Title: D.J. v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC10-1852
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: July 7, 2011

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC10-1852 
____________ 
 
D.J., 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Respondent. 
 
[July 7, 2011] 
 
QUINCE, J. 
 
We have for review the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in 
D.J. v. State, 43 So. 3d 176 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010).  In its opinion, the Third District 
affirmed a juvenile’s conviction for trespassing upon the grounds of a school 
facility in violation of section 810.097(2), Florida Statutes (2009).  We granted 
review to resolve a conflict between the Third District’s decision and the decision 
of this Court in State v. Dye, 346 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 1977), on the question of 
whether the prosecution must prove the identity of the individual who warned the 
defendant to leave the grounds of the school, and that individual’s authority to 
 
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restrict access to the property, as essential elements of the trespass offense.1   We 
conclude that the individual’s identity and authority are essential elements of the 
offense and quash the decision of the Third District.  Further, because in this case 
the State failed to present any evidence demonstrating that the petitioner was 
warned to leave by the school’s principal or a designee of the principal, we find 
that the petitioner’s conviction must be vacated. 
BACKGROUND 
 
 The petitioner in this case is D.J., a juvenile.  On January 14, 2009, a 
petition for delinquency was filed in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit charging the 
petitioner with a violation of section 810.097(2), Florida Statutes (2009).  The 
statute provides: 
Any person who enters or remains upon the campus or other facility 
of a school after the principal of such school, or his or her designee, 
has directed such person to leave such campus or facility or not to 
enter upon the campus or facility, commits a trespass upon the 
grounds of a school facility and is guilty of a misdemeanor in the first 
degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. 
 
§ 810.097(2), Fla. Stat. 
At a bench trial on the petition, the State’s primary witness testified that she 
was employed as a security guard at Charles Drew Middle School in Miami-Dade 
County.  When asked what her responsibilities were as a security guard, the 
                                         
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. 
 
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witness replied that her job was to monitor students’ behavior.  The witness 
testified that on January 12, 2009, she encountered the petitioner on the school’s 
grounds, recognized that he was not a student there, and told him that he would 
have to leave.  The next day, the witness again observed the petitioner on school 
grounds.  She notified the school’s police officer, who arrested the petitioner for 
trespassing. 
 
Following the presentation of the State’s evidence, the defense moved for a 
judgment of dismissal.  See Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.110(k).  Specifically, the defense 
argued that section 810.097(2) requires the State to prove, as an essential element 
of the trespass offense, that the defendant was warned to leave the school either by 
the school’s principal or by a person to whom the principal had granted authority 
to restrict access to the property.  The defense asserted that the State had presented 
no evidence that the security guard was authorized to order persons to leave the 
school.  The trial court agreed with the defense that no evidence of the security 
guard’s authority had been presented.  However, after considering argument by the 
parties, the trial court concluded that the statute did not require the State to present 
evidence of the security guard’s authority to restrict access to the school.  Based on 
this conclusion, the trial court found the petitioner guilty of the charged offense.  
The petitioner was later adjudicated delinquent and committed to the custody of 
the Department of Juvenile Justice. 
 
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The adjudication was appealed to the Third District Court of Appeal.  Like 
the trial court, the Third District observed that no evidence had been presented at 
trial concerning the security guard’s status as a designee of the school’s principal.  
See D.J. v. State, 43 So. 3d 176, 177 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010).  However, the Third 
District also agreed with the trial court that the State was not required to present 
such evidence.  Quoting Downer v. State, 375 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1979), the district 
court stated: 
We do not believe . . . that the identity and authority of those who 
have withheld permission to enter certain portions of a public facility 
are elements of the trespass statute.  It is sufficient if the prosecutor 
establishes that the defendant was on notice that he was not authorized 
to enter the portion of the public building in which the alleged trespass 
occurred.  Only if the defendant at trial challenges the authorization of 
one who has posted notice of or who has otherwise communicated this 
restriction, is the state required to prove the identity of the individual 
and his authority to restrict access to the portion of the public facility 
in question. 
 
D.J., 43 So. 3d at 177 (quoting Downer, 375 So. 2d at 845-46).  The Third District 
accordingly concluded that the motion for judgment of dismissal was properly 
denied.  See id. 
 
D.J. filed a petition for review in this Court based on an asserted express and 
direct conflict between the Third District’s decision below and the decision of this 
Court in State v. Dye, 346 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 1977).  We granted review, dispensing 
with oral argument pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.320.  See 
D.J. v. State, 47 So. 3d 1287 (Fla. 2010).  Based on our consideration of Dye as 
 
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well as the clear language of section 810.097(2), we find that the Third District’s 
conclusion was error. 
ANALYSIS 
 
The constitutional guarantee of due process requires that all essential 
elements of an offense must be proved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  See State v. Barnum, 921 So. 2d 513, 519 (Fla. 2005) (citing Fiore v. 
White, 531 U.S. 225, 229 (2001)).  The question presented in this case is whether 
the identity and authority of a person who has warned a defendant to leave a school 
are essential elements of the offense of trespass upon the grounds of a school 
facility as set out by section 810.097(2), Florida Statutes (2009).  The statute 
provides that a person commits a misdemeanor of the first degree by entering or 
remaining on the grounds of a school “after the principal of such school, or his or 
her designee, has directed such person to leave such campus or facility or not to 
enter upon the campus or facility.”  § 810.097(2).  The elements of a criminal 
offense are a matter of statutory interpretation, which we address under the de 
novo standard of review.  See State v. Sigler, 967 So. 2d 835, 841 (Fla. 2007). 
Initially, we observe that the facts of this case are nearly identical to those 
presented in State v. Dye, 346 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 1977).  The defendant in that case 
was arrested after being ordered to leave the grounds of a school by the school’s 
custodian, and after refusing to leave.  He was subsequently charged with 
 
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trespassing on school property in violation of section 810.09, Florida Statutes 
(1975) (“Trespass on property other than a structure or conveyance.”).2  At the 
time of the conviction, section 810.09(2) stated that a person would commit a 
misdemeanor of the first degree where that person “defie[d] an order to leave, 
personally communicated to him by the owner of the premises or other authorized 
person.”  See § 810.09(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1975).3  The trial court dismissed the 
charges based on its conclusion that the statute was unconstitutionally vague and 
overbroad.  See Dye, 346 So. 2d at 540-41. 
On review by this Court, we rejected the trial court’s finding that the statute 
was unconstitutional but affirmed its decision to dismiss the charges based on our 
conclusion that the charging document was deficient.  We explained that “[a]n 
information must allege each of the essential elements of a crime to be valid.”  Id. 
                                         
 
2.  At the time Dye was decided, trespassing on the grounds of a school was 
criminalized by section 228.091, Florida Statutes (1975).  That statute was later 
amended and renumbered, and is now codified under section 810.097, the statute at 
issue in the instant case.  See ch. 99-147, § 1, Laws of Fla.  Nonetheless, Dye was 
charged with committing the more general trespassing offense in violation of 
section 810.09, rather than with the more specific offense of trespassing on a 
school in violation of section 228.091. 
 
3.  The current version of section 810.09 uses essentially the same language 
as that used in the 1975 version.  See § 810.09(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2010) (“If the 
offender defies an order to leave, personally communicated to the offender by the 
owner of the premises or by an authorized person . . . the offender commits a 
misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 
775.083.”). 
 
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at 541.  In Dye’s case, we determined that the information was defective because it 
did not allege that “the offender defied an order to leave, personally communicated 
to him by an authorized person.”  Id. (quoting § 810.09(2)).  We stated, “Not only 
does [the information] fail to state that a person with requisite authority demanded 
he leave, it does not even state that anyone ordered him to leave.”  Id. 
This Court’s opinion next addressed the specific proof that would be 
required to support a conviction for violating section 810.09(2) under the 
circumstances presented in Dye.  Our discussion focused on the meaning of the 
phrase “other authorized person” within the context of the statute.  We explained: 
“Common understanding” dictates that the phrase “other 
authorized person” is to be read in light of the preceding phrase 
“owner of the premises” and in pari materia with other statutes 
controlling the delegation of authority to limit or withdraw access to 
specific types of public land.  In regard to private land, an “authorized 
person” is one who receives either express or implied authorization 
from the owner.  On public premises, authorized personnel includes 
those persons who have been given either express or implied authority 
from the chief executive. 
 
