Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Christopher E. Meisel
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2015AP000463-D
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: April 26, 2017

2017 WI 40 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP463-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Christopher E. Meisel, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
     v. 
Christopher E. Meisel, 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST MEISEL 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 26, 2017 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 11, 2017 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
 
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J. dissents (opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
 
For the respondent-appellant there were briefs filed by 
Terry 
E. 
Johnson 
and 
Peterson, 
Johnson 
& 
Murray, 
S.C., 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Terry E. Johnson. 
 
 
For the Office of Lawyer Regulation a brief was filed by 
Matthew J. Price and Foley & Lardner LLP, Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by Matthew J. Price. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2017 WI 40
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2015AP463-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Christopher E. Meisel, Attorney at Law: 
 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Christopher E. Meisel, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 26, 2017 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   Attorney's 
license 
suspended.  
 
¶1 
PER 
CURIAM.   Attorney 
Christopher 
E. 
Meisel 
has 
appealed Referee Hannah Dugan's recommendation that his license 
to practice law in Wisconsin be suspended for two years for 15 
counts of misconduct, which included converting approximately 
$175,000 from two estates and two guardianship proceedings.  
Attorney Meisel stipulated to all counts of misconduct but 
asserts that, rather than a two-year suspension, a five-month 
suspension of his law license is an adequate sanction. 
No. 
2015AP463-D   
 
2 
 
¶2 
Upon careful review of this matter, we uphold the 
referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law.  We conclude, 
however, that rather than a two-year suspension, Attorney 
Meisel's license to practice law should be suspended for 18 
months.  We further agree with the referee that Attorney Meisel 
should be required to pay the full costs of this proceeding, 
which are $10,831.67 as of February 7, 2017.  Although the 
referee recommended that various conditions be imposed upon 
Attorney Meisel, we find that the imposition of conditions would 
be better addressed in a future reinstatement proceeding. 
¶3 
Attorney Meisel was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 1994.  He has no prior disciplinary history.  In 
October of 2006, Attorney Meisel was diagnosed with brain cancer 
and days later underwent brain surgery to remove a tumor.  
Following surgery, he received chemotherapy and radiation 
treatments, which treatments continued until 2008.  Although his 
condition is currently stable, Attorney Meisel will require 
constant monitoring.  He is not able to work long hours.  While 
prior to his brain surgery he was earning over $100,000 per 
year, in recent years he has earned approximately $45,000 per 
year. 
¶4 
In 2008 Attorney Meisel and his wife decided to pursue 
international adoption of two children from Guatemala.  One of 
the children was later diagnosed with a number of medical 
issues, including significant brain formation issues, legal 
blindness, and learning disabilities.  In order to provide that 
child with the resources she needed, the family moved from the 
No. 
2015AP463-D   
 
3 
 
school district in which they were living to a different school 
district that they believed had better resources to educate the 
child.  The purchase price of the home in the new school 
district was $125,000 more than the price of the house the 
family sold.   
¶5 
In addition to his personal health problems and the 
medical issues of his daughter, Attorney Meisel was also under 
financial distress due to a real estate business called King 
Park Investment Company, LLC, (King Park), which he owned with 
another man.  King Park is a real estate venture in the 
Marquette University area in Milwaukee.   
¶6 
The Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) filed its 15 
count complaint against Attorney Meisel on March 10, 2015.  
Counts one through three of the complaint arose out of Attorney 
Meisel's handling of the estate of B.T., who died in October 
2008.  Attorney Meisel was retained to handle the estate and 
pursue a potential wrongful death claim.  In June 2009, he filed 
a petition for special administration of the estate in Milwaukee 
County Circuit Court.  Following a settlement of the wrongful 
death claim, in March 2011 Attorney Meisel filed a petition for 
formal administration of the estate.  The OLR's complaint 
alleged that Attorney Meisel disbursed numerous checks from his 
trust account for the benefit of King Park from funds belonging 
to the estate.   
¶7 
The specific counts of misconduct alleged in the 
complaint arising out of B.T.'s estate were as follows: 
No. 
2015AP463-D   
 
4 
 
Count 1:  By failing to hold $50,003.29 in trust 
belonging to the Estate of B.T., Attorney Meisel 
violated SCR 20:1.15(b)(1).1 
Count 2:  By converting to his own purposes $50,003.29 
in trust funds belonging to the estate of B.T., 
Attorney Meisel violated SCR 20:8.4(c).2 
Count 3:  By depositing $47,244.20 in personal and law 
firm funds into his trust account in April 2012, to 
replace the bulk of the funds that he had converted 
from the B.T. Estate, Attorney Meisel violated SCR 
20:1.15(b)(3).3 
¶8 
Counts 4 through 14 of the OLR's complaint arose out 
of Attorney Meisel's appointment as guardian of the estates of 
D.C. and Y.M., step-sisters whose parents died in an automobile 
accident in February of 2006.  D.C. was five years at the time 
                                                 
1 Effective July 1, 2016, substantial changes were made to 
Supreme Court Rule 20:1.15, the "trust account rule." See S. Ct. 
Order 14-07, (issued Apr. 4, 2016, eff. July 1, 2016). Because 
the conduct underlying this case arose prior to July 1, 2016, 
unless otherwise indicated, all references to the supreme court 
rules will be to those in effect prior to July 1, 2016.  
SCR 20:1.15(b)(1) provides:   
A lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from the 
lawyer's own property, that property of clients and 
3rd parties that is in the lawyer's possession in 
connection with a representation. All funds of clients 
and 3rd parties paid to a lawyer or law firm in 
connection with a representation shall be deposited in 
one or more identifiable trust accounts.   
2 SCR 20:8.4(c) provides:  "It is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation." 
3 SCR 20:1.15(b)(3) provides:  "No funds belonging to the 
lawyer or law firm, except funds reasonably sufficient to pay 
monthly account service charges, may be deposited or retained in 
a trust account." 
No. 
2015AP463-D   
 
5 
 
of the accident, and Y.M. was close to one year old.  A 
Milwaukee County probate court commissioner appointed Attorney 
Meisel as guardian of the girls' estates in October 2007.  
Attorney Meisel established separate guardianship accounts for 
the children.   
¶9 
Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 54.62, a guardian is required 
to file with the court an annual accounting for a guardianship 
prior to April 15 of the following year.  Amy Wochos, legal 
counsel and senior administrator for the Milwaukee County Clerk 
of Circuit Court, testified at the evidentiary hearing before 
the referee that she oversees filings in probate court.  She 
testified that in 2013 she became aware that an order to show 
cause had been issued against Attorney Meisel by the probate 
court because he had failed to file the annual accountings for 
the children's guardianship.   
¶10 Ms. Wochos testified that in early 2014 Attorney 
Meisel came to the probate office and asked to speak with her.  
She said Attorney Meisel indicated he had taken money from the 
minor guardianship accounts, that he had self-reported this 
behavior to the OLR, and that he had either put the money back 
or was in the process of putting it back and understood he 
needed to be relieved of his duties as guardian for the girls.  
Attorney Meisel converted money from the estate of J.D. to 
replace the funds he took from the guardianship accounts. 
¶11 OLR's complaint alleged the following counts of 
misconduct with respect to the two guardianship proceedings and 
the second estate proceeding: 
No. 
2015AP463-D   
 
6 
 
Count 4: By failing to hold as much as $21,000 in the 
D.C. Account at times between March 2009 and November 
2012, Attorney Meisel violated SCR 20:1.15(j)(l).4 
Count 
5: 
By 
converting 
and 
re-converting 
D.C. 
Guardianship funds to his own purposes between March 
2009 and March 2012, Attorney Meisel violated SCR 
20:8.4(c). 
Count 
6: 
By 
depositing 
into 
the 
D.C. 
Account 
$57,800.61 in King Park funds and funds converted from 
his trust account and the Estate of J.D., Attorney 
Meisel violated SCR 20:1.15(j)(l). 
Count 
7: 
By 
depositing 
into 
the 
D.C. 
Account 
$57,800.61 in King Park funds and funds converted from 
his trust account and the Estate of J.D., thereby 
concealing his conversion and re-conversion of funds 
belonging to D.C., Attorney Meisel violated SCR 
20:8.4(c). 
Count 8: By failing to hold as much as $21,455.25 in 
the Y.M. Account between March 2009 and November 2012, 
Attorney Meisel violated SCR 20:1.15(j)(l). 
Count 9:  By converting and re-converting Y.M. 
Guardianship funds to his own purposes between March 
2009 and March 2012, Attorney Meisel violated SCR 
20:8.4(c). 
Count 10:  By depositing into the Y.M. Account 
$70,056.12 in King Park funds and funds converted from 
his trust account and the Estate of J.D., Attorney 
Meisel violated SCR 20:1.15(j)(1). 
                                                 
4 SCR 20:1.15(j)(l) provides:   
A lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from the 
lawyer's own funds or property, those funds or that 
property of clients or 3rd parties that are in the 
lawyer's 
possession 
when 
acting 
in 
a 
fiduciary 
capacity that directly arises in the course of, or as 
a result of, a lawyer-client relationship or by 
appointment of a court. 
No. 
2015AP463-D   
 
7 
 
Count 11:  By depositing into the Y.M. Account 
$70,056.12 in King Park funds and funds converted from 
his trust account and the Estate of J.D., thereby 
concealing his conversion and re-conversion of funds 
belonging to Y.M., Attorney Meisel violated SCR 
20:8.4(c), 
Count 12:   By filing annual accountings with the 
Milwaukee County Probate Court for the D.C. and Y.M. 
Guardianships, 
which 
failed 
to 
disclose 
the 
disbursements that he made from those guardianships 
and included documentation of account balances that 
had been deliberately, and temporarily, inflated to 
document 
the 
required 
balances 
and 
conceal 
his 
conversions, 
Attorney 
Meisel 
violated 
SCR 
20:3.3(a)(l).5 
Count 13:  By failing to hold as much as $31,201.48 in 
the fiduciary account for the Estate of J.D., Attorney 
Meisel violated SCR 20:1.15(j)(1). 
Count 14:  By converting to his own purposes as much 
as $31,201.48 in the fiduciary account for the Estate 
of J.D., Attorney Meisel violated SCR 20:8.4(c). 
 
¶12 Count 15 of the OLR's complaint alleged: 
Count 15: By failing to maintain a transaction 
register and client ledgers with running balances, and 
by failing to perform monthly reconciliations of his 
trust account, thereby failing to maintain complete 
records of a trust account, Attorney Meisel violated 
SCR 20:1.15(f)(l)a., (f)(l)b., and f(i)g.6 
                                                 
5 SCR 20:3.3(a)(l) provides:  "A lawyer shall not knowingly 
make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to 
correct a false statement of material fact or law previously 
made to the tribunal by the lawyer." 
6 SCR 20:1.15(f)(l)a provides: 
The 
transaction 
register 
shall 
contain 
a 
chronological record of all account transactions, and 
shall include all of the following: 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP463-D   
 
8 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
1. the date, source, and amount of all deposits; 
2. the date, check or transaction number, payee 
and amount of all disbursements, whether by check, 
wire transfer, or other means; 
3. the date and amount of every other deposit or 
deduction of whatever nature; 
4. the identity of the client for whom funds were 
deposited or disbursed; and 
5. 
the 
balance 
in 
the 
account 
after 
each 
transaction. 
Section 20:1.15(f)(1)b provides:   
A subsidiary ledger shall be maintained for each 
client or 3rd party for whom the lawyer receives trust 
funds that are deposited in an IOLTA account or any 
other pooled trust account. The lawyer shall record 
each receipt and disbursement of a client's or 3rd 
party's 
funds 
and 
the 
balance 
following 
each 
transaction. A lawyer shall not disburse funds from an 
IOLTA account or any pooled trust account that would 
create 
a 
negative 
balance 
with 
respect 
to 
any 
individual client or matter. 
. . . 
Section 20:1.15(f)(1)g provides:   
For each trust account, the lawyer shall prepare 
and retain a printed reconciliation report on a 
regular and periodic basis not less frequently than 
every 30 days. Each reconciliation report shall show 
all of the following balances and verify that they are 
identical: 
1. the balance that appears in the transaction 
register as of the reporting date; 
2. the total of all subsidiary ledger balances 
for IOLTA accounts and other pooled trust accounts, 
determined by listing and totaling the balances in the 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP463-D   
 
9 
 
¶13 Attorney Meisel filed an answer to the complaint in 
April 2015.  In December of 2015, Attorney Meisel and the OLR 
entered into a stipulation whereby Attorney Meisel withdrew his 
answer to the complaint and pled no contest to each allegation 
of misconduct set forth in the complaint.  The parties agreed 
that the complaint could serve as the factual basis for the 
referee's 
determination 
of 
misconduct 
and 
the 
referee's 
recommendation as to discipline.  The parties further agreed 
that the evidentiary hearing would be limited to taking 
additional evidence and argument to facilitate the referee's 
recommendation to this court as to the appropriate amount of 
discipline.  The OLR's complaint had sought a three-year 
suspension of Attorney Meisel's law license. 
¶14 The evidentiary hearing took place on January 25, 
2016.  In addition to Amy Wochos, Heather Coning, an insurance 
and bonding agent, and Attorney Meisel testified in person.  
Dr. Mark G. Malkin testified by telephone.   
¶15 Attorney Meisel testified that if he were to lose his 
license to practice law for two or three years, he did not 
believe he would ever be able to return to the practice of law.  
                                                                                                                                                             
individual client ledgers and the ledger for account 
fees and charges, as of the reporting date; and 
3. the adjusted balance, determined by adding 
outstanding deposits and other credits to the balance 
in the financial institution's monthly statement and 
subtracting outstanding checks and other deductions 
from the balance in the monthly statement. 
No. 
2015AP463-D   
 
10 
 
When asked by the referee about his conversion of the funds, 
Attorney Meisel said:  
I did it.  It was wrong.  The whole world was in a 
fog.  I know I did it – it was wrong.  I was bonded at 
all times.  I'm not making a justification for it, but 
I didn't think it would come to a problem. . . . 
I knew I did it.  I have never denied that.  Why?  
It's hard to say.  I was juggling so many things that 
I just did it without really thinking, you know.  I 
just figured that money would be coming in or – I 
don't know.  It was dumb. 
¶16 Dr. Malkin's 
December 
31, 
2015, 
letter/report 
to 
Attorney Terry E. Johnson, Attorney Meisel's counsel in this 
matter, was received into evidence at the hearing.  The letter 
indicates that Dr. Malkin was Attorney Meisel's attending neuro-
oncologist from November 2006 through August 2013, at which time 
Dr. Malkin relocated from Milwaukee to Richmond, Virginia.  
Dr. Malkin's report explains Attorney Meisel's medical history.  
Dr. Malkin said:   
I am aware, from conversations with Mr. Meisel's 
attorneys, of some of the circumstances surrounding 
the fiscal decisions Mr. Meisel made which have 
resulted 
in 
the 
disciplinary 
proceedings 
brought 
against him.  I am aware that he missed time from work 
which would have left him with less time and more 
stress to complete the work which he had taken on.  I 
am aware that he turned away clients because he could 
not keep up with the case load to which he had been 
accustomed before he became ill.  I am aware that his 
practice declined, adding financial burden and stress.  
I am aware that certain real-estate investments were 
devalued, and that he fell out with his partner, 
adding further stress.  I am aware that he did not 
share these concerns at work with his wife, and he 
certainly didn't with me.  I am aware that he was not 
willing to seek professional help to manage distress.  
Under these circumstances anybody would have been 
No. 
2015AP463-D   
 
