Title: The Florida Bar v. Madsen Marcellus, Jr.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC16-1773
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: July 19, 2018

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC16-1773 
____________ 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR, 
Complainant, 
 
vs. 
 
MADSEN MARCELLUS, JR., 
Respondent. 
 
[July 19, 2018] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
We have for review a referee’s report recommending that Respondent, 
Madsen Marcellus, Jr., be found guilty of professional misconduct and suspended 
from the practice of law for one year.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15, Fla. 
Const.  We approve the referee’s findings of fact and recommendations as to guilt, 
but disapprove the referee’s recommended sanction, and instead suspend Madsen 
Marcellus, Jr., from the practice of law for eighteen months, as set forth below. 
BACKGROUND 
 
The Florida Bar (the Bar) filed a complaint with the Court alleging that 
Respondent, Madsen Marcellus, Jr., violated various Rules Regulating the Florida 
 
 
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Bar (Bar Rules).  The case was referred to a referee, and the referee filed his report 
with the Court.  Both Marcellus and the Bar sought review of the referee’s report. 
 
The referee made the following findings of fact in his report.  Marcellus was 
a party to dissolution of marriage proceedings that were initiated in 2009; the final 
hearing in the case took place in November 2009 and the Final Order on Petition 
for Dissolution of Marriage and Other Relief (Final Order) was issued on April 23, 
2010.  As reflected in the Final Order, the family court ordered Marcellus and his 
ex-wife, Kellie Peterson Gudger, to either refinance the marital home into solely 
Marcellus’s name within thirty days of that hearing or sell the home.  Although 
there was conflicting testimony at the final hearing before the referee, the referee 
found that Marcellus vacated the marital home sometime during the pendency of 
the divorce, and that the couple had arranged for sale of the home.  Two days prior 
to the closing, after Gudger vacated the house and completed her portion of the 
paperwork for the sale of the home, Marcellus moved back into the home and 
refused to complete his portion of the paperwork; as a result, the sale fell through.  
Thereafter Marcellus refused to leave the home.  After Marcellus reinhabited the 
home, he made several attempts to refinance the mortgage into his name alone.  
However, he was unable to do so based on his income.   
 
In March 2010, Marcellus pursued another mortgage modification, this time 
with the help of a family friend, Curt Francis.  Marcellus and Francis testified that 
 
 
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while applying for the mortgage modification, Marcellus contacted Gudger and 
asked her to apply for the modification with him, but she refused.  Francis told 
Marcellus that he would call Gudger and convince her to sign the document.  
Francis left the room as if to call her, and returned shortly thereafter indicating that 
Gudger had agreed to allow him to execute the mortgage modification on her 
behalf.  Francis signed the document, purportedly on Gudger’s behalf, and 
notarized the signature which he himself affixed to the document.  Marcellus knew 
that Francis signed the document and notarized his own signature.  However, 
contrary to assertions by Marcellus and Francis, Gudger testified that neither 
Marcellus nor Francis called her regarding the modification application.  She 
maintained that she never agreed to have Francis sign the modification application 
on her behalf.  As a result of this action, Francis lost his notary commission in 
Florida.  Ultimately, the mortgage modification application with the fraudulent 
signature was accepted and approved by the lender. 
 
Gudger first learned of Marcellus’s modification of the mortgage using the 
forged signature upon being served a foreclosure complaint filed by the lender on 
December 8, 2011, after Marcellus failed to make payments on the mortgage 
 
 
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following modification thereof.1  In June 2013, Gudger filed a motion for contempt 
with the family court as a result of Marcellus’s failure to comply with the terms of 
the Final Order in their divorce case, requiring him to either refinance the home 
into solely his name within thirty days of the November 2009 final hearing or sell 
the home.  The family court ordered Marcellus to pay Gudger $2,500 in fees 
charged to prepare and file the contempt motion but ultimately declined to hold 
him in contempt of court. 
 
Additionally, in May and June 2013, Gudger served Marcellus with various 
discovery requests regarding his alleged noncompliance with family court orders 
concerning child support and other matters.  At a July 24, 2013, hearing, the family 
court found that Marcellus had not responded to any of the discovery requests and 
ordered him to do so within ten days of that hearing.  Marcellus did not comply 
with that order and did not comply with any of the discovery requests for the next 
year of litigation.  Gudger filed several motions to compel discovery.  The family 
court granted Gudger’s motions to compel on September 24, 2013, July 1, 2014, 
and September 11, 2014.  The family court sanctioned Marcellus for his failure to 
comply with its orders and ordered him to pay Gudger’s attorneys’ fees within 
                                          
 
 
1.  Following instigation of the foreclosure proceedings, Gudger quitclaimed 
her interest in the home.  However, the lender refused to dismiss its claims against 
her, and she remains a defendant in the pending foreclosure proceedings. 
 
 
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thirty days.  Additionally, the September 11, 2014, order fined Marcellus $50 per 
day until he provided proof of compliance with the discovery requests.  
Subsequently, the family court issued an order directing Marcellus to appear before 
it on September 15, 2014, to show cause why he failed to comply with the court’s 
prior orders and why he should not be sanctioned.  Marcellus failed to appear, and 
the family court issued a writ of bodily attachment.  Ultimately, the family court 
dissolved the writ after Marcellus’s appearance at the next scheduled hearing so 
that the case could go forward, but expressed disbelief at Marcellus’s excuse that 
his newly hired counsel, who also happened to be his law partner, failed to notify 
him of the Monday morning show cause hearing until after close of business on the 
preceding Friday. 
  
The referee found that Marcellus remained in violation of several family 
court orders as of the date of the final hearing in this case.  Specifically, the referee 
found that Marcellus had failed to pay the attorneys’ fees or fines ordered by the 
family court on September 24, 2013, July 1, 2014, and September 11, 2014.  He 
also found that Marcellus remained in violation of the family court’s April 23, 
2010, Final Order by remaining in the marital home and failing to refinance it out 
of Gudger’s name.  Additionally, the referee found that Marcellus took actions to 
evade arrest on the writ of attachment, such as exchanging vehicles with his 
 
 
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current wife so that he would not be found driving the vehicle described in the writ 
and avoiding his children’s activities for fear of being arrested.   
RULE VIOLATIONS 
 
The referee recommended that Marcellus be found to have violated Bar 
Rules 3-4.3 (Misconduct and Minor Misconduct); 4-3.4(a) (a lawyer must not 
unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence or otherwise unlawfully 
alter, destroy, or conceal a document or other material that the lawyer knows or 
reasonably should know is relevant to a pending or reasonably foreseeable 
proceeding); 4-3.4(b) (a lawyer must not fabricate evidence); 4-3.4(c) (a lawyer 
must not knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for 
an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists); 4-3.4(d) (a 
lawyer must not in pretrial procedure make a frivolous discovery request or 
intentionally fail to comply with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing 
party); 4-8.4(c) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit, or misrepresentation); and 4-8.4(d) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct in 
connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice).   
Marcellus challenges several of the referee’s findings of fact and argues that 
the referee’s recommendations as to guilt with regard to Bar Rules 4-3.4(a), (c), 
and (d), and 4-8.4(c) are not sufficiently supported by the referee’s findings of fact.  
 
 
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Marcellus does not challenge the referee’s recommendations that he be found 
guilty of violating Bar Rules 3-4.3, 4-3.4(b), and 4-8.4(d).   
When reviewing a referee’s findings of fact, “the Court will not reweigh the 
evidence and substitute its judgment for that of the referee” if the referee’s findings 
of fact are supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record.  Fla. Bar v. 
Gwynn, 94 So. 3d 425, 428 (Fla. 2012).  Additionally, it is the referee’s 
responsibility to make credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the 
evidence presented at the final hearing.  Fla. Bar v. Niles, 644 So. 2d 504, 506 
(Fla. 1994).  Further, the referee’s findings of fact must be “sufficient” to support 
the recommendations as to guilt.  See Fla. Bar v. D’Ambrosio, 25 So. 3d 1209, 
1216 (Fla. 2009); Fla. Bar v. Shoureas, 913 So. 2d 554, 557-58 (Fla. 2005). 
In this case, many of Marcellus’s challenges to the referee’s factual findings 
represent no more than credibility arguments.  However, it is the respondent’s 
burden to demonstrate that the referee’s factual findings lack support, and simply 
“pointing to contradictory evidence where there also is competent, substantial 
evidence in the record that supports the referee’s findings” will not suffice.  Fla. 
Bar v. Glick, 693 So. 2d 550, 552 (Fla. 1997).  Accordingly, those findings of fact 
are hereby approved without further discussion. 
Marcellus does present several more substantive challenges to factual 
findings by the referee.  Marcellus contends that he did not violate the family 
 
