Title: TURLEY v TURLEY
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 81-061
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: July 22, 1982

No. 81-61 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA LYCURGUS A. TURLEY and ELNORA FAYE TURLEY, husband and wife, Plaintiffs and Appellants, VS. GERALD 0 . TURLEY and PHYLLIS K. TURLEY, his wife, a.nd JAMES M. TURLEY a/k/a MICHAEL TURLEY and MAXINE M. TURLEY, his wife, Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: District Court of the Fourteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Musselshell Honorable Nat Allen, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: Hennessey Law Office, Billings, Montana Joseph P. Hennessey argued, Billings, Montana For Respondents: Crowley, Haughey, Hanson, Toole & Dietrich, Billings, Montana George C. Dalthorp argued and Cynthia Ford argued, Billings, Montana Submitted: May 14, 1982 Decided: July 22, 1982 Filed: JUL 2 2 1 9 8 2 Mr. J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of t h e C o u r t . P l a i n t i f f s commenced t h i s a c t i o n i n September 1978 i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t o f t h e F o u r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t o f t h e S t a t e o f Montana, i n and f o r t h e County of M u s s e l s h e l l , t o s e t a s i d e two q u i t c l a i m d e e d s e x e c u t e d by them i n f a v o r o f t h e d e f e n d a n t s . The c a s e was t r i e d w i t h o u t a j u r y and i n J u l y 1980 t h e c o u r t found f o r t h e d e f e n d a n t s . T h i s a p p e a l f o l l o w s , G e r a l d E. and Regina T u r l e y r a n c h e d a t M u s s e l s h e l l , Montana. They had s e v e n l i v i n g c h i l d r e n a t t h e t i m e o f t h e t r i a l - - E d w a r d , G e r a l d O., T u r l a , Mike, F r a n c i s , Adele and Lycurgus. G e r a l d 0. and Mike, t h e two d e f e n d a n t s , h a v e s p e n t t h e i r e n t i r e l i v e s working on t h e r a n c h . L y c u r g u s , t h e p l a i n t i f f , went t o l i v e w i t h r e l a t i v e s i n Texas from a g e e l e v e n t o t h e c o m p l e t i o n o f h i g h s c h o o l b e c a u s e he r e q u i r e d s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n f o r h i s c e r e b r a l p a l s y . Lycurgus r e t u r n e d t o t h e T u r l e y r a n c h i n 1963 and began t o work t h e r e o f f and on w i t h h i s f a t h e r and h i s b r o t h e r s Mike and G e r a l d 0 , Lycurgus l e f t t h e r a n c h i n 1967 and h a s n o t l i v e d o r worked t h e r e s i n c e . The f a t h e r , G e r a l d E. T u r l e y , d i e d i n 1973. P r i o r t o h i s d e a t h , he e s t a b l i s h e d an e s t a t e p l a n by which t h o s e s o n s who worked t h e r a n c h would own t h e s u r f a c e of t h e l a n d . He a l s o i n t e n d e d t o g r a n t t h e r i g h t t o l e a s e t h e m i n e r a l r i g h t s t o t h e s o n s working t h e r a n c h , b u t t o r e s e r v e t o a l l o f t h e c h i l d r e n t h e r i g h t t o r e c e i v e r o y a l t i e s from p r o d u c t i o n . The s o n s on t h e r a n c h were t o pay $10,000 t o e a c h o f t h e i r b r o t h e r s and s i s t e r s upon t h e p a r e n t s ' d e a t h . The e s t a t e p l a n was i n i t i a t e d i n 1964 when G e r a l d 0. and Mike were t h e o n l y s o n s working t h e r a n c h . A t t h a t time, G e r a l d 0. and Mike were each deeded an undivided o n e - s i x t h of t h e s u r f a c e i n F e b r u a r y 1964. Lycurgus r e t u r n e d t o t h e r a n c h i n J u n e 1964 and was deeded a o n e - s i x t h i n t e r e s t i n t h e s u r f a c e i n December 1964. G e r a l d E, and Regina T u r l e y c o n t i n u e d t o convey e q u a l i n t e r e s t s t o G e r a l d O., Mike and Lycurgus i n 1965, 1966, and 1967. A f t e r L y c u r g u s h a d l e f t t h e r a n c h , t h e p a r e n t s c o n t i n u e d t o deed t h e s u r f a c e t o G e r a l d 0. and Mike from 1969 t o 1973 b u t d i d n o t convey any f u r t h e r i n t e r e s t t o Lycurgus. The f a t h e r , G e r a l d E . , d i e d b e f o r e t h e e n t i r e p l a n was c a r r i e d o u t and, a s a r e s u l t , none of t h e m i n e r a l i n t e r e s t and a l l b u t 2-1/2% o f t h e s u r f a c e r i g h t s had n o t been deeded. The m i n e r a l i n t e r e s t and a s m a l l s u r f a c e p e r c e n t a g e became p a r t o f t h e f a t h e r ' s e s t a t e and t h e r e b y p a s s e d t o h i s w i f e and c h i l d r e n . Lycurgus p o s s e s s e d a 24-1/2% i n t e r e s t i n t h e r a n c h a t t h e d a t e o f h i s f i n a l d e p a r t u r e from t h e r a n c h i n 1967. H i s f a t h e r wanted him t o deed t h i s i n t e r e s t t o t h e s o n s who were working t h e ranch. The T u r l e y f a m i l y lawyer p r e p a r e d a q u i t c l a i m d e e d f r o m L y c u r g u s t o G e r a l d 0, a n d M i k e , Lycurgus s i g n e d t h e deed on August 1 8 , 1968, The deed q u i t c l a i m e d Lycurcjus's s u r f a c e r i g h t s o n l y . I n t h a t same y e a r , 1 9 6 8 , t h e T u r l e y r a n c h was r e f i n a n c e d and a l o a n was p r o c u r e d from P r u d e n t i a l I n s u r a n c e Company i n t h e sum of $150,000. T h i s n o t e was s i g n e d by t h e p a r e n t s , G e r a l d O . , Mike and Lycurgus. When Lycuryus q u i t - c l a i m e d h i s i n t e r e s t t o G e r a l d 0. and M i k e , t h e y a g r e e d t o assume a l l t h e l i a b i l i t y of Lycurgus under t h e p r o m i s s o r y n o t e and mortgage t o P r u d e n t i a l I n s u r a n c e Company and t o indemnify and h o l d him h a r m l e s s from a l l c o n s e q u e n c e s o f h i s e x e c u t i o n t h e r e o f , a l l a c c o r d i n g t o t h e l a n g u a g e of t h e q u i t c l a i m deed. While L y c u r g u s ' s name was n o t removed from t h e n o t e , t h e r e was no showing t h a t h e s u s t a i n e d a n y damage o r d e t r i m e n t a s a r e s u l t . A f t e r t h e a c t i o n began, t h e d e f e n d a n t s s o u g h t t o h a v e L y c u r g u s ' s name removed from t h e n o t e , b u t he r e f u s e d t o upon a d v i c e from c o u n s e l . The c h i l d r e n o f G e r a l d E. e a c h r e c e i v e d an i n t e r e s t i n t h e m i n e r a l s under t h e l a n d upon t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f G e r a l d E . ' s e s t a t e . G e r a l d 0. and Mike r e q u e s t e d e a c h o f t h e i r s i b l i n g s t o q u i t c l a i m t h e i r m i n e r a l i n t e r e s t b u t t o r e s e r v e t h e i r r i g h t t o r o y a l t i e s . Lycurgus and h i s w i f e e x e c u t e d s u c h a q u i t c l a i m deed on March 3 , 1977. Lycurgus l a t e r c l a i m e d t h a t b o t h t h e 1968 and 1977 q u i t c l a i m d e e d s were e x e c u t e d a s a r e s u l t of f r a u d and undue i n f l u e n c e and t h i s s u i t was t h e r e s u l t . The f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s a r e p r e s e n t e d on a p p e a l : 1. Whether t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n d e c l a r i n g t h e 1968 d e e d v a l i d a n d i n b a r r i n g t h e p l a i n t i f f s ' a c t i o n f o r r e c o v e r y ? 2. Whether t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n d e c l a r i n g t h e 1977 d e e d v a l i d a n d i n b a r r i n g t h e p l a i n t i f f s ' a c t i o n f o r r e c o v e r y ? Four c a s e s a r e c i t e d by t h e a p p e l l a n t a s a u t h o r i t y f o r t h i s C o u r t t o o v e r r u l e t h e judgment o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t . Denny v. B r i s s o n n e a u d ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 1 6 1 Mont. 468, 506 P.2d 77; M e r c h a n t ' s Bank v. Greenhood ( 1 8 9 5 ) , 16 Mont. 395, 4 1 P. 250; Cameron v. Cameron ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 179 Mont. 219, 587 P.2d 939; Van E t t i n g e r v. Pappin ( 1 9 7 8 ) , - Mont. - , 588 P.2d 988, 35 St.Rep. 1956. Two o f t h e above c a s e s r e l i e d upon by t h e a p p e l l a n t , Van E t t i n g e r , s u p r a , and Denny, s u p r a , a r e n o t c o n t r o l l i n g . Van E t t i n g e r e s t a b l i s h e s n i n e c r i t e r i a n e c e s s a r y t o show f r a u d , and f a i l u r e t o e s t a b l i s h any one of t h e s e elements w i l l r e s u l t i n d i s m i s s a l . One of t h e s e elements is t h e h e a r e r ' s r e l i a n c e on t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . The record is b a r e of any evidence of r e l i a n c e on t h e p a r t of Lycurgus on s t a t e m e n t s made t o him. I n Denny, s u p r a , involving vendors, a r e a l e s t a t e broker and a purchaser of a r e s i d e n c e , t h i s Court h e l d t h a t t h e vendors who accepted cash a s an assignment of t h e p u r c h a s e r ' s i n t e r e s t i n a n o t e i n escrow f o r t h e i r e q u i t y i n t h e r e s i d e n c e were n o t e n t i t l e d t o recover from t h e pur- c h a s e r and t h e r e a l e s t a t e broker f o r f r a u d because vendors r e c e i v e d o n l y two monthly payments on t h e n o t e i n escrow. T h i s Court held where t h e r e was no proof t h a t t h e n o t e was v a l u e l e s s , they had n o t been damaged. Here, a s i n Denny, t h e a p p e l l a n t g o t what he bargained f o r when he deeded back h i s i n t e r e s t upon l e a v i n g t h e ranch o p e r a t i o n . Appellant h a s contended t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t is i n e r r o r f o r n o t d e c l a r i n g t h e 1968 and 1977 deeds i n v a l i d . The a p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h