Title: THOMAS v THOMAS
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 80-034
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: September 30, 1980

No. 80-34 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE OF MONTANA 1980 SUSAN W. THOMAS, P e t i t i o n e r and Appel l a n t , -vs-. DR. E. D O N A L L THOIIAS I Respondent and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Tenth J u d i c i a l District, I n and f o r t h e County of Fergus, The Hc:norabl6 LeRoy McFinnon, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Goetz and Madden, Bozeman, Montana For Respondent: K. Fobert F o s t e r , Lewistown, Montana F i l e d : Subniitted on B r i e f s : August 13, 1980 Decided : - 8 * k T Clerk M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. c his i s an appeal from a judgment i n t h e Tenth J u d i c i a l ~ i s t r i c t , Fergus County, which granted respondent's motion t o amend t h e decree of d i s s o l u t i o n and denied p e t i t i o n e r ' s motion t o quash and t o vacate. Susan Thomas, p e t i t i o n e r and a p p e l l a n t , and D r . E. Donna11 Thomas, respondent, were married on J u l y 2, 1973. One c h i l d was born t o t h e marriage on May 22, 1975. The p r i n c i p a l assets of t h e marriage consisted of D r . Thomas' medical p r a c t i c e and t h e family home i n Lewistown, Montana. Other a s s e t s included household furnishings, personal e f - f e c t s and two automobiles. O n December 16, 1977, t h e p a r t i e s entered i n t o a s e p a r a t i o n agreement whereby each agreed t h a t pending divorce o r r e c o n c i l i a t i o n , Susan would have custody of t h e i r c h i l d and D r . Thomas would make maintenance and support payments. Additionally, they agreed t h a t t h e family resi- dence be l e f t i n t h e i r j o i n t names and o t h e r a s s e t s w e r e d i s t r i b u t e d accordingly. I n t h e event of divorce proceed- i n g s , n e i t h e r p a r t y was t o be bound by t h e agreement re- l a t i n g t o t h e property d i v i s i o n . O n February 27, 1978, p e t i t i o n e r f i l e d f o r a dissolu- t i o n of t h e marriage, a l l e g i n g t h a t t h e marriage was irre- t r i e v a b l y broken. The p e t i t i o n requested t h a t she be awarded custody of t h e c h i l d and prayed f o r c h i l d support payments, maintenance payments and an e q u i t a b l e d i v i s i o n of a l l m a r i t a l assets and l i a b i l i t i e s . On August 24, 1978, a hearing was conducted on t h e p e t i t i o n . On t h e second day of t r i a l , t h e ~ i s t r i c t Court judge made f i n d i n g s of f a c t and conclusions of law and entered a w r i t t e n decree. The findings of f a c t and conclu- s i o n s of l a w r e c i t e d t h a t t h e marriage w a s i r r e t r i e v a b l y broken, t h a t t h e custody of t h e c h i l d w a s granted t o p e t i - t i o n e r and t h a t respondent was t o pay reasonable c h i l d support payments. The decree awarded p e t i t i o n e r $200 per month f o r c h i l d support and $750 f o r a t t o r n e y fees. The f i n d i n g s contained no r u l i n g with r e s p e c t t o p e t i t i o n e r ' s r e q u e s t f o r maintenance, and the decree awarded none. The c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s contain no determination of t h e t o t a l n e t worth of t h e p a r t i e s . The f i n d i n g s contain no determination of t h e n e t worth of t h e d o c t o r ' s p r a c t i c e o r of t h e r e l a t i v e f i n a n c i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s by e i t h e r party. The c o u r t concluded t h a t respondent should pay a monthly sum t o t h e p e t i t i o n e r u n t i l $15,000 has been paid as p a r t of t h e property settlement. The f i n d i n g s of f a c t a r e inconclusive a l s o as t o t h e family home, t h e t i t l e t o which i s i n j o i n t tenancy. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s Finding of Fact No. 5 states, " [ t l h a t t h e p a r t i e s acquired an e q u i t y i n a home i n Lewistown, of unknown value. . ." N o d i s p o s i t i o n of t h e home appears i n e i t h e r t h e c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s o r t h e decree, thus leaving it i n j o i n t tenancy i n both of t h e p a r t i e s ' names. Five months a f t e r t h e decree was entered, on January 24, 1979, respondent f i l e d a motion requesting t h a t t h e decree be amended. The motion requested t h e ~ i s t r i c t Court t o award t h e family home t o respondent. The motion was noticed f o r hearing on February 1, 1979. However, no hear- i n g w a s held a t t h a t t i m e . Ten months l a t e r on November 5, 1979, t h e ~ i s t r i c t Court s e t a hearing date. P e t i t i o n e r moved t o quash t h e motion t o amend and attempted t o vacate t h e hearing date. This motion was denied. O n December 5, 1979, t h e D i s t r i c t Court found t h a t it was t h e o r i g i n a l i n t e n t i o n of t h e c o u r t t o d i s t r i b u t e t h e family home t o respondent and t h a t t h e c o u r t had apparently e r r e d i n not so providing i n t h e find- i n g s of f a c t and conclusions of l a w and decree. Respondent claimed mere c l e r i c a l e r r o r which w a s c o r r e c t a b l e under Rule 6O(a), M.R.Civ.P., and t h e D i s t r i c t Court agreed. Amended findings of f a c t and conclusions of law and an amended decree were entered on December 1 0 , 1979. The amended decree awarded the family home t o respondent, and p e t i t i o n e r now appeals t h a t decree. The s o l e i s s u e on appeal is whether t h e a s s e r t e d m i s - take o r omission i n t h e o r i g i n a l findings of f a c t , conclu- s i o n s of law and decree i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court's apportion- ment of m a r i t a l property was mere " c l e r i c a l e r r o r " and c o r r e c t a b l e under Rule 60 ( a ) , M.R.Civ.P., o r whether it was " j u d i c i a l e r r o r , " therefore leaving t h e D i s t r i c t Court without j u r i s d i c t i o n t o amend the decree because t h e c o u r t d i d not a c t within t h e t i m e set by s t a t u t e . Because t h e house is a major, i f n o t the major, a s s e t of t h e marriage, t h e lack of a determination of i t s equity, value and d i s p o s i t i o n leads t h i s Court t o conclude t h a t t h e District Court e r r e d i n i t s attempt t o amend the decree i n question. Rule 6 0 ( a ) , M.R.Civ.P., provides: "Clerical mistakes. C l e r i c a l mistakes i n judgments, orders o r other p a r t s of t h e record, and i n pleadings, and e r r o r s t h e r e i n a r i s i n g from oversight o r omission may be corrected by t h e c o u r t a t any t i m e of i t s own i n i t i a t i v e o r on t h e motion of any p a r t y and a f t e r such notice, i f any, a s t h e c o u r t orders. " Rule 60(a) preserves t h e common-law power of D i s t r i c t Courts t o c o r r e c t c l e r i c a l e r r o r s i n judgments a t any t i m e , s i n c e c o r r e c t i o n of such e r r o r by d e f i n i t i o n does n o t a l t e r t h e substantive r i g h t s of t h e p a r t i e s . Correction of judgment f o r " j u d i c i a l e r r o r s " a f f e c t s t h e s u b s t a n t i v e r i g h t s of t h e p a r t i e s as pronounced i n t h e judgment. A t i m e l i m i t a t i o n i s imposed on a District Court's power t o a l t e r a decree. Motions t o amend under Rules 50, 52, and 59, M.R.Civ.P., must be made within t e n days following t h e e n t r y of judgment. Motions t o c o r r e c t j u d i c i a l mistakes must be made within s i x t y days a f t e r judgment. Rule 6 0 ( b ) , M.R.Civ.P. Respondent's motion t o amend was made well a f t e r t h e d a t e s s t a t e d . I f t h i s Court f i n d s t h a t t h e e r r o r w a s merely " c l e r i c a l , " under Rule 6 0 ( a ) t h e D i s t r i c t Court has j u r i s d i c t i o n t o amend t h e decree i n t h i s case. I f , however, t h i s Court f i n d s t h a t t h e e r r o r was n o t " c l e r i c a l " b u t " j u d i c i a l , " t h e District Court is without j u r i s d i c t i o n t o e n t e r t h e amended f i n d i n g s of f a c t and decree because it d i d n o t conform t o t h e time l i m i t a t i o n s . "The time and procedural l i m i t a t i o n s f o r motions subsequent t o judgment . . . a r e mandatory. S e i b e l v. Byers (Yurick), 136 Mont. 39, 344 P.2d 129. I n r e c e n t decisions by t h i s Court, Cain v. Harrington, 161 Mont. 401, 506 P.2d 1375; and L e i t h e i s e r v. Montana S t a t e Prison, 161 Mont. 343, 505 P. 2d 1203, we have r e i t e r a t e d t h e need t o make f i n a l t h e judgments of t h e D i s t r i c t Court s u b j e c t t o appeal t h a t would n o t unnecessarily lengthen l i t i g a t i o n . I n Cain and L e i t h e i s e r we s t r i c t l y applied Rule 59, M.R.Civ.P., i