Title: Cherokee LCP Land, LLC v. City of Linden Planning Board
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: August 2, 2018

Cherokee LCP Land, LLC v. City of Linden Planning Board Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary The issue this case presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court’s review centered on whether a tax lienholder has standing to challenge a planning board’s approval of a land use application for a neighboring property. The Court concluded that, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4, a tax lienholder who can show that its “right to use, acquire or enjoy property is or may be affected” if the application is granted is an interested party, and therefore may have standing to challenge a planning board’s approval of a land use application. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUS(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized.) Cherokee LCP Land, LLC v. City of Linden Planning Board (A-82-16) (079146)Argued February 26, 2018 -- Decided August 2, 2018SOLOMON, J., writing for the Court. This appeal tests the limits of the definition of “interested party” within the Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL), N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4, as applied to the holder of a tax sale certificate - - a tax lienholder -- under New Jersey’s Tax Sale Law. Specifically, the Court considers whether a tax lienholder has standing to challenge a planning board’s approval of a land use application for a neighboring property. Defendant Goodman North American Partnership Holdings, LLC (Goodman) purchased a parcel of land in Linden, New Jersey (the Property). In 2013, after several transfers, bankruptcy proceedings, and abandonment, ownership of the adjacent parcel (the Neighboring Property), a superfund site, was purportedly transferred by quitclaim deed to Cherokee LCP Land, LLC (Cherokee), a plaintiff in this matter. That same year, non-party Cherokee Equities, LLC (Equities), purchased three tax sale certificates on the Neighboring Property from the City of Linden and initiated tax foreclosure proceedings. After filing the foreclosure complaint, Equities assigned the tax sale certificates to Linden 587, LLC (Linden 587), and Linden 587 was substituted as plaintiff in the foreclosure proceedings. Goodman submitted a site plan application for development of the Property to the City of Linden Planning Board (the Board). Seventeen days before Equities assigned the tax sale certificates to Linden 587, the Board held a public hearing on Goodman’s application. Cherokee attended as an objector. Neither Equities nor Linden 587 attended the hearing. In part, Cherokee challenged the proposed project’s elimination of certain points of access to the Neighboring Property, its interference with an existing easement on the Property, and substantial modifications to storm water management on the Property. The Board unanimously approved the application with qualifications. Thereafter, Cherokee’s principal offered to sell the Neighboring Property to Goodman for 2% of the project to avoid litigation. Plaintiffs Cherokee and Linden 587 filed a complaint challenging the Board’s approval of Goodman’s application. Defendants filed motions to dismiss or for summary judgment, arguing, in part, that Cherokee and Linden 587 lacked standing. The trial court dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint with prejudice, concluding that “Linden 587 does not have a present interest in the Neighboring Property as its ownership rights . . . are conditioned upon its right of redemption which it has failed to exercise.” The 1 trial court found “that until redemption and entry of foreclosure, the holder of a tax sale certificate does not have any vested ownership or present possessory interest in a property that is subject to the tax sale certificate.” As a result, the trial court determined that Linden 587 “cannot be deemed an interested party” based on its status as a tax lienholder and that, as a consequence, dismissal was warranted. Additionally, the court noted that the plaintiffs’ motive was not to redevelop the Neighboring Property, but to “extract value from the Project through the sale of the Neighboring Property . . . to Goodman.” The Appellate Division affirmed, and the Court granted plaintiffs’ petition for certification. 230 N.J. 500 (2017).HELD: Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4, a tax lienholder who can show that its “right to use, acquire or enjoy property is or may be affected” if the application is granted is an interested party and therefore may have standing to challenge a planning board’s approval of a land use application.1. The sale of tax certificates allows a municipality to transform a non-performing asset into cash without raising taxes. However, the holder of a tax sale certificate does not have title to the land. The holder’s purchase of the certificate at a tax sale does not divest the delinquent owner of his title to the land. Instead, the purchaser of a tax sale certificate acquires a lien formerly held by the municipality’s taxing authority, derived from the property owner’s obligation to pay real estate taxes. The lien purchaser obtains an inchoate interest that consists of three rights: the right to receive the sum paid for the certificate with interest at the redemption rate for which the property was sold; the right to redeem from the holder a subsequently issued tax sale certificate; and the right to acquire title by foreclosing the equity of redemption of all outstanding interests, including that of the property owner. By virtue of foreclosure, the purchaser of the tax sale certificate may become the owner of the property in fee simple. (pp. 13-15)2. The “right to acquire title” is therefore significant in resolving standing under the MLUL. Indeed, the MLUL explains standing as follows: “[a]ny interested party may appeal to the governing body any final decision of a board of adjustment approving an application for development.” N.J.S.A. 40:55D-17(a). An “interested party” is defined as: “any person, whether residing within or without the municipality, whose right to use, acquire, or enjoy property is or may be affected by any action taken under [this act], or whose rights to use, acquire, or enjoy property under [this act], or under any other law of this State or of the United States have been denied, violated or infringed by an action or a failure to act under [this act].”N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4 (emphases added). New Jersey’s courts have long taken a liberal approach to standing in zoning cases and thus have broadly construed the MLUL’s definition of “interested party.” (pp. 15-16)3. Although a tax lienholder does not have title to the subject property and has, at best, a limited possessory interest in it, the absence of title or possession is not determinative of standing. Indeed, the MLUL clearly and unambiguously provides that standing may be afforded to those with a “right to use, acquire, or enjoy property.” N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4. The purchaser of the tax sale certificate has the right to acquire title to the property and the right to use the property in a limited manner “in order to make repairs, or abate, remove or correct any 2 condition harmful to the public health, safety and welfare, or any condition that is materially reducing the value of the property.” N.J.S.A. 54:5-86(c). Therefore, the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint based on its legal conclusion that holders of tax sale certificates who have not foreclosed upon the subject property cannot have standing. (pp. 16-18)4. That conclusion, however, is not in and of itself determinative of standing: to have standing pursuant to the MLUL, a tax lienholder must show that its “right to use, acquire, or enjoy property is or may be affected” by the action. N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4. Therefore, standing must be considered on a case-by-case basis. In this case, plaintiffs have alleged principally that the proposed project would eliminate certain points of access to the Neighboring Property, interfere with an existing easement on the Property, and substantially modify storm water management on the Property. Those representations -- which defendants have not contested -- suggest that plaintiffs’ limited present possessory interest in the Neighboring Property pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54:5-86(c) may be affected, and that Linden 587 therefore may have standing. Consequently, the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of standing. (pp. 18-19)5. The Court adds the following guidance. If the Legislature had intended for only parties required to be notified to have standing, it would have restricted the standing requirements accordingly. Standing does not depend upon ownership or proximity, but rather on the definition of an “interested party.” Linden 587’s motive in obtaining the certificates and challenging the Board’s decision is not pertinent to the determination here of standing under the MLUL. Nor is it conclusive that Linden 587 was assigned the tax sale certificates after the Board hearing; the date of acquisition is not determinative of a party’s standing. (pp. 19-20)6. The Court stresses that it makes no findings regarding Linden 587’s acquisition of the certificates; whether Cherokee did hold title to the Neighboring Property; the relationship among Cherokee, Equities, and Linden 587; whether the Neighboring Property was “abandoned,” thus providing a limited possessory interest under N.J.S.A. 54:5-86(c); the extent to which plaintiffs’ right to acquire or limited possessory interest “may be affected”; or the merits of plaintiffs’ objections in general. The record is lacking on these matters and, to the extent relevant, they should be considered and a record developed on remand. (pp. 20-21) REVERSED. TIMPONE, J., dissenting, disagrees that the holder of a tax sale certificate has the “right to acquire” property within the meaning of the MLUL. Even if a speculative, contingent interest like a tax lien could be deemed a “right to acquire” property, according to Justice Timpone, that right is not affected unless the acquisition itself is or may be affected by the Board’s decision. Justice Timpone stresses that Linden 587 failed to properly plead or defend standing and expresses concern about the impact of the majority’s decision.JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, and FERNANDEZ-VINA join in JUSTICE SOLOMON’s opinion. JUSTICE TIMPONE filed a dissent, in which CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER joins. 3 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 82 September Term 2016 079146CHEROKEE LCP LAND, LLC and LINDEN 587, LLC, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.CITY OF LINDEN PLANNING BOARD, GOODMAN NORTH AMERICAN PARTNERSHIP HOLDINGS, LLC, and LINDEN PROPERTY HOLDINGS, LLC, Defendants-Respondents. Argued February 26, 2018 – Decided August 2, 2018 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Keith A. Bonchi argued the cause for appellants Cherokee LCP Land, LLC and Linden 587, LLC (Goldenberg, Mackler, Sayegh, Mintz, Pfeffer, Bonchi & Gill, attorneys; Keith A. Bonchi, of counsel and on the briefs, and Elliot J. Almanza, on the briefs). Paul H. Schafhauser argued the cause for respondent Linden Property Holdings, LLC (Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi, attorneys; Paul H. Schafhauser, of counsel and on the briefs). Anthony D. Rinaldo, Jr., argued the cause for respondent City of Linden Planning Board (Law Offices of Anthony D. Rinaldo, Jr., attorneys; Anthony D. Rinaldo, Jr., on the brief). 1 Adam D. Greenberg argued the cause for amicus curiae National Tax Lien Association, Inc. (Honig & Greenberg and Taylor and Keyser, attorneys; Adam D. Greenberg and Robert W. Keyser, on the brief). JUSTICE SOLOMON delivered the opinion of the Court. The Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL), N.J.S.A. 40:55D-17(a),recognizes that development on one parcel of land can haveconsequences for others. The MLUL thus provides that “[a]nyinterested party may appeal to the governing body any finaldecision of a board of adjustment approving an application fordevelopment,” N.J.S.A. 40:55D-17(a), and defines “interestedparty” broadly to include “any person . . . whose right to use,acquire, or enjoy property is or may be affected by any actiontaken under [the MLUL],” N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4. This appeal tests the limits of that definition as appliedto the holder of a tax sale certificate -- a tax lienholder --under New Jersey’s Tax Sale Law (Tax Sale Law), N.J.S.A. 54:5-1to -137. Specifically, we consider whether a tax lienholder hasstanding to challenge a planning board’s approval of a land useapplication for a neighboring property. We conclude that, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4, a taxlienholder who can show that its “right to use, acquire or enjoyproperty is or may be affected” if the application is granted is 2 an interested party and therefore may have standing to challengea planning board’s approval of a land use application. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the AppellateDivision affirming the trial court’s dismissal with prejudice ofplaintiffs’ complaint in lieu of prerogative writs pursuant toRule 4:6-2(e), and remand for further proceedings. The recordis deficient with respect to a number of factual issues, asnoted throughout the opinion; to the extent that those mattersare pertinent to standing or the substantive merits of thiscase, they should be considered and a record developed onremand. I. A. We glean the following relevant facts from the motionproceedings before the trial court. A predecessor of GAF Corporation (GAF) acquired andsubsequently subdivided a property in Linden, New Jersey, intotwo parcels of land. GAF retained ownership of one parcel, nowknown as Block 587, Lots 1 and 2.01, on Linden’s official taxmap (the Property), and sold the other, now known as Block 587,Lots 3.01, 3.02, and 3.03, on the Linden tax map (theNeighboring Property) to Linden Chlorine Products, Inc. GAF transferred the Property to Linden Property Holdings,LLC (LPH), which entered into a purchase and sale agreement with 3 Goodman North American Partnership Holdings, LLC (Goodman). Thepurchase and sale agreement was contingent upon Goodmanprocuring approval to undertake redevelopment projects on theProperty. In 2013, after several transfers, bankruptcy proceedings,and abandonment, ownership of the Neighboring Property, asuperfund site, was purportedly transferred by quitclaim deed toCherokee LCP Land, LLC (Cherokee), a plaintiff in this matter.That same year, non-party Cherokee Equities, LLC (Equities),purchased three tax sale certificates on the NeighboringProperty from the City of Linden and initiated tax foreclosureproceedings. After filing the foreclosure complaint, Equitiesassigned the tax sale certificates to Linden 587, LLC (Linden587), and Linden 587 was substituted as plaintiff in theforeclosure proceedings.1 According to the record, thoseproceedings are still pending.21 Plaintiffs claim before this Court that Cherokee, rather than Equities, transferred the tax liens to Linden 587. They further contend that Cherokee was the party that foreclosed upon the Neighboring Property. However, the record indicates that Equities was the entity that purchased the tax liens from the City of Linden and transferred them to Linden 587. Additionally, Equities is named as the original plaintiff in the foreclosure proceedings. We make no findings regarding Linden 587’s acquisition of the tax sale certificates.2 During oral argument, counsel for plaintiffs represented that one tax lien had been foreclosed upon but not the remaining two. 4 In May 2014, Goodman submitted a site plan application fordevelopment of industrial, warehouse and distribution space onthe Property to the City of Linden Planning Board (the Board).Following the submission of those plans, Goodman served noticeof its application to interested parties and property ownerswithin 200 feet of the Property, as identified by the City ofLinden, including Cherokee. Seventeen days before Equities assigned the tax salecertificates to Linden 587, the Board held a public hearing onGoodman’s application. Cherokee attended the hearing as anobjector,3 based on its status as owner of the NeighboringProperty. Neither Equities nor Linden 587 attended the hearing. In part, Cherokee challenged the proposed project’selimination of certain points of access to the NeighboringProperty, its interference with an existing easement on theProperty, and substantial modifications to storm water3 In their complaint, plaintiffs asserted that they “appeared through counsel to oppose the application of Goodman” at the public hearing held in June 2014. In oral argument before this Court, plaintiffs appeared to suggest -- and defendants to dispute -- that the attorney for Cherokee also represented the entity that held the tax certificates. The record is undeveloped on this point, and the Court makes no findings as to whether counsel for Cherokee appeared at the Board hearing on behalf of Equities and/or Linden 587. 5 management on the Property. Counsel for Cherokee cross-examinedGoodman’s witnesses and presented its engineer as a witness. Following the hearing, the Board unanimously approved theapplication with qualifications.4 Thereafter, Cherokee’sprincipal, Jay Wolfkind, emailed Goodman offering to sell theNeighboring Property to Goodman as a means of avoidinglitigation in exchange for “just TWO (2%) PERCENT of theproject.”5 The bottom of Wolfkind’s email states, “[Cherokee]and Linden 587 . . . are separate legal entities from eachother, and from every other Cherokee entity.”6 In October 2014, plaintiffs Cherokee and Linden 587 filed acomplaint in lieu of prerogative writs with the ChanceryDivision of the Superior Court, challenging the Board’s approvalof Goodman’s application. The complaint named Goodman, LPH, andthe Board as defendants. In response, defendants Goodman andLPH filed motions to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint or,4 In its resolution, the Board noted that Goodman agreed to construct a thirty-five-foot roadway to allow access to the Neighboring Property.5 At oral argument, plaintiffs represented that the email should never have been included in the record under the rules of evidence that preclude consideration of settlement offers. The record is undeveloped on this point, and the Court makes no findings as to the admission of the email.6 The record is not conclusive as to the relationship among Cherokee, Equities, and Linden 587, and the Court makes no findings on that subject. 6 alternatively, for summary judgment, and submitted a statementof material facts in support of their motion. They argued, inpart, that Cherokee and Linden 587 lacked standing. The Boardjoined in those motions. Following oral argument, the trial court noted thatplaintiffs “either admitted or failed to substantively respond”to defendants’ statement of material facts. The trial courtthus considered the facts to be uncontested for the purposes ofruling on the motion to dismiss. The trial court granted themotion pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e) and dismissed plaintiffs’complaint with prejudice. In its Statement of Reasons, the court stated that bothCherokee and Linden 587 lacked standing to challenge the Board’sapproval. Based on that finding, the court did “not [need to]reach the merits of the summary judgment motion.” Indetermining that Linden 587 lacked standing, the court notedthat neither “Linden 587’s affiliated status with Cherokee” norits “status as a holder of three liens on the NeighboringProperty” conferred standing. In discussing Linden 587’s affiliated status with Cherokee,the court noted that “plaintiffs have not provided anyinformation to this court showing the nature of the relationshipbetween the entities,” adding that, as noted at the bottom ofWolfkind’s email offering to sell the Neighboring Property to 7 Goodman, the “record . . . suggests that the plaintiffs areseparate legal entities.” The court stated that “the injury ofone separate legal corporate entity cannot be imputed toanother” and reasoned that, even if imputation was permissible,it would not be appropriate because “Cherokee does not have aninterest in the Neighboring Property.”7 The court concluded that “Linden 587 does not have apresent interest in the Neighboring Property as its ownershiprights, which include the use and enjoyment of the property, areconditioned upon its right of redemption which it has failed toexercise.” Citing Township of Jefferson v. Block 447A, Lot 10,228 N.J. Super. 1, 4 (App. Div. 1988), the trial court found“that until redemption and entry of foreclosure, the holder of atax sale certificate does not have any vested ownership orpresent possessory interest in a property that is subject to thetax sale certificate.” As a result, the trial court determinedthat Linden 587 “cannot be deemed an interested party” based onits status as a tax lienholder and that, as a consequence,dismissal was warranted.7 Plaintiffs do not challenge the Appellate Division’s conclusion that Cherokee was not the titled owner of the Neighboring Property. Because the issue of Cherokee’s standing is not before this Court, our discussion of the Appellate Division’s judgment is limited to Linden 587’s standing. We make no findings as to whether Cherokee did, in fact, hold title to the Neighboring Property. 8 Additionally, the court noted that the plaintiffs’ motivewas not to redevelop the Neighboring Property, but to “extractvalue from the Project through the sale of the NeighboringProperty . . . to Goodman.” Plaintiffs appealed. The Appellate Division “affirm[ed]the dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint” and did “not reach themerits of the challenge to the Board’s approval.” In affirmingthe Chancery Division’s determination, the panel found thatLinden 587 lacked standing because “Linden 587 [did not]appear[] before the Board nor file[] any objection with theBoard.”8 The appellate panel also determined that Linden 587 hadnot foreclosed upon the Neighboring Property or redeemed the taxsale certificates before filing its complaint in lieu ofprerogative writs. Hence, the panel concluded that “Linden 587did not have an existing property interest in the NeighboringProperty.” The panel noted that “the holder of a tax salecertificate is not always an 'interested party’ with standing tobe heard concerning all matters affecting the property.” The Appellate Division also determined that the trial courtcorrectly considered plaintiffs’ motive because “courts neednot, and should not, ignore such facts,” but found motive to be8 The Appellate Division opinion indicates that Linden 587 did not acquire the tax liens until after the Board hearing. 