Title: Kendrick v. City of Midfield
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1130886
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: April 15, 2016

REL: 04/15/2016
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2015-2016
____________________
1130886
____________________
Keneisha Kendrick
v.
City of Midfield and Joseph Malachi Wordell
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
(CV-13-901086)
MURDOCK, Justice.
Keneisha Kendrick appeals from a summary judgment entered
by the Jefferson Circuit Court against her and in favor of the
City of Midfield ("the City") and one of its police officers,
Joseph Malachi Wordell, in her action for damages based on
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personal injuries she sustained as a result of a car accident. 
We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand.
I.  Facts and Procedural History
On the evening of October 1, 2011, Wordell had been
dispatched in response to a domestic-disturbance call; he was
traveling south on Highway 11 in his City-owned, police-
outfitted Ford Crown Victoria automobile.  Wordell testified
that, upon receiving the dispatch, he turned on his emergency
lights and siren and began proceeding toward the scene of the
domestic disturbance.
The east and west lanes of Woodward Road are divided by
a median where Woodward Road reaches Highway 11; as a result,
there are two intersections with traffic lights at Highway 11
and Woodward Road that are approximately 50 to 100 yards
apart.  The speed limit on the stretch of Highway 11
intersecting with Woodward Road is 40 miles per hour.  
Kendrick was on her way to work and was traveling
eastward on Woodward Road toward Highway 11 in a Ford
Freestyle sport-utility vehicle owned by her mother, Sharon
Parker.  Kendrick was planning to turn left onto Highway 11.
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Wordell testified that, when he reached the first
intersection with Woodward Road, the light was red and he
slowed down to a near stop but that the light quickly turned
green 
and 
he 
proceeded 
to 
reaccelerate 
through 
the
intersection toward the second traffic light, at which
Kendrick was stopped.  
Carol Coleman testified that she turned from another road
onto Highway 11 immediately after Wordell's police car passed
through the first intersection, following right behind him. 
She stated that the light for Highway 11 at the first
intersection 
was 
red 
when 
Wordell 
went 
through 
the
intersection, which is why she was able to turn and follow
him.  Coleman testified that Wordell's police vehicle had its
lights flashing but that she did not hear a siren even though
her radio was not on and her windows were open slightly. She
also stated that Wordell "was flying" through 
the 
intersection
and that he did not slow down as he passed through it.  
Wordell stated that when he arrived at the first
intersection 
he 
noticed 
Kendrick's 
vehicle 
stopped
approximately 30 feet from the traffic light at the second
intersection.  Wordell also stated that the light for the
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second intersection of Woodward Road and Highway 11 turned
green as he was accelerating toward it.  Wordell testified
that he assumed Kendrick stopped because she had seen his
emergency vehicle coming along Highway 11.  Wordell stated
that he accelerated as he approached the second intersection,
but that he was only going between 30 to 45 miles per hour
when he reached that intersection.  
Kendrick testified that she had come to a complete stop
at the second intersection and that, when the light for
traffic on Woodward Road turned green, she started moving
forward to prepare for a left turn onto Highway 11.  She
stated that a split-second before she hit Wordell's vehicle,
she saw the flashing emergency lights of his vehicle, but she
never heard a siren.  It is undisputed that Kendrick was
traveling at most 15 miles per hour when her vehicle collided
with Wordell's vehicle.  
Coleman testified that she stopped at the second
intersection because the light was red for traffic on
Highway 11.  She stated that Wordell continued "flying"
through the second intersection and that he did not slow down. 
Coleman estimated that Wordell was traveling at least 50 miles
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per hour when his vehicle collided with Kendrick's vehicle. 
Coleman stated that, in her opinion, the accident could have
been avoided "if [Wordell] had slowed down" going through the
intersection.  She also testified that Wordell told her after
the accident that he could not believe Kendrick did not see
his vehicle or his lights or hear his siren.
The front of Kendrick's vehicle collided with the right
front passenger side of Wordell's vehicle at approximately
8:50 p.m.  The impact of the crash rendered Kendrick
unconscious.  Wordell testified that he saw 
Kendrick's 
vehicle
at the last second and attempted to swerve left to avoid a
collision.  The impact of the collision caused Wordell's
vehicle to veer across the median and two lanes of traffic in
the opposite direction on Highway 11 and to collide head-on
with a vehicle being driven by Ijawuan Powell that was stopped
in the lane of opposite-direction traffic closest to the edge
of the road.  Pictures from the crash show that the front ends
of all three vehicles involved in the accident were severely
damaged.
Following the accident, Parker's automobile insurer,
Progressive 
Direct 
Insurance 
Company 
("Progressive"),
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contacted Wordell.  Following negotiations, Progressive paid
Wordell $1,500 for any personal injuries he might have
sustained in the accident, and Wordell executed a release of
any claims he might have had against Parker or Kendrick
stemming from the October 1, 2011, accident.  Progressive also
paid the City's insurer $8,445.68 for full and complete
settlement of its subrogation claim after the City's insurer
had paid the City for the total loss of the Ford Crown
Victoria.
On March 22, 2013, Parker and Kendrick filed a complaint
in the Jefferson Circuit Court against the City and Wordell
based on the October 1, 2011, accident.  Kendrick sought
compensatory and punitive damages for personal injuries she
sustained in the accident, and Parker sought recovery for
property damage because the Ford Freestyle was totaled as a
result of the accident.  
In their initial discovery requests filed with their
complaint, Parker and Kendrick sought production of 
the 
"black
box" located in Wordell's vehicle, which would indicate
Wordell's speed at the time of the accident.  The City and
Wordell refused to produce the "black box," and Parker and
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Kendrick filed a motion to compel.  On February 21, 2014, in
a deposition taken a week before the scheduled hearing on the
motion to compel, City Police Chief Frank Belcher testified
that the "black box" had been stolen sometime in 2013 when the
Ford Crown Victoria was parked in the City's garage.  Belcher
also stated that for some unknown reason no theft report was
created at the time the theft occurred, and it was unknown
exactly when the theft occurred.  
In response to Parker and Kendrick's motion to compel,
the City and Wordell filed their own motion to compel in which
they asserted that they had asked for the "black box" of the
Ford Freestyle in their own discovery requests filed April 29,
2013, but that Parker and Kendrick responded that they did not
have access to the data contained on the "black box" of the
Freestyle.  In response to the discovery request, Parker and
Kendrick actually had informed the City and Wordell that the
Ford Freestyle had been totaled in the accident and disposed
of shortly after the accident, which was the reason they did
not have access to the "black box" data for that vehicle.
On October 1, 2013, the City and Wordell filed
counterclaims against Parker and Kendrick.  The City sought
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recovery of compensatory damages because the Ford Crown
Victoria was totaled in the accident.  Wordell sought damages
for personal injuries he sustained in the accident.  
On October 28, 2013, Parker and Kendrick filed a motion
to dismiss the City and Wordell's claims on the ground that
their claims had been settled.  By order, the trial court
converted their motion to dismiss to a motion for a summary
judgment.
On January 24, 2014, the City and Wordell filed a motion
for a summary judgment as to the claims Parker and Kendrick
had asserted against them.  In the motion, the City and
Wordell contended that Wordell was entitled to peace-officer
immunity under § 6-5-338, Ala. Code 1975, and that, because
Wordell was immune from liability, the City likewise could not
be held liable for Wordell's conduct.  On February 24, 2014,
Parker and Kendrick filed a response in opposition to the City
and Wordell's motion for a summary judgment.
On April 3, 2014, the trial court entered an order in
which it disposed of the motions for a summary judgment as to
all claims pending in the case.  As to Kendrick's claim
against Wordell and the City, the court found, among other
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things, "that there are no material facts in dispute that
would prevent Officer Wordell from being entitled to immunity
pursuant to [Ala. Code 1975,] § 6-5-338, and therefore all
claims of Plaintiff Keneisha Kendrick against all Defendants
are due to be DISMISSED, with prejudice."1
On May 8, 2014, Kendrick filed a notice of appeal of the
trial court's judgment against her.  Parker is not a party to
this appeal, and the City and Wordell do not dispute that they
do not have viable claims against Parker and Kendrick.
II.  Standard of Review
"'We review a summary judgment de novo.'  Potter
v. First Real Estate Co., 844 So. 2d 540, 545 (Ala.
2002) (citation omitted).  'Summary judgment is
appropriate only when "there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and ... the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."' 
Ex parte Rizk, 791 So. 2d 911, 912 (Ala. 2000)
(citations omitted).
"'In determining whether the nonmovant has
created a genuine issue of material fact,
we 
apply 
the 
"substantial-evidence 
rule" 
--
evidence, to create a genuine issue of
material fact, must be "substantial." 
§ 
12-21-12(a), 
Ala. 
Code 
1975. 
"Substantial 
evidence" 
is 
defined 
as
"evidence of such weight and quality that
fair-minded persons in the exercise of
The trial court disposed of Parker's, the City's, and
1
Wordell's respective claims and counterclaims on various
grounds not relevant here.
9
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impartial 
judgment 
can 
reasonably 
infer 
the
existence of the fact sought to be proved."
West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of
Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989).'
"Callens v. Jefferson County Nursing Home, 769 So.
2d 273, 278-79 (Ala. 2000) (footnote omitted).  In
deciding a motion for a summary judgment, or in
reviewing a summary judgment, the court must accept
the tendencies of the evidence most favorable to the
nonmoving party and must resolve all reasonable
factual doubts in favor of the nonmoving party.
Bruce v. Cole, 854 So. 2d 47 (Ala. 2003), and Pitney
Bowes, Inc. v. Berney Office Solutions, 823 So. 2d
659 (Ala. 2001).  See Ex parte Helms, 873 So. 2d
1139 (Ala. 2003), and Willis v. Parker, 814 So. 2d
857 (Ala. 2001)."
Hollis v. City of Brighton, 885 So. 2d 135, 140 (Ala. 2004).
III.  Analysis
Kendrick contends that the trial court erred in
concluding that Wordell is immune from suit under § 6-5-338,
Ala. Code 1975.  Section 6–5–338(a) provides, in pertinent
part:  "Every peace officer ... shall at all times be deemed
to be officers of this state, and as such shall have immunity
from tort liability arising out of his or her conduct in
performance of any discretionary function within the line and
scope of his or her law enforcement duties."   This Court has
2
determined that "[w]hether a qualified peace officer is due
It is undisputed that Wordell qualifies as a "peace
2
officer" under § 6-5-338, Ala. Code 1975.
10
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§ 6-5-338(a) immunity is now judged by the restatement of
State-agent immunity articulated by Ex parte Cranman, 792
So.2d 392 (Ala. 2000) ...."  Hollis, 885 So. 2d at 143.   
3
"'This 
Court 
has 
established 
a 
"burden-shifting"
process when a party raises the defense of
State-agent immunity.'  Ex parte Estate of Reynolds,
946 So. 2d 450, 452 (Ala. 2006).  A State agent
asserting State-agent immunity 'bears the burden of
demonstrating that the plaintiff's claims arise from
a function that would entitle the State agent to
immunity.'  946 So. 2d at 452.  Should the State
agent make such a showing, the burden then shifts to
the plaintiff to show that one of the two categories
of exceptions to State-agent immunity recognized in
Cranman is applicable."
Ex parte Kennedy, 992 So. 2d 1276, 1282 (Ala. 2008).  
In the context of police officers acting in the line and
3
scope of their duties, Cranman originally extended immunity
when the conduct made the basis of the claim against the
officer was based on the officer's "exercising judgment in the
enforcement of the criminal laws of the State, including, but
not limited to law-enforcement officers' arresting or
attempting to arrest persons."  792 So. 2d at 405.  Because
§ 6-5-338 does not limit the availability of immunity to the
"enforcement of the criminal laws," the Court in Hollis v.
City of Brighton, 950 So. 2d 300 (Ala. 2006), modified the
above-quoted category of Cranman immunity to provide that
immunity would be extended when a State agent is "'exercising
judgment in the enforcement of the criminal laws of the State,
including, but not limited to, law-enforcement officers'
arresting or attempting to arrest persons, or serving as peace
officers under circumstances entitling such officers to
immunity pursuant to § 6–5–338(a), Ala. Code 1975.'"  Hollis,
950 So. 2d at 309.
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Kendrick does not dispute that her claim arises from a
function that would entitle Wordell to immunity.  The
exception 
to 
State-agent immunity 
Kendrick 
argues 
is
applicable in this case is that "the State agent act[ed]
willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, [or]
beyond his or her authority." Cranman, 792 So. 2d at 405. 
Specifically, Kendrick contends that Wordell acted beyond his
authority based on the conditions provided in § 32-5A-7, Ala.
Code 1975, for operating an emergency vehicle.  
Section 32–5A–7 provides:
"(a) The driver of an authorized emergency
vehicle, when responding to an emergency call or
when in the pursuit of an actual or suspected
violator of the law or when responding to but not
upon returning from a fire alarm, may exercise the
privileges set forth in this section, but subject to
the conditions herein stated.
"(b) The driver of an authorized emergency
vehicle may:
"(1) Park or stand, irrespective of
the provisions of this chapter;
"(2) Proceed past a red or stop signal
or stop sign, but only after slowing down
as may be necessary for safe operation;
"(3) Exceed the maximum speed limits
so long as he does not endanger life or
property;
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"(4) Disregard regulations governing
direction of movement or turning in
specified directions.
"(c) The exemptions herein granted to an
authorized emergency vehicle shall apply only when
such vehicle is making use of an audible signal
meeting the requirements of Section 32-5-213 and
visual requirements of any laws of this state
requiring visual signals on emergency vehicles.
"(d) The foregoing provisions shall not relieve
the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle from
the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of
all persons, nor shall such provisions protect the
driver from the consequences of his reckless
disregard for the safety of others."
(Emphasis added.)
In Blackwood v. City of Hanceville, 936 So. 2d 495 (Ala.
2006), this Court held that when a peace officer is seeking
immunity from liability for "the driving of an authorized
emergency vehicle in response to an emergency call," "the
immunity afforded the peace officer ... is subject to, and
limited by, the conditions imposed by § 32–5A–7."  936 So. 2d
at 505-06. In other words, "[i]n the particular settings
described by § 32–5A–7(a), the legislature has acted to
restrain the manner in which the driver of the emergency
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vehicle may exercise his or her discretion and judgment."  
4
936 So. 2d at 506.  
Kendrick contends that genuine issues of fact exist as to
whether Wordell violated the conditions of § 32–5A–7. 
Specifically, she states that there are disputed issues of
fact concerning: (1) whether Wordell used his siren at all
because neither Coleman nor Kendrick heard his siren; (2)
whether Wordell slowed down when traveling through the second
intersection because Coleman testified that Wordell was
"flying" through the intersection and that he did not slow
down; and (3) whether Wordell exceeded the speed limit in a
manner that endangered life or property because Coleman
testified that if Wordell had slowed down going through the
second intersection the accident would not have happened. 
Kendrick contends that those disputed facts precluded a
summary judgment in favor of Wordell and, by extension, the
City.   
5
This Court has reaffirmed the limitation in § 32-5A-7 on
4
§ 6-5-338 immunity in Ex parte Coleman, 145 So. 3d 751 (Ala.
2013), and Ex parte City of Midfield, 161 So. 3d 1158 (Ala.
2014).  
It is undisputed that the City's immunity is linked to
5
Wordell's immunity.  See § 6–5–338(b), Ala. Code 1975, and
Howard v. City of Atmore, 887 So. 2d 201, 211 (Ala. 2003).
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The City and Wordell do not dispute that Wordell had to
comply with the conditions of § 32-5A-7 in operating his
emergency vehicle to qualify for peace-officer immunity.  
They
do not ask this Court to reevaluate its jurisprudence
concerning the "beyond-authority" exception to State-agent
immunity.  Rather, their response focuses on the issue whether
Wordell activated his siren when answering the domestic-
disturbance call.  In that regard, they assert that "officer
Wordell's unwavering testimony that he had activated his
emergency sirens cannot be refuted by claims that others did
not hear them."  For support of this assertion, the City and
Wordell cite Ex parte Coleman, 145 So. 3d 751 (Ala. 2013).  
In Coleman, this Court determined that § 32-5A-7(c) does
not require the operator of an emergency vehicle to use a
siren continuously to meet the condition of that subsection
that the "vehicle is making use of an audible signal."  The
Court explained: 
"As the petitioners argue, 'Coleman had his
emergency lights on and had his siren make a yelping
sound to alert oncoming traffic.  Therefore, ...
Coleman was "making use of an audible signal ... and
visual requirements" pursuant to § 32–5A–7(c) ...
and is immune from liability under § 6–5–338(a).'
...  Nothing in § 32–5A–7 dictates the manner in
which a siren must be used; it requires only that a
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siren be used.  The legislature certainly could have
inserted the adjective 'continuous' in § 32–5A–7 to
modify 'audible signal' had it so intended.  'The
judiciary will not add that which the Legislature
chose to omit.'  Ex parte Jackson, 614 So. 2d 405,
407 (Ala. 1993).  In this case, although Coleman did
not make continuous use of the siren, that is not
what the statute requires."
145 So. 3d at 758.  
The obvious difference between Coleman and the present
case is that in Coleman it was undisputed that the police
officer made some use of his siren, whereas in this case both
Kendrick and Coleman 
testified that Wordell activated only his
lights and not his siren.  The City and Wordell argue that 
"[w]hile Ms. Kendrick has contended that Officer
Wordell did not have any use of his emergency
sirens, in an attempt to distinguish this case from
Ex parte Coleman, the simple allegation that his
sirens were not heard does not rise to the level
necessary to prove that Officer Wordell is not
entitled to immunity.  This is especially true
considering 
Officer 
Wordell's 
consistent 
and
continuous statements that his sirens were fully
engaged at the time the collision occurred."6
The City and Wordell also contend that Wordell's
6
testimony was "corroborated by others," but the only other
testimony they cite is from Ijawuan Powell.  In a recorded
statement dated October 3, 2011, taken by an insurance
adjustor, Powell stated that Wordell had both his lights and
siren activated when he was traveling through the second
intersection.  Powell also stated that he was stopped at the
intersection because his traffic light was red, but that the
light 
turned 
green 
before 
Wordell 
crossed 
into 
the
intersection.  In an affidavit Powell executed on January 24,
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But this argument asks the Court to give more weight to
Wordell's testimony than to the testimony of both Kendrick and
Coleman.  Both Kendrick and Coleman also have been
"consistent" in stating that they never heard a siren. Given
the facts of the case, the clear implication of their
testimony is that Wordell never engaged his siren.  This
constitutes a factual dispute not proper for disposition by a
summary judgment.  
As Kendrick notes, there is also a dispute concerning
whether Wordell slowed down when he proceeded through the
2013, and gave to Kendrick, which she attached to her reply
brief, Powell stated that Wordell went through a red traffic
light at the second intersection, that he was traveling at a
high rate of speed, and that he had his lights on but not his
siren. 
Powell's statement to the insurance adjustor is not in
the form of deposition testimony, and, therefore, it is not
admissible as independent evidence.  See Rule 56(e), Ala. R.
Civ. P.  Although it might be available to impeach Powell's
affidavit 
to 
Kendrick, 
Powell's 
subsequent 
affidavit 
cannot 
be
considered because it is not contained in the record.  See
Roberts v. NASCO Equip. Co., 986 So. 2d 379, 385 (Ala. 2007)
(observing that "'"attachments to briefs are not considered
part of the record and therefore cannot be considered on
appeal."'" (quoting Morrow v. State, 928 So. 2d 315, 320 n.5
(Ala. Crim. App. 2004), quoting in turn Huff v. State, 596 So.
2d 16, 19 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991)). Thus, none of Powell's
statements can be used to corroborate the testimony of any
party.
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second intersection.  Wordell testified that the 
traffic 
light
at the second intersection was green when he went through the
second intersection and thus that there was no reason for him
to slow down.  He also stated that he was traveling 30 to 40
miles per hour at the time or at the most 45 miles per hour
and so he was not traveling at an unsafe speed through the
second intersection.  In contrast, both Kendrick and Coleman
testified that Wordell went through a red traffic light at the
second intersection, and Coleman testified that Wordell "was
flying" through the intersection.  Indeed, Coleman estimated
that Wordell was going at least 50 miles per hour when he went
through the second intersection.   It can also be inferred
7
from the fact that Wordell's vehicle traveled across the
median and two lanes of oncoming traffic following its
collision with Kendrick's vehicle and from the severe damage
sustained by all the vehicles involved in the accident that
The City and Wordell argue on appeal that Coleman's
7
testimony about the speed at which Wordell was traveling
should be stricken because it constitutes an expert opinion by
a layperson in that she based her estimate of his speed on the
impact of the vehicles involved in the collision.  The City
and Wordell never filed a motion to strike Coleman's testimony
in this regard, however, nor did they present this argument in
any way in the trial court.  Therefore, they waived their
objection to Coleman's testimony on this basis.
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Wordell was traveling at a high rate of speed; it is
undisputed that Kendrick was going only 10 to 15 miles per
hour at the time of the collision.  Because the evidence is in
conflict as to whether Wordell went through a red traffic
light at the second intersection, there is also a genuine
issue of fact as to whether Wordell slowed down to an
appropriate speed when he proceeded through the second
intersection.  
IV.  Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court
erred in entering a summary judgment in favor of Wordell on
the basis of § 6-5-338.  Because the City's liability is
linked to Wordell's, the trial court likewise erred in
entering a summary judgment in favor of the City.  The
judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is
remanded for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Moore, C.J., and Bolin, Main, and Bryan, JJ., concur.
19