Title: People v. Ortega
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 93834
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: April 1, 2004

Docket No. 93834-Agenda 3-September 2003.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 							
ALVARO ORTEGA et al., Appellees.
Opinion filed April 1, 2004.
	JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	In 1996 defendants were charged by indictment with delivery of
999.38 grams of cocaine in violation of section 401 of the Illinois
Controlled Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/401 (West 2000)). In 1999,
prior to trial, the State successfully moved to disqualify defendants'
counsel, attorney Robert Novelle, on conflict of interest grounds.
Defendants petitioned for leave to appeal the disqualification order
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(7) (166 Ill. 2d R. 306(a)(7)). The
appellate court dismissed the petition, and defendants petitioned for leave
to appeal to this court. We denied the petition but entered a supervisory
order instructing the appellate court to hear the appeal. The appellate
court reversed the disqualification order. 329 Ill. App. 3d 114. The State
then filed a petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule
315 (177 Ill. 2d R. 315), which we allowed. We are now asked to
articulate the standard of review and the proper criteria with regard to a
trial court's decision to disqualify a criminal defendant's counsel of choice
prior to trial.

I. BACKGROUND
	Defendants Eugenio Natal and Alvaro Ortega were charged in
connection with the sale of nearly one kilogram of cocaine to Special
Agent Dean Endre of the Metropolitan Enforcement Group. The sale was
arranged by Juan Montez, a confidential informant working for Agent
Endre. Natal, Ortega, Montez and Agent Endre were present during the
sale, which occurred on August 1, 1996. On August 15, 1996, attorney
Robert Novelle filed a motion on behalf of Natal, and on October 11,
1996, he appeared on behalf of Ortega. Robert Novelle continues to
represent both defendants.
	Robert Novelle's brother and law partner, Donald Novelle,
represented Montez from the end of May 1996, until at least February 27,
1997, in connection with certain criminal charges. Donald's representation
of Montez directly involved the drug sale for which defendants are
charged. Montez claimed that Agent Endre promised that the criminal
charges pending against him would be dismissed in exchange for arranging
the sale. When the charges were not dismissed, Donald tried to enforce
the alleged promise on behalf of his client. He advised Montez to refuse
to answer questions about the sale before a grand jury on September 6,
1996. He then filed a motion to dismiss the charges. Donald litigated the
motion to dismiss in a hearing before Judge DeBoni on January 24, 1997.
He called Montez as a witness, and Montez testified about the events
leading up to the sale and about the sale itself. Judge DeBoni found that
Agent Endre did not make the alleged promises and denied the motion to
dismiss. By February 27, 1997, Montez had pled guilty and had been
sentenced to probation on some of the charges, while the others had been
dismissed.
	In February of 1999, shortly before defendants Natal and Ortega
were to go to trial, the State moved to disqualify Robert Novelle based on
a conflict of interest arising out of Donald Novelle's representation of
Montez. The trial court held hearings on the motion to disqualify Robert,
during which Donald testified that he knew prior to August 1, 1996, that
Montez was an informant who was in the process of arranging a sale of
cocaine for Agent Endre. Later in August, Donald learned from Assistant
State's Attorney Lorraine Scaduto that the sale Montez arranged led to
the arrest of defendants, and that defendants were represented by his
brother, Robert. Donald subsequently discussed with Robert what Montez
had told him with respect to the sale. He felt free to do so because he
thought Montez had given him "a waiver of any conflict of interest."
Donald also testified that Montez owed legal fees to the Novelle firm, but
that the firm had no plans to try to collect.
	The trial court found that Robert Novelle's firm represented a State's
witness, Montez, in matters involving the very facts that formed the basis
for the charges against defendants. The court found that, although the firm
no longer represented Montez, the prior representation raised doubts
about Robert's ability to cross-examine Montez. The court also found that
there would be an appearance of impropriety should the jury learn that
defense counsel's firm had represented a State's witness in connection
with the same drug sale that is at issue in the defendants' case. The trial
court then granted the State's motion to disqualify Robert.