9 “ancillary” to its analysis of plaintiffs’ standing in thematter. This Court granted plaintiffs’ petition for certification.230 N.J. 500 (2017). We granted leave to appear as amicuscuriae to the National Tax Lien Association, Inc. (NTLA). II. A. Plaintiffs assert “the strong merit of their substantivecase” and ask this Court to reverse and remand the matter. They maintain that Linden 587, as the holder of tax salecertificates and as plaintiff in the foreclosure proceedingsupon the Neighboring Property, has standing as an “interestedparty” pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4 “because its right toacquire or use the [Neighboring Property] has been destroyed bythe Board’s approval of the Goodman plan.” Plaintiffs also claim that the Appellate Division analyzedlegally irrelevant factors in determining standing. First, itwas inappropriate to consider the fact that Linden 587 was notassigned the tax sale certificates until after the Board hearingbecause, as “a Cherokee-related affiliate,” “Linden 587 stood inthe shoes of its assignor for all intents and purposes.”Second, plaintiffs contend that it was irrelevant that Linden587 “had not obtained or sought final judgment of taxforeclosure.” Lastly, plaintiffs assert that motive “is 10 irrelevant to the real and justiciable issues that are presentedto this Court” -- whether Linden 587 had standing to contest theBoard’s approval. B. Defendants LPH, Goodman, and the Board urge this Court toaffirm the Appellate Division’s determination that Linden 587lacks standing. They claim support for their argument in theMLUL’s requirement that notice of a public hearing need only begiven to “the owners of all real property as shown on thecurrent tax duplicates, located in the State and within 200 feetin all directions of the property.” N.J.S.A. 40:55D-12(b).Defendants assert that the statutory notice requirement bearsupon who qualifies as an “interested party” to challenge aplanning board’s action. Defendants contend that standing must be considered on acase-by-case basis and agree with the Appellate Division thatLinden 587 is not an “interested party” under the MLUL becauseit does not hold title to or a possessory interest in theNeighboring Property. Defendants note that the Board’s approvalof the Goodman project may change Linden 587’s desire to acquirethe Neighboring Property, but stress that its “right to acquire”is unaffected. C. 11 Aligning with plaintiffs, amicus curiae NTLA “submits thatNew Jersey’s traditionally liberal view of standing should applyto permit a tax lienholder’s concerns to be heard.” The NTLAcontends that, in rendering their decisions, “the lower courtswere unaware of all of the rights held by a tax lienholder and[]improperly entertained factors such as 'motive’ to assessstanding.” The NTLA avers that the trial court and Appellate Divisionoverlooked that Linden 587 has the “right to pay or redeemsubsequent municipal liens, and 'most importantly, the right toacquire title by foreclosing the equity of redemption of alloutstanding interests, including the owner’s.’” (quoting CaputMortuum, L.L.C. v. S & S Crown Servs., Ltd., 366 N.J. Super. 323, 336 (App. Div. 2004)). In addition to those rights, theNTLA contends that the Legislature granted tax lienholders theright “to enter onto a property to address conditions thatendanger the health, safety and welfare of the public, as wellas to add the costs of repair to the amount to redeem, and evento foreclose immediately or in rem.” (citing N.J.S.A. 54:5-86(b), (c), and (d)). Accordingly, the NTLA concludes that “atax lienholder [has] a possessory right, albeit limited, in aproperty.” III. 12 As indicated above, the procedural posture and inconclusiverecord of this case confine our inquiry to a narrow legalquestion -- whether a tax lienholder has standing to challenge aland use application for a neighboring property. The answer tothat question will determine whether plaintiffs’ complaint wasproperly dismissed for lack of standing. Whether a party has standing to pursue a claim is aquestion of law subject to de novo review. People For OpenGov’t v. Roberts, 397 N.J. Super. 502, 508 (App. Div. 2008)(citing Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995) (“The issue of standing is a matter of lawas to which we exercise de novo review.”)). We therefore accordno “special deference” to the “trial court’s interpretation ofthe law and the legal consequences that flow from establishedfacts.” Manalapan Realty, 140 N.J. at 378. IV. A. Under the Tax Sale Law, “a municipality that is owed realestate taxes [receives] 'a continuous lien on the land’ for thedelinquent amount as well as for 'all subsequent taxes,interest, penalties and costs of collection.’” In re PrincetonOffice Park, L.P. v. Plymouth Park Tax Servs., LLC, 218 N.J. 52,61-62 (2014) (quoting Simon v. Cronecker, 189 N.J. 304, 318(2007)). “[T]he municipality may enforce the lien by selling 13 the property as prescribed by [N.J.S.A. 54:5-19].” Varsolona v.Breen Capital Servs. Corp., 180 N.J. 605, 617 (2004) (quotingSavage v. Weissman, 355 N.J. Super. 429, 436 (App. Div. 2002)). The Tax Sale Law sets forth the procedure by which tax sale certificates are generated, purchased, and sold. The certificate . . . verifies “the taxes, assessments or other municipal liens or charges, levied or assessed against the property described in the application” as of the certificate’s effective date. After providing notice to the public and the property owner as required by N.J.S.A. 54:5-26 and -27, the municipality may sell the certificate at a public auction. [Princeton Office Park, 218 N.J. at 62 (footnote omitted) (quoting N.J.S.A. 54:5- 12).]In this way, the sale of tax certificates allows a municipalityto “transform a non-performing asset into cash without raisingtaxes.” Ibid. (quoting Varsolona, 180 N.J. at 610). However, “[t]he holder of a tax sale certificate does nothave title to the land. The holder’s purchase of thecertificate at a tax sale does not divest the delinquent ownerof his title to the land.” Township of Jefferson, 228 N.J.Super. at 4. “Instead, the sale operates as 'a conditionalconveyance of the property to the purchaser, subject to a personwith an interest in the property having the right to redeem thecertificate, as prescribed by statute.’” Princeton Office Park,218 N.J. at 63 (quoting Simon, 189 N.J. at 318). “The purchaserof a tax sale certificate thus acquires a lien formerly held by 14 the municipality’s taxing authority, derived from the propertyowner’s obligation to pay real estate taxes.” Id. at 67. Thelien purchaser obtains an inchoate interest [that] consists of three rights: the right to receive the sum paid for the certificate with interest at the redemption rate for which the property was sold; the right to redeem from the holder a subsequently issued tax sale certificate; and the right to acquire title by foreclosing the equity of redemption of all outstanding interests, including that of the property owner. [Id. at 63 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Varsolona, 180 N.J. at 618).] The tax sale certificate holder’s “right to acquire titleby foreclosure is asserted in the Superior Court, which mayenter [a] final judgment.” Ibid. “[B]y virtue of foreclosure,the purchaser of the tax sale certificate may become 'the ownerof the property in fee simple.’” Id. at 63-64 (quoting Simon,189 N.J. at 318). The “right to acquire title” is thereforesignificant in resolving standing under the MLUL. Indeed, the MLUL explains standing as follows: “[a]nyinterested party may appeal to the governing body any finaldecision of a board of adjustment approving an application fordevelopment.” N.J.S.A. 40:55D-17(a). Under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4,an “[i]nterested party” includes anyone with a “right to use,acquire, or enjoy property” “affected” by a land useapplication. In whole, an “interested party” is defined as: 15 any person, whether residing within or without the municipality, whose right to use, acquire, or enjoy property is or may be affected by any action taken under [this act], or whose rights to use, acquire, or enjoy property under [this act], or under any other law of this State or of the United States have been denied, violated or infringed by an action or a failure to act under [this act]. [ N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4 (emphases added).] “New Jersey’s courts have long taken a liberal approach tostanding in zoning cases and . . . [thus] have broadly construedthe MLUL’s definition of 'interested party.’” DePetro v. Twp.of Wayne Planning Bd., 367 N.J. Super. 