Title: State of New Jersey v. Sherron Latie Savage
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-57-01
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: June 20, 2002

Defendant, Sherron Savage and his brother, co-defendant, Terrell Savage, were charged by indictment with second-degree conspiracy to commit kidnapping and/or murder; first-degree kidnapping; first-degree purposeful or knowing murder; and first-degree felony murder. Terrell pled guilty to aggravated manslaughter and was sentenced to a thirty-year custodial term with an 85% period of parole ineligibility. Sherron went to trial. The facts at Sherron s trial established that on October 7, 1997, a Newark police officer and his partner found Adam Watkins in the fourteenth floor stairwell of Brick Towers, a Newark apartment building. He was badly bruised and naked. There were no witnesses to what happened to him. He was pronounced dead at the hospital about an hour later. Watkins had been homeless in the days before his death, due to marital difficulties, and had been spending nights at the Brick Towers apartments where Terrell lived with his family. Early on the morning of his death, Watkins left the Terrell s apartment and went to the home of Rashon Baskerville, where he fell asleep on the sofa. That same morning, Terrell discovered that a diamond ring was missing from his apartment and called his brother, Sherron, to ask him to help search the apartment for the ring. They did not find it, prompting Terrell to suspect Watkins of having stolen it. He asked Sherron to take a ride with him to pick up Watkins. The two drove to Baskerville s house. Terrell went into the house while Sherron waited in the car. A few minutes later, Terrell walked out the house accompanied by Watkins. Thereafter, with Watkins and Sherron in the car, Terrell then drove to see Kenneth Long. During the course of their conversation, Terrell told Long that if Watkins took the ring, he was going to beat him up. Terrell then drove back to Baskerville s house, where he had a conversation with Baskerville in which he told him that Watkins had crossed him. When Baskerville went over to the car, Watkins told Baskerville that the ring was in his house. Baskerville and Terrell accompanied Watkins into the house, where Watkins retrieved the ring and gave it to Terrell. Subsequently, Terrell walked out of the house with Watkins and both got into the car. Terrell then drove off with Watkins and Sherron. Thereafter, the three men returned to Terrell s apartment building so that Terrell could beat [Watkins] for stealing out of the house after he gave him somewhere to stay. According to Sherron, Terrell s intention was to beat Watkins to teach him a lesson not to kill him. When the three men entered the elevator to the apartment building, Terrell punched Watkins in the face. When the elevator door opened up to the sixteenth floor, Terrell and Watkins fell out. Terrell punched Watkins in the face several more times, causing him to fall to the ground. Sherron admitted that he kicked Watkins in his side once when Watkins was trying to get up, because he did not want him to be in a position to attack his brother. Sherron told Terrell to stop hitting Watkins because he had proved his point and had taught him a lesson. According to Sherron, they left Watkins sitting on the floor. At trial, the medical examiner testified that the cause of Watkins death was homicide-blunt force trauma to the head and that the other injuries Watkins sustained were superficial. Both Baskerville and Long cooperated with the police investigation. Portions of their statements were used as evidence during the course of the trial. At the close of the evidence, the trial court gave a lengthy jury instruction on the elements of all of the offenses, including accomplice liability, telling the jury that in order to hold Sherron guilty as an accomplice with equal responsibility to Terrell, it had to find that Sherron shared the purpose to commit the crime Terrell committed. The judge further instructed the jury that it could find Sherron guilty of a lesser included offense if he possessed a different state of mind. The trial judge refused to give an instruction on the lesser included offense of criminal restraint and did not, on his own, give an instruction on the lesser included offense of false imprisonment. During the course of deliberations, the jury asked for clarification of one of the instructions, which the trial court viewed as dissatisfaction on the jury s part with the state of the law. Thus, the trial judge instructed the jury that the court was the judge of the law not the jury and offered no further clarification. Based on the evidence, the jury convicted Sherron on all counts. At sentencing, the trial court merged the conspiracy conviction into the kidnapping conviction and the felony murder conviction into murder. The court then sentenced Sherron to a custodial term of life in prison for murder, with an eighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility pursuant to the No Early Release Act (NERA) and to a concurrent thirty-year term of imprisonment with a twenty-five and one-half year period of parole ineligibility pursuant to NERA, for first-degree kidnapping. The Appellate Division affirmed, but vacated the NERA aspect of the sentence and modified the sentence in accordance with the plea bargain. The State filed a petition for certification regarding the NERA sentence and Sherron filed a cross-petition alleging trial error. The Supreme Court denied the State s petition, but granted Sherron s cross-petition for certification. HELD : In this case involving convictions for murder, conspiracy, and kidnapping, the trial court s failure to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of criminal restraint constitutes error requiring reversal of the conspiracy and murder and kidnapping convictions; the trial court s failure to re-explain the accomplice instruction when the jury inquired about its duty under the instruction was plain error, requiring reversal of the conviction for knowing and purposeful murder. 1. Appropriate and proper jury instructions are essential to a fair trial and the standard for assessing the soundness of those instructions is how, under the evidence before them, and the circumstances of the trial, the jurors understand the instructions as a whole. (pp. 10-11) 2. When a prosecution is based on the theory that a defendant acted as an accomplice, the trial court is required to provide the jury with understandable instructions regarding accomplice liability, including the potential for finding a defendant guilty of a lesser included offense, depending on his or her state of mind. (pp. 11-13) 3. New Jersey courts regularly have recognized the importance of tailoring the jury charges to the facts of the particular case. (pp. 13-15) 4. The jury instruction on accomplice liability in this case was neither internally inconsistent nor legally deficient, and was entirely correct in its expression of relevant legal principles. (pp. 15-20) 5. The trial court failed to articulate factually how Terrell could have been guilty of purposeful or knowing murder, and Sherron guilty of one of the lesser included offenses, such as aggravated or simple assault, if he possessed a different state of mind. (pp. 20-21) 6. The trial court s failure to inquire further into the jury s note and to re-explain the accomplice charge in the context of the facts was plain error. Because the evidence does not necessarily support a finding that Sherron shared the same homicidal state of mind as Terrell, the supplemental jury instructions were inadequate to guide the jury in the course of its deliberations on the murder charge. Thus, the conviction for knowing and purposeful murder must be reversed. (pp. 21-23) 7. In order to justify a lesser included offense instruction, a rational basis must exist in the evidence for a jury to acquit the defendant of the greater offense as well as to convict the defendant of the lesser, unindicted offense. A defendant is entitled to a charge on all lesser included offenses supported by the evidence. (pp. 23-25) 8. An unrequested charge on a lesser included offense must be given only where the facts in evidence clearly indicate the appropriateness of that charge. When a lesser offense charge is requested by a defendant, the trial court is obligated to examine the record thoroughly to determine if the rational-basis standard has been satisfied. The failure to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense that a defendant has requested and for which the evidence provides a rational basis warrants reversal of a defendant s conviction. (pp. 25-27) 9. A jury reasonably could have acquitted Sherron of the kidnapping charge. In the alternative, the evidence at trial provided a rational basis to charge the jury on criminal restraint, and the trial court s failure to do so constitutes error requiring reversal of the conspiracy and murder convictions. (pp. 28-31) 10. The trial court had no duty on its own to instruct the jury on false imprisonment because the evidence did not clearly indicate or warrant such a charge. (pp. 31-32) 11. The trial court should have charged the jury, at Sherron s request, on criminal restraint as a lesser included offense of kidnapping. Thus, Sherron s convictions for kidnapping and conspiracy must be reversed. The lesser included offenses to be charged during a new trial must be evaluated in light of the evidence adduced at that trial. (p. 32) 12. Under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule, the State must meet three conditions: (1) the statement must have been made in furtherance of the conspiracy; (2) the statement must have been made during the course of the conspiracy; and (3) there must be evidence independent of the hearsay, of the existence of the conspiracy and defendant s relationship to it. (pp. 32-34) 13. A conspiracy continues until its objective is fulfilled. If a statement is made after the conspiratorial objective is completed, it is generally not admissible under the co-conspirator exception. A conspiracy may continue beyond the actual commission of the object of the conspiracy if it is shown that a conspirator enlisted false alibi witnesses, concealed weapons, or fled in order to avoid apprehension. (pp. 34-35) 14. If hearsay evidence is corroborated with sufficient independent evidence that engenders a strong sense of its inherent trustworthiness, it is admissible under the co-conspirator exception. (p. 35) 15. The trial court properly concluded that Sherron s statement to police investigators following the incident constituted independent evidence that is substantial enough to justify admission of a co-conspirator s statement. (pp. 36-37) 16. The portion of Baskerville s statement containing the declarations made by Terrell in the evening hours was inadmissible against Sherron under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule because the statements do not appear to have been made during and in the furtherance of the conspiracy. (pp. 37-39) 17. Based on Long s testimony that Terrell asked him to cover for him, it can be inferred that Terrell was attempting to enlist a false alibi witness as well as to avoid apprehension when they spoke. Because the criminal enterprise continued to be carried out when Terrell solicited Long s help in avoiding apprehension, the trial court did not err by admitting that portion of Long s testimony. (pp. 39-40) Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED, and the matter is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with the Court s opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES STEIN, COLEMAN, LaVECCHIA, and ZAZZALI join in JUSTICE LONG s opinion. JUSTICE VERNIERO did not participate. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 57 September Term 2001 Plaintiff-Respondent, v. SHERRON LATIE SAVAGE, Defendant-Appellant. Argued April 30, 2002 Decided June 20, 2002 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Theresa Yvette Kyles, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Peter A. Garcia, Acting Public Defender, attorney). Steven A. Yomtov, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Peter C. Harvey, Acting Attorney General, attorney). The opinion of the Court was delivered by LONG, J. Tried to a jury, defendant Sherron Savage (Sherron) was convicted, in connection with the beating death of Adam Watkins (Watkins), of a series of offenses, including murder, felony murder, kidnapping, and conspiracy. The Appellate Division affirmed those convictions and we granted certification to review trial errors alleged by Sherron, specifically, an inadequate accomplice instruction, failure to charge lesser included offenses, and the erroneous admission of evidence. We have carefully reviewed this record in light of the legal issues raised and now reverse. [State v. Bielkiewicz, 267 N.J. Super. 520, 528 (App. Div. 1993).] See also State v. Harrington, 310 N.J. Super. 272, 278 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 156 N.J. 387 (1998) (reversing defendant s convictions because accomplice liability charge inextricably link[ed] the criminal liability of the accomplice with the criminal liability of the principal ); State v. Williams, 298 N.J. Super. 430, 440 (1997) (finding harmless error trial court s failure to instruct jury that accomplice may be guilty of aggravated or reckless manslaughter while principal is guilty of murder because defendant was found guilty of lesser included offense of aggravated manslaughter and not murder); State v. Jackmon, 305 N.J. Super. 274, 286 (App. Div. 1997) (reversing defendant s murder and attempted murder convictions because jury instructions did not adequately convey that, even if principal committed purposeful or knowing murder, accomplice could be found guilty of lesser offense). In addition to requiring trial courts to instruct juries that an accomplice can have a different mental state from that of the principal, our courts regularly have noted the importance of tailoring the jury charge to the facts of the case. For example, in State v. Cook, 300 N.J. Super. 476 (App. Div. 1996), in the context of accomplice liability, defendant argued that the charge failed to explain to the jury that it could find him guilty as an accomplice to the lesser included offenses of aggravated manslaughter or manslaughter even if it found that the co-defendant committed purposeful or knowing murder. The Appellate Division noted that the jury should have been advised in unequivocal terms that, depending on its view of the evidence, it could decide that the liability of Cooke was different from that of [co-defendant] Vaughn because each had a different state of mind. To be sure, the trial court failed to articulate factually how Terrell could have been guilty of purposeful or knowing murder, and Sherron guilty of one of the lesser offenses, for example, aggravated or simple assault, if he possessed a different state of mind. Indeed, the court s canned accomplice liability instruction was not tied to the facts at all and, in that respect, violated our often-expressed exhortation that, to serve its purpose, a charge, especially a complex one, should be tethered to the facts that the jury has heard. However, because the trial court instructed the jury in accordance with relevant legal principles, under ordinary circumstances, we would presume that the jury understood and followed those instructions. See, e.g., State v. Buris, 145 N.J. 509 (1996) (citing State v. Manley, 54 N.J. 259, 270 (1969) (stating that, with regard to proper use of evidence, the Court presumes that juries will understand and abide by the court s instruction ). We cannot indulge that presumption here because, as we have indicated, the jury asked the following question: As defined by N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1d, confinement or removal are unlawful when accomplished by force, threat or deception. Criminal restraint, a closely-related third-degree crime occurs when a person knowingly ... [r]estrains another unlawfully in circumstances exposing the other to risk of serious bodily injury. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-2. Our Court has recognized that criminal restraint functions as a lesser included offense of kidnapping. See, e.g., Brent, supra, 137 N.J. at 122 (noting that kidnapping by removal and criminal restraint can be proved by the same set of facts). The question is whether any view of the evidence in this case presented a rational basis for the jury to acquit Sherron of kidnapping and, alternatively, to convict him of criminal restraint. The answer is yes. Under the State s theory of the case, Terrell and Sherron kidnapped Watkins by unlawfully removing him from Baskerville s home, driving him around to locate the ring, and bringing him to a isolated stairwell for the purpose of assaulting him. In support of that theory, Long testified that, when Terrell drove to his auto body shop on the morning of October 7th, Long saw Watkins in the back seat of the car looking sad, a little scared, and sitting like he wanted to jump out [of] the car or something. Additionally, Baskerville s statement recounted that Terrell had said that Watkins couldn t get out the car. Although the State suggested in its summation that the brothers grabbed Watkins from Baskerville s house while Baskerville was still asleep, there is no evidence in the record to support that assertion. A jury could have reached other equally rational, conclusions from Long s testimony and Baskerville s statement. Long testified, for example, that he could not read the facial expression or otherwise identify anyone else in the car except Watkins due to the dark tint of the car s windows, thus eliminating any suggestion that Long witnessed threatening conduct by Sherron. Watkins also made no attempt to speak to Long or exit from the car. Moreover, a jury could conclude that Watkins hang-dog expression resulted, not from being held against his will, but because his thievery from his best friend had been revealed and he knew that he deserved and would receive Terrell s opprobrium or worse. Likewise, Baskerville s statement was open to other reasonable interpretations. As the State noted in its summation, Baskerville flatly denied or could not recall the majority of his statement at trial. But even if the jury accepted it as true, in his statement Baskerville said that he opened the car door for Watkins without any objection from Terrell or Sherron; and that Watkins retrieved the ring from Baskerville s house, gave it back to Terrell, and got back into the car with the brothers without attempting to remain at Baskerville s house, evade the brothers, or otherwise demonstrate that he was being held against his will. No direct evidence existed that the brothers removed Watkins from Baskerville s house on either occasion or confined him by force, threat, or deceit. Accepting all reasonable inferences from Long and Baskerville s testimony, a jury could have found that Watkins accompanied the brothers voluntarily, if remorsefully, as they drove from one location to the next. That conclusion was bolstered by Sherron s statement that Watkins walked with the brothers past several people, including a security guard, through the apartment complex and into their building of his own will. In sum, a jury could reasonably have acquitted Sherron of the kidnapping charge. In the alternative, the evidence at trial provided a rational basis to charge the jury on criminal restraint. Although a jury could have found that there were no overt indications that Watkins was being unlawfully removed or confined prior to going to the apartment building, it could also have determined that, at the point that Sherron kicked Watkins when he tried to rise up, he unlawfully restrained him. Moreover, despite Sherron s testimony that he did not know that Terrell would assault Watkins until it occurred in the elevator, jurors could have determined that Sherron, in fact, knew of Terrell s intention to beat up Watkins as he stated in his initial statement to police. Moreover, a jury could have concluded that, at the very least, Sherron was aware of Terrell s intentions in the elevator and on the landing when he observed him administer a beating to Watkins. As a result, the jury could have found that, by assisting Terrell in restraining Watkins, Sherron exposed him to serious bodily injury at Terrell s hands, meeting the elements of criminal restraint. Under those circumstances and in light of Sherron s request, we conclude that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on criminal restraint as a lesser included offense of kidnapping and that that error requires reversal of the conspiracy and murder convictions. Sherron also argues that the trial court should have charged the jury on false imprisonment sua sponte. False imprisonment, a disorderly persons offense, occurs when a person knowingly restrains another unlawfully so as to interfere substantially with his liberty. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-3. False imprisonment is complete upon an unlawful restraint that interferes with a victim s liberty. No further wrongful purpose is required. State v. LaFrance, 117 N.J. 583, 591 (1990). The difference between false imprisonment and third-degree criminal restraint is that the latter requires that the restraint be in circumstances exposing the other to risk of serious bodily injury. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-2(a); State v. Bragg, 295 N.J. Super. 459, 469-70 (1996). As we have indicated, a jury could acquit Sherron of kidnapping and could conclude that Sherron unlawfully restrained Watkins when he kicked him as Watkins attempted to rise during the beating administered by Terrell. However, there is no rational basis for a jury to conclude that, by that point, Sherron s actions did not expose Watkins to the risk of serious bodily injury by Terrell. We, therefore, conclude that the court had no duty to instruct the jury sua sponte on false imprisonment because the evidence did not clearly indicate or warrant such a charge. See, e.g., State v. Turner, 246 N.J. Super. 22 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 126 N.J. 335 (1991) (finding trial court not required to charge third-degree aggravated assault as lesser included offense due to severity of victim s injury); State v. Mance, 300 N.J. Super. 37 (App. Div. 1997) (finding no rational basis for lesser included charge of fourth-degree aggravated assault because no evidence to support mental state of recklessness). In sum, we determine that the trial court should have charged the jury, at Sherron s request, on criminal restraint as a lesser included offense of kidnapping. We arrive at that conclusion after considering all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence at trial and the State s theory of the case. Thus, Sherron s convictions for kidnapping and conspiracy must be reversed. Depending on the evidence adduced at the next trial, the court will be required to reevaluate the issue of which lesser-included offenses must be charged. The court concluded that, based on Sherron s own statements, there was some commonality of purpose as evidenced by defendant s persistent use of the term we. Sherron counters that his statement to the police does not constitute sufficiently substantial evidence to engender a strong belief in the existence of the conspiracy and of defendant s participation, in conformance with Phelps and that his use of the term we merely indicates that he accompanied Terrell and that the commonality of purpose was to recover the ring. We disagree. The trial court properly concluded that Sherron s statement constituted independent evidence that is substantial enough to comply with the standard set forth in Phelps. His knowledge of Terrell s intentions and his admitted participation in at least one kick supports that inference and justifies consideration of the admission of a co-conspirators statement. As noted earlier, when Baskerville testified, he disavowed his statement that Terrell had told him that he and Sherron took part in the beating death of Watkins. Over Sherron s objection, Detective Eutsey was permitted to read Baskerville s entire statement to the jury as a prior inconsistent statement. See footnote 1 At that time, Sherron argued that Baskerville s statement should be redacted to exclude declarations made by Terrell after the beating of Watkins had occurred. Specifically, Sherron took issue with the following statements allegedly made by Terrell: (1) They told me they beat [Watkins]; (2) He said that he and [Watkins] were fighting and his brother [Sherron] and his friends bone rushed him and Terrell said he could not stop it; and (3) Yes, for humiliation. They took off his clothes and left him in the stairway to teach him a lesson. As noted earlier, a conspiracy may continue beyond the actual commission of its objective if it is shown that a conspirator enlisted false alibi witnesses, concealed weapons, or fled to avoid apprehension. State v. Cherry, 289 N.J. Super. at 523. Likewise, statements relating to past events are made in furtherance of the conspiracy if they serve some current conspiratorial purpose as in, for example, Taccetta, supra, 301 N.J. Super. at 253. Here, the State argues that Terrell had the objective to avoid detection because Terrell called Baskerville around noon on the day of Watkins death and asked to meet him at Long s auto body shop due to the large police presence at Terrell s apartment building. Shortly after that call, Terrell came to Baskerville s house and told him: yo, man, I don t think that cat was breathing; I hope he ain t dead. In Baskerville s statement to the police, he said that Terrell asked him to go to the hospital but that he refused to do so or to become involved. In his statement and at trial, Baskerville maintained that he later went the hospital with Alston to check for himself on Watkins condition. It was then that he ascertained that Watkins was dead. It was not until later that evening, around 8:30 or 9:00 p.m., that Terrell returned to Baskerville s house, apparently still under the impression that Baskerville had not gone to the hospital. When he found out Watkins was dead, he made the three challenged statements about the circumstances surrounding the beating death of Watkins. At that point, there was simply nothing in the record to indicate that Terrell was attempting to enlist a false alibi witness, conceal incriminating evidence, provide reassurance to a co-conspirator, otherwise obtain Baskerville s aid in furtherance of the conspiracy, or flee in order to avoid apprehension. Therefore, the portion of Baskerville s statement containing the declarations made by Terrell in the evening hours was inadmissible against Sherron under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule because the statements do not appear to have been made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Sherron also contends that the trial court erred in admitting Terrell s statement to Long, we beat him up and I think he is dead. However, the State points to Terrell s statement to Long in which he requested that Long cover for him as a continuance of the conspiracy. Based on Long s testimony, it can be inferred that Terrell was attempting to enlist a false alibi witness as well as to avoid apprehension when they spoke. Because the criminal enterprise continued to be carried out when Terrell solicited Long s help in avoiding apprehension, the trial court did not err by admitting that portion of Long s testimony. Obviously, if the evidence at the new trial differs from what was adduced on this record, the trial court will be required to evaluate it in light of the principles to which we have adverted and determine the applicability of N.J.R.E. 803(B)(5). NO. A-57 SEPTEMBER TERM 2001 ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. SHERRON LATIE SAVAGE, Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED June 20, 2002 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Long CONCURRING OPINION BY DISSENTING OPINION BY