	The defendants took an interlocutory appeal of the disqualification
order, which the appellate court heard pursuant to our supervisory order.
The appellate court reversed, holding that the defendants had given a clear
waiver of their right to conflict-free counsel and that the trial court abused
its discretion when it nevertheless disqualified their counsel of choice. 329
Ill. App. 3d at 123. The State appealed. We now reverse the appellate
court and affirm the order of the trial court disqualifying Robert Novelle.

II. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
	The sixth amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees a
criminal defendant the right to the assistance of the counsel of his choice,
but that right is subject to certain limits. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159, 100 L. Ed. 2d 140, 148-49, 108 S. Ct. 1692, 1697
(1988). Among those limits is a trial court's "substantial latitude" to refuse
to allow a defendant to waive his chosen counsel's actual or potential
conflict of interest. Wheat, 486 U.S.  at 163, 100 L. Ed. 2d  at 151, 108 S. Ct.  at 1699. Trial courts need latitude because they must decide
whether to accept a proffered waiver before trial, when the "likelihood
and dimensions of nascent conflicts of interest are notoriously hard to
predict, even for those thoroughly familiar with criminal trials." Wheat, 486 U.S.  at 162-63, 100 L. Ed. 2d  at 151, 108 S. Ct.  at 1699.
	In People v. Holmes, 141 Ill. 2d 204, 228 (1990), we expressly
followed Wheat to evaluate a defendant's claim that a trial court had
denied his right to counsel of choice. Holmes held that a reviewing court
must not set aside a trial court's decision to disqualify a defendant's
chosen counsel unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion. Holmes,
141 Ill. 2d  at 224. Thus the trial court's decision to disqualify Robert
Novelle must be affirmed unless it was a clear abuse of discretion.
Generally, a court abuses its discretion when its decision is fanciful,
arbitrary, or unreasonable to the degree that no reasonable person would
agree with it. People v. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d 353, 364 (1991).
	Defendants argue that, because it is particularly important to achieve
consistency when a constitutional right is at stake, we should apply a
deferential standard of review only to the trial court's factual findings and
should review the trial court's "assessment" of the facts de novo.
Defendants rely on People v. Crane, 195 Ill. 2d 42, 51-52 (2001), which
involved a claimed denial of the constitutional speedy-trial right. In Crane,
after noting that speedy-trial claims are decided under a balancing test, we
reasoned that:
		"when a trial court performs the *** balancing test and weighs
the interests of the State against the interests of the defendant in
light of the circumstances of the case, there is no need to afford
deference to a trial court's determination. The trial court is in no
better position than the reviewing court to balance the competing
concerns. For this reason, we conclude that the ultimate
determination of whether a defendant's constitutional speedy-trial
right has been violated is subject to de novo review." Crane,
195 Ill. 2d  at 51-52.
Defendants contend that the trial court in this case did not base its decision
on findings of disputed fact, but only on the undisputed fact that Donald
Novelle represented Montez. They argue that we should follow the
reasoning in Crane and review the trial court's decision de novo because,
as in Crane, the trial court in this case weighed the facts with a
constitutional right of the defendants lying in the balance.
	We reject defendants' argument. Wheat and Holmes are squarely
on point and clearly require deference to the weight the trial court gave to
the facts. We have said that "[a] reviewing court must look to the criteria
on which the trial court should rely to determine if the trial court abused its
discretion." Boatmen's National Bank of Belleville v. Martin, 155 Ill. 2d 305, 314 (1993). Thus a trial court abuses its discretion if it fails to
apply the proper criteria when it weighs the facts, and our inquiry must
consider both the legal adequacy of way the trial court reached its result
as well as whether the result is within the bounds of reason. Moreover,
while formal findings of fact and statements of reasons are not required,
the trial court must make a record adequate to allow meaningful review of
its exercise of discretion. People v. M.D., 101 Ill. 2d 73, 84 (1984),
quoting People v. Taylor, 76 Ill. 2d 289, 301 (1979). Such review
reconciles the need to protect defendants' constitutional right to counsel
of choice with the principle that trial courts must have discretion in this
area.

