Title: Commonwealth v. Wynn
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 072412
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 16, 2009

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
v.  Record No. 072412 
OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
January 16, 2009 
FREDDIE LEE WYNN 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PETERSBURG 
James F. D'Alton, Jr., Judge 
 
In this appeal, the Commonwealth challenges two evidentiary 
rulings by the circuit court during a trial under the Civil 
Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators Act (the SVPA), Code 
§§ 37.2-900 through -920.  Because the circuit court did not err 
by refusing to admit hearsay testimony concerning unadjudicated 
allegations of sexual misconduct and by admitting only a few 
pages of a mental health expert witness’ written report, we will 
affirm the circuit court’s judgment. 
I.  MATERIAL FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
The Commonwealth filed a petition in the circuit court for 
the civil commitment of Freddie Lee Wynn as a sexually violent 
predator under the SVPA.1  At the time the Commonwealth filed its 
petition, Wynn was incarcerated on two convictions for 
aggravated sexual battery of a child under age thirteen in 
violation of Code § 18.2-67.3.  Those convictions qualified as 
                     
1 The SVPA defines a sexually violent predator as “any 
person who (i) has been convicted of a sexually violent offense 
. . . and (ii) because of a mental abnormality or personality 
disorder, finds it difficult to control his predatory behavior, 
sexually violent offenses under Code § 37.2-900.  After the 
circuit court determined that probable cause existed to believe 
Wynn is a sexually violent predator pursuant to Code § 37.2-906, 
Wynn elected to have a trial by jury.  See Code § 37.2-908(B).  
At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury returned a verdict 
finding that Wynn is not a sexually violent predator.  
Subsequently, the circuit court entered an order in accordance 
with the jury verdict. 
Two evidentiary rulings by the circuit court during the 
jury trial are at issue in this appeal.  Those rulings concerned 
the testimony and written report of Glenn Rex Miller, Jr., 
Ph.D., who performed a mental health examination of Wynn 
pursuant to Code § 37.2-904(B).  Dr. Miller was the only mental 
health expert who testified at the trial.  In both his written 
report and trial testimony, Dr. Miller stated that Wynn suffers 
from pedophilia, paraphilia, and antisocial personality 
disorder.  Because of Wynn’s mental abnormalities and 
personality disorder, Dr. Miller concluded that Wynn finds it 
difficult to control his predatory behavior, which makes him 
likely to commit sexually violent acts.  In sum, Dr. Miller 
opined that Wynn meets the criteria as a sexually violent 
predator pursuant to Code § 37.2-900. 
                                                                  
which makes him likely to engage in sexually violent acts.”  
Code § 37.2-900. 
 
2
The first evidentiary ruling occurred during the 
Commonwealth’s direct examination of Dr. Miller.  The 
Commonwealth attempted to elicit testimony about allegations of 
sexual misconduct by Wynn made by children other than the victim 
involved in Wynn’s two aggravated sexual battery convictions.  
Dr. Miller had learned about those allegations, which concerned 
sexual abuse that supposedly occurred during the same time frame 
as the sexual batteries for which Wynn was convicted, by 
reviewing documents in a file maintained by the Assistant 
Commonwealth’s Attorney who had prosecuted Wynn.  When the 
Commonwealth asked Dr. Miller to relate specific information 
about those other allegations, Wynn objected, stating that the 
allegations were “hearsay upon hearsay” and he could not cross-
examine either the accuser, the person who prepared the 
documents detailing the allegations, or the individual who 
created the file.  In response, the Commonwealth asserted the 
allegations constituted information Dr. Miller relied upon in 
arriving at his conclusions and the jury could decide what 
weight to give his opinions based on those allegations. 
The circuit court decided Dr. Miller could testify that 
there were allegations from other children, but had to omit the 
specific details of those allegations.  The court stated, “I 
think you are going to have to limit it to that there were other 
accusations from other children in this and leave it at that.”  
 
3
When the Commonwealth resumed its direct examination of Dr. 
Miller, it asked two questions about the other allegations: 
“Doctor, did you review records regarding additional allegations 
made against Mr. Wynn?” and “Did you consider those in reaching 
your conclusions about his risk assessment and diagnosis?”  Dr. 
Miller responded affirmatively to both questions.  Notably, the 
Commonwealth limited its question to whether there were other 
allegations against Wynn and did not ask if those accusations 
came from children, even though the circuit court ruled that the 
Commonwealth could do so.  Despite the circuit court’s ruling, 
the jury did hear some details regarding the accusations by 
other children. 
The second evidentiary ruling occurred at the end of Dr. 
Miller’s direct examination.  At that point, the Commonwealth 
sought to admit into evidence Dr. Miller’s written report 
concerning his examination of Wynn.  Wynn objected on the basis 
that Dr. Miller’s report contained a significant amount of 
hearsay and his testimony was “the best evidence.”  Wynn 
specifically pointed to the portions of the report in which Dr. 
Miller discussed in detail the sexual abuse allegations from 
other children, Wynn’s threats of suicide, and the conclusions 
of a psychologist who had evaluated Wynn when he was 
incarcerated in Montana.   
 
4
The circuit court admitted into evidence page one and pages 
twelve through fifteen of Dr. Miller’s fifteen-page report.  
Page one discussed, among other things, the purpose of the 
evaluation and the sources of information he had utilized.  The 
other admitted pages included Dr. Miller’s assessments of Wynn’s 
personality and risk for re-offending, Dr. Miller’s diagnoses of 
Wynn’s mental abnormalities and personality disorder, and Dr. 
Miller’s conclusions that Wynn satisfied the criteria to be 
classified a sexually violent predator. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
On appeal, the Commonwealth claims the circuit court erred 
“in prohibiting the expert from testifying to the additional 
allegations of sexual misconduct” and “in prohibiting the 
Commonwealth from introducing the expert’s entire report.”  
Generally, we review a circuit court’s evidentiary rulings under 
an abuse of discretion standard.  See, e.g., John v. Im, 263 Va. 
315, 320, 559 S.E.2d 694, 696 (2002).  However, “[a] ‘trial 
court has no discretion to admit clearly inadmissible evidence 
because “admissibility of evidence depends not upon the 
discretion of the court but upon sound legal principles.”’”  
Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Puryear, 250 Va. 559, 563, 463 
S.E.2d 442, 444 (1995) (quoting Coe v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 83, 
87, 340 S.E.2d 820, 823 (1986) (quoting Crowson v. Swan, 164 Va. 
82, 92, 178 S.E. 898, 903 (1935))).  Evidence that is hearsay 
 
5
and does not fall under an exception is clearly inadmissible.  
See, e.g., Teleguz v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 458, 481, 643 S.E.2d 
708, 723 (2007) (“In the absence of any applicable exception to 
the hearsay rule which would have rendered the testimony 
admissible, we hold that the trial court erred in admitting the 
testimony.”) (citation omitted); Setliff v. Commonwealth, 162 
Va. 805, 814, 173 S.E. 517, 520 (1934) (holding evidence is 
“clearly hearsay and for that reason inadmissible in any form 
before the jury”). 
The SVPA requires a prisoner to undergo a mental health 
evaluation “by a licensed psychiatrist or a licensed clinical 
psychologist who is . . . skilled in the diagnosis, treatment, 
and risk assessment of sex offenders,” Code § 37.2-904(B), when 
the prisoner’s name is forwarded to the Commitment Review 
Committee pursuant to Code § 37.2-903.  Under the SVPA, a 
psychiatrist or clinical psychologist who satisfies the 
qualifications set forth in Code §§ 37.2-904(B) or -907 may 
testify at trial “as to his diagnosis, his opinion as to whether 
the respondent meets the definition of a sexually violent 
predator, his recommendation as to treatment, and the basis for 
his opinions.”  Code § 37.2-908(C).  The SVPA, however, contains 
no express provisions allowing the admission of hearsay evidence 
during an expert witness’ testimony at a SVPA trial.  Thus, “we 
will apply the general rules applicable to expert testimony in 
 
6
other civil cases” to address the issue before us.  Commonwealth 
v. Allen, 269 Va. 262, 274, 609 S.E.2d 4, 11–12 (2005).  
In McMunn v. Tatum, 237 Va. 558, 560, 379 S.E.2d 908, 909 
(1989), the Court decided whether an expert witness, in relating 
the basis for the expert opinion, could testify about the 
hearsay opinions of other persons.  We concluded that Code 
§ 8.01-401.1, which governs the admissibility of expert witness 
testimony in a civil action, “does not authorize the admission 
in evidence, upon the direct examination of an expert witness, 
of hearsay matters of opinion upon which the expert relied in 
reaching his own opinion.”  Id. at 566, 379 S.E.2d at 912; 
accord May v. Caruso, 264 Va. 358, 361, 568 S.E.2d 690, 691–92 
(2002); Weinberg v. Given, 252 Va. 221, 224, 476 S.E.2d 502, 503 
(1996); CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Casale, 247 Va. 180, 182–83, 
441 S.E.2d 212, 214 (1994).  The Court explained that “[n]o 
litigant in our judicial system is required to contend with the 
opinions of absent ‘experts’ whose qualifications have not been 
established to the satisfaction of the court, whose demeanor 
cannot be observed by the trier of fact, and whose 
pronouncements are immune from cross-examination.”  McMunn, 237 
Va. at 566, 379 S.E.2d at 912; see also Weinberg, 252 Va. at 
225, 476 S.E.2d at 503. 
The Commonwealth, however, asserts several reasons why it 
believes the specific details of the other unadjudicated 
 
7
allegations of sexual misconduct by Wynn were admissible at his 
SVPA trial: (1) the evidence tended to prove Wynn’s mental 
condition and risk of re-offending and was therefore more 
probative than prejudicial; (2) the allegations were a part of 
the factual basis for Dr. Miller’s opinions; (3) the allegations 
constituted unadjudicated conduct, which is admissible pursuant 
to this Court’s decision in Ellison v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 
254, 639 S.E.2d 209 (2007); (4) an SVPA proceeding is similar to 
the “future dangerousness” determination during the sentencing 
phase of a capital murder trial and the same evidentiary rules 
should therefore apply; (5) the allegations were not hearsay 
because they were not offered for the truth of the matter 
asserted but to show the factual basis for Dr. Miller’s 
opinions; and (6) even if the evidence was hearsay, the 
provisions of Code § 37.2-908(C) created an exception to the 
hearsay rule for SVPA proceedings.  We do not agree with any 
aspect of the Commonwealth’s position. 
That the details of the other allegations of sexual 
misconduct may have been probative to the issues before the 
circuit court does not answer the question whether the evidence 
was, nevertheless, inadmissible hearsay.  Furthermore, the 
Commonwealth did indeed offer the allegations for the truth of 
the matter asserted.  At no time before the circuit court did 
the Commonwealth suggest otherwise. 
 
8
However, the Commonwealth is correct in its assertion that 
allegations or unadjudicated charges of sexual offenses have 
clinical significance to licensed psychiatrists and licensed 
clinical psychologists who perform mental health evaluations 
pursuant to Code § 37.2-904(B).  We do not question the 
propriety of Dr. Miller and other mental health experts 
considering and using such allegations in formulating their 
opinions as to whether a prisoner qualifies as a sexually 
violent predator.  But see Commonwealth v. Garrett, 276 Va. 590, 
607, 667 S.E.2d 739, 749 (2008) (holding that “three carnal 
knowledge petitions standing alone were legally insufficient to 
permit [an expert witness] to draw the inference that [the 
prisoner] had in fact committed those offenses in the absence of 
any additional evidence concerning the circumstances surrounding 
the Commonwealth’s decision to dismiss those petitions”).  As 
Dr. Miller explained, “charges are considered . . . a risk 
factor for individuals depending on how many different times 
they have been charged with sex offenses, even if they weren’t 
convicted.”  According to Dr. Miller, psychologists look at the 
“quality of the offenses and what happened” as opposed to actual 
convictions since they may be the result of plea bargains that 
reduced the original charges. 
Likewise, Code § 37.2-908(C) provides that an expert 
witness testifying at an SVPA trial may state the “basis 
 
