Title: James v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 961294
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: June 6, 1997

Present:   Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson, Lacy, 
Hassell, and Keenan, JJ., and Whiting, Senior Justice 
 
 
LORENZO DEMONTE JAMES 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
v.   Record No. 961294         June 6, 1997 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether a criminal 
defendant was entitled to ask a physician whether a witness, 
who had suffered brain injuries, was "capable of lying" at 
trial. 
 
Lorenzo Demonte James was tried before a jury and 
convicted of:  first-degree murder, malicious wounding, use 
of a firearm in the commission of a murder, and use of a 
firearm in the commission of a malicious wounding.  The jury 
fixed his punishment as follows:  life imprisonment for the 
first-degree murder conviction and sentences totaling 23 
years' imprisonment for the remaining convictions.  The 
trial court confirmed the jury's verdict and entered 
judgment thereon.  The Court of Appeals denied the 
defendant's petition for appeal by unpublished order.  We 
awarded the defendant an appeal. 
 
On July 6, 1994, Terrence Hicks and Randall Thomas were 
"hanging out" next to Hicks' car which was parked in an 
apartment complex parking lot on Jefferson Davis Highway in 
Richmond.  Both men were shot some time late that morning.  
Hicks died at the scene, and Thomas was taken to the Medical 
College of Virginia Hospitals. 
 
Richmond Police Detective C. T. Woody, Jr., questioned 
Thomas at the hospital five days later.  Thomas identified 
James as the individual who shot him and Hicks.  Thomas gave 
the following version of events to Detective Woody.  Thomas, 
Hicks, and James had driven from the apartment complex to a 
convenience store to purchase beer.  They returned to the 
apartment complex parking lot, and an argument ensued 
between James and Hicks.  The two men argued because the 
"music was too loud" and someone had been "selling drugs."  
Hicks "pulled" a pistol and James left.  Hicks then placed 
the pistol in his car.  James returned, armed with two 
pistols, shot Hicks and Thomas, and then ran away. 
 
During the trial, Thomas gave the following testimony 
which differs in some respects from the statements he had 
made to Detective Woody.  Thomas and Hicks drove to the 
apartment complex on the morning of July 6, 1994, to "hang 
out, [and] drink some beer."  James approached Thomas and 
Hicks and complained about noise.  An argument ensued 
between James and Hicks.  Thomas walked alone to a 
convenience store to purchase beer.  When he returned to 
Hicks' car, which was parked in the apartment complex 
parking lot, Hicks was seated in the front passenger seat.  
Thomas entered the car and sat in the rear seat.  James, 
armed with two pistols, approached the car.  James entered 
the car, sat in the driver's seat, shot Hicks in the head, 
and shot Thomas several times as he tried to flee from the 
car.  Thomas denied that Hicks had a pistol in his car. 
 
Dr. David X. Cifu, medical director of the brain injury 
rehabilitation program at the Medical College of Virginia 
Hospitals, treated Thomas for brain injuries he sustained 
when he was shot.  Dr. Cifu was qualified to testify as an 
expert witness knowledgeable about the subject of brain 
injury rehabilitation.  During his direct examination, Dr. 
Cifu stated that Thomas sustained certain brain injuries, 
including "problems with thinking, memory [and] judgment."  
Dr. Cifu testified that a person, like Thomas, who had 
sustained traumatic brain injuries, would have problems with 
acute memory, "which is acute short term memory being what 
happened the last hours, the last couple of days, immediate 
recall, recalling what you were just told.  In addition you 
commonly have what's called retrograde amnesia.  What that 
implies is that in the acute period after a brain injury, a 
couple of weeks to months, it would be very unusual to 
recall immediate events of the injury, whether it is a car 
accident [or] gunshot wounds." 
 
Dr. Cifu also testified that Thomas was still in 
recovery, but "his memory . . . cognitive, and . . . 
thinking skills are to the point where he is completely 
aware of his situation, where he is and what is going on.  
And . . . [Thomas] has had recovery of his immediate memory 
and probably about 90 percent recovery from his short term 
memory deficit.  So, he is probably again about 90 percent 
recovered from his thinking deficit . . . ." 
 
The defendant asked Dr. Cifu the following question 
during cross-examination:  "Is Mr. Thomas capable of lying 
today?"  The Commonwealth objected, and the trial court 
sustained the objection.  The court stated:  "I don't think 
the doctor can testify as to the truth and veracity of this 
particular [witness] unless his brain is so damaged or he is 
so confused that he is incapable of understanding the 
difference between truth and untruth." 
 
On appeal, James essentially argues that the trial 
court erred by refusing to permit him to cross-examine Dr. 
Cifu on the subject whether Thomas was "capable of lying."  
Continuing, James claims that the trial court's failure to 
permit him to cross-examine Dr. Cifu on this subject 
contravened his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.  We 
disagree with James. 
 
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the 
Constitution of the United States grants a criminal 
defendant the right to cross-examine witnesses called by the 
prosecution.  Barker v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 370, 376, 337 
S.E.2d 729, 733 (1985); Shanklin v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 
862, 864, 284 S.E.2d 611, 612 (1981).  "[T]he main and 
essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the 
opponent the opportunity of cross-examination."  Delaware v. 
Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678 (1986) (quoting Davis v. 
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974)).  The Confrontation 
Clause, however, does not grant a defendant an unlimited 
right to cross-examination.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has 
held that "trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the 
Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable 
limits on such cross-examination."  Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 
679.   
 
It is well settled in this Commonwealth that the 
credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their 
testimony are questions exclusively for the jury.  Barker, 
230 Va. at 373, 337 S.E.2d at 732; Coppola v. Commonwealth, 
220 Va. 243, 252, 257 S.E.2d 797, 803 (1979), cert. denied, 
444 U.S. 1103 (1980); Zirkle v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 862, 
870, 55 S.E.2d 24, 29 (1949); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 142 
Va. 639, 640, 128 S.E. 456, 456 (1925).  The settled law of 
this Commonwealth simply does not permit a defendant to ask 
a witness to opine whether another witness is "capable of 
lying."  The finder of fact, in this instance the jury, must 
determine a witness' veracity. 
 
We hold that James' Confrontation Clause rights were 
not violated.  The trial court explicitly gave James an 
opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Cifu on the subject whether 
Thomas' brain damage affected his ability to distinguish 
right from wrong.  We note that Thomas took advantage of 
this opportunity and pursued this line of cross-examination 
in the presence of the jury.  The trial court's refusal to 
permit Dr. Cifu to speculate on Thomas' veracity was a 
reasonable limitation on the scope of that cross-
examination. 
 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals. 
 
Affirmed.