Title: William Melvin White v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC00-1148
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: April 4, 2002

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC00-1148
____________
WILLIAM MELVIN WHITE,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[April 4, 2002]
PER CURIAM.
William Melvin White appeals his sentence of death following resentencing. 
We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the reasons expressed
below, we affirm the death sentence.
The facts of the crime and procedural history of this case are detailed in
White v. State, 729 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 1999): 
[White] was convicted of the first-degree murder of Gracie Mae
Crawford.  The facts of the crime are detailed in our opinion on direct
appeal.
White was a member of a Kentucky chapter of the
Outlaws, a motorcycle gang, but was visiting the Orlando
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chapter.  A group of the Outlaws, accompanied by some
girl friends, visited an Orlando nightclub where they met
Gracie Mae Crawford.  Gracie Mae accompanied some
of the Outlaws back to their Orlando clubhouse.  Soon
after returning to the clubhouse, White retired to a
bedroom with his girl friend.  Sometime thereafter White
was called by Richard DiMarino who stated that
Crawford liked blacks and that they had to teach her a
lesson.  White dressed and went into the kitchen area
where he joined DiMarino and Guy Ennis Smith in
severely beating Crawford.  Whether DiMarino or White
led the assault is unclear, but one witness testified of
White's hitting Crawford with his fist and knocking her to
the floor.  After the beating, DiMarino and White placed
Crawford in the middle of the front seat of White's girl
friend's car.  White started driving but along the way
stopped the car and DiMarino drove the car to the end of
a deserted road.  (The victim, White and DiMarino had
done a lot of drinking that evening, but White's girl friend
testified that he knew what he was doing.)  After they
stopped the car, DiMarino and White pulled Crawford
from the car, passed her over a barbed wire fence, and
laid her on the ground.  White then straddled her, took
out his knife, stabbed her fourteen times and slit her
throat.  He handed the knife to DiMarino who also cut her
throat.  Crawford died as a result of the wounds inflicted
upon her.
While leaving the area White and DiMarino ran out
of gas at the Seaworld parking lot and were later identified
by Seaworld security guards who had given them gas. 
White and DiMarino went back and picked up the body
of the deceased and thereafter discarded it at a different
place.  The body was discovered that afternoon.
White v. State, 415 So. 2d 719, 719-20 (Fla. 1982).  After a penalty
phase proceeding in which defense counsel proffered no witnesses or
evidence, the advisory jury unanimously recommended that appellant
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be sentenced to death.  The trial court, finding that the three
aggravating circumstances [n. 1] outweighed the sole statutory
mitigating circumstance, [n. 2] sentenced appellant to death in
accordance with the unanimous jury recommendation.  We affirmed
the conviction and sentence.  Id. at 719-21.  The United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari review on November 29, 1982.  See
White v. Florida, 459 U.S. 1055, 103 S. Ct. 474, 74 L. Ed.2d 622
(1982).
[n. 1].  The trial court found:  (1) the murder was
committed during the course of a kidnapping; (2) the
murder was committed to disrupt or hinder enforcement
of laws; and (3) the murder was heinous, wicked, and
cruel.
[n. 2].  The trial court found that appellant had no
prior violent felony conviction.
Appellant filed [his] initial rule 3.850 motion in 1983.  In 1987,
while appellant's rule 3.850 motion was pending, the Supreme Court
issued its opinion in Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 107 S. Ct.
1821, 95 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1987).  Hitchcock held that a Florida jury
charge which precluded the trial court and the advisory jury from
considering nonstatutory mitigation was unconstitutional.  Appellant
subsequently filed a petition for habeas relief based on Hitchcock. 
The trial court stayed further proceedings in this postconviction
motion until final disposition of the habeas petition.  We rejected
appellant's claim for relief, concluding that "[t]he charge which may
have limited the jury to a consideration of statutory mitigating
circumstance was clearly harmless."  White v. Dugger, 523 So. 2d
140, 141 (Fla.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871 (1988).  The trial court
subsequently held an evidentiary hearing on most of appellant's claims
and denied relief on all claims by order . . . .
Id. at 910-11.
In White’s appeal of the denial of his 3.850 motion, this Court affirmed the
1.  Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987).
2.  The trial court found the following four aggravators:  (1) White was
convicted of a prior violent felony; (2) the murder was committed while White was
engaged in the commission of a kidnapping; (3) the murder was committed to
disrupt or hinder the enforcement of laws; and (4) the murder was heinous,
atrocious, or cruel (HAC).
3.  The trial court found and assigned weight to one statutory and nine
nonstatutory mitigating factors:  (1) the murder was committed while White was
under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance (little weight)
(statutory); (2) White had a poor family background and an abusive childhood,
lived in family squalor, and suffered from parental neglect (some weight); (3) White
had an extensive history of alcohol and substance abuse from an early age (some
weight); (4) White had organic brain damage and neurological deficiencies (some
weight); (5) White had marginal intelligence or a low IQ (little weight); (6) White
was intoxicated and had diminished capacity at the time he committed the crime
(very little weight); (7) White was a willing worker and a good employee (some
weight); (8) White lacked future dangerousness, had the potential to be
rehabilitated, and had and a good prison record (some weight); (9) White had
contributed to the community (very little weight); (10) White was a loving person
and was generous to others (very little weight).
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trial court’s order as to his conviction.  See id. at 910.  However, on the basis of a
Hitchcock error,1 we vacated White’s death sentence and remanded for a new
sentencing proceeding before a jury.  See id.
On remand, the resentencing jury voted ten to two in favor of imposing the
death sentence.  In sentencing White to the death penalty, the trial court found four
aggravators.2  The trial court also found and assigned weight to one statutory and
nine nonstatutory mitigating factors.3  In weighing the nature and quality of these
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aggravators and mitigators, the trial court found that the aggravators greatly
outweighed the mitigators.
On appeal to this Court, White raises five issues:  (1) the trial court erred in
not permitting the cross-examination of the key State witness concerning the
underlying facts of the witness’s subsequent murder conviction; (2) the trial court
erred in finding that the murder was committed to disrupt or hinder the enforcement
of laws; (3) the trial court erred in rejecting the statutory mitigating factor that the
murder was committed while White was under extreme duress or under the
substantial domination of another; (4) the imposition of the death penalty is
disproportionate; (5) White’s execution, after serving more than twenty-two years
on death row, will constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
We summarily reject White’s fifth claim, as it has previously been considered
and rejected.  See Rose v. State, 787 So. 2d 786, 805 (Fla. 2001) (prolonged delay
in imposing death penalty does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment).  We
now turn to the issues that merit discussion.
I.  COLLATERAL EVIDENCE
White claims that the trial court erred in preventing defense counsel’s full
cross-examination of Richard DiMarino, the State’s key witness and the other
perpetrator of the 1978 murder of Crawford, regarding the facts underlying the
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third-degree murder to which DiMarino pled guilty in Maryland in 1990.  This
Maryland crime occurred twelve years after White was convicted for the first-
degree murder of Crawford.
The facts underlying DiMarino’s Maryland crime occurred in July 1990,
when DiMarino and a codefendant were involved in an incident while riding their
motorcycles.  Words with two rival biker gang members escalated into a fight with
the two rival bikers at an intersection.  One of the two rival bikers fled, while
DiMarino and a codefendant continued to fight with the remaining biker.  In the
fight, the remaining biker was stabbed and died from a single stab wound to the
chest.  DiMarino agreed to plead guilty to third-degree murder and agreed to testify
against his codefendant in exchange for a reduced sentence of twenty years with ten
years of the sentence suspended.
Prior to DiMarino’s testimony at the resentencing proceeding, the State filed
a motion in limine seeking to prohibit defense counsel from questioning DiMarino
regarding the underlying facts of the 1990 Maryland murder conviction.  After
hearing argument from counsel, the trial court stated:
I certainly understand the State’s argument on this particular
motion.  However, I’m also aware that this is the penalty phase of a
first degree murder conviction.  And that in the penalty phase the court
can step outside the bounds of the traditional rules of evidence, step
out of bounds in the allowing of hearsay testimony.
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Therefore, my ruling is going to be as follows:  the defense in
order to evaluate the credibility of Mr. DiMarino and also evaluate,
properly put before the jury clearly what weight should be given to
mitigating circumstances, the defense may ask Mr. DiMarino whether
he has since his conviction for this particular crime been convicted of
a felony.  The defense may also ask him what type of felony it was,
but may not delve into the facts of this case, i.e., was there a stabbing,
was a throat slit, et cetera.  You may also ask him if he negotiated
some type of lesser sentence for his testimony against a codefendant,
if that in fact was the circumstance of that particular murder.
The defense may also inquire as to his lifestyle.
DiMarino gave testimony, on direct and cross-examination, that in 1978, he
was convicted and sentenced to fifteen years in prison for the third-degree murder
of Crawford.  Thereafter, DiMarino agreed to testify against his codefendants, Guy
Ennis Smith and White, in exchange for concurrent time in prison on other
unrelated felony charges.  To protect DiMarino from retaliation from members of
the Outlaws motorcycle gang, the State agreed to remove a tattoo and transfer
DiMarino to an out-of-state prison facility.
DiMarino further testified that he had been convicted of more than twenty-
five felonies, including the 1990 Maryland third-degree murder for which he
received a twenty-year sentence with ten years of the sentence suspended, in
exchange for his testimony against his codefendant.  Furthermore, defense counsel
established that DiMarino was on parole for the 1990 Maryland third-degree murder
conviction; thus, any deviation from DiMarino’s original 1978 testimony in the
4.  Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959).
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Crawford case could have been the basis for a perjury charge, constituting a parole
violation that could have required DiMarino to serve his complete sentence for the
1990 Maryland murder conviction.
On appeal, White now claims that the trial court erred in preventing defense
counsel’s full cross-examination of DiMarino regarding the facts underlying his
1990 third-degree murder conviction in Maryland.  White’s first subclaim is that the
facts underlying DiMarino’s 1990 third-degree murder conviction are similar to the
facts of Crawford’s murder, in that in both crimes DiMarino killed a person by
stabbing and then blamed a codefendant for his crime.  Hence, the trial court’s
limitation on the cross-examination of DiMarino erroneously prevented White from
using the facts underlying DiMarino’s Maryland crime to impeach DiMarino’s
asserted minimal involvement in Crawford’s murder.  See § 921.141 (6)(d), Fla.
Stat. (1999) (“[A] mitigating circumstance shall be . . . [that the] defendant was an
accomplice in the capital felony committed by another person and his or her
participation was relatively minor.”).  White’s second subclaim is that the facts
underlying DiMarino’s 1990 Maryland third-degree murder conviction should have
been admitted as reverse Williams4 rule evidence under section 90.404(2)(a),
Florida Statutes (1999).  White argues that the similarity between the facts
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underlying DiMarino’s 1990 third-degree murder conviction and Crawford’s
murder show DiMarino’s pattern of killing a person by stabbing and then blaming
another for his crime.  Hence, the trial court’s limitation on White’s cross-
examination of DiMarino erroneously prevented the presentation of collateral
evidence relevant to discrediting the view that DiMarino played a minimal role in
Crawford’s murder.  See § 921.141(6)(d), Fla. Stat.  We disagree.
We first discuss White’s second subclaim.  In Zack v. State, 753 So. 2d 9
(Fla. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 858 (2000), we explained:
In Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959), this Court
reiterated the standard rule for admission of evidence; that is, that any
evidence relevant to prove a material fact at issue is admissible unless
precluded by a specific rule of exclusion.  See § 90.402, Fla. Stat.
(1995).  The Court also said relevant evidence will not be excluded
merely because it relates to facts that point to the commission of a
separate crime, but added the caveat that "the question of the
relevancy of this type of evidence should be cautiously scrutinized
before it is determined to be admissible."  110 So. 2d at 662.  This
rule concerning the admissibility of similar fact evidence has been
codified by the Legislature as section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes
(1995).
Later, in Bryan v. State, 533 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 1988), we made it
clear that the admissibility of other crimes evidence is not limited to
crimes with similar facts.  We stated that similar fact evidence may be
admissible pursuant to section 90.404, and other crimes or bad acts
that are not similar may be admissible under section 90.402.  We
reiterated the distinction between "similar fact" evidence and
"dissimilar fact" evidence in Sexton v. State, 697 So. 2d 833, 837 (Fla.
1997).
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Thus, section 90.404 is a special limitation governing the
admissibility of similar fact evidence.  But if evidence of a
defendant's collateral bad acts bears no logical
resemblance to the crime for which the defendant is being
tried, then section 90.404(2)(a) does not apply and the
general rule in section 90.402 controls.  A trial court has
broad discretion in determining the relevance of evidence
and such a determination will not be disturbed absent an
abuse of discretion.  Heath v. State, 648 So. 2d 660, 664
(Fla. 1994).
Thus, whether the evidence of other bad acts complained of . . . is
termed "similar fact" evidence or "dissimilar fact" evidence, its
admissibility is determined by its relevancy.  The trial court must utilize
a balancing test to determine if the probative value of this relevant
evidence is outweighed by its prejudicial effect.  See § 90.403, Fla.
Stat. (1995); Gore v. State, 719 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1998).
Id. at 16.  “Admission of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and will
not be reversed unless there has been a clear abuse of that discretion.”  Ray v.
State, 755 So. 2d 604, 610 (Fla. 2000); see also Chandler v. State, 534 So. 2d 701,
703 (Fla. 1988).  Discretion is abused only when the judicial action is arbitrary,
fanciful, or unreasonable, which is another way of saying that discretion is abused
only where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. 
See Trease v. State, 768 So. 2d 1050, 1053 n.2 (Fla. 2000).
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
admit the facts underlying the 1990 Maryland crime but affording broad latitude
concerning DiMarino’s criminal background.  DiMarino’s 1990 Maryland murder
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was twelve years remote in time from the 1978 murder for which White was being
resentenced.  Moreover, the facts and circumstances of the Maryland murder are
very different from Crawford’s murder.  See State v. Savino, 567 So. 2d 892, 894
(Fla. 1990) (defendant must demonstrate “a close similarity of facts, a unique or
‘fingerprint’ type of information” in order to introduce evidence of another crime to
show that someone other than the defendant committed the instant crime).  While
both murders did involve stabbing with a knife, the 1978 murder involved activities
within White’s motorcycle group and the kidnapping of a young woman who was
then stabbed fourteen times, and DiMarino’s 1990 murder was during a fight at an
intersection between rival motorcyclists while biking.
The trial court achieved the proper balance by admitting evidence regarding
the circumstances of DiMarino’s 1990 guilty plea to third-degree murder in
Maryland, while not allowing this witness’s conviction for third-degree murder to
become the focus of White’s penalty phase proceeding.  See Steverson v. State,
695 So. 2d 687, 689 (Fla. 1997) (“Even when evidence of a collateral crime is
properly admissible in a case, we have cautioned that ‘the prosecution should not
go too far in introducing evidence of other crimes.  The state should not be allowed
to go so far as to make the collateral crime a feature instead of an incident.’ 
Randolph v. State, 463 So. 2d 186, 189 (Fla. 1984).”); Escobar v. State, 699 So.
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2d 988, 997 (Fla. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by Connor v. State, 803 So.
2d 598 (Fla. 2001); Stano v. State, 473 So. 2d 1282, 1289 (Fla. 1985) (“[E]vidence
of unrelated crimes, however, cannot be made a feature of the trial.”).  Therefore, in
light of the limited relevance of the facts underlying DiMarino’s 1990 Maryland
crime and the evidence actually presented through the testimony of DiMarino, we
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit
evidence of DiMarino’s Maryland crime as reverse Williams rule evidence.  See
Gore v. State, 784 So. 2d 418, 432 (Fla. 2001) (trial court did not abuse its
discretion where defendant failed to show relevance and requisite similarities to
admit evidence of collateral crime as reverse Williams rule evidence); Crump v.
State, 622 So. 2d 963, 969 (Fla. 1993) (trial court properly excluded evidence
regarding substance of a detective’s interviews of other suspects because such
evidence did not constitute reverse Williams rule evidence); Jones v. State, 580 So.
2d 143, 145 (Fla. 1991) (evidence regarding witnesses’ convictions involving drug-
related offenses and violence against police did not meet test for reverse Williams
rule evidence); Savino, 567 So. 2d at 894 (no abuse of discretion where trial court
ruled inadmissible reverse Williams rule evidence that was not sufficiently similar to
murder at issue); Rivera v. State, 561 So. 2d 536, 540 (Fla. 1990) (trial court did
not abuse its discretion in excluding proffered reverse Williams rule evidence).
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With respect to White’s first subclaim, the trial court’s ruling in the present
case did not prevent the effective and thorough impeachment of DiMarino.  Our
review of the record demonstrates that through the cross-examination of DiMarino
the jury was made aware of all the pertinent details concerning DiMarino’s prior
felonies and his agreements to testify against his codefendants in exchange for more
favorable sentences.  Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
limiting the admission of collateral evidence concerning the factual details of the
witness’s unrelated 1990 Maryland crime.  See Steverson, 696 So. 2d at 689; see
also Fotopoulos v. State, 608 So. 2d 784, 791 (Fla. 1992) (credibility of any
witness may be attacked by evidence of prior felony conviction, and such inquiry is
generally restricted to existence of prior convictions and number of such
convictions); Jackson v. State, 498 So. 2d 906, 909 (Fla. 1986).
White further contends that even if the trial court did not err in limiting the
cross-examination, the State opened the door to such examination when it elicited
from DiMarino that he was “sickened” by Crawford’s murder.  Again, we cannot
conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in holding that the facts and
circumstances of the 1990 Maryland murder do not impeach DiMarino’s testimony
that he was “sickened” by the murder of Crawford in 1978.  See Bryan, 533 So. 2d
at 750 (trial judge has wide discretion in determining permissible scope of cross-
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examination).  Moreover, considering the evidence concerning DiMarino that the
trial court did admit, any error in sustaining the objection to the admissibility of this
evidence is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  See State v. Diguilio, 491 So. 2d
1129, 1135 (Fla. 1986).
II.  HINDER THE ENFORCEMENT OF LAWS AGGRAVATOR
White’s second claim is that the trial court erred in finding that the victim was
killed in order to disrupt or hinder the enforcement of laws, i.e., to escape
detection, prosecution, and punishment for the preceding battery committed upon
the victim at the Outlaws’ clubhouse.  In reviewing a trial court’s finding of an
aggravating circumstance, this Court reviews the record to determine whether the
trial court applied the correct rule of law and, if so, whether such finding is
supported by competent, substantial evidence.  See Willacy v. State, 696 So. 2d
693, 695-96 (Fla. 1997).
In order to establish this aggravating circumstance, the State must
demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the dominant motive for the murder
was the elimination of the witness.  See Foster v. State, 778 So. 2d 906, 918 (Fla.
2000); Peterka v. State, 640 So. 2d 59, 71 (Fla. 1994).  The witness elimination
aggravating factor may be inferred from circumstantial evidence without direct
evidence of the defendant’s motive.  See Foster, 778 So. 2d at 18; Hall v. State,
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614 So. 2d 473, 477 (1993); Preston v. State, 607 So. 2d 404, 409 (1992).
In its sentencing order, the trial court found:
The facts of this case establish that Defendant and his co-
defendants kidnaped and murdered Gracie Mae Crawford to avoid
discovery and prosecution for the battery committed upon her at the
Outlaws clubhouse, just prior to the murder.  Evidence shows that co-
defendant Smith stated that “he wanted no witnesses,” so they had to
“take care of business.”  Co-defendant DiMarino knew that this meant
they would kill Gracie Mae Crawford to avoid prosecution for the
severe beating she received from these three co-defendants. 
Defendant placed Crawford in the middle of the front seat of
Defendant’s girlfriend’s car; DiMarino then got into the front
passenger seat, blocking any possible escape by Crawford.  The
evidence shows that the victim did not go with Defendant willingly to
the place where she was passed over a barbed wire fence and brutally
murdered.
State v. White, No. CR78-1840, order at 3 (Fla. 9th Cir. Ct. order filed Apr. 20,
2000).
We have repeatedly affirmed the finding of the witness elimination
aggravating circumstance in similar situations when the victim has been transported
to another location and then killed.  See Jones v. State, 748 So. 2d 1012, 1027 (Fla.
1999) (upholding elimination of witness aggravator when defendant robbed victim
and subsequently transported her to secluded location, where he killed her);
Preston, 607 So. 2d at 409 (upholding elimination of witness aggravator where
defendant robbed and kidnaped victim, transported her to secluded location, and
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killed her).  We find that these cases support the trial court’s determination that this
aggravator could be found in this case, and we conclude that there is competent,
substantial evidence in the record to support the aggravator that White killed the
victim in order to eliminate her as a witness to his prior crime.  See Jones, 748 So.
2d at 1027; Preston, 607 So. 2d at 409.
III.  EXTREME DURESS OR SUBSTANTIAL DOMINATION MITIGATOR
White’s third claim is that the trial court erred in failing to find the statutory
mitigating circumstance that White acted under extreme duress or under the
substantial domination of another during the murder.  A trial court may reject a
defendant’s claim that a mitigating circumstance has been established provided that
the record contains competent, substantial evidence to support the rejection.  See
Connor, 803 So 2d 611; Nibert v. State, 574 So. 2d 1059, 1062 (Fla. 1990). 
Whether a mitigating factor has been proven by the evidence is a question of fact
subject to the competent, substantial evidence standard.  See Zack, 753 So. 2d at
19.
In rejecting the extreme duress statutory mitigator the trial court found:
There was no evidence that Defendant acted under extreme
duress.  The evidence from other members of the Outlaws showed
that Defendant was a follower, not a leader, and because of his
alcoholism, could not be depended upon within the organization.  Dr.
Caddy testified that Defendant “was a man who was readily available
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to be influenced by others,” due to his intoxication, alcoholism,
polysubstance abuse and personality variables.  The State concedes
that Defendant had a need for approval from the other members of the
Outlaws which influenced him to be drawn into unlawful activities of
the other members.  The fact that he was in the company of another
Outlaw club member when he committed the murder, to some extent,
may have influenced him to carry it out.
However, while Defendant may have been a follower and easily
influenced, such evidence is insufficient to establish that Defendant
committed this crime under the “substantial domination” of another. 
The evidence does not suggest such a leap.  While some evidence
suggested that the murder may have initially been Smith’s idea, there
was no evidence that Defendant was under the substantial domination
of anyone at the point where he stabbed the victim.  Therefore, this
Court rejects the existence of this mitigating circumstance.
State v. White, order at 5.
The present case is similar to Valdes v. State, 626 So. 2d 1316, 1324 (Fla.
1993), in which this Court upheld the rejection of the extreme duress or substantial
domination statutory mitigator.  In Valdes, this Court found:
Here, the evidence offered to support Valdes' claim of substantial
domination by Van Poyck was Valdes' former girlfriend's testimony
that Valdes went with Van Poyck the morning of the murder to do him
a favor, that they had moved to Fort Lauderdale to get away from Van
Poyck, and that Van Poyck was dominant over Valdes.  However,
Valdes clearly participated equally in the escape attempt and murder. 
Valdes provided the murder weapon, and he was the one who forced
Griffis from the van and took him to the back of the vehicle, where he
was executed.  The testimony indicated that Valdes and Van Poyck
acted in concert during the entire episode.  Contrary to Valdes'
argument, the fact that we previously characterized Van Poyck as the
major participant in this incident does not mean Valdes' participation
was minor.  We find substantial competent evidence to support the
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trial court's rejection of these proposed mitigators.
Id. at 1324 (emphasis added).
In the present case, there was similar evidence supporting the trial court’s
finding that White played the dominant role in committing this murder.  There is no
evidence that anyone externally pressured White at the time of the stabbing murder
of Crawford.  There is evidence in the record, however, that White stabbed
Crawford fourteen times and slit her throat before giving the knife to DiMarino to
slice her throat.  White told his girlfriend to forget that she had heard the beating of
Crawford.  After taking the keys to his girlfriend’s car, White helped to carry
Crawford to this car and initially drove the car when taking the victim from the
Outlaws’ clubhouse.  White also provided the murder weapon, a knife. 
Accordingly, we conclude that there is competent, substantial evidence in the
record supporting the trial court’s rejection of the extreme duress statutory
mitigator.  See also San Martin v. State, 705 So. 2d 1337, 1348 (Fla. 1997)
(affirming rejection of extreme duress or substantial domination mitigator where
evidence established that defendant was integral part of planning and execution of
crimes); Raleigh v. State, 705 So. 2d 1324, 1330 (Fla. 1997) (same); Hill v. State,
515 So. 2d 176, 178 (Fla. 1987) (same).
IV.  PROPORTIONALITY
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White’s fourth claim is that his death sentence is disproportionate. 
Specifically, White first argues that his death sentence is impermissibly disparate
from the fifteen-year sentence received by his codefendant DiMarino, who White
contends instigated the beating of the victim, escorted her to a deserted area, and
slit her throat with the intent to kill her.  White’s second proportionality subclaim is
that his death sentence is disproportionate to other cases in which the death penalty
was not imposed.  We first address the alleged disproportionate treatment of
DiMarino.
“When a codefendant is equally as culpable or more culpable than the
defendant, the disparate treatment of the codefendant may render the defendant's
punishment disproportionate.”  Sexton v. State, 775 So. 2d 923, 935 (Fla. 2000). 
If the defendant, however, is the more culpable participant in the crime, disparate
treatment of the codefendant is justified.  See id.  “A trial court’s determination
concerning the relative culpability of the co-perpetrators in a first-degree murder
case is a finding of fact and will be sustained on review if supported by competent
substantial evidence.”  Puccio v. State, 701 So. 2d 858, 860 (Fla. 1997).
In its sentencing order, the trial court carefully considered and rejected
White’s argument that DiMarino was equally culpable for this murder:
Defendant was an accomplice in the capital felony committed
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by another person and his participation was relatively minor.
Defendant argues that because there was evidence that he was
not a leader and that he may have been easily influenced by others, it
follows that on the night of the homicide he was following the lead of
others, particularly DiMarino.  Even if this were true (and the Court
finds no evidence to support Defendant’s argument), the Court cannot
conclude those facts establish that Defendant’s participation was
relatively minor.  In fact, quite the contrary is true.  The evidence
clearly establishes that Defendant delivered the fatal stab wounds to
the victim’s body, and handed the knife to DiMarino to slit her throat. 
Further, an employee from Sea World testified that he observed no
blood on DiMarino, yet noticed what appeared to be a spot of blood
on Defendant’s forearm.  Therefore, the Court rejects the existence of
this mitigating circumstance.
. . . .
Sentences of co-defendants to life or a lesser term of
imprisonment.
In denying Defendant’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, the
Florida Supreme Court rejected the issue of disproportionate treatment
of DiMarino, stating:
White’s co-perpetrator, Richard DiMarino, was
convicted of only third-degree murder.  In White’s
original appeal we noted this fact and stated: “While this
is fortunate for him [DiMarino], it does not require the
reduction of White’s sentence.”  The two juries found
different culpabilities.  It is permissible to impose
different sentences on capital co-defendants where their
various degrees of participation and culpability are
different from one another.  (citations omitted).
The Court finds that the lesser sentence of DiMarino is not a mitigating
circumstance.  Co-defendant Guy Ennis Smith was convicted of first
degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment.  As quoted
5.  Any argument that this Court should unilaterally reject DiMarino’s
testimony is without merit.  See Brown v. State, 721 So. 2d 274, 282 (Fla. 1998)
(“The question of whether an accomplice is credible and the weight to be given to
the testimony are issues for the jury to determine.”).  In the instant case, DiMarino
was thoroughly impeached before the jury.  Yet, the jury voted ten to two in favor
of the death penalty, finding DiMarino sufficiently credible to sentence White to
death.  This Court does not disturb this finding.  See Brown, 721 So. 2d at 282.
