Title: Priest v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 272, 2004, 273, 2004
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: May 5, 2005

*Sitting in designation pursuant to Del. Const. Art. IV § 12. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
TORSHIRO PRIEST, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 272/273, 2004 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
)  Consolidated 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  for Kent County 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  Cr. ID. No. 0307022946A 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  April 20, 2005 
Decided:  July 5, 2005 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS, Justices, and 
NOBLE, Vice Chancellor,* constituting the court en banc. 
 
 
Upon Appeal from the Superior Court.  VACATED in part, REVERSED in 
part, and REMANDED in part. 
 
 
Sandra W. Dean, Office of the Public Defender, Dover, Delaware, for 
appellant. 
 
 
John Williams, Department of Justice, Dover, Delaware, for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STEELE, Chief Justice, for the Majority:   
 
2
Torshiro K. Priest appeals his convictions, by a Superior Court jury, of 
Maintaining a Vehicle for Keeping Controlled Substances and multiple counts of 
the compound offense of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a 
Felony, claiming that the trial judge erred by denying his motion for judgment of 
acquittal.  In this Opinion we hold that to sustain a finding of guilt on a 
Maintaining a Vehicle charge, the State must offer evidence of some affirmative 
activity by the defendant to utilize the vehicle to facilitate the possession, delivery, 
or use of controlled substances.  Because the record contains no evidence that 
Priest engaged in any of these activities, we vacate his Maintaining a Vehicle 
conviction.  We also hold that the jury’s failure to convict on either the predicate 
felony charges or any lesser-included felonies negates, as a matter of law, the first 
element of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony – that a 
defendant commit either the predicate felony or a lesser-included felony – and thus 
precludes a conviction of the compound PFDCF offenses.  We must, therefore, 
vacate Priest’s PFDCF convictions.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the 
Superior Court and remand with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal on the 
Maintaining a Vehicle and PFDCF counts.  
I. 
 
In July 2003, Deborah Powell drove to the Manchester Square Apartments 
in Dover looking for a friend.  On arriving at the apartment complex, Marvin 
 
3
Fletcher approached Powell and asked to borrow her car.  Fletcher, who was 
seeking transportation to buy crack cocaine, promised Powell a small amount of 
money or cocaine in return for the use of her car.  Powell refused to lend Fletcher 
her vehicle, but she did agree to drive Fletcher to a nearby fast-food restaurant 
where Powell thought that Fletcher would buy drugs.  Priest, who was not present 
during this conversation, arrived some time later and joined Fletcher in Powell’s 
car.  With Fletcher sitting in the front passenger seat and Priest in the rear, Powell 
drove the two men to the restaurant. 
 
While conducting surveillance at the restaurant, Delaware State Police 
Officer John Samis watched Powell’s vehicle enter the parking lot.  Samis 
observed Fletcher leave the car and enter the restaurant.  On returning to the car 
less than a minute later, Fletcher told Powell that “they’re not here.”  Throughout 
this exchange, Priest said nothing of consequence. 
 
Shortly thereafter, Samis approached Powell’s car.  Fletcher, recognizing the 
undercover vehicle, told Powell to leave the area quickly and told Priest to run.  
Neither Powell nor Priest, however, attempted to escape.  As the officer drew 
closer, Powell heard the glove box close and a heavy item fall to the floor of the 
vehicle.  Powell also observed Fletcher fumbling with an unknown item, and she 
saw Priest wedge another object in the cushion of the backseat. 
 
4
 
After searching Powell’s car, Samis and other officers found a digital scale 
in the front passenger-side door pocket and 18.8 grams of crack cocaine in the 
glove box.  In the backseat cushion, Samis discovered a loaded handgun.  The 
officers then arrested the three occupants of the vehicle.  Authorities later indicted 
Priest and Fletcher on twelve counts related to the incident, including Trafficking 
in Cocaine, Possession with Intent to Deliver, and Maintaining a Vehicle for 
Keeping Controlled Substances.  A charge of Possession of a Firearm During the 
Commission of a Felony accompanied each of these three predicate offense 
charges.  Priest and Fletcher were tried jointly in the Superior Court.  Powell was 
also indicted for several serious felony offenses but entered into a plea agreement 
in exchange for her testimony against Fletcher and Priest. 
 
After trial in March 2004, a jury acquitted Priest of the charges of 
Trafficking and Possession with Intent to Deliver.  The jury found Priest guilty of 
all other charges, including the count of Maintaining a Vehicle and the ancillary 
PFDCF charges that accompanied the drug charges.  The jury found Fletcher guilty 
on all counts except an unrelated firearms charge. 
After the jury returned its verdict, Priest and Fletcher jointly moved for 
judgment of acquittal on those counts.  In May 2004, the trial judge denied the 
 
5
motion.1  We rejected an appeal by Fletcher in March 2005.2  Priest now appeals, 
claiming that the trial judge erred by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. 
II. 
 
Priest first claims that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to 
support the Maintaining a Vehicle count and its accompanying PFDCF charge.  
Priest claims that because the jury acquitted him of the drug offenses, he was not in 
constructive possession of the drugs, nor could he be considered an accomplice to 
Fletcher’s conduct.  Priest also asserts that Fletcher alone solicited Powell for the 
use of her vehicle.  On these facts, Priest argues that he did not, as a matter of law, 
Maintain a Vehicle for the delivery of drugs.  We review de novo the trial judge’s 
denial of Priest’s motion for judgment of acquittal to determine whether any 
rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, 
could find Priest guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of all the elements of the crime.3 
A.  Delaware “Maintaining a Vehicle” Jurisprudence 
 
To further the “nationwide effort to achieve uniformity between the drug 
laws of the various states and federal legislation,”4 the General Assembly enacted 
                                                 
1  
State v. Fletcher, 2004 Del. Super. LEXIS 178 (consolidated with State v. Priest). 
2  
Fletcher v. State, 2005 Del. LEXIS 124. 
3  
Hardin v. State, 844 A.2d 982, 989 (Del. 2004). 
4  
State v. Gula, 320 A.2d 752, 753 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974).   
 
