Title: Roane v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 45, 2005
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: August 12, 2005

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
KYLE ROANE, 
 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 45, 2005 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID 0301008114 
§   
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: June 17, 2005 
 
 
 
 
  Decided: August 12, 2005 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 12th day of August 2005, after considering the parties’ briefs and 
the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Kyle Roane, filed this appeal from the Superior 
Court’s denial of his first motion for postconviction relief.  We find no merit 
to the issues Roane raises on appeal.  Accordingly, we affirm the Superior 
Court’s judgment. 
(2) 
The record reflects that a Superior Court jury convicted Roane 
in July 2003 of Robbery in the First Degree.  The Superior Court sentenced 
Roane as an habitual offender to twenty years imprisonment.  This Court 
 
2
affirmed Roane’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal.1  In June 2004, 
Roane filed his first motion for postconviction relief.  After full briefing, 
including an affidavit from Roane’s trial counsel, the Superior Court 
summarily rejected Roane’s motion.  This appeal followed. 
(3) 
Roane raises three issues in his opening brief on appeal.2  First, 
Roane asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate a 
prior inconsistent witness statement and for failing to bring the inconsistency 
to the jury’s attention.  Second, Roane asserts that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to object to an allegedly “fraudulent predicate felony,” 
which the Superior Court improperly relied on in sentencing Roane as an 
habitual offender. Third, Roane argues that the Superior Court committed 
reversible error in failing to give a proposed Dixon3 instruction.   
(4) 
In order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
a defendant must show: (a) counsel’s representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness; and (b) there is a reasonable probability that, but 
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the outcome of the proceeding would 
                                                 
1 Roane v. State, 2004 WL 1097692 (Del. Supr.). 
2 To the extent that Roane’s postconviction motion raised additional claims not briefed on 
appeal, those claims have been waived.  See Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del. 
1993). 
3 See Dixon v. State, 673 A.2d 1220, 1224-25 (Del. 1996) (holding that a person who uses 
no force to obtain property and who, after abandoning the property, uses force in an 
attempt to flee, has not committed the crime of robbery). 
 
3
have been different.4  There is a strong presumption that counsel’s 
representation was professionally reasonable.5 
(5) 
Roane first asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to investigate and challenge at trial the prior inconsistent statement 
made by witness Christopher White to the police.  Roane did not raise a 
claim concerning Christopher White’s statement in his postconviction 
motion.  To the extent Roane is now raising a new claim, that claim is barred 
from review because it was not presented to the Superior Court in the first 
instance.6  
(6) 
To the extent Roane’s ineffectiveness claim relates to the victim 
Jim Casula’s statement to police,7 we find no merit to Roane’s contention.  
As the Superior Court found, defense counsel was aware of the 
inconsistencies in the victim’s prior statement and made a tactical decision 
to challenge those inconsistencies during the cross-examination of the 
investigating officer.  In his affidavit, counsel stated that he chose that 
strategy because he believed that the victim might be able to “more credibly 
                                                 
4 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). 
5 Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753-54 (Del. 1990). 
6 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 8. 
7 In his postconviction motion, Roane argued that defense counsel was ineffective for 
failing to uncover and challenge inconsistencies in “the victim’s” statement to police.  
The Superior Court interpreted “the victim” to mean Jim Casula, the store clerk whom 
Roane bit during the course of the robbery. 
 
4
explain away such inconsistencies.” The Superior Court concluded that 
Roane had failed to establish that his counsel’s strategy fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness.  We agree.  Accordingly, we find no 
merit to Roane’s first claim. 
(7) 
Roane’s second claim is that his trial counsel was ineffective 
for failing to object to Roane’s sentencing as an habitual offender on the 
ground that Roane’s 1998 conviction was for simple possession rather than 
possession with intent to deliver.  In his affidavit, defense counsel concedes 
that he was unaware at sentencing that Roane’s 1998 conviction was a 
misdemeanor and not a felony.  Counsel points out, however, that, even 
without considering the 1998 conviction, Roane had the requisite prior 
felony convictions to be declared an habitual offender.  In fact, the Superior 
Court previously had declared Roane to be an habitual offender in 2000.  
Accordingly, the Superior Court found that counsel’s error notwithstanding, 
Roane had failed to establish prejudice from his counsel’s mistake.  We 
agree.  Accordingly, we reject Roane’s second claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
(8) 
Roane’s final argument on appeal is that the Superior Court 
erred in failing to grant defense counsel’s request for a Dixon8 instruction.  
                                                 
8 Dixon v. State, 673 A.2d 1220, 1226-28 (Del. 1996). 
 
5
Defense counsel requested the Superior Court to instruct the jury that a 
person is not guilty of robbery if the person uses no force to obtain property, 
abandons the property, then uses force in an attempt to flee.  At trial, the 
Superior Court concluded that the evidence did not warrant such an 
instruction because Roane did not abandon all of the stolen property.  This 
Court affirmed that ruling on direct appeal.  Accordingly, this final claim is 
procedurally barred under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(4) because it 
was previously adjudicated.9    
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
                                                 
9 Skinner v. State, 607 A.2d 1170, 1172 (Del. 1992).