Title: Com. v. Gambit
Citation: 462 A.2d 211, 501 Pa. 453
Docket Number: N/A
State: Pennsylvania
Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Date: July 8, 1983

501 Pa. 453 (1983) 462 A.2d 211 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Leslie GAMBIT, Sharmel Howard, and Geneva Massey, Appellees. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Submitted December 9, 1982. Decided July 8, 1983. Robert F. Banks, First Asst. Dist. Atty., Kenneth D. Brown, Dist. Atty., for appellant. John M. Humphrey, Williamsport, for appellees. Before ROBERTS, C.J., and NIX, LARSEN, FLAHERTY, McDERMOTT, HUTCHINSON and ZAPPALA, JJ. PER CURIAM. Order affirmed. *454 LARSEN, J., dissents in the result without an opinion. McDERMOTT, J., files a dissenting opinion. McDERMOTT, Justice, dissenting. On the afternoon of July 28, 1978, the shopkeepers of Williamsport, PA, were marked for pillage by a band of shoplifters. From the goods found in their car, the thieves were expert and efficient. They were caught flat out and now their catching is the issue before us. I regret that the majority is satisfied to issue a per curiam order affirming the Superior Court, 274 Pa.Super. 571, 418 A.2d 554, without defining their reasons in an area of law, dangling in the winds of change. Changes, one hopes, that will relieve us of the woeful need to discharge defendants so obviously guilty, that they defile our ostensible search for truth. The facts of this case are neither strange nor startling. Indeed, they comport with the solid expectation of thieves, that they may steal at will, because neither the obvious or the certain counts against an "unreasonable" search. I adopt the facts as distilled by the Superior Court. The Superior Court reversed the trial court holding the arrest in the station house was illegal and suppressed the evidence found on appellants as poisoned fruit. *457 I would find that the police officers properly stopped appellees on the street and that, given the totality of the circumstances, the accompanying of appellees with their consent, one-half block to the police station at City Hall did not constitute an arrest. When the officers accompanied by the appellants arrived at the police station and learned of the subsequent calls, probable cause existed and the arrest then occurred. The search of appellees was then proper and the stolen goods then found were admissible. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968) the United States Supreme Court pointed out that "a police Officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest." Terry further states that a stop for investigatory purposes is justified if the "police Officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot . . ." Terry supra, 392, U.S. 1 at 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868 at 1884. See also, Commonwealth v. Greber, 478 Pa. 63, 385 A.2d 1313 (1978). In the instant case the police officer had at his disposal, a detailed description of the suspects, the general area in which to search for the suspects and his 28 years of experience. When he approached the vehicle parked approximately one block from the store reporting the theft, the two women immediately reversed their directions and began to walk away. Officer Reiff testified that the women fit the given description to a "tee", which coupled with the abrupt reversal by the women alerted him to the fact that these women were acting suspiciously. The ensuing request to walk to the police station, only one-half block away, was the result of the officer's concern for the suspects. The suppression court reasoned that had the officers remained at the scene with the presumably innocent women, a midafternoon crowd could have been expected to accumulate as the investigation continued. Moreover, Officer Reiff testified that he did not want to *458 frisk a woman in public. (N.T.S.H. at 21.) His main concern thus revolved around his being male and the suspects being female. Such an event would be embarrassing, even traumatic to two innocent pedestrians. Under the given circumstances it was an entirely reasonable request to change the locus for the Terry stop. On the issue of whether evidence taken from the third appellee, Massey, while at the police station should be suppressed, I would find that Massey was arrested with probable cause at the time she was intercepted by Officer Mnick on the street just after appellees Gambit and Howard were stopped. The record shows that Officer Mnick apprehended Massey at the direction of Officer Wilson who had knowledge of the radio dispatches. Accordingly, the fact that the initial telephone complaint, in and of itself, may not be sufficient probable cause to arrest appellees Gambit and Howard, clearly, knowledge of three calls from three different storeowners detailing the same description of the three appellees was sufficient probable cause to arrest appellee Massey. In addition, I would find that the necessary facts exist in this case to permit the warrantless search of the automobile under the exigent circumstances exception to the rule prohibiting warrantless searches and seizures. The police testified that a vehicle driven by a black man, who might be a confederate of appellees, was seen circling the block. As Officer Reiff noted, "It was my concern from the start that the car would have been moved, and if there's anything of evidence type in that car, it could have been disposed of. . ." (N.T.S.H. at 19.) Moreover, Reiff also testified that the police force was undermanned on that day (N.T.S.H. at 19). In addition, the police were restrained from towing and impounding the vehicle because parked cars hemmed it in on both ends. And, the absence of a magistrate had thwarted the police effort to secure a warrant. It is obvious that when all the facts are observed we find the police doing all within their power to avert the loss of possible evidence. For the nonce, all time wasted. *459 I dissent from the majority's decision today for the same reasons that I dissented in Commonwealth v. Lovette, 498 Pa. 665, 450 A.2d 975 (1982)"That a block and a half might swallow the `Terry exception' is the type of finicky preciousness that has solidified our reputation for unreality." Perhaps historians of a future, hopefully recovered from our preciosities and all their consequences, will teach sounder lessons. Teach that freedom from oppressive governments is only one aspect of liberty, that mature societies learn there are other enemies of comfort and societal life. Enemies, who belong to no political cabals and have no aspirations beyond stealing from their neighbors, who when plainly caught by those acting in good faith and duly tried in open and public trial, shall not be freed because a Tarquin may try to come again. [1] The parties have stipulated to most of the facts. Where they dispute the facts, we have accepted those facts which, with reasonable basis in the record, support the findings of the suppression court. See Commonwealth v. Kichline, 468 Pa. 265, 361 A.2d 282 (1976). [2] Although the suppression court determined that Reiff merely detained the two women to whom he called and did not arrest them until their arrival at the station, the Commonwealth concedes that Reiff arrested the two women at the car.