Title: Lee's Hill Homeowners v. Carter
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 942231
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: November 3, 1995

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson, Lacy, Hassell, 
Koontz, JJ., and Whiting, Senior Justice 
 
LEE'S HILL HOMEOWNERS, et al. 
                                           OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 942231 
SENIOR JUSTICE HENRY H. WHITING 
                                          November 3, 1995 
RALPH DEWAYNE CARTER, et al. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY 
 
J. Peyton Farmer, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we decide whether the chancellor erred in 
holding that an instrument creating easements in the common area 
of a subdivision permits the developer to shift those easements 
from one part of the common area to a newly added part of the 
common area. 
 
In December 1989, Lee's Hill Partnership, the owner and 
developer of a tract of over 1,000 acres in Spotsylvania County 
(the developer), recorded a "Declaration for Lee's Hill" (the 
declaration) subjecting the land to a number of "covenants, 
restrictions, reservations, easements, servitudes, liens and 
charges."  The declaration also provided for the establishment of 
the "Lee's Hill Community Association, Inc." (the community 
association), a nonstock corporation to which the developer would 
convey fee simple title to various areas in its proposed 
development.  Although these separate areas were apparently 
conveyed to the community association at different times, they 
were collectively described as the "common area" of the 
development. 
 
The common area was to be owned by the community association 
"for the benefit, use and enjoyment of the [lot] [o]wners," to 
whom the developer granted "a non-exclusive right and easement of 
 
 
 
 
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use and enjoyment."  In February 1991, the developer conveyed 
Parcel G, Section 1B of Lee's Hill to the community association 
as part of the common area and apparently as "open space."
1  
Parcel G is a long, narrow, triangular strip of land lying 
generally south of land owned by Mary Lee Carter and Walter L. 
Carter, Jr., the parents of Ralph Dewayne Carter, and fronting 
the north side of Amelia Street.  The somewhat incomplete and 
unsatisfactory record in this appeal does not fully describe 
Parcel G.  It merely shows that Parcel G has a depth of 58.66 
feet on its western boundary and narrows continuously to its 
eastern boundary, but does not specify the lengths of Parcel G's 
boundary with the Carters' land or of its frontage on Amelia 
Street. 
 
After the developer's conveyance of Parcel G to the 
community association, various lot owners and their families used 
it for walking or jogging, sled riding, and as a place to 
congregate and visit with neighbors.  The lot owners also 
regarded this common area as an aesthetically pleasing "green 
space" separating the subdivision property from "a very busy 
 
     
1The declaration does not define the term "open space," nor 
does the deed to the community association indicate that the land 
conveyed was to be treated as part of the open space.  However, 
the witnesses and counsel for the lot owners described that land 
as "green space" or "open space." 
 
 
 
 
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road."  At a time not shown in the record, the lot owners formed 
an unincorporated association known as "Lee's Hill Homeowners" to 
protect their individual rights "in a collective fashion."
2
 
In May 1994, the community association conveyed 0.0479 acres 
of Parcel G to the developer in exchange for the developer's 
conveyance to the community association of 0.48489 acres located 
elsewhere in the development as a substitute common area.  Lying 
immediately south of the Carter land, the 0.0479 acre parcel 
(Parcel G-2) begins 76.93 feet east of Parcel G's western 
boundary, fronts 62.10 feet on the north side of Amelia Street, 
and extends 40.67 feet and 29.91 feet, respectively, on its 
western and eastern boundaries. 
 
Immediately thereafter, the developer conveyed Parcel G-2 to 
Ralph Dewayne Carter and Robin Keith Carter (the Carters), who 
had acquired part of his parents' land immediately north of 
Parcel G-2.  Later, the Carters began to construct two driveways 
across Parcel G-2 to serve a house they had moved to the land 
north of Parcel G-2.  Whereupon, "Lee's Hill Homeowners" and 
 
     
2The only indication of the formation and purpose of "Lee's 
Hill Homeowners" is in the averments of the bill of complaint, 
which are denied in the Carters' answer to the bill of complaint. 
 However, the Carters have not questioned the right of the 
homeowners association to participate in the suit and this 
appeal. 
 
 
 
 
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Kelly M. Boehringer, a lot owner, (collectively the lot owners) 
filed this suit against the Carters to enjoin their construction 
and use of the driveways as an interference with their easements 
in Parcel G, including Parcel G-2. 
 
Following an ore tenus hearing, the chancellor sustained the 
Carters' motion to strike the lot owners' evidence on the grounds 
that (1) the terms of the declaration gave the community 
association and the developer the right to exchange one part of 
the common area for another part, and (2) the lot owners had 
failed to show that their easements were "materially and 
adversely affect[ed]" by the exchange.  The lot owners appeal. 
 
In conformity with well-established appellate principles, we 
have viewed the facts in the light most favorable to the lot 
owners since the chancellor struck their evidence without hearing 
the Carters' evidence.  Ward v. Ernst & Young, 246 Va. 317, 330, 
435 S.E.2d 628, 634-35 (1993). 
 
The parties agree that the lot owners had easements in 
Parcel G-2 that were appurtenant to their lots.  They disagree as 
to whether those easements were terminated upon the community 
association's conveyance to the developer.  Our decision is 
controlled by the provisions of the developer's declaration and 
the principle that if the pertinent terms of a written instrument 
are clear and unambiguous, as we believe they are in this case, 
we do not resort to rules of construction.  State Farm Fire and 
Casualty Co. v. Walton, 244 Va. 498, 502, 423 S.E.2d 188, 191 
 
 
 
 
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(1992).  Instead, we apply those terms as written.  Id.
 
I. 
 
The lot owners assert that the provisions of § 3.8 of the 
declaration prohibit this exchange of a part of the common area 
for another part located elsewhere in the development.  
Section 3.8 provides that each lot owner's easement in the common 
area is "appurtenant to each Lot" and further provides that 
"[a]ny purported conveyance or other transfer of such rights and 
easements apart from the Lot to which such rights and easements 
are appurtenant shall be void."  (Emphasis added.)  Clearly, this 
provision is a prohibition against a lot owner's attempted 
conveyance of these easements apart from a conveyance of the lot, 
not a prohibition against the developer's transfer of these 
easements appurtenant to each lot to another part of the common 
area, the situation in this case.  Thus, we find no merit in this 
assertion. 
 
Next, the lot owners contend that the declaration gives the 
developer no clear and unambiguous right to extinguish their 
easements in Parcel G-2 by reacquiring that parcel and conveying 
it to the Carters.  They further contend that since the easements 
were incapable of being extinguished, the developer's conveyance 
of fee simple title to the Carters could not remove the burden 
imposed upon Parcel G-2 by their recorded, perpetual easements. 
 
In response, the Carters assert that the developer's right 
to extinguish the lot owners' easements in Parcel G-2 is clearly 
 
 
 
 
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and unambiguously set forth in §§ 2.4 and 2.6 of the declaration. 
 They also assert that the terms of the declaration do not create 
perpetual easements specifically in Parcel G-2, but rather 
easements that may be shifted to other parcels of land within the 
development. 
 
First, we consider whether the developer had a right to 
reacquire Parcel G-2 and convey it to the Carters.  Section 2.4 
of the declaration gives the community association the power to 
"convey the Common Area owned in fee simple by the Association 
. . . subject to [approval by any mortgagees of the property]."  
Also, § 2.6 provides that the community association can "transfer 
part of the Common Area to or at the direction of the [developer] 
for the purpose of adjusting Lot lines or otherwise in connection 
with the orderly subdivision and development of the Property."  
However, if the minimum level of "open space" is reduced by any 
such transfer, § 2.6 requires the developer to convey to the 
community association such portion of its property as is 
necessary to maintain that minimum level of "open space."  In our 
opinion, these provisions clearly gave the community association 
the right to convey Parcel G-2 to the developer and permitted the 
developer to convey this land to the Carters, provided that the 
developer conveyed to the community association other property 
necessary to maintain the minimum level of "open space," which it 
did.  Thus, we reject the contention that the developer was 
barred from reacquiring Parcel G-2 and conveying that parcel to 
 
 
 
 
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the Carters. 
 
Next, we consider whether the lot owners' easements in 
Parcel G-2 were perpetual and, therefore, incapable of being  
extinguished by these conveyances.  Looking at the language of 
the declaration, we note that the easements are described as a 
"non-exclusive right and easement of use and enjoyment in and to 
the Common Area . . . ."  The declaration does not describe any 
particular part of the common area, which, under the terms of the 
declaration, is defined as "all of the Property, other than Lots, 
then owned or leased by the Association or otherwise available to 
the Association for the benefit, use and enjoyment of the 
Owners."  And, as we have held, the developer and community 
association reserved the right under §§ 2.4 and 2.6 of the 
declaration to exchange and, thereafter, to convey parts of the 
common area in the orderly subdivision and development of the 
property, provided that the developer maintained the minimum 
"open space" of each subdivision of the property. 
 
Accordingly, we do not think that the lot owners' easements 
are affixed to a particular parcel of land, as the lot owners 
claim, but can be shifted from time to time to other parcels of 
land duly conveyed to the community association.  Hence, we 
conclude that the community association and the developer had the 
right to make this exchange of parts of the common area and to 
extinguish the lot owners' specific easements in Parcel G-2. 
 
II. 
 
 
 
 
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We next consider the lot owners' claim that the evidence 
that their easements in the balance of Parcel G were affected by 
the conveyance of Parcel G-2 raised factual issues which could 
not be resolved on a motion to strike. 
 
First, the lot owners cite the common law rule that a 
servient owner cannot use his property in such manner as to make 
the dominant owner's use of an easement less useful or 
convenient.  Willing v. Booker, 160 Va. 461, 466, 168 S.E. 417, 
419 (1933).  However, as the Carters note, the lot owners 
acquired their easements in Parcel G subject to the provisions of 
§§ 2.4 and 2.6 of the declaration giving the servient owners the 
right to transfer the lot owners' easements in one part of the 
common area to another part of the common area.  And the lot 
owners introduced no evidence comparing the relative usefulness 
and convenience of Parcel G and the substituted part of the 
common area.
3  Accordingly, the lot owners failed to carry their 
burden of showing that their use of the substituted part of the 
common area was less convenient or useful than their use of 
Parcel G or its remainder after the conveyance of Parcel G-2. 
                     
     
3In describing another part of the common area, Roger 
Dressler, a lot owner, testified that "one other strip of land 
that's off Amelia Drive [was] behind some other houses, and 
. . . inaccessible by us," but he did not identify that strip of 
land as the substituted part of the common area. 
 
 
 
 
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Next, the lot owners rely upon § 15.1(3) of the declaration. 
 Section 15.1(3) deals with the developer's unilateral right to 
"relocate boundary lines between the Common Area and any Lots or 
among any Lots; provided, however, that such relocation does not 
materially and adversely affect any Owner other than the 
[developer] and that such relocation is reflected in an approved 
resubdivision of all or any part of the Property."  The lot 
owners claim that their evidence raised a factual issue whether 
their easements in Parcel G were "materially and adversely 
affected."  
 
The difficulty with this claim is twofold.  First,  
§ 15.1(3) deals only with the developer's unilateral right to 
relocate lot boundaries.  Here, there is no relocation of 
boundary lines, particularly those of the complaining lot owners, 
but a conveyance of a part of the common area.  Second, as we 
have noted earlier, the lot owners introduced no evidence 
addressing the relative usefulness or convenience of their 
easements in the former and substituted parts of the common area. 
 Hence, we find no merit in the lot owners' contention. 
 
Accordingly, we will affirm the final decree of the 
chancellor. 
 
Affirmed.