Title: The Florida Bar v. Brian Neiman
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC94-738
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: May 2, 2002

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC94738
____________
THE FLORIDA BAR,
Complainant,
vs.
BRIAN NEIMAN and BRIAN NEIMAN, INC., a Florida corporation,
Respondents.
[May 2, 2002]
PER CURIAM. 
We have for review a referee’s report recommending that Brian Neiman,
individually, and Brian Neiman, Inc., a Florida corporation, (“Neiman”), be
enjoined from engaging in the unlicensed practice of law.  We have jurisdiction. 
See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.  For the reasons that follow, we approve the referee’s
recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law, concluding that the
respondents have extensively engaged in the unlicensed practice of law in Florida
for many years, and we enjoin such practice in the future.  
1.  The referee struck counts VIIA, X, XI, XIV, XIX, and XX.
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FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS TO DATE
The Florida Bar filed a twenty-two count1 petition alleging that the
respondents repeatedly engaged in the unlicensed practice of law over a period of
approximately seven years.  After twenty-one days of hearings, the referee made
detailed findings that respondent, Brian Neiman, performed acts commonly
understood to be the practice of law, including: serving as a primary contact for
conferences on legal disputes; holding himself out as an attorney in dealings with
others; attempting to argue and advocate the merits of cases, the applicability of the
law, evidentiary issues, liability issues, discovery matters, and settlement matters
with opposing counsel; attempting to analyze statutory and case law and to discuss
it with clients and opposing counsel; trying to advise clients on the strengths and
weaknesses of their cases and on how to proceed; actively participating in and
presenting clients’ cases at mediation sessions; actively participating in and
presenting the complainants’ cases at settlement sessions; extensively involving
himself with fee arrangements; attempting to advise clients of their obligations under
legal documents; drafting detailed letters and legal documents; signing court-filed
documents; and discussing legal documents with clients without any attorney
present.  
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The referee further found that Neiman engaged in the unlicensed practice of
law based upon the referee’s finding that no attorney had any meaningful role in the
development or settlement of several of the cases.  The referee concluded that in
some cases, such as those involved in counts IV, V, VI, and IX (discussed below),
Neiman served as a conduit or intermediary for the preparation, consideration, or
evaluation of legal matters of claimants who had not initially consulted with any
supervising attorney. 
REFEREE’S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
The proceedings below were extensive and an understanding of the facts
established during those proceedings is necessary to understand the referee’s
findings and conclusions, and our approval of those conclusions.  Because of the
large number of separate incidents, we will discuss the circumstances relevant to
only the most representative counts.  Neiman concedes in his amended initial brief
that the conduct alleged in counts IV, V, VI, VII, and XIII of the Bar’s complaint
were charged as criminal offenses and, on August 19, 1999, he entered a plea of
nolo contendere to five criminal misdemeanor counts of the unlicensed practice of
law.
COUNT I
The referee’s findings of fact for count I help place the case against Neiman
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in its overall context.  The referee concluded that for over seven years, Brian
Neiman, a convicted felon, acted essentially as an attorney, even though he was
never licensed to do so.
Before the referee, Neiman claimed his conduct was nothing more than
“relaying information” from his employing attorney to another party, whether it be a
client, opposing counsel, or another third party.  However, the referee rejected this
characterization of Neiman’s conduct and concluded that the facts showed
otherwise.  Numerous witnesses testified that Neiman held himself out as an
attorney, argued legal issues, and forcefully participated in settlement negotiations. 
The referee concluded that Neiman’s earnings alone were indicative of his role in
these cases, noting that Neiman personally received hundreds of thousands of
dollars in compensation.  For example, the record reflects that in 1995, Neiman
personally grossed over $1.4 million in salary from his law-related activities.  In
1996, Neiman, who was on probation for a criminal fraud conviction, actually
reported to his probation officer that his income was $50,000 per month.  A year
later, he reported his income as $1 million to $1.5 million annually.  
COUNT II
This count concerned Neiman’s activities in a personal injury action.  In 1995
and 1996, the law firm of Norman Ganz represented a woman claimant in an action
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stemming from injuries sustained in a golf cart accident.  Neiman, then working at
the Ganz firm, initially interviewed the woman concerning the facts of her claim and
then told her she had a “good case.”  Neiman admitted that he conducted his own
legal research on whether the dangerous instrumentality doctrine applied to the
operation of a golf cart, and that he called the client to report the results of the legal
research.  Neiman was the woman’s primary contact in the firm.  At the hearings,
Neiman admitted detailed knowledge of how the fee agreement was negotiated with
the client.  He also appeared on the client’s behalf at mediation and had settlement
discussions with the defending insurer’s attorney.
Neiman also engaged in substantial telephone discussions about the case with
a second defense attorney.  When this attorney would call and attempt to speak with
Ganz directly, Neiman, not Ganz, always returned her calls.  Neiman engaged this
attorney in discussions about discovery and settlement.  During these conversations,
Neiman was combative and attempted to argue the facts of the case. When the
attorney made a settlement offer, Neiman told her the offer was unacceptable and
warned that if her client did not offer more money, the client would be “dragged
through the coals” and be “required to jump through the hoops.”  This attorney
eventually refused to speak to Neiman further and attempted to notify Ganz by
faxed letter.  The fax machine, however, was located in Neiman’s own office and
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the attorney never received a response from Ganz.
Importantly, a paralegal of the Ganz firm testified that Neiman was “in charge
of the office” during this period.  The paralegal testified that Neiman instructed
office personnel that if the woman client called, the calls were to be given only to
him, even if the client asked for attorney Ganz. 
When Neiman received a letter from the claimant terminating the Ganz firm’s
representation of her, Neiman called her to try to convince her to stay with the firm
and offered to reduce “his fee.”  When the claimant declined his offer, Neiman told
her that she would be responsible for the $4,000 to $5,000 in costs the firm had
allegedly incurred.
COUNT III
This count involved a case wherein the Ganz firm represented a plaintiff in a
wrongful birth case.  When the defense attorney called to speak to attorney Ganz,
Neiman would usually return the calls.  Neiman called the defense attorney directly
to argue issues of liability, causation, and damages; and Neiman also presented the
defense attorney with a “rock bottom demand figure” that the plaintiff would accept
in settlement.  Neiman never advised the defense attorney that he was conveying
information previously approved or reviewed by Ganz.  
Although Ganz appeared with Neiman for the plaintiff at a mediation, Ganz
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explained to all present that Neiman would handle the mediation for the plaintiff. 
Thereafter, Ganz spoke very little, while Neiman argued issues of liability,
causation, and damages on behalf of the plaintiff.  The defense attorney testified that
Neiman appeared to be the most knowledgeable person at the Ganz firm regarding
the law and facts of the case.  Neiman acknowledged that he was responsible for
determining the strategy for the firm for such presentations in a case.  
COUNTS IV, V, AND VI
These counts asserted that from 1995 through 1998, the Ganz firm
represented several individuals in a series of discrimination complaints based on
race and disability against the Broward County Clerk of Court.  Once again, Neiman
was the main contact in the firm for these claimants.  He met with them on a number
of occasions, often at his own home.  As a consequence, several claimants believed
Neiman was an attorney.  He ran the meetings, explained the fee agreements,
discussed the courses the case could take, signed the claimants up with the firm, and
assured them that they had a “good case.”  When explaining actions taken in the
case, Neiman spoke in the first person by saying, “I did this” or “I did that.”  One
claimant clearly believed that Neiman was making decisions on the case without
consulting any “other attorney.”  Neiman also wrote and signed Ganz’s name on
correspondence on the case that Ganz never reviewed.  
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Opposing counsel were also led to believe that Neiman was an attorney. 
Neiman spoke with them dozens of times and acted as if he was providing legal
representation for the plaintiffs.  He discussed both substantive legal and settlement
matters, and argued the claimants’ positions, applicable law, potential liabilities, and
possible damages.  Neiman suggested specific language for various agreements and
talked about the deposition questions he planned to draft.  When some opposing
counsel realized that Neiman was not an attorney, they insisted that a Ganz law firm
attorney take part in the telephone conferences.  Instead, the Ganz attorneys
continually referred opposing counsel back to Neiman.  Further, in July 1995,
Neiman appeared at a settlement conference and advocated the settlement amounts
sought by the claimants, and no Ganz attorney even attended this conference.  
By November 1995, opposing counsel had warned the Ganz firm that Neiman
was improperly discussing substantive legal issues, and the firm then brought in an
attorney to assist with the case.  However, in March 1997, Neiman contacted
opposing counsel to inform them that the Ganz firm had fired the attorney, and he
took “credit” for the firing.  Notwithstanding previous warnings from opposing
counsel, Neiman continued to discuss substantive legal issues with them.  During
one telephone conference, Neiman had a Ganz attorney join the call so Neiman
could engage in extensive settlement discussions with opposing counsel.  Although
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the Ganz attorney spoke occasionally, it was usually to ask Neiman whether a
particular provision was satisfactory, rather than vice versa.  Drafts of a settlement
agreement were sent back and forth, and Neiman faxed opposing counsel revisions
to the agreement, which Neiman admitted he had never shown to Ganz.  Opposing
counsel repeatedly objected to dealing with Neiman, but felt they were forced to
deal with him in order to protect their client’s interests.
As the case progressed, some claimants developed conflicts of interest, but
Neiman made no attempt to resolve the conflicts.  Instead, he exacerbated the
conflicts by recruiting third parties, including a political acquaintance, to pressure
claimants into accepting the terms he dictated.  For example, the political
acquaintance called a claimant and threatened that Neiman would place a lien on her
property if she refused to settle.  Neiman also discussed claimants’ cases and their
legal positions with other clients, as well as with outsiders, in an effort to intimidate
the claimants into settlement so he could increase his personal share of any
recovery.
In March 1998, a settlement conference took place, and Neiman and an out-
of-state attorney attended the conference claiming to represent all of the plaintiffs. 
Neiman argued legal points for several hours during this eight-hour settlement
conference.  During these talks it was Neiman who proposed the settlement amounts
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on behalf of the claimants.  He never paused to contact a Ganz attorney for advice
or approval on any issues.  Eventually, the Clerk of Court agreed to a settlement in
excess of one million dollars.  Neiman insisted to opposing counsel that he did not
want the agreement to specify how much each claimant would receive and that he
wanted a lump sum for the claimants to divide among themselves.  Neiman then
deceived the Ganz firm’s clients about the amount of the settlement and the amount
of the distribution to them.  He manipulated the distribution of the settlement funds
so that he and his affiliated attorneys received over fifty percent of the funds, while
some claimants received as little as $10,000 or $20,000.  Although some claimants
requested a complete breakdown of all sums received, they were never given a final
breakdown of the total settlement amount.  Each claimant was advised only of his or
her allotted portion of the settlement proceeds. 
COUNT IX
This count involved the Ganz firm’s representation of individuals in a racial
discrimination complaint against Avis Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc.  Two Haitian-
Americans, who worked for Avis, visited the local NAACP office to complain of
perceived racial discrimination.  The NAACP then arranged a meeting for them with
Neiman, whom the Haitian-Americans believed was an attorney.  During this
meeting, Neiman discussed various aspects of their case and assured them that they
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“definitely had a case.”  No Ganz attorney attended this meeting.  
The next meeting included additional Avis employees who believed they also
had claims.  While a Ganz attorney was initially present with Neiman, the attorney
did not take an active role in the discussions and left soon after the meeting began. 
Neiman told the individuals that they “had a case” and that he had significant
experience with such cases.  Neiman presented the individuals with extensive
representation agreements that he wanted them to sign and, although some did not
want to sign, Neiman eventually convinced each to sign.  Each agreement contained
a paragraph setting forth an “engagement fee,” the amount of which was left blank. 
The claimants never saw a Ganz attorney sign these agreements on behalf of the
firm.  A Caucasian woman from Avis also attended the meeting, serving as the
union’s representative in support of the Haitian workers.  When Neiman learned that
the woman had minority family members, he solicited her to join the legal action as
a party.  
Neiman presided over several other meetings in which he discussed strategies
and settlement options with the claimants.  When he recommended settlement, the
Caucasian woman was concerned because her retirement pension would increase
significantly if she reached her twenty-year anniversary of employment with Avis,
which was just over one year away.  Neiman suggested that he and this woman call
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the pension officials of the company.  When she made the call, with Neiman on the
line, she told the Avis officials that her attorney was on the line and that he would
negotiate the matter for her.  Neiman did not inform the pension official that he was
not an attorney.
Eventually, a presettlement conference took place with the attorneys for Avis. 
Before this meeting, Neiman advised each party what they should expect to receive. 
Neiman attended this meeting and brought attorney Saul Smolar of the Ganz firm,
and also an out-of-state attorney, who was not licensed in Florida, but who spoke
French, as well as attorney Barry Mandelkorn, who was not with the Ganz firm, to
the meeting.  Neiman falsely told Mandelkorn the parties had agreed to a specified
minimum amount.  During the meeting, Neiman spoke on behalf of the claimants.  
Avis eventually agreed to a settlement under the terms of which the
Caucasian woman would lose her entitlement to the pension benefits she desired. 
