Title: John Steven Huggins v. State Of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC02-2364
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: December 17, 2004

Supreme Court of Florida 
_____________ 
No. SC02-2364 
____________ 
JOHN STEVEN HUGGINS, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
[December 2, 2004] 
CORRECTED OPINION 
 
PER CURIAM. 
We have on appeal a judgment of conviction for first-degree murder and a 
sentence of death.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the 
reasons stated below, we affirm the convictions and sentence of death. 
FACTS 
This is a direct appeal from John Steven Huggins’ second trial for the 
murder of Carla Larson on June 10, 1997.  Huggins was indicted on May 28, 1998, 
in Orange County.  Venue was later transferred to Duval County, where, on 
February 3, 1999, Huggins was convicted of first-degree murder, carjacking, 
kidnapping, and robbery.  The jury recommended a sentence of death, and the trial 
 
 
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court imposed the jury’s recommendation.  However, within weeks of the 
conclusion of the case, defense counsel learned of information that the State knew 
but never disclosed.  On March 25, 1999, Huggins filed a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus in the trial court, alleging that the State had withheld Brady1 
material.  In light of the pending petition, this Court relinquished jurisdiction over 
Huggins’ first direct appeal.  After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted 
Huggins a new trial, finding that the State had violated the dictates of Brady.2  The 
                                        
1.  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 
2.  In that order, the trial court found the following.  On June 16, 1997, 
Preston Ausley contacted Detective Daniel Nazarchuk of the Orange County 
Sheriff’s Office with information regarding the Larson case.  Ausley told Detective 
Nazarchuk that a white Ford Explorer cut him off in traffic in Orlando, that he had 
written down the tag number, and that he had verified within one digit that the 
license plate number was the same as that of Larson’s Ford Explorer.  Detective 
Nazarchuk’s notes from this conversation indicated that the date of the sighting 
was June 12, 1997, and that Ausley said he saw a white male driving the vehicle.  
However, at the evidentiary hearing, Ausley claimed that he told Detective 
Nazarchuk that the individual he saw driving the vehicle was a white female in her 
late twenties to early thirties with blonde hair that was just below shoulder length 
and that he encountered the vehicle on June 11, 1997.  Lead sheet 302 was created 
from Detective Nazarchuk’s notes of the conversation with Ausley and was 
provided to the defense during discovery. 
During Huggins’ first trial, Ausley saw Huggins’ former wife, Angel 
Huggins, on the television coverage of Huggins’ trial.  On February 1, 1999, the 
day after seeing Angel Huggins, Ausley went to the Office of the State Attorney.  
He was directed to Assistant State Attorney Dorothy Sedgwick, who spoke with 
him briefly and asked Pat Guice, an investigator with the State Attorney’s office, to 
take his tape-recorded statement.  In that statement, Ausley stated that when he saw 
Angel on television, it had struck him that she resembled the driver of the white 
Ford Explorer he had seen.  Guice then requested that Ausley return the next day 
so that the state attorneys who were at that time prosecuting the Huggins case in 
 
 
- 3 - 
State appealed that ruling, and this Court affirmed, finding that the suppressed 
evidence was material and failure to disclose it resulted in a verdict not worthy of 
confidence.  See State v. Huggins, 788 So. 2d 238, 244 (Fla. 2001). 
Upon this Court’s remand, the trial court granted a change of venue to 
Osceola County, and in April 2002, an unsuccessful attempt was made to select a 
jury in Osceola County.  Pursuant to a joint stipulation, venue was then transferred 
to Hillsborough County.  Jury selection began in Hillsborough County on July 15, 
2002, and a six-day trial followed.  On July 25, 2002, the jury found Huggins 
guilty of murder in the first degree, carjacking, kidnapping, and petit theft as a 
lesser included offense under the robbery charge. 
The facts of the case as presented at Huggins’ second trial were as follows.  
The victim, Carla Larson, was married and had a daughter.  She was an engineer 
for Centex-Rooney, a construction company, and was working on Disney’s 
Coronado Springs project in June 1997.  She drove a white Ford Explorer with a 
black bug guard on the front, light blue pinstripes, a Passport radar detector hard-
wired to the dash, and air conditioning and radio controls in the back seat.  On the 
                                                                                                                              
Jacksonville could speak with him.  The next morning, Assistant State Attorney 
Jeff Ashton spoke to Ausley on the telephone.  After their conversation, Ashton 
determined that Ausley’s name had been given to Huggins in lead sheet 302, 
Ausley’s statement did not support what he believed the defense’s theory of the 
case would be, and Ausley’s statement was of little value.  Ashton attended trial 
that day and did not disclose to the trial court or the defense counsel that he had 
been contacted by Ausley. 
 
 
- 4 - 
morning of June 10, 1997, Larson took her daughter to day care and went to work.  
Just prior to lunch, Larson told a co-worker, Cindy Garris, that she was going to a 
grocery store to pick up food for an afternoon meeting.  Garris suggested that she 
go to a new Publix grocery store on International Drive, just off of the Osceola 
Parkway, and Larson indicated that she would go there.  Larson left work at 
approximately noon.  A Publix receipt indicated that she purchased food at 12:11 
p.m.  However, Larson never returned to work. 
Numerous witnesses testified to various sightings that afternoon of a white 
sport utility vehicle (SUV) on a dirt road off of the Osceola Parkway that led into a 
wooded area.  Between 12:30 and 12:45 p.m., Barry O’Hearn and his landscaping 
crew were eating lunch in that wooded area when O’Hearn saw a white Ford 
Explorer drive past him on a dirt road.  He could only describe the driver as white.  
Between 12:45 and 1 p.m., Floyd Sparks, Disney’s superintendent of drainage and 
roadways in the area, was driving on the Osceola Parkway and saw, through a fire 
break line in the woods, that an SUV was parked in an unauthorized area of the 
woods.  Though normally part of his job, Sparks was not able to investigate it at 
that time.  Gary and Brad Wilson, a father and son who both worked for Centex-
Rooney, were returning from lunch on the Osceola Parkway just prior to 1 p.m. 
when they saw a white Ford Explorer exit from the dirt road onto the Osceola 
Parkway at an unusually high rate of speed.  Their vehicle soon passed the Ford 
 
 
- 5 - 
Explorer, and both looked at the driver.  Brad Wilson later told a sketch artist that 
the driver was a white male with a dark tan, weathering of the face, highlights in 
his hair, and a moustache and beard.  He testified at trial that the driver had longer, 
brownish hair and described his facial hair as a close growth.  Gary Wilson, 
however, described the driver as a white male who was flushed in the face, had 
medium-length dark hair, and no facial hair.  Finally, between 2:30 and 3 p.m., 
Chris Smithson, a subcontractor on the Coronado Springs project, saw a white 
Ford Explorer exit from the dirt road, partially cross the Osceola Parkway, stop in 
the median and wait to merge with on-coming traffic.  Smithson noticed the 
vehicle because it was nice and seemed out of place in the woods.  Smithson later 
saw Huggins in the median and identified him as the driver of that vehicle. 
Two days after Larson’s disappearance, two of her co-workers instituted a 
search.  They encountered Sparks, who mentioned the SUV he had seen two days 
earlier.  Sparks then went to the point on Osceola Parkway from where he had seen 
the SUV and, via hand-held radios, directed Larson’s co-workers to the point 
where he could see them through the same fire break line.  From there, they were 
led by smell to a body about 200 feet away.  The body, which was naked and 
covered by a towel, was later identified as Larson.  Dr. Shashi Gore, the medical 
examiner in this case, testified at trial that significant decomposition indicated the 
body had been there for approximately two days and concluded from his autopsy 
 
 
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that death was by strangulation.  Except for her wedding band, the jewelry Larson 
usually wore was missing, as was her clothing and purse.  Months later, on 
December 24, 1997, a landscaping crew found Larson’s purse in the brush off of 
the driver’s side of a ramp along World Drive between the Osceola Parkway and 
Highway 192. 
On the day of Larson’s disappearance, Huggins and his wife, Angel, were 
visiting Orlando with their five children.  Although Huggins and Angel were 
estranged, the family stayed together at a Days Inn on Highway 192 near the 
Osceola Parkway and International Drive on the evenings of June 8 and 9, 1997.  
At the trial, Huggins’ sixteen-year-old son, Jonathon Huggins, testified that he 
could not remember much about the trip, which had occurred five years earlier.  
The trial court found that Jonathon was effectively unavailable as a witness, and 
his prior deposition was admitted.  In Jonathon’s deposition, he stated that in the 
summer of 1997, his father did not have a car and the family visited Orlando in 
Angel’s small car.  On the day after visiting Gatorland, they returned to Angel’s 
house without his father, and his father later returned in a different vehicle, which 
Jonathon remembered as being dark in color, new in appearance, with air vents and 
radio controls in the back seat, and a clean interior.  Jonathon also remembered 
riding in that vehicle approximately three times and that later that summer, his 
 
 
- 7 - 
father drove him back to Panasoffkee, where Jonathon lived with his grandmother, 
in a little blue car. 
Angel Huggins’ mother, Fay Blades, with whom Angel lived in Melbourne, 
testified that on June 10, 1997, she returned home from work a little after 5 p.m. 
and found an unfamiliar, white SUV in her carport.  She saw Jonathon Huggins in 
the house but left shortly thereafter to attend night school.  One of Blades’ 
neighbors testified that she saw a white Ford Explorer at Blades’ home on two 
consecutive days sometime around June 11, 1997.  And a second neighbor testified 
that he once saw in Blades’ driveway a white SUV and a similar vehicle that had 
been poorly spray-painted a dark grey or black color later the same week. 
Kevin Smith, a friend of Huggins who worked in lawn maintenance and 
lived near Cocoa Beach, testified that on June 12, 1997, Huggins arrived at Smith’s 
house in a white SUV that appeared new.  It contained a radar detector hard-wired 
to the dash and may have had a “car bra” on the front and blue pinstripes.  Huggins 
asked if he could park the vehicle at Smith’s house.  Two days later, Huggins 
returned, spoke with Smith for a while, and took the vehicle.  Smith testified that 
sometime later, he found an unfamiliar radar detector in a box on top of his 
exterior water heater, realized its significance after being interviewed by police, 
initially threw it in a vacant lot, and ultimately showed the police where to find it.  
A police witness testified that it was a Passport radar detector. 
 
 
- 8 - 
Another witness, Charlotte Green, testified that sometime after she heard of 
Larson’s murder, a white Ford Explorer that was partially spray-painted black cut 
in front of her at a high rate of speed in the Melbourne area.  Two days later, she 
saw the same vehicle stopped along a fishing river in Cocoa Beach with all of its 
doors open and a man standing at the back hatch.  Green further testified that she 
saw the burned remains of a vehicle in the same location the following day.  After 
seeing Huggins on a television report, Green identified him as the driver. 
At 11:23 p.m. on June 26, 1997, the police received a call that a truck was 
burning on a vacant lot in Cocoa Beach.  An investigation revealed that the truck 
was the victim’s Ford Explorer.  The arson investigator testified to the presence of 
a fire accelerant and white paint partially covered with black paint.  Over-spray on 
the tires indicated the black paint had not been professionally applied. 
In late June and July, 1997, police conducted three searches of Blades’ 
house and a shed on her property, but no incriminating evidence was found.3  
However, Blades testified that her curiosity led her to conduct her own search.  As 
part of that search, she unscrewed the cover of an electrical box within her shed 
                                        
3.  Although not revealed at Huggins’ second trial, it appears that Huggins 
began a relationship with Angel’s sister, Tammy, sometime during this period.  On 
June 27, 1997, they left Florida together.  Shortly thereafter, Angel saw a television 
program, America’s Most Wanted, which featured Larson’s murder.  The search of 
her mother’s house resulted from Angel reporting to police that she suspected her 
husband of the murder. 
 
