Title: PEOPLE OF MI V STEPHEN J MCNALLY
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 120021
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: May 4, 2004

_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court  
Lansing, Michigan 48909  
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED MAY 4, 2004 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 120021 
STEPHEN J. MCNALLY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
MARKMAN, J.  
We granted leave to appeal in this case to consider 
whether the admission of testimony concerning defendant’s 
silence after his arrest, but before he was given Miranda 
warnings,1 
i.e., 
pre-Miranda 
silence, 
as 
substantive 
evidence of defendant’s guilt is error requiring reversal 
of defendant’s convictions. 
Following a jury trial, 
defendant was convicted of second-degree murder, MCL 
1 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed
2d 694 (1966). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
750.317, and failure to stop at the scene of an accident in 
which he was involved and that resulted in serious injury, 
MCL 
257.617. 
Defendant 
appealed 
these 
convictions, 
contending 
that 
the 
prosecutor 
improperly 
elicited 
testimony regarding his pre-Miranda silence. 
However, 
pursuant to its decision in People v Schollaert, 194 Mich 
App 158, 164-165; 486 NW2d 312 (1992), the Court of Appeals 
affirmed 
defendant’s 
convictions. 
We 
conclude 
that 
defendant forfeited the claim of error by not objecting to 
the 
prosecutor’s 
questions 
regarding 
defendant’s 
pre-
Miranda silence. 
Accordingly, we affirm defendant’s 
convictions. 
I. BACKGROUND 
On the afternoon of February 10, 1999, defendant and 
the victim, Harold VanDorn, met in a bar and decided to 
continue drinking together for the rest of the evening. By 
10:00 P.M., both men were intoxicated. 
After visiting a 
fast-food 
restaurant 
and 
before 
reaching 
their 
next 
destination, the two men had a disagreement. 
They 
exchanged punches, which prompted VanDorn to leave the 
truck and start walking in the road. 
Defendant drove away a short distance, but then made a 
U-turn and accelerated in VanDorn’s direction. By the time 
defendant reached VanDorn, the truck was traveling at 
2  
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
approximately forty-five miles an hour. 
At that point, 
defendant 
steered 
across 
the 
centerline 
at 
VanDorn, 
striking and killing him. 
The police arrested defendant 
one-half mile from the scene after a preliminary breath 
test indicated that defendant had a blood alcohol level of 
0.207 grams per 210 liters of breath. 
Defendant was prosecuted for murder. 
He did not 
testify, but his attorney offered two explanations for the 
accident: first, the truck’s brakes and steering were 
defective; and second, defendant blacked out immediately 
before striking VanDorn. 
To rebut these explanations, the 
prosecutor called several mechanics who examined the 
truck’s brakes and concluded they were not defective. 
To 
further rebut these explanations, the prosecutor, during 
his case-in-chief, elicited the following testimony of the 
arresting officer, Officer Cacicedo:1 
Q. 
At any point in time that evening, did
the defendant indicate to you that he had lost
control of the truck? 
A. 
No. 
Q. 
Did he ever indicate to you that there
was any mechanical defect with the truck? 
A. 
No. 
1 The prosecutor elicited similar testimony from 
Officers Hillman and Siladke, both of whom assisted in the
stop of defendant’s vehicle. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 Q. Did he ever indicate to you that he
blacked out that evening? 
A. 
No. 
Q. 
Did he ever indicate to you that he
couldn’t 
remember 
things 
that 
happened 
that 
evening? 
A. 
No. 
Defendant never objected to this testimony, nor did 
the prosecutor make any further comment at trial concerning 
this testimony. 
Defendant was convicted of second-degree 
murder and leaving the scene of an accident involving 
serious injury. 
The court imposed concurrent prison terms 
of twenty to fifty years for murder and two to five years 
for leaving the scene of a serious accident. 
Defendant appealed, contending that his convictions 
must be reversed because the prosecutor violated his Fifth 
Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination by 
impermissibly eliciting testimony regarding his pre-Miranda 
silence. 
However, pursuant to Schollaert, supra at 164­
165,2 the Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s convictions 
and stated, “The challenged testimony did not concern 
silence during custodial interrogation or silence in 
reliance on Miranda warnings. 
Therefore, defendant’s 
2 We have no occasion to consider the decision reached 
by the Court of Appeals in Schollaert in light of our
disposition of this case under Carines. 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
silence was not constitutionally protected.” 
Unpublished 
opinion per curium, issued July 20, 2001 (Docket No. 
223059). 
This Court granted defendant’s application for 
leave to appeal. 467 Mich 896 (2002). 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Unpreserved 
claims 
of 
constitutional 
error 
are 
reviewed for “plain error.” 
People v Carines, 460 Mich 
750, 764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. FORFEITED ERROR 
Defendant asks us to review a claim of error that he 
did not preserve at trial. 
We thus apply the principles 
articulated in Carines, supra at 763: 
To avoid forfeiture under the plain error
rule, three requirements must be met: 1) error 
must have occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e.,
clear or obvious, 3) and the plain error affected
substantial 
rights. 
The 
third 
requirement
generally requires a showing of prejudice, i.e.,
that the error affected the outcome of the lower 
court proceedings. 
It is the defendant rather 
than the Government who bears the burden of 
persuasion with respect to prejudice. . . . 
Reversal is warranted only when the plain,
forfeited error resulted in the conviction of an 
actually innocent defendant or when an error 
seriously affected the fairness, integrity or 
public 
reputation 
of 
judicial 
proceedings
independent 
of 
the 
defendant’s 
innocence. 
[Citations and internal quotation marks omitted.] 
Accordingly, in order for defendant to avoid forfeiture, he 
must show that the prosecutor’s questions regarding his 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
pre-Miranda silence affected his substantial rights. 
That 
is, he must show that the prosecutor’s questions affected 
the outcome of the lower court proceedings. 
The prosecutor’s evidence against defendant included 
two eyewitnesses. 
The first, John Dalling, testified that 
defendant slowly drove past the victim, made a sharp U-turn 
in the middle of the road, crossed two lanes while 
accelerating toward the victim, hit the victim, and then 
drove on. 
He stated, “it’s like he got in position and 
pretty much just went straight at him, across both lanes 
and went into the middle turning lane and hit him head on.” 
When asked if defendant's truck picked up speed after he 
made the U-turn, Dalling stated, “Yes, it did. It was like 
if he just gunned it.” 
According to Dalling, after 
defendant hit the victim, he made another U-turn and slowly 
drove past the victim’s body. 
Dalling further testified 
that he did not notice any problems with the truck, i.e., 
it was not veering in and out of lanes. He also testified 
that he did not hear any brakes or tires squeal before 
defendant struck the victim. 
Nor did he see any brake 
lights 
come 
on 
before 
defendant 
struck 
the 
victim. 
According to Dalling, defendant did not make any attempt to 
swerve away from the victim. 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A second eyewitness, Matt Walsh, was driving toward 
defendant’s truck, in light traffic with clear visibility, 
when he noticed defendant’s headlights veer sharply and he 
saw the victim go over defendant’s hood. Walsh stopped his 
truck in front of the victim and got out to help. 
Walsh 
saw defendant’s truck return to pass the victim slowly and 
then drive away. 
Further, 
the 
prosecutor 
introduced 
two 
expert 
witnesses 
who 
testified 
that 
defendant’s 
truck 
was 
mechanically sound. 
Specifically, one expert witness 
concluded that the steering and braking mechanisms were 
worn, 
but 
in 
working 
condition. 
Neither 
of 
the 
prosecutor’s expert witnesses found mechanical difficulties 
in the truck that would have caused defendant to lose 
control of the vehicle or swerve uncontrollably, or that 
would have prevented defendant from stopping the truck. 
Indeed, even defendant’s expert witness conceded that, when 
he drove the vehicle, it always stopped when the brakes 
were applied and it did not deviate course from one lane to 
another. 
Given this evidence of defendant’s guilt, we conclude 
that the prosecutor’s questions regarding defendant’s pre-
Miranda silence, even if error, did not affect the outcome 
of the lower court proceedings. 
In other words, defendant 
5  
 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
would 
have 
been 
found 
guilty 
independent 
of 
the 
prosecutor’s questions regarding defendant’s pre-Miranda 
silence. 
