Title: Metissia Ricks v. Rene Loyola, M.D.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC01-793
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: June 20, 2002

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC01-793
____________
METISSIA RICKS,
Petitioner,
vs.
RENE LOYOLA, M.D.,
Respondent.
[June 20, 2002]
PER CURIAM.
We have for review Loyola v. Ricks, 777 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000),
which expressly and directly conflicts with the decision in Ed Ricke & Sons, Inc. v.
Green, 468 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1985).  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla.
Const.  For the reasons set forth herein, we quash the decision of the Fourth District
Court of Appeal.
PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Dr. Rene Loyola (Loyola) was one of the defendants named in a medical
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malpractice suit filed below by plaintiff Metissia Ricks (Ricks).  Before trial, Ricks
settled her suit with another doctor and the hospital involved in this case.  At trial,
Loyola’s attorney made the following comments to the jury during opening
statements:
Now, as Mr. Vieth pointed out, Dr. Loyola is not the only health care
provider that you will be hearing about.  That is, I gather you've
gleaned, from what I've said up to this point, there's going to be
testimony that the nurses should have done things differently, that Dr.
Wengler should have done things differently, before it ever reached the
point of . . . of being contracted with permanent nerve damage.  It just
never should have happened.  
It will not be something that you need to consider as to why they
aren't in this courtroom, although you might want to ask yourself that
question.  I assure you, though, that this Miss Ricks and her attorney
aren't going to tell you why they aren't here.  
Loyola, 777 So. 2d at 424 (emphasis in original).  Ricks moved for a mistrial based
on Loyola’s attorney’s statement contending that the statement implied that there
had been prior settlements with other parties, but Ricks requested that the trial court
reserve ruling on the motion.  See id. at 424.  The trial court agreed to reserve ruling
and proceeded with a six-day trial, after which the jury returned a verdict for
Loyola.  The trial court then granted a new trial based on Ricks’ motion for mistrial
and objection to Loyola’s opening statement.  See id. at 425.  
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed and found that the trial court
abused its discretion when it reserved ruling on the motion for mistrial and in
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granting the motion for a new trial.  See id.  Regarding the trial court’s decision to
reserve ruling on the motion for mistrial, the Fourth District stated:
In the present case, the trial was scheduled to take five days. 
The trial actually took six days, in which approximately fifteen
witnesses were presented.  The motion for mistrial was made the very
first day of trial prior to any witnesses testifying.  We conclude that the
interests of judicial economy were not served by a reservation of ruling
based on these circumstances.  As such, we hold the trial court abused
its discretion by reserving ruling on the Plaintiff's motion for mistrial
and subsequently granting the motion for new trial.
Id.  In finding that the trial court abused its discretion by granting a new trial, the
Fourth District stated:
Section 768.041(3), Florida Statutes, provides that releases,
covenants not to sue, and dismissals of defendants by order of the court
"shall not be made known to the jury."  § 768.041(3), Fla. Stat. (2000). 
In the present case, the defense counsel's comment during opening
statements did not reference any of the prohibited categories. No
reference was made to a prior lawsuit, prior defendants, or a
settlement.  In addition, the jury was unaware that Dr. Wengler and the
hospital were originally in the lawsuit, and therefore, they would not
have necessarily thought the comment referenced a settlement.
Moreover, even if the comment was error, we would find it to be
harmless.  The comment was isolated and never mentioned again by
the defense. 
Id.  Ricks now contends that the Fourth District opinion conflicts with our decision
in Ed Ricke & Sons, Inc.
TRIAL ERROR
In Ed Ricke & Sons, Inc. we considered an “empty chair” argument made at
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trial during closing arguments after the trial court had entered an order in limine
stating that no party, attorney, or witness was to reveal to the jury that there had
been a prior lawsuit or settlement between the plaintiff and another defendant.  See
468 So. 2d at 909.  This Court agreed with the district court’s decision that the
defendant violated that order in limine in several instances, with the “most flagrant”
instance occurring during closing argument when defense counsel stated: “Now,
there’s going to be some other person responsible.  I would like for you to ask them
some questions.  I would like for you to ask him [w]hy Dade County is not a
defendant in this litigation.”  Id.  When this statement was made, the plaintiff made
a motion for a mistrial and asked the judge to reserve ruling until after the jury
returned a verdict.  See id.  However, the trial court denied the motion right away,
stating that the “empty chair” reference was a proper argument.  See id.  Thereafter,
the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant and a judgment was entered on
that verdict.  See id.  
On appeal, the Third District reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding
that the closing argument violated the order in limine, and that the plaintiff did not
waive the right to a new trial by asking the trial court to reserve ruling on the motion
for mistrial until after the jury reached a verdict.  See id.  Upon review, we
approved the Third District’s decision and explained:
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We now explicitly hold that the trial court has the power to wait until
the jury returns its verdict before ruling on a motion for a mistrial.  A
motion for a mistrial coupled with a request that the court reserve
ruling until after the jury deliberates is simply a motion for a mistrial,
and, if properly made, deserves full consideration at both the trial court
and appellate level.
The trial court judge may, in his or her sound discretion,
determine whether to rule on a motion for a mistrial immediately or
reserve ruling until after the jury deliberates.  However, this discretion
must be exercised in accordance with precepts of judicial economy. 
When, as here, the prejudicial comments occur during closing
argument, it is quite reasonable for a trial judge to reserve ruling until
after the jury deliberates in the hope that the jurors can rise above the
alleged prejudice and cure the error.  If the verdict cures the error, the
court will save the expenditure of additional time, money and delay
associated with a new trial.  On the other hand, if the judge, after the
verdict, incorrectly grants the motion for mistrial and orders a new trial,
that order is reviewable on appeal.  The appellate court could then
reverse the order granting the new trial and order the trial court to enter
a judgment on the jury verdict.
Id. at 910.  Hence, in Ed Ricke & Sons, Inc., we approved a procedure similar to
that invoked by the trial court here.
Although the Loyola district court opinion cited Ed Ricke & Sons, Inc., it
devoted little discussion to the holding and application of that case to its decision. 
We find that the Fourth District misapplied Ed Ricke, when it basically interpreted
the notion of “judicial economy” as involving only the length of time that the trial
court reserved ruling on the motion for mistrial without consideration, for example,
of the nature of the offending comment or the fact that a new trial would not have
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been required had there been a verdict for the plaintiff.  In the instant case, the
Fourth District reversed the trial court’s grant of a new trial solely because the
motion was made on the first day of a six-day trial, prior to the presentation of
evidence.  
In Gutierrez v. L. Plumbing, Inc., 516 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), the
Third District also commented on a trial court’s timing when ruling on motions for
directed verdict, demonstrating that resources can be conserved, even after appeal,
when trial judges reserve ruling until after the jury renders a verdict:
We have repeatedly instructed that trial judges who are inclined
to grant a directed verdict at the conclusion of the case should instead
reserve ruling thereon, allow the jury to return a verdict, and thereafter
rule on the motion.  Had this approved practice been followed in the
present case, our reversal of the trial court’s ruling would have resulted
in a reinstatement of a jury verdict rather than a remand for a costly,
time-consuming, and wholly unnecessary new trial.
Id. at 88 n.2 (citations omitted).  As noted in Gutierrez, it often makes more sense
for the trial court to wait until the jury renders a verdict, regardless of what stage the
trial is in at the time the motion is made, since the jury’s action may moot the
motion.  
