Title: Clay v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 002112
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: June 8, 2001

PRESENT: Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, and 
Kinser, JJ., and Stephenson, S.J. 
 
ROBERT LEWIS CLAY 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 002112 
SENIOR JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR. 
 
 
 
June 8, 2001 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In this appeal, we determine whether the trial court 
committed reversible error in (1) allowing certain evidence 
under the state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule and (2) 
excluding certain testimony of a deputy sheriff. 
I 
 
Robert Lewis Clay was indicted in the Circuit Court of 
Halifax County for the first-degree murder of his wife, Joy 
Clay, in violation of Code § 18.2-32, and for using a firearm in 
the commission of murder, in violation of Code § 18.2-53.1.  A 
jury found Clay guilty of second-degree murder and fixed his 
punishment at 40 years' imprisonment.  The jury also found Clay 
guilty of the firearm offense and fixed his punishment at 
imprisonment for three years, as prescribed by Code § 18.2-53.1.  
Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Clay 
in accordance with the jury's verdict. 
 
Clay appealed, and a panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed 
the convictions.  Clay v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 650, 519 
S.E.2d 393 (1999).  Thereafter, the Court of Appeals granted 
Clay a rehearing en banc, and the full Court also affirmed 
Clay's convictions.  Clay v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 96, 531 
S.E.2d 623 (2000).  We awarded Clay this appeal. 
II 
 
On the morning of August 25, 1996, Clay went to the Halifax 
County Sheriff's Office and asked to speak with Deputy Sheriff 
Ernest Powell.  Clay was visibly "shook up" and "upset."  Powell 
asked Clay what was wrong, and Clay requested to speak with 
Powell in private.  Clay then told Powell that he had shot his 
wife. 
 
Clay also told Powell that he did not know whether his wife 
was still alive or whether his house was locked.  Clay gave 
Powell the key to his house, and Powell directed the dispatcher 
to call the rescue squad.  When members of the rescue squad 
arrived at Clay's home, they found Joy Clay's dead body on the 
den floor.  Two telephone receivers in the house, one in the 
kitchen and one in the den, were off the hook. 
 
An autopsy revealed that Joy Clay had sustained two shotgun 
wounds to her body.  One wound was to her head and chest; the 
other was to her left arm and side.  According to the medical 
examiner, both wounds were lethal, and the victim died in 
minutes from the loss of blood. 
 
A Remington 12-gauge, number four buckshot shell and a 
Winchester 12-gauge, ought buckshot shell were found in the den.  
 
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Buckshot recovered from the victim's body was consistent with 
pellets that would have come from these shells.  The police 
seized a Model 58 Remington Sportsman 12-gauge shotgun from a 
gun cabinet in the house. 
 
A firearms expert testified that he test-fired the seized 
shotgun four times, and the weapon did not malfunction.  He 
stated that three and three-quarters pounds of pressure was 
required to pull the trigger and fire the weapon.  The expert 
also explained that the trigger had to be pulled and released in 
order for a second shell to enter the chamber and before the 
weapon could be fired a second time.  A single pull of the 
trigger, therefore, would not cause the weapon to fire twice. 
 
In July 1996, the month before Joy Clay's death, Thelma 
Burns, while talking on the telephone with Joy, overheard Clay 
call his wife a bitch and say to her, "I'm tired of you, I'm 
going to kill you."  Burns' son, Carlos Ragland, heard the same 
statement by Clay as he was listening on another telephone in 
his mother's house.  Three days before Joy's death, while Burns 
and Joy were having another telephone conversation, Burns heard 
Clay say, referring to a job Joy had secured as a school bus 
driver, "[Y]ou might have got that school bus, but you won't 
drive that school bus." 
 
Clay's son, Robert Lewis Clay, Jr., testified that his 
father was an avid hunter and had taught him to practice firearm 
 
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safety.  The son never had seen his father load or unload a gun 
in the house, and Clay had advised his son to keep a firearm's 
safety engaged until the gun was ready to be fired. 
 
Clay testified that, prior to the shooting, he discovered 
that $5,000 in cash was missing from his gun cabinet.  He went 
into the den where his wife was seated on a sofa and confronted 
her about the missing money.  Clay's wife first denied any 
knowledge of the money, but she later admitted taking the money 
and refused to return it.  Clay stated that he "just got all 
upset" and retrieved a gun from the gun cabinet.  He did not 
look to see if the gun was loaded, and he did not load it.  Clay 
told his wife that he "needed the money," and he thought she 
would tell him where the money was upon seeing the gun.  Clay 
claimed that, "when [he] raised the gun up[,] it just went off."  
He said the gun had discharged twice, but he did not recall 
having pulled the trigger. 
III 
 
At trial, Burns and Ragland were allowed to testify, over 
Clay's objection, that, in the months prior to Joy's death, she 
had told them that she planned to move because she was afraid of 
what Clay might do to her.  Clay contended then, as he does on 
appeal, that the testimony was inadmissible hearsay.  The Court 
of Appeals ruled that the testimony was admissible under the 
state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule, reasoning that 
 
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Joy's state of mind was relevant and material to show Clay's 
motive and intent in order to counter his assertion that the 
killing was accidental.  Clay, 33 Va. App. at 107, 531 S.E.2d at 
628. 
 
Clay was charged with first-degree murder.  Therefore, the 
Commonwealth had the burden of proving that he killed his wife 
and that the killing was willful, deliberate, and premeditated.  
See Stokes v. Warden, 226 Va. 111, 117, 306 S.E.2d 882, 885 
(1983). 
 
Generally, statements made by a crime victim that show the 
victim's state of mind are admissible as an exception to the 
hearsay rule, provided the statements are relevant and probative 
of some material issue in the case.  Karnes v. Commonwealth, 125 
Va. 758, 764-65, 99 S.E. 562, 564-65 (1919); see Compton v. 
Commonwealth, 219 Va. 716, 729, 250 S.E.2d 749, 757 (1979).  
Evidence is relevant if it tends to prove or disprove, or is 
pertinent to, matters in issue.  Boggs v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 
478, 486, 100 S.E.2d 766, 772 (1957). 
 
While it is difficult to reconcile the conflicting cases as 
to when a victim's statements are relevant, much must be left to 
the trial court's discretion.  Karnes, 125 Va. at 764, 99 S.E. 
at 564.  There seems to be substantial agreement, however, that 
a victim's statements regarding fear of the accused are 
admissible to rebut claims by the defense of self-defense, 
 
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suicide, or accidental death.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Brown, 490 F.2d 758, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1973); John W. Strong, 2 
McCormick on Evidence § 276 (5th ed. 1999). 
 
When Joy's state of mind regarding her fear of Clay is 
viewed in the light of the other facts and circumstances of the 
case, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion 
in admitting evidence of her statement.  Clay placed his intent 
at issue, claiming Joy's death was accidental.  Thus, Joy's 
expressed fear of Clay, coupled with his threats to kill her, 
was relevant and probative of a material issue in the case; 
i.e., whether the killing was willful and deliberate. 
IV 
 
Next, we consider whether the trial court erred in 
excluding certain testimony of Deputy Sheriff David Martin.  
Clay proffered Martin's testimony by calling him to the stand 
and interrogating him in the absence of the jury.  The proposed 
testimony can be summarized as follows: 
His name is David Martin.  He was instructed to obtain 
a full statement from Mr. Clay if he was willing to 
give one.  He indicated he would give one.  He was 
read his standard Miranda rights.  The statement is 
approximately four pages long in Martin's handwriting. 
About thirty minutes later, Martin returned and asked 
Clay some more questions. During the thirty minute 
interim, Clay was in the presence of Martin, except 
maybe for a second or two.  Clay's demeanor throughout 
the entire process was somber and quiet.  Those two 
words best described Clay to Martin.  Clay was 
cooperative. 
 
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Deputy Sheriff Ernest Powell previously had testified that 
Clay came to the sheriff's office, appearing "shook up" and 
"upset," and told Powell that he had shot his wife.  Clay gave 
his house key to Powell so law enforcement officers and members 
of the rescue squad could enter the house. 
 
Clay later testified on his own behalf.  Clay testified 
that he had told Martin that he did not know the gun was loaded 
and that he felt terrible about what had happened. 
 
The Court of Appeals concluded that Martin's testimony 
"would have been corroborative of Clay's testimony but 
cumulative of Powell's testimony."  Clay, 33 Va. App. at 109, 
531 S.E.2d at 629.∗  The Court held, therefore, that the trial 
court erred in excluding Martin as a witness because Clay "was 
entitled to call witnesses in his defense, and Martin's 
testimony, subject to appropriate objections by the 
[Commonwealth], was admissible."  Id. at 110, 531 S.E.2d at 630.  
We will assume, without deciding, that the exclusion of Martin's 
testimony was erroneous because we agree with the Court of 
Appeals' finding that any error was harmless. 
 
                     
 
∗ At the time Martin's testimony was offered, Clay had not 
testified, and, therefore, the trial court could not have known 
whether Martin's testimony would be corroborative of Clay's 
testimony.  After Clay's testimony, Clay did not recall Martin 
to testify. 
 
 
7
 
When a federal constitutional error is involved, a 
reviewing court must reverse the judgment unless it determines 
that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Chapman 
v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); Pitt v. Commonwealth, 260 
Va. 692, 695, 539 S.E.2d 77, 78 (2000), cert. denied, ___ U.S. 
___, 121 S.Ct. 1616 (2001).  We have not decided, however, what 
standard applies where, as here, a federal constitutional error 
is not involved. 
 
In determining that standard, which is a matter of state 
law, we are guided by Virginia's harmless-error statute, Code 
§ 8.01-678.  That statute provides, in pertinent part, as 
follows: 
 
When it plainly appears from the record and the 
evidence given at the trial that the parties have had 
a fair trial on the merits and substantial justice has 
been reached, no judgment shall be arrested or 
reversed . . . [f]or any . . . defect, imperfection, 
or omission in the record, or for any other error 
committed on the trial. 
 
We have applied Code § 8.01-678 in criminal as well as 
civil cases.  See, e.g., Greenway v. Commonwealth, 254 Va. 147, 
154, 487 S.E.2d 224, 228 (1997).  In a criminal case, it is 
implicit that, in order to determine whether there has been "a 
fair trial on the merits" and whether "substantial justice has 
been reached," a reviewing court must decide whether the alleged 
error substantially influenced the jury.  If it did not, the 
error is harmless. 
 
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In Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946), the 
Supreme Court adopted the standard to be applied in determining 
whether nonconstitutional error is harmless under the federal 
"harmless error statute," 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1994) (formerly 28 
U.S.C. § 391).  Id. at 757-58.  That statute, which is similar 
in substance to Code § 8.01-678, provides that a reviewing court 
"shall give judgment after an examination of the entire record 
before the court, without regard to technical errors, defects, 
or exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of the 
parties." 
 
The test for nonconstitutional harmless error adopted in 
Kotteakos is as follows: 
If, when all is said and done, the conviction is 
sure that the error did not influence the jury, or had 
but slight effect, the verdict and the judgment should 
stand . . . .  But if one cannot say, with fair 
assurance, after pondering all that happened without 
stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that 
the judgment was not substantially swayed by the 
error, it is impossible to conclude that substantial 
rights were not affected. . . .  If so, or if one is 
left in grave doubt, the conviction cannot stand. 
Id. at 764-65 (citation omitted). 
 
We adopt the Kotteakos harmless-error test and will apply 
the test in the present case in the light of Code § 8.01-678.  
The evidence showed that Clay discovered that $5,000 was missing 
from his gun cabinet and confronted his wife about the money. 
When Clay's wife admitted taking but refused to return the 
 
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money, Clay became upset.  Clay went to his gun cabinet, 
obtained a 12-gauge shotgun, returned to the den, and told his 
wife that he "needed the money."  Clay then raised the gun 
without determining whether it was loaded.  The gun fired twice. 
 
In the month before the shooting, Burns and Ragland heard 
Clay threaten to kill his wife.  Clay's wife had also expressed 
to Burns and Ragland that she feared her husband. 
 
The firearms expert testified that a person intending to 
fire the gun, had it been loaded, would have had to disengage 
the safety and pull the trigger.  This would have caused the 
shell in the chamber to fire, the empty shell to eject from the 
gun, and the next shell to load into the chamber from the 
magazine.  The gun then could be fired again, but the trigger 
would have to be pulled for the gun to fire a second time.  The 
expert further testified that the gun could not be fired easily; 
indeed, it would take three and three-quarters pounds of 
pressure to pull the trigger.  Finally, the expert testified 
that he had test-fired the weapon four times and that it did not 
malfunction. 
Applying the Kotteakos harmless-error test in the light of 
Code § 8.01-678, we can say, "with fair assurance, after 
pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous 
action from the whole," that it plainly appears that Clay has 
had a fair trial and the verdict and the judgment were not 
 
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substantially affected by the exclusion of Martin's testimony.  
We conclude that the evidence, especially that of the firearms 
expert, overwhelmingly proved that the gun was not fired 
accidentally.  Therefore, we hold that any error in this case is 
harmless. 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals. 
Affirmed. 
 
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