Title: State v. Fuerte
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2015AP002041-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: December 19, 2017

2017 WI 104 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP2041-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Jose Alberto Reyes Fuerte, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 372 Wis. 2d 106, 887 N.W.2d 121 
PDC No:  2016 WI App 78 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 19, 2017 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 5, 2017 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Columbia 
 
JUDGE: 
Alan J. White 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J. dissents, joined by A.W. BRADLEY, 
J. (opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Nancy A. Noet, assistant attorney general, and Brad D. 
Schimel, attorney general.  There was an oral argument by Lisa 
E.F. Kumfer, assistant attorney general.  
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief filed by Ben 
M. Crouse and Sesini Law Group, S.C., Milwaukee.  There was an 
oral argument by Ben M. Crouse.  
 
 
2017 WI 104
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2015AP2041-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2012CF582) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Jose Alberto Reyes Fuerte, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
FILED 
 
DEC 19, 2017 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.  
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals that reversed the 
Columbia County Circuit Court's1 order denying Jose Alberto Reyes 
Fuerte's ("Reyes Fuerte") motion to withdraw two guilty pleas 
for 
two 
separate 
criminal 
violations. 
 
The 
motions 
for 
withdrawal were made pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) (2013-
14).2  State v. Reyes Fuerte, 2016 WI App 78, 372 Wis. 2d 106, 
887 N.W.2d 121.  
                                                 
1 The Honorable Alan J. White presided. 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2015AP2041-CR   
 
2 
 
¶2 
The State argues that motions to withdraw a guilty 
plea pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) should be subject to 
harmless error analysis pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 971.26 and 
805.18, and thus this court should overrule its decision in 
State v. Douangmala, 2002 WI 62, 253 Wis. 2d 173, 646 N.W.2d 1.  
The State asks this court to remand this matter to the circuit 
court for a Bangert3 hearing in order to determine whether Reyes 
Fuerte knew of the potential immigration consequences of his 
plea at the time of the plea hearing. 
¶3 
We hold that Douangmala was objectively wrong because 
it failed to properly consider the harmless error statutes, Wis. 
Stat. §§ 971.26 and 805.18, and is thus overruled.  Applying 
harmless error analysis, we further hold that the circuit 
court's error in this case was harmless as a matter of law and 
thus reverse the decision of the court of appeals. 
¶4 
We 
begin 
with 
a 
description 
of 
the 
facts 
and 
procedural history.  We then set forth the standard of review.  
We begin our analysis by setting forth the decisions of this 
court and the court of appeals considering the applicability of 
Wis. Stat. §§ 971.26 and 805.18 to Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2).  We 
follow with our conclusion that Douangmala was wrongly decided 
because harmless error analysis does apply to § 971.08(2).  
Finally, we conclude that the circuit court's error in this case 
was harmless. 
                                                 
3 State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986). 
No. 
2015AP2041-CR   
 
3 
 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
¶5 
Reyes Fuerte entered guilty pleas on February 20, 
2014, to two charges:  (1) attempting to flee or elude a traffic 
officer, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3), and (2) second-
offense operating with a restricted controlled substance in his 
blood, 
contrary 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 346.63(1)(am) 
and 
346.65(2)(am)2.  At the plea hearing, the circuit court gave the 
following 
advisement 
regarding 
the 
potential 
immigration 
consequences of Reyes Fuerte's plea: 
Usually we're looking at felonies, but any conviction 
to a person who is not a resident of the United States 
could lead, at some point in the future, to that 
person either being denied re-entry or that person 
being required to leave this country.  And I'm not 
saying that's going to happen at all.  I'm just saying 
that convictions can lead to those results. 
Reyes 
Fuerte 
confirmed, 
through 
an 
interpreter, 
that 
he 
understood the circuit court's advisement.  Reyes Fuerte was 
also alerted to the potential immigration consequences of his 
plea in the Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights form, which was 
in English and Spanish.  Further, defense counsel was bilingual, 
and stated on the record that he also went over the form in 
Spanish with Reyes Fuerte.   
¶6 
At all times relevant to this case, Reyes Fuerte was 
in the United States illegally and spoke Spanish as his first 
language.  At the time of his plea, Reyes Fuerte was in the 
No. 
2015AP2041-CR   
 
4 
 
midst of deportation4 proceedings.  He asserted cancellation of 
removal as a defense in those proceedings.  Cancellation of 
removal allows the United States Attorney General to cancel 
removal 
and 
grant 
lawful 
permanent 
residence 
to 
aliens 
fulfilling certain criteria.  8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).  One of 
those criteria is that the alien has not been convicted of a 
crime of moral turpitude.  8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C) (citing 8 
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)).  At the time of Reyes Fuerte's plea, 
whether either or both of his convictions were for crimes of 
moral turpitude was unclear.   
¶7 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit resolved any ambiguities late in 2014.  Cano-Oyarzabal 
v. Holder, 774 F.3d 914, 919 (7th Cir. 2014).  In Cano-
Oyarzabal, the court affirmed a determination by the Board of 
Immigration Appeals that Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3), attempting to 
flee or elude a traffic officer, is a crime of moral turpitude.  
Id.  Thus, Reyes Fuerte was no longer eligible for the 
cancellation of removal defense. 
¶8 
Reyes Fuerte moved to withdraw his plea pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) in June 2015, alleging that the circuit 
court's immigration consequences advisement was defective and 
Reyes Fuerte's guilty plea resulted in losing the cancellation 
of removal defense.  The circuit court denied the motion because 
                                                 
4 Federal immigration law uses the term "removal" to 
describe the process traditionally known as "deportation." We 
use those terms interchangeably in this opinion. 
No. 
2015AP2041-CR   
 
5 
 
it found the immigration consequences advisement substantially 
complied with the statute under State v. Mursal, 2013 WI App 
125, 351 Wis. 2d 180, 839 N.W.2d 173.  Reyes Fuerte appealed.  
¶9 
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the 
circuit court's immigration consequences advisement did not 
substantially comply with Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c).  Reyes 
Fuerte, 372 Wis. 2d 106, ¶23.  The court of appeals identified 
two substantial deviations from the language of the statute.  
Id., ¶17.  First, the circuit court used the term "resident" 
rather than "citizen."  Id., ¶18.  This difference was 
substantial to the court of appeals because each term has a 
separate and distinct meaning under federal immigration law.  
Id.  United States citizens do not face any immigration or 
citizenship consequences for their crimes.  Id.  Conversely, 
residents of the United States who are not citizens, even those 
in 
the 
country 
legally, 
may 
suffer 
adverse 
immigration 
consequences.  Id., ¶19.  
¶10 Second, the circuit court made no mention of "denial 
of naturalization," one of the three warnings required by Wis. 
Stat. § 971.08(1)(c).  Id., ¶22.  Though Reyes Fuerte was not 
concerned 
with 
denial 
of 
naturalization 
at 
the 
moment—
naturalization would be possible only if Reyes Fuerte was not 
deported and was granted legal status at some point—the court of 
appeals rejected the State's argument that the omission of this 
warning was irrelevant because such a finding would constitute 
harmless error analysis, which this court prohibited in State v. 
No. 
2015AP2041-CR   
 
