Title: Commonwealth v. Rakes
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-10046
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: September 29, 2017

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SJC-10046 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JAMES M. RAKES. 
 
 
 
Norfolk.  April 7, 2017. - September 29, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Budd, & Cypher, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Joint Enterprise.  Grand Jury.  Evidence, Grand jury 
proceedings, Exculpatory, Prior misconduct, Joint venturer, 
Hearsay, Statement of codefendant, Criminal records, Prison 
record.  Criminal Records.  Practice, Criminal, Capital 
case, Indictment, Grand jury proceedings, Fair trial, 
Argument by prosecutor, Instructions to jury. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on April 1, 2002. 
 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by John C. Cratsley, J.; the 
cases were tried before Judith Fabricant, J., and a motion for a 
new trial, filed on November 6, 2013, was heard by her. 
 
 
Alan Jay Black for the defendant. 
Tracey A. Cusick, Assistant District Attorney, 
for the Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  In the summer of 1987, Jay B. Schlosser and his 
girl friend, Heather Buchannan, were shot and killed in the 
Westwood home they shared with John D. Sweeney.  In 2005, the 
2 
 
defendant was convicted by a Superior Court jury as a joint 
venturer on two counts of murder in the first degree on the 
theories of felony murder, deliberate premeditation, and extreme 
atrocity or cruelty.  His coventurer, James P. Ridge, had been 
tried separately at an earlier trial and had been convicted of 
the victims' murders.1 
 
The defendant appeals from his convictions and from the 
subsequent denial of his motion for a new trial.  He maintains 
that the indictments should have been dismissed because the 
evidence supporting them was insufficient and because the 
Commonwealth's presentation impaired the integrity of the grand 
jury by failing to disclose exculpatory evidence, introducing 
prior bad acts, and commenting on the defendant's invocation of 
his right to remain silent.  As to the trial, the defendant 
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and claims structural 
error and ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with a 
purported court room closure during jury selection.  He also 
asserts error in the admission of certain hearsay evidence 
concerning the joint venture, in the prosecutor's closing, and 
in the jury instructions on reasonable doubt.  He requests 
relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We affirm the convictions and 
                                                          
 
1 We affirmed James P. Ridge's convictions of two counts of 
murder in the first degree on all three theories, and affirmed 
the denial of postconviction relief.  See Commonwealth v. Ridge, 
455 Mass. 307 (2009). 
3 
 
the order denying the motion for a new trial, and, after careful 
review of the record, decline to set aside the verdicts or 
reduce the degree of guilt under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
1.  Background.  We recite the facts that the jury could 
reasonably have found, reserving certain details for later 
discussion.  The victims, Schlosser and Buchannan, were boy 
friend and girl friend.  Sweeney, the intended target of the 
armed robbery underlying this case, had recently moved in with 
the victims.  The victims and Sweeney, along with Ridge, the 
defendant's coventurer, and most of those involved in the events 
surrounding the killings, were all part of the same social 
circle, and all involved in the cocaine trade.  The defendant 
was not a member of that social circle, although Ridge knew him, 
and Ridge's roommate, Kevin Trundley, knew who the defendant 
was. 
 
Most of the evidence presented at trial related to Ridge.  
Sometime around 1986, Sweeney had convinced Ridge (a long-time 
friend) and members of the Ridge family to invest $10,000 to 
$15,000 in a business to retrieve treasure from a sunken ship in 
the Caribbean.  The business turned out to be a scam, and Ridge 
and his family members lost all the money that they had invested 
(as did Sweeney and members of his family).  Sweeney pledged to 
get Ridge his money back. 
 
The promised reimbursement never materialized, other than 
4 
 
through Sweeney's efforts to pay Ridge back by giving him 
cocaine free of charge.  Ridge was angry that Sweeney appeared 
to live in relative wealth while failing to pay Ridge the money 
he felt he was owed.  Trundley, a friend of both Sweeney and 
Ridge, testified that Sweeney flaunted his wealth in Ridge's 
presence.  Ridge was "very upset about the way [Sweeney] was 
living" in light of the slow repayment, and vowed to "get his 
money" back. 
 
In the months leading up to the killings, Ridge became 
increasingly fixated on Sweeney.  One witness testified that, at 
some point, Ridge was at Sweeney's mother's house when Sweeney 
was not present; he was shooting holes in Sweeney's shirts so 
that Sweeney would not have nice clothes to wear. 
 
Ridge began frequently asking various acquaintances where 
Sweeney lived.  At this time, Ridge was familiar with and had 
access to firearms, and he regularly traveled with a duffel bag 
containing "WD-40" metal lubricant, masks, and duct tape.  On 
multiple occasions, Ridge was seen loading firearms in a 
peculiar manner:  wearing gloves and spraying the bullets with 
WD-40. Ridge contended that this method would ensure that he 
left no traceable fingerprints.  Roughly two months prior to the 
killings, Ridge threatened Sweeney directly, saying he would 
kill him if he did not receive his money. 
 
Apparently in response to this threat, Sweeney left the 
5 
 
home he had previously shared with Trundley in the Jamaica Plain 
section of Boston.  He moved twice and ended up living in 
Westwood with Buchannan and Schlosser, his partners in the 
cocaine trade.  Ridge, for his part, took Sweeney's place as 
Trundley's roommate. 
 
At some point Ridge learned, through Trundley, that Sweeney 
had moved in with Schlosser and Buchannan.  Approximately one 
week before the killings, Ridge, Trundley, and their respective 
girl friends drove past Sweeney's house.  Both Trundley and his 
girl friend testified that when passing the home, Ridge 
instructed the driver to slow down.  As the vehicle slowed to a 
"crawl," Ridge slumped down in his seat and said he did not want 
anyone to recognize him.  He remarked that the house would be an 
easy hit because of its location.  Later that week, Ridge told 
Trundley that he planned to rob Sweeney's house with a "brother 
and sister" but refused to identify them.2  He explained further 
that he planned the robbery for some time between 8 and 10 P.M. 
on a rainy evening, when he expected the neighbors would have 
their windows closed and would be watching television. 
On June 25, 1987, Ridge told Trundley that the robbery 
would take place that night.  During the conversation, Ridge was 
                                                          
 
 
2 The Commonwealth argued that the robbery was committed by 
Ridge, the defendant, and the defendant's sister, Patricia 
Rakes.  Patricia was scheduled to be tried jointly with the 
defendant, but pleaded guilty to manslaughter after the jury had 
been empanelled but before opening statements. 
6 
 
carrying the duffel bag that he regularly kept with him.  
Trundley agreed with Ridge to provide a key to Sweeney's house, 
but testified at trial that he had no such key and never 
followed through on his promise.  In addition, as Trundley 
feared violence if Sweeney was in the house when the robbery 
occurred, he persuaded Sweeney -- without explaining why -- to 
leave his house and spend the evening with Trundley in Jamaica 
Plain.  The two men were joined by three women, and together the 
group drank alcohol and consumed cocaine.  At around 11 P.M., 
Sweeney and one of the women returned briefly to Sweeney's house 
with plans to pick up more cocaine.3 
Upon arriving, Sweeney saw the bodies of Schlosser and 
Buchannan, bound in duct tape, on the couch.  The whole house 
looked as if it had been ransacked.   An antique rifle belonging 
to Schlosser lay in the kitchen, out of its normal storage 
place, and there was a hole in the wall that, Sweeney testified, 
had not been there earlier in the day.  Sweeney left and 
immediately returned to Jamaica Plain to meet Trundley.  He did 
not tell the woman with him what he had seen.  Instead, on the 
drive back, he telephoned Trundley and told him that the three 
women would need to leave as soon as Sweeney arrived.  They did 
so.  Sweeney then frisked Trundley, suspicious he may have been 
                                                          
 
 
3 Trundley testified that he permitted Sweeney to go back to 
his house at this point because he expected the robbery to have 
concluded. 
7 
 
involved in the killing.  Finding no weapons, and apparently 
thus satisfied, he then told him what he had seen.  Sweeney next 
telephoned a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent he 
knew.  Early in the morning of June 26, Sweeney, Trundley, and 
the FBI agent met and drove together to the Westwood police 
station where they reported the victims' deaths.  Police tested 
Sweeney's hands for blood and found none.  Officers were 
dispatched to the house soon thereafter and found the victims' 
bodies as described. 
 