e c o n f i d e n t i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p , undue i n f l u e n c e , f r a u d , l a c k of c o n s i d e r a t i o n , n e c e s s i t y f o r r e s c i s s i o n , and n o n a p p l i c a b i l i t y of t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a - t i o n s a r e r e a d i l y a p p a r e n t and can be gleaned from t h e evidence p r e s e n t e d a t t r i a l . I t is important a t t h e o u t s e t of t h i s o p i n i o n t o r e i t e r a t e t h e law concerning t h e scope of t h i s C o u r t ' s review of t h e f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s of a t r i a l c o u r t s i t t i n g without a j u r y . I n Cameron v. Cameron ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 179 Mont. 219, 587 P.2d 939, when reviewing t h i s a r e a of law, we s t a t e d : " ' T h i s C o u r t ' s f u n c t i o n i n reviewing f i n d i n g s of f a c t i n a c i v i l a c t i o n t r i e d by t h e d i s - t r i c t c o u r t without a j u r y is n o t t o s u b s t i - t u t e its judgment i n p l a c e of t h a t of t h e t r i e r of f a c t s but r a t h e r i t is "confined t o d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r t h e r e is s u b s t a n t i a l c r e d i b l e evidence t o support" t h e f i n d i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of law. Hornung v . E s t a t e of L a g e r q u i s t , 155 Mont. 413, 420, 473 P.2d 541, 546,' Olson v. Westfork P r o p e r t i e s , Inc. ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 171 Mont. 154, 557 P.2d 821, 823, 33 St.Rep. 1133. "A1 though c o n f l i c t s may e x i s t i n t h e evidence p r e s e n t e d , i t is t h e d u t y of t h e t r i a l judge t o r e s o l v e such c o n f l i c t s . H i s f i n d i n g s w i l l n o t be d i s t u r b e d on appeal where they a r e b a s e d on s u b s t a n t i a l t h o u g h c o n f l i c t i n g evidence, u n l e s s t h e r e is a c l e a r preponder- a n c e of e v i d e n c e a g a i n s t s u c h f i n d i n g s . [ C i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d , ] " I n determining whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s a r e s u p p o r t e d by s u b s t a n t i a l evidence, t h i s Court m u s t view t h e evidence i n t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o t h e p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y . H e l l i c k s o n v. B a r r e t t Mobile Home T r a n s p o r t , Inc. ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 161 Mont. 455, 507 P,2d 5 2 3 , 525; W e s t f o r k - - - P r o p e r t i e s , I n c . , supra. ' S u b s t a n t i a l evidence' is evidence such ' a s w i l l convince r e a s o n a b l e men and on which such men may n o t reasonably d i f f e r a s t o whether it e s t a b l i s h e s t h e [ p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y ' s ] c a s e , and, i f a l l r e a s o n a b l e men must conclude t h a t t h e evidence does n o t e s t a b l i s h such c a s e , then it is n o t substan- t i a l evidence.' Morton v. Mooney ( 1 9 3 4 ) , 97 Mont. 1, 33 P,2d 262, 265; S t a g g e r s v. USF&G ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 159 Mont. 254, 496 P.2d 1161, 1163. The evidence may be i n h e r e n t l y weak and s t i l l b e deemed ' s u b s t a n t i a l ' and s u b s t a n t i a l evidence may con£ l i c t w i t h o t h e r evidence p r e s e n t e d , Campeau v. Lewis ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 144 Mont. 543, 398 P.2d 960, 962," 587 P.2d a t 944-945, The i s s u e s i n Cameron, s u p r a , a l s o d e a l t with f r a u d and undue i n f l u e n c e . Here, a s i n Cameron, t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n was based upon t h e j u d g e ' s r e s o l u t i o n of c o n f l i c t - ing testimony. W e h e l d i n Cameron: " M u c h o f t h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d a t t r i a l , which t h e t r i a l i u d a e c o n s i d e r e d i n making . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - --- 2 - - - a - h i s f i n d i n g s a n d c o n c l u s i o n s , --- c o n s i s t e d o i w i t n e s s e s ' t e s t i m o n v . The c r e d i b i l i t y o f such w i t n e s s e s is of prime importance i n t h i s a p p e a l . ' T h e c r e d i b i l i t y and w e i g h t g i v e n -- -- t h e w i t n e s s e s , however, is n o t f o r t h i s C o u r t t o determine. T h i s is a primary f u n c t i o n o f a t r i a l j u d g e s i t t i n g w i t h o u t a jury; i t is - - - - - - - - of s p e c i a l consequence where t h e e v i d e n c e is c o n f l i c t i n g . ~ o m i t t e d . ) ' l l i c k - son, supra. ". . . W e w i l l n o t s u b s t i t u t e our judgment f o r t h a t of t h e t r i e r of f a c t , b u t r a t h e r w i l l o n l y c o n s i d e r w h e t h e r s u b s t a n t i a l c r e d i b l e evidence s u p p o r t s t h e f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s . Those f i n d i n g s w i l l n o t be overturned by t h i s Court u n l e s s t h e r e is a c l e a r preponderance of evidence a g a i n s t them. W e w i l l view t h e evidence i n a l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o t h e p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y , recogniz- ing t h a t s u b s t a n t i a l evidence may be weak o r c o n f l i c t i n g with o t h e r evidence, y e t s t i l l s u p p o r t t h e f i n d i n g s . F i n a l l y , where t h e - c r e d i b i l i t y o f - w i t n e s s e s i s o f p r i m e i m p o r t a n c e , a s i t is h e r e , t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n -- of t h e weight g i v e n t o t h e t e s t i m o n y i s t h e p r i m a r y f u n c t i o n o f t h e t r i a l j u d g e s i t t i n g w i t h o u t a j u r y and n o t t h a t o f t h i s C o u r t . " 587 P.2d a t 945. (Emphasis added.) Applying t h e r u l e s of review s e t o u t i n Cameron, we conclude t h a t t h e f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s were supported by s u b s t a n t i a l c r e d i b l e e v i d e n c e and t h e t r i a l c o u r t was c o r r e c t i n its judgment. Appellant a r g u e s t h a t a con£ i d e n t i a l r e l a t i o n s l ~ i p e x i s t e d between himself and h i s family and t h a t a s a r e s u l t of t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p , he was o v e r t l y s u s c e p t i b l e t o t h e i r i n £ 1 uences. He f u r t h e r m a i n t a i n s t h a t because of t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p , he f a i l e d t o seek independent a d v i c e b e f o r e s i g n i n g t h e deeds. The t r i a l c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s f a i l t o s u p p o r t t h i s c o n t e n t i o n . The record r e v e a l s t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t had nothing more, o r l e s s , than a normal f a m i l i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p with t h e o t h e r members of h i s family. The law is c l e a r w i t h r e s p e c t t o what c o n s t i t u t e s a "con£ i d e n t i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p ' ' t h a t may a f f e c t t h e v a l i d i t y of a deed. I t is s t a t e d a t 26 C.J.S. Deeds, s e c t i o n 58 a t 751-752: "On t h e o t h e r hand, t h e b a r e e x i s t e n c e of a c o n £ i d e n t i a l r e l a t i o n between g r a n t o r a n d g r a n t e e does n o t , s t a n d i n g a l o n e , r a i s e a presumption of f r a u d , a deed w i l l n o t be s e t a s i d e m e r e l y b e c a u s e g r a n t o r and g r a n t e e s u s t a i n e d a c o n f i d e n t i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p where t h e evidence shows no abuse of confidence; and t h e mere f a c t t h a t t h e g r a n t o r l a t e r changed h i s mind w i l l n o t j u s t i f y a c o u r t i n undoing t h e g r a n t . Mere e x p r e s s i o n o f c o n f i d e n c e by t h e g r a n t o r i n t h e g r a n t e e does n o t c r e a t e a c o n f i d e n t i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p . . ." F u r t h e r , independent a d v i s e is n o t a p r e r e q u i s i t e t o t h e v a l i d i t y of a deed. 26 C.J.S. Deeds, s e c t i o n 58 a t 752-753. A p p e l l a n t h a s a l s o c o n t e n d e d t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e s u p p o r t s a c l e a r c a s e of undue i n f l u e n c e . He c i t e s s e c t i o n 28-2-407, MCA, and Cameron v. Cameron, s u p r a , t o s u p p o r t t h i s c o n t e n t i o n and a l l e g e s t h a t t h e test f o r undue i n f l u - ence h a s been completely s a t i s f i e d by t h e f a c t s . Again, t h e t r i a l c o u r t f a i l e d t o a g r e e and s t a t e d t h a t t h e r e was no evidence t o s u p p o r t t h i s c o n t e n t i o n . W e agree. The t e s t of what undue i n f l u e n c e is t h a t is r e q u i r e d t o s e t a s i d e a conveyance is s e t f o r t h i n s e c t i o n 28-2-407, MCA, which provides: "What c o n s t i t u t e s undue - - i n £ l u e n c e . Undue i n f l u e n c e c o n s i s t s i n : "(1) t h e use by one i n whom a confidence is reposed by a n o t h e r o r who h o l d s a r e a l o r a p p a r e n t a u t h o r i t y over him of such c o n f i - d e n c e o r a u t h o r i t y f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f o b t a i n i n g an u n f a i r advantage over him; " ( 2 ) t a k i n g an u n f a i r advantage of a n o t h e r ' s weakness of mind; " ( 3 ) t a k i n g a g r o s s l y o p p r e s s i v e and u n f a i r a d v a n t a g e of a n o t h e r ' s n e c e s s i t i e s o r d i s t r e s s . " See, Blackmer: The Presumption of Undue I n f l