Title: State v. Patrick A. Saunders
Citation: 2002 WI 107
Docket Number: 2001AP000271
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 16, 2002

2002 WI 107 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-0271 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Patrick A. Saunders,  
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(no cite) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 16, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
May 29, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha   
 
JUDGE: 
Bruce E. Schroeder   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by William L. Gansner, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by Beth 
Ermatinger 
Hanan 
and 
Reinhart 
Boerner 
Van 
Deuren, 
S.C., 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Beth Ermatinger Hanan. 
 
 
2002 WI 107 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-0271   
(L.C. No. 
93 CF 98) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Patrick A. Saunders,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 16, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals, which reversed an 
order of the Kenosha County Circuit Court, Bruce E. Schroeder, 
Judge, denying defendant Patrick A. Saunders' motion for post-
conviction relief.1  Saunders claimed that the State failed to 
prove his status as a repeat offender for sentence enhancement 
purposes.  He requested commutation of that portion of his 
prison sentence based on his status as a habitual criminal, to 
eliminate the alleged improper sentence enhancement.  The court 
                                                 
1 State v. Saunders, No. 01-0271, unpublished order (Wis. 
Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2001). 
No. 01-0271 
2 
 
of appeals granted Saunders' request for relief, and the State 
appealed. 
¶2 
This case requires the court to determine how prior 
convictions 
are 
"proved 
by 
the 
state" 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) (1999-2000)2 for sentence enhancement.  
The question presented is whether a copy of a prior judgment of 
conviction must be certified when the state uses it to prove a 
defendant's status as a repeat offender for sentence enhancement 
purposes.  To answer this question, we must also address the 
issue of whether the rules of evidence formally apply at 
presentence proceedings in which the state attempts to prove 
prior convictions 
for 
sentence enhancement 
purposes 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 939.62. 
¶3 
We hold that Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) does not require 
the state to use certified copies of prior judgments of 
conviction 
as 
the 
basis 
for 
enhanced 
penalties 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 939.62.  We conclude that the rules of evidence do 
not apply to documents offered during a circuit court's 
presentence 
determination 
of 
whether 
a 
qualifying 
prior 
                                                 
2 Although Saunders was convicted in the present case under 
the 1991-92 Statutes, the primary statutory sections discussed 
in this opinion are unchanged for purposes of our analysis.  
Therefore, all subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes 
are to the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise indicated.   
No. 01-0271 
3 
 
conviction exists.3  Use of an uncertified copy of a prior 
judgment of conviction may be an acceptable means of proving 
that a convicted defendant holds the status of a habitual 
criminal under § 939.62, so long as the state proves the 
existence of qualifying prior convictions beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶4 
The facts of this case are not in dispute.  In March 
1993 Patrick A. Saunders was charged in Kenosha County with five 
criminal offenses, including two counts of armed burglary for 
crimes committed in February 1993.4  In the information, the 
State also alleged that Saunders was a repeat offender, pursuant 
                                                 
3 The phrase "qualifying prior convictions" means, for 
purposes of this opinion, prior convictions that meet the 
requirements for permitting a defendant's criminal sentence to 
be enhanced under Wis. Stat. § 939.62.  A felony conviction 
"during 
the 
five-year 
period 
immediately 
preceding 
the 
commission of the crime for which the actor presently is being 
sentenced" or three misdemeanor convictions during that same 
period qualify an offender for sentence enhancement as a 
habitual criminal.  Wis. Stat. § 939.62(2).  In computing the 
preceding five-year period, the time during which the defendant 
was in actual confinement serving a criminal sentence is 
excluded.  Id.  Finally, these convictions must remain of record 
and be unreversed.  Id.; see also discussion infra ¶17. 
4 Saunders was charged with two counts of burglary while 
armed, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 943.10(1)(a)2. & (2)(a) (1991-
92); 
and 
one 
count 
each 
of 
theft, 
contrary 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 943.20(1)(a)3.a. 
(1991-92); 
operating 
a 
motor 
vehicle 
without 
the 
owner's 
consent, 
contrary 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 943.23(3) (1991-92); and operating a vehicle to 
flee an officer, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3) (1991-92). 
No. 01-0271 
4 
 
to Wis. Stat. § 939.62, based on his March 1991 conviction for 
burglary, entered in Rock County Circuit Court.5 
¶5 
In August 1993 a jury found Saunders guilty of all 
five counts.  Immediately after excusing the jury, the circuit 
court engaged in a colloquy with the prosecutor and Saunders' 
trial counsel.  Saunders was present at this colloquy.  The 
court noted that a copy of the 1991 Rock County judgment of 
conviction was located in the court file and asked if there were 
any dispute that the judgment of conviction was present in the 
court file.  Saunders' counsel replied that there was no dispute 
as to the file containing this document, nor was there a dispute 
as to the fact 
of Saunders' prior 
conviction 
in 
1991.  
Accordingly, the court made a finding that Saunders was a repeat 
offender under § 939.62.  The actual language used in this 
exchange was as follows: 
THE COURT: The Information alleges that the defendant 
is a repeat offender, having been convicted of felony 
on March 22, 1991, at Rock County, Wisconsin, and 
there is a judgment of conviction, as a matter of fact 
in the file.  Is there any dispute that that is the 
fact? 
[COUNSEL FOR SAUNDERS]:  No.  I believe that there is 
a conviction in Rock County and another one in 
Illinois, so that the repeater aspects of it is not in 
dispute. 
THE COURT:  Is not in dispute is that what you said? 
                                                 
5 The allegation in the information stated: "Said defendant 
is a repeat offender pursuant to Section 939.62, Wisconsin 
Statutes, having been convicted of the felony offense of 
BURGLARY on [or] about March 22, 1991 in Rock County, Wisconsin, 
Circuit Court File No. 89-CR-1131." 
No. 01-0271 
5 
 
[COUNSEL FOR SAUNDERS]: Is not in dispute. 
THE COURT:  Accordingly I find that the defendant is a 
repeat offender under our law. 
¶6 
After a sentencing hearing on October 7, 1993,6 the 
court sentenced Saunders to sixty years in prison, thirty years 
on each of the two burglary counts.7  Each sentence consisted of 
the maximum twenty years allowable under the state's then-
current armed burglary statutes, see Wis. Stat. §§ 943.10(1)(a) 
and (2)(a); 939.50(3)(b) (1991-92), and the maximum ten years 
allowable 
under 
the 
repeater 
statute, 
 
see 
Wis. Stat. § 939.62(1)(c) (1991-92).  Hence, one-third of each 
sentence 
was 
based 
on 
habitual 
criminality 
sentence 
enhancements. 
¶7 
After two unsuccessful motions for post-conviction 
relief,8 Saunders eventually filed a third motion in January 2001 
under Wis. Stat. § 974.06.9  He contended that the State failed 
                                                 
6 Saunders' prior convictions were not discussed during this 
sentencing hearing. 
7 The court withheld sentence on the remaining counts, and 
ordered eight years of probation to be served after completion 
of Saunders' prison sentence. 
8 Saunders' failure to raise in a prior motion or appeal a 
claim 
that 
his 
repeater 
sentence 
was 
invalid 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 973.12 does not prohibit him from asserting this 
claim under a subsequent § 974.06 motion.  State v. Flowers, 221 
Wis. 2d 20, 22-23, 586 N.W.2d 175 (Ct. App. 1998). 
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 974.06 provides, in pertinent part: 
Postconviction procedure.  (1) After the time for 
appeal or postconviction remedy provided in s. 974.02 
has expired, a prisoner in custody under sentence of a 
court or a person convicted and placed with a 
volunteers 
in 
probation 
program 
under 
s. 
973.11 
No. 01-0271 
6 
 
to satisfy the proof requirements of Wis. Stat. § 973.12 to 
permit an enhanced sentence under § 939.62.  Saunders asserted 
that he never personally admitted to the existence of a prior 
conviction during the sentencing proceedings and that the State 
failed to independently prove his prior Rock County conviction.  
Consequently, he argued, the repeater-enhanced portions of his 
sentence were in excess of that permitted by law and must be 
voided under Wis. Stat. § 973.13.10 
¶8 
The circuit court issued an order, dated January 10, 
2001, denying this request.  Saunders appealed.  The court of 
appeals summarily reversed the circuit court's order,  State v. 
Saunders, No. 01-0271, unpublished order (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 
2001), concluding that the State had failed to meet its burden 
                                                                                                                                                             
claiming the right to be released upon the ground that 
the sentence was imposed in violation of the U.S. 
constitution or the constitution or laws of this 
state, that the court was without jurisdiction to 
impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in 
excess of the maximum authorized by law or is 
otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the 
court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside 
or correct the sentence. 
10 Section 973.13 provides: 
Excessive sentence, errors cured.  In any case 
where the court imposes a maximum penalty in excess of 
that authorized by law, such excess shall be void and 
the sentence shall be valid only to the extent of the 
maximum term authorized by statute and shall stand 
commuted without further proceedings. 
Wis. Stat. § 973.13; see also Flowers, 221 Wis. 2d 28 (stating 
that § 973.13 applies if there is a failure to prove prior 
convictions under § 973.12(1)). 
No. 01-0271 
7 
 
of proving Saunders' prior conviction for repeater purposes.  
Id. at 1.  The court rejected each of the State's three 
arguments that it had established adequate proof of Saunders' 
prior conviction. 
¶9 
First, the court of appeals gave no weight to the 
State's use of an uncertified copy of the 1991 Rock County 
judgment of conviction.  The court concluded that, although no 
dispute existed as to the authenticity of the copy, the 
uncertified copy was inadequate.  The court noted the State's 
failure to cite any Wisconsin case permitting proof of a 
conviction by a copy other than a certified copy of a judgment 
of conviction.  Id. at 2.  It also looked to language in a prior 
court of appeals decision recognizing certified copies as the 
"best evidence" of the existence of prior convictions.  Id. 
(quoting State v. Flowers, 221 Wis. 2d 20, 32, 586 N.W.2d 175 
(Ct. App. 1998)). 
¶10 Second, the court concluded that the State was 
mistaken in attempting to use Saunders' admissions of his prior 
convictions during his impeachment at trial, as proof of these 
prior convictions at sentencing.  Id.  The court noted that 
prior convictions must be proved at sentencing, not during 
trial.  Id. (citing State v. Koeppen, 195 Wis. 2d 117, 129-30, 
536 N.W.2d 386 (Ct. App. 1995)).  Furthermore, these admissions 
did not relate directly to Saunders' repeater status and were 
not made to the level of detail required for an effective 
admission under Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1).  Id. at 2-3. 
No. 01-0271 
8 
 
¶11 Finally, 
the 
court 
held 
that 
the 
presentence 
investigation report (PSI) could not to serve as a source of the 
State's proof since it failed to make an explicit reference to a 
burglary conviction on March 22, 1991, the exact date of the 
Rock County conviction.  Id. at 3.  Without this detail, the 
court said, the PSI was inadequate for purposes of proving 
Saunders' prior conviction. 
¶12 The court of appeals concluded that, with only this  
evidence of Saunders' prior conviction, the State failed in its 
proof under § 973.12(1).  Id.  The court remanded the action to 
the circuit court, instructing it to vacate that portion of 
Saunders' conviction that was based on his status as a repeater 
and to enter a new sentence based solely on the allowable 
sentence maximums for his underlying crimes.  Id. 
¶13 We granted the State's petition for review. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
¶14 This case requires us to clarify the state's proof 
requirements for invoking the habitual criminality sentence 
enhancement 
provisions 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 939.62. 
 
More 
specifically, we must decide whether an uncertified copy of a 
judgment of conviction may serve as part of the proof of a 
defendant's qualifying prior conviction in the absence of a 
personal admission by the defendant. 
¶15 The 
question 
of 
whether 
penalties 
based 
on 
a 
defendant's repeater status were properly applied involves the 
application of Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) to a set of undisputed 
facts.  This is a question of law to which we apply de novo 
No. 01-0271 
9 
 
review.  State v. Liebnitz, 231 Wis. 2d 272, 283, 603 N.W.2d 208 
(1999); State v. Campbell, 201 Wis. 2d 783, 788, 549 N.W.2d 501 
(Ct. App. 1996). 
¶16 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.62 is one of many statutory 
provisions 
that 
enhance 
a 
convicted 
criminal 
defendant's 
potential exposure to confinement.11  The section pertains to 
persons whom the legislature has dubbed "habitual criminals" or 
"repeaters."  Wis. Stat. § 939.62. 
¶17 A "repeater," for purposes of penalty enhancement 
under § 939.62, is a person who has been convicted of at least 
one felony or three misdemeanors in the five years preceding the 
crime 
for 
which 
he 
or 
she 
is 
being 
sentenced.  
Wis. Stat. § 939.62(2).12  In computing this five-year period, 
                                                 
11 Other examples of statutory enhancements of criminal 
penalties include Wis. Stat. §§ 939.621 (certain domestic abuse 
offenses), 939.622 (committing a serious sex crime while 
infected with AIDS, HIV or a sexually transmitted disease), 
939.623 (repeat serious sex crimes), 939.624 (repeat serious 
violent crimes), 939.625 (criminal gang crimes), 939.63 (use of 
a dangerous weapon), 939.632 (violent crime in a school zone), 
939.64 
(use 
of 
bulletproof 
garment), 
939.641 
(concealing 
identity), 939.645 (crimes committed against certain people or 
property), 939.646 (crimes committed using information from the 
sex offender 
registry), 
939.647 (violent felony 
committed 
against an elder person), and 939.648 (terrorism).  In addition, 
the state has constructed graduated penalty schemes for repeat 
offenders 
of 
certain 
motor 
vehicle 
laws, 
including 
Wis. Stat. § 346.65 (operation of a vehicle while intoxicated), 
and Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2) (operation of a motor vehicle after 
revocation of license). 
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.62(2) provides: 
(2) The actor is a repeater if the actor was 
convicted of a felony during the 5-year period 
immediately preceding the commission of the crime for 
No. 01-0271 
10 
 
time spent by the defendant in actual confinement while serving 
a criminal sentence is excluded.13  Id. 
¶18 The statute permits a court to increase the sentence 
for most crimes that allow imprisonment, provided the person 
being 
sentenced 
is 
a 
repeater 
under 
the 
law.  
Wis. Stat. § 939.62(1).  The allowable increase in sentencing 
follows a formula based upon the maximum sentence available for 
the underlying crime.  Wis. Stat. § 939.62(1)(a)-(c).14 
                                                                                                                                                             
which the actor presently is being sentenced, or if 
the actor was convicted of a misdemeanor on 3 separate 
occasions during that same period, which convictions 
remain of record and unreversed.  It is immaterial 
that sentence was stayed, withheld or suspended, or 
that the actor was pardoned, unless such pardon was 
granted on the ground of innocence.  In computing the 
preceding 5-year period, time which the actor spent in 
actual confinement serving a criminal sentence shall 
be excluded. 
13 In the present case, Saunders was previously convicted as 
party to the crime of felony burglary on March 22, 1991.  
Therefore, irrespective of whether Saunders was placed in 
confinement subsequent to that conviction, his prior conviction 
occurred within the five-year period preceding his criminal acts 
on February 15 and 16, 1993——the acts that generated Saunders' 
October 1993 convictions in the present case. 
14 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.62(1) provides:  
(1) If the actor is a repeater, as that term is 
defined in sub. (2), and the present conviction is for 
any crime for which imprisonment may be imposed, 
except for an escape under s. 946.42 or a failure to 
report 
under 
s. 
946.425, 
the 
maximum 
term 
of 
imprisonment prescribed by law for that crime may be 
increased as follows: 
  
(a) A maximum term of one year or less may be 
increased to not more than 3 years. 
No. 01-0271 
11 
 
¶19 Before sentence enhancement may be considered, a 
criminal defendant's repeater status must be established before 
the circuit court.  A defendant is subject to an enhanced 
penalty for habitual criminality only if (1) the defendant 
personally admits to qualifying prior convictions, or (2) the 
existence of qualifying prior convictions is proved by the 
state.  Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1).  Subsection (1) reads: 
Sentence of a repeater or persistent repeater.  
(1) Whenever a person charged with a crime will be a 
repeater or a persistent repeater under s. 939.62 if 
convicted, any applicable prior convictions may be 
alleged in the complaint, indictment or information or 
amendments so alleging at any time before or at 
arraignment, and before acceptance of any plea. The 
court may, upon motion of the district attorney, grant 
a reasonable 
time 
to 
investigate 
possible 
prior 
convictions before accepting a plea. If the prior 
convictions are admitted by the defendant or proved by 
the state, he or she shall be subject to sentence 
under s. 939.62 unless he or she establishes that he 
or she was pardoned on grounds of innocence for any 
crime necessary to constitute him or her a repeater or 
a persistent repeater. An official report of the 
F.B.I. or any other governmental agency of the United 
States or of this or any other state shall be prima 
facie evidence of any conviction or sentence therein 
reported. Any sentence so reported shall be deemed 
prima facie to have been fully served in actual 
confinement or to have been served for such period of 
                                                                                                                                                             
  
(b) A maximum term of more than one year but not 
more than 10 years may be increased by not more than 2 
years if the prior convictions were for misdemeanors 
and by not more than 6 years if the prior conviction 
was for a felony. 
  
(c) A maximum term of more than 10 years may be 
increased by not more than 2 years if the prior 
convictions were for misdemeanors and by not more than 
10 years if the prior conviction was for a felony. 
No. 01-0271 
12 
 
time as is shown or is consistent with the report. The 
court shall take judicial notice of the statutes of 
the United States and foreign states in determining 
whether the prior conviction was for a felony or a 
misdemeanor. 
Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) 
(emphasis 
added). 
 
The 
subsection 
specifies that an "official report" by a government agency 
"shall be prima facie evidence of any conviction or sentence 
therein reported."  Id. 
¶20 It is clear on the face of § 973.12(1) that, absent a 
defendant's personal admission, the state bears the burden of 
proving that qualifying prior convictions exist if it seeks 
repeater enhancements under § 939.62.  Over time, however, some 
confusion has developed over what this burden of proof requires. 
¶21 In interpreting Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1), this court and 
the court of appeals have fleshed out some of the nuances found 
in the statute's proof requirements.  
¶22 For example, an admission under § 973.12(1) of prior 
convictions may not "be inferred nor made by defendant's 
attorney, but rather, must be a direct and specific admission by 
the defendant."  State v. Farr, 119 Wis. 2d 651, 659, 350 
N.W.2d 640 (1984).  Moreover, an admission by the defendant must 
contain specific reference to the date of the conviction and any 
period of incarceration if relevant to applying § 939.62.  State 
v. Zimmerman, 185 Wis. 2d 549, 557, 518 N.W.2d 303 (Ct. App. 
1994).  This court has also concluded that a defendant who 
pleads no contest can be held to have admitted to a prior 
conviction for enhancement purposes, even if the defendant never 
expressly admitted to the conviction.  See Liebnitz, 231 Wis. 2d 
No. 01-0271 
13 
 
at 286; State v. Rachwal, 159 Wis. 2d 494, 509, 465 N.W.2d 490 
(1991).  The court of appeals limited the preceding rule by 
stating that the Rachwal court "expressly recognized that a 
guilty plea may not constitute an admission if the judge fails 
to conduct the proper questioning so as to ascertain the meaning 
and potential consequences of such a plea."  Zimmerman, 185 
Wis. 2d at 555. 
¶23 With respect to the state's proof requirements, the 
court of appeals held that a presentence investigation report 
may be treated as an official report under § 973.12(1), and it 
will satisfy the state's proof requirement if it recites the 
date 
of 
the 
prior conviction.  
State v. 
Caldwell, 154 
Wis. 2d 683, 693-94, 454 N.W.2d 13 (Ct. App. 1990) (citing Farr, 
119 Wis. 2d at 658). 
¶24 Wisconsin courts have recognized that a certified copy 
of a judgment of conviction is excellent documentary evidence 
for proving a prior conviction for purposes of § 973.12(1).  See 
Farr, 119 Wis. 2d at 660; Block v. State, 41 Wis. 2d 205, 208, 
163 N.W.2d 196 (1968); State v. Meyer, 258 Wis. 2d 326, 333-334, 
46 N.W.2d 341 (1951); Flowers, 221 Wis. 2d at 32; Koeppen, 195 
Wis. 2d at 127.  In Flowers, the court of appeals described a 
certified copy of a judgment of conviction as "the best evidence 
we can conceive of to show a trial court the existence of a 
prior felony conviction."  Flowers, 221 Wis. 2d at 32.  We do 
not dispute this characterization.  However, use of the 
superlative "best" does not imply exclusion of the merely 
"good."  See Shellow v. Hagen, 9 Wis. 2d 506, 516, 101 
No. 01-0271 
14 
 
N.W.2d 694 (1960).  That a certified copy of a judgment of 
conviction is the "best evidence" does not connote that 
certified copies are the only copies that may be used. 
¶25 This court has never held that a copy of a prior 
judgment of conviction may be used as proof by the state in 
cases involving § 973.12(1) only when it is certified.  In fact, 
no reported Wisconsin case has imposed such a requirement on the 
state.  We believe that the court of appeals erred by announcing 
such a requirement. 
¶26 The plain language of Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) does not 
support the court of appeals' conclusion.  The subsection does 
not demand that prior convictions be proved through any specific 
method, such as the use of a certified copy of a judgment of 
conviction.  Moreover, the portion of § 973.12(1) that speaks of 
official government reports constituting prima facie evidence of 
prior convictions supports the inference that the state may use 
other forms of evidence——ones not entitled to prima facie 
deference——to meet its proof requirements under the subsection.   
¶27 By contrast, Farr's requirement that a defendant must 
personally admit to a prior conviction for an admission to be 
valid is readily extrapolated from the language of § 973.12(1), 
which states, "If the prior convictions are admitted by the 
defendant . . . he or she shall be subject to sentence under s. 
939.62 . . . ."  Id. (emphasis added).  No creative construction 
of this language is required to find a legislative intent that 
the admission be made by the defendant personally, as opposed to 
defendant's counsel. 
No. 01-0271 
15 
 
¶28 In addition, little 
is 
gained by 
distinguishing 
between certified and uncertified prior judgments of conviction 
in this context.  The primary purpose of certifying a record is 
to help ensure its authenticity and accuracy.  However, in the 
context of proof at a post-judgment presentence hearing, an 
uncertified copy is not materially different from a certified 
copy of the same judgment.  It is identical except for the 
certification that comes from an official stamp.  It should be 
at least as reliable as a summary of the conviction in an 
official government report.  Therefore, while a certified copy 
of a judgment of conviction is a superior form of documentary 
evidence, it need not represent the only copy that may be used 
by the state. 
¶29   If 
an 
uncertified 
copy 
contains 
inaccurate 
information about the prior conviction, the defendant should  
object to the accuracy of the document.  Likewise, if a 
defendant questions  the state's overall mode of proof, the 
defendant should object to that mode of proof.  An objection 
would advise the court of the defendant's concern and permit the 
state to take remedial action. 
¶30 After all, a defendant is always permitted to contest 
the authenticity or, more likely, the accuracy of even a 
certified copy of a judgment of conviction.  Human beings 
complete 
these 
forms 
and, 
although 
we 
would 
hope 
that 
typographical errors within these important documents are rare, 
No. 01-0271 
16 
 
errors may nonetheless exist.15  Similarly, the state may not use 
as proof a judgment that has been reversed or expunged, even if 
the judgment is certified.  Put simply, judicial personnel are 
not infallible.  Accordingly, even a certified copy of a 
document establishing a prior conviction may be rebutted, just 
as inaccuracy in a presentence investigation report may be 
challenged.  
¶31 It would be an odd result if we were to preclude the 
state from offering an uncertified copy of a prior judgment of 
conviction when the defendant makes no objection to the 
submission of the document.  It is commonly understood that when 
evidence is submitted at trial, much less for sentencing, a 
defendant who remains silent generally waives any objection to 
the submission of that evidence.16 
¶32 Finally, our holding is consistent with the differing 
proof requirements this court has established for general 
repeater 
enhancements 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 973.12 
and 
proof 
requirements for repeater enhancements for certain motor vehicle 
crimes.  In the companion cases of State v. Wideman, 206 
Wis. 2d 91, 556 N.W.2d 737 (1996), and State v. Spaeth, 206 
Wis. 2d 135, 556 N.W.2d 728 (1996), we held that the state's 
proof requirements for showing that a defendant is a repeat 
offender for the purposes of Wis. Stat. § 346.65, operating a 
                                                 
15 An example of such a clerical error within a judgment of 
conviction was at issue in  State v. Prihoda, 2000 WI 123, 239 
Wis. 2d 244, 618 N.W.2d 857.  
16 See also discussion infra note 25. 
No. 01-0271 
17 
 
motor 
vehicle 
while 
intoxicated 
(OWI), 
and 
Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2), 
operating 
a 
motor 
vehicle 
after 
revocation (OAR), are not governed by § 973.12(1).  Wideman, 206 
Wis. 2d at 94-95; Spaeth, 206 Wis. 2d at 149.  In particular, we 
held that prior OWI or OAR offenses may be proved by either "a 
defendant's admission, whether given personally or imputed 
through counsel," or by the state "placing before the court 
reliable documentary proof of each conviction."  Spaeth, 206 
Wis. 2d at 148. 
¶33 This proof requirement remains less imposing than the 
proof requirement under § 973.12(1).  By allowing the use of 
uncertified copies to prove prior convictions under § 973.12, we 
do nothing to disturb the holding in Farr that only a defendant, 
not defendant's counsel, may acknowledge the existence of a 
qualifying prior conviction.  See id. at 149 ("[t]he Farr 
holding is limited to situations in which the proof standards of 
§ 973.12(1) apply").  This burden remains greater than what this 
court required in Wideman and Spaeth, where we held that a 
defense counsel's admission of a defendant's prior offense 
constitutes competent proof of the prior offense for purposes of 
OWI or OAR penalty enhancement.  See Wideman, 206 Wis. 2d at 
105; Spaeth, 206 Wis. 2d at 148. 
¶34 In sum, the language of Wis. Stat. § 973.12 does not 
require an interpretation that only a certified copy of a 
judgment of conviction may be used as proof when the state seeks 
to show the existence of a qualifying prior conviction for 
No. 01-0271 
18 
 
sentence enhancement purposes.  We therefore decline to graft 
such a requirement onto the text of § 973.12(1). 
¶35  Our interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1)'s proof 
requirements does not resolve this case because there are other 
considerations that could require the state to proffer a 
certified copy of a prior judgment of conviction.   
¶36 In particular, we must determine whether the rules of 
evidence formally govern the state's mode of proof of prior 
convictions for sentence enhancement purposes.  If the rules of 
evidence were to apply in proving prior convictions under 
§ 973.12(1), then these rules alone might require that the state 
use a certified copy of a judgment of conviction to satisfy its 
burden of proof. 
¶37 In that event, we would need to address this court's 
rules regarding the use of public records at trial, as spelled 
out in Wis. Stat. § 910.05.17  Inasmuch as prior judgments of 
conviction are public records, copies of these judgments must 
conform to the public records requirements for documentary 
evidence under Wis. Stat. § 910.05, if the rules of evidence 
                                                 
17 Wisconsin Stat. § 910.05 provides: 
Public records.  The contents of an official 
record, or of a document authorized to be recorded or 
filed and actually recorded or filed, including data 
compilations in any form, if otherwise admissible, may 
be proved by copy, certified as correct in accordance 
with s. 909.02 or testified to be correct by a witness 
who has compared it with the original.  If a copy 
which complies with the foregoing cannot be obtained 
by the exercise of reasonable diligence, then other 
evidence of the contents may be given. 
No. 01-0271 
19 
 
apply.  Rule 910.05 appears to require that copies of judgments 
of conviction would need to be certified, unless a certified 
copy 
"cannot 
be 
obtained 
by 
the 
exercise 
of 
reasonable 
diligence."18  Id. 
¶38 To determine whether the rules of evidence apply, we 
must decide the true nature of the proceeding in which the state 
proves prior convictions for sentence enhancement purposes.  If 
habitual criminality is a factor that goes merely to sentencing, 
then 
the 
rules 
of 
evidence 
do 
not 
apply. 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. § 911.01(4)(c); Hammill v. State, 52 Wis. 2d 118, 
120, 187 N.W.2d 792 (1971).  Conversely, if prior convictions 
are deemed elements of the crime when defendants are charged as 
repeaters, then the full panoply of evidentiary rules at trial 
should 
apply. 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. § 911.01(2). 
 
If 
neither 
characterization is completely correct, then the court must 
determine what process of proof is required. 
                                                 
18 In oral argument the State offered another rule of 
evidence, Wis. Stat. § 910.03, as a possible means to counteract 
Saunders' argument that the uncertified copy of the judgment of 
conviction 
was 
improperly 
before 
the 
circuit 
court 
at 
sentencing.  Section 910.03 allows for duplicate copies to be 
used for evidentiary purposes to the same extent as an original 
if no genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the 
original.  It provides: "Admissibility of duplicates.  A 
duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an original unless 
(1) a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the 
original or (2) in the circumstances it would be unfair to admit 
the duplicate in lieu of the original."  Wis. Stat. § 910.03. 
The State maintains that because Saunders failed to object 
to the use of the uncertified copy, use of this "duplicate" copy 
of the judgment of conviction was proper. 
No. 01-0271 
20 
 
¶39 Considering 
many 
factors, 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
proceeding 
in 
which 
the 
state 
seeks 
to 
prove 
habitual 
criminality 
is, 
under 
Wisconsin's 
statutory 
scheme, 
more 
analogous 
to 
the 
sentencing 
process 
than 
to 
trial 
and, 
therefore, should be treated similarly in terms of evidentiary 
requirements.   
¶40 First, 
the 
legislature 
has 
placed 
the 
proof 
requirements for Wis. Stat. § 939.62 enhancements in Chapter 
973, a chapter that deals exclusively with sentencing matters.  
This categorization, combined with § 911.01(4)(c)'s express 
language that the rules of evidence are inapplicable during 
sentencing proceedings, strongly suggests that proof under 
§ 973.12(1) is not governed by the rules of evidence. 
¶41 Second, the legislature has determined that habitual 
offenders warrant increased punishment, in part because they 
have failed to learn respect for the law.  State v. Harris, 119 
Wis. 2d 612, 
619, 
350 
N.W.2d 633 
(1984). 
 
The 
increased 
penalties for repeaters "serve as a warning to first offenders."  
Id.  Rigorous application of the rules of evidence would subvert 
the purpose of the law if an offender were to escape punishment 
solely because of a technical failure of proof.  The process we 
require should not elevate form over substance. 
¶42 Third, this court has previously held that, in the 
context of sentence enhancements based on repeat offender 
status, the state may use reliable information that would be 
inadmissible at trial.  See Spaeth, 206 Wis. 2d at 151.  In 
reaching this conclusion, we stated, "There is no presumption of 
No. 01-0271 
21 
 
innocence 
accruing 
to 
the 
defendant 
regarding . . . previous . . . convictions; 
such 
convictions 
have already been determined in the justice system and the 
defendant was protected by his rights in those actions."  Id. 
(quoting 
State 
v. 
McAllister, 
107 
Wis. 2d 532, 
539, 
319 
N.W.2d 865 (1982)).  In other words, the very nature of prior 
convictions militates against the need to apply formal rules of 
proof.  The court is primarily concerned with the accuracy of 
details 
about 
the 
convictions. 
 
The 
defendant 
and 
the 
defendant's attorney have the information and incentive to 
contest any inaccuracy. 
¶43 Fourth, § 939.62 does not create an additional element 
of the underlying crime for which a defendant is charged.  This 
court has long held that "[a] charge of being a repeater is not 
a charge of a crime and, if proved, only renders the defendant 
eligible for an increase in penalty for the crime of which he is 
convicted."  Block, 41 Wis. 2d at 212; see also Liebnitz, 231 
Wis. 2d at 284; Farr, 119 Wis. 2d at 661.  The reasoning behind 
this treatment is that habitual criminality does not in any way 
change the nature of the recently committed crime.  See Harms v. 
State, 36 Wis. 2d 282, 285, 153 N.W.2d 78 (1967).  In earlier 
applications of § 939.62, this court expressly stated that proof 
of recidivism for purposes of enhancing a current criminal 
sentence should be made "in connection with the sentencing 
process and not contemporaneously with the issue of guilt."  
Block, 41 Wis. 2d at 212; see also State v. Goldstein, 182 
Wis. 2d 251, 260, 513 N.W.2d 631 (1994) ("prior conviction is an 
No. 01-0271 
22 
 
essential element of proof to be satisfied at sentencing if the 
State is to secure the additional punishment it seeks") 
(emphasis added).  Therefore, the defendant's guilt or innocence 
of the underlying crime is determined irrespective of, and prior 
to, the validity of the state's claim that the defendant is a 
repeater under § 939.62.19 
¶44 The concept that proof of prior convictions should be 
treated differently from other penalty enhancers is bolstered by 
recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions.  In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), the Court held that the U.S. 
Constitution requires that any fact which increases the penalty 
for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, other than 
the fact of a prior conviction, must be submitted to a jury and 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.20  In Almendarez-Torres v. 
United States, 523 U.S. 224, 230 (1998), the Court specifically 
                                                 
19 That a defendant's repeater status is not an element of 
the 
substantive 
offense 
is 
precisely 
why 
proof 
of 
the 
defendant's prior conviction need not be offered during trial 
and, therefore, why the state's burden of proving prior 
convictions does not need to be satisfied before a defendant can 
be convicted of the underlying crimes of which he or she is 
accused.  See State v. Spaeth, 206 Wis. 2d 135, 151, 556 
N.W.2d 728 (1996) ("prior convictions are not an element of the 
underlying OAR offense to be proven at trial") (citing State v. 
McAllister, 107 Wis. 2d 532, 537-38, 319 N.W.2d 865 (1982)). 
20 Likewise, in Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999), 
the Court held that "under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth 
Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases 
the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an 
indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt."  Id. at 243 n.6 (emphasis added). 
No. 01-0271 
23 
 
found that, with regard to federal law, statutory penalty 
enhancements based on criminal recidivism are not elements of 
the crime but are properly viewed as sentencing factors.  When 
constitutional due process and jury trial requirements do not 
compel the determination of a defendant's prior convictions at 
trial, there is no compelling reason why the rules governing 
proof of evidence at trial should be applied to a proceeding 
after trial. 
¶45 Finally, as with most sentencing decisions, the use of 
repeat-offender penalty enhancers lies within the discretion of 
the sentencing judge.  See Hanson v. State, 48 Wis. 2d 203, 207, 
179 N.W.2d 909 (1970) ("A trial judge clearly has discretion in 
determining the length of a sentence within the permissible 
range set by [§ 939.62]").  The circuit court is limited only by 
the statutory maximum allowed under the enhancement; there is no 
minimum mandatory sentence enhancement that the judge must apply 
upon a conviction in which habitual criminality has been proved.  
A sentencing court may, if it wishes, completely forego the use 
of the penalty enhancement when it sentences a proven repeat 
offender.  See Harris, 119 Wis. 2d at 617-18. 
¶46 To sum up, we know that proof of prior convictions 
must 
be 
made 
by 
the 
state, 
as 
clearly 
required 
under 
§ 973.12(1).  Yet it is equally true that a defendant's repeater 
status is not an element of the underlying crime to be proved 
prior to the verdict.  Because proof of the defendant's 
qualifying prior convictions comes after the verdict and is 
heard solely by the sentencing judge, the statutory scheme and 
No. 01-0271 
24 
 
case law have treated proof of this element differently from 
traditional proof at trial.  Overall, we believe the proof 
required of the state under § 973.12(1) fits much better with 
the process of sentencing.  We conclude that the state's proof 
process under § 973.12(1), at least as it pertains to the use of 
documentary evidence,21 is not governed by the formal rules of 
evidence applicable at trial.22  Therefore, a copy of a prior 
judgment of conviction need not be certified to be used as proof 
in this context. 
¶47 Although the formal rules of evidence do not apply to 
documentary proof under § 973.12(1), the state is not relieved 
of its burden of proof.  Penalty enhancement based on habitual 
criminality is not identical to other sentencing factors.   
¶48 For instance, proof of prior convictions must be 
offered by the state before sentencing.  Koeppen, 195 Wis. 2d at 
130 (noting that § 973.12(1) states that "[i]f such prior 
convictions are admitted . . . or proved . . . , [the defendant] 
shall be subject to sentence under s. 939.62" and that "[t]his 
                                                 
21 This court need not speculate as to what forms of 
evidence other than official reports of government agencies 
constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt of a defendant's 
prior conviction for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 939.62.  Rather, 
we only answer the question of whether uncertified copies of 
prior judgments of conviction are allowable as a means of 
satisfying the burden under § 973.12(1). 
22 Because we hold that the rules of evidence do not 
formally apply in this context, we do not reach the question of 
the interplay between Wis. Stat. §§ 910.03 and 910.05 in the 
context 
of 
the 
state 
proving 
prior 
convictions 
under 
§ 973.12(1). 
No. 01-0271 
25 
 
language suggests that the proofs must precede the sentence").  
The proof may be offered immediately after verdict, in a 
presentence investigation report, at a sentencing hearing, or at 
any time before actual sentencing.  In addition, the state must 
put the defendant on notice, either in the complaint or the 
information, that it will be seeking an enhanced penalty based 
on 
the 
defendant's 
prior 
conviction 
record. 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1). 
¶49 More important, a court may not impose a penalty 
enhancer until the defendant has admitted to qualifying prior 
convictions or the state has proved the qualifying prior 
convictions.  Because proof of prior convictions directly 
affects the sentence a criminal defendant may receive, and thus 
affects a major liberty interest, this proof is an essential 
element for the state to prove when it seeks additional 
punishment under § 939.62.  Therefore, "even though the rules of 
evidence 
generally 
do 
not 
apply 
at 
a 
sentencing 
hearing . . . the legislature via § 973.12(1), Stats., and the 
case law applying that statute has reintroduced a degree of 
formal proof requirements as to repeater allegations."  Koeppen, 
195 Wis. 2d at 131.  If the state fails to meet its proof 
requirement, then the sentencing court is without authority to 
sentence the defendant as a repeat offender.  Zimmerman, 185 
Wis. 2d at 558-59. 
¶50 The "degree of formal proof" noted in Koeppen, 195 
Wis. 2d at 131, is reflected in the high burden of proof the 
state must face.  In State v. Theriault, 187 Wis. 2d 125, 127, 
No. 01-0271 
26 
 
522 N.W.2d 254 (Ct. App. 1994), the court of appeals concluded 
that "when the State is put on notice that a defendant does not 
admit to [a] habitual criminality allegation, it must provide 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's repeater 
status." 
¶51 We agree that, in the absence of a defendant's 
admission that he or she has been previously convicted of a 
qualifying offense, the state must prove prior convictions 
beyond a reasonable doubt in order to satisfy the proof 
requirements found under § 973.12(1).  This burden of proof 
applies both to the existence of a conviction and the date of 
the conviction.  See Wis. Stat. § 939.62(2); see also Zimmerman, 
185 Wis. 2d at 558. 
¶52 In sum, we conclude that the rules of evidence do not 
apply to documentary evidence the state uses to prove the 
existence of prior convictions for repeater purposes under 
§§ 939.62 and 973.12(1).  A certified copy of a prior judgment 
of conviction is not required for this purpose.  Nevertheless, 
the state bears the full burden of proving prior convictions 
that may affect the maximum sentence of defendants.  The state 
must prove these convictions beyond a reasonable doubt, and the 
sentencing judge must weigh this evidence accordingly. 
¶53 The question ultimately becomes whether the state has 
submitted enough evidence to satisfy the sentencing judge beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant has the requisite number 
of qualifying prior convictions.  To answer this question the 
court must look to the totality of the post-trial evidence 
No. 01-0271 
27 
 
