Title: Breland v. City of Fairhope
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1180492
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: December 31, 2020

REL: December 31, 2020
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. 
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2020-2021
____________________
1180492
____________________
Charles K. Breland, Jr., and Breland Corporation
v.
City of Fairhope and The Battles Wharf / Point Clear Protective
Association
Appeal from Baldwin Circuit Court
(CV-13-901096)
MITCHELL, Justice.
Charles K. Breland, Jr., purchased land in Baldwin County to build
a housing subdivision.  The subdivision he planned to construct required
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filling about 10.5 acres of wetlands, which the City of Fairhope and
Baldwin County opposed.  Breland and Breland Corporation (collectively
"the Breland parties") sued Fairhope in the Baldwin Circuit Court,
claiming that they had a vested right to fill the wetlands, that Fairhope's
ordinances could not prevent them from filling the wetlands, that
Fairhope had acted negligently regarding Breland's application for a land-
disturbance permit, and that Breland's criminal citation for beginning
work without a permit should be expunged.  The trial court rejected their
claims following a nonjury trial. 
The Breland parties have appealed the trial court's judgment to this
Court.  For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment.
Facts and Procedural History
In 1999, Breland purchased 65 acres in Baldwin County ("the
property"), which lie outside Fairhope's corporate limits but within its
police jurisdiction.  Breland received preliminary site-plan approval from
Fairhope in 2000 to develop Battles Wharf Landing, an 18-lot subdivision
on uplands within the property.  Rather than developing the 18-lot
project, Breland revised his plan to include 36 lots.  This new plan
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required filling approximately 10.5 acres of wetlands to develop 20 of the
lots.  To fill the wetlands, Breland had to obtain, through a joint-
application process, a permit from the United States Army Corps of
Engineers ("the Corps") and a certification from the Alabama Department
of Environmental Management ("ADEM").  The joint application included
a preliminary subdivision-plot plan.
Breland's joint application was subject to a period of public input. 
In 2001, Fairhope's mayor, Tim Kant, submitted a letter on behalf of
Fairhope's city council objecting to Breland's application.  That letter
raised "environmental concerns associated with this project" and noted
that filling "these natural wetlands will cut off what acts as a filter for
water draining into Mobile Bay and also acts as a sponge, soaking in
runoff water reducing drainage naturally."  Mayor Kant testified at trial
that, around the time of Breland's application, Fairhope passed a
comprehensive plan directed at improving stormwater management and
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commissioned a study by Audubon International, which recommended
additional protections.1 
The Baldwin County Commission also objected to Breland's
application, arguing that his proposal did not conform with Baldwin
County Subdivision Regulation 5.2.2 ("Regulation 5.2.2"), which provides,
in relevant part:
"No development shall be approved that proposes to fill either
jurisdictional or nonjurisdictional wetlands in order to create
buildable lots. ...  Lots may be platted where sufficient upland
areas exist to provide a building site for the principal structure
and necessary ancillary facilities.  Fill may be used where
necessary to provide access to lots where approval for such fill
has been received from the Corps of Engineers and other
appropriate governmental agencies...."2 
The County also objected on the basis of the ecological impact of the
proposed development.
1According to Mayor Kant, the reason for these concerns was that
Fairhope was experiencing a "major influx of development" around that
time, which was causing stormwater challenges and flooding problems
that "put pressure on [Fairhope] to pass regulations and ordinances to
deal with it." 
2Regulation 5.2.2 was amended in 2012 to exempt landowners who
have obtained filling permits from the Corps.
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At the Corps' request, Breland responded to the objections to his
proposal.  He acknowledged that he "is required by law to obtain approval
under separate authorization from the Baldwin County Planning
Commission[, which] will review the project for conformity," and that
"[s]hould the Commission not approve conformity, the project will not be
built." 
ADEM completed its review of Breland's application and issued its
water-quality certification to the Corps in October 2002 ("the
certification").  The next month, the Corps issued a permit to Breland,
which provided authorization for him to "construct a residential
subdivision" of 35 lots and "include[d] the filling" of wetlands ("the federal
permit"). 
The federal permit was subject to several conditions and limitations. 
To offset the loss of wetlands, Breland had to preserve nearly 31 acres of
additional wetlands on the property through a restrictive covenant that
prohibited any other land disturbance.  Additionally, it required Breland
to purchase 24.68 mitigation credits from a mitigation bank run by Weeks
Bay Watershed Protective Association, Inc. ("Weeks Bay").  The federal
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permit also provided that Breland must "comply with all Federal, State,
and local floodplain ordinances" and that it did not "obviate the need to
obtain other Federal, State, or local authorizations required by law" or
"grant any property rights or exclusive privileges."  Breland purchased the
mitigation credits in July 2003 for $143,144.
In 2003, Breland's project manager contacted Fairhope and County
officials about developing a subdivision on the property called Loyola
Park.  Fairhope issued two letters in response, raising concerns that
"[a]lmost all of the entire project appears to be delineated wetlands" and
noting that "the Planning Commission may consider this property not
suitable for platting and development because of the filling issues,
drainage issues, and the health issues of building houses in a wetland." 
Fairhope also referred to the County's subdivision regulations, stating
that in Fairhope's view of the regulations, "the uplands should be
developed and not the wetlands."  The County denied Breland's site plan
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in part because it did not conform with Regulation 5.2.2.3  Breland did not
pursue further approval of Loyola Park. 
At the time the federal permit and the certification were issued,
Fairhope did not have an ordinance in place governing the filling of
wetlands outside Fairhope's corporate limits.  That changed in August
2006, when Fairhope enacted Ordinance No. 1313.  That ordinance
prohibited filling activity "until the land owner or contractor has obtained
a land disturbing permit from the City of Fairhope."  Ordinance No. 1313,
which was enacted to "protect the water quality and environmental
integrity for the area watersheds," provided that fill material could not be
more than 10% "red [soil] or clay."
Over a year later, without applying for a land-disturbance permit
under Ordinance No. 1313, Breland moved heavy machinery to the
property to clear an entrance in preparation for filling.  Before Breland
3In a report on Breland's plan, County staff concluded that it
"exploits the existing loophole in the regulations" -- which did "not allow
lots that are entirely wetland to be platted" -- by obtaining the federal
permit before securing the County's subdivision approval so that he could
plat lots "that were 100% wet."
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began land-disturbance activity, however, a Fairhope zoning enforcement
officer issued a stop-work order because of Breland's failure to obtain a
land-disturbance permit. 
In April 2008, the Breland parties applied for land-disturbance
permits from Fairhope and the County.  The County issued a permit to
Breland Corporation on June 2, 2008.  In the cover letter, the County
stated that "it appears that the purpose of this permit is to ultimately
allow for the development of a subdivision."  The County reminded
Breland Corporation that, as such, under its subdivision regulations, "[n]o
development shall be approved that proposes to fill either jurisdictional
or non-jurisdictional wetlands in order to create buildable lots," and it
advised Breland Corporation to consult with the County and Fairhope
"prior to moving forward with any development plans."
Fairhope never responded to Breland's permit application.  But on
June 9, 2008, Fairhope enacted Ordinance No. 1363, which instituted a
moratorium on issuing land-disturbance permits for projects that "may
result in the loss, fill or destruction of wetlands."  In its preamble, the
ordinance cited "substantial growth and development" locally that had
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"resulted in the loss of certain sensitive environmental wetlands," which
"serve a number of functions including pollution control and protection of
water quality, flooding and stormwater control, and which provide habitat
for fish, wildlife and vegetation."  Ordinance No. 1363 was set to lapse by
its own terms in October 2008.
With the federal permit set to expire in November 2008, Breland
sued Fairhope in the Baldwin Circuit Court to enjoin the enforcement of
Ordinance No. 1363 and to obtain a judgment declaring that Breland's
land-disturbance-permit application to Fairhope should be granted.  The
Breland parties voluntarily dismissed that lawsuit after obtaining an
extension of the federal permit.
Two days before the moratorium expired, Fairhope adopted
Ordinance No. 1370.  Like Ordinance No. 1313, Ordinance No. 1370
governs land-disturbance permits for projects that fill or destroy wetlands,
but it imposes more detailed regulations.  Ordinance No. 1370 states that
the destruction of wetlands within and near Fairhope had "increased
downstream water pollution, flooding, and erosion and [had] resulted in
the loss of wildlife habitat."  The ordinance also contains a "grandfather
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clause," which exempted from its permitting process "[a]ll uses and
activities that were lawful before the passage of this ordinance."  The
Breland parties have not attempted to obtain a permit under Ordinance
No. 1370.4
The Breland parties contend that, between late 2008 and 2011,
Fairhope officials negotiated with Breland to purchase the property.  But
by late 2011, Breland believed that Fairhope would not purchase the
property.  Without seeking further permits from Fairhope, Breland
attempted to resume his attempt to fill the wetlands.  Fairhope issued a
second stop-work order the same day.  A few days later, a Fairhope official
explained to Breland that he needed to comply with multiple ordinances,
including Ordinance No. 1370.  Fairhope also issued a criminal citation to
Breland for failing to obey a city ordinance.
The Breland parties then brought the underlying lawsuit against
Fairhope in the Baldwin Circuit Court.  They sought: (1) a temporary
4Fairhope later adopted additional relevant ordinances, including
Ordinance No. 1398, in August 2009, and Ordinance No. 1423, in May
2010. The Breland parties have not attempted to comply with these
ordinances either. 
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restraining order and a preliminary injunction against Fairhope's
attempts to stop them from filling the wetlands; (2) a judgment declaring
that they had obtained a vested right to fill the wetlands; (3) a judgment
declaring that Fairhope's ordinances are preempted by state law; (4) a
judgment declaring that Fairhope's ordinances are improper de facto
zoning regulations; (5) a verdict of negligence against Fairhope for
allegedly mishandling Breland's 2008 permit application; and (6)
expungement of the 2011 criminal citation issued against Breland.  The
trial court entered a summary judgment in Fairhope's favor, holding that
the statute of limitations barred most of the Breland parties' claims.  The
Breland parties appealed to this Court, and we reversed the trial court's
judgment and remanded the case to the trial court, holding that "each
time Fairhope enforced its ordinances to stop Breland from filling activity
on his property Fairhope committed a new act that serves as a basis for
a new claim."  Breland v. City of Fairhope, 229 So. 3d 1078, 1090 (Ala.
2016).  
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On remand, the trial court granted The Battles Wharf/Point Clear
Protective Association's motion to intervene and held a nonjury trial.5  In
a posttrial order, it held that the Breland parties had not obtained a
vested right to fill the wetlands, that state law did not preempt Fairhope's
ordinances, and that Fairhope's ordinances were not improper zoning
ordinances.  Therefore, it held that the Breland parties' negligence and
expungement claims were moot.  The Breland parties then appealed to
this Court.
Standard of Review
Where, as here, a trial court hears oral testimony in a nonjury trial,
the ore tenus rule governs.  Under that rule, the findings of the trial court
are presumed correct and its judgment based on those findings will not be
reversed unless the judgment is "palpably erroneous or manifestly unjust."
Philpot v. State, 843 So. 2d 122, 125 (Ala. 2002).  Nevertheless, we review
the trial court's "conclusions of law or its application of law to facts" de
novo.  Mitchell v. Brooks, 281 So. 3d 1236, 1243 (Ala. 2019).
5The Battles Wharf/Point Clear Protective Association is a group of
nearby property-owners who objected to Breland's proposed development.
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Analysis
The Breland parties raise a host of arguments on appeal, but we
need not address all of them.  As we explain: (1) the Breland parties'
constitutional challenge to Ordinance No. 1363 is moot, and their void-for-
vagueness constitutional challenge to the other ordinances is not ripe; (2)
the trial court did not err in holding that the Breland parties had no
vested right to fill the wetlands; (3) the trial court properly held that state
law does not preempt Fairhope's ordinances; and (4) the trial court did not
err in holding that Fairhope's ordinances are not de facto zoning
ordinances.  It is not necessary to address the Breland parties' remaining
arguments.
A. The Breland Parties' Constitutional Arguments
The Breland parties contend that Fairhope's ordinances -- "especially
Ordinance [No.] 1370" -- are unconstitutionally vague and allow for
arbitrary enforcement.  They also argue that Fairhope has denied them
due process of law by refusing to apply the grandfather clause in
Ordinance No. 1370 to their vested rights to fill the wetlands.  The trial
court did not address these arguments in its posttrial order.
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"In reviewing an ordinance against a challenge of unconstitutional
vagueness, '[w]e must be certain that the ordinance is so plainly and
palpably inadequate and incomplete as to be convinced beyond reasonable
doubt that it offends the constitution or we will not strike it down.'" Ex
parte Baldwin Cnty. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 68 So. 3d 133, 138-39
(Ala. 2010) (quoting Walls v. City of Guntersville, 253 Ala. 480, 485, 45 So.
2d 468, 471 (Ala. 1950)).  We will declare an act to be void for vagueness
"only if the act is so indefinite that 'a person of ordinary intelligence,
exercising common sense [could] derive no rule or standard at all from the
... language,' or if it is so vague as to 'authorize or encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement.' "  68 So. 3d at 139 (quoting Northington v.
Alabama Dep't of Conservation & Nat. Res., 33 So. 3d 560, 567 (Ala.
2009)).  In a vagueness challenge not based on the First Amendment, we
examine whether the statute is vague "as applied to the conduct allegedly
proscribed," not as applied to "hypothetical concerns."  Id. (internal
quotation marks and emphasis omitted). 
It is undisputed that the Breland parties have not attempted to
comply with any of Fairhope's ordinances adopted after Ordinance No.
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1313.  We therefore need not analyze the Breland parties' vagueness
arguments as to Ordinance No. 1370, or those ordinances enacted after it,
because they are "hypothetical concerns" that are not ripe for our review. 
Id.; see also DeBuys v. Jefferson Cnty., 511 So. 2d 196, 199 (Ala. Civ. App.
1987) (denying due-process challenge to county's failure to implement
"ascertainable" standards for evaluating permit requests because
plaintiffs "refused to give the Committee the opportunity to apply those
standards to their requests").6
Breland did apply for a land-disturbance permit under the
framework of Ordinance No. 1313.  The Breland parties argue: "Ordinance
6On a similar note, the Breland parties also argue that the
moratorium imposed by Ordinance No. 1363 attempted to suspend the law
in violation of Ala. Const. 1901, Art. I, § 21.  The moratorium expired by
its own terms in 2008, and Breland voluntarily dismissed his lawsuit
challenging the validity of the moratorium after it expired and after he
obtained an extension of the federal permit.  Thus, this argument is moot. 
See Bradley Outdoor, Inc. v. City of Florence, 962 So. 2d 824, 833 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2006) (holding that challenge to moratorium, which expired by
its terms when a new ordinance was enacted, was mooted by the
expiration of the moratorium); see also Aaron Private Clinic Mgmt. LLC
v. Berry, 912 F.3d 1330, 1335 (11th Cir. 2019) (holding that challenge to
temporary licensing moratorium was moot because the moratorium had
expired). 
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[No.] 1313 references obtaining a land disturbance permit but provides no
standards by which such a permit may be granted or denied.  Thus, from
the face of the ordinance, it appears that a permit is due to be granted
merely by filing the application."  Breland parties' brief, at pp. 54-55. 
Thus, while this argument appears in the briefing alongside the Breland
parties' vagueness argument, their argument is not that Ordinance No.
1313 is void because it is unconstitutionally vague.7  Rather, at bottom,
their argument is that they are entitled to the permit by the terms of
Ordinance No. 1313.
7In fact, the Breland parties conceded five times in their briefing
that they are obligated to comply with Ordinance No. 1313.  See Breland
parties' brief, at p. 24 ("Breland contends that he must comply only with
Ordinance [No.] 1313...."); id. at p. 25 ("Breland acquired 'vested rights' to
fill under his Permit, subject only to Ordinance [No.] 1313...."); id. at p. 29
("Fundamental principles of fairness, due process and equity dictate that
Breland has a 'vested right' to fill the wetlands with material that is
compliant with Ordinance [No.] 1313."); id. at p. 68 ("Breland seeks a
determination that he be permitted to fill the Property...subject only to
the 'red clay' limitations contained in Ordinance [No.] 1313...."); Reply
brief, at p. 35 ("Breland prays for declaratory relief establishing his right
to fill the Property in compliance with the Permit, subject only to the 'red
clay' provisions of Ordinance [No.] 1313....").  Taking the Breland parties'
argument to mean that Ordinance No. 1313 is void for vagueness would
conflict with these concessions.
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On that issue, the trial court noted that, "[w]hile [it] found no good
cause for the City's inaction on the [application], the parties agreed in
open court that the City's failure to act on the application served as a
denial" -- a finding Breland does not challenge.  But the trial court did not
determine what action Fairhope should have taken or would have been
justified in taking.  Nor, for that matter, did the trial court make factual
findings in its posttrial order essential to evaluating whether Breland was
entitled to the permit, and we are ill equipped to make those factual
findings in the first instance on appeal.8  Additionally, the Breland parties
8By contrast, in other cases in which this Court has held that a
permit was wrongfully denied, there have been clear factual findings
supporting that conclusion.  See, e.g., Mobile Cnty. v. City of Saraland,
501 So. 2d 438, 440 (Ala. 1986) (holding that city acted arbitrarily where
it routinely granted permits to other applicants, the applicant complied
with all provisions of the ordinance, and the permit would have been
granted absent political pressure, among other facts); Pritchett v. Nathan
Rodgers Constr. & Realty Corp., 379 So. 2d 545, 548 (Ala. 1979) (holding
that city acted arbitrarily by granting and denying sewer-connection
permits to different applicants on a case-by-case basis and where it had
not enacted a moratorium on those permits); Swann v. City of Graysville,
367 So. 2d 952, 953-54 (Ala. 1979) (noting that city had issued permits to
applicants similarly situated to the plaintiff). 
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have not articulated a clear federal or state constitutional basis for their
argument that Breland is entitled to a land-disturbance permit.  
But even assuming that Breland's application met the technical
requirements, an application for a permit does not automatically give the
applicant a vested right to avoid compliance with later, duly enacted
ordinances under a municipality's police power.  Further, the trial court's
unchallenged finding that Breland's application was denied by the passage
of time is not "palpably erroneous or manifestly unjust."  Philpot, 843 So.
2d at 125.  Thus, the Breland parties' argument concerning Ordinance No.
1313 does not exempt them from compliance with Fairhope's later enacted
ordinances.9  
9Because the Breland parties did not obtain a permit under
Ordinance No. 1313 or establish that they are entitled to it, filling the
wetlands was not a "lawful use or activit[y]," and thus we reject their 
claim that the grandfather clause in Ordinance No. 1370 exempts them
from compliance with that ordinance or that Fairhope denied them due
process of law by not applying this exception to their filling efforts.  And
for the same reason, we reject the Breland parties' argument that
Fairhope's ordinances have been improperly applied retroactively.
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B. The Breland Parties' Vested-Rights Argument
The Breland parties contend that the trial court erred when it held
that they had not obtained a vested right to fill the wetlands on the
property.  Specifically, they argue that the permits they obtained, the
$143,144 they spent on mitigation credits, and the unspecified sums they
spent on consultants created a vested right to fill the wetlands when they
first obtained a land-disturbance permit from the County.  The Breland
parties also argue that the trial court erred in applying Regulation 5.2.2
and in holding that they failed to exhaust administrative remedies before
filing the underlying lawsuit.10  Thus, the Breland parties contend, they
may fill the wetlands subject only to the requirements in Ordinance No.
1313. 
In Grayson v. City of Birmingham, 277 Ala. 522, 173 So. 2d 67
(1963), a case on which the Breland parties rely, this Court addressed the
framework for evaluating a vested-rights claim.  There, a company
10Because we affirm the trial court's judgment holding that the
Breland parties did not obtain a vested right, it is not necessary to
evaluate the merits of their argument that they were not required to
exhaust administrative remedies.
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obtained approval from the Jefferson County Planning and Zoning
Commission to have agricultural property rezoned to residential and
commercial parcels.  The company then improved the commercial parcels
by paving streets, adding water pipes and storm sewers, and grading,
leveling, and clearing the lots, at a cost (as of the mid 1950s) of $3,518. 
About two years after that approval, the City of Birmingham annexed the
land and rezoned the commercial parcels to residential.  The company
sued Birmingham to challenge the rezoning of the plaintiffs' property.
On appeal, this Court explained that such a rezoning "must stand or
fall on vested rights, which, in the absence of a contract, depend for their
existence on equitable fairness, both to the property owner and to the
general public."  277 Ala. at 525, 173 So. 2d at 69.  This Court further held
that the question of vested rights is a fact-intensive inquiry in which
"changes, investments, and permits" relating to the "structures initiated
or completed, are made the criteria of hardships imposed on the property
owner and judicially recognized to sustain the claims of vested rights."  Id. 
This Court noted in Grayson that the plaintiffs' investments in the
property, standing alone, might "serve to establish [the plaintiffs']
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contention that they have acquired a vested right in the property."  277
Ala. at 526, 173 So. 2d at 70.  But the Court also weighed the landowner's
interests against "the reasonable necessity for protecting and promoting
the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the public" underlying
Birmingham's rezoning of the plaintiffs' property -- in that case,
minimizing traffic hazards near a school.  277 Ala. at 528, 173 So. 2d at
72.  As such, the landowner's loss relating to its "naked lots, which [were]
without structural initiation thereon" and with "no building permit
granted," was of "minor weight" compared the city's zoning
responsibilities.  277 Ala at 525, 527, 173 So. 2d at 69, 71.
The Breland parties also rely on Baker v. State Board of Health, 440
So. 2d 1098 (Ala. Civ. App. 1983).  In Baker, a landowner obtained a
permit to install septic tanks on 3,200 square-foot lots for a mobile-home
park, which was permitted under applicable regulations at that time.  The 
landowner then spent about $32,000 purchasing equipment, clearing the
property, and building roads.  The mobile-home regulations were later
changed to require 15,000 square-foot lots.  After neighboring landowners
complained about the mobile-home development and sought to enforce
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regulations, the Court of Civil Appeals held that the regulation permitted
the landowner to develop the park on 3,200 square-foot lots based on a
grandfather clause in the new regulation.  Additionally, the court found
the landowners' "general equitable" arguments pertinent, noting that they
"relied on the permit and expended time and money developing and
improving the lots according to the regulations under which they acquired
the permit."  440 So. 2d at 1100.
In both Grayson and Baker, the landowners made physical
improvements to the land in reliance on the relevant government
authorizations.11  And, unlike here, there is no indication that relevant
governing authorities objected to the development from the outset or
during the landowners' development process.  Further, the Breland
parties cite no case in which an Alabama court has held that a
11The Breland parties also rely on Greenbriar Village, L.L.C. v. City
of Mountain Brook, 202 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (N.D. Ala. 2002), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 345 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2003).  There, the trial court held
that the landowner had a vested right to the continuation of a city permit. 
As in Grayson and Baker, however, the landowner in Greenbriar Village
had completed at least some improvement to the land, and, unlike here,
there is no indication that the landowner lacked any applicable permits.
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landowner's rights vested based solely on expenses related to permit
applications, permit approvals, or development plans.12  Yet, Breland
made no physical improvements to the property despite having had the
federal permit for nearly four years before Fairhope enacted Ordinance
No. 1313.
Although physical improvement to property may not be required to
establish a vested right in every instance, the lack of physical
improvement to the property, combined with other equitable
considerations outlined here, foreclose the Breland parties' vested-rights
argument.  First, the federal permit -- which serves as a key basis for the
Breland parties' vested-rights argument -- states: "This permit does not
grant any property rights or exclusive privileges." (Emphasis added.)  And
it is a condition of the federal permit that Breland must comply with local
law.  As noted, Breland's permit application was denied by the passage of
12In the zoning context, "[t]he general rule is that applications for
building permits may be denied based on zoning regulations enacted after
applications are made regardless of whether the zoning regulations were
pending when the applications were made."  101A C.J.S. Zoning and Land
Planning § 289 (2015).
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time; thus, he was not in compliance with local law or the federal permit
when he claims his rights vested.
Second, the County objected to Breland's federal permit application
in part because the proposed project did not conform with its subdivision
regulations.  At the Corps' request for a response to that concern, Breland
responded: "The applicant is required by law to obtain approval under
separate authorizations from the Baldwin County Planning Commission
who will review the project for conformity.  Should the Commission not
approve conformity, the project will not be built."  Used in the context of
the application process, "project" did not merely refer to construction of
houses, but to filling the wetlands as well.13  Further, the federal permit
provided that "[t]he determination of this office that issuance of this
13See, e.g., "Federal Permit Project" description ("The authorized
work includes the filling of ... wetlands ...." (emphasis added)); ADEM
certification ("The Alabama Department of Environmental Management
has completed its review of the above referenced proposed project to
impact 10.49 acres of pine flatwood wetlands ...."); joint application to the
Corps and ADEM ("The project involves the clearing, grading and filling
of 10.47 acres of wetlands for the construction of 20 single family
residential lots ....").
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permit is not contrary to the public interest was made in reliance on the
information you provided."  (Emphasis added.)14
Breland initially followed through with his representation to the
Corps when he submitted his Loyola Park site-plan proposal to the County
and Fairhope.  Fairhope responded first, suggesting that the proposal
might not conform with the County's subdivision regulations.  Proving
Fairhope correct, the County rejected that proposal in part on the basis of
Regulation 5.2.2.  Several years after the Loyola Park plan failed, Breland
embarked on his plan to fill first and seek permission later.15 
The Breland parties contend that none of this matters because, they
say, Regulation 5.2.2 does not apply to Breland's initial fill efforts and
that the fill-first approach was Breland's plan all along.   We need not
14In fact, the Corps made specific findings in its review of the project
concerning compliance with County regulations.  ("[T]he applicant[s]
provided that they are required by law to obtain separate approval and
authorization from the Baldwin County Planning Commission for
conformity ...." and "[t]he proposed project does not meet all existing
zoning and land use requirements ...."). 
15Even then, when the County issued its land-disturbance permit in
2008, it reminded Breland yet again of the need to comply with Regulation
5.2.2.  
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decide whether the Breland parties are correct.16  Rather, we consider it
relevant that Breland unambiguously represented to the Corps that the
"project" would not be built if it did not conform with the County's
subdivision regulations and that Fairhope and the County have
consistently objected to the filling on the basis of the County's subdivision
regulations.  Similarly, the Breland parties' additional argument -- that
the County has since amended Regulation 5.2.2 to allow Corps-approved
wetlands filling -- does not alter this analysis.  That amendment took
place after Fairhope enacted the ordinances at issue here.  And had
Breland not represented to the Corps that he would comply with the
County's subdivision regulations, it is unclear whether the Corps would
have issued the permit in the first place. 
Finally, based on this Court's equitable analysis in Grayson, we
consider "the reasonable necessity for protecting and promoting the
health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the public."  Grayson, 277
16We do note, however, that the Breland parties' fill-first position is
inconsistent with Breland's representation to the Corps and his Loyola
Park proposal in 2003. 
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Ala. at 528, 173 So. 2d at 72.  Fairhope is empowered to adopt ordinances
"to provide for the safety, preserve the health, promote the prosperity, and
improve the morals, order, comfort, and convenience" of citizens within its
police jurisdiction.  § 11-45-1, Ala. Code 1975.  The Breland parties have
presented no convincing evidence that Fairhope has arbitrarily targeted
them or the property.  In fact, Fairhope approved Breland's initial
development plans for the property in 1999, and Fairhope's actions
corroborate its stated concerns about growth and environmental
management.  Thus, the record supports the trial court's finding that the
ordinances at issue were "designed to minimize potential harm and
impacts to the environment and adjacent property owners."  
We acknowledge that the Breland parties have expended significant
time and resources on this project.17  But, under this Court's framework
17There is evidence in the record suggesting that the sum Breland
spent on mitigation credits may not be lost.  The owner of Weeks Bay
testified that the mitigation credits have a market value that has
increased from $5,800 per credit at the time Breland purchased them to
between $13,000 and $15,000 per credit at the time of trial.  She further
testified that Weeks Bay "would buy them back today" if the Corps
approved.
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in Grayson, we must balance those expenses against other equitable
considerations.  Given the equitable considerations here, we conclude that
the trial court did not err in holding that the Breland parties failed to
obtain a vested right to fill the wetlands.  See Grayson, 277 Ala. at 528,
173 So. 2d at 72 ("Where the [trial court's] decree correctly determines the
equities of the case, as here, ... the case will be affirmed.").
C. The Breland Parties' Preemption Arguments
The Alabama Constitution states that "[t]he legislature shall not
have power to authorize any municipal corporation to pass any laws
inconsistent with general laws of this state."  Ala. Const., 1901, Art. IV,
§ 89.  The Legislature, in turn, has given municipalities the authority to
"adopt ordinances and resolutions not inconsistent with the laws of the
state."   § 11-45-1, Ala. Code 1975.  Given those principles, this Court has
identified three instances in which state law preempts municipal
ordinances: (1) when the statute expressly "defines the extent to which its
enactment preempts municipal ordinances"; (2) "when a municipal
ordinance attempts to regulate conduct in a field that the legislature
intended the state law to exclusively occupy" -- that is, "field preemption";
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and (3) "when a municipal ordinance permits what a state statute forbids
or forbids what a statute permits."  Ex parte Tulley, 199 So. 3d 812, 821
(Ala. 2015). 
The Breland parties contend that Fairhope's ordinances are invalid
for two reasons: (1) the Alabama Environmental Management Act, § 22-
22A-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975 ("AEMA"), and the Alabama Water Pollution
Control Act, §22-22-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975 ("AWPCA") preempt the field
of wetlands regulations, and (2) because ADEM issued the certification in
accordance with the AWPCA, Fairhope's ordinances improperly conflict
with state law.  We address each argument.
1. The AEMA and the AWPCA Do Not Preempt the Field of
Wetlands Regulation
For state law to preempt an entire field, " ' " 'an act must make
manifest a legislative intent that no other enactment may touch upon the
subject in any way.' " ' "  Peak v. City of Tuscaloosa, 73 So. 3d 5, 19-20
(Ala. Crim. App. 2011) (quoting Gann v. City of Gulf Shores, 29 So. 3d 244,
251 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009), quoting other cases).  To make that
determination, we look to the text of the relevant statutes.  Ex parte
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Waddail, 827 So. 2d 789, 794 (Ala. 2001).  The presence of "extensive
regulation is not sufficient to establish that the State intended to preempt
an entire field."  Peak, 73 So. 3d at 24. Notably, however, the Breland
parties rely on the text of the AEMA and the AWPCA to establish field
preemption -- not the regulations approved under those statutes.  See
Breland parties' reply brief, at p. 9-10.
Concerning the AEMA, the Breland parties focus on a provision of
that statute setting forth the Legislature's express purpose.  See §
22-22A-2, Ala. Code 1975.  Specifically, the Breland parties point to the
Legislature's goal of providing "a comprehensive and coordinated program
of environmental management," the elimination of overlapping or
duplicative efforts "within the environmental programs of the state, and
a "unified environmental regulatory and permit system."  The Breland
parties also argue that the Legislature intended to "retain for the state"
control over its air, land, and water resources.  Thus, according to the
Breland parties, this evidences the Legislature's "clear preemptive intent." 
Breland parties' brief, at p. 38.
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The reliance on § 22-22A-2 is misguided.  The words "wetlands,"
"filling," and related terms do not appear in the text of the AEMA.  And
when the statute is read in its full context, it is clear that § 22-22A-2
attempts to create efficiencies within State agencies and programs -- not
between the State and municipalities.  See Antonin Scalia & Bryan
Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts § 24, at 167
(Thomson/West 2012) ("The text must be construed as a whole.").   For
example, § 22-22A-2 states that ADEM was created to "effect the grouping
of state agencies," to "eliminate overlapping or duplication of effort within
the environmental programs of the state," and to consolidate those
responsibilities "within the Executive Branch."  (emphasis added); see also
§ 22-22A-4, Ala. Code 1975  (consolidating various state commissions and
boards under ADEM's purview); § 22-22A-9, Ala. Code 1975 (transferring
funds from previous state commissions to new fund under ADEM and
abolishing funds of older state commissions).  Similarly, the reference in
§ 22-22A-2(2) to retaining control over air, land, and water resources
concerns the state's relationship to the federal government, as it
expressed its intent to retain that control "within the constraints of
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appropriate federal law."  See also § 22-22A-4(n), Ala. Code 1975
(designating ADEM as the "State Environmental Control Agency for the
purposes of federal environmental law"). 
The Breland parties' reliance on the AWPCA fares no better.  The
AWPCA broadly instructs ADEM to "receive and examine applications,
plans, specifications, and other data and to issue permits for the discharge
of pollutants" into state waters.  § 22-22-9(g), Ala. Code 1975.  Like the
AEMA, the AWPCA contains no specific references to wetlands, and the
Breland parties do not rely on any regulations promulgated under the
AWPCA to establish field preemption.  Further, the express purposes of
the AWPCA are to conserve the state's water resources and to regulate
pollution in state waters.  See § 22-22-2, Ala. Code 1975.  Although those
are also purposes of Fairhope's ordinances, they are not the only purposes;
for example, Fairhope's ordinances also exist to curb flooding and erosion. 
See, e.g., Ordinance No. 1363 (preserving wetlands because they "serve a
number of functions including pollution control and protection of water
quality, flooding and stormwater control"); Ordinance No. 1370 ("The
purpose of this ordinance is ... (a) protection of the quality and quantity
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of all Wetlands and waters ... and (d) minimization of impacts to existing
land uses and properties ... by preventing increases in flood, erosion, and
other natural hazards due to destruction of Wetlands and/or Buffer
areas.").  And even in carrying out the responsibility to regulate pollution,
the AWPCA at least implicitly contemplates municipal action in the same
field.  See § 22-22-9(d) ("It shall be the further duty of the commission to
extend its cooperation and to advise industries and municipalities relative
to the control of waste and other deleterious matter of pollutive nature
and to make available to industries and municipalities the benefits of its
studies and findings.").
Although the Breland parties do not rely on specific regulations
indicating that the Legislature intended to preempt the field of wetlands
regulation, they argue more broadly that ADEM "met its legislative
charge by adopting statewide regulations for permitting filling and
discharge activities in the state's wetlands."  Breland parties' brief, at p.
40.  But that does not mean that the Legislature has preempted all other
wetlands regulations.  See Tulley, 199 So. 3d at 821 (noting that
municipalities may " 'enlarge[] upon the provision of a statute by requiring
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more restrictions than the statute requires' " (quoting Congo v. State, 409
So. 2d 475, 478 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981))); Peak, 73 So. 3d at 24
("[E]xtensive regulation is not sufficient to establish that the State
intended to preempt an entire field.").  Further, at least some regulations
promulgated under the AEMA and the AWPCA require compliance with
municipal- and county-approval processes.  See, e.g., Ala. Admin. Code
(ADEM) R. 335-6-12-.35(5)(c) ("[I]ssuance of registration [of a National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit] under this Chapter does
not modify in any way an operator's legal responsibility or liability, to
apply for, obtain, or comply with other applicable ADEM, federal, State,
or local government permits, authorizations, registrations, ordinances,
regulations, certifications, licenses, or other approvals not regulated by
this chapter prior to commencing or continuing construction disturbance
regulated by this Chapter." (emphasis added)).
For these reasons, the AEMA and the AWPCA do not "make
manifest a legislative intent that no other enactment may touch upon the
subject in any way" such that Fairhope's ordinances are preempted.  Peak,
73 So. 3d. at 19-20.
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2. Fairhope's Ordinances Do Not Conflict with State Law
An ordinance is inconsistent with state law when it "permits what
a state statute forbids or forbids what a statute permits."  Tulley, 199 So.
3d at 821.  The Breland parties argue that the certification, issued in
accordance with the AWPCA, conflicts with Fairhope's ordinances.
Assuming that a state permit, license, or certification can serve as
the basis for a conflict-preemption claim, state approval for a given action
does not necessarily eliminate the need to comply with local law.   In
Gibson v. City of Alexander City, 779 So. 2d 1153, 1153 (Ala. 2000), the
Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control Board issued a business owner a
license that allowed him to sell and serve alcoholic beverages 24 hours per
day, 6 days per week.  Alexander City later adopted an ordinance
prohibiting establishments from allowing alcohol consumption on their
premises between midnight and 7 a.m., and the business owner
challenged the ordinance on the grounds that it was inconsistent with
Alabama law.  This Court rejected his argument, holding that "[t]he
challenged ordinance merely enlarges upon the statutory provisions of the
Alcoholic Beverage Licensing Code; it is not inconsistent with Alabama
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statutory law or the Alabama Constitution."  779 So. 2d at 1155; see also
Alabama Recycling Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Montgomery, 24 So. 3d 1085, 1090
(Ala. 2009) (holding that ordinance does not conflict with statute because
it "enlarges upon the provisions of the Act by adding certain restrictions"
or  "merely because the Act is silent where the ordinance speaks").  
ADEM issued the certification as a part of the joint application and
review process with the Corps, and it did not authorize the filling apart
from the federal permit -- nor did it exempt landowners from compliance
with local regulations.  But the federal permit, issued as a part of the joint
review process, expressly required compliance with local regulations. 
Further, the Breland parties have not identified any conditions in the
certification that conflict with the standards in Fairhope's ordinances. 
And as the trial court found, "[n]one of the ordinances adopted by
[Fairhope] prohibits the construction of a subdivision or the filling of
wetlands."  Thus, as in Gibson, Fairhope's ordinances "merely enlarge"
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upon state law.  Accordingly, the trial court did not err in holding that the
ordinances do not conflict with Alabama law.18
D. Fairhope's Ordinances Are Not De Facto Zoning Laws
The Breland parties contend that Fairhope's ordinances have been
"intentionally and systematically applied against [Breland] to prevent the
otherwise lawful use and development of his wetlands."  Breland parties'
brief, at p. 56.  Because, they claim, Fairhope has prohibited any lawful
"use" of the wetlands, the ordinances are de facto zoning regulations,
which are improper because they cannot apply outside Fairhope's
corporate limits. 
"'Zoning' is primarily concerned with the regulation of the use of
property, to structural and architectural designs of buildings, and the
character of use to which the property or the buildings within classified
18Concerning the preemption arguments, the trial court noted that
the Breland parties failed to "demonstrate the existence of a justiciable
controversy that would entitle [them] to declaratory judgment relief." 
Because we affirm the trial court's holding concerning the merits of the
Breland parties' preemption claim, we need not address the Breland
parties' argument that the trial court erred in holding that no justiciable
controversy exists. 
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or designated districts may be put."  Roberson v. City of Montgomery, 285
Ala. 421, 425, 233 So. 2d 69, 72 (1970).  The fact that regulations limit the
type of activity that can take place on real property, however, does not
convert them into zoning laws.  For example, the Court of Civil Appeals
has held that county subdivision regulations prohibiting development of
land unsuitable because of flooding or improper drainage were not zoning
ordinances.  See Dyess v. Bay John Devs. II, L.L.C., 13 So. 3d 390, 395
(Ala. Civ. App. 2007), cert. quashed, 13 So. 3d 397 (Ala. 2009).  Applying
Roberson, the court in Dyess reasoned that the regulations did not "seek
to limit the actual use of the land" and that they did not "mandate certain
types of land usage based upon categories, zones, or districts."  Id.  Rather,
the court held that the regulations were "a statutorily authorized and
proper exercise of the general police power to plan 'orderly development.' " 
Id.; see also City of Robertsdale v. Baldwin Cnty., 538 So. 2d 33, 36 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1988) (holding that city's requirement for building permit
outside corporate limits was valid exercise of police power).
As in Dyess, Fairhope's ordinances do not "mandate certain types of
land usage based upon categories, zones, or districts."    Dyess, 13 So. 3d
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at 395.  And as explained above, the trial court's finding that the
ordinances are "designed to minimize potential harm and impacts to the
environment and adjacent property owners" is not palpably erroneous. 
We therefore agree with the trial court that Fairhope's ordinances "were
enforceable in the police jurisdiction as they are not zoning ordinances,"
but instead were "enacted pursuant to [Fairhope's] police power to protect
public health, safety, and welfare."
Conclusion
The Breland parties have not established that Fairhope's ordinances
are invalid or that they obtained a vested right to fill the wetlands on the
property.  Further, the Breland parties' argument that Breland's citation
should be expunged is premised on the notion that he was not obligated
to comply with Fairhope's ordinances in existence at the time of his
citation.  Because we have rejected that premise, the Breland parties'
request  for expungement is moot.  And because we do not reverse or
remand for further proceedings and there is no other apparent remedy at
this stage, the Breland parties' claim that the trial court erred by allowing
The Battles Wharf/Point Clear Protective Association to intervene is moot. 
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AFFIRMED.
Bolin, Shaw, Mendheim, and Stewart, JJ., concur.
Parker, C.J., concurs in part and concurs in the result.
Bryan, J., concurs in the result.
Sellers, J., dissents.
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PARKER, Chief Justice (concurring in part and concurring in the result).
I concur in the main opinion as to all but its analysis of whether
Charles K. Breland, Jr., and Breland Corporation ("the Breland parties")
acquired a vested right to fill the wetlands. 
"Under either the vested rights or the estoppel standard, the
developer or builder must demonstrate: (1) the existence of a
valid government act; (2) substantial reliance on the
governmental act; (3) good faith; and (4) that the rights are
substantial enough to make it fundamentally unfair to
eliminate those rights." 
 
1 John J. Delaney et al., Handling the Land Use Case: Land Use Law,
Practice & Forms § 35:3 (3d ed. 2020) (footnotes omitted). Neither the
federal and county permits nor any action by the City of Fairhope created
a reasonable expectation, as against the City, that development could
proceed. Therefore, the Breland parties never obtained a vested right in
equity. But the main opinion goes further by distinguishing expenditures
from physical improvements for purposes of determining whether a
developer has substantially relied. I do not see why expenditures made in
reasonable reliance on an act by a government authority should not be
treated similarly to improvements. See, e.g., Kleikamp v. Board of Cnty.
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Comm'rs, 240 Or. App. 57, 61, 246 P.3d 56, 65 (2010) ("[A] landowner's
proof of 'substantial expenditures' is the sine qua non of a vesting
determination."); Cribbin v. City of Chicago, 384 Ill. App. 3d 878, 893
N.E.2d 1016, 323 Ill. Dec. 542 (2008) (holding that a developer obtained
a vested right based on substantial expenditures); Town of Midland v.
Wayne, 368 N.C. 55, 64, 773 S.E.2d 301, 308 (2015) ("[The] defendant in
good faith reliance made substantial expenditures of money, time, and
labor ..., thus supporting his common law vested right to develop the
subdivision in accordance with the plan."). I would not reach such a
distinction. 
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SELLERS, Justice (dissenting). 
I respectfully dissent.  Charles K. Breland, Jr., submitted an
application for certification from the Alabama Department of
Environmental Management ("ADEM") and for a permit from the United
States Army Corps of Engineers ("the Corps"), seeking approval to fill
approximately 10.5 acres of wetlands Breland had purchased in Baldwin
County outside the City of Fairhope.  In addition to ADEM and the Corps,
Breland communicated with the Alabama State Lands Division, the
United States Fish and Wildlife Service, and the Alabama Historical
Commission.  Breland paid between $20,000 and $30,000 in consulting
fees in pursuit of the ADEM certification and the Corps permit.  
ADEM provided the requested certification, and the Corps issued the
requested permit.  Thereafter, Breland spent another $143,144 on
wetlands "mitigation credits" aimed at mitigating the impact the filling
project would have on wetlands.  He also conveyed a portion of his
property to Weeks Bay Watershed Protective Association, Inc., as part of
the wetlands-mitigation process.   Eventually, Breland requested and
received a land-disturbance permit from Baldwin County authorizing the
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filling of the wetlands. All in all, Breland's project necessitated the
involvement of two federal agencies, three state agencies and two local
governments.
When Breland obtained the ADEM certification and the Corps
permit, Fairhope did not have any ordinances that governed the filling
necessary for the project.  But, in 2006, Fairhope adopted Ordinance No.
1313, which required a land-disturbance permit for "filling activity" and
prohibited the use of fill material consisting of more than 10% red soil or
clay.  Ordinance No. 1313 contained no restrictions that would have
prevented Breland from proceeding with the project.  
Breland submitted an application for a permit under Ordinance No.
1313.  Although it appears he was entitled to that permit, Fairhope simply
ignored his application and adopted a temporary moratorium on issuing
land-disturbance permits.  Shortly after imposing the moratorium,
Fairhope adopted a series of new ordinances dealing more specifically with
the filling of wetlands within the City's permitting jurisdiction.  Breland's
position in the trial court and on appeal suggests that the requirements
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of the new ordinances would have rendered his proposed project
impossible or economically impractical.19 
Thus, as a practical matter, even though Breland had taken all
regulatory steps required by existing law and had spent significant funds
on the project, Fairhope's subsequent adoption of new ordinances curtailed
his ability to proceed.  "Surely, no citation of authority is necessary to
demonstrate the constitutional invalidity, on general due process grounds,
of any regulatory scheme ... that fails to recognize vested rights of prior
interest holders."  Bingham v. City of Tuscaloosa, 383 So. 2d 542, 544 (Ala.
1980).  Almost 60 years ago, this Court acknowledged the principle that,
in some situations, a municipality cannot change its ordinances to the
detriment of vested property owners:
"We are quite aware that some courts ... determine the
existence of vested rights in property which has been made the
19Fairhope's mayor indicated during the trial in this case that, when
he learned of Breland's efforts to obtain a permit from the Corps, he took
steps to "stand in the way" of Breland's filling project. There is some
evidence indicating that the new ordinances adopted by Fairhope were
aimed at hampering Breland's development plan, but they were generic
enough to escape being declared as impermissibly aimed specifically at
that project. 
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subject of zoning amendments on the property owner's
substantial change of position, financial investments, or
permits granted, all relating to structures built, initiated, or
authorized on the rezoned area.
"Such changes, investments, and permits, relating as
they do to structures initiated or completed, are made the
criteria of hardships imposed on the property owner and
judicially recognized to sustain the claims of vested rights. The
facts in no two cases are the same."
Grayson v. City of Birmingham, 277 Ala. 522, 525, 173 So. 2d 67, 69
(1963).  As Fairhope points out, the Court in Grayson ultimately held that
the appellants in that case did not have vested rights in commercially
zoned real property, upon which they had built roads and installed
utilities, before the City of Birmingham amended its zoning ordinances to
designate the property as residential.  But the appellants in Grayson had
expended much less than Breland expended, even taking into account the
rate of inflation since Grayson was decided.  In addition, the Court in
Grayson noted that the appellants in that case had not obtained a building
permit and had "no intention of building on [the land]."  277 Ala. at 525,
173 So. 2d at 69.  Moreover, the Court acknowledged that the modest
investment made by the appellants in Grayson indeed might have been
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enough to establish vested rights if it were not for Birmingham's
significant interest in preserving the residential nature of the surrounding
area.  Specifically, the Grayson appellants' small investment in the
property was "of minor weight and importance in comparison with the
duty on the part of [Birmingham] to foresee the traffic and pass adequate
zoning regulations designed to protect pedestrians and motorists ... from
loss of life or serious injury."  277 Ala. at 527, 173 So. 2d at 71-72.  As
Breland and Breland Corporation point out, ADEM and the Corps granted
Breland  permission to proceed with his fill project.  Thus, those entities
must have determined that the project would not have had such a
detrimental effect on the environment that it should be prohibited.  
In Baker v. State Board of Health, 440 So. 2d 1098 (Ala. Civ. App.
1983), the Court of Civil Appeals held that the owners of a mobile-home
park with lots that were 3,200 square feet in size had a vested interest in
the land and were not subject to a new regulation requiring mobile-home
lots to be a minimum of 15,000 square feet:
"[W]e find pertinent the defendants' contention that the 15,000
square foot requirement should not be enforced because of
general equitable considerations. The mobile home park was
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developed under a permit that allowed 3,200 square foot lots.
The owners and their successors relied on the permit and
expended time and money developing and improving the lots
according to the regulations under which they acquired the
permit. Equity adapts relief to the case and in so doing form
gives way to substance."
440 So. 2d at 1100.  
Likewise, Breland expended a significant amount of money and took
all steps legally required of him to begin the fill project.  He paid more
than $140,000 to obtain mitigation credits, paid more than $20,000 in
consulting fees, and conveyed a portion of his property in connection with
a conservation easement, all in the absence of any municipal wetlands
regulations.  He obtained all necessary permits, with the exception of a
permit under Ordinance No. 1313.  Instead of issuing him that permit,
Fairhope simply ignored Breland's application and changed the governing
law, effectively blocking him from proceeding with the project.  
Property developers like Breland take on significant risk in
purchasing raw land in contemplation of development. Governmental
entities should not be allowed to add to that inherent risk by tacking on
further regulations to prohibitively increase the costs or otherwise block
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beneficial property improvements.  At the time of purchase, the proper
and improper uses of the property are readily discernable by a review of
the local, state, and federal laws.  A developer's right to use his or her
property according to those applicable regulations vests when the
developer expends significant time and expense in pursuit of developing
the property.  
The costs of obtaining regulatory approval for a development can be
quite significant and consist of more than the mere completion of
paperwork.  In the present case, Breland did not just submit simple plans
and applications to regulatory agencies.  He took significant steps, such
as purchasing mitigation credits and conveying a sizable piece of property
to a watershed organization, as contingencies for approval of the
preliminary phase of the project.  After a developer has attempted to
comply with the law, obtained appropriate permits, and incurred
significant expense in pursuit of a development, a local governmental
agency cannot deny a permit to which the developer is entitled, or change
the governing regulations to effectively stop the improvements, simply
because it does not like the development plans.  At that point, the right to
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use the property subject to the obtained applicable permitting vests, such
that any additional restrictions cannot be legally imposed to thwart the
approved development.  To impose such subsequent restrictions  amounts
to an impermissible ex post facto law.  Here, as in Baker, equity should
recognize the hardship Fairhope's position imposes on Breland and
Breland Corporation.  I would reverse the trial court's judgment.
50