Title: MARCIA SNIECINSKI V BLUE CROSS/BLUE SHIELD
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 119407
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: July 22, 2003

____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 22, 2003  
MARCIA SNIECINSKI,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v 
No. 119407  
BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD  
OF MICHIGAN,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH.  
CORRIGAN, C.J.  
In 
this 
pregnancy discrimination case, we have been asked  
to decide whether the trial court erred by denying defendant  
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan’s (BCBSM) motions for  
directed 
verdict 
and 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.  We  
hold that because plaintiff failed to adduce evidence of a  
causal 
connection 
between her pregnancy and BCBSM’s failure to  
hire her, BCBSM was entitled to a finding of no cause of  
 
action as a matter of law. The trial court erred by denying  
defendant’s motions for directed verdict and judgment  
notwithstanding the verdict.  
I. Underlying Facts and Procedural History  
Blue Care Network of East Michigan (BCN), a wholly owned  
subsidiary of BCBSM, employed plaintiff as a telemarketing  
representative.  
Plaintiff, a high school graduate, began work  
at BCN’s predecessor, Group Health Services (GHS), in 1983.  
She held a variety of positions.  In 1987, she became a  
telemarketing representative. In 1989, GHS merged into BCN.  
BCN honored the seniority that plaintiff had acquired at GHS.  
Also in 1989, plaintiff became pregnant.  She experienced  
pregnancy complications that required her to take a medical  
leave for seven months.  In October of that year, plaintiff  
gave birth to her daughter.  In November, she returned to work  
for BCN.  
Plaintiff became pregnant again in 1992 while she was  
supervised by Michael Curdy. Plaintiff testified that after  
she informed Curdy about her pregnancy, he seemed upset. He  
referred to plaintiff’s chair as the “pregnancy chair.”  He  
stated that he would not let anyone sit in that chair again.  
He asked plaintiff whether she was going to experience  
problems with her pregnancy as she had in 1989.  Curdy further  
told plaintiff that he would not permit her to use either sick  
2  
time or unpaid leave because of her pregnancy.  
In January 1993, Curdy placed a memo regarding  
plaintiff’s attendance in her personnel file.  When plaintiff  
learned about the memo, she complained to Patricia Stone, the  
Regional Human Resources Manager at BCN. Stone informed Curdy  
that he had not followed the appropriate procedure for  
discipline.  She advised Curdy to follow the correct procedure  
to determine whether a problem existed regarding plaintiff’s  
attendance before a disciplinary memo could be placed in  
plaintiff’s file.  Stone then removed the memo from  
plaintiff’s file.  
Plaintiff again experienced pregnancy complications that  
required her to take one week off from work in February 1993.  
During that time, she suffered a miscarriage.  Plaintiff  
testified that upon her return to work Curdy spoke to her  
about future pregnancies and stated, “We’ll have to deal with  
that problem when it comes.”  
During 1993, the marketing departments of BCN and BCBSM  
were merged.  Because the merger was going to eliminate the  
telemarketing positions at BCN, BCN telemarketers seeking to  
continue their employment were required to interview for a  
position of account representative at BCBSM.  
In August 1993, plaintiff interviewed for an account  
representative position with Donald Whitford, BCBSM Regional  
3  
 
  
Sales Director; Donald Roseberry, BCBSM Sales Team Manager;  
and Curdy.1 
Plaintiff testified that Curdy asked about her  
time off from work related to her previous pregnancy  
complications.  He also asked whether plaintiff thought her  
pregnancies would be a future problem.  After a second  
interview with Whitford and Roseberry only, plaintiff was  
offered 
an 
account 
representative 
position 
at 
BCBSM.  
Immediately thereafter, plaintiff told Whitford and Roseberry  
that she was pregnant.  Plaintiff testified that they “seemed  
surprised” and were “taken aback,” but congratulated her.  
Plaintiff and other BCN employees expecting to transfer  
to BCBSM continued to work for BCN until the merger.  
Plaintiff 
testified 
that when Curdy heard about her pregnancy,  
he remarked, “I’ll have to make sure I don’t hire anybody in  
child bearing years in the future.” In September 1993, soon  
after receiving the job offer, plaintiff began experiencing  
pregnancy-related complications.  She was again required to  
take time off from work. She remained on medical leave from  
September 1993 until May 1994, six weeks after giving birth to  
her son.  
Shortly 
after 
plaintiff 
was 
offered 
the 
account  
representative 
position, 
Whitford 
and 
Curdy 
contacted 
Stone 
to  
1  Although Curdy was a BCN employee at the time of the 
interview, he was slated to become the new team leader for 
BCBSM in the Flint region after the merger.  
4  
 
discuss placing a disciplinary note in plaintiff’s file  
regarding 
her 
attendance 
problems 
during 
previous 
pregnancies.  
Stone 
testified 
that 
Whitford wanted Curdy’s January 1993 memo  
put back in plaintiff’s file because plaintiff was continuing  
to have attendance problems.  Stone advised them that placing  
a memo in plaintiff’s file was inappropriate.  
On November 22, 1993, while plaintiff was on medical  
leave, the planned merger of the sales departments of BCN and  
BCBSM occurred, and all BCN employees who had been offered  
jobs with BCBSM terminated their employment with BCN and began  
working for BCBSM.  Plaintiff did not report for work at BCBSM  
because she was on medical leave at that time.  Instead, BCBSM  
held open an account representative position for her.  On  
March 1, 1994, plaintiff’s short-term disability benefits  
expired, and she began to collect long-term disability (LTD)  
benefits.
 Under BCN’s LTD policy, an employee on medical  
leave converts from short-term to LTD status on the first day  
of the employee’s sixth month off work.  The LTD policy  
provides that the employee is separated from the company and  
issued a final pay check, including accrued vacation and  
personal time.  
On October 11, 1993, while plaintiff was on short-term  
disability, she requested an extension of her medical leave.  
Plaintiff was concerned that the account representative  
5  
position at BCBSM would no longer be available when she was  
ready to return to work.  Stone informed plaintiff that the  
position would be held open until plaintiff went on LTD, if  
plaintiff’s medical leave extended that long. 
Stone’s  
notations 
in 
her 
Franklin planner corroborated this account of  
her conversation with plaintiff. The notes read as follows:  
Marcia concerned over job security- 
Advised her that not issue until LTD  
If LTD –> Blue Cross job not possible. 
We 
will 
attempt 
to 
find 
position 
similar  
qualifications/pay.  
Because plaintiff did not return to work before March 1,  
1994, she began collecting LTD benefits.  BCN issued plaintiff  
a vacation and incentive payout and separated her from the  
company.  
In late May 1994, plaintiff informed BCBSM that she was  
ready to return to work.  Because of the 1993 merger, her  
telemarketing position at BCN had been eliminated.  The BCBSM  
account representative position previously offered to her was  
not filled because of a company-wide hiring freeze resulting  
from a loss of Medicare business.  
Plaintiff thereafter collected unemployment benefits for  
six months while making periodic efforts to find another job.  
In December 1994, BCN offered, and plaintiff accepted, a  
position as a marketing representative that was unrelated to  
her previous job.  After resuming work, plaintiff learned that  
6  
 
 
BCBSM had recently hired an account representative who was a  
college graduate.  Both before and after the merger, the BCBSM  
account representative position required a college degree.  
The degree requirement had been waived only for those BCN  
employees transferring to BCBSM during the merger. Plaintiff  
had no college degree.  
In March 1996, while still employed at BCN, plaintiff  
sued BCBSM, alleging sex (pregnancy) discrimination in  
violation of Michigan’s Civil Rights Act (CRA), MCL 37.2101 et  
seq.  In August 1996, plaintiff saw a posting for an account  
representative with BCBSM.  The position still required a  
college degree. Upon her inquiry, the BCBSM human resources  
department informed her that the degree requirement could not  
be waived.  On September 20, 1996, plaintiff resigned from her  
position with BCN.  She did not seek employment, instead  
opting to enroll in college to attend classes part-time.  
Plaintiff’s lawsuit proceeded to trial. 
The jury  
rendered a verdict for plaintiff, awarding her $125,000 for  
past economic loss, $136,000 for future economic loss, and  
$90,000 in noneconomic damages.  Defendant moved for judgment  
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), a new trial, and  
remittitur of plaintiff’s economic damages.  The trial court  
denied the motions.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the  
7  
 
