Title: State v. Sturdivant
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC10-1791
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: February 23, 2012

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC10-1791 
____________ 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
ROBERT N. STURDIVANT,  
Respondent. 
 
[February 23, 2012] 
 
PARIENTE, J. 
 
The issue in this case is whether the merger doctrine precludes a first-degree 
felony-murder conviction predicated on a single act of aggravated child abuse that 
caused the child‟s death.  In Sturdivant v. State, 35 Fla. L. Weekly D1993 (Fla. 1st 
DCA Sept. 7, 2010), the First District Court of Appeal certified to this Court a 
question as one of great public importance, asking whether this Court‟s decision in 
Brooks v. State, 918 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 2005), precludes a felony-murder conviction 
in such a situation, notwithstanding the language of the felony-murder statute.1 
                                         
 
1.  Specifically, the First District asked: 
 
 
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We rephrase the certified question as follows: 
DOES THE MERGER DOCTRINE PRECLUDE A FELONY-
MURDER CONVICTION UNDER SECTION 782.04(1)(a)2., 
FLORIDA STATUTES (2007), THAT IS PREDICATED UPON A 
SINGLE ACT OF AGGRAVATED CHILD ABUSE THAT 
CAUSED THE CHILD‟S DEATH? 
Based upon legislative intent as evidenced by the plain language of the felony-
murder statute, we hold that the merger doctrine does not preclude a felony-murder 
conviction predicated upon a single act of aggravated child abuse that caused the 
child‟s death.  Accordingly, we answer the rephrased certified question in the 
negative, recede from Brooks to the extent that it holds to the contrary, and quash 
the First District‟s decision below. 
FACTS AND BACKGROUND 
 
The felony-murder statute in Florida provides that first-degree murder 
includes: “The unlawful killing of a human being . . . [w]hen committed by a 
person engaged in the perpetration of, or in the attempt to perpetrate, any . . .  
[a]ggravated child abuse . . . .”  § 782.04(1)(a)2.h., Fla. Stat. (2007).  In this case, 
                                                                                                                                   
DOES BROOKS v. STATE, 918 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 2005), PRECLUDE 
A CONVICTION FOR FELONY MURDER BASED ON THE 
PREDICATE OFFENSE OF AGGRAVATED CHILD ABUSE 
WHEN THE ABUSE CONSISTS OF A SINGLE ACT, 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE LANGUAGE OF SECTION 
782.04(1)(a)2.h., FLORIDA STATUTES (2007)? 
Sturdivant, 35 Fla. L. Weekly at D1995.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 
3(b)(4), Fla. Const. 
 
 
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Sturdivant “was indicted by a grand jury for first-degree felony murder and 
aggravated child abuse.  As to the felony-murder charge, the indictment alleged 
that [Sturdivant] killed the victim while committing aggravated child abuse by 
slapping the [two-year-old] victim into a wall.  The allegation was the same for the 
aggravated child abuse charge.”  Sturdivant, 35 Fla. L. Weekly at D1993.  In light 
of the Brooks decision, the State out of an abundance of caution also filed an 
information charging second-degree murder on the same allegation as had been 
made in the indictment.  The first-degree and second-degree murder cases were 
consolidated.  Id.   
 
At trial, the State “played for the jury a portion of a statement made by 
[Sturdivant] in which [he] said that he had slapped the two-year-old victim, who 
was standing on a coffee table, on the back of the head with such force that the 
victim fell, hitting his head on the concrete wall.”  Id.  The medical examiner 
testified that Sturdivant‟s “version of what had happened was consistent with the 
findings on autopsy, and that the force of the slap to the back of the victim‟s head 
would have been sufficient to cause death.”  Id. 
Following the trial, the jury returned verdicts finding Sturdivant guilty of 
first-degree felony murder, second-degree murder, and aggravated child abuse.2  At 
                                         
 
2.  The jury was instructed on aggravated child abuse as follows:  
 
 
 
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sentencing, Sturdivant was adjudicated guilty of first-degree murder and 
aggravated child abuse.  Id. at D1994.  The trial court sentenced him to life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the first-degree murder 
conviction and to thirty years‟ imprisonment for the aggravated child abuse 
conviction.  Because of double jeopardy concerns, Sturdivant was not adjudicated 
guilty of, or sentenced for, second-degree murder.  Id. 
 
 On appeal, Sturdivant argued that he could not be convicted of both the 
first-degree felony murder and the underlying felony of aggravated child abuse 
because of the merger doctrine.  After examining this Court‟s decision in Brooks, 
in which a majority of the Court held that it was error to convict Brooks of felony 
murder based on the predicate felony of a single act of aggravated child abuse, the 
First District held that in this case, “[b]ecause it is clear that the child victim died 
                                                                                                                                   
To prove the crime of aggravated child abuse the State must 
prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt.  First, 
Robert Nathan Sturdivant willfully tortured Isaiah Howard or 
maliciously punished Isaiah Howard.  And second, Isaiah Howard 
was under the age of 18 years.   
 
“Willfully” means knowingly, intentionally and purposefully. 
 
“Maliciously” means wrongfully, intentionally and without 
legal justification or excuse. 
 
Maliciousness may be established by circumstances from which 
one could conclude that a reasonable parent would not have engaged 
in the damaging acts toward the child for any valid reason and that the 
primary purpose of the acts was to cause the victim unjustifiable pain 
or injury. 
 
Child abuse means an intentional act that could reasonably be 
expected to result in physical or mental injury to a child. 
 
 
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as the result of a single blow from [Sturdivant], we are constrained to reverse 
[Sturdivant‟s] convictions.”  Id. at D1995.  The First District then certified to this 
Court the question of whether Brooks precludes a conviction for felony murder 
based on the predicate offense of aggravated child abuse when the abuse consists 
of a single act, despite the language of section 782.04(1)(a)2., the felony-murder 
statute.  Id.  
ANALYSIS 
 
In Brooks v. State, 918 So. 2d 181, 198 (Fla. 2005), a majority of this Court 
concluded that when a felony-murder conviction is predicated upon a single act of 
aggravated child abuse that causes the child‟s death, the underlying felony of 
aggravated child abuse based on that single act merges with the homicide.  We 
begin our analysis by examining the merger doctrine, which is a doctrine of 
statutory construction designed to effectuate legislative intent.  Then, we examine 
the relevant portions of the felony-murder statute to discern the legislative intent.  
We conclude that where the underlying felony has been explicitly enumerated by 
the Legislature as one upon which a felony-murder conviction can be based, the 
underlying felony and the homicide do not merge.  To hold otherwise would do 
violence to legislative intent as evidenced by the plain language of the felony-
murder statute.  Accordingly, we recede from Brooks to the extent that it holds to 
the contrary.  
 
 
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The Merger Doctrine 
The merger doctrine is a principle of statutory construction rather than a 
principle of constitutional law.3  The origins of the merger doctrine have been 
explained as follows: 
Conceived in the nineteenth century, the merger doctrine was 
developed . . . as a shorthand explanation for the conclusion that the 
felony-murder rule should not be applied in circumstances where the 
only underlying (or “predicate”) felony committed by the defendant 
was assault.  The name of the doctrine derived from the 
characterization of the assault as an offense that “merged” with the 
resulting homicide. 
State v. Godsey, 60 S.W.3d 759, 774 (Tenn. 2001) (quoting People v. Hansen, 885 
P.2d 1022, 1028 (Cal. 1994), overruled on other grounds by People v. Sarun Chun, 
203 P.3d 425 (Cal. 2009)).  With respect to the merger doctrine being one of 
preserving legislative intent, the Tennessee Supreme Court has explained: 
Courts have generally declined to hold that the merger doctrine 
implicates any principles of constitutional law.  Instead, courts have 
viewed the merger doctrine as a principle for preserving legislative 
intent and, more specifically, as a principle that preserves “some 
                                         
 
3.  The merger doctrine is distinct from double jeopardy, which is a 
constitutional principle.  However, this Court has made it clear that there is no 
double jeopardy concern with dual convictions for aggravated child abuse and 
felony murder.  Lukehart v. State, 776 So. 2d 906, 922 (Fla. 2000) (“[W]e find 
Lukehart‟s argument that double jeopardy principles prohibit the dual convictions 
of felony murder and aggravated child abuse to be without merit. . . .  This issue 
was recently addressed by the Third District Court of Appeal . . . .  Judge Cope 
wrote for the court: „Simply put, [a] defendant can be convicted of both felony 
murder and the qualifying felony because the felony murder statute says so.‟ ” 
(quoting Green v. State, 680 So. 2d 1067, 1068 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996))). 
 
 
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meaningful domain in which the Legislature‟s careful graduation of 
homicide offenses can be implemented.” 
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Hansen, 885 P.2d at 1028).  The court observed that 
“[t]he doctrine has been applied largely in those states where the felony murder 
statute fails to specifically list the felonies capable of supporting a felony murder 
conviction.”  Id. at 774-75.  
In a prior decision, this Court also recognized this distinction.  In Robles v. 
State, 188 So. 2d 789, 792 (Fla. 1966), this Court distinguished between a felony-
murder statute that provided that “any” felony could serve as a basis for felony 
murder and an enumerated felony-murder statute, such as Florida‟s.  In that case, 
the defendant asserted that the facts of the case—where the victim was killed 
during the course of a burglary—were not appropriate for the application of the 
felony-murder rule.  Id. at 791.  The defendant directed the Court‟s attention to a 
line of New York cases holding that the felony-murder rule does not apply unless 
the felony is separate and independent from the homicide and where the underlying 
felony is not separate and independent, the underlying felony and the homicide 
merge.  Id. at 792.  This Court disagreed, noting the difference between the general 
catch-all felony-murder statute in New York and the enumerated felony-murder 
statute in Florida, which listed burglary as an offense on which felony-murder can 
be predicated: 
 
 
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As appellant acknowledges, the concern of the New York court, 
which was to preserve the integrity of the statutory degrees of 
homicide, resulted from the fact that the statute of that state makes a 
homicide committed in the perpetration of any felony first degree 
murder.  Since the phrase “any felony” is broad enough to include 
even the aggravated assault that is usually involved in any homicide, 
the result would be that substantially every homicide would constitute 
first degree murder. 
It was to avoid this result that the New York court adopted the 
doctrine that the supporting felony had to be independent of the 
homicide. . . . 
It is obvious that the problem that motivated the New York 
court to adopt the above rule cannot exist under a statute like 
Florida‟s, which limits the felony-murder rule to homicides 
committed in the perpetration of specified felonies, not including 
assault in any of its forms. 
Id. (second emphasis added) (citation omitted).  Accordingly, this Court concluded 
that the concern motivating the New York courts—preserving the integrity of 
statutory degrees of homicide—did not compel the same result in Florida.4 
                                         
4.  New York subsequently amended its felony-murder statute to enumerate 
specific felonies, and New York courts have since declined to extend the merger 
doctrine in light of this amendment: 
The considerations which prompted our court to announce the merger 
doctrine do not justify its extension here.  We developed this doctrine 
to remedy a fundamental defect in the old felony-murder statute.  
Under that statute, any felony, including assault, could be the 
predicate for a felony murder.  Since, a fortiori, every homicide, not 
excusable or justifiable, occurs during the commission of assault, 
every homicide would constitute a felony murder.   
This defect was remedied by the Legislature in 1965 by 
including in the revised Penal Law a list of specified felonies—all 
involving violence or substantial risk of physical injury—as the only 
felonies forming a basis for felony murder. 
People v. Miller, 297 N.E.2d 85, 87 (N.Y. 1973) (citation omitted). 
 
 
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Florida’s Felony-Murder Statute 
Because the merger doctrine is a principle of statutory construction, our 
analysis focuses on legislative intent.  This is because “[a] court‟s purpose in 
construing a statute is to give effect to legislative intent, which is the polestar that 
guides the court in statutory construction.”  Larimore v. State, 2 So. 3d 101, 106 
(Fla. 2008).  “As with any case of statutory construction, [the Court must] begin 
with the „actual language used in the statute.‟ ”  Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 
963 So. 2d 189, 198 (Fla. 2007) (quoting Borden v. East-European Ins. Co., 921 
So. 2d 587, 595 (Fla. 2006)).  “This is because legislative intent is determined 
primarily from the statute‟s text.”  Id.  Accordingly, we begin our discussion of the 
felony-murder statute with an examination of the statute‟s language.  Because the 
question before this Court is a purely legal one that includes issues of statutory 
interpretation, this Court‟s review is de novo.  See Sanders v. State, 35 So. 3d 864, 
868 (Fla. 2010) (“Pure questions of law are subject to de novo review.”); State v. 
Burris, 875 So. 2d 408, 410 (Fla. 2004) (stating that a “question of statutory 
interpretation is subject to de novo review”). 
Florida‟s felony-murder statute specifically lists the underlying offenses that 
can justify a conviction for first-degree felony murder.  See § 782.04(1)(a)2., Fla. 
Stat.  Aggravated child abuse is one of the enumerated felonies in the statute.  The 
felony-murder statute provides that first-degree murder includes: “The unlawful 
 
