Title: State ex rel. MoGas Pipeline, LLC v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC91968
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: April 17, 2012

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
STATE OF MISSOURI EX REL. 
 
) 
MOGAS PIPELINE LLC, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Respondent,  
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
vs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC91968 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE 
 
 
) 
COMMISSION, 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cole County 
Honorable Gael D. Wood, Judge 
 
Opinion issued April 17, 2012 
 
MoGas Pipeline, LLC, seeks review of the Missouri Public Service Commission’s 
(PSC) order denying MoGas’ request that the PSC terminate its intervention in matters 
pending before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).  Because this Court 
finds that the PSC has no authority to intervene as a party in proceedings before the 
FERC, this Court affirms, as modified, the circuit court’s judgment that the PSC’s order 
was unlawful. 
I. 
 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
MoGas operates an interstate natural gas pipeline delivering natural gas to 
customers in Missouri.  The company was organized formally in 2008 after the FERC 
approved the merger of three affiliated gas pipeline systems.  Prior to the merger, two of 
MoGas’ predecessors, Missouri Gas Company, LLC, and Missouri Pipeline Company, 
LLC, operated pipelines only in Missouri; therefore, they were subject to the jurisdiction 
of the PSC.  MoGas’ third predecessor company, Missouri Interstate Gas, LLC, operated 
an interstate natural gas pipeline and, pursuant to the federally enacted Natural Gas Act, 
was subject to the jurisdiction of the FERC.1   See Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 
485 U.S. 293, 300-01 (1988) (“The [Natural Gas Act] confers upon FERC exclusive 
jurisdiction over the transportation and sale of natural gas in interstate commerce for 
resale.”).  Because the merger created a single natural gas pipeline system with interstate 
operations, MoGas’ entire system became subject to FERC’s jurisdiction in 2008. 
Throughout 2007 and 2008,2 MoGas submitted various petitions to the FERC for 
approval including, as relevant here, proposals to construct and operate new compression 
facilities on its systems and to modify its gas tariffs.  In both instances, the PSC 
intervened as a party in the related FERC proceedings to protest MoGas’ proposals.  In 
September 2008,3 MoGas filed a petition with the PSC alleging that the PSC did not have 
authority to intervene in matters before the FERC.  As such, the petition requested that 
                                             
 
1 The company’s formation commenced in 2006, when MoGas’ three predecessor 
companies filed a joint petition with the FERC to consolidate their operations.  See 
Missouri Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Missouri Interstate Gas, LLC, 266 S.W.3d 881, 883 (Mo. 
App. 2008).  The FERC authorized the merger effective June 1, 2008.  Id. at 885. 
2 Though the FERC did not issue its formal approval of MoGas’ formation until 2008, 
FERC procedures allow it to review petitions regarding a pipeline’s proposed operations 
prior to the time its formation officially is authorized. 
3 MoGas’ original petition, filed in September 2008, was supplemented twice and 
amended once.  The amendment, filed February 5, 2009, incorporated all previous filings.  
For convenience, these various submissions are referred to collectively as “the petition.” 
the PSC terminate its intervention in FERC cases concerning MoGas’ operations.  The 
PSC denied MoGas’ petition by an order issued in July 2009. 
After the PSC denied MoGas’ subsequent application for a rehearing, MoGas filed 
a petition for writ of review in the circuit court of Cole County.  In March 2010, the 
circuit court entered judgment holding the PSC’s July 2009 order unlawful.  The court 
reversed the order and remanded the cause to the PSC for further action.  The PSC 
appeals the circuit court’s judgment. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
“This Court reviews the decision of the PSC rather than that of the circuit court.”  
State ex rel. Praxair, Inc. v. Missouri Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 344 S.W.3d 178, 184 (Mo. 
banc 2011).  “[T]he appellate standard of review of a PSC order is two-pronged: ‘first, 
the reviewing court must determine whether the PSC’s order is lawful; and second, the 
court must determine whether the order is reasonable.’”  State ex rel. AG Processing, Inc. 
v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 120 S.W.3d 732, 734 (Mo. banc 2003), quoting State ex rel. Atmos 
Energy Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 103 S.W.3d 753, 759 (Mo. banc 2003).   
“The lawfulness of a PSC order is determined by whether statutory authority for 
its issuance exists, and all legal issues are reviewed de novo.”  AG Processing, Inc., 120 
S.W.3d at 734.  A PSC order is reasonable “‘where the order is supported by substantial, 
competent evidence on the whole record; the decision is not arbitrary or capricious[;] or 
where the [PSC] has not abused its discretion.’”  Praxair, Inc., 344 S.W.3d at 184, 
quoting Envtl. Utils., LLC v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 219 S.W.3d 256, 265 (Mo. App. 2007).  
This Court need not reach the issue of an order’s reasonableness if it finds the order 
 
3
unlawful.  See State ex rel. Util. Consumers’ Council of Missouri, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n, 585 S.W.2d 41, 47 (Mo. banc 1979). 
III. 
THE PSC’S ORDER WAS UNLAWFUL 
A. 
The PSC’s Authority is Limited to that Granted It by the Legislature 
and Not Preempted by Congress 
 
The PSC “is a creature of statute and can function only in accordance with” its 
enabling statutes.  State ex rel. Monsanto Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 716 S.W.2d 791, 796 
(Mo. banc 1986).  Its “powers are limited to those conferred by … statutes, either 
expressly, or by clear implication as necessary to carry out the powers specifically 
granted.”  Util. Consumers’ Council of Missouri, Inc., 585 S.W.2d at 49; see also             
§ 386.0404 (creating the PSC and vesting it with “the powers and duties … specified, and 
also all powers necessary or proper to enable it to carry out fully and effectually all the 
purposes” of its governing statutes).   If a power is not granted to the PSC by Missouri 
statute, then the PSC does not have that power. 
Though section 386.610 provides that statutes pertaining to the PSC “shall be 
liberally construed with a view to the public welfare,” this provision does not authorize 
the Court to vest the PSC with authority that the legislature has not granted it either 
expressly or by clear implication.  Cf. Reichert v. Bd. of Educ. of City of St. Louis, 217 
S.W.3d 301, 305 (Mo. banc 2007) (“[T]he Court has no authority to read into a statute 
legislative intent contrary to the intent made evident by the plain language.”). 
 
                                             
 
4 All statutory references are to RSMo 2000 unless otherwise noted. 
 
4
The powers and duties of the PSC are set forth principally in chapter 386.  As 
pertains to natural gas, section 386.250 extends the PSC’s jurisdiction “[t]o the 
manufacture, sale or distribution of gas, natural and artificial … within the state, and to 
persons or corporations owning leasing, operating or controlling the same; and to gas and 
electric plants, and to persons or corporations owning, leasing, operating or controlling 
the same.”  § 386.250(1) (emphasis added).   
As the Missouri legislature has recognized in section 386.030, those powers 
granted to the PSC by Missouri statute are limited by the doctrine of preemption as to 
matters affecting interstate commerce.5  Congress has preempted regulation of interstate 
gas pipelines by providing authority for such regulation to the FERC pursuant to the 
Natural Gas Act.  See 15 U.S.C. § 717; Schneidewind, 485 U.S. at 300-01.  As noted 
earlier, all parties agree that MoGas is an interstate gas pipeline subject to regulation by 
the FERC.  Therefore, the PSC has authority to act as to MoGas only (1) as it specifically 
is granted such authority by Missouri statute and (2) as permitted by FERC regulations 
and other federal law.  
B. 
The Missouri Legislature Has Neither Expressly Nor by Clear 
Implication Authorized the PSC to Intervene in FERC Proceedings 
 
Though the PSC alleges that several provisions within both state and federal law 
can be interpreted to vest the PSC with authority to intervene in FERC proceedings, for 
                                             
 
5 Section 386.030 states: 
 
Neither this chapter, nor any provision of this chapter, except when 
specifically so stated, shall apply to or be construed to apply to commerce 
with foreign nations or commerce among the several states of this union, 
except insofar as the same may be permitted under the provisions of the 
Constitution of the United States and the acts of Congress. 
 
5
the reasons detailed below, the PCS’s arguments are unavailing. 
1. 
Section 386.210.1 
First, the PSC cites section 386.210.1,6 which states: 
The [PSC] may confer in person, or by correspondence, by attending 
conventions, or in any other way, with the members of the public, any 
public utility or similar commission of this and other states and the United 
States of America, or any official, agency or instrumentality thereof, on any 
matter relating to the performance of its duties. 
 
(emphases added).  The PSC asserts that because section 386.210.1 authorizes the PSC to 
confer with other similar commissions, this means that it can intervene in matters before 
the FERC because: (1) the FERC is a commission of the United States that is similar to 
the PSC and (2) intervention in FERC proceedings is “[an]other way” by which the PSC 
may “confer” with the FERC.   
 
The PSC’s argument depends entirely on interpreting the word “confer” to include 
intervention by the PSC as a party in a regulatory proceeding of another state or the 
federal government.  The PSC cites no published case or other direct authority of any 
kind in support of this interpretation of the word “confer.”  Indeed, it concedes that this is 
a matter of first impression and that were this Court to interpret the PSC’s authority to 
confer with other commissions to include the power to intervene, it would be the first 
court to do so.   
The PSC nonetheless says that this Court should find intervention as a party in a 
federal regulatory proceeding is a form of “conferring” with that federal regulatory body 
because some other state public utility commissions also intervene with no more 
                                             
 
6 All references related to section 386.210 are to RSMo Supp. 2003. 
 
6
authority than this and, so, the PSC also should be permitted to do so.    
But the PSC admits that the authority of these other commissions to intervene has 
not been challenged, just as the authority of Missouri’s PSC to do so was not challenged 
until the instant case, nor has the PSC cited any governing authority from other state 
commissions specifically interpreting the word “confer” to encompass intervention as a 
party in FERC proceedings.  The PSC’s power and authority proceeds from Missouri 
statutes.  While a review of the reasoning of other states in permitting such intervention 
would have been informative had there been any such cases, there are none, and the 
unchallenged conduct of other state regulatory agencies provides no authority for the PSC 
to act beyond its statutory powers.  This Court, therefore, turns to the words of the PSC’s 
governing statutes, for it is this Court’s duty to ascertain the intent of the Missouri 
legislature from the language it used in drafting section 386.210.1.  See State ex rel. 
Nixon v. Karpierz, 105 S.W.3d 487, 489-90 (Mo. banc 2003). 
In considering whether the word “confer” as used in section 386.210.1 includes 
the right to intervene, the Court notes that the word is not defined in chapter 386.  
Accordingly, this Court begins with the well-established principle that “[i]n the absence 
of a statutory definition, words will be given their plain and ordinary meaning as derived 
from the dictionary.”  State v. Oliver, 293 S.W.3d 437, 446 (Mo. banc 2009).   
The verb “confer” means to contribute, to compare, or “to hold conversation or 
conference … typically on important, difficult, or complex matters.”  Webster’s Third 
New International Dictionary 475 (1993).  None of these terms encompass or overlap the 
meaning of the term “intervene,” which means “to become a party to an action or other 
 
7
legal proceeding begun by others for the protection of an alleged interest.”  Id. at 1183.  
“Intervention” is a legal term, however, so review of the meaning of “confer” and 
“intervene” in legal dictionaries might be expected to be more helpful.  Black’s Law 
Dictionary does not define the word “confer” but defines “intervene” as “[t]he entry into 
a lawsuit by a third party who, despite not being named a party to the action, has a 
personal stake in the outcome.”  Id. at 897 (9th ed. 2009).   Other legal dictionaries draw 
a clear distinction between the terms “confer” and “intervene.”  See, e.g., W. Statsky, 
West’s Legal Thesaurus/Dictionary 168, 424 (1986) (defining “confer” as “to consult” 
and “intervene” as “interfere” or “encroach”). 
Synonyms of “confer” have been expressed variously as “[c]ompare notes, 
discuss, deliberate, discourse, talk, talk over, consult, palaver, confide, parley, advise 
counsel, negotiate,” West’s Legal Thesaurus/Dictionary at 168, and as to advise, compare 
opinions, consult with, interchange views and talk over.  W. Burton, Legal Thesaurus 98 
(1980).  The synonyms of “intervene” are “become a party to an action,” “intercede” and 
“step in.”  Id. at 294.  As is evident, the term “confer” does not include within its 
definition or its synonyms the word “intervene” or any similar concept, and visa versa.   
Moreover, section 386.210 itself indicates that it uses the term “confer” in the 
sense of “communicate,” for section 386.210.2 refers collectively to the various ways of 
conferring with the public or other commissions permitted in section 386.210.1 as 
“communications.”7  “Communication” is “the act or action of imparting or transmitting” 
                                             
 
7 Sections 386.210.3 and 386.210.4 also use the term “communication” to describe the 
interaction permitted by section 386.210.1. 
 
8
and the “interchange of thoughts or opinions.”  Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary 460 (1993); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 316 (9th ed. 2009) (defining 
“communication” as an “expression or exchange of information by speech, writing, 
gestures, or conduct”).   
Nowhere in these definitions is there support for the PSC’s view that in permitting 
the commission to “confer” or “communicate” with the FERC, section 386.210.1 
expressly or by clear implication authorizes the PSC to intervene as a party in FERC 
proceedings.  Intervening parties do more than communicate, converse, discuss, consult 
or engage in an interchange of opinions about pending proceedings.  Rather, intervenors 
exercise control over litigation by engaging in oral arguments, presenting evidence and 
cross-examining witnesses.  Matter of Additional Magistrates for St. Louis Cnty., 580 
S.W.2d 288, 293-94 (Mo. banc 1979).  Indeed, the PSC admits that the very reason it 
intervenes in FERC proceedings is to reap the benefits of being an intervening party. 
Parties who appear at oral argument or who file briefs are not “conferring” with 
the court.  One who seeks to intervene before the FERC in order to file a brief or to 
engage in oral argument is not “conferring” with the FERC in any normal sense of the 
word.  It is seeking affirmative relief; it is obtaining a stake in the controversy.  If the 
PSC simply wishes to communicate its views to the FERC, it would do so not as a party, 
but as an interested body, in a role akin to amicus curiae.  But the PSC wants to do more 
than this; it wishes the benefit of being a party because it believes this would be 
beneficial to Missouri consumers.  To the extent this is true, the PSC should apply to the 
legislature for authority to intervene in FERC proceedings – and indeed, the parties 
 
9
indicate that it is in the course of seeking such express authority.   
Because “confer” carries none of the connotations of power and control associated 
with intervention, the right to confer with the FERC given the PSC by section 386.210.1, 
cannot reasonably be construed to include intervention.  In the absence of such authority, 
section 386.210.1 can be read only to authorize the PSC to “confer” with commissions 
similar to the FERC by contributing its opinion “for the purpose of assisting the 
[commissions] in cases of general public interest.”  3B C.J.S. Amicus Curiae § 1 (2003).  
Just as an amicus is not made a party simply by virtue of the fact that it has information 
that may be useful to the proceedings, the PSC may not assume the role of an intervening 
party merely because the legislature has authorized it to “confer” with the FERC. 
2. 
Section 386.210.7 
The PSC asserts that even if section 386.210.1 does not vest the commission with 
the right to intervene in FERC actions, such authorization can be found in its authority to 
engage in joint investigations with other public utility commissions under section 
386.210.7, which provides, in pertinent part: 
The [PSC] may make joint investigations, hold joint hearings within or 
without the state, and issue joint or concurrent orders in conjunction or 
concurrence with any railroad, public utility or similar commission, of other 
states or the United States of America, or any official, agency or any 
instrumentality thereof…. 
 
The PSC’s argument ignores the distinction between being a party to an action and 
being the adjudicator of that action.  Implicit in the use of the word “joint” is that the PSC 
must be acting in concert with its counterpart commission in conducting these 
investigations or hearings.  See Black’s Law Dictionary 913 (9th ed. 2009) (defining 
 
10
“joint” as “combined, united, or sharing with another”); W. Statsky, West’s Legal 
Thesaurus/Dictionary 436 (1986) (defining “joint” as “[s]hared by or between two or 
more” and listing as synonyms the words “collaborative, combined, concerted, common, 
acting in common, allied, united”). 
When the PSC intervenes in a FERC proceeding, it does not intervene as a second 
judge, sitting with the FERC and ruling on matters presented by the parties.  It intervenes 
as a party in the proceedings.  As an intervenor, the PSC functions as an interested 
litigant rather than as a neutral adjudicator.  
A party and a judge do not “jointly” investigate or hold hearings, any more than a 
party appearing at oral argument in this Court is holding a hearing “jointly” with this 
Court.  The party appears at a hearing and presents a case, which the court adjudicates.  
Similarly, while section 386.210.7 clearly authorizes the PSC to investigate matters or 
hold hearings jointly with the FERC or other regulatory agencies, the conduct at issue 
here was not the holding of a joint investigation or hearing but an attempt to become an 
additional party to a regulatory hearing before the FERC.  Nothing in section 386.210.7 
authorizes the PSC to assume such a role.8 
 
                                             
 
8 While the PSC again supports its position by noting that several state commissions 
intervene in matters before the FERC on the basis of authority no greater than statutes 
similar to section 386.210.7 that permit them to conduct joint investigations or hearings, 
see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-2-115; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 26,  § 214; IDAHO CODE ANN. 
§ 61-505, the PSC again cites no case interpreting a similar statute to authorize 
intervention as a party or holding that a party and a judge in a suit are “jointly 
investigating” or holding a “joint hearing.”  Rather, it again concedes that this Court 
would be the first to authorize such conduct under a statute permitting joint investigations 
and hearings.  This Court declines to so hold. 
 
11
3. 
 Sections 386.120.4 and 386.071 
In the absence of any other statutory provision granting the PSC power to 
intervene in matters before the FERC, the PSC suggests that the fact that it has the 
authority to “sue and be sued in its official name,” see § 386.120.4, and the fact that 
section 386.071 authorizes the PSC’s general counsel to intervene in proceedings 
involving any question under chapter 386 “if directed to do so by the commission”9 
empowers the commission to intervene in FERC matters as well. 
The PSC’s argument fails to acknowledge that it cannot direct its general counsel 
to engage in an activity the legislature has not authorized the PSC itself to undertake.  
Stated differently, the general counsel’s authority under section 386.071 can extend no 
further than the PSC’s own power.  Section 386.071 expressly states that the PSC’s 
general counsel may only “prosecute in the name of the state” when “authorized by law.”  
§ 386.071 (emphasis added).  Chapter 386 authorizes the PSC to bring actions concerning 
utilities subject to its jurisdiction, and its general counsel may intervene in actions 
involving questions related to that chapter.  See, e.g., McBride & Son Builders, Inc. v. 
                                             
 
9 Section 386.071 provides, as pertinent: 
The [PSC] may appoint … a general counsel to serve at the pleasure of the 
commission …. It shall be the duty of the general counsel for the 
commission to represent and appear for the commission in all actions and 
proceedings involving any question under this or any other law, or under or 
in reference to any act, order, decision or proceeding of the commission, 
and if directed to do so by the commission, to intervene, if possible, in any 
action or proceeding in which any such question is involved; to commence 
and prosecute in the name of the state all actions and proceedings, 
authorized by law and directed or authorized by the commission, and to 
expedite in every way possible, to final determination all such actions and 
proceedings …. 
 
12
Union Elec. Co., 526 S.W.2d 310 (Mo. 1975) (the PSC intervened in a suit because it had 
issued an order prohibiting a utility company from making certain payments plaintiff 
claimed it had a right to receive from defendant).  Were chapter 386 to contain a 
provision authorizing the PSC to intervene in proceedings before the FERC, the PSC 
would be correct in asserting that section 386.071 then would permit the commission’s 
general counsel to intervene on the PSC’s behalf in that forum also.  But, in merely 
specifying the authority of the PSC’s general counsel, section 386.071 in no way expands 
the PSC’s powers beyond those set forth in the remaining sections of chapter 386.  As 
noted, no provision within chapter 386 vests the PSC with authority to intervene in FERC 
proceedings. 
IV. 
FEDERAL LAW 
Finally, the PSC notes that 18 C.F.R. § 385.214(a)(2) of the FERC regulations 
permits state public utility commissions to intervene in FERC matters. It provides that 
“[a]ny State Commission … is a party to any [FERC] proceeding upon filing a notice of 
intervention in that proceeding, if the notice is filed” timely.  This provision is necessary 
for intervention to be allowed for those states that have statutes permitting such 
intervention, of course, as in the absence of such a provision, preemption would prohibit 
it.  See 15 U.S.C. § 717.10  But the FERC does not and cannot give Missouri’s regulatory 
                                             
 
10 Indeed, on the basis of 18 C.F.R. § 385.214(a)(2), several state legislatures have 
enacted statutes permitting state public service commissions to intervene in FERC 
proceedings.  See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16-2a; OR. REV. STAT. § 756.040.  Importantly, 
though the PSC previously has sought such authority, the Missouri legislature thus far has 
declined to similarly permit it to intervene in FERC matters.  See S.B. 897 and H.B. 2095, 
95th Gen. Assem. (2010) (constituting a failed attempt to enact legislation that would 
 
13
 
14
                                                                                                                                                 
agency power that it has not been granted by Missouri’s legislature.  Federal permission 
to intervene is not equivalent to authority to intervene.  Rather, as explained above, the 
Missouri legislature also must grant the PSC the right to intervene.  Accordingly, the PSC 
erred in denying MoGas’ request that it terminate its intervention in FERC proceedings. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, this Court holds that the PSC has no authority to 
intervene in matters pending before the FERC.  Finding that no remand to the PSC is 
necessary, this Court modifies the circuit court’s judgment, pursuant to Rule 84.14, to 
eliminate that requirement.  As modified in this manner, the circuit court’s judgment is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________  
 
 
 
 
LAURA DENVIR STITH, JUDGE 
 
 
Breckenridge and Fischer, JJ., and  
Page, Sp.J., concur; DeMarce, Sp.J.,  
dissents in separate opinion filed:  
Teitelman, C.J., and Draper, J., concur  
in opinion of DeMarce, Sp.J.; Russell and  
Price, JJ., not participating. 
 
 
have given the PSC authority to “appear and participate in any federal or state 
administrative, regulatory, or judicial proceeding”); Osterloh’s Estate v. Carpenter, 337 
S.W.2d 942, 946 (Mo. 1960) (“[This Court] may take notice of … attempts to enact 
legislation.”). 
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
STATE OF MISSOURI EX REL. 
 
) 
MOGAS PIPELINE LLC, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
Respondent,  
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
vs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC91968 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE 
 
 
) 
COMMISSION, 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
DISSENTING OPINION 
 
Because the principal opinion denies the Public Service Commission the 
full range of action contemplated by section 386.210.11 in selecting its methods 
for communicating its concerns, as to matters within its lawful sphere of activity, 
to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, I respectfully dissent.2 
The principal opinion correctly finds this to be a case of first impression, 
presenting a question of statutory interpretation.  Further, the principal opinion 
rightly concludes that sections 386.210.7, 386.120.4, and 386.071, on their own, 
                                                 
1 All statutory references are to RSMo 2000 unless otherwise noted. 
2 This Court transferred this case after an opinion by the Missouri Court of 
Appeals, authored by the Honorable Joseph M. Ellis.  Mo. Const. article V, section 
10.  Portions of the court of appeals opinion are incorporated without further 
attribution. 
 
1
do not provide authority to support the PSC’s intervention in FERC proceedings.  
However, I cannot join in the conclusion that section 386.210.1 is too narrow in its 
scope to grant the authority claimed by the PSC to intervene in proceedings before 
the FERC.    
Section 386.610 requires that statutes pertaining to the PSC “shall be 
liberally construed with a view to the public welfare, efficient facilities and 
substantial justice between patrons and public utilities.”  The PSC’s powers “are 
limited to those conferred by … statutes, either expressly, or by clear implication 
as necessary to carry out the powers specifically granted.”  State ex rel. Utility 
Consumers’ Council of Missouri, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 585 S.W.2d 41, 49 
(Mo. banc 1979).  However, the “interpretation and construction of a statute by an 
agency charged with its administration is entitled to great weight.”  State ex rel. 
Sprint Missouri, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 165 S.W.3d 160, 164 (Mo. banc 
2005). 
Sections 386.210 through 386.380 address the powers and duties of the 
PSC. Section 386.210.1 provides that the PSC “may confer in person, by 
correspondence, by attending conventions, or in any other way, with ... any public 
utility or similar commission of this and other states and the United States of 
America, or any official, agency or instrumentality thereof, on any matter relating 
to the performance of its duties.” (emphasis added).  Section 386.210.2 states that 
“[s]uch communication may address any issue that at the time of such 
communication is not the subject of a case that has been filed with the [PSC].”  
 
2
The subject of MoGas’ tariff is not the subject of any case before the PSC.  As 
such, the PSC clearly is empowered to communicate with the FERC in any way 
about any matter related to the performance of its duties. 
In reaching the conclusion that section 386.210.1 does not grant the PSC 
authority to intervene in proceedings before the FERC, the principal opinion notes 
that “the verb ‘confer’ means to contribute, to compare, or ‘to hold conversation or 
conference … typically on important, difficult, or complex matters.”  Slip op. at 7.   
This analysis follows: 
“Moreover, section 386.210 itself indicates that it uses the term 
‘confer’ in the sense of ‘communicate,’ for section 386.210 refers 
collectively to the various ways of conferring with the public or 
other 
commissions 
permitted 
in 
section 
386.210.1 
as 
‘communications.’  ‘Communication’ is ‘the act of imparting or 
transmitting’ and the ‘interchange of thoughts or opinions.’  
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 460 (1993); see 
also Black’s Law Dictionary 316 (9th ed. 2009) (defining 
‘communication’ as an ‘expression or exchange of information 
by speech, writing, gestures, or conduct’).”   
 
Id. at 8-9.  Further, in footnote 7, the principal opinion recognizes, “Sections 
386.210.3 and 386.210.4 also use the term ‘communication’ to describe the 
interaction permitted by section 386.210.1.” 
 
Having set forth the very broad definition of “communication” found in 
Webster’s and Black’s, the principal opinion then proceeds effectively to narrow 
that definition by concluding that intervention as a party in litigation is not a form 
of “communication,” stating:  “Intervening parties do more than communicate, 
converse, discuss, consult, or engage in an interchange of opinions about pending 
 
3
proceedings.  Rather, intervenors exercise control over litigation by engaging in 
oral arguments, presenting evidence, and cross-examining witnesses.”  Slip op. at 
9.  The opinion concludes that these activities do not constitute “conferring” with a 
court, but rather “seeking affirmative relief … [and] obtaining a stake in the 
controversy.”  Id. 
 
The principal opinion thereby confuses the purpose of communication with 
the forms that communication may take.  Obviously, the purpose of intervention is 
to persuade, or at least to influence, the decision-maker, in the hope of making a 
difference as to the outcome of the case.  This does not make intervention any less 
a form of communication, since persuasion is often a primary goal of any attempt 
to communicate.  The various activities associated with intervention -- filing 
pleadings and motions, presenting evidence, examining witnesses, engaging in 
oral argument, submitting briefs -- are all designed and calculated to impart 
information, data, and opinions to the adjudicator.  This goes to the very heart of 
the Webster’s and Black’s definitions of “communication” relied upon by the 
principal opinion. 
Moreover, intervention is the precise form of “communication” that the 
intended recipient, the FERC, expects and invites from a state utility regulator 
such as the PSC, with regard to a formal contested proceeding.  See 18 C.F.R.  
§ 385.102(b) and (c) (defining “party” and “participant” in such a proceeding);  
18 C.F.R. § 385.214(a)(2) (contemplating intervention by state commissions in 
such proceedings).  This approach is altogether consistent with the FERC’s 
 
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concern to limit inappropriate “off the record” communications, much as our 
courts forbid inappropriate ex parte communications.  18 C.F.R. § 385.2201;  
cf. Rule 2-2.9.  The mere fact that the FERC has chosen to permit other defined 
forms of communication from or with state commissions, such as “protests,” 18 
C.F.R. § 385.211, and “conferences,” 18 C.F.R. § 385.1303, does not suggest that 
intervention, with all the specific activities embraced therein, may not also be a 
valid form of “communication.”   
 
The verb “confer,” and the related noun “conference,” often connote a very 
formal setting, in which detailed notes or minutes may be kept, or a verbatim 
record made.  In the context of formal adjudication, it may not be the most 
common usage to suggest that parties to a proceeding are “conferring” with the 
decision-maker.  Yet one readily may point to exceptions.  When attorneys 
approach the court during trial to discuss an issue of law, procedure, or evidence, 
it commonly is referred to as a “bench conference.”  When attorneys meet with the 
court to finalize the instructions to be given to a jury, it commonly is referred to as 
an “instruction conference.”  These examples serve only to demonstrate further 
that having the opportunity to “confer” -- to communicate -- with the adjudicator 
is intrinsically part and parcel of any participation in litigation.  Not only is 
intervention in an administrative or adjudicatory proceeding a form of 
“communication,” but it is also the most clearly recognized and most acceptable 
form of holding “conversation or conference” on the “important, difficult, or 
 
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complex matters” that may come before the FERC.  Intervention falls squarely 
within the definition of “confer” first cited in the principal opinion. 
Thus, while section 386.210.1 does not explicitly grant the PSC the 
authority to assume the position of a party to a hearing before a federal regulatory 
commission such as the FERC, when construed with a view to the public welfare, 
the authority of the PSC to participate in such a manner clearly is implied. 
Certainly, the PSC’s participation in the action would appear to be the most 
expedient way for the PSC to communicate its concerns in the matter to the FERC. 
 
To draw the conclusion set forth in the principal opinion is to place an 
unwarranted gloss on section 386.210.1, rendering it in effect to provide that the 
PSC “may confer [with the FERC] in person, by correspondence, by attending 
conventions, or in any other way, except in the one way most likely to prove 
efficacious in sharing the PSC’s data, information, expertise, and opinions in the 
context of a formal administrative proceeding before the FERC.”  The statute does 
not so limit the authority of the PSC.   
Section 386.510 requires the reviewing court to determine whether the 
PSC’s order is lawful and, if so, whether the order is reasonable.  State ex rel. 
Praxair, Inc. v. Missouri Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 344 S.W.3d 178, 184 (Mo. banc 
2011).  Having concluded the PSC’s order was lawful, I likewise would find the 
order was reasonable.  “Missouri courts have long recognized that when the 
decision involves the exercise of regulatory discretion, the PSC is delegated a 
large amount of discretion, and many of its decisions necessarily rest largely in the 
 
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exercise of a sound judgment.” State ex rel. Sprint Missouri, Inc., 165 S.W.3d at 
164 (internal citation omitted).   
Here, the PSC’s order upholding its authority to intervene in the FERC 
proceedings concerning MoGas was reasonable in that the PSC was presenting 
evidence to enable the FERC to make a more informed decision regarding rates 
and related matters.  Therefore, I would affirm the order of the PSC and permit the 
PSC to continue to intervene in matters before the FERC relating to MoGas and 
others. 
 
_________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      KARL DEMARCE, SPECIAL JUDGE