Title: Commonwealth v. Smith
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13231
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: August 10, 2023

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SJC-13231 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  BRITTANY SMITH. 
 
 
 
Franklin.     April 10, 2023. - August 10, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Cypher, Kafker, & Wendlandt, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Joint Enterprise.  Evidence, Joint enterprise.  Jury 
and Jurors.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Venue, Jury 
and jurors. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 19, 2016, and March 31, 2017. 
 
The cases were tried before John A. Agostini, J. 
 
 
Richard J. Shea for the defendant. 
Cynthia M. Von Flatern, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  A jury convicted the defendant, Brittany Smith, 
of two counts of murder in the first degree on theories of 
deliberate premeditation, extreme atrocity or cruelty, and 
felony-murder for the deaths of Thomas Harty and Joanna Fisher.  
The defendant's codefendant, Joshua Hart, was tried and 
convicted separately of the same charges.  The defendant, who 
2 
 
was tried after Hart, was convicted on a theory of joint 
venture.  She was also convicted of two counts of home invasion, 
two counts of armed robbery, one count of larceny of a motor 
vehicle, and one count of credit card fraud.  Prior to trial, 
the defendant filed a motion for a change of venue, which the 
trial judge denied.1 
On appeal, the defendant challenges her conviction of 
murder in the first degree of Harty, on the basis of all three 
theories supporting the verdict, and her conviction of murder in 
the first degree of Fisher, solely on the basis of deliberate 
premeditation.2  She raises three principal arguments:  (1) that 
because of extensive pretrial publicity, the judge erred in 
denying her motion for change of venue, and that, as a result of 
that denial, she was not tried by an impartial jury; (2) that 
the evidence was insufficient to prove her guilt as a joint 
venturer of murder in the first degree of Harty; and (3) that 
the evidence was insufficient to prove her guilt as a joint 
 
1 After a hearing on various pretrial motions including the 
defendant's motion for a change of venue, the trial judge 
withheld ruling on the change of venue motion, indicating that 
he wanted to start empanelment in order to understand the extent 
of pretrial publicity and to establish whether any prejudice 
stemmed from that publicity.  The judge did not subsequently 
specifically rule on the motion, but venue was not changed. 
 
2 The defendant raises no arguments with respect to her 
other convictions. 
3 
 
venturer of murder in the first degree on the basis of 
deliberate premeditation of Fisher. 
We discern no reversible error in our review of the 
defendant's appeal.  Additionally, after a full review of the 
record, we conclude that there is no reason to grant relief 
pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
Background.  We summarize the facts as the jury reasonably 
could have found them, reserving certain details for later 
discussion.3  The charges against the defendant and Hart stem 
from a home invasion that occurred in Orange on the evening of 
October 5, 2016.  The defendant and Hart, who were in a romantic 
relationship and who both were then residing in the Orange area, 
were making a plan to leave the area.  The two had been arrested 
several days earlier for the larceny of the defendant's great-
grandmother's car and were also under investigation as suspects 
in other incidents -- of breaking and entering -- that had 
occurred in the area.  Additionally, the defendant, who had a 
drug addiction (and who had met Hart through her drug dealer), 
was due to appear in court on October 7 in connection with the 
larceny charge.  The defendant's mother intended to petition the 
court to have the defendant committed, or "sectioned," for 
 
3 At trial, the jury heard audio recordings of statements 
that Hart and the defendant gave, separately, to the police 
after the police arrested them.  The facts set forth herein are 
drawn largely from those recordings. 
4 
 
substance abuse treatment pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 35.  The 
defendant, however, did not want to be committed because she did 
not want to be separated from her young son or from Hart.  Hart, 
who had a prior criminal record and outstanding warrants in 
other jurisdictions, also did not want to appear in court to 
face the larceny charges. 
 
