Title: PEOPLE OF MI V WILLIAM ORVILLE HEGWOOD
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 118373
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: December 4, 2001

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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED DECEMBER 5, 2001  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v  
No. 118373  
WILLIAM ORVILLE HEGWOOD,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
PER CURIAM  
The defendant pleaded guilty to three drug offenses.  At  
sentencing, the circuit court chose to ignore the legislative  
sentencing guidelines that it was required to consider,  
erroneously stating that the Legislature had overstepped its  
role.  We disagree.  Therefore, we remand this case to the  
circuit court for resentencing.  
I  
The defendant was charged with sixteen counts of  
obtaining 
controlled substances (Soma, Tylenol # 4, and Xanax)  
by fraud. MCL 333.7407(1)(c). The offense is punishable by  
a maximum term of four years in prison.  The information  
stated an offense date of “December 1998-March 2000" for all  
counts.
 The defendant also was notified that he faced  
enhanced sentencing as a fourth-time felony offender.  MCL  
769.12.  
In May 2000, the defendant pleaded guilty to three counts  
of obtaining drugs by fraud.1
 The parties agreed that he  
would be sentenced as a third-time offender, so that the  
maximum term was raised from four years to eight years.  
The presentence report explained that the defendant was  
engaged in a lucrative business.  Using a variety of names,  
and visiting many doctors in the Thumb and surrounding  
regions, he obtained large quantities of pain pills for an  
alleged back condition.  He then sold the pills to drug  
dealers in Oakland County.  His income from this scheme may  
have reached $7,000 per week.  Evidence seized at the time of  
his arrest left little doubt about the carefully organized  
nature of this undertaking.  
At the defendant’s August 2000 sentencing, the parties  
discussed the offense dates.  Without mentioning that the  
legislative sentencing guidelines2 took effect on January 1,  
1 
 In exchange for the plea, the prosecuting attorney 
dismissed the remaining counts in this case, and dismissed an 
unrelated file.  
2 MCL 777.1 et seq.  
2  
1999,3 defense counsel and the court agreed to a December 1999  
offense date.4  
The 
legislative 
sentencing 
guidelines 
provided 
a 
range 
of  
zero to twenty-five months for the minimum sentence.5  The  
presentence investigator recommended a one-year term in the  
county jail.  Defense counsel sought a term of probation, with  
a requirement that the defendant participate in drug  
treatment.  The prosecuting attorney urged that the defendant  
be sentenced to prison.  In the alternative, he suggested that  
jail time be combined with a “substantial period” of  
probation.  
At 
sentencing, 
the 
circuit 
court 
discussed 
the 
background  
of the case, and asserted the court’s ability to employ  
3 MCL 769.34(2) provides that, with certain exceptions 
not pertinent to this case, "the minimum sentence imposed by 
a court of this state for a felony enumerated in [MCL 777.11 
through MCL 777.19] committed on or after January 1, 1999 
shall be within the appropriate sentence range under the 
version of those sentencing guidelines in effect on the date 
the crime was committed."  
4 
 At sentencing, no one suggested that the judicial 
sentencing 
guidelines, 
which 
preceded 
the 
legislative 
sentencing guidelines, were applicable to this case. See MCL  
769.34(1).  
5 The current guidelines apply to persons, such as the 
defendant, receiving enhanced sentences. MCL 777.21(3). The  
former judicial guidelines did not.  Michigan Sentencing 
Guidelines, Second Edition (1988), page 6.  
3  
   
   
 
 
"common sense" in evaluating the facts.6
 Following those  
6 In this regard the Court stated:  
[I]t has been claimed that the representations 
made in the report, and the conclusions made by the 
agent that the individual before the Court is a 
drug dealer are inaccurate, and untrue.  
That he doesn’t make a lot of money dealing 
drugs.  That those are false claims, or false 
accusations made by an individual whose motivation 
is vindictiveness, or whatever.  
But, you know I can draw my own conclusions as 
a Judge.  I don’t throw my common sense out the 
window when I get on the bench. And I mean I pick 
my pickles and I come to work.  
I can use my common sense when I arrive here, 
and simply I understand the facts and circumstances 
that have been presented to me, that if this 
individual were consuming all of these drugs that 
he was obtaining by this fraudulent method, I mean 
prescription of over 200 pills, he’d be dead.  
So I can draw the logical conclusion, I think 
he was not only supporting his own addiction, and 
apparently giving therapy to other individuals on 
the weekends, but he was also in the business of 
making a profit, and made a profit.  That’s what  
makes the difference here.  That is the turning 
point as to the potential disposition of this case.  
* 
* 
*  
There is no question in my mind that you have 
considerable problems, and you’re supporting the 
drug trafficking in the State of Michigan by coming 
to our little sleepy community where the doctors, I 
suspect, are not as vigilant, or are familiar as 
they are in the big city.  
That’s why you want to come up here.  That’s  
why you want to come to our friendly little people 
in this friendly little town and sweet-talk them in 
prescribing the drugs that you feel will make you 
high, and maybe make you feel good.  That’s why 
you’re going to prison.  
4  
remarks, the Court addressed the role of the Legislature in  
enacting Michigan’s new sentencing guidelines:  
I could care less what the legislature through 
its rule making authority says as to the guidelines 
that I could impose, or what kind of sentence I 
would impose.  
When the legislature and the senators take  
over and start becoming judges in the State of 
Michigan, they can impose the sentences.  
But in the meantime we still have separate and 
co-equal branches of government, wherein it’s my 
position and my responsibility, my authority to fix 
the sentence when someone is convicted of a felony.  
And I’m an elected official, I hold this 
office because the people of this county and this 
state entrusted with me the power and the authority 
to enforce the criminal laws of this state.  You’re  
a con. I believe you belong in prison.  
The circuit court then sentenced the defendant to  
concurrent, enhanced terms of four to eight years in prison.  
After 
the 
Court 
of Appeals denied his delayed application  
for leave to appeal,7 the defendant applied to this Court for  
leave to appeal.  
II  
This case presents an issue concerning the proper  
application of the statutory sentencing provisions, including  
MCL 777.1 et seq. and 769.34. 
Therefore, we review this  
This is not a probationable consideration. 
Probation is a matter of grace, not a matter of 
right.  
7 Unpublished order entered December 27, 2000 (Docket No. 
230843).  
5  
 
 
 
  
matter de novo.  People v Thousand, 465 Mich 149, 156; 631 
NW2d 694 (2001). 
III 
As the Court of Appeals explained in People v Babcock,  
244 Mich App 64, 68; 624 NW2d 479 (2000), the ultimate  
authority to provide for penalties for criminal offenses is  
constitutionally vested in the Legislature. Const 1963, art  
4, § 45.8  The authority to impose sentences and to administer  
the sentencing statutes enacted by the Legislature lies with  
the judiciary. See, e.g., MCL 769.1(1).9  
It 
is, 
accordingly, the responsibility of a circuit judge  
to impose a sentence, but only within the limits set by the  
Legislature. People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 651; 461 NW2d 1  
(1990).10  For example, no matter how unusual the circumstances  
8  
The legislature may provide for indeterminate 
sentences as punishment for crime and for the  
detention and release of persons imprisoned or 
detained under such sentences.  [Const 1963, art 4,  
§ 45.]  
9  
A judge of a court having jurisdiction may 
pronounce judgment against and pass sentence upon a 
person convicted of an offense in the court.  The  
sentence shall not exceed the sentence prescribed 
by law. [MCL 769.1(1).]  
10 
We 
said 
in 
Milbourn 
that 
judicial 
sentencing 
discretion  
should be exercised “within the legislatively prescribed 
range.”  That statement came in a discussion of the “principle 
of proportionality.”  435 Mich 651. 
The Court of Appeals 
indicated in Babcock that the principle of proportionality is 
not part of the legislative guidelines, and that there will be 
no appellate review of sentence length in cases in which there  
6  
of an offense or an offender, a judge is constrained by the  
Legislature’s determination of the maximum penalty and, if  
applicable, the minimum penalty.  Thus, a judge cannot impose  
a twenty-year maximum sentence on an especially depraved  
individual convicted  of unarmed robbery (a fifteen-year  
offense).11  Nor can a judge impose a one-year sentence on a  
previously upright citizen who has been convicted of felony­
firearm (punishable with a flat two-year term for first-time  
offenders).12  
Sentencing guidelines in Michigan have existed through  
two distinct eras. From 1983 though 1998, Michigan’s courts  
employed guidelines crafted by this Court and promulgated by  
administrative order.13
 The effort reflected this Court’s  
is a substantial and compelling reason to depart from the 
recommended 
minimum 
stated in the legislative guidelines.  244  
Mich App 77-78.  In this regard, however, we observe that the 
statute provides, “A court may depart from the appropriate 
sentence 
range 
established under the [guidelines] if the court 
has a substantial and compelling reason for that departure 
. . . .”  (Emphasis supplied.)  MCL 769.34(3). In light of 
such language, we do not believe that the Legislature 
intended, in every case in which a minimal upward or downward 
departure is justified by “substantial and compelling” 
circumstances, to allow unreviewable discretion to depart as 
far below or as far above the guideline range as the 
sentencing court chooses.
 Rather, the “substantial and 
compelling” circumstances articulated by the court must 
justify the particular departure in a case, i.e., “that 
departure.”  
11 MCL 750.530.  
12 MCL 750.227b(1).  
13 Administrative Order Nos. 1983-3, 417 Mich cxxi; 1984­
1, 418 Mich lxxx; 1985-2, 420 Mich lxii; and 1988-4, 430 Mich  
7  
 
 
attempt to respond to unwarranted disparities in sentencing  
practices between judges.14  Thus, the very premise of the  
guidelines is that judicial discretion will be restricted to  
a certain degree.  
This Court’s sentencing guidelines were “mandatory” only  
in the sense that the sentencing court was obliged to follow  
the procedure of "scoring" a case on the basis of the  
circumstances of the offense and the offender, and articulate  
the basis for any departure from the recommended sentence  
range yielded by this scoring. 
However, because the  
recommended ranges found in the judicial guidelines were not  
the product of legislative action, a sentencing judge was not  
necessarily obliged to impose a sentence within those ranges.  
Milbourn at 656-657; People v Raby, 456 Mich 487, 496-497; 572  
NW2d 644 (1998).  
Effective 
January 1, 1999, the state of Michigan embarked  
on a different course. 
By formal enactment of the  
Legislature, Michigan became subject to guidelines with  
sentencing ranges that do require adherence. 
MCL 777.1 et  
seq.  
ci.  See also Administrative Order Nos. 1998-2, 459 Mich 
clxxii, and 1998-4, 459 Mich clxxv.  
14 McComb, An overview of the second edition of the  
Michigan Sentencing Guidelines, 67 Mich B J 863 (September, 
1988).  
8  
 
 
 
 
 
At the time it enacted these guidelines, the Legislature  
opted for a system with many features that were easily  
recognizable by courts familiar with the format previously  
employed in Michigan.  The transition to the new guidelines  
was facilitated by this choice since Michigan’s sentencing  
judges were acquainted with, and fully understood, concepts  
such as prior record variables, offense variables, and  
sentencing ranges.  
However, the similarity between the pre-1999 judicial  
guidelines and the current legislative guidelines may have  
misled some courts into believing that application of the  
current guidelines is governed by previous principles. That  
may have been the court's impression in the present case.  Yet  
it is apparent that the Legislature has provided new ground  
rules.  As one example, a decision such as Raby, holding that  
a scoring error cannot form the basis of appellate relief, 456  
Mich 496, now must give way to the requirement of MCL  
769.34(10), which expressly permits sentence appeals on that  
basis.  
Because 
the 
new 
guidelines are the product of legislative  
enactment, a judge's discretion to depart from the range  
stated in the legislative guidelines is limited to those  
circumstances in which such a departure is allowed by the  
Legislature. The present language of MCL 769.34(3) states:  
A court may depart from the appropriate 
sentence range established under the sentencing  
9  
guidelines set forth in chapter XVII if the court 
has a substantial and compelling reason for that 
departure and states on the record the reasons for 
departure.  
By comparison, the more open-ended “departure policy” of the  
judicial guidelines stated:  
Whenever the judge determines that a minimum 
sentence outside the recommended minimum range 
should be imposed, the judge may do so.[15]  
In the present case, the circuit court stated several  
reasons for the sentence it imposed.  The court characterized  
the defendant as “a professional criminal” and described his  
conduct as “inexcusable.”  At no point, however, did the court  
appear to recognize that it was permitted to depart from the  
range prescribed by the Legislature only “if the court has a  
substantial and compelling reason for that departure and  
states on the record the reason for departure.”16
 MCL  
769.34(3). Instead, the court opined, "When the legislature  
and the senators take over and start becoming judges in the  
State of Michigan, they can impose the sentences."  These  
remarks demonstrate the court's misunderstanding in this case  
of the respective roles of Michigan's separate branches of  
government.
 Contrary to the circuit court’s view, the  
15 Michigan Sentencing Guidelines, Second Edition (1988), 
page 7.  
16 In MCL 769.34(3), the Legislature states a rule that 
makes no apparent distinctions between "upward departures" 
that increase the sentence beyond the length stated in the 
guidelines and "downward departures" that decrease the  
sentence below the length stated in the guidelines.  
10  
 
 
 
 
Legislature may impose restrictions on a judge’s exercise of  
discretion in imposing sentence.  
For these reasons, we vacate the sentence in this case,  
and remand it to the circuit court for resentencing consistent  
with the law.17  MCR 7.302(F)(1).  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and CAVANAGH, WEAVER, 
KELLY, TAYLOR, 
YOUNG, 
and  
MARKMAN, JJ., concurred.  
17 The defendant asks that the resentencing occur before 
a different judge.  In this instance however, the court’s 
error appears to be a function of its incorrect understanding 
of the new sentencing structure that now exists in Michigan, 
and not to any prejudices or improper attitudes regarding this 
particular defendant. Therefore, we see no reason to assign 
a different judge to conduct the sentencing.  See People v  
Evans, 156 Mich App 68, 71-72; 401 NW2d 312 (1986), and 
following cases such as People v Pillar, 233 Mich App 267, 
270-271; 590 NW2d 622 (1998).  
11