Title: Shipman v. Kruck
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 030500
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: March 5, 2004

PRESENT: All the Justices. 
 
DONALD L. SHIPMAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND 
AS TRUSTEE, ET AL. 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 030500 
JUSTICE G. STEVEN AGEE 
 
 
 
MARCH 5, 2004 
FREDERICK R. KRUCK, JR., ESQ. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA 
John E. Kloch, Judge 
 
 
The determinative issue in this appeal is when the 
appellants’ cause of action for legal malpractice accrued for 
purposes of the statute of limitations. 
I.  BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
 
On January 16, 1998, Donald L. Shipman and his wife, Kym L. 
Shipman (collectively, “the Shipmans”) hired Frederick H. Kruck, 
Jr. (“Kruck”) to defend them in an action brought by one of the 
Shipmans’ creditors.  The Shipmans informed Kruck that shielding 
their residence from the collection efforts of creditors was 
their primary objective.  The Shipmans also informed Kruck that 
the residence was held in trust under a 1984 Declaration of 
Trust (“the Trust”).  The Shipmans gave Kruck an unsigned and 
undated copy of the Declaration of Trust, reflecting Mr. Shipman 
was the Trust’s trustee holding the trust property for the 
benefit of Mrs. Shipman and their children.  The Shipmans had 
conveyed their residence by deed to Mr. Shipman as Trustee under 
the Trust.1 
On March 9, 1998, Kruck filed a joint Chapter 7 petition on 
behalf of the Shipmans in the United States Bankruptcy Court for 
the Eastern District of Virginia.  The Shipmans agreed to the 
bankruptcy filing based on Kruck’s advice. 
 
Kruck represented the Shipmans in the initial stages of the 
bankruptcy proceedings, but certain of the Shipmans’ creditors 
and the Bankruptcy Trustee asserted the Trust was revocable and 
therefore the Trust’s assets were nonexempt property of the 
Shipmans’ bankruptcy estate subject to sale and administration 
by the Bankruptcy Trustee.  On January 19, 1999, Kruck withdrew 
as the Shipmans’ counsel and advised them that he would be more 
valuable as a witness in the bankruptcy proceedings concerning 
the Trust.  The Shipmans promptly hired new counsel to represent 
them in the bankruptcy proceedings.2 
During the subsequent bankruptcy proceedings Kruck 
testified that he erroneously assessed the trust documents as 
establishing an irrevocable trust when he advised the Shipmans 
                     
 
1 By an examination of land title records, Kruck verified 
the real estate conveyances to the trust, but found no copy of 
the trust document on record. 
 
 
2 The parties disagree as to whether new counsel was hired 
explicitly to cure Kruck’s negligence.  Our resolution of this 
case does not depend on why, or even if, the Shipmans hired new 
counsel. 
 
2
to file bankruptcy.  On March 8, 2000, the bankruptcy court 
entered an order declaring the Trust to be a revocable trust and 
authorizing the Bankruptcy Trustee to sell the Shipmans’ 
residence as an asset of the bankruptcy estate for the payment 
of the Shipmans’ creditors.  To prevent their residence from 
being sold to a third party, the Shipmans purchased the 
residence for $427,000 from the Bankruptcy Trustee on June 29, 
2001. 
 
On January 8, 2002, the Shipmans filed a motion for 
judgment against Kruck in the Circuit Court of the City of 
Alexandria alleging counts for negligence, breach of contract, 
and negligent infliction of emotional distress.  They asserted 
that Kruck was negligent in failing to advise them that the 
Trust was revocable and could be revoked by the Bankruptcy 
Trustee if they filed for bankruptcy.  Kruck filed a demurrer 
and plea in bar alleging the Shipmans lacked standing to bring 
their suit because any claims they might have belonged to the 
bankruptcy estate and must be asserted by the Bankruptcy 
Trustee.  Before argument on Kruck’s demurrer and plea in bar 
the Shipmans requested a nonsuit which the trial court granted 
on March 12, 2002. 
 
The Shipmans then requested and received an order from the 
bankruptcy court abandoning any interest in an action for 
malpractice against Kruck as part of the bankruptcy estate.  
 
3
Armed with the abandonment order, the Shipmans filed a new 
motion for judgment against Kruck on September 11, 2002, in 
which they renewed the counts for negligence and breach of 
contract.  Kruck filed another demurrer and plea in bar alleging 
that the Shipmans’ action was barred by the three-year statute 
of limitations applicable to breach of an oral contract.  He 
asserted that the limitations period expired on January 19, 
2002, three years after Kruck’s representation of the Shipmans 
terminated. 
The trial court determined that because the action was 
based upon an oral contract, the applicable statute of 
limitations period was three years.  The trial court further 
held that the Shipmans’ cause of action accrued when Kruck’s 
representation of the Shipmans terminated on January 19, 1999, 
and that filing the nonsuit did not toll the running of the 
statute of limitations.  Therefore, the trial court sustained 
Kruck’s plea in bar.3 
The Shipmans filed a motion for reconsideration alleging a 
written contract existed (and thus the correct limitations 
period was five years) and that their legal malpractice claim 
did not accrue until there was payment on a judgment creating 
damages.  The trial court denied the motion, ruling the Shipmans 
                     
 
3 The trial court did not rule on Kruck’s demurrer and the 
Shipmans did not assign error to the trial court’s ruling on the 
effect of the nonsuit. 
 
4
failed to prove the existence of a written contract and that, in 
any event, it was not pled.  With regard to the accrual issue, 
the trial court held that the Shipmans’ cause of action accrued 
“when counsel was retained and paid,” referring to the counsel 
substituted for Kruck. 
On appeal, the Shipmans assert two assignments of error.  
First, they contend the trial court erred in granting Kruck’s 
plea in bar and denying their motion for reconsideration because 
their action was filed within the applicable three year 
limitations period.4  Second, they assert the trial court erred 
in holding that their cause of action accrued when Kruck’s 
representation of them ended and new counsel was retained and 
paid because there was no evidence in the record as to when new 
counsel was paid. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
“A cause of action for legal malpractice requires the 
existence of an attorney-client relationship which gave rise to 
a duty, breach of that duty by the defendant attorney, and that 
the damages claimed by the plaintiff client must have been 
proximately caused by the defendant attorney’s breach.”  Rutter 
v. Jones, Blechman, Wolz and Kelly, 264 Va. 310, 313, 568 S.E.2d 
                     
 
4 No assignment of error was made to the trial court’s 
ruling that the five year statute of limitations applicable to 
written contracts did not apply.  The parties now agree the 
applicable statute of limitations is three years, the period 
applicable to oral contracts. 
 
5
693, 695 (2002).  The statute of limitations for legal 
malpractice actions is the same as those for breach of contract 
because although legal malpractice actions sound in tort, it is 
the contract that gives rise to the duty.  MacLellan v. 
Throckmorton, 235 Va. 341, 343, 367 S.E.2d 720, 721 (1988); 
Oleyar v. Kerr, 217 Va. 88, 90, 225 S.E.2d 398, 400 (1976)); see 
also Code § 8.01-246 (setting forth the limitations periods for 
breach of contract actions). 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 
The parties agree the alleged negligent act, the breach of 
Kruck’s duty to the Shipmans, occurred when the bankruptcy 
petition was filed on March 9, 1998.  The parties differ, 
however, in affixing the date when the statute of limitations on 
the Shipmans’ legal malpractice action accrued. 
 
Code § 8.01-230 states, in pertinent part, that “[i]n every 
action for which a limitation period is prescribed, the right of 
action shall be deemed to accrue and the prescribed limitation 
period shall begin to run . . . when the breach of contract 
occurs in actions ex contractu and not when the resulting damage 
is discovered.”  We have previously stated that “[a] right of 
action is a remedial right to presently enforce a cause of 
action.”  Stone v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 232 Va. 365, 368, 350 
S.E.2d 629, 631 (1986).  Although a cause of action and a right 
 
6
of action may accrue simultaneously, a right of action cannot 
arise until a cause of action exists.  Id. 
The Shipmans contend that until the bankruptcy court 
finally adjudicated the Trust to be revocable and therefore a 
nonexempt part of the Shipmans’ bankruptcy estate, they had no 
cause of action (and thus no right of action) against Kruck.  
This is so, the Shipmans contend, because until that point in 
time they had no injury or damages − an essential element of a 
legal malpractice cause of action.  Alternatively, citing Allied 
Productions v. Duesterdick, 217 Va. 763, 232 S.E.2d 774 (1977), 
the Shipmans argue there could be no damages until there was 
payment on an underlying judgment under the so-called “payment 
rule.”  The Shipmans contend the “payment” did not occur, and 
the limitations period did not begin to run, until June 29, 
2001, when they purchased their residence from the Bankruptcy 
Trustee to prevent its sale. 
 
Kruck asserts the statute of limitations began to run when 
the bankruptcy petition was filed, subject to the “continuous 
representation rule” set forth in Keller v. Denny, 232 Va. 512, 
352 S.E.2d 327 (1987). 
A. 
DETERMINATION OF INJURY 
 
 
The parties agree that Kruck breached his duty to the 
Shipmans on March 9, 1998, when the bankruptcy petition was 
filed.  The issue in controversy is whether on that date, or at 
 
7
a later time, the Shipmans sustained injury or damage sufficient 
to constitute a cause of action. 
 
We have stated on more than one occasion that “[d]amage is 
an essential element of a cause of action.  Without some injury 
or damage, however slight, a cause of action cannot accrue.”  
Keller, 232 Va. at 520, 352 S.E.2d at 332; see Stone, 232 Va. at 
365, 368-69, 350 S.E.2d at 631-32; accord First Va. Bank-
Colonial v. Baker, 225 Va. 72, 82, 301 S.E.2d 8, 13-14 (1983); 
Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp., 221 Va. 951, 957, 275 S.E.2d 900, 
904 (1981); Caudill v. Wise Rambler, 210 Va. 11, 13, 168 S.E.2d 
257, 259 (1969).  “In the absence of any injury or damage, there 
is no cause of action.”  Rutter, 254 Va. at 313, 568 S.E.2d at 
695.  Moreover, we have said that it is immaterial whether all 
the damages resulting from the negligent act were sustained at 
the time that act occurred.  The running of the limitations 
period will not be tolled by the fact that the actual or 
substantial damages did not occur until a later date.  Stone, 
232 Va. at 369, 350 S.E.2d at 632; Housing Authority v. Laburnum 
Corp., 195 Va. 827, 839, 80 S.E.2d 574, 581 (1954)). 
 
In Virginia, 
 
[w]e have followed the general rule that the 
applicable period of limitation begins to run 
from the moment the cause of action arises rather 
than from the time of discovery of injury or 
damage, and we have said that difficulty in 
ascertaining the existence of a cause of action 
is irrelevant. 
 
8
 
Virginia Military Institute v. King, 217 Va. 751, 759, 232 
S.E.2d 895, 900 (1977) (hereinafter “VMI”) (citing Laburnum, 195 
Va. at 838, 80 S.E.2d at 580-81).  In VMI we commented that this 
rule may produce inequities by triggering a statute of 
limitations “when the injury or damage is unknown or difficult 
or even incapable of discovery . . . .”  Id. at 760, 232 S.E.2d 
at 900.  Nevertheless, we concluded that it was the role of the 
General Assembly, not the judiciary, to change a rule of law 
that has been relied upon by bench and bar for so long.  Id.  We 
continue to adhere to that principle.  Under Code § 8.01-230 the 
injury is deemed to accrue “when the breach of contract occurs 
. . . not when the resulting damage is discovered.” 
 
Upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition the Shipmans 
incurred a legal injury.  Although the injury could not be 
delineated as a sum certain or reflected as a final judgment on 
the merits, there was injury sufficient to commence a cause of 
action for legal malpractice.  First and foremost, the Shipmans 
lost control of their assets to the Bankruptcy Trustee, 
including the power to revoke the Trust and receive the 
reversion.  The filing of the bankruptcy, in and of itself, 
vested those rights in the Bankruptcy Trustee as a matter of 
law.  11 U.S.C. §§ 541, 542, 544, 704 (2000).  This injury in 
particular countermanded their express wishes to protect the 
 
9
Trust property from their creditors.  Even the Shipmans’ right 
to bring a legal malpractice claim vested in the Bankruptcy 
Trustee, which necessitated their initial nonsuit.  See National 
Am. Ins. Co. v. Ruppert Landscaping Co., 187 F.3d 439, 441 (4th 
Cir. 1999) (“If a cause of action is part of the estate of the 
bankrupt then the trustee alone has standing to bring that 
claim.”); Ellwanger v. Budsberg, 140 Bankr. 891, 903 (Bankr. 
W.D. Wash. 1992) (state court actions for legal malpractice are 
property of the bankruptcy estate); Scarlett v. Barnes, 121 
Bankr. 578, 579 (W.D. Mo. 1990) (state court actions for legal 
malpractice are property of the bankruptcy estate).  Further, 
the Shipmans admitted in their motion for judgment that in 
addition to the costs of repurchasing their residence, they 
incurred “additional costs in legal fees, litigation costs, and 
other costs associated with the bankruptcy filing and 
litigation.”  (Emphasis added).  The Shipmans’ own pleadings 
thus admit that the filing fee for the bankruptcy itself is a 
recoverable damage.5  As we note below, these damages need only 
be incurred, not paid. 
 
The unity of duty, breach, and damage required to establish 
a cause of action occurred on March 9, 1998, when the bankruptcy 
petition was filed.  It was at that time the Shipmans’ cause of 
                     
 
5 The Shipmans also allege their credit rating was damaged 
by the bankruptcy filing. 
 
10
action against Kruck attached, albeit vested in the Bankruptcy 
Trustee.  Having determined that the Shipmans’ cause of action 
existed as of the time the bankruptcy was filed, the question 
then becomes, under Code § 8.01-230, whether the Shipmans’ right 
of action came into existence simultaneously with their cause of 
action or whether it accrued at another time. 
B. 
THE CONTINUOUS REPRESENTATION RULE 
 
Code § 8.01-230 dictates the right of action shall accrue 
at the time of the breach.  Thus, in this case, the Shipmans’ 
right of action came into existence and their cause of action 
accrued contemporaneously with the filing of the bankruptcy 
petition.  In other words, the Shipmans could have brought an 
action against Kruck at any time after the bankruptcy petition 
was filed.  However, that does not necessarily establish the 
date the statute of limitations began to run for purposes of a 
legal malpractice action.  In Keller we held that 
 
when malpractice is claimed to have occurred 
during the representation of a client by an 
attorney with respect to a particular undertaking 
or transaction, the breach of contract or duty 
occurs and the statute of limitations begins to 
run when the attorney’s services rendered in 
connection with that particular undertaking or 
transaction have terminated. 
 
Keller, 232 Va. at 518, 352 S.E.2d 330.  This axiom is commonly 
termed the “continuous representation rule,” which takes into 
consideration the special trust and confidence inherent in the 
 
11
attorney-client relationship.  Id. at 518, 352 S.E.2d at 331.  
“The relationship between a lawyer and his client is a fiduciary 
relationship, one which commands the highest fidelity to a most 
solemn trust, for the lawyer is the expert and the client is 
utterly dependent upon his knowledge, his skill, and his honor.”  
Duesterdick, 217 Va. at 767, 232 S.E.2d at 776-77 (Poff, J., 
dissenting); see also MNC Credit Corp. v. Sickels, 255 Va. 314, 
318, 497 S.E.2d 331, 333 (1998) (noting “the highly confidential 
and fiduciary relationship between an attorney and client”).6 
 
In Keller we made clear that the continuous representation 
rule applies “only when a continuous or recurring course of 
professional services relating to a particular undertaking is 
shown to have taken place over a period of time.”  Keller, 232 
Va. at 518, 352 S.E.2d at 331.  The proper inquiry is not 
whether a general attorney-client relationship has ended, but 
instead, when the attorney’s work on the particular undertaking 
at issue has ceased.  Id.  If malpractice is alleged with 
respect to “a single, isolated act, Code § 8.01-230 . . . 
                     
 
6 Code § 8.01-230 was amended in 1996.  However, the changes 
do not materially affect the issue under consideration here and 
the statute as amended does not explicitly abrogate the 
continuous representation rule this Court expressed in Keller.  
See Weathers v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 803, 805, 553 S.E.2d 729, 
730 (2001) ("When the General Assembly acts in an area in which 
one of its appellate courts already has spoken, it is presumed 
to know the law as the court has stated it and to acquiesce 
therein, and if the legislature intends to countermand such 
appellate decision it must do so explicitly.") 
 
12
dictates that the statute of limitations begins to run when that 
act is performed, regardless of the time of its discovery.”  Id. 
at 518-19, 352 S.E.2d at 331. 
 
Applying the criteria of the continuous representation rule 
to the case at bar the record reflects that the attorney-client 
relationship between Kruck and the Shipmans was for the 
particular undertaking concerning the creditor’s action and the 
resulting bankruptcy.  Kruck’s advice to the Shipmans to file 
for bankruptcy was an important and integral part of his 
representation in that matter.  For statute of limitations 
purposes, the continuous representation rule effectively tolled 
the accrual of the statute of limitations for the Shipmans’ 
cause of action from the filing of bankruptcy until January 19, 
1999, the date Kruck’s representation terminated regarding the 
particular undertaking for which he was engaged. 
 
For purposes of the continuous representation rule, it is 
irrelevant whether substitute counsel is acquired or when that 
occurs.  The date the alleged negligent attorney’s 
representation of the client terminates is the relevant date 
which commences the running of the statute of limitations.  
Unless another rule of law tolls the accrual date further, the 
Shipmans thus had until January 19, 2002, to timely file their 
legal malpractice claim against Kruck. 
 
13
C. 
THE “PAYMENT RULE” 
 
In Duesterdick this Court held that a motion for judgment 
asserting legal malpractice that fails to allege actual damages 
fails to state a cause of action, and is demurrable. 
 
[W]hen a client has suffered a judgment for money 
damages as the proximate result of his lawyer's 
negligence such judgment constitutes actual 
damages recoverable in a suit for legal 
malpractice only to the extent such judgment has 
been paid.  Here, the motion for judgment failed 
to allege such actual damages.  It failed, 
therefore, to state a cause of action, and the 
trial court correctly sustained the demurrer. 
 
217 Va. at 766, 232 S.E.2d at 776.  The Shipmans aver that our 
decisions in Duesterdick and Rutter stand for the “payment 
rule,” which they construe to mean “that a cause of action for 
legal malpractice does not accrue until there is actual injury 
or damages, and there is, at a minimum, a judgment in any 
underlying litigation on an issue central to the malpractice 
claim.”  They argue that the outcome in Rutter was based on this 
view of the Duesterdick “payment rule.” 
 
According to the Shipmans, application of the “payment 
rule” means the statute of limitations did not begin to run 
until they had suffered a judgment (the bankruptcy court’s March 
8, 2000 order declaring the Trust revocable) and they had made 
payment on that judgment by purchasing the residence from the 
Bankruptcy Trustee on June 29, 2001.  The Shipmans thus contend 
they had three years from that date, until June 29, 2004, to 
 
14
bring their malpractice action.  Since Kruck’s alleged breach of 
duty occurred on March 8, 1998 with the filing of the bankruptcy 
petition, the Shipmans’ “payment rule” would allow them to file 
their malpractice claim more than six years after the breach. 
 
Kruck responds that Duesterdick is “not a statute of 
limitations or accrual case but instead simply stands for the 
proposition that attorneys are only liable for actual damages 
which their errors proximately cause their clients to incur.”  
Moreover, Kruck asserts the “payment rule” only applies “when a 
client has suffered a judgment for money damages as the 
proximate result of his lawyer’s negligence.”  Duesterdick, 217 
Va. at 766, 232 S.E.2d at 776. 
 
Neither Duesterdick nor Rutter involved a statute of 
limitations issue.  In Duesterdick, the trial court sustained a 
demurrer to a motion for judgment which failed to sufficiently 
plead damages.  The motion for judgment did not allege the 
plaintiff had made any payment upon a default judgment which was 
the basis of the alleged legal malpractice.  In affirming the 
trial court, we never considered the statute of limitations in 
any way. 
 
Rutter involved a legal malpractice claim brought by the 
executor of an estate against a law firm that had drafted the 
decedent’s will and trust documents.  The estate alleged that 
the testamentary documents failed to distribute charitable 
 
15
donations according to the decedent’s wishes, resulting in a 
significant estate tax liability.  The estate contended a cause 
of action against the law firm arose during the decedent’s 
lifetime because she was entitled to recover the fees paid to 
the law firm for drafting defective testamentary documents.  We 
held, however, that the additional amount of estate tax, not the 
fee decedent paid to the attorneys, was the injury or damage 
proximately caused by the legal malpractice.  Rutter, 264 Va. at 
314, 568 S.E.2d at 695.  Therefore, no cause of action came into 
existence during the decedent’s lifetime as to the estate tax 
liability and thus the claim did not survive her death.  Id. 
 
The distinctly different interpretations of the “payment 
rule” expressed by the litigants illustrates the difficulty in 
construing our holding in Duesterdick with our decisions in 
Stone, Laburnum, VMI, and Keller and other cases for purposes of 
the accrual of the statute of limitations.  If, as we have 
consistently held, even slight damage sustains a cause of 
action, it is difficult to discern how the existence of a cause 
of action can be postponed until some payment in partial or 
whole satisfaction of the client’s damage has occurred.  The 
infirmities of such a rule are obvious. 
 
First and foremost, adherence to a payment rule would vest 
the aggrieved client with the power to forestall the running of 
the statute of limitations by the deferral of payment, 
 
16
regardless of whether he has already suffered damages sufficient 
to give rise to his cause of action.  It is the legislature that 
decides when causes of action shall accrue, not plaintiffs. 
 
Second, such a rule does not protect a client who, due to 
bankruptcy or insolvency, cannot afford to pay whatever damage 
he has suffered.  “If the client has no cause of action until he 
has paid the judgment against him, then the larger the judgment, 
the greater the client’s burden and the lawyer’s impunity; the 
greater the injury wrongfully inflicted, the less the liability 
of the wrongdoer.”  Duesterdick, 217 Va. at 767, 232 S.E.2d at 
777 (Poff, J., dissenting). 
 
Finally, the “payment rule”, in a statute of limitations 
context, would work an injustice on attorneys who may be forced 
to defend allegations of malpractice brought many years after 
the alleged breach occurred, dependent entirely upon the ability 
or whim of the complaining client to pay the resulting damages.  
In this regard the “payment rule” defeats the primary objectives 
of statutes of limitations, such as compelling “the exercise of 
a right of action within a reasonable time,” Street v. Consumers 
Min. Corp., 185 Va. 561, 575, 39 S.E.2d 271, 277 (1946), 
preventing surprise, and avoiding problems “incident to the 
gathering and presentation of evidence when claims have become 
stale.”  Truman v. Spivey, 225 Va. 274, 279, 302 S.E.2d 517, 519 
 
17
(1983).  Application of the “payment rule” to the facts of the 
case at bar, as the Shipmans urge, illustrates these defects. 
 
Even if we determined that when the Shipmans hired the 
second attorney they incurred legal fees, and thus damages 
sufficient to establish a cause of action, there is no 
indication in the record as to when those fees were paid.  If 
they had given a retainer to that attorney on their first visit, 
presumably the “payment rule” would then be satisfied and their 
cause of action would begin to accrue.  Suppose, instead, the 
Shipmans did not pay their attorney for six months, one year, or 
longer.  Such a scenario exemplifies why the payment rule would 
frustrate the will of the legislature and circumvent the 
objectives of the statutes themselves if made applicable in a 
statute of limitations context. 
 
In the context of a judgment entered against a client by 
virtue of his attorney’s purported negligence, we said in 
Duesterdick, “until the client has made a payment on that debt 
he has suffered no actual loss or damage.”  217 Va. at 766, 232 
S.E.2d at 776.  For the reasons set forth above, we conclude 
that this is an incorrect statement of law.  As Justice Poff 
stated in his dissent in Duesterdick, a client who suffers the 
entry of a judgment against him indeed suffers a legal injury or 
damage. 
 
18
There is little remote, speculative, or 
contingent about a money judgment.  Indeed, it is 
a legal creature of singular dignity.  Such a 
judgment calls into existence what did not exist 
before, viz., a liquidated debt.  Except for 
jurisdictional defect, that judgment and the debt 
it creates cannot be collaterally attacked and is 
actionable in every state.  The recorded judgment 
constitutes a continuing lien (securing the debt 
and the interest as it accrues) on the debtor’s 
assets (presently owned and later acquired), a 
lien that is enforceable by public sale.  Subject 
to the statute of limitations, the debt survives 
the debtor’s death and may be revived against his 
personal representative.  Code § 8-396 (Cum. 
Supp. 1976).  Some judgments, such as that 
suffered by the client here, survive bankruptcy.  
11 U.S.C. § 35. 
 
Id., 217 Va. at 768, 232 S.E.2d at 777. 
 
Accordingly, our prior decision in Duesterdick is overruled 
and cannot be viewed as supporting the Shipmans’ argument, which 
we reject. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
“When the trial court has reached the correct result for 
the wrong reason, we will assign the correct reason and affirm 
that result.”  Mitchem v. Counts, 259 Va. 179, 191, 523 S.E.2d 
246, 253 (2000); accord Hartzell Fan, Inc. v. Waco, Inc., 256 
Va. 294, 303, 505 S.E.2d 196, 202 (1998); Ridgwell v. Brasco Bay 
Corp., 254 Va. 458, 462, 493 S.E.2d 123, 125 (1997); Harrison & 
Bates, Inc. v. Featherstone Assoc. Ltd. Partnership, 253 Va. 
364, 369, 484 S.E.2d 883, 886 (1997).  Although the trial court 
was initially correct in its ruling from the bench, it later 
 
19
 
20
held, incorrectly, that the Shipmans’ cause of action accrued 
“when counsel was retained and paid.” 
 
For the reasons stated above, the Shipmans’ cause of action 
for legal malpractice accrued at the time of the attorney’s 
breach, subject to the continuous representation rule.7  
Therefore, the Shipmans failed to timely prosecute their claim 
against Kruck and the trial court correctly granted Kruck’s plea 
in bar.  We will therefore affirm the judgment of the trial 
court. 
Affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
                     
 
7 No argument was made in the present litigation concerning 
any tolling effect of the bankruptcy on the Shipmans’ 
malpractice claim under federal law or Code § 8.01-229, or 
concerning the statute of limitations effect on the nonsuit of 
the original motion for judgment.  Hence, we express no opinion 
on such arguments in the present disposition.