Therefore, because defendant has not met his 
burden of establishing that the alleged error affected the 
outcome of the lower court proceedings, he is unable to 
avoid forfeiture.3  He has forfeited his claim of error by 
not objecting to the prosecutor’s questions regarding his 
pre-Miranda silence.4 
3 Because we conclude that the prosecutor’s questions
did not affect the outcome of the lower court proceedings,
it 
is 
unnecessary 
to 
determine 
if 
the 
prosecutor’s
questions were permissible and “it is an undisputed
principle 
of 
judicial 
review 
that 
questions 
of 
constitutionality should not be decided if the case may be
disposed of on other grounds.” 
J & J Construction Co v 
Bricklayers and Allied Craftsmen, 468 Mich 722, 734; 664
NW2d 728 (2003). 
In response to the partial concurrence and partial
dissent, we can only state that it is not to "evade" a
constitutional 
issue 
for 
this 
Court, 
after 
full 
consideration of the arguments, to reach the conclusion
that a matter may adequately be resolved by means other
than constitutional analysis. Indeed, it is incumbent on a
court of law to do exactly this. 
While it would be 
convenient if the decisions of this Court were always
defined by the terms of our grant orders, in the real
world, in which arguments are sometimes unanticipated and
in which briefs and oral arguments often shed new light
upon the issues presented by a case, no responsible court
can decide cases in such a constricted manner. 
No such 
court can be oblivious to the fact that its initial 
estimation of the issues presented by a case may have been
imperfect. 
4 
Because 
the 
admission 
of 
evidence 
regarding
defendant’s pre-Miranda silence did not affect the outcome 
of the lower court proceedings, i.e., defendant was not 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Because defendant failed to object to the prosecutor’s 
questions regarding defendant’s pre-Miranda silence and 
these questions did not affect the outcome of the lower 
court proceedings, defendant has forfeited his claim of 
error. Accordingly, we affirm defendant’s convictions. 
Stephen J. Markman
Maura D. Corrigan
Michael F. Cavanagh
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
prejudiced, defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel is also without merit. 
People v Pickens, 446 Mich
298, 338; 521 NW2d 797 (1994). 
7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
No. 120021 
STEPHEN J. MCNALLY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
WEAVER, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
I concur in the result because it is true that the 
alleged error was harmless given that other evidence 
establishing defendant’s guilt was substantial. 
However, the majority unwisely evades the question 
whether a defendant’s postarrest, pre-Miranda1 silence is 
admissible in a prosecutor’s case-in-chief. 
I write separately because I disagree with the 
majority’s 
choice 
to 
evade 
and 
fail 
to 
decide 
the 
substantive issue that this Court specifically ordered to 
be briefed and argued in this case. 
1 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed
2d 694 (1966). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
In October 2002, this Court granted leave to appeal, 
specifically limiting the grant to whether defendant’s 
postarrest, pre-Miranda silence was admissible and whether 
defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel 
because trial counsel failed to object to the admission of 
testimony relating to defendant’s silence.2
 In April of 
2003 this Court heard oral argument in the case. The Court 
failed to issue a decision by July 31, 2003, and ordered 
that the case be set for reargument and resubmission.3  The 
parties again argued this case in October 2003, addressing 
the same questions—whether it was error for the prosecutor 
to have introduced defendant’s postarrest, pre-Miranda 
silence and whether defendant was denied the effective 
2 The October 30, 2003, order granting leave read: “On
order of the Court, the delayed application for leave to
appeal from the July 20, 2001 decision of the Court of
Appeals is considered, and it is GRANTED, limited to Issue
I in the defendant’s application.” 
654 NW2d 328 (2002).
Defendant’s Issue I on his application for leave to appeal
read: 
Defendant was denied his state and federal 
constitutional rights to due process and a fair
trial, where the prosecutor elicited evidence in
his 
case-in-chief 
of 
defendant’s 
post-arrest
silence; defendant was also denied his state and
federal constitutional right to the effective 
assistance of counsel, where defense counsel 
failed to object. 
3 469 Mich 864 (2003). 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to 
object to the evidence of defendant’s silence. 
The majority now chooses to dodge the substantive 
issue—whether the defendant’s silence was admissible in the 
prosecutor’s case-in-chief—by skipping over the first two 
factors in People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 
130 (1999), whether error occurred and whether the error 
was plain, and moving directly to whether any hypothetical 
error would be harmless.4  In declining to address whether 
error occurred, the majority leaves unanswered the question 
whether a defendant’s postarrest, pre-Miranda silence is 
admissible in the prosecutor’s case-in-chief. 
The majority justifies its refusal to decide the 
substantive issue by referencing a principle of judicial 
review that “questions of constitutionality should not be 
decided if the case may be disposed of on other grounds.” 
J & J Constr Co v Bricklayers and Allied Craftsmen, 468 
Mich 722, 734; 664 NW2d 728 (2003). 
But that general principle does not apply here. 
The 
phrase used by the majority is a convenient and often-used 
4 The three requirements to avoid forfeiture of an
issue under the plain error rule are “1) error must have
occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious,
3) and the plain error affected substantial rights.”
Carines, supra at 763. 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
shorthand for the principle that “[c]onsiderations of 
propriety, as well as long-established practice, demand 
that we refrain from passing upon the constitutionality of 
an act of Congress [or the Legislature] unless obliged to 
do so in the proper performance of our judicial function, 
when the question is raised by a party whose interests 
entitle him to raise it.” 
Ashwander v Tennessee Valley 
Authority, 297 US 288, 341; 56 S Ct 466; 80 L Ed 688 (1936) 
(Brandeis, J., concurring). 
One of the earliest applications of this rule in 
Michigan 
was 
in 
1874, 
when 
this 
Court 
said 
“any 
consideration of the constitutional question might have 
been waived, upon the ground that a legislative act should 
not be declared unconstitutional unless the point is 
presented in such a form as to render its decision 
imperative . . . .” 
Weimer v Bunbury, 
30 Mich 201, 218 
(1874). 
The reasons behind such judicial restraint include the 
delicacy and finality of judicial review of legislative 
acts, separation of powers concerns raised by ruling on the 
acts of the other two branches of government, and the need 
to show respect for the other two branches of government. 
See Rescue Army v Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 US 
549, 571; 67 S Ct 1409; 91 L Ed 1666 (1947), and 
Kloppenberg, Avoiding serious constitutional doubts: The 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
supreme court’s construction of statutes raising free 
speech concerns, 30 UC Davis L R 1, 13-14 (Fall, 1996). 
These concerns are not implicated here, because the 
constitutionality of an act of the Legislature or the 
Governor is not at issue. 
In deciding whether the 
defendant’s postarrest, pre-Miranda silence was admissible 
in the prosecutor’s case-in-chief, the Court would not be 
ruling on the validity of a legislative or executive 
decree, but on a lower court’s decision whether to admit 
certain 
testimony. 
See 
Kloppenberg, 
Avoiding 
constitutional questions, 35 B C L R 1003, 1054 (1994). 
Evading the twice-argued question, and not resolving 
this substantive issue, leaves the lower courts without 
guidance from this Court. 
That drawback is illustrated by 
the fact that in May 2003 this Court ordered that People v 
Maxon be held in abeyance for this case.  People v Maxon, 
662 NW2d 753 (2003). 
In Maxon the question is whether 
defendant’s prearrest, pre-Miranda silence was admissible 
during the prosecutor’s case-in-chief. 
By refusing to 
decide the issue now, the Court merely postpones the issue 
until another term. 
This case has been in this Court for 1 ½ years. 
The 
Court granted leave to appeal in the case, heard oral 
argument, and held the case over for reargument and 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
resubmission. The majority now affirms the decision of the 
Court of Appeals on the ground of harmless error. 
The 
majority could have simply denied leave in October 2003. 
By avoiding the substantive issue the majority has wasted 
the time and resources of the parties and this Court. 
The 
issue 
whether 
the 
prosecutor’s 
use 
of 
defendant’s postarrest, pre-Miranda silence was error is 
squarely before the Court. 
This case has been briefed, 
argued, and reargued. The parties and the people deserve a 
clear answer. 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
6