 
- 9 - 
and discovered jewelry wrapped in some paper.  Blades turned the jewelry over to 
police, and Larson’s husband later identified it as Larson’s missing jewelry. 
In his defense, Huggins presented the testimony of a number of witnesses at 
trial.  That evidence indicated that the burned vehicle was removed from Cocoa 
Beach prior to the time Green testified that she had seen it; that no call to the 
Sheriff’s Office from Smithson was logged into police records of complaint or 911 
calls in June 1997; that Smith had long hair, a dark tan, and facial hair in June 
1997; that Smith owned an old van painted with black primer paint; and that no 
hair or DNA samples from the crime scene were matched to Huggins.  In closing 
arguments, defense counsel accused Smith of being the killer, noting that Smith 
resembled the sketch of the man Brad Wilson described, lived near where the 
burned vehicle was found, had possession of the radar detector, and was the only 
person placing Huggins at Smith’s house.  Defense counsel suggested that Smith 
painted the vehicle to match the van he already owned and gave Larson’s jewelry 
to Angel Huggins when she visited him on June 15.4  Defense counsel also heavily 
stressed the circumstantial nature of the State’s case. 
                                        
4.  On cross-examination, Smith testified that he had known Angel as 
Huggins’ wife and because she had been roommates with Smith’s girlfriend at one 
time.  Smith also testified that he saw Angel on June 15, 1997, when she came to 
his home to pick up some marijuana. 
 
 
 
- 10 - 
Huggins elected to represent himself in the penalty phase.  The trial court 
allowed him to discharge his counsel after first conducting a Faretta5 hearing.  On 
July 26, 2002, the jury heard penalty-phase testimony.  The State presented 
documentary evidence relating to Huggins’ nine prior violent felony convictions 
and probation, together with three victim-impact witnesses—the victim’s husband, 
mother, and best friend—who each read previously prepared statements about 
Larson and their relationships with her.  Huggins presented only one witness, his 
sister, Sandra Huggins, who testified to some family background.  On the same 
day, the jury recommended a sentence of death by a nine-to-three vote.  Special 
verdict forms were utilized and indicated that all twelve jurors made the following 
specific findings beyond a reasonable doubt:  (1) the crime was committed while 
Huggins had been previously convicted of a felony and was on felony probation; 
(2) Huggins has been previously convicted of another capital offense or of a felony 
involving the use or threat of violence to some person; (3) the crime was 
committed while Huggins was engaged in the commission of the crime of 
kidnapping; (4) the crime was committed for financial gain; and (5) the crime was 
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.  All twelve jurors also specifically rejected 
“any aspect of the defendant’s character, record, or background” or “other 
circumstance of the offense” as mitigating factors. 
                                        
5.  Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 
 
 
- 11 - 
On August 26, 2002, the trial court held a Spencer6 hearing, at which 
Huggins read a statement regarding his life background and the State introduced a 
letter from the victim’s mother.  The trial court ordered a presentence investigation 
report, which contained numerous comments from family and friends emphasizing 
Huggins’ missionary and church work.  The trial court also took into consideration 
the mitigation evidence presented in the penalty phase of Huggins’ first trial.  On 
September 19, 2002, the trial court issued its order sentencing Huggins to death for 
the first-degree murder conviction.  The trial court found the five aggravating 
circumstances previously found by the jury and thirteen nonstatutory mitigating 
factors, which were given slight to some weight.  The trial court also imposed a 
sentence of sixty days for petit theft and departure sentences of thirty years for 
carjacking and life imprisonment for kidnapping. 
ANALYSIS 
Huggins raises eleven points on appeal.  In the first, he asserts that the trial 
court erred in admitting (1) certain evidence to prove consciousness of guilt, and 
(2) for impeachment purposes, the fact that Huggins had nine prior felony 
convictions. 
On May 5, 1998, at a hearing attended by Huggins, the circuit court issued 
an order granting the State’s motion to compel the collection of hair samples from 
                                        
6.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
 
- 12 - 
Huggins.  At trial, over defense objection, the State called a crime scene 
investigator who testified that pursuant to that court order, he attempted to collect 
hair samples from Huggins on May 12, 1998, but was unable to collect pubic hair 
because Huggins’ pubic region was completely shaved.  The State then introduced 
a photograph taken that day of the upper portion of Huggins’ pubic region.  On 
cross-examination, defense counsel elicited testimony that the correctional facility 
in which Huggins was housed at the time was old and not air-conditioned.  Later, 
Huggins presented the testimony of a correctional officer who worked at the jail in 
which Huggins was housed in May 1998.  The officer testified that that facility was 
not air-conditioned and quite hot in the summer, that outbreaks of crab lice would 
occur, and that one method of addressing the problem would be for an inmate to 
shave.  One specific portion of the officer’s direct testimony was as follows: 
Q 
During the period of July of 1997, when Mr. Huggins 
was incarcerated, under part of your supervision, were you ever 
notified that Mr. Huggins complained of crabs? 
[STATE’S ATTORNEY]:  Objection.  Hearsay. 
THE COURT:  Sustained. 
Q 
Did Mr. Huggins ever directly contact you and indicate 
that he had crabs? 
A 
You mean directly?  I don’t recall that he did or did not. 
. . . . 
Q 
To your knowledge, did Mr. Huggins ever shave his 
pubic region after complaining of lice? 
[STATE’S ATTORNEY]:  Objection.  Hearsay.  Basis of 
knowledge. 
THE COURT:  Overruled.  You can answer the question, if you 
have personal knowledge.  Not what someone else told you. 
A 
Yes, I did. 
 
 
- 13 - 
Q 
Okay.  And do you know whether he did, in fact, shave 
himself? 
A 
Yes, he did. 
On cross-examination, the State’s attorney asked the officer how he knew that 
Huggins had shaved because of crab lice.  The officer responded, “That’s what he 
said.”  The State’s attorney then asked, “So your answer to counsel’s question was 
based upon what Mr. Huggins told you?,” and the officer responded, “Pretty 
much.” 
At the close of the defense’s case-in-chief, the State requested judicial notice 
of Huggins’ nine prior felony convictions and an instruction to the jury that they 
could consider the fact of those convictions in assessing the credibility of Huggins’ 
statement, as related by the correctional officer, that he had shaved due to crab lice.  
The defense objected, arguing that any statement was elicited on the State’s cross-
examination and that introduction of the convictions would be prejudicial.  The 
court reviewed the trial transcript and found the convictions admissible under 
section 90.806, Florida Statutes (2002).  The court then informed the jury of the 
fact of Huggins’ nine prior felony convictions, without specifying the nature of the 
crimes involved, and gave a limiting instruction regarding the jury’s use of that 
information. 
Huggins first argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence regarding 
his shaved pubic region because that evidence was susceptible to an explanation 
 
 
- 14 - 
other than consciousness of guilt.  He relies on the decisions in Herring v. State, 
501 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), State v. Esperti, 220 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 2d DCA 
1969), and Menna v. State, 846 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 2003), to argue that this incident 
was so ambiguous as to remove from its invocation any probative value.  However, 
we find those decisions, which involved voluntary gunshot residue testing, 
inapplicable to the present case, which involves a court-ordered collection of a hair 
sample. 
Because the parties cite to and we have found no case law in Florida 
addressing a factual scenario on point with the instant case, we must look to the 
general principles governing consciousness-of-guilt evidence.  This Court has 
stated: 
The law is well settled that “[w]hen a suspected person in any manner 
attempts to escape or evade a threatened prosecution by flight, 
concealment, resistance to lawful arrest, or other indications after the 
fact of a desire to evade prosecution, such fact is admissible, being 
relevant to the consciousness of guilt which may be inferred from 
such circumstance.”  Straight v. State, 397 So. 2d 903, 908 (Fla. 
1981).  However, we have held that in order to admit this evidence, 
there must be a nexus between the flight, concealment, or resistance to 
lawful arrest and the crime for which the defendant is being tried in 
that specific case.  See Escobar v. State, 699 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1997).  
Moreover, such an interpretation should be made with a sensitivity to 
the facts of the particular case.  See Bundy v. State, 471 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 
1985) (citing United States v. Borders, 693 F.2d 1318, 1325 (11th Cir. 
1982)). 
Looney v. State, 803 So. 2d 656, 666-67 (Fla. 2001) (quoting Randolph v. State, 
463 So. 2d 186, 189 (Fla. 1984)).  This Court has stated in a number of cases that 
 
 
- 15 - 
in order for the State to sufficiently demonstrate relevance and materiality, there 
must be a sufficient nexus between evidence of flight or concealment and the crime 
for which the defendant is being tried.  See, e.g., Murray v. State, 838 So. 2d 1073 
(Fla. 2002); Escobar, 699 So. 2d at 995.  Here, the evidence indicated that Huggins 
was present at the court hearing at which the hair collection was ordered.  
Additionally, the facts show that Huggins shaved his entire pubic region within one 
week of the date of that court order.  We conclude that those facts provide a 
sufficient nexus upon which the trial court could base its exercise of discretion in 
admitting this evidence.  Furthermore, we note that Huggins’ explanation 
regarding jail conditions and crab lice went to the weight of the evidence, rather 
than its admissibility. 
Huggins also contests the admission of his nine prior felony convictions for 
impeachment purposes, arguing that the State, rather than defense counsel, elicited 
the hearsay statement attributed to Huggins and that evidence of Huggins’ nine 
felony convictions should have been excluded under the balancing test of section 
90.403, Florida Statutes (2002).  The trial court admitted the fact of Huggins’ 
convictions on the basis of section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (2002), which 
provides in part that “[w]hen a hearsay statement has been admitted in evidence, 
credibility of the declarant may be attacked and, if attacked, may be supported by 
any evidence that would be admissible for those purposes if the declarant had 
 
 
- 16 - 
testified as a witness.”  The trial court’s ruling was made in accordance with First 
and Fourth District Court of Appeal holdings that section 90.806 permits the 
introduction of a defendant’s felony convictions when the defendant elicits his or 
her own exculpatory, hearsay statement through another witness at trial.  See Kelly 
v. State, 857 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); Werley v. State, 814 So. 2d 1159 
(Fla. 1st DCA 2002); Llanos v. State, 770 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).  Two 
of those decisions cite the following treatise passage concerning the functionally 
identical federal evidence provision:  “A defendant who chooses not to testify but 
who succeeds in getting his or her own exculpatory statements into evidence runs 
the risk of having those statements impeached by felony convictions.”  5 Jack B. 
Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 806.04(2)(b) 
(Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2002).  We agree with the First and Fourth 
Districts on that point of law.  Under section 90.806(1), a hearsay declarant is 
treated as a “witness” and his or her credibility may be attacked in the same 
manner as any other witness’s credibility.  In turn, section 90.610(1), Florida 
Statutes (2002), provides in pertinent part that “[a] party may attack the credibility 
of any witness . . . by evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime if the 
crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of 1 year.”7 
                                        
