Title: Matter of Mulhall
Citation: 159 Ariz. 528, 768 P.2d 1173
Docket Number: SB-88-0018-D
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: January 24, 1989

159 Ariz. 528 (1989) 768 P.2d 1173 In the Matter of a Member of the State Bar of Arizona, Michael Andrew MULHALL, Respondent. No. SB-88-0018-D. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. January 24, 1989. *529 Michael Andrew Mulhall, Phoenix, pro se. Beus, Gilbert, Wake &amp; Morrill by Shawn K. Aiken, Phoenix, State Bar Counsel. CAMERON, Justice. I. JURISDICTION The Disciplinary Commission of the Supreme Court of Arizona has recommended that the respondent, Michael Andrew Mulhall, be suspended from the practice of the law for 30 days. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Ariz.R.S.Ct. 53(e), 17A A.R.S.[1] II. FACTS The complainant in this case retained respondent in June of 1981 to represent her in connection with physical injuries and property damage sustained in an automobile accident. Respondent quickly settled the property damage claim. Respondent did not believe the complainant's injuries justified a large settlement. Many of the medical expenses she submitted were unrelated to the accident, and they totaled less than $1,000. Respondent informed complainant that he had not submitted her list of medical expenses to the insurance company because he believed that many of them had nothing to do with the accident. Respondent was involved in moving his office in the spring of 1983, and in June, 1983, the statute of limitations ran on complainant's claim. Complainant consulted another attorney and found out that the statute had run. Nevertheless, she met with respondent in July or August of 1983 and agreed to take a check for $3200 in settlement for her claim. Respondent bought a cashier's check with his own money. Respondent agreed to waive his contingency fee, but did not advise complainant that the settlement came from his own funds. Respondent also had the complainant sign a release in favor of the parties, the insurance company and the respondent.[2] The complainant wrote a letter to the State Bar and the matter was assigned to *530 Local Administrative Committee 5B. The Committee hearing took place in May of 1986. The only witnesses were the complainant and the respondent. The Local Administrative Committee found in part: The Committee recommended an informal reprimand as the appropriate sanction. The Disciplinary Commission adopted the Local Administrative Committee's findings of fact as set forth in its report with one minor, irrelevant exception. The Commission also adopted the Administrative Committee's Conclusions of Law No. 1, but rejected the Committee's Conclusions of Law Nos. 2 and 3 stating: The Commission also rejected the Local Administrative Committee's recommendation that the respondent be informally reprimanded and instead recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of 30 days. III. DISCUSSION We agree with both the Committee and the Commission that the respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(4) which reads: Respondent's negligence in allowing the statute of limitations to run may have been malpractice, but it was not an ethical violation. When, however, respondent discovered that the statute of limitations had run, he had a duty to inform his client. The client was entitled to know the source of the funds and should have been advised to confer with another attorney. Respondent by silence misrepresented the actual state of his client's affairs. Even though the respondent paid the client what appears to be a fair and reasonable amount for her injuries, he failed in his obligation of candor to his client. This was an ethical violation and specifically a violation of DR 1-102(A)(4). IV. SANCTION The Commission recommended that respondent should be suspended for 30 days. Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions states: ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Standard 1.1. (1986). The Standards state: ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Standard 3.0. (1986). Absence of a prior disciplinary record is also a mitigating circumstance. ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Standard 9.32(a) (1986). In protecting the public, suspension is frequently necessary but as the commentary to the Standards note: ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Standard 2.3. (1986). In the instant case, we believe that the respondent should not be suspended for any period of time. Given the fact that respondent has an otherwise unblemished record and that there appears to be no indication that his future conduct will result in harm to his clients or to the public, we believe suspension is not justified and that the appropriate sanction is a public censure. Ariz.R.S.Ct. 52(a)(4), 17A A.R.S. In this we are supported by the standards: ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Standards 2.5 and 5.13. (1986).[3] The respondent is publicly censured and assessed costs in the amount of $1,273.05. GORDON, C.J., FELDMAN, V.C.J., and MOELLER, J., concur. HOLOHAN, J., participated in this matter but retired prior to the filing of this opinion. CORCORAN, J., did not participate in the determination of this matter. [1] Because the events in this matter occurred prior to Arizona's adoption of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the matter is governed substantively by the Code of Professional Responsibility in effect at the time and governed procedurally by Rule 53, Ariz.R.S.Ct., adopted by this court in 1984. [2] We recognize this may be a violation of Disciplinary Rule 6-102. [3] Our rules provide for public censure as the more severe sanction to informal reprimand. See Ariz.R.S.Ct. 52(a)(4) and (5). The Standards refer to reprimand as "censure or public censure." ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Standard 2.5. This is the equivalent of our censure. The equivalent of our informal reprimand is "admonition, also known as private reprimand." Standard 2.6.