Title: State v. Timothy Scott Bailey Smith, Sr.
Citation: 2005 WI 104
Docket Number: 2003AP001698-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 6, 2005

2005 WI 104 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP1698-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Timothy Scott Bailey Smith, Sr.,  
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2004 WI App 116 
Reported at:  275 Wis. 2d 204, 685 N.W.2d 821 
(Ct. App. 2004-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 6, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 7, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Green   
 
JUDGE: 
James R. Beer   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
CONCUR/DISSENT: 
BUTLER, JR., J., concurs in part, dissents in 
part (opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by James M. Freimuth, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney 
general. 
  
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief and oral 
argument 
by 
Patrick 
M. 
Donnelly, 
assistant 
state 
public 
defender. 
 
 
2005 WI 104 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP1698-CR  
(L.C. No. 
1999CF89) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Timothy Scott Bailey Smith, Sr.,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 6, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   The State of Wisconsin 
requests review of a published decision of the court of appeals, 
State v. Smith, 2004 WI App 116, 275 Wis. 2d 204, 685 N.W.2d 
821.  The court of appeals reversed a judgment of the circuit 
court for Green County, the Honorable James R. Beer, presiding, 
convicting Timothy Smith, Sr. of two felony counts of failure to 
No. 
2003AP1698-CR   
 
2 
 
pay child support, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.22(2) (2001-02).1  
The State argues that the court of appeals erred in concluding 
that the circuit court violated the constitutional principles 
articulated in United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995), by 
declining to submit a question to the jury on whether child 
support was ordered by a "court of competent jurisdiction," as 
used in § 948.22(1)(a).  The State also argues that the court of 
appeals erred in concluding that the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion in admitting a copy of a certified copy 
of a Maine court's child support order. 
¶2 
We 
conclude 
that 
whether 
a 
court 
of 
competent 
jurisdiction issued the child support order underlying a 
prosecution for the crime of failure to pay child support is not 
an element of that crime.  Therefore, the constitutional 
principles discussed in Gaudin were not implicated when the 
circuit court declined to submit a question to the jury in that 
regard.  In addition, we conclude that the circuit court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion in admitting Exhibit 3, a 
copy of a certified copy of the Maine court's child support 
                                                 
1 All further references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2001-02 version unless otherwise noted.  The petitioner was 
charged under Wis. Stat. § 948.22(2) for conduct that allegedly 
occurred during two different time periods:  (1) between July 1, 
1996 and August 18, 1997 and (2) between February 17, 1998 and 
July 2, 1999.  The 2001-02 version of § 948.22(1)(a) and (2) is 
the same as the prior versions in effect during those time 
periods in all respects material to this review.  Compare 
§ 948.22(1)(a) and (2) (2001-02) with § 948.22(1)(a) and (2) 
(1999-00), § 948.22(1)(a) and (2) (1997-98), and § 948.22(1)(a) 
and (2) (1995-96). 
No. 
2003AP1698-CR   
 
3 
 
order, as it was admissible pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 909.015(1) 
and (7).  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and affirm the judgment of the circuit court. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
Timothy Smith ("Smith") and Denise Smith were married 
in Connecticut in 1977.  They had three children.  In 1989, they 
were divorced by a district court in Waldo County, Maine.  The 
divorce judgment did not order Smith to pay child support. 
¶4 
Denise Smith and the children subsequently moved to 
Wisconsin.  In February 1992, a Green County child support case 
manager filed a petition for child support against Smith on 
Denise Smith's behalf in the circuit court for Green County.  
The petition was later transmitted to the Maine Department of 
Human Services, pursuant to the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement 
of Support Act ("URESA").  On October 1, 1992, Smith met with an 
employee of the Maine Department of Human Services at the 
Sagadahoc County courthouse, and on the same day, he stipulated 
to the superior court of Sagadahoc County, Maine's order 
requiring him to pay $68 per week in child support. 
¶5 
On October 12, 1999, Smith was charged in Green County 
with two felony counts of failure to pay child support, contrary 
to Wis. Stat. § 948.22(2), based on allegations that he had not 
paid child support between July 1, 1996 and August 18, 1997 and 
again between February 17, 1998 and July 2, 1999. 
¶6 
In pretrial motions and argument, Smith asked the 
circuit court to conclude that the 1992 Maine court order was 
invalid.  He asserted various reasons for the order's alleged 
No. 
2003AP1698-CR   
 
4 
 
invalidity:  (1) it was issued by a court in Sagadahoc County, 
rather than a court in Waldo County; therefore, it was not 
issued by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) his agreement 
to pay $68 per week in child support was the result of his 
meeting with an employee of the Maine Department of Human 
Services, whom Smith contended had no authority to "prosecute" 
the URESA petition; therefore, the order was invalid; and (3) 
the Maine court order did not state under which provision of 
Maine or federal law it was proceeding upon; therefore, it was 
not a lawful order.  Smith asserted these attacks on the Maine 
order were appropriate because the third element necessary to 
prove a Wis. Stat. § 948.22(2) violation is that he knew or 
reasonably should have known that he was legally obligated to 
pay child support.  Smith contended that because he did not 
believe the order was valid, that affected his state of mind in 
regard to the third element.  Therefore, the question of the 
order's validity was a proper subject for the jury.2 
¶7 
The prosecutor characterized Smith's theories as a 
disguised collateral attack on the Maine order, an attack he 
argued should not be permitted because Smith pursued a remedy in 
the Maine courts.  The prosecutor pointed out that Smith 
admitted that once the support order began to be enforced, he 
had challenged it in Maine courts, but after losing, he did not 
                                                 
2 Smith has never contended that the Maine court order did 
not direct him to pay support for his children.  Rather, he has 
contended that the court that did so used its authority 
improperly for the reasons set out above. 
No. 
2003AP1698-CR   
 
5 
 
complete an appeal.  The circuit court concluded that whether 
the Maine order was valid was a question for the court.  The 
court concluded that it would give "full faith and credit" to 
the Maine order, which the court determined was a legal 
question, and it refused to permit Smith to "collaterally 
attack" the order.3  
¶8 
The case was tried before a jury.  At trial, Smith 
shifted his method of attacking the Maine court order somewhat 
by asking the court to instruct the jury that it was required to 
find, as an element of the offense, that a court of competent 
jurisdiction issued the October 1, 1992 child support order.  
The circuit court declined, concluding that the question of 
whether the Maine child support order was issued by a court of 
competent jurisdiction was a legal question that the court had 
already determined.  Additionally, Smith objected to the 
admission of Exhibit 3, a copy of a certified copy of the Maine 
child support order, arguing that the document had not been 
properly authenticated.  The circuit court overruled that 
objection as well. 
¶9 
The jury found Smith guilty of both counts of failure 
to pay child support, and the circuit court sentenced Smith and 
filed a judgment of conviction.  Smith appealed the judgment, 
and the court of appeals reversed.  The State then petitioned 
this court for review, which we granted. 
                                                 