The police investigation revealed that the victims died as 
a result of gunshot wounds.  Buchannan was shot twice, including 
once through the head, while Schlosser was shot once, with the 
single bullet passing through his wrist and then entering his 
skull.  As mentioned, both victims were bound with duct tape 
around the ankles, knees, and hands; their eyes, and Buchannan's 
mouth, were also covered.  Schlosser's mouth was not taped, but 
there appeared to be duct tape residue around it, and there was 
duct tape crumpled on the nearby coffee table.  Two spent .38 
caliber cartridges and three shell casings were found at the 
scene.  There were no eyewitnesses to the killing, the murder 
weapon was never found, and there was no physical evidence 
linking either Ridge or the defendant to the killing.  Police 
searched, but were not able to find any usable fingerprints.  
There is no indication that police tested for deoxyribonucleic 
8 
 
acid (DNA); that method of identification was in its infancy at 
the time. 
 
Later that same day, Trundley and Sweeney drove to Cape 
Cod.  Sweeney called Ridge and asked him to join them, and Ridge 
was driven down by Trundley's girl friend.  On the drive, she 
saw Ridge with a significant amount of cocaine despite the fact 
that she knew him to be "broke" and unable to afford it at the 
time.  In addition, Ridge mentioned to her that he had to see 
Trundley because "things didn't go right."  The evening that 
Ridge arrived, Trundley, who had expected only a robbery, 
confronted him and asked, "Why did you kill those people?"  
Ridge replied, "because she recognized me," and warned Trundley 
to "keep [his] mouth shut."  The next day, Sweeney and Trundley 
went to retrieve Sweeney's vehicle, which he had allowed Ridge 
to use, and found Ridge cleaning it out.  Sweeney noticed a loan 
coupon book in the vehicle, which he was certain he had left at 
home on June 25.  He abruptly took his vehicle back, and 
immediately drove away alone, leaving Ridge and Trundley behind. 
 
Trundley testified that, after learning of Ridge's 
involvement with the murders, he "stayed away from him as much 
as [he] could," but continued to speak to him on occasion.  A 
few weeks after their initial conversation, Ridge gave Trundley 
a more detailed account of the robbery and the ensuing killings.  
Ridge explained that when the robbers entered the home, 
9 
 
Schlosser grabbed an old rifle, but that "they beat him up, took 
the rifle away, brought him into the living room, [and] duct 
taped him."4  According to Ridge, Schlosser offered to give the 
robbers whatever they wanted and further offered to withdraw 
more money for them from the bank the following day.  He pleaded 
that "no one need[ed] to get hurt."  As the robbers were about 
to leave, "the person that [Ridge] went in there with said he 
wasn't about to do any more time."5  Ridge responded, "I got you 
into this, I'll get you out of this."  He shot Buchannan twice 
and subsequently shot Schlosser once.  Ridge reported that, 
although he stole some money and some cocaine from the home, he 
did not get as much as he had hoped.  He left some cocaine in 
the home so that police would suspect that the murder was 
related to drug sales, and be less interested in finding the 
perpetrators. 
 
Ridge again reminded Trundley to "keep [his] mouth shut."  
He threatened to kill him should he tell police, and pointed out 
that, as Trundley had aided in the preparation for the robbery, 
he could face charges as a joint venturer.  Ridge continued to 
warn Trundley to stay silent over the course of the following 
                                                          
 
4 At that point, Ridge still had not identified the persons 
who participated in the robbery with him, but acknowledged that 
at least one other person was involved and used the plural 
repeatedly. 
 
5 The defendant had been released on parole seventeen days 
prior to the killings. 
10 
 
year.  Trundley appears to have heeded these warnings for some 
time, but was cooperating with police by the summer of 1988. 
 
Two out-of-court statements by Ridge and one by the 
defendant himself linked the defendant to the killings.  The 
first was made by Ridge to Trundley sometime in late fall of 
1987, several months after the murders.  At the time, Trundley 
felt threatened by certain persons from whom he was attempting 
to collect a debt, and called Ridge for help.  Ridge told him he 
would "call up Rakesy and . . . come out there."  Ridge 
clarified that he was referring to "Jimmy Rakes" and that Rakes 
was "the guy I did Westwood with."   
 
The other inculpatory statements were made much later.  
Ridge and the defendant were both indicted on April 1, 2002, and 
arraigned in Superior Court the following day.  They were 
thereafter held in the Dedham house of correction.  Ridge told 
Mark Condon, an inmate who was being transferred between units 
at the same institution, to "tell Rakes my end is tight."  The 
defendant also became friendly with Condon while incarcerated.  
When Condon mentioned that he knew the reason for the 
defendant's incarceration and had read about it in the 
newspaper, the defendant replied, "It was the other guy [who] 
shot them" while pointing toward Ridge's unit, and added that 
"nobody planned on getting shot." 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Motion to dismiss.  Prior to trial, 
11 
 
the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on several 
grounds, and he renews most of his contentions on appeal.  
Specifically, he argues that the evidence before the grand jury 
was insufficient to demonstrate probable cause, and that the 
integrity of the grand jury was impaired both by the 
Commonwealth's failure to present certain exculpatory evidence 
and by inappropriate references to his criminal history and his 
invocation of the right to remain silent.  We discern no error 
warranting dismissal of the indictments or reversal of the 
convictions. 
 
i.  Insufficient evidence.  The defendant first contends 
that the indictment was not supported by sufficient evidence.  
An appellate court reviews the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting an indictment in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Levesque, 436 Mass. 
443, 444 (2002).  To sustain an indictment, the grand jury must 
be presented with "sufficient evidence to establish the identity 
of the accused . . . and probable cause to arrest him" for the 
crimes charged (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 
385 Mass. 160, 163 (1982).  Probable cause requires only 
evidence "sufficient to warrant a reasonably prudent [person] in 
believing that the [accused] had committed" the offense 
(citation omitted).  Id. at 163.  "This standard . . . has been 
employed primarily to strike down indictments in cases where a 
12 
 
grand jury has heard . . . no evidence whatever that would 
support an inference of the defendant's" guilt (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Truong Vo Tam, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 31, 
37 (2000). 
 
In this case, the grand jury heard sufficient evidence to 
warrant a finding of probable cause.  Three witnesses linked the 
defendant to the robbery and killing.  Sergeant Richard Nagle of 
the State police testified that he spoke to Michaelina Karos, 
the defendant's girl friend at the time of the killings, 
multiple times when investigating this case.  According to a 
conversation between Nagle and Karos in 1992, the defendant had 
admitted his involvement to her soon after the victims' deaths.  
The defendant told Karos that he "just killed two people 
somewhere out in Marlborough or some fucking place," "a guy and 
a girl," and that the victims had been tied up with duct tape.  
He explained that he killed them to avoid being identified and 
facing prison time for armed robbery.  Trundley testified to a 
conversation in which Ridge said that along with the defendant 
and a woman, he robbed the victims of money and cocaine, bound 
them with duct tape, and killed them.  Finally, Mary Bergin, a 
friend of the defendant, testified to a conversation with the 
defendant's sister Patricia.  Patricia said that she, the 
defendant, and Ridge "taped [the victims] up . . . and they shot 
them." 
13 
 
