Title: State v. Moore
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 22A17
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: December 8, 2017

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
No. 22A17   
Filed 8 December 2017 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
v. 
PIERRE JE BRON MOORE 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of 
the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. ___, 795 S.E.2d 598 (2016), finding no error after 
appeal from judgments entered on 15 January 2016 by Judge R. Allen Baddour in 
Superior Court, Orange County.  Heard in the Supreme Court on 11 October 2017. 
 
Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Jessica V. Sutton and Teresa M. Postell, 
Assistant Attorneys General, for the State. 
 
Allegra Collins for defendant-appellant. 
 
 
MARTIN, Chief Justice.  
 
Defendant was convicted of committing four crimes over a two-month period.  
He received two suspended sentences and was placed on probation.  His probation 
was revoked after he was charged with committing additional crimes.  We now 
consider whether defendant received adequate notice of his probation revocation 
hearing pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1345(e).  We modify and affirm the decision of 
the Court of Appeals and uphold the revocation of defendant’s probation. 
STATE V. MOORE 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-2- 
In August 2012, defendant was arrested for and charged with breaking and 
entering and larceny after breaking and entering.  Defendant was released on bond 
and then, in September 2012, was arrested for and charged with committing those 
same offenses again.  Defendant pleaded guilty to the August crimes and entered an 
Alford plea for the September crimes.  Defendant received a suspended sentence of 
eight to nineteen months and supervised probation for twenty-four months for the 
August crimes.  He received a suspended sentence of six to seventeen months and 
supervised probation for twenty-four months for the September crimes.  The 
punishments for these crimes were to run consecutively.  The judgments in both 
instances listed many of the “regular conditions of probation” under N.C.G.S. § 15A-
1343(b).  The listed conditions included that “defendant shall . . . [c]ommit no criminal 
offense 
in 
any 
jurisdiction,” 
consistent 
with 
the 
language 
of 
N.C.G.S. 
§ 15A-1343(b)(1). 
Defendant’s probation for the September crimes was modified and extended a 
number of times due to violations of probation conditions.  On 3 June 2015, the State 
filed two probation violation reports relating to defendant’s probation for the August 
and September 2012 crimes, respectively.  The reports alleged violations of monetary 
conditions of probation.  Each report also alleged an “Other Violation” that listed 
various pending criminal charges.  Specifically, under “Other Violation” the reports 
each stated the same thing: 
The defendant has the following pending charges in 
STATE V. MOORE 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-3- 
Orange County.  15CR 051315 No Operators License 
6/8/15, 15CR 51309 Flee/Elude Arrest w/MV 6/8/15.  13CR 
709525 No Operators License 6/15/15, 14CR 052225 
Possess Drug Paraphernalia 6/16/15, 14CR 052224 
Resisting 
Public 
Officer 
6/16/15, 
14CR706236 
No 
Motorcycle Endorsement 6/29/15, 14CR 706235 Cover Reg 
Sticker/Plate 6/29/15, and 14CR 706234 Reg Card Address 
Change Violation. 
 
(Original in all uppercase.)   
In January 2016, after many months of continuances, the trial court held a 
hearing on these violation reports.1  Defendant’s probation officer testified about the 
new offenses alleged in the reports, and two police officers testified about defendant’s 
fleeing to elude arrest two different times.  The trial court found that defendant had 
violated the condition of probation to commit no criminal offense, and specifically 
found that defendant had “committed the charges of” fleeing to elude arrest and of 
not having an operator’s license.  The trial court accordingly revoked defendant’s 
probation and activated the suspended sentences for defendant’s August and 
September 2012 crimes, to be served consecutively.   
Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, claiming that the probation 
violation reports did not give him adequate notice because they did not specifically 
state the condition of probation that he allegedly violated.  In a divided opinion, the 
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgments.  State v. Moore, ___ N.C. App. 
                                            
1 During the time period covered by the continuances, defendant was also charged 
with first-degree murder. 
STATE V. MOORE 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-4- 
___, ___, 795 S.E.2d 598, 600 (2016).  The Court of Appeals concluded that the notice 
was adequate—that there was “no ambiguity”—because the allegations in the 
violation reports could point only to the revocation-eligible violation of the condition 
to commit no new criminal offense.  Id. at ___, 795 S.E.2d at 600.  Defendant appealed 
to this Court based on the dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals.   
 
Before revoking a defendant’s probation, a trial court must conduct a hearing 
to determine whether the defendant’s probation should be revoked, unless the 
defendant waives the hearing.  N.C.G.S. § 15A-1345(e) (2015).  “The State must give 
the probationer notice of the hearing and its purpose, including a statement of the 
violations alleged.”  Id.  Probation can be revoked only if a defendant (1) commits a 
criminal offense in any jurisdiction in violation of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1343(b)(1); (2) 
absconds from supervision in violation of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1343(b)(3a); or (3) has 
already served two periods of confinement for violating other conditions of probation 
according to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(d2).  Id. § 15A-1344(a) (2015).  Only the first of 
these statutorily-enumerated instances—the commission of a criminal offense—is at 
issue here.    
 
Defendant argues that, because the probation violation reports did not 
specifically list the “commit no criminal offense” condition as the condition violated, 
the reports did not provide the notice that subsection 15A-1345(e) requires.  We must 
address whether these reports complied with the statute’s notice requirement.  To do 
STATE V. MOORE 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-5- 
that, we need to examine what exactly that statutory provision means.  This is a 
matter of first impression for this Court. 
“In resolving issues of statutory construction, this Court must first ascertain 
legislative intent to assure that both the purpose and the intent of the legislation are 
carried out.  In undertaking this task, we look first to the language of the statute 
itself.”  Poole v. Miller, 342 N.C. 349, 351, 464 S.E.2d 409, 410 (1995) (citation 
omitted).  “[O]rdinarily words of a statute will be given their natural, approved, and 
recognized meaning.”  Victory Cab Co. v. City of Charlotte, 234 N.C. 572, 576, 68 
S.E.2d 433, 436 (1951). 
Subsection 15A-1345(e) provides that “[t]he State must give the probationer 
notice of the hearing and its purpose, including a statement of the violations alleged.”  
Neither the term “violation” nor the term “violations,” as used in the statutory 
framework of which subsection 15A-1345(e) is a part, are defined by statute.  Black’s 
Law Dictionary defines “violation” as “1. An infraction or breach of the law; a 
transgression. . . .  2. The act of breaking or dishonoring the law; the contravention 
of a right or duty.”  Violation, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).  Similarly, 
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines “violation” as “the act of violating” 
and indicates in its definition of “violate” that “violating” means “break[ing]” or 
“disregard[ing].”  Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1396 (11th ed. 2007).  
These definitions show that a violation is an action that violates some rule or law; a 
violation is not the underlying rule or law that was violated.  In section 15A-1345, 
STATE V. MOORE 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-6- 
and hence in subsection 15A-1345(e), the words “violation” and “violations” refer to 
violations of conditions of probation.  See, e.g., N.C.G.S. § 15A-1345(a) (2015) 
(discussing when “[a] probationer is subject to arrest for violation of conditions of 
probation”).  It follows that the phrase “a statement of the violations alleged” refers 
to a statement of what a probationer did to violate his conditions of probation.  It does 
not require a statement of the underlying conditions that were violated.   
“[I]n effectuating legislative intent, it is our duty to give effect to the words 
actually used in a statute and not to delete words used or to insert words not used.”  
Lunsford v. Mills, 367 N.C. 618, 623, 766 S.E.2d 297, 301 (2014).  Defendant would 
have us insert a requirement into the statute that simply is not there: one that 
requires the State to provide notice of the specific condition of probation that 
defendant allegedly violated.  This approach would effectively add words to the 
statute so that the statute would read “a statement of the violations alleged and the 
conditions of probation allegedly violated.”  But the statute as it actually reads, 
without the italicized words, requires only a statement of the actions that violated 
the conditions, not of the conditions that those actions violated.   
Our straightforward interpretation is further supported by looking at the use 
of the word “violation” in N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(a).  This provision appears in the 
statute that directly precedes the statute in which subsection 15A-1345(e) appears 
and is part of the same statutory framework regarding probation.  Subsection 
15A-1344(a) pertains to the authority of trial courts to modify or revoke probation.  
STATE V. MOORE 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-7- 
In discussing when a court can revoke probation, the provision states that “[t]he court 
may only revoke probation for a violation of a condition of probation under” certain 
specified provisions.  N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(a) (emphasis added).  So the word 
“violation” cannot be synonymous with the phrase “condition of probation,” because 
subsection 15A-1344(a) uses “condition of probation” to modify “violation.”  And that 
makes sense, because the phrase “condition of probation” is describing what was 
violated rather than the action that constituted the violation.   
This interpretation is also consistent with the notice provision’s purpose.  Just 
as with the notice provided by criminal indictments, see, e.g., State v. Russell, 282 
N.C. 240, 243-44, 192 S.E.2d 294, 296 (1972), “[t]he purpose of the notice mandated 
by [N.C.G.S. § 15A-1345(e)] is to allow the defendant to prepare a defense and to 
protect the defendant from a second probation violation hearing for the same act,” 
State v. Hubbard, 198 N.C. App. 154, 158, 678 S.E.2d 390, 393 (2009) (citing Russell, 
282 N.C. at 243-44, 192 S.E.2d at 296).  A statement of a defendant’s alleged actions 
that constitute the alleged violation will give that defendant the chance to prepare a 
defense because he will know what he is accused of doing.  He will also be able to 
determine the possible effects on his probation that those allegations could have, and 
he will be able to gather any evidence available to rebut the allegations.  Our 
interpretation is therefore consistent with both the language of the statute and its 
purpose. 
STATE V. MOORE 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-8- 
The Court of Appeals in this case based its holding on, and the parties 
primarily argue over, a line of cases with which we disagree.  Before the Justice 
Reinvestment Act (JRA) was enacted in 2011, the Court of Appeals correctly 
interpreted subsection 15A-1345(e) in State v. Hubbard, 198 N.C. App. 154, 678 
S.E.2d 390 (2009).  In Hubbard, the Court of Appeals held that the State had complied 
with the notice requirement because, “while the condition of probation which 
Defendant allegedly violated might have been ambiguously stated in the [violation] 
report, the report also set forth the specific facts that the State contended constituted 
the violation.”  Id. at 158, 678 S.E.2d at 394.  “Defendant received notice of the specific 
behavior Defendant was alleged and found to have committed in violation of 
Defendant’s probation.”  Id. at 159, 678 S.E.2d at 394.  In other words, notice of the 
factual allegations—the specific behavior—that constituted the violation was enough. 
After the JRA was passed, however, the Court of Appeals began imposing an 
additional notice requirement that is not found in the text of subsection 15A-1345(e).  
Starting with State v. Tindall, 227 N.C. App. 183, 742 S.E.2d 272 (2013), the Court 
of Appeals began requiring that, when the State seeks to revoke a defendant’s 
probation at a revocation hearing, the notice of the hearing provided by the State 
must indicate the revocation-eligible condition of probation that the defendant has 
allegedly violated.  See id. at 187, 742 S.E.2d at 275.  The Court of Appeals noted in 
Tindall that the JRA changed the law by making only some of the conditions of 
probation revocation-eligible instead of all of them.  Id. at 185, 742 S.E.2d at 274; see 
STATE V. MOORE 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-9- 
also Justice Reinvestment Act of 2011, ch. 192, sec. 4(b), 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 758, 
767-68 (amending N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(a)).  The Court of Appeals then concluded that 
Hubbard did not apply because it was decided before the JRA changed the law.  
Tindall, 227 N.C. App. at 187, 742 S.E.2d at 275.  The Court of Appeals reasoned 
that, after the JRA, a probationer needs to “receive[ ] notice that the alleged violation 
was the type of violation that could potentially result in a revocation of her probation.”  
Id. at 187, 742 S.E.2d at 275.   
In State v. Kornegay, 228 N.C. App. 320, 745 S.E.2d 880 (2013), the Court of 
Appeals recognized that it was bound by Tindall and applied that decision.  See id. 
at 323, 745 S.E.2d at 883.  The Court of Appeals stated that, in order “[t]o establish 
jurisdiction over specific allegations in a probation revocation hearing, the defendant 
either must waive notice or be given proper notice of the revocation hearing, including 
the specific grounds on which his probation might be revoked.”  Id. at 324, 745 S.E.2d 
at 883 (emphasis added).  The Court of Appeals later applied the Tindall and 
Kornegay line of cases in State v. Lee, 232 N.C. App. 256, 753 S.E.2d 721 (2014).  
But the JRA did not change the notice requirements for probation revocation 
hearings.  So, to the extent that Tindall, Kornegay, and Lee created a new notice 
requirement not found in the text of subsection 15A-1345(e), they are overruled. 
It is true that, before the JRA was enacted in 2011, trial courts had authority 
to revoke probation for a violation of any probation condition.  See N.C.G.S. § 15A-
1344 (2010).  After the JRA, by contrast, only violations of any of the three conditions 
STATE V. MOORE 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-10- 
specified in N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(a) are revocation-eligible.  Yet the purpose of the 
JRA had nothing to do with heightened notice requirements for revocation hearings.  
The JRA’s purpose was “to reduce prison populations and spending on corrections 
and then to reinvest the savings in community-based programs.”  James M. 
Markham, The North Carolina Justice Reinvestment Act 1 (2012).  Before the JRA 
was enacted, over half of the individuals entering North Carolina prisons were doing 
so because of violations of conditions of probation.  Id. at 2.  In fiscal year 2009, 
moreover, three-quarters of these individuals were entering “for violations of 
supervision conditions, not the result of a new conviction or absconding.”  Council of 
State Gov’ts Justice Ctr., Justice Reinvestment in North Carolina: Three Years Later 
3 (Nov. 2014).  The changes to the law that the JRA effected were consistent with 
these concerns because subsection 15A-1344(a), as amended by the JRA, now makes 
only committing a new criminal offense or absconding revocation-eligible unless a 
defendant has already served two periods of confinement for violating other 
conditions of probation.  See Ch. 192, sec. 4(b), N.C. Sess. Laws at 767-68.  The 
decrease in revocation-eligible conditions—that is, the decrease in conditions whose 
violation would land a probationer back in prison—would have the natural effect of 
reducing the prison population. 
Even more fundamental than purpose, of course, is text.  As we have discussed, 
the phrase “a statement of the violations alleged” in subsection 15A-1345(e)’s notice 
requirement has a straightforward meaning when each of the words in that phrase 
STATE V. MOORE 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-11- 
is “given [its] natural, approved, and recognized meaning.”  Victory Cab Co., 234 N.C. 
at 576, 68 S.E.2d at 436.  And the JRA did not change the text of this phrase, compare 
Act of June 23, 1977, ch. 711, sec. 1, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 853, 870-71 (captioned “An 
Act to Amend the Laws Relating to Criminal Procedure”), with N.C.G.S. § 15A-
1345(e) (2015), so it did not change the phrase’s meaning.  That should not be 
surprising, because keeping the notice requirement as-is comports with the JRA’s 
purpose.  Just as reducing the number of substantive crimes could reduce the prison 
population without any change in indictment requirements, reducing the number of 
revocation-eligible conditions of probation can reduce the prison population without 
any change in notice requirements. 
Turning to the specifics of this case, the State sought to prove that defendant 
had violated the condition that he commit no criminal offense.  As we have seen, 
subsection 15A-1345(e) required the State to give defendant notice of his probation 
revocation hearing that “includ[ed] a statement of the violations alleged.”  This means 
that the notice needed to contain a statement of the actions defendant allegedly took 
that constituted a violation of a condition of probation—that is, a statement of what 
defendant allegedly did that violated a probation condition.  Here the alleged 
violation was the act of committing a criminal offense.  Defendant therefore needed 
to receive a statement of the criminal offense or offenses that he allegedly committed. 
The violation reports in this case stated that “the defendant has the following 
pending charges in Orange County,” and then went on to list, among other things, 
STATE V. MOORE 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-12- 
the names of the specific offenses and the criminal case file numbers.  While incurring 
criminal charges is not a violation of a probation condition, criminal charges are 
alleged criminal offenses.  And committing a criminal offense is a violation of a 
probation condition.  A statement of pending criminal charges, then, is a statement 
of alleged violations.  The information in the violation reports therefore constituted 
“a statement of the violations alleged” because it notified defendant of the actions he 
allegedly took that violated a probation condition.2  As the Court of Appeals stated in 
Hubbard, “[d]efendant received notice of the specific behavior [d]efendant was alleged 
and found to have committed in violation of [his] probation.”  198 N.C. App. at 159, 
678 S.E.2d at 394.  That is all that is required under subsection 15A-1345(e). 
Both the concurring opinion and the dissenting opinion in this case suggest 
that our interpretation of subsection 15A-1345(e) could result in due process 
violations.  The dissent appears to take that analysis even further and finds that 
defendant’s due process rights were violated in this case.  But defendant appealed 
this case to this Court based solely on a dissent in the Court of Appeals, and neither 
party petitioned for discretionary review of additional issues.  Our review is therefore 
limited to the issue or issues “specifically set out in the dissenting opinion as the basis 
for that dissent.”  N.C. R. App. P. 16(b).  In this case, the basis for the dissent in the 
                                            
2 We do not hold that a probation violation report must necessarily contain all of the 
information that these violation reports included in order to constitute “a statement of the 
violations alleged.”  We hold only that the information in these reports was enough.     
STATE V. MOORE 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-13- 
Court of Appeals was only that the majority had not properly applied subsection 15A-
1345(e).  See Moore, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 795 S.E.2d at 600-02 (Hunter, Jr., J., 
dissenting).  The Court of Appeals dissent said nothing at all about due process or the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  See generally id.  As a result, there is no constitutional issue 
before us.  This case is simply about statutory interpretation. 
 
The “statement of the violations alleged” requirement in N.C.G.S. 
§ 15A-1345(e) is satisfied by a statement of the actions that a defendant has allegedly 
taken that constitute a violation of a condition of probation.  We therefore modify the 
Court of Appeals’ decision to the extent that it holds otherwise.  In this case, the 
probation violation reports included a list of the criminal offenses that defendant 
allegedly committed.  That list provided a statement of alleged acts by defendant that, 
if proved, would violate a probation condition, as required by subsection 15A-1345(e).  
Accordingly, we modify and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals and uphold 
the trial court’s revocation of defendant’s probation.   
 
MODIFIED AND AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Justice ERVIN, concurring, in part, and concurring in the result, in part. 
 
In this case, the Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to revoke 
defendant’s probation because “the probation violation reports included a list of the 
criminal offenses that defendant allegedly committed” and “[t]hat list provided a 
STATE V. MOORE 
 
Ervin, J., concurring in result only 
 
 
-14- 
statement of defendant’s alleged acts that violated a probation condition, as required 
by subsection 15A-1345(e).”  In reaching this conclusion, the Court has overruled the 
Court of Appeals’ decisions in State v. Lee, 232 N.C. App. 256, 753 S.E.2d 721 (2014); 
State v. Kornegay, 228 N.C. App. 320, 745 S.E.2d 880; and State v. Tindall, 227 N.C. 
App. 183, 742 S.E.2d 272 (2013), on the grounds that the State is not required to give 
probationers “notice of the particular revocation-eligible violation,” Lee, 232 N.C. App. 
at 260, 753 S.E.2d at 723 (2014), and that a statement of the probationer’s alleged 
conduct is all that is required to support a trial court’s revocation decision.  Although 
I fully concur in the Court’s decision to uphold the revocation of defendant’s 
probation, I cannot agree with all of the reasoning in which the Court has engaged in 
order to reach that result or with its decision to overrule the Court of Appeals’ 
decisions in Tindall, Kornegay, and Lee.1 
As the majority notes, “[a]fter the [Justice Reinvestment Act] was passed” 
“only some of the conditions of probation [became] revocation-eligible instead of all of 
them.”  See Tindall, 227 N.C. App. at 185, 742 S.E.2d at 274.  More specifically, 
following the enactment of the Justice Reinvestment Act, a trial court was only 
entitled to revoke a defendant’s probation in the event that the defendant has (1) 
committed a criminal offense; (2) absconded supervision; or (3) served two periods of 
                                            
1 As an aside, I note that the State did not seek discretionary review in either Tindall 
or Kornegay and has not questioned the correctness of any of the decisions that the Court has 
overruled in the brief that it filed with us in this case.  Instead, the only issue debated in the 
parties’ briefs was the extent to which the allegations contained in the violation notices at 
issue in this case satisfied the test enunciated in Tindall, Kornegay, and Lee. 
STATE V. MOORE 
 
Ervin, J., concurring in result only 
 
 
-15- 
confinement in response to violation of other conditions of probation.  N.C.G.S. § 15A-
1344(a) (2015). 
Before revoking or extending probation, the court must, . . . 
hold a hearing to determine whether to revoke or extend 
probation and must make findings to support the decision 
and a summary record of the proceedings.  The State must 
give the probationer notice of the hearing and its purpose, 
including a statement of the violations alleged. 
 
Id. § 15A-1345(e) (2015).  The ultimate issue before the Court in this case is the 
meaning of the statutory requirement that the probationer receive “a statement of 
the violations alleged” before a trial court can revoke his or her probation. 
“A probation revocation proceeding is not a formal criminal prosecution, and 
probationers thus have ‘more limited due process right[s].’ ”  State v. Murchison, 367 
N.C. 461, 464, 758 S.E.2d 356, 358 (2014) (alteration in original) (quoting Gagnon v. 
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 789, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 1763, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656, 666 (1973), 
superseded by statute, Parole Commission and Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 94-
233, 90 Stat. 228 (1976)).  As a matter of due process, however, 
[t]he probationer is entitled to written notice of the claimed 
violations of his probation; disclosure of the evidence 
against him; an opportunity to be heard in person and to 
present witnesses and documentary evidence; a neutral 
hearing body; and a written statement by the factfinder as 
to the evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking 
probation. 
 
Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 612, 105 S. Ct. 2254, 2258, 85 L. Ed. 2d 636, 642-43 
(1985) (citing Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786, 93 S. Ct. at 1761, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 664).  The 
STATE V. MOORE 
 
Ervin, J., concurring in result only 
 
 
-16- 
General Assembly has effectuated this notice-related due process requirement by 
enacting N.C.G.S. § 15A-1345(e), the proper construction of which is the only issue 
that is before us in this case. 
As should be obvious, “[t]he purpose of the notice mandated by this section is 
to allow the defendant to prepare a defense and to protect the defendant from a second 
probation violation hearing for the same act.”  State v. Hubbard, 198 N.C. App. 154, 
158, 678 S.E.2d 390, 393 (2009) (citation omitted).  For that reason, I am inclined to 
believe that the notice required by N.C.G.S. § 15A-1345(e) must adequately inform 
the probationer of the condition that he or she is alleged to have violated, given that, 
following the enactment of the Justice Reinvestment Act,2 violations of certain 
conditions of probation justify revocation while violations of other conditions of 
probation do not.  I am frankly at a loss to see how a probationer can adequately 
prepare a defense in the event that he or she cannot determine the consequences to 
                                            
2 The Court is, of course, correct in pointing out that the enactment of the Justice 
Reinvestment Act made no change to the notice requirement spelled out in N.C.G.S. § 15A-
1345(e).  On the other hand, the enactment of the Justice Reinvestment Act did substantially 
change the effect of particular probation violations.  Prior to the enactment of the Justice 
Reinvestment Act, a probationer alleged to have violated any term or condition of probation 
knew that he or she was subject to having his or her probation revoked.  The same is not true 
in the aftermath of the enactment of the Justice Reinvestment Act.  As a result, additional 
allegations may, in some instances, be necessary before a probationer receives the same 
notice after the enactment of the Justice Reinvestment Act that he or she received prior to 
its enactment. 
STATE V. MOORE 
 
Ervin, J., concurring in result only 
 
 
-17- 
the continued existence of his “conditional liberty” that might flow from a 
determination in the State’s favor.3 
According to the Court, the statutory reference to “a statement of the violations 
alleged” contained in N.C.G.S. § 15A-1345(e) “requires only a statement of the actions 
that violated the conditions, not of the conditions that those actions violated,” with 
this determination being predicated, at least in part, on the understanding that “the 
word ‘violation’ cannot be synonymous with the phrase ‘condition of probation,’ 
because subsection 15A-1344(a) uses ‘condition of probation’ to modify ‘violation.’ ”  
After examining the plain language of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1345(e), I am inclined to refrain 
from parsing the relevant statutory language that finely.  Instead of being limited 
solely to a statement of conduct, it seems to me that the statutory reference to “a 
statement of the violations alleged,” when read as a unified whole, necessarily refers 
to both the specific conduct in which a defendant allegedly engaged and the likely 
effect of that conduct upon the continuation of the defendant’s conditional liberty. 
A defendant does, in many instances, receive adequate notice as required by 
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1345(e) in the event that a violation report includes nothing more 
than “a statement of the actions defendant allegedly took that constituted a violation 
of a condition of probation.”  Such a situation exists when the conduct alleged “could 
only point to a revocation-eligible violation.”  State v. Moore, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 
                                            
3 This interpretation is reinforced by the language in N.C.G.S. § 15A-1345(e) requiring 
that the probationer be notified of “the hearing and its purpose.” 
STATE V. MOORE 
 
Ervin, J., concurring in result only 
 
 
-18- 
795 S.E.2d 598, 600 (2016).  For instance, in State v. Lee, the violation report alleged 
that the “defendant had violated four conditions of his probation,” including “that he 
commit no criminal offense,” 232 N.C. App. at 258, 753 S.E.2d at 722, and listed 
“several new pending charges which were specifically identified,” id. at 259, 753 
S.E.2d at 723.  I believe that the Court of Appeals correctly held in Lee that the notice 
provided to the defendant in that case sufficed for purposes of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1345(e) 
given that “[t]he violation report identified the criminal offense on which the trial 
court relied to revoke defendant's probation.”4  Id. at 260, 753 S.E.2d at 724.  On the 
other hand, there are also occasions when a mere statement of the probationer’s 
alleged conduct does not unambiguously “point to a revocation-eligible violation.”  
Moore, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 795 S.E.2d at 600.  In State v. Tindall, for example, the 
violation report “indicat[ed] that defendant had violated her probation by using 
illegal drugs . . . and by failing to ‘complete Crystal Lakes treatment program’ as 
ordered.”  227 N.C. App. at 184, 742 S.E.2d at 274.  Unlike the allegations contained 
in the violation report at issue in Lee, the facts alleged in the violation report at issue 
in Tindall sufficed to allege both a violation of the condition of probation that the 
probationer “[c]ommit no criminal offense in any jurisdiction,” N.C.G.S. § 15A-
1343(b)(1) (2013), and the condition that the probationer “[n]ot use, possess, or control 
                                            
4 I would, in fact, be inclined to uphold the sufficiency of the notice at issue in State v. 
Lee even if it had not referenced the condition of probation which the defendant was alleged 
to have violated given that the defendant’s alleged conduct could only have been relevant to 
the “commit no criminal offense” condition of probation. 
STATE V. MOORE 
 
Ervin, J., concurring in result only 
 
 
-19- 
any illegal drug or controlled substance unless it has been prescribed for him or her 
by a licensed physician and is in the original container with the prescription number 
affixed on it,” id. § 15A-1343(b)(15) (2013).  Obviously, a violation of the condition of 
probation set out in N.C.G.S. § 15A-1343(b)(1) is “revocation-eligible” while a 
violation of the condition of probation set out in N.C.G.S. § 15A-1343(b)(15) is not.  In 
light of that set of circumstances, I do not believe that the probationer in Tindall 
received an adequate “statement of the violations alleged” and conclude that the 
Court of Appeals did not err by finding the notice at issue in that case insufficient.  
Tindall, 227 N.C. App. at 187, 742 S.E.2d at 275.5  As a result, while I share the 
Court’s discomfort with some of the language that the Court of Appeals used in its 
opinions in these decisions and do not believe that they should be understood as 
holding that, in each and every case, a violation notice fails to support the revocation 
of a probationer’s probation unless it specifically and explicitly alleges a violation of 
a “revocation-eligible” condition of probation, I do believe that each of these cases was 
correctly decided on the facts and cannot, for that reason, join the Court’s decision to 
overrule them. 
                                            
5 The violation notice before the Court in State v. Kornegay was even less likely to give 
the probationer adequate notice than the violation notice at issue in Tindall, given that the 
trial court in Kornegay revoked the probationer’s probation based upon a finding that the 
probationer had violated the conditions of probation set out in N.C.G.S. § 15A-1343(b)(1) 
despite the fact that the violation notice alleged, among other things, that the probationer 
had violated the condition that he “ ‘[n]ot use, possess or control any illegal drug’ ” without 
making any reference to the “commit no criminal offense” condition.  Kornegay, 228 N.C. App. 
at 321, 323, 745 S.E.2d at 881, 883. 
STATE V. MOORE 
 
Ervin, J., concurring in result only 
 
 
-20- 
Admittedly, the violation notice at issue in this case, unlike the violation notice 
at issue in Lee, does not make an explicit reference to an alleged violation of the 
condition of probation set out in N.C.G.S. § 15A-1343(b)(1).  On the other hand, given 
the terms and conditions of defendant’s probation, I am unable to understand, for the 
reasons stated by the Court, how the allegation that defendant had been charged with 
committing various criminal offenses could be understood as anything other than an 
allegation that he had violated the condition of probation that he “[c]ommit no 
criminal offense in any jurisdiction.”  N.C.G.S. § 15A-1343(b)(1).  In fact, as I read the 
briefs and record before us in this case, defendant does not seem to have had any 
doubt that the proceeding held in the trial court was focused upon the issue of 
whether he had violated the condition of probation set out in N.C.G.S. § 15A-
1343(b)(1).  As a result, given that defendant had ample notice of the violation of the 
terms and conditions of probation that he was alleged to have committed and the 
effect of a determination that he had committed the alleged violation, I agree with 
both the Court and the majority in the Court of Appeals that the trial court’s order 
revoking defendant’s probation should be affirmed. 
Justice HUDSON joins in this concurring opinion. 
 
Justice BEASLEY dissenting.  
 
The majority concludes that defendant had adequate notice of the alleged 
violations of probation, where the probation report contained a laundry list of “Other 
STATE V. MOORE 
 
Beasley, J., dissenting 
 
 
-21- 
Violation[s]” and failed to designate a statutory condition under N.C.G.S. §§ 15A-
1343(b)(1), 15A-1343(b)(3a), or 15A-1344(d2).  The majority further holds that a 
probation violation report need only describe behavior to provide sufficient notice.  
This holding does not comport with Fourteenth Amendment Due Process or the 
Justice Reinvestment Act’s changes to North Carolina’s probation system because it 
does not require proper notice to a defendant that her probation may be revoked.  
Therefore, I respectfully dissent.  
Due process under the Federal Constitution and our state statute requires 
notice to the defendant of the alleged violations against her before a hearing on 
probation revocation may take place.  See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 486-87, 
33 L. Ed. 2d 484, 497 (1972) ( “[T]he parolee should be given notice that the hearing 
will take place and that its purpose is to determine whether there is probable cause 
to believe he has committed a parole violation.  The notice should state what parole 
violations have been alleged.”); see also N.C.G.S. § 15A-1345(e) (2015) (“The State 
must give the probationer notice of the hearing and its purpose, including a statement 
of the violations alleged.”).  In Morrissey v Brewer, two Iowa parolees had their parole 
revoked without the benefit of a hearing.  408 U.S. at 472-73, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 489-90.  
The United States Supreme Court held in Morrissey that when the State attempts to 
curtail a parolee’s constitutionally protected liberty interest by revoking parole, due 
process mandates certain procedural safeguards.  See id. at 481-82, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 
495.  Specifically, the Court said in Morrissey that  
STATE V. MOORE 
 
Beasley, J., dissenting 
 
 
-22- 
the liberty of a parolee, although indeterminate, includes 
many of the core values of unqualified liberty and its 
termination inflicts a “grievous loss” on the parolee and 
often on others. . . .  By whatever name, the liberty is 
valuable and must be seen as within the protection of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Its termination calls for some 
orderly process, however informal.  
 
Id. at 482, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 495 (emphasis added).   
While Morrissey addressed liberty interests of parolees facing parole 
revocation, in Gagnon v. Scarpelli the Court applied the same analysis to conclude 
that the liberty interests were synonymous for purposes of parole and probation, both 
requiring notice of the violations alleged against a defendant.  Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 
411 U.S. 778, 782, 786, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656, 664 (1973), superseded by statute, Parole 
Commission and Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 94-233, 90 Stat. 228 (1976).  The 
Court in Gagnon clarified that probation revocation, like parole revocation “is not a 
stage of a criminal prosecution, but does result in a loss of liberty.”  Id. at 782, 36 L. 
Ed. 2d at 662.  Because a probationer risks the loss of liberty, she is entitled to notice 
of the asserted violations in compliance with the due process requirements of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. at 786, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 664. 
The import of these cases is that the State must not only give the defendant 
written notice of the violation at issue but also provide a number of other due process 
protections, including: 
(b) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; (c) 
opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses 
and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and 
STATE V. MOORE 
 
Beasley, J., dissenting 
 
 
-23- 
cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing 
officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing 
confrontation); (e) a ‘neutral and detached’ hearing body 
such as a traditional parole board, members of which need 
not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written 
statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on 
and reasons for revoking parole. 
 
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 492.  Importantly, Morrissey and Gagnon 
reject older concepts based on the tenet that because probation was only an “act of 
grace,” a defendant had little recourse to contest the violations asserted against her.  
See e.g., State v. Duncan, 270 N.C. 241, 246, 154 S.E.2d 53, 57 (1967) (“[P]robation or 
suspension of sentence is an act of grace and not of right[.]”).  Definitively, the right 
to due process during probation proceedings is derived from the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s liberty interest protections, and therefore, the right to proper notice 
cannot be so lightly dismissed.   
 
The Justice Reinvestment Act of 2011 (JRA), in implementing a plan for 
criminal justice reform, mirrored the Court’s rationale in Morrissey, which 
emphasized the importance probation plays in rehabilitation and reduction in costs 
of incarceration.  See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 477, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 492.  Part of the basis 
for the JRA was a report commissioned in 2009 by North Carolina state government 
officials.  Council of State Gov’ts Justice Ctr., Justice Reinvestment in North Carolina 
1 (Apr. 2011).  The State asked the Council of State Governments Justice Center to 
provide data-driven analysis, that would produce recommendations for new policies 
designed to both improve public safety and reduce the costs of our corrections system.  
STATE V. MOORE 
 
Beasley, J., dissenting 
 
 
-24- 
Id.  A key finding of the report was that “[p]robation revocations accounted for greater 
than 50 percent of admissions to prison in FY 2009,” id. at 2, which led the Council 
to recommend three priorities: “strengthen probation supervision, hold offenders 
accountable in more meaningful ways, and reduce the risk of reoffending,” id. at 1.   
Researchers struck a balance among these three priorities by stressing the 
importance of holding offenders accountable, while encouraging completion of 
probation programs through community-driven approaches.  See id. at 3.  One of the 
Council’s recommendations for holding offenders accountable, which is at issue in this 
case, was to limit revocation to those defendants who have committed a new criminal 
offense or absconded from supervision.  Id. at 15.  The JRA implemented this 
recommendation, among others, and codified the requirement that “[t]he court may 
only revoke probation for a violation of a condition of probation under G.S. 15A-
1343(b)(1)[1] or G.S. 15A-1343(b)(3a),[2] except as provided in G.S. 15A-1344(d2).[3] 
                                            
1 “(b) Regular Conditions. — As regular conditions of probation, a defendant must: (1) 
Commit no criminal offense in any jurisdiction.”  N.C.G.S. § 15A-1343(b)(1) (2015).  
2 “(b) Regular Conditions. — As regular conditions of probation, a defendant must: . . 
. (3a) Not abscond by willfully avoiding supervision or by willfully making the defendant's 
whereabouts unknown to the supervising probation officer, if the defendant is placed on 
supervised probation.”  Id. § 15A-1343(b)(3a) (2015). 
3 “(d2) Confinement in Response to Violation. — When a defendant under supervision 
for a felony conviction has violated a condition of probation other than G.S. 15A-1343(b)(1) or 
G.S. 15A-1343(b)(3a), the court may impose a period of confinement of 90 consecutive days to 
be served in the custody of the Division of Adult Correction of the Department of Public 
Safety. The court may not revoke probation unless the defendant has previously received a 
total of two periods of confinement under this subsection. A defendant may receive only two 
periods of confinement under this subsection. The 90-day term of confinement ordered under 
this subsection for a felony shall not be reduced by credit for time already served in the case. 
Any such credit shall instead be applied to the suspended sentence. However, if the time 
STATE V. MOORE 
 
Beasley, J., dissenting 
 
 
-25- 
Imprisonment may be imposed pursuant to G.S. 15A-1344(d2) for a violation of a 
requirement other than G.S. 15A-1343(b)(1) or G.S. 15A-1343(b)(3a).”  Justice 
Reinvestment Act of 2011, ch.192, sec. 4(b), 2011 N.C. Sess. Law 758, 767-68.  Before 
the insertion of this language, any judge entitled to sit in the court that imposed 
probation could revoke it, with the exception of drug treatment probation4 and 
unsupervised probation,5 both of which had jurisdictional limits.  See id.  
The majority discusses the JRA’s purpose, but fails to consider the changes it 
has made in North Carolina’s probation procedures.   While it is true that the JRA 
did not amend the specific provision relating to notice in N.C.G.S. § 15A-1345(e), the 
notice requirement cannot be read outside the context of the remainder of the 
statutory framework for probation created by the JRA.  Currently, N.C.G.S. § 15A-
1345(e) requires that  
                                            
remaining on the maximum imposed sentence on a defendant under supervision for a felony 
conviction is 90 days or less, then the term of confinement is for the remaining period of the 
sentence. Confinement under this section shall be credited pursuant to G.S. 15-196.1.”  Id. § 
15A-1344(d2) (2015).  
4 “(a1) Authority to Supervise Probation in Drug Treatment Court. — Jurisdiction to 
supervise, modify, and revoke probation imposed in cases in which the offender is required 
to participate in a drug treatment court or a therapeutic court is as provided in G.S. 7A-272(e) 
and G.S. 7A-271(f). Proceedings to modify or revoke probation in these cases must be held in 
the county in which the drug treatment court or therapeutic court is located.”  Id. § 15A-
1344(a1) (2015).  
5 “(b) Limits on Jurisdiction to Alter or Revoke Unsupervised Probation. — If the 
sentencing judge has entered an order to limit jurisdiction to consider a sentence of 
unsupervised probation under G.S. 15A-1342(h), a sentence of unsupervised probation may 
be reduced, terminated, continued, extended, modified, or revoked only by the sentencing 
judge or, if the sentencing judge is no longer on the bench, by a presiding judge in the court 
where the defendant was sentenced.”  Id. § 15A-1344(b) (2015).  
STATE V. MOORE 
 
Beasley, J., dissenting 
 
 
-26- 
[b]efore revoking or extending probation, the court must, 
unless the probationer waives the hearing, hold a hearing 
to determine whether to revoke or extend probation and 
must make findings to support the decision and a summary 
record of the proceedings.  The State must give the 
probationer notice of the hearing and its purpose, including 
a statement of the violations alleged. 
 
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1345(e) (emphasis added). However, as already explained, before the 
JRA was enacted a judge could revoke probation for virtually any violation, while 
after the JRA judges were limited to only three types of probation violations that 
could result in revocation (i.e., N.C.G.S. §§ 15A-1343(b)(1), 15A-1343(b)(3a), or 15A-
1344(d2)).   
Therefore, post JRA, probation violations can result in revocable or 
nonrevocable consequences to a defendant.  For example, nonrevocable consequences 
could include probation modification under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(d), holding a 
defendant in contempt under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(e1), or ordering a period of 
confinement under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1343(a1)(3).  Additionally, some conditions of 
probation may fall into either category of revocable and nonrevocable violations.  An 
illustration can be found in State v. Tindall, in which the defendant had a substance 
abuse problem and was ordered to submit to substance abuse treatment.  227 N.C. 
App. 183, 184, 742 S.E.2d 272, 273 (2013).  There “the violation reports alleged that 
defendant violated two conditions of her probation:  to ‘[n]ot use, possess or control 
any illegal drug’ and to ‘participate in further evaluation, counseling, treatment or 
education programs recommended [ ] and comply with all further therapeutic 
STATE V. MOORE 
 
Beasley, J., dissenting 
 
 
-27- 
requirements.’ ”  Id. at 186, 742 S.E.2d at 275.  The Court of Appeals correctly found 
that this description of the defendant’s behavior, while providing notice generally 
that the defendant’s conduct violated her probation, was not enough to support 
revocation of probation.  Id. at 187, 742 S.E.2d at 275.  The mere allegation that the 
defendant possessed or used a controlled substance was insufficient to put the 
defendant on proper notice of a potential revocation because the behavior could 
constitute a revocable violation (due to the nature of the conduct as a criminal offense) 
but could also be a technical violation triggering one of a host of nonrevocable 
consequences.  See, e.g., id. at 187, 742 S.E.2d at 275; see also N.C.G.S. § 15A-
1343(b)(15) (2015) (requiring as a regular condition of probation that a defendant 
“[n]ot use, possess, or control any illegal drug or controlled substance”).   
As defense counsel discussed at oral argument before this Court, the facts of 
this case provide another example in which allegations of behavior are insufficient to 
put a defendant on notice of the probation hearing’s possible consequences.  Here the 
probation officer’s report included in the section labeled “Other Violation[s]” that 
defendant had the pending charge of “No Operators License,” in violation of  N.C.G.S. 
§ 20-7(a) (2015) (requiring a license to operate a motor vehicle).  However, operating 
a vehicle without a license can be either an infraction or a criminal misdemeanor.  
See N.C.G.S. § 20-35 (2015) (listing differing circumstances under which the offense 
of driving a motor vehicle without a driver’s license is classified as a misdemeanor or 
an infraction).  Therefore, the infraction relating to driving without an operator’s 
STATE V. MOORE 
 
Beasley, J., dissenting 
 
 
-28- 
license might result only in a modification of probation because the court may impose 
additional requirements, such as the defendant surrendering her driver’s license, or 
defendant’s probation could be subject to revocation for committing a criminal 
offense.  Id. § 15A-1343(b)(1).  Thus, only stating the defendant’s behavior in the 
notice, without more specificity, does not always notify the defendant of the class of 
the offense or if the court plans to modify or revoke her probation.  
Similarly, in State v. Cunningham, the Court of Appeals found error when the 
defendant was given notice only of probation violations upon which the trial court did 
not rely in its decision to revoke the defendant’s probation.  63 N.C. App. 470, 475, 
305 S.E.2d 193, 196 (1983).  The alleged violation was that the defendant created a 
noise disturbance by playing loud music during late night hours.  Id. at 474, 305 
S.E.2d at 196.  But, the trial court found defendant in violation of probation not for 
the noise disturbance but for trespassing and destroying his neighbor’s property, 
offenses that were not included in his probation violation report and for which he did 
not have notice.  Id. at 475, 305 S.E.2d at 196.  As the Court of Appeals in 
Cunningham correctly held, only the allegations contained in the violation report can 
serve as notice to a defendant of conditions for which the trial court can consider 
revocation.  Id. at 475, 305 S.E.2d at 196.   
The majority’s effort to define the word “violation” by using its dictionary 
definition and its belief that a description of the defendant’s behavior is all that is 
legally required completely fails to reflect the specificity required for proper notice.  
STATE V. MOORE 
 
Beasley, J., dissenting 
 
 
-29- 
Despite the majority’s contention to the contrary, a statement describing “the specific 
behavior [d]efendant was alleged and found to have committed,” State v. Hubbard, 
198 N.C. App. 154, 159, 678 S.E.2d 390, 394 (2009), lacks the specificity sufficient to 
give notice to a defendant that her probation could be revoked at a hearing.  
Constitutionally and statutorily, notice requires a description of the violation alleged.  
See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 486-87, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 497; see also N.C.G.S. § 15A-1345 
(2015).  Logically, to satisfy notice, the term “violation” also requires a specific 
description of the condition of probation violated (in this case N.C.G.S. § 15A-
1343(b)(1)) and not simply a description of the behavior that constituted the violation.  
If the notice describes the defendant’s behavior alone without reference to a probation 
condition violated, the defendant, before entering the hearing, would not know 
whether the State might seek to revoke her probation or impose some lesser 
consequence.6  Describing only general types of behavior that may or may not fall 
under one of the three revocable conditions is insufficient because such an incomplete 
description permits the State to pick and choose when to proceed with revocation.  
Descriptions of general behavior only will cause a defendant to be ill-prepared for the 
hearing and do not “allow the defendant to prepare a defense and to protect the 
                                            
6 I also note that the majority’s holding that a description of behavior alone is 
sufficient to provide notice goes far beyond the reasonable inference standard applied by the 
Court of Appeals below.  Furthermore, the majority overrules a line of cases decided by the 
Court of Appeals that have correctly applied constitutional and statutory mandates since the 
passage of the JRA.  See generally, State v. Lee, 232 N.C. App. 256, 753 S.E.2d 721 (2014); 
State v. Kornegay, 228 N.C. App. 320, 745 S.E.2d 880 (2013); State v. Tindall, 227 N.C. App. 
183, 742 S.E.2d 272 (2013).  
STATE V. MOORE 
 
Beasley, J., dissenting 
 
 
-30- 
defendant from a second probation violation hearing for the same act.”  Hubbard, 198 
N.C. App. at 158, 678 S.E.2d at 393 (citing State v. Russell, 282 N.C. 240, 243-44, 192 
S.E.2d 294, 296 (1972)).  
The Supreme Court of the United States has ruled that probation implicates 
“core values of unqualified liberty and its termination inflicts a ‘grievous loss,’ ” and 
thus the State may not impinge upon that constitutionally protected liberty interest 
without appropriate process.  Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 495.  The 
majority ignores this mandate by failing to ensure that a defendant receives notice 
before her probation is revoked.  Although I do not condone this defendant’s alleged 
behavior,7 the process required under the Fourteenth Amendment, for him as well as 
all other defendants is fundamental.  As a result, I respectfully dissent.  
 
                                            
7 As the majority points out, defendant was also charged with first degree murder 
during the time defendant’s hearing was continued.