Title: LOUIS GHAFFARI V TURNER CONSTRUCTION CO
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 124787
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: July 12, 2005

Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 12, 2005 
LOUIS GHAFFARI, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v 
No. 124786 
TURNER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Defendant, Cross-Plaintiff,
Third Party Plaintiff-Appellee, 
and 
HOYT, BRUM & LINK, and GUIDELINE
MECHANICAL, INC., 
Defendants,
Cross-Defendants-Appellees, 
and 
R.W. MEAD & SONS, INC., and CONTI
ELECTRIC, INC., 
 
Third-Party Defendants, 
and 
ACOUSTICAL CEILING AND PARTITION 
COMPANY, 
Defendant, 
and 
THE EDISON INSTITUTE a/k/a HENRY FORD
MUSEUM & GREENFIELD VILLAGE, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
Defendant, Third-Party Plaintiff.
_______________________________________/ 
LOUIS GHAFFARI, 
Plaintiff-Appellant. 
No. 124787 
TURNER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Defendant, Cross-Plaintiff,
Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellee, 
and 
HOYT, BRUM & LINK, 
Defendant,
Cross-Defendant-Appellee, 
and 
GUIDELINE MECHANICAL, INC., 
 
Defendant, Cross-Defendant, 
and 
ACOUSTICAL CEILING & PARTITION 
COMPANY, 
Defendant, 
and 
THE EDISON INSTITUTE a/k/a HENRY FORD
MUSEUM & GREENFIELD VILLAGE, 
Defendant, Third-Party Plaintiff, 
and 
CONTI ELECTRIC, INC., 
 
Third-Party Defendant. 
_______________________________________/ 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
MARKMAN, J. 
The question presented is whether the “open and 
obvious” doctrine has any application in a claim brought 
under the “common work area” doctrine. We conclude that it 
does not. 
I. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This case arises out of a slip and fall incident that 
occurred during construction of an IMAX theater at Henry 
Ford Museum in Dearborn. 
The premises were owned by the 
Edison Institute, better known as the Henry Ford Museum and 
Greenfield Village (Edison). 
Edison signed a construction 
contract 
with 
defendant 
Turner 
Construction 
Company 
(Turner), whereby Turner agreed to act as the construction 
manager for the project. Pursuant to this contract, Turner 
then 
negotiated 
trade 
contractor 
agreements 
with 
subcontractors on behalf of Edison, and administered them 
as the construction manager. 
Plaintiff, an employee of electrical subcontractor 
Conti Electric, Inc., was injured on the construction site 
when he tripped on pipes left on the floor of a storage 
area 
that 
he 
alleged 
had 
served 
as 
a 
passageway. 
Plaintiff further alleged that the pipes were owned by one 
of two other subcontractors: either defendant Guideline 
Mechanical, 
Inc. 
(Guideline), 
the 
pipefitting
3 
 
 
 
 
 
subcontractor, or defendant Hoyt, Brum & Link (Hoyt), the 
plumbing subcontractor. 
Plaintiff testified that he had rounded a corner and 
walked through an archway that, until recently, had been 
covered with plywood. Plaintiff claimed that he slipped on 
the pipes as he entered the storage area from behind 
gangboxes that stood in the walkway. 
He testified that 
other pipes closer to eye level distracted his vision as he 
rounded the gangboxes. 
The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary 
disposition on the ground that the hazard was open and 
obvious, citing this Court’s then-recent decision in Lugo v 
Ameritech Corp, Inc, 464 Mich 512; 629 NW2d 384 (2001). 
The trial court also granted summary disposition to 
Guideline on the additional ground that no evidence was 
presented to indicate that the pipes in question belonged 
to Guideline. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed in an 
unpublished per curiam opinion, which was later published 
at defendants’ request. 
Ghaffari v Turner Constr Co, 259 
Mich App 608; 676 NW2d 259 (2003). 
We granted leave to appeal and directed the parties to 
address whether the open and obvious doctrine has any 
application in a claim under the common work area doctrine 
described in Ormsby v Capital Welding, Inc, 471 Mich 45, 
54; 684 NW2d 320 (2004), and, if so, how the open and
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
obvious doctrine could be reconciled with Hardy v Monsanto 
Enviro-Chem Systems, Inc, 414 Mich 29; 323 NW2d 270 (1992), 
in which this Court concluded that the goal of safety in 
the workplace would be enhanced by the application of 
principles of comparative negligence. 
See Ghaffari v 
Turner Constr Co, 471 Mich 915 (2004). 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This case requires that we consider whether the open 
and obvious doctrine is applicable in the construction 
setting. 
The applicability of a legal doctrine is a 
question of law that we review de novo. People v Thousand, 
465 Mich 149, 156; 631 NW2d 694 (2001). We also review de 
novo a circuit court’s grant of summary disposition. 
Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). 
III. ANALYSIS 
The 
question 
presented 
is 
whether 
a 
general 
contractor,1 when confronted with potential liability for a 
job 
site 
injury 
suffered 
by 
the 
employee 
of 
a 
subcontractor, may avoid liability on the basis that the 
condition giving rise to the injury was open and obvious. 
1 Although, under the terms of its contract with the
premises 
owner, 
Turner 
was 
in 
fact 
a 
“construction 
manager,” and not a “general contractor,” the distinction
is one without a difference for purposes of our analysis in
this case. 
Because our common work area jurisprudence has
heretofore referred to “general contractors,” we will 
continue to use that term. 
5  
 
