Title: Blake v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 140081
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: October 31, 2014

Present:  All the Justices 
 
MAUREEN ANNE BLAKE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  OPINION BY 
v. 
Record No. 140081 
 
   JUSTICE LEROY F. MILLETTE, JR.
 
                                  October 31, 2014 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In this appeal we consider whether Code § 22.1-254, 
requiring compulsory school attendance, can be used to 
prosecute parents or guardians whose children are tardy for 
school.  For the reasons stated below, we conclude that it 
cannot. 
I. 
Facts and Proceedings 
Maureen Anne Blake was convicted by the Circuit Court of 
Loudoun County of three counts of a Class 3 misdemeanor under 
Code § 22.1-263, enforcing Code § 22.1-254, Virginia's 
compulsory school attendance law, for failing to ensure that 
her children arrived at school in a timely manner. 
Blake is a divorced mother of three minor children, ages 
8, 10, and 11.  She shares joint custody with her ex-husband.  
She has custody of the children on Wednesday nights and is 
responsible for transporting the children to school on Thursday 
mornings.  From September 15, 2011 through January 19, 2012, 
the period charged in the warrants brought against Blake, the 
children were repeatedly tardy to school on Thursdays.  Within 
the time period of the warrants, the children were tardy two of 
 
 
2 
the three Thursdays in September, two of the four Thursdays in 
October, one of the three Thursdays in which school was in 
session in November, all three Thursdays that school was in 
session in December, and two of the three Thursdays in January.1  
The tardiness generally ranged from five to twenty minutes in 
length. 
The tardiness of the children on Thursdays was universally 
marked as unexcused.  The children's record showed no other 
unexcused tardiness.  The school's attendance officer sent the 
defendant a letter on November 3, 2011, containing language 
attempting to convey defendant's duty to send the children to 
school on time.2  Blake indicated in a December conference with 
the attendance officer that she and one of her children had 
been diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder 
(ADHD) and that one of her other children was currently being 
tested.  Blake stated that some of the tardiness was 
attributable to the ADHD, either due to behavioral problems on 
the part of the children or due to Blake's own ADHD, for which 
she was getting treatment.  It was determined by the school 
                     
 
1 The exact number and dates of the tardies were stipulated 
to at trial and presented to the circuit court in a document 
that was not entered into evidence and thus not in the record 
before this Court.  However, the Commonwealth’s Attorney gave 
the above recitation without objection in his closing argument. 
 
2 Receipt of this letter was acknowledged by the defendant, 
but the letter was not entered into evidence. 
 
 
3 
that none of the reasons proffered were sufficient to mark the 
tardies as "excused." 
Blake was prosecuted under Code §§ 22.1-254 and -263.  The 
circuit court heard the case on appeal from convictions in the 
Loudoun County Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, and 
convicted her of three Class 3 misdemeanors, one per child.  
Each misdemeanor was based on five instances of tardiness, from 
December 1, 2011 to January 19, 2012 (the period after the 
circuit court found effective notice by means of the November 
letter but still within the warrant period). 
Blake appealed to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, 
seeking review as to whether Code § 22.1-254(A) could be 
applied to prosecute tardiness when a child was otherwise 
enrolled in and regularly attending school.  A divided panel of 
the Court of Appeals affirmed her convictions in an unpublished 
opinion.  Blake v. Commonwealth, Record No. 1751-12-4, 2013 Va. 
App. LEXIS 339, at *19 (November 19, 2013).  Defendant sought a 
rehearing en banc, but her petition was denied.  Blake then 
appealed to this Court, and we granted review as an issue of 
significant precedential value under Code § 17.1-410(B). 
II. Analysis 
The dispositive threshold issue in this case is whether 
Code § 22.1-254(A) can be construed in a manner that 
encompasses tardiness.  If Code § 22.1-254(A) cannot be so 
 
 
4 
construed, Blake cannot be prosecuted under this Code section 
and the rest of the assignments of error in this case are 
rendered moot.  See, e.g., DurretteBradshaw, P.C. v. MRC 
Consulting, L.C., 277 Va. 140, 142 n.*, 670 S.E.2d 704, 705 n.* 
(2009) (addressing only one assignment of error that is 
dispositive). 
A. 
Standard of Review 
Whether Code § 22.1-254(A) should be construed as 
applicable to tardiness is a question of statutory 
interpretation; it therefore "'presents a pure question of law 
and is accordingly subject to de novo review by this Court.'"  
Warrington v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 365, 370, 699 S.E.2d 233, 
235 (2010) (quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 121, 124, 
661 S.E.2d 412, 414 (2008)).  While we view the facts in the 
light most favorable to the prevailing party below, in this 
instance, the Commonwealth, see Perry v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 
572, 578, 701 S.E.2d 431, 435 (2010), we will nonetheless 
review de novo the scope and application of the statute under 
which the defendant was convicted.  See Findlay v. 
Commonwealth, 287 Va. 111, 114, 752 S.E.2d 868, 870 (2014); 
Covel v. Town of Vienna, 280 Va. 151, 158, 167, 694 S.E.2d 609, 
613, 616-17 (2010); Muhammad v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 451, 479, 
619 S.E.2d 16, 31 (2005)("the legal viability of the 
 
 
5 
Commonwealth's theories" for imposing guilt under a statute 
reviewed de novo). 
B. 
Definition of "Send" in Code § 22.1-254(A) 
1.  The Term "Send" in Code § 22.1-254(A) is Ambiguous 
"When construing a statute, our primary objective is 'to 
ascertain and give effect to legislative intent,' as expressed 
by the language used in the statute."  Cuccinelli v. Rector & 
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 283 Va. 420, 425, 722 S.E.2d 626, 
629 (2012) (quoting Commonwealth v. Amerson, 281 Va. 414, 418, 
706 S.E.2d 879, 882 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
To best ascertain that intent, "'[w]hen the language of a 
statute is unambiguous, we are bound by the plain meaning of 
that language.'" Kozmina v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 347, 349, 706 
S.E.2d 860, 862 (2011) (quoting Conyers v. Martial Arts World 
of Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96, 104, 639 S.E.2d 174, 178 
(2007)). 
To determine whether language is ambiguous, we must 
consider whether "the text can be understood in more than one 
way or refers to two or more things simultaneously [or] 
whe[ther] the language is difficult to comprehend, is of 
doubtful import, or lacks clearness or definiteness."  Boynton 
v. Kilgore, 271 Va. 220, 227 n.8, 623 S.E.2d 922, 926 n.8 
(2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Code § 22.1-254(A) reads as follows: 
 
 
6 
Except as otherwise provided in this article, every 
parent, guardian, or other person in the Commonwealth 
having control or charge of any child who will have 
reached the fifth birthday on or before September 30 
of any school year and who has not passed the 
eighteenth birthday shall, during the period of each 
year the public schools are in session and for the 
same number of days and hours per day as the public 
schools, send such child to a public school or to a 
private, denominational, or parochial school or have 
such child taught by a tutor or teacher of 
qualifications prescribed by the Board of Education 
and approved by the division superintendent, or 
provide for home instruction of such child as 
described in § 22.1-254.1. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
The word "send" has a variety of different definitions, 
but to determine whether it is ambiguous, we must consider the 
term in context.  "'A statute is not to be construed by 
singling out a particular phrase.'"  Eberhardt v. Fairfax Cnty. 
Employees' Retirement Sys. Bd. of Trustees, 283 Va. 190, 195, 
721 S.E.2d 524, 526 (2012) (quoting Virginia Elec. & Power Co. 
v. Board of Cnty. Supervisors, 226 Va. 382, 388, 309 S.E.2d 
308, 311 (1983)). 
In considering the context, there can be little doubt that 
the statute is ambiguous.  Among ten definitions provided by 
Webster's Dictionary, two would result in distinct 
interpretations of the statute:  the first-listed definition, 
"to cause to go," and the fourth-listed definition, "to direct, 
order, or request to go; to permit or enable to attend a term 
or session."  Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 1071 (9th ed. 
 
 
7 
1983).  The example provided by the text in the latter instance 
is specific to school, as in to send to college, further making 
it a reasonably intended meaning despite its less common 
general usage.  Id.  Black's Law Dictionary presents a similar 
dichotomy, with its first-listed definition indicating 
authorization ("[t]o cause or direct to go or pass; to 
authorize to go and act") and its second indicating conveyance 
("[t]o cause to be moved or conveyed from a present location to 
another place").  Black's Law Dictionary 1568 (10th ed. 2014). 
Subsection (A) can therefore be read in one of two ways, 
in which "send" either means: (1) "enable to attend a term or 
session," with the requirement that any program that is an 
alternative to public school be just as comprehensive from a 
temporal perspective ("same number of days and hours per day") 
as public school, i.e., to enroll; or (2) "cause to go," with 
the literal requirement that the child be physically present 
for the same number of days and hours that the school is in 
session, i.e., to attend.  As the text can, indeed, "be 
understood in more than one way," Boynton, 271 Va. at 227 n.8, 
623 S.E.2d at 926 n.8 (citation omitted), we conclude that the 
term "send" as used in the statute is indeed ambiguous and 
proceed to further analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
2.  Statutory Context Indicates that "Send" 
Does Not Encompass Tardiness 
If the statutory language is, in fact, subject to more 
than one interpretation, "'we must apply the interpretation 
that will carry out the legislative intent behind the 
statute.'"  Kozmina, 281 Va. at 349-50, 706 S.E.2d at 862 
(quoting Conyers, 273 Va. at 104, 639 S.E.2d at 178). 
We construe statutory language in the context of the 
entire statute:  "A cardinal rule of statutory construction is 
that a statute be construed from its four corners and not by 
singling out a particular word or phrase."  Commonwealth 
Natural Resources, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 529, 536, 248 
S.E.2d 791, 795 (1978).  "[S]tatutes are not to be considered 
as isolated fragments of law, but as a whole, or as parts of a 
great connected, homogenous system, or a single and complete 
statutory arrangement."  Prillaman v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 
401, 405, 100 S.E.2d 4, 7 (1957) (quoting 50 Am. Jur., 
Statutes, § 349).  "[E]very part of a statute is presumed to 
have some effect and no part will be considered meaningless 
unless absolutely necessary."  Hubbard v. Henrico Ltd. 
Partnership, 255 Va. 335, 340, 497 S.E.2d 335, 338 (1998). 
Where multiple sections of a statute are inconsistent or 
ambiguous when read together, courts "are required to harmonize 
any ambiguity or inconsistency in the statute to give effect to 
 
