Title: Thomas v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 392, 2021
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: September 29, 2022

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DAMIAN THOMAS, 
 
 
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§ 
No. 392, 2021 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
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Appellant,  
 
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Court Below—Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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of the State of Delaware 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
Cr. ID No: N1505012411(N) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
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Appellees.  
 
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Submitted: September 14, 2022 
 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
September 29, 2022 
 
Before VALIHURA, VAUGHN, and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
 
 
ORDER  
This 29th day of September, 2022, after consideration of the parties’ briefs 
and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
Damien Thomas was convicted of murder in the first degree and related 
firearm charges in 2017 and sentenced to life in prison plus twenty years.  In 2018, 
Thomas moved for postconviction relief and an evidentiary hearing under Superior 
Court Criminal Rule 61.  The Superior Court denied Thomas’s motion, and Thomas 
has appealed to this Court.   
 
(2) 
Thomas asserts four claims on appeal, all of which are centered upon 
the apparently false testimony of one prosecution witness, Monique Pruden, who 
told police—and then testified at trial—that she had witnessed Thomas’s shooting 
2 
 
of his victim, DeShannon Reid.  During cross-examination, defense counsel 
thoroughly discredited Pruden’s testimony by showing that—despite her 
protestations to the contrary—she was incarcerated in a Department of Correction 
facility on the day of the shooting.   
 
(3) 
In his first two claims, Thomas contends that the use of Pruden’s 
perjured testimony and the prosecution’s references to it during closing argument 
violated his due process rights.1  Thomas also contends that the State’s failure to 
disclose information under its control regarding Pruden’s custodial status on the date 
of the murder violated his rights under Brady v. Maryland.2  And finally, Thomas 
claims that the Superior Court erred by denying his request for an evidentiary 
hearing.  But Thomas did not assert his substantive claims—that is, the claims other 
than the evidentiary-hearing claim—in the proceedings leading to the judgment of 
conviction.  Thus, those claims are procedurally barred under Rule 61(i)(3) unless 
Thomas can show “cause” for relief from his procedural default and “prejudice” 
from the violation of his rights.3  
 
(4) 
Thomas cannot show cause for his default because he knew, during trial 
and his direct appeal, that Pruden’s testimony was—to put it charitably—suspect.  
 
1 The Superior Court denied these claims as procedurally barred under Rule 61(i)(3) because 
Thomas could have, but did not, raise them in the proceedings leading to the judgment of 
conviction. 
2 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  The Superior Court denied this claim as moot. 
3 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3). 
3 
 
In fact, in closing argument, Thomas’s counsel suggested that the defense had 
proved conclusively that Pruden’s testimony was false because she was “in jail” on 
the date in question.4  Yet he did not request any specific relief from the trial court, 
nor did he raise his due-process arguments on direct appeal.  Thomas does not offer 
a persuasive excuse—or “cause”—for this default. 
 
(5) 
Nor can Thomas show that he suffered prejudice as the result of the 
prosecution’s use of Pruden’s testimony.  Had Pruden been the only—or the most 
critical—prosecution witness, Thomas might have a point.  But there was ample 
proof of Thomas’s guilt independent of Pruden’s problematic testimony.  Under the 
circumstances, it is not substantially likely that the outcome of Thomas’s trial would 
have been different had the jury not been exposed to Pruden’s testimony.  Our review 
of the record persuades us that, given the evidence adduced by defense counsel 
during trial showing that Pruden was incarcerated on the day of shooting, the jury 
almost certainly disregarded Pruden’s testimony altogether and based its verdict on 
the testimony of the other, more compelling witnesses. 
(6) 
For these reasons, the Superior Court was correct in concluding that 
Thomas’s claims related to the prosecution’s use of Pruden’s testimony are 
procedurally barred under Rule 61(i)(3).  Likewise, the court did not err by denying 
Thomas’s Brady claim, based as it is on the prosecution’s failure to disclose 
 
4 Trial Tr. 72–73, Sept. 19, 2017. 
4 
 
information (Pruden’s custodial status) of which Thomas was aware during his trial 
and direct appeal.  We also find no abuse of discretion in the Superior Court’s denial 
of Thomas’s request for an evidentiary hearing. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED.  
 
 
 
 
  
  
BY THE COURT:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Gary F. Traynor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice