Title: Harris v. McConnell
Citation: 194 Kan. 800, 401 P.2d 908
Docket Number: 44,080
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: May 15, 1965

194 Kan. 800 (1965)
401 P.2d 908
RUBY HARRIS, Appellant,
v.
HOWARD McCONNELL and McCONNELL LUMBER COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellees.
No. 44,080

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed May 15, 1965.
Eugene C. Riling, of Lawrence, argued the cause, and John J. Riling, of Lawrence, was with him on the brief for the appellant.
Harold E. Doherty, of Topeka, argued the cause, and Ernest J. Rice and James E. Benfer, of Topeka, were with him on the brief for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PRICE, J.:
This is an action to recover for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff when she slipped and fell on an alleged dangerous and defective sidewalk in front of defendants' place of business in the city of Lawrence.
Plaintiff has appealed from an order sustaining defendants' motion for summary judgment.
Omitting formal parts and allegations as to plaintiffs injuries, the petition alleged that sometime prior to July 13, 1961, defendants constructed a concrete sidewalk in front of their place of business; that such sidewalk when constructed was dangerous, defective and unsafe for travel upon it in that the sidewalk had holes and depressions in it, the surface was uneven and that it was constructed on the wrong grade. That the sidewalk remained in the same condition up until and including July 13, 1961, on which date plaintiff entered defendants' place of business for the purpose of purchasing merchandise. *801 That after making her purchase she proceeded to use the sidewalk, and in doing so stepped into a hole and depression in it which caused her to fall, and as a result of which she sustained injuries. That at the time and place in question it was and had been raining and that the hole and depression in the sidewalk contained water and dirt. That the negligence of defendants in maintaining the sidewalk in such dangerous and defective condition was the direct and proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries.
The answer contained formal admissions and denials, alleged that it was not defendants' duty to construct, maintain or care for the sidewalk, but rather that it was the duty and obligation of the city of Lawrence, and further alleged that if plaintiff suffered injuries they were through no negligence of defendants and were caused solely by plaintiff's contributory negligence.
The reply denied material allegations of the answer and further denied that it was the duty and obligation of the city to maintain and keep in repair the sidewalk for the reason that G.S. 1949, 12-1808 imposes such duty upon abutting owners.
After issues were joined, plaintiff's deposition was taken. The following portion of it is included in the record:
"A. Not a hole.
"A. No, sir.
"A. Yes, sir."
Defendants then filed a motion for summary judgment "... for the reason that all of the files, pleadings, depositions and evidence gathered to date indicate that plaintiff does not have a cause of action against defendants."
The motion was sustained, and plaintiff has appealed.
The question of liability of an abutting owner for injuries sustained by a pedestrian because of defects in a sidewalk has been *802 before the court many times, and an extended discussion of the cases on the subject is unnecessary.
The general rule in this jurisdiction and elsewhere is that persons injured through defects in a sidewalk have no cause of action against the abutting owner merely by reason of his ownership. (Jansen v. City of Atchison, 16 Kan. 358; Dixon v. Railway Co., 104 Kan. 404, 406, 179 Pac. 548, reh. den., 104 Kan. 787, 180 Pac. 733; Spear v. City of Sterling, 126 Kan. 314, 267 Pac. 979; Pierce v. Jilka, 163 Kan. 232, 238, 181 P.2d 330; Clair v. City of Kansas City, 180 Kan. 409, 415, 304 P.2d 468. See also the Annotation "Liability of abutting owner or occupant for condition of sidewalk," 88 A.L.R.2d 331, § 2 [a], p. 337, and § 3, p. 340.)
The statute, G.S. 1949, 12-1808 (now K.S.A. 12-1808), pleaded and relied on by plaintiff, is of no help to her. The duty imposed by it is one flowing from the abutting owner to the city. In the Dixon case, above, where a city ordinance similar to the mentioned statute was considered, it was said:
To like effect, see the Pierce case, above, pp. 236, 237.
In its memorandum decision the trial court recognized the foregoing rules and authorities, and in sustaining the motion for summary judgment stated:
We adhere to the rule of the above authorities, and, although we concede the record presents a "close" question, we believe that a literal reading of plaintiff's allegations brings the matter within what appears to be a well recognized exception to the general rule relating to liability of an abutting owner.
The petition in this case alleges that it was defendants who constructed the concrete sidewalk in front of their place of business and that when so constructed it was dangerous, defective and unsafe *803 for travel in that it contained holes and depressions, and that the surface thereof was uneven, and that it was constructed on the wrong grade. In other words, the claim is not that the sidewalk became defective through use, age or other means  but rather is that defendants themselves constructed and maintained it in the defective manner alleged.
In the early Jansen case, above, the action was against the city and the abutting landowner, Otis. At page 385 of the opinion is found this comment:
In the Pierce case, above, it was said:
In the recent Clair case, above, it was held:
The exception to the rule of nonliability of an abutting owner also is discussed in § 8, page 361, of the Annotation in 88 A.L.R.2d, above mentioned.
Despite plaintiff's misplaced reliance on 12-1808, above mentioned, and despite defendants' reliance on the portion of plaintiff's deposition above quoted, we are of the opinion that under the provisions of K.S.A. 60-256 (c), it was error to sustain defendants' motion for summary judgment. What the evidence may establish upon trial of the case is another matter.
The judgment is therefore reversed.