Title: Bobbitt v. the Orchard, Ltd.
Citation: 603 So. 2d 356
Docket Number: 89-CA-1157
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: June 17, 1992

603 So. 2d 356 (1992) Bernette BOBBITT v. THE ORCHARD, LTD.; The Orchard Development Co.; and the Madison Group. No. 89-CA-1157. Supreme Court of Mississippi. June 17, 1992. *357 Keith R. Raulston, Heidelberg &amp; Woodliff, Jackson, James A. Bobo, Brandon, for appellant. Stephen E. Gardner, James Leon Young, John S. Simpson, Young Scanlon &amp; Sessums, Jackson, for appellee. Before HAWKINS, P.J., and PRATHER and McRAE, JJ. HAWKINS, Presiding Justice, for the Court: On November 7, 1988, Bernette Bobbitt filed a complaint in the circuit court of Madison County against her nursing home employers, The Orchard, Ltd., The Orchard Development Company, and The Madison Group (The Orchard) for wrongfully discharging her. The Orchard had in effect published and disseminated "The Orchard Employee Manual," setting forth the administrative procedures which would be followed in event of an employee's incompetence or misconduct. On October 11, 1988, Bobbitt had been fired for insubordination. Bobbitt's complaint alleged, inter alia, that The Orchard completely ignored the manual in discharging her. While disputing this, The Orchard contended that because Bobbitt's contract of employment was terminable at will by either party, the manual imposed no legal requirement that it be followed before she could be discharged. Following discovery, The Orchard moved for summary judgment, and upon the sole basis that this was a terminable-at-will contract, the circuit court held that as a matter of law The Orchard was not required to follow its manual before it discharged her, and dismissed her complaint. We reverse, holding that when an employer publishes and disseminates to its employees a manual setting forth the proceedings which will be followed in event of an employee's infraction of rules, and there is nothing in the employment contract to the contrary, then the employer will be required to follow its own manual in disciplining or discharging employees for infractions or misconduct specifically covered by the manual. Because this case is before us on a summary judgment against the plaintiff Bobbitt, our recitation of facts will be summary and favorable to Bobbitt, subject to fuller development upon trial. Bobbitt, 28 years of age, was employed as a licensed practical nurse at The Orchard, a retirement complex in Ridgeland, on July 2, 1987, following her execution of an application which stated in pertinent part: In August, 1987, she was promoted to the position of assistant nursing supervisor. On October 11, 1988, after a rather mild exchange with the executive director, Sandra Simmons, over some minor problem in serving lunch, she was fired. The Orchard had in effect a manual, "The Orchard Employee Manual," consisting of fourteen single-spaced pages outlining the policies, purposes and procedures of the nursing home complex, and the mutual responsibilities of the employees and The Orchard. Pertinent portions follow: (Appellant's Brief, pp. 4-9). This manual had been given Bobbitt at the time she was employed. In its response to request for admissions, The Orchard stated that it had discharged Bobbitt for insubordination. From this record, if what occurred on October 11, 1988, was in fact insubordinate conduct, it apparently was her first infraction, and under the manual Bobbitt should have received "counseling and formal written warnings." Instead of being counselled or warned, however, she was discharged that day. Following discovery, The Orchard moved for summary judgment, and on the basis that this was a contract terminable at will, the circuit court on September 15, 1989, entered summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Bobbitt has appealed. In Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397 So. 2d 874 (Miss. 1981), the employee plaintiff sought damages for being discharged because he had put in a claim for workmen's compensation benefits. This Court stated the general rule regarding termination of contracts of employment for indefinite terms: 397 So. 2d at 874-75. This, however, is not the precise question in this case. The question in this case is when an employer furnishes its employees a detailed manual stating its rules of employment, and setting forth procedures that will be followed in event of infraction of its rules of employment, can it completely ignore the manual in discharging an employee for an infraction clearly covered by the manual? Put otherwise, when an offense specifically covered by the employer's own manual provides no more severe disciplining than a warning or counseling of the employee, may the employer pay no attention to the manual and fire the employee instead? We hold the employer to its word. In her application Bobbitt agreed to "abide by all present and subsequently issued Orchard rules." In Robinson v. Board of Trustees of East Central Junior College, 477 So. 2d 1352 (Miss. 1985), we held that an employee's handbook and manual were a part of the contract of employment: 477 So. 2d at 1353. We hold in this case that because the manual was given to all employees, it became a part of the contract. It did not give the employees "tenure," or create a right to employment for any definite length of time, but it did create an obligation on the part of The Orchard to follow its provisions in reprimanding, suspending or discharging an employee for infractions specifically covered therein. In Shaw v. Burchfield, 481 So. 2d 247 (Miss. 1985), in which a long time employee was discharged under a contract which expressly gave the employer the right to terminate, we expressed our growing unease with the harshness of the rule authorizing the employer to terminate an employment contract "for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all." 481 So. 2d at 255. We disposed of the argument that such a rule was fair because the employee was as free to quit as the employer to discharge him, and also signaled our direction for the future with the following comment: 481 So. 2d at 254. Neither Shaw v. Burchfield nor this case presents a precise terminable at will question, but Shaw warns employers that this Court will be looking for a wiser and more humane alternative to the terminable at will rule in an employment contract. In Perry v. Sears, Roebuck &amp; Co., 508 So. 2d 1086 (Miss. 1987), the long time employee, just a short time before retirement, was summarily discharged following an exchange with his supervisor. We noted: 508 So. 2d at 1087. We also held that a personnel manual "can create contractual obligations, even in the absence of a written agreement." 508 So. 2d at 1088. *362 Nevertheless, we upheld the employer's right to discharge Perry because the pension plan manual itself, upon which he based his claim of some protection, specifically in bold face type gave the company the right "to discharge or terminate you at any time without regard to the effect of such discharge or termination may have on your rights under the plan;" and also because Perry's employment agreement contained "an express statement that Sears did not intend to waive its right to terminate him unilaterally by promulgating the policy handbooks." 508 So. 2d at 1088. Had there been in Shaw and Perry an employee's manual purporting to give the employees the same protection as in this case, and there had been, again as in this case, no express disclaimer or contractual provision that the manual did not affect the employer's right to terminate the employee at will, without question we would have required the employer in both cases to abide by its own manual.[1] In McGlohn v. Gulf &amp; S.I.R.R. Co., 179 Miss. 396, 174 So. 250 (1937), we considered whether a written agreement between a railway labor union and the railroad concerning conditions of employment applied to a union member conductor's individual unwritten contract of employment with the railroad. In holding that the union agreement was a part of the conductor's contract of employment, our language there is apt to today's holding: 179 Miss. at 408-10, 174 So. at 253. REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. *363 ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., DAN M. LEE, P.J., and PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN, PITTMAN, BANKS and McRAE, JJ., concur. [1] The Orchard also seeks to uphold the summary judgment under the following sentence in the application for employment: "I understand that the first three months of employment will be considered as a period of probation and that my employment and compensation may be terminated with or without notice at any time, at the option of either The Orchard or myself." This sentence, at the very best, creates for The Orchard an ambiguity from which it will argue at full trial that it applied to long time employment and not just the first ninety days. The ambiguity itself, however, removes this case from a summary judgment posture; Pursue Energy Corp. v. Perkins, 558 So. 2d 349, 354 (Miss. 1990); Shelton v. American Ins. Co. Co., 507 So. 2d 894, 896 (Miss. 1987); Shaw, 481 So. 2d at 252; Dennis v. Searle, 457 So. 2d 941, 945 (Miss. 1984); Aetna Cas. &amp; Sur. Co. v. Giesow, 412 F.2d 468 (2nd Cir.1969).