Title: Brown v. United Water Delaware, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 291, 2009
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: August 27, 2010

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JOEL BROWN and IRIS BROWN, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 291, 2009      
 
Plaintiffs Below, 
 
§ 
 
Appellants, 
 
§ 
Court Below: Superior Court of  
 
 
 
§ 
the State of Delaware in and for 
              v. 
 
 
§ 
New Castle County 
 
 
 
§ 
UNITED WATER DELAWARE, INC., 
§ 
C.A. No. 07C-07-070  
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Defendant Below, 
 
§ 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
§ 
 
 
 
Submitted:  July 7, 2010 
 
 
Decided:    August 26, 2010 
 
 
Modified:  August 27, 2010 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS and 
RIDGELY, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc.  
 
 
Upon Appeal from the Superior Court. AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED 
and REMANDED. 
 
 
L. Vincent Ramunno, Esquire, of Ramunno & Ramunno, P.A., Wilmington, 
Delaware; for Appellants. 
 
 
Sean J. Bellew and David A. Felice, Esquires, of Ballard Spahr Andrews & 
Ingersoll, LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; for Appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JACOBS, Justice: 
FACTS1 
 
In the early morning hours of December 20, 2005, Joel and Iris Brown 
discovered a fire in the living room of their Wilmington home.  The Browns’ 
neighbor called 911 and firefighters responded within seven minutes.  A paramedic 
accompanying the firefighters attempted to connect the water hose to the hydrant 
nearest to the Browns’ home, but was unable to open the valve, because he was 
turning the valve in the wrong direction and broke the stem.  The fire chief then 
sent his crew to the next nearest hydrant.  They were unable to open the second 
hydrant, and concluded that it was frozen.  The firefighters eventually obtained 
water from a third hydrant, which was located much further from the Browns’ 
home.  By that time, unfortunately, it was too late to save any portion of the house.  
 
Later investigations revealed that United Water Delaware, Inc. (“United 
Water”) had painted over the top of the first hydrant, thereby covering the arrow 
that showed the direction in which to open the valve.  The Fire Marshall’s Office 
further concluded that the second hydrant had failed due to lack of maintenance.  
United Water’s November 2004 inspection records described the second hydrant as 
“very hard to open,” and its April 2005 records described it as “hard to open.”  The 
record further indicates that United Water took no action to correct the problem.   
 
                                          
 
1 The facts are taken from this Court’s opinion in Brown v. United Water Delaware, Inc., 2010 
WL 522785 (Del. Feb. 15, 2010).  
 
 
2
 
United Water’s “Tariff for Water Service” provides: 
 
49. The Company shall not be considered an insurer of property or 
persons or to have undertaken to extinguish fire or to protect 
persons or property against loss by fire or otherwise.  The Company 
does not guarantee any special service, pressure, capacity or facility 
other than what is provided by its ordinary and changing operating 
conditions as they exist from day to day.  It is agreed by the parties 
receiving service that the Company shall be free and exempt from 
any and all claims for injury to persons or property by reason of 
fire, water, failure to supply water pressure or capacity.  
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
In 2007 the Browns filed a three count complaint in the Superior Court 
alleging negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.  The trial court summarily dismissed the claim for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress.  In 2009, shortly before the scheduled 
trial date, United Water moved for summary judgment on the remaining two 
claims.  The Superior Court granted the motion, holding that the Browns’ claims 
were barred by the “filed rate” doctrine.  That doctrine forbids a regulated entity 
from charging rates other than those filed with the regulatory agency and, 
accordingly, prevents varying or enlarging “[t]he rights as defined by the tariff … 
by either contract or tort of the carrier.”2 
 
The Browns then appealed to this Court.  
                                          
 
2 Keogh v. N.W. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156, 163 (1992).   
 
 
3
 
We concluded, after oral argument, that the Browns’ claims for negligence 
were defeated by the above-quoted paragraph 49 of United Water’s filed rate,3  
relying on Woloshin v. Diamond State Tel. Co.,4 where the Court of Chancery 
implicitly recognized the filed rate doctrine.5  We remanded the case to the 
Superior Court, however, to consider the Browns’ claim that their complaint 
alleged gross negligence and willful and wanton misconduct.  As to that claim, the 
law is unclear whether the filed rate doctrine provides immunity.6 
 