On the day of October 5, while at Hart's step-grandmother's 
house, the defendant took certain medications -- Soma, a muscle 
relaxant; and Gabapentin, an antianxiety medication -- to try to 
avoid effects of heroin withdrawal because she did not have any 
heroin.  She and Hart decided that they would find a home to 
break into to get money and a car so that they could leave town.  
They left Hart's step-grandmother's house on foot.  The 
defendant then stopped at her grandmother's house on East River 
Street, where she saw her mother, while Hart waited at a nearby 
market; after that, the two continued on foot, walking along 
East River Street.  As the defendant's uncle was driving on East 
River Street that evening, he saw her walking with a man. 
 
After considering various other potential target houses, 
Hart and the defendant eventually decided to break into a house 
on East River Street, where they saw through a window an elderly 
man seated in a chair.  They also saw, in the house's garage, an 
older model car, which Hart thought would be a good car to steal 
because he thought it would be harder to track. 
5 
 
 
Hart initially tried to break into the house via a window, 
with some assistance from the defendant, but ultimately the two 
entered the home through the unlocked garage.  In the garage, 
before entering the house, they noticed that the car had keys in 
it.  Hart indicated that he and the defendant each picked up a 
socket wrench in the garage and had the wrenches in hand when 
they then entered the house.  Hart also stated that, once inside 
the house, he saw a knife on the kitchen counter and picked that 
up because he thought it was a better weapon. 
From the garage, before entering the rest of the house, 
Hart saw the man -- Harty -- sitting in a chair in the living 
room.  Harty was ninety-five years old.  Hart and the defendant 
also knew, at that point, that a second person -- Fisher -- was 
in the home and seated in her wheelchair, also in the living 
room.  Fisher was seventy-seven years old and had suffered a 
spinal stroke three years earlier.  Hart and the defendant made 
a quick plan that, after entering the house, Hart would 
"intimidate" Harty and the defendant would "intimidate" Fisher.  
Hart stated that when Harty saw Hart coming into the house, 
Harty stood up and started to approach him, which surprised 
Hart.  Hart then stabbed Harty with the knife that he had picked 
up in the kitchen.  He also held a pillow to Harty's face to 
suffocate him.  Hart initially told the police that he pushed 
Fisher out of her wheelchair so that she fell to the floor, 
6 
 
stabbed her, hit her in the head with the socket wrench, and 
briefly tried to suffocate her with a pillow.  While this was 
happening, according to what Hart initially told the police, the 
defendant was searching the house for money. 
The defendant, however, told the police that she had 
attacked Fisher before Hart did so -- that she pushed Fisher out 
of her wheelchair, put a pillow over Fisher's face and hit 
Fisher with her fist through the pillow, and then attempted to 
stab Fisher.  Initially, the defendant told the police that she 
"couldn't do it" -– that she attempted to stab Fisher in the 
area of her hip and made contact with Fisher's clothes and skin 
but did not "puncture" Fisher's skin.  The defendant also later 
acknowledged, however, during the police interview, that she may 
have punctured Fisher's lung.  After Hart learned from the 
police that the defendant had admitted what she had done, he 
also admitted to the police that the defendant had been involved 
in the attack on Fisher.  He stated that he had initially told 
the police that only he had attacked Fisher because he wanted to 
protect the defendant.4 
 
4 Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion in limine to 
admit Hart's statements to the police, either as statements 
against penal interest or as third-party culprit evidence.  The 
judge allowed the motion, indicating that all of Hart's 
statements would be submitted to the jury.  The defendant made a 
reasonably calculated decision regarding the admission of Hart's 
statements, and they were admitted at her own request.  In 
general, "the admission of a nontestifying codefendant's 
7 
 
 
When Hart and the defendant left the house, they took with 
them money, credit cards, and cellular telephones belonging to 
the victims.  They also turned out the lights, closed the 
shades, and disabled the house's cordless telephones.  They 
stopped at a nearby convenience store for cigarettes, drove to 
Fitchburg where the defendant purchased heroin and cocaine, and 
then drove south.  They stopped at several department stores in 
various States, purchasing new clothes and food; along the way, 
Hart disposed of the clothes they had been wearing at the time 
of the attack.  He also disposed of the knife.  The police 
subsequently arrested them in Virginia on October 8, 2016 (three 
days after the attack). 
 