3 From this discussion, it is unclear whether the circuit 
court is referring to the original Maine order, the judgment 
holding that order valid or both Maine decisions.  
No. 
2003AP1698-CR   
 
6 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Constitutional Challenge  
¶10 The court of appeals relied on the United States 
Supreme Court's decision in Gaudin in reaching its conclusion 
that the circuit court violated Smith's constitutional rights by 
declining to submit a jury question about whether a court of 
competent jurisdiction had ordered him to pay child support.  In 
Gaudin, the Supreme Court explained that the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution4 "require criminal 
convictions to rest upon a jury determination that the defendant 
is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is 
charged, beyond a reasonable doubt."  Id. at 510; see also In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) ("[T]he Due Process Clause 
protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond 
                                                 
4 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides in relevant part: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, 
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment 
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising 
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when 
in actual service in time of War or public danger 
. . . . 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides in relevant part: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . . 
No. 
2003AP1698-CR   
 
7 
 
a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the 
crime with which he is charged.").  We similarly have held that 
"where the finder of fact is a jury, rather than a judge, proof 
of all essential elements must be tendered to the jury."  State 
v. McAllister, 107 Wis. 2d 532, 533, 319 N.W.2d 865 (1982) 
(citations omitted).   
¶11 In Gaudin, the defendant had been charged with making 
false statements on federal loan documents.5  Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 
508.  The parties did not dispute that the "materiality" of 
those statements was an element of that offense and that the 
government bore the burden of proving "materiality."  Id. at 
509.  Rather, in Gaudin, the parties disputed whether the 
element of "materiality" must be submitted to the jury for 
determination.  Id.  The government argued, in part, that the 
question of "materiality" is a legal question and as such, a 
question for the court, not the jury, to determine.  Id. at 511.  
                                                 
5 The defendant had been charged with violating 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1001 (1988), which provided:  
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of 
any 
department 
or 
agency 
of 
the 
United 
States 
knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers 
up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or 
makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements 
or representations, or makes or uses any false writing 
or document knowing the same to contain any false, 
fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be 
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more 
than five years, or both. 
United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (quoting 18 
U.S.C. § 1001) (emphasis added). 
No. 
2003AP1698-CR   
 
8 
 
However, the Supreme Court held that the determination of 
"materiality" was a mixed question of fact and law.  Id. at 512.  
The Supreme Court then concluded that all elements of a crime 
must go to the jury, even those elements that involve a mixed 
question of fact and law.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court held 
that the jury should have determined whether the defendant's 
statements were "material."  Id. at 512-14. 
¶12 In the present case, the posture of the question 
differs from that in Gaudin because Smith and the State dispute 
whether the question at issue, i.e., whether a "court of 
competent jurisdiction" issued the Maine child support order, is 
an element of the crime of failure to pay child support.  
Because we determine that the question of whether a court of 
competent jurisdiction ordered Smith to pay child support is not 
an element of the crime at issue, we also conclude that the 
constitutional 
principles 
articulated 
in 
Gaudin 
are 
not 
implicated.   
1. 
Standard of review  
¶13  Because determination of the statutory elements of a 
crime is a question of law, our review is de novo.  State v. 
Ruesch, 214 Wis. 2d 548, 552-53, 571 N.W.2d 898 (Ct. App. 1997) 
(citation omitted). 
2. 
Elements of the crime  
¶14 In McAllister, as in the present case, we were asked 
to determine the "essential elements" of a crime, and we were 
asked to do so for the same purpose as in the present case, that 
is, to decide whether a circuit court had failed to submit an 
No. 
2003AP1698-CR   
 
9 
 
element to the jury for determination, thereby violating the 
defendant's 
right 
to 
have 
"proof 
of 
all 
essential 
elements . . . tendered to the jury."  McAllister, 107 Wis. 2d 
at 533.  We began our analysis in McAllister by noting the 
definition of "crime" provided for by the legislature in Wis. 
Stat. § 939.12.  Id. at 535.  Section 939.12 in relevant part 
provides, "A crime is conduct which is prohibited by state law 
and punishable by fine or imprisonment or both."  (Emphasis 
added.)  Then, to determine the elements of the crime in 
question in McAllister, we proceeded to examine the statute 
pursuant to which the defendant had been convicted in order to 
determine what conduct the statute prohibited,6 noting that the 
ordinary sense of the meaning of the word "element" is "the 
incidents 
of 
conduct 
giving 
rise 
to 
the 
prosecution," 
McAllister, 107 Wis. 2d at 535, 538. 
¶15 Here, too, we examine the statute providing for the 
crime, Wis. Stat. § 948.22(2), to determine the elements of the 
crime of failure to pay child support, and we focus on the 
conduct that is prohibited therein.  Section 948.22(2) in 
pertinent part provides, "Any person who intentionally fails for 
                                                 
6 In State v. McAllister, 107 Wis. 2d 532, 319 N.W.2d 865 
(1982), the defendant had been convicted of violating Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.63(1), which then provided, "No person may drive or 
operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of an 
intoxicant or a controlled substance."  Id. at 532 n.1 
(quoting § 346.63(1)).  We concluded that the two elements of 
the offense that needed to be proven to sustain a judgment of 
conviction and submitted to the jury were: "(1) driving or 
operating a motor vehicle, and (2) doing so while under the 
influence of an intoxicant."  Id. at 535.  
No. 
2003AP1698-CR   
 
10 
 
120 or more consecutive days to provide spousal, grandchild or 
child support which the person knows or reasonably should know 
the person is legally obligated to provide is guilty . . . ."  
On the face of § 948.22(2), the elements of this crime are:  (1) 
an intentional failure to provide child support; (2) that 
continued for 120 or more consecutive days; and (3) actual or 
constructive knowledge of the legal obligation to provide 
support.  The Jury Instructions Committee has come to the same 
conclusion, proposing these same three elements in Wisconsin 
Jury Instructions——Criminal 2152.7  
¶16 A requirement that a court of competent jurisdiction 
has issued the child support order is found in the definitions 
section of the statute, Wis. Stat. § 948.22(1).  Section 
948.22(1)(a) provides: 
'Child support' means an amount which a person is 
ordered to provide for support of a child by a court 
of competent jurisdiction in this state or in another 
state, territory or possession of the United States, 
or, if not ordered, an amount that a person is legally 
obligated to provide under s. 49.90.      
                                                 
7 The Wisconsin Criminal Jury Instructions Committee has 
articulated the elements of Wis. Stat. § 948.22 as: "1. The 
defendant intentionally failed to provide (spousal) (child) 
support . . . .  2. The failure to provide support continued for 
120 or more consecutive days.  3. The defendant (knew) 
(reasonably should have known) that (he) (she) was legally 
obligated to provide the (spousal) (child) support."  Wis JI——
Criminal 2152 (footnote omitted). 
We have recognized that the work of the Wisconsin Criminal 
Jury Instructions Committee, while not precedential, may be 
persuasive.  State v. Olson, 175 Wis. 2d 628, 642 n.10, 498 
N.W.2d 661 (1993).  
No. 
2003AP1698-CR   
 
11 
 
This provision, whether a court of competent jurisdiction issued 
the child support order, focuses on the characteristics of a 
court.  By contrast, elements of a crime generally are focused 
on a defendant's conduct.  See McAllister, 107 Wis. 2d at 535, 
538.  For example, in order to violate § 948.22(2), a defendant 
must intentionally fail to pay, the failure to pay must continue 
for 120 consecutive days and the defendant must have known or 
reasonably should have known of the obligation to pay.  All of 
the acts described in subsection (2) focus on the conduct of the 
defendant, while the phrase relied on by Smith focuses on the 
characteristics of a court.    This leads us to conclude that 
the phrase is not an element of the crime of failure to pay 
child support under § 948.22(2).  Therefore, the circuit court 
was not required to give the jury instruction Smith requested in 
order to satisfy the constitutional requirement that each 
element of the crime for which a defendant is charged be 
tendered to the jury.  See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 510; McAllister, 
107 Wis. 2d at 532.  
¶17 Our inquiry, however, does not end there.  Smith 
argues that in Wis. Stat. § 948.22(1)(a), "court of competent 
jurisdiction" encompasses the concepts of personal jurisdiction, 
subject matter jurisdiction and a court's "competency," while 
the State counters that the phrase refers only to a court's 
subject matter jurisdiction.   
¶18 To briefly review, subject matter jurisdiction refers 
to the power of a court to decide certain types of actions. 
United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828 (1984); Kohler Co. v. 
No. 
2003AP1698-CR   
 
12 
 
Wixen, 204 Wis. 2d 327, 336, 555 N.W.2d 640 (Ct. App. 1996); 21 
C.J.S. Courts § 10 (1990) ("Jurisdiction of the subject matter 
is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to 
which 
the 
proceedings 
in 
question 
belong."). 
 
Personal 
jurisdiction, on the other hand, refers to a court's power "to 
enter a judgment in personam against an individual party."  
Kohler, 204 Wis. 2d at 336; accord 21 C.J.S. Courts § 11 
("Jurisdiction of the person is the power of a court to bring 
before it the person to be affected by the judgment . . . and to 
render a judgment binding on such person.").  However, a court's 
"competency," as the term is understood in Wisconsin, is not 
jurisdictional at all, but instead, is defined as "the power of 
a court to exercise its subject matter jurisdiction" in a 
particular case.  Kohler, 204 Wis. 2d at 337.  For example, we 
have explained that a court may lose its "competency" to 
adjudicate a particular case if it fails to comply with a 
variety 
of 
statutory 
procedures, 
including 
certain 
time 
limitations.  Village of Trempealeau v. Mikrut, 2004 WI 79, 
¶¶12-13, 273 Wis. 2d 76, 681 N.W.2d 190.  
¶19 The 
legislature 
has 
used 
the 
phrase 
"court 
of 
competent jurisdiction" in numerous Wisconsin statutes.8  The 
parties have not pointed to a single Wisconsin appellate court 
decision that interprets this phrase in a Wisconsin statute, and 
                                                 
8 Text 
searches 
of 
electronic 
databases 
of 
Wisconsin 
statutes 
indicate 
that 
the 
phrase 
"court 
of 
competent 
jurisdiction" is used 175 times in 153 different Wisconsin 
statutes. 
No. 
2003AP1698-CR   
 
13 
 
our review of Wisconsin case law also has not revealed such a 
decision.9   
¶20  However, even if we were to conclude, which we do 
not, 
that 
the 
phrase 
"court 
of 
competent 
jurisdiction" 
encompasses one or any number of the characteristics proposed by 
the 
parties 
(i.e., 
subject 
matter 
jurisdiction, 
personal 
jurisdiction or competency), the presence or absence of these 
characteristics is a question of law, to be determined by a 
court.  See Van Deurzen v. Yamaha Motor Corp. USA, 2004 WI App 
194, ¶9, 276 Wis. 2d 815, 688 N.W.2d 777 (in regard to subject 
matter jurisdiction); see Marsh v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 
179 Wis. 2d 42, 52, 505 N.W.2d 162 (Ct. App. 1993) (in regard to 
personal jurisdiction); State v. Bollig, 222 Wis. 2d 558, 563, 
587 N.W.2d 908 (Ct. App. 1998) (in regard to competence).  The 
only exception would be if Smith had alleged historical facts 
inconsistent with the Maine court's jurisdiction that the State 
disputes.  However, we are not presented with any factual 
                                                 
9 The court of appeals has considered the phrase "court of 
competent jurisdiction" in the context of deciding that a forum 
selection clause of a guaranty conferred the right to exercise 
personal jurisdiction by consent.  Kohler Co. v. Wixen, 204 
Wis. 2d 327, 337, 555 N.W.2d 640 (Ct. App. 1996).  The Kohler 
decision concerned contract law and did not interpret the phrase 
"court of competent jurisdiction" in a statute.  Id.        
No. 
2003AP1698-CR   
 
14 
 
disputes about which court actually issued the child support 
order.10 
¶21 And finally, we agree with the circuit court's 
conclusion that Smith's requested jury instruction was an 
impermissible collateral attack on the validity of the Maine 
court order in a proceeding to enforce that order.  As has been 
explained: 
A collateral attack is an "attempt to avoid, 
evade or deny the force and effect of a judgment in an 
indirect manner and not in a direct proceeding 
prescribed by law and instituted for the purpose of 
vacating, reviewing, or annulling it." 
State v. Bouzek, 168 Wis. 2d 642, 644-45, 484 N.W.2d 362 (Ct. 
App. 1992) (quoting Schramek v. Bohren, 145 Wis. 2d 695, 713, 
429 N.W.2d 501 (Ct. App. 1988)).  Bouzek arose from enforcement 
proceedings on a harassment injunction.  Initially, Bouzek had 
                                                 
10 Here, while Smith characterizes the "court of competent 
jurisdiction" question in his case as a factual dispute in his 
briefing to this court, he has not identified any historical 
facts regarding any incident of jurisdiction that are in 
dispute.  Smith does explain that at the circuit court, he 
argued that a superior court of Sagadahoc County, Maine was not 
a court of competent jurisdiction to issue the child support 
order pursuant to a URESA request because a district court in 
Waldo County, Maine had earlier granted the divorce decree 
without ordering child support.  This would generally be deemed 
an issue of subject matter jurisdiction, as it regards the power 
of a particular court to hear and determine a particular type of 
case.  The parties do not dispute that a district court in Waldo 
County, Maine granted the divorce decree.  They also do not 
dispute that a superior court in Sagadahoc County, Maine issued 
the child support order.  As such, there is no dispute of 
historical fact.  All that is at issue, is which court should 
have issued the child support order, which is a legal question.  
Such a legal question regarding jurisdiction is for court, not 
jury, determination.   
No. 
2003AP1698-CR   
 
15 
 
consented to the issuance of the injunction and negotiated a 
plea agreement wherein he pled guilty to the violation of the 
injunction.  Bouzek, 168 Wis. 2d at 643.  After sentencing, he 
sought to vacate his conviction on the grounds that the 
underlying injunction was improperly issued.  Id.  The court of 
appeals did not address the merits of Bouzek's arguments because 
it concluded that the argument constituted an impermissible 
collateral attack.  Id. at 644.   
¶22 Here, Smith did not plead guilty to failing to pay 
child support.  However, he stipulated to the Maine court's 
order when it was entered, and after it began to be enforced, he 
participated in Maine courts to challenge the order's validity.  
He lost his challenge in Maine and did not pursue an appeal of 
that judgment.  Therefore, the Maine court judgment that is 
dispositive for purposes of our review is the judgment that held 
that the Maine court child support order was validly issued.  
The question of the subject matter jurisdiction of the Maine 
court decisions is now barred by claim preclusion because when 
the Maine 
court held 
that 
the child 
support 
order was 
enforceable, 
that 
determination 
necessarily 
included 
the 
determination that the court had subject matter jurisdiction to 
issue the order.  See Northern States Power Co. v. Bugher, 189 
Wis. 2d 541, 550, 525 N.W.2d 723 (1995) (claim preclusion 
determines all matters litigated).  As Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments explains: 
Whether a court whose jurisdiction has been invoked 
has subject matter jurisdiction of the action is a 
No. 
2003AP1698-CR   
 
16 
 
legal question that may be raised by a party to the 
action or by the court itself.  When the question is 
duly raised, the court has the authority to decide it.  
A decision of the question is governed by the rules of 
res 
judicata11 
and 
hence 
ordinarily 
may 
not 
be 
relitigated in a subsequent action. 
Restatement 
(Second) 
of 
Judgments, 
§ 11 
cmt. 
c 
(1982).  
Wisconsin 
follows 
the 
Restatement's 
determination 
that 
a 
decision on the question of subject matter jurisdiction is 
subject to principles of claim preclusion.  See H.N.T. v. State, 
125 Wis. 2d 242, 250-51, 371 N.W.2d 395 (Ct. App. 1985).  
Therefore, while we agree that an order entered without 
jurisdiction is void and may be challenged at any time, see 
Neylan v. Vorwald, 124 Wis. 2d 85, 99, 368 N.W.2d 648 (1985), 
Smith did challenge the child support order in Maine.  The 
resulting judgment confirmed the validity of the child support 
order.  Because he did not appeal the judgment, the principles 
of claim preclusion are operative to settle the question of 
whether the child support order was issued by a court of 
competent jurisdiction.12  See State v. Donohue, 11 Wis. 2d 517, 
523-24, 105 N.W.2d 844 (1960).  Accordingly, the circuit court 
correctly denied Smith's requested jury instruction.   
                                                 
11 Wisconsin's nomenclature for res judicata is "claim 
preclusion."  Northern States Power Co. v. Bugher, 189 Wis. 2d 
541, 549-50, 525 N.W.2d 723 (1995). 
12 The dissent misses the import of the Maine court judgment 
that held the child support order was valid.  Instead of 
examining the effect of that judgment, the dissent sets out 
principles for collaterally attacking a void judgment.  Dissent, 
¶¶45-46.  But the judgment is not void, and the child support 
order's validity is confirmed by that judgment.  
No. 
2003AP1698-CR   
 
17 
 
¶23 In sum, whether a court of competent jurisdiction 
ordered a defendant to pay child support is not an element of 
the crime of failure to pay child support and therefore, a 
question in that regard need not have been submitted to the jury 
as an element of the crime.  Further, because Smith has not 
identified a historical fact inconsistent with an incident of 
the Maine court's jurisdiction that he and the State dispute, 
whether a court of competent jurisdiction ordered him to pay 
child support was a purely legal question for the court to 
determine.   
B. 
Admissibility of Evidence 
¶24 The State also challenges the court of appeals' 
reversal of the circuit court's decision to admit Exhibit 3, a 
copy of a certified copy of the Sagadahoc County, Maine court 
order.  The order requires Smith to pay $68 per week in child 
support, beginning October 1, 1992, and it is signed both by a 
justice of the superior court in Maine and by Smith, attesting 
to his agreement with the order. 
¶25 At trial, an employee of the clerk's office of the 
circuit court for Green County, Jean Cook, testified.  Cook 
explained that before working for the clerk of court's office, 
she was a child support case manager, and in that capacity she 
assisted Denise Smith in preparing and filing a petition for 
child support under federal URESA law.  Cook described the URESA 
petition process that was in place in 1992 and followed in 
Denise Smith's case, which started with a petition being 
prepared in Green County and then approved by the circuit court 
No. 
2003AP1698-CR   
 
18 
 
for Green County and sent to Maine.  Later, on February 1, 1993, 
a certified copy of the Maine order was received and placed in 
the file of the circuit court for Green County, numbered 92-FA-
021. 
¶26 In the course of her testimony, Cook located the 
certified copy of the Maine order in the circuit court's case 
file 92-FA-021.  She identified the official raised seal of the 
Maine clerk of court's office, as well as an attestation from 
that office that the order was a true copy.  She also testified 
that she did not receive a judicial certificate indicating that 
the attestation was in proper form.  Additionally, she compared 
Exhibit 3 and the certified copy of the Maine order in file 92-
FA-021, and she testified that Exhibit 3 was a true and accurate 
copy of the certified copy of the Maine order. 
¶27 Smith argues that Exhibit 3 should not have been 
admitted into evidence because it did not comply with 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1738 (2002).13  The State counters that the exhibit did not 
need to comply with that federal law and was admissible under 
Wisconsin statutes, including Wis. Stat. § 909.015(1) and (7).  
We agree. 
1. 
Standard of review 
¶28 "We review a circuit court's decision to admit or 
exclude evidence under an erroneous exercise of discretion 
                                                 
13 All further references to the United States Code are to 
the 2002 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2003AP1698-CR   
 
19 
 
standard."  Martindale v. Ripp, 2001 WI 113, ¶28, 246 Wis. 2d 
67, 629 N.W.2d 698.   
2. 
Authentication 
¶29 Smith argues that the authentication provision of 28 
U.S.C. § 1738 must be met for a Wisconsin court to admit an out-
of-state court order into evidence.  28 U.S.C. § 1738 provides 
in relevant part:  
The records and judicial proceedings of any court 
of any . . . State, Territory or Possession, or copies 
thereof, shall be proved or admitted in other courts 
within the United States and its Territories and 
Possessions by the attestation of the clerk and seal 
of the court annexed, if a seal exists, together with 
a certificate of a judge of the court that the said 
attestation is in proper form. 
(Emphasis added.)  Smith contends that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1738, the Maine court order should not have been admitted 
without a judge's certification that the Maine court's clerk's 
attestation was in proper form. 
¶30 However, as other courts have recognized, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1738 does not provide the exclusive basis for authenticating a 
sister state's court order.  See Donald v. Jones, 445 F.2d 601, 
606 (5th Cir. 1971); State v. Wolfskill, 421 S.W.2d 193, 195-96 
(Mo. 1967); Price v. Price, 447 N.E.2d 769, 772 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1982); Murphy v. Murphy, 581 P.2d 489, 492 (Okla. Ct. App. 
1978).  As the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals explained in 
Donald: 
28 U.S.C. 1738 . . . was enacted to implement the 
full, faith, and credit clause of the United States 
Constitution by providing a way of exemplifying the 
records of judicial proceedings held in one state so 
No. 
2003AP1698-CR   
 
20 
 
that such records would be admissible in later 
judicial proceedings held in another state.  Thus, 
this statute merely means full, faith, and credit must 
be given if certain requirements are met.  However, 
evidence of judicial proceedings may be admissible if 
less is shown than the statute requires when it 
conforms to the rules of evidence of the state where 
the trial is being held. 
Donald, 445 F.2d at 606 (emphasis added).  Accordingly, we are 
not required to apply the authentication requirement of 28 
U.S.C. § 1738 to the Maine court order at issue here, and we 
instead turn to the authentication requirements found in 
Wisconsin statutes. 
¶31 Wisconsin Stat. § 909.01 provides, "The requirements 
of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to 
admissibility are satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a 
finding that the matter in question is what its proponent 
claims."  (Emphasis added.)  Wisconsin Stat. § 909.015 provides 
examples of authentication that, while not exclusive, satisfy 
the requirements of § 909.01.  For example, § 909.015(1) 
provides that the matter in question is what its proponent 
claims when "[t]estimony of a witness with knowledge that a 
matter is what it is claimed to be" is presented.  Furthermore, 
§ 909.015(7), entitled "Public records or reports," provides 
another example:  "Evidence that a writing authorized by law to 
be recorded or filed and in fact is recorded or filed in a 
public office, or a purported public record, report, statement, 
or data compilation, in any form, is from the public office 
where items of this nature are kept." 
No. 
2003AP1698-CR   
 
21 
 
¶32 Here, the State claimed that Exhibit 3 was a copy of 
the court order issued in Maine.  Cook, an employee of the clerk 
of circuit court's office, testified that the certified copy of 
the Maine court order, with the raised seal of that court, was 
in the circuit court's file for the underlying child support 
case, 92-FA-021.  She compared that certified copy with Exhibit 
3 and verified that Exhibit 3 was a copy of the certified copy 
of the Maine order.  Therefore, she had knowledge, and testified 
accordingly, that the certified copy of the Maine court order 
had been found in the public office where an item of its nature 
is kept and that Exhibit 3 was a copy of that order.  
¶33 We note additionally that Smith did not object that 
Exhibit 3 was a copy of the certified copy, rather than the 
actual certified copy of the Maine order.  Regardless, Wis. 
Stat. § 910.33 provides for admission of a duplicate to the same 
extent as an original unless circumstances, which are not 
implicated here, are present.  Accordingly, the circuit court 
did not erroneously exercise its discretion in admitting 
Exhibit 3.  
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶34 In sum, we conclude that whether a court of competent 
jurisdiction issued the child support order underlying a 
prosecution for the crime of failure to pay child support is not 
an element of that crime.  Therefore, the constitutional 
principles discussed in Gaudin were not implicated when the 
circuit court declined to submit a question to the jury in that 
regard.  In addition, we conclude that the circuit court did not 
No. 
2003AP1698-CR   
 
22 
 
erroneously exercise its discretion in admitting Exhibit 3, a 
copy of a certified copy of the Maine court's child support 
order, as it was admissible pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 909.015(1) 
and (7).  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and affirm the judgment of the circuit court. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
No.  2003AP1698-CR.lbb 
 
1 
 
¶35 LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   (concurring in part, 
dissenting in part).  The majority concludes that whether a 
"court of competent jurisdiction" issued a child support order 
is not an element of the crime of failure to pay child support 
under Wis. Stat. § 948.22.  Majority op., ¶2.  With this 
conclusion, I agree.  The crime of felony child support contains 
the following elements: (1) that the defendant intentionally 
failed to provide child support; (2) that the intentional 
failure to provide support continued for 120 or more consecutive 
days; and (3) that the defendant knew or reasonably should have 
known that he was legally obligated to provide child support.  
See 
Wis 
JI—Criminal 
2152 
(2001); 
Wis. Stat. § 948.22(1)(a) 
(2001-02).14   
¶36 The majority then concludes that because proof that a 
court of competent jurisdiction issued a child support order is 
not an element of the offense of failure to pay child support, 
the circuit court was not required to give the jury instruction 
requested by Smith in order to satisfy the constitutional 
requirement that each element of the crime for which a defendant 
is charged be tendered to the jury.  Majority op., ¶16.  The 
second conclusion does not follow the first.  Even though there 
is no separate element for a court of competent jurisdiction, 
Smith has nonetheless been deprived of jury consideration of the 
first and third elements of the offense as they relate to the 
validity of a child support order itself.  Accordingly, while I 
agree that the decision of the court of appeals must be reversed 
                                                 
14 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-
02 version. 
No.  2003AP1698-CR.lbb 
 
2 
 
with respect to its handling of the sufficiency of the evidence 
claim,15 I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority 
opinion that affirms the trial court.  
¶37 Prior to trial for two counts of failure to pay child 
support, Timothy Smith challenged the validity of the Maine 
child support order he was accused of violating on multiple 
grounds.  First, because his divorce took place in the district 
court of Waldo County, Maine, Smith argued that the Sagadahoc 
County Superior Court in Maine that issued the child support 
order was not a "court of competent jurisdiction" as that term 
is used in Wisconsin's failure to pay child support crime.16  See 
                                                 
15 
The 
court 
of 
appeals' 
decision 
with 
respect 
to 
sufficiency of the evidence was premised on its erroneous 
conclusion that the State had to prove as one of the elements 
that a court of competent jurisdiction issued an order requiring 
the defendant to provide child support.  State v. Smith, 2004 WI 
App 116, ¶9, 275 Wis. 2d 204, 685 N.W.2d 821.  Because the State 
failed to present the jury with any evidence as to the laws of 
Maine, or give to the jury sufficient facts from which it could 
have resolved the questions of subject matter and personal 
jurisdiction concerning whether the court which issued the order 
was one of competent jurisdiction, the court of appeals reasoned 
that the evidence was insufficient.  Id., ¶33.  Because that 
court mischaracterized the elements that had to be proved, it 
similarly mischaracterized the evidence needed by the State to 
prove its case.  I would reverse the court of appeals' decision 
with respect to sufficiency of the evidence.   
   
16 Without assessing the validity of Smith's argument, I 
note that Maine's judicial system is comprised of a supreme 
court and two different trial courts, superior courts, and 
district courts.  Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 4, §§ 1-57 (West 
2004) (supreme court); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 4, §§ 101-121 
(West 2004) (superior courts); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 4, §§ 
151-184 (West 2004) (district courts).   Within the district 
court is a family division.  Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 4, § 183 
(West 2004).  According to the family division's rules, the 
family division has jurisdiction over child support.  Rules for 
the Family Division of the Maine District Court, I.A. 
No.  2003AP1698-CR.lbb 
 
3 
 
Wis. Stat. § 948.22(1)(a).  Second, he argued that the Maine 
Department of Human Services had no authority to prosecute the 
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA) petition, 
rendering the child support order invalid.  Third, Smith argued 
that the Maine child support court order was unlawful because it 
did not state on which provision of law it was based. 
¶38 Smith specifically argued that his challenges to the 
Maine child support order went to the third element necessary to 
prove the charges against him, namely, that he knew or 
reasonably should have known that he was legally obligated to 
pay child support.  He argued that if he did not believe the 
order to be valid, then he lacked the intent necessary to 
constitute the third element.  Thus, Smith argued, the question 
on the validity of the child support order was a fact question 
for the jury because it ultimately determines whether he had the 
requisite criminal state of mind.17   
¶39 The trial court concluded that whether the Maine child 
support order was valid was a question for the court, not the 
jury.  The court gave "full faith and credit" to the Maine 
order, and refused to permit Smith to collaterally attack the 
order.  The trial court further refused to instruct the jury on 
the issue or to allow the defendant to present direct evidence 
on the issue.  State v. Smith, 2004 WI App 116, ¶3, 275 Wis. 2d 
204, 685 N.W.2d 821.  The trial court also refused to instruct 
the jury that it was required to find, as a separate element of 
                                                 
17 Smith currently argues that if the Maine Superior Court 
lacked the authority to issue the child support order for any 
reason, a criminal charge cannot stand. 
No.  2003AP1698-CR.lbb 
 
4 
 
the offense, that a court of competent jurisdiction issued the 
child support order.  The court only allowed Smith to present 
evidence as to the general concepts involved with jurisdiction, 
in addition to why he believed he was not legally obligated to 
comply with the child support order.  Id.   
¶40 The court of appeals reversed the trial court, 
concluding that there are four elements to this offense, 
including that a court of competent jurisdiction issued the 
child support order.  Id., ¶9.  This court's majority correctly 
determines that there are only three elements, those stated in 
Wis JI—Criminal 2152.  Majority op., ¶15.  With that conclusion 
in hand, however, both decisions miss the import of Smith's 
argument. 
¶41 As noted above, the crime of felony child support 
contains 
the 
following 
elements: 
(1) 
that 
the 
defendant 
intentionally failed to provide child support; (2) that the 
intentional failure to provide support continued for 120 or more 
consecutive days; and (3) that the defendant knew or reasonably 
should have known that he was legally obligated to provide child 
support.  See Wis JI—Criminal 2152.  As is evident, for Smith to 
have committed this offense, he had to intentionally fail to 
provide child support, which he knew or reasonably should have 
known that he was legally obligated to provide.18  The State had 
to prove that Smith had actual or constructive notice of a legal 
obligation to provide child support.  Whether such an obligation 
                                                 
18 The second element is not at issue in this case. 
No.  2003AP1698-CR.lbb 
 
5 
 
actually existed, therefore, cuts to the heart of Smith's legal 
defense.   
¶42 To begin with, "child support" is defined in pertinent 
part as "an amount which a person is ordered to provide for 
support of a child by a court of competent jurisdiction in this 
state or in another state . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 948.22(1)(a).  
In order to intentionally fail to provide child support, a court 
of 
competent 
jurisdiction 
had 
to 
issue 
such 
an 
order.  
Otherwise, by definition, no offense could have been committed.  
Child support is part of the first element of this offense.  One 
cannot intentionally fail to pay that which does not exist.  
Absent a valid order, Smith simply has no legal obligation 
whatsoever.   
¶43 The Jury Instructions Committee certainly recognized 
the fact that the question of whether a valid support order 
existed might come into play.  In defining the first element 
concerning the intentional failure to provide support, the 
Committee noted as follows:  "For purposes of instructing the 
jury, the Committee concluded that definition of 'support' would 
rarely be necessary in the usual case.  Should the facts present 
an issue, the statutes referenced in subs. (1)(a) and (c) may 
offer some guidance . . . ."  See Wis JI——Criminal 2152 cmt. 
n.4.  Smith attempted to raise facts that would present the 
issue, but was thwarted by the trial court.  Smith set forth his 
theory that the Maine order was not valid, but was not allowed 
to present any evidence to the jury.  He requested the court to 
define "child support," consistent with the Committee's note 
No.  2003AP1698-CR.lbb 
 
6 
 
that the statute may offer some guidance, but the trial court 
declined to do so.  In short, he was precluded from presenting a 
defense against one of the essential elements that the State had 
to prove:  whether he intentionally failed to provide child 
support. 
¶44 The trial court did allow Smith to present evidence as 
to why he believed he was not legally obligated to comply with 
the child support order.  Without being able to challenge the 
order itself, and without child support being defined for the 
jury, his defense to the third element was likewise completely 
undercut.  There was simply no way for the jury to understand 
the basis of his challenge regarding his knowledge, actual or 
constructive, of an obligation that he posited did not exist.  
The jury was not informed that the order had to be issued by a 
court of competent jurisdiction. 
¶45 Jurisdictional challenges to the validity of foreign 
judgments are a legitimate matter of inquiry whenever the 
enforcement of the foreign judgment is sought.  Hansen v. 
McAndrews, 49 Wis. 2d 625, 630, 183 N.W.2d 1 (1971).  While the 
general rule precludes collateral attacks of a valid judgment,19 
when a court acts in excess of its jurisdiction its orders and 
                                                 
19 Kehl v. Britzman, 258 Wis. 513, 516, 46 N.W.2d 841 
(1951).  Accordingly, I agree with the majority that Smith is 
precluded from challenging either the authority of the Maine 
Department of Human Services to prosecute the URESA petition or 
the fact that the Maine child support order was unlawful because 
it did not state on which provision of law it was based.  
Majority op., ¶¶21—22.  I respectfully disagree with the 
majority's 
collateral 
attack 
analysis 
with 
respect 
to 
jurisdictional challenges, however.  
 
No.  2003AP1698-CR.lbb 
 
7 
 
judgments are void and may be challenged at any time.  Kohler 
Co. v. DILHR, 81 Wis. 2d 11, 25, 259 N.W.2d 695 (1977).  The 
fact that a party is dilatory or lackadaisical in his or her 
efforts to overturn the judgment is irrelevant.  Id.  "'It is 
the duty of the court to annul an invalid judgment.'"  Id. 
(quoting Halbach v. Halbach, 259 Wis. 329, 331, 48 N.W.2d 617 
(1951)).   
¶46 Void 
judgments 
cannot 
be 
validated 
by 
consent, 
ratification, waiver, or estoppel.  Kohler, 81 Wis. 2d at 25.  
Void judgments may also be attacked collaterally, id., including 
foreign judgments.  See West v. West, 82 Wis. 2d 158, 262 N.W.2d 
87 (1978).20 
¶47 Smith has directly challenged the authority of the 
Sagadahoc Superior Court to issue the child support order.  
Accordingly, he was not precluded from collaterally attacking 
the validity of that order if that court acted in excess of its 
jurisdiction.  By not allowing Smith to present evidence in 
support of his challenge, and by refusing to instruct the jury 
as to the definition of "child support," the trial court 
effectively impaired Smith's right to defend against the first 
element of the offense.        
                                                 
20 
This 
court 
has 
previously 
indicated 
that 
if 
a 
jurisdictional issue has been fully litigated in a foreign court 
and is not subject to collateral attack in that state, then the 
forum court is bound by the judgment as to jurisdiction.  Hansen 
v. McAndrews, 49 Wis. 2d 625, 630, 183 N.W.2d 1 (1971).   
Nevertheless, this court noted exceptions to this rule that 
included relief from a void judgment which appears or purports 
to be valid, particularly when due process is violated.  Id. at 
630 n.5, 631 and 637.  Thus, even though Smith failed to follow 
through with his appeal in Maine, he is not precluded from 
raising his challenge to the Maine court's jurisdiction here.  
No.  2003AP1698-CR.lbb 
 
8 
 
¶48 Due process protects a person from conviction except 
"upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to 
constitute the crime with which he is charged."  In re Winship, 
397 U.S. 358, 365 (1970); see also State v. Smith, 117 Wis. 2d 
399, 415, 344 N.W.2d 711 (Ct. App. 1983).  The State had the 
burden of proving that Smith intentionally failed to provide 
child support in this matter, as well as his actual or 
constructive knowledge of his legal obligation to provide that 
support.  The trial court failed to correctly instruct the jury 
with respect to the first element by refusing to define "child 
support."21  Omissions in jury instructions are subject to a 
harmless error analysis.  See State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶6, 
254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189.  I conclude that the error 
cannot be harmless where, as here, not only was the jury not 
instructed with respect to the definition of child support, but 
also the defense was precluded from presenting evidence with 
respect to the first and third elements. 
                                                 
21 It is not unusual to find definitions of essential 
elements or essential facts in the standard jury instructions.  
Indeed, the standard instructions are full of such examples.  
For example, "truant" as part of the third element of the 
offense is defined in Wis JI—Criminal 2173, Contributing to 
Truancy.  The definitions of "drive" and "operated" are included 
with respect to the first element throughout the drunk driving 
and prohibited alcohol concentration instructions.  See Wis JI—
Criminal 2660, etc.  "Sexual intercourse" and "sexual contact" 
are defined throughout the sexual assault instructions with 
respect to that element.  See Wis JI—Criminal 1200, etc.  These 
examples are not meant to be exhaustive.  They are illustrative 
of the fact that this court and the Jury Instructions Committee 
have long recognized the importance of defining legal terms to 
the jury so that it can better understand the elements of the 
crime charged in fulfilling its decision-making function.  The 
jury should have been so instructed in this case.  
No.  2003AP1698-CR.lbb 
 
9 
 
¶49 The majority briefly discusses how the concept of a 
"court of competent jurisdiction" encompasses the concepts of 
personal 
jurisdiction, 
subject matter 
jurisdiction, 
and a 
court's competency.  Majority op., ¶¶18-20.  As the majority 
correctly notes, subject matter jurisdiction is the power of the 
courts to hear and determine cases of the general class to which 
the proceedings belong.  United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 
828 (1984); Kohler Co. v. Wixen, 204 Wis. 2d 327, 336, 555 
N.W.2d 640 (Ct. App. 1996).  Personal jurisdiction refers to a 
court's power to enter a judgment against an individual party.  
Kohler, 204 Wis. 2d at 336.  A court's competency is not 
jurisdictional, but is defined as "the power of a court to 
exercise its subject matter jurisdiction" in a particular case.  
Id. at 337.   
¶50 In Wisconsin, Article VII, Section 8 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution provides that: "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by 
law, the circuit court shall have original jurisdiction in all 
matters civil and criminal within this state."  See also Village 
of Trempealeau v. Mikrut, 2004 WI 79, ¶8, 273 Wis. 2d 76, 681 
N.W.2d 190.  Thus, "[n]o circuit court is without subject matter 
jurisdiction to entertain actions of any nature whatsoever."  
Mueller v. Brunn, 105 Wis. 2d 171, 176, 313 N.W.2d 790 (1982).  
But see State v. Bush, 2005 WI 103, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __ 
(released this same date).  This constitutional rule regarding 
Wisconsin jurisdiction has not always been in effect, however, 
as our constitution was amended in 1977 to create a unified 
court system with original jurisdiction vested wholly in the 
No.  2003AP1698-CR.lbb 
 
10 
 
circuit court.  See Eberhardy v. Cir. Ct. for Wood Co., 102 Wis. 
2d 539, 550-51, 307 N.W.2d 881 (1981).  Prior to that time, 
jurisdiction existed within the Supreme Court, circuit courts, 
probate courts, county courts, municipal courts, and with 
justices of the peace.  See Wis. Const. art. VII, § 8 (1975) and 
Wis. Stat. ch. 252 (1975) (circuit courts);22 Wis. Stat. ch. 253 
(1975) (county courts); Wis. Const. art. VII, § 2 (municipal 
courts);23  Wis. Const. art. VII, § 16 (1975) (tribunals of 
                                                 
22 Wisconsin Const. art. VII, § 8 (1975), stated: 
The 
circuit 
courts 
shall 
have 
original 
jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal within 
this state, not excepted in this constitution, and not 
hereafter 
prohibited 
by 
law; 
and 
appellate 
jurisdiction from all inferior courts and tribunals, 
and a supervisory control over the same.  They shall 
also have the power to issue writs of habeas corpus, 
mandamus, injunction, quo warranto, certiorari, and 
all other writs necessary to carry into effect their 
orders, judgments and decrees, and give them a general 
control over inferior courts and jurisdictions. 
23 Wisconsin Const. art. VII, § 2 (1975), stated in part: 
The judicial power of this state, both as to 
matters of law and equity, shall be vested in a 
supreme court, circuit courts, and courts of probate.  
The legislature may also vest such jurisdiction as 
shall be deemed necessary in municipal courts, and may 
authorize the establishment of inferior courts in the 
several counties, cities, villages or towns, with 
limited civil and criminal jurisdiction.  Provided, 
that the jurisdiction which may be vested in municipal 
courts 
shall 
not 
exceed 
in 
their 
respective 
municipalities 
that 
of 
circuit 
courts 
in 
their 
respective 
circuits 
as 
prescribed 
in 
this 
constitution; and that the legislature shall provide 
as well for the election of judges of the municipal 
courts as of the judges of inferior courts, by the 
qualified electors of the respective jurisdictions.  
The term of office of the judges of the said municipal 
No.  2003AP1698-CR.lbb 
 
11 
 
conciliation);24 Wis. Const. art. VII, § 15 (1965) (justices of 
the peace);25 Wis. Const. art. VII,  § 14 (judges of probate).26  
                                                                                                                                                             
and inferior courts shall not be longer than that of 
the judges of the circuit courts. 
 
24 Wisconsin Const. art. VII, § 16 (1975), provided: 
The 
legislature 
shall 
pass 
laws 
for 
the 
regulation of tribunals of conciliation, defining 
their powers and duties.  Such tribunals may be 
established in and for any township, and shall have 
power to render judgment to be obligatory on the 
parties when they shall voluntarily submit their 
matter in difference to arbitration, and agree to 
abide the judgment or assent thereto in writing. 
 
25 Wisconsin Const. art. VII, § 15 (1965), read: 
The electors of the several towns at their annual 
town meeting, and the electors of cities and villages 
at their charter elections except in cities of the 
first class, shall, in such manner as the legislature 
may direct, elect justices of the peace, whose term of 
office shall be for 2 years and until their successors 
in office shall be elected and qualified.  In case of 
an election to fill a vacancy occurring before the 
expiration of a full term, the justice elected shall 
hold for the residue of the unexpired term.  Their 
number and classification shall be regulated by law.  
And the tenure of 2 years shall in no wise interfere 
with the classification in the first instance.  The 
justices thus elected shall have such civil and 
criminal jurisdiction as shall be prescribed by law. 
26 Wisconsin Const. art. VII, § 14 (1975), stated: 
There shall be chosen in each county, by the 
qualified electors thereof, a judge of probate, who 
shall hold his office for two years and until his 
successor shall be elected and qualified, and whose 
jurisdiction, powers and duties shall be prescribed by 
law.  Provided, however, that the legislature shall 
have power to abolish the office of judge of probate 
No.  2003AP1698-CR.lbb 
 
12 
 
Our current jurisprudence regarding subject matter jurisdiction 
and a court's competence to act in furtherance of that 
jurisdiction may not have been applicable prior to the creation 
of the unified court system. 
¶51 Similarly, Wisconsin's unified court system is not 
necessarily the rule in other jurisdictions.  Issues of subject 
matter jurisdiction and a court's competency to exercise that 
jurisdiction may carry very different meanings in other states.  
Smith has every right to put the State to its burden of proof.  
That includes challenging the order for child support in the 
first instance.   
¶52 I agree with the majority that the court of appeals' 
decision must be reversed as to the sufficiency of evidence 
claim, but would nevertheless affirm the court of appeals 
determination that reversal of the trial court is warranted, and 
remand this matter to the circuit court for a new trial.   
¶53 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur in 
part, and dissent in part, and would remand this matter to the 
circuit court for a new trial.                         
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
in any county, and to confer probate powers upon such 
inferior courts as may be established in said county. 
 
See also Wisconsin Const. art. VII, § 2 (1975). 
No.  2003AP1698-CR.lbb 
 
1