Title: State v. Obea S. Hayes
Citation: 2004 WI 80
Docket Number: 2002AP001542-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 16, 2004

2004 WI 80 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-1542-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Obea S. Hayes,  
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2003 WI App 99 
Reported at: 264 Wis. 2d 377, 663 N.W.2d 351 
(Ct. App. 2003-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 16, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 13, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit  
 
COUNTY: 
Rock   
 
JUDGE: 
David G. Deininger   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
BRADLEY, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
PROSSER, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
SYKES, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
WILCOX, J., joins concurrence; ROGGENSACK, J., 
joins in part. 
ROGGENSACK, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Philip J. Brehm, Janesville, and oral argument by Philip J. 
Brehm. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Sally 
L. Wellman, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
2004 WI 80 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-1542-CR  
(L.C. No. 
00 CF 696) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Obea S. Hayes,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 16, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.    This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals1 affirming the 
judgment of conviction of Obea S. Hayes, the defendant, in the 
Circuit Court for Rock County, David G. Deininger, Judge.2  The 
                                                 
1 State v. Hayes, 2003 WI App 99, 264 Wis.2d 377, 663 N.W.2d 
351. 
2 Court of Appeals Judge David G. Deininger was sitting by 
special assignment to the circuit court pursuant to the Judicial 
Exchange Program. 
No. 
02-1542-CR   
 
2 
 
defendant was convicted of second-degree sexual assault pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 940.225(2)(a) (2001-02).3   
¶2 
The 
court 
of 
appeals 
affirmed 
the 
judgment 
of 
conviction, concluding that the defendant did not have to raise 
a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence during trial to 
preserve the challenge for appeal as a matter of right and that 
the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, of the defendant's guilt of second-
degree sexual assault. 
¶3 
Two issues are raised on review.  The first issue is 
whether the defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence must have been raised during trial to preserve the 
challenge for appeal as a matter of right.  Second, if the court 
reaches the issue, was the evidence sufficient in the present 
case to support the jury's verdict, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
of the defendant's guilt of second-degree sexual assault.   
¶4 
The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed.  
Justices Ann Walsh Bradley and N. Patrick Crooks join the author 
of this 
opinion in concluding that 
a challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence did not have to be raised during 
trial to preserve the issue for appeal as a matter of right and 
that the evidence was sufficient in the present case to support 
the 
jury's 
verdict, 
beyond 
a 
reasonable 
doubt, 
of 
the 
defendant's guilt of second-degree sexual assault.  Justice 
                                                 
3 All references to the Wisconsin statutes are to the 2001-
02 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
02-1542-CR   
 
3 
 
David T. Prosser, Jr., in a concurring opinion, adopts the 
interpretation of the statute set out in State v. Gomez, 179 
Wis. 2d 400, 402, 507 N.W.2d 378 (Ct. App. 1993).4  Thus, four 
members of the court reach the same result on the statute.  
Justices Diane S. Sykes and Jon P. Wilcox, in a concurring 
opinion, conclude that the waiver rule applies to sufficiency of 
the evidence challenges and that "sufficiency of evidence 
challenges [cannot] be made for the first time on appeal as a 
matter of right."5  Justice Patience D. Roggensack, in a 
concurring opinion, concludes that an accused's right to 
challenge the sufficiency of evidence is "bottomed in the 
requirement that the State must prove an accused's guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt, and that to relieve the State of that burden 
at 
any 
point 
in 
the 
process 
undermines 
the 
fundamental 
constitutional principle that a defendant is presumed innocent 
until the State proves him or her guilty by that requisite 
degree of proof."6   
I 
¶5 
The defendant did not move the circuit court for a 
directed verdict at the close of the State's evidence or the 
close of all the evidence and made no motions after judgment.  
The defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for the 
                                                 
4 Justice Prosser's concurrence, ¶70. 
5 Justice Sykes' concurrence, ¶116. 
6 Justice Roggensack's concurrence, ¶118. 
No. 
02-1542-CR   
 
4 
 
first time on appeal.  He continues to raise this issue before 
this court on review.  
¶6 
The State argued in the court of appeals and argues 
here that the defendant waived his challenge to the sufficiency 
of the evidence because he failed to raise the issue in a timely 
manner during trial.  
¶7 
Whether a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 
must be raised during trial to preserve the issue on appeal as a 
matter of right is a question of law requiring statutory 
interpretation.  This court decides this issue independently of 
the court of appeals, but benefiting from its analysis.7 
¶8 
The 
principal 
statute 
at 
issue 
is 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 974.02(2), which provides as follows: 
 
974.02 Appeals and postconviction relief in criminal 
cases.   
 
. . . .  
 
(2) 
An 
appellant 
is 
not 
required 
to 
file 
a 
postconviction motion in the trial court prior to an 
appeal if the grounds are sufficiency of the evidence 
or issues previously raised.  
 
¶9 
The State and the defendant disagree on the meaning of 
this statute.  The State argues that Wis. Stat. § 974.02(2) 
exempts criminal appellants from filing a postconviction motion 
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence as a prerequisite to 
appellate review.  The State's position is that Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.02(2) is directed only toward postconviction motions, not 
                                                 
7 See State v. Cole, 2003 WI 59, ¶12, 262 Wis. 2d 167, 663 
N.W.2d 700. 
No. 
02-1542-CR   
 
5 
 
toward challenging the sufficiency of the evidence during trial 
to preserve the issue on appeal as a matter of right. 
 
¶10 According to the State, an accused must challenge the 
sufficiency of the evidence by a motion during trial to preserve 
the right to appellate review of that claim.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 974.02(2), argues the State, eliminates only the redundancy of 
requiring an accused to bring issues, including the sufficiency 
of the evidence, to the circuit court both during trial and by 
postconviction motion.  The State argues that an accused must 
raise all issues about which he seeks appeal during trial as a 
prerequisite for appellate review as a matter of right. 
 
¶11 The defendant argues that the State's interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 974.02(2) 
is 
erroneous. 
 
The 
State's 
interpretation, according to the defendant, renders the words 
"sufficiency of the evidence" surplusage and meaningless.  The 
defendant contends that if a challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence has to be raised during trial, the challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence is equated with every other claimed 
error and would fall within the statutory phrase "issues 
previously 
raised." 
 
The 
defendant 
urges 
that 
because 
§ 974.02(2) uses both "sufficiency of the evidence" and "issues 
previously 
raised," 
the 
two 
phrases 
must 
have 
different 
meanings. 
¶12 The phrases have different meanings if § 974.02(2) is 
interpreted as signifying that a challenge to the sufficiency of 
the evidence need not be previously raised during trial.  The 
defendant's position can be summarized by saying that there 
No. 
02-1542-CR   
 
6 
 
would be no reason for the legislature to have included the 
language "sufficiency of the evidence" along with "issues 
previously raised" if failure to raise the issue during trial 
would preclude an accused from raising the sufficiency issues on 
appeal as a matter of right.   
¶13 The defendant bolsters his argument by pointing to the 
court of appeals' decision in State v. Gomez, 179 Wis. 2d 400, 
507 N.W.2d 378 (Ct. App. 1993).  Gomez was convicted of child 
enticement and various other sex crimes.  Gomez appealed his 
conviction 
on 
the 
child 
enticement 
offense, 
arguing 
insufficiency of the evidence.  The State argued in Gomez that 
the defendant had waived the challenge because he had not raised 
the issue in the circuit court before, during, or after trial. 
Without analysis of Wis. Stat. § 974.02(2) or the waiver issue, 
the court of appeals simply concluded that "Gomez correctly 
asserts that his argument is based upon the sufficiency of the 
evidence to convict, which under sec. 974.02(2), Stats., does 
not require a prior postconviction motion."8   
¶14 The court of appeals concluded in the present case, 
without analysis, that it was bound to follow the Gomez 
decision.  We recognize, as does the State, that the Gomez 
decision, although precedential, has limited precedential and 
                                                 
8 State v. Gomez, 179 Wis. 2d 400, 404, 507 N.W.2d 378 (Ct. 
App. 1993). 
No. 
02-1542-CR   
 
7 
 
persuasive value for the following reasons.9  The Gomez decision 
does not analyze Wis. Stat. § 974.02(2).  Nor does it consider 
the competing arguments about whether an accused who does not 
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence during trial should be 
held to have waived the right to argue the issue on appeal.   
¶15 The text of Wis. Stat. § 974.02(2) referring only to 
postconviction motions supports the State's interpretation.  The 
text of § 974.02(2) referring to "sufficiency of the evidence or 
issues 
previously 
raised" 
supports 
the 
defendant's 
interpretation. 
 
¶16 The text of Wis. Stat. § 974.02(2) is thus not 
determinative of the meaning of the statute and is not the only 
source of the intended effect of the text.   Additional sources 
of legislative intent such as the context, history, scope, and 
objective 
of 
the 
statute, 
including 
the 
consequences 
of 
alternative interpretations, 
illuminate 
the 
intent of the 
legislature. 
                                                 
9 Published 
opinions 
of 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
are 
precedential for lawyers, trial courts, the court of appeals, 
and this court.  See State v. Douangmala, 2002 WI 62, ¶42, 253 
Wis. 2d 173, 646 N.W.2d 1; Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 186, 
560 N.W.2d 246 (1997); Vollmer v. Luety, 156 Wis. 2d 1, 15, 456 
N.W.2d 797 (1990); State ex rel. Swan v. Elections Bd., 133 
Wis. 2d 87, 
108, 
394 
N.W.2d 732 
(1986) 
(Abrahamson, 
J., 
dissenting).  A decision of the court of appeals is not 
precedential in this court when this court has accepted review 
of the case.  On review of a decision of the court of appeals, 
this court may affirm, modify, or reverse the court of appeals.  
Even if this court is not reviewing a decision of the court of 
appeals, it may withdraw or disavow language in a decision of 
the court of appeals.   
No. 
02-1542-CR   
 
8 
 
 
¶17 We now consider those alternative sources, including: 
(A) the context of the statute; (B) the history of the statute; 
and (C) the purposes and consequences of the parties' competing 
interpretations of Wis. Stat. § 974.02(2). 
A 
 
¶18 Wisconsin Stat. § 974.02(2) must be viewed in the 
context of chapter 974 as a whole.  This chapter governs 
criminal procedure in appeals, new trials, and writs of error.  
Nothing in chapter 974 explicitly addresses the issue of whether 
a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence must be raised in 
the circuit court during trial to preserve the issue for appeal 
as a matter of right.   
¶19 Wisconsin Stat. § 974.02(2) must also be viewed in the 
context 
of 
chapter 
972, 
which 
governs 
criminal 
trials.  
Wisconsin 
Stat. § 972.10(4) 
governs 
motions 
during 
trial.  
Section 972.10(4) provides that at the conclusion of the entire 
case, an accused may move on the record for a dismissal.  One 
ground for dismissal is the insufficiency of the evidence.  
Motions for a directed verdict and motions to dismiss at the 
close of the State's case or at the close of all evidence are 
accepted practice.  The court has held that if an accused moves 
to dismiss on grounds of insufficiency of evidence, the circuit 
court may exercise its discretion to allow the State to 
introduce additional testimony after the State has rested.10 
                                                 
10 Grover v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 282, 283, 212 N.W.2d 117 
(1973). 
No. 
02-1542-CR   
 
9 
 
¶20 The State asks the court to examine Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.02(2) in the context of Wis. Stat. § 805.14(6), a rule 
governing civil actions.  Rules of practice in civil actions 
apply in all criminal proceedings "unless the context of a rule 
manifestly 
requires 
a 
different 
construction."11 
 
Section 
805.14(6) provides that "[i]n any motion challenging the 
sufficiency of the evidence, the grounds of the motion shall be 
stated with particularity. . . .  If the court grants a motion 
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the court shall 
state on the record or in writing with particularity the 
evidentiary 
defect 
underlying 
the 
order." 
 
The 
State 
acknowledges that a court cannot direct a verdict of guilt 
against an accused but argues that § 805.14(6) applies to both 
civil and criminal cases and compels that a motion challenging 
the sufficiency of the evidence be made during trial or be 
waived on appeal. 
¶21 The State also argues that we must consider Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.02(2) in the context of the general rule of appellate 
practice "that issues not raised in the circuit court will not 
be considered for the first time on appeal."12  This waiver rule 
serves 
several 
important 
objectives 
in 
sound 
judicial 
administration.  Failure to raise an issue in the circuit court 
                                                 
11 Wis. Stat. § 972.11. 
12 Apex Elecs. Corp. v. Gee, 217 Wis. 2d 378, 384, 577 
N.W.2d 23 (1998).  See also State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶¶10-
12, 
235 
Wis. 2d 486, 
611 
N.W.2d 727; 
Wirth 
v. 
Ehly, 
93 
Wis. 2d 433, 443, 287 N.W.2d 140 (1980). 
No. 
02-1542-CR   
 
10 
 
deprives both the adversary and the circuit court of the 
opportunity to address the issue and perhaps remedy the defect 
without the necessity of an appeal.  The waiver rule encourages 
attorneys to prepare for and conduct trials more diligently and 
prevents attorneys from sandbagging adversary counsel and the 
circuit court.13 
¶22 The State argues that nothing in the statutory 
provisions governing criminal trials suggests that a challenge 
to the sufficiency of the evidence might be different from other 
kinds of claims and therefore not subject to the general rule 
that arguments not raised at trial are deemed waived. 
¶23 Examining Wis. Stat. § 974.02(2) in the context of 
other statutes and the general rules of appellate practice does 
not definitively answer the critical question of whether the 
legislature sought to eliminate in Wis. Stat. § 974.02(2) a 
requirement that a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 
be made during the trial in order to preserve the issue for 
appeal as a matter of right.   
B 
¶24 We next consider the statutory and legislative history 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 974.02(2) 
to 
gain 
insight 
into 
what 
the 
legislature intended.  Section 974.02(2) was first enacted in 
1977, as part of a complete overhaul of appellate practice in 
Wisconsin with the creation of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals. 
                                                 
13 Huebner, 235 Wis. 2d 486, ¶¶11-12. 
No. 
02-1542-CR   
 
11 
 
¶25 When enacted in 1977, Wis. Stat. § 974.02(2) was 
worded differently than it is now.  The statute seemingly 
provided that a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence was 
not necessary to raise the claim on appeal as a matter of right.  
Section 974.02(2) stated: 
A motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence 
is not necessary to raise on appeal the sufficiency of 
the evidence.14  
¶26 The Legislative Reference Bureau Analysis of 1977 
Senate Bill 148, created by the Judicial Council and printed 
with and displayed on the bill introduced in the legislature, 
seems to limit the motion to a motion for a new trial.  Although 
the word "motion" in the bill seems to refer to any motion, the 
reference in the 1977 version of § 974.02(2) may have been 
intended merely to eliminate the need to make a motion for a new 
trial to preserve a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 
for appeal.  In other words, according to the Analysis, the word 
"motion" apparently meant "postconviction motion."  The Analysis 
reads as follows: 
Subsection (2) is intended to eliminate the need for a 
motion for new trial to set aside the judgment because 
of insufficiency of the evidence as a condition to 
raise the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal.  It 
does not change the quantum of evidence needed for the 
court to accept a guilty plea.  
 
¶27 Neither 
the 
statute 
nor 
the 
Analysis 
suggests, 
however, whether the removal of the need to file a motion for a 
new trial also eliminated the need to file a motion during trial 
                                                 
14 § 127, ch. 187, Laws of 1977 (emphasis added). 
No. 
02-1542-CR   
 
12 
 
in order to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal 
as of right. 
¶28 This 
court 
considered 
the 
1977 
version 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 974.02(2) in a per curiam decision in State v. 
Monje, 109 Wis. 2d 138, 325 N.W.2d 695 (1982).  The offender in 
that case argued, on a motion for reconsideration, that 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.30(1)(f) entirely eliminated the need 
for 
postconviction 
motions 
because 
the 
language 
of 
Rule 
809.30(1)(f) provided that the "defendant shall file a notice of 
appeal or motion seeking postconviction relief within 30 days of 
the service of the transcript."15   
¶29 In Monje, the court held that Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
809.30(1)(f) did not alter the rule that postconviction motions 
were necessary to preserve challenges for appeal as a matter of 
right.  The Monje court further concluded that the word "or" in 
Rule 809.30(1)(f) referred to the exception under § 974.02(2) 
for challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence.  The Monje 
court concluded that "for issues on appeal to be considered as a 
matter of right, postconviction motions must be made except in 
challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence."16  The Monje 
court did not specify whether the elimination of the need to 
file a postconviction motion with respect to a challenge on the 
                                                 
15 State v. Monje, 109 Wis. 2d 138, 153, 325 N.W.2d 695 
(1982). 
16 State v. Monje, 109 Wis. 2d 138, 153a, 327 N.W.2d 641 
(denying motion for reconsideration and clarifying court's 
holding). 
No. 
02-1542-CR   
 
13 
 
sufficiency of the evidence also eliminated the need to raise 
the issue during trial. 
¶30 In the wake of the Monje decision, Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.02(2) was amended, apparently in response to a position 
paper prepared by Charles Bennett Vetzner, Chief of the 
Appellate Division of the State Public Defender's Office.  In 
that position paper, Attorney Vetzner raised concerns that 
appellate counsel had, prior to Monje, viewed postconviction 
motions as not required when the issue had previously been 
raised in the trial court.  The rationale was that the same 
issue need not be presented twice to the circuit court.  
Attorney Vetzner urged that § 974.02(2) be amended to reflect 
the practice of avoiding this double presentation of the issues 
to the circuit court.   
¶31 Attorney Vetzner was thus not primarily concerned with 
challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence.  He was concerned 
about issues previously raised in the circuit court.  He did, 
however, briefly comment on challenges to the sufficiency of the 
evidence and on his interpretation of this court's decision in 
Monje as follows:  "[T]he [Monje] court concluded that it is 
still necessary to raise all issues twice in the trial court, 
except for sufficiency of the evidence.  A claim of insufficient 
evidence need never be presented in the trial court and can be 
raised initially in an appeal in the Court of Appeals."17   
                                                 
17 Charles Bennett Vetzner, Position Paper on Proposed 
Change in Sec. 974.02 at 2 (on file in the Records of the 
Judicial Council, Wisconsin State Law Library, Madison, Wis.). 
No. 
02-1542-CR   
 
14 
 
¶32 Nevertheless, Vetzner explained that his proposed 
statute "would not in any way affect traditional concepts of 
waiver which preclude pursuing an issue after conviction if an 
objection or motion was not properly tendered beforehand.  The 
change would only make it unnecessary to bring an additional 
trial court proceeding to again raise those issues previously 
decided adversely to the convicted offender."18  Vetzner, as the 
apparent drafter of the language, seemed to believe that a 
sufficiency of the evidence claim could be raised on appeal 
without having been raised at trial. 
¶33 To remedy the effect of the Monje decision, Vetzner 
proposed to recreate § 974.02(2) as follows: 
It is not necessary to file a post-conviction motion 
in the trial court prior to an appeal when the grounds 
are sufficiency of the evidence or issues previously 
raised.19 
¶34 Vetzner's 
proposed 
amendment 
to 
§ 974.02(2) 
was 
discussed by the Judicial Council and unanimously adopted by the 
Council in its January 21, 1983 meeting.20  A request was made to 
the Legislative Reference Bureau to draft the proposal for 
introduction in the 1983 legislature.  A copy of Vetzner's 
letter was placed in the drafting file as background.21  
                                                 
18 Id. at 3. 
19 Id. 
20 Letter from James L. Fullin to Charles B. Vetzner, 
February 14, 1983 (on file in the Records of the Judicial 
Council, Wisconsin State Law Library, Madison, Wis.). 
21 Id. 
No. 
02-1542-CR   
 
15 
 
 
¶35 The legislature amended the language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.02(2) in 1983 to its current form, adopting language that 
is substantially the same as Vetzner's proposed amendment.  The 
Legislative Reference Bureau's Analysis of 1983 Senate Bill 233, 
which was printed with and displayed on the bill when it was 
introduced in the legislature, reads as follows: 
NOTE: Subsection (2) is amended to eliminate the 
necessity of presenting an issue twice to the trial 
court in order to preserve it for appeal.  In State v. 
Monje, 109 Wis. 2d 138, 153 (1982), sub. (2) was 
construed 
to 
require 
a 
postconviction 
motion to 
preserve the right to appeal any issue other than 
sufficiency of the evidence.  This bill does not 
modify the waiver doctrine, requiring timely objection 
or motion to preserve alleged error.  It merely 
eliminates the need for additional postconviction 
proceedings raising those same issues again in the 
trial court. 
¶36 The State argues that Vetzner's letter is an anomaly 
and an incorrect view of the holding in Monje.  It argues that 
even if Vetzner's view had been conveyed to the Judicial 
Council, his position was not conveyed to the legislature that 
enacted the law.  Instead, the State takes the position that the 
Legislative Reference Bureau 
Analysis 
communicated to the 
legislature 
suggests 
that 
the 
waiver 
doctrine 
and 
the 
requirement of timely motions or objections during trial to 
preserve alleged error were not modified by the 1983 amendment 
to § 974.02(2). 
¶37 In contrast, the defendant takes the position that 
Vetzner's interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 974.02(2) and his draft 
of the amendment are strong indicia of the reasons for adopting 
No. 
02-1542-CR   
 
16 
 
the statute as enacted and are evidence of legislative intent 
supporting his position. 
¶38 The statutory and legislative history lend support to 
each party's respective views of the meaning of Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.02(2).  The 1983 amendment was seemingly designed to 
codify Vetzner's interpretation that no need exists to challenge 
the sufficiency of the evidence during trial.  Neither the text 
of the 1983 amendment nor the Legislative Reference Bureau 
Analysis of the bill conclusively support Vetzner's or the 
defendant's 
interpretation. 
 
