Title: Kack v. Kack
Citation: 142 N.W.2d 754
Docket Number: 8280
State: north-dakota
Issuer: north-dakota Supreme Court
Date: May 19, 1966

142 N.W.2d 754 (1966) Winnifred G. KACK, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Walter T. KACK, Defendant and Appellant. No. 8280. Supreme Court of North Dakota. May 19, 1966. *755 Mackoff, Kellogg, Kirby &amp; Kloster, Dickinson, for appellant. Stokes, Vaaler, Gillig &amp; Warcup, Grand Forks, for respondent. ERICKSTAD, Judge. By summons and complaint dated February 14, 1963, the plaintiff, Winnifred G. Kack, initiated an action against her former husband, the defendant, Walter T. Kack, asserting two causes of action. The first cause of action alleged: The second cause of action alleged that Mrs. Kack had been fraudulently induced by Mr. Kack, who was then her husband, to sign the property settlement agreement and that she was consequently damaged in the sum of $100,000. In his answer Mr. Kack denied the allegations material to this law suit and asserted that neither of Mrs. Kack's causes of action stated a claim upon which relief could be granted. Mr. Kack then moved for summary judgment in his favor pursuant to Rule 56 of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure. In findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for judgment dated February 24, 1964, the district court granted summary judgment of dismissal of Mrs. Kack's second cause of action but denied Mr. Kack's motion for summary judgment as to Mrs. Kack's first cause of action. Following a hearing on Mrs. Kack's first cause of action the district court found that she was entitled to and ordered that she recover a judgment against Mr. Kack in the sum of $1,886.40, together with her costs. The order was dated September 28, 1964. Judgment was entered in the District Court of Stark County pursuant to this order on October 22, 1964. Notice of the entry of the judgment, dated October 23, 1964, was served by mail on counsel for Mr. Kack on October 24, 1964. In February 1965 Mr. Kack moved to amend the judgment entered on October 22, 1964, to include provisions for the dismissal of Mrs. Kack's second cause of action in accordance with the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for judgment entered by the district court on February 24, 1964. The following stipulation was then entered into between counsel for the respective parties: *757 Dated this 16th day of March, A.D., 1965. Pursuant to this stipulation the district court on March 23, 1965, executed the following order: The amended judgment, dated March 24, 1965, accordingly contained a dismissal with prejudice of Mrs. Kack's second cause of action and an allowance of costs and disbursements to Mr. Kack in the sum of 5 dollars. Mr. Kack took his appeal in this matter on June 18, 1965. The notice of appeal reads as follows: Attached to the notice of appeal was the following: At the outset we are met with Mrs. Kack's contention that this court is without jurisdiction to consider this appeal. She bases this contention on the fact that more than six months expired between the service of the notice of the entry of the original judgment, which was on October 24, 1964, and the service of the notice of appeal from the amended judgment, which was on June 18, 1965. Our statute relating to the time for appeal reads as follows: Mr. Kack, however, argues that under Rule 54(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure there was no final judgment from which he could appeal until the judgment was amended to include an adjudication of all of the claims, and that, as the original judgment did not include an adjudication of the second cause of action, it did not include an adjudication of all of the claims. Rule 54(b) reads as follows: *759 Mr. Kack further argues that as the trial court had not made an express determination that there was no just reason for delay and as it had not expressly directed the entry of a judgment upon less than all of the claims, the original judgment which adjudicated less than all of the claims was not appealable; and the time for appeal did not start to run until after the judgment was amended to include an adjudication of all the issues. However, Mrs. Kack argues that as Mr. Kack is appealing only from that part of the amended judgment which is adverse to him and that this part is the same as it was in the original judgment, the time for appeal should commence running from the date of the service of the notice of the entry of the original judgment rather than from the date of the service of the notice of the entry of amended judgment, especially since the stipulation was that the judgment should be amended nunc pro tunc and as the district court so indicated in its order amending the judgment. As technical as Mr. Kack's contentions may appear to be, they express a view that has been most recently followed by the federal courts in the interpretation of Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which is nearly identical to Rule 54(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure. In a 1957 decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a case concerning a complaint and a counterclaim, the court said: Even where the trial court has made an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and has expressly directed entry of final judgment under the provisions of Rule 54(b), some appellate courts have held that a judgment which adjudicates less than all the claims in an action is not appealable. One of the reasons given for this determination is that the court below has abused its discretion. Gass v. National Container Corporation, 271 F.2d 231 (7th Cir. 1959). Another court has concluded that a certificate granted pursuant to Rule 54(b) cannot attach finality to an adjudication which does not finally dispose of a claim and that the lower court has no jurisdiction to enter a delayed certificate after the appeal has been taken. Bush v. United Benefit Fire Insurance Company, 311 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1963). In 38 A.L.R.2d, in an annotation on the subject Judgment on Multiple Claims, at page 396, § 6, it is said: It is interesting to note the following dissertation from § 7 [a] of the same annotation: The same article continues as follows: It would appear to us that the trend of the decisions is that judgments which do not adjudicate all claims are unappealable unless the determination and direction required by Rule 54(b) have been made before the taking of the appeal. Under these circumstances and with the hope of establishing a uniform practice in the application of Rule 54(b), we are constrained to hold that the time for appeal did not commence to run in the instant case until after the service of the notice of the entry of the amended judgment. In the instant case, as an order for summary judgment of the second cause of action had been rendered before the order for judgment as to the first cause of action was rendered, Mrs. Kack's attorneys could and should have included in the judgment prepared for execution the adjudication of both claims. Having failed to do so, Mrs. Kack is in no position to object to the consequences which necessitated an amendment to incorporate an adjudication of both claims. Having so decided, we are now faced with the arguments raised by Mr. Kack in his appeal. Specification of error No. 1 is to the effect that the trial court erred in finding that Mr. Kack failed and refused for a period of eighteen months to pay the full cost of education and maintenance of his minor son. He bases this contention on the fact that the court said, in its memorandum decision, "Mr. Kack has provided funds for his son rather lavishly, sums in excess of his needs for education and maintenance," and that, having so found, the court could not, if it were to be consistent, find that Mr. Kack failed and refused for a period of eighteen months to pay the full cost of the son's education and maintenance. It should be noted that this is an appeal without a transcript or a settled statement of the case and is presumably brought under § 28-27-28, N.D.C.C. *762 Section 28-27-07, which sets forth the record on appeal, provides as follows: Upon appeal the record must contain: Subsection 2 of § 28-20-12 describes what the judgment roll should consist of in a case of this type: Mrs. Kack argues that as a memorandum decision is required to be filed by the trial court only with orders granting or refusing a new trial, under Rule 59(f), N.D.R. Civ.P., a memorandum decision is not a part of the judgment roll, as it is not within the definition set forth in § 28-20-12. We need not decide here whether a memorandum decision is a part of the judgment roll, as in this case the court executed findings of fact and conclusions of law in addition to the memorandum decision; and under these circumstances the findings of fact prevail over any alleged inconsistencies in the memorandum decision. Fischer v. Fischer, 139 N.W.2d 845 (N.D.1966). In Stone v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 81 Cal. App. 2d 902, 185 P.2d 396, at 399, the District Court of Appeal of California said: See also: Bridgford v. Sawyer, 105 Cal. App. 2d 631, 234 P.2d 95. In Williams v. Kinsey, 74 Cal. App. 2d 583, 169 P.2d 487, at 499, the same court said: Rule 5(a) of the California Rules of Court reads as follows: Although the appellate court rules of California list the opinion of the trial court as part of the record on appeal, the California courts have refused to permit the opinion to be used to impeach the trial court's findings of fact. We are in accord with the view that the trial court's opinion, or memorandum decision as it is often called, may not be used to impeach the trial court's findings of fact which accompany its conclusions of law and order for judgment. The New Mexico Supreme Court seems to agree with this view. See Mosley v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 45 N.M. 230, 114 P.2d 740. In the instant case the findings of fact contain no references equivalent to that contained in the memorandum decision to the effect that Mr. Kack had provided funds for his son in excess of the son's needs for education and maintenance. The findings appear to be clearly to the contrary and read as follows: As this appeal is from the judgment, taken on the judgment roll, and the facts are not triable anew in this court, the findings of fact are presumed to be correct, there being no facts presented on appeal contrary to the findings of fact upon which the conclusions of law and order for judgment are based. Having so decided, we are not compelled to consider specification of error No. 1; however, we have done so and see no merit in it. *764 We are in accord with the view expressed by the trial court that pursuant to the property settlement entered into between Mr. Kack and Mrs. Kack in connection with their divorce proceeding, he agreed to pay to her the entire cost of the education of their minor son, including full cost of his maintenance during his minority. As this was an agreement between Mr. Kack and Mrs. Kack and not an agreement between Mr. Kack and his son, and as these payments were to be in addition to other payments specified in the property settlement agreement which were to be made to Mrs. Kack, the logical inference therefrom is that the payments for the son's education and maintenance should be made to Mrs. Kack and not to the minor son, of whom Mrs. Kack had custody. The next specification of error to be considered is that the trial court erred as a matter of law in determining that § 14-09-14 had no application to the facts in the instant case and that this statute did not bar a recovery by Mrs. Kack. The pertinent part of § 14-09-14 reads as follows: We are also in accord with the trial court in this determination. Section 14-09-14 has no application in the instant case, as the parties had entered into a contract which provided that Mr. Kack was to pay the entire costs of the education and maintenance of the parties' minor son during his minority. Having so decided these specifications of error, the last specification of error, that the district court erred in making and entering its judgment that the plaintiff have judgment against the defendant in the sum of $1,886.40, together with costs and disbursements taxed and allowed in the sum of $23.60, making a total judgment of $1,910.00, must be found to be without merit. This is especially true as this is not an appeal de novo. For the reasons stated in this opinion, the judgment of the trial court is in all things affirmed. TEIGEN, C. J., and KNUDSON and STRUTZ, JJ., concur. MURRAY, J., not being a member of the Court at the time of submission of this case, did not participate.