Title: Employers Insurance Company of Alabama v. Rives
Citation: 87 So. 2d 653
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: May 12, 1955

87 So. 2d 653 (1955)
EMPLOYERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF ALABAMA, Inc.,
v.
James V. RIVES.
6 Div. 662.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
May 12, 1955.
Spain, Gillon &amp; Young, Birmingham, for petitioner.
Lange, Simpson, Robinson &amp; Somerville, Birmingham, opposed.
*654 GOODWYN, Justice.
We granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals to review the judgment and decision of that court in the case of Employers Insurance Company of Alabama, Inc., v. Rives, 87 So. 2d 646.
The question presented involves the construction of a liability insurance policy issued by the Insurance Company to Rives, a contractor, wherein the insurer agreed "to pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become obligated to pay by reason of the liability imposed upon him by law for damages because of injury to or destruction of property, including the use thereof, caused by accident and arising out of the hazards hereinafter defined." [Emphasis supplied.]
The case was tried by the court, without a jury, on a "`Stipulation As To Facts'", of which the following, taken from the Court of Appeals' opinion, is a substantial part:
Judgment was rendered in favor of Rives, the insured, for the sum of $850. The Court of Appeals reversed that judgment holding that "the damage to the well was not sustained as the result of an accident, but was caused by plaintiff's negligence in failing to retighten the connecting nut at the union, unattended by any accidental cause, and the result that followed was the natural and probable consequence of such negligent act."
It is apparent that the precise point presented is whether the injury to the well was "`caused by accident'", that is, was the failure of Rives' employees to retighten the connecting nut at the union, resulting in the gasoline leakage, an "accident", as that term is used in the policy. Our view is that it was and that the Court of Appeals was in error in holding to the contrary.
We approach a consideration of this case having in mind the following rules approved in Cook v. Continental Ins. Co., 220 Ala. 162, 164, 124 So. 239, 242, 65 A. L.R. 921, which apply when construing a contract of insurance, viz.:
The basis of the Court of Appeals' decision, as stated therein, is that the injury "was caused by plaintiff's negligence * *, unattended by any accidental cause," and that, therefore, there can be no recovery since the contract of insurance only protects against "`damages because of injury * * * caused by accident'". That is to say, as we understand it, that if an injury is found to be the result of negligence such finding necessarily is exclusory of a finding that the injury resulted from an accident. Such appears to be the holding of a line of cases from other jurisdictions, as indicated by some of the authorities cited in the Court of Appeals' opinion. However, there is also a line of cases, followed in Alabama, holding that the term "accident" does not necessarily exclude the idea of negligence. As stated in 1 C.J.S., Accident, pp. 439, 440:
From 38 Am.Jur., Negligence, § 6, p. 647, is the following:
This court has been inclined to give a liberal construction to the word "accident". In Honeycutt v. Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co., 235 Ala. 507, 509, 180 So. 91, 92, the restricted definition of "accident" was clearly put to one side in favor of the more liberal construction. It was there said:
In American Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. Agricola Furnace Co., 236 Ala. 535, 537, 183 So. 677, 678, the suit was for declaratory judgment to determine whether the Insurance Company, as insurer of the Furnace Co., was bound by its contract of insurance to defend an action at law brought against the Furnace Co. by one Reed. Involved was the construction of an insurance policy similar in wording to the one now under consideration. In that case the policy contained the following provision:
Reed's complaint against the Furnace Company alleged:
It is apparent that Reed, in charging in his complaint that defendant "did not use reasonable diligence to provide a reasonably safe place in which to do his work", in effect charged defendant with being negligent. In holding that the insurer was bound by its contract of insurance to defend the Furnace Company, this court said:
"* * * The policies cover accidents which occur within the period *657 of their respective term. A tort is often an accident, as when injury results from negligent conduct, and it may be of a continuous sort, and, if so, a recovery may be had for all damages which occurred within the period of limitations, 37 Corpus Juris 897, and by successive actions. Louisville &amp; Nashville R. Co. v. Higginbotham, 153 Ala. 334, 44 So. 872.
What was said in Berger Bros. Electric Motors, Inc., v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 267 App.Div. 333, 46 N.Y.S.2d 64, 68, seems to be of peculiar significance here. The question there was whether damages to turkey eggs in an incubator resulting from improper circulation of air due to failure of a contractor's employees to properly install impeller blades on an electric motor used for cooling the incubator, resulted from an "accident" within liability policies covering the contractor's liability for injury to property as the result of an accident. The trial court had agreed with the insurer's argument that the damages resulted from negligence and not an accident. In reversing on appeal the appellate court said:
We are at the conclusion that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the damage to the well was not sustained as the result of an accident. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the cause remanded to that court for further consideration in the light of what has been here said.
Reversed and remanded.
All the Justices concur.