Title: Commonwealth v. Bonner
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12721
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: March 7, 2022

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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-12721 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  OMAR BONNER. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     October 8, 2021. - March 7, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Cypher, Kafker, & Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Joint Enterprise.  Evidence, Joint venturer, 
Accomplice, Intent, Firearm.  Intent.  Firearms.  Estoppel.  
Practice, Criminal, Instructions to jury, Capital case. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on February 14, 2014. 
 
The cases were tried before Janet L. Sanders, J., and 
following a mistrial on the indictment charging murder in the 
first degree, the case was tried before Linda E. Giles, J. 
 
 
Robert F. Shaw, Jr., for the defendant. 
Darcy A. Jordan, Assistant District Attorney (Ian 
Polumbaum, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  On December 14, 2013, Romeo McCubbin was shot 
and killed after attending a music performance at a Boston 
nightclub.  The shooting, which occurred on a nearby side 
street, was captured by surveillance cameras attached to a local 
2 
 
residence.  The video footage revealed that two individuals 
separately shot the victim less than one minute apart, one 
shooting while the victim was sitting in a parked vehicle and 
the second while the victim was lying on the sidewalk mortally 
wounded.  A grand jury returned indictments charging four men 
thought to have been accomplices with murder in the first 
degree.  The grand jury also indicted the defendant on one count 
of unlawful possession of a firearm and one count of resisting 
arrest.  At trial against the four codefendants, the 
Commonwealth proceeded on a theory that the defendant was liable 
for the victim's death as an accomplice to the second shooter.  
In June of 2016, at the first trial, the jury were unable to 
reach a verdict on the charge of murder against the defendant, 
but convicted him of the firearm offense and of resisting 
arrest.  At a subsequent joint trial with the other three 
codefendants in May of 2017, a second jury convicted the 
defendant of murder in the first degree on theories of 
deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty.1 
In this direct appeal, the defendant contends that the 
evidence was insufficient to sustain his murder conviction.  He 
 
 
1 The jury also convicted codefendants Andrew Robertson, 
Javaine Watson, and Omar Denton of murder in the first degree.  
We affirmed Robertson's and Watson's convictions, see 
Commonwealth v. Robertson, 489 Mass. 226, 227 (2022); 
Commonwealth v. Watson, 487 Mass. 156, 157 (2021).  Denton's 
appeal is pending before this court. 
3 
 
argues also that a new trial is warranted because of erroneous 
accomplice liability instructions.  The defendant next 
challenges the sufficiency of evidence introduced in the first 
trial that he unlawfully possessed a firearm, and the judge's 
decision, in the second trial, to preclude the defendant from 
contesting that point on estoppel grounds.  Finally, the 
defendant asks this court to exercise its extraordinary 
authority pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and to grant him a 
new trial or to reduce the conviction to a lesser degree of 
guilt.  Having carefully examined the record and considered the 
defendant's arguments, we conclude that there is no reversible 
error and find no reason to disturb the verdict. 
1.  Facts.  We summarize the facts that the jury could have 
found, viewing them in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth.  See Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677-
678 (1979). 
a.  Evening of the shooting.  On the evening of 
December 13, 2013, the victim attended a music performance at a 
nightclub on Blue Hill Avenue.  The victim drove his brother and 
his girlfriend, among others, to the event in a Ford Explorer, 
and he parked around the corner from the venue. 
The defendant, Denton, Robertson, and Watson attended the 
same performance.  The defendant had borrowed his sister's 
silver Toyota RAV4 to drive to the event.  Watson drove a red 
4 
 
Lincoln MKX that had been rented by his girlfriend the evening 
before, and that had been given to Watson that day. 
There was no dispute that the four codefendants knew each 
other, and multiple pieces of evidence were introduced to 
support their close ties.  An event photograph depicted three of 
the men -- the defendant, Denton, and Robertson -- standing near 
one another.  The defendant is depicted in the photographs 
wearing a bright red shirt, matching bright red pants, a red hat 
with a pom-pom on top, and a plaid scarf.  Denton is seen 
wearing a black wool hat and a maroon V-neck sweater over a 
white shirt.  Robertson appears to be wearing a hat and, in some 
photographs, to be concealing his face with a dark scarf. 
The Commonwealth also introduced cellular telephone records 
showing the defendant, Denton, Robertson, and Watson sending 
text messages to each other, as well as placing calls, in the 
month leading up to the shooting and within minutes of the 
shooting.  Indeed, the defendant's mother and sister both 
characterized Denton as a close family friend.  In addition, 
crime scene investigators found fingerprints that were matched 
to all four men inside and outside the recently rented (and 
cleaned) MKX. 
5 
 
After the show, the victim went outside, presumably to 
retrieve his vehicle, but he did not return to the club to pick 
up his brother and his girlfriend.2 
The shooting was captured by surveillance cameras mounted 
to the exterior of a residence on a residential street that 
intersected Blue Hill Avenue near the nightclub.  The video 
footage depicts two sport utility vehicles (SUVs), consistent 
with a Lincoln MKX and a Toyota RAV4, being driven down the 
street together, with the MKX in the lead.  The street is a one-
way residential street; traffic flows west to east from Morton 
Street to Blue Hill Avenue.  The drivers and the occupants (if 
any) of the SUVs are not visible in the video footage.  
Approximately three minutes later, the victim's vehicle is seen 
being driven down the street and parallel parking into a space 
in front of the residence. 
As the victim is finishing parking, an individual alleged 
to be Robertson runs into view from the direction of Morton 
Street.3  The individual approaches the driver's side of the 
Explorer and fires multiple rounds through the front window on 
the driver's side.  The SUV lurches forward, striking a pickup 
 
2 None of the witnesses observed an altercation inside the 
club, nor were they aware of any existing problems between the 
victim and the codefendants. 
 
3 The footage is not sufficiently clear to be able to see 
any of the individuals' faces. 
6 
 
truck.  Another vehicle, alleged to be the Lincoln MKX driven by 
Watson, immediately pulls up alongside the Explorer, the shooter 
gets in, and the vehicle speeds away.  The victim somehow 
manages to move across the seat, open the front passenger's side 
door, fall to the curb, and move a few feet along the sidewalk 
on his stomach, toward the rear of the vehicle.  The MKX 
continues to Blue Hill Avenue and turns right.  According to the 
Boston police department's ShotSpotter system,4 the volley was 
fired at precisely 1:45:00 A.M.  The next shooting, as detected 
by the ShotSpotter system, occurred forty seconds later, at 
1:45:40 A.M.  Video footage taken from the home security system 
depicts the following events.5 
After the MKX speeds off, the victim lies wounded on the 
sidewalk near the passenger's side of the Explorer, with his 
feet moving.  At 1:53:57 A.M., an individual alleged to be 
Denton runs down the sidewalk from the direction of Blue Hill 
Avenue (and the nightclub) toward the victim.  The individual 
hurriedly crosses the street at a diagonal, glancing over his 
 
4 A Boston police officer explained that ShotSpotter is a 
network of acoustic gunshot detection sensors. 
 
5 The times indicated refer to the time stamp on the 
security video footage, and not the actual time.  The homeowner 
acknowledged that the system was not set to "the right time."  
We refer to the time stamp imprinted on the security video 
recordings, which were introduced in evidence and played to the 
jury. 
7 
 
shoulder toward the intersection with Blue Hill Avenue.  At 
1:54:03 to 1:54:04 A.M., the individual, brandishing a handgun, 
approaches the victim from the driver's side rear of the 
Explorer.  At 1:54:05 A.M., the individual stands above the 
victim.  At that moment, another individual, alleged to be the 
defendant, walks down the street and into the camera's view from 
the direction of Blue Hill Avenue.  A second later, the man 
standing over the victim takes a few steps backward, squares his 
body into a shooting stance, and levels the gun at the victim, 
but the gun does not fire.  At that point, the individual 
alleged to be the defendant is standing on the opposite 
sidewalk, looking at the shooter and moving in the shooter's 
direction. 
Between 1:54:07 and 1:54:10 A.M., the shooter appears to 
"rack" the slide of the gun.  He once again aims it at the 
victim as the other individual walks across the street to join 
him.  At 1:54:11 to 1:54:12 A.M., the shooter fires four rounds 
at the victim in rapid succession.  As the gunfire erupts, the 
individual alleged to be the defendant is in the middle of the 
street moving toward the shooter.  The second shooter continues 
to point the gun at the victim for two more seconds, but no 
further shots are fired.  By that time, the other individual, 
assertedly the defendant, is standing next to the shooter at the 
rear of the Explorer.  From 1:54:14 to 1:54:15 A.M., the shooter 
8 
 
steps away from the victim; the other man exchanges places with 
him and kicks the victim in the head.  During the next three 
seconds, the two men, with the shooter in the lead, cross the 
street and run toward Blue Hill Avenue.  Police arrive at 
1:55:34 A.M. 
A resident of the house with the security camera was awoken 
at around 1:45 A.M. by four or five gunshots.  He then heard 
what he thought was the sound of something bumping into his 
parked pickup truck.  He looked out the second-floor window and 
saw the victim roll out of the passenger's side of the Explorer 
and collapse to the ground.  The witness then observed "two guys 
coming down the street" from the direction of Blue Hill Avenue.  
One of the men, by inference Denton, "did a motion with a 
handgun . . . like a reset," and pointed the gun at the victim 
on the ground.  The witness heard more gunfire.  He also saw the 
second individual, by inference the defendant, kick the victim.  
The defendant exclaimed, in a voice loud enough for the witness 
to hear, "dirty mother fucker."  On cross-examination, the 
witness explained that he believed the defendant had kicked an 
unresponsive, and presumably lifeless, body.  He saw the shooter 
and the other man turn around and run down the street toward 
Blue Hill Avenue. 
b.  Police investigation and forensic evidence.  Another 
neighbor called 911 to report the shooting.  By that time, 
9 
 
police had received ShotSpotter alerts of two separate shootings 
in the vicinity.  Police responded to the scene and found the 
victim lying face up on the sidewalk next to the bullet-ridden 
Explorer.  Police found ten nine millimeter shell casings on the 
ground near the Explorer and four discharged projectiles inside 
the vehicle.  These had been fired from the same weapon used to 
shoot the victim.  The nine millimeter weapon itself was never 
found.  Police also recovered four .380 shell casings and three 
live rounds of .380 caliber ammunition from the street.6  The 
shell casings and projectiles were fired from a .380 pistol that 
was recovered a short time after the shooting.  See discussion, 
infra. 
The autopsy revealed that the victim had been shot nine 
times by a nine millimeter handgun, and twice in the head by a 
.380 caliber handgun.  He died from multiple gunshot wounds to 
the head, torso, and lower extremities.  The medical examiner 
opined that either .380 caliber gunshot wound to the head could 
have caused immediate death. 
At 1:45 A.M. on December 14, 2013, Boston police Detective 
Brian Smigielski was inside the area B-3 police station when he 
 
6 A Boston police department ballistician testified that 
live rounds already chambered in a semiautomatic pistol can be 
ejected from the firearm if the operator pulls (or "racks") the 
slide mechanism backwards. 
10 
 
heard gunshots fired from two different weapons.7  Smigielski 
drove toward the scene in an unmarked vehicle.  En route, he 
observed a RAV4 turn recklessly from Baird Street onto Morton 
Street.8  Smigielski followed the RAV4 through several 
residential streets, while it reached speeds of up to sixty 
miles per hour and went through a red light.  The unmarked 
vehicle was not equipped with blue lights or a siren, and 
Smigielski did not attempt to stop the RAV4.  The RAV4 
eventually slowed down to the speed limit and traveled into the 
Hyde Park section of Boston.  It then turned into the driveway 
of a house that later was learned to be the defendant's family 
home.  Smigielski parked behind the RAV4.  The defendant opened 
the front passenger's side door and stepped out.  With his 
firearm held by his side, Smigielski ordered the defendant to 
get back into the vehicle.  The defendant instead ran toward the 
 
7 Smigielski, who had been assigned to the youth violence 
strike force, resigned from the Boston police department in 
January 2016, after being charged in Federal court with 
conspiracy to defraud the United States.  In pleading guilty, he 
admitted that he had impeded a Federal investigation into gang 
activity by supplying gang members with confidential 
information. 
 
8 Smigielski's characterization of the RAV4 as fleeing the 
crime scene was hotly contested.  In a radio broadcast, he 
informed fellow officers that he was trying to catch up with the 
car "fleeing that scene."  Defense counsel pointed out that 
Smigielski did not observe the RAV4 being driven away from the 
scene.  Smigielski explained that he meant to say that the 
vehicle was "fleeing the area" of the shooting. 
11 
 
rear of the house.  Smigielski saw something in the defendant's 
hand, but Smigielski could not tell what it was.  He yelled to 
the driver, Denton, to stay put, and chased after the defendant. 
 
Smigielski followed the defendant's path down the driveway 
to a detached garage.  He lost sight of the defendant but heard 
something heavy hit the ground in the yard where the defendant 
had run.  The defendant then emerged from behind the garage with 
his hands in his pockets.  Smigielski ordered the defendant to 
the ground; the defendant complied but then attempted to get up, 
and a struggle ensued.  At the same time, other police officers 
arrived at the house and encountered Denton in the driveway.  
Denton fled, but he eventually was found hiding underneath a 
pickup truck parked in the driveway of a house on a nearby 
street.9 
 
After the defendant's arrest, police backtracked along the 
path that the defendant had traveled while running from 
Smigielski.  They located the defendant's red hat toward the 
back of the driveway, near the garage doors.  Officers also 
found a .380 handgun in the back yard of the house behind the 
garage.  The firearm was on the ground on the other side of a 
fence that separated the two properties.  Although there was 
 
9 Police recovered a .25 caliber handgun on a walkway on the 
other side of a fence from the RAV4.  It contained Denton's 
fingerprint.  As discussed, this evidence was excluded from the 
second trial. 
12 
 
snow on the ground, there was no snow on the .380 caliber 
handgun.  Testing established that the firearm had fired the 
shell casings found on the street where the victim had been 
shot, as well as the projectiles found in the victim's head. 
 
Later that morning, police found the Lincoln MKX abandoned 
on and blocking a driveway on a street approximately one block 
from the defendant's home.  The MKX was pinned against a fence 
post; it was still running, and its reverse lights were on. 
 
2.  Prior proceedings.  Beginning on May 25, 2016, the 
defendant and his three codefendants were tried before a 
Superior Court jury.  On June 24, 2016, the jury found the 
defendant guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm and 
resisting arrest, but they could not reach a verdict on the 
murder charge for any of the defendants.  The jury also 
convicted Denton of unlawful possession of a firearm.  The judge 
declared a mistrial as to the murder indictments. 
 
The defendant was not sentenced on his two convictions at 
that point.  A second trial of all four codefendants, before a 
different judge, was conducted from May 3 to May 24, 2017.  The 
defendant moved for a required finding of not guilty at the 
close of the Commonwealth's case.  The motion was denied.  The 
jury found the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree on 
theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or 
cruelty. 
13 
 
 
3.  Discussion.  The defendant argued at trial that this 
was a case of mistaken identity and that, even if he was present 
at the scene of the shooting, he was an innocent bystander.  In 
this appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was 
insufficient to allow a rational jury to have concluded, beyond 
a reasonable doubt, that he was guilty of murder in the first 
degree.  He also contends that the judge's instructions on 
accomplice liability10 improperly lessened the Commonwealth's 
burden of proof.  In addition, the defendant challenges the 
sufficiency of the evidence, introduced at the first trial, that 
he possessed a firearm, and the judge's decision, at this trial, 
to preclude him from contesting that point.  The defendant also 
asks us to exercise our extraordinary authority under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, to order a new trial or to reduce the degree of 
guilt. 
 
a.  Sufficiency of the evidence supporting the conviction 
of murder.  In determining whether the evidence was sufficient 
 
10 In Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449, 467 (2009), we 
adopted the use of the term "accomplice liability" for 
individuals who did not actually kill the victim, but who 
participated in some way in the killing, with the shared intent 
that it be accomplished.  We recognize that, since our decision 
in that case, we have at times returned to the language of 
"joint venture," and at times used the phrase "accomplice 
liability."  Given the simultaneous use of both terms in our 
subsequent decisions, with the language in Zanetti becoming less 
and less prevalent, although its reasoning remains controlling, 
we use both terms as well, consistent with the language of the 
particular case being discussed. 
14 
 
to sustain the conviction, we consider the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the Commonwealth, see Latimore, 378 Mass. 
at 677-678, including issues of credibility, see Commonwealth v. 
James, 424 Mass. 770, 785 (1997).  "A conviction may rest 
exclusively on circumstantial evidence, and, in evaluating that 
evidence, we draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 
Commonwealth."  Commonwealth v. Javier, 481 Mass. 268, 279 
(2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Jones, 477 Mass. 307, 316 
(2017).  Inferences "need only be reasonable and possible and 
need not be necessary or inescapable."  Commonwealth v. Longo, 
402 Mass. 482, 487 (1988).  A conviction, however, may not "rest 
upon the piling of inference upon inference or conjecture and 
speculation."  Commonwealth v. Mandile, 403 Mass. 93, 94 (1988). 
 
In this case, there was overwhelming evidence that the 
shootings were acts of an intentional killing committed with 
either deliberate premeditation or extreme atrocity or cruelty, 
and the defendant does not contest that the shooting was a crime 
of murder in the first degree.  In brief, the victim was stalked 
by two gunmen, shot while he was seated in his vehicle, and shot 
a second time while he was lying mortally wounded on a sidewalk.  
See Commonwealth v. Castillo, 485 Mass. 852, 867-868 (2020) 
(conviction of murder in first degree on theory of extreme 
atrocity or cruelty requires evidence that defendant caused 
victim's death by method that surpassed cruelty inherent in 
15 
 
taking life); Commonwealth v. Chipman, 418 Mass. 262, 269 (1994) 
(murder in first degree on theory of deliberate premeditation 
requires evidence of resolution to kill after period of 
reflection). 
 
The essence of the defendant's argument that the evidence 
was insufficient to convict him of murder in the first degree is 
the asserted lack of evidence that he was liable for the 
victim's death as one who aided and abetted a crime.  See G. L. 
c. 274, § 2 (aiding and abetting is punished to same extent as 
act of "principal felon"); Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 454 Mass. 
449, 467 (2009) ("spirit behind the common law as now reflected 
in the aiding and abetting statute, G. L. c. 274, § 2, which 
declares the aider and abettor to be as culpable as the chief 
perpetrator of the offense . . . is to hold the criminal actor 
who participates in a felony liable as a principle without 
regard to whether the felony is completed or committed by 
another" [quotation and citation omitted]).  Under the theory of 
accomplice liability, it was the Commonwealth's burden to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly 
participated with another in the commission of the crime, with 
the intent required to commit that offense.  See Commonwealth v. 
Rakes, 478 Mass. 22, 32 (2017); Commonwealth v. Britt, 465 Mass. 
87, 100-101 (2013). 
16 
 
 
At the outset, it is important to bear in mind a 
fundamental limitation on joint venture liability:  it does not 
sweep so broadly as to establish a form of guilt by association.  
See Commonwealth v. Montalvo, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 319, 330 (2010) 
("evidence that a defendant associated with persons who 
committed the crime does not lead to an inference that he [or 
she] also participated in the crime").  See, e.g., Commonwealth 
v. Sherry, 386 Mass. 682, 695 (1982); Commonwealth v. Fancy, 349 
Mass. 196, 200 (1965).  "[M]ere presence coupled with the 
failure to take affirmative steps to prevent the crime is 
insufficient, as is simple knowledge that a crime will be 
committed, even if evidence of such knowledge is supplemented by 
evidence of subsequent concealment of a completed crime."  
Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 424 Mass. 853, 859 (1997).  See 
Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 475 Mass. 396, 409-410, 416-418 (2016) 
(insufficient evidence defendant, who was associated with 
alleged gunmen and had had dispute with victim, participated in 
crime by driving suspect vehicle, or that she shared lethal 
intent required for conviction); Commonwealth v. Sephus, 468 
Mass. 160, 167 (2014) (conviction may not rest on evidence that 
merely places defendant at crime scene and shows defendant to be 
associated with principals). 
 
The Commonwealth need not establish a defendant's precise 
role in the crime, i.e., whether the defendant acted as a 
17 
 
principal or as an accomplice.  Commonwealth v. Lee, 483 Mass. 
531, 547 (2019).  "[W]hat matters is only that there be proof 
of . . . the defendant's knowing participation in some manner in 
the commission of the offense."  Commonwealth v. Silva, 471 
Mass. 610, 621 (2015).  See Commonwealth v. Akara, 465 Mass. 
245, 254-256 (2013) (reviewing evidence of defendant's active 
participation in events leading to victim's death).  As we 
explained in Zanetti, 454 Mass. at 470 (Appendix), a defendant's 
knowing participation in the commission of the offense 
"may take the form of agreeing to stand by at, or near, the 
scene of the crime to act as a lookout, or to provide aid 
or assistance in committing the crime, or in escaping, if 
such help becomes necessary.  The agreement to help if 
needed does not need to be made through a formal or 
explicit written or oral advance plan or agreement; it is 
enough consciously to act together before or during the 
crime with the intent of making the crime succeed." 
 
See Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 13-14 (2018). 
 
Here, viewed in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to 
allow a rational jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
the defendant participated in the shooting with the shared 
intent to kill the victim.  This was established by evidence 
that (1) the victim was attacked by a group of individuals 
acting in concert; (2) the defendant was present at the scene of 
the second shooting, in a position to render aid if necessary, 
and demonstrated active hostility to the victim through verbal 
18 
 
insults and kicking the mortally wounded victim in the head; 
(3) the defendant facilitated the second shooter's escape from 
the scene by supplying the getaway vehicle and an intended place 
of safety to which to flee; and (4) the defendant attempted to 
hide the murder weapon. 
 
First, the jury reasonably could have inferred that the 
victim was set upon by individuals acting in concert, and that 
the defendant's actions before and after the second shooting 
indicated that he was part of that group effort.  The timeline 
begins with the defendant's three minute and fifty-five second 
telephone call to Watson's telephone at 11:39 P.M.11  Then, at 
1:42 A.M., less than three minutes before the shooting, the 
defendant's telephone placed an unanswered call to Denton's 
telephone.  At 1:44 A.M., a minute before the shooting, the 
defendant's telephone attempted to call Watson's telephone, but 
there was no answer.  Approximately two and three minutes after 
the shooting, at 1:47 and 1:48 A.M., Watson placed two 
unanswered telephone calls to the defendant.12 
 
11 The times of the calls noted are based on records 
maintained by the cellular service provider, which are accurate, 
in contrast to the incorrect time stamps on the surveillance 
video footage. 
 
12 The defendant argues that the evidence concerning the 
calls undermines the Commonwealth's claim that he participated 
in the shooting.  He contends that the telephone calls 
established that he was not with Watson or Denton in the minutes 
before the shooting, "the approximate time the government 
19 
 
 
In Watson, 487 Mass. at 162, we concluded that it was 
reasonable for the jury to infer that the last two telephone 
calls, at 1:47 and 1:48 A.M., suggested the defendant's 
involvement in the shooting.  See Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 477 
Mass. 658, 667 (2017) (inference of joint participation in crime 
based on telephone calls with suspected accomplices immediately 
before and within thirty minutes of shooting).  The record does 
not reveal the content of the defendant's nearly four-minute 
conversation with Watson at 11:39 P.M., or explain why the 
defendant called Denton and Watson minutes before the shooting, 
at 1:45 A.M., or Watson's reason for returning the defendant's 
calls at 1:47 and 1:48 A.M.  Nonetheless, it was reasonable for 
the jury to have inferred, on the basis of the surveillance 
video recording and the telephone records, that the codefendants 
searched for the victim after the show and eventually located 
him sitting in his parked vehicle around the corner from the 
nightclub.  See Watson, supra at 163.  The surveillance video 
 
suggests some sort of 'reconnaissance' was occurring from the 
RAV4 Denton was driving that night, and the Lincoln MKX 
allegedly driven by Watson."  It is more reasonable, the 
defendant suggests, to view this evidence as indicating that he 
remained at the nightclub while the others drove away without 
him.  We agree with the defendant that it is possible to 
interpret the evidence in this manner.  Our duty, however, is to 
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth.  See Watson, 487 Mass. at 162 (reasonable for jury 
to infer communications made in crucial minutes concerned 
shooting). 
20 
 
footage shows two SUVs, consistent with the rented Lincoln MKX 
and the defendant's sister's Toyota RAV4, going slowly down the 
street in tandem.  Id. at 164.  Shortly thereafter, the victim 
parked his vehicle and, within three minutes, was confronted by 
the first shooter, who approached on foot.  After firing 
numerous shots, that shooter ran from the victim he had just 
shot, got into the passenger's side of a vehicle with 
characteristics matching those of the MKX, which was waiting in 
the middle of the street, and the vehicle sped away.  Id. at 
163-164. 
 
Forty seconds later, another individual, presumptively 
Denton, approached the victim from the opposite direction.  A 
man who was presumably the defendant trailed behind Denton, 
walking the same path from Blue Hill Avenue and the location of 
the nightclub, along the sidewalk across the street from where 
the victim's vehicle was parked, and then crossing the street at 
an angle toward the victim as Denton fired at the prone victim.  
The acts of approaching the shooter as he was shooting, then 
standing beside him as he continued to point the gun at the 
victim, yelling insults, and kicking the prone victim in the 
head would have allowed a reasonable juror to decide that the 
defendant was present to render aid to the shooter if necessary 
and shared the intent to kill.  See Longo, 402 Mass. at 488 
(evidence was sufficient for jury to infer participation where 
21 
 
defendant knew of attack from armed principal and was present to 
lend assistance if necessary). 
 
In addition, the evidence was sufficient for the jury 
reasonably to have inferred that the defendant facilitated 
Denton's escape from the crime scene.  An individual who acts as 
a getaway driver or otherwise helps the principal to escape may 
be convicted as an accomplice to the crime.  See Zanetti, 454 
Mass. at 467-468, 470 (Appendix).  For example, in Commonwealth 
v. Gomes, 475 Mass. 775, 781-782 (2016), we noted that the jury 
reasonably could have inferred the defendant's knowing 
participation in a shooting based, in part, on evidence that 
"when the shooting ceased, the defendant sped off, quickly 
removing the shooters from the scene."  See Akara, 465 Mass. at 
255 (evidence of joint flight supports finding that each 
confederate was willing and available to assist another if 
necessary); Commonwealth v. Sokphann Chhim, 447 Mass. 370, 378 
(2006) (defendant was "present and available to assist his 
friends in a continuing assault on the victim or in their 
getaway"); Commonwealth v. Williams, 422 Mass. 111, 121 (1996) 
("joint venture may be proved by circumstantial evidence, 
including evidence of flight together"); Commonwealth v. Chay 
Giang, 402 Mass. 604, 608 (1988) (it was "undisputed that the 
defendant rendered aid to the principals"; "[h]e drove the 
getaway vehicle"). 
22 
 
 
Here, the surveillance footage showed the shooter and the 
kicker running together toward Blue Hill Avenue and the 
nightclub, with the shooter in the lead.  The silver Toyota RAV4 
that the defendant had driven to the nightclub was parked 
somewhere out of range of the surveillance camera.  Within 
minutes of the two men running from the scene toward Blue Hill 
Avenue, however, a RAV4 later learned to have been driven by 
Denton, with the defendant in the front passenger's seat, was 
seen being driven away at speeds of up to sixty miles per hour.  
The vehicle, followed by an investigating officer, was driven to 
the defendant's family home, where it turned into the driveway.  
The defendant got out and attempted to run from police. 
 
In addition to inferring that the defendant assisted Denton 
to escape, the jury were entitled reasonably to infer that the 
defendant continued to participate in the joint venture by 
disposing of the weapon Denton had used to shoot the victim.  
Immediately after the defendant got out of the RAV4, with 
Smigielski parked in the driveway behind the RAV4, the defendant 
took off running toward the garage, with Smigielski in pursuit.  
Although the defendant was able to pull ahead out of 
Smigielski's view, Smigielski heard the sound of an object 
falling, and shortly thereafter, officers found a .380 handgun 
lying on the snow on the other side of a fence behind the 
garage.  Ballistics testing established that the firearm had 
23 
 
shot the projectiles found in the victim's head.  See 
Commonwealth v. Reaves, 434 Mass. 383, 391 (2001) (evidence of 
defendant's participation in drive-by shooting included "attempt 
to dispose of both guns used in the attack"). 
 
We agree, as the defendant asserts, that "[c]onduct such as 
flight, or disposing of a weapon, or acting as an accessory 
through conduct after the fact . . . fail[s] the threshold for 
sufficiency."  Such conduct, occurring after the shooting, 
itself is insufficient to establish joint venture liability.  
See Commonwealth v. Simpkins, 470 Mass. 458, 461-462 (2015) 
(evidence was insufficient to establish accomplice liability 
where defendant hid murder weapon but Commonwealth could not 
prove implicit agreement to assist shooter at time of commission 
of offense).  The Commonwealth is required to prove knowing 
participation with another in the commission of the crime, with 
the intent required to commit the offense, beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  See Rakes, 478 Mass. at 32. 
 
Here, the evidence of the joint venture between the four 
codefendants -- the organized search for the victim, using the 
defendant's vehicle in conjunction with Watson's vehicle, the 
defendant's actions standing next to Denton at the scene, their 
joint flight in the defendant's RAV4, and the defendant's 
efforts to dispose of the murder weapon that he himself had not 
used -- was sufficient to allow a reasonable juror to infer, 
24 
 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant participated in 
the shooting and shared the intent to kill the victim. 
 
The defendant contends that his mere presence at the scene, 
and his flight with Denton after the shooting, indicated 
participation after the fact, rather than a shared intent to 
kill the victim.  The crime of being an accessory after the fact 
requires proof that "after the commission of a felony," the 
defendant harbored, concealed, maintained, or assisted another 
person, with knowledge that the other person committed a felony 
and with the intent that the other person avoid or escape 
detention, arrest, trial, or punishment (emphasis added).  G. L. 
c. 274, § 4.  In Watson, 487 Mass. at 165-166, we observed, 
"Although joint venture and accessory after the fact both 
include assisting an offender with escaping, the two are 
distinct crimes, with joint venture occurring before or during 
the commission of the crime and accessory after the fact 
occurring after the commission of the crime."  See United States 
v. Dinkane, 17 F.3d 1192, 1196 (9th Cir. 1994) ("if assistance 
is rendered while the felony is in progress, individual is 
guilty as a principal; if felony is no longer in progress, then 
individual can only be guilty as an accessory after the fact"); 
2 W.R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 13.1 (3d. ed. 2021) 
("[an] accessory after the fact, by virtue of his involvement 
only after the felony was completed . . . [is] not truly an 
25 
 
accomplice in the felony . . . but rather one who has obstructed 
justice"). 
 
The cases upon which the defendant relies in support of his 
argument that he acted, at most, as an accessory after the fact 
involve facts that are materially different from the facts in 
this case.  For example, in Commonwealth v. Lopez, 484 Mass. 
211, 215-216 (2020), four men, including the defendant, chased 
the victim into a driveway, where they assaulted him with their 
fists.  The victim was able to escape and scaled a fence to a 
back yard, where he was fatally stabbed by two assailants, not 
including the defendant.  Id. at 213-214.  The two men climbed 
back over the fence and fled with the defendant.  Id.  There, 
the Commonwealth failed to establish that the defendant 
knowingly participated in the fatal stabbing because "there was 
insufficient evidence to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant stabbed the victim or was present at the time 
of the fatal stabbing [in the back yard]."  Id. at 220-221.  In 
Simpkins, 470 Mass. at 460-462, another case the defendant 
cites, the evidence supported a charge of being an accessory 
after the fact where the defendant was not present during the 
shooting but hid the murder weapon after the commission of the 
crime.  Similarly, in Mandile, 403 Mass. at 95, 100, the 
evidence suggested that the defendant "(1) participated in 
stealing guns to aid in the commission of some future offense, 
26 
 
(2) was present during the commission of the murder [but did not 
enter the victim's house], (3) knew the passenger was armed, 
(4) was the driver of a getaway car, and (5) attempted to 
conceal the crime through the disposal of the murder weapon and 
inconsistent statements to the police."  The evidence 
nonetheless was insufficient to demonstrate shared intent to 
kill because the defendant, who had remained in the getaway 
vehicle, was unaware of the conduct of his accomplice, and there 
was no evidence of hostility between the accomplice or the 
defendant and the victim.  Id. at 101. 
 
The defendant argues that the shooting was "a spontaneous 
event that [he] became aware of after it was well under way, 
coming upon the event as it unfolded, but never putting himself 
in a position to facilitate or contribute to the victim's 
death."  After Denton shot the victim in the head, the defendant 
maintains, he merely "jog[ged] around the back of [the victim's] 
vehicle to look, and then appear[ed] to lightly kick the victim, 
who is dead, on the ground."  Although "distasteful," the kick 
to the head was not evidence of a shared lethal intent. 
 
The jury were not required to accept the defendant's 
explanation of how he came to kick the victim in the head.  See 
Commonwealth v. Merola, 405 Mass. 529, 533-534 (1989) 
(prosecution was not required to "exclude every reasonable 
hypothesis of innocence, provided the record as a whole supports 
27 
 
a conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt").  Having been 
presented with sufficient evidence of the defendant's knowing 
participation in the crime to meet the Latimore standard, it was 
the province of the jury to determine whether the defendant 
crossed "the line that separates mere knowledge of unlawful 
conduct and participation in it."  See Commonwealth v. Cerveny, 
387 Mass. 280, 287 (1982). 
 
Aside from evidence of his participation in the shooting, 
the key question here is whether the defendant shared the 
shooter's intent to kill the victim.  An individual's intent is 
a matter of fact, which is often not susceptible of proof by 
direct evidence, so resort frequently is made to proof by 
inference from all of the facts and circumstances developed at 
trial.  See Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 470, cert. 
denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979) ("The jury may infer the requisite 
mental state from the defendant's knowledge of the circumstances 
and subsequent participation in the offense").  The critical 
inquiry is whether the jury properly could have inferred beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant shared another's intent to 
kill "or whether, to the contrary, the Commonwealth only offered 
evidence of mere association, coupled with consciousness of 
guilt."  See Mandile, 403 Mass. at 100. 
 
In some cases, lethal intent may be inferred from a 
defendant's own conduct, such as bringing a gun to the scene of 
28 
 
a shooting but not firing the fatal shot.  See Gonzalez, 475 
Mass. at 416.  In other cases, "intent has been inferred from 
evidence that a defendant (a) observed a coventurer demonstrate 
or express lethal intent (e.g., by producing a gun) and 
(b) thereafter took some step to help carry out that intent."  
Id. at 416-417.  In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence of 
intent, we consider "the whole transaction of which the crime 
was a part," because "[e]vidence of the attendant circumstances 
may aid the jury in reaching a verdict by giving them the 
complete picture."  Longo, 402 Mass. at 489, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Durkin, 257 Mass. 426, 428 (1926). 
 
The evidence here supported a reasonable inference, beyond 
a reasonable doubt, that Denton arrived at the scene for the 
purpose of killing the victim.  It is clear from the 
surveillance footage that an individual -- later learned to be 
the defendant after his flight from the scene -- observed his 
accomplice "demonstrate or express lethal intent," Gonzalez, 475 
Mass. at 416-417.  While crossing the street, the defendant 
watched Denton (who also was identified after he got out of the 
getaway vehicle in front of Smigielski) wield a firearm, 
manipulate the slide, and aim at the fallen victim.  Thereafter, 
the defendant took some steps to carry out that lethal intent by 
moving to Denton's side to lend encouragement, facilitating 
Denton's escape in the RAV4, and disposing of the murder weapon.  
29 
 
See Barbosa, 477 Mass. at 667 ("defendant's flight from the 
scene less than a minute after the shooting . . . , and 
telephone calls with his suspected coventurers immediately 
before the shooting and in the thirty minutes after, allow the 
reasonable inference of the defendant's participation in and 
shared intent to commit the murder"). 
 
The defendant argues that his act of kicking the victim in 
the head cannot serve as a basis to infer an intent to kill.  We 
do not agree.  A jury may consider the defendant's conduct, 
including any overt expression of hostility toward the victim, 
in assessing his state of mind.  See Commonwealth v. Philbrook, 
475 Mass. 20, 26 (2016).  The case of Commonwealth v. Norris, 
462 Mass. 131 (2012), is instructive.  There, after the 
defendant and the victim fought over the victim's gold chain, 
the victim produced a handgun and warned the defendant and an 
accomplice to "get back."  Id. at 133-134.  The defendant 
complied.  Id. at 134.  The accomplice then fired his gun six 
times at the victim, striking him in the head.  Id.  The head 
wound would have caused death immediately or within seconds.  
Id. at 134-135.  The defendant "walked over to [the victim] as 
he lay motionless on the ground and kicked him in the face."  
Id. at 135.  We held that, considered as a whole, the evidence 
was sufficient for a rational jury to find a shared lethal 
intent beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. at 139.  "Most tellingly, 
30 
 
after [the accomplice] shot [the victim] six times and [the 
victim] lay on the ground motionless and bleeding from the head, 
[the defendant] walked over and kicked [the victim in the 
face]."  Id. at 140.  "This kick, considered with the evidence 
just summarized, clearly permitted the inference that [the 
defendant] wanted [the victim] to die."  Id. 
 
Here, similarly, the jury were entitled to consider the 
evidence that the defendant kicked the victim in the head and 
called him a "dirty motherfucker" as probative of a shared 
intent to kill.  In Commonwealth v. Casale, 381 Mass. 167, 173-
174 (1980), for example, we held that the jury reasonably could 
have inferred the requisite shared mental state from the 
circumstances, including evidence that the defendant "harbored 
hostility towards [the victims]."  See Mandile, 403 Mass. at 101 
(in case of murder involving group melee, court examines 
evidence of hostility between defendant and victim); Longo, 402 
Mass. at 487 (inference of requisite mental state was drawn from 
evidence of hostility between defendant and victim). 
 
b.  Instructions on joint venture liability.  The defendant 
contends that the judge erred in instructing the jury that the 
Commonwealth was not required to establish "how" the defendant 
knowingly participated in the shooting.  He also argues that the 
judge "unwisely" deviated from the instructions in Zanetti, 454 
Mass. at 470 (Appendix), by requiring only that the jury find 
31 
 
the defendant had some level of "involvement" in the crime.  
These errors, the defendant contends, substantially diminished 
the Commonwealth's burden of proof.  Because the defendant did 
not object at trial, we review under the standard of a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 682 (1992), S.C., 469 
Mass. 447 (2014). 
 
As the defendant points out, the judge supplemented the 
instructions set forth in the Appendix in Zanetti, 454 Mass. 
at 470, and adopted by this court in its Model Jury Instructions 
on Homicide.  She added the following: 
"The Commonwealth is not required to prove exactly how a 
joint venturer participated in the murder or which of the 
two or more did the actual killing.  A jury may convict a 
defendant of murder without deciding whether he or she was 
the shooter or an accomplice, as long as the jury finds, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant and another, 
either one of whom could have fired the fatal shot, were 
involved in a joint venture during which the alleged victim 
was killed." 
 
 
In reviewing the adequacy of a judge's final charge, we 
consider the totality of the instructions and interpret the 
instructions "as would a reasonable juror."  Commonwealth v. 
Kelley, 470 Mass. 682, 697 (2015).  "Trial judges have 
considerable discretion in framing jury instructions, both in 
determining the precise phraseology used and the appropriate 
degree of elaboration" (quotation and citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 487 Mass. 602, 612 (2021).  Although we 
32 
 
have urged trial judges to adhere to the Model Jury Instructions 
on Homicide, and to "proceed with caution" when not doing so, 
"judges are not required to deliver their instructions in any 
particular form of words" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Howard, 479 Mass. 52, 61 (2018). 
 
We discern no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice in the judge's instruction that "[t]he Commonwealth is 
not required to prove exactly how a joint venturer participated 
in the murder or which of the two or more did the actual 
killing."  That was an accurate statement of the law apparently 
drawn from Commonwealth v. Deane, 458 Mass. 43, 50 (2010).  See 
Barbosa, 477 Mass. at 671; Commonwealth v. Williams, 475 Mass. 
705, 712 (2016).  Such language is meant to inform the jury that 
joint venture liability is premised on knowing participation in 
a crime "even when there is differing evidence that the 
defendant committed the crime as a principal or as an 
accomplice."  See Zanetti, 454 Mass. at 466-467.  Although the 
first part of the sentence indeed does have the potential to 
diminish the Commonwealth's burden of establishing that the 
defendant knowingly participated in the crime, we do not 
evaluate "bits and pieces" of instructions "removed from their 
context" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Perez, 390 Mass. 
308, 313 (1983).  The judge explained that it is the 
33 
 
Commonwealth's burden to prove knowing participation beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and that 
"knowing participation by the defendant may take many 
forms.  It may take the form of personally committing the 
acts that constitute the crime or of aiding or assisting 
another in those acts.  It may take the form of the 
defendant asking or encouraging another person to commit 
the crime or of helping to plan the commission of the 
crime.  Alternatively, it may take the form of the 
defendant agreeing to stand by, at, or near the scene of 
the crime, to act as a lookout or to provide aid or 
assistance in committing the crime or in escaping, if such 
help becomes necessary." 
 
Considered in the context of the over-all instruction, the 
phrase did not diminish the Commonwealth's burden of proof. 
 
Nor do we discern a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage 
of justice in the judge's use of the word "involved."  The 
defendant argues that this language provided the jury with a 
watered down alternative to the key phrase "knowing 
participation."  This view takes the phrase out of context.  The 
judge used the word "involved" as a way to describe a 
cooperative effort between two individuals, i.e., that the 
defendant and an alleged accomplice were "involved" in a joint 
effort.  We used the same language of being "involved" with 
another to describe a joint venture in Akara, 465 Mass. at 258.  
There, we said that "[a] jury may convict a defendant of murder 
without deciding whether he was the shooter or an accomplice, as 
long as the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant and another (either one of whom could have fired the 
34 
 
fatal shot) were involved in a joint venture during which the 
victim was killed" (quotation and citation omitted).  Id.  See 
Commonwealth v. Williams, 450 Mass. 645, 653 (2008) (evidence 
was sufficient to believe others were involved in victim's 
shooting); Newman v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 599, 601 (2002) 
(discussing evidence of defendant's involvement in robbery). 
 
In sum, the judge's instructions, considered as a whole, 
adequately described the Commonwealth's burden to prove that the 
defendant knowingly participated in the shooting. 
 
c.  Sufficiency of evidence to support conviction of 
unlawful possession of a firearm.  The defendant argues that the 
evidence introduced at his first trial was insufficient to 
sustain the conviction of possession of a firearm without a 
license. 
 
To convict an individual of unlawful possession of a 
firearm, the Commonwealth must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that the defendant knowingly possessed an object, and that the 
object met the legal requirements of being a firearm as defined 
in G. L. c. 140, § 121.  See Commonwealth v. Young, 453 Mass. 
707, 713 n.9 (2009); G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a).  Possession may be 
either actual or constructive.  See Commonwealth v. Romero, 464 
Mass. 648, 652 (2013).  In this case, the Commonwealth alleged 
that the defendant actually had possessed the firearm and had 
thrown it away as he was being chased by Smigielski. 
35 
 
 
The defendant contends that "[t]he notion that [he] grabbed 
the .380 from the RAV4, possessed it when he stepped out 
(despite Smigielski not seeing it), is unsupported."  Rather, 
the defendant argues, the evidence implicated Denton because 
police "found the firearm not far from the location of 
[Denton's] arrest."  The defendant points out that the only 
evidence to support the suggestion that he tossed the .380 is 
the word of a "dishonest detective." 
 
In considering the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the Commonwealth, "we do not weigh the supporting evidence 
against conflicting evidence, nor consider the credibility of 
the witnesses."  Commonwealth v. Bacigalupo, 455 Mass. 485, 489 
(2009).  Here, the evidence established that the victim was shot 
with a .380 caliber firearm.  The shooter and the man who kicked 
the downed victim ran from the scene on foot, and they were next 
spotted "leaving the area" in a small SUV.  Having been alerted 
to the shooting, and while heading to the scene, Smigielski 
encountered and followed the fleeing vehicle until it turned 
into the driveway of what was learned to be the defendant's 
house.  The defendant got out of the RAV4 from the front 
passenger's seat and ran into the back yard.  Smigielski chased 
him and then lost sight of him, Smigielski but heard "an object 
hit the ground."  Minutes later, another police officer retraced 
the defendant's path and located a .380 caliber handgun lying on 
36 
 
top of the snow.  Ballistics testing established that this 
firearm was the same weapon that had fired the fatal rounds. 
 
Although the defendant argues that the evidence was 
insufficient to show that he, and not someone else, had thrown 
the weapon on top of the snow, the evidence permitted a 
reasonable inference that the defendant ran into the back yard 
behind the garage, carrying the murder weapon, and then threw it 
in the snow while he was being chased by police.  "Proof of 
possession and knowledge may be established by circumstantial 
evidence and the inferences that can be drawn therefrom."  
Commonwealth v. Gouse, 461 Mass. 787, 795 (2012).  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 461 Mass. 821, 824-825, 826 (2012) 
(reasonable inference from location of firearm in middle of 
walkway that it only recently had landed there); Commonwealth v. 
Ralph R., 100 Mass. App. Ct. 150, 163 (2021) (police recovered 
firearm in area within juvenile's path of flight); Commonwealth 
v. Grayson, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 748, 751 (2019) (firearm was found 
next to fence along defendant's flight path); Commonwealth v. 
Duncan, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 150, 153-154 (2008) (defendants were 
only persons in immediate vicinity of firearm). 
 
d.  Limitations on defendant's ability to challenge firearm 
evidence.  The defendant argues that the judge erred in ruling 
that the defendant was estopped from arguing at the second trial 
that he had not possessed the .380 caliber firearm. 
37 
 
 
Some discussion of the proceedings at the first trial is 
necessary to understanding the defendant's argument.  As stated, 
the first jury convicted the defendant of unlawful possession of 
a firearm and could not reach a verdict on the murder 
indictment.  The jury also convicted Denton of unlawful 
possession of a firearm.  It was the Commonwealth's theory at 
the first trial that the defendant had possessed the .380 
caliber handgun found behind the garage, and that Denton had 
possessed the .25 caliber handgun found near the driveway.  The 
Commonwealth did not move for sentencing following the 
codefendants' convictions of the firearms offenses, and the 
defendant did not seek interlocutory review to challenge the 
sufficiency of the evidence.  See Neverson v. Commonwealth, 406 
Mass. 174, 175-176 (1989). 
 
Prior to the second trial, Denton filed a motion in limine 
to exclude evidence that he had possessed the .25 caliber 
handgun.  Denton maintained that he would be unfairly prejudiced 
by the introduction of evidence that he had possessed a firearm 
that was not the murder weapon.  See Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 
463 Mass. 116, 122 (2012).  The Commonwealth then moved to 
introduce that evidence.  The Commonwealth argued that evidence 
of a second firearm would support its theory that Denton and the 
defendant shared an intent to kill, in that both men likely 
arrived at the scene armed.  The Commonwealth maintained that, 
38 
 
after the vehicle that was fleeing the area stopped in the 
driveway, one codefendant disposed of one of the guns (not 
necessarily the weapon he had possessed at the time of the 
shooting), and the other defendant threw away the other gun. 
 
The judge held that evidence of a second firearm would 
invite unfair speculation as to the defendant's intent.  She 
noted that Denton had been charged with unlawful possession of 
the .25 caliber handgun and convicted of that offense.  The 
judge observed, "There's no evidence that [the defendant] had 
any possession or any knowledge of that gun in this case."  
Given the speculative nature of the Commonwealth's theory of two 
men and two guns, the judge allowed Denton's motion to exclude 
the .25 caliber gun. 
 
In opening statements, Denton's counsel argued that the 
police rushed to judgment and arrested her client without 
legitimate grounds.  She also said that the jury should not 
credit Smigielski's anticipated testimony that the defendant 
threw the .380 caliber firearm in the snow.  Defense counsel 
urged the jury to scrutinize carefully the evidence that the 
defendant had disposed of the murder weapon.  The Commonwealth 
then argued that defense counsel had opened the door to the 
introduction of evidence that police had had probable cause to 
arrest both defendants for unlawful possession of a firearm.  
The judge denied the Commonwealth's motion.  She nonetheless 
39 
 
admonished counsel to "avoid an insinuation that these 
guys . . . didn't get near the gun . . . because . . . they were 
convicted of these charges."  Later, the judge ruled that the 
defendant was "estopped from denying that he possessed 
the .380." 
 
On appeal, the defendant argues that the doctrine of 
estoppel was not applicable because the Commonwealth did not 
move for sentencing following the first trial, and the defendant 
therefore did not have an opportunity to seek appellate review.  
As such, the conviction was not final, and the doctrine of 
estoppel was inapplicable.  See Commonwealth v. Stephens, 451 
Mass. 370, 375 (2008) ("doctrine of collateral estoppel provides 
that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by 
a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot be litigated 
between the same parties").  See also Commonwealth v. Williams, 
431 Mass. 71, 74 (2000); Commonwealth v. Lopez, 383 Mass. 497, 
499 (1981).  The Commonwealth maintains that the defendant 
waived his right to prompt sentencing by agreeing to defer 
sentencing on the firearm charge.  The Commonwealth argues that 
this resulted in a delay of the right to appeal and that,  "[b]y 
doing this, [the defendant] forwent the final judgment of his 
firearm conviction."  See Commonwealth v. Dascalakis, 246 Mass. 
12, 19 (1923) (in criminal case, sentencing is final judgment). 
40 
 
 
At trial, the defendant objected to the judge's ruling on 
the ground that the prior firearm conviction was tainted by the 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  He did not challenge 
the finality of the conviction.  See Commonwealth v. McDonagh, 
480 Mass. 131, 137 (2018) (only timely and precise objection to 
admission of evidence, or judge's ruling, will preserve asserted 
error for appellate review).  Accordingly, we review to 
determine whether there was a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  See Wright, 411 Mass. at 682. 
 
Notwithstanding the judge's admonition about avoiding any 
suggestion that the defendant had not had a gun, the defendant 
was able to contest the evidence that he had been in possession 
of the .380 firearm.  On cross-examination, Smigielski testified 
that he had not seen a firearm in the defendant's hand and did 
not observe the defendant throw an object.  Defense counsel also 
pointed out that Smigielski did not inform the responding police 
officers that he had heard an object thrown to the ground and 
that it landed with an audible thud.  One of the crime scene 
technicians testified that he had not observed any tracks in the 
snow indicating that the firearm had been tossed, had tumbled, 
or had rolled. 
 
Moreover, in his closing argument, defense counsel argued 
that the defendant had not discarded the firearm in the snow: 
41 
 
"Smigielski should be indicted.  Smigielski says he heard a 
thump or something, heard a heavy object hit the ground.  
It's funny because the officer that found this .380 in 
Lewiston in some yard, he says he never told him he heard 
any sound.  He says to Smigielski he's the one that found 
the gun.  Smigielski never told him he heard any sound.  'I 
heard a thump.'  Snow?  Look it, you've been at the scene, 
right?  You saw the garage, you saw the place -- If my 
client drew that, he's gone over the garage or across by 
[thirty] feet.  The gun's going to roll.  Look at the 
picture.  I asked the person that found it.  You know, I 
asked the lab person, 'Did you see any marks on the snow to 
indicate this weapon rolled?'  He said, 'No.'  Because my 
client never threw the gun." 
 
Defense counsel suggested that the object in the defendant's 
hand had been a cellular telephone, not a handgun:  "We know 
[the defendant's] got a phone because Smigielski said that's the 
only thing he saw.  He never saw him with a gun, never saw him 
throw a gun." 
 
Because the defendant was able to challenge the 
Commonwealth's theory that he had possessed the murder weapon, 
even if the judge erred in concluding that the defendant was 
estopped from making such a challenge, there was no substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, as the defendant was 
able to accomplish essentially all that he would have 
accomplished had the judge not ruled on the issue of estoppel. 
 
e.  Relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Having 
carefully reviewed the entire record, pursuant to our duty under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we discern no reason to order a new trial 
or to reduce the degree of guilt. 
42 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.