Title: People v. Sypien
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 89265
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: September 20, 2001

Docket No. 89265-Agenda 6-January 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 								MARK SYPIEN, Appellee.
Opinion filed September 20, 2001.
 
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:
	The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether the General
Assembly violated the single subject clause of the Illinois
Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §8(d)) when it
enacted Public Act 90-456 (Pub. Act 90-456, eff. January 1,
1998). The legislation in Public Act 90-456, styled as an act "in
relation to criminal law," amended, among other statutes, the
disorderly conduct provision of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code)
(720 ILCS 5/1-1 et seq. (West 1998)). Charged with disorderly
conduct under the amended provision, defendant moved to dismiss
the complaint, asserting a single subject violation. The circuit
court of De Kalb County granted defendant's motion, and the State
now appeals. Based upon the following discussion, we affirm and
hold that Public Act 90-456 violates the single subject rule.
BACKGROUND
	On or about August 1,1999, defendant allegedly reported to
De Kalb County Sheriff's Deputies Ryan Loyd and Tim Rogers
that a certain motor vehicle had been stolen. A brief investigation
led the deputies to conclude that defendant's report was false. He
was arrested and charged with disorderly conduct in violation of
section 26-1(a)(4) of the Code. Section 26-1(a)(4) was amended
by section 15 of Public Act 90-456 and now provides, in pertinent
part:
			"(a) A person commits disorderly conduct when he
knowingly:
* * *
				(4) Transmits or causes to be transmitted in any
manner to any peace officer, public officer or public
employee a report to the effect that an offense *** has
been committed, knowing at the time of such
transmission that there is no reasonable ground for
believing that such an offense *** has been
committed[.]" 720 ILCS 5/26-1(a)(4) (West 1998).
	Section 15 of Public Act 90-456 also amended the sentencing
portion of the Code's disorderly conduct provision to provide:
			"(b) Sentence.
			(1) *** A violation of subsection (a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(4),
or (a)(9) of this Section is a Class 4 felony." 720 ILCS
5/26-1(b) (West 1998).
Prior to the amendment, a violation of section 26-1(a)(4) was a
Class B misdemeanor. See 720 ILCS 5/26-1(b) (West 1996). In its
present form, an accused faces a maximum three-year prison term
if convicted of a section 26-1(a)(4) violation.
	The other amendments accomplished by Public Act 90-456
are summarized as follows:
			(1) 911 False Alarms. Section 5 amended the
Emergency Telephone System Act (50 ILCS 750/0.01 et
seq. (West 1998)) by adding the following: "Any person
calling the number '911' for the purpose of making a false
alarm or complaint and reporting false information is
subject to the provisions of Section 26-1 of the Criminal
Code of 1961." 50 ILCS 750/15.2 (West 1998).
			(2) Juvenile Court Act. Section 10 of Public Act
90-456 amended the Juvenile Court Act of 1987
(Juvenile Court Act of 1987 or Act) (705 ILCS 405/1-1
et seq. (West 1998)) to provide that once an adjudicatory
hearing is commenced in an abused or neglected juvenile
proceeding, subsequent delay in the proceeding may be
allowed by the court when necessary to ensure a fair
hearing. 705 ILCS 405/2-14(b) (West 1998). Formerly,
the adjudicatory hearing was required to be "held" within
90 days, and there was no provision for delays. See 705
ILCS 405/2-14(b) (West 1996).
			(3) Search Warrants. Section 20 amended the Code of
Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/100-1 et seq.
(West 1998)) to authorize an officer executing a search
warrant to make entry without first announcing his office
and without knocking in certain exigent circumstances.
725 ILCS 5/108-8(b) (West 1998).
	In the trial court, defendant maintained that Public Act
90-456 violated the single subject rule because the amendment to
the Juvenile Court Act in section 10 of Public Act 90-456, unlike
the other three amendments, does not relate to criminal law. The
trial court agreed, specifically finding that it "could see no
relationship to the criminal law with neglected or abused
juveniles." Thus, the issue presented for our review is whether the
amendment to the Juvenile Court Act bears any natural and logical
relationship to criminal law.

ANALYSIS 
	Legislative acts are to be afforded a considerable presumption
of constitutionality. In re Marriage of Lappe, 176 Ill. 2d 414, 422
(1997); Russell v. Department of Natural Resources, 183 Ill. 2d 434, 441 (1998). The party challenging the constitutionality of a
statute bears the burden of rebutting this presumption and clearly
establishing the constitutional violation. Russell, 183 Ill. 2d  at 441.
We review de novo a circuit court's holding that a statute is
unconstitutional. People v. Jung, 192 Ill. 2d 1, 4 (2000).
	The single subject rule provides as follows:
			"Bills, except bills for appropriations and for the
codification, revision or rearrangement of laws, shall be
confined to one subject." Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §8(d).
The rule is designed to prevent the passage of legislation that, if
standing alone, could not muster the necessary votes for
enactment. Geja's Caf© v Metropolitan Pier &amp; Exposition
Authority, 153 Ill. 2d 239, 258 (1992). Such "logrolling" by
legislators is a practice strictly prohibited by this state's
constitution. People v. Cervantes, 189 Ill. 2d 80, 98 (1999);
People v. Wooters, 188 Ill. 2d 500, 518 (1999).
	The term "subject" in this context is to be liberally construed
in favor of the legislature. People v. Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d 1, 8-9
(1999); People v. Dunigan, 165 Ill. 2d 235, 255 (1995); Cutinello
v. Whitley, 161 Ill. 2d 409, 423-24 (1994). The matters included in
the enactment, however, must have a natural and logical
connection to the single subject. People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 427 (2000); Cutinello, 161 Ill. 2d  at 423; People ex rel.
Ogilvie v. Lewis, 49 Ill. 2d 476, 487 (1971), quoting People ex rel.
Gutknecht v. City of Chicago, 414 Ill. 600, 607-08 (1953). In other
words, while the legislature is free to choose subjects
comprehensive in scope, the single subject requirement may not
be circumvented by selecting a topic so broad that the rule is
evaded as "a meaningful constitutional check on the legislature's
actions." Johnson v. Edgar, 176 Ill. 2d 499, 515-18 (1997). There
is no additional requirement that the individual provisions be
related to each other. Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 187 Ill. 2d 341,
356 (1999).
	Consequently, determining whether a public act runs afoul of
the single subject rule is a two-tiered analysis. First, we must
determine whether the act, on its face, involves a legitimate single
subject. Arangold, 187 Ill. 2d  at 361-62 (Freeman, C.J., specially
concurring). Second, we must discern whether the various
provisions within an act all relate to the proper subject at issue.
Arangold, 187 Ill. 2d  at 362 (Freeman, C.J., specially concurring).
	Considering the first tier of the analysis, the purported subject
of Public Act 90-456 is one that we have already found to be
legitimate for single subject purposes. For example, this court
found in Malchow that Public Act 89-8 (Pub. Act 89-8, eff.
March 21, 1995), entitled "An Act in relation to criminal and
correctional matters ***," did not comprehend a subject too broad
to pass constitutional muster. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d  at 428-29.
Likewise, we found that Public Act 81-1270 (Pub. Act 81-1270,
eff. July 3, 1980), embracing the lone subject of amending the
Criminal Code of 1961, did not run afoul of the single subject rule.
See People v. Dunigan, 165 Ill. 2d 235, 255 (1995). Thus, having
found that the subjects of criminal and correctional matters and
amendment of the Criminal Code of 1961 are legitimate subjects,
we need not reeexamine the issue in this case. The subject of
Public Act 90-456, on its face, is permissible. See also Wooters,
188 Ill. 2d  at 512-13 (while invalidating the public act at issue, we
held the legislature could pass legislation that amended several
acts as long as the amendments related to the single subject of
"crime").
	Moving to the second tier of our analysis, we must determine
whether each individual amendment in Public Act 90-456 relates
to the single subject of the criminal law. The State maintains that
the trial court's ability to extend the time of an adjudicatory
hearing for abused, neglected or dependent children relates to the
criminal law because the parent or person responsible in loco
parentis for the abuse, neglect or dependency may face criminal
liability as a direct result of the hearing. According to the State, the
legislature's concern with the timing of an adjudicatory hearing
under the Act is somehow connected to two criminal-law-related
goals: (1) preventing the criminal activity of parents who abuse or
neglect their children; and (2) ensuring that innocent parents are
not exposed to criminal liability. The State further cites People v.
Majors, 308 Ill. App. 3d 1021 (1999), and argues that the
enactment withstanding single subject scrutiny in that case is
sufficiently analogous to Public Act 90-456 to compel a similar
conclusion here.
