Title: State v. Haberlein
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 102254
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: December 28, 2012

1 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 102,254 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
ROBERT MARTIN HABERLEIN, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
 
Second-degree intentional murder is a lesser degree of homicide than first-degree 
premeditated murder and thus, if sufficient evidence of all of the elements of the greater 
offense has been presented by the State, an instruction on the lesser is legally and 
factually appropriate and should be given by the district judge. However, when a 
defendant challenges the judge's failure to give the lesser included offense instruction for 
the first time on appeal, the defendant must demonstrate that the failure was clearly 
erroneous, i.e., the defendant must firmly convince the appellate court that the giving of 
the instruction would have made a difference in the verdict. In a case with peculiarly 
abundant evidence of premeditation—including testimony that the armed defendant 
announced to accomplices before a planned robbery that something more serious was 
about to happen, as well as physical and testimonial evidence that he and an accomplice 
recaptured the robbery victim after an attempted escape and beat her for up to 10 minutes 
with several objects and then shot her for a third time—the district judge's failure to give 
a lesser included offense instruction on second-degree intentional murder was not clearly 
erroneous.  
 
 
2 
 
2.  
Neither the phrase "force, threat, or deception" nor the phrase "to facilitate flight 
or the commission of any crime" in the Kansas kidnapping statute sets forth alternative 
means of committing the crime of kidnapping or aggravated kidnapping.  
 
3. 
 
A jury instruction on the elements of a charged crime generally should not be 
broader than the charge contained in the information. An instruction on aggravated 
robbery that includes the phrase "from the person or presence" rather than the 
information's "from the presence" of the victim does not violate this general rule. A 
taking from the person of a victim necessarily constitutes a taking from the presence of 
the victim.    
 
4. 
A constitutional ground for reversal of a criminal conviction asserted for the first 
time on appeal is not properly before the court for review. The appellate court will not 
apply a caselaw exception to this rule when a defendant has not explained why such an 
exception is appropriate. 
 
5. 
 
One error cannot support application of the cumulative error doctrine.   
 
6. 
A constitutional ground for vacation of criminal sentence asserted for the first time 
on appeal is not properly before the court for review. The appellate court will not apply a 
caselaw exception to this rule when a defendant has not explained why such an exception 
is appropriate. 
 
3 
 
 
Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; JOHN J. MCNALLY, judge. Opinion filed December 28, 
2012. Affirmed. 
 
 
Korey A. Kaul, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief for 
appellant.  
 
 
Sheryl L. Lidtke, deputy district attorney, argued the cause, and Jerome A. Gorman, district 
attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with her on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
 
BEIER, J.:  Robert Martin Haberlein appeals his convictions for first-degree 
premeditated murder, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated robbery. He argues:  (1) the 
district judge erred by failing to instruct the jury on second-degree intentional murder; (2) 
the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove what he claims are two sets of 
alternative means of committing aggravated kidnapping; (3) the district judge erred in 
issuing an instruction on aggravated robbery that was broader than the language in the 
information; (4) the district judge erred in certifying him as an adult without having a 
jury make that determination; (5) cumulative error deprived him of a fair trial; and (6) the 
Kansas hard 50 sentencing scheme is unconstitutional. We affirm. 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY  
 
The State charged Robert Martin Haberlein with first-degree murder, 
premeditated, or, in the alternative, felony murder with the underlying felony of 
aggravated robbery; aggravated kidnapping; and aggravated robbery, in the November 
2005 death of Robin Bell.  
 
Bell was a manager at a Dollar General store in Bonner Springs. On the night of 
the crimes, Bell's husband woke up about 1 a.m. and discovered that Bell was not home 
4 
 
from work. He drove from Tonganoxie to Bonner Springs and arrived at the store about 
1:30 a.m. He saw his wife's car still parked at the store and called the police from across 
the street. Police responded to the scene and located a deceased female, later identified as 
Bell, in the back room of the store.  
 
Several police officers and crime scene investigators testified about their response 
to the scene and their subsequent investigation. Officers forced their way into the Dollar 
General, checked the front of the building, and then exited and re-entered through the 
back door. Just inside of the back door, officers located the body of Bell with "serious 
injuries about her head and face" and saw "a tremendous amount of blood on the floor." 
Bell had suffered severe trauma from "[b]lunt force items," including a step ladder, a 
tripod, and a shovel, which had "blood all over them."  
 
Officers did not know until a later autopsy that Bell also had been shot, once 
through her right cheek and once just under the skin on her scalp. An officer who 
attended the autopsy described Bell's injuries as follows: 
 
"[S]he had a broken finger. She had three broken ribs. Her upper and lower jaw [were] 
broken. The step stool that went through eye, her eye wasn't there. The cap was recovered 
from the rear of her skull . . . . She had—she was badly bruised, numerous contusions. 
She had—the best way I can describe it, he said divots, like little, in her skull from being 
hit, you know, a little divot. She had several cuts on her face from her—her injuries. We 
know when she was hit with the tripod, we can correspond the injuries to around her arms 
because, you know, it's a tripod. And she just—she suffered greatly."  
 
Forensic pathologist Erik Mitchell also testified regarding Bell's injuries. Mitchell 
noted the "dramatic evidence" of a "tremendous number of physical injuries." Mitchell 
identified several injuries to Bell's face and head, as well as two gunshot wounds. Bell 
also had a broken finger on each hand, abrasions and bruises on her legs and arms, and 
broken ribs. Mitchell identified 48 separate injuries on Bell's body, but he could not tell 
5 
 
the order in which they occurred. Bell had two injuries to the brain that would result in 
death if not treated, and Mitchell noted other injuries also capable of causing death. 
Mitchell ultimately said Bell's cause of death was "extensive crush injuries," and he 
identified the case as a homicide. 
 
At the crime scene, officers also found the cash register drawer in the front of the 
store open, and it showed an incomplete sale time stamped 20:23:01. A telephone in a 
back office was pulled out of the wall; a money bag was lying on a desk in the office; and 
cash drawers were lying on the floor of a safe. Roughly $2,000 was missing from the 
store.  
 
Officers also observed a bloodstain on the floor of the store and on the inside of 
the back door leading to the outside. The landing area outside of the door showed more 
blood. A blood trail led from the back door toward the rear of a Goodwill Store to the 
north.  
 
The State called Detective Victoria Fogarty of the Bonner Springs Police 
Department as a witness about the investigation. In September 2007, Fogarty was still 
working on the case when she received a report about a runaway named Christa Lewis. 
Haberlein called the police station to talk about the report and said that Lewis was his 
girlfriend. Lewis and Haberlein then came to the police station.   
 
Lewis, who was 18 years old at the time of Haberlein's trial, testified about her 
relationship with Haberlein and her knowledge of the robbery. She was friends with 
Haberlein, John Backus, and A.R. during high school. Lewis testified that the four talked 
about the robbery for a few days before it happened and that she participated in the search 
for a place to rob. Lewis did not end up going to the Dollar General with her friends, but 
she gave the three others the keys to another friend's car for use in the robbery. The three 
came back to Lewis' house the day after the crimes to watch the news for a story about 
6 
 
the robbery and murder. Backus and Haberlein threatened Lewis and said they would hurt 
her if she told anyone. Lewis also got money from Backus a few days later in exchange 
for providing the car. 
 
When Lewis and Haberlein came to the police station, another officer initially 
spoke with Haberlein but then requested assistance from Fogarty. After being read his 
Miranda rights, Haberlein brought up the Bell homicide. Haberlein initially said that he 
acted only as a lookout and implicated others, but the police recognized that Haberlein 
shared details of the crime that had not been released to the public.  
 
The officers took Haberlein to the Kansas City Police Department to videotape a 
formal statement. After the statement, Haberlein was transported to Wyandotte County 
Detention Center, where he was held while officers spent several days attempting to 
corroborate Haberlein's original account of the events. Officers then interviewed 
Haberlein again, and he began to change his story.    
 
After interviewing Haberlein, officers contacted A.R., who had been Haberlein's 
15-year-old girlfriend at the time of the crime. When A.R. and her parents arrived at the 
police station, officers told them that they were attempting to get background information 
on Haberlein. After about 20 minutes, Fogarty spoke with A.R. alone. A.R. explained that 
she was at the Dollar General at the time of the crimes, and Fogarty read A.R. her 
Miranda rights. Fogarty later said that A.R. acted afraid and said she had been told by 
Backus and Haberlein that she would get hurt if she revealed what she knew. After A.R. 
talked about her version of what happened in the store, officers took her to the crime 
scene, and then to the Kansas City Police Department for a videotaped statement. She 
also was placed in detention.   
 
7 
 
After A.R.'s interview, officers arrested Backus and took him to jail. At that point, 
they returned to Haberlein for another interview. Again, Haberlein changed his previous 
story and implicated Backus and A.R.   
 
A.R. ultimately testified against Haberlein in exchange for prosecution as a 
juvenile. She said that she first met Haberlein in the ninth grade, and eventually the two 
became a couple. Before that, she had dated Backus, who also knew Haberlein. A.R. was 
also friends with Lewis. About the time of the crime, Haberlein was living with A.R.'s 
family. She, Haberlein, and Backus went to Lewis' house to plan the robbery, which was 
motivated by A.R.'s knowledge of her family's financial problems. The four looked for a 
business in Bonner Springs that would be easy to rob and decided on the Dollar General. 
On the night of the crime, A.R., Haberlein, and Backus went to Lewis' house. Lewis 
decided not to go with them, but the three were able to obtain keys to a car.  
 
According to A.R., when she, Haberlein, and Backus arrived in a parking lot near 
Dollar General, Haberlein told her:  "[T]here's something more serious that's about to 
happen, and if you tell anybody, I'm going to kill you." A.R. was aware that Haberlein 
had a gun.    
 
Once inside the store, A.R. and Haberlein pretended to shop while Backus 
positioned himself near the back. When A.R. and Haberlein took the items they had 
collected to a cash register at the front of the store, Haberlein pulled out a gun, pointed it 
at Bell's forehead, and told her to give him all the money from the register. Bell started to 
give Haberlein the money, but he went behind the register, put Bell's hands behind her 
back, and took her to the back of the store. A.R. saw Backus follow Haberlein and Bell to 
a back office.  
 
A.R. was standing by the front counter when she heard screams and two or three 
gunshots. She ran to the back and saw Bell standing in front of a safe with Haberlein 
8 
 
pointing a gun at her and telling her to open it. Bell had been shot and was bleeding, but 
she opened the safe and put the money in a bag. Haberlein handed the money to Backus, 
and Backus put the money by the inside door. Bell then ran out of the store through its 
back door. Haberlein and Backus chased her, and A.R. held the door open for them as 
they pulled Bell back inside. Bell asked A.R. for help, but A.R. said she could not help.  
 
Haberlein and Backus then took Bell to a storage room, pushed her to the ground, 
and started beating her with things from the room. Backus beat her with a broom, and 
Haberlein beat her with a bucket, stuck a chair leg through her face, and beat her with a 
stool. A.R. stood silent in the doorway while the beating continued for what she 
estimated to be up to 10 minutes. Bell stopped moving when she was shot again by 
Haberlein.  
 
Backus or Haberlein then tried to clean up the area in the storage room. Backus 
picked up the money, and the three went out the store's back door and returned to the car. 
Backus or Haberlein put the money in the trunk; Haberlein threw the gun on the floor of 
the back seat; and the three drove to a McDonald's to eat.  
 
The three then went to Backus' house, where Backus and Haberlein changed 
clothes. They put their old clothes in the trunk of the car, and they dropped the car back 
off at Lewis' house. Haberlein and A.R. went to her house with the clothes and money. 
A.R. told her mother, Yvette, about the robbery the next day, and Yvette drove her 
daughter and Haberlein to a bridge to dump the gun. According to A.R., the money from 
the robbery went to her mother. A.R. said she and Haberlein burned the bloody clothes.   
 
Yvette's testimony at Haberlein's trial corroborated her daughter's testimony in 
part. On the morning after the crimes, Backus and Haberlein came to her house. Yvette 
overheard them talking about the robbery with her daughter and thought they were joking 
because Haberlein was laughing. Yvette followed her daughter into her bedroom, and 
9 
 
A.R. showed her mother Haberlein's gun. Yvette admitted that she knew the gun was the 
murder weapon. She did not want it in the house and went with her daughter to dispose of 
it. When Yvette took the gun out of the trunk, she said, she found a bag of bloody clothes 
as well. Yvette said she threw it all over the side of a bridge because she was "trying to 
protect" her daughter. Yvette said she received $400 from her daughter for helping to get 
rid of the gun. Yvette did not tell the police of her involvement until after her daughter 
gave her account of the crimes to the police. Yvette pleaded guilty to aiding a felon and 
received 18 months' probation in exchange for her testimony.   
 
A.W., a friend of A.R.'s who was 16 years old at the time of trial, testified that 
A.R. told her about a woman who had been killed in Bonner Springs. A.W. also testified 
that A.R. admitted involvement in the crimes, and said Haberlein and his best friend also 
were involved.    
 
No physical evidence from the crime scene tied Haberlein to the crime, and the 
murder weapon was not introduced into evidence. Letters that Haberlein allegedly sent to 
two other jail inmates were admitted into evidence. The State also introduced and played 
for the jury three videotaped statements made by Haberlein and one by A.R.   
 
The defense called Haberlein as its sole witness. Haberlein testified that he was at 
his mother's house on the day of the crimes. He also said that he had been taking cocaine 
and was off his prescribed medication for mental problems when he spoke with Fogarty 
for the first time. Haberlein said that he received information about the details of the 
crime from Fogarty and was still under the influence of cocaine and was given more 
details of the crime when he gave his first videotaped statement.   
 
During his interview with officers a few days later, Haberlein said, he explained 
that he was still recovering from his drug use and was still off of his prescribed 
medication. Haberlein said he told the police what he did because he was trying to protect 
10 
 
A.R. and her mother. Haberlein acknowledged that he wrote a letter discussing the crime 
while in jail, but he said that some of the content was untrue. Haberlein said he did not 
meet A.R. until after the robbery and did not move in with A.R.'s family until January 
2006, when A.R. told him that she had participated in the crimes. Haberlein denied any 
involvement in the Dollar General robbery and Bell's murder.    
 
Haberlein did not seek a lesser included offense instruction on second-degree 
intentional murder. He had been charged with aggravated kidnapping under K.S.A. 21-
3421. The statute provides:  "Aggravated kidnapping is kidnapping, as defined in K.S.A. 
21-3420 and amendments thereto, when bodily harm is inflicted upon the person 
kidnapped." K.S.A. 21-3420 provides:  
 
"Kidnapping is the taking or confining of any person, accomplished by force, 
threat or deception, with the intent to hold such person: 
 
"(a) For ransom, or as a shield or hostage;  
"(b) to facilitate flight or the commission of any crime;  
"(c) to inflict bodily injury or to terrorize the victim or another; or  
"(d) to interfere with the performance of any governmental or political function."  
 
The district judge instructed the jury: 
 
"The defendant is charged in Count II with the crime of Aggravated Kidnapping. 
The defendant pleads not guilty. 
 
"To establish this charge, each of the following claims must be proved: 
 
"1. 
That the defendant, or another for whose conduct he was 
criminally responsible, took or confined Robin Bell by force, threat or 
deception; 
 
11 
 
"2. 
That it was done with the intent to hold such person to facilitate 
flight or the commission of any crime, to-wit: Aggravated Robbery; 
 
 
"3. 
That bodily harm was inflicted upon Robin Bell; 
 
and 
 
"4. 
That this act occurred on or about the 11th day of November, 
2005, in Wyandotte County, Kansas."  
 
The jury convicted Haberlein of first-degree premeditated murder, aggravated 
kidnapping, and aggravated robbery.  
 
Haberlein filed two unsuccessful motions for new trial. Haberlein received a hard 
50 sentence for the first-degree premeditated murder conviction, a 253-month sentence 
for the aggravated kidnapping conviction, and a 59-month sentence for the aggravated 
robbery conviction. All of the sentences were ordered to run consecutively.    
 
FAILURE TO INSTRUCT ON SECOND-DEGREE MURDER 
 
Haberlein did not object to the district judge's failure to give an instruction on the 
lesser included offense of second-degree intentional murder. He now argues that the 
failure to give the instruction was clearly erroneous.  
 
This court has recently clarified the analytical steps and corresponding standards 
of review for jury instruction issues on appeal:    
 
"(1) First, the appellate court should consider the reviewability of the issue from both 
jurisdiction and preservation viewpoints, exercising an unlimited standard of review; (2) 
next, the court should use an unlimited review to determine whether the instruction was 
legally appropriate; (3) then, the court should determine whether there was sufficient 
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant or the requesting party, that 
12 
 
would have supported the instruction; and (4) finally, if the district court erred, the 
appellate court must determine whether the error was harmless, utilizing the test and 
degree of certainty set forth in State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. 
denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012)." State v. Plummer, 295 Kan. 156, Syl. ¶ 1, 283 P.3d 202 
(2012).   
 
Thus, to determine whether it was clearly erroneous to fail to give an instruction, the 
reviewing court necessarily has to first determine whether it was erroneous at all. Only 
after determining that the district judge erred in failing to give a particular instruction 
does a reviewing court engage in a reversibility inquiry. During this reversibility portion 
of the analysis, the burden to show clear error under K.S.A. 22-3414(3) remains on the 
defendant. State v. Williams, 295 Kan. 506, Syl. ¶ 5, 286 P.3d 195 (2012).  
 
 
K.S.A. 21-3401(a) defines first-degree premeditated murder as the killing of a 
human being committed intentionally and with premeditation. In contrast, second-degree 
intentional murder is the killing of a human being committed intentionally; no 
premeditation is required. K.S.A. 21-3402(a). The instruction about which Haberlein 
complains would have been legally appropriate here, because second-degree intentional 
murder is a lesser included offense of first-degree premeditated murder. See State v. 
Scaife, 286 Kan. 614, 620-23, 186 P.3d 755 (2008).  
 
 
The next question the court must consider is whether the instruction for second-
degree intentional murder would have been factually supported on the record before us. 
Plummer, 295 Kan. 156, Syl. ¶ 1. While the evidence of premeditation in this case was 
extremely strong, there also was at least some evidence of each of the other elements of 
first-degree premeditated murder, and these elements are identical to the elements of 
second-degree intentional murder. Thus, at least in theory, the jury could have chosen to 
convict Haberlein of second-degree intentional murder without having its verdict subject 
to reversal for insufficient evidence. This means the instruction was factually supported.    
 
13 
 
 
Because the second-degree intentional murder instruction was factually and 
legally supported, it was error for the district judge not to give it. See K.S.A. 22-3414(3) 
(judge shall give instruction on lesser included crime when some evidence would 
reasonably justify conviction).   
 
 
But our determination that the omission of this instruction was erroneous does not 
answer the question of whether the failure to give the unrequested instruction was clearly 
erroneous. Haberlein bears the burden of firmly convincing us that the jury would have 
convicted him of second-degree intentional murder rather than first-degree premeditated 
murder had the error not occurred. Plummer, 295 Kan. 156, Syl. ¶ 1 (citing State v. Ward, 
292 Kan. at 565). 
 
Haberlein argues that "[a]lthough premeditation can happen in a very short amount 
of time, a reasonable juror could require a longer time" and "there is a real possibility the 
jurors in this case would have had a more expanded definition of premeditation." The 
State responds that the evidence at trial excluded Haberlein's position and that no jury 
could have reasonably convicted Haberlein of second-degree intentional murder.   
 
This court has explained premeditation as follows: 
 
 
"'"Premeditation means to have thought the matter over beforehand, in other 
words, to have formed the design or intent to kill before the act. Although there is no 
specific time period required for premeditation, the concept of premeditation requires 
more than the instantaneous, intentional act of taking another's life."' State v. Martis, 277 
Kan. 267, 301, 83 P.3d 1216 (2004) (quoting State v. Hebert, 277 Kan. 61, 88, 82 P.3d 
470 [2004]). Several factors may give rise to an inference of premeditation, including: (1) 
the nature of the weapon used, (2) the lack of provocation, (3) the defendant's conduct 
before and after the killing, (4) threats and declarations of the defendant before and 
during the occurrence, and (5) the dealing of lethal blows after the deceased was felled 
and rendered helpless. State v. Scott, 271 Kan. 103, 109, 21 P.3d 516, cert. denied 534 
U.S. 1047 (2001). Moreover, premeditation and deliberation may be inferred from the 
14 
 
established circumstances of a case, provided the inference is a reasonable one. State v. 
Scott, 271 Kan. at 108; see also State v. Jones, 279 Kan. 395, 404, 109 P.3d 1158 
(2005)." State v. Morton, 283 Kan. 464, 474-75, 153 P.3d 532 (2007).   
 
Haberlein's jury was given the following definition:  "Premeditation means to have 
thought the matter over beforehand, in other words, to have formed the design or intent to 
kill before the act. Although there is no specific time period required for premeditation, 
the concept of premeditation requires more than the instantaneous, intentional act of 
taking another's life."    
 
The evidence of premeditation in this case was peculiarly abundant. It is rare for 
there to be testimony that an armed defendant announced before a planned robbery that 
"something more serious was about to happen." A.R. also testified that Bell had been shot 
and was bleeding by the time she reached the back office. After the safe was emptied, 
when Bell momentarily escaped, Haberlein and Backus chased after her, caught her, and 
forced her back inside the store. Bell's request for help from A.R. was in vain. Instead, 
Haberlein and Backus subjected Bell to a merciless and prolonged beating, converting 
several objects to weapons, and then again shot Bell. Finally, she stopped moving. She 
had 48 separate injuries. On this grisly record, and in light of Haberlein's shifting stories 
and trial defense of categorical denial, we are not firmly convinced there was a real 
possibility the jury would have convicted him of second-degree intentional murder, had it 
been given that option. The district judge's failure to instruct sua sponte on second-degree 
intentional murder was not clearly erroneous.     
 
ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING 
 
Haberlein's second claim on appeal challenges his aggravated kidnapping 
conviction on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of guilt 
on each of the alternative means for committing the crime on which the jury was 
instructed. Our recent decision in State v. Brown, 295 Kan. 181, 284 P.3d 977 (2012), 
15 
 
established a framework for considering whether statutory language creates alternative 
means demanding independently sufficient proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The first 
step to determine whether use of an "or" in a statute separates alternative means requires 
interpretation or construction. Brown, 295 Kan. 181, Syl. ¶ 4. Issues of statutory 
interpretation and construction, including issues of whether a statute creates alternative 
means, raise questions of law reviewable de novo on appeal. See State v. Burnett, 293 
Kan. 840, 847, 270 P.3d 1115 (2012); see also State v. Kesselring, 279 Kan. 671, 678, 
112 P.3d 175 (2005) (court exercises de novo review over jury unanimity issues). Only if 
statutory language is ambiguous do we move from interpretation to construction and rely 
on any revealing legislative history or background considerations that speak to legislative 
purpose, as well as the effects of application of the canons of statutory construction. See 
Double M Constr. v. Kansas Corporation Comm'n, 288 Kan. 268, 271-72, 202 P.3d 7 
(2009).     
 
In Brown, we set the following guideposts to determine whether a statute sets out 
alternative means:   
 
"In examining legislative intent, a court must determine for each statute what the 
legislature's use of a disjunctive 'or' is intended to accomplish. Is it to list alternative 
distinct, material elements of a crime—that is, the necessary mens rea, actus reus, and, in 
some statutes, a causation element? Or is it to merely describe a material element or a 
factual circumstance that would prove the crime? The listing of alternative distinct, 
material elements, when incorporated into an elements instruction, creates an alternative 
means issue demanding super-sufficiency of the evidence. But merely describing a 
material element or a factual circumstance that would prove the crime does not create 
alternative means, even if the description is included in a jury instruction. See [State v. 
Wright, 290 Kan. 194, 201, 224 P.3d 1159 (2010)] ('[State v. Timley, 255 Kan. 286, 875 
P.2d 242 (1994)] required sufficiency of evidence to support each alternative means upon 
which a jury is instructed, in order to protect a criminal defendant's right to a unanimous 
jury verdict.' [Emphasis added.]); see also [State v. Peterson, 168 Wash. 2d 763, 769, 230 
16 
 
P.3d 588 (2010)] (focus of the alternative means rule is on the jury instructions)." 295 
Kan. at 194.    
 
We noted in Brown that the legislature will typically signal its intent to state 
alternative means through structure, separating intended alternatives into distinct 
subsections. The legislature also may list additional alternatives or options within one 
alternative means of committing the crime. "But these options within an alternative do 
not constitute further alternative means themselves if they do not state additional and 
distinct ways of committing the crime, that is, if they do not require proof of at least one 
additional and distinct material element," i.e., mens rea, actus reus, or causation. Brown, 
295 Kan. at 196.  
 
"An option within a means scenario is another important clue to legislative intent because 
such options signal secondary status rather than an intent to create a material, distinct 
element of the crime. Options within a means—that is, the existence of options that do 
not state a material, distinct element—do not demand application of the super-sufficiency 
requirement. [Citations omitted.]." Brown, 295 Kan. at 197.  
 
Haberlein argues that force, threat, and deception are alternative means of 
committing the crime of aggravated kidnapping, that each was instructed upon, and that 
there was no evidence to support deception. He also argues that facilitation of flight and 
facilitation of the commission of the crime of aggravated robbery are alternative means 
that were instructed upon and that there was no evidence supporting the intention to hold 
Bell to facilitate the perpetrators' flight.  
 
In its brief, submitted well before Brown was filed, the State conceded that force, 
threat, and deception were alternative means but argued that there was sufficient evidence 
to support each. In the State's view, Haberlein "deceived" Bell when he pretended to shop 
and approached the register in "order to get close enough to her to hold and confine her." 
The State met Haberlein's argument on flight and commission in the same fashion, 
17 
 
arguing there was sufficient evidence that the holding of Bell facilitated flight in that "the 
continued confinement (and eventual murder) of [Bell] in the back room after she begged 
for her life substantially lessened [Haberlein's] risk of detection or made it easier for [him 
and Backus and A.R.] to escape without a single witness to identify them." Because 
Brown has intervened, we must analyze whether the governing statutory language and the 
jury instruction that repeated it actually created two sets of alternative means. In other 
words, the State's concessions may have been premature.   
 
Force, Threat, or Deception 
 
Haberlein does not challenge the phrase "taking or confining" in this appeal. Those 
two terms set out two alternative means of carrying out the crime of kidnapping and thus 
aggravated kidnapping. "Taking" and "confining" each denotes a distinct actus reus and 
they are, therefore, alternative means. But the phrase "force, threat, or deception" 
addresses secondary matter, merely describing ways in which the actus reus can be 
accomplished. In other words, under our Brown analysis, each is an option within the 
means of taking or confining. Each merely sets out factual circumstances that may prove 
the distinct, material element of taking or confining. Force, threat, and deception are not 
alternative means of committing a kidnapping or aggravated kidnapping, and we need not 
reach the question of whether sufficient proof of each was presented to Haberlein's jury. 
See Brown, 295 Kan. 181, Syl. ¶ 11; cf. State v. Wright, 290 Kan. 194, 207, 224 P.3d 
1159 (2010); State v. Timley, 255 Kan. 286, 290, 875 P.3d 242 (1994).    
 
Facilitation of Flight or Facilitation of Commission of Aggravated Robbery 
 
Haberlein next points to the following language in subsection (b) of K.S.A. 21-
3420:  "to facilitate flight or the commission of any crime." When we examine the 
language of the entire statute, it appears the legislature did signal through structure an 
intent to define alternative means of proving the mens rea for kidnapping and aggravated 
18 
 
kidnapping. It did not stop with "intent to hold" but listed several motivations for that 
intent to hold. Each of the subsections that follows states an additional and distinct way 
of committing the crime, and proof of one of these additional and distinct material 
elements must be shown in order to support a conviction. Thus, the different subsections 
create alternative means of committing a kidnapping.  
 
But the language on which Haberlein relies is within subsection (b). Facilitation of 
flight and facilitation of the commission of a crime are mere options within a means. The 
members of the legislature grouped certain potentially distinct and potentially 
overlapping items, which must mean they did not want jurors to have to split hairs over 
whether a kidnapping or aggravated kidnapping was committed to facilitate flight or the 
commission of any crime. Again, we need not reach the question of whether the evidence 
was sufficient on each.   
 
Accordingly, Haberlein is thus not entitled to reversal of his aggravated 
kidnapping conviction. This was not an alternative means case on either of the bases he 
asserts.   
 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY INSTRUCTION 
 
Count III of the information charged Haberlein with aggravated robbery as 
follows: 
 
"[O]n or about November 11th, 2005, defendant John William Backus, Robert Haberlein, 
and another did unlawfully, feloniously and willfully take property, to-wit: money, from 
the presence of another, to-wit: Robin Bell, by force, while the said John William Backus 
was armed with a dangerous weapon, to-wit: handgun, in violation of K.S.A. 21-3427." 
(Emphasis added.)  
 
 
At Haberlein's trial, in contrast, the jury was instructed: 
19 
 
 
"The defendant is charged in Count III with the crime of Aggravated Robbery. 
The defendant pleads not guilty. 
 
"To establish this charge, each of the following claims must be proved: 
 
 
"1. That the defendant, or another for whose conduct he was 
criminally responsible, intentionally took property, to-wit: money, from 
the person or presence of Robin Bell; 
 
 
"2. That the taking was by force; 
 
 
"3. That the defendant, or another for whose conduct he was 
criminally responsible, was armed with a dangerous weapon, to-wit: a 
handgun OR inflicted bodily harm upon Robin Bell in the course of such 
conduct; and 
 
"4. That this act occurred on or about the 11th day of November, 2005, in 
Wyandotte County, Kansas." (Emphasis added.)   
 
Haberlein did not object to the giving of this instruction at trial, but he now argues 
that it was impermissibly broader than the language in the information. He thus claims 
his conviction must be vacated. As explained in relation to the lesser included offense 
instruction discussed above, on appeal, Haberlein must demonstrate that the aggravated 
robbery instruction he challenges for the first time on appeal was clearly erroneous; i.e., 
he must firmly convince us that the jury would have reached a different verdict if it had 
been instructed as he now insists it should have been. See Plummer, 295 Kan. 156, Syl. ¶ 
1.    
 
It appears that this issue, as set out in Haberlein's brief, raised two distinct 
objections:  The instruction should not have included "the person" in the phrase "from the 
person or presence," and it should not have included "OR inflicted bodily harm." 
20 
 
Haberlein asserted that "[h]ad the district court properly instructed the jury, there is a real 
possibility the verdict would have been different" because the evidence indicated "that 
[Haberlein] took the bag from the person of Robin, not merely in her presence." 
Haberlein did not likewise elaborate on how the inclusion of "OR inflicted bodily harm" 
was reversible error, and we therefore will not address that objection.    
 
With regard to the "person or presence" objection, the State concedes that 
instructions generally should not be broader than the charges contained in the 
information. The State is bound by the wording of its complaint and limits itself to pursue 
only that "version of the offense" or "theory" of the case at trial. State v. Trautloff, 289 
Kan. 793, 802-03, 217 P.3d 15 (2009). A defendant must be informed of the nature of the 
accusation against him or her and "the prosecution and the court must exercise caution in 
conforming jury instructions to the charges." State v. Jones, 290 Kan. 373, 384, 228 P.3d 
394 (2010); see also Trautloff, 289 Kan. at 802 (citing Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 
749, 767, 770, 82 S. Ct. 1038, 8 L. Ed. 2d 240 [1962]); State v. Wade, 284 Kan. 527, Syl. 
¶ 3, 161 P.3d 704 (2007); State v. Hemby, 264 Kan. 542, 548, 957 P.2d 428 (1998); State 
v. Booker, 197 Kan. 13, 15, 415 P.2d 411 (1966).  
 
The State nevertheless contends that this rule does not apply here because the 
questioned jury instruction, although different from the information, was no broader. A 
taking from Bell's person necessarily also constituted a taking from her presence. Thus 
the addition of that word in the instruction added nothing not already covered in the 
information. We agree. See State v. Robinson, 27 Kan. App. 2d 724, 728, 8 P.3d 51 
(2000) ("Personal property can be taken from a victim's 'presence' without being taken 
from his or her 'person,' but it cannot be taken from his or her 'person' without being 
taken in his or her 'presence.'"); see also Walker v. State, No. 105,373, 2012 WL 
1237890, at *2 (Kan. App. 2012) (unpublished opinion) (citing State v. Verge, No. 
92,562, 2005 WL 2076503, at *3 [Kan. App. 2005] [unpublished opinion], rev. denied 
280 Kan. 991 [2005]) (taking from victim's person necessitates taking from victim's 
21 
 
presence). Because the information required the jury to find that Haberlein took money 
from the presence of Bell, the broader concept, it also permitted the jury to find that 
Haberlein took money from the person or presence of Bell, the narrower concept. The 
inclusion of both concepts in the instruction was neither factually nor legally erroneous 
and thus not clearly erroneous.    
 
ADULT CERTIFICATION 
 
Haberlein claims, for the first time on appeal, that the decision to authorize adult 
prosecution substantially increased the maximum penalty he faced, and he was therefore 
entitled to have a jury make the determination rather than a district judge, citing Apprendi 
v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000).    
 
Constitutional grounds for reversal asserted for the first time on appeal are not 
properly before us for review. State v. Perez, 292 Kan. 785, 789, 261 P.3d 532 (2011). 
Haberlein provides no explanation as to why we should apply cited exceptions 
recognized by caselaw, and we therefore decline to do so. See Perez, 292 Kan. at 789 
(declining to reach defendant's same argument under the same circumstances); State v. 
Kunellis, 276 Kan. 461, 465, 78 P.3d 776 (2003).     
 
CUMULATIVE ERROR 
 
Haberlein asserts that the cumulative error doctrine necessitates reversal, but we 
detect only one error—the failure to give a lesser included offense instruction. One error 
cannot support application of the doctrine. See State v. Miller, 293 Kan. 535, 582, 264 
P.3d 461 (2011) (citing State v. Dixon, 289 Kan. 46, 71, 209 P.3d 675 [2009]).   
 
22 
 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF HARD 50 SENTENCING SCHEME 
 
Following the jury verdict, the district judge sentenced Haberlein to the enhanced 
hard 50 life sentence, plus 312 months for the other offenses. Haberlein did not object to 
the constitutionality of the hard 50 sentencing scheme below, but he now argues that it is 
unconstitutional because it imposes additional punishment, a minimum of 50 years in 
prison rather than 25 years, based on factors not submitted to the jury and proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt. Again, we will not consider the merits of the argument because 
Haberlein provides no explanation of why the issue should be considered for the first 
time on appeal. See Perez, 292 Kan. at 789.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We conclude that defendant Robert Martin Haberlein has pursued only one 
meritorious appellate argument:  that the district judge should have given a jury 
instruction on the lesser included offense of second-degree intentional murder. His failure 
to object or otherwise call the judge's attention to this error in the district court places 
upon him a burden he cannot bear. We are not firmly convinced that the instruction 
would have affected the verdict. The judgment of the district court is therefore affirmed.   
 
* * *  
 
 
ROSEN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part:  I agree with the 
majority's well-reasoned conclusions affirming Haberlein's convictions. However, I 
respectfully dissent from the majority opinion which finds error by concluding that the 
record demonstrates an obligation to instruct the jury on second-degree murder. K.S.A. 
22-3414(3) provides "where there is some evidence which would reasonably justify a 
conviction of some lesser included crime . . . the judge shall instruct the jury as to the 
crime charged and any such lesser included crime." Even viewing the evidence in the 
23 
 
light most favorable to Haberlein, I cannot agree that we are required to speculate as to 
whether the evidence in this case would reasonably justify a conviction of the lesser 
included crime. As the majority so vividly describes:  
 
 
"The evidence of premeditation in this case was peculiarly abundant. It is rare for 
there to be testimony that an armed defendant announced before a planned robbery that 
'something more serious was about to happen.' A.R. also testified that Bell had been shot 
and was bleeding by the time she reached the back office. After the safe was emptied, 
when Bell momentarily escaped, Haberlein and Backus chased after her, caught her, and 
forced her back inside the store. Bell's request for help from A.R. was in vain. Instead, 
Haberlein and Backus subjected Bell to a merciless and prolonged beating, converting 
several objects to weapons, and then again shot Bell. Finally, she stopped moving. She 
had 48 separate injuries." Haberlein, slip op. at 14.  
 
The difference between first-degree murder and second-degree murder is 
premeditation. As the majority points out, a jury may reasonably infer premeditation from 
the circumstances of a case. State v. Morton, 283 Kan. 464, 475, 153 P.3d 532 (2007). 
And I agree with the majority's conclusion that the circumstances of this case could lead 
the jury to reasonably infer that the crime was premeditated. 
 
I disagree with the majority's conclusion, however, that an instruction on second-
degree murder was required based on the facts of this case. Haberlein did not request nor 
did he object to the trial court's omission of an instruction on second-degree intentional 
murder. Here, the majority simply concludes that  
 
"[w]hile the evidence of premeditation in this case was extremely strong, there also was 
at least some evidence of each of the other elements of first-degree premeditated murder, 
and these elements are identical to the elements of second-degree intentional murder. 
Thus, at least in theory, the jury could have chosen to convict Haberlein of second-degree 
intentional murder without having its verdict subject to reversal for insufficient evidence. 
This means the instruction was factually supported." Haberlein, slip op. at 12-13.  
24 
 
 
The test set forth in K.S.A. 22-3414(3) is not a theoretical one. Instead, it requires 
the trial judge, who has heard the evidence in the case, to determine whether there is 
"some evidence which would reasonably justify a conviction" of the lesser included 
crime. (Emphasis added.) If our test is to find in "theory" whether the facts support a 
lesser included crime, any scenario limited only by one's imagination would suffice in 
making the determination on whether to instruct. It seems to me by employing such a 
standard we are mandating that in all cases where the facts support a charge of 
premeditated first-degree murder, the trial court is now required to instruct on all lesser 
included instructions. In short, the majority position would require the court to give 
weight to ephemeral evidence—or nonevidence—and to apply it to any speculative 
scenario that the facts of the case may provide in order to reach the far-fetched 
conclusion that the crime was not premeditated. That is not the law in this state, and it 
should not become the law of this state.  
 
I would simply find on this record and consistent with my dissenting opinions in 
State v. Tahah, 293 Kan. 267, 262 P.3d 1045 (2011), and State v. Scaife, 286 Kan. 614, 
186 P.3d 755 (2008), that it was not error for the trial court to not instruct the jury on 
second-degree murder.