Title: City of Trussville v. Personnel Board of Jefferson County
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1200629
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: March 18, 2022

Rel: March 18, 2022
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. 
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2021-2022
____________________
1200629
____________________
City of Trussville
v.
Personnel Board of Jefferson County
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
(CV-19-904034)
PER CURIAM.
The City of Trussville ("the City") appeals from the Jefferson Circuit
Court's summary judgment in favor of the Personnel Board of Jefferson
1200629
County ("the Board") in the City's action seeking a judgment declaring
that it has the authority to create and operate its own civil-service system. 
Facts and Procedural History
The Board was created pursuant to a local act of the Alabama
Legislature in 1935. See Act No. 284, Ala. Acts 1935. That legislation was 
subsequently reenacted in 1945. See Act No. 248, Ala. Acts 1945. The 1935
and 1945 acts together are referred to in the record as the "enabling act." 
The enabling act was last amended in 1977 by Act No. 782, Ala. Acts 1977. 
The Board was created to administer the civil-service system in Jefferson
County, and  to ensure that hiring and advancement in public-sector jobs
in Jefferson County is conducted in an impartial, professional manner
without political or personal bias and favoritism. 
Regarding the authority of the Board, § 2 of the enabling act, as
amended, provides in pertinent part:
"Personnel Board; extent of its authority defined.  In and for
each separate county of the State of Alabama which has a
population of four hundred thousand or more inhabitants
according to the last or any future federal census, there shall
be a personnel board for the government and control, by rules
and regulations and practices hereinafter set out or
authorize[d], of all employees and appointees holding positions
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in the classified service of such counties, the municipalities
therein having a population of five thousand or more
inhabitants, according to the last federal census, whose
corporate limits lie wholly within the county, the police officers
who are employed by any municipality therein having a
population of 2500 or more inhabitants, according to the last
federal census, whose corporate limits lie wholly within  the
county, and the County Board of Health, and such personnel
board is vested with such powers, authority and jurisdiction."
Act No. 782, § 1.  Section 2 of the enabling act, as amended, further
provides:
"In the event the governing body of any municipality whose
corporate limits lie partly within said county and partly within
any other county and having a population of five thousand or
more inhabitants, according to the last federal census, or any
succeeding federal census, shall adopt a resolution in favor of
such municipality coming under the provisions of this Act, and
transmit or cause to be transmitted a certified copy of such
resolution to the Personnel Board of such civil service system,
then sixty days after the effective date of such resolution, the
provisions of this Act shall apply to any such municipality
having the required number of inhabitants and whose
corporate boundaries lie partly within said county and partly
without said county.  Any municipality which adopts a
resolution and comes under the provisions of this Act, as
herein provided, shall thereafter remain under this Act, and
may not repeal or rescind such action either by adoption of a
resolution or otherwise."
Id.  Thus, § 2 of the enabling act, as amended, grants the Board  (1) 
authority to the Board over  "all employees and appointees holding
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positions in the classified service of ... the municipalities therein [i.e.,
within Jefferson County] having a population of five thousand or more
inhabitants, according to the last federal census, whose corporate limits
lie wholly within the county" and (2)  authority over "police officers who
are employed by any municipality therein [i.e., within Jefferson County]
having a population of 2500 or more inhabitants, according to the last
federal census, whose corporate limits lie wholly within the county."  Id. 
In 1977, the City's police department came under the authority of the
Board because the City had reached a population of 2,500 inhabitants and
its corporate limits at the time were wholly within Jefferson County.     
In May 1986, the City began to consider the annexation of property
located in St. Clair County, which adjoined the City and Jefferson County, 
and the effect that such an annexation would have on the authority of the
Board over the City's police department. Charles Grover, the City's mayor
at the time, wrote to the Board's director of personnel, raising the
question regarding whether the proposed annexation would affect the
Board's authority over the City's police department and the director
informed Mayor Grover that it was his "opinion that [the proposed
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annexation] would have no bearing on the matter and the police
department would continue to come under the rules and regulations of the
[Board]."  In June 1986, the City annexed the property located in St. Clair
County, thereby  extending the City's boundaries beyond Jefferson
County. 
According to the 1990 federal census, the population of the City
exceeded 5,000 inhabitants, thus making the City's nonpolice civil
servants eligible for inclusion in the Board's civil-service system.  In July
1991, the City passed an ordinance purporting to establish its own
personnel board.  The City determined that, while its police department
had been under the jurisdiction of the Board, the City's police department
had experienced "substantial delay in attempting to employ and assign
qualified law enforcement personnel, which delays ha[d] impaired
employee morale and implementation of legitimate municipal goals and
objectives," and that the "City's best interests would be served by the
creation of a personnel board for the City."  In September 1991, the Board
passed its own ordinance, purporting to extend its jurisdiction to include
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all classified and regular employees of the City, pursuant to § 2 of the
enabling act, as amended.
  On October 9, 1991, the City sued the Board in the Jefferson
Circuit Court, seeking a judgment declaring that, despite the fact that the
1990 federal census reflected that the population of the City exceeded
5,000 inhabitants, the Board lacked the authority to assert its jurisdiction
over its employees based solely on the 1990 federal census ("the 1991
action").  The City also sought a judgment declaring that it had the
statutory authority to adopt a resolution establishing its own personal
board and civil-service system.  It appears from the record that, before
initiating the 1991 action,  the City's leaders had contemplated the effect
the City's annexation of property in St. Clair County would have on the
Board's jurisdiction over its employees and that the issue had been
discussed at several city-council meetings.  However, the issue of what
effect the City's annexation of property in St. Clair County would have on
the Board's jurisdiction over the City's employees  was not specifically
raised in the 1991 action.  In June 1992, while the 1991 action was still
pending, the City annexed additional property located in St. Clair County. 
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In October 1992, the City and the Board negotiated a settlement
agreement regarding the 1991 action. The settlement agreement provided
that the "parties hereby agree that, as of the Effective Date specified in 
paragraph 8 [October 3, 1992], all classified and regular employees of
Trussville shall be deemed to be under the jurisdiction and control of the 
Board ...."  The settlement agreement also provided that "[t]he City shall
comply with all of the rules and regulations of the Board, as the same
exists as of the Effective Date and as hereafter amended from time to
time."  The settlement agreement further provided that "[t]he City shall
take such acts as are necessary or desirable to adopt this Settlement
Agreement and its Exhibits."  
Mayor Grover announced at a city-council meeting on October 2,
1992, that a settlement agreement had been negotiated with the Board
regarding the 1991 action.  Also at that city-council meeting, council
members unanimously passed an ordinance that rescinded the prior
ordinance purporting to establish the City's personnel board.  During a
city-council meeting on October 13, 1992, the council members  considered 
approving the settlement agreement.  The City's attorney stated that, in
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his opinion, the settlement agreement was in the best interest of the City.
The council members voted to authorize Mayor Grover to sign the
settlement agreement. On October 16, 1992, Mayor Grover and the City's
attorney signed the settlement agreement on behalf of the City. On
October 29, 1992, the circuit court entered a final consent judgment in the
1991 action, approving and ratifying the settlement agreement and
directing that the parties comply with the terms and conditions of the
settlement agreement. Thereafter, the City operated under the
jurisdiction of the Board. After the entry of the consent judgment, the City
has on several occasions annexed additional property in St. Clair County.
Buddy Choat was elected mayor of the City in 2016.  Mayor Choat
testified that, after he ran into difficulty trying to fill several vacant
employment positions with the City, he determined it would be in the
City's best interest to separate from the Board.  In particular, Choat
testified that the City's police chief had decided to retire and had
recommended an individual that had been serving as a captain on the
police force as the new chief of police.  Mayor Choat was unable to hire the
individual recommended by the outgoing chief because that individual did
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not qualify for inclusion on the list of eligible candidates provided to
Mayor Choat by the Board.  Mayor Choat testified that he had not been
familiar with the Board and how it operated because he came from the
private sector.  Mayor Choat stated that, because of the City's growth, he
felt that the City would be better served by forming its own civil-service
system.  Mayor Choat further explained that his decision to pursue
forming the City's own civil-service system was based upon his belief that
"one size doesn't fit all" and that, with its own civil-service system, the
City would have more flexibility in filling job openings, which, he said,
would better benefit the City. 
In 2018, the City requested that the attorney general issue an
opinion regarding whether, once it had annexed land in St. Clair County,
it was subject to being governed by the Board or could form its own civil-
service system.   The attorney general issued the following opinion:
"Your request states as follows:
"1. The City of  Trussville is a municipality
incorporated under the laws of the State of
Alabama and has historically filled vacancies in its
work force through the Personnel Board of
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Jefferson County and has participated in the
Personnel Board's civil service merit system.
"2. According to the most recent federal
decennial census, the city has a population of
approximately 20,000 inhabitants within its
corporate limits.
"3. The corporate limits do not lie wholly
within 
Jefferson 
County 
because 
of 
prior
annexations. In 1992 the limits extended into St.
Clair County due to annexation. Subsequently, two
additional annexations into St. Clair County
occurred in 2004 and more recently. 
"4. Following these annexations, the city did
not adopt a resolution electing to come under the
provisions of the Personnel Board of Jefferson
County; therefore, the city could not have
transmitted a copy of the resolution to the 
Jefferson County Personnel Board.
"Act 248 of the Regular Session of the Legislature of
Alabama of 1945 established the Civil Service System of
Jefferson County. 1945 Ala. Acts No. 248, 377. It was last
amended in 1977 by Act 782. Section [1] of  Act 782 states, in
pertinent part regarding the authority of the Personnel Board
of Jefferson County, as follows:
" 'Personnel Board; extent of its authority
defined.  In and for each separate county of the
State of Alabama which has a population of four
hundred thousand or more inhabitants according to
the last or any future federal census, there shall be
a personnel board for the government and control,
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by rules and regulations and practices hereinafter
set out or authorize[d], of all employees and
appointees holding positions in the classified
service of such counties, the municipalities therein
having a population of five thousand or more
inhabitants, according to the last federal census,
whose corporate limits lie wholly within the
county, the police officers who are employed by any
municipality therein having a population of 2500 or
more inhabitants, according to the last federal
census, whose corporate limits lie wholly within 
the county, and the County Board of Health, and
such personnel board is vested with such powers,
authority and jurisdiction .'
"1977 Ala. Acts No. 782, 1347-48 (1977) ....
"The act further provides as follows:
" 'In the event the governing body of any
municipality whose corporate limits lie partly
within said county and partly within any other
county and having a population of 5,000 or more
inhabitants, according to the last federal census, or
any succeeding federal census, shall adopt a
resolution in favor of such municipality coming
under the provisions of the Act, and transmit or
cause to be transmitted a certified copy of such
resolution to the Personnel Board of such civil
service system, then sixty days after the effective
date of such resolution, the provisions of the Act
shall apply to any such municipality having the
required number of inhabitants and whose
corporate boundaries lie partly within said county
and partly without said county.  Any municipality
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which adopts a resolution and comes under the
provisions of this Act, as herein provided, shall
thereafter remain under this Act, and may not
repeal or rescind such action either by adoption of
a resolution or otherwise.'
"Id. at 1350-51 ....
"This Office has previously determined that '[t]he Civil
Service System o f Jefferson County does not govern employees
of a  municipality whose corporate limits extend beyond
Jefferson County.' ... Because the corporate limits of the City
of  Trussville do not lie wholly within Jefferson County and the
city did not adopt a resolution in favor of coming under the
provisions of the act after the city annexed into St. Clair
County, the city is not subject to the Civil Service System of
Jefferson County."
Ala. Att'y. Gen. Op. No. 2018-036 (emphasis omitted).  Accordingly, the
attorney general concluded that the City was not subject to the Board's
civil-service system and, therefore,  had the authority to establish its own
civil-service system.  It is clear from the text of the attorney general's
opinion quoted above that the attorney general did not consider what
effect the settlement agreement, and the consent judgment ratifying that
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settlement agreement, entered in the 1991 action had on the question
presented by the City for consideration.1 
On April 23, 2019, the City passed Ordinance No. 2019-020-ADM,
creating a civil-service system for City employees.  On April 25, 2019, the
City notified the Board that it had passed an ordinance creating its own
civil-service system and that, once rules and regulations for the City's civil
service system were formally adopted, the City's employees would  cease
being under the authority of the Board and would come under the
authority of the City's civil-service system.   The Board took the position
that the City lacks the authority to form its own civil-service system and
that the City is bound to continue under the jurisdiction of the Board. 
On September 9, 2019, the City sued the Board in the Jefferson
Circuit Court, seeking a judgment declaring that the City had the
authority to separate from the jurisdiction of the Board and create its own
1Mayor Choat testified in his deposition that the City's request for
an opinion from the attorney general regarding its authority to form its
own civil-service system did not contain information regarding the 1991
action and the settlement agreement reached between the parties in that
action, in which it was agreed that City employees would come under the
authority of the Board. 
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civil-service system. The City alleged, in part, that in June 19922 it had
annexed property in St. Clair County, and, thus, that its corporate limits
no longer lie wholly within Jefferson County, and that it never adopted a
resolution pursuant to § 2 of the enabling act, as amended,  in favor of the
City's coming under the the authority of the Board.  Therefore, the City
alleged, its employees did not fall under the jurisdiction of the Board. 
On October 8, 2019, the Board moved the circuit court to dismiss the
City's declaratory-judgment complaint.  On that same date, the Board also
sought a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction 
preventing the City from acting outside the Board's hiring processes.
Following a hearing on the Board's motion, the circuit court, on October
10, 2019, entered an order enjoining the City from separating from the
Board and forming its own civil-service system. 
On October 31, 2019, the City appealed the circuit court's order. 
This Court transferred the appeal to the Court of Civil Appeals, pursuant
2It is undisputed that the City first annexed property in St. Clair
County in 1986, well before the commencement of the 1991 action and the
parties' execution of the settlement agreement. 
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to § 12-2-7(6), Ala. Code 1975.    On June 12, 2020, the Court of Civil
Appeals issued an opinion reversing the circuit court's order and
remanding the case to the circuit court, finding that the circuit court's
order did not comply with the requirements of Rule 65(d)(2), Ala. R. Civ.
P. See City of Trussville v. Personnel Bd. of Jefferson Cnty., 313 So. 3d
566, 571 (Ala. Civ. App. 2020).
On remand, the City, on July 1, 2020, moved the circuit court to
strike the Board's motion for a preliminary injunction, arguing that the
motion was improper because the Board had not asserted an underlying
cause of action.   On July 2, 2020, the Board filed an answer to the City's
complaint, asserting, among other defenses, the doctrines of collateral
estoppel and res judicata; asserted a counterclaim for a judgment
declaring that it retained jurisdiction over the City's employees; and
requested a preliminary injunction and a permanent injunction enjoining
the City from separating from the Board to form its own civil-service
system. 
On July 6, 2020, the City and the Board jointly moved the circuit
court to consider the Board's requests for injunctive relief with a decision
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or trial on the merits. The circuit court granted that motion on July 7,
2020.  Thereafter, the parties conducted discovery.
On March 29, 2021, the City moved the circuit court for a summary
judgment, arguing that it did not fall under the jurisdiction of the Board
because (1) its corporate limits were not located wholly within Jefferson
County and (2) it had not adopted a resolution in favor of coming under
the authority of the Board or forwarded such a resolution to the Board, as
required by § 2 of the enabling act, as amended, so as to be bound by the
authority of the Board. The City further argued that its current action
was not barred by the doctrines of collateral estoppel or res judicata
because, it asserted, the 1991 action was based on the City's claim that it
was not subject to the Board's authority solely because of its population
under the 1990 federal census, whereas the current action is based on the
City's claim that its corporate limits do not lie wholly within Jefferson
County and it has not adopted a resolution in favor of coming under the
jurisdiction of the Board or forwarded such a resolution to the Board. 
Also on March 29, 2021, the Board moved the circuit court for a
summary judgment, arguing that the plain language of the enabling act,
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as amended,  does not provide any means by which a municipality may
terminate the Board's authority over it -- whether the municipality
became subject to the authority of the Board automatically or by
resolution  -- and expressly disallows a municipality that has come under
the authority of the Board by resolution from repealing or rescinding such
a resolution.  See Act No. 782, § 1 ("Any municipality which adopts a
resolution and comes under the provisions of this Act ... shall thereafter
remain under this Act, and may not repeal or rescind such action either
by the adoption of a resolution or otherwise.").   The Board additionally
argued that a resolution by the City submitting to the authority of the
Board was not necessary to bring it within the jurisdiction of the Board
because the City had voluntarily submitted to the authority of the Board
by entering into the settlement agreement that was incorporated into the
consent judgment entered in the1991 action.  The Board further argued
that the City's action is barred by the doctrines of collateral estoppel and
res judicata because, it said,  the City could have asserted in the 1991
action that its corporate limits did not lie wholly within Jefferson County
and that it had not adopted a resolution indicating its intent to come
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under the authority of the Board -- issues, the Board said, the City could
have raised and litigated in the 1991 action but did not. Instead, the
Board argued, the City, by entering into the 1991 settlement agreement,
agreed to continue to be bound by the authority of the Board. 
On April 27, 2021, the circuit court ruled on the parties' motions for
a summary judgment, entering a summary judgment in favor of the Board
and finding that the City is permanently subject to the jurisdiction of the
Board and that the City does not have the authority to withdraw from
that jurisdiction and create its own civil-service system.  The City appeals.
Standard of Review
Our standard of review of a summary judgment is as follows:
"We review the trial court's grant or denial of a
summary-judgment motion de novo, and we use the same
standard used by the trial court to determine whether the
evidence presented to the trial court presents a genuine issue
of material fact. Bockman v. WCH, L.L.C., 943 So. 2d 789 (Ala.
2006). Once the summary-judgment movant shows there is no
genuine issue of material fact, the nonmovant must then
present substantial evidence creating a genuine issue of
material fact. Id. 'We review the evidence in a light most
favorable to the nonmovant.' 943 So. 2d at 795. We review
questions of law de novo. Davis v. Hanson Aggregates
Southeast, Inc., 952 So. 2d 330 (Ala. 2006)."
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Smith v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 952 So. 2d 342, 346 (Ala. 2006).
Discussion
As discussed above, the parties submitted the issue whether the
City's action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, among others, to the
circuit court in their motions for a summary judgment. We find the
resolution of that issue to be dispositive of this appeal.  
In Lee L. Saad Construction Co. v. DPF Architects, P.C., 851 So. 2d
507, 516-17 (Ala. 2002), this Court explained:
"Res judicata and collateral estoppel are two closely
related, judicially created doctrines that preclude the
relitigation of matters that have been previously adjudicated
or, in the case of res judicata, that could have been adjudicated
in a prior action.
" 'The doctrine of res judicata, while actually
embodying two basic concepts, usually refers to
what commentators label "claim preclusion," while
collateral estoppel ... refers to "issue preclusion,"
which is a subset of the broader res judicata
doctrine.'
"Little v. Pizza Wagon, Inc., 432 So. 2d 1269, 1272 (Ala.
1983)(Jones, J., concurring specially). See also McNeely v.
Spry Funeral Home of Athens, Inc., 724 So. 2d 534, 537 n.1
(Ala. Civ. App. 1998). In Hughes v. Martin, 533 So. 2d 188
(Ala. 1988), this Court explained the rationale behind the
doctrine of res judicata:
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" 'Res judicata is a broad, judicially developed
doctrine, which rests upon the ground that public
policy, and the interest of the litigants alike,
mandate that there be an end to litigation; that
those who have contested an issue shall be bound
by the ruling of the court; and that issues once
tried shall be considered forever settled between
those same parties and their privies.'
"533 So. 2d at 190. The elements of res judicata are
" '(1) a prior judgment on the merits, (2) rendered
by a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) with
substantial identity of the parties, and (4) with the
same cause of action presented in both actions.'
"Equity Res. Mgmt., Inc. v. Vinson, 723 So. 2d 634, 636 (Ala.
1998). 'If those four elements are present, then any claim that
was, or that could have been, adjudicated in the prior action is
barred from further litigation.'  723 So. 2d at 636. Res judicata,
therefore, bars a party from asserting in a subsequent action
a claim that it has already had an opportunity to litigate in a
previous action.'
"The corollary to the above-stated rationale is that the
doctrine of res judicata will not be applied to bar a claim that
could not have been brought in a prior action. Old Republic
[Ins. Co. v. Lanier] ... 790 So. 2d [922,] 928 [(Ala. 2000)]. See
also United States v. Maxwell, 189 F. Supp. 2d 395, 406 (E.D.
Va. 2002); Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 26(1)(c)
(1982), Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 51(1)(a).  'In
order for a judgment between the same parties to be res
judicata, it must, among other things, ... involve a question
that could have been litigated in the former cause or
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proceeding.'  Stephenson v. Bird, 168 Ala. 363, 366, 53 So. 92,
93 (1910). "
(Footnotes omitted.)
It is undisputed that the first three elements of the doctrine of res
judicata are satisfied in this case.   The 1991 action ended with the entry
of a consent judgment ratifying the settlement agreement reached
between the City and the Board.3 The City argues that the present action
is not barred by the doctrine of res judicata because the fourth element
requiring that the same cause of action be present in both actions is not
satisfied in this case.  In discussing the same-cause-of-action element of
the doctrine of res judicata, this Court has stated:
" ' " '[T]he principal test for comparing causes of action [for the
application of res judicata] is whether the primary right and
duty or wrong are the same in each action.' " ' Old Republic
Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 790 So. 2d 922, 928 (Ala. 2000) (quoting
Wesch v. Folsom, 6 F.3d 1465, 1471 (11th Cir. 1993)). This
Court further stated:  ' "Res judicata applies not only to the
exact legal theories advanced in the prior case, but to all legal
theories and claims arising out of the same nucleus of
3"[A] consent judgment is generally entitled to the same conclusive
effect as a judgment on the merits."  Sanders v. First Bank of Grove Hill,
564 So. 2d 869, 872 (Ala. 1990).  See also Austin v. Alabama Check
Cashers Ass'n, 936 So. 2d 1014, 1038-39 (Ala. 2005). 
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operative facts." ' 790 So. 2d at 928 (quoting Wesch, 6 F.3d at
1471). As a result, two causes of action are the same for res
judicata purposes  ' "when the same evidence is applicable in
both actions." ' Old Republic Ins. Co., 790 So. 2d at 928
(quoting Hughes v. Martin, 533 So. 2d 188, 191 (Ala. 1988))."
Chapman Nursing Home, Inc. v. McDonald, 985 So. 2d 914, 921 (Ala.
2007).
Specifically, the City relies upon the "same evidence" test to argue
that the 1991 action and the present action do not involve the same cause
of action.  The "same evidence" test has been stated as follows:
"The determination of whether the cause of action is the same
in two separate suits depends on whether the issues in the two
actions are the same and whether the same evidence would
support a recovery for the plaintiff in both suits. Dominex, Inc.
v. Key, 456 So. 2d 1047, 1054 (Ala.1984). Stated differently,
the fourth element is met when the issues involved in the
earlier suit comprehended all that is involved in the issues of
the later suit. Adams v. Powell, 225 Ala. 300, 142 So. 537
(1932). "
Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 566 So. 2d 723, 726 (Ala. 1990).   
The City has presented this Court with several cases in which the
"same evidence" test was applied to determine that the doctrine of res
judicata did not bar a subsequent action.  In Vaughan v. Barr, 600 So. 2d
994 (Ala. 1994), a plaintiff landowner commenced an action against a
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neighboring landowner, seeking a determination as to the boundary lines
of their properties, and the trial court concluded that the land in dispute
belonged to the neighboring landowner.  The plaintiff landowner did not
appeal.  Subsequently, the plaintiff landowner commenced an action
seeking an easement by necessity over the neighboring landowners'
property to obtain a means of ingress and egress from his landlocked
property.  The neighboring landowner raised the doctrine of res judicata
as a defense, and the trial court entered a judgment in favor of the
neighboring landowner on that  ground.  This Court reversed that
judgment, holding that 
"[a]n action to establish an easement and an action to
determine a disputed boundary are based on different theories,
involve different areas of law, require different evidence, and
carry different elements that must be proven. A common law
easement by necessity for private use involves more elements
than just unity of title, and these elements were not material
in the boundary line litigation. The boundary dispute and the
claim of an easement by necessity are separate causes of
action; therefore the doctrine of res judicata is not a bar to [the
plaintiff landowner's] present easement action."
Vaughan, 600 So. 2d at 996.
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In Croft v. Pate, 585 So. 2d 799 (Ala. 1991), the plaintiffs commenced
an action against the defendant, claiming to have an equitable ownership
in a particular piece of property and that their equitable ownership gave
them the right to redeem the property.  The trial court entered a summary
judgment in favor of the defendant, and the plaintiffs did not appeal. 
Subsequently, the plaintiffs commenced an action against the defendant,
asserting a claim of intentional interference with a business or contractual
relationship by specifically alleging that the defendant's actions had
interfered with a preforeclosure settlement agreement that they had
entered into with a third party, to whom they had transferred title to the
property.  The defendant raised the doctrine of res judicata in a motion for
a summary judgment, and the trial court granted the motion on that
basis.  In reversing the summary judgment entered by the trial court, this
Court stated:
"In the first action, the evidence concerned the right of
the [plaintiffs] to redeem the property once [the defendant]
had purchased it at the foreclosure sale. In determining the
right of the [plaintiffs] to redeem the property, the court would
have considered the deed by which the [plaintiffs] conveyed the
property to [the third party], in light of Ala. Code 1975, § 6-
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5230.[4] Section 6-5-230 contains a list of those entitled to
redeem property sold under a power of sale in a mortgage. A
copy of that deed was included as an exhibit in the first action,
and [the defendant] based his motion for summary judgment
on that exhibit. The court granted [the defendant's] motion for
summary judgment.
"The [plaintiffs] argue, and the depositions of [the
defendant, and the third party, and the plaintiffs' former
attorney]  corroborate, that in this action the evidence
concerns the existence vel non of a contractual relationship
between the [plaintiffs] and [the third party] and whether [the
defendant] intentionally interfered with that relationship.
That proposition has not been fully and fairly tried. The
parties to this action have not had an opportunity to say and
prove all that they can in relation to it, and the mind of the
court has not been brought to bear on this claim raised by the
[plaintiffs]."
Croft, 585 So. 2d at 801. 
In Dairyland, supra, a driver was operating his brother's vehicle
when he crossed the median and struck another vehicle. The passenger in
the vehicle the driver struck commenced a negligence action against the
driver, and the trial court entered a judgment on a jury verdict in favor of
the passenger for $50,000.  Following that trial, the driver commenced an
4Section 6-5-230, Ala. Code 1975, has since been repealed. 
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action against Dairyland Insurance Company, his brother's uninsured-
motorist provider, asserting that an uninsured motorist had caused the
accident by forcing him to cross the median.   Dairyland argued at trial
that the driver was barred from asserting the uninsured-motorist action
against it based on the doctrine of res judicata.  The jury returned a
verdict in favor of the driver for $20,000, and the trial court entered a
judgment on that verdict.  Dairyland appealed, again asserting that the
doctrine of res judicata barred the driver from bringing the uninsured-
motorist action against it.  This Court affirmed the judgment in favor of
the driver, holding, in pertinent part, that  the applicability of the doctrine
of res judicata had not been established because
"[the passenger's] action against [the driver],which sounded in
tort, involved only questions of negligence, and [the driver's]
claim for damages was not at issue. In contrast, [the driver's]
suit against Dairyland was a contract action on an insurance
policy. To recover, [the driver] had to produce evidence that he
was covered under his brother's policy, that the accident was
caused by an uninsured motorist, and that he was not
contributorily negligent. Because the two actions were based
on different theories, involved different plaintiffs, and required
different evidence to entitle those plaintiffs to recover, they
were not the same cause of action. Therefore, the doctrine of
res judicata was not a bar to [the driver's] action against
Dairyland."
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566 So. 2d at 726.
Relying on those cases, the City argues that the 1991 action
challenged the authority of the Board to assert jurisdiction over its
employees  solely based on the City's population under the 1990 federal
census.  The City states that the only evidence that was necessary to
determine the 1991 action was the results of the 1990 federal census.  The
City further argues that the present action was brought to determine
whether the City had the authority to form its own civil-service system or
was obligated to continue under the jurisdiction of the Board's civil-service
system based on the fact that the City's corporate limits no longer lie
wholly within Jefferson County.  The City contends that the evidence
necessary for a determination of the present action involves its annexation
of property in St. Clair County and is entirely different from the evidence
necessary for a determination of the 1991 action involving the results of
the 1990 federal census.   Therefore, the City argues, because the evidence
necessary to support a recovery in the two actions is different, the same
cause of action is not present in both actions and the doctrine of res
judicata is not a bar to the present action.   We are not persuaded by the
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cases relied upon by the City, and we find them largely distinguishable
from the present case.
In Vaughan, Croft, and Dairyland, the "primary right and duty or
wrong" differed in the first and second actions at issue in each of those
cases.  MacDonald, 985 So. 2d at 921.  In Vaughan, the initial action
sought to settle the rights of the parties to particular boundary lines
between adjoining parcels of property.  In the subsequent action, the loser
of the boundary-line dispute sought the right to an easement by necessity
for ingress and egress to his property over the property of the winner of
the boundary-line dispute.  Although both actions involved the same
parcels of property, they involved separate rights to the property, i.e., the
right to title to certain land based on the location of the boundary lines
and the right to an easement by necessity.  The primary rights to be
determined were not the same in each action, and the actions involved
different  elements of proof and evidence.  Thus, this Court determined
that the actions did not involve the same cause of action for res judicata
purposes. 
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In Croft, the plaintiffs sought in the initial action the right to
redeem certain property based on their claim to an equitable ownership
interest in the property. The plaintiffs alleged in their subsequent action
that the defendant had wrongfully interfered in a contractual or business
relationship that they had entered into with a third party before the
foreclosure.  The primary right asserted in the first action, i.e., the right
to redeem the property based on an alleged equitable ownership interest
in the property, was not the same as the primary wrong asserted in the
subsequent action, i.e., the wrongful interference with a contractual or
business relationship. Therefore, this Court determined that the actions
did not involve the same cause of action for res judicata purposes.  
In Dairyland, the passenger in one vehicle initially brought a
negligence action against the driver of another vehicle.  In the second
action, the driver brought a contract action against an uninsured-motorist
insurance provider, seeking uninsured-motorist benefits.  The primary
wrong in the first action, i.e., the alleged negligence of the driver, was not
the same as the primary right or duty in the second action, i.e., the
driver's right to, and the insurer's duty to pay, uninsured-motorist
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benefits.  One action sounded in tort, the other in contract, and they
involved different elements of proof and required different evidence.
Therefore, this Court determined that the actions did not involve the same
cause of action for res judicata purposes.  
Here, the City has asserted identical claims for a declaratory
judgment in both the 1991 action and this, the subsequent action  --
specifically, a determination as to whether the City is bound by the
jurisdiction of the Board under the enabling act, as amended, or whether
the City can form its own civil-service system.  Although the theories of
relief in the two declaratory-judgment actions may differ -- in the 1991
action, the City challenged whether the Board could assert jurisdiction
over the City based solely on the 1990 federal census but, in the current
action, the City challenged the jurisdiction of the Board based on the fact
that part of the City's corporate limits lie outside Jefferson County -- the
two declaratory-judgment actions arose out of the same dispute and
presented the same rights to be determined --  whether the City fell under
the jurisdiction of the Board or whether the City could form its own civil-
service system. The fact that both the 1991 action and the present action
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were based on different theories is of no consequence. See McDonald, 985
So. 2d at 921 (stating that " ' "[r]es judicata applies not only to the exact
legal theories advanced in the prior case, but to all legal theories and
claims arising out of the same nucleus of operative facts" ' ").       
We further note that all the facts relevant to the theory that the City
is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Board because a portion of the City's
corporate limits lies outside Jefferson County, which is the City's theory
of relief in the current action, were present and known to the City before
the commencement of the 1991 action.  The City first annexed property in
St. Clair County in June 1986, thereby extending the City's boundaries
beyond Jefferson County. It appears from the record that, before initiating
the 1991 action, the City's leaders had contemplated the effect the City's
annexation of property in St. Clair County would have on the Board's
jurisdiction over its employees and that the issue had been discussed at
several city-council meetings.  However, this theory for challenging the
Board's jurisdiction over the City under  the enabling act, as amended, 
was not specifically asserted in the City's 1991 action. In June 1992, while
the 1991 action was still pending, the City annexed additional property
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located in St. Clair County, but it failed to amend its claim seeking a
declaratory judgment to assert the theory that a portion of the City's
corporate limits lied outside Jefferson County.  In October 1992, the City
reached a settlement agreement with the Board, in which the parties
agreed that all classified and regular employees of the City would be
deemed to be under the jurisdiction and control of the Board.  The City's
mayor signed the settlement agreement on behalf of the City after being
authorized to do so by the City's council members.  The City entered into
the settlement agreement with the Board having full knowledge of the fact
that a portion of the City's corporate limits lied outside Jefferson County
and having failed to amend its complaint seeking a declaratory judgment
at any time before entering into the settlement agreement with the Board. 
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the same cause of action
was presented in both the 1991 action and the present action and that the
theory upon which the City sought to litigate the present action could have
been litigated in the 1991 action, but was not. Accordingly, the City's
present action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 
Conclusion
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We affirm the summary judgment entered in favor of the Board on
the ground that the City's declaratory-judgment action is barred by the
doctrine of res judicata.  We pretermit discussion of the remaining issues
presented.       
AFFIRMED.
Parker, C.J., and Bolin, Shaw, Wise, Stewart, and Mitchell, JJ.,
concur.
Sellers and Mendheim, JJ., concur in the result.
Bryan, J., dissents.
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