Title: State v. Gronlie
Citation: 213 N.W.2d 874
Docket Number: 464, 465
State: north-dakota
Issuer: north-dakota Supreme Court
Date: December 4, 1973

213 N.W.2d 874 (1973) STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff, v. Patrick GRONLIE, Defendant. STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff, v. Dale HECK, Defendant. Crim. Nos. 464, 465. Supreme Court of North Dakota. December 4, 1973. *875 Paul M. Sand, First Asst. Atty. Gen., Bismarck, for State Parole Board. Neil W. Fleming, State's Atty., of Pembina County, Cavalier. William S. Heigaard, State's Atty., and F. Gene Gruber, Asst. State's Atty., Cavalier County, Langdon. John F. LaQua, Langdon, for defendants Gronlie and Heck on certified question. *876 ERICKSTAD, Chief Justice. Two questions have been certified to this court. The trial court has answered the first question No and the second question Yes. The questions follow: For purposes of background, we quote the pertinent parts of the trial court's findings of fact. All parties agree that the first question is correctly answered on the basis of John v. State, 160 N.W.2d 37 (N.D.1968). Although John does not involve a commitment to the State Farm as in the instant case, we believe that the rationale of John is that once the trial court has sentenced a person charged with the commission *877 of a felony and convicted of a felony to the State Farm, the trial court loses jurisdiction. This is so except when Rule 35 of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure, effective November 1, 1973, applies. We conclude, since Rule 35 is not applicable in the instant case, that the trial court correctly answered question No. 1, both defendants having been charged with the commission of a felony, both having been convicted thereof, and both having been sentenced to the State Farm, Gronlie on January 29, 1973, and Heck on April 19, 1973, for one year. We move on to consideration of question No. 2, involving the authority and jurisdiction of the State Parole Board over persons committed to the State Farm. Because of the peculiar alignment of counsel and parties in this case, wherein counsel appointed on behalf of the defendants and the respective State's attorneys of the counties involved in the original proceedings are seeking the same objective, namely the affirmance of the trial court's answers to the two certified questions, and the First Assistant Attorney General is seeking a reversal of the trial court's answer to question No. 2, in support of the position taken by the State Parole Board consistent with the Attorney General's opinion of May 4, 1973, referred to in paragraph 3 of the findings of fact, we shall refer to arguments made on behalf of the Parole Board's position as arguments made by the Parole Board and to arguments made in support of the trial court's position as arguments made by the court. The Parole Board contends that a review of Section 76 of the North Dakota Constitution creating the Board of Pardons and Chapters 12-51, 12-55, and 12-59 of the North Dakota Century Code should convince us that the State Parole Board does not have jurisdiction to hear applications for parole or to grant paroles to persons sentenced to the State Farm. It concedes, however, that the State Pardon Board may have such jurisdiction because of its constitutional origin and asserts that maybe the director of institutions or the warden or the two together may have such jurisdiction under the statutes. The pertinent part of section 76 reads: It is the Board's contention that as it was created by the Legislature it has only such powers as have been granted to it by the Legislature or such powers as may be *878 necessarily implied from some grant by the Legislature. It asserts that the duties and the functions of the Board are set out in Chapter 12-59 and that nowhere in this chapter is any reference found to the State Farm. An examination of Chapter 12-59 discloses no reference to the State Farm. The State Penitentiary and persons confined to it are often mentioned. Specific references to the Penitentiary follow: The omitted sections speak generally and make no reference to either the State Penitentiary or the State Farm. The Board further refers us to an exhibit in this case, which is a report signed by a Mr. J. A. Vandal, long-time chief parole officer and secretary of the Pardon Board and Parole Board, dated July 1, 1968. The Vandal report indicates that it had been a policy of both the Parole and Pardon Boards not to hear inmates of the State Farm except in emergencies, since it was believed that they had received maximum consideration by the court when they were sentenced to the State Farm. Since this court is permitted under Subsection 41 of Section 31-10-02, N. D.C.C., to take judicial notice of official acts of public officers, and as the record *879 of the Pardon Board are such, this court asked the present clerk of the Pardon Board and Parole Board to review the records of both boards. The records of the Pardon Board disclose: The records of the Parole Board Subsequent to 1963 disclose: This report indicates a significant administrative practice. In light of this report may we not assume that the General Affairs Subcommittee of the Legislative Research Committee for 1961-63 interim was cognizant of the Pardon Board's practice of exercising jurisdiction over persons committed to the State Farm; that when the full committee accepted the recommendations of the subcommittee it intended that the parole duties previously performed by the Pardon Board would be transferred to the Parole Board; that House Bill No. 534, which the committee prepared, was intended to accomplish this transfer; and that the Legislature in enacting the bill so intended ? The concluding paragraph of the summary of the Legislative Research Committee Report relative to "Pardon and Parole Laws" made to the 1963 session of the Legislature, at page F, reads: *880 The court asserts that although there is no specific reference in Chapter 12-59 to persons committed to the State Farm, Chapter 12-59 must be considered to apply to such persons as well as to persons committed to the Penitentiary because for all practical purposes the State Farm is a part of the State Penitentiary and is administered by the same authority, to wit, the Director of Institutions. Section 54-21-06.1, N.D.C.C., places the authority formerly vested in the Board of Administration in the Director of Institutions. The pertinent sections from Chapter 12-51, N.D.C.C., follow: The Parole Board responds that these sections of the Code do not make inmates *881 of the State Farm inmates of the State Penitentiary. It asserts that these sections are merely directed toward the Board of Administration (Director of Institutions) and the warden of the State Penitentiary. Both sides argue convincingly. We resolve the issue by resorting to administrative practice as an aid to construction of the statute. In construing a statute of doubtful meaning, courts have given weight to the long-continued practical construction placed thereon by officers charged with the duty of executing and applying the statutes. In State v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 68 N.D. 641, 282 N.W. 411 (1938), this court said in its syllabus: We again referred to this rule in Backman v. Guy, 126 N.W.2d 910 at 917 (N.D. 1964). In both of the latter cases, this court refused to apply that rule, concluding in each case that the meaning was so clear that construction was not necessary. In the instant case, however, we believe that the statutes are to some extent ambiguous and that therefore this practical rule of construction would be of aid in determining the intent of the Legislature. We conclude that the Legislature in enacting House Bill No. 534 intended to place the parole jurisdiction previously residing in the Pardon Board in the Parole Board, and that as the Pardon Board had previously exercised jurisdiction over State Farm inmates, jurisdiction over those inmates was now placed in the State Parole Board. An examination of Chapter 12-53, N.D.C.C., relating to suspended sentences and suspended imposition of sentences, before and after the enactment of House Bill No. 534, reveals in Sections 12-53-06, 12-53-07, 12-53-08, 12-53-10, 12-53-11, 12-53-12, 12-53-14, 12-53-15, and 12-53-16, the words "parole board" were substituted for the words "board of pardons", disclosing an intent to transfer from the Pardon Board to the Parole Board parole jurisdiction of all persons convicted of a felony. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court answered the second question correctly. The case is remanded for further proceedings conformable to law. VOGEL, TEIGEN, PAULSON and KNUDSON, JJ., concur.