 
 
 
 
verdict.2  We granted BCBSM’s application for leave to appeal.3  
II. Standard of Review  
Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying  
its motions for directed verdict or JNOV.4  We review de novo  
the trial court’s denial of both motions.  Forge v Smith, 458  
Mich 198, 204; 580 NW2d 876 (1998); Smith v Jones, 246 Mich  
App 270, 273-274; 632 NW2d 509 (2001).  We “review the  
evidence and all legitimate inferences in the light most  
favorable to the nonmoving party.”  Wilkinson v Lee, 463 Mich  
388, 391; 617 NW2d 305 (2000); Forge, supra at 204, quoting  
Orzel v Scott Drug Co, 449 Mich 550, 557; 537 NW2d 208 (1995).  
A motion for directed verdict or JNOV should be granted only  
if the evidence viewed in this light fails to establish a  
claim as a matter of law.  Wilkinson, supra at 391; Forge,  
supra at 204.  
III. Analysis  
Section 202 of the CRA, MCL 37.2202, provides in part:  
(1) An employer shall not do any of the 
following:  
(A) Fail or refuse to hire or recruit, 
discharge, or otherwise discriminate against an  
2  Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued March 9, 2001 
(Docket No. 212788).  
3  466 Mich 859 (2002).  
4  Given our holding on this issue, we need not address 
BCBSM’s remaining issues.  
8  
 
 
individual 
with 
respect 
to 
employment, 
compensation, or a term, condition, or privilege of 
employment, because of religion, race, color, 
national origin, age, sex, height, weight, or 
marital status. [Emphasis added.]  
The CRA defines “sex,” within the meaning of the above  
section, as “‘[s]ex’ includes, but is not limited to,  
pregnancy, childbirth, or a medical condition related to  
pregnancy or childbirth . . . .” MCL 37.2201(d). Plaintiff  
claims that defendant discriminated against her in violation  
of the CRA by refusing to hire her because she was pregnant.5  
Proof of discriminatory treatment in violation of the CRA may  
be established by direct evidence or by indirect or  
circumstantial evidence. DeBrow v Century 21 Great Lakes, Inc  
(After Remand), 463 Mich 534, 539; 620 NW2d 836 (2001);  
Harrison v Olde Financial Corp, 225 Mich App 601, 606-607; 572  
NW2d 679 (1997).  
In cases involving direct evidence of discrimination, a  
plaintiff 
may 
prove 
unlawful discrimination in the same manner  
as a plaintiff would prove any other civil case.  Hazle v Ford  
Motor Co, 464 Mich 456, 462; 628 NW2d 515 (2001). 
We have  
previously cited with approval the United States Court of  
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’s definition of “‘direct  
5  The 
Court 
of 
Appeals 
improperly 
characterized  
plaintiff’s claim as wrongful discharge. Plaintiff concedes  
that her claim stems from BCBSM’s failure to hire her rather  
than from wrongful discharge.  
9  
 
  
 
evidence’ as ‘evidence which, if believed, requires the  
conclusion that unlawful discrimination was at least a  
motivating factor in the employer’s actions.’” Hazle, supra  
at 462, quoting Jacklyn v Schering-Plough Healthcare Products  
Sales Corp, 176 F3d 921, 926 (CA 6, 1999); Harrison, supra at  
610.  
In a direct evidence case involving mixed motives, i.e.,  
where the adverse employment decision could have been based on  
both 
legitimate 
and 
legally 
impermissible 
reasons, 
a 
plaintiff  
must 
prove 
that 
the 
defendant’s discriminatory animus was more  
likely than not a “substantial” or “motivating” factor in the  
decision. Price Waterhouse v Hopkins, 490 US 228, 244; 109 S  
Ct 1775; 104 L Ed 2d 268 (1989);6 Harrison, supra at 612-613.  
In addition, a plaintiff must establish her qualification or  
other eligibility for the position sought and present direct  
proof that the discriminatory animus was causally related to  
the adverse decision.  Harrison, supra at 612-613. 
Stated  
another way, a defendant may avoid a finding of liability by  
proving that it would have made the same decision even if the  
impermissible consideration had not played a role in the  
6 Although the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
Price Waterhouse involved title VII of the federal Civil  
Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC 2000e et seq., its analysis is 
persuasive.
 We agree with Harrison that the reasoning of 
Price Waterhouse is applicable in cases arising under the CRA.  
See Harrison, supra at 612.  
10  
 
 
 
 
 
decision. Price Waterhouse, supra at 244-245.  
In cases involving indirect or circumstantial evidence,  
a 
plaintiff 
must 
proceed by using the burden-shifting approach  
set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green, 411 US 792; 93 S  
Ct 1817; 36 L Ed 2d 668 (1973).  Hazle, supra at 462; DeBrow,  
supra at 540.  This approach allows “a plaintiff to present a  
rebuttable prima facie case on the basis of proofs from which  
a factfinder could infer that the plaintiff was the victim of  
unlawful discrimination.” DeBrow, supra at 538. To establish  
a rebuttable prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff  
must present evidence that (1) she belongs to a protected  
class, (2) she suffered an adverse employment action, (3) she  
was qualified for the position, and (4) her failure to obtain  
the position occurred under circumstances giving rise to an  
inference of unlawful discrimination.  Hazle, supra at 463;  
Lytle v Malady (On Rehearing), 458 Mich 153, 172-173; 579 NW2d  
906 (1998) (opinion by WEAVER, J.); see also McDonnell Douglas,  
supra at 802.7  Once a plaintiff has presented a prima facie  
case of discrimination, the burden then shifts to the  
defendant 
to 
articulate 
a 
legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory 
reason  
7  As required by Hazle and Lytle, the elements of the  
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case are adapted to the present 
factual situation. The elements of a prima facie case under 
the McDonnell Douglas approach should be tailored to the facts 
and circumstances of each case.  Hazle, supra at 463 n 6; see 
also Lytle, supra at 173 n 19 (opinion by WEAVER, J.).  
11  
  
  
for the adverse employment action.  Hazle, supra at 464;  
Lytle, supra at 173 (opinion by WEAVER, J.). If a defendant  
produces such evidence, the presumption is rebutted, and the  
burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the  
defendant’s reasons were not the true reasons, but a mere  
pretext for discrimination. Hazle, supra at 465-466; Lytle,  
supra at 174 (opinion by WEAVER, J.).  
Under either the direct evidence test or the McDonnell  
Douglas test, a plaintiff must establish a causal link between  
the 
discriminatory 
animus 
and 
the 
adverse 
employment 
decision.  
Because a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas test  
creates 
a 
presumption 
of 
unlawful 
discrimination, 
causation 
is  
presumed. Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v Burdine, 450 US  
248, 254; 101 S Ct 1089; 67 L Ed 2d 207 (1981). A defendant  
may rebut the presumption of causation by articulating a  
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment  
decision. Under the direct evidence test, a plaintiff must  
present direct proof that the discriminatory animus was  
causally related to the adverse employment decision.  Price  
Waterhouse, supra at 244-245; Harrison, supra at 612-613.  
In support of her claim, plaintiff relied in part upon  
the following alleged statements regarding her pregnancies:  
(1) Curdy referred to plaintiff’s chair as the 
“pregnancy chair” and stated that he was not going 
to allow anyone else to sit in the chair;  
12  
 
  
(2) Curdy informed plaintiff that she would 
not be permitted to use sick time or unpaid leave 
in connection with her second pregnancy;  
(3) When discussing possible complications 
with future pregnancies, Curdy stated, “We’ll have 
to deal with that problem when it comes”;  
(4) Curdy asked plaintiff whether she was 
going to have complications with her second  
pregnancy “like she had in 1989";  
(5) Curdy asked plaintiff about her pregnancy 
complications at the interview for the BCBSM  
account representative position; and  
(6) Curdy stated that he would never hire 
anyone in child-bearing years again.  
BCBSM argued that the above statements were merely “stray  
remarks” and not direct evidence of discrimination.8  We need  
not determine whether the cited comments were mere “stray  
remarks.”  Regardless of whether these were “stray remarks” or  
direct evidence of a discriminatory animus, plaintiff failed  
as a matter of law to prove that the remarks were causally  
related to BCBSM’s failure to hire her. Stated another way,  
plaintiff failed to establish causation under either the  
8 Factors to consider in assessing whether statements are 
“stray remarks” include: (1) whether they were made by a 
decision maker or an agent within the scope of his employment, 
(2) whether they were related to the decision-making process, 
(3) whether they were vague and ambiguous or clearly 
reflective of discriminatory bias, (4) whether they were 
isolated or part of a pattern of biased comments, and (5) 
whether they were made close in time to the adverse employment 
decision. Cooley v Carmike Cinemas, Inc, 25 F3d 1325, 1330 
(CA 6, 1994); Krohn v Sedgwick James, Inc, 244 Mich App 289, 
292; 624 NW2d 212 (2001).  
13  
 
McDonnell Douglas test or the direct evidence test.  
BCBSM preserved its causation argument by raising it in  
both the motion for directed verdict and the motion for JNOV.  
The 
trial 
court 
did 
not specifically address BCBSM’s causation  
argument in ruling on the motion for directed verdict.  The  
court merely stated that reasonable minds could differ  
regarding the interpretation of the facts of this case.  
Further, the trial court failed altogether to address BCBSM’s  
causation argument when deciding the JNOV motion.  
Defendant presented evidence that plaintiff’s job offer  
for an account representative position at BCBSM expired  
administratively because of the neutral operation of the LTD  
policy.  Plaintiff produced no evidence that Curdy or Whitford  
manipulated the operation of that neutral policy to prevent  
BCBSM from hiring her because of her pregnancy.  Human  
resources manager Stone’s direct testimony and corroborative  
evidence established that BCBSM offered to hold the position  
open for plaintiff only until she went on long-term  
disability.  Thereafter, the job was “not possible” by virtue  
of the neutral operation of the LTD policy and plaintiff’s  
resulting separation from BCN.  Plaintiff was informed of the  
terms of the LTD policy in October 1993, five months before  
she accepted LTD benefits.  
When plaintiff was ready to return to work in May 1994,  
14  
her previous job at BCN no longer existed because the  
marketing departments had been unified and transferred to  
BCBSM.
 Under BCN’s general practices, the company would  
attempt to place a former employee returning from long-term  
disability in her previous position or a comparable position,  
but BCN no longer had such a position because of the  
unification.  In addition, it is undisputed that, at the time  
plaintiff was able to return to work, both BCN and BCBSM were  
in the midst of the hiring freeze precipitated by the loss of  
Medicare business.  
Plaintiff argues that BCBSM should have hired her as an  
account representative in May 1994 because of her previous job  
offer.  In addition, the dissent contends that BCBSM’s failure  
to 
“rehire” 
plaintiff as an account representative is contrary  
to its custom of allowing an employee to resume a previous  
position upon return from disability status.  In support of  
her argument, plaintiff produced evidence that eighty-nine  
other individuals returning from LTD status were returned to  
their previous jobs.  That evidence is inapposite, however,  
because plaintiff did not seek to return to her previous job.  
Rather, she sought to begin new employment at BCBSM.  The  
eighty-nine individuals to whom plaintiff refers had returned  
to the same company, either BCN or BCBSM, from which they were  
separated under the LTD policy.  Neither BCN’s general  
15  
practices nor the LTD policy required, or for that matter  
authorized, BCN to transfer a former employee to BCBSM, a  
separate corporate entity. In short, plaintiff never worked  
for BCBSM, and she has not demonstrated a causal relationship  
between the alleged evidence of discriminatory animus and  
BCBSM’s failure to hire her.  
Plaintiff further argues that BCBSM kept her on BCN’s  
payroll, thus forcing her to collect LTD benefits as a BCN  
employee rather than as a BCBSM employee.  In addition, she  
contends that BCBSM did not inform her that she would have had  
to come to work on November 22, 1993, the date of the  
unification, to fill out paperwork necessary to transfer her  
to BCBSM. Plaintiff incorrectly assumes that merely filling  
out paperwork was sufficient to effect her transfer to BCBSM.  
Further, although plaintiff presented conflicting evidence on  
this point at trial, she now maintains that she was able to go  
to work on that day to fill out the paperwork notwithstanding  
her medical leave.  
Plaintiff’s arguments fail because she was required to  
begin working for BCBSM as an account representative in order  
to accept the job offer and become a BCBSM employee.  Whitford  
testified that an individual becomes a BCBSM employee by  
reporting to work and performing the functions of the job,  
not by merely completing paperwork.  According to Whitford,  
16  
 
 
 
  
 
   
   
until a prospective employee reports to work and performs her  
job functions, a job offer is simply that—“strictly a job  
offer . . . .”9  
Plaintiff did not report to work after the unification  
and before her separation from BCN.  Thus, she never performed  
the functions of a BCBSM account representative to thereby  
accept the job offer.  While plaintiff argued at trial that  
completing the paperwork was sufficient to execute her  
transfer, she offered no evidence in support of her argument.  
9  Whitford’s testimony is consistent with the law 
regarding unilateral contracts. 
Generally, employment  
contracts are unilateral and may be accepted only by  
performance. In re Certified Question, 432 Mich 438, 445-447;  
443 NW2d 112 (1989); Cunningham v 4-D Tool Co, 182 Mich App 
99, 106-107; 451 NW2d 514 (1989).  
A unilateral contract is one in which the  
promisor does not receive a promise in return as 
consideration.  1 Restatement Contracts, §§ 12, 52, 
pp 10-12, 58-59.  In simplest terms, a typical 
employment 
contract 
can 
be 
described 
as 
a  
unilateral contract in which the employer promises 
to pay an employee wages in return for the  
employee’s work. 
In essence, the employer’s 
promise constitutes the terms of the employment 
agreement; the employee’s action or forbearance in 
reliance upon the employer’s promise constitutes 
sufficient consideration to make the promise 
legally binding.  In such circumstances, there is 
no contractual requirement that the promisee do 
more than perform the act upon which the promise is 
predicated in order to legally obligate the  
promisor. [Certified Question, supra at 446, citing 
Toussaint v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 
408 Mich 579, 630-631; 292 NW2d 880 (1980) 
(separate opinion of RYAN, J).]  
17  
Rather, her argument was based wholly on speculation.  Because  
plaintiff never accepted the job offer by working for BCBSM,  
she never became a BCBSM employee.  She remained on BCN’s  
payroll and collected LTD benefits as a BCN employee.  
BCBSM held open the account representative position for  
plaintiff until she began collecting LTD benefits.  When  
plaintiff contacted Stone because of concern about BCBSM  
filling the account representative position while she was on  
medical leave, Stone informed her that the job would not be  
“possible” if plaintiff went on long-term disability.  
Therefore, 
when 
plaintiff began accepting LTD benefits and was  
separated from BCN, the job offer expired under the terms of  
the neutral LTD policy.  
Plaintiff did not show that she was treated differently  
from others under the LTD policy because of her pregnancy.  
She also did not show that Curdy, Whitford, or anyone at BCBSM  
or BCN manipulated the operation of the LTD policy to prevent  
her hire because she was pregnant. Rather, plaintiff relied  
on conjecture and speculation to support her claim that BCBSM  
failed to hire her because of an unlawful pregnancy animus.  
Mere speculation or conjecture is insufficient to establish  
reasonable inferences of causation.  Skinner v Square D Co,  
445 Mich 153, 164; 516 NW2d 475 (1994).  
Plaintiff failed to establish a causal nexus between her  
18  
pregnancy and the adverse employment action.  Because the  
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff,  
fails to establish her claim as a matter of law, the trial  
court should have granted BCBSM’s motion for a directed  
verdict or a JNOV. Wilkinson, supra at 391; Forge, supra at  
204.  
IV. Conclusion  
We conclude that because plaintiff failed to establish a  
causal 
connection 
between her pregnancy and BCBSM’s failure to  
hire her, BCBSM was entitled to a finding of no cause of  
action as a matter of law.  Given this holding, we need not  
address BCBSM’s remaining issues.  We reverse the judgment in  
favor of plaintiff and remand this case to the trial court for  
entry of judgment in favor of BCBSM.  
Maura D. Corrigan 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman  
CAVANAGH, J.  
I concur in the result only.  
Michael F. Cavanagh  
19  
 
 
___________________________________ 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
MARCIA SNIECINSKI,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
No. 119407  
BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD  
OF MICHIGAN,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
WEAVER, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
I concur with the majority to the extent that it reverses  
the trial court’s decision to deny defendant’s motion for  
directed verdict regarding plaintiff’s noneconomic damages.  
As stated by Judge SAWYER, who concurred in part and dissented  
in part on the Court of Appeals panel below, “plaintiff failed  
to present any ‘specific and definite evidence of mental  
anguish, anxiety or distress’ as she was required to do.”1  
However, I disagree with the majority conclusion that  
plaintiff failed to establish a causal nexus between her  
1  Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued March 9, 2001 
(Docket No. 212788), quoting Wiskatoni v Michigan Nat’l Bank- 
West, 716 F2d 378, 389 (CA 6, 1983).  
 
 
 
 
pregnancy and the adverse employment action.2
 Although  
plaintiff was told that if she went on long-term disability,  
the account representative job was “not possible,” she was  
also reassured by defendant’s management employees that she  
need not worry about her job opportunity.  Indeed, she was  
given the impression that her future transfer to BCBSM was  
essentially 
an 
administrative matter.  The record reveals that  
she was told that BCBSM “did not want to absorb the medical  
disability at that time . . . they wanted [her] to take the  
disability benefits through Blue Care Network and then once  
[she] was—six weeks after [she] had her child and returned to  
work [she] would be transferred to Blue Cross and Blue Shield  
. . . ."  In my view, this evidence provides a reasonable  
inference that the defendant’s failure to hire plaintiff was  
causally connected to her pregnancy.  
Regarding 
defendant’s 
remaining 
issues 
on 
appeal, 
I 
would  
affirm the result and reasoning of the Court of Appeals  
majority.  
Elizabeth A. Weaver  
2  As noted by the majority, ante at 9 n 9, the Court of 
Appeals mischaracterized plaintiff’s claim as wrongful 
discharge rather than failure to hire.  
2  
___________________________________ 
  
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
MARCIA SNIECINSKI,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
No. 119407  
BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD  
OF MICHIGAN,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
KELLY, J. (dissenting).  
In resolving this appeal for defendant, the majority  
interprets the facts in the light most favorable to defendant.  
It ignores the fact that the jury is entitled to infer  
causation from the proofs presented.  Viewed properly, in the  
light most favorable to plaintiff, the facts support the  
jury's verdict. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.  
I  
This Court reviews motions for a directed verdict or  
judgment 
notwithstanding 
the 
verdict 
by 
drawing 
all 
legitimate  
factual inferences in the light most favorable to the  
nonmoving party. Wilkinson v Lee, 463 Mich 388, 391; 617 NW2d  
305 
(2000). 
 
This 
rule reflects the longstanding understanding  
of our appellate courts that a jury's verdict should not be  
lightly disturbed.  However, the majority does just that,  
viewing the evidence that reached the jury through a distorted  
lens.  
A plaintiff must convince a jury that he has satisfied  
each element of his cause.  He may do that either with direct  
evidence or with evidence that permits the jury to infer the  
required conclusion. Here, the majority properly catalogues  
the discriminatory actions undertaken by Mr. Curdy, ante at  
13, but ignores the jury's ability to infer that the same  
discriminatory animus caused plaintiff's job loss later.  
Rather, the majority simply concludes that the existence of  
defendant's long-term disability (LTD) policy made it  
unreasonable to conclude that plaintiff established causation  
and, therefore, plaintiff loses.  
However, plaintiff presented abundant proof to create an  
inference regarding causation consistent with the jury's  
finding.  The jury was entitled to believe that the facts  
precipitating the loss of her account representative position  
were an extension of the discriminatory animus to which  
defendant subjected plaintiff.  Specifically, defendant's  
words and actions made it unclear whether it required  
plaintiff to report for work at defendant before the onset of  
LTD benefits.  
Several important facts support the jury's conclusion.  
2  
First, defendant's management employees repeatedly assured  
plaintiff that her position would be available when she  
returned from medical leave.  However, no one informed her  
that, to preserve her job, she would need to report to  
defendant before she began collecting LTD benefits. Instead  
of transferring her to defendant's medical leave roster on the  
date of the merger, one of defendant's executives, Joel  
Gibson, decided to keep plaintiff on the Blue Care Network  
(BCN) roll.  
In September 1993, plaintiff asked Pat Stone, the human  
resources manager at BCN, how the leave of absence would "fall  
within the merger . . . ."  Plaintiff testified that Stone  
talked to Gibson and then explained to plaintiff that because  
defendant "did not want to absorb the medical disability at  
that time . . . they wanted [her] to take the disability  
benefits through Blue Care Network and then once [she]  
was-
-
-six weeks after [she] had her child and returned to work  
[she] would be transferred to Blue Cross and Blue Shield  
. . . ." Plaintiff testified that had defendant transferred  
plaintiff to defendant's disability roster, she would have  
been entitled to resume the account representative position  
upon returning from LTD leave.  
Additionally, despite having received repeated phone  
calls from plaintiff to check on the status of her BCBSM job,  
3  
 
Curdy, 
Whitford, 
and 
Roseberry 
neglected 
to 
return 
plaintiff's  
calls. Plaintiff managed to reach Roseberry by telephone on  
one occasion, but he told her not to worry and that he would  
keep her informed of the merger.  He never did. Consequently,  
plaintiff's 
termination 
proceeded 
administratively 
and 
without  
notice to her. 
These intentional omissions supported  
plaintiff's position that the discriminatory animus earlier  
exhibited led to her dismissal.  
Moreover, 
defendant's 
posttermination 
actions 
support 
the  
inference of a causal link between the discrimination alleged  
and defendant's employment actions. Specifically, defendant  
refused to rehire plaintiff to the account representative  
position upon her return, despite its custom of allowing an  
employee to resume his old position, if it remained available.  
When the account representative position became available  
after plaintiff's return, defendant refused to waive its new  
college degree requirement and consider plaintiff for the  
position.
 These posttermination facts support a jury  
inference that defendant's discriminatory animus caused it to  
exclude plaintiff from the account representative position  
after her disability leave.  
II  
The factual scenario presented in this case is scarcely  
so one-sided that a court could rule, as does the majority,  
4  
that defendant prevails as a matter of law. Considering that  
plaintiff presented sufficient proof for the jury to infer a  
causal link between her pregnancy and defendant's failure to  
hire her, the jury's verdict should not be disturbed.  The  
jury was entitled to disbelieve that the LTD policy was the  
cause of her losing the job.  This Court should not supersede  
the jury's factual findings with its own evaluation of the  
facts; rather, it should affirm the Court of Appeals decision  
and allow the verdict to stand.  
Marilyn Kelly  
5