7.  In her dissent, Justice Pariente questions whether the admission of 
Huggins’ prior record is authorized by section 90.806.  She quotes the second 
sentence of that section and suggests that Huggins’ prior record should not have 
 
 
- 17 - 
Additionally, we find that the testimony quoted above supports the trial 
court’s conclusion that defense counsel initially elicited testimony from the 
correctional officer attributing a hearsay statement to Huggins.  Indeed, defense 
counsel specifically asked the officer, “Did Mr. Huggins ever directly contact you 
and indicate that he had crabs?”  When the State’s hearsay objection was sustained, 
defense counsel indirectly elicited the same information by including it as an 
implied assumption within the question “To your knowledge, did Mr. Huggins ever 
shave his pubic region after complaining of lice?”  The State’s later question, “So 
your answer to counsel’s question was based upon what Mr. Huggins told you?,” 
was designed merely to reveal the implication that defense counsel had already 
succeeded in getting before the jury.  Thus, pursuant to section 90.806, as properly 
construed in Llanos, Werley, and Kelly, Huggins opened the door to his own 
impeachment. 
Regarding Huggins’ argument that evidence of his nine prior felony 
convictions should have been excluded under the balancing test of section 90.403, 
this Court must determine if the trial court abused its discretion.  See Mansfield v. 
                                                                                                                              
been admitted because it does not constitute “[e]vidence of a statement or conduct 
by the declarant at any time inconsistent with the declarant’s hearsay statement.”  
However, the first sentence of that section provides that a hearsay declarant’s 
credibility may be attacked “by any evidence that would be admissible . . . if the 
declarant had testified as a witness.”  That provision clearly implicates the 
application of section 90.610, which allows the admission of prior convictions of 
certain crimes to attack the credibility of a witness. 
 
 
- 18 - 
State, 758 So. 2d 636, 648 (Fla. 2000).  Section 90.403 provides that relevant 
evidence is inadmissible if “its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence.”  The general principle behind section 
90.610, Florida Statutes (2002), which permits the use of convictions for 
impeachment purposes under certain circumstances, supports the conclusion that 
the fact of Huggins’ prior felony convictions had probative value regarding the 
credibility of the hearsay statement attributed to him.  The trial court attempted to 
limit any danger of unfair prejudice by refraining from informing the jury of the 
nature of Huggins’ crimes and by giving a limiting instruction regarding the jury’s 
use of the information.  On the basis of these facts, we conclude the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence for impeachment purposes. 
In Huggins’ second point of appeal, he asserts that the trial court erred in 
admitting testimony regarding the victim’s plans on the day of her murder.  At 
trial, the State presented the testimony of Cindy Garris, who was the office 
manager for Centex-Rooney in June 1997.  Over a defense objection, Garris 
testified that on June 10, 1997, she and Larson had a conversation prior to lunch in 
which Larson indicated she was going to a Goodings grocery store to pick up food 
for a meeting, Garris suggested a new and closer Publix grocery store, and Larson 
indicated that she would go there and return shortly.  Huggins argues that this 
 
 
- 19 - 
testimony was inadmissible hearsay.  We find the testimony fell squarely within 
the hearsay exception in section 90.803(3), Florida Statutes (2002), which provides 
that a statement of the declarant’s then-existing state of mind, including a 
statement of intent, is not inadmissible when offered to prove or explain acts of 
subsequent conduct of the declarant so long as the statement was not made under 
circumstances that indicate its lack of trustworthiness.  First, the State introduced 
Larson’s statement of intent to prove her subsequent conduct of going to Publix.  
Second, there is no indication from the record that Larson’s statement was made 
under circumstances that indicate its lack of trustworthiness.  Third, although case 
law provides that a victim’s state of mind is inadmissible unless probative of a 
material issue, see Brooks v. State, 787 So. 2d 765, 771 (Fla. 2001), this case falls 
within an exception to that rule because the State also introduced the statement to 
inferentially rebut the defense argument that Larson may have voluntarily 
accompanied her killer from Publix to another location.  See id. (noting exception 
where state of mind of victim-declarant is used to rebut a defense raised by 
defendant).  Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
admitting this testimony.8  Moreover, even if the trial court erred, we would find 
                                        
8.  In his reply brief to this Court, Huggins conceded that section 90.803(3) 
allows the admission of a declarant’s statement of intent to support an inference of 
the future act of the declarant but further argued that neither the State nor the trial 
court relied on that basis at trial.  The record indicates that the trial court required 
no argument from the State on this issue, and defense counsel failed to request 
 
 
- 20 - 
such error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the Publix receipt also 
established Larson’s subsequent conduct. 
In Huggins’ third point of appeal, he asserts the trial court erred in granting 
the State’s challenge for cause to a prospective juror without following the dictates 
of State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984).  During individual voir dire, the 
following inquiry of prospective juror Coley occurred: 
THE COURT:  This trial will take approximately two weeks.  
Will that impose an unreasonable burden on you to sit and hear this 
case for the next two weeks? 
JUROR COLEY:  No. 
. . . . 
THE COURT:  State may inquire. 
. . . . 
[STATE’S ATTORNEY]:  I notice from your jury 
questionnaire you work at McDonald’s? 
JUROR COLEY:  Yes. 
[STATE’S ATTORNEY]:  What do you do there? 
JUROR COLEY:  I’m a maintenance man. 
[STATE’S ATTORNEY]:  Okay.  Have you made 
arrangements with your employer to pay you while you’re in jury 
service? 
JUROR COLEY:  Well, I told him about it, but I ain’t make 
arrangements about it. 
[STATE’S ATTORNEY]:  Okay.  I want to make sure that if 
you are here for two weeks, is it going to cause you any financial 
problems as far as paying your bills, things like that? 
JUROR COLEY:  For two weeks? 
[STATE’S ATTORNEY]:  Yeah, I don’t know if you work at 
night, normally, or during the day, but obviously, if you are here, you 
probably won’t be able to work.  I want to make sure that won’t cause 
you a financial problem or a hardship. 
                                                                                                                              
clarification of the grounds for the court’s ruling.  Clearly, the trial court found this 
to be a straightforward matter requiring no further elaboration. 
 
 
- 21 - 
JUROR COLEY:  Well, see, I don’t know how much they pay 
for jury duty. 
[STATE’S ATTORNEY]:  I don’t know what the habit is in 
Hillsborough County, but generally they don’t pay very much.  
Certainly not a reimbursement for lost wages.  Some people can 
handle that; some people can’t. 
JUROR COLEY:  Oh, I can’t. 
[STATE’S ATTORNEY]:  Okay.  That’s what the judge asked 
about.  Whether it would be burdensome.  That’s kind of what he was 
getting at.  We don’t want you to not be able to pay your light bill 
because you are on jury duty.  Do you think that that is going to be 
any problem for you? 
JUROR COLEY:  It would be a little bit of a problem, to tell 
you the truth. 
[STATE’S ATTORNEY]:  Okay.  That’s why I brought it up.  I 
want to make sure you thought that through. 
JUROR COLEY:  Okay. 
[STATE’S ATTORNEY]:  At this point, if your employer does 
not pay you while you are on jury duty, will you be able to afford to 
not work for two weeks, not get paid for two weeks to be on jury 
duty? 
JUROR COLEY:  No. 
At this point, defense counsel objected “to the back door [Neil] objection in this 
phase,” and arguments were heard at the bench. 
At the bench, defense counsel noted that the State questioned Coley about 
financial problems despite the fact that Coley’s prior answer to the court’s question 
had indicated no inconvenience.  Defense counsel then noted that Coley was a 
black male.  In response, the prosecutor stated that it was unclear whether defense 
counsel was asking the court to order a race-neutral reason for the questioning.  
The court stated it would ask Coley to inquire of his employer whether he would 
be paid.  In response, defense counsel “move[d] the court to assure that all 
 
 
- 22 - 
prospective jurors are paid the same rate that they would pay at their normal jobs.”  
The court noted its own lack of authority to order juror reimbursement beyond 
what is set by state statute, and the prosecutor argued that the motion was untimely 
because it challenged the constitutionality of the statute on jury compensation. 
Open court resumed, and Coley was requested to contact his employer.  The 
court informed Coley of the statutory juror compensation and that he would need 
to determine whether that would be sufficient to cover his personal obligations.  
Upon Coley’s later return, he informed the court that his employer would pay him 
five dollars a day, and the court inquired further: 
THE COURT:  Okay.  Since we know that you would only get 
five dollars a day from your employer for serving on jury duty, next 
question, sir, is if you are selected to serve on this jury, will it cause 
you any financial problems to the extent that it would hurt you 
financially? 
JUROR COLEY:  Yes. 
THE COURT:  And would you tell me how it would hurt you 
financially if you were asked to serve for the next two weeks? 
. . . . 
JUROR COLEY:  Okay.  Like you said, I got to pay my rent, I 
got to pay my lights, stuff, and I got stuff that I got to pay for, my TV 
that I got, all that.  I ain’t going to be able to pay for everything.  So— 
THE COURT:  So not to put words in your mouth, you would 
be able for some, but some of the things you would lose? 
JUROR COLEY:  Yes, I would. 
The State then moved to excuse juror Coley for cause based on financial 
circumstances.  In response, defense counsel argued that to eliminate jurors who 
are day workers or whose employers do not make up the difference between their 
 
 
- 23 - 
regular wages and statutory juror compensation would deprive Huggins of a fair 
cross-section of the community.  In response, the State argued that defense counsel 
should have filed a pretrial motion.  In rebuttal, defense counsel urged that the 
issue is not null until it presents itself and that the court “has the right to do thing[s] 
to ensure protection.”  The court then ruled as follows:
 
The issue of jury compensation, and the limits on jury 
compensation is something that has been well known to all lawyers 
that practice in the field of criminal law and civil law.  It has been 
quite well known that certain jurors, when asked to serve, particularly 
for extended periods of time, would either cause them financial 
hardships or personal hardships.  While we look at the fact that jury 
service is something that all citizens should do, we also recognize that 
we should not cause a juror, because of their service, to suffer a 
financial hardship.  The young man in question, who is African 
American, indicated even though he would like to serve, that it would 
cause him a number of hardships. . . .  I agree with [the State’s 
attorney], when these things are known pre-trial, they should be 
brought up.  The Supreme Court in the case of Correll versus State 
amply points that out when dealing with new, significant evidence 
where it is known ahead of time, has been presented before, if one 
waits until it’s being offered, the Correll case stands for the 
proposition that that should have been brought up pre-trial.  The 
motion, or the objection to excusing Mr. Coley for cause will be 
denied.  Be excused for cause, based upon financial hardship. 
Defense counsel made no additional objections, and Coley was excused. 
In this appeal, Huggins asserts that the trial court erred in granting the 
State’s challenge for cause to Coley.  However, based upon the above recitation of 
facts, we do not agree with Huggins’ assertion in his initial brief that “[d]efense 
counsel objected, contending that the state was unfairly excluding a black juror 
 
 
- 24 - 
without being forced to follow the dictates of State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 
1984).”  Initial Brief of Appellant at 45.  With the exception of defense counsel’s 
single, initial statement that he “object[ed] to the back door [Neil] objection in this 
phase,” the primary focus of defense counsel’s arguments and objection when the 
State moved for cause was on the exclusion of nonsalaried day workers who might 
encounter financial difficulties due to jury service in a two-week trial—not the 
exclusion of African-American jurors.  While at one point defense counsel 
indirectly implied that the State’s questioning of Coley might be based on race, 
defense counsel never asked the trial court to conduct a Neil inquiry, even after the 
prosecutor specifically noted that it was unclear whether “[defense counsel] is 
asking the court to order me to make some race neutral reason why I ask it.”  As 
this Court has stated, “A party objecting to the other side’s use of a peremptory 
challenge on racial grounds must:  (a) make a timely objection on that basis, (b) 
show that the venire person is a member of a distinct racial group, and (c) request 
that the court ask the striking party its reason for the strike.”  Melbourne v. State, 
679 So. 2d 759, 764 (Fla. 1996) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).  We 
therefore conclude that Huggins failed to meet this requirement for raising and 
preserving the issue now argued before this Court.  But even if properly preserved, 
we find this claim to have no merit. 
 
 
- 25 - 
In Huggins’ fourth point on appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in 
excluding “reverse Williams9 rule evidence” tending to prove that another person 
committed the murder.  Pretrial, Huggins filed a notice of intent to use similar fact 
evidence, alleging the following: 
Calvin Duane Rewis killed William Glenn Lewis, Sr., 
sometime between 6-9-97 and 6-26-97 in Duval County, Florida.  
Rewis killed Lewis and stole his late model Ford Explorer.  Lewis’ 
body was found hidden in a thick tree line off a highway.  His body 
was wrapped around the head and feet.  Rewis and Lewis were known 
to travel and work construction in and around central Florida.  Rewis 
was in Orlando on June 10, 1997. 
Rewis was convicted of first degree murder and robbery in the 
death of Mr. Lewis.  In addition, Mr. Rewis’ criminal history includes 
robbery, dealing in stolen property, and auto theft.  See attached 
documents. 
Three documents were attached to the notice.  The first was a printout of Rewis’s 
criminal history, which reflected numerous prior charges for burglary, grand 
larceny, and vehicle theft, together with the homicide, vehicle theft, and robbery 
charges relating to the Lewis murder.  The second attachment was the homicide 
report for the Lewis murder, which indicated that Lewis was murdered between 
June 11 and 26, 1997, in his Jacksonville home; that Rewis was living with the 
victim at the time; that the victim died from blunt trauma by a hammer; that the 
body, which was wrapped in plastic and a bedspread, was found ten feet into a tree 
line off a Georgia highway; that various witness statements indicated Rewis stole 
                                        
9.  Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959). 
 
 
- 26 - 
the victim’s vehicle and several property items, a few of which he later tried to 
sell; and that although Rewis stated in interviews that he knew of several locations 
where the police could find the bodies of victims murdered by a man named 
“Dray” and “dumped on top of the ground,” no such bodies were located after 
several attempts to do so.  The third attachment was the investigative tip sheet that 
identified Rewis as a potential suspect in the Larson murder.  It indicated that John 
Ricker, a Centex-Rooney employee, called the police on July 11, 1997, and 
provided the name and phone number of Jim Benson.  Ricker stated that Benson 
had information about a white male who was arrested for murder, was known to 
travel from Cocoa Beach to Miami and Tampa, was in Orlando on June 10, 1997, 
and had a Centex-Rooney money clip in his possession when arrested.  The tip 
sheet further indicated that a detective contacted Benson, who stated that his father, 
Calvin Rewis, “has been known for theft of automobiles” and was awaiting 
transport to Duval County on a murder charge. 
After receiving Huggins’ notice of intent, the State made an oral motion 
requesting that the court require Huggins to proffer the evidence he wished to 
present at trial.  The court agreed and ordered the defense to proffer the Rewis 
evidence.10  Thereafter, the State also filed a written motion opposing the evidence 
                                        
10.  Aside from what was contained in Huggins’ original notice and limited 
pretrial arguments heard on July 9, 2002, Huggins failed to file a written proffer or 
orally present further information regarding the Rewis evidence until after the 
 
 
- 27 - 
and arguing that the attachments to Huggins’ notice demonstrated numerous 
dissimilarities between the Lewis and Larson murders, as well as the fact that 
Rewis was in jail on the date Larson’s vehicle was burned.  In a pretrial hearing 
addressing the State’s motion, defense counsel argued that the Rewis evidence was 
admissible as similar fact evidence of “pattern of criminality, motive, [and] 
opportunity,” and the State responded that none of those issues were established by 
the proffered evidence.  Defense counsel also offered to disclose ex parte 
additional facts, which the trial court rejected.  The court granted the State’s 
motion and excluded Huggins’ proffered evidence, stating: 
When you compare the two murders, the victim in the Rewis case, the 
victim was a man.  In this particular case, the victim is a woman.  In 
that case, the defendant and the victim in the Rewis case had a prior 
relationship.  That is, they knew each other.  In this case, the Larson 
case, there is no evidence whatsoever that the defendant or the victim 
knew each other.  In the Rewis case, the victim was found clothed, 
and wrapped.  In the Larson case, the victim was found nude.  In the 
Rewis case, the victim died as a result of blunt force trauma.  In this 
particular case, the victim died as a result of strangulation, 
asphyxiation.  In the Rewis case, the victim was killed in his home.  In 
this particular case, the evidence is that Ms. Larson was kidnapped 
and killed outside of her home.  Either in a wooded area, or inside of 
her car.  Thus, this evidence is not unique, nor are there similar 
factors.  Nor is there any evidence pointing to the similarity of these 
two crimes . . . . 
Huggins now appeals that decision. 
                                                                                                                              
close of the evidentiary portion of trial.  On July 25, 2002, a day after the defense 
rested, Huggins filed a written proffer of the Rewis evidence.  The court permitted 
the filing, noting that the prior ruling would stand and the filing would be treated 
as a proffer of what Huggins would have presented had the ruling been otherwise. 
 
 
- 28 - 
A trial court’s exclusion of evidence of similar crimes committed by another 
person for exculpatory purposes, generally referred to as “reverse Williams rule 
evidence,” is subject to an abuse of discretion review.  See Kimbrough v. State, 
700 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 1997).  This Court first considered reverse Williams rule 
evidence in Rivera v. State, 561 So. 2d 536, 539 (Fla. 1990), where it stated:
 
[W]here evidence tends in any way, even indirectly, to establish a 
reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt, it is error to deny its admission.  
§ 90.404(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1985).  However, the admissibility of this 
evidence must be gauged by the same principle of relevancy as any 
other evidence offered by the defendant. 
Thus, in Rivera, this Court compared the proffered crime to the subject crime and 
ultimately determined that their dissimilarities were “sufficient to preclude its 
admissibility as relevant evidence.”  Id. at 540.  In so ruling, this Court 
acknowledged some similarities between the crimes but specifically noted the 
dissimilarity in age and body type of the victims, that one body was found clothed 
and the other nude, that one body was weighted down in a canal and the other was 
in a vacant field, that there was evidence of anal sex in one case and not the other, 
and that the victims were abducted in different counties.  Six months after Rivera 
was issued, this Court expanded on the principles guiding reverse Williams rule 
evidence in State v. Savino, 567 So. 2d 892, 894 (Fla. 1990), stating: 
The test for admissibility of similar-fact evidence is relevancy.  
Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847 
(1959).  When the purported relevancy of past crimes is to identify the 
perpetrator of the crime being tried, we have required a close 
 
 
- 29 - 
similarity of facts, a unique or “fingerprint” type of information, for 
the evidence to be relevant.  Drake v. State, 400 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. 
1981); State v. Maisto, 427 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Sias v. 
State, 416 So. 2d 1213 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 424 So. 2d 763 
(Fla. 1982).  If a defendant’s purpose is to shift suspicion from 
himself to another person, evidence of past criminal conduct of that 
other person should be of such nature that it would be admissible if 
that person were on trial for the present offense.  Evidence of bad 
character or propensity to commit a crime by another would not be 
admitted; such evidence should benefit a criminal defendant no more 
than it should benefit the state.  Relevance and weighing the probative 
value of the evidence against the possible prejudicial effect are the 
determinative factors governing the admissibility of similar-fact 
evidence of other crimes when offered by the state.  These same 
factors should apply when the defendant offers such evidence. 
This Court also rejected the argument that the standard of similarity should be less 
strict when similar-fact evidence is offered by the defendant.  Id. 
Later, in Crump v. State, 622 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1993), this Court affirmed a 
trial court’s exclusion of defense questions to a detective witness regarding 
whether he had been given information that another suspect had committed similar 
crimes.  Relying upon the principle stated in Savino that evidence of past criminal 
conduct of another person should be of such a nature that it would be admissible if 
that person were on trial for the present offense, this Court concluded that evidence 
concerning the detective’s interviews was inadmissible hearsay that would not 
have been admissible had the other suspect been on trial for the crime with which 
Crump was charged.  And, in Gore v. State, 784 So. 2d 418, 432 (Fla. 2001), this 
Court found that a trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding reverse 
 
 
- 30 - 
Williams rule evidence because the defendant “did not proffer the underlying facts 
of the [similar fact crime] to the trial court to enable the court to determine whether 
[it] was relevant and sufficiently similar to [the subject crime] to warrant 
admissibility.” 
In the present case, Huggins asserts a theory of relevancy based largely on 
facts that were never proffered to the trial court.  Even after being ordered by the 
court to do so, Huggins failed to file a written proffer or orally present further 
information to the court regarding the Rewis evidence until after the close of the 
evidentiary portion of trial.  In his briefs to this Court, Huggins asserts that Rewis 
was a violent felon with a penchant for stealing cars who was in Orlando on the 
day Larson disappeared, failed to show up for work after her disappearance, had a 
Centex-Rooney money clip in his possession when arrested in late June 1997, and 
admitted responsibility for several homicides after which he dumped the victims’ 
bodies on the ground unburied.  Although some of these facts regarding Rewis are 
supported by the attachments to Huggins’ notice of intent to present similar fact 
evidence, many of his specific points of relevancy were never argued before the 
trial court.  Thus, as in Gore, the trial court cannot be said to have abused its 
discretion where Huggins did not proffer the underlying facts of the Rewis crimes 
to it in order to enable it to determine whether the purported similar fact crime was 
relevant and sufficiently similar to warrant admissibility. 
 
 
- 31 - 
Additionally, many of the facts relied upon by Huggins would not have been 
admissible had Rewis been on trial for Larson’s murder.  First, Rewis’s criminal 
record, indicating his “penchant for stealing cars,” would not have been admissible 
without a showing of similarity between his prior vehicle thefts and the carjacking 
in this case.  Huggins failed to allege, let alone prove, such similarity.  Second, 
Huggins’ claim that Rewis had admitted responsibility for several homicides was 
not supported by the documents submitted to the court, which indicated that Rewis 
had stated that he knew of murders committed by another man and that those 
bodies were not found.  Third, the only source for the “facts” that Rewis was in 
Orlando on June 10, 1997, and that he had a Centex-Rooney money clip when he 
was arrested was the phone call from Ricker to the police that was recorded on the 
tip sheet.  However, the tip sheet itself would be inadmissible hearsay, similar to 
the information derived through the detective’s interviews in Crump.  Although 
Huggins could have called Ricker to testify, he failed to discover and inform the 
trial court of the source of Ricker’s information.  Given that the tip sheet listed 
Ricker as a Centex-Rooney employee rather than a police officer and that Ricker 
identified Benson as the person with information, it is reasonable to infer that his 
knowledge of Rewis was not direct but was based on hearsay. 
Finally, the trial court is correct in its conclusion that the Lewis and Larson 
murders were quite dissimilar.  Lewis was a 42-year-old white male who was 
 
 
- 32 - 
killed by blunt force from a hammer in his own home and whose body was 
disposed of off the side of a road, clothed and wrapped in plastic and a bedspread.  
Additionally, Rewis lived with Lewis and stated in various confessions that his 
murder was the result of events arising out of Rewis’s financial debt to another 
man for drugs.  Larson, on the other hand, was a young woman who was killed by 
strangulation after being kidnapped in a public place and whose naked body was 
disposed of in the woods.  Huggins presented no evidence to the trial court that 
Rewis knew Larson.  Further, many of the facts contained in the Lewis murder 
report are contradictory to a theory that Rewis murdered Larson.  Rewis’s 
employer told the police that Rewis stated on June 9, 1997, that he wanted to visit 
his son in Jessup, Georgia—a fact suggesting Rewis was not in Orlando on June 
10.  Others told the police that they saw Rewis driving Lewis’s vehicle around the 
same time Larson’s vehicle was missing—a fact suggesting Rewis was not in 
possession of the Larson vehicle.  Further, the report indicates that Rewis was 
arrested in Hillsborough County on June 24, 1997, two days prior to the date 
Larson’s vehicle was set on fire on the other side of the state.  Therefore, we 
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the Rewis 
evidence. 
In Huggins’ fifth point of appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in 
admitting allegedly prejudicial evidence.  Huggins first challenges the introduction 
 
 
- 33 - 
during the medical examiner’s testimony of photographic slides of the crime scene 
and the victim’s body, which he argues lacked relevance and were gruesome to the 
point that any possible relevance was outweighed by unfair prejudice.  This Court 
has stated that “[t]he test for admissibility of photographic evidence is relevancy 
rather than necessity,” Pope v. State, 679 So. 2d 710, 713 (Fla. 1996), and has 
upheld the admission of photographs where relevant to “explain a medical 
examiner’s testimony, to show the manner of death, the location of wounds and the 
identity of the victim.’”  Larkins v. State, 655 So. 2d 95, 98 (Fla. 1995).  While 
Huggins is correct that the photographs in this case depicted significant 
decomposition of the body, that decomposition was relevant to the medical 
examiner’s conclusion that the body had been exposed to the elements for two or 
three days, a fact indicating that Larson was murdered on the day of her 
disappearance.  Additionally, various photographs were utilized to show possible 
traumatic injury to the victim’s left hand, thighs, and genital region, as well as to 
demonstrate the basis for his conclusion that the victim died from strangulation.   
Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting these 
photographs as part of the medical examiner’s testimony regarding the manner and 
timing of death and the location of possible antemortem injury. 
Huggins next challenges the introduction of the medical examiner’s 
testimony regarding the effects of strangulation on a victim.  Pretrial, Huggins filed 
 
 
- 34 - 
a motion in limine to prohibit the medical examiner from testifying regarding the 
psychological effects of strangulation.  In response, the State argued that testimony 
regarding the physiological effects of fear fell within the medical examiner’s area 
of expertise.  The trial court denied the motion but instructed that the testimony be 
limited to language such as “fear” or “fright” and not “terror” or “horror.”  At trial, 
the medical examiner described how a conscious victim who is being strangled 
will experience a “frightening fear” causing him or her to struggle and that 
suffocation might occur after one or two minutes unless struggling results in only 
intermittent pressure.  The following testimony was also given: 
Q 
Now, how does death actually come in this process?  I 
mean, you said about the struggling, the oxygen.  What does it feel 
like, physically? 
A 
Well, it’s, of course, intense pain, initially, on the neck. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Object to the characterization, your 
honor.  Not necessary for the jury to determination of the fact at issue. 
THE COURT:  Overruled. 
. . . . 
A 
Well, it’s, of course, terrible pain on the neck area, when 
somebody is being—putting pressure on the neck, so there is a sense 
of impending death, fright, and different systems of the body, they 
start working.  For example, heart will start beating more.  It is 
adrenalin type of reaction, when adrenaline is pumped into your 
system.  Pulse rate.  Sweating starts, and the heart starts pumping fast. 
Q 
Is there any pain associated with not being able to 
breathe?  In other words, do the lungs hurt, anything like that that 
goes with that? 
A 
Well, there is not pain into the lungs.  But the pain 
primarily is only in the neck area.  And psychological pain is there 
always.  Suffering.  That, you know, that the death is coming there. 
 
 
- 35 - 
Huggins appeals the admission of this testimony.  However, this Court has long 
recognized that a “trial court has broad discretion in determining the range of 
subjects on which an expert witness may be allowed to testify, and, unless there is 
a clear showing of error, its decision will not be disturbed on appeal.”  Johnson v. 
State, 393 So. 2d 1069, 1072 (Fla. 1980).  Given that the medical examiner’s 
testimony was primarily directed toward the description of the physiological rather 
than psychological effects of strangulation and remained within the confines of the 
trial court’s limits as to language, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in permitting this testimony. 
Huggins next challenges the admission, over defense objection, of the 
victim’s purse and its contents, testimony revealing the victim was a wife and 
mother, and victim-impact evidence.  We find the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion with regard to this evidence.  The purse and its contents were relevant to 
establishing the victim’s ownership of those items, which were discovered at a 
different location than the body.  Although the introduction of many of the 
individual items within the purse was unnecessary to establishing ownership, the 
particular items that Huggins claims would engender sympathy for the victim were 
introduced as parts of composite exhibits without specific testimonial reference to 
them or publication during trial.  The testimony that indirectly revealed that the 
victim was a wife and mother was brief and directly relevant to showing what 
 
 
- 36 - 
activities the victim engaged in on the day of her murder and what items were 
within the victim’s stolen vehicle.  Finally, the victim-impact evidence presented 
during the penalty phase of the trial encompassed three statements—by the 
victim’s husband, mother, and best friend—regarding their relationship with the 
victim and the loss they suffered due to her murder.  This Court has previously 
approved the use of victim-impact evidence in penalty-phase proceedings, see 
Windom v. State, 656 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 1995), and the record in this case reveals 
that the evidence introduced by the State fell within the purpose of section 
921.141(7), Florida Statutes (2002), which allows the jury to consider “the victim’s 
uniqueness as an individual human being and the resultant loss to the community’s 
members by the victim’s death.” 
In Huggins’ sixth point of appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in 
denying his motion for judgment of acquittal.  The standards applicable to this 
issue are as follows: 
In reviewing a motion for judgment of acquittal, a de novo 
standard of review applies.  Generally, an appellate court will not 
reverse a conviction that is supported by competent, substantial 
evidence.  There is sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction if, after 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a 
rational trier of fact could find the existence of the elements of the 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  “A motion for judgment of 
acquittal should be granted in a circumstantial evidence case if the 
state fails to present evidence from which the jury can exclude every 
reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.”  Orme v. State, 677 So.2d 
258, 262 (Fla.1996). 
 
 
- 37 - 
“The question of whether the evidence fails to exclude all 
reasonable hypotheses of innocence is for the jury to determine, and 
where there is substantial, competent evidence to support the jury 
verdict, we will not reverse.”  Darling v. State, 808 So. 2d 145, 155 
(Fla.) (quoting State v. Law, 559 So. 2d 187, 188 (Fla. 1989)), cert. 
denied, 537 U.S. 848 (2002).  In meeting its burden, the State is not 
required to “rebut conclusively, every possible variation of events” 
which could be inferred from the evidence, but must introduce 
competent evidence which is inconsistent with the defendant’s theory 
of events.  Darling, 808 So.2d at 156 (quoting Law, 559 So.2d at 189). 
Johnston v. State, 863 So. 2d 271, 283 (Fla. 2003) (some citations omitted), cert. 
denied, 124 S. Ct. 1676 (2004).  Thus, we must determine if there is competent, 
substantial evidence that supports Huggins’ convictions and is inconsistent with his 
theory of events. 
We find the following competent, substantial evidence presented at trial 
supports the carjacking, kidnapping, petit theft, and murder convictions.  Larson 
left work at noon on June 10, 1997, with the intention of buying food at Publix and 
returning shortly.  She in fact bought food at Publix but did not return to work.  
Her body was found two days later, and it was determined that she had been 
strangled to death.  Larson had been driving a white Ford Explorer with a black 
bug-guard in the front, light blue pinstripes, a Passport radar detector, and air-
conditioning and radio controls in the backseat.  On the day of her disappearance, 
between 12:30 and 12:45 p.m., a white Ford Explorer was seen on the dirt road 
leading to the wooded area where Larson’s body was later found.  Between 12:45 
and 1 p.m., a white SUV was seen parked about 200 feet from where Larson’s 
 
 
- 38 - 
body was later found.  Just prior to 1 p.m., a white Ford Explorer was seen exiting 
the wooded area on a dirt road and driven by a white male.  Also, between 2:30 
and 3 p.m., a white Ford Explorer exiting the wooded area on the dirt road was 
again seen by a witness who identified Huggins as the driver.  Huggins was in the 
specific area of Orlando on the day of Larson’s murder but did not leave the area in 
the same car in which he arrived.  Huggins’ mother-in-law saw an unfamiliar white 
SUV at her home on the evening of June 10, 1997.  Huggins parked a white SUV 
at a friend’s house in Cocoa Beach on June 12 and 13.  That friend described the 
vehicle as having a “car bra” on the front, blue pinstripes, and a radar detector.  He 
later found a Passport radar detector on his property.   Neighbors of Huggins’ 
mother-in-law saw a white SUV parked at her house at around this same time 
period and later saw that it had been poorly spray-painted a dark color.  Another 
witness twice saw a white, partially spray-painted Ford Explorer in the Melbourne 
and Cocoa Beach areas and identified Huggins as the driver.  Finally, Huggins’ 
mother-in-law found the victim’s jewelry hidden in an electrical box within her 
shed, to which Huggins had access. 
We also conclude that evidence presented at trial was inconsistent with the 
defendant’s theory of events.  The primary issue in dispute at trial was identity.  
Defense counsel argued to the jury that the State’s case was circumstantial in 
nature and did not preclude the possibility that Kevin Smith was the killer or that 
 
 
- 39 - 
the victim voluntarily accompanied her killer from Publix.  However, testimony 
identifying Huggins as the driver of a white Ford Explorer which exited the 
wooded area where Larson’s body was found, placing an unfamiliar white SUV at 
Huggins’ mother-in-law’s house, and identifying Huggins as the driver of a 
partially spray-painted SUV in the area where Larson’s spray-painted vehicle was 
later burned contradicts the Smith-as-killer theory.  Furthermore, testimony 
indicating Larson expected to return to work shortly after going to Publix, together 
with the reasonable inference that Larson, a wife and mother, would not have 
voluntarily accompanied Huggins from Publix to a wooded area, contradicts the 
hypothesis that Huggins was not kidnapped prior to her murder. 
In Huggins’ seventh point of appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in 
denying his request for a jury instruction regarding circumstantial evidence.  
However, we have consistently found that since this Court deleted the instruction 
on circumstantial evidence from the standard jury instructions, it is within the trial 
court’s discretion to not give such an instruction.  See, e.g., Floyd v. State, 850 So. 
2d 383, 400 (Fla. 2002) (“We have previously stated that when proper instructions 
on reasonable doubt and burden of proof are given, an instruction on circumstantial 
evidence is ‘unnecessary.’”); Darling v. State, 808 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 2002); Monlyn 
v. State, 705 So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. 1997).  We likewise conclude that the trial court did 
 