presented by the state, including copies of prior judgments of 
conviction, be they certified or uncertified.  The defendant 
must be informed of the evidence the state is relying upon and 
be given the opportunity to challenge that evidence.  This 
approach ensures due process, adheres to the requirements of 
§ 973.12(1), and places upon the state its appropriate burden of 
proof. 
¶54 Before concluding our analysis, we pause to comment on 
the process of proving prior convictions.  This case concerns a 
proceeding in 1993.  In the years since 1993, Wisconsin courts 
have observed that prosecutors face many difficult tasks, but 
"properly pleading and proving repeater allegations are not 
among them."  Wideman, 206 Wis. 2d at 107-08 n.24; see also 
Koeppen, 195 Wis. 2d at 130; Theriault, 187 Wis. 2d at 132 n.1; 
Goldstein, 182 Wis. 2d at 261. 
¶55 Prosecutors should not depend upon the cooperation of 
defendants to prove prior convictions.  They should plan to 
present the best evidence available, and the best evidence 
available will normally be a certified copy of a judgment of 
conviction.  When the state presents a certified copy of a 
judgment of conviction, it reduces the likelihood of a challenge 
from the defendant and effectively limits any challenge to the 
accuracy of information within the document.  When the defendant 
challenges information in the document, the defendant invites 
inquiry into the basis for the challenge and whether he or she 
is willing to admit any prior convictions.  A personal 
admission, on the record and fully stated, serves as the 
No. 01-0271 
28 
 
alternative form of proof recognized in Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1).  
Although our decision does not require the use of certified 
copies of judgments of conviction, we strongly urge prosecutors 
to acquire certified copies of judgments to avoid unnecessary 
proof problems.  This court, in the past, has urged defense 
counsel to put the state to its proof when the state alleges 
qualifying prior convictions.  See Wideman, 206 Wis. 2d at 108.  
Prosecutors should be ready to respond accordingly. 
¶56 We also urge courts to develop a standard colloquy 
regarding prior convictions, so that a defendant's admissions 
will fully satisfy the requirements of the statute.  The 
defendant may stand mute and decline to respond, as is his or 
her right, but in many instances an admission will obviate the 
need for the state to meet its proof requirements. 
¶57 Finally, presentence investigation reports ought to 
include the specific dates of any prior convictions still of 
record and specify dates of incarceration if they are to be 
relied upon.  These relatively simple steps will promote the 
efficient administration of justice. 
¶58 We now review, under the standards outlined above, 
whether the circuit court erred in finding that the State 
adequately proved the existence of Saunders' prior Rock County 
conviction for purposes of sentence enhancement.  We conclude 
that, under the totality of the information in the record, the 
court did not err.  There was sufficient documentary evidence 
for the court to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Saunders 
had been previously convicted of a felony on March 22, 1991, and 
No. 01-0271 
29 
 
that his conviction made him eligible for sentence enhancement 
under Wis. Stat. § 939.62.23 
¶59 First, the uncertified copy of the Rock County 
judgment of conviction was in the circuit court's file prior to 
sentencing.  Immediately after the jury had been dismissed, the 
court made direct reference to this copy being in the court 
file.  The copy contained the requisite information from which a 
court is permitted to conclude that the defendant is a repeater. 
¶60 Second, the circuit court directly asked at the close 
of trial whether there was any dispute as to the fact that there 
was a copy of the judgment of conviction in the file.  Saunders' 
counsel replied: "No.  I believe that there is a conviction in 
Rock County and another one in Illinois, so that the repeater 
aspects of it is not in dispute."  This inquiry was precise and 
correct in inviting dispute as to the existence of this 
evidence, rather than asking only whether there was any dispute 
as to the underlying fact of the conviction.  The latter 
question, directed toward Saunders' trial counsel, would have 
done no more than repeat the same error identified by this court 
in Farr, 119 Wis. 2d at 659. 
¶61 This exchange between Saunders' counsel and the court 
should be properly viewed as the circuit court expressing that: 
(1) an uncertified copy of a prior judgment of conviction was in 
                                                 
23 The dissent asserts that the State failed to offer 
evidence in support of its burden of proof.  Dissent at ¶84.  
The court had before it an uncertified copy of the judgment of 
conviction and the presentence investigation report, as well as 
the defense's reaction to these documents. 
No. 01-0271 
30 
 
the file; (2) the State was proffering the copy to meet its 
burden of proof under Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1); and (3) Saunders 
or his counsel, if they disputed the authenticity or accuracy of 
the document, should object to its use, at some time prior to 
sentencing.  The court did not ask Saunders to personally admit 
to the prior conviction, although it could have made such an 
inquiry, and any complete answer with appropriate colloquy would 
have been given effect as an admission under § 973.12(1). 
¶62 In rejecting Saunders' argument, as adopted by the 
court of appeals, we conclude that the failure of Saunders' 
counsel to object to the evidence offered by the State in this 
context is significant.  When the court inquired as to the 
presence of the uncertified copy, the initial response of "No" 
from Saunders' counsel should be construed as an admission to 
the copy being in the court file and acceptance of its use as 
the State's proof of Saunders' prior conviction.24 
¶63 Therefore, by implication, there was a waiver of the 
defendant's right to object to the use of the uncertified copy 
as proper proof of a prior conviction.  This omission is 
distinct from any "waiver" of the State's overall proof 
requirement.  A defendant's trial counsel may not, on his or her 
own, countenance the state's failure to attempt to meet its 
burden of proof.  The colloquy at the end of the jury trial 
                                                 
24 The defense counsel's follow-up statement regarding his 
belief that the convictions themselves occurred is of little 
probative value to the question of whether the State met its 
burden under § 973.12(1).  It merely illustrates the defense 
counsel's desire not to object to the State's method of proof. 
No. 01-0271 
31 
 
merely shows that Saunders, through his counsel, stipulated to 
the mode of proof employed by the State.25  This action 
contributed to the reasonableness of the circuit court's finding 
that the State had met its burden of proof under § 973.12(1). 
¶64 Third, the information presented in the presentence 
investigation report supports the reasonableness of the circuit 
court's conclusion that the State met its burden of proof.  In 
this case, the only relevant flaw in the PSI is that it fails to 
specifically state that Saunders was convicted on March 22, 
1991, for the Rock County burglary.  Instead, it merely states 
that Saunders had been charged with "PTAC Burglary" for an 
offense that occurred on "09-20-89."  The report follows with an 
explanation of the disposition of the case as "5 Years Wisconsin 
State Prison System to run concurrent with imprisonment in the 
state of Illinois."   
¶65 "PTAC" is a shorthand reference to "Party to a Crime," 
under Wis. Stat. § 939.05.  The copy of the judgment of 
conviction, under the heading "Crime," lists "Party to the Crime 
Burglary."  The date of the crime in the PSI——"09-20-89"——is the 
same as the date——"9-20-89"——listed under "Date Crime Committed" 
in the judgment of conviction.  Although we agree with the State 
that the description of this offense in the PSI plainly refers 
to the offense and conviction reflected in the judgment of 
                                                 
25 We note that, even if the rules of evidence would have 
applied in this case, it is likely that the failure of Saunders' 
counsel to object would have permitted introduction of the prior 
judgment of conviction into evidence. 
No. 01-0271 
32 
 
conviction in the court file, we nevertheless do not conclude 
that the report suffices as prima facie evidence of such 
conviction.  The PSI must state clearly the date of the prior 
conviction if it is to be used as an official government 
document under § 973.12(1).  See Farr, 119 Wis. 2d at 658.  This 
omission ultimately prevents the PSI in this case from being 
treated as an official government agency report entitled to 
prima facie deference under § 973.12(1).  See Caldwell, 154 
Wis. 2d at 693. 
¶66 Nonetheless, while insufficient by itself to prove 
Saunders' 
prior 
Rock 
County 
conviction, 
the 
report 
does 
contribute additional evidence of the existence of Saunders' 
Rock County conviction.  It shows that the offense itself was 
committed less than five years before sentencing.  The record 
also indicates that both parties examined the PSI, and that 
Saunders noted factual discrepancies in the report related to 
other prior convictions but did not raise questions about the 
1991 Rock County burglary conviction.  The court is entitled to 
draw reasonable inferences from the evidence before it. 
¶67 Although only post-trial evidence may be relied upon 
to prove prior convictions, we note that there was discussion 
and acknowledgement of Saunders' prior conviction throughout his 
criminal 
prosecution——literally 
from 
its 
inception. 
 
For 
instance, 
at 
Saunders' 
initial 
appearance, 
the 
court 
commissioner, for purposes of determining bail, inquired into 
the nature and existence of Saunders' prior convictions.  At the 
preliminary hearing eight days later, the State mentioned that 
No. 01-0271 
33 
 
plea negotiations with Saunders' defense counsel had occurred 
under the premise that Saunders would plead guilty as a repeater 
to four of the counts.  One month later at arraignment, Saunders 
reserved the right to challenge what he deemed to be "the 
multiple use of enhancers."  Shortly thereafter, Saunders filed 
a motion to strike any enhancements based on alleged weapons in 
his possession during his commission of the crimes.  However, he 
was completely silent as to the alleged repeater status 
enhancement, even though both sets of enhancers were alleged in 
the Information.  He did not subsequently move to strike the 
enhancements based on repeat offender status.  Finally, in 
response to Saunders' motions for discovery, the State provided 
to him copies of an FBI teletype/arrest record summarizing his 
criminal history in Illinois along with a Chicago Police 
Department report on his criminal history.  At that time, the 
State provided Saunders with a copy of the judgment of 
conviction for his March 22, 1991, Rock County burglary 
conviction, along with other documents related to that offense. 
¶68 Overall, the record is replete with instances showing 
that Saunders and his trial counsel were well aware of the 
State's intent to invoke Saunders' Rock County conviction for 
the purpose of enhancing his sentence.  While this portion of 
the record may not be used as evidence for the State's post-
trial proof requirement, it does strip Saunders' argument of any 
pretense that he was treated unfairly. 
¶69 In sum, based on the totality of the post-trial 
evidence to the court and the reasonable inferences to be drawn 
No. 01-0271 
34 
 
from it, the circuit court properly determined that Saunders 
qualified as a repeat offender under § 939.62 and the court was 
permitted to impose sentence enhancements accordingly. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶70 An uncertified copy of a prior judgment of conviction 
may be used by the state to meet its burden of proving a 
convicted defendant's status as a habitual criminal under 
Wis. Stat. § 939.62. 
 
Wisconsin Stat. § 973.12(1) 
does 
not 
require the use of only certified copies of judgments of 
conviction.  Furthermore, the rules of evidence do not apply to 
documents 
offered 
during 
a 
circuit 
court's 
presentence 
determination of whether a qualifying prior conviction exists.  
However, the state continues to bear the full burden of proof 
and it must offer proof beyond a reasonable doubt of such a 
conviction.  The better practice is to offer certified copies of 
judgments of conviction. 
¶71 The court of appeals erred in concluding that an 
uncertified, yet uncontested, copy of a judgment of conviction 
may not be used by the state under § 973.12(1).  The circuit 
court's proper consideration of the copy of the judgment of 
conviction in the court record, along with the totality of the 
record surrounding this document, supported a finding that the 
State proved the requirements of § 939.62 beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and reinstate the Kenosha County Circuit Court's January 
10, 2001, order denying Saunders' motion for post-conviction 
relief.  
No. 01-0271 
35 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  01-0271.awb 
 
1 
 
¶72 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  This case turns 
on the majority's interpretation of a post-verdict exchange 
between the circuit court and defense counsel.  It interprets 
the exchange as a defense stipulation to the mode of proof for 
prior convictions.  This interpretation is the linchpin of the 
majority opinion.  Without it, the opinion collapses.  Because I 
conclude that the majority improperly recasts a cursory and 
ambiguous exchange into a "precise" stipulation, and erroneously 
determines that a copy of an uncertified judgment of conviction 
is sufficient to prove repeater status, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶73 The 
majority 
concedes 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) 
(1999-2000)26 clearly requires that, absent a personal admission 
                                                 
26 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are 
to 
the 
1999-2000 
version 
unless 
otherwise 
indicated.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 973.12(1) provides in part: 
(1) Whenever a person charged with a crime will 
be a repeater or a persistent repeater under s. 939.62 
if convicted, any applicable prior convictions may be 
alleged in the complaint, indictment or information or 
amendments so alleging at any time before or at 
arraignment, and before acceptance of any plea. The 
court may, upon motion of the district attorney, grant 
a reasonable 
time to 
investigate 
possible 
prior 
convictions before accepting a plea. If the prior 
convictions are admitted by the defendant or proved by 
the state, he or she shall be subject to sentence 
under s. 939.62 unless he or she establishes that he 
or she was pardoned on grounds of innocence for any 
crime necessary to constitute him or her a repeater or 
a persistent repeater. An official report of the 
F.B.I. or any other governmental agency of the United 
States or of this or any other state shall be prima 
facie evidence of any conviction or sentence therein 
reported. 
No.  01-0271.awb 
 
2 
 
by the defendant, the State bears the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt the existence of qualifying prior convictions 
it seeks to use as repeater enhancements.  No one asserts that 
Saunders personally admitted to the prior conviction.  Thus, in 
order to sustain his sentence, the majority must conclude that 
the exchange constitutes a stipulation as to the mode of proving 
the prior conviction. 
¶74 According to the majority, the following exchange 
constitutes a stipulation that is "precise . . . as to the 
existence of [prior conviction] evidence."  Majority op at ¶60.  
The majority also opines that the exchange clearly demonstrates 
the circuit court expressing 1) that an uncertified copy of a 
prior judgment of conviction was in the file; and 2) that the 
State was proffering the copy to meet its burden of proof under 
Wis. Stat. 973.12(1).  Majority op. at ¶61.  I conclude that the 
majority is overreaching in its interpretation and set forth the 
exchange for the reader to decide: 
THE COURT: 
The 
Information 
alleges 
that 
the 
defendant is a repeat offender, having been convicted 
of [a] felony on March 22, 1991, at Rock County, 
Wisconsin, and there is a judgment of conviction, as a 
matter of fact in the file.  Is there any dispute that 
that is the fact? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No.  I believe that there is a 
conviction in Rock County and another one in Illinois, 
so that the repeater aspects of it is not in dispute. 
THE COURT: 
Is not in dispute is that what you 
said? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Is not in dispute. 
THE COURT: 
Accordingly I find that the defendant 
is a repeat offender under our law. . . .  
No.  01-0271.awb 
 
3 
 
¶75 Was 
this 
exchange 
"precise"? 
 
Does 
it 
clearly 
demonstrate the introduction of evidence by the State sufficient 
to meet its burden of proof under § 973.12(1)?  I do not think 
so, and I am not alone. 
¶76 The circuit court did not think so.  In denying 
Saunders' postconviction motion, the circuit court referred only 
to the sentencing hearing, the presentence investigation report 
(PSI) before the court at the hearing, and a conviction in the 
PSI that was "acknowledged as factual" at that hearing. 
¶77 The court of appeals did not think so.  It construed 
the exchange as an admission by defense counsel, which was 
insufficient to satisfy the personal admission requirement of 
§ 973.12(1). 
¶78 Even the State apparently did not think so, at least 
not until it raised the argument for the first time in this 
court.  In its brief to the court of appeals, the State 
acknowledged that the "not in dispute" statement by Saunders' 
counsel was in reference to the fact of conviction, not to 
whether the file contained a copy of a judgment of conviction. 
¶79 I think the record speaks for itself.  The exchange 
was not the "precise and correct" inquiry the majority terms it. 
¶80 If this exchange is a stipulation to the mode of 
proof, then it is no longer clear what difference remains 
between a stipulation to mode of proof and an admission by 
defense counsel, which is barred under § 973.12(1).  To 
interpret the exchange as does the majority is to render 
No.  01-0271.awb 
 
4 
 
meaningless the requirement that an admission by the defendant 
for purposes of § 973.12(1) be personal to the defendant. 
¶81 Given the weakness of its reliance on this "not in 
dispute" exchange, the majority opinion seeks to bolster its 
conclusion by reference to other information in the record, 
although it acknowledges the inadequacy of this information as 
proof under § 973.12(1).  It bases its conclusion on the 
totality of the evidence and couches its review of the circuit 
court's finding of repeater status in terms of "reasonableness."  
Majority op. at ¶¶53, 63-64. 
¶82 Specifically, the majority references both the PSI and 
the pretrial record in support of the circuit court's finding of 
repeater status.  However, as the majority must concede, neither 
the PSI nor the pretrial history qualifies as proof sufficient 
for purposes of § 973.12(1).  The PSI does not indicate the date 
of conviction and consequently, it does not qualify as an 
"official report" under § 973.12(1).  See State v. Caldwell, 154 
Wis. 2d 683, 693-94, 454 N.W.2d 13 (Ct. App. 1990).  Also, as 
the majority concedes, the pretrial record does not support a 
finding that the State met its post-trial proof requirement.  
Majority op. at ¶68. 
¶83 Despite these concessions, the majority concludes that 
based on the totality of the evidence and the "reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from it," the circuit court properly 
determined that Saunders was a repeater.  Majority op. at ¶69.  
It thereby applies a sort of "new math" for proving repeater 
status in which zero (the purported stipulation) plus zero (the 
No.  01-0271.awb 
 
5 
 
PSI) plus zero (the pretrial record) equals beyond a reasonable 
doubt for purposes of § 973.12(1). 
¶84 I apply the old math under which zero plus zero plus 
zero still equals zero.  The State failed to offer evidence in 
support of its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt under 
§ 973.12(1). 
II 
¶85 Unlike the majority, I would interpret § 973.12(1) to 
require that a copy of a judgment of conviction be certified.  
Several considerations lead me to this conclusion:  (1) the 
seriousness of the liberty interest at stake, (2) a comparison 
to the form of proof necessary in other repeater contexts, and 
(3) good public policy. 
¶86 The majority goes to great lengths to determine 
whether the proceeding at which the State proves repeater status 
is more like part of a trial or more like sentencing.  In doing 
so, it acknowledges that proof of prior convictions "directly 
affects the sentence . . . and thus affects a major liberty 
interest."  Majority op. at ¶49.  Ultimately, however, it 
concludes that proof of repeater status "fits much better with 
the process of sentencing."  Majority op. at ¶46. 
¶87 I disagree.  The serious liberty interest at stake 
tips the scales in favor of requiring more formal methods of 
proof like those required at trial.  The requirement under 
§ 973.12(1) that proof be beyond a reasonable doubt reinforces 
my conclusion, contrary to the majority, that proof of repeater 
status does not fit "much better" with sentencing. 
No.  01-0271.awb 
 
6 
 
¶88 The effect of a finding of repeater status is more 
like that of an element of a crime that goes to the grade of a 
crime than it is like that of a sentencing factor.  It may 
significantly 
increase 
the 
defendant's 
maximum 
criminal 
exposure.  Here, for example, a finding of repeater status 
increased Saunders' maximum exposure from 40 to 60 years in 
prison.  
¶89 Professor 
LaFave 
explains 
that many 
states 
have 
recognized the serious liberty interest at stake:  "In light of 
the effect of [repeater] statutes in extending the defendant's 
term beyond the maximum allowed for the offense of conviction, a 
substantial 
number 
of 
jurisdictions 
impose 
more 
formal 
procedures for determining repeat-offender status."  Wayne R. 
LaFave, 5 Criminal Procedure § 26.6(b), p. 799 (2d ed. 1999). 
¶90 Wisconsin is one of these jurisdictions.  In light of 
the liberty interest involved, the purpose of § 973.12(1) is to 
require formal proof of repeater allegations.  See State v. 
Koeppen, 195 Wis. 2d 117, 131, 536 N.W.2d 386 (Ct. App. 1995).  
What could be more consistent with a formal proof requirement 
than requiring a copy of a judgment of conviction to be 
certified? 
¶91 Section 973.12(1) 
should 
also be 
interpreted to 
require a certified copy based on previous case law addressing 
repeater 
status 
in 
other 
contexts. 
 
The 
majority's 
interpretation is at odds with this precedent. 
¶92 In State v. Wideman, 206 Wis. 2d 91, 556 N.W.2d 737 
(1996), and State v. Spaeth, 206 Wis. 2d 135, 556 N.W.2d 728 
No.  01-0271.awb 
 
7 
 
(1996), this court addressed repeater status in the context of 
OWI and OAR.  Those cases established that § 973.12(1) does not 
apply to OWI and OAR repeater status and that the State carries 
a lower burden in proving OWI and OAR repeater status than the 
burden required under § 973.12(1).  Wideman, 206 Wis. 2d at 102; 
Spaeth, 206 Wis. 2d at 146-47.  The majority recognizes, as it 
must, that the proof requirement for OWI and OAR "remains less 
imposing 
than 
the 
proof 
requirement 
under 
§ 973.12(1)."  
Majority op. at ¶33. 
¶93 What the majority does not recognize is that in 
Spaeth, the court 
specifically outlined three 
alternative 
minimum proof requirements in OAR cases.  See 206 Wis. 2d at 
153.  The court indicated that one of the alternatives was a 
copy of the judgment of conviction; the court did not specify 
that the copy must be certified.27  Id.  It is difficult to 
reconcile this rule from Spaeth with the majority's rule that an 
uncertified copy is sufficient under § 973.12(1).  How can the 
minimum proof sufficient to meet the lower standard also be 
sufficient to meet the higher standard?  Tellingly, the majority 
does not answer this question. 
¶94 Finally, an interpretation of § 973.12(1) to require 
that a copy of the judgment be certified is good public policy.  
The court of appeals stated eight years ago: 
In 
recent 
times, 
this 
court 
has 
seen 
a 
substantial number of cases involving pleading and 
                                                 
27 The other two alternatives given were (1) an admission, 
and (2) a teletype from the Department of Transportation.  State 
v. Spaeth, 206 Wis. 2d 135, 153, 556 N.W.2d 728 (1996). 
No.  01-0271.awb 
 
8 
 
proof issues under the repeater statute.  We are aware 
of 
the 
heavy 
burdens 
and 
caseloads 
confronting 
prosecutors.  However, correctly pleading and proving 
a prior conviction for purposes of obtaining an 
enhanced sentence does not strike us as a particularly 
onerous or complicated prosecutorial task.  
State v. Goldstein, 182 Wis. 2d 251, 261, 513 N.W.2d 631 (Ct. 
App. 1994).  Shortly thereafter, the court of appeals repeated a 
similar admonition, see Koeppen, 195 Wis. 2d at 130-31, and this 
court has as well, see Wideman, 206 Wis. 2d at 108.  Similarly, 
the majority now "strongly urge[s]" prosecutors to acquire 
certified copies of judgments "to avoid unnecessary proof 
problems."28  Majority op. at ¶55. 
¶95 In light of the serious liberty interests at stake, 
our previous cases addressing repeater status in the OWI and OAR 
context, and good public policy, I conclude that an uncertified 
copy of a judgment of conviction is insufficient to prove 
repeater status beyond a reasonable doubt in accordance with 
§ 973.12(1).  I would stop urging and start requiring. 
III 
¶96 Unlike the majority, I conclude that the cursory and 
ambiguous post-verdict exchange was not a "precise" stipulation 
that clearly demonstrated the State was proffering evidence in 
support of its burden of proof.  I also conclude that an 
uncertified copy of a judgment of conviction is insufficient to 
prove repeater status beyond a reasonable doubt as required by 
§ 973.12(1).  Because I determine that the State failed to meet 
                                                 
28 The majority recognizes that this court and the court of 
appeals have similarly implored prosecutors in the past, yet 
apparently continues to believe that urging is sufficient. 
No.  01-0271.awb 
 
9 
 
its burden of proof under § 973.12(1), I conclude that Saunders' 
sentence was greater than that authorized by law.  When a court 
imposes a sentence greater than that authorized by law, the 
excess portion of the sentence is void and commuted without 
further proceedings.  Spaeth, 206 Wis. 2d at 155-56 (citing 
Wis. Stat. § 973.13); see also Koeppen, 195 Wis. 2d at 131. 
¶97 I would affirm the court of appeals decision, which 
remanded to the circuit court to vacate the repeater portion of 
Saunders' conviction and to enter a new judgment of conviction 
reflecting 
a 
sentence 
without 
the 
repeater 
enhancement.  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
¶98 I am authorized to state that SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, 
CHIEF JUSTICE joins this dissent. 
 
 
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1