The Superior Court returned its Memorandum Opinion on Remand on May 
20, 2010, concluding that a reasonable trier of fact could find that United Water 
was grossly negligent in maintaining the fire hydrants.  The Superior Court held 
that “[a] reasonable trier of fact could conclude, on the basis that the directional 
arrows on other nearby hydrants were obscured by paint, that the arrows on the 
hydrants in question were also obscured by paint when the firefighters arrived and 
                                          
 
3 Brown v. United Water, Delaware, Inc., 2010 WL 522785 at *2. 
 
4 Woloshin v. Diamond State Tel. Co., 380 A.2d 982, 984 (Del. Ch. 1977).  
 
5 Id. (“The theory is … that, since [the utility] renders a service affecting the public, the state 
shall regulate and control it in order to prevent injustice, and … in consideration of such 
regulation and control, its liability is and should be defined and limited.”) (quotation and citation 
omitted).   
 
6 Brown v. United Water Delaware, Inc., 2010 WL 522785, at * 3 (“Although Paragraph 49 of 
United Water's filed rate purports to exempt the utility from all claims, it is not clear that the filed 
rate doctrine provides absolute immunity.  Courts overwhelmingly reject attempts to limit 
liability either by contract or by tariff for gross negligence, willful misconduct, and fraud.  We 
will not address that issue, however, because it was not fairly presented to the Superior Court.”) 
(citations omitted).   
 
4
that the paint was scraped off during efforts to open those hydrants.”7  Therefore, 
United Water could not argue that it was not negligent, let alone not grossly 
negligent.  The Superior Court further determined, as a matter of law, that a 
reasonable trier of fact could not find that United Water had acted willfully or 
wantonly. 
 
The Superior Court also found that by conceding that the filed rate doctrine 
does not bar claims for gross negligence, and by having decided not to brief the 
issue, United Water waived any argument that the Browns’ gross negligence claim 
was barred by the filed rate doctrine.8  Finally, the Superior Court held, in dictum, 
that under Delaware law, the filed rate doctrine may bar claims for gross 
negligence.  The court reasoned that no “overwhelming” persuasive case law holds 
that filed tariffs cannot preclude claims for gross negligence,9 and that no statute, 
constitutional provision or public policy prohibits a tariff from limiting liability for 
gross negligence.10 
 
The parties filed supplemental memoranda addressing the Superior Court 
Memorandum Opinion on Remand.   The Browns endorse the Superior Court’s 
                                          
 
7 Brown v. United Water Delaware, Inc., 2010 WL 2052373, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. May 20, 
2010).  
 
8 Id. at *5. 
 
9 Id. at *5-6. 
 
10 Id. at *7. 
 
5
conclusion that a reasonable trier of fact could find that United Water was grossly 
negligent, but they disagree with the Court’s conclusion that no jury could find 
willful misconduct as a matter of law.  The Browns also endorse the Superior 
Court’s holding that United Water waived any argument that the Browns’ gross 
negligence claim is barred by the filed rate doctrine.  Accordingly, the entirety of 
the Browns’ supplemental memorandum is dedicated to arguing that the Superior 
Court erred in concluding that no trier of fact could find that United Water’s 
conduct was willful.  Unsurprisingly, United Water’s supplemental memorandum 
contests the Superior Court’s first conclusion, urges that the Browns have no 
evidence that United Water engaged in willful misconduct, and contends that 
United Water did not waive its right to argue the preclusive effect of the filed rate 
doctrine on claims for gross negligence. 
ANALYSIS 
 
We agree with, and affirm, the Superior Court’s first two conclusions on 
remand.  We need not address the court’s third conclusion, regarding the scope of 
protection granted by the filed rate doctrine under Delaware law, which is dictum 
without precedential effect.      
 
I.  Summary Judgment on Gross Negligence Claim Was Inappropriate 
 
The first issue is whether or not United Water was entitled to summary 
judgment on the claims alleging gross negligence and willful or wanton conduct.  
 
6
This Court reviews de novo the Superior Court’s grant or denial of summary 
judgment “to determine whether, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to 
the nonmoving party, the moving party has demonstrated that there are no material 
issues of fact in dispute and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.”11   
 
Ordinarily, questions of gross negligence and willful or wanton conduct are 
for the jury and are not susceptible of summary adjudication.12  Here, a jury could 
reasonably find that United Water was on notice that the hydrants near the Browns’ 
house had been painted over and not properly maintained.  United Water’s failure 
to correct those known problems, which could foreseeably “cause damage or injury 
at any site reliant upon a United Water hydrant,”13 would constitute “an extreme 
departure from the ordinary standard of care”––i.e., gross negligence.14  That 
failure, however, would not constitute willful or wanton behavior, which we have 
defined as conduct reflecting a “conscious indifference” or “I don’t care” attitude.15 
                                          
 
11 Estate of Rae v. Murphy, 956 A.2d 1266, 1269-70 (Del. 2006) (citation omitted). 
  
12 Pauley v. Reinoehl, 848 A.2d 569, 576 (Del. 2004).  See also Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 180 
A.2d 467, 469 (Del. 1962) (“Generally speaking, issues of negligence are not susceptible of 
summary adjudication.”). 
 
13 Brown v. United Water Delaware, Inc., 2010 WL 2052373, at *4. 
 
14 Browne v. Robb, 583 A.2d 949, 953 (Del. 1990) (citations omitted).  
 
15 Porter v. Turner, 954 A.2d 308, 312 (Del. 2008).  
 
 
7
 
 
II.  United Water Waived Any Agreement That 
                Gross Negligence Claim Was Barred 
 
The second issue is whether or not United Water has waived any argument 
that the Browns’ claim for gross negligence was barred by the filed rate doctrine.  
A waiver occurs where a party intentionally relinquishes an available contention or 
objection.16  United Water argues that it did not waive the available argument that 
the filed rate doctrine was an affirmative defense to the Browns’ claim of gross 
negligence, for two reasons.  First, United Water raised the doctrine as an 
affirmative defense in its answer to the Browns’ complaint; and second, the 
applicability of the doctrine to gross negligence claims under Delaware law was 
undetermined at the time of remand.   
 
United Water’s contentions, however, ignore the fact that, following remand, 
the parties submitted additional briefs to the Superior Court in which United Water 
did not brief that issue.  That failure was deliberate and intentional, as evidenced by 
a letter from United Water’s counsel to the Superior Court, stating that United 
Water “will not argue that claims of gross negligence or willful misconduct are 
barred by the filed rate doctrine [because t]he persuasive case law clearly holds that 
the filed rate doctrine would not bar claims of gross negligence or willful conduct.”  
                                          
 
16 Minna v. Energy Coal S.p.A., 984 A.2d 1210, 1214 (Del. 2009); Beebe Medical Center, Inc. v. 
Bailey, 913 A.2d 543, 550-51 (Del. 2006).  
 
8
Instead, United Water’s supplemental brief focused on whether there was evidence 
in the record from which a trier of fact could conclude that United Water acted 
willfully or with gross negligence.  By choosing not to address an issue that was 
clearly identified in this Court’s order of remand to the Superior Court (i.e., 
whether or not the filed rate doctrine provides absolute immunity), United Water 
waived any defense that it may have had under the doctrine. 
 
Accordingly, 
we 
need 
not 
address 
the 
Superior 
Court’s 
third 
conclusion―that under Delaware law, the filed rate doctrine may bar claims for 
gross negligence.  As the Superior Court itself noted, that holding is obiter dictum 
and “not the result of an adversarial argument.”17  Because it would have no effect 
on the outcome of this case, we leave that issue for another case and another day.  
CONCLUSION 
 
Because the record now discloses that the plaintiffs established a prima facie 
case of gross negligence which the defendant concedes is not foreclosed by the 
filed rate doctrine, the Superior Court’s original final judgment in favor of United 
Water is vacated.  This matter is remanded for further proceedings in accordance 
with this Opinion.  Jurisdiction is not retained.  
    
                                          
 
17 Brown v. United Water Delaware, Inc., 2010 WL 2052373, at *5.  As such, that conclusion is 
without precedential effect.  See Crown EMAK Partners, LLC v. Kurz, 992 A.2d 377, 379 (Del. 
2010).