Title: In Re Guardianship Of Mary Ann Malloy (Opinion on Application - Remand to TC)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: s
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: May 28, 2024

In re MALLOY GUARDIANSHIP 
In re JENKINS GUARDIANSHIP 
 
Docket Nos. 165018 and 165020.  Argued on application for leave to appeal December 7, 
2023.  Decided May 28, 2024. 
 
 
Darren Findling, an attorney and professional guardian, and the Darren Findling Law 
Firm, PLC, brought two separate actions in the Oakland County Probate Court against Auto-
Owners Insurance Company, seeking reimbursement for guardianship services performed for 
Mary Ann Malloy and Dana Jenkins by employees of the law firm.  In 2019, Findling was 
appointed to serve as guardian for Jenkins and as coguardian for Malloy, both of whom suffered 
serious injuries in automobile crashes that rendered them legally incapacitated.  Both Jenkins 
and Malloy received no-fault benefits from Auto-Owners.   
 
 
In 2019 and 2020, Findling, along with employees of his law firm, provided various 
guardianship services to Malloy and Jenkins, including guardian visits and meetings with 
physicians, case managers, the Social Security Administration, and their banks.  Findling sought 
reimbursement from Auto-Owners for these and other services under MCL 500.3107(1)(a) of 
the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq.  Auto-Owners declined to reimburse for the services that 
were performed by the employees of Findling’s law firm, raising as affirmative defenses that the 
care and services provided were not lawfully rendered.  In both cases, Findling moved for partial 
summary disposition solely on the issue whether Auto-Owners was required to reimburse for 
guardianship services performed by employees of his law firm, and Auto-Owners filed 
countermotions for summary disposition on the same issue.  Auto-Owners argued that it was not 
required to reimburse for such services because Findling had not complied with MCL 700.5103 
of the Estates and Protected Individuals Code (EPIC), MCL 700.1101 et seq., which restricts the 
delegation of guardianship “powers” to fewer than 180 days and requires a valid power of 
attorney and notice to the court.  Findling countered that he only delegated his guardianship 
duties—but not his powers—to employees of his law firm and therefore was not required to 
comply with MCL 700.5103.  He further argued that he was legally permitted to have employees 
perform guardianship duties under MCL 700.5106(5) and (6).   
 
 
The probate court, Daniel A. O’Brien, J., heard oral argument in both cases together and 
granted Findling’s motions for partial summary disposition.  Auto-Owners filed interlocutory 
applications for leave to appeal in both cases, which the Court of Appeals originally denied.  
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Syllabus 
 
Chief Justice: 
Elizabeth T. Clement 
 
 
Justices: 
Brian K. Zahra 
David F. Viviano 
Richard H. Bernstein 
Megan K. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth M. Welch 
Kyra H. Bolden 
This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been  
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 
Reporter of Decisions: 
Kathryn L. Loomis 
Auto-Owners sought leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court remanded 
both cases to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted.  509 Mich 880 (2022).  
On remand, the Court of Appeals, SWARTZLE, P.J., and CAVANAGH and REDFORD, JJ., 
consolidated the two appeals and affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that a guardian 
is only required to comply with MCL 700.5103 to lawfully delegate guardianship powers, which 
it defined as tasks that alter the rights, duties, liabilities, or other legal relations of an 
incapacitated individual.  343 Mich App 548 (2022).  Under this framework, the Court of 
Appeals concluded that there was no question of fact that Findling largely delegated 
guardianship duties—but not powers—to his employees.  However, the Court of Appeals held 
that there remained questions of fact as to whether Findling unlawfully delegated his powers by 
allowing employees to prepare for and attend hearings regarding the modification of Malloy’s 
and Jenkins’s guardianships.  Auto-Owners again sought leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, 
and the Supreme Court ordered and heard oral argument on the application.  511 Mich 913 
(2023). 
 
 
In a unanimous opinion by Justice CAVANAGH, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting 
leave to appeal, held: 
 
 
A professional guardian of an incapacitated individual cannot, without executing a power 
of attorney complying with MCL 700.5103 of the Estates and Protected Individuals Code 
(EPIC), MCL 700.1101 et seq., lawfully delegate to employees their final decision-making 
authority over a guardianship “power” that is explicitly listed in MCL 700.5314 or over any 
guardianship task that alters or impairs the incapacitated individual’s rights, duties, liabilities, or 
legal relations; however, a professional guardian may lawfully have employees assist in 
exercising a guardianship power and may have employees perform any other guardianship task 
or duty on behalf of the professional guardian without complying with MCL 700.5103. 
 
 
1.  Under EPIC, a probate court may appoint a guardian to be legally responsible for an 
incapacitated individual.  A guardian may be entitled to reimbursement from an applicable no-
fault insurer under MCL 500.3107(1)(a) for guardianship services that are lawfully performed 
on behalf of an incapacitated individual.  MCL 700.5103 prohibits all guardians—including 
professional guardians—from delegating their guardianship powers for more than 180 days and 
requires that a guardian who wants to delegate their powers execute a power of attorney and 
notify the court of the delegation within seven days of execution.  In this case, it was undisputed 
that Findling did not comply with MCL 700.5103 before delegating certain guardianship tasks 
to employees of his law firm; accordingly, the dispositive question was whether the tasks 
Findling’s employees performed fell within the scope of MCL 700.5103. 
 
 
2.  MCL 700.5314 provides that a guardian of an incapacitated individual has “all of the 
following powers and duties, to the extent granted by court order,” and then provides a lettered 
list of possible “powers” and “duties” a guardian might have.  While many items in the list are 
explicitly identified as a “power” or a “duty,” some items include neither term; additionally, the 
lettered list in MCL 700.5314 does not provide an exclusive list of tasks a guardian is required 
or permitted to perform on behalf of an incapacitated individual.  Because MCL 700.5314 does 
not provide an exhaustive list of tasks a guardian is permitted or required to perform, it was 
proper for the Court of Appeals to consult Black’s Law Dictionary to assist in understanding 
what other guardianship activities fall within the statutorily undefined term “power.”  However, 
that definition was insufficient on its own because multiple definitions of “power” could apply, 
and the alternative definitions are meaningfully distinct.  Accordingly, it was necessary to 
examine the surrounding statutory provisions to define “power” in this context.   
 
 
3.  The Court of Appeals correctly determined that viewed in the broader context of EPIC, 
the proper definition of “power” that is to be applied to acts outside those explicitly listed in 
MCL 700.5314 is an act that alters or impairs the rights, duties, liabilities, or legal relations of 
the incapacitated individual.  The listed powers in MCL 700.5314 provide a guardian the 
authority to (1) handle the incapacitated individual’s money and medical care, (2) establish their 
residence, and (3) institute legal proceedings on their behalf, and the listed “duties” require a 
guardian to (1) visit and/or consult with the incapacitated individual, that individual’s family, 
and their doctors, (2) care for the ward’s property, and (3) make provision for the ward’s care, 
comfort, and maintenance and, when appropriate, arrange for the ward’s training and education.  
The term “power” in this context thus does not refer broadly to a guardian’s authority to take 
actions on behalf of or in lieu of the incapacitated individual.  Rather, the “power” that must be 
delegated pursuant to MCL 700.5103 is a guardian’s authority to alter the rights, duties, 
liabilities, or legal relations of the incapacitated individual.  MCL 700.5106(5) and (6) reinforced 
this conclusion; those provisions explicitly contemplate that a professional guardian will hire 
employees to assist in performing guardianship duties.   
 
 
4.  However, there is not a bright-line dichotomy between a guardian’s powers and duties.  
Relatedly, a guardian’s overarching responsibility for the ward’s care, custody, and control 
necessarily includes both the imposition of certain duties and the grant of certain powers.  If a 
guardian exercises a power to fulfill a duty owed to a ward, then the guardian must comply with 
MCL 700.5103 to lawfully delegate the exercise of that power.  Moreover, MCL 700.5103 only 
limits common-law agency principles with regard to a guardian’s final decision-making 
authority to exercise a power listed in MCL 700.5314 or to approve any other alteration or 
impairment of the ward’s rights, duties, liabilities, or legal relations; MCL 700.5103 does not 
apply to a professional guardian’s use of employees to assist in making such a decision, nor does 
it apply to the use of employees to execute such a decision.  Finally, a professional guardian 
cannot shirk their responsibility for ensuring that a ward receives proper care by using 
employees; the ultimate responsibility for the ward’s custody and care lies with the court-
appointed guardian. 
 
 
5.  The Court of Appeals’ holdings regarding whether there existed questions of fact in 
these cases were premature.  Accordingly, these holdings were vacated, and the cases were 
remanded to the probate court for further proceedings.  The parties’ countermotions for partial 
summary disposition were brought before the completion of discovery, and the current factual 
record was limited to short descriptions of the employees’ activities in billing statements that 
were attached to Findling’s complaints.  Moreover, neither the parties nor the probate court had 
appellate guidance as to the appropriate framework for assessing whether an employee lawfully 
performed guardianship tasks when the motions for partial summary disposition were filed and 
decided.  Finally, throughout this litigation, the parties have framed their arguments in broad all-
or-nothing terms without reference to the specific entries in Findling’s billing statements, and 
the probate court’s decision was similarly broad in its reasoning.  Under these circumstances, it 
was appropriate for the parties and probate court to reassess these cases on remand. 
 
 
Court of Appeals decision and the decisions of the Oakland County Probate Court 
granting Findling’s motions for partial summary disposition and denying Auto-Owners’ 
countermotions for partial summary disposition in both docket numbers vacated; both cases 
remanded to the Oakland County Probate Court for further proceedings. 
 
 
 
 
FILED May 28, 2024 
 
 
 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re Guardianship of MARY ANN MALLOY. 
 
 
 
DARREN FINDLING, Coguardian of MARY 
ANN MALLOY, a legally protected person, and 
DARREN FINDLING LAW FIRM, PLC, 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
 
and 
 
PATRICK MALLOY, Coguardian of MARY 
ANN MALLOY, a legally protected person, and 
KATHERN MALLOY, 
Plaintiffs, 
 
 
 
v 
 
No. 165018 
 
AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
OPINION 
 
Chief Justice: 
Elizabeth T. Clement   
 
 
 
Justices: 
Brian K. Zahra 
David F. Viviano 
Richard H. Bernstein 
Megan K. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth M. Welch 
Kyra H. Bolden 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
In re Guardianship of DANA JENKINS. 
 
 
 
DARREN FINDLING, Guardian of DANA 
JENKINS, a legally protected person, and  
DARREN FINDLING LAW FIRM, PLC, 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
 
 
 
v 
No. 165020 
AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
 
CAVANAGH, J.  
This case raises the important questions of whether and when professional guardians 
may use employees to perform guardianship tasks on their behalf.  While these specific 
cases are billing disputes between a professional guardian and a no-fault insurer, the issue 
presented has significant practical implications for the thousands of Michiganders under 
the care of a professional guardian who, by virtue of their legal incapacitation, are among 
the most vulnerable groups in our society.1  The amicus briefs filed in these cases reflect 
 
1 As of the end of 2022, there were over 30,000 adults with a guardian in Michigan.  See 
State Court Administrative Office, 2022 Court Caseload Report: Statewide Probate 
Court 
Summary, 
p 9, 
available 
at 
<https://www.courts.michigan.gov/48fd7b/ 
siteassets/reports/statistics/caseload/2022/statewide.pdf> (accessed March 4, 2024) 
[https://perma.cc/VS99-FVKM].  While the Statewide Probate Court Summary does not 
include the number of adults who have professional guardians, an amicus brief filed by the 
Michigan Guardianship Association asserts that there are approximately 15,000 
professional guardianships in Michigan.  Brief for Michigan Guardianship Association as 
Amicus Curiae (July 27, 2023) (Docket No. 165018) at 14. 
 
 
3 
 
the differing views as to whether the use of employees to perform guardianship tasks serves 
the interests of vulnerable adults who are subject to a professional guardianship.2  While 
this is an important and nuanced policy issue, it is not our role to make this policy choice.  
Rather, our job is to ascertain and carry into effect the scheme adopted by our Legislature.3   
We hold that a professional guardian of an incapacitated individual must execute a 
power of attorney that complies with MCL 700.5103 to lawfully delegate to employees the 
authority to make any final decision to exercise a guardianship “power” that is explicitly 
 
2 Amicus briefs filed by the Michigan Guardianship Association and the Probate and Estate 
Planning Section of the State Bar of Michigan note that many professional guardians 
currently have hundreds of wards under their care.  They argue that, given the myriad tasks 
a professional guardian is legally required to undertake, it is impractical to require them to 
personally perform all of them.  They further contend that limiting a professional 
guardian’s ability to delegate all guardianship tasks would create insurmountable 
administrative and financial burdens.  Ultimately, they contend that such a limitation would 
harm those subject to a professional guardianship by diminishing both the quality of care 
provided and the number of individuals who are willing to act as a professional guardian.   
By contrast, an amicus brief filed by the Michigan Elder Justice Initiative, the Legal 
Services Association of Michigan, and the Michigan State Planning Body argues that the 
use of employees prevents professional guardians from forming the personal relationships 
that are necessary to understanding an individual’s needs and providing proper care.  These 
amici further contend that the use of employees creates the risk of fraud against 
incapacitated individuals by individuals falsely claiming to work for the guardian.  Broadly 
stated, these amici argue that the use of employees to perform tasks specifically entrusted 
to the guardian results in impersonal and subpar care while also breeding uncertainty as to 
who is ultimately responsible if guardianship authority is abused or proper care is not 
provided. 
3 While our decision is based on the statutes currently in effect, we note that the Legislature 
is considering potential statutory amendments relevant to the issue presented in this appeal, 
and those changes, if enacted, may further clarify the distinction between “powers” and 
“duties,” specify which actions may be delegated by a professional guardian, and prescribe 
when such delegations require execution of a formal power of attorney.  See 2023 
HB 4909. 
 
 
4 
 
listed in MCL 700.5314 or to delegate any other final decision that would alter or impair 
an incapacitated individual’s rights, duties, liabilities, or legal relations.  However, a 
professional guardian need not comply with MCL 700.5103 to use employees to perform 
any other guardianship task or duty on the guardian’s behalf.  Moreover, a professional 
guardian may use employees to assist in exercising a guardianship power or to assist in 
deciding how to exercise these powers without complying with MCL 700.5103.  A 
professional guardian who lawfully uses employees nonetheless retains the ultimate legal 
responsibility for ensuring that all statutory and fiduciary duties owed to an incapacitated 
individual are fulfilled and that they receive proper care.   
We vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and the decisions of the Oakland 
County Probate Court granting plaintiffs-appellees’ motions for partial summary 
disposition and denying defendant-appellant’s countermotions for partial summary 
disposition in both docket numbers and remand both cases to the Oakland County Probate 
Court for further proceedings in light of this opinion. 
I.  GUARDIANSHIPS OF INCAPACITATED INDIVIDUALS 
Before discussing the facts of this case, it is helpful to provide a brief overview of 
Michigan’s statutory scheme governing guardianships and the role of professional 
guardians within that scheme.  Under the Estates and Protected Individuals Code, MCL 
700.1101 et seq. (EPIC), a probate court may appoint a guardian to be legally responsible 
for an incapacitated individual.  See MCL 700.5303; MCL 700.5306.4  An “incapacitated 
 
4 A court may also appoint a guardian for a “minor,” defined as “an individual who is less 
than 18 years of age.”  MCL 700.1106(c); see also MCL 700.5204.  By definition, a 
“minor” is not an “incapacitated individual” under EPIC, see MCL 700.1105(a); MCL 
700.1105(i), and there are separate provisions governing guardianships of minors versus 
 
 
5 
 
individual” is a person over 17 years old who “lack[s] sufficient understanding or capacity 
to make or communicate informed decisions.”  MCL 700.1105(a).  Broadly stated, a 
guardianship is one available legal mechanism for ensuring the safety and well-being of 
individuals who are not capable of independently making decisions and caring for 
themselves.5  In such circumstances, “[a]n individual in his or her own behalf, or any 
person interested in the individual’s welfare, may petition [the probate court] for a finding 
of incapacity and appointment of a guardian.”  MCL 700.5303(1).   
Despite the significant and necessary role that guardianships may play in the life of 
an incapacitated individual, it is important to recognize that appointing a guardian deprives 
an individual of their legal autonomy, often completely and in extremely intimate ways.  A 
guardian is bestowed by statute and court order with myriad duties and powers falling 
under the broad umbrella of ensuring that an incapacitated individual’s needs are met.  See 
 
guardianships of incapacitated individuals, see MCL 700.5101 et seq. (general provisions); 
MCL 700.5201 et seq. (guardians of minors); MCL 700.5301 et seq. (guardians of 
incapacitated individuals).  While there are some important differences between 
guardianships of minors and guardianships of incapacitated persons, there is also overlap.  
Relevant for our purposes, a professional guardian can be appointed to care for either an 
incapacitated individual or a minor, see MCL 700.5313; MCL 700.5106(1) and (2), and 
the provision governing the delegation of guardianship powers—MCL 700.5103—applies 
to both types of guardians.  Because this case only involves guardianships of incapacitated 
individuals, we do not address whether the statutory provisions uniquely governing 
guardianships of minors would dictate a different framework for a professional guardian’s 
use of employees to care for a minor.   
5 Other legal options for ensuring the proper care of individuals in need of assistance 
include, but are not limited to, a “conservator, patient advocate designation, do-not-
resuscitate order, physician orders for scope of treatment form, or durable power of 
attorney . . . .”  MCL 700.5303(2). 
 
 
6 
 
MCL 700.5314.  Accordingly, a ward6 may lose legal authority over, among other things, 
their finances, where they live, and what medical care they receive.  See id.  The serious 
consequences flowing from adult guardianships have led many to fairly characterize them 
as akin to a “civil death.”7  In light of the liberty interests at stake, a person for whom a 
guardian has been sought has statutory rights similar to those of a criminal defendant, 
including the rights to written notice of a potential guardianship, to present evidence on 
their behalf, to retained or appointed counsel, and to a jury trial.  See MCL 700.5304; MCL 
700.5306a.8  A court may only appoint a guardian if the court concludes by clear and 
 
6 EPIC defines “ward” as “an individual for whom a guardian is appointed,” MCL 
700.1108(a), and therefore the term can encompass both incapacitated individuals and 
minors who are subject to a guardianship.  See note 4 of this opinion.  Because our holding 
is limited to guardianships of “incapacitated individuals,” we use “ward” in this opinion to 
refer only to such individuals.   
7 See, e.g., Kohn & Koss, Lawyers for Legal Ghosts: The Legality and Ethics of Representing 
Persons Subject to Guardianship, 91 Wash L Rev 581, 582 n 3 (2016) (“[Adult 
guardianship] is a harsh remedy.  A judgment of interdiction amounts to civil death . . . .”) 
(cleaned up); Cavey, Realizing the Right to Counsel in Guardianship: Dispelling 
Guardianship Myths, 2 Marq Elder’s Advisor 26, 28 (2000) (describing guardianship as a 
“legal death”); Perlin, “Striking for the Guardians and Protectors of the Mind”: The 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Mental Disabilities and the Future of Guardianship 
Law, 117 Penn St L Rev 1159, 1159 (2013) (describing guardianship as a “civil death”); Salzman 
& Diller, Britney Spears’ New Lawyer Must Reverse Her ‘Civil Death.’ She’s Been Robbed of 
Who She Is, USA Today (July 14, 2021) (opinion piece on a high-profile conservatorship case), 
available at <https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2021/07/14/britney-spears-wins-back-
constitutional-right-choose-lawyer/7965211002/> [https://perma.cc/34TK-3TGN]. 
8 As summarized in greater detail by one Court of Appeals panel: 
EPIC provides specific procedures for determining whether an individual is 
legally incompetent, including provisions providing for the appointment of a 
guardian ad litem to represent the allegedly incapacitated individual upon the 
filing of the petition, MCL 700.5303(3); requiring the court to conduct a 
hearing on the issue of incapacity, MCL 700.5303(3); entitling the alleged 
incapacitated individual to secure his own independent evaluation, to be 
 
 
7 
 
convincing evidence—“the most demanding standard applied in civil cases,”  In re Martin, 
450 Mich 204, 227; 538 NW2d 399 (1995)—that an individual fits the definition of an 
“incapacitated individual” and that “appointment is necessary as a means of providing 
continuing care and supervision of the incapacitated individual . . . .”  MCL 700.5306(1).   
An appointed guardian exercises legal authority on behalf of, and in the best 
interests of, the incapacitated individual.  See MCL 700.5306(1); MCL 700.5314.  The 
scope of a guardian’s authority must be tailored to the specific needs of the incapacitated 
individual.  “The court shall grant a guardian only those powers and only for that period of 
time as is necessary to provide for the demonstrated need of the incapacitated individual.”  
MCL 700.5306(2).  If the individual “lacks the capacity to do some, but not all, of the tasks 
necessary to care for himself or herself, the court may appoint a limited guardian to provide 
guardianship services to the individual . . . .”  MCL 700.5306(3).  However, “[i]f . . . the 
individual is incapacitated and is totally without capacity to care for himself or herself, the 
court . . . may appoint a full guardian.”  MCL 700.5306(4).  The powers granted to a 
guardian define the scope of the guardian’s responsibilities toward the incapacitated 
 
present at the hearing, to be represented by legal counsel, to present evidence 
and cross-examine witnesses, and to a trial by jury, MCL 700.5304(2), (4) & 
(5); and providing that the court “may appoint a guardian if the court finds 
by clear and convincing evidence both that the individual for whom a 
guardian is sought is an incapacitated individual and that the appointment is 
necessary as a means of providing continuing care and supervision of the 
incapacitated individual[.]”  MCL 700.5306(1).  See also, MCL 700.5306a 
specifying the rights of an individual for whom guardianship is sought.  See 
MCL 700.5406 for similar provisions regarding a petition to appoint a 
conservator for an allegedly incapacitated individual.  [Bacon v Zappia, 
unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued 
November 17, 2015 (Docket No. 323570), p 4 n 2.] 
 
 
8 
 
individual.  See MCL 700.5314 (“To the extent a guardian of a legally incapacitated 
individual is granted powers by the court under [MCL 700.5306], the guardian is 
responsible for the ward’s care, custody, and control . . . .”).  These statutory obligations 
give rise to a fiduciary duty to act in the ward’s best interests.  See MCL 700.1104(e) 
(defining “fiduciary” to include guardians); In re Karmey Estate, 468 Mich 68, 74 n 2; 658 
NW2d 796 (2003) (“ ‘[F]iduciary relationships—such as . . . guardian-ward . . . —require 
the highest duty of care.’ ”), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed). 
In determining whom to appoint as guardian, a court must give first preference to 
an incapacitated individual’s desires and then look to that individual’s family members.  
See MCL 700.5313(2) and (3).  This priority scheme is consistent with the intimate and 
personal nature of a guardianship.  If no one falling within these categories is “suitable or 
willing to serve” as guardian, “the court may appoint any competent person who is suitable 
and willing to serve, including a professional guardian as provided in [MCL 700.5106].”  
MCL 700.5313(4).  A “professional guardian” is “a person that provides guardianship 
services for a fee.”  MCL 700.1106(w).  Professional guardians generally have no 
preexisting relationship with a ward before they are appointed, and they are often 
responsible for more than one ward, with some professional guardians having hundreds of 
wards under their care at any given time.  Id.; Brief for the Probate and Estate Planning 
Section of the State Bar of Michigan as Amicus Curiae (July 26, 2023) (Docket No. 
165018) at 15.   
Before appointing a professional guardian, a court must “find[] on the record” that 
(1) appointing a professional guardian is in the ward’s best interests and (2) “[t]here is no 
other person that is competent, suitable, and willing to serve in that fiduciary capacity . . . .”  
 
 
9 
 
MCL 700.5106(2); see also In re Gerstler Guardianship/Conservatorship, 324 Mich App 
494, 512-514; 922 NW2d 168 (2018) (holding that the probate court erred by appointing a 
professional guardian without making any factual finding that a person higher in the 
priority scheme was unable or unwilling to serve as guardian).  In practical terms, this 
means that professional guardians are most often appointed as a last resort when an 
incapacitated individual has no one else in their life who is able and willing to accept the 
responsibility of a guardianship.   
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
These cases involve billing disputes between plaintiff-appellee Darren Findling—
an attorney and professional guardian—and defendant-appellant, Auto-Owners Insurance 
Company.9  In 2019, Findling was appointed to serve as the guardian for Dana Jenkins and 
as coguardian for Mary Ann Malloy, both of whom suffered serious injuries in automobile 
crashes that rendered them legally incapacitated.  Both Jenkins and Malloy receive no-fault 
benefits from Auto-Owners.  In 2019 and 2020, Findling, along with employees of his law 
firm, provided various guardianship services to Malloy and Jenkins, including guardian 
visits and meetings with physicians, case managers, the Social Security Administration, 
and their banks.  Findling sought reimbursement from Auto-Owners for these and other 
 
9 Findling’s law firm—The Darren Findling Law Firm, PLC—is also a named plaintiff in 
these cases.  In the action seeking reimbursement for guardianship services related to Mary 
Ann Malloy, Malloy’s current and former coguardians—Patrick and Kathern Malloy—
were also named plaintiffs at various times, but they are not parties to this appeal.  The 
complaints in these cases alleged that The Darren Findling Law Firm represents Findling 
and Patrick and Kathern Malloy in their roles as fiduciaries.  This opinion refers only to 
Findling for ease of reference.   
 
 
10 
 
services under MCL 500.3107(1)(a).  Auto-Owners declined to reimburse for the services 
that were performed by the employees of Findling’s law firm. 
Findling filed two lawsuits against Auto-Owners in his guardianship capacity, 
seeking reimbursement for the guardianship services performed for Malloy and Jenkins by 
employees of his law firm.10  In its answers, Auto-Owners raised as affirmative defenses 
that the care and services provided were not lawfully rendered.  In both cases, Findling 
filed early motions for partial summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(9) (failure to state 
a valid defense to a claim) and (C)(10) (no genuine issue of material fact) solely on the 
issue of whether Auto-Owners was required to reimburse for guardianship services 
performed by employees of his law firm, and Auto-Owners filed countermotions for 
summary disposition on the same issue under MCR 2.116(I)(2).  Auto-Owners argued that 
it was not required to reimburse for such services because Findling had not complied with 
MCL 700.5103, which restricts the delegation of guardianship “powers” to fewer than 180 
days and requires a valid power of attorney and notice to the court.  Findling countered that 
he only delegated his guardianship duties—but not his powers—to employees of his law 
firm and therefore he was not required to comply with MCL 700.5103.  He further argued 
that he was legally permitted to have employees perform guardianship duties under MCL 
700.5106(5) and (6).  
 
10 In support of the complaints in these cases, Findling submitted invoices from The Probate 
Pro, a division of The Darren Findling Law Firm, PLC, reflecting charges for services 
provided by both Darren Findling and employees of his law firm.  Specifically, with respect 
to Mary Ann Malloy, the invoices reflected 56 hours of services provided by employees 
and 0.5 hours of services provided by Darren Findling.  With respect to Dana Jenkins, the 
invoices reflected 150.8 hours of services provided by employees and 1.2 hours of services 
provided by Darren Findling. 
 
 
11 
 
The probate court heard oral argument on the motions in both cases together and 
agreed with Findling.  The court therefore granted Findling’s partial motions for summary 
disposition and denied Auto-Owners’ countermotions for partial summary disposition.  
Auto-Owners filed interlocutory applications for leave to appeal in both cases, which the 
Court of Appeals originally denied “for failure to persuade the Court of the need for 
immediate appellate review.”11  Auto-Owners sought leave to appeal in this Court, and we 
remanded both cases to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted.12  On 
remand, the Court of Appeals consolidated the two appeals13 and affirmed in part and 
reversed in part.  In re Guardianship of Malloy, 343 Mich App 548; 997 NW2d 733 (2022).   
The Court of Appeals found it significant that EPIC distinguishes between a 
guardian’s “powers” and “duties,” see MCL 700.5314, but that MCL 700.5103 only refers 
to the delegation of a guardian’s “powers.”  Id. at 561-565, 569.  Accordingly, the panel 
held that a guardian is only required to comply with MCL 700.5103 to lawfully delegate 
guardianship “powers,” which it defined as tasks that “alter the ‘rights, duties, liabilities, 
or other legal relations’ ” of an incapacitated individual.  Id. at 565, quoting Black’s Law 
Dictionary (11th ed).  Under this framework, the Court of Appeals concluded that there 
was no question of fact that Findling largely delegated guardianship duties—but not 
 
11 In re Guardianship of Malloy, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered 
September 13, 2021 (Docket No. 358006); In re Guardianship of Jenkins, unpublished 
order of the Court of Appeals, entered September 13, 2021 (Docket No. 358021). 
12 In re Guardianship of Malloy, 509 Mich 880 (2022); In re Guardianship of Jenkins, 509 
Mich 880 (2022).   
13 In re Guardianship of Malloy, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered July 5, 
2022 (Docket Nos. 358006 and 358021). 
 
 
12 
 
powers—to his employees.  Id. at 565, 567.  The panel concluded that employees attending 
meetings with doctors, the Social Security Administration Office, and Malloy’s and 
Jenkins’s banks, among other tasks, were proper delegations of guardianship “duties” 
rather than guardianship “powers.”  Id. at 565-567.  However, the Court of Appeals held 
that there remained questions of fact as to whether Findling unlawfully delegated his 
“powers” by allowing employees to prepare for and attend hearings regarding the 
modification of Malloy’s and Jenkins’s guardianships.  Id. at 570.   
Defendant again sought leave to appeal in this Court.  We ordered oral argument on 
the application and directed the parties to address 
whether the Court of Appeals properly construed and applied the relevant 
provisions of the Estates and Protected Individuals Code, MCL 700.1101 et 
seq., in determining that there is a genuine issue of material fact whether the 
guardianship services provided by the appellee and the appellee firm were 
“lawfully rendered” so as to be payable under MCL 500.3107 of the no fault 
act, MCL 500.3101 et seq.  [In re Guardianship of Malloy, 511 Mich 913, 
913 (2023).] 
III.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
We review de novo questions of statutory interpretation and whether a trial court 
properly granted summary disposition.  See Jesperson v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 499 Mich 29, 
34; 878 NW2d 799 (2016).   
IV.  ANALYSIS 
The parties do not dispute that a guardian may be entitled to reimbursement from 
an applicable no-fault insurer under MCL 500.3107(1)(a) for guardianship services that are 
lawfully performed on behalf of an incapacitated individual.  See Heinz v Auto Club Ins 
Ass’n, 214 Mich App 195, 198; 543 NW2d 4 (1995) (holding that services performed by a 
 
 
13 
 
guardian are allowable expenses under MCL 500.3107(1)(a)).  The question in these cases 
is whether a professional guardian may lawfully delegate guardianship tasks to employees 
without complying with MCL 700.5103.  Answering this question requires an examination 
of how common-law agency principles apply to guardianships in light of the relevant EPIC 
provisions.   
A.  COMMON-LAW AGENCY PRINCIPLES 
Under the common law, “whatever a person may lawfully do if acting in his own 
right and on his own behalf he may lawfully delegate to an agent.”  Link, Petter & Co v 
Pollie, 241 Mich 356, 359-360; 217 NW 60 (1928) (citation omitted).  This common-law 
principle may apply even if an exhaustive statutory scheme that did not exist under the 
common law is silent as to whether delegation is permitted.  See generally Wigfall v 
Detroit, 504 Mich 330; 934 NW2d 760 (2019) (applying established agency principles to 
the notice requirements to overcome governmental immunity).  This principle reflects “the 
practical reality” and common understanding that people often cannot feasibly personally 
perform all tasks that are required of them.  Id. at 343.  Moreover, delegation in some 
contexts can provide societal benefits related to specialization and efficiency.14  One 
common category of agency–principal relationship is that of an employer and an employee.  
See Chambers v Trettco, Inc, 463 Mich 297, 310; 614 NW2d 910 (2000).   
 
14 See Mushkat & Mushkat, The Challenge of COVID-19 and the World Health 
Organization’s Response: The Principal-Agent Model Revisited, 36 Am U Int’l L Rev 487, 
521 (2021); 1 Ries, Regulation of Investment Management & Fiduciary Services (July 
2021 update), § 14:5.   
 
 
14 
 
But the use of an agent is not a get-out-of-jail-free card that relieves the principal of 
their legal responsibilities.  When an agent acts within the express or implied scope of their 
authority, the principal is responsible for the agent’s improper exercise of that authority.  
See, e.g., Rogers v J B Hunt Transp, Inc, 466 Mich 645, 652; 649 NW2d 23 (2002).  In 
other words, an agent’s acts that fall within the scope of authority granted to the agent are 
considered to be “functionally interchangeable” with acts directly performed by the 
principal.  Wigfall, 504 Mich at 349 (MCCORMACK, C.J., concurring); see also Cox v Flint 
Bd of Hosp Managers, 467 Mich 1, 11; 651 NW2d 356 (2002).  The principal’s 
responsibility for an agent’s actions flows from the agent’s exercise of authority provided 
by, or exercised on behalf of, the principal.  See Chambers, 463 Mich at 311; Smith v 
Webster, 23 Mich 298, 300 (1871) (“The employer, who leaves to his subordinates a 
discretion which they abuse, is responsible as if he had approved their action.”). 
B.  DELEGATION OF GUARDIANSHIP TASKS  
Notwithstanding common-law agency principles, the Legislature has recognized 
unique concerns in the guardianship context that justify limiting a guardian’s ability to 
enlist an agent to perform guardianship tasks on the guardian’s behalf.  In particular, MCL 
700.5103 provides, in pertinent part:   
(1)  By a properly executed power of attorney, a parent or guardian of 
a minor or a guardian of a legally incapacitated individual may delegate to 
another person, for a period not exceeding 180 days, any of the parent’s or 
guardian’s powers regarding care, custody, or property of the minor child or 
ward, except the power to consent to adoption of a minor ward or to release 
of a minor ward for adoption. 
*   *   * 
 
 
15 
 
(4)  If a guardian for a minor or legally incapacitated individual 
delegates any power under this section, the guardian shall notify the court 
within 7 days after execution of the power of attorney and provide the court 
the name, address, and telephone number of the attorney-in-fact. 
This provision prohibits all guardians—including professional guardians—from delegating 
their guardianship “powers” for more than 180 days.15  Moreover, it requires a guardian 
who wants to delegate their “powers” to execute a power of attorney and notify the court 
of the delegation within 7 days of execution.  It is undisputed in this case that Findling did 
not comply with MCL 700.5103 before delegating certain guardianship tasks to employees 
of his law firm.  So the dispositive question is whether the tasks those employees performed 
fall within the scope of MCL 700.5103.   
Like the Court of Appeals, we find it significant that MCL 700.5103 only addresses 
delegation of a guardian’s “powers,” which suggests that MCL 700.5103 does not apply to 
the delegation of guardianship tasks that are not “powers.”  See Detroit v Redford Twp, 
253 Mich 453, 456; 235 NW 217 (1931) (noting the presumption that the “[e]xpress 
mention in a statute of one thing implies the exclusion of other similar things”).  We further 
agree with the Court of Appeals that the Legislature’s use of “power” in other EPIC 
provisions governing guardianships helps illuminate the meaning of “power” in MCL 
700.5103.  See South Dearborn Environmental Improvement Ass’n, Inc v Dep’t of 
Environmental Quality, 502 Mich 349, 367 n 16; 917 NW2d 603 (2018) (recognizing that 
 
15 MCL 700.5103(1) uses the term “may,” which “is ordinarily considered to be 
permissive.”  James Twp v Rice, 509 Mich 363, 372; 984 NW2d 71 (2022).  But as this 
Court has recognized, “this does not end the inquiry because it is necessary to ascertain to 
whom the statute gives that discretion.”  Id.  Similarly, it is also necessary to specify what 
action the statute makes discretionary.  In this context, the word “may” signifies only that 
a guardian’s decision to delegate is discretionary, not that a guardian can delegate their 
“powers” without complying with MCL 700.5103.   
 
 
16 
 
interpreting a statutory term “requires consideration of the relationship of text within a 
single statutory provision as well as its relationship to the text of other provisions within 
the same act”).   
MCL 700.5314 provides that “a guardian [of an incapacitated individual] has all of 
the following powers and duties, to the extent granted by court order,” and then provides a 
lettered list of possible “powers” and “duties” a guardian might have.  See, e.g., MCL 
700.5314(d) (providing a guardian “[t]he power to execute, reaffirm, and revoke a do-not-
resuscitate order on behalf of a ward”); MCL 700.5314(b) (imposing “the duty to make 
provision for the ward’s care, comfort, and maintenance”).  While many items in the list 
are explicitly identified as a “power” or a “duty,” some items include neither term.  See, 
e.g., MCL 700.5314(a) (providing that “[t]he guardian shall visit the ward” at least once 
every three months).16  We have little trouble concluding that if MCL 700.5314 explicitly 
identifies something as a “power” of the guardian, then it falls within the scope of 
limitations in MCL 700.5103 on the delegation of a guardian’s “powers.”  See Arrowhead 
Dev Co v Livingston Co Rd Comm, 413 Mich 505, 516; 322 NW2d 702 (1982) (explaining 
 
16 MCL 700.5314 further provides various actions that a guardian “shall not” take.  See, 
e.g., MCL 700.5314(d)(i) and (ii) (providing that a guardian “shall not execute a do-not-
resuscitate order unless the guardian” consults with the incapacitated individual and their 
attending physician).  By its nature, a prohibition on conduct cannot be delegated.  Any 
delegation of guardianship authority is necessarily subject to any limitation that would 
apply if that task were performed by the guardian, regardless of whether a formal 
delegation under MCL 700.5103 is required; a principal cannot delegate authority they 
themselves lack.  See Link, Petter & Co, 241 Mich at 359-360 (“[W]hatever a person may 
lawfully do if acting in his own right and on his own behalf he may lawfully delegate to an 
agent.”) (citation omitted; emphasis added).   
 
 
17 
 
that statutory terms “must be assigned such meanings as are in harmony with the whole of 
the statute”).  
However, this is not the end of the story.  The lettered list in MCL 700.5314 does 
not provide an exclusive list of tasks a guardian is required or permitted to perform on 
behalf of an incapacitated individual.  In relevant part, MCL 700.5314 provides: 
To the extent a guardian of a legally incapacitated individual is granted 
powers by the court under [MCL 700.5306], the guardian is responsible for 
the ward’s care, custody, and control . . . .  In particular and without 
qualifying the previous sentences, a guardian has all of the following powers 
and duties, to the extent granted by court order[.]  [Emphasis added.] 
Thus, MCL 700.5314 provides that a guardian has an overarching “responsib[ility] for the 
ward’s care, custody, and control” and then provides a nonexhaustive list of “powers and 
duties” that might fall under that umbrella.  And the reality is that a guardian’s obligation 
to care for an incapacitated individual varies on an individual basis and may require a 
guardian to perform tasks that are not explicitly listed in MCL 700.5314.  The question 
then becomes to what extent compliance with MCL 700.5103 is necessary to delegate 
guardianship tasks that are not explicitly listed in MCL 700.5314.  In other words, how do 
we identify whether a task that is not explicitly identified as a “power” in MCL 700.5314 
is nonetheless a “power” of the guardian that must be formally delegated under MCL 
700.5103? 
In defining the scope of a guardian’s “powers,” the Court of Appeals noted that 
EPIC does not define the word “power” and therefore turned to Black’s Law Dictionary 
(11th ed), which defines “power” as: 
1. The ability to act or not act; esp., a person’s capacity for acting in such a 
manner as to control someone else’s responses.  2. Dominance, control, or 
 
 
18 
 
influence over another; control over one’s subordinates.  3. The legal right or 
authorization to act or not act; a person’s or organization’s ability to alter, by 
an act of will, the rights, duties, liabilities, or other legal relations either of 
that person or of another. 
Because MCL 700.5314 does not provide an exhaustive list of tasks a guardian is permitted 
or required to perform, it was proper for the Court of Appeals to consult a dictionary to 
assist in understanding what other guardianship activities fall within the statutorily 
undefined term “power.”  See Champine v Dep’t of Transp, 509 Mich 447, 453-454; 983 
NW2d 741 (2022).  Moreover, we agree with the Court of Appeals that this dictionary 
definition is helpful in resolving this case.17   
However, this definition is insufficient on its own because there are multiple 
definitions of “power” that could conceivably apply, and the alternative definitions are 
meaningfully distinct.  There is a significant difference between broadly defining a 
guardian’s “powers” that must be delegated under MCL 700.5103 as a guardian’s “legal 
right or authorization to act” on a ward’s behalf and defining it more narrowly as the 
“ability to alter . . . the rights, duties, liabilities, or other legal relations” of a ward.  Black’s 
 
17 Generally, resort to a legal dictionary is most helpful if a word is used as a legal term of 
art.  See, e.g., Sanford v Michigan, 506 Mich 10, 21; 954 NW2d 82 (2020).  “This is 
because the common and approved usage of a nonlegal term is most likely to be found in 
a standard dictionary, not in a legal dictionary.”  People v Thompson, 477 Mich 146, 152; 
730 NW2d 708 (2007).  However, many words are defined in both lay and legal 
dictionaries, and it is not always clear whether the Legislature intended for a term to bear 
its plain meaning or a specialized legal meaning.  As discussed later, the statutory scheme 
indicates that the term “powers” in this context refers to a guardian’s authority to alter the 
rights, duties, liabilities, or legal relations of the incapacitated individual, which is 
consistent with one definition of that term in Black’s Law Dictionary.  Neither the parties 
nor the lower courts cite a lay dictionary definition of “power,” let alone cite a lay 
dictionary definition that is more consistent with the statutory context than the applicable 
definition in Black’s Law Dictionary.  Accordingly, we conclude that resort to a legal 
dictionary is appropriate and sufficient in this case.   
 
 
19 
 
Law Dictionary (11th ed).  Accordingly, it is necessary to examine the surrounding 
statutory provisions to determine what “power” means in this context.  See, e.g., Honigman 
Miller Schwartz & Cohn LLP v Detroit, 505 Mich 284, 307; 952 NW2d 358 (2020) (“A 
statute should be interpreted in light of the overall statutory scheme, and although a phrase 
or a statement may mean one thing when read in isolation, it may mean something 
substantially different when read in context.”) (quotation marks, citation, and brackets 
omitted).   
Viewed in the broader context of EPIC, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the 
proper definition of “power” that is to be applied to acts outside those explicitly listed in 
MCL 700.5314 is an act that alters or impairs the rights, duties, liabilities, or legal relations 
of the incapacitated individual.  As summarized by the Court of Appeals: 
A guardian’s powers to the extent granted by the court under MCL 700.5306 
include the power to establish the ward’s residence, MCL 700.5314(a); give 
consent or approval to enable the ward to receive medical care, mental health 
care, professional care, counseling, treatment, or service, MCL 700.5314(c); 
execute, reaffirm, and revoke a ward’s do-not-resuscitate order with some 
requirements, MCL 700.5314(d); execute, reaffirm, and revoke a ward’s 
nonopioid directive, MCL 700.5314(f); execute, reaffirm, and revoke a 
physician’s orders for scope of treatment for the ward with some 
requirements, MCL 700.5314(g); and take action to compel persons 
responsible to support the ward, to pay money for the ward’s welfare, and 
apply money and property for the ward’s support, care, and education, MCL 
700.5314(i).   
A guardian’s duties include being responsible for the ward’s care, 
custody, and control and communicating and consulting with the ward if 
possible before making decisions.  MCL 700.5314.  A guardian also has the 
duty to make provisions for the ward’s care, comfort, maintenance, and, 
when appropriate, education; secure services for the ward’s mental and 
physical well-being; and care for and protect the ward’s personal and real 
property or dispose of it if in the ward’s best interests.  MCL 700.5314(b).  
Further, if a guardian executes a do-not-resuscitate order, the guardian has 
the duty to visit, communicate, and consult with the ward and consult directly 
 
 
20 
 
with the ward’s attending physician.  MCL 700.5314(d).  Similarly, 
respecting physician orders for scope of treatment, a guardian has the duty to 
visit, communicate, and consult with the ward about such orders.  MCL 
700.5314(h).  A guardian has the duty to report at least annually the condition 
of the ward and the ward’s estate to the court.  MCL 700.5314(j).  Under 
MCL 700.5106(6), among other duties, a professional guardian appointed by 
the court has the duty to “ensure that there are a sufficient number of 
employees assigned to the care of wards for the purpose of performing the 
necessary duties associated with ensuring that proper and appropriate care is 
provided.”  [In re Guardianship of Malloy, 343 Mich App at 561-563.] 
In broad strokes, the listed “powers” provide a guardian the authority to (1) handle 
the incapacitated individual’s money and medical care, (2) establish their residence, and 
(3) institute legal proceedings on their behalf.  The listed “duties” require a guardian to (1) 
visit and/or consult with the incapacitated individual, that individual’s family, and their 
doctors, (2) care for the ward’s property, and (3) “make provision for the ward’s care, 
comfort, and maintenance and, when appropriate, arrange for the ward’s training and 
education.”  MCL 700.5314(b).  The term “power” in this context thus does not refer 
broadly to a guardian’s authority to take actions on behalf of or in lieu of the incapacitated 
individual.  Rather, the “power” that must be delegated pursuant to MCL 700.5103 is a 
guardian’s authority to alter the rights, duties, liabilities, or legal relations of the 
incapacitated individual. 
This conclusion is reinforced by MCL 700.5106, which specifically governs 
professional guardians.  MCL 700.5106 provides, in relevant part:  
(5) A professional guardian appointed under this section shall 
establish and maintain a schedule of visitation so that an individual 
associated with the professional guardian who is responsible for the ward’s 
care visits the ward within 3 months after the professional guardian’s 
appointment and not less than once within 3 months after each previous visit. 
 
 
21 
 
(6) A professional guardian appointed under this section shall ensure 
that there are a sufficient number of employees assigned to the care of wards 
for the purpose of performing the necessary duties associated with ensuring 
that proper and appropriate care is provided.  [Emphasis added.] 
These provisions explicitly contemplate that a professional guardian will hire employees 
to assist in performing guardianship duties.  We find it unlikely that the Legislature, in 
requiring a professional guardian to hire sufficient employees to assist in performing the 
necessary duties for a ward, intended that the ability to use such employees would be 
contingent on a statutory provision governing the delegation of guardianship “powers” that 
requires the execution of a power of attorney (perhaps a power of attorney for every 
employee used) every six months.  Accordingly, these provisions further support 
interpreting “powers” in this context in a narrower sense as referring only to “powers” 
explicitly listed in MCL 700.5314 and to any guardianship act that would alter the rights, 
duties, liabilities, or legal relations of the incapacitated individual.  As applied to this case, 
we agree with the Court of Appeals that a decision to seek an alteration of who is to serve 
as a ward’s guardian or coguardian—an act that is not explicitly listed in MCL 700.5314—
is the exercise of a guardianship “power” because changing a ward’s guardian alters the 
ward’s rights and legal relations. 
We clarify a few points.  We do not hold that there is a bright-line dichotomy 
between a guardian’s powers and duties.  Many guardianship duties implicitly require a 
grant of power in the broadest sense, i.e., the legal authority to act, and the grant of 
guardianship powers necessarily results in certain statutory and fiduciary duties.  See MCL 
700.5314 (explaining that the court grants a guardian “powers” and that a guardian has “all 
of the following powers and duties, to the extent granted by court order”) (emphasis 
 
 
22 
 
added).  Relatedly, a guardian’s overarching “responsib[ility] for the ward’s care, custody, 
and control” necessarily includes both the imposition of certain duties and the grant of 
certain powers.  Id.  If a guardian exercises a “power” as defined in this opinion to fulfill a 
duty owed to a ward, then the guardian must comply with MCL 700.5103 to lawfully 
delegate the exercise of that power.  Auto-Owners is thus correct that a guardian’s powers 
and duties often overlap.  Our holding is simply that the relevant EPIC provisions use the 
term “power” to refer only to a subset of a guardian’s broader authority and that MCL 
700.5103 does not apply to delegations of any other guardianship authority or duty.    
Moreover, MCL 700.5103 only limits common-law agency principles with regard 
to a guardian’s final decision-making authority to exercise a power listed in MCL 700.5314 
or to approve any other alteration or impairment of the ward’s rights, duties, liabilities, or 
legal relations.  MCL 700.5103 does not apply to a professional guardian’s use of 
employees to assist in making such a decision, nor does it apply to the use of employees to 
execute such a decision.  For example, one of a guardian’s “powers” is “to establish the 
ward’s place of residence . . . .”  MCL 700.5314(a).  Thus, a professional guardian must 
personally make the final decision regarding where to establish a ward’s residence unless 
the guardian complies with MCL 700.5103 to formally delegate that power to someone 
else.  However, a delegation under MCL 700.5103 is not required for a professional 
guardian to hire someone knowledgeable about residential options to advise the 
professional guardian regarding possible housing for their wards.  Relatedly, a formal 
delegation is not required to have an employee, at the request of the professional guardian 
and with their prior approval, take the steps necessary to carry out the guardian’s choice in 
securing a new residence for a ward.  MCL 700.5103 limits a guardian’s ability to make 
 
 
23 
 
someone else the de facto guardian with ultimate decision-making authority as to what is 
necessary to provide proper care for a ward, but it does not limit the use of employees to 
perform tasks that help a guardian fulfill their “responsib[ility] for the ward’s care, custody, 
and control . . . .”  MCL 700.5314; see also MCL 700.5106(5) and (6). 
Finally, we caution that, at least in the absence of a formal delegation of 
guardianship powers under MCL 700.5103, we see no reason why the common-law 
doctrine that imputes to employers the actions of their employees would not apply with 
equal force to a professional guardian.  See, e.g., Rogers, 466 Mich at 652.  Thus, 
professional guardians should be careful when entrusting others to perform guardianship 
tasks on their behalf and should anticipate being held legally responsible if an employee 
fails to adequately perform guardianship tasks or otherwise abuses the authority entrusted 
to them.  Under EPIC, a court bestows authority on the guardian, thereby creating a 
fiduciary relationship rendering that individual responsible for ensuring that a ward 
receives proper care.  See MCL 700.1104(e); In re Karmey Estate, 468 Mich at 74 n 2.  A 
professional guardian cannot shirk that responsibility by using employees; the ultimate 
responsibility for the ward’s custody and care lies with the court-appointed guardian. 
C.  APPLICATION 
In these cases, the Court of Appeals held that there remained questions of fact as to 
whether Findling unlawfully delegated his “powers” by allowing employees to prepare for 
and attend hearings regarding the modification of Malloy’s and Jenkins’s guardianships.  
However, the panel concluded that there were no questions of fact that all the other tasks 
performed by employees of Findling’s law firm—such as attending meetings with doctors, 
 
 
24 
 
the Social Security Administration Office, and Malloy’s and Jenkins’s banks—were 
lawfully rendered because these tasks did not constitute the exercise of guardianship 
powers.  We believe that these holdings were premature.  Accordingly, we vacate these 
holdings and remand this case to the probate court for further proceedings in light of this 
opinion.  
The parties’ countermotions for partial summary disposition were brought before 
the completion of discovery, and the current factual record appears limited to short 
descriptions of the employees’ activities in billing statements that were attached to 
Findling’s complaints.  Moreover, neither the parties nor the probate court had appellate 
guidance as to the appropriate framework for assessing whether an employee lawfully 
performed guardianship tasks when the motions for partial summary disposition were filed 
and decided.  Finally, throughout this litigation, the parties have framed their arguments in 
broad all-or-nothing terms without reference to the specific entries in Findling’s billing 
statements, and the probate court’s decision was similarly broad in its reasoning.  Under 
these circumstances, we decline to engage in a line-by-line analysis of Findling’s billing 
statements in the first instance.  Instead, we find it appropriate for the parties and probate 
court to reassess these cases in light of this opinion. 
 
To assist the parties and probate court on remand, we note the apparent limitations 
of the current factual record.  The billing statements attached to Findling’s complaints 
contain only brief descriptions of the guardianship tasks that were performed.  For example, 
in one entry in a billing statement attached to the complaint, Findling seeks compensation 
for “Preparation for meeting at Medical Alternatives.  Teem [sic] meeting at Medical 
Alternatives regarding Mary [Ann Malloy]’s care, recovery, and rehabilitation.”  The Court 
 
 
25 
 
of Appeals characterized this entry, and other similar ones, as delegating to employees the 
task of “attending meetings with Malloy’s doctors,” which it concluded did not involve the 
exercise of a guardianship “power” because this task did not involve an alteration or 
impairment of Malloy’s rights, duties, liabilities, or legal relations.  In re Guardianship of 
Malloy, 343 Mich App at 565.   
However, MCL 700.5314(c) provides that a guardian has “[t]he power to give 
consent or approval that is necessary to enable the ward to receive medical, mental health, 
or other professional care, counsel, treatment, or service.”  (Emphasis added.)  It seems at 
least possible that a “meeting . . . regarding Mary’s care, recovery, and rehabilitation” 
could include the exercise of a guardian’s “powers” if, for example, at that meeting the 
employee gave consent for Malloy to receive medical treatment.  If so, the question would 
be whether Findling was the final decision-maker for approving that treatment or whether 
Findling improperly delegated that decision to the employee.  By contrast, if at that meeting 
the employee only gathered information relevant to Malloy’s medical care but approved 
no actual change in that care, then the employee was not unlawfully exercising Findling’s 
guardianship “powers.”   
To take another example, the Court of Appeals held that there remained questions 
of fact as to whether Findling improperly delegated his “powers” by allowing employees 
to prepare for and attend hearings regarding the modification of Malloy’s and Jenkins’s 
guardianships on April 23, 2019, and April 24, 2019.  As already stated, we agree with the 
Court of Appeals that modifying a ward’s guardianship alters the ward’s rights, duties, 
liabilities, or legal relations, and therefore the decision to seek such a change is the exercise 
 
 
26 
 
of a guardianship “power.”  However, the billing entries describing these activities are 
unclear as to whether the employees’ activities involved the exercise of Findling’s powers.   
The April 23, 2019 billing entries for both Malloy and Jenkins state only that an 
employee “[p]repared for hearing in Oakland County Probate Court,” and the April 24, 
2019 billing entries state little more than that the employees attended hearings on the 
petitions to modify the guardianships and “[a]ttended to necessary follow up.”  Standing 
alone, these entries do not indicate whether the result of these hearings was to alter the 
terms of Malloy’s or Jenkins’s guardianships.18  Moreover, these entries do not indicate 
whether Findling was personally aware of the proceedings or whether Findling was the 
ultimate decision-maker as to what guardianship arrangements to advocate for on behalf of 
Malloy and Jenkins. 
As stated earlier, we do not decide in this opinion whether, on the current record, 
either party is entitled to partial summary disposition as to all or some of the services 
performed by employees of Findling’s law firm.  Instead, we leave that for the probate 
court to assess on remand in light of this opinion and with the assistance of more-focused 
party argument.   
V.  CONCLUSION 
We hold that a professional guardian cannot, without complying with MCL 
700.5103, lawfully delegate to employees their final decision-making authority over a 
 
18 The April 24, 2019 entry in Jenkins’s billing statement includes the following phrase: 
“Task to Sharon to serve Order.”  The “Order” mentioned here presumably refers to an 
order entered at the hearing on the petition to modify the guardianship.  But that entry does 
not indicate the content of any order that was entered or to whom that order was to be 
served.    
 
 
27 
 
guardianship “power” that is explicitly listed in MCL 700.5314 or over any guardianship 
task that alters or impairs an incapacitated individual’s rights, duties, liabilities, or legal 
relations.  However, a professional guardian may lawfully have employees assist in 
exercising a guardianship power and may have employees perform any other guardianship 
task on behalf of the professional guardian.  We vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals 
and the decisions of the Oakland County Probate Court granting Findling’s motions for 
partial summary disposition and denying Auto-Owners’ countermotions for partial 
summary disposition in both docket numbers and remand both cases to the Oakland County 
Probate Court for further proceedings in light of this opinion. 
 
 
Megan K. Cavanagh 
 
Elizabeth T. Clement 
 
Brian K. Zahra 
 
David F. Viviano 
 
Richard H. Bernstein 
 
Elizabeth M. Welch 
 
Kyra H. Bolden