Title: Churchhill v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 601, 2008
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: March 20, 2009

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
KELLY V. CHURCHILL, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 601, 2008 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below—Superior Court  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
for Kent County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
Cr. ID No. 0107004333 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: December 31, 2008 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
March 20, 2009 
 
Before BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices.   
 
 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 20th day of March 2009, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the State’s motion to affirm, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The appellant, Kelly V. Churchill, filed this appeal from the 
Superior Court’s order of December 2, 2008 that summarily dismissed his 
second motion for postconviction relief pursuant to several subsections of 
Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i).1  The State of Delaware has filed a 
motion to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment on the ground that it is 
                                          
 
1 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (listing procedural bars to postconviction relief). 
 
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manifest on the face of Churchill’s opening brief that the appeal is without 
merit.2  We agree and affirm. 
 
(2) 
In October 2001, a Superior Court jury convicted Churchill of 
Delivery of Cocaine.  At sentencing, the Superior Court declared that 
Churchill was a habitual offender and sentenced him to life in prison without 
parole.3  On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Churchill’s conviction and 
sentence.4  Thereafter, the Superior Court denied Churchill’s first motion for 
postconviction relief.  Churchill’s appeal from that decision was dismissed 
as untimely.5     
 
 
(3) 
On appeal, Churchill contends that the Superior Court abused 
its discretion when dismissing his postconviction motion pursuant to Rule 
61(i).  Churchill argues that his sentencing claim raises a constitutional 
violation that warrants application of the Rule 61(i)(5) exception6 to a claim 
                                          
 
2 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
3 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4214(b) (2007). 
4 Churchill v. State, 2002 WL 31780197 (Del. Supr.). 
5 Churchill v. State, 2005 WL 534920 (Del. Supr.). 
6 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5) (providing that bars to relief are inapplicable to a 
jurisdictional claim “or to a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice 
because of a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, 
integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction”). 
 
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that is otherwise barred as untimely pursuant to Rule 61(i)(1)7 or as 
procedurally defaulted pursuant to Rule 61(i)(3).8  Second, Churchill claims 
that the claim was not formerly adjudicated pursuant to Rule 61(i)(4) as was 
determined by the Superior Court.9  
 
 
(4) 
After careful consideration of Churchill’s opening brief and the 
State’s motion to affirm, we have concluded that the judgment of the 
Superior Court should be affirmed.  It appears from the record that Churchill 
raised his sentencing claim, first, at the March 2002 sentencing hearing and 
then in his second postconviction motion, which was filed nearly six years 
after his conviction became final.  In the absence of demonstrated cause and 
prejudice and any indication that reconsideration is warranted in the interest 
of justice, the untimely claim was appropriately summarily dismissed as 
procedurally barred without exception. 
                                          
 
7 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1) (barring claim filed more than three years after 
judgment is final or after newly recognized retroactively applicable right) (amended 2005 
to reduce limitations period to one year for conviction final after July 1, 2005). 
8 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3) (providing that any ground for relief that was not 
previously asserted is barred unless the movant demonstrates “[c]ause for relief from the 
procedural default” and “[p]rejudice from violation of the movant’s rights”). 
9 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4) (providing that “[a]ny ground for relief that was 
formerly adjudicated, whether in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, 
in an appeal, in a postconviction proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, is 
thereafter barred, unless reconsideration of the claim is warranted in the interest of 
justice). 
 
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(5) 
It is manifest on the face of the opening brief that the appeal is 
without merit.  The issues presented on appeal are controlled by settled 
Delaware law.  To the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, there was 
no abuse of discretion. 
 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      Justice