 
9 
the General Assembly's intent without usurping 'the 
legislature's right to write statutes.'"  Parker v. Warren, 273 
Va. 20, 24, 639 S.E.2d 179, 181 (2007) (quoting Boynton, 271 
Va. at 229-30, 623 S.E.2d at 927). 
Code § 22.1-254 is the opening section of Title 22.1, 
Chapter 14, Article 1.  Code § 22.1-254(A) itself has a number 
of primary features that deal specifically with mandatory 
enrollment:  it addresses the span of ages during which school 
enrollment is required and the various permissible forms of 
education (private, denominational, parochial, home 
instruction, and approved alternative programs).  It would be 
consistent and relevant to enrollment for the time period 
referred to therein ("same number of days and hours per day") 
to refer to the requisite length of time for such a program.  A 
previous case before this Court considering a family's 
religious objection to the mandate that students "attend" 
school under Code § 22.1-254 addressed their objections not to 
attending a few hours or days but attending school generally, 
i.e., enrollment.  See Johnson v. Prince William County School 
Bd., 241 Va. 383, 384-85, 404 S.E.2d 209, 209-10 (1991).  This 
Court's own use of "sending" in that case pertained to 
enrollment.  Id.  Notably, while truancy and absence are 
clearly addressed elsewhere in Chapter 14, this opening 
 
 
10 
subsection is the only portion of the statutory scheme that is 
a general enrollment requirement of its kind. 
In addition, reading subsection (A) as pertaining to 
attendance rather than enrollment risks failing to give full 
effect to other statutory provisions because Code § 22.1-254(A) 
alone would authorize criminal proceedings under Code § 22.1-
263 against any parent whose child was absent for even one day.  
As we have previously stated, "no part [of a statute] will be 
considered meaningless unless absolutely necessary."  Hubbard, 
255 Va. at 340, 497 S.E.2d at 338.  If it were construed to 
address attendance and tardiness, Code § 22.1-254(A) would 
disrupt the cohesive reading of this chapter. 
For example, Code § 22.1-258 specifically addresses truant 
children and includes a graduated plan for addressing multiple 
days of nonattendance, providing for notice to the parent, 
conference with the parent after a sixth absence, and 
notification of the court if the child continues to be absent 
without parental awareness or support.  Code § 22.1-263 
punishes noncompliance with this statute.  If these same 
criminal repercussions could be triggered for failing to send a 
child to school for even one day, however, the entire 
structured graduated plan articulated in Code § 22.1-258 would 
be advisory at best. 
 
 
11 
Similarly, under Article 3 of the same chapter, Code 
§ 22.1-279.3(A) imposes on parents a "duty to assist the school 
in enforcing the standards of student conduct and compulsory 
school attendance."  Code § 22.1-263 provides the same criminal 
penal provisions for violating "parental responsibility 
provisions relating to compulsory school attendance included in 
§ 22.1-279.3" as for violating Code § 22.1-254(A).  Thus, 
violation of Code § 22.1-254(A) must encompass something 
distinct from compliance with attendance policies, or Code 
§ 22.1-254(A) and Code § 22.1-279.3(A) would be redundant and 
have no independent legal meaning. 
Under Code § 22.1-279.3, school boards are required to 
establish and distribute a copy of the standards of student 
conduct and a copy of the compulsory attendance law at the 
beginning of the school year for parental notice and signature.  
Code § 22.1-279.3(C).  The section also outlines a process for 
parental notification of violations, allows for meetings to 
remedy problematic student behavior or failure to comply with 
school attendance policies, and provides for court orders and 
civil penalties if parents do not engage in this process.  Code 
§ 22.1-279.3(D)-(H).  In short, Code § 22.1-279.3 arms schools 
to enforce standards for behavior, tardiness, and absence. 
The provisions of Code § 22.1-279.3 requiring parents to 
meet regarding their child's failure to comply with compulsory 
 
