Title: State v. Sharkey
Citation: 574 N.W.2d 6
Docket Number: N/A
State: Iowa
Issuer: Iowa Supreme Court
Date: December 24, 1997

574 N.W.2d 6 (1997) STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Dennis SHARKEY, Sr., Appellant. No. 95-2078. Supreme Court of Iowa. December 24, 1997. *7 Timothy McCarthy II of Cook, Gotsdiner, McEnroe &amp; McCarthy, Des Moines, for appellant. Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary Tabor, Assistant Attorney General, and Fred H. McCaw, County Attorney, for appellee. Considered by McGIVERIN, C.J., and LARSON, CARTER, LAVORATO, and ANDREASEN, JJ. LARSON, Justice. Dennis J. Sharkey, Jr. was convicted of unlawful disposal of hazardous waste under Iowa Code section 716B.2 (1995) and unlawful storage of hazardous waste under Iowa Code section 716B.4. He appealed on the grounds of double jeopardy and collateral estoppel because earlier he had been found guilty of contempt and sentenced for violating injunctions relating to his storage activities. We affirm his convictions. Sharkey operated a salvage yard near Dubuque. Three parcels of land are involved, parcels "A," "B," and "D." In September 1980 a district court entered a permanent injunction restraining Sharkey, in part, from causing or allowing open burning on parcels A and B and from operating a junkyard without a special-use permit. In September 1988 Sharkey was enjoined from filling or excavating without permits on parcel B, conducting salvage operations, and storing materials outside the fenced salvage yard. He was also enjoined from conducting or allowing landfilling on parcel D with solid waste and allowing open burning on any of the property. That decree also required that Sharkey take certain abatement actions, including the removal and disposal of illegal buildings on parcel A, erecting a suitable fence of at least eight feet in height around the salvage yard on parcel B, removing and disposing of junk and vehicles stored outside the salvage area on parcel B, and removing vehicles and junk on parcel D. In October 1994 the Dubuque County Attorney filed contempt charges against Sharkey for violation of these injunctions. The court found Sharkey guilty of contempt for violating numerous provisions of the court orders. The court fined Sharkey $500 and imposed a jail sentence of six months. Meanwhile, in October 1994 the State charged Sharkey with five criminal violations relating to his operation of the junkyard and filling activities, four counts of illegal storage and disposal of hazardous waste, and one count of receiving stolen property. Sharkey was found guilty of two counts (illegal storage and disposal of hazardous material), fined $5000, and sentenced to two years imprisonment on each conviction. Sharkey contends that his prosecution has subjected him to double jeopardy because of his earlier punishment for contempt. Contempt proceedings are "quasicriminal," Phillips v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 380 N.W.2d 706, 708-09 (Iowa 1986), and the State concedes that criminal contempt implicates double jeopardy protections. See United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2856, 125 L. Ed. 2d 556, 568 (1993); State v. Kraklio, 560 N.W.2d 16, 19 (Iowa 1997). The State contends, however, that Sharkey's convictions under chapter 716B and the contempt orders involved distinct offenses and double jeopardy is therefore not implicated. Under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, "[n]o person shall ... be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." See also Iowa Const. art. I, § 12. The Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S. Ct. 2056, 23 L. Ed. 2d 707 (1969). The United *8 States Supreme Court has described double jeopardy protections as follows: North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 2076, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 664-65 (1969) (footnotes omitted) (overruled in part on other grounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 109 S. Ct. 2201, 104 L. Ed. 2d 865 (1989)). The Court also noted that, "the Constitution was designed as much to prevent the criminal from being twice punished for the same offence as from being twice tried for it." Id. at 718, 89 S. Ct. at 2077, 23 L. Ed. 2d at 665 (quoting Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163, 173, 18 Wall. 163, 173, 21 L. Ed. 872, 878 (1873)). The seminal case for double jeopardy analysis is Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S. Ct. 180, 76 L. Ed. 306 (1932). That case held: Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304, 52 S. Ct. at 182, 76 L. Ed. at 309. Sharkey argues that he was convicted on the criminal charges with the same evidence and witnesses used in the contempt proceeding, and the convictions arose from the same events. Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785 n. 17, 95 S. Ct. 1284, 1293 n. 17, 43 L. Ed. 2d 616, 627 n. 17 (1975) (citations omitted). The Supreme Court case of Dixon provided additional analysis of the same-elements test and marked a return to the Blockburger test after the Court had used a same-conduct test in Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 110 S. Ct. 2084, 109 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1990). A majority in Dixon overruled Grady. Dixon, 509 U.S. at 704, 113 S. Ct. at 2860, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 573. In our Kraklio case, the conduct restrained by an injunction was the collecting of fees under false pretenses. We noted that, to support a conviction for securities fraud, the State was required to prove that Kraklio engaged in a transaction involving a security and, while so engaged, employed a scheme to defraud, made false statements of material fact, or acted in such a way as to defraud or deceive. Kraklio, 560 N.W.2d at 20. No proof was required regarding the collection of fees. We held that "this comparison of elements yields differences that overcome a claim of double jeopardy under Blockburger." Id. In the present case, the contempt order showed that Sharkey violated the injunctions in the following ways: In the court's instruction to the jury for unlawful disposal of hazardous waste under Iowa Code section 716B.2, the court stated: Instruction number 25, for unlawful storage of hazardous waste under Iowa Code section 716B.4, read: The gravamen of the criminal prosecutions was the hazardous nature of the material stored and disposed of by Sharkey. On the other hand, the court's injunctions, and the contempt action based on them, merely prohibited Sharkey from landfilling with solid material; the hazardous nature of the waste was not a part of the injunction or the contempt action that followed. Therefore, the elements of the contempt and the criminal charges are so dissimilar that even the broadest application of the double jeopardy tests under Blockburger could not support Sharkey's argument. We therefore reject it. Sharkey contends that his criminal sentences are invalid under principles of collateral estoppel. The Supreme Court outlined this concept in Ashe v. Swenson. It explained: Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443, 90 S. Ct. 1189, 1194, 25 L. Ed. 2d 469, 475 (1970). We have outlined the requirements for collateral estoppel as follows: State v. Sunclades, 305 N.W.2d 491, 495-96 (Iowa 1981) (citation omitted). While we held in State v. Stergion, 248 N.W.2d 911, 913 (Iowa 1976), that the doctrine was applicable *10 in criminal cases, it could not help Sharkey here. We have said that State v. Pospishel, 218 N.W.2d 602, 604 (Iowa 1974) (citation omitted). Applying this test, no elements of the criminal charges had been resolved favorably to Sharkey in the contempt case, and he therefore cannot claim collateral estoppel. We affirm the convictions. AFFIRMED.