Neiman told her she should accept the settlement anyway, because it was the best
she would get, and that even if she rejected the settlement, Avis was going to fire
her.  When other claimants also expressed dissatisfaction with the settlement,
Neiman told one claimant that Neiman “would take care of him” if he would get the
other Haitians to agree to the settlement.  Eventually, each claimant did agree, and
the one who assisted Neiman received an additional $10,000.  None of the attorneys
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involved spoke with the claimants about the terms of the settlement.
Neiman never told the claimants the total amount of the settlement.  Instead,
he disclosed to each person only what he or she was receiving.  Neiman himself
disbursed the settlement checks at his office, having each claimant sign a “receipt”
that Neiman wrote in his own handwriting.  After each claimant had signed, Neiman
altered the document into a “closing statement” by adding waiver language and the
amounts each attorney received.  Several claimants attempted to obtain a copy of
the “receipt” they had signed, but Neiman denied their requests, claiming the
documents were confidential.  Neiman also demanded a $5,000 engagement fee
from each claimant, over and above that which he received as a fee in the case. 
This fee was not previously disclosed to or accepted by any claimant.  Neiman
never forwarded a copy of the closing statement to the other attorneys in the case.
Although no active litigation ever took place, and actual costs were only $52,
the portion for the “attorneys” amounted to almost fifty percent of the total
settlement of the Avis case.  The settlement was $573,420 and the Ganz firm
retained $239,368, with Barry Mandelkorn receiving $20,000 and the out-of-state
attorney receiving $20,000. 
COUNT XVIII
During 1998, Neiman was working with the Smolar law firm, which was
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involved in federal litigation regarding discrimination claims against SunTrust Bank. 
Neiman stipulated that during the SunTrust matter he signed a federal complaint and
discovery documents using Smolar’s name, and this action directly violated federal
court rules.  Neiman testified that he routinely signed Smolar’s name to court-filed
documents.
When SunTrust directed an attorney to handle the complaint and the SunTrust
attorney called Smolar’s office, both Smolar and Neiman joined in the call.  Neiman
failed to disclose that he was not an attorney.  Neiman discussed the factual
allegations in the complaint, and brought up the possibility of NAACP involvement. 
Upon completion of the call, the SunTrust attorney concluded that Neiman was an
attorney.
When SunTrust brought in a second attorney to assist with the case, he
telephoned the Smolar firm and asked to speak to the “person responsible for the
case.”  Neiman took the call and stated that he was responsible for the case.  When
the attorney asked to reschedule an upcoming settlement meeting, Neiman agreed to
do so and, just as with the cases in the other counts, Neiman spoke in the first
person, but failed to disclose that he was only a paralegal.  The attorney testified
that after the telephone conversation, he thought Neiman was an attorney, and, in
subsequent correspondence the attorney referred to Neiman as “Brian Neiman,
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Esq.”
Several days later, the second attorney and a colleague attended a meeting
with Neiman, Smolar, and one of the plaintiffs.  Neiman presented the case, argued
the applicable law, and stated that they would bring in another firm to try the case if
it went to trial.  Neiman argued that the complaint was not vulnerable to a motion to
dismiss, and that applicable law would prevent SunTrust from severing the
plaintiffs’ claims.  Neiman spoke of the standards of proof required and the
elements of the causes of action, and clearly advocated the position of the Smolar
firm’s clients.  Neiman stated that he had the authority to settle on behalf of all the
plaintiffs in the case, even though only one plaintiff was present, and he never
sought guidance from Smolar during the discussions.  
In fact, Smolar did not speak at the meeting until someone asked whether
Neiman was an attorney.  When informed that Neiman was not an attorney, the
SunTrust attorneys declined to hear further from Neiman and demanded to hear
directly from attorney Smolar.  Smolar attempted to take over the presentation, but
was unable to keep up with the discussion without continually seeking guidance
from Neiman.
COUNT XXI
In 1998, Neiman and the Ganz firm were involved in federal litigation
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regarding sexual harassment claims against a local CBS affiliate and one of its
employees.  The Ganz firm was referred to the corporate labor counsel for CBS, and
Neiman placed a call to that corporate counsel and stated that he was going to file a
complaint against CBS alleging tort and federal civil rights violations.  Neiman
forcefully argued that the Ganz firm’s client, a black man, was being sexually
harassed by a white female CBS reporter.  Neiman stated that the client had gone to
the NAACP, and as general counsel for the NAACP, Neiman’s firm was handling
the matter.  He claimed that federal jurisdiction arose because the client was black,
and that CBS would have handled the matter differently if he had been white. 
Neiman stated that his firm would attempt to obtain an injunction against the CBS
affiliate.  
After making this presentation, Neiman told corporate counsel that he was
calling to propose the following settlement: the client would take a polygraph test on
the issues of harassment.  If the client passed, CBS would agree to give the client
two years’ salary and pay his attorneys’ fees.  In exchange, the client would resign. 
Corporate counsel declined the offer to settle, but agreed to travel to Florida to meet
with the client.  Based on the manner in which Neiman handled the telephone
conversation, corporate counsel concluded that Neiman was a lawyer.
The next day, corporate counsel received another telephone call from
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Neiman, who was upset because the local CBS affiliate had refused to give the
client the entire day off for the upcoming meeting.  Neiman told corporate counsel
the client needed the whole day off because “I [Neiman] want to prepare him for the
meeting.”  Corporate counsel then arranged for the client to have the day off.  
The subsequent meeting was held at the offices of another law firm, although
no attorney from that firm attended the meeting.  The CBS vice-president of human
resources appeared along with corporate counsel.  Neiman and an attorney affiliated
with the Ganz firm appeared along with the client.  Neiman conducted the meeting,
which lasted well over an hour.  During the client’s description of his grievances,
Neiman would interrupt him to elaborate.  Even though the Ganz affiliated attorney
was present, her participation was minimal. 
Neiman then tried to get CBS to settle, advocating the client’s position by
saying, “Can’t you see how bad this looks,” “you ought to settle,” and “you have
ruined this guy’s life.”  Neiman told corporate counsel and the CBS vice-president
that if CBS did not settle, he was going to sue them.  The case did not settle at that
meeting.  Subsequently, corporate counsel received a letter from the Ganz firm
which clearly indicated that Neiman was not an attorney.  Corporate counsel then
contacted Ganz directly, and the case was settled thereafter.  
REFEREE’S CONCLUSION
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Having made these findings of fact, as well as findings on other counts we
have not discussed, the referee concluded that Neiman had extensively engaged in
the unlicensed practice of law for years.  The referee found that Neiman had not
been properly acting as a paralegal.  Rather, the referee concluded that Neiman
appeared to be a businessman who was trying to use his association with a law firm
to run a lucrative business.  
As noted above, the referee made detailed findings concluding that Neiman
performed acts commonly understood to be the practice of law, such as: holding
himself out as an attorney in dealings with others; attempting to argue and advocate
the merits of cases, the applicability of the law, evidentiary issues, liability issues,
discovery matters, and settlement matters with opposing counsel; and attempting to
analyze statutory and case law and to discuss it with clients and opposing counsel.  
Further, the referee found that not only was Neiman not supervised by an
attorney, Neiman actually “ran the show” in his law-related activities at the law
firm.  The referee noted that: (1) Neiman required that he be the person who opened
the firm’s mail each day unless he was not present in the office; (2) the firm’s fax
machine was located in Neiman’s own office so he could monitor incoming faxes;
(3) Neiman reprimanded Ganz, his purported boss, when Ganz would leave work
early; (4) Neiman decided which cases the firm would or would not accept; (5)
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Neiman set his own schedule and work hours; and (6) upon leaving the Ganz firm,
Neiman retained access to many of the firm’s files.  
The referee ultimately concluded that Neiman had performed services under a
course of conduct that “affect[ed] important rights of a person under the law, and . .