n order t o p u t t o an end t h e l i t i g a t i o n of those a c t i o n s . " Armstrong v. High C r e s t O i l s , Inc. (1974), 164 Mont. 187, 196, 520 P.2d 1081, 1086. I n S t a t e ex rel. Union Bank and T r u s t Co. v. District Court (1939), 108 Mont. 151, 91 P.2d 403, 406, w e s t a t e d : . . . ' I n c a s e of an omission o r e r r o r i n t h e record, t h e power e x i s t s i n t h e c o u r t t o amend such record s o t h a t it s h a l l conform t o t h e a c t u a l f a c t s and t r u t h of the case: b u t a c o u r t - - cannot amend i t s record t o c o r r e c t a j u d i c i a l e r r o r -- o r r o d t h e e f f e c t of j u z i c i a l non- - - action.' . . . 'The a u t h o r i t y of a c o u r t t o - - amend its record Q a nunc pro tunc o r d e r i s -- t o k e i t - the t r u t h , b u t not t o m a k e i t ---- ----- speak what it d i d n o t speak b u t ought t o have ---- -- spoken. . .' "That orders made by a c o u r t through mistake, - - - inadvertance, want of s u f f i c i e n t consideration, -- oversight o r otherwise, where they a f f e c t t h e sub- -- s t a n t i a l r i g h m - a r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r s and cannot be c o F e c t e d o r removed Q summary - a c t i o n of the c o u r t whichmade them . . . " ( C i - -- -- t a t i o n s omitted. ) (Emphasis added. ) Since t h e family home, next t o the d o c t o r ' s medical p r a c t i c e w a s t h e s i n g l e most valuable and important asset before t h e court, it i s d i f f i c u l t t o comprehend how t h e c o u r t could overlook s p e c i f i c apportionment of t h a t asset. I t i s even more d i f f i c u l t t o understand why respondent f a i l e d t o bring t h e alleged "omission" t o t h e c o u r t ' s a t t e n - t i o n by f i l i n g a timely motion t o amend o r c l a r i f y t h e decree, i f he r e a l l y believed the c o u r t had erred. The attempted change by the amended findings and decree adversely affected p e t i t i o n e r ' s substantive r i g h t s by de- priving her of her i n t e r e s t i n t h e family home. Such e r r o r i s j u d i c i a l and could n o t be corrected by t h e District Court except by motion made within the t i m e l i m i t a t i o n s of Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59 o r 60(b) ( I ) , M.R.Civ.P., a v a i l a b l e f o r the correction of j u d i c i a l e r r o r . N o such motion having been made, t h e e r r o r was correctable only by appeal which was never taken by e i t h e r of t h e p a r t i e s . The D i s t r i c t Court, therefore, lacked j u r i s d i c t i o n t o make t h e change e f f e c t e d by h i s e n t r y of t h e amended findings and decree. There i s no question t h a t the D i s t r i c t Court's o r i g i n a l findings and decree a r e d e f i c i e n t . They f a i l t o make a determination of the p a r t i e s ' t o t a l n e t worth. They f a i l t o determine t h e value of respondent's medical p r a c t i c e , t h e r e l a t i v e f i n a n c i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n t h e r e t o by each p a r t y and t o apportion t h a t a s s e t . They f a i l t o determine t h e p a r t i e s ' e q u i t y i n t h e family home and t o equitably dispose of t h a t asset by express language. However, s i n c e n e i t h e r p a r t y made a timely appeal of t h e o r i g i n a l f i n d i n g s and decree, t h e p a r t i e s a r e bound by it, unless an appropriate proceed- i n g i s maintained subsequent hereto f o r c l a r i f i c a t i o n of t h e f i n d i n g s and decree. Since t h e amended findings and decree involve an a t - tempt by t h e District Court t o c o r r e c t a j u d i c i a l e r r o r which it had no j u r i s d i c t i o n t o remedy, they must be set a s i d e and t h e o r i g i n a l f i n d i n g s and decree r e i n s t a t e d . Unfortunately, t h i s r e s u l t leaves open t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of f u r t h e r l i t i g a t i o n a r i s i n g o u t of t h e shortcomings i n t h e f i n d i n g s and decree observed above. However, it i s a c i r - cumstance f o r which t h e p a r t i e s and t h e c o u r t are a l l re- sponsible, each having had t h e opportunity t o timely c l a r i f y t h e o r i g i n a l findings and decree following t h e i r e n t r y . The cause i s remanded t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court. W e concur: / I J u s t i c e s