Dye, 346 So. 2d at 541-42.  In the case of a public school, we found that the chief 
executive was the school board.  Thus, in order to prove that a defendant violated 
section 810.09(2) for the purposes of a trespass on a school, the State was required 
to demonstrate that the defendant was ordered to leave the school by an employee 
of the school board who was given authority to exercise control over school 
property.  We held:  “Whether an individual has express or implied authority then 
 
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is a fact which must be stated in the information and proved by the prosecution at 
trial.”  Id. at 542 (emphasis added). 
 
Although the two cases concerned prosecutions under different trespass 
statutes, the parallels between Dye and the instant case cannot be avoided.  When 
viewed in pari materia with section 810.09, it becomes clear that section 810.097 
grants to the principal of a school the same authority that is granted to the owner of 
private property by section 810.09, namely, the authority to order persons to either 
leave the premises or face criminal sanction.  Moreover, just as we concluded that 
the phrase “other authorized person” in section 810.09(2) referred to one who had 
received either express or implied authorization from the property’s owner to 
exercise control over the property, we find that the phrase “his or her designee” in 
section 810.097(2) necessarily refers to one who has received express or implied 
authorization from the school’s principal to exercise control over the property of 
the school.  Accordingly, to prove that a defendant has committed the first-degree 
misdemeanor set out in section 810.097(2), the State must present evidence that the 
defendant was (1) warned to leave the premises by a specific person, and (2) that 
that person was either the principal of the school or one who had received 
authorization from the principal to restrict access to the property. 
That the identity and authority of the person who has warned a defendant to 
leave is an essential element of the offense is supported by the plain language of 
 
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the statute, which clearly states that the offender must have been warned to leave 
the property “by the principal of such school, or his or her designee.”  § 
810.097(2).  This conclusion is also supported by the language of the standard jury 
instruction on the offense, which was approved by this Court in 2007.  See In re 
Std. Jury Instructions in Crim. Cases—Report No. 2006-2, 962 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 
2007).  The instruction states: 
To prove the crime of Trespass on School Grounds or Facilities 
after Warning by Principal or Designee, the State must prove the 
following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 
 
1.  (Defendant) entered or remained on the campus or facility of 
(school name). 
 
2.  The principal or [his] [her] designee [told or directed the 
defendant to leave the campus or facility] [told the defendant not to 
enter the campus or facility] of (school name). 
 
Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 13.5(b) (“Trespass on School Grounds or Facilities 
after Warning by Principal or Designee”) (emphasis added).  Thus, the instruction 
clearly requires the prosecution to prove that the defendant was directed to leave or 
refrain from entering the premises by either the principal or a designee of the 
principal. 
 
Furthermore, the primary decision relied on by the district court, Downer v. 
State, 375 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1979), is not applicable to the current language of 
section 810.097(2).  In Downer, we reviewed several convictions for trespassing in 
a structure or conveyance in violation of section 810.08, Florida Statutes (Supp. 
 
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1976).  The appellants in that case were members of an organization that had 
conducted a “consumer inspection” of the maternity section of a hospital.  See 
Downer, 375 So. 2d at 842-43.  In doing so, the appellants had passed several signs 
stating that visiting hours were over, as well as other signs stating that they were 
not permitted to enter those areas of the hospital.  See id. 
In Downer, this Court addressed the appellants’ argument that the trial court 
should have granted a motion for judgment of acquittal.  Similar to the claim raised 
in Dye, the appellants argued that “[b]ecause the state did not introduce evidence 
as to the identity of those who had placed the restrictive signs in the hospital, nor 
proof of their authorization to do so, it purportedly failed to establish a prima facie 
case.”  Downer, 375 So. 2d at 845.  We rejected that argument, concluding that the 
identity and authority of the persons who had restricted access to the property were 
not elements of section 810.08.  Instead, we held that the lack of such authority on 
the part of those who had imposed the restriction could be raised by the defendant 
as an affirmative defense.  See id. at 845-46 (“Only if the defendant at trial 
challenges the authorization of one who has posted notice of or who has otherwise 
communicated this restriction, is the state required to prove the identity of the 
individual and his authority to restrict access to the portion of the public facility in 
question.”). 
 
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Importantly, however, the language of the statute that was at issue in 
Downer was materially distinguishable from that of the statute we reviewed in 
Dye.  At the time of Downer’s conviction, the relevant portion of section 810.08 
stated: 
Whoever, without being authorized, licensed, or invited, willfully 
enters or remains in any structure or conveyance or, having been 
authorized, licensed, or invited is warned to depart and refuses to do 
so, commits the offense of trespass in a structure or conveyance. 
 
§ 810.08(1), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1976).  In contrast to section 810.09(2), Florida 
Statutes (1975), which we addressed in Dye, section 810.08 did not state that the 
offender must have been warned to leave by the owner of the property or a person 
authorized by the owner.4  The conclusion reached by this Court in Downer 
therefore does not apply in the instant case.  Instead, the trial court and the district 
court should have relied on this Court’s decision in Dye when determining the 
requirements of section 810.097. 
 
Finally, the State argues that even if the identity and authority of the person 
who has warned a defendant to leave school property are elements of the school 
trespass statute, the petitioner’s conviction should be upheld because sufficient 
                                         
 
4.  However, we note that section 810.08 was amended shortly after 
Downer’s conviction.  The amended version of the statute stated, and continues to 
require, that a person who has been authorized, licensed, or invited to enter or 
remain on the property must be warned to leave “by the owner or lessee of the 
premises, or by a person authorized by the owner or lessee.”  See Ch. 77-132, § 33, 
Laws of Fla.; see also 810.08(1), Fla. Stat. (2010). 
 
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evidence was presented to demonstrate that the security guard was authorized to 
restrict access to the school.  See Johnston v. State, 863 So. 2d 271, 283 (Fla. 
2003) (“Generally, an appellate court will not reverse a conviction that is supported 
by competent, substantial evidence.”).  We disagree.  A review of the record 
demonstrates that when asked about her duties as a security guard, the witness 
responded only that her job was to monitor students’ behavior.  No further 
testimony regarding the witness’s duties or authority was elicited.  Notably, the 
trial court expressly determined that the State had presented no evidence that the 
school’s security guard was a designee of the school’s principal for the purposes of 
the trespass statute, or that the guard was in any way vested with authority to 
restrict access to the school’s property.  Further, the State has cited no rule or 
statute indicating that a school security guard, by virtue of his or her title, would 
possess such authority as a matter of law.  Cf. Dye, 346 So. 2d at 542 (observing 
that under a statute in force at the time of the defendant’s conviction, a school 
custodian could be considered an employee of the school board with inherent 
authority to manage school property).  Because an essential element of the offense 
was not supported by competent, substantial evidence, we find that the petitioner’s 
conviction must be vacated.  
CONCLUSIONS 
 
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“That the government must prove each element of a criminal offense beyond 
a reasonable doubt is a bedrock principle of our criminal justice system and one 
that guides the review of any criminal conviction in this state.”  Barnum, 921 So. 
2d at 519.  Here, the statute provides that the offender must have been warned to 
leave “by the principal of such school, or his or her designee.”  § 810.097(2), Fla. 
Stat.  As in Dye, we find that the identity and authority of the person who has 
warned the defendant to leave the grounds of the school are essential elements of 
the trespass offense, which must be stated in the charging document and proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt at trial.  Accordingly, we quash the decision of the 
Third District in D.J., vacate the conviction for trespassing upon the grounds of a 
school facility, and remand this case to the district court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, LEWIS, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
CANADY, C.J., dissents. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct 
Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Third District - Case No. 3D09-1965 
 
 
(Dade County) 
 
 
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Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Brian L. Ellison, Assistant Public 
Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Richard L. Polin, Bureau 
Chief, and Nicholas Merlin, Assistant Attorneys General, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent