Title: Sirote v. Compass Bank
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1100870
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: August 5, 2011

REL:08/05/2011
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2011
____________________
1100870
____________________
Ex parte Compass Bank d/b/a BBVA Compass and Amy Hovis
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Jerome Sirote
v.
Compass Bank d/b/a BBVA Compass et al.)
(Madison Circuit Court, CV-11-900185)
BOLIN, Justice.
Compass Bank d/b/a BBVA Compass and Amy Hovis petition
this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Madison
Circuit Court to dismiss an action filed in that court by
1100870
2
Jerome Sirote, based on Alabama's abatement statute, § 6-5-
440, Ala. Code 1975.
Facts and Procedural History
On October 5, 2010, Sirote filed a complaint in the
federal district court against BBVA Compass, and its
employees, Amy Hovis and Lisa D. Williams, alleging breach of
contract; breach of fiduciary duty; violations of the Truth in
Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. ("TILA); violations of
the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et
seq. ("RESPA"); fraud; deceit; and violations of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.  Sirote
contended that BBVA Compass, through its employees, Hovis and
Williams, forged his name on a deed of trust for property in
Tennessee owned by Sirote and his wife and that it also forged
his name on an amended trust deed.  Both deeds secured
promissory notes held by BBVA Compass and executed by Sirote
and his wife.  Sirote also alleged that BBVA Compass
misappropriated and converted millions of dollars in bonds
that BBVA Compass was managing for him.  Sirote alleged that
BBVA Compass improperly processed transactions in his deposit
account and misstated material facts related to that account.
1100870
3
The defendants moved to dismiss Sirote's complaint. On
December 30, 2010, the federal district court entered an order
dismissing Sirote's federal claims with prejudice.  With
regard to Sirote's state-law claims, the court stated:
"Jurisdiction over plaintiff's remaining claims
-- for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty,
fraud, and deceit under Alabama law (Counts One,
Two, Five, and Eight, respectively, of plaintiff's
original Complaint, and Counts One, Two, Five, and
Six, respectively, of plaintiff's proposed Amended
Complaint) -- was based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the
statute governing supplemental jurisdiction over
state law claims. In cases where the court's
jurisdiction 
is 
based 
solely 
upon 
a 
federal
question, the district court has discretion to
entertain state claims that are 'supplemental' to
the federal claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The
district court may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction when: 
"'(1) the claim raises a novel or
complex issue of state law, 
"'(2) 
the 
claim 
substantially
predominates over the claim or claims over
which the district court has original
jurisdiction,
"'(3) the district court has dismissed
all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction, or 
"'(4) in exceptional circumstances,
there are other compelling reasons for
declining jurisdiction.' 
"28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (emphasis supplied). '[I]n the
usual case in which all federal-law claims are
1100870
4
eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to
be 
considered 
under 
the 
pendent 
jurisdiction
doctrine –- judicial economy, convenience, fairness,
and comity –- will point toward declining to
exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law
claims.'  Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484
U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988).
"Here, plaintiff's federal claims have been
eliminated.  There is no independent basis for this
court to assert jurisdiction over plaintiff's state
law claims.
 Accordingly, this court will decline
19
supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state
law claims, and will exercise its discretion to
dismiss those claims. 
___________________
"
Plaintiff cannot assert federal jurisdiction
19
based on satisfaction of the requirements of the
diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, because
complete diversity of citizenship is not present.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)(requiring that, in
addition to an amount in controversy exceeding
$75,000, the civil action must be between 'citizens
of different States.'  Plaintiff is a resident of
Alabama, as are the individual defendants Amy L.
[Hovis] and Lisa D. Williams. ..."
Sirote filed a Rule 59(e), Fed. R. Civ. P., motion to
alter, amend, or vacate the judgment, which the federal court
denied.  On February 11, 2011, Sirote filed a notice of appeal
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit.  
