Title: State v. Hendrick
Citation: 164 N.W.2d 57
Docket Number: 375
State: north-dakota
Issuer: north-dakota Supreme Court
Date: January 23, 1969

164 N.W.2d 57 (1969) STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Grant H. HENDRICK, Defendant and Appellant. Cr. No. 375. Supreme Court of North Dakota. January 23, 1969. *58 Wolf, Glaser &amp; Milhollan, Bismarck, for defendant and appellant. Helgi Johanneson, Atty. Gen., and Dale H. Jensen, State's Atty. for Burleigh County, Bismarck, for plaintiff and respondent. ERICKSTAD, Judge. On October 1, 1968, a Burleigh County jury found the defendant, Grant H. Hendrick, guilty of the crime of escape from imprisonment. Upon the return of that verdict the district court executed judgment sentencing Mr. Hendrick to imprisonment in the state penitentiary for a term of 2 years less 70 days, to commence at the termination of the sentence he had previously received upon conviction of the crime of robbery in the first degree, the latter term having been for not less than 5 years nor more than 15 years, commencing October 3, 1966. It is from the judgment entered upon the verdict of guilty of the crime of escape from imprisonment that Mr. Hendrick now appeals. He concedes that the evidence amply supports his conviction but asserts that the *59 judgment should be set aside because of errors of law committed by the trial court. For this reason he has not supplied this court with a transcript of any of the testimony given at the trial. He asserts that the court erred (1) in failing to grant his motion for mistrial and (2) in failing to grant his motion in arrest of judgment. We shall first consider specification of error No. 1. Apparently following the roll call of the entire jury panel but before the selection of the jury in this case a motion for mistrial was made out of the hearing of the prospective jurors on the ground that while they were seated in the courtroom Mr. Hendrick was brought into the courtroom, in full view of the prospective jurors, dressed in prison garb. The garb was described by his counsel as "being a white coverall, with some dirt on it, wrinkled to some extent, with apparently no undergarments underneath it." Mr. Hendrick was described as wearing tattered shoes with no socks. Instead of granting the motion for mistrial the court granted the State's motion for a recess so that Mr. Hendrick could obtain proper clothing and return to the courtroom properly dressed. When Mr. Hendrick, properly dressed, returned to the courtroom after recess, the roll of the entire jury panel was again called, and thereafter twelve prospective jurors were called. The record does not disclose what questions were asked the prospective jurors by Mr. Hendrick's counsel, but it does indicate that his counsel passed peremptory challenge, which means that he did not exercise all peremptory challenges permitted by statute. Mr. Hendrick does not base his claim for a mistrial on statutory law but instead bases his claim on encyclopedia law and on a 5th Circuit case asserted to support that law. We are referred to 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 239 (1965), which reads: § 239. Trial of defendant in prison garb. The 5th Circuit case relied upon by Mr. Hendrick is that of Brooks v. Texas. In it the court said: Brooks v. Texas, 381 F.2d 619, 624 (5th Cir. 1967). It should be noted that the foregoing statement was made without reference to any authority. In Brooks the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the judgment because the defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel. Brooks was dressed in his jail uniform throughout his trial without an objection being registered by his counsel, but more than that, his trial counsel failed to adequately prepare for his only possible defense, that of insanity. It was this latter failure on the part of counsel that the court stressed in reversing the judgment. In the instant case Mr. Hendrick was attired in his prison garb only briefly and only before the commencement of the selection of the jury. In Brooks at the very opening of the trial the prosecutrix identified *60 the defendant by pointing at him while he was in his white uniform, and the assistant district attorney noted for the record that the person in the white uniform was the defendant. The facts inBrooks are so different from the facts in this case that the rule in Brooks would not necessarily apply to require reversal in the instant case. One of the most recent decisions we have been able to find on this issue is that of People v. Shaw, 7 Mich.App. 187, 151 N.W.2d 381 (1967). In that case the Michigan court was urged, as we are urged, to adopt the rule of law stated in 21 Am.Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 239. The Michigan court in Shaw discussed the three cases cited in Am.Jur.2d in support of the rule, and distinguished each case from the facts in Shaw. In Shaw the jury observed the defendant twice in prison garb before objection was made. The court commented: It is easily deduced that defense counsel in making objection when he did, permitted the jury to observe defendant for a second time in jail garb. People v. Shaw, supra, 384. Accordingly, the court found that the objection to the right of defendant Shaw to appear in ordinary clothing was not timely made. Notwithstanding that feature in Shaw, the court concluded: People v. Shaw, supra, 385. That conclusion was based on decisions earlier cited and quoted as follows: It should be noted that we have a statute similar in meaning to the Michigan rule stated in Kasem: North Dakota Century Code. See: State v. Moe, 151 N.W.2d 310, 320 (N.D.1967). In State v. Hashimoto, 47 Hawaii 185, 389 P.2d 146 (1963), it was asserted by the defendants that the trial court erred in denying their motion for mistrial made immediately after the jury had been sworn, which motion was based on the contention that the defendants were prejudiced before the jury because the guards, in full uniform, brought the defendants into the courtroom handcuffed to each other in full view of the jury. As to whether the jurors had actually seen the defendants handcuffed together, the trial court was in doubt. The Hawaii Supreme Court commented that the jury was not polled in this regard. Concerning the voir dire examination it said: In the instant case the record does not disclose what questions were asked or what answers were given by the prospective jurors during the voir dire examination, but it does disclose that counsel for Mr. Hendrick did not exhaust his peremptory challenges, and no contention is made on this appeal that counsel for Mr. Hendrick attempted to determine during the voir dire examination whether the jurors had seen Mr. Hendrick in his prison garb, or, if they had seen him in his prison garb, what their attitude was in respect thereto. In closing their discussion of that aspect of the case in Hashimoto the Supreme Court said: State v. Hashimoto, supra, 152. The Kansas Supreme Court has held that the mere inadvertent bringing of a defendant into the courtroom in prison garb when no prejudice therefrom was shown did not justify the granting of a new trial: State v. Woods, 179 Kan. 601, 296 P.2d 1114, 1116 (1956). A case closely resembling the instant case is that of People v. Garcia, 124 Cal. App. 2d 822, 269 P.2d 673 (1954), cert. denied 348 U.S. 901, 99 L. Ed. 708, 75 S. Ct. 225, cert. denied 350 U.S. 1000, 100 L. Ed. 864, 76 S. Ct. 554. The California District Court of Appeal stated the facts to be as follows: People v. Garcia, supra, 674. In finding no prejudicial error in the trial court's denial of the motion to discharge the entire panel the court of appeal said: The situation in this case parallels the situation in Garcia, in that the jurors were examined after the denial of the motion for mistrial by counsel for Mr. Hendrick, and it does not appear which, if any, of the jurors noticed the presence of Mr. Hendrick in court in his prison garb, or that any juror was influenced or challenged by reason of that fact, or that Mr. Hendrick exhausted his peremptory challenges. Likewise, it does "not affirmatively appear in this case that Mr. Hendrick did not have a fair and impartial trial. For reasons similar to those stated in Garcia, we conclude that Mr. Hendrick was not prejudiced by his brief appearance in court in prison garb. For further encyclopedic and case law on this subject see 24A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1898 (1962) and pocket parts. We shall now consider specification of error No. 2, which is that the court erred in failing to grant the motion in arrest of judgment. The motion in arrest of judgment was made before sentencing but after the rendition of the jury's verdict, which found the defendant guilty of the offense as charged in the criminal information. The motion was made on the ground that the facts stated in the information did not constitute a public offense, in that it failed to assert that Mr. Hendrick escaped from prison "with intent to escape therefrom" as required by N.D.C.C. § 12-16-05. The pertinent part of that section reads: The information asserts that Mr. Hendrick "did commit the crime of escape from imprisonment committed in the manner following, to-wit: "That at the time and place the said defendant did then and there wilfully and unlawfully escape from imprisonment on July 31, 1968, after having been sentenced on October 3, 1966, to a term of five (5) to fifteen (15) years in the State Penitentiary, on the charge of robbery in the first degree." Mr. Hendrick cites in support of his contention that the information should have stated that he escaped with intent to escape and that such an omission was a jurisdictional defect the case of State v. Mutschler, 55 N.D. 120, 212 N.W. 832 (1927). In Mutschler the information charged that the defendant did "willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously set fire to and burn, in the nighttime, a certain dwelling house." Motion was made in arrest of judgment on the ground that the information did not state facts sufficient to constitute a public offense. In considering whether the trial court erred in denying the motion in arrest of judgment the Supreme Court of this state, speaking through District Judge Lowe, said: In light of N.D.C.C. § 29-01-29 we are of the opinion that the court's decision in Mutschler was overtechnical and not in accord with the liberal construction required by that section of our code, which reads: Because the wordescape connotes an attitude of mind as well as an act, and that attitude of mind requires an intent to avoid lawful confinement or custody, the criminal information was sufficient, although the words With intent toescape therefrom were not contained in it. In Gallegos v. People the Supreme Court of Colorado said: Later in the instructions the court said: Although we have not been provided with a transcript of the testimony at the trial and thus do not know whether the defendant attempted to show that he did not intend to escape when he departed from prison or custody, we note that no contention has been made on appeal that the trial court refused to admit in evidence testimony bearing on mental condition or intent. Section 29-11-10 sets forth the requirements of an information. It reads: North Dakota Century Code. The information in the instant case contains the name given to the offense by the statute and sufficient particulars to give the court and the defendant notice of the offense intended to be charged. No motion for a bill of particulars was made by either the defendant or the court under § 29-11-11, which reads: We conclude, in light of (1) the fact that inherent in the word escape is the meaning that departure is with intent to avoid lawful confinement or custody, and (2) the fact that the trial court's instructions required the jury to find that the defendant escaped with intent to escape, that the trial court properly denied Mr. Hendrick's motion in arrest of judgment. As Mr. Hendrick has failed to show wherein he was prejudiced or wherein he was deprived of a fair and impartial trial, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. TEIGEN, C. J., and STRUTZ, PAULSON and KNUDSON, JJ., concur.