6 
 
Douangmala, 2002 WI 62, 253 Wis. 2d 173, 646 N.W.2d 1.  Id., 
¶23. 
¶11 Next, the court of appeals held that, under the second 
prong of Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2), Reyes Fuerte had successfully 
alleged that his plea was "likely" to result in deportation 
because the cancellation of removal defense was no longer 
available.  Id., ¶41.  The court of appeals then remanded to the 
circuit court for a hearing to determine whether Reyes Fuerte 
would have fulfilled the requirements for the cancellation of 
removal defense except for his guilty plea in this case.  Id., 
¶42.  
¶12 The State petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted on January 18, 2017.  
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶13 This court reviews motions to withdraw guilty pleas 
after sentencing in one of two ways, known as the Bentley 
standard and the Bangert standard.  State v. Negrete, 2012 WI 
92, ¶¶16, 19, 343 Wis. 2d 1, 819 N.W.2d 749.  
¶14 Under the Bentley standard, the reviewing court first 
determines whether the motion "alleges sufficient material facts 
that, if true, would entitle the defendant to relief."  Id., ¶17 
(citing State v. Allen, 2004 WI 106, ¶9, 274 Wis. 2d 568, 682 
N.W.2d 433).  See also State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 309-
10, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996).  If sufficient facts are alleged, the 
court then looks to the record to determine whether an 
evidentiary hearing is required.  Negrete, 343 Wis. 2d 1, ¶17 
n.6.  An evidentiary hearing is required if the record is 
No. 
2015AP2041-CR   
 
7 
 
insufficient to determine whether the defendant is entitled to 
relief.  Id.  Conversely, no hearing is required if the record 
"conclusively demonstrates" that the defendant is not entitled 
to relief, even if the motion alleges sufficient facts.  Id., 
¶17.  These determinations are questions of law reviewed de 
novo.  Id.  
¶15 If the motion does not allege sufficient facts that, 
if true, would entitle the defendant to relief, then the 
decision to grant an evidentiary hearing is discretionary.  Id., 
¶18.  As such, this court reviews the decision for an erroneous 
exercise of discretion.  Id.  
¶16 Under the Bangert standard, defendants may shift the 
burden of proof to the State when:  "(1) the defendant can point 
to a plea colloquy deficiency evident in the plea colloquy 
transcript, and (2) the defendant alleges that he did not know 
or understand the information that should have been provided in 
the colloquy."  Id., ¶19 (citing State v. Bangert, 131 
Wis. 2d 246, 274-75, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986)).  This court applies 
de novo review to both elements:  whether the colloquy is 
sufficient and whether an evidentiary hearing is required.  Id. 
¶17 We apply the Bangert standard in this case because 
Reyes Feurte can point to a defect in the plea colloquy 
transcript and Reyes Fuerte has alleged that he was unaware of 
the immigration consequences of his plea.  Therefore, we review 
the sufficiency of the colloquy and the necessity of an 
evidentiary hearing de novo.  Id. 
No. 
2015AP2041-CR   
 
8 
 
¶18 This case also requires us to interpret Wis. Stat. 
§§ 971.08, 971.26, and 805.18.  Statutory interpretation is an 
issue of law we review de novo.  State v. Ozuna, 2017 WI 64, ¶9, 
376 Wis. 2d 1, 898 N.W.2d 20.  However, when a party asks this 
court to overrule one of its prior decisions interpreting a 
statute, as the State asks us to do in this case, we do not 
interpret the statute de novo.  Progressive N. Ins. Co. v. 
Romanshek, 2005 WI 67, ¶46, 281 Wis. 2d 300, 697 N.W.2d 417.  
Rather, the party seeking we overturn a prior statutory 
interpretation must show that the prior interpretation was 
"objectively wrong" and thus the court has a "compelling reason 
to overrule it."  Id., ¶45 (quoting Wenke v. Gehl Co., 2004 WI 
103, ¶21, 274 Wis. 2d 220, 682 N.W.2d 405). 
III.  DISCUSSION 
¶19 Before we begin our analysis, we take a moment to 
remind circuit court judges that simply reading the language of 
the advisement from Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c) is by far the best 
option.  The use of quotation marks (such as those in 
§ 971.08(1)(c)) is "an unusual and significant legislative 
signal" that should be given effect by circuit courts.  State v. 
Garcia, 2000 WI App 81, ¶16, 234 Wis. 2d 304, 610 N.W.2d 180.  
In this instance, those quotation marks are best given effect by 
reading the advisement as written in the statute.  See id.  
Though, as a result of this opinion, harmless error now applies 
as a "safety net" for circuit courts, the best practice remains 
reading the exact language of the statute.  Id. 
No. 
2015AP2041-CR   
 
9 
 
¶20 Our analysis first discusses the three statutes at 
issue and how Wisconsin courts previously construed them.  We 
next discuss why Douangmala was wrongly decided and why we 
overrule it.  Finally, we apply the harmless error analysis to 
this case and hold that the circuit court's errors were 
harmless. 
A.  Statutory Background 
¶21 This case requires us to consider the interplay of 
three statutes:  Wis. Stat. §§ 971.08, 971.26, and 805.18.  
Section 971.08(1)(c) requires a circuit court to, before 
accepting a plea of guilty or no contest: 
Address the defendant personally and advise the 
defendant as follows:  "If you are not a citizen of 
the United States of America, you are advised that a 
plea of guilty or no contest for the offense with 
which you are charged may result in deportation, the 
exclusion from admission to this country or the denial 
of naturalization, under federal law."  
Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c).  The next subsection then provides a 
remedy if the circuit court fails to give the required 
advisement: 
If a court fails to advise a defendant as required by 
sub. (1)(c) and a defendant later shows that the plea 
is likely to result in the defendant's deportation, 
exclusion from admission to this country or denial of 
naturalization, the court on the defendant's motion 
shall vacate any applicable judgment against the 
defendant and permit the defendant to withdraw the 
plea and enter another plea. This subsection does not 
limit the ability to withdraw a plea of guilty or no 
contest on any other grounds. 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2).  This court has construed § 971.08(2) to 
require defendants prove two elements in order to withdraw their 
No. 
2015AP2041-CR   
 
