of the DNA in the van.  That 
expert also opined that Clark was wrong to say that a full DNA 
profile could not be developed from a naturally shed hair.  That 
expert also posited several theories as to how the detached hair 
could have innocently come to rest on Pearce’s leg after she was 
killed. 
The circuit court denied Jackson’s DNA-based claim on lack-
of-prejudice grounds.  We agree that Jackson cannot demonstrate 
prejudice and do not address the deficiency prong except to say that 
Jackson failed to prove that counsel was deficient for not objecting 
to Clark’s reference to the published papers and for not presenting 
expert testimony on possible theories of hair transference.10 
 
9.  Those samples did not include the DNA recovered from the 
detached hair. 
 
10.  Clark’s reference to the published papers was brief and 
not particularly prejudicial.  See Hubbard v. Haley, 317 F.3d 1245, 
1259 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[D]efense counsel, in defending their client’s 
interests, need not urge every conceivable objection the law would 
provide.”).  As for the additional theories of hair transfer, we find 
that the theories advanced at the evidentiary hearing were not 
beyond the ordinary understanding of jurors.  Thus, no expert was 
needed to convey them to the jury.  See Mitchell v. State, 965 So. 2d 
246, 251 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (“Expert testimony should be 
 
- 29 - 
Jackson’s postconviction experts did not undermine Clark’s 
primary conclusions.  Those conclusions were that the detached 
hair on the back of Pearce’s leg was Jackson’s and that the hair was 
not naturally shed.  At the evidentiary hearing, both of Jackson’s 
experts essentially conceded the accuracy of the first conclusion.  
And neither expert provided any testimony that the amount of DNA 
extracted from the hair at issue could come from a naturally shed 
hair. 
Additionally, Jackson’s expert testimony—that he should be 
excluded as a minor donor to the mixed sample in the van—does 
not help him.  Of note, the steering wheel DNA evidence was not a 
key piece of evidence for the State.  Indeed, the jury simply heard 
that as a male, Jackson could not be excluded as a possible 
contributor to the steering wheel sample.  The more damaging 
aspect of the van-related evidence was its location.  Several weeks 
after the murder, police found the van within a mile and a half of 
Jackson’s residence.  And, even if Jackson should have been 
 
excluded where the facts testified to are of such a nature as not to 
require any special knowledge or experience in order for the jury to 
form conclusions from the facts.”). 
 
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excluded as a contributor to the steering wheel DNA, that would not 
undermine Clark’s two primary conclusions as to the detached hair. 
Finally, the hair DNA evidence was not the only proof of 
Jackson’s guilt.  Jackson left a bloody fingerprint on the kitchen 
sink.  According to the trial evidence, the nature of the print 
demonstrates that Jackson had blood on his finger when he 
touched the sink.  That evidence establishes Jackson’s presence in 
Pearce’s home at the time of the murder.  Additionally, during his 
prison interview with Detective Waldrup, Jackson lied about not 
knowing the victim and falsely indicated that he had never been in 
her home.  That constitutes evidence of a guilty mind.  See 
Hayward v. State, 24 So. 3d 17, 39 (Fla. 2009) (“Evidence of 
conduct or speech of the accused which demonstrates a 
consciousness of guilt is relevant since it supplies the basis for an 
inference that the accused is guilty of the offense.”); United States v. 
Holbert, 578 F.2d 128, 129 (5th Cir. 1978) (“[F]alse exculpatory 
statements may be used . . . as substantive evidence tending to 
prove guilt.”).  And, as noted above, Pearce’s vehicle was found near 
Jackson’s residence several weeks after the murder. 
 
- 31 - 
In light of the hair DNA evidence (which Jackson has not 
undermined) and the existence of other substantial evidence 
connecting Jackson to the crime, we hold that Jackson failed to 
demonstrate prejudice.  Accordingly, the circuit court properly 
denied this claim.  See Deparvine v. State, 146 So. 3d 1071, 1102-
03 (Fla. 2014) (resolving Strickland issue on lack-of-prejudice 
grounds without analyzing performance prong). 
7. Cumulative Prejudice 
Finally, Jackson argues that the circuit court erred in denying 
his claim that the numerous alleged deficiencies of counsel 
warranted a new guilt phase.  Where multiple instances of deficient 
performance are proven or assumed, we “consider the impact of 
the[] errors cumulatively to determine whether [the defendant] has 
established prejudice.”  Brown v. State, 304 So. 3d 243, 258 (Fla. 
2020) (second alteration in original) (quoting Sparre v. State, 289 
So. 3d 839, 847 (Fla. 2019)).  We rejected Jackson’s arguments of 
deficient performance as to all but two claims.  For those two 
claims, we assumed deficient performance but ultimately found no 
prejudice.  Even considering the combined effect of the assumed 
 
- 32 - 
deficient performance, we find that Jackson cannot establish 
prejudice.  Accordingly, the circuit court properly denied this claim. 
B. 
Habeas Petition 
 
In his habeas petition, Jackson contends that appellate 
counsel rendered deficient performance on direct appeal in failing to 
argue all of the instances of improper (but unobjected-to) 
prosecutorial comments.11  Jackson is not entitled to habeas relief. 
“In general, claims of ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel are properly presented in a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus[.]”  Brown, 304 So. 3d at 278 (citing Baker v. State, 214 So. 
3d 530, 536 (Fla. 2017); Wickham v. State, 124 So. 3d 841, 863 
(Fla. 2013)).  “The standard for a claim of ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel mirrors the Strickland standard for ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel: the petitioner must demonstrate 
deficient performance and resulting prejudice.”  Hilton v. State, 326 
So. 3d 640, 652 (Fla. 2021) (citing Frances v. State, 143 So. 3d 340, 
358 (Fla. 2014)).  Therefore, the petitioner must 
 
11.  As noted above, on direct appeal, appellate counsel 
challenged several prosecutorial comments.  See Jackson, 180 So. 
3d at 958.  We held that, to the extent the comments were 
improper, they did not rise to the level of fundamental error.  Id. 
 
- 33 - 
establish [first, that] the alleged omissions are of such 
magnitude as to constitute a serious error or substantial 
deficiency falling measurably outside the range of 
professionally acceptable performance and, second, [that] 
the deficiency in performance compromised the appellate 
process to such a degree as to undermine confidence in 
the correctness of the result. 
 
Brown, 304 So. 3d at 278 (alteration in original). 
 
As relevant here, appellate counsel can be deficient for not 
raising meritorious claims of fundamental error, and improper 
prosecutorial comments can, in some limited circumstances, rise to 
the level of fundamental error.  Sheppard, 47 Fla. L. Weekly at S74.  
To establish fundamental error, Jackson relies on two unobjected-to 
comments.  However, because those two comments do not rise to 
the level of fundamental error on their own or in combination with 
the comments challenged on direct appeal, Jackson has failed to 
demonstrate deficient performance. 
During the initial closing argument, the prosecutor stated: 
 
Now, he can’t come in here and lie to you 
today about knowing her because he has to be 
able to explain his DNA and his fingerprints. 
 
 
His DNA, his fingerprints on her body, in 
her blood is as good as a signed confession.  
 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
 
- 34 - 
As Jackson notes, his fingerprint was not found on Pearce’s 
body; rather, it was found on the kitchen sink.  Even accepting 
Jackson’s interpretation that the statement did not entirely conform 
to the facts, we find that appellate counsel was not deficient for 
failing to urge reversal based on it.  The statement was brief and the 
only occasion where the prosecutor conflated the fingerprint and 
DNA evidence.  Accordingly, this comment appears to be an 
inadvertent “slip of the tongue,” not an instance of prosecutorial 
misconduct.  See Burr v. Pollard, 546 F.3d 828, 832 (7th Cir. 2008). 
Jackson is not entitled to habeas relief as to the second 
unbriefed comment either.  In rebuttal closing argument, the 
prosecutor led off with the following remark: 
Defense counsel said in jury selection that there are 
two sides to every story.  And that’s true.  There are two 
sides to every story.  But there can be only one truth. . . . 
And while there are two halves to a basketball game, a 
blow-out is still a blow-out when the final score is 
determined.  And this case, with its evidence being 
overwhelming, is a blowout.  It is.  The evidence of this 
man’s guilt is overwhelming. 
 
We find this statement not impermissible.  Fairly interpreted, 
the prosecutor was merely giving his view of the strength of the 
State’s case.  See Dessaure v. State, 55 So. 3d 478, 487 (Fla. 2010); 
 
- 35 - 
Dailey v. State, 965 So. 2d 38, 44 (Fla. 2007); Fountain v. State, 275 
So. 3d 253, 255 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019); Easterly v. State, 22 So. 3d 
807, 817 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). 
There is another reason why this comment was not improper.  
We have stated that “[a] prosecutor’s comments are not improper 
where they fall into the category of an ‘invited response’ by the 
preceding argument of defense counsel concerning the same 
subject.”  Scott v. State, 66 So. 3d 923, 930 (Fla. 2011) (alteration in 
original) (quoting Walls v. State, 926 So. 2d 1156, 1166 (Fla. 2006)).  
Here, defense counsel characterized the State’s case against 
Jackson as weak—asserting that the State produced absolutely no 
evidence of his guilt.  Accordingly, the prosecutor’s statement of a 
contrary view was a fair reply to the defense’s closing argument. 
Nevertheless, even if both challenged comments were 
improper, they would not—on their own or in combination with the 
remarks found (or assumed) improper on direct appeal—rise to the 
level of fundamental error.  See Alcegaire v. State, 326 So. 3d 656, 
665 (Fla. 2021) (noting that unobjected-to comments rise to the 
level of fundamental error only when those comments “reach[] down 
into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty 
 
- 36 - 
could not have been obtained without the[m]”).  Both comments 
were quite brief, not inflammatory, and not statements on the law 
the jury would apply during deliberations.  And, though the 
fingerprint remark was factually inaccurate, we do not think that 
this stray comment confused the jury given the state of the evidence 
at trial.  Thus, had appellate counsel pressed the arguments 
advanced now, we would still have affirmed on the closing-
argument issue on direct appeal. 
Accordingly, Jackson has failed to demonstrate ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel and is not entitled to a writ of 
habeas corpus.  See Brown, 304 So. 3d at 280 (denying habeas 
relief “because appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to 
challenge on direct appeal unpreserved issues that do not amount 
to fundamental error”). 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons given above, we affirm the circuit court’s order 
and deny Jackson’s habeas petition. 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LAWSON, MUÑIZ, COURIEL, and 
GROSSHANS, JJ. concur. 
LABARGA, J., concurs in result. 
 
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NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County, 
James Hunt Daniel, Judge 
Case No. 162008CF010726AXXXMA 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 
 
Robert S. Friedman, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Thomas 
Voracek and Karin L. Moore, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional 
Counsel, North Region, Tallahassee, Florida, and Stacy R. Biggart, 
Special Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Gainesville, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Jason W. Rodriguez, Assistant 
Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent