Title: Felix v. Richards
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: February 26, 2020

Felix v. Richards Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary Guerline Felix’s vehicle collided with Brian Richards’ vehicle in New Jersey. Richards was insured under a New Jersey automobile insurance policy issued by AAA Mid-Atlantic Insurance Company (AAA). The policy provided bodily injury (BI) liability coverage, as well as uninsured and underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) coverage. Felix was insured by the Government Employee Insurance Company (GEICO) under a policy written in Florida. That policy provided up to $10,000 in property liability and personal injury protection (PIP) benefits, but it did not provide any BI liability. Felix sued Richards for personal injuries, and, in a separate action, Richards sued Felix and AAA for personal injuries. AAA then filed a third-party complaint against GEICO, claiming that GEICO’s policy was automatically deemed to include $15,000/$30,000 in BI coverage and that payment would eliminate the claim for UM/UIM coverage by AAA. The motion court determined that the New Jersey "deemer" statute applied to GEICO’s policy, rejecting the argument that the statute created a carve-out for BI coverage based upon the basic policy, as well as GEICO’s constitutional challenge. The Appellate Division affirmed, and the New Jersey Supreme Court granted the petition for certification filed by GEICO. The Supreme Court concluded after review that the deemer statute did not incorporate by reference the basic policy’s BI level for insurers, like GEICO, to which the second sentence of N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.4 applied. From the perspective of the insurers’ obligation, the required compulsory insurance liability limits remained $15,000/$30,000. As to the equal protection claim, New Jersey insureds were the ones who had a choice to purchase less than the presumptive minimum BI amount. The obligation of in-state insurers to offer and provide that minimum was the same as the obligation imposed under the deemer statute’s second sentence on authorized insurers writing an out-of-state policy. "The equal protection claim therefore falls flat," and the Appellate Division's judgment was affirmed. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUSThis syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized. Guerline Felix v. Brian V. Richards (A-27-18) (081799)Argued September 24, 2019 -- Decided February 26, 2020LaVECCHIA, J., writing for the Court. Under New Jersey’s so-called “deemer” statute, N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.4, out-of-state motor vehicle insurance policies have been deemed to guarantee the same $15,000 per person/$30,000 per accident bodily injury (BI) liability insurance coverage required under New Jersey’s standard policy. Since the enactment of the deemer statute, the Legislature has created two alternate forms of lesser insurance coverage -- coverage that does not automatically include BI: the basic policy and the special policy, both of which satisfy New Jersey’s compulsory insurance requirements. In this case, the Court considers whether the later enactment of the basic policy has fundamentally altered the requirements of the deemer statute, such that the amount deemed to be covered by out-of- state policies has been reduced from previously required amounts -- namely $15,000/$30,000 in compulsory minimum BI liability -- to the level of the basic policy, which would mean that BI coverage would no longer be required. The Court also considers the argument that a contrary reading would create an equal protection violation. Guerline Felix’s vehicle collided with Brian Richards’ vehicle in New Jersey. Richards was insured under a New Jersey automobile insurance policy issued by AAA Mid-Atlantic Insurance Company (AAA). The policy provided BI liability coverage, as well as uninsured and underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) coverage. Felix was insured by the Government Employee Insurance Company (GEICO) under a policy written in Florida. That policy provided up to $10,000 in property liability and personal injury protection (PIP) benefits, but it did not provide any BI liability. Felix sued Richards for personal injuries, and, in a separate action, Richards sued Felix and AAA for personal injuries. AAA then filed a third-party complaint against GEICO, claiming that GEICO’s policy was automatically deemed to include $15,000/$30,000 in BI coverage and that payment would eliminate the claim for UM/UIM coverage by AAA. The motion court determined that the deemer statute applied to GEICO’s policy, rejecting the argument that the statute creates a carve-out for BI coverage based upon the basic policy, as well as GEICO’s constitutional challenge. The Appellate Division affirmed, and the Court granted the petition for certification filed by GEICO. 236 N.J. 117 (2018). 1 HELD: The deemer statute does not incorporate by reference the basic policy’s BI level for insurers, like GEICO, to which the second sentence of N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.4 applies. From the perspective of the insurers’ obligation, the required compulsory insurance liability limits remain $15,000/$30,000. As to the equal protection claim, New Jersey insureds are the ones who have a choice to purchase less than the presumptive minimum BI amount. The obligation of in-state insurers to offer and provide that minimum is the same as the obligation imposed under the deemer statute’s second sentence on authorized insurers writing an out-of-state policy. The equal protection claim therefore falls flat.1. The deemer statute, N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.4, achieved its present form in 1998, when the Legislature added in the first sentence an express reference to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3.1, which sets forth requirements for a basic policy. In the second sentence of the deemer statute, the Legislature inserted the words “subsection a” before the citation to N.J.S.A. 39:6B-1; N.J.S.A. 39:6B-1(a) contains the compulsory requirements for BI liability for motor vehicles. The Legislature did not add any mention of the basic policy or its lack of any BI required coverage to the second sentence, which GEICO agrees covers the category of insurer into which it falls. Context is important. The second sentence of the deemer statute employs words that convey a presumed requirement of some minimum BI liability coverage: “shall . . . satisfy at least.” Moreover, the legislative insertion of “subsection a.” must be regarded as intentional and meaningful to the Legislature. The plain language leads to one clear conclusion. The basic policy was added as a standard for insurers covered by the deemer statute’s first sentence, but the basic policy’s BI limits do not apply to insurers governed by the deemer statute’s second sentence. (pp. 13-17)2. The legislative history of the deemer statute aligns with the result compelled by its plain language. That history reveals an intent to lessen the regulatory burden only on insurers who have the most attenuated connection to motor vehicle insurance business in New Jersey -- those governed by the first sentence of the deemer statute. For insurers governed by the statute’s second sentence, like GEICO, the Legislature has never lessened their obligation to provide, or be deemed as providing, compulsory minimum liability coverage. The Legislature reaffirmed its commitment to BI coverage in the second sentence by its additional reference to subsection a. of N.J.S.A. 39:6B-1. And the second sentence’s reference to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3 does not establish that the Legislature implicitly intended to convert the entire second sentence’s BI requirements to the equivalent of a basic policy. First, that reference was meant to ensure that the statute encompasses both automobiles and motor vehicles. Further, it defies logic and sensibility that by retaining the reference to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3, the Legislature intended to make so large scale a change to the deemer statute’s second sentence when, at the same time, the Legislature knew how to and did incorporate an explicit reference to the basic policy in the first sentence. And, last, if the compulsory insurance obligations of insurers has dropped to the basic policy’s BI floor, it would render the “shall . . . satisfy at least” language of the deemer statute’s second sentence nonsensical. The fact that the Legislature now permits New Jersey insureds to accept zero BI coverage does not alter 2 what remains the compulsory minimum BI liability coverage amounts that insurers writing in New Jersey must provide. That principle was recognized shortly after the 1998 changes, and the Legislature has never corrected that interpretation. (pp. 17-23)3. The Court applies the rational basis test to GEICO’s equal protection challenge to this economic legislation. Comparing a New Jersey authorized insurer that writes in New Jersey to another New Jersey authorized insurer that writes in New Jersey and also writes in other states, the equal protection claim falls flat. The insurers are treated the same with respect to the duty to provide minimum compulsory insurance coverage limits. There is no discriminatory classification. New Jersey insureds are the ones who have a choice to purchase less than the presumptive minimum amount that must be offered by all insurers authorized to transact automobile insurance business in this State. The obligation of in- state insurers to offer and provide that minimum is the same as the obligation imposed under the deemer statute’s second sentence on authorized insurers writing an out-of-state policy. For those out-of-state policies, the Legislature has made the policy choice to stick with the compulsory minimum limits. That choice -- to be more protective of the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund from claims caused by out-of-state insured tortfeasors who may have no access to BI insurance coverage than from a claim caused by a New Jersey tortfeasor having only a basic policy -- is not an irrational policy choice. (pp. 24-28)4. Any argument that relies on a claimed disparity for the out-of-state insured is misplaced in this appeal because there is no insured to advance such a claim and because a proper record has not been presented. The Court notes, however, that in the past, the legislative decision to treat in-state and out-of-state insureds differently in terms of the scope of their choice of coverage has not been deemed irrational. (pp. 28-30) The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED. JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA, dissenting, expresses the view that, under the deemer statute, an insurer’s out-of-state policies must include coverage to satisfy at least the liability insurance requirements of N.J.S.A. 39:6B-1(a) or N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3 and that, because both statutes can be satisfied by policies that carry no BI coverage, GEICO fulfilled its duty. Requiring GEICO to reform its policy would constitute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Fernandez-Vina notes, because New Jersey insureds are not required to have BI coverage themselves and requiring out-of-state insurers to provide more coverage when their insureds enter the state distinguishes unconstitutionally between in-state and out-of-state drivers.CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICE ALBIN join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA’s opinion. JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA filed a dissent, in which JUSTICE SOLOMON joins. JUSTICES PATTERSON and TIMPONE did not participate. 3 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 27 September Term 2018 081799 Guerline Felix, Plaintiff, v. Brian V. Richards, Defendant.Brian V. Richards and Kassandria Richards, His Wife Per Quod, Plaintiffs, v. Guerline Felix, Mid-Atlantic Insurance Company of New Jersey, Defendants, and AAA Mid-Atlantic Insurance Company, Third-Party Plaintiff-Respondent, v. GEICO Indemnity Company, Third-Party Defendant-Appellant. 1 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Argued Decided September 24, 2019 February 26, 2020 Eric G. Siegel argued the cause for appellant (McElroy, Deutsch, Mulvaney & Carpenter, attorneys; Michael J. Marone and Richard J. Williams, Jr., of counsel and on the briefs, and Eric G. Siegel, on the briefs). Sanford D. Kaplan argued the cause for respondent (Muscio, Kaplan & Helfrich, attorneys; Sanford D. Kaplan, on the brief). Eric S. Poe argued the cause for amicus curiae Citizens United Reciprocal Exchange (Eric S. Poe, attorneys; Eric S. Poe, of counsel and on the brief, and Abbey True Harris, on the brief). John E. Molinari argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey Association for Justice (Blume Forte Fried Zerres & Molinari, attorneys; John E. Molinari, on the brief). JUSTICE LaVECCHIA delivered the opinion of the Court. Automobile insurance is compulsory in New Jersey. All owners ofautomobiles registered or principally garaged in New Jersey are required toinsure their vehicles for minimum amounts of liability insurance coverage andpersonal injury protection. See Caviglia v. Royal Tours of Am., 178 N.J. 460(2004) (generally discussing New Jersey’s compulsory insurance framework). 2 Insurers authorized to do business in New Jersey and writing policies forsuch vehicles must comply with compulsory insurance coverage limits. See N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3, -4. The Legislature established a standard policy setting theminimal compulsory coverages that an insurer must offer and provide toinsureds in New Jersey. Under the standard policy, the insurer must providethe insured with, in pertinent part, at least $15,000 per person/$30,000 peraccident in bodily injury liability insurance coverage (BI). No insurer is forced to write in New Jersey, but for the privilege ofdoing so, an insurer is bound by the laws in this state. One demand placed oninsurers that choose to do insurance business in New Jersey concerns thepolicies written by such insurers for insureds in other states. That demand iseffectuated through New Jersey’s so-called “deemer” statute, N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.4, which lies at the heart of this appeal. The deemer statute’s purpose,generally stated, is to ensure that New Jersey residents injured as a result of anaccident with an out-of-state vehicle will have recourse to policies of insurancethat are at least as broad as the presumptive minimal limits of a New Jerseyinsurance policy. See generally Craig & Pomeroy, N.J. Auto Insurance Law§ 3.3 (2019). In other words, regardless of the actual terms of out-of-statepolicies, those policies have been deemed to guarantee the same $15,000 perperson/$30,000 per accident BI that New Jersey policies have had to offer. 3 Since the enactment of the deemer statute, the Legislature has createdtwo alternate forms of lesser insurance coverage -- coverage that does notautomatically include BI. One is the basic policy, created in 1998 as part ofthe Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act (AICRA), L. 1998, cc. 21 and22, which carries no BI unless an optional $10,000 amount is selected. See N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3.1. The other is the special policy, created in 2003, which hasan income eligibility requirement for participation and no optional BI. See N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3.3. Eligible insureds may satisfy New Jersey’s insurance lawrequirements by purchasing basic or special policies. In this case, an insurer argues that the later enactment of the basic policyhas fundamentally altered the requirements of the deemer statute. Because thebasic policy carries no BI requirement, the argument goes, the amount deemedto be covered by out-of-state policies has been reduced from previouslyrequired amounts -- namely $15,000/$30,000 in compulsory minimum BIliability -- to the level of the basic policy. If correct in its argument, theinsurer would have no obligation to provide any BI because the basic policydoes not contain any minimally required BI. The trial court rejected that argument and the Appellate Divisionaffirmed. We agree with those determinations and affirm the AppellateDivision judgment in all respects. 4 The plain language of the deemer statute does not support theinterpretation being advanced; in fact, amendments to the deemer statutereveal a distinct legislative effort to avoid that result. The Legislature knewhow to, and did elsewhere, make an explicit reference to basic policystandards. It did not do so here for BI, and importing the basic policy’srequirement into the deemer statute would subvert the Legislature’s carefullycrafted insurance scheme. The insurer’s fallback claim of an equal protection violation is equallyunavailing. Every insurer that writes in New Jersey accepts the law of NewJersey. And all such insurers are treated equally under our law’s obligation toprovide the minimal amount of BI coverage that our compulsory insurance lawrequires. Through the deemer statute, in-state insurers writing policies in NewJersey and insurers that write in New Jersey and in other states must both offerinsureds the minimum compulsory level of BI liability coverage of$15,000/$30,000 per person/per accident. The fact that the Legislature now gives New Jersey resident insureds achoice to purchase a lesser amount of liability coverage to drive lawfully onthe roadways of this state does not alter the compulsory obligation of bothcategories of insurers to offer and provide the same default minimum level ofcoverage. The insurers are treated uniformly. From the perspective of an 5 insurer, this appeal presents no viable equal protection violation caused by thedeemer statute. We also reject any attempt by the insurer to assert an equal protectionclaim from the perspective of the insured. That said, we do note that, as aresult of application of our deemer statute in this case, the out-of-state insuredis receiving a benefit: with respect to this accident that took place in NewJersey, the insured is receiving more liability protection than she would have ifthe accident occurred in Florida where her policy was written. But there is no insured advancing a claim here. Hence, any discussionabout the statute’s impact on an insured is misplaced and speculative. Notonly do we not have a proper party advancing an equal protection claim froman insured’s position, we have no record for an insured’s claim. We couldonly speculate about what insureds are told in other states about their optionsregarding BI liability coverage and whether there is any rating impact thatwould be discernible and significant as a result of the operation of the deemerstatute as construed. We do not decide cases based on speculation. In short, there is no actionable equal protection claim here, and there isthus no constitutional basis to depart from the result reached by a plain-language interpretation of the statutory scheme in question. 6 I. This appeal involves a pure question of law. The facts aid primarily inunderstanding the relationship of the parties. The individuals involved in theaccident that led to the underlying lawsuit have settled. The party in interest inthis appeal is the Government Employee Insurance Company (GEICO) -- aninsurer that writes automobile insurance policies in New Jersey and in otherstates -- which seeks to avoid operation of the deemer statute to a policy itwrote for an insured in Florida. In September 2013, Guerline Felix’s vehicle collided with BrianRichards’ vehicle in Newark, New Jersey. At the time, Richards was insuredunder a New Jersey automobile insurance policy issued by AAA Mid -AtlanticInsurance Company (AAA). The policy provided BI liability coverage, as wellas uninsured and underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) coverage in the amount of$15,000 per person and $30,000 per accident. Felix was insured by GEICOunder a policy written in Florida. That policy provided up to $10,000 inproperty liability and personal injury protection (PIP) benefits, but it did notprovide any BI liability. Felix sued Richards for personal injuries, and, in a separate action,Richards sued Felix and AAA for personal injuries. GEICO declined to defendFelix in the suit filed by Richards because its policy did not provide BI 7 coverage. AAA then filed a third-party complaint against GEICO. AAAclaimed that it had no obligation to provide UM or UIM coverage to Richardsbecause, pursuant to the deemer statute, GEICO’s policy was automaticallydeemed to include $15,000/$30,000 in BI coverage and that payment wouldeliminate the claim for UM/UIM coverage by AAA. In the Law Division, the matter proceeded on motions for summaryjudgment filed by AAA and GEICO. The motion court determined that thedeemer statute applied to GEICO’s policy, rejecting the argument that thestatute creates a carve-out for BI coverage in this circumstance based upon theBI standard for the basic policy in New Jersey. The court held that GEICOwas “required to conform to the statutorily mandated minimum of $15,000 perperson, $30,000 per accident in [BI] coverage” and, further, granted AAA’ssummary judgment motion, concluding that because the deemer statuteapplied, AAA’s “UM/UIM coverage . . . is equal to the [BI] liability coverageunder the reformed GEICO policy and, accordingly, plaintiff is not entitled toreceive the UM/UIM [coverage] from AAA.” The motion court also rejectedGEICO’s constitutional challenge, citing prior law. The Appellate Division affirmed. It rejected GEICO’s argument that, byenacting AICRA and, among other things, creating for New Jersey insureds theoption to select a basic policy option with no BI coverage, the Legislature 8 intended to modify the deemer statute “to require no BI coverage forautomobiles to which the statute would otherwise apply.” After examinationof the statute’s plain language, as well as a historical review of legislativerevisions to the deemer statute, the appellate court concluded that “[s]hould theLegislature have intended a change in the [d]eemer statute, as argued byGEICO, it could have said so expressly.” The court held that “the plainlanguage of the [d]eemer statute requires GECIO’s policy here to be reformedto include BI coverage in the amount of $15,000/$30,000.” The court alsofound meritless GEICO’s equal protection challenge, explaining that “allinsurers writing policies in New Jersey are treated uniformly; it’s the consumerwho has the option to purchase more affordable coverage.” We granted the petition for certification filed by GEICO. 236 N.J. 117(2018). We also granted amicus curiae status to the New Jersey Associationfor Justice (NJAJ) and to Citizens United Reciprocal Exchange (CURE). II. According to GEICO, the deemer statute’s second sentence, whichGEICO agrees covers the category of insurer into which it falls, incorporatesby reference the BI requirement, or more accurately the lack of any BIcoverage, applicable in the basic policy. GEICO relies on the sentence’slanguage that requires such insurers to include in the out-of-state policy 9 “coverage to satisfy at least the liability insurance requirements of [N.J.S.A.39:6B-1(a)] or [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3].” GEICO then points to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3,which now states that, “[e]xcept as provided by [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3.1],” (thestatute authorizing creation of a basic policy), the compulsory$15,000/$30,000 liability limits apply. According to GEICO, the exceptinglanguage of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3 has been incorporated by reference into thedeemer statute’s requirements, and, thus, the basic policy now eliminates BIrequirements from the deemer statute’s list of required coverages. GEICOconcludes that its out-of-state policy, which like the basic policy has no BIcoverage, satisfies the liability insurance requirement of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3 andtherefore satisfies the deemer statute. CURE aligns itself with GEICO’s position that the Florida policy shouldnot be deemed to require BI coverage of $15,000/$30,000. CURE urges us toview the basic policy as the new general standard for compulsory liabilityinsurance. AAA disputes that the deemer statute incorporates by reference the basicpolicy. It notes that the second sentence of the deemer statute does not refer tothe basic policy; rather, it identifies the two statutes that establish thecompulsory minimum BI coverage required to be provided by insurers toinsureds under New Jersey’s standard policy of insurance: N.J.S.A. 39:6B- 10 1(a) and 39:6A-3. Thus, AAA maintains that, when the deemer statute applies,the default coverage required of out-of-state policies includes BI coverage of$15,000/$30,000. NJAJ offers two arguments in support of AAA’s position. First, it pointsto the first sentence, where “the legislature demonstrates a clear understandingof the existence of the 'basic’ policy” and expressly included it, while “[i]n thesecond sentence dealing with liability . . . it did not.” Second, with respect tothe second sentence pertinent here, NJAJ observes that the deemer statuterequires insurers “to satisfy at least the liability insurance requirements of[N.J.S.A. 39:6B-1(a)] or [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3].” NJAJ notes that N.J.S.A.39:6B-1(a) refers to “motor vehicles” and N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3 refers toautomobiles. It explains that the Legislature has always cited both statutes toclearly establish that the deemer statute reaches both passenger automobilesand other types of motor vehicles and argues that the reference to the twostatutes does not suggest that there are two different and conflicting standards.According to NJAJ, that is so because the Legislature particularly underscoredthe BI requirement by adding the reference to subsection a. for the motorvehicle statute citation, which contains no reference to the basic policy, unlikesection b. of that statute. 11 In addition to textual arguments, GEICO, AAA, and the amici includearguments on why their interpretation advances their perception of thelegislative intent underlying the deemer statute. III. With a question of statutory construction, we begin with the language ofthe statute as the surest indicator of legislative intent. DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005) (“The Legislature’s intent is the paramount goal wheninterpreting a statute and, generally, the best indicator of that intent is thestatutory language.”). If the language admits of only one clear interpretation,the interpretative task can come to an end and we enforce that meaning. Statev. Reiner, 180 N.J. 307, 311 (2004). The parties agree it is the second sentence of the first paragraph of thedeemer statute that applies in this matter because GEICO, an insurer thatwrites automobile policies in New Jersey, wrote the policy at issue for its out -of-state insured in Florida. What the parties dispute is whether an insurer hasmet its duty under that sentence when the out-of-state policy has no BIcoverage. We apply traditional principles of statutory construction to that keytext. 12 A. Here, a plain language construction points compellingly in favor ofconcluding that the basic policy’s BI level was not incorporated by referenceinto the second sentence of the deemer statute. First enacted in 1985, the deemer statute achieved its present form whenit was amended in 1998 through the enactment of AICRA. L. 1998, cc. 21, 22.Two key changes accomplished by that amendment warrant particularattention. In the first sentence, the Legislature added the express reference to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3.1 and its requirements for a basic policy. That first sentencenow reads: Any insurer authorized to transact or transacting automobile or motor vehicle insurance business in this State, or controlling or controlled by, or under common control by, or with, an insurer authorized to transact or transacting insurance business in this State, which sells a policy providing automobile or motor vehicle liability insurance coverage, or any similar coverage, in any other state or in any province of Canada, shall include in each policy coverage to satisfy at least the personal injury protection benefits coverage pursuant to section 4 of L. 1972, c. 70 ([ N.J.S.A.] 39:6A-4) or section 19 of L. 1983, c. 362 ([ N.J.S.A.] 17:28-1.3) for any New Jersey resident who is not required to maintain personal injury protection coverage pursuant to section 4 of L. 1972, c. 70 ([ N.J.S.A.] 39:6A-4) or section 4 of L. 1998, c. 21 ([ N.J.S.A.] 39:6A-3.1) and who is not otherwise eligible for such benefits, whenever the 13 automobile or motor vehicle insured under the policy is used or operated in this State. [N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.4.] In the second sentence of the deemer statute, the Legislature inserted thewords “subsection a” before “section 1 of L. 1972, c. 197 ([ N.J.S.A.] 39:6B-1),” which contains the compulsory requirements for BI liability for motorvehicles. That sentence now states: In addition, any insurer authorized to transact or transacting automobile or motor vehicle insurance business in this State, or controlling or controlled by, or under common control by, or with, an insurer authorized to transact or transacting automobile or motor vehicle insurance business in this State, which sells a policy providing automobile or motor vehicle liability insurance coverage, or any similar coverage, in any other state or in any province of Canada, shall include in each policy coverage to satisfy at least the liability insurance requirements of subsection a. of section 1 of L. 1972, c. 197 ([ N.J.S.A.] 39:6B-1) or section 3 of L. 1972, c. 70 ([ N.J.S.A.] 39:6A-3), the uninsured motorist insurance requirements of subsection a. of section 2 of L. 1968, c. 385 ([N.J.S.A.] 17:28-1.1), and personal injury protection benefits coverage pursuant to section 4 of L. 1972, c. 70 ([ N.J.S.A.]39:6A-4) or of section 19 of L. 1983, c. 362 ([ N.J.S.A.] 17:28-1.3), whenever the automobile or motor vehicle insured under the policy is used or operated in this State. [N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.4.] 14 The AICRA amendment to the first sentence -- added at the same time asthe creation of the basic policy -- made express reference to the basic policyand thus clearly made that category of out-of-state insurers subject to the basicpolicy requirements for PIP coverage. That legislative change to the firstsentence also implicitly acknowledged that there was no BI liability obligationimposed on those insurers; there is no mention of any liability requirement.Thus, in clear directory language, the first sentence further reduced theobligation imposed on that category of insurer by setting it to the basicpolicy’s PIP coverage. Where the Legislature meant to incorporate a basicpolicy level of required coverage, it knew how to do so and did it. The amendments to the second sentence did nothing similar for thecategory of insurer it covers. In the second sentence, the Legislature did notadd any mention of the basic policy with its lack of any BI required coverage. Context is important. The second sentence of the deemer statuteemploys words that convey a presumed requirement of some minimum BIliability coverage. In addressing insurers that write automobile insurance inNew Jersey and that also write automobile insurance policies in other states orCanada, the legislation states that such insurers’ out-of-state policies must“satisfy at least the liability requirements of subsection a. of section 1 of L.1972, c. 197 ([ N.J.S.A.] 39:6B-1) [(concerning motor vehicles)] or section 3 of 15 L. 1972, c. 70 ([ N.J.S.A.] 39:6A-3) [(concerning automobiles)].” N.J.S.A.17:28-1.4. Read plainly, the Legislature is imposing a required amount ofliability insurance by using the words, “shall . . . satisfy at least.” As we said in Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. Melcar Utility Co.,we apply “the bedrock assumption that the Legislature did not use 'anyunnecessary or meaningless language,’ so a court 'should try to give effect toevery word of [a] statute . . . . [rather than] construe [a] statute to render partof it superfluous.’” 212 N.J. 576, 587 (2013) (first quoting Patel v. MotorVehicle Comm’n, 200 N.J. 413, 418-19 (2009), then quoting Med. Soc’y ofN.J. v. Dep’t of Law & Pub. Safety, 120 N.J. 18, 26-27 (1990)). We thuspresume that “every word” in the deemer statute, including its words requiringthe minimal amount of liability coverage, “has meaning and is not meresurplusage.” Cast Art Indus., LLC v. KPMG LLP, 209 N.J. 208, 222 (2012)(quoting In re Attorney Gen.’s Directive on Exit Polling: Media & Non-Partisan Pub. Interest Grps., 200 N.J. 283, 297-98 (2009)). Moreover, in connection with its discussion of BI requirements for thiscategory of insurers, the Legislature underscored the obligation in subsectiona. of N.J.S.A. 39:6B-1, which refers to the $15,000/$30,000 compulsory BIcoverage requirements. Subsection a. of N.J.S.A. 39:6B-1 contains noreference to the basic policy. Subsection b. of N.J.S.A. 39:6B-1 does. It 16 contains the reference to a basic policy as being acceptable if an insuredchooses to go bare on BI coverage. The legislative insertion of theemphasizing words of “subsection a.” -- not leaving the sentence as it was andallowing it to simply reference any or all subsections of N.J.S.A. 39:6B-1 --must be regarded as intentional and meaningful to the Legislature. We cannotand will not assume that the Legislature meant something other than what itsaid, when it added a specific reference to the liability requirements ofsubsection a. The plain language leads to one clear conclusion. The basic policy wasadded as a standard for insurers covered by the deemer statute’s first sentence.The second sentence makes no mention whatsoever of the basic policy. Itrefers only to the standard policy’s compulsory minimum insurance coveragerequirements. The plain language controls, and it does not support theargument that the basic policy’s BI limits apply to insurers governed by thedeemer statute’s second sentence. B. 1. To the extent that there is any doubt about the plain language conclusionreached, the outcome here also aligns with the legislative history of the deemerstatute. 17 When originally enacted, the statute applied to insurers who soldpolicies providing automobile or motor vehicle coverage and who were eitherauthorized to sell automobile or motor vehicle insurance in New Jersey orwere legally affiliated with insurers authorized to sell insurance -- of any kind,whether automobile/motor vehicle insurance or not -- in New Jersey. SeeCooper Hosp. Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 378 N.J. Super. 510, 515-16 (App. Div. 2005). The law required those insurers to include in their out-of-state policies “coverage to satisfy at least the liability insurancerequirements of [N.J.S.A. 39:6B-1] or [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3].” N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.4 (1985). And, both of those statutes required BI coverage of at least$15,000/$30,000. See N.J.S.A. 39:6B-1 (1985); N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3 (1985). If any one of those insurers did not provide for the BI coverage of$15,000/$30,000 and an insured driver of that insurer was involved in anaccident in New Jersey, the driver’s policy would be deemed to have BIcoverage “of not less than $15,000 on account of injury to, or death of, oneperson in any one accident” and “coverage of not less than $30,000 on accountof injury to or death of more than one person in any one accident.” Whitakerv. DeVilla, 147 N.J. 341, 347-48 (1997) (describing pre-AICRA versions of N.J.S.A. 39:6B-1 and N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3). 18 Through a 1998 amendment, L. 1997, c. 436, § 1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1998), theLegislature lightened the regulatory burden on one category of insurer:affiliates of insurers who sell only non-motor vehicle and non-automobileinsurance in New Jersey. See Cooper Hosp., 378 N.J. Super. at 517. TheLegislature added language (creating a new, and currently the first, sentence ofthe deemer statute) establishing that this category of insurer must include in itsout-of-state policies “only PIP benefits coverage and then only for New Jerseyresidents.” Id. at 516. Although that amendment limited the coverage that affiliates of insurerstransacting only non-motor vehicle/automobile insurance needed to provideunder the deemer statute, it was understood as not “effect[ing] a change in thecoverage required of” the other two types of insurers to which the deemerstatute applied: New Jersey authorized automobile/motor vehicle insurers andaffiliates of such insurers. Cooper Hosp., 378 N.J. Super. at 516-17; see alsoCraig & Pomeroy, § 3.1 (acknowledging statutory distinction betweencategories of insurers). Those insurers continued to have a duty to include BIcoverage of at least $15,000/$30,000 in their out-of-state policies, and if theyfailed to do so and one of their insured drivers was involved in an accident inNew Jersey, that driver’s policy would still be deemed to have BI coverage of$15,000/$30,000. Cooper Hosp., 378 N.J. Super. at 517. 19 Thus, the history of amendments reveals an intent to lessen theregulatory burden only on the first sentence’s category of insurers who havethe most attenuated connection to motor vehicle insurance business in NewJersey. For insurers governed by the second sentence, the Legislature hasnever lessened their obligation to provide, or be deemed as providing,compulsory minimum liability coverage. Even with the AICRA amendments,when the Legislature altered language to further relieve insurers under the firstsentence of some requirements by expressly referencing PIP requirementsunder the basic policy’s statutory commands, there was no similar,coincidental action by the Legislature with respect to the second sentence.Instead, the Legislature reaffirmed its commitment to BI coverage by itsadditional reference to subsection a. of N.J.S.A. 39:6B-1. 2. That the second sentence also includes its longstanding reference to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3 -- which contains a carve-out that allows a New Jerseyinsured the option to purchase less BI coverage -- does not establish that theLegislature implicitly intended to convert the entire second sentence’s BIrequirements to the equivalent of a basic policy. First, we reject any suggestion that the Legislature meant to create twostandards with respect to the terms of “automobile” and “motor vehicle.” The 20 deemer statute’s reference to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3 was meant to ensure that thestatute encompasses both automobiles and motor vehicles. 1 Further, we do not believe the Legislature would have adopted,elliptically, two conflicting standards. That would be the case if we were toagree with GEICO that the change made for New Jersey insureds in N.J.S.A.39:6A-3 is enough to lessen the deemer statute’s BI liability requirements.Indeed, we conclude otherwise with respect to the deemer statute’srequirements. The Legislature did not incorporate into the deemer statute thenew clause added to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3 -- “Except as provided in [N.J.S.A.39:6A-3.1” -- which provided an exception to the mandatory BI coverage byway of the basic policy. Without a new cross-reference or some otheramendment to the deemer statute in 1998, we read the deemer statute asoriginally drafted: it referenced the mandatory BI coverage provided for in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3 at the time the deemer statute was enacted.1 As NJAJ has argued, automobile is defined as “a private passenger automobile of a private passenger or station wagon type that is owned . . . and is neither used as a public or livery conveyance for passengers nor rented to others with a driver.” N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(a). Motor vehicle means “motor vehicle as defined in [N.J.S.A. 39:1-1], exclusive of an automobile as defined in subsection a. of this section.” N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(j). Thus, the Legislature recognized a distinction between automobiles and motor vehicles. For that reason, the deemer statute contains an “or” provision that incorporates N.J.S.A. 39:6B-1 (which covers motor vehicles) and N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3 (which covers automobiles). 21 GEICO’s interpretation would inject ambiguity into the mandatorystandard. It defies logic and sensibility that by retaining the reference to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3, the Legislature intended to make so large scale a change tothe deemer statute’s second sentence when, at the same time, the Legislatureknew how to and did incorporate an explicit reference to the basic policy in thefirst sentence. And, last, if we were to accept that the compulsory insurance obligationsof insurers has dropped to the basic policy’s BI floor, it would render themandatory language of the deemer statute’s second sentence nonsensical. Weare directed by the Legislature to presume that it intended that its words begiven their ordinary and plain meaning. See N.J.S.A. 1:1-1. GEICO’sinterpretation conflicts with the must “satisfy at least” structure of thesentence, as well as the Legislature’s added emphasis on the requirements ofsubsection a. of N.J.S.A. 39:6B-1. Ultimately, the Legislature’s failure toinclude any reference to a basic policy in the deemer statute’s second sentenceis fatal to the argument advanced by GEICO. The deemer statute speaks to what an insurer must provide. It hasalways been aligned to compulsory minimums that insurers must provide forinsureds in New Jersey. The fact that the Legislature now permits New Jerseyinsureds to accept something less in BI coverage -- namely, zero BI coverage 22 -- does not alter what remains the compulsory minimum BI liability coverageamounts that insurers writing in New Jersey must provide. See N.J. Mfrs. Ins.Co. v. Varjabedian, 391 N.J. Super 253, 258 (App. Div. 2007) (“It is only theinsured, not the insurer, who can elect to purchase the reduced coverageprovided with the basic policy.”). “From the perspective of the insurers’obligation, the required compulsory insurance liability limits remain$15,000/$30,000.” Ibid. That principle was recognized shortly after theAICRA changes, see Cooper Hosp., 378 N.J. Super. at 516, and the Legislaturehas never corrected that interpretation of the import of its AICRA alterationsregarding minimum compulsory insurance to be offered by insurers in NewJersey. As the Appellate Division stated, “[w]e have no reason to conclude thatthe Legislature meant to eliminate the $15,000/$30,000 BI coverage minimumjust because it referred to the basic policy in one part of the statute thataddresses affiliates where it did not include that reference in the secondsentence, the original portion of the statute.” We agree. The plain language ofthe statute leads to that conclusion. 23 IV. A. GEICO claims a federal equal protection violation as its fallbackargument in its challenge to the deemer statute. Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a statemay not “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protections oflaws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 2. A state is required to generally treatalike “all persons who are similarly situated.” State v. Bianco, 103 N.J. 383,394 (1986); see Greenberg v. Kimmelman, 99 N.J. 552, 564 (1985) (explaininghow federal equal protection analysis employs different tiers of review whenreviewing classifications that differentiate among persons). Here we deal not with any fundamental right nor must we differentiatebetween a suspect or semi-suspect class, which require the stricter forms ofreview. See Greenberg, 99 N.J. at 564. This is economic legislation beingchallenged by an insurer subject to its requirements. In this circumstance, therational basis test applies, in which “legislation is presumed to be valid andwill be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally relatedto a legitimate state interest.” Bianco, 103 N.J. at 394. 24 B. At the outset, it bears noting that no insurer is forced to write in NewJersey. For the privilege of doing that, an insurer is bound by the law of NewJersey. Every automobile insurance company that writes in New Jerseyaccepts the same law and, thus, is treated the same. In-state insurers that write auto policies in New Jersey and authorizedinsurers that write in New Jersey and that also write for out-of-state insuredsmust both offer their insureds the minimum compulsory level of BI liabilitycoverage of $15,000/$30,000 per person/per accident. The fact that legislationnow permits New Jersey resident insureds to choose to purchase a lesseramount of liability coverage, and still be considered lawfully insured, does notalter the obligation of either category of insurers to offer and provide the samedefault statutory minimum level of compulsory coverage. See Varjabedian, 391 N.J. Super at 258 (noting that AICRA’s basic policy construct has notaltered the obligations of the insurer because, “[f]rom the perspective of theinsurers’ obligation, the required compulsory insurance liability limits rema in$15,000/$30,000”). The choice to elect basic policy coverage belongs to theNew Jersey insured, not to the insurer; the insurer remains bound to offer andmust provide at least the minimum compulsory liability amounts 25 presumptively set by the Legislature, unless a New Jersey resident makes thebasic policy election. As the Appellate Division correctly observed, “all insurers writingpolicies in New Jersey are treated uniformly; it’s the consumer who has theoption to purchase more affordable coverage.” We agree with that assessment. Comparing a New Jersey authorized insurer that writes in New Jersey toanother New Jersey authorized insurer that writes in New Jersey and alsowrites in other states, the equal protection claim falls flat. The insurers aretreated the same with respect to the duty to provide minimum compulsoryinsurance coverage limits -- whether to resident insureds or to out-of-stateinsureds through policies written in other states. There is no discriminatoryclassification. New Jersey insureds are the ones who have a choice to purchase lessthan the presumptive minimum amount that must be offered by all insurersauthorized to transact automobile insurance business in this State. Theobligation of in-state insurers to offer and provide that minimum is the same asthe obligation imposed under the deemer statute’s second sentence onauthorized insurers writing an out-of-state policy. For those out-of-statepolicies, the Legislature has made the policy choice to stick with the 26 compulsory minimum limits. We do not view that legislative choice as failinga rational basis test. The deemer statute has long been recognized as having a rationalpurpose that advanced legitimate state interests. The statute was enacted in1985 “in response to a growing number of cases where New Jersey residentswere injured in accidents caused by out-of-state drivers whose insurancecoverage was less than New Jersey’s statutory requirements.” Gov’t Emps.Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 358 N.J. Super. 555, 560 (2003) (internalquotation marks omitted) (quoting Craig & Pomeroy, § 1:2-6). In imposing onthe out-of-state insurance writer the same obligation to write insurance for itsout-of-state insureds that it must write for insureds in New Jersey, New Jerseyinsureds’ interests were advanced as well as other policy goals. The statutewas also expressly “intended 'to reduce the demands on the Unsatisfied Claimand Judgment Fund [(UCJF)].’” Ibid. (quoting Craig & Pomeroy, § 1:2-6).The statute was intended to help “lower premiums, reduce litigation[,] andmake PIP benefits available to all.” Id. at 561. The Legislature’s choice to exercise caution with respect to the assets ofthe UCJF is also advanced here and lends support in this challenge to thecurrent version of the deemer statute. The legislative choice to be moreprotective of the UCJF from claims caused by out-of-state insured tortfeasors 27 who may have no access to BI insurance coverage than from a claim caused bya New Jersey tortfeasor having only a basic policy is not an irrational policychoice. The allowance of a basic-policy choice for New Jersey residents doesnot undermine the rationality of the deemer statute. In New Jersey, there isstill a presumption for the standard policy and its limits of coverage. TheLegislature has reinforced that presumption through the deemer statute , whichpromotes the availability of insurance coverage for accidents that occur inNew Jersey, helps reduce litigation, and alleviates the upward pressure onpremiums in New Jersey. C. Finally, we are compelled to note that any argument that relies on aclaimed disparity for the out-of-state insured -- for whom the Legislature hasmade the choice to retain the presumptive standard policy BI coverage limits --is misplaced in this appeal. First of all, there is no insured to advance such a claim. GEICO cannotadvance the claim of an insured as if it were its own.22 The perspective of the insured is not only an improper viewpoint for the insurer to adopt as its argument in this equal protection analysis, we are constrained to note, moreover, that an out-of-state insured, unhappy with the deemer statute’s impact on his or her rates with an insurer subject to New Jersey’s statute, has other viable courses of action. Such an individual can choose to purchase insurance from an out-of-state insurer that does not write in New Jersey in order to avoid the deemer statute’s application. 28 The lack of an insured as a party is problematic also because a properrecord has not been presented. We do not know from this record what aninsured is told in another jurisdiction about his or her coverage choices. Wedo not know whether the potential for the deemer statute’s triggering has anyimpact on out-of-state insurance policy ratings. Not knowing whether therewould be any differential, we cannot assume or speculate on whether anyeffect would be impactful or even discernible from an insured’s perspective.In short, there is critical information missing from this record. We cannotoperate on assumptions and speculation about the impact that the deemerstatute has on an out-of-state insured. That said, in the past, the legislative decision to treat in-state and out-of-state insureds differently in terms of the scope of their choice of coverage hasnot been deemed irrational. See Whitaker, 147 N.J. at 357-58. In Whitaker,this Court rejected an equal protection challenge by an insured because in-stateinsureds are afforded a verbal threshold/tort option choice but the deemerstatute imposed a verbal threshold on out-of-state policies. Ibid. (“Because[out-of-state] carriers could be compelled to offer their non-resident insuredsthe benefits of New Jersey’s minimum liability, uninsured motorist, andpersonal injury protection benefit coverages, the Legislature determined that itcould appropriately impose the verbal threshold on those insureds.”). 29 We deal here only with an insurer’s claim of an equal protectionviolation. As to that, we find no violation of equal protection in the operationof the deemer statute as construed. V. The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICE ALBIN join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA’s opinion. JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA filed a dissent, in which JUSTICE SOLOMON joins. JUSTICES PATTERSON and TIMPONE did not participate. 30 Guerline Felix, Plaintiff, v. Brian V. Richards, Defendant.Brian V. Richards and Kassandria Richards, his wife per quod, Plaintiffs, v. Guerline Felix, Mid-Atlantic Insurance Company of New Jersey, Defendants, and AAA Mid-Atlantic Insurance Company, Third-Party Plaintiff-Respondent, v. GEICO Indemnity Company, Third-Party Defendant-Appellant.JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA, dissenting. 1 I would reverse the Appellate Division’s judgment. Under the deemerstatute, an insurer’s out-of-state policies must include coverage to satisfy atleast the liability insurance requirements of N.J.S.A. 39:6B-1(a) or N.J.S.A.39:6A-3. Because both statutes can be satisfied by policies that carry no BIcoverage, GEICO fulfilled its duty. I respectfully dissent from the majority’sfinding that GEICO did not satisfy its duty because requiring GEICO to reformits policy would constitute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. New Jersey insureds are not required to have BIcoverage themselves, and requiring out-of-state insurers to provide morecoverage when their insureds enter the state distinguishes unconstitutionallybetween in-state and out-of-state drivers. The deemer statute, N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.4, “requires insurers authorized totransact automobile insurance business in New Jersey to provide coverage toout-of-state residents consistent with New Jersey law 'whenever theautomobile or motor vehicle insured under the policy is used or operated inthis State.’” Zabilowicz v. Kelsey, 200 N.J. 507, 513 (2009) (quoting N.J.S.A.17:28-1.4). The statute was enacted in 1985 as part of the State’s “no faultautomobile insurance plan” and “in response to a growing number of caseswhere New Jersey residents were injured in accidents caused by out-of-statedrivers whose insurance coverage was less than New Jersey’s statutory 2 requirements.” Leggette v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 450 N.J. Super. 261, 265(App. Div. 2017) (quoting Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 358 N.J.Super. 555, 560 (App. Div. 2003)). When enacted in 1985, the deemer statute required insurers to includePersonal Injury Protection (PIP) and other New Jersey coverages in their out-of-state drivers’ policies. Allstate Ins. Co., 358 N.J. Super. at 560. TheLegislature aimed to minimize the number of New Jersey residents injured inautomobile accidents by out-of-state drivers with BI coverage less than theNew Jersey state requirements. Ibid. The Legislature additionally intended“to reduce the demands on the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund[(UCJF)].” Ibid. (quoting Craig & Pomeroy, N.J. Auto Insurance Law, § 1:2-6(2003)). Out-of-state policies subject to the statute that do not contain expressprovisions in compliance with the New Jersey statute are “deemed” to comply.Ibid. As a result, “the law acquired the name by which it is commonly known,the deemer statute.” Ibid. The deemer statute was additionally intended “tolower premiums, [and] reduce litigation” while seeking the proper recourse forNew Jersey residents when injured by out-of-state drivers. Id. at 561. I conclude GEICO satisfied its duty under the deemer statute, andmandating it to reform its Florida policy violates the Equal Protection Clauseof the federal constitution. I disagree with the majority’s view that to satisfy 3 its duty under the deemer statute, GEICO must include in its Florida policy theBI coverage outlined in N.J.S.A. 39:6B-1(a), or if it fails to do so, the policywill be deemed to have BI coverage of $15,000/$30,000. This view ignoresthat N.J.S.A. 39:6B-1 has been amended since the deemer statute was enacted,and thus has created two alternate tracks by which a New Jersey driver cansatisfy the requirements of N.J.S.A. 39:6B-1(a), even if her policy carries zeroBI coverage. The basic policy referenced in N.J.S.A. 39:6B-1(b) explicitly offersinsureds the option of purchasing personal liability coverage for $10,000.Nonetheless, the basic policy does not “provide for or mandate personalliability insurance like its 'standard policy’ counterpart.” Citizens UnitedReciprocal Exch. v. Perez, 223 N.J. 143, 153 (2015). Therefore, a New Jerseydriver can satisfy N.J.S.A. 39:6B-1(a), a statute that “appears” to require allNew Jersey drivers to carry BI coverage of $15,000/$30,000, by purchasing abasic policy that may carry zero BI coverage. At most, the basic policy canhave BI coverage of $10,000 per accident. Furthermore, like the basic policy, the special policy referenced in N.J.S.A. 39:6B-1(c) has no BI coverage. As such, a New Jersey driver canalso satisfy the minimum requirements of N.J.S.A. 39:6B-1(a), a statute thatalso “appears” to require all New Jersey drivers to carry BI coverage of 4 $15,000/$30,000, by purchasing a special policy that necessarily has no BIcoverage. In sum, when read together, N.J.S.A. 39:6B-1(a), (b), and (c)establish that New Jersey drivers can satisfy the minimum requirements andavoid sanctions for noncompliance under N.J.S.A. 39:6B-2 by purchasing astandard, basic, or special automobile insurance policy that has no BIcoverage. An out-of-state insurance provider satisfies its duty under the deemerstatute if its policy’s coverage satisfies at least the liability insurancerequirements of N.J.S.A. 39:6B-1(a) or N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3. Although GEICOsatisfied its duty pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6B-1(a), it also satisfied its dutyunder N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3. More specifically, the language of the statute’s firstsentence, “[e]xcept as provided by [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3.1],” amounts to anexception within N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3 for the policy defined by N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3.1: the basic policy. The Legislature’s intent in amending N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3 is clear: a NewJersey driver can lawfully purchase a basic policy that has no BI coverage. Asa result, an insurer can satisfy the minimum requirements of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3in its out-of-state policy, even if the policy carries no BI coverage. This leadsto the same conclusion drawn above: GEICO’s Florida policy should not bedeemed to have BI coverage of $15,000/$30,000. 5 Given the specific facts of this case and the creation of the basic andspecial policies, New Jersey drivers can no longer reasonably expect the otherdrivers with whom they share the road to necessarily have BI coverage. Inother words, whenever a New Jersey resident is driving, he or she is at risk ofinvolvement in an accident with another New Jersey driver whose policycarries no BI coverage. According to the Legislature, this is an acceptable riskbecause policies with no BI coverage are more “affordable for individuals withlimited income” and “encourage drivers to seek coverage” who otherwisemight not. See Citizens United, 223 N.J. at 153, 156. If the deemer statutewere interpreted to require insurers to include BI coverage of $15,000/$30,000in their out-of-state policies, New Jersey drivers would be in a better positionif injured by an out-of-state driver with the out-of-state equivalent of a basic orspecial policy than they would be if they were injured by a New Jersey driverwho had an actual basic or special policy. Because GEICO satisfied its duty pursuant to the deemer statute, it is notnecessary to reach the constitutional question at issue. However, even thoughthe majority deemed GEICO’s Florida policy to carry $15,000/$30,000 BIcoverage, mandating GEICO to reform its out-of-state policy violates theEqual Protection Clause, as it requires out-of-state insurance companies whodo business in New Jersey or are affiliated with those who do business in New 6 Jersey to provide higher coverage limits for its out-of-state insureds than isrequired for in-state drivers. This is not to suggest that the deemer statuteitself is unconstitutional, but that it is unconstitutional as applied to GEICO inthis circumstance. “The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibitsa State from denying 'any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection ofthe laws,’” which is “'essentially a direction that all persons similarly situatedshould be treated alike.’” Dyszel v. Marks, 6 F.3d 116 , 124-25 (3d Cir. 1993)(quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 , 439 (1984)).Because the deemer statute does not infringe on fundamental rights and is not“drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion, oralienage,” it is evaluated under rational basis review. Maceluch v. Wysong, 680 F.2d 1062, 1065 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 , 303 (1976)); accord Dyszel, 6 F.3d at 125. “If a statutory distinction hassome reasonable basis, 'a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clausemerely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect.’” Whitakerv. DeVilla, 147 N.J. 341, 358 (1997) (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 , 485 (1970)). The basic automobile policy was introduced by the Legislature with theintent to provide affordable insurance to those who would otherwise not pursue 7 coverage. However, the scheme that New Jersey implements does not furtherthe Legislature’s intent. When enacting basic and special automobileinsurance policies, the Legislature was likely not interested in whether out-of-state drivers had access to the same type of affordable insurance product asNew Jersey drivers. The Legislature, therefore, could have sought to design ascheme in which most drivers on New Jersey roads carry BI coverage becausethey either own a standard policy, own a basic policy with optional BIcoverage, or own an out-of-state policy that, regardless of its terms, is deemedto have BI coverage of $15,000/$30,000. The only drivers without at leastsome amount of BI coverage would be the minority of drivers who own eithera basic policy with no BI coverage, or a special policy. This scheme wouldmaximize New Jersey consumers’ access to affordable insurance while alsominimizing the pressure on the UCJF’s financial resources. Although this Court recognizes that an automobile insurance scheme thatproperly compensates accident victims by liable tortfeasors is desirable, such ascheme cannot expect or require out-of-state drivers to carry higher BIcoverage limits than those New Jersey drivers are required to carry. In such acircumstance, and in this case, New Jersey drivers are wrongfully advantaged,given the option to purchase no BI coverage while out-of-state drivers aredeemed to provide $15,000/$30,000, regardless of insurer or policy type. This 8 wrongfully infringes upon the rights of out-of-state insurance carriers andcitizens, as well as out-of-state insurers’ ability to do business in New Jersey. The argument that this provides a benefit to the out-of-state driver byproviding additional BI coverage does not consider that the coverage is likelyprovided at the cost of an increase in premium. Specifically, Florida’s MotorVehicle No-Fault Law was enacted in 1971 to “provide for medical, surgical,funeral, and disability insurance benefits without regard to fault, and to requiremotor vehicle insurance securing such benefits.” Fla. Stat. § 627.731.Through its enactment, the Florida Legislature intended to require motorvehicle insurers who issue policies in Florida to provide PIP benefits forbodily injury “arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motorvehicle.” Fla. Stat. § 627.736(1). Therefore, Florida insureds driving throughNew Jersey inevitably carry BI coverage in their policies, something NewJersey drivers are not required to do. In the event a Florida insured is involved in an accident with a NewJersey driver in New Jersey, under the current New Jersey legislative scheme,the Florida driver is required to carry more BI coverage than the New Jerseydriver and is more likely to be liable for damages as a result. Such disparity incoverage frustrates the legislative intent of our sister state and may affectFlorida insurers’ willingness to do business in New Jersey in the future. The 9 same holds true for all other states whose insurance policies carry some levelof mandated BI coverage. Because GEICO satisfied its duty pursuant to the deemer statute, as wellas both N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3 and N.J.S.A. 39:6B-1, GEICO should not be requiredto reform its Florida policy to include $15,000/$30,000 BI coverage . Even ifGEICO failed to satisfy its statutory duty, requiring it to reform its Floridapolicy would violate the Equal Protection Clause and would beunconstitutional. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 10