Title: Allstate Insurance Company v. Hicks
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1170632
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: June 19, 2020

Rel: June 19, 2020
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2019-2020
____________________
1170589
____________________
Nancy Hicks
v.
Allstate Insurance Company
____________________
1170632
____________________
Allstate Insurance Company
v.
Nancy Hicks
Appeals from Madison Circuit Court
(CV-15-901699)
1170589, 1170632
STEWART, Justice.
This matter is before the Court on consolidated appeals
from the Madison Circuit Court ("the trial court") stemming
from an action filed by Nancy Hicks for injuries sustained in
an automobile accident. Hicks appeals following the trial
court's denial of her motion for a new trial.  Allstate
Insurance Company ("Allstate") cross-appeals, challenging the
trial court's denial of its motion for a partial judgment as
a matter of law on the issue of causation of Hicks's injuries. 
For the reasons stated below, we reverse the trial court's
order denying Hicks's motion for a new trial, and we remand
the cause to the trial court for a new trial. We affirm the
trial court's order denying Allstate's motion for a partial
judgment as a matter of law. 
Facts and Procedural History
On October 9, 2014, Hicks was the passenger in an
automobile being driven by Yesy Gonzalez ("Yesy") when William
Davis rear-ended their vehicle, causing  injuries to Hicks's
head, back, and neck.  Yesy also sustained injuries as a
result of the accident.
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1170589, 1170632
Hicks, Yesy, and Alfonso Gonzalez ("Alfonso"), Yesy's
husband (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the
plaintiffs") filed a complaint in the trial court on September
16, 2015, asserting various claims against Davis's estate1 and
against Allstate, the Gonzalezes' underinsured-motorist
("UIM") insurance carrier. Hicks and Yesy asserted claims of
negligence against Davis's estate, and Alfonso asserted a
loss-of-consortium 
claim 
against 
Davis's 
estate. 
The
plaintiffs also sought UIM benefits from Allstate. Hicks also
amended the complaint to assert a claim for UIM benefits
against 
State 
Farm 
Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company 
("State
Farm"), her UIM insurance carrier. 
Initially, both Allstate and State Farm opted out of the
litigation, see Lowe v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 521 So. 2d
1309 (Ala. 1988), and 
the 
plaintiffs proceeded against Davis's
estate. The plaintiffs subsequently agreed to 
a 
stipulation of
dismissal of all claims they asserted against Davis's estate.
As a result of the dismissal of the claims against Davis's
estate, the matter proceeded to trial on February 12, 2018,
1Davis died after the accident but before the plaintiffs
filed the complaint.  
3
1170589, 1170632
solely on the plaintiffs' claims against Allstate for UIM
benefits. State Farm continued to opt out.  
The evidence at trial presented the following relevant
facts pertaining to Hicks's claim. As a result of the
collision, Hicks's body was thrown forward and then backward,
and her head hit the passenger-side window of the car.  Hicks
sought initial treatment at the Huntsville Hospital emergency
room for pain in her back, neck, and head. On October 13,
2014, Hicks visited Dr. Ramakrishna Vennam, her primary-care
physician, who diagnosed Hicks with a whiplash injury, post-
traumatic headaches, and lower back pain. One month after the
wreck, Hicks was diagnosed by Dr. Lynn Boyer, a neurologist,
with a concussion.  On October 28, 2014, Hicks went to the
emergency room at Huntsville Hospital complaining of pain in
her head, neck, and back, and she was diagnosed by the
emergency-room physician with a cervical strain in her neck.
On January 23, 2015, Dr. Vennam saw Hicks, who was complaining
of a sharp pain in the left side of her head from headaches
and chronic back pain.  Dr. Vennam referred Hicks to Dr. Rhett
Murray, a neurosurgeon.  Dr. Murray had previously treated
Hicks for lower back pain in 2009, which treatment included
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1170589, 1170632
surgery to correct a herniated or ruptured disk, relieving a
compressed nerve. 
Dr. Murray diagnosed Hicks with spondylolisthesis, grade
one, and indicated there was a 25 percent slip between the L-4
and L-5 vertebrae in Hicks's back. Dr. Murray also diagnosed
Hicks with mild spondylosis, which is arthritic spurs in the
neck. Dr. Murray stated that the slip of the bone that he
found between the L-4 and L-5 vertebrae in March 2016 was not
present in scans of Hicks's back after the 2009 operation. Dr.
Murray also diagnosed Hicks with a slipped disk between the
bones of her L-5 and S-1 vertebrae and with stenosis, a
narrowing of the spinal canal, which was causing nerve
compression in her back.
On October 17, 2016, Dr. Murray performed a two-level
spinal-fusion surgery on Hicks. Under direct examination by
Hicks's attorney during a video deposition that was played to
the jury, Dr. Murray testified as follows concerning the
surgery:
"An incision is made on the low back in the middle
of the affected areas. And the muscles are pulled
back exposing the spine. The roof of the spine
bones, which is called the 'lamina,' are removed in
order to expose the nerves. The spurs form on these
joints. They are removed so that the nerves are
5
1170589, 1170632
further decompressed. If there's any scar tissue, it
is removed from around the nerves. That's called a
'neurolysis,' Screws are placed into the spine bones
through what we call the 'pedicles' which are die
arms that connect the back of the spine to the front
of the spine. So six screws were placed in her L-4,
L-5j and S-1, at each level. The discs which are the
spacers between the bones are removed. This doesn't
show –- well, actually it does show. This is the
spacer that [we] put back into the disc once we
remove it. It's packed with her bone that we harvest
from the removal of the roof of the spine. So two of
these were placed. And then rods are passed through
the screws and locked down with top screws as well
as a cross link in order to hold everything
together. Bone is also laid down to the sides here
in hopes of getting this to become solid with bone
overtime."
 
Dr. Murray testified that the screws and the rods would likely
remain in Hicks's body permanently.  Dr. Murray testified:
"[T]hose bones no longer bend. That's what a fusion
is designed to do. So it adds stresses to the joints
above. And she has a probable 10 to 15 percent
chance of developing adjacent level significant
disease."
Hicks testified that she had external scarring at the site of
the surgery.  Dr. Murray testified as follows regarding
Hicks's impairment:
"[Hick's 
attorney:] 
Doctor, 
is 
there 
an
impairment rating associated with this type of
procedure?
"[Dr. Murray]: There is. I usually send them out
to our physiatrist  to perform the impairment rating
6
1170589, 1170632
using the [American Medical Association] Guidelines. 
I am certain she would have one."
 
 
Hicks attempted to introduce a mortality table into
evidence to aid the jury in determining damages. Hicks argued
that the testimony of Dr. Murray, specifically that Hicks
would have permanent hardware in her spine and permanent
scarring from the fusion surgery and that Hicks had not yet
recovered from the neck injuries she complained of, was
sufficient evidence to allow for the submission of a mortality
table. The trial court acknowledged that "the whole transcript
of [Dr. Murray's] deposition [was] admitted for purposes of
this argument" but ultimately did not allow Hicks to admit the
mortality table into evidence, finding that Hicks had not
presented 
sufficient 
evidence 
that 
her 
injuries 
were
permanent. The trial court also prohibited Hicks from
discussing permanent disability in her closing argument.  In
addition, during the charging conference, the trial court,
over Hicks's objection, rejected jury instructions on
permanent injury and mortality tables. 
At the close of the plaintiffs' evidence, Allstate filed
a motion for a partial judgment as a matter of law as to
Hicks's claim against it, arguing  that Hicks had failed to
7
1170589, 1170632
prove that her spinal-fusion surgery was necessitated by the
injuries she 
suffered in the October 2014 automobile accident.
The trial court denied Allstate's motion. Allstate did not
file a postjudgment motion to renew its motion for a partial
judgment as a matter of law.
On February 15, 2018, the jury returned a verdict for
Hicks in the amount of $135,000 and for Yesy in the amount of
$200,000.2  The trial court reduced the judgment against
Allstate and in favor of Hicks to $35,000 because Davis's
insurance company was responsible under its policy with Davis
for the first $100,000 in damages.  
On February 28, 2018, Hicks filed a motion for a new
trial pursuant to Rule 59(a), Ala. R. Civ. P. Hicks argued
that the trial court erroneously determined that Hicks's
injuries were not permanent, that the trial court should have
allowed Hicks to offer a mortality table into evidence, and
that the trial court improperly refused to instruct the jury
on permanent injuries and mortality tables. The trial court
denied the motion on the same day. On March 23, 2018, Hicks
2Alfonso's loss-of-consortium claim had been dismissed.
8
1170589, 1170632
filed a notice of appeal. Allstate timely filed a  cross-
appeal on April 5, 2018.   
Analysis
I. Allstate's Cross-Appeal (No. 1170632)
Because the issues raised by Allstate in its cross-appeal
could be dispositive of Hicks's appeal, we address the cross-
appeal first.  Allstate argues that the trial court's denial
of its motion for a partial judgment as a matter of law on the
issue of causation underlying Hicks's claim is reversible
error because, it asserts, Hicks did not present sufficient
evidence 
showing 
that 
her 
spinal-fusion 
surgery 
was
necessitated by the October 2014 automobile accident. 
We must first determine whether Allstate has preserved
this argument for appellate review.
"Rule 50(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides a specific
procedure for challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence: 
"'....'
"... In accordance with this procedure is the
well-settled rule 'that a motion for a [preverdict
judgment as a matter of law] must be made at the
close of all the evidence and that a timely
post-trial motion for judgment [as a matter of law]
must be subsequently made before an appellate court
may consider on appeal the insufficiency-of-evidence
9
1170589, 1170632
issue directed to the jury's verdict.' Bains v.
Jameson, 507 So. 2d 504, 505 (Ala. 1987); see also
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Sealy, 374 So.
2d 877 (Ala. 1979); Black v. Black, 469 So. 2d 1288
(Ala. 1985); Housing Auth. of the City of Prichard
v. Malloy, 341 So. 2d 708 (Ala. 1977)."
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Harris, 630 So. 2d 1018, 1024-25 (Ala.
1993).  In Clark v. Black, 630 So. 2d 1012, 1016 (1994), this
Court stated that "the unsuccessful movant's failure to
present the trial court with an opportunity to revisit the
sufficiency of the evidence issue in [a postverdict motion for
a judgment as matter of law] precludes appellate reversal of
the denial of the [preverdict motion for a judgment as matter
of law]."  See also Cook's Pest Control, Inc. v. Rebar, 28 So.
3d 716, 723 (Ala. 2009).
Allstate made its motion for a partial judgment as a
matter of law at the close of the plaintiffs' evidence and
before the jury entered its verdict. Allstate, however, did
not make a postjudgment motion for a partial judgment as a
matter of law on the issue of causation. Therefore, Allstate
did not preserve its causation argument for appellate review.
Accordingly, we do not address the merits of Allstate's
argument, and we affirm the trial court's judgment insofar as
10
1170589, 1170632
it denied Allstate's motion for a partial judgment as a matter
of law.
II.  Hicks's Appeal (No. 1170589)
Hicks argues that the trial court erred in refusing to
allow the jury to determine whether Hicks had suffered
permanent injury in computing damages. In particular, Hicks
asserts that she presented evidence demonstrating a permanent
injury and that, as a result, the trial court erred by denying
the admission into evidence of the mortality table and by
refusing to instruct the jury using Hicks's proposed
instructions on the law pertaining to permanent injury and on
the use of mortality tables.
"The decision to grant or deny a motion for new
trial rests within the sound discretion of the trial
court, and the exercise of that discretion will not
be disturbed on appeal unless some legal right was
abused and the record plainly and palpably shows
that the trial court was in error."
Green Tree Acceptance, Inc. v. Standridge, 565 So. 2d 38, 45
(1990) (citing Hill v. Cherry, 379 So. 2d 590 (1980)). 
We first address Hicks's argument that the trial court
erred by excluding the mortality table from evidence because,
she argues, the trial court incorrectly determined that Hicks
had not presented sufficient evidence or testimony from her
11
1170589, 1170632
treating physicians to indicate that her injuries were
permanent. "'"It has been held that where there is nothing
from which a layman can form any well-grounded opinion as to
the permanency of the injury or where the injury is purely
subjective, expert evidence must be introduced. 25A C.J.S.
Damages § 162(9), at 110 (1966)."'" Skerlick v. Gainey, 42 So.
3d 1288, 1290 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010) (quoting Flowers Hosp.,
Inc. v. Arnold, 638 So. 2d 851, 852 (Ala. 1994), quoting in
turn Jones v. Fortner, 507 So. 2d 908, 910 (Ala. 1987)). 
Further, "[t]his court has held that where there is evidence
from which there is a reasonable inference that a plaintiff's
injuries are permanent, the mortality tables are admissible."
Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Steel, 257 Ala. 474, 481, 59
So. 2d 664, 669 (1952) (citing Southern Ry. v. Cunningham, 152
Ala. 147, 44 So. 658 (1907)). 
At trial, Hicks offered deposition testimony from Dr.
Vennam and Dr. Murray showing the extent of the injuries she
suffered as a consequence of the automobile accident. Dr.
Murray 
testified in 
detail 
regarding 
the 
spinal-fusion 
surgery
he performed on Hicks following the accident.  Although Dr.
Murray did not specifically mention the words "permanent
12
1170589, 1170632
injury," he testified that the hardware inserted during the
surgery –- screws, rods, and "spacers" between Hicks's
vertebrae -- is likely to remain permanently in Hicks's body.
He testified that, as a result of the surgery, the spinal
bones that were involved in the operation no longer bend,
which adds stress to the joints above those bones. When asked
about the effect that the surgery he performed on Hicks in
2009 could have on the development of her spondylolisthesis,
Dr. Murray responded: "[W]hen you operate on anyone, even the
smallest operation, you do not strengthen the spine. In fact,
you take a little bit of strength away from the spine."  He
testified that Hicks had a "10 to 15 percent chance of
developing adjacent level significant disease." Finally, Dr.
Murray testified that he was certain that there would be an
impairment rating associated with the surgery he performed on
Hicks. Hicks further testified that she had surgical scars on
her body as a result of the 2016 surgery. See Ozment v.
Wilkerson, 646 So. 2d 4, 6 (Ala. 1994)("[T]he jury could
reasonably have concluded that the [plaintiff's] scar
constituted a permanent injury. Therefore, the court did not
err in admitting the mortality tables.").
13
1170589, 1170632
Allstate did not offer any evidence at trial to refute
the testimony of Dr. Murray or to challenge his testimony as
to the extent of Hicks's injuries. Allstate simply argued that
Hicks had failed to present sufficient evidence that her
injuries were permanent and that they were caused by the
October 2014 automobile accident to allow for the submission
into evidence of a mortality table. 
Dr. Murray's medical testimony about the permanent
hardware remaining in Hicks's body, Hick's permanently
hindered mobility as a result of the spinal-fusion surgery,
and the inherent damage that generally occurs as a result of
any surgical procedure on the spine, combined with Hicks's
testimony about 
the 
permanent 
external 
scarring 
resulting from
the surgery, provided evidence from which a jury could
reasonably infer that Hicks suffered permanent injuries.
Accordingly, the trial court exceeded its discretion in
refusing to admit into evidence the mortality table offered by
Hicks as an aid for the jury in determining damages.
"In reviewing a ruling on the admissibility of
evidence, ... the standard is whether the trial
court exceeded its discretion in excluding the
evidence. In Bowers v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 827
So. 2d 63, 71 (Ala. 2001), this Court stated: 'When
evidentiary rulings of the trial court are reviewed
14
1170589, 1170632
on appeal, "rulings on the admissibility of evidence
are within the sound discretion of the trial judge
and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse
of that discretion."'" 
Swanstrom v. Teledyne Cont'l Motors, Inc., 43 So. 3d 564, 574
(Ala. 2009) (quoting Bama's Best Party Sales, Inc. v.
Tupperware, U.S., Inc., 723 So. 2d 29, 32 (Ala. 1998)). 
The only issue for the jury to determine in this case was
the amount of damages to which Hicks was entitled, and the
mortality table can be used by the jury as an aid in
determining permanent damages.3 By refusing to allow the jury
to consider the mortality table, the trial court hindered the
jury's ability to determine the appropriate amount of damages
to which Hicks was entitled in a trial in which the only issue
was the amount of damages. Because the trial court erroneously
determined that the mortality table could not be admitted into
evidence, the trial court's denial of Hicks's motion for a new
trial is due to be reversed.  Because of our holding on this
issue, we pretermit discussion of Hicks's other argument in
3See Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Smelley,
295 Ala. 346, 349, 329 So. 2d 544, 546 (1976) ("If the
[mortality] tables are admitted, they may be used by the jury
to determine the plaintiff's impaired or diminished earning
capacity." (citing Alabama Great Southern Ry. 
v. 
Gambrell, 262
Ala. 290, 78 So. 2d 619 (1955))).
15
1170589, 1170632
support of her request for a new trial, namely that the trial
court erred by not giving the requested jury instructions on
permanent injuries and on the use of mortality tables. 
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's order
denying Hicks's motion for a new trial is reversed, and the
cause is remanded to the trial court for a new trial. Because
Allstate did not properly preserve for appellate review its
motion for a partial judgment as a matter of law of the issue
of causation underlying Hicks's claim, the trial court's
denial of that motion is affirmed.
1170589 –- REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Parker, C.J., and Wise, J., concur. 
Bolin and Sellers, JJ., concur in the result.
1170632 -– AFFIRMED.
Parker, C.J., and Bolin and Wise, JJ., concur.
Sellers, J., concurs in the result.
16