Title: Huddleston v. State
Citation: 295 N.E.2d 812
Docket Number: 1268S211
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: May 18, 1973

295 N.E.2d 812 (1973)
Marvin Wayne HUDDLESTON, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
No. 1268S211.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
May 18, 1973.
*813 Harrietee Bailey Conn, Public Defender, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., A. Frank Gleaves, III, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.
GIVAN, Justice.
Appellant was indicted for the first degree murder of his wife, Betty Jean Huddleston. Appellant entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. Jury trial resulted in a verdict of guilty as charged. Appellant was sentenced to the Indiana State Prison during life.
It is unnecessary for the purposes of this opinion to go into the details surrounding the appellant's killing of his wife.
Appellant claims the trial court erred in giving its Final Instruction No. 13 to the jury, which reads as follows:
Subsequent to the filing of this appeal, this Court held that a similar instruction dealing with temporary insanity was reversible error. Dipert v. State (1972), Ind., 286 N.E.2d 405, 32 Ind.Dec. 382. In so doing this Court overruled Baker v. State (1921), 190 Ind. 385, 129 N.E. 468, and adopted the reasoning of Aszman v. State (1890), 123 Ind. 347, 24 N.E. 123 wherein the Court made the following statement:
We, therefore, hold it was reversible error for the trial court to give the above quoted instruction.
Because this case must be retried and because the same question probably will again arise, we also pass on appellant's contention that the trial court erred in allowing a lay witness for the State to testify as to his opinion of appellant's sanity. Appellant acknowledges that a lay witness may state an opinion as to sanity if sufficient facts are stated. Cockrum v. State (1968), 250 Ind. 366, 234 N.E.2d 479, 13 Ind.Dec. 288. He argues, however, that no factual basis had been stated. An examination of the record, however, reveals that the witness Delvie Masterson testified that he was safety superintendent for the Wanatah Trucking Company, Inc.; that he had interviewed the appellant when he made application for employment; that appellant was employed by the trucking company and worked under Masterson where he was observed over a period of time on a day to day basis.
We hold that there was sufficient factual basis to warrant the trial court's ruling allowing Masterson to testify as to appellant's sanity.
We, therefore, hold the trial court did not err in allowing the testimony of Masterson. We do, however, reverse because of error in giving to the jury Instruction No. 13.
The cause is reversed and re-trial ordered.
ARTERBURN, C.J., and DeBRULER, HUNTER and PRENTICE, JJ., concur.