Title: Elaine Marie Kohn v. Darlington Community Schools
Citation: 2005 WI 99
Docket Number: 2003AP001067
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 1, 2005

2005 WI 99 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP1067 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Elaine Marie Kohn, Ronnie A. Kohn and  
Lori K. Kohn,  
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
Physicians Plus Insurance Corporation,  
          Plaintiff, 
     v. 
Darlington Community Schools, EMC  
Insurance Company, Standard Steel  
Industries, Inc., and Medalist  
Industries, Inc.,  
          Defendants, 
Illinois Tool Works, Inc.,  
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  276 Wis. 2d 309, 686 N.W.2d 455 
(Ct. App. 2004-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 1, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 29, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Lafayette   
 
JUDGE: 
Daniel L. LaRocque   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BUTLER, JR., J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins the dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
by William H. Levit, Jr., Michael B. Apfeld, Josh Johanningmeier 
and LaFollette, Godfrey & Kahn, Madison, and oral argument by 
Michael B. Apfeld. 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants there was a brief by David E. 
Lasker, and Lasker Law Offices, L.L.C., Madison, and oral 
argument by David E. Lasker. 
 
 
 
2
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Eric Englund, Madison, 
on behalf of the Wisconsin Insurance Alliance. 
 
 
 
2005 WI 99
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP1067  
(L.C. No. 
01 CV 48) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Elaine Marie Kohn, Ronnie A. Kohn and Lori K. 
Kohn, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
Physicians Plus Insurance Corporation, 
 
          Plaintiff, 
 
     v. 
 
Darlington Community Schools, EMC Insurance 
Company, Standard Steel Industries, Inc. and 
Medalist Industries, Inc., 
 
          Defendants, 
 
Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 1, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   The plaintiffs, Elaine, Ronnie, 
and Lori Kohn (the Kohns), seek review of an unpublished per 
curiam court of appeals decision, Kohn v. Darlington Community 
Schools, No. 2003AP1067, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. 
No. 
2003AP1067   
 
2 
 
July 1, 2004).  The court of appeals reversed an order of the 
Lafayette County Circuit Court, Daniel L. LaRocque, Judge, 
granting summary judgment to the defendant, Illinois Tool Works, 
Inc. (ITW).   
I. 
FACTS 
 
¶2 
The following facts are undisputed.  On September 29, 
2000, Elaine Kohn and her then four-year-old daughter, Lori 
Kohn, attended the homecoming football game at Darlington High 
School.  At approximately 2:30 p.m., Lori fell through the space 
at the foot of her seat in the home bleachers to the ground 15 
feet below, sustaining injuries.   
 
¶3 
The bleachers in question were purchased by Darlington 
Community Schools (Darlington) in 1969 from Standard Steel 
Industries, Inc. (Standard) at a cost of $16,167.1  Standard 
agreed to ship the materials for the bleachers and supervise 
their construction.  
¶4 
The home bleachers are 15 rows tall and over 100 feet 
long.  They contain nearly 1500 aluminum seats and a 50-inch-
wide walkway elevated 30 inches above the ground.  The bleachers 
are located on one side of the Darlington High School football 
                                                 
1 Standard subsequently merged into Medalist Industries, 
Inc., which, in turn, merged into ITW.   
No. 
2003AP1067   
 
3 
 
stadium and track field.2  A press box and wheelchair accessible 
ramp were later added to the bleachers.   
¶5 
Darlington inspected the bleachers each year after 
construction 
and 
performed 
necessary 
repairs, 
including 
repainting, 
external 
improvements 
to 
the 
press 
box, 
and 
replacement of the walkway planks, footboards, and side rails.  
The bleachers were never moved or taken apart.  The parties do 
dispute whether the bleachers are anchored into the ground.3  
II. PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
 
¶6 
On August 15, 2001, the Kohns filed suit against 
Darlington and its insurer, contending that Darlington violated 
its duty of care to the plaintiffs, that the bleachers were 
negligently designed, constructed, and/or maintained, and that 
the bleachers were inherently unsafe and posed a hazardous 
condition to frequenters of the premises.  On April 15, 2002, 
the Kohns filed an amended complaint against ITW and its 
predecessors in interest.  The Kohns alleged that the bleachers 
were in a dangerously defective condition when they left the 
control of Standard and that the product caused harm to the 
                                                 
2 The contract with Standard also involved the installation 
of visitor bleachers on the opposite side of the stadium and 
track.  These bleachers are 10 rows tall and 90 feet in length.  
The visitor bleachers also include a 50-inch wide walkway 
elevated 30 inches above the ground.   
3 The 
summary 
judgment 
materials 
contain 
numerous 
photographs of the bleachers and stadium at Darlington High 
School from different angles.   
No. 
2003AP1067   
 
4 
 
Kohns.  The Kohns further alleged that as a result, Standard and 
its successors were subject to strict liability.   
 
¶7 
On August 2, 2002, ITW filed a motion for summary 
judgment seeking to dismiss the Kohns' action against it as time 
barred under Wis. Stat. § 893.89 (2001-02).4  In their brief in 
opposition, the Kohns argued that § 893.89 did not apply because 
their claim against ITW was a product liability claim, not a 
claim for improvement to real property.  At the hearing on the 
motion, the Kohns also argued that the statute violated Article 
I, Section 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution, and the equal 
protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions.   
 
¶8 
The circuit court first ruled that the bleachers 
constituted an improvement to property as a matter of law, and 
that therefore the Kohns' claims against ITW were governed by 
the ten-year repose period set forth in § 893.89.  Next, the 
circuit court held that the statute was not unconstitutional on 
equal protection grounds because the classifications within 
§ 893.89 contained a rational basis.  Finally, the circuit court 
ruled that the statute did not violate Article I, Section 9 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution, relying on this court's decision in 
Aicher v. Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund, 2000 WI 98, 237 
Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849.  Accordingly, on February 15, 2003, 
the circuit court entered an order granting ITW's motion for 
                                                 
4 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2001-02 version unless otherwise indicated.   
No. 
2003AP1067   
 
5 
 
summary judgment and dismissing all claims against ITW with 
prejudice.    
 
¶9 
The court of appeals in an unpublished per curiam 
opinion reversed.  The court of appeals concluded that the 
bleachers did not constitute an improvement to real property 
because there was no evidence that the bleachers were anchored 
to the ground.  Kohn, unpublished slip op., ¶7.  The court of 
appeals explained:  "The degree of physical annexation shown by 
the pictures [in the record] convinces us that the bleachers are 
not an improvement to real property."  Id.  Thus, the court of 
appeals held that the Kohns' claims were governed by the three-
year statute of limitation in Wis. Stat. § 893.54, rather than 
the ten-year period of repose in § 893.89.   
III. ISSUES 
 
¶10 Three issues are presented to this court.  First, do 
the bleachers in question constitute an "improvement to real 
property" for purposes of § 893.89?  Second, if so, does 
§ 893.89 violate the "right to remedy" provision in Article I, 
Section 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution?  Third, if the 
bleachers are an improvement to real property, does § 893.89 
violate the equal protection clauses of the federal and state 
constitutions?  We hold that the bleachers in question do 
constitute an improvement to real property for purposes of 
§ 893.89.  Further, we hold that § 893.89 does not violate 
Article I, Section 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  Finally, we 
hold that § 893.89 does not violate the guarantee of equal 
protection in the federal and state constitutions.   
No. 
2003AP1067   
 
6 
 
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
¶11 This case comes to us on a motion for summary 
judgment.    
This court reviews a circuit court's decision granting 
summary judgment independently, but we apply the same 
methodology as the circuit court.  Smaxwell v. Bayard, 
2004 WI 101, ¶12, 274 Wis. 2d 278, 682 N.W.2d 923.  
Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2), summary judgment 
"shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law."  Therefore, "[s]ummary judgment should not be 
granted, 'unless the facts presented conclusively show 
that the plaintiff's action has no merit and cannot be 
maintained.'"  Smaxwell, 274 Wis. 2d 278, ¶12 (quoting 
Goelz v. City of Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 2d 491, 495, 103 
N.W.2d 551 (1960)).  In determining whether summary 
judgment was appropriately granted, "[w]e view the 
summary judgment materials in the light most favorable 
to the nonmoving party."  Id. 
Mayberry v. Volkswagen of Am., 2005 WI 13, ¶15, 278 Wis. 2d 39, 
692 N.W.2d 226.  Further, "[w]hen the facts are undisputed, the 
interpretation and application of a statute to these facts 
present a question of law appropriate for summary judgment."  
Progressive N. Ins. Co. 
v. 
Romanshek, 2005 
WI 67, ¶9, 
___Wis. 2d ___, 697 N.W.2d 417. 
¶12 Whether an item is an "improvement to real property" 
under § 893.89 is a question of law that we review de novo.  
Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wis. 2d 382, 386, 225 
N.W.2d 454 (1975) [hereinafter "Kallas"].  Likewise, whether a 
statute is unconstitutional is a question of law subject to de 
No. 
2003AP1067   
 
7 
 
novo review.  Funk v. Wollin Silo & Equip., Inc., 148 
Wis. 2d 59, 61, 435 N.W.2d 244 (1989).   
V. 
ANALYSIS 
A. 
Improvement to Real Property 
 
¶13 Section 893.89 is a statute of repose that sets forth 
the time period during which an action for injury resulting from 
improvements to real property must be brought.  It provides, in 
pertinent part: 
(1) In this section, "exposure period" means the 
10 years immediately following the date of substantial 
completion of the improvement to real property.  
(2) Except as provided in sub. (3), no cause of 
action may accrue and no action may be commenced, 
including an action for contribution or indemnity, 
against the owner or occupier of the property or 
against any person involved in the improvement to real 
property after the end of the exposure period, to 
recover damages for any injury to property, for any 
injury to the person, or for wrongful death, arising 
out of any deficiency or defect in the design, land 
surveying, planning, supervision or observation of 
construction 
of, 
the 
construction 
of, 
or 
the 
furnishing of materials for, the improvement to real 
property.  This subsection does not affect the rights 
of any person injured as the result of any defect in 
any material used in an improvement to real property 
to 
commence 
an 
action 
for 
damages 
against 
the 
manufacturer or producer of the material. 
Wis. Stat. § 893.89.   
¶14 No one disputes that the installation of the bleachers 
at Darlington High School was substantially completed in 1969.  
The question is whether the bleachers constitute an "improvement 
to real property" under the statute.  If they do, then the 
No. 
2003AP1067   
 
8 
 
"exposure period" ended in 1979, and the Kohns' claims against 
ITW failed to accrue.  Wis. Stat. § 893.89(1)-(2).  
¶15 The 
parties 
dispute 
whether 
the 
bleachers 
are 
permanently anchored to the ground and whether this makes a 
difference in the analysis.  The Kohns contend that the 
bleachers are not an improvement to real property because they 
are not anchored in the ground and are portable.  The Kohns, 
like the court of appeals, rely on the "degree of physical 
annexation" 
of 
the 
bleachers 
to 
support 
their 
argument.  
Plaintiffs' Br. at 12.  The Kohns further contend that very 
little effort or expenditure was required to place the bleachers 
on the ground.  They argue that the bleachers are simply 
"personal property resting upon the real estate" and are not 
"integral" to the usefulness of the property.  Plaintiffs' Br. 
at 18.  Finally, relying on this court's decision in Swanson 
Furniture Co. v. Advance Transformer Co., 105 Wis. 2d 321, 313 
N.W.2d 840 (1982)[hereinafter "Swanson"], the Kohns assert that 
the bleachers are not an improvement to real property because 
they were not specifically designed or manufactured for use at 
Darlington High School. 
¶16 ITW, in contrast, argues that the bleachers are an 
improvement to real property because the photographs in the 
record demonstrate that they are anchored into the ground.  ITW 
also contends that even if there is insufficient evidence to 
conclude that the bleachers are anchored into the ground, they 
still constitute an improvement to real property.  ITW argues 
that the bleachers are permanent as their permanency is a 
No. 
2003AP1067   
 
9 
 
function of their purpose.  ITW emphasizes that in the 30 years 
since they were erected, the bleachers have not been moved, and 
there is no evidence that they were ever intended to be moved.  
ITW also focuses on the size of the bleachers and the fact that 
they enhance the value and usefulness of the property.  ITW 
states 
that 
it 
is 
significant 
that 
the 
bleachers 
are 
specifically adapted to the purpose for which the property is 
devoted.  ITW also argues that the fact that the bleachers 
theoretically 
could 
be 
disassembled 
and 
moved 
is 
not 
dispositive, as most improvements to real estate, including the 
Eiffel Tower, can be disassembled and moved.  Finally, ITW 
argues that the court of appeals inappropriately relied on All 
City Communication Co. v. DOR, 2003 WI App 77, 263 Wis. 2d 394, 
661 N.W.2d 845, and Massie v. City of Duluth, 425 N.W.2d 858 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1988), to conclude that the bleachers here were 
not an improvement to property.   
 
¶17 In Kallas, this court set forth the following test, 
based on a dictionary definition, for determining whether a 
given item qualifies as an improvement to real property:  "'[A] 
permanent addition to or betterment of real property that 
enhances its capital value and that involves the expenditure of 
labor or money and is designed to make the property more useful 
or valuable as distinguished from ordinary repairs.'"  Kallas, 
66 Wis. 2d at 386 (quoted source omitted).  See also U.S. Fire 
Ins. Co. v. E.D. Wesley Co., 105 Wis. 2d 305, 309, 313 
N.W.2d 833 (1982)(accord).  Applying this definition, the Kallas 
court concluded that a "high-pressure water pipe designed for 
No. 
2003AP1067   
 
10 
 
fire protection, as a matter of law, was 'an improvement to real 
property' . . . ."  Kallas, 66 Wis. 2d at 386.   
 
¶18 While 
the 
Kohns 
spend 
much 
time 
comparing 
the 
bleachers here to the water pipe in Kallas, the appropriate 
question is whether the bleachers satisfy the test set forth in 
Kallas.  The test first requires a "permanent addition to or 
betterment of real property."  The parties disagree as to 
whether the word "permanent" modifies both "addition to" and 
"betterment of" such that a non-permanent betterment qualifies 
under the first part of the definition.  However, we need not 
decide whether a non-permanent betterment satisfies the first 
No. 
2003AP1067   
 
11 
 
part of the test for an improvement to real property because we 
conclude that the bleachers here are permanent.5   
 
¶19 The Kohns contend that the bleachers are not permanent 
because they are not anchored into the ground.  While there may 
be a disputed issue of fact as to whether the bleachers are 
anchored into the ground, we conclude that this fact is not 
material 
to 
the 
question 
of 
whether 
the 
bleachers 
are 
"permanent" in this case.  That is, we conclude that the 
bleachers here qualify as "permanent" regardless of whether they 
are anchored into the ground.   
                                                 
5  Cf. Witham v. Whiting Corp., 975 F.2d 1342, 1345-46 (7th 
Cir. 1992)(holding that under Illinois' statute of repose a 
product could constitute an "improvement to real property" under 
the following definition:  "'an addition to real property 
amounting to more than mere repair or replacement, and which 
substantially enhances the value of the property'")(quoting 
Calumet Country Club v. Roberts Envtl. Control Corp., 483 N.E.2d 
613 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)); Ahrens v. Town of Fulton, 2002 WI 29, 
¶29, 251 Wis. 2d 135, 641 N.W.2d 423 (for purposes of tax 
statute, "a mobile home is an improvement to real property when 
the home is resting for more than a temporary time, in whole or 
in part, on some other means of support than its wheels"); 
Black's Law Dictionary 761 (7th ed. 1999)(defining "improvement" 
as "[a]n addition to real property, whether permanent or not; 
esp., one that increases its value or utility or that enhances 
its appearance"); The American Heritage Dictionary of the 
English Language 909 (3d ed. 1992)(defining "improve" as:  "To 
raise to a more desirable or more excellent quality or 
condition; make better[;]" or "[t]o increase the productivity or 
value of (land or property)[;]" or "[t]o make beneficial 
additions or changes."  The focus of these definitions is on the 
fact that the addition improves the value of the property.  See 
also 63B Am. Jur. 2D Products Liability § 1631 (2d ed. 
1997)("Although the permanent nature of an alleged improvement 
is a consideration, some courts do not view permanency as a 
mandatory requirement.")(emphasis added).   
No. 
2003AP1067   
 
12 
 
¶20 We disagree with the Kohns that "the degree of 
physical annexation" of the alleged improvement is dispositive.  
While the law of fixtures may focus on the degree of annexation 
of a chattel 
to 
land, 
see 
All 
City 
Communication, 263 
Wis. 2d 394, ¶13; Black's Law Dictionary 652 (7th ed. 1999), 
courts, 
applying 
a 
commonsense 
definition 
to 
the 
term 
"improvement 
to 
real 
property," 
have 
"viewed 
the 
term 
'improvement' as having broader significance than 'fixture' and 
ha[ve] indicated that the term comprehends all additions and 
betterments 
to 
the 
freehold, 
including 
everything 
that 
permanently enhances the value of the premises."  63B Am. Jur. 
2D Products Liability § 1631 (2d ed. 1997).6  Therefore, a given 
item need not be actually physically annexed to the land in 
order to constitute a permanent addition to or betterment of 
property.  
 
¶21 In assessing the permanency of property, it is 
appropriate to consider the nature of the alleged improvement 
and the intention of the party making the alleged improvement.  
63B Am. Jur. 2D Products Liability § 1631 (2d ed. 1997); Garner 
                                                 
6 For this reason, we conclude that the court of appeals' 
decision in All City Communication Co. v. DOR, 2003 WI App 77, 
263 Wis. 2d 394, 661 N.W.2d 845, is inapplicable to this case.  
The 
question 
in 
All 
City 
Communication 
was 
whether 
a 
communication tower was "personal property" or "real estate" for 
purposes of a tax statute.  Id., ¶¶1, 13.  All City 
Communication did not involve the application of the test for 
"improvements to real property" and instead applied the test 
governing fixtures, i.e., real estate.  Id., ¶13.  As the court 
of appeals aptly stated:  "Borrowing language from one context 
and applying it to another poses a danger."  Id., ¶16.   
No. 
2003AP1067   
 
13 
 
v. Kinnear Mfg. Co., 37 F.3d 263, 267 (7th Cir. 1994)(noting 
that Illinois courts have provided the following criteria for 
determining whether an item constitutes an "improvement to real 
property":  "whether the addition was intended to be permanent 
or temporary, whether it became an integral component of the 
overall system and whether the value and use of the property was 
enhanced.")(emphasis added).7  See also The American Heritage 
Dictionary of the English Language 1348 (3d ed. 1992)(defining 
"permanent" as "[n]ot expected to change in status, condition, 
or place").   
 
¶22 We conclude that the bleachers at Darlington High 
School constitute a "permanent addition to" the Darlington High 
School stadium and track.  First, examining the nature of the 
bleachers, we note that the home bleachers are a huge structure.  
They are 15 rows tall, over 100 feet long, and contain a 50-
inch-wide walkway elevated 30 inches above the ground.  They can 
seat nearly 1500 individuals.  They adjoin a rather large press 
box and incorporate a wheelchair access ramp.  While it is 
unclear whether they are anchored to the ground, they clearly 
are not readily moveable.   
                                                 
7 Also, we note that while the test for "fixtures" focuses 
on the degree of physical annexation of an item to a piece of 
property rather than simply whether the item is an "addition to 
or betterment of" the property (the appropriate test here), the 
test for "fixtures" nonetheless incorporates a party's intent 
into the analysis of whether the item is permanently annexed to 
the land.  See All City Communication, 263 Wis. 2d 394, ¶14 
(citing 
DOR 
v. 
A.O. 
Smith 
Harvestore 
Prods., 
Inc., 
72 
Wis. 2d 60, 68, 240 N.W.2d 357 (1976)).   
No. 
2003AP1067   
 
14 
 
 
¶23 The Kohns focus on the fact that the bleachers can be 
disassembled and would not require any excavation to be removed.  
However, 
while 
the 
bleachers 
could 
theoretically 
be 
disassembled, that is true of almost any addition to property.  
Almost any structure that is assembled and installed can be 
dissembled and removed, even, as ITW artfully notes, a structure 
as large as the Eiffel Tower.  See 63B Am. Jur. 2D Products 
Liability 
§ 1631 
(2d 
ed. 
1997)("[T]he 
fact 
that 
a[n] . . . improvement can be removed without harming the real 
property will not necessarily indicate that the . . . item is 
not an improvement to real property.").  We believe the more 
pertinent inquiry is whether the item can be readily dissembled 
and moved.  See Massie, 425 N.W.2d at 861 (waterslide not an 
improvement because it was removed from small lake after every 
summer season for a number of years).  Given the nature of the 
bleachers and the subsequent additions thereto, it cannot be 
disputed that it would require a significant amount of time and 
effort to completely disassemble them and remove them from the 
field.   
 
