Title: Jackson v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 971720
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 17, 1998

Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, and 
Kinser, JJ., and Whiting, Senior Justice 
 
CHAUNCEY JACOB JACKSON 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v. Record Nos. 971720 & 971721 SENIOR JUSTICE HENRY H. WHITING 
 
 
 
April 17, 1998 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 
Lydia Calvert Taylor, Judge 
 
 
In these appeals, we review a capital murder conviction, a 
sentence of death (Record No. 971720), and five other related 
felony convictions (Record No. 971721). 
I. PROCEEDINGS 
 
On September 1, 1994, 16-year-old Chauncey Jacob Jackson 
was arrested and incarcerated on charges of capital murder and 
five other felonies.1  The alleged crimes had all occurred the 
day before.  On September 21, 1994, the Norfolk Juvenile and 
Domestic Relations District Court issued transfer orders 
pursuant to Code § 16.1-269.1, certifying Jackson to the circuit 
court for criminal proceedings as an adult on those charges. 
On October 5, 1994, indictments were issued in the circuit 
court charging Jackson with the following six felonies: (1) the 
capital murder of Ronald Gene Bonney, Jr., while attempting to 
rob him (Code §§ 18.2-31(4), 18.2-10), (2) attempted robbery 
                     
1 Although Jackson's middle name is shown as "Jacob" in the 
pleadings and in many of the documents in the file, he described 
and spelled it as "Jabob" in his statements to the police.  
(Code §§ 18.2-58, 18.2-26), (3) and (4) two charges of the use 
of a firearm while committing the above-mentioned offenses (Code 
§§ 18.2-53.1, 18.2-10), (5) the conspiracy to commit a robbery 
(Code §§ 18.2-22, 18.2-58, 18.2-10), and (6) the receipt of 
stolen property (§§ 18.2-108, 18.2-95).  The trial date was 
fixed and continued eight times, six times on Jackson’s motion 
and two times on joint motion of Jackson and the Commonwealth. 
During the 23-month interval between the date of the 
transfer order and August 21, 1996, when Jackson’s trial began, 
it was discovered that indictments had been issued before the 
circuit court conducted the review of Jackson’s transfer 
required by Code § 16.1-269.6.  On June 23, 1995, after 
conducting the required review, a circuit judge other than the 
trial judge concluded that the applicable statutes had been 
complied with and authorized the Commonwealth to proceed against 
Jackson by indictment.  However, Jackson was not indicted on 
these charges for the second time until December 6, 1995. 
 
At the beginning of a bifurcated jury trial on August 21, 
1996, Jackson was arraigned on the December 1995 indictments.  
The trial was conducted pursuant to the provisions of Code 
§§ 19.2-264.3, -264.4, and –295.1, and Jackson was found guilty 
of all six charges.  After hearing additional evidence, the jury 
fixed Jackson’s punishment for the capital murder conviction at 
death, based on the “future dangerousness” predicate.  Code 
 
2
§ 19.2-264.2.  After considering a report prepared by a 
probation officer pursuant to Code § 19.2-264.5, the court 
sentenced Jackson in accordance with the jury verdict in the 
capital murder case.  Since he was a juvenile when the offenses 
were committed, the court sentenced Jackson on the remaining 
offenses in conformity with Code §§ 16.1-269.1 and -272 to terms 
of imprisonment aggregating 48 years.  The court suspended 
eighteen years of the sentence for the conviction of receiving 
stolen goods, subject to 20 years’ probation. 
 
Pursuant to Code § 17-110.1(F), we have consolidated the 
automatic review of Jackson’s death sentence with the appeal of 
right of his capital murder conviction.  By order entered August 
14, 1997, Jackson’s appeal of his other convictions was 
certified from the Court of Appeals, Code § 17-116.06, and we 
have consolidated that appeal with the capital murder appeal and 
given them priority on our docket.  Code § 17-110.2. 
II. THE EVIDENCE 
 
We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the circuit court.  Roach 
v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 324, 329, 468 S.E.2d 98, 101, cert. 
denied, 519 U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 365 (1996). 
A. Guilt Phase  
The day after Bonney’s murder, Jackson made a series of 
four oral statements to police investigators.  The first 
 
3
statement was not recorded, but the remaining three statements 
were recorded and transcribed.  The following facts appear in 
one or more of those statements. 
On the evening of August 31, 1994, Jackson was riding in a 
Jeep Cherokee driven by his friend, Rashad Vick.  Vick stopped 
the vehicle when three other friends, standing near a so-called 
"dope house" on Vine Street, waved at them.  One of the three 
friends suggested robbing a man, later identified as Ronald Gene 
Bonney, Jr., who was within sight, seated in the driver’s seat 
of a Chevrolet Blazer parked nearby.  Jackson and Vick agreed. 
Accordingly, two of the group acted as "lookouts."  Jackson 
procured a .25 caliber Beretta handgun from the Jeep.  
Accompanied by Calvin Outlaw and Angelo Artis, the other two 
members of the group, Jackson approached the parked vehicle.  
Outlaw placed his leg against the driver’s door, next to Bonney, 
and later took the keys from the ignition switch when Bonney 
tried to drive away.  Jackson, armed with the handgun, entered 
the front seat of the vehicle from the passenger’s side, and, 
according to his last statement, Jackson told Bonney to “[g]ive 
it up.”  Bonney then “started patting his pockets and said, 
‘Give what up?’ . . . .  And then [Bonney] said, ‘Shoot me, you 
little f--ker.’  And then I cocked the gun, and then Angelo 
stepped up, and the gun jammed, and I tried to unjam it, and it 
shot.”  The gun fired three bullets which hit Bonney in the 
 
4
chest and arm and caused his death. 
Jackson fled in the Jeep.  He was arrested late that night 
and brought to police investigators for an interview at 7:20 
a.m. 
B. Penalty Phase 
The Commonwealth introduced evidence of Jackson’s criminal 
record.  It began with a finding that he was not innocent of the 
theft of a car when he was 13 years old and included, a few 
months later, a finding that he was not innocent of receiving 
stolen property.  When Jackson was 14 years old, he was also 
found not innocent of possession of cocaine.  Additionally, 
Jackson was found not innocent of a number of offenses dealing 
with motor vehicles, such as unauthorized use of an inspection 
sticker, driving without a license, altered license plates, and 
speeding.  Many of the offenses were committed while Jackson was 
on probation for earlier offenses. 
Jackson had been incarcerated for more than 13 months on 
the present charges when he was released on bond on October 24, 
1995.  In December 1995, while free on bond awaiting trial for 
the subject offenses, Jackson was involved with several other 
persons in the unlawful entry of a house in Jackson’s 
neighborhood, and later convicted of the following 14 felony 
charges arising therefrom: statutory burglary, four abductions, 
 
