Title: Brown v. Acuity, A Mut. Ins. Co.
Citation: 2013 WI 60
Docket Number: 2011AP000583
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 9, 2013

2013 WI 60 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP583   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Marilyn M. Brown and Delores M. Schwartz, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
Dean Health Insurance, Inc., Conseco Insurance 
Company and  
Kathleen Sebelius, 
          Involuntary-Plaintiffs, 
     v. 
Acuity, A Mutual Insurance Company, Parnell P. 
Burditt,  
American Alternative Insurance Company and 
Okauchee Fire Department, 
          Defendants-Respondents, 
Utica Mutual Insurance Company, 
          Defendant.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 342 Wis. 2d 236, 815 N.W.2d 719 
(Ct. App. 2012 – Published) 
PDC No: 2012 WI App 66     
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 9, 2013   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 12, 2013   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha   
 
JUDGE: 
Donald J. Hassin Jr.    
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners, 
there 
were 
briefs by Don C. Prachthauser, Keith R. Stachowiak, and Murphy & 
Prachthauser, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Keith R. 
Stachowiak. 
 
For  defendants-respondents American Alternative Insurance 
Company and Okauchee Fire Department, there was a brief by 
 
 
2
Bennett J. Brantmeier, Amanda J. Ramaker, Danielle H. Thompson 
and Brantmeier Law, LLC, Jefferson, with oral argument by 
Bennett J. Brantmeier. 
 
For 
defendants-respondents 
Acuity, 
A 
Mutual 
Insurance 
Company, and Parnell P. Burditt, there was a brief filed by 
Lance S. Grady and Daniel K. Miller, Waukesha, with oral 
argument by Lance S. Grady. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by J. Michael Riley and 
Axley Brynelson, LLP, Madison, and oral argument by J. Michael 
Riley on behalf of Wisconsin Association for Justice.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Michele M. Ford and 
Crivello Carlson, S.C., Milwaukee, on behalf of Wisconsin 
Defense Counsel.  
 
 
  
 
 
2013 WI 60
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2011AP0583 
(L.C. No. 
2010CV520) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Marilyn M. Brown and Delores M. Schwartz, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
Dean Health Insurance, Inc., Conseco Insurance 
Company and Kathleen Sebelius, 
 
          Involuntary-Plaintiffs, 
 
     v. 
 
Acuity, A Mutual Insurance Company, Parnell P. 
Burditt, American Alternative Insurance Company 
and Okauchee Fire Department, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents, 
 
Utica Mutual Insurance Company, 
 
          Defendant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 9, 2013 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioners, Marilyn M. 
Brown (Brown) and Delores M. Schwartz (Schwartz), seek review of 
a published opinion of the court of appeals affirming the 
No. 
2011AP0583   
 
2 
 
circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants, 
dismissing 
Parnell 
P. 
Burditt 
(Burditt), 
the 
Okauchee Fire Department (OFD), and their insurers.1  Brown and 
Schwartz commenced an action alleging that Burditt, a volunteer 
firefighter and a member of the OFD, negligently caused their 
injuries when he drove his vehicle through a red stop signal 
into an intersection, where it collided with a vehicle carrying 
Brown and Schwartz.  The circuit court granted summary judgment 
dismissing Burditt, the OFD, and their insurers on the grounds 
that Burditt is shielded by public officer immunity and that his 
acts do not fall within the ministerial duty exception to that 
immunity. 
¶2 
Brown and Schwartz argue that Burditt was not acting 
within the scope of his employment as a volunteer firefighter 
when the collision occurred, thus placing him outside the class 
of 
individuals 
subject 
to 
public 
officer 
immunity.  
Additionally, they argue that because Burditt acted contrary to 
a ministerial duty to stop at the red stop signal, his acts fall 
within 
the 
ministerial 
duty 
exception 
to 
public 
officer 
immunity. 
¶3 
We conclude that Burditt was acting within the scope 
of his employment when the collision occurred.  Accordingly, he 
is within the class of individuals that may be shielded by 
public officer immunity. 
                                                 
1 Brown v. Acuity, 2012 WI App 66, 342 Wis. 2d 236, 815 
N.W.2d 719, affirming the circuit court for Waukesha County, 
Donald J. Hassin, J., presiding. 
No. 
2011AP0583   
 
3 
 
¶4 
However, we further conclude that Burditt is not 
entitled to public officer immunity because his acts in 
proceeding through the red stop signal without an audible signal 
violated a clear ministerial duty.  He therefore falls within 
that exception to public officer immunity.  The "rules of the 
road" statutes codified at Chapter 346 of the Wisconsin Statutes 
required Burditt to stop at the red stop signal because his 
vehicle lacked an audible signal.  Because Burditt's acts fall 
within 
the 
ministerial 
duty 
exception 
to 
public 
officer 
immunity, he is not shielded by immunity and summary judgment is 
not appropriate.  Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals 
and remand for further proceedings.   
I 
¶5 
The material facts of this case are undisputed.  On 
June 8, 2008, a dark and rainy evening, Burditt was driving his 
truck on his way to the OFD fire station when he came to an 
intersection 
with 
a 
four-lane 
divided 
highway. 
 
It 
was 
approximately 10:20 p.m., and Burditt was responding to an 
emergency call issued by the OFD.  The OFD is organized as a 
non-stock corporation and serves several communities in the area 
around Okauchee, Wisconsin.  Burditt has been a member of the 
OFD since 2002.  Burditt served as a Lieutenant volunteer 
firefighter 
and 
Emergency 
Medical 
Services 
(EMS) 
Service 
Director with the OFD.       
¶6 
When Burditt reached the intersection, he encountered 
a red stop signal and accordingly he brought his truck to a 
stop.  His truck had three flashing lights activated, but it had 
No. 
2011AP0583   
 
4 
 
no audible signal.2  Burditt looked to his left into the 
southbound lanes of the intersecting road and saw that there was 
no oncoming traffic coming from that direction, so he proceeded 
through the red stop signal into the middle of the intersection.   
¶7 
Burditt stopped his truck again at the median between 
the northbound and southbound lanes of the intersecting road.  
He looked to the right into the northbound lanes. Seeing a 
vehicle coming, he waited for the other vehicle to pass through 
the 
intersection. 
 
However, 
just 
prior 
to 
reaching 
the 
intersection, the other vehicle pulled over to the side of the 
road and stopped.   
¶8 
After seeing the other vehicle pull over, Burditt 
proceeded across the northbound lanes, still against the red 
stop signal.  A third vehicle that had been traveling behind the 
vehicle that pulled over collided with Burditt's vehicle as he 
was crossing the northbound lanes.  He did not see the vehicle 
that collided with his truck.  Burditt later acknowledged that 
he had no authority to proceed against the red stop signal, 
calling it a "poor decision." 
¶9 
As indicated, Burditt was on the road on the evening 
of June 8 in response to the OFD's emergency call for 
                                                 
2 One revolving red light was located on the vehicle's 
center dash, another flashing light was located on the vehicle's 
driver side, and a strobe light was mounted on the passenger-
side visor.  
No. 
2011AP0583   
 
5 
 
assistance.3  The OFD uses a system of pagers to dispatch 
emergency calls to volunteer firefighters.  When the volunteer 
firefighters receive the call on their pagers, they decide if 
they can respond.  In most cases, responding to a call initially 
means leaving from home, work, or some other location and 
traveling to the fire station.  For calls that are related only 
to EMS, the volunteer firefighters respond directly to the scene 
of the emergency.  
¶10 The call that was issued on June 8 was not an EMS-only 
call, and therefore Burditt was traveling to the fire station.  
The means and methods by which Burditt traveled to the station 
were left up to him.   
¶11 The OFD exercises no control over how volunteer 
firefighters 
choose 
to 
travel 
to 
the 
fire 
station 
when 
responding to a call.  Variables of travel such as route, speed, 
and the type of vehicle used to travel to the fire station are 
left entirely to the volunteer firefighters.   
¶12 When the volunteer firefighters arrive at the station 
on an emergency call, generally they are expected to obtain the 
needed equipment for responding to the emergency.  Once 
equipped, the volunteer firefighters then travel to the scene of 
the emergency.  Assignments in responding to the emergency are 
normally given en route to the call.     
                                                 
3 The emergency later turned out to be a flooded basement.  
However, Burditt did not know the call was for a flooded 
basement when he received it——he received only a message on his 
OFD-issued pager that an emergency was taking place.   
No. 
2011AP0583   
 
6 
 
¶13 The OFD procedures are collected in a set of Standard 
Operating Guidelines that are set forth by the OFD.  One such 
guideline governs the manner in which volunteer firefighters may 
utilize personal vehicles to respond to calls: 
S.O.G. 300.0 
Goal: Provide a guideline for the operation of motor 
vehicles. 
. . . . 
Use of Personal Vehicles 
A) Members may have emergency lights only 
B) Members vehicles used to respond to alarms are not 
covered by the Okauchee Fire Department 
C) Unless authorized, emergency lights will not be 
used, if responding more than 15 minutes f[rom] the 
fire station.  Red lights may be used only when 
responding to an alarm for OKFD, unless authorized by 
O.I.C. 
No warning device will automatically grant you the 
right of way! 
Another guideline states that "Wisc. Statute 346.03" is an 
"Applicable State Statute[]" for emergency vehicles and that 
guideline reminds the volunteer firefighters that they "are 
responsible to operate within these guidelines" when operating 
vehicles for the OFD.      
¶14 Officers of the OFD are expected to carry pagers 
twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week.  When a call to 
respond to an emergency goes out, the officers are expected to 
respond to the emergency if available.  From the time of 
dispatch until the time that an emergency call ends, Burditt and 
No. 
2011AP0583   
 
7 
 
other members of the OFD are obligated to follow the orders of 
their commanding officers.  
¶15 Brown and Schwartz were passengers in the vehicle that 
collided with Burditt's truck.  They commenced this action, 
alleging that Burditt negligently caused their injuries.  The 
allegations in the complaint are brief and are set forth in 
relevant part as follows: 
On June 8, 2008, in Waukesha County, Wisconsin, a 
motor vehicle collision occurred involving automobiles 
being driven by defendant, Parnell Burditt, who was 
responding to a volunteer fire call with the Okauchee 
Fire Department and struck the automobile being driven 
by Frank V. Brown.  Plaintiffs, Marilyn M. Brown and 
Delores M. Schwartz were passengers in the vehicle 
operated by Frank V. Brown.   
[] The negligence of defendant, Parnell Burditt, was a 
substantial factor causing the collision.     
 
¶16 Burditt moved for summary judgment, arguing that he 
was acting within the scope of his employment with the OFD when 
he was responding to the call and traveling to the fire station, 
and that he was therefore shielded by public officer immunity.4  
                                                 
4 Under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4), public officers are immune 
from liability for certain acts.  The statute provides as 
follows: 
(4) No suit may be brought against any volunteer fire 
company 
organized 
under 
ch. 
213, 
political 
corporation, governmental subdivision or any agency 
thereof for the intentional torts of its officers, 
officials, agents or employees nor may any suit be 
brought 
against 
such 
corporation, 
subdivision 
or 
agency or volunteer fire company or against its 
officers, officials, agents or employees for acts done 
in the exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, 
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. 
No. 
2011AP0583   
 
8 
 
Additionally, he contended that his acts in proceeding through 
the intersection were discretionary, and as a result, he did not 
fall within the ministerial duty exception to public officer 
immunity.  In response, Brown and Schwartz argued that Burditt 
was not entitled to immunity because he was not acting within 
the scope of his employment when the accident occurred and that 
his acts were contrary to a ministerial duty to stop at the red 
stop signal.  
¶17 In addressing the motion, the circuit court considered 
first whether Burditt was acting in the scope of his employment 
at the time the collision occurred.  It determined that "the 
minute that . . . he's responding to the circumstances of the 
emergency, whether he goes to the firehouse, the scene of the 
motor vehicle accident, the crisis . . . it's occurring within 
the scope of the umbrella covered by the Okauchee Fire 
Department, [and] he is acting within the scope of his 
employment."   
 
¶18 It addressed next whether Burditt acted contrary to a 
ministerial duty when he proceeded through the red stop signal.  
The circuit court explained that the act of going through the 
red stop signal requires discretion, "one to operat[e] the 
vehicle, two [to] put your foot on the accelerator, and three 
[to] drive your car through the intersection."  It distinguished 
a duty to "obey traffic laws" from a ministerial duty, and 
ultimately concluded that the duties imposed on Burditt in this 
case were not ministerial.  As a result, the circuit court 
No. 
2011AP0583   
 
9 
 
granted summary judgment dismissing Burditt and his insurer from 
the case.  
 
¶19 The OFD subsequently moved for summary judgment, 
arguing that the circuit court's rationale for dismissing 
Burditt from the action entitled it also to immunity and to the 
same relief.  The circuit court granted summary judgment 
dismissing OFD and its insurer from the case "for the same 
reasons" that it dismissed Burditt and his insurer.   
 
¶20 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court.  
Brown v. Acuity, 2012 WI App 66, 342 Wis. 2d 236, 815 N.W.2d 
719. Addressing first whether Burditt was within the scope of 
his employment, the court of appeals determined that Burditt's 
relationship with the OFD is "nontraditional."  Id., ¶9.  It 
observed 
that 
although 
Burditt 
chooses 
the 
mode 
of 
transportation and the route he will take once a call comes in, 
"it is the OFD that decides when a call goes out and to whom."  
Id.  The court of appeals opined that volunteer firefighters 
"are actuated by a purpose to serve the fire department from the 
moment they choose to respond to an emergency call."  Id.  
Ultimately, it concluded that Burditt was acting within the 
scope of his employment while en route to the fire station.  Id. 
 
¶21 Turning 
to 
address 
whether 
Burditt's 
acts 
in 
proceeding through the red stop signal were contrary to a 
ministerial duty, the court of appeals determined that the 
ministerial duty exception to public officer immunity does not 
apply.  It concluded that although Burditt undisputedly "failed 
to meet" the standard set forth in Wis. Stat. § 346.03(3) (2009-
No. 
2011AP0583   
 
10 
 
10)5 requiring an audible and visual signal when proceeding 
through a red stop signal, that failure merely "subjected him[] 
to the penalty for violating" the statute and did not render the 
duty to comply ministerial.  Id., ¶18  
II 
¶22 In this case, we are called upon to review the opinion 
of the court of appeals that affirmed the circuit court's grant 
of summary judgment in favor of the defendants.  The circuit 
court dismissed Burditt, the OFD, and their insurers because of 
its conclusion that Burditt is shielded by public officer 
                                                 
5 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes refer 
to the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 346.03(3) provides as follows: 
(3) 
The 
exemption 
granted 
the 
operator 
of 
an 
authorized emergency vehicle by sub. (2)(a) applies 
only when the operator of the vehicle is giving visual 
signal by means of at least one flashing, oscillating 
or rotating red light except that the visual signal 
given by a police vehicle may be by means of a blue 
light and a red light which are flashing, oscillating 
or rotating, except as otherwise provided in sub. 
(4m). The exemptions granted by sub. (2)(b), (c) and 
(d) apply only when the operator of the emergency 
vehicle is giving both such visual signal and also an 
audible signal by means of a siren or exhaust whistle, 
except as otherwise provided in sub. (4) or (4m). 
The requirements set forth in Wis. Stat. § 346.03(3) 
qualify a grant of privilege to the operator of an authorized 
emergency vehicle to "[p]roceed past a red or stop signal or 
stop sign, but only after slowing down as may be necessary for 
safe operation."  Wis. Stat. § 346.03(2)(b).   
No. 
2011AP0583   
 
11 
 
immunity.6  Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.08(2).  Here, the material facts are undisputed and the 
resolution of the case ultimately turns on questions of law.  
¶23 The first question presented is whether Burditt falls 
within a class of individuals who may be shielded by public 
officer immunity because he was acting within the scope of his 
employment as a volunteer firefighter at the time the accident 
occurred.  Whether Burditt was acting within the scope of his 
employment given the undisputed material facts presents a 
question 
of 
law 
that 
we 
review 
independently 
of 
the 
determinations of the circuit court and the court of appeals.  
                                                 
6 The OFD and its insurer argue that Burditt is, and 
therefore that they are, shielded by immunity.  Additionally, 
they echo Burditt's argument that Burditt was within the scope 
of his employment at the time of the collision.     
The OFD and its insurer appear to advance these positions 
because they additionally contend that Burditt's insurer is the 
primary insurer under Wis. Stat. § 895.46, a statute that sets 
forth indemnification criteria for governmental entities when 
public officers become liable for acts committed within the 
scope of their employment.  They reason that if Burditt was 
within the scope of his employment and not immune, the 
limitation on damages set forth in Wis. Stat. § 893.80(3) 
applies to any damages that are awarded.  Thus, any potential 
damages would fall within the liability limits of Burditt's 
insurance policy and they would not be responsible for any 
damages. 
The questions concerning the OFD's ultimate liability and 
whether there are statutory limitations on any damages that may 
be awarded are outside the scope of our review and we do not 
address them.         
No. 
2011AP0583   
 
12 
 
See Olson v. Connerly, 156 Wis. 2d 488, 494-95, 457 N.W.2d 479 
(1990).   
¶24 If we determine that Burditt was acting within the 
scope of his employment as a volunteer firefighter, we must then 
determine whether Burditt's acts in proceeding through a red 
stop signal fall within the ministerial duty exception to public 
officer immunity.  Whether the ministerial duty exception to 
public officer immunity applies to undisputed facts presents a 
question 
of 
law 
that 
we 
review 
independently 
of 
the 
determinations of the circuit court and the court of appeals.  
Pries v. McMillon, 2010 WI 63, ¶19, 326 Wis. 2d 37, 784 N.W.2d 
648.       
III 
¶25 We first address whether Burditt was acting within the 
scope of his employment at the time of the collision.  Burditt 
argues that he was acting as a volunteer firefighter from the 
moment he chose to respond to the call and began to travel to 
the fire station.  He contends that this case differs from a 
typical commuter case and therefore the general rule set forth 
in DeRuyter v. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 200 Wis. 2d 349, 546 N.W.2d 
534 (Ct. App. 1996) stating that an employee is not acting 
within the scope of his employment when going to and from a 
given 
place 
of 
employment 
does 
not 
apply 
under 
these 
circumstances.  Because he was merely acting within the scope of 
his employment, Burditt contends that he falls within the class 
No. 
2011AP0583   
 
13 
 
of individuals to which public officer immunity applies.7  Thus, 
the ultimate aim of our inquiry into whether Burditt acted 
within the scope of his employment is to determine whether he 
falls within the class of individuals who may be shielded by 
public officer immunity.   
¶26 We begin that inquiry by examining DeRuyter to 
determine whether it sets forth an analytical framework for the 
present case.  In that case, an individual was driving from his 
home to a vocational training session at his employer's central 
training center.  DeRuyter, 200 Wis. 2d at 355.  While 
traveling, he lost control of his vehicle and caused a tanker 
filled with jet fuel to jackknife, roll down an embankment, and 
burst into flames, killing its driver.  Id. at 355-56. 
¶27 Two civil actions were commenced after the accident, 
and both alleged that the driver was acting within the scope of 
his employment with Wisconsin Electric when the accident 
occurred.  Id. at 356.  The allegations were advanced in order 
to render Wisconsin Electric vicariously liable through the 
doctrine of respondeat superior.  Id. at 358-59.   
                                                 
7 Public officer immunity applies "regardless of whether the 
public [officer] is employed by the state or by a political 
subdivision of the state," such as a municipality.  Kierstyn v. 
Racine Unified School Dist., 228 Wis. 2d 81, 89, 596 N.W.2d 417 
(1999).  
Although 
the OFD is organized as a non-stock 
corporation and not as a fire company under Chapter 213 of the 
Wisconsin statutes, it is considered a government subdivision or 
agency for the purposes of an immunity analysis.  See Mellenthin 
v. Berger, 2003 WI App 126, ¶¶9, 15, 265 Wis. 2d 575, 666 N.W.2d 
120 (a fire department that is a non-stock corporation is 
considered a government subdivision or agency for the purposes 
of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4)).   
No. 
2011AP0583   
 
14 
 
¶28 The court of appeals, in concluding that the driver 
was not acting within the scope of his employment, noted that 
the "touchstone of scope-of-employment issues . . . is employer 
control over the employee."  Id. at 360.  It set forth as a 
"general maxim" in commuter cases that where an employee works 
for another at a given place of employment, and lives at home or 
boards himself, "it is the business of the employee to present 
himself at the place of employment, and the relation of master 
and servant does not exist while he is going between his home 
and place of employment."  Id. at 361.  Therefore, under those 
circumstances, only when the employer "exercises control over 
the method or route of the employee's travel to or from work can 
the employee be said to be acting within his or her employment."8  
Id.  The DeRuyter court focused on employer control in the 
commuting context because "without such control, the employee is 
not actuated by a purpose to serve the employer . . . but is 
solely promoting the employee's 'own convenience.'"  Id. at 361-
62.   
¶29 Thus, the DeRuyter court's ultimate focus was on 
whether the employee is actuated by a purpose to serve the 
employer.  Id.  Other scope of employment cases likewise focus 
on that same requirement.  For example, in Olson v. Connerly, 
                                                 
8 See also Murray v. Travelers Ins. Co., 229 Wis. 2d 819, 
827, 601 N.W.2d 661 (Ct. App. 1999) ("DeRuyter determined that 
an employer could be held vicariously liable for the negligent 
acts of an employee when commuting only if the employer 
exercised control over the method or route of the employee's 
travel."). 
No. 
2011AP0583   
 
15 
 
156 Wis. 2d 488, 457 N.W.2d 479 (1990), this court addressed a 
scope-of-employment 
question 
arising 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 895.46(1)(a), a public officer indemnification statute.9   
¶30 In Olson, a faculty member argued that he was acting 
within the scope of his employment when he negligently caused 
injury to a medical assistant, making the State responsible for 
the damages and costs entered against him pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.46(1)(a).  Id. at 496.  The Olson court surveyed other 
scope of employment cases arising in different contexts to 
determine whether the faculty member was acting within the scope 
of his employment.  Id. at 496-97.  It stated that this court 
has "always deemed significant the employee's intent at the time 
the acts in question were committed."  Id. at 497-98.  
¶31 Ultimately, the Olson court determined that there is 
no requirement that serving the employer be the employee's "only 
purpose or even the employee's primary purpose."  Id. at 499.  
                                                 
9 Wisconsin Stat. 895.46(1)(a) provides as follows, in 
relevant part: 
(1)(a) If the defendant in any action or special 
proceeding is a public officer or employee and is 
proceeded against in an official capacity or is 
proceeded against as an individual because of acts 
committed while carrying out duties as an officer or 
employee and the jury or the court finds that the 
defendant was acting within the scope of employment, 
the judgment as to damages and costs entered against 
the officer or employee, except as provided in s. 
146.89(4), in excess of any insurance applicable to 
the officer or employee shall be paid by the state or 
political subdivision of which the defendant is an 
officer or employee. . . . 
No. 
2011AP0583   
 
16 
 
Rather, an employee's conduct is not within the scope of his 
employment if "it is too little actuated by a purpose to serve 
the employer or if it is motivated entirely by the employee's 
own purposes."  Id. at 499-500.   
¶32 Here, as in other contexts, the focus of our inquiry 
must likewise center on whether an employee is actuated by a 
purpose to serve his employer.  However, a different analysis 
from 
the 
one 
set 
forth 
in 
DeRuyter 
is 
required 
under 
circumstances where the employee does not have a fixed place of 
employment.  Recognizing the differences in cases where there is 
no fixed place of employment, the court of appeals declared that 
the DeRuyter analysis "does not apply" in those circumstances.10  
Murray v. Travelers Ins. Co., 229 Wis. 2d 819, 828, 601 N.W.2d 
661 (Ct. App. 1999).   
¶33 In Murray, a physical therapist was required to 
schedule appointments with clients of her employer and travel to 
and from the homes of the patients to administer physical 
therapy to them.  Id. at 823-24.  One day, on her way from one 
                                                 
10 Case law indicates that there are other exceptions to the 
"general maxim" that where an employee works for another at a 
given place of employment, and lives at home or boards himself, 
"it is the business of the employee to present himself at the 
place of employment, and the relation of master and servant does 
not exist while he is going between his home and place of 
employment."  DeRuyter v. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 200 Wis. 2d 349, 
361, 546 N.W.2d 534 (Ct. App. 1996).  For additional discussion 
of the "general maxim" and its exceptions, see Christopher 
Vaeth, Employer's Liability for Negligence of Employee in 
Driving his or her own Automobile, 27 A.L.R. 5th 174 (1995) 
(collecting cases that identify the "coming and going" rule and 
the exceptions to that rule, including the "on-call" exception).    
No. 
2011AP0583   
 
17 
 
appointment to another appointment, she was involved in an 
automobile accident with a third party, and one of the 
passengers in the other vehicle commenced an action against her 
and her employer.  Id. at 823.   
¶34 The court of appeals reasoned that the circumstances 
presented in that case distinguished it from DeRuyter because 
under DeRuyter, the employee must have a fixed place of 
employment.  Id. at 827-28.  Upon determining that the DeRuyter 
analysis did not apply, the court of appeals examined the 
circumstances of the physical therapist's travel and concluded 
that her travel "was actuated by a purpose to serve her employer 
when the accident occurred."  Id. at 831.   
¶35 Like Murray, the facts of this case do not comfortably 
fit into the DeRuyter analysis.  Burditt is an on-call volunteer 
firefighter who could be called to any number of locations at 
any time.  Sometimes he may be required to report to the fire 
station and sometimes he may need to report directly to the 
scene of the emergency depending on the nature of the call.  
Even though the OFD guidelines require him to travel first to 
the fire station in responding to a non-EMS call, the fire 
station is still not Burditt's ultimate destination.  Rather, he 
is expected to pick up the necessary equipment and travel again 
to the scene of the emergency. 
¶36 Thus, Burditt is not a typical commuter with a fixed 
place of employment as described by DeRuyter.  Instead he is 
more like the physical therapist in Murray, whose employment 
required 
her 
to 
travel 
to 
a 
number 
of 
destinations.  
No. 
2011AP0583   
 
18 
 
Accordingly, the DeRuyter "general maxim" does not apply in this 
case.  200 Wis. 2d at 361.  Like the Murray and Olson courts, we 
focus instead on whether Burditt was actuated by a purpose to 
serve his employer when the accident occurred.   
¶37 The undisputed facts of this case show that Burditt 
was actuated by a purpose to serve the OFD when the accident 
occurred.  His entire purpose in traveling to the fire station 
on the evening of June 8 was to respond to the emergency call 
that had come through on his pager.  No one argues that he had 
any other motivation.  
¶38 Furthermore, once he responded, Burditt was obligated 
to follow the orders of his commanding officers.  Although 
DeRuyter does not apply, the fact that Burditt was bound by the 
orders of his commanding officers lends further support to our 
analysis.11 
                                                 
11 In 2011 Wisconsin Act 162, effective April 12, 2012, the 
legislature amended Wis. Stat. § 893.80 to expressly provide 
that an "agent" for the purposes of the immunity analysis 
includes a volunteer firefighter.  One element of the statute 
provides that a volunteer firefighter must be "subject to the 
right of control of the volunteer company": 
(1b) In this section, "agent" includes a volunteer. In 
this 
subsection, "volunteer" means a person who 
satisfies all of the following: 
(a) The person provides services or performs duties 
for and with the express or implied consent of a 
volunteer fire company organized under ch. 181 or 213, 
political corporation, or governmental subdivision or 
agency thereof. A person satisfies the requirements 
under this paragraph even if the activities of the 
person with regard to the services and duties and the 
details and method by which the services are provided 
No. 
2011AP0583   
 
19 
 
¶39 Therefore, we conclude that Burditt, in responding to 
the call, acted within the scope of his employment.  Because he 
was acting within the scope of his employment as a volunteer 
firefighter, Burditt falls within the class of individuals who 
may be shielded by public officer immunity.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(4). 
IV 
¶40 Having determined that Burditt falls within the class 
of individuals who may be shielded by public officer immunity, 
we address next whether Burditt's allegedly negligent acts 
qualify for an exception to that immunity.  Brown and Schwartz 
argue that Burditt acted contrary to a ministerial duty to 
follow certain "rules of the road," which are codified in 
Chapter 346 of the Wisconsin statutes.  Specifically, they 
contend that Burditt disregarded a statutory requirement that he 
                                                                                                                                                             
and 
the 
duties 
are 
performed 
are 
left 
to 
the 
discretion of the person. 
(b) The person is subject to the right of control of 
the 
volunteer 
company, 
political 
corporation, 
or 
governmental subdivision or agency described in par. 
(a). 
(c) The person is not paid a fee, salary, or other 
compensation by any person for the services or duties 
described 
in 
par. 
(a). 
In 
this 
paragraph, 
"compensation" does not include the reimbursement of 
expenses. 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1b) (2011-12).  Although the current 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1b) was not in effect during the relevant 
events of this case, our analysis is consistent with the 
elements set forth by the legislature in the recent revisions to 
the statute. 
No. 
2011AP0583   
 
20 
 
may not proceed through a red stop signal unless he activates 
both an emergency light and an audible signal as set forth in 
Wis. Stat. § 346.03(3).     
¶41 Public officer immunity is grounded in Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(4).  The statute provides as follows: 
(4) No suit may be brought against any volunteer fire 
company 
organized 
under 
ch. 
213, 
political 
corporation, governmental subdivision or any agency 
thereof for the intentional torts of its officers, 
officials, agents or employees nor may any suit be 
brought 
against 
such 
corporation, 
subdivision 
or 
agency or volunteer fire company or against its 
officers, officials, agents or employees for acts done 
in the exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, 
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. 
Thus, a public officer is immune from "any suit" for "acts done 
in the exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial or 
quasi-judicial functions."   Id.; see also Willow Creek Ranch, 
L.L.C. v. Town of Shelby, 2000 WI 56, ¶25, 235 Wis. 2d 409, 611 
N.W.2d 693.   
¶42 The general rule of immunity for public officers in 
their performance of acts within the scope of employment is 
subject to four exceptions identified in case law.  Scott v. 
Savers Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 2003 WI 60, ¶16, 262 Wis. 2d 
127, 663 N.W.2d 715.  The four exceptions to public officer 
immunity are set forth as follows: 
Both state and municipal immunity are subject to 
several exceptions "representing a judicial balance 
struck between 'the need of public officers to perform 
their functions freely [and] the right of an aggrieved 
party to seek redress.'" . . . There is no immunity 
against liability associated with: 1) the performance 
of ministerial duties imposed by law; 2) known and 
No. 
2011AP0583   
 
21 
 
compelling dangers that give rise to ministerial 
duties on the part of public officers or employees; 3) 
acts involving medical discretion; and 4) acts that 
are malicious, willful, and intentional. 
Lodl v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co., 2002 WI 71, ¶24, 253 Wis. 
2d 323, 646 N.W.2d 314.   
¶43 In this case, the sole exception at issue is the 
ministerial duty exception.  A public officer's duty is 
ministerial only when it is "absolute, certain and imperative," 
involving the "performance of a specific task" that the law 
imposes and defines the "time, mode and occasion for its 
performance with such certainty that nothing remains for 
judgment or discretion."  Lister v. Board of Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 
282, 301, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976).  If liability is premised on 
either the negligent performance or non-performance of a 
ministerial duty, then immunity will not apply.  Lodl, 253 
Wis. 2d 323, ¶26.   
¶44 To determine whether a ministerial duty exists, this 
court has in past cases examined the language of an applicable 
statute, regulation, or procedure that is argued to impose such 
a duty.  See, e.g., id., ¶¶29-30 (examining an operations policy 
guideline to determine whether it imposed a ministerial duty); 
Bicknese v. Sutula, 2003 WI 31, ¶25, 260 Wis. 2d 713, 660 N.W.2d 
289 (evaluating an employee policy manual); Umansky v. ABC Ins. 
Co., 2009 WI 82, ¶18, 319 Wis. 2d 622, 769 N.W.2d 1 (examining a 
safety 
regulation). 
 
The 
duty 
imposed 
by 
the 
statute, 
regulation, or procedure must conform to all elements of a 
No. 
2011AP0583   
 
22 
 
ministerial duty.  Yao v. Chapman, 2005 WI App 200, ¶31, 287 
Wis. 2d 445, 705 N.W.2d 272.   
¶45 Here, Brown and Schwartz argue that the "rules of the 
road" codified at Chapter 346 of the Wisconsin Statutes imposed 
a ministerial duty upon Burditt to stop at a red stop signal.  
The "rules of the road" generally require that a vehicle must 
stop at a red stop signal: 
(1) Whenever traffic is controlled by traffic control 
signals 
exhibiting 
different 
colored 
lights 
successively, or with arrows, the following colors 
shall be used and shall indicate and apply to 
operators of vehicles and pedestrians as follows: 
... 
(c) Red. 1. Vehicular traffic facing a red signal 
shall stop before entering the crosswalk on the near 
side of an intersection, or if none, then before 
entering the intersection or at such other point as 
may be indicated by a clearly visible sign or marking 
and shall remain standing until green or other signal 
permitting movement is shown. 
Wis. Stat. § 346.37(1)(c)1.  Although all vehicles are subject 
to the general requirement to stop at a red stop signal, Wis. 
Stat. § 346.03 grants authorized emergency vehicles a privilege 
to proceed through the red stop signal under certain specified 
circumstances.12  The authorized emergency vehicle may "[p]roceed 
                                                 
12 An "authorized emergency vehicle" is defined in the 
statutes to include "[p]rivately owned motor vehicles being used 
by deputy state fire marshals or by personnel of a full-time or 
part-time fire department or by members of a volunteer fire 
department while en route to a fire or on an emergency call 
pursuant to orders of their chief or other commanding officer."  
Wis. Stat. § 340.01(3)(d).   
 
No. 
2011AP0583   
 
23 
 
past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but only after slowing 
down as may be necessary for safe operation" and meeting 
additional conditions set forth in other portions of the 
statute.  Wis. Stat. § 346.03(2)(b).   
 
¶46 In order to lawfully proceed through a red stop 
signal, the operator of the authorized emergency vehicle must 
give a "visual signal," which is defined as "at least one 
flashing, oscillating or rotating red light."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.03(3).  Furthermore, it must also give an audible signal, 
which the statute defines as "a siren or exhaust whistle."  Id.   
¶47 Even if an operator of an authorized emergency vehicle 
gives 
both a 
visual and an audible signal, Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.03(5) still requires that the operator drive "with due 
regard under the circumstances for the safety of all persons."  
Thus, in order to comply with Wis. Stat. § 346.03 and lawfully 
proceed through a red stop signal, an authorized emergency 
vehicle must slow down as may be necessary for safe operation, 
have given both a visual and an audible signal, and must have 
proceeded with due regard under the circumstances for the safety 
of all persons.   
 
¶48 Here, Burditt by his own admission made a "poor 
decision" to proceed through the red stop signal, proceeding 
while giving a visual signal, but not while giving any audible 
signal.  His actions are undisputedly contrary to the statutory 
requirements set forth in Wis. Stat. § 346.03(3).  The only 
question is whether acting contrary to that "rule of the road" 
was ministerial.   
No. 
2011AP0583   
 
24 
 
¶49 This court considered whether acting contrary to the 
"rules of the road" may constitute an act contrary to a 
ministerial duty in Estate of Cavanaugh v. Andrade, 202 Wis. 2d 
290, 550 N.W.2d 103 (1996).  In that case, a law enforcement 
official engaged in a high-speed chase with another vehicle that 
failed to stop at a red stop signal.  Id. at 296.  The vehicle 
which was being pursued struck and killed a third-party driver.  
Id.  The deceased driver's estate sued the law enforcement 
official and the municipality for which he was employed alleging 
a cause of action sounding in negligence.  Id. at 297.   
¶50 The municipality and the law enforcement official 
argued that they were immune from liability.13  Id.  The law 
enforcement officer argued that his alleged negligent initiation 
of the high-speed chase and his failure to terminate it were 
discretionary 
acts, 
and 
further 
argued 
that 
his 
alleged 
                                                 
13 The municipality argued that Wis. Stat. § 346.03(6) set 
forth no ministerial duty such that failing to comply with a 
statutory mandate regarding policies and procedures for high-
speed chases exposed it to liability.  Estate of Cavanaugh v. 
Andrade, 202 Wis. 2d 290, 296-97, 550 N.W.2d 103 (1996).  The 
Cavanaugh court agreed that the municipality's failure to comply 
with Wis. Stat. § 346.03(6) constituted an act contrary to a 
ministerial duty.  Id. at 301.   
In examining the statute, the court observed that although 
"the promulgation of guidelines in general involves a great 
amount of governmental discretion, § 346.03(6) makes the 
inclusion 
of 
certain 
parts 
of 
the 
policy 
promulgation 
ministerial."  Id.  The duty was ministerial because the statute 
mandated 
that 
law 
enforcement agencies consider "specific 
factors" that were "absolute, certain and imperative, involving 
merely the performance of a specific task."  Id. (quoting Kimps 
v. Hill, 200 Wis. 2d 1, 10, 546 N.W.2d 151 (1996)).   
No. 
2011AP0583   
 
25 
 
operation of his vehicle contrary to Wis. Stat. § 346.03(5) 
requiring due regard under the circumstances for the safety of 
all persons did not mean that he had acted contrary to a 
ministerial duty.  Id. at 315.   
¶51 The 
Cavanaugh 
court 
determined 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.03(5) 
imposed 
only 
a 
discretionary 
duty 
under 
the 
circumstances of the case.  Id. at 315-16.  It noted that the 
officer's actions in initiating and continuing the high-speed 
chase were discretionary, distinguishing those acts from the 
physical operation of the vehicle, which it suggested may be 
ministerial in some circumstances.  Id. at 316-18. 
¶52 In Cavanaugh, it was the officer's decisions relating 
to the initiation and continuance of the high-speed chase that 
constituted the negligent conduct.  Id.  This court employed a 
similar analysis in Lodl, 253 Wis. 2d 323, ¶27, where it 
examined law enforcement regulations relating to the decision to 
direct traffic at an intersection.  The Lodl court noted that 
the regulations did not require the officer to direct traffic in 
any given situation or otherwise remove officer discretion over 
the decision to undertake manual traffic control, and determined 
that they did not impose a ministerial duty.  Id.   
¶53 In this case, Burditt argues that, like the officer 
initiating and continuing the high-speed chase in Cavanaugh, his 
decision 
to 
enter 
the 
intersection 
was 
not 
ministerial.  
Likewise, he contends that his decision to proceed through the 
red stop signal is comparable to the law enforcement officer 
deciding whether to direct traffic in Lodl.  However, unlike the 
No. 
2011AP0583   
 
26 
 
decisions to initiate and continue a high-speed chase in 
Cavanaugh and the decision to direct traffic in Lodl, Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.03(3) directly governs Burditt's acts in proceeding 
through a red stop signal without an audible signal and 
satisfies all elements of a ministerial duty.  Lister, 72 Wis. 
2d at 301. 
¶54 Burditt may proceed through a red stop signal only if 
his vehicle gives a visual and an audible signal.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.03(3).  He did not give an audible signal, and therefore, 
he had no discretion to proceed through the red stop signal.  
The statute sets forth "absolute, certain and imperative," 
requirements concerning the "performance of a specific task," 
proceeding through the red stop signal, and it imposes and 
defines the "time, mode and occasion" for proceeding through the 
red stop signal "with such certainty that nothing remains for 
judgment or discretion."  Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 301.   
¶55 Thus, Wis. Stat. § 346.03(3) imposed upon Burditt a 
ministerial duty to stop at the red stop signal.  He failed to 
comply with that ministerial duty and now faces allegations of 
negligence premised on his failure to comply.  He therefore 
falls within the ministerial duty exception to public officer 
immunity.   
¶56 We further observe that as a supplement to Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.03, the OFD set forth guidelines that appear to prohibit 
its members from proceeding through a red stop signal.  The 
guidelines state that a personal vehicle must be driven with 
"emergency lights only," excluding audible signals from use.  
No. 
2011AP0583   
 
27 
 
Also 
under 
the 
"Use 
of 
Personal 
Vehicles" 
heading, 
the 
guidelines caution that "[n]o warning device will automatically 
grant you the right of way!"  Although we need not determine 
whether the guidelines themselves established a ministerial 
duty, those directives only strengthen our conclusion.   
¶57 Accordingly, we conclude that Burditt is not shielded 
by public officer immunity because he acted contrary to a 
ministerial duty.  Because Burditt is not shielded by public 
officer immunity, summary judgment dismissing Burditt, the OFD, 
and their insurers is not appropriate. 
V 
¶58 In sum, we conclude that Burditt was acting within the 
scope 
of 
his 
employment 
when 
the 
collision 
occurred.  
Accordingly, he is within the class of individuals that may be 
shielded by public officer immunity. 
¶59 However, we further conclude that Burditt is not 
entitled to public officer immunity because his acts in 
proceeding through the red stop signal without an audible signal 
violated a clear ministerial duty.  He therefore falls within 
that exception to public officer immunity.  The "rules of the 
road" statutes codified at Chapter 346 of the Wisconsin Statutes 
required Burditt to stop at the red stop signal because his 
vehicle lacked an audible signal.  Because Burditt's acts fall 
within 
the 
ministerial 
duty 
exception 
to 
public 
officer 
immunity, he is not shielded by immunity and summary judgment is 
not appropriate.  Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals 
and remand for further proceedings.     
No. 
2011AP0583   
 
28 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded. 
 
 
No. 
2011AP0583   
 
 
 
1