 
- 40 - 
not abuse its discretion in refusing to give the requested instruction on 
circumstantial evidence in Huggins’ case. 
In Huggins’ eighth point of appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in 
denying his four written motions to disqualify Assistant State Attorney Jeff 
Ashton.  In the first motion, Huggins generally alleged that Ashton’s continued 
representation of the State upon retrial gave “rise to the appearance of 
impropriety.”  At the hearing on this motion, defense counsel noted Ashton’s prior 
failure to disclose evidence that resulted in the retrial, 11 the State’s appeal to this 
Court of the trial court’s order for retrial, and Huggins’ personal complaint to The 
Florida Bar against Ashton.  On the basis of this Court’s case law, the trial court 
found Huggins had demonstrated no “specific prejudice” and denied the motion.  
In the second motion, Huggins alleged that Ashton’s loss of a letter from a 
potential witness, which apparently constituted impeachment evidence pertaining 
to Angel Huggins, had caused actual prejudice to the defense.  At the hearing on 
this motion, the State conceded that the letter had been lost but noted that Huggins 
could depose the potential witness and that the State was attempting to retrieve a 
copy of the letter.  The trial court expressed concerns about the issue but denied the 
motion.  In the third motion, Huggins alleged that Ashton had failed to provide full 
and complete disclosure of tip sheets.  Throughout the pretrial period, defense 
                                        
11.  See supra note 2. 
 
 
- 41 - 
counsel repeatedly raised this issue in hearings, with the State arguing that full 
disclosure had already been provided and defense counsel arguing that pages were 
missing and some tip sheets suggested the existence of other information not yet 
provided.  In response to this discovery litigation, the trial court ordered the State 
to file with the court copies of all discovery provided.  Thus, having taken 
measures to resolve the discovery litigation, the trial court again denied the third 
motion.  A fourth motion was filed on the day of the Spencer hearing,12 and the 
court again denied the motion. 
In this appeal, Huggins’ primary argument is that upon re-trial, which 
resulted from Ashton’s failure to disclose Brady material during the first trial, 
Ashton had a personal stake in the successful prosecution of Huggins in order to 
validate his initial successful prosecution.  Huggins appears to assert that the 
prejudice resulting from this was the increased strength of the State’s case in his 
second trial.  The State, on the other hand, argues that Huggins failed to establish 
the required specific prejudice, as best evidenced by the absence of any appellate 
claims based upon the specific conduct complained of below. 
Regarding motions for the disqualification of a state attorney, this Court has 
stated: 
                                        
12.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
 
 
- 42 - 
[D]isqualification is proper only if specific prejudice can be 
demonstrated.  State v. Clausell, 474 So. 2d 1189, 1190 (Fla. 1985).  
Actual prejudice is “something more than the mere appearance of 
impropriety.”  Meggs v. McClure, 538 So. 2d 518, 519 (Fla. 1st DCA 
1989).  Disqualification of a state attorney is appropriate “only to 
prevent the accused from suffering prejudice that he otherwise would 
not bear.”  Id. at 519-20. 
Farina v. State, 680 So. 2d 392, 395-96 (Fla. 1996); see also Kearse v. State, 770 
So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 2000).  Therefore, this Court has previously determined similar 
issues on the basis of whether the defendant suffered actual prejudice from the 
complained-of conduct.  See Rogers v. State, 783 So. 2d 980, 992 (Fla. 2001) 
(acknowledging that prosecutor’s conduct of instructing investigators to search 
defendant’s jail cell without warrant and seize documents was clearly improper but 
holding defendant not specifically prejudiced because neither prosecution nor 
police involved in case examined seized documents, all documents were returned, 
and State did not use seized documents at trial); Kearse, 770 So. 2d at 1129 
(affirming denial of motion where prosecutor was judge-elect but “blanket 
assumption that such a person would have an advantage in court” could not be 
made); Farina, 680 So. 2d at 395-96 (finding no actual prejudice where prosecutor 
asked court clerk to assign case to another division where particular judge was only 
sitting judge, especially as that judge ultimately did not preside over case); Bogle 
v. State, 655 So. 2d 1103, 1106 (Fla. 1995) (rejecting claim where formal hearing 
established that no prejudicial information had been exchanged between 
 
 
- 43 - 
defendant’s former counsel who was hired by state attorney’s office and assistant 
state attorney handling defendant’s case). 13 
Huggins’ first basis of support for his motion was that Ashton’s failure to 
disclose the Brady material at the first trial justified his disqualification upon 
retrial.  However, he has failed to allege facts indicating that disqualification would 
have prevented “prejudice that [Huggins] otherwise would not bear.”  The failure 
to disclose the Brady material was remedied by the trial court’s order of a new 
trial, and Ashton’s disqualification would not have provided any further remedy.   
Huggins also argues that Ashton had a personal stake in the prosecution because 
retrial resulted from his own conduct.  However, to conclude that disqualification 
was necessary based on this general allegation would effectively require 
disqualification of the prosecutor every time a criminal case is retried, despite the 
fact that this Court has always required a showing of actual prejudice, which is 
“something more than the mere appearance of impropriety.” 
                                        
13.  On a case-by-case basis, specific or actual prejudice will not be required 
where the appearance of impropriety is strong.  For example, this Court has held 
that a pretrial motion to disqualify a prosecutor who previously defended the 
defendant in any criminal matter that involved or likely involved confidential 
communications with the same client should be granted.  See Reaves v. State, 574 
So. 2d 105, 107 (Fla. 1991).  As well, this Court has held that personal assistance 
to the prosecution by a defendant’s prior counsel created a sufficient appearance of 
impropriety to warrant a disqualification.  See Castro v. State, 597 So. 2d 259, 260-
61 (Fla. 1992).  However, the present case does not resemble either of these 
circumstances. 
 
 
- 44 - 
Huggins’ second basis of support for his motion was that the State’s case 
became stronger in the years between his first and second trials.  Again, Huggins 
fails to establish specific prejudice.  First, Huggins has consistently failed to allege 
within any degree of specificity how the State’s case was strengthened.  Second, 
assuming arguendo that the State’s case did strengthen, there is no indication that 
Ashton’s disqualification would have remedied that.  If Ashton had been 
disqualified, another prosecutor simply would have replaced him.  Third, the 
length of time between the first and second trials primarily resulted from the 
intervening appeal by the State of the trial court’s order granting retrial, which was 
permissible action, not prosecutorial misconduct. 
Huggins’ third and fourth bases of support for his motion were allegations 
that Ashton lost potential impeachment evidence pertaining to Angel Huggins and 
failed to fully comply with discovery requests.  The loss of the impeachment 
evidence was harmless because the evidence was relevant to the impeachment of 
Angel Huggins, who did not testify at Huggins’ second trial.  The alleged failure of 
compliance with discovery requests is insufficient to establish specific prejudice.  
First, Huggins fails to specifically identify the items that were allegedly missing 
from discovery production.  Second, in the absence of record evidence of a failure 
to comply with discovery requests, such as a finding by the trial court that the State 
 
 
- 45 - 
committed discovery violations, this Court cannot conclude that disqualification 
was the necessary remedy. 
Finally, Huggins argues that Ashton should have been disqualified because 
Huggins had filed a grievance against him with The Florida Bar.  However, the 
filing of a grievance in and of itself does not provide a basis for the removal of a 
prosecutor. 
In Huggins’ ninth point of appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in 
finding the aggravating circumstances that the murder was committed during the 
course of a kidnapping, was committed for pecuniary gain, and was especially 
heinous, atrocious, or cruel.  When the finding of an aggravating circumstance is 
challenged on appeal, the standard of review is whether competent, substantial 
evidence supports the trial court’s finding.  Willacy v. State, 696 So. 2d 693, 695 
(Fla. 1997). 
In finding that the murder was committed during the course of a kidnapping, 
the trial court noted the following: 
It was uncharacteristic for Carla Larson not to return to work or 
to return home at the end of a work day.  She had an excellent 
relationship with her husband and child.  There was absolutely no 
reason for Carla Larson not to return to work or home.  Additionally, 
there was absolutely no reason for her to go to the wooded area where 
her body was eventually found.  The only credible reason for her 
failure to return to work or home and to be in the wooded area where 
her body was subsequently located, was that she had been kidnapped 
by the defendant.  The record in this case clearly supports that Carla 
 
 
- 46 - 
Larson was taken by force or threat of force, against her will, and 
taken to the place where she was murdered and robbed. 
State v. Huggins, No. CR98-7190 at 5 (Fla. 9th Cir. Ct. order filed Sept. 19, 2002) 
(sentencing order).  We find no error in the reasoning of the trial court and affirm 
the trial court’s determination. 
In finding that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain, the trial court 
noted that the evidence showed that Huggins was in possession of the victim’s 
Ford Explorer on June 10 through 26, 1997, and that the victim’s missing jewelry 
was found in a shed at Huggins’ mother-in-law’s home, to which Huggins had 
access.  The trial court further noted: 
The evidence showed that the body was found in a wooded area 
some two miles away from where the defendant and his family were 
staying during their visit to the Orlando area.  If the taking of this 
vehicle was merely an afterthought, then it would seem logical that 
the defendant would have simply abandoned the vehicle after 
facilitating his escape from the scene of the murder and returning to 
his family where ready transportation was awaiting him.  But the 
defendant did not abandon the vehicle.  Instead, he kept the Explorer 
and used it until it was no longer feasible to openly drive it.  The 
defendant’s actions clearly indicate that he intended to benefit by 
taking the Explorer and its subsequent use by him. 
Further, the evidence established that when she left home that 
morning, Carla Larson was wearing a diamond ring, diamond earrings 
and a necklace. . . .  These items were not simply discarded some 
distance from the body like the victim’s purse. 
Why were these items not discarded like the purse?  The answer 
is simple—they were taken because of their financial worth. 
Sentencing order at 6-7.  Although Huggins asserts that the evidence fails to 
establish that he was motivated by a desire to financially benefit from the victim’s 
 
 
- 47 - 
vehicle and jewelry, the evidence established that Huggins did not own a car 
during the relevant time period and utilized the victim’s vehicle for over two weeks 
after her murder.  Furthermore, Huggins and Larson were strangers to each other, 
and nothing in the evidence suggests Huggins was motivated to commit the crime 
for another reason.  Finally, the jury unanimously convicted Huggins of carjacking 
and petit theft.  Thus, we conclude that competent, substantial evidence supports 
the trial court’s finding that Larson’s murder “was motivated, at least in part, by a 
desire to obtain money, property, or other financial gain.”  Finney v. State, 660 So. 
2d 674, 680 (Fla. 1995). 
In finding the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, the trial 
court noted that Larson was kidnapped and driven more than two miles to a dirt 
road that led to a wooded area, that she was strangled to death, and that there was 
no evidence she was unconscious when strangled.  “[I]t is permissible to infer that 
strangulation, when perpetrated upon a conscious victim, involves foreknowledge 
of death, extreme anxiety and fear, and that this method of killing is one to which 
the factor of heinousness is applicable.”  Tompkins v. State, 502 So. 2d 415, 421 
(Fla. 1986).  This Court has consistently upheld this aggravating factor where a 
conscious victim was strangled.  See, e.g., Conde v. State, 860 So. 2d 930 (Fla. 
2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1885 (2004); Robertson v. State, 699 So. 2d 1343, 
1347 (Fla. 1997).  In this case, the medical examiner testified that Larson died of 
 
