Title: McGEE v BURLINGTON NORTHERN
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 12796
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: August 18, 1975

No. 12796 I N THE S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1975 D O N A L D R. McGEE, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, BURLINGTON N O R T H E R N , INC., a corporation, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Paul G. Hatfield, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Gough, Booth, Shanahan and Johnson, Helena, Montana Cordell Johnson argued and Ronald F. Waterman argued, Helena, Montana For Respondent : Hoyt and Bottomly, Great F a l l s , Montana John C. Hoyt argued, Great F a l l s , Montana Submitted : January 14, 1975 Y : t ; v Decided: ? , " ' ' - Filed : ? 11a;;rq Yir. Justice Frank I. Haswell delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an action f o r damages under the Federal ~mployers' L i a b i l i t y Act. P l a i n t i f f brakeman sued defendant r a i l r o a d f o r i n j u r i e s he received i n a switching accident. The d i s t r i c t court, Cascade County, granted p l a i n t i f f a p a r t i a l summary judg- ment on the issue of l i a b i l i t y . The i s s u e of the amount of p l a i n t i f f ' s damages was t r i e d t o a jury which returned an 8 t o 4 verdict f o r $525,000. Following entry of judgment thereon and denial of defendant's motion for a new t r i a l , defendant appeals. P l a i n t i f f i s Donald R. McGee, a 44 year old r a i l r o a d employee with about 20 years experience. Defendant i s Burlington Northern Inc., a r a i l r o a d corporation, which was p l a i n t i f f ' s employer . The accident forming the basis of t h i s l i t i g a t i o n occurred i n the railroad yards a t Omak, Washington on November 4, 1971 a t about 5 : 4 5 p.m. P l a i n t i f f , a swing brakeman on a switching crew, was struck from behind by an iron door handle protruding downward and outward from the door of a moving boxcar. There were no eyewitnesses t o the accident. It was dark and switching was being done by lan tern. The switch crew con- s i s t e d of the engineer, the conductor, the head brakeman, the flagman and the swing brakeman ( p l a i n t i f f ) . The conductor was not present a t the accident s i t e a s he was checking a c a r of f r u i t i n another part of the yard. Shortly before the accident, the switch engine was on the main l i n e facing east. A boxcar was coupled t o the front of the engine with a chip car coupled d i r e c t l y t o the boxcar. The switch engine pushed the two cars e a s t along the main l i n e . A s the three neared a passing track leading off the main l i n e , p l a i n t i f f uncoupled the chip car which was "kicked" upgrade along I I the main l i n e t o a point where t h e flagman chopped" the wheels t o prevenc i t from r o l l i n g back down the grade. After "kicking" the chip c a r up the main l i n e , the switch engine and boxcar came t o a stop on the main l i n e with the forward trucks o r wheels ~f the boxcar r e s t i n g on the switch points of the passing track. A t t h i s point the engineer was i n h i s cab on the south side of the main l i n e ; he was facing e a s t . The head brakeman was a t the switch box on the north side of the main l i n e . P l a i n t i f f was about ten f e e t away from the head brakeman and had him i n f u l l view. The flagman was some distance away near the chip car. According t o p l a i n t i f f , he told the head brakeman t h a t the switch engine and boxcar were going t o be moved onto t h e passing track and the head brakeman acknowledged t h i s verbally. The head brakeman denies p l a i n t i f f said anything t o him concerning where the boxcar would be "kicked", but he was aware it would go on one of the inside tracks r a t h e r than the main l i n e . However, I I he could not throw the switch because the boxcar was s i t t i n g r i g h t on the switch". Again, according t o p l a i n t i f f , he s t a r t e d walking e a s t along the south s i d e of the main l i n e and called t o the flagman 1 f " W e a r e going t o p u l l the pass'1. The flagman gave a come ahead'' signal with h i s lantern, which p l a i n t i f f repeated t o the engineer. The flagman confirmed p l a i n t i f f ' s statement t o him and indicated t h a t he acknwkdged the message by pointing h i s lantern a t plain- 11 t i f f . He denies giving a come ahead" signal. A t t h i s time, the flagman was walking down the passing track on the north s i d e of the main l i n e out of s i g h t of the engineer. In any event, the engine with boxcar i n f r o n t moved e a s t down the main l i n e . The protruding door handle of the boxcar struck p l a i n t i f f from behind causing h i s i n j u r i e s . P l a i n t i f f f i l e d t h i s action i n the d i s t r i c t court of Cascade County on February 21, 1973, under the Federal ~mployers' L i a b i l i t y Act and the Federal Safety Applicance Act claiming daniages of $736,000. ~ e f e n d a n t ' s answer denied any negligence on the part of the railroad and pleaded the p a r t i a l affirmative defense of contributory negligence. Extensive p r e t r i a l discovery was pursued by both p a r t i e s consisting principally of interroga- corks and answers, demands f o r production of documents, requests f o r admissions and responses, and numerous depositions. P l a i n t i f f moved f o r a p a r t i a l summary judgment on the issue of l i a b i l i t y . The d i s t r i c t court granted p l a i n t i f f a p a r t i a l summary judgment on the i s s u e of l i a b i l i t y under t h e Federal ~mployers' L i a b i l i t y Act. The d i s t r i c t court deemed it unnecessary t o r u l e on p l a i n t i f f ' s claim of violation of the Federal Safety Appliance Act. In i t s order, the d i s t r i c t court s p e c i f i c a l l y s t a t e d there were no genuine issues of material f a c t , t h a t defendant's negli- gence was established a s a matter of law, and t h a t the record dis- closed no negligence on the part of p l a i n t i f f which i n any way contributed t o h i s i n j u r i e s . The order specified t h a t the uncon- troverted f a c t s established defendant's violation of i t s own r u l e s requiring the boxcar door t o be closed before the switching operation was ever commenced i n which event the handle would not have protruded outward i n the manner it did and p l a i n t i f f would not have been struck and injured. Defendant then applied t o t h i s Court f o r supervisory control, seeking review and reversal of the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s order. This Court accepted jurisdiction and issued an a l t e r n a t i v e 11 w r i t ordering t h e d i s t r i c t court (1) t o enter an order denying partial summary judgment", o r (2) t o appear and show cause "why said motion f o r p a r t i a l summary judgment should not be denied. I I After o r a l argument, written b r i e f s , and hearing, we denied defendant's application i n t h i s ~ p e r a t i v e language: "IT IS ORDEREE t h a t the r e l i e f sought be, and it hereby is, denied, and t h i s proceeding i s ordered dismissed, and our stay order i s revoked. I I Thereafter a jury t r i a l was held i n the d i s t r i c t court t limited t o the i s s u e of damages sustained by p l a i n t i f f . Prior t o and during t r i a l , defendant sought t o reopen the issue of \ l i a b i l i t y which i t supported by o f f e r s of proof, a l l of which were denied. The jury returned a verdict f o r p l a i n t i f f i n t h e amount of $525,000 and judgment was entered thereon. The dis- t r i c t court denied defendant" motion f o r a new t r i a l . Defendant appeals from t h e judgment. Defendant assigns 21 issues f o r review. The claimed e r r o r s (1) can be sumrnarized:/denial of defendant's motion f o r a new t r i a l ; (2) zwarding p l a i n t i f f a p a r t i a l summary judgment on the issue of l i a b i l i t y and limiting the jury t r i a l t o the amount of damages sustained by p l a i n t i f f ; (3) admission of inadmissible evidence; (4) an excessive verdict based on passion and prejudice; (5) e r r o r i n jury instructions; (6) prejudicial conduct by p l a i n t i f f ' s counsel and the presiding judge; (7) improper r e b u t t a l testimony; and (8) denying defendant a p r e t r i a l examination of p l a i n t i f f f o r r e h a b i l i t a t i o n purposes. The principal e r r o r s claimed a r e the f i r s t four. W e find t h a t we must grant defendant a new t r i a l on the basis of errors i n law t h a t occurred p r i o r t o and a t the t r i a l . These e r r o r s of law consisted principally of the exclusion of evidence r e l a t i n g t o defendant's p a r t i a l affirmative defense of contributory negligence. A t the outset, we hold the d i s t r i c t court's order granting p a r t i a l summary judgment was correct t o the extent of i t s ruling that the negligence of defendant was established a s a matter of law on t h e record before it. Defendant disputes t h i s holding. It argues the record discloses many genuine issues of material f a c t , principally j u s t what did happen i n the r a i l r o a d yard a t Omak a t the time of the accident and s p e c i f i c a l l y whether p l a i n t i f f was struck by the boxcar i t s e l f o r the protruding door handle. Defendant contends the position of p l a i n t i f f a f t e r the accident, i n r e l a t i o n t o the boxcar, i s as equally consistent with h i s being struck by t h e boxcar i t s e l f a s by the protruding door handle. Therefore, defendant argues, the d i s t r i c t court had t o weigh the evidence, draw inferences therefrom, and assume t h e r o l e of t r i e r of t h e f a c t s i n order t o conclude t h a t p l a i n t i f f was struck by the pro- truding door handle and defendant's negligence was thereby es- tablished. The record before the d i s t r i c t court b e l i e s t h i s contention. The following uncontroverted evidence was before the d i s t r i c t court: (1) p l a i n t i f f ' s deposition testimony t h a t he was h i t by the protruding door handle; (2) the accident report phoned t o the r a i l r o a d ' s Wenatchee o f f i c e within a half hour a f t e r the accident and subsequently reduced t o writing, s t a t e s t h a t p l a i n t i f f was struck by the protruding door handle; and (3) the r a i l r o a d ' s o ~ m operating r u l e s require a l l doors t o be closed before moving the boxcar. N o factual inferences were required t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t p l a i n t i f f was h i t by the protruding door handle i n violation of defendant's otm operating rules. ~ e f e n d a n t ' s contention t h a t the f a c t s of t h e accident a r e equally consistent with p l a i n t i f f ' s being struck by the boxcar i t s e l f r e s t s on supposition and con- jecture not contained i n the evidence before the court. However, the record before the d i s t r i c t court a t the time it granted p a r t i a l summary judgment disclosed several genuine issues of material f a c t r e l a t i n g t o defendant's claim of contri- butory negligence by p l a i n t i f f . Without attempting t o s e t f o r t h an exhaustive o r all-inclusive l i s t of such issues, we note these: (a) Should p l a i n t i f f i n the exercise of ordinary care have seen t h e protruding door handle and corrected it p r i o r t o t h e accident? (b) Should p l a i n t i f f i n t h e exercise of ordinary care have seen t h a t the f r o n t trucks o r wheels of the boxcar were on the switch points requiring the engine and boxcar t o be backed up, so the switch could be thrown directing the boxcar onto the passing track? (c) Did p l a i n t i f f himself i n i t i a t e the "come ahead" signal t o the engineer o r was he simply relaying such signal from the flagman? (d) Was p l a i n t i f f himself g u i l t y of violation of the r a i l r o a d ' s operating r u l e s ? (e) Did p l a i n t i f f himself conform t o reasonable standards of conduct under t h e circum- stances? The existence of these genuine issues of material f a c t i n the record before the d i s t r i c t court precluded a finding o r r e c i t a l by the d i s t r i c t court t h a t "the record discloses no neg- ligence on the part of the p l a i n t i f f which i n any way contri- buted t o h i s injuries". In t h i s respect the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s order was i n error. In Federal ~mployers' L i a b i l i t y Act cases contributory negligence on the part of p l a i n t i f f does not bar h i s claim, but simply reduces h i s recovery i n proportion t o h i s own contri- buting f a u l t . The controlling s t a t u t e provides t h a t i n a l l actions t o recover damages under the Federal Employers' L i a b i l i t y Act 1 I the f a c t t h a t t h e employee may have been g u i l t y of contributory negligence s h a l l not bar a recovery, but t h e damages s h a l l be diminished by t h e jury i n proportion t o t h e amount of negligence a t t r i b u t a b l e t o such employee * % *." 45 U.S.C.A. $53. In the i n s t a n t case, defendant was denied the r i g h t t o introduce evidence on the issue of p l a i n t i f f ' s alleged contribu- tory negligence i n diminution of damages. W e acknowledge e r r o r i n our order dismissing defendant's application f o r supervisory control i n f a i l i n g t o s t r i k e the summary finding o r r e c i t a l i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s order t h a t the record disclosed no negligence on t h e part of p l a i n t i f f contributing t o h i s i n j u r i e s . Perhaps t h i s misled the d i s t r i c t court i n i t s subsequent rulings. In any event, the f a c t remains t h a t defendant should have been permitted t o introduce evidence r e l a t i n g t o p l a i n t i f f ' s alleged contributory negligence i n reduction of damages. The prejudicial and rever- s i b l e nature of the e r r o r i s obvious. O n t h i s b a s i s , the judgment herein i s vacated and s e t aside. A new t r i a l i s granted limited t o the amount of damages t h a t should be awarded p l a i n t i f f . A t such t r i a l defendant s h a l l be permitted t o introduce relevant, competent, and admissible evidence i n support of i t s p a r t i a l affirmative defense of con- tributory negligence. This ruling renders consideration of most of the other issues on appeal unnecessary. They simply involve various alleged e r r o r s t h a t occurred a t t h e t r i a l assigned a s additional and independent grounds f o r granting a new t r i a l . The only remaining issue l i k e l y t o recur on r e t r i a l i s whether defendant should be permitted t o have a p r e t r i a l examina- t i o n of p l a i n t i f f f o r r e h a b i l i t a t i o n purposes. It i s c l e a r the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s order denying such examination was based, i n part a t l e a s t , on these considerations: (1) the repeated delay of defendant i n advising the court of the purposes of the examina- t i o n , the nature of the t e s t s t o be administered, who would perform the t e s t s , where and when they would be conducted, and similar relevant information, (2) the conflicting representations t o the court a s t o whether psychological t e s t i n g would be in- volved, (3) the repeated continuances i n hearing defendant's motion occasioned thereby, and (4) defendant's motion a s presented was not i n such form o r with such p a r t i c u l a r i t y t h a t p l a i n t i f f could make proper objections o r concurrences. W e agree with the previous ruling of the d i s t r i c t court based on the foregoing considerations. The broad question of whether defendant i s e n t i t l e d t o p r e t r i a l discovery of p l a i n t i f f ' s vocational r e h a b i l i t a t i o n potential by means of aptitude o r psychological t e s t i n g i s not f a i r l y presented by t h e record be- fore us. Only i f and when a timely, s u f f i c i e n t and proper motion i s presented t o the d i s t r i c t court w i l l such issue be reached. W e decline t o r u l e on t h i s broad question i n a f a c t u a l vacuum. The judgment of the d i s t r i c t court i s vacated and s e t aside. A new t r i a l i s ordered on the issue of the amount of damages t o be awarded p l a i n t i f f , f o r the reasons and under t h e guidelines s e t f o r t h herein. J u s t i c e W e Concur: Chief J u s t i c e ................................ Justices. M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly dissenting: I dissent. A very serious and therefore the principal problem presented by the majority opinion i s the readjudication of a f i n a l order of t h i s Court based on the contention t h a t t h a t order was i n p a r t i n error. I f it were conceded the order r e s u l t i n g from the show cause hearing was t o t a l l y i n e r r o r , t h a t would not be grounds f o r a second review on appeal of a t r i a l on damages. This s t r i k e s a t the very foundation of our j u d i c i a l system. As alluded t o i n the majority opinion, the d i s t r i c t court granted a p a r t i a l summary judgment on the i s s u e of l i a b i l i t y and contributory negligence i n t h i s cause and a t t h a t time defendant had the option t o (1) go t o t r i a l under the d i s t r i c t court order and t r y the cause on damages, a s the summary judgment was not appealable, and handle the issue i n the regular course of appeal, o r (2) ask t h i s Court t o exercise i t s jurisdiction and hear the matter a t t h a t time on a p e t i t i o n f o r supervisory control. Defendant chose the l a t t e r course. Supreme Court Case No. 12660, the application for r e l i e f , p e t i - t ioned : I I That the Order granting summary judgment i s not an appealable order, and unless the D i s t r i c t Court i s ordered and directed by a proper w r i t or order of t h i s Court, the D i s t r i c t Court of the Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t of the State of Montana, i n and f o r the County of Cascade, and the Honorable Paul G. Hatfield, D i s t r i c t Judge thereof, Respondents herein w i l l proceed t o t r y the damage issues i n the case of ' ~ o n a l d R. McGee, P l a i n t i f f , vs. Burlington Northern, Inc., Defendant' being Civil Action No. 759206 i n said D i s t r i c t Court: and t h a t an appeal from a f i n a l judgment i n that action would impose undue hardship on Relator and be wholly inadequate a s a remedy f o r the reason that Relator would be forced t o go t o t r i a l on t h e damage issues with i t s l i a b i l i t y already established i n an Federal Employers' L i a b i l i t y Act case which applies a r u l e of comparative negligence i n connection with the affirmative defense of contributory negligence, and f o r t h a t reason the - remedy afforded by appeal would not be adequate i n a case such a s t h i s where the comparative negligence theory is the applicable r u l e of law." (Emphasis supplie Petitioner prayed f o r an appropriate w r i t directed t o respondent d i s t r i c t court t o withdraw i t s order dated November 30, 1973, granting p a r t i a l surnma.ry judgment and t h a t an order be entered denying p l a i n t i f f ' s motion f o r p a r t i a l summary judgment i n i t s e n t i r e t y o r i n the a l t e r n a t i v e t o appear and show cause why it has not done so. Further, t h a t upon a hearing t h i s Court find and adjudicate t h a t the motion f o r summary judgment should not have been granted. O n December 17, 1973, t h i s Court assumed jurisdiction i n the matter and directed t h i s order t o the d i s t r i c t court: h he Court i s i n receipt of an Application f o r W r i t of Supervisory Control o r other appropriate w r i t t o inquire i n t o an Order entered i n Civil No. 75920C, i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court of the Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t of t h e State of Montana, i n and f o r the County of Cascade, which said Order granted a p a r t i a l summary judgment against Relator; counsel f o r Petitioner and Relator was heard ex parte and the matter taken under advisement. "IT I S ORDERED t h a t Respondents s h a l l withdraw the order of November 30, 1973, granting p a r t i a l summary judgment and s h a l l enter on Order denying p a r t i a l summary judgment i n the case of 'Donald R. McGee, P l a i n t i f f , -vs- Burlington Northern Inc., a corporation, Defendantf, being No. 75920C, i n the D i s t r i c t Court of the Eighth Judicial D i s t r i c t of the State of Montana, i n and f o r the County of Cascade, o r , a l t e r n a t i v e l y , t o be and ap- pear before t h i s Court a t the hour of 9:30 A.M., on the 16 day of January, 1974, t o show cause why said motion f o r p a r t i a l summary judgment should not be denied. + : * *'I (Emphasis supplied) . Thereafter b r i e f s were f i l e d by defendant and p l a i n t i f f i n the d i s t r i c t court action. The b r i e f s were exhaustive on the issues presented t o the d i s t r i c t court i n support of and i n opposition t o p l a i n t i f f ' s motion f o r p a r t i a l summary judgment. A l l the depositions of a l l the witnesses had been taken and were referred t o i n the b r i e f s . A l l of the discovery proceedings had been completed and were referred t o i n the b r i e f s . P l a i n t i f f ~ c G e e ' s b r i e f i n Cause No. 12660, s t a t e d a t the outset: I 1 The D i s t r i c t Court granted p l a i n t i f f ' s motion f o r p a r t i a l summary judgment leaving only the amount of damages t o be determined by the jury. Defendant applied t o t h i s Court f o r an appropriate w r i t which was granted and t h i s matter i s s e t f o r hearing before t h i s Court a t 9:30 a.m. on the 16th day of January, 1974. 11 In i t s Application for W r i t and Memorandum of Authori- t i e s defendant spent some time justifying t h i s procedure. Let it be c l e a r l y understood t h a t counsel f o r p l a i n t i f f completely approve of the procedure followed by the de- fendant and desire t o thank and commend t h i s Court f o r l i b e r a l l y applying Writs of Supervisory Control a s there i s no question but t h a t t h i s saves l i t i g a n t s and t h e i r attorneys a great deal of time, money and uncertainty. * * Jcff A f u l l hearing on a l l issues was had by the Court on January 16, 1974 and the matter taken under advisement. After a complete examination of the record t h i s Court found no quarrel with the p a r t i a l summary judgment entered by the t r i a l court and so s t a t e d i n i t s order dated January 21, 1974, which i n e f f e c t permitted the t r i a l t o proceed on damages and terminated the issue of l i a b i l i t y and contributory negligence: "PER CURIAM: I t This i s an o r i g i n a l proceeding wherein PLelator sought an appropriate w r i t t o reverse an order granting a p a r t i a l summary judgment entered i n C i v i l No. 759206, i n the D i s t r i c t Court of the Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t of t h e S t a t e of Montana, i n and f o r the County of Cascade, i n an action e n t i t l e d Donald R. ItfcGee, P l a i n t i f f , vs. Bur- lington Northern Inc., a corporation, Defendant, pending i n said Court. I I Counsel f o r Relator was heard ex parte, an order t o show cause issued, a l l proceedings stayed i n the D i s t r i c t Court u n t i l further order. I I Upon the return day o r a l argument was had and b r i e f s f i l e d and the matter was taken under advisement. If The Court having now considered the pleadings, b r i e f s , and argument, and being advised, "IT I S ORDERED t h a t the r e l i e f sought be, and it hereby i s , denied, and t h i s proceeding .. is . ordered dis- - . .. missed, and our stay order i s revoked." (Emphasis supplied). Here, defendant argues t h a t t h i s court's January 21, 1974, order, a s a r e s u l t of the procedures j u s t related, could only mean t h a t we f e l t defendant had an adequate remedy a t law and it would not be proper t o i s s u e a w r i t of supervisory c o n t r o l and based i t s contention on t h e f a c t t h a t we did not s t a t e t h e grounds f o r the decision i n t h e order. For a u t h o r i t y defendant miscited Schultz v. Adams, 1611font. 463, 507 P.2d 530. Schultzwas an attempt t o appeal a d i s t r i c t court order f o r p a r t i a l summary judgment and t h e Chief J u s t i c e c l e a r l y s t a t e d t h a t the c o n t r o l l i n g i s s u e i n Schultz was whether the order was an appealable order. There t h e contention was t h a t the order was f i n a l and appealable a t t h e d i s t r i c t court l e v e l . A l l t h e language about "interlocutory order" and review on appeal i s c o r r e c t under those f a c t s , b u t i f a l i t i g a n t f e e l s a s strongly a s t h e defendant d i d here about t h e e f f e c t of t h e order and pursuades t h i s Court t o review t h a t order under supervisory c o n t r o l and t h i s i s done, the order of t h i s Court, p a r t i c u l a r l y i f i t affirmed t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , i s a f i n a l order and n o t subject t o review again. Considering t h e process a s a whole, f o r a minute o r two, i t becomes apparent on i t s face and t o adopt the r a t i o n a l e of t h e defendant would be self-defeating. It i s t r u e we freq~zently do n o t take j u r i s d i c t i o n , but i n those cases t h e Court orders an I I advisory hearing" and a f t e r hearing r e f u s e j u r i s d i c t i o n and dismiss thus leaving t h e p a r t i e s where we found them. O n t h e few occasions t h a t t h i s Court has taken j u r i s d i c t i o n and issued an order t o show cause and a f t e r hearing d i d not wish t o grant r e l i e f , a s argued by defendant, w e p l a i n l y s t a t e d t h e w r i t was improvidently issued and we did n o t wish t o intervene. The f a c t s t i l l remains t h a t w e did order t h e d i s t r i c t court order set a s i d e here, when we issued t h e w r i t and gave the d i s t r i c t court the a l t e r n a t e choice t o come i n and j u s t i f y i t s order. Had t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t not s e l e c t e d t o appear, t h e order of t h i s Court would have been binding and t h e summary judgment of the d i s t r i c t court withdrawn. The d i s t r i c t court d i d come i n and j u s t i f y i t s order and we made an order denying t h e r e l i e f t o - 13 - petitioner-defendant and permitted the d i s t r i c t court order t o stand, and the court t o proceed t o t r i a l on the issue of damages. There i s no support i n the law f o r a second review a f t e r an adjudication on the merits by a court of l a s t r e s o r t , i n the same jurisdiction. Therefore, i f the majority opinion i s allowed t o stand a s precedent f o r t h e proposition t h a t a second review i s allowable under these f a c t s , then the bench and the bar would be b e t t e r served i f these kind of proceedings were abandoned. W e have no r i g h t t o review a matter on the merits, dismiss the order against the t r i a l court, permit defendant t o proceed, and lead it i n t o e r r o r and a new t r i a l by a second review which s t a t e s we a r e now convinced we were i n e r r o r the f i r s t time around. This obviously imposes the same burden on the p a r t i e s t h a t they both agreed they wished t o avoid by a hearing on t h e merits, under our power of supervisory control a t a time before t r i a l . The temporary beneficiary of t h i s kind of precendent i s not going t o gain i n the long view of the matter, a s one day the r u l e surely w i l l be applied against it. So f a r a s the merits of the argument on contributory negligence a r e concerned, I a m sure we were correct i n our f i r s t decision. Defendant raised a number of disputed f a c t s from which, i t argued, an inference could be drawn t h a t p l a i n t i f f stepped i n front of the t r a i n and was struck by the f r e i g h t car. The court has disagreed with t h i s and established the r a i l r o a d was negligent and operating i n violation of i t s own rules. Now, the majority contends t h i s i s a genuine i s s u e of f a c t on reasonable conduct o r care by not seeing the protruding door handle. F i r s t , there is no discussion i n any part of the record t h a t would indicate p l a i n t i f f had any duty t o inspect and the contrary i s true. A l l witnesses deposed placed the duty on various employees who were not employed a t t h a t yard. Also, everyone deposed f a i l e d t o see t h e protruding hook. Vernon B. Workman passed t h e door i n daylight and f a i l e d t o see it. Whe he a s s i s t e d p l a i n t i f f i n t h e dark a f t e r t h e accident he d i d not see it and bumped h i s head on t h e hook. The engineer was coupled on the c a r and did not see it while looking d i r e c t l y p a s t it. N o one even i n f e r r e d i n t h e record t h a t p l a i n t i f f should have seen the hook. I n f a c t , Paluch v. E r i e Lackawanna Railroad Company, 387 F.2d 996,999 (1968), s t a t e s : 'If: 9 : it i s not contributory negligence t o f a i l t o discover a danger when t h e r e is no reason t o apprehend one. I t See a l s o : Colorado and Southern Railway Co. v. Lombardi, 156 Colo. 488, 400 P.2d 428 (1965). Second, a l l t h e conversation about t h e c a r on the switch point and t h e dispute with the flagman and t h e come ahead s i g n a l a r e frivolous. P l a i n t i f f gave t h e s i g n a l and was alongside t h e t r a i n "in t h e c l e a r " and but f o r t h e defendant's negligent open door would not have been struck. There i s no evidence t h a t those switching matters contributed t o p l a i n t i f f ' s injury. Since 1939, t h e plea of contributory negligence i s not a defense but a plea t o diminish damages. The burden of proof of contributory negligence i s on t h e defendant and includes proof of negligent a c t s o r omissions and causal e f f e c t of the a c t o r omission on accident and injury. Page v. S t . Louis Southwestern Railway Company, 312 F.2d 84, 98 ALR2d 639, (1963). Further, t h i s r u l e i.s not a mere matter of procedure but of substantive l a w and a p p l i e s i n s t a t e c o u r t s where the r u l e i s d i f f e r e n t . Crugley v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 79 N.H. 276, 108 A. 293. Contributory negligence of t h e employee which remotely, b u t not d i r e c t l y and proximately contributes t o the i n j u r y , t h a t is negligence t h a t i s n o t causal, does not operate t o reduce damages. I l l i n o i s Cent R.Co. v. P o r t e r , 207 F.311. Third, the violation of operating r u l e s by the p l a i n t i f f i s not well taken. Defendant claimed violation of Rule #712-- a general operating r u l e of the r a i l r o a d and which applies t o a l l personnel t o the e f f e c t t h a t i f they see a hot box, dragging brake, e t c . , they must report o r stop the train---. F i r s t , there i s no duty here unless you see a defect and, second, the federal courts have held these general r u l e s t o be advisory and not grounds f o r contributory negligence. A, r u l e t o meet the standard of contributory negligence must be directory, that i s a r u l e applicable t o p l a i n t i f f d i r e c t l y which would create a duty. In the e n t i r e record there i s no evidence of such a violation. So I f I 1 f a r a s violation of r u l e M f o r employees, it i s another general operating r u l e , a s well, and only provides employees must keep a lookout f o r movement of t r a i n s a t any time, and again t h i s has been covered above. There was no evidence t o c r e a t e the If issue and p l a i n t i f f was i n the clear" and not struck by the t r a i n i t s e l f . The l a s t issue raised was reasonable conduct of the p l a i n t i f f . A.gain, there i s no evidence i n the record t h a t would bear on t h i s issue. I f it i s urged by defendant under the cases c i t e d , defendant must s e t f o r t h the conduct and i t s causal connec- t i o n t o the accident and injury. This has never appeared i n the record. For the above reasons the judgment of the d i s t r i c t court should be affirmed. Jus'tice. Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison dissenting: I concur in the foregoing dissent of Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly. -----c-----------------*------- $ Justice.