5
robbery, attempted robbery, and seven charges of use of a 
firearm during the commission of those crimes. 
Additionally, an inmate testified that Jackson, again 
incarcerated after the December 1995 incidents, assaulted him in 
jail on February 9, 1996.  This assault occurred less than two 
months after Jackson had committed the December 1995 crimes and 
before his capital murder trial in August and September 1996. 
Jackson called as witnesses Dr. Evan S. Nelson and Dr. 
Thomas Pasquale, both forensic psychologists, who had examined 
and evaluated him.  Both testified that Jackson had an 
antisocial personality disorder, basing their diagnosis in part 
on Jackson’s history of aggressive acts.  Dr. Nelson assessed 
Jackson as having a high number of “risk factors” for violent 
conduct and Dr. Pasquale at one time had evaluated Jackson as 
being a “moderate to severe [assault] risk.”  However, both 
psychologists declined to say that Jackson would be a future 
danger to society.  Dr. Nelson felt that an affirmative answer 
to the question required a psychologist to “predict with 
certainty that someone will commit an offense of violence in the 
future.”  Dr. Pasquale “follow[ed] the guidelines of the 
American Psychological Association" which state that 
“psychologists are best not to make such predictions due to the 
fact that we have not developed the circumstances sufficiently 
to be able to do so.” 
 
6
Although both psychologists testified that an antisocial 
personality disorder cannot be cured, Dr. Pasquale opined that a 
person with such a disorder could be “amenable to management.”  
On the other hand, Dr. Nelson thought that Jackson’s history of 
continued violent acts, especially when under the constraints of 
probation, bond, and incarceration awaiting trial on these 
charges, was a “very negative indicator for how much change 
[from his violent acts against Bonney] we can expect from him 
over the years.”  
 
Jackson’s mother and grandmother, with whom Jackson lived, 
testified that Jackson had been a normal child, and that they 
had a good relationship with him.  The grandmother said that 
Jackson had been a good boy “until, you know, he got with the 
wrong bunch of kids.”  And the mother testified that Jackson 
received a “long-term” suspension from school because, while 
waiting in the school office for some sort of a disciplinary 
interview, Jackson had told another student that he would kill 
“somebody” if he were suspended from school. 
Neighbors and persons who had contact with Jackson when he 
was living at home described him as “respectful,” “polite,” and 
“courteous.”  A member of Jackson’s community also testified 
that Jackson called her to ask “how [she] was doing” after an 
operation. 
 
7
One of the members of the family that was burglarized and 
robbed by Jackson and other intruders in December 1995 testified 
that she knew Jackson and that he “just stood there” and “had 
some tears in his eyes” during the robbery.  However, she also 
testified that Jackson had a gun and, like the other intruders, 
was wearing a hood that partially masked his face. 
III. WAIVER OF CERTAIN ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
Jackson did not brief, and has therefore waived, 
assignments of error 6, 9, 12, 21, 29, and 32.  Rule 5:27; Rule 
5:17(c)(4); Williams v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 528, 537, 450 
S.E.2d 365, 372 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1161 (1995).2
IV. ISSUES PREVIOUSLY DECIDED 
 
In the remaining assignments of error, Jackson raises a 
number of issues which we have previously decided adversely to 
his contentions.  Because he offers no persuasive reasons to 
modify our previous conclusions, and we perceive none, we will 
adhere to our previous rejections of those contentions.  Hence, 
we will not discuss these contentions beyond identifying the 
assignments of error to which we believe each contention relates 
and citing representative cases in which those arguments were 
                     
2 It has been difficult to ascertain which assignments of error 
have been briefed or which of the 37 assignments of error relate 
to the 29 questions presented by Jackson.  Jackson has not given 
“a clear and exact reference to the particular assignment of 
error to which each question relates” as required by Rule 5:27 
 
8
expressly rejected.  
The death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.  
Rejected in Goins v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 442, 453, 470 S.E.2d 
114, 122, cert. denied, 519 U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 222 (1996); 
Joseph v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 78, 82, 452 S.E.2d 862, 865, 
cert. denied, 516 U.S. 876 (1995). 
“[I]mposition of the death penalty based on ‘future 
dangerousness’ is unconstitutional because the use of [a] prior 
unadjudicated factor is permitted without any requirement that 
the conduct be established by any standard of proof.”  Rejected 
in Breard v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 68, 74-75, 445 S.E.2d 670, 
675, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 97l (1994); Satcher v. Commonwealth, 
244 Va. 220, 228, 421 S.E.2d 821, 826 (1992), cert. denied, 507 
U.S. 933 (1993); Stockton v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 192, 210, 402 
S.E.2d 196, 206, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 902 (1991). 
The statute and the court’s instructions in conformity 
thereto which permit imposition of the death penalty based on 
“future dangerousness” are unconstitutional because they are 
“incomplete and vague” and do not provide “meaning and 
guidance.”  Rejected in Williams v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. at 
535, 450 S.E.2d at 371. 
Allowing the introduction of evidence of Jackson’s 
                                                                  
and 5:17(c)(4).  Indeed, he rarely refers to the assignments of 
error by number in the arguments in his brief. 
 
9
convictions for other crimes in the sentencing phase to 
establish future dangerousness violates the double jeopardy 
clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.  
Rejected in Mickens v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 395, 404, 442 
S.E.2d 678, 684-85, vacated on other grounds,  513 U.S. 922 
(1994); Stewart v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 222, 229, 427 S.E.2d 
394, 400, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 848 (1993); Yeatts v. 
Commonwealth, 242 Va. 121, 126, 410 S.E.2d 254, 258 (1991), 
cert. denied, 503 U.S. 946 (1992). 
This Court’s method of reviewing the proportionality of the 
sentence by considering the records only of those murder cases 
in which sentences of death were imposed and not of those murder 
cases in which lesser sentences were imposed is invalid.  
Rejected in Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260, 283-84, 257 
S.E.2d 808, 824 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 972 (1980) (“test 
is not whether a jury may have declined to recommend the death 
penalty in a particular case but whether generally juries in 
this jurisdiction impose the death sentence for conduct similar 
to that of the defendant”). 
V. PRETRIAL MATTERS 
A. Discovery of Exculpatory Evidence 
Jackson complains that the trial court did not “order 
appropriate relief” when it failed to require the Commonwealth 
to produce “exculpatory statements, evidence or admissions,” and 
 
10
to “ensure that no such evidence existed; or, in the event that 
it did exist, that it be provided for counsel for the 
defendant.”  However, he does not state in what respects the 
court failed to provide such relief or how Jackson was 
prejudiced thereby. 
As the Commonwealth observes on brief, the record indicates 
that Jackson was supplied with all exculpatory evidence within 
the Commonwealth’s knowledge, which he used at trial.  
Accordingly, we find no merit in this contention. 
B. Suppression of Jackson’s Statements to Police 
Jackson does not dispute the sufficiency of the 
Commonwealth's evidence indicating that before his in-custody 
interrogation by the police, he was fully advised of his Fifth 
Amendment rights as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436, 467-73, 479 (1966).  Although a juvenile, Jackson was not 
unfamiliar with these rights as evidenced by his statement to 
Investigator John R. Malbon that he had previously been arrested 
and informed of his legal rights "about three times."  Malbon 
testified that while being advised of his rights, Jackson 
appeared "calm" and "alert."  In any case, Jackson does not 
contend that he failed to understand either his rights or the 
effect of a waiver but rather that the police engaged in a 
strategy designed to capitalize on Jackson's youth and 
isolation.  His claim is that the police interrogated him for 
 
11
"approximately 25 to 28 hours" and placed him “in a situation 
where he was deprived of sleep, deprived of the advice and 
counsel of his mother, [and he] was placed in a small windowless 
interrogation room for hours on end, and denied repeated access 
by his parent to him despite her best efforts.” 
We find no support in the record for Jackson’s statement 
that he was deprived of sleep and interrogated for 25 to 28 
hours.  Jackson was brought to the Norfolk Police Department on 
the night of Bonney’s murder and put in a temporary holding 
cell.  Although he was awakened several times during the night 
and offered food, water, and use of the bathroom, Jackson was 
permitted to sleep until 7:05 the following morning. 
The investigators interrogated Jackson four separate times 
between 7:20 a.m. and 1:59 the next morning.  These sessions, 
together with related contacts setting up the interviews and 
permitting Jackson to review the written transcripts of the 
preceding two interrogations, totaled four hours and thirty-
eight minutes.  The longest uninterrupted period of contact with 
Jackson was one hour and twenty minutes.  After each contact, 
Jackson was left alone either in a locked cell or a locked 
interview room while police investigated the accuracy of his 
statements. 
Jackson decided not to testify at the pretrial hearing on 
the admissibility of his confession and called his mother, Carol 
 
12
Lee Jackson, as his only witness on this subject.  Her testimony 
focused primarily on the alleged delay by the police in 
permitting her to see her son.  
Jackson does not claim that he asked for the presence of 
his mother,3 but suggests that police interrogation of a 16-year-
old juvenile without the presence of one of his parents is a 
violation of his constitutional rights.  In Wright v. 
Commonwealth, 245 Va. 177, 185-86, 427 S.E.2d 379, 385-86 
(1993), vacated on other grounds, 512 U.S. 1217 (1994), we 
rejected the contention of a juvenile capital murder defendant 
that his confession was involuntary in part because his mother 
was not present at the interrogation.  Like Jackson, Wright had 
been advised of his rights when arrested on prior occasions and 
had knowingly waived those rights before making the statement at 
issue.  Perceiving no significant difference between the 
situation in Wright and the situation in this case, we reject 
Jackson's suggestion. 
The alleged police delay in honoring Ms. Jackson’s request 
to see her son is irrelevant to the issue of the voluntariness 
of his statements.  As the United States Supreme Court observed 
in Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422 (1986), “[e]vents 
                     
3 Jackson did ask whether his mother was in the building during 
his interrogation and was told that she was not.  Therefore, we 
do not consider the effect, if any, of a police officer's 
 
13
occurring outside of the presence of the suspect and entirely 
unknown to him surely can have no bearing on the capacity to 
comprehend and knowingly relinquish a constitutional right."  In 
Moran, the police failed to tell a suspect in custody that his 
attorney was trying to reach him.  Id. at 433.  Under these 
circumstances, the Constitution of Virginia provides no greater 
protection than the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.  See Walton v. City of Roanoke, 204 Va. 678, 682, 
133 S.E.2d 315, 318 (1963).  Hence, we find no violation of 
Jackson’s rights under either constitution because of the 
failure of the police to permit Ms. Jackson immediate access to 
her son.  For these reasons, we conclude that Jackson's 
statements were the product of his free will, made after a 
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his Miranda 
rights.  See Wright, 245 Va. at 185-86, 427 S.E.2d at 385-86. 
C. Change of Venue  
Jackson complains that the trial court denied him the 
opportunity to present evidence of pre-trial publicity.  
Jackson further alleges that the trial court had “clearly made 
up her mind on the issue of pre-trial publicity, and ultimately 
on the motion for change of venue.” 
 
Contrary to these claims, the record shows that the trial 
                                                                  
failure to honor a request by a juvenile for the presence of a 
parent or guardian during an in-custody interrogation.   
 
14
court merely told Jackson’s counsel that his oral proffer was 
insufficient to schedule a hearing on this issue at that time.  
However, the court permitted counsel a period of more than three 
weeks in which to produce affidavits indicating that an 
impartial jury could not be selected in Norfolk, after which the 
court would consider fixing a date to hear evidence from both 
sides on that issue.  No affidavits were produced and, in fact, 
Jackson filed no newspaper articles or other information with 
the court. 
Thus, the court was not presented with evidence sufficient 
to overcome the "presumption that a defendant can receive a fair 
trial from the citizens of the county or city in which the 
offense occurred.”  Stockton v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 124, 137, 
314 S.E.2d 371, 379, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 873 (1984).  Hence, 
we reject this contention. 
D. Jury Matters 
1. 
Refusal to strike entire venire 
 
As prospective members of the jury sat in the courtroom 
completing jury questionnaires, the court conducted sentencing 
proceedings in an unrelated matter and explained to those 
parties that, although a defendant in a pre-1995 case may be 
eligible for parole, an exact calculation of how much time he 
would serve was impossible.  Jackson asked the court to strike 
 
15
the panel because this explanation was made within the hearing 
of his venire. 
As soon as Jackson raised the issue, the court asked the 
entire venire who among them had heard its discussion.  Although 
20 panel members indicated that they had heard parts of the 
court’s explanations, none of them was among the venire 
comprising panel members from whom the jury was actually 
selected.  Under these circumstances, we find no error in the 
trial court’s refusal to strike the entire venire. 
2. Peremptory strikes by the Commonwealth 
In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986), the United 
States Supreme Court held that purposeful discrimination based 
on race in selecting jurors violates the Equal Protection 
Clause.  If an accused makes a prima facie showing of the 
prosecution’s use of peremptory strikes on the basis of race, 
the burden shifts to the prosecution to articulate race-neutral 
reasons for such strikes.  Chichester v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 
311, 323, 448 S.E.2d 638, 646 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 
1166 (1995). 
In exercising its peremptory strikes, the Commonwealth 
removed four black members of the venire.  When challenged as to 
the reasons for three of the four strikes, the Commonwealth gave 
the following explanations: one prospective juror had “fairly 
recent DUI and CCW convictions,” another’s son had been 
 
16
convicted of firearm possession and for selling drugs, and the 
third was a social services employee.  One of the prosecutors 
with experience with social services employees found them to be 
“fairly liberal” and without exception possessed of a belief 
that treatment rather than punishment was a more appropriate way 
of dealing with juvenile offenders.  
Jackson, who is black, does not attack the racial neutrality 
of these statements; instead he claims that they were pretextual 
explanations designed to mask racially discriminatory reasons 
for the peremptory strikes.  Concluding that Jackson has failed 
to carry his burden of showing that the court abused its 
discretion in accepting those explanations, we find no merit in 
this contention.  See James v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 459, 461-
62, 442 S.E.2d 396, 398 (1994).  
3. Refusal to grant Jackson’s strikes for cause 
In reviewing a trial court’s action in denying a motion to 
strike prospective jurors for cause, absent manifest error, we 
defer to the trial court’s exercise of discretion.  Roach, 251 
Va. at 343, 468 S.E.2d at 109; Yeatts v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 
at 134, 410 S.E.2d at 262.  Applying this standard, we find no 
error in the trial court’s refusal to sustain Jackson’s motions 
to strike the following three prospective jurors for cause. 
Robert Lee was one of a group of five prospective jurors 
present when another member of the group asked whether the jury 
 
17
would be able to “say no to the death penalty and yes to life 
but life without parole?”  The court responded: 
No.  The jury has very limited things they’re told to 
do.  They can only do what they’re told to do.  They 
can say life or they can say death.  That’s all 
they're allowed to do. 
 
The court offered to discuss the matter further with the five 
members of the venire and to ask them whether her explanation 
had affected the venire members in any way prejudicial to 
Jackson.  Jackson declined both offers.  Hence, he waived any 
objection he may have had to the court’s response. 
Prospective juror Elizabeth Huffman’s first cousin was the 
wife of the Commonwealth’s attorney for the City of Norfolk.  
The Commonwealth was represented throughout the trial by two 
assistant Commonwealth's attorneys; the Commonwealth’s attorney 
signed none of the pleadings and did not appear at trial. 
 
Ms. Huffman testified that she generally saw her cousin’s 
husband only twice a year at family gatherings and that her 
limited association with him would not affect her ability to 
give Jackson a fair trial.  However, Jackson claims that, 
because she indicated that these family gatherings were at 
Christmas and other important holidays, she “gave the 
insurmountable appearance of bias for a juror in a capital 
murder case.”   We do not agree. 
 
18
The relationship Ms. Huffman had with the Commonwealth’s 
attorney does not disqualify her from sitting on this jury.  See 
Roach, 251 Va. at 343, 468 S.E.2d at 109 (Commonwealth’s 
attorney in capital murder case formerly represented prospective 
juror in matter and prospective juror still regarded him as his 
“personal attorney"); Wise v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 322, 325, 
337 S.E.2d 715, 717 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1112 (1986) 
(Commonwealth’s attorney “golfing buddy” and “long standing” 
friend of prospective juror). 
An illiterate juror was seated over Jackson’s objection.  
Recognizing that illiteracy does not disqualify a juror under 
any statute in Virginia, Jackson contends that seating such a 
person as a juror violates “his rights under the Fifth, Sixth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution” and 
the “strong public policy against seating illiterate jurors.”  
Jackson claims that such a policy is reflected in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1865, which requires a juror in the federal courts to be able 
to read, write, and understand the English language.  Jackson 
argues that “he had the benefit of at most, eleven jurors [and] 
[i]t is unknown what one juror or more, may have said to [the 
illiterate juror] or whether they made any mistakes, intentional 
or unintentional, in reading the written materials.”  
We do not agree with Jackson.  In Virginia, illiteracy does 
not automatically disqualify a person from serving as a juror if 
 
19
the trial court takes steps to assure that the illiterate juror 
has essentially the same opportunity to review the written 
material in the case as the other jurors.  Here, the record 
indicates that virtually all the documentary evidence, the 
court’s instructions to the jury, and the verdict forms were 
read to the jury, and that the illiterate juror was able to have 
any documents read to her by the other jurors.  And we assume 
that the other jurors accurately read the documents to the 
illiterate juror.  
E. Circuit Court Review of Juvenile Court 
 Transfer Proceedings 
 
Jackson raises a number of issues stemming from the nine-
month period before the circuit court reviewed the juvenile 
court’s transfer order. 
As relevant, Code § 16.1-269.6(B) in effect in September 
1994 provided that: 
The circuit court shall, within a reasonable time 
after receipt of the case from the juvenile court (i) 
examine all such papers, reports and orders; (ii) if 
either the juvenile or the attorney for the 
Commonwealth has appealed the transfer decision, 
conduct a hearing to take further evidence on the 
issue of transfer, to determine if there has been 
substantial compliance with § 16.1-269.1, . . . and 
(iii) enter an order either remanding the case to the 
juvenile court or advising the attorney for the 
Commonwealth that he may seek an indictment. 
 
As we have noted earlier, there was no such review before the 
October 1994 indictments were returned.  The review occurred on 
 
20
July 23, 1995.  
Jackson maintains that the court should have sustained his 
motion to quash the October 1994 indictments on the ground that 
they were issued before the circuit court had entered its July 
1995 order authorizing the Commonwealth to proceed by indictment 
against him.  The Commonwealth responds that no such review was 
required in this case because neither party appealed the 
transfer order.  
We do not agree with the Commonwealth.  The statute clearly 
required this review, even if neither party filed an appeal to 
the juvenile court’s transfer order.  If such an appeal is 
filed, the statute required the circuit court to schedule a 
hearing in addition to its review.4
Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court had no 
jurisdiction to try Jackson on the October 1994 indictments.  
Even so, the court had jurisdiction over Jackson following the 
required circuit court review of the transfer order and it could 
and did try him on the indictments issued thereafter. 
 
This brings us to Jackson’s contentions that the court 
should have sustained his motion to dismiss the December 1995 
indictments.  The Commonwealth's attorney sought and obtained 
                     
4 The statute presently in effect does not require the review if 
the transfer decision is not appealed.  Code § 16.1-269.6(B); II 
Acts of Assembly 1996, c. 755, p. 1338. 
 
 
21
those indictments in accordance with the circuit court’s 
authorization order entered after its transfer review in June 
1995.  Jackson reasons that the circuit court never acquired 
jurisdiction over him because it failed to act upon the juvenile 
court’s transfer order within a reasonable time, as required by 
Code § 16.1-269.6(B), and he never had the benefit of a 
subsequent and more current juvenile court transfer review prior 
to his December 1995 indictments.  We find no merit in either 
contention. 
Although the requirement of a transfer review is 
jurisdictional, the time within which that review must be made 
is procedural.  Jamborsky v. Baskins, 247 Va. 506, 511, 442 
S.E.2d 636, 638-39 (1994).  In Jamborsky, we concluded that, 
absent a showing of prejudice to the juvenile’s due process 
rights, a procedural error in conducting the review three days 
after the then statutorily specified 21-day period for review, 
did not invalidate the review.  Id., 442 S.E.2d at 638. 
Here, the nine-month period before conducting the review 
was unreasonable and constituted a procedural error in failing 
to comply with the statute in effect at that time.  However, 
Jackson does not claim that he was prejudiced by the delay in 
conducting the review.  Indeed, the record indicates that 
Jackson treated the case as properly before the circuit court 
and continued his preparation in the same manner before and 
 
22
after he was told on October 24, 1995, of the circuit court’s 
failure to conduct the review of his transfer order within a 
reasonable time.  The record fails to disclose that the 
procedural error prejudiced Jackson in such a manner as to 
constitute a denial of due process.  See id.  Accordingly, we 
find no merit in this contention. 
F. Violation of Rights to a Speedy Trial 
This brings us to Jackson’s contention that his 
constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy trial have been 
violated.  Jackson’s trial did not begin within the periods 
fixed for a speedy trial by Code § 19.2-243 and it may not have 
begun within a period considered as constitutionally permissible 
under normal circumstances. 
However, we find no violation of those rights in these 
cases.  As we have noted, every continuance was either on 
Jackson’s motion alone or a motion he made jointly with the 
Commonwealth.  Under these circumstances, we conclude that 
Jackson has waived his statutory and constitutional rights to a 
speedy trial.  O’Dell v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 672, 681, 364 
S.E.2d 491, 496, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871 (1988); see also 
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 534 (1972).  
Nevertheless, since the circuit court had no jurisdiction 
to try him on the October 1994 indictments, Jackson contends 
that the waivers of his speedy trial rights before his release 
 
23
on bond in October of 1995 were as void as those indictments.  
In deciding whether to transfer Jackson for proper criminal 
proceedings, Code § 16.1-269.1(2) requires the juvenile court to 
find “that probable cause exists to believe that the juvenile 
committed the delinquent act as alleged.”  The delinquent acts 
alleged were the commissions of six felonies referred to 
earlier.  Accordingly, Jackson’s speedy trial rights attached 
upon that determination of probable cause.  Compare Code § 16.1-
269.1(2) with Code § 19.2-243 (speedy trial rights of an accused 
attach upon general district court’s finding of probable cause 
“to believe that the accused has committed a felony”). 
It was those rights that Jackson waived in his motions for 
a continuance of the trial, not any right having to do with the 
validity of the indictments returned against him in the circuit 
court.  For these reasons, we reject this contention. 
VI. THE TRIAL 
A. Guilt Phase Issues 
1. 
Testimony of Lakisha Spruill 
Shortly before the expected close of the Commonwealth’s 
case in chief, it appeared that a recess until the next day 
would be required to obtain the presence of a witness for 
Jackson.  To conserve trial time, the court suggested that the 
Commonwealth rest its case except for some evidence relating to 
Jackson’s failure to conform to court orders to appear in 
 
24
criminal matters and his flight to avoid arrest on an unrelated 
motor vehicle charge.  Defense counsel responded that “I think 
procedurally we cannot do that.”  When the court responded that 
it was “a perfectly acceptable procedure,” defense counsel made 
and argued the motion to strike, which the court considered and 
denied.  
The next day, the Commonwealth called Lakisha Spruill, an 
eyewitness to Jackson's encounter with Bonney.  Jackson objected 
to this action on the ground that the Commonwealth had rested 
its case.  Jackson did not claim that he would be surprised by 
Spruill’s testimony or that he had not talked to her about her 
testimony.  In fact, he had summoned her as a witness.  The 
court overruled the objection, assigning a number of reasons for 
its action, one of which was that it had the discretion to vary 
the order of trial. 
Jackson argues that he was prejudiced by the court’s action 
(1) in requiring him to argue the motion to strike in which he 
pointed out the lack of corroboration of Jackson’s attempted 
robbery of Bonney before the Commonwealth had actually rested 
its case, and (2) in permitting Spruill to testify after Jackson 
had made his motion to strike. 
In the absence of a showing of prejudice, a trial court 
may, in the exercise of its discretion, permit the Commonwealth 
to reopen its case after it has rested and the defendant has 
 
25
moved to strike the evidence.  Hargraves v. Commonwealth, 219 
Va. 604, 608, 248 S.E.2d 814, 816-17 (1978).  We will not 
reverse such a ruling, absent an abuse of discretion.  Id.  
Under the circumstances of this case, and without necessarily 
approving the procedure followed, we are unable to say that the 
court abused its discretion in permitting the Commonwealth to 
call Spruill as a witness after it had rested its case.  Nor can 
we say that the trial court erred in holding that Jackson was 
not prejudiced by its action.  
2. 
Rulings on sufficiency of evidence 
 
Jackson contends that the court erred in overruling his 
motions to strike made at the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s 
case and after both parties had rested their case in the guilt 
phase because the Commonwealth’s evidence was insufficient to 
convict him of the crime of attempted robbery.  He bases his 
claim upon the Commonwealth’s alleged failure to sustain its 
burden of proving that this crime has been committed (the corpus 
delicti).  Maughs v. City of Charlottesville, 181 Va. 117, 120, 
23 S.E.2d 784, 786 (1943) (Commonwealth must prove corpus 
delicti in every criminal prosecution); Nicholas v. 
Commonwealth, 91 Va. 741, 750, 21 S.E. 364, 366-67 (1895). 
(Commonwealth’s burden to establish corpus delicti); see also 
Epperly v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 214, 228-29, 294 S.E.2d 882, 
890-91 (1982). 
 
26
Jackson’s statements, as successively amended, show clearly 
that, pursuant to the agreement with his friends, Jackson 
retrieved the .25 caliber handgun from the Jeep for the purpose 
of robbing Bonney, and that, during the robbery attempt, when 
Bonney refused to give him his money, Jackson stepped out of the 
vehicle and fired the gun three times, killing Bonney.5   
While Jackson recognizes that his statements tend to show 
the corpus delicti of attempted robbery, he argues correctly 
that the corpus delicti cannot be established solely by his 
uncorroborated statements.  Wheeler v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 
665, 669, 66 S.E.2d 605, 607 (1951).  However, only slight 
corroboration of an accused’s statements is required to 
establish the corpus delicti when the accused fully confesses 
that he committed the crime.  Clozza v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 
124, 133, 321 S.E.2d 273, 279 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 
1230 (1985); Lucas v. Commonwealth, 201 Va. 599, 603, 112 S.E.2d 
915, 918 (1960). 
Jackson’s confession of the attempted robbery and murder of 
Bonney was corroborated in many respects.  The passenger who 
came to the scene in Bonney’s Blazer testified that, after 
                     
5 The jury was not required to accept Jackson’s statement that 
the gun fired accidentally while he was attempting to clear a 
jam.  In fact, the pistol was fired three times at some distance 
from Bonney and a firearms expert testified not only that the 
gun would not fire when jammed but also that the trigger had to 
be pulled each time before the gun would fire a single bullet. 
 
27
discussing where to buy crack cocaine, Bonney and the passenger 
went to a house in Norfolk where the passenger knew he could buy 
drugs.  When they arrived, the passenger directed Bonney to wait 
in the Blazer while he went into the house to make the purchase.  
Lakisha Spruill, an eyewitness who was seated on the porch of a 
house next door, saw the passenger leave the Blazer and enter 
the house while the driver remained in the Blazer.  Spruill, who 
had known Jackson for some time, saw him get into the 
passenger’s side of the Blazer, talk to the driver, and the 
“[n]ext thing I heard was gunshots.” 
The circumstantial evidence at the scene of the murder also 
corroborated Jackson’s statements.  A police investigator 
identified Outlaw’s palm print on the driver’s door of Bonney’s 
vehicle and also testified that the keys to Bonney's vehicle 
were not found in the Blazer, supporting Jackson’s statement 
that Outlaw had reached into the car and removed the keys to 
prevent Bonney from driving away.  
In our opinion, these circumstances corroborate Jackson's 
confession that he had killed Bonney during an attempted 
robbery.  The evidence demonstrates that the defendant and a 
confederate converged upon a stranger and engaged in conduct 
designed to prevent the stranger from fleeing while the 
defendant spoke to him and carried a loaded pistol.  This 
corroborating evidence is consistent with a reasonable inference 
 
28
that Jackson was attempting to rob Bonney when he shot him.  
Indeed, this corroborating evidence is more consistent with the 
commission of the offense than it is with its non-commission.  
See Wright v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. at 194, 427 S.E.2d at 390 
(confession to attempted rape corroborated by discovery of 
victim's underpants which had been removed and were found at 
crime scene); cf. Phillips v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 207, 212, 
116 S.E.2d 282, 285 (1960) (corroborating evidence "just as 
consistent with non-commission of the offense as it is with its 
commission"). 
B. Penalty Phase Issues 
1. 
Subjecting 16-year-old defendants to death penalty 
 
Jackson, who had attained his 16th birthday only six weeks 
before the offenses occurred, contends that execution of 16-
year-old defendants is not authorized by statute in Virginia.  
According to him, in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), 
the United States Supreme Court made it “very clear that it is 
up to each state to decide the minimum age for execution” and 
“provide[d] that each state must enact [death penalty statutes] 
with great specificity, especially dealing with juveniles, in 
order to allow for constitutionally sound punishments.”  Since 
Code §§ 18.2-31, 19.2-264.2 and –264.5 do not specifically 
provide for the imposition of the death penalty on juveniles 
convicted of capital murder, Jackson concludes that the death 
 
29
penalty cannot be imposed upon him.  We do not agree. 
Under the provisions of Code §§ 16.1-269.1 and –272, 
juveniles over the age of 14 years are, after proper proceedings 
in juvenile court and circuit court, subject to trial and 
possible punishment as an adult.  Indeed, in the statute in 
effect at the time of the crime, the legislature provided for 
transfer hearings in the juvenile court when such a juvenile is 
charged with capital murder.  Code § 16.1-269.1(B).  In our 
opinion, Code § 16.1-269.1 addresses the prosecution and 
punishment of juveniles in as much detail as the similar 
Kentucky and Missouri statutes which are acknowledged in 
Stanford as sufficient to authorize those states to impose the 
death penalty upon juveniles 16 or 17 years of age. 
Jackson also argues that imposition of the death penalty 
upon a 16-year-old juvenile constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.  In Stanford, the Court stated, “[w]e 
discern neither a historical nor a modern societal consensus 
forbidding the imposition of capital punishment on any person 
who murders at 16 or 17 years of age.”  492 U.S. at 380.   
And we discern no such consensus in Virginia, as evidenced 
by its statutes subjecting juveniles over the age of 14 to 
punishment as adults.  Code §§ 16.1-269.1, -272.  Therefore, we 
conclude that a 16-year-old person who is convicted of capital 
 
30
murder may be subjected to capital punishment.  
2. 
Psychological evaluation under Code § 19.2-264.3:1(F)(1) 
Pursuant to the provisions of Code § 19.2-264.3:1(E), 
Jackson gave notice of his intent to present psychological 
evidence on the issue of mitigation of punishment during the 
penalty phase of the trial.  In response, the Commonwealth 
requested the court to order Jackson to submit to a court-
ordered examination by a psychologist designated by the court as 
provided in Code § 19.2-264.3:1(F)(1) in the following relevant 
language:  
If the attorney for the defendant gives notice 
pursuant to [Code § 19.2-264.3:1(E)] and the 
Commonwealth thereafter seeks an evaluation concerning 
the existence or absence of mitigating circumstances 
relating to the defendant’s mental condition at the 
time of the offense, the court shall appoint one or 
more qualified experts to conduct such an evaluation.  
The court shall order the defendant to submit to such 
an evaluation, and advise the defendant on the record 
in court that a refusal to cooperate with the 
Commonwealth’s expert could result in exclusion of the 
defendant’s expert evidence. 
 
The succeeding paragraph states in pertinent part:  
If the court finds . . . that the defendant has 
refused to cooperate with an evaluation requested by 
the Commonwealth, the court may admit evidence of such 
refusal or, in the discretion of the court, bar the 
defendant from presenting his expert evidence. 
 
Code § 19.2-264.3:1(F)(2).  
Over Jackson’s objection, the court ordered him to submit 
to an evaluation by Dr. Nelson, a forensic psychologist, 
 
31
appointed under the provisions of these statutes.  Jackson 
submitted to the evaluation.  Although Jackson, not the 
Commonwealth, called Dr. Nelson as a witness in his own behalf 
in the penalty phase of the trial, he complains that the court 
erred in several respects in ordering his evaluation by Dr. 
Nelson.  
First, he contends that the evaluation should not have been 
ordered.  According to Jackson, the statute violated his Fifth 
Amendment rights against self-incrimination and his Sixth 
Amendment rights to a fair trial because the statute required 
him to cooperate with a court-appointed psychiatrist or suffer 
the possibility that his expert evidence would be barred.  We 
rejected similar contentions in Stewart v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 
at 243-44, 427 S.E.2d at 407-08, and we apprehend no reason to 
modify our opinion on those issues. 
Second, Jackson maintains that, in ordering the evaluation, 
the court failed to warn Jackson of the consequences of his 
failure to cooperate and ruled erroneously that Dr. Nelson could 
testify in the penalty phase even though Jackson never called 
his own expert on the issue of mitigation.  We do not consider 
either contention because Jackson called Dr. Nelson as his own 
witness.  A defendant in a criminal case cannot take advantage 
of an alleged error he has injected into the record.  Saunders 
v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 399, 400, 177 S.E.2d 637, 638 (1970). 
 
32
Nevertheless, Jackson claims that the court erroneously 
"allowed Dr. Nelson to offer an opinion on Jackson’s future 
dangerousness," which was “an opinion on the ultimate issue of 
fact.”  We do not agree for two reasons.   
First, Dr. Nelson merely testified as to the risk factors 
associated with violence that were exhibited in Jackson’s 
personality and caused him to diagnose Jackson as suffering from 
an antisocial personality disorder.  Dr. Nelson testified 
further that Jackson exhibited more of the risk factors for 
future violent acts “than many of the other [criminal] 
defendants I have evaluated.”  Dr. Nelson quantified neither the 
extent of those factors nor the probability of Jackson’s future 
dangerousness and he did not opine that Jackson would be a 
danger in the future.  Jackson recognizes this in his later 
argument that Dr. Nelson “could not say that Jackson would be a 
danger in the future.”  
Second, even if Dr. Nelson had expressed an opinion of 
Jackson’s “future dangerousness,” such evidence would not have 
constituted an opinion as to the ultimate issue in this case.  
That issue is whether Jackson should be sentenced to death or 
imprisoned for life.  Payne v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 460, 469-
70, 357 S.E.2d 500, 506, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 933 (1987). 
Accordingly, we reject all of Jackson’s claims relating to 
his psychological evaluation and to Dr. Nelson’s testimony. 
 
33
3. 
Sufficiency of Evidence of Future Dangerousness 
Since neither psychologist was willing to predict that 
Jackson would commit criminal acts of violence in the future, 
Jackson argues that the court erred in submitting this issue to 
the jury since it “could only arrive at a verdict by speculation 
and guesswork.”  We disagree. 
Expert opinion is not required on this issue if there is 
sufficient evidence to permit a lay person to conclude that an 
accused would commit criminal acts of violence in the future 
that would constitute a serious danger to society.  Indeed, we 
have held that a jury is entitled to disregard an expert’s 
opinion that a defendant would not be dangerous in the future.  
Saunders v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 107, 114-15, 406 S.E.2d 39, 
43, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 944 (1991).  Rejecting Jackson’s 
contentions, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to 
permit a reasonable person to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Jackson would be dangerous in the future. 
4. 
Instructions refused 
 
Jackson contends the court erroneously refused two 
instructions he tendered, one of which would have told the jury 
that it “must consider a mitigating circumstance if you find 
there is evidence to support it” and the other that the jury was 
not required to fix the punishment at death even if the jury 
found “beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of the 
 
34
aggravating circumstance(s).”  The claim is that these theories 
were not covered by other instructions. 
We disagree.  The only instruction granted in the penalty 
phase told the jury that if it found beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the Commonwealth proved future dangerousness, the jury may 
"fix the punishment of the defendant at death.”  It further 
instructed the jury that “if you believe from all of the 
evidence that the death penalty is not justified," then the jury 
could fix Jackson’s punishment at life imprisonment or life 
imprisonment and a fine.  Since both Jackson’s theories were 
covered by these instructions, he is not entitled to have 
duplicative instructions on those theories.  See, e.g., Tuggle 
v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 493, 508, 323 S.E.2d 539, 548 (1984), 
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1096 (1985), 
aff'd on remand, 230 Va. 99, 334 S.E.2d 838 (1985), cert. 
denied, 478 U.S. 1010 (1986).  Furthermore, we have held that 
instructions similar to those given by the court in this case 
"adequately stated the statutory framework and were sufficient."  
LeVasseur v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 564, 595, 304 S.E.2d 644, 661 
(1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063 (1984).  For these reasons, 
we find no error in the court's refusal of Jackson’s tendered 
instructions. 
VII.  SENTENCE REVIEW 
 
35
 
Under Code § 17-110.1(C)(1) and (2), we are required to 
determine “[w]hether the sentence of death was imposed under the 
influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor," 
and “[w]hether the sentence of death is excessive or 
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, 
considering both the crime and the defendant." 
A. Passion and Prejudice 
 
Jackson does not contend that the sentence of death was 
imposed under any of the impermissible factors and our 
independent review of the entire record fails to reveal that the 
jury’s death sentence “was imposed under the influence of 
passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor.”  Code § 17-
110.1(C)(1). 
B. Excessiveness and Proportionality 
 
Jackson argues that a review of similar capital murder 
cases “would reflect the excessiveness and disproportionate 
punishment inflicted on this 16 year old defendant.”  We 
disagree. 
 
In our proportionality review, we have considered “whether 
other sentencing bodies in this jurisdiction generally impose 
the supreme penalty for comparable or similar crimes, 
considering both the crime and the defendant."  Jenkins v. 
Commonwealth, 244 Va. 445, 461, 423 S.E.2d 360, 371 (1992), 
cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1036 (1993).  Our comparison of the 
 
36
record in this case with the records in other capital murder 
cases, including those in which life sentences were imposed, 
fails to indicate that the death penalty imposed in this case is 
“excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar 
cases, considering both the crime and the defendant."  Code 
§ 17-110.1(C)(2). 
 
Since the jury based its death sentence solely on the 
“future dangerousness” predicate, we have given particular 
consideration to other capital murder cases in which robbery or 
attempted robbery was the underlying felony and the death 
penalty was based only on the “future dangerousness” predicate.  
Such cases were compiled in Yeatts v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. at 
143, 410 S.E.2d at 267-68, and supplemented in Chichester, 248 
Va. at 332-33, 448 S.E.2d at 652, and Roach v. Commonwealth, 251 
Va. at 351, 468 S.E.2d at 113 (17-year-old defendant). 
 
Our conclusion is that, while there are exceptions, juries 
in this Commonwealth generally impose the death sentence for 
crimes comparable to Jackson’s murder of Bonney.  Jackson killed 
Bonney in cold blood simply because Bonney had refused to comply 
with Jackson’s demand for money.  This killing demonstrates 
Jackson’s lack of respect for human life. 
 
Although Jackson was only 16 years old when he killed 
Bonney, his criminal conduct on other occasions, especially the 
violent acts he committed while (1) on probation, (2) free on 
 
37
bond, and (3) in jail awaiting trial for these offenses, 
manifests an escalating pattern of violent criminal behavior 
that compels us to conclude that the imposition of the death 
penalty in his case is neither excessive nor disproportionate to 
the penalty imposed in similar cases.6
VIII  CONCLUSION 
 
We find no reversible error in the issues presented in this 
case.  After reviewing Jackson’s sentence of death pursuant to 
Code § 17-110.1, we decline to commute the sentence of death.  
Therefore, we will affirm the judgments of the trial court. 
Affirmed.  
JUSTICE HASSELL, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
 
Code § 17-110.1(C)(2) requires this Court to consider and 
determine “[w]hether the sentence of death is excessive or 
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, 
considering both the crime and the defendant.” 
 
We have stated that “the test of proportionality is whether 
‘juries in this jurisdiction generally approve the supreme 
penalty for comparable or similar crimes.’”  Davidson v. 
Commonwealth, 244 Va. 129, 136, 419 S.E.2d 656, 660, cert. 
denied, 506 U.S. 959 (1992) (citing Smith v. Commonwealth, 239 
                     
6 Unlike the dissent, in resolving the issues of excessiveness 
and proportionality, we did not limit our comparison to the 
records in cases in which the defendants were 16 years old when 
 
38
Va. 243, 271, 389 S.E.2d 871, 886, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881 
(1990) (quoting Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260, 284, 257 
S.E.2d 808, 824 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 972 (1980))).  
Juries in Virginia generally have not approved of the imposition 
of the death penalty for 16-year-old capital murder offenders. 
 
Since 1987, ten 16-year-old offenders have been convicted 
of capital murder, and only one defendant, Chauncey J. Jackson, 
has been sentenced to death.  I agree with the majority that 
Jackson’s offenses are atrocious and that he has exhibited 
little, if any, regard for the value of human life or the 
consequences of his criminal conduct.  However, my review of all 
capital murder cases involving 16-year-old offenders in Virginia 
leads me to the conclusion that the sentence of death imposed 
upon Jackson is excessive and disproportionate to penalties 
imposed in similar cases. 
 
For example, in Novak v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 373, 
382, 457 S.E.2d 402, 406 (1995), a Virginia Beach jury refused 
to impose the penalty of death upon a 16-year-old defendant, 
Shawn Paul Novak, even though the jury convicted him of capital 
murder.  The facts in Novak are more egregious than the facts in 
the present case.  Novak killed two young boys, age 7 and age 9.  
The seven-year-old victim died from “three stab wounds which 
                                                                  
the offenses were committed.  Instead, we considered Jackson’s 
age as one of many relevant factors.   
 
39
would have been a quick three thrusts resulting in 
incapacitation and . . . repeated cutting and slashing of the 
neck until it was almost decapitated . . . .”  The nine-year-old 
victim “had been killed by a ‘blunt force injury’ and ‘multiple 
slashes’ on his neck.”  Id. at 379-80, 457 S.E.2d at 405. 
 
In Owens v. Commonwealth, No. 2259-95-1 (Va. Ct. App. Nov. 
*19, 1996), the defendant, Marvin T. Owens, was convicted of 
capital murder.  Owens killed four persons, including a 14-year-
old boy, by using a pistol to shoot each victim in the head.  
Just as Jackson, Owens had an extensive juvenile criminal 
history, including commitments to the Department of Youth and 
Family Services for the following criminal offenses:  conspiracy 
to distribute cocaine, possession of cocaine with the intent to 
distribute, and possession of cocaine.  The jury fixed Owens’ 
punishment at life imprisonment. 
 
The case of Reid v. Commonwealth, No. 1175-95-1 (Va. Ct. 
App. July 2, 1996), is very similar factually to the present 
case.  There, the defendant, Dwayne M. Reid, then 16 years old, 
approached two males who were traveling in a truck in Suffolk.  
The men in the truck, Joseph Mehalko and Tommy Runyon, asked 
several young male pedestrians, including Reid, whether any of 
the pedestrians had “a twenty rock [of crack cocaine].”  One of 
the pedestrians threw an item, about the size of a pebble, 
through a window into the truck, and Mehalko and Runyon, 
 
40
thinking the item was a rock of crack cocaine, began to search 
for it.  As Runyon retrieved some money from his wallet, Mehalko 
noticed “a gun come through the passenger side window.”  A 
struggle ensued, and Reid shot Runyon in the head.  Runyon 
subsequently died as a result of the gunshot wound. 
 
Reid had a prior criminal record, and he had been convicted 
of the following crimes: two counts of armed robbery and two 
different offenses of use of a firearm during the commission of 
robbery.  At a bench trial, Reid was convicted of capital murder 
and sentenced to life imprisonment. 
 
In Rea v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 940, 941, 421 S.E.2d 
464, 465 (1992), the defendant, Stephen Rea, was convicted, at a 
jury trial, of three separate counts of capital murder.  Rea 
killed three persons, including a 17-year-old boy, by shooting 
them with a firearm.  Rea had an extensive juvenile criminal 
history.  He was arrested for petty larceny which was taken 
under advisement for six months.  He was arrested and charged 
for disorderly conduct, vandalism, and “being a runaway,” and he 
was convicted and placed on supervised probation.  He was 
arrested for trespass, which was resolved at the juvenile 
intake.  He was arrested for violation of his probation.  He was 
subsequently arrested for breaking and entering, petty larceny, 
and grand larceny, and placed on house arrest and ordered to pay 
restitution.  He was also arrested for eluding police, reckless 
 
41
driving, and driving without a Virginia operator’s license.  The 
jury fixed Rea’s punishment at life imprisonment for each of the 
capital murder convictions.  See also Faulk v. Commonwealth, CR 
95J2 and CR95J4 (Southhampton County Cir. Ct. Sept. 17, 1996) 
(Defendant, 16 years of age at the time of the offenses, pled 
guilty to capital murder in the commission of robbery, capital 
murder in the commission of abduction, and robbery with a 
weapon, and sentenced to life imprisonment.); Prostell v. 
Commonwealth, No. J-1179 (Virginia Beach Cir. Ct. June 18, 1987) 
(The 16-year-old defendant, whose criminal history included one 
previous felony conviction as a juvenile, pled guilty to capital 
murder and received life imprisonment.  The defendant killed the 
victim after being advised by a co-defendant that the defendant 
would receive $300 for the murder of the victim.  At the time of 
the murder, the defendant was on probation after having been 
found guilty of robbery.); Campbell v. Commonwealth, No. 5559 
(Amherst County Cir. Ct. June 4, 1987) (The defendant was found 
guilty at a bench trial of capital murder and certain other 
related crimes.  The defendant, 16 years old at the date of this 
offense, entered a pizza restaurant wearing a ski mask and armed 
with a loaded 12-gauge shotgun, ordered the employees to the 
floor, and shot a restaurant employee in the head, killing him.  
The defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment.); Stewart v. 
Commonwealth, No. 2928-97-1 (Va. Ct. App. July 7, 1997) (This 
 
42
16-year-old defendant pled guilty in the Norfolk Circuit Court 
to capital murder and certain other related offenses and was 
sentenced to life without parole plus 18 years.  The defendant 
killed the victim with a pistol during an attempted robbery.).  
Tross v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 362, 464 S.E.2d 523 (1995) 
(This 16-year-old defendant was convicted of capital murder, 
robbery, and using a firearm to commit murder and was sentenced 
to life imprisonment for the capital murder, 20 years’ 
imprisonment for the robbery, and two years’ imprisonment for 
the firearm charge.  His prior record included convictions for 
petit larceny and possession of a beeper/pager on school 
grounds.  He had been arrested and charged on two separate 
occasions for assault and battery, but those charges were nolle 
prossed.). 
 
Shawn Novak, age 16, killed two young boys, but he was not 
sentenced to death.  Stephen Rea, age 16, killed three people, 
including a teenager, but he was not sentenced to death.  Marvin 
Owens, age 16, killed four persons, but he was not sentenced to 
death.  Dwayne Reid, who committed crimes substantially similar 
to Jackson’s crimes, was not sentenced to death.  Upon 
comparison of Jackson’s sentence of death, along with his 
criminal history and facts surrounding his case, to the facts 
and criminal histories of the other defendants who committed 
capital offenses at age 16, I can only conclude that Jackson’s 
 
43
sentence of death is both excessive and disproportionate in 
violation of Code § 17-110.1 (C)(2). 
 
I would reduce Jackson’s sentence of death to life 
imprisonment.  In view of Jackson’s sentences for his other 
convictions, he would remain incarcerated for the remainder of 
his natural life. 
 
44