 
 
 
In order to answer this question, we must first examine two 
relevant common-law doctrines: 
the common work area 
doctrine and the open and obvious doctrine. 
A. 
The Common Work Area Doctrine 
At common law, property owners and general contractors 
generally could not be held liable for the negligence of 
independent subcontractors and their employees. 
However, 
in Funk v Gen Motors Corp, 392 Mich 91, 104; 220 NW2d 641 
(1974), this Court departed from this traditional framework 
and set forth an exception to the general rule of 
nonliability in cases involving construction projects: 
We regard it to be part of the business of a
general contractor to assure that reasonable 
steps within its supervisory and coordinating
authority are taken to guard against readily
observable, avoidable dangers in common 
work 
areas which create a high degree of risk to a
significant number of workmen. [Emphasis added.] 
We also articulated several practical considerations 
that supported this exception: 
Placing 
ultimate 
responsibility 
on 
the 
general contractor for job safety in common work
areas 
will, 
from 
a 
practical, 
economic 
standpoint, render it more likely that the 
various subcontractors being supervised by the
general contractor will implement or that the
general contractor will himself implement the 
necessary precautions and provide the necessary
safety equipment in those areas. 
[A]s a practical matter in many cases only
the general contractor is in a position to 
coordinate 
work 
or 
provide 
expensive 
safety
features that protect employees of many or all of
the 
subcontractors. 
. 
. 
. 
[I]t 
must 
be 
6  
 
 
 
 
recognized 
that 
even 
if 
subcontractors 
and 
supervisory 
employees 
are 
aware 
of 
safety
violations they often are unable to rectify the
situation themselves and are in too poor an 
economic position to compel their superiors to do
so. 
[Id. (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted).] 
In Ormsby, supra at 54, we listed the elements of what 
had become known since Funk as the common work area 
doctrine: 
That is, for a general contractor to be held
liable under the “common work area doctrine,” a
plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant,
either the property owner or general contractor,
failed to take reasonable steps within its 
supervisory and coordinating authority (2) to 
guard against readily observable and avoidable
dangers (3) that created a high degree of risk to
a significant number of workmen (4) in a common
work area. [Emphasis added.] 
We made clear in Ormsby that only when this test is 
satisfied may a general contractor be held liable for the 
alleged 
negligence 
of 
the 
employees 
of 
independent 
subcontractors with respect to job site safety. Id. at 55­
56. 
The failure to satisfy any one of these elements is 
fatal to a Funk claim. Id. at 59. 
B. The Open and Obvious Doctrine 
In 
general, 
a 
premises 
possessor 
must 
exercise 
reasonable care to protect invitees from an unreasonable 
risk of harm caused by a dangerous condition on the land. 
Bertrand v Alan Ford, Inc, 449 Mich 606, 609; 537 NW2d 185 
(1995). 
However, this duty does not generally require the 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
removal of open and obvious dangers. 
In Lugo, supra at 
516-517, we rearticulated the open and obvious doctrine: 
[W]here the dangers are known to the invitee
or 
are 
so 
obvious 
that 
the 
invitee 
might
reasonably be expected to discover them, an 
invitor owes no duty to protect or warn the
invitee unless he should anticipate the harm 
despite knowledge of it on behalf of the invitee. 
* * * 
In sum, the general rule is that a premises
possessor is not required to protect an invitee
from open and obvious dangers, but, if special
aspects of a condition make even an open and
obvious risk unreasonably dangerous, the premises
possessor has a duty to undertake reasonable 
precautions to protect invitees from that risk.
[Internal citations omitted; emphasis added.] 
We also stated that the open and obvious doctrine 
should not be viewed as “some type of ‘exception’ to the 
duty generally owed invitees,” but rather viewed “as an 
integral part of the definition of that duty.” Id. at 516. 
C. 
Compatibility of the Two Doctrines 
Defendants urge us to find that the two doctrines—the 
common work area doctrine and the open and obvious 
doctrine—are compatible and can be applied harmoniously. 
However, as noted above, for a general contractor to be 
held liable under the common work area doctrine, a 
plaintiff must show that the general contractor has failed 
“to guard against readily observable and avoidable dangers 
. . . .” Ormsby, supra at 54. Yet, one could replace the 
phrase “readily observable and avoidable” as used in Ormsby 
8  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
with the phrase “open and obvious” without significantly 
changing 
the 
meaning 
of 
this 
passage. 
Thus, 
an 
irreconcilable conflict immediately arises: 
one doctrine 
(common work area) imposes an affirmative duty to protect 
against hazards that are open and obvious, while the other 
(open and obvious) asserts that no duty exists if the 
hazards are open and obvious.2
 Because of this logical 
conflict, we have no difficulty in concluding that the open 
and obvious doctrine and the common work area doctrine are 
incompatible. 
The Court of Appeals recognized in this case that 
Michigan courts have not expanded the open and obvious 
doctrine 
into 
a 
general-contractor 
liability 
context. 
Ghaffari, supra at 614. 
However, the Court then proceeded 
to conclude that “there is nothing in the history of the 
open and obvious danger doctrine . . . to suggest that the 
doctrine should not apply in other contexts.” 
Id. 
With 
this conclusion, we respectfully disagree. 
In addition to the logical conflict noted above, we 
recognize that there are several critical distinctions 
between the two doctrines that demonstrate that they serve 
different objectives. First, our jurisprudence makes clear 
2 At least, absent “special aspects.” 
Lugo, supra at 
517-518. 
9  
 
 
that the two doctrines are applicable in entirely different 
contexts. 
The open and obvious doctrine is specifically 
applicable to a premises possessor. 
Lugo, supra at 516­
517. 
The common work area doctrine, meanwhile, is not 
applicable to the premises possessor, but rather to a 
general contractor whose responsibility it is to coordinate 
the activities of an 
array of subcontractors. 
See, 
generally, Funk and Ormsby. 
In Perkoviq v Delcor Homes—Lake Shore Pointe, Ltd, 466 
Mich 11; 643 NW2d 212 (2002), this Court recognized the 
distinction inherent in these two contexts. 
In Perkoviq, 
the plaintiff worker was injured when he fell from the roof 
while painting a partially constructed house. He brought 
suit 
against 
the 
defendant, 
the 
owner 
and 
general 
contractor of the subdivision development, on both premises 
liability and contractor liability theories. 
In reversing 
the Court of Appeals conclusion that genuine issues of 
material fact existed regarding the plaintiff’s premises 
liability claim, we observed: 
The Court of Appeals seems to have confused
general contractor liability with the liability
of a possessor of premises. In explaining its
conclusion that defendant could be liable on a 
premises 
liability 
theory, 
the 
Court 
used 
analysis that was irrelevant to that theory and
would be applicable only to a claim against a
general contractor. . . . 
The fact that defendant may have additional
duties 
in 
its 
role 
as 
general 
contractor, 
10 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
however, does not alter the nature of the duties
owed by virtue of its ownership of the premises.
[Id. at 19.] 
Thus, contrary to the Court of Appeals analysis, Perkoviq 
makes clear that different duties are owed under each 
doctrine, and that the legal analyses employed in the two 
contexts are distinct. 
Moreover, Ormsby itself implicitly recognized the 
fundamental difference between these two contexts. While a 
premises owner who hires an independent contractor is 
generally not liable for injuries that the contractor 
negligently causes,3 we noted in Ormsby that a premises 
owner may still be liable for injuries to workers under 
limited circumstances. 
Where the premises owner retains 
sufficient control over the construction project, the owner 
“steps into the shoes of the general contractor and is held 
to the same degree of care as the general contractor.” 
Ormsby, supra at 49. In such a case, the owner would face 
liability under the “retained control doctrine,” which we 
described as standing for the proposition 
that when the Funk “common work area doctrine” 
would 
apply, 
and 
the 
property 
owner 
has 
sufficiently 
“retained 
control” 
over 
the 
construction project, that owner steps into the
shoes of the general contractor and is held to
the 
same 
degree 
of 
care 
as 
the 
general 
3 See, e.g., DeShambo v Anderson, 471 Mich 27, 31; 684
NW2d 332 (2004). 
11  
 
 
 
    
                                                 
contractor. 
Thus, 
the 
“retained 
control 
doctrine,” in this context, means that if a 
property owner assumes the role of a general
contractor, such owner assumes the unique duties
and obligations of a general contractor. 
[Id. 
(emphasis added).] 
Ormsby made clear that the owner’s liability in such a 
situation would stem not from the owner’s status as the 
premises possessor, but from his or her status as the de 
facto general contractor. 
In making such a distinction, 
Ormsby recognized the distinction between the duties a 
premises possessor owes by virtue of his or her status as a 
possessor, and the duties owed by virtue of retaining 
control as a contractor over a common work area. 
Because 
these duties—articulated in the open and obvious doctrine 
and 
the 
common 
work 
area 
doctrine, 
respectively—are 
distinct, so too must be the doctrines that articulate such 
duties.4 
A second distinction between the two doctrines that 
our cases make apparent concerns the issue of worker 
4 We note that the retained control doctrine is not 
implicated in the instant case, because none of the 
remaining defendants is the premises owner. 
We refer to 
that doctrine only to point out its recognition that the
nature of the liability faced by one who possess premises,
and by one who controls premises during their construction,
are distinct. 
12  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
safety.5
 We note that the application of the open and 
obvious doctrine in the construction setting would conflict 
with the reasoning underlying this Court’s holding in 
Hardy, because it would largely nullify the doctrine of 
comparative negligence in the construction setting, and 
effectively restore the complete bar to a contractor’s 
liability abolished when Hardy eliminated contributory 
negligence in that setting. 
In Hardy, supra at 39, this Court addressed “whether 
the Funk policy of promoting safety in the workplace would 
be undermined or enhanced by the application of the 
principles 
of 
comparative 
negligence.” 
In 
adopting 
comparative negligence, we observed: 
In Funk, this Court found the total bar of
contributory negligence to be inconsistent with
the public policy of promoting safety in the
workplace. 
The Court refused to allow a general
contractor and a landowner to “avoid” liability
“by pointing to the concurrent negligence of the
injured worker in using the [unsafe] equipment.”
Before Funk, the contractor could entirely avoid 
5 While the foundational consideration underlying the
common work area doctrine is one of job site safety, safety
concerns of course are not limited to the construction 
setting. 
While our opinion today distinguishes the common
work area doctrine from the open and obvious doctrine, we
emphasize our view that the latter doctrine also promotes
safety concerns, albeit in a different manner. 
As is 
apparent from our discussion later in this opinion of the
hazards typically found in a construction site, what 
constitutes “ordinary care” in a premises liability setting
may differ substantially from what constitutes “ordinary
care” in the construction setting. 
13  
 
 
 
