Title: Merritt v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 104, 2018
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: November 5, 2018

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DAVID MERRITT, 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 104, 2018 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court    
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
Cr. ID No. N0903001739  
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
Submitted: August 8, 2018 
Decided: 
November 5,2018 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; SEITZ and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
(1) 
This appeal is from the Superior Court’s summary dismissal of the 
appellant’s second motion for postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal 
Rule 61.1  The State has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment on the 
ground that it is manifest on the face of the appellant’s opening that the appeal is 
without merit.  We agree and affirm. 
(2) 
The appellant, David Merritt, was tried in 2010 on charges that he 
sexually abused a minor.  At the close of the State’s case, Merritt’s trial counsel 
moved unsuccessfully for a judgment of acquittal.  The jury convicted Merritt of 
                                         
1 State v. Merritt, 2018 WL 11690644 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2018).  
2 
 
eight counts of Rape First Degree and one count of Continuous Sexual Abuse of a 
Child.  On direct appeal, Merritt’s appellate counsel argued that he was denied the 
right to proceed pro se at trial.  We concluded that the claim was without merit and 
affirmed Merritt’s convictions.2 
(3) 
Merritt’s first motion for postconviction relief as amended and his 
related motions for the appointment of counsel and for an evidentiary hearing were 
referred to a Superior Court Commissioner.  After considering counsel’s affidavit 
responding to the allegations of ineffective counsel, the State’s response to the 
motion, and Merritt’s reply, the Commissioner issued a report recommending that 
the postconviction motion and other motions should be denied.3  The Commissioner 
determined, in relevant part, that Merritt’s stand-alone claims of prosecutorial 
misconduct and insufficient evidence were procedurally barred under Rule 61 
because the issues were raised and ruled on at trial and were not pursued on direct 
appeal.  The Commissioner determined that the ineffective counsel claims were 
without merit because Merritt did not establish any deficiencies in his counsel's 
representation or any prejudice from the alleged deficiencies.  After considering 
Merritt’s objections to the report and recommendation and conducting a de novo 
                                         
2 Merritt v. State, 2011 WL 285097 (Del. Jan. 27, 2011). 
3 State v. Merritt, 2012 WL 5944433 (Del. Super. Comm’r Nov. 20, 2012). 
3 
 
review of the record, the Superior Court adopted the report and recommendation and 
denied Merritt’s first motion for postconviction relief. 
(4) 
On appeal from the denial of his first motion for postconviction relief, 
Merritt argued that his trial counsel failed to effectively challenge the sufficiency of 
the State’s proffered evidence of penetration, an essential element of first degree 
rape.  We disagreed and affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment.4 
(5) 
Merritt’s second motion for postconviction relief raised the same 
claims as his first postconviction motion.  Merritt also filed numerous motions in 
conjunction with the motion, including a motion to withdraw the postconviction 
motion and to replace it with another version of the motion.  The motion to withdraw 
and replace was granted by the Superior Court.         
(6) 
Merritt’s replacement postconviction motion raised two claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  Merritt claimed that he would have been granted 
a directed verdict or a judgment of acquittal based on insufficient evidence of 
penetration had his trial counsel timely objected to the prosecutor’s use of an 
“anatomically incorrect” hand gesture simulating a penis penetrating a vagina.  
Second, Merritt claimed that his trial counsel’s failure to interview an eyewitness—
namely, the complaining witness’ younger sister—deprived him of an actual 
innocence defense.  According to Merritt, had the jury heard the trial testimony of 
                                         
4 Merritt v. State, 2013 WL 5432824 (Del. Sept. 24, 2013). 
4 
 
the complainant’s younger sister, he would have been found not guilty because the 
younger sister would have testified that she was not aware of any abuse.  Merritt 
contends that evidence of the younger sister’s lack of awareness of the alleged sexual 
abuse was crucial to his defense because it contradicted the complaining witness’ 
testimony that her younger sister was in the room when some of the sexual abuse 
occurred.      
(7) 
By order dated January 29, 2018, the Superior Court summarily 
dismissed Merritt’s second postconviction motion under Rule 61(d)(2).5  On appeal 
from that decision, Merritt argues that the Superior Court erred when summarily 
dismissing the motion.  His argument is without merit. 
(8) 
Rule 61(d)(2) provides: 
 
A second or subsequent motion under this rule shall be 
summarily dismissed, unless the movant was convicted after a trial and 
the motion either: 
 
 
(i) 
pleads with particularity that new evidence exists that 
creates a strong inference that the movant is actually innocent in fact of 
the acts underlying the charges of which he was convicted; or 
 
 
(ii) 
pleads with particularity a claim that a new rule of 
constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the 
United States Supreme Court or the Delaware Supreme Court, applies 
to the movant’s case and renders the conviction or death sentence 
invalid. 
  
                                         
5 Supra note 1. 
5 
 
(9) 
Merritt’s claims do not satisfy either standard in Rule 61(d)(2).  None 
of the constitutional violations advanced by Merritt arise from a “new rule of 
constitutional law.”6  Merritt simply rehashes his previously-adjudicated ineffective 
counsel claims and raises a new claim that he was entitled to the appointment of 
counsel for his first postconviction motion.  Merritt also cannot demonstrate that the 
younger sister’s lack of awareness of the alleged sexual abuse constitutes “new 
evidence.”  The evidence at trial included a videotaped interview of the younger 
sister and a detective’s trial testimony, both of which indicated that the younger sister 
was unaware of the alleged abuse.7  Finally, where the evidence at trial included the 
complaining witness’s lengthy and detailed testimony describing the acts of sexual 
intercourse committed by Merritt on a weekly basis over a period of three years, 
Merritt cannot demonstrate that the younger sister’s lack of awareness of the alleged 
sexual abuse creates “a strong inference” of his actual innocence.8 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is 
GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/Gary F. Traynor 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           Justice 
                                         
6 Rule 61(d)(2)(ii). 
7 Rule 61(d)(2)(i).  Cf. Sykes v. State, 2018 WL 4932731 (Del. Oct. 10, 2018) (finding that the 
defendant did not satisfy the “new evidence” requirement in Rule 61(d)(2)(i) when the defendant 
presented “no argument that his so-called new evidence was not actually discovered”). 
8 Rule 61(d)(2)(i).