Title: Lucas v. Woody
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 131064
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 17, 2014

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
SUNDAY LUCAS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     OPINION BY 
v. 
Record No. 131064 
 
 
  JUSTICE S. BERNARD GOODWYN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   April 17, 2014 
C. T. WOODY, JR., ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
Michael C. Allen, Judge Designate 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether a plaintiff who brings 
a personal injury action relating to the conditions of her 
confinement in a state or local correctional facility must be 
incarcerated at the time her cause of action is filed in order 
for the statute of limitations in Code § 8.01-243.2 to be 
applicable to that action. 
Background 
 
Sunday Lucas (Lucas) filed suits against C.T. Woody, Jr., 
Stanley Furman, Menyon Graham, Laura Terry, Robert Ford, 
Anneika Brown, Carolyn Quigley, Robert Cushionberry, Yuvonka 
Lewis and Darryl Hack (the Defendants).  She alleged that she 
was injured by the Defendants’ course of conduct that began on 
January 16, 2008, while she was incarcerated in the Richmond 
City Jail, and concluded on March 11, 2008, when she was 
released from the jail. 
 
Lucas filed her initial complaint against defendants 
Woody, Graham, Terry, Ford, Brown, Quigley, Cushionberry and 
Lewis on August 13, 2009, in the Circuit Court of the City of 
 
2 
Richmond (Circuit Court).  Another lawsuit concerning the same 
events was filed against defendants Furman and Hack in the same 
court on January 13, 2010.  The two suits were consolidated on 
March 18, 2011.  The actions against all of the Defendants were 
nonsuited by order dated October 5, 2011. 
 
On February 1, 2012, Lucas refiled her causes of action 
against the Defendants in the Circuit Court.  In that 
complaint, as in the previous complaints, Lucas asserted only 
state law causes of action.  Lucas was not incarcerated when 
she filed any of her lawsuits. 
 
In response to the complaint filed on February 1, 2012, 
the Defendants filed a plea of the statute of limitations and 
asserted the running of the statute of limitations in Code 
§ 8.01-243.2 as an affirmative defense.  At a hearing on 
September 20, 2012, the Circuit Court sustained the plea in bar 
regarding the statute of limitations in Code § 8.01-243.2 as to 
all of Lucas’s state claims, but granted Lucas leave to file an 
amended complaint asserting federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983. 
 
On October 11, 2012, Lucas filed an amended complaint 
against the Defendants asserting claims pursuant to § 1983 only 
(amended complaint).  Shortly thereafter, Lucas filed a motion 
for leave to file a second amended complaint.  The proposed 
second amended complaint contained the state law claims 
 
3 
previously dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations, 
as well as the § 1983 claims.  A motion to reconsider the 
statute of limitations ruling regarding the state law claims 
was filed with the motion for leave to amend and the proposed 
second amended complaint. 
 
In response to the amended complaint, the Defendants each 
filed a special plea of the statute of limitations alleging 
that the § 1983 claims were barred by the applicable statute of 
limitations or asserted the statute of limitations as a 
defense.  At a hearing on March 1, 2013, the Circuit Court 
considered and denied Lucas’s motion to reconsider its statute 
of limitations ruling on the state law claims.  It also denied 
her motion to file a second amended complaint. 
The Circuit Court thereafter considered the Defendants’ 
special pleas and affirmative defense of the statute of 
limitations to the amended complaint.  The Defendants conceded 
that a two-year statute of limitations applied to Lucas’s 
§ 1983 claims.  The Defendants also conceded that the conduct 
or injury claimed in support of the § 1983 action was the same 
as the conduct or injury alleged in the state law claims.  The 
primary issue considered by the Circuit Court in determining 
whether such claims were barred by the statute of limitations 
related to whether the claims alleged in the amended complaint 
 
4 
were allowed, by Code § 8.01-6.1, to relate back to the filing 
of the initial complaints. 
The Circuit Court ruled that the due diligence and absence 
of prejudice requirements of Code § 8.01-6.1 had not been 
satisfied and that the § 1983 claims filed in 2012 did not 
relate back to the original filings of the state law claims.  
It sustained the special plea and affirmative defense of the 
statute of limitations on the § 1983 claims. 
Lucas appeals.  This Court has granted the following 
assignments of error: 
 
 
1. 
The trial court erred in sustaining the 
defendants’ pleas in bar to Lucas’ state law causes 
of action based on the statute of limitations. 
 
2. 
The trial court erred in refusing to grant 
Lucas leave to file a second amended complaint which 
would have allowed her to pursue the state law causes 
of action and a § 1983 cause of action. 
 
Analysis 
 
Code § 8.01-243.2 states: 
 
No person confined in a state or local 
correctional facility shall bring or have brought 
on his behalf any personal action relating to the 
conditions of his confinement until all available 
administrative remedies are exhausted.  Such action 
shall be brought by or on behalf of such person 
within one year after cause of action accrues or 
within six months after all administrative remedies 
are exhausted, whichever occurs later. 
 
 
 
5 
 
The facts surrounding the dates the causes of action 
accrued and the filing dates of the complaints are not in 
dispute.  Lucas’s complaints alleged that she was injured 
between January 16, 2008, and March 11, 2008, while 
incarcerated in the Richmond City Jail.  She was released 
from incarceration on March 11, 2008. 
Lucas filed her initial complaints against the Defendants 
on August 13, 2009, and January 13, 2010, and the actions were 
refiled within six months of being nonsuited.  The issue of 
whether the actions filed by Lucas related to the conditions of 
her confinement is settled for purposes of this appeal in that 
no party disputes the Circuit Court’s ruling in that regard.  
Thus, the only issue is whether the statute of limitations 
contained in Code § 8.01-243.2 is applicable in this instance. 
 
Where the facts are undisputed, as in the present 
case, “the applicability of the statute of limitations is 
a purely legal question of statutory construction which we 
review de novo.”  Conger v. Barrett, 280 Va. 627, 630, 702 
S.E.2d 117, 118 (2010).  In Conyers v. Martial Arts World 
of Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96, 104, 639 S.E.2d 174, 178 
(2007), our Court stated: 
When the language of a statute is unambiguous, we 
are bound by the plain meaning of that language. 
Furthermore, we must give effect to the legislature's 
intention as expressed by the language used unless a 
literal interpretation of the language would result 
 
6 
in a manifest absurdity. If a statute is subject to 
more than one interpretation, we must apply the 
interpretation that will carry out the legislative 
intent behind the statute. 
 
(Citations omitted.) 
 
Lucas asserts that the Circuit Court erred in 
sustaining the Defendants’ pleas in bar to her state law 
claims because Code § 8.01-243.2 is not applicable to her 
claims.  In support of this position, Lucas argues that 
the statute of limitations provision in Code § 8.01-243.2 
does not apply because she was no longer “confined” at the 
time she filed her actions.  Because she was not 
incarcerated when she filed her actions, Lucas asserts 
that she had two years from the time her causes of action 
arose within which to file suit as provided in Code 
§ 8.01-243(A). 
 
The Defendants claim that the statute of limitations, 
stated in the second sentence of Code § 8.01-243.2, 
applies to all personal actions related to conditions of 
confinement in a state or local correctional facility.  
They claim the statute of limitations is applicable 
whether or not a plaintiff is still confined at the time 
he or she files an action. 
 
In Bing v. Haywood, 283 Va. 381, 385, 722 S.E.2d 244, 
246 (2012), this Court stated, “For the one-year provision 
 
7 
in Code § 8.01-243.2 to apply, the plaintiff must have 
been confined at the time the cause of action accrued, and 
the cause of action must relate to plaintiff’s conditions 
of confinement.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  It 
is undisputed that Lucas was confined at the time the 
cause of action accrued and that her causes of action 
related to her conditions of confinement. 
As the Court’s holding in Bing reflects, the plain 
language of the first sentence of Code § 8.01-243.2 
requires that a person confined in a state or local 
correctional facility exhaust all available administrative 
remedies before bringing a personal injury action relating 
to conditions of confinement.  The second sentence of Code 
§ 8.01-243.2 creates a statute of limitations period for 
the cause of action mentioned in the first sentence of the 
statute — a personal injury cause of action relating to 
the conditions of confinement in a state or local 
correctional facility.  This case concerns the question, 
which was not directly addressed in Bing, of whether the 
statute of limitations in Code § 8.01-243.2 applies when 
the plaintiff is no longer incarcerated at the time she 
files her action relating to conditions of her 
confinement.  It does. 
 
8 
The terms “[s]uch action” and “such person” used in 
the Code § 8.01-243.2 statute of limitations provision are 
not defined.  As mentioned above, “[s]uch action” clearly 
refers to a personal action relating to the conditions of 
the plaintiff’s confinement.  The parties, however, 
disagree as to what the term “such person” refers.  Lucas 
claims it refers to a person confined in a state or local 
correctional facility.  The Defendants assert that it 
refers to a person who brings or has brought on his behalf 
a personal action relating to the conditions of his or her 
confinement.  Both interpretations of “such person” can be 
supported by the language of the statute. 
If the term “such person” is interpreted as urged by 
Lucas, the applicability of the statute of limitations is 
dependent upon whether a plaintiff is confined at the time 
he or she brings an action relating to conditions of 
confinement.  If the term is interpreted as urged by the 
Defendants, the statute of limitations in Code § 8.01-
243.2 applies to all personal actions relating to the 
conditions of confinement. 
The first sentence of Code § 8.01-243.2 clearly 
requires a person who is confined to exhaust all 
administrative remedies before filing a personal action 
relating to conditions of confinement.  This makes sense 
 
9 
in that an individual would necessarily need to be 
confined in order to take advantage of administrative 
remedies offered by a state or local correctional 
facility.  However, a person does not need to be confined 
to file a personal action relating to the conditions of 
his or her confinement.  Therefore, it does not follow 
that the legislature intended continued confinement to be 
a prerequisite for the applicability of the statute of 
limitations imposed upon a personal action relating to 
conditions of the plaintiff’s confinement. 
Having the applicability of a statute of limitations 
change based upon the confinement status of the plaintiff 
at the time a lawsuit is filed, rather than the particular 
cause of action asserted and the plaintiff’s status at the 
time the action accrued would be anomalous.  It would 
result in two different and shifting statutes of 
limitations for the same cause of action relating to a 
plaintiff’s conditions of confinement.  It would create 
uncertainty concerning when the statute of limitations for 
personal actions relating to confinement has run because a 
claim barred by the statute of limitations in Code § 8.01-
243.2 could be revived by a change in a plaintiff’s 
confinement status and a resulting change in the 
applicable statute of limitations.  Reading the statute as 
 
10 
Lucas suggests, such that the applicability of Code 
§ 8.01-243.2 is dependent upon the plaintiff’s confinement 
status at the time suit is filed, would produce bizarre 
results.  For instance, it would allow a cause of action 
otherwise barred by the statute of limitations to be 
revived upon the individual’s release from incarceration, 
and then, perhaps, to be extinguished once again if the 
individual is reincarcerated before filing suit.  The 
purpose of a statute of limitations is to provide parties 
and potential parties certainty with regard to when a 
cause of action is extinguished; the interpretation of 
Code § 8.01-243.2 urged by Lucas would do the opposite. 
Additionally, Code § 8.01-230 provides that “the 
right of action shall be deemed to accrue and the 
prescribed limitation period shall begin to run from the 
date the injury is sustained.”  When Code § 8.01-230 is 
read in conjunction with Code § 8.01-243.2, the statutes 
mandate the conclusion that a cause of action for personal 
injury related to conditions of confinement in a state or 
local correctional facility accrues on, and the statute of 
limitations period begins to run from, the date the injury 
is sustained.  If a person’s confinement status is 
relevant, it is the confinement status of the plaintiff at 
the time that the cause of action accrues that determines 
 
11 
the proper statute of limitations.  Inherently, a personal 
action relating to conditions of confinement accrues while 
the plaintiff is confined.  So, even if the language in 
the Code § 8.01-243.2 statute of limitations is 
interpreted as Lucas argues, that statute of limitations 
would still apply to any claim relating to the conditions 
of a plaintiff’s confinement. 
The statute of limitations in Code § 8.01-243.2 
applies to personal actions relating to conditions of 
confinement in a state or local correctional facility.  
The General Assembly clearly intended to impose a defined 
end-point for commencement of such claims.  There is no 
obvious rationale which explains how exempting individuals 
from that statute of limitations upon their release from 
incarceration would further that intent.  We rule that the 
statute of limitations provision in Code § 8.01-243.2 
applies to all personal actions relating to the conditions 
of an individual’s confinement regardless of whether the 
plaintiff is still incarcerated when such action is filed.  
Thus, the Circuit Court did not err in finding that 
Lucas’s state law claims were barred by the statute of 
limitations contained in Code § 8.01-243.2. 
 
Lucas also alleges that the Circuit Court erred in 
not granting leave for her to file a second amended 
 
12 
complaint.  The applicable standard of review for this 
assignment of error is an abuse of discretion standard.  
“On appeal, review of the trial court’s decision to grant 
or deny a motion to amend is limited to the question 
whether the trial judge abused his discretion.”  Hetland 
v. Worcester Mutual Ins. Co., 231 Va. 44, 46, 340 S.E.2d 
574, 575 (1986).  We hold that the Circuit Court did not 
abuse its discretion in refusing to grant Lucas leave to 
file her second amended complaint, which sought to 
reassert state law claims that the court had properly 
dismissed pursuant to pleas in bar. 
Conclusion 
 
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, we will 
affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court. 
Affirmed. 
 
JUSTICE MILLETTE, with whom JUSTICE MIMS and JUSTICE POWELL 
join, dissenting. 
 
I believe the majority fails to apply the plain language 
of Code § 8.01-243.2, and instead improperly invokes the 
doctrines of ambiguity and absurdity to apply the statutory 
language it might have preferred.  I therefore respectfully 
dissent. 
I. 
The Applicable Statute of Limitations 
A. 
Code § 8.01-230 
 
13 
Code § 8.01-230 reads in relevant part: 
In every action for which a limitation period is 
prescribed, the right of action shall be deemed to 
accrue and the prescribed limitation period shall 
begin to run from the date the injury is sustained in 
the case of injury to the person or damage to 
property. 
Code § 8.01-230 establishes when a plaintiff's cause 
of action accrues and when the applicable statute of 
limitations begins to run.  Notably, Code § 8.01-230 does 
not identify what statute of limitations applies to any 
particular cause of action.  That is, although Code § 8.01-
230 certainly provides a starting point for a court to 
determine when a statute of limitations clock begins, it 
provides no guidance to determine just how long that clock 
will run before time has run out. 
This appeal requires us to resolve whether Lucas's 
conditions of confinement action is governed by the two 
year limitations period in Code § 8.01-243, or by the 
variable limitations period in Code § 8.01-243.2.  Because 
the plain language of Code § 8.01-243.2 does not apply to 
Lucas's action, I would hold that the two year limitations 
period prescribed by Code § 8.01-243 governs. 
B. 
Code § 8.01-243.2 
Code § 8.01-243.2 consists of only two sentences and reads 
in its entirety: 
 
14 
[1] No person confined in a state or local 
correctional facility shall bring or have brought on 
his behalf any personal action relating to the 
conditions of his confinement until all available 
administrative remedies are exhausted.  [2] Such 
action shall be brought by or on behalf of such 
person within one year after [the] cause of action 
accrues or within six months after all administrative 
remedies are exhausted, whichever occurs later. 
(Bracketed numbers added.) 
Sentence [1] is not a statute of limitations provision.  
Instead, it creates a prerequisite for a person currently 
"confined in a state or local correctional facility" who wants 
to "bring" an action "relating to the conditions of his 
confinement."  Code § 8.01-243.2.  Before bringing such an 
action, such person must first "exhaust[]" "all available 
administrative remedies."  Id.  Sentence [1] does not apply to 
Lucas because she was not "confined in a state or local 
correctional facility" when she "brought" her February 2012 
complaint. 
Sentence [2] of Code § 8.01-243.2 is a statute of 
limitations provision.  Two key terms are used in this 
sentence: "[s]uch action" and "such person."  These terms are 
not defined within Sentence [2].  However, this Court 
"examine[s] a statute in its entirety, rather than by isolating 
particular words or phrases."  Small v. Fannie Mae, 286 Va. 
119, 127, 747 S.E.2d 817, 821 (2013).  Indeed, by using the 
word "such" to modify both "action" and "person," Sentence [2] 
 
