Title: Moultrie v. Wall, II
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1111507
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: September 13, 2013

Rel: 9/13/13
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2013
____________________
1111507
____________________
Frank A. Moultrie
v.
Charles O. Wall II and Autauga Automotive, LLC
Appeal from Autauga Circuit Court
(CV-11-900263)
BRYAN, Justice.
Frank A. Moultrie appeals from a judgment of the Autauga
Circuit Court assessing attorney fees and costs to Moultrie
after finding him in contempt for violating the terms of a
1111507
temporary restraining order ("TRO") entered by the circuit
court.  We dismiss the appeal in part and affirm the judgment.
Procedural History
On December 1, 2011, Charles O. Wall II, individually and
as the manager of Autauga Automotive, LLC ("Autauga
Automotive"), and Autauga Automotive sued Moultrie, seeking a
TRO, a preliminary injunction, and a judgment declaring
Moultrie's 
and 
Wall's 
respective 
rights 
in 
Autauga 
Automotive. 
In the complaint, Wall and Autauga Automotive (hereinafter
referred to collectively as "the plaintiffs") asserted that
Autauga Automotive was created to own and operate an
automobile dealership in Prattville ("the dealership").  Wall
and Moultrie are the only members of Autauga Automotive, and
Wall was the general manager of the dealership, which sells
vehicles manufactured by Ford Motor Company ("Ford").  
The complaint alleged that the operating agreement
pertaining to Autauga Automotive was amended on August 20,
2009, to reflect that Moultrie owned 51% and Wall owned 49% of
the capital of Autauga Automotive, that they would share any
profits and losses in the same percentages, and that Wall was
the manager and the registered agent of Autauga Automotive. 
2
1111507
The complaint further alleged that on or about December 15,
2009, Wall and Moultrie met the comptroller and the certified
public accountant for Autauga Automotive to discuss, among
other things, tax planning and the allocation of profits and
losses.  During that meeting, the plaintiffs allege, Wall and
Moultrie orally agreed that the profits and losses of Autauga
Automotive for 2009 were to be allocated 90% to Wall and 10%
to Moultrie.   The plaintiffs alleged that the profits and
1
losses of Autauga Automotive were allocated to Moultrie and
Wall in the same manner in 2010.  
On November 21, 2011, Wall received notice from Moultrie
of a special meeting of the members of Autauga Automotive to
be conducted on December 5, 2011.  The proposed agenda for
that meeting included removing Wall as the manager of Autauga
Automotive, removing Wall as the general manager of the
dealership, and discussing the sale of Autauga Automotive or
its assets.  
The 
plaintiffs 
attached 
affidavits 
from 
Autauga
1
Automotive's comptroller and certified public accountant
verifying the plaintiffs' rendition of the facts in the
complaint regarding Moultrie's and Wall's agreement in
December 2009 to allocate 90% of Autauga Automotive's profits
and losses to Wall and the remaining 10% of the profits and
losses to Moultrie.
3
1111507
The plaintiffs sought a TRO preventing Moultrie from
holding the December 5 meeting, preventing him from making any
attempt to sell Autauga Automotive or its assets, and
preventing him from taking any actions that would be
detrimental to Autauga Automotive, the dealership, or Wall. 
The plaintiffs also sought a judgment declaring that Wall's
interest in the profits and losses of Autauga Automotive was
90%, that Wall was the "majority in interest" member of
Autauga Automotive, and that Moultrie lacked the 
authority to,
among other things, remove Wall as the general manager of the
dealership.  The plaintiffs alleged that, pursuant to Autauga
Automotive's operating agreement, Wall possessed the majority
interest in Autauga Automotive because, they alleged, 
he 
owned
a 90% interest in the profits and losses of Autauga Automotive
and, thus, controlled the voting interests of Autauga
Automotive.  The plaintiffs alleged that Moultrie was under
the mistaken belief that his 51% interest in the capital of
Autauga Automotive gave him the majority interest in Autauga
Automotive.
The plaintiffs further alleged that Wall, Autauga
Automotive, 
Autauga 
Automotive's 
employees, 
and 
the 
dealership
4
1111507
would suffer immediate and irreparable harm if Moultrie was
allowed to take the actions set forth in the notice provided
to Wall.  They alleged that Wall had successfully and
profitably 
managed 
Autauga 
Automotive 
and 
the 
dealership 
since
Autauga Automotive's inception, that Wall was the contact
person in all dealings with Ford, and that any interruption in
Wall's dealings with Ford would directly jeopardize Autauga
Automotive's agreements with Ford and the ability of the
dealership to do business as a Ford dealership.  The
plaintiffs set forth several reasons why Ford was unlikely to
approve Moultrie as the new general manager of the dealership
and alleged that the removal of Wall as the manger of Autauga
Automotive and as the general manger of the dealership would
cause "the current profitability of both to significantly
decrease, [would cause] damage [to] Autauga Automotive's
relationship with Ford[,] and [would] likely cause a mass
departure of employees."  
On December 2, 2011, the circuit court entered a TRO
enjoining Moultrie, or anyone acting on his behalf, from
holding a special meeting of the members of Autauga Automotive
and taking the actions set forth in the notice sent to Wall,
5
1111507
from taking any action to sell Autauga Automotive or its
assets, or from taking "any further actions that are
detrimental to the best interest of Autauga Automotive, ...
the automotive dealership arrangement held by it[,] or ...
Wall."  The circuit court scheduled a hearing on the
plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction for December
12, 2011.
On December 9, 2011, Moultrie removed the action to the
United States District Court for the Middle District of
Alabama.  On December 12, 2011, the day the TRO was to expire,
United States District Judge Keith Watkins remanded the case,
sua sponte, to the circuit court, concluding that the federal
court did not have jurisdiction over the action.   That same
2
day, the plaintiffs moved the circuit court to extend the TRO
based on the federal court's remand order.  On December 13,
the 
circuit 
court 
scheduled 
the 
preliminary-injunction 
hearing
for the following day.  On December 14, the circuit court
entered an order, based on an agreement of the parties,
Judge Watkins noted in his remand order that he would
2
entertain a motion for costs, attorney fees, or other
appropriate sanctions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) as a
result of the improper removal of the action. The record on
appeal does not indicate whether the plaintiffs filed such a
motion in the federal court.
