Title: Wallace v. Smyth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 93144
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: December 19, 2002

Docket No. 93144-Agenda 31-September 2002.
SHANDOULIA WALLACE, Indiv. and as Adm'r of the Estate of 
Waketta Roy Wallace, Deceased, Appellant, v. JOHN P. SMYTH
et al., Appellees.
Opinion filed December 19, 2002.
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:
	The issue in this case is whether, in the wake of our decisions
to retain a limited form of parental immunity in Cates v. Cates,
156 Ill. 2d 76 (1993), and to extend this immunity to foster parents
in Nichol v. Stass, 192 Ill. 2d 233 (2000), the defendants, a
residential child care facility and seven of its employees, enjoyed
a similar immunity from the plaintiff's negligence claims after her
son died in their care. We conclude that because the corporation-child relationship does not mirror the parent-child relationship, the
defendants do not have parental immunity. We reverse the
appellate court and the circuit court, and we remand for further
proceedings.

BACKGROUND
	On June 12, 1989, the Illinois Department of Children and
Family Services (DCFS) placed one of its wards, 12-year-old
Waketta Roy Wallace (Roy), at Maryville Academy (Maryville)
for a 90-day diagnostic assessment regarding his future placement.
Maryville is a not-for-profit corporation that operates a licensed
residential child care facility for state wards. In 1989, Maryville
cared for approximately 500 children.
	A month later, on July 11, 1989, Roy reported to the office of
Maryville program manager Paul Voltz after school. Voltz
confronted Roy about sleeping in study hall. Roy made threatening
gestures, and Voltz removed him to an adjacent hallway. Once
there, Voltz summoned assistant program manager Laura
Angelucci and family educator Jill Jacobe to assist him in
restraining Roy. Family educator Jim Geidner also participated for
a short time until his shift ended, when he was replaced by family
educator Xavier Collier. Eventually, after a struggle, Roy was
placed on his stomach with his arms crossed in front of his
abdomen and his wrists held to the floor. The restraint continued
for more than four hours and ended in Roy's death from positional
asphyxia.
	Roy's mother, Shandoulia Wallace, filed a four-count
complaint in the circuit court of Cook County against Maryville,
its executive director Reverend John Smyth, Voltz, Angelucci,
Collier, Geidner, Jacobe, and nurse Dee LeBel. Wallace alleged
that the defendants' negligence, and, alternatively, willful and
wanton misconduct, proximately caused Roy's death. The
defendants filed a motion to dismiss Wallace's negligence claims;
they asserted the parental immunity doctrine shielded them from
liability. The trial court agreed and dismissed these claims, stating:
"I am convinced from the cases that the defendants have tendered
to me, and from the arguments made, and everything that I know
about the case that Maryville was acting de facto as loco parentis
for this child. *** I do not believe that Maryville can be sued
under theories of ordinary negligence." The case proceeded to trial
on Wallace's willful and wanton misconduct claims. After a jury
returned a verdict for the defendants, Wallace appealed the
dismissal of her negligence claims.
	The appellate court reversed. Wallace v. Smyth, 301 Ill. App.
3d 75 (1998). The court noted, "At common law, in loco parentis
status belonged to persons who put themselves in a parent's shoes
by assuming all parental obligations toward a child without going
through the formalities of legal adoption." Wallace, 301 Ill. App.
3d at 80. After reviewing Wallace's negligence allegations, the
court rejected the defendants' argument that Wallace conceded
they stood in loco parentis by pleading that Maryville was
licenced by the state to house, care for, and educate children.
Wallace, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 80. The court held that housing, caring
for, and educating a child do not confer in loco parentis status.
Wallace, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 80. According to the appellate court,
teachers are in loco parentis with regard to students under the
School Code, but no statutory equivalent exists to insulate an
entity like Maryville against allegations that it negligently
disciplined a child. Wallace, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 80-81. Rather, in
conjunction with Illinois' statutory scheme, DCFS bore ultimate
responsibility for traditional parental functions with regard to Roy.
Wallace, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 81, citing 89 Ill. Adm. Code §§359.7,
359.9 (1996). The appellate court concluded that Wallace's
allegations did not show Maryville stood in loco parentis to Roy
and that the trial court improperly dismissed her negligence
claims. Wallace, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 81.
	The defendants filed a petition for leave to appeal. While this
petition was pending, we decided Nichol. Accordingly, we denied
the defendant's petition and remanded this cause to the appellate
court for additional consideration in light of Nichol. See Wallace
v. Smyth, 191 Ill. 2d 562 (2000).
	On remand, the appellate court discussed both Cates and
Nichol and stated:
			"The similarities between foster parents and defendants
are obvious. The wards that foster parents and facilities
such as Maryville provide care for are both under the
ultimate legal and financial control of DCFS. Further,
both foster parents and Maryville assume physical custody
of the minors in their care. They both provide day-to-day
housing, care, medical attention, supervision, and
discipline to those in their care pursuant to extensive
DCFS regulations. Those are exactly the types of duties
and responsibilities found in Cates and Nichol to be
inherent to the parent-child relationship. *** Both Cates
and Nichol make clear that what matters most for
purposes of extending immunity is whether the party to
whom it is being extended exercises a substantial amount
of parental discretion in discipline, supervision, and care
of minors. *** [W]e cannot say that there is meaningful
difference between foster parents and residential child
care institutions such as Maryville so as to preclude the
limited form of parental immunity discussed in Cates and
Nichol from applying to such institutions and those who
work there." 327 Ill. App. 3d 411, 419-20.
The court vacated its previous opinion and remanded to allow
Wallace to amend her complaint and allege facts which would
preclude parental immunity. 327 Ill. App. 3d at 421.
	In dissent, Justice Cahill stated:
		"The opinion in Nichol [citation] is a narrow one. ***
Nichol extends a limited form of parental immunity to
foster parents. The role of a natural parent and a foster
parent in the life of a child is so often similar our supreme
court concluded that it would be anomalous to reject a
limited form of personal immunity for foster parents. The
immunity shields one person in his or her relationship
with one child. To now broaden limited immunity to
include a corporation, however dedicated, however
essential its work, strikes me as a public policy decision
for the legislature." 327 Ill. App. 3d at 422 (Cahill, J.,
dissenting).
	We allowed Wallace's petition for leave to appeal. See 177
Ill. 2d R. 315.(1)

ANALYSIS
	A motion to dismiss under section 2-615(a) of the Civil
Practice Law (735 ILCS 5/2-615(a) (West 2000)) tests the legal
sufficiency of the plaintiff's claim, while a motion to dismiss
under section 2-619(a) (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a) (West 2000)) admits
the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's claim, but asserts certain
defects or defenses outside the pleading which defeat the claim.
See Provenzale v. Forister, 318 Ill. App. 3d 869, 878 (2001);
Joseph v. Chicago Transit Authority, 306 Ill. App. 3d 927, 930
(1999). Consistent with the designation the defendants gave to
their motion to dismiss, the trial court considered the motion under
section 2-615. This motion, however, should have been brought
under section 2-619(a)(9) because the defendants argued that the
plaintiff's negligence claim was barred by "other affirmative
matter," namely, parental immunity. 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(2)
(West 2000); see Nichol, 192 Ill. 2d  at 235. We will address the
merits of this appeal, despite the defendants' error, because
Wallace has suffered no prejudice from the defendants' improper
designation. See Storm &amp; Associates, Ltd. v. Cuculich, 298 Ill.
App. 3d 1040, 1047 (1998); see also Janes v. First Federal
Savings &amp; Loan Ass'n of Berwyn, 57 Ill. 2d 398, 406-07 (1974)
(expressly disapproving of hybrid dismissal/summary judgment
motions, but refusing to waste judicial resources by remanding for
the defendants to correct their motion). Under either section, our
standard of review is de novo. See Kedzie &amp; 103rd Currency
Exchange, Inc. v. Hodge, 156 Ill. 2d 112, 116 (1993).
	In this appeal, Wallace contends that the parental immunity
doctrine does not extend to residential child care facilities because
such entities do not have a parent-child relationship with the state
wards in their care. By contrast, the defendants contend that the
doctrine protects any person or entity charged with the day-to-day
care, supervision, and discipline of state wards, regardless of any
familial relationship between the child and the person or entity. In
the defendants' view, "the parental immunity doctrine follows the
child."
	The parental immunity doctrine, which blocks mere
negligence claims, but not willful and wanton misconduct claims
(see Gerrity v. Beatty, 71 Ill. 2d 47, 49 (1978), citing Nudd v.
Matsoukas, 7 Ill. 2d 608 (1956)), was recognized in Illinois in
Foley v. Foley, 61 Ill. App. 577 (1895). Nearly 100 years later, this
court first discussed the doctrine at length in Cates. In Cates, a
four-year-old girl was seriously injured in an automobile accident
involving vehicles driven by her noncustodial father and another
driver. The girl, by her mother, filed a negligence complaint
against the other driver; she subsequently amended her complaint
to add her father as a defendant. The father filed a summary
judgment motion, asserting that the parental immunity doctrine
blocked the girl's negligence claim against him. The trial court
granted summary judgment to the father. The appellate court
reversed and partially abrogated the doctrine in automobile
negligence cases.
	We affirmed the appellate court. Cates, 156 Ill. 2d 76. After
concluding that this court had recognized the parental immunity
doctrine in earlier cases (Cates, 156 Ill. 2d at 85), we turned to its
history. The cases which created the doctrine relied on several
public policy justifications: preservation of family harmony,
preservation of family assets, and preservation of parental
authority. Cates, 156 Ill. 2d  at 88. We noted that the family
harmony justification was no longer viable: "The focus has shifted
to a concern with preventing litigation concerning conduct
intimately associated with the parent-child relationship. ***
[W]here that relationship is not impacted, the policies supporting
the doctrine lose their persuasive strength." Cates, 156 Ill. 2d  at
98-99. We also noted that the family assets justification had
become irrelevant with the proliferation of liability insurance.
Cates, 156 Ill. 2d  at 101-02. We observed that, today, the parental
immunity doctrine is supported by other policy concerns:
		"Courts should not be involved in deciding matters
between parent and child which concern decisions which
those persons are uniquely equipped to make because of
that relationship; to allow otherwise would unnecessarily
and obtrusively inject courts into family matters which
they are ill-equipped to decide. Such matters, by
definition, involve parental discretion in discipline,
supervision and care. *** [T]hose underlying policies
ought to determine the scope of the immunity."
(Emphases added.) Cates, 156 Ill. 2d  at 103-04.
	In short, we focused on both the nature of the conduct and the
nature of the relationship. Cates, 156 Ill. 2d  at 103. The central
inquiry, thus, is whether the allegedly negligent conduct is conduct
intimately associated with the parent-child relationship-such as the
care, supervision, and discipline of a child. Cates, 156 Ill. 2d  at
104. As we observed, "These limited areas of conduct require the
skills, knowledge, intuition, affection, wisdom, faith, humor,
perspective, background, experience, and culture which only a
parent and his or her child can bring to the situation; our legal
system is ill-equipped to decide the reasonableness of such
matters." (Emphasis added.) Cates, 156 Ill. 2d  at 105. We
concluded that operating a motor vehicle is not such conduct;
accordingly, parental immunity did not block the girl's negligence
claim against her father. Cates, 156 Ill. 2d  at 106.
	More recently, in Nichol, we addressed the issue of who, in
addition to biological parents, may claim this immunity. There, the
biological parents of a two-year-old child who drowned in a toilet
filed a negligence complaint against the child's foster parents, in
whose home the accident occurred. The foster parents filed a
motion to dismiss, asserting that they enjoyed sovereign immunity
as state employees. The trial court granted the motion, and the
biological parents appealed. The appellate court affirmed, and the
biological parents appealed to this court. Before us, the foster
parents again claimed sovereign immunity, and, as further support
for the appellate court's judgment, claimed parental immunity.
	We rejected the sovereign immunity argument, but accepted
the parental immunity argument:
		"[A]lthough the relationship between foster parents and
foster children is not identical with the relationship
between biological parents and their children, we believe
that it would be anomalous to reject some form of the
[parental immunity] defense in these circumstances. The
rationale identified by the Cates court as justifying the
retention of some portion of the doctrine-the preservation
of parental authority and discipline [citation]-is also
applicable in the foster parent setting. Although foster
parents receive compensation for their role, they exercise
a substantial amount of discretion in discipline,
supervision, and care, areas in which Cates found
immunity to be appropriate." Nichol, 192 Ill. 2d  at 244-45.
Accord Commerce Bank v. Augsburger, 288 Ill. App. 3d 510, 517
(1997) ("Foster parents are nearly as much in need of leeway [in
regard to the supervision and discipline of those children under
their care] as are natural parents").
	We compared teachers, who enjoy statutory immunity under
the School Code, to foster parents. Like teachers and biological
parents, foster parents remain responsible for "a broad range of
decisions affecting the vital interests of the children involved."
Nichol, 192 Ill. 2d  at 246. We noted, however, that parental
immunity in this context is tailored to the peculiar circumstances
of the foster parent-child relationship. Nichol, 192 Ill. 2d  at 246.
Parental immunity is not available to foster parents when the
allegedly negligent conduct results in a revocation of their license,
a finding of neglect, or a criminal charge; it also cannot override
any DCFS regulations. Nichol, 192 Ill. 2d  at 246-47. We reversed
and remanded to allow the plaintiffs to amend their complaint to
allege facts that would defeat parental immunity. Nichol, 192 Ill. 2d  at 248.
	The defendants assert that foster parents and residential child
care facilities are no different. At trial, Father Smyth even
characterized Maryville as "a very large foster home for the
children who are dependent and neglected [and abused]."
According to the defendants, foster parents and facilities like
Maryville are trained to provide day-to-day care for state wards,
and both should receive immunity. The defendants contend that
we have refined the parental immunity doctrine to shield persons
and entities who perform parental functions and exercise parental
functions, without regard for the existence of a "filial or pseudo-filial relationship."
	We disagree. The Cates standard "focuses primarily on
conduct inherent to the parent-child relationship." (Emphasis
added.) Cates, 156 Ill. 2d  at 105. Clearly, neither the conduct nor
the relationship is the sole consideration. Both remain important
in determining who is cloaked with immunity. That is, application
of the doctrine depends upon more than the performance of so-called "parental" responsibilities; we also consider whose
performance is at issue. See Gulledge v. Gulledge, 51 Ill. App. 3d
972, 974 (1977) ("the rationale behind the [parental immunity]
rule loses its persuasive force as one considers situations involving
other than the actual parent"); see also Cates, 156 Ill. 2d  at 99
("where the family relationship is dissolved or where that
relationship has ceased to exist with respect to conduct giving rise
to the injury, the immunity will not be applied").
	Consequently, we conclude that, while the parental immunity
doctrine logically reaches foster parents, it cannot stretch to cover
a corporate entity and its employees. The employees of a
residential child care facility like Maryville exercise their
professional duties in handling state wards; they are not parents,
however similar their responsibilities. See Cates, 156 Ill. 2d  at
105. As Wallace notes in her brief, a biological parent or foster
parent does not discipline a child by means of a four-hour
restraint, pinning the child to the floor with the assistance of three
additional adults. The fact that Maryville employees were ordered
to participate in the restraint by the program manager, and later
replaced each other during the restraint, underscores the
institutional nature of Maryville's response.
	We recognize that the parental immunity doctrine is a judicial
creation (see Nudd, 7 Ill. 2d  at 619; accord Cates, 156 Ill. 2d at
108), but we note that only the legislature has provided parental
immunity to individuals who are not parents or foster parents (see
105 ILCS 5/24-24, 34-84a (West 2000) ("In all matters relating
to the discipline in and conduct of the schools and the school
children, [educators] stand in the relation of parents and guardians
to the pupils"); Arteman v. Clinton Community Unit School
District No. 15, 198 Ill. 2d 475, 480 (2002) (sections 24-24 and
34-84a of the School Code grant educational employees the same
immunity enjoyed by parents); Gerrity, 71 Ill. 2d  at 51; Kobylanski
v. Chicago Board of Education, 63 Ill. 2d 165, 173 (1976); see
also Possekel v. O'Donnell, 51 Ill. App. 3d 313, 319 (1977)
(holding that the immunity under the School Code does not extend
to private day-care centers, nursery schools, and kindergartens
governed by the Child Care Act)). We decline to extend the
immunity to a corporate entity, even one whose purpose and
history demonstrate the noblest motives. The corporation-child
relationship simply does not mirror the parent-child relationship.
Consequently, the defendants do not enjoy parental immunity.

CONCLUSION
	For the reasons we have discussed, we reverse the judgment
of the appellate court, reverse the judgment of the trial court, and
remand to the trial court for further proceedings.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment reversed;
cause remanded.
	I agree that Maryville Academy and its employees (hereinafter
Maryville Academy) may not invoke parental immunity as a
defense to plaintiff's action. Thus, I concur in the result reached by
the majority. However, I disagree with the analysis the majority
uses in arriving at its decision. In my opinion, Nichol v. Stass, 192 Ill. 2d 233 (2000), which extended a limited form of parental
immunity to foster parents in negligence actions, is controlling.
Foster parents and institutions, such as Maryville Academy, that
provide care to wards of the state should be treated the same. Like
foster parents, these institutions assume physical custody of the
ward and provide housing, food and medical care to the ward. The
institutions supervise and discipline the ward, as do foster parents.
Also, both foster parents and the institutions are subject to
supervision and regulation by DCFS. Lastly, foster parents and the
institutions receive financial reimbursement for the services they
provide.
	I also believe, however, that Nichol was wrongly decided. I
dissented in Nichol, 192 Ill. 2d  at 253-73 (Freeman, J., dissenting),
because there are fundamental differences in the relationship
between a foster parent and foster child and the relationship
between a biological parent and child that militate against
extension of parental immunity to foster parents. In my dissent, I
noted that all foster parents, whether supervised directly by DCFS
or supervised by a child welfare agency, are subject to DCFS
licensing requirements, must participate in DCFS training
programs, must maintain records required by DCFS, must provide
access to DCFS, and must comply with DCFS standards relating
to the appearance, cleanliness and safety of the facility; the
discipline of children at the facility; and the provision of care to
children at the facility. I also noted that foster parents are entitled
to reimbursement from the state for the services they provide to
foster children. Foster parents do not stand in loco parentis to
foster children because foster parents do not take upon themselves
the financial obligations of a parent. Lastly, I sounded a cautionary
note regarding the majority's holding:
			"By its holding today, the majority has eliminated the
requirement that one who stands in loco parentis must
assume financial responsibility for the child. The majority
has redefined the term in loco parentis. The implication
in the present case is that the Stasses may invoke the
doctrine of parental immunity to bar an action for
negligent supervision of Jonathan Nichol. The majority
opinion, however, may have unintended consequences. As
noted by the appellate court in Wallace [v. Smyth], 301 Ill.
App. 3d [75], 80, housing, care and education are also
provided by summer camps, day-care centers, medical and
psychological treatment facilities, grandparents and other
relatives of a child. Do these persons or entities also stand
in loco parentis to a child? Should the Wallace court have
held that the [Maryville Academy] and counselors stood
in loco parentis to the child placed in their care?
Moreover, use of the term in loco parentis is not restricted
to the area of foster care or education. Under the Workers'
Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 1998))
death benefits are payable to a child to whom the
deceased employee stood in loco parentis. A parent, or
one who stands in loco parentis to a child, may be guilty
of the offense of contributing to the dependency or neglect
of the child. 720 ILCS 130/2 (West 1998). By redefining
the term in loco parentis, the majority opinion may have
an impact on diverse areas of the law." Nichol, 192 Ill. 2d 
at 272-73 (Freeman, J., dissenting).
Thus, in my dissent, I anticipated that other providers of care
would claim immunity in negligence actions filed against them. I
felt strongly that these providers and foster parents are not entitled
to parental immunity.
	The present case offered this court an opportunity to
reconsider the holding in Nichol. To do so would have been
helpful to persons bringing actions on behalf of children hurt by
providers of care, whether these providers be foster parents or
institutions such as Maryville Academy. These providers would
not be able to claim parental immunity as a defense in actions filed
against them. Further, reconsideration would have safeguarded
precious judicial resources since our courts would not be faced
with claims of parental immunity by other care providers. The
majority fails to grasp this opportunity, however. Instead, the
majority relies on an artificial distinction between foster parents
and Maryville Academy. The majority apparently bases this
distinction on the assistance of additional adults in disciplining the
child. Can this court then assume that a foster parent could not
enlist the help of other adults in the foster home (or even other
children in the foster home) in disciplining a particular minor? In
my opinion, this court cannot do so.
	Because the majority has refused to reconsider the holding in
Nichol, our courts will inevitably be faced with claims of parental
immunity by other care providers, leading to delay in recovery for
wrongs perpetrated against minor wards of this state and a waste
of precious judicial resources. I, for one, continue to believe that
Nichol was wrongly decided. I also believe the present case is
controlled by Nichol. This court should reconsider the holding in
Nichol rather than create an unreal distinction between foster
parents and Maryville Academy. For these reasons, I cannot join
in the majority opinion, although I concur in the result reached.
	 
	 
1.      1We granted leave to the Cook County public guardian; the Children
and Family Justice Center of Northwestern University School of Law;
the ChildLaw Center and ChildLaw Clinic of the Loyola University
Chicago School of Law; the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association;
Cochran, Cherry, Givens, Smith and Montgomery, L.L.C.; and the
Clifford Law Offices to file a brief as amici curiae in support of
Wallace. See 155 Ill. 2d R. 345.