Title: Oropeza v. Maurer
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 89, 2004
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: September 20, 2004

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
KEVIN B. OROPEZA,                      
           
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellant,   
 
v. 
 
EUGENE J. MAURER, JR., 
     
 
 
     
Defendant Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
   No. 89, 2004 
 
   Court Below---Superior Court 
   of the State of Delaware, 
   in and for New Castle County  
   C.A. No. 04C-01-283 
                      
 
Submitted:  July 16, 2004 
Decided:  September 20, 2004 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and JACOBS, Justices 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 20th day of September 2004, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 
25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The plaintiff-appellant, Kevin B. Oropeza, filed an appeal from the 
Superior Court’s February 10, 2004 order dismissing his complaint.1  The 
defendant-appellee, Eugene J. Maurer, Jr., Esquire, has moved to affirm the 
Superior Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face of 
                                                 
1 On March 11, 2004, the Superior Court also denied Oropeza’s motion for reargument.   
 
 
-2-
Oropeza’s opening brief that the appeal is without merit.2  We agree and 
AFFIRM.3 
 
(2) 
In January 2004, Oropeza, an inmate at the Delaware Correctional 
Center, filed a civil complaint in the Superior Court against Maurer, a Delaware 
lawyer, alleging legal malpractice.  In his complaint, Oropeza made the following 
allegations.  In July 1994, he retained Maurer for advice on the viability of a 
postconviction motion, but only received a response from Maurer after writing him 
several letters.  On September 20, 1995, Maurer finally wrote back to Oropeza 
advising that a review of his file revealed no errors to raise in a postconviction 
motion and, therefore, he was terminating the representation.  Sometime shortly 
thereafter Oropeza’s sister went to Maurer’s office to retrieve Oropeza’s file, but 
was given only the trial transcripts.  It was not until February 6, 2002 that Maurer, 
despite repeated requests, finally turned over the remainder of the file.4  Oropeza 
claims that, as a result of Maurer’s “fraudulent concealment” of a number of viable 
                                                 
2 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
3 On July 30, 2004, after the motion to affirm was filed, Oropeza filed a pleading entitled 
“Appellant’s Supplemental Objections to Appellee’s Motion to Affirm.”  While this pleading 
was filed in violation of Supr. Ct. R. 25(a), we, nevertheless, have reviewed the arguments 
contained therein along with Oropeza’s opening brief in the interest of justice. 
4 Oropeza alleges that he wrote numerous letters to Maurer during 1996 and 1997, but received 
no response.  According to Oropeza, in 2001 he again wrote to Maurer and, still having received 
no response, wrote to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) for assistance.  Oropeza alleges 
that he finally received his file from Maurer on February 6, 2002, but only after the intervention 
of the ODC. 
 
 
-3-
postconviction claims over a period of seven years, he was unable to file a 
postconviction motion in a timely manner.   
 
(3) 
The three-year statute of limitations is applicable to a claim of legal 
malpractice.5  The statute begins to run at the time of the alleged malpractice and 
ignorance of the facts constituting a cause of action does not act as an obstacle to 
the operation of the statute.6  The only exceptions to this rule are in cases of 
infancy, incapacity, fraud7 and where there are no observable factors that would 
place a layman on notice of a problem, such as a title defect.8  In such cases, the 
statute of limitations begins to run when the defect is discovered.9     
 
(4) 
Because Oropeza claims that the legal malpractice occurred in 1995 
when Maurer’s allegedly erroneous advice was given, the three-year statute of 
limitations on his claim has long since run.  Oropeza’s argument that the statute 
was tolled during the time Maurer had possession of his file is unavailing.  
Oropeza alleges no facts supporting his claim of fraudulent concealment and no 
facts supporting his claim that it was not until he gained possession of the 
remainder of his file that he was aware of the existence of a number of viable 
                                                 
5 Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 8106; Taylor v. Bernstein, Del. Supr., No. 174, 1993, Moore, J. (Jan. 
3, 1994), citing Began v. Dixon, 547 A.2d 620, 623 (Del. Super. 1988). 
6 Mastellone v. Argo Oil Corp., 82 A.2d 379, 383 (Del. 1951). 
7 Id. 
8 Pioneer National Title Insurance Co. v. Child, Inc., 401 A.2d 68, 71-72 (Del. 1979). 
9 Id. 
 
 
-4-
postconviction claims.  Oropeza has not shown specifically what document or 
documents in the file put him on notice of which claim, and why the documents 
contained in the public record would not have sufficed for that purpose.  While it is 
regrettable that Maurer did not return the remainder of Oropeza’s file at the time 
the representation was terminated, and we do not condone such conduct,10 Oropeza 
alleges no facts to support his failure to file a timely postconviction motion 
utilizing the trial transcripts, which he admits were returned to him shortly after 
Maurer rendered his allegedly erroneous advice and which presumably would have 
placed him on notice of any viable postconviction claims.  The Superior Court, 
thus, properly found that the three-year statute of limitations barred Oropeza’s 
claims and dismissed his complaint.11   
 
(5) 
It is manifest on the face of Oropeza’s opening brief that this appeal is 
without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled by settled 
Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, clearly there 
was no abuse of discretion. 
                                                 
10 Prof’l Conduct R. 1.16(d). 
11 Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 8106. 
 
 
-5-
 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 25(a), Maurer’s motion to affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice