Title: State v. Michael Love
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1997AP002336-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 23, 1999

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-2336-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Michael Love, 
 
Defendant-Appellant.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  218 Wis. 2d 1, 579 N.W.2d 277 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1998, Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 23, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
February 23, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Rock 
 
JUDGE: 
Edwin C. Dahlberg 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner the cause 
was argued by Maureen McGlynn Flanagan, assistant attorney 
general with whom on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney 
general. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief and 
oral argument by Philip J. Brehm, Janesville. 
 
No. 97-2336-CR 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 97-2336-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Michael Love,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant.  
FILED 
 
JUN 23, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   The State of Wisconsin (State) 
seeks review of a published decision of the court of appeals 
reversing a judgment of the Rock County Circuit Court, Edwin C. 
Dahlberg, Judge.1  In 1994, the defendant, Michael Love (Love), 
was convicted of burglary.  The court withheld sentence and 
placed him on three years of probation.  In 1995, Love was 
charged with new offenses leading to the revocation of his 
probation.  When he was returned to court for sentencing on the 
original conviction, he was represented by a public defender 
who, while working as an assistant district attorney 20 months 
earlier, 
had 
represented 
the 
State 
at 
Love's 
original 
sentencing.  The circuit court sentenced Love to ten years in 
prison. 
                     
1 State v. Love, 218 Wis. 2d 1, 579 N.W.2d 277 (Ct. App. 
1998). 
No. 97-2336-CR 
 
2 
¶2 
Love 
filed a motion 
for 
post-conviction relief, 
claiming he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at 
the 
second 
sentencing 
because 
his 
defense 
attorney 
had 
previously represented the State in the same case.  The circuit 
court denied the motion, finding that Love's attorney had done 
nothing improper.  The court of appeals reversed, holding that 
the potential conflict of interest that exists when an attorney 
switches sides during a case requires resentencing without the 
defendant having to demonstrate either an actual conflict or 
prejudice.  State v. Love, 218 Wis. 2d 1, 11, 579 N.W.2d 277 
(Ct. App. 1998). 
¶3 
The issue presented is whether a defendant, who is 
represented at a sentencing hearing by an attorney previously 
involved in the prosecution of the same case, may raise a 
successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a post-
conviction motion based on an alleged conflict of interest 
without any showing of actual conflict or prejudice.  Because we 
believe this case is governed by the principles set out in 
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 346 (1980), and State v. Kaye, 
106 Wis. 2d 1, 8-16, 315 N.W.2d 337 (1982), we reverse the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
FACTS 
¶4 
The central facts of this case are not in dispute.  In 
January of 1994, Michael Love was charged with one count of 
burglary and one count of misdemeanor theft.  In September of 
1994, a plea agreement was negotiated by Love’s public defender, 
Jane Wagner, and Rock County Assistant District Attorney Gerald 
No. 97-2336-CR 
 
3 
Urbik.  Under the terms of the agreement, Love pled guilty to 
the burglary charge, the theft charge was dismissed, and the 
attorneys agreed jointly to recommend that Love be placed on 
three years of probation.  Despite a presentence report which 
recommended that Love receive a five-year sentence to the 
Intensive Sanctions Program, the court accepted the attorneys' 
joint recommendation, withheld sentence, and placed Love on 
probation for three years. 
¶5 
From January 1994 to December 1994, several Rock 
County assistant district attorneys participated in the court 
proceedings involving Love's case.  Brenna Lisowski (Lisowski), 
an assistant district attorney in the Rock County District 
Attorney's Office from June 1990 until March 1995, represented 
the State in two of these proceedings, after Love's guilty plea. 
 On November 1, 1994, Lisowski made a brief appearance at a 
continuance hearing to allow a presentence report to be 
completed.  On December 13, 1994, Lisowski appeared at the 
defendant's sentencing hearing and argued to implement the plea 
agreement.  She said on the record at the time that she "was 
handed the file by the secretary about 15 minutes ago. . . ." 
¶6 
In 1995, while still on probation for the burglary 
conviction, Love was arrested for new charges of armed burglary 
and armed sexual assault.  Because Love's sentence on the 
burglary conviction had been withheld, the new charges led to 
the revocation of his probation and then his reappearance before 
Judge 
Edwin 
C. 
Dahlberg, 
the 
original 
sentencing 
court.  
Ironically, Lisowski, who had left the district attorney's 
No. 97-2336-CR 
 
4 
office in March of 1995 to become an assistant public defender, 
was appointed to represent Love.  At the second sentencing 
hearing, Love's probation agent and the assistant district 
attorney recommended a prison sentence of ten years.  Lisowski 
urged the court to disregard the pending charges and impose a 
sentence of only five years.  Based on Love's extensive criminal 
record,2 the circuit court imposed the maximum sentence of ten 
years in prison, noting that Love had been given a break when he 
was originally given probation. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶7 
Claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, Love later 
filed a motion for post-conviction relief requesting re-
sentencing in the circuit court.  Although he had never raised 
the issue at the time of his sentencing, Love now claimed he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel because his defense 
attorney, Lisowski, had represented the State at his first 
sentencing hearing and then switched sides at his second 
sentencing hearing on the same charge.  This, he claimed, was a 
violation of Supreme Court Rule 20:1.9. 
¶8 
The court held a post-conviction hearing on July 19, 
1997. 
 
Lisowski 
testified 
that 
she 
had 
no 
independent 
                     
2 In addition to the burglary conviction and the later 
incident resulting in charges of armed burglary and armed sexual 
assault, Love was convicted and sentenced to three years in 
prison in 1987 for possession of a stolen vehicle and was also 
convicted of robbery in Illinois in 1990, for which he was 
sentenced to four years in prison.  Love was also convicted of 
possession of a controlled substance and aiding and abetting a 
fugitive in 1974. 
No. 97-2336-CR 
 
5 
recollection of ever having appeared on behalf of the State at 
the defendant's original sentencing in December of 1994.  With 
the observation that several assistant district attorneys had 
appeared on behalf of the State at the various proceedings in 
the case,3 the court accepted as true Lisowski's testimony that 
she did not recall her appearances on behalf of the State.  The 
court concluded that Lisowski had done nothing improper and that 
there was no reason for resentencing. 
¶9 
The court of appeals reversed and remanded in a 
published decision filed March 19, 1998.  Love, 218 Wis. 2d 1.  
The court acknowledged that both federal and state courts have 
required that a defendant asserting a Sixth Amendment conflict 
of interest claim from multiple representation who did not raise 
the issue in a timely manner must prove that both an actual 
conflict of interest existed and that the attorney's performance 
was adversely affected by the conflict.  Id. at 4-5 (citing 
Cuyler, 446 U.S. 335; Kaye, 106 Wis. 2d 1; State v. Street, 202 
Wis. 2d 533, 551 N.W.2d 830 (Ct. App. 1996);  State v. Foster, 
152 Wis. 2d 386, 448 N.W.2d 298 (Ct. App. 1989)). 
¶10 However, the court distinguished Cuyler, Kaye, and 
their progeny as cases which involved simultaneous or earlier 
representation of a person related to the crimes with which the 
respective defendants were charged - i.e., a co-defendant, a 
                     
3 According to the court, six different assistant district 
attorneys appeared at 14 different hearings in connection with 
Love's burglary case.  Assistant District Attorney Gerald Urbik, 
who negotiated the plea agreement with Love's counsel, did not 
appear at any of the 14 hearings.  
No. 97-2336-CR 
 
6 
witness, or an investigator - whereas the present case involved 
an attorney who had switched sides from prosecution to defense 
in the same case.  See Love, 218 Wis. 2d at 5.  The court of 
appeals relied on cases from other jurisdictions which adopted a 
per se conflict of interest rule when an attorney switches sides 
in a case.  People v. Kester, 361 N.E.2d 569, 571-72 (Ill. 
1977); State v. Sparkman, 443 So.2d 700 (La. Ct. App. 1983); 
Skelton v. State, 672 P.2d 671 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983).  The 
court 
fashioned 
a 
"bright 
line 
rule" 
for 
these 
limited 
circumstances, stating that when a defense attorney has appeared 
for and represented the State as a prosecutor in prior 
proceedings in the same case in which he or she is now 
representing the defendant, a conflict of interest exists which 
warrants reversal - even in the absence of actual conflict or 
prejudice to the defendant.  Love, 218 Wis. 2d at 11. 
¶11 Perceiving this case to be an important matter of 
first impression in Wisconsin, we accepted review. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶12 We begin by looking to the standards of review.  On a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, "An appellate court 
will not overturn a trial court’s findings of fact concerning 
the circumstances of the case and the counsel’s conduct and 
strategy unless the findings are clearly erroneous."  State v. 
Knight, 168 Wis. 2d 509, 514 n.2, 484 N.W.2d 540 (1992).  
"However, 
whether 
counsel’s 
performance 
was 
deficient and 
whether the deficient performance prejudiced the defense are 
questions of law which this court decides without deference to 
No. 97-2336-CR 
 
7 
the court of appeals or the circuit court."  State v. Sanchez, 
201 Wis. 2d 219, 236-37, 548 N.W.2d 69 (1996).  When the 
pertinent facts are not in dispute, whether the facts establish 
a constitutional violation is a question of law which an 
appellate court reviews de novo.  State v. Cobbs, 221 Wis. 2d 
101, 105, 584 N.W.2d 709 (1998); Street, 202 Wis. 2d at 543. 
ANALYSIS 
¶13 In 
criminal 
cases, 
conflict 
of 
interest 
claims 
involving attorneys are treated analytically as a subspecies of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 691-92 (1984).   
¶14 In Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980), the United 
States Supreme Court set the current standard for analyzing 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on an attorney's 
potential conflict of interest. Cuyler involved two attorneys' 
multiple representation of three defendants charged with murder. 
 In three separate trials, Sullivan was convicted, while his co-
defendants were acquitted.  Id. at 338.  After his conviction, 
Sullivan alleged that he was denied the effective assistance of 
counsel because his attorneys represented conflicting interests. 
 Id.  The Court held that "the possibility of conflict is 
insufficient to impugn a criminal conviction.  In order to 
demonstrate a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights, a 
defendant must establish that an actual conflict of interest 
adversely affected his lawyer's performance."  Id. at 350.  At 
least, "a defendant who raised no objection at trial must 
demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely 
No. 97-2336-CR 
 
8 
affected his lawyer's performance."  Id. at 348 (emphasis 
supplied).4   
¶15 This court embraced the Cuyler standard in State v. 
Kaye, 106 Wis. 2d at 7, where one attorney represented two 
defendants in the same case.  Kaye sought to be resentenced on 
grounds that due to a conflict of interest, his attorney could 
not make an argument that Kaye should receive a lighter sentence 
because he was less culpable than his co-defendant.  The court 
rejected the claim, saying that more than a potential conflict 
of interest must be shown.  Id. at 7-8. 
¶16 The court's discussion in Kaye wrestled with the 
question of how a defendant makes the proper showing of "an 
actual conflict of interest" on the part of his attorney.  The 
test, as Justice Marshall noted in his Cuyler dissent, is 
somewhat ambiguous, but: 
 
 
Neither this court nor the United States Supreme Court 
has ever held that representation by one attorney of 
multiple defendants constitutes a per se violation of 
the right to counsel of the defendants. . . .  This is 
true despite the fact that a potential conflict of 
interest 
inheres 
almost 
every 
time 
an 
attorney 
represents more than one defendant.  This potential 
conflict is perhaps strongest at the sentencing stage. 
. . .   In short, it is clear that a lawyer 
                     
4 The Court vacated the decision of the Third Circuit Court 
of Appeals which had stated that a criminal defendant is 
entitled to reversal of his conviction whenever he makes "some 
showing of a possible conflict of interest or prejudice, however 
remote. . . ."  State ex rel. Sullivan v. Cuyler, 593 F.2d 512, 
519 (3rd Cir. 1979) (quoting Walker v. United States, 422 F.2d 
374, 375 (3rd Cir. 1970) (per curiam), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 
915 (1970)). 
No. 97-2336-CR 
 
9 
representing more than one defendant can almost always 
emphasize certain factors about one defendant in an 
effort to minimize his sentence.  If his co-defendant 
does not possess these same factors, then a potential 
conflict of interest appears.  However, we have held 
that more than such a potential conflict of interest 
must be shown.  (emphasis supplied) 
Id. at 7. 
¶17 The Kaye court set forth a standard:  To establish 
that he was denied effective representation by counsel, a 
defendant must establish by clear and convincing evidence that 
an actual conflict of interest existed.  It is not sufficient 
that he show that "a mere possibility or suspicion of a conflict 
could arise under hypothetical circumstances."  Id. at 8.  
However, the defendant does not have to show actual prejudice; 
once he shows an actual conflict he is entitled to relief.  The 
fact that one attorney represents more than one defendant is not 
in itself a conflict of interest and the attorney is entitled to 
represent more than one defendant unless the interest of the 
defendants is shown to be in conflict.  Id. 
¶18 Then the court reconciled its prior rulings with the 
holding in Cuyler: 
 
We read Cuyler v. Sullivan as imposing a test very 
similar to the one adopted by this court.  [Cuyler] 
requires proof that an "actual conflict of interest 
adversely affected his lawyer's performance."  We do 
not 
interpret 
this 
language 
as 
meaning 
that 
a 
defendant must first show an actual conflict and then 
prove that some kind of specific adverse effect or 
harm resulted from this conflict.  This would be 
logically inconsistent with the rule in [Cuyler] and 
previous supreme court cases that a defendant need not 
demonstrate prejudice in order to obtain relief. . . . 
 The harm to a defendant necessarily follows once it 
has 
been 
demonstrated 
that 
his 
lawyer 
actively 
No. 97-2336-CR 
 
10
represented a conflicting interest.   A defendant's 
constitutional right to the effective assistance of 
counsel certainly includes the guarantee that his 
counsel not proceed when there appears to be an actual 
conflict of interest.  We think this is what the court 
meant in Cuyler v. Sullivan, when it wrote, "But until 
a 
defendant 
shows 
that 
his 
counsel 
actively 
represented 
conflicting 
interests, 
he 
has 
not 
established the constitutional predicate for his claim 
of ineffective assistance." 
Id. at 8-9 (citation omitted). 
¶19 A number of Wisconsin decisions have applied the Kaye 
principles in different contexts.  These cases include State v. 
Owen, 202 Wis. 2d 620, 551 N.W.2d 50 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. 
Street, 202 Wis. 2d 533, 551 N.W.2d 830 (Ct. App. 1996); State 
v. Foster, 152 Wis. 2d 386, 448 N.W.2d 298 (Ct. App. 1989); and 
State v. Franklin, 111 Wis. 2d 681, 331 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 
1983).  But the rule remains "somewhat ambiguous" and deserves 
clarification. 
¶20 In order to establish a Sixth Amendment violation on 
the basis of a conflict of interest, a defendant who did not 
raise an objection at trial must demonstrate by clear and 
convincing evidence that his or her counsel had an actual 
conflict of interest.  Determining what constitutes an actual 
conflict of interest must be resolved by looking at the facts of 
the case.  An actual conflict of interest exists when the 
defendant's attorney was actively representing a conflicting 
interest, so that the attorney's performance was adversely 
affected.  Once an actual conflict of interest has been 
established, the defendant need not make a showing of prejudice 
No. 97-2336-CR 
 
11
because prejudice is presumed.  Counsel is considered per se 
ineffective once an actual conflict of interest has been shown. 
¶21 We conclude that, in a post-conviction motion when no 
timely objection was made, "actual conflict of interest" cannot 
be neatly separated from performance, for it is difficult to 
draw a line between potential conflict and actual conflict 
without 
pointing 
to 
some 
deficiency 
in 
the 
attorney's 
performance either in what was done or in what was not done.5  
Moreover, it is not satisfactory to condemn relationships which 
are labeled as "actual conflicts of interest," then disregard 
them when they do not have any discernible effect on the case. 
¶22 Before trial, these problems can and should be 
avoided, as suggested in Kaye, by requiring circuit courts to 
conduct an inquiry whenever the same attorney or law firm 
represents more than one defendant in the same criminal case.  
                     
5  In United States v. Ziegenhagen, 890 F.2d 937, 939 (7th 
Cir. 1989), the court said that an actual conflict of interest 
means "'that the defense attorney was required to make a choice 
advancing his own interests to the detriment of his client's 
interests,' United States v. Horton, 845 F.2d 1414, 1419 (7th 
Cir. 1988)."  The attorney's choice could presumably advance any 
person's interest at the expense of the defendant and thereby 
create an actual conflict.  The Ziegenhagen definition serves 
the useful purpose of suggesting choices that are happening or 
have happened in the past as opposed to choices that might 
happen in the future and thus are only potential choices. 
In People v. Spreitzer, 525 N.E.2d 30, 36 (Ill. 1988), the 
Illinois Supreme Court expressed its understanding of the phrase 
"an actual conflict of interest adversely affected" counsel's 
performance.  The court said, "What this means is that the 
defendant must point to some specific defect in his counsel's 
strategy, tactics, or decision making attributable to the 
conflict." 
No. 97-2336-CR 
 
12
We recognized in Kaye that when no objection is made at trial it 
is very difficult later to prove a conflict of interest by clear 
and convincing evidence from the record.  Kaye, 106 Wis. 2d at 
13-14.  We therefore stated: 
 
To avoid such problems in the future, we will require 
trial courts to conduct an inquiry whenever the same 
attorney 
or 
law 
firm 
represents 
more 
than 
one 
defendant in the same criminal case.  The court should 
inquire of the defendants and their attorney at the 
arraignment as to the possibility for actual conflicts 
of interest.  The judge should ensure that the 
defendants understand the potential conflicts and 
determine whether they want separate counsel.  If the 
defendants insist on being represented by the same 
counsel after being fully advised of the potential 
problems, the trial judge should permit such multiple 
representation.  However, this determination should 
not be made unless it is clear the defendants have 
made a voluntary and knowing waiver of their right to 
separate counsel. 
Id. at 14. 
¶23 The hearing directed in Kaye is also discussed in 
State v. Miller, 160 Wis. 2d 646, 467 N.W.2d 118 (1991), where 
the court approved a circuit court's disqualification of an 
attorney over the objection of the defendant because of a 
serious potential for conflict of interest.  The standards to be 
applied in the Kaye hearing dealing with a potential or actual 
conflict of interest before trial, are different from the 
standards applied in a motion for relief after trial, because 
both the defendant and the court should be given the opportunity 
before trial to head off an actual conflict of interest before 
it happens. 
No. 97-2336-CR 
 
13
¶24 This brings us to the case at hand.  Love attempts to 
distinguish the Cuyler-Kaye line of cases from this one by 
categorizing them as instances of multiple representation, 
whereas this case involves serial representation.  Serial 
representation occurs when an attorney represents one party in a 
case, then switches sides to represent the other party in the 
same proceeding or in an unrelated case.   
¶25 While this court has not previously been faced with a 
serial representation conflict of 
interest 
claim, several 
federal courts have addressed the distinction between serial and 
multiple representation and have concluded that the Cuyler test 
should be extended to conflict of interest cases involving 
serial representation.  Spreitzer v. Peters, 114 F.3d 1435, 
1450-52 (7th Cir. 1997); Hernandez v. Johnson, 108 F.3d 554, 559-
60 (5th Cir. 1997); Maiden v. Bunnell, 35 F.3d 477, 480 (9th Cir. 
1994); cf. United States v. Carpenter, 769 F.2d 258, 262 (5th 
Cir. 1985).  But see Beets v. Scott, 65 F.3d 1258, 1265 (5th Cir. 
1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1157 (1996).   
¶26 Spreitzer addressed the issue in considerable detail. 
 A former prosecutor who was "very much involved" in the 
decision to charge Spreitzer with murder became an assistant 
public defender during Spreitzer's pretrial proceedings and 
ultimately Public Defender of DuPage County, Illinois, before 
Spreitzer's trial.  In short, he became head of the office 
defending Spreitzer but was not otherwise involved in the case. 
 The trial judge was always aware of the former prosecutor's 
involvement and there was no objection from Spreitzer until 
No. 97-2336-CR 
 
14
after the trial.  The Illinois Supreme Court in People v. 
Spreitzer, 525 N.E.2d 30 (Ill. 1988), rejected Spreitzer's 
arguments that a conflict existed.  In a collateral challenge in 
federal court, the court of appeals also rejected the argument, 
applying a Cuyler analysis.  The court said: 
 
If . . . the defendant does not make a timely 
objection or the trial court is not otherwise apprised 
of the possible conflict, then the reviewing court 
will presume prejudice only if the defendant can show 
that 
"an 
actual 
conflict 
of 
interest 
adversely 
affected his lawyer's performance."  Cuyler. . . .  We 
believe that the judge was adequately informed of the 
nature of the conflict and correctly admonished that 
[the former prosecutor] could not be involved in the 
case. . . . 
Spreitzer, 114 F.3d at 1450-51.  The record did not indicate 
that the former prosecutor was involved in Spreitzer's defense 
in any way other than in a titular capacity.  Id. at 1452. 
 
¶27 A different result was reached in United States v. 
Ziegenhagen, 890 F.2d 937 (7th Cir. 1989).  There, the Seventh 
Circuit remanded a case in which the defendant's attorney had 
participated in sentencing the defendant 20 years earlier and 
subsequently was involved in his defense when the government was 
trying to use the old offense as a prior conviction for sentence 
enhancement.  While the defendant was told of his attorney's 
former role, the trial judge was not.  The court said it was 
disturbed that the attorney could have informed the court of the 
potential conflict but had not done so.  "An actual conflict of 
interest between retained counsel and a represented party 
requires an evidentiary hearing to determine whether or not the 
No. 97-2336-CR 
 
15
represented party made a knowing and intelligent waiver of the 
conflict."  Ziegenhagen, 890 F.2d at 941.6 
 
¶28 In Maiden, the Fifth Circuit commented on Ziegenhagen: 
 
We agree that the prosecutor in Ziegenhagen labored 
under an actual conflict of interest, but hesitate to 
adopt the broader per se rule announced in that case. 
 Although the possibilities for actual conflicts are 
very 
real 
when 
attorneys 
"switch 
sides" 
in 
a 
subsequent criminal case involving the same defendant, 
such 
conflicts 
do 
not 
automatically 
occur.  
Determining whether an attorney has an actual conflict 
involves a closer examination of the facts of each 
particular case, with a particular eye to whether the 
attorney will, in the present case, be required to 
undermine, criticize, or attack his or her own work 
product from the previous case. 
Maiden, 35 F.3d at 480-81. 
¶29 Our court of appeals based its decision on a small 
group of cases from other jurisdictions which adopted a per se 
disqualification rule in the serial representation situation.  
Love, 218 Wis. 2d at 6-8.  The court relied primarily on People 
v. Kester, 361 N.E.2d 569 (Ill. 1977), an Illinois case in which 
a court-appointed defense attorney had previously represented 
the State in the same criminal proceeding.  The Illinois Supreme 
Court held that a potential conflict was present, and it was 
unnecessary for the defendant to show that actual prejudice 
resulted therefrom.  The court said: 
 
[W]here counsel has repeatedly appeared on behalf of 
the State in the particular case in which he is now 
representing the defendant, we are not persuaded that 
inquiring into the precise nature and extent of his 
                     
6 Ziegenhagen, 890 F.2d 937, was not cited in Spreitzer v. 
Peters, 114 F.3d 1435 (7th Cir. 1997). 
No. 97-2336-CR 
 
16
personal involvement is either necessary or desirable. 
 While there has been no showing that, as assistant 
public 
defender, 
counsel 
did 
not 
represent 
the 
defendant in a competent and dedicated manner with 
complete loyalty to him, we conclude that a potential 
conflict was present, and . . . we hold that it was 
unnecessary for the defendant to show that actual 
prejudice resulted therefrom. 
Kester, 361 N.E.2d at 572. 
¶30 The 
Illinois Supreme 
Court's decision 
in 
Kester 
predates the United States Supreme Court's decision in Cuyler by 
three years.  Since then, the Illinois Supreme Court itself has 
noted that this per se approach is confusing.7  Spreitzer, 525 
N.E.2d at 34; see also, Robert C. Perry, Conflict of Interest in 
Criminal Cases after Cuyler v. Sullivan:  Time to Reconsider the 
Illinois Approach, 14 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1 (1980).  A recent 
interpretation of the Illinois rule has rejected the per se 
conflict of interest approach altogether.  Spreitzer v. Peters, 
114 F.3d at 1451. 
¶31 Another case relied upon by the court of appeals is 
State v. Sparkman, 443 So.2d 700 (La. Ct. App. 1983).  In that 
case, a Louisiana court held that where a defendant's attorney 
had previously represented the State as an assistant district 
                     
7 Noting that "[t]he term 'per se' conflict does not appear 
in the United States Supreme Court case law, or for that matter, 
in cases from our sister jurisdictions," the Illinois Supreme 
Court stated that "[w]hat has been perhaps less clear . . . is 
when and under what circumstances conflicting interests will 
mandate the reversal of a conviction.  This lack of clarity has 
partially stemmed from a confusing, and sometimes inconsistent, 
use of such terms as 'per se conflict,' 'potential conflict,' 
'possible conflict,' 'actual conflict,' 'prejudice,' and 'actual 
prejudice.'"  People v. Spreitzer, 525 N.E.2d 30, 34 (Ill. 
1988). 
No. 97-2336-CR 
 
17
attorney, there was a provision in the Louisiana Professional 
Responsibility 
Code 
which 
barred 
his 
employment 
by 
the 
defendant.  Sparkman, 443 So.2d at 701.  The conflict was raised 
at the trial court level, but the trial court refused to 
disqualify the defendant's attorney.8 
¶32 Finally, the court of appeals cited an Oklahoma case, 
Skelton v. State, in support of its decision to create a per se 
disqualification rule.  In Skelton, the court held that where an 
attorney 
represented 
the 
State 
at 
the 
arraignment 
and 
preliminary hearing 
and 
then 
subsequently 
represented the 
defendant at trial in the same case, the situation created a 
pervasive atmosphere of impropriety that could not be waived.  
Skelton, 672 P.2d at 671.   
¶33 In each of these three cases, the time between the 
attorney's involvement as a prosecutor and the attorney's 
involvement for the defendant was much shorter than it was here. 
 In addition, the attorney's involvement for the prosecution was 
more extensive than here, and the attorney was fully cognizant 
of the prior involvement.  Conducting a preliminary examination 
for the State and then switching sides and handling the 
defendant's trial - within a short time frame - is quite 
different from supporting someone else's plea bargain and then 
advocating for the defendant 20 months later.  In the present 
                     
8 Wisconsin case law clearly states that an attorney may be 
disqualified for a potential conflict of interest if the issue 
is raised in a timely manner.  See, e.g.,  Berg v. Marine Trust 
Co., 141 Wis. 2d 878, 892, 416 N.W.2d 643 (Ct. App. 1987). 
No. 97-2336-CR 
 
18
case, Lisowski made only two brief appearances for the State, 
was handed the case file a mere 15 minutes before the sentencing 
hearing, and could not remember her prior involvement at the 
second hearing. 
¶34 Love 
argues 
that 
important 
public 
policy 
considerations indicate we should not extend the Cuyler standard 
to cases of serial representation but instead should approve the 
per se rule adopted by the court of appeals.  He contends that 
counsel's representation of both sides in the same criminal case 
will rarely be consistent with the sound administration of 
justice.   
¶35 The court of appeals was eloquent in its contention 
that the appearance of fairness of trials and judicial acts is 
essential to our system of justice. 
¶36 While 
we 
are 
sensitive 
to 
the 
appearance 
of 
professional impropriety described by the court, we are not 
persuaded that a per se rule is required to address this concern 
or 
to 
protect 
the 
other 
interests 
implicated 
in 
serial 
representation.  We are also not convinced that the bright line 
rule suggested by the court is so bright and self-evident that 
it could be limited to the particular facts of this case.  For 
instance, suppose Gerald Urbik, the assistant district attorney 
who negotiated the plea agreement with Love's attorney, had 
switched sides and appeared for Love at his new sentencing 
hearing.  The bright line rule, as stated, would not have 
applied to him because he never "appeared for and represented 
the State as a prosecutor in prior proceedings."  Yet, his 
No. 97-2336-CR 
 
19
appearance would have been a far more obvious conflict than 
Lisowski's unwitting conflict.  Moreover, the court's bright 
line rule does not provide guidance for those situations in 
which a defendant's attorney later becomes a prosecutor and 
faces the former client. 
¶37 In 
extending 
Cuyler-Kaye 
standards 
to 
serial 
representation, we are bound to extend also the requirement that 
all potential conflicts of interest that result from an attorney 
switching sides be made known to the court as soon as feasible 
before trial so that the court can inform the affected parties 
and conduct an appropriate inquiry.  When an attorney who has 
switched sides informs the defendant and informs the court of 
the potential conflict, the attorney will often realize that he 
or she cannot proceed under Supreme Court Rules 20:1.99 or 
20:1.11.10  When a former prosecutor enjoys the confidence of a 
                     
9 SCR 20:1.9 (1997-98) provides: 
 
A lawyer who had formerly represented a client in 
a matter shall not: 
 
(a) represent another person in the same or a 
substantially related matter in which that person's 
interests are materially adverse to the interests of 
the former client unless the former client consents in 
writing after consultation; or  
 
(b) use information relating to the representation to 
the disadvantage of the former client except as Rule 
1.6 [regarding confidentiality] would permit with 
respect to a client or when the information has become 
generally known. 
 
10 SCR 20:1.11 (1997-98) provides:  
 
No. 97-2336-CR 
 
20
                                                                  
(a) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a 
lawyer shall not represent a private client in 
connection 
with 
a 
matter 
in 
which 
the 
lawyer 
participated personally and substantially as a public 
officer or employee, unless the appropriate government 
agency consents after consultation.  No lawyer in a 
firm 
with 
which 
that 
lawyer 
is 
associated 
may 
knowingly undertake or continue representation in such 
a matter unless: 
 
(1) the disqualified lawyer is screened from any 
participation in the matter and is apportioned no part 
of the fee therefrom; and 
 
(2) written notice is promptly given to the 
appropriate 
government 
agency 
to 
enable 
it 
to 
ascertain compliance with the provisions of this rule. 
 
(b) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a 
lawyer having information that the lawyer knows is 
confidential government information about a person 
acquired when the lawyer was a public officer or 
employee, may not represent a private client whose 
interests are adverse to that person in a matter in 
which the information could be used to the material 
disadvantage of that person.  A firm with which that 
lawyer 
is 
associated 
may 
undertake 
or 
continue 
representation in the matter only if the disqualified 
lawyer is screened from any participation in the 
matter 
and 
is 
apportioned 
no 
part 
of 
the 
fee 
therefrom. 
 
(c) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a 
lawyer serving as a public officer or employee shall 
not: 
 
(1) participate in a matter in which the lawyer 
participated personally and substantially while in 
private practice or nongovernmental employment, unless 
under 
applicable 
law 
no 
one 
is, 
or 
by 
lawful 
delegation may be, authorized to act in the lawyer's 
stead in the matter; or 
 
(2) negotiate for private employment with any 
person who is involved as a party or as attorney for a 
No. 97-2336-CR 
 
21
defendant despite the potential conflict, the defendant's waiver 
should be formalized on the record so that it can be evaluated 
by the court and so that it will not later serve as a basis for 
post-conviction relief. 
¶38 In all these situations, the court must be empowered 
to disqualify attorneys in the interest of justice.  In State v. 
Miller, 160 Wis. 2d at 653, this court stated that "An actual 
conflict or serious potential for conflict of interest imperils 
the accused's right to adequate representation and jeopardizes 
the integrity of the adversarial trial process and the prospect 
of a fair trial with a just, reliable result."  The court 
reiterated three institutional interests enumerated in Wheat v. 
United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988), when a criminal defense 
                                                                  
party in a matter in which the lawyer is participating 
personally and substantially. 
 
(d) As used in this rule, the term "matter" includes: 
 
(1) 
any 
judicial 
or 
other 
proceeding, 
application, 
request 
for 
a 
ruling 
or 
other 
determination, 
contract, 
claim, 
controversy, 
investigation, charge, accusation, arrest or other 
particular 
matter 
involving a specific 
party or 
parties; and 
 
(2) any other matter covered by the conflict of 
interest rules of the appropriate government agency. 
 
(e) As used in this rule, the term "confidential 
government information" means information which has 
been obtained under governmental authority and which, 
at the time this Rule is applied, the government is 
prohibited by law from disclosing to the public or has 
a legal privilege not to disclose, and which is not 
otherwise available to the public. 
 
No. 97-2336-CR 
 
22
attorney has an actual or serious potential conflict of 
interest. 
 
First, a court's institutional interest in ensuring 
that "criminal trials are conducted within the ethical 
standards of the profession."  Wheat, 486 U.S. at 160. 
 Second, a court's institutional interest in ensuring 
that "legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe 
them."  Id.  Third, a court's institutional interest 
that the court's "judgments remain intact on appeal" 
and be free from future attacks over the adequacy of 
the waiver or fairness of the proceedings.  Id. at 
161. 
Miller, 160 Wis. 2d at 653 n.2. 
¶39 In a post-conviction motion, the institutional factors 
are different.  If a defendant has received a fair trial, the 
court has an institutional interest in protecting the finality 
of its judgment.  Moreover, theoretical imperfections and 
potential problems ought not be treated more seriously than real 
deficiencies and real problems, for such skewed values would 
undermine public confidence in the administration of justice. 
¶40 We hold that in order to establish a Sixth Amendment 
violation on the basis of a conflict of interest in a serial 
representation case, a defendant who did not raise an objection 
at trial must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that 
his or her counsel converted a potential conflict of interest 
into an actual conflict of interest by (1) knowingly failing to 
disclose to the defendant or the circuit court before trial the 
attorney's 
former 
prosecution 
of 
the 
defendant, 
or 
(2) 
representing the defendant in a manner that adversely affected 
the defendant's interests.  If either of these factors can be 
No. 97-2336-CR 
 
23
shown, the circuit court should provide the defendant with 
appropriate relief.  If an attorney knowingly fails to disclose 
to a defendant or the circuit court his or her former role in 
prosecuting the defendant, the attorney is subject to discipline 
from the Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility. 
¶41 In 
this 
case, 
the 
circuit 
court 
could 
have 
disqualified Lisowski before the sentencing hearing at the 
request of the defendant, at the request of the State, or on its 
own motion.  But no one raised objection before sentencing; and 
the court, after a hearing, concluded that Lisowski did not 
remember her appearance at Love's first sentencing and thus 
could not have intentionally withheld information about her 
prior involvement from Love.  Love concedes that Lisowski's 
performance was not deficient and that she represented Love as 
effectively as she could have under the difficult circumstances 
he created. 
¶42 Counsel for defendant, in this well argued case, 
points to a statement Lisowski made at the first sentencing 
hearing on December 13, 1994.  Lisowski said then: 
 
I think Ms. Wagner has set forth the reasons why the 
court can in good conscience adopt the recommendation 
of the parties.  Despite the history, the only other 
thing that I would add along the same line of the 
manner over his head, to which Ms. Wagner referred, I 
think the defendant has to know here and now, in 
court, 
that 
if 
this 
court 
does 
follow 
the 
recommendation 
of 
the 
parties, 
and 
he 
is 
not 
successful on Probation, given his history, I don't 
think the court is going to have any choice but to 
send the defendant to prison, and send the defendant 
to prison for ten years, should he not comply with 
No. 97-2336-CR 
 
24
Probation 
and 
be 
successful 
while 
on 
Probation.  
(Emphasis supplied) 
¶43 Had this statement come up at the defendant's second 
sentencing hearing, August 19, 1996, he could have argued 
successfully that his attorney's prior involvement in this case 
had irreparably compromised her representation of him.  But 
Lisowski's statement did not come up.  It was not used against 
the defendant.  In fact, the transcript of the first sentencing 
hearing was not prepared until almost three months after the 
second sentencing hearing. 
¶44 We conclude that the defendant has not established a 
violation of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance 
of counsel.  Consequently, the decision of the court of appeals 
is reversed. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
 
1