TRIAL COURT DISCRETION
We have previously held that trial courts have broad discretion when ruling
on motions for new trial and motions for mistrial.  In Brown v. Estate of Stuckey,
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749 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1999), we stated: 
To summarize, this Court has repeatedly held that the trial judge
has broad discretion in ruling on a motion for a new trial on the
grounds that the verdict is contrary to the manifest weight of the
evidence.  A trial judge has the responsibility to draw "on his [or her]
talents, his [or her] knowledge, and his [or her] experience to keep the
search for the truth in a proper channel," and the trial judge should
always grant a motion for a new trial when "the jury has been deceived
as to the force and credibility of the evidence or has been influenced by
considerations outside the record."  Cloud, 110 So. 2d at 673.  The trial
judge's discretion permits the grant of a new trial although it is not
"clear, obvious, and indisputable that the jury was wrong."  When a
trial judge grants the motion for a new trial, he or she must articulate
the reasons for the new trial in the order.
When reviewing the order granting a new trial, an appellate
court must recognize the broad discretionary authority of the trial judge
and apply the reasonableness test to determine whether the trial judge
committed an abuse of discretion.  If an appellate court determines that
reasonable persons could differ as to the propriety of the action taken
by the trial court, there can be no finding of an abuse of discretion. 
The fact that there may be substantial, competent evidence in the
record to support the jury verdict does not necessarily demonstrate that
the trial judge abused his or her discretion.
Id. at 497-98.  In Ed Ricke & Sons, Inc., we indicated that trial courts possess the
same broad discretion in determining whether to reserve ruling on a motion for
mistrial.  We recognized that a trial court’s evaluation of “judicial economy” is an
important factor to be considered by the trial court in exercising its broad discretion
when ruling on a motion for mistrial.  Thus, when a motion for mistrial is made, it is
within a trial court’s discretion to determine whether it is the best use of judicial
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resources to let the case go to jury to see if the verdict cures the need for a new trial,
or whether it is best to rule on the motion at an earlier stage in the proceedings.  But
that call remains essentially for the trial court to make from its superior vantage
point.  See Castlewood Int’l. Corp. v. LaFleur, 322 So. 2d 520, 522 (Fla. 1975)
(“Mere disagreement from an appellate perspective is insufficient as a matter of law
to overturn a trial court on the need for a new trial.  The trial judge ‘was in a much
better position than an appellate court to pass on the ultimate correctness of the
jury’s verdict.’ ”).
Another consideration for trial courts in exercising their broad discretion
when reserving ruling on motions for mistrial is that litigants who may be unhappy
with the jury that has been selected will not be rewarded when they purposely
engage in conduct intended to cause a mistrial.  As we explained in Ed Ricke &
Sons, Inc.: 
The power of a trial court judge to reserve ruling on a motion for
a mistrial will not only conserve judicial resources but may also
operate to prohibit a wrongdoer from profiting from his intentional
misconduct.  Unfortunately, it is common practice for some trial
attorneys to make prejudicial remarks during closing argument when
the posture of his case is doubtful.  In these instances, the opposing
counsel is forced to make a motion for a mistrial.  The trial judge will
then order a new trial.  Thus, the offending counsel has a second
opportunity to try the case and the aggrieved party has little solace but
the afforded remedy of beginning all over again.  Now that it is clear
that a trial judge may wait until after the jury deliberates before ruling
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on a motion for a mistrial, the incentive to intentionally make
prejudicial remarks during closing argument will be minimized.
Id. at 910.  Thus, by vesting trial courts with broad discretion to rule on a motion for
mistrial after a jury verdict, we maintain a disincentive for parties to engage in
improper conduct during the trial.
THIS CASE
The Fourth District’s holding in this case represents a departure from an
appellate court’s duty to apply the reasonableness test when evaluating abuse of
discretion.  See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Manasse, 707 So. 2d 1110, 1111 (Fla. 1998).  In
this case, we find that under our holding in Ed Ricke & Sons, Inc., the trial court
was well within its discretion to reserve ruling on the “empty chair” comment until
after the jury returned a verdict.  Therefore, we disapprove of the Fourth District’s
rationale that a trial court defies the concept of “judicial economy” merely because
it reserves ruling on a motion for mistrial made early on in a trial. 
We also disagree with the Fourth District that the objectionable statement
was an insufficient basis for the trial court to use in exercising its discretion to grant
a new trial.  Even though it was Loyola’s defense at trial that others were negligent,
we find that the objectionable statement could be construed to improperly refer to
the underlying reason why those other parties were not involved in the case.  Of
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course, one of the reasons they were not directly involved is because they had
settled with the plaintiff.  Section 768.041 states in pertinent part:
Release or covenant not to sue.–
(1) A release or covenant not to sue as to one tortfeasor for
property damage to, personal injury of, or the wrongful death of any
person shall not operate to release or discharge the liability of any other
tortfeasor who may be liable for the same tort or death.
(2) At trial, if any defendant shows the court that the plaintiff, or
any person lawfully on her or his behalf, has delivered a release or
covenant not to sue to any person, firm, or corporation in partial
satisfaction of the damages sued for, the court shall set off this amount
from the amount of any judgment to which the plaintiff would be
otherwise entitled at the time of rendering judgment and enter judgment
accordingly.
(3) The fact of such a release or covenant not to sue, or that any
defendant has been dismissed by order of the court shall not be made
known to the jury.
§ 768.041, Fla. Stat. (2000).  Here, jurors logically could have interpreted counsel’s
statement to imply that a settlement had been reached with others involved in the
case, despite the fact that counsel did not actually use the word “settlement.”  
In addition, the statement imposed an improper burden on plaintiffs to explain
why the others were not present in the courtroom and parties to the suit.  In Ed
Ricke & Sons, Inc., we discussed a similar “empty chair” argument, stating:
[D]efense counsel’s closing argument was highly prejudicial and
improper.  The closing argument was not just a traditional empty chair
argument.  Defense counsel did more than simply argue that Dade
County was responsible for the accident.  Rather, defense counsel
emphasized that there had been a prior suit against that empty chair.
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468 So. 2d at 909.  In the case at bar, Loyola not only emphasized that there was an
empty chair by discussing the parties’ absence, but insinuated that Ricks was
responsible for their absence and was improperly withholding an explanation from
the jury.  Thus, the Fourth District failed to accord the trial court’s ruling the broad
discretion it merited and minimized the impact that such an “empty chair” argument
may have on a jury by finding that the comment did not reference settlement with
other parties, or that if it did, that the error was harmless.  See Muhammad v. Toys
“R” Us, Inc., 668 So. 2d 254, 256 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (holding that counsel’s
improper “empty chair” comments made during voir dire “were patently prejudicial
and may have influenced the jury to return a verdict in favor of Toys “R” Us,” even
though the trial court gave the jury a curative instruction).
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we disapprove the Fourth District’s decision and opinion.
Pursuant to our opinion in Ed Ricke & Sons, Inc., the trial court had broad
discretion in deciding to reserve ruling on the motion for mistrial, even though the
motion was made before any testimony was taken.  Further, the trial court acted
within its discretion in concluding that Loyola’s reference to other parties being
absent from the courtroom and that the plaintiff was responsible for explaining why,
was a purposeful violation of section 768.014, which could have influenced the jury. 
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Because we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by reserving ruling
on the motion for mistrial, and subsequently granting a new trial, we quash the
Fourth District’s decision and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered. 
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ.,
concur.
ANSTEAD, J., dissents with an opinion.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF
FILED, DETERMINED.
ANSTEAD, J., dissenting.
I respectfully dissent and conclude that jurisdiction was not properly granted
in this case.  The asserted basis for jurisdiction is that the Fourth District misapplied
this Court’s ruling in Ed Ricke & Sons, Inc. v. Green, 468 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1985),
concerning the authority of a trial court to reserve ruling on a motion for mistrial
based upon counsel’s improper closing argument.  However, upon review of the two
cases, it is apparent that they are factually distinguishable, and that conflict
jurisdiction cannot be granted on a “misapplication” theory because the cases
involve significantly different controlling facts.  See Mancini v. State, 312 So. 2d
732, 733 (Fla. 1975).  
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In Ed Ricke & Sons, Inc., we held:
In summary, we conclude that a motion for a mistrial coupled
with a request that the court reserve ruling until the jury completes their
deliberations is merely a motion for a mistrial.  Any ruling on such a
motion is preserved for appellate review.  The judge may, at his
discretion, order a new trial immediately following the motion for a
mistrial or reserve ruling on the motion until after the jury deliberates. 
However, such a power is limited and must be based upon notions of
judicial economy.  
468 So. 2d at 911 (emphasis supplied).  The majority has ignored our holding that
the authority to reserve ruling on a motion for mistrial “is limited and must be based
upon notions of judicial economy.”  Id.  On the other hand, the Fourth District in
Loyola specifically distinguished our holding in Ed Ricke & Sons, Inc., concerning
the “judicial economy” standard for reserving on a motion for mistrial: 
A trial court has discretion to reserve ruling on motions for a
mistrial. See Ed Ricke & Sons, Inc. v. Green, 468 So. 2d 908, 910
(Fla. 1985). "However, this discretion must be exercised in accordance
with precepts of judicial economy. . . . The power of a trial court judge
to reserve ruling on a motion for a mistrial will not only conserve
judicial resources but may also operate to prohibit a wrongdoer from
profiting from his intentional misconduct."  Id.
In the present case, the trial was scheduled to take five days.
The trial actually took six days, in which approximately fifteen
witnesses were presented.  The motion for mistrial was made the very
first day of trial prior to any witnesses testifying.  We conclude that the
interests of judicial economy were not served by a reservation of ruling
based on these circumstances.  As such, we hold the trial court abused
its discretion by reserving ruling on the Plaintiff's motion for mistrial
and subsequently granting the motion for new trial.
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Loyola, 777 So. 2d at 425.  It is apparent that the Fourth District came to a different
conclusion than this Court did in Ed Ricke & Sons, Inc., because the motion for
mistrial in Loyola came at the very beginning of trial rather than at the end.
In Ed Ricke & Sons, Inc., it made abundant sense for the trial court to reserve
ruling to see if the jury would cure the error with its verdict.  To grant the mistrial
would have foreclosed that opportunity and wasted all the time spent in trial. 
However, in Loyola, counsel’s comment was made during opening statements, and
the trial court reserved ruling while the trial proceeded thereafter for some six days. 
Hence, the two cases present diametrically opposed circumstances concerning
judicial economy, one mandating delayed consideration, the other immediate relief,
if concerns of judicial economy are to prevail.  
Indeed, in Loyola, the trial court was urged by counsel to act at once if it
should conclude that the opening statement was prejudicial enough to warrant a
mistrial, since a new trial could immediately be started with little waste of resources. 
Surely, waiting for an entire six-day trial to rule that a patently prejudicial opening
statement requires a new trial does not comport with the notion of judicial economy. 
If the ruling on counsel’s statement had been rendered shortly after the motion for
mistrial was made, the time and expense of the six-day trial would have been saved. 
This contrasts sharply with the circumstances in Ed Ricke & Sons, Inc., where the
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entire trial time would have been wasted by an immediate ruling, but possibly saved
by reserving ruling.  As it stands, an entire six-day trial conducted after the motion
for mistrial was made was wasted, and the parties must try this case again.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - 
Direct Conflict
Fourth District - Case No. 4D00-221 
(St. Lucie County)
Mark Vieth of Tilghman & Vieth, P.A., Miami, Florida; and Lauri Waldman Ross of
Lauri Waldman Ross, P.A., Miami, Florida,
for Petitioner
William T. Viergever of Sonneborn, Rutter, Cooney & Klingensmith, P.A., West Palm
Beach, Florida,
for Respondent