Title: State v. Salinas
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 105988
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: July 13, 2012

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 105,988 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
AARON ISREAL SALINAS, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
Under the facts of this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying the defendant's motion to depart from the hard 25 life sentence provided for in 
Jessica's Law, K.S.A. 21-4643, for a conviction of aggravated criminal sodomy with a 
child less than 14 years of age. Reasonable people could agree with the district court's 
determination that the mitigating factors presented by the defendant were not substantial 
and compelling in light of the circumstances of the case, which included the fact that the 
victim was a 6-year-old autistic child who had been in the defendant's care at the time of 
the crime, that expert testimony indicated the defendant was likely to reoffend, and that 
evidence supported the conclusion that the defendant was not amenable to rehabilitation. 
 
Appeal from Reno District Court; TIMOTHY J. CHAMBERS, judge. Opinion filed July 13, 2012. 
Affirmed. 
 
Shawn E. Minihan, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, was on the brief for appellant.  
 
Keith E. Schroeder, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were on the brief for 
appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
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LUCKERT, J.:  This appeal raises the single issue of whether the district court 
abused its discretion in denying Aaron Isreal Salinas' motion to depart from the hard 25 
life sentence provided for in Jessica's Law, K.S.A. 21-4643, for his conviction of 
aggravated criminal sodomy with a child less than 14 years of age. We conclude the 
district court did not abuse its discretion because reasonable people would agree with the 
district court's determination that the mitigating factors presented by Salinas were not 
substantial and compelling in light of the circumstances of the case, which included the 
fact the victim was a 6-year-old autistic child who had been in the defendant's care at the 
time of the crime, expert testimony supported the conclusion that the defendant was 
likely to reoffend, and there was evidence of factors that supported the conclusion that 
the defendant was not amenable to rehabilitation. 
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
After Salinas pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated criminal sodomy involving 
oral contact with a child less than 14 years of age, K.S.A. 21-3506(a)(1), Salinas filed a 
motion to depart from the life sentence provided for in Jessica's Law, K.S.A. 21-
4643(a)(1)(D). In support of his motion, Salinas stated five reasons for departure:   
 
"(1) That a non-prison or shorter sanction will serve community safety interests by 
promoting offender reformation more than incarceration.  
"(2) That the offender, because of his mental impairment, lacked substantial capacity for 
judgment when the offense was committed. . . .  
"(3) Since this crime was committed on September 20, 2008, the defendant has had no 
arrests or police contact and his Criminal History reflects that he has no convictions or 
adjudications and is a criminal history I.  
"(4) That the defendant had just turned 18 years old on August 2, when this offense was 
committed [on September 20, 2008].  
"(5) That Mr. Salinas has admitted to the crime charged, acknowledges that his behavior 
was wrong and is amenable to sex offender treatment and can enter in a treatment 
program."  
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At the sentencing hearing, Salinas called two witnesses—Salinas' mother and 
psychologist Dr. Jarrod Steffan—to present evidence in support of these mitigating 
factors. 
 
 
Salinas' mother testified that Salinas had been physically and emotionally abused 
by his stepfather and sexually abused by his male cousins when he was 5 to 8 years of 
age. She also testified that Salinas had been diagnosed as having attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and depression when he was 12 years old. After Salinas 
dropped out of school in the eighth grade, he moved to Oklahoma at age 16; at that point 
he stopped taking medications for ADHD and depression because he no longer had 
medical insurance. During this time, Salinas became addicted to illegal drugs. Salinas' 
mother testified that he sold drugs to finance his drug habit.  
 
 
The second witness, Dr. Steffan, testified to the results of a psychological 
evaluation he had performed at the request of defense counsel. Steffan opined that 
Salinas' intellectual function was in "a range that's above what would be seen in persons 
with mental retardation, but certainly below the majority of the general population." He 
reached this opinion, in part, because Salinas displayed "rather concrete and simplistic 
thinking about the world and himself." In addition, Steffan determined that Salinas had 
limited reasoning abilities, judgment, and vocabulary. Further, Salinas lacked emotional 
maturity and had a limited ability "to look at possible consequences of his behaviors and 
behaviors of other persons and foresee or appreciate those consequences." Steffan also 
testified that Salinas still had symptoms of ADHD.  
 
 
When asked to express an opinion regarding whether Salinas was a pedophile, 
Steffan noted that the acts that led to Salinas' conviction presented the only evidence of 
behavior, fantasies, or urges that would meet the diagnostic criteria for pedophilia. 
Nevertheless, Steffan reported that Salinas was at a medium to high risk of reoffending or 
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recidivism. Steffan listed several factors that led him to this conclusion, including:  
Salinas' scores on the Static 99 actuarial instrument for predicting recidivism, Salinas' 
young age, Salinas' lack of a long-term cohabitating romantic relationship, the fact that 
the victim was unrelated to Salinas, the fact that Salinas did not know the victim prior to 
the incident, and the fact the victim was male. Finally, Steffan opined that Salinas would 
be amenable to treatment because he had indicated a willingness to be treated, had 
admitted responsibility for the crime, was young, was a first-time offender, and had never 
had sexual offender treatment or substance rehabilitation.  
 