11 
 
overwhelmed, and certainly Mr. Meisel was especially 
susceptible 
to 
making 
errors 
in 
judgment 
as 
a 
maladaptive 
strategy 
to 
deal 
with 
the 
multiple 
stressors, given his medical history, the medications 
he was on, and the permanent damage to his brain from 
the tumor and treatment thereof.  It was a 'perfect 
storm'. . . . 
All of us are subject to stress, and much of this 
stress is external and beyond our control.  Mr. Meisel 
is no different.  However, his brain tumor and the 
treatment 
thereof 
created 
brain 
damage 
that 
predisposed him to inappropriate, non-constructive 
cognitive responses to stress.  I cared for Mr. Meisel 
for almost seven years, and therefore I believe I know 
him quite well.  I believe the behavior that led to 
the inappropriate fiscal decisions that he made was an 
aberration and not likely to repeat itself.  That 
said, it is my recommendation that he undergo a 
comprehensive neuropsychological evaluation, . . ..  I 
recommend that he receive formal psychotherapy to help 
him manage 
stress in a constructive way, . . .. 
Finally, I recommend that Mr. Meisel continue to be 
followed on a scheduled basis by a neuro-oncologist 
with MRI scans of the brain to monitor his brain tumor 
status, . . .. 
¶17 In his telephone testimony at the evidentiary hearing, 
Dr. Malkin said: 
Well, I would sum it up by saying that we have a 
situation here where, beyond the usual stressors in 
anyone's 
life, 
Mr. 
Meisel 
was 
affected 
by 
a 
potentially fatal brain tumor, which necessitated 
surgery 
to 
remove 
the 
tumor 
and 
part 
of 
the 
surrounding brain, radiation therapy, which affected 
the brain volume and function, chemotherapy, and other 
medications to control symptoms of the brain tumor, 
like seizures, and the stressors, like anxiety and 
depression, are associated with this diagnosis and 
treatment, all of which conspired to create a perfect 
storm such that his injured brain, under extreme 
stress, has reacted to a situation, his judgment was 
affected, and he made a financial decision which I'm 
sure he regrets. 
No. 
2015AP463-D   
 
12 
 
¶18 When asked by Attorney Meisel's counsel whether those 
opinions were held to be true to a reasonable degree of medical 
probability, Dr. Malkin answered in the affirmative.   
¶19 On 
cross-examination 
by 
the 
OLR's 
counsel, 
the 
following exchange occurred: 
Q:  Can you state to a reasonable degree of medical 
probability 
that 
Mr. 
Meisel's 
medical 
conditions 
relating to the brain tumor caused him to repeatedly 
convert trust funds, and reconvert trust funds, over a 
three-year period? 
A:  Yes 
Q:  And what's the basis for that conclusion? 
A:  The basis is that the damage we are looking at on 
the MRI scan of 2011 is permanent damage.  It's never 
going to change.  It will always look at least that 
bad.  It's a static problem, not one that evolved 
overnight nor one that is ever going to get better. 
So it stands to reason that this impaired brain will 
be susceptible, or predisposed, as I wrote, to making 
the same error in judgment, or memory, or executive 
function over and over again. 
Q:  But being predisposed to doing something is 
different than causing it to happen, right?  They're 
not necessarily the same thing, you testified to? 
A:  Correct. 
Q:  Okay.  So not everyone who is predisposed to 
alcoholism, 
for 
example, 
becomes 
an 
alcoholic, 
correct? 
A:  That's correct. 
Q:  So on one hand in your report we talked about the 
predisposed section, and you testified in response to 
Mr. Johnson's question that the – the damage is 
permanent, it's not going to change, but then in the 
last paragraph of your report, the – the fourth 
sentence of the last paragraph on your report you 
No. 
2015AP463-D   
 
13 
 
state, 'I believe the behavior that led to the 
inappropriate fiscal decisions that he made was 
aberration and not likely to repeat itself.'  Did you 
put that statement in your report? 
A:  Yes, I did. 
Q:  So how can you on one hand tell us that he's 
predisposed to engaging in these activities, and has 
engaged in these activities, the damage is permanent, 
and things are not likely to improve, yet in the next 
paragraph you're telling us presumably what you 
believe to a medical – high degree of medical 
probability, that he's not likely to re-engage in the 
same conduct?  How do you reconcile that? 
A:  The reconciliation is based upon the fact that Mr. 
Meisel is not under anywhere near the kind of stress 
that he was under when these events occurred.  His 
tumor is in remission.  It is not impossible that it 
won't come back, but it is unlikely.  That's number 
one. 
As his attorney has just told all of us, his financial 
situation is more stable, his child situation is more 
stable.  These are important stressors which were in 
effect at the time but no longer operable. 
And at the time, despite this predisposition, Mr. 
Meisel did not avail himself of the kind of support 
and professional help that might have prevented him, 
given this predisposition, from acting in the way he 
did. 
Now, if Mr. Meisel didn't do anything about his 
stress, 
and 
ignored 
recommendations 
to 
find 
constructive ways to manage stress, then I would say 
there would be a concern that it could happen in the 
future. 
But I think the circumstances of his life now are very 
different than they were then.  And – and that's how I 
would reconcile the two paragraphs. 
Q:  But as I understand it, your position that it's 
not likely to recur, the behavior – the inappropriate 
behavior is not going to recur, is largely based upon 
the reduction of stress in Mr. Meisel's life, correct? 
No. 
2015AP463-D   
 