¶24 While the Kohns rely on the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals' 
decision 
in 
Massie, 
that 
decision 
is 
entirely 
distinguishable and actually beneficial to ITW in light of the 
distinctions drawn in that opinion.  Massie involved a 30-foot 
tall water slide installed in a shallow lake that was bolted to 
concrete pads.  Id. at 859.  "The slide was installed at the 
facility in 1974 and was used during the summers of 1975-83.  At 
No. 
2003AP1067   
 
15 
 
the end of each summer, the city would unbolt the slide from its 
base and apparently store it until the next season."  Id.   
 
¶25 The court concluded that the slide was not an 
improvement to real property, reasoning:   
The water slide was not a permanent addition to 
the property.  While it was bolted to concrete pads at 
the bottom of the pond, it was designed to be and was 
removed every winter for storage. . . . The slide was 
a removable piece of playground equipment. . . . The 
slide was only used at the Twin Ponds area for three 
months out of the year and was permanently removed 
from the area after the 1983 season.  There has been 
no decrease in the capital value of the Twin Ponds 
facility due to its removal. 
Id. at 861.     
 
¶26 Here, in contrast, the bleachers have never been taken 
apart or moved, much less permanently removed for an entire 
season.  They are certainly not the equivalent of "a removable 
piece of playground equipment."  Id.   
 
¶27 Further, it is quite apparent that the bleachers, 
unlike the slide in Massie, were never intended to be moved or 
taken apart.  As evidence of this, we again note the length of 
time they have remained at Darlington High School——over 30 
years.  The fact that Darlington has constructed a large press 
box adjoining the bleachers is further evidence of the intent 
that the bleachers be permanent.  Moreover, we note that 
Darlington has made significant improvements to the bleachers 
themselves, in the form of a wheelchair accessible ramp, new 
railings, and new footboards.  Further evidence of the intended 
permanency of the bleachers is the fact that the utility of the 
No. 
2003AP1067   
 
16 
 
stadium and track would be seriously diminished were the 
bleachers removed.  In light of the above analysis, we do not 
find it significant that the bid contract Standard submitted to 
Darlington labeled the product as "portable bleachers."  As 
such, we are satisfied that the bleachers consitutue "a 
permanent addition to" the property. 
 
¶28 The second and third prongs of the test for an 
improvement to real property under Kallas is that the permanent 
addition to the property must "'enhance[] its capital value 
and . . . involve[] the expenditure of labor or money and [be] 
designed to make the property more useful or valuable as 
distinguished from ordinary repairs.'"  Kallas, 66 Wis. 2d at 
386 (quoted source 
omitted).  As 
these 
two 
prongs are 
interrelated, we shall consider them together.  
 
¶29 Darlington contracted with Standard to provide the 
materials for the bleachers and supervise their installation at 
a cost of $16,167.  Thus, the installation of the bleachers 
clearly involved the expenditure of labor and a significant 
amount of money.  Further, we conclude that the bleachers 
increase the capital value of the track and football stadium at 
Darlington High School and make the property more useful or 
valuable.  It seems patently obvious that a football stadium and 
track with a set of bleachers is more useful and valuable than 
an empty field and track.  Clearly, the school would not be able 
to attract as many spectators and charge the same admission fee 
to see a game or meet if there were no bleachers in the stadium, 
as far less people would be able to have a clear line of vision 
No. 
2003AP1067   
 
17 
 
to the field.  Finally, it cannot seriously be argued that the 
installation of the bleachers constituted "ordinary repairs."  
Therefore, we conclude that the bleachers in this case meet all 
of the requirements of the test for an improvement to real 
property set forth in Kallas.   
 
¶30 The Kohns also argue that the bleachers are not an 
improvement to real property, based on our opinion in Swanson, 
because 
the 
bleachers 
were 
not 
specifically 
designed 
or 
manufactured for use at Darlington High School.  The Kohns 
mischaracterize our opinion in Swanson.  In Swanson, we did not 
even address the issue of what constitutes an improvement to 
real property, much less hold that the materials that comprise 
an addition to property must be specifically designed or 
manufactured for the project in question in order for the 
addition to qualify as an improvement to real property.  
¶31 Swanson involved a suit against remote manufacturers 
of lighting fixtures that allegedly caused a fire.  Swanson, 105 
Wis. 2d at 323-24.  The issue presented was whether the 
defendants fell within the category of defendants protected by a 
predecessor statute to § 893.89, Wis. Stat. § 893.155 (1977).  
Id. at 324.  Unlike § 893.89, the statute at issue in Swanson 
applied to "[a]ny person performing or furnishing the design, 
land surveying, planning, supervision of construction, materials 
or 
construction 
of 
such 
improvement 
to 
real 
property."  
No. 
2003AP1067   
 
18 
 
Wis. Stat. § 893.155 (1977).8  Thus, the issue in Swanson was not 
whether the lighting fixture at issue constituted an improvement 
to 
real 
property 
but 
whether 
the 
statute 
"applie[d] 
to 
manufacturers of a product and its component parts incorporated 
into an improvement to real property."  Swanson, 105 Wis. 2d at 
322.   
 
¶32 We concluded that the defendants did not fall within 
the purview of the statute because they did not directly deal 
with Swanson and did not manufacture lighting fixtures for the 
improvement to Swanson's property.  Id. at 324, 327-28.  We 
therefore held that the statute was inapplicable to the remote 
manufacturers "[e]ven though the light fixture [in question] was 
an ultimate improvement to real property."  Id. at 329.  In 
other words, we specifically concluded that the light fixture 
was an improvement to real property even though it was not 
specifically manufactured for Swanson's property.  Thus, Swanson 
                                                 
8 In contrast to the statute at issue in Swanson Furniture 
Co. v. Advance Transformer Co., 105 Wis. 2d 321, 313 N.W.2d 840 
(1982), § 893.89(2) applies to "owner[s] or occupier[s] of the 
property or . . . any person involved in the improvement to real 
property . . . ."  Thus, the category of persons protected by 
the statute at issue in Swanson and the statute at issue here 
are entirely different.  Here, Standard, ITW's predecessor, 
contracted 
to 
deliver 
materials 
for 
and 
supervise 
the 
installation of the bleachers at Darlington High School.  Thus, 
Standard plainly qualifies as a "person involved in the 
improvement to real property" who "furnish[ed] . . . materials 
for" the improvement and "supervise[ed] . . . construction of" 
the improvement.  Wis. Stat. § 893.89(2).  The contract was for 
the specific project at Darlington High School.  Standard was 
therefore directly involved in the improvement to Darlington's 
property.    
No. 
2003AP1067   
 
19 
 
is not controlling here because it dealt with a different issue 
and a different statute.  To the extent it is relevant, Swanson 
stands opposed to the Kohns' assertion that the materials 
utilized in an addition to property must be specifically 
manufactured for that property in order for the addition to be 
an improvement.   
¶33 Therefore, we hold that the bleachers at Darlington 
High School constitute an "improvement to real property" for 
purposes of § 893.89.  The bleachers qualify as an "improvement 
to real property" because they are a permanent addition to 
Darlington's real property that enhance its capital value, 
involved the expenditure of labor and money, and were designed 
to make the property more useful or valuable.  Kallas, 66 
Wis. 2d at 386.    
B. 
Constitutionality of § 893.89 
 
¶34 The Kohns argue that even if the bleachers constitute 
an improvement to real property under § 893.89, the statute is 
nonetheless inapplicable because it is unconstitutional.  They 
argue that the statute violates Article I, Section 9 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution and the equal protection clauses of the 
state and federal constitutions.    
 
¶35 Before addressing each argument, we set forth the 
deferential standard under which we review the constitutional 
validity of legislative enactments: 
Statutes 
are 
presumptively 
constitutional.  
[Riccitelli v. Broekhuizen, 227 Wis. 2d 100, 119, 595 
N.W.2d 392 
(1999)]. 
 
The 
court 
indulges 
every 
presumption to sustain the law if at all possible, and 
No. 
2003AP1067   
 
20 
 
if 
any 
doubt 
exists 
about 
a 
statute's 
constitutionality, we must resolve that doubt in favor 
of constitutionality.  State ex rel. Hammermill Paper 
Co. v. La Plante, 58 Wis. 2d 32, 46-47, 205 N.W.2d 784 
(1973).  
To overcome this strong presumption, the party 
challenging 
a 
statute's 
constitutionality 
must 
demonstrate 
that 
the 
statute 
is 
unconstitutional 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  State v. Hezzie R., 219 
Wis. 2d 848, 863, 580 N.W.2d 660 (1998). It is not 
sufficient 
for 
the 
challenging 
party 
merely 
to 
establish doubt about a statute's constitutionality, 
and it is not enough to establish that a statute 
probably is unconstitutional.  Hammermill Paper Co., 
58 Wis. 2d at 46-47. 
The presumption of statutory constitutionality is 
the product of our recognition that the judiciary is 
not positioned to make the economic, social, and 
political decisions that fall within the province of 
the legislature.  See State ex rel. Carnation Milk 
Prods. Co. v. Emery, 178 Wis. 147, 160, 189 N.W. 564 
(1922).  The duty of the court is only to determine if 
the legislation clearly and beyond doubt offends a 
provision of the state constitution that specifically 
circumscribes legislative action.  Hammermill Paper 
Co., 58 Wis. 2d at 46-47; Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. La 
Follette, 27 Wis. 2d 505, 521, 135 N.W.2d 269 (1965). 
Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, ¶¶18-20 (emphasis added).   
1. 
Article I, Section 9 
 
¶36 The Kohns set forth two arguments why § 893.89 
violates Article I, Section 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  
First, they argue that "[r]ather than recognizing the Kohns' 
entitlement to a remedy at law for [Lori's] injuries, § 893.89 
has the direct effect of extinguishing any remedy as of way back 
in 1979 . . . ."  Plaintiffs' Br. at 31.  They contend that the 
statute "irrationally deprives [them] of a remedy for an already 
existing right."  Id. at 34.  Second, the Kohns argue that 
No. 
2003AP1067   
 
21 
 
unlike the statute of repose at issue in Aicher, § 893.89 is 
irrational and poor public policy.  They argue that there is no 
rational basis for cutting off their remedy for injuries caused 
by ITW's negligence.  We reject both arguments. 
 
¶37 Article I, Section 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides: 
Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the 
laws for all injuries, or wrongs which he may receive 
in his person, property, or character; he ought to 
obtain justice freely, and without being obligated to 
purchase it, completely and without denial, promptly 
and without delay, conformably to the laws. 
As we recognized in Aicher, "art. I, § 9 confers no legal 
rights."  Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, ¶43 (emphasis added).  The 
provision "applies only when a prospective litigant seeks a 
remedy for an already existing right."  Id.   
¶38 A statute of repose "limits the time period within 
which an action may be brought based on date of the act or 
omission."  Id., ¶26.  A statute of repose may therefore bar an 
action before the injury is discovered or before the injury even 
occurs.  Id.  "[B]y definition, a statute of repose cuts off a 
right of action regardless of the time of accrual."  Tomczak v. 
Bailey, 218 Wis. 2d 245, 277, 578 N.W.2d 166 (1998)(emphasis 
added).  As such, when the legislature enacts a statute of 
repose, it "expressly cho[o]se[s] not to recognize rights after 
the conclusion of the repose period[]."  Wenke v. Gehl, 2004 WI 
103, ¶24, 274 Wis. 2d 220, 682 N.W.2d 405 (citing Aicher, 237 
Wis. 2d 99, ¶54).  In other words, a statute of repose does not 
merely extinguish a party's remedy, it extinguishes the right of 
No. 
2003AP1067   
 
22 
 
recovery altogether.  Therefore, statutes of repose do not 
violate the right to remedy provision of Article I, Section 9 
because any right of recovery is extinguished at the end of the 
repose period and the right for which the litigant seeks a 
remedy no longer exists.  Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, ¶54.   
¶39 Here, § 893.89(2) provides, in part:  "[N]o cause of 
action may accrue and no action may be commenced . . . after the 
end of the exposure period, to recover damages for any injury to 
property, for any injury to the person, or for wrongful 
death . . . ."  The "exposure period" is defined in § 893.89(1) 
as "10 years immediately following the date of substantial 
completion of the improvement to real property."  It is 
undisputed that the bleachers were substantially completed in 
1969.  Thus, the exposure period ended in 1979.  As such, as of 
1979, the Kohns possessed no right of recovery against ITW.  
Therefore, because Article I, Section 9 guarantees a remedy only 
for existing rights, and the Kohns possessed no right of 
recovery when they brought their action against ITW, § 893.89 
does not violate the constitutional guarantee in Article I, 
Section 9. 
¶40 However, the Kohns also argue that the statute 
violates Article I, Section 9 because it is poor public policy 
and that unlike the statute of repose at issue in Aicher, there 
is no legitimate reason to deny a right to recovery in this 
instance when they could not have even discovered the injury at 
the end of the exposure period.  The Kohns misread our decision 
in Aicher.  Our decision to uphold the statute at issue in 
No. 
2003AP1067   
 
23 
 
Aicher under Article I, Section 9, was not premised on our 
agreement with the policy choice made by the legislature in that 
instance; rather, it was based on our recognition that statutes 
of repose represent policy decisions the legislature is entitled 
to make and our deference to those policy decisions.   
¶41 In Aicher, we recognized that "[c]ourts may shudder at 
the unfairness visited by statutes of repose, but we generally 
acknowledge 
the 
policies 
underlying 
these 
limiting 
statutes. . . . The question of what the statute of limitations 
or the statute of repose for a particular action should be is a 
fundamental question of public policy."  Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 
¶¶45-46.   
¶42 Further, we stated: 
This 
court 
has 
concluded 
many 
times 
that 
the 
legislature may sever a person's claim by a statute of 
limitations or a statute of repose when the person has 
had no possibility of discovering the injury——when the 
person has been blameless in every respect.  These 
decisions represent judicial deference to the stated 
policy of the legislature.  Protecting the interests 
of those who must defend claims based on old acts or 
omissions is a policy concern that legislative bodies 
have weighed for centuries. . . .  
The legislature formulates the statutory law of 
Wisconsin, pursuant to constitutional authority.  The 
legislature's authority includes the power to define 
and limit causes of action and to abrogate common law 
on policy grounds. 
 . . . Article I, § 9 does not empower this court 
to substitute its views for legislative policy any 
more than art. I, § 9 prevents this court from using 
sound policy to influence tort law.  
Statutes limiting the time period for filing 
actions historically have been policy decisions within 
No. 
2003AP1067   
 
24 
 
the province of the legislature. . . . [Statutes of 
repose] reflect the legislature's view that prompt 
litigation ensures fairness to the parties. . . .  
We remain persuaded that time limitation periods 
articulated by statutes of repose inherently are 
policy considerations better left to the legislative 
branch of government. . . . Were we to extend a remedy 
outside the limits of these recognized rights, we 
effectively would 
eviscerate the 
ability 
of the 
legislature to enact any statute of repose.   
Id., ¶¶50-54 (emphasis added).   
¶43 As such, we are not permitted to second-guess the 
policy choices the legislature made in enacting § 893.89 under 
the guise of Article I, Section 9.  Regardless of whether this 
court considers the repose period in § 893.89 to be a wise 
policy decision or the result it produces in this case to be 
"fair," these are policy choices the legislature was entitled to 
make and to which we must defer.  Therefore, the Kohns' 
challenge under Article I, Section 9 must fail.   
2. 
Equal Protection 
¶44 The Kohns also contend that § 893.89 runs afoul of the 
constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the state and 
federal constitutions9 because it grants protections to a certain 
class of defendants and not others.  Specifically, the Kohns 
                                                 
9 This court has long held that "[w]e have given the equal-
protection provision of the Wisconsin Constitution and the 
parallel clause of the United States Constitution identical 
interpretation."  Funk v. Wollin Silo & Equip., Inc., 148 
Wis. 2d 59, 61 n.2, 435 N.W.2d 244 (1989)(citing State ex rel. 
Sonneborn v. Sylvester, 26 Wis. 2d 43, 49, 132 N.W.2d 249 
(1965)).  See also Aicher v. Wisconsin Compensation Fund, 2000 
WI 98, ¶55 n.14, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849 ("We apply the 
same interpretation to the equal protection provisions of both 
the Wisconsin Constitution and the federal constitution.").   
No. 
2003AP1067   
 
25 
 
argue that the statute is unconstitutional because it grants 
protections to those involved in the improvement of real 
property, 
but 
not 
material 
manufacturers 
and 
owners 
and 
occupiers of the property in certain circumstances.   
¶45 While it may seem odd that the Kohns are essentially 
alleging that the statute is unconstitutional because it does 
not protect additional classes of defendants, we specifically 
held in Funk, 148 Wis. 2d at 68, that a "plaintiff has standing 
in a representative capacity to raise the rights of the 
potential defendants excluded from the statute."   
¶46 When considering an equal protection challenge to a 
statute, this court employs the rational basis test, unless the 
statute involves a suspect class or a fundamental right (which 
§ 893.89 does not).  Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, ¶56; Tomczak, 218 
Wis. 2d at 264.  "Under the rational basis test, a statute is 
unconstitutional if the legislature applied an irrational or 
arbitrary 
classification 
when 
it 
enacted 
the 
provision."  
Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, ¶57.  Under the rational basis test, it 
is not sufficient to declare a statute unconstitutional because 
"some inequality results from a classification[,]" Kallas, 66 
Wis. 2d at 388; rather, we must "sustain a statute unless we 
find that 'it is "patently arbitrary" and bears no rational 
relationship to a legitimate governmental interest.'"  Aicher, 
237 Wis. 2d 99, ¶57 (quoting Tomczak, 218 Wis. 2d at 264 
(quoting Sambs v. City of Brookfield, 97 Wis. 2d 356, 371, 293 
N.W.2d 504 (1980))). 
No. 
2003AP1067   
 
26 
 
¶47 When applying the rational basis test, "'it is not our 
task 
to 
determine 
the 
wisdom 
of 
the 
rationale 
or 
the 
legislation.'  In particular, limitation periods are a subject 
over which we have traditionally afforded the legislature 
significant control."  Tomczak, 218 Wis. 2d at 265 (quoting 
Sambs, 97 Wis. 2d at 371)(emphasis added).  See also Aicher, 237 
Wis. 2d 99, ¶57 (accord).  Therefore, "[g]reat deference is 
afforded to legislative classifications under the rational basis 
test."  Tomczak, 218 Wis. 2d at 264.  Moreover, "'it is the 
court's obligation to locate or to construct, if possible, a 
rationale that might have influenced the legislature and that 
reasonably upholds the legislative determination[,]'" even if 
that rationale "'is not likely to be indisputable.'"  Id. at 
264-65 (quoting Sambs, 97 Wis. 2d at 371)(emphasis added).   
¶48 A legislative enactment involving classifications will 
pass the rational basis test if it satisfies the following five 
criteria: 
"(1) All 
classification[s] 
must 
be 
based 
upon 
substantial distinctions which make one class really 
different from another. 
(2) The classification adopted must be germane to the 
purpose of the law. 
(3) The 
classification 
must 
not 
be 
based 
upon 
existing circumstances only.  [It must not be so 
constituted as to preclude addition to the numbers 
included within a class.] 
(4) To whatever class a law may apply, it must apply 
equally to each member thereof. 
(5) That the characteristics of each class should be 
so far different from those of other classes as to 
No. 
2003AP1067   
 
27 
 
reasonably suggest at least the propriety, having 
regard to the public good, of substantially different 
legislation." 
Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, ¶58 (quoting Tomczak, 218 Wis. 2d at 
272-73 (quoting Dane County v. McManus, 55 Wis. 2d 413, 423, 198 
N.W.2d 667 (1972))).   
¶49 With this deferential standard of review in mind, we 
turn now to address the classifications contained in § 893.89.  
The ten-year repose period set forth in § 893.89(1) operates to 
protect certain individuals from suits arising from certain 
types of injuries.  Section 893.89(2) provides, in part: 
Except as provided in sub. (3), no cause of action may 
accrue and no action may be commenced, including an 
action for contribution or indemnity, against the 
owner or occupier of the property or against any 
person involved in the improvement to real property 
after the end of the exposure period, to recover 
damages for any injury to property, for any injury to 
the person, or for wrongful death, arising out of any 
deficiency or defect in the design, land surveying, 
planning, supervision or observation of construction 
of, 
the 
construction 
of, 
or 
the 
furnishing 
of 
materials for, the improvement to real property.   
(Emphasis added.) 
¶50 However, § 893.89(2) goes on to carve out an exception 
for certain individuals who manufacture or produce material 
utilized in the improvement to real property.  The exception 
does not cover all who produce or manufacture such material; its 
coverage extends only to those who manufacture or produce 
materials if a suit is based on damages resulting from a defect 
in the material:  "This subsection does not affect the rights of 
any person injured as the result of any defect in any material 
No. 
2003AP1067   
 
28 
 
used in an improvement to real property to commence an action 
for damages against the manufacturer or producer of the 
material."  Wis. Stat. § 893.89(2).   
¶51 Further, § 893.89(4) provides:   
This section does not apply to any of the following: 
(a) A person who commits fraud, concealment or 
misrepresentation related to a deficiency or defect in 
the improvement to real property. 
(b) A 
person 
who 
expressly 
warrants 
or 
guarantees the improvement to real property, for the 
period of that warranty or guarantee. 
(c) An owner or occupier of real property for 
damages resulting from negligence in the maintenance, 
operation or inspection of an improvement to real 
property. 
(d) Damages that were sustained before April 29, 
1994.  
(Emphasis added.)  The Kohns' equal protection challenge focuses 
on the distinctions the statute draws between those who are 
involved in the improvement of real property, those who 
manufacturer or produce defective material utilized in the 
improvement, and owners or occupiers whose negligence in 
maintaining, operating, or inspecting the improvement results in 
damages.   
¶52 Before discussing the classifications in § 893.89, it 
is necessary to understand the history of the statute.  Section 
893.89 represents the legislature's latest incarnation of a 
statute of repose governing improvements to real property.  Two 
of the previous versions were found unconstitutional by this 
court.   
No. 
2003AP1067   
 
29 
 
¶53 In Kallas, 66 Wis. 2d at 384, this court struck down 
Wis. Stat. § 893.155 
(1973), 
as 
unconstitutional 
on 
equal 
protection grounds.10  The statute provided a six-year statute of 
repose for actions arising out of the improvement of real 
property against "any person performing or furnishing the 
design, planning, supervision of construction or construction of 
such improvement to real property[.]"  Wis. Stat. § 893.155 
(1973).  However, the statute exempted from its protection "any 
person in actual possession and control as owner, tenant or 
otherwise, of the improvement at the time the defective and 
unsafe condition of such improvement constitutes the proximate 
cause of the injury for which it is proposed to bring an 
action."  Wis. Stat. § 893.155 (1973).   
¶54 The court in Kallas concluded that the statute, by 
protecting those involved in the design, planning, supervision 
of construction or construction of real property but not owners 
and occupants or materialmen, drew unreasonable distinctions 
                                                 
10 In a somewhat perplexing manner, the court in Kallas 
Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wis. 2d 382, 384, 225 
N.W.2d 454 (1975) [hereinafter "Kallas"], began by stating that 
the statute was also in violation of Article I, Section 9 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution, but later expressly stated that although 
there was a plausible argument that the statute violated Article 
I, Section 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution, "we do not rest our 
decision on that aspect of possible unconstitutionality."  Id. 
at 393.  Thus, the language in Kallas regarding Article I, 
Section 9 is dicta, and, in any event, is inconsistent with 
Aicher.   
No. 
2003AP1067   
 
30 
 
between these groups.  Kallas, 66 Wis. 2d at 389-91.11  The court 
ruled that there was no justification for "the special immunity 
accorded to the protected class but denied to others similarly 
situated."  Id. at 392.  Further, it stated:  "While there are 
public policy reasons that might justify a limitations period 
that takes into consideration those who are engaged in the 
construction business, there appears no reason why only a very 
restricted class of those thus occupied is protected by the 
statute."  Id. at 391.     
¶55 The legislature promptly amended the statute by virtue 
of § 2, ch. 335, Laws of 1975, which deleted the exception for 
owners and occupiers and included surveyors and material 
providers within the statutory protection.  In addition, § 1, 
ch. 335, Laws of 1975, contained extensive legislative findings 
and intent in order to justify the protection afforded in the 
statute.  Specifically, the legislature stated that after 
completion of an improvement, those involved in its construction 
lack control over the real estate and have no opportunity or 
right to be made aware of any subsequent changes in the 
improvement, and no right to modify the improvement or ensure 
                                                 
11 The dissent fails to recognize that the chief objection 
to the statute in Kallas was that it provided special immunity 
"to the protected class but denied [immunity] to others 
similarly situated."  Kallas, 66 Wis. 2d at 392.  Here, in 
contrast to the statute at issue in Kallas, § 893.89 does apply 
to materialmen to the extent they furnished materials for the 
improvement.  Both materialmen and designers are covered under 
the current statute to the extent they are similarly situated——
i.e., involved in a specific improvement to property.   
No. 
2003AP1067   
 
31 
 
proper maintenance is conducted.  § 1, ch. 335, Laws of 1975.  
The legislature also stated that it was in the public interest 
to set a point in time to limit liability for errors and 
omissions relating to the planning, design, and construction of 
improvements.  Id.  However, the findings also stated that any 
class not listed in the statute was not protected.  Id.   
¶56 Subsequently, the legislature repealed and renumbered 
Chapter 893 of the statutes.  § 28, ch. 323, Laws of 1979.  
Section 893.155 (1975), as amended by § 2, ch. 335, Laws of 
1975, was renumbered as § 893.89.  § 28, ch. 323, Laws of 1979. 
¶57 Following the renumbering of the statute, this court 
in Funk, 148 Wis. 2d at 61, held that § 893.89 (1979-80) 
violated the equal protection clauses of the federal and state 
constitutions.  The court in Funk found that "[t]he revised 
statute now appearing as sec. 893.89 suffers from substantially 
the same deficiencies as the earlier one[,]" id. at 64, in that 
it continued to exclude owners and occupiers.  Id. at 73.  The 
court reasoned: 
The substantive effect of the change, insofar as 
classification 
is 
concerned, 
is 
merely 
to 
add 
surveyors and material suppliers to the protected 
class.  Owners and occupiers of land are still in the 
non-protected class.  This deficiency alone places the 
new 
statute 
within 
the 
proscription 
of 
Kallas.  
Although 
the 
body 
of 
the 
statute 
no 
longer 
specifically excepts owners or occupants, the attached 
Finding (2)(b) states that any omitted classifications 
are not protected by the statute.   
Id. at 66-67.   
No. 
2003AP1067   
 
32 
 
 
¶58 However, the revised statute at issue in Funk, just 
like 
the 
current 
statute, 
applied 
to 
individuals 
"'furnishing . . . materials . . . of such improvement.'"  Id. 
at 
64 
(quoting 
Wis. Stat. § 893.89 
(1979)). 
 
The 
court 
specifically noted that, as opposed to the statute at issue in 
Kallas, the 1979 version applied to individuals furnishing 
materials.  Id. at 66.  When analyzing whether the 1979 statute 
violated the equal protection clause, the court stated in regard 
to material providers:  "[F]urnishers of materials . . . have 
now been included in the protected class.  No doubt, this 
reduces the under-inclusiveness of the statute . . . ."  Id. at 
73 (emphasis added).  Thus, the 1979 statute in Funk was found 
unconstitutional only because it did not apply to owners and 
occupiers, as it did not mention this class of individuals.  Id.  
Notably the statute at issue in Funk, although providing 
immunity to "material providers," made no mention of those 
responsible for defects in the material, and thus did not apply 
to them.   
¶59 The court in Funk specifically stated that the overall 
purpose of the statute——limiting the long-term liability of 
those who improve real property——was a legitimate policy 
objective:   
Thus, there is a rationale expressed that might 
tend to justify some special protection to tortfeasors 
whose liability, under ordinary tort rules, could 
potentially exist for decades. . . . However, laudable 
the general public purpose might be, it is the means 
used to effect that public purpose that is under 
scrutiny . . . ."   
No. 
2003AP1067   
 
33 
 
Id. at 70-71 (emphasis added).  That is, while the Funk court 
found the purpose of the statute to be legitimate, it took issue 
with the classifications that that statute drew.   
¶60 The court stated that the legislative findings that 
distinguished between those who improve property and those who 
own or occupy that property based on their control over the 
property was "a distinction without a relevant difference."  Id. 
at 67.  Specifically, the court found the "control" rationale to 
be unpersuasive because the statute, in attempting to limit the 
liability of those involved in the improvement of property, 
nonetheless protected some classes of defendants involved in the 
improvement of property and not others: 
Both 
owners and 
tenants 
unprotected 
by the 
statute . . . may be subject to long-term liability 
for harms that result from the torts of the protected 
class.  Liability is not terminated when it is shifted 
to another class whose ability to compensate for 
injuries is questionable. . . . "'"It is not at all 
inconceivable that the owner or person in control of 
such an improvement might be held liable for damage or 
injury that results from a defective condition for 
which 
the 
architect 
or 
contractor 
is 
in 
fact 
responsible."'" 
Id. at 74-75 (quoting Kallas, 66 Wis. 2d at 389 (quoting Skinner 
v. Anderson, 231 N.E.2d 588 (Ill. 1967))).  Further, the court 
stated:   
"Control" 
as 
a 
standard 
to 
justify 
the 
under-
inclusiveness of the statute is unrelated to the 
fundamental 
purpose 
for 
which 
the 
statute 
was 
intended.  It is a meaningless distinction. 
 
The arbitrary non-inclusion of property owners 
and tenants was not cured by the addition of land 
surveyors and materialmen to the protected class.  
No. 
2003AP1067   
 
34 
 
Although the legislature purported to cure the under-
inclusiveness which invalidated the statute considered 
in Kallas, it failed to do so in a meaningful way.   
Id. at 77 (emphasis added).   
¶61 Following 
our decision in 
Funk, 
the 
legislature 
created 1993 Wis. Act 309, which amended § 893.89.12  As 
explained in the legislative history of 1993 Wis. Act 309, the 
amendments to § 893.89 were passed out of a concern that groups 
were reluctant to participate in state-sponsored construction 
projects because of the limited period of protection offered by 
state-purchased 
insurance 
coverage 
and 
the 
potential 
for 
unlimited tort liability past the end of such coverage.  See LRB 
Drafting File, 1993 Wis. Act 309.  The legislature also 
expressed concern that: 
[As] a major property owner, the State has a loss 
exposure for anyone injured in a State building.  Due 
to the court ruling [in Funk], the State could be 
deemed liable even though maintenance was proper and 
the 
building 
designed 
and 
constructed 
to 
meet 
code. . . . Since this bill pertains only to building 
improvements, it would not prevent recovery where the 
State negligence in the maintenance of buildings was 
shown. 
Id.  
 
¶62 Thus, it is clear that the purpose of § 893.89 is to 
provide protection from long-term liability for those involved 
in the improvement to real property.  This purpose has been 
                                                 
12 Following this court's decision in Funk, 148 Wis. 2d at 
61, the legislature twice amended § 893.89 in 1993.  1993 Wis. 
Act 309 made the substantive changes to the statute that are 
under consideration in this case.  1993 Wis. Act 311 corrected a 
scrivener's error made when drafting 1993 Wis. Act 309, relating 
to the period of repose.   
No. 
2003AP1067   
 
35 
 
recognized as legitimate by this court:  "'[T]here are public 
policy reasons that might justify a limitations period that 
takes 
into 
consideration 
those 
who 
are 
engaged 
in 
the 
construction 
business . . . .'" 
 
Funk, 
148 
Wis. 2d at 
70 
(quoting Kallas, 66 Wis. 2d at 391).  In other words, the 
legislature is entitled to address "the long-term liability——the 
'long tail of liability'——that accompanies torts of commission 
or omission in the construction of durable buildings."  Id. at 
74. 
 
¶63 Given that the purpose behind § 893.89 is legitimate, 
we do not consider whether the legislature made a wise policy 
decision 
in 
choosing 
to 
protect 
those 
involved 
in 
the 
improvement of real property versus other individuals or whether 
other groups of individuals deserve protection.  Our review is 
limited to whether the classifications drawn in the statute are 
rationally related to the purpose of protecting those involved 
in the improvement of real property from long-term tort 
liability.   
¶64 This court in both Kallas and Funk invalidated the 
different iterations of the statute of repose for improvements 
to real property because the distinctions the respective 
statutes drew between classes of defendants did not relate to 
the purpose of the statute——to limit liability after a certain 
point in time for damages caused from improvements to real 
property.  Both the statute at issue in Kallas and the statute 
at issue in Funk purported to be concerned with protecting those 
involved in the improvement of real property but excluded 
No. 
2003AP1067   
 
36 
 
classes 
of 
defendants 
who 
could 
be 
involved 
in 
such 
improvements.  In other words, the principal objection to the 
precursors of § 893.89 was "the under-inclusiveness of the 
statute[s]."  Funk, 148 Wis. 2d at 73 (emphasis added).  Kallas 
held the statute unconstitutional because it failed to cover 
owners and occupiers and materialmen.  Funk held the statute 
unconstitutional because, 
although 
it 
applied 
to material 
providers, it failed to cover the liability of owners and 
occupiers in relation to defects in the design and construction 
of the improvement. 
 
¶65 To this extent, the present version of § 893.89 cures 
what the court in Kallas and Funk found objectionable.  Rather 
than drawing arbitrary profession-based distinctions, as did the 
statutes at issue in Kallas and Funk, the current version of 
§ 893.89 draws distinctions based on the conduct of certain 
individuals.  The statute begins by broadly including within its 
protections 
"owner[s] 
or 
occupier[s] 
of 
the 
property 
or . . . any 
person 
involved 
in 
the 
improvement 
to 
real 
property" to the extent that a cause of action is based on "any 
deficiency or defect in the design, land surveying, planning, 
supervision or observation of construction of, the construction 
of, or the furnishing of materials for, the improvement to real 
property."  Wis. Stat. § 893.89(2).   
 
¶66 The statute then proceeds to exclude certain classes 
of defendants based on the type of conduct that gives rise to 
potential liability.  Owners and occupiers are excluded from the 
statute's protections only if a cause of action is based upon 
No. 
2003AP1067   
 
37 
 
"damages resulting from negligence in the maintenance, operation 
or 
inspection 
of 
an 
improvement 
to 
real 
property."  
Wis. Stat. § 893.89(4)(c).  Thus, owners and occupiers are 
included within the protection of the statute so long as they 
are being sued for their conduct in improving the property.  
This class loses its protection when liability is based upon 
subsequent negligent maintenance, operation, or inspection of 
the improvement.  Further, unlike the statute at issue in Funk, 
the liability of those who are involved in the improvement of 
property is not shifted to owners or occupiers.  See Funk, 148 
Wis. 2d at 74-75.  Owners and occupiers are held liable only for 
their own negligent maintenance, inspection, or repair of the 
improvement once it is complete.   
 
¶67 Likewise, 
the statute excepts those 
who provide 
material for an improvement if a suit is based on "any defect in 
any material used in an improvement to real property . . . ."  
Wis. Stat. § 893.89(2).  Thus, material providers are included 
within the scope of the statute to the extent that a cause of 
action is based on "the furnishing of materials for" the 
improvement, § 893.89(2), and are excluded only when liability 
is based upon a defect in the material provided.  In other 
words, material providers are included within the protections of 
the statute for their involvement in the improvement——furnishing 
materials——but are excluded based on their prior conduct of 
designing or manufacturing the material.   
 
¶68 In sum, § 893.89 protects all persons involved in the 
improvement to real property but does not protect individuals 
No. 
2003AP1067   
 
38 
 
whose liability arises based on conduct occurring prior to or 
subsequent to the improvement.  These distinctions are rational 
because they are real, substantial distinctions that are germane 
to the purpose of the statute——to protect those involved in the 
improvement of real property.  This statute is distinguishable 
from its predecessors because, as noted, the current statute 
immunizes all conduct related to the improvement after a period 
of ten years.  It does not cover liability-forming conduct 
unrelated 
to 
the 
act 
of 
improving 
property, 
such 
as 
manufacturing defects, for any amount of time.  Stated another 
way, the statute protects all who are involved in the actual 
improvement of real property to the extent they participated in 
improving the property.  The only time individuals involved in 
the improvement of real property are held liable (after ten 
years) under the statute is when their liability arises from 
conduct that preceded or followed the actual improvement.13   
¶69 In 
Funk, 
the 
court 
held 
the 
1979 
statute 
unconstitutional because it continued to fail to cover owners 
and occupiers in relation to any liability based on design 
defects in the improvement or construction of the improvement, 
but held that the statute's inclusion of those who furnish 
                                                 
13 The dissent fails to appreciate that the design of the 
improvement is part of the process of improving property and is 
specific to that improvement.  See dissent, ¶95.  In contrast, 
as discussed infra, the materials utilized in the construction 
of an improvement are generally designed without any regard to 
the purposes for which they will be eventually put and will be 
defective regardless of the project in which they are utilized.   
No. 
2003AP1067   
 
39 
 
materials cured the statute's under-inclusiveness in relation to 
materialmen:   
We invalidated the predecessor of this statute [in 
Kallas] because no reasonable distinction could be 
found between the builders in the protected class and 
other like materialmen and owners who were not 
protected by the statute.  As pointed out above, 
furnishers of materials and land surveyors have now 
been included in the protected class.  No doubt, this 
reduces the under-inclusiveness of the statute, but 
owners or occupants who may be liable to suit by third 
parties 
as 
the 
result 
of 
design 
defects 
or 
construction errors or omission are not in the 
protected class.   
Funk, 148 Wis. 2d at 73 (emphasis added).14  Here, the statute 
continues to apply to those who furnish materials.  It simply 
does not cover those whose liability arises because of a defect 
in the material, as did the statute at issue in Funk.  However, 
the current version of the statute now applies to owners and 
occupiers to the extent their liability is based on design 
defects or construction errors.  They are held liable after ten 
                                                 
14 Thus, the dissent is incorrect when it compares the 
current statute to the statute at issue in Kallas, with respect 
to materialmen.  Dissent, ¶89.  The statute here is identical to 
the statute at issue in Funk with respect to materialmen, as it 
covers those who furnish materials but does not apply to those 
responsible for defects in the material.  The court in Funk held 
that by including those who furnish materials under the revised 
statute, the legislature had eliminated the statute's under-
inclusiveness vis-à-vis materialmen.  Funk, 148 Wis. 2d at 73.  
Although 
the 
Funk 
court 
mentioned 
that 
component 
parts 
manufacturers were not covered, it did so only to demonstrate 
that the legislature's "control" rationale vis-à-vis owners and 
occupiers was irrational.  Funk, 148 Wis. 2d at 76.  At no point 
did the Funk court hold that the statute was unconstitutional 
because it failed to apply to component parts manufacturers.   
No. 
2003AP1067   
 