Meanwhile, on the morning following the attack, a nurse who 
visited Fisher regularly at home to provide physical therapy 
services arrived as scheduled.  Her coworker arrived shortly 
thereafter, and as they made their way into the house together, 
they noticed things out of place -- among other things, they 
 
statement, naming the defendant as a participant in the crime 
. . . violate[s] the defendant's right to confrontation under 
the Sixth Amendment [to the United States Constitution]."  
Commonwealth v. Resende, 476 Mass. 141, 150 (2017), citing 
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968).  Although the 
issue often arises in cases where codefendants are tried 
together, the admission of Hart's statements might have raised a 
concern pursuant to Bruton, even where the defendant and Hart 
were tried separately.  Because, however, Hart's statements were 
admitted at the defendant's own request, the Bruton rule is not 
implicated. 
8 
 
noticed items strewn across the ramp that Fisher used to access 
the house in her wheelchair, and that the door from the garage 
to the kitchen, which was usually closed, was wide open.  When 
they entered the house, the nurse heard Fisher, who was still 
alive, moaning.  Fisher then called out to the nurse and told 
her that there had been an "invasion" and that "they" tried to 
kill her.  The nurse and her coworker immediately contacted the 
police, who arrived shortly thereafter and found that Harty was 
dead.  Fisher was brought to a hospital with multiple stab 
wounds, multiple rib fractures on the right side, and a small 
pneumothorax or punctured lung.  Although Fisher initially 
survived, she subsequently died on November 10, 2016, as a 
result of the attack.5 
Discussion.  1.  Change of venue.  In light of media 
coverage of the murders, both at the time they occurred and just 
prior to trial, the defendant sought a change of venue pursuant 
to Mass. R. Crim. P. 37 (b), 378 Mass. 914 (1979).6  As noted, 
 
5 The initial charges against both Hart and the defendant 
included one count of murder and one count of attempted murder.  
After Fisher died, Hart and the defendant were each subsequently 
charged with a second count of murder. 
 
6 Because Hart's trial took place shortly before the 
defendant's trial, the pretrial publicity related to the 
defendant included not only media coverage of the murders at the 
time that they occurred in 2016 but also more recent coverage of 
Hart's trial, including that a jury convicted him of the 
murders. 
9 
 
see note 1, supra, the judge declined to rule on the motion at 
the time he heard it and chose instead to wait to see whether an 
impartial jury could be empanelled.  More specifically, the 
judge stated that he wanted to start empanelment "in order to 
understand the extent of saturation of media coverage and to 
establish prejudice, if any, stemming from extensive pretrial 
publicity or settled community opinion." 
Determining whether extensive pretrial publicity violates a 
defendant's right to a trial by an impartial jury pursuant to 
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 
12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights requires a two-
step analysis.  "First, we examine 'whether a change of venue 
was required because the jury were presumptively prejudiced 
against [the defendant].'  [Commonwealth v. Toolan, 460 Mass. 
452, 462 (2011), S.C., 490 Mass. 698 (2022).]  If it is 
determined that the jury were not presumptively prejudiced, 'we 
next examine whether the defendant has shown actual juror 
prejudice.'  Id."  Commonwealth v. Mack, 482 Mass. 311, 315 
(2019).  Here, the defendant does not allege, and the record 
does not reflect, presumptive prejudice, and we therefore 
consider only whether the defendant has shown actual juror 
prejudice.  See id. 
To demonstrate actual juror prejudice, the defendant "must 
show that, in the totality of the circumstances, pretrial 
10 
 
publicity deprived [her] of [her] right to a fair and impartial 
jury."  Commonwealth v. Hoose, 467 Mass. 395, 408 (2014), citing 
Commonwealth v. Morales, 440 Mass. 536, 542 (2003).  "A 
defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury does not require 
that the jury members have no prior knowledge of the crime."  
Morales, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 408 Mass. 
533, 551 (1990).  Where, as here, a case "has been the subject 
of pretrial publicity, the voir dire procedures utilized by the 
judge are particularly important."  Hoose, supra, citing Toolan, 
460 Mass. at 466-467. 
The voir dire procedure in this case was extensive.  
Indeed, the defendant does not argue otherwise; nor does she 
argue that the judge failed to address any potential juror bias.  
Over the course of four days, the judge conducted individual 
voir dire of 139 potential jurors, during which the judge and 
counsel for both parties questioned the potential jurors, each 
of whom had also completed a detailed questionnaire.  Of the 
fourteen seated jurors, three had heard nothing about the case 
prior to the trial.  The remaining eleven jurors all indicated 
that they had heard about the case but nothing more than what 
11 
 
the judge had set forth in the summary that he provided for the 
entire venire.7,8 
 
As each juror was selected, the judge instructed the juror 
not to discuss the case with anyone, including fellow jurors; 
not to read, see, or hear anything about the case; not to go to 
any scenes that the judge may have described in his brief 
summary of the allegations; and not to conduct any independent 
research related to the case.  Furthermore, throughout the 
trial, the judge reminded the jurors of these instructions as 
they were dismissed at the end of each day of trial, and he 
 
7 That summary set forth the outlines of the Commonwealth's 
"allegations" -- that Hart and the defendant entered the 
victims' home intending to rob them and steal their car; that 
Hart brutally attacked Harty, killing him; that the defendant, 
and then Hart, attacked Fisher and that the attack did not 
result in her immediate death; that Hart and the defendant left 
her on the floor and disabled the telephones; that Fisher 
crawled outside to seek help, was unsuccessful, and then lay on 
the floor inside for twelve hours until she was found the next 
day; that she subsequently died as a result of the attack; and 
that Hart and the defendant stole money and credit cards from 
the victims and fled to Virginia. 
 
8 One of the seated jurors indicated that he was aware that 
there had been another trial (i.e., Hart's trial) and that he 
believed that there had been a conviction but that he had not 
followed the story "too closely."  Although other jurors who 
indicated awareness of Hart's trial were excused, the seated 
juror, who was extensively questioned, clearly stated that 
knowing that information would not affect his judgment in the 
defendant's case because the two cases needed to be considered 
separately, i.e., the juror could remain impartial.  Defense 
counsel also chose not to exercise a peremptory challenge for 
this juror, even though she had numerous challenges remaining at 
the time. 
12 
 
inquired of the jurors whether anyone had done any of those 
things when they returned to court each day (to which there were 
never any affirmative responses). 
The steps taken by the judge "to safeguard the defendant's 
right to an impartial jury," see Hoose, 467 Mass. at 409, did 
just that.  The defendant argues, among other things, that a 
high percentage of the venire were aware of the crimes due to 
pretrial publicity, but, again, a juror need not have no prior 
knowledge in order to be impartial.  See Morales, 440 Mass. at 
542.  She also raises certain arguments that would apply to any 
potential jurors, not just those exposed to the crimes through 
pretrial publicity, including a concern that the nature of the 
crimes would likely arouse strong sympathy for the victims and 
anger at Hart and the defendant.  The judge was "well aware of 
the potential for prejudice in the minds of the jurors and 
proceeded with extreme caution to assure that the jurors 
selected were unswayed by any media publicity and were 
impartial."  Id. at 542-543, citing Colon-Cruz, 408 Mass. at 
551.  The defendant has failed to show any actual juror 
prejudice or that she was tried by anything but a fair and 
impartial jury. 
 
2.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  "In reviewing the 
sufficiency of the evidence, . . . [w]e consider whether, after 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
13 
 
Commonwealth, any rational trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt."  
Commonwealth v. Ayala, 481 Mass. 46, 51 (2018), citing 
Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677-678 (1979).  "The 
evidence may be direct or circumstantial, and we draw all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the Commonwealth."  Ayala, 
supra, citing Commonwealth v. Rakes, 478 Mass. 22, 32 (2017). 
a.  Harty.  The defendant argues that the evidence was 
insufficient to convict her of the murder of Harty on any of the 
three bases upon which the jury reached their verdict.  To prove 
a defendant guilty as a joint venturer under both the theory of 
deliberate premeditation and the theory of extreme atrocity or 
cruelty, the Commonwealth has to "prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant knowingly participated in the 
commission of the crime charged, and that the defendant had or 
shared the required criminal intent" (quotation and citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Watson, 487 Mass. 156, 162 (2021). 
i.  Knowing participation.  There was sufficient evidence 
that the defendant knowingly participated in the murder of 
Harty.  She and Hart set out to rob someone and steal a car and 
armed themselves as they proceeded to carry out their plan.  
They eventually settled on the victims' house, and entered the 
house knowing that two people were inside.  They also did so 
after seeing that the car that they intended to steal already 
14 
 
had the keys in it and could therefore be stolen without 
confronting those in the house. 
When they entered the house, they were each armed with a 
socket wrench, and, at least according to the defendant, Hart 
also had a knife that he had taken with him from his step-
grandmother's house.  Once inside the home, while Hart was 
stabbing Harty, the defendant was herself engaged in physically 
attacking Fisher.  The attacks, resulting in the deaths of both 
victims, were coordinated.  Before they left the victims' house, 
Hart and the defendant took credit cards and cellular 
telephones.  They also disabled the victims' cordless 
telephones, making it impossible for Fisher, who was then still 
alive, to call for help.  Additionally, they closed the blinds 
or shades in the house so that no one could see in from the 
outside.  And then they fled. 
ii.  Criminal intent.  There was also sufficient evidence 
from which the jury could conclude that the defendant "shared 
the mental state of malice aforethought for murder in the first 
degree under the theories of deliberate premeditation and 
extreme atrocity or cruelty."  Watson, 487 Mass. at 163.  In 
order to convict the defendant on the basis of deliberate 
premeditation, the Commonwealth was required to prove that she 
knew that Hart intended to kill Harty and that she shared that 
intent.  See id.  The defendant's presence does not alone 
15 
 
establish her participation, but there was sufficient evidence 
that the defendant "consciously . . . act[ed] together [with 
Hart] before or during the crime with the intent of making the 
crime succeed."  Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 475 Mass. 396, 414 
(2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449, 470 
(2009) (Appendix).  The evidence was sufficient to demonstrate a 
coordinated, concerted, armed, and deadly attack against both 
victims.  Importantly, "a plan to murder may be formed in 
seconds" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Tavares, 471 Mass. 
430, 435 (2015). 
The jury could have found that Hart intended to kill Harty.  
Hart entered the home armed with a socket wrench, and a knife 
from his step-grandmother's house.9  The defendant also knew that 
Hart had both a knife and a socket wrench on his person when he 
entered the house.  When Harty stood up from his chair and 
started toward Hart, Hart stabbed him multiple times.  The jury 
could also have found that the defendant's "actions demonstrated 
'knowledge of the circumstances and participation in the crime,' 
leading to the conclusion that the defendant shared [Hart's] 
intent with respect to killing [Harty]."  Tavares, 471 Mass. at 
 
9 In his interview with the police, Hart stated that he 
picked up the knife that he used to stab the victims from the 
kitchen counter in the victims' house.  He also stated that he 
could not remember whether he had one knife or two.  The jury 
could have found that Hart came armed with a knife, as the 
defendant stated in her interview with the police. 
16 
 
435.  As explained supra, the defendant knew that Hart was armed 
with a knife and a socket wrench.  She likewise entered the 
house armed, after they specifically chose the victims' house 
and knowing that there were two people inside.  Hart and the 
defendant also coordinated their attack, with Hart attacking the 
elderly male victim while the defendant attacked the elderly 
female victim. 
As to proving that the defendant committed murder in the 
first degree on the basis of extreme atrocity or cruelty, the 
Commonwealth also proved that she had the required malice:  "an 
intent to cause death, to cause grievous bodily harm, or to do 
an act which, in the circumstances known to the defendant, a 
reasonable person would have known created a plain and strong 
likelihood that death would follow."  Watson, 487 Mass. at 164, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Sokphann Chhim, 447 Mass. 370, 377 
(2006).  The evidence that, among other things, Hart and the 
defendant entered the house armed and that Hart used a knife to 
attack Harty, while the defendant pushed, punched, and stabbed 
the wheelchair-bound Fisher, was sufficient to demonstrate the 
necessary intent.  There was also sufficient evidence to prove 
the murder was committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty.  
Harty was ninety-five years old and stabbed multiple times by 
Hart while the defendant attacked his wheelchair-bound seventy-
seven year old wife in Harty's presence.  Hart and the defendant 
17 
 
also ensured that no one could discover or assist the victims by 
disabling the telephones, turning out the lights, and closing 
the shades.  As they left the murder scene, the defendant called 
her drug dealer, further displaying her indifference to the 
victims' suffering. 
iii.  Felony-murder.  There was also ample evidence to 
support the defendant's conviction of Harty's murder on the 
basis of felony-murder.  For purposes of felony-murder, a jury 
may "find a defendant guilty of murder in the first degree where 
the murder was committed in the course of a felony punishable by 
life imprisonment even if it was not committed with deliberate 
premeditation or with extreme atrocity or cruelty."  
Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass. 805, 807-808 (2017), cert. 
denied, 139 S. Ct. 54 (2018).  A conviction of felony-murder 
requires a finding of actual malice, and therefore, 
"a defendant who commits an armed robbery as a joint 
venturer will be found guilty of murder where a killing was 
committed in the course of that robbery if he or she 
knowingly participated in the killing with the intent 
required to commit it -- that is, with the intent either to 
kill, to cause grievous bodily harm, or to do an act which, 
in the circumstances known to the defendant, a reasonable 
person would have known created a plain and strong 
likelihood that death would result." 
 
Id. at 832 (Gants, C.J., concurring). 
Harty was killed in the course of Hart and the defendant's 
armed robbery of his and Fisher's home.  The jury could 
reasonably have concluded, based on the evidence set forth 
18 
 
supra, that the required malice was present as a part of, and 
during the course of, that armed robbery -- that Hart and the 
defendant entered the victims' home armed and with an intent to 
cause grievous bodily harm or to do an act that the defendant 
would have known created a "plain and strong likelihood" of 
death.10 
b.  Fisher.  In appealing from her conviction of the murder 
of Fisher, the defendant concedes that there was sufficient 
evidence of malice and argues only that there was not sufficient 
evidence of deliberate premeditation.  In other words, she does 
not contest the conviction on the theory of extreme atrocity or 
cruelty or on the theory of felony-murder; she contests only the 
conviction in so far as it was based on a theory of premeditated 
murder.  The evidence that supported the conviction of the 
murder of Harty on the theory of deliberate premeditation 
similarly supports the conviction of the murder of Fisher on 
that theory.  The attacks against the victims, as described 
supra, were concerted, coordinated, and armed.  The defendant 
tossed Fisher, a frail, wheelchair-bound, seventy-seven year old 
 
10 To the extent that the defendant suggests that she did 
not know what she was doing -- that she could not have knowingly 
participated or formed the requisite intent for murder -- 
because she was "not all there" or "high," there was sufficient 
evidence from which the jury could have inferred that the drugs 
that the defendant had taken that day because she did not have 
any heroin, Soma and Gabapentin, would not have had this effect 
on her. 
19 
 
woman, out of her wheelchair, punched her and stabbed her, and 
left her to die.  Even if this were not sufficient evidence of 
deliberate premeditation, and we conclude that it was, the 
defendant would still be guilty of murder on the theories of 
both extreme atrocity or cruelty and felony-murder, which, 
again, she does not contest.  See Commonwealth v. Samia, 492 
Mass. 135, 140-141 (2023), citing Commonwealth v. Wadlington, 
467 Mass. 192, 208 (2014) (conviction of murder in first degree 
based on deliberate premeditation still stands even where 
conviction based on felony-murder is vacated). 
3.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Finally, we have 
reviewed the entire record in accordance with G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E, and discern no basis to set aside or reduce the verdicts 
of murder in the first degree. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.