Title: Application of City of White Bear Lake
Citation: 247 N.W.2d 901
Docket Number: 46058
State: Minnesota
Issuer: Minnesota Supreme Court
Date: November 19, 1976

247 N.W.2d 901 (1976) In re Application of the CITY OF WHITE BEAR LAKE, Minnesota, for a Permit to Encroach upon a Bay of Birch Lake, as a Part of the "Ninth Street Extension" Project, (P.A. 74-5084). STATE of Minnesota, DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, by Robert L. Herbst, Its Commissioner, Appellant, v. CITY OF WHITE BEAR LAKE, Respondent. No. 46058. Supreme Court of Minnesota. November 19, 1976. *902 Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., C. Paul Faraci, Deputy Atty. Gen., William G. Peterson and A. W. Clapp III, Special Asst. Attys. Gen., St. Paul, for appellant. Newcome Wallace &amp; Newcome and Thomas W. Newcome, St. Paul, for respondent. Heard before TODD, YETKA and SCOTT, JJ., and considered and decided by the court en banc. SCOTT, Justice. This is an appeal from an order and judgment of the Ramsey County District Court which reversed an order of the commissioner of natural resources. The commissioner had denied a permit application of the city of White Bear Lake to encroach upon a bay of Birch Lake to construct a roadway. In 1969 the city of White Bear (hereinafter city) began action on a proposed route for County Highway No. 9 to conduct traffic around the city's central business district and link State Highways Nos. 61 and 96 near Birch Lake. Between 1969 and 1974 the city spent $50,000 on planning, designing, and land costs for the proposed route. The Minnesota Legislature amended the so-called Minnesota Water Management Law[1] by passage of L.1973, c. 315. Prior to that amendment, Minn.St.1971, § 105.42, gave the state authority to control any activity which changed the course, current, or cross section of public waters. The 1973 amendment defined public waters as any waters of the state which serve a beneficial public purpose. L.1973, c. 315, § 4 (Minn.St. 105.38[1]). L.1973, c. 315, also amended Minn.St.1971, § 105.45, to expressly state that in all permit applications the applicant has the burden of proving that the proposed project is reasonable, practical, and will adequately protect the public safety and promote the public welfare. L.1973, c. 315, § 13. On February 27, 1974, the city filed its application under Minn.St. 105.42 for a permit to encroach upon Birch Lake. A public hearing was held on August 7 and 8, 1974. Prior to the hearing, the commissioner of natural resources (hereinafter commissioner) advised the city that if the proposal was found to cause environmental damage, then the hearing would also consider whether there were "feasible and prudent alternatives" to the proposal as required by Minn.St. 116D.04, subd. 6, of the so-called Minnesota Environmental Policy Act, Minn.St. c. 116D. Seven alternatives were considered at the hearing. *903 On November 22, 1974, the commissioner issued an order denying the city's application. The city appealed the order to Ramsey County District Court pursuant to Minn.St. 105.47, and the court reversed the commissioner's order on the grounds that it was arbitrary and capricious. The court held: The issues presented on appeal are: (1) Did L.1973, c. 315, create a higher standard for the granting of permits under the Water Management Law? (2) Was there sufficient evidence before the commissioner of natural resources to support the denial of a permit to encroach upon Birch Lake? L.1973, c. 315, amended Minn.St.1971, § 105.37, by adding the following definition (L.1973, c. 315, § 3): Minn.St.1971, § 105.38, containing the declaration of policy, was amended as follows (L.1973, c. 315, § 4): The district court found that the above amendment made substantial changes in the requirements of municipalities, such as the city of White Bear Lake, to obtain permits for any projects which might affect *904 public waters. The changes in the language of the law, however, do not justify such a conclusion. While the 1973 amendment expanded the definition of public waters, Birch Lake would constitute public waters under either the old or new definition because of the number and intensity of various uses of the lake. See, Nelson v. DeLong, 213 Minn. 425, 431, 7 N.W.2d 342, 346 (1942). The only specific language in the Water Management Law used by the district court for its ruling is a portion of a sentence added to a paragraph in Minn.St. 1971, § 105.45, relating to the commissioner's authority to issue permits and orders. The sentence in question is: Whether or not the above amendment applies in this case, the city's burden is the same because the amendment is only a restatement of a well-established rule of administrative law. "In administrative proceedings, the general rule is that an applicant for relief, benefits, or a privilege has the burden of proof." 73 C.J.S., Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure, § 124. In this state the burden of proof generally rests on the one who seeks to show he is entitled to the benefits of a statutory provision. 