Title: ROZELL DESHUN MARTIN V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2013-SC-000071-MR
State: Kentucky
Issuer: Kentucky Supreme Court
Date: October 23, 2014

IMPORTANT NOTICE NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER, UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS, RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE ACTION. ,i5uptrIttr (Court of, 2013-SC-000071-MR ROZELL DESHUN MARTIN RENDERED: OCTOBER 23, 2014 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED ON APPEAL FROM LOGAN,CIRCUIT COURT V. HONORABLE TYLER L. GILL, JUDGE NO. 11-CR-00046 COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT AFFIRMING Rozell Martin appeals as a matter of right from a judgment of the Logan Circuit Court sentencing him to a twenty-year prison term for incest. Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b). Martin raises two issues on appeal: 1) the trial court erred when it refused to admit evidence relating to a prior accusation allegedly made by the victim; and 2) the trial court's decision to admit sexually explicit text messages was an abuse of discretion. We affirm the judgment and sentence of the Logan Circuit Court. FACTS On March 11, 2011, Appellant Rozell Deshun Martin was indicted by a Logan County Grand Jury for incest and being a persistent felony offender ("PFO") in the first degree. The indictment was in reference to allegations of sexual conduct between Martin and his daughter, "Jamie."' In July 2008, The name "Jamie" is a pseudonym. Jamie, then sixteen, and her two sisters moved in with Martin after previously living with their mother and step-father. The girls shared a trailer with Martin and his live-in girlfriend, Peggy Estes, as well as other siblings, half-siblings, and other young children. In 2011, Estes contacted the Department for Community Based Services ("DCBS") after learning of an alleged sexual encounter between Martin and Jamie. Martin was later arrested and charged. At trial, the Commonwealth called Estes, Detective Robbie Matthews with the Logan County Sheriff's Department, and Jamie to testify. Estes testified to the events of an evening in October of 2008. She remembered Martin and Jamie leaving the residence around 11:00 p.m. and not returning until 10:00 the next morning. Martin had told Estes that they were going to kill rabbits. Estes also testified to discovering sexually graphic messages on Jamie's phone in January 2011. Jamie confirmed that the messages were sent from her father. Estes reported that, when confronted, Martin claimed that he intended to send the messages to someone else but sent them to Jamie by mistake. Detective Matthews then testified that, after being notified by DCBS, he took Jamie's phone into evidence and typed and printed the text messages from her father. He also photographed a location where a sexual encounter was alleged to have taken place. Jamie was the final witness for the Commonwealth. She testified that on a night in October of 2008, her father had her perform oral sex on him in the trailer where they both lived. Jamie testified that he then took her from the house in a red pick-up truck and drove for several miles before 2 parking on the side of the road. Jamie stated that she and Martin had sexual intercourse in the truck before returning home. Martin testified in his own defense. He denied ever having sexual intercourse or sexual contact with Jamie. He stated that he sent the 2011 text messages to Jamie in order to embarrass her and discourage her from looking at pornography. At the close of the trial, the jury convicted Martin of one count of incest and recommended a twenty-year prison sentence. 2 The trial court imposed the recommended sentence, and this appeal followed. ANALYSIS I. Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Prohibiting Testimony Regarding an Unsubstantiated Prior Allegation. After completing jury selection, the trial court held a hearing to address an evidentiary issue. Martin's counsel explained Martin was told by someone that Jamie had "started some trouble" while living with her mother and stepfather. Defense counsel stated the following: She's made an allegation—we don't know if it's true or not—but she's made an allegation that her stepfather has done something to her. So, she switches homes, and within a few months—she's not making an allegation within a few months, she doesn't make an allegation until 2011—but we're led to believe that within a few months of her staying with her father, he's done things to her also. When the trial court asked if the defense could identify to whom Jamie made these allegations against her stepfather, Martin's counsel conceded that 2 Prior to trial, the Commonwealth moved to dismiss the PFO-I charge. The trial court granted the motion. 