Title: The Florida Bar v. Jonathan Stephen Schwartz
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC17-1391
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: November 7, 2019

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC17-1391 
____________ 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR, 
Complainant, 
 
vs. 
 
JONATHAN STEPHEN SCHWARTZ, 
Respondent. 
 
November 7, 2019 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
We have for review a referee’s report recommending that Respondent, 
Jonathan Stephen Schwartz, be found not guilty of professional misconduct.  We 
have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.  We disapprove the referee’s 
findings of fact and recommendation that Schwartz did not violate any Bar rules in 
his use of two defense exhibits during a pretrial deposition, and we remand to a 
newly appointed referee for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  We 
also disapprove the referee’s order that the parties bear their own costs. 
 
- 2 - 
BACKGROUND 
 
Schwartz is primarily a criminal defense attorney who was admitted to The 
Florida Bar (Bar) in 1986.  He became the subject of these Bar proceedings based 
upon his use of two defense exhibits during a pretrial deposition conducted on 
February 13, 2015, while representing the defendant in the case of State v. Virgil 
Woodson, Circuit Case No. 13-2013-CF-012946-0001-XX (Miami-Dade County, 
Florida).  The exhibits at issue included two photocopied versions of black and 
white police photo lineups in which the victim had originally signed her name and 
identified the defendant by circling both the defendant’s photograph and the 
designation below it of subject number five.  The exhibits also included the 
signature of the police officer who conducted the photo lineup.  The disciplinary 
issue here centers on the fact that Schwartz altered the photo lineup by replacing 
his client’s image in one exhibit with the image of an alternate suspect whom 
witnesses other than the victim had identified as the perpetrator and by changing 
the client’s image in the other exhibit by imposing the alternate subject’s hairstyle 
on the client’s image.  Although the images in the exhibits were altered in this 
manner, they nonetheless retained the circle around subject number five and the 
signatures of the victim and police officer below the photographs.  The Bar, in its 
complaint filed on July 27, 2017, alleged that Schwartz violated Rules Regulating 
the Florida Bar (Bar Rules) 3-4.3 (Misconduct and Minor Misconduct) and 4-
 
- 3 - 
8.4(c) (“A lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit 
or misrepresentation.”). 
The referee, in her report dated May 21, 2018, having heard testimony from 
the Bar complainant (former assistant state attorney Cristina Cabrera, who was 
lead prosecutor in the Woodson case), the court reporter at the deposition, 
Schwartz’s co-counsel in representing Woodson (Judy McGuire), attorney Barry 
Wax (presented as an expert defense lawyer), and Schwartz, found that 
“[Schwartz] made a messy (but clearly not deceitful) effort to comply with State v. 
[Mc]Williams[, 817 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)], with only black and white 
copies of the state’s photographic lineups that the state had given him in 
discovery.”  Report of Referee, at 7. 
Turning to the alleged rule violations, the referee wrote that “a violation of 
Rule 4-8.4(c) requires proof of ‘a purpose to deceive and not merely negligent 
misrepresentation or failure to apprise another of relevant information.’ ”  Id. at 22. 
The referee found that 
the Bar’s proof did not establish that [Schwartz] acted with any 
purpose or intent to deceive during the course of his handling the 
[victim’s] deposition.  The defense-created line-ups are not, in and of 
themselves, misleading, fraudulent, deceitful, or misrepresentations, 
and were not contrary to honesty or justice.  Nor was the manner of 
use of the defense-created line-ups capable of misleading the 
witnesses. 
 
 
- 4 - 
Id. at 22-23.  The referee found it significant that Schwartz “had only black and 
white photocopies of the state’s evidence to work with,” and that his substituting 
his client’s face with that of an alternate suspect he had “previously disclosed to 
the state was consistent with honesty and justice.”  Id. at 23.  The referee also 
relied upon the fact that the Bar admitted that there was not a single Bar 
disciplinary case on point. 
By separate order, the referee denied Schwartz’s Motion to Assess Costs and 
instead ordered the parties to bear their own costs. 
ANALYSIS 
The Court’s review of the referee’s findings of fact is limited, and if a 
referee’s findings of fact are supported by competent, substantial evidence in the 
record, this Court will not reweigh the evidence and substitute its judgment for that 
of the referee.  Fla. Bar v. Frederick, 756 So. 2d 79, 86 (Fla. 2000).  That is, “[a] 
referee’s findings of fact regarding guilt carry a presumption of correctness that 
should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the record.”  Fla. 
Bar v. Barrett, 897 So. 2d 1269, 1275 (Fla. 2005) (quoting Fla. Bar v. Spann, 682 
So. 2d 1070, 1073 (Fla. 1996)).  But as to the actual recommendations of guilt, the 
referee’s factual findings must be sufficient under the applicable rules to support 
the recommendations.  See Fla. Bar v. Shoureas, 913 So. 2d 554, 557-58 (Fla. 
2005).  Ultimately, the party challenging the referee’s findings of fact and 
 
- 5 - 
recommendations as to guilt has the burden to demonstrate “that there is no 
evidence in the record to support those findings or that the record evidence clearly 
contradicts the conclusions.”  Fla. Bar v. Germain, 957 So. 2d 613, 620 (Fla. 
2007). 
Bar Rule 4-8.4(c):  Bar Rule 4-8.4(c) provides in pertinent part that “[a] 
lawyer shall not . . . engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation.”  To sustain a violation of that rule, “the Bar must prove intent.”  
Fla. Bar v. Brown, 905 So. 2d 76, 81 (Fla. 2005).  The element of intent can be 
satisfied, however, “merely by showing that the conduct was deliberate or 
knowing.”  Id.  Therefore, the motive underlying the lawyer’s conduct is not 
determinative; instead the issue is whether he or she purposefully acted.  Fla. Bar 
v. Berthiaume, 78 So. 3d 503, 510 n.2 (Fla. 2011); Fla. Bar v. Riggs, 944 So. 2d 
167, 171 (Fla. 2006); see also Fla. Bar v. Smith, 866 So. 2d 41, 46 (Fla. 2004). 
Here, the referee improperly focused upon Schwartz’s asserted motive, 
which was to provide constitutionally effective assistance of counsel, apparently by 
attempting to undermine the victim’s identification of Schwartz’s client.  As the 
above-cited case law makes clear, Schwartz’s motive or purpose in acting is not 
determinative of a Bar Rule 4-8.4(c) violation.  Indeed, if motive were the standard 
for evaluating whether the rule was violated, there would be no reason for 
“absence of a dishonest or selfish motive” to be a mitigating factor.  See Fla. Std. 
 
- 6 - 
Imposing L. Sancs. 9.32(b).  Thus, notwithstanding the referee’s credibility 
findings and her finding that Schwartz did not subjectively intend to deceive the 
witness, this finding does not address the undisputed fact that Schwartz knowingly 
and deliberately created the defense exhibits by altering photocopies of the police 
lineups and showing them to the victim at the deposition.  Those exhibits included 
the victim’s circle of subject number five and the victim’s and detective’s 
signatures, along with a photograph of the so-called alternate subject replacing the 
defendant’s image, and a photograph altering the defendant’s image by imposing 
the alternate subject’s hairstyle. 
Our consideration of the defense-altered exhibits leads to the inevitable 
conclusion that they are deceptive on their face.  The referee, without elaboration, 
concluded that the exhibits “in and of themselves” were not “misleading, 
fraudulent, deceitful, or misrepresentations.”  This conclusion is unsupported by 
the record and patently erroneous.  The exhibits retained the witness’s circle 
identifying subject number five in the lineup as the perpetrator and the victim’s and 
detective’s signatures.  By their very nature, they conveyed the false message that 
the substituted photograph was the photograph that had been previously identified 
by the victim. 
Controlling precedent governing defense discovery using photo lineups also 
does not legitimize Schwartz’s conduct.  In McWilliams, 817 So. 2d at 1036-37, 
 
- 7 - 
the Third District Court of Appeal addressed the propriety of defense counsel using 
two police lineups each containing one of the defendants during a deposition of a 
State witness.  The State had objected to the defense’s use of the lineups and 
refused to let the witness answer.  As explained by the district court, 
[t]he defense moved the trial court for an order permitting them to use 
the police photo line-ups in depositions of all state witnesses who 
made an (alleged) out-of-court identification of the defendants[, and 
t]he trial court ruled that the defendants could use the police photo 
line-ups in the depositions of those state witnesses who identified 
either defendant from them. 
 
Id. at 1036.  In upholding the trial court’s ruling, the Third District observed that 
the exhibits used by the defense “involved the actual police photo line-ups, not 
photo arrays prepared by the defense.”  Id. at 1037.  And, in State v. Kuntsman, 
643 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994), the Third District held that Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.220, Discovery, does not accord the trial judge the authority 
to compel a prosecution witness to view a defendant’s photo array of thirty-eight 
photographs, absent strong or compelling reasons.  Id. at 1173.  That is, the 
discovery rule “is not intended to provide defendants with an opportunity to build 
their cases during the discovery process by ‘creating’ evidence, i.e. 
misidentifications.”  Id. at 1174. 
 
Here, the referee erroneously concluded that Schwartz’s conduct comported 
with the dictates of McWilliams and Kuntsman.  Contrary to the referee’s 
conclusion, that authority does not permit lawyers to use “police line-ups and to 
 
- 8 - 
create their own line-ups when needed to test the accuracy of witness 
identifications” in the manner done by Schwartz.  Report of Referee, at 15.  While 
Schwartz believed it necessary to test the witness’s identification based upon 
evidence of another person being the actual perpetrator, a factual matter that we do 
not reweigh if supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record, see Fla. 
Bar v. D’Ambrosio, 25 So. 3d 1209, 1215 (Fla. 2009), that does not give rise to the 
right to use inherently deceptive lineups.  To the contrary, the manipulation of the 
police photo lineups here is more akin to that not permitted in Kuntsman and is not 
the same as use of the actual police lineups as in McWilliams.  While the referee 
focused upon the fact that the defense could only use black and white exhibits 
because that was what the State provided in discovery, she did not address 
Schwartz’s use of the lineups retaining the victim’s circle around subject number 
five and the signatures in concluding that Schwartz complied with McWilliams.  
Moreover, the referee’s reliance upon Schwartz’s expert for the legal conclusion 
that Schwartz acted properly under the case is misplaced.  See Cty. of Volusia v. 
Kemp, 764 So. 2d 770, 773 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (“[A]n expert should not be 
allowed to render an opinion which applies a legal standard to a set of facts.”). 
 
Accordingly, notwithstanding the referee’s credibility findings and her 
finding that Schwartz’s subjective intent was not to deceive the witness, in light of 
Schwartz’s intent in creating the deposition exhibits and the deceptive nature of the 
 
- 9 - 
exhibits themselves and that they do not comport with controlling case law, we 
disapprove the referee’s recommendation and conclude that Schwartz violated Bar 
Rule 4-8.4(c). 
Bar Rule 3-4.3:  Bar Rule 3-4.3 provides in pertinent part: “The commission 
by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and justice may 
constitute a cause for discipline whether the act is committed in the course of the 
lawyer’s relations as an attorney or otherwise . . . .”  The Court has found that this 
rule has been violated where the attorney has engaged in misrepresentations, Fla. 
Bar v. Stillman, 606 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 1992); Fla. Bar v. Williams, 604 So. 2d 447 
(Fla. 1992), or other misleading conduct, Fla. Bar v. Beach, 699 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 
1997).  While the referee repeatedly stated that Schwartz’s use of the defense-
created exhibits was either not contrary to, or was consistent with, honesty and 
justice, the exhibits themselves establish the opposite.  In light of the discussion 
pertaining to Bar Rule 4-8.4(c), we disapprove the referee’s recommendation that 
Schwartz did not violate Bar Rule 3-4.3. 
 
Costs:  Based upon our determination that Schwartz violated the Bar Rules 
as charged, we further disapprove the referee’s determination that the Respondent 
and the Bar bear their own costs.  See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.6(q)(3). 
 
- 10 - 
CONCLUSION 
 
We conclude that the referee’s conclusion that Respondent did not violate 
Rules Regulating the Florida Bar 3-4.3 and 4-8.4(c) was clearly erroneous.  
Therefore, we disapprove the referee’s report and remand this case to a newly 
appointed referee for a hearing limited to a determination of recommended 
discipline.  Finally, we also disapprove the referee’s determination that the parties 
bear their own costs, and direct that the Bar submit its statement of costs, pursuant 
to Bar Rule 3-7.6(q)(5), following the additional proceedings before the newly 
appointed referee. 
 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LABARGA, LAWSON, LAGOA, LUCK, and 
MUÑIZ, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar 
 
Joshua E. Doyle, Executive Director, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida, Adria 
E. Quintela, Staff Counsel, The Florida Bar, Sunrise, Florida, and Thomas Allen 
Kroeger, Bar Counsel, The Florida Bar, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Complainant 
 
Benedict P. Kuehne and Michael T. Davis of Kuehne Davis Law, P.A., Miami, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent