Title: People v. City of Chicago
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 93978
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: October 18, 2002

Docket No. 93978-Agenda 37-September 2002.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS ex rel. JOSEPH E.
BIRKETT et al., Appellees and Cross-Appellants, v. THE
								CITY OF CHICAGO, Appellant and Cross-Appellee.
Opinion filed October 18, 2002.
	 
	JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:
	Plaintiffs, Joseph E. Birkett, State's Attorney of Du Page
County, on behalf of the People of the State of Illinois, the County
of Du Page, the Village of Bensenville, the City of Elmhurst, and
the City of Wood Dale, filed a two-count amended complaint
seeking (1) a declaration that the City of Chicago was constructing
certain improvements at O'Hare International Airport in violation
of the Illinois Aeronautics Act (Act) (620 ILCS 5/1 et seq. (West
2000)); and (2) an order enjoining the further construction of any
such improvements until such time as the City complied with the
Act. The circuit court of Du Page County entered summary
judgment in the City's favor and denied plaintiffs' motion for
partial summary judgment and injunctive relief. In addition, the
trial court denied the request of United States Congressman Henry
J. Hyde and State Senator James "Pate" Philip to intervene as
plaintiffs. Plaintiffs appealed, and the appellate court concluded
that entry of summary judgment in the City's favor was erroneous.
329 Ill. App. 3d 477. We granted the City's petition for leave to
appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a). In addition, we allowed the
submission of several amicus curie briefs supporting both the City
and plaintiffs. 155 Ill. 2d R. 345.
BACKGROUND
	Section 47 of the Act (620 ILCS 5/47 (West 2000)) prohibits
a municipality from making "any alteration or extension of an
existing airport *** for which a certificate of approval has not
been issued by the [Illinois Department of Transportation
(IDOT)]." As the owner and operator of O'Hare International
Airport, the City routinely undertakes a wide variety of projects
designed to improve airport facilities. These projects generally fall
into one of three categories: (1) "airfield" development, which
includes runways, taxiways, aprons, hold pads, cargo areas,
hangars, and other areas designed to facilitate the movement of
aircraft; (2) "terminal" development, which includes terminals,
concourses, and other areas designed to facilitate the movement of
people through the airport; and (3) "landside" or "ground
transportation" development, which includes roadways, parking
facilities, mass transit, and other facilities designed to facilitate the
movement of vehicles to and from the airport terminals. The City
admits that it previously has undertaken extensive terminal and
ground transportation improvements at O'Hare without first
obtaining a certificate of approval from IDOT and that it intends
to continue undertaking such improvements in the future. These
improvements include new and renovated terminals, renovated
concourses, new and renovated roadways, and expanded parking
facilities.
	On December 22, 1995, plaintiffs filed a two-count amended
complaint against the City. Count I, an action in quo warranto,
alleged that, in clear violation of section 47, the City was
undertaking substantial terminal and ground transportation
improvements at O'Hare without first obtaining a certificate of
approval from IDOT. Specifically, count I alleged that the City
"currently has under construction tens of millions of dollars of
physical alterations to [O'Hare]" and "in the past has constructed,
or plans to build several hundred million dollars of additional
construction projects at O'Hare." Accordingly, plaintiffs sought
both a declaration that the City's actions were without authority
and an order prohibiting the City from "constructing current and
proposed alterations at O'Hare" without first obtaining a
certificate of approval from IDOT. Count II, which was brought
specifically under the Act, incorporated all of the allegations of
count I, adding that "the intended primary purpose of much of the
recent, ongoing and planned construction at O'Hare Airport is to
incrementally expand the capacity of the airport" both to the
detriment of neighboring communities and without the approval
of IDOT. Count II sought an order prohibiting the "continued
construction of current and proposed piecemeal elements of
Chicago's construction program at O'Hare" without first obtaining
a certificate of approval from IDOT.
	On December 16, 1996, the trial court allowed Congressman
Hyde and State Senator Philip to intervene as plaintiffs. The trial
court later vacated this decision, concluding that Congressman
Hyde and Senator Philip did not have standing to intervene.
	On June 6, 2000, the City filed a motion for summary
judgment. Plaintiffs responded with a cross-motion seeking both
partial summary judgment and an injunction against "further
physical alterations at O'Hare until these alterations are submitted
to the State for a certificate of approval, and the State has issued
a certificate of approval." After hearing arguments and reviewing
the parties' briefs, the trial court entered summary judgment in the
City's favor and denied plaintiffs' motion in its entirety. In so
ruling, the trial court explained that the phrase "any alteration or
extension of an existing airport," as set forth in section 47, is
ambiguous. After considering both the Act as a whole and the
IDOT regulation construing section 47 (see 92 Ill. Adm. Code
§14.640 (2000)), the trial court determined that section 47 requires
IDOT certification only for those alterations and extensions that
affect "flight safety, glide path, obstruction of approaches, and
things of that matter." Because none of the projects targeted by
plaintiffs' complaint in any way implicated such matters, the trial
court concluded that IDOT certification for those projects was
unnecessary.
	Plaintiffs appealed, and the appellate court affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded. 329 Ill. App. 3d 477. Initially, the
appellate court agreed with the trial court's conclusion that section
47 requires IDOT certification only for those projects that impact
runways or flight patterns. 329 Ill. App. 3d at 484-85. The
appellate court then held, however, that the City may not evade
compliance with section 47's certification requirement by
segmenting a comprehensive project that includes alterations to
runways or flight patterns into a series of smaller pieces. Thus,
because there is evidence in the record to suggest that the
contested terminal and ground transportation improvements to
O'Hare are but one component of an overall plan that includes
new or reconfigured runways, the appellate court concluded that
the entry of summary judgment in the City's favor was erroneous.
329 Ill. App. 3d at 485. The appellate court additionally held that
(1) plaintiffs were not entitled to injunctive relief; (2) federal law
does not preempt section 47's certification requirement; and (3)
the trial court's refusal to allow Congressman Hyde and Senator
Philip to intervene was not an abuse of discretion. 329 Ill. App. 3d
at 486-491.
ANALYSIS
	Three issues are presented for our review: (1) whether section
47 requires the City to obtain IDOT certification before
undertaking the terminal and ground transportation improvements
at issue; (2) if so, whether section 47's certification requirement
is preempted by federal law; and (3) whether the trial court's
refusal to allow Congressman Hyde and Senator Philip to
intervene was an abuse of discretion. Before reaching these issues,
however, we must briefly consider whether this case is appropriate
for our review at this time.
Propriety of Supreme Court Review
	Plaintiffs argue that, due to certain changes in the City's plans
for terminal and ground transportation improvements at O'Hare,
this case presently rests upon an uncertain factual foundation and
therefore is inappropriate for review at this time. Specifically,
plaintiffs point to a series of news reports suggesting that, since
the appellate court filed its judgment in this case, the City has
announced that the World Gateway Project, which encompasses
many of the terminal and ground transportation projects at issue in
this case, may not go forward as planned. According to plaintiffs,
in light of the uncertainty concerning which, if any, portions of the
World Gateway Project remain viable, any decision by this court
at this time would be purely advisory. Plaintiffs therefore urge this
court to dismiss this appeal and remand the cause for additional
fact finding in accordance with the appellate court's opinion.
	We decline plaintiffs' invitation to dismiss this appeal. First,
the issue in this case has never turned upon knowing with certainty
what terminal and ground transportation improvements the City
seeks to undertake at O'Hare. Plaintiffs' complaint did not seek to
enjoin only those terminal and ground transportation
improvements at O'Hare that are part of the World Gateway
Project, nor did plaintiffs' complaint identify with any degree of
specificity what projects they were seeking to enjoin. Rather,
plaintiffs' complaint sought to enjoin the City from "constructing
current and proposed alterations at O'Hare," whatever those
alterations might prove to be.
	Second, in the course of this appeal, this court allowed the
City to file an affidavit from John F. Harris, the first deputy
commissioner of the City of Chicago department of aviation. In
that affidavit, Harris testifies that, notwithstanding the World
Gateway Project's uncertain future, the City still intends to
undertake substantial improvement projects at O'Hare without
seeking IDOT's approval, including the construction of a new
terminal and the extension of an existing concourse. Thus, we
know with certainty that the City still intends to undertake at least
some of the improvements that plaintiffs' complaint seeks to
enjoin.
	Finally, if plaintiffs genuinely believed that the City no longer
intends to undertake the terminal and ground transportation
improvements targeted in plaintiffs' complaint, then plaintiffs
need only dismiss their complaint to end this litigation. The fact
that plaintiffs are instead seeking a dismissal of this appeal-and
with it the preservation of the appellate court's decision on the
merits-suggests that plaintiffs fully expect the City to proceed
with at least some terminal and ground transportation
improvements at O'Hare. For these reasons, we decline to dismiss
this appeal.
Necessity of IDOT Certification
	The central question in this case is whether the City must
obtain IDOT certification before undertaking the terminal and
ground transportation improvements at issue. This question is one
of statutory construction, and our analysis is guided by familiar
principles.
	The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain
and give effect to the legislature's intent. Michigan Avenue
National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 503-04 (2000).
The best indication of legislative intent is the statutory language,
given its plain and ordinary meaning. Illinois Graphics Co. v.
Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d 469, 479 (1994). Where the language is clear
and unambiguous, we must apply the statute without resort to
further aids of statutory construction. Davis v. Toshiba Machine
Co., America, 186 Ill. 2d 181, 184-85 (1999). If the statutory
language is ambiguous, however, we may look to other sources to
ascertain the legislature's intent. People v. Ross, 168 Ill. 2d 347,
352 (1995). A court will give substantial weight and deference to
an interpretation of an ambiguous statute by the agency charged
with administering and enforcing that statute. Bonaguro v. County
Officers Electoral Board, 158 Ill. 2d 391, 398 (1994). Indeed, a
reasonable construction of an ambiguous statute by the agency
charged with that statute's enforcement, if contemporaneous,
consistent, long-continued, and in concurrence with legislative
acquiescence, creates a presumption of correctness that is only
slightly less persuasive than a judicial construction of the same act.
People ex rel. Watson v. House of Vision, 59 Ill. 2d 508, 514-15
(1974). A statute is ambiguous if it is capable of being understood
by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different
ways. People v. Jameson, 162 Ill. 2d 282, 288 (1994). The
construction of a statute is a question of law that is reviewed de
novo. In re Estate of Dierkes, 191 Ill. 2d 326, 330 (2000).
	The statute at issue in this case is section 47 of the Illinois
Aeronautics Act, which states:
			"It shall be unlawful for any municipality or other
political subdivision, or officer or employee thereof, or for
any person, to make any alteration or extension of an
existing airport or restricted landing area, or to use or
operate any airport or restricted landing area, for which a
certificate of approval has not been issued by the
Department." 620 ILCS 5/47 (West 2000).
Plaintiffs argue that section 47 unambiguously requires the City to
obtain IDOT certification before undertaking the substantial
terminal and ground transportation improvements at issue. The
City, by contrast, argues that section 47 is ambiguous because, as
plaintiffs concede, not every "alteration or extension of an existing
airport" necessitates IDOT's approval. Instead, an alteration or
extension of an existing airport must cross some threshold of
significance before IDOT certification becomes necessary, and
section 47 offers no guidance whatsoever as to when that threshold
is crossed.
	We agree with the City. As used in section 47, the phrase "any
alteration or extension of an existing airport" is ambiguous. As
both parties acknowledge, strict enforcement of the statute's plain
language leads to patently absurd results, such as requiring IDOT
certification for the installation of a new drinking fountain or the
replacement of worn carpeting in any O'Hare facility. At the same
time, neither party disputes that the phrase "any alteration or
extension of an existing airport" includes the construction of a new
runway. The difficulty lies in discerning the point in this
continuum at which a project becomes less like a drinking fountain
and more like a runway-in other words, the point at which IDOT
certification becomes necessary. Unfortunately, the plain language
of section 47 offers no guidance on this point.
	Because strict application of the phrase "any alteration or
extension of an existing airport" leads to patently absurd results,
and because nothing in section 47 narrows the reach of this phrase,
we are compelled to look beyond section 47 for assistance in
construing this statute's scope. Fortunately, we need not look far,
as IDOT has issued a regulation specifically construing the
ambiguous language at issue. Enacted in 1985, the regulation
provides:
		"The phrase, 'alteration or extension', shall include any of
the following:
	a) Any material change in the length, width or direction
of runways or landing strips;
			b) Construction or installation of any building or other
structure on the airport property which would extend
above an approach slope or a transition slope or turning
zone;
			c) Planting or permitting to grow any growth or
placement of any other obstacle on the airport property
which would extend above an approach slope or a
transition slope or turning zone." 92 Ill. Adm. Code
§14.640 (1998).
Unlike section 47, this regulation provides clear and unambiguous
guidance as to the types of improvements for which IDOT
certification is necessary. The regulation itself informs us that the
phrase "alteration or extension" includes any improvement that (1)
materially alters the length, width, or direction of a runway or
landing strips; or (2) extends above an approach slope, transition
slope, or turning zone. And established rules of statutory
construction inform us that, when a statute provides a list that is
not exclusive, as section 14.640 does ("[t]he phrase, 'alteration or
extension,' shall include ***"), the class of unarticulated things
will be interpreted as those that are similar to the named things.
Zekman v. Direct American Marketers, Inc., 182 Ill. 2d 359, 369
(1998); see also Northern Illinois Automobile Wreckers &amp;
Rebuilders Ass'n v. Dixon, 75 Ill. 2d 53, 58 (1979) (administrative
rules and regulations are construed under the same standards that
govern the construction of statutes). Clearly, the common feature
of the alterations and extensions identified in section 14.640 is the
direct impact that each of them has on runway layout and/or flight
paths. Stated differently, IDOT requires certification only for those
alterations or extensions on the ground that materially alter runway
size or layout and/or interfere with or otherwise obstruct an
approach slope, transition slope, or turning zone.
	Of course, the mere fact that IDOT construes section 47 in
this manner does not end our inquiry. While courts afford
considerable deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute
that it administers, that interpretation is not binding and will be
rejected if erroneous. Denton v. Civil Service Comm'n, 176 Ill. 2d 144, 148 (1997). That said, we conclude that IDOT's construction
of section 47 is entirely reasonable and not the least bit erroneous.
	As noted above, section 47 is silent as to the types of
alterations or extensions that require IDOT certification. However,
in ascertaining the meaning of a statute, a court should not read
that statute in isolation but in the context of the Act as a whole.
People v. Trainor, 196 Ill. 2d 318, 322 (2001). When section 47
is considered in the context of the Act as a whole, it becomes clear
that IDOT's construction of that section is sound. Section 25 of the
Act, for example, sets forth the purpose of the Act as a whole:
			"It is hereby declared that the purpose of this Act is to
further the public interest and aeronautical progress by
providing for the protection and promotion of safety in
aeronautics; by cooperating in effecting a uniformity of
the laws relating to the development and regulation of
aeronautics in the several states; by revising existing
statutes relative to the development and regulation of
aeronautics so as to grant to a state agency such powers
and impose upon it such duties that the state may properly
perform its functions relative to aeronautics and
effectively exercise its jurisdiction over persons and
property within such jurisdiction, may assist in the
promotion of a State-wide system of airports, may
cooperate with and assist the political subdivisions of this
State and others engaged in aeronautics, and may
encourage and develop aeronautics; by establishing
uniform rules and regulations, consistent, so far as
practicable, with Federal rules and regulations, in order
that those engaged in aeronautics of every character may
so engage with the least possible restriction, consistent
with their safety and with the safety and the rights of
others; and by providing for cooperation with the Federal
authorities in the development of a national system of
civil aviation and for coordination of the aeronautical
activities of those authorities and the authorities of this
State by assisting in accomplishing the purposes of federal
legislation and eliminating costly and unnecessary
duplication of functions properly in the province of
federal agencies." 620 ILCS 5/25 (West 2000).
Nothing in these declarations evinces any degree of legislative
concern with an airport's terminal or ground transportation
facilities. However, phrases such as "safety in aeronautics," "the
development and regulation of aeronautics in the several states,"
"a State-wide system of airports," "the development of a national
system of civil aviation," and "eliminating costly and unnecessary
duplication of functions properly in the province of federal
agencies" reveal a clear legislative interest in maintaining a safe,
uniform, and coherent system of flight patterns and air traffic.
	Similarly, section 48 of the Act, which enumerates the
standards for issuing certificates of approval under section 47,
reveals that runway layout and flight patterns-not terminal and
ground transportation facilities-are the primary legislative
priorities underlying the certification requirement:
			"In determining whether it shall issue a certificate of
approval for any airport or restricted landing area, or any
alteration or extension thereof, the Department shall take
into consideration its proposed location, size and layout,
the relationship of the proposed airport or restricted
landing area to the then current national airport plan, the
then current Federal airways system, the then current State
airport plan, and the then current State airways system,
whether there are safe areas available for expansion
purposes, whether the adjoining area is free from
obstructions based on a proper glide ratio, the nature of
the terrain, the nature of the uses to which the proposed
airport or restricted landing area will be put, the
possibilities for future development, and such other
factors as, under the circumstances, it regards as having
an important bearing thereon." 620 ILCS 5/48 (West
2000).
Again, nothing in the preceding language reflects any degree of
legislative concern with an airport's terminal or ground
transportation facilities. By contrast, the legislatively mandated
considerations of "the then current national airport plan, the then
current Federal airways system, the then current State airport plan,
and the then current State airways system," "proper glide ratios,"
and "the nature of the terrain" make sense only in the context of
maintaining a safe, uniform, and coherent system of flight patterns
and air traffic. Thus, to the extent that IDOT's interpretation of
section 47 requires certification only for those alterations or
extensions that materially alter runway size or layout and/or
interfere with or otherwise obstruct an approach slope, transition
slope, or turning zone, that interpretation dovetails perfectly with
the public policy considerations identified in other relevant
portions of the Act.
	Plaintiffs maintain, however, that IDOT's interpretation
conflicts with the definition of "airport" as set forth in section 6 of
the Act and therefore is not entitled to deference. Section defines
"airport" as:
			"any area of land, water, or both, except a restricted
landing area, which is designed for the landing and take-off of aircraft, whether or not facilities are provided for
the shelter, servicing, or repair of aircraft, or for receiving
or discharging passengers or cargo, and all appurtenant
areas used or suitable for airport buildings or other
airport facilities, and all appurtenant rights of way,
whether heretofore or hereafter established." (Emphasis
added.) 620 ILCS 5/6 (West 2000).
According to plaintiffs, section 6 specifically defines "airport" to
include terminals. Thus, if section 47 requires IDOT certification
for "any alteration or extension of an existing airport," then IDOT
certification must be required for any alteration or extension of a
terminal. Under IDOT's interpretation, however, certification is
not required for alterations or extensions of terminals but only for
those alterations or extensions that materially alter runway size or
layout and/or interfere with or otherwise obstruct an approach
slope, transition slope, or turning zone. Because IDOT's
interpretation of section 47 defines "airport" more narrowly than
does the Act itself, plaintiffs insist that IDOT's interpretation is
not reasonable and therefore not entitled to deference.
	Plaintiffs' argument is flawed in two respects. First, contrary
to plaintiffs' reading, IDOT's interpretation of section 47 does not
exempt terminal and ground transportation projects from the
certification requirement. On the contrary, IDOT interprets section
47 as requiring certification for any alteration or extension of an
existing airport that materially alters runway size or layout and/or
interferes with or otherwise obstructs an approach slope, transition
slope, or turning zone. While plaintiffs apparently believe that
only runway projects could have any of the prohibited effects, this
simply is not the case. For example, if the City set out to build a
20-story terminal facility at O'Hare, that project would be subject
to IDOT certification, as it would undoubtedly interfere with an
approach slope, transition slope, or turning zone. Similarly, if a
new O'Hare access road required construction of an overpass that
would compromise an existing approach slope, that project too
would require IDOT certification. Thus, plaintiffs' assertion that
IDOT's interpretation of section 47 conflicts with section 6's
definition of "airport" rests upon a fundamental misreading of
IDOT's regulation.
	This misreading, in turn, leads to the second flaw in plaintiffs'
argument. Rather than settling the question at hand, knowing that
section 6's definition of "airport" specifically includes terminals
merely gets us back to square one. Again, plaintiffs concede that
not every alteration or extension of an existing airport-including
alterations to existing terminals-requires IDOT certification. Thus,
knowing that the Act's definition of "airport" specifically includes
terminals tells us nothing, as the critical question remains: What
types of alterations or expansions to an existing airport require
certification? IDOT's interpretation of section 47 answers this
question quite reasonably, requiring certification only for those
alterations or extensions-whether to runways, terminals, ground
transportation facilities, or whatever-that materially alter runway
size or layout and/or interfere with or otherwise obstruct an
approach slope, transition slope, or turning zone.
	Finally, we note that IDOT's interpretation of "alteration or
extension of an existing airport," as set forth in section 14.640, has
remained on the books continuously and unaltered since 1985.
More importantly, although the General Assembly has enacted
numerous amendments to the Act since section 14.640 was issued
in 1985 (see, e.g., Pub. Act 84-1473, eff. January 26, 1987; Pub.
Act 87-232, eff. September 3, 1991; Pub. Act 89-345, eff. January
1, 1996; Pub. Act 91-712, eff. July 1, 2000), sections 47 and 48 of
the Act have remained perfectly intact. In fact, sections 47 and 48
read exactly the same today as when originally enacted in 1945. As
this court explained almost 50 years ago:
		"That the statute has remained unaltered through
successive sessions of the General Assembly ***
indicates legislative acquiescence in the contemporary and
continuous administrative interpretation." People ex rel.
Spiegel v. Lyons, 1 Ill. 2d 409, 414 (1953).
Here, IDOT's construction of section 47 has stood undisturbed by
legislative intervention for more than 17 years, a clear indication
that the General Assembly fully acquiesces in that construction.
	In sum, as used in section 47, the phrase "any alteration or
extension of an existing airport" is ambiguous. IDOT, the agency
charged by the General Assembly with the enforcement of that
section, has issued a regulation specifically construing the
ambiguity at issue. IDOT's interpretation is reasonable on its face,
consistent with related portions of the Act, and has been in force
continuously for more than 17 years without any intervention from
the legislature. In light of these facts, we choose to defer to
IDOT's construction of section 47, which requires certificates of
approval only for those alterations or extensions that materially
alter runway size or layout and/or interfere with or otherwise
obstruct an approach slope, transition slope, or turning zone.
	Having concluded that IDOT's interpretation of section 47 is
reasonable and entitled to deference, we now must decide whether
the trial court properly entered summary judgment in the City's
favor. We hold that it did.
	Summary judgment is proper where, when viewed in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party, the pleadings, depositions,
admissions, and affidavits on file reveal that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West
2000); Ragan v. Columbia Mutual Insurance Co., 183 Ill. 2d 342,
349 (1998). Like the construction of a statute, the entry of
summary judgment is a question of law that is reviewed de novo.
Ragan, 183 Ill. 2d  at 349.
	Plaintiffs' complaint raises one central issue-whether the City
must obtain IDOT certification before undertaking the substantial
terminal and ground transportation improvements at issue. As to
this issue, no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the City
unquestionably is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Plaintiffs do not argue, and there is nothing in the record to
suggest, that the City's proposed terminal and ground
transportation improvements themselves will either materially alter
runway size or layout and/or interfere with or otherwise obstruct
an approach slope, transition slope, or turning zone. On the
contrary, plaintiffs' position throughout this litigation has been
that IDOT certification is required because the proposed terminal
and ground transportation improvements are part of a larger plan
that ultimately will include material changes in O'Hare's runway
configuration. And while the City concedes that plaintiffs'
characterization of the City's long-term plan for O'Hare is
accurate, our analysis of section 47 demonstrates that the City's
long-term plan for O'Hare is irrelevant to the question of whether
IDOT certification is required for the improvements at issue.
Again, the only relevant question under section 47 is whether the
proposed improvements themselves will either materially alter
runway size or layout and/or interfere with or otherwise obstruct
an approach slope, transition slope, or turning zone. Nothing in the
record suggests that any of the proposed improvements will have
that effect, and the circuit court therefore properly entered
summary judgment in the City's favor.
	In reaching this result, we necessarily reject the appellate
court's theory of segmentation, which formed the basis for its
determination that a remand for additional fact finding was
necessary. Under the appellate court's analysis, although the City
is required to obtain IDOT certification only for those projects that
either materially alter runway size or layout and/or interfere with
or otherwise obstruct an approach slope, transition slope, or
turning zone, the City "cannot evade statutory requirements by
segmenting an overall project into smaller pieces." 329 Ill. App.
3d at 485. Thus, because there is evidence in the record suggesting
that the proposed terminal and ground transportation
improvements are but one component of a larger plan that also
includes new or reconfigured runways, the appellate court
concluded the entry of summary judgment was erroneous.
	Although we have no quarrel with the appellate court's
characterization of the evidentiary record in this case, we
nevertheless must reject the appellate court's analysis, as it rests
upon a faulty premise, namely, that by segmenting the O'Hare
expansion project into a series of smaller projects, the City
somehow could evade IDOT certification for material changes to
O'Hare's runway system or improvements that obstruct or
otherwise interfere with an approach slope, transition slope, or
turning zone. One simply does not follow from the other. Assume,
for example, that the City undertakes every conceivable terminal
and ground transportation improvement-e.g., a new terminal, new
parking facilities, new rail service, and new western expressway
access-and that all of these projects are explicitly undertaken with
runway expansion in mind. The City still would have to obtain
IDOT certification before initiating the actual runway expansion.
And IDOT still would have to assess the propriety of the proposed
runway expansion in light of the factors set forth in any relevant
portions of the Act and/or IDOT regulations. And, on
administrative review, this state's courts still would have to review
the propriety of IDOT's determination solely in light of the
relevant legal and statutory standards. Simply put, and contrary to
the appellate court's analysis, nothing that the City undertakes in
anticipation of new or expanded runways can relieve the City of
its obligation to obtain IDOT certification for the construction of
new or expanded runways.
	As a final note on the question of IDOT certification, we wish
only to direct the City's attention to the counsel offered by the
circuit court upon the entry of summary judgment in the City's
favor:
			"In making these findings the Court will note that any
construction that is made by the City of Chicago it
undertakes at its peril unless and until the certificate is
received from the Department of Transportation ***. The
issue of runways is not before the court and is not
germane. So, in short, if the City goes ahead and builds
and doesn't ultimately get a certificate of approval for
extending runways or doesn't apply for one, then that is
the concern only of the City of Chicago."
Preemption
	In light of our conclusion that IDOT certification is
unnecessary for the proposed terminal and ground transportation
improvements at issue in this case, we need not decide whether
section 47's certification requirement is preempted by federal law.
Dismissal of Intervening Plaintiffs
	The final issue is whether the trial court erred in vacating its
decision to allow United States Congressman Henry J. Hyde and
State Senator James "Pate" Philip to intervene as plaintiffs in this
litigation. We hold that it did not.
	Intervention in civil proceedings is governed by section 2-408
of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-408 (West 2000)),
which provides in relevant part:
			"(a) Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted
as of right to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute
confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when
the representation of the applicant's interest by existing
parties is or may be inadequate and the applicant will or
may be bound by an order or judgment in the action; or
(3) when the applicant is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other disposition of property
in the custody or subject to the control or disposition of
the court or a court officer.
			(b) Upon timely application anyone may in the
discretion of the court be permitted to intervene in an
action: (1) when a statute confers a conditional right to
intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and
the main action have a question of law or fact in
common." 735 ILCS 5/2-408(a), (b) (West 2000).
The purpose of this section is to liberalize the practice of
intervention so as to avoid, upon timely application, the
relitigation of issues in a second suit which were being litigated in
a pending action. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Lenckos, 84 Ill. 2d 102, 111-12 (1981). Although a party need not have a direct
interest in the pending suit, it must have an interest greater than
that of the general public, so that the party may stand to gain or
lose by the direct legal operation and effect of a judgment in the
suit. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 84 Ill. 2d  at 112. The decision to
allow or deny intervention, whether permissively or as of right, is
a matter of sound judicial discretion that will not be reversed
absent an abuse of that discretion. In re Application of the County
Collector of Du Page County for Judgment for Delinquent Taxes
for the Year 1992, 181 Ill. 2d 237, 247 (1998).
	Here, we find no basis for reversing the trial court's decision
denying Congressman Hyde and Senator Philip's request to
intervene. First, Congressman Hyde and Senator Philip have failed
to identify any statute that either conditionally or unconditionally
confers upon them a right to intervene in this litigation. Although
they point to section 33 of the Act, that section applies only to
"State, county and municipal officer[s] charged with the
enforcement of State and municipal laws." (Emphasis added.) 620
ILCS 5/33 (West 2000). As members of the legislative branch,
Congressman Hyde and Senator Philip are not charged with the
enforcement of state or municipal laws. Consequently, section 33
does not apply to them. Second, Congressman Hyde and Senator
Philip argue that they should have been allowed to intervene
because they "are both residents of the communities adjacent to
O'Hare," "are personally affected by noise and air pollution from
O'Hare," and "have personal interests in the welfare of the
constituencies they represent." While we have no reason to doubt
any of these assertions, Congressman Hyde and Senator Philip
overlook the fact that State's Attorney Birkett filed this action on
behalf of the citizens of Du Page County, including Congressman
Hyde, Senator Philip, and all of their respective constituents. More
importantly, Congressman Hyde and Senator Philip do not
anywhere suggest that State's Attorney Birkett's representation of
their interests may prove inadequate or that their interests do not
coincide with those of Birkett or any of the other named plaintiffs.
	In light of the forgoing, we conclude that the trial court's
denial of Congressman Hyde and Senator Philip's request to
intervene was not an abuse discretion.
CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court
is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the judgment of the
circuit court is affirmed.
Appellate court judgment affirmed
in part and reversed in part;
circuit court judgment affirmed.