Title: State v. Watts
Citation: 225 N.W.2d 143
Docket Number: 57397
State: Iowa
Issuer: Iowa Supreme Court
Date: January 22, 1975

225 N.W.2d 143 (1975) STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Hayden Jasper WATTS, Appellant. No. 57397. Supreme Court of Iowa. January 22, 1975. *144 Barry M. Anderson, Keokuk, for appellant. Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Raymond W. Sullins, Asst. Atty. Gen., and James P. Hoffman, County Atty., for appellee. Submitted to MOORE, C. J., and LeGRAND, REES, HARRIS and McCORMICK, JJ. MOORE, Chief Justice. Defendant was originally charged with the offense of breaking and entering. Pursuant to a plea-bargaining agreement the charge with the trial court's approval, was changed to the lesser offense of attempting to break and enter. The minutes of testimony attached to the county attorney's information detailed how defendant had been seen on April 19, 1974 attempting to break into Priebyl Jewelry Store in Keokuk, Lee County, Iowa and later police officers arrested him inside that place of business. On May 20, 1974 defendant with his attorney appeared before the trial court and entered a plea of guilty to attempting to break and enter as then charged. After personal interrogation of defendant the court accepted the guilty plea. Sentencing was set for June 4 but defendant failed to appear on that date. He did appear on June 13, 1974, the rescheduled sentencing date. Defendant's motion to withdraw his plea was overruled. Judgment was entered sentencing defendant to serve a term not to exceed five years in the men's penitentiary. Defendant has appealed. Defendant asserts the trial court erred in failing to (1) inquire into defendant's understanding of the charge, (2) determine factual basis existed for the plea and (3) sustain his motion to withdraw his plea of guilty. We have repeatedly held that when a guilty plea is tendered the trial court must personally interrogate the defendant to determine whether (1) he understands the charge, (2) is aware of the penal consequences of the plea and (3) the plea is entered voluntarily. State v. Williams, Iowa, 224 N.W.2d 17, filed December 18, 1974; Brainard v. State, Iowa, 222 N.W.2d 711, 713; State v. Sisco, Iowa, 169 N.W.2d 542, 549. Meaningful compliance is the requirement. Brainard v. State, supra, 222 N.W.2d at page 714, and citations. Before sentencing the judge must also satisfy himself there is factual basis for the plea. State v. Hansen, Iowa, 221 N.W.2d 274, 276, and citations. In Ryan v. Iowa State Penitentiary, Ft. Madison, Iowa, 218 N.W.2d 616, 620, we say: I. Defendant's first assigned error points out the trial court did not make a direct inquiry of his understanding of the charge. It is true the trial court never directly asked defendant if he understood the charge. We have heretofore suggested *145 such an inquiry be made. However, the absence of such inquiry will not invalidate the conviction where, as here, the whole record demonstrates defendant understood the nature of the charge when entering the plea. Brainard v. State, Iowa, 222 N.W.2d 711, 715; State v. Hansen, Iowa, 221 N.W.2d 274, 276; State v. Bedell, Iowa, 220 N.W.2d 891, 892, and citations in each. The extent of the trial judge's explanation and inquiry into defendant's understanding varies with the circumstances of each case, including the complexity of the charge and other factors involved in the particular case. Brainard v. State, supra, Iowa, 222 N.W.2d 711, 714; Michels v. Brewer, Iowa, 211 N.W.2d 293, 296. As we have already stated, defendant was originally charged with breaking and entering. Plea bargaining had been accomplished. The information which detailed the elements of the charged offense of attempting to break and enter was read to defendant at the plea proceeding. The name of the offense is sufficiently descriptive of its nature to make further explanation unnecessary. State v. Sargent, Iowa, 210 N.W.2d 656, 660; State v. York, Iowa, 210 N.W.2d 608, 609. Defendant's answers to the court's many questions indicate complete understanding thereof. At the close of the interrogation the court asked: "You have any questions whatsoever of this court before the court accepts your plea?" Defendant answered: "No, Sir." Under the circumstances shown by the record it seems clear defendant understood the charge when entering his guilty plea. Defendant's first assignment of error is untenable. II. At the sentencing hearing defendant and his counsel, Barry M. Anderson, were questioned concerning defendant's request to withdraw his guilty plea. This colloquy, set out in relevant part below, demonstrates the trial court did determine a factual basis existed for the plea as required by our holdings in State v. Hansen and Ryan v. Iowa State Penitentiary, Ft. Madison, both supra. It is not necessary that defendant have an independent recollection of the facts of the alleged crime for his guilty plea, voluntarily entered, to be valid. State v. Hansen, supra, Iowa, 221 N.W.2d 274, 276; Young v. Brewer, Iowa, 190 N.W.2d 434, 438, and citations in each. III. Code section 777.15 provides: The word "may" as used in the statute must be given its usual meaning. It clearly implies that discretion is lodged in the court and does not give a defendant an absolute right to withdraw his plea. State v. Taylor, Iowa, 211 N.W.2d 264, 266; State v. Machovec, 236 Iowa 377, 382, 17 N.W.2d 843, 846. In State v. Weckman, Iowa, 180 N.W.2d 434, 436, we say: We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in refusing withdrawal of defendant's plea of guilty. We find no reversible error in the issues raised by defendant. Affirmed.