u e n c e i n Montana, 37 Mont. L.Rev. 250 (1976) ; Orton v. Gray (1970) , 285 Ala. 270, 231 So.2d 305; Thomas v. Seaman ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 457 Pa. 347, 304 A.2d 134. The f a c t s of t h i s c a s e do n o t i n d i c a t e o v e r t h e p e r i o d h e r e i n v o l v e d a n i n t e n t by a n y member o f t h e f a m i l y t o t a k e a d v a n t a g e o f a p p e l l a n t . The n e x t aryument made by a p p e l l a n t is t h a t t h e f a c t s p r e s e n t e d i n t h e r e c o r d s u p p o r t a c l e a r c a s e o f f r a u d . H e c o n t e n d s t h a t s e c t i o n 28-2-405, MCA, a p p l i e s and t h a t t h e f a c t s s a t i s f y t h e n i n e p a r t t e s t s e t o u t i n Van E t t i n g e r v . P a p p i n , s u p r a . F u r t h e r , a p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t i f a c t u a l f r a u d was n o t e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e f a c t s , t h e n c o n s t r u c t i v e f r a u d , a s d e f i n e d by s e c t i o n 28-2-406, MCA, is p r e s e n t , A n e c e s s a r y p a r t of a p p e l l a n t ' s c o n t e n t i o n a s t o w h e t h e r f r a u d is p r e s e n t s h o u l d i n c l u d e a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s o n f r a u d , s e c t i o n 27-2-203, MCA. The t r i a l c o u r t c o n c l u d e d , and we a g r e e , t h a t s e c t i o n 27-2-203, MCA, a s a p p l i e d h e r e , b a r s t h e a p p e l l a n t from e v e n b r i n g i n g a c l a i m a s t o f r a u d w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e 1968 q u i t c l a i m d e e d , A s t h i s C o u r t h e l d i n I s r a e l s o n v. Mountain T r a c t o r s Co. ( 1 9 7 0 ) , 1 5 5 Mont. 6 9 , 467 ". . . t h e c l a i m a r i s e s upon t h e o c c u r r e n c e o f t h e f r a u d and n o t upon d i s c o v e r y w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n o f t h e p e r s o n who c a n show t h a t t h e a c t o f f r a u d was committed under s u c h circum- s t a n c e s t h a t he would n o t be presumed t o h a v e Itnowledge o f t h e m . H o w e v e r , u n d e r t h i s e x c e p t i o n a n o b l i g a t i o n r e s t s upon t h e ag- g r i e v e d p a r t y t o p r e s e n t f a c t s t o b r i n g him- s e l f w i t h i n t h e e x c e p t i o n . He must show some a f f i r m a t i v e a c t o r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , o r i t s ----------- - - - e q u i v a l e n t , d e s i g n e d t o prevent-and which d i d p r e v e n t h e r e , d i s c o v e r y o f f a c t s by him. Too, h e must show d i l i g e n c e . I ' 467 P.2d a t 152. (Emphasis s u p p l i e d .) A s f o r t h e 1977 q u i t c l a i m d e e d , t h e e v i d e n c e d o e s n o t s u p p o r t t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s c o n t e n t i o n . The a p p e l l a n t d i d n o t s a t i s f y a l l n i n e p a r t s o f t h e t e s t s e t o u t i n Van E t t i n g e r , s u p r a . The n i n e e l e m e n t s from Van E t t i n g e r a r e a s f o l l o w s : "1. A r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ; "2. F a l s i t y of t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ; " 3 . M a t e r i a l i t y o f t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ; "4. S p e a k e r ' s knowledge of t h e f a l s i t y o f t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o r i g n o r a n c e o f its t r u t h ; "5. S p e a k e r ' s i n t e n t it s h o u l d be r e l i e d upon; "6. The h e a r e r ' s i g n o r a n c e o f t h e f a l s i t y o f t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ; "7. The h e a r e r ' s r e l i a n c e on t h e r e p r e s e n t a - t i o n ; "8. The h e a r e r ' s r i g h t t o r e l y on t h e r e p r e - s e n t a t i o n ; and "9. C o n s e q u e n t and p r o x i m a t e i n j u r y c a u s e d by t h e r e l i a n c e on t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . " 588 P.2d a t 994. A s p r e v i o u s l y n o t e d a t t h e time o f t h e f a t h e r ' s d e a t h i n 1973, a l l of t h e l a n d e x c e p t 2-1/2 p e r c e n t o f t h e s u r f a c e r i g h t s had been d i s t r i b u t e d t o t h e s o n s , G e r a l d 0. and Mike, a c c o r d i n g t o t h e p r e v i o u s l y s e t up e s t a t e p l a n . Regina T u r l e y , mother o f t h e c h i l d r e n , t e s t i f i e d a t l e n g t h a b o u t t h e r a n c h , t h e e s t a t e p l a n , t h e r e a s o n s f o r l e a v i n g t h e p r o p e r t y i n t h e manner it was d o n e , and t h e p r o b l e m s t h a t r e s u l t e d . Mrs. T u r l e y , a t t h e t i m e s h e t e s t i f i e d , was a woman of s e v e n t y - t h r e e y e a r s , who was c a u g h t i n a f a m i l y d i s p u t e o v e r p r o p e r t y a r r a n g e m e n t s made some y e a r s b e f o r e t o p r e s e r v e t h e r a n c h . She t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e r husband was t h e d o m i n a t i n g member o f t h e f a m i l y on b u s i n e s s m a t t e r s and t h a t s h e went a l o n g w i t h him on d e c i s i o n s made t o p r e s e r v e t h e r a n c h . She t e s t i f i e d s h e went w i t h him t o s e e Mr. K i l b o u r n e a t t h e t i m e t h e e s t a t e p l a n was s e t up and t h a t s h e went a l o n g w i t h h e r h u s b a n d ' s p l a n s t o g i v e t h e s u r f a c e r i g h t s o f t h e r a n c h t o t h e boys who s t a y e d on t h e r a n c h . The t e s t i m o n y i n d i c a t e s s h e agreed t h a t t h e boys who worked t h e ranch should b e n e f i t and t h a t when Lycurgus l e f t , she was aware t h a t her husband went t o Two Dot t o g e t Lycurgus t o s i g n t h e q u i t c l a i m of t h e i n t e r e s t g i v e n him when he r e t u r n e d t o t h e ranch f o r a s h o r t p e r i o d . From h e r testimony, confused a s it was, it can be seen t h a t t h e problem of who g o t t h e ranch was an u p s e t t i n g problem i n t h e f a m i l y , b u t t h e record f a i l s t o i n d i c a t e such i n f l u e n c e by t h e f a t h e r o r b r o t h e r s t h a t w a r r a n t s s e t t i n g a s i d e t h e deeds. Here, t h e a p p e l l a n t f a i l e d t o prove t h a t any f r a u d e x i s t e d . F i r s t , it is d o u b t f u l whether t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n made t o t h e a p p e l l a n t concerning t h e n e c e s s i t y of t h e signa- t u r e s on t h e 1977 q u i t c l a i m deed was anything b u t good b u s i n e s s p r a c t i c e , much l e s s f a l s e . Second, t h e a p p e l l a n t d i d n o t prove t h a t h i s b r o t h e r s , Gerald and Mike, nor h i s mother, knew t h a t t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s were anything b u t t r u e . T h i r d , t h e a p p e l l a n t d i d n o t have t o r e l y on t h e i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t was g i v e n him. A s t h i s Court s t a t e d i n - Van E t t i n g e r , s u p r a , 588 P.2d a t 994: " A p p e l l a n t s could n o t r e l y on t h e a l l e g e d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of respondents a s a m a t t e r of law. I n Lee v. Stockmen's N a t i o n a l Bank ( 1 9 2 2 ) , 63 Mont, 262, 284, 207 P. 623, 630, it was s t a t e d : "'When i t a p p e a r s t h a t a p a r t y , who c l a i m s t o have been deceived t o h i s p r e j u d i c e , - h a s i n v e s t i g a t e d f o r h i m s e l f - - - o r t h a t t h e means were a t hand t o a s c e r t a i n t h e t r u t h . . . of any r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s made t o him, h i s r e l i a n c e upon s u c h r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s made t o him, however f a l s e t h e y may have been, a f f o r d s no ground of complaint. (Grindrod v , Anglo- American Bond Co., 34 Mont. 169, 85 P. 891; Power & B r o t h e r s v. Turner, 37 Mont. 521, 97 P. 950; 26 C . J . 1149.) ' (Emphasis added.) W e n o t e t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court d i d n o t make s p e c i f i c f i n d i n g s on t h e i s s u e of c o n s t r u c t i v e f r a u d . C o n s t r u c t i v e f r a u d is d e f i n e d by s e c t i o n 28-2-406, MCA, a s follows: " C o n s t r u c t i v e f r a u d c o n s i s t s i n : " ( 1 ) Any breach of d u t y which, without any a c t u a l l y f r a u d u l e n t i n t e n t , g a i n s a n advantage t o t h e person i n f a u l t -or anyone claiming under him by misleading a n o t h e r t o t h i s p r e j u d i c e o r t o t h e p r e j u d i c e of anyone claiming under him; o r " ( 2 ) Any such a c t o r omission a s t h e law e s p e c i a l l y d e c l a r e d t o be f r a u d u l e n t , without r e s p e c t t o a c t u a l fraud." (Emphasis added.) The record f a i l s t o s e t f o r t h any f a c t s showing t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t was misled by t h e respondents. The record does n o t show any a c t on t h e p a r t of t h e r e s p o n d e n t s d e c l a r e d by law t o be f r a u d u l e n t . W e t h e r e f o r e conclude t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t h a s f a i l e d t o prove c o n s t r u c t i v e f r a u d . The f a c t s and law do n o t s u p p o r t a p p e l l a n t ' s conten- t i o n t h a t t h e r e was no c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r e i t h e r deed. S e c t i o n 70-1-502, MCA, provides: "A v o l u n t a r y t r a n s f e r is an executed c o n t r a c t s u b j e c t t o a l l r u l e s of law concerning c o n t r a c t s i n g e n e r a l , e x c e p t t h a t a c o n s i d e r a t i o n is n o t n e c e s s a r y t o i t s v a l i d i t y . " A l s o , a t 1 3 Am.Jur.2d C a n c e l l a t i o n of I n s t r u m e n t s , s e c t i o n 25 a t 519-520, we f i n d : "The r u l e is c l e a r t h a t inadequacy of c o n s i d e r a t i o n is n o t , i n i t s e l f , a s u f f i c i e n t ground f o r c a n c e l l a t i o n of any agreement o r i n s t r u m e n t , i n c l u d i n g a deed." From t h e f a c t s we f i n d t h a t c o n s i d e r a t i o n was indeed p r e s e n t . The a p p e l l a n t ' s b r o t h e r s agreed t o hold him harmless on t h e promissory n o t e from P r u d e n t i a l I n s u r a n c e Company i f he signed t h e q u i t c l a i m deed. The f a c t t h a t t k e a p p e l l a n t ' s name was m i s t a k e n l y n o t taken o f f t h e n o t e is i r r e l e v a n t i n l i g h t of t h e hold harmless c l a u s e of t h e 1968 q u i t c l a i m deed and t h e f a c t t h a t a p p e l l a n t was never asked t o pay on t h e note. A s f o r t h e 1977 q u i t c l a i m deed, t h e a p p e l l a n t received a $2,500 down payment froin h i s b r o t h e r s who promised t o pay an a d d i t i o n a l $7,500 t o a p p e l l a n t when t h e i r mother d i e s . The respondents have been paying t h e premiums on a l i f e i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y t h a t is i n t h e i r m o t h e r ' s name. The proceeds of t h e p o l i c y w i l l p a s s t o t h e a p p e l l a n t and h i s s i b l i n g s , o t h e r than Gerald and Mike, i n r e t u r n f o r t h e s i g n a t u r e on t h e 1977 q u i t c l a i m deed. A p p e l l a n t ' s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t b o t h q u i t c l a i m d e e d s should be rescinded because t h e y come under s e c t i o n 28-2- 1711, MCA, is unfounded. The c i t e d s e c t i o n is n o t a p p l i - c a b l e t o t h e f a c t s of t h i s c a s e . F i r s t , our s t a t u t e s do n o t r e q u i r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r t h e t r a n s f e r of p r o p e r t y . S e c t i o n 70-1-502, MCA, v o l u n t a r y t r a n s f e r - - a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f c o n t r a c t , r u l e s : "A v o l u n t a r y t r a n s f e r is an executed c o n t r a c t s u b j e c t t o a l l r u l e s of law concerning con- t r a c t s i n g e n e r a l , e x c e p t t h a t c o n s i d e r a t i o n is n o t n e c e s s a r y t o its v a l i d i t y . " I n a d d i t i o n , h e r e evidence c l e a r l y showed a p p e l l a n t was t o be indemnified f o r s i g n i n g and t h a t would be s u f f i - c i e n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n . A p p e l l a n t ' s f i n a l c o n t e n t i o n is t h a t h i s a c t i o n a s t o t h e 1968 q u i t c l a i m deed is n o t b a r r e d by t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s . Again, t h i s a s s e r t i o n is n o t supported by e i t h e r t h e f a c t s o r law. Both p a r t i e s agreed t h a t s e c t i o n 27-2-203, MCA, is c o n t r o l l i n g on t h i s p o i n t . S e c t i o n 27-2- 203, MCA, provides: " A c t i o n s f o r r e l i e f on g r o u n d o f f r a u d o r ---- - - - - - mistake. The p e r i o d p r e s c r i b e d f o r t h e com- mencement of an a c t i o n f o r r e l i e f on t h e ground of f r a u d o r mistake is w i t h i n 2 y e a r s , t h e cause of a c t i o n i n such c a s e n o t t o be deemed t o have accrued u n t i l t h e d i s c o v e r y by t h e aggrieved p a r t y of t h e f a c t s c o n s t i t u t i n g t h e fraud o r mistake." The c a s e law i n t e r p r e t i n g when t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s begins t o run is q u i t e c l e a r l y i n f a v o r of t h e respondents. I n I s r a e l s o n v. Mountain T r a c t o r s Co., s u p r a , we h e l d t h a t s t a t u t e begins t o run when t h e f r a u d o c c u r s and t h e o n l y e x c e p t i o n t o t h i s is i f t h e r e was an a f f i r m a t i v e a c t t o p r e v e n t a person from d i s c o v e r i n g t h e f r a u d . T h i s Court i n I s r a e l s o n , s u p r a , c i t e d Kerrigan v. O'Meara ( 1 9 2 4 ) , 71 Mont, 1, 227 P. 819, which c o n t a i n s t h e following language: "There must be some a c t i v e a f f i r m a t i v e con- cealment of t h e f r a u d , something s a i d o r done t o c o n t i n u e t h e d e c e p t i o n o r t o p r e v e n t i n q u i r y and l u l l t h e p l a i n t i f f i n t o a s e n s e of s e c u r i t y , i n o r d e r t o postpone t h e running of t h e s t a t u t e . . . " A s a g e n e r a l r u l e , t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a - t i o n s begins t o run from t h e time t h e r i g h t of a c t i o n a c c r u e s , and n o t when t h e p l a i n t i f f who is i g n o r a n t b e f o r e comes t o a knowledge o f h i s r i g h t s . . . "Now t h e word ' d i s c o v e r y ' a s used i m p l i e s t h a t t h e f a c t s have been concealed from t h e p a r t y r e l y i n g upon t h e e x c e p t i o n . 'Discovery' and 'knowledge' a r e n o t c o n v e r t i b l e terms, and whether t h e r e h a s been a d i s c o v e r y of t h e f a c t s c o n s t i t u t i n g t h e f r a u d w i t h i n t h e meaning of t h e s t a t u t e is a q u e s t i o n of law t o be determined from t h e f a c t s proved. I t is n o t enough f o r t h e p l a i n t i f f merely t o s a y he was i g n o r a n t of t h e f a c t s a t t h e time of t h e i r o c c u r r e n c e , and h a s n o t come i n t o knowledge of them u n t i l w i t h i n two y e a r s . He m u s t show t h a t t h e a c t s o f f r a u d were committed under such c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h a t he would n o t be presumed t o have knowledge of them, i t b e i n g t h e r u l e t h a t ---- i f h e h a s ' n o t i c e of i n f o r m a t i o n of c i r c u m s t a n c e s which would p u t him on i n q u i r y which i f followed - - - - - - -- -- would l e a d t o knowledge, o r t h a t t h e f a c t s - - - - - - - - - - were p r e s u m p t i v e l y w i t h i n h i s knowledge, he - - - - - w i l l be deemed t o h a v e --- had a c t u a l knowledge of t h e f a c t s . "The f a c t t h a t a person e n t i t l e d t o an a c t i o n h a s no knowledge of h i s r i g h t t o s u e , o r of t h e f a c t s o u t of which h i s r i g h t a r i s e s , d o e s n o t , a s a g e n e r a l r u l e , p r e v e n t t h e running of t h e s t a t u t e , o r postpone t h e commencement of t h e p e r i o d of l i m i t a t i o n , u n t i l h e d i s c o v e r s t h e f a c t s o r l e a r n s of h i s r i g h t t h e r e u n d e r . Nor d o e s t h e mere s i l e n c e of t h e p e r s o n l i a b l e t o t h e a c t i o n p r e v e n t t h e r u n n i n g o f t h e s t a t u t e . To h a v e s u c h e f f e c t , t h e r e m u s t b e s o m e t h i n g d o n e t o p r e v e n t d i s c o v e r y - - s o m e t h i n g which c a n be s a i d t o amount t o c o n c e a l m e n t . . . " I g n o r a n c e of r i g h t , t h e r e b e i n g no more t h a n mere p a s s i v e n e s s , mere s i l e n c e , on t h e p a r t of h i s a d v e r s a r y , c a n n o t be e n g r a f t e d a s an e x c e p t i o n o n t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s , w i t h o u t a d e s t r u c t i o n of its w i s e p o l i c y , and w i t h o u t a n encouragement o f mere n e g l i g e n c e . [ C i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ; e m p h a s i s s u p p l i e d . ] " 227 P. a t 821. A p p e l l a n t d i d n o t b r i n g t h i s c l a i m u n t i l t e n y e a r s a f t e r t h e 1968 q u i t c l a i m deed was s i g n e d . The t e s t i m o n y d i d n o t r e v e a l an a f f i r m a t i v e a c t on t h e p a r t of r e s p o n d e n t s o r any member o f a p p e l l a n t ' s f a m i l y . C l e a r l y , t h e l a w c a n n o t b e s t r e t c h e d t o accommodate a p a r t y who sits on h i s r i g h t s f o r s o l o n g . The d o c t r i n e o f l a c h e s would b a r t h e a p p e l - l a n t ' s c l a i m i f t h e r e was a n y d o u b t a s t o t h e a p p l i c a b i l i t y of s e c t i o n 27-2-203, MCA. I n summary, t h i s c a s e c a n be q u i t e e a s i l y c a p s u l i z e d . I t is a p p a r e n t from t h e t e s t i m o n y t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t was aware o f t h e o r i g i n a l p u r p o s e b e h i n d t h e q u i t c l a i m d e e d s . He knew t h a t h i s f a t h e r ' s p l a n was t o g i v e t h e r a n c h t o t h o s e members o f the f a m i l y who c h o s e t o s t a y and work on t h e r a n c h . The r e s p o n d e n t s have worked t h e r a n c h f o r t h e i r e n t i r e l i v e s ; t h e a p p e l l a n t was t h e r e a p p r o x i m a t e l y t h r e e y e a r s . The judgment is a f f i r m e d . We concur: Judge, sitting in place of Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy Mr. Justice Frank B. Morrison, Jr., dissenting: I respectfully dissent. The majority opinion correctly notes that appellant relies upon the existence of a confidential relationship routed in family as a basis for constructive fraud allegations. The crux of this argument is that appellant, because of his weak physical and mental condition, was dependent for financial advice upon his father and brothers. If appellant indeed were found to have reposed special trust and confidence in defendant3,a breach of such trust could form the basis for constructive fraud relief. The majority states "The trial court's findings fail to support this contention." However, the trial court made no findings with respect to constructive fraud. Therefore, I would remand this case to the District Court with directions to make findings.