161, 172 (App. Div.2004). Nevertheless, standing requires that, in addition toestablishing its “right to use, acquire, or enjoy property,” aparty must establish that that right “is or may be affected.”N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4. B. In this appeal, the trial court found that only a partywith an “ownership or possessory interest” could have standingto maintain an action challenging a municipal planning board’sapproval. The trial court dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint,finding that “the holder of a tax sale certificate cannot bedeemed an 'interested party’” without an “ownership orpossessory interest,” which did not exist here. We disagree andconclude that a tax lienholder may have standing to challenge aplanning board’s actions. 16 Although a tax lienholder does not have title to thesubject property, Township of Jefferson, 228 N.J. Super. at 4,and has, at best, a limited possessory interest in it pursuantto N.J.S.A. 54:5-86 (c),9 the absence of title or possession isnot determinative of standing. Indeed, the MLUL clearly andunambiguously provides that standing may be afforded to thosewith a “right to use, acquire, or enjoy property.” N.J.S.A.40:55D-4. The purchaser of the tax sale certificate has the“right to acquire title” to the property, Princeton Office Park,218 N.J. at 63, and “the right to use” the property in a limitedmanner “in order to make repairs, or abate, remove or correct9 N.J.S.A. 54:5-86 allows tax certificate holders to access an “abandoned property.” Specifically, subsection (c) states: Any person holding a tax sale certificate on a property that meets the definition of abandoned property as set forth in L. 2003, c. 210 ([ N.J.S.A.] 55:19-78 et al.), either at the time of the tax sale or thereafter, may enter upon that property at any time after written notice to the owner by certified mail return receipt requested in order to make repairs, or abate, remove or correct any condition harmful to the public health, safety and welfare, or any condition that is materially reducing the value of the property. [N.J.S.A. 54:5-86(c).]The record reveals that the Neighboring Property was previously abandoned. However, the record does not reveal whether the Neighboring Property satisfies the requirements for “abandonment” under N.J.S.A. 55:19-81. 17 any condition harmful to the public health, safety and welfare,or any condition that is materially reducing the value of theproperty,” N.J.S.A. 54:5-86(c). We therefore find that thetrial court erred in dismissing the complaint based on its legalconclusion that holders of tax sale certificates who have notforeclosed upon the subject property cannot have standing. C. That conclusion, however, is not in and of itselfdeterminative of standing: to have standing pursuant to theMLUL, a tax lienholder must show that its “right to use,acquire, or enjoy property is or may be affected” by the action.N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4. Therefore, not every tax lienholder hasstanding to challenge a land use application. We thus agreewith defendants that standing must be considered on a case-by-case basis. In this case, plaintiffs have alleged principally that theproposed project would eliminate certain points of access to theNeighboring Property, interfere with an existing easement on theProperty, and substantially modify storm water management on theProperty. Those representations -- which defendants have notcontested -- suggest that plaintiffs’ limited present possessoryinterest in the Neighboring Property pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54:5-86(c) -- the right to enter onto the property to address certainconditions -- may be affected by the elimination of certain 18 points of access to the Neighboring Property, the interferencewith an existing easement on the Property, and the modificationof storm water management on the Property. Linden 587 therefore may have standing as the holder of taxsale certificates for the Neighboring Property whose “right touse . . . [the] property . . . may be affected” if theapplication is granted. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1541 (6thed. 1990) (defining “use,” in pertinent part, as “[t]o make useof; to convert one’s service; to employ; to avail oneself of”).Consequently, we determine that the trial court erred indismissing plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of standing. D. We add the following guidance. It is true that the MLULrequires notice of a public hearing only to “the owners of allreal property as shown on the current tax duplicates, located inthe State and within 200 feet in all directions of theproperty.” N.J.S.A. 40:55D-12(b). However, we rejectdefendants’ assertion that the MLUL’s statutory noticerequirement bears upon who qualifies as an “interested party” tochallenge a planning board’s action. If the Legislature hadintended for only parties required to be notified to havestanding, it would have said so and restricted the standingrequirements accordingly. Instead, the Legislature allows any“interested party” to appeal a board action, which is discrete 19 from a noticed party under the MLUL. Standing does not dependupon ownership or proximity, but rather on meeting thedefinition of an “interested party.” In addition, Linden 587’s motive in obtaining the tax salecertificates and challenging the Board’s decision is notpertinent to our determination here of standing under the MLUL.10Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that their “right to use,acquire, or enjoy [the neighboring] property . . . may beaffected” to establish standing. Nor is it conclusive that Linden 587 was assigned the taxsale certificates after the Board hearing; the date ofacquisition is not determinative of a party’s standing. SeeDomanske v. Rapid-Am. Corp., 330 N.J. Super. 241, 248 (App. Div.2000) (observing that successor in interest “retains the samerights as the original owner, with no change in substance”(quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1445 (7th ed. 1999)). Finally, we stress once more that we make no findingsregarding Linden 587’s acquisition of the tax sale certificates;whether Cherokee did, in fact, hold title to the Neighboring10 In their briefing, plaintiffs contend that in Bron v. Weintraub, 42 N.J. 87, 91 (1964), this Court issued a “commandment . . . that courts not express hostility towards certificate-holders.” However, Bron does not conclude that motive is irrelevant. Because motive is not relevant under the facts before us, we decline to determine whether and under what circumstances it might be relevant. 