Title: Charles Dusseau v. Metropolitan Dade County Board of County Commissioners
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC95-217
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: May 17, 2001

Supreme Court of Florida
 
____________
No. SC95217
____________
CHARLES DUSSEAU, et al.,
Petitioners,
vs.
METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS, et al.,
Respondents.
[May 17, 2001]
SHAW, J.
We have for review Metropolitan Dade County v. Dusseau, 725 So. 2d 1169
(Fla. 3d DCA 1998), based on conflict with Education Development Center, Inc. v.
City of West Palm Beach, 541 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 1989).  We have jurisdiction.  See
art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.  We approve in part and quash in part the decision in
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Dusseau as explained herein.
I.  FACTS
University Baptist Church owns 19.7 acres of land in Miami-Dade County on
which it seeks to build a large new church.  The district is zoned for single-family
one-acre estates, but churches are a permitted special exception.  The project is
opposed by Charles Dusseau and other local homeowners, who want just “a simple
church.”  After exhaustive review, the project ultimately was approved by the
following local agencies:  the Zoning and Planning Department; the Department of
Environmental Resources Management; the Public Works Department; the Water
and Sewer Authority; the Fire Department; the Metro-Dade Transit Agency; the
School Board; the Solid Waste Department; the Parks Department; the Public
Safety Department; and the Aviation Department.  In spite of these approvals, the
Zoning Appeals Board denied the application.
The County Commission heard testimony from both sides at a lengthy
hearing and approved the project by a nine-to-two vote.  The circuit court reversed,
by a two-to-one vote.  The court issued an eight-page majority opinion assessing
the evidence presented by both sides and concluding as follows:
As there was no competent substantial evidence that the church
met the criteria for a special exception and there was competent
substantial evidence that the church did not meet the code criteria for
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the grant of a special exception, certiorari is hereby granted and the
decision of the Metropolitan Dade County Board of County
Commissioners is hereby reversed.
Dusseau v. Board of County Commissioners, No. 97-115 AP, slip op. at 8 (Fla.
11th Cir. Ct. May 22, 1998).
The district court granted certiorari and quashed the circuit court decision,
ruling as follows:
The circuit court’s majority opinion correctly states that “[i]n
order to sustain the action of the Commission, upon review by
certiorari in the circuit court it must be shown that there was
competent substantial evidence presented to the Commission to
support its ruling.” . . .  However, in finding that the Commission’s
ruling was not supported by competent substantial evidence, the
circuit court primarily focused on the testimony presented by the
neighbors’ attorney and their expert witnesses.
We find that the circuit court departed from the essential
requirements of law when it reweighed evidence and completely
ignored evidence that supported the Commission’s ruling.  Further, a
review of the evidence clearly demonstrates that the Commission’s
ruling was supported by competent substantial evidence–the
recommendations of the Zoning and Planning Departments, and the
testimony of the project architect, an independent real estate appraiser,
and a traffic engineer.  Accordingly, we grant the petition.
Dusseau, 725 So. 2d at 1171 (citation omitted).  This Court granted review based
on conflict with Education Development Center v. City of West Palm Beach, 541
So. 2d 106 (Fla. 1989), wherein the Court set forth the appropriate standards
governing certiorari review.
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II.  THE APPLICABLE LAW
This Court recently addressed this issue in Florida Power & Light Co. v.
City of Dania, 761 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. 2000), wherein the Court set forth the
applicable law governing an application for a special exception:
This Court in Irvine v. Duval County Planning Commission, 495
So. 2d 167 (Fla. 1986), delineated the allocation of burdens in a
special exception proceeding:
[O]nce the petitioner met the initial burden of showing
that his application met the statutory criteria for granting
such exceptions, "the burden was upon the [opposing
party] to demonstrate, by competent substantial evidence
presented at the hearing and made a part of the record,
that the [special] exception requested by petitioner did
not meet such standards and was, in fact, adverse to the
public interest."
Irvine, 495 So. 2d at 167 (emphasis added).  In order for the agency
to deny a permitted special exception application, the party opposing
the application (i.e., either the agency itself or a third party) must show
by competent substantial evidence that the proposed exception does
not meet the published criteria.
Florida Power & Light, 761 So. 2d at 1091-92.
This Court in Florida Power & Light further explained that once a local
agency has ruled on an application for a special exception, the parties may seek
review under the two-tiered certiorari system:
Once the local agency has ruled on the application, the parties
may seek review in the court system, twice.  First, a party may seek
certiorari review in circuit court, i.e., “first-tier” certiorari review. 
Although termed "certiorari" review, review at this level is not
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discretionary but rather is a matter of right and is akin in many respects
to a plenary appeal.  The court must review the record and determine
inter alia whether the agency decision is supported by competent
substantial evidence.  Competent substantial evidence is tantamount to
legally sufficient evidence.  In contrast to the Irvine "competent
substantial evidence" standard of proof, which the agency must apply
at the fact-finding level, this first-tier "competent substantial evidence"
standard is a standard of review, which the reviewing court must
apply.  Next, a party may seek certiorari review of the circuit court
decision in the district court, i.e., “second-tier” certiorari review. 
Review at this level is circumscribed and is similar in scope to true
common law certiorari review.  As a practical matter, the circuit
court’s final ruling in most first-tier cases is conclusive, for second-tier
review is extraordinarily limited.
These two standards of certiorari review were clarified by this
Court in City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 419 So. 2d 624 (Fla.
1982):
We hold that where full review of administrative
action is given in the circuit court as a matter of right, one
appealing the circuit court's judgment is not entitled to a
second full review in the district court.  Where a party is
entitled as a matter of right to seek review in the circuit
court from administrative action, the circuit court must
determine [1] whether procedural due process is
accorded, [2] whether the essential requirements of the
law have been observed, and [3] whether the
administrative findings and judgment are supported by
competent substantial evidence.  The district court, upon
review of the circuit court's judgment, then determines
whether the circuit court [1] afforded procedural due
process and [2] applied the correct law.
Vaillant, 419 So. 2d at 626 (emphasis added).
Florida Power & Light, 761 So. 2d at 1092.
Although first- and second-tier certiorari review are similar in several
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respects, they are dissimilar in a key respect:
The Court later compared the two Vaillant standards and
concluded that they are similar in several respects:  The first prongs of
both standards (i.e., the due process prongs) are the same, and the
second prongs (i.e., the “essential requirements of the law” and
“applied the correct law” prongs) also are equivalent.  However, the
Court noted a key difference:  The third prong in the circuit court
standard (i.e., the “competent substantial evidence” prong) is absent
from the district court standard.  Thus, the district court on second-
tier certiorari review may not review the record to determine whether
the agency decision is supported by competent substantial evidence.
Florida Power & Light, 761 So. 2d at 1092-93 (footnotes omitted).
III.  THE PRESENT CASE
As noted above, although numerous local agencies recommended approval
of the church’s application, the Zoning Appeals Board denied the application.  The
Commission then conducted a lengthy hearing and approved the application.  At
the circuit court level, the court reviewed the record evidence on both sides and
reversed the Commission’s decision based on the following rationale:  “[T]here
was no competent substantial evidence that the church met the criteria for a special
exception and there was competent substantial evidence that the church did not
meet the code criteria for the grant of a special exception.”  This was error.
Although the circuit court phrased its reversal in terms of “competent
substantial evidence,” the plain language of its order shows that the court in fact
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reweighed the evidence, at length.  Instead of simply reviewing the Commission’s
decision to determine whether it was supported by competent substantial evidence,
the court also reviewed the decision to determine whether it was opposed by
competent substantial evidence.  The circuit court then substituted its judgment for
that of the Commission as to the relative weight of the conflicting evidence.  The
circuit court thus usurped the fact-finding authority of the agency.
At the district court level, the court ruled as follows:  “We find that the
circuit court departed from the essential requirements of law when it reweighed
evidence and completely ignored evidence that supports the Commission’s ruling.” 
Dusseau, 725 So. 2d at 1171.  This ruling was proper.  The Court in Florida Power
& Light explained:
Under Vaillant, the district court was required to determine whether the
circuit court applied the correct law.   As noted above, according to
the plain language of its order, the circuit court reweighed the evidence
and decided anew the merits of the special exception application.  The
circuit court thus applied the wrong law (i.e., instead of applying the
Vaillant standard of review, the court reapplied the Irvine standard of
proof), and this is tantamount to departing from the essential
requirements of law (as the district court ruled). 
Florida Power & Light, 761 So. 2d at 1093.
The district court further stated:  “[A] review of the evidence clearly
demonstrates that the Commission’s ruling was supported by competent
1.  See Florida Power & Light, 761 So. 2d at 1093.
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substantial evidence . . . .”  Dusseau, 725 So. 2d at 1171.  This ruling was
improper.  Again, the Court in Florida Power & Light explained:
As explained above, second-tier certiorari review differs from first-tier
review in one critical respect:  The “competent substantial evidence”
component has been eliminated.  The district court thus was precluded
from assessing the record evidence.  Once the district court
determined–from the face of the circuit court order–that the circuit
court had applied the wrong law, the job of the district court was
ended.  In proceeding to apply the right first-tier law, i.e., in evaluating
the record for competent substantial evidence to support the
Commission’s decision, the district court usurped the jurisdiction of
the circuit court.
Florida Power & Light, 761 So. 2d at 1093.   
IV.  CONCLUSION
As in Florida Power & Light, we decline to conduct our own review of the
present record to determine whether the Commission’s decision is supported by
competent substantial evidence, “for to do so would perpetuate the district court’s
error and usurp the first-tier certiorari jurisdiction of the circuit court.”1  Instead, we
return this case to the circuit court and direct that court to apply the three-pronged
standard of review set forth in Vaillant.  Notably, when applying the third prong, the
court should review the record to determine simply whether the Commission’s
decision is supported by competent substantial evidence.
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We reiterate that the “competent substantial evidence” standard cannot be
used by a reviewing court as a mechanism for exerting covert control over the
policy determinations and factual findings of the local agency.  Rather, this
standard requires the reviewing court to defer to the agency’s superior technical
expertise and special vantage point in such matters.  The issue before the court is
not whether the agency’s decision is the “best” decision or the “right” decision or
even a “wise” decision, for these are technical and policy-based determinations
properly within the purview of the agency.  The circuit court has no training or
experience–and is inherently unsuited–to sit as a roving “super agency” with
plenary oversight in such matters.
The sole issue before the court on first-tier certiorari review is whether the
agency’s decision is lawful.  The court’s task vis-a-vis the third prong of Vaillant is
simple:  The court must review the record to assess the evidentiary support for the
agency’s decision.  Evidence contrary to the agency’s decision is outside the
scope of the inquiry at this point, for the reviewing court above all cannot reweigh
the “pros and cons” of conflicting evidence.  While contrary evidence may be
relevant to the wisdom of the decision, it is irrelevant to the lawfulness of the
decision.  As long as the record contains competent substantial evidence to
support the agency’s decision, the decision is presumed lawful and the court’s job
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is ended.
Based on the foregoing, we approve in part and quash in part Board of
County Commissioners v. Dusseau, 725 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), as
explained herein.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and HARDING, ANSTEAD, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
PARIENTE, J., concurs with an opinion, in which ANSTEAD and LEWIS, JJ.,
concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
PARIENTE, J., concurring.
The majority focuses on the standards of appellate review of a zoning
decision regarding a special exception, relying on our previous decision in Florida
Power & Light Co. v. City of Dania, 761 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. 2000).  See majority
op. at 4-6.  I write to make several observations about the nature of that appellate
review, given that we begin with the premise that the reviewing court should give
deference to the "agency's superior technical expertise and special vantage point." 
Id. at 9.  
The majority explains that the role of the circuit court, as the first-tier
reviewing body, is to "review the record to assess the evidentiary support for the
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agency's decision."  Id.  I have no difficulty with the notion that the circuit court as
a reviewing body should defer to the agency's superior expertise and vantage point. 
However, I share Judge Zehmer's observations in Irvine v. Duval County Planning
Commission, 466 So. 2d 357, 366 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (Zehmer, J., dissenting), as
to the commensurate obligations of the agency to make written findings of fact and
the reason for those obligations: 
To meet due process requirements, it is necessary that the
agency set out detailed facts found from the evidence so that a court
authorized to review the matter on certiorari can first determine
whether or not the facts found by the agency constitute lawful grounds
for its action and, then, determine whether the evidence supports the
finding--"Without [detailed findings], the reviewing court would be
compelled to grope in the dark and to resort to guess-work as to what
facts the Board had found to be true and what facts alleged were not
found to be true."  Laney v. Holbrook, 8 So.2d [465,] 468 [(Fla.
1942)]; Hickey v. Wells, 91 So.2d [206,] 210 [(Fla. 1957)]; Powell v.
Board of Public Instruction of Levy County, 229 So.2d [308,]
311-312 [(Fla. 1st DCA 1970)].  It is not sufficient that the cited
findings merely be general conclusions in the language of the statute or
ordinance because such conclusions provide no way for the court to
know on judicial review whether the conclusions have sufficient
foundation in findings of fact.  E.g., City of Apopka v. Orange
County, 299 So.2d 657 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974); McCulley Ford, Inc. v.
Calvin, 308 So.2d 189; Lynch-Davidson Motors, Inc. v. Calvin, 308
So.2d 197 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975); Bill Kelley Chevrolet, Inc. v. Calvin,
308 So.2d 199 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974).  Furthermore, requiring detailed
findings of fact is manifestly helpful in assuring that administrative
decisions are not the result of improper considerations.
The foregoing essential requirements of due process are now
specifically required by chapter 120 and other provisions of Florida
Statutes applicable in administrative proceedings. . . .  Even though no
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statutory or ordinance provision specifically directed the Planning
Commission to comply with these well-established rules of
administrative law, these rules have their origin in constitutional due
process concepts and set the minimum requirements of law applicable
to the commission's action in this case.  Its failure to apply and
faithfully adhere to these administrative principles constituted a
departure from the essential requirements of law.
This Court subsequently adopted Judge Zehmer's dissenting opinion concerning
the allocations of burdens in a special exception zoning case, but the Court did not
discuss Judge Zehmer's observations concerning the necessity of written findings. 
See Irvine v. Duval County Planning Comm'n, 495 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 1986).
In this case, although the Commission provided a written resolution reversing
the Zoning Appeals Board, the resolution contained no written factual findings. 
Although the lack of written findings is not fatal to appellate review based on this
Court's current precedent, written findings would greatly assist the reviewing court
in performing its more limited appellate role.  Further, if the reviewing court was
able to ascertain how the agency arrived at its decision, it would avoid any
temptation on the part of the reviewing court to reweigh the evidence.  If the
agency's factual findings were legally sufficient to support a given decision and
were supported by competent substantial evidence in the record, there would be no
necessity for the reviewing court to explore the record to attempt to find what facts
do support the agency's decision.
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In this case, I would further point out that the circuit court sat in a three-
judge panel that produced a reasoned and detailed majority and dissent.  This in
turn facilitated the more limited second-tier review of the Third District as well as
this Court's review of the Third District's decision.  We previously have noted the
disparity of the practices among circuits and referred this matter to the Rules of
Judicial Administration Committee for study.  See Florida Power & Light, 763 So.
2d at 1094.  In light of the far-reaching impact of zoning decisions, we should not
continue to sanction a statewide system that allows a single circuit judge to have the
identical appellate reviewing authority as a three-judge panel and that also requires
the district court of appeal to accord the identical deference to the circuit court's
decision regardless of whether the decision was made by a one-judge or three-judge
court.  
ANSTEAD and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - 
Direct Conflict
Third District - Case No. 3D98-01611 & 3D98-01612 
(Dade County)
Jeffrey S. Bass of Shubin & Bass, P.A., Miami, Florida,
for Petitioners
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Robert A. Ginsburg, Miami-Dade County Attorney, and Augusto E. Maxwell,
Assistant County Attorney, Miami, Florida; and Arthur J. England, Jr., and Elliot H.
Scherker of Greenberg Traurig, P.A., Miami, Florida,
for Respondents