Title: Sarasota Citizens For Responsible Government, Etc., Et Al. v. City Of Sarasota Florida, Etc., Et Al.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC10-1647
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: October 28, 2010

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC10-1647 
____________ 
 
SARASOTA CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT, etc.,  
et al., 
Appellants, 
 
vs. 
 
CITY OF SARASOTA, FLORIDA, etc., et al., 
Appellees. 
 
[October 28, 2010] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Sarasota Citizens for Responsible Government, et al., (collectively referred 
to as “Citizens”) appeal a trial court‟s judgment validating bonds proposed for 
issuance by the City of Sarasota and the County of Sarasota in furtherance of an 
agreement bringing the Baltimore Orioles to Sarasota for spring training.1  On 
appeal in this Court, Citizens only allege Sunshine Law violations by the County.  
They do not challenge any other aspect of the bond validation proceedings, and 
                                          
 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(2), Fla. Const.; see also Rowe v. 
Pinellas Sports Auth., 461 So. 2d 72, 74 (Fla. 1984). 
 
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they do not appeal the trial court‟s determination that the City did not violate the 
Sunshine Law.  For the reasons explained below, we affirm the trial court. 
I. BACKGROUND 
As the trial court summarized, 
 
 
[t]he Sarasota County Board of County Commissioners [Board] 
entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the 
Baltimore Orioles (Orioles) in July, 2009.  The MOU obligated the 
Orioles, among other things, to relocate to Sarasota for spring 
training.  Sarasota County is obligated to fund construction of 
facilities/facility improvements at the Ed Smith complex, the location 
within the City of Sarasota where the Orioles are obligated to conduct 
spring training activities, and other facilities located elsewhere in the 
County. 
 
Negotiation of the MOU with the Orioles followed 
unsuccessful attempts to retain the Cincinnati Reds in Sarasota and to 
secure relocation of the Boston Red Sox to Sarasota.  In November, 
2008, the [Board] instructed the County Administrator, James Ley, to 
initiate negotiations with the Orioles.  Mr. Ley delegated this task to 
Deputy County Administrator David Bullock (Bullock).  Negotiations 
between the County and Orioles began immediately and continued 
until the terms of the MOU were finalized in July, 2009.  The MOU 
was approved by the [Board] at a public meeting on July 22, 2009.  At 
that public hearing, the [Board] adopted an amended or modified 
Tourist Development Tax Ordinance, in part to provide part of the 
County‟s funding obligation under the MOU; approved an Interlocal 
Agreement with the City which included an obligation of the City to 
convey the Ed Smith complex to the County, to transfer funds to the 
County to offset part of the cost of construction and to undertake 
responsibility for environmental remediation, if required, at the 
complex; and adopted a resolution authorizing issuance of bonds for 
the purpose of financing costs associated with the improvements 
required by the MOU.  Simultaneously, the City also authorized 
issuance of bonds to fulfill its obligations pursuant to the [I]nterlocal 
[A]greement. 
 
 
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More specifically, the MOU between the County and the Orioles states that 
the County shall provide “23.7 million to the Project” and that it is estimated the 
City‟s contribution will be approximately $7.5 million, for a total not to exceed 
“$31.2 million from all governmental sources.”  The MOU details that the 
proceeds of the County‟s bond issuance is “expected to be approximately $18.7 
Million,” that the proceeds of “[c]ash collections of one-half (1/2) of one percent 
(1%) of the County‟s Tourist Development Tax” is “estimated to be approximately 
$2 million,” and that the County‟s “cash contributions from legally available non-
ad valorem revenues” will not exceed $3 million.  The County is also required to 
maintain and contribute annually to a capital repair and improvements fund with 
the Orioles also contributing to this fund.  The MOU further explains that the 
City‟s bond issue serviced by funds from the State of Florida Office of Tourism, 
Trade and Economic Development (OTTED) or a cash equivalent of non-ad 
valorem revenues will be “in an amount no less than $7.5 million.” 
The MOU calls for the renovation of the Ed Smith Stadium complex, 
including a renovated clubhouse, batting cages, pitching mounds, practice fields, 
parking facilities, utilities, etc.  Additionally, the MOU calls for renovations at the 
Orioles‟ minor league spring training facilities located at County-owned Twin 
Lake Park, including practice fields, a renovated clubhouse, administrative offices, 
batting cages, utilities, weight rooms, pitching mounds, etc.  The MOU provides 
 
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that the Orioles‟ lease of these facilities commences on November 1, 2009 and 
continues through October 31, 2039.  The Orioles may not relocate its major 
league and minor league spring training operations from Sarasota during this lease 
term, and the Orioles‟ rent for this lease term is $1.00.  However, the Orioles are 
generally responsible for the operating, maintenance, and repairs expenses.  The 
Orioles are to manage the ticketing and parking operations and are to receive the 
revenue from concessions.  But the County maintains some ability to use both the 
major league and minor league sites for civic-oriented events and for natural 
disaster purposes.  In the MOU, the County and the Orioles also “acknowledge that 
it is mutually beneficial to facilitate the establishment of a youth baseball 
academy” at the minor league site.   
The Interlocal Agreement between the City and the County requires the City 
to transfer ownership of the Ed Smith Stadium complex to the County.  It also 
requires the City to pay the environmental remediation costs associated with this 
facility.  The City is further required to “use its best efforts to issue its bonds to be 
repaid by the OTTED funds . . . in an amount estimated to be not less than $7.5 
million.”   
The terms of the MOU and Interlocal Agreement were the result of 
extensive negotiations.  In furtherance of the Board‟s directive to begin 
negotiations with the Orioles, Bullock retained two consultants for their baseball 
 
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expertise and also consulted with County staff, including the County‟s chief 
financial officer, the County‟s attorney, the County‟s parks and recreation director, 
and a County planning coordinator.  Bullock‟s communications and discussions 
with these individuals were not advertised or otherwise treated as public meetings. 
 
The negotiations with the Orioles took place intermittently over a series of 
months through meetings, phone calls, and e-mailed documents involving different 
individuals, all coordinated by Bullock.  Representatives of the Sarasota Chamber 
of Commerce became involved to advocate for an agreement with the Orioles, and 
the Chamber funded a study of the economic impact of spring training in Sarasota.  
The Orioles invoked the confidentiality provision of section 288.075, Florida 
Statutes (2009), to keep confidential its proprietary economic development 
information relating to the proposed transaction.  These negotiations led to the July 
22, 2009 presentation to the Board of the Interlocal Agreement and the MOU and 
several mechanisms to finance renovations to the stadium and other facilities. 
 
The negotiations with the Orioles took place alongside a series of 
discussions by the Board at its public meetings.  For example, on November 4, 
2008, the Board approved a motion directing staff to open negotiations using one-
half percent of tourist development tax revenue and potential City contributions.   
On November 18, 2008, Bullock provided a status report of the meetings and 
discussed the location of a proposed new facility and the components of the new 
 
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facility.  County staff also presented information regarding capital costs, potential 
funding sources, and the economic impact of the proposed new facility.  On 
November 18, the Board also discussed specific components of the potential deal, 
including operations and maintenance payments and a proposed Cal Ripken youth 
baseball academy.  Then, on December 9, 2008, the Board discussed a proposal by 
one of the commissioners that involved $31.6 million financed with one-half 
percent of tourist development tax money to renovate the existing Ed Smith 
Stadium.  On December 17, 2008, Bullock requested guidance from the Board on 
acceptable parameters for a proposal to retain Major League Baseball.  Both 
County staff and Orioles representatives made presentations.  Also on December 
17, the Board discussed and rejected an Orioles‟ proposal for a $58 million spring 
training facility to be funded by an additional one-quarter percent of tourist 
development tax money, but then approved a counteroffer involving a lower dollar 
figure.  At public meetings on January 27, 2009 and February 11, 2009, the Board 
again discussed the Orioles negotiations.  On March 17, 2009, the Board directed 
the County Administrator to send correspondence signed by the Board Chair to the 
Orioles requesting a written counteroffer.     
 
At various points after the start of negotiations with the Orioles in November 
2008, e-mails from constituents or others to members of the Board regarding the 
Orioles were copied to other Board members and sometimes included the reactions 
 
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from other Board members.  In at least one e-mail correspondence, a comment was 
directly addressed from one Board member to another.  The last e-mail among 
Board members produced at trial was sent on April 12, 2009. 
Thereafter, at its properly noticed public meeting on April 14, 2009, the 
Board discussed the Baltimore Orioles negotiations, including construction costs 
and potential funding, and one of the commissioners presented a detailed, draft 
counter-proposal term sheet outlining funding, terms of the lease, advertising, the 
youth facility, and an agreement with the City, among other issues.  The Board 
rejected that commissioner‟s proposal as well as another commissioner‟s 
alternative proposal.  At an April 21, 2009 meeting, the Board discussed the 
Orioles‟ proposal and directed the County Administrator to send correspondence to 
the City asking for formal confirmation of the City‟s willingness to issue bonds.  
At a May 13, 2009 meeting, the Board discussed the City‟s resolution, and Bullock 
advised the Board on discussions with the Orioles.  The Board discussed stadium 
costs and financing and then directed the County Administrator to proceed with 
negotiations providing funding in the amount of $28.2 million contingent upon 
specific terms relating to operations and maintenance, advertising, construction 
management, stadium uses, property taxes, terms of occupancy, and the Cal 
Ripken youth facility.  Then, on May 26, 2009, the Board discussed the Orioles‟ 
response as well as funding sources for the renovation of the stadium.  One 
 
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commissioner noted that she “could handle” another $3 million in addition to the 
prior $28.2 million offer.  And members of the public, including a representative of 
Citizens, spoke regarding the proposed facilities.   
 
Ultimately, these negotiations and meetings resulted in Board action on July 
22, 2009.  On that date, the Board held a public hearing that lasted over four hours.  
The Board heard from approximately forty citizens, including several 
representatives of Citizens.  Bullock and staff gave a presentation on the provisions 
of the proposed documents and answered questions posed by the Board.   
 
Then, on February 19, 2010, after Citizens filed a suit alleging Sunshine 
Law violations against the City and the County, the Board held another public 
hearing for the reconsideration and ratification of the Interlocal Agreement, the 
MOU, and related actions.  The Board also adopted a new resolution authorizing 
the sale of bonds to finance the County‟s portion of the facility renovations.  
 
Additionally, the County and the City filed separate complaints seeking 
validation of the bonds proposed for issuance in furtherance of the agreement with 
the Orioles.  The County‟s validation complaint related to County Resolution No. 
2010-029, which was adopted on February 19, 2010 and which authorized three 
types of bonds:  (1) Capital Improvement Revenue Bonds, Series 2010A (Federally 
Taxable-Build America Bonds-Direct Subsidy); (2) Capital Improvement Revenue 
Bonds, Series 2010B (Federally Taxable-Build America Bonds-Recovery Zone 
 
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Economic Development Bonds-Direct Subsidy); and (3) Capital Improvement 
Revenue Bonds, Series 2010C.  And the City‟s validation complaint related to City 
Resolutions No. 10R-2135 and 10R-2139, which were adopted on November 2, 
2009 and December 7, 2009 and which authorize Sales Tax Payments Revenue 
Bonds, Series 2010 (Federally Taxable-Build America Bonds-Recovery Zone 
Economic Development Bonds-Direct Subsidy).  Citizens alleged Sunshine Law 
violations as objections to both of these bond validation actions.   
The trial court consolidated the bond validation proceedings and Citizens‟ 
Sunshine Law complaint.  After a four-day bench trial, the trial court validated the 
County‟s and the City‟s proposed bonds and denied Citizens‟ complaint.  On 
appeal in this Court, Citizens allege that the trial court erred in ruling that (a) 
Bullock‟s consultations were not required to be in the sunshine, (b) the one-on-one 
staff briefings of County Board members prior to the July 22, 2009 public meeting 
were not a violation of the Sunshine Law, and (c) any e-mail violations were cured 
by the Board‟s public meetings. 
II.  THE NEGOTIATIONS TEAM 
Citizens contend that the trial court erred when ruling that Bullock and the 
individuals he consulted in negotiating with the Orioles (the so-called negotiations 
team) were not a board or commission subject to the Sunshine Law.  However, we 
agree with the City and County and affirm the trial court. 
 
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At the outset, we note the following: 
[A] trial court must make three determinations during a bond 
validation proceeding:  (1) whether the public body has the authority 
to issue the subject bonds; (2) whether the purpose of the obligation is 
legal; and (3) whether the authorization of the obligation complies 
with the requirements of law.  City of Gainesville v. State, 863 So. 2d 
138, 143 (Fla. 2003).  On appeal, this Court reviews the “trial court‟s 
findings of fact for substantial competent evidence and its conclusions 
of law de novo.”  Id. (citing City of Boca Raton v. State, 595 So. 2d 
25, 31 (Fla. 1992); Panama City Beach Cmty. Redev. Agency v. State, 
831 So. 2d 662, 665 (Fla. 2002)).   
 
Bay County v. Town of Cedar Grove, 992 So. 2d 164, 167 (Fla. 2008).  This 
appeal regarding alleged Sunshine Law violations only concerns the third item  
above, whether the authorization complies with the requirements of law.   
Article I, section 24(b) of the Florida Constitution provides: 
 
All meetings of any collegial public body of the executive 
branch of state government or of any collegial public body of a 
county, municipality, school district, or special district, at which 
official acts are to be taken or at which public business of such body is 
to be transacted or discussed, shall be open and noticed to the public 
and meetings of the legislature shall be open and noticed as provided 
in Article III, Section 4(e), except with respect to meetings exempted 
pursuant to this section or specifically closed by this Constitution. 
And section 286.011, Florida Statutes (2009), commonly known as the 
Government in the Sunshine Law, provides in part: 
All meetings of any board or commission of any state agency or 
authority or of any agency or authority of any county, municipal 
corporation, or political subdivision, except as otherwise provided in 
the Constitution, at which official acts are to be taken are declared to 
be public meetings open to the public at all times, and no resolution, 
rule, or formal action shall be considered binding except as taken or 
 
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made at such meeting.  The board or commission must provide 
reasonable notice of all such meetings. 
Because section 286.011 “was enacted in the public interest to protect the 
public from „closed door‟ politics . . . the law must be broadly construed to effect 
its remedial and protective purpose.”  Wood v. Marston, 442 So. 2d 934, 938 (Fla. 
1983).  As this Court has explained, 
[t]he statute should be construed so as to frustrate all evasive devices.  
This can be accomplished only by embracing the collective inquiry 
and discussion stages within the terms of the statute, as long as such 
inquiry and discussion is conducted by any committee or other 
authority appointed and established by a governmental agency, and 
relates to any matter on which foreseeable action will be taken. 
Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison, 296 So. 2d 473, 477 (Fla. 1974).  “Mere 
showing that the government in the sunshine law has been violated constitutes an 
irreparable public injury . . . .”  Id.  Therefore, where officials have violated section 
286.011, the official action is void ab initio.  Id. 
All governmental authorities in Florida are subject to the requirements of the 
Sunshine Law unless specifically exempted.  See art. I, § 24(c), Fla. Const.  The 
requirements may also apply to committees subordinate to or selected by 
traditional governmental authorities.  This Court in Wood explained that the 
dispositive question is whether “decision-making authority” has been delegated to 
the committee.  442 So. 2d at 939.  Where the committee has been delegated 
decision-making authority, the committee‟s meetings must be open to public 
 
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scrutiny, regardless of the review procedures eventually used by the traditional 
governmental body.  See id. at 939-40 (“Where a body merely reviews decisions 
delegated to another entity, the potential for rubber-stamping always exists.  To 
allow a review procedure to insulate the decision itself from public scrutiny invites 
circumvention of the Sunshine Law.”).  In contrast, a committee is not subject to 
the Sunshine Law if the committee has only been delegated information-gathering 
or fact-finding authority and only conducts such activities.  See id. at 940-41; see 
also Lyon v. Lake County, 765 So. 2d 785, 789 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (“When a 
committee has been established for and conducts only information gathering and 
reporting, the activities of that committee are not subject to section 286.011, 
Florida Statutes.”).  Whether, in fact, the delegation is a delegation of decision-
making authority or fact-finding authority is evaluated according to the “nature of 
the act performed, not on the make-up of the committee or the proximity of the act 
to the final decision.”  Wood, 442 So. 2d at 939 (emphasis omitted).   
In this case, the trial court‟s order included factual findings regarding the 
roles of the individuals Bullock consulted when negotiating with the Orioles.  
Specifically, the trial court found that “the people and entities Bullock met with . . . 
operated in the roles of advisor, consultant and facilitator to assist him in the 
performance of his duty to negotiate with the Orioles.”  The trial court found that 
these individuals “did not deliberate with, or without, him.”  “Bullock retained and 
 
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exercised the ultimate authority to negotiate the terms of the MOU that would be 
submitted to the [Board] for consideration.”   
These factual findings are supported by competent substantial evidence in 
the record.  See Lyon, 765 So. 2d at 790 (reviewing trial court‟s factual finding 
that a meeting was informational for competent substantial evidence in the record).  
For example, Bullock testified that there was never a committee formed to 
negotiate any aspects of the MOU.  Bullock also testified that he only consulted 
with the County‟s chief financial planning officer for information regarding 
potential funding and financing mechanisms and that the County‟s parks and 
recreation director “would provide information because this is essentially a 
recreational facility.”  Additionally, the County‟s project coordinator testified that 
she provided staff support by making copies, typing letters, and scheduling 
meeting rooms.  There was also testimony from the County Administrator that the 
baseball experts‟ responsibilities were “to advise staff as to the makeup of what 
should be [in] an MOU, the issues to be aware of[, and] to provide some 
comparative analysis of other such deals around the country.”  And individual 
members of the so-called negotiating team testified that they were not delegated 
any authority to negotiate with the Orioles and that everything was under the 
direction of Bullock.  Therefore, there is competent substantial evidence in the 
 
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record to support the trial court‟s findings that the individuals consulted by Bullock 
performed an informational and fact-finding role in assisting Bullock. 
Because the individuals consulted by Bullock served an informational role, 
the so-called negotiations team did not constitute an advisory committee subject to 
the requirements of the Sunshine Law.  As explained above, only advisory 
committees acting pursuant to a delegation of decision-making authority by the 
governmental entity are subject to the open meetings requirement of section 
286.011.  Advisory committees functioning as fact-finders or information gatherers 
are not subject to section 286.011.  See Lyon, 765 So. 2d at 789; Cape Publ‟ns, 
Inc. v. City of Palm Bay, 473 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); Bennett v. Warden, 
333 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976).  This is not a situation where Bullock and the 
individuals he consulted made joint decisions.  Cf. Dascott v. Palm Beach County, 
877 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004).  Instead, these individuals were simply 
providing advice and information, which does not make the negotiations team a 
board or commission subject to the Sunshine Law.  See, e.g., McDougall v. Culver, 
3 So. 3d 391, 393 (Fla 2d DCA 2009) (“[T]he senior officials provided only a 
recommendation to the Sheriff but they did not deliberate with him nor did they 
have decision-making authority.  Therefore, we conclude that the use of the 
memoranda did not violate the Sunshine Law.”); Jordan v. Jenne, 938 So. 2d 526, 
530 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (“Because the [group] provided only a mere 
 
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recommendation to the inspector general and did not deliberate with the inspector 
general, the ultimate authority on termination, we conclude that the [group] does 
not exercise decision-making authority so as to constitute a „board‟ or 
„commission‟ within the meaning of section 286.011, and as a result, its meetings 
are not subject to the Sunshine Act.”).   
Citizens argue that the statutes regarding economic development agencies 
should alter this analysis.  Citizens specifically point to section 288.075(2)(a), 
Florida Statutes (2009), which provides: 
Upon written request from a private corporation, partnership, or 
person, information held by an economic development agency 
concerning plans, intentions, or interests of such private corporation, 
partnership, or person to locate, relocate, or expand any of its business 
activities in this state is confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1) and 
s. 24(a), Art. I of the State Constitution for 12 months after the date an 
economic development agency receives a request for confidentiality 
or until the information is otherwise disclosed, whichever occurs first. 
The County acknowledges that Bullock was acting as an economic development 
agency and that the Orioles‟ proprietary information was not released pursuant to 
section 119.07(1), Florida Statues (2009), of the Public Records Act after the 
Orioles invoked the exemption outlined in section 288.075(2)(a).  However, this 
does not mean Bullock and the individuals he consulted were a board or 
commission within the meaning of section 286.011 of the Sunshine Law.  If an 
individual is not already a member of a board or commission governed by the 
 
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Sunshine Law, nothing about working on economic development projects or 
receiving proprietary information converts him or her into one. 
Accordingly, this Court affirms the trial court‟s ruling regarding Bullock and 
the individuals he consulted while negotiating with the Orioles.   
III.  ONE-ON-ONE BRIEFINGS  
Citizens next argue that the trial court erred in determining that the private 
staff briefings of individual board members in preparation for the July 22, 2009 
public hearing did not violate the Sunshine Law.  We agree with the contrary 
arguments of the City and County and affirm the trial court. 
This Court has explained that meetings within the meaning of the Sunshine 
Law include any gathering, formal or informal, of two or more members of the 
same board or commission “where the members deal with some matter on which 
foreseeable action will be taken by the Board.”  Tolar v. School Bd. of Liberty 
County, 398 So. 2d 427, 428 (Fla. 1981); see also Bd. of Pub. Instruction v. Doran, 
224 So. 2d 693, 698 (Fla. 1969).  However, public officials may call upon staff 
members for factual information and advice without being subject to the Sunshine 
Law‟s requirements.  See Occidental Chem. Co. v. Mayo, 351 So. 2d 336, 342 
(Fla. 1977); Wood, 442 So. 2d at 940 (“The Second District found no violation, 
holding, inter alia, that the meetings were not decision-making in nature, but were 
„for the purpose of “fact-finding” to assist him in the execution of [his] duties,‟ 
 
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[Bennett,] 333 So. 2d at 99, and we approve the holding that such fact-finding staff 
consultations are not subject to the Sunshine Law.”). 
Here, Bullock, individually and assisted by other County staff, held one-on-
one meetings in the two- or three-day period immediately preceding the Board‟s 
public meeting on July 22, 2009.  These meetings were informational briefings 
regarding the contents of the MOU, where Bullock would also ask if the individual 
members had any questions about the MOU.  There is no evidence that Bullock or 
other County staff communicated what any commissioner said to any other 
commissioner.   
These informational briefings for individual members of the Board were not 
violations of the Sunshine Law.  As this Court has explained,  
members of a collegial administrative body are not obliged to avoid 
their staff during the evaluation and consideration stages of their 
deliberations.  Were this so, the value of staff expertise would be lost 
and the intelligent use of employees would be crippled. 
Occidental, 351 So. 2d at 342 n.10.  Therefore, we affirm the trial court‟s ruling 
regarding these one-on-one meetings. 
IV.  E-MAILS 
Lastly, Citizens contend that the trial court erred by ruling that any 
violations committed in e-mail discussions between board members were cured by 
the Board‟s public meetings that were held up to and including July 22, 2009.  
 
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Agreeing with the contrary arguments of the City and County, we affirm the trial 
court. 
In Tolar, 398 So. 2d at 429, this Court held that Sunshine Law violations can 
be cured by “independent, final action in the sunshine,” which this Court 
distinguished from mere ceremonial acceptance or perfunctory ratification of secret 
actions and decisions.  See also Zorc v. City of Vero Beach, 722 So. 2d 891, 903 
(Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (“[O]nly a full, open hearing will cure a defect arising from a 
Sunshine Law violation.  Such violation will not be cured by a perfunctory 
ratification of the action taken outside of the sunshine.”); Monroe County v. 
Pigeon Key Historical Park, Inc., 647 So. 2d 857, 861 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) 
(“Governmental actions will not be voided whenever governmental bodies have 
met in secret where sufficiently corrective final action has been taken.”). 
In Tolar, a school superintendent-elect met privately with school board 
members and discussed, among other things, the removal of Tolar as director of 
administration and abolition of his position.  398 So. 2d at 427.  At a subsequent 
public meeting in which Tolar was present and “given full opportunity to express 
his views,” the school board members voted to transfer Tolar to another position 
and abolish his position.  Id.  Tolar sued for injunctive relief, alleging a violation of 
section 286.011.  Id.  As this Court noted, “By the express terms of section 
286.011, any resolution, rule, regulation, or formal action taken at these secret 
 
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meetings would not be binding.”  Id. at 428.  Yet this Court declined to invalidate 
the action taken by the school board.  Id.  Instead, this Court distinguished Tolar 
from its previous holding in Gradison, 296 So. 2d 473, where this Court held void 
formal action that “was merely the crystallization of secret decisions.”  Tolar, 398 
So. 2d at 428.   
As explained in Tolar, the Gradison holding invalidating what was merely a 
summary approval of secret decisions 
does not mean, however, that public final action of the Board will 
always be void and incurable merely because the topic of the final 
public action was previously discussed at a private meeting. . . .  
. . . . 
 . . . [H]ere[,] the Board took independent, final action in the 
sunshine in voting to abolish the position.  The Board‟s action was not 
merely a ceremonial acceptance of secret actions and was not merely 
a perfunctory ratification of secret decisions at a later meeting open to 
the public. 
 
398 So. 2d at 428-429.   
In this case, e-mails from constituents to members of the Board were copied 
to other members and sometimes led to comments between Board members 
regarding the topic of bringing the Orioles to Sarasota for spring training.  The last 
such e-mail exchange, which possibly violated the Sunshine Law, occurred on 
April 12, 2009.  However, the Board conducted multiple public meetings 
subsequent to that April 12 exchange where the topic of Orioles spring training 
was discussed and considered.  For example, on April 14, 2009, the Board publicly 
 
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rejected a commissioner‟s detailed proposal for an agreement with the Orioles as 
well as another commissioner‟s alternative proposal.  Then, on May 13, 2009, the 
Board publicly discussed stadium costs and financing and directed the County 
Administrator to proceed with negotiations providing funding in the amount of 
$28.2 million contingent upon specific terms relating to operations and 
maintenance, advertising, construction management, stadium uses, property taxes, 
terms of occupancy, and the Cal Ripken youth facility.  Then, on May 26, 2009, 
the Board considered the Orioles‟ response as well as funding sources for the 
renovation of the stadium.  One commissioner noted that she “could handle” 
another $3 million in addition to the prior $28.2 million offer.  Ultimately, on July 
22, 2009, the Board held a properly noticed public hearing and approved the MOU 
and the Interlocal Agreement after a multi-hour discussion.  In fact, representatives 
of Citizens spoke at that July 22 hearing as well as the prior meeting on May 26.   
Based upon the fact that, subsequent to the last possibly violative e-mail, 
multiple proposals were discussed and rejected before one was finally approved, it 
is clear the Board took independent, final action in the sunshine regarding Orioles 
spring training in Sarasota.  This simply is not the case of a “ceremonial 
acceptance of secret actions [or] merely a perfunctory ratification of secret 
decisions at a later meeting open to the public.”  Tolar, 398 So. 2d at 429.  
Therefore, any possible e-mail violations were cured.   
 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
 
We affirm the trial court‟s judgment validating bonds proposed for issuance 
by the City of Sarasota and the County of Sarasota in furtherance of the agreement 
bringing the Baltimore Orioles to Sarasota for spring training.  Because Bullock‟s 
so-called negotiations team only served an informational role, it was not subject to 
the requirements of the Sunshine Law.  The County also did not violate the 
Sunshine Law when Bullock, assisted by other County staff, briefed individual 
Board members prior to the July 22, 2009 public meeting.  Finally, any possible 
violations that occurred when Board members circulated e-mails among each other 
were cured by subsequent public meetings regarding the negotiations and 
agreement with Orioles.   
 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, 
and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
NO MOTION FOR REHEARING WILL BE ALLOWED. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Sarasota County – Bond Validations   
Robert B. Bennett, Jr., Judge – Case No. 2009 CA 21849 NC, 2010 CA 
02766 NC and 2010 CA 03194 NC 
 
Andrea Flynn Mogensen of the Law Office of Andrea Flynn Mogensen, Sarasota, 
Florida; Gregg D. Thomas and Paul R. McAdoo of Thomas and Locicero, PL, 
Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellants, 
 
 
- 22 - 
Susan H. Churuti and Michael S. Davis of Bryant Miller Olive, P.A., Tampa, 
Florida and Robert M. Fournier, City Attorney and Michael A. Connolly, Deputy 
City Attorney of Fournier and Connolly, P.A., Sarasota, Florida, on behalf of The 
City of Sarasota; Stephen E. DeMarsh, County Attorney, Frederick J. Elbrecht, and 
Alan W. Roddy, Deputy County Attorneys, Sarasota, Florida, and Ed Vogel, III 
and Michael Lawrence Wiener of Holland and Knight, Lakeland, Florida, on 
behalf of Sarasota County, Board of County Commissioners of Sarasota County, 
Florida, Shannon Staub, Nora Patterson and Joe Barbetta, 
 
 
for Appellees 
 
Victor Lee Chapman of Barrett, Chapman and Ruta, P.A., Orlando, Florida, on 
behalf of First Amendment Foundation, Inc.,  
 
 
as Amicus Curiae