Title: Sears v. State
Citation: 282 N.E.2d 807
Docket Number: 671S161
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: June 1, 1972

282 N.E.2d 807 (1972)
Alvin Daniel SEARS, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
No. 671S161.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
June 1, 1972.
Malcolm G. Montgomery, Evansville, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Stephen D. Clase, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.
DeBRULER, Justice.
The appellant was convicted of second degree burglary by a jury in the Vanderburgh Circuit Court, the Honorable Steve Bach, Special Judge, presiding. The appellant here raises two points in support of his appeal for a new trial: (1) that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to elicit incompetent evidence from the appellant on cross examination which in fact shifted the burden of proof to the appellant, and (2) that one of the instructions given to the jury by the trial court was erroneous *808 in that it invaded the province of the jury.
The evidence in this case indicates that the Evansville Police, responding to a radio call at approximately 2:50 a.m. in the morning, went to an American Legion Post and found the appellant hiding on the second floor of the building. A glass pane in the front door had been broken, and the appellant later admitted that he had broken into the building in order to look for some liquor. This statement, not challenged here, was reduced to writing, signed by the appellant, and introduced into evidence against him.
The appellant testified at the trial that he had been drinking heavily on the day in question and, while admitting that he broke into the building asserted that he went in to get warm and not with the intention of taking any property from the building. On his direct testimony he mentioned two or three friends by name who had been drinking with him on the day in question. On cross examination, the prosecutor asked him if these friends were in the courtroom, and when the appellant answered no, the prosecutor asked further whether they still lived in Evansville. The appellant argues that these questions obviously carry with them the implications that the appellant was lying about where he had been that day, since the jury might well infer that the appellant would have produced these witnesses if in fact they could have testified as to his state of intoxication. The appellant urges that permitting such an implication to arise shifts the burden to him and requires him to establish his innocence. We find no merit in this contention.
In our opinion, the prosecutor in this case was employing perfectly proper cross examination techniques. The right to vigorous cross examination is fundamental to our adversary process, and wide latitude is allowed both sides in a dispute to ask pointed and relevant questions on cross examination in an attempt to undermine the opposition's case. Thus, any doubt as to the legitimacy of a question on cross examination should be resolved in favor of the questioner. In the case before us, the appellant stands as any other witness. As we said in Keyes v. State (1889), 122 Ind. 527, 23 N.E. 1097:
See also Barnett v. State (1959), 240 Ind. 129, 161 N.E.2d 444, and cases cited therein. Speaking to the proper scope of cross examination in general, we said in Mark v. City of Indpls. (1966), 247 Ind. 511, 219 N.E.2d 434, quoting from 30 I.L.E. WITNESSES § 113, pp. 105-106, that:
Secondly, the appellant argues that the court committed error in reading to the jury the following instruction:
The appellant's argument concerning this instruction is quoted verbatim as follows:
There is little to be said about this argument other than the fact that it bears no recognizable relation to the instruction quoted above. The instruction states that "if" the jury finds certain facts then they "may" find the appellant guilty, which in no sense can be considered a mandatory instruction. Loftis v. State (1971), Ind., 269 N.E.2d 746. Further, it is difficult to imagine the appellant complaining of undue emphasis put on his intent in this case, since his primary defense concerns his lack of intent to take anything from the building. The instruction clearly indicates to the jury that they must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant broke into the building with the intent to commit theft. It in no way comments on the presence or absence of evidence as to intent but does rightfully include such intent as a necessary element of the crime charged.
Judgment affirmed.
ARTERBURN, C.J., and GIVAN, HUNTER and PRENTICE, JJ., concur.