Title: SMITH v. MOORE
Citation: 2002 OK 49, 50 P.3d 215
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: June 11, 2002

SMITH v. MOORE Annotate this Case SMITH v. MOORE 2002 OK 49 50 P.3d 215 Case Number: 96949 Decided: 06/11/2002 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA EUGENE SMITH, Appellant v. THE HONORABLE MARK A. MOORE, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE, BLAINE COUNTY, Appellee [50 P.3d 215] ON APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BLAINE COUNTY, HONORABLE MARK A. MOORE, ASSOCIATE DISTRICT JUDGE ¶0 Eugene Smith, a prisoner, filed for a writ of mandamus in the District Court of Blaine County. He submitted a request to proceed as a pauper so that he would not have to pay the filing fee in the case. Upon consideration of Smith's status, the trial judge ordered Smith to pay $48.00 as a filing fee and imposed a lien on his pay from prison labor. Smith appealed. We recast the appeal as an original proceeding for a prerogative writ. WRITS OF PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, WITH INSTRUCTIONS. Eugene Smith, pro se WINCHESTER, J. ¶1 The appellant, Eugene Smith, a prisoner, filed an application for a writ of mandamus and requested pauper status so that court costs would be waived. The trial court issued an order dated September 24, 2001, which found that Smith had an income of $24.00 per month for "gang pay." The court then assessed $48.00 of court costs against Smith, citing Foust v. Pearman, ¶2 We must initially determine a procedural issue, and that is whether the district court's order is appealable. This Court has appellate jurisdiction to review final orders, interlocutory orders appealable by right, and certified interlocutory orders. "An appeal does not lie to this court from an intermediate or interlocutory order made during the pendency of an action, which intermediate or interlocutory order leaves the parties in court to have the issues tried on the merits, unless the appeal sought to be taken comes within some one of the special orders from which an appeal is authorized by statute prior to final judgment in the main action." The order in the present case is not a final order because it does not conclude the litigation; [50 P.3d 216] it merely requires the payment of a filing fee. The wording of the order does not prevent the prisoner from proceeding further with the case, nor does it require him to wait until he has accumulated $48.00. Rather, the order imposes a lien on Smith's gang pay so that it would be paid to the court clerk by the prison facility as the pay became due. Because the order has no effect on the continuation of the district court case, the order is an interlocutory judicial action that is unreviewable in advance of judgment. LCR, Inc. v. Linwood Properties, ¶3 Even though this case is not appealable, and this Court may properly dismiss it, the case presents the issue of the constitutional right of access to the courts. ¶4 Smith asserts that he had only $0.24 in his account at the time he petitioned for pauper status. He argues that the trial court abused its discretion, given the amount in his account, by failing to follow the guidelines in ¶5 Foust, ¶6 Foust held that a court in exercising its discretion when determining a proper partial fee, may consider present account balances of the prisoner, monthly income, other assets, and whether any funds are withdrawn to avoid payment of a statutory fee or partial fee. Foust, ¶7 The general rule for a prerogative writ to issue is that the party seeking the writ must have a clear legal right to the relief sought and the respondent must have a plain legal duty in which the exercise of discretion is not implicated; and it may be issued only in situations where there is no plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. Oklahoma Gas & Electric v. District Court, ¶8 We issue the writs of mandamus and prohibition to the extent that the district court shall not require a filing fee equal to all of Smith's funds. The district court shall determine the amount of the filing fee consistent with the guidelines found in Foust and the instructions in this opinion. That court shall also allow Smith an opportunity to object to the filing fee as so determined. WRITS OF PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, WITH INSTRUCTIONS. ¶9 CONCUR HARGRAVE, C.J., WATT, V.C.J., HODGES, LAVENDER, SUMMERS, BOUDREAU, WINCHESTER, JJ. OPALA, J., DISSENTING, ¶1 I DISSENT FOR THE REASONS EXPRESSED BY KAUGER, J. IN HER DISSENT KAUGER, J., DISSENTING ¶1 FOR REASONS EXPRESSED IN MAHORNEY V. MOORE, 2002 OK 39. [ 50 P.3d 218 ] FOOT