9
for his opinions.”  Similarly, pursuant to Code § 8.01-
401.1, an expert witness may rely upon “facts, 
circumstances or data made known to . . . such witness” in 
formulating an opinion; those “facts, circumstances or data 
. . . , if of a type normally relied upon by others in the 
particular field of expertise in forming opinions and 
drawing inferences, need not be admissible in evidence.”  
Neither of these statutes, however, allows for the 
introduction of otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence 
during the direct examination of an expert witness merely 
because the expert relied on the hearsay information in 
formulating an opinion.  See McMunn, 237 Va. at 565, 379 
S.E.2d at 912 (“[Code § 8.01-401.1 is] silent . . . with 
respect to the admissibility of the otherwise inadmissible 
information upon which the expert’s opinion is based, at 
least upon the expert’s direct examination.”). 
The Commonwealth, however, asserts that our holding in 
McMunn should be limited to “hearsay matters of opinion” 
upon which an expert relied.  See id. at 566, 379 S.E.2d at 
912.  We do not agree.  Whether an expert relies upon the 
opinions of others or allegations of sexual misconduct in 
formulating an opinion, both constitute hearsay.  While 
certain information may be of the type routinely used by 
experts in a given field of expertise when formulating 
 
10
their opinions, a litigant, nevertheless, should not be 
required to contend with such hearsay information because 
the trier of fact cannot observe the demeanor of the 
speaker and the statements cannot be tested by cross-
examination.2  See id.  
The inadmissibility of the hearsay evidence concerning the 
other allegations of sexual misconduct by Wynn is not altered by 
our decision in Ellison.  There, the issue was whether the 
Commonwealth, in an SVPA trial, could introduce evidence from a 
prior criminal trial in which the prisoner had been acquitted of 
rape.  273 Va. at 256, 639 S.E.2d at 211.  We held that the 
introduction of such evidence did not offend double jeopardy 
protections of the Virginia and United States constitutions, nor 
did it violate the principles of collateral estoppel.  Id. at 
                     
2 The Commonwealth asserts that our resolution of the issue 
before us should be guided by the decision in United States v. 
Leeson, 453 F.3d 631 (4th Cir. 2006).  Although we recognized in 
McMunn that Code § 8.01-401.1 was based, in part, on Federal 
Rules of Evidence 703 and 705, there is a significant difference 
between our statute and Federal Rule of Evidence 703.  In 
pertinent part, the rule states: “Facts or data that are 
otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the 
proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court 
determines that their probative value in assisting the jury to 
evaluate the expert’s opinion substantially outweighs their 
prejudicial effect.”  (Emphasis added.)  Section 8.01-401.1 does 
not contain this proviso.  The issue in Leeson was whether an 
expert witness’ testimony about statements made by two prison 
inmates concerning the defendant was admissible under Rule 703.  
453 F.3d at 636.  Thus, the holding has no relevance to the 
issues in this appeal. 
 
11
261, 639 S.E.2d at 214.  Moreover, the victim of the alleged 
rape testified at the SVPA trial, see id. at 257, 639 S.E.2d at 
211–12, so no question arose as to the admissibility of the 
testimony on hearsay grounds. 
Finally, the Commonwealth asserts that proceedings under 
the SVPA are analogous to the future dangerousness determination 
at the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial because both 
proceedings require a fact-finder to decide the likelihood of an 
individual’s engaging in criminal conduct in the future.  Since 
evidence of a defendant’s unadjudicated criminal conduct is 
admissible at a capital murder sentencing proceeding to 
determine future dangerousness, see Beaver v. Commonwealth, 232 
Va. 521, 528–29, 352 S.E.2d 342, 346–47 (1987), the Commonwealth 
contends the evidence regarding the unadjudicated allegations of 
Wynn’s sexual misconduct was admissible at his SVPA trial.  The 
Commonwealth’s argument overlooks the provisions of Code § 19.2-
264.4.  The statute lists the types of evidence relevant in the 
sentencing phase of a capital murder trial, but states that such 
evidence “may be admissible, subject to the rules of evidence 
governing admissibility.”  Code § 19.2-264.4(B).  Also, the fact 
that a trial court may consider hearsay evidence contained in a 
postsentence report prepared and filed in accordance with Code 
§§ 19.2-264.5 and -299, see O’Dell v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 672, 
 
12
701–02, 364 S.E.2d 491, 508 (1988), does not alter our 
conclusion. 
Thus, we conclude the circuit court did not err by refusing 
to allow Dr. Miller to testify about the details of the other 
alleged acts of sexual misconduct by Wynn.  Even though Dr. 
Miller relied on those allegations in formulating his opinions, 
the information came from sources unavailable for cross-
examination.  The evidence clearly fell within the realm of 
hearsay and was, therefore, inadmissible.  
With regard to the evidentiary ruling concerning Dr. 
Miller’s written report, the Commonwealth complains that the 
circuit court redacted more sections of the report than the 
portions identified by Wynn as examples of the hearsay contained 
in the report.  Wynn’s objection, however, was not as limited as 
the Commonwealth suggests.  Instead, Wynn argued to the circuit 
court that the report contained a “significant amount of 
hearsay” and was “replete with various items which quite frankly 
are inadmissible.”  Wynn was correct.  Hearsay abounded in the 
redacted portions of the report.  For the reasons already 
discussed in this opinion, the hearsay information in Dr. 
Miller’s report was not admissible. 
The Commonwealth further asserts that the jury “was given a 
dissected and incomplete report with only portions of Dr. 
Miller’s opinions and no explanation for the bases of those 
 
13
opinions.”  In comparing the redacted portions of the report 
with Dr. Miller’s testimony, we find the jury actually learned 
much of the redacted information from Dr. Miller.  
Significantly, Dr. Miller testified at length concerning his 
opinions and the basis for those opinions. 
Finally, during oral argument before this Court, the 
Commonwealth asserted that Dr. Miller’s report was akin to a 
report by a mental health expert in a general commitment 
proceeding for involuntary admission.  According to the 
Commonwealth, such a report is admissible by statute and, by 
implication, Dr. Miller’s report was therefore admissible.  The 
provisions of Code § 37.2-815 require a mental health 
professional examining a person who is the subject of a hearing 
for involuntary admission to “provide a written report of his 
examination prior to the hearing.”  Code § 37.2-815(C).  The 
written report “may be accepted into evidence unless objected to 
by the person or his attorney, in which case the examiner shall 
attend in person or by electronic communication.”  Id.  
Additionally, prior to a civil commitment hearing for 
involuntary admission, “[t]he district court judge or special 
justice shall require a preadmission screening report from the 
community services board,” which “shall be admissible as 
evidence of the facts stated therein.”  Code § 37.2-816.  The 
report must include conclusions and recommendations as to 
 
14
 
15
whether a person should be involuntarily committed.  Id.  In the 
absence of similar express statutory language in the SVPA, we 
are unwilling to hold that written reports by mental health 
expert witnesses are automatically admissible in SVPA trials. 
In sum, the hearsay information in the redacted portions of 
Dr. Miller’s report was not admissible, and no statute or other 
authority compelled the circuit court to admit the unredacted 
report in its entirety.  Thus, we reach the same conclusion as 
we did previously.  The circuit court did not err by admitting 
into evidence only portions of Dr. Miller’s written report. 
III. CONCLUSION  
For the reasons stated, we will affirm the judgment of the 
circuit court. 
Affirmed.