III. THE APPLICABLE CRITERIA
A
	Wheat and Holmes provide substantial guidance regarding how a
trial court may exercise its discretion when ruling on a motion to disqualify
defense counsel. Wheat held that a trial court may decline a proffered
waiver, not only when it has reason to find an actual conflict of interest, but
also when there is a showing of "serious potential for conflict." Wheat,
486 U.S.  at 164, 100 L. Ed. 2d  at 152, 108 S. Ct.  at 1699. In Holmes,
we followed Wheat to hold that the trial court acted within its discretion
in disqualifying defense counsel when defendant's right to counsel of
choice "was overcome by a showing of a serious potential for conflict."
Holmes, 141 Ill. 2d  at 228. Therefore a trial court may exercise its
discretion to deny a defendant's right to counsel of choice only if it could
reasonably find that defense counsel has a specific professional obligation
that actually does conflict or has a serious potential to conflict with
defendant's interests. See, e.g., State v. Ehlers, 262 Neb. 247, 260, 631 N.W.2d 471, 483-84 (2001) (following Wheat to hold that the trial court
erred in disqualifying defense counsel where the record did not show a
serious potential for conflict). If the court has grounds to find at least a
serious potential for conflict, it must then go on to consider the interests
threatened by the conflict or potential conflict.
	The trial court " 'must recognize a presumption in favor of
[defendant's] counsel of choice.' " Holmes, 141 Ill. 2d  at 223, quoting
Wheat, 486 U.S at 164, 100 L. Ed. 2d  at 152, 108 S. Ct.  at 1700. The
question is whether the interests threatened by the conflict or potential
conflict are weighty enough to overcome the presumption. Holmes, 141 Ill. 2d  at 228. Holmes identified four interests or factors that the court
correctly considered in determining that the presumption was overcome
in that case: (1) the defendant's interest in having the undivided loyalty of
counsel; (2) the State's right to a fair trial in which defense counsel acts
ethically and does not use confidential information to attack a State's
witness; (3) the appearance of impropriety should the jury learn of the
conflict; (4) the probability that continued representation by counsel of
choice will provide grounds for overturning a conviction. Holmes, 141 Ill. 2d  at 226-27. A trial court may weigh any of these factors, as the case
requires.
	We note Holmes did not hold that the four factors just listed are the
only ones that a court may consider. A court should seek to fairly consider
all the interests that are affected by a conflict in a given case. As the
Seventh Circuit said, in an opinion that we cited with approval in Holmes:
"[T]he decision to disqualify an attorney in a criminal case requires an
evaluation of the interests of the defendant, the government, the witness
and the public in view of the circumstances of each particular case."
United States v. O'Malley, 786 F.2d 786, 790 (7th Cir. 1986).
	An important factor that Holmes did not discuss is whether the
State's claim that a conflict warrants disqualification is the result of
overreaching. The Wheat Court put the point rather more harshly when
it agreed with the defendant in that case that, "the Government may seek
to 'manufacture' a conflict in order to prevent a defendant from having a
particularly able defense counsel at his side." Wheat, 486 U.S.  at 163,
100 L. Ed. 2d  at 151, 108 S. Ct.  at 1699. Without limiting the inquiry that
a court may make into the prosecution's conduct, we note that the
prosecution's need to call a witness who creates a conflict is often an
important consideration. E.g., United States v. Messino, 852 F. Supp. 652, 656 (N.D. Ill. 1994); State v. Miller, 160 Wis. 2d. 646, 659, 467 N.W.2d 118, 122 (1991). In Messino, defense counsel had represented
two witnesses when they testified before a grand jury regarding the drug
distribution conspiracy of which the defendant was allegedly a member.
The two were also expected to testify for the government at trial. The
court held that disqualification was merited, even though neither witness
would testify directly about the defendant's conduct, because the
government had a legitimate need to call the witnesses to establish various
facets of the conspiracy. It is even clearer that the witness in this case is
important to the prosecution's case because Montez was a witness to the
conduct for which the defendants are charged. Montez, the defendants,
and Agent Endre were the four persons present at the drug sale. We
conclude that in this case the clearly legitimate need to call Montez gave
the trial court little or no reason to expressly explore the possibility that the
prosecution was overreaching when it moved to disqualify Robert
Novelle.
	Defendants suggest that it was only at the "last minute" that the State
characterized Montez as a "State Witness." They argue that the State acted
slowly in responding to requests for information about Montez during
discovery. Finally, they point out that Agent Endre was present during the
drug sale, and argue the State would not need to call Montez to make its
case. They urge us to conclude that the State's effort to remove Robert
Novelle is in bad faith. However, the timing of the State's actions and the
fact that the State could conceivably proceed without calling Montez as a
witness are insufficient bases for a reviewing court to draw such a
conclusion. Moreover, it would hardly be appropriate, even for the trial
court, to find before trial that the prosecution has no legitimate need to call
an occurrence witness such as Montez. Finally, the trial court is in a better
position than a reviewing court to judge the motives and intentions of the
prosecutors. There is no indication that the trial court in this case suspected
overreaching or bad faith on the part of the prosecution.

B
	The parties before this court, and the courts below, largely framed the
issue in this case in terms of two questions: (1) Did Donald Novelle's
representation of Montez create a per se conflict? (2) Did the defendants
provide a valid waiver of the right to conflict-free counsel?
	In Holmes we explained that the concept of a per se conflict applies
only to cases where a defendant claims ineffective assistance of counsel due
to his attorney's conflict. Holmes, 141 Ill. 2d  at 220-21. This is not such
a case. Rather, Wheat and Holmes are the controlling precedent.
	The appellate court found that defendants provided a valid waiver and
reversed the trial court on that basis alone. 329 Ill. App. 3d at 123.
However, a valid waiver by itself does not negate the trial court's authority
to deny counsel of choice. People v. Barrow, 133 Ill. 2d 226, 252 (1989).
Among the factors that Holmes identified as permissible considerations in
the decision to disqualify defense counsel, neither factor (2), the State's
right to a fair trial, nor factor (3), the appearance of impropriety, are
affected by a valid waiver. Assuming, arguendo, that defendants Natal and
Ortega did clearly waive the potential conflict, the trial court nevertheless
acted within its discretion provided it considered the second and third
factors from Holmes, or other permissible factors not affected by a waiver,
and reasonably concluded that those factors outweigh the presumption in
favor of defendants' counsel of choice.

IV. ANALYSIS OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION
	Our first question is whether the trial court could have reasonably
found at least a serious potential for conflict arising from Donald Novelle's
representation of Montez. Holmes, 141 Ill. 2d  at 228. The court heard
testimony from Donald Novelle about his representation of Montez. After
hearing this evidence, the trial court found that there was a per se conflict
of interest. As we have explained, there was no need to determine whether
there was a per se conflict. However, we conclude that record evidence
that the trial court relied upon in finding a per se conflict would also
reasonably support a finding that there is at least a serious potential for
conflict. Specifically, the court could find a potential conflict between
Robert Novelle's professional obligation to protect confidential information
given to him by Montez through Donald Novelle and the interests of the
defendants in thorough cross-examination of the witnesses against them.
The record shows that Donald Novelle represented Montez in connection
with the very facts that are at issue in this case and that Donald discussed
his representation of Montez with Robert. Because Montez was to testify
for the prosecution, the evidence that Robert Novelle received confidential
information from Montez through Donald Novelle is sufficient to support a
finding that there is a serious potential for conflict in this case.
	The defendants argue that the record indicates there is no conflict
because Montez's testimony before Judge DeBoni shows that he will testify
that Natal was entrapped. Specifically, they contend that the record shows
that Natal was involved in the drug sale only as a favor to Montez, to help
Montez keep his alleged bargain with Agent Endre, and that Agent Endre
promised Montez that Natal would not be charged. We note, first, that the
entrapment defense that the defendants describe does not apply to Ortega
and thus would not negate the conflict as to Ortega. Moreover, defendants
acknowledged at oral argument that they presented the same argument to
the trial court, which nevertheless found a conflict. We cannot say that the
trial court's finding was arbitrary, fanciful, or that no reasonable person
would agree with it. The evidence that Montez's testimony will support a
defense for Natal simply does not eliminate the serious possibility that
Montez could testify against Natal's interests on some point.
	Defendants assert that Montez waived any conflict. Donald Novelle
testified that Montez waived any conflict during what Novelle described as
an "informal conference" before Judge Fitzgerald, which took place
immediately after Montez refused to testify before the grand jury. The
informal conference before Judge Fitzgerald is not of record. Assuming,
arguendo, that we could find a waiver based on testimony that a waiver
occurred, it would not affect our conclusion that the trial court could
reasonably find a conflict. In Wheat the trial court's decision to deny
counsel of choice was upheld even though both the defendant and the
potential prosecution witnesses proffered waivers. Wheat, 486 U.S.  at
157, 100 L. Ed. 2d  at 147, 108 S. Ct.  at 1696.
	The dissent believes the record clearly shows Montez waived
attorney-client confidentiality, and contends that a waiver of confidentiality,
unlike a waiver of the conflict, erases the conflict itself. The dissent
concludes we cannot affirm the trial court's decision even under a
deferential standard of review.
	We express no opinion about whether there is a crucial difference
between a waiver of confidentiality and a waiver of the conflict. The circuit
court heard evidence that Montez waived confidentiality and nevertheless
granted the motion to disqualify Robert Novelle. Even if we assume,
arguendo, that a waiver of confidentiality requires the motion be denied,
the circuit court's decision must be upheld unless the court was bound to
find that Montez waived confidentiality. The dissent claims that failure to so
find cannot be affirmed in light of Donald Novelle's testimony regarding
Montez's waiver. We disagree.
	First, the only thing that the testimony quoted by the dissent clearly
shows is that Donald Novelle believed that, if present, Montez would tell
the court that he had no objection to Novelle's firm divulging otherwise
privileged information. Donald based this belief on what occurred more
than two years previously during the informal conference before Judge
Fitzgerald. The record shows that, prior to the quoted testimony, the court
tried several times to clarify what occurred during the informal conference.
Initially, Donald stated that Judge Fitzgerald recommended that another
attorney represent Montez, "even though my client had waived any
conflict." Later, Donald gave a lengthy account of the events leading up to
the informal conference, which he concluded by again stating that Judge
Fitzgerald recommended separate representation for Montez "even though
your client has waived any conflict." Shortly after that, the court asked
Donald whether he had shared any private information regarding Montez
with Robert Novelle. Donald replied, "I had from my client a waiver of any
conflict of interest." Finally the court posed the hypothetical question that
the dissent quotes. Donald's various statements that Montez "waived any
conflict," combined with his assertion that Montez would waive
confidentiality, simply is not a clear statement that Montez actually did
waive confidentiality.
	Second, even had Donald Novelle clearly and unequivocally testified
that Montez waived confidentiality, the trial court would not be bound to
hold there was a waiver. There are indeed circumstances in which a fact
finder is bound by testimony. People ex rel. Brown v. Baker, 88 Ill. 2d 81, 85 (1981). That is, the fact finder may not make an affirmative finding
that is the exact opposite of what was stated in the testimony. Brown, 88 Ill. 2d  at 86, quoting 30 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence §1080, at 227 (1976).
However, Donald's testimony that Montez gave an effective waiver of
confidentiality is not a factual statement. It states a legal conclusion that may
or may not be supported by facts regarding what Montez said and did
during the informal conference. Donald did not attempt to describe what
Montez said or did at that time. Furthermore, although he testified that
Montez knew that Robert Novelle represented the defendants, he did not
relate any other facts pertaining to whether Montez understood what it
meant to waive confidentiality. Thus the circuit court lacked facts necessary
to draw its own conclusion about whether there was an effective, knowing
and intelligent, waiver of confidentiality. We are aware of no authority for
the proposition that a court may be bound by testimony that states a bare
legal conclusion, even when the witness is an attorney. If there were such
a rule, a witness could usurp the function of the court.
	We note in this regard that the court could have taken Donald's
testimony at something less than face value without finding that Donald was
untruthful. The court may have thought that Donald's testimony was a true
and sincere statement of the conclusion Donald drew from the informal
conference, and yet not found itself bound to adopt that conclusion. The
court may have considered that even honest people prefer to draw
inferences for themselves rather than against themselves.
	Third, testimony about another person's waiver, whatever its merits,
is one step removed from a waiver. The alleged waiver itself is not of
record. We are not prepared to hold that it was an abuse of discretion to
decline to find a waiver by Montez based on Donald's testimony that a
waiver occurred over two years before. The cases the dissent cites
involved waivers given in open court (United States v. Oberoi, 331 F.3d 44, 46-47 (2d Cir. 2003)), or in an affidavit (United States v. Dalke, No.
02 CR 50078-5 (N.D. Ill. April 1, 2003)).
	In sum, Donald Novelle's testimony is (1) unclear as to whether there
was a waiver of confidentiality or merely of the conflict, (2) a bare legal
conclusion, and (3) not equivalent to a waiver of record by Montez himself.
	Having determined that the trial court could reasonably find at least a
serious potential for conflict, the second step in our inquiry is to ask
whether the court applied legally proper criteria to determine that the
conflict overcomes the presumption in favor of counsel of choice. See
Holmes, 141 Ill. 2d  at 228. Before ruling, the trial court properly referred
to Holmes. The court noted that the competing interests at stake in Holmes
were similar to the interests at stake in the present case. The court
expressly noted the two factors from Holmes that are not affected by the
provision of a valid waiver. First, the court noted that the State has a right
to a fair trial in which defense counsel does not have access to confidential
information about a State's witness that would give the defense an unfair
advantage. Second, the court noted that there was a risk of the appearance
of impropriety should the jury learn that defense counsel's brother and law
partner represented a State's witness. Moreover, the court stressed the
fact that Donald Novelle's representation of Montez involved the very facts
at issue in this case, which was not true in Holmes. The court properly
considered that fact because it enhances both the possibility of unfairness
to the State and the possibility of an appearance of impropriety. We
conclude that the trial court based its disqualification order on legally
proper criteria.
	Next we must consider whether the court applied its criteria to reach
a reasonable result. That is, we must consider whether a reasonable person
could take the court's view that the interests threatened by the potential
conflict outweigh the defendants' right to counsel of choice. For the
following reasons, we find that a reasonable person could do so.
	A reasonable person could conclude that it would be seriously unfair
to the State if defendants were to use confidential information received from
Montez to cross-examine Montez, or to otherwise mount their defense.
Moreover, a reasonable person could fear that if the jury or other members
of the public learned that the same law firm is allowed to represent both a
prosecution witness and the defendants in connection with the same case,
the public would conclude that the trial is not fair or that the defense bar is
being allowed to behave unethically. For example, a reasonable person
could fear that the public would assume that the Novelle firm must either be
less than fully loyal to either the defendants or to Montez. This is not to say
that the Novelle brothers have done anything improper. Reasonable people
may disagree about whether their representation of both Montez and the
defendants would appear improper to the public. The interest of the State
in a fair trial and the judicial interest in proceedings that not only are fair but
also appear fair are both substantial, and a reasonable person could assign
them substantial weight in this case. Thus we find that the trial court reached
a reasonable result.
	As a final matter, we note that the possibility of unfairness to the State
and of the appearance of impropriety are factors that cannot be waived by
the defendants or by Montez. In sum, we need not reach the question
whether the defendants or Montez provided a valid waiver.

V. CONCLUSION
	The trial court, at the time it ruled on the motion to disqualify Robert
Novelle, could reasonably conclude that there was at least a serious
potential for conflict. It applied legally correct criteria as it weighed the
interests that were threatened by the conflict. Finally, it reasonably
concluded that the factors favoring disqualification overcame the
presumption in favor of counsel of choice. Therefore, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion when it disqualified Robert Novelle and its order must
be affirmed and the judgment of the appellate court reversed. We remand
the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court order affirmed;
cause remanded.
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN, dissenting:
	I respectfully dissent.
	I agree with the majority on several points. One is the analytical
framework for a trial court's resolution of a pretrial motion by the State to
disqualify defense counsel. There is a presumption in favor of counsel of
choice, which must be respected unless there exists a "serious potential for
conflict." Slip op. at 9. Even if there is a serious potential for conflict, a
defendant might (as in the instant case) attempt to waive any conflict. If so,
the court must evaluate whether that waiver sufficiently obviates the
concerns raised by the potential conflict. Only if there is a serious potential
for conflict, and no effective waiver, may the court grant the State's motion
and disqualify defense counsel.
	I also agree with the majority that a waiver of conflict by all potential
clients is not, without more, reason to overrule a trial court's disqualification
order. Even a waiver by all potential clients does not obviate two concerns
potentially raised by conflicted representation of a criminal defendant: the
State's interest in a fair trial and the concern about appearances should the
conflicted representation become known to the jury. See slip op. at 7.
	I nevertheless depart from the majority because the uncontroverted
evidence at the hearing on the motion to disqualify establishes that Montez
not only waived  the conflict of interests but, more importantly, he also
waived attorney-client confidentiality. The majority does not consider
the difference between these two waivers. Accordingly, I shall attempt
briefly to explain their salient distinguishing characteristics.
	By waiving a conflict, a client acknowledges that the attorney does
or may have a conflict of interests, but avows his preference for
representation by that attorney regardless. This type of waiver is nothing
more than a prospective relinquishment of the waiving party's right to
object to an impropriety in the proceedings. It does not purport to
eliminate a conflict of interest. Rather, it is a statement by a client that he
wishes the proceedings to continue notwithstanding any effect that the
conflict of interests would have on him. Accordingly, the "serious potential
for conflict" would still exist. Thus, the State's interests in a fair trial and in
avoiding the appearance of impropriety would still remain a valid basis for
disqualification of counsel notwithstanding a client's waiver of conflict.
	I believe that a waiver of confidentiality is a much different matter,
however. In the instant case, if Montez did indeed agree to waive attorney-client privilege with respect to anything he might have told Donald regarding
this case, there would seem to be no conflict of interests to begin with. If
Montez waived confidentiality, then Robert would have no "professional
obligation to protect confidential information" (slip op. at 8), because there
would be no confidential information to protect-by his waiver, Montez
would have rendered that information unconfidential. See United States v.
Dalke, No. 02 CR 50078-5 (N.D. Ill. April 1, 2003) ("Because [attorney]
does not currently represent [witness] and [witness] has voluntarily
consented to waive any claim of privilege he has with respect to confidential
information [attorney] may have acquired during the course of his prior
representation of [witness], [attorney] no longer labors under any conflict
of interest in using such information to cross-examine [witness]"). See also
United States v. Oberoi, 331 F.3d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 2003) ("most
authorities hold that an attorney may use the confidences of a former client
to cross-examine that client if both the former and the current client
consent"); Oberoi, 331 F.3d  at 47, 51 ("the pertinent authorities likely
would allow the [attorney] to continue to represent [his client] in the
circumstances of this case," where the former client who was a potential
witness had consented to cross-examination " 'even if it reveals confidential
information' ").(1) Cf. Holmes, 141 Ill. 2d  at 226 (where defense counsel
admitted that due to confidentiality concerns he would restrict cross-examination to matters of public record. Thus, there could be no conflict
between that now nonexistent obligation on the part of Robert and "the
interests of the defendants in thorough cross-examination").
	Accordingly, if Montez waived attorney-client privilege with regard to
anything he may have told Donald that bears on this case, then the circuit
court would have abused its discretion if it had determined that there was
"a potential conflict between Robert Novelle's professional obligation to
protect confidential information *** and the interests of the defendants
in thorough cross-examination." Thus-since this is the only "serious
potential for conflict" which the majority identifies-the presumption in favor
of counsel of choice should stand.
	And the record clearly indicates that Montez did indeed waive
attorney-client confidentiality:
			"Q. [by the court] It's your understanding if your client was
brought in before me would tell me that he would have absolutely
no problem at all with your firm divulging any information that
would other wise be considered attorney-client privilege?
			A. [by Donald Novelle] As it related to that transaction, Judge.
			Q. To that transaction meaning this case present before me?
			A. Yes.
			Q. And that was done before Judge Fitzgerald?
			A. Yes."
This sworn testimony by Donald Novelle was uncontroverted, and nothing
in the record suggests that the trial court disbelieved it. Although Montez
was listed as a State's witness-the majority notes that it is "clear[] that
[Montez] is important to the prosecution's case" (slip op. at 6)-the State
did not attempt to call Montez to rebut this testimony.
	The standard of review provides no answer to my concerns. Although
I agree with the majority that we must defer to the circuit court's balancing
of factors as well as its findings of fact, in the instant case the circuit court
never found that there was a "serious potential for conflict." Rather,
although the circuit court cited Holmes, the court errantly decided the case
based on its determination that there was a "per se" conflict-a concept
which Holmes itself makes clear has no relevance to this case, as the
majority notes (slip op. at 7). Thus, we are not reviewing a circuit court
factual finding that there was a "serious potential for conflict." Rather, the
majority concludes that the evidence "would also reasonably support"
such a finding (if the circuit court had made such a finding, which it did not).
In other words, we are not reviewing a conclusion which the circuit court
did reach. Rather, in order to affirm the circuit court's judgment, the
majority states that because of our deferential standard of review we could
uphold this factual finding if the circuit had reached it. I do not believe that
it is appropriate to decide the case based on the standard of review, when
the factual conclusion at issue-that the evidence supports a finding that
there is a "serious potential for conflict"-is our own.
	Moreover, even if a deferential standard of review did apply to
hypothetical findings of fact, I do not see how we could affirm a finding that
there was a serious potential for conflict between Robert's confidentiality
obligations and the defendants' interest in cross-examination, in light of
Donald Novelle's explicit and uncontroverted testimony that Montez
waived confidentiality. Nothing in the record indicates that the trial court did
not believe this testimony, nor does the record give this court any reason
to disregard it. This is especially true in light of the fact that Donald is an
attorney, an officer of the court with ethical responsibilities. This court
assumes that attorneys are retained only to serve their clients' interests
through ethical means, which surely would not include false testimony under
oath. Moreover, it was the State's burden on the motion to disqualify, and
Montez is the State's witness. If Donald's testimony that Montez had
waived confidentiality was untrue, the State could simply have put Montez
on the stand-but the State did not do so.
	The majority affirms the trial court's decision to deny criminal
defendants their counsel of choice based on its own independent conclusion
that the evidence "would" support a factual finding which the trial court
never made, notwithstanding uncontroverted sworn evidence by an officer
of the court which would wholly contradict such a finding.
	I respectfully dissent.
	 
	 
1.                
         
   The Oberoi court ruled that counsel should be permitted to withdraw even though counsel could have continued with 
representation, given the circumstances of that casecounsel's continued belief that withdrawal was most appropriate; the possibility that 
cross-examination could harm the witness in his still-pending sentencing hearing; the absence of evidence of tactical abuse by the 
government; and the absence of evidence that the current client was amenable to continued representation. Oberoi, 331 F.3d  at 52.