Title: David Goodwin v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC93-491
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: December 16, 1999

Supreme Court of Florida
 
____________
No. 93,491
____________
DAVID GOODWIN,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
____________
No. 93,805
____________
HERBERT JONES, 
Petitioner, 
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
[December 16, 1999]
PARIENTE, J.
We consolidate these cases because the Fourth District in Goodwin v. State,
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721 So. 2d 728, 731 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), and the First District in Jones v. State,
715 So. 2d 378, 378 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998), both certified the following question as
one of great public importance:
IN APPEALS WHICH DO NOT INVOLVE
CONSTITUTIONAL ERROR, DOES THE
ENACTMENT OF SECTION 924.051(7), FLORIDA
STATUTES, ABROGATE THE HARMLESS ERROR
ANALYSIS ANNOUNCED IN [STATE V. DIGUILIO],
491 SO. 2D 1129 (FLA. 1986)?
We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  For the reasons expressed
below, we answer the certified question in the negative.
FACTS
We first briefly review the facts of both cases.  In Goodwin, the prosecuting
attorney erred by eliciting improper "bad neighborhood" testimony from one of the
arresting officers that he targets "areas that are known for street level drug sales"
and "tries to make buys from street level dealers."  721 So. 2d at 728.  The trial
court sustained defense counsel's objection to the testimony and gave a curative
instruction for the jury to disregard the comment.  See id.  The trial court reserved
ruling on the defendant's motion for a mistrial until after trial, at which time it was
denied.  See id.  
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On appeal, the Fourth District held that this type of "bad neighborhood"
testimony was not a "constitutional error" to which this Court's decision in DiGuilio
applied.  Id.  Instead, the Fourth District found that the defendant had failed to meet
his burden of demonstrating "prejudicial error" pursuant to section 924.051(7),
Florida Statutes (1996).  Goodwin, 721 So. 2d at 729.
In Jones, the trial court allowed the introduction of collateral crimes evidence
over the defendant's timely objection.  The First District affirmed based on section
924.051(7), but certified the identical question as in Goodwin for this Court's
review.  Jones, 715 So. 2d at 378.
ANALYSIS
The subject of the certified questions, section 924.051(7), provides:  
In a direct appeal or a collateral proceeding, the party
challenging the judgment or order of the trial court has the
burden of demonstrating that prejudicial error occurred in
the trial court.  A conviction or sentence may not be
reversed absent an express finding that a prejudicial error
occurred in the trial court.  
Section 924.051(1)(a) defines "prejudicial error" as "an error in the trial court that
harmfully affected the judgment or sentence."  Notably, section 924.051(7) does not
distinguish between constitutional and nonconstitutional error. 
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The certified question raises important issues concerning the role of the
appellate courts in ensuring that criminal trials are free of harmful error, an essential
judicial function that serves to protect a defendant’s constitutional right to a fair
trial.  By limiting the certified question to appeals that do not involve "constitutional
error," a term not utilized in the statute, the First and Fourth Districts acknowledged
that in cases of constitutional error, state appellate courts are bound to apply the
harmless error standard enunciated in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967),
and followed by this Court in DiGuilio.  The State concedes this as well.  In fact, the
State contends that section 924.051(7) merely reaffirms existing standards of
review.  In order to test the validity of the State's position, we deem it appropriate to
trace the evolution of the harmless error standard for review of criminal convictions.
In the early history of the United States justice system, appellate courts
routinely reversed convictions for almost every error committed during trial.  See 
Roger Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error 13 (1970).  The threat of reversal was
so great that appellate courts came to be described as "impregnable citadels of
technicality."  Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 759 (1946) (quoting
Marcus A. Kavanaugh, Improvement of Administration of Criminal Justice by
Exercise of Judicial Power, 11 A.B.A.J. 217, 222 (1925)). 
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Dissatisfied with automatic reversals based on "technical errors," described
by Justice Frankfurter as ones concerned with the "mere etiquette of trials and with
the formalities and minutiae of procedure," Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287,
294 (1939), the great legal scholars of the day, including Taft, Wigmore, Pound and
Hadley, sought the enactment of harmless error statutes in order to
substitute judgment for automatic application of rules; to
preserve a check upon arbitrary action and essential
unfairness in trials, but at the same time to make the
process perform that function without giving men fairly
convicted the multiplicity of loopholes which any highly
and minutely detailed scheme of errors, especially in
relation to procedure, will engender and reflect in a
printed record.
Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 760.  
Thus, the first federal harmless error statute, Act of February 26, 1919, ch.
48, 40 Stat. 1181, provided that reversal could not be based on errors "which [did]
not affect the substantial rights of the parties."  The goal of the statute was to
prevent reversal based on mere "technical" errors at trial.  See Kotteakos, 328 U.S.
at 758-59.  This statute is strikingly similar to one of the other harmless error
statutes in Florida, section 924.33, which provides that "[n]o judgment shall be
reversed unless the appellate court is of the opinion . . . that error was committed
1Section 924.33, Florida Statutes (1997), was first enacted in 1939 and is still in effect
today.
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that injuriously affected the substantial rights of the appellant."1
Writing for the Court, Justice Rutledge cautioned in Kotteakos that, while the
distinction between "technical errors" and errors affecting "substantial rights" was
an easy one to require, the actual application of the distinction to a given case was
more difficult.  328 U.S. at 761.  We agree that the "discrimination it requires is one
of judgment transcending confinement by formula or precise rule," id., especially
considering that "what may seem technical may embody a great tradition of justice." 
Id.  
In Kotteakos, the Supreme Court enunciated the analysis to be applied by
federal appellate courts in cases other than those involving departures from
constitutional norms:
If, when all is said and done, the conviction is sure that
the error did not influence the jury, or had but very slight
effect, the verdict and the judgment should stand, except
perhaps where the departure is from a constitutional norm
. . . .  But if one cannot say, with fair assurance, after
pondering all that happened without stripping that
erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was
not substantially swayed by the error, it is impossible to
conclude that substantial rights were not affected.  The
inquiry cannot be merely whether there was enough to
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support the result, apart from the phase affected by the
error. It is rather, even so, whether the error itself had
substantial influence. If so, or if one is left in grave doubt,
the conviction cannot stand. 
Id. at 764-65 (emphasis supplied).  Thus, the test for reversal established in
Kotteakos requires the appellate court to determine whether the error had a
"substantial influence" on the verdict, or whether the court is left with "grave doubt"
as to its influence.  Id.  If the court cannot say with "fair assurance" that the error
had no substantial effect on the verdict, reversal is required under this standard
because it is "impossible to conclude that substantial rights were not affected." 
Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764-65.
Despite developing its first harmless error analysis, the Supreme Court
suggested in the Kotteakos opinion that constitutional error would continue to
require automatic reversal, without regard to the error's effect on the verdict.  See id. 
Twenty years later, in Chapman v. California, the Court reconsidered that
assumption.  386 U.S. at 22. 
In Chapman, the Court concluded that some constitutional errors could be
considered harmless.  Id.  The Court struck down the California Supreme Court's
application of the harmless error provision found in the California Constitution,
2Note the similarity between this constitutional provision and section 59.041, Florida
Statutes (1997), which provides: 
No judgment shall be set aside or reversed, or new trial granted by any court of the
state in any cause, civil or criminal, on the ground of [1] misdirection of the jury or
[2] the improper admission or rejection of evidence or [3] for error as to any
matter of pleading or procedure, unless in the opinion of the court to which
application is made, after an examination of the entire case it shall appear that the
error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.  This section shall be
liberally construed.
(Emphasis supplied.)  This statute was first enacted in 1911 and is still in effect today.
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which forbade reversal "unless 'the court shall be of the opinion that the error
complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.'"  Id. at 20 (quoting Cal.
Const. art. VI, § 4 ½ (1914)).2 
The error complained of in Chapman was an improper comment on the
defendants' exercise of their right not to testify against themselves in a criminal
proceeding.  The Supreme Court concluded that this error intruded on the
constitutional protections of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and that it was
therefore the Court's responsibility to protect these rights by reviewing the error
independently.  Recognizing that their prior cases indicated that "there are some
constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated
as harmless error," the Court ultimately concluded that "before a federal
constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief
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that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."  Id. at 23-24.  
This harmless error analysis adopted in Chapman requires appellate courts to
first consider the nature of the error complained of and then the effect this error had
on the triers of fact.  See id. at 25-26.  The Court applied this test to the facts in
Chapman and enunciated the oft-quoted standard that reversal was required in that
case because it was "completely impossible . . . to say that the State has
demonstrated, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the prosecutor's comments and the
trial judge's instruction did not contribute to petitioners' convictions."  386 U.S. at
26.
In DiGuilio, this Court considered whether the per se rule of reversal should
continue to be applied to improper comments on the right to remain silent, or section
924.33 and the United States Supreme Court's decision in Chapman permitted a
harmless error analysis.  See DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d at 1130; see also State v. Murray,
443 So. 2d 955, 956 (Fla. 1984) (holding that the appropriate standard to judge
whether a prosecutor's improper closing argument was so prejudicial as to require a
new trial was the "harmless error" rule set forth in Chapman).  
DiGuilio began its analysis by acknowledging that the "authority of the
legislature to enact harmless error statutes is unquestioned."  Id. at 1134.  This
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observation still holds true today.  The Court further observed that the harmless
error rule is "concerned with the due process right to a fair trial," id. at 1135, and
"preserves the accused's constitutional right to a fair trial by requiring the state to
show beyond a reasonable doubt that the specific comment(s) did not contribute to
the verdict."  Id. at 1136 (emphasis supplied).  Thus, DiGuilio stands for the
proposition "that a defendant has a constitutional right to a fair trial free of harmful
error."  State v. Schopp, 653 So. 2d 1016, 1020 (Fla. 1995) (emphasis supplied).
We explained in DiGuilio that important policy concerns support the harmless
error rule:
[The harmless error rule] preserves the public and state
interest in finality of verdicts which are free of any
harmful error.  In view of the heavy burden the harmless
error rule places on the state, it further serves as a strong
deterrent against prosecutors advertently or inadvertently
commenting on an accused's silence.
DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d at 1136.  In enunciating the harmless error test to be applied,
we cited Chapman:
The harmless error test . . . places the burden on the state,
as the beneficiary of the error, to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not
contribute to the verdict or, alternatively stated, that there
is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to
the conviction.
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Id. at 1135.
In adopting Chapman's harmless error analysis, we provided "guidance" for
the "benefit of further appellate review" by adopting the views of former Chief
Justice Roger Traynor of the California Supreme Court view on how the harmless
error test should be applied:
In his perceptive essay, The Riddle of Harmless
Error, former Chief Justice Traynor addressed various
common myths which, historically, appellate courts fall
into when applying harmless error analysis.  The worst is
to abdicate judicial responsibility by falling into one of the
extremes of all too easy affirmance or all too easy
reversal.  Neither course is acceptable.  The test must be
conscientiously applied and the reasoning of the court set
forth for the guidance of all concerned and for the benefit
of further appellate review.  The test is not a sufficiency-
of-the-evidence, a correct result, a not clearly wrong, a
substantial evidence, a more probable than not, a clear
and convincing, or even an overwhelming evidence test. .
. .   The focus is on the effect of the error on the trier of
fact.
Id. at 1139 (emphasis supplied).  Finally, although the Court observed that no
sentence should be reversed absent harmful error, the Court made clear that 
[i]f the appellate court cannot say beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error did not affect the verdict, then the
error is by definition harmful. 
Id.  Although the DiGuilio decision adopting Chapman arose in the context of
3Section 924.33 provides that a conviction should not be reversed unless the error affected
the defendant's substantial rights and states that "[i]t shall not be presumed that error injuriously
affected the substantial rights of the appellant."  Section 59.041 specifies that "improper
admission or rejection of evidence" should lead to reversal only if "after an examination of the
entire case it shall appear that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice."
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constitutional error, we applied this standard in subsequent decisions regarding
other types of errors, except those requiring per se reversal.  See, e.g., State v.
Davis, 720 So. 2d 220, 230 (Fla. 1998); Moore v. State, 701 So. 2d 545, 550 (Fla.
1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1536 (1998); State v. Lee, 531 So. 2d 133, 134 (Fla.
1988).  
Our decision in Lee is especially important for our analysis in this case.  In
Lee, this Court considered a certified question regarding whether the DiGuilio
standard of harmless error should apply to require reversal for "erroneous admission
of evidence of collateral crimes" where the "error has not resulted in a miscarriage
of justice but the state has failed to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that
there is no reasonable possibility that the error affected the jury verdict."  Lee, 531
So. 2d at 134.  In answering the question in the affirmative, we recognized that the
certified question reflected the district court's acknowledgment of both section
924.33 and section 59.041.  See id. at 136 n.1.
Despite the existence of these harmless error statutes,3 the Court reaffirmed
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the DiGuilio test and its applicability to the case.  We concluded that neither of
these statutes affected the harmless error standard enunciated in DiGuilio and we
made clear that, although the Legislature has the authority to enact harmless error
statutes like sections 924.33 and 59.041, this Court retains the authority to
determine the analysis to be applied in deciding whether an error requires reversal. 
See id. at 136 n.1. 
In reaffirming DiGuilio and its applicability to error such as the improper
admission of collateral crime evidence, we reiterated in Lee that the harmless error
analysis focuses on the effect of the error on the trier of fact.  Id. at 137.  Thus, the
reviewing court must resist the temptation to make its own determination of whether
a guilty verdict could be sustained by excluding the impermissible evidence and
examining only the permissible evidence.  We also repeated our agreement with
Chief Justice Traynor, previously quoted in DiGuilio:
Overwhelming evidence of guilt does not negate the fact that an
error that constituted a substantial part of the prosecution's case may
have played a substantial part in the jury's deliberation and thus
contributed to the actual verdict reached, for the jury may have reached
its verdict because of the error without considering other reasons
untainted by error that would have supported the same result.  
Lee, 531 So. 2d at 137 (citations omitted); see also Ciccarelli v. State, 531 So. 2d
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129, 131 (Fla. 1988).
Eleven years after Lee and after the enactment of yet another harmless error
statute, we are now considering essentially the same issue as in Lee and we reach
the same conclusion.  First, as to federal constitutional errors, it is clear that section
924.051(7) cannot be held to abrogate the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Chapman and our decision in DiGuilio.
At the outset, we note that the statute itself contains no language that would
allow this Court to read section 924.051(7) as only applying to non-constitutional
error as construed by the Fourth District in Goodwin.  See Goodwin, 721 So. 2d at
729.  However, because the statute unambiguously applies to all errors in criminal
appeals, construing the statute as limited to non-constitutional errors would
effectively require us to rewrite section 924.051(7). 
Further, even if this Court adopted a construction of section 924.051(7) as
applying only to nonconstitutional errors, we note that no appellate court in Florida
has defined where the line would be drawn between constitutional and
nonconstitutional error.  In Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 294 (1991), a case
involving collateral review, the Supreme Court identified fifteen "constitutional
4These errors included:  (1) unconstitutionally overbroad jury instructions; (2) the
admission of evidence at the sentencing stage of a capital case in violation of the Sixth
Amendment Counsel Clause; (3) a jury instruction containing an erroneous conclusive
presumption; (4) a jury instruction misstating an element of the offense; (5) erroneous exclusion
of a defendant's testimony regarding the circumstances of his confession; (6) restriction on a
defendant's right to cross-examine a witness for bias in violation of the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause; (7) the denial of a defendant's right to be present at trial; (8) improper
comments on a defendant's silence at trial in violation of the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination
Clause; (9) a statute improperly forbidding the trial court's giving a jury instruction on a lesser
included offense in a capital case in violation of the Due Process Clause; (10) the failure to
instruct the jury on the presumption of innocence; (11) the admission of identification evidence in
violation of the Sixth Amendment Counsel Clause; (12) admission of the out-of-court statement
of a nontestifying codefendant in violation of the Sixth Amendment Counsel Clause; (13) a
confession obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment; (14) admission of evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment; (15) denial of counsel at a preliminary hearing in violation of
the Sixth Amendment Counsel Clause.  See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 294 (1991).
5Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).   
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errors."4  Clearly, errors that directly impact basic constitutional rights such as the
right to remain silent as set forth in Chapman or the right to confront witnesses
against the defendant such as in Bruton5 are "constitutional errors."  
There are many errors, however, that do not neatly fit into a fixed category
such as "constitutional error," yet may be extremely serious.  For example, the
erroneous admission of collateral crime evidence is "presumptively harmful."
Czubak v. State, 570 So. 2d 925, 928 (Fla. 1990); Castro v. State, 547 So. 2d 111,
116 (Fla. 1989).  Is such "presumptively harmful" error also constitutional error? 
Certainly the admission of such evidence impacts the defendant's right to a fair trial
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and therefore implicates a defendant's basic due process rights.  
We have seen of late repeated instances of improper closing argument.  See,
e.g, Ruiz v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly S157 (Fla. Apr. 1, 1999), Gore v. State, 719
So. 2d 1197, 1202 (Fla. 1998), and cases cited therein.  At what point does properly
objected-to closing argument become constitutional error by thwarting the
defendant's right to a fair trial?  As these few cases demonstrate, it is difficult to
establish a brightline test that would determine which errors rise to the level of
constitutional significance.
To require the appellate courts to analyze each error to decide if it is
constitutional or nonconstitutional before determining whether to apply the
DiGuilio analytical framework would leave appellate courts to chart a course in
murky waters.  For example, some errors, while obviously not technical and not
clearly constitutional, may nevertheless impact the constitutional right to a fair trial. 
To that end, were we to adopt this distinction, we can envision the development of
an entire body of case law concerning whether, in any given case, the error
complained of had constitutional significance.  Further, any attempt to develop a
"laundry list" of constitutional errors would not guarantee the integrity of the
criminal process.
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To the contrary, the State has argued, and we agree, that the enactment of
section 924.051(7) merely reaffirms existing standards of review requiring the
application of the DiGuilio test to errors that are not per se reversible.  This
reaffirmation is in recognition of the undeniable obligation of the judiciary to
safeguard a defendant's right to a fair trial and its constitutional authority to
determine "when an error is harmless and the analysis to be used in making the
determination."  Lee, 631 So. 2d at 136 n.1.
In fact, we view the enactment of section 924.051(7) as a codification of
existing law by referring to prejudicial error as "harmful" error.  Because the term
"harmful" is not defined by statute, we consider whether there are definitions of the
same term found in case law.  See State v. Mitro, 700 So. 2d 643, 645 (Fla. 1997). 
In this regard, we find that the DiGuilio defined "harmful error" as error about which
"an appellate court cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt . . . did not affect the
verdict."  As we explained in DiGuilio, harmful error is the converse of harmless
error.  491 So. 2d at 1139.  Thus, we conclude that by referring to "harmful" error
without defining the term, the Legislature incorporated the DiGuilio usage. 
This brings us to the essential issue raised by the certified question: has the
enactment of section 924.051(7) shifted the burden of proof regarding whether the
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error harmfully affected the verdict?  In cases of doubt, does the benefit of that
doubt now go to the beneficiary of the error?  As Judge Griffin recognized, "Read
literally and in isolation, the burden imposed by the statute to demonstrate that an
error 'harmfully affected the judgment or sentence' appears virtually impossible for a
defendant to meet."  Jackson v. State, 707 So. 2d 412, 414 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).
We interpret section 924.051(7) as a reaffirmation of the important principle
that the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that an error occurred in the
trial court, which was preserved by proper objection.  See, e.g., Castor v. State, 365
So. 2d 701, 703 (Fla. 1978); Driver v. State, 46 So. 2d 718, 720 (Fla. 1950).  Only
when the defendant satisfies the burden of demonstrating the existence of preserved
error does the appellate court engage in a DiGuilio harmless error analysis.  If the
error is not properly preserved or is unpreserved, the conviction can be reversed
only if the error is "fundamental."  See, e.g., Chandler v. State, 702 So. 2d 186, 191
(Fla. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1535 (1998); Whitfield v. State, 706 So. 2d 1, 4
(Fla. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 103 (1998); Larkins v. State, 655 So. 2d 95, 98
(Fla. 1995).
Our appellate cases are filled with examples of errors that are unpreserved
6See, e.g., Shellito v. State, 701 So. 2d 837, 841 (Fla. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1537
(1998); Ferrell v. State, 686 So. 2d 1324, 1328 (Fla. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1173 (1997).
7See Gamble v. State, 659 So. 2d 242, 245 (Fla. 1995); Windom v. State, 656 So. 2d 432,
439 (Fla. 1995); Rodriguez v. State, 609 So. 2d 493, 499 (Fla. 1992).
8Under the invited-error doctrine, a party may not make or invite error at trial and then
take advantage of the error on appeal.  See Norton v. State, 709 So. 2d 89, 94 (Fla. 1997); Terry
v. State, 668 So. 2d 954, 962 (Fla. 1996); Czubak v. State, 570 So. 2d 925, 928 (Fla. 1990);
Pope v. State, 441 So.2d 1073, 1076 (Fla. 1983).
9See Knight v. State, 721 So. 2d 287, 296 (Fla. 1998), cert. denied, 68 U.S.L.W. 3307
(U.S. Nov. 8, 1999) (No. 98-9741); Monlyn v. State, 705 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1997), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 2378 (1998); Tompkins v. State, 502 So. 2d 415, 419 (Fla. 1986); Bozeman v. State,
698 So.2d 629, 630-31 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).
10See Finney v. State, 660 So.2d 674, 684 (Fla.1995); Norton v. State, 709 So. 2d 87, 96
(Fla. 1997); Lucas v. State, 568 So. 2d 18, 21 (Fla. 1990); Loehrke v. State, 722 So. 2d 867, 871
(Fla. 5th DCA 1998).
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either because no objection was made6 or because the objection was not specific.7 If
the error is "invited,"8 or the defendant "opens the door" to the error, the appellate
court will not consider the error a basis for reversal.9  In addition, if it is alleged that
evidence has been improperly excluded and the appellate record does not establish
that a proffer has been made, the lack of an adequate record will be grounds to
affirm.10  Indeed, our case law is filled with procedural pitfalls that may preclude an
error from being considered on appeal.
Most importantly, without regard to the language of section 924.051(7), the
Legislature cannot relieve the appellate courts of their independent and inherent
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obligation to assess the effect of the error on the verdict.  As observed by Justice
Grimes in his concurring opinion in Ciccarelli, regarding whether each appellate
judge must independently review the complete criminal trial record:
While the standard of review for harmless error is
properly established by this Court, the manner by which
each judge makes the determination of this issue must
necessarily be decided by that judge.  Each judge in the
State of Florida takes an oath "to well and faithfully
perform the duties" of his or her office. Art. II, Sec. 5, Fla.
Const.  In order to fulfill that oath, a finding of harmless
error cannot be made unless the judge is satisfied beyond
a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not
contribute to the verdict or judgment.
531 So. 2d at 132 (emphasis supplied) (Grimes, J., specially concurring).
The solemn obligation of the Court to perform an independent harmless error
review and establish the analysis to be applied in performing that review is so
critical to the appellate function that this Court has satisfied its obligation to review
for harmless error, even when the State has not argued that the complained of error
was harmless.  See Heuss v. State, 687 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 1996).  We concluded in
that case that regardless of any lack of argument on the issue by the state, 
[t]he court must still be able to conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt, after evaluation of the impact of the
error in light of the overall strength of the case and the
defenses asserted, that the verdict could not have been
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affected by the error. 
Id. at 824.  We further observed that 
our holding is consistent with the legislative directive of
the harmless error statutes,  sections 59.041 and 924.33,
Florida Statutes (1995), which prohibit reversal if the
error does not result in a miscarriage of justice or
injuriously affect a substantial right of the appellant.
Id.  Thus, we held that "[t]o preclude application of the test merely because the
State failed to make the argument would elevate form over substance and hamper
the goal of efficient use of judicial resources."  Id.
These observations of our Court are consistent with those of the United States
Supreme Court.  As Justice Breyer recently observed in explaining why a burden of
persuasion is ill-suited to the appellate process:
The case before us does not involve a judge who shifts a
"burden" to help control the presentation of evidence at a
trial, but rather involves a judge who applies a legal
standard (harmlessness) to a record that the presentation
of evidence is no longer likely to affect.  In such a case,
we think it conceptually clearer for the judge to ask
directly, "Do I, the judge, think that the error substantially
influenced the jury's decision?" than for the judge to try to
put the same question in terms of proof burdens (e.g., "Do
I believe the party has borne its burden of showing . . .?")
O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436-37 (1995).  Justice Breyer went on to
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quote Chief Justice Traynor with approval on the issue of appellate responsibility:
Whether or not counsel are helpful, it is still the
responsibility of the . . . court, once it concludes that there
was error, to determine whether the error affected the
judgment. It must do so without benefit of such aids as
presumptions or allocated burdens of proof that expedite
fact-finding at the trial.
Id. (quoting Roger J. Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error 26 (1970)).  Moreover,
as Justice Stevens has observed, "In the end, the way we phrase the governing
standard is far less important than the quality of the judgment with which it is
applied."  Brecht v. Ambramson, 507 U.S. 619, 643 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring); see also Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 761. 
Review of the record to ascertain whether the error is harmless is an essential
and critical appellate function.  For this reason, we hold that to shift the burden to
the defendant would not only be an abdication of judicial responsibility, but could
lead to the unjust result of an affirmance of a conviction even though the appellate
court was not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the
defendant's conviction. 
  
We further note that section 924.051(7) purports to apply the same standard
for determining whether an error is harmless on direct appeal as in a claim for
-23-
collateral relief after the conviction has been affirmed on direct appeal.  However,
this would be contrary to the long-standing principle of appellate review that applies
a different standard for reversal on direct appeal than on collateral proceedings.  As
the United States Supreme Court has observed, once a conviction has been affirmed
on direct appeal "a presumption of finality and legality attaches to the conviction
and sentence."  Brecht v. Ambramson, 507 U.S. 619, 633 (1992).  Our construction
of section 924.051(7) accords with this principle that a different standard for
determining whether an error harmfully affected the judgment applies on direct
appeal than in postconviction proceedings.
Finally, reading the statute to reaffirm rather than abrogate existing standards
of review furthers important policies by:  (1) promoting public trust and confidence
by preserving the State's interest in the finality of verdicts free from harmful error;
see DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d at 1136; (2) protecting a citizen's constitutional right to a
fair trial by ensuring that no conviction will be affirmed unless, from a review of the
record as a whole, there is no reasonable possibility that the error affected the
verdict; (3) reaffirming the appellate courts' obligation not to reverse for technical or
harmless error; and (4) providing an incentive on the part of the State, as beneficiary
of the error, to refrain from causing error to occur in the trial of a case.
-24-
As in Lee, we continue to recognize the authority of the Legislature to enact
harmless error statutes such as sections 924.051(7) and 924.33.  However, we
reaffirm our inherent authority "to determine when an error is harmless and the
analysis to be used in making the determination."  Lee, 531 So. 2d at 136 n.1; see
also DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d at 1137.  Thus, in answering the certified question, we
conclude that once the defendant has satisfied the burden of demonstrating that error
has occurred, the DiGuilio standard of harmless error remains the applicable
analysis to be employed in determining whether the error requires a reversal on
direct appeal.  Accordingly we answer the certified question in Goodwin and Jones
in the negative.
B.  Application in Goodwin
With these principles in mind, we first review Goodwin.  In Goodwin, the
issue on appeal before the Fourth District was whether reversal was required
because of allegedly impermissible "bad neighborhood" testimony.  However, in
Goodwin the trial court not only sustained the objection to the "bad neighborhood"
testimony, but gave the jury a curative instruction to disregard the comment.  The
defendant then moved for a mistrial.  The trial court reserved ruling on the motion
until after trial at which time the motion for mistrial was denied.  As explained by
11We recognize that we have not always been consistent in applying the abuse of
discretion standard to denials of motions for mistrial. See, e.g., Whitton v. State, 649 So. 2d 861,
864 (Fla. 1994) (applying a DiGuilio analysis to a trial court's denial of a motion for mistrial); see
also Lowder v. State, 589 So. 2d 933, 935-36 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).
-25-
the Fourth District, similar testimony had already been admitted without objection. 
Goodwin, 721 So. 2d at 728-29.
This Court's case law states that a trial court's ruling on a motion for mistrial
is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review.  See Cole v. State, 701 So.
2d 845, 853 (Fla. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1370 (1998); Power v. State, 605
So. 2d 856, 860 (Fla. 1992).11  Recently we reaffirmed that a motion for mistrial
"should be granted only when it is necessary to ensure that the defendant receives a
fair trial."  Cole, 701 So. 2d at 853; see also Terry v. State, 668 So. 2d 954, 962
(Fla. 1996).  We held in Cole that because the complained-of remark "was not so
prejudicial as to require reversal," the trial court did not abuse its discretion.  701
So. 2d at 853.
Therefore, use of a harmless error analysis under DiGuilio is not necessary
where, as occurred in Goodwin, the trial court recognized the error, sustained the
objection and gave a curative instruction.  Instead, the correct appellate standard is
whether the trial court abused its discretion in its denial of a mistrial.  In analyzing
-26-
the abuse of discretion issue in Goodwin, it is necessary to determine whether the
single improper remark, to which the trial court sustained an objection and gave a
curative instruction, was so prejudicial as to deny defendant a fair trial.  See Cole,
701 So. 2d at 853.  Accordingly, while we answer the certified question in the
negative, we approve the result in Goodwin.
C.  Application in Jones
The claimed error in the consolidated case of Jones was the admission of
collateral crime evidence over the defendant’s objection, which was overruled.  The
State concedes that neither party addressed the applicability of section 924.051(7),
the enactment of which postdated the crime.  On appeal to the First District, the
State relied on DiGuilio to argue that the admission of the collateral crime evidence
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  However, collateral crime evidence is
presumptively harmful.  See Czubak, 570 So. 2d at 928.  It is clear that Lee requires
the application of DiGuilio to the improper admission of collateral crime evidence. 
Based on the foregoing, we quash Jones.  We remand to the district court for further
consideration in light of this opinion.
It is so ordered.
HARDING, C.J., and SHAW, ANSTEAD, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
-27-
WELLS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF
FILED, DETERMINED.
WELLS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I dissent from answering the certified question in the negative.  I dissent from
quashing the decision of the First District in Jones v. State, 715 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1998).  I concur in approving the result in Goodwin v. State, 721 So. 2d 728
(Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
I begin from the perspective of the following hallmark principles which have
long guided this Court in issues concerning the giving of effect to legislative
enactments.
1.
"[W]hen reasonably possible and consistent with legislative intent, we
must give preference to a construction which will give effect to the
statute over another construction which would defeat it."  Schultz v.
State, 361 So. 2d 416, 419 (Fla. 1978).
2.
"It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that statutory
language cannot be construed so as to render it potentially
meaningless."  Ellis v. State, 622 So. 2d 991, 1001 (Fla. 1993).
3.
"[T]his Court is eminently qualified to give Florida statutes a narrowing
construction to comply  with our state and federal constitutions.  In
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fact, it is our duty to save Florida statutes from the constitutional
dustbin whenever possible.  We have done so regularly and with
statutes that required far more rewriting than the present sections." 
Doe v. Mortham, 708 So. 2d 929, 934 (Fla. 1998) (footnotes omitted).
4.
"The authority of the legislature to enact harmless error statutes is
unquestioned.  Contraposed to this legislative authority, the courts may
establish the rule that certain errors always violate the right to a fair
trial and are, thus, per se reversible.  To do so, however, we are
obligated to perform a reasoned analysis which shows that this is true,
and that, for constitutional reasons, we must override the legislative
decision."  State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1134 (Fla. 1986)
(footnote omitted).
5.
"[W]e believe that the legislature may implement this constitutional
right and place reasonable conditions upon it so long as they do not
thwart the litigants' legitimate appellate rights."  Amendments to the
Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, 685 So. 2d 773, 774 (Fla. 1996).
Applying the foregoing sound principles of this Court, I conclude that there is
a distinction, as recognized by the federal courts and virtually every other state
court, between constitutional error and nonconstitutional error.  This Court's
decision in DiGuilio addresses constitutional error and is in accord with the United
States Supreme Court decisions in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), and
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993), as to the analysis to be applied to
constitutional error on direct appeal.
However, as to nonconstitutional error, DiGuilio should not be held to be
-29-
controlling in light of the legislative enactment of section 924.051(7), Florida
Statutes.  This statute can easily be given its plainly intended effect by giving to it a
narrowing construction of pertaining only to nonconstitutional error.  The plainly
intended effect of the statute in respect to nonconstitutional error is to place the
burden upon the party claiming error to demonstrate that the error was "prejudicial,"
with prejudice being defined in accord with Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S.
750 (1946).  The Kotteakos test for harmless error is whether the error had
substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.  This is
considered to be a less onerous standard for determining that error was harmless
than the Chapman standard adopted in DiGuilio, which is to the exclusion of a
reasonable doubt.  Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
Giving to this statute its plainly intended effect in respect to nonconstitutional
error would be consistent with the federal courts as the standard to be applied in
reviewing nonconstitutional error and as to the other state courts in respect to the
burden of demonstrating harmful error.  
In Brecht, the Court said that the Kotteakos standard, "had substantial and
injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict," was grounded in the
federal harmless error statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2111, which is only applied to claims of
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nonconstitutional error.  It said that Chapman's "harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard is applied to claims of constitutional error.  507 U.S. at 630-31.
The Court in United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449 (1986), applied the
less stringent Kotteakos harmless error standard to a case of misjoinder.  It
explained that the joinder standards under the federal criminal rules were not
themselves of constitutional magnitude.  474 U.S. at 446, 449.  Hence, it held that
misjoinder affects substantial rights only if it results in actual prejudice.  Id. at 449.
Later, in Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 346-347 (1990), the Court
agreed with the circuit court's determination that a less stringent standard than the
harmless error rule articulated in Chapman applied because the error was merely
evidentiary and not constitutional in nature.  493 U.S. at 346, 354.  The trial court in
Dowling admitted testimony over the defendant's claim that it was barred by
collateral estoppel.  The Supreme Court reasoned that because the evidence was only
barred by the common-law doctrine of collateral estoppel, the government was not
"constitutionally" barred from using the contested testimony.  493 U.S. at 350.  See
also United States v. Quintero, 38 F.3d 1317 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v.
Grayson, 795 F.2d 278, 290 (3d Cir. 1986).
In People v. Mateo, 551 N.W.2d 891 (Mich. 1996), the Supreme Court of
-31-
Michigan was confronted with this exact question.  The Supreme Court of Michigan
held that the legislative harmless error statute was not a usurpation of the court's
authority and that courts are not to analyze nonconstitutional error for harmlessness
beyond a reasonable doubt.  There is no reason Florida should not recognize this
view.
Many courts have explicitly found, as the statute in this case requires, that the
burden should be on the defendant to show prejudicial or harmful error on appeal. 
See, e.g., People v. Vigil, 718 P.2d 496, 500 (Colo. 1986) ("Because the defendant
does not allege a deprivation of constitutional rights . . . the defendant has the burden
of showing prejudice."); State v. McKnight, 706 A.2d 1003, 1007 (Conn. App. Ct.
1998) ("When a trial error . . . does not involve a constitutional violation the burden
is on the defendant to demonstrate the harmfulness of the court's error."); Stewart v.
State, 349 S.E.2d 18, 19 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986) ("The burden is on the party claiming
error not only to show error, but error which injured him and unless the error results
in a miscarriage of justice or constitutes a substantial violation of a constitutional or
statutory right, an appellate court will not reverse.”); State v. Rodriguez, 674 P.2d
1029 (Idaho Ct. App. 1983) ("An appellant has the burden to show prejudicial error .
. . .  [E]rror will be deemed harmless if an appellate court finds, beyond a reasonable
-32-
doubt, that there was no reasonable possibility that the erroneously admitted
evidence contributed to the conviction."); Edwards v. State, 479 N.E.2d 541, 548
(Ind. 1985) ("The appellant always has the burden to show affirmatively that the
alleged error was prejudicial."); Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 425 N.E.2d 294, 296
(Mass. 1981) ("The burden is on the defendant to show prejudice."); State v. Hicks,
428 S.E.2d 167, 174 (N.C. 1993) (for errors other than those arising under the
Federal Constitution, "the defendant has the burden of establishing prejudice by
showing that ‘there is a reasonable possibility . . . a different result would have been
reached at the trial [absent the error]’"); Harrall v. State, 674 P.2d 581 (Okla. 1984)
(“[T]he burden is on the appellant to establish the fact that he was prejudiced in his
substantial rights by the commission of error."); State v. Fender, 358 N.W.2d 248,
254 (S.D. 1984) ("Appellant must affirmatively show prejudicial error.  A showing
of prejudicial error requires a showing from the record that under the evidence the
jury might and probably would have returned a different verdict if the alleged error
had not occurred."); Wilson v. State, 646 S.W.2d 472, 473 (Tex. 1982) ("It is
encumbent [sic] upon the appellant to show harm or prejudice when he alleges
error."); State v. Bushey, 513 A.2d 1177, 1182 (Vt. 1986) ("[D]efendant bears the
burden of showing prejudicial error."); Dotson v. State, 712 P.2d 365, 366 (Wyo.
-33-
1986) ("Error which does not affect substantial rights is regarded as harmless and
'shall be disregarded' on appeal. . . .  Appellant must show prejudice and has the
burden of establishing that prejudice.").
I reject the majority's analysis, which renders section 924.051(7), in reality, a
nullity, although stopping short of holding the statute unconstitutional.  What the
majority does is directly contrary to the reasoning in DiGuilio that the Court is bound
to honor the authority of the legislature to enact harmless error statutes which will
only be overridden by the Court for constitutional reasons.
I reject the majority's premise that to distinguish between constitutional errors
and nonconstitutional errors is too difficult a task for Florida's appellate courts.  If
this analysis can be successfully performed by the federal courts and the appellate
courts of other states, our courts clearly have the capability.
The majority relies upon this Court's 1988 decision in State v. Lee, 531 So. 2d
133 (Fla. 1988), which I find to be clearly not determinative of the present issue. 
First, Lee did not differentiate between constitutional and nonconstitutional error.  It
was plainly not an issue discussed.  Second, Lee was prior to the 1996 act which
results in the need for an opinion in this case.  Third, Lee was decided before the
important decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Brecht (making clear the
-34-
distinction between constitutional error and nonconstitutional error for purposes of
the application of the Chapman and Kotteakos tests) and Dowling.
I reject the analysis in the majority opinion which states, "We interpret section
924.051(7) as a reaffirmation of the important principle that the defendant bears the
burden of demonstrating that an error occurred in the trial court, which was
preserved by proper objection."  Majority op. at 17.  That interpretation either
ignores or gives hollow effect to the plain language of the section, which is "has the
burden of demonstrating that prejudicial error occurred in the trial court."  Obviously,
it is patently erroneous to substitute "preserved" for "prejudicial."
I adopt the analysis of Judge Klein in his concurring opinion in Goodwin in the
Fourth District:
I fully agree with the majority opinion and am writing only to
explain more fully why we are not citing State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d
1129 (Fla.1986), as authority to determine whether the error is
harmless, but rather section 924.051(7), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996),
which provides:
In a direct appeal or a collateral proceeding, the party
challenging the judgment or order of the trial court has the
burden of demonstrating that a prejudicial error occurred in
the trial court.  A conviction or sentence may not be
reversed absent an express finding that a prejudicial error
occurred in the trial court.
-35-
As the United States Supreme Court observed in Kotteakos v.
United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S. Ct. 1239, 90 L. Ed. 1557 (1946),
harmless error statutes were adopted by the states, as well as Congress,
in the early part of this century, as a reaction to widespread
dissatisfaction with appellate courts routinely reversing criminal
convictions.  The Kotteakos court quoted a 1925 article suggesting that
appellate courts towered "above the trials of criminal cases as
impregnable citadels of technicality."  Id. at 759, 66 S. Ct. at 1245.
In Kotteakos the Court, in addressing the federal harmless error
statute, was careful not to ascribe any burden to one side or the other,
although it noted that the legislative history reflected that Congress
intended for the burden to be on the appellants for technical errors, but
on beneficiaries of the errors for substantive ones.  Id. at 765, 66 S. Ct.
at 1248.
The most important federal decision pertinent to this analysis is
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed.2d 705
(1967), because federal constitutional rights are often implicated in
criminal cases, and also because DiGuilio is based on Chapman.  In
Chapman the issue before the United States Supreme Court was
whether a state prosecutor's comment on the defendant's failure to
testify, a violation of the Fifth Amendment, could be harmless error. 
The Court held in Chapman that although some constitutional violations
are per se reversible, such as the denial of the right to counsel, there are
constitutional errors which can be harmless if the state can "prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not
contribute to the verdict obtained."  386 U.S. at 24, 87 S. Ct. at 828. 
The Court held that the comment on the defendant's silence in Chapman
was of the type that could be harmless, but under the facts it did not
pass the harmless error test enunciated in Chapman and therefore
required a new trial.
Significantly, after announcing the "harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt" test for federal constitutional error in Chapman, the Court
observed that "appellate courts do not ordinarily have the original task
of applying such a test."  86 U.S. at 24, 87 S. Ct. at 828. The Chapman
Court also noted that every state had a harmless error statute or rule and
-36-
that they "serve a very useful purpose insofar as they block setting aside
convictions for small errors or defects that have little, if any, likelihood
of having changed the result of the trial."  Id. at 24, 87 S. Ct. at 828. 
Chapman, along with the fact that the federal constitution does not
require states to grant appeals to criminal defendants, leads me to
conclude that the burden established by section 924.051(7) is
permissible under federal law except where there is a federal
constitutional violation, in which case the Chapman standard controls.
This brings us to DiGuilio.  Shortly before DiGuilio, the Florida
Supreme Court concluded in State v. Murray, 443 So.2d 955
(Fla.1984), that the appropriate test for determining whether error is
prejudicial or harmless was the rule established by the United States
Supreme Court in Chapman.  In Murray, however, the error was not one
which violated the defendant's rights under the federal constitution.  As
a result of confusion between Murray and other Florida Supreme Court
decisions, the fifth district in DiGuilio certified a question of great
public importance as to whether a comment on the right to silence, a
constitutional violation, was per se reversible error.
At the time DiGuilio was decided section 924.051(7) was not in
effect; however, we then had, and still have, section 924.33, which
provided:
No judgment shall be reversed unless the appellate court is
of the opinion, after an examination of all the appeal
papers, that error was committed that injuriously affected
the substantial rights of the appellant.  It shall not be
presumed that error injuriously affected the substantial
rights of the appellant.
The DiGuilio court observed:
Section 924.33 respects the constitutional right to a fair
trial free of harmful error but directs appellate courts not to
apply a standard of review which requires that trials be
free of harmless errors.  The authority of the legislature to
-37-
enact harmless error statutes is unquestioned.  Contraposed
to this legislative authority, the courts may establish the
rule that certain errors always violate the right to a fair trial
and are, thus, per se reversible.  To do so, however, we are
obligated to perform a reasoned analysis which shows that
this is true, and that, for constitutional reasons, we must
override the legislative decision.  (footnote omitted).
The DiGuilio court then went on to adopt, for constitutional
errors, the same standard adopted by the United States Supreme Court
in Chapman, setting it out as follows:
The harmless error test, as set forth in Chapman and
progeny, places the burden on the state, as the beneficiary
of the error, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or,
alternatively stated, that there is no reasonable possibility
that the error contributed to the conviction.  See Chapman,
386 U.S. at 24, 87 S. Ct. at 828.
DiGuilio, 491 So.2d at 1135.
Returning to section 924.051(7), which puts the burden of
demonstrating prejudice on the defendant, I note that when the Florida
Supreme Court implemented other portions of the "Criminal Appeal
Reform Act of 1996," of which section 924.051(7) is a part, it
expressed the belief that the legislature could "place reasonable
conditions upon [the right of appeal provided by the Florida
Constitution] so long as they do not thwart the litigants' legitimate
appellate rights."  Amendments to Fla. R. App. P., 685 So.2d 773, 774
(Fla.1996).
Finally, it is at least worth mentioning that just as civil judgments
are presumed correct on appeal, so are criminal convictions. 
Spinkellink v. State, 313 So.2d 666 (Fla.1975).  In light of that
presumption, as well as the deference given the legislature regarding
harmless error statutes by both the Chapman and DiGuilio courts, I
-38-
agree that section 924.051(7), and not the standard established in
DiGuilio for constitutional error, is the harmless error test to apply here.
Goodwin, 721 So. 2d at 729-31 (Klein, J., concurring specially) (footnotes omitted).
I would also adopt the following from Judge Klein's opinion in Mason v. State,
719 So. 2d 304, 306 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998):
Although we concluded in Goodwin that our supreme court in
DiGuilio was only deciding when constitutional error can be harmless,
we believe that the general thoughts expressed by the court are still
significant in helping us to determine whether nonconstitutional error is
harmful under § 924,051(7), which took effect in 1996.  In that regard,
one sentence in the above quote bears repeating:
The focus is on the effect of the error on the trier-of-fact.
491 So. 2d at 1139.
It is important, when determining the effect of an error on the fact
finder, to keep in mind that "the Due Process Clause protects the
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged."  In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed.
2d 368 (1970).  Accordingly, even where the defendant in a criminal
case has the burden of demonstrating the prejudicial effect of the error,
that burden will be easier to carry than the burden on an appellant in a
civil case in which the burden of proof in the trial court is lighter, i.e.,
preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing evidence.
Judge Klein does what we stated in Schultz in 1952 that it was our duty to do:  "give
preference to a construction which will give effect to the statute."
-39-
Two Cases Consolidated:
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified Great
Public Importance
Fourth District - Case No. 97-2086 and 
First District - Case No. 97-909
(Broward and Duval Counties)
Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Tatjana Ostapoff, Assistant Public Defender,
Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, Florida; and Nancy A. Daniels, Public
Defender, and Paula S. Saunders, Assistant Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit,
Tallahassee, Florida,
for Petitioners
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Celia A. Terenzio, Assistant Attorney
General, Chief, and Melynda L. Melear, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach,
Florida; and James W. Rogers, Tallahassee Bureau Chief, and Carolyn M. Snurkowski
and Denise O. Simpson, Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Respondents