 
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court’s April 23, 2010, Final Order on Petition for Dissolution of Marriage and 
Other Relief by obtaining a mortgage modification using Gudger’s name because 
the Final Order was not issued until after the modification had occurred.  However, 
the referee’s finding that Marcellus violated the family court’s order by his conduct 
is well supported by evidence, including the family court’s order itself, which 
directed Marcellus to “within thirty (30) days of the date of this hearing, determine 
whether or not the house can be retained.  If the house can be retained, [Marcellus] 
will refinance the mortgage out of [Gudger’s] name within that thirty (30) day 
period.”  Marcellus v. Marcellus, No. 09-0511-37, at ¶ 25 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. Apr. 
23, 2010) (emphasis added).  If the house could not be refinanced, the family court 
directed Marcellus to “put the house up for sale as soon as possible.”  Id. 
Similarly, although Marcellus challenges as unsupported the referee’s 
finding that he refused to comply with various family court orders compelling him 
to respond to Gudger’s discovery requests and to appear before it, the referee’s 
finding is amply supported by evidence produced at the final hearing in this 
disciplinary matter.  Marcellus offers as an explanation that he was represented by 
counsel for much of the time that Gudger’s discovery requests went unanswered, 
and thus he is not personally liable.  However, the record indicates that he 
proceeded pro se for over two months, during which time he refused to respond to 
pending discovery requests.  Even after he was represented by counsel, he was 
 
 
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ordered by the family court on September 24, 2013, July 1, 2014, and September 
11, 2014, to respond to various discovery requests; however, Marcellus refused to 
respond to the discovery requests for the next year of litigation.    
Moreover, Marcellus’s argument that his failure to appear before the family 
court for consideration of sanctions against him, despite having been ordered to do 
so, did not violate any Bar Rules because he was attending to matters on behalf of 
a client holds no water.  Despite the fact that Marcellus knew about the order 
directing him to appear before the family court, the evidence before the referee 
indicates he made no attempt whatsoever to notify the family court that he would 
not be present as a result of his alleged obligation to appear on behalf of a client in 
another matter.  Marcellus’s excuse that he was not notified that his presence was 
required before the family court until after close of business on Friday preceding 
the Monday morning hearing is no excuse for his failure to have notified the family 
court that he would not be present, or to find another attorney to cover his prior 
obligations to clients. 
Accordingly, because the referee’s findings of fact are supported by 
competent, substantial evidence in the record, we hereby approve the referee’s 
findings of fact.  Because Marcellus’s challenges to the referee’s recommendations 
that he be found to have violated Bar Rules 4-3.4(a) and (d), and 4-8.4(c), rest 
solely on his challenges to the referee’s factual findings underpinning those 
 
 
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recommendations, we hereby approve the referee’s recommendations that 
Marcellus be found to have violated those rules without further comment. 
Marcellus further challenges the referee’s recommendation that he be found 
to have violated Bar Rule 4-3.4(c) “because this rule has an element of scienter and 
the Respondent certainly did not intend to mislead anyone.”  Respondent’s Answer 
Brief and Initial Brief on Cross Appeal at 19.  Bar Rule 4-3.4(c) provides that a 
lawyer must not “knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal 
except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists.”  
However, failing to respond to discovery requests in the face of orders compelling 
responses is grounds for a violation of Bar Rule 4-3.4(c).  See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. 
Bischoff, 212 So. 3d 312 (Fla. 2017) (suspending attorney from the practice of law 
for failing to respond to discovery requests, filing a false notice of serving 
discovery responses, and instructing client not to respond to questions during 
deposition); Fla. Bar v. Whitney, 132 So. 3d 1095 (Fla. 2013) (suspending attorney 
from the practice of law for failing to take action in a case on behalf of client, 
failing to respond to discovery requests, and misrepresenting material facts to the 
presiding court). 
We therefore approve the referee’s findings of fact and recommendations 
that Marcellus be found to have violated Bar Rules 3-4.3, 4-3.4(a), (b), (c), and (d), 
 
 
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and 4-8.4(c) and (d).  These findings are amply supported by the record before the 
referee. 
FINDINGS IN AGGRAVATION AND SANCTION 
 
The referee found that several aggravating and mitigating factors were 
present in this case.  After considering the facts of the case, his findings in 
aggravation and mitigation, the applicable case law, and the applicable Florida 
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (Standards), the referee recommended 
that Marcellus be suspended from the practice of law for one year and ordered to 
pay the Bar’s costs.  Marcellus challenges several of the referee’s findings in 
aggravation as unsupported as well as the referee’s recommended sanction; the Bar 
also challenges the referee’s recommended sanction.  For the reasons discussed 
below, we hereby approve the referee’s findings in aggravation, but disapprove the 
referee’s recommended sanction and instead suspend Marcellus from the practice 
of law for eighteen months. 
 
In his report, the referee found the existence of seven aggravating factors: 
Standards 9.22(b) (dishonest or selfish motive); 9.22(c) (a pattern of misconduct); 
9.22(d) (multiple offenses); 9.22(f) (submission of false evidence, false statements, 
or other deceptive practices during the disciplinary process); 9.22(h) (vulnerability 
of victim); 9.22(i) (substantial experience in the practice of law); and 9.22(j) 
(indifference to making restitution).  “[A] referee’s findings of mitigation and 
 
 
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aggravation carry a presumption of correctness and will be upheld unless clearly 
erroneous or without support in the record.”  Fla. Bar v. Germain, 957 So. 2d 613, 
621 (Fla. 2007).  The burden of demonstrating that the findings in aggravation or 
mitigation are clearly erroneous lies with the party challenging the findings.  See 
Fla. Bar v. Glick, 693 So. 2d 550, 552 (Fla. 1997) (holding that the burden of 
disproving a referee’s findings of fact or recommendations as to guilt is upon the 
party challenging those findings).   
Here, Marcellus concedes that the referee’s findings as to Standards 9.22(c), 
(d), and (i), are supported by evidence; he challenges the remaining findings in 
aggravation, oftentimes without providing any specific reference to authority 
supporting his position or demonstrating that the findings are without support in 
the record.  Marcellus argues that the referee’s finding that Gudger was a 
vulnerable victim was erroneous because she is “a practicing attorney and a 
litigator.”  Respondent’s Answer Brief and Initial Brief on Cross Appeal at 24.  
However, this argument is clearly without merit.  See Fla. Bar v. Arcia, 848 So. 2d 
296, 298-99 (Fla. 2003) (finding a law firm to be a vulnerable victim in a case 
where one of its lawyers diverted fees from the law firm to his own personal 
accounts).  Because Marcellus makes only general challenges to the remaining 
findings in aggravation, he has failed to meet his burden and we hereby approve 
 
 
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the remaining findings in aggravation without further comment.  See R. Regulating 
Fla. Bar 3-7.7(c)(5). 
With regard to the sanction, we disapprove the referee’s recommendation 
that Marcellus be suspended from the practice of law for one year, and instead 
suspend him for eighteen months.  This Court’s scope of review in imposing 
discipline is broader than that afforded to the referee’s factual findings because, 
ultimately, it is the Court’s responsibility to order the appropriate sanction.  Fla. 
Bar v. Anderson, 538 So. 2d 852, 854 (Fla. 1989); see also art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.  
The Court will generally not second-guess the referee’s recommended sanction as 
long as it has a reasonable basis in existing case law and the Florida Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, see Florida Bar v. Temmer, 753 So. 2d 555, 558 (Fla. 
1999), although recently the Court has “moved toward imposing stronger sanctions 
for unethical and unprofessional conduct.”  Fla. Bar v. Rosenberg, 169 So. 3d 
1155, 1162 (Fla. 2015).   
The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions dictate that a 
suspension is appropriate in this case.  Specifically, Standards 6.12 (“Suspension is 
appropriate when a lawyer knows that false statements or documents are being 
submitted to the court or that material information is improperly being withheld, 
and takes no remedial action.”) and 6.22 (“Suspension is appropriate when a 
lawyer knowingly violates a court order or rule, and causes injury or potential 
 
 
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injury to a client or a party, or causes interference or potential interference with a 
legal proceeding.”) are instructive in this case and provide that suspension is the 
appropriate sanction for Marcellus’s actions.  However, the length of the 
suspension imposed is guided by case law and the Court’s discretion. 
Due to the seriousness of Marcellus’s misconduct in this case, we find that 
the referee’s recommended sanction of a one-year suspension is too lenient.  In 
reaching this conclusion, we found the following cases particularly instructive, 
although the conduct in each of these cases was less egregious than Marcellus’s 
conduct in this case.  First, we look to Florida Bar v. Bischoff, 212 So. 3d 312, 319 
(Fla. 2017), in which the Court approved a referee’s findings of fact demonstrating 
“that Bischoff knowingly and recklessly pursued frivolous claims, he repeatedly 
engaged in discovery-related misconduct, and he failed to comply with court 
orders and rules,” and suspended Bischoff from the practice of law for one year.  
Bischoff failed to respond to discovery requests on behalf of his clients for over 
two years, despite the trial court’s entry of several orders compelling him to do so; 
refused to produce his client for a deposition until after a court order directing him 
to do so, then advised his client to refuse to answer any questions during the 
deposition; filed a “Notice of Serving Responses to Discovery Requests” with a 
court despite having not served any such responses; and refused for some time to 
pay any of the attorneys’ fees or sanctions ordered by the trial court.  Id. at 314-16.  
 
 
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Notably, the referee in Bischoff found that he had eventually paid the fees and 
sanctions ordered by the trial court.  Id. at 320.   
We next look to Florida Bar v. Rosenberg, 169 So. 3d 1155 (Fla. 2015), for 
direction.  Rosenberg was disciplined for having failed to respond to discovery 
requests on behalf of his clients for over a year, despite the circuit court’s six 
orders compelling discovery in the case.  Id. at 1156-57.  He failed to provide 
complete discovery responses in the form dictated by the Florida Rules of Civil 
Procedure and refused to provide various information based on objections that had 
previously been overruled.  Id. at 1157-58.  The circuit court ordered Rosenberg to 
pay attorneys’ fees as a result of his misconduct and for having acted in bad faith; 
the referee found that he never paid those sanctions.  Id. at 1158.  As a result of his 
misconduct, the Court suspended Rosenberg from the practice of law for one year.  
Id. at 1161-62. 
We last turn to Florida Bar v. Whitney, 132 So. 3d 1095 (Fla. 2013), for 
guidance.  The Court suspended Whitney from the practice of law for one year 
following his failure to take action in a case on behalf of his clients, as well as 
various discovery violations and misrepresentations to the court that he made in the 
context of another case in which he was the defendant.  Id. at 1098.  Whitney took 
over $60,000 in fees as well as the cost of travel to and from Brazil twice to handle 
the client’s fiancée’s immigration from Brazil.  Despite receiving the fees, Whitney 
 
 
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took virtually no action with regard to the immigration and ultimately withdrew 
from representing that client without returning any fees.  Id. at 1099-1100.  In a 
subsequent lawsuit initiated by the client in connection with Whitney’s deficient 
representation and failure to return fees, Whitney failed to appear for depositions, 
testified falsely at depositions when he finally appeared, waited six months to 
respond to any discovery requests, and then served incomplete responses.  Id. at 
1100-01.  The referee found that although Whitney ultimately paid the judgment 
that was entered against him by the circuit court, he had not paid the almost 
$25,000 in attorneys’ fees also ordered by the circuit court.  Id. at 1101. 
The lawyers in Bischoff, Rosenberg, and Whitney were each suspended from 
the practice of law for one year.  Although Marcellus’s conduct is similar to that in 
each of those cases, it is more severe and accordingly deserving of a more severe 
sanction.  For instance, although Marcellus engaged in the same type of conduct as 
that at issue in Bischoff, he failed to pay any of the fees or sanctions ordered by the 
family court and remained in violation of the family court’s 2010 Final Order on 
Petition for Dissolution of Marriage and Other Relief because he remained in the 
marital home and did not finance it out of Gudger’s name.  Not only did Marcellus 
refuse to comply with orders of the family court directing him to provide discovery 
responses for over a year, and refuse to pay the penalties associated therewith, but 
he also remained in violation of some of those orders as of May 30, 2017.  He also 
 
 
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refused to appear before the family court for consideration of sanctions, and as a 
result the family court issued a writ of bodily attachment in order to compel his 
appearance.  It is clear that, at least in the context of Marcellus’s divorce case, he 
engaged in a pattern of deliberately disobeying and disregarding orders of the 
family court.  “This Court has long held that ‘cumulative misconduct of a similar 
nature warrants an even more severe discipline than might dissimilar conduct.’ ”  
Fla. Bar v. Picon, 205 So. 3d 759, 766 (Fla. 2016) (quoting Fla. Bar v. Walkden, 
950 So. 2d 407, 410 (Fla. 2007)).   
Moreover, unlike in Bischoff, Rosenberg, or Whitney, Marcellus submitted a 
mortgage modification application with a forged signature, despite having 
personally witnessed the forgery.  Gudger discovered that her signature had been 
forged only after Marcellus failed to pay his mortgage and the bank filed suit to 
foreclose on the home; otherwise she would have never discovered Marcellus’s 
conduct.  Gudger remained a defendant in the pending foreclosure action solely as 
a result of Marcellus’s misconduct.  His conduct was entirely unbecoming of a 
lawyer, who is held within a position of trust and respect in our society, and cannot 
be tolerated.  Although Marcellus committed this misconduct as a party to his own 
divorce, lawyers “do not cast aside the oath they take as an attorney or their 
professional responsibilities” just because they are litigants in personal matters.  
Fla. Bar v. Cibula, 725 So. 2d 360, 365 (Fla. 1998); see Fla. Bar v. Baker, 810 So. 
 
 
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2d 876, 882 (Fla. 2002) (“We impose this discipline because we expect members 
of The Florida Bar to conduct their personal business affairs with honesty and in 
accordance with the law.”). 
 
Accordingly, Madsen Marcellus, Jr., is hereby suspended from the practice 
of law for eighteen months.  The suspension is effective, nunc pro tunc, June 16, 
2018, the date on which this Court ordered that Marcellus’s suspension shall be 
effective.  See Fla. Bar v. Marcellus, No. SC16-1773 (Fla. order issued May 15, 
2018) (granting Marcellus’s motion to extend the commencement date of the 
suspension imposed by order dated April 25, 2018, and extending the effective 
date of Marcellus’s suspension until June 16, 2018).  Marcellus shall fully comply 
with Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 3-5.1(h).  Further, Marcellus shall accept no 
new business from the date this opinion is filed until he is reinstated. 
 
Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson Street, 
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from Madsen Marcellus, 
Jr., in the amount of $3,048.94, for which sum let execution issue. 
 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, 
and LAWSON, JJ., concur. 
 
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS SUSPENSION. 
 
 
 
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Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar  
 
Joshua E. Doyle, Executive Director, Tallahassee, Florida, Jennifer R. Falcone, Bar 
Counsel, Miami, Florida, and Adria E. Quintela, Staff Counsel, The Florida Bar, 
Sunrise, Florida,   
 
for Complainant  
 
Kevin P. Tynan of Richardson & Tynan, P.L.C., Tamarac, Florida,   
 
for Respondent