Title: State v. Harrison
Citation: 2015 WI 5
Docket Number: 2013AP000298-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: January 22, 2015

2015 WI 5 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2013AP298-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Richard H. Harrison, 
          Defendant-Appellant.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(No cite) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 22, 2015 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 5, 2014 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Clark 
 
JUDGE: 
Jon M. Counsell 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, the cause was 
argued by Peter S. Rank, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief by Katie R. 
York, assistant state public defender, and oral argument by 
Katie R. York. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 WI 5
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2013AP298-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2010CF88) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Richard H. Harrison, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 22, 2015 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished court of appeals opinion and order reversing the 
judgment of conviction and postconviction order of the Circuit 
Court for Clark County, Jon M. Counsell, Judge.1  The court of 
                                                 
1 State v. Harrison, No. 2013AP298-CR, unpublished slip op. 
& order (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2013). 
No. 
2013AP298-CR 
 
2 
 
appeals remanded the cause for a new trial.2  We affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
¶2 
Richard 
H. 
Harrison, 
the 
defendant, 
appealed 
a 
judgment of conviction and an order denying his motions for 
postconviction 
relief. 
 
The 
defendant 
had 
filed 
two 
postconviction motions requesting, among other things, a new 
trial.  The motions alleged that Judge Counsell had no authority 
to preside over the defendant's trial and sentencing because the 
defendant had filed a timely and proper request for substitution 
of judge pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 971.20 and the request had 
been granted.  Wisconsin Stat. § 971.20 is often referred to as 
the criminal peremptory substitution statute, the peremptory 
right to substitution, or the peremptory right to substitution 
statute.3 
¶3 
The 
circuit 
court 
denied 
the 
defendant's 
postconviction motions.  The court of appeals summarily reversed 
the judgment of conviction and postconviction order and remanded 
for a new trial. 
¶4 
The State raises two issues for our review: 
                                                 
2 The court of appeals concluded that the instant case was 
appropriate for summary disposition under Wis. Stat. § 809.21 
(2011-12). 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 See State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 34-35, 315 N.W.2d 703 
(1982). 
No. 
2013AP298-CR 
 
3 
 
¶5 
First, did the defendant forfeit his Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.20 peremptory right to substitution? 
¶6 
Second, if the circuit court erred in presiding over 
the defendant's trial, sentencing, and postconviction motions 
after the defendant filed a timely and proper Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.20 request for substitution of judge, the request was 
granted, and a new judge was appointed, was the error harmless? 
¶7 
For the reasons set forth, we answer the questions of 
law posed by the State as follows: 
¶8 
First, we conclude that the defendant in the instant 
case 
did 
not 
forfeit 
his 
statutory 
right 
to 
peremptory 
substitution of the judge.  The defendant persisted with his 
substitution request throughout the proceedings and did not 
follow the procedure outlined in Wis. Stat. § 971.20(11) for 
abandoning his substitution request.  Thus, the circuit court 
erred in presiding over the defendant's trial, sentencing, and 
postconviction motions. 
¶9 
Second, harmless error analysis does not apply in the 
instant case when the circuit court erred by presiding over the 
defendant's trial, sentencing, and postconviction motions after 
the defendant filed a timely and proper Wis. Stat. § 971.20 
request for substitution of judge, the request was granted, and 
a new judge was appointed.  Applying the doctrine of harmless 
error under these circumstances is contrary to case law and 
would nullify the defendant's statutory right to substitute the 
judge without furnishing a reason for the requested substitution 
No. 
2013AP298-CR 
 
4 
 
and without demonstrating that prejudice would result from the 
substituted judge's presiding. 
¶10 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand the cause to the circuit court for a new 
trial. 
I 
¶11 The facts are not in dispute for purposes of this 
review. 
¶12 On July 16, 2010, the State filed a criminal complaint 
against the defendant in Clark County Circuit Court, charging 
him as a repeater with burglary, resisting and obstructing an 
officer, misdemeanor theft, and criminal damage to property.  
Circuit Court Judge Jon M. Counsell is the sole circuit court 
judge in Clark County. 
¶13 On four occasions, the defendant or his attorney 
requested that Judge Counsell not preside at a case involving 
the defendant: 
¶14 1. On August 20, 2010, the defendant filed a timely 
and proper request for substitution of judge pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 971.20.  On August 26, 2010, the circuit court approved 
the defendant's request.  Because Clark County is a single-judge 
county, the chief judge of the district reassigned the case to 
Judge Thomas Flugaur, a judge in a neighboring county. 
¶15 On December 29, 2010, Judge Flugaur presided over the 
defendant's preliminary hearing.  Judge Flugaur found probable 
cause and bound the defendant over to the Clark County Circuit 
Court for arraignment and trial.  Judge Flugaur instructed the 
No. 
2013AP298-CR 
 
5 
 
parties: "You can schedule with Judge Counsell for arraignment 
and trial since this court is no longer involved in the case."  
This comment ended the proceedings. 
¶16 2. On January 14, 2011, an arraignment was held before 
Judge Counsell on the charges in the instant case and on charges 
in a subsequently filed second criminal complaint.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 971.20(9) provides that "the judge whose substitution 
has been requested has no authority to act further in the action 
except to . . . accept pleas . . . ."  Thus, Judge Counsell's 
presiding over the arraignment did not violate Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.20(9). 
¶17 The defendant's counsel advised the circuit court that 
the defendant intended to request substitution of the judge in 
the second criminal case.  The defendant's counsel did not 
mention the prior substitution request in the instant case.   
¶18 Although the defendant's counsel advised the court at 
arraignment that he would be filing a request for substitution 
of judge in the second case that very day, the district attorney 
and the defendant's counsel set a trial date for the instant 
case for March 29, 2011. 
¶19 3. On February 17, 2011, at the pretrial conference 
for the instant case, Judge Counsell reported that the case was 
still first on the calendar for March 29, 2011.  The State 
advised the circuit court that if the defendant took the stand, 
it would file a motion allowing the defendant to be asked 
whether he had ever been convicted of a crime.  The defendant's 
counsel had no motions. 
No. 
2013AP298-CR 
 
6 
 
¶20 The defendant, appearing by video, stated that it had 
been "several months" since he had spoken with his attorney.4  
The defendant further stated that he was under the impression 
that his attorney would offer a motion regarding "change of 
judge based on the fact [of] conflict of interest and some other 
things."  The defendant stated several times:  "I don't know 
what's going on." 
¶21 The circuit court, Judge Counsell presiding, asked 
whether the defendant wanted to speak privately with his 
attorney.  The defendant said he did and the defendant's counsel 
said that he would arrange to speak privately with the 
defendant. 
¶22 Judge Counsell did not address the defendant's request 
for change of judge but instead said that the defendant's 
counsel intended to go see the defendant "and you can talk over 
these issues.  We are set for the trial.  Thank you all." 
¶23 4. On March 24, 2011, the defendant's counsel sent a 
letter to the circuit court, along with an affidavit from the 
defendant, requesting that Judge Counsell recuse himself from 
the instant case.  The letter disassociated the defendant's 
counsel from the defendant's request that Judge Counsell recuse 
himself, stating as follows: 
Further, enclosed is a notarized statement from my 
client that I have held and not filed with the Court 
                                                 
4 The defendant's counsel advised the circuit court that 
"for the record, it hasn't been months.  The last time we were 
in court was slightly more than 30 days ago." 
No. 
2013AP298-CR 
 
7 
 
until this time.  I hesitated to bring this matter up 
because I have no feeling of "bias" as my client 
appears to have, and I did not know how to handle the 
matter.  With my last meeting with my client, I was 
directed to file same and ask that you interpret this 
paragraph of my letter to you to be a request, made on 
behalf and at the direction of my client, to review 
his affidavit and address the matter of him requesting 
your recusal from this case.  My client and I have 
already 
discussed 
the 
matter 
and 
I 
believe 
he 
understands 
the 
circumstances 
and 
potential 
ramifications of his request and he also would 
acknowledge that the request is made by me solely 
based upon his direction to do so. 
¶24 Judge Counsell denied the defendant's request the 
following day. 
¶25 Judge Counsell continued to preside over the remainder 
of the defendant's case, including the defendant's trial in July 
2011 and the sentencing hearing in September 2011.5 
¶26 Although the defendant used phrases like "change of 
judge" and "recusal" in some of his filings, rather than 
consistently 
discussing 
Judge 
Counsell's 
"substitution" 
or 
"authority to act," the defendant's goal was clear:  He did not 
want Judge Counsell on the instant case or the other criminal 
case in which he was being charged. 
¶27 After a jury trial in the instant case, the defendant 
was found guilty of three offenses6 and Judge Counsell imposed 
                                                 
5 In his March 24 letter to the court, the defendant's 
counsel also requested a postponement of the trial from March 
2011.  The circuit court granted the postponement request. 
No. 
2013AP298-CR 
 
8 
 
three consecutive sentences for a total of 13 years' initial 
confinement and seven years' extended supervision. 
¶28 On 
August 
27, 
2012, 
the 
defendant 
filed 
a 
postconviction motion requesting, among other things, a new 
trial.  The defendant asserted that Judge Counsell had no 
authority to preside over the defendant's trial or sentencing 
because the defendant had filed a timely and proper request for 
substitution of judge under Wis. Stat. § 971.20 and the request 
had been granted. 
¶29 The defendant also requested "in the alternative" that 
he be declared eligible for the Earned Release Program (ERP) and 
Challenge Incarceration Program (CIP). 
¶30 The circuit court granted the defendant's request for 
ERP and CIP eligibility.  But the circuit court declined to 
address the defendant's request for a new trial, stating: "As 
the court has granted defendant's requested alternate relief, 
the court concludes that there is no longer a need for 'a new 
trial or an evidentiary hearing' to address other issues the 
defendant has raised, as they are rendered moot" (citation 
omitted). 
                                                                                                                                                             
6 A jury found the defendant guilty of burglary of a 
building or dwelling as a repeater, contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§§ 943.10(1m)(a) and 939.62(1)(b); resisting or obstructing an 
officer as a repeater, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 946.41(1) and 
939.62(1)(a); and theft of movable property as a repeater, 
contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 943.20(1)(a) and 939.62(1)(a). 
No. 
2013AP298-CR 
 
9 
 
¶31 The defendant filed an amended postconviction motion, 
clarifying that his request for ERP and CIP eligibility was not 
intended to be in the alternative to his request for a new 
trial. 
¶32 The circuit court, Judge Counsell presiding, denied 
the amended postconviction motion, stating: 
The defendant has filed an amended motion for post-
conviction relief.  The motion was preceded by a 
letter from defendant's counsel [] filed November 28, 
2012, attempting to explain that defendant was not 
satisfied with the relief the court granted defendant 
in its decision filed November 27, 2012. 
The court granted defendant the relief asked for in 
his original post-conviction motion.  The court is 
concluded with this matter.  All remaining motions are 
denied.  All future hearings are cancelled. 
¶33 The court of appeals summarily reversed the judgment 
of conviction and postconviction order and remanded the matter 
to the circuit court for a new trial.  The court of appeals 
cited Wis. Stat. § 971.20(9) and (11) and held as follows:  
Once a timely substitution request has been made and 
approved as to form, "the judge whose substitution has 
been requested has no authority to act further in the 
action except to conduct the initial appearance, 
accept pleas and set bail," unless the defendant or 
defense counsel, the prosecutor, the substituted judge 
and the substituting judge all sign and file an 
agreement 
to 
transfer 
the 
matter 
back 
to 
the 
substituted judge.7 
II 
                                                 
7 State v. Harrison, No. 2013AP298-CR, unpublished slip op. 
& order at 2 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2013). 
No. 
2013AP298-CR 
 
10 
 
¶34 The State presents two questions for our review: 
¶35 First, did the defendant forfeit his Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.20 peremptory right to substitution? 
¶36 Second, if the circuit court erred in presiding over 
the defendant's trial, sentencing, and postconviction motions 
after the defendant filed a timely and proper Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.20 request for substitution of judge, the request was 
granted, and a new judge was appointed, was the error harmless? 
¶37 Both questions require us to interpret Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.20.  The interpretation and application of a statute 
present questions of law that we decide independently of the 
circuit court and the court of appeals but benefiting from their 
analyses.8 
¶38 Thus, we turn to Wis. Stat. § 971.20, the criminal 
peremptory substitution statute. 
III 
¶39 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.20 grants criminal defendants 
the right to substitute a judge without providing a reason for 
the requested substitution.  Two subsections are especially 
important in the present case. 
¶40 Subsection (9) declares that when a timely request for 
substitution of judge has been filed in proper form, the 
substituted judge "has no authority to act further in the action 
except to conduct" three proceedings enumerated in the statute. 
                                                 
8 See State v. Austin, 171 
Wis. 2d 251, 254-55, 490 
N.W.2d 780 (Ct. App. 1992). 
No. 
2013AP298-CR 
 
11 
 
¶41 Subsection (11) explains that after the statutory 
right to substitution has been properly invoked, a substituted 
judge may return to preside over the case "[u]pon the filing of 
an agreement signed by the defendant or defendant's attorney and 
by the prosecuting attorney, the substituted judge and the 
substituting judge."  As the text makes clear, this subsection 
permits a substituted judge to return to a case when everyone 
involved in the matter agrees to it. 
¶42 The criminal peremptory substitution statute provides 
in full as follows: 
971.20.  Substitution of Judge. 
(1) Definition.  In this section, "action" means all 
proceedings before a court from the filing of a 
complaint to final disposition at the trial level. 
(2) One substitution.  In any criminal action, the 
defendant has a right to only one substitution of a 
judge, 
except 
under 
sub. 
(7). 
 
The 
right 
of 
substitution shall be exercised as provided in this 
section. 
(3) Substitution of judge assigned to preliminary 
examination.  
(a) In this subsection, "judge" includes a circuit 
court commissioner who is assigned to conduct the 
preliminary examination. 
(b) A written request for the substitution of a 
different judge for the judge assigned to preside at 
the preliminary examination may be filed with the 
clerk, or with the court at the initial appearance.  
If filed with the clerk, the request must be filed at 
least 5 days before the preliminary examination unless 
the court otherwise permits.  Substitution of a judge 
assigned to a preliminary examination under this 
subsection exhausts the right to substitution for the 
duration of the action, except under sub. (7). 
No. 
2013AP298-CR 
 
12 
 
(4) Substitution of trial judge originally assigned.  
A written request for the substitution of a different 
judge for the judge originally assigned to the trial 
of the action may be filed with the clerk before 
making any motions to the trial court and before 
arraignment. 
(5) Substitution of trial judge subsequently assigned.  
If a new judge is assigned to the trial of an action 
and the defendant has not exercised the right to 
substitute an assigned judge, a written request for 
the substitution of the new judge may be filed with 
the clerk within 15 days of the clerk's giving actual 
notice or sending notice of the assignment to the 
defendant or the defendant's attorney.  If the 
notification occurs within 20 days of the date set for 
trial, the request shall be filed within 48 hours of 
the clerk's giving actual notice or sending notice of 
the assignment.  If the notification occurs within 48 
hours 
of 
the 
trial 
or 
if 
there 
has 
been 
no 
notification, the defendant may make an oral or 
written 
request 
for 
substitution 
prior 
to 
the 
commencement of the proceedings. 
(6) Substitution of judge in multiple defendant 
actions. 
 
In 
actions 
involving 
more 
than 
one 
defendant, the request for substitution shall be made 
jointly by all defendants.  If severance has been 
granted and the right to substitute has not been 
exercised prior to the granting of severance, the 
defendant or defendants in each action may request a 
substitution under this section. 
(7) Substitution of judge following appeal.  If an 
appellate court orders a new trial or sentencing 
proceeding, a request under this section may be filed 
within 20 days after the filing of the remittitur by 
the appellate court, whether or not a request for 
substitution was made prior to the time the appeal was 
taken. 
(8) Procedures for clerk.  Upon receiving a request 
for substitution, the clerk shall immediately contact 
the judge whose substitution has been requested for a 
determination of whether the request was made timely 
and in proper form.  If no determination is made 
within 7 days, the clerk shall refer the matter to the 
chief judge for the determination and reassignment of 
No. 
2013AP298-CR 
 
13 
 
the action as necessary.  If the request is determined 
to be proper, the clerk shall request the assignment 
of another judge under s. 751.03. 
(9) Judge's authority to act.  Upon the filing of a 
request for substitution in proper form and within the 
proper time, the judge whose substitution has been 
requested has no authority to act further in the 
action except to conduct the initial appearance, 
accept pleas and set bail. 
(10) Form of request.  A request for substitution of a 
judge may be made in the following form: 
STATE OF WISCONSIN 
CIRCUIT COURT 
 . . . County 
State of Wisconsin 
 
vs. 
 . . . (Defendant) 
Pursuant to s. 971.20 the defendant (or defendants) 
request(s) a substitution for the Hon. . . . as judge 
in the above entitled action. 
Dated . . . , . . . (year). 
. . . (Signature of defendant or defendant's attorney) 
(11) Return of action to substituted judge.  Upon the 
filing of an agreement signed by the defendant or 
defendant's attorney and by the prosecuting attorney, 
the substituted judge and the substituting judge, the 
criminal action and all pertinent records shall be 
transferred back to the substituted judge. 
¶43 In the instant case, it is undisputed that the 
defendant 
timely 
and 
properly 
invoked 
his 
peremptory 
substitution right under the statute; that the circuit court 
granted the defendant's substitution request; and that a 
No. 
2013AP298-CR 
 
14 
 
substitute judge, Judge Flugaur, presided over the defendant's 
preliminary hearing. 
¶44 It is also undisputed that the substituted judge, 
Judge Counsell, returned to preside over the instant case after 
the defendant had timely and properly filed his request for 
substitution, the request had been granted, and the substitute 
judge had presided over the preliminary hearing. 
¶45 Finally, it is undisputed that no written agreement 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 971.20(11) was filed authorizing the 
substituted 
judge 
to 
return 
to 
preside 
over 
the 
trial, 
sentencing, and postconviction motions in the instant case. 
A 
¶46 The first question the State poses is whether the 
defendant forfeited his Wis. Stat. § 971.20 right to peremptory 
substitution. 
¶47 The State argues that by participating in the trial 
and sentencing conducted by Judge Counsell and by failing to 
object to Judge Counsell's presiding at those proceedings, the 
defendant forfeited his right to object to Judge Counsell's 
return to the instant case. 
¶48 The State's argument is unconvincing for two reasons.   
¶49 First, the text of the statute provides the method by 
which a substituted judge can return to a case, that is, the 
method by which a substituted judge regains authority to act in 
the case.  It is undisputed that there was no compliance with 
this provision in the instant case.   
No. 
2013AP298-CR 
 
15 
 
¶50 Nothing in the statute intimates that a defendant can 
forfeit or waive the right to substitution without complying 
with Wis. Stat. § 971.20(11).  We need not address, however, 
whether a request for substitution of the judge may be forfeited 
or waived without complying with Wis. Stat. § 971.20(11) under 
circumstances not presented in the instant case.  Under the 
circumstances of the instant case, it is clear the defendant did 
not forfeit or waive his substitution request. 
¶51 Second, case law interpreting and applying Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.20 does not support the State's position.  According to 
State v. Austin, 171 Wis. 2d 251, 490 N.W.2d 780 (Ct. App. 
1992), a request for substitution of the judge is not forfeited 
when the defendant makes a timely and proper substitution 
request, the substitution request is granted, and a new judge 
presides over one of the proceedings in the case. 
¶52 In Austin, as in the instant case, the defendant 
timely and properly filed a request for substitution of judge.  
The circuit court granted the request, and a new judge was 
assigned. 
¶53 The new judge accepted Austin's guilty plea.  Austin's 
supervision was later revoked and the substituted judge returned 
to sentence Austin after revocation.  Austin did not object to 
the participation of the substituted judge at this proceeding. 
¶54 The court of appeals concluded that Austin's failure 
to object to the substituted judge's continued participation in 
No. 
2013AP298-CR 
 
16 
 
the case did not constitute an implied waiver of Austin's right 
to substitution of the judge.9 
¶55 According to the Austin decision, the doctrines of 
forfeiture and waiver do not apply after a substitution request 
is granted.10  The court of appeals declared that "deviation from 
the requirements of [§ 971.20(11)] would allow for substantial 
problems 
that 
are 
prevented 
by 
strict 
adherence 
to 
the 
statute."11  It further declared that Wis. Stat. § 971.20(11) 
                                                 
9 Austin 
uses 
the 
phrase 
"implied 
waiver" 
to 
mean 
forfeiture. 
For a discussion of the distinction between waiver and 
forfeiture, see State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶¶29-31, 315 
Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612.  Cases, including Austin, do not 
use the two words consistently.  See Ndina, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 
¶28. 
10 Austin, 171 Wis. 2d at 257-58. 
11 Id. at 257.  The "substantial problems" identified by the 
Austin court were as follows: 
First, to find implied waiver in circumstances like 
these would be to condone carelessness among lawyers 
and courts.  It is the responsibility of both lawyers 
and courts to check on previous substitutions as a 
matter of course.  Second, to allow an implied waiver 
would 
serve 
to 
unfairly 
penalize 
less 
informed 
defendants who, because they appear pro se, or because 
they are represented by successor counsel or forgetful 
counsel, may not remember the substitution.  While 
apparently acquiescent before the judge, they are 
still entitled to the protection of the substitution 
statute.  Third, to allow an implied waiver would be 
to allow a new form of "forum shopping."  Defendants, 
realizing that the first judge is more "lenient" than 
the second judge, could simply reappear before the 
first judge, hoping that busy clerks and prosecutors 
would not notice.  Defendants unilaterally could 
(continued) 
No. 
2013AP298-CR 
 
17 
 
"specifically delineates the requirements to be followed for a 
transfer back to the substituted judge."12  Because those 
requirements were not met, Austin did not lose his right to 
substitution of the judge. 
¶56 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
in 
Austin 
imposed 
a 
responsibility on lawyers and courts "to check on previous 
substitutions as a matter of course," intimating that a 
defendant need not repeatedly request substitution to preserve 
the issue after a timely and proper substitution request has 
been made and granted.13 
¶57 Austin relied on State v. Smith, 106 Wis. 2d 17, 315 
N.W.2d 343 (1982), a case decided by this court.  The Smith 
court stated that "[t]he plain language of the statute controls 
the disposition of this case.  Once a judge has been substituted 
                                                                                                                                                             
create a second substitution.  Such a unilateral 
loophole 
was 
explicitly 
proscribed 
by 
the 
sec. 
971.20(11) requirement that both parties agree before 
a case is returned to the first judge. 
Austin, 171 Wis. 2d at 257. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
No. 
2013AP298-CR 
 
18 
 
out of a case, he may not preside over any subsequent 
proceedings in that case."14 
¶58 Austin also relied on this court's decision in Clark 
v. State, 92 Wis. 2d 617, 632-33, 286 N.W.2d 344 (1979).  Clark 
requested substitution of the judge.  Nothing happened in 
response to Clark's request and Clark did not follow up on his 
request.  He did not seek an appropriate writ to compel the 
circuit court judge to stop the proceedings, to rule on the 
request, or to reassign the case.  Clark proceeded through 
motion hearings and trial without objecting to the judge's 
presiding. 
 
The 
Clark 
court 
explained 
that 
under 
these 
circumstances, an "objection to the judge's or clerk's failure 
to substitute a judge comes too late on appeal."15 
¶59 The Clark court also commented on the then-recent 
enactment of present Wis. Stat. § 971.20(11), which was not in 
effect when Clark's case was pending.  The Clark court wrote 
that before the enactment of subsection (11), a defendant like 
Clark could unilaterally withdraw a request for substitution.16  
                                                 
14 Smith, 106 Wis. 2d at 20.  Smith's reference to "any 
subsequent proceeding" did not refer to the ability of a 
substituted judge to conduct "an initial appearance, accept 
pleas of not guilty, [or] set bail," which were permitted under 
the version of Wis. Stat. § 971.20 in effect when Smith was 
decided.  The Smith case did not involve any of these enumerated 
proceedings. 
15 Clark v. State, 92 Wis. 2d 617, 631, 286 N.W.2d 344 
(1979). 
16 Id. at 631-32. 
No. 
2013AP298-CR 
 
19 
 
The court construed Clark's conduct "as in effect constituting a 
unilateral 
withdrawal 
of 
the 
request 
for 
substitution."17  
However, after the enactment of subsection (11), the request for 
substitution "is no longer subject only to the control of the 
party making the motion."18 
¶60 The State does not argue that the instant case differs 
from Austin or that Austin does not govern the instant case.  
Rather, the State asserts that Austin was incorrectly decided 
and urges this court to overrule Austin and to apply the common-
law rule of forfeiture to the instant case. 
¶61 Forfeiture is the failure to timely assert a right.19  
Waiver, in contrast, is the "intentional relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right."20  The words "forfeiture" and 
"waiver" are often (incorrectly) used interchangeably in cases. 
¶62 In the instant case, the State contends that the 
defendant 
forfeited 
(rather 
than 
waived) 
his 
right 
to 
substitution.  More specifically, the State asserts that because 
the defendant proceeded through trial and sentencing despite 
Judge Counsell's presiding, and without reserving the right to 
challenge Judge Counsell's return to the case, the defendant 
forfeited his request for and right of substitution.  The State 
                                                 
17 Id. at 632. 
18 Id. 
19 State v. Soto, 2012 WI 93, ¶35, 343 Wis. 2d 43, 817 
N.W.2d 848. 
20 Id.   
No. 
2013AP298-CR 
 
20 
 
contends that the defendant's conduct at trial and sentencing 
(his silence with regard to Judge Counsell's return to the case, 
in particular) was inconsistent with the defendant's request for 
substitution of the judge.  The State concludes that through his 
conduct, 
the 
defendant 
forfeited 
his 
statutory 
right 
to 
substitution. 
¶63 The common-law rule of forfeiture, argues the State, 
promotes expediency and efficiency and encourages diligent 
preparation.  The State urges us to recognize that the 
defendant's belated request for a "do-over" in the instant case 
highlights the potential for abuse under the Austin rule. 
¶64 To 
support 
its 
position 
that 
Austin 
should 
be 
overruled and that the court should declare that a substitution 
request that has been granted is nevertheless subject to 
forfeiture, 
the 
State 
relies 
on 
State 
v. 
Damaske, 
212 
Wis. 2d 169, 567 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1997).21  According to the 
                                                 
21 The State also relies on Pure Milk Products Co-op v. 
National Farmers Organization, 64 Wis. 2d 241, 219 N.W.2d 564 
(1974), and Golos v. Worzalla, 178 Wis. 414, 190 N.W. 114 
(1922).  Neither the governing statutes nor the issues presented 
in Pure Milk and Golos are the same as in the instant case. 
The issue in 
Pure Milk was whether a request for 
substitution pursuant to the civil peremptory substitution of 
judge statute was timely when preliminary proceedings had 
already taken place but trial had not yet commenced.  The court 
held the request untimely under the statute and thus denied 
relief.  In the instant case, it is undisputed that the 
defendant's substitution request was timely and proper.  Thus, 
Pure Milk is unhelpful. 
(continued) 
No. 
2013AP298-CR 
 
21 
 
State, Damaske, which was decided five years after Austin, is 
inconsistent with Austin. 
¶65 We 
conclude 
that 
the 
facts 
of 
Damaske 
are 
significantly different from those in Austin and in the instant 
case; that Damaske and Austin are not inconsistent with each 
other; and, finally, that Austin should not be overruled. 
¶66 In Damaske, unlike in Austin and in the instant case, 
the trial judge denied the defendant's request for substitution 
as untimely.  Damaske never challenged this determination by 
seeking review of the denial either by the chief judge of the 
administrative district or by a writ of prohibition.22  Damaske 
entered a no-contest plea with the judge whom Damaske had 
                                                                                                                                                             
The issue in Golos was whether, under the peremptory 
substitution of judge statute in place at the time, a defendant 
could "waive the disqualification of the judge created by the 
filing of [an affidavit of prejudice] by subsequently appearing 
and proceeding with the cause as if no affidavit had been 
filed[.]"  Golos, 178 Wis. at 420.  The court determined that 
the defendant's failure to object to the judge's return four 
years after the request for substitution was made indicated that 
the request for substitution had passed from the minds of all 
parties and the judge. 
The Golos court concluded that a waiver could be inferred 
under the circumstances of that case.  The court stated: "A 
waiver should not be implied, except where the facts are clear, 
and it appears that no right of the party in respect thereto has 
been consciously denied by the judge."  Golos, 178 Wis. at 423.  
The 
facts 
and 
circumstances 
of 
the 
instant 
case 
are 
significantly different and do not permit the inference made in 
Golos. 
22 State v. Damaske, 212 Wis. 2d 169, 189, 567 N.W.2d 905 
(Ct. App. 1997). 
No. 
2013AP298-CR 
 
22 
 
attempted to substitute presiding.  Damaske made no objections 
regarding the judge's presiding. 
¶67 The court of appeals concluded in Damaske that by 
entering a plea of no contest without a reservation of rights 
and without seeking immediate review of the denial of his 
substitution request, Damaske waived the right to object to the 
substituted judge's imposing sentence.23 
¶68 Damaske 
presents 
a 
significantly 
different 
fact 
situation than that presented in Austin or in the instant case.24  
In Damaske, the request for substitution was denied as untimely 
and no new judge was appointed to preside.  In Austin and in the 
instant case, the request for substitution was granted as timely 
and proper and a new judge participated in one of the 
proceedings before the substituted judge returned. 
¶69 Austin remains intact after Damaske.  The court of 
appeals in Austin refused to view Austin's conduct, namely his 
participation in the revocation proceeding, as inconsistent with 
his previous request for substitution.  The court of appeals in 
the instant case likewise refused to view the defendant's 
participation at trial and sentencing as inconsistent with the 
defendant's previous request for substitution. 
                                                 
23 Damaske, 212 Wis. 2d at 186, 189-90. 
24 The Damaske opinion provides other examples of waiver or 
forfeiture of the right to complain on appeal that a request for 
substitution was not honored.  The facts in those examples 
differ from the facts in Austin and in the instant case. 
No. 
2013AP298-CR 
 
23 
 
¶70 As we set forth previously, the defendant in the 
present case requested on four occasions that Judge Counsell not 
preside in the instant case or in a different criminal case 
involving the defendant.  The defendant's initial request for 
substitution in the instant case was granted; his subsequent 
requests were acknowledged but not granted.  The circuit court 
judge was, therefore, fully aware of the defendant's challenge 
to the judge's participation in the instant case and another 
pending criminal case. 
¶71 The defendant's efforts seeking substitution in the 
instant case were, as we explained previously, rebuffed by the 
defendant's counsel and the circuit court. 
¶72 These facts do not support a conclusion that the 
defendant forfeited his request for substitution.  Indeed, the 
case law makes it eminently clear that after the defendant's 
timely and proper request for substitution of judge was made and 
granted in the instant case, the defendant did not have to take 
additional steps to avoid forfeiture of his substitution 
request. 
¶73 We need not address whether under other circumstances 
an accused may forfeit or waive the statutory right to 
substitute the judge after a timely and proper request for 
substitution has been made and granted.  We need not address 
whether compliance with Wis. Stat. § 971.20(11) is the exclusive 
method for abandoning a request for substitution.  We need 
address only whether under the circumstances of the instant case 
the defendant forfeited his request for substitution.   
No. 
2013AP298-CR 
 
24 
 
¶74 Again, the circumstances of the instant case are that 
a timely and proper request for substitution was made and 
granted; a new judge presided at a hearing; the substituted 
judge 
returned 
to 
preside 
over 
the 
defendant's 
trial, 
sentencing, and postconviction motions; the defendant objected 
to the substituted judge's returning; and no agreement under 
Wis. Stat. § 971.20(11) was reached. 
¶75 Austin 
answers 
our 
question: 
Under 
these 
circumstances, the defendant's right to substitution was not 
forfeited.  In Austin, the court of appeals remanded the cause 
for a new trial. 
¶76 We conclude that this case presents a fact situation 
substantially similar to that presented in Austin and that 
Austin is not inconsistent with Damaske or the other cases cited 
by the State, which recognize forfeiture or waiver of a 
substitution request under certain circumstances not present in 
the instant case.  We further conclude that Austin governs the 
instant case; that the defendant did not forfeit the right to 
substitution; and that Judge Counsell erred in presiding over 
the defendant's trial, sentencing, and postconviction motions.  
Adhering to Austin, we remand the cause for a new trial on 
account of the circuit court's error. 
B 
¶77 Because we have concluded that the circuit court erred 
in presiding over the defendant's trial, sentencing, and 
postconviction motions, the State asks that we determine the 
error was harmless. 
No. 
2013AP298-CR 
 
25 
 
¶78 According to the State, the error was harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  The State argues that the defendant 
received a fair trial before an impartial judge.  The State 
points out that no evidence has been presented indicating that 
the proceedings were unfair due to Judge Counsell's presiding. 
¶79 We are not persuaded by the State's harmless error 
argument. 
¶80 To determine whether Wis. Stat. § 971.20 is amenable 
to harmless error analysis, we must look to the text of the 
statute.  The statute declares that a substituted judge, here 
Judge Counsell, "has no authority to act further in the action 
except to conduct" three enumerated proceedings.25  We must 
determine what the phrase "no authority to act" means and 
whether the phrase is amenable to a harmless error analysis.   
¶81 The court of appeals and the parties offer different 
interpretations of the phrase "no authority to act" in Wis. 
Stat. § 971.10(9). 
¶82 The court of appeals determined that "when the 
substitution statute refers to a judge lacking the 'authority to 
act' it means the court can no longer exercise jurisdiction over 
the matter."26  The court of appeals therefore declared that 
                                                 
25 See Wis. Stat. § 971.20(9). 
26 State v. Harrison, No. 2013AP298-CR, unpublished slip op. 
& order at 3 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2013). 
No. 
2013AP298-CR 
 
26 
 
"when a judge lacks 'authority to act,' any judgment or order 
rendered by that judge is void for lack of jurisdiction."27  
¶83 The court of appeals' position does not comport with 
the case law.  Damaske explains that Wis. Stat. § 971.20(9) is 
"a limitation on the trial judge's competency to act, not on his 
or her jurisdiction."28 
¶84 Adhering to Damaske, the defendant contends that Wis. 
Stat. § 971.20(9), referring to the substituted judge's lack of 
authority, deprives a substituted circuit court judge of 
"competency," not jurisdiction.  The defendant cites Jefferson 
County v. Joseph S., 2010 WI App 160, ¶15, 330 Wis. 2d 737, 795 
N.W.2d 450, 
and 
State 
ex 
rel. 
Jones 
v. 
Franklin, 
151 
Wis. 2d 419, 423-25, 444 N.W.2d 738 (Ct. App. 1989), for the 
proposition that harmless error analysis does not apply when a 
circuit court lacks competency to act. 
¶85 The State appears to agree with the defendant that the 
error of Judge Counsell's presiding over the defendant's trial, 
sentencing, and postconviction motions was not jurisdictional.  
However, citing State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 69-70, 315 
                                                 
27 Id. at 3. 
28 Damaske, 212 Wis. 2d at 188-89.  See Wis. Const. art. 
VII, § 8 ("Except as otherwise provided by law, the circuit 
court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters civil and 
criminal within this state . . . . ").  "Only when the failure 
to abide by a statutory mandate is 'central to the statutory 
scheme' of which it is a part will the circuit court's 
competency to proceed be implicated."  Village of Trempealeau v. 
Mikrut, 2004 WI 79, ¶10, 273 Wis. 2d 76, 681 N.W.2d 190 
(citation omitted). 
No. 
2013AP298-CR 
 
27 
 
N.W.2d 703 (1982), the State contends that "[a]n individual 
judge's 'authority' to act in a specific case is an even 
narrower concept than competency . . . ." 
¶86 The Holmes court upheld the criminal peremptory 
substitution of judge statute against a challenge grounded in 
separation of powers.  The court reasoned that Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.20 removes the individual judge but does not deprive the 
circuit court of the power to hear the case by assigning another 
judge.  Holmes does not support the State's contention that a 
judge's authority to act in a specific case is a narrower 
concept than competency. 
¶87 The case law supports the defendant's contentions that 
Judge Counsell lost competency to act in the present case and 
that harmless error analysis does not apply.  The cases cited by 
the defendant clearly establish that a harmless error analysis 
does not apply when such an analysis effectively nullifies a 
right granted by statute. 
¶88 Applying a harmless error analysis in the instant case 
would nullify the defendant's statutory right to substitution of 
the judge.  As we explained previously, the statute does not 
require a defendant to provide a reason for the requested 
substitution or to demonstrate that prejudice would result from 
the substituted judge's presiding. 
¶89 In a prior iteration of Wis. Stat. § 971.20, the 
legislature did require an "affidavit of prejudice" to support a 
No. 
2013AP298-CR 
 
28 
 
defendant's request for substitution of the judge.29  The 
legislature repealed the affidavit of prejudice requirement to 
protect both defendants and circuit court judges and to preserve 
the public's confidence in a fair, impartial judicial system.30  
"[T]he intent of [§ 971.20] was that a defendant should not have 
to prove prejudice to obtain a new judge."31  As the court stated 
in Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d at 61: 
In weighing the merits of alternative approaches to 
substitution, the legislature obviously concluded that 
sec. 
971.20 . . . is 
a 
commendable 
procedure 
to 
protect the defendant's right to a fair trial, to 
protect the judge from having his or her impartiality 
unfairly impugned, to avoid having the lawyer file an 
affidavit of prejudice without having guidelines as to 
the proper use of the affidavit, and to promote the 
bench's and public's interest in preserving confidence 
in the judiciary. 
¶90 Thus, by seeking to impose a harmless error analysis 
in the present case, the State attempts to insert a condition 
for substitution that the legislature has deliberately refused 
to impose.  The court should not add an element to the 
substitution statute that the legislature did not enact.32     
                                                 
29 For the statutory history of Wis. Stat. § 971.20, see 
State v. Bell, 62 Wis. 2d 534, 536-38, 215 N.W.2d 535 (1974); 
State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 47-51, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1982). 
30 See Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d at 61. 
31 Bell, 62 Wis. 2d at 537.  See also Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d at 
60-61. 
32 See State v. Matasek, 2014 WI 27, ¶20, 353 Wis. 2d 601, 
846 N.W.2d 811 ("We should not read into the statute language 
that the legislature did not put in" (quoting Brauneis v. LIRC, 
2000 WI 69, ¶27, 236 Wis. 2d 27, 612 N.W.2d 635).). 
No. 
2013AP298-CR 
 
29 
 
¶91 In sum, application of a harmless error analysis in 
the 
present 
case 
would 
undercut 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.20 
by 
nullifying the defendant's statutory right to request and obtain 
substitution without any showing of prejudice.  The text of Wis. 
Stat. § 971.20 controls the disposition of the instant case.  
The statutory violation in the instant case is simply not 
amenable to harmless error review, and the case law does not 
permit us to apply a harmless error analysis.  Thus, we decline 
to do so. 
* * * * 
¶92 For the reasons set forth, we answer the questions of 
law posed by the State as follows: 
¶93 First, we conclude that the defendant in the instant 
case 
did 
not 
forfeit 
his 
statutory 
right 
to 
peremptory 
substitution of the judge.  The defendant persisted with his 
substitution request throughout the proceedings and did not 
follow the procedure outlined in Wis. Stat. § 971.20(11) for 
abandoning his substitution request.  Thus, the circuit court 
erred in presiding over the defendant's trial, sentencing, and 
postconviction motions. 
¶94  Second, harmless error analysis does not apply in the 
instant case when the circuit court erred by presiding over the 
defendant's trial, sentencing, and postconviction motions after 
the defendant filed a timely and proper Wis. Stat. § 971.20 
substitution request, the request was granted, and a new judge 
was appointed.  Applying the doctrine of harmless error under 
these circumstances is contrary to case law and would nullify 
No. 
2013AP298-CR 
 
30 
 
the defendant's statutory right to substitute the judge without 
furnishing a reason for the requested substitution and without 
demonstrating that prejudice would result from the substituted 
judge's presiding. 
¶95 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand the cause to the circuit court for a new 
trial. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed and the cause is remanded for a new trial. 
 
 
 
No. 
2013AP298-CR 
 
 
 
1