Title: Ryan v. Mary Ann Morse Healthcare Corp.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12708
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: December 5, 2019

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12708 
 
JAMES M. RYAN, executor,1,2  vs.  MARY ANN MORSE HEALTHCARE CORP.3  
 
 
 
Middlesex.     September 9, 2019. - December 5, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Assisted Living Residence.  Landlord and Tenant, Security 
deposit.  Consumer Protection Act, Availability of remedy, 
Landlord and tenant.  Statute, Construction. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
August 24, 2016. 
 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Christopher K. Barry-
Smith, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Joshua N. Garick (Matthew T. LaMothe also present) for the 
plaintiff. 
 
AiVi Nguyen for the defendant. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
                     
 
1 Of the estate of Julia W. Ryan. 
 
 
2 Individually and on behalf of all others similarly 
situated. 
 
 
3 Doing business as Heritage at Framingham. 
2 
 
 
 
Joseph M. Desmond & Justin L. Amos for Massachusetts 
Assisted Living Association. 
 
Lillian Glickman, pro se. 
 
Elizabeth A. Aniskevich & Susan A. Silverstein, of the 
District of Columbia, Richard M.W. Bauer, Liane Zeitz, & Rebecca 
J. Benson for AARP & others. 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  At issue in this case is the extent to which 
Massachusetts assisted living residences (ALRs) are subject to 
the strictures of the security deposit statute, G. L. c. 186, 
§ 15B.  The defendant operates an ALR in Framingham that charges 
new residents an upfront "community fee," in addition to the 
first month's rent and the last month's rent permitted by G. L. 
c. 186, § 15B.  The community fee was intended to cover upfront 
administrative costs, an initial service coordination plan, 
move-in assistance, and a replacement reserve for building 
improvements.  The plaintiff alleges that the community fee 
violates G. L. c. 186, § 15B, as it exceeded the upfront costs 
allowed by the security deposit statute.  The defendant moved to 
dismiss the suit, arguing that ALRs are not subject to G. L. 
c. 186, § 15B.  The motion to dismiss was granted, and the 
plaintiff appealed. 
We conclude that G. L. c. 19D, the ALR statute, 
incorporates applicable consumer protection laws, including 
G. L. c. 186, § 15B, but allows for additional upfront charges 
for the distinctive services assisted living facilities provide 
that are not applicable to traditional landlord-tenant 
3 
 
 
relationships.  Indeed, the ALR statute and corresponding 
regulations expressly provide for the payment of particular fees 
related to initial assessments of residents to determine their 
suitability for placement in an assisted living facility.  Such 
services and fees have no applicability to the traditional 
landlord-tenant relationship, and are thus not subject to the 
security deposit law.  Accordingly, ALRs may institute upfront 
charges beyond those permitted by G. L. c. 186, § 15B (1) (b), 
to the extent that such charges correspond to the distinct 
services enumerated in G. L. c. 19D, § 13, or to other services 
designed specifically for assisted living residences.  If, 
however, an ALR charges upfront fees that are not used to fund 
such distinct assisted living services, it does so in violation 
of § 15B. 
In the instant case, further factual development is 
required to determine whether the fee at issue was permissibly 
charged and used for services distinct to ALRs, and thus the 
motion to dismiss was not properly allowed.  One or more 
components of the defendant's community fee appear to have been 
charged for initial assessments mandated by the ALR statute.  
Such a service and fee would be specific to assisted living 
facilities and not governed by the security deposit statute.  
However, further clarification and factual development as to the 
purpose and use of other components of the community fee is 
4 
 
 
required, particularly for the replacement reserve fee for 
building improvements.  We cannot discern on this record whether 
each component of the community fee was imposed and used for 
services distinct to assisted living facilities but inapplicable 
to the traditional landlord-tenant relationship.  We therefore 
reverse the decision allowing the motion to dismiss and remand 
the case to the Superior Court for further proceedings 
consistent with our decision.4 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  We review the allowance of a 
motion to dismiss de novo, accepting as true all well-pleaded 
facts alleged in the complaint.  See Calixto v. Coughlin, 481 
Mass. 157, 158 (2018).  We summarize the factual allegations as 
set forth in the complaint and the residency agreement 
referenced by both parties.5  See Marram v. Kobrick Offshore 
Fund, Ltd., 442 Mass. 43, 45 & n.4 (2004). 
                     
 
4 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the 
Massachusetts Assisted Living Association, by Lillian Glickman, 
and by AARP, AARP Foundation, the National Consumer Law Center 
and the National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys.  
 
 
5 The residency agreement into which Julia Ryan entered with 
the defendant was not attached to the plaintiff's complaint.  
Rather, the agreement was first submitted as an exhibit to the 
defendant's memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss.  
Despite this, the complaint makes clear reference to the 
agreement.  Indeed, both parties rely on the terms of the 
agreement in support of their briefing, and neither party 
disputes the existence or terms of the agreement.  Thus, in 
light of the importance of this document, and the fact that it 
is not in dispute, this court may properly consider it in 
5 
 
 
 
In 2013, Julia Ryan entered into an agreement with Mary Ann 
Morse Healthcare Corp., doing business as Heritage at Framingham 
(Heritage), to lease an apartment in the defendant's ALR in 
Framingham.  The agreement, titled "Residency Agreement," 
provided that Heritage "hereby leases to the Resident" an 
apartment at the Framingham facility. 
 
Ryan's rent was $4,000 per month.  Prior to the 
commencement of Ryan's residency, Heritage required her to pay 
the first and last month's rent.  In addition to the first and 
last month's rent, Heritage also charged Ryan a nonrefundable, 
one-time "community fee" of $2,800.  According to the residency 
agreement, the community fee was "intended to cover upfront 
staff administrative costs, the Resident's initial service 
coordination plan and move-in assistance, and establish a 
replacement reserve for building improvements."  The agreement 
also provided that "the Community is required to pay interest to 
                     
connection with the complaint.  See Marram v. Kobrick Offshore 
Fund, Ltd., 442 Mass. 43, 45 n.4 (2004) (because "the plaintiff 
had notice of these documents and relied on them in framing the 
complaint, the attachment of such documents to a motion to 
dismiss does not convert the motion to one for summary judgment, 
as required by Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 [b] [6], 365 Mass. 754 
[1974]").  See also Berkowitz v. President & Fellows of Harvard 
College, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 262, 270 n.7 (2003). 
6 
 
 
the Resident annually in keeping with the Landlord/Tenant Law 
Chapter 186, Section 151B(2)(a)."6 
 
In 2016, James Ryan, the executor of Julia Ryan's estate, 
commenced this putative class action, alleging that Heritage 
violated G. L. c. 186, § 15B, and G. L. c. 93A by charging new 
residents the community fee.  Heritage moved to dismiss the 
plaintiff's complaint, claiming that, as an ALR, it was not 
subject to the security deposit statute.  On March 5, 2018, a 
judge in the Superior Court granted the motion, concluding that 
the Legislature did not intend for ALRs to be subject to the 
security deposit statute.  The plaintiff appealed. 
 
In May 2017, while the motion to dismiss was still pending, 
a different judge in the Superior Court concluded that the 
security deposit statute did apply to ALRs.  See Gowen vs. 
Benchmark Senior Living LLC, Mass. Super. Ct., No. 1684CV03972-
BLS2 (Suffolk County May 9, 2017).  The Gowen decision 
recognized, however, a possible exception to the fee 
restrictions imposed by G. L. c. 186, § 15B, in the context of 
ALRs, stating: 
"The statutory limitation on fees imposed by residential 
landlords only governs fees charged for a 'tenancy.'  To 
the extent that [the defendant] or another assisted living 
facility operator provides its residents with services that 
                     
 
6 The reference to "151B(2)(a)" in the residency agreement 
appears to be a typographical error.  As discussed infra, the 
pertinent section pertaining to a landlord's handling of the 
last month's rent is G. L. c. 186, § 15B (2) (a). 
7 
 
 
are beyond the scope of a typical residential tenancy, it 
is entitled to charge for those services and may do so 
without running afoul of § 15B."  (Citation omitted.) 
 
Id. at 3-4.  The judge went on to conclude, however, that the 
plaintiff had plausibly alleged facts suggesting that the 
community fee "was assessed at least in part as a charge for her 
residential tenancy, and not for separate activities or 
services."  Id. at 4.  That judge reached a similar conclusion 
again in another case in August 2018.  See Hennessy vs. 
Brookdale Senior Living Communities, Inc., Mass. Super. Ct., No. 
1784CV04215-BLS2 (Suffolk County Aug. 1, 2018).  In light of the 
conflicting reasoning and outcomes on this issue by judges in 
the Superior Court, we transferred the plaintiff's appeal to 
this court on our own motion. 
 
b.  Relevant statutes.  i.  The security deposit statute.  
The Legislature enacted the security deposit statute "as part of 
an elaborate scheme of rights and duties to prevent abuses and 
to insure fairness to the tenant."  Meikle v. Nurse, 474 Mass. 
207, 212 (2016).  "In passing the [security deposit statute], 
the Legislature recognized that tenants have less bargaining 
power than landlords and are less able to vindicate their rights 
in court."  Phillips v. Equity Residential Mgt., L.L.C., 478 
Mass. 251, 254 (2017).  See Mellor v. Berman, 390 Mass. 275, 282 
(1983) (explaining that § 15B manifests Legislature's "concern 
for the welfare of tenants in residential property who, as a 
8 
 
 
practical matter, are generally in inferior bargaining positions 
and find traditional avenues of redress relatively useless").  
Accordingly, § 15B "protects tenants by providing clear 
guidelines for landlords to follow with regard to handling 
security deposits."  Phillips, supra. 
 
Section 15B provides, inter alia, that "[a]t or prior to 
the commencement of any tenancy, no lessor may require a tenant 
or prospective tenant to pay any amount in excess of" four 
enumerated charges.  G. L. c. 186, § 15B (2) (b).  Specifically, 
lessors are limited to charging the first month's rent, the last 
month's rent, a security deposit equal to the first month's 
rent, and the purchase and installation cost for a key and lock.  
Id.  Charging any amount in excess of those four permissible 
fees is considered an unfair or deceptive practice in violation 
of G. L. c. 93A.  See 940 Code Mass. Regs. § 3.17(4)(a) (1993).  
 
To the extent that a landlord charges a permissible upfront 
fee, § 15B also imposes specific requirements as to the handling 
of those fees.  If a landlord chooses to require a security 
deposit, the landlord must hold the deposit in a "separate, 
interest-bearing account in a bank, located within the 
commonwealth under such terms as will place such deposit beyond 
the claim of creditors of the lessor."  G. L. c. 186, 
§ 15B (3) (a).  If a landlord chooses to require the last 
month's rent upfront, the landlord must "pay interest at the 
9 
 
 
rate of five per cent per year or other such lesser amount of 
interest as has been received from the bank where the deposit 
has been held."  G. L. c. 186, § 15B (2) (a).  The landlord must 
also provide the tenant with yearly receipts as to the amount of 
interest payable on the last month's rent.  See id.  The failure 
to comport with these requirements may entitle a tenant to 
recover treble damages against his or her landlord.  See id.; 
G. L. c. 186, § 15B (7). 
 
Section 15B also provides additional protections for 
tenants beyond the mere regulation of fees.  Landlords must 
furnish new tenants with a statement of the condition of the 
premises and adhere to strict record-keeping requirements upon 
withholding any portion of the tenant's security deposit after 
the termination of the tenancy.  Further, pursuant to G. L. 
c. 186, § 15B (1) (a), a landlord may only enter the premises 
"to inspect the premises, to make repairs thereto or to show the 
same to a prospective tenant, purchaser, mortgagee or its 
agents," to survey damage to the premises from an outgoing 
tenant, or in accordance with a court order or if the premises 
appear to have been abandoned. 
 
Although the security deposit statute does not explicitly 
define the scope of its applicability, "the elaborately drafted 
text of the section indicates by repeated references that the 
draftsmen were thinking in terms of residential applicability."  
10 
 
 
Shwachman v. Khoroshansky, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 1002, 1002 (1983).  
See Norfolk & Dedham Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Morrison, 456 Mass. 
463, 468-469 (2010) (acknowledging that G. L. c. 186, § 15B, 
applies to residential, rather than commercial, leases). 
 
ii.  The ALR statute.  Decades after the enactment of the 
security deposit statute, the Legislature enacted G. L. c. 19D, 
which regulates ALRs.  See St. 1994, c. 354.  That statute 
defines ALRs as entities that (1) provide room and board; (2) 
provide "assistance with activities of daily living for three or 
more adult residents who are not related by consanguinity or 
affinity to their care provider"; and (3) "collect[] payments or 
third party reimbursements from or on behalf of residents to pay 
for the provision of assistance with the activities of daily 
living or arranges for the same."  G. L. c. 19D, § 1.  Examples 
of the types of assistance that residents may receive include 
assistance with bathing, dressing, grooming, ambulation, and 
other similar tasks.  See G. L. c. 19D, §§ 1, 10. 
 
In order to provide these services, ALRs develop a "service 
plan" with each resident and document the provision of services 
in accordance with the plan using written progress reports.  
G. L. c. 19D, § 2 (v), (vi), (vii).  These individualized plans 
must describe "the needs of the resident for personal services 
and the providers, or intended providers thereof, and the 
frequency and duration of such services."  G. L. c. 19D, § 12.  
11 
 
 
ALRs must also provide residents with opportunities to 
socialize, access to community resources, regular meals, 
housekeeping, self-administered medication management, and 
laundry services.  G. L. c. 19D, § 10 (a).  Further, ALRs must 
have a system in place to respond to emergency resident needs.  
G. L. c. 19D, § 10 (a) (6).  ALRs may also choose to provide 
residents with additional amenities, such as local 
transportation and barber and beauty services.  See G. L. 
c. 19D, § 10 (b). 
 
Because the suitability of a resident's placement in an ALR 
turns on whether the ALR can adequately accommodate the 
resident's needs, ALRs conduct an initial screening and 
assessment of each resident before he or she moves in.  See 651 
Code Mass. Regs. § 12.04(6) (2017).  The screening and 
assessment evaluate the prospective resident's service needs and 
preferences, as well as the ALR's ability to meet those needs.  
Id.  Each resident's service plan must be developed before the 
resident moves into the facility.  See 651 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 12.04(7) (2017). 
 
Within the realm of elderly housing options, ALRs fall 
within a "spectrum of living alternatives for the elderly in the 
commonwealth."  St. 1994, c. 354, § 1.  ALR facilities provide 
elderly residents with services well beyond what would be 
available at a regular apartment complex, but short of the care 
12 
 
 
and supervision at a nursing home.  See id.  Unlike regular 
apartment complexes, ALRs not only provide elderly residents 
with private living quarters but, as discussed supra, also 
furnish personal services to assist residents with daily tasks.  
See G. L. c. 19D, §§ 1, 10, 16.  "In support of the goal of 
aging in place, the services available . . . are added, 
increased or adjusted to compensate for the physical or 
cognitive impairment of the individual while maximizing the 
individual's dignity and independence."  St. 1994, c. 354, § 1.  
However, ALRs are not operated or regulated as medical or 
nursing facilities, and do not provide the level of extensive 
medical care available from those facilities.  See id.; G. L. 
c. 19D, § 18 (a).  Accordingly, individuals who require twenty-
four hour skilled nursing care may not reside in an ALR.  See 
G. L. c. 19D, § 11.  Indeed, ALRs may not house residents who 
require any skilled nursing care, unless the care falls within 
narrow limitations.7  See id.  See also G. L. c. 19D, § 18 (a) 
                     
 
7 Specifically, ALRs may only house residents who require 
skilled nursing care if all of the following conditions are met: 
 
"1.  The care will be provided by a home health agency 
certified under Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, 49 
Stat. 620 (1935), 42 U.S.C. [§§] 301, as amended or an 
entity licensed under [G. L. c. 111], on a part-time, 
intermittent basis for not more than a total of ninety days 
in any twelve-month period, or by a licensed hospice. 
 
13 
 
 
(exempting ALRs from statutes applicable to nursing homes and 
hospitals).  Thus, ALRs serve individuals who suffer from some 
cognitive or physical limitations that require additional 
assistance with daily tasks, but who do not need extensive 
medical care and wish to remain in a residential setting. 
 
As a prerequisite to operating in the Commonwealth, ALRs 
must apply for, and obtain, certification from the Executive 
Office of Elder Affairs (EOEA).  See G. L. c. 19D, §§ 3, 4.  
Applications for certification require ALRs to disclose an 
operating plan for the facility.  See G. L. c. 19D, § 4.  ALRs 
must also report whether the facility is "in sound fiscal 
condition" with "sufficient cash flow and reserves" to meet the 
needs of their residents' service plans.  See id.  An ALR's 
failure to maintain its certification will subject the operator 
of the facility to civil liability.  See G. L. c. 19D, § 8.  In 
order to receive or renew its certification, an ALR must submit 
to a compliance review of the premises at least once every two 
years.  See 651 Code Mass. Regs. § 12.09 (2017).  ALRs must also 
meet minimum management and staffing qualifications and adhere 
                     
"2.  The certified home health agency, entity licensed 
under [G. L. c. 111], or hospice does not train [ALR] staff 
to provide the skilled nursing care. 
 
"3.  The individual to whom the skilled nursing care is 
provided is suffering from a short-term illness." 
 
G. L. c. 19D, § 11. 
14 
 
 
to certain staff training requirements.  G. L. c. 19D, § 2 (ix); 
651 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 12.06, 12.07 (2017). 
 
To handle possible compliance issues, the ALR statutory and 
regulatory scheme provides for a Statewide ombudsman program 
that receives, investigates, and resolves resident complaints.  
See G. L. c. 19D, § 7; 651 Code Mass. Regs. § 13.09 (1995).  The 
ALR statute also provides an enumerated list of eighteen 
resident rights, including the right to "not be evicted from the 
[ALR] except in accordance with the provisions of landlord 
tenant law as established by [G. L. c. 186] or [G. L. c. 239]."  
G. L. c. 19D, § 9 (18).  The ALR statute does not, however, 
include a private right of action. 
 
2.  Discussion.  The issue presented in this case is 
whether the restrictions on initial residential lease fees 
contained within G. L. c. 186, § 15B, apply to ALRs certified 
pursuant to the ALR statute.  More broadly, it raises the issue 
whether and to what extent the ALR statute incorporates 
additional protections for residents that are not enumerated 
within the ALR statute itself.  Heritage characterizes the ALR 
statute as largely a stand-alone regulatory scheme addressing a 
distinct residential arrangement.  The plaintiff, by contrast, 
asserts that the ALR statute incorporates consumer protection 
laws, including the security deposit law, and ALRs fall well 
within the scope of the landlord-tenant relationships governed 
15 
 
 
by such laws.  The question is not an easy one.  The statute is 
a complex combination of stand-alone provisions and cross-
references to other "applicable" laws.  Whether a statute is 
"applicable" in whole, in part, or not at all is not always 
clear.  Two different Superior Court judges in three separate 
cases carefully considered the question and reached opposite 
conclusions as to the applicability of the security deposit 
statute to ALRs.  We conclude that the ALR statute incorporates 
applicable consumer protection laws, including G. L. c. 186, 
§ 15B, but allows for additional upfront charges for the 
distinctive services ALR facilities provide that are not 
applicable to traditional landlord-tenant relationships. 
 
a.  Standard of review.  We interpret statutes in 
accordance with the intent of the Legislature.  See Meyer v. 
Veolia Energy N. Am., 482 Mass. 208, 211 (2019).  "Ordinarily, 
where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, it is 
conclusive as to legislative intent" (citation omitted).  Ciani 
v. MacGrath, 481 Mass. 174, 178 (2019).  Where the statutory 
language is ambiguous or unclear, however, our task is more 
complicated.  "Where the words of the statute are ambiguous, we 
strive to make it an effectual piece of legislation in harmony 
with common sense and sound reason and consistent with 
legislative intent" (quotation and citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Pon, 469 Mass. 296, 302 (2014).  We must also 
16 
 
 
take into account the interrelationship of different statutes.  
"In the absence of explicit legislative commands to the 
contrary, we construe statutes to harmonize and not to undercut 
each other."  School Comm. of Newton v. Newton Sch. Custodians 
Ass'n, Local 454, SEIU, 438 Mass. 739, 751 (2003). 
 
b.  Ambiguity of the ALR statute.  The extent to which the 
Legislature intended to provide ALR residents with the 
protections afforded by other statutes is not readily apparent 
from the plain language of the ALR statute.  The statute 
repeatedly makes reference to the fact that ALRs are subject to 
other "applicable" laws and regulations.  For example, G. L. 
c. 19D, § 16, requires ALRs to "meet the requirements of all 
applicable federal and state laws and regulations, including, 
but not limited to, the state sanitary code, state building and 
fire safety codes and regulations, and laws and regulations 
governing handicapped accessibility."8  Additionally, ALRs are 
                     
 
8 The ALR statute further provides that, "[i]n order to 
facilitate compliance with these laws and regulations, the 
[Executive Office of Elder Affairs (EOEA)], in consultation with 
the department of housing and community development and the 
executive office of public safety, shall compile and make 
available a list of all such applicable laws and regulations."  
G. L. c. 19D, § 16.  The EOEA does not appear to have compiled 
such a list.  Rather, the corresponding regulations parrot the 
same language found in the statute.  See 651 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 12.04(1)(e) (2017) ("Every [ALR] shall meet the requirements, 
of all applicable federal and state laws and regulations 
including, but not limited to, the state sanitary codes, state 
building and fire safety codes and laws and regulations 
governing use and access by persons with disabilities"). 
17 
 
 
required to enter into a written residency agreement with each 
resident that includes a "covenant to comply with applicable 
federal and state laws and regulations regarding consumer 
protection and protection from abuse, neglect and financial 
exploitation of the elderly and disabled."  G. L. c. 19D, § 14.  
Despite these references, the ALR statute does not identify 
which laws or regulations regarding consumer protection and 
protection from abuse, neglect, and financial exploitation of 
the elderly and disabled are "applicable" to ALRs.  Nor does the 
statute expressly address whether G. L. c. 186, § 15B, is 
applicable.  There is only one reference to G. L. c. 186 -- the 
ALR statute provides that tenants may be evicted only in 
accordance with G. L. c. 186 and G. L. c. 239.  See G. L. 
c. 19D, § 9 (18). 
 
Each party urges us to draw inferences selectively from the 
ALR statute's ambiguity.  The plaintiff relies on the language 
in the ALR statute generally incorporating applicable consumer 
protection laws.  The plaintiff also relies on the failure to 
include the security deposit statute in a list of laws 
referenced in the ALR statute as being inapplicable.9  The 
                     
 
9 The statute explicitly states that ALRs "shall not be 
subject to the provisions of" G. L. c. 1ll, §§ 25B-25H, 51, 70E-
73B, or G. L. c. 40A, § 9, seventh par.  G. L. c. 19D, § 18 (a).  
These laws primarily pertain to the statutory schemes governing 
18 
 
 
defendant contends that the Legislature's explicit reference to 
G. L. c. 186 with regard to evictions implies that the 
Legislature did not intend for G. L. c. 186 to otherwise apply.10  
Neither proffered explanation is wholly satisfactory, as each 
relies on selective readings of the statutory language. 
 
c.  Harmonizing the ALR statute with preexisting law.  To 
resolve the ambiguity, we look at the statute holistically to 
determine its intent.  See Casseus v. Eastern Bus Co., 478 Mass. 
786, 795 (2018).  See also Adams v. Boston, 461 Mass. 602, 613 
(2012) (employing maxim that "[s]eemingly contradictory 
provisions of a statute must be harmonized so that the enactment 
as a whole can effectuate the presumed intent of the 
Legislature" [citation omitted]).  We also recognize that, 
whenever possible, "a statute is to be interpreted in harmony 
with prior enactments to give rise to a consistent body of law."  
                     
hospitals, nursing homes, and other long-term care facilities.  
See 651 Code Mass. Regs. § 12.14 (2017). 
 
 
10 We also note that it is not immediately clear which 
portions of G. L. c. 186 are implicated by the ALR statute's 
reference to eviction proceedings.  For example, eviction 
actions under G. L. c. 186 may implicate G. L. c. 186, § 15B, to 
the extent such evictions involve impermissible penalties, see 
Commonwealth v. Chatham Dev. Co., 49 Mass. App. Ct. 525, 527-528 
(2000), or the failure to return a security deposit 
posteviction, see Vinton v. Demetrion, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 948, 
949 (1985).  Further, we have held that a violation of the 
security deposit statute may be asserted as a defense to a 
summary process action for possession under G. L. c. 239.  See 
Meikle v. Nurse, 474 Mass. 207, 213-214 (2016). 
19 
 
 
Jancey v. School Comm. of Everett, 421 Mass. 482, 496 (1995).  
See County Comm'rs of Middlesex County v. Superior Court, 371 
Mass. 456, 460 (1976) ("Statutes which do not necessarily 
conflict should be construed to have consistent directives so 
that both may be given effect").  "Where two statutes appear to 
be in conflict, . . . we 'endeavor to harmonize the two statutes 
so that the policies underlying both may be honored.'"  George 
v. National Water Main Cleaning Co., 477 Mass. 371, 378 (2017), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Harris, 443 Mass. 714, 725 (2005).  We 
conclude that when the two statutes at issue here are read 
holistically, they can be harmonized as follows:  the security 
deposit law was meant to be incorporated by the ALR statute to 
the extent that it is applicable to ALRs, but ALRs may also 
charge additional upfront fees for the distinct services that 
such facilities provide that are not applicable to ordinary 
landlord-tenant relationships. 
 
We begin with the express statutory language of the ALR 
statute.  In so doing, we presume that the Legislature enacted 
the ALR statute with full knowledge of the security deposit 
statute that preceded it.  Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, 
Inc. v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 457 Mass. 663, 673 (2010).  
The ALR statute requires ALRs to include a provision within 
their residency agreements "to comply with applicable federal 
and state laws and regulations regarding consumer protection and 
20 
 
 
protection from abuse, neglect and financial exploitation of the 
elderly and disabled."  G. L. c. 19D, § 14.  We conclude that 
the security deposit statute, G. L. c. 186, § 15B, is an 
"applicable" consumer protection law, at least to the extent 
that ALRs resemble a traditional landlord-tenant relationship.  
As we have previously recognized, tenant protections are firmly 
rooted within the Commonwealth's consumer protection laws.  See 
Humphrey v. Byron, 447 Mass. 322, 327 (2006) ("modern notions of 
consumer protection have played a role in the development of the 
law regarding residential leases" [quotation and citation 
omitted]).  This is so because residential tenants generally 
inhabit an inferior bargaining position relative to their 
landlords, and the Legislature has enacted laws such as the 
security deposit statute out of concern for their welfare.  See 
Mellor, 390 Mass. at 282.  Such protections are particularly 
significant for elderly tenants, who are among the most needy 
and vulnerable segments of our population.  See Lowell Hous. 
Auth. v. Melendez, 449 Mass. 34, 40 (2007).  They are greatly 
dependent upon, and benefited by, such laws.  If the security 
deposit statute were not applicable to ALRs, ALR residents would 
be in a worse position than other elderly residents living in 
their own apartments.  They would also be without the extensive 
regulatory protections that inure to nursing home residents.  We 
21 
 
 
discern no intention by the Legislature to leave this particular 
group of elderly residents unprotected relative to their peers. 
 
The implication of such tenant protections within the ALR 
context also comports with the significant similarities between 
ALR residencies and residential tenancies.  An ALR must enter 
into a written residency agreement with each resident that is 
akin to a lease; the residency agreement sets forth the rights 
and responsibilities of both the resident and the entity that 
runs the ALR.  See G. L. c. 19D, § 14.  The agreement must also 
specify "the conditions under which the agreement may be 
terminated by either party," as well as "reasonable rules for 
conduct and behavior."  Id.  Additionally, each resident's unit 
must include amenities traditionally found in an apartment, such 
as lockable doors, private bathrooms, and kitchenettes or access 
to kitchen amenities.  See G. L. c. 19D, § 16.  See also 651 
Code Mass. Regs. § 12.04(1) (2017).  Moreover, ALR residents are 
entitled to protections resembling the warranties of 
habitability and quiet enjoyment provided to residential 
tenants.  See G. L. c. 19D, § 9 (1), (3).  These components of 
the ALR statute reflect the Legislature's intent to ensure that 
such facilities constitute a suitable residential environment.11  
                     
 
11 Notably, the Legislature repeatedly made reference to the 
residential nature of ALRs in articulating the purpose of the 
ALR statute: 
22 
 
 
Indeed, the Legislature explicitly states that ALRs "should be 
operated and regulated as residential environments with 
supportive services and not as medical or nursing facilities."  
St. 1994, c. 354, § 1. 
 
In sum, we conclude that the security deposit statute is a 
consumer protection law applicable to ALRs to the extent that 
ALRs resemble an ordinary landlord-tenant relationship.  This 
is, however, not the end of our analysis.  We must now consider 
the services that ALR facilities provide that are not applicable 
to ordinary landlord-tenant relationships, and determine whether 
ALR facilities may impose upfront fees for such services.  We 
conclude that they may. 
 
d.  The inapplicability of security deposit statute to 
distinct ALR services.  In analyzing the applicability or 
inapplicability of the security deposit statute, in part or in 
                     
 
"to promote the availability of services for elderly or 
disabled persons in a residential environment; to encourage 
the development of residential alternatives that promote 
the dignity, individuality, privacy and decision-making 
ability of such persons; to provide for the health, safety, 
and welfare of residents in [ALRs]; to promote continued 
improvement of such residential alternatives; to encourage 
the development of innovative and affordable residential 
alternatives for such persons; and to encourage the 
provision of economic, social and health services to 
residents through such residential alternatives by sponsors 
of [ALRs] and community agencies" (emphases added). 
 
St. 1994, c. 354, § 1. 
23 
 
 
whole, we must also examine the differences between ALRs and 
traditional landlord-tenant relationships.  We conclude that the 
important differences between these relationships, in 
combination with express language in the ALR statute allowing 
for particular charges, permit the imposition of fees for the 
distinct services ALRs provide, and that doing so does not 
constitute a violation of the security deposit statute. 
Here we focus on substance, not semantics.  To be sure, the 
ALR statute uses terms different from the traditional language 
of tenancy, employing the term "resident" rather than "tenant" 
and "residency agreement" rather than "lease."  G. L. c. 19D, 
§ 1.  More important, however, are the significant substantive 
differences between an ALR and a regular residential landlord.  
Chief among these is the ALR's obligation to provide multiple 
services to elderly residents needing assistance with activities 
of daily living, apart from mere possession of a rental unit.  
See APT Asset Mgt., Inc. v. Board of Appeals of Melrose, 50 
Mass. App. Ct. 133, 143 (2000) ("Landlords do not customarily 
provide their tenants with most of these [ALR] services nor are 
they required by law to do so").12 
                     
 
12 The ALR statute's definition of "elderly housing" 
elucidates this distinction.  Elderly housing, which falls 
outside the statute's purview, is defined as "any residential 
premises available for lease by elderly or disabled individuals 
which is financed or subsidized in whole or in part by state or 
24 
 
 
 
Indeed, while normal residential leaseholds do not 
contemplate, and certainly do not mandate, the provision of 
elderly assistance services, ALR residencies are premised upon 
them.  The provision of elderly assistance services is the means 
by which the Legislature contemplated that ALRs would allow the 
elderly to "age in place" in a residential setting, without 
prematurely moving to a nursing home.  See St. 1994, c. 354, 
§ 1.  By providing elderly residents with services that 
"compensate for the physical or cognitive impairment of the 
individual," ALRs ensure that the elderly can receive adequate 
assistance with daily tasks "while maximizing [their] dignity 
and independence."  Id.  These services are thus mandated by 
law.  They are, as explained supra, the sine qua non of ALRs.13 
 
Because the provision of services is at the core of what an 
ALR does for its residents, it is crucial that the services be 
tailored for each individual resident, and that the ALR have the 
                     
federal housing programs established primarily to furnish 
housing rather than housing and personal services" (emphasis 
added).  G. L. c. 19D, § 1.  This definition makes clear that 
the primary difference between ALRs and age-restricted housing 
turns on the provision of personal services. 
 
 
13 Even to the extent that a residential lease includes the 
provision of certain services to a tenant, such as those 
provided in a luxury apartment complex, they are distinguishable 
from the services furnished by ALRs.  While luxury apartment 
complexes may choose to provide additional amenities to tenants 
at their own discretion, ALRs are mandated by law to provide 
specific elderly assistance services tailored to the needs of 
their residents. 
25 
 
 
ability to appropriately furnish such services.  An ALR would 
not be able to adequately "provide for the health, safety, and 
welfare" of residents in accordance with the ALR statute's 
purpose if it admitted an individual that the ALR was ill 
equipped to care for.  See St. 1994, c. 354, § 1.  Moreover, the 
ALR statute requires that ALRs formulate individualized service 
plans for each of their residents, and the regulations specify 
that such plans are to be developed before the resident moves 
in.  See G. L. c. 19D, § 12 (a); 651 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 12.04(7).  Thus, a prospective ALR resident must also undergo 
an initial screening and assessment to determine whether the ALR 
is adequately suited to the prospective resident's particular 
needs.  See 651 Code Mass. Regs. § 12.04(6).  This constitutes 
one of the other most significant distinctions between ALR 
residencies and residential leases and has specific implications 
for the applicability of the security deposit statute.  Regular 
residential landlords are not mandated by statute or regulation 
to conduct the kind of assessment that ALRs are so mandated to 
conduct.  Thus, while landlords are strictly prohibited from 
imposing upfront charges that exceed those specifically 
enumerated in the security deposit statute, such a prohibition 
is incongruous in the context of an ALR, which is mandated to 
spend additional resources on initial resident assessments. 
26 
 
 
 
In recognition of this mandate, the ALR statute explicitly 
contemplates that ALRs may charge privately paying residents for 
such initial assessments.  Pursuant to G. L. c. 19D, § 13, 
residents eligible for financial assistance under G. L. c. 118E, 
which governs MassHealth, are entitled access to preadmission 
screening procedures and assessments.14  Section 13 provides in 
pertinent part: 
"All elderly residents or residents with special needs who 
seek admission to an [ALR] and who are eligible for the 
medical assistance program under [G. L. c. 118E], shall: 
 
"1.  Be afforded the opportunity to apply for [ALR] 
services, and be informed about the eligibility 
requirements and his or her rights and obligations under 
the program. 
 
"2.  Have an initial pre-screening assessment conducted for 
the purposes of determining eligibility for and need of 
assisted living services.  Such assessment shall consider 
the appropriateness of assisted living services for said 
resident, and other community-based alternatives that are 
appropriate and available. 
 
"3.  Have a service plan monitoring assessment conducted by 
an assessor at the site of the [ALR] resident annually from 
the date of initial occupancy.  Said monitoring assessment 
shall determine if the services provided to the resident 
are meeting his or her needs as determined in the service 
plan, the assessor shall report any instances of resident 
abuse or neglect pursuant to [G. L. c. 19A, § 15,] and 
[G. L. c. 111, § 72G]." 
 
                     
 
14 For ALR residents who receive financial assistance under 
G. L. c. 118E, the ALR statute specifies that such service plans 
are to be "developed in consultation with the pre-screening 
assessor as set forth in [G. L. c. 19D, § 13]."  G. L. c. 19D, 
§ 12 (a). 
27 
 
 
G. L. c. 19D, § 13.  Crucially, while this provision focuses on 
the rights of residents who receive financial assistance, it 
also states that privately paying residents "may be offered the 
services specified in said subparagraphs 1 to 3, inclusive, on a 
fee for service basis."15  Id.  Thus, by its very terms, the ALR 
statute permits ALRs to charge privately paying residents for 
initial prescreening assessments on a "fee for service basis."  
In interpreting this provision, "[w]e presume that the 
Legislature acts with full knowledge of existing laws."  
Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc., 457 Mass. at 673.  At 
the time of the ALR statute's passage in 1994, the security 
deposit statute had been in effect in its present form for 
nearly twenty years and was a mainstay of modern landlord-tenant 
law in the Commonwealth.  Accordingly, because the ALR statute, 
passed after the security deposit statute, explicitly permits 
upfront charges that pertain to initial resident assessments, 
                     
 
15 The overwhelming majority of individuals residing in ALRs 
appear to be privately paying residents.  According to the 
Massachusetts Assisted Living Association, approximately ninety 
percent of ALR residents in Massachusetts pay privately.  Mass-
ALA, Massachusetts Assisted Living Resource Guide 3 (2019).  In 
2018, only 2.9% of ALR residents were enrolled in Group Adult 
Foster Care, a benefit program provided by MassHealth that 
assists with personal care services and medication management 
expenses.  Executive Office of Elder Affairs, Assisted Living 
Residence Certification Program:  Resident Aggregate Information 
Annual Report 3 (2018), https://www.mass.gov/files/documents 
/2019/10/11/ALR%20Annual%20Distribution%20Report%20Summary%20-
%20CY2018%20%20%2010.8.19.pdf [https://perma.cc/RQW7-BS5H]. 
28 
 
 
while the security deposit statute does not, we conclude that 
the Legislature intended for such charges to be permissible.16 
 
This interpretation of the ALR statute is further bolstered 
by the corresponding ALR regulations.  In apparent recognition 
of the fee for service provision in G. L. c. 19D, § 13, the EOEA 
promulgated regulations that acknowledge that ALR residents may 
be charged an "administrative fee" in connection with their 
admission.  See 651 Code Mass. Regs. § 12.02 (2017).17  The 
                     
 
16 Other sections within the ALR statute similarly clarify 
how an ALR resident's rights under the security deposit statute 
are modified by the ALR's provision of services.  For example, 
while the security deposit statute strictly curtails a 
landlord's ability to enter a residential tenant's premises, see 
G. L. c. 186, § 15B (1) (a), the ALR statute provides that 
residents have a right to privacy within their living unit 
"subject to rules of the [ALR] reasonably designed to promote 
the health, safety and welfare of residents."  G. L. c. 19D, 
§ 9 (3).  This provision indicates that while an ALR resident 
has a right to privacy, this right may be subject to ALR-
specific exceptions, such as the need to enter a resident's 
living unit to provide daily services, to assist in an 
emergency, or to supervise access to kitchen amenities.  See 651 
Code Mass. Regs. § 12.04(1)(a) (2017) ("Residents shall have 
exclusive rights to their Units . . . .  [H]owever, as part of a 
Resident's Service Plan, keys or access codes may be readily 
available to specified shift staff"). 
 
17 The statute applicable to continuing care retirement 
communities also explicitly acknowledges "entrance fees."  See 
G. L. c. 93, § 76 (a) (defining entrance fee as "an initial or 
deferred transfer to a provider of a sum of money or other 
property made or promised to be made as full or partial 
consideration for acceptance of a specified individual as a 
resident in a facility").  At a hearing on the motion to 
dismiss, however, the defendant conceded that it is not a 
continuing care retirement community.  Nor has either party, or 
the amici, provided us with briefing on the issue.  Accordingly, 
we decline to consider the permissibility of upfront charges in 
continuing care retirement communities. 
29 
 
 
regulations define an administrative fee as "[a]ny charge billed 
to and payable by a Resident as a condition of admission, 
excluding room, board, and services."  Id.  The initial 
assessment activities that ALRs are mandated to conduct are 
unquestionably conditions of admission, and the regulatory 
definition recognizes that charges may be imposed for such 
activities, which fall outside the purview of regular monthly 
charges for room, board, and ongoing services.  As the EOEA is 
the agency charged with administering the ALR statute, its 
interpretation of the statute is entitled to deference.  See 
Camargo's Case, 479 Mass. 492, 497 (2018) ("In matters of 
statutory interpretation, deference is due when an agency 
interprets a statute it is charged with administering" 
[quotation and citation omitted]).  Thus, the fact that the EOEA 
contemplated that initial fees may be charged in accordance with 
G. L. c. 19D, § 13, further demonstrates that such charges are 
permissible. 
 
In summary, we conclude that the significant differences 
between ALRs and residential landlords, combined with the 
explicit language of the statute and the EOEA's interpretation 
thereof, indicate a legislative intent to allow ALRs to charge 
incoming residents initial fees that correspond to initial ALR-
specific services inapplicable to ordinary landlord-tenant 
relationships, without violating the security deposit statute. 
30 
 
 
 
e.  Permissibility of the community fee.  We turn now to 
the specific allegations advanced in the instant case.  To 
determine whether the community fee was charged in violation of 
the security deposit statute, it is necessary to examine both 
the purpose for which the fee was imposed as well as the 
specific way in which the fee was used.  To be permissible, the 
purpose and the use of the community fee must correspond to 
either the on-boarding services enumerated in G. L. c. 19D, 
§ 13, or other services designed specifically for ALRs.  In 
other words, the permissibility of the community fee will hinge 
on a determination of (1) the actual purpose and use of the fee, 
and (2) whether such purpose and use are for distinctive ALR-
specific services, rather than general maintenance or other 
aspects of a generic residential tenancy. 
 
The plaintiff's complaint does not specify whether the 
community fee was used to charge solely for initial assessment 
services distinctive to the ALR.  The residency agreement, which 
both sides agree is applicable and should be considered in 
connection with the motion to dismiss, see note 5, supra, 
indicates that the community fee was directed toward "upfront 
staff administrative costs, the Resident's initial service 
coordination plan and move-in assistance, and [to] establish a 
replacement reserve for building improvements."  Of the four 
categories listed, the first three appear to pertain to 
31 
 
 
distinctive entry services provided by the ALRs.  Pursuant to 
our analysis supra, imposing the community fee for such purposes 
would appear to be permissible.18  In the instant case, however, 
the residency agreement indicates that the community fee is not 
limited to providing initial ALR-specific services.  The last 
category, which refers to establishing a replacement reserve for 
building improvements, appears much more open ended and 
potentially problematic.  It is unclear from the language in the 
residency agreement whether, and to what extent, this building 
reserve fund was used toward ALR-specific services, rather than 
generic building maintenance.  If this fee were just a generic 
building maintenance fee, imposed and used in the ordinary 
course, with no particular connection to structures, services, 
or requirements distinct to ALRs, it would fall afoul of the 
security deposit prohibitions applicable to the landlord-tenant 
relationship.  Given the breadth of the language in the 
plaintiff's residency agreement, and the uncertainty with which 
it applies, the motion to dismiss should not have been allowed.  
                     
 
18 Given the vagueness of the agreement and the complaint, 
and our conclusion that the motion to dismiss cannot be granted 
regarding the fourth component, we need not, however, 
definitively address this issue and decline to do so here. 
32 
 
 
At a minimum, factual development of the purpose and use of the 
building maintenance fee was required.19 
3.  Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the 
allowance of the defendant's motion to dismiss.  We remand the 
matter to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                     
 
19 Whether the community fee was, in fact, charged for each 
of the purposes listed in the residency agreement, or only a 
subset, is also a question of fact that cannot be resolved on 
the record before the court on a motion to dismiss.