15 
directs this Court to look elsewhere in the same statute to 
understand those terms.  See, e.g., Smith v. Commonwealth, 190 
Va. 10, 18, 55 S.E.2d 427, 430 (1949) ("In our opinion, 'such 
person' in the second portion of [then existing Code § 4488] 
refers to 'any person' in the first portion thereof."); see 
also Black's Law Dictionary 1570 (9th ed. 2009) (defining the 
adjective "such" as referring to "[t]hat or those; having just 
been mentioned"). 
The only other provision within Code § 8.01-243.2 alluding 
to "person" and "action" is Sentence [1].  It is there that 
this Court can find what actions and persons are governed by 
Sentence [2].  Thus, "[s]uch action" and "such person" are not 
ambiguous terms by being "difficult to comprehend" or 
"lack[ing] clearness and definiteness."  Brown v. Lukhard, 229 
Va. 316, 321, 330 S.E.2d 84, 87 (1985). 
In Sentence [1], "[s]uch action" is defined as "any 
personal action relating to the conditions of his [or her] 
confinement."  Code § 8.01-243.2; see also Bing v. Haywood, 283 
Va. 381, 385, 722 S.E.2d 244, 245-46 (2012).  In Sentence [1], 
"such person" is defined as a "person confined in a state or 
local correctional facility."  Code § 8.01-243.2.  The terms 
"action" and "person," as used in Sentence [2], are matched 
with the phrases in Sentence [1] that define those very terms.  
Thus, this is the "plain, obvious, and rational meaning" of the 
 
16 
terms "[s]uch action" and "such person," and it is the 
construction that this Court must "prefer[] over any curious, 
narrow, or strained construction."  Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 285 
Va. 187, 237, 738 S.E.2d 847, 875 (2013).  Indeed, this is the 
method this Court employed to previously define "[s]uch action" 
as a "personal action relating to the conditions of [the 
plaintiff's] confinement."  See Bing, 283 Va. at 387, 722 
S.E.2d at 247.  It stands to reason that this Court should also 
employ this method to define "such person" in this case. 
Substituting the applicable phrases from Sentence [1] for 
the terms "[s]uch action" and "such person," Sentence [2] 
reads: 
["[A]ny personal action relating to the conditions of 
his confinement"] shall be brought by or on behalf of 
[a "person confined in a state or local correctional 
facility"] within one year after cause of action 
accrues or within six months after all administrative 
remedies are exhausted, whichever occurs later. 
Code § 8.01-243.2. 
With these statutory definitions plugged into Sentence 
[2], the plain language is clear.  The statute of limitations 
provision in Code § 8.01-243.2 applies only if two requirements 
are met: if "[s]uch action" is a "personal action relating to 
the conditions of [the plaintiff's] confinement," and if that 
personal action is "brought by or on behalf of such person," 
 
17 
who is a "person confined in a state or local correctional 
facility."  See Bing, 283 Va. at 387, 722 S.E.2d at 247. 
1. 
The "Such Action" Requirement 
In this case, Lucas's state law claims related to the 
conditions of her confinement at the Richmond Jail.  Indeed, 
Lucas was confined at a state or local correctional facility at 
the time her cause of action accrued because the injuries 
giving rise to Lucas's state law claims occurred while Lucas 
was an inmate at the Richmond Jail.  See Code § 8.01-230; Laws 
v. McIlroy, 283 Va. 594, 599, 724 S.E.2d 699, 702 (2012); see 
also Bing, 283 Va. at 387, 722 S.E.2d at 247.  Because Lucas's 
claims relate to the conditions of the confinement she endured 
when her cause of action accrued, the "[s]uch action" 
requirement was satisfied.  Bing, 283 Va. at 385-87, 722 S.E.2d 
at 245-47. 
2. 
The "Such Person" Requirement 
The "[s]uch action" requirement looks to see if the 
plaintiff was confined at the time her cause of action accrued.  
In contrast, the "such person" requirement evaluates whether 
the plaintiff was a person "confined" when the action is 
"brought."  When a plaintiff's cause of action accrues is not 
synonymous with when a plaintiff "brought" a personal action. 
A personal action is brought when a complaint is filed.  
See Ahari v. Morrison, 275 Va. 92, 96, 654 S.E.2d 891, 894 
 
18 
(2008) ("Only at that time was the amended complaint deemed 
filed, thereby adding the new party defendants and commencing 
the action as to them."); Mendenhall v. Douglas L. Cooper, 
Inc., 239 Va. 71, 76, 387 S.E.2d 468, 471 (1990) ("[I]t is 
well-established that when a new party is brought into a suit 
by an amended pleading, the suit must be deemed to have been 
commenced as to him at the time that he was so brought in." 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Bulala v. Boyd, 
239 Va. 218, 224, 389 S.E.2d 670, 672 (1990) ("[Plaintiffs] 
brought this civil action against [defendant] by complaint 
filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia.").  In contrast, a "cause of action 
accrues [at the time when] the injury is sustained in the case 
of injury to the person."  McIlroy, 283 Va. at 599, 724 S.E.2d 
at 702 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Code 
§ 8.01-230. 
Thus, the "such person" requirement is met when the 
plaintiff was "confined" at the time when that plaintiff 
"brought" her personal action.  Code § 8.01-243.2 (emphasis 
added).  In this case, Lucas was not "confined in a state or 
local correctional facility" when she "brought" her "conditions 
of . . . confinement" action by filing the February 2012 
complaint.  Thus, the "such person" requirement was not 
satisfied. 
 
19 
For these reasons, by its plain language, the statute of 
limitations provision in Code § 8.01-243.2 did not apply to 
Lucas's state law claims alleged in her February 2012 
complaint. 
C. 
The Court Ignores the Plain Language of Code § 8.01-243.2 
Today, the Court commits error by incorrectly invoking the 
doctrines of ambiguity and absurdity — while conspicuously 
refusing to identify those doctrines by their names — to avoid 
the plain language of Code § 8.01-243.2. 
1. 
The Court Finds Ambiguity Where None Exists 
The Court summarily holds that two interpretations of the 
phrase "such person" appearing in Sentence [2] can be supported 
by the language of the statute.  It utilizes this ambiguity to 
justify its deviation from the plain language of the statute.  
However, this invocation of ambiguity is valid only if the 
Court ignores the plain language of Sentence [1], which it 
cannot do.  BBF, Inc. v. Alstom Power, Inc., 274 Va. 326, 331, 
645 S.E.2d 467, 469 (2007) ("[W]e are not free . . . to ignore 
language[] contained in statutes.") (quoting SIGNAL Corp. v. 
Keane Federal Sys., Inc., 265 Va. 38, 46, 574 S.E.2d 253, 257 
(2003)). 
The first understanding of "such person," argued for by 
Lucas, is what Sentence [1] states plainly: "such person[s]" 
are those plaintiffs who, simply and unqualifiedly, are 
 
20 
"confined."  (Emphasis added.)  This is how Sentence [1] 
clearly reads without judicial alteration. 
The second understanding of "such person," argued for by 
the Defendants, is that it refers to all persons who bring a 
conditions of confinement claim regardless of their confinement 
status when the action is brought.  But the Defendants' reading 
of "such person" is supported by the statutory language only if 
the Court ignores the statement in Sentence [1] that a "person" 
is someone who is "confined in a state or local correctional 
facility."  By embracing such a reading, however, the Court 
abandons its obligation "to provide meaning to all the words of 
a statute," and thereby impermissibly creates an ambiguity 
where none otherwise exists.  Commonwealth v. Squire, 278 Va. 
746, 752, 685 S.E.2d 631, 634 (2009); see LaCava v. 
Commonwealth, 283 Va. 465, 471, 722 S.E.2d 838, 841 (2012). 
2. 
The Court Utilizes the Absurdity Doctrine to Impose Its 
Policy Preferences 
The Court does not invoke the absurdity doctrine by name, 
but instead describes the application of the plain language of 
Code § 8.01-243.2 as being "anomalous" and "bizarre."  Taking 
this assessment of the plain language at face value reveals 
error, because the Court "traverse[s] the separation of powers 
and enter[s] the domain of . . . questions of legislative 
policy."  Starrs v. Commonwealth, 287 Va. 1, 14, 752 S.E.2d 
 
21 
812, 820 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).  It is not 
the role of the judicial branch to question the soundness of 
the policies adopted by the political branches.  Elizabeth 
River Crossings OpCo, LLC v. Meeks, 286 Va. 286, 309, 749 
S.E.2d 176, 187 (2013) ("[If the political branches have] acted 
within the constitutional boundaries that limit the exercise of 
their governmental power, . . . then their policy decisions are 
subject to, and properly evaluated by, the political will of 
the people, and [this Court has] no authority to override such 
political decisions."). 
But a deeper problem exists with the Court's avoidance of 
the absurdity doctrine.  Both the circuit court and the 
Defendants characterized the application of the plain language 
of Code § 8.01-243.2 as being absurd.  The Court today adopts 
those arguments as its own, but simply reframes the argument as 
describing an "anomalous" and "bizarre" result, rather than an 
absurdity.  To the extent this is the Court's invocation of the 
absurdity doctrine in all but name, it is error.  No absurdity 
results from applying the plain language of Code § 8.01-243.2. 
The absurdity doctrine is a tool of statutory construction 
employed in rare circumstances involving fundamentally flawed 
legislative drafting.  The doctrine is implicated only if 
adopting the plain language of a statute would result in 
absurdity.  See Cook v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 111, 116, 597 
 
22 
S.E.2d 84, 87 (2004).  If an absurd result would occur, this 
Court replaces the literal meaning of the statute's plain 
language with a construction avoiding such absurdity.  See, 
e.g., Baker v. Wise, 57 Va. (16 Gratt.) 139, 214-15 (1861). 
Because of the absurdity doctrine's potential to enable 
the judicial branch to appropriate the Commonwealth's 
legislative power, which is constitutionally vested in the 
General Assembly, Va. Const. art. IV, § 1, this Court prohibits 
courts from exploiting that doctrine as a back door to impose 
their own policy preferences upon duly enacted statutes.  To 
this end, we recognize absurdity in only two narrowly defined 
situations: when "the law would be internally inconsistent," 
and when the law would be "otherwise incapable of operation."  
Covel v. Town of Vienna, 280 Va. 151, 158, 694 S.E.2d 609, 614 
(2010).  A related doctrine, although not directly arising from 
absurdity, requires that when the plain language of multiple 
statutes conflict, this Court construes those statutes in 
harmony.  See Boynton v. Kilgore, 271 Va. 220, 228-29 & n.11, 
623 S.E.2d 922, 926-27 & n.11 (2006). 
Applying the plain language of Code § 8.01-243.2, so that 
its statute of limitations provision applies only if the 
plaintiff is "confined" at the time the action is "brought," is 
not absurd.  It is not internally inconsistent because it 
applies identically to identically situated plaintiffs: the 
 
23 
statute of limitations consistently applies to all plaintiffs 
who are "confined" at the time their action is "brought," and 
consistently does not apply to all plaintiffs who are not 
"confined" at the time their action is "brought."  It is not 
incapable of operation because a court need only determine 
whether a plaintiff is or is not "confined" when the complaint 
was "brought."  And it does not conflict with any other 
statutory provision because, when Code § 8.01-243.2 does apply, 
it still operates in conjunction with Code § 8.01-230 for the 
separate determination of when the plaintiff's cause of action 
accrued and when the limitations period began to run. 
II. Conclusion 
Because I believe the Court fundamentally errs in its duty 
to construe the plain language of Code § 8.01-243.2, I must 
respectfully dissent.