 
- 48 - 
asphyxiation due to severe neck trauma and strangulation.  Additionally, the 
autopsy indicated possible antemortem trauma to her left hand, thighs, and genital 
region, but did not reveal any head injury.  Thus, the medical examiner’s testimony 
supports the reasonable inference that Larson was conscious at the time she was 
strangled, and we find competent, substantial evidence supports the finding of the 
heinous, atrocious, or cruel factor. 
In Huggins’ tenth point on appeal, he asserts that the death penalty is not 
warranted in this case.  In accordance with the jury’s findings, the trial court found 
the following aggravating factors:  (1) the crime was committed while Huggins had 
been previously convicted of a felony and was on felony probation; (2) Huggins 
has been previously convicted of another capital offense or of a felony involving 
the use or threat of violence to some person; (3) the crime was committed while 
Huggins was engaged in the commission of the crime of kidnapping; (4) Huggins 
committed the crime for financial gain; and (5) the crime was especially heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel.  The trial court found the following nonstatutory mitigating 
factors:  (1) Huggins abused alcohol, had broken marriages, and was a good 
Samaritan—given some weight; (2) he had a positive attitude toward people of 
other races—given some weight; (3) Huggins could contribute spiritual support to 
the prison community if given a sentence of life without parole—given very little 
weight; (4) Huggins suffered continuous violence at the hands of his father—given 
 
 
- 49 - 
very little weight; (5) Huggins witnessed violence by his father toward his 
mother—given little weight; (6) Huggins endured difficult family separation as a 
child—given slight weight; (7) he is a caring and loving parent—given some 
weight; (8) Huggins actively participated in religious functions—some weight; (9) 
he contributed his inheritance and more to the church—given some weight; (10) 
Huggins was active in the “Love a Child” ministry in Florida—given some weight; 
(11) Huggins served the sick and the poor, and ministered to the children in 
Haiti—given some weight; (12) he served the homeless through his contribution 
and labor—given some weight; and (13) he demonstrated good conduct during trial 
proceedings—given very little weight. 
In deciding whether death is a proportionate penalty, this Court considers the 
totality of the circumstances of the case and compares it to other capital cases.  See 
Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411, 417 (Fla. 1998).  However, this proportionality 
review “is not a comparison between the number of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances.”  Porter v. State, 564 So. 2d 1060, 1064 (Fla. 1990).  Here, the 
majority of Huggins’ arguments asserting that the death sentence is not 
proportionate in his case are of the type of “lingering doubt” arguments not 
properly considered in a proportionality review.14  His other arguments highlight 
                                        
14.  Huggins argues that the sequence of events leading to the victim’s death 
are unknown, that the evidence does not preclude the possibility that he acted 
 
 
- 50 - 
the facts of his life on which the trial court based the numerous mitigating factors.  
Additionally, he argues that two of the aggravating factors are relatively weak 
because many of his prior convictions arose from a single incident, and his 
probation resulted from charges of possession of an unauthorized driver’s license 
and issuing a worthless check.  In response, the State notes that Huggins has nine 
prior violent felony convictions and had been on felony probation less than a year 
when Larson was murdered. 
Given Huggins’ numerous prior violent felony convictions, the nature of this 
crime, which supports the heinous, atrocious, or cruel factor, and the existence of 
three other aggravating factors, this case presents substantial aggravation.  
Additionally, although the trial court found numerous mitigating factors, none 
were statutory or given great weight and most primarily involved the single 
circumstance that Huggins had participated in a great deal of missionary and 
church work.  On the basis of this record, we conclude that Huggins’ sentence of 
death is proportionate to other cases where the death sentence has been applied.  
See, e.g., Stewart v. State, 872 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 2003) (finding proportionality 
where victim forced to drive to woods where defendant robbed and killed him, and 
court found three aggravating factors, including prior violent felony conviction and 
that capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain, and mitigation in form of 
                                                                                                                              
without premeditation, and that this Court cannot rule out the hypothesis that 
Larson met Huggins at the Publix and willingly accompanied him from there. 
 
 
- 51 - 
two statutory mitigating factors and twenty-three nonstatutory mitigating factors); 
Conde v. State, 860 So. 2d 930 (Fla. 2003) (finding proportionality where female 
victim was stranger to defendant and strangled to death, and court found three 
aggravating factors, including heinous, atrocious, or cruel and prior violent felony 
conviction, one statutory mitigating factor, and five nonstatutory mitigating 
factors, including positive influence on family despite adversity and status as 
model inmate). 
In Huggins’ final point of appeal, he argues that Florida’s death penalty 
sentencing scheme is unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), 
and that the trial court’s use of special verdict forms in the penalty phase was 
inconsistent with the requirements of section 921.141, Florida Statutes (2002), and 
violated his constitutional rights.  With regard to the former, we deny this claim, as 
we have denied similar claims.  See, e.g., Globe v. State, 877 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 
2004); Smith v. State, 866 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 2004); Johnston v. State, 863 So. 2d 271 
(Fla. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1676 (2004); Jones v. State, 845 So.2d 55 
(Fla.2003); Chavez v. State, 832 So.2d 730, 767 (Fla. 2002).  In particular, we note 
that one of the aggravating factors found in this case is based on Huggins’ prior 
violent felony convictions. 
Pretrial, Huggins filed various motions based on Ring, one of which 
requested specific jury findings of penalty-phase facts.  The trial court denied that 
 
 
- 52 - 
motion, but later utilized, in addition to the normal verdict form for the penalty 
phase, special verdict forms on which the jury was to indicate the aggravating and 
mitigating factors found and the number of jurors finding those factors.  Prior to 
penalty-phase jury instructions, Huggins objected to the use of the special verdict 
forms and argued that the forms had the effect of changing the statutory scheme of 
Florida’s death penalty sentencing.  In this appeal, Huggins claims that the use of 
the forms violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution and under article 1, sections 9 and 17 of the Florida 
Constitution.  However, Huggins fails to allege any prejudice from the use of the 
forms.  Therefore, without determining whether the use of these special verdict 
forms constituted error, we find that any error was harmless under State v. 
DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the convictions and sentence of 
death. 
It is so ordered. 
WELLS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur. 
LEWIS, J., concurs in result only. 
PARIENTE, C.J., dissents with an opinion, in which ANSTEAD, J., concurs. 
 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
 
- 53 - 
PARIENTE, C.J., dissenting. 
I would reverse the convictions in this case because of the erroneous 
admission of evidence that Huggins shaved his pubic region, ostensibly to show 
consciousness of guilt.  The trial court compounded the error when it allowed the 
introduction of Huggins' nine prior felony convictions to impeach his hearsay 
explanation of why he shaved his pubic region.  Although I would reverse the 
convictions and death sentence because of these trial errors, I nevertheless 
commend the trial court for presenting the jury with special interrogatories on the 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances during the penalty phase. 
Evidence of Shaved Pubic Region 
One week after the trial court ordered Huggins to submit samples of his head 
hair and pubic hair for comparison with other evidence, a crime scene investigator 
sent to collect the samples discovered that Huggins' pubic region was recently 
shaved, precluding collection of a pubic hair sample at that time.  The investigator 
was able to obtain a sample of Huggins' scalp hair.  The State sought to admit both 
the investigator's testimony and a photograph of the shaved area to support its 
assertion that Huggins was attempting to avoid the court-ordered testing because it 
would yield incriminating evidence.  Huggins argued that the evidence was 
irrelevant and misleading because there was an innocent explanation why he 
 
 
- 54 - 
shaved his pubic region:  to combat a crab lice infestation at the detention facility 
where he was being held. 
The appropriate inquiry for admission of an attempt to conceal evidence of a 
crime is whether a clear nexus exists between the act of concealment and the 
offense for which the defendant is on trial.  See Menna v. State, 846 So. 2d 502, 
506 (Fla. 2003).  If the act is "so ambiguous as to remove from its invocation any 
probative value . . . as to the issue of the defendant's alleged consciousness of 
guilt," the evidence is inadmissible.  Id. at 506-07.  This test applies to the court-
ordered submission of pubic hair samples in this case.  Ambiguity of purpose can 
arise in a variety of circumstances, and is not limited to refusal to participate in a 
voluntary procedure, as in Menna.  Regardless of whether the procedure allegedly 
evaded or hampered by the defendant is voluntary or compulsory, the defendant's 
act must clearly appear to be an attempt to avoid the gathering of inculpatory 
evidence before the jury may be exposed to what would otherwise be an irrelevant 
and prejudicial matter. 
In Looney v. State, 803 So. 2d 656, 667 (Fla. 2001), this Court stated that 
the determination of whether there is a sufficient nexus to demonstrate materiality 
"should be made with a sensitivity to the facts of the particular case."  Several 
factors present in this case deprive this evidence of the proper nexus between the 
act of Huggins' shaving his pubic region and consciousness of guilt.  First, as 
 
 
- 55 - 
advanced by Huggins, the heat and humidity in the unairconditioned facility where 
Huggins was housed created favorable conditions for lice infestations that led some 
inmates to shave their pubic hair to combat the problem.15  Second, Huggins 
shaved only his pubic region, not his head, from which samples were also ordered 
to be taken.  Third, shaving is at best a temporary measure.  In contrast to 
destruction of an object to prevent the discovery of inculpatory evidence, the 
inevitable regrowth of hair would have enabled the State to obtain a pubic hair 
sample a relatively short time later.  Under these circumstances, Huggins' act 
evinced a desire to avoid a lice infestation as much as, or more than, it showed a 
desire to avoid submitting pubic hair for analysis.  I conclude that pursuant to 
Menna and Looney, this evidence was erroneously admitted as evidence of 
consciousness of guilt. 
Evidence of Nine Prior Felony Convictions 
The error in exposing the jury to this equivocal evidence was further 
compounded by allowing the introduction into evidence of Huggins' nine prior 
felony convictions after Huggins' counsel attempted to elicit testimony from a 
correctional officer that Huggins shaved his pubic region to avoid being infested 
with lice.  First, it is not even clear from the testimony that the correctional 
                                        
15.  Crab lice, also known as pubic lice, do not infest the scalp.  Centers for 
Disease Control, Fact Sheet––Pubic Lice Infestation, at 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dpd/parasites/lice/factsht_pubic_lice.htm (visited Nov. 
30, 2004). 
 
 
- 56 - 
officer's knowledge of Huggins' explanation for shaving came solely from what 
Huggins told him, which would be necessary for impeachment of Huggins as a 
hearsay declarant under section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (2004).  Second, 
assuming the explanation came solely from Huggins, this hearsay statement was 
ultimately elicited on cross-examination by the State and not (because of the State's 
hearsay objections) by Huggins, as required for impeachment of a hearsay 
declarant under the precedent relied upon by the majority.  See majority op. at 16-
17.  Third, the issue of why Huggins shaved his pubic region was a collateral 
matter at best.  Impeachment on a collateral matter is not proper.  See Caruso v. 
State, 645 So. 2d 389, 394 (Fla. 1994) (reiterating well-established rule that "if a 
witness is cross-examined concerning a collateral or irrelevant matter, the 
cross-examiner must 'take' the answer, is bound by it, and may not subsequently 
impeach the witness by introducing extrinsic evidence to contradict the witness on 
that point"). 
The wholly collateral character of the matter on which Huggins was 
impeached by the prior convictions distinguishes this case from the precedent cited 
by the majority for prior-record impeachment of a defendant's exculpatory hearsay 
statement.  See majority op. at 17.  In two of the decisions relied upon by the 
majority, the defense elicited hearsay statements indicating the defendant's 
innocence of the crime charged.  See Kelly v. State, 857 So. 2d 949, 950 (Fla. 4th 
 
 
- 57 - 
DCA 2003) (holding defendant's felony record admissible to impeach credibility of 
defendant's statements elicited by defense to show that in its entirety, interrogation 
in which statements were made was exculpatory on crime charged); Werley v. 
State, 814 So. 2d 1159, 1160 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (holding defendant's felony 
record admissible to impeach credibility of defendant's statements to his wife 
introduced in attempt to show that he injured her accidentally).  The third case 
cited by the majority for admission of a prior record to impeach a defendant's 
exculpatory hearsay statement, Llanos v. State, 770 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 4th DCA 
2000), concerned the defendant's probationary status rather than his prior record.  
In Llanos, the State was permitted to introduce evidence that the defendant was on 
probation at the time of a domestic battery to show that he wanted the victim to 
remain silent about the crime so he could avoid having his probation revoked, 
rather than because he was remorseful and wanted to resume the relationship, as 
stated in hearsay introduced by the defense.  See id. at 726.  In each of these cases, 
the hearsay directly concerned the alleged criminal conduct, and thus impeachment 
was not on a collateral matter.  Here, however, the prior-record impeachment on a 
collateral matter took the jury far from the question of the defendant's guilt of the 
charged murder. 
Even when the impeachment does not go to a collateral matter, the 
impeachment evidence may be excluded under section 90.403, Florida Statutes 
 
 
- 58 - 
(2004), which provides that evidence is inadmissible if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, 
misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.  See id.  
Indeed, the potential for unfair prejudice and confusion of issues would appear to 
be greater when the impeachment is accomplished solely through a credibility 
attack, as with prior convictions, rather than through contradictory evidence or 
inconsistent statements by the witness on a specific matter.  Cf. Riechmann v. 
State, 581 So. 2d 133, 140 (Fla. 1991) (observing that "the nature and remoteness 
of prior convictions" may justify exclusion under section 90.403). 
In this case, the prior record created the danger, posed by all collateral-crime 
evidence, "that [the] jury will take the bad character or propensity to crime thus 
demonstrated as evidence of guilt of the crime charged."  Robertson v. State, 829 
So. 2d 901, 913-14 (Fla. 2002).  In this case it is likely that the jury would focus on 
Huggins' nine prior convictions as evidence of guilt rather than as a reason to 
disbelieve the innocent explanation for Huggins' act of shaving his pubic region. 
Weighed against the potential prejudice, the probative value of Huggins' 
prior felony record was slight.  The prior record was relevant only on the narrow 
issue of the credibility of Huggins' statement as to why he shaved his pubic region.  
The State did not attempt to introduce the prior record under section 90.404, 
Florida Statutes (2004), which governs the admission of evidence of other crimes, 
 
 
- 59 - 
demonstrating its irrelevance for any purpose but impeachment.  Accordingly, the 
prior record should have been excluded under section 90.403. 
Even assuming that the testimony concerning Huggins' reason for shaving 
his pubic region opened the door for impeachment and that the prior record was 
not inadmissible under section 90.403, I nonetheless question whether the 
admission of Huggins' prior record is authorized by section 90.806.  Section 
90.806(1) provides that the credibility of a hearsay declarant "may be attacked . . . 
by any evidence that would be admissible for those purposes if the declarant had 
testified as a witness."  A nontestifying hearsay declarant has not been given the 
opportunity to admit or deny the prior conviction, a prerequisite to introduction of 
the record of the conviction against a witness under section 90.610, Florida 
Statutes (2004).  See, e.g., Gavins v. State, 587 So. 2d 487, 489-90 (Fla. 1st DCA 
1991).  See generally McArthur v. Cook, 99 So. 2d 565, 567  (Fla. 1957) ("[T]he 
proper procedural approach is simply to ask the witness the straight-forward 
question as to whether he had ever been convicted of a crime."); § 90.610, Fla. 
Stat. Ann. (1999) (Law Revision Council Note – 1976) ("McArthur . . . sets forth 
the accepted procedure for using prior convictions to impeach.")  Further, the 
rationale for prior-record impeachment is that the willingness to violate the law 
bears upon the witness's willingness to disregard the oath to tell the truth.  See 
Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 610.1, at 519 (2003 ed.).  This rationale 
 
 
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does not apply when the "testimony" being impeached is a hearsay statement not 
made under oath. 
Section 90.610(1) further provides that a "party may attack the credibility of 
any witness, including an accused," with the witness's prior criminal record.  
(Emphasis supplied.)  However, section 90.806(1), which governs impeachment of 
hearsay declarants rather than witnesses, authorizes admission of "[e]vidence of a 
statement or conduct by the declarant at any time inconsistent with the declarant's 
hearsay statement."  A prior criminal record that is unrelated to the hearsay 
statement is not "inconsistent" with the statement. 
Harmless Error Analysis 
The focus on Huggins' shaved pubic region and nine prior convictions 
cannot be considered harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.  Although 
substantial circumstantial evidence pointed to Huggins, absolutely no physical 
evidence directly linked him to the murder.  Further, the prosecutor emphasized the 
evidence of Huggins' shaved pubic region and his prior convictions in closing 
argument: 
And lastly of all, you have the pubic hair issue . . . . The 
defendant was in court with his attorney and the court ordered him to 
submit to pubic hair samples . . . .  And what happens when the law 
enforcement officer goes there to get the samples?  He has shaved 
every bit of pubic hair off of his body, which their own expert 
acknowledges makes analysis impossible.  Makes it absolutely 
impossible.  Basically, what we have shown is the defendant made 
any hair analysis by the state absolutely impossible. 
 
 
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Now, how has the defense responded to that?  They have 
responded . . . that he shaved his pubic hair off because of an 
infestation of lice.  You have to decide the credibility of the defendant 
as he made that statement.  You got to decide whether that statement 
is believable or not.  And one of the things the court will instruct you, 
you may consider, among a lot of others, is the defendant's felony 
convictions.  You have to decide whether a statement made by a 
nine-time convicted felon is worthy of your belief. . . .  It's not.  That . 
. . is an excuse.  That, in fact, the reason that he shaved off his pubic 
hair was for exactly the reason that I discussed . . . designed to make it 
impossible to find evidence to convict him, and that's exactly what 
John Huggins did when he shaved off his pubic hair. 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
Because of the circumstantial nature of the evidence in this case and the 
prosecutor's emphasis on both the shaved pubic region as consciousness of guilt 
and the nine prior convictions, the errors in admitting this evidence were not 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Therefore, I would grant Huggins a new 
trial. 
Penalty-Phase Instructions and Interrogatories 
Independent of my dissent from the affirmance of the convictions, I take this 
opportunity to commend the trial court for its actions during the penalty phase in 
submitting special interrogatories regarding the aggravating factors and instructing 
the jurors accordingly.  The trial court instructed the jury as follows: 
During your determination of the sentence, you will be required 
to answer several questions concerning statutory aggravating 
circumstances.  These questions will be listed on the verdict form, 
which I will give you.  If you find that the statutory aggravating 
circumstances exist, mark . . . which particular aggravating 
 
 
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circumstances have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  And for 
each aggravating circumstance, . . . indicate the number of the jurors' 
findings in the particular circumstance. 
. . . During your determination of the sentence, you will be 
required to answer several questions concerning mitigating 
circumstances.  Those questions will be listed on a verdict form, 
which I will give you.  If you find the mitigating circumstances do 
exist, mark . . . which particular mitigating circumstances have been 
established, and for each mitigating circumstance, indicate the number 
of the jurors finding that particular circumstance. 
The special verdict interrogatories read as follows:
 
       members of the Jury find beyond a reasonable doubt that [the 
specific aggravating circumstance applies]; 
       members of the Jury do not find beyond a reasonable doubt 
that [the specific aggravating circumstance applies]. 
. . . 
       members of the Jury find that [specific circumstance] is a 
mitigating factor. 
       members of the Jury do not find that [specific circumstance] is a 
mitigating factor. 
The jurors found each aggravator by a unanimous vote, satisfying not only the 
Sixth Amendment requirements of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), but also 
the right to a unanimous verdict on aggravators qualifying a first-degree murderer 
for the death penalty that I believe is required by article I, section 22 of the Florida 
Constitution.   See Butler v. State, 842 So. 2d 817, 838-29 (Fla. 2003) (Pariente, J., 
dissenting). 
As I have recently noted, various members of this Court have stated that 
specific interrogatories on the aggravating factors submitted to a jury are advisable 
following Ring.  See Globe v. State, 877 So. 2d 663, 679-80 (Fla. 2004) (Pariente, 
 
 
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J., specially concurring).  The findings on the aggravators and the mitigators are 
not prohibited by section 921.141, Florida Statutes (2003).  See Bottoson v. Moore, 
833 So. 2d  So. 2d 693, 723 (Fla. 2002) (Pariente, J., concurring in result only). 
In general, a jury finding on each aggravator eliminates the uncertainties of 
appellate review inherent in the "bare advisory recommendation" now required by 
the standard jury instructions.  See Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 708 (Anstead, C.J., 
concurring in result only) (stating that it is impossible to tell from jury's death 
recommendation "which, if any, aggravating circumstances a jury or any individual 
juror may have determined existed").  As I stated in my concurring opinion in 
Bottoson: 
By requiring a special verdict on aggravating circumstances, 
this Court will not only assist trial judges in administering section 
921.141, but also enhance the quality of our own constitutionally 
mandated review of death sentences in a manner that anticipates the 
likely effect of Ring and its progeny.  First, the special verdi
ct would 
serve to facilitate our determination of harmless error during appellate 
review.  Second, the additional procedure would assist in the jury 
override situation because this Court would know whether the jury's 
life recommendation was based on a finding of no aggravators or on a 
determination that the mitigators outweighed the aggravators. Finally, 
a special verdict form would help to ensure that this Court does not 
run afoul of the Eighth Amendment by affirming a death sentence 
based on an invalid aggravator--i.e. in this context, an aggravator not 
properly found by the jury. 
833 So. 2d at 724 (footnote omitted). 
The trial court in this case is to be lauded for taking this step in a penalty 
phase conducted shortly after the decision in Ring.  The instructions and verdict 
 
 
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form demonstrate how simple it is to comply with the spirit of Ring without 
deviating from our statutory scheme.  I encourage other trial judges to similarly 
obtain specific jury findings on the proposed aggravators at the conclusion of the 
penalty phase of each capital trial. 
ANSTEAD, J., concurs. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Orange County,  
Belvin Perry, Jr., Chief Judge - Case No. 98CF-7190 
 
James B. Gibson, Public Defender and Christopher S. Quarles, Assistant Public 
Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Kenneth S. 
Nunnelley, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee