Title: Boermeester v. Carry
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S263180
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: July 31, 2023

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
MATTHEW BOERMEESTER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
AINSLEY CARRY et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
 
S263180 
 
Second Appellate District, Division Two 
B290675 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
BS170473 
 
 
July 31, 2023 
 
Justice Groban authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, 
Jenkins, and Evans concurred. 
 
1 
BOERMEESTER v. CARRY 
S263180 
 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
In recent years, courts in California and throughout the 
nation, as well as the California Legislature and the United 
States Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR), 
have 
attempted 
to 
determine 
the 
precise 
procedures 
universities1 must utilize when investigating and disciplining 
students accused of sexual misconduct or intimate partner 
violence.  This judicial and legislative activity likely began in 
response to a “Dear Colleague” letter relating to title IX of the 
Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.) (Title 
IX) that the OCR issued in 2011, which gave guidance on the 
specific procedures federally funded universities should 
implement when investigating sexual harassment allegations.  
The letter sought to stymie the rising tide of sexual assault on 
campuses by making it easier for victims to prove their claims 
in university disciplinary actions.  Though the letter was 
rescinded in 2017, students accused of sexual misconduct or 
intimate partner violence continue to challenge many of the 
disciplinary procedures universities have since implemented, 
asserting that these procedures create an unfair process which 
may result in universities mistakenly imposing severe sanctions 
upon accused students, including expulsion.  
 
1 
In this opinion, we use the term “universities” to refer to 
all postsecondary educational institutions.    
BOERMEESTER v. CARRY 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
2 
In this case, respondents University of Southern 
California and its Vice President of Student Affairs, Ainsley 
Carry 
(collectively, 
USC) 
expelled 
appellant 
Matthew 
Boermeester from the private university after conducting a two-
month investigation and determining that he violated USC’s 
policy 
against 
engaging 
in 
intimate 
partner 
violence.  
Boermeester filed a petition for a writ of administrative 
mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 (section 
1094.5), alleging that he was deprived of the “fair trial” required 
by that section.  A divided Court of Appeal agreed, with the 
majority concluding that “USC’s disciplinary procedures . . . 
were unfair because they denied Boermeester a meaningful 
opportunity to cross-examine critical witnesses at an in-person 
hearing.”  (Boermeester v. Carry (June 4, 2020, B290675) review 
granted and opn. ordered nonpub. Sept. 16, 2020, S263180.)  
More specifically, the Court of Appeal majority determined that 
USC’s disciplinary procedures were unfair because USC should 
have afforded Boermeester the opportunity to attend a live 
hearing at which he or his advisor-attorney would directly cross-
examine the alleged victim, Jane Roe,2 as well as the third party 
witnesses, or indirectly cross-examine them by submitting 
questions for USC’s adjudicators to ask them at the live hearing.  
(Boermeester v. Carry, supra, B290675.)  The Court of Appeal 
majority made clear that the witnesses need not be “physically 
present to allow the accused student to confront them” and could 
instead appear “by videoconference, or by another method that 
would facilitate the assessment of credibility.”  (Ibid.)  
 
2  
Like the Court of Appeal, we refer to Roe and the other 
witnesses in a manner that protects their privacy.  (Cal. Rules 
of Court, rule 8.90.) 
BOERMEESTER v. CARRY 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
3 
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal majority believed that 
accused students must be able to contemporaneously hear and 
observe the real-time testimony of the accuser and other 
witnesses at a live hearing to have a “meaningful opportunity to 
respond to the evidence against [them]” and ask follow-up 
questions.  (Ibid.)  
We hold that, though private universities are required to 
comply with the common law doctrine of fair procedure by 
providing accused students with notice of the charges and a 
meaningful opportunity to be heard, they are not required to 
provide accused students the opportunity to directly or 
indirectly cross-examine the accuser and other witnesses at a 
live hearing with the accused student in attendance, either in 
person or virtually.  Requiring private universities to conduct 
the sort of hearing the Court of Appeal majority envisioned 
would be contrary to our long-standing fair procedure 
admonition that courts should not attempt to fix any rigid 
procedures that private organizations must “invariably” adopt.  
(Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Society of Orthodontists (1974) 
12 Cal.3d 541, 555 (Pinsker II).)  Instead, private organizations 
should “retain the initial and primary responsibility for devising 
a method” to ensure adequate notice and a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard.  (Ibid.)  We accordingly reverse the 
Court of Appeal’s judgment.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
This matter comes to us on appeal from a judgment on a 
petition for a writ of administrative mandate made pursuant to 
section 1094.5.  Our recitation of the facts is accordingly derived 
solely from the administrative record.  (Sierra Club v. California 
Coastal Com. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 839, 864; accord, Pomona Valley 
BOERMEESTER v. CARRY 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
4 
Hospital 
Medical 
Center 
v. 
Superior 
Court 
(1997) 
55 Cal.App.4th 93, 101.)      
A.  USC’s Policies 
The USC student conduct code in effect at the time of the 
incident in question prohibited students from engaging in 
intimate partner violence, which it defined as “violence 
committed against a person . . . with whom [the accused student 
has] had a previous or current dating, romantic, intimate, or 
sexual relationship.”  Violence, in turn, was defined as “causing 
physical harm to the person.”  Upon receiving a report of 
intimate partner violence or other prohibited conduct, USC’s 
Title IX office would conduct an intake interview of the accuser 
or alleged victim.3  If USC decided to open a formal 
investigation, it would notify the accuser and the accused 
student of the investigation and the alleged policy violations.  
USC would also assign a Title IX investigator to the matter, who 
would gather facts and interview witnesses.  Upon completion 
of the investigation, USC would provide the accuser and the 
accused student “individual and separate” opportunities to 
review the gathered evidence.  After reviewing the evidence, the 
accuser and the accused student would be given “individual and 
separate” opportunities to respond to the evidence through an 
“evidence hearing” held at the Title IX office and conducted by 
 
3  
All universities that receive federal financial assistance 
must designate at least one employee, referred to as the Title IX 
coordinator, as being responsible for ensuring compliance with 
Title IX.  (34 C.F.R. § 106.8(a) (2023).)  At the time of the 
incident in question, USC had a Title IX office consisting of a 
Title IX coordinator, who oversaw the office, and Title IX 
investigators, 
who 
investigated 
specific 
allegations 
of 
misconduct.   
BOERMEESTER v. CARRY 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
5 
USC’s Title IX coordinator.  USC would also provide the accuser 
and the accused student the opportunity to submit questions for 
the Title IX coordinator to ask one another at their separate 
hearings.  If either student shared new information during their 
separate hearing, USC would provide the other student an 
opportunity to review and respond to the new evidence. 
At the conclusion of the evidence hearings, the Title IX 
investigator would prepare a summary administrative review 
(SAR) which, using a preponderance of the evidence standard, 
would make factual findings and conclusions as to whether the 
accused student violated one or more of USC’s policies.  If the 
SAR found that a policy was violated, the SAR would be 
forwarded to a misconduct sanctioning panel, composed of one 
undergraduate student and two staff designated by the provost 
and senior vice president for academic affairs, to impose 
sanctions.  Either the accuser or the accused student could file 
a written appeal.  The appeal would be reviewed by an appellate 
panel composed of three individuals appointed by the vice 
president for student affairs.  The vice president of student 
affairs had the discretion to accept or reject the appellate panel’s 
recommendations and made the final decision.  Throughout the 
process — from investigation to final adjudication — both the 
accuser and accused student were allowed to receive support 
and assistance from an advisor of their choice, who could be an 
attorney. 
B. The Incident 
Boermeester and Roe were students at USC who had an 
“ ‘on and off’ ” romantic relationship from approximately March 
2016 to October 2016.  Although they were no longer in a 
relationship by January 21, 2017 — the date the incident 
BOERMEESTER v. CARRY 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
6 
occurred — the two often spent time together and Boermeester 
regularly stayed the night at Roe’s apartment.   
USC’s Title IX office received a report of an incident that 
took place on January 21, 2017.  The office assigned a Title IX 
investigator to investigate the incident, who interviewed Roe 
two days later.  Roe explained that, on the night of the incident, 
Boermeester called her and asked her to pick him up from a 
party.  He was the “ ‘drunkest’ ” she had ever seen him.  Roe had 
her dog with her, and when they arrived at Roe’s apartment and 
exited the car, Boermeester instructed Roe to drop her dog’s 
leash.  She did not want to do so, so he grabbed the back of her 
hair “ ‘hard’ ” and said “ ‘drop the fucking leash.’ ”  Roe said 
“ ‘No’ ” and Boermeester grabbed her harder, causing her to drop 
the leash because it “ ‘hurt.’ ”  Boermeester then grabbed the 
front of Roe’s throat and neck, causing her to cough.  She was 
able to breathe but stated that the pressure “ ‘hurt.’ ”  
Boermeester laughed and let go of her neck, but then grabbed 
her by the neck again and pushed her “ ‘hard,’ ” forcing her head 
against the concrete wall along the alley behind her apartment 
duplex.  Boermeester again let her go, but then grabbed her neck 
once more and again hit her head against the wall.  Roe’s head 
hurt from the impact.   
Roe also provided the Title IX investigator with a detailed 
account of prior instances of physical violence perpetrated by 
Boermeester.  She described Boermeester as being “ ‘mean’ ” 
and “ ‘always putting [her] down,’ ” and she read a list of 
demeaning things he had said to her within a 24-hour period, 
which she had catalogued on her phone.  Roe requested an 
avoidance of contact order prohibiting Boermeester from 
contacting her and requested temporary emergency housing.   
BOERMEESTER v. CARRY 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
7 
There were two eyewitnesses to the incident.  A student, 
D.H., reported to the Title IX investigator that sometime after 
midnight on January 21, 2017, he heard a male yelling loudly in 
the alley next to the apartment duplex D.H. shared with Roe.  
D.H. looked out the window and saw Boermeester pinning Roe 
against a wall with his hand around her neck.  He also saw Roe’s 
dog running up and down the street, which D.H. perceived as a 
problem because Roe never allowed her dog to run freely.  He 
awakened his roommate, T.S., who did not see the incident but 
accompanied D.H. outside.  D.H. and T.S. escorted Roe back to 
their apartment.  D.H. reported that Roe seemed “ ‘pretty 
scared’ ” but she refused to sleep at their apartment because she 
did not want to make Boermeester “ ‘more mad.’ ”  Roe told the 
investigator that she refused to spend the night at D.H.’s and 
T.S.’s apartment because Boermeester “ ‘wouldn’t understand,’ ” 
and so she returned to her own apartment to avoid “ ‘mak[ing] 
it worse.’ ”  Later the same day, D.H. reported the incident to 
the men’s tennis coach, who in turn reported it to the Title IX 
office.    
A second eyewitness, M.B.2, was interviewed twice.  
Initially, he told the Title IX investigator that he saw Roe 
arguing with a male he did not recognize but did not see any 
physical contact between the two.  Later, however, he called the 
Title IX investigator to report that he “ ‘saw everything’ ” and 
wished to speak with the investigator again.  During the second 
interview, M.B.2 explained that he “ ‘tried to downplay’ the 
incident” in his initial interview both because he believed Roe 
was scared of Boermeester and because Roe had asked M.B.2 to 
“ ‘keep it on the down low.’ ”  M.B.2 reported during his second 
interview that he, like D.H., heard screaming in the alley near 
his residence on the night in question.  He looked out the window 
BOERMEESTER v. CARRY 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
8 
and saw Boermeester standing in front of Roe with both hands 
around her neck.  Boermeester pushed Roe into the alley wall 
and Roe made “ ‘gagging’ ” sounds.  Based on his observations, 
M.B.2 stated that Boermeester “ ‘is violent’ ” and “ ‘domestically 
was abusing [Roe].’ ”  M.B.2 grabbed a trash bag, went outside, 
and asked Roe and Boermeester how things were going, which 
“ ‘broke it up.’ ”   
In his own interview with the Title IX investigator, 
Boermeester admitted that he had instructed Roe to release her 
dog, and then put his hand around her neck while she was 
against the alleyway wall.  But he insisted that the act 
amounted to playful “ ‘horsing around’ ” or sexual foreplay — 
not intimate partner violence.             
USC’s Title IX office obtained surveillance video of the 
incident.  As the Court of Appeal majority observed, the video is 
“grainy and there is no audio”; Boermeester and Roe “are small 
figures in the frame of the video” since the camera “is positioned 
approximately two buildings away from [them]”; and “the 
interaction between Boermeester and Roe when they are near 
the wall [is] barely visible.”  (Boermeester v. Carry, supra, 
B290675.)  Nevertheless, the following events can be seen, as 
described by both the superior court and the Court of Appeal 
majority:  “ ‘At 12:16:16 a.m., the video shows [Boermeester] 
shoving Roe from the area adjacent to the house into the 
alleyway.  At 12:16:50, [Boermeester] appears to be holding 
Roe’s neck or upper body area.  At 12:17:12, [Boermeester] grabs 
Roe by the neck and pushes her toward the wall of the alley.  At 
12:17:13 and 12:17:14, Roe’s head and body arch backwards.  
Between 12:17:16 and 12:17:26, [Boermeester] and Roe are 
against the wall and barely visible from the camera.  At 
12:17:26, [Boermeester] backs away from the wall and re-enters 
BOERMEESTER v. CARRY 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
9 
the camera’s view.  At 12:17:28, Roe re-enters the camera’s view.  
Roe and [Boermeester] proceed to push each other.  At 12:17:38, 
[Boermeester] moves toward Roe and appears to be pushing her 
against the wall.  At 12:17:40, a dog can be seen running across 
the alley.  At 12:17:57, a third party enters the camera’s view 
and walks in the direction of [Boermeester] and Roe.  At that 
moment, [Boermeester] and Roe walk away from the wall and 
back towards the house.  At 12:18:19, the third party walks over 
to the dumpster, places a trash bag inside, and walks back 
toward the house.’ ”  (Ibid.)    
Over the course of USC’s investigation, the Title IX 
investigator interviewed both parties (as noted) and 16 
additional witnesses (including D.H., T.S., and M.B.2), and also 
gathered documentary evidence including the video and text 
messages.  Roe did not want to participate in the investigation 
and discouraged other witnesses from testifying against 
Boermeester.  Two days after her initial interview, she told the 
Title IX investigator she was “ ‘freaked out’ ” that Boermeester 
would learn of the investigation and she feared retaliation from 
USC’s football team (Boermeester was a member of the team).  
The next day, she reiterated that she was “freaked out” and 
stressed that Boermeester “can’t know I made a statement” and 
“can’t know I met with you guys.”  After Boermeester was given 
notice of the investigation, Roe stated that she no longer “ ‘fully 
believe[d]’ ” the statements she made during her initial 
interview and asked if she could withdraw her statement and 
the avoidance of contact order, explaining she did not want 
Boermeester to be “ ‘mad’ ” at her and she did not “ ‘trust’ ” that 
it would be clearly conveyed to Boermeester that the 
investigation was initiated by the Title IX office.  Roe also 
expressed concern that Boermeester would be punished too 
BOERMEESTER v. CARRY 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
10 
harshly.  After the investigation was reported in the media, Roe 
published a tweet on Twitter stating that “I am the one involved 
in the investigation with Matt Boermeester.  The report is false.”     
At the conclusion of the investigation, Boermeester and 
Roe separately reviewed the evidence with their advisor-
attorneys at the Title IX office.  The parties declined to attend 
their separate hearings or to submit questions for USC’s Title 
IX coordinator to ask one another during their hearings.  
Instead, they opted to submit separate written statements 
responding to the evidence.  In her written statement, Roe 
recanted her initial statement and claimed the Title IX office 
manipulated her into saying exaggerated or untrue things about 
Boermeester and their relationship.  Specifically, Roe explained 
that she believed her initial discussion with the Title IX office 
was a “counseling session where [she] was free to vent about 
[her] relationship or blow off steam,” but she later felt that the 
office was “trying to get [her] to say bad things about 
[Boermeester] so that they could use those things against him.”  
She further claimed that, had she understood the true nature of 
the meeting, she “would not have said many of the things [she] 
said and [she] would have made a greater effort to be accurate.”  
Finally, she emphasized that Boermeester never “hit, choked, 
kicked, pushed or otherwise physically abused” her.  (Boldface 
omitted.)   
The Title IX investigator issued an SAR concluding that 
Boermeester violated USC’s student conduct code by (1) 
engaging in intimate partner violence and (2) violating the 
interim avoidance of contact order.   The SAR was forwarded to 
a misconduct sanctioning panel, which recommended expulsion.  
Boermeester appealed to an appellate panel, which agreed that 
Boermeester physically harmed Roe — and thus engaged in 
BOERMEESTER v. CARRY 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
11 
intimate partner violence — but was “less certain as to whether 
[Boermeester] intentionally physically harmed [Roe].”  The 
appellate panel acknowledged that intent “is not a required 
element” for proving intimate partner violence as defined by 
USC’s policy, but nevertheless felt that intent was relevant for 
sanctioning purposes and accordingly recommended reducing 
the sanction to a two-year suspension and completion of a 52-
week intimate partner violence program.  The Vice President of 
Student Affairs, respondent Carry, rejected the appellate 
panel’s recommendation to reduce the sanction of expulsion.  
She explained that, whether Boermeester intended to cause Roe 
physical harm or did so recklessly, expulsion was appropriate 
given the nature of the harm inflicted.   
Boermeester filed a section 1094.5 petition for writ of 
administrative mandate, which the superior court denied.  A 
divided Court of Appeal reversed, with the majority concluding 
that USC’s disciplinary procedures were unfair because 
Boermeester was unable to directly or indirectly question Roe 
and the third party witnesses in real time at a live hearing.  
(Boermeester v. Carry, supra, B290675.)  The Court of Appeal 
majority declined to reach Boermeester’s other claims regarding 
fairness, including his assertion that USC’s disciplinary 
procedures were unfair because USC’s Title IX investigator held 
the dual roles of investigator and adjudicator.  (Ibid.)  We 
granted review to determine whether the Court of Appeal 
majority was correct in concluding that USC should have held a 
live hearing featuring real-time direct or indirect cross-
examination of all parties and witnesses (whether conducted in-
BOERMEESTER v. CARRY 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
12 
person or virtually) with an opportunity for Boermeester to ask 
the witnesses follow-up questions.4 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Writ of Administrative Review    
A writ of administrative review brought pursuant to 
section 1094.5 allows for judicial review of quasi-judicial 
decisions that are made “as the result of a proceeding in which 
by law a hearing is required to be given, evidence is required to 
be taken, and discretion in the determination of facts is vested 
in the inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or officer.”  (§ 1094.5, 
subd. (a).)  Judicial review is limited to “whether the respondent 
 
4  
The Court of Appeal was split as to whether Boermeester 
forfeited his right to challenge USC’s failure to provide him with 
a live hearing featuring direct or indirect cross-examination of 
Roe and the other witnesses.  Justice Wiley emphasized in his 
dissent that Boermeester did not submit cross-examination 
questions for USC’s adjudicators to ask Roe and “never requested 
live cross-examination” of Roe or the other witnesses.  
(Boermeester v. Carry, supra, B290675 (dis. opn. of Wiley, J.).)  
The Court of Appeal majority declined to find forfeiture, 
deciding that it would have been futile for Boermeester to 
request cross-examination at a live hearing since neither USC’s 
policies nor the law at the time allowed for it.  (Boermeester v. 
Carry, supra, B290675.)  
 
Neither party asks that we resolve this matter on 
forfeiture grounds.  USC instead urges us to resolve the issue on 
the merits, noting the need for “clear guidance on what the 
common law actually requires.”  We find that the issues raised 
are important and recurring, and accordingly exercise our 
discretion to reach the merits without deciding whether 
Boermeester forfeited his claims.  (See Teacher v. California 
Western School of Law (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 111, 129; JMS Air 
Conditioning & Appliance Service, Inc. v. Santa Monica 
Community College Dist. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 945, 962, fn. 6.)        
BOERMEESTER v. CARRY 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
13 
has proceeded without, or in excess of, jurisdiction; whether 
there was a fair trial; and whether there was any prejudicial 
abuse of discretion.”  (§ 1094.5, subd. (b).)  “ ‘A challenge to the 
procedural fairness of the administrative hearing is reviewed de 
novo on appeal because the ultimate determination of 
procedural fairness amounts to a question of law.’ ”  (Doe v. 
University of Southern California (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 221, 
239 (University I); accord, Natarajan v. Dignity Health (2021) 
11 Cal.5th 1095, 1111.) 
Section 1094.5 review applies not only to the decisions of 
governmental agencies but also to the decisions of private 
organizations, so long as the private organization was legally 
required to hold a hearing, take evidence, and make factual 
determinations in coming to its decision.  (Anton v. San Antonio 
Community Hospital (1977) 19 Cal.3d 802, 815–817.)  We have 
never previously applied section 1094.5 to a private university’s 
disciplinary decisions.  We nevertheless find that section 1094.5 
writ review is appropriate because, for the reasons more fully 
explained below, the common law doctrine of fair procedure 
applies in this context.  Among other things, this doctrine, when 
applicable, requires a private organization to comply with its 
own procedural rules governing the expulsion of individuals 
from the organization, and it permits courts to evaluate the 
basic fairness of those procedural rules when the organization 
seeks 
to 
exclude 
or 
expel 
an 
individual 
from 
its 
membership.  (Cason v. Glass Bottle Blowers Assn. (1951) 37 
Cal.2d 134, 143 (Cason); accord, Otto v. Tailors’ P. & B. Union 
(1888) 75 Cal. 308, 314–315.)  Here, USC’s policies were subject 
to the common law doctrine of fair procedure, and those policies 
specified that the university would offer the accused student a 
hearing, take evidence, and make factual determinations in a 
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
14 
final adjudicatory decision issued by the vice president of 
student affairs.  Thus, the section 1094.5 “elements of hearing, 
evidence, and discretion in the determination of facts are clearly 
required by law” and section 1094.5 writ review applies.  (Anton, 
at p. 815; see also Bray v. International Molders & Allied 
Workers Union (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 608, 616 [courts “ ‘pay 
proper respect’ ” to a private organization’s “ ‘quasi-judicial 
procedure, precluding an aggrieved party from circumventing’ ” 
section 1094.5 review].) 
The parties do not dispute that section 1094.5 applies.  
The parties’ dispute instead centers on the meaning of a “fair 
trial” under section 1094.5, subdivision (b).  Boermeester asserts 
that section 1094.5’s fair trial component can only be satisfied 
by adhering to principles established by the common law 
doctrine of fair procedure which, in certain limited contexts, 
requires a private organization to give an individual adequate 
notice of the charges and a reasonable opportunity to respond 
before expelling the individual from the organization’s 
membership.  (Pinsker II, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 555.)  
Boermeester additionally urges us to rely on constitutional due 
process principles, though he does not go so far as to suggest 
that due process applies to private universities like USC.  USC, 
on the other hand, claims that “[s]ection 1094.5 is a procedural 
vehicle for reviewing public and private administrative 
decisions” and “does not impose any particular standards of fair 
procedure.”  Even so, USC does not dispute that some minimum 
standard of procedural fairness is required in this context.  
Moreover, USC relies on cases decided under the common law 
doctrine of fair procedure in asserting that its disciplinary 
process was fair.   
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
15 
Neither we nor any other court has held that the fair trial 
component of section 1094.5 is synonymous with either the 
common law doctrine of fair procedure or with due process 
principles, and we decline to do so here.  Nevertheless, and as 
explained more fully below, our fair procedure cases are 
instructive because the membership-related decisions made by 
the private organizations in those cases are similar in 
significant respects to private universities’ student disciplinary 
decisions.       
The principles of common law fair procedure are similar to 
those of constitutional due process in that they are flexible and 
context specific.  Under either concept, the precise procedures 
necessary to provide a complainant with a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard “depend[] largely on ‘the nature of the 
tendered issue.’ ”  (Ezekial v. Winkley (1977) 20 Cal.3d 267, 279 
(Ezekial); accord, Saleeby v. State Bar (1985) 39 Cal.3d 547, 
565.)  This is not to say that fair procedure and due process are 
identical.  Due process is a constitutional right designed to 
protect citizens from abuses of state power, and it does not apply 
here since no state action is involved.  Fair procedure, on the 
other hand, is a more flexible judicially created concept 
applicable to private organizations in limited situations.  (See 
Pinsker II, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 550, fn. 7 [distinguishing due 
process and fair procedure]; Cotran v. Rollins Hudig Hall 
Internat., Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 93, 108, quoting Friendly, 
“Some Kind of Hearing” (1975) 123 U. Pa. L.Rev. 1267, 1269–
1270, fn. 10 [“ ‘The precise content of the common law “fair 
procedure” requirement is far more flexible than that which the 
Supreme Court has found to be mandated by due process’ ”].)  
Because this matter involves a private university, no 
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
16 
constitutional rights are at stake and a greater degree of 
flexibility is warranted.  (See Pinsker II, at p. 555.)    
With these considerations in mind, we next provide a 
background on the common law doctrine of fair procedure and 
discuss how it governs our inquiry.       
B. The Common Law Doctrine of Fair Procedure 
The common law doctrine of fair procedure originally 
developed to prevent the arbitrary expulsion of individuals from 
memberships in certain private organizations — such as mutual 
aid societies, fraternities, or unions — where the expulsion 
“adversely affected [property] rights in specified funds held for 
the association’s members.”  (Potvin v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 
(2000) 22 Cal.4th 1060, 1066 (Potvin).)  The doctrine was 
subsequently expanded to prevent the arbitrary expulsion or 
exclusion of individuals from private organizations that “possess 
substantial power either to thwart an individual’s pursuit of a 
lawful trade or profession, or to control the terms and conditions 
under which it is practiced.”  (Ezekial, supra, 20 Cal.3d at 
p. 272.)  For the doctrine to apply, individuals need not show 
that they would be fully unable to practice their chosen 
profession absent membership in the organization; they can 
instead show that “exclusion from membership . . . deprives 
[them of] substantial . . . educational, financial, and professional 
advantages.”  (Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc. of Orthodontists 
(1969) 1 Cal.3d 160, 164–165, italics omitted (Pinsker I).)  
In Pinsker I, for example, we held that an orthodontics 
association was subject to the doctrine of fair procedure, 
explaining that while membership in the association was “not 
economically necessary in the strict sense of the word,” it was a 
“practical necessity for a dentist who wishes not only to make a 
BOERMEESTER v. CARRY 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
17 
good living as an orthodontist but also to realize maximum 
potential achievement and recognition in such specialty.”  
(Pinsker I, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 166.)  Similarly, in Potvin, we 
held that an insurer’s removal of a physician from its preferred 
provider list was subject to the doctrine of fair procedure 
because “the insurer possesses power so substantial that the 
removal significantly impairs the ability of an ordinary, 
competent physician to practice medicine or a medical specialty 
in a particular geographic area, thereby affecting an important, 
substantial economic interest.”  (Potvin, supra, 22 Cal.4th at 
p. 1071.)  We also elaborated on our rationale for requiring 
certain private organizations to apply fair procedure in their 
membership decisions by observing that these organizations 
“affect[] the public interest” and “ ‘are viewed by the courts as 
quasi-public in nature’ ” which “ ‘lead courts to impose’ ” on 
them certain obligations to the public and the individuals with 
whom they deal.  (Id. at p. 1070.)  This rationale applied to the 
insurer in Potvin since “ ‘[t]he public has a substantial interest 
in the relationship between [insurers] and their preferred 
provider physicians.’ ”  (Ibid.)    
 Most notably, in Ezekial, we applied the fair procedure 
doctrine to prevent an individual’s arbitrary expulsion from a 
residency program at Kaiser, a private teaching hospital.  
(Ezekial, supra, 20 Cal.3d 267.)  We found that the plaintiff was 
entitled to fair procedure because, by accepting him into its 
residency program and later seeking to expel him from that 
program, “Kaiser has assumed the power to permit or prevent 
[the plaintiff’s] practice of a surgical specialty and to thwart the 
enjoyment of the economic and professional benefits flowing 
therefrom.”  (Id. at p. 274.)  We additionally reasoned that 
“[d]ismissal from Kaiser will, as a practical matter and because 
BOERMEESTER v. CARRY 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
18 
of Kaiser’s close relationship with other teaching hospitals, 
prevent plaintiff’s acceptance in any other surgical residency 
program.  Successful completion of an approved surgical 
residency is a prerequisite to attainment of the status of a ‘board 
certified general surgeon,’ without which plaintiff cannot 
practice a surgical specialty in any accredited California 
hospital.”  (Id. at pp. 270–271.)  Because “the right to practice a 
lawful trade or profession is sufficiently ‘fundamental’ to require 
substantial 
protection 
against 
arbitrary 
administrative 
interference,” the doctrine of fair procedure applied.  (Id. at 
p. 272.)  
Unlike in the above cases, this matter does not involve a 
private entity with “a virtual monopoly” sufficient to impede an 
individual’s pursuit of a particular trade or profession.  (Pinsker 
I, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 166; accord, Potvin, supra, 22 Cal.4th at 
p. 1072 [fair procedure applied because “only a handful of health 
care entities have a virtual monopoly on managed care” and 
“removing individual physicians from preferred provider 
networks controlled by these entities could significantly impair 
those physicians’ practice of medicine”].)  Nevertheless, a 
private 
university 
provides 
an 
important, 
quasi-public 
service — a postsecondary education — affecting the public 
interest.  “ ‘[E]ducation is vital and, indeed, basic to civilized 
society. . . . [I]t is an interest of almost incalculable value, 
especially to those students who have already enrolled in the 
institution and begun the pursuit of their college training.’ ”  
(Goldberg v. Regents of University of California (1967) 
248 Cal.App.2d 867, 876 (Goldberg); accord, Doe v. University of 
Cincinnati (6th Cir. 2017) 872 F.3d 393, 399 [expulsion from a 
university “ ‘clearly implicates’ a protected property interest” 
and may also involve a protected liberty interest].)  Much like in 
BOERMEESTER v. CARRY 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
19 
Ezekial, this case involves “an important benefit or privilege,” 
which was already conferred on Boermeester and which USC 
took away from him by expelling him.  (Ezekial, supra, 20 Cal.3d 
at p. 273.)  Given the seriousness of sexual misconduct or 
intimate partner violence allegations, a student who is expelled 
from a university for such conduct may find it especially 
difficult — if not impossible — to complete a postsecondary 
education elsewhere, thwarting the student’s ability to realize 
“the economic and professional benefits flowing” from a college 
degree.  (Id. at p. 274.)5  For these reasons, we find that a 
student’s interest in completing a postsecondary education at a 
private university is analogous to an individual’s interest in 
continuing membership in a private organization that impacts 
the individual’s ability to practice his or her chosen profession.  
Our common law doctrine of fair procedure therefore applies in 
determining whether USC’s disciplinary procedures were fair.    
Where it applies, the common law doctrine of fair 
procedure requires private organizations to provide adequate 
 
5  
USC counters that expulsion will not “tarnish a student’s 
reputation for life” because “federal law prohibits universities 
from disclosing the findings of investigations into alleged 
misconduct to unauthorized persons without the consent of the 
student or, when applicable, his parent.”  The statute to which 
USC cites, the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 
1974, prohibits the federal funding of educational institutions 
that have a policy or practice of releasing education records to 
unauthorized persons.  (20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1).)  It contains an 
exception, however, that allows the release of a student’s records 
to other schools at which the student is seeking admission.  
(20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)(B).)  It therefore does not alter our 
observation that a student who is expelled from a university for 
committing sexual misconduct or intimate partner violence may 
find it difficult to complete his or her education elsewhere.   
BOERMEESTER v. CARRY 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
20 
notice of the charges and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.  
(Pinsker II, supra, 12 Cal.3d at pp. 555–556; Ezekial, supra, 
20 Cal.3d at p. 278.)  We have never held, however, that any 
specific or baseline procedures must be followed to satisfy these 
requirements.  Boermeester points to Cason, supra, 37 Cal.2d 
134, where we observed in dicta that a “fair trial” “includes the 
right . . . to confront and cross-examine the accusers” (id. at 
pp. 143, 144), but we did not hold in Cason that the plaintiff was 
denied a fair procedure on that ground.  Instead, we held that 
the plaintiff was denied a fair procedure because he was not 
permitted to hear or review the accuser’s testimony or to refute 
that testimony, nor was he allowed to examine the written 
evidence submitted against him.  (Id. at pp. 144–145.)  
Moreover, we have since noted that “[t]he common law 
requirement of a fair procedure does not compel formal 
proceedings with all the embellishments of a court trial 
[citation], nor adherence to a single mode of process.  It may be 
satisfied by any one of a variety of procedures which afford a fair 
opportunity for an applicant to present his position.”  (Pinsker 
II, at p. 555.)  In fact, we have observed that a formal hearing is 
not required in all circumstances; at times, it may be sufficient 
for a private organization to allow only a written response to the 
charges.  (Ezekial, at p. 279.)  We have further emphasized that, 
given “the practical limitations on the ability of private 
institutions to provide for the full airing of disputed factual 
issues” (id. at p. 278), courts “should not attempt to fix a rigid 
procedure that must invariably be observed.  Instead, the 
associations themselves should retain the initial and primary 
responsibility for devising a method which provides an applicant 
adequate notice of the ‘charges’ against him [or her] and a 
reasonable opportunity to respond” (Pinsker II, at p. 555).   
BOERMEESTER v. CARRY 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
21 
In short, though the fair procedure doctrine requires 
adequate notice of the charges and a reasonable opportunity to 
respond, applying the doctrine to this context requires us to give 
private universities primary responsibility for crafting the 
precise procedures meant to afford a student with notice and an 
opportunity to respond.  (Pinsker II, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 555.)  
Private universities generally know best how to manage their 
own operations, and requiring a fixed set of procedures they 
must utilize in every situation when determining student 
discipline would constitute an improper “ ‘intrusion into the[ir] 
internal affairs.’ ”  (Id. at p. 557; accord, Ezekial, supra, 
20 Cal.3d at pp. 278–279.)  
C. Recent Legislation 
The Legislature recently enacted legislation setting forth 
the precise procedures it felt were necessary to ensure fairness 
to both the accused student and the accuser and to combat 
sexual violence on university campuses.  Senate Bill No. 493 
(2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 493), which became effective 
on January 1, 2021 (Stats. 2020, ch. 303), applies to public or 
private universities that receive state financial assistance and 
are not exempt from the statute.  (Ed. Code, § 66281.8, subd. 
(a)(1); id., § 66271.)  It specifies the procedures universities 
must implement on and after its effective date to address 
incidents of sexual violence.  (See generally id., § 66281.8.)  
Senate Bill 493 does not apply here since the incident itself and 
USC’s subsequent investigation of the incident occurred prior to 
Senate Bill 493’s effective date.  We nevertheless find it 
noteworthy that the statute does not require universities to 
conduct live hearings featuring cross-examination of the accuser 
and other witnesses.  (Cf. Nightlife Partners, Ltd. v. City of 
Beverly Hills (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 81, 91 [the Administrative 
BOERMEESTER v. CARRY 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
22 
Procedure Act (Gov. Code, § 11340 et seq.) was inapplicable but 
was nonetheless “helpful as indicating what the Legislature 
believes are the elements of a fair and carefully thought out 
system of procedure for use in administrative hearings”].)    
Senate Bill 493 is intended “to account for the significant 
individual civil consequences faced by respondents alleged to 
have committed sexual violence as well as the significant harm 
to individual complainants and to education equity more 
generally if sexual violence goes unaddressed.”  (Stats. 2020, ch. 
303, § 1, subd. (n).)  As relevant here, it gives universities the 
discretion to decide whether “a hearing is necessary to 
determine whether any sexual violence more likely than not 
occurred.”  (Ed. Code, § 66281.8, subd. (b)(4)(A)(viii), added by 
Stats. 2020, ch. 303, § 3.)  It also instructs universities to 
consider, “[i]n making this decision, . . . whether the parties 
elected to participate in the investigation and whether each 
party had the opportunity to suggest questions to be asked of 
the other party or witnesses, or both, during the investigation.”  
(Ibid.)  Thus, universities are left to determine for themselves 
whether to conduct a hearing, how to format it, and what rules 
govern it.     
Senate Bill 493 expressly provides that universities need 
not comply with any of its provisions that conflict with federal 
law.  (Ed. Code, § 66281.8, subd. (f).)  Federal law in this area is 
still evolving.  After the OCR rescinded its 2011 “Dear 
Colleague” letter in 2017, it began a rulemaking process 
culminating in Title IX regulations that went into effect on 
August 14, 2020, three years after Boermeester’s expulsion from 
USC.  Though the 2020 Title IX regulations are inapplicable 
here, it is worth observing that the Title IX regulations may be 
trending towards providing private universities with more 
BOERMEESTER v. CARRY 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
23 
flexibility in determining whether to conduct a live hearing.  To 
explain, the 2020 Title IX regulations require universities 
receiving federal funds to “provide for a live hearing” that allows 
“each party’s advisor to ask the other party and any witnesses 
all relevant questions and follow-up questions, including those 
challenging credibility,” which “must be conducted directly, 
orally, and in real time.”  (34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(6)(i) (2023).)  In 
June 2022, however, the OCR proposed amendments to the 2020 
regulations, which are not yet final.  The proposed amendments 
provide that universities may opt “to conduct live hearings with 
cross-examination or have the parties meet separately with the 
decisionmaker and answer questions submitted by the other 
party when a credibility assessment is necessary.”  (87 Fed. Reg. 
41390, 41397 (July 12, 2022).)  After reexamining its position 
and evaluating relevant case law, the OCR determined that 
“neither Title IX nor due process and fundamental fairness” 
(87 Fed. Reg., supra, at p.  41505) requires universities “to 
provide for a live hearing with advisor-conducted cross-
examination in all cases” (id. at p. 41507).  The OCR further 
justified the proposed amendments by stating that growing 
evidence calls into question “whether adversarial cross-
examination is the most effective tool for truth-seeking in the 
context of sex-based harassment complaints involving students 
at postsecondary institutions” and shows that “information-
gathering approaches such as questions asked in individual 
meetings instead of during a live hearing (sometimes described 
as inquisitorial procedures) are more likely to produce the truth 
than adversarial methods like cross-examination.”  (Ibid.)   
 
As stated above, we find it significant that Senate Bill 493 
(as well as the OCR’s most recent proposed amendments to the 
Title IX regulations) give universities wide latitude in 
BOERMEESTER v. CARRY 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
24 
determining the precise nature of their disciplinary proceedings.  
But we also observe that the state of the law in this area is in 
flux and is, therefore, subject to continued change and 
development.  We further emphasize that, because neither 
Senate Bill 493 nor the current or proposed Title IX regulations 
apply to this matter, they are not dispositive.6   
D. Fair Procedure Does Not Require Live Hearings 
with Cross-examination  
We must decide whether fair procedure requires private 
universities to provide accused students the opportunity to 
directly or indirectly cross-examine the accuser and other 
witnesses at a live hearing with the accused student in 
attendance, either in person or virtually.  Applying our fair 
procedure precedent discussed above, we hold that it does not.  
Requiring live hearings featuring real-time cross-examination 
of witnesses in the accused student’s presence would be contrary 
to our prior conclusion that “fair procedure does not compel 
formal proceedings with all the embellishments of a court trial.”  
(Pinsker II, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 555.)  It would also be contrary 
 
6  
Going forward, all universities that receive state financial 
assistance and are not exempt from Senate Bill 493 will need to 
comply with Senate Bill 493 in any context in which the statute 
applies.  To the extent that our holding conflicts with any of the 
provisions of Senate Bill 493, Senate Bill 493’s provisions 
control.  (Ed. Code, § 66281.8, subd. (g)(2) [“Any case law that 
conflicts with the provisions of the act . . . shall be superseded 
as of this statute’s effective date”]; see also Woods v. Young 
(1991) 53 Cal.3d 315, 324 [“[A] later, more specific statute 
controls over an earlier, general statute”].)  The parties agree 
that Senate Bill 493 does not apply retroactively to this matter, 
and we accordingly do not opine on what the outcome of 
Boermeester’s petition would have been had the statute applied 
to his claims. 
BOERMEESTER v. CARRY 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
25 
to our admonition that courts must refrain from fixing rigid 
trial-like procedures “that must invariably be observed.”  (Ibid.)   
As we have recognized, an accused student has a 
significant interest in completing a postsecondary education.  
For this reason, private universities must comply with the fair 
procedure doctrine by affording accused students reasonable 
notice of the charges and a meaningful opportunity to respond 
before disciplining them.  When crafting the precise procedures 
necessary to provide a meaningful opportunity to respond, 
however, a private university must balance competing interests, 
including the accused student’s interests in a fair procedure and 
completing a postsecondary education, the accuser’s interest in 
not being retraumatized by the disciplinary process, and the 
private university’s interests in maintaining a safe campus and 
encouraging victims to report instances of sexual misconduct or 
intimate partner violence without having to divert too many 
resources from its main purpose of education.  (See Ezekial, 
supra, 20 Cal.3d at pp. 277–278 [weighing the plaintiff’s 
economic interest in completing the residency program against 
the private hospital’s interest in protecting itself from the 
mistakes of incompetent physicians]; accord, Doe v. Westmont 
College (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 622, 634 (Westmont) [observing 
that “[a] fair hearing strives to balance three competing 
interests” among the accused student, the accuser, and the 
university].)  It is therefore appropriate to give private 
universities broad discretion in formulating their disciplinary 
processes to ensure that they not only provide the accused 
student a meaningful opportunity to be heard, but also 
embolden victims to report incidents of sexual misconduct or 
intimate partner violence, encourage witnesses to participate in 
the disciplinary process, and allow the private university to 
BOERMEESTER v. CARRY 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
26 
conserve its resources so that it can remain focused on its 
primary mission of providing a postsecondary education.    
The Court of Appeal majority reasoned that the accused 
student must be able to engage in adversarial back-and-forth 
questioning with the accuser and other witnesses at a live 
hearing in order to assess witness credibility and to “fully 
present his [or her] defense.”  (Boermeester v. Carry, supra, 
B290675.)  While live adversarial questioning may be 
considered essential in the context of a criminal trial (People v. 
Louis (1986) 42 Cal.3d 969, 982–983), there is no absolute right 
to a live hearing with cross-examination in administrative 
proceedings, even where constitutional due process applies.  As 
courts have explained in other administrative contexts, 
“ ‘[d]ifferences in the origin and function of administrative 
agencies “preclude wholesale transplantation of the rules of 
procedure, trial, and review which have evolved from the history 
and experience of courts.” . . . The judicial model of an 
evidentiary hearing is neither a required, nor even the most 
effective, method of decisionmaking in all circumstances.’ ”  
(Murden v. County of Sacramento (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 302, 
311.)  The fair procedure doctrine similarly recognizes “the 
practical limitations on the ability of private institutions to 
provide for the full airing of disputed factual issues.”  (Ezekial, 
supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 278.)  Private universities are ill-equipped 
to function as courts because they lack subpoena power to force 
key witnesses to attend a hearing and be subject to cross-
examination.  They must instead rely on the voluntary 
participation of witnesses, which may prove more likely when 
the disciplinary process allows witnesses to testify outside of the 
context of a live hearing and outside the accused student’s 
presence.  As the Attorney General, appearing here as amicus 
BOERMEESTER v. CARRY 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
27 
curiae, observes, requiring live hearings featuring real-time 
adversarial questioning “threatens to deter students from 
participating and to traumatize those who do.”  Furthermore, 
such hearings would require private universities to make on-
the-fly rulings on objections to proposed questions and other 
issues raised during the hearing, which university staff may not 
be adequately trained to do.  This would “divert both resources 
and attention from a university’s main calling, that is 
education.”  (Doe v. Regents of University of California (2016) 
5 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1078 (Regents I); accord, Goss v. Lopez 
(1975) 419 U.S. 565, 583 [“To impose . . . even truncated trial-
type procedures might well overwhelm administrative facilities 
in many places and, by diverting resources, cost more than it 
would save in educational effectiveness”].)  Simply put, the 
“ ‘procedures for dismissing college students [are] not analogous 
to criminal proceedings and could not be so without at the same 
time being both impractical and detrimental to the educational 
atmosphere and functions of a university.’ ”  (Andersen v. 
Regents of University of California (1972) 22 Cal.App.3d 763, 
770, quoting Goldberg, supra, 248 Cal.App.2d at p. 881.)   
In this case, USC provided Boermeester notice of the 
allegations; the opportunity to provide his version of events in 
his interview with the Title IX investigator; the opportunity to 
independently review the testimonial and documentary 
evidence with his attorney-advisor; the opportunity to submit 
his own evidence and the names of potential witnesses to the 
Title IX investigator; the opportunity to respond to the 
testimonial and documentary evidence through an in-person 
evidence hearing held at the Title IX office and conducted by the 
Title IX coordinator (which he declined to attend in favor of 
submitting a written response to the evidence); the opportunity 
BOERMEESTER v. CARRY 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
28 
to submit questions for the Title IX coordinator to ask Roe at her 
own evidence hearing (which he also declined to do); and the 
opportunity to appeal the misconduct sanctioning panel’s 
decision to the appellate panel.  USC was not required to have 
gone further by conducting a live hearing with Boermeester in 
attendance and with Boermeester directly or indirectly cross-
examining the witnesses and asking follow-up questions, either 
in person or virtually.       
Boermeester relies on recent appellate court decisions to 
support his view that fair procedure requires live hearings at 
which accused students are permitted to cross-examine 
witnesses (in person or virtually), but most of these cases do not 
help him.  In University I, the first California appellate case to 
analyze what procedures might be required in this context, the 
court correctly observed that fair procedure requires only 
“ ‘notice reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties of 
the pendency of the action . . . and an opportunity to present 
their objections’ ” (University I, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 240) and concluded from this that “a full trial-like proceeding 
with the right of cross-examination is not necessary” (id. at 
p. 248).  It is true that, subsequent to the University I decision, 
some courts have held that private universities must allow the 
accused student to indirectly cross-examine the accuser or third 
party witnesses where the adjudication “turns on witness 
credibility,” but most of these decisions have not specified that 
the indirect cross-examination should occur within the context 
of a live hearing.  (Westmont, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 638; 
accord, 
Doe 
v. 
Claremont 
McKenna 
College 
(2018) 
25 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1070 (Claremont McKenna); Doe v. 
University of Southern California (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 1212, 
1237 (University II); see also Regents I, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at 
BOERMEESTER v. CARRY 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
29 
p. 1084.)  In University II, for example, the court directed the 
private university to give the accused student “an opportunity 
to submit a list of questions” for the university’s adjudicators to 
ask the accuser if it proceeded with a new disciplinary 
proceeding upon remand (University II, at p. 1238), but it did 
not direct the university to conduct a hearing — even after 
acknowledging that the university’s policies did not allow for a 
hearing (see id. at pp. 1235, 1238).  Moreover, courts have been 
careful to observe that there exist several “ ‘alternate ways of 
providing accused students with the opportunity to hear the 
evidence being presented against them’ ” and to rebut such 
evidence, other than “permit[ting] [the accused student’s] 
presence during the [witnesses’] testimony.”  (Westmont, at 
p. 638; accord, University I, at p. 245, fn. 12.)   
Indeed, aside from the split opinion of the Court of Appeal 
below, Doe v. Allee (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1036 is the only 
decision to hold that a private university must allow an accused 
student to indirectly cross-examine witnesses “at a hearing at 
which the witnesses appear[] in person or by other means [e.g., 
videoconferencing],” even where the private university’s policies 
do not provide a hearing.  (Id. at p. 1071.)  The Allee court 
acknowledged that fair procedure “requirements are ‘flexible’ 
and entail no ‘rigid procedure’ ” (id. at p. 1062), yet it failed to 
explain how its holding comports with these principles.  We 
accordingly disapprove of Doe v. Allee, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th 
1036 to the extent it is inconsistent with our opinion.     
At oral argument, Boermeester’s counsel asserted that 
providing direct or indirect cross-examination of the accuser or 
other witnesses outside of a live hearing attended by the accused 
student is inadequate because the private university may 
“filter” or misrepresent witnesses’ answers to the accused 
BOERMEESTER v. CARRY 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
30 
student’s questions.  Of course, if universities choose to question 
the accuser or other witnesses outside of the accused student’s 
presence, they will need to conceive of a method by which to 
meaningfully convey the responses to the accused student, such 
as by providing the accused student with transcripts, video or 
audio recordings, or reasonably detailed summaries of the 
testimony.  (See Westmont, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 638.)  We 
leave these specific procedures up to the university to 
determine.  But we see no reason to address the theoretical risk 
that private universities may filter answers by, in response, 
categorically requiring them to conduct a live hearing with the 
accused student in attendance and at which the accused student 
is allowed to directly or indirectly cross-examine witnesses.   
We note that this is not a case in which the accused 
student was given no hearing at all.  As described above, the 
parties agree that USC’s policies provided separate and 
individual evidence hearings for both Boermeester and Roe, and 
that USC complied with its policies by offering the parties the 
opportunity to attend their separate evidence hearings.  
Although Boermeester could not have cross-examined Roe or the 
third party witnesses in real time at his hearing, he could have 
responded to the evidence and presented his defense before 
USC’s adjudicators had he chosen to attend his hearing.  We do 
not opine on whether and under what circumstances a private 
university might properly choose to refrain from providing an 
accused student with a hearing that gives the accused student 
the opportunity to respond to the evidence before the 
university’s adjudicators, since such a hearing was offered to the 
accused student in this case.   
We also do not opine on whether and under what 
circumstances a private university might be required to allow 
BOERMEESTER v. CARRY 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
31 
the accused student to indirectly cross-examine the accuser by 
submitting questions for the university’s adjudicators to ask the 
accuser outside of the context of a live hearing or the accused 
student’s presence, since USC afforded Boermeester the 
opportunity to submit questions for the Title IX coordinator to 
ask Roe at her separate evidence hearing.  Similarly, we do not 
opine on whether USC’s procedure was unfair because 
Boermeester was not allowed to submit questions for USC’s 
adjudicators to ask the third party witnesses during the Title IX 
investigator’s 
interviews 
with 
those 
witnesses, 
since 
Boermeester does not raise this claim.   
Were we to assume, however, that a private university 
must provide an accused student the opportunity to indirectly 
cross-examine the accuser or third party witnesses outside of 
the context of a live hearing when the credibility of the accuser 
or third party witnesses is central to the adjudication, as some 
lower courts have held (see Claremont McKenna, supra, 
25 Cal.App.5th at p. 1070; University II, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th 
at p. 1237; Westmont, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at pp. 638–639; see 
also Regents I, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 1084), we would find 
USC’s failure to provide Boermeester the opportunity to submit 
questions for the third party witnesses in this case to be 
harmless.  In this case, the accounts of the third party witnesses 
merely corroborated Roe’s initial accusation that Boermeester 
harmed her during the incident in question.  Shortly after the 
incident occurred, Roe told the Title IX investigator that 
Boermeester had physically harmed her.  Specifically, Roe said 
that it “hurt” when Boermeester grabbed the back of her hair 
“hard” and told her to drop her dog’s leash; that it “hurt” when 
Boermeester grabbed the front of her throat and neck, causing 
her to cough; and that her “head hurt” after Boermeester 
BOERMEESTER v. CARRY 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
32 
grabbed her by the neck again and pushed her head “hard,” 
causing her head to hit the alleyway wall.  The video of the 
incident — though grainy and soundless — is consistent with 
Roe’s initial account.  (Boermeester v. Carry, supra, B290675.)  
Boermeester himself admitted that he had his hands on Roe’s 
neck and had her against the alleyway wall.  In sum, even 
without considering the third party eyewitness testimony, USC 
could have concluded that Boermeester “caus[ed] physical 
harm” to Roe and, thus, violated its policy against intimate 
partner violence.   
Boermeester maintained that the act was playful or sexual 
in nature and amounted to mere “roughhousing.”  USC 
determined, however, that Boermeester’s intent was irrelevant.  
Carry — who made the final decision per USC’s policy — found 
that since “[i]ntent to cause physical harm is not a required 
element” of USC’s policy against intimate partner violence, 
Boermeester’s alleged lack of intent to cause Roe physical harm 
was not a mitigating factor.  She therefore concluded that, 
“[w]hether [Boermeester] intended to cause [Roe] harm or did so 
recklessly, expulsion [was] appropriate given the nature of the 
harm inflicted.”  Because intent was irrelevant under USC’s 
policy against intimate partner violence, USC could have based 
its decision to expel Boermeester exclusively on Roe’s initial 
statement, the video consistent with that statement, and 
Boermeester’s own admissions — all of which tended to show 
that Boermeester caused Roe physical harm. 
It is true that Roe later recanted her testimony and agreed 
with Boermeester that the incident was playful in nature.  But 
even if Roe’s recantation put her initial testimony in doubt, USC 
provided Boermeester the opportunity to indirectly cross-
examine Roe and explore any inconsistencies in her story.  
BOERMEESTER v. CARRY 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
33 
Boermeester thus had the opportunity to submit questions to be 
asked of the most important witness — the person he allegedly 
hurt.  Moreover, USC, as the finder of fact, was entitled to 
determine that Roe’s first statement was more credible than her 
later recantation.  Finally, we must acknowledge, as we did in 
People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 892, 899, that it is not 
uncommon for victims of intimate partner violence to recant.  
Roe’s post-incident communications with USC’s Title IX office 
and her friends indicate that she feared retaliation and felt a 
sense of loyalty towards Boermeester, either of which may have 
motivated her later recantation.   
In conclusion, USC was not required to provide 
Boermeester the opportunity to directly or indirectly cross-
examine Roe and other witnesses at a live hearing with 
Boermeester in attendance, whether in person or virtually.    
III.  DISPOSITION 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and 
remand for it to determine in the first instance the remaining 
claims Boermeester raised on appeal that the Court of Appeal 
expressly declined to reach.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GROBAN, J. 
 
We Concur: 
GUERRERO, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
EVANS, J.
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  Boermeester v. Carry 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 49 Cal.App.5th 682 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S263180 
Date Filed:  July 31, 2023 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Los Angeles 
Judge:  Amy D. Hogue 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Hathaway Parker, Mark M. Hathaway and Jenna E. Parker for 
Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Cynthia P. Garrett for Families Advocating for Campus Equality as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Horvitz & Levy, Beth J. Jay, Jeremy B. Rosen, Mark A. Kressel, Scott 
P. Dixler, Sarah E. Hamill; Young & Zinn, Julie Arias Young and 
Karen J. Pazzani for Defendants and Respondents.  
 
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Matthew Rodriquez, Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, Michael L. Newman, Assistant Attorney General, 
Sarah E. Belton and Alexis M. Piazza, Deputy Attorneys General, for 
the Attorney General of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 
Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Theane Evangelis, Jeremy S. Smith, 
Andrew M. Kasabian; Amy Porter; and Brenda Adams for California 
 
 
Women’s Law Center, Equal Rights Advocates, Kylee O., Maryam I., 
Claudia R., Alliance for HOPE International, Atlanta Women for 
Equality, Child Abuse Forensic Institute, Center for Community 
Solutions, Community Legal Aid SoCal, Domestic Abuse Center, 
Family Violence Appellate Project, Family Violence Law Center, 
Feminist Majority Foundation, Law Foundation of Silicon Valley, 
Legal Aid at Work, Legal Voice, Los Angeles Center for Law and 
Justice, National Association of Women Lawyers, National Women’s 
Law Center, Public Counsel, Rural Human Services/Harrington House, 
San Diego Volunteer Lawyer Program, Southwest Women’s Law 
Center, Texas Association Against Sexual Assault, Walnut Avenue 
Family & Women’s Center, WEAVE, Inc., and Women’s Law Project  
as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
O’Melveny & Myers, Apalla U. Chopra, Marni Barta, Allan W. Gustin 
and Anton Metlitsky for California Institute of Technology, Chapman 
University, Claremont McKenna College, Occidental College and 
Pepperdine University as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and 
Respondents. 
 
Arent Fox, Lowell C. Brown and Candace C. Sandoval for California 
Hospital Association as Amicus Curiae.
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Mark M. Hathaway 
Hathaway Parker 
445 South Figueroa Street, 31st Floor 
Los Angeles, CA 90071 
(213) 529-9000 
 
Jeremy B. Rosen 
Horvitz & Levy LLP 
505 Sansome Street, Suite 375 
San Francisco, CA 94111-3175 
(818) 995-5838