Title: Lahey v. Johnson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 110552
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 13, 2012

PRESENT: All the Justices 
 
MARK F. LAHEY 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 110552 
ELIZABETH A. McCLANAHAN 
 
 
 
January 13, 2012 
GENE M. JOHNSON, DIRECTOR 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF AUGUSTA COUNTY 
Victor V. Ludwig, Judge 
 
 
Mark F. Lahey challenges on appeal the circuit court's 
order dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus as 
time-barred under the statute of limitations set forth in Code 
§ 8.01-654(A)(2).  Lahey submitted his habeas petition for 
filing on the last day of the limitations period, but did not 
complete payment of the filing fee until days later.  The 
circuit court dismissed the petition as untimely under Code 
§ 8.01-654(A)(2) upon determining that, under the express 
requirements of Code § 8.01-655, the petition could not be 
filed, or deemed filed, without proper payment of the filing 
fee.  We agree with the circuit court and will affirm its 
judgment. 
BACKGROUND 
 
In 2006, Lahey was convicted of two counts of attempted 
first degree murder and was sentenced to 18 years' imprisonment.  
The Court of Appeals and this Court refused Lahey's petitions 
for appeal on June 7, 2007 and December 27, 2007 respectively.  
 
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Therefore, the last day for Lahey to file a petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus was December 29, 2008.∗  Code § 8.01-654(A)(2). 
 
On December 29, 2008, the circuit court clerk's office 
received by mail from Lahey's counsel a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus accompanied by a check in the amount of $32 for 
the filing fee.  The same day, a deputy clerk emailed Lahey's 
counsel to advise him that the proper filing fee was $37, and 
that the fee submitted was $5 short.  Lahey's counsel mailed a 
$5 check to the clerk's office on December 30, 2008.  Due to the 
holidays and the weekend, the clerk's office received the $5 
check on January 5, 2009, at which time the petition was 
"stamped and filed." 
 
Appellee, Gene M. Johnson, Director of the Virginia 
Department of Corrections (the Director), moved to dismiss 
Lahey's habeas petition as untimely filed under the statute of 
limitations contained in Code § 8.01-654(A)(2).  The Director 
asserted that the deadline for filing the petition was December 
29, 2008; and that, while the clerk's office received the 
petition on that date, the clerk's office did not file it 
because Lahey failed to submit the proper filing fee at that 
time.  Payment of the filing fee, the Director argued, was a 
"precondition to filing" under Code § 8.01-655, as the statute 
                     
∗ Because December 27, 2008 was a Saturday, the filing 
deadline was not until Monday, December 29, 2008.  Code § 1-210. 
 
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expressly provided that the petition was "not [to] be filed 
without payment of court costs," Code § 8.01-655(B).  Thus, 
Lahey's habeas petition was time-barred, according to the 
Director, as it was not filed until January 5, 2009, when the 
clerk's office received payment for the remainder of the filing 
fee. 
 
In response, Lahey conceded that December 29, 2008 was the 
last day of the limitations period under Code § 8.01-654(A)(2) 
for filing his habeas petition.  He argued, however, that the 
petition was filed, or alternatively should be deemed filed, 
when it was received in the clerk's office on that date for 
purposes of the statute of limitations - even though the filing 
fee was not paid in full, and the clerk's office did not accept 
the petition for filing, until January 5, 2009.  According to 
Lahey, no Virginia habeas related statute required payment of 
the filing fee as a precondition to filing a habeas petition; 
and he was at least in "substantial compliance" with the terms 
of Code § 8.01-655 when he submitted the initial payment of $32 
with his petition, which was all the statute required. Lahey 
further argued that his petition otherwise should be considered 
"conditionally filed" on December 29, 2008 until he later 
"addressed and paid the $5 deficiency." 
 
Following a hearing on the Director's motion, the circuit 
court ordered dismissal of Lahey's habeas petition upon 
 
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concluding that the petition was time-barred under Code § 8.01-
654(A)(2).  In its letter opinion, the court explained that 
payment of the filing fee was a "mandatory predicate" for filing 
the petition under Code § 8.01-655.  Thus, "Lahey did not timely 
file his petition because he did not timely pay the [f]ee." 
ANALYSIS 
 
On appeal, Lahey assigns error to the judgment of the 
circuit court on the grounds that (i) the court erred in 
dismissing his habeas petition as time-barred "when the petition 
and $32 were timely but the filing fee was short by $5"; and 
(ii) the court erred in ruling that "the full filing fee was 
'mandatory' or 'jurisdictional," instead of "apply[ing] 
substantial compliance, equitable tolling, or the concept of 
conditional filing." 
 
Lahey's assignments of error present issues of law 
regarding the construction and application of Code §§ 8.01-
654(A)(2) and 8.01-655(B).  We review such issues de novo.  
Kummer v. Donak, 282 Va. 301, 304, 715 S.E.2d 7, 9 (2011); 
Antisdel v. Ashby, 279 Va. 42, 47, 688 S.E.2d 163, 166 (2010). 
 
Code § 8.01-654(A)(2) sets forth Virginia's statute of 
limitations governing the filing of habeas petitions, and 
provides, in relevant part: "A habeas corpus petition attacking 
a criminal conviction or sentence . . . shall be filed within 
two years from the date of final judgment in the trial court or 
 
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within one year from either final disposition of the direct 
appeal in state court or the time for filing such appeal has 
expired, whichever is later."  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Code § 8.01-655 then addresses numerous substantive and 
procedural matters related to the filing of a habeas petition, 
including the directive that "[t]he petition will not be filed 
without payment of court costs unless the petitioner is entitled 
to proceed in forma pauperis and has executed the affidavit in 
forma pauperis."  Code § 8.01-655(B) (emphasis added). 
 
The dispositive statutory provisions are thus limited to 
the following: the habeas petition "shall be filed" within the 
applicable limitations period, Code § 8.01-654(A)(2); however, 
the petition "will not be filed without payment of court costs" 
(where the petitioner is not proceeding in forma pauperis).  
Code § 8.01-655(B). 
 
The last day for Lahey to file his habeas petition was 
December 29, 2008.  He submitted his petition to the circuit 
court clerk's office for filing on that date with insufficient 
payment of the filing fee, and he did not complete the payment 
until days later.  Nor did he submit his petition seeking in 
forma pauperis status.  On those facts, we agree with the 
circuit court that Lahey's habeas petition was time-barred under 
Code §§ 8.01-654(A)(2) because (a) the filing of the petition 
was conditioned upon proper payment of the filing fee (i.e., the 
 
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court cost) under Code § 8.01-655(B), and (b) Lahey did not 
complete payment of the filing fee until after the limitations 
period for filing the petition under Code § 8.01-654(A)(2) had 
expired. 
Challenging the circuit court's ruling, Lahey asserts that 
Code § 8.01-655 requires only "substantial compliance" with its 
provisions.  He then argues that his payment of $32 of the $37 
filing fee, along with submission of his habeas petition, on the 
last day of the limitations period should be held to meet this 
standard.  Lahey's reliance on this standard is misplaced.  As 
the circuit court correctly concluded in rejecting this 
argument, the statute utilizes this standard only in reference 
to compliance with the required contents of the habeas petition.  
Code § 8.01-655(A) states in this regard: "Every petition filed 
by a prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus must be filed on 
the form set forth in subsection B.  The failure to use such 
form and to comply substantially with such form shall entitle 
the court to which such petition is directed to return such 
petition to the prisoner pending the use of and substantial 
compliance with such form." 
 
By contrast, the filing provision at issue under Code 
§ 8.01-655(B) is unequivocal in providing, through plain and 
unambiguous language, that the petition "will not be filed 
without payment of court costs" where, as here, the petitioner 
 
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is not seeking in forma pauperis status.  To hold that this 
provision requires something less than complete payment of the 
full filing fee to achieve filing of the habeas petition would 
amount to this Court rewriting the statute under the guise of 
statutory construction.  " 'When the legislature has spoken 
plainly it is not the function of courts to change or amend its 
enactments under the guise of construing them.  The province of 
[statutory] construction lies wholly within the domain of 
ambiguity, and that which is plain needs no interpretation.' "  
Doss v. Jamco, Inc., 254 Va. 362, 370, 492 S.E.2d 441, 445 
(1997) (quoting Winston v. City of Richmond, 196 Va. 403, 407-
08, 83 S.E.2d 728, 731 (1954)). 
 
For the same reasons, we reject Lahey's argument that the 
circuit court should have otherwise deemed his habeas petition 
filed on the last day of the limitations period until he paid 
the balance of the filing fee days later by applying some 
principle of "equitable tolling" or "conditional filing."  The 
express language of the Code § 8.01-655(B) filing provision does 
not contain any terms open for interpretation as such a savings 
provision.  In making this argument, Lahey points to various 
rules of this Court, none of which address the statute's filing 
provision.  See Rules 3:2, 3:3, 3A:25 and 5:5.  To the extent, 
however, that any of those rules could be construed as 
conflicting with the statute, the statute would "prevail[] over 
 
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[them]."  Turner v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 513, 519-20, 273 
S.E.2d 36, 40 (1980) ("The Constitution of Virginia, Art. VI, 
§ 5, prohibits the promulgation of any court rule 'in conflict 
with the general law as the same shall, from time to time, be 
established by the General Assembly.' "); see Pulliam v. Coastal 
Emergency Servs. of Richmond, Inc., 257 Va. 1, 21-23, 509 S.E.2d 
307, 319 (1999) (same); see also Code § 8.01-3(D) ("In the case 
of any variance between a rule and an enactment of the General 
Assembly such variance shall be construed so as to give effect 
to such enactment"). 
 
Finally, we reject Lahey's contention that a habeas 
petition can be found to have been "filed" for purposes of the 
limitations period under Code § 8.01-654(A)(2) simply upon its 
submission to the clerk's office, even if it was not "filed" for 
purposes of Code § 8.01-655(B) due to a petitioner's failure to 
pay the full filing fee.  Reading Code §§ 8.01-654 and 8.01-655 
in pari materia, we are convinced the legislature was addressing 
the same action when it used the term "filed" in each of these 
related statutes.  See Evans v. Evans, 280 Va. 76, 83 n.2, 695 
S.E.2d 173, 176 n.2 (2010) ("Because [the two statutes at issue] 
clearly address the same subject matter, we construe them 
together under the 'in pari materia' canon of construction.").  
Thus, if a habeas petition does not qualify for filing due to a 
 
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lack of full payment under Code § 8.01-655(B), then, as a matter 
of law, it is not "filed" for purposes of Code § 8.01-654(A)(2). 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated, Lahey's habeas petition was time-
barred under Code § 8.01-654(A)(2). Accordingly, we will affirm 
the judgment of the circuit court. 
Affirmed.