Title: J.C. Duke & Associates General Contractors, Inc. v. Myrita West
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1051732
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: March 14, 2008

REL:03/14/08
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
_________________________
1051732
_________________________
J.C. Duke & Associates General Contractors, Inc.
v.
Myrita West
Appeal from Mobile Circuit Court
(CV-03-3968)
BOLIN, Justice.
The 
plaintiff, 
J.C. 
Duke 
& 
Associates 
General
Contractors, Inc., appeals from the trial court's dismissal of
one of the defendants, Myrita West, on the grounds of lack of
personal jurisdiction. We reverse and remand.
1051732
2
Facts and Procedural History
On November 18, 2003, J.C. Duke sued Clements-West
Construction, Inc., and Terry Clements, the president of
Clements-West.  J.C. Duke alleged that in operating as the
general contractor renovating a high school in Mobile County,
it had entered into a contract with Clements-West to lay the
concrete block and brick for the project.  J.C. Duke claimed
that it had overpaid Clements-West.  The defendants filed an
answer and a counterclaim.  On July 19, 2004, J.C. Duke
amended its complaint to add Myrita West, an officer and co-
owner of Clements-West, as a defendant. J.C. Duke alleged that
Terry Clements and Myrita West were brother and sister and
that they had used Clements-West "as their alter ego, having
set the corporation up as a subterfuge, failing to observe the
corporate form, failing to comply with corporate law, failing
to maintain corporate records and/or corporate bank accounts,
intermingling personal and corporate funds and using them for
personal 
purposes, 
and/or 
draining 
funds 
from 
the
corporation." J.C. Duke alleged that Clements-West was used as
a mere instrumentality or alter ego of Myrita West to gain
personal profits.  On December 9, 2004, Clements-West filed in
1051732
3
the trial court a suggestion of Chapter 7 bankruptcy,
notifying the trial court that it had filed a petition in
bankruptcy on October 15, 2004, and that it was requesting a
stay of the trial court's proceedings.  The trial court
granted the stay and set the stay for review in six months.
On December 9, 2004, Terry Clements also filed a suggestion of
Chapter 13 bankruptcy, notifying the trial court that he had
filed a petition in bankruptcy on October 15, 2004, and that
he was requesting a stay.  The trial court granted the stay
and set the stay for review in 60 months.     
Myrita was served with notice and, in response, filed a
motion entitled "Special Appearance Pro Se and Motion to
Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction." The motion has an Orlando,
Florida, address for Myrita. In the motion she asserted that
she was not a resident of Alabama, that she had no contacts
with the State of Alabama, and that she had never traveled to
Alabama for any purposes related to the allegations of the
complaint.  Myrita stated that she was an officer of Clements-
West, but that "that is insufficient for [J.C. Duke] to obtain
personal jurisdiction over her, individually, in the State of
1051732
4
Alabama." Myrita did not file any affidavits in support of her
motion to dismiss.  
J.C. Duke filed a response to the motion to dismiss.
Attached to its response were portions of Terry Clements's
deposition testimony in which Terry stated that Myrita was an
officer in Clements-West. J.C. Duke also presented records
from Clements-West's bankruptcy proceedings that indicated
that Myrita had loaned Clements-West over $400,000 and that
Clements-West sought to discharge those debts in bankruptcy.
On August 16, 2006, the trial court entered an order granting
Myrita's motion to dismiss and, at J.C. Duke's request, the
trial court certified the order as a final judgment pursuant
to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.  J.C. Duke appeals.   
Standard of Review
A de novo standard of review applies when an appellate
court reviews a trial court's judgment on a motion to dismiss
for lack of in personam jurisdiction.   Hiller Invs. Inc. v.
Insultech Group, Inc., 957 So. 2d 1111 (Ala. 2006);  Elliott
v. Van Kleef, 830 So. 2d 726 (Ala. 2002).  The plaintiff has
the burden of proving that the trial court has personal
1051732
5
jurisdiction over the defendant.  Ex parte Covington Pike
Dodge, Inc., 904 So. 2d 226 (Ala. 2004).   
"'In considering a Rule 12(b)(2), Ala.
R. Civ. P., motion to dismiss for want of
personal 
jurisdiction, 
a 
court 
must
consider as true the allegations of the
plaintiff's complaint not controverted by
the defendant's affidavits.  Robinson v.
Giamarco & Bill, P.C., 74 F.3d 253 (11th
Cir. 1996), and Cable/Home Communications
Corp. v. Network Productions, Inc., 902
F.2d 829 (11th Cir. 1990), and "where the
plaintiff's complaint and the defendant's
affidavits conflict, the ... court must
construe all reasonable inferences in favor
of the plaintiff."  Robinson, 74 F.3d at
255 (quoting Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510,
1514 (11th Cir. 1990)). "For purposes of
this appeal [on the issue of in personam
jurisdiction] the facts as alleged by the
... plaintiff will be considered in a light
most favorable to the him [or her]." Duke
v. Young, 496 So. 2d 37, 38 (Ala. 1986).'
"Ex parte McInnis, 820 So. 2d 795, 798 (Ala. 2001)."
Ex parte Puccio, 923 So. 2d 1069, 1072 (Ala. 2005).  When a
defendant files a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction and supports that motion with an affidavit, the
plaintiff is then required to controvert that affidavit with
his or her own affidavit or other competent evidence to
survive the motion to dismiss.  Ex parte Duck Boo Int'l Co.,
[Ms. 1061114, November 16, 2007]      So. 2d     (Ala. 2007).
1051732
6
Even though Myrita filed no affidavit with her motion to
dismiss, J.C. Duke responded to her motion with an affidavit.
Discussion
With regard to personal jurisdiction, this Court has
stated:
"Rule 4.2(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., Alabama's 'long-
arm' provision, governs whether an Alabama court may
exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state
defendant. In pertinent part, that rule states:
"'(b) Basis for Out-of-State Service.
An appropriate basis exists for service of
process outside of this state upon a person
or entity in any action in this state when
the person or entity has such contacts with
this state that the prosecution of the
action against the person or entity in this
state 
is 
not 
inconsistent 
with 
the
constitution 
of 
this 
state 
or 
the
Constitution of the United States ....'
"This rule extends the personal jurisdiction of
Alabama courts to the limit of due process under the
United 
States 
and Alabama Constitutions. When
applying Rule 4.2(b), this Court has interpreted the
due 
process 
guaranteed 
under 
the 
Alabama
Constitution as coextensive with that guaranteed
under the United States Constitution. See Elliott
[v. Van Kleef], 830 So. 2d [726] at 730 [(Ala.
2004)].
"The analytical framework applicable here was
thoroughly described in Elliott:
"'The 
Due 
Process 
Clause 
of 
the
Fourteenth Amendment permits a forum state
to subject a nonresident defendant to its
1051732
7
courts 
only 
when 
that 
defendant 
has
sufficient "minimum contacts" with the
forum state. International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct.
154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). The critical
question with regard to the nonresident
defendant's 
contacts 
is 
whether 
the
contacts are such that the nonresident
defendant "'should reasonably anticipate
being haled into court'" in the forum
state. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471
U.S. 462, 473, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d
528 (1985), quoting World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295, 100
S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980). The
sufficiency of a party's contacts are
assessed as follows:
"'"Two types of contacts can
form 
a 
basis 
for 
personal
jurisdiction: general contacts
and specific contacts. General
contacts, which give rise to
general 
personal jurisdiction,
consist 
of 
the 
defendant's
contacts with the forum state
that are unrelated to the cause
of action and that are both
'continuous 
and 
systematic.'
Helicopteros 
Nacionales 
de
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S.
408, 414 n. 9, 415, 104 S.Ct.
1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984);
[citations 
omitted]. 
Specific
contacts, which give rise to
specific jurisdiction, consist of
the defendant's contacts with the
forum state that are related to
the cause of action. Burger King
Corp., 471 U.S. at 472-75, 105
S.Ct. 
2174, 
85 
L.Ed.2d 
528
(1985). 
Although 
the 
related
1051732
8
contacts need not be continuous
and systematic, they must rise to
such a level as to cause the
defendant to anticipate being
haled into court in the forum
state. Id."
"'Ex parte Phase III Constr., Inc., 723 So.
2d 1263, 1266 (Ala. 1998) (Lyons, J.,
concurring in the result). Furthermore,
this Court has held that, for specific in
personam jurisdiction, there must exist "a
clear, firm nexus between the acts of the
defendant and the consequences complained
of." Duke v. Young, 496 So. 2d 37, 39 (Ala.
1986). ...
"'In the case of either general in
personam 
jurisdiction 
or 
specific 
in
personam jurisdiction, "[t]he 'substantial
connection' between the defendant and the
forum state necessary for a finding of
minimum contacts must come about by an
action 
of 
the 
defendant 
purposefully
directed toward the forum State."  Asahi
Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of
California, 480 U.S. 102, 112, 107 S.Ct.
1026, 
94 
L.Ed.2d 
92 
(1987). 
This
purposeful-availment requirement assures
that a defendant will not be haled into a
jurisdiction 
as 
a 
result 
of 
"'the
unilateral activity of another person or a
third person.'" Burger King, 471 U.S. at
475, 105 S.Ct. 2174, quoting Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466
U.S. 408, 417, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d
404 (1984).
"'Only after such minimum contacts
have been established does a court then
consider those contacts in the light of
other factors –- such as the burden on the
1051732
9
defendant of litigating in the forum state
and 
the 
forum 
state's 
interest 
in
adjudicating the dispute, Burger King, 471
U.S. at 476-77, 105 S.Ct. 2174 –- to
determine whether the exercise of personal
jurisdiction 
over 
the 
nonresident 
defendant
comports with "'traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.'" Brooks v.
Inlow, 453 So. 2d 349, 351 (Ala. 1984),
quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at
316, 66 S.Ct. 154.'
"830 So.2d at 730-31."
Hiller Investments, 957 So. 2d at 1114-16 (emphasis omitted).
The threshold question presented here is whether, for the
purposes of a motion to dismiss, Myrita has sufficient minimum
contacts with Alabama so as to reasonably anticipate being
haled into court in Alabama in an action in which J.C. Duke
alleges that Clements-West, the corporation, is the alter ego
of Myrita, a corporate officer.  We addressed a similar issue
in Ex parte Puccio, supra. Ex parte Puccio involved plaintiffs
who sued a nonprofit credit-counseling corporation and one of
its corporate officers, John Puccio.  The plaintiffs alleged
that the corporation had made false representations regarding
a debt-management program.  They argued that the corporation
acted as Puccio's alter ego to allow Puccio to avoid personal
liability and to gain personal profits for himself.  Puccio
1051732
Although 
personal 
jurisdiction over an individual
1
corporate officer cannot be based solely on jurisdiction over
the 
corporation, 
a 
corporate 
agent 
who 
personally
participates, albeit in his capacity as such agent, in a tort
is personally liable for the tort, and the status as an agent
of the corporation does not insulate the agent personally from
his jurisdictional contacts with a state.  See Ex parte
McInnis, 820 So. 2d 795 (Ala. 2001)(holding that two
nonresident corporate officers had sufficient contacts with
Alabama to support exercise of personal jurisdiction in a
products-liability action arising from a fatal explosion where
the corporate officers had made trips to Alabama to develop
this state as a market). 
10
filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that he lacked sufficient
minimum contacts with Alabama to satisfy the requirements of
personal jurisdiction.  He argued that personal jurisdiction
over him as a corporate officer could not be based on the
trial court's jurisdiction over the corporation.  Puccio
supported his motion to dismiss with an affidavit stating that
he had no financial interests in Alabama, that he had never
communicated with the plaintiffs, and that he had signed an
agreement between the plaintiffs and the corporation solely in
his capacity as president of the corporation.
The Puccio Court noted that personal jurisdiction over an
individual corporate officer could not be predicated upon
jurisdiction over the corporation.   However, this Court held
1
that if a corporation is the alter ego of an individual, then
1051732
11
the court may disregard the corporate form and exercise
personal jurisdiction over the individual because attributing
the contacts to the individual defendant reflects the reality
that although the contacts were ostensibly those of the
corporation, the individual was the true actor.  In his
affidavit, Puccio did not address the factual allegations in
the complaint addressing whether the corporation was Puccio's
alter ego.  Rather, Puccio stated that he was not an Alabama
resident and that he did not have sufficient minimum contacts
with Alabama for the trial court to exercise jurisdiction over
him. "In construing the allegations in the [plaintiffs']
complaint not controverted by Puccio as true, as we are
required to do for the purposes of Puccio's motion to dismiss,
... we cannot say that the trial court erred in denying the
motion."  Ex parte Puccio, 923 So. 2d at 1076.
In the present case, Myrita argued that J.C. Duke's
claims against her should be dismissed because she had no
contacts with the State of Alabama; she had never traveled to
Alabama for any purposes related to the transaction that is
the basis of the allegations of the complaint.  She also
stated that she is an officer of Clements-West, but that her
1051732
12
status as a corporate officer alone is insufficient to support
personal jurisdiction.  Myrita fails to deny J.C. Duke's
allegations that the trial court had personal jurisdiction
over her because Clements-West's contacts with Alabama were
sufficient to give the trial court jurisdiction over it and
Clements-West was the alter ego of Myrita and was controlled
by Myrita.  The allegations in the complaint were not disputed
in any affidavit attached to the motion to dismiss, because
Myrita did not file an affidavit. Myrita has offered no
evidence to counter the allegations in J.C. Duke's complaint;
thus, these uncontroverted allegations establish the trial
court's personal jurisdiction.  Therefore, the trial court
erred in dismissing J.C. Duke's action against Myrita for lack
of personal jurisdiction.  Accordingly, the judgment of the
trial court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  We note that we
make no judgment concerning the merits of J.C. Duke's claims
against 
Myrita. 
Additionally, 
the 
issue 
of 
personal
jurisdiction may be raised again by a defendant who
appropriately persists in challenging it in his or her answer,
in a motion for a summary judgment, or at the trial on the
1051732
13
merits, where proof by substantial evidence may be necessary
to prove the plaintiff's jurisdictional allegations in the
complaint.  Ex parte McInnis, 820 So. 2d 795 (Ala. 2001).  
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Stuart, and Murdock, JJ., concur.