Title: Ex parte David Bronner, et al.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1110472
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: December 31, 2014

REL:" 12/31/2014
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2014-2015
____________________
1110472
____________________
Ex parte David Bronner, in his official capacities as chief
executive officer and secretary-treasurer of the Employees'
Retirement System of Alabama and as chief executive officer
and secretary-treasurer of the Teachers' Retirement System
of Alabama, et al.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Tonya Denson and Venius Turner
v.
David Bronner et al.)
(Montgomery Circuit Court, CV-11-900738)
MURDOCK, Justice.
1110472
The ERSA and the TRSA are part of the RSA.  See Ala. Code
1
1975, § 16-25-22(a) and § 36-27-3.
2
Tonya Denson, a member of the Employees' Retirement
System of Alabama ("the ERSA"), and Venius Turner, a member of
the Teachers' Retirement System of Alabama ("the TRSA"),
brought this action on behalf of themselves, individually, as
well as similarly situated members of the Retirement Systems
of Alabama ("the RSA"), in the Montgomery Circuit Court
against (1) David Bronner, in his official capacities as chief
executive officer and secretary-treasurer of the ERSA, the
TRSA, and the RSA  and (2) the officers and members of the
1
respective boards of control of the TRSA and the ERSA, in
their official capacities (Bronner and the officers and
members of the boards of control are hereinafter referred to
collectively as "the RSA defendants").
The RSA defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint, which the trial court denied.  The RSA defendants
then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with this Court,
asking that we direct the trial court to vacate its order
denying their motion to dismiss and to grant the motion.  We
grant the petition.
1110472
3
I.  Facts and Procedural History
The RSA includes the TRSA, which is administered for the
benefit of public-education employees who are members of the
TRSA, and the ERSA, which is administered for the benefit of
state employees who are members of the ERSA.  See supra
note 1.  Denson is a member of the ERSA; Turner is a member of
the TRSA.  The board of control of the TRSA is charged by
statute with making and overseeing investments on behalf of
the TRSA, just as the board of control of the ERSA is tasked
with the same responsibility and authority as to the ERSA.
See Ala. Code 1975, § 16-25-2(b) and § 36-27-2(b).
Section 16-25-20, Ala. Code 1975, provides: 
"(a)(1)  The Board of Control [of the TRSA]
shall be the trustees of the several funds of the
Teachers' Retirement System created by this chapter
as provided in Section 16-25-21, and shall have full
power to invest and reinvest the funds, through its
Secretary-Treasurer, in the classes of bonds,
mortgages, common and preferred stocks, shares of
investment companies or mutual funds, or other
investments as the Board of Control may approve,
with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under
the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man
acting in a like capacity and familiar with the
matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of
a like character and with like aims; and, subject to
like 
terms, 
conditions, 
limitations, 
and
restrictions, the Board of Control, through its
Secretary-Treasurer, shall have full power to hold,
purchase, sell, assign, transfer, and dispose of any
1110472
4
investments in which the funds created herein shall
have been invested, as well as the proceeds of the
investments and any moneys belonging to the funds.
"(2)  The Secretary-Treasurer shall have the
authority and it shall be his or her duty to carry
out the investment policies fixed by the Board of
Control, and pursuant thereto he or she shall
examine all offers of investments made to the funds,
shall initiate inquiries as to available investments
therefor, shall review periodically the investment
quality and desirability of retention of investments
held, and shall make purchases and sales of
investments as he or she shall deem to the best
interests of the funds and as the investment
committee hereinafter provided for, and as the
consultant to the Secretary-Treasurer, if any,
appointed by the Board of Control hereunder, to the
extent of the purpose for which it is appointed,
shall approve.  ...
"(3)  The Board of Control shall elect an
investment committee which shall consist of three
members of the board, one of whom shall be the
Director of Finance.  The investment committee shall
act as agent for the board and shall consider all
investment 
recommendations 
made 
by 
the
Secretary-Treasurer and shall either approve or
disapprove the same in accordance with policies set
by the board.  ...
"(4)  The Board of Control may appoint and
employ as consultant to the Secretary-Treasurer, in
the purchase, sale, and review of investments of the
funds, to the extent the board may designate, a bank
having its principal office in the State of Alabama,
having capital, surplus, and undivided profits of
not 
less 
than 
three 
hundred 
million 
dollars
($300,000,000), and having an organized investment
department."
1110472
A regulation governing the ERSA provides, in part, as
2
follows:
"(1) The fiduciary standards of staff and Board
of Control members [are] to be of the highest
degree.
"(a)  All investments are to be made
within 
the 
'prudent 
man' 
concept 
of
fiduciary trusteeship; 
"(b) 
The 
fiduciary 
standards 
are
governed by any federal law, Securities and
Exchange Commission rulings, and general
laws of the State of Alabama, in addition
to any specific rulings of the Alabama
Ethics Commission such as 'Advisory Opinion
No. 230.'"
Ala. Admin. Code (RSA), Rule 800-2-3-.09.  No comparable
regulation exists as to the TRSA.  The plaintiffs do not rely
upon the above-quoted regulation in their complaint, and no
party addressed it in the briefs to the trial court or
addresses it in the briefs to this Court.  As discussed infra,
a version of the "'prudent man' concept" is embodied in § 16-
25-20 and § 36-27-25, which are applicable to the TRSA and the
ERSA, respectively.   
5
See also Ala. Code 1975, § 36-27-25(a), (c), (d), and (e)
(substantially similar provisions as to the board of control
of the ERSA).2
In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the RSA
defendants had violated their fiduciary duties.  Quoting Ala.
Code 1975, § 16-25-20(a)(1), governing the TRSA, and citing §
36-27-25(a), governing the ERSA and which, in all material
1110472
6
respects, is identical to § 16-25-20(a)(1), the plaintiffs
alleged that the RSA defendants are obligated to invest the
respective retirement funds being managed by them "'with the
care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances
then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity
and familiar with the matters would use in the conduct of an
enterprise of a like character and with like aims.'"  