	We believe that the theory proffered by the State of how the
amendment of the Juvenile Court Act included in Public Act
90-456 relates to the criminal law is too tenuous to pass
constitutional muster. Any connection drawn by the State between
abuse, neglect and dependency hearings under the Act and the
criminal law is neither natural nor logical. See Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d  at 427. The State makes the blanket assertion that a parent or
person in loco parentis responsible for a child who has been
adjudged abused, neglected or dependent under the Juvenile Court
Act may face criminal liability under the Neglected Children
Offense Act (720 ILCS 130/0.01 et seq. (West 1998)) or the
Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986 (750 ILCS 60/101 et seq.
(West 1998)). Unfortunately, the State provides absolutely no
authority, statutory or otherwise, indicating how the theoretical
criminal charges faced by such a parent or person in loco parentis
would derive, be based on, or otherwise relate to the adjudicatory
hearings under the Juvenile Court Act. Upon careful review by this
court, we are unable to discern any such support. More
importantly, if we were to accept the State's argument, a myriad
of inherently civil statutes would then be sufficiently related to the
criminal law to withstand similar single subject scrutiny.
	For example, a custodial parent whose former spouse has been
granted visitation rights of the couple's child in a divorce decree
may be subject to criminal liability if that custodial parent attempts
to deprive his former spouse of visitation. See 720 ILCS 5/10-5.5
(West 1998)). Consequently, under the State's view of the single
subject rule, a public act amending any provision of the Criminal
Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/1-1 et seq. (West 1998)) and any of the
provisions of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage
Act (750 ILCS 5/101 et seq. (West 1998)) dealing with visitation
could survive a single subject challenge. We cannot countenance
such a conclusion, as it would completely eviscerate the single
subject rule. Simply put, the hypothetical possibility that a person
may face criminal charges as a result of a civil proceeding is
insufficient to relate the civil statute at issue to the criminal law
with regard to a single subject inquiry.
	We recently addressed a comparable situation in People v.
Wooters, 188 Ill. 2d 500 (1999). At issue in Wooters was the
constitutionality of Public Act 89-203 (Pub. Act 89-203, eff. July
21, 1995). Most of the various sections of Public Act 89-203 had
a logical relationship to its purported subject of "crime." For
example, the enactment included an amendment to section 32-10
of the Criminal Code of 1961, expanding the circumstances when
a person charged with a felony while on bail must appear in court
to have his bail reset. See 720 ILCS 5/32-10 (West 1996). Public
Act 89-203 also amended section 11-6 of the Criminal Code to
add a definition of "solicits" for the crime of indecent solicitation
of a child. See 720 ILCS 5/11-6 (West 1996). In addition, the
enactment added section 5-1120 to the Counties Code,
empowering counties to establish and fund programs to reduce,
prevent or control juvenile delinquency. See 55 ILCS 5/5-1120
(West 1996). We held that each of the above amendments and
several others were logically related to crime, the purported
subject of the Act. Wooters, 188 Ill. 2d  at 512.
	In the end, however, we held that Public Act 89-203 included
non-crime-related amendments. Those amendments were to
sections 15-508 and 15-1701 of the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure
Law, codified in the Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS
5/15-1508, 15-1701 (West 1996). The foreclosure amendments
altered the procedure for notifying renters and other nonowners of
real property of a foreclosure. Wooters, 188 Ill. 2d  at 513. The
offending amendments bore no logical or natural connection to the
single subject of "crime" (Wooters, 188 Ill. 2d at 513) and,
therefore, Public Act 89-203 violated the single subject rule.
Wooters, 188 Ill. 2d  at 520. The same conclusion is evident in this
case. The amendments to the Juvenile Court Act included in
Public Act 90-456 are related neither logically nor naturally to the
criminal law.
	Turning to the State's argument regarding People v. Majors,
308 Ill. App. 3d 1021 (1999), in that case the appellate court
considered a single subject challenge to Public Act 89-689.
Among several amendments clearly related to the criminal justice
system, Public Act 89-689 also amended section 5-23 of the
delinquency article of the Juvenile Court Act, adding another type
of authorized disposition for wards of the court. See 705 ILCS
405/5-23 (West Supp. 1997) (repealed by Pub. Act 90-590, art.
2001, §2001-15, eff. January 1, 1999; reinstated Pub. Act 90-590,
art. 2001, §2001-10, eff. January 1, 1999; now 705 ILCS
405/5-710 (West 1998)). The court upheld the statute against a
single subject challenge, finding that each of the amendments
related to the criminal justice system. Majors, 308 Ill. App. 3d at
1032-33. The State asks this court to hold likewise that the
amendment to the Juvenile Court Act implemented by Public Act
90-456 is related to the criminal law. The case at hand, however,
is distinguishable from Majors. Simply put, there is a fundamental
difference between delinquency proceedings at issue in Majors
and abuse, neglect and dependency proceedings at issue here.
	Dependency and neglect proceedings, unlike criminal and
delinquency proceedings, are " ' "civil"  *** both in the legal and
lay sense of the word.' " In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d 1, 8 (1991), quoting
In re Urbasek, 38 Ill. 2d 535, 543 (1967). The standard of proof
and the rules of evidence of civil proceedings are applicable in
dependency and neglect cases. 705 ILCS 405/2-18 (West 1998).
Moreover, the State does not assume an adversarial role against
the minor in dependency and neglect proceedings. In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d  at 8. The minor is not being punished and is not regarded as
a criminal. In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d  at 8. To the contrary, neglect and
dependency proceedings are normally instituted due to the
unwillingness or inability of a parent or person in loco parentis to
undertake his or her parental duties, not due to the child's
misconduct. Urbasek, 38 Ill. 2d  at 543. Furthermore, in
dependency and neglect proceedings, not only is the State's
Attorney charged with the duty of ensuring that the best interests
of the minor, the minor's family and the community are served,
but the court itself is also so charged. In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d at 8-9;
see also In re D.S., No. 88460, slip op. at 17-18 (June 21, 2001)
(holding that the duty and authority vested in the circuit court by
the Juvenile Court Act does not violate the separation of powers
doctrine). Thus, the court may invade the executive discretion of
the constitutional office of the State's Attorney to dismiss a
complaint in dependency and neglect cases, although such an
invasion is impermissible in the State's Attorney's initiation and
management of criminal litigation. In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d  at 8-9.
	We recently highlighted the distinction between delinquency
proceedings and abuse, neglect and dependency proceedings in In
re A.G., 195 Ill. 2d 313, 317 (2001). In A.G., we were asked to
determine whether Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (188 Ill. 2d R.
604(d)) applies to delinquency cases under the Act. Rule 604(d)
addresses under what circumstances a criminal defendant can
appeal a judgment entered upon a guilty plea. 188 Ill. 2d R.
604(d). In holding that Rule 604(d) applies in delinquency
proceedings, we stated:
		"Although proceedings under the [Juvenile Court] Act are
still not criminal in nature and are to be administered in a
spirit of humane concern for, and to promote the welfare
of, the minor [citation], article V of the Act has been
reconfigured and now contains a purpose and policy
section which represents a fundamental shift from the
singular goal of rehabilitation to include the overriding
concerns of protecting the public and holding juvenile
offenders accountable for violations of the law.
[Citation.]" In re A.G., 195 Ill. 2d  at 317.
	This shift in policy regarding delinquency proceedings is
manifested in several ways. For example, virtually all of the
constitutional requirements of a criminal trial have been
introduced into juvenile delinquency proceedings, including the
right to adequate notice of charges, the right to counsel, the right
to remain silent, and the right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses. In re A.G., 195 Ill. 2d  at 318. Moreover, the reasonable
doubt standard of proof and the rules of evidence used in criminal
proceedings are also applied in delinquency proceedings. In re
A.G., 195 Ill. 2d  at 318. Accordingly, the kinship between
delinquency proceedings under the Act and the criminal justice
system arguably supports the conclusion of the Majors court that
Public Act 89-689 did not violate the single subject rule. In this
case to the contrary, abuse, neglect and dependency proceedings
under the Act are not related to any degree to criminal law and
thus do not warrant a comparable conclusion regarding Public Act
90-456.

CONCLUSION
	As we can discern no natural or logical relation between
Public Act 90-456's amendment of the Juvenile Court Act of
1987 and that public act's stated subject of "the criminal law," we
are compelled to hold that Public Act 90-456 contravenes the
single subject rule clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.
1970, art. IV, §8(d)). The judgment of the circuit court of De Kalb
County is therefore affirmed.




Affirmed.