 
While the evidence before the grand jury consisted purely 
of hearsay, "[w]e have consistently and without notable 
exception held that 'an indictment may be based solely on 
hearsay.'"  Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 474 Mass. 372, 376 
(2016), quoting Commonwealth v. O'Dell, 392 Mass. 445, 450-451 
(1984).  Only in "extraordinary circumstances" does the 
exclusive reliance on hearsay so impair the grand jury 
proceedings as to warrant dismissal.  Stevenson, supra at 377.  
We discern no such extraordinary circumstances in this case. 
 
ii.  Impairment of grand jury integrity through failure to 
present exculpatory evidence.  The defendant also argues for 
dismissal of the indictments on the ground that the integrity of 
the grand jury was impaired by the Commonwealth's failure to 
present certain exculpatory evidence.  See O'Dell, 392 Mass. at 
449.  Generally, "the mere withholding of exculpatory evidence 
[from a grand jury] is not a proper ground for the dismissal of 
an indictment."  Commonwealth v. Pina, 406 Mass. 540, 549, cert. 
denied, 498 U.S. 832 (1990).  There are two exceptions to this 
rule:  if evidence was withheld in a manner that distorts the 
meaning of the evidence admitted, or if the exculpatory evidence 
was so powerful it would have severely undermined the 
credibility of an important witness or likely have led the grand 
jury not to indict.  See Commonwealth v. Wilcox, 437 Mass. 33, 
37 (2002); Commonwealth v. McGahee, 393 Mass. 743, 747 (1985); 
14 
 
O'Dell, supra at 449. 
 
The defendant contends that two pieces of evidence could 
have undermined the credibility of the witnesses before the 
grand jury.  Neither, however, was of sufficient significance to 
require that it be introduced.  First, the defendant argues that 
the grand jury should have been told that Bergin admitted to 
being under the influence of cocaine during her conversation 
with Patricia Rakes.  Nagle's police report indicates that 
Bergin told him, "I remember it was the 80's because I was doing 
[c]oke at the time . . . . [Patricia] came over . . . [Patricia] 
was nervous/paranoid looking out the window.  But at the time we 
were all paranoid looking out the window[,] because we all did 
coke."  This statement does not indicate that Bergin was 
intoxicated at the time of her conversation with Patricia. 
Rather, it is best read as an acknowledgment by the witness that 
she had used cocaine regularly in the years surrounding the 
victims' deaths and, as a result, feared the possibility of 
arrest.  The admission of chronic drug use fifteen years prior 
to her statement would not "greatly undermine" Bergin's 
credibility or the Commonwealth's case.  Cf. Commonwealth v. 
LaVelle, 414 Mass. 146, 150-151 (1993) (even prior criminal 
convictions of grand jury witness would not "greatly undermine" 
credibility). 
 
Second, the defendant claims that the grand jury should 
15 
 
have been told of Federal indictments against FBI Agent John 
Connolly, whom Sergeant Nagle referenced.  He argues that the 
integrity of the proceedings were undermined by the failure to 
disclose indictments for Connolly's offenses, including 
obstruction of justice, racketeering, and conspiracy.6  This 
evidence also need not have been placed before the grand jury.  
Connolly was mentioned only briefly and in passing, and his 
credibility was not relevant to the grand jury's determination.  
Sergeant Nagle testified that he first heard the defendant's 
name when "an FBI agent named Connolly . . . called . . . and he 
said, 'The person you want to look at is James Rakes.'"  The 
subsequent investigation of the defendant, which led to the 
inculpatory evidence placed before the grand jury, did not 
involve Connolly at all. 
 
iii.  Impairment of grand jury integrity through evidence 
of prior bad acts and reference to invocation of right to 
silence.  Before the grand jury, Nagle made certain references 
to both the defendant's unrelated bad acts and his invocation of 
the right to silence.  Specifically, Nagle related three 
statements that Karos ascribed to the defendant:  that "he kills 
people for money," that "his sister . . . introduced him to 
                                                          
 
6 The government contended that John Connolly committed 
these offenses in aid of the criminal enterprise led by James 
"Whitey" Bulger.  See United States v. Connolly, 341 F.3d 16 
(1st Cir. 2003). 
16 
 
Whitey Bulger when he was seventeen," and that she should always 
"remember the five P's when you kill someone -- proper planning 
prevents poor performance."  Soon thereafter, however, the 
prosecutor instructed the grand jurors that "you've heard some 
testimony . . . [that] at least some of the individuals hav[e] 
been involved in other crimes, and you should not use that in 
your consideration of whether or not they committed these 
particular crimes."  Nagle also commented on the defendant's 
invocation of his right to silence.  He told the grand jurors 
that he had asked the defendant about his relationship with 
Ridge, and the defendant replied, "This is where I stop 
answering questions."  He added that, when confronted with 
details of the murders during the interview, the defendant's 
"eyes began to fill up with tears" and he stared at the floor. 
 
To warrant reversal, the defendant must show not only that 
the statements were inappropriate, but also that "viewed in the 
context of all the evidence presented to the grand jury, [the 
statements] 'probably made a difference,' in [the] decision to 
indict" (emphasis added).  Commonwealth v. Freeman, 407 Mass. 
279, 283 (1990), quoting Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 398 Mass. 
615, 621-622 (1986).  On this record, the defendant cannot make 
that showing.  The appropriately admitted evidence was more than 
sufficient to demonstrate probable cause.  Moreover, the 
prosecutor's clear and relatively contemporaneous instruction 
17 
 
presumably mitigated the prejudice from the introduction of 
prior bad acts evidence.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jenks, 426 
Mass. 582, 587 (1998).  Testimony regarding the defendant's 
invocation of his right to silence added little to the 
Commonwealth's case, as the grand jury heard stronger evidence 
of the defendant's consciousness of guilt in the form of his 
confession to  Karos. 
 
b.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  The defendant contends 
that there was insufficient evidence to convict him under any of 
the three theories of murder in the first degree and that his 
motion for a required finding should have been allowed.  Because 
the defendant was convicted as a joint venturer, we must 
determine whether the evidence showed that he knowingly 
participated in the commission of the crime charged, alone or 
with others, with the intent required for the offense.  See 
Commonwealth v. Benitez, 464 Mass. 686, 689 (2013), citing 
Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449, 467-468 (2009).7 
                                                          
 
 
7 Both parties cite the formulation of the joint venture 
standard that was commonly used in jury instructions prior to 
our decision in Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449 (2009).  
This standard asks whether a defendant was "(1) present at the 
scene of the crime, (2) with knowledge that another intends to 
commit the crime or with intent to commit a crime, and (3) by 
agreement, was willing and available to help the other if 
necessary" (citation omitted).  Id. at 455.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Green, 420 Mass. 771, 779 (1995).  The test we 
apply today does not differ in substance from that one, but is 
simply intended to provide clearer guidance.  Commonwealth v. 
Miranda, 474 Mass. 1008, 1008-1009 (2016). 
18 
 
 
To determine whether the Commonwealth met its burden, we 
apply the familiar Latimore standard:  whether viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any 
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Commonwealth v. 
Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979).  A conviction may rest 
exclusively on circumstantial evidence, and, in evaluating that 
evidence, we draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 
Commonwealth.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lydon, 413 Mass. 309, 
312 (1992), overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Britt, 
465 Mass. 87, 100 (2003).  A conviction may not, however, be 
based on conjecture or speculation.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Gonzalez, 475 Mass. 396, 407 (2016).  The defendant was 
convicted under three theories, and we consider each in turn. 
 
i. Felony-murder.  The predicate felony alleged at trial 
was armed robbery.  To warrant a conviction of felony-murder as 
a joint venturer with armed robbery as the predicate felony, the 
Commonwealth had to prove that "the defendant was a joint 
venturer in an armed robbery and that [the victims'] death 
occurred 'in the commission or attempted commission of' that 
[armed] robbery."  Commonwealth v. Williams, 475 Mass. 705, 710 
(2016), quoting G. L. c. 265, § 1.  To find the defendant guilty 
of the underlying felony of armed robbery, proof was required 
that the defendant was part of a venture in which at least one 
19 
 
of the coventurers was armed with a dangerous weapon, either 
applied violence to the victims' bodies or put them in fear, and 
took the victims' property with the intent to steal it.  Id., 
and cases cited.  Absent proof that the defendant himself was 
armed, proof that he knew his coventurer to be armed suffices to 
satisfy the standard.  Id. 
 
Ridge's statements indicated that a group, including at 
least one member who was armed, went to the house that Sweeney 
shared with the victims with the intent to burglarize it.  The 
robbers bound the victims in duct tape and Ridge shot them.  The 
perpetrators then took money and cocaine from the home.  The 
jury could have inferred the defendant's participation in this 
robbery from, among other things, the fact that Ridge identified 
him as "the guy I did Westwood with." 
 
The jury could further conclude that the defendant knew 
Ridge to be armed.  A jury can infer that a defendant knew his 
or her coventurer to be armed in cases where the victims' 
resistance can reasonably be anticipated, as the defendant is 
presumed to recognize the need for a means by which to overcome 
that resistance.  Commonwealth v. Netto, 438 Mass. 686, 702-703 
(2003), and cases cited.  In this case, the victims were to be 
robbed in their own home and were drug dealers.  These factors 
were sufficient for the jury to conclude that the defendant 
would reasonably have expected the need to overcome resistance, 
20 
 
and therefore that he knew Ridge to be armed.  See id. at 703 
(robbery in victim's home); Williams, 475 Mass. at 711 (victim 
was drug dealer); Commonwealth v. Housen, 458 Mass. 702, 708 
(2011) (same).  Even if the defendant had been unaware that 
Ridge possessed a weapon in advance, it would be reasonable to 
conclude that he became aware over the course of the robbery and 
continued to participate, implicating him in the joint venture.  
Williams, supra at 711, citing Commonwealth v. Norris, 462 Mass. 
131, 140 (2012). 
 
ii.  Deliberate premeditation.  Taken in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence was also sufficient 
to sustain the conviction on the theory of deliberate 
premeditation.  Under this theory, the Commonwealth was required 
to prove that the defendant caused the victims' deaths, that he 
did so intentionally, and that he did so "after a period of 
reflection."  See Gonzalez, 475 Mass. at 406, quoting Model Jury 
Instructions on Homicide 37 (2013).  Because the defendant did 
not carry out the killings himself, the Commonwealth had to show 
that he participated in the killings, that he did so knowing of 
his coventurer's intent to kill the victims, and that he shared 
the necessary specific intent to kill.  See Gonzalez, supra, 
quoting Britt, 456 Mass. at 100-101.  The defendant contends 
that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he shared Ridge's 
intent to kill, or that he deliberately premeditated the 
21 
 
victims' deaths. 
The evidence supported the inference that the defendant 
shared Ridge's intent to kill the victims.  See Commonwealth v. 
Nolin, 448 Mass. 207, 217 & n.11 (2007).  A request that a 
coventurer kill the victims demonstrates the specific intent to 
kill.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cintron, 435 Mass. 509, 515-
516 (2001) ("shouted [at the shooter] to kill 'that cabron'"), 
overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Hart, 455 Mass. 
230 (2009).  Here, the jury reasonably could find that the 
defendant's statement that he would not do "any more time" was 
intended to communicate that message.  It was made after the 
robbery had been accomplished, to a man he knew to be armed, and 
in the presence of the only possible witnesses, one of whom had 
already identified Ridge.  Cf. Norris, 462 Mass. at 139 (where 
defendant, in altercation with victim, stepped away and called 
for help from man he knew to be armed, jury could infer intent 
that victim be killed). 
The evidence also suggested that the defendant made his 
decision to kill "after a period of reflection."  Gonzalez, 475 
Mass. at 406.  No particular length of time of reflection is 
required to find deliberate premeditation, and the decision may 
be made in only a few seconds.  See Commonwealth v. Whitaker, 
460 Mass. 409, 419 (2011).  The jury can infer premeditation 
from the nature of the attack.  See id.  The evidence in this 
22 
 
case suggested that after having subdued, bound, and robbed the 
victims, the defendant urged his coventurer to kill them in 
order to avoid detection.  This demonstrated the necessary 
sequence of thought to support a finding of deliberate 
premeditation.  Cf. Norris, supra at 139. 
 
iii.  Extreme atrocity or cruelty.  The judge also properly 
denied the defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the 
theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty.  To warrant a conviction 
under this theory, the Commonwealth was required to prove that 
the defendant knowingly participated in the killing, that he 
intended to cause death or grievous bodily harm or engaged in an 
act a reasonable person would know created a plain and strong 
likelihood of death, and that the killing was committed with 
extreme atrocity or cruelty.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Chhim, 
447 Mass. 370, 377 (2006).  The defendant need not have intended 
that the killing be extremely atrocious or cruel.  See id. at 
379.  For the reasons discussed, supra, the evidence established 
that the defendant knowingly participated in the killings with 
the necessary mental state. 
The jury reasonably could infer that both killings were 
committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty.  The evidence 
suffices to warrant a finding of extreme atrocity or cruelty if 
23 
 
it establishes one or more of the so-called Cunneen factors.8  
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Linton, 456 Mass. 534, 546 & n.10 
(2010), citing Commonwealth v. Cunneen, 389 Mass. 216, 227 
(1983).  In this case the evidence warranted finding at least 
one such factor:  a degree of consciousness and suffering on the 
part of each victim.  After the victims' home was broken into by 
two or more people, the victims were immobilized and blinded 
with duct tape, and remained in each other's presence.  The 
robbery continued for some time while one of the victims 
attempted to bargain with the robbers.  "From the evidence, the 
jury reasonably could have inferred that, in those . . . minutes 
before [their] death[s], the victim[s were] terrified."  
Commonwealth v. Anderson, 445 Mass. 195, 202 (2005). 
c.  Court room closure.  The defendant contended in his 
motion for a new trial that the judge improperly closed the 
court room to spectators during empanelment of the jury, and 
that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object.  
The motion judge, who was also the trial judge, held an 
evidentiary hearing and made written findings of fact 
                                                          
 
 
8 The factors are:  (1) whether the defendant was 
indifferent to or took pleasure in the victim's suffering; (2) 
the consciousness and degree of suffering of the victim; (3) the 
extent of the victim's injuries; (4) the number of blows 
inflicted on the victim; (5) the manner and force with which the 
blows were delivered; (6) the nature of the weapon used; and (7) 
the disproportion between the means used to cause death and 
those employed.  See Commonwealth v. Cunneen, 389 Mass. 216, 227 
(1983). 
24 
 
determining that the defendant had not met his burden to 
demonstrate that the court room had been closed.9  See 
Commonwealth v. Cohen (No.1), 456 Mass. 94, 107 (2010). 
 
We accept as true the motion judge's findings of fact 
absent clear error.  See Commonwealth v. Greineder, 458 Mass. 
207, 225 (2010), vacated on other grounds, 567 U.S. 948 (2012), 
S.C., 464 Mass. 580, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 166 (2013).  
Special deference is due where, as here, the motion judge was 
also the trial judge.  See id.  The defendant's motion depended 
primarily on testimony from his wife that she saw a "do not 
enter" sign on the court room door and that a court officer 
prohibited her from entering.10  The judge was not required to 
credit the wife's testimony, and the judge articulated the 
specific reasons that she did not.  See Commonwealth v. DePina, 
476 Mass. 614, 622 (2017).  We discern no error in the judge's 
findings or in her ruling that the defendant failed to meet his 
burden to demonstrate that the court room had been closed.  The 
defendant's motion for a new trial was properly denied. 
 
d.  Admission of out-of-court statements.  Over objection, 
                                                          
 
 
9 The motion judge also found that the defendant had waived 
the substantive issue of court room closure and that any 
ineffective assistance was not prejudicial. 
 
10 The defendant's further contention that a member of his 
family was removed after passing a tissue to the codefendant is 
not borne out by the trial transcript, which indicates some 
discussion after the codefendant had been handed the tissue, but 
not that anyone was removed from the court room. 
25 
 
the judge admitted a series of out-of-court statements made by 
Ridge recounting the robbery that led to the victims' deaths and 
implicating the defendant.  The defendant contends that these 
statements constituted inadmissible hearsay. 
 
"We recognize an exception to the hearsay rule whereby 
statements by joint venturers are admissible against each other 
if the statements are made both during the pendency of the 
cooperative effort and in furtherance of its goal" (quotations 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Bright, 463 Mass. 421, 426 (2012), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Braley, 449 Mass. 316, 319 (2007).  See 
also Commonwealth v. Winquist, 474 Mass. 517, 520-521 (2016).  
The justification for this rule is two-fold.  First, it derives 
from an analogy between a criminal joint venture and a lawful 
partnership.  Joint venturers, like business partners, are each 
"an agent for the other in all matters relating to the common 
object."  Bright, supra at 426, quoting Commonwealth v. Tivnon, 
8 Gray 375, 381 (1857).  Second, the rule "is buttressed by 
significant policy" considerations.  Commonwealth v. White, 370 
Mass. 703, 712 (1976).  During the pendency of a joint venture, 
the interests of the joint venturers are sufficiently aligned so 
as "to assure that their statements about one another will be 
[at least] minimally reliable."  Id. 
To admit the statement of a joint venturer, the judge must 
make a preliminary determination, based on a preponderance of 
26 
 
the evidence, other than the out-of-court statement itself, that 
a joint venture existed between the declarant and the defendant 
and that the statement was made in furtherance of that venture.11  
Bright 463 Mass. at 426; Commonwealth v. Cruz, 430 Mass. 838, 
844 (2000).  This determination permits the statement to be 
placed in front of the jury, but does not suffice for the jury 
to consider it as bearing on the defendant's guilt.  The jury 
must first make their own independent determination, again based 
on a preponderance of the evidence other than the statement 
itself, that a joint venture existed and that the statement was 
made in furtherance thereof.  Bright, supra at 427, 432.  We 
review the judge's decision to place a joint venturer's 
statement before the jury for abuse of discretion.  See, e.g., 
Winquist, 474 Mass. at 521. 
The defendant challenges Ridge's statements, contending 
that neither prerequisite was met.  He argues that the 
independent evidence did not show the existence of a joint 
venture with the defendant, and that the statements were, in any 
event, not made in furtherance of any such venture. 
 
i.  Existence of a joint venture.  As an initial matter, 
the judge did not abuse her discretion in finding that the 
                                                          
 
 
11 Alternatively, the statement may be admitted 
provisionally, subject to a motion to strike should the evidence 
presented through the course of the Commonwealth's case fail to 
establish the existence of a joint venture.  Commonwealth v. 
Bright, 463 Mass. 421, 426 n.9 (2012), and cases cited. 
27 
 
independent evidence demonstrated a joint venture between Ridge 
and the defendant.  On appeal, we consider the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the Commonwealth, to determine whether 
the declarant and the defendant knowingly participated in the 
commission of a crime together with the requisite intent.  See 
Winquist, 474 Mass. at 521, quoting Bright, 463 Mass. at 435.  
In this case, Condon, who had been incarcerated with the 
defendant, testified that when he mentioned the killings in 
Westwood, the defendant responded "it was the other guy [who] 
shot him" while pointing to Ridge's unit and added that "nobody 
planned on getting shot."  This testimony establishes, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant and Ridge were 
involved in a joint venture that resulted in the victims' 
deaths.  Having so determined, we consider each of the 
challenged statements to determine whether they were made 
during, and in furtherance of, that joint venture. 
 
ii.  Specific statements.  The defendant objects to the 
admission of a statement from Ridge to Trundley from "days" 
before the killing.  In it, Ridge purportedly revealed the 
details of his planned robbery, including his intention to 
involve a brother and sister as accomplices and to execute the 
robbery between 8 and 10 P.M. on a rainy night.  Second, the 
defendant challenges testimony regarding a series of threats in 
which Ridge is said to have warned Trundley not to speak to 
28 
 
police.  The first such threat was made one week after the 
killings, and the last one was made approximately one year after 
the killings.  Third, the defendant challenges Trundley's 
testimony that Ridge made a statement implicating the defendant 
in late fall of 1987.  Trundley testified that when he called 
Ridge for help dealing with a threat, Ridge offered to "call up 
Rakesy" and clarified that "Rakesy" was "Jimmy Rakes."  When 
Trundley asked, "What's he gonna to do?" Ridge responded, "He's 
the guy I did Westwood with."  Finally, the defendant challenges 
the admission of Ridge's statement to Condon when Condon was an 
inmate with both Ridge and the defendant.  In that statement, 
made nearly fifteen years after the killings, Ridge asked Condon 
to "tell Rakes that my end is tight." 
 
A.  Statements from Ridge to Trundley.  I.  Statement 
before the killing.  The defendant challenges the admission of 
statements from Ridge to Trundley, made a few days before the 
killing, arguing that they predate any joint venture.  We reject 
this contention, as "[m]atters surrounding the history of the 
conspiracy, including statements of coconspirators, may be 
admissible even if they predate the conspiracy."  Commonwealth 
v. McLaughlin, 431 Mass. 241, 248 (2000), citing Commonwealth v. 
Rankins, 429 Mass. 470, 473 (1999).  The Commonwealth is 
entitled to "show the whole history of the conspiracy" beginning 
with "preparations made by [the principal]" (citation omitted). 
29 
 
Commonwealth v. Borans, 379 Mass. 117, 147 (1979).  Therefore, 
statements probative of the declarant's intent to enter into a 
joint venture with the defendant to commit a crime may be 
admitted under the joint venture exception.12  McLaughlin, supra 
at 248.  See also Rankins, supra at 474 (statement two years 
prior to killings in which declarant expressed "disdain for her 
husband" [the victim] admissible in prosecution of coventurer as 
"relevant to whether there was a later conspiracy").  Here, as 
in Rankins, even if the joint venture had not yet begun, Ridge's 
statement that he expected to be accompanied by a brother and 
sister was relevant to proving the existence of a joint venture 
in the near future. 
 
II.  Warnings to stay silent.  We turn next to the series 
of threats Ridge made to Trundley in an attempt to ensure his 
silence.  These threats were communicated at various times over 
the year following the murders.  The defendant contends that any 
joint venture had concluded before these statements were made, 
and therefore they cannot have been made in furtherance of the 
joint venture. 
                                                          
 
 
12 Ridge's statement also was admissible as a statement of 
the declarant's intent.  "Statements, not too remote in time, 
which indicate an intention to engage in particular conduct, are 
admissible to prove the conduct was, in fact, put in effect."  
Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 463 Mass. 402, 409 (2012), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Avila, 454 Mass. 744, 767 (2009); Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 803(3)(B) (2017).  See Commonwealth v. Fernandes, 427 Mass. 
90, 95 (1998) (statement of intent one week prior to crime 
admissible). 
30 
 
 
"Although [the joint venture] exception to the hearsay rule 
'does not apply [to statements made] after the criminal 
enterprise has ended . . . [it] does apply where the joint 
venturers are acting to conceal the crime that formed the basis 
of their enterprise.'"  Commonwealth v. Raposa, 440 Mass. 684, 
689-690 (2004), quoting Commonwealth v. Angiulo, 415 Mass. 502, 
519 (1993).  See Bright, 463 Mass. at 436 (statements made after 
fact "to encourage [a potential witness] not to disclose facts 
related to the murder" admissible [quotation and citation 
omitted]).  In this case, the threats from Ridge to Trundley 
"were attempts 'to conceal the crime in furtherance of the joint 
venture,'" Bright, supra at 436, quoting Braley, 449 Mass. at 
330, and therefore properly admitted.13 
 
III.  Statement naming and implicating the defendant.  
Next, we turn to Ridge's naming of the defendant as "the guy I 
did Westwood with."  The defendant argues that this statement 
was not made in furtherance of any coventure.  He contends that 
Ridge merely shared information regarding the crime with a third 
party.  While we have expressed skepticism that disclosing the 
circumstances of a crime to a third party can be considered to 
be in furtherance of the crime disclosed, in this case Trundley 
                                                          
 
13 As we pointed out in Bright, 463 Mass. at 437, absent 
indication that the defendant had withdrawn from the joint 
venture "it is of no consequence" that he was not involved in 
the conversations. 
31 
 
was, himself, a part of the joint venture.  He was aware of the 
robbery, and helped in both the preparation for and concealment 
of it.  Cf. Bright, 463 Mass. at 436 n.21; Commonwealth v. 
Colon-Cruz, 408 Mass. 533, 544 (1990). 
 
Statements meant to ensure the silence of a coventurer, or 
another involved in concealing the crime, are admissible as 
furthering the joint venture.  See Raposa, 440 Mass. at 690; 
Commonwealth v. Hardy, 431 Mass. 387, 393-394 (2000), S.C., 464 
Mass. 660, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 248 (2013).  To be admitted, 
the statement need not be necessary, or even important, to the 
success or concealment of the joint venture, so long as it 
advances the joint venture in some way.  See United States v. 
Ford, 839 F.3d 94, 106-107 (1st Cir. 2016).  Cf. United States 
v. Clark, 18 F.3d 1337, 1342 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 
852 (1994) (statement to girl friend identifying coventurer 
"induced her to conceal the crimes, to allow use of her 
automobile to execute the robberies, and to allow use of her 
home to plan the robberies," thereby furthering joint venture). 
 
In this case, Ridge's offer of help, including his 
identification of the defendant as a participant in the Westwood 
robbery and killings, advanced the coventurers' shared goal of 
concealing their crimes.  It served to gain Trundley's loyalty, 
and thereby, it was hoped, his silence.  Trundley already knew 
that Ridge and others had made their way into the victims' home 
32 
 
in an attempt to steal money and cocaine, and that when one of 
the two victims recognized Ridge, he shot and killed both.14  To 
evade detection, Ridge and his coventurers needed Trundley to 
remain silent.  To help ensure that silence, Ridge offered to 
help Trundley confront an otherwise unrelated threat to safety. 
 
Implicating the defendant in the Westwood murders was a 
necessary part of the offer of assistance.  Trundley had never 
met and had no reason to trust the defendant.  When Ridge first 
offered the defendant's help, Trundley, apparently skeptical, 
asked, "What's he gonna do?"  By mentioning, in response, the 
defendant's participation in an armed robbery and murder, Ridge 
gave Trundley a reason to believe that the defendant was the 
type of person who would be useful in confronting a potentially 
violent situation.  Consequently, the judge did not abuse her 
discretion in finding the statement, in full, to be admissible. 
 
B.  Statement from Ridge to Condon in 2002.  We turn 
finally to Ridge's request to Condon, made almost fifteen years 
after the crime, to "tell Rakes my end is tight." 
 
To the extent the statement was hearsay,15 it falls within 
                                                          
 
14 While Trundley did not yet know the identities of the 
other coventurers, even his limited knowledge posed a threat to 
them.  Police officers would be better able to identify the 
coventurers if the officers knew the details of the crime and 
Ridge's involvement.  Therefore, all involved in the joint 
venture shared a common interest in his silence. 
15 The Commonwealth contends that the statement was an 
operative statement, not offered for the truth of the matter 
33 
 
the exception for statements by a joint venturer.  Typically, 
statements deemed admissible as part of the concealment phase of 
a joint venture have been made relatively close in time to the 
commission of the crime.  Winquist, 474 Mass. at 522-523.  
However, "the relevant consideration is not whether the 
statements of a joint venturer were made close in time to the 
commission of a crime," but rather whether the attempt to 
conceal was continuing.  Id. at 523 (communications discussing 
ways to neutralize potential witnesses demonstrates ongoing 
effort to conceal two years after crime).  Recalling the 
reasoning behind the joint venture exception, we look to whether 
the "joint venturers [continue to] share the commonality of 
interests which is some assurance that their statements are 
reliable."  Id. at 522, quoting Colon-Cruz, 408 Mass. at 543. 
In this case, the statement itself -- "tell Rakes my end is 
tight" -- demonstrates that Ridge and the defendant "remained 
actively engaged in an effort to conceal their . . . crimes."  
Winquist, 474 Mass. at 523.  The statement advanced that effort 
by attempting to ensure that they would not testify against one 
another, and by "sharing information" regarding the possible 
testimony of others.  Commonwealth v. Leach, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 
758, 764 (2009) (incarcerated coventurers' discussion of need 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
asserted, and therefore not hearsay at all.  No such limiting 
instruction was given at trial. 
34 
 
for silence).  See also Winquist, supra.  Moreover, the 
interests of the joint venturers remained fully aligned.  Both 
faced trials in which the strength of the Commonwealth's case 
would turn on the willingness of the same set of witnesses to 
testify, as well as the willingness of either coventurer to 
testify against the other.  See Colon-Cruz, 408 Mass. at 545; 
Leach, supra.  Contrast Commonwealth v. Santos, 463 Mass. 273, 
291 (2012) (statement seeking to exculpate declarant by 
inculpating defendant); White, 370 Mass. at 706, 710-711 (the 
same).16 
 
To be sure, in many cases the commonality of interests that 
justify the joint venture hearsay exception may dissipate over 
an extended period of time.  In each instance, then, the judge 
must make a careful and fact-intensive determination before 
admitting a joint venturer's out-of-court statements, and all 
the more so when a significant period of time had passed between 
the crime and the statement.  See Winquist, 474 Mass. at 523.  
                                                          
 
16 Dicta suggesting that a joint venture ends once the 
declarant has been arrested and incarcerated is not to the 
contrary.  See Commonwealth v. Santos, 463 Mass 273, 294 (2012); 
Commonwealth v. Angiulo, 415 Mass. 502, 519-520 (1993).  Such 
dicta, never the basis of any decision, is predicated on the 
view that after apprehension, the commonality of interests among 
joint venturers gives way to self-interest.  See Commonwealth v. 
Winquist, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 695, 703-704 (2015), S.C., 474 Mass. 
517 (2016).  This view has no application where, as here, the 
statement itself demonstrates that the declarant and the 
defendant continue to cooperate to conceal the crime in 
preparation for trial.  See Commonwealth v. Leach, 73 Mass. App. 
Ct. 758, 764 (2009). 
35 
 
That was done here.  In light of the specifics of this case, the 
judge did not abuse her discretion when she determined that 
Ridge and the defendant were continuing to work together 
actively to conceal their crime when Ridge spoke to Condon in 
2002.17 
 
e.  Records of prior incarceration.  The Commonwealth moved 
to introduce certain Department of Correction (DOC) records 
demonstrating the defendant's prior incarceration.  He had been 
paroled seventeen days prior to the killings.  It was the 
Commonwealth's theory that after the defendant said he "wasn't 
about to do any more time," Ridge killed the victims so they 
could not testify against the defendant.  The judge, after a 
lengthy sidebar conference with counsel, allowed the 
introduction of the defendant's certificate of parole, the 
defendant's so called "VAX sheet," which is a computerized list 
that details an inmate's movement amongst various correctional 
institutions while in custody, and a page from the defendant's 
booking sheet including photographs.  The defendant concedes 
that some documentation of his prior incarceration could have 
been admitted.  He contends, however, that a single document 
                                                          
 
17 The United States Supreme Court, in Grunenwald v. United 
States, 353 U.S. 391, 402 (1957), noted that extending the life 
of a joint venture could practically eliminate the statute of 
limitations in cases charging conspiracy.  This concern has no 
application in this case, as there is no statute of limitations 
for murder.  See Commonwealth v. Winquist, 474 Mass. 517, 525 
(2016). 
36 
 
showing his release date would have been sufficient. 
 
Evidence of a defendant's prior incarceration may be 
admitted if it is offered for a purpose other than showing the 
defendant's bad character or propensity to commit a crime, and 
if its probative value outweighs the risk of unfair prejudice.  
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 249 n.27 
(2014); Mass. G. Evid. § 404 (b) (2017).  The judge admitted the 
DOC records to show the defendant's identity and the motive for 
the killing, i.e., the defendant did not want to be sent back to 
prison for his participation in an armed robbery.  See 
Commonwealth v. Brown, 462 Mass. 620, 628 (2012); Commonwealth 
v. Barbosa, 457 Mass. 773, 793-794 (2010), cert. denied, 563 
U.S. 990 (2011).  She carefully reviewed the documents proffered 
by the Commonwealth, and ordered significant redaction.  Even if 
further redactions may have been desirable, we see nothing in 
the records admitted that warrants reversal. 
 
The inmate history and certificate of parole were both 
admitted to show the defendant's release date, and therefore his 
motive for the killing.  To the extent such duplication was 
unwarranted, the admission of both documents did not prejudice 
the defendant, as we are confident their admission "did not 
influence the jury, or had but very slight effect."  Braley, 449 
Mass. at 326, quoting Commonwealth v. Flebotte, 417 Mass. 348, 
353 (1994).  Beyond the facts of the defendant's incarceration 
37 
 
and release, information the defendant concedes could properly 
have been placed before the jury, the documents mentioned the 
length of his sentence, the institutions in which he served that 
sentence, and the conditions of parole.  None of this 
information was particularly inflammatory.  Moreover, we presume 
the jury followed the judge's detailed limiting instruction that 
the evidence was not to be used to infer bad character or 
criminal propensity.  See, e.g., Brown, 462 Mass. at 628 (2012) 
(discussing value of limiting instruction when evidence of prior 
incarceration is admitted).  See also Commonwealth v. Donahue, 
430 Mass. 710, 718 (2000) (limiting instruction usually renders 
improperly admitted evidence harmless). 
 
The booking sheet, including photographs, was properly 
admitted to show that the person referenced in the other 
documents was the defendant.  Therefore, it was appropriate for 
the purpose of identification.  Moreover, there is little 
prejudicial about the booking sheet beyond the admissible fact 
that the defendant had previously been incarcerated.  Cf. 
Commonwealth v. McCowen, 458 Mass. 461, 478 (2010) (evaluating 
prejudice stemming from prior bad acts evidence "in the context 
of the trial"); Commonwealth v. Bonds, 445 Mass. 821, 835 (2006) 
(evaluating prejudice "[i]n light of the properly admitted" 
evidence). 
 
f.  Prosecutor's closing argument.  The defendant claims 
38 
 
three errors in the prosecutor's closing argument:  that he 
improperly appealed to jurors' emotions, that he impermissibly 
vouched for the credibility of a Commonwealth witness, and that 
he argued facts not in evidence.  We consider each in turn. 
 
i.  Appeal to emotion.  The prosecutor in his closing 
argument related the last moments of one of the victims:  
"[Schlosser] can't see what's going on, he's got that duct tape 
over his face, but he knows what's coming next.  He puts his 
hands up in a defensive position, in desperation, maybe as he 
begs for his life.  In desperation he puts his hands up."  The 
defendant argues that this was an impermissible appeal to the 
jurors' emotions. 
 
The Commonwealth charged the defendant with Schlosser's 
murder on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty.  Schlosser's 
emotional response was relevant, and the Commonwealth was 
entitled to argue it in closing.  See Commonwealth v. Barros, 
425 Mass. 572, 581 (1997).  See also Commonwealth v. Murphy, 426 
Mass. 395, 402 (1998) (victim's emotional suffering relevant to 
extreme atrocity or cruelty).  The brief reference to his mental 
suffering, relevant to an issue being tried, was presented in a 
relatively straightforward manner, and "[t]he prosecutor . . . 
did not . . . dwell on the potentially sympathetic material."  
Commonwealth v. Evans, 439 Mass. 184, 195, cert. denied, 540 
U.S. 923, and cert. denied, 540 U.S. 973 (2003).  Compare Bois, 
39 
 
476 Mass. 15, 34 (2016) (five references to defendant as the 
"monster[] that come[s] out at night" and prosecutor crying by 
end of closing); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 425 Mass. 491, 494-
495 (1997), S.C., 427 Mass. 298 and 428 Mass. 39, cert. denied, 
525 U.S. 1003 (1998) (seven references in closing to victim's 
pregnancy in case not charging extreme atrocity or cruelty). 
 
ii.  Vouching.  Defense counsel, in his closing, frequently 
argued that Trundley was not to be believed because he was a 
"drug dealer, a liar, and a thief."18  The prosecutor countered 
by arguing: 
 
"Now why would Kevin Trundley make up that portion of 
the statement?  When Ridge finally tells Kevin Trundley who 
was with him, what motive does Kevin Trundley have against 
this man?  He knew who he was; he had seen him around South 
Boston before.  He had seen him around the same area as 
James Ridge before.  He doesn't even really know him.  Does 
he have any motive to come before you and implicate him, 
other than the truth?  That's for you to decide, ladies and 
gentlemen.  There is no reason why he would say 'Jimmy 
Rakes was the name given to me by James Ridge' if it wasn't 
the true." 
 
                                                          
 
 
18 Defense counsel began his closing argument, a bookend to 
his very similar opening statement, as follows:  "A drug dealer, 
a liar, and a thief.  Kevin Trundley is all of those things 
wrapped up in one phony package, propped up on the stand to sell 
you a bill of goods.  He's a drug dealer, he's a liar, and he's 
a thief. . . .  [H]e's trying to steal [the defendant's] 
liberty.  He's trying to steal from you a true verdict.  He is a 
drug dealer, he is a liar, and he is a thief."  Much of the rest 
of the closing argument continued in this vein.  Counsel 
concluded by telling the jury "you won't follow what a drug 
dealer, a liar, and a thief is asking you to do.  You won't let 
him steal his way out of responsibility for whatever happened 
there, you won't let him steal a true verdict from you folks, 
and you won't let him steal this man's liberty." 
40 
 
 
A "prosecutor may marshal the evidence in closing argument 
to 'urge the jury to believe the government witnesses.'"  
Commonwealth v. Polk, 462 Mass. 23, 39 (2012), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Beaudry, 445 Mass. 577, 587 (2005).  This is 
especially so when defense counsel has attacked the credibility 
of a Commonwealth witness.  In such cases, the prosecutor may 
invite the jury to consider whether that witness had any motive 
to lie.  See Polk, supra at 39-40; Commonwealth v. Smith, 450 
Mass. 395, 408, cert. denied, 555 U.S. 893 (2008).  While the 
prosecutor may argue on the basis of the evidence that a witness 
should be believed, he or she may not imply "special knowledge 
by which [he or she] can verify the witness's testimony."  
Commonwealth v. Hardy, 431 Mass. at 396-397, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Ciampa, 406 Mass. 257, 265 (1989).  The 
prosecutor did not suggest personal knowledge or exceed the 
bounds of proper argument here; instead, he provided the jury 
with reasons to credit the account of a key witness.  We discern 
no error. 
 
iii.  Facts not in evidence.  Closing argument must be 
limited to discussion of the evidence presented and the 
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from that evidence.  
Bois, 476 Mass. at 32, quoting Commonwealth v. Carriere, 470 
Mass. 1, 22 (2014).  Counsel may, however, zealously argue in 
favor of those inferences favorable to his or her case.  Bois, 
41 
 
supra at 32, quoting Carriere, supra.  The inferences for which 
counsel argues need not be necessary, or inescapable; they only 
need be reasonable and possible.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Jones, 432 Mass. 623, 628 (2000); R.W. Bishop, Prima Facia Case, 
§ 53.134 n.5 (5th ed. 2005). 
 
The defendant contends that several statements made by the 
prosecutor went beyond the evidence and the reasonable 
inferences.  First, the prosecutor suggested that no 
incriminating fingerprints or DNA were left in the house because 
the perpetrators of the killings wore gloves.  While this 
statement approached the fine line separating inference from 
speculation, see Commonwealth v. Kozec, 399 Mass. 514, 517 
(1987), it was nonetheless sufficiently tethered to the evidence 
to be permissible.  There was testimony that Ridge had, on other 
occasions, used gloves and WD-40 to conceal his fingerprints 
while loading a firearm.  There also was evidence that he kept 
items he used for this task in a bag similar to the one with 
which he was seen the night of the murders.  From this, it was 
not "wholly implausible" to infer that Ridge used gloves for the 
same purpose on the evening of the killings and convinced his 
compatriot to do the same.19  Commonwealth v. Best, 23 Mass. App. 
Ct. 943, 944 (1986).  Cf., e.g., Bois, 476 Mass. at 32-33 (where 
                                                          
 
 
19 There was testimony that wearing gloves would both limit 
the deposit of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) at the scene and 
prevent fingerprints. 
42 
 
person in room adjacent to victim's bedroom did not wake due to 
noise, permissible inference that victim encountered defendant 
elsewhere in home); Commonwealth v. Semedo, 456 Mass. 1, 13 
(2010) (where defendant shopped at store where victim worked, 
permissible inference that they had interacted before). 
 
Second, the prosecutor said that the robbers "asked 
[Schlosser], having ripped that [duct] tape off his mouth, 
'Where's the rest of [the money and cocaine]?'"  The marks on 
Schlosser's face, the crumpled duct tape on the coffee table 
next to him, and Ridge's references to speaking with Schlosser 
support the inference that at some point the duct tape over 
Schlosser's mouth had been removed to talk to him.  The 
hypothetical dialogue presents a closer question.  "[C]ounsel 
may present an argument by dramatizing it in imaginary 
dialogue," but that dialogue must remain "grounded in the 
evidence" [citations omitted].  Commonwealth v. Pope, 406 Mass. 
581, 587 (1990).  There was evidence that the robbers intended 
to steal money and cocaine, that they did not find as much as 
they had hoped, and that Schlosser pleaded with them for a 
chance to get more money before being killed.  From this, it 
could fairly be inferred that Ridge demanded more money and 
cocaine from the victim. 
 
In any event, even if the prosecutor's argument went too 
far, we are confident that it did not have an impact on the 
43 
 
verdict.20  Closing argument is argument, not evidence, and 
jurors are presumed to be capable of discounting excessive 
claims.  Kozec, 399 Mass. at 517.  Moreover, the judge in this 
case directly instructed the jurors not to credit statements 
made by counsel if such statements conflicted with the jurors' 
own memory of the evidence.21  
 
g.  Reasonable doubt instruction.  The defendant argues 
that the judge's instruction on reasonable doubt diminished the 
Commonwealth's burden of proof.  The judge instructed the jury, 
"The Commonwealth is not required to prove the case to an 
absolute, mathematical certainty.  Mathematical certainty is 
that level of certainty that you have if you add two and two and 
arrive at four.  The Commonwealth is not required to prove its 
                                                          
 
20 The parties dispute whether the defendant's objections to 
the closing argument were properly preserved.  Even reviewing 
under the more searching standard -- prejudicial error -- we see 
no basis for reversal.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Akara, 465 
Mass. 245, 263 (2013). 
 
21 We discern no merit in the defendant's remaining claims 
of improper argument.  First, the defendant contends that no 
evidence supported the prosecutor's claim that "more than one" 
person was involved in subduing the victims.  Trundley, however, 
testified that Ridge told him that "they" subdued the victims.  
Moreover, it would be reasonable to infer that multiple people 
were necessary to subdue and bind two adult victims.  Second, 
Trundley's testimony that Ridge told him of a struggle over 
Schlosser's rifle was sufficient for the prosecutor to include 
this detail in closing argument.  Third, the prosecutor's 
suggestion that the victims were killed because they were 
witnesses to the robbery was little more than a reformulation of 
Ridge's statements that he killed the victims because one 
recognized him and that he did so to prevent the defendant from 
"do[ing] any more time." 
44 
 
case to an absolute or mathematical certainty, but it must prove 
each and every element of the charge beyond a reasonable 
doubt."22  This instruction correctly stated the law, and 
                                                          
 
 
22 The reasonable doubt instruction in full was:  "The third 
important principle that applies in all criminal cases is the 
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  I've told you --
I've told you that the burden is on the Commonwealth to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the 
charges made against him. 
 
 
"So what is proof beyond a reasonable doubt?  The term is 
often used and probably pretty well understood, but it is not 
easily defined.  Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean 
proof beyond all possible doubt, for everything in the lives of 
human beings is open to some possible or imaginary doubt.  A 
charge is proved beyond a reasonable doubt, if, after you have 
compared and considered all of the evidence, you have in your 
minds an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, that the 
charge is true. 
 
 
"I've told you that every person is presumed to be innocent 
unless and until he is proved guilty, and that the burden of 
proof is on the prosecution.  If you evaluate all of the 
evidence and you still have a reasonable doubt remaining, the 
defendant is entitled to the benefit of that doubt and must be 
acquitted. 
 
 
"It is not enough for the Commonwealth to establish a 
probability, even a strong probability, that the defendant is 
more likely to be guilty than not guilty.  That is not enough.  
Instead, the evidence must convince you of the defendant's guilt 
to a reasonable and moral certainty, a certainty that convinces 
your understanding and satisfies your reason and judgment as 
jurors who are sworn to act conscientiously on the evidence.  
That is what we mean by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
 
"The Commonwealth is not required to prove the case to an 
absolute, mathematical certainty.  Mathematical certainty is 
that level of certainty that you have if you add two and two and 
arrive at four.  The Commonwealth is not required to prove its 
case to an absolute or mathematical certainty, but it must prove 
each and every element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. 
45 
 
mirrored, nearly verbatim, instructions we have previously 
upheld against constitutional challenge.23  In several cases, we 
have explicitly approved of an instruction contrasting the 
certainty necessary for a conviction with the greater certainty 
of simple arithmetic.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. O'Brian, 445 
Mass. 720, 731, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 898 (2006) ("[t]he 
Commonwealth is not required to prove the case to a mathematical 
certainty.  Mathematical certainty is that level of certainty 
you'd have if you add ten and ten at arrive at twenty"); 
Commonwealth v. Mack, 423 Mass. 288, 290 n.5 (1996) ("[t]he 
Commonwealth is not required to prove the case to a mathematical 
certainty.  Mathematical certainty is that level of certainty 
that you will have if you add two and two and arrive at four").  
There was no error in giving the same instruction in this case. 
 
h.  Relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have 
carefully reviewed the entire record, pursuant to our duty under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We see no reason to set aside the verdicts 
or to reduce the degree of guilt. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
"Now that does not mean that every fact about which there 
is testimony in this case must be proven to that standard.  It 
is the elements of the crime charged that must be proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt, and I will tell you what those are shortly." 
 
 
23 Approximately nine years after trial in this case, we 
mandated a standard reasonable doubt instruction in the exercise 
of our supervisory authority.  Commonwealth v. Russell, 470 
Mass. 464, 477-478 (2015).  The decision in Russell was not 
retroactive and has no application here.  See id. at 478-479. 
46 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.