14 
 
A:  That is correct. 
Q:  But –  
A:  I don’t think we should underestimate the 
importance of that.  I really don't. 
Q:  Okay.  Accepting that, wouldn't the opposite then 
be true, that if the stress – if the high level of 
stress returned to his life, we should reasonably 
expect that he's predisposed to commit the same 
misconduct that he did previously? 
A:  We should be concerned about that risk and do what 
can be done to prevent that.  And that is why I 
recommend 
the 
neuropsych 
evaluation, 
to 
better 
understand 
it, 
and 
to 
objectify 
it, 
and 
the 
psychotherapy intervention. 
Because the stress that comes into our lives is not 
always under our control.  Sometimes we bring it upon 
ourselves, but more often than not it's an external 
thing.  And that needs to be managed.  That's the 
missing link in Mr. Meisel's care. 
¶20 The parties filed post-hearing briefs regarding the 
appropriate sanction.  The referee filed her report and 
recommendation on July 15, 2016.  The referee said Attorney 
Meisel's violations of supreme court rules were made more 
egregious because 11 counts involved the guardianship of funds 
of orphaned children.  The referee also said the three counts 
related to the B.T. estate reflected a serious breach of trust 
to the estate beneficiaries and to the court.  The referee 
acknowledged: 
The 
confluence 
of 
personal 
and 
medical 
matters 
Attorney 
Meisel 
faced 
beginning 
in 
2006 
were 
substantial, life-changing. The long term cognitive 
effects of the brain cancer and treatments are 
balanced sympathetically in favor of Attorney Meisel, 
for misconduct that would otherwise call for a much 
greater 
sanction, 
especially 
because 
the 
actual 
No. 
2015AP463-D   
 
15 
 
misconduct did not occur until he returned to active 
practice a couple of years later. 
The misconduct related to sustaining the King Park 
project is not viewed as sympathetically; options in 
handling the business partnership were available and 
the nature of that business deal is not so compelling 
as 
to 
warrant 
much 
mitigation 
for 
substantial 
misconduct 
involving 
substantial 
conversions. 
Additionally, it cannot go without note that Attorney 
Meisel presented his defenses regarding his misconduct 
in matters he handled which affected only these four 
vulnerable people and estates; even while during the 
same time period he carried forth on other client 
matters without engaging in similar misconduct. 
¶21 As part of her report, the referee discussed in detail 
the American Bar Association's standards for imposing lawyer 
sanctions.  With respect to aggravating factors, the referee 
found that Attorney Meisel demonstrated a dishonest or selfish 
motive since he used converted client funds for his own personal 
benefit.  The referee also found a pattern of misconduct in that 
Attorney 
Meisel's 
repeated 
conversions 
and 
unreported 
replenishments of the money occurred over a three-year period, 
involved four separate matters – two vulnerable wards and two 
estates over which he had exclusive control – and eventually 
were determined to total more than $175,000.  The referee noted 
that Attorney Meisel's conduct involved multiple offenses.  She 
said that Attorney Meisel had substantial experience in the 
practice of law, having practiced for almost 15 years when he 
first converted funds. 
¶22 The referee also found a number of mitigating factors, 
including Attorney Meisel's lack of a prior disciplinary record; 
his significant personal and emotional problems; the fact that 
No. 
2015AP463-D   
 
16 
 
he made full restitution to the clients from which he converted 
funds; the fact that he was cooperative during the OLR 
proceedings and eventually entered into a stipulation; and the 
fact that he expressed remorse for his misconduct.  
¶23 Although 
the 
OLR 
included 
physical 
and 
mental 
disability in its list of mitigating factors, the referee found 
that the record did not support placing much weight on those 
factors as mitigating the misconduct.  In the referee's opinion, 
Attorney Meisel did not provide clear, satisfactory, and 
convincing evidence of the nexus between his medical condition 
and the repeated proactive misconduct of converting client funds 
that occurred over the course of several years.   
¶24 The referee went on to say that although the record 
supported the finding that Attorney Meisel had and has mental 
health conditions, the record did not establish that those 
conditions were mental disabilities.  The referee noted that Dr. 
Malkin ultimately testified that Attorney Meisel's health 
condition may have predisposed him to less acute judgment and 
executive 
function, 
but 
Dr. 
Malkin 
acknowledged 
that 
predisposition is not the same as causation.  Accordingly, the 
referee concluded that Dr. Malkin did not satisfactorily draw 
the required causal connection between Attorney Meisel's health 
issues and his misconduct.  The referee noted that in In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Sosnay, 209 Wis. 2d 241, 243, 
562 N.W.2d 137 (1997), this court said that absent a causal 
connection between an attorney's medical condition and the 
attorney's professional misconduct, the medical condition may 
No. 
2015AP463-D   
 
17 
 
not be considered a factor mitigating either the seriousness of 
the misconduct or the severity of the discipline to be imposed 
for it. 
¶25 The referee also noted that even when an attorney has 
been able to establish a direct causal connection between a 
medical condition and professional misconduct, the fact that the 
attorney was apparently able to serve other clients free of 
misconduct, as the record shows Attorney Meisel was able to do, 
was significant in determining the sanction and the mitigating 
effects 
of 
medical 
conditions. 
 