 
Relying on this evidence, defense counsel summarized the mitigating 
circumstances that supported granting the request for departure, noting:  Salinas had just 
turned 18 years of age when he committed the offense; he had a history of being sexually 
abused; he had not had a steady male figure in his childhood; he had not completed 
eighth grade; he had limited mental and emotional maturity; and he had no prior 
convictions, adjudications, arrests, or problems with the law. Additionally, defense 
counsel noted there were treatment options and, according to the psychologist, Salinas 
was amenable to treatment.   
 
 
The State countered that Salinas only admitted to the oral offense and not the anal 
offense, despite strong evidence against him. Further, the State pointed to Steffan's 
testimony regarding the medium to high risk of reoffending. This meant, the State argued, 
Salinas posed a danger to the public. 
 
 
The district court denied Salinas' motion for departure, stating:  
 
 
"On the departure issue the court is required to find the reasons are legally 
sufficient and there are substantial and compelling reasons to support that finding. 
Certainly the reasons given were legally sufficient as per the statute. The court cannot 
find there is evidence rising to a substantial and compelling reason to depart. The court 
certainly recognizes it is a harsh sentence."  
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The district court then considered Salinas' argument that a life sentence would be 
cruel or unusual punishment. Even though that issue is not raised on appeal, some 
discussion of the court's findings is relevant because the district court addressed factual 
issues that overlapped with the motion for departure. Looking at the facts—Salinas 
committed aggravated criminal sodomy with a 6-year-old autistic child who was 
unrelated to him and with whom Salinas had had very minimal prior contact—the court 
determined that the offense was "severe." The court also considered the psychological 
findings—that Salinas has limited judgment, does not foresee consequences, and has an 
extensive prior history of drug use—and determined that these factors were not 
conducive towards rehabilitation. Further, the court acknowledged the classification of 
Salinas' risk of reoffending as moderate to high.  
 
 
After denying Salinas' motions, the district court sentenced Salinas to a term of life 
imprisonment without possibility of parole for 25 years under Jessica's Law, K.S.A. 21-
4643(a)(1). 
 
 
Salinas appeals the district court's denial of his departure motion. This court has 
jurisdiction under K.S.A. 22-3601(b)(1) (maximum sentence of life imprisonment 
imposed; appeal docketed prior to July 1, 2011). 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
 
Under Jessica's Law, a first-time offender who is over the age of 18 and convicted 
of aggravated criminal sodomy "shall" be sentenced to life imprisonment with a 
minimum imprisonment of not less than 25 years "unless the judge finds substantial and 
compelling reasons, following a review of mitigating circumstances, to impose a 
departure." K.S.A. 21-4643(a)(1)(D), (d). If the judge departs, "the judge shall state on 
the record at the time of the sentencing the substantial and compelling reasons for the 
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departure." K.S.A. 21-4643(d). The statute provides a nonexclusive list of six mitigating 
circumstances the judge may consider when determining whether substantial and 
compelling reasons for departure exist. K.S.A. 21-4643(d)(1)-(6). Four of these 
circumstances potentially apply to Salinas' arguments:  (1) the defendant has no 
significant criminal history; (2) the crime was committed while the defendant was under 
the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbances; (3) the defendant's capacity to 
appreciate the criminality of his or her conduct or conform such conduct to the 
requirements of the law was substantially impaired; and (4) the defendant's age at the 
time of the crime. K.S.A. 21-4643(d)(1), (2), (5), (6).  
 
 
When applying these or other factors to determine whether a departure motion 
should be granted, "[a] district court judge first reviews the mitigating circumstances, and 
then determines whether substantial and compelling reasons warrant a departure." State v. 
Plotner, 290 Kan. 774, 780, 235 P.3d 417 (2010); accord State v. Harsh, 293 Kan. 585, 
586, 265 P.3d 1161 (2011); see State v. Spotts, 288 Kan. 650, 655, 206 P.3d 510 (2009). 
This court has defined the term "'substantial' as 'something that is real, not imagined; 
something with substance and not ephemeral,' while the term '"compelling" implies that 
the court is forced, by the facts of a case, to leave the status quo or go beyond what is 
ordinary.'" State v. Seward, 289 Kan. 715, 722, 217 P.3d 443 (2009) (quoting State v. 
McKay, 271 Kan. 725, 728, 26 P.3d 58 [2001]).  
 
 
The review of factors is not a mathematical exercise; "sentencing courts do not 
simply add together the total number of mitigating circumstances and then contrast them 
with the total number of aggravating circumstances." State v. Ballard, 289 Kan. 1000, 
1009, 218 P.3d 432 (2009). "Nor is each mitigating factor required to sufficiently justify 
a departure by itself, so long as the collective factors constitute a substantial and 
compelling basis for departure." Harsh, 293 Kan. at 587 (citing State v. Spencer, 291 
Kan. 796, 815, 248 P.3d 256 [2011]).  
 
 
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On appeal, an appellate court applies an abuse of discretion standard to determine 
if a district court erred in denying a motion for departure. State v. Mondragon, 289 Kan. 
1158, 1160, 220 P.3d 369 (2009) (citing Spotts, 288 Kan. at 654-55); see Harsh, 293 
Kan. at 585-86; Spencer, 291 Kan. at 807.  
 
"Judicial discretion is abused if judicial action (1) is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, 
i.e., if no reasonable person would have taken the view adopted by the trial court; (2) is 
based on an error of law, i.e., if the discretion is guided by an erroneous legal conclusion; 
or (3) is based on an error of fact, i.e., if substantial competent evidence does not support 
a factual finding on which a prerequisite conclusion of law or the exercise of discretion is 
based." State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 550, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 
1594 (2012) (citing State v. Gonzalez, 290 Kan. 747, 755-56, 234 P.3d 1 [2010]).  
 
 
The second and third prongs of this abuse of discretion standard do not apply to 
our review of the district court's decision in this case. This is true even though the district 
court did not engage in a weighing of the mitigating and aggravating circumstances on 
the record. The Jessica's Law statute does not require a district court to state the reasons a 
departure motion is denied; the statute only requires a court to state on the record the 
substantial and compelling reasons for departure. See K.S.A. 21-4643(d); see also Harsh, 
293 Kan. at 587 ("'Specificity by the district court judge when making his or her 
determination is not statutorily required,' unless the court decides a departure is 
warranted."); State v. Mendoza, 292 Kan. 933, 935-36, 258 P.3d 383 (2011) (upholding 
denial of departure where district court did not expressly consider mitigating factors on 
the record, because it was difficult for appellate court to conclude that no reasonable 
person would take view adopted by district court).  
 
 
Without the second or third prongs of the abuse of discretion standard at issue, 
Salinas argues on appeal that the district court abused its discretion because no 
reasonable person would have sentenced him to life in prison given that (1) he had just 
turned 18 years old at the time of the offense; (2) he had suffered emotional, physical, 
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and sexual abuse as a young boy; (3) he had been diagnosed with depression and ADHD; 
(4) he had limited emotional and intellectual abilities; and (5) Steffan believed he was 
amenable to treatment.  
 
 
Salinas' assertion that no reasonable person would have agreed with the district 
court is belied by several recent cases in which this court has upheld a district court's 
denial of a departure motion based on grounds similar to those asserted by Salinas. See, 
e.g., State v. Roberts, 293 Kan. 1093, 1098, 272 P.3d 24 (2012) (upholding denial of 
departure motion despite defendant's lack of criminal history and diminished mental 
capacity and maturity); Harsh, 293 Kan. at 587-88 (holding district court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying departure when defendant accepted responsibility for his actions 
and pleaded guilty); State v. Whorton, 292 Kan. 472, 475-76, 254 P.3d 1268 (2011) 
(finding district court considered mitigating factor of defendant's criminal history score of 
I and upholding departure denial); Plotner, 290 Kan. at 780-81 (upholding district court's 
decision to deny departure motion despite defendant's claims he took responsibility for 
his actions, showed deep remorse, had no significant criminal record, and was relatively 
young at time crimes were committed); State v. Reyna, 290 Kan. 666, 689-90, 234 P.3d 
761, cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 532 (2010) (upholding district court's determination that even 
though there was no evidence of pedophilia and a lack of criminal history, none of 
mitigating factors justified departure); Seward, 289 Kan. at 721-22 (affirming district 
court's denial of departure despite defendant's lack of prior felony convictions, his own 
sexual victimization as a child, his low intelligence, and his status as a high school 
dropout); Spotts, 288 Kan. at 655-56 (finding district court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying departure where defendant had no prior sexually motivated convictions, took 
responsibility for his actions and showed remorse, and was taking antidepressants and 
sleep aids when the offenses occurred). 
 
 
Likewise, in this case reasonable people would agree with the district court's 
decision to deny the departure. Even though there were mitigating factors to be weighed, 
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there were significant offsetting aggravating factors. As the district court noted, this was 
a severe offense involving a 6-year-old autistic child with whom Salinas had had minimal 
prior contact and who, at the time of the offense, was in Salinas' care. Second, Steffan 
graded Salinas' risk of recividism as moderate to high. Consequently, as the State noted, 
he presents a risk to the public. Further, even though Steffan opined that Salinas was 
amenable to rehabilitation, there was substantial competent evidence of factors that, in 
the district court's judgment, were not conducive to rehabilitation. These included Salinas' 
limited judgment, inability to foresee consequences, and prior drug use. Reasonable 
people could agree with the district court's resolution of the conflicting evidence 
regarding Salinas' amenability to treatment and with the district court's overall 
determination that the mitigating circumstances cited by Salinas were not substantial and 
compelling reasons to depart from the hard 25 sentence under Jessica's Law. Therefore, 
the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Salinas' departure motion. 
 
 
Affirmed.