Title: Betts v. Elutions Capital Ventures S.A.R.L.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 440, 2022
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: January 12, 2023

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JOHN BETTS, 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
and 
 
NOBLE TALENTS LLC, 
 
Nominal Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
ELUTIONS CAPITAL VENTURES 
S.A.R.L., NBL FUND I, LP, and 
HAMSHINE LLC, 
 
Plaintiffs Below, 
Appellees. 
§ 
§   
§  No. 440, 2022 
§ 
§  Court Below—Court of Chancery 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§  C.A. No. 2020-0455 
§  
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: November 23, 2022 
Decided: 
January 12, 2023 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VAUGHN and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
 
 
ORDER 
 
After consideration of the notice of appeal from an interlocutory order and its 
exhibits, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
Nominal defendant-appellant Noble Talents LLC (the “Company”) is a 
Delaware limited liability company.  The plaintiffs-appellees, Elutions Capital 
Ventures S.A.R.L., NBL Fund I, LP, and Hamshine LLC (the “Plaintiffs”), are 
 
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holders of Series A Preferred Units in the Company.  They filed a derivative action 
in the Court of Chancery alleging that defendant-appellant John Betts breached his 
fiduciary duties to the Company by engaging in self-dealing and by interfering with 
and ultimately scuttling a sale of the Company’s wholly owned subsidiary, Noble 
International Bank, LLC (“Noble Bank”), to Alpha Global Fintech LLC because 
Betts was unable to extract personal benefits from the sale.  The Plaintiffs also 
asserted a claim for tortious interference based on Betts’s alleged interference with 
the prospective sale.  On March 30, 2021, Betts filed an answer and counterclaims 
asserting claims for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, misappropriation 
of trade secrets, and tortious interference.1 
(2) 
In April 2021, Betts moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to 
adequately plead demand futility under Court of Chancery Rule 23.12 and moved for 
judgment on the pleadings, and the Plaintiffs moved to dismiss the counterclaims.  
In June 2021, while briefing on the parties’ motions was proceeding, Betts issued 
 
1 The pleading asserted the counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty on behalf of both Betts and 
the Company.  For simplicity, this order refers only to Betts as asserting, and opposing dismissal 
of, the counterclaims and as the appellant here. 
2 See DEL. CT. CH. R. 23.1 (providing that in a derivative action the complaint must “allege with 
particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action the plaintiff desires from 
the directors or comparable authority and the reasons for the plaintiff’s failure to obtain the action 
or for not making the effort”); see also 6 Del. C. § 18-1001 (“A member or an assignee of a limited 
liability company interest may bring an action in the Court of Chancery in the right of a limited 
liability company to recover a judgment in its favor if managers or members with authority to do 
have refused to bring the action or if an effort to cause those managers or members to bring the 
action is not likely to succeed.”). 
 
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numerous subpoenas, including to the custodian of the Company’s electronic 
records.3  The custodian produced documents during the first week of October 2021 
(the “October Records”).  The court heard argument on the motions to dismiss and 
for judgment on the pleadings on November 8, 2021.  Betts did not refer to the 
October Records during the hearing or at any time between the hearing and when 
the court ruled on the motions. 
(3) 
On February 2, 2022, the Court of Chancery denied Betts’s motion to 
dismiss under Rule 23.1, concluding that demand was excused as futile because 
Betts was the sole member of the board of managers when the complaint was filed 
and the Plaintiffs had pleaded with particularity that Betts received or attempted to 
receive material personal benefits from the misconduct alleged in the complaint.4  
The Court of Chancery also denied Betts’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, 
concluding that the allegations in the complaint supported reasonable inferences that 
Betts breached fiduciary duties that he owed to the Company during the relevant 
 
3 Elutions Capital Ventures S.A.R.L. v. Betts, C.A. No. 2020-0455, Docket Entry No. 135, 
Transcript of Oct. 24, 2022 Bench Ruling, at 4-5 (Del. Ch.) [hereinafter Interlocutory Bench 
Ruling]; see also Elutions Capital Ventures S.A.R.L. v. Betts, 2022 WL 17075692, at *1 (Del. Ch. 
Nov. 18, 2022). 
4 Elutions Capital Ventures S.A.R.L. v. Betts, C.A. No. 2020-0455, Docket Entry No. 78, Transcript 
of Feb. 2, 2022 Bench Ruling, at 20-21 (Del. Ch.) (quoting three-part test for demand futility 
adopted in United Food & Commercial Workers Union & Participating Food Industry Employers 
Tri-State Pension Fund v. Zuckerberg, 262 A.3d 1034, 1058 (Del. 2021)). 
 
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time periods and that he tortiously interfered with the prospective sale of Noble Bank 
to Alpha Global.5   
(4) 
As for the Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss Betts’s counterclaims, the court 
held that Betts failed to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty because he did not 
adequately plead that the Plaintiffs owed the Company fiduciary duties, either by 
controlling the Company generally or by exercising control with regard to the Alpha 
Global deal.6  The court held that Betts failed to state a claim for breach of contract 
because he did not allege that the Plaintiffs were parties to any of the contracts at 
issue.7  The court held that Betts failed to state a claim for misappropriation of trade 
secrets because he did not adequately plead, even under a notice pleading standard, 
what trade secrets the Plaintiffs allegedly misappropriated.8  Finally, the court held 
that Betts failed to state a claim that the Plaintiffs tortiously interfered with contracts 
between the Company and Betts or with the prospective sale of Noble Bank.9  The 
court therefore dismissed all of the counterclaims.10 
(5) 
On February 9, 2022, Betts moved for reargument.  He also sought 
leave to amend his counterclaims, stating that he could further clarify the facts 
 
5 Id. at 21-29. 
6 Id. at 29-32. 
7 Id. at 32-33. 
8 Id. at 33-36. 
9 Id. at 36-39. 
10 Id. 39. 
 
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alleged and indicating that he had received information from a former Company 
executive to support his counterclaims.  He still did not refer to the October Records.  
On March 1, 2022, the Court of Chancery denied reargument and the request for 
leave to amend. 
(6) 
On July 1, 2022, Betts again moved for leave to amend the answer and 
to add six counterclaims—two that would reassert two of the dismissed 
counterclaims and four that were purportedly new.  For the first time, Betts pointed 
to the October Records, arguing that they contained “new evidence” that supported 
the counterclaims that he was seeking to assert.  The Plaintiffs opposed the motion 
on the grounds that the proposed counterclaims were barred by Court of Chancery 
Rule 15(aaa) and that amendment would be futile under Rule 15(a).   
(7) 
The court denied the motion to add the previously dismissed 
counterclaims, holding that the court had previously dismissed those claims with 
prejudice and that Betts’s failure to bring the October Records to the court’s attention 
earlier barred him from relying on those records in an effort to revive those claims.11  
The court also denied the motion to add the purportedly new counterclaims, 
concluding that because those claims simply repackaged the dismissed 
counterclaims, Rule 15(aaa) barred the amendment.12  The court granted the motion 
 
11 Interlocutory Bench Ruling, supra note 3, at 7-11. 
12 Id. at 11-15. 
 
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to amend the answer because the Plaintiffs did not argue that the amendments would 
be prejudicial and the court therefore was “‘required to exercise discretion in favor 
of granting leave to amend.’”13 
(8) 
Betts then asked the Court of Chancery to certify an interlocutory 
appeal under Supreme Court Rule 42.  He argued that the Court of Chancery should 
not have applied Rule 15(aaa) to deny the motion to add the counterclaims because 
two of them were based on newly discovered evidence that was not available at the 
time of the original answer and counterclaims, and the other four contained 
additional elements that were not the subject of the original motion to dismiss.  Betts 
argued that the court’s order decided a substantial issue of material importance 
because it “alter[ed] the balance of procedural rights between plaintiffs and 
defendants” in the Court of Chancery.14  Addressing the Rule 42(b)(iii) factors, Betts 
argued that (i) the order involves a question of first impression;15 (ii) the order “is in 
tension with” governing law;16 and (iii) interlocutory review would serve 
considerations of justice.17 
 
13 Id. at 15-16 (quoting Mullen v. Alarmguard of Delmarva, Inc., 625 A.2d 258, 263 (Del. 1993)). 
14 Application for Certification of Interlocutory Appeal at 6. 
15 DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 42(b)(iii)(A). 
16 Application for Certification of Interlocutory Appeal at 13.  Cf. DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 42(b)(iii)(B) 
(stating that the trial court should consider whether the “decisions of the trial courts are conflicting 
upon the question of law” presented by the interlocutory order). 
17 DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 42(b)(iii)(H). 
 
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(9) 
The Court of Chancery denied the application for certification.  The 
court determined that the order did not decide a substantial issue of material 
importance because a “decision granting or denying leave to amend is not part of a 
merits determination” but rather “collateral to a merits determination.”18  The court 
also concluded that the Rule 42(b)(iii) factors do not support interlocutory review.  
First, the court determined that the order at issue did not resolve a novel question of 
law but rather “applied settled Rule 15(aaa) precedent to a tattered procedural history 
involving parties who repeatedly tried to revive counterclaims that were dismissed 
with prejudice.”19  The court similarly determined that the order did not conflict with 
governing law, but rather applied settled law to the circumstances of the case.20  
Finally, the court concluded that interlocutory review would not serve considerations 
of justice, particularly because Betts waited so long to argue that the October 
Records supported his claims.21 
(10) We agree with the Court of Chancery that interlocutory review is not 
warranted in this case.  Applications for interlocutory review are addressed to the 
sound discretion of this Court.22  In the exercise of its discretion and giving great 
 
18 Elutions Capital Ventures S.A.R.L. v. Betts, 2022 WL 17075692, at *4 (Del. Ch. Nov. 18, 2022); 
see also id. (“A decision holding otherwise would endorse immediate appeals from any adverse 
outcome on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion that does not result in a final judgment.”). 
19 Id. at *5. 
20 Id. at *5-7. 
21 Id. at *7. 
22 DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 42(d)(v). 
 
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weight to the trial court’s view, this Court has concluded that the application for 
interlocutory review does not meet the strict standards for certification under 
Supreme Court Rule 42(b).  Exceptional circumstances that would merit 
interlocutory review of the decision of the Court of Chancery do not exist in this 
case,23 and the potential benefits of interlocutory review do not outweigh the 
inefficiency, disruption, and probable costs caused by an interlocutory appeal.  Betts 
did not bring the October Records to the Court of Chancery’s attention at the hearing 
on the motion to dismiss; in the three months between that hearing and the court’s 
decision on the motion; or when he sought reargument and leave to amend his 
counterclaims following that decision.  Interlocutory review of the results of that 
strategy is not warranted. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the interlocutory appeal is 
REFUSED. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/ Gary F. Traynor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
23 Id. R. 42(b)(ii).