Title: State v. Pollock
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S51010
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: December 9, 2004

FILED:  December 9, 2004
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
ROGER MILLEN POLLOCK,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 0103-32263; CA A116427; SC S51010)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted September 14, 2004.
Stephen A. Houze, Portland, argued the cause and filed the
briefs for petitioner on review.
Jennifer S. Lloyd, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause for respondent on review.  With her on the brief were
Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams, Solicitor
General.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
De Muniz, and Balmer, Justices.**
DE MUNIZ, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
*Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, Ellen F. Rosenblum, Judge. 189 Or App 38, 73 P3d 297 (2003).
**Kistler, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
DE MUNIZ, J.
The issue in this criminal case is whether the police
had probable cause to arrest defendant, thereby justifying a
search incident to the arrest.  Two women told a police officer
that defendant had tried to sell them a controlled substance, the
illegal drug ecstasy, while they were visiting a bar in Old Town
in Portland.  The officer arrested defendant and, upon searching
him incident to the arrest, discovered a large sum of money and
the drug.  Defendant later was charged with delivery and
possession of a controlled substance.  ORS 475.992(1) and
(4). (1)
  Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the
evidence found during the search, arguing that the officer lacked
probable cause to arrest him.  The trial court agreed, concluding
that a credible report of defendant's offer to sell drugs was
insufficient to constitute probable cause to arrest defendant for
delivery of a controlled substance.  
The Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that, because
an offer to sell drugs was a substantial step in delivering them,
the officer had probable cause to arrest defendant.  The court
concluded, therefore, that the trial court should not have
suppressed the evidence found during the search incident to the
arrest.  State v. Pollock, 189 Or App 38, 46, 73 P3d 297 (2003). 
We allowed defendant's petition for review and conclude that, in
the circumstances presented here, the credible report of an offer
to sell drugs constituted probable cause to arrest defendant for
possession of a controlled substance.  Accordingly, we need not
reach the issue whether such a report constituted probable cause
to arrest defendant for delivery of a controlled substance.  We
therefore affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The following facts are taken from the opinion of the
Court of Appeals:
"On March 28, 2001, Officer Brian Hubbard was on patrol
in Old Town in Portland.  At approximately 1:00 a.m.,
Iran Johnson flagged Hubbard down.  Johnson told him
that '[a] gal at Fourth and Burnside was sick and had
possibly been given drugs by a guy at Dante's,' a local
bar.  Hubbard spoke with the woman, Katie Andersen, who
appeared to be sick.  Her hands were shaking, her head
was down, and she showed signs of being nauseated. 
Andersen and a friend, Greer Carver, 'told [Hubbard]
that a guy in Dante's tried to sell them ecstasy and
offered to put it in their drinks.  They told the
officer that they declined and, 'after persisting a
bit, he left.'  When Andersen started feeling bad, she
thought that he might possibly have put the drug in her
drink.'
"Johnson told the officer that he knew who the man
was and where he was sitting in the bar.  'He described
him as a big blond guy and told the officer that he had
seen him with the women in the bar and that he had
"kept an eye on him."'  Johnson, however, had not seen
the man put anything in Andersen’s drink.  Based on
what he learned from Andersen, Carver, and Johnson, the
officer entered Dante’s and, after Johnson pointed
defendant out, placed him under arrest.  During a
search incident to arrest, the officer found what
appeared to be a controlled substance and over $2,000
in cash on defendant." (2)

189 Or App at 40 (footnote omitted).
Defendant was charged by indictment with one count of
delivery of a Schedule I controlled substance, (3)
 one count of
possession of a Schedule I controlled substance, and one count of
fourth-degree assault.  Defendant moved to suppress the evidence
that the police officer found when the officer arrested him,
arguing that, because the officer lacked probable cause to arrest
him, the court should exclude the evidence.  In response, the
state contended that the officer had probable cause to believe
either that defendant had put ecstasy in Andersen's drink or that
defendant had offered to deliver ecstasy to Andersen and Carver. 
Defendant denied that he offered the drug to them.
The trial court concluded that, although the officer
did not have probable cause to believe that defendant had put
ecstasy into Andersen's drink, the evidence was sufficient to
establish that defendant had offered to sell drugs to Andersen
and Carver.  Nevertheless, the trial court concluded that an
offer to sell drugs was insufficient to demonstrate the crime of
possession or attempted delivery of a controlled substance.  As a
result, the trial court ruled that the officer lacked probable
cause to arrest defendant and therefore suppressed the evidence
seized pursuant to the arrest. (4)
  The state appealed.
The Court of Appeals framed the issue presented as
"whether an offer to sell a controlled substance is sufficient to
establish an attempted transfer of that substance."  Pollock, 189
Or App at 42.  Focusing on the alleged attempted transfer, the
Court of Appeals concluded that an offer to sell a controlled
substance satisfied the elements of a criminal attempt, as
defined in ORS 161.405(1) and State v. Walters, 311 Or 80, 804
P2d 1164, cert den, 510 US 1209 (1991), and therefore the police
officer had probable cause to arrest defendant.  As noted, we
allowed defendant's petition for review.
A warrantless arrest is appropriate if a police officer
has probable cause to believe that a person has committed a
felony.  ORS 133.310(1)(a).  Probable cause to arrest must be
based on "a substantial objective basis for believing that more
likely than not an offense has been committed and a person to be
arrested has committed it."  ORS 131.005(11).  From a
constitutional perspective, (5)
 two components comprise
probable cause: "[a]n officer must subjectively believe that a
crime has been committed and thus that a person or thing is
subject to seizure, and this belief must be objectively
reasonable in the circumstances."  State v. Owens, 302 Or 196,
204, 729 P2d 524 (1986).
The Court of Appeals and the parties have focused on
the elements of criminal attempt, set out in ORS
161.405(1), (6)
 and the evidence necessary to satisfy those
statutory elements.  In doing so, the parties' research and
arguments have centered on the correctness of this court's
extended discussion of "criminal attempt" in Walters.  However,
in our view, whether Walters correctly interprets the reach of
ORS 161.405(1) is beside the point.  This case is not about
whether the evidence that the officer had when he confronted
defendant was sufficient to satisfy the statutory elements of
delivery of a controlled substance as defined in ORS 475.992(1). 
Instead, all that is at issue at this stage of the proceedings is
whether the police officer had probable cause to arrest defendant
for some felony crime.
In this instance, the police officer indisputably had
an objective basis to believe that defendant had committed a
crime, viz., possession of a controlled substance, irrespective
of whether defendant had attempted to transfer that substance to
another person.  The officer could infer that, because defendant
allegedly said that he would put the drug in Andersen's and
Carver's drinks, defendant possessed the controlled substance
when he talked to the women.  In this instance, a credible report
of an offer to sell a controlled substance constituted probable
cause to arrest defendant for possession of a controlled
substance and, therefore, to search defendant incident to that
arrest.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
1. ORS 475.992(1) provides, in part:
"Except as authorized by ORS 475.005 to 475.285
and 475.940 to 475.999, it is unlawful for any person
to manufacture or deliver a controlled substance. Any
person who violates this subsection with respect to:
"(a) A controlled substance in Schedule I, is
guilty of a Class A felony."
ORS 475.992(4) provides, in part:
"It is unlawful for any person knowingly or
intentionally to possess a controlled substance unless
the substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant
to, a valid prescription or order of a practitioner
while acting in the course of professional practice, or
except as otherwise authorized by ORS 475.005 to
475.285 and 475.940 to 475.999. Any person who violates
this subsection with respect to:
"(a) A controlled substance in Schedule I, is
guilty of a Class B felony."
ORS 475.005(8) provides that "'[d]eliver' or 'delivery' means the
actual, constructive or attempted transfer * * * from one person
to another of a controlled substance[.]"
2. In this court, defendant asserts that the Court of Appeals
mischaracterized the trial court's finding that Anderson and
Greer Carver told the officer "that a guy in Dante's tried to
sell them ecstasy and offered to put it in their drinks." 
According to defendant, the Court of Appeals characterized the
finding as one establishing that defendant did, in fact, offer to
sell the complainants ecstasy.  We do not agree with defendant's
reading of the Court of Appeals' opinion.  Nevertheless, on
review, we accept the trial court's finding, irrespective of
either party's characterization of it.
3. "Ecstasy" is a Schedule I controlled substance,
3,4-methylenedioxy methamphetamine (MDMA).  See OAR
855-080-0021(3)(j).
4. As we shall explain, it was at that point that the court's
and the parties' focus as to the legal implication of the
established facts became too narrow, and it would remain so.
5. Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution provides:
"No law shall violate the right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure; and
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or
thing to be seized."
6. ORS 161.405(1) provides:
"A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a
crime when the person intentionally engages in conduct
which constitutes a substantial step toward commission
of the crime."