Title: State v. LaGrange
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 101348
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: June 29, 2012

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 101,348 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
WILLARD LAGRANGE, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
 
As a general rule, courts should construe a statute to avoid unreasonable results 
and should presume that the legislature does not intend to enact useless, superfluous, or 
meaningless legislation. 
 
2. 
 
The rule of lenity dictates that a court strictly construe a criminal statute for the 
benefit of the defendant, with any reasonable doubt as to the statute's meaning being 
resolved in favor of the accused. But the rule of lenity is subject to the constraint that the 
judicial interpretation of the statute must be reasonable and sensible to effect its 
legislative design and intent. 
 
3. 
 
Under K.S.A. 21-4204(a)(4)(A), criminal possession of a firearm, an adult 
convicted of a felony listed in the statute and sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment 
for that conviction is prohibited from possessing a firearm for a 10-year period that 
commences on the date that person is released from prison.  
 
2 
 
 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed April 15, 2010. 
Appeal from Reno District Court; JOSEPH L. MCCARVILLE III, judge. Opinion filed June 29, 2012. 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is affirmed. Judgment of the district court is 
affirmed. 
 
Rachel L. Pickering, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief 
for appellant.  
 
Keith E. Schroeder, district attorney, argued the cause, and Steve Six, attorney general, was with 
him on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
JOHNSON, J.:  Willard LaGrange challenges his conviction for criminal possession 
of a firearm, in violation of K.S.A. 21-4204(a)(4)(A). That statute imposes a 10-year 
prohibition on the possession of a firearm by persons convicted of certain felonies. 
LaGrange had a 1994 conviction for aggravated battery, K.S.A. 21-3404, one of the 
felonies listed in K.S.A. 21-4204(a)(4)(A), for which he served a prison sentence. He was 
released from prison on that sentence in 2004. The district court found that the 10-year 
firearm prohibition period began upon LaGrange's release from prison in 2004. In 
contrast, LaGrange contends that, as applied to him, the statutory language prohibited 
firearm possession for 10 years from his date of conviction, which period had expired 
before his firearm possession in this case. We agree with the district court's interpretation 
of K.S.A. 21-4204(a)(4)(A):  the 10-year ban on the possession of firearms began to run 
against LaGrange on the date he was released from prison on the aggravated battery 
sentence. Accordingly, we affirm. 
 
3 
 
 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW 
 
On August 28, 2007, LaGrange, armed with a revolver, intervened in a fight 
between brothers Lucas and Jason Magerfleisch. After a warning shot into the air went 
unheeded, LaGrange approached the combatants and held the weapon close to Jason. The 
weapon discharged another round, albeit LaGrange contended that it was an accidental 
shot caused by Jason's wife jumping on him. The bullet entered the left side of Jason's 
throat and became lodged in his shoulder blade. LaGrange fled the scene. 
 
LaGrange was arrested later that evening. The next day, law enforcement 
recovered the revolver, which was loaded and contained two spent cartridges. The State 
charged LaGrange with attempted first-degree murder and criminal possession of a 
firearm. LaGrange filed a pretrial motion to dismiss the criminal possession of a firearm 
count, arguing that the complaint was fatally defective for failing to allege a crime. 
Specifically, he argued that his prior felony conviction occurred more than 10 years prior 
to the current incident and, therefore, K.S.A. 21-4204(a)(4)(A) did not ban his possession 
of a firearm at that time. 
 
The district court denied LaGrange's pretrial motion, as well as denying his 
renewed motions for dismissal of the firearm count after opening statements and before 
closing arguments. After the denial of his second motion to dismiss, LaGrange stipulated 
to the following facts with respect to the firearm charge:   
 
 
"1. The Defendant, Willard L. LaGrange, has been convicted of a felony crime 
under the laws of the State of Kansas; 
 
"2. The felony conviction is for a crime specifically designated under K.S.A. 21-
4204(a)(4)(A); 
 
"3. The Defendant was not found in possession of a firearm at the time of the 
commission of the felony crime of conviction; 
4 
 
 
 
 
"4. The Defendant was released from imprisonment for such felony conviction 
within 10 years of August 28, 2007; and 
 
"5. The felony conviction has not been expunged and the Defendant has not been 
pardoned for such crime."  
 
The jury acquitted LaGrange of attempted murder but convicted him of the 
firearms charge. After the district court sentenced LaGrange to 18 months' imprisonment, 
he appealed to the Court of Appeals. A split panel of that court affirmed LaGrange's 
conviction. State v. LaGrange, No. 101,348, 2010 WL 1610398, at *2-3 (Kan. App. 
2010) (unpublished opinion). The majority concluded that the legislature intended K.S.A. 
21-4204 to make "it a crime for anyone released from prison within the past 10 years for 
'such felony' to include those released from prison within the past 10 years after 
convictions for one of the specific felonies listed in K.S.A. 21–4204(a)(4)(A)." 
LaGrange, 2010 WL 1610398, at *2. The dissent determined that the language of K.S.A. 
21-4204(a)(4)(A) was ambiguous and should be strictly construed against the State under 
the rule of lenity. LaGrange, 2010 WL 1610398, at *3. This court granted review. 
 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION OF K.S.A. 21-4204(a)(4)(A) 
 
Inherent in the jury's guilty verdict on the firearm charge is a finding—
unchallenged here by LaGrange—that he possessed a firearm on August 28, 2007. That 
date was more than 10 years after LaGrange's 1994 aggravated battery conviction, but 
less than 10 years after LaGrange's 2004 release from prison on the aggravated battery 
sentence. Whether LaGrange violated K.S.A. 21-4204(a)(4)(A)'s ban on firearm 
possession depends upon our determination of when the 10-year clock began to run 
against LaGrange—on the 1994 conviction date or on the 2004 prison release date. In 
other words, did LaGrange's time in prison count towards his 10-year firearm possession 
ban?  
 
5 
 
 
 
Standard of Review 
 
The firearm possession ban at the heart of this appeal was created by a statute, 
K.S.A. 21-4204(a)(4)(A), which we must interpret or construe and then apply to resolve 
the issue presented. Accordingly, we employ the familiar standard that the interpretation 
of a statute is a question of law over which this court has unlimited review. State v. 
Arnett, 290 Kan. 41, 47, 223 P.3d 780 (2010). 
 
Analysis 
 
The interpretation of a statute normally begins with a review of the language 
employed by the legislature—giving common words their ordinary meanings—to discern 
whether legislative intent has been plainly and unambiguously expressed. See State v. 
Urban, 291 Kan. 214, 216, 239 P.3d 837 (2010). Accordingly, we start by setting forth 
the relevant portions of the then current version of K.S.A. 21-4204(a)(4)(A), which 
applies in this case: 
 
 
"(a) Criminal possession of a firearm is: 
 
. . . . 
 
(4) possession of any firearm by a person who, within the preceding 10 years, has 
been convicted of: (A) A felony under K.S.A. 21-3401, 21-3402, 21-3403, 21-3404, 21-
3410, 21-3411, 21-3414, 21-3415, 21-3419, 21-3420, 21-3421, 21-3427, 21-3442, 21-
3502, 21-3506, 21-3518, 21-3716, 65-4127a or 65-4127b, or 65-4160 through 65-4164, 
and amendments thereto, or a crime under a law of another jurisdiction which is 
substantially the same as such felony, has been released from imprisonment for such 
felony, or was adjudicated as a juvenile offender because of the commission of an act 
which if done by an adult would constitute the commission of such felony, was found not 
to have been in possession of a firearm at the time of the commission of the offense, and 
has not had the conviction of such crime expunged or been pardoned for such crime." 
 
6 
 
 
 
The parties proffer different interpretations of this language, principally 
disagreeing on the meaning or application of two phrases:  (1) "or a crime under a law of 
another jurisdiction which is substantially the same as such felony," which we will refer 
to as the "out-of-state felony" phrase, and (2) "has been released from imprisonment for 
such felony," which we will refer to as the "released from prison" phrase. LaGrange 
argues that the "such felony" language of the released from prison phrase only refers to 
the immediately preceding out-of-state felony description. In other words, LaGrange 
would paraphrase the statute as prohibiting possession of a firearm by a person who, 
within the preceding 10 years, has been convicted of a listed Kansas felony or has been 
convicted of and released from imprisonment for a similar out-of-state felony. That 
interpretation would always commence the running of the 10-year firearm possession ban 
on the conviction date for those committing a listed Kansas felony, but would add the 
felon's prison release date when calculating the ban period for out-of-state convictions. 
As applied to LaGrange, that interpretation would mean that he had satisfied his firearm 
ban period while imprisoned for 10 years for his listed felony conviction. 
 
We pause briefly to quickly dispose of one of LaGrange's arguments. He contends 
that his interpretation must be correct because the legislature placed the released from 
prison phrase in the middle of the statutory provision, rather than at the end. That 
argument ignores that immediately following the released from prison phrase, the 
subsection provides for a 10-year firearm possession ban for a person who "was 
adjudicated as a juvenile offender because of the commission of an act which if done by 
an adult would constitute the commission of such felony." K.S.A. 21-4204(a)(4)(A). The 
released from prison phrase cannot apply to adjudicated juvenile offenders because they 
are not imprisoned for their transgressions. Therefore, placing the released from prison 
phrase at the end of the subsection—after the juvenile offender proviso—would have 
been patently ambiguous and confusing. LaGrange's argument on this point is unavailing.  
 
7 
 
 
 
In contrast, the State's reading of the statute ties the out-of-state felony phrase to 
the specific list of Kansas felonies, rather than to the released from prison phrase.  
To illustrate, the State's reading could be rephrased as follows:  Possession of a firearm is 
prohibited by:  (1) a person who, within the preceding 10 years, has been convicted of a 
listed Kansas felony or of a similar out-of-state felony; or (2) a person who, within the 
preceding 10 years, has been released from imprisonment for a listed Kansas felony or a 
similar out-of-state felony. Under that reading, the 10-year period is effectively stayed 
during the time a person is imprisoned for the felony that triggered the firearm possession 
ban. 
 
Prior to the 1995 amendment that resulted in the version of the statute applicable 
here, K.S.A. 21-4204 was amended in 1994 to read as follows, in relevant part:  
 
 
"(a) Criminal possession of a firearm is: 
 
. . . . 
 
(3)(4) possession of any firearm by any person who, within the preceding 10 
years, has been convicted of a crime felony to which this subsection applies, but was not 
found to have been in the possession of a firearm at the time of the commission of the 
offense, or has been released from imprisonment for such a crime, or was adjudicated as a 
juvenile offender because of the commission of an act which if done by an adult would 
constitute the commission of a felony, and has not had the conviction of such crime 
expunged or been pardoned for such crime; 
 
. . . . 
 
"(b) Subsection (a)(3) (a)(4) shall apply to a felony under K.S.A. 21-3401, 21-
3402, 21-3403, 21-3404, 21-3410, 21-3411, 21-3414, 21-3415, 21-3419, 21-3420, 21-
3421, 21-3427, 21-3502, 21-3506, 21-3518, 21-3716, 65-4127a or 65-4127b or sections 1 
through 5 of 1994 Senate Bill No. 856, and amendments thereto, or a crime under a law 
of another jurisdiction which is substantially the same as such felony." L. 1994, ch. 348, 
sec. 4. 
 
 
8 
 
 
 
The Court of Appeals majority looked to the wording of subsection (a)(4) in the 
1994 version and determined that the language employed clearly manifested an intent to 
prohibit the possession of a firearm by a person who had been released from prison for a 
covered crime within the preceding 10 years. LaGrange, 2010 WL 1610398, at *2. The 
majority then looked at the 1995 amendments and opined that they were not intended to 
eliminate the 10-year ban that commenced upon release from prison for the listed 
felonies. 2010 WL 1610398, at *2. Interestingly, the majority did not mention subsection 
(b) of the 1994 version or note that in the 1995 amendment it was moved into and 
combined with subsection (a)(4).  
 
The Court of Appeals dissent opined that the language of K.S.A. 21-4204(a)(4)(A) 
is ambiguous, so that it must be construed against the State because of the rule of lenity, 
which dictates that a court strictly construe a criminal statute, with any reasonable doubt 
as to its meaning being resolved in favor of the accused. The dissent discerned that the 
released from prison phrase could  
 
"be read in at least three quite different ways:  (1) as an additional element of the offense, 
thus requiring both a conviction of one of the listed offenses within 10 years and release 
from prison [at any time thereafter]; or (2) as an alternative means of committing the 
offense and subject to the 10-year restriction, thus requiring only a release from prison 
within 10 years after conviction of one of the listed felonies; (3) as independent of the 10-
year restriction but incorporating the 10-year restriction on date of conviction, thus 
requiring release from prison after conviction of 'such' felony, i.e., one committed within 
the preceding 10 years." LaGrange, 2010 WL 1610398, at *3.  
 
The dissent could not "perceive any of these potential constructions as patently 
unreasonable or in obvious contravention of legislative intent." LaGrange, 2010 WL 
1610398, at *3. We disagree with the dissent's reasonableness assessment, as will be 
discussed below. 
9 
 
 
 
 
We arrive at the same conclusion as the Court of Appeals majority with respect to 
the meaning of the released from prison phrase in K.S.A. 21-4202(a)(4)(A), i.e., "such 
felony" identifies both the listed Kansas felonies and the substantially similar out-of-state 
felonies. Accordingly, LaGrange's release from prison following his conviction for a 
listed Kansas felony started a 10-year ban on his possessing a firearm. But in our journey 
to that conclusion we may not step precisely into the footprints of the Court of Appeals 
opinion. 
 
