Title: Drayton v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 170, 2004
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: November 12, 2004

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
LAUANE T. DRAYTON, 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§  
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§   No. 170, 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§   Court Below – Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   of the State of Delaware, 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§   in and for Sussex County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   Cr.A. No. 02-10-0840 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§         
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
  Submitted:  September 9, 2004 
 
 
 
 
     Decided:  November 12, 2004 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 12th day of November 2004, upon consideration of the 
appellant’s Opening Brief under Rule 26(c) and the appellee’s response, it 
appears to the Court that: 
 
1) 
On January 21, 2003, the defendant-appellant, Lauane T. 
Drayton, entered a guilty plea in the Superior Court to one count of Delivery 
of Cocaine.  Sentencing was deferred and Drayton entered the Boot Camp 
Program. 
 
2) 
While on probation, Drayton violated his curfew.  On 
November 21, 2003, he was sentenced to thirty days at Level V Boot Camp 
 
2
Tune-Up.  A random urine screening on February 3, 2004 resulted in a 
positive test for cocaine.   
 
3) 
Following a contested violation of probation (“VOP”) hearing 
on April 2, 2004, the Superior Court found Drayton guilty of violating his 
probation and revoked it.  On April 7, 2004, the Superior Court sentenced 
Drayton to be incarcerated for five years at Level V, with credit for 161 days 
previously served, followed by six months at Level IV Work Release.   
 
4) 
On appeal, Drayton’s defense attorney has moved to withdraw 
under Delaware Supreme Court Rule 26(c).  The standard and scope of 
review applicable to this Court’s consideration of a motion to withdraw and 
accompanying brief under Rule 26(c) is two-fold:  1) this Court must be 
satisfied that defense counsel has, in fact, made a conscientious examination 
of the record and law for arguable claims; and (2) this Court must conduct 
its own review of the record and determine that the appeal is so totally 
devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that it can be decided without 
adversary presentation.1  If this Court finds that the record fairly presents 
non-frivolous claims, then defense counsel should be permitted to withdraw 
and a new attorney be appointed.2 
                                          
 
1 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988) (quoting McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wis., 
Dist. 1, 486 U.S. 429, 442 (1988)); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
2 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. at 83. 
 
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5) 
Drayton’s attorney asserts that he “has made a conscientious 
examination of the record and the law and believes an appeal is wholly 
without merit.”  Drayton’s attorney identifies no arguably appealable issues. 
 
6) 
In a letter to his defense attorney, however, Drayton states that 
he needs treatment for his drug problem.  He has requested that his sentence 
be modified so that upon successful completion of the TEMPO Drug 
Treatment Program, a G.E.D., and Vo-Tech Trade School, the balance of 
Level V be suspended for one year at Level II probation.  For purposes of 
this appeal, we have deemed Drayton’s request for a sentence modification 
to be a claim that his VOP sentence was excessive. 
 
7) 
The record reflects that Drayton entered a guilty plea on 
January 21, 2003 to Delivery of Cocaine.  Drayton acknowledged, as part of 
his plea agreement, that if he failed to complete the Boot Camp Program 
including Aftercare, he faced a minimum mandatory sentence of five years 
at Level V pursuant to Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 4763 because of a prior Title 
16 conviction. 
 
8) 
When Drayton was sentenced on the VOP, his attorney argued 
that he should not receive the minimum mandatory sentence because the 
statute had recently been amended.  The Superior Court rejected Draytons 
attorney’s argument.  Instead, the Superior Court followed the decision in 
 
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State v. Ismaaeel,3 which held that the sentencing scheme in effect when the 
drug offenses were committed applied to Drayton because the subsequent 
statutory amendments applied prospectively only.  
 
9) 
If a violation of probation is established under Del. Code Ann. 
tit. 11, § 4334(c), the Superior Court “may continue or revoke the probation 
or suspension of sentence, and may require the probation violator to serve 
the sentence imposed, or any lesser sentence, and if the imposition of the 
sentence was suspended, may impose any sentence which might originally 
have been imposed.”4  In this case, the Superior Court revoked Drayton’s 
probation and sentenced him to the five-year minimum-mandatory sentence 
that had been deferred when Drayton was diverted into the Boot Camp 
Program.  Since Drayton was sentenced, this Court has affirmed the Superior 
Court’s judgment in State v. Ismaaeel5 that construed the amended statute as 
applying prospectively only.  Accordingly, Drayton’s claim that his VOP 
sentence was excessive is without merit. 
                                          
 
3  State v. Ismaaeel, 840 A.2d 644 (Del. Super. Ct. 2004). 
4 See Larson v. State, 1995 WL 236650 (Del., Apr. 13, 2995) (once probation conditions 
are violated, the sentencing court may revoke probation and resentence the offender in 
accordance with the statute). 
5 See Ismaaeel v. State, 2004 WL 1587040 (Del., June 25, 2005). 
 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the judgment 
of the Superior Court is affirmed.  The motion to withdraw is moot. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice