Title: Paul William Scott v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC07-1734
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: October 15, 2009

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC07-1734 
____________ 
 
PAUL WILLIAM SCOTT, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
[October 15, 2009] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
This case is before the Court on appeal from an order denying a motion for 
postconviction DNA testing under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.853.1  For 
the reasons expressed below, we affirm.   
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In 1979, Paul Scott was convicted of the first-degree murder of James 
Alessi.  Alessi died from a compressed fracture of his skull after he sustained six 
                                          
 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. 
 
 
- 2 - 
blows to his head with a blunt object.  Scott v. State, 411 So. 2d 866, 867 (Fla. 
1982).   
The evidence presented at trial revealed that, on the evening of the murder, 
Scott and his coperpetrator, Richard Kondian, told a third party about their plans to 
rob and kill Alessi.  Id.  The next morning, Alessi’s nude body, bound at his hands 
and feet, was found in his home, covered with blood.  Id.  Due to the multitude of 
broken objects and the presence of blood throughout the home, it was clear that a 
violent struggle had taken place.  Id.  Scott’s fingerprints were found all through 
the home, including on the neck of a broken vase and on a ―bloodstained knife on 
the sofa which apparently had been used to cut the electrical cords used to tie the 
victim.‖  Id.  After Alessi died, Scott and Kondian ―rummaged through‖ Alessi’s 
house, stole his car, and then went to his jewelry and flower shop and took most of 
the gold.  Id.  Scott was arrested a month later in California in possession of 
several items of jewelry that were apparently the same items stolen from Alessi’s 
store.  Id.   
This Court affirmed Scott’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal.  Id.  It 
has also affirmed all of the trial court’s orders denying Scott’s various requests for 
rehearing, habeas corpus, and postconviction relief.  See Scott v. State, 717 So. 2d 
908 (Fla. 1998); Scott v. State, 657 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1995); Scott v. Dugger, 634 
So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 1993); Scott v. State, 513 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 1987); Scott v. State, 
 
 
- 3 - 
464 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. 1985); Scott v. Wainwright, 433 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 1983); 
Scott v. State, 419 So. 2d 1058 (Fla. 1982). 
In December 2005, Scott filed a 3.853 motion pro se and an amended motion 
requesting appointment of counsel.  The trial court appointed Scott legal 
representation, and his new counsel filed an amended motion for postconviction 
DNA testing of blood stains in the following areas:  a wood chair in the kitchen, 
the bedroom/family room hallway, a circle of blood, the south wall, a dividing 
wall, and the hall wall.  The amended motion alleged that DNA testing would 
exonerate Scott by establishing that the blood stains in certain areas are consistent 
with the victim’s blood and the imprint of a champagne bottle which Kondian 
admitted (post-trial) he used to strike the victim.   The motion also alleged that the 
results of the DNA tests would show that blood stains in other areas belonged to 
either Scott or Kondian, not the victim, a point he claims is in direct opposition to 
the State’s theory at trial.   
The trial court denied Scott’s amended motion stating it was 
technically legally insufficient in that Defendant fails to allege that he 
is innocent and fails to allege how the DNA Testing required by the 
motion would exonerate him of the crime of which he was convicted.   
However, even if the Motion was technically legally sufficient, 
it fails on its merits because the Defendant has failed to show 
reasonable probability that the Defendant would have been acquitted 
or would have received a lesser sentence if the DNA evidence tested 
favorably and had been admitted at trial.  The other evidence at trial, 
specifically fingerprint evidence, indisputably demonstrated that the 
Defendant was present at the scene.  Viewed in its entirety, the 
 
 
- 4 - 
evidence at trial is such that there is no reasonabl[e] probability that 
Defendant would have been acquitted or received a lesser sentence 
had DNA evidence been admitted.  
 
Scott now appeals the denial of his motion for postconviction DNA testing 
to this Court.  As explained below, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Scott’s 
amended motion for postconviction DNA testing. 
ANALYSIS 
Rule 3.853 requires that a motion for postconviction DNA testing include: 
(1) a statement of the facts relied upon in support of the motion, 
including a description of the physical evidence containing DNA to be 
tested and, if known, the present location or last known location of the 
evidence and how it originally was obtained; 
(2) a statement that the evidence was not previously tested for 
DNA, or a statement that the results of previous DNA testing were 
inconclusive and that subsequent scientific developments in DNA 
testing techniques likely would produce a definitive result establishing 
that the movant is not the person who committed the crime; 
(3) a statement that the movant is innocent and how the DNA 
testing requested by the motion will exonerate the movant of the 
crime for which the movant was sentenced, or a statement how the 
DNA testing will mitigate the sentence received by the movant for 
that crime; 
(4) a statement that identification of the movant is a genuinely 
disputed issue in the case and why it is an issue or an explanation of 
how the DNA evidence would either exonerate the defendant or 
mitigate the sentence that the movant received. 
 
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.853(b). 
 
 
A review of Scott’s motion reveals that he adequately described the evidence 
to be tested, established its last known location, asserted that the evidence had not 
been previously tested for DNA, and alleged that his identification was genuinely 
 
 
- 5 - 
in dispute.  He also asserted his innocence and presented his theory of how the 
DNA evidence will exonerate him.  Therefore, Scott facially fulfilled the technical 
requirements of the rule.   
However, the motion remains legally insufficient because Scott failed to 
show that there is a reasonable probability the test results would exonerate him or 
lessen his sentence.  As we have stated, ―It is the defendant’s burden to explain, 
with reference to specific facts about the crime and the items requested to be 
tested, how the DNA testing will exonerate the defendant of the crime or will 
mitigate the defendant’s sentence.‖  Robinson v. State, 865 So. 2d 1259, 1265 (Fla. 
2004) (citing Hitchcock v. State, 866 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 2004)).  And, when the 
defendant cannot show that DNA will prove or negate a material fact, the request 
for testing should be denied.  See, e.g., Overton v. State, 976 So. 2d 536, 569 (Fla. 
2007) (affirming denial of postconviction DNA testing because it would not prove 
or disprove any material fact); King v. State, 808 So. 2d 1237, 1247-49 (Fla. 2002) 
(affirming denial of DNA testing when defendant could not show that the result 
would raise a reasonable probability of acquittal); Galloway v. State, 802 So. 2d 
1173, 1175 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (affirming denial of DNA testing, concluding that 
a mere allegation that the DNA would not match was insufficient to establish that 
the defendant was not present and a coparticipant in the crime). 
 
 
- 6 - 
In the instant case, the presence or absence of Scott’s blood at the crime 
scene has no bearing on whether he committed the crime because Scott’s presence 
at Mr. Alessi’s home is not in question.  Consequently, even if DNA testing 
revealed that Scott’s blood was not at the scene, it would not tend to establish his 
innocence or prove that he did not strike the victim.  See Galloway, 802 So. 2d at 
1175.     
Furthermore, Scott never advanced the theory that he was not present in the 
victim’s home.  In fact, the opposite is true.  In his initial brief, Scott stated that he 
admitted being present for an altercation between himself, the codefendant, and the 
victim.  He also ―defended against the murder charges by attempting to blame 
Kondian for the actual murder and minimize his own involvement.‖  Scott, 513 So. 
2d at 654.  And, in an earlier 3.850 motion, he even claimed his counsel was 
ineffective for failing to present a defense of others theory.  Id. at 654-55.  What 
Scott has attempted to allege is that he was not present for the actual murder.  
However, given that Scott has admitted he was involved in an altercation with the 
victim, Scott cannot reasonably show how the absence of his blood would give rise 
to a reasonable probability that he did not commit the crime.   
Alternatively, Scott asserts that if the DNA test revealed that his blood was 
at the scene it would lend support to his theory that he acted in defense of Kondian.   
First, as we have previously held, Scott cannot simultaneously allege two 
 
 
- 7 - 
competing theories, namely that Kondian was responsible for the murder and 
Scott’s involvement was minimal and that Scott acted in defense of Kondian.  See 
id.; see also Amour & Co. v. Lambdin, 16 So. 2d 805, 809 (Fla. 1944) (―[A] suitor 
is not permitted to invoke the aid of the Courts upon contradictory principles or 
theories.‖ (emphasis in original) (quoting 28 C. J. S., Election of Remedies § 2)).  
Second, this theory is unpersuasive because the presence of Scott’s blood at the 
scene lends nothing to the theory that he acted in defense of Kondian.  Rather, if 
Scott’s blood was detected, it would only confirm that he was present—a point not 
in dispute.  Third, Scott’s theory that he killed Alessi while defending Kondian is 
contradicted by the evidence.  The doctor in this case testified that  
the victim was still alive when his hands and feet were bound.  There 
remained no reason to pursue the beating . . . .  The subsequent blows 
to the head were fatal and the entire episode can only reflect there 
being imposed upon the victim a high degree of pain with little 
indifference to, or even the enjoyment of the suffering of the victim.  
It was pitiless and totally unnecessary . . . .  
 
Scott, 411 So. 2d at 869 (quoting trial court’s sentencing order).  Given that Alessi 
was bound before he was killed, Scott cannot possibly show that he killed Alessi in 
defense of Kondian.   
For the above reasons, we find that Scott has not met his burden of showing 
how the results of the DNA testing will exonerate him.  See generally Hitchcock v. 
State, 866 So. 2d at 28 (holding that it is the defendant’s burden to show ―how the 
DNA testing requested by the motion will exonerate the movant of the crime for 
 
 
- 8 - 
which the movant was sentenced, or . . . will mitigate the sentence received by the 
movant for that crime.‖) (emphasis in original) (quoting Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.853 
(b)(3) (2001)).  Accordingly, we find that, even though the trial court erred in 
finding the motion technically insufficient, any error was harmless because the 
motion failed to show any reasonable probability that Scott would have been 
acquitted or received a lesser sentence.  See Sireci v. State, 908 So. 2d 321, 325 
(Fla. 2005) (―[W]e conclude that the circuit court erred in ruling that Sireci failed 
to meet the technical requirements of rule 3.853(b)(3) and (4).  We find the error 
harmless, however . . . [because] there is no reasonable probability that Sireci 
would have been acquitted or received a lesser sentence.‖). 
 
Scott also claims that the trial court erred by summarily denying his 3.853 
motion without making the findings required by the rule, namely whether DNA 
evidence still exists, whether the results would be admissible at trial or a hearing, 
and ―[w]hether there is a reasonable probability that the movant would have been 
acquitted or would have received a lesser sentence if the DNA evidence had been 
admitted at trial.‖  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.853(c)(5).  We conclude that this is not 
reversible error.  Although the rule requires the trial court to make these three 
specific findings, whether the evidence is in existence and whether it would be 
admissible became irrelevant here after the trial court correctly concluded that 
 
 
- 9 - 
Scott presented no argument supporting a reasonable probability that he would be 
acquitted or would have received a lesser sentence.    
 
We also conclude that it was not necessary for the trial court to conduct an 
evidentiary hearing on the motion, as Scott suggests, because no further 
investigation was necessary to determine that no possible DNA test result could 
exonerate him or lessen his sentence.  It simply does not make a difference in this 
case whether Scott’s blood was present or not.  See Hitchcock, 866 So. 2d at 27 
(―The presence of physical evidence linked to Richard Hitchcock would not 
establish that Defendant [James Hitchcock] was not at the scene or that he did not 
commit the murder.‖ (quoting trial court’s order)). 
 
Finally, we find Scott’s claim that he is constitutionally entitled to a right of 
access to DNA evidence unpersuasive.  First, this claim is procedurally barred 
because it was never presented to the trial court.  See id. at 28 n.3 (―[T]his 
argument was not preserved because Hitchcock did not claim a constitutional right 
to DNA testing before the circuit court below.‖).  Second, it is meritless because 
the DNA evidence would not have entitled Scott to any relief.  See Cole v. State, 
895 So. 2d 398, 403 n.1 (Fla. 2004) (―Because we agree with the circuit court that 
Cole would not have been acquitted or received a lesser sentence if he had offered 
the DNA test results at trial, any constitutional right to access evidence . . . is not 
implicated in this case.‖).   
 
 
- 10 - 
 
Accordingly we affirm the trial court’s denial of Scott’s 3.853 motion for 
postconviction DNA testing. 
 
It is so ordered. 
QUINCE, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, POLSTON, LABARGA, 
and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Palm Beach County,  
Lucy Chernow Brown, Judge – Case No. 1979CF000167BMB 
 
D. Todd Doss, Lake City, Florida 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Celia Terenzio, 
Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee