Title: Ken Kempfer v. Automated Finishing, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1995AP000649
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 20, 1997

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
95-0649 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
Ken Kempfer, 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
Automated Finishing, Inc., 
 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
                                                              
 
Opinion Filed:  
June 20, 1997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument:  
October 31, 1996 
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha 
 
JUDGE: 
 
PATRICK L. SNYDER 
 
                                                              
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
Abrahamson, C.J., concurs (opinion filed) 
 
 
 
    Bradley, J., joins 
 
 
 
Steinmetz, J., concurs (opinion filed) 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: 
 
                                                              
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs by 
Joseph E. Redding, Thomas R. Napierala and Glojek Limited, West 
Allis and oral argument by Thomas R. Napierala 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief by Joseph J. 
Welcenbach and Welcenbach & Widmann, S.C., Milwaukee and oral 
argument by Joseph J. Welcenbach and Patricia Meunier of 
Shneidman, Myers, Dowling, Blumenfield, Ehlke, Hawks & Domer, 
Milwaukee. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Timothy G. Costello and Krukowski 
& Costello, S.C., Milwaukee for the Wisconsin Manufacturers & 
Commerce. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports.   
 
 
 
No.  95-0649 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN             :                IN SUPREME COURT 
                                                                   
 
 
Ken Kempfer, 
 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
Automated Finishing, Inc., 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 20, 1997 
 
 
 Marilyn L. Graves 
  
Clerk of Supreme Court 
  
Madison, WI  
 
 
                                                                
  
 
APPEAL from an order and a judgment of the Circuit Court.  
Affirmed in part, and reversed in part. 
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.  This case is on certification from 
the court of appeals following a jury trial.  The jury concluded 
that the plaintiff, Ken Kempfer (Kempfer), was entitled to 
damages of $22,167 for past wages and benefits and $145,000 for 
future lost wages and benefits from Automated Finishing, 
Incorporated (AFI) for his wrongful discharge.  The Circuit 
Court for Waukesha County, Patrick L. Snyder, Judge, denied 
AFI's motions after verdict.  AFI appealed. 
¶2 
On certification, we consider:  (1) whether, as a 
matter of law, Kempfer identified a fundamental and well-defined 
public 
policy, 
(2) 
whether 
Kempfer, 
an 
employee-at-will, 
demonstrated that he was terminated for refusing to act contrary 
to a fundamental and well-defined public policy; and (3) whether 
No. 95-0649 
 
 
2
the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by 
allowing the jury to consider awarding damages of future wage 
loss.  We hold that Kempfer identified a fundamental and well-
defined public policy and that he was terminated for refusing to 
act contrary to that public policy; however, we also hold that 
the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when it 
allowed the jury to consider awarding damages for Kempfer's 
future wage loss.  The circuit court should have determined 
whether reinstatement was feasible.  If it was not feasible, the 
circuit court should have determined what amount, if any, of 
front pay was necessary to make Kempfer whole.  Thus, we affirm 
in part and reverse in part the decision of the circuit court. 
¶3 
The relevant facts are not in dispute.  Kempfer 
was 
hired by the defendant, AFI, on October 8, 1981.  He was 
initially assigned to perform urethane mold work.  After 
approximately five years, Kempfer's job duties began to vary and 
at some point AFI began to ask Kempfer and three other employees 
to make as-needed deliveries with a 22-foot International 
Harvester flatbed truck.  The truck had been purchased in 1984 
and 
its 
weight 
was 
registered 
with 
the 
Department 
of 
Transportation as 32,000 pounds.  At the time Kempfer began 
driving the truck, AFI indicated that the only requirement was 
that the drivers hold a valid, regular driver license. 
¶4 
On March 1, 1993, Kempfer, while returning from a 
delivery, was stopped by a state patrol officer who had noticed 
that the truck had a cracked windshield.  The officer issued 
warning tickets to AFI for the cracked windshield and to Kempfer 
for not having a commercial driver license (CDL).  The officer 
No. 95-0649 
 
 
3
explained that due to the weight of his truck Kempfer was 
required by law to hold a CDL and that further violations would 
result in personal fines and/or jail time. 
¶5 
When he returned to the plant, Kempfer gave both 
citations to the plant manager.  Kempfer then made the first of 
four trips to the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) to learn 
more 
about 
the 
CDL 
requirements. 
 
He 
picked 
up 
some 
informational booklets about the CDL requirements which he later 
gave to his employer. 
¶6 
AFI subsequently asked Kempfer to drive the truck on 
six separate occasions.  Kempfer refused each time stating that 
he did not have the required CDL to drive the truck.  Kempfer 
stated that he was not told by AFI to get a CDL and that he 
would have needed to use AFI's truck to take the test.  
Accordingly, he never obtained a CDL. 
¶7 
On the morning of April 16, 1994, the plant manager 
again told Kempfer to drive the truck.  Kempfer refused stating 
that he did not have the proper licensing.  The plant manager 
found another employee to drive the truck, and reported 
Kempfer's refusal. As a result, Kempfer was suspended for two 
days.  Kempfer then went to the DMV for a fourth time.  An 
employee at the DMV called AFI to explain the CDL requirement 
for operation of the company truck. 
¶8 
Upon returning from his suspension on April 20, 1994, 
Kempfer was informed that his position had been eliminated, and, 
accordingly, he was fired.  Kempfer's foreman, Mark Bonney, was 
also fired for refusing to sign Kempfer's suspension notice.   
No. 95-0649 
 
 
4
¶9 
Kempfer filed suit alleging that he was wrongfully 
discharged for refusing to violate public policy.  AFI argued at 
trial that Kempfer was released because of cost-cutting efforts 
to reduce the labor force.  Following a three-day trial, the 
jury found that Kempfer was suspended and fired for his refusal 
to operate the company truck without a CDL.  Kempfer was awarded 
back pay and benefits in the amount of $22,167.  The jury also 
awarded Kempfer $145,000 for future lost wages and benefits.  
The circuit court denied AFI's motions after verdict and AFI 
appealed. 
I. 
¶10 The first issue that we address is whether as a matter 
of law, Kempfer identified a fundamental and well-defined public 
policy.  This issue is a question of law, Brockmeyer v. Dun & 
Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 573-574, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983), 
that this court reviews de novo.  Winkelman v. Beloit Memorial 
Hospital, 168 Wis. 2d 12, 24, 483 N.W.2d 211 (1992).  The 
plaintiff-employee 
bears 
the 
burden 
of 
proving 
that 
the 
dismissal 
violates 
a 
clear 
mandate 
of 
public 
policy.  
Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d at 574. 
¶11 Under the employee-at-will doctrine, an employer may 
discharge an employee-at-will "for good cause, for no cause, or 
even for cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of 
legal wrong." Id. at 567.  However, this court has recognized a 
"narrowly circumscribed public policy exception" to this general 
rule.  Id. at 574.  Specifically, this exception provides that 
an employer may not discharge an employee for refusing a command 
to violate a fundamental and well-defined public policy.  Bushko 
No. 95-0649 
 
 
5
v. Miller Brewing Co., 134 Wis. 2d 136, 141, 396 N.W.2d 167 
(1986). 
¶12 This 
court 
first 
recognized 
the 
public 
policy 
exception to the employee-at-will doctrine in Brockmeyer.  In 
that case, this court explained what was meant by a fundamental 
and well-defined public policy: 
 
Public policy is a broad concept embodying the community 
common sense and common conscience. . . .  The 
provisions of the Wisconsin Constitution initially 
declared the public policies of this state.  Each time 
the constitution is amended, that also is an expression 
of public policy.  In addition, public policy is 
regularly adopted and promulgated in the form of 
legislation.  These declarations of public policy are 
inherently incorporated into every employment at will 
relationship. 
 
Given the vagueness of the concept of public policy, it 
is necessary that we be more precise about the contours 
of the public policy exception.  A wrongful discharge is 
actionable when the termination clearly contravenes the 
public 
welfare 
and 
gravely 
violates 
paramount 
requirements of public interest.  The public policy must 
be evidenced by a constitutional or statutory provision. 
 An employee cannot be fired for refusing to violate the 
constitution or a statute.  Employers will be held 
liable for those terminations that effectuate an 
unlawful end. 
 
We intend to recognize an existing limited public policy 
exception.  An employer may not require an employee to 
violate a constitutional or statutory provision with 
impunity.  If an employee refuses to act in an unlawful 
manner, the employer would be violating public policy by 
terminating the employee for such behavior. 
 
Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d at 573 (emphasis added).  However, 
this court warned: 
 
Courts should proceed cautiously when making public 
policy determinations.  No employer should be subject to 
suit merely because a discharged employee's conduct was 
praiseworthy or because the public may have derived some 
benefit from it. 
Id. at 573-74.  This court's rejection of an expansive exception 
to the employee-at-will doctrine is also illustrated by the 
No. 95-0649 
 
 
6
refusal in Brockmeyer to impose an implied covenant and fair 
dealing on employers: 
 
We refuse to impose a duty to terminate in good faith 
into employment contracts.  To do so would "subject each 
discharge to judicial incursions into the amorphous 
concept of bad faith."  Moreover, we feel it unnecessary 
and unwarranted for the courts to become arbiters of any 
termination that may have a tinge of bad faith attached. 
 Imposing a good faith duty to terminate would unduly 
restrict an employer's discretion in managing the work 
force. 
Id. at 569 (citation omitted). 
¶13 This court again considered Wisconsin's narrow public 
policy exception to the employee-at-will doctrine in Bushko, 134 
Wis. 2d 136.  In that case, this court considered whether the 
public policy exception included employees who were discharged 
for acting consistent with a fundamental and well-defined public 
policy when there was no order by the employer to violate the 
public policy.  This court stated: 
 
The plaintiff is not required under Brockmeyer to prove 
the employer had an evil intent in the discharge.  
Likewise, gratuitous allegations or other evidence of 
evil intent will not save a cause of action from 
defendant's motion for summary judgment if the elements 
required by Brockmeyer are not present.  Brockmeyer 
requires an employee allege and attest that he was 
discharged for refusing to violate a constitutional or 
statutory provision.  Although Brockmeyer was intended 
to provide relief for the employee who was a victim of 
evil intent, it did so under very limited circumstances. 
 Brockmeyer defined the cause of action and the 
standards for summary judgment in such a way that the 
trial judge need not inquire into the intent of the 
employer. 
 
. . . 
 
An employee who refuses a command to violate public 
policy 
is 
acting 
consistent 
with 
public 
policy.  
However, if the employee of his own volition acts 
consistently with public policy, he does no more than 
obey the law.  Such consistent action, without an 
employer's 
command 
to 
do 
otherwise, 
is 
merely 
"praiseworthy" conduct. 
No. 95-0649 
 
 
7
Id. at 141-42.  Accordingly, the public policy exception does 
not apply in cases where the employee-at-will is simply 
discharged for acting consistently with the fundamental and 
well-defined public policy; there must be an order by the 
employer to violate the public policy. 
¶14 We are provided with further guidance on the scope of 
this public policy exception by this court's decision in 
Winkelman, 168 Wis. 2d 12.  In that case, this court considered 
whether a fundamental and well-defined public policy could be 
evidenced by an administrative rule rather than a statutory or 
constitutional provision.  Id. at 21.  This court stated: 
 
We hold that where a fundamental and well-defined public 
policy is evidenced by an administrative rule, a 
discharge for refusal to violate that public policy is 
actionable.  The guiding principle of Brockmeyer is not 
a slavish adherence to the arbitrary requirement that 
the public policy be evidenced by a statutory or 
constitutional procedure; rather, it is that an employer 
must not be allowed to discharge an employee for the 
employee's refusal to violate a formally stated, 
fundamental and well-defined public policy which has the 
effect of law.  Heretofore we have required that the 
public 
policy 
be 
evidenced 
by 
a 
statutory 
or 
constitutional provision as a means to protect the 
public from frivolous lawsuits by allowing the circuit 
court to screen cases on motions to dismiss or motions 
for summary judgment. [Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d at 574]. 
 The facts of this case make clear that public policy 
that is fundamental and important may be enunciated in 
administrative rules and that to use such rules will not 
frustrate this type of screening.  An administrative 
rule, as well as statutory or constitutional provision, 
may contain a clear expression of public policy. 
Id. at 22.  Accordingly, in Winkelman, this court recognized 
that the definition of the public policy exception in Brockmeyer 
includes fundamental and well-defined public policies that are 
evidenced 
by 
statutory, 
constitutional, 
or 
administrative 
provisions.  However, this definition does not include case law 
and it does not mean that every statutory, constitutional, or 
No. 95-0649 
 
 
8
administrative provision evidences a fundamental and well-
defined public policy. 
¶15 If a public policy is not contained in a statutory, 
constitutional, or administrative provision, it cannot fall 
under the public policy exception to the employee-at-will 
doctrine.  However, just because a public policy is evidenced by 
a statutory, constitutional, or administrative provision does 
not mean that it falls under the exception.  This was recognized 
by this court in Winkelman:   
 
We however do not hold that all administrative rules 
implicate fundamental public policy.  Neither do all 
statutes.  Rather, it is the content of either a rule or 
statute that determines whether a fundamental public 
policy is stated. 
Id. at 24.  Accordingly, the public policy must still be found 
to be fundamental and well defined.  This is determined by the 
guidelines set forth in Brockmeyer.  See Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d 
at 573-74.1 
¶16 Thus, the Wisconsin public policy exception to the 
employee-at-will doctrine is very narrow.  It only provides that 
an employee may not be discharged for refusing a command to 
violate a fundamental and well-defined public policy that is 
evidenced by a constitutional, statutory, or administrative 
provision.  With the exception of such a public policy, an 
employer may discharge an employee-at-will for any reason or no 
reason. 
                     
1  We note that an administrative rule is less likely to 
satisfy the fundamental and well-defined requirements than a 
statutory provision and that a statutory provision is less likely 
to rise to the level of fundamental and well defined than a 
constitutional provision.  
No. 95-0649 
 
 
9
¶17 AFI contends that the public policy recognized by the 
circuit court--that an employer cannot require someone to 
violate the law--was not grounded in a specific constitutional 
or statutory provision which evidenced a fundamental and well-
defined public policy.  Kempfer asserts that the circuit court 
identified two fundamental and well-defined public policies: (1) 
the public policy against improperly licensed commercial drivers 
evidenced by Wis. Stat. § 343.05(2)(a) (1993-94)2; and (2) the 
public policy against employers ordering employees to violate a 
statute that carried criminal penalties. 
¶18 We find that Kempfer identified a fundamental and 
well-defined public policy sufficient to invoke Wisconsin's 
public policy exception to the employee-at-will doctrine.  Wis. 
Stat. § 343.05(2)(a) sets forth the requirements for operating a 
commercial vehicle in Wisconsin.  If a person operates a 
commercial vehicle without complying with these requirements the 
driver and his or her employer may be subject to penalties under 
Wis. Stat. § 343.245.  The guidelines for operating a commercial 
vehicle contained in § 343.05(2)(a) which are designed to 
promote highway safety and violation of which may be punished by 
                     
2 Unless otherwise stated, all future statutory references 
are to the 199-94 volume.  Wis. Stat. § 343.05(2)(a) provides in 
relevant part: 
 
(2) COMMERCIAL MOTOR VEHICLES. (a) No person may operate a 
commercial motor vehicle upon a highway in this state 
unless the person is one of the following: 
 
 
1. A resident who is at least 18 years of age, who 
is not disqualified under s. 343.315, who has a valid 
commercial 
driver 
license 
which 
is 
not 
revoked, 
suspended, canceled, or expired and, for the operation 
of any vehicle type under s. 343.04(2), has an 
endorsement authorizing operation of the vehicle type.   
No. 95-0649 
 
 
10
fine and/or incarceration constitute a fundamental and well-
established public policy--to promote highway safety through the 
use of regulations and penalties. 
 
II. 
¶19 The next issue that we address is whether Kempfer, an 
employee-at-will, demonstrated 
that 
he 
was 
terminated for 
refusing to act contrary to a fundamental and well-defined 
public policy.  This is a jury finding that this court will not 
overturn if there is any credible evidence that supports the 
verdict.  Coryell v. Conn, 88 Wis. 2d 310, 315, 276 N.W.2d 723 
(1979).  In addition, this court views the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the verdict.  Roach v. Keane, 73 Wis. 2d 524, 
536, 243 N.W.2d 508 (1976). 
¶20 As we have already found that Kempfer identified a 
fundamental and well-defined public policy, we need only 
determine whether any credible evidence supports the jury's 
finding that Kempfer was discharged for refusing to act contrary 
to that public policy.  AFI contends that there is no evidence 
to support that Kempfer was terminated for failing to act 
contrary to a fundamental public policy.  In support of this 
contention, AFI states that only Kempfer could have obtained a 
CDL and that AFI did not prevent him from doing so.  AFI further 
states that it only told Kempfer to "drive the truck." 
¶21 We conclude that under the facts of this case 
commanding Kempfer to drive the truck with full knowledge that 
he did not have the required license is tantamount to commanding 
him to violate public policy.  At the time that AFI ordered him 
No. 95-0649 
 
 
11
to drive the truck it knew that Kempfer did not have a CDL.  
Kempfer refused to drive the truck and was suspended by AFI.  
Accordingly, there is credible evidence to support the jury's 
finding that Kempfer was discharged for refusing to act contrary 
to a fundamental and well-defined public policy. 
III. 
¶22 The last issue that we consider is whether the circuit 
court erroneously exercised its discretion by allowing the jury 
to consider awarding damages of future wage loss.  Discretionary 
acts of the circuit court are upheld absent an erroneous 
exercise of discretion.  Johnson v. Johnson, 78 Wis. 2d 137, 
143-44, 254 N.W.2d 198, 202 (1977).  Failure to apply the proper 
standard of law is an erroneous exercise of discretion.  Loy v. 
Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400, 411-15, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982). 
¶23 During the course of the trial in this case, the 
circuit court decided to allow the jury to consider whether 
Kempfer would suffer a future wage loss.  The circuit court gave 
the jury the following instruction: 
 
If you are satisfied that the plaintiff will suffer a 
future wage and benefit loss as the natural result of 
his wrongful discharge, then include in your answer to 
question 2 such sum as will fairly and reasonably 
compensate plaintiff for such future loss of wages and 
benefits . . . 
 
AFI contends that this was an erroneous exercise of the circuit 
court's discretion because in an at-will employment relationship 
there are no foreseeable future damages upon which to base an 
award of future lost earnings because the parties cannot foresee 
the duration of the employment relationship.  Kempfer asserts 
that the decisions of the court of appeals in Weyenberg Shoe 
No. 95-0649 
 
 
12
Mfg. Co. v. Seidl, 140 Wis. 2d 373, 410 N.W.2d 604 (Ct. App. 
1987), Brogan v. Industrial Casualty Ins. Co., 132 Wis. 2d 229, 
392 N.W.2d 439 (Ct. App. 1986), and Hale v. Stoughton Hosp. 
Assoc., Inc., 126 Wis. 2d 267, 376 N.W.2d 89 (Ct. App. 1985), 
illustrate that future wages are an available remedy in public 
policy exception cases. 
 
¶24 In Weyenberg, a jury determined that the employee had 
been wrongfully terminated for participating in national guard 
exercises.  The jury awarded the employee $57,000 for past 
damages, $35,000 for future damages, and $15,000 for lost 
employee benefits.  The court of appeals agreed with the trial 
court that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's 
finding that the plaintiff was terminated for participating in 
the national guard exercises.  However, the court of appeals 
also held that the termination did not fall under the Brockmeyer 
public policy exception to the employee at will doctrine: 
 
Because [the plaintiff's] action in going to guard 
camp is consistent with public policy rather than a 
refusal to violate public policy, termination for said 
conduct does not fall within the extremely narrow 
exception of the employment at will doctrine under 
Brockmeyer and Bushko.    
Weyenberg, 140 Wis. 2d at 383 (emphasis in original).  The court 
of appeals instead upheld the jury's award of damages based on a 
finding that the plaintiff had been discharged in violation of 
the Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act, 38 U.S.C. 
§ 2021(b)(3) (1982).  Kempfer contends that the Weyenberg 
decision is significant because the court of appeals upheld the 
propriety of the jury's award of future damages to an at-will 
employee.  We do not find this case significant as it does not 
concern the public policy exception to the employee-at-will 
No. 95-0649 
 
 
13
doctrine.  Whether an award of future damages is appropriate 
under 38 U.S.C. § 2021(b)(3) (1982) does not bear on whether 
such an award is consistent with Brockmeyer, and, thus, 
available under the public policy exception to the employee-at-
will doctrine.  
 
¶25 The next case that Kempfer relies on, Brogan, also did 
not involve the public policy exception to the employee-at-will 
doctrine.  This was a breach of contract case that centered on 
whether the contract was rendered void by Wis. Stat. § 611.63 
(1983-84).  Brogan, 132 Wis. 2d at 233.  The court of appeals 
held that the contract was not void and upheld the jury's award 
of future damages to the plaintiff.  Of particular significance, 
according to Kempfer, is the court of appeals' statement that 
"[t]he amount of damages awarded is a matter resting largely in 
the jury's discretion."  Id. at 238.  In so relying on the court 
of appeals' decision in Brogan, Kempfer fails to consider the 
distinction between those employed pursuant to a contract and 
those who are employed at will.  This case does not pertain to 
the at-will employment relationship and is not relevant to our 
decision. 
 
¶26 Kempfer also relies on the court of appeals' decision 
in Hale.  In that case, the plaintiff brought suit against his 
former 
employer 
for 
wrongful 
termination 
and 
tortious 
interference with contract.  At trial, the jury was given two 
verdict questions.  The first question involved whether the 
defendant-employer had wrongfully terminated the plaintiff-
employee.  This question and the accompanying instruction was 
derived from the court of appeals decision in Brockmeyer v. Dun 
No. 95-0649 
 
 
14
& Bradstreet, 109 Wis.2d 44, 325 N.W.2d 70 (Ct. App. 1982).  The 
second 
question 
concerned 
the 
tortious 
interference 
with 
contract claim.  The jury did not answer the second question, 
but found that the plaintiff had been wrongfully discharged.  
Shortly after the jury returned its verdict in Hale, this court 
rejected the court of appeals' holding in Brockmeyer.  The 
circuit court concluded that it had applied the wrong law and 
ordered a new trial on whether the plaintiff-employee had been 
wrongfully terminated.  Kempfer contends that Hale supports his 
position because the court of appeals endorsed the award of 
future wages in a wrongful termination case.  What Kempfer fails 
to mention is that the plaintiff-employee in Hale was not an 
employee-at-will.  The court of appeals stated: 
 
Nor 
does 
the 
wrongful 
termination 
question 
and 
instruction adequately describe the duty that the 
hospital accepted in its bylaw.  We agree that the 
bylaw creates more than a mere "at will" employment 
relationship.  Unlike an "at will" employer, the 
[defendant-employer] 
could 
not 
discharge 
[the 
plaintiff-employee] for any or even no cause. 
Hale, 126 Wis. 2d at 275.  Thus, neither Hale, Weyenberg, nor 
Brogan is relevant to whether an employee-at-will who is 
discharged for refusing to violate a fundamental public policy 
is entitled to front pay. 
¶27 Our determination of this issue is controlled by this 
court's decision in Brockmeyer.  In Brockmeyer, this court held 
that under Wisconsin's public policy exception to the employee-
at-will doctrine, the wrongfully discharged employee's right to 
compensation is in contract.  In reaching this conclusion, the 
court considered whether such a wrongful discharge suit would 
most appropriately be brought as a tort or contract action.  
No. 95-0649 
 
 
15
This court determined that contract was more appropriate because 
the damages available in those suits best reflected the damages 
stemming from wrongful discharge suits: 
 
The most significant distinction in our view between the 
two causes of action in wrongful discharge suits is in 
the damages that may be recovered.  In tort actions, the 
only limitations are those of "proximate cause" or 
public policy considerations.  Punitive damages are also 
allowed.  In contract actions, damages are limited by 
the concepts of foreseeability and mitigation.  The 
remedies established by the majority of Wisconsin 
wrongful discharge statutes are limited to reinstatement 
and backpay, contractual remedy concepts. We believe 
that reinstatement and backpay are the most appropriate 
remedies for the public policy exception wrongful 
discharges since the primary concern in these actions is 
to make the wronged employee "whole."  Therefore, we 
conclude that a contract action is most appropriate for 
wrongful discharges. 
 
Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d at 575 (emphasis added).  Accordingly, 
Brockmeyer stands for the proposition that reinstatement and 
backpay are the most appropriate remedies. 
¶28 Kempfer argues that Brockmeyer did not expressly limit 
the damages for a wrongfully discharged employee-at-will to 
reinstatement and backpay when there is a more appropriate 
remedy.  According to Kempfer, it is more appropriate in this 
case to award him future wages instead of reinstatement.  We 
agree that there may be some cases where an award of front pay 
in lieu of reinstatement is necessary to make the wronged 
employee whole.  However, as Brockmeyer limited damages in 
almost all cases to reinstatement and backpay, front pay can 
only be available when there is no other avenue to make the 
employee whole.  In other words, front pay is only an available 
remedy in those cases in which the employee has been discharged 
No. 95-0649 
 
 
16
for refusing to violate a fundamental and well-defined public 
policy and reinstatement is not feasible. 
¶29 Reinstatement is not feasible if the employee cannot 
be placed in the same or a similar position or if the company 
refuses to reinstate the employee.  However, reinstatement is 
not infeasible simply because a plaintiff claims that he or she 
does not get along with the employer or because the plaintiff 
claims that he or she is not comfortable working for someone who 
previously terminated him or her. 
¶30 In 
those 
situations 
where 
reinstatement 
is 
not 
feasible an award of front pay is still limited by the concepts 
of foreseeability and mitigation.  See Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d 
at 575; see also Klug v. Flambeau Plastics Corp., 62 Wis. 2d 
141, 155, 214 N.W.2d 281 (1974)(requiring that the injured party 
in an employment situation "must make reasonable efforts to 
mitigate damages.").  Thus, in determining whether front pay is 
available, 
when 
reinstatement 
has 
already 
been 
deemed 
infeasible, the court must consider (1) the extent of front pay, 
if any, foreseeable under the circumstances of the case, and (2) 
what effect the employee's mitigation will have on the award of 
front pay. 
¶31 Accordingly, the circuit court must first determine 
whether reinstatement is feasible.  If the circuit court 
concludes that reinstatement is not feasible then the court 
rather than the jury should determine the amount of front pay, 
if any, that is necessary to make the wronged employee whole.  
See Stafford v. Electronic Data Systems Corp., 741 F. Supp. 664, 
667 (E.D. Mich. 1990).  In the present case, the circuit court 
No. 95-0649 
 
 
17
did not condsider whether reinstatement was infeasible, but 
submitted the question of front pay to the jury.  Thus, we hold 
that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when 
it allowed the jury to consider future wage loss in its damages 
determination.  The cause is remanded for a determination of 
whether reinstatement is not feasible, and, if so, for a 
calculation of front pay by the circuit court. 
By the Court.—The decision of the circuit court is affirmed 
in part and reversed in part. 
No. 95-0649.ssa 
 
 
1
¶32 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (concurring).   I 
agree with the majority opinion’s resolution of the preliminary 
question in this case, that the plaintiff was discharged in 
violation of a fundamental and well-defined public policy. I 
also agree that the case should be remanded to determine whether 
front pay should be awarded and, if so, how much.  
¶33 I write separately: (1) because the availability of an 
award of front pay for discharge of an at-will employee is not 
obvious and I want to explain why I conclude that front pay 
should be available; (2) to suggest several considerations the 
circuit court might entertain in awarding front pay upon remand; 
and (3) to explore the respective roles of the circuit court and 
the jury on remand in determining front pay in lieu of 
reinstatement. 
I. 
¶34 The dual goals of a Brockmeyer cause of action for 
wrongful discharge of an at-will employee are to make wronged 
employees whole and to deter employers' violations of public 
policy.3 The court's decisions relating to public policy wrongful 
discharge give little practical guidance concerning remedies 
                     
3 Cases subsequent to Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 
Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983), have more fully addressed 
the contours of the cause of action. Wandry v. Bull's Eye Credit 
Union, 129 Wis. 2d 37, 384 N.W.2d 325 (1986); Bushko v. Miller 
Brewing Co., 134 Wis. 2d 136, 396 N.W.2d 167 (1986); Schultz v. 
Production Stamping Corp., 148 Wis. 2d 17, 434 N.W.2d 780 
(1989); Winkelman v. Beloit Mem'l Hosp., 168 Wis. 2d 12, 483 
N.W.2d 211 (1992). None of these cases has addressed the 
question of remedies. 
No. 95-0649.ssa 
 
 
2
generally. Nonetheless, the Brockmeyer court set forth certain 
general propositions regarding remedies in its effort to paint 
the outlines of the newly recognized cause of action: (1) the 
remedial goal is to make the wronged employee whole and to 
advance well-established public policies; (2) remedies should be 
controlled by contract rather than tort principles; thus 
foreseeability and mitigation limit the range of available 
remedies; 
and 
(3) 
the 
most 
appropriate 
remedies 
are 
reinstatement and back pay. Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 
Wis. 2d 561, 574-76, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983).4 
¶35 While reinstatement and back pay are, as Brockmeyer 
stated, the most appropriate remedies, reinstatement is not 
appropriate in certain cases. In these cases, I conclude that an 
award of front pay should be available to fill the remedial gap. 
Front pay is necessary to achieve the principles set forth in 
Brockmeyer: (1) front pay comports with the Brockmeyer principle 
that reinstatement and back pay are the most appropriate 
remedies; (2) while reinstatement is an important remedy for 
                     
4 For discussions of Brockmeyer's contract approach, see 
Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Employee Dismissal Law and Practice, 
§ 1.2 at p. 8 (3d ed. 1992); Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies: 
DamagesEquityRestitution, § 6.10(2) at p. 195-96 and nn.13, 
14 (2d ed. 1993). See also John C. McCarthy, Recovery of Damages 
for Wrongful Discharge, § 1.31 at pp. 118-19 (1990)(doctrine of 
foreseeability 
and 
the 
unavailability 
of punitive damages 
characterize "elusive" differences between contract and tort 
damages for public policy wrongful discharge). 
 
No. 95-0649.ssa 
 
 
3
making 
wronged 
employees 
whole, 
there 
are 
often 
serious 
obstacles to reinstatement and it is rarely ordered; (3) front 
pay is designed to achieve precisely what reinstatement would 
achieve, were reinstatement feasible: to place the wronged 
employee in the position he or she would be in had there been no 
wrongful discharge; (4) awarding front pay comports with the 
Brockmeyer contract theory of damages for wrongful discharge; 
and (5) allowing front pay comports with the Brockmeyer court's 
reliance on Wisconsin and federal wrongful discharge statutes 
for crafting the common law cause of action for wrongful 
discharge. 
¶36 First, 
front 
pay 
comports 
with 
the 
Brockmeyer 
principle 
that 
reinstatement 
and 
back 
pay 
are 
the 
most 
appropriate remedies. If employers know that only reinstatement 
and back pay are legally available, and that front pay is not 
available in lieu of reinstatement, reinstatement will cease to 
be available in fact. Barring front pay as a substitute for 
reinstatement will create a perverse incentive for employers who 
wrongfully discharge employees in violation of public policy to 
make reinstatement not feasible. In essence, were front pay not 
available when reinstatement is not feasible the deterrent 
effect of the cause of action would be undermined or the 
No. 95-0649.ssa 
 
 
4
employer could discharge an employee in violation of public 
policy by paying a minimum amount of damages.5 
¶37 Second, while reinstatement is an important remedy for 
making 
wronged 
employees 
whole, 
there 
are 
often 
serious 
obstacles 
to 
reinstatement 
and 
it 
is 
rarely 
ordered.6 
Reinstatement has high costs for employers and employees,7 as 
well as for the courts.8  
                     
5 Unless the court holds as it does, employers would have 
the further incentive of admitting to liability instantly after 
wrongfully discharging an employee and employees would be 
encouraged to delay asserting a cause of action. In that way 
employers would seek to reduce the amounts they pay to the 
wrongfully discharged employee and employees would seek to 
increase the amounts they receive. The deterrent effect of the 
public policy wrongful discharge cause of action would be 
seriously threatened. 
6 Professor Dobbs has noted as follows: "Common law remedies 
for an employer's breach of an employment contract have not 
traditionally 
included 
specific 
performance. 
Although 
reinstatement has been mentioned quite casually in some common 
law wrongful discharge cases [quoting Brockmeyer], it seems not 
actually to have been sought or granted." Dobbs, Law of 
Remedies, § 6.10(2) at p. 198 and n.28 (citations omitted). See 
also Lex K. Larson, Unjust Dismissal, § 9A.02[2] at p. 9A-9 
(3/97) ("reinstatement is not normally awarded, due to the often 
deteriorated employment relationship"). 
Nonetheless, 
many 
courts 
consider 
reinstatement 
"the 
preferred remedy." See, e.g., Sasser v. Averitt Express, Inc., 
839 S.W.2d 422, 439 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); Stafford v. 
Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 749 F. Supp. 781, 785 (E.D. Mich. 
1990)(applying Michigan law); McNeil v. Economics Lab., Inc., 
800 F.2d 111, 118 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 
(1987), overruled on other grounds, 860 F.2d 834 (1988). 
The majority opinion does not discuss whether the employee 
in 
this 
case 
sought, 
or 
whether 
the 
employer 
offered, 
reinstatement. Reinstatement was not ordered. 
7 Courts evaluating the feasibility of reinstatement have 
identified various obstacles to the remedy for both employers 
and employees. No suitable position may be available; other 
No. 95-0649.ssa 
 
 
5
¶38 Because of the costs of reinstatement for employers, 
employees and courts it has been suggested that front pay more 
efficiently compensates the future economic loss flowing from a 
wrongful discharge. Chief Judge Posner has offered the following 
economic analysis supporting front pay: 
 
[T]he social costs of [reinstatement] may be avoided 
by corrective transactions. Suppose that reinstatement 
would be worth $100,000 to the employee but would cost 
the employer $150,000 because of a negative effect of 
reinstatement 
on 
the 
employer's 
productivity; 
in 
contrast, an award of $100,000 would cost the employer 
only $100,000 while benefiting the employee to the 
tune of $100,000. The substitution of front pay for 
reinstatement would produce a savings in social costs 
of $50,000yet if front pay were unavailable, the 
                                                                  
employees may be displaced or otherwise disrupted; or, quite 
commonly, there is such hostility that a productive and amicable 
working 
relationship 
would 
be 
impossible, 
such 
that 
the 
conditions would amount to a constructive discharge. See Sasser, 
839 S.W.2d at 433; Stafford, 749 F. Supp. at 785-86; McNeil, 800 
F.2d 
at 
118-19; 
Restatement 
(Second) 
of 
Contracts 
§ 367(1)(1981)(noting 
"undesirability 
of 
compelling 
the 
continuance 
of 
personal 
association 
after 
disputes 
have 
arisen"). These same considerations are often used as factors in 
determining the feasibility of reinstatement.  
 
8 Reinstatement imposes costs on courts which front pay may 
not. A reinstatement order requires either careful continued 
monitoring or risks spurring additional litigation surrounding 
issues of compliance and retaliation. The Seventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals described the costs of reinstatement for courts as 
follows: 
Courts of equity traditionally have refused to order 
specific performance of employment contracts, because 
it is difficult and time-consuming for a court to 
supervise the parties' conduct in an ongoing and 
possibly long-term relationship of employment. . . . 
Courts do not want to involve themselves in the 
industrial equivalent of matrimonial squabbling.  
 
McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104, 115 (7th 
Cir. 1990). 
No. 95-0649.ssa 
 
 
6
employer might buy out the employee's right of 
reinstatement, since at any price between $100,000 and 
$150,000 both parties would be made better off by such 
a buy-out. Front pay may still be the socially 
preferable form of relief, because it avoids the need 
for a tricky transaction. 
Avitia v. Metropolitan Club of Chicago, Inc., 49 F.3d 1219, 1232 
(7th Cir. 1995)(citation omitted). 
¶39 Third, front pay is designed to achieve precisely what 
reinstatement would achieve, were reinstatement feasible: to 
place the wronged employee in the same position he or she would 
be in had there been no wrongful discharge. Front pay makes up 
the difference between the earnings an employee would receive 
were the old employment to continue and the earnings expected in 
present and future employment. Thus, front pay substitutes for 
reinstatement in that it remedies future economic losses flowing 
from the wrongful discharge. In conjunction with recovery of 
past wage loss through a back pay award, front pay, like 
reinstatement, 
remedies the 
wrongful 
discharge 
itself and 
assures that the wronged employee is made whole.  
¶40 When reinstatement is not feasible, back pay is 
insufficient to make a wronged employee whole. Back pay 
compensates for the loss of wages until judgment; it does not 
remedy the wrongful discharge itself. Reinstatement remedies the 
wrongful discharge and precludes economic loss that would 
otherwise flow from the wrongful discharge. If reinstatement is 
not feasible and the discharged employee's new employment 
opportunities are inferior, the employee should receive front 
No. 95-0649.ssa 
 
 
7
pay. "The logic of such an award, if the purpose . . . is indeed 
to make the plaintiff whole, is undeniable." McKnight v. General 
Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104, 116-17 (7th Cir. 1990).9 
¶41 Front pay fulfills the expectation interest where 
otherwise there would be a remedial void. "Wrongfully discharged 
employees may have valid claims for lost future wages. Such an 
award of 'front pay' is predicated on the 'rightful place' 
theory; i.e., that wrongfully discharged employees are entitled 
to the benefit of the jobs they would have obtained but for the 
discharge." Paul H. Tobias, 
Litigating 
Wrongful 
Discharge 
Claims, § 8.12 at pp. 8-37-38 (6/91). 
¶42 Fourth, 
awarding 
front 
pay 
comports 
with 
the 
Brockmeyer contract theory of damages for wrongful discharge. 
For a remedy to be available in a contract action the fact of 
                     
9 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals discussed front pay 
under Title VII as follows, without deciding the issue: 
[T]he Supreme Court has said that the remedial scheme 
in Title VII is designed to make the plaintiff whole, 
and this dictum has been thought by some courts to 
imply that if the plaintiff's employment opportunities 
are inferior and reinstatement is infeasible, he 
should receive in addition to back pay a lump 
sumcalled "front pay" to distinguish it from the 
remedy 
of 
back 
pay 
specified 
in 
the 
statuterepresenting the discounted present value of 
the difference between the earnings he would have 
received in his old employment and the earnings he can 
be expected to receive in his present and future, and 
by hypothesis inferior, employment. The logic of such 
an award, if the purpose of Title VII's remedial 
scheme is indeed to make the plaintiff whole, is 
undeniable. 
 
McKnight, 908 F.2d at 116-17 (citations omitted). 
No. 95-0649.ssa 
 
 
8
loss must be foreseeable. Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
§ 351 (1981). It is enough that the loss was foreseeable as a 
probable, as distinguished from a necessary, result of the 
breach. Id. at cmt. a. 
¶43 An employer might argue that because an at-will 
employee has no expectation of future employment with this 
employer for a definite term, the loss of future wages is 
unforeseeable and front pay is inappropriate. This argument 
confuses the foreseeability of the harm, lost future wages, with 
the foreseeability of the amount of the loss. Only the former 
need be foreseeable; the latter need only be reasonably 
calculable.10 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 352 (1981). 
¶44 The 
harm 
of 
future 
wage 
loss 
to 
a 
wrongfully 
discharged indefinite term employee is foreseeable. Although an 
at-will employee may be discharged at any time for many reasons, 
or no reason, an at-will employee may not be discharged for a 
reason that violates public policy. It is foreseeable that if 
wrongfully discharged, the at-will employee will suffer economic 
harm due to many factors including having to begin new 
employment at or near the bottom of a seniority or experience-
                     
10 "The existence of damages must be proved; the amount of 
damages must be decided with all the certainty the case 
permits." Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Smith, 637 P.2d 
1020, 
1027 
(Wyo. 
1981)(approving 
award 
of 
front 
pay 
to 
indefinite term employee for employer's breach). 
No. 95-0649.ssa 
 
 
9
based pay scale. That harm flows necessarily from the employer's 
wrongful conduct.11 
¶45 The argument against the availability of front pay, 
that "[s]uch employment relationships do not exist for a 
foreseeable, definite period of time," is not an argument that 
the loss of future wages is unforeseeable. Rather it is an 
argument that the amount of the loss is difficult to ascertain 
with certainty. This is doubtless true.12 As one court has put 
it:  
 
The biggest problem in awarding future damages for the 
wrongful discharge of an at-will employee is avoiding 
speculation. . . . It is well established, however, 
that 
"while 
recovery 
will 
be 
denied 
if 
it 
is 
speculative and uncertain whether damage has been 
sustained, recovery will not be denied merely because 
the amount of damages is difficult to ascertain."  
Smith v. Smithway Motor Xpress, Inc., 464 N.W.2d 682, 688 (Iowa 
1990)(citation omitted)(reversing trial court refusal to submit 
                     
11 See Repinski v. Clintonville Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 49 Wis. 
2d 53, 58, 181 N.W.2d 351 (1970)("An award of damages for breach 
of contract should compensate the injured party for losses 
necessarily flowing from the breach"); Wis JICivil 3710. 
12 As Professor Corbin has instructed: 
The rules of law governing the recovery of damages for 
breach 
of 
contract 
are 
very 
flexible. 
Their 
application in the infinite number of situations that 
arise is beyond question variable and uncertain. Even 
more than in the case of other rules of law, they must 
be regarded merely as guides to the court, leaving 
much to the individual feeling of the court created by 
the special circumstances of the particular case. 
 
5 Corbin on Contracts, § 1002 at 33 (1964). 
No. 95-0649.ssa 
 
 
10
front pay question to jury in wrongful discharge action). The 
fact that a remedy may require a degree of uncertainty in 
calculating the amount of the loss is not a reason to preclude 
it as a matter of law. The amount of damages must be decided 
with all the certainty the case permits. 
¶46 Indeed the black letter rule in contract actions 
involving employment seems to be that recovery of damages 
includes front pay. State Bar of Wisconsin, The Law of Damages 
in Wisconsin, § 23.2 at p.23-3 (2d ed. 12/95)(Russell M. Ware, 
ed.); State Bar of Wisconsin, Wisconsin Employment Law, § 13.40 
at p. 13-14 (4/95). See, e.g., Hale v. Stoughton Hospital Ass'n, 
Inc., 126 Wis. 2d 267, 279-81, 376 N.W.2d 89 (Ct. App. 
1985)(indefinite employment term, loss of future wages and 
pension benefits arising in ordinary course of breach of 
employment contract foreseeable as matter of law ). 
¶47 Although the measure of a front pay remedy is 
uncertain, it is appropriate where necessary to make the wronged 
employee whole. As one court has said: "Substantial justice is 
better than exact injustice." Weinglass v. Gibson, 155 A. 439, 
440 (Pa. 1931)(discussing need to award contract damages even 
where uncertain in amount). 
¶48 Fifth, allowing front pay comports with the Brockmeyer 
court's reliance on Wisconsin and federal wrongful discharge 
statutes for crafting the common law cause of action for 
wrongful discharge. The Brockmeyer court, 113 Wis. 2d at 568, 
No. 95-0649.ssa 
 
 
11
575, determined that, as with state public policy statutes, 
reinstatement and back pay are the most appropriate remedies.13 
Yet the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act (WFEA), provides for a 
remedy of "compensation in lieu of reinstatement if requested by 
any party." Wis. Stat. § 111.389(4)(c)(1995-96).14 Similarly, in 
                     
13 The Brockmeyer court recognized that the public policy 
wrongful discharge cause of action has the same goals as 
specific Wisconsin statutory causes of action for wrongful 
discharge, such as the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act, Wis. Stat. 
ch. 111, subch. II, the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act, Wis. 
Stat. § 111.06(1)(c)1, as well as Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 
et seq., and other federal statutes prohibiting wrongful 
discharges in violation of public policy. Because remedying and 
deterring violations of public policy are at the heart of these 
statutory causes of action, decisions in cases brought under 
these statutes may provide helpful analyses for determining the 
appropriate remedial regime in a common law public policy 
wrongful discharge action. Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d at 567-68.  
The Brockmeyer court stated, without citation, that "[t]he 
remedies established by the majority of Wisconsin wrongful 
discharge statutes are limited to reinstatement and backpay, 
contractual remedy concepts." Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d at 575. 
Regardless of whether this statement, drawn from the briefs of 
the employer (at p. 30, 35) and amicus Wisconsin Association of 
Manufacturers and Commerce (at p. 17), was accurate in 1983, it 
is not today.  
14 See Byers v. LIRC, 208 Wis. 2d 388, 397-99, 561 N.W.2d 
678, (1997)(discussing public policy purposes of the WFEA and 
remedies available); Watkins v. LIRC, 117 Wis. 2d 753, 764, 345 
N.W.2d 482 (1984)(finding that the WFEA provides authority to 
fashion appropriate remedy). 
No. 95-0649.ssa 
 
 
12
federal 
wrongful 
discharge 
statutes, 
front 
pay 
has 
been 
recognized as a remedy in lieu of reinstatement.15  
¶49 Consistent with the state and federal statutes which 
seek to deter violations of public policy by employers and to 
make employees whole, a plaintiff in a common law public policy 
wrongful discharge action should have available the remedy of 
front pay when reinstatement is not feasible. 
                     
15 Federal 
statutes, 
such 
as 
Title VII 
and the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et 
seq., 
are 
similarly 
premised 
on 
remedying 
and 
deterring 
violations of public policy. Each has been interpreted as 
allowing courts to provide front pay as a substitute for 
reinstatement, in addition to back pay, where reinstatement is 
not feasible. Front pay is available under these statutes 
regardless of whether the employment was for an indefinite term. 
The United States Supreme Court has stated that the 
purposes of Title VII are to remedy and deter discrimination in 
employment and to "make persons whole" for injuries due to 
unlawful employment discrimination. Albemarle Paper Co. v. 
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975). 
The following are among the courts that have held that 
front pay is available in lieu of reinstatement under Title VII: 
Weaver v. Casa Gallardo, Inc., 922 F.2d 1515, 1528 (11th Cir. 
1991); Edwards v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 892 F.2d 1442, 1449 
(9th Cir. 1990); Shore v. Federal Express Corp., 777 F.2d 1159-
60 (6th Cir. 1985); Goss v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 885, 
889-91 (3d Cir. 1984); McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 768 F. 
Supp. 675, 680 (E.D. Wis. 1991), aff'd, 973 F.2d 1366 (7th Cir. 
1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 915 (1993). 
The seventh circuit has stated that: "All of the circuits 
that have decided the issue . . . have held that front pay is an 
available remedy in appropriate cases brought under the ADEA." 
McNeil, 800 F.2d at 118. 
The seventh circuit has held that front pay is available in 
lieu of reinstatement in retaliatory discharge actions brought 
under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. 
Avitia v. Metropolitan Club of Chicago, Inc., 49 F.3d 1219, 1231 
(7th Cir. 1995). 
No. 95-0649.ssa 
 
 
13
¶50 For these reasons all but one of the jurisdictions16 
that have considered the issue of the availability of front pay 
in public policy wrongful discharge actions have concluded that 
front pay is available where reinstatement is not feasible.17 I, 
too, conclude that front pay should be an available remedy in 
lieu of reinstatement when reinstatement is not feasible. Front 
pay is consistent with the principles set out in Brockmeyer and 
state and federal statutes which seek to deter wrongful 
discharges violating public policy.  
II. 
¶51 Because this case is remanded for determination of 
front pay, I wish to set forth several factors that the circuit 
court might appropriately consider in awarding front pay. Front 
pay is, as one court stated, a "special remedy, not necessarily 
                     
16 The Supreme Court of Arkansas has held that front pay is 
not available in public policy wrongful discharge actions. 
Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 743 S.W.2d 380 (Ark. 1988). 
17 "Since much of the wrongful discharge litigation is 
relatively recent and has focused on the existence and breadth 
of the cause of action, the remedies available have not received 
extensive attention in reported decisions." Stephen P. Pepe & 
Scott H. Dunham, Avoiding and Defending Wrongful Discharge 
Claims, § 1.10 at p. 1-36 (5/93).  
The following are among the courts that have resolved the 
question in favor of the availability of front pay: Hummer v. 
Evans, 923 P.2d 981, 987-88 (Idaho 1996); Sasser, 839 S.W.2d 
422, 433-34; Smith v. Smithway Motor Xpress, Inc., 464 N.W.2d 
682, 687-88 (Iowa 1991); Hayes v. Trulock, 755 P.2d 830, 834 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1988); Goins v. Ford Motor Co., 347 N.W.2d 184, 
191 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983). See also Francis M. Dougherty, 
Damages Recoverable for Wrongful Discharge of At-Will Employee, 
44 A.L.R. 4th 1131 § 5[c] and anno. supp. (collecting cases). 
No. 95-0649.ssa 
 
 
14
warranted in every case." Sasser v. Averitt Express, Inc., 839 
S.W.2d 422, 433, 439 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). 
¶52 The 
following 
factors, 
among 
others, 
should 
be 
considered in determining the propriety and amount of front pay 
when reinstatement is not feasible: (1) the employee's seniority 
at the time of the wrongful discharge; (2) the likelihood that 
the employment would have continued, and for how long, but for 
the wrongful discharge; (3) the employee's work and life 
expectancy; (4) the employee's efforts at mitigating his or her 
damages, including the nature of new employment, if any; (5) the 
availability of comparable employment opportunities; and (6) the 
length of time required to find another job. See Sasser, 839 
S.W.2d at 434. 
¶53 In this case the employee was an employee of long 
standing. Although an employee at will, there was no indication 
that he was going to be discharged. According to the record the 
employee's salary level had been achieved in part through 
seniority, and his skills and employment history made it 
unlikely that he could obtain a comparable salary elsewhere. 
Front pay may be proper in this case if reinstatement is found 
not feasible. 
III. 
¶54 Finally, the court's decisions relating to public 
policy wrongful discharge actions give no guidance concerning 
the respective roles of the circuit court and the jury in 
No. 95-0649.ssa 
 
 
15
determining the propriety and amount of remedies. The majority 
opinion, without discussion, mandates that front pay is to be 
determined by the court rather than by a jury.  
¶55 A growing number of courts in common law and statutory 
wrongful discharge actions have concluded that the question of 
the amount of front pay, and not simply its propriety, should be 
decided by the trial court, not by a jury. See generally Richard 
J. Seryak, Front-Pay Awards in Employment Litigation: An Issue 
for the Judge or Jury? 17 Employee Relations L.J. 131 (1991). 
The most common rationale for assigning this duty to the court 
is that front pay is essentially an equitable remedy in this 
context. See Stafford v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 741 F. 
Supp. 664, 665-67 (E.D. Mich. 1990)(applying Michigan common 
law);18 Sasser, 839 S.W.2d at 434-36. Front pay is awarded in 
lieu of the equitable remedy of reinstatement and is predicated 
on the equitable principle of making a wronged employee whole 
where there would otherwise be a remedial gap left by only 
awarding back pay.  
¶56 Courts have noted that it is practical to have the 
court charged with deciding the propriety of front pay also 
decide the amount. Entrusting the front pay award to the court 
                     
18 In Stafford, 749 F. Supp. at 791-93, the court ultimately 
set front pay and ordered it paid on an "installment" basis 
whereby the court made biannual inquiry into the continued 
propriety of front pay, including the employee's employment 
situation and mitigation efforts.  
No. 95-0649.ssa 
 
 
16
may also assure that front pay is not excessive or overly 
speculative under the circumstances of the particular case. 
¶57 The roles of the circuit court and jury were not 
briefed or argued by the parties and therefore I, unlike the 
majority opinion, would not decide this issue. I would remand 
this cause to the circuit court for determination of whether, 
after considering argument by the parties, a front pay award 
should be made by a circuit court or by a jury. In the 
alternative, I would order additional briefing in this court. 
¶58 The majority directs that the circuit court is to 
decide the amount of the front pay award, if appropriate. In 
this case the circuit court presented the issue to a jury. 
Should the circuit court determine that the plaintiff is 
entitled to front pay, the circuit court may consider the jury 
award of front pay in this case as advisory. Wis. Stat. 
§ 805.02(1)(1995-96).  
¶59 For the foregoing reasons, I concur. 
¶60 I am authorized to state that Justice Ann Walsh 
Bradley joins this opinion. 
 
 
No. 95-0649.dws   
 
1
¶61 DONALD W. STEINMETZ, J. (Concurring).  I agree 
with the mandate of the majority in this case.  However, 
due to the majority's treatment of the important issue of 
front pay as a possibility in future cases, I write 
separately solely to further discuss the issue of front 
pay.  In keeping with the spirit of the employment-at-will 
doctrine, I note that the availability of front pay must be 
limited to cases in which the employee has been discharged 
in violation of a fundamental and well-defined public 
policy.  Additionally, I write to further explain some of 
the situations in which front pay will and will not be 
available as a remedy instead of reinstatement. Finally, I 
write to stress that the employee has a duty to mitigate 
all damages, including those awarded as front pay, and to 
explain the employee's duty to mitigate.  
¶62 The employment-at-will doctrine recognizes "that 
where an employment [is] for an indefinite term, an 
employer may discharge an employee 'for good cause, for no 
cause, or even for cause morally wrong, without being 
thereby guilty of legal wrong.'"  Brockmeyer v. Dun & 
Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 567, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983).  
However, over the years, exceptions have been carved out of 
this rule through both legislative and judicial action.  
See id.  It is now unlawful to discharge an employee, even 
an employee-at-will, because of race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.; 
Wis. Stat. § 111.31-111.395.  In Brockmeyer, this court 
 
 
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also held that it is unlawful to terminate an at-will 
employee if "the discharge is contrary to a fundamental and 
well-defined public policy as evidenced by existing law."  
113 Wis. 2d at 573.   
¶63 As with discriminatory discharges where front pay 
may be available only in limited circumstances,19 this court 
held in Brockmeyer that "reinstatement and backpay are the 
most appropriate remedies for public policy exception 
wrongful discharges."  Id. at 575.  Based on Brockmeyer, 
then, I stress that the majority opinion must be limited to 
extremely rare cases when an employee-at-will has been 
discharged in violation of a fundamental and well-defined 
public policy.  Generally, however, reinstatement and back 
pay are the preferred remedies and front pay should be 
available only when reinstatement 
is "not 
feasible."  
Majority op. at 17. 
¶64 The majority opinion provides some examples of 
when reinstatement would and would not be feasible.  Id.  
However, I feel that it is important to expand on these 
examples and to stress that they are only examples.  There 
will be numerous other situations in which reinstatement is 
                     
19 See Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389, 398 (7th 
Cir. 1991) ("the very possibility of front pay under Title 
VII is uncertain" though some courts have imposed it).  See 
also Griffith v. Colorado, Div. of Youth Servs., 17 F.3d 
1323 (10th Cir. 1994) (front pay may be appropriate where 
reinstatement is simply not reasonable); Gutzwiller v. 
Fenik, 860 F.2d. 1317, 1333 (6th Cir. 1988) (back pay and 
reinstatement are the favored remedies for discrimination 
claims under Title VII, though front pay may be appropriate 
at the trial court's discretion).   
 
 
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required as a remedy and front pay is not an option.  
Reinstatement is not impossible in a situation where the 
discharged employee's former position is not available, but 
a substantially similar position in terms of job duties and 
salary is available.  Reinstatement is not impossible 
simply because the employer and the employee do not get 
along, or the employee claims that he or she is not 
comfortable working for someone who previously terminated 
him or her.  There are laws already in place to prevent an 
employer or its employees from retaliating against such an 
employee.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3.  Following the 
law as it is stated in Brockmeyer, I feel that front pay 
will only be properly awarded if the employer has no 
positions (or no positions substantially similar to the 
employee's pre-discharge position) available, or if the 
employer simply refuses to rehire the discharged employee. 
¶65 Finally, I write to stress that a plaintiff who 
is awarded front pay necessarily has a duty to mitigate 
damages.  This is a long-standing principle in Wisconsin 
law.  See Klug v. Flambeau Plastics Corp., 62 Wis. 2d 141, 
155, 214 N.W.2d 281 (1974) (requiring that the injured 
party in an employment situation "must make reasonable 
efforts to mitigate damages"); Gauf v. Milwaukee Athletic 
Club, 151 Wis. 333, 335, 139 N.W. 207 (1912) (damages in a 
wrongful discharge case are "subject to mitigation by the 
amount the employee earn[s], or might by the exercise of 
reasonable diligence [earn]").  See also Marten Transport 
 
 
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v. DILHR, 171 Wis. 2d 147, 155, 491 N.W.2d 96 (Ct. App. 
1992); Hale v. Stoughton Hospital Ass'n, Inc., 126 Wis. 2d 
267, 279, 376 N.W.2d 89 (Ct. App. 1985); Koenings v. Joseph 
Schlitz Brewing Co., 123 Wis. 2d 490, 503, 368 N.W.2d 690 
(Ct. App. 1985).  Mitigation has always been required in 
employment cases. Consequently, I stress that a discharged 
employee has a duty to mitigate damages and to actively 
seek other employment if reinstatement is not possible.  To 
hold otherwise would be to discourage the employee from 
seeking other employment entirely to the detriment of the 
employer. 
¶66 The majority opinion touches on all of the 
aspects of front pay raised in this opinion.  I write 
separately simply to further discuss these important issues 
and to provide guidance in future cases.   
For the foregoing reasons, I write separately.