. the reasonable protection of the rights and property of those advised and served
require[d] that [Neiman] possess legal skill and a knowledge of the law greater than
that possessed by the average citizen.”  See State ex rel. Florida Bar v. Sperry, 140
So. 2d 587, 591 (Fla. 1962), vacated on other grounds, 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
RECOMMENDED INJUNCTION
Having found that Neiman engaged in the unlicensed practice of law, the
referee recommended that this Court comprehensively enjoin Neiman from:
a.  having direct contact with any client, opposing counsel or third
party, unless it involves Neiman’s own personal legal matters;
b.  without limiting the above, discussing, construing or interpreting the
applicability of any caselaw, statutory law or any other law with any
opposing counsel or other third party;
c.  speaking on behalf of third parties at settlement conferences,
meetings, negotiations or mediations, even with an attorney present;
d.  appearing on behalf of third parties at settlement meetings,
negotiations or mediations without the attorney present for whom
[Neiman] is employed;
e.  without limiting the above, providing third parties advice on the
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strengths and weaknesses of any legal matter, or making decisions on
behalf of others that require legal skill and a knowledge of the law
greater than the average citizen;
f.  without limiting the above, advising third parties as to various legal
remedies available to them and possible courses of action;
g.  preparing pleadings, motions or any other legal documents for
others, and, without limiting the above, explaining to third parties the
legal significance of any document;
h.  without limiting the above, having direct contact in the nature of
consultation, explanation, recommendation, advice or assistance in the
selection of any legal remedy or course of action;
i.  suggesting, directing or participating in the accumulation of evidence
supporting any legal claim;
j.  holding [himself] out to third parties in such a manner that a third
party places some reliance on [him] to handle legal matters;
k.  impliedly holding himself out as an attorney;
l.  without limiting the above, serving as a conduit or intermediary for
the obtaining or relaying of any information for the preparation,
consideration or evaluation of any legal matter from others who have
never consulted with [Neiman’s] supervising attorney;
m.  soliciting or accepting attorney’s fees;
n.  without limiting the above, corresponding with parties or attorneys
of parties as the representative of any client relating to legal matters;
o.  signing any letter, pleading or other document on behalf of any
attorney or under any attorney’s signature, even with such attorney’s
consent;
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p.  and from otherwise engaging in the practice of law in the State of
Florida until such time as Respondent Brian Neiman is duly licensed to
practice [law] in this state.
ANALYSIS
Neiman now petitions for review asserting three claims: (1) that participating
in settlement negotiations does not constitute the unlicensed practice of law; (2) that
the referee’s recommendation to enjoin Neiman from participating in settlement
negotiations violates the Equal Protection Clause; and (3) that three of the referee’s
recommended injunction provisions are overbroad, prohibiting Neiman from
performing routine paralegal activities.  As a preliminary matter, Neiman does not
contest the referee’s recommended findings of fact.  Therefore, we approve the
findings of fact.  We sequentially address Neiman’s challenges to the referee’s
report.  
First, Neiman argues that participating in settlement negotiations does not
constitute the unlicensed practice of law.  
This Court has held that a referee’s conclusion that a nonlawyer has engaged
in the unlicensed practice of law is “presumed correct and will be upheld unless
clearly erroneous or without support in the record.”  Florida Bar v. Embassy of
Heaven Church, 761 So. 2d 1053, 1054 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Florida Bar v. Weisser,
721 So. 2d 1142, 1144 (Fla. 1998)).  We find the referee’s conclusion that
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Neiman’s conduct during settlement negotiations constituted the unlicensed practice
of law is sound and supported in the record.  
This Court has held that defining the practice of law must be considered in
the context of our obligation to protect the public:
[I]n determining whether the giving of advice and counsel and the
performance of services in legal matters for compensation constitute
the practice of law it is safe to follow the rule that if the giving of such
advice and performance of such services affect important rights of a
person under the law, and if the reasonable protection of the rights and
property of those advised and served requires that the persons giving
such advice possess legal skill and a knowledge of the law greater than
that possessed by the average citizen, then the giving of such advice
and the performance of such services by one for another as a course of
conduct constitute the practice of law.  
State ex rel. Florida Bar v. Sperry, 140 So. 2d 587, 591 (Fla. 1962).  Applying this
definition to the facts of the instant case, the record shows that Neiman committed
an extensive number of acts constituting the unlicensed practice of law when he
participated in settlement negotiations as if he were legal counsel for one of the
parties.  The acts included discussing case law and legal strategy with clients;
speaking on behalf of clients; and arguing the legal merits of cases, as well as other
activity usually reserved only to the judgment of a person educated, trained, and
licensed in the practice of law. 
Moreover, in Florida Bar v. Schramek, 616 So. 2d 979, 983 (Fla. 1993), this
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Court emphasized that the major purpose for prohibiting the unlicensed practice of
law is to protect the consuming public from being advised and represented in legal
matters by unqualified persons who may put the consuming public’s interests at risk. 
See also Florida Bar v. Furman, 376 So. 2d 378, 381 (Fla. 1979).  Indeed,
considering the facts in the instant case, it is apparent that Neiman’s activities are
precisely the type of harmful behavior that this Court strives to prevent in
prohibiting the unlicensed practice of law.  Those activities include misleading
claimants and others so they believed he was an attorney; convincing people he
could adequately represent them in their legal matters; making huge personal profits,
while giving the actual claimants only small portions of the settlements; and even
causing one claimant to lose certain pension benefits.  See Schramek, 616 So. 2d at
983.  
Neiman further argues that enjoining him from participating in settlement
negotiations, while permitting certain nonlawyers such as insurance claims adjusters
to participate in such negotiations, would violate his constitutional right to the equal
protection of the law.  We find no merit to this argument.  
We have generally held that “regulating the practice of law among
nonlawyers does not violate nonlawyers' constitutional rights.”  Florida Bar v.
Miravalle, 752 So. 2d 1049, 1052 (Fla. 2000).  Further, it has been observed that
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employment as a paralegal does not create any fundamental interests, and paralegals
are not a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis.  See Monroe v.
Horwitch, 820 F. Supp. 682 (D. Conn. 1993) (holding that differential treatment of
paralegals, depending upon the existence of attorney supervision, did not violate
equal protection), aff’d, 19 F. 3d 9 (2d Cir. 1994).  In Monroe, the United States
District Court for the District of Connecticut addressed a similar equal protection
claim by a paralegal and found:
No fundamental interest is at stake.  “The Constitution does not create
fundamental interests in particular types of employment.”  Edelstein v.
Wilentz, 812 F.2d 128, 132 (3rd Cir. 1987), citing Massachusetts Bd.
of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313, 96 S. Ct. 2562, 2567, 49
L. Ed. 2d 520 (1976).  Nor is the class of individuals regulated
inherently suspect.  A suspect class is one “saddled with such
disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as
to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process.”  Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement, 427 U.S. at 313, 96 S. Ct.
at 2567.
Id. at 687.  Because the regulation of the unlicensed practice of law serves the
critical role of protecting the public from unqualified individuals who attempt to
perform legal services, nonlawyers do not have a constitutional right to practice law
by participating in settlement negotiations or giving legal advice.  See Miravalle,
752 So. 2d at 1052.  There is simply no constitutional right to engage in the
unlicensed practice of law.
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Finally, Neiman argues that three of the referee’s recommended injunction
provisions are overbroad, prohibiting him from performing routine paralegal
activities: 
a.  having direct contact with any client, opposing counsel or third
party, unless it involves Neiman’s own personal legal matters; . . . 
g.  preparing pleadings, motions or any other legal documents for
others, and, without limiting the above, explaining to third parties the
legal significance of any document; . . . 
i.  suggesting, directing or participating in the accumulation of evidence
supporting any legal claim. . . .
Neiman suggests, for example, that these recommendations prohibit him from:
answering the phone because it could be a client; scheduling meetings for an
employing attorney; drafting any documents whatsoever for an employing attorney;
and picking up medical records.  He states that these recommendations effectively
bar him from setting foot inside his employer’s law office.  We disagree.  
Neiman’s argument overlooks the facts found by the referee and approved by
this Court as well as the referee’s and this Court’s conclusion in this case that he
has been conclusively proven to have extensively engaged in the unlicensed practice
of law for profit. 
The referee’s recommended terms of injunction are based on Neiman’s
demonstrated misconduct.  Therefore, Neiman’s compliance with the terms of the
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recommended injunction shall be interpreted in accordance with this Court’s
definition of the practice of law in Sperry, set out above.  We find the challenged
provisions appropriate in the present case based on the egregious and cumulative
acts that Neiman perpetrated repeatedly for approximately seven years.  He held
himself out as an attorney and used this persona to take advantage of numerous
members of the public for his personal financial profit.  In view of these facts, we
conclude the referee’s recommendations as to the terms of the injunction are
warranted and are clearly necessary for the protection of the public.
Although there is no Rule Regulating the Florida Bar specifically dealing with
the employment of paralegals, the rules provide guidance concerning the
employment of suspended attorneys and attorneys who have been disbarred or
whose disciplinary resignations have been allowed.  Rule 3-6.1 (Employment of
Certain Attorneys or Former Attorneys) provides that an “authorized business entity
(as defined elsewhere in these rules), may employ individuals subject to this rule to
perform such services only as may ethically be performed by other lay persons
employed by authorized business entities.”  Further, subdivision (d) of rule 3-6.1
(Client Contact) provides that “[n]o employee shall have direct contact with any
client.  Direct client contact does not include the participation of the employee as an
observer in any meeting, hearing, or interaction between a supervising attorney and
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a client.”  In light of this language, we conclude that paralegals may only perform
such services as may be ethically performed by other lay persons employed by the
business entity.  Therefore, if suspended or former attorneys are not allowed to have
client contact, as described in rule 3-6.1, then neither should paralegals.
Neiman argues that this recommendation will enjoin him from performing
menial tasks like answering the telephone for fear that he would have contact with a
client, opposing party, or third party.  Neiman has unnecessarily interpreted this
recommendation to the extreme because the purpose of the referee’s
recommendation is to prevent the unlicensed practice of law.  Thus, for Neiman to
violate the injunction, he would have to engage in conduct similar to that which the
referee has already reviewed and concluded constitutes the unlicensed practice of
law.  Obviously, answering the telephone without discussing any legal matter would
not constitute the unlicensed practice of law according to Sperry and, therefore,
would not violate the injunction.  
Neiman also argues that the referee’s recommendation that he be enjoined
from “preparing pleadings, motions or any other legal documents for others, and,
without limiting the above, explaining to third parties the legal significance of any
document” is overbroad because it precludes him from preparing such documents
under the supervision of his employing attorney.  We disagree because the term
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“others” does not include a supervising attorney, particularly because a supervising
attorney must approve and sign a prepared document before it is filed with a court. 
As a result, the document is not attributed to the paralegal, but to the supervising
attorney.  Also, we note that the referee clarified his recommendation about the
preparation of documents by further recommending that Neiman be enjoined from
“explaining to third parties the legal significance of any document.”  This specific
language has been used previously by this Court in enjoining nonlawyers from
“preparing pleadings and any other legal documents for others.”  Florida Bar v.
Eubanks, 752 So. 2d 540, 544 (Fla. 1999).  Although a clearer recommendation may
have been to enjoin Neiman from preparing documents for third parties or for
anyone other than a supervising attorney, we conclude that the referee’s
recommendation under the circumstances of this case that Neiman be enjoined from
preparing legal documents for others is not overbroad.
Finally, Neiman argues that the referee’s recommendation that he be enjoined
from “suggesting, directing or participating in the accumulation of evidence
supporting any legal claim” is overbroad because it would preclude him from
participating in such tasks as picking up medical records from a custodian of
records.  This Court has enjoined nonlawyers from “suggesting, directing, or
participating in the accumulation of evidence to be submitted with the completed
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forms.”  Eubanks, 752 So. 2d at 544 (emphasis added); see Schramek, 616 So. 2d at
987; Florida Bar v. King, 468 So. 2d 982, 983 (Fla. 1985).  The referee’s
recommendation in the instant case is similar to the cited cases in that it enjoins
Neiman from having a directive role in the accumulation of evidence.  Although
Neiman argues that this language will prevent him from doing ministerial tasks for
his employing attorney, under the attorney’s direct supervision, we disagree.  To use
Neiman’s example, picking up medical records does not involve his “suggesting,
directing, or participating in the accumulation of evidence” because it does not
ordinarily involve a determination of what evidence should be accumulated.  Rather,
it is purely a ministerial act at the direction of his supervising attorney.  Simply
picking up medical records as a courier would not constitute the unlicensed practice
of law and, therefore, would not violate the injunction.  
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, based upon the circumstances and analysis set out above, we
agree with the referee that Neiman has improperly engaged in the unlicensed
practice of law for profit for years.  In common parlance, Neiman’s activities fail the
“duck” test.  That is, in common parlance, one would expect that if it looks like a
duck, and walks, talks, and acts like a duck, one can usually safely assume it is a
duck.  Unfortunately, while Neiman at all times acted like an educated and licensed
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lawyer, he was not.  And, just as the public must be protected from uneducated and
unlicensed physicians in an operating room, the public must be protected from
bogus attorneys seeking to profit from the problems of the innocent and uninformed
with serious personal and legal problems who may be taken in by a smooth but
deceitful demeanor.  We therefore approve the referee’s report and
recommendations in their entirety and we hereby enjoin Brian Neiman, individually,
and Brian Neiman, Inc., a Florida corporation, from engaging in the unlicensed
practice of law in the State of Florida, including those activities specified in the
referee’s report and quoted above.  Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 650
Apalachee Parkway, Tallahassee, Florida 32399, for recovery of costs from Brian
Neiman, individually, and Brian Neiman, Inc., jointly and severally, in the amount of
$28,726.16, for which sum let execution issue.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and
QUINCE, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF
FILED, DETERMINED.
Original Proceeding - The Florida Bar
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, and Mary Ellen Bateman, UPL Counsel,
The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida; Jacquelyn Plasner Needelman, Branch UPL
Counsel, Miami, Florida; and Allan James Sullivan, Co-Bar Counsel of Sullivan &
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Rivero, P.A., Miami, Florida,
for Complainant
H. Dohn Williams, Jr. of Hicks, Anderson & Kneale, P.A., Miami, Florida,
for Respondents