3 he did not know. 3 The defense counsel went on to explain that Martin would testify to the allegation against Jamie's stepfather because that was his understanding as to why Jamie was relocating to his home. The trial court ruled that Martin would not be permitted to testify concerning the prior allegation. The trial court did rule, however, that Martin would be permitted to question Jamie concerning those claims on avowal. Martin's counsel examined Estes about an alleged conversation with Jamie wherein Estes suggested that Jamie "charge" both her stepfather and Martin with sexual abuse. Estes denied ever making that statement to Jamie. Martin did not question Jamie on avowal regarding the alleged prior accusation against her stepfather. Martin now argues that rather than denying his request, the trial court should have conducted a hearing pursuant to Dennis v. Commonwealth, 306 S.W.3d 466 (Ky. 2010) to ascertain the falsity of the alleged accusation against Jamie's stepfather. He claims that the trial court's failure to properly apply Dennis deprived him of his right to present a complete defense and his right to confrontation under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Section Eleven of the Kentucky Constitution. The Commonwealth contends that Martin offered no evidence that the accusation was false, and therefore failed to meet the standards set forth in Dennis. 3 In its brief, the Commonwealth states that Estes had told Martin that Jamie made an allegation against her stepfather. Martin's examination of Estes on avowal supports this contention. However, during the hearing to address the admissibility of the alleged accusation, Martin's counsel told the trial court that he did not know to whom Jamie made the allegation. 4 In criminal prosecutions, evidence of a victim's prior sexual conduct is barred by Kentucky Rule of Evidence ("KRE") 412(a). The purpose of KRE 412(a), often referred to as the "rape shield rule," is to protect the victim against "surprise, harassment, and unnecessary invasions of privacy" as well as to exclude irrelevant character evidence. Dennis, 306 S.W.3d at 474 (quoting Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 150 (1991)). However, KRE 412(a) does not apply to evidence of prior false allegations of abuse because such allegations do not implicate "other sexual behavior." Id. Under this Court's decision in Dennis v. Commonwealth, past allegations of sexual abuse may be admissible only if the allegations are proven to be demonstrably false. Id. at 474. Evidence will not be admitted under the Dennis standard unless the proponent of the evidence establishes at a KRE 104 hearing that "there is a distinct and substantial probability that the prior accusation was false." Id; see also Perry v. Commonwealth, 390 S.W.3d 122, 129-30 (Ky. 2012). On appeal, Martin contends that the trial court did not properly apply Dennis because it did not address whether Jamie's prior accusation against her stepfather was demonstrably false. Martin is correct to the extent that the trial court did not rule on the veracity of the allegation when the issue was first raised. However, the trial court explicitly held that Martin would have the opportunity to question Jamie about the allegation out of the presence of the jury in order to "see what [Martin] can bring out." In our view, the trial court did not fail to apply Dennis. Rather, when the issue was first raised, there was no evidence upon which the trial court could have conducted a Dennis hearing, 5 simply an allegation by Martin based on something he had allegedly heard from some unknown person. The burden was on Martin, the proponent, to prove first that there had been a prior allegation and, second, that it was demonstrably false. The trial court's initial ruling in no way prohibited Martin from bringing forth that evidence. To that end, Martin offered no evidence other than his own proposed testimony that Jamie made an accusation against her stepfather. Martin did not submit any proof of the nature of the alleged accusation or to whom it was made. Defense counsel stated that it was unknown whether the allegation was "true or not." As this Court opined in Perry v. Commonwealth, "admitting allegedly false prior allegations without substantial proof of their falsity .. . prejudices crime victims." 390 S.W.3d at 130. Without evidence bearing on its veracity, admission of an unsubstantiated hearsay claim would circumvent KRE 412(a) and undermine our holding in Dennis. 4 In crafting a workable rule for the admission of a prior false accusation of sexual abuse, the Dennis court analyzed the rape shield rule's implication of a defendant's rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. See 306 S.W.3d at 473-74. Mindful of this careful balance, we reject Martin's claim that he was denied his right to present a complete defense. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986); Perry, 390 S.W.3d at 128. There were twelve 4 "To insure that the rape shield rule is not circumvented, however, the proponent of such evidence is required to make a preliminary showing that the prosecuting witness made a prior accusation and that the accusation was in fact false." Dennis, 306 S.W.3d at 472 (citing State v. Guenther, 181 N.J. 129, 854 A.2d 308 (2004); United States v. Kenyon, 481 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2007)). 6 pre-trial hearings conducted in this case. As noted by the Commonwealth, there are no subpoenas for Jamie's stepfather, her mother, or any other potential witness in the record. By court order, Martin was given access to all of the DCBS records concerning Jamie, and yet he offered no evidence of any prior allegations contained therein. The trial court allowed Martin to cross- examine Jamie and Estes on avowal. Estes denied ever having a conversation with Jamie concerning the allegation against her stepfather, and Martin never questioned Jamie about the allegation. Despite having ample opportunity to tender evidence and cross examine witnesses, at no point before or during the trial was Martin able to bring forth any evidence bearing on the existence of an allegation against Jamie's stepfather. In sum, when this issue was raised there was insufficient evidence to rule on the existence of the allegation, much less its falsity. We cannot find an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court where the proponent of evidence has failed to avail himself of, or has elected to forego, an opportunity to demonstrate a prior accusation of sexual abuse and the falsity of that accusation. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's decision disallowing Martin's testimony concerning the alleged prior accusation. II. Sexually Explicit Text Messages Were Admissible. During the Commonwealth's case-in-chief, Peggy Estes testified to discovering a series of sexually explicit text messages on Jamie's phone. The messages were sent from Martin, who was listed in Jamie's phone as "Daddy." Estes testified that after the discovery, she, her daughter, and Jamie went to 7 Cave City to stay with her sister. Three days passed until she eventually confronted Jamie about the messages. It was during that conversation that Jamie said she had engaged in sexual conduct with her father in October of 2008. Estes testified that when she contacted Martin he claimed that he had intended to send the text messages to someone else but had mistakenly sent them to Jamie. When the Commonwealth moved to admit the text messages into evidence, Martin objected on the grounds that the messages were not relevant. 5 The trial court granted the Commonwealth's motion, and Jamie read a copy of the text messages during her direct examination. Martin later testified that he in fact sent the messages to Jamie in an attempt to embarrass her for watching pornography. On appeal, Martin contends that the messages were not relevant to his prosecution, and that their admission constituted a violation of KRE 404(b) which prohibits the admission of evidence of prior crimes, wrongs, or bad acts. In determining the admissibility of proof of prior crimes, wrongs, or bad acts, we must address three critical questions: 1) whether the evidence is relevant, 2) whether the evidence has probative value, and 3) whether the risk of undue prejudice outweighs its probative value. Matthews v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 11, 18-19 (Ky. 2005). A trial court is given broad discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence, and we will reverse its ruling only 5 At a pre-trial conference, Martin's counsel indicated that he would file a motion in limine to exclude the text messages. However, it appears no written motion was filed with the trial court. 8 when there has been an abuse of discretion. Page v. Commonwealth, 149 S.W.3d 416, 420 (Ky. 2004). a. The text messages were relevant. KRE 401 defines "relevant evidence" as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." "Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." KRE 402. Martin contends that neither the content nor the timing of the messages supports the trial court's decision allowing their admission. We disagree. As we have previously held, evidence of similar acts perpetrated against the same victim is almost always admissible to prove intent, plan, or absence of mistake. Price v. Commonwealth, 31 S.W.3d 885 (Ky. 2000)). In Noel v. Commonwealth, a defendant charged with sexual abuse appealed the admission of the victim's testimony that he had abused her "more than one time." 76 S.W.3d 923, 931 (Ky. 2002). This Court concluded that the testimony was admissible as it evidenced similar acts perpetrated against the same victim, which is admissible to prove intent, plan, or absence of mistake or accident under KRE 404(b)(1). 6 We have further held that evidence of bad acts may also be admitted to prove a pattern of conduct or modus operandi when the facts of the prior misconduct are "so strikingly similar to the charged offense as to create a reasonable probability" that the acts were committed by 6 KRE 404(b)(1) provides that evidence of a prior bad act may be admissible: "(1) If offered for some other purpose, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident[.)" 9 the same person with the same state of mind. Dant v. Commonwealth, 258 S.W.3d 12, 19 (Ky. 2008). In Dant v. Commonwealth, the trial court allowed the Commonwealth to put forth evidence that the defendant had previously struck the child victim on the head. Id. This Court held that the evidence was admissible and relevant under KRE 404(b) as it "could support a reasonable probability that [the defendant] also struck [the victim] on the head" on the night of her death. Id. (internal citations omitted). Martin argues that the content of the messages was irrelevant because the exchange reflects little more than a "dialogue" between Jamie and Martin about "watching pornography." A review of the evidence at issue reveals that Martin mischaracterizes the evidence with this comparatively innocuous description of the text messages. To understand their relevance, it is necessary to consider the messages themselves and their context. At the time that the messages were sent, Jamie and Martin were in separate rooms in their home. The exchange begins with Martin asking Jamie to watch pornography with him. She declines, and advises Martin that she cannot delete text messages from her phone. Seemingly unfazed, Martin suggests that Jamie "bend over an I jingleling watching u." Jamie testified that she understood "jingleing" to mean masturbation. She then asks Martin if he is "serious," to which Martin replies "yes y would I say it." Martin tells Jamie "u got to move play with it." Martin again tells Jamie to "just bend over hell u got to do something so I can squirt," and asks her if she will "play with wat ur self." He ultimately instructs Jamie to "do it back here but better then dat." 10 In Harp v. Commonwealth, a defendant convicted of sexually abusing his girlfriend's daughter appealed on the grounds that evidence that he had exposed his genitals to the alleged victim on several occasions was inadmissible under KRE 404(b). 266 S.W.3d 813, 823 (Ky. 2008). This Court disagreed, concluding that evidence of sexual contact between the defendant and alleged victim was highly relevant and probative. Id. Similar to the KRE 404(b) evidence offered in Harp, the text message evidence was relevant to prove that Martin, accused of having sexual intercourse with his daughter, made inappropriate sexual advances toward the same victim. As Martin was charged with incest, the Commonwealth had to prove that he had "sexual intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse" with a "person whom he or she knows to be an ancestor, descendant, uncle, aunt, brother, or sister." KRS 530.020. The evidence was relevant because it showed that Martin sought to induce Jamie to engage in a sexual performance for his own sexual gratification some time after the alleged initial encounter in 2008. Despite Martin's argument to the contrary, the fact that the messages were sent two years after the alleged incident does not diminish their probative value, but rather establishes some proof of recurring sexual conduct. Dant, 258 S.W.3d at 19. Martin's claim that the evidence was admitted for the sole purpose of showing a "lustful inclination" is without merit. This Court has held that evidence of "lustful inclination," which is evidence offered to prove that a defendant has a lustful character and was acting in conformity therewith at the time of the alleged offense, is inadmissible. Pendleton v. Commonwealth, 685 S.W.2d 549 (Ky. 1985). Martin cites Lantrip v. Commonwealth, where this Court held that the testimonies of two female witnesses concerning improper sexual advances made to them by a defendant charged with rape of his adopted daughter was inadmissible because it was offered for the sole purpose of showing lustful inclination. 713 S.W.2d 816, 817 (Ky. 1986). Unlike the testimony of the witnesses in Lantrip, Martin's text messages relate to the same victim, his daughter, and concern conduct similar to the conduct giving rise to the charged offense. b. The probative value of the text messages outweighed the risk of undue prejudice. All relevant evidence admitted against a criminal defendant is prejudicial to some degree. Ford Motor Co. v. Fulkerson, 812 S.W.2d 119, 127 (Ky. 1991). Only when the evidence's probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice will it be excluded. KRE 403. Evidence is considered unduly prejudicial and thus inadmissible when it "appeals to the jury's sympathies, arouses its sense of horror, provokes its instinct to punish, or otherwise may cause a jury to base its decision on something other than the established propositions" presented in the case. Ten Broeck Dupont, Inc. v. Brooks, 283 S.W.3d 705, 716 (Ky. 2009) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Because proof of sexual intercourse between family members is an essential element of KRS 530.020, evidence that is sexual in nature will 12 necessarily be presented to a jury in an incest prosecution. Sexually explicit materials, much like gruesome crime scene photographs, are not rendered automatically inadmissible due to the repulsive nature of the evidence. See Little v. Commonwealth, 272 S.W.3d 180 (Ky. 2008); see also Clark v. Commonwealth, 833 S.W.2d 793 (Ky. 1991). While graphic, the messages were relevant to provide the jury with a complete picture of the dynamics of the sexual relationship between Jamie and her father. Therefore, we cannot say that the danger of undue prejudice substantially outweighed the probative value of the text messages. The trial court's decision to admit the evidence was not arbitrary nor was it unreasonable given the evidence's probative weight. See Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941 (Ky. 1999). Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not err in admitting the text messages. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgment and sentence of the Logan Circuit Court. All sitting. All concur. COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Brandon Neil Jewell Assistant Public Advocate COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: Jack Conway, Attorney General of Kentucky Thomas Allen Van De Rostyne Assistant Attorney General 13