7A Dunnell, Dig. (3 ed.) §§ 3468 and 3469. There is not sufficient evidence to conclude that L.1973, c. 315, created a higher standard for granting water permits. If the city had been ready to begin construction in 1973, it would still have been required to apply to the commissioner for a permit and to prove that the proposed construction would promote the public welfare. Because L.1973, c. 315, did not create a higher standard, it is not necessary for this court to consider the question of whether the city has a vested right to use the former statutory procedure.[2] The central issue in this case and the crux of the district court's ruling is whether the evidence which was presented to the commissioner justifies a denial of the permit to encroach upon Birch Lake. The district court's review of the commissioner's decision is restricted to the question of whether the decision is "lawful and reasonable" or "unjust, unreasonable, or not supported by the evidence." Minn.St. 105.47. This court noted in Minneapolis Van &amp; Whse. Co. v. St. Paul Terminal Whse. Co., 288 Minn. 294, 299, 180 N.W.2d 175, 178 (1970), that the substantial-evidence rule governs the scope of all judicial review of evidence supporting factual findings of administrative agencies: See also, In re Lake Elysian High-Water Level, 208 Minn. 158, 293 N.W. 140 (1940). The district court further concluded on the basis of this court's ruling in In re Certain School Districts, Freeborn County, 246 Minn. 96, 74 N.W.2d 410 (1956), that it had authority to determine whether the commissioner's ruling was an abuse of discretion. The test for the commissioner to use in deciding whether to grant a permit under Minn.St. 105.45 is whether he "concludes that the plans of the applicant are reasonable, practical, and will adequately protect public safety and promote the public welfare * * *." Among the commissioner's conclusions in this case were the following: Among the commissioner's factual findings supporting his conclusions were the following: In reversing the commissioner, the district court in its memorandum stated that the evidence did not support the commissioner's findings and "[did] not even show a prima facie case which would warrant the issuance of [the commissioner's] order denying the permit * * *."[3] We cannot agree. There is substantial evidence in the record to support the commissioner's findings. The fact that the city has expended a substantial amount of money in preparation for an environmentally damaging project does not require that project's construction. The commissioner's decision also is supported by Minn.St. c. 116D, the Minnesota Environmental Policy Act. Minn.St. 116D.04, subd. 6, provides in part: This statute was given a broad scope in County of Freeborn v. Bryson, 297 Minn. 218, 210 N.W.2d 290 (1973), in which this court reversed a district court's denial of an injunction preventing a county from constructing a roadway which would eliminate a portion of a marsh. After trial on remand, that case was again appealed to this court. In County of Freeborn v. Bryson, Minn., 243 N.W.2d 316, 321 (1976), we said: Other alternate routes were approved by the commissioner and remain available to the city. While the trial court concluded that the other alternatives were not feasible, the record again reasonably supports the commissioner's conclusion. The city's argument that no other alternative will be equally as effective as a traffic bypass does not mean that the commissioner's finding that other routes are feasible and prudent was arbitrary and capricious. We would anticipate that the city will reapply to the commissioner for a hearing on other permits necessary for the construction of one of the alternative roadways and will also seek the involvement of the State Highway Department. Reversed. [1] Minn.St.1971, c. 105. [2] Without pursuing the question of vested rights in depth, we note that Monk &amp; Excelsior, Inc. v. Minn. State Bd. of Health, 302 Minn. 502, 225 N.W.2d 821 (1975), cited by the district court, does not support the conclusion that the defendant city had a vested right in the prior procedure and need not be subject to L.1973, c. 315. In Monk, the corporation which sought to construct a nursing home without obtaining a certificate of need under a recently enacted statute actually had begun construction after repeated attempts to obtain prior approval of the Minnesota Department of Health. [3] The district court concluded that the Ninth Street Extension Project "will protect the public safety and promote the public welfare and will not have a material adverse effect on the wetlands, wildlife habitat or the water quality of Birch Lake or of any other natural resources." The court also concluded that, "There is no other feasible, economical or prudent alternate route for location of the proposed roadway." [4] Minn.St. 116D.04, subd. 5, defines "[p]ermits for natural resources management" as including permits required under Minn.St. 105.42, which is the type of permit the city seeks here.