Title: Carroll v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 091987
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: November 4, 2010

Present: Hassell, C.J., Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, Goodwyn, and 
Millette, JJ., and Carrico, S.J.  
 
JAMES CARROLL 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 091987 
SENIOR JUSTICE HARRY L. CARRICO
 
 
 
November 4, 2010 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In this appeal, we decide whether a person charged with 
rape who enters an Alford plea and is placed on probation 
violates the terms of his probation by refusing to admit his 
guilt during the course of ordered treatment for sex 
offenders.  The circuit court held that the defendant, James 
Carroll, was in violation of his probation for his refusal 
to make such an admission.  The Court of Appeals of Virginia 
affirmed the judgment of the circuit court.  We will affirm 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
THE ALFORD PLEA 
 
The use of an Alford plea arose out of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 
(1970).  There, the Court held as follows: 
An individual accused of crime may voluntarily, 
knowingly, and understandingly consent to the 
imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling 
or unable to admit his participation in the acts 
constituting the crime. 
 
Id. at 37. 
 
 
This Court explicated the Alford plea in Parson v. 
Carroll, 272 Va. 560, 636 S.E.2d 452 (2006).  There, we 
stated as follows: 
Based on [the] holding in Alford, the courts in this 
Commonwealth in the exercise of their discretion have 
permitted criminal defendants who wish to avoid the 
consequences of a trial to plead guilty by conceding 
that the evidence is sufficient to convict them, while 
maintaining that they did not participate in the acts 
constituting the crimes.  See e.g., Patterson v. 
Commonwealth, 262 Va. 301, 302 n. 1, 551 S.E.2d 332, 
333 n.1 (2001); Reid v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 561, 563 
n.1, 506 S.E.2d 787, 788 n.1 (1998); Zigta v. 
Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 149, 151 n.1, 562 S.E.2d 347, 
348 n.1 (2002); Perry v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 410, 
412-13, 533 S.E.2d 651, 652-53 (2000). 
 
Id. at 565-66, 636 S.E.2d at 455.  See also the following 
cases in which defendants made Alford pleas since Parson: 
Malbrough v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 163, 168, 655 S.E.2d 1, 3  
(2008); Neighbors v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 503, 506, 650 
S.E.2d 514, 515 (2007).  
BACKGROUND 
 
 
On June 18, 2007, a grand jury in the Circuit Court of 
Arlington County indicted James Carroll for the rape of a 
child less than thirteen years of age.  Code § 18.2-61.  The 
rape occurred between 1982 and 1984, and the child was 
Carroll’s stepdaughter, who was then twelve years old. 
 
On September 6, 2007, Carroll and the Commonwealth’s 
Attorney signed a plea agreement.  In the document, Carroll 
stated that he was “going to plead guilty to the crime of 
 
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Rape,” although he did not “admit that [he] committed the 
crime to which [he was] pleading guilty,” because he had 
“decided it [was] in [his] interest to accept the 
prosecutor’s offer to enter into this agreement.”  He also 
stated he understood that “by pleading guilty [he] may 
receive the same penalties as if [he] had been convicted of 
the same crime after a trial by a jury or by a judge sitting 
without a jury.” 
 
Also on September 6, 2007, the circuit court conducted 
a hearing on Carroll’s guilty plea.  The following colloquy 
ensued between the court and Carroll: 
THE COURT:  Are you pleading guilty because you are, in 
fact, guilty and no other reason? 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, sir. 
 
. . . . 
 
THE COURT:  Tell me what an Alford plea is. 
 
. . . . 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Well, what the plea is, it says that 
the prosecutor feels he has enough evidence to convict 
me even though I don’t think I’m guilty of the crime.  
 
THE COURT:  And you don’t want to take that chance. 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Correct. 
 
. . . . 
 
THE COURT:  Okay. Now, do you . . . understand that the 
legal consequences of an Alford plea are the same as a 
guilty plea or a finding of guilt? 
 
 
3
THE DEFENDANT:  That’s what I am told [by my attorney]. 
. . . I know what I am doing. 
 
. . . . 
 
THE COURT:  What is your plea?  Alford plea at this 
time? 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, sir. 
 
. . . . 
 
THE COURT:  Let the record reflect that the plea is 
made freely and voluntarily with an understanding of 
its nature and its consequences. 
 
 
After a proffer by the prosecutor of what the evidence 
would have shown, the circuit court accepted Carroll’s plea 
of guilty and convicted him of rape.  Pursuant to the plea 
agreement, the court suspended the imposition of sentence 
for five years, directed that Carroll be of general good 
behavior, have no contact with the victim or her family, and 
pay court costs. 
 
The circuit court also placed Carroll on supervised 
probation during the period of suspension.  The court’s 
sentencing order entered on September 20, 2007, provided 
that Carroll “shall comply with all the rules and 
requirements set by the Probation Officer” and that 
“[p]robation shall include any substance abuse counseling, 
testing, and/or treatment as prescribed by the Probation 
Officer.” 
 
4
 
The court informed Carroll that if, at the end of the 
suspension period, he had fulfilled “all these conditions, 
[he] can withdraw this plea [of guilty], enter a plea of 
guilty to assault and battery, and the Court will impose a 
fine of $750 in accordance with [the plea] agreement.”  The 
case was continued until September 14, 2012, for final 
disposition. 
 
On October 5, 2007, Carroll filed a motion to amend the 
sentencing order to provide that “[n]o sex offender 
treatment be prescribed or required by the Probation 
Officer” because the “incident occurred over 20-something 
years ago,” there have been “no allegations” against Carroll 
since, and “there is no need for any treatment.”  The 
circuit court did not grant the motion and ordered that “any 
sex offender treatment is to be determined by the 
Defendant’s supervising Probation Officer.” 
 
On March 6, 2008, Carroll began attending a sex-
offender treatment group to which he had been assigned by 
his probation officer for sex offender therapy.  As part of 
this treatment program, Carroll was required to admit his 
guilt to the crime of rape with which he had been charged.  
He refused to make the admission or otherwise cooperate and, 
after the therapy staff had worked with him for two months, 
he was terminated from the program on May 7, 2008.  The 
 
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prosecutor then moved for the revocation of Carroll’s 
probation. 
 
The circuit court held a hearing on the prosecutor’s 
motion on June 13, 2008.  Opposing the motion, Carroll 
argued that the requirement that he admit his guilt would be 
“a breach of the plea agreement . . . [a]s part of an Alford 
plea.”  The court found Carroll in violation of his 
probation and asked defense counsel “why [Carroll] should 
not go to jail?”  Counsel urged that Carroll be allowed to 
participate in individual sex offender therapy provided by 
Dr. Stanton E. Samenow, a psychologist who was not certified 
as a sex offender therapist. 
 
The circuit court did not grant the request for 
individual sex offender therapy.  Instead, in an order 
entered June 17, 2008, the court vacated the sentence 
imposed and suspended in the September 20, 2007 order, 
sentenced Carroll to five years imprisonment, with the five 
years suspended for a period of five years upon the “special 
condition” that Carroll “enter & complete sex offender 
treatment as directed by his Probation Officer.”  
 
Carroll then filed a petition for appeal with the Court 
of Appeals containing a Statement of Questions Presented 
reading as follows: 
 
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1) Whether the trial court erred in finding Appellant 
in violation of probation based solely on Appellant’s 
refusal to admit to rape during sex offender therapy 
given the fact that the Commonwealth agreed to and the 
court accepted an Alford plea? 
 
2) Whether the trial court erred in not considering a 
reasonable alternative treatment modality (sex offender 
treatment with an expert forensic psychologist) in lieu 
of probation revocation coupled with the condition of 
successfully completing the same program from which 
appellant was terminated? 
 
Carroll v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. App. 730, 737, 682 S.E.2d 
92, 95 (2009). 
ANALYSIS 
Breach of Plea Agreement 
 
Carroll argued the two questions quoted above and also 
argued that the revocation of his probation violated the 
terms of the plea agreement he signed with the Commonwealth.  
However, a majority of the Court of Appeals held that it 
could not “consider the plea agreement terms” because under 
“Rule 5A:12(c) ‘[o]nly questions presented in the petition 
for appeal will be noticed by the Court of Appeals’ ” and 
“[n]either question [presented in Carroll’s petition] asks 
us to consider whether the trial court’s decision finding 
that Carroll was in violation of his probation was a breach 
of the terms of the plea agreement.”  Carroll, 54 Va. App. 
at 737, 682 S.E.2d at 95-96. 
 
7
 
Carroll argues here that he did ask the Court of 
Appeals in his Statement of the Questions Presented “to 
consider whether the trial court’s decision finding that 
Appellant was in violation of his probation was a breach of 
the terms of the plea agreement.”  Quoting the definition of 
an Alford plea in Black’s Law Dictionary 83 (9th ed. 2009) 
as a “guilty plea that a defendant enters as part of a plea 
bargain, without actually admitting guilt,” Carroll submits 
that “but for the plea bargain, manifested as a written plea 
agreement in this case, there is no Alford plea; they are 
not divisible in this case, and the elements of an Alford 
plea, paragraphs 5 and 15, are contained within the Plea 
Agreement.”1  
 
We disagree with this argument.  Obviously, there is 
some connection between the plea agreement and the Alford 
plea in this case, but Carroll failed to make the connection 
in his Statement of the Questions Presented.  Like the 
requirement in our Rule 5:17(c) for assignments of error, 
the purpose of questions presented in the Court of Appeals 
is to “point out the errors with reasonable certainty in 
order to direct [the] court and opposing counsel to the 
points on which appellant intends to ask a reversal of the 
                     
1 In Paragraphs 5 and 15 of the plea agreement Carroll 
agrees to plead guilty but maintains his claim of innocence. 
 
8
judgment, and to limit discussion to these points.”  Yeatts 
v. Murray, 249 Va. 285, 290, 455 S.E.2d 18, 21 (1995) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  And like assignments of 
error under this Court’s Rule 5:17(c), it was the duty of 
Carroll’s counsel to “lay his finger on the error” in his 
Statement of Questions Presented in the Court of Appeals.2  
See First National Bank of Richmond v. William R. Trigg Co., 
106 Va. 327, 342, 56 S.E. 158, 163 (1907) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 
Carroll’s questions presented fail to conform to these 
requirements.  Neither the words “breach” and “plea 
agreement” nor any synonyms appear anywhere in the statement 
and are not connected in a way that would inform the Court 
of Appeals and the Commonwealth “with reasonable certainty” 
that Carroll intended to ask for a reversal of the judgment 
against him on the ground that the revocation of his 
probation was a breach of the plea agreement.  In short, 
Carroll’s counsel simply failed to “lay his finger on the 
error” in his Statement of the Questions Presented.  
Accordingly, we will not give further consideration to 
                     
2 Effective July 1, 2010, the rules of the Court of 
Appeals were changed to require assignments of error rather 
than questions presented. 
 
9
Carroll’s argument concerning a breach of the plea 
agreement.3 
Refusal to Admit Guilt 
 
This brings us to Carroll’s argument that the Court of 
Appeals erred in “affirming the trial court’s revocation of 
[his] probation because [he] refused to accept 
responsibility in sex-offender treatment by admitting to 
rape based upon his Alford plea as a matter of law.”  
Carroll contends that the “probation of one who has entered 
an Alford plea cannot be revoked for refusing to admit to 
the offense, thereby accepting responsibility for the 
offense, after entering the plea” and that this “is 
particularly the case when the trial court does not warn the 
defendant prior to or at the time of entering the plea that 
he/she will be required to admit to the offense at a later 
time, such as, in treatment.”4  
                     
3 Carroll requests that we invoke the “ends of justice” 
exception of Rule 5:25 and consider the plea agreement 
question if we hold he did not preserve the point in the 
Court of Appeals.  The application of the exception is 
justified only when failure to do so “would result in a 
grave injustice.” Gheorghiu v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. ___, 
___, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___ (2010) (this day decided); see also 
Charles v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 14, 17, 613 S.E.2d 432, 433 
(2005).  Upon the record before us in this case, we cannot 
say that if the exception is not applied “a grave injustice” 
would result. 
 
4 In its opinion, the Court of Appeals expressed 
Carroll’s argument in much more succinct terms than he 
expresses it.  The court wrote that “[a]t its core, 
 
10
 
Carroll cites our decision in Parson v. Carroll, quoted 
previously herein, which involved a defamation action 
brought by Thomas Parson against Robert Carroll.  272 Va. at 
562, 636 S.E.2d at 452.  Parson had entered an Alford plea 
to six counts of sexual battery with Carroll as the victim 
and then filed a defamation action against Carroll for 
telling others what Parson had done to him.  Id. at 562, 636 
S.E.2d at 453.  The trial court granted Carroll’s motion for 
summary judgment, holding that the doctrine of judicial 
estoppel barred the defamation action.  This Court reversed, 
holding that when Parson entered his Alford plea, he 
“conceded only that the evidence was sufficient to convict 
him of the offenses and did not admit as a factual matter 
that he had participated in the acts constituting the 
crimes,” and this “concession of law did not provide a basis 
for applying judicial estoppel.”  Id. at 566, 636 S.E.2d at 
455.  Further, “[b]ecause the material facts of Parson’s 
motion for judgment were still in dispute at this stage of 
the proceedings, the circuit court further erred in awarding 
Carroll summary judgment.”  Id. 
                                                              
Carroll’s argument is that an Alford plea, by its nature, 
contains an implicit promise that the defendant will never 
be required to admit his guilt.”  54 Va. App. at 743, 682 
S.E.2d at 98. 
 
11
 
Parson is not controlling.  In Parson, a civil case, 
this Court decided that a concession made in an Alford plea 
is a concession of law and not of fact and is not a bar to a 
post-Alford proceeding in which the issue is whether, as a 
matter of fact, the accused participated in the acts 
constituting the offense.  Here, the Commonwealth has not 
claimed that Carroll’s concession in his Alford plea should 
be treated as an admission of factual guilt.  Rather, the 
Commonwealth correctly points out that Parson “did not 
discuss or hold anything with respect to the effect an 
‘Alford plea’ has in a criminal case or that it guarantees a 
defendant special rights with respect to probation 
conditions.”  The important point to be made here is that 
nothing in the Alford opinion, the Parson opinion, or any 
other Virginia opinion indicates that an Alford plea is a 
bar to a post-Alford proceeding in which a sex offender is 
required to admit his guilt during treatment. 
 
Carroll cites two decisions from other jurisdictions in 
support of his position.  In State v. Birchler, 2000 Ohio 
App. LEXIS 4622, at *8 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (unpublished), 
the court reversed the judgment revoking the defendant’s 
probation because he was not given notice when he offered 
his Alford plea that he would be required to admit he had a 
victim in order to complete his probation.  In People v. 
 
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Walters, 627 N.Y.S.2d 289, 290-91 (N.Y. Cnty. Ct. 1995), the 
judgment revoking the defendant’s probation was reversed 
because he was not informed when he entered his Alford plea 
that he would be required to admit his guilt to the 
underlying crime during therapy.  Later, however, the Court 
of Appeals of New York held directly opposite to Walters.  
Silmon v. Travis, 741 N.E.2d 501, 504 (N.Y. 2000). 
 
In addition to this decision of the Court of Appeals of 
New York, the decisions of one United States Court of 
Appeals and the highest courts of three other states support 
the Commonwealth’s position.  See Warren v. Richland Cnty. 
Cir. Ct., 223 F.3d 454 (7th Cir. 2000); People v. Birdsong, 
958 P.2d 1124 (Colo. 1998); State v. Faraday, 842 A.2d 567 
(Conn. 2004); State ex rel. Warren v. Schwarz, 579 N.W.2d 
698 (Wis. 1998).  We will follow their lead. 
 
The two Warren cases, involving the same defendant, are 
of special interest.  In the case decided by the Supreme 
Court of Wisconsin, Philip I. Warren was charged with the 
sexual assault of a child.  He entered an Alford plea, was 
placed on probation, participated in sex offender treatment, 
refused to admit his guilt, and had his probation revoked.  
He argued that the revocation of his probation because he 
refused to admit his guilt violated his right to due 
 
13
process.  In response, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held 
as follows: 
[W]hen the State required Warren to admit to the sexual 
assault in this case, it did not act inconsistently 
with the ‘bargain’ it had made to ‘induce’ his guilty 
plea.  A defendant’s protestations of innocence under 
an Alford plea extend only to the plea itself. 
 
A defendant may choose to enter an Alford plea for 
various reasons.  He may wish to take advantage of the 
state’s offer for a reduced sentence.  He may wish to 
spare himself or his family of the expense and 
embarrassment of a trial.  Whatever the reason for 
entering an Alford plea, the fact remains that when a 
defendant enters such a plea, he becomes a convicted 
sex offender and is treated no differently than he 
would be had he gone to trial and been convicted by a 
jury. 
. . . . 
 
[W]e hold that the revocation of Warren’s probation for 
failure to admit his guilt after acceptance of his 
Alford plea did not violate his right to due process. 
 
579 N.W.2d at 706-07. 
 
Warren then filed a petition for habeas corpus in 
federal court challenging the revocation his probation.  In 
rejecting the challenge, the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals stated as follows: 
Warren believes that the acceptance of an Alford plea 
is an assurance that a defendant will not have to admit 
guilt during either conviction or punishment.  He is 
wrong.  He can maintain his innocence at the drug 
store, the grocery store and any other public place he 
desires.  But, when in the private setting of sex 
offender counseling that is ordered as a condition of 
probation, and his admission is necessary for 
rehabilitation, he must admit responsibility for his 
conduct. 
 
 
14
223 F.3d at 459. 
 
Carroll attempts to distinguish the decision of the 
Supreme Court of Wisconsin on the ground that before the 
trial court accepted the Alford plea it advised Warren that 
if he was placed on probation he would “very likely . . . be 
ordered” to undergo counseling and he would “have an 
obligation to enter into counseling in good faith with the 
counselor, the psychiatrist, or doctor.”  Warren, 579 N.W.2d 
at 703.  In his case, Carroll says, he “had no warnings that 
his refusal to admit to a rape would be cause for his 
probation to be revoked.” 
 
However, the “good faith” statement by the trial court 
in Warren falls far short of a “warning that [a defendant’s] 
refusal to admit to a rape would be cause for his probation 
to be revoked,” so that part of Warren provides Carroll 
little comfort.  Indeed, Warren himself did not consider it 
sufficient.  He argued separately that the circuit court’s 
failure to inform him at the time of his Alford plea that he 
would be required to admit his guilt during treatment 
rendered the plea unknowing and involuntary.  The Supreme 
Court of Wisconsin responded as follows: 
[I]t is well-established that in informing defendants 
of their rights, courts are only required to notify 
them of the ‘direct consequences’ of their pleas.  
Defendants do not have a due process right to be 
 
15
informed of consequences that are merely collateral to 
their pleas. 
. . . . 
 
[W]e conclude that the circuit court was not required 
to inform Warren that his probation could be revoked 
for failing to take responsibility for his actions 
because it was only a collateral consequence of his 
conviction. 
 
579 N.W.2d at 708-09 (citations omitted). 
 
We hold that the record in this case fully supports the 
conclusion that Carroll violated the terms of his probation 
by refusing to admit his guilt during sex offender 
treatment.  We hold further that Carroll’s failure to 
receive warning at the time he entered his Alford plea that 
such a refusal could result in the revocation of his 
probation is a collateral and not a direct consequence of 
his plea and does not render the revocation improper. 
Alternative Treatment 
 
 
Citing Peyton v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 503, 604 S.E.2d 
17 (2004), Carroll argues that “[u]nder the circumstances of 
this case, the revocation of [his] probation in lieu of an 
alternative treatment modality, and then the requirement for 
successful completion of the same program, are unreasonable 
and are not an appropriate exercise of conscientious 
judgment by the trial court.”  In Peyton, the defendant was 
convicted of a drug offense, given a suspended sentence, and 
placed on probation conditioned upon his entry into and 
 
16
successful completion of his participation in the Detention 
Center Incarceration Program pursuant to Code § 19.2-316.2.  
Id. at 506, 604 S.E.2d at 18. 
 
When Peyton was within one month of completing his 
participation in the program, he became ill, was 
hospitalized, and was removed from the program for 
“medical/psychological reasons.”  Id. at 507, 604 S.E.2d at 
18.  The trial court held a show cause hearing, revoked the 
suspended sentence, and ordered Peyton to serve the original 
sentence.  The trial judge stated he did not question the 
“sincerity” of Peyton’s desire to complete the program, but 
said there was not “anything I can do.”  Id. 
 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s 
judgment, and this Court reversed the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals.  We held that the circuit court abused its 
discretion in revoking the suspended sentence, and we stated 
as follows: 
 
There is surely a distinction between the willful 
failure of an inmate to comply with the requirements of 
the detention center program and the conditions of his 
suspended sentence permitting his participation in that 
program and the subsequent inability of the inmate to 
do so resulting from an unforeseen medical condition.  
 
268 Va. at 511, 604 S.E.2d at 21.  
 
 
Carroll can hardly equate himself with Peyton or his 
situation with Peyton’s.  Carroll did not refuse to admit 
 
17
his guilt during sex offender treatment because of some 
inability resulting from an unforeseen condition that arose.  
Rather, his refusal was an out-and-out “willful failure 
. . . to comply with the requirements” of his probation 
officer.  Id. 
 
The “revocation of a suspended sentence lies in the 
discretion of the trial court and . . . this discretion is 
quite broad,” but “[t]he cause deemed . . . sufficient for 
revoking a suspension must be a reasonable cause.”  Hamilton 
v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 325, 326-27, 228 S.E.2d 555, 556 
(1976) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  
The same discretion applied when the circuit court was 
called upon here to decide whether Carroll should be allowed 
to receive alternative treatment and what penalty should be 
imposed for his earlier failure to successfully complete sex 
offender treatment. 
 
We certainly cannot say that the circuit court abused 
its discretion or acted unreasonably in refusing to allow 
Carroll to be treated in some unsupervised situation by 
someone not versed in the treatment of sex offenders.  Nor 
can we say that the circuit court abused its discretion or 
acted unreasonably in ordering Carroll to participate in the 
same program he was discharged from earlier.  The circuit 
court merely gave Carroll a second chance to avoid 
 
18
imprisonment, which is one of the reasons a defendant enters 
an Alford plea in the first place.  
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons assigned, we will affirm the judgment 
of the Court of Appeals. 
Affirmed. 
 
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