liability by convincing the finder of fact that
the plaintiff was even 1% negligent. 
Apparently
it was feared that some contractors might succumb
to the temptation of employing skilled defense
counsel instead of adequate safety devices. . . . 
“To allow defendants in this case to invoke 
the protection of the contributory negligence 
doctrine would be tantamount to subverting the
very safety concerns that the . . . Funk court[]
extolled as of paramount importance. Such a 
position might allow a manufacturer to escape its
duty of due care . . . .” 
* * * 
In 
stark 
contrast, 
the 
defense 
of 
comparative negligence never allows a contractor
to entirely “avoid” liability and thus “escape”
the duty of due care. 
Under Placek [v Sterling
Hts, 405 Mich 638; 275 NW2d 511 (1979)], the
defendant must pay the full percentage of damages
caused 
by 
his 
negligence. 
[Id. 
at 
39-40 
(citations omitted).] 
The adoption of the open and obvious doctrine in the 
general contractor setting would tend to thwart the goals 
of workplace safety advanced by our decisions in Funk and 
Hardy. If we were to adopt the rule set forth below by the 
Court of Appeals, we would effectively return to a 
contributory negligence regime. 
In such a case, no matter 
how negligent the general contractor was in creating or 
failing to ameliorate the hazard, the employee would be 
barred from recovery because the hazard was open and 
obvious. 
Hardy recognized that such bars to recovery “provide a 
strong financial incentive for contractors to breach the 
14  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
duty to undertake reasonable safety precautions.” 
Id. at 
41. 
Indeed, such a rule might lead to a paradoxical 
result—the more egregious (i.e., obvious) the safety 
violation, the less incentive the contractor would have to 
ameliorate the hazard, because of the knowledge that 
obviousness of the hazard would bar the contractor's 
liability for the resulting injury. Instead, Hardy adopted 
a comparative negligence rule on the grounds that such a 
rule retains a strong incentive for general contractors to 
maintain workplace safety.6
 Accordingly, we believe that 
Hardy supports the conclusion that the open and obvious 
doctrine should remain distinct from the common work area 
doctrine. 
As a third distinction between the two doctrines, we 
offer a final observation grounded in the nature of the 
different harms confronted in the realms in which each 
doctrine is applicable. 
In particular, there exist unique 
and distinct attributes of the construction setting that 
would make the rules applicable in the typical premises 
liability setting inappropriate.    
6 In addition, such a rule also ensures that the worker 
also bears responsibility for his or her own conduct. 
A 
comparative negligence regime “enhances the goal of safety
in the workplace under these conditions . . . .” 
Hardy, 
supra at 41. 
15  
 
 
 
 
 
Construction sites typically involve the comings and 
goings of multiple subcontractors and their materials, a 
physical venue that is constantly being subjected to 
alteration, with any number of open hazards that are 
evolving 
by 
the 
moment. 
The 
hazards 
existing 
at 
construction sites are numerous and may typically come from 
any one of three dimensions, including from above. 
These 
hazards may often be in motion. Loud and sudden noises may 
surround and distract the construction worker, with many of 
these noises emanating from the dangerous activities 
carried 
out 
by 
fellow 
workers 
who 
may 
be 
near. 
Nonetheless, at the same time that he or she is confronted 
with such an environment, the construction worker must move 
at a business-like pace in order to carry out his or her 
job—one that may require considerable physical exertion, 
and require attention to detail and compliance with 
demanding professional standards—in a timely manner. 
This 
is in contrast to the typical premises liability case in 
which the open and obvious hazard is found on or near 
ground level, and in which distractions, although they may 
sometimes exist, are of a considerably less urgent and 
persistent character than those faced by the construction 
worker. 
While the construction worker still bears the 
responsibility of carrying out his or her work in a 
reasonable and prudent manner, the worker will typically 
16 
 
 
 
encounter more dangers of a more diverse character, and 
more distractions coming from more directions, than will 
persons shopping in retail establishments or walking in 
parking lots or visiting the residences of others, and will 
generally be less able to avoid a given hazard than the 
typical invitee or licensee, even if the hazard may be seen 
after the fact as open and obvious. 
It is the general contractor who has the coordinating 
power and supervisory authority to ensure that this unusual 
array of physical risks does not devolve into chaos, and it 
is the general contractor upon whom ultimate responsibility 
for the safe completion of a project rests. As the overall 
coordinator of this activity, the general contractor is 
best situated to ensure workplace safety at the least cost. 
Because of this position, the duty to keep common work 
areas safe reasonably falls on the general contractor. 
As our analysis today attempts to make clear, the two 
doctrines at issue are independent of and distinct from one 
another. 
The open and obvious doctrine serves as an 
“integral part of the definition” of the duty a premises 
possessor owes invitees, Lugo, supra at 516, while the 
common work area doctrine “is an exception to the general 
rule of nonliability for the negligent acts of independent 
subcontractors and their employees,” under which “an 
injured employee of an independent subcontractor [may] sue
17 
 
 
 
 
the general contractor . . . .” Ormsby, supra at 49. The 
two 
doctrines 
involve 
completely 
distinct 
sets 
of 
plaintiffs and defendants, and therefore, as noted in 
Perkoviq, different sets of duties. 
Thus, contrary to the Court of Appeals conclusion, 
this Court’s cases have not suggested that the two 
doctrines are compatible, but rather have made clear that 
the rationale and practical considerations underlying the 
open and obvious doctrine are separate and distinct from 
those that underlie the common work area doctrine. Because 
we reaffirm that the two doctrines are, in fact, distinct, 
we hold that the open and obvious doctrine has no 
applicability to a claim under the common work area 
doctrine, and therefore the trial court erred in granting 
summary disposition in favor of defendants on the basis 
that the pipes at issue were an open and obvious hazard. 
D. 
Subcontractor Liability 
The question remains regarding the liability of the 
defendant subcontractors, Hoyt and Guideline. 
Plaintiff 
argues that summary disposition should not have been 
granted because a question of fact existed with regard to 
“whether defendants negligently performed their contractual 
obligations to clean up and remove safety hazards.” 
Plaintiff 
and 
defendant 
Hoyt 
disagree 
regarding 
the 
18  
 
 
 
relevance of our decision in Fultz v Union-Commerce Assoc, 
470 Mich 460; 683 NW2d 587 (2004). 
Moreover, with respect to defendant Guideline, besides 
granting summary disposition because the condition was open 
and obvious, the trial court granted summary disposition on 
the additional ground that no evidence was presented to 
indicate that the pipes in question belonged to Guideline. 
Plaintiff argues to this Court, as he did to the Court of 
Appeals, that summary disposition was inappropriate with 
regard to Guideline, because a genuine issue of material 
fact was presented concerning whether it owned the pipes 
that caused plaintiff’s fall. 
However, in light of its 
conclusion that the open and obvious doctrine barred 
plaintiff’s claim, the Court of Appeals never addressed 
this alternate ground for summary disposition. 
Because our decision in Fultz was released nine months 
after the Court of Appeals decision in this case, and 
because the Court did not address the matter of Guideline’s 
ownership of the pipes, remand to the Court of Appeals is 
necessary for resolution of these issues. 
On remand, the 
Court shall first consider whether a genuine issue of 
material fact exists regarding Guideline’s ownership of the 
pipes. 
If it concludes that no such issue exists, then it 
shall affirm the trial court’s grant of summary disposition 
for Guideline on that ground. 
Should the Court conclude 
19 
 
 
    
 
                                                 
that an issue of fact does exist, then the Court shall 
consider if Guideline, along with Hoyt, owed plaintiff any 
duty under Fultz. 
If the Court concludes that Hoyt, Guideline, or both 
owed plaintiff a duty under Fultz, the Court shall then 
remand to the trial court for further proceedings against 
the relevant subcontractor(s) and Turner. 
However, should 
the Court conclude that the subcontractor(s) owed plaintiff 
no contractual duty, then it shall dismiss Hoyt and 
Guideline from the suit and remand for further proceedings 
against Turner only.7 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The open and obvious doctrine has no applicability to 
a claim brought under the common work area doctrine. 
The 
two doctrines are conceptually distinct, and our case law 
7 While we decline to review plaintiff’s contract-based
claim of liability in advance of the Court of Appeals, we
note in passing that the subcontractors face no liability
under the other theories addressed in this opinion. 
No 
liability could attach under a premises liability theory,
because 
the 
subcontractors 
were 
not 
the 
premises
possessors. 
See Lugo, supra at 516-517. 
Nor can the 
subcontractors face liability under the common work area 
doctrine, because they did not have control of the work
area. 
We recognized in Ormsby, supra at 56-57, that the
common work area doctrine is only applicable to a general
contractor or to a property owner who retains sufficient
control of the work so as to act in a superintending
capacity (under the “retained control” doctrine).  Here,
the subcontractors acted as neither. 
Thus, neither of
these doctrines serves as a basis for imposing liability on
Hoyt or Guideline. 
20  
 
 
 
has treated them as such. Accordingly, the decision of the 
Court of Appeals is reversed. 
However, because the Court of Appeals declined, on the 
basis of its findings regarding the applicability of the 
open and obvious doctrine, to review the alternate ground 
for summary disposition given with respect to defendant 
Guideline, and because our decision in Fultz was released 
after the Court of Appeals decision in the instant case, we 
remand to that Court to determine the outstanding questions 
concerning the liability of the subcontractors. 
Once it 
has resolved these questions, the Court of Appeals is 
instructed to further remand to the trial court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion with regard to 
Turner and, if applicable, Hoyt and Guideline. 
Stephen J. Markman
Clifford W. Taylor
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
21