Title: State of New Jersey v. P.Z.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-21-96
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: November 26, 1997

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). PORITZ, C.J., writing for a majority of the Court. The issue in this case is whether a caseworker from DYFS must give Miranda warnings to a parent prior to a non-custodial interview related to a child abuse investigation. In November 1993, defendant's seven-week-old daughter, C.Z., was admitted to Jersey Shore Medical Center where she was diagnosed with and treated for Shaken Baby Syndrome. C.Z. suffered from both old and new bleeding in the brain and from retinal bleeding in both eyes. The hospital notified DYFS about C.Z.'s injuries as mandated by statute. DYFS commenced a Title Nine investigation and reported the case to the Ocean County Prosecutor's Office. Initial interviews by a DYFS caseworker with defendant, his wife, and defendant's father did not reveal a plausible explanation for C.Z.'s injuries. The Attorney General instituted a civil action against defendant and his wife under Title Nine. DYFS sought temporary custody of C.Z. and her two-year-old sister, on grounds that C.Z. had been injured by other than accidental means and that DYFS was unable to ascertain who had caused the child's injuries. Defendant and his wife were represented by separate counsel in the Title Nine action. The Chancery Division granted legal custody of both children to DYFS but gave physical custody of the older child to defendant's father. C.Z. remained hospitalized. Shortly before April 5, 1994, defendant's wife informed her counselor that defendant had admitted causing C.Z.'s injuries. C.Z. had been hospitalized for five months and was expected to be released shortly. The mother's statement was therefore critical to the placement of both C.Z. and her older sister. DYFS caseworker Cheryl Ann Kobran attended a case planning conference with her supervisors and the Deputy Attorney General in charge of the Title Nine action to discuss how to proceed with the new information. It was decided that Kobran should interview P.Z. after contacting the Ocean County Prosecutor's Office to determine whether the interview would impede any pending investigation by that Office. On the morning of April 5, Kobran spoke to an investigator at the Prosecutor's Office and advised him that she planned to interview P.Z. The investigator told Kobran that, although the Prosecutor's Office could not interview defendant because he had a lawyer, there was no obstacle to DYFS questioning P.Z. The investigator also asked Kobran to report the results of her interview with defendant to the prosecutor. Later that day, Kobran and another DYFS caseworker made an unannounced home visit to defendant. Kobran told defendant she was there to ask him about his wife's statement that he had admitted causing his infant daughter's injuries. Defendant's father was present and Kobran asked him to leave the room because he was talking. The father complied and waited outside on the front porch. Defendant acknowledged that he knew why Kobran was there, but said his attorney had told him not to speak to anyone. Kobran nonetheless encouraged defendant to speak, telling him that she was there to complete the DYFS investigation and to decide where to place C.Z. upon her impending discharge from the hospital. Defendant admitted causing C.Z.'s injuries by shaking the baby two or three times because she was crying and he could not console her. He said he felt remorse for what had happened and deserved to be punished. Kobran advised defendant that his statement would be turned over to the Prosecutor's Office and left. Almost six months later, on September 28, 1994, defendant was charged with endangering the welfare of a child and aggravated assault, both second degree crimes. Defendant pled not guilty and his attorney moved to suppress defendant's statement to Kobran. The Title Nine action concluded on February 10, 1995, when custody of C.Z. and her sister was granted to their mother. At the suppression hearing, defendant claimed that his rights as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution had been violated by the State. The trial court determined that defendant's Fifth Amendment rights had not been violated because Kobran's interview with defendant was non-custodial. However, it considered that defendant had invoked his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when he told Kobran his attorney had advised him not to talk to her. The court found persuasive that a Title Nine action was pending, that counsel had been appointed for defendant, that the prosecutor was investigating the matter, and that the prosecutor had knowledge that the interview was taking place. The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal and affirmed. It focused on the serious personal consequences that flowed from a Title Nine proceeding and concluded that there was at least some coercive element in the environment of the situation confronting defendant because parallel civil and criminal systems [were] both operating against [him]. It held that fundamental fairness and the Title Nine objective of child protection require that statements made to DYFS in the context of a Title Nine investigation may not be used against a party in a criminal action unless there is advice of Miranda rights and the affording of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The Court granted leave to appeal. HELD: There is no constitutional or other basis on which to hold defendant's April 5, 1994 statement inadmissible. The Court also finds no basis to require that DYFS caseworkers give Miranda warnings or afford a right to counsel during non-coercive, non-custodial interviews of parents subject to Title Nine investigations. 1. Title Nine was enacted to protect children from abuse and neglect. It contemplates criminal prosecution of acts of abuse and neglect that constitute crimes. It requires that DYFS immediately report all instances of suspected abuse and neglect to the county prosecutor. Title Nine responds to the terrible reality that not all children are safe with their families. At the same time, the goal of family rehabilitation and reunification is a priority unless that goal is not in the best interest of the child. The abused child's interest is paramount; only when the child can be protected within the family will the parents' interest in the care and custody of their child also be realized. The criminal justice system acts separately, but in tandem with the civil system, to investigate and prosecute those who abuse and neglect children. To the extent that criminal prosecution serves as a deterrent to child abuse, the criminal justice system also protects children. (pp. 9-16) 2. In Miranda, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that a custodial interrogation by law enforcement officers is inherently coercive, automatically triggering the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The predicate requirements of Miranda are that the defendant must be in custody and the interrogation must be carried out by law enforcement. The circumstances surrounding defendant's interview on April 5 fail to demonstrate the coercive atmosphere and restraint of freedom that comprises custodial interrogation. Defendant asserts, nonetheless, that he invoked the privilege against self-incrimination when he stated that his attorney had advised him not to speak with a DYFS investigator. Again, despite defendant's assertions to the contrary, the issue turns on his non-custodial status. The Court concludes that defendant's reference to his attorney did not, in this setting, require the DYFS investigator to terminate the interview. (pp. 16-25) 3. The state may not force an individual to choose between his or her Fifth Amendment privilege and another important interest because such choices are deemed to be inherently coercive. Defendant asserts that his statement was obtained in a coercive manner because he was faced with an implied threat that his children would not be returned unless he admitted responsibility for his youngest daughter's injuries. Although an admission of abuse may aid in the rehabilitative process, termination of custody is not automatic on invocation of the privilege. Defendant was not asked to choose between his children and the exercise of his right to remain silent. The Court concludes that defendant's statement to Kobran was not coerced in violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. (pp. 25-31) 4. The right to counsel in criminal proceedings does not attach until the return of an indictment or like process. The court below extended the right to counsel to Title Nine civil actions in which a complaint has been filed. The Court declines to expand the rights of Title Nine respondents to include protections accorded criminal defendants after they have been indicted or taken into custody. Defendant asserts that because Title Nine envisions a right to counsel once a complaint has been filed, he is entitled to have counsel present whenever a DYFS caseworker conducts a child abuse investigation. Acceptance of defendant's argument would shift the primary focus of Title Nine from the right of children to be protected from abuse and neglect to the right of parents to the custody of their children. (pp. 31-37) 5. Defendant also claims that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the suppression of his statement because it was not made voluntarily. Although defendant claims that he feared his children would not be returned if he did not confess, his subjective fear did not derive from a threat amounting to coercion. Defendant had a lawyer in the Title Nine proceeding who had advised him not to speak. He chose not to take that advice. In the totality of the circumstances, the Court holds that defendant's statement was voluntary. (pp. 37-44) 6. The court declines to apply the doctrine of fundamental fairness to require any additional procedural safeguards not now required by constitution or statute. The relationship between DYFS and the prosecutor concerned the Appellate Division in this case. The exchange of information between DYFS and the prosecutor that is statutorily required in these cases does not demonstrate such unfairness and want of consideration for justice that defendant's statement must be suppressed. Kobran's visit to P.Z. had a legitimate independent purpose and was not pretextual. If there was evidence that a DYFS worker met with defendant simply as a subterfuge to achieve law enforcement purposes, the Court might reach a different result. There was no such evidence here. (pp. 44-50) The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED. JUSTICE POLLOCK, dissenting, in which JUSTICE COLEMAN joins, is of the view that it is fundamentally unfair to allow the prosecutor to introduce in defendant's criminal trial his uncounseled, inculpatory statement to a DYFS worker. JUSTICE COLEMAN, dissenting, is of the view that defendant's confession also should be suppressed under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it was coerced by the interrogator's not-so-subtle suggestion that if defendant did not cooperate, his fundamental right to his children would be jeopardized. JUSTICES HANDLER, O'HERN, GARIBALDI, and STEIN join in CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ's opinion. JUSTICE POLLOCK has filed a separate, dissenting opinion, in which JUSTICE COLEMAN joins. JUSTICE COLEMAN has filed a separate, dissenting opinion. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. P.Z., Defendant-Respondent. Argued October 8, 1996 -- Decided November 26, 1997 On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 285 N.J. Super. 219 (1995). Marc E. Roessler, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant (Daniel J. Carluccio, Ocean County Prosecutor, attorney; Mr. Roessler, Thomas M. Cannavo and Brent D. Miller, Assistant Prosecutors, on the briefs). James K. Smith, Jr., Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent (Susan L. Reisner, Public Defender, attorney; Mr. Smith and James Pinchak, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, on the brief). Peter D. Alvino, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae, New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services (Peter Verniero, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel). We granted leave to appeal, 143 N.J. 480 (1996), to consider whether a caseworker from the Child Protective Services Unit of the Division of Youth and Family Services ( DYFS or Division ) must give Miranda warnings to a parent prior to a non-custodial interview related to a child abuse investigation. Defendant, P.Z., provided an inculpatory statement to a DYFS caseworker during an at-home interview conducted in the course of a Title NineSee footnote 1 inquiry. The caseworker reported the substance of the statement to the Ocean County Prosecutor's Office. When the prosecutor later filed criminal charges, defendant moved to suppress his statement. The trial court ruled defendant's statement inadmissible, and the Appellate Division affirmed. 285 N.J. Super. 219 (1995). We reverse. The New Jersey Legislature has enacted two separate and distinct statutes to protect children from abuse and neglect and provide for the protection of children under 18 years of age who have had serious injury inflicted upon them by other than accidental means. It is the intent of this legislation to assure that the lives of innocent children are immediately safeguarded from further injury and possible death and that the legal rights of such children are fully protected. Because child abuse and neglect are often difficult to detect, Title Nine provides that [a]ny person having reasonable cause to believe that a child has been subjected to child abuse or acts of child abuse must inform DYFSSee footnote 3 immediately. N.J.S.A. While the state may not compel therapy treatment that would require appellants to incriminate themselves, it may require parents to otherwise undergo treatment. Therapy, however, which does not include incriminating disclosures, may be ineffective; and ineffective therapy may hurt the parents' chances of regaining their children. These consequences lie outside the protective ambit of the Fifth Amendment. . . . In the lexicon of the Fifth Amendment, the risk of losing the children for failure to undergo meaningful therapy is neither a threat nor a penalty imposed by the state. It is simply a consequence of the reality that it is unsafe for children to be with parents who are abusive and violent. [In re J.W., supra, 415 N.W.2d at 883-84 (footnote omitted).] Certainly, the state could decide in a particular case that a parent should be compelled to speak to a counselor, with the Although this Court has held that the right to counsel found in Article I, Paragraph 10 of the New Jersey Constitution can provide greater protection than the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, see Sanchez, supra, 129 N.J. at 275-77, we have read Article I, Paragraph 10 as consonant with the Federal Constitution on the issue of when the right to counsel is triggered, Tucker, supra, 137 N.J. at 291. In this case, when defendant was interviewed by Kobran on April 5, 1994, he was not the subject of a criminal prosecution since, at that time, he had not been arrested, indicted or arraigned. It was not until September 28, 1994, almost six months after Kobran questioned P.Z., that an indictment was issued against him. During the pre-indictment period of criminal investigation, a law enforcement officer could have questioned The Court held that a confession made under such circumstances was coerced and could not be deemed 'the product of a rational intellect and a free will.' Ibid. (citation omitted). Similarly, in United States v. Tingle, 658 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1981), the court held that a confession obtained after FBI Special Agents led defendant to believe that she would never see her son again, id. at 1334 n.2, was coerced even though the defendant signed a standard FBI Advice of Rights form, id. at 1333. The interrogation was conducted by two agents in their car. They told defendant that she faced a maximum of forty years imprisonment for the crimes of which she was suspected. Id. at 1336. One of the agents used his knowledge that the defendant had a two-year-old child to suggest to the defendant that she had 'a lot at stake.' Id. at 1334. The court found that the purpose and objective of the interrogation was to cause Tingle to JUSTICES HANDLER, O'HERN, GARIBALDI, and STEIN join in CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ's opinion. JUSTICE POLLOCK has filed a separate dissenting opinion, in which JUSTICE COLEMAN joins. JUSTICE COLEMAN has filed a separate dissenting opinion. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 21 September Term 1996 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. P.Z., Defendant-Respondent. POLLOCK, J., dissenting. Occasional disagreement on an appellate tribunal is inevitable. As regrettable as disagreement may be, the exposition of different views may serve the public interest. My perception of the facts and law lead me to a conclusion opposite from that of the majority. Consequently, I respectfully dissent. From my perspective, the only issue on this appeal is whether the State may admit in a criminal prosecution defendant's uncounselled oral statement made to a Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS) investigator after invoking his right to counsel. Critical to this determination are the facts that both the DYFS caseworker and the Prosecutor knew that defendant's wife [N.J.A.C. 10:129-1.1(a).] Thus, both the Legislature and DYFS recognize the delicate balance among DYFS's protection of a child's best interests, the Prosecutor's interest in enforcing criminal laws prohibiting child abuse, and a parent's privilege against self-incrimination. This Court should be no less sensitive in recognizing that SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 21 September Term 1996 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. P.Z., Defendant-Respondent. COLEMAN, J., dissenting. I concur in Justice Pollock's dissenting opinion. I write separately because I believe defendant's confession should be inadmissible in the criminal proceedings for an additional reason. This case involves the admissibility of a confession that resulted from a noncustodial interrogation during an ostensible Title Nine civil investigation. The trial court excluded the confession under a Sixth Amendment analysis based on defendant invoking the right to counsel. The Appellate Division excluded the confession based on the twin principles of fundamental [Id. at 1336.] Both Lynumn and Tingle involved noncustodial interrogations in criminal cases. Both confessions were suppressed under the Due Process Clause. The same rule prevails when interrogations occur in civil cases regardless of whether criminal charges are likely to follow. See, e.g., Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 4, 88 S. Ct. 1503, 1504-05, 20 L. Ed. 2d 381, 384 (1968) (involving questions asked by Internal Revenue Service agent during routine tax investigation); United States v. Mata-Abundiz, 717 F.2d 1277, 1279 (9th Cir. 1983) (involving questions asked during Immigration and Naturalization Service investigation); State v. Clark, 58 N.J. 72, 83 (1971) (involving welfare, bastardy and police proceedings). A party to Title Nine litigation is permitted to speak with another party involved in that litigation who is known to be NO. A-21 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. P.Z., Defendant-Respondent. DECIDED