 
12 
school attendance and to assist the school in enforcing 
compulsory attendance can be enforced by court order under Code 
§ 22.1-279.3(G)(1) or criminal prosecution under Code § 22.1-
263.  Once again, these graduated enforcement options seem 
inconsistent with a reading of Code § 22.1-254(A) in which a 
single day's absence would trigger the same criminal penalties.  
There would simply be no need for criminal enforcement 
provisions for the compulsory attendance portion of this 
statute if parents could already be criminally prosecuted for 
absences and tardiness alone. 
In sum, in order to read Code § 22.1-254(A) to encompass 
absence and tardiness, the Court would fail to give full effect 
to many pages of statutory material.  We decline to read Code 
§ 22.1-254 in this manner. 
Although the statutes that Code § 22.1-254 risks rendering 
redundant speak to attendance or absence generally and not 
specifically to tardiness, the two are the same for the 
purposes of construing Code § 22.1-254(A).  In construing a 
statute, the "plain, obvious, and rational meaning . . . is to 
be preferred over any curious, narrow, or strained 
construction."  Meeks v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 798, 802, 651 
S.E.2d 637, 639 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).  It 
would be the epitome of a "strained" construction if we were to 
somehow construe Code § 22.1-254 as applying to tardiness but 
 
 
13 
not absences:  because the statute refers to days and hours per 
day in the same sentence, it must be read to apply to both or 
neither.  Thus, in concluding that Code § 22.1-254(A) does not 
apply to absences, we must likewise conclude that it does not 
apply to tardiness. 
Finally, interpreting "send" to encompass tardiness would 
entail construing Code § 22.1-254 as blanket authority for 
prosecution of parents for even de minimis tardiness or absence 
on the part of their children.  This result seems contrary to 
the comprehensive and graduated approach to absences found 
elsewhere in the Code.  Given the obvious attention to detail 
and structured guidance that the General Assembly has provided 
through other attendance- and truancy-related sections, we find 
it highly unlikely that the General Assembly intended that sort 
of result. 
3.  The Rule of Lenity Dictates that "Send" 
Should Not Encompass Tardiness 
Should any ambiguity remain, penal statutes must be 
strictly construed according to the rule of lenity and, if the 
language of the statute permits two "reasonable but 
contradictory constructions," the statutory construction 
favorable to the accused should be applied.  Wesley v. 
Commonwealth, 190 Va. 268, 276, 56 S.E.2d 362, 365 (1949).  The 
Commonwealth is correct in its contention that a criminal 
 
 
14 
defendant is not "entitled to benefit from an 'unreasonably 
restrictive interpretation of [a] statute.'"  Holloman v. 
Commonwealth, 221 Va. 196, 198, 269 S.E.2d 356, 357 (1980) 
(citation omitted).  As demonstrated both by the detailed 
discussion set forth above and by the sheer lack of any mention 
of tardiness or absence at all in the subsection, however, the 
narrower construction presented here does not constitute an 
unreasonably restrictive interpretation. 
We therefore conclude that the requirement that a parent, 
guardian, or person having control or charge of a minor "send" 
that child to school requires that such child be enrolled in a 
school program fulfilling the requirements of Code § 22.1-
254(A), including that the program meet for as many days and 
hours each year as the public school year.  We further conclude 
that, while enrollment necessarily contemplates general 
attendance, the statute cannot be used to prosecute instances 
of tardiness. 
C. 
Additional Assignments of Error 
Defendant also assigned error to the refusal of the Court 
of Appeals to reverse based on issues involving lack of notice 
and the constitutionality of the statute if interpreted to 
encompass tardiness.  Because we conclude that Code § 22.1-254 
does not apply to tardiness, we need not reach any additional 
assignments of error here. 
 
 
15 
III. Conclusion 
For the aforementioned reasons, we hold that Code § 22.1-
254 cannot be used to prosecute tardiness.  Accordingly, we 
will reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and enter 
final judgment vacating the defendant's convictions. 
Reversed and final judgment. 
 
 
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE MIMS joins, dissenting. 
 
 
I agree with the majority that the use of the word “send” 
in Code § 22.1-254(A) is ambiguous, but I disagree with the 
majority’s holding that “send,” as used in Code § 22.1-254, 
means merely “enroll.”  After “harmoniz[ing] any ambiguity or 
inconsistency in the statute to give effect to the General 
Assembly’s intent without usurping ‘the legislature’s right to 
write statutes,’” Parker v. Warren, 273 Va. 20, 24, 639 S.E.2d 
179, 181 (2007)(quoting Boynton v. Kilgore, 271 Va. 220, 229-
30, 623 S.E.2d 922, 927 (2006)), I believe that the General 
Assembly necessarily intended that the definition of “send” in 
Code § 22.1-254(A) includes both attendance and, as at issue 
here, tardiness. 
 
Except as otherwise provided in this 
article, every parent . . . having control 
or charge of any child . . . shall, during 
the period of each year the public schools 
are in session and for the same number of 
days and hours per day as the public 
schools, send such child to a public school 
or to a private, denominational, or 
 
 
16 
parochial school or have such child taught 
by a tutor or teacher of qualifications 
prescribed by the Board of Education and 
approved by the division superintendent, or 
provide for home instruction of such child 
as described in § 22.1-254.1. 
 
Code § 22.1-254(A)(emphasis added).  The oldest historical 
meaning of “send” is “to cause to go by physical means or 
direct volition.”  Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 
2065 (1983); see id. at 17a (stating in explanatory note 12.5 
that “[t]he order of [meanings] is historical: the one known to 
have been first used in English is entered first.”).  Thus, 
“send” means more than “enroll.” 
 
Indeed, the General Assembly chose to use “enroll” 
elsewhere in this article when it wanted to limit the 
obligations of parents and educators to issues of mere 
enrollment.  See Code § 22.1-260 (imposing a duty upon a 
principal to report to the superintendent all students enrolled 
and, to the extent he or she is able to, not enrolled within 
ten days of the start of each school year); Code § 22.1-261 
(requiring the attendance officer or division superintendent to 
compose a list of all unenrolled children by cross-checking the 
list compiled pursuant to Code § 22.1-260 with the State 
Registrar of Vital Records and Health Statistics).  Moreover, 
albeit in the context of parents seeking a religious exemption 
for their children, this Court has previously stated that Code 
 
 
17 
§ 22.1-254 requires that children attend school.  Johnson v. 
Prince William County School Bd., 241 Va. 383, 385, 404 S.E.2d 
209, 210 (1991) (stating “Code § 22.1-254 provides that all 
children between the ages of five and seventeen shall attend 
school.”).  Thus, it is clear that the definition of “send,” 
coupled with our prior holding and the General Assembly’s 
decision to use the phrase “hours per day” in Code § 22.1-254, 
clearly contemplates attendance for the full day as well as 
tardiness rather than mere enrollment. 
 
Contrary to the majority’s position that reading Code 
§ 22.1-254(A) to include tardiness “risks failing to give full 
effect to other statutory provisions,” nothing in the language 
of the remainder of this Article would be affected by 
interpreting Code § 22.1-254 to apply to tardiness.  Code 
§ 22.1-258 specifically deals with the procedure that is to be 
followed when a student “fails to report to school” and there 
is no indication that the parent is “aware” of the absence.  
That is inherently different from Code § 22.1-254, which places 
the duty upon parents to “send” their children to school.  This 
duty connotes a knowing obligation and/or requirement on the 
parent that would apply under circumstances such as here, where 
the parent was only prosecuted for those instances of which she 
was aware. 
 
 
18 
 
Significantly, Code § 22.1-258 specifically provides that, 
“[n]othing in this section [dealing with the unaware parent] 
shall be construed to limit in any way the authority of any 
attendance officer or division superintendent to seek immediate 
compliance with the compulsory school attendance law as set 
forth in this article.”  There is nothing mentioned in this 
statute about allowing a school district to proceed immediately 
against a parent who is aware but unresponsive to a child’s 
failure to attend school and/or to attend school in a timely 
fashion that would render ineffective a separate provision that 
allows a gradual approach to be taken with a parent who is 
unaware of a student’s absence. 
 
Code § 22.1-279.3 governs the role a parent plays in 
improving her child’s behavior and attendance and what happens 
when a parent is derelict in her responsibility to perform that 
role.  The primary focus of this section is on a parent’s 
failure to attend a meeting to discuss a student’s conduct 
and/or absences or to accompany the student to such a meeting.  
It also imposes a lesser penalty ($500) than Code § 22.1-254.  
Again, this is very different from the parent who is causing 
her child to be tardy in violation of Code § 22.1-254. 
 
The majority hypothesizes that interpreting Code § 22.1-
254 to mean more than mere enrollment would allow a parent to 
be prosecuted for de minimis absence or tardiness, but this 
 
 
19 
contention is speculative.  While this hypothesis is possible, 
the absence of any reported cases of this occurring would tend 
to indicate it is unlikely.  Although Code § 22.1-268 compels 
Commonwealth's Attorneys to prosecute all cases arising under 
this article, Code § 22.1-269 bestows upon the board of 
education in each jurisdiction the power and duty to “see that 
the provisions of this article are properly enforced throughout 
the Commonwealth.”  The school board is required to create, 
publish, and enforce “standards of student conduct and 
attendance and enforcement procedures designed to provide that 
public education be conducted in an atmosphere free of 
disruption.”  Code § 22.1-253.13:7(C)(3).  To this end and 
pursuant to Code § 22.1-254, the board of education and each 
school district employs a system whereby it identifies excused 
and unexcused absences.  The Loudoun County School Board 
Policies and Regulations state that the principal shall excuse 
any absences or tardiness for personal illness, death in the 
family, medical or dental appointments, and court appearances.  
The principal may excuse absences or tardiness for “illness in 
the immediate family that requires the student to be absent,” 
“emergencies that require the student to be absent,” or “trips 
 
 
20 
or activities that enhance or extend the student’s education, 
when approved by the [p]rincipal in advance.”1 
Loudoun County Public Schools, Policy and Regulations, Chapter 
8, § 8-17, available at 
http://www.lcps.org/cms/lib4/VA01000195/Centricity/Domain/9/Cha
pter 8/8-17.pdf (last visited October 9, 2014).  Pragmatically, 
only the unexcused absences would ever come to the attention of 
the Commonwealth's Attorney.2 
                     
 
1 Although the regulations for Loudoun County are not a 
part of the record, "[w]henever in any criminal case it becomes 
necessary to ascertain what the law, statutory or otherwise, of 
this Commonwealth, . . . or of any political subdivision or 
agency of the same is, or was, at any time, the court shall 
take judicial notice thereof whether specially pleaded or not.”  
Code § 19.2-265.2(A); see also Va. R. Evid. 2:202.  Moreover, 
we have said that "courts may take judicial notice of generally 
known or easily ascertainable facts". Shackleford v. 
Commonwealth, 262 Va. 196, 211 (2001) (quoting Ryan v. 
Commonwealth, 219 Va. 439, 445, 247 S.E.2d 698, 703 (1978)). 
See also Flory v. Smith, 145 Va. 164, 168-70, 134 S.E. 360, 
362-63 (1926)(treating school board rule about absence from 
school grounds during the school day as regulation having the 
force of law). 
2 In fact, in Loudoun County, the School Board has stated 
that “[a]ll absences should be investigated by each teacher as 
far as possible.  A written excuse from parents must be 
required in case of absence.  Teachers will report through the 
principal to the Attendance Officer problem cases involving 
conduct and attendance.  In many cases, a short talk with 
parents will secure better attendance or correct habits of 
tardiness.”  Loudoun County Public Schools, Policy and 
Regulations, Chapter 8, § 8-17 Reg, available at 
http://www.lcps.org/cms/lib4/VA01000195/Centricity/Domain/9/Cha
pter 8/8-17_reg.pdf (last visited October 9, 2014).  The Board 
has established that “[a]ll absences not excused by the 
[p]rincipal or caused by a student's suspension from school are 
classified as unexcused absences, which shall result in 
 
 
 
21 
 
Indeed, here, Lori Melcher, the attendance officer, 
testified that she recorded all of the times that Blake’s 
children were tardy.  The children were late for valid reasons, 
such as a doctor’s appointment, on days when their father was 
responsible for bringing them to school.  The unexcused late 
arrivals, for reasons such as spilled soup or misplaced keys, 
occurred on days when Blake was responsible for bringing the 
children to school.  While an overzealous prosecutor could 
theoretically prosecute a parent for a child being tardy 
without an excuse on only one occasion, by only a few minutes, 
[t]he [prosecutor] is the representative 
not of an ordinary party to a controversy, 
but of a sovereignty whose obligation to 
govern impartially is as compelling as its 
obligation to govern at all; and whose 
interest, therefore, in a criminal 
prosecution is not that it shall win a 
case, but that justice shall be done.  As 
such, he is in a peculiar and very definite 
sense the servant of the law, the twofold 
aim of which is that guilt shall not escape 
or innocence suffer.  He may prosecute with 
earnestness and vigor -- indeed, he should 
do so.  But, while he may strike hard 
blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul 
ones.  It is as much his duty to refrain 
from improper methods calculated to produce 
a wrongful conviction as it is to use every 
legitimate means to bring about a just one. 
                                                                 
appropriate disciplinary measures.”  Loudoun County Public 
Schools, Policy and Regulations, Chapter 8, § 8-17, available 
at 
http://www.lcps.org/cms/lib4/VA01000195/Centricity/Domain/9/Cha
pter 8/8-17.pdf (last visited October 9, 2014). 
 
 
 
22 
 
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).  Thus, the 
responsibility of the school board to ensure that the article 
is properly enforced together with a prosecutor’s duty to 
ensure that justice is done provide safeguards for responsible 
parents. 
 
Moreover, I believe that reading Code § 22.1-254 to refer 
merely to enrollment and not to encompass truancy or tardiness 
results in a “curious, narrow, or strained construction” of the 
statute.  Lucas v. Woody, 287 Va. 354, 365, 756 S.E.2d 447, 452 
(2014).  Under the majority’s definition of “send,” there are 
no repercussions under the Code for a parent who brings her 
child to school twenty minutes prior to dismissal every day.  
That is clearly a “curious, narrow, [and] strained 
construction” and could result in a greater harm than the 
hypothetical posed by the majority.  While it is true “that if 
the language admits of two reasonable but contradictory 
constructions, that resulting favorably to the accused should 
be applied,” it is also axiomatic that “if that favorable 
result be attained only by an interpretation so narrow as to be 
unreasonable, it must be rejected.”  Wesley v. Commonwealth, 
190 Va. 268, 276, 56 S.E.2d 362, 365 (1949).  Because I believe 
that interpreting Code § 22.1-254 to not apply to tardiness 
 
 
23 
would clearly lead to an unreasonable result, I would reject 
such an interpretation. 
 
Having determined that Code § 22.1-254 allows a parent to 
be prosecuted when her child is tardy for unexcused reasons, I 
must next address Blake’s assertion that the Court of Appeals 
erred in holding that “[b]ecause appellant was convicted and 
sentenced pursuant to Class 3 misdemeanors, the Commonwealth 
was not required to prove that she knowingly and willfully 
violated the compulsory attendance law, nor was the 
Commonwealth required to prove notice.” Blake v. Commonwealth, 
Record No. 1751-12-4, 2013 Va. App. LEXIS 339, at *19 (Nov. 19, 
2013). 
 
Any person violating the provisions of 
either § 22.1-254, except for clause (ii) 
of subsection A, §§ 22.1-255, 22.1-258, 
22.1-267, or the parental responsibility 
provisions relating to compulsory school 
attendance included in § 22.1-279.3, shall 
be guilty of a Class 3 misdemeanor.  Upon a 
finding that a person knowingly and 
willfully violated any provision of § 22.1-
254, except for clause (ii) of subsection 
A, or any provision of §§ 22.1-255, 22.1-
258, or § 22.1-267 and that such person has 
been convicted previously of a violation of 
any provision of § 22.1-254, except for 
clause (ii) of subsection A, or any 
provision of §§ 22.1-255, 22.1-258 or § 
22.1-267, such person shall be guilty of a 
Class 2 misdemeanor. 
 
Code § 22.1-263.  Thus, under the Code, a conviction for a 
Class 2 misdemeanor requires proof of both a prior violation 
 
 
24 
and a knowing and willful violation.  Id.  A Class 3 
misdemeanor conviction requires only a violation of Code 
§ 22.1-254. 
 
Here, Blake’s arrest warrants were modified from Class 1 
to Class 2 misdemeanors in general district court, charging 
knowing and willful violations of Code §§ 22.1-254 and -263.  
In circuit court, Blake was arraigned for a Class 3 
misdemeanor, which does not require proof of a knowing and 
willful violation of Code § 22.1-254, however when arraigning 
Blake, the court stated, 
[t]he charge[] in each case then is while 
being a parent of a child being between the 
ages of 5 and 18, to wit KFB, to wit KAB, 
and to wit KEB, did fail to send such child 
to school during the period of each year 
the public schools are in session and for 
the same number of days and hours per day 
at the public schools, the failure being 
knowing and willful. 
 
Therefore, while under Code § 22.1-263 a Class 3 misdemeanor 
need not be knowing and willful, the Commonwealth alleged that 
the violation was knowing and willful, and Blake was so 
arraigned. 
It is true that a variance between the 
allegations of an indictment and proof of 
the crime may be “fatal”, Etheridge v. 
Commonwealth, 210 Va. 328, 171 S.E.2d 190 
(1969), and “[t]he offense as charged must 
be proved.”  Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 141 
Va. 541, 560, 127 S.E. 368, 374 (1925).  A 
variance is fatal, however, only when the 
proof is different from and irrelevant to 
 
 
25 
the crime defined in the indictment and is, 
therefore, insufficient to prove the 
commission of the crime charged. 
 
Hawks v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 244, 247, 321 S.E.2d 650, 651-52 
(1984).  Because the Commonwealth alleged a knowing and willful 
violation, even though they were seeking a Class 3 misdemeanor 
conviction, the Commonwealth raised its own burden of proof.  
“It is elementary that what need not be proved need not be 
alleged, but sometimes, as in the instant case, the pleader 
goes beyond what is necessary and alleges something that it was 
not necessary to allege and the result is that he must prove 
what he has alleged unless the unnecessary allegation can be 
rejected as surplusage.”  Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 
541, 555, 127 S.E. 368, 373 (1925).  “If the unnecessary word 
or words inserted in the [charge] describe, limit or qualify 
the words which it was necessary to insert therein, then they 
are descriptive of the offense charged in the indictment and 
cannot be rejected as surplusage. The offense as charged must 
be proved.”  Id. at 560, 127 S.E. at 374.  Based on the manner 
in which the Commonwealth charged this case, it assumed the 
burden of proving a knowing and willful violation.3  Thus, the 
                     
 
3 Cf. Myers v. Commonwealth, 148 Va. 725, 729, 138 S.E. 
483, 484 (1927); Morris v. Commonwealth, 145 Va. 880, 881-82, 
134 S.E. 567, 568 (1926)(where the defendant was charged with a 
misdemeanor, inclusion of the word “feloniously” either was 
 
 
 
26 
Court of Appeals erred in holding that Blake was attempting to 
approbate and reprobate.  However, the Court of Appeals’ error 
on this point was harmless in light of the record. 
 
“We have said that non-constitutional error may be 
harmless ‘[i]f other evidence of guilt is so overwhelming and 
the error [is] insignificant[] by comparison, supporting a 
conclusion that the error did not have a substantial effect on 
the verdict.’”  Turner v. Commonwealth, 284 Va. 198, 209, 726 
S.E.2d 325, 331 (2012)(quoting Angel v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 
248, 268, 704 S.E.2d 386, 398 (2011)).  Here, the evidence was 
fully sufficient to support a finding that the violation was 
knowing and willful.  School officials met with Blake in 
December 2011 to inform her of the compulsory attendance law.  
Despite this knowledge, Blake’s children were inexcusably late 
on all five of the six Thursdays in December and January that 
school was in session.  Thus, the evidence was sufficient to 
prove a knowing and willful violation of Code § 22.1-254.  For 
this reason, the Court of Appeals’ approbate and reprobate 
analysis is harmless error. 
 
Finally, Blake argues that “[t]he Court of Appeals erred 
by holding that the issues of notice and constitutionality of 
                                                                 
harmless surplusage or would be treated as charging only the 
scienter required for the lesser grade of offense). 
 
 
 
27 
Code § 22.1-254 were not included in the Assignments of Error.”  
In her petition to the Court of Appeals, Blake assigned the 
following error:  “The trial court erred in ruling that 
Virginia Code 22.1-254 prohibits a parent from occasionally 
allowing his/her child to be tardy to school where the child is 
otherwise validly enrolled and regularly attending.”  She 
subsequently filed a motion to amend seeking to change the 
wording to “[t]he trial court erred in interpreting what it 
means to send a child to school pursuant to Code § 22.1-254 and 
ruling that such interpretation was not unconstitutionally 
vague.”  The Court of Appeals denied her motion.  The Court 
then ruled that her constitutional argument was waived because 
she had not properly assigned error to it. 
 
Contrary to Blake’s argument, her assignment of error 
filed in the Court of Appeals did not encompass a 
constitutional argument under Findlay v. Commonwealth, 287 Va. 
111, 752 S.E.2d 868 (2014).  In Findlay, this Court held that 
Findlay’s assignment of error goes beyond 
the bare-bones allegations prohibited by 
Rule 5A:12(c)(1)(ii). Findlay does not 
merely allege that his convictions are 
contrary to the law.  Likewise, he does not 
state generally that the evidence is 
insufficient.  Rather, Findlay points to a 
specific preliminary ruling of the trial 
court — the trial court’s denial of his 
motion to suppress — that he believes to be 
in error.  Such specificity adequately puts 
the court and opposing counsel on notice as 
to “what points [appellant]’s counsel 
 
 
28 
intends to ask a reversal of the judgment 
or decree” and prevents them from having to 
“hunt through the record for every 
conceivable error which the court below may 
have committed.” 
 
Id. at 116, 752 S.E.2d at 871 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of 
Richmond v. William R. Trigg Co., 106 Va. 327, 341, 56 S.E. 
158, 163 (1907).  Blake made a very general challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence and never mentioned the 
constitutionality of the statute in her assignments of error.  
Although she filed a motion to amend her assignments of error 
to insert a specific reference to the constitutionality of the 
statute, the Court of Appeals denied that motion and she did 
not assign error to that ruling on the present appeal.  
Therefore, Blake has waived her challenges based on inadequacy 
of notice and the asserted unconstitutionality of the statute 
on vagueness grounds. 
 
Thus, for the above-stated reasons, I would affirm Blake’s 
convictions.