40 
 
years only for conduct that occurred after the construction of 
the improvement.   
¶70 Owners and occupiers are protected to the extent they 
are involved in the actual improvement of the property.  They 
are 
not 
protected 
for 
post-improvement 
conduct, 
such 
as 
negligent 
inspection 
or 
maintenance 
of 
the 
improvement.  
Likewise, material providers are protected in relation to their 
conduct 
in 
the 
improvement 
of 
the 
property——furnishing 
materials——but are not protected for conduct that occurred prior 
to the improvement, namely, producing defective materials.  The 
statute applies with equal force to each member of the classes 
defined in the statute.  The statute protects all those involved 
in the improvement of real property to the extent liability is 
based upon such involvement and does not foreclose addition to 
the numbers included in each class.    
¶71 That the legislature has chosen not to protect 
individuals whose conduct precedes or follows the improvement of 
real property is completely rational, because the purpose of the 
statute is to protect individuals from liability based upon the 
actions that occur during their involvement in improving the 
property.  As noted, part of the impetus behind amending 
§ 893.89 was to encourage participation in state-sponsored 
construction projects.  Thus, excluding owners and occupiers 
from protection from liability based on negligence in inspecting 
and maintaining the improvement is rational because the project 
is already completed at the time when these negligent acts 
occur.   
No. 
2003AP1067   
 
41 
 
¶72 Likewise, excluding material producers from protection 
from liability when liability is based on defects in material 
(as opposed to the furnishing of those materials) is rational 
because those defects will exist regardless of the use to which 
the material is put.  That is, the act giving rise to liability—
—the defective design or manufacture of the materials——occurs 
prior to any involvement in the improvement to the property.  
The material is defective when it is designed or produced and 
remains defective regardless of the acts of third parties 
related to the improvement in which it is used.  Notably, the 
current version of § 893.89, with regard to materialmen, is 
almost identical to the statute at issue in Funk in that it 
covers those who furnish materials for an improvement, but not 
those responsible for defects in the material.  The court in 
Funk explicitly held that in relation to materialmen, the 
statute was no longer underinclusive because it applied to 
"furnishers of materials[.]"  Funk, 148 Wis. 2d at 73.  
¶73 Additionally, because materials are often designed 
without regard to the specific projects in which they will be 
incorporated,15 a defectively designed material will affect a 
large number of projects and individuals.  Further, the material 
will continue to be defective until its design or manufacturing 
process is changed.  Thus, when a manufacturer defectively 
designs a material, such as aluminum, that aluminum will be 
                                                 
15 For instance, there is no evidence that the aluminum 
utilized 
in 
the 
bleachers 
was 
specifically 
designed 
or 
manufactured for the project at Darlington High School.   
No. 
2003AP1067   
 
42 
 
placed in the stream of commerce and will affect every project 
in which it is utilized.  The aluminum that rolls off the 
assembly 
lines 
will 
continue 
to 
be 
defective 
until 
the 
manufacturer changes the design.  As such, when material is 
defective, it will affect a large number of people and there 
will be numerous individuals who can testify as to its defective 
condition.   
¶74 In contrast, when an improvement is designed or 
constructed, any tortious acts are confined to the limited time 
during which the improvement is being planned and constructed 
and are directed to the specific project under construction.  As 
such, the number of witnesses who can testify as to such 
tortious conduct is limited to those involved in that specific 
improvement. 
 
Thus, 
the 
legislature 
may 
reasonably 
have 
concluded it would be much more difficult to prove or disprove 
wrongful conduct, due to the lack of witnesses, faded memories, 
etc., in relation to a specific improvement,16 than it would be 
to prove or disprove wrongful conduct in relation to the 
defective design of the material utilized in that improvement.  
It is reasonable to conclude that after ten years it would be 
much more difficult to prove or disprove tortious conduct in 
relation to the design or construction of a set of bleachers 
                                                 
16 Krull v. Thermogas Co. of Northwood, 522 N.W.2d 607, 615 (Iowa 
1994)(noting that "'[t]he lapse of time between completion of an 
improvement and initiation of suit often results in the 
unavailability of witnesses, memory loss and a lack of adequate 
records'")(quoted source omitted).   
No. 
2003AP1067   
 
43 
 
than it would to prove the raw material utilized in those 
bleachers was defectively designed.   
 
¶75 While there may be instances in which a material 
provider specifically designs a material for a particular 
improvement project or custom manufactures the material for that 
project, there is still a rational basis to distinguish this 
class of defendant from those protected under the statute.  A 
material producer that designs or produces a defective material 
places that material in the stream of commerce and has the 
ability to change a defective design.  Further, the material 
itself remains defective throughout the life of the project in 
which it is used.  For instance, had Standard produced defective 
aluminum for use in the seats in the bleachers, that aluminum 
would have remained defective regardless of any subsequent 
modifications to the bleachers.   
 
¶76 In contrast, an individual who merely installs an 
improvement completes his work upon the installation of the 
improvement.  That improvement may then be subsequently modified 
by the owner or occupier.  The contactor who installed the 
improvement has no right to ensure that his work is properly 
inspected and maintained throughout the life of the improvement.  
Thus, in contrast to the material supplier, the installer's work 
may be subsequently modified by another party.  Therefore, the 
contractor who installs an improvement may face potential 
liability for conduct of others that occurred after the 
improvement was installed and may encounter proof problems that 
a material producer does not.   
No. 
2003AP1067   
 
44 
 
 
¶77 Conversely, an individual who merely installs an 
improvement is distinguished from an owner or occupier who 
negligently maintains or repairs an improvement because the 
former's duty to properly install the improvement ends at the 
time the improvement is completed, whereas an owner or occupier 
has a continuing duty to properly maintain and repair the 
improvement.  A contractor who installs an improvement may thus 
face liability long after any negligent conduct has occurred, 
whereas the owner or occupier who continually negligently 
maintains an improvement faces liability for recent acts of 
negligence.  With regard to these two classes, the legislature 
could have reasonably determined that: 
"'[t]he lapse of time between completion of an 
improvement and initiation of suit often results in 
the unavailability of witnesses, memory loss and a 
lack 
of 
adequate 
records. 
 
Another 
problem 
particularly critical is the potential application of 
current improved state-of-the-art standards to cases 
where the installation and design of an improvement 
took place many years ago.'"   
Krull v. Thermogas Co. of Northwood, 522 N.W.2d 607, 615 (Iowa 
1994)(quoted source omitted).   
¶78 An owner or occupier engaged in continuous acts of 
negligent maintenance, inspection, and repair clearly does not 
face the same concerns.  Moreover, such acts are in no way 
related to the act of completing the improvement.  Further, as 
previously stated, owners and occupiers are held liable only for 
their own post-improvement negligence; the statute eliminates 
No. 
2003AP1067   
 
45 
 
any shift of liability from those improving the property to 
those who own or operate the property.   
 
¶79 These real and substantial distinctions suggest the 
propriety of different legislation governing:  1) those involved 
in the improvement of real property who produce defective 
materials; 2) those who negligently inspect, maintain, and 
repair improvements; and 3) those who merely design, survey, 
supervise, or construct the improvement.   
¶80 Therefore, 
we 
cannot 
conclude 
that 
§ 893.89 
is 
patently arbitrary or bears no rational relationship to a 
legitimate governmental interest.  The classifications within 
§ 893.89 rationally serve the legitimate purpose of limiting the 
long-term liability of those who are involved in the improvement 
of real property.  The distinctions drawn by the statute are 
based on real and substantial distinctions, are germane to the 
purpose of the law, are not based on existing circumstances 
only, apply equally to all the members of each respective class, 
and suggest the propriety of different legislation for each 
class.  Thus, we hold that § 893.89 does not violate the equal 
protection clauses of the state or federal constitution.   
VI. SUMMARY 
¶81 We hold that the bleachers in question constitute an 
improvement to real property for purposes of § 893.89.  Further, 
we hold that § 893.89 does not violate Article I, Section 9 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution.  Finally, we hold that § 893.89 does 
not violate the guarantee of equal protection in the federal and 
state constitutions.   
No. 
2003AP1067   
 
46 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.   
 
No.  2003AP1067.lbb 
 
1 
 
 
¶82 LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   (dissenting).   The 
majority concludes that the home bleachers at Darlington High 
School purchased in 1969 constitute an "improvement to real 
property" for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 893.89 (2001-02),17 and 
that § 893.89 does not violate Article I, Section 9 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  Majority op., ¶10.  I agree, and join 
the majority's opinion with respect to its decision on these 
issues.  The majority further concludes that § 893.89 does not 
                                                 
17 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.89 (2001-02) provides in pertinent 
part: 
Action for injury resulting from improvements to real 
property.  (1) In this section, "exposure period" 
means the 10 years immediately following the date of 
substantial completion of the improvement to real 
property. 
(2) Except as provided in sub. (3), no cause of action 
may accrue and no action may be commenced, including 
an action for contribution or indemnity, against the 
owner or occupier of the property or against any 
person involved in the improvement to real property 
after the end of the exposure period, to recover 
damages for any injury to property, for any injury to 
the person, or for wrongful death, arising out of any 
deficiency or defect in the design, land surveying, 
planning, supervision or observation of construction 
of, 
the 
construction 
of, 
or 
the 
furnishing 
of 
materials for, the improvement to real property. This 
subsection does not affect the rights of any person 
injured as the result of any defect in any material 
used in an improvement to real property to commence an 
action 
for 
damages 
against 
the 
manufacturer 
or 
producer of the material. 
No.  2003AP1067.lbb 
 
