Title: EDWARD C v COLLINGS
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 81-080
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: August 5, 1981

NO. 81-80 I N T H E SUPREME COURT O F T H E STATE O F MONTANA 1381 EDWARD C . , Guardian A d Litem of WILLIAM E . , a Minor, P e t i t i o n e r and Appellant, DAVID J. COLLIXGS, S h e r i f f of Powell County, Montana, Respondent and Respondent. ORIGIXAL PROCEEDING : Counsel of Record: For Appellant: McCaffery and Peterson, Butte, Montana For Respondent: & * j & Ted L. Mizner, County ~ t t o r n e y ; ? m a d I Montana Submitted on Brief: A p r i l 2 3 , 1 9 8 1 Dec2ded: August 5, 1 9 8 1 F i l e d : N G 5 - 1981 M r . J u s t i c e Frank B. Morrison, Jr., d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Edward C . , p e t i t i o n e d f o r a w r i t of habeas corpus on behalf of h i s minor son, William E. The p e t i t i o n stemmed from an order of t h e J u s t i c e Court, Powell County, finding William g u i l t y of i l l e g a l possession of alcohol and sen- tencing him t o a $50 f i n e and ten days i n the Powell County j a i l . William i s a 17-year-old minor who l i v e s i n Deer Lodge, Montana. O n January 30, 1981, he w a s a r r e s t e d f o r i l l e g a l possession of alcohol, a misdemeanor. A c i t a t i o n was issued, and William was ordered t o appear i n the Powell County J u s t i c e Court, Deer Lodge, Montana. William appeared before the j u s t i c e c o u r t on February 3, 1981. H e was unaccompanied by parent o r counsel. William was read h i s r i g h t s including h i s r i g h t t o counsel. P e t i t i o n e r a s s e r t s t h e minor was n o t advised t h a t h i s p a r e n t s could o r should be present. Additionally, p e t i t i o n e r a l l e g e s t h a t William requested t h e r i g h t t o speak with h i s f a t h e r , b u t such r e q u e s t was denied a f t e r William admitted t o possession of two cans of beer. By a f f i d a v i t , the presiding j u s t i c e of t h e peace s t a t e d t h a t William was o f f e r e d the opportunity t o have h i s p a r e n t s present. The minor defendant a l l e g e d l y had already discussed t h e problem with h i s parents; he d i d n o t want them there, and he d i d n o t want counsel. According t o t h e j u s t i c e , William admitted possession of alcohol and wanted t o plead g u i l t y though he had been advised of the f i n e and j a i l time t o be imposed. William was found g u i l t y of i l l e g a l possession of alcohol and sentenced t o a $50 f i n e and ten days i n the county j a i l . The j a i l t e r m was t o be s a t i s f i e d by serving f i v e consecutive weekends, beginning a t 4:00 p.m. of each Friday and ending a t 4:00 p.m. each Sunday. William began serving the sentence, during the weekends of February 6-8 and 13-15, 1981, whereupon the sentence was suspended by agreement of a l l p a r t i e s u n t i l t h e matter could be heard and decided by t h i s Court. The i s s u e presented t o t h i s Court is: Whether William E. e f f e c t i v e l y waived h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o counsel i n t h e j u s t i c e court? The i s s u e i n t h i s case a r i s e s a s a r e s u l t of t h e concur- r e n t j u r i s d i c t i o n over i l l e g a l possession of alcohol v i o l a t i o n s granted t o youth c o u r t s and t o j u s t i c e , municipal, o r c i t y c o u r t s . Section 41-5-203, MCA, Montana Youth Court Act, provides t h a t : " (1) Except a s provided i n subsection ( 2 ) , t h e c o u r t has exclusive o r i g i n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n of a l l proceedings under the Montana Youth Court Act i n which a youth i s a l l e g e d t o be a delinquent youth, a youth i n need of supervision, o r a youth i n need of c a r e o r concerning any person under 2 1 years of age charged with having v i o l a t e d any law of t h e s t a t e o r ordinance of any c i t y o r town other than a t r a f f i c o r f i s h and game law p r i o r t o having become 18 years of age. " ( 2 ) J u s t i c e , municipal, and c i t y c o u r t s have concurrent j u r i s d i c t i o n with the youth c o u r t over a l l a l c o h o l i c beverage v i o l a t i o n s a l l e g e d t o have been committed by a youth." Possession of alcohol i s an offense pursuant t o s e c t i o n 45-5-624, MCA, which provides: " (1) . . . A person under the age of 19 commits t h e offense of possession of an i n t o x i c a t i n g substance i f he knowingly has i n h i s possession an a l c o h o l i c beverage, except t h a t he does n o t commit the offense when i n the course of h i s employment it i s necessary t o possess a l c o h o l i c beverages." The p e n a l t i e s pursuant t o t h i s s t a t u t e a r e : " ( 2 ) A person convicted of the offense of possession of an i n t o x i c a t i n g substance s h a l l be fined not t o exceed $50 o r be imprisoned i n t h e county j a i l f o r any term n o t t o exceed 10 days, o r both. I f proceedings a r e held i n t h e youth c o u r t , t h e pre- ceding p e n a l t y does n o t apply, and t h e o f f e n d e r s h a l l be t r e a t e d a s an a l l e g e d youth i n need of s u p e r v i s i o n a s defined i n 41-5-103(13) . . ." I n l i g h t of s e c t i o n 45-5-624, MCA, it i s c l e a r t h a t t h e county a t t o r n e y has s o l e d i s c r e t i o n over which c o u r t s h a l l hear i l l e g a l possession of a l c o h o l v i o l a t i o n s . D i f f i c u l t i e s a r i s e because although a d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s must be r e s p e c t e d i n each s e t t i n g , waiver p r o v i s i o n s a r e e x p r e s s l y s t a t e d f o r youth c o u r t and would s e e m t o be a t v a r i a n c e w i t h those i n j u s t i c e c o u r t . Regarding t h e r i g h t t o counsel i n j u s t i c e o r municipal c o u r t , s e c t i o n 46-8-101, MCA, provides: "(1) Every defendant brought b e f o r e t h e c o u r t must be informed by t h e c o u r t t h a t it i s h i s r i g h t t o have counsel b e f o r e proceeding and must be asked i f he d e s i r e s t h e a i d of counsel. " ( 2 ) The defendant, i f charged w i t h a f e l o n y , must be advised t h a t counsel w i l l be f u r n i s h e d a t s t a t e expense i f he i s unable t o employ counsel. I f t h e o f f e n s e charged i s a f e l o n y and i f t h e defendant d e s i r e s counsel and i s unable t o employ counsel, a c o u r t of r e c o r d must a s s i g n counsel t o defend him. " ( 3 ) I f t h e o f f e n s e charged i s a misdemeanor and i f t h e defendant d e s i r e s counsel and i s unable t o employ counsel, a c o u r t of record i n t h e i n t e r e s t of j u s t i c e may a s s i g n counsel t o defend him." Waiver of t h i s r i g h t i s allowable under s e c t i o n 46-8-102, MCA, which s t a t e s t h a t : "A defendant may waive h i s r i g h t t o counsel, except t h a t i n a l l f e l o n y c a s e s where t h e defendant i s under 18 y e a r s of age, t h e defendant s h a l l be r e p r e s e n t e d by counsel a t every s t a g e of t h e pro- ceedings following t h e f i l i n g of a p e t i t i o n under 41-5-501." N o express s t a t u t o r y g u i d e l i n e s e x i s t i n t h i s s t a t u t e d e l i n e a t i n g an e f f e c t i v e waiver. This Court has h e l d t h a t t o c o n s t i t u t e an e f f e c t i v e waiver, t h e waiver must be i n - t e l l i g e n t l y and knowingly given. S t a t e v. Schenk (1968), 151 Mont. 493, 498, 444 P.2d 861, 863. I n determining whether t h e waiver was i n t e l l i g e n t l y given, a c o u r t must look a t t h e p a r t i c u l a r f a c t s of each c a s e , a s w e l l a s t h e background, experience and conduct of t h e defendant. I n R e J o n e s ' P e t i - t i o n (1963), 143 Mont. 19, 2 3 , 386 P.2d 747, 750. These a r e t h e s t a n d a r d s a j u s t i c e o r municipal c o u r t i s governed by i n accepting o r r e j e c t i n g a waiver of counsel. However, an examination of t h e Youth Court A c t p r o v i s i o n e s t a b l i s h i n g r i g h t t o counsel and waiver thereof d i s c l o s e s a marked d i f f e r e n c e from t h e above j u s t i c e and municipal c o u r t p r o v i s i o n s . S e c t i o n 41-5-511, MCA, provides t h a t : " I n a l l proceedings following t h e f i l i n g of a p e t i t i o n a l l e g i n g a d e l i n q u e n t youth o r youth i n need of s u p e r v i s i o n , t h e youth and t h e p a r e n t s o r guardian of t h e youth s h a l l be advised by t h e c o u r t o r , i n t h e absence of t h e c o u r t , by its r e p r e s e n t a t i v e t h a t t h e youth may be r e p r e s e n t e d by counsel a t a l l s t a g e s of t h e proceedings. - I f counsel -- i s n o t r e t a i n e d o r i f it appears t h a t --- counsel w i l l n o t be r e t a i n e d , counsel s h a l l be --- p- appointed -- f o r t h e youth u n l e s s t h e r i g h t t o appointed counsel i s waived -- by t h e youth -- and t h e p a r e n t s o r g u a r d i a n . Neither t h e youth nor h i s p a r e n t o r g u a r d i a n may waive counsel a f t e r a p e t i t i o n has been f i l e d i f commitment t o a s t a t e c o r r e c t i o n a l f a c i l i t y o r t o t h e department of i n s t i t u t i o n s f o r a p e r i o d of more than 6 months may r e s u l t from a d j u d i c a t i o n . " (Emphasis added.) Under t h i s s e c t i o n an e x p r e s s p r o v i s i o n governing t h e waiver of t h e r i g h t t o counsel i s included w i t h i n t h e s t a t u t e . This s t a t u t e r e q u i r e s n o t only waiver by t h e youth -- b u t a l s o by t h e p a r e n t s o r guardian of t h e youth. Therefore, i n -- - youth c o u r t , a waiver must be i n t e l l i g e n t l y and understand- i n g l y given by both minor and p a r e n t o r guardian. When a county a t t o r n e y chooses t o a l l o w i l l e g a l possession of a l c o h o l v i o l a t i o n s t o be heard i n j u s t i c e o r municipal c o u r t s , h i s a c t i o n s t r i p s a minor of an a d d i t i o n a l p r o t e c t i o n o r safeguard which t h e l e g i s l a t u r e e x p r e s s l y granted t o such minors, i . e . , waiver by t h e p a r e n t s o r guardian. S e c t i o n 41-5-102, MCA, d e c l a r e s t h a t : "The Montana Youth Court A c t s h a l l be i n t e r p r e t e d and construed t o e f f e c t u a t e t h e following e x p r e s s l e g i s l a t i v e purposes: " ( 4 ) t o provide j u d i c i a l procedures i n which t h e p a r t i e s a r e assured a f a i r hearing and recognition and enforcement of t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and s t a t u t o r y r i g h t s . " One of the express j u d i c i a l procedures adopted by t h e l e g i s - l a t u r e t o e f f e c t t h i s purpose was the a d d i t i o n a l requirement of p a r e n t a l waiver of the youth's r i g h t t o counsel. Surely t h e l e g i s l a t u r e d i d n o t intend t o g r a n t a j u d i c i a l safeguard t o minors i n one j u d i c i a l s e t t i n g and then preclude t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of such safeguard f o r t h e same crime charged i n a d i f f e r e n t forum. Yet t h i s would be t h e r e s u l t i f t h i s Court refused t o r e q u i r e p a r e n t a l waiver of t h e r i g h t t o counsel i n j u s t i c e o r municipal c o u r t s regarding i l l e g a l possession of alcohol v i o l a t i o n s . The concurrent j u r i s d i c t i o n of j u s t i c e and municipal c o u r t s with youth c o u r t s of i l l e g a l possession of alcohol v i o l a t i o n s c r e a t e s a s i t u a t i o n whereby a county a t t o r n e y has t h e power t o determine a minor's r i g h t s . Such a s i t u a t i o n i s untenable i n l i g h t of t h e express purposes of t h e Youth Court A c t . Therefore, w e hold t h a t t h e waiver of r i g h t t o counsel by William i n the case a t bar w a s i n e f f e c t i v e . P a r e n t a l waiver i s necessary i n j u s t i c e o r municipal c o u r t s where t h e youth c o u r t has concurrent j u r i s d i c t i o n . I t i s hereby ordered t h a t t h e w r i t of habeas corpus be issued. The defendant's p l e a is vacated and t h e cause re- manded t o j u s t i c e c o u r t f o r proceeding i n accordance with t h i s opinion.