 
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killing of a human being . . . [w]hen committed by a person engaged in the 
perpetration of, or in the attempt to perpetrate, any . . . [a]ggravated child 
abuse . . . .”  § 782.04(1)(a)2.h., Fla. Stat.  Aggravated child abuse is defined as 
follows: 
 “Aggravated child abuse” occurs when a person: 
(a) Commits aggravated battery on a child; 
(b) Willfully tortures, maliciously punishes, or willfully and 
unlawfully cages a child; or 
(c) Knowingly or willfully abuses a child and in so doing 
causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent 
disfigurement to the child. 
§ 827.03(2), Fla. Stat. (2007).  The statute defines “maliciously” as follows: 
For purposes of this section, “maliciously” means wrongfully, 
intentionally, and without legal justification or excuse.  Maliciousness 
may be established by circumstances from which one could conclude 
that a reasonable parent would not have engaged in the damaging acts 
toward the child for any valid reason and that the primary purpose of 
the acts was to cause the victim unjustifiable pain or injury. 
§ 827.03(4), Fla. Stat.5 
                                         
 
5.  When the Legislature added aggravated child abuse to the felony-murder 
statute, see ch. 84-16, § 1, Laws of Fla., aggravated child abuse was defined as 
follows: 
Whoever: 
(1) Commits aggravated battery on a child; 
(2) Willfully tortures a child; 
(3) Maliciously punishes a child; or 
(4) Willfully and unlawfully cages a child 
shall be guilty of a felony of the second degree . . . . 
§ 827.03, Fla. Stat. (1983).  The current provision specifying the types of 
aggravated child abuse was adopted in 1996.  See ch. 96-322, § 8, Laws of Fla. 
 
 
- 11 - 
Sturdivant argues that the merger doctrine should apply in his case, which 
would preclude his felony-murder conviction being based on aggravated child 
abuse consisting of a single violent act.6  However, we note that the merger 
doctrine “has been applied largely in those states where the felony murder statute 
fails to specifically list the felonies capable of supporting a felony murder 
conviction.  Where a „legislature explicitly states that a particular felony is a 
predicate felony for felony-murder, no “merger” occurs.‟ ”  Godsey, 60 S.W.3d at 
774-75 (footnote omitted) (quoting State v. Lopez, 847 P.2d 1078, 1089 (Ariz. 
1992)); see also Lopez, 847 P.2d at 1089 (“Even those states that follow the 
merger doctrine recognize that, if the legislature explicitly states that a particular 
felony is a predicate felony for felony-murder, no „merger‟ occurs.”).  Here, the 
Florida Legislature has specifically listed aggravated child abuse as a predicate 
offense that will support a conviction for first-degree felony murder.  Accordingly, 
we conclude that the merger doctrine does not apply where the underlying felony is 
the enumerated felony of aggravated child abuse.7 
                                         
 
6.  Sturdivant does not challenge the underlying aggravated child abuse 
conviction in this Court. 
 
7.  The State proposes, as an alternative, that this Court narrow the 
application of the felony-murder statute in aggravated child abuse murders to 
“prototypical child abuse murders”; that is, where a caregiver “punishes a child to 
death.”  The State bases this argument on the legislative history of the felony-
murder statute.  We decline to consider such a construction because “[w]hen the 
statute is clear and unambiguous, courts will not look behind the statute‟s plain 
 
 
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Further, the plain language of the felony-murder statute makes no distinction 
between cases involving single or multiple acts of aggravated child abuse.  Rather, 
the statute clearly encompasses those situations involving a single act of 
aggravated child abuse by providing that a felony-murder conviction may be 
predicated upon “any . . . [a]ggravated child abuse.”  § 782.04(1)(a)2.h., Fla. Stat. 
(emphasis added).  After examining the language of the statute, we conclude that 
the Florida Legislature has unambiguously indicated its intent to elevate the 
punishment to that of first-degree murder in situations wherein the death of a child 
is caused by even a single act of aggravated child abuse. 
Receding from Brooks 
Having examined the merger doctrine and discerned the legislative intent 
from the plain language of the statute, we now turn to our consideration of the 
Brooks decision and whether to recede from it.  When considering whether to 
recede from precedent, this Court has explained: “The doctrine of stare decisis 
counsels us to follow our precedents unless there has been „a significant change in 
circumstances after the adoption of the legal rule, or . . . an error in legal 
                                                                                                                                   
language for legislative intent or resort to rules of statutory construction to 
ascertain intent.”  Koile v. State, 934 So. 2d 1226, 1230-31 (Fla. 2006) (quoting 
Daniels v. Fla. Dep‟t of Health, 898 So. 2d 61, 64 (Fla. 2005)).  Further, this Court 
has “decline[d] to add words to a statute where . . . the language is clear and 
unambiguous.”  State v. Burris, 875 So. 2d 408, 414 n.2 (Fla. 2004) (quoting 
Overstreet v. State, 629 So. 2d 125, 126 (Fla. 1993)). 
 
 
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analysis.‟ ”  Rotemi Realty, Inc. v. Act Realty Co., 911 So. 2d 1181, 1188 (Fla. 
2005) (quoting Dorsey v. State, 868 So. 2d 1192, 1199 (Fla. 2003)).  “Fidelity to 
precedent provides stability to the law and to the society governed by that law.  
However, the doctrine does not command blind allegiance to precedent.  Stare 
decisis yields when an established rule of law has proven unacceptable or 
unworkable in practice.”  State v. Green, 944 So. 2d 208, 217 (Fla. 2006) (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted). 
In Brooks, the defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder 
for the murder of Rachel Carlson and her three-month-old daughter; he was 
sentenced to death for both murders.  918 So. 2d at 186.  Brooks was not charged 
with aggravated child abuse; however, the trial court found as an aggravating 
circumstance that “the murder occurred during the commission of the felony of 
aggravated child abuse.”  Id. at 187.  Brooks argued on appeal that the trial court 
erred by finding that he committed the murders during the course of a felony 
(aggravated child abuse) and then by applying the aggravating circumstance based 
on the aggravated child abuse.  Id. at 197.  He contended that “because the single 
act of stabbing [the child] formed the basis of both the aggravated child abuse 
aggravating factor under section 921.141(5)(d) of the Florida Statutes and the first-
degree felony murder charge, the court should have found that the aggravated child 
abuse allegation „merged‟ with the more serious homicide charge.”  Id.  A majority 
 
 
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of the Court concluded that the aggravated child abuse based on a single stab 
wound would merge with the homicide.  Id. at 198-99; id. at 217 (Pariente, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  In so holding, the per curiam opinion, in 
which two Justices concurred, relied upon this Court‟s prior decision in Mills v. 
State, 476 So. 2d 172, 177 (Fla. 1985), wherein the Court held that an aggravated 
battery conviction (which is not an enumerated felony in the felony-murder statute) 
and a homicide conviction, both based on a single gun blast, merged into one 
criminal act.  Brooks, 918 So. 2d at 198 (per curiam op.).   
Justice Lewis concurred in part and dissented in part, writing separately to 
express his disagreement with “the majority‟s determination that aggravated child 
abuse was not available for consideration in the instant matter because Brooks 
inflicted only one lethal stabbing blow on the infant‟s body.”  Id. at 217 (Lewis, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Justice Lewis stated that the result 
“contravenes the plain language of the felony murder statute and is directly 
contrary to the Legislature‟s intent in amending that statute to include the felony of 
aggravated child abuse as a basis for application of the doctrine of felony murder 
and as a factor to be weighed in aggravation in the sentencing determination.”  Id.  
Justice Lewis also discussed why reliance on Mills was misplaced.  See id. at 218-
20.  With respect to the underlying felony in Mills, he explained in relevant part: 
At the time of our decision in Mills, as well as currently, 
aggravated battery of an adult cannot serve as the basis for a felony 
 
 
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murder conviction or be applied as an aggravating factor during the 
course of a sentencing determination. . . .  By law, however, 
aggravated battery of a child can serve as the basis for a felony 
murder conviction . . . , regardless of whether a single act of violence 
constituted both the abuse and resulted in the death of the child. 
Id. at 220.   
In light of the nature of the merger doctrine and the plain language of the 
Florida felony-murder statute, we agree with Justice Lewis‟s dissent in Brooks that 
the holding was contrary to the plain language of the statute and legislative intent.  
Thus, we recede from Brooks to the extent it holds that felony murder cannot be 
predicated upon a single act of aggravated child abuse.  See Dorsey, 868 So. 2d at 
1199 (stating that stare decisis will yield “when there has been an error in legal 
analysis”).  The Brooks decision created a distinction not contemplated by the 
Legislature—whether the underlying felony of aggravated child abuse consists of a 
single act or multiple acts. 
Further, we recognize that Brooks improperly extended and relied upon 
Mills.  The Court in Mills concluded that it did not “believe that the legislature 
intended dual convictions for both homicide and the lethal act that caused the 
homicide [aggravated battery] without causing additional injury to another person 
or property.”  Mills, 476 So. 2d at 177.  Accordingly, based on legislative intent, 
the Mills Court concluded that “[i]n this limited context” the aggravated battery 
and the homicide “merged into one criminal act” and therefore vacated the 
 
 
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sentence and conviction for aggravated battery.  Id.  However, the underlying 
felony in Mills was aggravated battery, a felony not enumerated in the felony-
murder statute.8  The Brooks Court reasoned that “aggravated child abuse is an 
aggravated battery, the only difference being that the victim is a child.”  Brooks, 
918 So. 2d at 198.  However, this reasoning failed to recognize that aggravated 
battery is not listed in the felony-murder statute, whereas aggravated child abuse is 
clearly enumerated in the statute. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the merger doctrine does not 
preclude a felony-murder conviction predicated upon a single act of aggravated 
                                         
 
8.  The holding in Mills that the aggravated battery, a non-enumerated 
felony, merges with the homicide is consistent with the reasoning of this case as 
well as the reasoning of other states applying the merger doctrine where the felony-
murder statutes do not enumerate specific predicate felonies.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Gunter, 692 N.E.2d 515, 525 (Mass. 1998) (holding that where 
statute provided that a murder committed in the commission or attempted 
commission of a life felony was first-degree murder, acts constituting the 
underlying felony must be separate from the acts that were a necessary part of the 
homicide itself and reasoning that “[w]ere felonious assault sufficient to support a 
conviction of murder in the first degree, the distinctions among homicides would 
be rendered meaningless: all murders in the second degree and manslaughters 
could be enhanced to murder in the first degree based on the felony-murder theory 
with assault as the underlying felony.”); State v. Campos, 921 P.2d 1266, 1271-74 
(N.M. 1996) (holding that because New Mexico felony-murder statute did not 
enumerate predicate felonies, the predicate felony could not be a lesser-included 
offense of second-degree murder, reasoning that this holding was necessary in 
order to avoid improperly elevating the vast majority of second-degree murders to 
first-degree murders by charging the underlying assaultive act as the predicate 
felony). 
 
 
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child abuse that caused the child‟s death since aggravated child abuse is an 
enumerated underlying offense in the felony-murder statute.  Therefore, we answer 
the rephrased certified question in the negative, recede from Brooks to the extent 
that it holds to the contrary, and quash the First District‟s decision below. 
 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and LEWIS, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
QUINCE, J., dissents with an opinion. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
QUINCE, J., dissenting. 
 
 
I dissent because the single act of aggravated abuse in this case is necessary 
to prove the felony murder.  Thus, the aggravated abuse is a necessarily lesser 
included offense of the felony murder.  This is no different from a case of second-
degree murder and manslaughter.  Certainly, a defendant could not be convicted of 
second-degree murder and manslaughter of the same victim. 
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Great Public Importance  
 
 
First District - Case No. 1D08-0658 
 
 
(Bay County) 
 
 
 
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Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Charmaine M. Millsaps, Assistant 
Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Paula S. Saunders, Assistant Public 
Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent