Title: Martinez v. State
Citation: 564 So. 2d 1071
Docket Number: 74497
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: July 5, 1990

564 So. 2d 1071 (1990)
Antonio MARTINEZ, Petitioner,
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
No. 74497.

Supreme Court of Florida.
July 5, 1990.
Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender and Jeffrey L. Anderson, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for petitioner.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Sylvia H. Alonso, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for respondent.
OVERTON, Justice.
We have for review Martinez v. State, 544 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989), in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of Martinez's motion to suppress his taped statement and concluded that Martinez's responses concerning his right to counsel were not equivocal. We find that the district court's decision conflicts with our decision in Long v. State, 517 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017, 108 S. Ct. 1754, 100 L. Ed. 2d 216 (1988), and the First District Court of Appeal's decision in Fields v. State, 402 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). We have jurisdiction.[1] We find that Martinez's responses concerning his right to counsel were equivocal and we quash the district court's decision.
The relevant facts reflect that on February 15, 1987, Antonio Martinez was arrested for the killing of Jimenez Miguel and was taken to the sheriff's substation in Indiantown. At that location, a deputy *1072 sheriff twice read the required Miranda[2] rights to Martinez. He was then transported to the sheriff's office in Stuart, where he was given his Miranda rights for a third time. There, he signed a waiver-of-rights form and then orally admitted that he had stabbed the victim. Following this admission, the officers desired to obtain from him a taped statement. In this regard, he was given his Miranda rights for a fourth time. During this recitation, the investigating officer advised Martinez, "If you don't have money for a lawyer, the county will pay for a lawyer that can represent you at that time in court, do you understand?" Martinez responded, "Okay." The investigating officer then advised Martinez that he had a right to have an attorney present at this questioning, to which Martinez answered, "But what if I don't have any money?" In response to Martinez's inquiry, the deputy stated, "But do you understand the rights I am reading to you, do you understand? Do you want to talk to us?" Martinez answered this question in the affirmative and then gave a taped statement in which he again admitted his involvement in the charged offense.
Subsequently, a grand jury indicted Martinez for first-degree murder. Martinez entered a plea of not guilty and filed a motion to suppress "any written or oral statements made by Defendant to law enforcement or other agents of the State of Florida." (Emphasis added.) The trial judge denied the motion, stating:
Martinez, 544 So. 2d  at 311. The trial judge's written order stated: "[T]he Motion to Suppress Statements is denied." Following the entry of this order, Martinez changed his plea to nolo contendere to the lesser included offense of second-degree murder, expressly reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The state agreed that the dispositive issue in the case was whether the statements should be suppressed.
On appeal, the Fourth District, in a split decision, affirmed the trial court, finding that it "could conclude from this record that the defendant's query could not reasonably be construed as a request for counsel, that he did understand his rights, and that he wanted to proceed at that time to repeat his confession." Id. at 311-12. In so holding, the court also noted: "There is no contention that the substance of the taped statement differed in any respect from the earlier oral confession, with respect to which no issue has been raised." Id. at 311. The dissent expressed the view *1073 that the First District Court of Appeal's decision in Fields v. State, 402 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), should have been followed since it involved similar circumstances, and concluded that "[Martinez's] statement could be deemed to show that he did not comprehend his right to counsel even though he had been advised at least three times that he would be appointed counsel if he could not afford the cost of legal representation." 544 So. 2d  at 312 (Glickstein, J., dissenting).
In this proceeding, Martinez argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the taped statement. He contends (1) that the officer failed to give him a complete Miranda warning prior to the taped statement and (2) that Martinez's question concerning whether he had a right to an attorney if he could not afford one indicated that he did not fully comprehend his rights. He asserts that the only permissible questioning after his response should have been to clarify his equivocal request concerning counsel.
In Long v. State, 517 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017, 108 S. Ct. 1754, 100 L. Ed. 2d 216 (1988), we reviewed the law concerning an equivocal response by a defendant to his Miranda warning, stating:
Id. at 728-29 (emphasis supplied).
Long, 517 So. 2d  at 666-67. See also Thompson v. State, 548 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1989); Kyser v. State, 533 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1988).
Contrary to the state's position, we find that Martinez's response displayed his uncertainty as to whether he was entitled to counsel during the interrogation. Given this finding, further inquiry was limited to clarifying Martinez's wishes. Long; Cannady. Consistent with the above decisions, we find that Martinez's taped statement must be suppressed.
The state also argues that this Court should reject Martinez's petition for review because the issue sought to be reviewed was not dispositive since no issue concerning the prior oral statement was presented. While the district court's opinion addressed only the taped statement, the trial court's order denying the motion to suppress encompassed both the oral and taped statements. Consequently, the district court had jurisdiction, as does this Court.
Accordingly, we quash the district court of appeal's decision in the instant case and direct that, upon remand, the trial court suppress Martinez's taped confession and afford him an opportunity to withdraw his plea.
It is so ordered.
SHAW, C.J., and McDONALD, EHRLICH, BARKETT, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur.
[1]  Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.
[2]  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).