10 
 
pleas:  (1) the circuit court failed to give the immigration 
advisement to the defendant as required by § 971.08(1)(c), and 
(2) the plea is "likely" to result in deportation, exclusion 
from admission, or denial of naturalization.  State v. Valadez, 
2016 WI 4, ¶28, 366 Wis. 2d 332, 874 N.W.2d 514.   
¶22 Wisconsin Stat. §§ 971.26 and 805.18 serve as savings 
clauses for judgments affected by harmless errors.  Section 
971.26 applies exclusively to criminal actions: 
No indictment, information, complaint or warrant shall 
be invalid, nor shall the trial, judgment or other 
proceedings be affected by reason of any defect or 
imperfection in matters of form which do not prejudice 
the defendant. 
Wis. Stat. § 971.26.  Section 805.18 is part of the civil 
procedure code, but is made applicable to criminal actions by 
Wis. Stat. § 972.11(1), and states: 
(1) The court shall, in every stage of an action, 
disregard any error or defect in the pleadings or 
proceedings which shall not affect the substantial 
rights of the adverse party. 
(2) No judgment shall be reversed or set aside or new 
trial granted in any action or proceeding on the 
ground of selection or misdirection of the jury, or 
the improper admission of evidence, or for error as to 
any matter of pleading or procedure, unless in the 
opinion of the court to which the application is made, 
after 
an 
examination 
of 
the 
entire 
action 
or 
proceeding, it shall appear that the error complained 
of has affected the substantial rights of the party 
seeking to reverse or set aside the judgment, or to 
secure a new trial. 
Wis. Stat. § 805.18.  
¶23 Prior 
to 
this 
court's 
decision 
in 
Douangmala, 
Wisconsin courts applied harmless error analysis to motions to 
No. 
2015AP2041-CR   
 
11 
 
withdraw pleas pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2).  E.g., State 
v. Chavez, 175 Wis. 2d 366, 371, 498 N.W.2d 887 (Ct. App. 1993).  
See also Douangmala, 253 Wis. 2d 173, ¶¶33-40 (discussing Chavez 
and its progeny).  The Chavez court noted that the intersection 
of Wis. Stat. §§ 971.08(2) and 971.265 created an ambiguity 
because both statutes use mandatory language with seemingly 
contradictory commands.  Chavez, 175 Wis. 2d at 370-71.  The 
court of appeals then utilized legislative history6 to hold that 
the legislature intended to protect only "an alien [who] 
unwittingly pleads guilty or no contest . . . without being 
                                                 
5 Chavez did not consider Wis. Stat. § 805.18.  State v. 
Chavez, 175 Wis. 2d 366, 370-71, 498 N.W.2d 887 (Ct. App. 1993). 
6 This legislative history consists of an article attached 
to the drafting request by Senator John Norquist that stated 
statutes like section 971.08 help "alleviate the hardship and 
unfairness involved when an alien unwittingly pleads guilty or 
nolo contendere to a charge without being informed of the 
immigration consequences of such a plea."  (Emphasis added)  
This language never made it into the Legislative Reference 
Bureau analysis that was ultimately distributed with the draft 
bill to the entire legislature. 
The State uses the same legislative history in its argument 
in the present matter, but we do not need the legislative 
history because we are tasked with giving effect to what the 
legislature enacted, not necessarily what it intended.  State ex 
rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  Nonetheless, we are inclined to 
agree with the Chavez court that "the legislature did not intend 
a windfall to a defendant who was aware of the deportation 
consequences of his plea," 175 Wis. 2d at 371, though we 
emphasize that we resolve this case based solely on the plain 
meaning of all statutes involved. 
 
No. 
2015AP2041-CR   
 
12 
 
informed of the consequences of such a plea."  Id. at 371.  
Thus, harmless error could apply where the defendant otherwise 
knew (i.e., was not "unwitting") about the consequences of the 
plea.  Id. 
¶24 This court rejected Chavez's conclusion in Douangmala, 
instead holding that the legislative history merely indicated 
that the legislature said what it intended to:  if all 
conditions of Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) are met, then the court 
must vacate the judgment.  Douangmala, 253 Wis. 2d 173, ¶31.  
The Douangmala court found it highly relevant that the mention 
of aliens who unwittingly enter a guilty or no-contest plea was 
contained solely in the drafting file, which not all legislators 
see.  Id., ¶¶28-29.   
¶25 Further, the court noted that Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) 
uses mandatory "shall" language.  Id., ¶31.  Thus, the court 
held 
that 
harmless 
error 
does 
not 
apply 
because 
the 
legislature's use of mandatory language in effect precluded 
harmless error analysis.  Id., ¶42.   
B.  Douangmala failed to harmonize the interplay between Wis. 
Stat. §§ 971.08, 971.26, and 805.18. 
¶26 This court set out the basic method for statutory 
interpretation in State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane 
Cty., 2004 WI 58, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  See also 
Daniel R. Suhr, Interpreting Wisconsin Statutes, 100 Marq. L. 
Rev. 969, 970 (2017).  Where the meaning of a statute is plain 
based on the language of the statute, analysis ends there.  
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45.  As part of our plain language 
No. 
2015AP2041-CR   
 
13 
 
analysis, we must consider the statute's context as well.  Id., 
¶46.  This means we read "statutory language . . . not in 
isolation, but as part of a whole; in relation to the language 
of 
surrounding 
or 
closely-related 
statutes . . . ." 
 
Id.  
Accordingly, analyzing Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) in a vacuum is 
improper, and we must view it in light of its related statutes.  
In this instance, that means we must read § 971.08(2) in light 
of the statutory savings clauses in Wis. Stat. §§ 971.26 and 
805.18. 
¶27 Though many decisions parrot Kalal's language that 
statutes are to be interpreted "in relation to the language of 
surrounding or closely-related statutes," id., few provide any 
definition of "closely-related."  Statutes are closely related 
when they are in the same chapter, reference one another, or use 
similar terms.  City of Janesville v. CC Midwest, Inc., 2007 WI 
93, 
¶24, 
302 
Wis. 2d 599, 
734 
N.W.2d 428 
(interpreting 
"comparable replacement property" in Wis. Stat. § 32.05(8)(b)-
(c) in light of Wis. Stat. § 32.19).  Being within the same 
statutory scheme may also make two statutes closely related.  
State v. Scruggs, 2017 WI 15, ¶24, 373 Wis. 2d 312, 891 
N.W.2d 786 
(considering 
a 
statute's 
presence 
in 
criminal 
sentencing statutes as part of its context, but ultimately 
concluding that other context took precedence in that case); cf 
Homeward Bound Servs. v. Office of the Ins. Comm'r, 2006 WI App 
208, ¶34, 296 Wis. 2d 481, 724 N.W.2d 380 (considering Wis. 
Stat. 
chs. 
600-655 
closely 
related 
because 
they 
are 
a 
No. 
2015AP2041-CR   
 
14 
 
comprehensive statutory scheme intended to "ensure that policy 
holders are treated fairly.").   
¶28 We conclude that Wis. Stat. §§ 971.08, 971.26, and 
805.18 are closely related, and thus must be construed together, 
because they all appear in the same statutory scheme.  See id.  
Sections 971.08 and 971.26 are in the same chapter, which 
strongly indicates they are related and should be construed 
together.  CC Midwest, 302 Wis. 2d 599, ¶24.  Additionally, 
though § 805.18 is not in the same chapter, Wis. Stat. 
§ 972.11(1) incorporates § 805.18 for use in criminal cases, and 
§ 972.11 is part of the criminal code.  Chapters 971 and 972 
both deal with criminal procedure; chapter 971 generally governs 
pre-trial procedures while chapter 972 governs trial procedure.  
Thus, chapters 971 and 972 are related as part of the same 
statutory scheme.  See Homeward Bound Servs., 296 Wis. 2d 481, 
¶34.  Finally, this court acknowledged post-Douangmala that 
reading § 971.08(2) in light of § 971.26 is "reasonable."  State 
v. Lagundoye, 2004 WI 4, ¶26 n.17, 268 Wis. 2d 77, 674 
N.W.2d 526 (stating "[b]oth statutes concern when a defendant 
may be relieved of a judgment based on a defect in the 
proceedings" in deciding whether Douangmala had retroactive 
effect).   
¶29 Where multiple statutes are at issue, this court seeks 
to harmonize them through a reasonable construction that gives 
effect to all provisions.  State v. Delaney, 2003 WI 9, ¶13, 259 
Wis. 2d 77, 658 N.W.2d 416.  Where conflict between statutes is 
unavoidable, specific statutes take precedence over general 
No. 
2015AP2041-CR   
 
15 
 
statutes.  Rouse v. Theda Clark Med. Ctr., 2007 WI 87, ¶37, 302 
Wis. 2d 358, 735 N.W.2d 30. 
¶30 We hold that the State has met its high burden of 
showing 
that 
this 
court's 
decision 
in 
Douangmala 
was 
"objectively wrong."  See Romanshek, 281 Wis. 2d 300, ¶45.  
Douangmala made no attempt to harmonize Wis. Stat. §§ 971.08(2) 
and 971.26.  See Douangmala, 253 Wis. 2d 173, ¶¶32-33.  While 
the decision makes mention of § 971.26, it did not analyze how 
it applied in that case.  Id., ¶42.  Rather, Douangmala 
overruled Chavez and its progeny based on Chavez's reliance on 
the legislative history that the court found unpersuasive and 
the use of the mandatory "shall" in § 971.08(2) rather than 
independently analyzing the interplay between the statutes.  Id.7 
                                                 
7 Navigating the reasoning in Douangmala is a challenge in 
and of itself.  The court first held that the use of "shall" 
indicated an intent that withdrawal be mandatory, contrary to 
the legislative history proffered by the State: 
The legislative history therefore persuades us that 
the legislature intended what the statute explicitly 
states. 
 Section 
971.08(2) 
states 
that 
if 
the 
conditions set forth therein are met (and they were in 
the present case), the circuit court "shall" vacate 
the 
judgment and 
shall 
permit 
the 
defendant 
to 
withdraw the plea. The word "shall" in a statute is 
presumed 
to 
be 
mandatory 
unless 
a 
different 
construction 
is 
necessary 
to 
carry 
out 
the 
legislature's clear intent.  Nothing in Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08 points to a different interpretation of the 
word "shall" than an interpretation that the word 
signifies a mandatory act. 
State v. Douangmala, 2002 WI 62, ¶31, 253 Wis. 2d 173, 646 
N.W.2d 1 (footnotes omitted). 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP2041-CR   
 
16 
 
¶31 Douangmala's analysis suffers a fatal flaw in this 
regard:  both of the harmless error savings statutes also use 
the mandatory "shall" language.  Wis. Stat. § 971.26 ("[N]or 
shall the . . . judgment . . . be affected by reason of any 
defect or imperfection in matters of form which do not prejudice 
the defendant.") (emphasis added); Wis. Stat. § 805.18 ("(1) The 
court shall, in every stage of action, disregard any error or 
defect in the pleadings or proceedings which shall not affect 
                                                                                                                                                             
The court then mentions Wis. Stat. § 971.26, but 
proceeds to discuss Chavez and its progeny.  Douangmala, 
253 Wis. 2d 173, ¶32-40.  The analysis section concludes 
with the court overruling Chavez, 175 Wis. 2d 366, State v. 
Issa, 186 Wis. 2d 199, 519 N.W.2d 741 (Ct. App. 1994), 
State v. Lopez, 196 Wis. 2d 725, 539 N.W.2d 700 (Ct. App. 
1995), 
and 
State 
v. 
Garcia, 
2000 
WI 
App 
81, 
234 
Wis. 2d 304, 610 N.W.2d 180: 
The principle of stare decisis is applicable to the 
decisions of the court of appeals.  Stare decisis 
requires us to abide by precedent established by the 
court of appeals unless a compelling reason exists to 
overrule the precedent.  The principle of stare 
decisis does not, however, require us to adhere to 
interpretations 
of 
statutes 
that 
are 
objectively 
wrong.  That the legislature has not taken action with 
respect to a statute that a court has construed is 
entitled to some weight in determining legislative 
intent, but it is not conclusive.  As we have 
explained, we conclude that the Chavez harmless-error 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 
971.08(2) 
is 
objectively wrong under the language of the statute. 
Accordingly, we overrule Chavez, Issa, Lopez, and 
Garcia to the extent that these cases hold that 
harmless-error principles apply to a defendant who 
satisfies the conditions set forth in § 971.08(2). 
Douangmala, 
253 
Wis. 2d 173, 
¶42 
(footnotes 
omitted).  
Nowhere does the court analyze Wis. Stat. § 971.26 outside 
of the context of Chavez.  
No. 
2015AP2041-CR   
 
17 
 
the substantial rights of the adverse party.  (2) No judgment 
shall be reversed or set aside . . . unless in the opinion of 
the court to which the application is made . . . the error 
complained of has affected the substantial rights of the party 
seeking to reverse . . . .") (emphasis added).  We agree with 
Douangmala that "[t]he word 'shall' in a statute is presumed to 
be mandatory" and "[n]othing in Wis. Stat. § 971.08 points to 
a[n] . . . interpretation [other] than that the word signifies a 
mandatory act."  Douangmala, 253 Wis. 2d 173, ¶31.  More 
particularly, we agree this analysis is true as far as it goes; 
however, this analysis is incomplete in that it ignores the 
presence of "shall" in Wis. Stat. §§ 971.26 and 805.18. 
¶32 We hold that Wis. Stat. §§ 971.08(2), 971.26, and 
805.18 are most comprehensibly harmonized by applying harmless 
error analysis.  All of the relevant statutes use "shall," and, 
accordingly, none is "more mandatory" than any other.  We 
emphasize that applying harmless error analysis does not 
facially violate § 971.08(2), but failing to apply harmless 
error analysis does facially violate §§ 971.26 and 805.18.   
¶33 Further, harmless error was plainly codified in the 
two statutes ignored by Douangmala that we harmonize today, long 
before Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) was enacted into law.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 971.26 was enacted in its current form in 1969, though 
the concept goes back much further.  See § 63, ch. 255, Laws of 
1969; Flynn v. State, 97 Wis. 44, 47, 72 N.W. 373 (1897) 
(referencing 
"harmless 
error"). 
 
When 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 971.08(2) was created in 1986, the legislature was well aware 
No. 
2015AP2041-CR   
 
18 
 
of the concept of harmless error in criminal proceedings.  1985 
Wis. Act 252, §§ 3-4; see Villa Clement, Inc. v. National Union 
Fire Ins. Co., 120 Wis. 2d 140, 147, 353 N.W.2d 369 (Ct. App. 
1984) (presuming the legislature is aware of pre-existing 
statutes). 
¶34 Our holding is consistent with how federal courts 
review imperfect immigration advisements in plea colloquies.8  
Before 2013, federal courts were not required to give any sort 
of immigration advisement.  See United States v. Matamula, 788 
F.3d 166, 174 (5th Cir. 2015).  The Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure were amended, effective December 1, 2013, to require 
federal courts to give an immigration advisement substantially 
identical to that of Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c) before accepting 
a guilty or no contest plea.9  Id.; Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(O). 
                                                 
8 "Federal cases are persuasive guides to the construction 
of 
state 
law 
when 
state 
and 
federal 
provisions 
are 
similar . . . ."  State v. Brady, 118 Wis. 2d 154, 157 n.1, 345 
N.W.2d 533 (Ct. App. 1984).  Cf State v. Cardenas-Hernandez, 219 
Wis. 2d 516, 527-28, 579 N.W.2d 678 (1998) ("Wisconsin courts 
look to federal cases interpreting and applying the federal 
rules of evidence as persuasive authority" where federal rules 
of evidence and Wisconsin rules of evidence are similar.).  
9 The federal immigration advisement provides the same 
substantive warnings as Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c) with minor 
linguistic differences:  
Before the court accepts a plea of guilty or nolo 
contendre . . . the court must address the defendant 
personally in open court . . . that, if convicted, a 
defendant who is not a United States Citizen may be 
removed from the United States, denied citizenship, 
and denied admission to the United States in the 
future. 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP2041-CR   
 
19 
 
¶35 Imperfect plea colloquies in federal courts are 
subject to harmless error analysis.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(h) ("A 
variance from the requirements of this rule is harmless error if 
it does not affect substantial rights.").  Federal courts 
consider an imperfect immigration advisement harmless error 
where the defendant otherwise knew of potential immigration 
consequences.  United States v. Anderson, 624 F. App'x 106, 107 
(4th Cir. 2015) (per curiam)10 ("[W]e conclude that any such 
error is harmless because Anderson had actual notice of these 
possible immigration consequences . . . .").  This reasoning is 
entirely 
consistent 
with 
pre-Douangmala 
court 
of 
appeals 
decisions applying harmless error to Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2), 
e.g., State v. Lopez, 196 Wis. 2d 725, 731, 539 N.W.2d 700, and 
our holding today. 
¶36 In light of the foregoing, we hold that Douangmala was 
objectively wrong because it failed to consider the mandatory 
language in Wis. Stat. §§ 971.26 and 805.18 and thus overrule 
it.  Additionally, we reinstate Chavez,11 Issa,12 Lopez,13 and 
                                                                                                                                                             
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(O). 
10 No published federal court decisions apply harmless error 
under rule 11(h) to plea colloquies that imperfectly state the 
immigration advisement required by rule 11(b)(1)(O) due to the 
short time rule 11(b)(1)(O) has been in existence.  We are thus 
left with only unpublished decisions, of which United States v. 
Anderson is the most analogous to Reyes Fuerte's situation, 624 
F. App'x 106 (4th Cir. 2015) (per curiam).  Anderson is citable 
in federal courts.  Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a) (allowing citation 
to unpublished decisions issued on or after January 1, 2007). 
11 State v. Chavez, 175 Wis. 2d 366, 498 N.W.2d 887 (Ct. 
App. 1993). 
No. 
2015AP2041-CR   
 
20 
 
Garcia14 as valid law and binding precedent.  See Steele v. 
State, 97 Wis. 2d 72, 85, 294 N.W.2d 2 (1978) (reinstating cases 
overruled by the case Steele overruled).15   
C.  The circuit court's errors were harmless. 
¶37 The circuit court made two errors in its immigration 
advisement:  (1) completely omitting any mention of denial of 
naturalization and (2) using the term "resident" instead of 
"citizen."  We hold both errors were harmless.   
¶38 We identify three reasons these errors were harmless.  
First, defense counsel testified at the plea withdrawal hearing 
that he went over the Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights form 
in Spanish with Reyes Fuerte.  The form contains language 
                                                                                                                                                             
12 State v. Issa, 186 Wis. 2d 199, 519 N.W.2d 741 (Ct. App. 
1994). 
13 State v. Lopez, 196 Wis. 2d 725, 539 N.W.2d 700 (Ct. App. 
1995). 
14 State v. Garcia, 2000 WI App 81, 234 Wis. 2d 304, 610 
N.W.2d 180 (Ct. App. 2000).  
15 Since Douangmala, the court of appeals developed a line 
of cases that applied the substantial compliance doctrine to 
immigration advisements under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c).  State 
v. Mursal, 2013 WI App 125, 351 Wis. 2d 180, 839 N.W.2d 180.  An 
immigration 
advisement 
substantially 
complied 
with 
§ 971.08(1)(c) if it explained all elements of the statute.  
Id., ¶16.  Thus, minor linguistic differences that did not 
change the meaning of the advisement could not form the basis of 
plea withdrawal under § 971.08(2).  Id.  Our decision today does 
not affect the substantial compliance doctrine, as no error is 
present in an immigration advisement that substantially complies 
with § 971.08(1)(c). 
No. 
2015AP2041-CR   
 
21 
 
substantially similar to that of Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c).16  
Wisconsin 
Court 
System, 
Circuit 
Court 
Form 
CR-227, 
Plea 
Questionnaire/Waiver 
of 
Rights 
(revised 
May 
1, 
2004), 
https://www.wicourts.gov/formdisplay/CR-227.pdf?formNumber=CR-
227&formType=Form&formatId=2&language=en.  Thus, we conclude 
that Reyes Fuerte had actual knowledge of the potential 
immigration consequences of his plea and thus the circuit 
court's errors were harmless.  This is consistent with pre-
Douangmala court of appeals decisions applying harmless error to 
§ 971.08(2).  The court of appeals in Lopez concluded the error 
was harmless where the trial court completely omitted the 
immigration advisement during the plea colloquy, but trial 
counsel testified to going over the Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of 
Rights form in Spanish with the defendant.  State v. Lopez, 196 
Wis. 2d 725, 728-29, 539 N.W.2d 700 (Ct. App. 1995).  The facts 
of Lopez are even more extreme than this case because the 
circuit court at least gave Reyes Fuerte an advisement, albeit 
an imperfect one.  Our conclusion is further bolstered by 
Garcia, which found harmless error where the defendant had 
actual knowledge of the potential immigration consequences 
                                                 
16 The relevant language in the Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of 
Rights form states: "I understand that if I am not a citizen of 
the United States, my plea could result in deportation, the 
exclusion of admission to this country, or the denial of 
naturalization under federal law."  Wisconsin Court System, 
Circuit Court Form CR-227, Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights 
(revised May 1, 2004), https://www.wicourts.gov/formdisplay/CR-
227.pdf?formNumber=CR-227&formType=Form&formatId=2&language=en. 
No. 
2015AP2041-CR   
 
22 
 
through, inter alia, going over the plea waiver form with 
counsel.  State v. Garcia, 2000 WI App 81, ¶¶3, 14, 234 
Wis. 2d 304, 610 N.W.2d 180. 
¶39 Next, 
Reyes 
Fuerte 
has 
not 
alleged 
ineffective 
assistance of counsel under Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 
(2010).  Padilla held that effective assistance of counsel under 
the Sixth Amendment requires defense attorneys to inform 
criminal defendants of the potential immigration consequences of 
a plea.  Id. at 374.  We do not hold that the mere lack of a 
Padilla ineffective assistance claim is sufficient, on its own, 
to prove actual knowledge and thus harmless error when a circuit 
court fails to give the advisement as required by Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08(1)(c).  However, the lack of such a claim can be a 
factor to be included in our consideration to support other 
facts of record that show actual knowledge and harmless error. 
¶40 Finally, we hold the circuit court's error was 
harmless because the immigration consequence at issue in this 
case——deportation——was raised by the circuit court.  Reyes 
Fuerte brought his motion because he was concerned about being 
deported, not because he was concerned about being denied 
naturalization.  Reyes Fuerte never argues that the advisement 
given for deportation was deficient in any way.  Thus, the 
circuit court's error in omitting denial of naturalization is 
harmless. 
¶41 We hold that, under the circumstances of this case, 
the circuit court's errors in giving the plea advisement 
required by Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c) are harmless.  Reyes 
No. 
2015AP2041-CR   
 
23 
 
Fuerte knew of the potential immigration consequences because 
his counsel went over the plea waiver form, which contains a 
substantially similar advisement, with him in Spanish.  The 
failure to bring any ineffective assistance claim under Padilla 
further indicates that counsel did inform Reyes Fuerte of the 
potential immigration consequences of his plea.  Finally, the 
two immigration consequences relevant to Reyes Fuerte were 
raised by the circuit court, such that he had knowledge of those 
potential consequences.17  To allow him to withdraw his plea now 
would be to allow him to "manipulate [Wisconsin's] criminal 
justice system in order to circumvent the immigration laws;" we 
cannot accept that the legislature intended to, or actually did, 
write § 971.08(2) to have such a result.  State v. Issa, 186 
Wis. 2d 199, 212, 519 N.W.2d 741 (Ct. App. 1994) (Fine, J., 
concurring).  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶42 We hold that Reyes Fuerte is not entitled to withdraw 
his pleas of guilty to attempting to flee or elude a traffic 
officer, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3), and second-offense 
operating with a restricted controlled substance in his blood, 
                                                 
17 The record reveals that Reyes Fuerte was in deportation 
proceedings at the time of his guilty plea.  However, the record 
does not state why he was in deportation proceedings; it may 
have been for the conduct underlying the charges in this case, 
but it may not have.  Thus, we leave for another case whether a 
defendant who was already in deportation proceedings for the 
conduct underlying the criminal charge is imputed with knowledge 
that a guilty or no contest plea may bring adverse immigration 
consequences. 
No. 
2015AP2041-CR   
 
24 
 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(am), pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08(2) because the circuit court's error in giving an 
imperfect immigration advisement under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c) 
was harmless.  In so doing, we overrule this court's decision in 
State v. Douangmala, 2002 WI 62, 253 Wis. 2d 173, 646 N.W.2d 1 
because it was objectively wrong due to its failure to properly 
address the harmless error statutes. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
  
No.  2015AP2041-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶43 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (dissenting).  The State 
of Wisconsin, petitioner in the instant case, presented one 
issue for review: 
Now that criminal defense attorneys are obligated to 
advise 
their 
clients 
about 
the 
immigration 
consequences of their pleas, Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 
U.S. 356 (2010), should the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
overturn its decision in State v. Douangmala, 2002 WI 
62, 253 Wis. 2d 173, 646 N.W.2d 1, and reinstate the 
harmless error rule to prohibit a defendant who was 
aware of the potential immigration consequences of his 
plea from being able to withdraw the plea because the 
circuit court failed to give a statutory immigration 
warning that complied with Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c)? 
Rather than answer this single question limited to the effect of 
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), the majority opinion 
reaches beyond the issue presented to reinterpret anew Wis. 
Stat. §§ 971.08(1)(c), 971.08(2), and 971.26.  In so doing, the 
majority overrules State v. Douangmala, 2002 WI 62, 253 
Wis. 2d 173, 646 N.W.2d 1, a unanimous decision of this court 
that has gone unchallenged for fifteen years and has been cited 
and relied upon in numerous cases.  As the majority makes clear, 
Padilla has no effect on Douangmala. 
¶44 The 
majority's 
errors 
are 
threefold. 
 
First, 
Douangmala was properly decided, and the majority's contrary 
conclusion is unpersuasive and objectively wrong.  Second, the 
majority announces a novel interpretation of the harmless error 
statute with implications far beyond the present case, affecting 
future 
petitions 
for 
plea 
withdrawal 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.08(2).  Third, the majority flouts the generally accepted 
rule of stare decisis that an appellate court adheres to its own 
No.  2015AP2041-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
prior decisions unless there are compelling reasons not to do 
so.  Accordingly, I dissent.   
I 
 
¶45 In 
Douangmala, 
the 
unanimous 
court 
reached 
two 
conclusions: 
 
(1) The plain text of Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c) directs and 
requires a circuit court to address a defendant personally 
and advise the defendant that his plea of guilty or no 
contest for the offense may result in deportation, the 
exclusion from admission to the United States, or the 
denial of naturalization; and  
 
(2) If the circuit court fails to so advise a defendant who 
later shows that the plea is likely to result in 
deportation, the exclusion from admission to the United 
States, or the denial of naturalization, the court shall 
vacate any applicable judgement and allow the defendant to 
withdraw his plea.   
Douangmala, 253 Wis. 2d 173, ¶¶3, 4.   
 
¶46 In reaching these conclusions, the Douangmala court 
examined Wis. Stat. §§ 971.08(1)(c), 971.08(2), and 971.26.     
¶47 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.08(1)(c) directs a circuit court 
to give a warning about immigration consequences.  Before the 
court accepts a plea of guilty or no contest, the legislature 
requires the circuit court to do the following: 
Address the defendant personally and advise the 
defendant as follows: "If you are not a citizen of the 
United States of America, you are advised that a plea 
of guilty or no contest for the offense with which you 
are charged may result in deportation, the exclusion 
No.  2015AP2041-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
from admission to this country or the denial of 
naturalization, under federal law." 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c). 
¶48 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.08(2) provides the remedy if the 
circuit court fails to give the statutorily mandated warnings 
about immigration consequences.  The remedy provision of the 
statute reads as follows: 
If a court fails to advise a defendant as required by 
sub.(1)(c) and a defendant later shows that the plea 
is likely to result in the defendant's deportation, 
exclusion from admission to this country or denial of 
naturalization, the court on the defendant's motion 
shall vacate any applicable judgment against the 
defendant and permit the defendant to withdraw the 
plea and enter another plea.  This subsection does not 
limit the ability to withdraw a plea of guilty or no 
contest on any other grounds. 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2). 
¶49 I turn now to Wis. Stat. § 971.26, the harmless error 
statute.  This statute saves numerous proceedings in which an 
error is made.  The harmless error statute applied in criminal 
cases provides as follows: 
No indictment, information, complaint or warrant shall 
be invalid, nor shall the trial, judgment or other 
proceedings be affected by reason of any defect or 
imperfection in matters of form which do not prejudice 
the defendant. 
Wis. Stat. § 971.26.1 
                                                 
1 The majority also invokes Wis. Stat. § 805.18, the 
harmless error statute applicable to civil actions.  The 
majority claims that § 805.18 is made applicable to criminal 
actions 
by 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 972.11(1). 
 
Majority 
op., 
¶22.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 972.11(1) provides as follows: 
Except as provided in subs. (2) to (4), the rules of 
evidence and practice in civil actions shall be 
applicable in all criminal proceedings unless the 
(continued) 
No.  2015AP2041-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶50 I now return to Wis. Stat. § 971.08.  Applying the 
plain text rule of interpretation to § 971.08(2), the unanimous 
Douangmala court concluded that if a circuit court fails to give 
the statutory warning, the legislature explicitly directs that 
the defendant is entitled to withdraw the plea upon a showing 
that 
the 
plea 
is 
likely 
to 
result 
in 
the 
defendant's 
deportation.  Douangmala, 253 Wis. 2d 173, ¶¶3, 4.     
¶51 Relying on the text of Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2), the 
unanimous Douangmala court also concluded that prior cases 
applying the harmless error rule to § 971.08 were "objectively 
wrong under the language of the statute."  Douangmala, 253 
Wis. 2d 173, ¶42.  These cases were explicitly overruled.  
Douangmala, 253 Wis. 2d 173, ¶42.    
¶52 The justices joining the majority opinion——committed 
to applying the same plain-text analysis to the identical text 
of 
the 
statutes 
interpreted 
in 
Douangmala——overrule 
the 
unanimous Douangmala decision believing it to be "objectively 
wrong."  The majority faults the Douangmala court for failing to 
                                                                                                                                                             
context of a section or rule manifestly requires a 
different construction.  No guardian ad litem need be 
appointed for a defendant in a criminal action.  
Chapters 885 to 895 and 995, except ss. 804.02 to 
804.07 and 887.23 to 887.26, shall apply in all 
criminal proceedings. 
Wis. Stat. § 972.11(1).   
 
The 
majority 
does 
not 
explain 
how 
or 
why 
§ 805.18 
constitutes a "rule[] of evidence or practice in civil actions."  
Thus, § 805.18's applicability to criminal cases is, at best, 
questionable.  Regardless, there is nothing in my analysis that 
would be affected by § 805.18's applicability. 
No.  2015AP2041-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
harmonize Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) (remedy provision) with Wis. 
Stat. § 971.26 (harmless error).  Majority op., ¶¶26-36.   
¶53 The majority acknowledges that when two statutes 
conflict with one another, the more specific statute takes 
precedence over the more general statute.  Majority op., ¶29.2 
¶54 The majority gets around this rule, however, by 
declaring "that applying harmless error analysis does not 
facially violate Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2), but failing to apply 
harmless error analysis does facially violate Wis. Stat. 
§§ 971.26 and 805.18."  Majority op., ¶32. 
¶55 Curiously, 
the 
majority 
does 
not 
explain 
its 
assertion.  The majority recognizes that both Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08(2) and § 971.26 use the mandatory "shall," and neither 
statute is "more mandatory" than the other, but the majority 
somehow reaches the conclusion that applying the harmless error 
rule to § 971.08(2) does not create a conflict.  How?  Wis. 
Stat. § 971.08(2) sets forth a simple "if-then" conditional 
sentence:  If the circuit court fails to provide the immigration 
consequence warning and the defendant shows that his plea is 
likely to result in deportation, then the circuit court shall 
                                                 
2 The majority relies on Rouse v. Theda Clark Med. Ctr., 
2007 WI 87, ¶37, 302 Wis. 2d 358, 735 N.W.2d 30.  See also 
Marder v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 2005 WI 159, 
¶23, 286 Wis. 2d 252, 706 N.W.2d 110 ("[W]here a specific 
statutory provision leads in one direction and a general 
statutory provision in another, the specific statutory provision 
controls."). 
No.  2015AP2041-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
vacate the applicable judgment and permit the defendant to 
withdraw his plea.  No exception is made for harmless errors.3 
¶56 In my view, it is evident that there is a conflict 
between Wis. Stat. §§ 971.08(2) and 971.26.  To resolve this 
conflict, the more specific statute should control over the more 
general statute.   
II 
¶57 I must also call attention to the staggering breadth 
of the majority's application of the harmless error statute in 
the instant case, and therefore, in future cases.  See majority 
op., ¶¶31-33.  According to the majority, in a battle between 
competing "shall" directives, the harmless error statute will 
always win out.  This conclusion is in part supported by the 
                                                 
3 The majority points out that harmless error statutes 
existed long before Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) was enacted.  So 
what?  This court has given effect to specific statutes over 
general statutes for at least a century.  See Chippewa & 
Flambeau Improvement Co. v. R.R. Comm'n of Wis., 159 N.W. 739, 
744, 164 Wis. 105 (1916).  Rather than explicitly excepting 
§ 971.08(2) from the harmless error rule, the legislature has 
relied on the courts to apply this century-old canon of 
construction to give effect to § 971.08(2). 
Moreover, the majority relies in part on Federal Rule of 
Criminal 
Procedure 
11(b)(1)(O), 
which 
requires 
a 
federal 
district court to inform defendants that their conviction may 
result in adverse immigration consequences before accepting 
their pleas of guilty or nolo contendere.  Majority op., ¶34.  A 
defendant's claim that Rule 11(b)(1)(O) was violated is subject 
to harmless error analysis.  Majority op., ¶35 (citing United 
States v. Anderson, 624 F. App'x 106, 107 (4th Cir. 2015)).  
However, there is no federal analogue to Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2), 
and it is the remedy provision unique to Wisconsin that is at 
issue in the instant case.  The federal rule is of no help to 
the majority. 
No.  2015AP2041-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
fact that the harmless error statute, in one form or another, 
existed at least as early as 1897, long before Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08(2) was enacted.     
 
¶58 Apparently, hereafter, every statute enacted and every 
case decided after 1897 is subject to a mandatory harmless error 
analysis (except perhaps when a violation of a constitutional or 
statutory provision has been declared prejudicial per se).  This 
poses a conundrum for legislative drafters:  What words should 
the drafter use if the legislature does not want the mandatory 
harmless error statute to apply?  The legislature explicitly 
stated in the instant case that it did not want the mandatory 
harmless error to apply but the majority is ignoring the 
legislative direction. 
III 
¶59 I now turn to the issue of affording due respect to 
precedent.  The court's interpretation and application of Wis. 
Stat. § 971.08 and the harmless error statute has not been 
challenged or changed since the Douangmala decision.  Since 
Douangmala was decided, neither the text of § 971.08(2) nor the 
text of the harmless error statute has been changed by the 
legislature.  Generally speaking, legislative acquiescence to a 
judicial construction of a statute gives rise to a presumption 
that the judicial construction should stand.  See, e.g., Force 
ex rel. Welcenbach v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2014 WI 82, ¶124 
n.76, 
356 
Wis. 2d 582, 
850 
N.W.2d 866; 
Milwaukee 
Journal 
Sentinel v. City of Milwaukee, 2012 WI 65, ¶43, n.21, 341 
Wis. 2d 607, 815 N.W.2d 367; Wenke v. Gehl Co., 2004 WI 103, 
No.  2015AP2041-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
¶¶32-35, 274 Wis. 2d 220, 682 N.W.2d 405; State v. Hansen, 2001 
WI 53, ¶38, 243 Wis. 2d 328, 627 N.W.2d 195; Reiter v. Dyken, 95 
Wis. 2d 461, 471-72, 290 N.W.2d 510 (1980).      
¶60 Furthermore, litigants and courts have relied on 
Douangmala.  Douangmala has been cited 168 times.  Though not an 
absolute rule, stare decisis protects litigants' and courts' 
reliance on judicial decisions. 
¶61 A court should not overrule a judicial interpretation 
of a statute when the court simply disagrees with the rationale 
of the prior decision.  Rather, the party seeking the overruling 
must show "not only that [the decision] was mistaken but also 
that it was objectively wrong, so that the court has a 
compelling reason to overrule it."  Wenke, 274 Wis. 2d 220, ¶21.  
As I explained above, there are no compelling reasons for 
overruling Douangmala, and the majority reaches a contrary 
conclusion overruling Douangmala by hoping that the reader will 
not scrutinize the majority's baseless conclusion that applying 
harmless error to Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) does not give rise to a 
conflict——even though it plainly does.       
 
¶62 Though not an absolute rule, stare decisis promotes 
stability, coherence, and the rule of law.  By disregarding the 
generally accepted interpretative approach of adhering to a 
prior judicial interpretation of a statute and by overruling the 
No.  2015AP2041-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
Douangmala decision, the majority scoffs at stare decisis and 
jeopardizes finality and certainty in the law.4   
* * * * 
¶63 The majority has no justification beyond its doctrinal 
disposition to overrule Douangmala.  The only change since the 
Douangmala decision is the make up of the court.  A change in 
judges is not a valid reason to overturn a decision of the 
court.  "A basic change in the law upon a ground no firmer than 
a change in our membership invites the popular misconception 
that this institution is little different from the two political 
branches of the Government.  No misconception could do more 
lasting injury to this Court and to the system of law which it 
is our abiding mission to serve."  Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 
416 U.S. 600, 636 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
¶64 The majority opinion represents the will of the 
justices joining the opinion; it does not promote the rule of 
law.  Accordingly, I dissent. 
¶65 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissenting opinion. 
 
                                                 
4 See also Planned Parenthood of S.E. Penn. v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833, 864 (1992) (citing Mitchell) ("To overrule prior law 
for no other reason than [a present doctrinal disposition to 
come out differently from the previous court] would run counter 
to the view repeated in our cases, that a decision to overrule 
should rest on some special reason over and above the belief 
that a prior case was wrongly decided."); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U.S. 643, 677 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
No.  2015AP2041-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
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