First, we agree with the majority's interpretation of the 1994 version as clearly 
commencing a 10-year firearm ban upon a convict's release from prison for a listed 
Kansas felony. The verbs employed in the 1994 subsection (a)(4) delineated three events 
that triggered the firearm possession ban:  "has been convicted," "has been released," and 
"was adjudicated." The crimes for which the triggering events applied were separately 
described in subsection (b) and included both the specifically listed Kansas felonies and 
"a crime under a law of another jurisdiction which is substantially the same as such 
[listed] felony." L. 1994, ch. 348, sec. 4. Thus, in the prior 1994 version, the out-of-state 
felony phrase was clearly designed to augment the specific list of Kansas felonies, and it 
was not designed to restrict or narrow any of the triggering events. 
 
With respect to the portions of the statute we are concerned with here, the 1995 
amendment simply merged the prior subsection (b) into subsection (a)(4). The 
amendment replaced (a)(4)'s reference to "a felony to which this subsection applies" with 
the list of Kansas felony statutes and the out-of-state felony phrase that were formerly 
contained in subsection (b). L. 1995, ch. 92, sec. 2. Moreover, the 1995 amendment 
retained the same verb structure—has been convicted; has been released; was 
adjudicated—and did not add a separate verb in front of the out-of-state conviction 
phrase. In short, for our purposes, the 1995 amendments appear to be merely stylistic 
10 
 
 
 
changes. That assessment is corroborated by the statement to the Senate Judiciary 
Committee by the Revisor of Statutes that the proposed amendment in 1995 made "no 
substantive changes." Minutes of the Senate Committee on Judiciary, March 21, 1995. 
 
In short, the wording of K.S.A. 21-4204(a)(4)(A), together with the legislative 
history of that provision, convince us that the legislature intended for an adult convicted 
of a listed Kansas felony or of an out-of-state crime that is substantially the same as a 
listed felony to be prohibited from possessing a firearm for a 10-year period that 
commences either on the date of conviction of the applicable felony or on the date of 
release from prison for the applicable felony. That clear intent is not trumped by the rule 
of lenity, because the alternative construction proffered by LaGrange is unreasonable, 
nonsensical, and ineffectual to accomplish legislative design and purpose. See State v. 
Jackson, 291 Kan. 34, 40, 238 P.3d 246 (2010) (rule of lenity is subject to qualification 
that judicial interpretation must be reasonable and sensible to effect legislative design and 
intent). 
 
One of the obvious purposes of prohibiting firearm possession by a person who 
has previously been convicted of a serious felony is to protect the public. As the Court of 
Appeals majority pointed out, LaGrange did not proffer a reasonable explanation as to 
why the legislature would treat out-of-state felons differently from Kansas felons. We 
would go further and suggest that, intuitively, such a distinction makes no sense from a 
public safety viewpoint. An armed felon is equally dangerous whether the prior felony 
occurred in this jurisdiction or another. 
 
Perhaps more fundamentally, however, permitting a convicted felon to satisfy the 
10-year ban on firearm possession during the period that the felon is imprisoned 
accomplishes nothing and renders the statutory provision virtually meaningless. See State 
v. Trautloff, 289 Kan. 793, 797, 217 P.3d 15 (2009) (generally, courts should presume the 
11 
 
 
 
legislature does not intend to enact useless or meaningless legislation). The public is 
protected from a convicted felon who is imprisoned because the convict is segregated 
from the citizenry; no firearm ban is needed for public safety. Further, other statutes and 
regulations prohibit an inmate from possessing a firearm while inside prison, for obvious 
reasons. See K.S.A. 21-3826 (prohibiting trafficking in contraband in correctional 
institution); K.A.R. 44-2-103(a)(3); (b)(1) (prohibiting possession of guns or firearms of 
any type in any correctional facility). The protections afforded by K.S.A. 21-
4204(a)(4)(A) are utterly and totally superfluous and unnecessary when applied to a 
person locked up in prison. Such an interpretation will not pass muster, even under the 
rule of lenity. 
 
The district court was correct in denying LaGrange's motions to dismiss. The 
Court of Appeals majority correctly affirmed that ruling. 
 
Affirmed.