20 Property; the relationship among Cherokee, Equities, and Linden587; whether the Neighboring Property was “abandoned” underN.J.S.A 55:19-81, thus providing plaintiffs with a limitedpossessory interest under N.J.S.A. 54:5-86(c); the extent towhich plaintiffs’ “right . . . to acquire” or limited possessoryinterest in the Neighboring Property “may be affected”; or themerits of plaintiffs’ objections in general. The record islacking on these matters and, to the extent they are relevant,they should be considered and a record developed on remand. V. For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the AppellateDivision’s judgment and remand to the trial court for furtherproceedings consistent with this opinion. JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, and FERNANDEZ-VINA join in JUSTICE SOLOMON’s opinion. JUSTICE TIMPONE filed a dissent, in which CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER joins. 21 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 82 September Term 2016 079146CHEROKEE LCP LAND, LLC and LINDEN 587, LLC, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.CITY OF LINDEN PLANNING BOARD, GOODMAN NORTH AMERICAN PARTNERSHIP HOLDINGS, LLC, and LINDEN PROPERTY HOLDINGS, LLC, Defendants-Respondents. JUSTICE TIMPONE, dissenting. Liberality in standing should not be confused withautomatic standing. In the context of land use disputes, thestanding requirement protects the ability to develop property inaccordance with the Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL), N.J.S.A.40:55D-1 to -112, without interference by third parties who lackany cognizable interest. The majority’s decision -- that taxlienholders who have not yet foreclosed on, and may never obtaina possessory interest in, a property have standing to challengedevelopment on adjacent land -- crosses the generous line drawnby the MLUL’s liberal standing requirement and opens thecourthouse door to claimants with other similarly attenuatedinterests. Mindful that the difference in standards commands adifference in result in this matter, and of the profound impact 1 today’s decision will have on future land use cases, Irespectfully dissent. I. I adopt the majority’s statement of facts and highlightpertinent portions from the record. Plaintiffs Cherokee LPCLand, LLC (Cherokee) and Linden 587, LLC (Linden 587)(collectively, the LLCs) dispute and challenge the City ofLinden Planning Board’s (the Board) grant of approval to GoodmanNorth American Partnership Holdings, LLC, and Linden PropertyHoldings, LLC (collectively, Goodman) to redevelop heavy-industrial-zone property into an industrial campus withwarehouses, office space, and distribution facilities. The LLCsclaim unique interests in a nearby property -- a long-unremediated Superfund site (the Neighboring Property):Cherokee, as a one-dollar quitclaim deed holder, and Linden 587,as the assignee of tax sale certificates on the NeighboringProperty. Pursuant to the MLUL, the Board held a public hearing onGoodman’s application. Cherokee attended the hearing andobjected to Goodman’s proposed development project, assertingownership in the Neighboring Property. Cherokee sought anagreement from Goodman that its development would “provideappropriate access to their property” by means of preserving anexisting easement. Cherokee also raised concerns regarding the 2 development’s impact on the Neighboring Property’s EnvironmentalProtection Agency (EPA) remediation and susceptibility tostormwater run-off. The Board permitted Cherokee to present witnesses andconsidered Cherokee’s objections. Ultimately, the Boardunanimously approved Goodman’s application, noting that Goodmanagreed to build a thirty-five-foot roadway that would protectthe Neighboring Property’s easement to a nearby road. The Boardalso conditioned Goodman’s application, in part, on receiving ahardship waiver from the New Jersey Department of EnvironmentalProtection (DEP) for stormwater quality and other DEP and EPAapprovals. Neither Linden 587 nor the assignor of its tax salecertificates, Cherokee Equities, LLC (Equities), attended thehearing. Instead, Linden 587 and Cherokee filed a complaint inlieu of prerogative writs in the Chancery Division, challengingthe Board’s resolution. Goodman filed a motion to dismiss theLLCs’ complaint and, in the alternative, a motion for summaryjudgment. Highlighting the Neighboring Property’s tortuousownership history leading to Cherokee’s purported quitclaim deedand Linden 587’s assignment of tax liens for nominal value,Goodman argued that the LLCs lacked standing to file suit. The trial court agreed. In its thorough and well-reasonedStatement of Reasons, the court concluded that Cherokee did not 3 have an ownership interest in the Neighboring Property becausethe company that conveyed its quitclaim deed did not itself havea valid ownership interest. So, it dismissed Cherokee for lackof standing. Linden 587 suffered a similar fate. Its only connection tothe Neighboring Property is an inchoate ownership interest inunredeemed tax sale certificates for which it paid ten dollarsand “other valuable consideration.” Relying on this Court’sprecedent, the trial court carefully explained the rights of atax sale certificate owner, including “the right to acquiretitle,” and stressed that those rights are “subordinate to theproperty owner’s right of redemption.” (quoting Simon v.Cronecker, 189 N.J. 304, 319-20 (2007)). The court noted thatLinden 587 had no present possessory interest in the NeighboringProperty through which it could obtain “interested party” statusbecause it had not foreclosed on the property owner’s right toredeem. For those reasons, the court concluded that Linden 587also lacked standing and dismissed the LLCs’ complaint withprejudice. For substantially the same reasons as the trialcourt, the Appellate Division affirmed. II. Standing is a “threshold issue” that “neither depends onnor determines the merits of a plaintiff’s claim.” Watkins v.Resorts Int’l Hotel & Casino, 124 N.J. 398, 417 (1991). Our 4 courts “will not render advisory opinions or function in theabstract or entertain proceedings by plaintiffs who do not havesufficient legal standing to maintain their actions.” AlWalker, Inc. v. Borough of Stanhope, 23 N.J. 657, 660 (1957)(citation omitted). We also will not “entertain proceedings byplaintiffs who are 'mere intermeddlers,’ or are merelyinterlopers or strangers to the dispute.” Crescent Park TenantsAss’n v. Realty Equities Corp. of N.Y., 58 N.J. 98, 107 (1971)(citations omitted). A litigant has standing only if thelitigant demonstrates “a sufficient stake and real adversenesswith respect to the subject matter of the litigation [and a]substantial likelihood of some harm . . . in the event of anunfavorable decision.” Jen Elec., Inc. v. County of Essex, 197 N.J. 627, 645 (2009) (first alteration in original) (quoting Inre Adoption of Baby T., 160 N.J. 332, 340 (1999)). The court must determine standing before resolving themerits of a plaintiff’s claim. Watkins, 124 N.J. at 418. Seealso Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. v. Mitchell, 422 N.J. Super. 214, 224-25 (App. Div. 2011) (finding that a plaintiff must havestanding at the time of filing a complaint); see also Davis v.FEC, 554 U.S. 724 , 734 (2008) (“While the proof required toestablish standing increases as the suit proceeds, the standinginquiry remains focused on whether the party invoking 5 jurisdiction had the requisite stake in the outcome when thesuit was filed.”). For land use disputes, the MLUL permits “[a]ny interestedparty [to] appeal to the governing body any final decision of aboard of adjustment approving an application for development.”N.J.S.A. 40:55D-17(a). The MLUL defines “interested party,” inrelevant part, as “any person . . . whose right to use, acquire,or enjoy property is or may be affected by any action takenunder [the MLUL].” N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4. I agree with the majority that the “right to acquire” issignificant in resolving standing under the MLUL. But I departfrom my colleagues in their approach to that significant issuein two critical respects. First, I disagree that the holder ofa tax sale certificate has the “right to acquire” propertywithin the meaning of the MLUL. Second, even if a speculative,contingent interest like a tax lien could be deemed a “right toacquire” property, that right is not affected unless theacquisition itself -- not the post-acquisition use or enjoymentof the property -- is or may be affected by the Board’s action. A. The purpose behind the municipal sale of tax certificatesis twofold. First, the sale of outstanding tax debt generatesrevenue for a municipality by providing “a mechanism totransform a non-performing asset into cash without raising 6 taxes.” In re Princeton Office Park, L.P. v. Plymouth Park TaxServs., LLC, 218 N.J. 52, 62 (2014) (quoting Varsolona v. BreenCapital Servs. Corp., 180 N.J. 605, 610 (2004)). Second, itgives “the property owner the opportunity to redeem thecertificate and reclaim his land.” Simon, 189 N.J. at 319. The New Jersey Tax Sale Law, N.J.S.A. 54:5-1 to -137, “setsforth the procedure by which tax sale certificates aregenerated, purchased, and sold.” Princeton Office Park, 218 N.J. at 62. For purchasers, tax sale certificates constitute aninvestment -- an “inchoate interest” -- in the burdened propertycomprised of three rights: [1] the right to receive the sum paid for the certificate with interest at the redemption rate for which the property was sold; [2] the right to redeem from the holder a subsequently issued tax sale certificate; and [3] the right to acquire title by foreclosing the equity of redemption of all outstanding interests, including that of the property owner. [Id. at 63 (quoting Varsolona, 180 N.J. at 618).]Significantly, “[a]lthough the property is 'sold’ as evidencedby a tax sale certificate, N.J.S.A. 54:5-46, a tax salecertificate is not an outright conveyance, and the certificateholder does not have title to the land.” Caput Mortuum, L.L.C.v. S & S Crown Servs., Ltd., 366 N.J. Super. 323, 336 (App. Div.2004) (emphasis added). Rather, a tax sale certificate holder 7 has a conditional right to acquire title. Princeton OfficePark, 218 N.J. at 63. Forces beyond the control of the lienholder determinewhether a tax lienholder can eventually acquire title. Firstand foremost, the conditional right to acquire is subject to theproperty owner’s failure to redeem the certificate, ibid., andthe entry of final judgment of the Superior Court foreclosingredemption, N.J.S.A. 54:5-86(a), -87. Property owners mayexercise their right of redemption at any time until entry ofthat final judgment. R. 4:64-6(b); Simon, 189 N.J. at 319.And, during the court-determined redemption period, “others withan interest in the land (an heir, a prior tax certificateholder, a mortgagee, or an occupant)” may also redeem. Simon,189 N.J. at 319; accord N.J.S.A. 54:5-54. Until the tax salecertificate holder receives and records a final judgment, theholder’s right to acquire title remains subordinated to anyinterested party’s right to redeem. See N.J.S.A. 54:5-86(a),-104.65; Simon, 189 N.J. at 318. A tax sale certificate holder’s right to acquire title isalso subject to the priority of liens. Municipal liens are“paramount” to all other liens on encumbered land exceptsubsequent municipal liens. N.J.S.A. 54:5-9. For tax liens,“[a] subsequent tax sale certificate . . . has priority over anearlier certificate, and the foreclosure of the later 8 certificate can extinguish the earlier certificate.” Lato v.Rockaway Township, 16 N.J. Tax 355, 363 (Tax 1997) (citationomitted); see also Town of Phillipsburg v. Block 1508, Lot 12,380 N.J. Super. 159, 165-66 (App. Div. 2005) (suggesting that toprotect its inchoate interest in property, a prior taxlienholder must redeem a later tax sale certificate before thesubsequent holder obtains a judgment in foreclosure). So, eventhe earliest tax lienholder must remain vigilant and perhapspurchase later tax certificates and any other municipal liens toretain its potential to acquire title. Like any other investment, the purchase of a tax salecertificate carries risks. The Tax Sale Law, while affordingthe tax lienholder certain rights, does not protect the holderfrom those risks. The Tax Sale Law neither promises the holderthat she will acquire title to the subject property nor assuresthe holder that, after receiving authorization to exercise herright to foreclose, she will receive a favorable return on herinvestment. The statute is intended “to promote the sale of taxsale certificates as a source of municipal revenue,” PrincetonOffice Park, 218 N.J. at 56 (emphasis added), not to shieldlienholders from uncertainties natural to a tax sale certificateinvestment. Risks like the need to purchase subsequent liens topreserve a priority interest, a decline in property value orworthless property, repair costs after foreclosure, and 9 municipal fines and condemnation are inherent in a tax salecertificate investment. Development on adjacent property is nodifferent. A tax sale certificate confers a right to acquiretitle that is packaged with -- not separate from -- those risks. I am not persuaded, based on the foregoing, that Linden 587has the right to acquire title to the Neighboring Property. TheMLUL speaks only to the right to acquire and not a contingentright to acquire title to property. Here, the record reflectsthat Linden 587 had not obtained and recorded a final judgmentforeclosing the title holder’s right to redeem the NeighboringProperty before filing suit. Cf. N.J.S.A. 54:5-86(a), -87.Counsel’s representation at oral argument that Linden 587 hasforeclosed on one of its three tax sale certificates isinconsequential. Standing is an issue that “must be resolvedbefore a court proceeds to determine the merits of a suit.”Watkins, 124 N.J. at 418; see also Mitchell, 422 N.J. Super. at 224-25 (suggesting that any post-complaint foreclosure cannotretroactively confer standing). Obtaining a final judgment before filing a complaint isimperative because it cuts off the title holder’s right toredeem, N.J.S.A. 54:5-86(a), and it prevents subsequentlienholders from acquiring a priority interest, which wouldcomplicate Linden 587’s future right to foreclose, Town ofPhillipsburg, 380 N.J. Super. at 165. Without that final order,10 Linden 587’s ability to acquire is entirely dependent on theabsence of intervening forces that may compromise its interestin the Neighboring Property. When it filed its complaint,Linden 587 had no right to acquire title to the NeighboringProperty, or even to exercise its right to acquire theNeighboring Property. Whether that right will be realizedremains speculative. And it is certainly apparent that it hasno present rights to use and enjoy that property. B. Even if I agreed with the majority that the MLUL could beread to confer interested-party status on persons with acontingent right to acquire title, I would not agree with itsdetermination that Linden 587 has standing. Linden 587’s rightto acquire the Neighboring Property has not been -- nor could itbe -- affected by the challenged Board action. An interested party is one whose right to acquire property“is or may be affected by any action taken under [the MLUL].”N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4. Here, Linden 587 challenges the Board’sdecision to grant Goodman’s application for development. Itlogically flows that Goodman’s development project on theProperty must, at the very least, have the potential to affectLinden 587’s right to acquire the Neighboring Property. It doesnot. Linden 587’s right to foreclose on the NeighboringProperty owner’s right to redeem and later acquire title through 11 that foreclosure is in no way affected by development projectson adjacent land. To be sure, Linden 587 may decide not to exercise its rightto acquire the Neighboring Property as a result of the Goodmanproject, but it still has the ability to assert that right.Simply put, Linden 587 can exercise its right to acquire theNeighboring Property whether or not the Board approves theGoodman project. Whether the Neighboring Property is affectedby Goodman’s development is a risk Linden 587, as an investorwithout present title to the property, assumed. Because Linden587’s conditional right to acquire is not and could not beaffected by the Board’s approval, Linden 587 cannot be aninterested party under the MLUL. The essence of the LLCs’ complaint is not that the Goodmanproject will compromise their putative right to acquire, butrather that -- assuming they can exercise that right –- theproject will infringe on their ability to use and enjoy theNeighboring Property. In accepting that argument, the majorityapplies a two-level analysis to the MLUL’s one-level definitionof “interested party” as a person “whose right to use, acquire,or enjoy property is or may be affected by any action takenunder [the MLUL].” Ibid. In other words, the majority’sdecision requires the following analysis: (1) Is there a rightto acquire property?; and (2) If so and if that right is 12 exercised, will development on adjacent land affect the futurerights to use and enjoy the property? I reject the majority’s two-step analysis. A plain readingof N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4 suggests that future or speculative rightsdo not satisfy the interested-party requirement. The statuterequires that a person’s “right to use, acquire, or enjoyproperty” “is or may be affected by any action taken” under theMLUL. A person need not have a present injury; it suffices thatthe asserted right “may be affected.” But that contingencyarises only if the person has a present property right to assertat the outset. To interpret the statute to include speculativeor future rights renders the statute superfluous, conferringinterested-party status and standing to anyone that might have aprotected property right that might be affected sometime in thefuture. But, the statute plainly requires a party to have apresent -- not future -- right to use, acquire, or enjoyproperty, and without it, the party does not have standing. The three protectable property interests set forth inN.J.S.A. 40:55D-4 are distinct, as evidenced by the statute’suse of the word “or.” The two other bases for standing listedin the statute are the right to use and the right to enjoy. Didthe plaintiffs’ tax sale certificate give them the right to usethe property? No. Did it give them the right to enjoy theproperty? No. It is the claimant’s present rights -- not 13 speculative future rights -- that are necessary to satisfy theinterested-party requirement. The majority’s theory of standing appears to rest on Linden587’s right to use the Neighboring Property -- its “limited”“right to enter onto the property to address certainconditions.” That theory, in turn, rests on a slender reed:N.J.S.A. 54:5-86(c). N.J.S.A. 54:5-86(c) permits a tax salecertificate holder of abandoned property to enter that property“to make repairs, or abate, remove or correct any conditionharmful to the public health, safety and welfare, or anycondition that is materially reducing the value of theproperty.” Put otherwise, tax sale certificate holders do nothave a right to enter property that is not abandoned. And, evenif the property “meets the definition of abandoned,” the holdermay not enter until it provides “written notice to the owner bycertified mail return receipt requested.” N.J.S.A. 54:5-86(c). Here, the record is devoid of any evidence that theNeighboring Property was abandoned, as the majority concedes.Nothing in the record shows that the Neighboring Property meetsthe definition of abandoned under N.J.S.A. 55:19-81. Section 86therefore does not provide a basis for standing in this case.And, even if the Neighboring Property were statutorilyabandoned, I question whether a limited right to abate a publicsafety concern or material reduction in property value can be 14 equated with the “right to use” property under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4. Regardless, we need not determine whether the neighboringproperty is abandoned under the statutory definition. Theparties did not raise abandonment under N.J.S.A. 54:5-86(c) toour Court or the courts below in their briefs or during oralarguments. Linden 587 had neither the right to use nor the right toenjoy the Neighboring Property when it filed suit. See MichaelG. Pellegrino & Ralph P. Allocca, Tax Certificates: A Review ofthe Tax Sale Law, 26 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1607, 1620 (1996) (“Atax certificate represents only a lien; no immediate possessoryrights are transferred until foreclosure is completed. Thus, aprivate certificate holder is not entitled to enter upon theunderlying property to analyze, manage or protect it.”(footnotes omitted)). So, whether Linden 587 has standinghinges on whether its claimed right to acquire is or may beaffected by the Board’s action. It follows that, because Linden587’s inchoate, contingent right to acquire the NeighboringProperty was not and could not be affected by the Board’saction, Linden 587 did not have standing. New Jersey courts often liberally construe the standingrequirements to grant standing. Crescent Park Tenants Ass’n, 58 N.J. at 107-12; Spinnaker Condo. Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Sea IsleCity, 357 N.J. Super. 105, 110-11 (App. Div. 2003). But the 15 majority’s decision takes liberality a step too far. Instead ofrelying on the MLUL’s plain language to arrive at the mostlogical conclusion, the majority has transformed a list ofpresent rights into a fusion of present and future rights toconfer standing on a class of third parties never envisioned bythe Legislature. Standing should only be accorded to truestakeholders and, in my mind, according to the facts of thiscase, Linden 587 is not one of them. We should not graft upon the statute additional rights notintended by the Legislature or met by Linden 587. Nor should weafford plaintiff a fresh opportunity to establish standing byremanding to the trial court for further proceedings. Thenature of the hearing on remand will be novel in light of ourtraditional recognition of standing as a “threshold” issue thata court must determine at the outset of a lawsuit. Watkins, 124 N.J. at 417-18. Addressing the standing inquiry at the firststage of a plaintiff’s claim is crucial because the answerdetermines whether the court has “power to hear the case.” Id.418. Linden 587 had the opportunity to demonstrate its standingin its bare-bones, four-page complaint, its brief in response tothe motion to dismiss its complaint, and during oral argument atthe motion hearing. It failed to do so. Failure of Linden 587to properly plead under the requisite statutes or properlydefend in motion practice or in oral argument are not a cause 16 for remand. Linden 587’s failures are of its own design and maybe causes for its lack of standing. For those reasons, I departfrom my colleagues in the majority that a remand is warrantedhere. III. To me, the fact that this land use standing issue -- in2018 -- is an issue of first impression suggests tax salecertificate holders have not previously sought to use our courtsto thwart development projects related to neighboring propertiesof land they may or may not acquire. No longer. Going forward,I predict an onslaught of new land use disputes in our SuperiorCourt that will stall development projects and encourage otherattenuated interested parties to follow suit. For all of thosereasons, I respectfully dissent. 17