Title: State v. Michael R. Andrews, Jr.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1994AP001888-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 4, 1996

No. 94-1888-CR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
 
 
 
No.  94-1888-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN             :                IN SUPREME COURT 
                                                                   
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
Michael R. Andrews, Jr., 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
FILED 
 
 JUNE 4, 1996 
 
 
 Marilyn L. Graves 
  
Clerk of Supreme Court 
  
Madison, WI  
 
                                                                 
  
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Washington 
County, James B. Schwalbach, Circuit Court Judge.  Affirmed. 
 
JANINE 
P. 
GESKE, 
J.  This 
case 
comes 
before 
us 
on 
certification from the court of appeals pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 
(Rule) 809.61 (1993-1994) for review of a judgment of conviction 
entered against Michael R. Andrews, Jr. (Andrews).  This 
conviction arose from an incident that occurred while Andrews was 
visiting a friend's apartment where police executing a premises 
search warrant discovered marijuana in Andrews' duffel bag.  After 
an unsuccessful motion to suppress the evidence, on the grounds 
that search of a visitor's possessions violates the Fourth 
 
No. 94-1888-CR 
 
 
 
2 
Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches, Andrews pled 
guilty to and was convicted of one count of possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to deliver.   
 
The issue before us is whether the police, while executing a 
search warrant for private premises, may search the belongings of 
a visitor who happens to be on those premises.  We conclude that 
police may search all items found on the premises that are 
plausible repositories for the objects of the search, except those 
worn by or in the physical possession of persons whose search is 
not authorized by the warrant.  The search was proper under the 
warrant because the duffel bag was not in Andrews' possession at 
the time, and could reasonably contain the marijuana, baggies or 
paraphernalia sought.  Thus, we affirm the judgment of conviction. 
 
I. 
 
The facts, as relevant to this opinion, are as follows.  
Washington County Circuit Judge Richard T. Becker issued a search 
warrant for the premises of 729 Timberline Trail Apartment 5, City 
of Hartford, Wisconsin, based upon the sworn testimony of Deputy 
Sheriff James Wolf of the multi-jurisdictional drug unit.  He 
identified the occupant of that apartment as Ms. Terry Simko.  In 
support of the warrant, Deputy Wolf testified that stems, seeds, 
and leafy material testing positive for THC, as well as two 
marijuana 
pipes 
containing 
residue, 
and 
a 
ziplock 
baggie 
containing marijuana particles had been retrieved from Simko's 
garbage.  The judge was satisfied that probable cause existed 
 
No. 94-1888-CR 
 
 
 
3 
justifying a search of Simko's apartment for contraband as 
evidence of the crime of possession of a controlled substance.
1  
 
At the suppression hearing, Andrews testified that he had 
gone to Simko's apartment to study.  He indicated that the two of 
them were in the master bedroom studying when they heard a knock 
at the front door.  Simko and her son answered the door.  Andrews 
exited the bedroom and walked down the hall toward the door when 
he heard something about a search warrant.  Andrews testified that 
an officer, whom he could not later positively identify, 
confronted and frisked him.  He believed this was the same officer 
who handled a drug dog brought onto the premises.  In response to 
questions from the officer, Andrews responded that he did not live 
at the apartment and that he owned a duffel bag which was in the 
master bedroom.  Andrews was then told to sit at the dinette while 
the police searched the apartment. 
 
The drug dog reacted to the duffel bag in the master bedroom. 
Deputy Wolf, who was searching that room with Officer Boudry (the 
dog handler), then opened the duffel bag and searched it.  
Underneath some notebooks and papers, Deputy Wolf found a large 
plastic bag with smaller baggies inside containing marijuana.  The 
duffel bag also contained a hand-held scale and other drug 
paraphernalia.  Deputy Wolf testified that, at the time of the 
                     
     
1  Andrews does not contest the sufficiency or validity of 
the warrant, only the proper scope of its execution. 
 
No. 94-1888-CR 
 
 
 
4 
search, he assumed the duffel bag belonged to the apartment's 
occupant, Ms. Simko.  
 