6
1111507
stating that the TRO entered on December 2 remained in effect
pending further orders of the court.
On January 3, 2012, Moultrie filed an answer and a
counterclaim.  
Moultrie alleged, among 
other 
things, 
that Wall
had breached fiduciary duties he owed Autauga Automotive as
its manager and that Wall had breached the operating agreement
of Autauga Automotive.  Moultrie also sought a preliminary
injunction seeking, among other things, to prohibit Autauga
Automotive from paying Wall anything except his monthly
salary.  Moultrie also moved the circuit court to dismiss any
claim brought by Autauga Automotive.  In his motion to
dismiss, Moultrie alleged that, because Moultrie owned a 51%
majority interest in Autauga Automotive, Wall lacked standing
to bring suit on behalf of Autauga Automotive without
Moultrie's approval or consent.
On February 13, 2012, Wall filed a petition seeking to
hold Moultrie in contempt for violating the terms of the TRO. 
Wall alleged that "certain important documents ha[d] been
removed 
without 
proper 
authorization 
from 
the 
... 
dealership."
Wall alleged that the documents, which were required by Ford
to be maintained at all times on the dealership's premises,
7
1111507
were missing; that those documents had been removed by an
employee "believed to be in contact, and working at the
direction and in concert, with [Moultrie]"; that Wall's
counsel had informed Moultrie's counsel of the missing
documents and had expressed concern that Moultrie was in
possession of the documents; that, subsequently, Moultrie's
counsel had represented to Wall's counsel that the documents
in question would be returned to the dealership the following
day; that a courier from one of Moultrie's businesses had
brought copies of some of, but not all, the missing documents
to the dealership; and that no additional documents had been
returned since February 3, 2012. Wall requested an award of
costs for filing the motion and an award of damages to prevent
further violations of the TRO.  
On February 21, 2012, the plaintiffs amended their
complaint, adding a claim to enforce a "letter of intent"
signed by Moultrie and acknowledged by Wall in October 2011
indicating that Moultrie intended to sell his interest in
Autauga Automotive.  The circuit court entered an order on
February 22, 2012, indicating that the parties were working
together to arrive at a mutually agreeable temporary
8
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arrangement.  On February 27, 2012, the circuit court entered
an amended TRO, based on an agreement of the parties, that was
to remain in effect pending further order of the court.  The
amended TRO left in place the terms of the original TRO, but
it also prohibited the plaintiffs from, among other things,
paying any amount to Wall other than a rental payment and his
monthly salary, incurring non-business-related debts in the
name of Autauga Automotive, causing Autauga Automotive to pay
or incur legal fees in the prosecution of this action after
February 22, 2012, and taking any actions that were
detrimental to the interests of Autauga Automotive, the
dealership, or Moultrie.
On March 20, 2012, the day before the final hearing in
this matter was scheduled to take place, all four attorneys
representing Moultrie filed a motion for leave to withdraw
from the case.  The same day, Wall filed a second petition
seeking to hold Moultrie in contempt for violating the TRO and
the amended TRO.  Wall alleged that Moultrie had admitted in
his deposition that he had contacted Ford to report warranty
fraud occurring at the dealership and that, as a result of
that report to Ford, Autauga Automotive had incurred
9
1111507
"significant financial penalties."  Wall alleged that the
dealership had been penalized by Ford because of the missing
documents that had been removed from the premises of the
dealership at Moultrie's direction.  Wall also alleged that
Moultrie had disregarded a March 15, 2012, order of the
circuit court that had required him to provide the plaintiffs
any and all financial documents or records involving him,
Autauga Automotive, and the dealership by March 16, 2012. 
Further, Wall alleged that, in violation of the TRO and
without Wall's knowledge or permission, Moultrie had entered
into a written agreement to sell "100%" of Autauga Automotive
to Sansing Holdings, LLC, and that Moultrie had assigned the
right to the proceeds of the sale to Citizens Bank & Trust of
Guntersville as collateral for a loan to Moultrie Nissan, a
separate automobile dealership in which Moultrie possessed an
ownership interest.  The circuit court allowed Moultrie's
attorneys to withdraw and postponed the final hearing that had
been scheduled for March 21.
On May 1, 2012, Moultrie filed a motion seeking the
return of funds of Autauga Automotive and a petition seeking
to hold Wall in contempt. Moultrie alleged that Wall had used
10
1111507
dealership funds to pay his personal income taxes in violation
of the amended TRO.  On May 22, 2012, Moultrie filed a second
petition for contempt and a second motion seeking the return
of funds, alleging that Wall had violated the terms of the
amended TRO by paying his attorney fees using funds from
Autauga Automotive. 
After conducting a hearing, the circuit court entered a
judgment on May 29, 2012, finding Moultrie in contempt for
violating the TRO and the amended TRO based on his having
entered into a "sales agreement" with Sansing Holdings, LLC,
and having pledged the right to the proceeds from that sale as
security for a loan from the Citizens Bank & Trust of
Guntersville.  The circuit court also found Moultrie in
contempt for causing Ford to conduct an audit of the
dealership, which audit resulted in a penalty being assessed
against the dealership as a result, in part, of the absence of
documents that were removed from the dealership at Moultrie's
instructions.  The circuit court ordered Moultrie to pay the
dealership $25,000, which was the penalty assessed 
against 
the
dealership by Ford.  Moultrie was also ordered to pay Wall's
attorney fees and costs incurred from February 22, 2012,
11
1111507
through May 29, 2012.   The court stated that it would enter
3
further orders setting forth the amount to be paid by Moultrie
after Wall's counsel submitted their bills and costs to the
court. In a separate judgment entered on May 29, 2012, the
circuit court denied Moultrie's motions seeking the return of
funds and his petitions seeking to hold Wall in contempt.  
On June 21, 2012, the circuit court entered a judgment
assessing $132,345.57 in attorney fees and costs against
Moultrie.  The circuit court's June 21, 2012, judgment
"specifically assessing attorney fees and costs" provided:
"In this Court's order of May 29, 2012, in which
it found Defendant Frank Moultrie in [c]ontempt, the
[c]ourt assessed [Wall]'s attorney fees and costs
incurred from February 22, 2012, through May 29,
2012, against Mr. Moultrie.
"The Court has now had the opportunity to review
itemized statements and cost bills presented by
[Wall]'s counsel as well as the affidavit of
Attorney 
Simeon 
Penton 
attesting 
to 
the
reasonableness of the attorney fees incurred. The
[c]ourt finds that the fees and expenses incurred
are reasonable for the work performed in the
prosecution of the [p]etitions for [c]ontempt which
were filed and prosecuted against Frank Moultrie.
The circuit court's contempt judgment instructs Moultrie
3
to pay "the plaintiff's" attorney fees and costs. Because the
petitions for contempt were filed by Wall, we assume that the
circuit court was referring solely to Wall when it awarded
those fees.
12
1111507
"It is therefore [o]rdered that Frank Moultrie
shall pay the following on or before August 24,
2012:
"Hawthorne & Meyers, LLC -- attorney fees and
expenses of $10,546.62 plus costs incurred for Dr.
Richard Roper of $2450.00;[4]
"Law Office of George P. Walthall, Jr. --
attorney fees and expenses of $38,538.30;
"Capell & Howard, P.C. -- attorney fees and
expenses of $80,335.65 plus costs of $475.00
incurred 
for 
Research 
Services 
Investigative
Specialists.
"The Court 
has not 
assessed 
expenses 
for 
Jackson
& Thornton at this time as it cannot determine
whether its bill is directly related to the contempt
issues.[5]
As a defense to Wall's contempt petitions, Moultrie
4
alleged that, without his knowledge, his brother Steve had
signed his name to the sales agreement with Sansing Holdings,
LLC, and that Steve had obtained a loan on behalf of Moultrie
Nissan by pledging the right to the proceeds of the sale of
Autauga Automotive as collateral for the loan. Roper is a
handwriting expert who was used by Wall during the hearing on
the contempt petitions to show that Moultrie, and not his
brother Steve, had signed the sales agreement with Sansing
Holdings, LLC.
The record indicates that Jackson & Thornton is a
5
professional corporation that employs certified public
accountants. The circuit court's contempt judgment required
Moultrie to pay Wall's attorney fees and costs and ordered
Wall's counsel to submit their bills and costs to the court. 
Neither party contends that a possible future award to Jackson
& Thornton renders the circuit court's assessment of attorney
fees and costs nonfinal. 
13
1111507
"It is further [o]rdered that the itemized
attorney fees and expenses submitted to the [c]ourt
for in camera review shall be filed and kept 'under
seal' pending further orders of this [c]ourt." 
On June 29, 2012, Moultrie filed a "motion to reconsider"
the assessment of attorney fees.   On July 9, 2012, the
6
circuit 
court 
entered 
an 
order 
denying 
Moultrie's 
postjudgment
motion, stating that it had relied on its experience in
setting the attorney-fee award and that the attorney fees and
costs Moultrie had been ordered to pay as a result of his
contempt and his failure to follow the court's orders were
"extremely appropriate under the circumstances."  Moultrie
filed a notice of appeal on August 19, 2012.  On appeal,
Moultrie challenges parts of the May 29, 2012, contempt
judgment as well as the June 21, 2012, judgment assessing
attorney fees and costs.7
Jurisdiction
"While the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure do not speak
6
of a 'motion to reconsider,' this Court has repeatedly
construed motions so styled, when they have been filed within
30 days after the entry of a final judgment, to be Rule
59(e)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] motions." Evans v. Waddell, 689 So.
2d 23, 26-27 (Ala. 1997).
Moultrie does challenge on appeal that aspect of the May
7
29, 2012, contempt judgment that required him to pay the
dealership $25,000.
14
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Rule 70A(g)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides that a contempt
adjudication is reviewable by appeal.  This Court has
previously reviewed a contempt adjudication by appeal even
though there had not been a final judgment on the merits in
the underlying proceeding. See Gilbert v. Nicholson, 845 So.
2d 785 (Ala. 2002).  Moreover, the circuit court's failure to
adjudicate the amount of the attorney fees to be awarded Wall
did not affect the finality of the contempt adjudication. See
State Bd. of Educ. v. Waldrop, 840 So. 2d 893, 899 (Ala. 2002)
(citing Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 199-
200 (1988)) ("[A] decision on the merits disposing of all
claims is a final decision from which an appeal must be timely
taken, whether a request for attorney fees remains for
adjudication."); and R.J.G. v. S.S.W., 42 So. 3d 747, 750 n.1
(Ala. Civ. App. 2009) (holding that the trial court's judgment
finding the father in contempt was final and appealable even
though the trial court had determined, in that judgment, that
the mother was due an award of attorney fees but had not
determined the amount of attorney fees the mother should be
awarded). Cf. Eagerton v. Vision Bank, 99 So. 3d 299, 303
(Ala. 2012) (concluding that a summary-judgment order was
15
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final and appealable despite the fact that the trial court
reserved jurisdiction to determine the appropriate amount of
attorney fees and costs owed to one of the parties).
However, the timeliness of an appeal affects this Court's
jurisdiction to consider the appeal.  Therefore, we first
consider whether Moultrie's appeal, insofar as it challenges
parts of the May 29, 2012, contempt judgment, is timely. See
Miller Props., LLC v. Green, 958 So. 2d 850, 851-52 (Ala.
2006) (holding that an untimely filed postjudgment 
motion 
does
not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal and that this
Court has no jurisdiction over an untimely filed appeal).
Moultrie did not file a postjudgment motion within 30
days of the circuit court's entry of the contempt judgment on
May 29, 2012.   See Rule 59(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.  Thus, he was
8
required to file his notice of appeal from the contempt
judgment within 42 days of its entry on May 29, 2012, i.e., on
or before July 10, 2012. See Rule 4(a)(1), Ala. R. App. P. 
Moultrie did not file a notice of appeal until August 19,
To the extent that Moultrie's postjudgment "motion to
8
reconsider," which was filed on June 29, 2012, can be
construed as a challenge to the contempt judgment entered on
May 29, 2012, that motion was filed 31 days after the contempt
judgment was entered.
16
1111507
2012.  Accordingly, insofar as any aspect of Moultrie's appeal
challenges the contempt judgment entered on May 29, 2012, the
appeal is untimely and is due to be dismissed.   Furthermore,
9
Notably, Moultrie argued in response to Wall's motion to
9
dismiss Moultrie's appeal to this Court that his "appeal
arises from the trial court's order of June 21, 2012, wherein
the trial court ordered [Moultrie] to pay $132,435.57 in
attorney's fees plus other expenses for work performed by the
appellee's attorneys."  He further represented to this Court
that "there is nothing in the May 29, 2012, order to appeal."
However, in his brief on appeal Moultrie challenges the
circuit court's May 29, 2012, judgment to the extent that it
required him to pay the dealership $25,000. Moultrie argues
that because, he says, he owns a majority interest in Autauga
Automotive, Wall did not have "standing" to bring suit on
behalf of Autauga Automotive and, thus, the circuit court
lacked jurisdiction over Autauga Automotive.  
Although phrased as a "standing" issue, this is really an
issue relating to Wall's "capacity" to sue on behalf of
Autauga Automotive. It is undisputed between the parties that
the majority member of Autauga Automotive, which issue has yet
to be resolved by the circuit court, may bring suit on behalf
of Autauga Automotive.  Questions as to capacity are not
jurisdictional in nature. 
See 
Penick v. Most Worshipful Prince
Hall Grand Lodge F & AM of Alabama, Inc., 46 So. 3d 416, 425
(Ala. 2010) (noting that "a capacity defense ... does not per
se implicate standing and subject-matter jurisdiction"). See
also Ex parte Tyson Foods, Inc., [Ms. 1110931, May 24, 2013]
___ 
So. 
3d 
___, 
___ 
(Ala. 
2013) 
(discussing 
"the
standing/capacity dichotomy"). Accordingly, there is no need
to address that argument at this time.  Moreover, the question
of Wall's status as the majority-interest holder in Autauga
Automotive is at the heart of the underlying action.  Wall
sought a judgment declaring Wall's and Moultrie's respective
interests in Autauga Automotive, and the circuit court has not
yet ruled on Wall's request for a declaratory judgment.
Because this issue goes to the merits of the underlying
action, because capacity 
is 
not a jurisdictional question, and
17
1111507
to the extent that Moultrie challenges the circuit court's
amended TRO, which was entered by agreement of the parties on
February 27, 2012, the time for appealing that order had long
passed when Moultrie filed his notice of appeal on August 19,
2012. See Rule 4(a)(1)(A), Ala. R. App. P.  Thus, we dismiss
Moultrie's appeal insofar as it relates to the May 29, 2012,
contempt judgment or the February 27, 2012, TRO.
However, Moultrie filed a timely postjudgment motion
challenging the circuit court's June 21, 2012, judgment
assessing attorney fees and costs against Moultrie, which
suspended the time for appealing that judgment. See Rule
4(a)(3), Ala. R. App. P.  Because Moultrie filed his notice of
appeal within 42 days from the date his postjudgment motion
was denied, this Court has jurisdiction to consider the
propriety of the June 21, 2012, judgment assessing attorney
fees and costs against Moultrie. Rule 4(a)(1) and (3), Ala. R.
App. P.
Propriety of the Award of Attorney Fees
because this Court has jurisdiction to consider only the
narrow issue of attorney fees and costs assessed against
Moultrie based on the contempt petitions filed and prosecuted
by Wall, there is no need to consider this argument further.
18
1111507
Moultrie argues that the circuit court exceeded its
discretion by assessing what he says is an unreasonable amount
of attorney fees against him.  
"The 
determination 
of 
whether 
an 
attorney 
fee 
is
reasonable is within the sound discretion of the
trial court and its determination on such an issue
will not be disturbed on appeal unless in awarding
the fee the trial court exceeded that discretion.
State Bd. of Educ. v. Waldrop, 840 So. 2d 893, 896
(Ala. 2002); City of Birmingham v. Horn, 810 So. 2d
667, 681–82 (Ala. 2001); Ex parte Edwards, 601 So.
2d 82, 85 (Ala. 1992), citing Varner v. Century Fin.
Co., 738 F.2d 1143 (11th Cir. 1984).
"This Court has set forth 12 criteria a court
might consider when determining the reasonableness
of an attorney fee:
"'(1) [T]he nature and value of the subject
matter of the employment; (2) the learning,
skill, and labor requisite to its proper
discharge; (3) the time consumed; (4) the
professional experience and reputation of
the attorney; (5) the weight of his
responsibilities; 
(6) 
the 
measure 
of
success 
achieved; 
(7) 
the 
reasonable
expenses incurred; (8) whether a fee is
fixed or contingent; (9) the nature and
length 
of 
a 
professional 
relationship; 
(10)
the fee customarily charged in the locality
for similar legal services; (11) the
likelihood 
that 
a 
particular 
employment 
may
preclude other employment; and (12) the
time limitations imposed by the client or
by the circumstances.'
"Van Schaack v. AmSouth Bank, N.A., 530 So. 2d 740,
749 (Ala. 1988). These criteria are for purposes of
evaluating whether an attorney fee is reasonable;
19
1111507
they are not an exhaustive list of specific criteria
that must all be met. Beal Bank v. Schilleci, 896
So. 2d 395, 403 (Ala. 2004), citing Graddick v.
First Farmers & Merchants Nat'l Bank of Troy, 453
So. 2d 1305, 1311 (Ala. 1984).
"We defer to the trial court in an attorney-fee
case because we recognize that the trial court,
which has presided over the entire litigation, has
a superior understanding of the factual questions
that 
must 
be 
resolved 
in 
an 
attorney-fee
determination. Horn, 810 So. 2d at 681–82, citing
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437, 103 S.Ct.
1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). Nevertheless, a trial
court's order regarding an attorney fee must allow
for meaningful appellate review by articulating the
decisions 
made, 
the 
reasons 
supporting 
those
decisions, and how it calculated the attorney fee.
Horn, 810 So. 2d at 682, citing American Civil
Liberties Union of Georgia v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423,
427 (11th Cir. 1999); see also Hensley, 461 U.S. at
437, 103 S.Ct. 1933."
Pharmacia Corp. v. McGowan, 915 So. 2d 549, 552-53 (Ala.
2004).
Moultrie argues that the circuit court's June 21, 2012,
judgment lacks the required specificity to allow for
meaningful appellate review.  Specifically, he contends that
the judgment should be reversed because, he says, there is no
indication that the circuit court considered each of the 12
factors set forth in Pharmacia.  According to Moultrie, the
record indicates that the circuit court considered only 3 of
the 12 factors: the amount of time consumed, the success
20
1111507
achieved, and the reasonable expenses incurred. To support
reversal on this basis, Moultrie relies on this Court's
decision in Peebles v. Miley, 439 So. 2d 137, 141 (Ala. 1983),
in which this Court stated that "all of the criteria set forth
above[, 
i.e., 
the 
12 
factors 
for 
determining 
the
reasonableness of an attorney fee,] must be taken into
consideration by the trier of the facts in determining a
proper counsel fee."
The record, which includes the affidavit of Simeon
Penton, an attorney who testified as to the reasonableness of
the attorney fees incurred, indicates that the circuit court
considered evidence concerning both the fees customarily
charged in the locality for similar legal services and the
labor requisite to the proper discharge of the subject matter
of the employment, in addition to evidence concerning the
amount of time consumed, the measure of success achieved, and
the reasonable expenses incurred; moreover, as set forth in
the 
order denying 
Moultrie's postjudgment 
"motion to
reconsider," the circuit court relied upon its own experience
in setting attorney fees.  Although the judgment assessing
attorney fees does not expressly state that the circuit court
21
1111507
considered each of the 12 factors set out in Pharmacia,
Moultrie has failed to affirmatively demonstrate that the
circuit court did not take into consideration all the
pertinent criteria for determining the reasonableness of an
attorney fee.  "[W]e are governed by the long-standing, well-
established rule that the appellant has an affirmative duty of
showing error upon the record." Tucker v. Nichols, 431 So. 2d
1263, 1264 (Ala. 1983).  Moreover, as this Court stated in
Pharmacia, the 12 factors are factors that "a court might
consider when determining the reasonableness of an attorney
fee," 915 So. 2d at 552 (emphasis added), but the 12 factors
"are not an exhaustive list of specific criteria that must all
be met." 915 So. 2d at 553.  Accordingly, we will not reverse
the circuit court's judgment on the sole basis that it does
not, on its face, specifically indicate that it considered
each of the 12 Pharmacia factors.
Moultrie further argues that the circuit court's judgment
lacks the required specificity because neither the judgment
nor the record provides an account of the time spent by Wall's
attorneys on the contempt issues. In Madison 
County 
Department
of Human Resources v. T.S., 53 So. 3d 38 (Ala. 2009), this
22
1111507
Court remanded a case in which the trial court had entered a
judgment assessing attorney fees and instructed the trial
court to enter an order "explaining its decision and
articulating its reasons for that decision." 53 So. 3d at 45. 
In that case, the trial court had assessed a fee of $262,500,
which was 33 1/3% of the attorney's recovery for his minor
client. In its judgment assessing the attorney fee, the trial
court held: "'Based upon the evidence, the [c]ourt concludes
that the attorney fees and expenses sought by counsel are
just, fair and equitable for the service he has rendered.'"
Id. at 43.  The evidence presented to the trial court to
support the attorney fee was an affidavit from the attorney in
question, as well as two affidavits from local attorneys who
stated that, in their opinions, the attorney fee of $262,500
was reasonable. Id.  
This Court held:
"[T]he trial court's order approving an attorney fee
in the amount of $262,500 plus litigation expenses
in the amount of $29,315.99 provides no indication
as to whether the trial court considered the
criteria 
set 
forth 
for 
determining 
the
reasonableness of an attorney fee as detailed in
Pharmacia, nor does it indicate how the trial court
calculated the attorney fee. Although the trial
court states that its decision is based on the
evidence, it provides no detailed application of the
23
1111507
facts regarding [the attorney] fee to the factors
set forth in Pharmacia. Additionally, although the
record is filled with explanation for the litigation
expenses, the record contains no evidence detailing
the attorney fee for [the attorney in question]. For
instance, it does not contain any document detailing
the time [the attorney] spent working on the case.
As we stated in Pharmacia, '[i]t is generally
recognized that the "first yardstick that is used by
the trial judges [in assessing the reasonableness of
an attorney-fee request] is the time consumed."
Peebles v. Miley, 439 So. 2d 137, 141 (Ala. 1983).'
915 So. 2d at 553.  ... Without some explanation by
the trial court with regard to its consideration of
the 12 factors set out in Van Schaack v. AmSouth
Bank, N.A., 530 So. 2d 740, 749 (Ala. 1988), and
discussed in Pharmacia and how it calculated the
attorney fee, we cannot ascertain whether the trial
court exceeded its discretion in awarding that fee."
Id. at 44-45.
In the present case, the circuit court's judgment does
indicate that the circuit court considered the criteria for
determining the reasonableness of an attorney fee set forth in
Pharmacia and Van Schaack v. AmSouth Bank, N.A., 530 So. 2d
740 (Ala. 1988).  The circuit court's judgment also indicates
how the circuit court calculated the attorney fee –- by
relying on the itemized statements and cost bills presented by
Wall's attorneys.  The record does not contain the itemized
billing statements from Wall's attorneys because the itemized
billing 
statements 
from 
Wall's 
attorneys 
were 
sealed; 
however,
24
1111507
it is undisputed that the circuit court considered itemized
billing statements from Wall's attorneys before it assessed
the attorney-fee award.  In this appeal, Moultrie has not
specifically challenged the circuit court's decision to keep
that evidence sealed.  Moultrie also has not taken any steps
to have the sealed records, which were evidence used to
support the circuit court's judgment, made available for this
Court's review. "This Court has ... held that when all the
evidence before the trial court is not before this Court, it
is presumed that the missing evidence is sufficient to support
the judgment and the judgment should not be disturbed."
Seidler v. Phillips, 496 So. 2d 714, 716 (Ala. 1986).
Moultrie further argues that the circuit court's
attorney-fee award was unreasonable because, he says, 
the 
fees
were excessive and redundant.  He contends that the circuit
court was required to deduct excessive, redundant, or
otherwise unnecessary hours billed by Wall's attorneys when
determining the total amount of attorney fees to be assessed
against Moultrie. Cf. Norman v. Housing Auth. of the City of
Montgomery, 836 F. 2d 1292, 1301 (11th Cir. 1988) (quoting
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)) (applying the
25
1111507
lodestar approach to determining attorney fees in a class
action and stating that "'excessive, redundant or otherwise
unnecessary' hours should be excluded from the amount
claimed").  Moultrie argues that, because he has not been
permitted to review the itemized billing statements presented
to the Court, he has "no other choice but to assume [the] fees
are grossly excessive and unreasonable." Moultrie's brief, at
24.  Moultrie points out that one of Wall's attorneys, Frank
Hawthorne, filed a notice of appearance on May 18, 2012, only
11 days before the hearing on Wall's contempt petitions, yet
his firm was awarded $10,546.62 in attorney fees and expenses. 
Moultrie also argues that Hawthorne was one of four attorneys
who participated in the contempt hearing on behalf of Wall and
that the other three attorneys were capable of handling the
contempt issues without Hawthorne's assistance.
However, in order to reverse the circuit court's judgment
based on the excessiveness or redundancy of the attorney fees,
this Court would be required to assume that Hawthorne's fees,
or any other attorney fees in the itemized billing statements
presented to the circuit court, were excessive, redundant,
unnecessary, or otherwise unreasonable.  As noted previously,
26
1111507
however, the law forbids this Court from presuming that the
circuit court erred. See Tucker v. Nichols, 431 So. 2d at
1265-66.  Furthermore, we disagree with Moultrie's implicit
argument that the award of attorney fees to Hawthorne's firm
was unreasonable on its face.  The affidavit of attorney
Penton indicates that Hawthorne's hourly rate was $300. 
Assuming that Hawthorne's bill was based solely on hours he
had expended on the case, Hawthorne would have accumulated
$10,546.62 in fees in approximately 35 hours.  This could have
occurred by billing slightly more than three hours per day
from the date he filed his notice of appearance to the date of
the hearing on the contempt petitions. 
In response to Wall's argument on appeal that Moultrie's
"bad acts" further support the circuit court's assessment of
attorney fees and costs, Moultrie contends that his actions do
not merit such a sanction.  However, it is evident from the
May 29, 2012, contempt judgment that the circuit court found
Moultrie guilty of what amounts to flagrant violations of the
TRO and the amended TRO entered by the circuit court. Based on
the arguments presented by Moultrie in this appeal, we cannot
conclude 
that 
Moultrie 
has 
affirmatively 
demonstrated 
that 
the
27
1111507
circuit 
court 
exceeded 
its 
discretion 
by 
assessing 
$132,345.57
in attorney fees and costs against Moultrie.  Accordingly, the
judgment assessing attorney fees and costs is due to be
affirmed.
APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART; JUDGMENT OF JUNE 21, 2012,
AFFIRMED.
Moore, C.J., and Stuart, Parker, Main, and Wise, JJ.,
concur.
Murdock and Shaw, JJ., dissent.
28
1111507
MURDOCK, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
A.
The main opinion cites State Board of Education v.
Waldrop, 840 So. 2d 893, 899 (Ala. 2002), for the proposition
that "the circuit court's failure to adjudicate the amount of
the attorney fees to be awarded" to Charles O. Wall II as a
sanction for the contempt of which Frank A. Moultrie was found
guilty "did not affect the finality of the contempt
adjudication." __ So. 3d at __.  Waldrop is distinguishable
from the present case, however, because it was not a contempt
proceeding.  The case of Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co.,
486 U.S. 196 (1988), upon which Waldrop relies, also is
distinguishable because it too was not a contempt proceeding. 
As in Waldrop, the judgment evaluated for appealability in
Budinich was a judgment resolving underlying tort claims as to
which an award of attorney fees was a collateral issue.
Here, the adjudication at issue is not of an underlying
tort or contract claim, as to which an award of attorney fees
would in fact be collateral or incidental. Instead, the claim
29
1111507
is one of contempt.   As to that claim, the award of attorney
fees is an intrinsic part of the relief sought and obtained. 
In a conventional tort or contract action, the  purpose
of the action is to have the court address wrongful,
extrajudicial behavior of a defendant, typically by providing
relief in the form of money damages or an injunction.  In
contrast, the purpose of a contempt claim is to have the court
address the wrongful litigation behavior of a party, usually
by means of a "sanction" for that behavior.   Typical of such
10
sanctions is an award of attorney fees against the
contumacious party.  Until the amount of those fees are set by
the court, therefore, the contempt judgment is not final.  As
to a contempt claim, there can no more be a final, appealable
order on the merits based merely on decision that there is to
be a payment of attorney fees as a sanction without a decision
as the amount of the fees thus to be paid than there could be
a final, appealable order on the merits of a contract or tort
action based merely on a decision that there is to be a
Wall concedes on page 14 of his brief to this Court that
10
the contempt petitions he filed were for the very purpose of
obtaining 
"sanctions" 
against 
Moultrie; 
the 
attorney-fee 
award
was by far the largest part of the "sanction" sought and
awarded. 
30
1111507
payment of compensatory and punitive damages without a
decision as to the amount of the damages to be paid.
In Budinich, the Supreme Court observed that "'[a] "final
decision" generally is one which ends the litigation on the
merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the
judgment.'  Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233
(1945)."  Budinich, 486 U.S. at 199.  No such executable
"final decision" as to the claim seeking a contempt judgment
and sanctions was entered in this case until the trial court
did in fact set the amount of those sanctions.
The Budinich Court continued:
"A question remaining to be decided after an order
ending litigation on the merits does not prevent
finality if its resolution will not alter the order
or moot or revise decisions embodied in the order.
See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294, 
308-309 
(1962); 
Dickinson 
v. 
Petroleum
Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 513-516 (1950)."  
Id. (emphasis added).  Unlike the collateral relationship
between the resolution of a request for attorney fees and the
adjudication of conventional tort and contract claims as in
Budinich, the resolution of an attorney-fee claim in a
contempt action will satisfy the above-emphasized test.  That
is, because it is the substance or essence of the claim and
31
1111507
relief pursued in the contempt action, the setting of the
amount of the sanction necessarily "will ... alter the order
or moot or revise decisions embodied in the order."11
The Budinich Court also stated:
"In White v. New Hampshire Dept. of Employment
Security, 455 U.S. 445 (1982), we held that a
request for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988
is not a motion 'to alter or amend the judgment'
within the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 
59(e) 
because 
it 
does 
not 
seek
'reconsideration of matters properly encompassed in
a decision on the merits.' 455 U.S., at 451. This
holding was based on our conclusion that 'a request
for attorney's fees under § 1988 raises legal issues
collateral to' and 'separate from' the decision on
the merits. Id., at 451-452. ...  See also Sprague
v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 170 (1939)
(observing that a petition for attorney's fees in
equity is 'an independent proceeding supplemental to
the original proceeding and not a request for a
modification of the original decree')."
Perhaps the easiest illustration would be the setting of
11
an attorney-fee award in an unduly small amount.  This clearly
would have the practical effect of "alter[ing]," "moot[ing],"
or "[revis]ing" an earlier contempt judgment in which the
trial court announced that it would award "reasonable attorney
fees" incurred by the petitioner in responding to the
contemnor's contumacious conduct.  A similarly unexpectedly
low setting of fees collateral to a judgment for breach of
contract or in tort would not have the effect of "revising" or
"altering" that judgment; execution on the conventional
judgment to enforce 
injunctive 
orders or collect money damages
could proceed unaffected and "unrevised" by the subsequent
setting of attorney fees. 
32
1111507
486 U.S. at 200 (emphasis added).  Here, the attorney-fee
request is a, if not the, primary "matter[] properly
encompassed in a decision on the merits" of the contempt
petition.  
The Budinich Court further explained:
"If one were to regard the demand for attorney's
fees as itself part of the merits, the analysis
would not apply. The merits would then not have been
concluded, and [28 U.S.C.] § 1291 finality would not
exist. See Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wetzel,
424 U.S. 737, 740-742 (1976).  As a general matter,
at least, we think it indisputable that a claim for
attorney's fees is not part of the merits of the
action to which the fees pertain. Such an award does
not remedy the injury giving rise to the action, and
indeed is often available to the party defending
against the action. At common law, attorney's fees
were regarded as an element of 'costs' awarded to
the prevailing party, see 10 C. Wright, A. Miller,
& M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil §
2665 (1983), which are not generally treated as part
of the merits judgment, cf. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 58
('Entry of the judgment shall not be delayed for the
taxing of costs')."
486 U.S. at 200-01 (emphasis other than on "itself" added).
The opposite of everything the Budinich Court said in the
foregoing passage as to the relationship of attorney fees to
the merits of the underlying tort claim at issue there can be
said of the relationship of an attorney-fee award to the
contempt claim here.  "[T]he demand for attorney's fees [is]
33
1111507
part of the merits" and therefore "the analysis [does] apply."
Perhaps most telling is the fact that, in regard to a
conventional tort claim, an award of attorney fees is in fact
collateral and, as the Budinich Court explained, "does not
remedy the injury giving rise to the action," whereas the
opposite is true here.  Budinich, 486 U.S. at 200.  The
gravamen of the contempt action here is the bad litigation
behavior of the opposing party.  Correcting that behavior is
the purpose of the action.  Sanctions in the form of attorney
fees are intrinsic to that end and are a central part of the
relief sought, not incidental to the relief sought.  Until
such sanctions have been awarded, there is no final and
appealable judgment on 
the 
contempt 
petition 
itself.
Furthermore, treating the contempt judgment as final before
the requested sanction for the contempt is decided upon by the
trial court is to encourage piecemeal appeals, as well as
appeals from orders that might not have been appealed if the
defendant had known the ultimate amount of sanctions that
would be awarded.
Although there are decisions that take a different view
of 
the 
Budinich 
holding 
as 
it 
relates 
to 
contempt
34
1111507
proceedings,  I find more persuasive the view expressed above
12
and by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit in Napier v. Thirty or More Unidentified Federal
Agents, Employees or Officers, 855 F.2d 1080 (3d Cir. 1988). 
In Napier, the federal appeals court addressed an order of a
federal district court entered on May  20, 1987, in which the
district court ruled that "'sanctions shall be imposed on
plaintiff's counsel.'" Id. at 1084.  The amount of those
sanctions, however, was not set by the district court until a
later date, June 29, 1987.  The Court of Appeals explained the
difference between (a) that sanction award and the contempt
judgment of which it was a part and (b) the award of attorney
fees that was collateral to the tort judgment in Budinich:
"The defendants argue that [the plaintiff's]
appeal with respect to the sanctions was untimely. 
They say that [the plaintiff] had to appeal the May
20, 1987 order determining that sanctions would be
levied against him and that his August 4 appeal was
out of time. ...
"As a general rule, when a district court
determines liability before determining the damages
amount, 
the 
liability 
determination 
is 
not
appealable until judgment has been entered on the
amount.  In re Jeannette Corp., 832 F.2d 43, 45 (3d
See, e.g., In re Tetracycline Cases, 927 F.2d 411 (8th
12
Cir. 1991).
35
1111507
Cir. 1987)('until fixed in amount, an award of
attorneys' fees is not a final order for purposes of
appeal'); Sauter v. Ross Restaurants, Inc., 674 F.2d
194, 197 (3d Cir. 1982) (decision is appealable if
it terminates litigation and 'leaves nothing to be
done but to enforce' the judgment).  In re Jeannette
Corp. held that '[i]f sanctions are to be an
assessment of counsel fees or expenses, they must be
fixed before the order is final and appealable.' 
832 F.2d at 46.  In re Jeannette Corp. is
dispositive of this question unless recent Supreme
Court jurisprudence undermines it.
"In Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S.
196, 108 S.Ct. 1717, 100 L.Ed.2d 178 (1988), the
Supreme Court held that a determination of liability
and damages is final despite a pending determination
of costs and attorney's fees.  The rationale of
Budinich is that the determination of costs and fees
following entry of judgment involves considerations
distinct from the underlying merits of the action
itself.  See West v. Keve, 721 F.2d 91 (3d Cir.
1983) (viewing fee determination as collateral to
merits decision thereby requiring appellants to
appeal 
from 
earlier 
merits 
decision). 
 
We
acknowledge a superficial similarity between the
determination of the sanctions amount here and a
determination of costs and attorneys fees such as
might render the district court's May 20 order an
appealable order. We think that the better approach,
however, is to analogize the situation before us to
the traditional liability and damages scenario:  the
May 20 order determined liability, but the court's
order was not final and appealable until the June 29
order, which fixed damages. ...  Cf. United States
v. Sleight, 808 F.2d 1012 (3d Cir. 1987) (in
criminal case, order that reasonable restitution
shall be paid is not the final, appealable order,
but only the order stating exact amount is
appealable).
36
1111507
"More importantly, however, the decision to
impose sanctions and the decision fixing the amount
of the sanction are far more closely intertwined,
both 
substantively 
and 
practically, 
than 
the
decision about counsel fees and costs is to the
underlying merits.  Rule 11[, Fed. R. Civ. P.,]
'combines 
the 
concepts 
of 
deterrence 
and
reimbursement,' hence the district court in a
sanctions determination may require 'the offending
client, lawyer or both to pay all or part of the
adversary's counsel fees incurred as a result of the
violation.' Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479,
482 (3d Cir. 1987) (emphasis added [in Napier]). ... 
Moreover, policy reasons support this view. To
require an appeal from the decision to impose
sanctions would engender needless appeals -- which
never would have been filed had the sanctions been
fixed in a relatively small amount, a not uncommon
occurrence.  See In re Jeannette Corp., 832 F.2d at
45 (noting 'concerns about duplicate expenditures of
time and resources in coping with separate appeals
initially from the award of fees and later from the
calculation of the amount').  Also supporting our
conclusion 
is 
our 
longstanding 
antipathy 
to
piecemeal appeals.  See Mary Ann Pensiero, Inc. v.
Lingle, 847 F.2d 90, 92 (3d Cir. 1988) (adopting
supervisory rule requiring counsel to file Rule 11
motions before entry of final judgment by district
court 'to eliminate piecemeal appeals'). Thus
nothing 
in 
Budinich 
undermines 
our 
earlier
jurisprudence."
855 F.2d at 1089-90 (some emphasis added; footnotes omitted). 
Cf. John v. Barron, 897 F.2d 1387, 1390 (7th Cir.
1990)(holding that an award of attorney fees as a "sanction"
for a violation of Rule 11, Fed. R. Civ. P., without setting
the amount of that sanction is not a final, appealable order);
37
1111507
Jensen Elec. Co. v. Moore, Caldwell, Rowland & Dodd, Inc., 873
F.2d 1327, 1329 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding in a Rule 11
proceeding that "[t]he district court's first order imposing
sanctions but not setting an amount was ... not a final or
appealable 
order" 
because 
"[a]n 
order 
awarding 
attorney's 
fees
which does not fully dispose of the issue of attorney's fees
is not a final, appealable order");  Gates v. Central States
Teamsters Pension Fund, 788 F.2d 1341, 1343 (8th Cir. 1986)
(holding that an order awarding attorney fees as a sanction
for a Rule 11 violation "without determining the amount of
that award is not an order which 'leaves nothing for the court
to do but execute upon the judgment.' Catlin v. United States,
324 U.S. 229, 233 ... (1945)," and therefore is "not a final
and appealable order").  
As Professors Wright and Miller have put it, "[a]
determination that contempt has occurred is not final if the
question of sanctions is postponed. ... Finality, in short,
requires determination 
of 
both liability and sanction, just as
with ordinary civil and criminal proceedings."  15B Charles
Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Edward H. Cooper, Federal
Practice & Procecure § 3917 (2d ed. 1992).
38
1111507
B.
I am concerned about a number of aspects of the award of 
attorney fees in this case.  These include the sealed nature
of evidence upon which the trial court based its judgment and
its apparently unobjected-to unavailability (even in redacted
form) to opposing counsel, as well as its unavailability to
this Court as the result of its unobjected-to absence from the
record on appeal.   In addition, I am concerned about the fact
13
that the trial court apparently made its decisions based upon
only 3 or 4 of the 12 factors listed in Peebles v. Miley, 439
So. 2d 137 (Ala. 1983), and that the trial court does not
appear to have been sufficiently specific as to its reasoning. 
Ultimately, a substantial question exists as to whether the
total amount awarded to multiple attorneys and groups of
attorneys for a limited amount as to a limited period of time
was excessive and redundant.  I dissent as to the affirmance
of the attorney-fee award without reaching the merits of these
issues, however, because I do not think we should address the
As a result of its absence of from the record, this
13
Court does not even have access to statements documenting the
number of hours upon which the trial court based its award,
despite the fact that time expended generally is viewed as the
cornerstone of attorney-fee awards in cases of this nature. 
39
1111507
merits of the attorney-fee issue without first addressing the
merits of the contempt judgment itself, which, for the reasons
explained in Part A of this writing, I believe has been timely
appealed.
40
1111507
SHAW, Justice (dissenting).  
I respectfully dissent, and I concur with Part A of
Justice Murdock's dissenting opinion.  
41