Title: The Florida Bar v. John Vernon Head
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC07-2398
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: January 7, 2010

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC07-2398 
____________ 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
JOHN VERNON HEAD, 
Respondent. 
 
[January 7, 2010] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
We have for review a referee’s report regarding alleged ethical breaches by 
John Vernon Head.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.  For the 
reasons discussed herein, we disapprove the referee’s recommended sanction of a 
sixty-day suspension and instead impose a one-year suspension.   
FACTS 
 
The Florida Bar filed a complaint against Head alleging that he engaged in 
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; knowingly made 
a false statement of material fact or law to a third person in the course of 
representing a client; engaged in acts in connection with the practice of law that 
 
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were prejudicial to the administration of justice; knowingly made a false statement 
of material fact or law to a tribunal; and represented a client when Head’s exercise 
of  independent professional judgment might be materially limited by his own 
interests.  After holding a hearing, the referee issued a report in which he made the 
following findings and recommendations.  
 
Clayton Hackney and Linda Hackney, a married couple, filed a petition for  
bankruptcy under chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code in an attempt to retain 
ownership of real property that was their primary asset.  They had purchased the 
land from George Turner, who held a mortgage on the property.  The relationship 
between the Hackneys and Turner became acrimonious.  Ultimately, Turner 
obtained a Final Judgment of Foreclosure against the Hackneys in February 2003.  
The principal amount of the judgment was $142,000, which carried interest.  The 
Hackneys also owed Turner attorney fees of $15,375.58. 
 
In March 2003, the Hackneys retained attorney Ezra Witsman to represent 
them in the bankruptcy.  The Hackneys paid Witsman $1500 and also agreed to 
pay an hourly rate pursuant to a signed fee agreement.  
 
Thereafter, Head purchased Witsman’s law practice.  He filed “motions for 
substitution” on behalf of a number of Witsman’s former clients, including the 
Hackneys.  Head took over the bankruptcy case in August 2003.  He never 
received any additional fees for the bankruptcy from the Hackneys. 
 
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During the course of the bankruptcy, the Hackneys had other legal matters.  
They owned stock in a corporation, Crown Tree Tech, a tree trimming service.  
The business was their principal source of income.  One of Crown Tree Tech’s 
former employees filed a federal lawsuit on a wage and hour claim against the 
corporation and the Hackneys.  Head agreed to represent Crown Tree Tech and the 
Hackneys.  The corporation provided Head $1000 as a cost retainer for the case.  
Further, the corporation paid Head a $1000 cost retainer to represent Clayton 
Hackney when he was charged with nonpayment of child support.  Head also 
represented Clayton on an unrelated felony charge, in which Turner claimed 
Clayton tried to run him over while driving a Crown Tree Tech motor vehicle.  
Head did not wish to represent Clayton on the felony charge.  However, when no 
one else would take the case because of Clayton’s inability to pay a retainer, Head 
agreed to represent Clayton.  Ultimately, Head was able to finalize these matters by 
a payment of money on the wage claim and without Hackney being incarcerated 
for either the child support or criminal matter.  Head, who was not paid any 
additional money by the Hackneys, determined that he was owed $14,013.69 in 
attorney fees for these “non-bankruptcy matters.” 
 
The bankruptcy was continuing and the Hackneys were under a repayment 
plan.  However, the repayment plan would not pay off the obligation to Turner.  
Therefore, the Hackneys had to obtain refinancing of the property to acquire funds 
 
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to pay off the mortgage.  In 2005, a lender was located.  The closing on this 
transaction and its aftermath are when Head engaged in misconduct.   
 
The Hackneys had spoken with Head’s office about using money from the 
proceeds of the loan to pay Head for the enormous amount of work he had 
performed.  Specifically, a payment of $10,000 was discussed, although the 
Hackneys had not agreed to that amount.  On the day of the closing, the Hackneys 
called Head’s office to question a $10,000 figure that was to be paid to Head from 
the proceeds of the closing.  Eventually the Hackneys signed the closing 
documents, Head received a check for $10,000, and Turner received a check for 
$143,184.82.  The closing took place on May 28, 2005, and the proceeds were 
distributed on June 7, 2005.  Head’s payment was based on an invoice that had no 
information about hours worked, hourly rate, or what work was performed.   
The original HUD Settlement Statement does not show the $10,000 
payment.  Instead, it states Turner received $153,184.82.  An Amended HUD-1 
statement was prepared that shows the $10,000 payment to Head, but apparently 
that statement was not provided to anyone.  
A determination of what was owed to Turner in the refinancing was difficult 
because the Hackneys were often late with their payments in the chapter 13 
proceeding, and Turner refused to cooperate in establishing what was owed to him.  
The burden fell on Head’s office to determine the amount owed to Turner and to 
 
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provide the figure to the closing agent.  The closing agent went forward with the 
closing without any confirmation from Turner as to the total amount owed.  There 
was no evidence explaining why this was done or why there were two different 
HUD statements. 
It is crucial to recognize that the primary reason the Hackneys were 
refinancing the property was to cease having Turner as a creditor.  The $10,000 
payment to Head from the loan proceeds prevented the achievement of this goal.  
The Hackneys still owed Turner money. 
 
A few months later, on September 2, 2005, Head filed a Second Amended 
Motion to Modify Confirmed Chapter 13 Plan with the bankruptcy court on behalf 
of the Hackneys.  The motion stated Turner’s claims had been paid in full.  
Attached to the motion was a “payoff worksheet”—a single page that showed 
attorney fees of $8999 in the payoff, but it is obvious that these were shown as 
attorney fees owed to Turner that were part of the total payoff.   
Even though the proceeds from the real estate closing were distributed in 
June 2005, Head did not inform the bankruptcy court that he received the $10,000 
until January 24, 2006, at a hearing before that court.  At that point, an evaluation 
of the HUD Settlement Agreement and the Turner disbursement check brought the 
discrepancy to light.  By stipulation of the parties at the January 24, 2006, hearing, 
it was determined that Turner was still owed $7200. 
 
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Because the second amended motion to modify the confirmed chapter 13 
plan showed that only $143,184.82 had been disbursed to Turner, the referee found 
that Head had not attempted to mislead the court.  In addition, Head thought he 
was not obligated to disclose the receipt of this money because it was for matters 
unrelated to the bankruptcy. 
 
According to the transcript from a bankruptcy hearing on March 7, 2006, 
even the bankruptcy judge was initially unsure whether Head should have reported 
the fees.  Thereafter, by motion, the trustee sought disgorgement of the $10,000.  A 
hearing was held on the motion and an order was entered that had findings of fact.  
The bankruptcy court’s found as follows:  (1) Head’s statements in the pleadings 
were disingenuous; (2) his request for and receipt of the $10,000 disbursement was 
intentional and contrary to his statutory and ethical duties as counsel for the 
debtors; his receipt of the disbursement created a conflict of interest between him 
and the debtors that disqualified him from continuing to represent them; and (3) 
Head violated fundamental Bankruptcy Code and rule provisions governing the 
conduct of attorneys, and his actions created irreconcilable differences with his 
clients. 
 
The bankruptcy court concluded as follows:  (1) Head received $2000 from 
the debtors directly and $10,000 from the closing of the refinancing; (2) Head was 
required to disclose receipt of these funds and failed to make such disclosure in 
 
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violation of  11 U.S.C.A. §329 (2004) and Federal Bankruptcy Rule 2016; and (3) 
Head had not been candid with the bankruptcy court. 
 
Head filed a motion for reconsideration.  The bankruptcy court granted the 
motion to the extent that it reduced the amount ordered to be disgorged from 
$12,000 to $10,000. 
 