Upon determining that the duffel bag in fact belonged to 
Andrews, the police arrested Andrews who was subsequently charged 
with possession of a controlled substance (marijuana) with intent 
to deliver and possession of a controlled substance (marijuana) 
without tax stamps.  The defense filed a motion to suppress, 
arguing that the search of the duffel bag was unreasonable and 
violative of the Fourth Amendment because it was not authorized 
under the search warrant issued for Simko's residence.  The 
circuit court denied the motion, finding that the search was 
proper both under the authority of the warrant, and pursuant to 
probable cause supplied by the dog sniff and exigent circumstances 
presented by the mobility of the bag.
2  
 
Upon the State's motion at the plea hearing, the circuit 
court dismissed the tax stamp charge.  Andrews pled guilty to one 
count of possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
deliver.  He was sentenced to three years in prison (imposed and 
stayed) and three years of probation with one year in jail as a 
condition of probation.  Andrews filed an appeal and this court 
subsequently granted certification from the court of appeals. 
 
                     
     
2  Because we find the search to fall within the scope of the 
warrant, we do not reach the issue of whether the situation viewed 
in its entirety would have provided the probable cause and exigent 
circumstances necessary to justify a warrantless search. 
 
No. 94-1888-CR 
 
 
 
5 
 
II. 
 
The issue before us is one of first impression in Wisconsin--
may any belongings of a visitor/non-resident be searched in the 
execution of a premises only search warrant.  The focus of this 
appeal is the circuit court's denial of Andrews' motion to 
suppress.  When this court reviews a denial of a suppression 
motion "we will uphold the trial court's findings of fact unless 
they are against the great weight and clear preponderance of the 
evidence."  State v. Whitrock, 161 Wis. 2d 960, 973, 468 N.W.2d 
696 (1991).  However, the question of whether the facts satisfy 
constitutional guarantees is one of law which we review de novo.  
Id. 
 
Both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution guarantee 
that persons shall be secure from unreasonable searches and 
seizures.
3  This court traditionally interprets the two very 
                     
     
3  Art. I, sec. 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides: 
   Searches and seizures . . .  The right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable 
cause, 
supported 
by 
oath 
or 
affirmation, 
and 
particularly describing the place to be searched and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
 
The Fourth Amendment of the federal constitution provides: 
   The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects, 
against 
unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
 
No. 94-1888-CR 
 
 
 
6 
similar provisions in concert.  State v. DeSmidt, 155 Wis. 2d 119, 
129, 454 N.W.2d 780 (1990).  The development of Wisconsin law on 
search and seizure parallels that developed by the United States 
Supreme Court.  State v. Guy, 172 Wis. 2d 86, 93, 492 N.W.2d 311 
(1992), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 914 (1993). 
 
Generally a premises warrant authorizes the search of all 
items on the premises so long as those items are plausible 
receptacles of the objects of the search.  The Supreme Court has 
held that: 
A lawful search of fixed premises generally extends to the 
entire area in which the object of the search may be 
found and is not limited by the possibility that 
separate acts of entry or opening may be required to 
complete the search.  Thus, a warrant that authorizes an 
officer to search a home for illegal weapons also 
provides authority to open closets, chests, drawers, and 
containers in which the weapon might be found. 
 
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-21 (1982).  However, 
courts have found that special concerns are raised when the items 
searched belong to non-residents or visitors to the premises 
described in the warrant.  See, e.g., United States v. Giwa, 831 
F.2d 538 (5th Cir. 1987). 
  
