Title: Catlin v. Super. Ct.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S167148
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: January 27, 2011

1 
Filed 1/27/11 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
STEVEN DAVID CATLIN, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Petitioner, 
) 
 
 
) 
S167148 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 5 F053705 
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF KERN 
) 
COUNTY, 
) 
 
 
) 
Kern County 
 
Respondent; 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 30594 
 
 
) 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Real Party in Interest. 
) 
 
____________________________________) 
 
After petitioner Steven D. Catlin was sentenced to death, the Legislature 
enacted Penal Code section 1054.9.1  That statute permits a defendant who has 
been sentenced either to death or to life imprisonment without parole to obtain 
discovery of “materials . . . to which the . . . defendant would have been entitled at 
time of trial” (§ 1054.9, subd. (b)) if the defendant shows that good faith efforts to 
obtain such materials from trial counsel were unsuccessful.  Four and one-half 
years after the law‟s passage, petitioner sought discovery under its provisions.  
The trial court denied the request as untimely, because it had not been made within 
a “reasonable time” after section 1054.9‟s enactment.  Petitioner filed a writ 
                                              
1  
All statutory citations are to the Penal Code.   
 
2 
petition in the Court of Appeal challenging the trial court‟s denial order; the Court 
of Appeal upheld the order.  
At issue here is whether a trial court may deny as untimely a section 1054.9 
motion for postconviction discovery.  Our answer is “no,” for these reasons:  The 
statute lacks any language allowing a trial court to deny such a motion as 
untimely, and the statute‟s legislative history shows that the Legislature 
specifically chose not to impose a timeliness limitation.  
I 
In 1986, in Monterey County Superior Court, petitioner was convicted of 
murdering Glenna Catlin, one of his ex-wives; he was sentenced to life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  In 1988, the Court of Appeal 
affirmed the judgment.  (People v. Catlin (June 13, 1988, H002078) [nonpub. 
opn.].)  In 1990, in Kern County Superior Court, petitioner was convicted of 
murdering Martha Catlin (his mother) and Joyce Catlin (another ex-wife).  For 
Martha‟s murder, petitioner was sentenced to death; for Joyce‟s murder, he was 
sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  In 2000, while 
petitioner‟s appeal from the Kern County Superior Court judgment was pending 
before us, he petitioned us for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging the judgment.  
In 2001, we resolved the appeal by affirming the judgment in its entirety.  (People 
v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81.)  At that time, the habeas corpus petition remained 
pending. 
In 2002, the Legislature enacted section 1054.9.  That statute permits a 
defendant sentenced to death or to life imprisonment without possibility of parole 
to obtain postconviction discovery from the prosecution of any materials that the 
defendant would have been entitled to receive at the time of trial, upon a showing 
that good faith efforts to obtain those materials from trial counsel were 
unsuccessful. 
 
3 
Section 1054.9 became effective on January 1, 2003.  Four and one-half 
years later, in August 2007, petitioner moved in Kern County Superior Court for 
postconviction discovery.  Pertaining to his three murder convictions, he sought 
materials in the possession of the prosecution and law enforcement authorities to 
which he would have been entitled at the time of trial.  In support of the motion, 
petitioner submitted a declaration from his current habeas corpus counsel, J. 
Wilder Lee, stating that Lee, as well as Attorney Horace Freedman (petitioner‟s 
counsel on appeal) and Attorney Jeffrey Schwartz (petitioner‟s initial habeas 
corpus counsel) had “made diligent and repeated informal attempts to obtain the 
discovery materials requested” from “trial counsel, counsel‟s investigators and 
defense experts,” and that they had reviewed “trial counsel‟s files and the files of 
other defense team members.”   
The trial court denied the motion as untimely because petitioner had not 
justified the four-and-one-half year delay between the effective date of section 
1054.9 and petitioner‟s filing of the discovery motion.  In September 2007, 
petitioner sought a writ of mandate from the Court of Appeal directing the trial 
court to grant his postconviction discovery motion.  Later that month, while the 
mandate petition was pending in the Court of Appeal, we denied the 2000 habeas 
corpus petition.  The next month, the Court of Appeal summarily denied the 
mandate petition.  Petitioner sought review in this court, and we transferred the 
matter back to the Court of Appeal for issuance of an alternative writ.   
The Court of Appeal, after briefing and oral argument, again denied the 
mandate petition, this time in a written opinion.  The two-justice majority relied on 
a footnote in our decision in In re Steele (2004) 32 Cal.4th 682 (Steele), which 
stated that an inmate who seeks postconviction discovery under section 1054.9 
must do so within a “reasonable time.”  (Steele, supra, at pp. 692-693, fn. 2.)  The 
Court of Appeal majority agreed with the Attorney General that the footnote‟s 
 
4 
language supported the trial court‟s denial of the discovery motion for being 
untimely.  The dissenting justice viewed the Steele footnote as ambiguous, and 
pointed out that section 1054.9 lacked any timeliness requirement.  Petitioner 
sought review in this court, and we granted review to clarify the matter. 
II 
To determine whether a section 1054.9 postconviction discovery motion 
may be denied as untimely, we must construe the statutory language. 
“The basic rules of statutory construction are well established.  „When 
construing a statute, a court seeks to determine and give effect to the intent of the 
enacting legislative body.‟  [Citation.]  „ “We first examine the words themselves 
because the statutory language is generally the most reliable indicator of 
legislative intent.  [Citation.]  The words of the statute should be given their 
ordinary and usual meaning and should be construed in their statutory context.”  
[Citation.]  If the plain, commonsense meaning of a statute‟s words is 
unambiguous, the plain meaning controls.‟  [Citation.]  But if the statutory 
language may reasonably be given more than one interpretation, „ “ „courts may 
consider various extrinsic aids, including the purpose of the statute, the evils to be 
remedied, the legislative history, public policy, and the statutory scheme 
encompassing the statute.‟ ” ‟ ”  (People v. King (2006) 38 Cal.4th 617, 622; 
accord, Klein v. United States of America (2010) 50 Cal.4th 68, 77.) 
As pertinent here, section 1054.9 provides:  “(a)  Upon the prosecution of a 
postconviction writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate a judgment in a case in 
which a sentence of death or of life in prison without the possibility of parole has 
been imposed, and on a showing that good faith efforts to obtain discovery 
materials from trial counsel were made and were unsuccessful, the court shall . . . 
order that the defendant be provided reasonable access to any of the materials 
described in subdivision (b).  [¶]  (b)  For purposes of this section, „discovery 
 
5 
materials‟ means materials in the possession of the prosecution and law 
enforcement authorities to which the same defendant would have been entitled at 
time of trial.”  (Italics added.) 
Section 1054.9 is silent about untimely motions.  It simply says that “on a 
showing that good faith efforts to obtain discovery materials from trial counsel 
were made and were unsuccessful, the court shall . . . order” discovery.  The 
language could not be plainer:  If that showing is made, the defendant is entitled to 
discovery.  
Even if ambiguity could be perceived in the statutory language, section 
1054.9‟s legislative history supports our conclusion that a trial court may not deny 
as untimely a postconviction discovery motion brought under section 1054.9.  As 
originally introduced in February 2002, Senate Bill No. 1391 (2001-2002 Reg. 
Sess.), which proposed creating section 1054.9, made its discovery provisions 
available to anyone convicted of a felony.  The Attorney General opposed the bill.  
One legislative committee analysis described that opposition in these words:  “The 
Attorney General contends that with no time limitations on when a motion for 
discovery could be made, it would impose an unreasonable burden on law 
enforcement and prosecutors‟ offices to maintain files and all types of evidence 
long after defendants had been discharged from custody.”  (Assem. Com. on 
Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1391 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) as amended 
Apr. 10, 2002, p. 4, italics added; see also Assem. Com. on Appropriations, 
Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1391 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.), as amended Apr. 10, 2002, 
pp. 2-3.)   
In response, the proposed legislation was amended to narrow its scope.  As 
amended, the proposed legislation no longer covered anyone convicted of a 
felony, but only those inmates sentenced to either death or life imprisonment 
without possibility of parole.  Because such inmates are never discharged from 
 
6 
custody, law enforcement and prosecutors‟ offices would not be burdened with 
“maintain[ing] files and all types of evidence long after defendants had been 
discharged from custody” (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill 
No. 1391 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.), supra, p. 4), which was the reason for the 
Attorney General‟s objection to the original bill‟s lack of time limitations for 
discovery.  Tellingly, the amended bill did not alter the original bill‟s lack of time 
limitations.  Three days after the bill‟s amendment, the Attorney General withdrew 
his opposition to the bill.  (See Deputy Director Les Kleinberg, Atty. Gen. Office 
of Legis. Affairs, letter to Sen. John Burton, Aug. 26, 2002 [with copies to Sen. 
and Assem. Coms. on Public Safety].)  The Legislature then passed the bill, which 
added section 1054.9 to the Penal Code.  (Stats. 2002, ch. 1105, § 1.) 
This legislative history thus shows that before enacting section 1054.9, the 
Legislature knew of the Attorney General‟s expressed concern about the proposed 
legislation‟s lack of time limits for postconviction discovery but it chose not to 
include such limits. 
The Attorney General now insists, however, that a section 1054.9 
postconviction discovery motion may be denied as untimely.  In support, he points 
to footnote 2 in Steele, supra, 32 Cal.4th 682, 692.  In Steele, we held that a 
section 1054.9 discovery motion should generally be filed in the trial court in 
which the conviction occurred, and that the motion may be filed either by an 
inmate who has already filed a habeas corpus petition, or by an inmate who is 
preparing to file such a petition.  (Steele, supra, at p. 691.)  Footnote 2 discussed 
the timeliness question:  “Section 1054.9 provides no time limits for making the 
discovery motion or complying with any discovery order.  We believe the statute 
implies that the motion, any petition challenging the trial court‟s ruling, and 
compliance with a discovery order must all be done within a reasonable time 
period.  We will consider any unreasonable delay in seeking discovery under this 
 
7 
section in determining whether the underlying habeas corpus petition is timely.  
(See generally In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770; In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 
750.)”  (Steele, supra, at p. 692, fn. 2, italics added.)   
The Attorney General construes the above-italicized language from the 
Steele footnote as stating that when a section 1054.9 postconviction discovery 
motion is not brought “within a reasonable time” (Steele, supra, 32 Cal.4th at 
p. 692, fn. 2), the court in which the motion is brought may deny it as untimely.  
The Court of Appeal majority accepted this view, which seems plausible when the 
footnote‟s italicized language is considered in isolation.  Viewed in context, 
however, the footnote merely states that discovery must be sought “within a 
reasonable time” and that when a petitioner files an untimely discovery motion, the 
court in which the inmate files a habeas corpus petition based on the information 
obtained through discovery should consider the delay “in determining whether the 
underlying habeas corpus petition is timely.”  (Ibid.)  The footnote goes on to say 
that this court will “consider the date of compliance with the [discovery] order in 
considering the timeliness of any petition for writ of habeas corpus that might be 
filed in light of the discovery.”  (Ibid.)   
The Steele footnote‟s observation simply reflects our well-established rule 
that habeas corpus petitions must be prepared and filed “without substantial 
delay.”  (In re Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 787.)  Otherwise stated, Steele‟s 
footnote 2 simply explains that when, because of delay in seeking postconviction 
discovery, an inmate does not file a habeas corpus petition within a reasonable 
time, the petition may be denied as untimely, assuming no exception to the habeas 
corpus timeliness requirement applies.  Indeed, by addressing the situation in 
which a habeas corpus petition is based on information obtained through an 
unreasonably delayed postconviction discovery request, the Steele footnote 
necessarily implies that trial courts will not deny such requests as untimely, 
 
8 
because a petitioner cannot obtain such information when the discovery request is 
denied. 
As we noted earlier, the text of section 1054.9 does not contain a timeliness 
requirement.  At least two possible reasons come to mind why the Legislature 
chose not to allow a trial court to deny as untimely a section 1054.9 postconviction 
discovery motion.  First, a petitioner who files an untimely habeas corpus petition 
may nonetheless be entitled to relief upon a showing “that a fundamental 
miscarriage of justice occurred as a result of the proceedings leading to conviction 
and/or sentence.”  (In re Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 797.)  Thus, as long as the 
habeas corpus petitioner satisfies this test, an unreasonable delay in seeking 
section 1054.9 postconviction discovery will not bar relief.  The possibility of such 
postconviction relief may have persuaded the Legislature that the consequences of 
an unreasonably delayed postconviction discovery motion should be determined as 
part of a court‟s evaluation of the petitioner‟s habeas corpus petition, and that a 
postconviction discovery motion (which seeks information that, the defendant 
hopes, will show that the defendant is entitled to habeas corpus relief) should not 
be denied as untimely.  Second, the Legislature may have seen it as a waste of 
time and resources to have the motion‟s timeliness litigated twice:  once when the 
discovery motion itself is made, and again when the habeas corpus petition is 
adjudicated. 
The Court of Appeal majority here expressed its concern that precluding a 
trial court‟s denial of a postconviction discovery motion as untimely “would result 
in mischief,” because “a defendant could file numerous section 1054.9 motions 
over a period of years and the trial court would be without power to deny the 
motions on the grounds that he or she had waited too long.”  If this reflects a fear 
that petitioners will bombard the courts with successive or repeated discovery 
motions, that fear is not a reason to deny such motions as untimely, as occurred 
 
9 
here.  The question whether a court may deny multiple discovery motions as 
successive is not before us, and we therefore do not address it.  With respect to any 
concern that petitioners would use postconviction discovery motions for the 
purpose of delay, we observe that delay will injure the petitioner:  The longer the 
delay, the greater the likelihood that the postconviction discovery items sought 
will no longer exist, and the greater the likelihood that any ensuing habeas corpus 
petition will be denied as untimely.2  Moreover, to ensure that inmates sentenced 
to death will not use postconviction discovery motions under section 1054.9 for 
purposes of delay,3 this court will not, as a general rule, postpone consideration of 
a habeas corpus petition merely because the petitioner‟s postconviction discovery 
motion is pending in the trial court.  Indeed, as mentioned earlier (see p. 3, ante), 
in this very case we denied petitioner‟s habeas corpus petition when his writ 
petition challenging the trial court‟s denial of his motion for postconviction 
discovery was still pending in the Court of Appeal.   
We stress that an inmate sentenced to death cannot use an untimely section 
1054.9 postconviction discovery motion as a procedural ploy to delay the 
execution.  “[A] stay of execution is an equitable remedy” that “is not available as 
a matter of right.”  (Hill v. McDonough (2006) 547 U.S. 573, 584.)  “A court 
considering a stay must . . . apply „a strong equitable presumption against the grant 
                                              
2  
If an order to show cause ultimately issues, the prosecution too may suffer 
injury caused by unavailable witnesses or lost evidence. 
3  
Because inmates sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of 
parole are imprisoned and are seeking release, they have no incentive to engage in 
delaying tactics that would prolong their imprisonment.  By contrast, for inmates 
sentenced to death, delay may postpone execution.  (See In re Clark, supra, 5 
Cal.4th at p. 796, fn. 31 [“the state has a compelling need for rules that require 
timely presentation of challenges to the judgments in capital cases where 
petitioners, unlike prisoners who are not under sentence of death, have a strong 
incentive for delay”].)   
 
10 
of a stay where a claim could have been brought at such a time as to allow 
consideration of the merits without requiring entry of a stay.‟ ”  (Ibid.)  Thus, the 
pendency of a last-minute discovery request under section 1054.9, with or without 
a concurrently filed habeas corpus petition,4 will not — absent a compelling 
showing of good cause — justify the issuance of a stay of execution, nor should it 
justify postponement of the setting of an execution date.  
DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed, and the matter is 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, ACTING, C. J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
GEORGE, J.* 
                                              
4  
Although we do not decide the issue here, it is doubtful that the filing of a 
section 1054.9 postconviction discovery motion would, in the absence of a 
concurrently filed habeas corpus petition, empower a trial court or an appellate 
court to issue a stay of execution.   
* 
Retired Chief Justice of California, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.  
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Catlin v. Superior Court 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 166 Cal.App.4th 133 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S167148 
Date Filed: January 27, 2011 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Kern 
Judge: Clarence Westra, Jr. 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
J. Wilder Lee, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Petitioner. 
 
Christina Bordé for Habeas Corpus Resource Center as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner. 
 
No appearance for Respondent. 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael  
P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, George Hendrickson, Ward A. Campbell and Stephen G. Herndon, 
Deputy Attorneys General, for Real Party in Interest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
J. Wilder Lee 
360 Ritch Street, Suite 201 
San Francisco, CA  94107 
(415) 495-3115 
 
Stephen G. Herndon 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street, Suite 125 
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550 
(916) 327-0350