6
Delaware’s version of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act in June 1972.5  By 
so doing, the General Assembly also sought to combat the ills of drug abuse more 
effectively and to encourage cooperation between different governmental 
agencies.6  Title 16, Section 4755(a)(5), which is Delaware’s version of Section 
402(a)(5) of the original model UCSA, states that it is a crime for a person: 
[K]nowingly to keep or maintain any store, shop, warehouse, 
dwelling, building, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other structure or place 
which is resorted to by persons using controlled substances . . . for the 
purposes of using these substances or which is used for keeping or 
delivering them. . . .7 
 
The only difference between Delaware’s Section 4755(a)(5) and UCSA Section 
402(a)(5) is that in our statute the word chapter replaced the word act and, in the 
final clause, the word delivery replaced the word sell.  The word maintain is left 
undefined in the statute.8   
 
In recent years, this Court and the Superior Court have considered Section 
4755 on several occasions.  In State v. Rhinehardt, the Superior Court addressed 
                                                 
5  
16 Del. C. §§ 4701-4796.  
6  
Gula, 320 A.2d at 753-54, citing NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON 
UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT, prefatory note (1970) 
[hereinafter UCSA].  See also Ana Kellia Ramares, Annotation, Forfeitability Of Property 
Under Uniform Controlled Substances Act Or Similar Statute Where Amount Of Controlled 
Substance Seized Is Small, 6 A.L.R.5TH 652 (2005) (describing goal of intergovernmental 
agency cooperation to combat drug abuse as “interlocking trellis”). 
7  
16 Del. C. § 4755(a)(5); UCSA § 402(a)(5) (1970) (current version at USCA § 402(f) 
(1994)). 
8  
See 16 Del. C. § 4701 (defining terms of the act).  
 
7
the interpretation of the phrase keep or maintain.9  Rhinehardt was convicted for 
maintaining a vehicle for drug use, in addition to other drug charges arising out of 
a single incident where police had found illegal drugs in his car.  At his bench trial, 
Rhinehardt contended that “maintaining” a vehicle differed conceptually from 
“using” a vehicle.  Rejecting this claim, the trial judge found that a defendant 
maintains a vehicle by “having the substantial use, alone or in conjunction with 
another person, of a motor vehicle for the purpose of storage, transportation[,] and 
substantial use of drugs.”10  Rhinehardt did not appeal.  
 
In 1991 we considered the required scope of a defendant’s “use” of a vehicle 
in Lonergan v. State.11  Lonergan challenged the sufficiency of the evidence that 
underlay his conviction of Maintaining a Vehicle.  Lonergan claimed that a “single 
incident of transporting drugs in a vehicle is insufficient to satisfy the statutory 
requirement of maintaining, and that the State must establish a continuing illicit 
operation before liability will attach.”12  Rejecting this argument, we held that:  
[I]t is our belief that the language of this section should be interpreted 
broadly to include a single incident.  The obvious purpose of the 
statute is to discourage the use of motor vehicles in the transportation 
                                                 
9  
1990 Del. Super. LEXIS 9. 
10 
Id. at *1-2. 
11 
590 A.2d 502 (Del. 1991) (TABLE); 1991 Del. LEXIS 101. 
12  
1991 Del. LEXIS 101, at *12. 
 
8
of drugs.  That purpose is not served by exempting individual 
violations.13  
 
Based on the “obvious purpose of the statute,” we held that a single incident of 
transporting drugs in a vehicle, without any additional evidence tending to 
establish an ongoing pattern, can suffice to support a maintaining charge.14 
 
In McNulty v. State, however, this Court overturned a Maintaining a Vehicle 
conviction on the grounds of insufficiency of evidence.15  A jury convicted 
McNulty of the Maintaining a Vehicle charge, along with charges of trafficking 
and possession.  Police had conducted surveillance of McNulty’s mother in an 
attempt to verify a report that she was selling drugs.  The police observed McNulty 
enter a car with three other persons after having a conversation with his mother.  
One of the occupants carried drugs.  The police followed the car and saw McNulty, 
in the back seat, “ducking back and forth and looking back at [the police].”16  The 
officers then arrested all four occupants.  At trial the State proved that each 
defendant knew that there were drugs in the car and that McNulty was critical to 
the drug deal because he alone was able to identify the buyer.   
                                                 
13  
Id. at *13. 
14  
Id. 
15  
655 A.2d 1214 (Del. 1995). 
16  
Id. at 1215. 
 
9
On appeal, the State contended that because McNulty’s presence was critical 
to the drug deal’s success, the jury properly convicted McNulty as an accomplice.  
We reversed the maintaining charge, finding that the “evidence relating to 
McNulty’s exclusive ability to identify the buyer has no relevance to McNulty’s 
having facilitated the commission of the offense” of knowingly maintaining a 
vehicle for drug dealing.17  Although we implicitly assumed the Lonergan “single 
incident” definition, we found that the fact that McNulty personally knew a party 
to the transaction, without more and whatever might be its effect on accomplice 
liability for a drug possession offense, could not “facilitate” the other party’s 
knowing maintenance of a vehicle for drug dealing.   
In Watson v. State, we decided another sufficiency of the evidence claim.18  
Watson, a passenger, argued that because the driver of the car admitted ownership 
of the drugs, he (Watson) could not be convicted of Maintaining a Vehicle.  After 
stating that “[p]roof of a single incident of transporting drugs in a vehicle meets the 
statutory requirement,”19 we held that proof of constructive possession is sufficient 
to warrant a conviction for Maintaining a Vehicle.  Finally, in the companion to 
                                                 
17  
Id. at 1219, citing 11 Del. C. § 271(2)(b) (defining accomplice liability) (quotation marks 
omitted). 
18  
755 A.2d 390 (Del. 2000) (TABLE); 2000 Del. LEXIS 258.  
19  
2000 Del. LEXIS 258, at *6. 
 
10
this case, Fletcher v. State, we considered Fletcher’s maintaining conviction.20  
Distinguishing McNulty, we found that both Fletcher’s control of the drugs and the 
conduct of the driver constituted “significant evidence of [Fletcher’s] direct 
involvement” in maintaining the vehicle for keeping a controlled substance.21 
B.  Priest’s Claims 
 
Starting with Lonergan, each of these cases, either implicitly or expressly, 
reaffirmed the principle that Section 4755 requires only that the State prove a 
single instance of possession or use of a controlled substance in connection with a 
vehicle.22  In these cases, the critical benchmark for determining the sufficiency of 
the evidence in a Maintaining a Vehicle prosecution has been the degree of the 
                                                 
20  
2005 Del. LEXIS 124. 
21  
Id. at *10. 
22   
We recognize that most, if not all, other UCSA jurisdictions reject the “single 
occurrence” approach that Delaware endorses.  See, e.g., People v. Griffin, 597 N.W.2d 176, 
180-81 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that defendant must exercise authority or control 
continuously for an appreciable period of time); State v. Mitchell, 442 S.E.2d 24, 30 (N.C. 1994) 
(holding that "to keep" denotes “not just possession, but possession that occurs over time”); 
Dodd v. State, 879 P.2d 822, 828 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (rejecting single, isolated instances of 
use, possession, or sale of controlled substances in connection with vehicle); Barnes v. State, 339 
S.E.2d 229, 234 (Ga. 1986) (determining that possession of limited quantities of drugs within a 
building, without more, is insufficient to support a maintaining conviction);  People v. Holland, 
322 P.2d 983, 987 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958) (holding that to constitute the offense of “open[ing] or 
maintain[ing] any place for the purpose of unlawfully selling, giving away, or using any 
narcotic," there must be some purpose of continuity in the use of the place for the proscribed 
illegal conduct) (citation omitted).  See also People v. Shoals, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 296, 304 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1992) (“Perhaps by emphasizing one of the listed factors [beyond simple possession,] 
respondent is suggesting that possession of a large quantity of narcotics is sufficient to establish 
the crime of ‘maintaining a place.’ If so, we disagree.”).  But since the record is devoid of any 
evidence supporting the proposition that Priest knowingly maintained a vehicle for keeping a 
controlled substance, we have no occasion to reassess our position vis-à-vis the other states. 
 
11
defendant’s control or use of the vehicle in connection with the possession of 
drugs. 
These principles applied, Priest’s Maintaining a Vehicle conviction must be 
reversed.  The record reflects that Priest took no part in the original conversation 
between Fletcher and Powell, and that Priest said nothing to either the driver or 
front-seat passenger throughout the car trip except that Powell “talked too much.”  
The evidence shows only that Priest was present in the car while Fletcher 
attempted to buy drugs.  While these facts might arguably be sufficient to support 
some type of drug possession charge, they do not establish that Priest knowingly 
kept or maintained a vehicle “used for keeping or delivering” controlled 
substances.  The crucial inquiry is whether Priest knew that he was using the car to 
facilitate Fletcher’s attempted drug deal, not whether Priest knew only that 
Fletcher was about to buy drugs, with Priest by happenstance being present in the 
car alongside Fletcher.  Although it is possible to imagine a scenario where a 
passenger’s actions might adequately demonstrate his knowledge that the vehicle 
was kept or maintained for illegal drug activity, the facts here do not support that 
scenario.  Therefore, we vacate Priest’s Maintaining a Vehicle conviction and its 
associated PFDCF conviction. 
 
 
 
12
III. 
Priest next argues that the jury’s finding of guilt on the other PFDCF charges 
is legally and factually inconsistent with the jury’s decision not to convict him of 
the underlying felony charges of Trafficking and Possession with Intent to Deliver.  
Priest claims that his convictions of the PFDCF charges must be vacated because 
as a matter of law the jury’s acquittal on the predicate offenses negates the factual 
element of the weapons charges of having committed a felony while possessing a 
firearm.  Priest therefore contends that the trial judge erred by denying his motion 
for judgment of acquittal on the PFDCF counts.  We review de novo the denial of a 
motion for judgment of acquittal to determine "whether any rational trier of fact, 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could find the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."23   
A.  Jurisprudential Background 
Under Delaware law, “[a] person who is in possession of a firearm during 
the commission of a felony is guilty of possession of a firearm during the 
commission of a felony.”24  To obtain a conviction of that crime, the State must 
prove two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: a defendant's commission of a 
                                                 
23  
Couch v. State, 823 A.2d 491 (Del. 2003).   
24  
11 Del. C. § 1447A(a).   
 
13
specific felony, and his possession of a firearm during the commission of that 
felony.25   
Beginning with Brooks v. State,26 a case where the defendant faced a single 
weapons charge with no predicate offense pending, our precedent has rejected, in a 
variety of contexts, the requirement to obtain a jury verdict convicting the 
defendant of a predicate felony, even where the defendant is charged with a 
predicate felony in the indictment.  Specifically, we have interpreted the PFDCF 
statute and its companion – Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the 
Commission of a Felony27 (“PDWDCF”) – to require only that “the weapons 
offense occur during the commission of the felony.”28  We first stated this view in 
Brooks where the State had indicted the defendant for the firearms charge alone.  
In Brooks the defendant did not face a separate charge for an underlying felony.  In 
a later case, we applied the Brooks language where a jury refused to convict on the 
predicate felony or a lesser-included felony, and ruled that there is “no requirement 
                                                 
25  
Cf. Lewis v. State, 2005 Del. LEXIS 90 (interpreting “deadly weapon” companion 
statute).   
26  
367 A.2d 638 (Del. 1976).    
27  
See 11 Del. C. § 1447(a) (“A person who is in possession of a deadly weapon during the 
commission of a felony is guilty of possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a 
felony.”). 
28  
Brooks, 367 A.2d at 640. 
 
14
that a defendant be convicted of the underlying felony in order to uphold a firearm 
offense.”29   
Priest’s argument implicates a fundamental tenet of criminal law that guides 
our review in this case: the General Assembly’s declaration that “[n]o person may 
be convicted of an offense unless each element of the offense is proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”30  Here a grand jury – presented with an indictment charging a 
defendant with the commission of particular predicate offenses – returned a true 
bill for PFDCF charges predicated on the commission of those specifically charged 
offenses.  Thereafter, a petit jury unequivocally found Priest not guilty of those 
charged predicate offenses, yet still convicted him of the related compound 
offenses.  As a result, the petit jury reached a not guilty verdict on the predicate 
offense, which negated the essential element of committing the specific felony 
charged in the grand jury’s indictment, while at the same time the jury reached a 
guilty verdict on the compound weapons offense that charged the commission of 
that very same felony as an essential element.  The verdicts are inescapably 
inconsistent.      
                                                 
29  
Brown v. State, 729 A.2d 259, 266 (Del. 1999) (emphasis added). 
30  
11 Del. C. § 301(b).  In this statute, the General Assembly chose to codify what is widely 
recognized as a federal constitutional mandate.  See generally In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 
(1970) (“[P]roof of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required.”).  
 
 
 
15
Our analysis of inconsistent jury verdicts has in some cases been guided by 
principles of jury lenity.  In other cases our analysis has involved independent 
consideration of the sufficiency of the evidence, relying on language from cases 
where the jury did not render inconsistent verdicts.  Brooks, for example, involved 
a juvenile defendant who was tried in the Superior Court on a single count of 
PDWDCF.31  There, we stated that the “record is clear that Brooks aided [a 
codefendant] in the commission of the robbery and the weapons offense.”32  In a 
one paragraph disposition, we found that since “there is no question that the 
robbery was committed . . . and that the weapon was used in commission of [that] 
felony,” the record established the elements of the PDWDCF statute.33  Because 
there was no pending predicate charge for the jury to consider, the jury’s 
factfinding and verdict in Brooks could not be inconsistent.   
Although in Brooks the jury heard facts at trial that supported the 
commission of an underlying felony charged as an element of the weapons offense, 
no separate, distinct felony charge was submitted on which the jury could have 
rendered a not guilty verdict.  Therefore, in Brooks, unlike this case, the jury could 
not have returned an inconsistent verdict, nor could it have made an underlying 
                                                 
31  
See 367 A.2d at 639. 
32  
Id.   
33  
Id. at 640.   
 
16
factual finding that conflicted with any element of the PDWDCF charge.  
Consequently, we conducted a traditional sufficiency-of-the-evidence review, as 
would have occurred in any appellate review of a single multi-element criminal 
charge.  Ironically, Brooks, a case where no inconsistent verdict was possible, 
spawned a line of decisions, each quoting language from the Brooks opinion, 
where juries, in fact, did return inconsistent verdicts. 
Brown v. State was such a case.  In Brown, a jury acquitted the defendant of 
the specific predicate felonies underlying several PFDCF charges, but convicted 
him of thirteen other felonies.  In those circumstances, we found that the 
inconsistency in the verdict could be explained by jury lenity, citing Brooks (which 
involved inapposite facts) for the proposition that jury lenity can explain a 
compound-predicate inconsistency on the basis that “there is no requirement that a 
defendant be convicted of the underlying felony. . . .”34  Although the jury had 
rendered an inconsistent verdict, it had convicted the defendant of thirteen other 
felonies.  Therefore, we had no occasion to scrutinize more deeply the applicability 
of the PFDCF statute or the extension of our language in Brooks to cases not 
presenting the unique Brooks facts.  Instead, we decided Brown on principles of 
jury lenity.  Consequently, we did not address the central question presented here: 
whether after an acquittal of all predicate charges, the weapons statutes permit 
                                                 
34  
See 729 A.2d at 266. 
 
17
appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence heard by the jury and to 
conclude therefrom that a compound-charge conviction should be affirmed.35     
Brown and Brooks illustrate that the common law of this State as applied to 
inconsistent verdicts evolved in two different ways.  On the one hand, we have 
applied principles of jury lenity to prevent a reviewing court from upsetting 
inconsistent verdicts between predicate and compound offenses.  These cases all 
involved some type of underlying conviction.36  On the other hand, in cases in 
which there was no jury lenity analysis at all, this Court and the Superior Court 
have, without examining the language of the weapons statutes in context, extended 
the Brooks language beyond its single-charge factual setting to uphold inconsistent 
verdicts based solely on a sufficiency-of-the-evidence review.37   
In this case, the jury acquitted Priest of all underlying felony charges.  
Therefore, the facts of this case squarely present, for the first time, the need for us 
to scrutinize closely the language of the weapons statutes, and the proper 
                                                 
35  
See id.    
36  
See Brown, 729 A.2d at 266 (thirteen other felony convictions); Tilden v. State, 513 A.2d 
1302 (Del. 1986) (lesser-included predicate felony). 
37  
See Samuel v. State, 1997 Del. LEXIS 133 (four underlying felonies merged into two); 
Fletcher v. State, 435 A.2d 1040 (Del. 1981) (predicate felony charge dropped in exchange for 
guilty plea on compound offense).  Cf. State v. Nickerson, 1997 Del. Super. LEXIS 586, aff’d 
734 A.2d 159 (Del. 1999) (holding that Tilden controlled and precluded reanalysis of § 1447A(g) 
despite Tilden’s conviction of a lesser included felony and Nickerson’s conviction on a mere 
misdemeanor); State v. Mintz, 1993 Del. Super. LEXIS 491, appeal dismissed, 633 A.2d 370 
(Del. 1993) (misdemeanor guilty plea on predicate offense). 
 
18
application of Brooks, to cases involving more than a single weapons charge.  
Specifically, we must determine whether the doctrine implicit in the Brooks 
language – that a jury need not convict the defendant of the underlying offense to 
return a guilty verdict on a weapons offense where no underlying felony is 
separately charged – should apply in a case where a jury fails to convict the 
defendant of a specifically charged underlying felony or a lesser-included felony, 
yet convicts the defendant of PFDCF.   
The question of whether an actual conviction of the underlying felony is an 
element of the statutory PFDCF offense requires a close reading of the applicable 
statute and a reappraisal of the role of jury lenity in cases of predicate and 
compound felony inconsistencies.  We conclude that the common law analysis 
normally employed to avoid post-verdict inquiry into what appears to be jury 
mistake or a jury’s exercise of leniency cannot be reconciled with the PFDCF 
statute.  Therefore, the failure to obtain a conviction of either the specific predicate 
offense or a lesser-included felony left the State unable to prove – as our General 
Assembly requires – that Priest possessed a firearm “during [his] commission of a 
felony.”  We accordingly conclude that Priest’s PFDCF convictions, predicated on 
the charges of Trafficking and Possession with Intent to Deliver, must be vacated. 
 
19
 
B.  The Statute 
Although the PFDCF statute recognizes that jury lenity may come into play, 
it forecloses that doctrine’s application where, as here, an inconsistency between 
the verdicts relating to the predicate and compound offenses results from the trial 
jury’s verdict of not guilty on all predicate offenses charged in the indictment.  
Subsection (g) of the statute provides:  
A person may be found guilty of violating this section 
notwithstanding that the felony for which the person is convicted and 
during which the person possessed the firearm is a lesser included 
felony of the one originally charged.38  
 
Thus, the only inconsistency that the statute expressly contemplates and allows is 
the inconsistency which arises where the jury finds a defendant guilty of a lesser-
included offense of a predicate felony charged in the indictment.  The statute’s 
reference to “the felony for which the person is convicted” necessarily must refer 
to a separately charged felony, i.e., the predicate felony, that is the subject of a 
distinct count in the indictment.  That must be so, because a “conviction” on the 
compound felony (the weapons offense) is by its very nature all or nothing – for 
the weapons count there can be no lesser-included offense. 
                                                 
38  
11 Del. C. § 1447A(g) (emphasis added).  See also 11 Del. C. § 1447(e) (“A person may 
be found guilty of [PDWDCF] notwithstanding that the felony for which the person is convicted 
and during which the person possessed the deadly weapon is a lesser included felony of the one 
originally charged.”).  
 
20
In the absence of any ambiguity, we must be guided by the plain meaning of 
the statutory language.  Given the principle of statutory construction, expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius – the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another 
– the “lesser-included exception” found in subsection (g) must be read to signify 
the General Assembly’s intent that a not guilty verdict on a predicate felony 
precludes a conviction for PFDCF, except where there is a conviction of a lesser-
included felony under the predicate felony.39  By instructing that a conviction on 
the compound offense may remain “notwithstanding” a jury’s finding of guilt on a 
lesser-included felony, the General Assembly carved out only one exception.  By 
referring to the “felony for which the person is convicted,” that legislative 
instruction indicates that the statute creates criminal liability only where a 
defendant is actually found guilty of some felony: either the felony charged in the 
indictment or a lesser-included felony.   
Given the General Assembly’s codification of the federal constitutional 
mandate in 11 Del. C. § 301(b) – that a conviction is valid only where the State 
establishes each element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt – this 
result is not surprising.  To allow Priest’s PFDCF convictions to stand despite an 
outright acquittal of each predicate offense would read into the statute an exception 
                                                 
39  
See Walt v. State, 727 A.2d 836, 840 (Del. 1999) (holding that since the term step-
grandfather is not enumerated in statutory definition of the term family, statute at issue could not 
apply to step-grandfather).   
 
21
that finds no support in the statutory language.  Thus, whatever may otherwise be 
the reach of the common-law doctrine of jury lenity, its application here would 
contravene the public policy expressed in the PFDCF statute and Section 301(b).  
To the suggestion by the dissent that today’s ruling overturns twenty-five years of 
precedent, we demur.  All we do today is give effect to the plain language of our 
weapons statutes and recognize the limited factual reach of Brooks.  We overrule 
prior case law only to the extent those precedents uphold convictions after 
inconsistent verdicts where the jury failed to convict on a predicate felony, either 
the felony originally charged in the indictment or a lesser-included felony.40 
C.  Jury Lenity and Inconsistent Verdicts 
 
The principle of jury lenity – settled in our law and vital to a system of 
justice that recognizes the primacy of citizen-based factfinding – continues to 
guide our review of many inconsistent-verdict cases.  But, in cases where the State 
has failed, as a matter of law, to meet its burden imposed by the language of the 
weapons statutes and Section 301(b), appellate review of the sufficiency of the 
evidence cannot salvage a conviction.  In those limited circumstances, jury lenity 
                                                 
40 
See Brown, 729 A.2d at 266 (acquittal on predicate charge); Nickerson, 1997 Del. Super. 
LEXIS 586, aff’d 734 A.2d 159 (Del. 1999) (underlying misdemeanor conviction).  By contrast, 
in the Fletcher and Mintz cases, 435 A.2d at 1040 and 1993 Del. Super. LEXIS 491, 
respectively, the defendant voluntarily removed the issue from consideration by entering pleas to 
misdemeanors to avoid trial on the predicate charge and admitted the facts alleged in the 
weapons charges.  As a result, no inconsistent jury verdict occurred, and as in Brooks, there was 
no need to obtain a conviction on the underlying felony. 
 
22
cannot operate to excuse or explain away the State’s failure to establish an 
essential, statutorily-dictated element of its case. 
1.  General Principles 
 
The majority recognizes that but for language in Sections 1447(e) and 
1447A(g), one could argue that the jury has made two separate findings of fact, 
albeit with inconsistent results – that the defendant both did and did not commit a 
felony that underlies a weapons charge.  The common-law approach would explain 
this inconsistency in terms of jury lenity or mistake, and would require a reviewing 
court to accept this result so long as there exists record support for the commission 
of the felony when viewed solely as an element of the weapons charge.  In effect, 
this approach would be to treat the case as if it were Brooks, where there was no 
predicate felony charge, except that the reviewing court would ignore the jury’s 
failure to convict on the predicate felony and would examine the record to 
determine if there is sufficient evidence that would have permitted the jury to 
convict on the element of the weapons charge that alleged that the defendant’s 
possession of the weapon occurred during the commission of a specific underlying 
felony.   
Much has been written on similar issues in the federal system, although in a 
different context.  In United States v. Powell, a jury acquitted the defendant of two 
 
23
predicate felonies: distribution and conspiracy to distribute controlled substances.41  
Nonetheless, the jury convicted Powell of the compound charge of facilitating 
those felonies by telephone.  On review by the United States Supreme Court, 
Powell argued that the inconsistent verdicts required the Court to find as a matter 
of law that the evidence was insufficient to support the compound felony 
conviction.42  Rejecting Powell’s argument, the Court held: 
Whether presented as an insufficient evidence argument, or as an 
argument that the acquittal on the predicate offense should collaterally 
estop the Government on the compound offense, the argument 
necessarily assumes that the acquittal on the predicate offense was 
proper – the one the jury “really meant.”  This, of course, is not 
necessarily correct; all we know is that the verdicts are inconsistent.43 
 
The Court concluded that “if inconsistent verdicts are nevertheless reached[,] those 
verdicts still are likely to be the result of mistake, or lenity,” and thus must remain 
undisturbed by reviewing courts.44   
Importantly, the Court in Powell disclaimed that it was engaging in 
sufficiency-of-the-evidence review.  The United States Supreme Court held that 
regardless of the implications of the inconsistent verdicts, the prosecuting authority 
“must convince the jury with its proof, and must also satisfy the courts that given 
                                                 
41  
469 U.S. 57 (1984).   
42  
Id. at 68.   
43  
Id. 
44  
Id.  
 
24
this proof the jury could rationally have reached a verdict of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”45  Powell represents the federal courts’ articulation of the jury 
lenity doctrine.   
Several years later, we adopted Powell’s rationale in Tilden v. State.46  
Tilden was charged with two counts of first-degree robbery as predicate felonies, 
crimes that involved the use of a deadly weapon.  A jury convicted Tilden of two 
counts of second-degree robbery, however, as well as two counts of PDWDCF.  
On appeal, Tilden argued that the convictions were legally inconsistent, claiming 
that the jury had implicitly rejected the State’s evidence supporting the weapons 
element of first-degree robbery yet had simultaneously accepted that same 
evidence to convict him of the PDWDCF charge.  Affirming Tilden’s convictions, 
we held that Powell’s “rule of jury lenity finds proper application in cases of 
verdict inconsistency,”47 and that judicial review of the sufficiency of the evidence, 
independent of lenity considerations, affords “protection against jury irrationality 
or error.”48  Noting that the record demonstrated gun-related testimony by the 
robbery victims and evidence of a shotgun seizure by police, we held that, viewing 
                                                 
45  
Id. at 67. 
46  
513 A.2d 1302 (Del. 1986).   
47  
Id. at 1307.  
48  
Id., citing Powell, 469 U.S. at 67.   
 
25
the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a “rational fact finder 
could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as to the 
weapons charge.”49  Although Tilden focused on the Powell “rule of jury lenity,” it 
did not consider the language of our weapons statutes, which state that a jury 
finding of guilt on a lesser-included felony would suffice to sustain a conviction on 
the PDWDCF charge. 
Unlike Tilden, where the jury did convict (inconsistently) on a lesser-
included felony, a later case – Johnson v. State50 – presented the precise question 
before us today: whether a conviction of a compound offense can survive in the 
face of an acquittal of its predicate felony charge.  In Johnson, a jury acquitted 
Johnson of burglary but convicted him of conspiracy to commit burglary.  On 
appeal, we vacated the conspiracy conviction.  Looking to the language of the 
indictment, we held that by “failing to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed burglary in the third degree as alleged in the first count of the 
indictment, the State also failed to prove that he committed the overt act necessary 
to the conspiracy charge as alleged in the third count of the indictment.”51  We also 
found that the possibilities that a Johnson coconspirator could have performed the 
                                                 
49  
Tilden, 513 A.2d at 1307, citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (emphasis 
added). 
50  
409 A.2d 1043 (Del. 1979).   
51  
Id. at 1044.   
 
26
overt act or that Johnson could have been found culpable as an accomplice could 
not cure the inconsistency, because neither the indictment nor the arguments 
advanced at trial presented those alternate theories of guilt.52 
2.  Reconciling Johnson with Tilden 
Although Johnson remains jurisprudentially sound, the inconsistent-verdict 
principles later established in Tilden purported to modify Johnson’s precedential 
reach.  Tilden stands for the proposition that an acquittal of one predicate count 
does not automatically require a post-trial judgment of acquittal on a factually-
related offense, as Johnson might be read to suggest.  Adopting the Powell 
rationale, we held in Tilden that “[w]hile we decline to expressly overrule Johnson, 
. . . the controlling standard for testing a claim of inconsistent verdicts is the rule of 
jury lenity now approved coupled with the sufficiency of evidence standard.”53  
Thus, our reconciliation of Tilden – which coupled jury lenity and a sufficiency-of-
the-evidence standard – with Johnson – which we declined in Tilden to overrule – 
is that a multiple-count verdict that includes a weapons charge as the compound 
offense, even if factually inconsistent, must stand where the verdict reflects jury 
lenity and where the jury has convicted on a lesser-included felony.   
                                                 
52  
Id.  
53  
Tilden, 513 A.2d at 1307.   
 
27
In most cases of verdict inconsistency, the facts will be controlled by the 
Johnson-Tilden principle, and inconsistent verdicts resulting from a not guilty 
verdict on a predicate charge and a guilty verdict on a compound charge will likely 
not invalidate the conviction.  In Tilden, the jury convicted the defendant of 
second-degree robbery (an offense that did not implicate a weapon), rather than 
first-degree robbery (an offense that did).  Second-degree robbery was, of course, a 
lesser-included felony, although not the felony originally charged as the predicate 
in Tilden’s indictment – the very scenario contemplated by our weapons statute.  
As the Tilden court pointed out, the evidence that Tilden possessed a deadly 
weapon while committing the acts constituting second-degree robbery (as the jury 
found) independently supported his conviction on the compound offense. 
The indictment in Powell contained language similar to the language 
contained in the indictment here.54  The Powell Court, nonetheless, upheld the 
inconsistent verdicts, holding that where there is a finding of guilt on an offense 
that incorporates by reference a predicate charge on which there was an acquittal, 
the rule of jury lenity controls in the federal courts.  But the indictment in Tilden 
did not involve a predicate-compound inconsistency of the kind presented in 
                                                 
54  
Compare id. at 60 (stating that the jury convicted Powell of “using a telephone in 
committing” the felonies of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute and, in a 
separate count, possession with intent to distribute cocaine) with 11 Del. C. § 1447A(a) (“A 
person who is in possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony is guilty of 
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.”) (emphasis added). 
 
28
Powell.  Accordingly, Tilden, in which we refused to overrule Johnson, does not 
reach or control the circumstances presented here.  Nor does Powell, but for a 
different reason:  Powell’s jury lenity rationale, which Tilden adopted, is 
proscribed by the statutory language that defines Delaware’s weapons offenses.   
If on Priest’s predicate drug possession charge the jury had returned a guilty 
verdict on a lesser-included felony, the statute would control and, as in Tilden, the 
verdict would reflect that the jury opted for a more lenient finding by intentionally 
disregarding the evidence of the more serious charge.  In that scenario, the General 
Assembly has specifically chosen to modify the principle of lenity – a doctrine that 
discourages post-verdict judicial inquiry into jury decisionmaking – by providing 
that a conviction on a lesser-included felony of that on which the defendant was 
indicted will suffice to support a conviction on the weapons charge.   
In this case, however, there is no underlying felony conviction at all.  
Because the jury refused to find Priest guilty of any predicate felony, whether as 
charged or in the form of a lesser-included offense, the statute precludes any 
application of the Powell jury lenity rationale which we purported to adopt in 
Tilden. 
 
29
3.  Priest’s Claims of Inconsistency 
Because this case involves inconsistent jury verdicts relating to predicate 
felonies and compound weapons offenses, by reason of an acquittal on the 
predicate charges, the analysis employed in Johnson is more properly applicable 
here.  In Johnson, the indictment alleged that the overt act of the charged 
conspiracy “consisted of the crime of burglary in the third degree as charged in the 
first count of the indictment.”55  Absent a conviction on that predicate offense – or 
some alternative basis of culpability supported by the record, such as accomplice 
liability – we found the evidence insufficient to support a conspiracy conviction.   
The facts here mirror those in Johnson.  The PFDCF counts were expressly 
tied to the underlying felonies.56  The jury did not convict Priest either as a 
principal or as an accomplice to Fletcher’s drug activity.  Therefore, the PFDCF 
convictions cannot stand in the face of an acquittal of the predicate crimes 
explicitly charged as an element of the compound offenses, and absent a conviction 
on a lesser-included felony.  In statutory terms, the jury’s outright acquittal on the 
predicate felonies establishes that Priest is not a “person . . . convicted” of a felony 
                                                 
55  
Johnson, 409 A.2d at 1044. 
56  
See State v. Priest, Del. Super., ID No. 00414252 (Oct. 6, 2003), Indictment at Count 3 
(“Torisho K. Priest . . . did knowingly possess a firearm during the commission of a felony by 
possessing a firearm during the commission of Trafficking Cocaine as set forth in Count 3 [sic] 
of this Indictment. . . .”), Count 5 (“Torshiro K. Priest . . . did knowingly possess a firearm . . . 
during the commission of Possession with Intent to Deliver Cocaine as set forth in Count 4 of 
this Indictment. . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 
30
or “lesser included felony of the one originally charged,” as contemplated by 11 
Del. C. § 1447A(g).  For that reason, and because no other legally cognizable basis 
to support such a verdict exists, Priest’s weapons convictions are unsustainable as a 
matter of law.57  
D.  The Federal Statute 
 
We pause here to observe that, because it employs hortatory language at 
odds with Delaware’s mandatory provisions, the counterpart federal weapons-
possession statute affords no guidance in our application of the PFDCF statute.  
Under federal law, “. . . any person who, during and in relation to any crime of 
violence or drug trafficking crime . . . for which the person may be prosecuted in a 
court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm . . .” is subject to a range of 
sentences separate from those connected to the underlying felony.58  The Circuit 
Courts of Appeal that have addressed the issue of compound-predicate 
                                                 
57  
Any other reading runs counter to our well-established precedent that demands both 
particularity in the indictment and, to sustain a conviction, proof of each element of the offense 
charged therein.  See, e.g., Gray v. State, 441 A.2d 209, 223 (Del. 1981) ("Indictments and 
informations . . . are sufficient in law if drawn with such particularity that the accused will be 
fully informed of the charge he will be required to meet, and, upon the basis of such information, 
will be given a reasonable opportunity to prepare his defense, and to permit the pleading in 
future prosecutions of the proceeding as a bar to further prosecution upon the same facts."); State 
v. Steele, 2002 Del. Super. LEXIS 20 (“All essential elements of a crime must be incorporated 
into the indictment count.”); State v. Samuels, 67 A. 164, 165 (Del. Oyer & Term. 1904) (“The 
burden of proving every material element of the crime charged in the indictment rests upon the 
State.”).  Cf. State v. Naylor, 90 A. 880, 890 (Del. Oyer & Term. 1913) (focusing on “material 
ingredient[s]” of indictment). 
58  
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2005) (emphasis added).  See also Simpson v. United States, 
435 U.S. 6, 10 (1978) (confirming that, despite its language, Section 924 constitutes a separate 
offense, rather than a sentencing enhancement). 
 
31
inconsistencies have all held that under the federal statute, a jury need not find a 
defendant guilty of the predicate offense to convict on the compound charge.59  To 
the contrary, the phrase may be prosecuted indicates that for a weapons conviction 
to survive appellate scrutiny, the government need only show that a reasonable jury 
could have found the defendant guilty of the predicate offense, not that it actually 
did.60  “It is only the fact of the offense, and not a conviction, that is needed to 
establish the required predicate.”61   
 
By contrast, Delaware’s PFDCF statute affirmatively requires that the 
defendant possess a firearm “during the commission of a felony.”  That language 
focuses on the defendant’s conduct, rather than the defendant’s status.  Under the 
Delaware statute, the defendant must actually be found to have perpetrated a 
specified felony, whereas under the federal counterpart, the trier of fact is directed 
to look only to whether the defendant “may be prosecuted” for the actions that give 
                                                 
59  
See, e.g., United States v. Frye, 402 F.3d 1123, 1128 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. 
Carter, 300 F.3d 415, 425 (4th Cir. 2002); United States v. Lake, 150 F.3d 269, 274-75 (3d Cir. 
1998); United States v. Nelson, 27 F.3d 199, 200 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Myers, 993 
F.2d 171, 172 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Hill, 971 F.2d 1461, 1467 (10th Cir. 1992); 
United States v. Munoz-Fabela, 896 F.2d 908, 910-11 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Hunter, 
887 F.2d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir. 1989).  
60  
See Carter, 300 F. 3d at 425 (holding that there only need be “some showing by the 
government that a reasonable jury could have convicted on the predicate drug offense”).  See 
also Hill, 971 F.2d at 1463-64 (“This interpretation finds support in the statutory language which 
provides that the underlying offense need only be on for which the defendant ‘may be prosecuted 
in a court of the United States. . . .’ ”).   
61  
Munoz-Fabela, 896 F.2d at 911. 
 
32
rise to the compound offense.  By using the precatory term may, the federal statute 
signals unequivocally that an actual conviction is unnecessary to sustain a finding 
of guilt on the compound offense.  Because of the vastly different policy 
approaches underlying these two statutes, the federal analysis is inapplicable and 
therefore unpersuasive. 
E.  Disposition 
 
The General Assembly’s word choice controls our analysis.  In the PFDCF 
statute, the General Assembly opted to create an offense that punishes one who 
uses a firearm while committing a felony.  As a result, the PFDCF statute and its 
counterpart modify the common law by proscribing jury lenity and sufficiency-of-
the-evidence review.  To allow Priest’s weapons-possession convictions to stand in 
the face of an outright acquittal on the predicate felony would undermine the plain 
language of the PFDCF statute.  Given the statutory limitation on judicial review, 
the acquittal removed from the jury’s further consideration the very conduct that 
the General Assembly sought to criminalize.  Where a jury finds that a defendant 
did not commit an underlying felony or a lesser-included felony, and they reject an 
independent basis for culpability (such as accomplice liability), as they did here, 
the policy justification for applying the PFDCF statute vanishes.  We must, 
therefore, vacate Priest’s PFDCF convictions.    
 
33
 
To forestall the possibility of this type of predicate-compound inconsistency 
arising in the future, we suggest that, when instructing a jury, trial judges develop 
and use a pattern instruction that precludes the jury from deliberating on a PFDCF 
or PDWDCF count in the event that they find the defendant not guilty of the 
underlying predicate felony or of a lesser-included felony.  If the jury acquits on 
the predicate count, the trial judge should enter a judgment of acquittal on the 
related weapons charge.   
We acknowledge that removing the possibility of predicate-compound 
inconsistencies by juries may lead to convictions on both charges, rather than on a 
single weapons offense.  Defendants would thus be subject to potentially harsher 
consequences.  The terms of the weapons statutes, however, dictate this result by 
mandating that there be an underlying felony conviction.  Ultimately, judicial 
deference to the factfinder, embodied in the doctrine of jury lenity, cannot 
supercede the judiciary’s primary obligation to give effect to the General 
Assembly’s formulation of the criminal law.    
 
34
 
IV. 
For these reasons, Priest’s convictions for Maintaining a Vehicle for 
Keeping Controlled Substances and Possession of a Firearm During the 
Commission of a Felony are VACATED.  We REVERSE the judgment of the 
Superior Court, and REMAND with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal 
on the Maintaining a Vehicle and all PFDCF counts. 
 
35
BERGER, J., Concurring in part and Dissenting in part: 
 
I agree with the majority=s conclusion that here, as in McNulty v. State,62 
there is insufficient evidence to support Priest=s conviction on the charge of 
maintaining a vehicle.  I would affirm, however, on the two PFDCF convictions.   
Under settled law, the fact that the jury acquitted Priest on the predicate 
offenses is not dispositive.  Inconsistent verdicts must be reviewed to determine 
whether there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction on the predicate 
offense. If there was, then the weapons conviction stands and the inconsistency is 
attributed to jury lenity.  The majority has overturned more than 25 years of 
precedent, relying on a newly discovered legislative intent to preclude convictions 
in cases like this one. Since there have been no recent amendments to the relevant 
criminal statutes,  I find no basis on which to write new law governing inconsistent 
verdicts.  Therefore, I dissent. 
In 1976, this Court held that a person may be convicted of a weapons charge 
without being convicted of the underlying felony. In Brooks v. State,63 defendant 
advanced the very argument now adopted by the majority B that '1447(e)64 
implicitly requires a conviction on the underlying felony.  The Brooks Court 
                                                 
62 655 A.2d at 1219. 
63367 A.2d 638 (Del. 1976). 
64At that time it was designated ' 1447(d). 
 
36
rejected that argument, noting that, A[t]he statute does not require a conviction by 
its terms, but only requires that the weapons offense occur during the commission 
of a felony.@65  Since then, this Court and the Superior Court have repeatedly 
upheld weapons convictions in cases where there was no underlying felony 
conviction.  See, e.g.: Brown v. State, 729 A.2d 259 (Del. 1999)(Upholding 
weapons convictions where defendant acquitted of underlying felonies.); Samuel v. 
State, 694 A.2d 48 (Del. 1997)(Upholding four weapons convictions where the 
four underlying felonies were merged into two.); Fletcher v. State, 435 A.2d 1040 
(Del. 1981) (Upholding  weapons conviction, after a guilty plea, where underlying 
robbery charge was nolle prossed.); State v. Nickerson, 1997 WL 855706 (Del. 
Super.), aff=d., Nickerson v. State, 734 A.2d 159 (Del. 1999) (Upholding weapons 
conviction where defendant acquitted of underlying felony, but convicted on lesser 
included misdemeanor.); State v. Mintz, 1994 WL 465539 (Del. Super.)(Upholding 
weapons conviction, after a guilty plea, where defendant also pled guilty to 
misdemeanor.) 
Because the jury acquitted Priest on the underlying felonies, this Court is 
obliged to review the record and determine whether, despite the verdict, there is 
sufficient evidence to support convictions on those drug crimes.   Viewed in the 
light most favorable to the State, the evidence that Priest was a participant in the 
                                                 
65Id. at 640. 
 
37
planned drug deal may be inferred from the fact that: (i) Priest got into the car with 
Fletcher, and, according to Powell, Fletcher said, Athis is his cousin, and he is got 
to come with me kind of thing....@; (ii) while Priest was sitting in the back seat, 
Fletcher told Powell that he had to go to Bob Evans to get Ahooked up@ (meaning 
get a supply of cocaine); and (iii) Priest was carrying a loaded, stolen gun.  The 
jury was satisfied, from the evidence, that Priest and Fletcher were conspiring to 
commit the crime of possession with intent to deliver cocaine.  The jury also could 
have concluded that Priest was Fletcher=s accomplice in possessing the crack 
cocaine found in the glove compartment, and in possessing the same cocaine with 
intent to deliver.  As this Court noted in upholding Fletcher=s convictions: 
The State showed that Fletcher and Priest were engaged in a joint criminal 
enterprise and conspired to sell the cocaine, that Priest rode in the vehicle 
after Fletcher obtained Powell=s consent, that Priest remained with the 
vehicle while Fletcher went into the restaurant, and that Priest was in 
possession of the firearm while he and Fletcher were in the car.  That 
evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that Fletcher and Priest had 
agreed that Priest would carry the gun during the criminal enterprise.66 
 
In sum, since there is enough evidence to support convictions on the underlying 
drug charges, the jury=s decision to acquit Priest can be attributable to lenity, and 
the weapons convictions should be affirmed. 
                                                 
66 Fletcher v. State, 2005 WL 646841, **4 (Del. Supr.).