On February 11, 2011, the same day Sirote filed his
notice of appeal, Sirote filed a complaint in the Madison
1100870
5
Circuit Court against BBVA Compass, Hovis, and Williams,
alleging breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty,
fraudulent concealment, accounting for bonds, deprivation of
possession of personal property in violation of § 6-5-260,
Ala. Code 1975, conversion, money had and received, unjust
enrichment, and civil conspiracy.  Sirote contended in the
state-court action that BBVA Compass, through its employees,
Hovis and Williams,  forged his name on a deed of trust on
property in Tennessee owned by Sirote and his wife and again
forged his name on a modification of that deed, both of which
secured promissory notes in favor of BBVA Compass executed by
Sirote and his wife. Sirote also alleged that BBVA Compass
misappropriated and converted millions of dollars in bonds
that it was managing for him.  Sirote further alleged that
BBVA Compass improperly processed transactions in his deposit
account and misstated material facts related to that account.
According to BBVA Compass, Williams was never properly served;
she is not a party to this petition.
BBVA Compass and Hovis moved to dismiss on the ground
that Sirote's complaint violated § 6-5-440, which prohibits a
party from prosecuting two actions simultaneously in different
1100870
6
courts if the claims alleged in each action arose from the
same underlying operative facts.  The trial court denied the
motion.  BBVA Compass and Hovis then filed this petition
asking this Court to direct the trial court to dismiss
Sirote's action against them.  We grant the petition and issue
the writ.
Standard of Review
"[A] writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, which
requires the petitioner to demonstrate a clear, legal right to
the relief sought, or an abuse of discretion."  Ex parte Palm
Harbor Homes, Inc., 798 So. 2d 656, 660 (Ala. 2001).  Mandamus
is the appropriate remedy to correct a trial court's failure
to properly apply § 6-5–440. See Ex parte Chapman Nursing
Home, Inc., 903 So. 2d 813 (Ala. 2004);  Ex parte Breman Lake
View Resort, L.P., 729 So. 2d 849, 852 (Ala. 1999).
Analysis
Section 6-5-440 provides:
"No plaintiff is entitled to prosecute two
actions in the courts of this state at the same time
for the same cause and against the same party. In
such a case, the defendant may require the plaintiff
to elect which he will prosecute, if commenced
simultaneously, and the pendency of the former is a
good defense to the latter if commenced at different
times."
1100870
7
This Court has stated:
"[Section 6–5–440], by its plain language,
forbids a party from prosecuting two actions for the
'same cause' and against the 'same party.'  This
Court has previously held that an action pending in
a federal court falls within the coverage of this
Code section:
"'"The phrase 'courts of this state,'
as used in § 6–5–440, includes all federal
courts located in Alabama. This Court has
consistently refused to allow a person to
prosecute an action in a state court while
another action on the same cause and
against the same parties is pending in a
federal court in this State."'"
Ex parte Norfolk Southern Ry., 992 So. 2d 1286, 1289 (Ala.
2008)(quoting Ex parte University of South Alabama Found., 788
So. 2d 161, 164 (Ala. 2000), quoting in turn Weaver v. Hood,
577 So. 2d 440, 442 (Ala. 1991)).  The application of § 6-5-
440 "is guided by 'whether a judgment in one suit would be res
judicata of the other.'"  Chiepalich v. Coale, 36 So. 3d 1, 3
(Ala. 2009) (quoting Sessions v. Jack Cole Co., 276 Ala. 10,
12, 158 So. 2d 652, 654-55 (1963)).
"'[A] "cause of action" grows out of the wrongful
act, and not the various forms of damages that may
flow from the single wrongful act.' Sessions [v.
Jack Cole Co.], 276 Ala. [10,] 12, 158 So. 2d [652,]
654 [(1963)].
"Plaintiff's state and federal actions arise
from the same alleged fact situation.  Although
1100870
8
plaintiff's state court action was instituted on
different theories of recovery, these theories are
not different causes of action in the context of the
rule against splitting a cause of action.  A cause
of action may give rise to one or more theories of
recovery.  It has been recognized that where a
single wrong leads to an action under state law and
leads to an action under federal law, there is but
one wrong and one cause of action.  Norman Tobacco
& Candy Co. v.  Gillette Safety Razor Co., 295 F.2d
362 (5th Cir. 1961)."
Terrell v. City of Bessemer, 406 So. 2d 337, 339 (Ala. 1981).
BBVA Compass and Hovis contend that although Sirote gives
different labels to some claims in his complaint filed in the
state court, every claim he has made in the federal district
court and in the state court is based on the same allegations
of wrongdoing.  BBVA Compass and Hovis go on to argue that
Sirote's appeal of the dismissal of his federal-court
complaint did not lessen the application of § 6-5-440, because
an action is deemed pending in federal court so long as a
party's right to appeal has not yet been exhausted  or
expired.  BBVA Compass and Hovis argue that the federal
court's 
decision 
to 
decline 
to 
assert 
supplemental
jurisdiction over Sirote's state-law claims and to dismiss
those claims without prejudice does not mean that Sirote can
pursue his state-law claims in state court because if the
1100870
9
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reverses the
judgment of the federal district court, the federal district
court will again have jurisdiction over all Sirote's claims.
Sirote does not dispute that his state-court claims arose
out of the same facts as the claims that he has asserted in
the federal-court action.  Sirote asserts that when he
properly filed his notice of appeal to the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, the federal district court was divested of
jurisdiction and the federal appellate court now has
jurisdiction.  Sirote argues that the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit is not a "court of this state" for the
purposes of Alabama's abatement statute, because, he argues,
§ 6-5-440 has been interpreted to govern only courts in which
suits are "filed" or "prosecuted," and not appellate courts.
Sirote argues that BBVA Compass and Hovis's argument that, if
Sirote wins on appeal, the federal district court will again
have jurisdiction over his state-law claims is speculative and
does not place a justiciable controversy before the court. He
also argues that their argument ignores the abstention
doctrine. 
1100870
10
This Court has addressed an exception to § 6-5-440. In
Terrell, 406 So. 2d 337, the plaintiff brought claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, along with common-law claims, in the federal
court.  The federal court declined to entertain the pendent
common-law claims on the ground that the different legal
principles and possible defenses involved in the federal and
common-law counts would create jury confusion.  The federal
court retained jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claim
asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff then brought
the common-law claims against the same defendant in the state
court, and the defendants moved to dismiss those claims in
light of § 6-5-440.  The Terrell Court recognized that there
was one cause of action for the single wrong, even when the
wrong leads to actions under both state and federal law. 406
So. 2d at 339. The Court in Terrell adopted the position that
if "the court in the first action would clearly not have had
jurisdiction to entertain the omitted theory or ground (or,
having jurisdiction, would clearly have declined to exercise
it as a matter of discretion), then a second action in a
competent court presenting the omitted theory or ground should
not be precluded." 406 So. 2d at 340 (emphasis added).
1100870
11
Therefore, the Court carved out an exception to the rule
allowing a cause of action for the same wrong against the same
party to be pending in only one court at a time.  Because the
plaintiff could not litigate his state-law claims in the
federal court, the Terrell Court held that he "should be
afforded an opportunity to pursue his alleged common law
theories of recovery in state court."  406 So. 2d at 339.
We have also addressed abatement under § 6-5-440 when an
appeal has been filed in a federal appellate court in the
earlier filed federal-court action.  In L.A. Draper & Son,
Inc. v. Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc., 454 So. 2d 506 (Ala. 1984),
the sole issue presented on appeal  was whether the filing of
an appeal in the federal appeals court of the dismissal of the
plaintiff's pendent unfair-competition claim served under § 6-
5-440 to abate the plaintiff's subsequent unfair-competition
claim and related common-law claim brought in the state court.
In L.A. Draper & Son, the plaintiff first filed an action in
the federal district court, asserting that the defendants had
conspired to destroy the plaintiff's business in violation of
federal antitrust law and state unfair-competition laws. The
federal district court had jurisdiction of the unfair-
1100870
12
competition claim on the basis of pendent jurisdiction. At the
close of the plaintiff's case, the court directed a verdict
with respect to the federal antitrust claim and dismissed the
pendent 
state-law 
unfair-competition 
claim 
when 
the 
defendants
stipulated that they would not raise a statute-of-limitations
defense (as to the time between the filing of the federal
action and the dismissal of the claims) to the plaintiff's
unfair-competition claim if an action was filed in the state
court.  The federal district court issued a final order, and
subsequently the plaintiff filed an action in the state court
and then appealed the federal district court's dismissal of
the state-law unfair-competition claim.  
In L.A. Draper & Son, this Court discussed Terrell and
noted that the Court in Terrell did not consider the issue
whether the plaintiff could have sought review of the federal
court's decision not to exercise pendent jurisdiction over
that plaintiff's state claims.  Relying on the Terrell Court's
reasoning that the harm to which § 6-5-440 is directed is to
prevent a party from having to defend against two suits in
different courts at the same time brought by the same
plaintiff on the same cause of action, the Court noted that
1100870
13
Terrell was procedurally similar except that the plaintiff in
Terrell did not appeal the dismissal of his common-law claims.
The plaintiff in L.A. Draper & Son did; therefore, the L.A.
Draper & Son Court concluded that it was not clear that the
federal court would not entertain the common-law claims.
Accordingly, the Court held that the filing of the appeal from
the federal district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's
state-law claim served to abate the plaintiff's subsequently
filed action in state court.  "An action is deemed pending in
federal court so long as a party's right to appeal has not yet
been exhausted or expired."  454 So. 2d at 508.  
More recently, in Ex parte J.E. Estes Wood Co., 42 So. 3d
104 (Ala. 2010), a railroad company filed an action in the
federal court after a "controlled burn" by a timber-management
company grew out of control and burned a bridge on the
railroad company's property.  The railroad company alleged
both federal and state-law claims.  Two days later, the
railroad company filed an action in the state court based on
the same underlying facts and sought the same relief under the
same theories as it sought in the federal action.  Although a
motion to dismiss the complaint in the federal court for lack
1100870
14
of subject-matter jurisdiction was pending,  the defendants
moved to dismiss the  state-court action pursuant to § 6-5-
440.  In  response to the state-court motions, the railroad
company asked the state court to stay the state-court action,
which the state court did.  The defendants then filed a
petition for a writ of mandamus with this Court.  While the
petition was pending, the federal district court dismissed the
railroad company's action, and, subsequently, the railroad
company appealed the dismissal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.  At the outset, this Court
stated that the dismissal of the earlier federal action did
not render § 6-5-440 inapplicable during an appeal from that
dismissal.  It went on to hold that a stay of the state-court
action is not an abatement and that a stay is not an option
that can be exercised at the discretion of the court.  
"[T]he principle codified by [§ 6-5-440] 'is founded
upon the policy of discouraging a multiplicity of
suits 
–- 
of 
protecting 
the 
defendant 
from
oppression, [and] from the grievance of double
vexation for the same cause or thing.' Foster v.
Napier, 73 Ala. 595, 606 (1883). '[W]hen a defendant
is twice impleaded by the same plaintiff, for the
same thing, the oppression and vexation is not
matter of fact; it is a conclusion of law, and is
not dependent upon an inquiry into the actual
circumstances of the two cases.'  73 Ala. at 603."
1100870
15
42 So. 3d at 111.  In a footnote in J.E. Estes Wood, this
Court stated:
"Where the plaintiff's first-filed action is in
federal court seeking relief on both federal claims
and state-law claims but the federal court has
declined to exercise its pendent jurisdiction over
the state-law claims, the plaintiff may then pursue
the 
state-law 
claims 
in 
state 
court 
without
violating § 6–5–440. Terrell v. City of Bessemer,
406 So. 2d 337 (Ala. 1981). However, the dismissal
of an earlier filed federal action does not render
§ 6–5–440 inapplicable during the pendency of an
appeal. 
L.A. 
Draper 
& 
Son, 
Inc. 
v.
Wheelabrator–Frye, Inc., 454 So. 2d 506 (Ala.
1984)."
42 So. 3d at 111 n. 1.
In the present case, the federal district court dismissed
Sirote's state-law claims without prejudice, based on its lack
of supplemental jurisdiction because it had dismissed Sirote's
federal-law claims.  This case is distinguishable from
Terrell, where the dismissal of the state-law claims was based
on the federal court's discretionary authority to refuse to
entertain state-law claims.  The plaintiff in Terrell was no
longer able to pursue his state-law claim in the federal
court, and the plaintiff in Terrell did not seek an appeal of
that decision.  Accordingly, the Court created an exception to
the abatement statute so that the plaintiff there could pursue
1100870
16
his state-law claims.  Here, Sirote has appealed the federal
district court's dismissal of his state-law claims.  
We note that Rule 3, Fed. R. App. P., provides that a
notice of appeal must be filed with the district court clerk.
Rule 3(c), Fed. R. App. P., provides that the notice of appeal
must designate the judgment, order, or part thereof being
appealed.  In the present case, Sirote's notice of appeal in
the federal court provides that he is appealing from the
"order dismissing all of plaintiff's claim (his federal claims
of TILA and RESPA violations with prejudice and his state law
claims without prejudice) entered in this action."   Clearly,
Sirote has appealed from the dismissal of both his federal-law
claims and his state-law claims.  Cf.  Guy v. Lexington-
Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov't, 57 Fed. Appx. 217, 223 (6th Cir.
2003) (not selected for publication in the Federal Reporter)
("Although 'the law is well settled that an appeal from a
final judgment draws into question all prior non-final rulings
and orders,' McLaurin v. Fischer, 767 F.2d 98, 101 (6th Cir.
1985), if an appellant 'chooses to designate specific
determinations in his notice of appeal –- rather than simply
appealing from the entire judgment –- only the specified
1100870
17
issues may be raised on appeal.'  Id. at  102; see also
Crawford v. Roane, 53 F.3d 750, 752 (6th Cir. 1995).
Therefore, where 'a party intentionally does not appeal a part
of judgment, he cannot, after the time for filing has elapsed,
change his mind and appeal from that part of the judgment.'
Bach v. Coughlin, 508 F.2d 510, 516 (7th Cir. 1974); see also
Wilson v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 932 F.2d 510, 516 (6th
Cir. 1991)(holding that the plaintiff failed to preserve any
state law contract/promissory estoppel claim for appeal where,
in his notice of appeal, the plaintiff failed to raise
dismissal of state law claims as matters for appeal).").
In Tiftarea Shopper, Inc. v. Georgia Shopper, Inc., 786
F.2d 1115 (11th Cir. 1986), the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit addressed the appeal of the dismissal
of a plaintiff's federal and state-law claims.  That court
stated: "The district court dismissed the pendant state claims
after it had dismissed the federal claim on the ground that
absent the federal claim it had no subject matter jurisdiction
over the state claims.  Because we find that the federal claim
should not have been dismissed, we must reverse on the state
law claims."  786 F.2d at 1118.  Here, the result of an
1100870
18
appellate court's reversal in Sirote's federal action will be
the reinstatement of all of his claims.  
The exception set out in Terrell applies to allow a
second action on the same cause when the court in the first
action would clearly not have had jurisdiction to entertain
the omitted theory or ground or, having jurisdiction, would
clearly have declined to exercise jurisdiction as a matter of
discretion.   In this case, it remains unclear whether the
federal district court will entertain Sirote's state-law
claims, which will be reinstated if Sirote succeeds on appeal.
Therefore, the Terrell exception does not apply. 
Additionally, this Court in both L.A. Draper & Son and
J.E. Estes Wood held that § 6-5-440 will operate to bar a
subsequent state-court action if an appeal is pending in the
first-filed federal-court action.  In other words, for
purposes of abatement, a case is pending until it has been
finally adjudged, which would include the resolution of a
timely appeal.    
Sirote argues that this case presents a nonjusticiable
controversy because, he argues, the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals may not reverse the decision of the district court,
1100870
19
and therefore he contends that the controversy is an
anticipated controversy and not a justiciable one.  We
disagree.  Sirote's appeal from the judgment of the federal
district court is pending.  If the federal appeals court
reverses the district court's decision, then all Sirote's
claims will be before the federal district court.  If the
federal appeals court affirms the district court's decision,
then Sirote may pursue his state-law claims.  It is the
pendency 
of 
the 
appeal 
that 
makes 
this 
controversy
justiciable, and it is currently being litigated in both the
federal and the state courts.  
Sirote argues that if the federal appeals court reverses
the decision of the federal district court and his state-law
claims are pending in the state court, then the federal
district court would likely decline to decide the case based
on the abstention doctrine.  In Ex parte Norfolk Southern
Railway, 992 So. 2d 1286 (Ala. 2008), this Court addressed the
abstention 
doctrine 
discussed in Colorado 
River Water
Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
Under the Colorado River abstention doctrine, a federal court
stays an action when there is an ongoing parallel action in a
1100870
20
state court.  In Norfolk Southern, the train conductor was
injured in a collision between a train he was operating and a
tractor-trailer truck.  The conductor filed an action in the
state court against the railroad company under the Federal
Employment Liability Act and against the truck driver, the
truck driver's employer, and the owner of the truck, alleging
negligence and wantonness.  Subsequently, the railroad company
filed a complaint in the federal court against the truck
driver, the driver's employer, and the owner of the truck,
alleging negligence and wantonness.  
In the state-court action, the truck driver, the driver's
employer, and the owner of the truck filed an answer and filed
what they asserted were "cross-claims" against the railroad
company, the conductor, and the train engineer.  The railroad
company filed a motion in the state court contending that § 6-
5-440 required the trial court to dismiss the "cross-claims"
because the federal-court action had been filed and took
precedence over the state-court action.  The truck driver, the
truck owner, and the employer moved the federal court to stay
the case under Colorado River.  The federal court found that
Colorado River required it to abstain from proceeding with the
1100870
21
case, and it entered a stay.  The state court denied the
railroad company's motion to dismiss, and the railroad company
petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus.  While the
petition was pending, the railroad company appealed the
district court's order entering a stay, and the federal
appeals court affirmed the decision of the district court.  
 This Court held:
"In the instant case, the federal district court
exercised its power under Colorado River to stay the
action pending in that court. [The railroad company]
attempted, but failed, to have the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals dissolve that stay. For all
practical purposes, the federal district court has
declined to hear [the railroad company's] claims. If
this Court were to halt the Clarke County action
pursuant to § 6-5-440, then this case would present
the absurd result the Terrell exception was crafted
to prevent: the respondents would have no forum in
which to present their claims. We thus hold that,
when a federal court abstains from hearing a case
under the Colorado River doctrine, that case is not
considered as an action being prosecuted, for
purposes of § 6-5-440."
992 So. 2d at 1291.  Accordingly, we denied the petition.
In the present case, the federal district court ruled
against Sirote and dismissed his federal-law claims with
prejudice 
and 
dismissed 
his 
state-law 
claims 
without
prejudice.  Sirote has appealed the decision to the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals.  Sirote's argument is that if the
1100870
22
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reverses the judgment of the
district court then the district court would be required under
the factors set out in Colorado River to stay or to dismiss
the federal-court action.   Sirote presents nothing to support
his argument that the federal district court will be required
to stay or dismiss the federal-court action following his
appeal while his subsequently filed state-court action is
pending, because the abstention doctrine discussed in Colorado
River is discretionary.  Also, we note that Sirote first filed
his claims arising out of these facts in the federal court,
and he has timely appealed that court's decision to the
federal appeals court.  This indicates Sirote's desire to
litigate his claims in the federal court.  As discussed above,
the federal district court will retain jurisdiction over
Sirote's state-law claims if the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals reverses its decision.  To require BBVA Compass and
Hovis to defend claims in the state court while also defending
claims arising out of the same facts in the federal court is
prohibited under § 6-5-440.
Conclusion
1100870
23
Sirote's pending appeal in the federal court abates his
subsequently filed state-court action against BBVA Compass and
Hovis arising out of the same facts.  Accordingly, BBVA
Compass and Hovis have shown that they have a clear legal
right under § 6-5-440 to a dismissal of Sirote's claims
pending in the state court.  We grant the petition and issue
the writ.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Woodall, Murdock, Shaw, and Main, JJ., concur.