Title: Egly v. Blackford County DPW
Citation: 592 N.E.2d 1232
Docket Number: 05S02-9206-CV-431
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: June 4, 1992

592 N.E.2d 1232 (1992)
Walter EGLY and Diana Egly, Appellants, (Respondents below),
v.
BLACKFORD COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE, Appellee. (Petitioner below).
No. 05S02-9206-CV-431.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
June 4, 1992.
Thomas A. Brown, Hartford City, for appellants, Walter Egly and Diana Egly.
William E. Ervin, Hartford City, for appellee, Blackford County Dept. of Public Welfare.
Mary Jane Norman, Derelle Watson-Duvall, Indianapolis, for amicus curiae, Marion County Dept. of Public Welfare.
*1233 KRAHULIK, Justice.
Blackford County Department of Public Welfare (Petitioner-Appellee below) ("Welfare Department") seeks transfer after the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court judgment terminating the parental rights of Walter and Diana Egly (Respondents-Appellants below) (the "Eglys"). Egly v. Blackford County Welfare Dept. (1991), Ind. App., 575 N.E.2d 312. We grant transfer to address the proper standard to be applied in actions to terminate parental rights.
The facts pertinent to the petition are as set out in the opinion of the Court of Appeals:
Id. at 312-13.
The Eglys appealed.[1] The Court of Appeals reversed the termination. Citing Matter of Miedl (1981), Ind., 425 N.E.2d 137, 141, the court held that parental rights may be terminated only where there is clear and convincing evidence that the continued custody of the parents is wholly inadequate for the child's very survival. *1234 575 N.E.2d  at 314. The court opined that the findings of the trial court were "not of a serious enough nature to warrant termination of the Egly's parental rights over their children" and, thus, the Welfare Department had not established that the termination was in the best interests of the children. Id. The Welfare Department now seeks transfer on the grounds that the Court of Appeals applied an incorrect standard for termination of parental rights. We agree.
When a welfare department seeks to terminate parental rights, the department must plead and prove that:
Ind. Code § 31-6-5-4(c) (1990). These allegations must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Ind. Code § 31-6-7-13(a).
The Court of Appeals focused on a single sentence found in the Miedl decision which opined that children "are taken [from their parent's custody] because the present place in the custody of their parents is wholly inadequate for their very survival," 425 N.E.2d  at 141, and then inserted that statement as a requirement of Ind. Code § 31-6-5-4(c)(3) for establishing that the termination is in the best interests of the children. To the extent the Court of Appeals relied on that sentence as a standard, it was relying on dicta. Miedl did not append an additional requirement onto the statute. As this Court noted in Herman v. State (1856), 8 Ind. 545, 553:
Our reading of Miedl convinces us that this singular sentence, written in the context of the alleged failure of a welfare department to have a written plan for the future of the children, was not intended to preclude the termination of parental rights under the facts presented here.
The Eglys argue that their parental rights were terminated because of their intellect. Mental retardation of the parents, standing alone, is not a proper ground for terminating parental rights. Ind. Code § 31-6-5-4(c); see also Dull v. Delaware County Department of Public Welfare (1988), Ind. App., 521 N.E.2d 972. Where, however, the parents are incapable of or unwilling to fulfill their legal obligations in caring for their children, then mental illness may be considered. In re Wardship of B.C. (1982), Ind., 441 N.E.2d 208, 211.
The purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish parents, but to protect the children. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services (1981), 452 U.S. 18, 101 S. Ct. 2153, 68 L. Ed. 2d 640. Although parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law allows for the termination of those rights when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their responsibilities as parents. This includes situations not only where the child is in immediate danger of losing his life, but also where the child's emotional and physical development are threatened. See, e.g. In re Y.D.R. (1991), Ind. App., 567 N.E.2d 872; Page v. Greene County Dept. of Pub. Welf. (1991), Ind. App., 564 N.E.2d 956.
The trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law following the bench trial. Where the trial court has heard the evidence and has had the opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses, *1235 we will not set aside the judgment unless it is clearly erroneous. In re Wardship of B.C., 441 N.E.2d  at 211. We do not reweigh the evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses, but consider only the evidence that supports the judgment and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Id. The Eglys do not challenge the findings of fact made by the trial court, but only whether the findings support the conclusions based on those facts. Thus we determine whether the findings support those conclusions. We reverse only upon a showing of "clear error"  that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.
Using this standard, we agree with Judge Baker in his dissent that there is clear and convincing evidence to support the termination of the Eglys' parental rights. At the time the Egly children were first taken from the home, Walter, Jr., almost four years old, was not yet toilet trained and suffered from a speech problem in that he repeated everything he heard. The younger child, Matthew, age nine months, had few mobility skills and was unable to crawl. Even after parental counseling, Matthew was always found in his crib when the social worker visited the home. Once removed from the home and placed in a foster home, Walter, Jr., was toilet trained within two weeks, Matthew learned to crawl, and both children showed marked improvement in communication skills, education levels, and interaction with others. There was testimony from the child welfare case worker that the Eglys were not capable of providing a nurturing, stable environment for the minor children. After 16 months of counseling the Eglys, the only improvement seen by a social worker who saw the Eglys twice a week was in the cleanliness of the home. There was no change in the interaction between parents and children observed by the social workers, although the children progressed quickly to age and intellect appropriate skills while away from the parents. A psychologist who counseled with the Eglys for more than a year testified that they made no progress during counseling and that further counseling would be of no assistance. It was his opinion that the children would be at serious risk if they were returned to the Egly household. Based on this evidence, we hold that the trial court's judgment was not clearly erroneous and should be affirmed.
Accordingly, we now grant transfer, vacate the opinion of the Court of Appeals, and affirm the trial court.
SHEPARD, C.J., and DeBRULER and GIVAN, JJ., concur.
DICKSON, J., votes to deny transfer and dissents without opinion.
[1]  Mr. Egly also agreed to the termination of his parental rights with respect to Joseph Egly, his son from a prior marriage. This agreed termination is not part of this appeal.