Title: National U. Fire Ins. Co. v. Lenox Liquors, Inc.
Citation: 358 So. 2d 533
Docket Number: 51266
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: December 15, 1977

358 So. 2d 533 (1977)
The NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner,
v.
LENOX LIQUORS, INC., Respondent.
No. 51266.

Supreme Court of Florida.
December 15, 1977.
Rehearing Denied June 5, 1978.
Richard A. Sherman of Wicker, Smith, Blomqvist, Davant, McMath, Tutan &amp; O'Hara, Miami, for petitioner.
Michael B. Solomon of Theodore M. Trushin Law Offices, Miami Beach, for respondent.
KARL, Justice.
This cause is before us on petition for writ of certiorari granted to review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, 342 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1977), which conflicts directly with Capoferri v. Allstate Insurance Company, 322 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1975), thereby vesting jurisdiction in this Court pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution.
Carrying a BB and pellet gun, McClendon, a thirteen-year-old minor, and another entered respondent's liquor store. Believing that Lenox Liquors was being held up by McClendon, Rosen, president of Lenox Liquors, shot McClendon. McClendon brought an action against Lenox and Rosen, alleging that Rosen assaulted him by maliciously, willfully and wantonly firing a loaded shotgun at him striking him in the back, thereby causing grievous personal injury. The complaint expressly charged:
Respondent called upon petitioner, its insurer, to defend, but petitioner refused. Respondent then filed a third party complaint against petitioner and claimed indemnification in the event it was liable to McClendon. Petitioner moved for judgment on the pleadings and argued that the allegations of McClendon's complaint charging intentional tort relieved it from responsibility to defend. The trial judge granted judgment on the pleadings but explained:
Thereafter, respondent and McClendon settled the matter and entered into a joint stipulation which provided inter alia:
After settlement and payment, respondent instituted an action against petitioner under the terms of the policy for indemnification for settlement, costs and attorney's fees incident to defense of McClendon's action. The trial judge entered final judgment for respondent and found that as a matter of law, respondent is not barred from proceeding in the instant suit because of res judicata or estoppel by judgment and determined that respondent's claim falls within the exception to the general rule pertaining to liability insurer's duty to defend being governed by the allegations of the complaint filed against its insured, since the exception to the rule states that an insurer is obligated to defend its insured when the insurer knows or should reasonably be expected to know the facts which bring the claim within the purview of the policy. The Court expressly stated:
Upon appeal, the District Court of Appeal, Third District, affirmed the final judgment and opined that an insurance company's duty to defend is greater than its duty to pay and that the petitioner, insurer, stipulated that McClendon's claim would have to be tried on a negligence theory.
*535 We find that the instant decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, conflicts with Capoferri v. Allstate Insurance Company, supra, wherein the same District Court expressly recognized the well-established rule of this state that the insurer is under a duty to defend a suit against an insured only where the complaint alleges a state of facts within the coverage of the insurance policy and explained:
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, distinguished Capoferri v. Allstate Insurance Co., 322 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1975), cited sub judice, as the basis for conflict, on the basis that in the instant case, the insurer stipulated that McClendon's claim would sound in negligence while in Capoferri the claim was for intentional tort.
However, this is not a valid distinction. Review of the stipulation between petitioner and respondent evidences that the insurer did not stipulate that McClendon's claim would sound in negligence but rather stipulated that prior to the scheduled trial of the cause between McClendon and Lenox Liquors, Inc., Rosen and Lenox Liquors, Inc., reached an oral agreement with McClendon's attorneys, and that this agreement, formalized by the parties into a written joint stipulation and Motion for Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem and Approval of Settlement, recited that those parties had agreed that had settlement not been reached, the cause would have been tried on negligence grounds rather than willful conduct.
Having found conflict which vests jurisdiction in this Court, we now proceed to consider the cause on the merits. The insurance policy involved sub judice provides, in pertinent part:
Occurrence is defined as:
The allegations of the complaint govern the duty of the insurer to defend.[1] The original complaint filed by McClendon did not allege facts which would bring the cause within the coverage of the insurance policy since the only cause of action alleged was one for intentional acts by Rosen. Therefore, the insurer had no duty to defend. The trial court recognized this fact when, in his order granting judgment on the pleadings for the insurer, the trial judge expressly stated that the main suit alleged willful, wanton and malicious assault and the policy of insurance does not provide coverage for bodily injury that was expectedly or intentionally inflicted by an insured.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the District Court of Appeal is quashed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.
It is so ordered.
OVERTON, C.J., BOYD, ENGLAND, SUNDBERG and HATCHETT, JJ., and DREW (Retired), J., concur.
[1]  Cf. C.A. Fielland, Inc. v. Fidelity and Cas. Co. of New York, supra.