Title: The Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Company v. Tuscaloosa County, Alabama and The Tuscaloosa County Special Tax Board
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1060496
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: May 16, 2008

REL: 05/16/2008
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
____________________
1060496
____________________
The Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Company
v.
Tuscaloosa County, Alabama, and the Tuscaloosa County
Special Tax Board
Appeal from Tuscaloosa Circuit Court 
(CV-06-816)
SMITH, Justice.
The Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Company ("the
Company") appeals from a judgment of the Tuscaloosa Circuit
Court dismissing the Company's action against the Tuscaloosa
1060496
This Court previously denied a petition for a writ of
1
mandamus filed by the Tax Board asking this Court to intervene
in litigation in Fayette County between the Tax Board, the
Company, and the Fayette County Commission.  See Ex parte
Tuscaloosa County Special Tax Bd., 963 So. 2d 610 (Ala. 2007).
In their materials to this Court in the present case, the
parties refer to that litigation as ongoing.  
2
County Special Tax Board ("the Tax Board") and Tuscaloosa
County.  We reverse and remand.
Facts and Procedural History
This appeal stems from an attempt to determine which of
two 
counties--Fayette 
County 
or 
Tuscaloosa 
County--is 
entitled
to the sales or use taxes on some of the equipment, supplies,
and mine fixtures the Company used in its mining operations in
those counties from 1999 to 2005.   The Company alleges that,
1
in what it contends was good faith and based on a reasonable
interpretation of the law and on previous audits and advice by
the Alabama Department of Revenue,  it paid the taxes for that
time period to Fayette County.  The Tax Board claims, however,
that a large portion of those taxes should have been paid to
it instead. 
On July 11, 2005, the Tax Board issued a "preliminary
assessment" of the taxes it claimed that the Company owed for
the period June 1, 1999, through April 30, 2005 ("the audit
1060496
3
period").  The preliminary assessment sought taxes, interest,
and penalties for the audit period.  The preliminary
assessment stated:
"[I]f you believe these additional amounts are not
due to the [Tax Board], you have the right to
contest 
this 
preliminary 
tax 
assessment 
to
Tuscaloosa County's Administrative 
Appeals 
Committee
discussed in the Taxpayer's [sic] Bill of Rights
(copy enclosed).
"Please take notice of the fact that you have
Thirty (30) DAYS after receipt of this letter within
which to file your formal written appeal with the
Tuscaloosa County Special Tax Board's Manager.
Please also be advised that if a formal protest is
not filed within this deadline, the unpaid balance
of these taxes, penalties, and interest will become
a final assessment against your business.  Once the
assessment becomes a final assessment you have
Thirty (30) days to either file an appeal with the
Tax Boards' [sic] Appeals Officer or appeal to
Circuit Court.  After thirty days has expired from
the date of the Final Assessment, the assessment
will become final and entered as a judgment.
"After this deadline, if no appeal has been
timely 
filed 
by 
you 
or 
your 
representative,
enforcement and other collection procedures will
then become applicable in this matter for any unpaid
amounts."
(Boldface type in original.)
A brochure entitled "Taxpayers' Bill of Rights" was
included 
with 
the 
preliminary 
assessment. 
 
The 
name
"Tuscaloosa County Special Tax Board, Tuscaloosa, Alabama"
1060496
Although the Alabama Department of Revenue is not listed
2
as an author of the brochure or otherwise, the brochure the
Tax Board provided to the Company with the preliminary
assessment 
nevertheless 
references 
"the 
Department"
throughout.  The Company points out that the language of the
Tax Board's brochure is virtually identical to the language in
a brochure published by the Alabama Department of Revenue,
entitled 
"Alabama 
Taxpayers' 
Bill 
of 
Rights," 
which 
summarizes
the appeal procedures set forth in the Alabama Taxpayers' Bill
of Rights, §§ 40-2A-1 to -18, Ala. Code 1975.
4
appears at the top of the cover page of the brochure.  After
describing the audit procedure, the brochure states:
"After your audit, we will take one of the
following three actions:
"....
"2.  issue a 'preliminary assessment' which will
state any additional tax, penalty, and interest we
believe you owe ....
"If you do not agree with the Department's[2]
decision in your case, you may appeal this decision
by filing a written petition requesting a review
hearing on your case.  The petition for review must
be filed within thirty (30) days of the issuance
date of the preliminary assessment.  The petition
may be through a written letter addressed to the
Department outlining the amount you are protesting
and the reason.  
"The Department will review your petition and
schedule a conference if requested or otherwise
necessary. During this conference you will have the
opportunity to discuss your case with designated
officers from the division whose actions you are
contesting.  This conference will allow both you and
the Department to present each side of the issue and
1060496
5
to 
review 
any 
additional 
information 
being
presented.
"Based on the outcome of this conference, the
Department will either cancel, change, or affirm its
previous action.  If you do not timely file your
petition for review or the Department determines
from the conference that the preliminary assessment
is due to be upheld in whole or in part, the
Department will enter a final assessment.
"If a final assessment is entered, you will be
notified in writing and advised that you may appeal
to circuit court or the Department's appeals
representative."  
On August 10, 2005, the Company filed a petition with the
Tax Board seeking a review of the preliminary assessment; the
petition asked for hearing before the Tax Board.  Because the
Company contended that it had already paid taxes to Fayette
County on most of the items that were the subject of the Tax
Board's preliminary assessment, the Company also filed a
petition on August 18, 2005, with Fayette County under § 40-
23-2.1, Ala. Code 1975, which the parties refer to as the
"anti-whipsaw" statute.  The Fayette County petition sought a
refund for the taxes the Company had paid during the audit
period on the items included in the Tax Board's preliminary
assessment. 
1060496
6
The Tax Board revised its preliminary assessment on
August 30, 2005; the revised preliminary assessment claimed an
increased amount of taxes, interest, and penalties.  According
to the complaint, representatives of the Company informally
met with representatives of the Tax Board on September 9,
2005, at the law offices of the Tax Board's then counsel.  On
September 29, 2005, the Company filed a petition for a review
of the revised preliminary assessment.
According to the complaint, the Company made several
requests for a hearing before the Tax Board, but the Tax Board
did not grant those requests.  The Tax Board issued a "final
assessment" on March 28, 2006, and the complaint alleges that
the Tax Board did so without prior notice or explanation to
the Company.
The August 30, 2005, assessment sought a total of
$1,200,412.27 in taxes, penalties, and interest, but the March
28, 2006, assessment sought $521,576.69 in taxes, $169,924.71
in interest, and $57,695.71 in penalties, for a total of
$749,197.11.  
The March 28, 2006, final assessment stated:
"The purpose of this report is to give your
business the opportunity to pay these additional
1060496
7
local taxes.  The taxpayer has Thirty (30) days to
either file an appeal with the Tax Boards' [sic]
Appeals Officer or appeal to Circuit Court.  After
thirty days has expired from the date of this Final
Assessment, [t]he assessment will become final and
entered as a judgment.
"After this deadline, if no appeal has been
timely 
filed 
by 
you 
or 
your 
representative,
enforcement and other collection procedures will
then become applicable in this matter for any unpaid
amounts."
(Boldface type in original.)
On April 27, 2006, the Company delivered a five-page
"notice of appeal of final assessment" to the Tax Board, along
with attached exhibits.  The Company addressed the "notice of
appeal" to the "appeals officer" of the Tax Board.
On May 31, 2006, the Tax Board, contrary to its earlier
position, notified the Company that it did not have an
administrative-appeal process.  The Tax Board's May 31 letter
stated:
"Please take note that there is currently no
Appeals 
Officer 
employed 
or 
utilized 
by 
the
Tuscaloosa County Special Tax Board.  Moreover,
there is no mechanism for the hearing of any
administrative appeals by the board or such an
officer on account of the special provisions of the
local act creating and governing the Board.  See Act
56, 1953 Ala. Acts, Vol. I, pgs. 76-86, as amended
by Act 94-554, 1994 Ala. Acts, Vol. 2, pgs. 1010-21.
1060496
8
"These Acts provide that the sole avenue for
appealing an assessment lies with the Tuscaloosa
County Circuit Court.  (See Section 10 of the Act,
as amended.)  Please direct any appeals you wish to
file to that court.  No further action will be taken
on your filing with the Board."
On June 30, 2006, the Company filed a complaint in the
Tuscaloosa Circuit Court.  The complaint sought a judgment
declaring that the Tax Board, in issuing the final assessment
and in "reinterpreting" its appeal procedures, violated
various 
Alabama 
statutes 
as 
well 
as 
the 
Company's
constitutional due-process rights.  In the event that the
court held that the Tax Board's actions were constitutional,
the complaint also gave notice of appeal from the Tax Board's
final assessment. 
The Tax Board filed a motion to dismiss.  The Tax Board
argued that the local act that created the Tax Board provides
an exclusive appeal process, and that process, the Tax Board
contended, required the Company to file an appeal in the
Tuscaloosa Circuit Court within 30 days of the March 28, 2006,
final assessment.  Because the Company had not filed an appeal
within that time, the Tax Board argued that the action filed
June 30, 2006, was an untimely appeal.  The Company filed a
brief in opposition to the Tax Board's motion.
1060496
9
Following a hearing, the trial court agreed with the Tax
Board and dismissed the action.  The Company timely appealed
to this Court.
Standard of Review
"Appellate review of a ruling on a question of law is de
novo."  Ex parte Forrester, 914 So. 2d 855, 858 (Ala. 2005).
"A de novo review is a review without any assumption of
correctness."  Kenworth of Dothan, Inc. v. Bruner-Wells
Trucking, Inc., 745 So. 2d 271, 273 (Ala. 1999).
The trial court dismissed this case on a motion to
dismiss grounded on Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P.
"'"The standard of review of the grant of a
motion to dismiss ... was set out in Nance v.
Matthews, 622 So. 2d 297, 299 (Ala. 1993):
"'"'On appeal, a dismissal is not
entitled to a presumption of correctness.
The appropriate standard of review ... is
whether, when the allegations of the
complaint are viewed most strongly in the
pleader's favor, it appears that the
pleader 
could 
prove 
any 
set 
of
circumstances that would entitle [him] to
relief.  In making this determination, this
Court 
does 
not 
consider 
whether 
the
plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but only
whether [he] may possibly prevail.  We note
that a ... dismissal is proper only when it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of the
1060496
10
claim that would entitle the plaintiff to
relief.'"
"'Jacks v. Madison County, 741 So. 2d 429, 430 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1999) (citations omitted).  In addition,
"[m]otions to dismiss are rarely appropriate in
declaratory judgment proceedings. Such a motion
does, 
however, 
serve 
one 
purpose, 
that 
of
determining whether the [complaint] states the
substance of a bonafide justiciable controversy
which should be settled." Wallace v. Burleson, 361
So. 2d 554, 555 (Ala. 1978) (citation omitted).'"
Waite v. Waite, 959 So. 2d 610, 614 (Ala. 2006) (quoting Helms
v. Barbour County, 914 So. 2d 825, 828-29 (Ala. 2005)).  
Discussion
The legislature created the Tax Board in 1953.  See Act
No. 56, Ala. Acts 1953, as amended by Act No. 94-554, Ala.
Acts 1994, and Act No. 96-554, Ala. Acts 1996 ("the local
act").  The Tax Board is a five-member board; Tuscaloosa
County, the City of Tuscaloosa, the Tuscaloosa County Board of
Education, the City of Tuscaloosa Board of Education, and the
Druid City Hospital Board each elect one member of that board.
Local act §§ 1, 9.
Section 10 of the local act contains a specific
procedure for an appeal from a final assessment issued by the
Tax Board.  As amended, § 10 provides:
1060496
Section 1 of the local act defines "county" as
3
"Tuscaloosa County in the state."
11
"Section 10. Appeals 
from 
Assessments. 
 
Whenever
any taxpayer who has duly appeared and protested a
final 
assessment 
made 
by 
the 
tax 
board 
is
dissatisfied with the assessment finally made, he
may appeal from said final assessment to the Circuit
Court of the county,
 sitting in equity, by filing
[3]
notices of appeals with the secretary of the tax
board and with the register of said court within
thirty (30) days from the date of said final
assessment, and in addition thereto by giving bond
conditioned to pay all costs, such bond to be filed
with and approved by the register of said court.
All provisions of Chapter 2A of Title 40 of the Code
of Alabama 1975, as amended from time to time,
pertaining to payment of an assessment unless a
supersedeas bond shall be filed and approved, the
burden of proof, and the procedure to be followed in
appeals from the judgment of the said court, shall
be applicable to appeals from final assessments made
hereunder, and the tax board shall have with respect
to such appeals all the rights conferred on and the
functions assigned to the Department of Revenue by
said Chapter 2A."
In dismissing the Company's action, the trial court
concluded that "the [Company's] exclusive remedy to challenge
the final assessment entered against it by the Tuscaloosa
County Special Tax Board lies under the Local Act creating and
governing the [Tax] Board."  The trial court construed § 10 as
permitting only one procedure by which the Company could
challenge the March 28, 2006, assessment: the filing of a
notice of appeal in the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court within 30
1060496
12
days of that assessment.  Because the Company did not file a
notice of appeal within that time, the trial court held that
the notice of appeal the Company did file was untimely. 
The trial court also dismissed the Company's declaratory-
judgment action, which was based on various Alabama statutes
as well as constitutional due-process protections.  The trial
court held that that action was "an impermissible substitute
for an appeal" from the March 28, 2006, final assessment.
The Company, however, argues that after the Tax Board
issued the final assessment on March 28, 2006, the Company was
entitled to an administrative appeal before the Tax Board.
The Company further contends that the 30-day period for filing
a notice of appeal under § 10 of the local act did not begin
to run until such an administrative appeal had been exhausted.
The Company offers two arguments in support of that position.
First, the Company argues that the plain language of § 10
of the local act requires the Tax Board to provide some form
of an administrative hearing following issuance of a final
assessment.  Noting that § 10 authorizes an appeal to the
Tuscaloosa Circuit Court "[w]henever any taxpayer who has duly
appeared and protested a final assessment made by the tax
1060496
13
board is dissatisfied with assessment finally made" (emphasis
added), the Company argues that the final assessment does not
become "finally made" until the Tax Board (1) holds a hearing
after issuance of the final assessment and (2) renders a final
decision after that hearing.  We disagree.
Section 10 of the local act states that the notice of
appeal must be filed "within thirty (30) days from the date of
said final assessment."  The Company does not dispute that the
March 28, 2006, assessment was a "final assessment."  Thus,
according to § 10 of the local act, the Company was required
to do the following within 30 days of March 28, 2006: (1)
"duly appear[] and protest[] [the] final assessment" before
the Tax Board and (2) file a notice of appeal in the
Tuscaloosa Circuit Court. 
However, the Company also argues that the Local Tax
Simplification Act of 1998, Act No. 98-192, Ala. Acts 1998
("the LTSA"), superseded the local act and required the Tax
Board to offer an administrative-appeal procedure like that
set forth in the Alabama Taxpayers' Bill of Rights, §§ 40-2A-1
to -18, Ala. Code 1975 ("the TBOR").  We agree.
1060496
14
The purpose of the TBOR is stated in § 40-2A-2(1), Ala.
Code 1975, entitled "Legislative Intent":
"a. The legislative intent of this chapter is to
provide equitable and uniform procedures for the
operation of the department and for all taxpayers
when dealing with the department.  This chapter is
intended as a minimum procedural code and the
department may grant or adopt additional procedures
not inconsistent with this chapter.  This chapter
shall be liberally construed to allow substantial
justice.
"b. The provisions of this chapter shall be
complementary 
and 
in 
addition 
to 
all 
other
provisions of law. In the event of any conflict
between the provisions of this chapter and those of
any other specific statutory provisions contained in
other chapters of this title, or of any other title,
it is hereby declared to be the legislative intent
that, to the extent such other specific provisions
are 
inconsistent 
with 
or 
different 
from 
the
provisions of this chapter, the provisions of this
chapter shall prevail."
In General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. City of Red Bay,
894 So. 2d 650 (Ala. 2004), this Court summarized some of the
procedures outlined in the TBOR:  
"The TBOR prescribes uniform procedures that
must be followed in assessing and collecting taxes.
§ 40-2A-1 and -2.  Pursuant to the TBOR, the State
Department of Revenue ('the Department') is required
to provide a taxpayer with notice of any planned
audit of the taxpayer's books and records; with a
statement of the taxpayer's procedural rights,
including the right to an administrative review of
a preliminary assessment; and with a written
description 
of 
the 
grounds 
for 
any 
claimed
1060496
15
underpayment or nonpayment of a tax.  § 40-2A-4. ...
If 
the 
parties 
are 
unable 
to 
resolve 
their
differences and the Department determines that the
assessment 
is 
valid, 
it 
must 
enter 
a 
final
assessment.  The taxpayer may then appeal the
assessment to the administrative law division of the
Department (or to a similar administrative agency in
the event the dispute involves local taxes levied by
a municipality or county not administered by the
Department) or to the circuit court in the county
where the taxpayer resides.  § 40-2A-7."
894 So. 2d at 653 (emphasis added).  
In particular, § 40-2A-7(b)(5), Ala. Code 1975, entitled
"Procedure for Appeal from Final Assessment," provides, in
relevant part:
"a. A taxpayer may appeal from any final
assessment entered by the department by filing a
notice of appeal with the Administrative Law
Division within 30 days from the date of entry of
the final assessment, and the appeal, if timely
filed, shall proceed as herein provided for appeals
to the Administrative Law Division.
"b.1. In lieu of the appeal under paragraph a.,
at the option of the taxpayer, the taxpayer may
appeal from any final assessment to the Circuit
Court of Montgomery County, Alabama, or to the
circuit court of the county in which the
taxpayer resides or has a principal place of
business in Alabama, as appropriate, by filing
notice of appeal within 30 days from the date
of entry of the final assessment with both the
secretary of the department and the clerk of
the circuit court in which the appeal is
filed."
1060496
16
In the event a taxpayer files an administrative appeal, § 40-
2A-9(g) of the TBOR gives the taxpayer 30 days after the final
order is issued in the administrative appeal in which to file
a notice of appeal to the appropriate circuit court.  Thus,
the TBOR--unlike § 10 of the local act--offers the taxpayer
the option of filing an administrative appeal and obtaining an
administrative ruling before the 30-day period for filing a
notice of appeal in the appropriate circuit court begins to
run.  
By its terms the TBOR applies only to the Department of
Revenue and not to a local taxing authority like the Tax
Board.  Red Bay, 894 So. 2d at 653.  Even so, it is undisputed
in this case that the Tax Board represented to the Company
more than once that the Tax Board had an administrative-appeal
process essentially identical to the appeal process the TBOR
requires in § 40-2A-7(b)(5) and § 40-2A-9(g).  Moreover, the
Company alleges that, before the Tax Board's May 31, 2006,
letter informing the Company that it had "no mechanism for the
hearing of any administrative appeals," the Tax Board had in
fact offered an administrative-appeal process since at least
2001. 
1060496
Those admissions, which the Tax Board made in litigation
4
in Fayette County between the Fayette County Commission, the
Company, and the Tax Board, see supra note 1, are (1) that the
Tax Board represented to the Company that it had an "appeals
officer" or "appeals representative" to which the Company
could appeal from the final assessment; (2) that other
taxpayers had been given the option to appeal a final
assessment 
to 
such 
an 
administrative 
appeals 
officer; 
(3) 
that
other taxpayers had appealed final assessments to the Tax
Board's "appeals officer"; and (4) that an individual named
Stanley McCracken had served as the Tax Board's "appeals
officer" for at least one such administrative appeal.
17
In its materials to this Court, the Tax Board states:
"[The Company] makes much ado about the Tax Board's
admissions in the proceedings in Fayette County
[between the Tax Board, the Company, and the Fayette
County Commission ], as if to give the impression
4
that 
heretofore 
the 
Tax 
Board 
has 
not 
been
completely truthful about the facts of this case.
However, the Tax Board has never concealed the fact
of the contents of its brochure, nor has the Tax
Board ever represented to [the Company] or to any
court that it had never had an administrative
process in the past.  The Tax Board's position on
this fact is quite simple: the Board discovered that
it had failed to follow the law as mandated by the
Local Act, and it corrected that error."
The Company argues, however, that the Tax Board's prior
practice of offering an administrative-appeal process was
correct because, the Company contends, the LTSA effectively
amended the procedure in § 10 of the local act to conform to
the appeal procedures outlined in the TBOR. 
Section 2 of the LTSA provides:
1060496
18
"The Legislature hereby finds and declares that the
enactment by this state of a simplified system of
local sales, use, rental, and lodgings taxes which
may 
be 
levied 
by 
or 
for 
the 
benefit 
of
municipalities and counties in Alabama effectuates
desirable public policy by promoting understanding
of and compliance with applicable local tax laws.
The Legislature does therefore declare that the
provisions of this act are intended to accomplish
these purposes."
(Emphasis added.)
The LTSA amended § 11-3-11.2, Ala. Code 1975, to provide,
in part:
"(b) Any county commission which elects to
administer 
and 
collect, 
or 
contract 
for 
the
collection of, any local sales and use taxes or
other local taxes, shall have the same rights,
remedies, power and authority, including the right
to adopt and implement the same procedures, as would
be available to the Department of Revenue if the tax
or taxes were being administered, enforced, and
collected by the Department of Revenue."
In the same legislative session during which it passed the
LTSA, the legislature also passed the "Local Tax Procedures
Act of 1998," Act No. 98-191, Ala. Acts 1998 ("the LTPA").
Section 5 of the LTPA added § 40-2A-13(a), Ala. Code 1975, to
the TBOR, which provides:
"The Department of Revenue, a governing body of a
self-administered county or municipality, or an
agent of such a municipality or county may not
conduct an examination of a taxpayer's books and
records for compliance with applicable sales, use,
1060496
19
rental, or lodgings tax laws except in accordance
with this section and with the Alabama Taxpayers'
Bill of Rights and Uniform Revenue Procedures Act."
This Court in Red Bay held that the LTSA made the
administrative-appeal 
procedures 
in 
the 
TBOR 
"equally
applicable to tax assessments and tax-collection procedures by
local taxing authorities such as the City [of Red Bay] and
[Franklin] County."  894 So. 2d at 653.  This Court reached
that conclusion in part by reading  § 11-3-11.2 and § 40-2A-
13(a) together.  The Court also explained:
"The Alabama Administrative Code (Department of
Revenue), implementing the TBOR, sets forth the
following regulations:
"'This chapter sets forth the rules to
be used by the Alabama Department of
Revenue in the administration of Chapter 2A
of Title 40, Code of Ala. 1975, passed
during 
the 
1992 
regular 
legislative
session.  Chapter 2A of Title 40, Code of
Ala. 1975, titled the "Alabama Taxpayers'
Bill 
of 
Rights 
and 
Uniform 
Revenue
Procedures Act," was enacted to provide
equitable and uniform procedures for the
operation of the Department and for all
taxpayers when dealing with the Department.
These rules are promulgated to implement
the [TBOR] and clarify the rights of the
Alabama 
taxpayer 
and 
the 
role 
and
responsibilities of the Department in
administering the state's tax laws.'
"Ala. Admin. Code (Department of Revenue) r. 810-14-
1-.01 (emphasis added).  
1060496
20
"The City [of Red Bay] and [Franklin] County ask
us to restrict the Department's embrace of the TBOR
as 
applicable 
to counties and municipalities,
arguing that if the Legislature had intended for the
TBOR to apply to all counties and municipalities, it
could have so specified.  In their brief to this
Court, the City and the County contend that 'only
the "direct pay permit and drive-out certificate
procedures, statutes of limitations, penalties,
fines, punishments, and deductions" of § 40-2A-7 of
the TBOR are applicable to municipalities under §
11-51-201 as a result of the [LTSA].  Because the
administrative remedies contained within § 40-2A-7
are not specifically listed, they do not apply.'
They further contend that § 11-3-11.2 'merely
clarifies that "[a]ny rules and regulations adopted
or utilized by the county or its designee shall be
consistent with the rules and regulations adopted
through the provisions of the Alabama Administrative
Procedures Act [§ 41-22-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975]."
Nothing in this section requires that a county must
undergo administrative remedies prior to filing
suit.'
"We do not read the language of the TBOR, the
LTSA, and the regulations adopted by the Department
so narrowly.  The statutes amended by the LTSA
clearly 
adopt 
the 
administrative 
rules 
and
regulations 
promulgated 
by 
the 
Department 
to
implement the TBOR, thus making municipalities and
counties 
subject 
to 
the 
statutory 
mandates
applicable to both taxing authorities and taxpayers
alike when enforcing the State's tax laws.  
"GMAC also points to § 40-2A-13(a) of the TBOR
.... 
"'....'
"They contend that § 11-3-11.2, § 11-51-201, and §
40-2A-13(a) combine to obligate municipalities and
1060496
21
counties to follow the Department's tax-collection
procedures and to comply with the TBOR in the same
manner as the Department must.  
"In response to this contention, the City and
the County argue that § 40-2A-13(a) of the TBOR
deals exclusively with examining a taxpayer's books
and records and does not make the provisions of the
TBOR applicable to cities and counties.  The fact
that 
the 
Legislature 
specifically 
listed
municipalities and counties in § 40-2A-13(a), they
argue, indicates that the Legislature intended that
only certain sections of the TBOR apply to local
taxing entities.  Again, we find this argument a
narrow and strained interpretation of the TBOR and
the LTSA.  It ignores the fact that the LTSA was
passed at the very same session of the Legislature
as, and became effective on the same day as, the act
codified as § 40-2A-13.  We decline to read one
section of the statutory scheme in isolation.  When
we consider both the TBOR and the LTSA in their
entirety, we can only conclude that the TBOR applies
not only to the Department and taxpayers, but also
to municipalities and counties."
894 So. 2d at 654-55.
The Tax Board contends that Red Bay is distinguishable
because, the Tax Board argues, the Tax Board is not the "agent
or alter ego of" and "is not controlled by [Tuscaloosa]
County."  The Tax Board contends that its alleged status as a
non-agent is important because § 11-3-11.2 applies to a
"county commission" and 40-2A-13(a) applies to "a governing
1060496
Section 40-2A-3(21) defines a "self-administered county
5
or municipality" as:
"A county or municipality that administers its own
sales and use taxes or other local municipal or
county taxes levied or authorized to be levied by a
general or local act, or contracts out all or part
of that function to a private auditing or collecting
firm. The term does not include any of the
following:
"a. A county or municipality that allows the
department to administer a sales, use, rental, or
lodgings tax which is levied by or on behalf of that
county or municipality.
"b. A municipality or county that levies a gross
receipts tax in the nature of a sales tax, as
defined in subdivision (8). A county or municipality
that both self-administers a sales, use, rental, or
lodgings tax and allows the department to administer
a sales, use, rental, or lodgings tax that is levied
by or on behalf of the county or municipality is
only a self-administered county or municipality with
respect to those sales, use, rental, or lodgings
taxes that the county or municipality administers
itself or for those taxes that it contracts for the
collection."
22
body of a self-administered county"  or its "agent."  However,
5
§ 2 of the LTSA states that it is intended to simplify the
system of "local sales, use, rental, and lodgings taxes which
may be levied by or for the benefit of municipalities and
counties in Alabama."  (Emphasis added.)  Under the local act,
it is undisputed that the Tax Board collects taxes for the
1060496
23
benefit of Tuscaloosa County.  See, e.g., Act No. 94-554, § 1,
amending § 11(a) of Act No. 56 to provide:
"After deduction of [certain] expenses, the tax
board shall distribute the remaining proceeds from
the said taxes as follows: 
"(a) One hundred per cent (100%) of the proceeds
held or collected pursuant to Sections 3A [levying
a special sales tax] and 4A [levying a special use
tax] of this Act shall be paid to the governing body
of Tuscaloosa County for general county purposes."
(Emphasis added.)  Assuming, without deciding, that the Tax
Board is not the agent of Tuscaloosa County, we are not
persuaded that it is outside the reach of the LTSA.
The Tax Board also argues that Red Bay is distinguishable
because "local laws pertaining to the City [of Red Bay] and
[Fayette] County ... indicate that they are obligated to
comply with the same statutory provisions as those that
regulate the Department, including the TBOR." 894 So. 2d at
655.  In the present case, however, the Tax Board points to
the following emphasized language in § 4(b) of the local act:
"All provisions and procedures with respect to the
filing of returns, collection and payment of taxes,
keeping of records, making of reports, determination
of 
the 
amount 
of 
the 
tax 
due, 
penalties,
assessments, notices, examinations of taxpayers and
their books provided in the state use tax statutes
with respect to the tax levied in those statutes
shall be applicable to the tax levied in this
1060496
24
section 
excepting, however, the procedure for
appeals from assessments, and such appeals shall be
made as hereafter set forth; provided, however, that
any procedure or provision involving the State
Department of Revenue which is incorporated herein
by reference to the use tax statutes shall be deemed
to apply, with respect to the tax levied in this
section, to the tax board."
We do not agree with the Tax Board that Red Bay is
distinguishable on that basis.  This Court in Red Bay cited
the language of the local acts merely as additional authority
in support of the Court's conclusion that the effect of the
LTSA was to apply the TBOR procedures to local taxing
authorities.  See Red Bay, 894 So. 2d at 655 ("When we
consider both the TBOR and the LTSA in their entirety, we can
only conclude that the TBOR applies not only to the Department
and taxpayers, but also to municipalities and counties."
(emphasis added)). 
The Tax Board also notes that the 1994 and 1996
amendments to the local act, which occurred after the passage
of the TBOR (but before the passage of the LTSA), did not
change the language the Tax Board quotes from § 4(b) of the
local act.  But that observation does not advance the Tax
Board's argument, because the LTSA was enacted in 1998, after
the 1994 and 1996 amendments to the local act. 
1060496
25
As noted, the LTSA, as construed in Red Bay, "made the
TBOR equally applicable to tax assessments and tax-collection
procedures by local taxing authorities such as the City [of
Red Bay] and [Franklin] County."  894 So. 2d at 653.  The
specific TBOR procedure at issue in the present case is the
statutory right of the taxpayer, as stated in § 40-2A-7(b)(5)
and § 40-2A-9(g) of the TBOR, to pursue an administrative
appeal before the time begins to run for the taxpayer to file
a notice of appeal in an appropriate circuit court.  That
statutory procedure, as noted, is in direct conflict with that
part of the procedure outlined in § 10 of the local act, which
does not guarantee the taxpayer the right to obtain a ruling
in an administrative appeal before the time begins to run for
filing a notice of appeal to the appropriate circuit court.
Section 11 of the LTSA provides:
"Subject to the limitations and exceptions provided
in Section 11-3-11.2, Code of Alabama 1975, as
amended by this act, any specific provisions of a
local or general law in direct conflict with a
specific provision of this act is hereby repealed.
The repeal of such portion, however, shall not
affect the remaining provisions of the local or
general law not in direct conflict with a specific
provision of this act."
Notably, the LTSA specifically provides that certain
1060496
26
types of local acts were not amended or repealed by the LTSA.
See § 11-3-11.2(c), Ala. Code 1975 (extending the operation of
local acts that authorize a county commission only to contract
with a designee for the enforcement of any tax enacted by the
county); § 11-3-11.2(d) (pertaining to local acts that
establish or limit the amount a county may retain for costs of
collection or may pay to a designee for collection).  The
implication of these provisions, especially when considered
together with the purposes stated in § 2 of the LTSA and the
general repealer clause in § 11 of the LTSA, is that the
legislature intended that those local acts affecting the
various counties be amended or repealed unless excepted by the
LTSA.
A general act may amend or repeal a local act by express
words or by necessary implication.  Vaughan v. Moore, 379 So.
2d 1240, 1241 (Ala. 1980). 
"Whether the enactment of a general law repeals
a preexisting local law is, of course, dependent
upon ascertaining the legislature's intent from the
language used. Champion v. McLean, 266 Ala. 103, 95
So. 2d 82 (1957).  Certain principles applied in
earlier cases, e.g. Connor v. State, 275 Ala. 230,
153 So. 2d 787 (1963), and expressed in Sutherland,
Statutes and Statutory Construction (Sands 4th ed.
1985) § 23.15 at 245, have been helpful in resolving
such an issue:
1060496
27
"'The enactment of a general law broad
enough in its scope and application to
cover the field of operation of a special
or local statute will generally not repeal
a statute which limits its operation to a
particular phase of the subject covered by
the general law.... An implied repeal of
prior statutes will be restricted to
statutes of the same general nature, since
the legislature is presumed to have known
of the existence of prior special or
particular 
legislation, 
and 
to 
have
contemplated only a general treatment of
the 
subject 
matter 
by 
the 
general
enactment.  Therefore, where the later
general 
statute 
does 
not 
present 
an
irreconcilable conflict the prior special
statute will be construed as remaining in
effect as a qualification of or exception
to the general law.
"'However, since there is no rule of
law to prevent the repeal of a special by
a later general statute, prior special or
local 
statutes 
may 
be 
repealed 
by
implication from the enactment of a later
general statute where the legislative
intent 
to 
effectuate 
a 
repeal 
is
unequivocally expressed.  A repeal will
also 
result 
by 
implication 
when 
a
comprehensive revision of a particular
subject 
is 
promulgated, 
or 
upon 
the
predication of a statewide system of
administration 
to 
replace 
previous
regulation 
by 
localities.' 
(Footnotes
omitted.)
"To the same effect is this Court's observation on
repeals by implication contained in Connor, supra,
275 Ala. at 234, 153 So. 2d at 791-92, quoting from
50 Am. Jur. Statutes, § 564:
1060496
28
"'There is no rule which prohibits the
repeal by implication of a special or
specific act by a general or broad one.
The question is always one of legislative
intention, and the special or specific act
must yield to the later general or broad
act, where there is a manifest legislative
intent that the general act shall be of
universal application notwithstanding the
prior special or specific act.  It is,
however, equally true that the policy
against implied repeals has peculiar and
special 
force 
when 
the 
conflicting
provisions, which are thought to work a
repeal, are contained in a special or
specific act and a later general or broad
act.  In such case, there is a presumption
that the general or broad law was not
designed to repeal the special or specific
act, but that the special or specific act
was intended to remain in force as an
exception to the general or broad act, and
there is a tendency to hold that where
there are two acts, one special or specific
act which certainly includes the matter in
question, and the other a general act which
standing alone would include the same
matter so that the provisions of the two
conflict, the special or specific act must
be given the effect of establishing an
exception to the general or broad act.
Hence, 
it 
is 
a 
canon 
of 
statutory
construction that a later statute general
in its terms and not expressly repealing a
prior special or specific statute, will be
considered as not intended to affect the
special or specific provisions of the
earlier statute, unless the intention to
effect the repeal is clearly manifested or
u n a v o i d a b l y  
i m p l i e d  
b y  
t h e
irreconcilability 
of 
the 
continued
operation of both, or unless there is
1060496
29
something in the general law or in the
course of legislation upon its subject
matter that makes it manifest that the
legislature contemplated and intended a
repeal.  Unless there is a plain indication
of an intent that the general act shall
repeal the special act, the special act
will continue to have effect, and the
general words with which it conflicts will
be restrained and modified accordingly, so
that the two are to be deemed to stand
together, one as the general law of the
land, and the other as the law of the
particular case.'"
Day v. Morgan County Comm'n, 487 So. 2d 856, 858-59 (Ala.
1986) (emphasis added).
The LTSA is the type of comprehensive statewide revision
of a particular subject that this Court in Day, supra,
contemplated can amend or repeal prior local acts.  This Court
has noted the manifest legislative intent in enacting the
LTSA, i.e., that the LTSA, a general act, shall be of
universal application in order to bring uniformity to local
taxing systems.  Red Bay, 894 So. 2d at 655.  Furthermore, the
LTSA specifically refers to the types of special and local
acts the legislature did not intend to repeal or amend,
thereby evidencing its intent to amend or repeal the remaining
provisions of special and local laws that conflict with the
LTSA.  See LTSA § 11; § 11-3-11.2(c) and (d).  The Tax Board
1060496
The Tax Board cites § 11-3-11.2(b) as evidence of
6
legislative intent to the contrary; that section provides, in
relevant part:
"If 
a 
specific 
provision 
of 
the 
rules 
and
regulations 
of 
the 
Department 
of 
Revenue 
is
inconsistent with a specific provision of a local
act, resolution, or general law authorizing or
levying a local tax, including a gross receipts tax
in the nature of a sales tax, as defined in Section
40-2A-3(8), which was enacted or adopted prior to
February 25, 1997, the local act, resolution, or
general law provision shall prevail."
In the present case, the appeal provision in conflict with the
local act is not set forth in a rule or regulation of the
Department of Revenue; it is set forth in § 40-2A-7(b)(5) and
§ 40-2A-9(g) of the TBOR.  Consequently, § 11-3-11.2(b) does
not suggest that the LTSA does not apply the administrative-
appeal process in § 40-2A-7(b)(5) and § 40-2A-9(g) to appeals
from final assessments issued by the Tax Board. 
30
has not demonstrated that the unique appeal procedure of the
local act, which is in conflict with the appeal procedure
provided in the TBOR, falls within any of the excepted
categories of statutes.6
In sum, we see nothing in the LTSA indicating that the
administrative-appeal procedure stated in § 40-2A-7(b)(5) and
§ 40-2A-9(g) of the TBOR should not also apply to the Tax
Board, the local taxing authority in this case.  Therefore, we
hold that the LTSA effectively amended § 10 of the local act
to incorporate an administrative-appeal process in conformity
1060496
In the event that this Court ruled that the LTSA and the
7
TBOR did not require the Tax Board to offer an administrative-
appeal process, the Company argued that principles of
equitable estoppel, such as those outlined in Ex parte State
Department of Human Resources, 548 So. 2d 176 (Ala. 1988),
should prevent the Company's appeal from being dismissed as
untimely filed.  
In Ex parte State Department of Human Resources, the
Department 
of 
Human 
Resources 
("DHR") 
had 
adopted 
a 
regulation
that authorized a party to appeal from a DHR-administrative
ruling by filing a timely notice of appeal with the
appropriate circuit court.  548 So. 2d at 177.  However, the
statutory provision governing appeals from DHR-administrative
proceedings required the party to file a timely notice of
appeal with DHR in addition to filing a petition with the
circuit court. 548 So. 2d at 176.  After the petitioner in
that case relied on the regulation and filed a timely notice
of appeal with the circuit court but not with DHR, DHR
contended that the petitioner's appeal should be dismissed
because he had not filed a timely notice of appeal with DHR in
accordance with the statute. 548 So. 2d at 177.  This Court
held that DHR did not have the authority to adopt a regulation
creating an appeal process that conflicted with the statutory
appeal process.  However, applying principles of equitable
31
with § 40-2A-7(b)(5) and § 40-2A-9(g) of the TBOR.
Under the facts as alleged in the complaint, the Company
filed a notice of administrative appeal to the Tax Board
within 30 days of the final assessment.  Because the Company
had the right, under the LTSA and the TBOR, to file an
administrative appeal after the final assessment, the Tax
Board's May 31, 2006, letter operated, in effect, as a denial
of the Company's administrative appeal.   The Company filed a
7
1060496
estoppel, this Court refused to dismiss the appeal as
untimely, noting that "it would be unfair to permit the
Department to now rely on its own wrongdoing in order to deny
[the petitioner] an appeal."  548 So. 2d at 179.
In the present case, however, the appeal to the circuit
court was timely filed under the governing statutory
provisions.  Consequently, we are not required to consider
whether principles of equitable estoppel should apply. 
Because 
the 
trial 
court 
dismissed 
the 
Company's 
remaining
8
claims not on the merits but on the basis that they were
untimely filed, we express no opinion on the merits of those
remaining claims. 
32
notice of appeal to the circuit court within 30 days of the
Tax Board's May 31, 2006, letter; therefore, under the
procedure outlined in § 40-2A-9(g), the Company's notice of
appeal to the circuit court was timely.  Consequently, the
trial court erred in dismissing the Company's notice of appeal
as untimely. Because the notice of appeal was timely filed,
the trial court erred in dismissing the Company's remaining
claims as an impermissible substitute for a timely appeal.8
Conclusion
The judgment of the trial court dismissing the Company's
action is reversed, and the cause is remanded for proceedings
consistent with this opinion. 
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Cobb, C.J., and See, Woodall, and Parker, JJ., concur.