Title: People v. Normand
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 97984
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: June 3, 2005

Docket No. 97984-Agenda 5-March 2005.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 							ERNEST J. NORMAND, Appellant.
Opinion filed June 3, 2005.
	JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	In August 2000, defendant, Ernest J. Normand, was arrested and
charged with three counts of possession of child pornography. 720
ILCS 5/11-20.1(a)(6) (West 2000). A computer, related equipment,
computer disks, and a box of Polaroid photographs were taken from
defendant's home pursuant to a search warrant. Defendant was
initially charged with possessing three Polaroid photographs depicting
nude and sexualized images of defendant's then 16-year-old former
girlfriend, Sheri F. In November 2000, a grand jury indictment was
issued, charging defendant with four additional counts of possession
of child pornography. These charges were based on images contained
on some of the seized computer disks, which depicted what appeared
to be unidentified minors in sexualized poses or engaging in sexual
activity. The images were converted into photographs and were
admitted into evidence. In April 2002, following a bench trial in the
circuit court of Ogle County, defendant was convicted of six counts
of possession of child pornography. The trial court sentenced him to
two years' probation. The appellate court affirmed. 345 Ill. App. 3d
736. We granted defendant leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.
	The section of the child pornography statute under which
defendant was charged states:
			"(a) A person commits the offense of child pornography
who:
* * *
				(6) with knowledge of the nature or content thereof,
possesses any film, videotape, photograph or other similar
visual reproduction or depiction by computer of any child
or institutionalized severely or profoundly mentally
retarded person whom the person knows or reasonably
should know to be under the age of 18 or to be an
institutionalized severely or profoundly mentally retarded
person, engaged in any activity described in subparagraphs
(i) through (vii) of paragraph (1) of this subsection[.]" 720
ILCS 5/11-20.1(a)(6) (West 2000).
	The definition of "child" states:
			"(f) Definitions. For the purposes of this Section:
* * *
				(7) 'Child' includes a film, videotape, photograph, or
other similar visual medium or reproduction or depiction
by computer that is, or appears to be, that of a person,
either in part, or in total, under the age of 18, regardless of
the method by which the film, videotape, photograph, or
other similar visual medium or reproduction or depiction
by computer is created, adopted, or modified to appear as
such. 'Child' also includes a film, videotape, photograph,
or other similar visual medium or reproduction or
depiction by computer that is advertised, promoted,
presented, described, or distributed in such a manner that
conveys the impression that the film, videotape,
photograph, or other similar visual medium or
reproduction or depiction by computer is of a person
under the age of 18." 720 ILCS 5/11-20.1(f)(7) (West
2000).
	In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 152 L. Ed. 2d 403, 122 S. Ct. 1389 (2002), the United States Supreme Court
invalidated two sections of the Child Pornography Prevention Act of
1996 (CPPA). One section prohibited any visual depiction, including
any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or picture that is or appears to be of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct. The other section defined child
pornography to include any sexually explicit image that, inter alia,
conveys the impression that it depicts a minor engaged in sexually
explicit conduct. The Supreme Court invalidated these two sections
because the "appears to be" and "conveys the impression" language
targeted virtual child pornography, i.e., realistic images of children
created entirely by computer software that were not of actual children
and, therefore, not illegal. The Court found those sections of the
CPPA to be overbroad and unconstitutional. Ashcroft, 535 U.S.  at
256, 152 L. Ed. 2d  at 425, 122 S. Ct.  at 1405.
	In People v. Alexander, 204 Ill. 2d 472 (2003), this court
addressed a similar provision in the Illinois child pornography statute.
Like the statute in Ashcroft, the Illinois statute contained the "appears
to be" and the "conveys the impression" language in defining the term
"child." 720 ILCS 5/11-20.1(f)(7) (West 2000). We found these
definitions of "child" to be unconstitutional because they were
indistinguishable from the language in the federal CPPA invalidated in
Ashcroft. We struck only subsection (f)(7), finding that the rest of the
statute could stand without the unconstitutional provisions.
Alexander, 204 Ill. 2d  at 483-84. This decision was issued after
defendant filed his initial brief in the appellate court.
	In the appellate court, defendant argued that the convictions
based on the computer images must be reversed in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft and that the application of the
Illinois statute to his conduct was unconstitutional because there was
no proof that actual children were used in the making of the computer
images. The appellate court rejected this argument, holding that the
State need not prove that "the image is not something other than it
plainly appears to be through some means other than an examination
of the image itself." 345 Ill. App. 3d at 741.
	Before this court, defendant argues that (1) the trial court
erroneously relied on the statutory definition of "child" that was later
declared unconstitutional by this court in Alexander, (2) the State
failed to authenticate the photographs admitted into evidence to prove
that they depicted real children, and (3) the evidence was insufficient
to convict him.
	The State argues that defendant has waived his arguments. He
did not object to the admission of the computer photographs into
evidence. He did not argue to the trial court that the State had failed
to establish that the images were of actual children. Defendant did not
raise any such contention in his posttrial motion, nor did he argue in
his motion that the trial court failed to find the minors in the
photographs to be real children. To preserve an error for review, a
defendant must make an objection at trial and include the error in a
posttrial motion. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). Failure
to follow this procedure results in waiver of the issues on appeal.
People v. Phelps, 211 Ill. 2d 1, 10-11 (2004); People v. Macri, 185 Ill. 2d 1, 44 (1998). We note, however, that the rule of waiver is an
admonition to the parties and not a limitation on the jurisdiction of this
court. In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d 307, 323 (1995). Our decision in
Alexander was not filed until well after defendant's trial. Therefore,
we decline to find waiver and will address defendant's contentions on
their merits.
	Our discussion relates only to the photographs obtained from the
computer disks seized during the search of defendant's apartment. The
photographs were taken from two floppy computer disks and one zip
disk. The only objection to their admission into evidence that defense
counsel posed was as to the chain of custody of one photograph. The
trial court overruled the objection. Sergeant James Wilcox, who
assisted in the search of defendant's apartment, testified that he spoke
with defendant as other officers were performing the search.
Defendant told Wilcox that he had been collecting pornography for
the previous five years. He told Wilcox that a child was someone
under 18 years of age. He downloaded the pornographic images from
the Internet and had saved thousands of such images over the years.
When asked how he knew that an image portrayed a person under age
18, defendant said he could tell by looking at the photograph. The size
and weight of the person and the development of their genitalia are
factors defendant would look at to judge the age of the person. He
would separate out the images of children from those of adults and
transfer them to removable disks titled "younger or young stuff."
Defendant told Wilcox he knew child pornography was illegal and that
defendant, in his words, "fucked up" by not getting rid of it.
Defendant also told Wilcox that the computer located inside the front
door (the computer that was seized) was his computer and he used it
to download pornography from the Internet.
	Sheri F., defendant's former girlfriend, testified that she and
defendant broke off their relationship in October 1999. Prior to that
time, she had seen several of their friends use defendant's computer
to check their e-mail. Defendant would watch them while they did
this. Sheri F. did not see the friends do anything else on defendant's
computer. She had occasion to see defendant using the computer.
While he was doing so, she saw nude women and small children
displayed on the computer monitor. Sometimes the children were
clothed and sometimes they were nude and were engaged in sexual
acts. Sheri F. identified defendant's handwriting on the zip disk and
floppy disks from which the pornographic images were retrieved. The
handwriting on the zip disk said, "Ernest Special Disk."
	Defendant testified in his own behalf. He stated that he owned the
computer seized in the search of his apartment. He lived with a
roommate, who had his own computer. During the time he lived in the
apartment, more than 10 of his friends would use the computer when
they were there for word processing, for Internet access, to check
their e-mail, and to play games. He placed no restrictions on others'
use of his computer. It was not password protected. Defendant
testified that not all of the zip disks and floppy disks seized in the
search belonged to him. Although defendant downloaded about
20,000 pornographic images over a five-year period, he did not seek
to download child pornography. Most of the time, he would receive
the images compressed into zip files which could not be viewed until
they were on his computer and were unzipped. Once he looked at the
images, he would delete any that were corrupted or undesirable.
Sometimes, he deleted images of children. However, he did not go
through each zip file he received to verify that no child pornography
was in it.
	Defendant denied telling Wilcox that he had child pornography
on his computer. When he told Wilcox that he had "fucked up," he
was referring to the fact that, of the thousands of images he
downloaded, there might have been some of an illegal nature that he
did not review and discard. Defendant denied naming any disk or file
"younger" or "young fuck." Those names were given to the files
before he downloaded them in compressed format. Defendant
conceded that two of the disks admitted into evidence labeled "Ernest
Special Disk" and "Classics/s-w-o-t-l" were his and contained his
handwriting. The other disk contained only the number "8" and he
was not certain that was his handwriting. When Wilcox asked
defendant if he had any child pornography on his computer, defendant
said not to his knowledge. Defendant denied telling Wilcox that he
would sort through the images and if persons in the images appeared
to be under age 18, he would save the images to a separate disk or
folder titled "younger." He told Wilcox that if he saw any images that
were questionable, he would put them in a folder, view them and
delete them.
	During his closing argument to the trial court, defense counsel
challenged the State's evidence as to defendant's knowing possession
of the images taken from the computer disks that were admitted into
evidence. It was counsel's position that the fact that defendant had
other child pornography on his computer was insufficient to prove his
knowing possession of the images in question. Counsel also noted
defendant's testimony concerning the other people who had access to
his computer. Counsel further argued that the State had not proved
beyond a reasonable doubt that the individuals in one of the
photographs admitted into evidence were under the age of 18, based
on their appearance.
	The trial judge rendered his verdict from the bench. Referring to
the four photographs taken from the computer disks, the judge
described the issue as whether defendant possessed the images from
which the photographs came with knowledge of the nature of the
images. The judge noted that defendant admitted he downloaded
thousands of pornographic images, that some of those images may
have been of children, and that defendant would delete the child
pornography if he found it, but that he did not check every image. The
judge also noted the testimony of Wilcox as to his conversation with
defendant in which defendant admitted that there was child
pornography in his apartment, that he knew it was illegal and he
should have gotten rid of it. The judge found the testimony of Wilcox
and Sheri F. to be convincing and found defendant guilty on all but the
last count of the indictment. On that count, the judge found reasonable
doubt as to the ages of the individuals in the photograph and he found
defendant not guilty of that count.
	Defendant filed a motion for new trial and a motion to reconsider
the verdict. Both motions alleged several grounds for a new trial, but
no issue was raised as to the State's failure to prove or the trial
court's failure to find that the individuals portrayed in the photographs
obtained from the computer disks were of actual children.
	Defendant first argues that the verdict is unreliable because the
trial court relied on a statutory definition that was later declared
unconstitutional and, consequently, did not find that the individuals in
the computer photographs were actual children. Defendant asserts that
the court relied on the "appears to be" definition of "child" contained
in subsection (f)(7) of the child pornography statute and that the judge
specifically referred to that language in making his finding of guilt.
	We reject this argument. We note that defendant explained to
Wilcox that he could tell an individual in a photograph was under the
age of 18 by looking at the photograph itself, noting particularly the
individual's height, weight, and the development of their genitalia.
There was no suggestion by anyone that the individuals depicted in the
photographs were anything other than real children. In fact, the trial
court did not, as defendant claims, rely on the "appears to be"
definition of "child" in finding defendant guilty. The reference to the
"appears to be" language was made during defense counsel's closing
argument, in which he challenged the age of the individuals in one of
the computer photographs admitted into evidence. There was no
discussion about whether the individuals in any of the photographs
were real children.
	In rendering its verdict, the court stated:
			"The other issue that was raised [the first issue being
knowing possession] is the issue of age. That is whether or
not as to these-particularly it was raised as to count seven,
Exhibit 15, whether or not the age of the persons or person
that is found in that photograph was under the age of 18 or
could be found to have been. I don't think there could be any
argument and there was none made that as to counts four,
five and six, which are Exhibits 13, 14, and 16, that the
children, the girls depicted in those photographs, are under
the age of 18 and that they are engaged in the type of sexual
acts which are prohibited by the statute. And I do find that as
to counts four, five, and six, the Defendant has been proven
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
			As to seven, that's photograph Exhibit 15, I do find that
there is a reasonable doubt as to age of the participants in
that photograph. And I will find the Defendant not guilty
under count seven."
	Clearly, the trial judge believed the individuals depicted in the
photographs to be actual children. He referred to them as "children,"
"girls," "participants," and "persons." We conclude that the verdict is
not unreliable and that the trial court did not rely on the
unconstitutional definition of "child."
	Defendant next argues that the photographs taken from the
computer disks were improperly admitted into evidence without the
proper foundation. Defendant further argues that if the photographs
themselves were the evidence that actual children were used to
produce them, it was error for the trial court to admit the images
without requiring authentication of them as fairly and accurately
representing the matter depicted. The result, according to defendant,
is that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of possessing the
photographs. We note that defendant has also argued that the State
failed to prove an essential element of the offense, i.e., that actual
children were used in making the computer images that defendant was
convicted of possessing. Defendant's argument regarding the
authentication of the computer photographs is, essentially, a challenge
to the sufficiency of the evidence, since defendant's main claim in this
appeal is that some additional proof was required, beyond the
photographs themselves, to establish that actual children were
depicted. Accordingly, we turn to defendant's argument that he was
not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
	When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, "the relevant
question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."
(Emphasis in original.) Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 573, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985).
	In Alexander, we held that "child" means "actual child." The
statute requires that the defendant "knows or reasonably should
know" that the child depicted is under the age of 18. We noted that in
the context of virtual child pornography, the State could never satisfy
the scienter requirement because a virtual child is ageless.
Accordingly, we held that the statute prohibits "making and
possessing sexually explicit computer depictions of any actual child
under 18 years of age." Alexander, 204 Ill. 2d  at 486. Thus, the State
was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the sexually
explicit images possessed by defendant depicted actual children. The
only evidence that actual children were depicted by the photographs
admitted at defendant's trial were the photographs themselves.
	Defendant cites United States v. Hilton, 363 F.3d 58 (1st Cir.
2004), in support of his argument that there must be some proof in
addition to the images themselves to establish that real children are
depicted. In Hilton, a pre-Ashcroft prosecution, the defendant was
charged under the federal CPPA with possession of child pornography
that had traveled between states or between countries. The images
were taken from backup disks of the defendant's computer hard drive.
An expert testified as to the age of the children, using the Tanner
Scale which provides a basis for estimating a person's stage of
physiological development. In the expert's opinion, nine of the images
depicted children from preschool age to young teenagers. After
Ashcroft was decided, the defendant filed a petition for postconviction
relief, alleging that the government did not prove that the children in
the images were real. The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the
district court vacating defendant's conviction. The court rejected the
government's argument that the expert's testimony using the Tanner
Scale sufficed to prove that the children were real, finding that a
virtual pornographer, with the aid of technology, would be able to
produce images that would mimic the indicators of age used by the
Tanner Scale. The court disagreed with the argument that as a matter
of common sense, the district court found, or must have found, that
the images represented real children. Rather, the State must present
relevant evidence in addition to the images themselves to establish that
they depict real children. Hilton, 363 F.3d  at 66.
	Hilton does not support defendant's argument. The court of
appeals subsequently withdrew its opinion and issued another opinion
in its place. United States v. Hilton, 386 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2004). In
that decision, the court did not mention its withdrawn opinion.
Although the court again vacated the defendant's convictions, it did
so because the district court did not make a finding of fact that the
images depicted real children. There is no mention of the prior
opinion's requirement that the State produce evidence in addition to
the computer images to carry its burden of proof that real children
were depicted. Hilton, 386 F.3d  at 18-19.
	Other federal courts of appeal have concluded that the
government need not introduce evidence other than the pornographic
images themselves. See United States v. Slanina, 359 F.3d 356, 357
(5th Cir. 2004) (neither expert testimony nor additional evidence is
required to prove downloaded images are of real children); United
States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1142 (10th Cir. 2003) (concluding
that Ashcroft did not establish a requirement that, absent direct
evidence of identity, an expert must testify that the unlawful image is
of a real child; juries are still capable of distinguishing between real
and virtual images and admissibility remains within the sound
discretion of the trial judge); United States v. Hall, 312 F.3d 1250,
1260 (11th Cir. 2002) (although jury was instructed on pre-Ashcroft
definition of "child," an examination of the pictures viewed by the jury
demonstrates that the children depicted in the images were real and
that a reasonable jury could not have found that the images were of
virtual children); United States v. Vig, 167 F.3d 443, 450 (8th Cir.
1999) (rejecting argument that technology was available to produce
pornographic images without using real children; government was not
required to negate what is merely unsupported speculation).
	Unlike photographs used as demonstrative evidence, the
photographs taken from the computer images here were themselves
the evidence of defendant's offense. Accordingly, the question is
whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the children
depicted in the images were real children. Although, following our
decision in Alexander, the State must prove that real children were
used to create pornographic images, it does not follow that Alexander
placed a higher burden of proof on the State than previously existed.
Defendant's argument assumes that computer imaging technology has
advanced to the stage where pornographic images of children may be
produced without using real children. This is the so-called virtual
child. Defendant did not argue in the trial court nor does he argue in
this court that such technology is so widely available that its use must
be affirmatively negated in every case.
	This court acknowledged in Alexander the findings of Congress
in enacting the CPPA, specifically, the finding that " ' "new
photographic and computer imagining [sic] technologies make it
possible to produce by electronic, mechanical, or other means, visual
depictions of what appear to be children engaging in sexually explicit
conduct that are virtually indistinguishable to the unsuspecting viewer
from unretouched photographic images of actual children engaging in
sexually explicit conduct." ' " Alexander, 204 Ill. 2d  at 477-78,
quoting 18 U.S.C. §2251, Congressional Findings, Note (5) (2000),
quoting Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-26 (1996). However, the
fact that such technology is available does not mean that it is
necessarily being widely used by those who produce pornographic
images of children. Rather, we find more persuasive comments made
by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft :
			"The Government next argues that its objective of
eliminating the market for pornography produced using real
children necessitates a prohibition on virtual images as well.
Virtual images, the Government contends, are
indistinguishable from real ones; they are part of the same
market and are often exchanged. In this way, it is said, virtual
images promote the trafficking in works produced through
the exploitation of real children. The hypothesis is somewhat
implausible. If virtual images were identical to illegal child
pornography, the illegal images would be driven from the
market by the indistinguishable substitutes. Few
pornographers would risk prosecution by abusing real
children if fictional, computerized images would suffice."
(Emphasis added.) Ashcroft, 535 U.S.  at 254, 152 L. Ed. 2d 
at 423, 122 S. Ct.  at 1403-04.
	The italicized portion of the quote has relevance to defendant's
argument. If child pornographers had easy access to the technology to
produce virtual child images that are indistinguishable from images
using real children, no reason would exist to use real children. The risk
of prosecution and prison sentences for using real children contrasts
sharply with the legality of using virtual child images. Few
pornographers would be willing to take that risk if a legal means of
producing the same type of images existed. Yet, if virtual child
pornography exists, it has not been well publicized. Given the
substantial market for child pornography on the Internet, it stands to
reason that such a radical development would not go unnoticed,
especially in legal and law enforcement circles. Therefore, we are not
convinced that this technology is so widely available that the State
must be required as a matter of law to produce evidence in addition
to the images themselves to carry its burden of proof.
	For the reasons stated, we conclude that a trier of fact is capable
of determining whether real children were used in pornographic
images simply by viewing the images themselves. In this particular
case, after viewing the images ourselves, we find that any trier of fact
could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the photographs
depicted actual children, and that defendant knowingly possessed the
images. Accordingly, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prosecution, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to convict
defendant of possession of child pornography.
	For the reasons stated, the judgment of the appellate court is
affirmed.

Appellate court judgment affirmed.