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above, the Florida Supreme Court stated that capital co-defendants
may receive different sentences based on their varying degrees of
participation and culpability.  The evidence clearly established that it
was Defendant, not Smith, who repeatedly stabbed Crawford, causing
her death.  Therefore, the Court finds that the life sentence of Smith is
not a mitigating circumstance.
State v. White, order at 5, 9.  The testimony from DiMarino, the Sea World
employees, and the medical examiner constitute competent, substantial evidence to
support the trial court’s findings.5  See Sexton, 775 So. 2d at 935-36; Howell v.
State, 707 So. 2d 674, 682-83 (Fla. 1998) (rejecting claim of disparate sentencing
where codefendant pled to second-degree murder and received sentence of forty
years); Cardona v. State, 641 So. 2d 361, 365 (Fla. 1994) (rejecting claim of
disparate sentencing where codefendant pled guilty to second-degree murder and
testified against defendant); Cook v. State, 581 So. 2d 141, 143 (Fla. 1991)
(rejecting claim of disparate sentencing where codefendants pled guilty to second-
degree murder and received sentences of twenty-three and twenty-four years);
Hayes v. State, 581 So. 2d 121, 127 (Fla. 1991) (rejecting claim of disparate
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sentencing where codefendant pled guilty to second-degree murder and testified
against defendant); Brown v. State, 473 So. 2d 1260, 1268 (Fla. 1985) (rejecting
claim of disparate sentencing where codefendant pled guilty to second-degree
murder).  We find no error in the trial court’s ruling on this issue.
Finally, we address White’s subclaim that his death sentence is
disproportionate when compared to other similar capital cases where the defendant
received a life sentence.  The death penalty is reserved for the most aggravated and
least mitigated of capital crimes.  See Sexton, 775 So. 2d at 935.  In deciding
whether death is a proportionate penalty, the Court must consider the totality of the
circumstances of the case and compare the case with other capital cases.  See id.
In the present case, the trial court sentenced White to death in an eleven-page
order carefully detailing its findings that the found aggravators greatly outweighed
the mitigators.  The circumstances of this case are similar to other cases in which
we have upheld the death penalty.  For instance, in Singleton v. State, 783 So. 2d
970, 979 (Fla. 2001), the trial court found as aggravators to a stabbing murder HAC
and the existence of a prior violent felony.  In Singleton, the trial court determined
that these aggravators outweighed the statutory mitigators of extreme mental
disturbance, inability to appreciate the criminality of conduct, and the defendant’s
age of sixty-nine at the time of the offense, and the nine nonstatutory mitigators,
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which included that the defendant was an alcoholic and under the influence of
alcohol at the time of the murder.  In Alston v. State, 723 So. 2d 148, 153 (Fla.
1998), where the defendant was convicted for the armed robbery, kidnapping, and
murder of a victim, the trial court found five aggravators (prior violent felonies,
committed during the course of robbery/kidnapping and for pecuniary gain, avoid
arrest, HAC, and cold, calculated, and premeditated).  In Alston, the trial court also
found five nonstatutory mitigators, including a horribly deprived and violent
childhood, low intelligence, and mental age.  See Alston, 723 So. 2d at 153, 162. 
In Alston we found the death sentence proportional where the trial court determined
that the found aggravators outweighed five nonstatutory mitigators.  See id.; see
also Spencer v. State, 691 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 1996) (affirming death sentence for
stabbing murder where trial court found HAC and prior violent felony aggravators
outweighed two statutory mental mitigators and numerous nonstatutory mitigators). 
Hence, we reject White’s contention and find that the death sentence is
proportionate.
Accordingly, for the reasons expressed, we affirm the sentence of death.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and HARDING, ANSTEAD, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
SHAW and PARIENTE, JJ., concur in result only.
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NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Orange County,
Margaret T. Waller, Judge - Case No. CR78-1840
Chandler R. Muller, Winter Park, Florida,
for Appellant
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Stephen D. Ake, Assistant Attorney
General, Tampa, Florida,
for Appellee