2 
 
violate the equal protection clauses of the federal18 and state 
constitutions.19  Id.  For the reasons stated by this court in 
Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wis. 2d 382, 225 
N.W.2d 454 (1975), and Funk v. Wollin Silo & Equipment, Inc., 
148 Wis. 2d 59, 435 N.W.2d 244 (1989), I disagree.  I therefore 
respectfully dissent from that portion of the decision. 
I 
¶83 Twice before this court has struck down predecessors 
to Wis. Stat. § 893.89.  A careful review of those cases reveals 
that Wis. Stat. § 893.89 remains unconstitutional.  
¶84 In Kallas, this court determined that the predecessor 
statute to Wis. Stat. § 893.89, Wis. Stat. § 893.155 (1971),20 
                                                 
18 Article XIV, Section 1, Amendments to the United States 
Constitution, provides in pertinent part that "[n]o State shall 
 . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws."   
19 Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides in pertinent part that "[a]ll people are born equally 
free and independent, and have certain rights; among these are 
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness  . . . " 
20 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.155 (1971) provided: 
Within 6 years.  No action to recover damages for any 
injury to property, or for an injury to the person, or 
for bodily injury or wrongful death, arising out of 
the defective and unsafe condition of an improvement 
to real property, nor any action for contribution or 
indemnity for damages sustained on account of such 
injury, shall be brought against any person performing 
or furnishing the design, planning, supervision of 
construction or construction of such improvement to 
real property, more than 6 years after the performance 
or furnishing of such services and construction. This 
limitation shall not apply to any person in actual 
possession and control as owner, tenant or otherwise, 
of the improvement at the time the defective and 
No.  2003AP1067.lbb 
 
3 
 
violated constitutional guarantees of equal protection under the 
United States and Wisconsin Constitutions.  Kallas, 66 Wis. 2d 
at 391, 393.  The issue was whether there were "any real 
differences to distinguish the favored class——those persons who 
perform and furnish the 'design, planning supervision of 
construction or construction' of improvements to real property——
from other classes, such as materialmen, who are ignored by the 
statute, 
and 
owners 
and 
occupants, 
who 
are 
specifically 
excepted."  Id. at 389.  This court concluded there were not.  
It was unreasonable to provide "special and unusual immunities" 
to those persons "performing or furnishing the design, planning, 
supervision of construction or construction of such improvement 
to real property."  Id. at 388, 391.  As the Kallas court 
concluded:  "it is ludicrous to permit a recovery against a 
manufacturer of a negligently formulated mortar or adhesive, but 
to deny a recovery against an architect who negligently designed 
a cornice or façade so that its fall was inevitable."  Id. at 
391-92. 
¶85 Months after this court's decision in Kallas, the 
legislature scrambled to revise Wis. Stat. § 893.155 and 
eventually created Wis. Stat. § 893.89 (1979-80).21  In an 
                                                                                                                                                             
unsafe condition of such improvement constitutes the 
proximate cause of the injury for which it is proposed 
to bring an action. 
 
21 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.89 (1979-80) provided: 
Action for injury resulting from improvements to real 
property. No action to recover damages for any injury 
to property, or for an injury to the person, or for 
No.  2003AP1067.lbb 
 
4 
 
attempt to bypass Kallas, the legislature included "surveyors" 
and "material suppliers" (that is, those who merely furnish 
materials) to the protected class and deleted the sentence that 
excluded "owners and occupiers."  See Funk, 148 Wis. 2d at 66, 
73. 
¶86 The statute was again challenged, and in Funk, this 
court 
again 
struck 
down 
the 
statute 
as 
violating 
equal 
protection.  Id. at 77.  The Funk court observed that the 
legislature attempted to justify its distinction between persons 
who had a hand in planning, design, and construction of 
improvements against those who subsequently own and occupy the 
property by noting that the former lacked control "over other 
forces, uses and intervening causes" that caused strain on the 
improvements.  Id. at 66-67.  "'Control,'" this court wrote, "is 
irrelevant to the fundamental problem the statute purportedly 
addresses, 
the 
long 
term 
liability——the 
'long 
tail 
of 
liability'——that accompanies torts of commission or omission in 
the construction of durable buildings."  Id. at 74. In the end, 
this court noted that the protected persons would never be 
                                                                                                                                                             
bodily injury or wrongful death, arising out of the 
defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to 
real property, nor any action for contribution or 
indemnity for damages sustained on account of such 
injury, shall be brought against any person performing 
or furnishing the design, land surveying, planning, 
supervision of construction, materials or construction 
of such improvement to real property, more than 6 
years 
after 
the 
substantial 
completion 
of 
construction. If the injury or defect occurs or is 
discovered more than 5 years but less than 6 years 
after the substantial completion of construction, the 
time for bringing the action shall be extended 6 
months. 
No.  2003AP1067.lbb 
 
5 
 
liable for negligence arising from the owner's and occupier's 
failure to adequately control the property.  Id. at 75.  If the 
legislature was actually concerned with protecting those without 
"control," 
then 
this 
court 
noted 
that 
"component 
parts 
manufacturers" should also be protected.  Id. at 76. 
¶87 Thus, while the legislature purported to cure the 
under-inclusiveness that invalidated the statute in Kallas, this 
court in Funk concluded that "it failed to do so in a meaningful 
way."  Id.  Because "[t]he statute still affords its protection 
and favors without a reasonable and rational basis," this court 
concluded the statute violated equal protection.  Id. at 77.   
¶88 Following 
this 
court's 
decision 
in 
Funk, 
the 
legislature amended Wis. Stat. § 893.89.  A number of changes 
were made:  owners and occupiers were included in the protected 
class and a number of exceptions were carved out.  See § 893.89 
(2001-02).  What is critical here, however, is that the 
legislature excluded a key class:   
This subsection does not affect the rights of any 
person injured as the result of any defect in any 
material used in an improvement to real property to 
commence 
an 
action 
for 
damages 
against 
the 
manufacturer or producer of the material. 
Id.   
¶89 This 
exclusion 
reflects 
the 
exact 
same 
problem 
identified by this court in Kallas 30 years ago:  "it is 
ludicrous to permit a recovery against a manufacturer of a 
negligently formulated mortar or adhesive, but to deny a 
recovery against an architect who negligently designed a cornice 
No.  2003AP1067.lbb 
 
6 
 
or façade so that its fall was inevitable."22  Kallas, 66 Wis. 2d 
at 391-92 (emphasis added).   
¶90 If it was ludicrous then, it is ludicrous now.  
Nothing has changed.  Negligent designers cannot lawfully be 
granted "special and unusual immunities."  Id. at 388.  Because 
the legislature has made the same error, this court must strike 
down Wis. Stat. § 893.89 on equal protection grounds. 
¶91 The majority minimizes this problem by attempting to 
rationalize a distinction between a "material producer" that 
designs or produces a defective material and places that 
material in the stream of commerce from one who merely installs 
an improvement.  Majority op. at ¶¶70-71.  "[E]xcluding material 
producers from protection from liability when liability is based 
on defects in material is rational because those defects will 
exist regardless of the use to which the material is put."  Id., 
¶69.  Further, the defective material "itself remains defective 
throughout the life of the project in which it is used."  Id., 
¶70. 
¶92 The circumstances here indicate why this distinction 
is not rational.  The majority has simply skated over the fact 
that ITW was not only the installer of the bleachers, it was 
also the designer of the bleachers.  The Kohns have alleged that 
the bleachers were defectively designed.  As such, the Kohns 
contend that the bleachers were "defective throughout the life 
of the project."  There continues to be no rational distinction 
                                                 
22 Regardless of whether this was the chief objection to the 
statute or not, it was a constitutional infirmity that this 
court recognized then and still exists today.  
No.  2003AP1067.lbb 
 
7 
 
between 
protecting 
defective 
designers 
but 
not 
defective 
manufacturers.  Our decisions in Kallas and Funk still directly 
control the outcome of this case, and I see no reason to abandon 
these precedents now.   
II 
¶93 Based on the majority's own reasoning, this court 
should still strike down Wis. Stat. § 893.89 as violating equal 
protection. 
¶94  The majority suggests that "[r]ather than drawing 
arbitrary profession-based distinctions, as did the statutes at 
issue in Kallas and Funk, the current version of § 893.89 draws 
distinctions based on the conduct of certain individuals."  
Majority 
op., 
¶65. 
 
The 
majority 
asserts 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 893.89 
"protects 
all persons involved in the 
improvement to real property but does not protect individuals 
whose liability arises based on conduct occurring prior to or 
subsequent to the improvement."  Id., ¶68.  On this basis, the 
majority states that the statute is constitutional. 
¶95 That conclusion, however, again disregards what the 
Kohns have alleged here.  Aside from claiming that the bleachers 
were negligently constructed, the Kohns specifically allege that 
the bleachers were "inherently unsafe" due to their "negligent 
design."  The Kohns further allege that "[b]ecause of the 
dangerously defective nature of the bleachers that existed when 
the product left the possession or control of the seller [ITW], 
the product caused harm."  If conduct is the touchstone that 
saves the statute, when exactly does the majority think the 
No.  2003AP1067.lbb 
 
8 
 
design specifications were made for the bleachers?23  During 
construction?  After construction?   
¶96 The conduct is clearly alleged to have occurred "prior 
to . . . the improvement."   See id.  Because that conduct is 
not protected while other conduct is, the statute is under-
inclusive under the majority's own reasoning. 
¶97 I would therefore affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals.  For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶98 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent.   
 
 
                                                 
23 The narrow focus of the majority's "conduct" rationale is 
troublesome for another reason.  That distinction would protect 
custom designers (which I gather from the majority opinion as 
meaning those who design and forge improvements specifically for 
the requested project, see majority op., ¶¶73-74) while it 
excludes 
mass 
production 
designers 
(by 
mass 
production 
designers, I mean those who design and manufacture certain 
products on a wide-scale basis that could later constitute 
"improvements").  First, I see no rational basis for this 
distinction.  Second, this is a major sub silencio departure 
from Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wis. 2d 382, 225 
N.W.2d 454 (1975), and Funk v. Wollin Silo & Equipment, Inc., 
148 Wis. 2d 59, 435 N.W.2d 244 (1989). 
No.  2003AP1067.lbb 
 
 
 
1