Title: Rhoten v. Dickson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 98837
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: January 29, 2010

1 
 
 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 98,837 
 
DANIELLE RHOTEN, AS AN INDIVIDUAL AND AS 
HEIR-AT-LAW OF XAVIER RHOTEN (DECEASED), 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
BRUCE DICKSON, IV, Defendant, 
AND 
FRANK PASE, AS AN INDIVIDUAL AND AN EMPLOYEE OF TOPEKA, KANSAS, 
AND THE CITY OF TOPEKA, KANSAS, AS THE PRINCIPAL AND EMPLOYER OF FRANK PASE, 
Appellees. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
Under K.S.A. 60-212(b), a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is treated like a 
motion for summary judgment if matters outside the pleadings are considered by the court. 
 
2. 
Failure to comply with Supreme Court Rule 141 (2009 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 225) may 
constitute harmless error if subsequent filings of findings of fact allow for proper presentation of 
the uncontroverted facts establishing summary judgment is proper.  
 
3. 
Whether the doctrines of issue preclusion or claim preclusion apply in a certain situation 
is a question of law. An appellate court may analyze the question using de novo review. 
 
4. 
A pending appeal does not suspend the finality of a judgment for claim preclusion 
purposes. 
  
 
2 
 
5. 
State courts are bound to apply federal law in determining the preclusive effects of a 
federal court decision on issues of federal law.  
 
6. 
Federal courts traditionally adhere to the related doctrines of res judicata (claim 
preclusion) and collateral estoppel (issue preclusion). Under claim preclusion, a final judgment 
on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating claims that were 
or could have been raised in that action. Under issue preclusion, once a court has decided an 
issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision may preclude relitigation of the same 
issue in a suit on a different cause of action involving a party to the first case. 
 
7. 
A federal court's refusal to consider a plaintiff's state law theories does not prevent claim 
preclusion from applying to theories subsequently filed in a state lawsuit if those theories arose 
out of the same claim or factual transaction determined by the federal court.  
 
8. 
 
A court of last resort will follow the rule of law it established in its earlier cases unless 
clearly convinced the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changing 
conditions and more good than harm will come by departing from precedent. 
 
9. 
 
To satisfy the burden of proof for causation in a negligence claim, the plaintiff must 
produce evidence affording a reasonable basis to conclude it is more likely than not the 
defendant was a cause in fact of the result. 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in 40 Kan. App. 2d 433,192 P.3d 679 (2008).  Appeal 
from Shawnee district court; LARRY D. HENDRICKS, judge. Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district 
court is affirmed. Judgment of the district court is affirmed. Opinion filed January 29, 2010. 
 
Keith Renner, of Renner Law Office, P.A., of Topeka, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.  
3 
 
 
David R. Cooper, of Fisher, Patterson, Sayler & Smith, LLP, of Topeka, argued the cause, Teresa 
L.Watson, of the same firm, and Deanne Watts Hay, of Parker & Hay, LLP, of Topeka, were with him on the briefs 
for appellees. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
BILES, J.:  This appeal asks whether the doctrines of res judicata (claim preclusion) and 
collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) bar plaintiff's negligence and negligence per se claims in 
state court against the City of Topeka and one of its police officers after those same claims were 
dismissed without prejudice in federal court. We hold these claims are barred and decline 
plaintiff's invitation to overrule Stanfield v. Osborne Industries, Inc., 263 Kan. 388, 949 P.2d 602 
(1997), cert. denied 525 U.S. 831 (1998), which found claim preclusion barred plaintiff's claims 
under parallel circumstances. 
  
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
This controversy arises from an intersection collision between a pickup truck driven by 
defendant Bruce Dickson, IV, and a van in which plaintiff Danielle Rhoten was a passenger. 
Rhoten sustained serious injuries and a miscarriage 2 weeks before her due date. Defendant 
Frank Pase was working at the time of the accident as a police officer for the City of Topeka. 
The material facts are not in dispute.  
 
Pase was on duty, driving an unmarked patrol car, on the evening of February 5, 2004. 
Several inches of snow had fallen with accumulations of up to 10 inches. The road in places was 
wet, slushy, or slick when Pase noticed Dickson's truck about one block ahead weaving in and 
out of traffic and making quick lane changes. The officer also noticed a dark-colored car closely 
following the pickup as it maneuvered around traffic. Pase accelerated from approximately 35 
m.p.h. to about 55 m.p.h., intending to stop the pickup. 
 
Pase's unmarked patrol car was equipped with a rear-facing red and blue flashing light 
mounted on the vehicle's interior rear window, a red and blue flashing strobe light on the 
4 
 
passenger sun visor, "wig-wag" headlights, a siren, and a chrome spotlight mounted on the front 
driver's side windshield pillar. Pase intended to activate his lights and siren when he got closer to 
the pickup, but he did not do so prior to the collision nor did he notify his dispatcher that he was 
in pursuit of the vehicles. 
 
Both the pickup and the dark-colored car preceded Pase southbound onto the Topeka 
Boulevard bridge. The bridge inclines as one proceeds southbound and rises to a crest, after 
which there is a flat expanse across the river. Pase accelerated to 65 m.p.h. in a 35 m.p.h. zone as 
he approached the bridge's crest and reached the flat expanse, but Pase could not see Dickson's 
pickup. The dark-colored car following the pickup reduced its speed, discontinued passing, and 
moved into the right lane. Pase passed it and other vehicles in his attempt to locate the pickup, 
which by then was out of sight over the bridge's southern crest. 
 
As Pase approached the bridge's south end, he spotted the pickup, approximately 2 blocks 
ahead. The officer then saw the pickup accelerate and drive through several green lights before it 
collided with a van traveling the opposite direction. The van was attempting to turn onto a cross 
street. Pase was still about 2 blocks from the collision, still attempting to follow the pickup. 
When Pase arrived at the accident scene, he told Dickson he clocked his speed and was 
"following and/or chasing" him. Pase also commented to another person at the scene that the 
officer had "been trying to catch this guy since North Topeka." Plaintiff was a passenger in the 
van.  
  
  Rhoten filed her first lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of 
Kansas against Dickson, Pase, and the City of Topeka. Rhoten v. Dickson, IV, 2006 WL 2524157 
(D. Kan. 2006) (unpublished opinion). She brought a substantive due process claim against Pase 
and the City pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000), and supplemental state law claims for 
negligence and negligence per se against Pase, the City, and Dickson. Her allegations against 
Pase were premised upon two theories: (1) Pase's actions, i.e. speeding while pursuing Dickson; 
and (2) Pase's inactions, i.e. his failure to activate the car's lights and siren.  
 
5 
 
Following discovery, the federal district court granted summary judgment on the 
substantive due process claim in favor of Pase and the City. The court found Pase's actions were 
causally unrelated to plaintiff's injuries because Dickson testified in his deposition that nothing 
done by any car following him that night influenced the way he drove his pickup. Similarly, and 
on the strength of the same testimony, the court found Pase's alleged inactions to be causally 
unrelated, concluding Pase did not create any danger or cause plaintiff or anyone else to be any 
more vulnerable to any danger than otherwise would have been the case. The court held that 
"[b]ecause defendant Dickson's speed and other manner of driving was totally unaffected by 
Pase's actions or inactions, any danger posed to plaintiff by virtue of Dickson's driving already 
existed." Dickson, 2006 WL 2524157, at *9. These findings also terminated Rhoten's due process 
claim against the City because a municipality is not liable if there is no underlying constitutional 
violation by the officer. Trigalet v. City of Tulsa, Oklahoma, 239 F.3d 1150, 1155-1156 (10th 
Cir. 2001). 
 
Having found against plaintiff on her federal allegations, the federal district court then 
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims and dismissed 
them without prejudice. In doing so, the federal court rejected an argument by Pase and the City 
that the court's findings regarding causation in Rhoten's substantive due process claim also were 
dispositive of the negligence claims. As to that point, the court said this "may or may not be so, 
as causation in the context of a negligence claim may differ somewhat from causation in the 
context of a substantive due process claim." Dickson, 2006 WL 2524157, at *12. Rhoten 
appealed the federal district court's summary judgment decision to the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, which affirmed. Rhoten v. Pase, 2007 WL 3088226 (10th Cir. 2007) (unpublished 
opinion). 
 
While the federal appeal was pending, Rhoten timely refiled the state law negligence and 
negligence per se theories in state district court against Dickson, Pase, and the City. The 
negligence claims alleged "defendants failed to . . . operate their vehicle in a safe and reasonable 
manner and in a manner designed to provide warning to other drivers and pedestrians." The 
negligence per se theory was brought under K.S.A. 8-1506, stating "defendants engaged in a 
6 
 
violation of K.S.A. 8-1506 (and possibly other statutes)." But Rhoten never asserted the violation 
of another statute. 
 
Pase filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be 
granted under K.S.A. 60-212(b)(6). The City filed a motion to dismiss under K.S.A. 60-
212(b)(6), or, in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment. A certified copy of Rhoten's 
federal district court complaint, the federal district court's order, and judgment were filed with 
the state district court motions. Pase and the City argued Rhoten's claims were barred by the 
doctrines of claim and issue preclusion due to the federal district court's dismissal without 
prejudice. 
 
During the course of subsequent proceedings on those motions, the state district court 
ordered Rhoten, Pase, and the City to submit findings of fact and conclusions of law. All parties 
complied, filing separate pleadings. The district court then heard oral arguments. During those 
arguments, Rhoten's counsel conceded that this court's Stanfield decision controlled whether 
claim preclusion applied, adding that if the district court strictly followed Stanfield, it would be 
required to grant defendants' motions. 
 
The district court dismissed Rhoten's claims against Pase and the City for failure to state 
a claim upon which relief could be granted. The district court did not grant summary judgment 
because it held it was not considering evidence beyond the pleadings. The district court then 
certified its orders as a final judgment under K.S.A. 60-254(b), severing the litigation in this 
appeal from Rhoten's lawsuit against Dickson. 
 
The district court held the claim preclusion doctrine barred Rhoten's state law claims 
because the federal due process claim arose from a common nucleus of operative facts, forming 
part of a single transaction or claim. The district court reasoned that because the federal due 
process claim reached final judgment in the federal court case, and the parties were identical, 
claim preclusion prevented the state law claims from resurfacing in another court action. Citing 
Stanfield, the state district court also held the federal court's decision to decline supplemental 
jurisdiction over the negligence theories did not change this outcome. 
7 
 
The state district court also found Rhoten's state law claims against Pase and the City 
were barred by the issue preclusion doctrine. The court reasoned the causation question was 
common to both the state law claims and federal claims as to those particular defendants. It held 
the federal court's determination that there was no material question of fact as to causation 
between Pase's alleged actions or inactions and Rhoten's injuries was binding on plaintiff in state 
court. The district court held:  
 
"If Plaintiff was allowed to proceed on her negligence claims, a relitigation of that issue would be 
inevitable because causation is an element of negligence. The relitigating of causation, which 
Plaintiff has already failed to prove, is strictly prohibited by issue preclusion." 
 
Rhoten timely appealed those rulings. Her motion to transfer the appeal directly to this 
court was denied. 
 
Before the Court of Appeals, Rhoten made three arguments: (1) Pase and the City failed 
to comply with Supreme Court Rule 141 (2009 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 225), which governs 
summary judgment motions, and the district court prejudiced plaintiff by not treating the motions 
as ones for summary judgment; (2) the district court erred by following Stanfield; and (3) the 
district court erred in finding issue preclusion barred her claims. 
 
In a published decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of the 
claims against Pase and the City. Rhoten v. Dickson, 40 Kan. App. 2d 433, 192 P.3d 679 (2008). 
The court found there was substantial compliance with Rule 141 because the defendants' motions 
identified the federal district court's decision as the basis for applying res judicata and collateral 
estoppels as a bar to plaintiff's claims and attached to those motions a certified copy of that 
decision as well as Rhoten's federal civil complaint. 40 Kan. App. 2d at 439-40. The court 
further held any violations with Rule 141 in the initial motions to dismiss were cured by the 
district court's subsequent requirement that the parties file proposed findings and conclusions, 
which contained statements of fact in separately numbered paragraphs as required by the rule. 40 
Kan. App. 2d at 440. 
 
8 
 
On the claim preclusion issue, the Court of Appeals stated it was duty bound to apply 
Stanfield unless this court had signaled a willingness to depart from it. 40 Kan. App. 2d at 441. 
Noting this court recently cited Stanfield in State v. Flores, 283 Kan. 380, 384, 153 P.3d 506 
(2007), for the proposition that res judicata requires a prior final judgment on the merits, the 
Court of Appeals determined there was no intent to depart from this prior ruling. 40 Kan. App. 
2d at 441. Accordingly, the court found Stanfield controlled the analysis, and then stated: 
 
 
"To apply the ruling in Stanfield to this case, we must first decide if Rhoten's state lawsuit 
for negligence arises out of the same transaction as her lawsuit in federal court for § 1983 
violation. Obviously, both of Rhoten's claims arose out of the traffic accident between Dickson 
and Conley and Lt. Pase's conduct in that accident. Further, similar to Stanfield, the facts 
necessary to prove Rhoten's federal and state law theories relate in time and origin. Also, Rhoten's 
statement of facts in her federal complaint and state petition discloses the witnesses and proof 
needed in both actions are identical. Thus, because Rhoten's state claim arose out of the same 
transaction as her federal lawsuit, we find that res judicata applies. The district court was correct." 
40 Kan. App. 2d at 443-44. 
 
On issue preclusion, the Court of Appeals affirmed only part of the district court's 
analysis. It agreed that issue preclusion barred Rhoten's negligence claims, but it held the district 
court erred in finding the negligence per se claims were barred under this doctrine. 40 Kan. App. 
2d 445-46. It concluded the causation elements of Rhoten's negligence per se claims were not 
identical to the federal issue and were not reached by the federal court in its judgment in 
defendants' favor. In doing so, the Court of Appeals sua sponte cited to K.S.A. 8-1738(d) 
regarding a driver's duty to activate a siren when reasonably necessary to warn others of a public 
safety vehicle's approach. 40 Kan. App. 2d at 445-46. But Rhoten claimed Pase violated K.S.A. 
8-1506, which requires drivers of authorized vehicles to activate the signal if violating 
enumerated traffic laws. The Court of Appeals did not address the statute cited by plaintiff. 
 
Rhoten's appeal comes to this court on cross-petitions for review, which were each 
granted. Plaintiff asks us to reverse the Court of Appeals on the summary judgment question 
regarding compliance with Rule 141, its adherence to Stanfield, and its ruling regarding issue 
preclusion on plaintiff's negligence claim. Defendants seek to reverse the Court of Appeals on its 
sua sponte application of K.S.A. 8-1738(d) on the issue preclusion question. 
9 
 
It should be emphasized the issue preclusion question is a secondary matter in this case 
because the claim preclusion doctrine alone is sufficient to bar plaintiff from proceeding with her 
lawsuit against Pase and the City. Issue preclusion would impact the result only if we decide to 
depart from Stanfield and reach a different result on the claim preclusion issue. But as will be 
explained below, we find all of plaintiff's claims are barred by claim preclusion, and the state law 
negligence theories based on Pase's actions are barred also by issue preclusion. 
 
COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 141 
 
First, Rhoten argues the district court was barred procedurally from considering 
defendants' motions to dismiss, or the City's alternative motion for summary judgment, because 
the motions failed to state the uncontroverted facts in separately numbered paragraphs as 
required by Rule 141. She cites McCullough v. Bethany Med. Center, 235 Kan. 732, 683 P.2d 
1258 (1984), as controlling. Defendants argue Rule 141 does not apply because the district court 
granted a motion to dismiss, not summary judgment, and the Rule 141 requirements only apply 
to summary judgment motions. In the alternative, defendants claim they substantially complied 
with the rule. The interpretation of a Kansas Supreme Court rule is a question of law subject to 
unlimited review. Gerhardt v. Harris, 261 Kan. 1007, 1010, 934 P.2d 976 (1997). 
 
Rule 141(a) states a motion for summary judgment shall not be heard or deemed finally 
submitted until the following requirements are satisfied: 
 
"(a) The moving party has filed with the court and served on opposing counsel a 
memorandum or brief setting forth concisely in separately numbered paragraphs the 
uncontroverted contentions of fact relied upon by said movant (with precise references to pages, 
lines and/or paragraphs of transcripts, depositions, interrogatories, admissions, affidavits, exhibits, 
or other supporting documents contained in the court file and otherwise included in the record)." 
(Emphasis added.) 2009 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 225-26.  
 
Plaintiff is correct in noting McCullough found strict compliance with Rule 141 was 
required on a motion for summary judgment, but other decisions have not treated McCullough as 
controlling. See Key v. Hein, Ebert and Weir, Chtd., 265 Kan. 124, 133, 960 P.2d 746 (1998) 
10 
 
(holding failure to comply with Rule 141 was harmless error); Calver v. Hinson, 267 Kan. 369, 
377-78, 982 P.2d 970 (1999) (distinguishing McCullough because the noncomplying motion for 
summary judgment was denied, thereby holding substantial compliance was enough); Kelley v. 
Barnett, 23 Kan. App. 2d 564, 566, 932 P.2d 471, rev. denied 262 Kan. 961 (1997) (holding 
"[s]ince the major dispute between the parties is a legal one rather than a factual one, we view 
this technical compliance [with Rule 141] as superfluous"). 
 
We believe we must examine two questions to resolve this issue: (1) whether the district 
court erred by characterizing these motions as motions to dismiss; and (2) whether there was 
compliance with Rule 141 if the motions properly should have been considered motions for 
summary judgment. A more detailed review of the record is required to address Rhoten's Rule 
141 argument. 
 
Additional Facts 
 
Pase's motion to dismiss asserted the following as the statement of facts: 
 
 
"1. 
The petition herein was filed on September 28, 2006, and pertains to a motor 
vehicle accident which occurred on February 5, 2004. 
 
 
 
"2. 
Plaintiff filed a substantially similar pleading in federal district court on 
November 30, 2004, styled as Danielle Rhoten and Xavier Rhoten (Deceased), by and through his 
Heir-at-Law, Danielle Rhoten v. Bruce Dickson IV; Frank Pase; and City of Topeka, Kansas, 
Case no. 04-4160. (The Court may take judicial notice of this pleading, though a copy will be 
supplied to the Court.) 
 
 
"3. 
On August 30, 2006, Federal Senior District Judge Sam A. Crow, in Case No. 
04-4160, entered judgment against plaintiff on plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, declined 
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law negligence and negligence per se claim 
asserted in plaintiff's petition herein. Rhoten v. Dickson, et al., 2006 WL 2524157 (D. Kan. Aug. 
30, 2006). (The Court may also take judicial notice of this decision . . . .)" 
 
In the motion's analysis section, Pase argued Rhoten's claims were barred by the 
doctrines of claim and issue preclusion. He argued claim preclusion applied because the federal 
11 
 
suit was composed of the same "claim," and the federal district court had granted summary 
judgment against Rhoten. Pase also argued issue preclusion applied because Rhoten had fully 
litigated the issue of causation, and the federal court held there was no evidence Pase caused 
Rhoten's injuries. These statements were not presented in separately numbered paragraphs. 
 
The City's motion to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary judgment adopted the 
analysis from Pase's motion to dismiss. The City also attached a memorandum with the 
following statement of facts: 
 
 
"1. 
The court is requested to take judicial notice of Plaintiff's complaint and the 
allegations contained in it, filed in the federal court lawsuit case of Danielle Rhoten and Xavier 
Rhoten (Deceased), by and through his Heir-at-Law, Danielle Rhoten v. Bruce Dickson IV; Frank 
Pase; and City of Topeka, Kansas, Case No. 04-4160. . . . 
 
 
"2. 
The court is requested to take judicial notice of the federal court's Memorandum 
Decision and Order filed in the federal district court lawsuit of Danielle Rhoten and Xavier Rhoten 
(Deceased), by and through his Heir-at-Law, Danielle Rhoten v. Bruce Dickson IV; Frank Pase; 
and City of Topeka, Kansas, Case No. 04-4160 in the United States District Court for the District 
of Kansas. . . . 
 
 
"3. 
The court is requested to take judicial notice of Judgment filed in the federal 
court lawsuit case of Danielle Rhoten and Xavier Rhoten (Deceased), by and through his Heir-at-
Law, Danielle Rhoten v. Bruce Dickson IV; Frank Pase; and City of Topeka, Kansas, Case No. 
04-4160 in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas. . . ." 
 
Rhoten submitted one response to both motions. She objected to defendants' motions 
because, she argued, neither defendant complied with Rule 141. She asked the district court to 
strike the statement of facts due to the defendants' failure to make specific statements of 
uncontroverted fact supporting judgment. The district court ordered Rhoten, Pase, and the City to 
submit findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
 
Both the City and Pase submitted statements of fact in separately numbered paragraphs 
detailing the federal district court's factual findings, the claims filed by Rhoten in both lawsuits, 
and the federal district court's decision. Rhoten did not renew her Rule 141 objection at oral 
12 
 
argument on the defendants' motions. The district court did not address the Rule 141 objection 
because it granted defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 
 
On appeal, Rhoten renewed her Rule 141 objection and argued the district court erred by 
granting the motions to dismiss because it considered matters outside the pleadings. Rhoten 
contends the defendants' pleadings should have been treated as summary judgment motions and 
that summary judgment was inappropriate because defendants failed to comply with the rule. 
The Court of Appeals implicitly agreed the defendants' pleadings more properly should have 
been treated as summary judgment motions, but found substantial compliance. 40 Kan. App. 2d 
at 439. The court went on to recognize Rule 141's purpose is to identify the facts that are or are 
not controverted and the evidence on which the parties are relying, and "[b]y identifying 
Rhoten's federal civil lawsuit and the federal district court's decision in their motions and further 
providing facts in separately numbered paragraphs in later documents which were filed before 
oral arguments, Pase and [the City] substantially complied with Rule 141." 40 Kan. App. 2d at 
440. 
 
Discussion  
 
We agree with Rhoten that defendants should have styled their motions to dismiss as 
motions for summary judgment and complied with Rule 141. To do otherwise risks confusion 
among the litigants and the court and runs a substantial prejudicial risk to the fair presentation of 
the facts and law. The district court should have treated the pleadings as motions for summary 
judgment and insisted on compliance with the rule. 
 
But we also agree with the Court of the Appeals that the error was insignificant in this 
particular context because it was very easy to determine what evidence Pase and the City relied 
upon. Whether issue or claim preclusion applies is a question of law and a minimal number of 
uncontroverted facts are required to determine these questions in this instance. The subsequent 
remedial measures employed by the district court to have the parties submit findings of fact and 
conclusions of law prior to oral argument sufficiently ameliorated the potential prejudice to 
avoid reversal now. 
13 
 
Under K.S.A. 60-212(b), a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is treated like a 
motion for a summary judgment if matters outside the pleadings are presented and not excluded 
by the court. Whether matters outside the pleadings were considered "must be decided from the 
allegations of the petition." State ex rel. Slusher v. City of Leavenworth, 279 Kan. 789, 790, 112 
P.3d 131 (2005). Dismissal is only justified if the petition's allegations clearly demonstrate 
petitioners do not have a claim, after viewing all claims in the light most favorable to petitioner 
and resolving every doubt in their favor. 279 Kan. at 790. 
 
In this case, Rhoten's petition on its face stated valid negligence and negligence per se 
claims. In order to address the claim and issue preclusion arguments, the district court had to 
consider the federal court decision when deciding those arguments. This is a matter outside the 
pleadings. Therefore, the motions to dismiss needed to be treated like summary judgment 
motions, and Rule 141 applied. 
 
This court required strict compliance with Rule 141 in McCullough. In that case, the 
party moving for summary judgment did not set forth any uncontroverted statements of facts in 
separately numbered paragraphs. 235 Kan. at 735. The non-moving party objected, and the 
district court held the movant had substantially complied with the rule. In a harsh rebuke of the 
moving party's failure to comply with Rule 141, the McCullough court made the following 
statement: 
 
"Rule 141 is not just fluff – it means what it says and serves a necessary purpose. Contrary to the 
opinion of [movant's] counsel, a moving party's compliance with Rule 141(a) is even more crucial 
in complex cases than in simple ones. In accordance with the express language of the rule, the 
district court could not even hear the motion until the moving party was in compliance with the 
requirements of the rule. On this basis alone, the summary judgment . . . must be reversed." 235 
Kan. at 736. 
 
But reversal was required in McCullough because, as the court emphasized, "summary 
judgment was granted with no way to determine then or now what facts are or are not 
controverted or on what evidence the parties rely." 235 Kan. at 736. Four years after McCullough 
was decided, this court held the failure to comply with Rule 141's requirement that the moving 
14 
 
party file a memorandum setting forth uncontroverted facts with references to the supporting 
documents contained in the record and court file was harmless error. Key, 265 Kan. at 130, 133. 
In Key, many of the facts cited by the moving party referred to a deposition that was not filed 
with the district court. 265 Kan. at 130-31. This court held the error was harmless because the 
district court did not rely on any of those facts. 265 Kan. at 133.   
 
This court also has found the failure to comply with Rule 141 by providing extraneous 
facts in multiple summary judgment motions was not reversible error since the error did not 
infect the district court's analysis. In City of Arkansas City v. Bruton, 284 Kan. 815, 166 P.3d 922 
(2007), the moving party submitted an amended motion for summary judgment and numerous 
statements of uncontested facts in response to the non-moving party's Rule 141 objection. 284 
Kan. at 834. The Court of Appeals determined Rule 141 required a single memorandum by the 
movant with uncontroverted contentions of fact and said it was the better practice to disallow the 
shifting or refining of arguments before resolution of summary judgment. 284 Kan. at 835. This 
court disagreed, focusing instead on whether the district court undertook the correct legal 
analysis and identified the facts necessary to resolve the motion. 284 Kan. at 837. The issue was 
different from the instant case because the moving party submitted extraneous uncontroverted 
facts as opposed to submitting insufficient findings. But the Bruton holding recognizes a Rule 
141 violation should not be considered fatal if the party complies with the rule in subsequent 
filings before the district court renders judgment. 
 
To summarize, Pase and the City were wrong to have filed their motions to dismiss when 
they relied on a federal court decision from an earlier litigation between the same parties. The 
district court was wrong to grant dismissal instead of summary judgment. But we find the district 
court's error harmless in this particular instance because the subsequent filings of findings of fact 
prior to oral arguments allowed for the proper presentation of the minimal number of 
uncontroverted facts required to establish defendants' entitlement to issue and claim preclusion. 
This minimum showing necessitated that Pase and City: (1) identify the federal district court 
decision; (2) demonstrate Rhoten's claims from both suits concerned the same accident; and (3) 
show the federal court's holding that Rhoten had not established causation on the federal claim 
and granted summary judgment. Pase and the City satisfied these requirements in their proposed 
15 
 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. For these reasons, we affirm the district court and Court 
of Appeals on this issue. 
 
CLAIM PRECLUSION 
 
Rhoten next argues the district court erred in finding the state law negligence claims were 
barred by claim preclusion, also termed res judicata. As mentioned briefly above, this argument 
was decided adversely to Rhoten's interest in Stanfield v. Osborne Industries, Inc., 263 Kan. 388, 
949 P.2d 602 (1997), cert. denied 525 U.S. 831 (1998). We accepted review of this case, in part, 
to re-examine that holding. 
 
Standard of Review 
 
Whether the claim preclusion doctrine applies is a question of law subject to unlimited 
review. Stanfield, 263 Kan. at 396. But this court must apply federal law since the issue is 
whether Rhoten's state law claims are precluded by a federal court decision. 263 Kan. at 396 
(quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 488, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383, 114 S. Ct. 2364 [1994]) 
(holding '"state courts are bound to apply federal rules in determining the preclusive effect of 
federal-court decisions on issues of federal law'"). This distinction, though, appears academic 
because this court previously recognized "Kansas law does not appear to differ significantly from 
the federal law regarding the preclusion doctrines." 263 Kan. at 396. 
 
Under federal law, the claim preclusion doctrine prevents a party from relitigating a claim 
that was, or could have been, the subject of a previously issued final judgment. Mactec, Inc. v. 
Gorelick, 427 F.3d 821, 831 (10th Cir. 2005), cert. denied 547 U.S. 1040 (2006). Claim 
preclusion applies if the following three elements exist: (1) There is a final judgment on the 
merits in an earlier action; (2) the same parties are involved in the two suits; and (3) there is the 
same cause of action in both suits. 427 F.3d at 831. The majority of federal courts, including the 
United States Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit, recognize an exception if the party seeking 
to avoid preclusion did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim in the prior suit. 
Although some courts treat this exception as a fourth element, the Tenth Circuit agrees it is an 
16 
 
exception that only needs to be addressed in limited circumstances. Yapp v. Excel Corp., 186 
F.3d 1222, 1226 n.4 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 
The Stanfield Decision 
 
   Review of Rhoten's state court litigation necessarily requires us to discuss and re-
examine Stanfield because that case addressed the same issue. In Stanfield, the plaintiff first filed 
an action in federal district court invoking both federal questions and supplemental jurisdiction. 
Plaintiff alleged two federal trademark claims under the Lanham Act and state law claims for 
slander, disparagement, and misappropriation of plaintiff's name. 263 Kan. at 391-92. 
Defendants filed for summary judgment, which was granted on the federal law claims only. 263 
Kan. at 393. The federal district court then declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state law 
claims, which was affirmed by the Tenth Circuit on appeal. 263 Kan. at 394. Plaintiff then filed 
the same state law claims in state court. Defendants moved again for summary judgment, 
asserting the issue preclusion doctrine as a bar to further proceedings. The district court found 
both issue and claim preclusion applicable. 263 Kan. at 395. On appeal, this court declined to 
address whether issue preclusion applied after determining plaintiff's claims were barred by 
claim preclusion. 
 
The Stanfield court held the so-called "transactional approach" was the test used to define 
what claims were precluded by the doctrine. Under this approach, a claim is defined as a natural 
grouping or common nucleus of operative facts. 263 Kan. at 401. Then, the court held the federal 
claims dismissed on summary judgment arose from the same nucleus of operative facts as the 
state law claims because the facts were identical in time and origin and required the same 
witnesses and proof. On this basis, the court held both the state law and federal law theories 
comprised the same claim, and plaintiff was precluded from relitigating the state law claims. 263 
Kan. at 402. 
 
Next, the Stanfield court addressed whether an exception should be created because the 
federal district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. This court held claim 
17 
 
preclusion applies even though the federal court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, 
explaining: 
 
"Claim preclusion prohibits a party from asserting in a second lawsuit any matter that might have 
been asserted in the first lawsuit. [Citation omitted.] Thus, a legal theory does not even need to be 
raised in the first action, more or less considered by the court, in order for it to be precluded in a 
later action under the claim preclusion doctrine, if it arose out of the same claim or factual 
transaction which the first action determined. [Citation omitted.] The fact that the federal court did 
not consider the plaintiff's state law theories does not prevent claim preclusion from applying to 
the theories, since the theories arose out of the same claim or factual transaction which the federal 
court did determine." 263 Kan. at 404. 
 
Rhoten makes the following arguments to challenge the application of claim preclusion in 
her case: (1) The federal district court's orders were a not final judgment; (2) the state law 
negligence theories do not arise from the same claim or common nucleus of operative facts as the 
federal due process claim; (3) she did not have an opportunity to fully and fairly litigate the state 
law claims; and (4) Stanfield should be overruled.  
 
In deciding Rhoten's case, the district court and the Court of Appeals relied upon 
Stanfield, and it controls several issues. But the Stanfield court did not discuss the exception 
recognized by the Tenth Circuit when a party did not have an opportunity to fully and fairly 
litigate its claims. We will need to address that point when deciding Rhoten's third argument, as 
well as deciding whether Stanfield remains consistent with federal law in deciding her other 
contentions. 
 
Is the federal district court's order a final judgment on the merits? 
 
Rhoten argues her state law negligence claims were not addressed on the merits and did 
not reach final judgment. She argues Stanfield erroneously interprets federal law because federal 
courts do not treat a dismissal on jurisdictional grounds as reaching final judgment. Pase and the 
City argue Rhoten's federal suit proceeded to final judgment on the merits because the federal 
court granted summary judgment on Rhoten's federal claims. They argue Stanfield correctly 
applied federal law and should be upheld. 
18 
 
The Court of Appeals declined to address whether summary judgment was a final 
judgment on the merits. Instead, it dismissed the issue, noting the federal district court's decision 
was affirmed later on appeal. 40 Kan. App. 2d at 440-41. In this respect, the Court of Appeals 
erred by implying the federal district court's decision was not final for purposes of res judicata 
while Rhoten's federal appeal was pending. Both federal and Kansas courts have held a pending 
appeal does not suspend the finality of the lower court's judgment for claim preclusion purposes. 
Roberts v. Anderson, 66 F.2d 874, 875-76 (10th Cir. 1933) (citing Deposit Bank v. Frankfort, 
191 U.S. 499, 48 L. Ed. 276, 24 S. Ct. 154 [1903]); Willard v. Ostrander, 51 Kan. 481, 489-90, 
32 P. 1092 (1893) (holding a lower court's judgment remains in full force pending appeal for the 
purposes of res judicata even though this may "work great hardship in some cases"). 
 
The Stanfield court held "[f]ederal courts treat a summary judgment as a judgment on the 
merits." 263 Kan. at 400. While the Tenth Circuit does not appear to have directly addressed this 
issue under federal law, other federal circuits have held summary judgment is a final judgment 
on the merits for purposes of establishing claim preclusion. See Maher v. GSI Lumonics, Inc., 
433 F. 3d 123, 127 (1st Cir. 2005) (summary judgment is a traditional basis supporting claim 
preclusion in the second suit); First Pacific Bancorp, Inc. v. Helfer, 224 F.3d 1117, 1128 (9th 
Cir. 2000) (claim preclusion arises from summary judgment); King v. Hoover Group, Inc., 958 
F.2d 219, 222 (8th Cir. 1992) (summary judgment constitutes final judgment on the merits). In 
this respect, Stanfield remains consistent with federal law, and the federal district court's 
summary judgment order should be treated as a final judgment for claim preclusion purposes.          
 
Is the state lawsuit based upon the same claim as the federal suit? 
 
 
Rhoten argues the state law negligence theories do not comprise the same claim as the 
federal due process theories. She also argues Stanfield was wrong when it determined a legal 
theory does not need to be determined by a prior court to be precluded in a later action arising 
out of the same claim. In other words, Rhoten argues the federal district court had to address her 
negligence claims before they could be precluded. Defendants argue the state law and federal 
law claims compose the same claim because they are based upon the same series of factual 
transactions. The state district court and Court of Appeals agreed with defendants, and so do we. 
19 
 
 
Stanfield held federal law determines whether Rhoten's legal theories comprise a single 
claim. 263 Kan. at 396. In 1988, the Tenth Circuit adopted the transactional approach from the 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments to determine whether separate legal theories constitute the 
same claim for claim preclusion purposes. Petromanagement Corp. v. Acme-Thomas Joint 
Venture, 835 F.2d 1329, 1335 (10th Cir. 1988); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 (1980). 
This approach was most recently employed in 2006, and there is no evidence the Tenth Circuit is 
moving away from it. Hatch v. Boulder Town Council, 471 F.3d 1142 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 
The transactional approach focuses on the facts underlying the separate legal theories, 
and a "'claim arising from the same "transaction or series of connected transactions" as a 
previous suit, which concluded in a valid and final judgment, will be precluded.'" Hatch, 471 
F.3d at 1149 (quoting Restatement [Second] of Judgments § 24). To determine whether separate 
legal theories comprise the same transaction or series of transactions, courts examine whether the 
facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation and whether they would form a convenient 
trial unit. 471 F.3d at 1149. We find the Stanfield court correctly applied the transactional 
approach and that this approach remains an accurate reflection of federal law. 
 
In Rhoten's case, all theories arise from the traffic accident and the parties' conduct 
leading up to the accident. The federal and state law theories relate in time and origin. The same 
witnesses and proof are required for both claims, and they form a convenient trial unit. The 
district court and Court of Appeals were correct in finding Rhoten's federal claims comprise the 
same series of transactions as her state negligence claims. 
 
Were the state law claims fully and fairly litigated? 
 
Rhoten argues next that "[i]n filing this present action, plaintiff was only attempting to 
have the claims which were not fully and fairly litigated to final judgment in the federal action 
addressed by a court with jurisdiction." We take this to mean Rhoten is seeking to invoke the 
federal court's exception to the claim preclusion doctrine. 
 
20 
 
Under this exception, preclusion may be avoided if a party did not have an opportunity to 
fully and fairly litigate the claim. Mactec, 427 F.3d at 831. When determining whether a claim 
was fully and fairly litigated, federal courts consider the following factors: (1) whether there 
were significant procedural limitations in the prior proceeding; (2) whether the party had the 
incentive to fully litigate the issue; and (3) whether effective litigation was limited by the parties' 
nature or relationship. Burrell v. Armijo, 456 F.3d 1159, 1172 (10th Cir. 2006). None of these 
factors weigh in Rhoten's favor. 
 
We find no procedural limitations in the federal court proceedings. The state district court 
ruling held the federal court "carefully considered all of the evidence regarding Pase's actions 
and inactions." The federal district court's opinion reinforces this conclusion by noting the 
extensive discovery conducted before the defendants filed their summary judgment motions. The 
parties took depositions that were submitted to the federal court in support of arguments for and 
against summary judgment and stipulated to the admission of several documents. It is apparent 
the parties fully briefed the issues. Rhoten does not claim otherwise. In addition, Rhoten filed a 
motion for clarification after the federal court granted summary judgment, which the court 
treated as a motion for reconsideration and then denied. Rhoten v. Dickson, 2006 WL 2949530, 
at *3 (D. Kan. 2006) (unpublished opinion). Those decisions were appealed to the Tenth Circuit, 
which affirmed. Rhoten v. Pase, 2007 WL 3088226, at *5 (10th Cir. 2007) (unpublished 
opinion).  
 
As to the remaining matters, Rhoten had the incentive to fully litigate the federal claim 
because the existing law regarding claim preclusion would have barred the same theory 
underlying the state law claims. Finally, there is no reason to believe the parties' relationship had 
any undermining effect on the federal litigation. As such, we find Rhoten's federal theories were 
fully and fairly litigated, and the exception recognized under federal law does not apply. 
 
Should Stanfield be overruled? 
 
The remaining issue is whether this court should overturn the Stanfield court's decision 
not to create an exception for claims that were dismissed without prejudice. The essence of 
21 
 
Rhoten's claim in this regard is that it seems unjust that claim preclusion prevents a party from 
bringing a state law claim in state court. To be sure, this outcome does seem counterintuitive, but 
this court recognized long ago that preclusion doctrines sometimes present difficult questions. 
See Willard v. Ostrander, 51 Kan. at 488. 
 
The Stanfield court clearly considered this difficulty and determined the claim preclusion 
doctrine should apply when the elements of claim preclusion are satisfied, even though a claim 
was dismissed without prejudice. Stanfield, 263 Kan. at 404. This holding continues to comport 
with federal law, and we find no reason to overrule the decision. 
 
The doctrine of stare decisis holds that "'once a point of law has been established by a 
court, that point of law will generally be followed by the same court and all courts of lower rank 
in subsequent cases where the same legal issue is raised.'" Crist v. Hunan Palace, Inc., 277 Kan.  
706, 715, 89 P.3d 573 (2004) (quoting Samsel v. Wheeler Transport Services, Inc. 246 Kan. 336, 
356, 789 P.2d 541 [1990], overruled on other grounds Bair v. Peck, 248 Kan. 824, 844, 811 P.2d 
1176 [1991]). A court of last resort will follow the rule of law it established in its earlier cases 
unless clearly convinced the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of 
changing conditions and more good than harm will come by departing from precedent. Crist, 277 
Kan. at 715. The doctrine is designed to "'promote system-wide stability and continuity by 
ensuring the survival of decisions that have been previously approved by a court.'" 277 Kan. at 
715. While this court is not inexorably bound by its own precedent, it will follow the law of 
earlier cases unless "'clearly convinced that the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer 
sound because of changing conditions and that more good than harm will come by departing 
from precedent.'" 277 Kan. at 715. 
 
Based on the Stanfield decision's continuing strength, we affirm the district court and the 
Court of Appeals' decisions that claim preclusion barred Rhoten from renewing her state law 
claims in state court after they were dismissed without prejudice in federal court. This holding is 
determinative of this case, but we also address the issue preclusion arguments for the reasons 
stated below.  
 
22 
 
ISSUE PRECLUSION 
  
As mentioned above, Rhoten brought state law negligence and negligence per se claims. 
Both claims were premised upon two theories of liability: (1) Pase's actions, i.e. speeding while 
following Dickson, and (2) Pase's inactions, i.e., failure to activate the vehicle's lights and siren. 
Failing to distinguish between these theories of liability, the Court of Appeals affirmed the 
district court's order applying issue preclusion to Rhoten's negligence claims, but it held the 
causation elements were not identical to the negligence per se claims. It arrived at this conclusion 
by analyzing the issue under K.S.A. 8-1738(d), even though Rhoten brought her negligence per 
se claims under K.S.A. 8-1506. Therefore, it held Rhoten's negligence per se claims were not 
barred by issue preclusion. Rhoten, 40 Kan. App. 2d at 445-46.   
 
Both parties seek review of this determination. Rhoten argues the Court of Appeals erred 
by applying issue preclusion to the negligence claims, while Pase and the City object to the 
Court of Appeals reaching beyond the allegations in Rhoten's petition to deny issue preclusion 
on the negligence per se claims based upon K.S.A. 8-1738(d). The dispute is academic because 
claim preclusion, as described above, operates to stop the litigation against these defendants dead 
in its tracks regardless of the issue preclusion analysis. But we discuss it here because the Court 
of Appeals reviewed the issue, and both parties challenge the result. 
 
Standard of Review 
 
As with claim preclusion, this court reviews issue preclusion de novo. Stanfield, 263 Kan. 
at 396. Federal law controls because this court is examining the preclusive effects from a federal 
court judgment. 263 Kan. at 396. 
 
According to the Tenth Circuit, the four elements required to establish issue preclusion 
are whether: (1) the previously decided issue is identical to the one presented in the current 
action; (2) the previous action reached final judgment; (3) the party against which the doctrine is 
invoked was a party or in privity with a party from the prior adjudication; and (4) the party 
against whom the doctrine is invoked had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the 
prior action. Burrel, 456 F.3d at 1172 (citing Dodge v. Cotter Corp., 203 F.3d 1190, 1198 [10th 
23 
 
Cir. 2000]). Unlike claim preclusion, the "full and fair opportunity to litigate" question is treated 
as an element in the analysis, rather than as an exception. 
 
As discussed above regarding claim preclusion, the federal district court's summary 
judgment order was a final judgment, the parties are identical, and Rhoten had the opportunity to 
fully and fairly litigate her federal liability theories. So this court's review is focused on the first 
element—whether the causation elements in Rhoten's federal claims are identical with her state 
law negligence and negligence per se claims. We discuss negligence and negligence per se 
separately because the elements differ. 
 
Negligence 
 
Rhoten argues the Court of Appeals erred in finding her negligence claim was barred by 
issue preclusion, claiming the issues of fact required to prove a substantive due process claim 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) are not identical to the factual issues in her negligence claim. She 
contends the due process claim requires her to show intent, which is not required to prove 
negligence. Pase and the City counter by arguing both the federal and state law liability theories 
employ the same "substantial factor" test to determine causation.  Both the state district court and 
Court of Appeals assumed the causation elements were identical and failed to provide any 
analysis on this issue. But the Tenth Circuit employs distinct tests to determine causation for acts 
or omissions in a § 1983 substantive due process claim, so Rhoten's two negligence theories 
must be examined separately. 
 
 Pase's Actions 
 
The federal district court employed the substantial factor test when analyzing whether 
there was a material question of fact as to causation on Rhoten's federal claim. Kansas employs a 
different test with a higher burden of proof. In Kansas, an injured party's right to recover is 
limited to when the injury is a direct and proximate result of a defendant's negligence. Deal v. 
Bowman, 286 Kan. 853, 859, 188 P.3d 941 (2008). Proximate cause is cause "which in natural 
and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and 
without which the injury would not have occurred, the injury being the natural and probable 
24 
 
consequences of the wrongful act." Yount v. Deibert, 282 Kan. 619, 624-25, 147 P.3d 1065 
(2006). To satisfy the plaintiff's burden of proof on the causation element, the plaintiff must 
produce evidence that "'affords a reasonable basis for the conclusion that it is more likely than 
not that the conduct of the defendant was a cause in fact of the result.'" 282 Kan. at 628 (quoting 
Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 41, pp. 269-70 [5th ed. 1984]). 
 
Pase and the City erroneously argue Kansas employs the substantial factor test used by 
the Tenth Circuit, relying primarily on a decision by this court, Roberson v. Counselman, 235 
Kan. 1006, 686 P.2d 149 (1984). Roberson is a medical malpractice loss of chance to survive 
case that applied the substantial factor test for causation. 235 Kan. at 1021. But this court later 
clarified that the substantial factor test only applies to loss of chance cases. Delaney v. Cade, 255 
Kan. 199, 211, 873 P.2d 175 (1994).  
 
In Delaney, this court held "[t]he loss of a chance cause of action, although grounded in 
negligence, relies upon a lesser or reduced standard of causation than the traditional standard 
applied in negligence cases." 255 Kan. 199, Syl. ¶ 3. The substantial factor test was adopted in 
loss of chance cases to allow plaintiffs who have less than a 50 percent chance of survival to 
bring a medical malpractice action. Roberson, 235 Kan. at 1021. Under the "more likely than 
not" standard, plaintiffs with less than a 50 percent chance of survival could not bring a 
negligence claim for even the grossest forms of malpractice. 235 Kan. at 1021. 
 
Since Rhoten could not satisfy the lower burden of proof in the federal action, the district 
court properly held that issue preclusion applied to bar her negligence claims based on Pase's 
actions. 
 
Pase's Inactions 
 
   State negligence law does not impose a different causation standard if the breach was 
caused by an act or omission, but federal due process law requires an additional showing. 
Generally, federal liability does not attach if state actors do nothing when suspicious 
circumstances require action unless the state actor recklessly created the danger through some 
25 
 
affirmative conduct on the state's part that placed plaintiff in danger. This is called the "danger 
creation" theory. Christiansen v. City of Tulsa, 332 F.3d 1270, 1279-80 (10th Cir. 2003). 
 
 The federal district court relied upon Rhoten's failure to establish that Pase created the 
danger when granting summary judgment under the omission theory of liability. It held there was 
no § 1983 liability, reasoning that Pase did not change the status quo or place Rhoten in a worse 
position by following Dickson. But this additional showing is not required under Kansas 
negligence law, and the issue decided by the federal district is not identical to the causation 
analysis in Kansas.  
 
Since Rhoten's omission theory was rejected by the federal district court based upon the 
failure to establish Pase created the danger, it did not decide whether Pase's failure to activate his 
lights and sirens caused Rhoten's injury. Therefore, issue preclusion would not bar Rhoten's 
negligence claim.  
  
 Negligence Per Se         
 
Rhoten's petition in state court alleged Pase violated K.S.A. 8-1506. She did not assert 
any other statutory violations. The state district court did not specifically address Rhoten's 
negligence per se claim. The Court of Appeals analyzed the claim under K.S.A. 8-1738(d), 
which is a different statute than the one referenced by plaintiff in the petition. Based on that 
statute, the Court of Appeals found the negligence per se theory was not precluded. Rhoten, 40 
Kan. App. 2d at 445-46. Pase and the City filed a cross-petition for review arguing the Court of 
Appeals erred by citing the wrong statute and in finding the causation elements are not identical. 
 
Did the Court of Appeals examine the wrong statute?  
 
Rhoten asserted her negligence per se claim under K.S.A. 8-1506. It permits the driver of 
an authorized emergency vehicle to disregard certain enumerated traffic laws when pursuing an 
actual or suspected criminal, if the driver activates the vehicle's lights and siren. It states: 
 
26 
 
"(a)  The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle, when responding to an emergency 
call or when in the pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law, or when responding to but 
not upon returning from a fire alarm, may exercise the privileges set forth in this section, but 
subject to the conditions herein stated. 
 
"(b)  The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle may: 
 
. . . . 
 
"(3)   Exceed the maximum speed limits so long as such driver does not endanger life or 
property; 
 
. . . . 
 
"(c)  The exceptions herein granted to an authorized emergency vehicle shall apply only 
when such vehicle is making use of an audible signal meeting the requirements of K.S.A. 8-1738 
and visual signals meeting the requirements of K.S.A. 8-1720 . . . ." K.S.A. 8-1506. 
 
Without explanation, the Court of Appeals treated Rhoten's claim as if she alleged a 
violation of K.S.A. 8-1738(d), which states: 
 
"(d)   Every authorized emergency vehicle shall be equipped with a siren . . . but such 
siren shall not be used except when such vehicle is operated in response to an emergency call or in 
the immediate pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law, in which said latter events the 
driver of such vehicle shall sound said siren when reasonably necessary to warn pedestrians and 
other drivers of the approach thereof." (Emphasis added.) 
 
  The statutes are not identical, even though K.S.A. 8-1738(d) is referenced in K.S.A. 8-
1506 and both statutes impose a requirement upon drivers of authorized vehicles to activate their 
sirens. In K.S.A. 8-1506, the statute referenced by Rhoten, the emergency vehicle driver is 
required to activate the signal if violating the enumerated traffic laws. In K.S.A. 8-1738, the 
driver is required to activate the siren when reasonably necessary to warn others of the vehicle's 
approach. 
 
27 
 
Appellate courts do not ordinarily consider issues the parties failed to raise unless an 
issue's consideration is necessary to serve the ends of justice or to prevent the denial of 
fundamental rights. State v. Adams, 283 Kan. 365, 367, 153 P.3d 512 (2007). No such 
circumstances are presented in this case, and Rhoten makes no claim that there was such 
justification for the Court of Appeals to analyze her claim under a different statutory basis than 
the one she asserted in her petition. The Court of Appeals erred and should have considered 
Rhoten's claim under K.S.A. 8-1506. 
 
Is causation identical between the federal and state law claims? 
 
To establish negligence per se, a plaintiff must show (1) the defendant violated a statute; 
(2) the violation caused plaintiff's damages; and (3) the legislature intended to create an 
individual right of action arising from the violation. Pullen v. West, 278 Kan. 183, Syl. ¶ 3, 92 
P.3d 584 (2004). 
 
Rhoten argues K.S.A. 8-1506 imposed a duty on Pase to "activate his lights and siren 
when driving in violation of traffic laws." She argues Pase violated this duty when he "drove at 
speeds in excess of 65 miles per hour on icy roads while pursuing Dickson."  
 
Applying this theory to the elements of negligence per se, Rhoten would have to establish 
Pase violated K.S.A. 8-1506 by failing to activate his lights and siren while speeding and his 
failure to activate his lights caused Rhoten's injuries. Causation under this theory is identical to 
causation under her second negligence claim because they both require a showing that Pase's 
inactions, or failure to activate his lights or siren, caused her injuries. The same analysis recited 
above applies here. Since the federal district court did not determine this issue, but instead 
analyzed the § 1983 claim under a danger creation theory, issue preclusion does not bar this 
theory of recovery. 
 
But since Rhoten's claims are barred completely under the claim preclusion doctrine, we 
do not reverse because the state district court and Court of Appeals erred in their issue preclusion 
analysis. 
28 
 
The judgments of the district court and the Court of Appeals are affirmed. 
 
 
ROSEN, J., not participating. 
 
ELLIOTT, J., assigned.1 
 
1REPORTER'S NOTE: Judge Jerry G. Elliott, of the Kansas Court of Appeals, was appointed 
to hear case No. 98,837 vice Justice Rosen pursuant to the authority vested in the Supreme Court 
by K.S.A. 20-3002(c).