Search warrants must be issued by a neutral, disinterested 
magistrate to whom it has been demonstrated that there is probable 
cause to believe that the evidence sought will aid in prosecution 
for a particular offense, and the warrant must describe with 
particularity the place to be searched and things to be seized.  
Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 255 (1979).  This court has 
 
No. 94-1888-CR 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
7 
stated that the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment 
satisfies three objectives by preventing general searches, the 
issuance of warrants on less than probable cause, and the seizure 
of objects different from those described in the warrant.  State 
v. Petrone, 161 Wis. 2d 530, 540, 468 N.W.2d 676 (1991), cert. 
denied, 502 U.S. 925 (1991). 
 
 
Even when the validity of the warrant is itself uncontested, 
the manner in which it is executed may be subjected to later 
judicial review.  A search "must be conducted reasonably and 
appropriately limited to the scope permitted by the warrant.  
Whether an item seized is within the scope of a search warrant 
depends on the terms of the warrant and the nature of the items 
seized."  Id. at 542.   
 
The Supreme Court has stated that, "[w]herever a man may be, 
he is entitled to know that he will remain free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures."  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 
(1967).  And the "application of the Fourth Amendment depends on 
whether 
the 
person 
invoking 
its 
protection 
can 
claim 
a 
'justifiable,' a 'reasonable,' or a 'legitimate expectation of 
privacy' that has been invaded by government action."  Smith v. 
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (citations omitted).   
 
Thus, the question we face is whether a visitor's belongings 
fall within the scope of a warrant issued for another's premises 
and thus may be lawfully searched, or whether they are prohibited 
 
No. 94-1888-CR 
 
 
 
8 
 
 
8 
as unreasonable invasions of the privacy of an individual who just 
happens to be on those premises.  
 
Jurisdictions are divided on the question of which personal 
effects, if any, of a non-occupant or visitor can be searched 
under a premises warrant.  Courts have utilized several, sometimes 
overlapping, approaches with the primary ones known as the 
"relationship," "notice" and "physical proximity or possession" 
tests.  We will briefly review the basic tenets and development of 
each in order to place our decision in the appropriate context. 
 
Under the "relationship" test, a court looks first to the 
relationship between the owner of the belongings in question and 
the place named in the warrant; the personal effects of a "mere 
visitor" cannot be searched pursuant to a premises warrant.  
Although many courts subscribing to this construct do not clearly 
articulate its legal basis, those that do tie it to the 
particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment.  This was most 
clearly explained in Commonwealth v. Platou, 312 A.2d 29, 32 (Pa. 
1973), overruled by Commonwealth v. Reese, 549 A.2d 909, 911 (Pa. 
1988), which held that a warrant authorizing search of a place 
could not be extended to include the search of things not 
belonging to the occupant of the premises.  The court reasoned 
that because the police had no prior knowledge that the appellant 
would be visiting the premises, "[a] fortiori, neither did the 
issuing magistrate.  The warrant therefore could not possibly have 
 
No. 94-1888-CR 
 
 
 
9 
 
 
9 
described appellant's effects.  If the officer executing the 
warrant, by his own choice, could extend its reach by searching 
things not particularly described therein, the constitutional 
prescription of particularity would be violated."  Platou, 312 
A.2d at 33. 
 
The most frequently cited example of the relationship 
approach is United States v. Micheli, 487 F.2d 429 (1st Cir. 
1973).
4  There, the federal appellate court upheld the search of a 
briefcase found under a desk during the search of a business on a 
premises warrant, even though the police knew that it belonged to 
a co-owner who was not named in the warrant.  The court concluded 
that the question of which personal effects fall within the scope 
of a premises warrant requires analysis of the relationship of the 
person to the place in order to determine "why" the belongings are 
on the premises.  Id. at 431-32.  The court held that, as co-owner 
of the business, the defendant was not a "mere visitor or 
passerby" and his "special relationship to the place" put his 
personal belongings within the warrant's scope.  Id. at 432. 
 
Other courts have modified the relationship test by adding a 
"notice" requirement.  Jurisdictions utilizing this approach begin 
with the premise that items known to belong to visitors cannot be 
                     
     
4  See also United States v. Young, 909 F.2d 442, 445 (11th 
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 825 (1991); United States v. 
Giwa, 831 F.2d 538, 545 (5th Cir. 1987). 
 
No. 94-1888-CR 
 
 
 
10 
 
 
10 
searched.
5  However, under this formulation, police lacking notice 
that property belongs to a visitor may assume that all property on 
the premises is owned by the occupant and, therefore, is 
searchable.
6  In the leading case, Hawaii's Supreme Court held 
that the search of a purse, which was on the floor when the police 
initiated their search but was picked up by its owner during 
execution of the warrant, violated the Fourth Amendment.  State v. 
Nabarro, 525 P.2d 573 (Haw. 1974).  The court reasoned that under 
the circumstances: 
there was no question that the police had notice, prior to 
the search, that Miss Nabarro--indisputably a non-
resident visitor to the premises--was the owner of the 
purse.  The warrant named two men as the occupants of 
the room to be searched, making it likely that any 
purses, which are characteristically female attire, 
found in the room belonged to non-residents.   
 
Id. at 588.  Because the police had notice, the court held that 
the search of the purse was beyond the scope of the warrant and, 
therefore, impermissible.  Id. 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellants have seized on the issue of notice in contesting 
the validity of searches of visitors' belongings.  The primary 
challenge is that, although no actual notice of ownership was 
given, officers "should have known" the items searched belonged to 
                     
     
5  See Hummel-Jones v. Strope et al., 25 F.3d 647, 652 (8th 
Cir. 1994).   
     
6  See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 818 S.W.2d 350, 359 (Tenn. 
Crim. App. 1991); People v. McCabe, 192 Cal. Rptr. 635, 636 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1983). 
 
No. 94-1888-CR 
 
 
 
11 
 
 
11 
non-residents.  Some courts (in both jurisdictions that employ 
relationship/notice and ones which do not) have responded by 
adding the caveat that officers executing a warrant have no duty 
or obligation to establish ownership of items found on the 
premises before searching them.  See, e.g., Carman v. State, 602 
P.2d 1255, 1262 (Alaska 1979) (concluding search was legal because 
there was no notice purse belonged to visiting sister of one of 
three men living on premises, and police had no duty to solicit 
information as to ownership).
7 
 
Other courts have added an additional modification to the 
relationship test (as already modified by the notice requirement). 
 Under this approach, police can search items they have actual 
knowledge belong to a non-resident if "someone within the premises 
has had an opportunity to conceal contraband within the personal 
effects of the non-resident immediately prior to" the execution of 
the warrant.  People v. McCabe, 192 Cal. Rptr. 635, 637 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1983).
8 
                     
     
7  See also State v. Wills, 524 N.W.2d 507, 510-11 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1994); State v. Kurtz, 612 P.2d 749, 751 (Or. Ct. App. 1980). 
     
8  See also Thomas, 818 S.W.2d at 359-60 (relying on McCabe, 
finding search exceeded warrant where officers knew or should have 
known purse belonged to visitor and there "was no opportunity for 
anyone to have hidden [in it] the cocaine suspected on the 
premises"); People v. Coleman, 461 N.W.2d 615, 619 & n.10 (Mich. 
1990) (citing Wayne R. LaFave, 2 Search and Seizure § 4.10(b) for 
the proposition that police may search even known personal effects 
of a visitor if they reasonably believe the visitor "had an 
opportunity to conceal contraband in his personal belongings 
immediately prior to or during the execution of the premises 
search warrant"). 
 
No. 94-1888-CR 
 
 
 
12 
 
 
12 
 
In stark contrast to the checklist of criteria that must be 
satisfied pursuant to the prodigy of the relationship test, courts 
applying the "physical possession" or "proximity" test impose the 
sole limitation that the police may not search items which are 
worn by or within the physical possession of persons whose search 
is not authorized in the warrant.  Such belongings (for example 
jackets and purses) are considered "an extension of the person" 
and therefore not searchable under a premises only warrant.  
However, the same items may be searched, as they are considered 
just another part of the premises, if they have been set down, 
i.e. if the visitor has relinquished control over them.  Many 
sources cite United States v. Teller, 397 F.2d 494, 497 (7th Cir. 
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 937 (1968), as the progenitor of 
this test, but it is notable that the item in question in that 
case (a purse that had been set down on a bed and was therefore 
deemed searchable as "merely another household item") was owned by 
the wife of the person named in the warrant, and was herself an 
occupant of the premises.
9 
                     
     
9  Accord State v. Hill, 870 P.2d 313, 315 (Wash. 1994) 
(recognizing general principle that "officers have no authority 
under a premises warrant to search personal effects an individual 
is wearing or holding"); State v. Jackson, 873 P.2d 1166, 1169 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) (concluding that purse fell within scope of 
premises search warrant because it was not in the physical 
possession of the defendant when searched); Commonwealth v. Reese, 
549 A.2d 909, 911 (Pa. 1988) (holding that a visitor's personal 
property, which is not on the person, may be searched as long as 
it "is a plausible repository for the object of the search"). 
 
No. 94-1888-CR 
 
 
 
13 
 
 
13 
 
Both the State and Andrews urge this court to analyze 
searches of visitor's belongings under the relationship test as 
modified by the Nabarro notice requirement.  They disagree only in 
the result when that test is applied to the given facts.  Andrews 
asserts that because he told one officer that the duffel bag in 
the master bedroom was his, the information should be imputed to 
the rest of the search team, particularly to the officer jointly 
searching the master bedroom, Detective Wolf.  The State counters 
that the circuit court found that Detective Wolf did not know that 
anyone other than Simko owned the bag at the time he opened and 
searched it.  Further, the State argues that notice should not be 
imputed and, lacking actual knowledge that a particular item 
belongs to a visitor, an officer may reasonably search all items 
found on the premises.  
 
However, we need not decide the issue of imputation of 
knowledge of ownership because we reject the relationship/notice 
test and adopt the physical proximity test in its stead. 
 
 
Although we do not have the benefit of an analysis by the 
United States Supreme Court that is directly on point, the Court 
has spoken on the issue of the proper scope of searches conducted 
pursuant to warrants.  In Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979), 
the Supreme Court held that a warrant authorizing the search of a 
tavern and the person of the bartender did not justify the search 
of any of the patrons present during execution of the warrant.  
 
No. 94-1888-CR 
 
 
 
14 
 
 
14 
The Court held that the warrant gave the police "no authority 
whatever to invade the constitutional protections possessed 
individually by the tavern's customers."  Id. at 92 n.4.  Further, 
"a person's mere propinquity to others independently suspected of 
criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable 
cause to search that person" because the search must be supported 
by probable cause particularized to that individual.
10  Id. at 91. 
  
 
This proscription against search of the person of an 
individual whose search is not specifically authorized in the 
warrant has been expanded to bar searches of items worn by or 
otherwise "in the immediate possession of" a person because those 
items are considered extensions of the person.  See United States 
v. Robertson, 833 F.2d 777, 784 (9th Cir. 1987).
11  The converse is 
                     
     
10  The Court in Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 92-93 
(1979), found the patdown of Ybarra to be unconstitutional because 
the police lacked any reasonable belief that he was armed and 
dangerous.  This court subsequently distinguished Ybarra from a 
case involving a patdown of an occupant of a residence during 
execution of a search warrant in, State v. Guy, 172 Wis. 2d 86, 
91-92, 98, 495 N.W.2d 311 (1992), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 914 
(1993).  There, we concluded that the challenged frisk was 
justified by the officer's reasonable suspicion that the defendant 
was armed, given: the prior determination by a magistrate of 
probable cause that drug trafficking was occurring at the 
residence, and thus the likelihood that occupants were involved in 
that crime; officers' testimony that previous experience indicated 
that weapons were often associated with drugs; and the increased 
danger entailed in executing a warrant in a private rather than a 
public place.  Id. at 91-92. 
     
11  See also People v. Reyes, 273 Cal. Rptr. 61, 64 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1990) (holding, given circumstances--police searched clothing 
placed within defendant's reach while he was in the shower--that 
 
No. 94-1888-CR 
 
 
 
15 
 
 
15 
also true--a search warrant for a person has been found to 
encompass the search of a bag or purse carried at the time of 
execution of the search warrant because it is considered a part of 
that person.  "Containers such as [clothing pockets, purses or 
shoulder bags], while appended to the body, are so closely 
associated with the person that they are identified with and 
included within the concept of one's person."  United States v. 
Graham, 638 F.2d 1111, 1114 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 450 
U.S. 1034 (1981).  
 
We also find the Supreme Court's decision in Zurcher v. 
Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978), (which focuses on the search 
and seizure of things, not people) relevant to our inquiry.  
Zurcher arose from a demonstration and the occupation of the 
Stanford University Hospital administrative offices.  As police 
entered one end of a barricaded hallway, a group of demonstrators 
exited at the far end and attacked police officers there with 
sticks and clubs.  One of the injured officers saw a person taking 
photographs and two days later the student newspaper, the Stanford 
Daily, published photos of the clash.  The district attorney 
(..continued) 
clothing was an extension of the person and therefore beyond scope 
of premises warrant); Reese, 549 A.2d at 911-12 (finding "jacket 
was not being worn by Reese and therefore, cannot be characterized 
as an extension of his person so as to propel its search into a 
search of Reese's person"); United States v. Johnson, 475 F.2d 
977, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (noting that purse "not worn" therefore 
not "an extension of her person so as to make the search one of 
her person"). 
 
No. 94-1888-CR 
 
 
 
16 
 
 
16 
obtained a warrant authorizing search of the Stanford Daily's 
premises for "[n]egatives and photographs and films, evidence 
material and relevant to the identity of the perpetrators of 
felonies, to wit, Battery on a Peace Officer, and Assault with a 
Deadly Weapon, . . ."  Id. at 551.  The newspaper brought a civil 
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that the search of the 
office violated their constitutional rights.  Id. at 552.  
 
The Zurcher Court described the issue as centering on how the 
Fourth Amendment should be construed and applied in situations 
involving a "third party" search under color of a warrant 
supported by probable cause that evidence of a crime is located on 
specific property but which does not purport to demonstrate 
probable cause that the owner of the property is involved in the 
crime.  Id. at 553.  The Court concluded that nothing in the 
Fourth Amendment barred issuance of third party warrants, as the 
"critical element in a reasonable search is not that the owner of 
the property is suspected of crime but that there is reasonable 
cause to believe that the specific 'things' to be searched for and 
seized are located on the property to which entry is sought."  Id. 
at 554, 556. 
 
Although the case did not hinge on the propriety of a search 
of 
a 
visitor's 
belongings, 
we 
find 
the 
legal 
principles 
articulated in United States v. Schmude, 699 F.Supp. 200 (E.D. 
Wis. 1988), helpful in our analysis.  In Schmude, the federal 
 
No. 94-1888-CR 
 
 
 
17 
 
 
17 
district court for Eastern Wisconsin denied a motion to suppress 
evidence gathered from a vehicle located on the premises for which 
a valid search warrant had been issued: 
Because 
the search 
warrant 
and accompanying 
affidavit 
established probable cause for the search of the 
premises for firearms, ammunition and U.S. currency, and 
the affidavit indicates that Schmude was the target of 
the search, this court does not believe that ownership 
or control of the various containers searched on the 
premises should be a relevant consideration.  The 
warrant authorized the search of the premises, limited 
only by the nature of what the agents were searching 
for.   
 
Id. at 202.  Therefore, the court concluded that the automobile 
was within the scope of the warrant even though it was not owned 
by the person who was the target of the search. 
 
In articulating the physical proximity test, the Teller court 
did not hinge its decision on the relationship of persons present 
to the premises, or on notice of the ownership of an item, but on 
whether the item searched shared such a close physical proximity 
to a person (any person--occupant or visitor) that it could be 
considered an extension of that person.  We feel that this test 
frames the issue in its proper legal context.  As the Supreme 
Court has said, "[s]earch warrants are not directed at persons; 
they authorize the search of 'place[s]' and the seizure of 
'things,' and as a constitutional matter they need not even name 
the person from whom the things will be seized."  Zurcher, 436 
U.S. at 555.  A premises search warrant authorizes search of items 
found on those premises regardless of ownership; a premises only 
 
No. 94-1888-CR 
 
 
 
18 
 
 
18 
search warrant, without more, does not authorize the search of a 
person or of objects worn or possessed so as to constitute 
extensions of the person.  The critical nexus is not an abstract, 
relational one between person and place, but a concrete, physical 
one between person and thing. 
 
None of the approaches yet devised lack detractors.  Some 
courts have criticized the physical proximity test as being easily 
thwarted because a visitor could simply pick up an item containing 
contraband when police enter to execute a warrant.
12  The most 
frequently cited source of this criticism is Walker v. United 
States, 327 F.2d 597, 600 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 
956 (1964).  There, the federal appellate court allowed the search 
of a handheld wallet and bag, reasoning that to rule otherwise, 
"would be to suggest that a warrant to search premises may be 
frustrated by the device of simply picking up the guilty object 
and holding it in one's hand."  Walker, 327 F.2d at 600.    
 
However, critics usually fail to mention the facts of this 
pre-Teller case in which the police executing the warrant arrived 
to find the door of the premises open with both occupants named in 
the warrant visible inside.  When the officer announced his 
presence and identity as law enforcement, he saw the male occupant 
hand a wallet and bag to the female occupant.  Walker, 327 F.2d at 
                     
     
12  See, e.g., State v. Wills, 524 N.W.2d 507, 510 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1994); United States v. Micheli, 487 F.2d 429, 431 (1st Cir. 
1973). 
 
No. 94-1888-CR 
 
 
 
19 
 
 
19 
598.  The Walker court found that, given the factual scenario, it 
was not unreasonable for the officer to believe that the heroin 
sought was contained in those items and therefore the premises 
warrant encompassed their seizure and search.  Id. at 600.  
Further, the court repeatedly stressed that its holding was 
limited to the facts of the case, commenting: 
[t]his is not to say that the authority conferred by a 
warrant to search premises is coterminous with that 
residing in a warrant to search the person.  United 
States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948).  There are 
obviously situations where the grant of the one cannot 
be enlarged to include the other. 
 
Id. 
 
We find that the relationship/notice test is much more 
susceptible to abuse, as illustrated in the following points 
raised during oral argument: a visitor could simply assert 
ownership to immunize property from search or, conversely, police 
could make a point of never being put on notice so that they could 
assume all items were searchable.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
expressed similar concerns in Commonwealth v. Reese, 549 A.2d 909 
(Pa. 1988).  There, it overruled its 1973 decision, Platou, in 
which it had utilized the relationship test.  The court commented 
that under the old test: 
visitors to the premises could frustrate the efforts of 
police by placing contraband among their unworn personal 
effects or by announcing ownership of various articles 
of clothing and containers in order to place those items 
beyond the scope of the warrant.  We cannot sanction any 
rule that through fraud and gamesmanship erects barriers 
to the effective and legitimate execution of search 
warrants. 
 
No. 94-1888-CR 
 
 
 
20 
 
 
20 
 
Reese, 549 A.2d at 911. 
 
 
Courts have inconsistently applied the relationship/notice 
test which perhaps provides the strongest argument against its 
use.  The parameters of the test are so nebulous as to provide 
little guidance, as evidenced by the cases employing it which have 
arrived at opposite conclusions given very similar fact patterns. 
 For example, where the warrant names only male occupants, the 
search of a woman's purse has been found to be: (a) within the 
scope of the warrant because there was no notice of ownership 
(Carman v. State, 602 P.2d 1255 (Alaska 1979)), and conversely (b) 
illegal because the police could not have reasonably believed it 
belonged to the man named in the warrant (State v. Lambert, 710 
P.2d 693 (Kan. 1985)).    
 
Jurists have had a particularly hard time distinguishing 
visitors from occupants, which is a critical determination in the 
relationship test under which the police cannot search the 
belongings of a "mere visitor."  For example, a person found naked 
or partially clothed and/or sleeping when police arrive to execute 
the warrant has been alternatively deemed: (a) more than a "mere 
visitor" because nakedness evinced a connection with the premises 
(State v. Hill, 870 P.2d 313 (Wash. 1994)) or (b) a "mere visitor" 
even though obviously an overnight guest who had gotten out of bed 
to open the door (State v. Thomas, 818 S.W.2d 350 (Tenn. Crim. 
App. 1991)).  Courts have found time of day to be no more a 
 
No. 94-1888-CR 
 
 
 
21 
 
 
21 
definitive factor than the degree of nakedness.  Compare, United 
States v. Gray, 814 F.2d 49, 51 (1st Cir. 1987), in which the 
court found the defendant was not merely a casual visitor because 
he was in a private residence in which a drug deal had just 
occurred at "the unusual hour of 3:45 a.m." to Hummel-Jones v. 
Strope, et al., 25 F.3d 647, 652 (8th Cir. 1994), where the court 
found that a couple spending the night in a birthing clinic was 
merely patronizing the establishment and therefore the 2 a.m. 
search of their belongings was unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
 
Taking 
into 
account 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
principles 
articulated by the Supreme Court and the practical considerations 
posed by application of the various proposed tests, we conclude 
that the physical proximity test has the strongest legal basis and 
is the most practical and easiest to apply for both the police 
executing a search and a judge subsequently reviewing the 
propriety of the search.  Thus, we hold that police can search all 
items found on the premises that are plausible repositories for 
objects named in the search warrant, except those worn by or in 
the physical possession of
13 persons whose search is not authorized 
                     
     
13  As with all Fourth Amendment inquiries, reasonableness is 
key and the court must examine the totality of the given 
circumstances to determine whether the zone of privacy represented 
by an extension of the person has been invaded.  The more divorced 
an object is from the person, the less reasonable is an 
expectation that the object falls within the protected sphere. 
 
No. 94-1888-CR 
 
 
 
22 
 
 
22 
by the warrant, irrespective of the person's status in relation to 
the premises. 
 
The 
touchstone 
of 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
remains 
reasonableness.  We hold that it is reasonable for officers 
executing a premises warrant to search all items on the premises 
that could contain the contraband or evidence sought under the 
warrant, except those items worn by, or in the physical possession 
of, persons whose search is not authorized.  We believe this 
decision strikes the proper balance between society's interests in 
curtailing crime and the individual protections embodied in the 
Fourth Amendment.  Because we conclude that the search of Andrews' 
duffel bag was properly within the scope of the warrant as it was 
neither worn by Andrews nor in his physical possession, we affirm 
the judgment of conviction entered by the circuit court. 
 
By the Court.—The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. 
 
No. 94-1888-CR 
 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
94-1888-CR 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
Michael R. Andrews, Jr., 
 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
                                                              
 
Opinion Filed:  
June 4, 1996 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
April 3, 1996  
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Washington 
 
JUDGE: 
JAMES B. SCHWALBACH 
 
                                                              
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: 
 
                                                              
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs by 
Robert C. Raymond, Roxanne F. Felizmena and Raymond Law Office, 
Milwaukee and oral argument by Robert C. Raymond. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Mary E. 
Burke, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
James E. Doyle, attorney general.