Title: State ex rel. Kaul v. Prehn
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2021AP001673
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 29, 2022

2022 WI 50 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2021AP1673 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Joshua L. Kaul, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Frederick Prehn, 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
Wisconsin Legislature, 
          Intervenor-Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
ON BYPASS FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS  
(No Cite) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 29, 2022   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 10, 2022   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Valerie Bailey-Rihn   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ZIEGLER, C.J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ROGGENSACK, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, and HAGEDORN, JJ., 
joined.  DALLET, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which ANN 
WALSH BRADLEY and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant, there were briefs by Gabe 
Johnson-Karp, Anthony D. Russomanno, and Colin A. Hector, 
assistants attorney general, with whom on the brief was Joshua 
L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral argument by Gabe 
Johnson—Karp.  
 
For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Mark P. Maciolek and Murphy Desmond, S.C., Madison. There was an 
oral argument by Mark P. Maciolek.  
 
 
 
2 
For the intervenor-defendant-respondent, there was a brief 
filed by Ryan J. Walsh, John K. Adams and Eimer Stahl LLP, 
Madison. There was an oral argument by Ryan J. Walsh.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Christa O. Westerberg 
and Pines Bach LLP, Madison, for the Humane Society of the 
United States and the Center for Biological Diversity.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Scott B. Thompson, 
Jeffrey A. Mandell, Rachel E. Snyder, and Carly Gerads and Law 
Forward, Inc., Madison and Stafford Rosenbaum LLP, Madison and 
Summer H. Murshid and Hawks Quindel S.C., of counsel, Milwaukee 
for the America Federation of Teachers-Wisconsin.  
 
 
 
 
2022 WI 50 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2021AP1673   
(L.C. No. 
2021CV1994) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Joshua L. Kaul, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Frederick Prehn, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
 
Wisconsin Legislature, 
 
          Intervenor-Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 29, 2022 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ZIEGLER, C.J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ROGGENSACK, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, and HAGEDORN, JJ., 
joined.  DALLET, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which ANN 
WALSH BRADLEY and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the Circuit Court 
for Dane County, Valerie Bailey-Rihn, Judge.   Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J.   This case is before 
the court on bypass pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.60 
No. 2021AP1673    
 
2 
 
(2019-20).1  We review an order of the Dane County circuit 
court,2 dismissing the State's complaint with prejudice.   
¶2 
The Attorney General, on behalf of the State, seeks 
quo warranto and declaratory judgment relief, alleging that the 
defendant, Frederick Prehn, unlawfully holds a position on the 
Wisconsin Board of Natural Resources ("the DNR Board").  The 
State argues that when Prehn's term expired on May 1, 2021, he 
no longer possessed any legal right to the position.  In 
addition, the State claims that Prehn is not entitled to "for 
cause" protection and can be removed at the discretion of the 
Governor.  The circuit court disagreed and dismissed the case, 
reasoning that there was no statutory or constitutional basis to 
remove Prehn from office without cause. 
¶3 
We affirm the decision of the circuit court.  Under 
Wis. Stat. § 17.03, the expiration of Prehn's term on the DNR 
Board does not create a vacancy.  Prehn lawfully retains his 
position on the DNR Board as a holdover.  Therefore, the 
Governor cannot make a provisional appointment to replace Prehn 
under Wis. Stat. § 17.20(2)(a).  Until his successor is 
nominated by the Governor and confirmed by the senate, under 
Wis. Stat. § 17.07(3), Prehn may be removed by the Governor only 
for cause.  This conclusion complies with the plain language of 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2019-20 version unless otherwise indicated.   
2 The Honorable Valerie Bailey-Rihn presided. 
No. 2021AP1673    
 
3 
 
the Wisconsin Statutes and does not raise constitutional 
concerns.  The State's complaint is dismissed with prejudice. 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶4 
The Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") 
is an environmental agency that regulates parks and natural 
resources around the state.  The agency is placed "under the 
direction and supervision of the natural resources board."  Wis. 
Stat. § 15.34(1).  The DNR Board has seven members nominated by 
the Governor and confirmed by the senate for staggered six-year 
terms.  Wis. Stat. §§ 15.07(1)(a), 15.34(1) & (2)(a).  In 
addition, the DNR's Secretary must be nominated by the Governor 
and confirmed by the senate.  Wis. Stat. § 15.05(1)(c). 
¶5 
In May 2015, Governor Scott Walker nominated Prehn to 
the DNR Board.  Prehn was confirmed by the senate in November 
2015, with a term to expire on May 1, 2021. 
¶6 
On April 30, 2021, Governor Tony Evers announced the 
appointment of Sandra Dee E. Naas to replace Prehn on the DNR 
Board.  However, the senate has not confirmed Naas and Prehn has 
declined to step down from his position.  Prehn continues to act 
as a member of the DNR Board, attending meetings and submitting 
votes on DNR policies and positions as a full DNR Board member.  
¶7 
On August 17, 2021, the Attorney General, on behalf of 
the State, filed this action in Dane County circuit court 
alleging quo warranto and declaratory judgment claims.  The 
State argued that because Prehn's term expired in May 2021, 
Prehn was unlawfully holding the office of a DNR Board member.  
In addition, the State claimed that Prehn could be removed at 
No. 2021AP1673    
 
4 
 
the pleasure of the Governor.  The State asked that the circuit 
court order Prehn removed from office or, in the alternative, 
that the circuit court declare that the Governor can remove him 
without cause. 
¶8 
On August 27, 2021, Prehn filed a motion to dismiss 
the case for failure to state a claim.  He argued that no 
vacancy had yet occurred for the position he occupied on the DNR 
Board and he could remain on the DNR Board until a successor was 
confirmed by the senate.  The circuit court received briefing 
from 
the 
parties 
and 
the 
Wisconsin 
Legislature 
("the 
Legislature"), and on September 17, 2021, granted Prehn's motion 
to dismiss.  The circuit court explained that the expiration of 
Prehn's term of office did not create a vacancy, and the 
Governor could not use his provisional appointment power to 
replace Prehn on the DNR Board.  In conclusion, the circuit 
court held that Prehn was not illegally occupying his position, 
he was entitled to for cause protections, and he could not be 
removed at the pleasure of the Governor.  The circuit court 
dismissed the complaint with prejudice.  
¶9 
On September 20, 2021, the State appealed the circuit 
court's order and soon thereafter filed a petition in this court 
to bypass the court of appeals.  On November 16, 2021, we 
granted 
the 
petition 
to 
bypass. 
 
We 
also 
granted 
the 
Legislature's request to intervene as a party.  
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶10 In this case, we review a motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim.  The motion "tests the legal 
No. 2021AP1673    
 
5 
 
sufficiency 
of 
the 
complaint." 
 
DeBruin 
v. 
St. 
Patrick 
Congregation, 2012 WI 94, ¶11, 343 Wis. 2d 83, 816 N.W.2d 878.  
"For purposes of the motion, we accept as true all facts well-
pleaded 
in 
the 
complaint 
and 
the 
reasonable 
inferences 
therefrom."  Id.  In order to survive a motion to dismiss, 
"[p]laintiffs must allege facts that plausibly suggest they are 
entitled to relief" as a matter of law.  Data Key Partners v. 
Permira Advisers LLC, 2014 WI 86, ¶31, 356 Wis. 2d 665, 849 
N.W.2d 693.  "We review de novo the circuit court's dismissal of 
a complaint for failure to state a claim."  Doe v. Archdiocese 
of Milwaukee, 2005 WI 123, ¶19, 284 Wis. 2d 307, 700 N.W.2d 180.  
¶11 This case also presents questions of statutory and 
constitutional interpretation.  "Interpretation of a statute is 
a question of law that we review de novo, although we benefit 
from the analyses of the circuit court and the court of 
appeals."  Estate of Miller v. Storey, 2017 WI 99, ¶25, 378 
Wis. 2d 358, 903 N.W.2d 759.  "[S]tatutory interpretation begins 
with the language of the statute.  If the meaning of the statute 
is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry.  Statutory language is 
given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that 
technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given their 
technical or special definitional meaning."  State ex rel. Kalal 
v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
681 N.W.2d 110 (citations and quotations omitted).  In addition, 
"statutory language is interpreted in the context in which it is 
used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to 
No. 2021AP1673    
 
6 
 
the language of surrounding or closely-related statutes; and 
reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results."  Id., ¶46. 
¶12 We interpret the Wisconsin Constitution de novo.  
Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2021 WI 87, ¶22, 399 
Wis. 2d 623, 967 N.W.2d 469.  "Our goal when we interpret the 
Wisconsin Constitution is to give effect to the intent of the 
framers and of the people who adopted it."  Id.  "In 
interpreting the Wisconsin Constitution, we focus on the 
language of the adopted text and historical evidence."  State v. 
Halverson, 2021 WI 7, ¶22, 395 Wis. 2d 385, 963 N.W.2d 847.  
Such historical evidence includes "the practices at the time the 
constitution was adopted, debates over adoption of a given 
provision, and early legislative interpretation as evidenced by 
the first laws passed following the adoption."  Id. (quotations 
omitted). 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶13 The 
State 
alleges 
quo 
warranto 
and 
declaratory 
judgment claims.  Quo warranto actions "test [the] ability [of 
an individual] to hold office."  State ex rel. Shroble v. 
Prusener, 185 Wis. 2d 102, 108-09, 517 N.W.2d 169 (1994).  
Wisconsin Stat. § 784.04(1)(a) states that the Attorney General 
may bring a quo warranto claim "[w]hen any person shall usurp, 
intrude into or unlawfully hold or exercise any public office, 
civil or military, or any franchise within this state, or any 
office in a corporation created by the authority of this state."  
If successful, the subject office holder may be "excluded from 
the office, franchise or privilege."  Wis. Stat. § 784.13.  
No. 2021AP1673    
 
7 
 
Generally, "quo warranto relief is an exclusive remedy, except 
when the issue warranting quo warranto relief is ancillary to an 
issue that does not sound in quo warranto."  City of Waukesha v. 
Salbashian, 128 Wis. 2d 334, 348, 382 N.W.2d 52 (1986).  
¶14 In its quo warranto claim, the State argues that Prehn 
does not legally hold office because his term expired and his 
office is therefore vacant.  With the Governor's selection of 
Naas as a provisional appointee to replace Prehn, the State 
claims Prehn must be immediately removed.  The State also seeks 
a declaratory judgment that Prehn can be removed at the pleasure 
of the Governor.  No party contests or presents arguments on the 
State's ability to bring a declaratory judgment claim in this 
context.   
¶15 Thus, we will review whether Prehn lawfully holds 
office as a DNR Board member and whether Prehn has for cause 
protections.  We will consider each issue in turn. 
 
A.  Whether Prehn Lawfully Holds Office. 
¶16 The State indicates that Prehn's term of office 
expired on May 1, 2021.  Therefore, according to the State, 
there is now a vacancy in Prehn's position on the DNR Board.  
The State contends that Naas must replace Prehn as a provisional 
gubernatorial appointment.  We disagree.  Accepting all facts 
alleged in the complaint as true, we hold that the expiration of 
Prehn's term did not create a vacancy, and Prehn lawfully 
retains his office as a holdover.  DeBruin, 343 Wis. 2d 83, ¶11.  
No. 2021AP1673    
 
8 
 
¶17 The DNR is "under the direction and supervision of the 
natural resources board."  Wis. Stat. § 15.34(1).  Wisconsin 
Stat § 15.05 describes the allocation of authority between the 
DNR Board and the Secretary: 
 
[T]he powers and duties of the board shall be 
regulatory, 
advisory 
and 
policy-making, 
and 
not 
administrative.  All of the administrative powers and 
duties of the department are vested in the secretary, 
to be administered by him or her under the direction 
of the board.  The secretary, with the approval of the 
board, shall promulgate rules for administering the 
department and performing the duties assigned to the 
department. 
 
§ 15.05(1)(b). 
¶18 The Governor must nominate and the senate must confirm 
members of the DNR Board, who serve six-year terms.  Wis. Stat. 
§§ 15.07(1)(a), 15.34(1) & (2)(a).  Because DNR Board members 
serve in an office "filled by appointment of the governor for a 
fixed term by and with the advice and consent of the senate," 
the Governor may remove DNR Board members "for cause."  Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 17.07(3). 
 
"Cause" 
is 
statutorily 
defined 
as 
"inefficiency, 
neglect 
of 
duty, 
official 
misconduct, 
or 
malfeasance in office."  Wis. Stat. § 17.001.  The DNR Secretary 
must be "nominated by the governor, and with the advice and 
consent of the senate."  Wis. Stat. § 15.05(1)(c).  The 
Secretary "serve[s] at the pleasure of the governor," id., and 
can be removed "by the governor at any time."  § 17.07(4).   
¶19 The DNR Board is subject to carefully defined vacancy 
rules.  Article XIII, Section 10 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
states that "[t]he legislature may declare the cases in which 
No. 2021AP1673    
 
9 
 
any office shall be deemed vacant, and also the manner of 
filling the vacancy, where no provision is made for that purpose 
in this constitution."  The provision provides the Legislature 
"the power to declare when an office shall be deemed to be 
vacant."  State ex rel. Thompson v. Gibson, 22 Wis. 2d 275, 290, 
125 N.W.2d 636 (1964).   
¶20 The Legislature exercised its authority to determine 
the existence of a vacancy by enacting Wis. Stat. § 17.03.  Id.; 
accord State v. Devitt, 82 Wis. 2d 262, 266, 262 N.W.2d 73 
(1978).  Section 17.03 states, in pertinent part:  
Except as otherwise provided, a public office is 
vacant when: 
(1) The incumbent dies. 
(2) The incumbent resigns. 
(3) The incumbent is removed. 
 . . . . 
(10) If the office is elective, the incumbent's 
term expires, except for the office of sheriff, 
coroner, register of deeds or district attorney. 
 
 . . . . 
(13) Any other event occurs which is declared by 
any special provision of law to create a vacancy. 
¶21 When a vacancy occurs in an appointed office such as 
the DNR Board, the office "shall be filled by appointment by the 
appointing power and in the manner prescribed by law for making 
regular full term appointments thereto."  Wis. Stat. § 17.20(1).  
In the case of the DNR Board, individuals selected to fill a 
vacancy must be nominated by the Governor and confirmed by the 
No. 2021AP1673    
 
10 
 
senate.  Id.; Wis. Stat. § 15.07(1)(a).  Individuals appointed 
to "fill vacancies . . . shall hold office for the residue of 
the unexpired term or, if no definite term of office is fixed by 
law, until their successors are appointed and qualify."3  
§ 17.20(1).  Because DNR Board members have a fixed term by law, 
individuals selected to fill a vacancy on the DNR Board step 
into the shoes of the prior member and serve for the remainder 
of the term.  Id.; Wis. Stat. § 15.34(2)(a). 
¶22 The Governor need not wait for senate advice and 
consent to ensure someone occupies a DNR Board seat once a 
vacancy occurs.  "Vacancies occurring in the office of any 
officer normally nominated by the governor, and with the advice 
and consent of the senate appointed, may be filled by a 
provisional appointment by the governor for the residue of the 
unexpired term, if any, subject to confirmation by the senate."  
Wis. Stat. § 17.20(2)(a).  While a provisional appointee serves, 
she "may exercise all of the powers and duties of the office to 
which such person is appointed during the time in which the 
appointee qualifies."  Id.  
¶23 Here, the parties accept that Prehn was properly 
nominated by the Governor and confirmed by the senate to serve a 
                                                 
3 "'Qualified,' when applied to any person elected or 
appointed to office, means that such person has done those 
things which the person was by law required to do before 
entering upon the duties of the person's office."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 990.01(33).  For instance, a qualification of a DNR Board 
member is that the member "take and file the official oath."  
Wis. Stat. § 15.07(7).    
No. 2021AP1673    
 
11 
 
full term on the DNR Board.  Wis. Stat. §§ 15.07(1)(a), 15.34(1) 
& (2)(a).  His six-year term expired by statute in May 2021.  
§ 15.07(1)(a) & (1)(c) ("[F]ixed terms of members of boards 
shall expire on May 1.").  Once Prehn's term expired, the 
Governor had the prerogative to nominate another individual to 
serve a six-year term between May 2021 and May 2027 and replace 
Prehn.  §§ 15.34(1), 15.07 (explaining that Board members "shall 
be nominated by the governor . . . to serve for terms prescribed 
by law"); see also Thompson, 22 Wis. 2d at 293 (explaining that 
nominees "duly appointed and confirmed by the senate" take over 
the office from their successors); State ex rel. Martin v. Heil, 
242 Wis. 41, 48-49, 7 N.W.2d 375 (1942) (stating that officials 
who, through established legal processes, are selected for a 
term 
position 
take 
office 
from 
any 
individual 
currently 
occupying the position as a holdover (citing State ex rel. 
Pluntz v. Johnson, 176 Wis. 107, 112-16, 184 N.W. 183, vacating 
judgment on rehearing, 186 N.W. 729 (1922))).  However, that 
nomination is subject to "the advice and consent of the senate."  
§ 15.07(1)(a).  If the nominee is not confirmed, the nominee is 
not "appointed" into office and cannot exercise the authority 
assigned to that position.  Id.  While the Governor can make a 
provisional appointment who exercises "all of the powers and 
duties of the office," subject to later confirmation by the 
senate, there must first be a "vacancy" to fill.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 17.20(2)(a). 
No. 2021AP1673    
 
12 
 
¶24 The expiration of Prehn's term did not create a 
vacancy.  Thus, the Governor did not have a right to make a 
provisional appointment under Wis. Stat. § 17.20(2)(a).   
¶25 Wisconsin Stat. § 17.03 provides a list of events that 
cause a vacancy.  The list is detailed and includes various 
types of events, ranging from death to, in the case of a school 
district office, "absen[ce] from the district for a period of 60 
days."  § 17.03(1), (4m).  The list is exclusive, "[e]xcept as 
otherwise provided" or "declared by any special provision of 
law."  § 17.03, 17.03(13).  By the plain text of the statute, 
expiration of a term for an appointed office is not included as 
an event causing a vacancy.  This is a straightforward 
application of the canon of statutory interpretation expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius, "[t]he expression of one thing 
implies the exclusion of others."  State v. Dorsey, 2018 WI 10, 
¶29, 379 Wis. 2d 386, 906 N.W.2d 158; see Andruss v. Divine 
Savior Healthcare Inc., 2022 WI 27, ¶30, 401 Wis. 2d 368, 973 
N.W.2d 435 (explaining a statute that listed individuals and 
entities subject to a healthcare Chapter of the Wisconsin code, 
but did not state a specific type of entity in the list, was "a 
textbook example of the canon" and demonstrated that the 
specific entity was neither included in the list nor subject to 
the Chapter).  The Legislature was deliberate and specific in 
defining which events constitute a vacancy, and explicitly 
stated that the list was exclusive absent a contrary provision 
of law.  § 17.03, 17.03(13).  The statute by its plain text 
excluded the expiration of appointed terms; we must give effect 
No. 2021AP1673    
 
13 
 
to this plain language.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶44 ("Judicial 
deference to the policy choices enacted into law by the 
legislature 
requires 
that 
statutory 
interpretation 
focus 
primarily on the language of the statute.").  
¶26 This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the list 
of vacancies under Wis. Stat. § 17.03 expressly includes the 
expiration of an incumbent's term "[i]f the office is elective."  
§ 17.03(10). 
 
The 
Legislature 
clearly 
demonstrated 
the 
wherewithal and ability to include the expiration of an 
incumbent's term for public office in the list of vacancies 
under 
§ 17.03. 
 
See 
Andruss, 
401 
Wis. 2d 368, 
¶¶30, 
37 
(reasoning that the Legislature's choice to consider corporate 
affiliation for one type of healthcare provider under statute 
demonstrated Legislature's "ability to [do so]"; its decision 
not to do so for other healthcare providers indicated corporate 
affiliation was not be considered); State v. Yakich, 2022 WI 8, 
¶24, 400 Wis. 2d 549, 970 N.W.2d 12 (explaining that the 
Legislature chose not to set or limit how multiple NGI 
commitments may be imposed as it did in other statutes and 
reasoning that "we must give effect to the legislature's 
choice").  The Legislature included term expiration in the 
vacancy list for elected offices, but did not for appointed 
offices.  To read the statute to include all term expirations 
would render the phrase "[i]f the office is elective" in 
§ 17.03(10) completely superfluous.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 
("Statutory language is read where possible to give reasonable 
effect to every word, in order to avoid surplusage.").  Section 
No. 2021AP1673    
 
14 
 
17.03 unambiguously excluded the expiration of appointed terms 
from the list of vacancy events.   
¶27 Notably, we came to the same conclusion in State ex 
rel. Thompson v. Gibson.  In Thompson, we explained that 
[section] 17.03 provides that an office shall be 
deemed to be vacant upon (among other things) the 
death, resignation or removal of the incumbent, but 
nowhere is it declared that an office is vacant when 
an incumbent holds over after expiration of the term 
for which he was initially appointed. 
22 Wis. 2d at 290.  We see no reason to depart from Thompson's 
reasoning, which remains as sound today as it did when the case 
was first decided.  
¶28 The State argues that in order to read Wis. Stat. 
§ 17.03 in conformity with common law jurisprudence, the 
expiration of Prehn's term in office must be construed as a 
vacancy.  However, it is well established in Wisconsin precedent 
and the common law that appointed officers can lawfully holdover 
after the expiration of their term until a successor is properly 
appointed to the position.  In Thompson, we held unambiguously 
that 
appointed 
incumbents 
whose 
terms 
had 
expired 
could 
"holdover in office until their successors are duly appointed 
and confirmed by the senate."  22 Wis. 2d at 293.  This was in 
line with prior Wisconsin precedent.  See, e.g., Heil, 242 Wis. 
at 48-49 (explaining that "[t]he absence of words extending the 
term until such time as a successor has been duly elected and 
qualified is, of course, not wholly conclusive and . . . there 
has been a tendency in the authorities to hold, in spite of the 
absence of these words, that an incumbent holds over until his 
No. 2021AP1673    
 
15 
 
successor is selected and qualified" (citing Pluntz, 176 Wis. 
107)); Pluntz, 176 Wis. at 114 ("[T]he general trend of 
decisions in this country is to the effect that, where the 
written law contains no provision either express or implied to 
the contrary, an officer holds his office until his successor is 
elected and qualified.").  It was also in line with the common 
law.  63C Am. Jur. 2d Public Officers and Employees § 148 (2022) 
("[A]s a general rule, apart from any constitutional or 
statutory regulation on the subject, an incumbent of an office 
may hold over after the conclusion of his or her term until the 
election [or appointment] and qualification of a successor."); 
67 C.J.S. Officers § 154 (2022) ("As a general rule, in the 
absence of a constitution or statute providing otherwise, an 
officer is entitled to hold office until a successor is 
appointed or elected and has qualified.").  By statute, Prehn's 
term has expired, but he is lawfully retaining office as a 
holdover until a successor is legally appointed, i.e., nominated 
and confirmed by the senate.  Wis. Stat. §§ 15.07(1)(a), 
15.34(1).  Neither our precedents nor the common law support the 
State's position that the expiration of Prehn's term must be 
construed as a vacancy, notwithstanding the text of Wis. Stat. 
§ 17.03.  
¶29 The State also points out that the statutes setting 
the length of DNR Board member's terms of office indicate that 
DNR Board members "serve for terms prescribed by law" and their 
terms "shall expire" after six years.  Wis. Stat. § 15.07(1)(a) 
& (1)(c).  The State cites this language to argue that Prehn can 
No. 2021AP1673    
 
16 
 
no longer be in office because he has served his term and 
therefore, Prehn is now illegally holding office.  But the 
State's conclusion does not follow from the statutes upon which 
it relies.  It is undoubtedly true that Prehn serves a defined 
term of office, and it is accepted that Prehn's term expired in 
May 2021.  However, those realities say nothing about whether 
there is now a "vacancy" in Prehn's DNR Board position under 
Wis. Stat. § 17.03 justifying a provisional appointment under 
Wis. Stat. § 17.20(2)(a), which the State in this case seeks.  
Because 
Prehn's 
term 
expired, 
the 
Governor 
now 
has 
the 
prerogative to appoint a successor who, if confirmed, may 
replace Prehn on the Board for a full appointed term.  Wis. 
Stat. §§ 15.34(1), 15.07; Thompson, 22 Wis. 2d at 293; Heil, 242 
Wis. at 48-49.  Without the expiration of Prehn's term, the 
Governor would not have the ability to appoint a replacement to 
complete a successive term.  Further, if the Governor wished to 
replace Prehn prior to the completion of Prehn's term, the 
Governor would need to overcome Prehn's "for cause" protections.  
Wis. Stat. § 17.07(3).  The Governor does not need to explain 
the reasons for nominating another individual for senate 
confirmation to replace Prehn.   
¶30 Nonetheless, as explained above, the plain text of 
Wis. Stat. § 17.03 establishes that the expiration of a defined 
term for an appointed office does not create a vacancy.  Without 
a vacancy, the Governor cannot make a provisional appointment 
and Prehn cannot be replaced with an individual whom the senate 
has not confirmed.  As we correctly explained in Thompson, 
No. 2021AP1673    
 
17 
 
"after 
the 
expiration 
of 
[incumbents'] 
terms," 
"the 
incumbents . . . may holdover in office until their successors 
are duly appointed and confirmed by the senate."  22 Wis. 2d at 
293.  This conforms with well established law.  Heil, 242 Wis. 
at 48-49; Pluntz, 176 Wis. at 113-16; 63C Am. Jur. 2d Public 
Officers and Employees, supra ¶28; 67 C.J.S. Officers, supra 
¶28.  
¶31 Finally, the State cites statutes for other offices 
that specify term lengths based on when a successor is 
appointed.  For instance, election officials at the municipal 
level are appointed to "hold office for 2 years and until their 
successors 
are 
appointed 
and 
qualified." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 7.30(6)(a).  Local fire and police commissioners serve terms 
of "5 years . . . and until their respective successors shall be 
appointed and qualified."  Wis. Stat. § 62.50(1h).  The State 
argues that the inclusion of this language for these offices 
implies that the expiration of an appointed term as a general 
matter creates a vacancy.  In so doing, the State notes that 
Wis. Stat. § 17.03 provides an exclusive list of vacancies 
"[e]xcept as otherwise provided" or "declared by any special 
provision of law."  § 17.03, 17.03(13).   
¶32 The State is correct that some statutes define terms 
for different offices in a different manner than Wis. Stat. 
§ 15.07 defines terms for DNR Board members.  But that does not 
answer whether incumbents may stay in office after their term 
has expired, however that term is defined, or whether the 
expiration of terms for appointed offices create a vacancy.  
No. 2021AP1673    
 
18 
 
Under the law in this state, absent statutory or constitutional 
language prohibiting a holdover period, incumbents may lawfully 
holdover after their statutorily prescribed term has concluded 
and until their successor is appointed and qualified.  Thompson, 
22 Wis. 2d at 293; Heil, 242 Wis. at 48-49; Pluntz, 176 Wis. at 
113-16; 63C Am. Jur. 2d Public Officers and Employees, supra 
¶28; 67 C.J.S. Officers, supra ¶28.  And under Wis. Stat. 
§ 17.03, the expiration of appointed terms of office do not 
create vacancies justifying a provisional appointment, unless a 
provision of law states otherwise.  Wis. Stat. §§ 17.03, 
17.03(13); 17.20(2)(a).  No statute or constitutional provision 
has been identified that prohibits DNR Board members from 
lawfully 
holding 
over, 
and 
no 
statute 
or 
constitutional 
provision cited to the court defines the expiration of a DNR 
Board member's term as a vacancy.   
¶33 Simply because some offices in this state have defined 
terms of office to end when a successor is appointed or 
qualified does not imply that holdover periods are prohibited 
for other offices such as the DNR Board, after the expiration of 
fixed terms.  As we explained in Thompson, the existence of an 
explicit "holdover clause" makes it "even more clear that the 
office is not 'vacant'" simply due to the fact that the time 
specified by statute for holding office (e.g., two years for 
municipal election officials) has passed.  22 Wis. 2d at 293-94.  
The existence of holdover clauses in some statutes did not 
prevent the Thompson court from recognizing, in line with 
precedent and the common law, that incumbents "may holdover in 
No. 2021AP1673    
 
19 
 
office until their successors are duly appointed and confirmed 
by the senate," even without explicit statutory authorization.  
Id. at 293.   
¶34 Furthermore, 
even 
if 
for 
some 
positions 
the 
Legislature chose to explicitly incorporate the common law rule 
through a holdover provision does not on its own imply the 
abrogation of the established common law rule for other 
positions that do not include a holdover provision, such as the 
DNR Board.  See Strenke v. Hogner, 2005 WI 25, ¶29, 279 
Wis. 2d 52, 694 N.W.2d 296 ("To accomplish a change in the 
common law, the language of the statute must be clear, 
unambiguous, and peremptory."); Biart v. First Nat'l Bank of 
Madison, 262 Wis. 181, 191, 54 N.W.2d 175 (1952) ("It is a 
principle of statutory construction that the rules of common law 
are not to be changed by doubtful implication.").  Restating the 
common law for a specific class of offices should not be 
interpreted as removing common law rules for offices outside the 
class.  Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 318-19 (2012) (reasoning that a 
statute explicitly stating dogs "wearing tax tag[s]" are 
personal property protected under tort law did not abrogate the 
common law rule that all dogs are personal property protected 
under tort law, notwithstanding the potential application of the 
expressio unius canon); see also Fuchsgruber v. Custom Assocs., 
Inc., 2001 WI 81, ¶¶18-30, 244 Wis. 2d 758, 628 N.W.2d 833 
(explaining that a statute affecting the common law for 
contributory negligence in negligence suits did not affect the 
No. 2021AP1673    
 
20 
 
common law for product liability suits, despite the fact that 
product 
liability 
law 
incorporated 
and 
heavily 
utilized 
contributory negligence principles); Schmidt v. N. States Power 
Co., 2007 WI 136, ¶¶66-67, 305 Wis. 2d 538, 742 N.W.2d 294 
(reasoning that a statute setting standards for electricity 
safety did not abrogate common law negligence rules on safety 
and risk, despite the rules affecting the same types of 
businesses performing the kinds of services).  
¶35 Under Wisconsin law, the expiration of an appointed 
term of office does not create a vacancy justifying a 
provisional appointment.  Wis. Stat. §§ 17.03, 17.20(2)(a).  
Members of the DNR Board whose terms have expired may remain in 
office 
as 
holdovers 
until 
their 
successors 
are 
properly 
nominated 
by 
the 
Governor 
and 
confirmed 
by 
the 
senate.  
Thompson, 22 Wis. 2d at 293; 63C Am. Jur. 2d Public Officers and 
Employees, supra ¶28; 67 C.J.S. Officers, supra ¶28; Wis. Stat. 
§§ 17.03, 15.07(1)(a), 15.34(1) & (2)(a).  Prehn lawfully holds 
office as a holdover, and because there is no vacancy in Prehn's 
position, the Governor may not replace Prehn through use of a 
provisional appointment.  § 17.20(2)(a). 
 
B.  Whether Prehn Has For Cause Protections. 
¶36 The State argues that Prehn does not have for cause 
protections and can be removed at the pleasure of the Governor.  
According to the State, this result is required under a plain 
reading of the statutes and under the Wisconsin Constitution.  
We again disagree. 
No. 2021AP1673    
 
21 
 
¶37 Under Wis. Stat. § 17.07(3), "[s]tate officers serving 
in an office that is filled by appointment of the governor for a 
fixed term by and with the advice and consent of the 
senate . . . [may be removed] by the governor at any time, for 
cause."  Members of the DNR Board must be nominated by the 
Governor and confirmed by the senate; they serve fixed terms.  
Wis. Stat. §§ 15.07(1)(a), 15.34(1) & (2)(a).  By the plain text 
of § 17.07(3), DNR Board members who have undergone this 
appointment process are entitled to for cause protections.   
¶38 As alleged in the complaint, Prehn was lawfully 
nominated by the Governor and confirmed by the senate in 2015 to 
a fixed, six-year term.  DeBruin, 343 Wis. 2d 83, ¶11.  As a 
member of the DNR Board, he is therefore entitled to for cause 
protection.  He still lawfully occupies the office of DNR Board 
member, despite the fact that his term has expired; because 
there is no vacancy in his position, he cannot be replaced by 
provisional appointment.  Thompson, 22 Wis. 2d at 293; 63C Am. 
Jur. 2d Public Officers and Employees, supra ¶28; 67 C.J.S. 
Officers, 
supra 
¶28; 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 17.03, 
17.20(2)(a).  
Therefore, Prehn under Wis. Stat. § 17.07(3) is a "[s]tate 
officer" who currently "serv[es] in an office that is filled by 
appointment of the governor for a fixed term by and with the 
advice and consent of the senate."  As a holdover, he still may 
be removed only "for cause."  § 17.07(3).   
¶39 This is in line with the common law principle that 
public officers have the same rights and responsibilities when 
they are lawful holdovers as they do when they hold office prior 
No. 2021AP1673    
 
22 
 
to expiration of their terms.  63C Am. Jur. 2d Public Officers 
and Employees, supra ¶28, § 149 ("A holdover officer has all the 
authority to act in that capacity and receive compensation" and 
also "continues as the incumbent of the office"); 67 C.J.S. 
Officers, supra ¶28, § 155 ("[T]he period of . . . holding over 
is as much a part of [the incumbent's] tenure of office as the 
regular period fixed by law" and "[t]he office is held by the 
same title and by as high and lawful a tenure after the 
prescribed term . . . as before and during such term").  
¶40 Our plain reading of Wis. Stat. § 17.07(3) is also 
supported by our decision in Moses v. Bd. of Veterans Affairs, 
80 Wis. 2d 411, 259 N.W.2d 102 (1977).  In that case, an officer 
was nominated by the Governor and confirmed by the senate to 
serve as the Secretary of Veterans Affairs as required by 
statute.  Id. at 415.  After the secretary was appointed, the 
Legislature amended the governing statute to make appointments 
to the position of secretary the decision of the Board of 
Veterans Affairs alone.  Id.  Under Wis. Stat. § 17.07, after 
the amendment of the statute, secretaries of Veterans Affairs 
could be removed at the pleasure of the Board of Veterans 
Affairs.  Id.  The board argued that they could therefore remove 
the officer who currently held the position without cause.  The 
Wisconsin Supreme Court disagreed.  Id. at 415-16.  The court 
explained that § 17.07 describes for cause protections in terms 
of the individual "officer" who is subject to appointment.  Id. 
at 416-17.  Even though under existing statutes the Secretary of 
Veterans Affairs could be appointed only by the board, the 
No. 2021AP1673    
 
23 
 
current officeholder had already undergone nomination and senate 
confirmation and lawfully held office.  Id.  Thus, under 
§ 17.07, the officeholder was subject to for cause protections.  
Id.  As we explained, "[a]s long as [the current Secretary of 
Veterans Affairs] remains an officer appointed by the governor, 
confirmed by the senate, he remains removable from office only 
by the governor, for cause."  Id. at 416. 
¶41 Moses' understanding of Wis. Stat. § 17.07 is readily 
applicable here.  Prehn was an "officer" who, to hold appointed 
office on the DNR Board, was nominated by the Governor and 
confirmed by the senate.  Moses, 80 Wis. 2d at 416-17 (quoting 
Wis. Stat. § 17.07 (1977-78).  He remains in this position as a 
lawful holdover.  Thompson, 22 Wis. 2d at 293; 63C Am. Jur. 2d 
Public Officers and Employees, supra ¶28; 67 C.J.S. Officers, 
supra ¶28; Wis. Stat. §§ 17.03, 17.20(2)(a).  As an officeholder 
who underwent confirmation procedures, while Prehn remains on 
the DNR Board he can be removed by the Governor only for cause.  
§ 17.07(3).   
¶42 The State argues that Wis. Stat. § 17.07 must be read 
to permit Prehn's removal at the Governor's pleasure because, if 
Prehn has for cause protection, the statute would violate the 
separation 
of 
powers 
under 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution.  
According to the State, providing Prehn for cause protection 
would improperly limit the ability of the Governor to select a 
DNR Board member who has similar views on policy.  The State 
argues this would prevent the Governor from "control[ling] the 
execution of the law" as required by the Wisconsin Constitution. 
No. 2021AP1673    
 
24 
 
¶43 In making this argument, the State predominantly cites 
federal caselaw on the removal power of the United States 
President.  See, e.g., Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. 
Bureau, 591 U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020); Myers v. United 
States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 
(1988); Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).  
While these cases may be foundational to properly understanding 
the President's authority to remove federal officials in the 
executive branch, they lend only limited support to structure, 
meaning, and original understanding of the Wisconsin Governor's 
removal power.   
¶44 To properly confirm the meaning of the Wisconsin 
Constitution, we consult "historical evidence" such as "the 
practices at the time the constitution was adopted, debates over 
adoption 
of 
a 
given 
provision, 
and 
early 
legislative 
interpretation as evidenced by the first laws passed following 
the adoption."  Halverson, 395 Wis. 2d 385, ¶22; see, e.g., 
Koschkee v. Taylor, 2019 WI 76, ¶¶22-32, 387 Wis. 2d 552, 929 
N.W.2d 600 (providing analysis on the history and meaning of the 
Wisconsin Constitution's provision on the authority of the 
Superintendent of Public Instruction); Johnson v. Wis. Elections 
Comm'n, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶¶28-33 (analyzing the meaning of the 
apportionment 
clause 
in 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
for 
legislative districts).  But the State here presents no 
historical research or explanation to allow us to fully 
interpret the Wisconsin Constitution and its original meaning.  
Given that the State is arguing that Wis. Stat. § 17.07, as 
No. 2021AP1673    
 
25 
 
plainly read, would be unconstitutional, this lack of fully 
developed argument is fatal to the State's position.  See Soc'y 
Ins. v. LIRC, 2010 WI 68, ¶27, 326 Wis. 2d 444, 786 N.W.2d 385 
("The challenger [in a constitutional claim] has the burden of 
proof."); Mayo v. Wis. Injured Patients and Fams. Comp. Fund, 
2018 WI 78, ¶25, 383 Wis. 2d 1, 914 N.W.2d 678 ("[W]e presume 
that . . . statute[s] [are] constitutional."); Halverson, 395 
Wis. 2d 385, ¶26 (rejecting a challenge to the admission of 
evidence made by a criminal defendant who argued for the 
application prophylactic right under the Wisconsin Constitution, 
explaining 
that 
the 
defendant 
"provide[d] 
no 
textual 
or 
historical basis" for his challenge); Serv. Employees Int'l 
Union Local 1 v. Vos, 2020 WI 67, ¶73, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946 
N.W.2d 35 (explaining that our analysis under the Wisconsin 
Constitution was limited to the "claim[s] developed before us").  
We have no obligation to "develop or construct arguments for 
parties" or construct a historical record in support of the 
State's constitutional claim.  Id., ¶24.  
¶45 The 
lack 
of 
a 
complete 
historical 
record 
is 
significant here because, from the court's independent research, 
it appears that the power of the Wisconsin Governor to control 
the occupancy of public offices within administrative agencies 
is far less robust than that of the United States President.   
¶46 The Wisconsin Constitution, adopted in 1848, divides 
government power "into three separate branches, each 'vested' 
with a specific core government power."  Id., ¶31 (citing Gabler 
v. Crime Victims Rights Bd., 2017 WI 67, ¶11, 376 Wis. 2d 147, 
No. 2021AP1673    
 
26 
 
897 N.W.2d 384); see also Wis. Const. art. IV, § 1 ("The 
legislative power shall be vested in a senate and assembly."); 
id., art. V, § 1 ("The executive power shall be vested in a 
governor."); id., art. VII, § 2 ("The judicial power of this 
state shall be vested in a unified court system.").  "To 
exercise this vested power, the legislature is tasked with the 
enactment of laws; the governor is instructed to 'take care that 
the laws be faithfully executed'; and courts are empowered to 
adjudicate civil and criminal disputes pursuant to the law."  
Vos, 393 Wis. 2d 38, ¶31 (citing Wis. Const. art. IV, § 17; id., 
art. V, § 4; id., art VII, §§ 3, 5, 8, 14). 
¶47 "A separation-of-powers analysis ordinarily begins by 
determining if the power in question is core or shared."  Vos, 
393 Wis. 2d 38, ¶35.  Core powers are those given by the 
constitution to a single branch, such that "no other branch may 
take" up those powers and "use [them] as [their] own."  Id. 
(quoting another source).  Shared powers, meanwhile, "lie at the 
intersections of these exclusive core constitutional powers."  
State v. Horn, 226 Wis. 2d 637, 643, 594 N.W.2d 772 (1999).  
"The branches may exercise power within these borderlands but no 
branch may unduly burden or substantially interfere with another 
branch."  Id. at 644. 
¶48 Wisconsin's constitution, and the separation of powers 
principles embodied in it, was the product of constitutional 
conventions in 1846 and 1848.  Ray A. Brown, The Making of the 
Wisconsin Constitution (Part I), 1949 Wis. L. Rev. 648, 655 n.* 
(1949) (noting that although the constitution framed by the 1846 
No. 2021AP1673    
 
27 
 
convention was ultimately rejected, the "essential details of 
the 1848 constitution followed closely the rejected predecessor" 
and that the 1846 convention brought "sharply into focus the 
vital political, economic and social issues of the period").  
The records from both conventions reveal that the authority to 
appoint those whom the Governor supported was limited under the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  With respect to the 1846 convention, it 
has been noted: 
The governor was to be elected for a two-year term and 
was given a comparatively small salary.  He was given 
a veto, which could only be overridden by a two-thirds 
vote by each chamber of the legislature, but otherwise 
his powers were quite limited.  In particular, he was 
given no appointive powers:  convention delegates made 
it clear they did not want the governor to exercise 
extensive patronage. 
Joseph A. Ranney, Trusting Nothing to Providence:  A History of 
Wisconsin's Legal System 51 (1999) (emphasis added).  Similarly, 
at the 1848 convention, "it seemed to be assumed by the 
delegates that the governor would have no appointive power."  
Ray A. Brown, The Making of the Wisconsin Constitution (Part 
II), 1952 Wis. L. Rev. 23, 34 (1952).  But see id. at 34 n.34 
(noting that the legislature nevertheless could "confer the 
appointive power on the governor"). 
¶49 Consistent with the understanding our constitutional 
framers had in mind, the first compilation of the Wisconsin 
Statutes assigned the Governor only modest responsibilities to 
control who held public offices.  For example, the Governor 
could appoint individuals to fill certain positions that were 
No. 2021AP1673    
 
28 
 
administrative in nature.  See § 57, ch. 9, Laws of 1849 
(notaries public); § 2, ch. 23, Laws of 1849 (state librarian); 
§ 1, ch. 61, Laws of 1849 (out-of-state land commissioners); 
§ 1, ch. 143, Laws of 1849 (out-of-state agents to demand 
fugitives from other jurisdictions); § 2, ch. 156, Laws of 1849 
(state printer).  In addition, the Governor was assigned 
responsibility to fill vacancies in various offices.  See § 11, 
ch. 11, Laws of 1849 (vacant statewide offices); § 13, ch. 11, 
Laws of 1849 (vacant local officers); § 5, ch. 18, Laws of 1849 
(vacant positions on the board of regents).  These statutes, 
enacted immediately after the 1848 constitution was ratified, 
reveal 
a 
circumscribed 
understanding 
of 
the 
Governor's 
appointment power. 
¶50 In contrast, the understanding of the Wisconsin 
Constitution that prevailed at the time of its ratification 
contemplated a strong role for the Legislature in appointment 
decisions.  Turning again to Wisconsin's first statutory 
compilation 
following 
ratification, 
we 
see 
both 
close 
legislative scrutiny of appointments made by the Governor and 
direct legislative appointments.  First, although the Governor 
could remove certain officers for cause during a recess of the 
Legislature, his power to fill the resulting vacancy was subject 
to close legislative review: 
All officers . . . who are or shall be appointed by 
the governor, by and with the advice and consent of 
the senate . . . may, for official misconduct, or 
habitual or willful neglect of duty, be removed by the 
governor upon satisfactory proofs, at any time during 
the recess of the legislature, and the vacancy filed 
No. 2021AP1673    
 
29 
 
by appointment made by him, until such vacancy shall 
be regularly supplied; but no such appointment shall 
extend beyond twenty days after the commencement of 
the next meeting of the legislature. 
§ 8, ch. 11, Laws of 1849.  Thus, dating back to the founding of 
our state, the Governor has never had expansive ability to 
control who held public offices in administrative agencies.  The 
powers of removal and appointment were limited.   
¶51 Further, we see that the Legislature itself exercised 
the appointment power at the State's founding.  Under the 1849 
statutes, the board of regents governing the University of 
Wisconsin did not consist of members appointed by the Governor 
as it does today.  Compare Wis. Stat. §§ 15.07(1)(a) & 15.91 
with § 4, ch. 18, Laws of 1849.  Instead, its members were 
"elected by the senate and the assembly" to six-year terms.  
§ 4, ch. 18, Laws of 1849.  This reveals that the Governor was 
never 
understood 
to 
wield 
an 
exclusive 
power 
over 
the 
appointment and selection of administrative offices.  To the 
contrary, the Legislature retained a strong hand in most 
appointment decisions, both by overseeing the Governor's use of 
his limited appointment power and by making appointments itself. 
¶52 Under this record, the restriction of the Governor's 
removal 
power 
for 
DNR 
Board 
members 
does 
not 
present 
constitutional concerns.  Reviewing the structure of the DNR, 
the Governor is not completely excluded from exercising control 
No. 2021AP1673    
 
30 
 
over the makeup of DNR public officials.4  The DNR Secretary must 
be nominated by the Governor and confirmed by the senate, but 
unlike the Board, the Secretary "serve[s] at the pleasure of the 
governor."  Wis. Stat. § 15.05(1)(c).  By statute, the Secretary 
wields "[a]ll of the administrative powers and duties of the 
department." 
 
§ 15.05(1)(b). 
 
Further, 
the 
Secretary 
"promulgate[s] rules for administering the department and 
performing the duties assigned to the department" with "the 
approval of the board."  Id.  The Secretary, over whom the 
Governor has direct control, exercises aspects of executive 
power. 
See 
Koschkee, 
387 
Wis. 2d 552, 
¶28 
(describing 
administrative roles such as "the oversight and charge of 
something with the power of direction" as "executive . . . in 
nature"); 
Horn, 
226 
Wis. 2d at 
650 
(reasoning 
that 
the 
"administrative process . . . directed to the correctional and 
rehabilitative processes of the parole and probation system" was 
vested in the executive branch); Vos, 393 Wis. 2d 38, ¶¶59-60 
(explaining 
that 
the 
administration 
of 
offices 
such 
as 
"coroners, 
registers 
of 
deeds, 
district 
attorneys, 
[and] 
sheriffs" were "executive functions").   
¶53 The DNR Board is tasked with "regulatory, advisory and 
policy-making," "not administrative," responsibilities.  Wis. 
Stat § 15.05(1)(b).  Although more circumscribed than the 
                                                 
4 We do not hold that the Governor must exercise control 
over the makeup of DNR administrative positions under the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  Even if that were required under the 
Wisconsin Constitution, the structure of the DNR provides the 
Governor control and influence in the makeup of DNR offices.  
No. 2021AP1673    
 
31 
 
Governor's control over the Secretary, the Governor still 
retains influence over the makeup of the DNR Board.  See Vos, 
393 Wis. 2d 38, ¶60 ("[A]dministrative agencies are considered 
part 
of 
the 
executive 
branch." 
(quoting 
Koschkee, 
387 
Wis. 2d 552, ¶14)).  As previously explained, the Governor may 
nominate a replacement to DNR Board members once their terms 
expire.  Subject to the advice and consent of the senate, the 
Governor has ability to select who holds office on the DNR Board 
for six-year terms.  Wis. Stat. §§ 15.07(1)(a), 15.34(1) & 
(2)(a).  The people's elected representatives in the senate may 
accept or reject the Governor's nominees, but the Governor 
undoubtedly 
has 
wide 
discretion 
in 
whom 
he 
chooses 
for 
nomination.  See Jensen v. Wis. Elections Bd., 2002 WI 13, ¶10, 
249 Wis. 2d 706, 639 N.W.2d 537 (explaining the Legislature is 
tasked 
to 
perform 
constitutional 
responsibilities 
as 
"representatives elected by the people to make . . . political 
and policy decisions").  As has been true since the enactment of 
the Wisconsin Constitution, the Governor may of course work with 
the senate to obtain a mutually satisfactory outcome on 
appointments and selections for administrative offices.  As 
explained above, at the time the Wisconsin Constitution was 
enacted, it appears that the Governor's authority to control the 
occupancy of public offices was narrowly limited; the Governor, 
for instance, had no inherent appointment power.   
¶54 Furthermore, although the Governor does not have a 
free hand to control who sits on the DNR Board, the Governor has 
authority to remove DNR Board members "for cause" while they 
No. 2021AP1673    
 
32 
 
serve in office.  Wis. Stat. §§ 15.07(1)(a), 15.34(1), 17.07(3).  
Whenever there is a vacancy on the DNR Board, the Governor may 
make a provisional appointment, who exercises all the authority 
of a DNR Board member "until acted upon by the senate."  Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 17.20(2)(a). 
 
Public 
offices 
with 
different 
responsibilities, 
operating 
in 
agencies 
with 
different 
structures, may present constitutional issues or concerns not 
present in the present suit.  Nonetheless, with the available 
record and the lack of developed argumentation on the part of 
the State, we cannot conclude that for cause protections for DNR 
Board members violate the Wisconsin Constitution.  
¶55 While "[w]e must be assiduous in patrolling the 
borders between the branches," based on the available record we 
have before us, we cannot conclude that providing Prehn for 
cause protection so offends the separation of powers that he 
must as a matter of law be removable at the Governor's pleasure.  
Tetra Tech EC, Inc. v. DOR, 2018 WI 75, ¶45, 382 Wis. 2d 496, 
914 N.W.2d 21 (lead op.).  Without any showing that Wis. Stat. 
§ 17.07 violates the Wisconsin Constitution, we must follow the 
statute's plain language.  Until his successor is nominated and 
confirmed by the senate, Prehn may be removed only for cause.  
Neither the quo warranto nor declaratory relief requested by the 
State is warranted.    
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶56 We affirm the decision of the circuit court.  Under 
Wis. Stat. § 17.03, the expiration of Prehn's term on the DNR 
Board does not create a vacancy.  Prehn lawfully retains his 
No. 2021AP1673    
 
33 
 
position on the DNR Board as a holdover.  Therefore, the 
Governor cannot make a provisional appointment to replace Prehn 
under Wis. Stat. § 17.20(2)(a).  Until his successor is 
nominated by the Governor and confirmed by the senate, under 
Wis. Stat. § 17.07(3), Prehn may be removed by the Governor only 
for cause.  This arrangement complies with the plain language of 
Wisconsin Statutes and does not raise constitutional concerns.  
The State's complaint is dismissed with prejudice. 
By the Court.—The judgment and the order of the circuit 
court are affirmed. 
 
No.  2021AP1673.rfd 
 
1 
 
¶57 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   (dissenting).  Imagine 
that, in 2015, you hired someone for a position that, by law, 
was for a "6-year term[]" that "shall expire on May 1 . . . in 
an 
odd-numbered 
year." 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 15.34(2)(a), 15.07(1)(c).  Imagine also that you promised 
your new employee that, while they were "serving in [that] 
office" you wouldn't fire them except "for cause."  See Wis. 
Stat. § 17.07(3).  If you were asked when that position would be 
vacant so that you could hire someone else, you'd say "May 1, 
2021," right?  "Wrong," says the majority.  In its view, that 
position isn't vacant until your employee decides to leave.  Oh, 
and they still can't be fired without cause either, even after 
their term has expired.  
¶58 The majority's absurd holding allows Prehn's six-year 
term on the Board of Natural Resources——which expired over a 
year ago——to last for as long as Prehn wants it to, so long as 
he refuses to leave and the senate doesn't confirm a successor 
nominated by the governor.  And even though his term is long 
expired, the governor can't remove him except for cause.  The 
majority bases these nonsensical conclusions on its misguided 
reading of a handful of statutes and a common-law doctrine meant 
to avoid the "disorder and inconvenience" that would result if 
incumbents were unable to continue holding office after their 
terms expired but before a successor was in place.  See State ex 
rel. Martin v. Heil, 242 Wis. 41, 49, 7 N.W.2d 375 (1942).  The 
majority's decision, however, steers our state's government 
directly into disorder and chaos, threatening the fragile 
No.  2021AP1673.rfd 
 
2 
 
separation of powers central to its functions.  I therefore 
dissent. 
I 
¶59 The Board of Natural Resources, which "direct[s] and 
supervis[es]" the Department of Natural Resources, is made up of 
seven members appointed to "staggered 6-year terms."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 15.34(2)(a).  The legislature specified that those six-year 
fixed terms "shall expire on May 1" and "in an odd-numbered 
year."  § 15.07(1)(c).  The Board's members are nominated by the 
governor and officially appointed to their position on "the 
advice and consent of the senate."  Wis. Stat. § 15.07(1)(a).   
¶60 Although positions on the Board are typically filled 
through that nomination-and-appointment process, the governor 
alone can fill a vacancy on the Board for the "residue of [an] 
unexpired term" through a provisional appointment.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 17.20(2)(a).  Such provisional appointments "shall be in 
full force until acted upon by the senate" and entitle the 
appointee to exercise all the powers of the office "during the 
time in which the appointee qualifies."  Id.  To "qualif[y]" in 
this context, an appointee need only "file[] the required oath 
of office."  § 17.01(13).   
¶61 Turning to this case, the majority concludes that 
Prehn's office is not vacant even though his six-year term 
indisputably expired on May 1, 2021.  As a result, the majority 
holds that the governor may not provisionally appoint a 
replacement for Prehn, for two reasons.  First, the majority 
points to the "well established" common law rule "that appointed 
No.  2021AP1673.rfd 
 
3 
 
officers can lawfully holdover after the expiration of their 
term until a successor is properly appointed to the position."  
Majority op, ¶28.  And second, it reasons that the "carefully 
defined vacancy rules" in Wis. Stat. § 17.03 make clear that the 
expiration of a fixed term in appointed office does not create a 
vacancy.  See id., ¶¶19-20.  Neither of these reasons supports 
the majority's conclusion.   
¶62 Although the majority reaches the wrong conclusion, 
its common-law starting point is correct.  The longstanding 
common law rule in Wisconsin and elsewhere is that, absent a 
provision otherwise, an officeholder may continue serving beyond 
the expiration of their term until a successor is appointed and 
qualified.  See State ex rel. Pluntz v. Johnson, 176 Wis. 107, 
114, 186 N.W. 729 (1922); see also State ex rel. Thompson v. 
Gibson, 22 Wis. 2d 275, 283-84, 125 N.W.2d 636 (1964).  The 
courts 
adopted 
this 
rule 
to 
avoid 
the 
"disorder 
and 
inconvenience" that might result if officials were required to 
leave their office immediately at the expiration of their term 
even if no one was ready to replace them.  See Heil, 242 Wis. at 
49.  These concerns were particularly serious before the advent 
of modern communication, when news of a vacancy could take a 
long time to pass along, and when the legislature was rarely in 
session, 
thus 
slowing 
the 
confirmation 
of 
gubernatorial 
appointees.  For those reasons, it's unsurprising that many of 
our cases involving holdover officials were decided in the late 
1800s and early 1900s.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Finch v. 
No.  2021AP1673.rfd 
 
4 
 
Washburn, 17 Wis. 658 (1864); State ex rel. Guernsey v. Meilike, 
81 Wis. 574, 51 N.W. 875 (1892).   
¶63 Today, however, those concerns are at play rarely, if 
ever, and particularly not in a situation like Prehn's.  Prior 
to Prehn's term expiring in May 2021, the governor had appointed 
a successor, who also filed the oath of office, thus qualifying 
her for the position.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 17.01(13), 17.20(2)(a).  
Thus, there would be no disruption to the work of DNR or the 
Board if Prehn were removed from office tomorrow.  And despite 
having numerous opportunities over more than a year to confirm 
or reject the governor's nominee, the senate has refused even to 
act on that nomination.  Meanwhile, allowing Prehn to continue 
serving in office indefinitely makes him the final authority on 
whether he remains in office——not the legislature, which 
specified by statute that his term expired over 13 months ago, 
and not the governor, who the legislature gave the authority to 
nominate a replacement.  One unelected official should not be 
able to dictate his term in office over the will of the people's 
elected representatives.   
¶64 Fortunately, that is not the law.  Although Prehn may 
hold over after his term expires to avoid a temporary disruption 
to the Board's work, his office is vacant upon the expiration of 
his term.  That is because not all holdover officials are the 
same, at least when it comes to whether holding over creates a 
vacancy.  We have distinguished between two types of holdover 
officers:  de jure and de facto.  See Thompson, 22 Wis. 2d at 
294.  A de jure officer is one may continue serving in office 
No.  2021AP1673.rfd 
 
5 
 
after their term expires under "an express statutory provision 
for holding over after expiration of an appointive term."  Id.  
Our statutes contain a number of such provisions, including 
those applicable to members of the council on recycling, local 
election 
officials, 
first-class 
city 
fire 
and 
police 
commissioners, and local weed commissioners.  See Wis. Stat. 
§§ 15.347(17)(c), 7.30(6)(a), 62.50(1h), 66.0517(2)(a).  All of 
these officials have statutory authority to remain in office 
past the expiration of their term until a successor is appointed 
and qualified to replace them.  See, e.g., § 66.0517(2)(a).  
Thus, their office is not vacant if they so hold over.  See 
Thompson, 22 Wis. 2d at 294 (holding that both nomination by the 
governor and senate confirmation are necessary to replace a de 
jure officer).   
¶65 A de facto officer, on the other hand, is an officer 
who holds over after the expiration of their term without the 
explicit statutory authority to do so.  See id.  In that case, 
although there is technically someone in the office, and they 
may legally discharge that office's duties, the office is vacant 
for appointment purposes and can be filled by a valid 
appointment.  See, e.g., Romanoff v. State Comm'n on Jud. 
Performance, 126 P.3d 182, 191 (Colo. 2006) (explaining that a 
de facto officer may serve in the office only until the office 
is filled by appointment); Bradford v. Byrnes, 70 S.E.2d 228, 
231 (S.C. 1952); State ex rel. Ryan v. Bailey, 48 A.2d 229, 231-
32 (Conn. 1946); see also 67 C.J.S. Officers § 154 (explaining 
that 
officers 
holding 
over 
without 
express 
statutory 
No.  2021AP1673.rfd 
 
6 
 
authorization "are generally regarded as de facto officers and 
cannot be punished as intruders; but their temporary occupation 
of office does not prevent the existence of a vacancy and the 
filling of the office by the duly empowered authority"). 
¶66 Prehn is a de facto officer whose authority to serve 
in office ended when the governor appointed Prehn's successor 
after the expiration of his term.  That is because he was 
appointed to a fixed, six-year term on the Natural Resources 
Board, and nothing in the statutes creating that position 
expressly authorizes him to hold over until a successor is 
appointed and qualified.  See §§ 15.34(2)(a), 15.07(1)(a)-(c).  
Prehn is therefore differently situated from de jure officers, 
such as the local weed commissioners, all of whom have explicit 
statutory authorization to remain in office until a successor is 
appointed and qualified.  See § 66.0517(2)(a).  And as a result, 
Prehn's office is vacant for appointment purposes even though he 
continues to occupy it as a holdover.   
¶67 The relevant statutes support that conclusion.  The 
vacancy statutes originate from Article XIII, Section 10(1) of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, 
which 
provides 
that 
"[t]he 
legislature may declare the cases in which any office shall be 
deemed vacant . . . where no provision is made for that purpose 
in this constitution."  Since statehood, the legislature has 
specified by statute at least some situations in which an 
appointed office is vacant.  For example, Wis. Stat. ch. 11, § 2 
(1849) stated that "[e]very office shall become vacant on the 
happening of . . . the following events before the expiration of 
No.  2021AP1673.rfd 
 
7 
 
a term," and listed several such events including resignation, 
removal from office, or conviction of certain crimes.  Today's 
vacancies statute, § 17.03, is a direct descendant of that early 
statute, and states that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided, a 
public office is vacant when," for instance, an incumbent 
resigns, is removed, is convicted of certain crimes, or "[a]ny 
other event occurs which is declared by any special provision of 
law to create a vacancy."  See § 17.03(2)- (3), (5), (13).     
¶68 Although 
§ 17.03 
does 
not 
explicitly 
list 
the 
expiration of a fixed term as an instance in which an office is 
vacant, that event fits within the statute reference to 
vacancies that are "otherwise provided" for.  Indeed, the only 
reasonable interpretation of what it means for a person's term 
to "expire" is that it marks the last date on which the person 
has the statutory authority to continue serving in that 
position.  See State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 
2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (we give 
statutory 
language 
its 
"common, 
ordinary, 
and 
accepted 
meaning").  When, under a statute of limitations, the time to 
bring a cause of action "expires," that's the end of it; a party 
cannot initiate a claim after that date.  So too for appointees 
who lack explicit statutory authorization to hold over.  The 
expiration of their term in office necessarily creates a vacancy 
in that office.   
¶69 That conclusion is at odds with our decision in 
Thompson, and to that extent, Thompson should be overruled.  
There, we held that an office is not vacant when it is occupied 
No.  2021AP1673.rfd 
 
8 
 
by a holdover official, even if that official lacks statutory 
authority to hold over.  See Thompson, 22 Wis. 2d at 293-94.  
Thompson, however, did so based on its incorrect assumption that 
the 
vacancies 
statute, 
§ 17.20 
(1963-64), 
exhaustively 
identified all situations in which a vacancy existed.  See id. 
at 293.  As explained above, however, events not enumerated in 
the vacancies statute can (and indeed must) create vacancies.  
Moreover, although Thompson acknowledged the existence of de 
facto and de jure officers, it failed to recognize the 
importance of that distinction on the existence of a vacancy.  
Id. at 293-94.  In these respects, Thompson is "detrimental to 
coherence and consistency in the law," "unsound in principle," 
and "unworkable in practice," and should be overruled.  See 
State v. Roberson, 2019 WI 102, ¶50, 389 Wis. 2d 190, 935 
N.W.2d 813 (identifying the grounds for overruling a prior 
decision).   
¶70 Setting aside those reasons for why Thompson should be 
overruled, it is distinguishable in all other respects because 
it addressed a fundamentally different appointments system than 
exists today.  See State ex rel. DNR v. Wis. Ct. of Appeals, 
Dist. IV, 2018 WI 25, ¶38 n.16, 380 Wis. 2d 354, 909 N.W.2d 114 
("[W]hen the legislature changes the structure of a statute, we 
must construe it anew.").  When Thompson was decided, the 
governor could make provisional appointments only when the 
legislature was in recess or out of session, but could do so 
even in the absence of a vacancy.  See Wis. Stat. § 14.22 (1963-
64).  That meant that if the governor wanted to replace a 
No.  2021AP1673.rfd 
 
9 
 
holdover official and the senate refused to act on the 
nomination, the governor could simply wait for a recess and then 
make an appointment.  Today, however, the governor may make 
provisional 
appointments 
at 
any 
time, 
but 
only 
to 
fill 
vacancies. 
 
See 
§ 17.20(2)(a). 
 
Importing 
Thompson's 
interpretation of outdated vacancy and appointment statutes into 
the current statutory context, as the majority does, produces 
results that Thompson could not have anticipated and that are at 
odds 
with 
the 
legislature's 
subsequent 
changes 
to 
the 
appointments system.  See Wis. Legis. Ref. Bureau, LRB-9627 
(explaining that 1977 Wis. Laws ch. 418 was meant to "extend[] 
the power of the governor to make provisional appointments under 
the same circumstances" permitted under the prior law and 
"regardless of whether the legislature is in recess," "[u]nless 
the appointee is to replace an official who has not resigned and 
is serving for a fixed term which has not yet expired." 
(emphasis added)).  Namely, it transforms a statutory change 
meant to expand the governor's power to make provisional 
appointments into one that grants appointees like Prehn the 
power both to hold office indefinitely in spite of the 
expiration of their term and to prevent provisional appointees 
from taking office.  Given the changes to the statutory 
structure, Thompson has little, if anything, to say about this 
case. 
¶71 The majority's contrary reasoning, based in large part 
on Thompson, is also unpersuasive, mainly because it creates 
tension elsewhere in the appointments statutes.  For example, 
No.  2021AP1673.rfd 
 
10 
 
the majority does not explain why, if the expiration of the term 
doesn't cause a vacancy, the governor and the senate together 
could nevertheless replace Prehn.  After all, if his office 
isn't vacant, then why can he be replaced by a new nominee 
confirmed by the senate?  See 76 Wis. Op. Att'y Gen. 272, 273-74 
(1987) (explaining that the governor and the legislature cannot 
fill vacancies that do not yet exist).  Yet both the majority 
and all the parties seem to take it as a given that if the 
Senate confirmed the governor's nominee tomorrow, then she would 
immediately replace Prehn, even though there would be no 
statutory vacancy to fill.   
¶72 Moreover, the majority's textual analysis is flawed, 
and, in at least one instance, is at odds with itself.  For 
starters, the majority offers no reasonable interpretation of 
what § 15.07(1)(c) means by "fixed terms . . . shall expire on 
May 1 . . . [of] an odd-numbered year."  Rather, it asserts that 
the expiration of a term means only that "the Governor now has 
the prerogative to appoint a successor who, if confirmed, may 
replace Prehn on the Board for a full appointed term."  Majority 
op., ¶29.  That is a bizarre way to read § 15.07(1)(c), which 
says nothing whatsoever about the powers of the governor or the 
senate.  Next, the majority reasons that the expiration of 
Prehn's term doesn't create a vacancy because § 17.03(10) states 
that 
a 
vacancy 
in 
"elective" 
offices 
arises 
when 
"the 
incumbent's term expires."  According to the majority, this 
provision would be "surplusage" if the expiration of a term——for 
elected or unelected offices——necessarily created a vacancy.  
No.  2021AP1673.rfd 
 
11 
 
See majority op., ¶26.  Maybe so, but the majority's contrary 
interpretation also creates surplusage by giving no meaning to 
the statutory provisions referenced above that give de jure 
officers like the local weed commissioner the explicit statutory 
authority to hold over after the expiration of their term.  See, 
e.g., § 66.0517(2)(a).  So there is "surplusage" either way, and 
the majority articulates no principled reason for choosing its 
interpretation over all others.  Likewise, the majority's 
conclusion that Prehn may continue serving indefinitely after 
the expiration of his term gives no meaning to the statutory 
requirement 
that 
Board 
members 
serve 
"staggered" 
terms.  
§ 15.34(2)(a).  At this point, Prehn is seemingly not serving a 
term at all, let alone one that is "staggered" with the terms of 
the Board's other members.  See id.  Again, the majority fails 
to 
square 
that 
"staggered 
term" 
language 
with 
its 
interpretation.   
¶73 Luckily, our precedents offer a solution, mandating 
that we choose an interpretation that most closely adheres to 
the statute's text, context, and purpose.  See, e.g., Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.  And for those reasons, we must conclude that 
a vacancy arose in Prehn's office when his term expired in May 
2021.  That is the only way to make sense of the competing 
statutory provisions at play.  Because Prehn's office was 
vacant, the governor had the power to fill it "at any time" by 
provisional appointment, see § 17.20(2)(a), with a nominee who 
qualified for office by filing the statutorily required oath.  
No.  2021AP1673.rfd 
 
12 
 
The governor and his appointee did so as of May 1, 2021, and as 
a result, Prehn ceased lawfully serving on that date.  
II 
¶74 Even if Prehn's office is not vacant, however, there 
is another reason why he cannot remain in office:  He is no 
longer entitled to the for-cause removal protection that applies 
to Board members during their terms in office.  
¶75 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 17.07 
provides 
specific 
rules 
governing the removal from office of state officers.  The 
statute generally distinguishes among various state offices 
according to how they are filled.  See, e.g., § 17.07(1)-(5).  
In the case of "[s]tate officers serving in an office that is 
filled by appointment of the governor for a fixed term by and 
with the advice and consent of the senate," like members of the 
DNR Board, they may be removed from office "by the governor at 
any time, for cause."  § 17.07(3).  When a statute provides 
protection from removal except for cause, "'cause' means 
inefficiency, 
neglect 
of 
duty, 
official 
misconduct, 
or 
malfeasance in office."  Wis. Stat. § 17.001.  Aside from the 
narrow 
categories 
of 
officers 
granted 
for-cause 
removal 
protections, all other state officers serve at the pleasure of 
either the governor or the other officer or body that appointed 
them.  See, e.g., § 17.07(3m)-(6).   
¶76 During Prehn's six-year term, he indisputably fell 
within 
the 
category 
of 
officers 
with 
for-cause 
removal 
protection under § 17.07(3).  He was a "[s]tate officer[] 
serving in an office that [was] filled by appointment of the 
No.  2021AP1673.rfd 
 
13 
 
governor for a fixed term by and with the advice and consent of 
the senate."  See id.  The question is whether that protection 
continues now that he is holding over after the expiration of 
his term in office.   
¶77 The majority concludes that it does because Prehn 
"still lawfully occupies the office of DNR Board member, despite 
the fact that his term has expired," and he therefore "'serv[es] 
in an office that is filled by appointment of the governor for a 
fixed term by and with the advice and consent of the senate.'"  
See 
majority 
op., 
¶38 
(alteration 
in 
original) 
(quoting 
§ 17.07(3)).  As a result, the majority holds that "while 
[Prehn] remains on the DNR Board," even as a holdover, "he can 
be removed by the Governor only for cause."  See id., ¶41.   
 
¶78 What the majority overlooks, however, is that the 
statute limits for-cause removal protection to the Board 
members' fixed terms.  Section 17.07(3) provides for-cause 
removal protection to those "serving in an office that is filled 
by 
appointment . . . for 
a 
fixed 
term." 
 
See 
§ 17.07(3) 
(emphasis added).  The use of the present tense in § 17.07(3) 
makes clear that for-cause removal protection applies only while 
the officeholder is serving the fixed term to which he was 
appointed.  So even though Prehn was once serving such a fixed 
term, during which he had for-cause protection, he isn't 
anymore——that term expired more than a year ago.  Now he is 
serving in an office filled by a holdover appointee for a 
No.  2021AP1673.rfd 
 
14 
 
seemingly indefinite term.  And for that reason, he falls 
outside the for-cause removal protections granted by § 17.03(3).1   
 
¶79 This conclusion is supported by the broader structure 
of the removal statutes, is confirmed by the legislative 
history, and avoids possible constitutional problems.  To begin 
with, 
the 
majority's 
incomplete 
and 
consequences-be-damned 
interpretation of the removal statutes effectively grants Prehn 
life tenure.  If the only way Prehn can be removed from office 
is for cause by the governor, then the majority does not explain 
why he can be replaced even if the senate confirms the 
governor's nominee for Prehn's office.  See majority op., ¶38.  
After all, the majority's logic is that Prehn "lawfully occupies 
the office of DNR Board member" and thus, "[a]s a holdover, he 
still may be removed only 'for cause.'"  See id. (quoting 
§ 17.07(3)).  This cannot be right, if for no other reason than 
it leads to the absurd result that Prehn's expired six-year term 
has somehow transformed into life tenure with for-cause removal 
protection.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 (we interpret 
statutes "reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results").    
                                                 
1 The majority's citation to Moses v. Board of Veterans 
Affairs, 80 Wis. 2d 411, 259 N.W.2d 102 (1977) is not to the 
contrary.  In that case, we held that when the law governing who 
appointed the Secretary of Veterans Affairs changed while an 
incumbent was in office, the incumbent was entitled to the prior 
law's removal procedures so long as he remained in office.  Id. 
at 417.  Moses did not address whether for-cause removal 
protections extend beyond the expiration of an incumbent's term—
—indeed, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs served an indefinite 
term.  See Wis. Stat. § 15.05(1)(b) (1975-76).  Thus, Moses does 
not help answer the particular removal question raised in this 
case.   
No.  2021AP1673.rfd 
 
15 
 
¶80 By contrast, interpreting for-cause removal to expire 
when a fixed term expires avoids that absurd result, and is 
consistent with the legislative evidence.  When the phrase 
"fixed term" was added to § 17.07(3) in 1980, the explanatory 
notes stated that the change was to be read "in accordance with 
the presently accepted understanding," which provided that 
"appointees who serve for a fixed term and whose appointments 
require senate confirmation may not be removed by the governor 
in mid-term unless a showing of cause is made."  Dep't of 
Admin., Explanatory Notes for Statutory Changes Appearing in the 
1980 Annual Review Bill, App'x to 1980 Assembly Bill 1180 
(emphasis added).  This explanation of the 1980 amendment 
confirms that Prehn's for-cause removal protection ended when 
his fixed term expired in May 2021.  That conclusion also avoids 
the potential separation-of-powers issues that could arise if 
the governor's inability to remove Prehn prevents the governor 
from exercising his powers over the executive branch, including 
DNR.2  See, e.g., Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Local 1 v. Vos, 2020 
                                                 
2 The majority concludes that, based on its "independent 
research, it appears that the power of the Wisconsin Governor to 
control the occupancy of public offices within administrative 
agencies is far less robust than that of the United States 
President."  Majority op., ¶45.  Perhaps that was true in the 
State's early days, when the governor could appoint only a 
handful of state officials and had little or no power to remove 
them.  See id., ¶¶49-50.  But I question whether that remains 
true today, now that the legislature has granted the governor 
broad authority to make appointments without input from the 
legislature and to remove most state officials without cause.  
See, e.g., Wis. Stat. §§ 17.07(3m)-(6), 17.20(2)(a).  In any 
event, because I conclude that the governor has the statutory 
authority to remove Prehn for any reason after the expiration of 
Prehn's fixed term, I do not address these constitutional 
questions further.   
No.  2021AP1673.rfd 
 
16 
 
WI 67, ¶¶129-30, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946 N.W.2d 35 (discussing the 
relationship 
between 
executive 
power 
and 
administrative 
agencies); see also Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. DOR, 222 
Wis. 2d 650, 667, 586 N.W.2d 872 (1998) (explaining that courts 
"should avoid interpreting a statute in such a way that would 
render it unconstitutional when a reasonable interpretation 
exists that would render the legislation constitutional.").   
¶81 As a result, I conclude that for-cause removal 
protection for DNR Board members is limited to their fixed terms 
in office, and that holdover members like Prehn are therefore 
removable at will by the governor.  Thus, even if Prehn's office 
is not vacant, the governor may remove him from office 
immediately.   
¶82 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and JILL J. KAROFSKY join this opinion.   
 
 
No.  2021AP1673.rfd 
 
 
 
1