Title: State v. Harberts
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S41741
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: September 14, 2000

Filed:  September 14, 2000
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent,
	v.
SCOTT DEAN HARBERTS,
	                                                  Appellant.
(CC 89-0557; SC S41741)

	On automatic and direct review of the judgment of conviction
and sentence of death imposed by the Circuit Court of Clackamas
County.
	Robert Morgan, Judge.
	Argued and submitted March 10, 1999.
	Eric Cumfer, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause
for appellant.  With him on the brief were Sally Avera, Public
Defender, and David Groom, Deputy Public Defender.
	Robert B. Rocklin, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause for respondent.  With him on the brief were Hardy
Myers, Attorney General, Virginia L. Linder, Solicitor General,
and David B. Thompson, Assistant Attorney General.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Durham, Leeson, and Riggs, Justices.*  
	LEESON, J.
	The judgment of conviction is reversed, and the sentence of
death is vacated.  The case is remanded to the circuit court with
instructions to dismiss the accusatory instrument with prejudice. 

	Van Hoomissen, J., dissented and filed an opinion. 
	*Kulongoski, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
	This is an automatic and direct review of a judgment of
conviction and a sentence of death.  Former ORS 163.150(1)(g) 
(1993), renumbered as ORS 138.012(1); ORAP 12.10(1).  Defendant
seeks reversal of his conviction on three counts of aggravated
murder for the death of a young child.  ORS 163.095; ORS 163.115. 
Defendant was arrested and placed in jail on July 14, 1989.  His
trial did not begin until July 12, 1994, nearly five years later. 
Under Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution, the
state must bring a defendant to trial "without delay."  We hold
that, under the circumstances of this case -- five years between
arrest and trial during which defendant was being held in jail
solely on the pending charges, many months of unreasonable delay
during that period, and both personal prejudice and prejudice to
the defense caused by the five-year delay -- the state violated
Article I, section 10.  Accordingly, we reverse the conviction,
vacate the sentence of death, and remand the case to the trial
court with instructions to dismiss the accusatory instrument with
prejudice.
	The victim in this case, a young child, lived with her
father, the father's girlfriend, and the girlfriend's three young
children.  Defendant, a friend of the victim's father, also had
lived in the house for approximately a year before the victim's
death, where he was treated as a member of the family.  During
the evening of July 13, 1989, the victim's father purchased
cocaine, and he and defendant cooked and smoked it together. 
Defendant, an admitted alcoholic, also consumed substantial
amounts of alcohol that day and evening.  
	Defendant claims to have found the victim lying on the
bathroom floor at approximately 3:00 a.m. on the morning of July
14, 1989, when he awakened to use the bathroom.  Defendant then
awakened the victim's father and the father's girlfriend.  They
both went to the bathroom, where they saw the victim.  At
defendant's urging, the father called 9-1-1.  The father told the
dispatcher that he was afraid that his daughter had swallowed
some rubbing alcohol.  While he waited for paramedics to arrive,
the father hid the cocaine paraphernalia that he and defendant
had used the evening before.  Meanwhile, defendant and the
father's girlfriend attempted to revive the victim.  After the
paramedics arrived, defendant continued to perform chest
compressions on the victim while the paramedics attempted to
administer oxygen.  When the paramedics asked defendant to step
aside so that they could work, he became very upset.  One of the
paramedics, Rawson, testified as follows:
"Q:  You started to mention that a person that you
ultimately have come to know was [defendant], you
started to describe some of his activities immediately
following your setting up the oxygen and his being
asked to move aside.  Could you go ahead and elaborate
on that, if you would, please?
"A:  Well, he several times stated things like:
Don't let my baby die, and loudly.  He was really
agitated.  And at the time I assumed he was the father,
because the other -- the other man and lady were just
kind of standing off on the side, not really too
excited.  They were just standing there.  They kept
telling him to settle down.  So I just -- you know, at
the time assumed that he was the father and he was
quite upset, and rightfully so."  
	Defendant repeatedly interrupted the paramedics' work
by telling them that he knew how to perform CPR and that they
were doing it wrong.  The victim's father testified that he
"tried to help restrain [defendant] and * * * tried to calm him
down."  When the police arrived, the paramedics asked the police
to get defendant out of the way.  One of the officers told
defendant to sit down in a chair and stay there.  When defendant
did not do so, and again tried to reach the victim, he was
arrested for harassing a police officer.  According to Rawson,
the police arrested defendant "just to get him away from us."
	The victim apparently had died sometime between 10:30
p.m. on July 13 and 1:30 a.m. on July 14, 1989.  The cause of
death was head trauma, smothering, or a combination of the two. 
She also had been raped or sodomized.
	After they arrested defendant for harassment, the
police took him to the Clackamas County Jail and placed him in a
holding cell.  Just before 6:00 a.m. on July 14, 1989, detectives
told defendant that the victim was dead and began interviewing
him.  After defendant repeatedly had denied killing the victim,
detectives asked him to take a polygraph examination, which he
did.  Detective Harvey, a polygraph intern, administered the
examination, which lasted approximately four hours.  Afterward,
Harvey told defendant that she believed that he had killed the
victim.  Defendant responded that, although he did not remember
killing the victim and could not believe that he would do
something like that, if the polygraph had indicated he had killed
her, he was "going along with what the polygraph said." 
Defendant made several other inculpatory statements, each of
which referred to the results of the polygraph examination. 
	Defendant was indicted for murder on July 20, 1989. 
His trial was scheduled to begin on January 3, 1990.  In November
1989, defendant moved to suppress all the inculpatory statements
that he had made surrounding the administration of the polygraph
examination.  The trial court granted that motion on March 5,
1990.  It found that defendant's blood alcohol level at the time
when he made the statements was "approximately .16 to .18," that
defendant had consumed cocaine, and that defendant had had
"limited sleep and was fatigued" when he made the statements. 
The court also found that the first two-thirds of the polygraph
examination were inconclusive, that Harvey had not given
defendant "a complete and detailed explanation of what
defendant's polygraph performance was," and that defendant
probably would not have made the inculpatory statements if Harvey
had not told him that the polygraph examination had led her to
believe that he was the killer.  The court concluded that,
considering all the circumstances, defendant had not made the
inculpatory statements voluntarily. 
	The court also found that "[a]ll statements by
defendant at issue constitute polygraph evidence."  Relying on
State v. Lyon, 304 Or 221, 233-34, 744 P2d 231 (1987), and State
v. Brown, 297 Or 404, 445, 687 P2d 751 (1984), the court held
that such evidence was inadmissible as a matter of law.  Finally,
the trial court held that, as a factual matter, it could not
"sanitize" or edit defendant's statements, because they were
"inextricably linked and wedded to defendant's understanding of
the results of the polygraph and to what Detective Harvey told
defendant."  For those reasons, the court granted defendant's
motion to suppress.
	After the trial court granted defendant's motion to
suppress the inculpatory statements, the state announced that it
planned to appeal the trial court's order. (1)  Defendant then filed
a motion for release pending the state's appeal.  Defendant
argued that, in light of the trial court's rulings regarding the
inadmissibility of defendant's inculpatory statements, there was
not sufficient evidence to support the findings under ORS
135.240 (2) that the proof was evident or the presumption strong
that defendant was guilty.  On March 5, 1990, the trial court
denied defendant's motion for release.  The court found "by clear
and convincing evidence that the proof is evident and the
presumption strong that the defendant is guilty."  Accordingly,
defendant remained in jail.  On March 20, 1990, the state filed a
notice of appeal from the trial court's suppression order. 
	In November 1991, the Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court's suppression order.  State v. Harberts, 109 Or App
533, 820 P2d 1366 (1991).  It held that defendant had made the
inculpatory statements voluntarily and that, as a matter of law,
the statements could be edited to avoid any reference to the
polygraph examination.  Id. at 539-40.  
	Defendant sought review by this court and obtained two
extensions of time to file his petition for review.  The case was
argued in September 1992, and, in February 1993, this court held
that defendant had made the inculpatory statements voluntarily. 
However, it rejected the Court of Appeals' holding that, as a
matter of law, defendant's statements could be edited in a manner
that would eliminate reference to the polygraph examination
without changing their meaning.  State v. Harberts, 315 Or 408,
415, 848 P2d 1187 (1993).  In April 1993, this court remanded the
case to the trial court for it to determine whether it could
eliminate defendant's references to the polygraph examination in
his inculpatory statements without altering the meaning of those
statements.  Id. at 419.   
	On remand, the trial court again found that, as a
factual matter, it could not edit defendant's inculpatory
statements without changing their meaning, because the statements
contained a "direct linkage to the polygraph."  On May 27, 1993,
the court again suppressed those statements.  The state filed a
timely notice of appeal from the second order of suppression. 
The state requested three extensions of time to file its opening
brief, each time explaining that the Assistant Attorney General
assigned to the case was working on other cases.  Seven months
later, on January 21, 1994, the state moved to dismiss the
appeal, stating that it "no longer wishes to pursue this appeal." 
The Court of Appeals granted the state's motion and dismissed the
appeal three days later. 
	Thereafter, the record reveals that nothing occurred to
schedule the case for trial.  On April 11, 1994, defendant wrote
a letter to the State Court Administrator inquiring about the
status of the case and explaining that he had been in jail
awaiting trial since July 14, 1989.  In response to defendant's
letter, the trial court scheduled the trial for July 7, 1994.
	On May 23, 1994, defendant moved to dismiss the charges
against him for lack of a speedy trial.  After a hearing on the
motion, the trial court analyzed defendant's motion based on the
factors that this court had identified in State v. Ivory, 278 Or
499, 564 P2d 1039 (1977):  the length of the delay, the reasons
for the delay, and prejudice to defendant.  It found that the
length of the delay --  almost five years -- "is extraordinary
and shocking," and "unprecedented in the State of Oregon and
perhaps unprecedented in the country as a whole."  As to the
reasons for the delay, the trial court found that the period
between July 14, 1989, the date of defendant's arrest, and
January 3, 1990, when the trial originally would have begun, was
"a minimum amount of time" to bring an aggravated murder case to
trial.  The court also found that the state had a "legitimate and
statutory right" to appeal the court's first suppression order
and that the Court of Appeals' decision put defendant in the
position of petitioning for review to this court "or never again
[having] a legal opportunity to challenge the [d]ecision in the
future."  Therefore, the court concluded, the period of delay
caused by the first interlocutory appeal "cannot be laid at the
feet of the defendant but at the same time cannot be wholly
assigned to the State." 
	The trial court found that, although neither of the
state's interlocutory appeals was taken to vex or frustrate
defendant's desire for a speedy trial, the state's decision to
file the second appeal was "less understandable and less benign"
than the first appeal, and that both the attorney in charge of
the second appeal and the Solicitor General always had "'serious
doubts' as to whether the appeal could be successful."  According
to the trial court, the decision to take that appeal was "a
mistake in judgment." (3)  The court also found that the conduct of
the attorney in charge of the second appeal during the time that
appeal was pending was "curious and questionable in light of the
facts as [the attorney in charge] testified he knew them to be." 
According to the trial court, the seven months between when the
state filed the second interlocutory appeal and when the state
moved to dismiss that appeal was a period of "protracted
indecision and unreasonably long under all the circumstances    
* * *."
	With respect to prejudice, the trial court found that
defendant had suffered actual personal prejudice by being held in
jail for five years without a trial and by having aggravated
murder charges against him unresolved for that period of time. 
However, the court also held that there was "no compelling and
cogent evidence" suggesting that defendant's ability to defend
himself had been impaired: 
"The position by the defendant that defendant's
ability to receive a fair trial because of the
extraordinary delay has been impaired is a reach on the
part of the defendant as solid evidence supporting that
position is not apparent to this Court."  
On June 17, 1994, the trial court denied defendant's motion to
dismiss, reasoning:
"The consideration of all 'factors' including the
circumstances mentioned above bearing on the question
of prejudice have caused the Court to conclude that
while the delay is extraordinary and shocking and has
indeed prejudiced defendant Harberts by reason of his
long pre-trial incarceration and the attendant anxiety
and concern, this is counter-balanced by the nature of
the charges against this defendant and the Court's
Finding of February 28, 1990 [denying defendant's
motion for release pending appeal because of a strong
presumption of guilt] so as to render the prejudice
defendant suffered to be of insufficient magnitude to
warrant dismissal."
	On June 28, 1994, after the case had been set for
trial, defendant petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in this
court, which this court denied approximately a week later, on
July 6, 1994.  Defendant's trial began the following week.  The
jury convicted him of all three counts, and defendant was
sentenced to death on October 27, 1994.
	As a threshold matter, defendant assigns error to the
trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss on speedy-trial
grounds.  The requirement for a speedy trial is both statutory
and constitutional.  ORS 135.747 requires that a defendant
charged with a crime be brought to trial "within a reasonable
period of time[.]"  Article I, section 10, of the Oregon
Constitution, provides, in part, that "justice shall be
administered * * * without delay."  The Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution provides, in part, that "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy * * * trial."  In this case, defendant sought dismissal of
the charges against him on both statutory and constitutional
grounds.  
	Procedurally, this court usually examines statutory
claims first.  See, e.g., Ivory, 278 Or at 503 (so stating). 
However, if defendant were to prevail on his statutory claim, the
remedy would be dismissal of the charges without prejudice, and
the state would be able to prosecute him again, because the
charges against him are felonies.  See ORS 135.753(2) (dismissal
of charge under ORS 135.747 does not bar another prosecution for
same crime if crime charged is Class A misdemeanor or felony);
State v. Emery, 318 Or 460, 471 n 18, 869 P2d 859 (1994) (same). 
Therefore, even if we were to hold in defendant's favor on his
statutory speedy-trial claim, we still would have to address his
constitutional claims, because the remedy for those claims is
dismissal with prejudice.  See Ivory, 278 Or at 505 (remedy for
Article I, section 10, violation is dismissal with prejudice,
same as for violation of Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial,
citing Strunk v. United States, 412 US 434, 440, 93 S Ct 2260, 37
L Ed 2d 56 (1973)).  Defendant must prevail on his state or
federal constitutional speedy-trial claims to be entitled to the
complete relief that he seeks.  Under those circumstances,
therefore, it is appropriate to address defendant's
constitutional claims first.  See Ivory, 278 Or at 503 (same
rationale for addressing constitutional speedy-trial claim
first).  
	We begin with defendant's claim under Article I,
section 10, of the Oregon Constitution.  See State v. Kennedy,
295 Or 260, 262, 666 P2d 1316 (1983) (court decides state 
constitutional issues before resorting to federal law).  In
analyzing that provision, we consider its specific wording, the
case law surrounding it, and the historical circumstances that
led to its creation.  See Priest v. Pearce, 314 Or 411, 415-16,
840 P2d 65 (1992) (explaining methodology).
	By its terms, Article I, section 10, of the Oregon
Constitution requires that justice be administered "without
delay," a term that traces to Magna Charta.  Note, The Right to a
Speedy Criminal Trial, 57 Col L Rev 846, 847 n 7 (1957).  At the
beginning of the twentieth century, this court stated that
Article I, section 10, "declares that justice shall be
administered without delay, which is substantially the same as
guarantying to a defendant in a criminal action a speedy trial." 
State v. Breaw, 45 Or 586, 587, 78 P 896 (1904).
	In the criminal law context, the requirement for a
speedy trial is embedded deeply in the Anglo-American legal
tradition:
"'The right of all persons held on a criminal
charge, to a speedy and impartial trial, has been
guaranteed from the earliest times to the English
people, first by the Magna Charta and the petition of
rights * * *.  The * * * right has been declared in
most of the constitutions of the American states, and
also in the sixth amendment to the federal
constitution.'"
State v. Lee, 110 Or 682, 685, 224 P 627 (1924) (quoting Freeman,
41 Am Dec 604).  The historical reason for the speedy-trial
requirement is prevention of prolonged pretrial incarceration. 
Sir Edward Coke's commentaries on Magna Charta, for example,
explained that English judges did "'not suffer[] the prisoner to
be long detained, but at their next coming have given the
prisoner full and speedy justice * * * without detaining him long
in prison.'"  See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 US 213, 224, 87
S Ct 988, 18 L Ed 2d 1 (1967) (quoting Coke, The Second Part of
the Institutes of the Laws of England 43 (Brooke, 5th ed, 1797)). 
To Coke, prolonged pretrial incarceration not only would have
been contrary to English law and custom, it would have been "an
improper denial of justice."  Id.; see also Note, The Lagging
Right to a Speedy Trial, 51 Va L Rev 1587, 1594 (1965) 
(requirement of trial without delay protects defendants from
"interminable pretrial imprisonment").
	Colonial constitutions mandated trial "without delay"
beginning with the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776, which
phrased the requirement as a "speedy trial."  Bernard Schwartz, 
1 The Bill of Rights:  A Documentary History, 234 (1971).  The
Kentucky Constitution of 1799, and the Ohio Constitution of 1802,
guaranteed that "right and justice [be] administered without
denial or delay."  Charles Kettleborough, 1 Constitution Making
in Indiana xx, 86 (1916).  The Indiana Constitution of 1816 took
its "substance and phraseology" from the Kentucky and Ohio
Constitutions.  Id. at xx.  The Indiana Constitution of 1851 
rephrased the requirement as follows:  "Justice shall be
administered freely, and without purchase; completely, and
without denial; speedily, and without delay."  Id. at 297-98.
	The Indiana Constitution of 1851 was "the chief model
for substance and phraseology" of the Oregon Constitution that
was adopted in 1857.  Charles Henry Carey, ed., The Oregon
Constitution and Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional
Convention of 1857, 28 (1926).  The committee on the Bill of
Rights submitted the text of Article I, section 10, to the
convention as Article I, section 12.  Id. at 120.  There is no
record of any discussion of the phrase "without delay."  See id.
at 310 (noting adoption without comment). 
	This court long has held that Article I, section 10,
contains a "command * * * that justice shall be administered
'without delay[.]'"  State v. Clark, 86 Or 464, 471, 168 P 944
(1917).  That command is addressed to the prosecution and to the
court.  State v. Crosby, 217 Or 393, 402, 342 P2d 831 (1959). 
The state must not violate the constitutional speedy-trial
mandate.  State of Oregon v. Kuhnhausen, 201 Or 478, 512, 266 P2d
698, on reh'g 272 P2d 225 (1954).  
	Although there is "no general principle that fixes the
exact time within which a trial must be had" to satisfy the
requirement of Article I, section 10, Kuhnhausen, 201 Or at 492,
the constitutional mandate means that "there shall be no
unreasonable delay after a formal complaint has been filed
against the defendant."  State v. Vawter, 236 Or 85, 90-91, 386
P2d 915 (1963) (emphasis added).  That requirement serves both a
defendant's interest in a speedy trial and the public's interest
in the prompt administration of justice.  See Brown, 297 Or at
441 (delay in administration of justice a factor in determining
admissibility of polygraph evidence).  Whether the state has
violated the constitutional mandate depends on the circumstances
of each case.  Kuhnhausen, 201 Or at 536.  Pretrial imprisonment
in connection with the pending charges "shortens the
constitutionally permissible measure of delay."  Haynes v. Burks,
290 Or 75, 83, 619 P2d 632 (1980); see also Vawter, 236 Or at 91
(even incarceration for unrelated offenses does not relieve state
of speedy-trial obligations). (4)
	Historically, the test that this court used to resolve
speedy-trial claims was whether the process was "free from
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, created by the
ministers of justice * * *."  Clark, 86 Or at 471 (citations
omitted).  In 1977, this court held that, consistent with that
historical test, it would follow the same analysis that the
United States Supreme Court had adopted in Barker v. Wingo, 407
US 514, 92 S Ct 2182, 33 L Ed 2d 101 (1972), to resolve speedy-trial claims under the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.  Ivory, 278 Or at 504.  
	Under Barker, the analysis begins with the length of
the delay.  Delay that is "presumptively prejudicial" is a
"triggering mechanism" for inquiry into three other factors:  
whether the defendant asserted the right to a speedy trial, the
reasons for the delay, and prejudice to the defendant.  Barker,
407 US at 530.  The Barker court rejected the argument that a
defendant who fails to demand a speedy trial waives the right to
a speedy trial.  Id. at 528.  Instead, it held that a defendant's
failure to assert the right to a speedy trial is "one of the
factors to be considered in an inquiry into the deprivation of
the right."  Id.  
	With respect to the reasons for the delay, the Barker
court held that different weights should be assigned to different
reasons.  For example, a deliberate attempt by the government to
delay a trial to hamper the defense weighs heavily against the
government, while neutral reasons weigh less heavily.  Id. at
531.  However, even neutral reasons for delay must be weighed
against the government, because "the ultimate responsibility for
such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with
the defendant."  Id. (5)
	With respect to prejudice to the defendant, the Barker
court explained that such prejudice is to be assessed in light of
the interests that the speedy-trial requirement was designed to
protect:
"This Court has identified three such interests:  
(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii)
to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and
(iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be
impaired.  Of these, the most serious is the last,
because the inability of a defendant adequately to
prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire
system.  If witnesses die or disappear during a delay,
the prejudice is obvious.  There is also prejudice if
defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately
events of the distant past.  Loss of memory, however,
is not always reflected in the record because what has
been forgotten can rarely be shown."
Id. at 532.  The "prejudice to defense" factor has proved
controversial in United States Supreme Court jurisprudence. (6) 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court continues to apply the Barker
framework in cases involving speedy-trial claims that are brought
under the Sixth Amendment.  See Doggett v. United States, 505 US
647, 112 S Ct 2686, 120 L Ed 2d 520 (1992) (applying Barker
methodology.)  
	This court has held that delay in and of itself may be
sufficient to establish a speedy-trial violation if the delay is
so long "that the thought of ordering [a] defendant to trial
'shocks the imagination and the conscience,'" Vawter, 236 Or at
96 (quoting United States v. Chase, 135 F Supp 230, 233 (ND Ill
1955)), or if the delay is caused purposely to hamper the
defense, Ivory, 278 Or at 506.  Short of those circumstances,
however, this court considers the other factors. (7)  If a defendant
has been imprisoned for a long period awaiting trial, or if the
government has caused the delay in bad faith, then prejudice is
"obvious."  Ivory, 278 Or at 508 (quoting Dickey v. Florida, 398
US 30, 53, 90 S Ct 1564, 26 L Ed 2d 26 (1970)).  If a witness
dies or disappears during the delay, the prejudice also is
"obvious."  Id. at 508 (quoting Barker, 407 US at 532).  In cases
in which inquiry into impairment of the defense is required, a
defendant needs to show only that the delay caused a "reasonable
possibility of prejudice" to the ability to prepare a defense.  
Id. at 508. (8)
	Although this court endorsed the Barker analysis in
Ivory, it subsequently acknowledged that not all the Barker
analysis is appropriate for evaluating claims under Article I,
section 10.  In State v. Dykast, 300 Or 368, 375 n 6, 712 P2d 79
(1985), for example, this court explained that it had been
"mistaken" in adopting the requirement that a defendant demand a
speedy trial.  That is so because, as noted, the requirement that
a defendant be brought to trial "without delay" is not a "right"
of a criminal defendant.  Rather, it is a mandatory directive to
the state.  See Clark, 86 Or at 471 (so stating).  Accordingly,
the burden to proceed promptly is on the state.  Vawter, 236 Or
at 87.  Because Article I, section 10, does not guarantee an
individual a "right" to a speedy trial, the second Barker factor
is inapplicable under the Oregon Constitution.  Emery, 318 Or at
468 n 13; State v. Mende, 304 Or 18, 21, 741 P2d 496 (1987);
Dykast, 300 Or at 375 n 6. (9)
	This court also has declined to follow the federal
practice of balancing the conduct of the defendant against the
conduct of the state in evaluating speedy-trial claims.  Mende,
304 Or at 22.  Rather, this court considers all the relevant
factors, Haynes, 290 Or at 81, and assigns "weight" to them,
Mende, 304 Or at 24.  The length of delay affects the relative
weight of each factor:  
	"the longer the state unjustifiably delays a trial, the
more heavily the 'reasons for delay' factor weighs in
favor of the defendant.  Similarly, the longer the
defendant must endure pretrial incarceration or anxiety
and other forms of personal prejudice, the more the
'prejudice to defendant' factor weighs in the
defendant's favor.  * * * Obviously, length of delay
also may be a factor in assessing a defendant's claim
that the passage of time has dimmed witnesses' memories
or made other evidence unavailable."  
Mende, 304 Or at 24 (citation omitted).  Moreover, pretrial
imprisonment shortens the constitutionally permissible measure of
delay, even when that imprisonment results from denial of
pretrial release in a murder case.  Haynes, 290 Or at 83.  In
that regard, we note that the trial court in this case held that
its finding of February 28, 1990 -- that the presumption that
defendant was guilty and would not be released pretrial --
"counter-balanced" the "extraordinary and shocking" delay in this
case.  That was error because, as noted, Oregon courts do not
engage in a balancing of the speedy-trial factors, and pretrial
incarceration shortens, rather than counter-balances, the
constitutionally permissible measure of delay.  Haynes, 290 Or at
81, 83.
	To summarize:  Article I, section 10, imposes on the
state a mandatory directive to bring a defendant to trial
"without delay."  Determining whether the state did so is a fact-specific inquiry that requires the court to examine the
circumstances of each particular case.  Under our present-day
jurisprudence, speedy-trial claims are guided by considering the
length of the delay and, if it is not manifestly excessive or
purposely caused by the government to hamper the defense, the
reasons for the delay, and prejudice to the defendant.  Prolonged
pretrial imprisonment, even if it is caused by the trial court's
finding that the defendant is not entitled to release pretrial
because of a strong presumption of guilt, shortens the
constitutionally permissible measure of delay.  With that
framework in mind, we turn to the circumstances of this case,
beginning with the length of the delay.
	The pretrial delay in this case was two days short of
five years.  The length of the delay after an indictment has been
filed not only triggers inquiry into the other factors, it
remains an element of the inquiry in the examination of the
reasons for the delay and prejudice.  Mende, 304 Or at 24; accord
Doggett, 505 US at 651-52 (uncustomary delay triggers inquiry
into other factors and contributes to presumption that pretrial
delay caused prejudice to accused).  The state concedes that the
five-year delay in this case is "more than sufficient" to trigger
inquiry into the reasons for that delay.  We agree.  The state
identifies no cases, and we have found none, involving such a
long period of pretrial delay where the defendant was held in
jail awaiting trial solely in connection with the pending
charges.  However, the delay in this case was not so manifestly
excessive that we may ignore the other factors.  Ivory, 278 Or at
506.  Cf. Chase, 135 F Supp at 233 (criminal charges dismissed
because of 20-year delay before trial).  We consider the other
factors in turn, beginning with the reasons for the delay.
	Defendant argues that "the lion's share of the delay 
was for the [state's] appeals which were ultimately unsuccessful,
unduly lengthy, and negligently handled."  He contends that the
state's second interlocutory appeal was "especially weak" and
added almost a year to an already unnecessarily long pretrial
delay.  The state responds that, under ORS 138.060(3), it had a
right to take both interlocutory appeals and that "none of the
time taken up in pretrial appeals should be considered" in
analyzing a speedy-trial claim under Article I, section 10.  The
state reasons that the pretrial delay caused by the appeals in
this case is "so benign as to exclude that period from the
speedy-trial analysis." 
	The state's argument reduces to the assertion that,
even when a defendant has been incarcerated pretrial, the state's
statutory right to take an interlocutory appeal frees it from the
constitutional mandate of Article I, section 10.  For the state
to prevail on that argument, this court would have to hold that
the state's statutory right to appeal from a pretrial suppression
order either defines or supercedes the constitutional command in
Article I, section 10.  In Kuhnhausen, this court rejected a
similar argument.
	Kuhnhausen involved a question of the meaning and
application of Article I, section 10, in relation to the speedy-trial statute, former ORS 134.120 (1953), renumbered as ORS
135.747.  201 Or at 512.  The state had argued that the statute,
which was enacted contemporaneously with the Oregon Constitution,
constituted the legislative construction and definition of
Article I, section 10.  This court held that the statute "is not
a 'definition' of the constitutional provision * * *."  Id. at
516.  The court explained that determining whether a trial is a
speedy trial is a judicial question that "should not be lightly
whittled away by any rule which recognizes the power of the
legislature to authoritatively construe the constitution."  Id.
at 517.  The same reasoning is applicable here.
	When the Oregon Constitution was adopted, and for more
than a hundred years thereafter, the state had no right to take
an interlocutory appeal from an order of suppression.  The
legislature enacted ORS 138.060(3) granting such a right in 1969. 
See Or Laws 1969, ch 529, § 1 (enacting provision as ORS
138.060(4), renumbered as ORS 138.060(3) in 1973, Or Laws 1973,
ch 836, § 276).  ORS 138.060(3) did not, because it could not,
nullify the state's obligation under Article I, section 10, to
bring an accused to trial "without delay."  The state always must
exercise its statutory right to appeal in a manner that is
consistent with its constitutional obligation.  Accordingly, we
reject the state's argument that no delay caused by interlocutory
appeals may be considered in analyzing a defendant's speedy-trial
claim under Article I, section 10.  Because ORS 138.060(3) does
not shield the state from an inquiry into the reasons for the
delay associated with its interlocutory appeals in this case, we
turn to an analysis of those reasons for delay.
	The state's first appeal raised the issues whether
defendant had made his inculpatory statements voluntarily and
whether his statements were linked to the polygraph examination
so inextricably that they should be considered as "polygraph
evidence" and excluded under Lyon, 304 Or at 233-34, and Brown,
297 Or at 445.  As noted, the state prevailed at the Court of
Appeals, and defendant sought review by this court.  We accept
the trial court's finding that the state filed and pursued its
first appeal with reasonable diligence and that defendant was
required to seek review of the Court of Appeals' decision or lose
his opportunity to challenge that ruling in the future.  Under
those circumstances, we conclude that the decision to take, and
the time devoted to the resolution of, the state's first appeal
was consistent with the state's constitutional duty to exercise
reasonable diligence in bringing defendant to trial.  However,
whatever the constitutional permissibility might be of holding a
defendant in custody for four years without a trial, the passage
of that amount of time changed the constitutional calculus under
Article I, section 10, for what had to occur thereafter.  That is
so because, as we have explained, the core value protected by the
speedy-trial requirement is prevention of prolonged pretrial
incarceration.  
	By the time that the state's first interlocutory appeal
was resolved, defendant had been held in jail without trial for
so long that the state had an affirmative duty to bring him to
trial without further delay, unless it had a strong justification
for not doing so.  Even assuming that the state had a strong
justification for not bringing defendant to trial at that point,
it was obligated to give this case the highest priority to remove
any remaining barriers to trial.  We turn to the justification
for the period of delay following the resolution of the state's
first appeal. 
	On remand from this court's decision in Harberts, the
trial court made a factual finding that it could not edit
defendant's inculpatory statements to omit reference to the
polygraph examination without changing the meaning of those
statements.  Accordingly, on May 27, 1993, the trial court again
suppressed the evidence of the statements, just as it had on
March 5, 1990.  
	Soon after the trial court entered its second order of
suppression, the Clackamas County Assistant District Attorney
assigned to prosecute the case called the Appellate Division of
the Attorney General's office to discuss the possibility of
taking an appeal from the second order of suppression.  The
state's attorney in charge of the second interlocutory appeal
testified that, when he received the prosecutor's call, he had
doubts about the strength of the state's position if it were to
file another appeal and was worried specifically about the length
of time that defendant already had been in jail awaiting trial. 
As another witness, the Solicitor General, further explained: 
	"[Appellate Division attorneys] immediately were
worried about how strong a case we could make on [the
second] appeal since it was a fact intensive inquiry. 
In fact, fact intensive inquiries are the most
difficult ones to get reversed in the appellate
courts."  
Nonetheless, the state filed a notice of appeal from the second
order of suppression.  
The trial court found that the decision to take the
second interlocutory appeal was a mistake in judgment by the
assistant district attorney and the Appellate Division.  We
agree.  A fact-bound interlocutory appeal that had little
likelihood of success was not a strong justification for
postponing the trial of a defendant who had been held in jail
awaiting trial for four years. 
Justification for the second appeal aside, we turn to
the question whether the state gave this case highest priority to
move defendant's case to trial, which, under the circumstances,
it constitutionally was required to do.  The attorney in charge
of the state's second appeal testified that he made no effort to
expedite the appeal within the Appellate Division.  Rather, he
testified that the Appellate Division "just handled [the second
interlocutory] appeal as we would in the normal course."  He
requested and received three extensions of time to file the
state's opening brief, explaining that he was "working on other
cases."  He testified that criminal defendants generally are
released from jail pending an interlocutory appeal by the state
and that usually only defendants charged with aggravated murder
are held in jail pending a state's interlocutory appeal.  He also
testified that he could not think of "any other appeals during
this time where we had a state's [interlocutory] appeal in a
murder case where the defendant was being held in custody."  The
list of other cases that the attorney in charge gave priority
over the state's second interlocutory appeal in this case grew
longer, not shorter, with each request for an extension of time.
Seven months after the state had filed the second
appeal, the state moved to dismiss it.  The trial court found
that the period of time that the state had spent on the second
appeal was marked by "protracted indecision" and was
"unreasonably long" under the circumstances.  That is true.  Even
assuming that the state had a strong justification for the second
appeal, and we already have concluded that it did not, the state
failed to give this case the highest priority so that it could
resolve the second appeal in a manner that was consistent with
its obligation under Article I, section 10.  Viewed in the
context of the previous four years of delay, the state's failure
to provide a strong justification for the second appeal, coupled
with its failure to give this case the highest priority, means
that the months of delay associated with the second appeal weigh
heavily against the state in defendant's speedy-trial claim. 
This case presents yet a further period of delay, for
which the state provides no justification.  Between January 24,
1994, when the Court of Appeals dismissed the second appeal, and
April 11, 1994, apparently nothing happened to move the case to
trial.  The case was scheduled for trial only after defendant
wrote to the State Court Administrator inquiring about the status
of the case and explaining that he had been in jail awaiting
trial since his arrest in July 1989.  This court consistently has
held that it is not incumbent on the accused to demand a trial or
to take affirmative action to bring a case to trial, because the
duty to bring a defendant to trial under the mandate of Article
I, section 10, is on the state.  See, e.g.,  Vawter, 236 Or at
87.  As we have explained, in light of the preceding four years
of delay, the state had an affirmative duty to give this case the
highest priority to bring defendant to trial after resolution of
the first appeal, unless it had a strong justification for not
doing so.  The state offers no justification for the months of
inaction after the Court of Appeals dismissed the second appeal. 
Added to what by then had become almost five years of delay in
bringing this incarcerated defendant to trial, those additional
months of delay also weigh heavily in defendant's favor.
We turn to the prejudice factor.  As noted, prejudice
can be of three kinds:  the damage arising from lengthy pretrial
incarceration, the anxiety and public suspicion resulting from
public accusation of a crime, and the hampering of the ability to
defend at trial.  Ivory, 278 Or at 507-08.  
The state argues that, although five years of pretrial
incarceration is serious "in the abstract" and defendant's
situation "apparently is unprecedented in reported cases in
Oregon," the "real type of prejudice relevant to a speedy trial
claim is impairment of a defendant's defense."  The state cites
no authority for its argument that prejudice to the defense is
the only relevant form of prejudice.  That argument ignores one
of the centuries-old principles that undergirds the speedy-trial
requirement, namely, the purpose of preventing prolonged
incarceration without trial.  See Klopfer, 386 US at 224
(identifying principle).  As this court stated in Mende, "the
longer the defendant must endure pretrial incarceration or
anxiety and other forms of personal prejudice, the more the
'prejudice to defendant' factor weighs in the defendant's favor." 
304 Or at 24.  In this case, the trial court found that
"[t]here has been prejudice to defendant * * * in
being held in detention for almost five years without
trial.  There is also prejudice to [defendant] for a
protracted period of anxiety concerning the pending
serious charges (Aggravated Murder -- potential death
penalty) without trial."
We do not ignore that finding regarding the first two forms of
prejudice.
	The next question is whether the five-year delay in
this case caused prejudice to the defense.  As noted, the trial
court found that there was "no compelling and cogent evidence" of
prejudice to the defense.  However, the trial court applied the
wrong test.  As we have explained, the proper inquiry is whether
the delay caused a reasonable possibility of prejudice to the
defense.  Ivory, 278 Or at 508.
	In this case, no direct evidence linked defendant to
the crime.  Defendant's defense theory was that the victim's
father, either alone or with the help of the father's girlfriend,
had killed the victim and that the state incorrectly had
eliminated them as suspects.  Defendant contends that his ability
to prepare and present that defense was impaired in at least two
ways.  
	Defendant first points to the fact that, in the
bathroom where the victim's body had been found, the police found
a bloody cigarette wrapper from the brand of cigarettes that the
father smoked.  The police also found several damp cigarettes of
the brand that the father smoked in the garbage can in the
bathroom.  Defendant sought to establish that the cigarettes had
been dropped into the garbage can near the time when the victim
had been killed.  His theory was that, if the police had found
the cigarettes atop some damp tissues that the police also had
found in the garbage can, that would suggest that the father had
murdered the victim.  The father had told the police on July 14,
1989, that he had dropped the cigarettes when he went into the
bathroom and saw his daughter's body on the floor that morning. 
At trial in 1994, by contrast, the father testified that the
cigarettes had fallen out of his pocket on the evening of July
13, 1989, when he had taken the victim to the bathroom, and that
he had put them in the garbage can. 
	On July 14, 1989, the father's girlfriend had told the
police that she, not the father, had taken the victim to the
bathroom the night before the murder.  However, in 1994, at
trial, the girlfriend testified that she could not remember
whether it was she or the father who had taken the victim to the
bathroom the night before the murder.  Regarding the
inconsistencies in their stories, both the father and his
girlfriend testified that so much time had passed that they could
not remember what they had told the police soon after the murder. 
The detective who had examined the bathroom was no help in
resolving their inconsistencies, because she could not remember
if she had found the cigarettes on top of, beside, or under the
damp tissues.  
	Defendant argues that the passage of time provided both
the father and the father's girlfriend with a plausible excuse
for not remembering what they had told the police, thereby
undermining defendant's ability to impeach their credibility with
their prior inconsistent statements.  The state, without
discussion, dismisses defendant's argument as "mere speculation." 
We disagree.  The state was required to prove its case against
defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.  The only other possible
suspects in this case were the father and, perhaps, the father's
girlfriend.  It is not speculative to say that successfully
impeaching their credibility could have established some doubt
about whether the police properly had eliminated the father and
the father's girlfriend as suspects.  
	Defendant makes a second argument respecting prejudice
to his defense.  Defendant asserts that the police who searched
the house where the victim died did not do so carefully or
thoroughly.  An investigator, Graber, testified without
contradiction that only one of the investigating detectives,
Erickson, had searched the bedroom of the father and the father's
girlfriend.  Erickson, who did not prepare a detailed report of
his search of that area, died in 1992.  Accordingly, defendant
argues, Erickson was not available as a witness at trial, and
defendant had no opportunity to question Erickson about how
thoroughly he had searched the bedroom, what he saw, or whether
Erickson could have overlooked evidence in the bedroom that would
have created a reasonable doubt that defendant had killed the
victim.
	The state responds that Erickson's death "had no
possibility of impairing defendant's defense."  That is so, the
state argues, because Erickson had "no unique knowledge" and
defendant has not demonstrated that he would have said anything
exculpatory.  What is more, the state contends, defendant
established through cross-examination of other detectives that
"the search of the house was not as thorough as it could have
been." (10)
	We disagree with the state that Erickson's death was of
no consequence to the defense.  Although several detectives were
involved in the search of the house where the victim died,
Erickson was the only detective who searched the father's
bedroom.  Contrary to the state's assertion, Erickson did have
"unique knowledge" of that area.  Erickson prepared several
reports about the search of the house, but none of those reports
described in detail the extent and nature of his search of the
father's bedroom.  Defendant's opportunity at trial to question
other detectives, who had not participated in the search of the
bedroom and whose police reports did not describe the search of
that area, was no substitute for defendant's inability to
question Erickson.  What is more, contrary to the state's
assertion, defendant was not required to show that Erickson would
have said anything exculpatory.  It is sufficient that defendant
was deprived of the opportunity to demonstrate potential
weaknesses in the state's case.  When the state has the burden to
prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, a defendant need do no
more.  See State v. Burrow, 293 Or 691, 703, 653 P2d 226 (1982) 
(state must prove "every ingredient" of offense beyond 
reasonable doubt). 
	Defendant's impaired ability to impeach the credibility
of the father and the father's girlfriend, and his inability to
cross-examine Erickson, created a reasonable possibility of
prejudice to the defense.  Defendant has established all three
forms of prejudice that this court has identified as relevant
under Article I, section 10.  The prejudice factor weighs heavily
in defendant's favor.  
	This case involves the application of speedy-trial
principles that were well established long before defendant was
charged with the most serious charge that can be brought against
a person, aggravated murder.  The speedy-trial requirement
addresses both a defendant's interest in having criminal charges
resolved promptly and the public's constitutionally declared goal
not to delay the administration of justice.  Haynes, 290 Or at
81; accord Barker, 407 US at 527 ("society has a particular
interest in bringing swift prosecutions, and society's
representatives are the ones who should protect that interest"). 
This court has held that there shall be no unreasonable delay
after a formal complaint has been filed against a criminal
defendant.  Vawter, 236 Or at 90-91.  This court also has stated
that pretrial imprisonment of a defendant shortens, rather than
lengthens, the constitutionally permissible delay that is
tolerated under Article I, section 10.  Haynes, 290 Or at 83. (11)
	As noted, this case involves a five-year delay in
bringing to trial a criminal defendant who was held in jail
solely in connection with the pending charges from the time when 
he was arrested in July 1989.  Even acknowledging, as we do, the
constitutional permissibility of the delay caused by the state's
first interlocutory appeal from the trial court's first order of
suppression, we may not ignore the passage of approximately four
years from the time of defendant's arrest until resolution of
that first appeal.  At that point, the burden was on the state to
provide a strong justification for any further delay in bringing
this incarcerated defendant to trial.  Assuming that the state
had strong justification for any further delay after the first
interlocutory appeal, it was required to limit that delay. 
Instead, the state chose to take a second interlocutory appeal,
causing serious further delay.  In that context, the state
constitutionally was required to assign highest priority to
resolution of that appeal so that the case could be set for
trial.  The state did not have strong justification for the
second appeal, which it knew from the outset involved a fact-bound issue on which the state stood little chance of prevailing. 
The state compounded that mistake by failing to assign highest
priority to resolution of the second appeal.  Finally, the state
failed to provide any justification for the months of inaction in
bringing defendant to trial that followed dismissal of the second
appeal.  Defendant suffered both personal prejudice and a
reasonable possibility of prejudice to his defense because of the
five-year delay in this case.  
	On the facts of this case, which are unprecedented in
Oregon, we hold that the state failed to bring defendant to trial
"without delay" under Article I, section 10, of the Oregon
Constitution.  The trial court therefore erred in denying
defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of a speedy
trial.  Accordingly, we have no choice but to order dismissal of
the charges with prejudice.  See Emery, 318 Or at 471 (dismissal
with prejudice only adequate remedy for violation of
constitutional speedy-trial violation). (12)
	The judgment of conviction is reversed, and the
sentence of death is vacated.  The case is remanded to the
circuit court with instructions to dismiss the accusatory
instrument with prejudice.
	VAN HOOMISSEN, J., dissenting.
	Defendant was convicted of aggravated murder and
sentenced to death.  The majority holds that the state failed to
bring defendant to trial "without delay" and, therefore, violated
Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution.  The majority
reverses defendant's conviction, vacates his sentence of death,
and remands the case to the trial court with instructions to
dismiss the indictment with prejudice.  For the reasons explained
below, I respectfully dissent.
FACTS

	Defendant was charged with aggravated murder (three
counts) in connection with the death of a child.  The majority
provides a detailed chronology of the events that occurred
between the discovery of the child's body in 1989 and defendant's
conviction in 1994.  
	When the trial court denied defendant's motion to
dismiss the indictment on speedy-trial grounds, it found in part:
"5.

"The State in pursuing the appeals of
the Trial Court's Orders of February 1, 1990
and May 27, 1993 were [sic] on both occasions
in good faith and the appeals were not
frivolous in nature and were not undertaken
to vex or frustrate defendant's desire for a
speedy trial and were not done to gain a
judicial or competitive advantage in the
trial that was to come."
Concerning the issue of trial prejudice, the court found:
"17.

"There is no compelling and cogent
evidence that suggests defendant's ability to
defend himself and receive a fair trial has
been impaired.
"18.

"The position by the defendant that
defendant's ability to receive a fair trial
because of the extraordinary delay has been
impaired is a reach on the part of the
defendant as solid evidence supporting that
position is not apparent to the court.
"19.

"The death of State's witness Detective
Erickson in February 1993 has not materially
adversely affected the defendant's chances of
receiving a fair trial and presenting the
kind of defense he would have presented had
the case gone to trial in January and
February of 1990 or in June of 1993.  It is
to be noted that Detective Erickson had
already passed away prior to [the state's]
decision to file the second appeal and pursue
the three extensions of time before
abandoning the appeal on January 21, 1994." 
	In denying defendant's motion to dismiss the
indictment, the trial court explained:
"The consideration of all 'factors'
including the circumstances mentioned above
bearing on the question of prejudice have
caused the Court to conclude that while the
delay is extraordinary and shocking and has
indeed prejudiced defendant Harberts by
reason of his long pre-trial incarceration
and the attendant anxiety and concern, this
is counter-balanced by the nature of the
charges against this defendant and the
Court's Finding of February 28, 1990 [denying
defendant's motion for release pending appeal
because of a strong presumption of guilt] so
as to render the prejudice defendant suffered
to be of insufficient magnitude to warrant
dismissal."
	In State v. Ivory, 278 Or 499, 504, 564 P2d 1039
(1977), this court adopted the four Barker factors for the
purpose of analyzing a claim of "undue delay" under Article I,
section 10.  See Barker v. Wingo, 407 US 514, 530-33, 92 S Ct
2182, 33 L Ed 2d 101 (1972) (explaining "factors").  This court
later held that it was mistaken in adopting one of the Barker 
factors, i.e., whether the defendant asserted the right to a
speedy trial.  State v. Dykast, 300 Or 368, 375 n 6, 712 P2d 79
(1985). (13)  Thus, the other three Barker factors -- the length of
the delay, the reasons for the delay, and the resulting prejudice
to the defendant -- make up the present analysis under Article I,
section 10.  State v. Emery, 318 Or 460, 468 n 13, 869 P2d 859
(1994).  In my opinion, the majority's analysis of the case law
surrounding Article I, section 10, as well as its application of
that case law to the facts of this case, is seriously flawed.  I
proceed to demonstrate where, I believe, the majority goes
astray.
LENGTH OF THE DELAY

	The majority concludes that the length of the delay in
this case was not so manifestly excessive that we may ignore the
other Barker factors.  (Slip op at 24).  I agree.  This court
never has characterized a pretrial delay as sufficient, because
of its length alone, to justify dismissal under Article I,
section 10.  See State v. Vawter, 236 Or 85, 96, 386 P2d 915
(1963) (describing the standard of automatic dismissal as being a
delay that "shocks the imagination and the conscience").  
REASONS FOR THE DELAY

	I note first that the majority significantly
mischaracterizes one of the state's arguments regarding the
reasons for the delay to be that the state's right to appeal
under ORS 138.060(3) "trumps" Article I, section 10. (14)  The state
does not make that argument.  Rather, the state argues that its
appeals were statutorily authorized and temporally reasonable
and, therefore, did not violate Article I, section 10.
	The majority correctly concludes that 
	"the decision to take, and the time devoted
to the resolution of, the state's first
appeal was consistent with the state's
constitutional duty to exercise reasonable
diligence in bringing defendant to trial." 
(Slip op at 27).  Thus, the majority recognizes that at least 80
percent of the pretrial delay in this case, i.e., from July 1989
until June 1993, was constitutionally unobjectionable.  According
to the majority, it is what occurred thereafter that precipitated
the constitutional violation.
	The state's second appeal caused about seven and one-half months of delay.  The majority chastises the state for
taking the second appeal, concluding that the state lacked
"strong justification" for doing so.  As did the trial judge, the
majority engages in "Monday morning quarterbacking."
	When evaluating the "justification" for pretrial delay,
I find the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in United
States v. Loud Hawk, 474 US 302, 106 S Ct 648, 88 L Ed 2d 640
(1986), to be persuasive.  See State v. Kennedy, 295 Or 260, 267,
666 P2d 1316 (1983) ("when this court cites federal opinions in
interpreting a provision of Oregon law, it does so because it
finds the views there expressed persuasive, not because it
considers itself bound to do so").  The Loud Hawk Court
emphasized that
	"there are important public interests in the
process of appellate review.  The assurance
that motions to suppress evidence or to
dismiss an indictment are correctly decided
through orderly appellate review safeguards
both the rights of defendants and the 'rights
of public justice.'"
474 US at 313.  Loud Hawk instructs that
	"an interlocutory appeal by the Government
ordinarily is a valid reason that justifies
delay.  In assessing the purpose and
reasonableness of such an appeal, courts may
consider several factors.  These include the
strength of the Government's position on the
appealed issue, the importance of the issue
in the posture of the case, and -- in some
cases -- the seriousness of the crime."
Id. at 315 (emphasis added).  In my view, it is eminently
sensible to evaluate interlocutory appeals by looking to the
strength of the state's position, the importance of the appealed
issue to the state's case, and the seriousness of the crime.
	In this case, the state had strong justification for a
second appeal.  At the time when the state decided to appeal the
second suppression order, the suppressed evidence appeared to be
critical to the state's case.  No direct evidence, other than the
suppressed statements, linked defendant to the crime.  The
physical evidence, to some extent, was ambiguous.  Some of the
evidence could have been interpreted to suggest that the victim's
father and/or the father's girlfriend had committed the crime. 
Without defendant's inculpatory statements, the state's case
against defendant was entirely circumstantial.  Defendant himself
concedes that, without the suppressed statements, the state's
case against him was "significantly weakened."  Indeed, during
his closing argument at trial, defendant's counsel told the jury:
	"There were three adults in this house when
this [murder] happened. * * * There are no
witnesses to this crime, there are no
admissions, there are no confessions, there
are no eyewitnesses whatsoever.  There is no
direct evidence linking anyone to this crime,
none."
	In my view, the prosecutor's decision to take a second
appeal was fully justified under the circumstances.  The state's
position was not as strong as it had been during the first
appeal, however, given the seriousness of the charges against
defendant and the importance of the suppressed statements to the
state's case, I believe that the state acted with strong
justification in taking and pursuing its second appeal.  The
majority's conclusion to the contrary represents a judgment call
with which I cannot concur.
	Moreover, the majority ignores the fact that, by
voluntarily moving to dismiss its second appeal, the state no
doubt advanced defendant's trial date by at least a year.  In my
view, the state's action in dismissing the appeal weighs in favor
of the state because it demonstrates the state's good faith
effort to comply with Article I, section 10, even at the risk of
jeopardizing the prosecution of the case by going to trial
without the evidence of defendant's incriminating statements. 
	The Attorney General did not give the state's second
appeal the priority it required.  Even assuming, however, that
the Appellate Division's handling of the state's second appeal
was negligent, this court has stated that, although negligent
delay weighs against the state, it does not weigh as heavily as
intentional misconduct by the state.  See Dykast, 300 Or at 377-78 (intentional or malicious acts intended to injure a defendant
or gain unfair advantage weigh "much more heavily than
inadvertent or negligent conduct").  Moreover, the record here
contains abundant and unchallenged evidence of the Appellate
Division's heavy caseload at the relevant time.  See Strunk v.
United States, 412 US 434, 436, 93 S Ct 2260, 37 L Ed 2d 56
(1973) (in determining whether Sixth Amendment was violated,
delay caused by understaffed prosecutors weighs less heavily than
intentional delay calculated to hamper defense). 
	Finally, the majority faults the state for not bringing
the case to trial promptly after the Court of Appeals dismissed
the state's second appeal.  However, in my view, even assuming
that the District Attorney's failure to set the case for trial
promptly was due to negligence, given the seriousness of the
charges against defendant, the remaining few months of pretrial
delay simply are insufficient to show a state constitutional
violation. 
PREJUDICE

	Defendant was incarcerated for almost five years. 
During that period, he undoubtedly experienced some anxiety and
concern.  In my view, however, that type of prejudice is not
entitled to much weight in the analysis. 
	Here again, the majority mischaracterizes the state's
argument to be that the only type of prejudice that is relevant
under the prejudice prong of the analysis is prejudice to the
defense.  The state does not make that argument.  Rather, the
state argues that, of the three types of prejudice that can be
cause by pretrial delay, the "most serious" is impairment of a
defendant's ability to present a defense.  See Barker, 407 US at
532 (so stating).  In fact, in its respondent's brief in this
court, the state specifically acknowledges:
"Although less serious than impairment
of defense, pretrial delay also may prejudice
a defendant by reason of incarceration and
anxiety."
	Courts have recognized that anxiety and concern are
inherent in any criminal prosecution and have not given them much
weight.  See, e.g., United States v. Simmons, 536 F2d 827, 831
(9th Cir 1976) ("Conclusory allegations of general anxiety and
depression are present in almost every criminal prosecution.").
In Dykast, 300 Or at 378, this court recognized that "[m]ost
criminal prosecutions cause stress, discomfort and interference
with a normal life."  And, in Emery, this court gave little
weight to the defendant's claims of anxiety, explaining:
	"We recognize that delay adds to the ordinary
anxiety and inconvenience caused by the
pending criminal charge, however, there was
no cognizable prejudice to defendant."  
318 Or at 473.  Under Article I, section 10, pretrial anxiety and
concern, although ostensibly entitled to some weight in
determining whether a defendant was prejudiced by delay, appear
not to factor significantly.
TRIAL PREJUDICE

	The majority factors Detective Erickson's death into
the "prejudice to the defense" prong of the Barker analysis. 
Erickson died in 1992, before this court resolved the state's
first appeal.  In my view, allegedly prejudicial events should
not be factored into the analysis if, like Erickson's death, they
occurred during a period of reasonable delay.  
	The majority apparently believes that the "prejudice to
the defense" prong is intended to evaluate the cumulative effect
of all changes in circumstance between the time of defendant's
arrest and the time of trial, regardless of the timing of the
events that led to those changes of circumstance.  Article I,
section 10, however, does not confer on a criminal defendant a
right to a trial in the identical format that the trial would
have taken if it had commenced on the day the defendant was
arrested.  Instead, that provision mandates that the state avoid
"unreasonable delay" in bringing the matter to trial (or other
resolution).  Logically, then, dismissal of charges is intended
to remedy any prejudice to a defendant caused by the state's
failure to avoid unreasonable delay.  Oregon case law supports
the view that Article I, section 10, was not intended to provide
a remedy for all prejudicial events that might occur before
trial. 
	First, Oregon courts have established that one of the
purposes of Article I, section 10, is to "limit the possibility"
of impairment to a defendant's ability to put on a defense.  
Dykast, 300 Or at 378.  When the state avoids unreasonable delay,
it limits the possibility of prejudice to the defendant. 
However, the state cannot eliminate that possibility.  Holding
the state responsible for prejudicial events that occur when the
state is meeting its constitutional obligations can do little to
effectuate the purpose of limiting the possibility of prejudice.
   	Second, this court has suggested that the date on which
an allegedly prejudicial event occurred is important.  In Ivory,
the defendant was indicted secretly in January 1975, but was not
arrested and did not learn of the indictment until December 1975. 
278 Or at 501, 509 n 8.  The defendant moved to dismiss, claiming
that he had been prejudiced by the disappearance of two
witnesses.  After concluding that the period of delay between the
indictment and the arrest was unreasonable, this court noted that
those witnesses had been seen last in March 1975 and June 1975,
respectively.  The court went on to find that the defendant had
demonstrated prejudice "by identification of potentially
favorable witnesses who could not be found due to a delayed
trial."  Id. at 508 (emphasis added).  The Ivory court appears to
have factored the prejudicial event (the disappearance of the
witnesses) into the analysis because the witnesses had
disappeared during a period of unreasonable delay. (15)
	I concede that prejudicial events that occur during
periods of reasonable delay occasionally might factor into
another element of the constitutional calculus, such as the
"reasons for the delay" prong of the Barker analysis.  For
example, when the state learns that a defense witness has fallen
terminally ill and has limited time to testify, it is reasonable
for the state to expedite the trial or otherwise to perpetuate
the witness's testimony.  In such a case, the state has warning
of an impending prejudicial event, and a failure to expedite
trial or to preserve the evidence appropriately should be
considered when evaluating the reasonableness of the state's
conduct.  Nevertheless, I would hold that events like the death
of Erickson, i.e., events occurring during a period of reasonable
delay, should be excluded from the prejudice element of the
analysis.  Moreover, I agree with the state that the allegations
of prejudice caused by Erickson's death are too speculative to
merit any weight in the prejudice analysis.  
	I also would reject defendant's claim that he was
prejudiced because his ability to impeach the victim's father and
the father's girlfriend with inconsistent statements was
undermined by the passage of time.  Despite the majority's
conclusory insistence otherwise, (slip op at 20 n 8), defendants
must demonstrate more than a "reasonable possibility" of
prejudice to their defenses.
	In Mende, this court stated:
	"[Defendant] has not demonstrated any actual
prejudice to his ability to prepare a
defense.
"We speak of 'actual' prejudice because,
as a practical matter, and despite [language
from Haynes suggesting that prejudice might
not be considered under the Oregon
Constitution], our prior cases all have
required in effect that there be some degree
of actual prejudice to the ability to prepare
a defense to the charge in order to establish
a constitutional violation * * *."
304 Or at 22-23 (emphasis added).  The wording "in effect"
signaled that, although in the past the court had articulated one
standard, in practice it had effectuated another.  The standard
set out in Mende, and controlling here, requires actual trial
prejudice as distinct from a mere possibility of trial prejudice.
  	In this case, defense counsel was able to demonstrate
at trial inconsistencies between statements made by the father
and his girlfriend to police officers on the day of the crime and
their testimony at trial.  The father and his girlfriend each
testified that their earlier statements to the police were made
during a period of extreme emotional upset and either were
incomplete or mistaken.  Each denied that he or she had killed
the child.  Thus, the jury heard the complete testimony of all
three principal suspects in this case, was alerted to the
discrepancies in their testimony, and had every opportunity to
evaluate their individual credibility and demeanor.  Nothing
different would have occurred had the case been tried twelve
months earlier.  As noted, the trial court expressly concluded
that defendant's claim of prejudice "is a reach * * as solid
evidence supporting that [claim] is not apparent to the court." 
I agree.  Defendant has not demonstrated the actual prejudice to
his ability to prepare a defense that is required by Article I,
section 10.  Mende, 304 Or at 22. 
ASSERTION OF THE RIGHT

	In Barker, the Supreme Court made a defendant's
assertion of or failure to assert his right to a speedy trial one
of the factors to be considered in speedy trial analysis.  407 US
at 528.  As noted, after Dykast, this court no longer considers a
defendant's failure to demand a quicker pace in the proceedings. 
On review of the court's opinion in Dykast, however, I agree with
the state that Dykast was decided incorrectly.  
	According to the majority:
	"Abandoning Dykast would require us also to
abandon the well-established principle that
Article I, section 10, contains a mandatory
directive to the state that is 'not within
the disposal of the parties[.]'"
(Slip op at 21 n 9).  Dykast did not analyze the assertion issue
in terms of waiving constitutionally mandated state conduct.  In
fact, Dykast contained no analysis of the assertion issue
whatsoever.  Instead, the court took the rather dramatic step of
eliminating a factor from the Barker analysis in a footnote
containing nothing more than a citation to Vawter, 236 Or at 87,
for the proposition that "this court has consistently held that
it is not incumbent upon the accused to demand a trial[.]" 
Dykast, 300 Or at 375 n 6.  Vawter, in turn, cited to State v.
Dodson, 226 Or 458, 466, 360 P2d 782 (1961).  Vawter, 236 Or at
87.  Dodson, however, was decided on statutory, not
constitutional, grounds.  The Dodson court explicitly declined to
determine whether the rule that a defendant need not take
affirmative action to procure his right should be applied where a
defendant claims only a violation of Article I, section 10.  226
Or at 466.  Thus, Dodson provides no support for the Dykast
holding that assertion of the right is irrelevant to an Article
I, section 10 analysis. 
	Simply considering a defendant's demands for a speedy
trial or lack thereof as one of the factors in the Barker
calculus is not equivalent to requiring a defendant to assert the
right to a speedy trial at peril of waiver.  The Barker court
recognized that reality when it rejected the "demand-waiver rule"
and, instead, adopted "a balancing test, in which the conduct of
both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed."  407 US at
529-30.  That balancing test specifically placed the "primary
burden on the courts and the prosecutors to assure that cases are
brought to trial."  Id. at 529.  
	Finally, given the severity of the remedy for a speedy-trial violation, i.e., dismissal with prejudice, it is
nonsensical to allow a defendant to sit quietly as times passes -- potentially weakening the state's case -- only to assert an
"unreasonable delay" late in the proceedings, thus preserving the
issue for appeal if convicted. (16)
	Because "unreasonable delay" analysis is intended to be
flexible and to take into account all relevant factors, (17) this
court should consider as relevant a criminal defendant's timely
assertion of the right to a speedy trial, or lack thereof.  By
"timely," I mean at a time when the harm still may be avoided,
i.e., before unreasonable delay has occurred.  The majority does
not explain why it is unpersuaded by the arguments in favor of
abandoning Dykast.  I am troubled by the majority's failure to
deal substantively with those arguments.
	The majority also states that abandoning Dykast would
require us to
	"overrule Vawter and hold that a defendant is
responsible for insuring that a case is scheduled for
trial."  
(Slip op at 21 n 9).  Abandoning Dykast would require neither.  
	As noted, the Vawter court's assertion that "it is not
incumbent upon the accused to demand a trial or take affirmative
action to enforce his right to a speedy trial" was followed by a
citation to Dodson, which was authority only for the proposition
that an accused need not take affirmative action to enforce his
statutory right to a speedy trial.  Even if we were to interpret
the above sentence from Vawter as expanding the rule from Dodson
to include the constitutional mandate (something that, as noted,
the Dodson court explicitly declined to consider), the sentence
means only that, in Oregon, the mandate regarding a speedy trial
is not waived by a defendant's failure to demand such a trial.  
	The authorities cited in Dodson state simply that the
duty of ensuring the (statutory) right to a speedy trial falls on
the state, not the defendant.  See State v. Crosby, 217 Or 393,
402, 342 P2d 831 (1959) (bringing a case to trial timely "is in
the hands of the prosecutor and the court, not the defendant");
State v. Chadwick, 150 Or 645, 650, 47 P2d 232 (1935) ("The law
imposes no duty on a defendant * * * [to insist that his or her
case] be set for trial at any particular time.  That duty
devolves upon the state.").  Placing the duty to move forward on
the prosecutor and the courts rather than on the defense does not
preclude consideration of evidence of the defense's desire to
move forward (or lack thereof) as a factor in a test for a
constitutional violation.  See Barker, 407 US at 528 ("[T]he
better rule is that the defendant's assertion of or failure to
assert his right to a speedy trial is one of the factors to be
considered in an inquiry into the deprivation of the right."). 
Although it is not incumbent on a defendant to demand a trial,
doing so can be helpful to that defendant in making out a speedy
trial claim.  Recognizing that a defendant's desire or lack of
desire for a speedy trial is relevant to a speedy trial claim
(even though a defendant does not waive the right to a speedy
trial by failing to demand one), neither requires us to overrule
Vawter nor requires us to hold that a defendant is responsible
for insuring that a case is scheduled for trial.
CONCLUSION

	In summary, the trial court explicitly found that both
the state's appeals were taken in good faith, were not taken to
vex or frustrate defendant's desire for an expeditious trial, and
were not taken to gain a judicial or competitive advantage over
defendant in the trial.  I read the majority opinion essentially
to agree with all those findings. 
	Although the pretrial delay in this case is lengthy, an
analysis of the Barker factors does not lead me to the conclusion
that defendant is entitled to the severe remedy of dismissal with
prejudice.  See Barker, 407 US at 522 (characterizing that remedy
as "unsatisfactorily severe").  In my view, there was strong
justification for the state's appeals.  The combination of the
importance of the suppressed evidence to the state's case, the
seriousness of the crimes charged, and the absence of actual
trial prejudice, strongly suggests to me that the majority
holding in this case is an unwarranted reaction to the majority's
conclusion that the District Attorney and the Attorney General 
fumbled the ball.  The majority holding results not in justice
being administered "completely and without [unreasonable] delay,"
but, rather, in justice being completely denied.  The majority
analysis has the potential to chill the state's ability to pursue
in good faith statutorily authorized and important pretrial
remedies in the prosecution of serious criminal cases. 
	My dissent in this case should not be read as an
endorsement of the manner in which the District Attorney and the
Attorney General handled this case.  The state was negligent. 
However, I cannot agree that that negligence reached
constitutional dimensions.  On this record, I am not persuaded
that defendant has shown that he was deprived of his state
constitutional right to have "justice" administered "completely
and without [unreasonable] delay."  Accordingly, I would proceed
to consider defendant's other arguments under this particular
assignment of error and, if appropriate, his other assignments
and arguments on review.
	I dissent.

1. 	ORS 138.060 provides, in part:
"The state may take an appeal from the circuit
court to the Court of Appeals from:
"* * * * *
"(3)  An order made prior to trial suppressing
evidence[.]"
2. 	ORS 135.240 (1989) provided, in part:
"(1)  Except as provided in subsection (2) of this
section, a defendant shall be released in accordance
with ORS 135.230 to 135.290.
"(2)  When the defendant is charged with murder or
treason, release shall be denied when the proof is
evident or the presumption strong that the person is
guilty.
"(3)  The magistrate may conduct such hearing as
the magistrate considers necessary to determine
whether, under subsection (2) of this section, the
proof is evident or the presumption strong that the
person is guilty." 

3. 	As to that finding, the trial court stated:
"The Court understands that this finding
concerning faulty judgment is perhaps presumptuous and
based upon 'Monday morning quarterbacking,'
nonetheless, it is the Court's finding based upon a
thorough examination of this record including the
testimony of [the attorney in charge of the second
appeal.]"
4. 	The dissent apparently would overrule that part of
Haynes that declares that pretrial imprisonment shortens the
constitutionally permissible length of delay.  See __ Or at __ 
(Van Hoomissen, J., dissenting, slip op at 6-7) (seriousness of
the charges and importance of evidence to state's case excuses
negligent delay in bringing defendants to trial). 

5. 	As noted, in Ivory this court explained that the
speedy-trial provision in Article I, section 10, is equivalent to
the speedy-trial provided in the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and that the Barker test generally is the
appropriate methodology for testing the requirement of Article I,
section 10.  278 Or at 504.  In United States v. Loud Hawk, 474
US 302, 314, 106 S Ct 648, 88 L Ed 2d 640 (1986), the Supreme
Court reaffirmed that "[t]he Barker test furnishes the
flexibility to take account of the competing concerns of orderly
appellate review on the one hand, and a speedy trial on the
other."

6. 	Within a decade of Barker, 407 US 514, the Court
declared that the Sixth Amendment's speedy-trial guarantee is
	"not primarily intended to prevent prejudice to the
defense caused by passage of time; that interest is
protected primarily by the Due Process Clause and by
statutes of limitations.  The speedy trial guarantee is
designed to minimize the possibility of lengthy
incarceration prior to trial, to reduce the lesser, but
nevertheless substantial, impairment of liberty imposed
on an accused while released on bail, and to shorten
the disruption of life caused by arrest and the
presence of unresolved criminal charges."
United States v. MacDonald, 456 US 1, 8, 102 S Ct 1497, 71 L Ed
2d 696 (1982).  The Court repeated that proposition in Loud Hawk,
474 US at 312, stating that "the Speedy Trial Clause's core
concern is impairment of liberty[.]"
Nonetheless, in Doggett v. United States, 505 US 647,
648, 112 S Ct 2686, 120 L Ed 2d 520 (1992), the Supreme Court
reversed a conviction on speedy-trial grounds when eight and one-half years had elapsed between the defendant's indictment and his
arrest.  The Court relied solely on prejudice to the defendant's
ability to defend himself after such a long period of time.  It
held that "affirmative proof of particularized prejudice is not
essential to every speedy trial claim," because "excessive delay
presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that
neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify."  Id. at
655.  
In dissent, Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, argued that the Speedy Trial Clause
of the Sixth Amendment "does not come into play unless the delay
impairs the defendant's liberty."  Doggett, 505 US at 661 
(Thomas, J., dissenting).  Justice Thomas argued that the concern
in Barker regarding preventing prejudice to the defense was
merely dictum and that that dictum had not survived the Court's
subsequent decisions in MacDonald and Loud Hawk.  Id. at 664-65.  

7. 	In Haynes, this court stated that
	"whether there has been compliance with the
constitutional injunction against 'delay' does not
itself depend on prejudice to the defendant.  Nor does
it depend on defendant's demand for trial.  Compliance
as such depends on the length of the delay and the
reasons for it." 
290 Or at 81.  In the state's view, that statement suggested that
this court had abandoned altogether the prejudice prong in
analyzing speedy-trial claims.  In State v. Mende, 304 Or 18, 23,
741 P2d 496 (1987), this court made clear that, "despite the
foregoing language from Haynes," prejudice remains a relevant
factor in most cases involving speedy-trial claims.  

8. 	The state asserts that Mende adopted an "actual
prejudice" test in place of the "reasonable possibility of
prejudice" test in Ivory.  We disagree.  In Mende, the court held
that the defendant, who had not been held in jail pretrial, had
failed to demonstrate "any actual prejudice to his ability to
prepare a defense."  Mende, 304 Or at 22.  The court explained
that it used the term "actual" prejudice in that context because,
"as a practical matter, and despite the foregoing language from
Haynes, our prior cases all have required in effect that there be
some degree of actual prejudice to the ability to prepare a
defense to the charge in order to establish a constitutional
violation of sufficient magnitude to justify dismissal of the
criminal charge."  Id. at 23 (emphasis added).  Mende did not
change the standard in Ivory or disavow this court's acceptance
of the standard set out in Barker regarding the prejudice prong
of the speedy-trial analysis.

9. 	In this case, the state urges us to abandon Dykast and
its progeny, and the dissent would do so.  __ Or at __ (Van
Hoomissen, J., dissenting, slip op at 14).  Abandoning Dykast
would require us also to abandon the well-established principle
that Article I, section 10, contains a mandatory directive to the
state that is "not within the disposal of the parties[.]" 
Haynes, 290 Or at 80.  This court also would have to overrule
Vawter and hold that a defendant is responsible for insuring that
a case is scheduled for trial.  We disagree with the dissent that
this court has erred in following an independent state analysis
of Article I, section 10, rather than adopting the Barker
methodology in its entirety. 

10. 	The dissent adds an argument that the state has not
made regarding Erickson's death:  Because Erickson died in 1992,
during a period of reasonable delay, any prejudice that was
caused by his unavailability at trial should not be factored into
the speedy-trial inquiry in this case.  __ Or at __ (Van
Hoomissen, J., dissenting, slip op at 9-10).  The dissent asserts
that, in Ivory, "this court * * * suggested that the date on
which an allegedly prejudicial event occurred is important."  Id.
at 11.  Ivory does not support that assertion.  The court in
Ivory stated that, with respect to proof of prejudice to the
defense, post-indictment and pre-arrest delay "is inherently more
damaging to [a] defendant's ability to obtain a fair trial,"
because a person who is unaware of the outstanding charge has
"little inducement to preserve memories and evidence."  278 Or at
508-09.  Ivory did not distinguish between reasonable and
unreasonable delay for purposes of speedy-trial analysis.
The dissent contends that "allegedly prejudicial events
should not be factored into the analysis if * * * they occurred
during a period of reasonable delay."  __ Or at __ (Van
Hoomissen, J., dissenting, slip op at 9-10) (emphasis in
original).  Apparently, the dissent would hold that, once long
delay has triggered inquiry into the reasons for the delay, the
length of the delay no longer is relevant in analyzing a speedy-trial claim.  What is more, in the dissent's view, only prejudice
that occurs during a period of unreasonable delay need be
considered.  Case law from the United States Supreme Court and
this court establishes that the length of the delay is the
"triggering mechanism" for inquiry into the other factors in the
speedy-trial analysis and that the length of the delay
"obviously" may be a factor in assessing the prejudice factor. 
Mende, 304 Or at 23-24; Doggett, 505 US at 651-52.  As the Barker
Court explained: "Until there is some delay which is
presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into
the other factors * * *."  407 US at 530.  The Barker court also
noted that, "[i]f witnesses die or disappear during a delay, the
prejudice is obvious."  Id. at 532.  The Court referred to "a
delay," not to "unreasonable delay." 

11. 	As noted, the dissent would overrule parts of Haynes,
thereby raising to at least five -- Haynes, Vawter, Dykast,
Mende, and Emery -- the number of cases that this court would
have to disavow in whole or part for the dissent to prevail.  The
state was aware of Haynes and this court's view of the state's
constitutional responsibilities throughout the events in this
case.
Also, the dissent relies heavily on Loud Hawk, 474 US
302, for its view that no speedy-trial violation occurred here. 
That case provides false comfort to the dissent.  In Loud Hawk,
the delay between the defendants' indictment and trial was
approximately seven-and-one-half years.  Unlike defendant here,
however, the defendants in that case were incarcerated for only a
short period of time and were released without restriction during
almost all the period of pretrial delay.  474 US at 309.  The
defendants in Loud Hawk did not assert their right to a speedy
trial, id. at 314, and, unlike defendant here, they failed to
demonstrate that the delay caused a reasonable possibility of
prejudice to their defense.  Id. at 316.  Thus, the only question
in Loud Hawk was whether the reasons for the delay -- the
government's appeals from a suppression order and subsequent
order of dismissal -- were sufficient to warrant dismissal of the
charges on speedy-trial grounds.  Id.  The Supreme Court
concluded that, standing alone, the reasons for the delay in that
case did not warrant dismissal.  Id. at 317.  Significantly, the
Loud Hawk court reaffirmed that "[t]he speedy trial guarantee is
designed to minimize the possibility of lengthy incarceration
prior to trial[.]"  Id. at 311 (quoting MacDonald, 456 US at 8).  

12. 	In light of that holding, we need not address
defendant's speedy-trial claim under the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution or his other assignments of error. 

13. 	For the reasons explained post I conclude that Dykast
was decided incorrectly.  However, even without considering
defendant's failure to demand a speedy trial, I would hold that
Article I, section 10, was not violated in these circumstances.

14. 	The majority states:
"The state's argument reduces to the assertion
that, even when a defendant has been incarcerated
pretrial, the state's statutory right to take an
interlocutory appeal frees it from the constitutional
mandate of Article I, section 10."
(Slip op at 25).

15. 	It appears that only one federal court has addressed
the issue whether a prejudicial event must occur during a period
of unreasonable delay to be factored into the Barker analysis. 
That court declined to consider prejudice caused by the death of
a witness, explaining that the death occurred only one month
after the defendant's indictment and arrest:
	"Certainly the government cannot be charged with
unreasonable delay at that point in time * * *. 
Considering the length of time between indictment and
trial, the reasons for the continuances, appellant's
failure to object to postponements until the day before
he was tried, and his failure to show any substantial
prejudice he suffered because of the continuances, we
conclude he was not denied his Sixth Amendment right to
speedy trial."
United States v. Anderson, 471 F2d 201, 203 (5th Cir 1973)
(emphasis added).   

16. 	Generally, delay bolsters the defense of a criminal
case.  See Loud Hawk, 474 US at 315 (passage of time may make it
difficult or impossible for state to prove its case beyond a
reasonable doubt); Barker, 407 US at 521 (delay is not an
uncommon defense tactic; delay may work to the defendant's
advantage).  In this case, it is interesting to note that,
although the state's second appeal was dismissed in January 1994,
defendant's counsel did not inquire about the status of the case
until April 1994.

17. 	"The point of the [Barker] formula is that all relevant
criteria be examined and not overlooked or ignored." Haynes v.
Burks, 290 Or 75, 81, 619 P2d 632 (1980).