Title: Santa Rita Mining Co. v. Department of Prop. Val.
Citation: 111 Ariz. 368, 530 P.2d 360
Docket Number: 11744
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: January 10, 1975

111 Ariz. 368 (1975) 530 P.2d 360 SANTA RITA MINING COMPANY, a corporation, the Flintkote Company, a corporation, Arizona Quarry &amp; Stone Company, a corporation, and Paul Lime Plant, Inc., a corporation, Petitioners, v. The DEPARTMENT OF PROPERTY VALUATION of the State of Arizona, and the Court of Appeals of the State of Arizona, Division II, Respondents. No. 11744. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. January 10, 1975. Rehearing Denied February 11, 1975. Williams, Ryan &amp; Herbolich by Michael J. Herbolich, Douglas, for petitioners. N. Warner Lee, Former Atty. Gen., Bruce E. Babbitt, Atty. Gen. by Mary Z. Chandler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for respondents. CAMERON, Chief Justice. This is a petition for special action in which we are asked to order the dismissal of an appeal presently pending in the Court of Appeals, Division Two. We took jurisdiction because of the importance of the question and also because there was no adequate remedy by way of appeal. We consider only one question: May the Attorney General of the State of Arizona appeal a decision of the Superior Court against the wishes of the state agency allegedly appealing? The facts necessary for a determination of this case are as follows. The petitioners are limestone mining companies which were classified prior to 1972 by the Department of Property Valuation as "producing mines," taxable at a rate of 60% of cash value. Upon petition in 1972 the Board of Property Tax Appeals reclassified these lime industries as "commercial ventures" taxable at 25% of cash value. Arlo Woolery, the Director of the Department of Property Valuation, directed the Attorney General to appeal the 1972 decision to the Superior Court pursuant to A.R.S. § 42-123(B)(6). The Superior Court found in favor of the petitioners. Mr. Woolery decided not to appeal this 1974 judgment and orally communicated this decision to the office of the Attorney General. The affidavit of James D. Winter, Assistant Attorney General of the State of Arizona in the tax section, states: The Pima County Manager, at the request of the Pima County Board of Supervisors, also asked the Attorney General's Office to appeal the case even though Pima County was not a party to the action in the Superior Court. The Attorney General's Office filed timely notice of appeal. Petitioner's motion to dismiss in the Court of Appeals was denied, and a petition for special action was filed in this court. Our Constitution states: In discussing the powers of the Attorney General this court has stated: Our statutes read: A.R.S. § 41-193 reads in part as follows: In his capacity as legal representative of state agencies, this court has upheld the right of the Attorney General to appeal by way of a writ of certiorari from a decision of the Superior Court involving a state department when the department head was silent as to a desire to appeal. The majority in State v. Thomas, 80 Ariz. 327, 297 P.2d 624 (1956) stated: The majority went on to hold that the Attorney General could: However, Justice Struckmeyer, joined by Justice Windes, stated: And: Later in a case wherein the Attorney General brought suit in the Superior Court against the State Land Department to prevent the department and its commissioner from selling certain parcels of land we said: *371 In the instant case, the Director of Property Valuation is allowed to litigate on behalf of the State of Arizona. A.R.S. § 42-123(B)(6) provides as part of the powers and duties of the Director of Property Valuation: The director then may appeal such decision to the Superior Court. He is not required to appeal to the Superior Court but may when, in his opinion, the decision of the board is erroneous. Having the discretion to appeal to the Superior Court, we do not think it unreasonable to hold that he has that same discretion if he is dissatisfied with an opinion of the Superior Court. It would be inconsistent to hold that the Director of Property Valuation has this discretion and then to hold that in exercising this discretion not to appeal that the Attorney General can then appeal against the director's wishes. It is the director's discretion which may be exercised and not the Attorney General's. The Attorney General is the attorney for the agency, no more. In the instant case the Attorney General did not have the power to appeal against the wishes of his client. The Attorney General contends, however, that this dispute is really one between two political subdivisions of the State, that is between Pima County and the Department of Property Valuation. By characterizing the facts this way and by reading them with A.R.S. § 41-193 [A](2), which empowers the Attorney General to act on behalf of any officer of the State, the Attorney General attempts to legitimize his appeal of the limestone quarries' classification as an action on behalf of Pima County or its manager. We do not agree. In order for a person to be entitled to appeal as a matter of right that individual must be a party to the action in the court from which the appeal is taken. Rule 73(a), Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S.; Christian v. Cotten, 1 Ariz. App. 421, 403 P.2d 825 (1965). Pima County was not a party and may not "authorize" the Attorney General to appeal for one of the parties to the lawsuit. The issuance of the mandate in this case will constitute an order dismissing the appeal in the Court of Appeals, Division II. STRUCKMEYER, V.C.J., and LOCKWOOD, HAYS and HOLOHAN, JJ., concur.