The plaintiffs also alleged that the RSA has adopted a
policy 
statement 
entitled 
"Investment 
Policies 
and 
Procedures"
that states, in part, as follows:
"The Boards of Control, as Trustees of the
Teachers' 
Retirement 
System 
and 
Employees'
Retirement 
System 
(Systems), have full power,
through each System's secretary-treasurer, to invest
and reinvest System funds in accordance with the
Prudent Man Rule: 'with the care, skill, prudence,
and 
diligence 
under 
the 
circumstances 
then
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like
capacity and familiar with such matters would use in
the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and
with like aims.'  Other funds currently and
hereafter under the management of the Systems will
be governed by this Investment Policy Statement
within each System's limitations and/or by other
applicable legislated restrictions. 
"It is the objective of the Boards [of Control
of the TRSA and the ERSA] that funds be invested in
such a manner as to maximize the total return of
each System within prudent risk parameters.  Also,
the Systems recognize that a stronger Alabama
equates to a stronger Retirement System, and as
1110472
In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that the RSA has
3
adopted the following mission statement:  "The mission of the
Retirement Systems of Alabama is to serve the interests of our
members by preserving the excellent benefits and soundness of
the Systems at the least expense to the State of Alabama and
all Alabama taxpayers." 
7
such, 
investments 
in 
Alabama 
businesses 
are
encouraged to the extent the investment meets the
criteria delineated by this policy statement."  
3
The plaintiffs alleged that, "for as much as the most
recent fifteen year period," the RSA defendants have made
investments
"in 
Alabama 
golf 
courses, 
office 
buildings,
condominiums, hotels, resorts and stock and debt
holdings in companies conducting business in Alabama
(collectively referred to as 'Alabama Investments'),
which investments have historically yielded lower
returns than investments which could or should have
been made in compliance with the mandates of the
law, the Prudent Man Rule, the Investment Policy of
the RSA, and its Mission Statement."
(Emphasis added.)  In this regard, the plaintiffs contended
that "up to ... approximately 15%" of the investments made by
the boards of control have been in such Alabama-based
investments.  They contend that the ERSA and the TRSA received
lower returns on those investments than could have been
realized on other investments, which, in turn, made it
necessary for members of the ERSA and the TRSA and the State
of Alabama to pay more to enable the ERSA and the TRSA to meet
1110472
8
their obligations to retirees.  They alleged that, "though the
Alabama Investments may have been well intended, and may serve
as a vehicle for creating goodwill, they have not been made in
compliance with the Prudent Man Rule."
The plaintiffs asked the trial court to enter a judgment
declaring
"that the duties of the [RSA] Defendants, separately
and severally, are specifically subject to the
statutory provisions, mandates and restrictions
specified in § 36-27-25 and § 16-25-20, Code of
Alabama, 
and 
that 
any 
deviation 
from 
those
provisions, mandates and restrictions [is] unlawful"
and declaring further that it is "beyond the authority" of the
boards of control to invest "any assets and funds ... in
Alabama Investments which the [RSA defendants] expected or
were aware would yield less of a return than alternative or
other investments."  Similarly, the plaintiffs requested in
their complaint that the trial court enjoin the RSA defendants
from, among other things, investing "any assets" within their
control in a manner not in accord with the "Prudent Man Rule"
and from investing "in Alabama Investments ... which the [RSA
defendants] expect or are aware will yield less of a return
than alternative or other investments."
1110472
The RSA defendants also asserted that the plaintiffs had
4
failed to allege a cognizable claim based on violations of the
"prudent-man rule."  As this Court noted in American Suzuki
Motor Corp. v. Burns, 81 So. 3d 320, 321 (Ala. 2011), however,
the denial of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted generally is not subject to
appellate review unless this Court has granted permission to
appeal pursuant to Rule 5, Ala. R. App. P.  The RSA defendants
did not seek permission to appeal pursuant to Rule 5, Ala. R.
App. P., and they have not argued the failure-to-state-a-claim
9
The RSA defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint.  The motion, as initially filed, asserted two
grounds for dismissal of the complaint.  First, the RSA
defendants asserted that State, or sovereign, immunity
precluded prosecution of the claims.  See Art. I, § 14, Ala.
Const. 1901; Ala. Code 1975, §§ 16-25-2(b) and 36-27-2(b)
(recognizing that the boards of control of the TRSA and the
ERSA are instrumentalities of the State, that the TRSA and the
ERSA are funded by the State, and that their officers and
employees are immune from suit in their official capacities to
the same extent as the State, its agencies, and its officers
and employees).  According to the RSA defendants, the
plaintiffs' claims do not fall within any of the recognized
"exceptions" to State immunity applicable to State officials.
Second, the RSA defendants asserted that Denson and Turner
lacked standing.  
4
1110472
issue in their petition.  Thus, we will not address that
issue.     
10
Denson and Turner filed a reply in opposition to the
motion to dismiss, contending that the plaintiffs' claims did
in fact fall within recognized "exceptions" to State immunity.
They 
also 
contended 
that 
they 
had 
standing, 
relying
principally on a 1981 decision of this Court, Lee v. Bronner,
404 So. 2d 627 (Ala. 1981).
The RSA defendants filed a response to Denson and
Turner's reply in opposition, adding arguments that the
plaintiffs' claims were nonjusticiable and that Denson and
Turner had failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
In December 2011, the trial court denied the motion to
dismiss.  The RSA defendants filed a timely petition for the
writ of mandamus with this Court. 
II.  Standard of Review
A writ of mandamus is an
"'extraordinary writ that will be issued only when
there is:  1) a clear legal right in the petitioner
to the order sought; 2) an imperative duty upon the
respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to
do so; 3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and
4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.'"
1110472
11
Ex parte Wood, 852 So. 2d 705, 708 (Ala. 2002) (quoting
Ex parte United Serv. Stations, Inc., 628 So. 2d 501, 503
(Ala. 1993)).  "'When we consider a mandamus petition, the
scope of our review is to determine whether the trial court
clearly exceeded its discretion.'"  Ex parte Thomas, 110
So. 3d 363, 365-66 (Ala. 2012) (quoting State v. Bui, 888
So. 2d 1227, 1229 (Ala. 2004).
"Subject to certain narrow exceptions ..., we have held
that, because an 'adequate remedy' exists by way of an appeal,
the denial of a motion to dismiss ... is not reviewable by
petition for writ of mandamus."  Ex parte Liberty Nat'l Life
Ins. Co., 825 So. 2d 758, 761–62 (Ala. 2002).  One of the
recognized exceptions to this general rule is "that mandamus
will lie to compel the dismissal of claim that is barred by
the doctrine of sovereign immunity."  Ex parte Blankenship,
893 So. 2d 303, 305 (Ala. 2004).  Likewise, the writ may be
issued where the plaintiff's claims fail to present a
justiciable controversy. Gulf Beach Hotel, Inc. v. State ex
rel. Whetstone, 935 So. 2d 1177, 1182 (Ala. 2006).
1110472
12
III.  Analysis   
The RSA defendants argue that they are entitled to
immunity as to the plaintiffs' claims, that Denson and Turner
lack standing because they "cannot allege an injury in fact,"
that the controversy at issue is nonjusticiable, and that
Denson and Turner have failed to exhaust administrative
remedies. In response to those arguments, the trial court
identified a number of issues that gave it "considerable
concern":
"The issues presented on motion to dismiss are
significant ones, several of which cause the court
considerable concern.  These issues include whether
Plaintiffs 
have 
standing; 
whether 
[the 
RSA]
Defendants are entitled to state sovereign immunity;
whether 
a 
Prudent 
Man 
Rule 
applies 
and 
the
parameters of a Prudent Man Rule, if one applies;
whether the Boards of Control, as fiduciaries, have
discretion to consider any factor other than
obtaining the highest rate of return; whether and
how the court might substitute its judgment for the
judgment of the Boards of Control, since investment
policymaking 
is 
a 
function 
allotted 
by 
the
legislature to the Boards of Control; whether the
court can take the responsibility for investment
policymaking from the Boards of Control when
Plaintiffs have the political remedy of electing new
and different members to the Boards of Control; and
whether Plaintiffs are required to exhaust the
available administrative remedy.  These issues
should be presented to the court on a motion for
summary judgment with supporting materials and law."
1110472
The appropriateness of our review of these issues at this
5
juncture is a function of the legal nature of the questions
presented, as well as the fact that these issues go to the
subject-matter jurisdiction of the trial court.  We also note
that sovereign immunity is a defense that protects the State
and its officials not only from liability, but also from suit.
See, e.g., Burgoon v. Alabama State Dep't of Human Res., 835
So. 2d 131, 133 (Ala. 2002) ("A trial court must dismiss an
action against a State agency or against a State agent acting
in an official capacity at the earliest opportunity.");
Ex parte Auburn Univ., 6 So. 3d 478, 484 (Ala. 2008) (applying
to a defense of sovereign immunity the federal qualified-
immunity principle that "'[t]he privilege is "an immunity from
suit rather than a mere defense to liability"'" (quoting Ryan
v. Hayes, 831 So. 2d 21, 31 (Ala. 2002), quoting in turn
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001))).
13
The issues that gave the trial court concern also give
this Court concern.  Unlike the trial court, however, we
conclude that some of those issues are appropriate for
consideration at this juncture in the litigation.  In this
regard, we turn first to the corollary questions of sovereign
immunity and separation of powers.  
5
Section 14 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901 provides:
"[T]he State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any
court of law or equity."  As discussed below, the doctrine of
sovereign immunity not only prohibits the State itself from
being named as a defendant in an action, but it also prohibits
State agencies and, as a general rule, State officials sued in
1110472
Section 43, Ala. Const. 1901, states:
6
"In the government of this state, except in the
instances in this Constitution hereinafter expressly
directed or permitted, the legislative department
shall never exercise the executive and judicial
powers, or either of them; the executive shall never
exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or
either of them; the judicial shall never exercise
the legislative and executive powers, or either of
them; to the end that it may be a government of laws
and not of men."
See also Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392, 399 (Ala. 2000)
(plurality opinion) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,
521 (1985), for the proposition that the doctrine of sovereign
immunity has "footings" in the doctrine of separation of
powers).
14
their official capacity from being named as defendants in an
action.  As discussed further below, the bar of sovereign
immunity aligns with and is buttressed by the doctrine of
separation of powers to the extent the latter prohibits the
judicial 
branch, 
through 
adjudications, 
from 
usurping
functions dedicated to the executive and legislative branches.
See Art. III, § 43, Ala. Const. 1901.6
It has long been held that the wall of sovereign immunity
erected by § 14 of the Alabama Constitution is formidable:
"The wall of immunity erected by § 14 is nearly
impregnable.  Sanders Lead Co. v. Levine, 370 F.
Supp. 1115, 1117 (M.D. Ala. 1973); Taylor v. Troy
State Univ., 437 So. 2d 472, 474 (Ala. 1983);
Hutchinson v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama,
1110472
15
288 Ala. 20, 24, 256 So. 2d 281, 284 (1971).  This
immunity may not be waived.  Larkins v. Department
of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 806 So. 2d
358, 363 (Ala. 2001)('The State is immune from suit,
and its immunity cannot be waived by the Legislature
or by any other State authority.'); Druid City Hosp.
Bd. v. Epperson, 378 So. 2d 696 (Ala. 1979) (same);
Opinion of the Justices No. 69, 247 Ala. 195, 23 So.
2d 505 (1945) (same); see also Dunn Constr. Co. v.
State Bd. of Adjustment, 234 Ala. 372, 175 So. 383
(1937).  'This means not only that the state itself
may not be sued, but that this cannot be indirectly
accomplished by suing its officers or agents in
their official capacity, when a result favorable to
plaintiff would be directly to affect the financial
status of the state treasury.'  State Docks Comm'n
v. Barnes, 225 Ala. 403, 405, 143 So. 581, 582
(1932) ...; see also Southall v. Stricos Corp., 275
Ala. 156, 153 So. 2d 234 (1963)."
Patterson v. Gladwin Corp., 835 So. 2d 137, 142 (Ala. 2002)
(emphasis omitted).
It is not merely when an action against a State official
would "affect the financial status of the state treasury,"
however, that such an action is barred by § 14.   This Court
has long recognized that actions against State officials sued
in their official capacity are barred by § 14 unless they fall
within certain categories of actions that, as a rule, do not
involve discretionary decision-making by those officials.  As
early as 1971, this Court recognized that those categories
included:
1110472
16
"(1)  Actions brought to compel State officials to
perform 
their 
legal 
duties. 
 
Department 
of
Industrial Relations v. West Boylston Manufacturing
Co., 253 Ala. 67, 42 So. 2d 787 [(1949)]; Metcalf v.
Department of Industrial Relations, 245 Ala. 299, 16
So. 2d 787 [(1944)].  (2) Actions brought to enjoin
State officials from enforcing an unconstitutional
law.  Glass v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America,
246 
Ala. 
579, 
22 
So. 
2d 
13 
[(1945)] 
....
(3) Actions to compel State officials to perform
ministerial acts.  Curry v. Woodstock Slag Corp.,
242 Ala. 379, 6 So. 2d 479 [(1943)], and cases there
cited.  (4) Actions brought under the Declaratory
Judgments Act, [now Ala. Code 1975, § 6–6–220 et
seq.], seeking construction of a statute and how it
should be applied in a given situation."
Aland v. Graham, 287 Ala. 226, 229–30, 250 So. 2d 677, 679
(1971). 
To the four categories of action identified in Aland,
this Court has since added and repeatedly recognized two
additional categories of action against State officials that
do not seek to invade the exercise of discretion delegated to
them by State law and, therefore, do not qualify as "actions
against the State" for purposes of § 14 immunity:
"'"'"(5) valid inverse condemnation actions brought
against State officials in their representative
capacity ...."'"'"; and
"'(6)[] actions for injunction brought against State
officials in their representative capacity where it
is alleged that they had acted fraudulently, in bad
faith, beyond their authority, or in a mistaken
interpretation of law ....'"
1110472
In Ex parte Jackson County Board of Education we also
7
noted that actions for monetary damages against State
officials "'in their individual capacity'" are not properly
deemed actions against the State "'where it is alleged that
[the State officials] had acted fraudulently, in bad faith,
beyond their authority, or in a mistaken interpretation of
law.'"  ___ So. 3d at ___ (quoting Ex parte Moulton, 116
So. 3d at 1141).  We take this opportunity to clarify that any
action against a State official that seeks only to recover
monetary damages against the official "in [his or her]
individual capacity" is, of course, not an action against that
person in his or her official capacity and would of necessity
fail to qualify as "an action against the State" for purposes
of § 14.
17
Ex parte Jackson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., [Ms. 1130738, Sept. 26,
2014] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2014) (quoting Ex parte
Moulton, 116 So. 3d 1119, 1131 and 1141 (Ala. 2013), quoting
in turn other cases).  
7
Turning then to the present case, the gravamen of the
plaintiffs' complaint is this:  "Up to ... approximately 15%"
of the investments made by the boards of control have been
made in Alabama-based assets and, as a group, those
investments have not yielded as much return to the ERSA and
the TRSA as other investments that could have been made by the
RSA defendants.  As a consequence, the plaintiffs contend, the
investments pursued by the RSA defendants reflects a violation
of a "legal duty" imposed upon them by State law and
1110472
The plaintiffs also seek to maintain this action under
8
the "exception" to sovereign immunity recognized for actions
brought 
against 
State 
officials under the Declaratory
Judgments Act, seeking the construction of a statute (i.e.,
category (4)).  The statutes relevant to that issue are the
same statutes that are at issue in determining whether the
"legal duty" and "beyond ... authority" "exceptions" (i.e.,
category (1) and category (6)) are applicable, and, therefore,
our 
resolution 
of 
whether 
those 
exceptions 
apply 
is
dispositive.  
 
18
therefore 
those 
investments 
are 
"beyond 
the 
[lawful]
authority" of the RSA defendants.8
The RSA defendants argue as follows in their initial
brief to this Court:
"By adopting -- and when implementing -- the
part of RSA's investment policy challenged by
Plaintiffs, [the RSA] Defendants made discretionary
decisions that RSA members would be benefitted
indirectly 
through 
limited 
prudent 
Alabama
investments, which could increase the revenues of
the funding sources for RSA, i.e., strengthen the
State and the counties and cities and other
governmental entities that participate in RSA.  [The
RSA] 
Defendants' 
investment 
policy 
recognizes
(1) that whether RSA members' benefits are secure
depends on the ability of the State of Alabama to
pay; (2) that the ability of the State of Alabama to
pay depends on its tax base; and (3) that the State
of Alabama's tax base depends on the financial
strength of the State.
"Plaintiffs' action asks the circuit court to
substitute its judgment for [the RSA] Defendants'
judgment and declare that whether an investment
strengthens Alabama should not be a factor that [the
RSA] Defendants may consider when RSA chooses
1110472
In their reply brief, the RSA defendants summarize their
9
position on this matter as follows:
"[The RSA] Defendants have ... made and make
investment decisions only to benefit the RSA
beneficiaries.  Specifically, [the RSA] Defendants
follow their policy to include a small fraction of
their prudent investments in Alabama, recognizing
that 'a stronger Alabama equates to a stronger
Retirement System.'  ...  Because [the RSA]
Defendants 
make 
all 
RSA 
investments 
for 
the
exclusive purpose of promoting the interests of RSA
beneficiaries, Plaintiffs' arguments fail." 
19
investments. Indeed, by focusing on maximizing rates
of return, Plaintiffs seem to assert that the only
factor [the RSA] Defendants (as fiduciaries) are
permitted to consider is maximizing rates of return
(which in turn implies that RSA can only have
investments with predictable returns, such as CDs
and bonds)."
The parties acknowledge that certain Code provisions
relating to trusts may shed light on the duties of the RSA
defendants under the statutes at issue in this case.  The
plaintiffs point to, and the RSA defendants acknowledge, the
general principle of trust law 
requiring trustees to
"administer the trust solely in the interests of the
beneficiaries."  Ala. Code 1975, § 19-3B-802(a).   Similarly,
9
both sides acknowledge Alabama's codification for application
to trusts generally of the so-called "prudent-investor rule,"
including § 19-3B-902(c), Ala. Code 1975 (part of Alabama's
1110472
20
version of the Uniform Trust Act).  Section 19-3B-902(c)
provides:
"Among circumstances that a trustee may consider in
investing and managing trust assets are such of the
following as are relevant to the trust or its
beneficiaries:
"(1) general economic conditions; 
"(2) the possible effect of inflation
or deflation; 
"(3) the expected tax consequences of
investment decisions or strategies; 
"(4) the role that each investment or
course of action plays within the overall
trust 
portfolio, 
which 
may 
include
financial assets, interests in closely held
enterprises, 
tangible 
and 
intangible
personal property, and real property; 
"(5) the expected total return from
income and the appreciation of capital; 
"(6) 
other 
resources 
of 
the
beneficiaries; 
"(7) needs for liquidity, regularity
of income, and preservation or appreciation
of capital; 
"(8) an asset's special relationship
or special value, if any, to the purposes
of the trust or to one or more of the
beneficiaries; 
"(9) the size of the portfolio; and 
1110472
21
"(10) 
the 
purposes 
and 
estimated
duration of the trust.  
The RSA defendants, however, reject the notion that those
general principles of trust law require emphasis upon rate of
return to the exclusion of other factors.  Indeed, as
indicated, § 19-3B-902(c) expressly contemplates investment
decisions that take into consideration "the role that each
investment ... plays within the overall trust portfolio"
(which may include not just stocks, bonds, and other financial
instruments, but also "interests in closely held enterprises,
tangible 
and 
intangible 
personal 
property, 
and 
real
property"); "the expected total return from income and the
appreciation 
of 
capital"; 
"other 
resources 
of 
the
beneficiaries"; 
the 
"need[] 
for 
... 
preservation 
or
appreciation of capital"; "an asset's special relationship or
special value, if any, to the purposes of the trust or to one
or more of the beneficiaries"; "the size of the portfolio";
and "the purposes and estimated duration of the trust."
The RSA defendants likewise take note of caselaw that
explains that the traditional "prudent-investor rule," as
applied in the context of a conventional trust agreement,
allows for competing obligations –- such as preserving the
1110472
22
trust corpus, diversifying investments, avoiding unnecessary
risks and volatility, and planning for tax consequences –- to
be taken into consideration.  See, e.g., Withers v. Teachers'
Ret. Sys. of City of New York, 447 F. Supp. 1248, 1258
(S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 595 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1979) (table)
("In the area of investment decisions, the obligation to
exercise prudence is essentially an obligation to give primacy
to the preservation of the trust estate and the procurement of
a reasonable income while avoiding undue investment risks, see
e.g., King v. Talbot, [40 N.Y. 76] at 86 [(1869)]; In re
Mendleson's Will, 46 Misc. 2d 960, 261 N.Y.S.2d 525, 534
(Surrogate's Ct. 1965).").  As has been aptly stated: 
"The record of any individual investment is not to
be viewed exclusively, of course, as though it were
in its own water-tight compartment, since to some
extent individual investment decisions may properly
be affected by considerations of the performance of
the fund as an entity, as in the instance, for
example, of individual security decisions based in
part on considerations of diversification of the
fund or of capital transactions to achieve sound tax
planning for the fund as a whole."
In re Bank of New York, 35 N.Y. 2d 512, 517, 323 N.E.2d 700,
703, 364 N.Y.S.2d 164, 168 (1974).
The RSA defendants further emphasize that the question of
the authority and responsibility of the boards of control is
1110472
23
a function of a specific statutory scheme adopted by our
legislature with respect to the ERSA and the TRSA.  In § 16-
25-19 as to the TRSA and in § 36-27-23 as to the ERSA, the
legislature delegated to the applicable board of control
"[t]he general administration and responsibility for the
proper operation of the retirement system and for making
effective the provisions of" the Code applicable to the ERSA
and the TRSA.  (Emphasis added.) More specifically, under
§ 16-25-20(a)(1) and § 36-27-25(a) (with minor wording
variations), the legislature has provided that the boards of
control for the TRSA and the ERSA "shall have full power to
invest and reinvest the funds ...  with the care, skill,
prudence, 
and 
diligence 
under 
the 
circumstances 
then
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and
familiar with the matters would use in the conduct of an
enterprise of a like character and with like aims." 
Obviously, there is no single investment strategy that
alone can be said to satisfy the responsibility and authority
that has been delegated to the boards of control under those
statutory 
provisions. 
 
Instead, 
the 
legislature 
unquestionably
has delegated to the boards of control discretion in assessing
1110472
24
what overall strategies, and what specific investments, will
best serve the "aims" and "character" of the ERSA and the TRSA
given the nature of the "enterprise" at issue.  See, e.g.,
Withers, 
supra 
(recognizing 
an 
express 
statutory 
authorization
of the challenged actions of public-pension fiduciaries, but
also holding that the prudent-investor rule did not prevent
those fiduciaries from considering possible bankruptcy of the
city that contributed to the pension plan if the pension plan
did not purchase the city's municipal bonds).
Ultimately, in fact, the plaintiffs concede that the RSA
defendants may "legally consider factors other than rate-of-
return."  In this regard, the plaintiffs do not contend that
the investment strategies and decisions of the boards of
control are not "discretionary" in nature.  The plaintiffs
contend only that the discretion that has been delegated to
the boards of control by our legislature is not "unfettered."
This, however, is a proposition with which the RSA defendants
do not disagree.  
More specifically, the plaintiffs contend that the
discretion afforded the boards of control is constrained by a
fiduciary obligation to administer the ERSA and the TRSA
1110472
25
solely in the interest of the members of the ERSA and the TRSA
and, as prescribed in §§ 16-25-20(a)(1) and 36-27-25(a), to
invest with the "care, skill, prudence, and diligence under
the circumstances then prevailing" that a "prudent man" acting
in a "like capacity" would use in the conduct of "an
enterprise of a like character" and "with like aims."  The RSA
defendants do not disagree with this proposition either. 
The difference in the positions of the plaintiffs and the
RSA defendants is that the plaintiffs would have the courts
assume responsibility for examining what the fulfillment of
the aforesaid statutory responsibilities should look like.
For this or any court to be able to engage in such an
examination as it relates to State officials, however, as
opposed to private trustees, we must first surmount the wall
of sovereign immunity that protects executive action from
interference by the judiciary.  
We cannot conclude, however, that, by asking the courts
to enforce the general statutory obligations of the nature
described above, the plaintiffs have sought enforcement of a
"legal duty" of the nature contemplated by the first
"exception" or category recognized in Aland.   The "prudent-
1110472
26
man rule" is, by its essential nature, a standard that allows
for the exercise of ample discretion.  It may provide general,
guiding principles against which a court could assess a claim
of personal liability or perhaps removal of a private trustee
accused of making imprudent investment decisions, but it does
not advance a specific duty that can serve as a basis for an
order by the judicial branch to the executive branch to take
certain action going forward.  Compare, e.g., the "legal duty"
cases cited in Aland:  Department of Indus. Relations v. West
Boylston Mfg. Co., 253 Ala. 67, 42 So. 2d 787 (1949) (ordering
refund to an employer of specific contributions made to the
State's unemployment-compensation fund pursuant to a statute
providing for such refunds), and Metcalf v. Department of
Indus. Relations, 245 Ala. 299, 16 So. 2d 787 (1944)
(requiring the Director of Industrial Relations to collect no
more than the statutorily prescribed amount pursuant to the
unemployment-compensation contribution rate applicable to a
given employer).  Put differently, the general duty to invest
prudently and in the best interests of plan participants,
taking into consideration a variety of competing concerns,
provides no more basis for surmounting the wall of sovereign
1110472
Nor 
do 
the 
internal 
"Investment Policies and Procedures"
10
adopted by the RSA ("the investment policy") (or for that
matter the RSA's internal mission statement) create a "legal
duty" or prohibition that alters this conclusion.  Even if the
investment policy was in the nature of a formal regulation
and, thus, binding on the boards of control, which it is not,
the investment policy begins by recognizing a need to maximize
"total return" to the ERSA and the TRSA only "within prudent
risk parameters."  The investment policy then adds that "the
systems recognize that a stronger Alabama equates to a
stronger retirement system, and as such, investments in
Alabama businesses are encouraged to the extent the investment
meets the criteria delineated by this policy statement."  The
RSA defendants note that the "criteria delineated by this
policy statement" include the statutory requirement that the
boards of control act with "care, skill [and] prudence" as
stated by the pertinent statutes and reiterated in the
preceding paragraph of the investment policy itself.  The RSA
defendants reject the notion that it was the intent of the
investment policy, which the RSA itself promulgated, to expect
that investment decisions on the part of the boards of control
be for the purpose of maximizing immediate or direct return to
the ERSA and the TRSA.  "'[T]he interpretation of an agency
regulation by the promulgating agency carries "'controlling
weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation.'"'"  Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 64 v.
Personnel Bd. of Jefferson Cnty., 103 So. 3d 17, 25 (Ala.
27
immunity than would, for example, the general rule that the
director of any executive agency should prudently administer
assigned resources and employees.  If such a director is
performing the task of administering the applicable agency,
poor decision-making does not of itself give cause for legal
action that is not subject to the doctrine of sovereign
immunity.10
1110472
2012) (quoting Brunson Constr. & Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. City
of Prichard, 664 So. 2d 885, 890 (Ala. 1995), quoting in turn
United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 872 (1977), quoting
in turn Bowles v. Seminole Rock Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414
(1945)).  A fortiori, the RSA defendants' interpretation and
application of the RSA's own internal policies are entitled to
deference.
28
By the same token, we do not have here a case that
satisfies the "beyond authority" exception to sovereign
immunity identified above.  The boards of control have
statutory authority to invest the assets of the ERSA and the
TRSA.  They are doing that.  The fact that they might not do
that in accordance with the legal standard to which they would
be held liable if they could be sued does not mean that they
can in fact be sued.   
The 
standard 
for 
liability 
and 
the 
standard 
for
overcoming the bar of sovereign immunity are two different
things.  Thus, one might question whether a State official has
acted with sufficient care or prudence in his or her decision-
making, but imprudence or lack of care has never, of itself,
been a basis for overcoming the bar of sovereign immunity.
Were it otherwise, the protection afforded State officials in
their making of discretionary decisions would cease to exist.
The "nearly impregnable" wall of immunity would be collapsed
1110472
29
into the bare question of liability itself, e.g., whether a
State official can be adjudged to have acted negligently, or
merely unwisely.  And the efficient and effective functioning
of the executive branch free of the "hamstringing" effect of
second-guessing by the judicial branch would be put at risk
accordingly.  Cf. Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392, 400-01
(Ala. 2000) (plurality opinion) (explaining the correlation
between § 14 immunity and the separation of powers required by
§ 43 and that "the vulnerability of State agents to suit, if
not constrained, could lead to excessive judicial interference
in the affairs of coequal branches of government, contrary to
§ 43").
Finally, even if we could overcome the bar of sovereign
immunity in order to rule in favor of the plaintiffs on the
issue of liability, it is not within the subject-matter
jurisdiction of the courts to grant the relief requested here.
Specifically,  granting the remedy sought by the plaintiffs in
this case would run afoul of the constitutionally mandated
principle of separation of powers, a principle that not only
is an underpinning of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, but
also provides an independent basis for concluding that the
1110472
30
trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to act as
requested in this case.
This is not a private-trust case in which the plaintiffs
seek a divestiture of a particular investment, monetary
damages to compensate for a specific investment decision, or
even to remove a trustee from his or her post.  Instead, the
essential relief requested by the plaintiffs in this case is
a permanent injunction to be enforced by the court into the
indefinite future that would purport to require the boards of
control to do two things going forward:
1.  Follow "the prudent-man rule" and 
2.  Refrain from investing in any Alabama-based
investment that "the [RSA] Defendants expect or are
aware will yield less of a return than alternative
or other investments."
The latter form of relief is not an accurate statement of
the "prudent-man rule" invoked in the former form of relief
and, in fact, conflicts with it.  The "prudent-man rule," or
the "prudent-investor rule," itself, as discussed above, not
only allows, but in fact requires, a trustee to take into
consideration 
many 
factors other than the direct 
and immediate
rates of return.  As discussed above, those factors include,
but are not limited to, general economic conditions, the
1110472
31
effects 
of 
inflation 
or 
deflation, 
the 
need 
for
diversification and the role each investment plays within the
overall trust portfolio, the need for liquidity, the need for
regularity 
of 
income, 
preservation 
or 
appreciation 
of 
capital,
an asset's special relationship or special value to the
purposes of the trust, the size of the portfolio, and the
purposes and estimated duration of the trust.  Furthermore,
investments may include real property as well as tangible or
intangible personal property.
Considering the first form of relief noted above, what
the plaintiffs seek is merely a reiteration in a court order
of what is already the statutorily prescribed standard
applicable to the investment decisions of the boards of
control.  To simply order the RSA defendants to follow this
statutorily prescribed "prudent-man rule" would provide the
boards of control with no specific guidance as to how to
exercise the discretionary authority invested in them under
that rule.  What it would do, however, is put the courts in
the position of analyzing and overseeing the decisions of the
boards of control on a continual and ongoing basis because any
such order must of course be enforced by the courts in the
1110472
32
years to come.  It would put the courts in a position
analogous in some ways to the position assumed by the federal
courts in overseeing Alabama's mental-health system for
several decades. See Wyatt ex rel. Rawlins v. Sawyer, 219
F.R.D. 529 (M.D. Ala. 2004).  Unlike the federal courts acting
in relation to the State of Alabama, however, Alabama courts
are restricted by the doctrine of separation of powers in
relation to their coequal branches of government.  
In what came to be known as the "equity-funding case,"
this Court, in Ex parte James, 836 So. 2d 813 (Ala. 2002),
stepped back from the brink of usurping the authority of a
coordinate branch of our government to make decisions as to
how, to what extent, and to what ends to fund our public
schools.  Although the Court acknowledged serious concerns as
to the propriety of its previous judgment of liability, it
ultimately found it unnecessary to resolve 
those 
concerns 
and,
instead, "retreated" from its earlier judgment on the
alternative ground that the remedy that it was being asked to
order, and that it would be required to administer for years
to come, would have put the Court on a collision course with
1110472
33
§ 43 of the Alabama Constitution.  As the Court explained in
Ex parte James:
"This 
Court 
'shall 
never 
exercise 
the
legislative and executive powers, or either of them;
to the end that it may be a government of laws and
not of men.' Ala. Const. 1901, § 43 (emphasis
added). In Alabama, separation of powers is not
merely an implicit 'doctrine' but rather an express
command; a command stated with a forcefulness
rivaled by few, if any, similar provisions in
constitutions of other sovereigns. ... Compelled by
the weight of this command and a concern for
judicial restraint, we hold (1) that this Court's
review of the merits of the still pending cases
commonly and collectively known in this State, and
hereinafter referred to, as the 'Equity Funding
Case,' has reached its end, and (2) that, because
the duty to fund Alabama's public schools is a duty
that –- for over 125 years –- the people of this
State have rested squarely upon the shoulders of the
Legislature, it is the Legislature, not the courts,
from which any further redress should be sought.
Accordingly, we hold that the Equity Funding Case is
due to be dismissed.
"....
"...  [T]he issue of the proper remedy in this
case raises concerns for judicial restraint ....
With regard to the remedy, our concern is ... that
the pronouncement of a specific remedy 'from the
bench' would necessarily represent an exercise of
the power of that branch of government charged by
the people of the State of Alabama with the sole
duty to administer state funds to public schools:
the Alabama Legislature.  As Justice Houston noted
in Ex parte James[, 713 So. 2d 869 (Ala. 1997), a
previous opinion in the Equity Funding Case]:
1110472
34
"'Circumstances have denied this Court the
opportunity to review the trial court's
liability order. Even so, it is the duty of
the 
Judicial 
Department 
of 
Alabama
government only to determine what the
Constitution of Alabama requires. In my
opinion, 
the 
Legislative 
Department 
and 
the
Executive Department, and not the Judicial
Department, have the power and duty to
implement a plan that would make this
system equitable .... I trust that the
Legislative Department and the Executive
Department will proceed to exercise the
power and perform the duty they have been
called upon to exercise and perform to make
Alabama's 
public 
educational 
system
constitutional. The "Separation of Powers"
provision of 
the Constitution of 
Alabama of
1901 (Art. III, § 43) prohibits me from
doing 
more, 
without 
resorting 
to
unconstitutional judicial activism, which
I have heretofore avoided.'
"713 So. 2d at 895 ... (Houston, J., concurring in
the result in part and dissenting in part).
"...  In Ex parte James, the Court recognized
the serious difficulties implicated by judicial
involvement in the administrative details of school
funding. 713 So. 2d at 880–82.  ...
"....
"Our conclusion that the time has come to return
the Equity Funding Case in toto to its proper forum
seems a proper and inevitable end, foreshadowed not
only by the obvious impracticalities of judicial
oversight, but also by the Court's own actions in
Ex parte James.  While the plurality in Ex parte
James opined that, in the abstract, the judiciary
had the authority to implement a remedy, it did not
attempt 
this 
task 
(which 
may 
have 
proven
1110472
35
illustrative, because its concrete, rather than
abstract, form would have proven its legislative
nature) and instead admitted that 'the legislature
... bears the "primary responsibility" for devising
a constitutionally valid public school system.'  Id.
at 882 (quoting McDuffy v. Secretary of the Exec.
Office of Educ., 415 Mass. 545, 619 n. 92, 615
N.E.2d 516, 554 n. 92 (1993) (quoting Edgewood
Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 399
(Tex. 1989))). ...
"Continuing 
the 
descent 
from 
the 
abstract 
to 
the
concrete, we now recognize that any specific remedy
that the judiciary could impose would, in order to
be effective, necessarily involve a usurpation of
that power entrusted exclusively to the Legislature.
Accordingly, compelled by the authorities discussed
above -- primarily by our duty under § 43 of the
Alabama Constitution of 1901 -- we complete our
judicially prudent retreat from this province of the
legislative branch in order that we may remain
obedient to the command of the people of the State
of Alabama that we 'never exercise the legislative
and executive powers, or either of them; to the end
that it may be a government of laws and not of men.'
Ala. Const. 1901, § 43 (emphasis added)."
836 So. 2d at 815-19 (some emphasis in original, some emphasis
added, and some emphasis omitted; footnotes omitted).
By the same token, the complex task of continually
analyzing, comparing, and choosing from among the myriad of
different 
investment 
vehicles 
available 
in 
today's
sophisticated investment world is a task delegated by the
legislature to the executive branch and to the boards of
control in particular.  The plaintiffs ask us nonetheless to
1110472
36
assume going forward the ongoing responsibility of overseeing
the decisions of the boards of control and evaluating the
extent of their compliance with the "prudent-man rule."  To
send this case back to the trial court for further examination
of this request would be to contemplate that the trial court,
in order to enforce a permanent declaratory and injunctive
order of the nature requested, could engage in an ongoing, in-
depth factual inquiry into the advantages and disadvantages of
various Alabama-based investment strategies the boards may
consider from time to time and compare those strategies to the
various advantages and disadvantages of all other alternative
investment opportunities available to the boards, weighing in
the process all relevant factors, including rates of return,
volatility, 
security, 
diversification, general economic
conditions, the effects of inflation or deflation, the role
each investment would play 
within 
the overall 
trust 
portfolio,
the need for liquidity, the need for regularity of income, and
preservation or appreciation of capital.  The type of
continual oversight and analysis that would be required of
this Court to assess compliance with permanent orders of the
type sought by the plaintiffs highlights the fact that this is
1110472
37
not a task for which the courts of this State are suited and
is not a task that has been delegated to them.  Instead, as
was true in the equity-funding case, the remedy for any
deficiency in the investment strategies pursued by the boards
of control lies elsewhere.  One possible remedy would be
recourse to the ballot box for the election of different State
officials who either serve on, or appoint some of the members
of, the boards of control.  See §§  16-25-19(b) and 36-27-
23(b), Ala. Code 1975.  More likely, it might mean an even
more direct political recourse in the form of an exercise of
the 
"political 
power" 
specifically 
delegated 
by 
the
legislature to ERSA and TRSA members themselves, who by
statute are directly empowered to elect most of the members of
each board of control.   Id.  We cannot conclude that it means
the assumption by the courts of the continuing oversight of
the investment decisions made by the boards of control in
response to the actions alleged in this case.
IV.  Conclusion
The legislature has delegated broad authority to the
boards of control; it has vested in those boards flexibility
and discretion to be exercised in the context of the
1110472
Our conclusion in this regard is bolstered by the fact
11
that the type and mixture of investments for which the RSA
defendants are now criticized by the plaintiffs have been in
place for approximately 15 years with no objection by the
legislature.  Cf. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Kinzer, 142 F.2d
833, 837 (6th Cir. 1944) (recognizing that, for federal
pension plan, "Congress, by regularly appropriating funds ...,
has demonstrated its intention that the statutory mandate is
to be construed and understood in accordance with the settled
construction placed upon it by the Authority [responsible for
administering the pension plan], as disclosed by the Rules and
Regulations" applicable to the pension plan and that those
rules and regulations "are deemed to have received legislative
ratification and, thereby, to have become embedded in the
law").
38
"character" of the "enterprise" at issue and its "aims."  The
doctrines of sovereign immunity and separation of powers
require that the judicial branch honor that delegation and not
take upon itself the task of reviewing the investment
strategies and decisions of the boards of control, at least
not under the circumstances presented here.
 
11
This Court has long recognized through adherence to the
principle of separation of powers and the political-question
doctrine 
"'the 
impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution'" of every dispute affecting the
operation of State government "'without expressing lack of the
respect 
due 
coordinate 
branches 
of 
government.'"
Birmingham-Jefferson Civic Ctr. Auth. v. City of Birmingham,
1110472
39
912 So. 2d 204, 215 (Ala. 2005) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).  For that matter, any oversight by this
Court of investment choices made by the boards of control
would be a task for which this and other courts are not
equipped.  The "[l]ack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards" supports the conclusion that the making
and oversight of such choices has been, and should be, left to
a branch of government other than the judicial.  Id. at 218.
Although the ultimate question decided in Cranman
regarded so-called State-agent immunity, that Court directly
addressed the nature of the protection afforded by §§ 14 and
43 of the Constitution in a manner that is apposite here:  
"[W]e cannot ignore the strong policy against
judicial interference in the affairs of State
government as articulated in § 14 and mandated by §
43. Although § 14 is, by its terms, restricted to
prohibiting lawsuits against the State, we cannot
disregard its impact upon our obligation to observe
the constitutional separation of powers."
Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d at 401.  "[Section] 14 [is] an
expression of a strong public policy against the intrusion of
the judiciary into the management of the State ...."  Id.
Based on the foregoing, we grant the RSA defendants'
petition and issue the writ.  We direct the trial court to
1110472
40
vacate its order refusing to dismiss the complaint and to
grant the RSA defendants' motion to dismiss.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Stuart, Parker, and Wise, JJ., concur.
Bolin and Bryan, JJ., concur in the result. 
Moore, C.J., and Shaw, J., dissent.
Main, J., recuses himself.
1110472
41
MOORE, Chief Justice (dissenting).
I agree with Justice Shaw that it is premature at this
point in the case to supplant the considered judgment of the
trial court. "[A] Rule 12(b)(6)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] dismissal
is proper only when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would
entitle the plaintiff to relief."  Nance v. Matthews, 622
So. 2d 297, 299 (Ala. 1993). 
The trial court took into account the concerns expressed
in the main opinion when it stated that among the issues
before it were the following: 
"whether and how the Court might substitute its
judgment for the judgment of the Boards of Control,
since investment policymaking is a function allotted
by the legislature to the Boards of Control; [and]
whether the Court can take the responsibility for
investment policymaking from the Boards of Control
when Plaintiffs have the political remedy of
electing new and different members to the Boards of
Control ...." 
I would defer to the trial court to adjudge these issues
in the first instance upon a full summary-judgment record.
1110472
42
SHAW, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.  The motion to dismiss in this
case raised numerous complex issues.  Given that fact and the
trial court's holding that "[t]hese issues should be presented
to the court on a motion for summary judgment with supporting
materials and law," I believe that it is premature to hold at
this early juncture in the case that Ala. Const. 1901, art. I,
§ 14, bars this action or that any potential remedy would
violate Ala. Const. 1901, art. III, § 43.
Moore, C.J., concurs.