Title: Edward Zabilowicz v. Roslyne Kelsey
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: December 17, 2009

Edward Zabilowicz v. Roslyne Kelsey Annotate this Case SYLLABUS(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Edward Zabilowicz v. Roslyne Kelsey (A-87-08)Argued October 14, 2009 -- Decided December 17, 2009ALBIN, J., writing for a unanimous Court. The Court considers whether plaintiff Edward Zabilowicz, a Pennsylvania resident whose automobile insurance carrier was authorized to do business in New Jersey, is bound by the limitation-on-lawsuit threshold and barred from suing for noneconomic injuries caused by another Pennsylvania resident, defendant Roslyne Kelsey, who was not insured by a carrier doing business in New Jersey and therefore was not entitled to New Jersey PIP benefits. Zabilowicz filed a lawsuit in Atlantic County alleging that on October 18, 2005, Kelsey's automobile struck his Chevy truck from behind while he was stopped in traffic at an intersection in Pleasantville, New Jersey. Zabilowicz alleged that he suffered severe, permanent, and painful bodily injuries. Both Zabilowicz and Kelsey are residents of Pennsylvania and are covered by automobile insurance policies written in that state. Plaintiff is insured by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, which is authorized to do business in New Jersey. Kelsey's insurance carrier, Infinity, is not authorized to do business in New Jersey. Kelsey moved for summary judgment, asserting that Zabilowicz's injuries did not satisfy the limitation-on- lawsuit threshold and therefore he could not collect damages for pain and suffering. Zabilowicz conceded that his injuries would not permit him to sue for noneconomic damages if the threshold applied. However, he argued that the threshold can only be invoked by defendants who have been issued insurance policies by companies doing business in New Jersey and are thus entitled to receive PIP benefits. The trial court determined that the limitation- on-lawsuit threshold applied to Zabilowicz by reason of the Deemer Statute, N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.4. Because he did not have a qualifying injury under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a)(identifying six categories of injuries that vault the threshold), the court granted the motion for summary judgment and dismissed Zabilowicz's personal injury action. The Appellate Division affirmed in an unpublished decision. The Supreme Court granted Zabilowicz's petition for certification. 198 N.J. 474 (2009).HELD: In this automobile insurance case, under the plain language of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a), the limitation-on- lawsuit threshold can be invoked only by a defendant who is eligible to receive New Jersey PIP benefits. Because the defendant's out-of-state insurance policy does not provide her with this State's PIP benefits, she is subject to suit for noneconomic damages without restriction under that statute.1. Under New Jersey's no-fault insurance system, owners of motor vehicles registered or principally garaged in New Jersey have certain legal obligations. First, they must purchase standard, basic or special insurance coverage for their automobile. Second, every policy must provide personal injury protection (PIP) benefits--the payment of medical expenses to the insured and family household members who suffer bodily injury in an automobile accident. Those medical benefits are paid without regard to who caused the accident ("no-fault insurance"). Third, New Jersey policyholders, in exchange for lower premium payments, have the option of selecting the limitation-on- lawsuit threshold, which restricts their right to sue for "noneconomic loss" if they are injured in an accident. Those covered by the threshold may not sue a tortfeasor for noneconomic damages unless they suffer a serious or permanent bodily injury, as defined in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a). Under the same provision, a New Jersey policyholder who chooses the threshold may sue for noneconomic damages if the tortfeasor is not a participant in this State's no- fault system and therefore is not insured for PIP benefits. (Pp. 1-3)2. N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.4, the Deemer Statute, and N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a) define when the limitation-on-lawsuit threshold shall apply to an out-of-state plaintiff bringing a personal injury action arising from an automobile accident. To interpret these enactments, the Court reads them in context with each other and with the overall legislative schemegoverning automobile insurance. The Court presumes that the Legislature intended the outcome dictated by the statutes' clear language. (Pp. 6-8)3. The Deemer Statute requires that insurers authorized to transact automobile insurance business in New Jersey provide coverage to out-of-state residents consistent with New Jersey law whenever the automobile insured under the policy is used or operated in this State. The required coverage includes liability insurance, uninsured motorist insurance, and personal injury protection benefits. In addition, the Deemer Statute provides that the named insured and the immediate family members "shall be subject to the tort option specified in subsection a. of [N.J.S.A. 39:6A- 8]." In short, the Deemer Statute furnishes the covered out-of-state driver with New Jersey's statutory no-fault PIP and other benefits and, in exchange, deems that driver to have selected the limitation-on-lawsuit option of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a). Here, Zabilowicz is insured by a carrier transacting automobile insurance in New Jersey and therefore is bound by the Deemer Statute. Because Kelsey is not insured by a carrier doing business in this State, she does not fall within the sweep of the Deemer Statute and is not covered by the no-fault PIP provisions. The question before the Court in this case is whether an out-of-state defendant not eligible for New Jersey PIP benefits can invoke the limitation-on-lawsuit threshold against a plaintiff covered by the Deemer Statute. (Pp. 8-11)4. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a) states that a defendant who wishes to invoke the limitation-on-lawsuit threshold against a plaintiff must demonstrate eligibility for no-fault PIP benefits under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3.1, -3.3, or -3.4. Unless the defendant meets this burden, the remainder of the statute does not apply, including the requirement that a plaintiff prove that he or she sustained one of the six qualifying injuries. One of the rationales for the limitation-on-lawsuit threshold is to offset the costs to insurers of a system that mandates the prompt payment of medical expenses resulting from automobile accidents. An insurer of a defendant not participating in New Jersey's no-fault system is not subject to the monetary quid pro quo that justifies making the threshold available to a PIP defendant. For that reason, a defendant ineligible for PIP benefits cannot assert the threshold as a defense. (Pp. 11-13)5. The plain language of the statutes makes clear that an out-of-state defendant who is not eligible to receive New Jersey PIP benefits may be sued for pain and suffering damages without regard to the threshold. If the Legislature, through the Deemer Statute, intended to restrict Zabilowicz's right to sue for pain and suffering caused by the negligence of an out-of-state driver who is not part of New Jersey's PIP system, it could have drafted the statute to achieve that result. Nothing in the legislative history conflicts with this finding. The quid pro quo presented to New Jersey drivers under our no-fault system is no different for out-of-state residents insured by carriers doing business in this State. Under the Deemer Statute, in exchange for prompt payment of medical bills, the out-of-state insured gives up the unlimited right to sue for pain and suffering, provided that the defendant is eligible to receive New Jersey PIP benefits. A defendant--such as the one here--who is not participating in New Jersey's no-fault system does not receive the benefit of invoking the N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a) limitation-on-lawsuit as a defense. (Pp. 13-16)6. A defendant who causes an automobile accident and is not eligible for PIP benefits cannot bind a plaintiff to the limitation-on-lawsuit threshold set forth in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a). Under the Deemer Statute, Zabilowicz could have been subject to the limitation-on-lawsuit threshold because he had no qualifying injury under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a). In this case, however, he is not statutorily barred from recovering pain and suffering damages because Kelsey is ineligible to collect New Jersey PIP benefits. (Pp. 16-17) The grant of summary judgment in Kelsey's favor is REVERSED, and the matter is REMANDED to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, WALLACE, RIVERA-SOTO and HOENS join in JUSTICE ALBIN's opinion. JUSTICE LONG did not participate. 2 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 87 September Term 2008EDWARD ZABILOWICZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.ROSLYNE KELSEY, Defendant-Respondent. Argued October 14, 2009 ­ Decided December 17, 2009 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Frank N. DiMeo, Jr., argued the cause for appellant (Rosen, Schafer & DiMeo, attorneys). Sanford D. Kaplan argued the cause for respondent (Muscio & Kaplan, attorneys). JUSTICE ALBIN delivered the opinion of the Court. Under New Jersey's system of no-fault automobile insurance,owners of motor vehicles registered or principally garaged inNew Jersey have certain legal obligations. First, they mustpurchase standard, basic, or special insurance coverage for N.J.S.A. 39:6B-1; see also Caviglia v. Royal their automobiles.Tours of Am., 178 N.J. 460, 466 (2004). Second, everyautomobile insurance policy must provide "personal injuryprotection [(PIP)] benefits" -- the payment of medical expensesto the insured and his family household members who sufferbodily injury in an automobile accident. See N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4,-3.1(a), -3.3(b)(1); see also Caviglia, supra, 178 N.J. at 466.Those medical benefits are paid without regard to who caused theaccident, giving rise to the moniker "no-fault" insurance.Caviglia, supra, 178 N.J. at 466; see also N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.Third, New Jersey policyholders -- in exchange for lower premiumpayments -- have the option of selecting the limitation-on-lawsuit threshold, which restricts their right to sue for"noneconomic loss" if injured in an accident.1 DiProspero v.Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 480-81 & n.1 (2005); see also N.J.S.A.39:6A-8(a). Those covered by the limitation-on-lawsuit threshold maynot sue a tortfeasor for noneconomic damages unless they suffera serious or permanent bodily injury, as defined in N.J.S.A.39:6A-8(a) (identifying six categories of injuries that vault DiProspero, supra, 183 N.J. limitation-on-lawsuit threshold).at 481, 497-98. Significantly, a New Jersey policyholder whochooses the lawsuit threshold may nonetheless sue fornoneconomic damages if the tortfeasor is not a participant in1 The lawsuit threshold applies to "the named insured and any immediate family member residing in the named insured's household." N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8.1(a). "`Noneconomic loss' means pain, suffering and inconvenience." N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(i). 2this State's no-fault system and therefore is not insured forPIP benefits. See N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a). In this case, plaintiff, a Pennsylvania resident, whiledriving a vehicle in New Jersey, was allegedly rear-ended by acar operated by defendant, also a Pennsylvania resident.Although both had automobile insurance, only plaintiff wasinsured by a carrier authorized to do business in New Jersey.N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.4 -- known as the "Deemer Statute" -- providesbenefits and burdens to out-of-state drivers insured bycompanies authorized to do business in New Jersey.2 On the onehand, such out-of-state drivers, like New Jersey policyholders,receive PIP benefits on a no-fault basis under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4;on the other hand, they are subject to the limitation-on-lawsuitthreshold, as defined in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a). The issue before us is whether, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.4, plaintiff is bound by the limitation-on-lawsuit thresholdwhen an out-of-state tortfeasor, such as defendant, is notinsured by a carrier doing business in New Jersey and therefore2 N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.4 apparently acquired its name as the Deemer Statute because it "deems" New Jersey insurance coverage and tort limitations to apply to out-of-state policies. Cf. Whitaker v. DeVilla, 147 N.J. 341, 344 (1997); see also Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 358 N.J. Super. 555, 560 (App. Div. 2003) ("[F]rom this consequence, the law acquired the name by which it is commonly known, the [D]eemer [S]tatute."); Lusby v. Hitchner, 273 N.J. Super. 578, 583-84 (App. Div. 1994) ("[T]he statute eponymously `deems' that the policy includes the required coverage."). 3is not entitled to New Jersey PIP benefits. The trial courtdismissed plaintiff's personal injury suit because he could notprove a qualifying injury under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a). TheAppellate Division affirmed. We now reverse. Plaintiff is subject to all of theprovisions of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a) pursuant to the DeemerStatute. Under the plain language of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a), thelimitation-on-lawsuit threshold can be invoked only by adefendant who is eligible to receive New Jersey PIP benefits.Because defendant's out-of-state insurance policy does notprovide her with this State's PIP benefits, she is subject tosuit for noneconomic damages without restriction under N.J.S.A.39:6A-8(a). I. Plaintiff Edward Zabilowicz filed a lawsuit in the AtlanticCounty Superior Court, Law Division, alleging that on October18, 2005, defendant Roslyne Kelsey's automobile struck his Chevytruck from behind while he was stopped in traffic at anintersection in Pleasantville, New Jersey. Plaintiff claimsthat, as a result of defendant's negligence, he has "sufferedsevere, permanent and painful bodily injuries." Both plaintiff and defendant are residents of Pennsylvaniaand are covered by automobile insurance policies written in that 4state. Plaintiff is insured by State Farm Mutual AutomobileInsurance Company, which is authorized to do business in NewJersey. Defendant's insurance carrier, Infinity, is notauthorized to do business in this State. Defendant moved for summary judgment, asserting thatplaintiff's injuries did not satisfy the limitation-on-lawsuitthreshold and therefore plaintiff could not collect damages forpain and suffering. Plaintiff responded that under the plainterms of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a), the limitation-on-lawsuitthreshold did not apply. He argued that the threshold can onlybe invoked by defendants who have been issued insurance policiesby companies doing business in New Jersey and are thus entitledto receive PIP benefits. Plaintiff conceded that his injuriesdid not fall into any of the six categories in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a). Accordingly, plaintiff could not sue for noneconomicdamages if the threshold applied. For purposes of the summary judgment motion, the partiesdid not dispute any material facts. On the contested issue oflaw, the court determined that the limitation-on-lawsuitthreshold applied to plaintiff by reason of the Deemer Statute.Because plaintiff did not have a qualifying injury underN.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a) that allowed him to sue for pain and 5suffering, the court granted summary judgment in favor ofdefendant and dismissed plaintiff's personal injury action.3 In an unpublished per curiam opinion, the AppellateDivision affirmed the dismissal of the action. The panel alsoconcluded that "an out-of-state plaintiff insured by aninsurance company authorized to transact business in New Jerseyis subject to the New Jersey verbal threshold limitation underthe [D]eemer [S]tatute."4 We granted plaintiff's petition for certification.Zabilowicz v. Kelsey, 198 N.J. 474 (2009). II. Plaintiff and defendant contest the interpretation of ourlaws, not the facts of the case. We review the law de novo andowe no deference to the trial court and Appellate Division ifthey have wrongly interpreted a statute. M.S. v. Millburn3 The payment of plaintiff's recoverable medical expenses is not at issue. Those expenses, apparently, were paid by plaintiff's insurance company. 4 We note that "verbal" threshold is used as a shorthand term to describe the limitation-on-lawsuit threshold. The modern "limitation on lawsuit" threshold was adopted as part of the 1998 Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act (AICRA). L. 1998, c. 21, § 11. It replaced the older "verbal" threshold, which required a plaintiff to show that her injuries met one of nine statutory categories and that she had suffered a serious life impact. See generally DiProspero, supra, 183 N.J. at 485-89 (discussing development of tort limitations in New Jersey automobile insurance law). 6Police Dep't, 197 N.J. 236, 246 n.10 (2008); Manalapan Realty,L.P. v. Twp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995) ("A trial court'sinterpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flowfrom established facts are not entitled to any specialdeference."). In deciding the issue before us, we must look to theinterrelationship between two statutes, N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.4, theDeemer Statute, and N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a), which define when thelimitation-on-lawsuit threshold shall apply to an out-of-stateplaintiff bringing a personal injury action arising from anautomobile accident. Both statutes are part of New Jersey'scomprehensive scheme of no-fault automobile insurance. We begin as we must with the plain language of thestatutes, mindful that the ordinary meaning and significancegiven to the words chosen by the Legislature are generally thebest indicators of statutory intent. DiProspero, supra, 183 N.J. at 492. We must read the two applicable statutes incontext with each other and in context with the overalllegislative scheme governing automobile insurance. Ibid. It isour purpose to give life to the statutory language, not to"rewrite a plainly-written enactment of the Legislature." Ibid.(citation omitted). Therefore, we will presume that theLegislature intended the outcome dictated by the clear languageof the statute. Ibid. Only if the words of the enactment are 7shrouded in ambiguity will we turn to other sources in search oflegislative intent. Id. at 492-93. A. We first look to the specific language of the Deemer N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.4 requires insurers authorized to Statute.transact automobile insurance business in New Jersey to providecoverage to out-of-state residents consistent with New Jerseylaw "whenever the automobile or motor vehicle insured under thepolicy is used or operated in this State." Under the DeemerStatute, those insurance companies must provide out-of-stateresidents with liability insurance pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6B-1or N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3, uninsured motorist insurance pursuant toN.J.S.A. 17:28-1.1, and personal injury protection benefitspursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 or N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.3. In additionto that mandated coverage, the Deemer Statute provides that thenamed insured and his or her immediate family members "shall besubject to the tort option specified in subsection a. of[N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8]." 5 N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.4. In short, the Deemer5 For purposes of our analysis, the relevant part of N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.4 reads: In addition, any insurer authorized to transact or transacting automobile or motor vehicle insurance business in this State, or controlling or controlled by, or under common control by, or with, an insurer 8Statute furnishes the covered out-of-state driver with NewJersey's statutory no-fault PIP and other benefits and, inexchange, deems that driver to have selected the limitation-on-lawsuit option of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a).6 authorized to transact or transacting automobile or motor vehicle insurance business in this State, which sells a policy providing automobile or motor vehicle liability insurance coverage, or any similar coverage, in any other state or in any province of Canada, shall include in each policy coverage to satisfy at least the liability insurance requirements of [N.J.S.A. 39:6B-1(a)] or [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3], the uninsured motorist insurance requirements of [N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.1(a)], and personal injury protection benefits coverage pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4] or of [N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.3], whenever the automobile or motor vehicle insured under the policy is used or operated in this State. Any liability insurance policy subject to this section shall be construed as providing the coverage required herein, and any named insured, and any immediate family member as defined in [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8.1], under that policy, shall be subject to the tort option specified in subsection a. of [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8]. 6 Extending this State's liability and no-fault insurance laws to covered out-of-state drivers generates a real benefit to both New Jersey residents injured by those drivers and medical providers. Our injured residents can turn to an insurance policy at least as generous as one that must be maintained by a New Jersey driver. See Cynthia M. Craig & Daniel J. Pomeroy, New Jersey Auto Insurance Law: No Fault (PIP), Uninsured & Underinsured Motorists § 3:3 at 59 (2009). Additionally, medical providers in this State tending to the injuries suffered by the covered out-of-state driver are ensured that their 9 In Whitaker v. DeVilla, we upheld the constitutionality ofthe Deemer Statute, which imposed the limitation-on-lawsuitthreshold on an out-of-state plaintiff. 147 N.J. 341, 355-58(1997). We found that the Legislature, in an effort to containthe rising cost of automobile insurance premiums, made aconstitutionally permissible policy determination by imposingthe limitation-on-lawsuit threshold on non-residents who areinjured in New Jersey and insured by carriers authorized to Id. at 356-57. We transact insurance business in this State.noted that the limitation-on-lawsuit option is deemed to applyeven if a plaintiff has selected, and paid for, full tortcoverage in his out-of-state insurance policy. Id. at 355-56.In Whitaker, the defendant/tortfeasor presumably was insured forPIP benefits under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4. The Pennsylvania plaintiff in this case is insured by acarrier transacting automobile insurance in New Jersey andtherefore is bound by the Deemer Statute. Because defendant isnot insured by a carrier doing business in this State, she doesnot fall within the sweep of the Deemer Statute and is notcovered by the no-fault PIP provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4. Wemedical bills will be paid to the extent of the applicable PIP coverage. See Adams v. Keystone Ins. Co., 264 N.J. Super. 367, 377-78 (App. Div. 1993) ("New Jersey has an interest in ensuring that persons injured in this state receive prompt and proper medical care and in assuring that the medical care facilities and practitioners who provide such care will be paid."). 10must address the issue that was not before the Whitaker Court --whether an out-of-state defendant not eligible for New JerseyPIP benefits can invoke the limitation-on-lawsuit thresholdagainst a plaintiff covered by the Deemer Statute. We now turn to "the tort option specified in subsection a.of [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8]" that is applicable to plaintiff under theDeemer Statute. B. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8 reads in relevant part: a. Limitation on lawsuit option. Every owner, registrant, operator or occupant of an automobile to which [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4], personal injury protection coverage, [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3.1], medical expense benefits coverage, or [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3.3] regardless of fault, applies, . . . is hereby exempted from tort liability for noneconomic loss to a person who is subject to this subsection and who is either a person who is required to maintain personal injury protection coverage pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4], medical expense benefits pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3.1] or benefits pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3.3], or is a person who has a right to receive benefits under [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4], [N.J.S.A. 39:6A- 3.1] or [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3.3], as a result of bodily injury, arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of such automobile in this State, unless that person has sustained a bodily injury which results in death; dismemberment; significant disfigurement or significant scarring; displaced fractures; loss of a fetus; or a permanent injury within a reasonable degree 11 of medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement. [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a) (emphasis added).]7 By the clear language of the statute, a defendant whowishes to invoke the limitation-on-lawsuit threshold against aplaintiff must demonstrate that she is eligible for no-fault PIPbenefits under either N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3.1, -3.3, or -3.4. Unlessthe defendant meets this initial burden, the remainder of thestatute does not apply. Therefore, a defendant without astatutory entitlement to PIP benefits cannot insist that aninjured plaintiff prove a qualifying injury within one of thesix categories set forth in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a), even though theplaintiff is otherwise bound by the limitation-on-lawsuitthreshold. One of the rationales for the limitation-on-lawsuitthreshold "[is] to offset the costs to insurers of a system thatmandates the prompt payment of medical expenses resulting from See Cynthia M. Craig & Daniel J. automobile accidents."Pomeroy, New Jersey Auto Insurance Law: No Fault (PIP),Uninsured & Underinsured Motorists § 15:3-3 at 278 (2009). Aninsurer of a defendant not participating in New Jersey's no-7 PIP benefits triggering the threshold include those provided by the "standard," N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4, "basic," N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3.1, and "special," N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3.3, automobile policies allowed by statute. 12fault system is not "subject to the monetary quid pro quo thatjustifies making the [limitation-on-lawsuit] threshold availableto a PIP-eligible defendant." Ibid. It is for that reason thata defendant ineligible for PIP benefits cannot assert thelimitation-on-lawsuit threshold as a defense. Ibid. C. Defendant would have the Court read out of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a) the requirement that she must be eligible for New JerseyPIP coverage to benefit from the limitation-on-lawsuitthreshold. The critical language of the Deemer Statute,however, makes plaintiff, as a covered out-of-state driver,"subject to the tort option specified in subsection a. of[N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8]." This reference to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a) doesnot suggest that one part of the statute shall apply and anothernot. We cannot read just half of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a) when theDeemer Statute pointedly references the entirety of subsection(a). We must read the statute as a whole, giving meaning to See DiProspero, supra, 183 N.J. at 492. each of its parts.Simply stated, an out-of-state defendant who is not eligible toreceive New Jersey PIP benefits cannot find shelter underN.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a) and may be sued for pain and sufferingdamages without regard to the threshold. Loftus-Smith v. Henry,286 N.J. Super. 477, 487 (App. Div. 1996). 13 As indicated earlier, we will not rewrite a plainly writtenstatute or remove a statutory qualification included within acomprehensive legislative scheme. If the Legislature, throughthe Deemer Statute, intended to restrict plaintiff's right tosue for pain and suffering caused by the negligence of an out-of-state driver who is not part of New Jersey's PIP system, thenthe wording of N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.4 would simply read thatplaintiff is "subject to the requirement of proving an injuryfalling into one of the six categories set forth in N.J.S.A.39:6A-8(a)." The Legislature knows how to draft a statute toachieve that result when it wishes to do so. For example, anautomobile accident victim seeking to recover noneconomicdamages from the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund must showthat the injured person "sustained an injury described in[N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a)]." N.J.S.A. 39:6-70(n) (emphasis added);see generally Jimenez v. Baglieri, 152 N.J. 337 (1998). Unlikethe Deemer Statute, which incorporates by reference all ofN.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a), N.J.S.A. 39:6-70(n) instead directs theinquiry specifically to an injury qualifying under N.J.S.A.39:6A-8(a).88 We decline defendant's invitation to pass judgment on Stamps v. New Jersey Automobile Full Insurance Underwriting Ass'n, 279 N.J. Super. 485 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 141 N.J. 96 (1995). That case involved a plaintiff's uninsured motorist coverage claim against her carrier under N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.1(a) for recovery of noneconomic damages resulting from a collision with 14 Nothing in the legislative history concerning the DeemerStatute and N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a) conflicts with our plain readingof those statutes. Moreover, the quid pro quo presented to NewJersey drivers under our no-fault system is no different forout-of-state residents insured by carriers doing business inthis State. Under the Deemer Statute, in exchange for promptpayment of medical bills, the out-of-state insured gives up theunlimited right to sue for pain and suffering, provided that thedefendant is eligible to receive New Jersey PIP benefits. Adefendant -- such as the one here -- who is not participating inNew Jersey's no-fault system does not receive the benefit ofinvoking the N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a) limitation-on-lawsuit thresholdas a defense. Defendant is not disadvantaged under this statutory scheme.The Deemer Statute does not impose the limitation-on-lawsuitthreshold on non-residents who are "insured by carriers notan uninsured truck. Id. at 486. The Appellate Division found that the plaintiff, who had selected the threshold, had to show a qualifying injury. Id. at 489. The Stamps court concluded that "the application of the verbal threshold to an injured party's claim against his or her own insurance carrier for uninsured motorists benefits is significantly different from its application to a negligence claim against an alleged tortfeasor." Id. at 488. Stamps implicated a different statute and other policy considerations. The present case is not the appropriate vehicle for reviewing Stamps. 15authorized to transact business in New Jersey." Whitaker,supra, 147 N.J. at 356; see also Comitale v. Masters, 302 N.J.Super. 291, 295 (App. Div. 1997) (holding that threshold did notapply to out-of-state plaintiff not covered by Deemer Statute).That is because those non-resident insureds, if injured in anautomobile accident in this State, "would not receive thebenefit of New Jersey's minimum mandatory liability coverage,uninsured motorist coverage, or personal injury protectioncoverage that the [D]eemer [S]tatute mandates for non-residentsinsured through New Jersey authorized insurers." Whitaker,supra, 147 N.J. at 356. Defendant's problem is not the Deemer Statute, but the factthat she is not participating in New Jersey's no-fault system.Had a New Jersey resident, rather than plaintiff, selected theinsurance policy's limitation-on-lawsuit option, and weredefendant the tortfeasor, defendant would be in the sameposition. She could not invoke the threshold as a defensebecause she is not participating in New Jersey's no-fault systemof PIP benefits. III. A defendant who causes an automobile accident and is noteligible for PIP benefits cannot bind a plaintiff to thelimitation-on-lawsuit threshold set forth in N.J.S.A 39:6A-8(a). 16Under the Deemer Statute, plaintiff could have been subject tothe limitation-on-lawsuit threshold because he had no qualifyinginjury under N.J.S.A 39:6A-8(a). In this case, however,plaintiff is not statutorily barred from recovering pain andsuffering damages because defendant is ineligible to collect NewJersey PIP benefits.9 We reverse the grant of summary judgmentin defendant's favor and remand to the trial court forproceedings consistent with this opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, WALLACE, HOENS, and RIVERA-SOTO join in JUSTICE ALBIN's opinion. JUSTICE LONG did not participate.9 We note that plaintiff selected the limited tort option under his Pennsylvania policy. We express no opinion on the application of that contractual provision in this case. 17 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEYNO. A-87 SEPTEMBER TERM 2008ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior CourtEDWARD ZABILOWICZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.ROSLYNE KELSEY, Defendant-Respondent.DECIDED December 17, 2009 Chief Justice Rabner PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Albin CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY DISSENTING OPINION BY REVERSE AND CHECKLIST REMAND CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER X ------------------------ ----------------------- JUSTICE LONG X JUSTICE LaVECCHIA X JUSTICE ALBIN X JUSTICE WALLACE X JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO X JUSTICE HOENS TOTALS 6