Title: Harrell v. Harrell
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 052629
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: November 3, 2006

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Kinser, Lemons, and 
Agee, JJ., and Russell, S.J. 
 
O. RIDDICK HARRELL, JR. 
 
v.  Record No. 052629  
OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
November 3, 2006 
CHRISTINA H. HARRELL 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of Appeals 
erred in affirming the trial court's reservation of spousal 
support to a party without a valid pleading requesting it.  
For the reasons stated below, the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals will be reversed. 
I. 
Facts and Proceedings Below 
 
Christina H. Harrell ("Ms. Harrell") and O. Riddick 
Harrell, Jr. ("Mr. Harrell") were married on November 22, 
1969.  The parties separated on June 27, 2003.  On June 15, 
2004, Ms. Harrell filed a bill of complaint for a no-fault 
divorce in the Circuit Court of the County of Chesterfield.  
This bill of complaint was filed before the expiration of the 
one year separation period required by Code § 20-91(9)(a).  
The complaint requested that Ms. Harrell "be awarded temporary 
and permanent spousal support."  On June 15, 2004, Ms. Harrell 
also filed a motion for relief pendente lite in which she 
moved the court to direct Mr. Harrell to pay temporary spousal 
support.  On June 29, 2004, without leave of court, Ms. 
Harrell filed an amended bill of complaint.  In her amended 
complaint, Ms. Harrell requested a divorce on the grounds of 
adultery and again requested "temporary and permanent spousal 
support."  On July 1, 2004, Mr. Harrell filed an "Answer and 
Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff's Bill of Complaint for 
Divorce."  Included in Mr. Harrell's answer and motion to 
dismiss was a cross-bill in which he requested "that he be 
awarded permanent spousal support."  Ms. Harrell did not file 
an answer to the cross-bill. 
 
On November 3, 2004, the trial court issued an opinion 
letter in which it ruled on several issues.  First, it granted 
Mr. Harrell's "Motion to Dismiss the Bill of Complaint" 
because the bill was filed before the passage of the period of 
separation required by statute.  The opinion letter also 
stated that the amended bill of complaint was not properly 
before the Court because Ms. Harrell had not sought leave of 
court to file it pursuant to Rule 1:8.  The trial court 
indicated it would grant a divorce based on Mr. Harrell's 
cross-bill.  Finally, the trial court indicated that the final 
decree should include a "reservation of Ms. Harrell's right to 
request spousal support pursuant to Va. Code 20-107.1(D)." 
 
In response to the November 3, 2004, opinion letter, Ms. 
Harrell filed "Defendant's Omnibus Motion for Relief" 
("omnibus motion") wherein she requested that her amended bill 
 
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of complaint be deemed an answer to the cross-bill, thereby 
placing the issue of a permanent award of spousal support 
before the court.  She also requested that her "prior 
pleadings" be deemed sufficient to place her request for 
permanent spousal support before the court. 
On January 18, 2005, in a final decree, the trial court 
dismissed Ms. Harrell's bill of complaint and granted a final 
divorce to Mr. Harrell based solely on his cross-bill.  The 
trial court's decree ordered that "both parties [were] 
entitled to a reservation of the right to request spousal 
support."  The trial court never specifically ruled on Ms. 
Harrell's motion to consider her amended bill of complaint as 
an answer to the cross-bill or to "deem her prior pleadings 
. . . to be responsive pleadings sufficient to place before 
[the trial court] the matter[] of spousal support."  
Significantly, however, in the final decree, the trial court 
does not recite that the amended bill of complaint was one of 
the pleadings it considered and the trial court ordered that 
the bill of complaint be dismissed. 
On February 11, 2005, Mr. Harrell filed a timely notice 
of appeal.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the 
trial court.  Because the Court of Appeals' judgment involves 
a matter of significant precedential value, we granted Mr. 
 
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Harrell an appeal to this Court.  See Code §§ 17.1-410(B) and 
–411. 
II. Analysis 
 
On appeal, Mr. Harrell advances three assignments of 
error.  First, "[t]he trial court erred in granting wife 
relief in the absence of a valid pleading."  Second, "[t]he 
trial court erred in awarding wife a reservation of spousal 
support in the absence of a specific prayer for that form of 
relief."  Third, "[t]he trial court erred in granting wife a 
reservation of spousal support without considering all of the 
factors contained in Virginia Code Section 20-107.1(E)."  Ms. 
Harrell assigns cross-error as follows:  "The trial court 
erred in dismissing wife's original bill of complaint."  Under 
well-established principles, we review such questions of law 
de novo.  Westgate at Williamsburg Condominium Ass'n v. Philip 
Richardson Co., 270 Va. 566, 574, 621 S.E.2d 114, 118 (2005). 
Code § 20-79(b) states "[i]n any suit for divorce, the 
court in which the suit is instituted or pending, when either 
party to the proceedings so requests, shall provide in its 
decree . . . support and maintenance for the spouse."  
(Emphasis added.)  Pursuant to Code § 20-79(b), a party must 
request spousal support in order to be granted that relief. 
In Potts v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 165 Va. 196, 181 S.E. 
521 (1935), this Court held: 
 
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No court can base its decree upon facts not 
alleged, nor render its judgment upon a right, 
however meritorious, which has not been pleaded and 
claimed.  Pleadings are as essential as proof, the 
one being unavailing without the other. 
Id. at 207, 181 S.E. at 525 (citation omitted). 
Ms. Harrell alleges that she properly pled her request 
for spousal support in several of her pleadings:  the bill of 
complaint, the amended bill of complaint, the motion for 
relief pendente lite, and in the omnibus motion for relief.  
We will address each in turn. 
In her bill of complaint, Ms. Harrell's grounds for 
divorce were that she and Mr. Harrell had "lived separate and 
apart for a period of more than one year" pursuant to Code 
§ 20-91(9)(a).  The bill of complaint also requested that Ms. 
Harrell be awarded "temporary and permanent spousal support."  
However, when Ms. Harrell filed the bill of complaint, she had 
not been separated from Mr. Harrell "without interruption for 
one year" as required by the statute.  Code § 20-91(9)(a).  
"[J]urisdiction in divorce suits is purely statutory," Sprouse 
v. Griffin, 250 Va. 46, 50, 458 S.E.2d 770, 772 (1995), and 
this Court has held that "[t]he act relied upon for divorce 
must be alleged and proved to have occurred prior to the 
bringing of the suit, not based upon some act or conduct 
alleged to have taken place during its pendency."  Beckner v. 
Beckner, 204 Va. 580, 583, 132 S.E.2d 715, 717-18 (1963).  
 
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Consequently, Ms. Harrell failed to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted.  The trial court had subject matter 
jurisdiction over the divorce; however, inadequate grounds 
were alleged in the bill.  The trial court properly dismissed 
the bill for this reason.  Consequently, the request for 
spousal support contained in the bill of complaint abated with 
its dismissal. 
Ms. Harrell's amended complaint was also properly 
dismissed by the trial court because Ms. Harrell failed to 
seek leave of court prior to amending her pleading pursuant to 
Rule 1:8.  Her request for spousal support therein abated with 
the dismissal of the amended bill. 
Ms. Harrell's motion for relief pendente lite was 
insufficient to grant a reservation of permanent spousal 
support pursuant to Code § 20-107.1.  A trial court grants 
pendente lite relief pursuant to Code § 20-103, while a 
request for permanent spousal support or a reservation of 
permanent spousal support is made pursuant to Code § 20-107.1.  
The two statutory schemes are separate and distinct.  See 
Whiting v. Whiting, 262 Va. 3, 4 (2001) ("This Court further 
holds that the pendente lite decree awarding spousal support 
only applied during the pendency of litigation and was 
terminated when the cause was dismissed by the final decree of 
divorce."); Reid v. Reid, 245 Va. 409, 412, 429 S.E.2d 208, 
 
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209 (1993) ("The authority granted by § 20-107.1 relates to 
orders entered at the time divorce is awarded or denied and is 
limited to matters of 'maintenance and support.' ").  Ms. 
Harrell's request for pendente lite support was not sufficient 
for the trial court to order that Ms. Harrell was "entitled to 
a reservation of the right to request spousal support pursuant 
to Section 20-107.1(D)." 
Additionally, Ms. Harrell could not be granted a 
reservation of spousal support based on her "omnibus motion."   
Ms. Harrell's omnibus motion does not contain an independent 
request for spousal support.  In the omnibus motion, Ms. 
Harrell requests that the amended bill of complaint be 
considered an answer to the cross-bill and that all of her 
"prior pleadings" be deemed "sufficient" to place the issue of 
spousal support before the trial court.  The trial court did 
not address this matter in its final decree.  There was no 
objection to the failure to rule on the motion and no 
assignment of error made on this basis. 
Ms. Harrell failed to request permanent spousal support 
in any valid pleading.  Her bill of complaint was properly 
dismissed as premature.  Her amended bill of complaint was 
properly dismissed for failing to comply with the requirements 
of Rule 1:8 to obtain leave of court before filing.  Any 
request for spousal support contained in either of these 
 
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pleadings was rendered a nullity by the respective dismissals.  
Ms. Harrell's separate motion for pendente lite spousal 
support was inadequate to obtain permanent spousal support.  
Ms. Harrell's omnibus motion did not contain an independent 
request for spousal support and the court did not rule on the 
request to deem prior dismissed pleadings as a request for 
permanent spousal support or to consider the amended bill of 
complaint to be an answer to the cross-bill.  Ms. Harrell does 
not assign error to the trial court's failure to rule on the 
omnibus motion.  Finally, Ms. Harrell filed no answer to the 
cross-bill. 
As a consequence, Ms. Harrell had no valid pleading 
before the trial court requesting permanent spousal support.  
Without such a pleading, it was error for the trial court to 
grant a reservation of spousal support to her pursuant to Code 
§ 20-107.1(D). 
III. Conclusion 
We hold that the trial court erred in its judgment that 
Ms. Harrell was "entitled to a reservation of the right to 
request spousal support pursuant to Section 20-107.1(D)."  We 
do not address assignment of error three concerning compliance 
under Code § 20-107.1(E).  For the reasons stated herein, the 
assignment of cross-error is without merit.  Accordingly, we 
will reverse that portion of the judgment of the Court of 
 
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Appeals concerning a reservation of spousal support to Ms. 
Harrell, with directions to the Court of Appeals to remand 
this case to the trial court for entry of a modified decree in 
accordance with this opinion. 
Reversed in part and remanded. 
 
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