Title: Vinson v. Meridian Masonic Temple Bldg.
Citation: 475 So. 2d 807
Docket Number: 54902
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: August 28, 1985

475 So. 2d 807 (1985) Eugene Clint VINSON, Individually, and as Executor of Estate of Eugene Vinson, Deceased, v. MERIDIAN MASONIC TEMPLE BUILDING ASSOCIATION: Mr. &amp; Mrs. L.M. Dudley, Sr., et al. No. 54902. Supreme Court of Mississippi. August 28, 1985. *808 James E. Williamson, Joe Clay Hamilton, Meridian, for appellant. Robert M. Dreyfus, Jr., Goldman, Dreyfus &amp; Primeaux, Meridian, for appellee. Before ROY NOBLE LEE, P.J., and DAN M. LEE and ROBERTSON, JJ. ROY NOBLE LEE, Presiding Justice, for the Court: The complaint of Eugene Vinson, trustee for Eugene Clint Vincent; and Merchants &amp; Farmers Bank, conservator of Arlene Vinson; filed in the Chancery Court of Lauderdale County, sought both prohibitory and mandatory injunctions for the repair and maintenance of the roof on a building known as the Masonic Temple Building in the City of Meridian, Mississippi. Defendants in the suit were Meridian Masonic Temple Building Association; L.M. Dudley, Sr., and Flora M. Dudley, his wife; Robert Merson; James T. Speed; David Majure; Barbara Robinson; and Broadhead Foundation, Inc. After a three-day trial, the lower court entered judgment in the sum of one hundred sixty-five thousand dollars ($165,000) in favor of the Vinsons against Broadhead Foundation, Inc., denied the prayer for prohibitory and mandatory injunctions and denied all relief prayed for against the remaining defendants. The Vinsons have appealed to this Court and assign the following errors in the trial below: On December 28, 1950, Clint Vinson and A.P. Carney, predecessors in title to the appellants, executed a warranty deed conveying the second and third floors of the Masonic Temple Building to the Meridian Masonic Temple Building Association (corporation) which is now defunct and is a nominal defendant in the case. The deed contained the following provision: The Masonic Temple Building Association conveyed the property by warranty deed on September 30, 1976, to L.M. Dudley, Sr. and Flora Dudley, as joint tenants, with right of survivorship and not as tenants-in-common. The deed contained the following provision: Subsequently, on March 10, 1977, L.M. Dudley, Sr., and Flora Dudley executed a special warranty deed to Bob Merson, James Speed, David Majure and Barbara Robinson conveying the property and including the same provision contained in the 1976 deed, viz, "Grantees assume occupancy and upkeep of said building." Those four appellees conveyed the property to the Broadhead Foundation, a non-profit corporation, on December 19, 1977, with the same provision in that deed. The building sustained considerable water damage from a leaking roof, which caused tenants on the first floor to vacate spaces rented by them at various times between July, 1980, and November, 1981. Attempts of a sort were made to alleviate the problem, but without success. The crucial factual question is when did the leaking begin and when was the damage incurred before or after December 19, 1977? The evidence was conflicting as to *809 exactly when the leaking started and when the damage began to occur. The covenant involved in this case is a covenant running with the land, which is admitted by the parties. They all agree that the appellants are bound by the covenant which required the purchasers and their successors in title to maintain the roof over the building. Since the covenant runs with the land, a successor in title is liable for breach of that covenant, but only for such breaches which occur during his ownership. 21 C.J.S. Covenants § 86 (1940); 20 Am.Jur.2d Covenants, Conditions, etc. § 25 (1965). Appellees contend that transfer of title terminates liability. Nevertheless, liability exists for breaches and damages occurring during ownership. Appellants concede that there is no liability on the owner where no damage occurs during his ownership, but maintain that when the leak started, all involved were liable. In a nutshell, after sifting the positions and arguments of the parties, there remains the proposition that (1) if a leak occurred in the roof during the occupancy of an owner without damage, then there was a breach but no damage occurred as a result of the breach, and (2) where damage occurred during an owner's occupancy, then such owner was liable for the breach and the damage during his ownership. That reasoning is borne out by Sexauer v. Wilson, 136 Iowa 357, 113 N.W. 941 (1907), cited by both parties in the present case. In Wilson, there was a covenant for the covenantor/grantee to perpetually maintain a division fence between two properties. The Iowa Court held that ascertaining the intent of the parties is the main inquiry and said: 113 N.W. at 944. It reasonably can be said that, fairly construing the covenant, the appellees' obligation was to maintain and repair the roof only during the time they owned the property. In this state, intent of the parties is determined by giving the instrument a fair and just interpretation. Duane v. Saltaformaggio, 455 So. 2d 753 (Miss. 1984); Welborn v. Henry, 252 So. 2d 779 (Miss. 1971); Rogers v. Morgan, 250 Miss. 9, 164 So. 2d 480 (1964); Schaeffer v. Gatling, 243 Miss. 155, 137 So. 2d 819 (1962); Mendrop v. Harrell, 233 Miss. 679, 103 So. 2d 418 (1958).[1] The chancellor filed a well-reasoned opinion consisting of thirteen (13) pages, *810 parts of which, pertinent to this decision, follow: We do not disagree with the chancellor's interpretation of the law relating to covenants running with the land. We are unable to say that the chancellor was manifestly wrong in his finding of fact that the extent of the leaking and the resulting water damage on and prior to December 19, 1977, or when the leaking started was not ascertainable. Our review of the record indicates that the appellants failed to meet their burden of proof in showing that leaking and damage occurred during the period of time that the appellees would have been liable for such damage. Therefore, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed. AFFIRMED. PATTERSON, C.J., WALKER, P.J., and HAWKINS, DAN M. LEE, PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN and ANDERSON, JJ., concur. [1] Mendrop v. Harrell, supra, held that an affirmative covenant running with the land also creates for its enforcement a charge or lien upon the property.