Title: STATE v RADI
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 12893
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: November 25, 1975

No. 12893 I N THE SUPRENE C O U R T O F T H E STATE OF M O N T A N A STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, GARY EUGENE RADL , Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Thirteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable C. B. Sande, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record : For Appellant : Robert L. Stephens, Jr. argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana For Respondent : Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Thomas A. Budewitz, Assistant Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana Arthur Ayers, County Attorney, argued, Red Lodge, Montana .. Filed : 5 !pE Submitted: September 25, 1975 Decided : M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an appeal from the d i s t r i c t court, Carbon County. Gary Eugene Radi appeals from a June 25, 1974, jury verdict finding him g u i l t y of attempted burglary, pursuant t o sections 94-4-103 and 94-6-203, R.C.M. 1947. From appellant's point of view, the record presents t h i s f a c t u a l setting: In e a r l y March 1974, Radi and several others including John Miner, were i n attendance a t a l o c a l night spot i n Billings, Montana. Sometime during t h e course of t h e evening, they were introduced t o a man c a l l e d "Pat" who mentioned t h a t he was from Red Lodge and lived i n an apartment j u s t above a Safeway store. Radi purchased a round of drinks f o r those a t h i s t a b l e , and several witnesses t e s t i f i e d t h a t he paid f o r the drinks with a one hundred d o l l a r b i l l . The waitress took the b i l l and l a t e r returned with the change. She observed t h a t several of those present, including Radi, had l e f t the t a b l e t o dance. She placed both the drinks and the change on the table. Upon ~ a d i ' s r e t u r n he discovered t h a t h i s change and t h e man "Pat" had disappeared. Approximately ten days l a t e r , Radi invited John Miner and one Daniel Cinnamon t o accompany him t o Red Lodge i n an attempt t o I1 locate t h i s Pat" and recover the money. It is a t t h i s point t h a t appellant's s t o r y begins t o c o n f l i c t with the o f f i c i a l police version. Police suspicions were f i r s t aroused on t h a t evening, when they observed tracks i n t h e freshly f a l l e n snow, i n an a l l e y behind t h e B & P Hardware s t o r e i n Red Lodge. The tracks led t o the back door of the s t o r e , stopped, and continued up the a l l e y . The police followed the tracks t o the r e a r of a neighboring Safeway s t o r e , where they spotted Radi and Miner i n the general area of some abandoned apartments located above the store. The two men were ordered downstairs and asked t o stand against t h e building. Radi suddenly ran down the a l l e y , but was l a t e r apprehended several blocks away. During h i s run, an object f e l l from h i s person which l a t e r was i d e n t i f i e d a s a .22 c a l i b e r p i s t o l , A search of Miner resulted i n t h e recovery of a twelve-inch crowbar c a r r i e d up t h e sleeve of h i s coat. The t h i r d participant, Cinnamon, was apparently standing i n the f r o n t stairway t o the apartments and was l a t e r apprehended a t a nearby motel. The police established t h a t the crowbar found on Miner was very similar t o the one which had been used i n an attempt t o burgle the B & P Hardware store. A l l three were a r r e s t e d and charged with aggravated burglary. The charges against Pliner and Cinnamon were l a t e r dropped and t h e charge against Radi was reduced t o attempted burglary. A t t r i a l appellant attempted t o explain t h a t h i s presence i n the a l l e y on the evening of March 17, 1974, was only f o r the I t purpose of locating pat" i n the hope of recovering h i s money. The Carbon County jury refused t o accept t h i s s t o r y and i t s adverse verdict engendered t h i s multi-issue appeal. A t t r i a l appellant consistently denied any i n t e n t t o commit the offense. O n appeal he f i r s t contends t h a t the evidence was in- s u f f i c i e n t t o support h i s conviction and sustain a finding of criminal i n t e n t . In Montana, a person commits the offense of burglary i f he I I knowingly enters o r remains unlawfully i n an occupied s t r u c t u r e with t h e purpose t o commit an offense therein." Section 94-6-204, R.C.M. 1947. The charge of attempted burglary w i l l l i e where a person has done any - a c t toward the commission of t h e burglary i f the r e q u i s i t e specific purpose can a l s o be established. Section 94-4-103(1), R.C.M. 1947. The Montana "attempt" s t a t u t e i s somewhat unique i n t h a t it expressly provides f o r a complete defense under circumstances where an abandonment of criminal purpose can be estab- lished. Section 94-4-103(4), R.C.M. 1947, provides: "A person s h a l l not be l i a b l e under t h i s section, i f under circumstances manifesting a voluntary and complete renunciation of h i s criminal purpose, he avoided the commission of the offense attempted by abandoning h i s criminal e f f o r t . " Appellant suggests t h a t only two possible inferences could be drawn from t h e record a s a matter of law: 1 ) That there was a complete renunciation and abandonment of the attempt t o commit any offense; and 2) t h a t i f g u i l t y a t a l l , appellant could have committed no crime more serious than a criminal trespass under section 94-6-203, R.C.M. 1947. I n support of h i s contention appellant emphasizes he was never seen attempting t o enter the s t o r e , t h a t i n f a c t the s t o r e was never entered and t h a t he was apprehended two buildings away. Appellant r e f e r s us t o the uncon- troverted f a c t t h e tracks followed by the police could only have been made a t a walking pace and h i s "activity" a t the hardware s t o r e was not interrupted by the police, but abandoned voluntarily. W e agree the aforementioned f a c t o r s give r i s e t o t h e possible inference of a voluntary abandonment. But, we do not find t h a t they c o n s t i t u t e conclusive evidence of abandonment a s a matter of law. The record i s s u f f i c i e n t t o demonstrate an entry i n t o t h e B Q P Hardware s t o r e had been attempted through the use of a crowbar on the back door. Footprints i n the snow demonstrated t h a t several individuals had entered t h e a l l e y and approached the door. The a r r e s t i n g o f f i c e r s followed these footprints i n the a l l e y t o the place where appellant and h i s associate were apprehended. Finally we consider t h e crowbar which was seized from John Miner. It can hardly be s a i d t h a t under these c i r c m s t a n c e s a conclusion of voluntary abandonment i s mandated a s a matter of law. Section 94-4-103 (2), R.C.M. 1947, s t a t e s : "It s h a l l not be a defense t o a charge of attempt t h a t because of a misapprehension of the circumstances it would have been impossible f o r t h e accused t o commit t h e offense attempted. I I In the i n s t a n t case the jury might have reasonably concluded the burglary was terminated because the participants found t h e i r e f f o r t s t o be f u t i l e or f o r any number of reasons other than voluntary abandonment. This Court has often s t a t e d the jury i s the s o l e judge of the weight t o be accorded the testimony and that where substan- t i a l evidence e x i s t s t o support its determination, it w i l l stand. S t a t e v. Merseal, M o n t . , 538 P.2d 1366, 32 St.Rep. 823; S t a t e v. G l e i m , 17 Mont. 17, 29, 41 P. 998; State v. White, 146 Mont. 226, 405 P.2d 761; State v. Stoddard, 147 Mont. 402,408, 412 P.2d 827. The record before us substantially supports t h a t which t h e jury chose t o believe, and we decline t o d i s t u r b its findings on appeal. Appellant next contends the d i s t r i c t court erred by f a i l i n g t o i n s t r u c t the jury on the offense of criminal trespass, which he terms a l e s s e r included offense, A t the outset, we note the probable issue of whether the offense of criminal trespass may i n f a c t be considered a l e s s e r included offense of burglary. But we need not reach t h a t issue. It i s argued appellant never offered t h i s instruction a t the t r i a l level and therefore t h i s i s s u e i s raised f o r the f i r s t time on appeal. Generally, t h i s Court w i l l refuse t o r u l e on issues which were not presented t o the d i s t r i c t court and t h i s r u l e i s especially applicable t o the i n s t a n t case. The Montana Code of Criminal Procedure, section 95-1910 (d) , R.C.M. 1947, provides i n pertinent part : "When the evidence i s concluded, i f e i t h e r party desires special instructions t o be given t o the jury, such instructions s h a l l be reduced t o writing, numbered, and signed by t h e party, o r h i s attorney, and delivered t o the court. 11 The s t a t u t e i s written i n mandatory language and therefore should be construed a s such. S t a t e v. Cook, 42 Mont. 329, 112 P. 537; State v. Dougherty, 71 Mont. 265, 229 P. 735; State v. Sawyer, 71 Mont. 269, 229 P. 734; State v. Donges, 126 Mont. 341, 251 P.2d 254; State v, Maciel, 130 Mont. 569, 305 P.2d 335. The next issue raised by appellant concerns a request t o exclude prospective witnesses from the courtroom. The court granted t h i s motion, but exempted, sua sponte, the o f f i c e r s from the Red Lodge police department. The n e t e f f e c t of t h i s action was t o exclude a l l the defense witnesses and none of the prosecution witnesses. Appellant now contends the d i s t r i c t court committed prejudicial error i n exempting the prosecution witnesses. Section 93-1901-2, R.C.M. 1947, s t a t e s : 11 Witnesses not under examination may be excluded. If e i t h e r party requires it, the judge may exclude from the courtroom any witness of the adverse party, not a t t h a t time under examination, so that he may not hear the testimony of other witnesses, 11 Although section 93-1901-2 was enacted under ~ o n t a n a ' s c i v i l code, it has long been held t o apply t o criminal t r i a l s also. State v. McDonald, 51 Mont. 1, 149 P. 279. The motion t o sequester o r exclude witnesses not currently under examination from the courtroom i s not granted a s a matter of r i g h t , but i s addressed t o the sound discretion of the t r i a l court. The motion may be granted when such action is necessary t o insure the spontaneity and r e l i a b i l i t y of the witnesses by limiting t h e i r opportunity t o be i n f l u e n d by each other's testimony. See Anno. 32 ALR2d 358-361; 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law, 5 1010, pp. 1072,1073. W e c i t e with approval the language i n State v. McLeod, 131 Mont. 478, 492, 311 P.2d 400, t o the e f f e c t section 93-1901-2 1 1 is a salutary provision, especially i n felony cases i n the a i d of a f a i r t r i a l t o which every defendant i s entitled." McLeod a l s o c l e a r l y s t a t e s t h a t the action of the t r i a l judge cannot be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of manifest abuse of discretion and pre- judice. In Montana, certain types of witnesses have traditionally been exempted from the operation of the witness exclusionary rule, including attorneys of the court, court officers who happen t o be witnesses and whose attendance i n the courtroom is necessary, and police officers assisting i n preparation of the prosecution's case, State v. Walsh, 72 Mont. 110, 232 P. 194; State v, Fitz- patrick, 149 Mont. 400, 427 P.2d 300. The t r i a l court, by incor- porating one of these exceptions into its ruling, was correctly following the law of t h i s s t a t e and therefore did not e r r . State v. Meidinger, 160 Mont. 310, 320, 502 P.2d 58; State v. Love, 151 Mont. 190, 440 P.2d 275. While the record here evidences no prejudicial harm, we direct in the f u t ~ r e where the t r i a l judge grants a motion t o sequester, that i n the s p i r i t of fairness, a l l witnesses who are t o t e s t i f y be excluded from the courtroom. Appellant's fourth specification of error refers t h i s Court t o the denial by the t r i a l court of his motion f o r mistrial, a motion precipitated by a rather unusual chain of events. Appellant alleges that the defense witness Daniel Cinnamon was arrested a t or just outside the courtroom door, t o appellant's prejudice. The evidence a s t o the exact place of a r r e s t is i n conflict, a s i s whether any of the jurors knew what went on. The t r i a l judge did not observe what took place, and when appellant's counsel made an issue of what happened, he allowed argument and I I then ruled there was no prejudice", W e find no error. In State v. Bentley, 155 Mont. 383, 405,406, 472 P.2d 864, t h i s Court stated: "This Court w i l l not reverse a decision of the t r i a l court unless prejudice i s shown, and such prejudice w i l l not be presumed but must be affirmatively shown. State v. Love, 151 Mont. 190, 440 P.2d 275; State v. Walker, 148 Mont. 216, 419 P.2d 300; State v. Heiser, 146 Mont. 413, 407 P.2d 370." Next appellant takes issue with what he characterizes a s 1' certain opinion evidence1' given by the police officers a s t o the crowbar and the marks found i n the door of the hardware s t o r e . W e find no error. State v. Collins, 88 Mont. 514, 294 P. 957. Two evidentiary issues remain f o r consideration, Appel- l a n t a l l e g e s t h a t t h e admission of t h e weapon and ammunition c l i p , which f e l l t o the ground during h i s attempted escape from custody, was improper and prejudicial when offered f o r the purpose of allowing t h e jurors t o in&er criminal i n t e n t therefrom. Appellant's contehthnn cannot be sustained under t h e pertinent Montana case law, especially under t h e f a c t s presented by t h i s case. The judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t court i s affirmed. . - J u s t i c e W e concur: .................................... 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