Title: N.H. v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.)
Citation: 1999 OK 88, 70OBJ3260, 998 P.2d 592
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: November 2, 1999

N.H. v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) Annotate this Case N.H. v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) 1999 OK 88 998 P.2d 592 70 OBJ 3260 Case Number: 92953 Decided: 11/02/1999 Mandate Issued: 10/02/1962 Supreme Court of Oklahoma N.H., a minor, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH (U.S.A.), an unincorporated association, Defendant/Appellee. [998 P.2d 593] APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY; Honorable Nancy L. Coats, District Judge ¶0 The plaintiff/appellant, N.H. (N.H.), is one of twelve minors molested by a Presbyterian minister, Robert Bruce Brigden (Brigden). The minors, under N.H.'s name, sued the defendant/appellee, Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) (national organization), for damages arising from the molestation. N.H. asserted that the national organization was liable for Brigden's conduct under the doctrine of respondeat superior and for negligence in hiring, retaining and supervising Brigden. The national organization moved for summary judgment arguing that: 1) no master/servant or employer/employee relationship existed to support the imposition of liability; and 2) even if an agency relationship could be established, the United States Constitution barred [998 P.2d 594] adjudication of the cause. Persuaded by the First Amendment argument, the trial judge, Honorable Nancy J. Coats, sustained the motion for summary judgment on all claims and causes of action. Presuming the existence of a principal/agent or employer/employee relationship, we hold that: 1) because Brigden's acts were outside the scope of employment as a matter of law, respondeat superior liability may not be imposed; 2) the action for negligent hiring, retention and supervision fails because the national organization lacked knowledge sufficient to impose liability; and 3) pursuant to Bladen v. First Presbyterian Church of Sallisaw, 1993 OK 105, ¶29, 857 P.2d 789 , 797, the lack of an underlying relationship supporting an award against the national organization renders a First Amendment analysis unnecessary. AFFIRMED. Michael M. Blue, John M. Merritt, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, For Plaintiffs/Appellants. Graydon Dean Luthey, Jr. Tulsa, Oklahoma, For Defendant/Appellee. John B. Jarboe, Tulsa, Oklahoma, Mark E. Chopko, General Counsel, Michael F. Moses, Assistant General Counsel, United States Catholic Conference, Washington, D.C., For Amici Curiae. ¶1 KAUGER, J.:¶2 We retained this cause to consider,1 under the facts presented: 1) whether respondeat superior liability may be imposed against the defendant/appellee, Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) (national organization), for tortious acts of its minister, Robert Bruce Brigden (Brigden); 2) whether the national organization is liable for negligence in hiring, retaining or supervising Brigden; and 3) whether a First Amendment2 analysis is necessary to resolve the issues. For the purposes of this opinion, we presume that an employer-employee relationship existed between the national organization and Brigden. Under the facts presented, we hold that the national organization is not liable for Brigden's tortious conduct. Because no basis exists to impose liability against the national organization, we decline, as we did in Bladen v. First Presbyterian Church of Sallisaw, 1993 OK 105, ¶29, 857 P.2d 789 , 797, to determine whether the First Amendment stands as a bar to all employment-related liability of an ecclesiastical organization for its ministerial officers. ALLEGED FACTS ¶3 The cause arises from actions occurring in 1990 and in 1991 while Brigden served as a minister of the First Presbyterian Church in Alva, Oklahoma [Alva Church]. Brigden was [998 P.2d 595] ordained as a Presbyterian minister on July 1, 1960. Prior to his employment in Alva, Brigden served as a minister of the Presbyterian Church in Wellington, Kansas from July of 1969 to March of 1980. During this period, there were complaints from members of his congregation lodged with the church session (elders) and with a representative of the Presbytery of Southern Kansas (a group composed of several churches in the geographical area).3 The allegations concerned his relationship with minors.4 On January 27, 1980, a special congregational meeting of the Wellington church was called to approve dissolution of the ministerial relationship effective July 1,1980, or at an earlier date if Brigden received a call to another congregation.5 ¶4 Effective March 24, 1980, Brigden transferred from the Wellington Church to Beloit, Kansas, where he served as minister until May of 1987. Upon the transfer, the Presbytery of Southern Kansas did not inform the Presbytery of Northern Kansas of any problems with the minister. Rather, Brigden was described as a "faithful Presbyter."6 At the Beloit church, concerns relating to Brigden's conduct surfaced again. Some of these complaints specifically related to his involvement with children.7 Although a representative of the Presbytery of Northern Kansas attended a session meeting where some of these concerns were voiced, the representative did not report the concerns to the regional organization. Before leaving the Beloit church, Brigden's attendance at a [998 P.2d 596] psychiatric facility for evaluation was approved.8 Brigden was referred to the Menninger Foundation by the Committee on Ministry of the Presbytery of Northern Kansas.9 The diagnostic interview report prepared during Brigden's stay indicated that any contact he might have with children should be monitored.10 Without having obtained a copy of the report, the Presbytery of Northern Kansas approved Brigden's move to the Cimarron Presbytery of Oklahoma representing him "as a member in good standing . . . to whose fraternal affection and fellowship this minister is hereby cordially commended. . . ."11 ¶5 Effective, August 23, 1987, Brigden was transferred to the Alva Church at which time the Presbytery of Northern Kansas characterized the minister as a "member in good standing."12 Brigden served as a counselor at a Presbyterian children's camp from August 6-12, 1989. While there, serious allegations of inappropriate behavior with minors were raised by camp counselors. These concerns were communicated to the Chairman of the Cimarron Presbytery Committee on Ministry. However, the concerns were not shared with anyone at the Alva Church or with the general assembly of the national organization.13 ¶6 Although ecclesiastical authorities at the session and presbytery levels of the church structure were aware of complaints involving Brigden at each of the three churches where he served, these concerns were not communicated to anyone at the national organization. Not only were worries about his behavior not shared as Brigden transferred from church-to-church, Brigden [998 P.2d 597] was recommended favorably to the receiving ministries.14 ¶7 During his tenure as minister of the Alva Church, Brigden sexually molested twelve minors.15 Although some of the children molested may have been from Presbyterian families, many of the children molested were not church members or the children of members of the congregation. Rather, Brigden committed the acts during recreational activities aimed at recruiting new members and their families. Most of the acts occurred in the church manse --- housing provided to Brigden and his family by the church. ¶8 On September 30, 1997, the minors, represented by the plaintiff/appellant, N.H. (N.H.), filed suit against the national organization of the Presbyterian Church alleging its liability for Brigden's conduct. N.H. does not assert that anyone other than Brigden actually committed the acts, and the complaint does not name the minister or his estate, the local congregation, the session (composed of elders of the local church), the presbytery (composed of several churches in the geographical area), the synod (composed of all presbyteries within a state), or the general assembly (the highest governing body).16 Rather, N.H. named only the national organization which is characterized as an unincorporated association made up of all members of the Presbyterian Church governed by the general assembly.17 N.H. sought recovery under the doctrine of respondeat superior and for negligence in hiring, retaining and supervising Brigden.18 ¶9 The national organization filed a motion for summary judgment on July 15, 1998. It asserted that the First Amendment prevented the trial court from proceeding. The national organization also argued that any liability based upon a master/servant or principal/agent theory must fail, because it had no authority over the ordination of Brigden as a minister or his hiring at the Alva Church or elsewhere. The trial court sustained the national organization's motion for summary judgement on March 23, 1999, finding that "all of the claims and causes of actions [sic] pursued by the Plaintiffs herein are barred by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution."19 On May 11, 1999, N.H. appealed, and the parties filed a joint [998 P.2d 598] motion to retain. The motion was granted on June 1, 1999, and briefs were ordered. On August 19, 1999, we granted amici curiae's20 application to file a brief in support of the national organization. The final brief was filed on August 23, 1999. I. ¶10 ASSUMING THE EXISTENCE OF AN AGENCY RELATIONSHIP, LIABILITY MAY NOT BE IMPOSED FOR BRIGDEN'S ACTS. ¶11 N.H. alleges that there are material issues of fact militating against the entry of summary judgment on the existence of an employment relationship and on questions of liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior and for negligence in hiring, retaining and supervising Brigden. The national organization argues that no agency relationship existed. Assuming the relationship, it urges that liability may not be imposed, because: 1) the acts were outside the scope of employment; and 2) it had no notice of Brigden's activities or propensities. ¶12 Agency is generally a question of fact determined by the trier of fact.21 The burden of proving agency rests on the party asserting it.22 In the Presbyterian Church structure, the presbytery (the local congregation) is responsible for examining, ordaining, installing, dismissing and otherwise disciplining ministers.23 Even the session, composed of the presbytery's elders, may not remove a pastor without the former's consent.24 Nevertheless, the national organization has been found to exert sufficient control over a pastor and the congregation to allow jurisdiction under a long-arm statute.25 Because we presume that Brigden was the national organization's agent for the purposes of this opinion, we need not determine the exact parameters of the relationship between a Presbyterian minister and the national organization. ¶13 A. UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR - THE ACTS WERE OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. ¶14 Respondeat superior is a legal doctrine holding an employer liable for the willful torts of an employee acting within the scope of employment in furtherance of assigned duties.26 Generally, an assault upon a third person is not within the scope of employment.27 Exceptions to the general rule exist if: 1) the act is fairly and naturally incident to the employer's business; 2) the act occurs while the employee is engaged in an act for the employer; or 3) the assault [998 P.2d 599] arises from a natural impulse growing out of or incident to the attempt to complete the master's business.28 Nevertheless, an assertion that an act is accomplished during an employment activity is insufficient to assess liability against the employer unless the act was done to accomplish the assigned work.29 ¶15 We held in Rodebush v. Oklahoma Nursing Homes, Ltd., 1993 OK 160, ¶15, 867 P.2d 124l, that a nursing home employee was within the scope of employment when he struck an Alzheimer patient during a bathing procedure. The attendant had been assigned the specific duty of bathing Alzheimer patients known to be combative. No evidence was presented that the aide had been told not to strike patients. In Rodebush, the aide's act was an impulsive action naturally arising from the situation he had been placed in by the employer. ¶16 In Rodebush, the aide had to control a combative patient. The assault was an impulsive response to attempt to complete the patient's bath. Although Brigden's acts may have arisen from some "impulse" while he was supposedly approaching the children to bring them to the Presbyterian faith, no one contends that sexual acts with minors are in any manner authorized or condoned by the national organization. Assuredly, the acts are condemned by the Presbyterian Church. Undoubtedly, such conduct is an anathema to the national organization's religious practices. ¶17 Our survey of national jurisprudence reveals that the majority of jurisdictions considering the issue of sexual contact between an ecclesiastic officer and a parishioner have held that the act is outside the scope of employment as a matter of law.30 We agree. Ministers should not molest children. When they do, it is not a part of the minister's duty nor customary within the business of the congregation.31 Rather than increasing membership, the conduct would assuredly result in persons spurning rather than accepting a faith condoning the abhorrent behavior. No reasonable person would conclude that Brigden's sexual misconduct was within the scope of employment or in furtherance of the national organizations's business. ¶18 Brigden acted for his own personal gratification rather than for any religious purpose. Brigden abused his position and exploited his special relationship with the children. It is inconceivable that Brigden's acts were of the nature of those which he was hired to perform. Because Brigden was acting outside the scope of his employment as a [998 P.2d 600] matter of law when the molestation occurred, we hold that liability may not be imposed under the doctrine of respondeat superior.32 ¶19 B. BECAUSE THE NATIONAL ORGANIZATION WAS UNAWARE OF BRIGDEN'S ACTS AND PROPENSITIES, A CAUSE OF ACTION WILL NOT LIE FOR NEGLIGENT HIRING, RETENTION OR SUPERVISION. ¶20 Employers may be held liable for negligence in hiring, supervising or retaining an employee.33 In such instances, recovery is sought for the employer's negligence.34 The claim is based on an employee's harm to a third party through employment. An employer is found liable, if - at the critical time of the tortious incident- , the employer had reason to believe that the person would create an undue risk of harm to others. Employers are held liable for their prior knowledge of the servant's propensity to commit the very harm for which damages are sought.35 In Oklahoma, the theory of recovery is available if vicarious liability is not established.36 In other jurisdictions, actions against churches for negligent hiring, supervision and retention have been allowed when the supervising authority had notice sufficient to prevent reasonably foreseeable harm caused by sexual advances of its ecclesiastical representatives.37 ¶21 The critical element for recovery is the employer's prior knowledge of the servant's propensities to create the specific danger resulting in damage.38 Before N.H. may recover, it would be necessary to demonstrate that the national organization had notice of Brigden's deviant sexual tendencies before his transfer to the Alva Church.39 There is nothing in the record to [998 P.2d 601] indicate that Brigden had a criminal history before moving to Alva. Although concerns had been voiced previously concerning his conduct and contact with children at the presbytery level, there is no evidence that those concerns were communicated to the national organization or to members of the Alva Church. Rather, in the transfers from church-to-church, Brigden was described as a "faithful Presbyter"40 and recommended "as a member in good standing . . . to whose fraternal affection and fellowship this minister is hereby cordially commended. . . ."41 Reports which would have alerted the Alva Church of Brigden's propensities were not obtained by his preceding congregational leaders.42 Concerns about Brigden's conduct at a youth camp after his transfer to Alva was approved were not communicated either to the Alva Church or the national organization.43¶22 Knowledge of an agent is imputed to the principal absent circumstances raising a clear presumption that the agent will not communicate the knowledge to the principal.44 Here, it is obvious that not only was the national organization not advised of the situation, evidence of Brigden's propensities may have been intentionally withheld from members at both the national and the local church level. We hold that the action for negligent hiring, retention and supervision fails because the national organization lacked knowledge sufficient to impose liability. II. ¶23 PURSUANT TO BLADEN v. PRESBYTERIAN CHURCHOF SALLISAW, THE LACK OF AN UNDERLYING RELATIONSHIP SUPPORTING AN AWARD AGAINST THE NATIONAL ORGANIZATION RENDERS A FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS UNNECESSARY. ¶24 N.H. asserts that claims against the national organization do not contravene the First Amendment. Although in granting summary judgment, the trial court found that all claims and causes of action were barred by the Constitution,45 the national organization invokes First Amendment protection only for liability for negligent hiring, retention and supervision.46 ¶25 Both parties rely on Bladen v. First Presbyterian Church of Sallisaw, 1993 OK 105, ¶29, 857 P.2d 789 , 797. In Bladen, a husband and wife brought suit against a local church and its minister for an adulterous affair conducted between the minister and the wife. The affair occurred while the minister was providing the couple with marital counseling. Finding that the minister was not liable, we refused to consider claims against the church under the doctrine of respondeat superior or for negligent hiring and supervision. In so doing, the Court did not reach the issue of whether the Constitution barred civil courts from defining the nature of the employment criteria a church should use in selecting individuals for ecclesiastical office. [998 P.2d 602] ¶26 Bladen did not address the First Amendment question because there was no underlying employee liability to support recovery against the church. Here, we are in a similar procedural posture. The specific governmental interference challenged is civil court enforcement of tort law against the religious organization. Because we hold that - even assuming an agency or employment relationship between Brigden and the national organization - no liability may be imposed, we need not determine whether the First Amendment would stand as a bar to all employment-related liability of an ecclesiastical organization for its ministerial officers.47 CONCLUSION ¶27 The First Amendment does not grant religious organizations blanket immunity from suit.48 The parties do not contend - and this Court would not sanction an [ 998 P.2d 603 ] argument - that broad First Amendment protection be given to protect sexual abusers of children. However, we are not asked in this cause to address the liability of the abuser. Rather, the issue of whether church officials, who did not perpetrate acts of childhood sexual abuse and who lacked knowledge that such acts were being committed, should be held liable is presented. Sexual abuse of children is a tragedy. Hard questions are presented because the Court is faced with strong public policy favoring the protection of children from sexual abuse.49 At the same time, payment for that harm is sought not from the tortfeasor, but from others. Ultimately, the Court is determining potential liability of a third party for another person's intentional criminal conduct. As difficult as it may be to conclude that recovery will not be allowed, there is no principled basis for finding liability on the part of the national organization. We conclude that, under the facts presented - where the acts were clearly outside the scope of employment and the church officials lacked knowledge of the abuse - liability may not be imposed. ¶28 Summary judgment is proper only when the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions or other evidentiary materials establish that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.50 Although we do not reach the constitutional issue found dispositive by the trial court, the summary judgment ruling is affirmed.51 Our holding is based on Oklahoma law which provides bona fide, separate, adequate and independent grounds for our decision.52 ¶29 AFFIRMED. ALL JUSTICES CONCUR. FOOT