Title: Howser v. BEN DIERKS LUMBER CO., INC.
Citation: 528 P.2d 1341
Docket Number: N/A
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: December 12, 1974

528 P.2d 1341 (1974)
B.J. HOWSER, Appellant,
v.
BEN DIERKS LUMBER CO., INC., a Corporation, Respondent.

Supreme Court of Oregon.
Argued and Submitted October 8, 1974.
Decided December 12, 1974.
William A. Mansfield, Medford, argued the cause and filed a brief for appellant.
Donald F. Myrick, Grants Pass, argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Myrick, Coulter, Seagraves &amp; Nealy, Grants Pass.
Before O'CONNELL, C.J., and McALLISTER, HOLMAN, TONGUE, and HOWELL, JJ., and SLOPER and LEAVY, JJ. Pro Tem.
McALLISTER, Justice.
The trial court dismissed this action for lack of prosecution. Plaintiff appeals  we affirm.
On May 22, 1969, the plaintiff filed this action in Josephine County for damages sustained because defendant breached a contract with plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged that he agreed to sell to defendant the timber standing on certain land in Del Norte County, California. Plaintiff further alleged that to facilitate the removal of the timber he deeded the property to defendant on condition that defendant, after removing the timber, would reconvey the property to plaintiff. The defendant did not reconvey the property after removing the timber and plaintiff brought this action praying for damages in the sum of $16,000 and attorney fees.
On February 11, 1974 the court dismissed the action for want of prosecution.
The chronological history of the case is as follows:
The sole issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing plaintiff's action for lack of prosecution.
ORS 18.260[1] is an expression of the public policy that suits and actions which *1343 are not prosecuted with reasonable diligence should be dismissed. Pemberton v. Pemberton, 230 Or. 190, 193, 369 P.2d 276 (1962) and cases cited therein.
In addition to the power vested in it by statute a trial court has inherent power to dismiss an action for want of prosecution. Lee v. Brown, 264 Or. 341, 505 P.2d 924 (1973); Downey v. Long, 258 Or. 197, 482 P.2d 162 (1971); Pemberton v. Pemberton, supra; Horn v. Calif.-Ore. Power Co. et al., 221 Or. 328, 351 P.2d 80 (1960); Longyear, Admx. v. Edwards, 217 Or. 314, 342 P.2d 762 (1959); Smith v. DeKraay, 217 Or. 436, 342 P.2d 784 (1959); Hyde et ux. v. Velvin, 212 Or. 73, 318 P.2d 269 (1957); City of Reedsport v. Hubbard et ux., 202 Or. 370, 274 P.2d 248 (1954); Bock v. Portland Gas and Coke Co., 202 Or. 609, 277 P.2d 758 (1954); Kaufman v. Oregonian Pub. Co., 195 Or. 164, 245 P.2d 237 (1952); Reed v. First Nat. Bank of Gardiner, 194 Or. 45, 241 P.2d 109 (1952); 24 Am.Jur.2d 49, Dismissal, Discontinuance, and Nonsuit § 59; 27 C.J.S. Dismissal &amp; Nonsuit § 65(1)b, p. 430.
The dismissal of an action by the trial court for want of diligent prosecution will be reversed only if the court has abused its discretion. Reed v. First Nat. Bank of Gardiner, supra, 194 Or. at 57, 241 P.2d 109; Bock v. Portland Gas and Coke Co., supra, 202 Or. at 616, 277 P.2d 758; Horn v. Calif.-Ore. Power Co. et al., supra, 221 Or. at 338, 351 P.2d 80.
An analysis of the chronological history of this case will disclose that there is no evidence of delay on the part of defendant. Plaintiff himself was grossly dilatory. Over a period of almost five years between the filing of the action and its dismissal, plaintiff, on a number of occasions failed to comply with the orders of the trial court.
On June 16, 1969 the court, in response to defendant's motion to strike and make more definite and certain, issued an order allowing defendant's motion in part and gave plaintiff ten days within which to further plead. However, plaintiff did not file his amended complaint until September 29, 1969, more than three months after the date upon which such pleadings were due.
On July 6, 1970 the court allowed plaintiff's request for a ninety day extension from July 1, 1970 to October 1, 1970. Other than filing a substitution of attorneys on October 4, 1971, plaintiff did nothing until September 29, 1972, approximately two years after his extension of time had expired, when he again sought an order extending time from September 30, 1972 to September 30, 1973. There is no order in the record responding to this motion. However, on October 9, 1972 plaintiff again moved for an order extending time from September 30, 1972 to December 30, 1972. This motion was denied.
On or about October 12, 1972 defendant filed a demurrer to plaintiff's amended complaint and on December 4, 1972 the court entered an order sustaining defendant's demurrer and again gave plaintiff ten days within which to further plead. Again, plaintiff did not comply with this order.
More than 13 months elapsed before the court on January 17, 1974 notified the parties that the cause would be dismissed within 30 days unless good cause was shown for continuing the case upon its docket. Only then did plaintiff file another motion for substitution of attorneys and a second amended complaint.
Plaintiff contends that since the court gave notice to both parties that the action would be dismissed within 30 days unless a sufficient showing was made for continuing the case upon the docket the court had no discretion to dismiss the case prior to the expiration of this period. Plaintiff had made his showing, appeared in person and by his attorney. The court then decided that the showing was not sufficient and *1344 on his own motion dismissed the action. Plaintiff did not ask permission to make a further showing and has not pointed out in what manner he was prejudiced by an entry of the order before the expiration of 30 days. In any event the trial court had inherent power to dismiss and announced that it was dismissing the action sua sponte. See Hyde et ux. v. Velvin, supra; Horn v. Calif.-Ore. Power Co. et al., supra, 221 Or. at 336, 351 P.2d 80; 27 C.J.S. Dismissal and Nonsuit § 65(3) and § 71d, pp. 441, 464.
It is questionable whether plaintiff's second amended complaint and motion to continue the action upon the docket were sufficient to show good cause why the action should be continued. As stated in Horn v. Calif.-Ore. Power Co. et al., supra, 221 Or. at 337, 351 P.2d at 85:
It also appears that plaintiff's second amended complaint alleged substantially the same facts as those alleged in plaintiff's earlier complaints. Under these circumstances the court may well have found that the complaint did not provide any good cause to continue the case. See Downey v. Long, supra, 258 Or. at 199-200, 482 P.2d at 163:
Since this case had been pending approximately five years, we think the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing this action for want of diligent prosecution. The trial court gave plaintiff an adequate opportunity to make a showing as to why the case should not be dismissed and after hearing and consideration of the showing made in response to the notice the court in its discretion concluded that no good cause was shown for continuing this action on its docket.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
[1]  "Not less than 60 days prior to the first regular motion day in each calendar year, unless the court has sent an earlier notice on its own motion, the clerk of the court shall mail notice to the attorneys of record in each pending case in which no action has been taken for one year immediately prior to the mailing of such notice, that each such case will be dismissed by the court for want of prosecution, unless on or before such first regular motion day application, either oral or written, is made to the court and good cause shown why it should be continued as a pending case. If such application is not made or good cause shown, the court shall dismiss each such case. Nothing contained in this section shall prevent the dismissing at any time, for want of prosecution, of any suit, action or proceeding upon motion of any party thereto."