See 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Jacobson, 2004 WI 152, ¶79, 277 Wis. 2d 120, 
690 N.W.2d 264; In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Karlsson, 
2001 WI 126, ¶48, 248 Wis. 2d 681, 635 N.W.2d 771. 
¶26 Due to the lack of a causal connection between the 
medical condition and the misconduct, the referee found that 
Attorney Meisel failed to present persuasive arguments that 
would support a five-month suspension.  The referee concluded 
that a two-year suspension of Attorney Meisel's license to 
practice law was an appropriate sanction.  In support of this 
recommendation, the referee cited In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Edgar, 230 Wis. 2d 205, 601 N.W.2d 284 (1999); In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Edgar (Edgar II), 2003 WI 49, 
261 Wis. 2d 413, 661 N.W.2d 817; In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Brown, 2012 WI 51, 340 Wis. 2d 527, 814 N.W.2d 172; and 
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Carter, 2014 WI 126, 359 
Wis. 2d 70, 856 N.W.2d 595.   
No. 
2015AP463-D   
 
18 
 
¶27 The referee noted that the law licenses of Brown and 
Edgar were suspended for two years, and Carter's license was 
suspended for three years.  All three cases involved conversion 
of funds and comingling of trust and personal funds to pay 
personal expenses.  The amounts of the conversions in those 
cases were significantly less than at issue here, with the Edgar 
case involving about $11,000, Brown $13,000, and Carter $75,000.  
The referee noted that as in Carter, Attorney Meisel entered 
into a stipulation to resolve the matter.  She also noted that 
Attorney Meisel has made restitution and returned the converted 
funds.   
¶28 In addition to concluding that a two-year suspension, 
was appropriate, the referee also recommended the imposition of 
the following conditions upon Attorney Meisel: 
(1) demonstration that he has his medical conditions 
and stress and any other emotional or psychological 
problems 
under 
control, 
by 
his 
submission 
of 
documentation 
of 
fitness 
pursuant 
to 
a 
medical 
examination by a health provider approved by the OLR, 
at his own expense; 
(2) that he remain in treatment as recommended by his 
treating physician and obtain evaluations and neuro-
oncologist monitoring pursuant to the written medical 
report included in the record as Exhibit 117 and via 
trial testimony, and that his medical treatment be 
monitored by the OLR via submission of quarterly 
reports for a period of two years following his 
reinstatement; 
(3) that his practice of law be monitored by an 
attorney approved by OLR for a period of two years 
following reinstatement, unless he is either employed 
by a law firm, corporate office or practicing with 
another attorney aware of his disciplinary and medical 
history;  
No. 
2015AP463-D   
 
19 
 
(4) that he obtain six Continuing Legal Education 
credits in trust account and/or law office management, 
and six Continuing Legal Education credits in business 
and professional conflict of interest, to be approved 
by OLR and monitored by OLR for compliance. 
 
¶29 Attorney Meisel's appeal raises three issues: 
1. Did Attorney Meisel present clear, convincing, and 
satisfactory evidence of a causal connection between 
Attorney 
Meisel’s 
medical 
condition 
and 
his 
misconduct? 
2. Did the aggravating factors of Attorney Meisel’s 
conduct 
weigh 
more 
heavily 
than 
the 
mitigating 
factors? 
3. Is a two-year suspension disproportionate for the 
alleged offenses? 
 
¶30 Attorney Meisel argues that his testimony at the 
evidentiary hearing, combined with the testimony of Dr. Malkin, 
presented clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence that 
Attorney Meisel's medical condition caused him to engage in the 
misconduct.  He argues that the referee erroneously found 
otherwise. 
¶31 Attorney Meisel further argues that the referee's 
finding that the aggravating factors in this case weigh more 
heavily than the mitigating factors is not supported either by 
the record or by applicable case law.  He asserts there is 
simply no evidence to support any contention that his actions 
were made with a selfish motive.  He asserts that the mitigating 
factors in this case far outweigh any aggravating factors and he 
No. 
2015AP463-D   
 
20 
 
says the contrary conclusion of the referee is based on mere 
speculation. 
¶32 Attorney 
Meisel 
also 
argues 
that 
the 
referee's 
recommendation of a two-year suspension is disproportionate to 
the allegations of misconduct.  Attorney Meisel acknowledges 
that what he did was wrong, but he notes that the actions were 
taken during a very bad time in his life when he was undergoing 
very stressful situations involving his health and his family.  
He says his contrition, his appreciation of the error of his 
ways, and his understanding of what he needs to do to return to 
being a productive member of the bar were evident in his 
testimony at the evidentiary hearing.   
¶33 Attorney Meisel acknowledges that one factor the court 
considers when assessing the appropriate level of discipline to 
impose is the need to deter other attorneys from engaging in 
similar misconduct.  He says not only are the unique medical, 
personal, emotional, and financial circumstances that led to the 
series of terrible, stupid mistakes he made extremely unlikely 
to ever be repeated by any other attorney, the experience which 
he has already gone through will strongly motivate him to avoid 
any such conduct in the future.  He asserts that no other 
attorney is ever going to be placed in the same situation he was 
and in the extremely unlikely event someone was placed in a 
similar 
situation, 
that 
attorney's 
impaired 
judgment 
capabilities would not make it possible to fully take into 
account the circumstances and discipline imposed in this case. 
No. 
2015AP463-D   
 
21 
 
¶34 Attorney Meisel argues that when viewed in its 
entirety, the appropriate sanction for his misconduct would be a 
suspension of no more than five months.  Attorney Meisel notes 
that the difference between a five-month suspension and a six-
month suspension is significant since, pursuant to SCR 22.28, 
suspensions of less then six months permit reinstatement upon 
application and execution of documents indicating compliance 
with 
the 
requirements 
of 
the 
suspension. 
 
By 
contrast, 
suspensions of six months or more require the attorney to file a 
petition for reinstatement and go through a full reinstatement 
proceeding, which can add as much as one to two years on to the 
suspension.   
¶35 Attorney Meisel argues that the decision in Jacobson 
should guide this court in its analysis of the case.  Attorney 
Jacobson received a five-month suspension for multiple counts of 
misconduct, which included failure to communicate with clients 
and keep them informed; trust account discrepancies; misuse of 
client funds; and misrepresentation to and failure to cooperate 
with the OLR.  The referee in that case found that Attorney 
Jacobson's ongoing depression was the cause of the misconduct 
that led to the disciplinary proceedings.  A psychiatrist 
testified at Attorney Jacobson's evidentiary hearing that, to a 
reasonable degree of medical probability, there was a direct 
relationship between Attorney Jacobson's depression and his 
misconduct. 
¶36 The OLR argues that Attorney Meisel's egregious 
misconduct involving conversions in excess of $175,000 over a 
No. 
2015AP463-D   
 
22 
 
three-year period warrants a two-year suspension of his license 
to practice law.  According to the OLR, Attorney Meisel's 
misconduct more closely approaches the standards for revocation, 
and it says the minimally appropriate discipline in this case 
should be a very lengthy suspension. 
¶37 As 
to 
Attorney 
Meisel's 
claim 
that 
Dr. 
Malkin 
established a causal connection between Attorney Meisel's health 
issues and his misconduct, the OLR says that Dr. Malkin wrote in 
his expert report and said in testimony at the evidentiary 
hearing initially consistent with the report, that Attorney 
Meisel's health condition may have predisposed Attorney Meisel 
to less acute judgment and executive function.  The OLR says 
Dr. Malkin then dramatically detoured from his report in his 
hearing testimony and opined that the medical issues actually 
caused Attorney Meisel's three year pattern of misconduct.  The 
OLR says in attempting to justify that opinion on cross-
examination, Dr. Malkin apparently recognized the dearth of any 
medical basis to support it and promptly retreated to his theory 
of predisposition, not causation. 
¶38 The OLR notes that in her findings of fact, the 
referee found that Dr. Malkin clarified on cross-examination 
that his ultimate opinion was that Attorney Meisel was merely 
predisposed to bad decision making and the doctor did not 
provide testimony of a causal relationship between the medical 
condition and the conversions.  The OLR asserts the referee's 
findings of fact are supported by Dr. Malkin's own testimony and 
should be upheld by this court.   
No. 
2015AP463-D   
 
23 
 
¶39 The 
OLR 
argues 
that 
Attorney 
Meisel's 
proposed 
discipline of a suspension of less than six months would 
undermine multiple goals of attorney discipline, particularly 
recognition of the seriousness of the misconduct and the need to 
deter other attorneys from engaging in similar misconduct.  The 
OLR says the referee appropriately cited the Edgar, Brown, and 
Carter cases as support for the imposition of a two-year 
suspension of Attorney Meisel's law license.  As to the 
conditions recommended by the referee, the OLR says they all 
relate to appropriate reinstatement concerns and the OLR 
suggests that this court refrain from ordering the conditions as 
part of the disciplinary case and rather allow the particulars 
of appropriate treatment and monitoring to be addressed in the 
context of a future formal reinstatement proceeding. 
¶40 A referee's findings of fact are affirmed unless 
clearly erroneous.  Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.  
See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 2004 WI 
14, ¶5, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747.  The court may impose 
whatever sanction it sees fit, regardless of the referee's 
recommendation.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686.   
¶41 After careful review of the matter, we conclude there 
has been no showing that any of the referee's findings of fact, 
including her finding that Dr. Malkin did not provide testimony 
showing a causal relationship between Attorney Meisel's medical 
condition and the conversions, are clearly erroneous and, 
accordingly, we adopt them.  We further agree with the referee's 
No. 
2015AP463-D   
 
24 
 
conclusions of law that Attorney Meisel violated all of the 
supreme court rules set forth above.   
¶42 Turning to the question of the appropriate sanction, 
the four primary goals of attorney discipline are to address the 
seriousness of the misconduct; to protect the public, courts, 
and the legal system from repetition of misconduct; to impress 
upon the attorney the seriousness of the misconduct; and to 
deter other attorneys from engaging in similar misconduct.  See 
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Arthur, 2005 WI 40, ¶78, 
279 
Wis. 2d 
583, 
694 
N.W.2d 910. 
 
Both 
aggravating 
and 
mitigating 
factors 
may 
be 
taken 
into 
consideration 
in 
determining the appropriate sanction for attorney misconduct.   
¶43 We disagree with Attorney Meisel's claim that there is 
no evidence in the record to support a finding that his actions 
were made with a selfish motive or to gain advantage.  In the 
referee's words:   
Attorney Meisel used converted client funds for his 
own personal benefit, including but not limited to 
sustaining King Park, even though his business partner 
was not pressuring him to maintain payments.  Further, 
Attorney Meisel camouflaged his conversions replacing 
converted funds with those converted from other client 
funds and by mingling personal funds and law firm 
funds.  The timing of the conversions was deliberate 
and, with respect to the guardianships, often very 
close 
to 
accounting 
time 
frames. 
 
The 
actual 
conversions 
further 
demonstrated 
dishonesty 
when 
Attorney Meisel further concealed his misconduct by 
filing falsified annual accountings with the Milwaukee 
County 
Probate 
Court 
that 
intentionally 
omitted 
disclosure of the converted and replenished fund 
transactions.   
No. 
2015AP463-D   
 
25 
 
¶44 We find that the record supports the referee's 
conclusions.  We also agree with the referee that Attorney 
Meisel's repeated conversions and unreported replenishments, 
which occurred over a three-year period, involved four separate 
matters, and totaled more than $175,000, evidenced a pattern of 
misconduct.  We also share the referee's concern that Attorney 
Meisel converted funds from vulnerable victims.  All of these 
are aggravating factors.   
¶45 We agree that this case also presents a number of 
mitigating factors.  Specifically, we agree with Attorney Meisel 
that his medical condition and other personal and financial 
issues do constitute mitigating factors.  We view Dr. Malkin's 
characterization of the multiple stressors facing Attorney 
Meisel as being a "perfect storm" as being an apt description of 
the situation in which Attorney Meisel found himself. 
¶46 Although we agree with the referee that Attorney 
Meisel failed to prove that his medical condition caused his 
professional misconduct, the referee and the OLR acknowledge 
that Dr. Malkin opined that the medical condition may have pre-
disposed Attorney Meisel to less acute judgment. 
¶47 We noted in Sosnay that absent a causal connection 
between an attorney's psychological condition and professional 
misconduct the referee properly declined to consider the 
psychological condition in mitigation either of the seriousness 
of the misconduct or the severity of the discipline warranted.  
In the instant case, however, the OLR concedes that Attorney 
No. 
2015AP463-D   
 
26 
 
Meisel's serious medical condition should be considered a 
mitigating factor.  In its appellate brief, the OLR said: 
Despite the absence of the required causal connection 
between 
Meisel's 
medical 
condition 
and 
his 
misconduct . . . OLR does not contest that Meisel's 
health issues contributed to increased stress on his 
everyday life. 
¶48  In addition, although the referee found the record 
did not support placing "much weight" on Attorney Meisel's 
medical issues, she did agree that, "[t]he confluence of 
personal 
and 
medical 
matters . . . were 
substantial, 
life-
changing" and the long term effects of Attorney Meisel's medical 
condition were "balanced sympathetically" in his favor. 
¶49 We agree with the OLR and the referee that the unique 
medical and personal issues facing Attorney Meisel should be 
considered mitigating factors.  We also agree with the OLR and 
the referee that absent those medical and personal issues a very 
lengthy suspension, or perhaps even revocation, would be under 
consideration.  Although no two disciplinary proceedings are 
ever identical, this court does, to the extent possible, 
endeavor to impose a similar level of discipline in fact 
situations that are somewhat analogous.  In support of his 
argument that a two-year suspension is excessive, Attorney 
Meisel notes that in In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
MacLean, 2016 WI 45, 369 Wis. 2d 59, 879 N.W.2d 767, an attorney 
who intentionally misappropriated over $450,000 received a two-
year suspension.  Although we find that the clients in this case 
were more vulnerable than the client in MacLean, the amount of 
No. 
2015AP463-D   
 
27 
 
the conversions in this case is less than half of the amount 
converted in MacLean.  After careful consideration of the 
aggravating and mitigating factors present in this case, we deem 
it appropriate to impose a lesser suspension in this case than 
was imposed in MacLean and find it appropriate to impose an 18-
month suspension of Attorney Meisel's license to practice law in 
Wisconsin.   
¶50 We agree with the OLR that it would be premature to 
develop conditions for Attorney Meisel's reinstatement at this 
juncture.  We find that the issue of conditions would be best 
addressed in the context of a future reinstatement proceeding.  
Since Attorney Meisel has already made full restitution of all 
converted funds, no restitution award is sought.  As is our 
general practice, we agree that Attorney Meisel should be 
required to pay the full costs of this disciplinary proceeding.  
¶51 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Christopher E. 
Meisel to practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of 
18 months, effective June 7, 2017. 
¶52 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Christopher E. Meisel shall 
comply with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of 
a person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been 
suspended.   
¶53 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Christopher E. Meisel pay to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation the costs of this proceeding, which are $10,831.67.  
If the costs are not paid within the time specified, and absent 
a showing to this court of his inability to pay the costs within 
No. 
2015AP463-D   
 
28 
 
that time, the license of Christopher E. Meisel to practice law 
in Wisconsin, shall remain suspended until further order of the 
court.  
¶54 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all 
conditions of this order is required for reinstatement.  See 
SCR 22.29(4)(c). 
 
 
No.  2015AP463-D.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶55 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (dissenting).  Attorney 
Meisel has had more than his share of medical problems and has 
obviously suffered immensely.  I could go along with the 
referee's recommendation of a two-year suspension.  The referee 
already considered mitigating factors.  In In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Sosnay, 209 Wis. 2d 241, 562 N.W.2d 137 
(1997), this court said that absent a causal connection between 
an attorney's medical condition and the attorney's professional 
misconduct, the medical condition may not be considered a factor 
mitigating either the seriousness of the misconduct or the 
severity of the discipline to be imposed for it.  The per curiam 
opinion undermines Sosnay.  I am unwilling to do that.  What is 
left of Sosnay?  Lawyers, the OLR, and referees ought to know 
what factors are mitigating factors. 
No.  2015AP463-D.ssa 
 
 
 
1