On February 20, 2007, Head filed a “Suggestion of Bankruptcy” for the firm 
of John Vernon Head, P.A. in the Hackney bankruptcy file.  However, Head did 
not file a petition for bankruptcy for the firm.  Thus, the bankruptcy court entered 
an order to show cause against Head for filing the Suggestion of Bankruptcy when 
no petition for bankruptcy was ever filed.  A hearing was held and an order 
entered.  The bankruptcy court found that (1) “Head certified in filing the 
Suggestion his firm had filed a bankruptcy case and the automatic stay provisions 
of U.S.C. Section 362(a) had been invoked.  Those certifications were not true”; 
and (2) “Head falsely represented his firm had filed for bankruptcy protection and 
the automatic stay was in effect.  He willfully abused the judicial process by filing 
the Suggestion.  He violated Rule 4-3.3 of the Florida Rules of Professional 
Conduct and Rule 9.011(b).”  The bankruptcy court sanctioned Head by 
prohibiting him from practicing before the bankruptcy court for ninety days. 
 
The referee found that Head violated Rule of Professional Conduct 4-1.7(b) 
of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar (2003) (prior to the May 22, 2006, 
 
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amendment).  Head represented a client when his exercise of independent 
professional judgment was materially limited by his own interests.  Head knew his 
clients owed him a large sum of money that they were unable to pay unless they 
used the receipts from the refinancing.  By accepting the $10,000 from the 
refinancing, Head prevented his clients from being able to completely pay off their 
primary creditor, Turner.  It was ultimately stipulated that the Hackneys owed 
Turner $7200 more than the $143,184.82 Turner had received from the closing.  
The $10,000 Head received would have covered the $7200, as well as the clients’ 
primary objective, which was paying off the money owed to Turner. 
 
The referee also found that Head violated Rule of Professional Conduct 4-
3.1 (after the May 22, 2006, amendment) (bringing or defending a proceeding, or 
asserting or controverting an issue therein, when there is no basis in law or fact for 
doing so that is not frivolous).  Head knowingly filed a Suggestion of Bankruptcy 
with the bankruptcy court when no petition for bankruptcy had been filed.  The 
bankruptcy court sanctioned him for this misconduct by prohibiting him from 
practicing before that court for ninety days.  Upon these same facts, the referee 
found Head guilty of Rule of Professional Conduct violating 4-3.3(a)(1) 
(knowingly making a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal).   
 
Next, the referee found Head guilty of violating Rule of Professional 
Conduct 4-4.1(a)(knowingly making a false statement of material fact or law to a 
 
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third person in the course of representing a client).  Head filed the Suggestion of 
Bankruptcy when no petition had been filed.  He filed it while the trustee was 
attempting to enforce the court’s disgorgement order, which was then final. 
 
Head was also found guilty of violating Rule of Professional Conduct 4-
8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation).  Head misrepresented to the bankruptcy court that a petition for 
bankruptcy had been or would be filed. 
 
The referee found Head guilty of violating rule 4-8.4(d) (engaging in 
conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice).  Head was not forthcoming as to his receipt of the 
$10,000 from the refinancing.  As a result, unnecessary hearings were held to 
determine the sums due to Turner.  Further, Head’s filing of the suggestion, when 
no petition for bankruptcy was actually filed, caused additional unnecessary 
proceedings before the court. 
 
As to discipline, the referee recommended a sixty-day suspension.  Because 
the Bar prevailed in this case, the referee recommended that the Bar be awarded 
costs of $9,222.80.  With regard to aggravating factors, the referee found that Head 
has prior disciplinary offenses1 and substantial experience in the practice of law.2
                                          
 
1.  Head received an admonishment for minor misconduct in August 2005.  
The basis of the admonishment was a finding that Head “had no reasonable basis 
to pursue the litigation, and that the respondent had intentionally, while without 
 
 
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The referee found the mitigating factors of timely good faith effort to make 
restitution (Head paid the $10,000 after judgment was entered) and character or 
reputation. 
The Florida Bar sought review of the referee’s recommended sanction, and 
Head filed a cross-petition for review in which he challenges several aspects of the 
referee’s report.  
ANALYSIS 
First, Head asserts that the referee should have granted his motion to 
dismiss.  The standard for review of a referee’s ruling on a motion is whether the 
referee abused his or her discretion.  Fla. Bar v. Rotstein, 835 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 
2002); Fla. Bar v. Kandekore, 766 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 2000). 
 
Head claims that the Bar’s complaint did not have a “structure” and did not 
link the alleged facts with the rules allegedly violated.  On that basis, he argues that 
the referee should have granted his motion to dismiss.  This argument is without 
merit.  Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 3-7.6(h)(1)(C) provides that the “complaint 
shall set forth the particular act or acts of conduct for which the attorney is sought 
to be disciplined.”  Our review of the complaint found that the alleged facts are 
                                                                                                                                        
malice, filed and presented claims that lacked any plausible, legal or factual 
support.”  The lawsuit was “lacking in merit” and “frivolous.” 
 
 
2.  Head has been a practicing attorney for thirty-five years, including 
practice in other jurisdictions. 
 
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clearly presented.  Also, the penultimate paragraph in the complaint specifically 
lists the rules that Head allegedly violated, including language explaining each 
rule.  Thus, Head was informed of the facts in dispute and the rules alleged to have 
been violated, and he was able to formulate a response.  See Fla. Bar v. Tipler, 8 
So. 3d 1109, 1118 (Fla. 2009)(“Due process is satisfied in Bar disciplinary 
proceedings where the attorney is served with notice of the Bar’s charges and is 
afforded an opportunity in the disciplinary hearing to be heard and defend 
himself”).  We conclude that the referee did not abuse his discretion by permitting 
the case to proceed.   
 
Second, Head argues that the referee’s findings of fact are not supported by 
competent, substantial evidence in the record.  He claims that the referee should 
not have relied on facts found by the bankruptcy court when the referee examined 
whether Head engaged in misconduct.   
The Court’s standard of review for evaluating a referee’s factual findings is 
as follows:  This Court’s review of such matters is limited, and if a referee's 
findings of fact are supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record, this 
Court will not reweigh the evidence and substitute its judgment for that of the 
referee.  Fla. Bar v. Frederick, 756 So. 2d 79, 86 (Fla. 2000);   see also Fla. Bar v. 
Jordan, 705 So. 2d 1387, 1390 (Fla. 1998).  To successfully challenge a referee’s 
factual findings, a party must show there is a lack of evidence in the record to 
 
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support such findings or that the record clearly contradicts the referee’s 
conclusions; this burden cannot be met merely by pointing to contradictory 
evidence when there is substantial competent evidence in the record supporting the 
referee’s findings.  Fla. Bar v. Glueck, 985 So. 2d 1052, 1056 (Fla. 2008). 
Head claims that the referee should not have relied on the facts established 
in the bankruptcy proceeding.  The disciplinary record contains a “Judicial Notice 
Notebook,” which contains fifty-four documents from the bankruptcy court 
proceedings.  The notebook includes a “Motion for the Court to Take Judicial 
Notice” that the Bar submitted to the referee.  The motion states that “[d]uring the 
case management conference conducted on April 2, 2008, the respondent 
stipulated that the documents obtained from the bankruptcy court file are true and 
correct copies.”  Further, section 90.202(6), Florida Statutes (2009), provides that a 
court may take judicial notice of the “[r]ecords of any court of this state or of any 
court of record of the United States or of any state, territory, or jurisdiction of the 
United States.”  The Bar asked the referee to take judicial notice of the bankruptcy 
court documents and orders.  Thus, Head was given notice of the request and had 
an opportunity to challenge the documents.  In fact, he acknowledged that the 
records were true and correct copies.  In light of these circumstances, we conclude 
that the referee did not abuse his discretion in accepting these documents into the 
record and then relying on the documents and decisions from the bankruptcy court.  
 
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See Fla. Bar v. Tobkin, 944 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 2006) (referee’s consideration of the 
facts included in a district court of appeal’s opinion for the underlying medical 
malpractice case, in which the district court of appeal held that the respondent’s 
actions before the trial court were contumacious and willfully disobedient, was 
proper; the statute governing matters that have to be judicially noticed states that a 
court has to take judicial notice of decisional law, and the opinion in the medical 
malpractice case constituted decisional law).  
Further, it is well established that in bar disciplinary proceedings, the referee 
is permitted to consider all relevant information pertaining to the alleged 
misconduct.  See id. at 224 (“Because Bar disciplinary proceedings are quasi-
judicial rather than civil or criminal, the referee is not bound by the technical rules 
of evidence.  Consequently, a referee has wide latitude to admit or exclude 
evidence, and may consider any relevant evidence, including hearsay and the trial 
transcript or judgment in a civil proceeding.”).  Contrary to Head’s arguments, the 
referee was permitted to consider the bankruptcy court documents and rely on 
them as support for the disciplinary findings of fact. 
Head also challenges the referee’s findings of fact by basically asserting that 
the referee should have believed him instead of relying on the bankruptcy court 
documents.  The Court has a long-established and clear standard regarding a 
referee’s credibility findings:  The Court defers to the referee’s assessment and 
 
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resolution of conflicting testimony because the referee is in the best position to 
judge the credibility of the witnesses.  Fla. Bar v. Batista, 846 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 
2003).  The referee did not find Head believable on these points.  Further, Head 
cannot prevail on review, when contesting the referee’s findings of fact, merely by 
continuing to restate his arguments.  A respondent cannot prevail on review by 
contesting factual findings and simply pointing to contradictory evidence, when 
competent, substantial evidence (such as the bankruptcy documents and orders) 
supports the referee’s findings.  Fla. Bar v. Varner, 992 So. 2d 224, 228 (Fla. 
2008).  In addition, the referee thoroughly supported his findings with competent, 
substantial evidence by over twenty citatious to documents in the record, 
discussing the stipulations entered into by the parties, scrutinizing the testimony of 
witnesses, quoting and examining the findings from the bankruptcy court orders, 
and quoting the transcript from the bankruptcy court hearings.  We conclude that 
Head has failed to meet his burden of proving that the referee’s findings of fact are 
not supported by the record.   
Third, the Bar challenges the referee’s recommended sanction of a sixty-day 
suspension, arguing that a three-year suspension is appropriate.  In response, Head 
argues that he should not be sanctioned severely because his misconduct was 
minor and he did not have the intent to misrepresent anything.   
 
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In reviewing a referee's recommended discipline, this Court’s scope of 
review is broader than that afforded to the referee’s findings of fact because, 
ultimately, it is the Court’s responsibility to order the appropriate sanction.  See 
Fla. Bar v. Anderson, 538 So. 2d 852, 854 (Fla. 1989); see also art. V, § 15, Fla. 
Const.  However, generally speaking, this Court will not second-guess the referee’s 
recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in existing case law 
and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.  See Fla. Bar v. 
Temmer, 753 So. 2d 555, 558 (Fla. 1999). 
Head argues that his misconduct was “minor.”  Contrary to his perspective, 
the Court does not view violations of rule 4-8.4(c) (a lawyer shall not engage in 
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation) and rule 4-8.4(d) 
(a lawyer shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice) as minor.  The Court has clearly stated 
that “basic, fundamental dishonesty . . . is a serious flaw, which cannot be 
tolerated” because dishonesty and a lack of candor “cannot be tolerated by a 
profession that relies on the truthfulness of its members.”  Fla. Bar v. Rotstein, 835 
So. 2d 241, 246 (Fla. 2002).  Dishonest conduct demonstrates the utmost disrespect 
for the court and is destructive to the legal system as a whole.   
Head also claims that he lacked intent to engage in the misconduct.  
Contrary to this argument, the referee agreed with the bankruptcy court’s finding 
 
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that Head’s “request for and receipt of the $10,000 disbursement was intentional 
and contrary to his statutory and ethical duties as counsel for the debtors.”   
Further, it is well established in disciplinary case law that “in order to satisfy the 
element of intent it must only be shown that the conduct was deliberate or 
knowing.”  Fla. Bar v. Fredericks, 731 So. 2d 1249, 1252 (Fla. 1999) (the motive 
behind the respondent’s action was not the determinative factor; rather, the issue 
was whether the respondent deliberately or knowingly engaged in the activity in 
question); see also Fla. Bar v. Brown, 905 So. 2d 76, 81 (Fla. 2005); Fla. Bar v. 
Barley, 831 So. 2d 163, 169 (Fla. 2002).  The referee and bankruptcy court found 
that Head deliberately and knowingly requested $10,000 from the debtors’ 
refinancing and deliberately and knowingly filed the misleading Suggestion of 
Bankruptcy.  We conclude that the element of intent has been proven and found.   
The Bar argues that a three-year suspension is appropriate.  The cases cited 
by the Bar present more egregious misconduct than that committed by Head.  See 
Fla. Bar v. Dove, 985 So. 2d 1001 (Fla. 2008) (suspending the respondent for three 
years for knowingly making material misrepresentations to a court in a termination 
of parental rights and adoption matter, and for willfully withholding material 
information from the court, which impacted a child, and caused adverse effects on 
the legal proceedings and the interested parties); Fla. Bar v. Hagendorf, 921 So. 2d 
611 (Fla. 2006) (suspending the respondent for two years for using the legal 
 
- 17 - 
system to seek revenge on his business landlord, which included making 
misrepresentations to a court and seeking to quiet title to a building that he did not 
own).   
Head’s violations of rules 4-8.4(c) and (d) establish that a serious sanction is 
merited.  See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Colclough, 561 So. 2d 1147 (Fla.1990) (suspending 
the respondent, who did not have any prior disciplinary history, for six months for 
misrepresenting to the judge and opposing counsel that a hearing on costs had 
already been held).  Head knowingly filed the Suggestion of Bankruptcy with the 
bankruptcy court, even though no petition for bankruptcy had been filed.  He also 
was not forthcoming about his receipt of the $10,000 from the refinance loan.   
Further, Head knew his clients were unable to pay his fee unless they used 
money from the refinancing loan.  In accepting the $10,000 from the refinancing, 
he knew his clients would be unable to pay off their primary creditor, Turner.  
Paying Turner in full had been the main objective for the refinancing loan.  Thus, 
Head’s action created a conflict of interest that proved detrimental to his clients.  
See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.7(b) (prohibiting a lawyer from representing a 
client when the lawyer’s exercise of independent professional judgment may be 
materially limited by the lawyer’s own interests).   
 
In light of Head’s misconduct, Florida Bar v. Varner, 992 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 
2008), provides guidance.  The respondent in Varner permitted a voluntary 
 
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dismissal of his client’s case by lying and stating that the client, through legal 
counsel, sought the voluntary dismissal of all pending claims in his workers 
compensation case.  The respondent deliberately intended to communicate that the 
client was aware of and consented to the dismissal of the case; however, the 
respondent knew that the client did not know of it and had not authorized it.  
Varner, like Head, violated rules 4-8.4(c) and (d).  The Court suspended Varner for 
one year. 
 
Head, like Varner, made a misrepresentation to a court and to others (Varner 
lied to opposing counsel when he stated that his client dismissed the case; Head’s 
actions were done to mislead the bankruptcy trustee).  In Varner, the Court stated 
that the “profession of the practice of law requires lawyers to be honest, competent, 
and diligent in their dealings with clients, other lawyers, and courts.”  Id. at 231.  
Head has not met this requirement.   
 
Further, Varner deliberately misled his client because, for almost a year, 
Varner did not inform the client that he had allowed the dismissal of the case.  
Head engaged in a similar act of self-interest, by obtaining a portion of the 
refinancing loan money and placing his own clients at a disadvantage by rendering 
them unable to pay off Turner.  Also like Varner, Head was previously disciplined 
for similar misconduct.  Head was admonished in 2005 for bringing a lawsuit that 
was “lacking in merit” and “frivolous,” which is similar to his filing the Suggestion 
 
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of Bankruptcy in this case.  The Court views cumulative misconduct more 
seriously than an isolated instance of misconduct.  Fla. Bar v. Carlon, 820 So.2d 
891, 899 (Fla. 2002).  Thus, based on Varner, we find that the referee’s 
recommendation of a sixty-day suspension is unsupported and we impose a one-
year suspension.   
Fourth, Head claims that the referee’s award of costs to the Bar was 
improper.  He broadly asserts that “the costs sought by the Bar are essentially 
unnecessary and were compiled by it without reason and Respondent should not be 
held responsible for them.”   
Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 3-7.6(q)(2) provides that the referee “shall 
have discretion to award costs and, absent an abuse of discretion, the referee’s 
award shall not be reversed.”  Further, rule 3-7.6(q)(3) provides that the referee 
may assess the Bar’s costs against a respondent when the Bar is “successful, in 
whole or in part.”  The referee here found Head guilty of several rule violations, so 
the Bar was successful in part.  Thus, the referee’s award of costs is supported.   
Further, the costs listed in the Bar’s Affidavit of Costs are permitted under 
rule 3-7.6(q).  Head cannot overcome the referee’s award of costs by broadly 
claiming, without providing any specifics or support, that the costs are 
“unnecessary” or “without reason.”  He has not provided any evidence that the 
costs “were unnecessary, excessive, or improperly authenticated.”  R. Regulating 
 
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Fla. Bar 3-7.6(q)(3); see Fla. Bar v. Kassier, 730 So. 2d 1273, 1276 (Fla. 1998).  
Thus, Head has failed to show that the referee abused his discretion in 
recommending that costs be awarded to the Bar.   
 
As the Court has stated, “[w]here the choice is between imposing costs on a 
bar member who has misbehaved and imposing them on the rest of the members 
who have not misbehaved, it is only fair to tax the costs against the misbehaving 
member.”  Kassier, 730 So. 2d at 1276.  We conclude that the referee’s award of 
costs to the Bar was proper. 
CONCLUSION 
 
Accordingly, we approve the referee’s findings of fact, recommendations as 
to guilt, and award of costs.  We disapprove the referee’s recommendation of a 
sixty-day suspension.  Instead, John Vernon Head is hereby suspended from the 
practice of law for one year and thereafter until he proves rehabilitation.   
 
This suspension will be effective thirty days from the filing of this opinion 
so that John Vernon Head can close out his practice and protect the interests of 
existing clients.  If Head notifies this Court in writing that he is no longer 
practicing and does not need the thirty days to protect existing clients, this Court 
will enter an order making the suspension effective immediately.  Head shall 
accept no new business from the date this opinion is filed until he is reinstated to 
the practice of law in Florida.  
 
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Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson Street, 
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from John Vernon Head in 
the amount of $9,222.80, for which sum let execution issue. 
 
It is so ordered. 
QUINCE, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, POLSTON, LABARGA, 
and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS SUSPENSION. 
 
 
Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar 
 
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, Kenneth Lawrence Marvin, Staff 
Counsel, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida, and JoAnn Marie Stalcup, Bar 
Counsel, The Florida Bar, Orlando, Florida, 
 
 
for Complainant 
 
John Vernon Head, pro se, Orlando, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent