Title: In re: ACPE Opinion 705
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-74-06
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: July 19, 2007

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 74 September Term 2006 IN RE: ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OPINION 705 Argued April 5, 2007 Decided July 19, 2007 On petition for review of an opinion of the Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics. Jo Astrid Glading, Acting Public Advocate, argued the cause for appellant, Department of the Public Advocate. R. Brian McLaughlin argued the cause for respondent, Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics (Elaine D. Dietrich, Counsel to the Administrative Director of the Courts, attorney). John M. Van Dalen argued the cause for respondent, pro se. PER CURIAM In this appeal, we must determine whether a provision of the New Jersey Conflicts of Interest Law (Act), N.J.S.A. 52:13D-12 to -27, must yield to a conflicting Rule of Professional Conduct (RPC). Specifically, the question presented is whether attorneys formerly employed by the State are subject to N.J.S.A. 52:13D-17 when the Act s post-employment restrictions are more stringent than the directives of RPC 1.11(c). In response to an attorney inquiry, the Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics (ACPE) concluded that, absent a decision by this Court to defer to the Legislature, RPC 1.11 should prevail over the Act s more restrictive mandates. Because N.J.S.A. 52:13D-17 serves a legitimate governmental purpose and does not improperly encroach on judicial interests, we defer to the Legislature in the spirit of comity and hold that attorneys formerly employed by the State must comply with both the Act and the RPCs. written notice is given promptly to the appropriate government agency to enable it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this Rule. [RPC 1.11(c).] In May 2005, in compliance with RPC 1.11(c)(2), attorney John M. Van Dalen, of Van Dalen Brower, L.L.C., notified the Division of Law of the Department of Law and Public Safety that he represented Scarborough Construction in a matter concerning Harbor Cove in Somers Point. Van Dalen s letter informed the Division that his partner, Stephen Brower, a former Deputy Attorney General, was screened from participation in the matter because of Brower s responsibilities while in the Attorney General s office for legal services to the Department of Environmental Protection in connection with Harbor Cove. Three weeks later, the Division advised Van Dalen, also a former Deputy Attorney General, that in addition to meeting the requirements of RPC 1.11(c)(2), his firm was also required to comply with N.J.S.A. 52:13D-17, which provides that no former State employee may represent, whether by himself [or herself] or through any partnership, firm or corporation in which he [or she] has an interest, any client other than the State in connection with a matter that the employee was substantially and directly involved with as a State employee. See N.J.S.A. 52:13D-17. Although the present conflict of interest has proven to be moot, Van Dalen requested that the ACPE address the overlap of the Act and RPC due to the issue s strong continuing importance to my firm and to the bar generally as the situation is likely to reoccur. In response, the ACPE published Opinion No. 705, 184 N.J. L.J. 390 (2006). After recognizing a direct conflict between N.J.S.A. 52:13D-17 and RPC 1.11(c), the ACPE opined that the Court-approved RPC should prevail. Opinion No. 705, supra, 184 N.J.L.J. at 390. The ACPE stated: In this inquiry, the statute is more restrictive and the Court s ethics rule in RPC 1.11(c) is more liberal, allowing attorneys to proceed in proper cases by screening and notification. Our reading of Winberry [v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 877, 71 S. Ct. 123, 95 L. Ed. 638 (1950)] and Knight [v. City of Margate, 86 N.J. 374 (1981)] is that the Court s ethics rule should prevail in this case, absent a decision by the Court to defer to the statute under principles of comity. [Opinion No. 705, supra, 184 N.J.L.J. at 390.] Pursuant to Rule 1:19-8, the Department of the Public Advocate petitioned this Court to review Opinion 705. We granted the petition. __ N.J. __ (2006). [(Emphasis added).] The Act defines interest, in part, as: (1) the ownership or control of more than 10% of the profits or assets of a firm, association, or partnership, or more than 10% of the stock in a corporation for profit other than a professional service corporation organized under the Professional Service Corporation Act . . . . The provisions of this act governing the conduct of individuals are applicable to shareholders, associates or professional employees of a professional service corporation regardless of the extent or amount of their shareholder interest in such a corporation. [N.J.S.A. 52:13D-13(g).] Willful violators are subject to a maximum of six-months imprisonment and a $1,000 fine, as well as a civil penalty of not less than $500 nor more than $10,000. N.J.S.A. 52:13D-17. In short, the Act imputes the conflict of interest of a former State government employee -- including an attorney -- to the entire partnership, firm, or corporation in which the former employee obtains an interest, as statutorily defined. Applied here, Van Dalen would be precluded from representing Scarborough Construction due to Brower s prior substantial, direct involvement in the Harbor Cove matter and Brower s significant interest in the law firm. [N.J. Const. art. III, 1.] That bedrock principle is one of independence and interdependence among the coordinate branches of our government. Knight, supra, 86 N.J. at 388. First, [t]he constitutional spirit inherent in the separation of governmental powers contemplates that each branch of government will exercise fully its own powers without transgressing upon powers rightfully belonging to a cognate branch. Ibid. The principle guarantees that no one branch can claim[] or receive[] inordinate power. Brown v. Heymann, 62 N.J. 1, 11 (1972). Accordingly, we refuse to tolerate any deviation from the separation of powers principle that impairs the essential integrity of one of the great branches of government. Massett Bldg. Co. v. Bennett, 4 N.J. 53, 57 (1950). Second, and equally important, the doctrine requires not an absolute division of power but a cooperative accommodation among the three branches of government. Commc ns Workers of Am., supra, 130 N.J. at 449. [T]he division of governmental powers implants a symbiotic relationship between the separate governmental parts so that the governmental organism will not only survive but will flourish. Knight, supra, 86 N.J. at 388. Conversely, a rigid and inflexible classification of powers would render government unworkable. Massett Bldg. Co., supra, 4 N.J. at 57. Thus, the separation of powers principle was not intended to create three watertight governmental compartments, stifling cooperative action. In re P.L. 2001, Chapter 362, supra, 186 N.J. at 379 (quotation omitted); see also In re Salaries for Prob. Officers of Bergen County, 58 N.J. 422, 425 (1971) ( [T]he doctrine of separation of powers was never intended to create, and certainly never did create, utterly exclusive spheres of competence. ). Rather, our Constitution encourages cooperation among the branches, In re Zicarelli, 55 N.J. 249, 264-65 (1970), aff d, 406 U.S. 472, 92 S. Ct. 1670, 32 L. Ed. 2d 234 (1972), and permits some osmosis . . . when the branches of government touch one another, Knight, supra, 86 N.J. at 388. Our Constitution vests this Court with the authority to make rules governing the administration of all courts in the State and, subject to the law, the practice and procedure in all such courts. The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction over the admission to the practice of law and discipline of persons admitted. N.J. Const. art. VI, 2, 3. Notwithstanding that grant of authority, [i]n the spirit of comity, this Court has shared its jurisdiction with the Legislature and upheld narrowly-circumscribed legislation that touches on attorney discipline. McKeown-Brand v. Trump Castle Hotel &amp; Casino, 132 N.J. 546, 554, 556 (1993). In certain circumstances, although they might impinge upon the Court s constitutional concerns, we have accommodated the lawful and reasonable exercise of power by the other branches of government on the practice of law. Knight, supra, 86 N.J. at 391; see also Passaic County Prob. Officers Ass n v. County of Passaic, 73 N.J. 247, 255 (1977) ( It has . . ., since 1948, been the practice of this Court, with only occasional deviation, to accept and adopt legislative arrangements that have not in any way interfered with this Court s constitutional obligation. ). Accordingly, when the actions of another branch of government implicate fields within this Court s purview, the validity of such action and this Court s ultimate power to accept or reject such action, turn upon the legitimacy of the governmental purpose of that action and the nature and extent of its encroachment upon judicial prerogatives and interests. Knight, supra, 86 N.J. at 391. Resolution of such questions calls for the most thorough and careful review to guard against the encroachment of one co-equal branch of government on another. Commc ns Workers of Am., supra, 130 N.J. at 457. Nevertheless, [w]e ordinarily do our very best to harmonize our constitutional powers with the apparently conflicting will of the Legislature. In re Hearing on Immunity for Ethics Complainants, 96 N.J. 669, 677 (1984). JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO, dissenting. In unambiguous terms, the New Jersey Constitution makes clear that [t]he Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction over the admission to the practice of law and the discipline of persons admitted. N.J. Const. art. VI, 2, 3. In the exercise of that exclusive grant of jurisdiction, we have made clear that [n]either the Legislature nor the Executive has any power to overrule attorney ethical standards promulgated by this Court[,] reasoning that, [u]ltimately, it is the Court that establishes the ethical standards to which an attorney is held, and neither the Legislature nor the Executive can diminish them. In re Advisory Comm. on Prof l Ethics Opinion No. 621, 128 N.J. 577, 591 (1992). In this case, we are called on to determine which standard of conduct applies -- either the Conflict of Interest Law, N.J.S.A. 52:13D-12 to -27, or Rule of Professional Conduct 1.11(c) -- when the two are in obvious conflict. Acknowledging this Court s supremacy in the area of the regulation and discipline of attorneys, the majority nevertheless concludes that, [b]ecause N.J.S.A. 52:13D-17 serves a legitimate governmental purpose and does not improperly encroach on judicial interests, [the majority] defer[s] to the Legislature in the spirit of comity and hold[s] that attorneys formerly employed by the State must comply with both the [Conflict of Interest Law] and the RPCs. Ante, ___ N.J. ___ (2007) (slip op. at 2). This Court adopted RPC 1.11(c) in the face of the prohibitions already extant in the Conflict of Interest Law and nothing has been advanced as having arisen during the interim to justify the invocation of comity at this juncture. Thus, unless we are to confess error, there is no reason to supersede a Rule of Professional Conduct that was adopted in the face of the pre-existing statutory prohibition. I, therefore, respectfully dissent. [N.J.S.A. 52:13D-17.] Against that backdrop, and thirty years after the Conflict of Interest Law was adopted, this Court undertook a comprehensive review of the Rules of Professional Conduct. We described that process in detail: In January 2001, the Supreme Court created an ad hoc Commission on the Rules of Professional Conduct. . . . . The Court directed the Commission to review the existing Rules of Professional Conduct in light of the work of the American Bar Association s Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct (the Ethics 2000 Commission ). . . . . During the ensuing twenty-two months, the Commission -- familiarly known as the Pollock Commission -- met in subcommittees and plenary sessions. It conducted public hearings on the issues before it. In December 2002, the Commission filed a comprehensive report with the Court. The report was published for comment. Given the importance of the issues addressed in the Commission s recommendations, the Court provided for an extended comment period. . . . Responses were received from the New Jersey State Bar Association, the Attorney General s Division of Law, the New Jersey Office of Government Integrity, the Pennsylvania and Philadelphia Bar Associations, the New Jersey Lawyers Fund for Client Protection, the Office of Attorney Ethics, and several individuals. On April 23, 2003, the Supreme Court conducted a public hearing on the reports of the Pollock Commission and the Ad Hoc Committee on Bar Admissions. In addition to some of those who had provided written comments, a representative of the Attorney General s Division of Criminal Justice participated. The Court invited the Commission to reply to the comments that had been made. The Commission s comments completed the record. In reviewing each recommendation of the Pollock Commission, the Court considered the proposal in the context of the language of and policies underlying the existing Rules of Professional Conduct, pertinent case law, and the comments that had been submitted. During the review process, the Court developed a deep appreciation for the amount of time and effort that the Commission and its staff devoted to their assignment. Although the Court did not adopt every recommendation of the Commission, its decisions were solidly grounded in the knowledge that the Pollock Commission had given all of the issues confronting it both thoughtful and detailed consideration. . . . . . . . . Among the Court s actions are the following: . . . . 4. Codified in RPC 1.11 the existing policy of the Office of the Attorney General that prohibits former government lawyers from serving certain clients for six months immediately following the termination of the lawyer s government service[.] [Supreme Court of New Jersey, Administrative Determinations in Response to the Report and Recommendation of the Supreme Court Commission on the Rules of Professional Conduct (Sep. 10, 2003) (Administrative Determinations), reprinted in Kevin H. Michels, New Jersey Attorney Ethics The Law of New Jersey Lawyering 1143-44 (2007).] ON PETITION FOR REVIEW of an Opinion of the Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics IN RE: ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OPINION 705 DECIDED July 19, 2007 Chief Justice Zazzali PRESIDING OPINION BY Per Curiam CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY DISSENTING OPINION BY Justice Rivera-Soto