Title: Alliance Mutual Casualty Co. v. Bailey
Citation: 191 Kan. 192, 380 P.2d 413
Docket Number: 43,049
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: April 6, 1963

191 Kan. 192 (1963)
380 P.2d 413
ALLIANCE MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY, Appellee,
v.
CLAYTON BAILEY, RAYMOND A. WHITEBREAD, BILLY L. SPILLMAN, and ROBERT LIGGETT, Appellants.
No. 43,049

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed April 6, 1963.
George V. Allen, of Lawrence, argued the cause and was on the briefs for appellant Billy Spillman.
Kermit Beal, of Lawrence, was on the briefs for appellant Raymond A. Whitebread.
L.M. Ascough; John A. Bausch; E. Edward Johnson, and Elwaine Pomeroy, all of Topeka, were on the briefs for appellant Clayton Bailey.
Harold E. Doherty, of Topeka, argued the cause, and James E. Benfer, of Topeka, was with him on the briefs for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PARKER, C.J.:
The plaintiff, Alliance Mutual Casualty Company, commenced this action for a declaratory judgment, under the provisions of G.S. 1949, 60-3127, against its insured, Raymond A. *193 Whitebread, and other defendants who had claims against the insured as the result of an automobile collision, seeking an adjudication that the insurance policy in question had expired before the collision occurred.
The extensive pleadings, which disclose the conflicting contentions as to the nature of the controversy and the conflicting theories as to how the contentions arose may be summarized as follows:
The petition sets out the names and addresses of the parties and then alleges:
The petition further denied that there was any liability on the part of the plaintiff to defend the claims or answer in damages to the defendants, and that because of the various claims of the parties an actual controversy existed between them; and then prayed for a declaratory judgment adjudging that the plaintiff was not obligated under its policy to defend or answer in damages to the defendants or any of them.
The defendant, Robert Liggett, neither appeared nor answered the petition. The other three defendants (Whitebread, Bailey and Spillman) filed answers and cross-petitions.
Spillman filed an answer which in effect admitted all of the allegations of the petition except the allegation that the insurance policy had expired on November 5, 1959. The answer admitted that "this *194 is one of those cases mentioned in G.S. 1949, 60-3127, providing for declaratory judgment where an actual controversy exists between the parties." The prayer of the answer asked for a declaratory judgment adjudging that plaintiff was obligated under its policy to defend and answer in damages to the defendants or any of them.
It is to be noted that neither the petition nor the answer disclosed any of the contentions of the defendant, Spillman, as to what his contentions are as to why the policy did not expire on November 5, 1959.
Spillman then filed a lengthy cross-petition consisting of some 15 paragraphs. It suffices to here state that this pleading, after stating preliminary facts, did allege that:
The cross-petition further alleged that the defendant Spillman had demanded of the plaintiff that it pay all expenses incurred within one year from the date of the accident for necessary medical expenses as provided for in the policy and that plaintiff had refused such demands. And such pleading concluded:
The Plaintiff's reply to Spillman's answer was a general denial. Its answer to his cross-petition follows:
It is to be noted that in no place in the pleading is there any agreement as to the issues and controversy. The plaintiff contends that the policy in question had expired by its terms before the accident occurred. The defendant Spillman's cross-petition was in effect an action to reform an instrument, the insurance policy. It was met by a general denial.
The defendant Clayton Bailey filed an answer and cross-petition. It alleged facts quite similar to those set out in the answer and cross-petition of Spillman except for additional allegations in the cross-petition, which we note:
The plaintiff replied with a general denial to Bailey's answer and answered Bailey's cross-petition as follows:
The defendant Whitebread, named in the insurance contract as the insured, filed an answer and cross-petition quite similar to the answer and cross-petition filed by Spillman. In addition he included the allegations of constructive fraud pleaded by Bailey. He also added a second cause of action to his cross-petition in which he alleged:
The prayer of the second cause of action of Whitebread's cross-petition asked for the recovery of damages in the amount of Ten Thousand Dollars.
The plaintiff's response to Whitebread's pleadings will now be noted 
Reply to answer:
*197 Answer to amended cross-petition:
Answer to second cause of action:
Having described the pleadings it can now be stated that the case was tried as issues of fact with complete disagreement as to the questions of law involved and how the contentions of the parties arose. In this connection it is interesting to note the transcript consisted of some one hundred and thirty pages with numerous Exhibits.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against each defendant; namely, Whitebread, Spillman and Bailey. The judgment, as it applies to such defendants, is set forth in separate and distinct journal entries of record which were approved by counsel for the respective parties and signed by the trial court. The concluding portion of each such journal entry of judgment reads:
*198 After rendition of the judgment each of the above named defendants filed a motion for a new trial. The trial court's action in overruling each of such motion is reflected by three journal entries of record and the defendants bring the case to this court under three separate and distinct notices of appeal.
The first question confronting this court is whether, under the complicated and highly controversial pleadings, a controversy is presented which is justiciable under the declaratory judgment act (G.S. 1949, 60-3127, et seq.). The parties have not raised or discussed the question. Even so this serious preliminary question requires attention before the merits of the case can be considered.
The question, being one of jurisdiction, can and should be raised by this court on its own motion. (Riley v. Hogue, 188 Kan. 774, 365 P.2d 1097.)
In Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. v. Barnett, 189 Kan. 385, 369 P.2d 350, we said:
This court, in considering controversies justiciable under the declaratory judgment act (G.S. 1949, 60-3127, et seq.), has consistently adhered to the rule that a declaratory judgment action will not lie where there is a factual dispute as to how the contentions arose and what the legal contentions are. If the legal contentions, or the controversy as to what the legal controversies are, cannot be determined until after an extended hearing of the evidence and findings of fact, a declaratory judgment action is not proper. See, e.g., McAdam vs. Western Casualty &amp; Surety Co., 186 Kan. 505, 351 P.2d 202, where the following statement appears:
Under the pleadings before us in this case we have a situation where an insurance company brought an action against the insured and three other defendants who claim injuries due to the negligence *199 of the insured in an automobile collision. The insurance company, here the appellee, seeks an adjudication that the insurance policy expired by its own terms before the accident occurred. The defendants, now the appellants, filed cross-petitions in which they alleged constructive fraud and mutual mistakes, and asked to have the expiration term of the insurance policy reformed and extended. In addition, the insured (Whitebread) filed a cross-petition against the company for special damages due to the refusal of the company to recognize the claimed extention date of the insurance policy. The appellee answers all these allegations with a general denial. There is no attempt to reach an agreement as to these contentions or, for that matter, numerous other controversial issues raised by the pleadings. The appellee, in answering the cross-petition, contends "that the court is without jurisdiction to grant a reformation of the contract to some third party, not a party to this contract." It is clearly shown on the face of the pleadings that the legal controversy or contention to be determined could not be known until there was a determination of the facts to which the law must be applied.
In Huber v. Schmidt, 188 Kan. 36, 360 P.2d 854, we outlined the proper procedure for a declaratory judgment and there stated:
A declaratory judgment action is not suitable where the defendant's answer and cross-petition, abandon the contentions set out in the petition and raise entirely new contentions based on a *200 disputed question of fact. Moreover where the cross-petition is met by a general denial, there is no common ground where the specific contentions of the parties meet.
There have been two very recent cases, covering facts quite similar to those involved in the case at bar, which determine the jurisdictional question now under consideration.
In Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. v. Barnett, 189 Kan. 385, 369 P.2d 350, we stated and held:
Later, and in State Automobile &amp; Casualty Underwriters v. Gardiner, 189 Kan. 544, 370 P.2d 91, we said:
Aside from the heretofore cited decisions there is an additional reason why a declaratory judgment action is not proper in this case. A proceeding for a declaratory judgment cannot be used where the object of the proceeding is to try issues of fact as the determinative *201 issue. A declaratory judgment proceeding may be maintained although such proceeding involves the determination of questions of fact. This is anticipated by the declaratory judgment act. (G.S. 1949, 60-3130.) However, the questions of fact must be incidental to the determination of the main issue and not the main issue in the case. As the issues developed in this action, the factual questions of constructive fraud and mutual mistake where the determinative issues presented. These issues presented questions of fact which were seriously disputed.
The last rule stated appears to be one of very general application. In the case of Ennis v. Casey, 72 Idaho 181, 238 P.2d 435 28 A.L.R.2d 952, we find the following statement:
The primary purpose of the declaratory judgment act is to adjudicate questions of law not questions of fact.
What has been heretofore stated compels a conclusion that the issues as presented by the pleadings in this case are not suitable for determination by a declaratory judgment action.
Therefore the judgment is reversed with instructions to dismiss the action.