In 
short, 
the 
history 
of 
§ 974.02(2), like the text and context of the statute, supports 
both the State's and the defendant's interpretations of the 
statute.  
C 
¶39 We therefore turn to an analysis of the purposes and 
consequences of alternative interpretations of the statute to 
determine the interpretation that gives the statute its intended 
effect. 
¶40 The State argues that there are strong policy reasons 
an accused must raise a challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence during trial to preserve the issue for appeal as a 
matter of right.  According to the State, such a rule forces 
attorneys to prepare diligently for trial.  The State asserts 
that requiring an accused to challenge the sufficiency of the 
evidence in the circuit court before verdict allows the error to 
be corrected and might eliminate the need for an appeal.  
Applying the waiver rule to a challenge to the sufficiency of 
No. 
02-1542-CR   
 
17 
 
the evidence, according to the State, "prevents attorneys from 
'sandbagging' errors,"22 when an accused fails to make the 
challenge for strategic reasons and later claims that the error 
is grounds for reversal.23  Requiring an accused to challenge the 
sufficiency of the evidence during trial and giving the State an 
opportunity to correct the error, contends the State, is of 
particular concern because the consequences of an appellate 
court's declaring the evidence insufficient are so serious; if 
an appellate court determines the evidence to be insufficient, 
constitutional 
double 
jeopardy 
protections 
would 
prohibit 
retrial.24 
¶41 The State argues that the application of the waiver 
rule will not prevent an appellate court from considering a 
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in exceptional 
cases even when an accused has not preserved the issue during 
                                                 
22 Huebner, 235 Wis. 2d 486, ¶12. 
23 The State argues that at trial the defendant did not 
assert that the jury should find the evidence insufficient on 
the element of use or threat of force or violence; that the 
defendant did not ask for an instruction on the lesser crime of 
sexual contact without consent but without use or threat of 
force or violence; and that the defendant agreed with the State 
that the issue was his credibility and that of the victim.  The 
State claims that the defendant did not give it fair notice that 
he was contesting the sufficiency of the evidence on the force 
element of the crime based on the sequence of events described 
by the victim.  Had the defendant alerted the State during 
trial, the State argues, the record could have been clarified at 
that time.    
24 State v. Ivy, 119 Wis. 2d 591, 608, 350 N.W.2d 622 
(1984). 
No. 
02-1542-CR   
 
18 
 
trial.  This court may exercise its discretion to hear a claim 
and grant relief even when the issue has been waived.25  The 
State urges that the defendant did not ask the court of appeals 
or this court to grant relief in the interest of justice.  
¶42 Finally, the State asserts that the appropriate way to 
analyze a failure to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence 
during trial is within the framework of ineffective assistance 
of counsel.  The State argues that the defendant has never 
claimed that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective, 
and no postconviction factual record exists on this issue.   
¶43 The defendant asserts that it is manifestly unjust for 
an appellate court to apply the waiver rule to a challenge to 
the sufficiency of the evidence.  He relies on State v. 
Harrington, 181 Wis. 2d 985, 512 N.W.2d 261 (Ct. App. 1994), in 
which the court of appeals held that the circuit court's failure 
to find a factual basis to support the accused's guilty plea 
constituted a manifest injustice warranting appellate relief 
even though the accused's plea was the result of a plea 
negotiation.  The State minimizes the significance of Harrington 
by noting that no Wisconsin authority holds it is manifestly 
unjust for an appellate court to apply the waiver rule to a 
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. 
                                                 
25 See, e.g., State v. Schumacher, 144 Wis. 2d 388, 406-07, 
424 N.W.2d 672 (1988). 
No. 
02-1542-CR   
 
19 
 
¶44 Although the State makes a number of good policy, 
purpose, and consequence arguments, ultimately we are not 
persuaded by them. 
¶45 First, when an accused challenges the sufficiency of 
the evidence, he or she is arguing that the State has not 
carried its burden of proving the commission of a crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Such a claim presents a very serious issue in 
the administration of justice.  If the claim can be proved but 
is deemed waived, a person whom the State has not proved guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt would remain incarcerated.   
¶46 Several courts, but not all of them, have agreed with 
the public policy argument the defendant makes.  These courts 
conclude that the potential miscarriage of justice resulting 
from a conviction based on insufficient evidence is so great as 
to justify review even when the issue was not raised in the 
trial court.26  Other courts conclude that a challenge to the 
                                                 
26 Commonwealth v. McGovern, 494 N.E.2d 1298, 1300-01 (Mass. 
1986) ("[T]he defendant did not move for required findings of 
not guilty. However, findings based on legally insufficient 
evidence are inherently serious enough to create a substantial 
risk of a miscarriage of justice."); Commonwealth v. Dion, 575 
N.E.2d 759, 764 (Mass. Ct. App. 1991) (same, quoting McGovern); 
Commonwealth v. Sims, 565 N.E.2d 463, 464 (Mass. Ct. App. 1991) 
(sufficiency of evidence issue not treated as waived because of 
substantial risk of miscarriage of justice); Commonwealth v. 
Baldwin, 509 N.E.2d 4, (Mass. Ct. App. 1987) (same).  
See also State v. Miller, 2004 WL 115374, *2 (Tenn. Crim. 
App. 2004) (despite waiver, court addressed sufficiency of 
evidence issue in "interest of justice"); State v. Otto, 717 
A.2d 775, 784 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998) (addressing the sufficiency 
of the evidence claim although waived because it was "of 
constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental 
right . . . and the record is adequate to permit review"). 
No. 
02-1542-CR   
 
20 
 
sufficiency of the evidence is not waived even if not raised 
during trial because by merely entering the plea of not guilty, 
the defendant has asked for a judgment of acquittal and has 
challenged the sufficiency of the evidence by implicitly 
asserting that the State does not have enough evidence to meet 
its burden of proof.27   
¶47 Federal 
courts 
have 
reviewed 
challenges 
to 
the 
sufficiency of the evidence when the challenge was not made 
during trial or was not renewed during trial under various 
standards, including "to prevent a manifest miscarriage of 
                                                 
27 See Wis. Stat. § 805.17(4) (in actions tried to the court 
without a jury, sufficiency of the evidence may be raised on 
appeal regardless whether the party objected in the trial court 
or moved for a new trial); United States v. South, 28 F.3d 619, 
627 (7th Cir. 1994) (in a bench trial, plea of not guilty is the 
same as a formal motion for acquittal); United States v. 
Atkinson, 990 F.2d 501, 503 (9th Cir. 1993) (same, following 
5th, 6th, 7th, and D.C. Circuits); Hall v. United States, 286 
F.2d 676, 677 (5th Cir. 1960) (same); State v. Himmerick, 499 
N.W.2d 568, 571 (N.D. 1993) (holding that in a bench trial, 
merely pleading "not guilty" is sufficient to preserve a 
sufficiency of the evidence challenge for appellate review); 
State v. Osier, 569  N.W.2d 441, 443 (N.D. 1997) (same, citing 
Himmerick); 2A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: 
Criminal § 469 at 322-23 (3d ed. 2000) (arguing that entering 
plea of not guilty should preserve issue for appeal in jury 
trials as well as bench trials). 
No. 
02-1542-CR   
 
21 
 
justice," to avoid "plain error,"28 and to prevent a "clearly and 
grossly unjust" conviction.29 
¶48 Although the language employed by these courts varies 
somewhat from case to case, the general sense from the cases is 
that because a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence goes 
to the heart of a determination of guilt in a criminal trial, 
                                                 
28 United States v. Barragan, 263 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 
2001) (claim not presented after all the evidence was in is 
ordinarily waived, but court of appeals reviews claim "to 
prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice, or for plain 
error."); United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 398 (6th 
Cir. 2001) (failure to raise challenge to sufficiency of 
evidence at end of government's case or at end of all evidence 
is reviewed only for a manifest miscarriage of justice); United 
States v. Finley, 245 F.3d 199, 202-03 (2d Cir. 2001) (failure 
to renew challenge to sufficiency of evidence at end of all 
evidence puts burden on accused to persuade court of plain error 
or manifest injustice); United States v. Cole, 262 F.3d 704, 708 
(8th Cir. 2001) (defense counsel's failure to renew claim for 
insufficient evidence following all of the evidence would 
normally constitute waiver, but defendant's "assertion that the 
government failed to prove one of the elements of his crime 
would prejudice his substantial rights, if proven to be correct, 
and we thus review his sufficiency of the evidence claim."); 
United States v. Pruneda-Gonzalez, 953 F.2d 190, 193 (5th Cir. 
1992) (manifest miscarriage of justice); United States v. 
Caudill, 915 F.2d 294, 296 (7th Cir. 1990) (same). 
Federal Rule 29 of Criminal Procedure provides that an 
accused may move for an acquittal when the evidence is 
insufficient to sustain a conviction either after the close of 
the government's evidence, after the close of all evidence, 
after a guilty verdict or after the court discharges the jury.  
Federal Rule 29(c)(3) provides that "[a] defendant is not 
required to move for a judgment of acquittal before the court 
submits the case to the jury as a prerequisite for making such a 
motion after jury discharge."  
29 United States v. Richard, 943 F.2d 115, 117 (1st Cir. 
1991) (despite failure to make proper motion, court would review 
sufficiency of the evidence claim for gross injustice). 
No. 
02-1542-CR   
 
22 
 
courts will find a way to address the challenge on its merits.  
The need to protect the integrity of a finding of guilt is such 
that courts hesitate to treat the issue as waived.  The waiver 
doctrine is muted because it limits the right of an accused to 
have the State prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt and 
because the waiver doctrine is imported from civil actions 
without fully considering the accusatorial system of criminal 
justice. 
¶49 These 
courts 
conclude 
that 
a 
challenge 
to 
the 
sufficiency of the evidence is of sufficient import that an 
accused should be entitled to raise it on appeal as of right 
even when the challenge was not raised during trial.  We could 
interpret Wis. Stat. § 974.02 as requiring a challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence to be made in the circuit court or 
be waived as a matter of right and then undercut the statute by 
deciding the sufficiency of the evidence by some mechanism, such 
as plain error.30  We conclude that it is more in keeping with 
the intended effect of § 974.02 to interpret the statute to 
allow an accused to raise a challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence for the first time on appeal as a matter of right. 
¶50 Second, although the State is correct that it is 
preferable to give the State an opportunity to correct an 
                                                 
30 See State v. Gustafson, 119 Wis. 2d 676, 687, 350 
N.W.2d 653 (1984) ("[P]lain error is 'error so fundamental that 
a new trial or other relief must be granted even though the 
action was not objected to at the time.'") (quoting State v. 
Sonnenberg, 117 Wis. 2d 159, 177, 344 N.W.2d 95 (1984) (quoting 
Virgil v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 166, 191, 267 N.W.2d 852 (1978))). 
No. 
02-1542-CR   
 
23 
 
insufficiency of evidence during trial to avoid appeals, the 
possibility of "sandbagging" is minimal.  After an accused has 
been found guilty and convicted, he or she has the burden to 
prove that no reasonable jury could have come to the conclusion 
that it did.  This burden is heavy, and appellate courts give 
great deference to jury verdicts.  It is therefore unlikely that 
an accused or defense counsel will try to sandbag the State and 
the circuit court rather than make the proper objections and 
motions during trial.   
¶51 Furthermore, as the defendant points out, persons 
facing incarceration have little reason to delay in making a 
motion to dismiss because they will be waiting in prison while 
an appeal is being litigated.  These factors will limit 
"sandbagging."   
¶52 Third, because the State concedes that an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim, which would require proof of 
essentially the same issues, could be brought in cases like 
these, prosecutorial and court resources will not be subject to 
greater taxation as a result of our decision.  
¶53 The criminal justice system is designed, insofar as it 
is possible, to punish only those who have committed crimes.  If 
a conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence, it is 
incumbent upon the legal system to make certain that the 
conviction is overturned.  The guilty should be punished, but 
those whose guilt has not been proved by the State beyond a 
reasonable doubt should not be punished.   
No. 
02-1542-CR   
 
24 
 
¶54 On the basis of an analysis of the policies, purposes, 
and consequences of alternative interpretations proposed by the 
parties in the case at bar, we conclude that the following 
interpretation best gives Wis. Stat. § 974.02(2) its intended 
legislative effect:  A challenge to the sufficiency of evidence 
is different from other types of challenge not previously raised 
during trial.  This difference justifies allowing a challenge to 
the sufficiency of the evidence to be raised on appeal as a 
matter of right despite the fact that the challenge was not 
raised in the circuit court.  This interpretation comports with 
the text, context, history, and purposes of the statute, 
including the consequences of alternative interpretations.   
II 
¶55 Having concluded that the defendant may challenge the  
sufficiency of the evidence as of right even though he did not 
raise the challenge during trial, we turn to the merits of his 
claim.    
¶56 The standard of review in determining whether the 
evidence was sufficient to support a conviction is that "an 
appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of the 
trier of fact unless the evidence, viewed most favorably to the 
state and the conviction, is so lacking in probative value and 
force that no trier of fact, acting reasonably, could have found 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."31 
                                                 
31 State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 507, 451 N.W.2d 752 
(1990). 
No. 
02-1542-CR   
 
25 
 
¶57 Our review of a sufficiency of the evidence claim is 
therefore very narrow.  We give great deference to the 
determination of the trier of fact.32  We must examine the record 
to find facts that support upholding the jury's decision to 
convict. 
¶58 The defendant concedes in this court that the evidence 
showed that he had sexual contact with the victim, M.M., and 
that the sexual contact occurred without M.M.'s consent.  The 
defendant 
thus 
concedes 
that 
the 
first 
two 
elements 
of 
§ 940.225(2)(a) are satisfied. 
¶59 The defendant's sole claim is that the evidence was 
insufficient to prove that the nonconsensual sexual contact was 
achieved by force or threat of force.  The "use or threat of 
force or violence" element of second-degree sexual assault under 
Wis. Stat. § 940.225(2)(a) is satisfied if the use or threat of 
force or violence is directed to compelling the victim's 
submission.33  The element is satisfied whether the force is used 
or threatened as part of the sexual contact or whether it is 
used or threatened as part of the sexual contact to compel the 
victim's submission.34  The defendant's argument is that M.M.'s 
testimony at trial did not connect the use or threat of force or 
violence with the nonconsensual sexual contact, and therefore 
                                                 
32 Id. 
33 See State v. Bonds, 165 Wis. 2d 27, 32, 477 N.W.2d 265 
(1991). 
34 Id. 
No. 
02-1542-CR   
 
26 
 
the evidence was not sufficient to support the jury's verdict, 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  
¶60 We disagree with the defendant.  According to the 
record, the defendant and M.M. (who is 4'11" and weighs 95 
pounds) were involved in an intimate relationship.  The two 
lived together for four months.  In October 1999, M.M. 
apparently terminated her relationship with the defendant.  That 
October, the defendant and M.M. had an argument in which the 
defendant kicked down M.M.'s door and threatened to kill her.  
M.M. called the police, and the defendant was jailed.  Upon his 
release, the defendant signed a 72-hour no-contact order, which 
he immediately violated by returning to M.M.'s house.   
¶61 M.M. testified that on March 24, 2000, the defendant 
appeared at her dwelling.  He forced his way into her home, and 
a scuffle ensued.  He accused her of "messin' around" and stated 
that he wanted to have sex with her.  He choked her, shoved her 
into a wall, and touched her breasts and vagina repeatedly while 
she struggled to get free.  He tore her t-shirt and bra.  He 
broke her finger.  He told her he wanted to throw her down on 
the floor and have sex with her.  
¶62 In contrast, the defendant testified that he had never 
grabbed M.M.'s breasts or buttocks, or attempted to fondle her 
vaginal area, or tried to physically harm her.   
¶63 We reprint, verbatim, the pertinent direct and cross-
examination of M.M.:  
Q: 
Let's go back to the evening of March 24.  You 
said Mr. Hayes knocked on the door, you opened it. 
No. 
02-1542-CR   
 
27 
 
A: 
Right. 
Q: 
Did you invite Mr. Hayes inside? 
A: 
No, I did not. 
Q: 
Did Mr. Hayes come inside? 
A: 
Yes, he did. 
Q: 
How did that happen? 
A: 
He put his foot in, so——between the door. 
Q: 
Then what happened? 
A: 
He walked right on in. 
Q: 
What did Mr. Hayes say to you at that time, if 
anything? 
A: 
Where have you been?  Apparently, you must have 
been out there, messin' around. 
Q: 
What did you say? 
A: 
I told him, no.  I told him that was none of his 
business. 
Q: 
What happened after that? 
A: 
He ended up putting his hand on me and touched me 
in places where he wasn't supposed to be.  My breasts, 
plus my vagina. 
Q: 
How many times did Mr. Hayes touch you on the 
breasts? 
A: 
About two or three times. 
Q: 
What were the other areas you mentioned? 
A: 
My sitting part. 
Q: 
Are you referring to your vaginal area? 
A: 
Right. 
Q: 
And how many times did he touch you there? 
No. 
02-1542-CR   
 
28 
 
A: 
Two or three times. 
Q: 
Did he touch you on the buttocks? 
A: 
Yes. 
Q:  How many times? 
A: 
Two. 
Q: 
Did he say anything to you during that period of 
time? 
A: 
He grabbed ahold to my clothes and then tored 
[sic] my T-shirt, along with the bra. 
Q: 
Okay.  Did he indicate——make any statements to 
you about wanting to have sex with you at some point? 
A: 
Yes, he did. 
Q: 
When did that occur? 
A: 
The same night. 
Q: 
Did that occur during—— 
A: 
During. 
Q: 
——the time he was taking your clothes off? 
A: 
Right. 
. . . . [M.M. testified that her shirt and bra 
were ripped.] 
Q: 
How long did the struggle go on? 
A: 
It went on for a little while.  I really can't 
pinpoint to know exactly about what time.  When you 
are scuffling and fighting, you are not looking at no 
watch to find out, you know? 
Q: 
What 
particular 
injuries 
did 
the 
defendant 
inflict on you? 
A: 
He ended up choking me with the left hand, and he 
ended up shoving me against my bathroom corner wall. 
Q: 
Okay. 
No. 
02-1542-CR   
 
29 
 
A: 
And then he end [sic] up putting a scar on my 
chest.  Then he grabbing ahold to my hand and trying 
to break my fingers, but he broke the one finger. 
 
 . . . . 
Q: 
Going back to when Mr. Hayes was in your 
apartment on March 24th of 2000, what specifically do 
you recall him saying about him wanting to have sex 
with you? 
A: 
Because I hadn't had sex with him since heaven 
knows when. 
Q:  I beg your pardon? 
A: 
I hadn't had sex with him at all. 
Q: 
What specifically did he say? 
A: 
He said I had been out with someone else.  The 
way he puts it, he was gonna have sex with me because 
he called that, his thing. 
Q: 
Did he——did you tell the police officer that he 
told you that he wanted to throw you down on the floor 
and have sex with you? 
A: 
Right. 
Q: 
Is that what you recall happening, today? 
A: 
Right. 
 
On cross-examination, M.M. further explained: 
Q: 
As soon as he got inside the apartment, what was 
the first thing that happened? 
A: 
He done end up accusing me of messin' around. 
Q: 
So it was before he tried to touch you that he 
accused you——that he accused you of fooling around? 
A: 
Right.  Right. 
Q: 
Okay.  At the time, what did you say? 
No. 
02-1542-CR   
 
30 
 
A: 
I told him I wasn't, and I told him that it was 
my business.  I told him to go find him someone else. 
Q: 
He then touched your breast? 
A: 
Right. 
Q: 
Was he standing in front of you at the time? 
A: 
Right. 
Q: 
Did he put his hand up your shirt? 
A: 
Right. 
Q: 
Did he put his hand inside of your bra? 
A: 
Right. 
Q: 
How long did that go on? 
A: 
Well, it went on for quite awhile, because I kept 
on wrassling with him, and all of that kind of stuff, 
to try to get him away from me. 
Q: 
All right.  But this was——he was doing this 
underneath your clothing; is that correct? 
A: 
Right. 
Q: 
At the time——well, how was it he stopped touching 
your breast?  Did you push him away, or did he just 
stop? 
A: 
I pushed him away. 
Q: 
When he——you testified that he fondled your 
vaginal area. 
A: 
Right. 
Q: 
Was that also underneath your clothing? 
A: 
That's right.  I had pants on. 
Q: 
And he reached down inside your pants? 
A: 
Right. 
Q: 
Same with when he touch [sic] your buttocks? 
No. 
02-1542-CR   
 
31 
 
A: 
Right. 
¶64 We agree with the court of appeals that M.M.'s 
testimony did not follow a chronological order.  A reasonable 
factfinder could, however, draw the inference that the defendant 
verbally threatened to have retaliatory sex with M.M. and that 
the 
sexual 
contact 
occurred 
while 
he 
was 
wrestling 
and 
struggling with her to overcome her resistance.  Wrestling, 
struggling, verbally threatening unwanted sex, tearing the 
victim's clothes, and breaking her finger are a sufficient use 
or threat of force or violence to support a conviction under 
Wis. Stat. § 940.225(2)(a). 
¶65 M.M.'s testimony was sufficient to support a jury 
verdict, beyond a reasonable doubt, that force or the threat of 
force or violence was used prior to or during the sexual contact 
to compel the victim's submission.  We cannot conclude that the 
evidence in support of the defendant's conviction is so lacking 
in probative value and force that it can be said, as a matter of 
law, that no reasonable trier of fact could have drawn the 
inference that force or the threat of force or violence was used 
prior to or during the sexual contact to compel the victim's 
submission.  Accordingly, we do not disturb the jury's verdict, 
and we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  02-1542-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶66 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  I agree with 
the majority opinion that a defendant's challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence need not be raised during trial to 
preserve the issue for appeal as a matter of right.  I also 
agree that the evidence in this case was sufficient to support 
the jury's verdict.  As I did in State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit 
Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___, 
I 
write 
separately 
because 
of 
the 
spirited 
discussions of statutory interpretation set forth in the 
majority and in the concurrence of Justice Sykes.  Although I 
again commend both authors of the discussion, I ultimately join 
neither. 
¶67 Based on my observations of the past, the new "bright 
line" rules of statutory interpretation recently set forth by 
the majority in Kalal will be often mouthed but not always 
applied.   Earlier this term in Keup v. DHFS, 2004 WI 16, ¶17, 
269 Wis. 2d 59, 675 N.W.2d 755, the same majority purported to 
clearly and concisely set forth the "bright line" rules of 
statutory interpretation which are substantially different from 
the bright line rules of the Kalal majority.35  The now-defunct 
                                                 
35 As recently as two months ago, the majority set forth a 
relatively lengthy discussion of the now defunct bright line 
rule of statutory interpretation.  The majority stated in part:   
If the statute is unambiguous, we must give effect to 
the words within the statute according to their common 
meanings.  DNR v. Wis. Power & Light Co., 108 Wis. 2d 
403, 407, 321 N.W.2d 286 (1982).  As a general rule, 
we do not review extrinsic sources unless there is 
ambiguity.  If the statutory language is ambiguous, 
however, we then may use the scope, history, context, 
and subject matter of the statute in order to 
No.  02-1542-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
bright line rules of statutory interpretation were honored by 
the Keup majority as much in the breach as in the observance.  
Although the ink is hardly dry on the Keup bright line rules of 
statutory interpretation, they are now branded as "misleading."  
Justice Sykes's concurrence at ¶18 (citing Kalal at ¶47).   
¶68 This case presents yet another opportunity for part of 
the court to engage in vigorous discussions of statutory 
interpretation.  I will not add to the mass of our jurisprudence 
by continuing to write future concurrences on what I believe 
will be a continuing discussion.   Instead, I invite the reader 
of our opinions to observe what I am confident will be the well 
intentioned, but nevertheless early and often misapplication by 
the Kalal majority of the "new" bright line rules of statutory 
interpretation.  For the above reasons, I respectfully concur. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
ascertain legislative intent.  State v. Delaney, 2003 
WI 9, ¶14, 259 Wis. 2d 77, 658 N.W.2d 416. 
Keup v. DHFS, 2004 WI 16, ¶17, 269 Wis. 2d 59, 675 N.W.2d 755. 
No.  02-1542-CR.dtp 
1 
 
¶69 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring).  As a general 
rule, issues not presented to the circuit court will not be 
considered for the first time on appeal.  State v. Caban, 210 
Wis. 2d 597, 604, 563 N.W.2d 501 (1997).  This general rule of 
judicial administration makes good sense, and normally it must 
be honored to preserve appellate deference to circuit courts. 
¶70 The problem is that general rules frequently have 
exceptions.  At the moment, sufficiency of the evidence appears 
to be one of the exceptions to the general rule of waiver. 
¶71 This concurrence will attempt to trace the source of 
this exception and explain my separate vote to affirm.36 
¶72 In State v. Van Beek, 31 Wis. 2d 51, 141 N.W.2d 873 
(1966), the defendant claimed that the evidence adduced at his 
trial was not sufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  He neglected, however, to move for a new trial or to set 
aside the jury's verdict.  On appeal, this court refused to 
evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence, saying: 
The failure to present a motion for a new trial 
deprived the trial court of the opportunity to examine 
the very question which is now presented upon appeal.  
At least four times during the past six years this 
court has asserted that such an omission barred an 
appellant 
from 
the 
right 
to 
have 
the 
evidence 
evaluated in this court [citing cases]. . . .  [W]e 
find no factors in the case at bar which prompt us to 
                                                 
36 This concurrence will refer to the opinion of the Chief 
Justice as the "majority" opinion.  Three members of the court——
Chief Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson, Justice Ann Walsh Bradley, 
and 
Justice 
N. 
Patrick 
Crooks——agree 
with 
the 
statutory 
interpretation in the opinion.  The writer reluctantly adopts 
the interpretation of the statute set out in State v. Gomez, 179 
Wis. 2d 400, 404, 507 N.W.2d 378 (Ct. App. 1993).  Because four 
members of the court reach the same result on the statute, the 
Chief's opinion may be characterized as the majority opinion. 
No.  02-1542-CR.dtp 
2 
 
relieve this appellant from the quicksand in which he 
is trapped. 
Id. at 52-53. 
 
¶73 A month later, in State v. Thompson, 31 Wis. 2d 365, 
367, 142 N.W.2d 779 (1966), the court reiterated the point, 
saying: 
In effect, this appeal is a challenge to the 
sufficiency 
of 
the 
evidence 
supporting 
the 
conviction. . . .  The appellant made no motion in the 
trial court for a new trial, nor did he move to have 
the verdict set aside on the grounds of insufficient 
evidence.  Accordingly, Mr. Thompson does not have the 
right to have the evidence reviewed upon appeal.   
See also State v. Escobedo, 44 Wis. 2d 85, 89-90, 170 N.W.2d 709 
(1969); State v. Schneidewind, 47 Wis. 2d 110, 119-20, 176 
N.W.2d 303 (1970); Davis v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 180, 184, 181 
N.W.2d 346 (1970); State v. Charette, 51 Wis. 2d 531, 536, 187 
N.W.2d 203 (1971). 
 
¶74 In 1977, as part of a comprehensive revision of 
appellate procedure, the legislature approved a statute on 
"Appeals and post-conviction relief in criminal, juvenile, 
youthful 
offender 
and 
mental 
commitment 
cases."  
Wis. Stat. § 974.02 (1977-78).  As the majority opinion points 
out, § 974.02(2) originally read: "A motion challenging the 
sufficiency of the evidence is not necessary to raise on appeal 
the sufficiency of the evidence."  Majority op., ¶26.  This 
subsection did not stand in isolation, however.  Subsection (1) 
stated that "an appeal to the court of appeals . . . or a motion 
for post-conviction relief in a felony case must be taken in the 
time and manner provided in s. 809.40."  The reference to 
"motion for post-conviction relief" in subsection (1) implies 
No.  02-1542-CR.dtp 
3 
 
that subsection (2) should be read as follows: "A [post-
conviction] motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence 
is not necessary to raise on appeal sufficiency of the 
evidence."  (Emphasis added.)  It would have been quite odd to 
change a long-established rule of trial practice in a section of 
the statutes dealing with postconviction procedure. 
 
¶75 In 1978, in their manual on Wisconsin Appellate 
Practice, Robert J. Martineau and Richard R. Malmgren described 
the revised statute: 
§ 2706. Post-Conviction Motions 
A. 
The Necessity of Filing Post-Conviction Motions 
 
The procedure for filing direct post-conviction 
motions in criminal cases is substantially changed.  
Under the former procedure, a defendant in a jury 
trial case was required to file a motion for a new 
trial in order to raise any issue on appeal as a 
matter of right.  Sanford v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 72, 250 
N.W.2d 348 (1977).  This prior procedure required 
post-conviction counsel to file usually futile motions 
with the trial court asking it to review issues that 
were often raised at several earlier points in the 
trial.  The Supreme Court was particularly reluctant 
to review a claimed insufficiency of the evidence 
without a motion based on such assertion.  State v. 
Charette, 
51 
Wis. 2d 531, 
187 
N.W.2d 203 
(1971).  
Indeed, even in bench trials the Supreme Court 
recommended that motions be filed with the trial court 
asserting lack of sufficient evidence, notwithstanding 
the specific provision of repealed Section 974.02(5) 
making such motions unnecessary.  Gilbertson v. State, 
69 Wis. 2d 587, 230 N.W.2d 874 (1975). 
 
Section 974.02(2) specifically provides that a 
motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is 
not necessary to raise on appeal the sufficiency of 
the evidence.  In addition, under Rule 809.30[(1)](f) 
all post-conviction motions become optional.  This is 
not to say that a defendant after conviction can raise 
any issue on appeal.  The law in Wisconsin clearly 
requires that in order for an issue to be properly 
No.  02-1542-CR.dtp 
4 
 
raised on appeal, it often has to be raised at a more 
preliminary point in the proceedings, such as in a 
motion to dismiss . . . The primary change in the law, 
as reflected in Rule 809.30[(1)](f) and the Judicial 
Council Committee's Note, is that the errors need not 
be reasserted after conviction if they have been 
raised at the appropriate point in the earlier 
proceedings. 
Robert J. Martineau & Richard R. Malmgren, Wisconsin Appellate 
Practice 172-73 (1978). 
 
¶76 This court took issue with part of the above-quoted 
interpretation 
in 
State 
v. 
Monje, 
109 
Wis. 2d 138, 
325 
N.W.2d 695 (1982).  Discussing § 974.02(2), the court stated: 
It is only under sec. 974.02(2), Stats. 1979-80 that 
authorization is given to take an appeal without a 
postconviction motion first being made. . . .  We 
construe this rule as being consistent with prior case 
law and hold that for issues on appeal to be 
considered 
as 
a matter 
of right, postconviction 
motions must be made except in challenges to the 
sufficiency of the evidence under sec. 974.02(2). 
Id. at 153a. 
 
¶77 In 1983, the legislature responded to the Monje 
decision by revising § 974.02(2).  It now reads: "An appellant 
is not required to file a postconviction motion in the trial 
court prior to an appeal if the grounds are sufficiency of the 
evidence or issues previously raised."  This subsection plainly 
refers to postconviction motions.  Moreover, the analysis 
accompanying the bill states:  "This bill does not modify the 
waiver doctrine, requiring timely objection or motion to 
preserve alleged error."  See Majority op., ¶36. 
¶78 During the time that Wisconsin was refining its 
postconviction 
procedure, 
the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
decided Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978).  In this 
No.  02-1542-CR.dtp 
5 
 
case, the Court held that double jeopardy precludes a second 
trial once a reviewing court has found the evidence insufficient 
to sustain the jury's verdict of guilty. 
 
¶79 The year after Burks, this court stated in Thiesen v. 
State, 86 Wis. 2d 562, 564, 273 N.W.2d 314 (1979) that: "This 
court has frequently said that if the alleged error is one which 
the trial court could have corrected by granting a new trial, a 
motion for a new trial is necessary before the claimed error 
will be reviewed by this court as a matter of right" (citing 
cases).  This statement was repeated in Beamon v. State, 93 
Wis. 2d 215, 218, 286 N.W.2d 592 (1980), with the supplementary 
comment that: "This rule has been applied to claims of 
insufficient evidence."  Beamon, 93 Wis. 2d at 218. 
 
¶80 There 
is 
an 
obvious 
inconsistency 
in 
this 
pronouncement.  In view of the Burks decision, a circuit court 
may not grant the state a new trial when the court concludes 
there is insufficient evidence to convict.  There may be times 
when the trial court can permit the state to reopen the case to 
introduce additional evidence after the state has rested.  
Grover v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 282, 283, 212 N.W.2d 117 (1973); 
Wis. Stat. § 972.10(3).  However, if the case has reached the 
point of no return when the evidentiary record is closed, the 
case must be dismissed.  "[T]he only remedy available to the 
court is to order a judgment of acquittal."  State v. Ivy, 119 
Wis. 2d 591, 608, 350 N.W.2d 622 (1984). 
 
¶81 Put another way, when a defendant believes the state 
has failed to produce sufficient evidence to convict, the 
defendant should move to dismiss.  A defendant should not move 
No.  02-1542-CR.dtp 
6 
 
for a new trial on these grounds, either before conviction or 
after conviction, because a new trial based on insufficiency of 
the evidence would constitute double jeopardy. 
 
¶82 The issue for us is whether a defendant is required to 
move to dismiss, or make an equivalent motion, before the case 
goes to the fact-finder in order to preserve the issue of 
evidence sufficiency for appeal as of right. 
 
¶83 Justice 
Sykes 
contends 
that 
§ 974.06 
is 
a 
postconviction statute that does not excuse a defendant's 
failure to preserve the issue of evidence sufficiency during the 
trial, at some point before conviction.  There is compelling 
evidence to support this view.   
¶84 Nonetheless, two points must be made.  First, because 
the "waiver" rule is a rule of judicial administration as 
opposed to an inflexible prohibition, it is often disregarded by 
appellate courts.  The reasons for this may be found in the 
policy discussions in the majority opinion and in the concurring 
opinion of Justice Roggensack.  The fact that the waiver rule is 
not consistently applied breeds an expectation on the part of 
some defendants that it will not be applied to them.   
¶85 Second, 
some 
defendants 
see 
the 
Gomez 
case 
as 
establishing an exception to the waiver rule.  State v. Gomez, 
179 Wis. 2d 400, 404, 507 N.W.2d 378 (Ct. App. 1993). The Gomez 
decision interpreting § 974.02 is quite imprecise but it has 
been relied upon by defendants for more than a decade.37   
                                                 
37 In State v. Gomez, 179 Wis. 2d 400, 404, 507 N.W.2d 378 
(Ct. 
App. 
1993), 
the 
defendant 
argued 
that 
there 
was 
insufficient evidence to convict him of child enticement.  The 
court said: 
No.  02-1542-CR.dtp 
7 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Gomez did not file a postconviction motion but instead 
directly appealed to this court. 
Gomez challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to 
convict him of enticement of a child in violation of 
sec. 948.07, Stats.  The State argues that Gomez 
waived the argument because he did not present this 
issue to the trial court before, during or after the 
trial.  Gomez correctly asserts that his argument is 
based upon the sufficiency of the evidence to convict, 
which under sec. 974.02(2) Stats., does not require a 
prior postconviction motion.  Therefore, the issue is 
preserved for appeal.  
Gomez, 179 Wis. 2d at 404. 
In its appeal brief, the State said: "The appellant's 
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to convict was 
rejected by the trial court (19:40-41).  The appellant failed to 
present any challenge to the applicability of sec. 948.07, 
Stats., to the enticement of a child into her own bedroom." 
It is the appellant's position that sec. 948.07, 
Stats., as a matter of law was not intended to apply 
to the fact situation presented by this case. . . .  
The appellant never presented this challenge to 
the applicability of sec. 948.07, Stats., at any point 
before, during or after trial.  He has, consequently, 
failed 
to 
properly 
preserve 
this 
challenge 
for 
appellate review. 
. . . .  To properly preserve his objection, the 
appellant must at least present the claim in a 
postconviction motion, if it was not raised earlier.  
Sec. 974.02(2). . . .  
The appellant's failure to properly preserve this 
issue of statutory construction at the trial court 
level is fatal to his claim on appeal.  
In his reply brief, the defendant said:  
The state . . . asks this court to refuse to 
address an issue based on some waiver theory. . . .  
Gomez has argued that his conduct, assuming the facts 
alleged were true, did not meet the legal definition 
of the crime . . . That is just another way of saying 
that the state failed to prove any conduct by Gomez 
that would allow him to be found guilty of violating 
No.  02-1542-CR.dtp 
8 
 
¶86 In his valuable 
treatise 
on appellate 
practice, 
Michael S. Heffernan writes: 
One of the major limitations on review is the general 
refusal of appellate courts to consider issues raised 
for 
the 
first 
time 
on 
appeal. . . .  
Sections 
974.02(2) and 805.17(4) provide that sufficiency of 
the evidence may be raised for the first time on 
appeal from criminal cases and trials to the court. 
Michael S. Heffernan, Appellate Practice and Procedure in 
Wisconsin III. [§ 3.3], Trial Record - Avoiding Waiver [3.4], 
Raising Issues in the Trial Court. (3d ed. 2002). 
 
¶87 It is not certain whether Heffernan is asserting that 
a criminal defendant has no obligation to preserve an objection 
to the sufficiency of the evidence during trial in order to 
appeal on this issue as of right, but his comment can be read 
that way.   
¶88 In light of both precedent and scholarly commentary, 
it is difficult for me to set out and enforce a strict waiver 
rule in this situation. 
 
¶89 Although Gomez appears to be questionable, I think the 
better 
course 
for 
now 
is 
to 
stick 
with 
its 
perceived 
interpretation of the statute, as a matter of policy, with the 
                                                                                                                                                             
the crime defined by § 948.07.  It is a sufficiency of 
evidence argument, and § 974.02(2) plainly states that 
a postconviction motion in the trial court is not 
necessary in such a case.  (Emphasis added)  
The Gomez case did not say explicitly that a defendant is 
not required to make a timely objection as to evidence 
sufficiency at some point during trial in order to preserve that 
issue as of right on appeal.  Without digging deeper into the 
record, it appears as though the court of appeals permitted a 
general challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to suffice 
for a narrower challenge to the state's proof.   
No.  02-1542-CR.dtp 
9 
 
hope that the statute will be clarified by the legislature or by 
this court through judicial rule-making.  Creating clear rules 
governing when and how a defendant should challenge the 
sufficiency of the evidence in the trial court ought to be a 
high priority, because the result of the majority opinion is 
that the state can and will be sandbagged by defendants who 
remain silent until it is too late for the court to react.  I 
cannot join the majority opinion because it has the effect of 
turning "quicksand" into solid rock.  It is now urgent for 
courts and prosecutors to develop techniques to force a 
defendant's hand, so that a defendant cannot euchre the court 
into making an avoidable and irrevocable error. 
 
¶90 In any event, I agree with the court of appeals that 
the defendant's conviction must be affirmed because the evidence 
was sufficient to support the jury's verdict. 
 
 
 
 
No.  02-1542-CR.dss 
 
1 
 
¶91 DIANE S. SYKES, J.   (concurring).   Anyone who 
follows and attempts to apply the decisions of this court will 
be justifiably exasperated by this case.  The majority opinion 
fundamentally misconstrues the issue on this appeal.  This is 
not really a statutory interpretation case.  The issue on this 
appeal is the application of the common-law waiver rule to a 
sufficiency of the evidence argument raised for the first time 
on appeal.  Having mischaracterized the issue in this case, the 
majority compounds the analytical confusion by inexplicably 
refusing to apply the legal principles governing statutory 
interpretation as recently clarified in State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court, 2004 WI 58, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___.        
I 
¶92  The defendant Obea Hayes was convicted of sexual 
assault and on appeal challenged the sufficiency of the evidence 
without ever having raised the issue in the circuit court.  "It 
is a fundamental principle of appellate review that issues must 
be preserved at the circuit court.  Issues that are not 
preserved at the circuit court, even alleged constitutional 
errors, generally will not be considered on appeal."  State v. 
Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶10, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727.  This 
is denominated as the "waiver rule" (even though it might more 
precisely be labeled the "forfeiture rule") because "issues that 
are not preserved are deemed waived."  Id., ¶11.  The waiver 
rule is a fundamental and well-established rule of judicial 
administration, "not merely a technicality or a rule of 
No.  02-1542-CR.dss 
 
2 
 
convenience; it is an essential principle of the orderly 
administration of justice."  Id. 
¶93  We have emphasized that "[t]he reasons for the waiver 
rule go to the heart of the common law tradition and the 
adversary system."  State v. Caban, 210 Wis. 2d 597, 604, 563 
N.W.2d 501 (1997).  The rule "exists to cultivate timely 
objections.  Such objections promote both efficiency and 
fairness."  State v. Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d 758, 766, 596 N.W.2d 
749 (1999).  The waiver rule limits the scope of appellate 
review to issues that were first raised in the circuit court, 
and thus "gives deference to the factual expertise of the trier 
of fact, encourages litigation of all issues at one time, 
simplifies the appellate task, and discourages a flood of 
appeals."  Caban, 210 Wis. 2d at 605 (citing David L. Walther, 
Patricia L. Grove, and Michael S. Heffernan, Appellate Practice 
and Procedure in Wisconsin, § 3.2 (1995)).  Accordingly, "when a 
party seeks review of an issue that it failed to raise before 
the circuit court, issues of fairness and notice, and judicial 
economy are raised."  Id. 
¶94  We have described the central significance of the 
waiver rule in the following terms: 
The 
waiver 
rule 
serves 
several 
important 
objectives.  Raising issues at the trial court level 
allows the trial court to correct or avoid the alleged 
error in the first place, eliminating the need for 
appeal. . . . It also gives both parties and the trial 
judge notice of the issue and a fair opportunity to 
address the objection. . . . Furthermore, the waiver 
rule encourages attorneys to diligently prepare for 
and conduct trials. . . . Finally, the rule prevents 
attorneys from "sandbagging" errors, or failing to 
object to an error for strategic reasons and later 
No.  02-1542-CR.dss 
 
3 
 
claiming that the error is grounds for reversal. . . . 
For all of these reasons, the waiver rule is essential 
to the efficient and fair conduct of our adversary 
system of justice. 
Huebner, 235 Wis. 2d 486, ¶12 (citations omitted). 
¶95  While appellate courts have the authority to overlook 
a waiver and address the merits of an issue not raised in the 
circuit court, "the normal procedure in criminal cases is to 
address waiver within the rubric of the ineffective assistance 
of counsel."  Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d at 766.  Also, in 
exceptional cases, Wis. Stat. §§ 751.06 and 752.35 provide 
authority for discretionary review and reversal despite a 
waiver.  State v. Schumacher, 144 Wis. 2d 388, 399-401, 424 
N.W.2d 672 (1988). 
¶96  In short, the waiver rule is a fundamental, essential, 
and firmly-established principle of appellate jurisprudence in 
Wisconsin, 
necessary 
to 
both 
fairness 
and 
the 
efficient 
administration of justice.  The law provides remedial safeguards 
by which reviewing courts may ignore waiver where appropriate in 
individual cases.   
¶97 How is it, then, that the majority jettisons a rule 
deemed "fundamental," "essential," and at the "heart of the 
common 
law 
tradition 
and 
the 
adversary 
system," 
and 
categorically 
authorizes 
all 
sufficiency 
of 
the 
evidence 
challenges to be raised for the first time on appeal as a matter 
of right?  It does so by a novel and ultimately subjective 
approach to the interpretation of an inapplicable statute——an 
approach, moreover, that conflicts with the principles of 
No.  02-1542-CR.dss 
 
4 
 
statutory interpretation just clarified in Kalal, ___ Wis. 2d 
___, ¶¶44-52. 
 
 
 
 
 
 II 
¶98 The majority has concluded that Wis. Stat. § 974.02(2), 
which provides that sufficiency of the evidence arguments on 
appeal need not be preceded by postconviction motion in the 
circuit court, somehow governs the broader question of whether 
sufficiency of the evidence challenges must be preserved at all, 
during trial when the state initially rests or at the close of 
the evidence.  This broader question requires only consideration 
of the common-law waiver rule, but the majority opinion treats 
it 
as 
a 
question 
of 
the 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 974.02(2).  It is not. 
¶99  Wisconsin Stat. § 974.02 addresses only postconviction 
motion requirements——not motions or objections at trial or the 
waiver rule on appeal——and specifies at subsection (2) that 
"[a]n appellant is not required to file a postconviction motion 
in the trial court prior to an appeal if the grounds are 
sufficiency of the evidence or issues previously raised."  The 
statute on its face does not address whether a motion to dismiss 
or other objection to the sufficiency of the evidence is 
required during trial or at the close of the evidence in order 
to preserve the issue for appeal.  Motions to dismiss during 
trial in criminal cases are governed by Wis. Stat. § 972.10(4), 
and more generally by Wis. Stat. § 805.14(6)(requiring grounds 
for 
insufficiency 
of 
the 
evidence 
to 
be 
stated 
with 
No.  02-1542-CR.dss 
 
5 
 
particularity), which is made applicable to criminal cases by 
Wis. Stat. § 972.11(1). 
¶100 The postconviction motion statute does not address 
whether a defendant who neglects to raise a sufficiency of the 
evidence argument at any time in the circuit court has waived 
it; the statute is silent on the issue of whether sufficiency of 
the evidence may be raised for the first time on appeal.  
Accordingly, 
the 
common-law 
waiver 
rule, 
and 
not 
Wis. Stat. § 974.02(2), governs the outcome of this appeal.  
¶101  In fairness, the analytical confusion surrounding 
this issue started with the court of appeals' decision in State 
v. Gomez, 179 Wis. 2d 400, 507 N.W.2d 378 (Ct. App. 1993).  In 
Gomez, the court of appeals concluded, without analysis, that 
because Wis. Stat. § 974.02(2) does not require a postconviction 
motion 
for 
sufficiency 
of 
the 
evidence 
challenges, 
such 
challenges are preserved for appeal even when not raised in the 
circuit court during trial or at the close of the evidence.  Id.  
at 404.  This non sequitur formed the basis for the court of 
appeals' decision in this case, and the majority now perpetuates 
the mistake by treating this issue as though it is controlled by 
an interpretation of the postconviction motion statute, which it 
is not.  By its terms, Wis. Stat. § 974.02(2) governs only 
postconviction motion procedure.  The statute says nothing about 
what must be done at trial to preserve arguments for appeal as a 
general matter, or whether sufficiency of the evidence arguments 
in particular are exempt from the general rule of waiver if not 
preserved at trial. 
No.  02-1542-CR.dss 
 
6 
 
¶102  The majority nonetheless devotes 47 paragraphs to an 
unusual, freewheeling  method of statutory interpretation as 
applied 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 974.02(2), 
finds 
the 
exercise 
inconclusive, and eventually makes its own policy choice about 
whether to allow this category of unpreserved argument to be 
raised for the first time on appeal.  The majority assiduously 
avoids 
the 
customary 
opening 
articulation 
of 
the 
legal 
principles that apply to questions of statutory interpretation.  
This would not be so bad if the accepted legal principles made 
an appearance later in the opinion.  But they do not. 
¶103 Instead, the majority begins with a recitation of the 
parties' proffered interpretations of the statute (as if the 
parties' interpretations controlled the analysis), and then 
moves into a consideration of the "context of the statute" (this 
includes an inconclusive discussion of Chapters 972 and 974 and 
the common law of waiver).  We next enter the realm of 
legislative 
history 
(where 
we 
discover 
contradictory 
and 
misleading information) and then take up what the majority calls 
the 
"policies, 
purposes 
and 
consequences" 
of 
alternative 
interpretations (where apparently there are no real principles 
to guide decision-making other than the judiciary's own policy 
preferences).  Ultimately, this interpretive journey leads 
nowhere (at each stage we are told there are good arguments all 
around), so the majority decides that the "best" interpretation 
is one that recognizes that sufficiency of the evidence 
challenges are "different from other types of challenge not 
previously raised during trial," which "justifies allowing a 
No.  02-1542-CR.dss 
 
7 
 
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to be raised on 
appeal as a matter of right despite the fact that the challenge 
was not raised in the circuit court."  Majority op., ¶54. 
¶104  Apart from the fundamental reality that this is not a 
statutory 
interpretation 
case, 
I 
cannot 
agree 
with 
the 
majority's approach because it conflicts in certain important 
respects from accepted principles of statutory interpretation 
found in our case law.  It is certainly true that our statutory 
interpretation cases have not always been consistent; it is also 
true that some recent opinions have appeared to depart from the 
standard rules of statutory interpretation.  Nevertheless, 
certain well-established general principles prevail, and this 
court has very recently clarified, and, as clarified, reaffirmed 
those general principles in Kalal, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ¶¶44-52.  I 
recognize that these principles are of general application and 
therefore may require supplementation by special or additional 
rules applicable to specific problems of interpretation in 
particular cases.  Also, because they are general legal 
principles of broad application, they may not provide answers to 
all or the most difficult statutory interpretation questions.  
But the principles of statutory interpretation as restated in 
Kalal cannot simply be ignored.38    
III A 
                                                 
38 Neither can the principles of statutory interpretation 
articulated by this court in State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit 
Court, 2004 WI 58, ¶¶44-52, ___ Wis. 2d. ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, be 
dismissed 
as 
mere 
"spirited 
discussions" 
or 
"vigorous 
discussions" by "part of the court."  Concurrence of Justice 
Bradley, ¶¶66, 68.  Needless to say, Kalal is binding precedent. 
No.  02-1542-CR.dss 
 
8 
 
¶105  "[T]he purpose of statutory interpretation is to 
determine what the statute means so that it may be given its 
full, proper, and intended effect."  Kalal, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 
¶44.  We held in Kalal that "judicial deference to the policy 
choices enacted into law by the legislature requires that 
statutory interpretation focus primarily on the language of the 
statute.  We assume that the legislature's intent is expressed 
in the statutory language."  Id. 
¶106 Thus, 
statutory 
interpretation 
"begins 
with 
the 
language of the statute.  If the meaning of the statute is 
plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry."  Seider v. O'Connell, 
2000 WI 76, ¶43, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659; see also State 
v. Setagord, 211 Wis. 2d 397, 406, 565 N.W.2d 506 (1997); State 
v. Williams, 198 Wis. 2d 516, 525, 544 N.W.2d 406 (1996); State 
v. Martin, 162 Wis. 2d 883, 893-94, 470 N.W.2d 900 (1991).  
Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted 
meaning, except that technical or specially-defined words or 
phrases are given their technical or special definitional 
meaning.  Bruno v. Milwaukee County, 2003 WI 28, ¶¶8, 20, 260 
Wis. 2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 656; see also Wis. Stat. § 990.01(1). 
¶107  "[S]tatutory language is interpreted in the context 
in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in 
relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related 
statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable 
results."  Kalal, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ¶46 (citing State v. Delaney, 
2003 WI 9, ¶13, 259 Wis. 2d 77, 658 N.W.2d 416; Landis v. 
Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 2001 WI 86, ¶16, 245 Wis. 2d 1, 628 
No.  02-1542-CR.dss 
 
9 
 
N.W.2d 893; and Seider, 236 Wis. 2d 211, ¶43).  Statutes are 
read where possible to give reasonable effect to every word, to 
avoid surplusage.  Kalal,  ___ Wis. 2d ___, ¶46; Martin, 162 
Wis. 2d at 894.  "If this process of analysis yields a plain, 
clear statutory meaning, then there is no ambiguity, and the 
statute is applied according to this ascertainment of its 
meaning."  Bruno, 260 Wis. 2d 633, ¶20.  Where statutory 
language is unambiguous, there is no need to consult extrinsic 
sources of interpretation, such as legislative history.  Kalal, 
___ Wis. 2d ___, ¶46 (citing Bruno, 260 Wis. 2d 633, ¶7; State 
ex rel. Cramer v. Schwartz, 2000 WI 86, ¶18, 236 Wis. 2d 473, 
613 N.W.2d 591; Seider, 236 Wis. 2d 211, ¶50; and Martin, 162 
Wis. 2d at 893-94). 
¶108 
It 
is 
at 
this 
point 
in 
the 
process——the 
unambiguous/ambiguous line of demarcation——that the cases have 
sometimes blurred the analysis.39  As we noted in Kalal, many 
                                                 
 
39  Some of our recent cases have appeared to cross this 
analytical threshold into a mode of analysis traditionally 
reserved for ambiguous statutes without an initial determination 
of statutory ambiguity.  See Hubbard v. Messer, 2003 WI 145, ¶9, 
267 Wis. 2d 92, 673 N.W.2d 676; Village of Lannon v. Wood-land 
Contractors, Inc., 2003 WI 150, ¶13, 267 Wis. 2d 158, 672 N.W.2d 
275; Highland Manor Assocs. v. Bast, 2003 WI 152, ¶¶15-19, 268 
Wis. 2d 1, 672 N.W.2d 709.  See also Hubbard, 267 Wis. 2d 92, 
¶¶44-47 
(Roggensack, 
J., 
concurring)(commenting 
on 
this 
departure from standard methodology); Courtney F. v. Ramiro 
M.C., 2004 WI App 36, ¶14, 269 Wis. 2d 709, 676 N.W.2d 545 
(same).  I do not read these cases as representing an 
abandonment of the plain-meaning rule or an endorsement of 
resort to extrinsic sources of interpretation in all statutory 
interpretation cases.  While it is fair to say that they 
incorporate certain interpretive inquiries that have often 
fallen on the far side of the traditional ambiguity threshold, 
they do so in a way that does not actually go behind the 
statutory law in search of ambiguity or into a consideration of 
No.  02-1542-CR.dss 
 
10 
 
cases contain this statement: "If a statute is ambiguous, the 
reviewing court turns to the scope, history, context and purpose 
of the statute."  Cramer, 2000 WI 86, ¶18, 236 Wis. 2d 473, 613 
N.W.2d 591.  This formulation, we said, "is somewhat misleading: 
scope, context, and purpose are perfectly relevant to a plain 
meaning interpretation of an unambiguous statute as long as the 
scope, context, and purpose are ascertainable from the text and 
structure of the statute itself, rather than extrinsic sources, 
such as legislative history."  Kalal, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ¶48. 
¶109  In any event, we reaffirmed in Kalal that it remains 
true that Wisconsin courts generally do not consult extrinsic 
sources of interpretation, such as legislative history, unless 
the statute is ambiguous.  Kalal, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ¶¶50-51.  
"Traditionally, 
'resort 
to 
legislative 
history 
is 
not 
appropriate in the absence of a finding of ambiguity.'"  Seider, 
236 Wis. 2d 211, ¶50 (quoting State v. Sample, 215 Wis. 2d 487, 
495-96, 573 N.W.2d 187 (1998) (quoting in turn, State v. 
                                                                                                                                                             
classic extrinsic sources, such as items of legislative history.  
Legislative history is the customary "extrinsic aid" for 
purposes of statutory interpretation, see Norman J. Singer, 
Sutherland Statutory Construction § 45:14 at 109 (6th ed. 2002), 
and can potentially include a broad array of material, reliable 
and unreliable, objective and subjective.  In any event, to the 
extent that there was some confusion in this area, we have 
clarified the principles that govern statutory interpretation in 
Kalal, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ¶¶44-52.  The majority opinion conflicts 
with Kalal in some important aspects of its analysis.  The 
majority engages in a wide-ranging examination of legislative 
history and a policy-based evaluation of the competing "purposes 
and consequences" of alternative interpretations, where the 
statute by its plain language does not apply.  This, in my 
judgment, represents a departure from our generally accepted 
statutory 
interpretation 
jurisprudence, 
and 
is 
clearly 
inconsistent with Kalal.  See, ¶¶12-20, infra.   
  
No.  02-1542-CR.dss 
 
11 
 
Setagord, 211 Wis. 2d at 406)).  While legislative history will 
sometimes be consulted to confirm or verify a plain meaning 
interpretation, Seider, 236 Wis. 2d 211, ¶¶51-52, as a general 
matter, 
legislative 
history——unquestionably 
an 
"extrinsic 
source" for statutory interpretation purposes——is not consulted 
except to resolve an ambiguity in the statute.  Kalal, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ¶¶50-51.  If the language of the statute is 
ambiguous even when considered in light of its textually 
ascertainable context, scope, and purpose, then the primary 
intrinsic analysis has been exhausted and secondary extrinsic 
sources of interpretation become relevant.  
¶110 These principles, we said in Kalal, are fundamentally 
important to the rule of law.  Kalal, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ¶52.  The 
majority does not explain its refusal to apply or even mention 
them here. 
III B 
¶111  Here, we need go no further than the text of 
Wis. Stat. § 974.02(2) to discover that it does not apply, as I 
have discussed above.  Nonetheless, the majority embarks upon a 
lengthy, unnecessary, and ultimately fruitless consideration of 
conflicting legislative history.  Majority op., ¶¶24-38.  A 
position paper by Charles Bennett Vetzner of the State Public 
Defender's office figures prominently; from this flows the 
majority's supposition that the statute was "seemingly designed" 
to 
codify 
Vetzner's 
position——also 
the 
defendant's——that 
sufficiency of the evidence challenges cannot be waived.  
Majority op., ¶38.  As it turns out, however, the Legislative 
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Reference Bureau's Analysis supports the opposite conclusion: 
that Wis. Stat. § 974.02(2) has nothing to do with, and does not 
modify, the common-law waiver doctrine.  Majority op., ¶35.  The 
whole exercise illustrates one of the potential pitfalls of 
unnecessary forays into legislative history: the risk that the 
views of those who sought to influence the legislative process 
might skew a straightforward, plain-meaning reading of the 
statutory text itself. 
¶112  In any event, the majority eventually concludes that 
the legislative history is inconclusive, and ventures into an 
equally lengthy discussion of what is analytically labeled the 
"purposes 
and 
consequences" 
or 
"policies, 
purposes 
and 
consequences" 
of 
alternative 
interpretations 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 974.02(2).  Majority op., ¶¶39-54.  As far as I can 
tell, this is new to our statutory interpretation jurisprudence, 
and the majority cites no authority for it.  This alternative 
"purposes and consequences" approach to statutory interpretation 
appears to consist entirely of a policy discussion, in this 
instance focusing on an analysis of the common-law waiver 
doctrine and its justifications.  If, as a matter of judicial 
policy, the majority has decided to carve out a common-law 
exception to the common-law rule of waiver for all sufficiency 
of the evidence challenges, it should say so, and not attempt to 
disguise the analysis as an interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 
974.02(2).  As it is, the majority appears to be endorsing the 
concept that statutory interpretation involves a judicial policy 
judgment based upon a weighing and balancing of competing 
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"purposes and consequences" of alternative interpretations.  
This leaves room for the substitution of the judiciary's 
subjective policy choices for those of the legislature, a 
phenomenon 
that 
a 
text-based, 
plain-meaning 
approach 
to 
statutory interpretation seeks to guard against. 
¶113  Indeed, the majority ultimately concludes that its 
"policies, purposes and consequences" analysis carries the day, 
leading to an interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 974.02(2) that 
treats sufficiency of the evidence challenges as "different from 
other types of challenge not previously raised during trial."  
Majority 
op., 
¶54. 
 
That 
is, 
the 
majority 
interprets 
Wis. Stat. § 974.02(2) as creating a categorical exception to 
the common-law waiver rule for all sufficiency of the evidence 
challenges, even though the statute by its terms pertains only 
to postconviction motion requirements and has nothing to do with 
the common-law waiver rule at all.  This represents a judicial 
policy decision, not statutory interpretation; even if it were 
good policy, it is bad statutory interpretation precedent. 
IV 
¶114  Moreover, I do not believe it to be good common-law 
policy.  There is no sound reason to refuse to apply the wavier 
rule to sufficiency of the evidence challenges.  Requiring 
challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to be preserved in 
the circuit court during trial promotes the fairness, notice, 
and judicial economy objectives of the waiver rule.  Automatic 
preservation without objection or motion at trial deprives the 
parties and the circuit court of the opportunity to correct the 
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problem prior to appeal and will result in a proliferation of 
these arguments in the appellate courts.  A categorical 
exception is not needed, as there is statutory and case law 
authority that allows a reviewing court to ignore a waiver and 
reach the merits in exceptional cases where necessary to avoid 
individual injustices.  In any event, a waived argument can be 
raised by way of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
¶115  There is another factor that weighs in favor of 
applying the waiver rule to sufficiency of the evidence 
challenges: as Justice Prosser discusses at greater length in 
his concurrence, double jeopardy bars retrial where reversal is 
based on insufficiency of the evidence. State v. Ivy, 119 
Wis. 2d 591, 608, 350 N.W.2d 622 (1984).  A sufficiency of the 
evidence objection raised in the circuit court during trial or 
at the close of the evidence can potentially be cured; a 
sufficiency of the evidence challenge raised for the first time 
on 
appeal 
(whether 
strategically 
or 
otherwise) 
will, 
if 
successful, result in a bar to retrial.  I recognize that 
defendants generally will not want to strategically "save" their 
sufficiency 
of 
the 
evidence 
arguments 
until 
appeal, 
and 
therefore the risk of "sandbagging" with sufficiency of the 
evidence arguments is low.  But the waiver rule exists in part 
to promote resolution of all potential arguments in the circuit 
court, and a rule of automatic preservation without objection or 
motion at trial frustrates that purpose.  
¶116  The defendant did not argue ineffective assistance of 
counsel or invoke Wis. Stat. §§ 751.06 or 752.35 as a means of 
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getting to the merits of his sufficiency of the evidence 
argument despite having waived it.  Nor did he offer any basis 
upon which the court should exercise its inherent authority to 
ignore the waiver.  I would not create a categorical exception 
to the waiver rule at common law to allow sufficiency of the 
evidence challenges to be made for the first time on appeal as a 
matter of right.  Wisconsin Stat. § 974.02(2) pertains only to 
postconviction motion requirements and therefore does not apply.  
Accordingly, I respectfully concur.   
¶117 I am authorized to state that Justice JON P. WILCOX 
joins this concurring opinion; Justice PATIENCE D. ROGGENSACK 
joins sections I, II, III A, and III B.   
   
  
 
  
 
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¶118 PATIENCE D. ROGGENSACK, J.   (concurring).  While I 
agree with the conclusions reached by the majority opinion, that 
Hayes was not required to raise a challenge to the sufficiency 
of the evidence during trial and that the evidence was 
sufficient to support the jury's verdict, I write separately 
because I conclude that an accused's right to challenge the 
sufficiency of the evidence is not grounded in Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.02(2)40 nor is it subject to waiver if not raised at trial.  
Rather, it is bottomed in the requirement that the State must 
prove an accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and that to 
relieve the State of that burden at any point in the process 
undermines the fundamental constitutional principle that a 
defendant is presumed innocent until the State proves him or her 
guilty by that requisite degree of proof.  See Jackson v. 
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).   
¶119 In the landmark case of In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 
(1970), the United States Supreme Court explained that the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a defendant 
in a criminal case against conviction unless proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of the crime charged has been submitted to the 
fact-finder.  Id. at 364.  Accordingly, when a claim of 
insufficient evidence is raised, the evidence is examined in the 
view most favorable to the State, and we reverse only if the 
record contains no evidence from which a jury could reach a 
finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Hoffman v. 
                                                 
40 As I have joined Justice Sykes's concurrence in regard to 
the interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 974.04(2), I will not address 
that issue further. 
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Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 2003 WI 64, ¶9, 262 Wis. 2d 264, 664 
N.W.2d 55.  Appellate reversal based on insufficient evidence 
means that the State's case was so lacking in proof that it 
should not have been sent to the jury.  In such a case, society 
has no interest in upholding the conviction.  Therefore, I 
conclude that the better choice between applying waiver and 
reaching the issue of sufficiency of the evidence on the merits 
is the later one.  Accordingly, I respectfully concur. 
 
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