Title: STATE v FINLEY
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 12652
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: April 18, 1974

No. 12652 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1974 THE STATE OF M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, RICHARD JAMES FINLEY, Defendant, and INLAND BONDING C O M P A N Y , Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Fourth Judicial D i s t r i c t , Honorable Jack Green, Judge presiding . Counsel of Record : For Appellant : Donald R. Matthews argued, Missoula, Montana For Respondent : Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Thomas J. Beers, Assistant Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana Richard P. Heinz argued, Polson, Montana Submitted: March 22, 1974 Decided : 1 8 1974 Filed : APR 1 8 1974 M r . J u s t i c e Frank I. H a s w e l l delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This is an appeal by a bonding company from an order of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of Lake County, refusing t o vacate a b a i l bond f o r f e i t u r e . Richard Finley, defendant i n t h i s a c t i o n , plead g u i l t y t o a charge of f i r s t degree a s s a u l t . H e w a s released when h i s surety, Inland Bonding Company, posted t h e i r $2,500 b a i l bond. He was ordered t o appear i n court on March 1 4 , 1973, f o r sentencing. O n March 1 4 , 1973, defendant d i d not appear f o r sentencing and t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ordered t h e b a i l bond f o r f e i t e d . Subse- quently, defendant was a r r e s t e d on a bench warrant J u l y 25, 1973, taken t o Polson, Montana, sentenced, and is now i n t h e S t a t e Prison. O n August 1 4 , 1973, t h e bonding company f i l e d a motion t o vacate t h e order of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r f e i t i n g b a i l . The motion w a s denied. From t h i s d e n i a l , t h i s appeal is brought. Two i s s u e s a r e presented f o r review: (1) Does t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t l o s e j u r i s d i c t i o n over b a i l bonds t h i r t y days a f t e r f o r f e i t u r e ? ( 2 ) Did t h e d i s t r i c t court abuse i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n deny- i n g t h e bonding company's motion t o vacate t h e p r i o r f o r f e i t u r e order? The questions presented f o r review a r e e s s e n t i a l l y ques- t i o n s of s t a t u t o r y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . The applicable s e c t i o n of t h e Montana Criminal Procedure Act is s e c t i o n 95-1116, R.C.M. 1947. That s e c t i o n provides f o r t h e conditions of b a i l and f o r f e i t u r e when t h e conditions a r e not performed as follows: " ( a ) When t h e conditions of b a i l have been performed and t h e accused has been discharged from h i s o b l i - gations i n t h e cause, t h e c o u r t s h a l l r e t u r n t o him o r h i s s u r e t i e s t h e d e p o s i t of any cash, stocks o r bonds. I f t h e b a i l is real e s t a t e , t h e c o u r t s h a l l n o t i f y , i n writing, t h e county c l e r k and recorder and t h e l i e n of t h e b a i l bond on t h e r e a l e s t a t e s h a l l be discharged. I f t h e b a i l is a w r i t t e n undertaking o r a commercial s u r e t y bond, it s h a l l be discharged and t h e s u r e t i e s exonerated. " ( b ) I f t h e accused does not comply with t h e con- d i t i o n s of t h e b a i l bond, t h e c o u r t having j u r i s - d i c t i o n s h a l l e n t e r an order declaring t h e b a i l t o be f o r f e i t e d . " I f such f o r f e i t u r e i s declared by a d i s t r i c t c o u r t , n o t i c e of such order of f o r f e i t u r e s h a l l be mailed forthwith by the c l e r k of t h e court t o t h e accused and h i s s u r e t i e s a t t h e i r l a s t known address. " (c) I f a t any t i m e within t h i r t y (30) days a f t e r t h e f o r f e i t u r e t h e defendant o r h i s b a i l appear and s a t i s f a c t o r i l y excuse h i s negligence o r f a i l - u r e t o comply with t h e conditions of t h e b a i l , t h e court, i n its d i s c r e t i o n , may d i r e c t t h e for- f e i t u r e of t h e b a i l t o be discharged upon such t e r m s a s may be j u s t . " I f such f o r f e i t u r e is declared by a d i s t r i c t c o u r t and i f t h e f o r f e i t u r e is not discharqed a s provided i n t h i s s e c t i o n , t h e c o u r t s h a l l e n t e r judqment f o r t h e s t a t e a q a i n s t t h e accused and h i s s u r e t i e s f o r t h e amount of t h e b a i l and c o s t s of t h e proceedinqs." (Emphasis added.) It is a general r u l e of s t a t u t o r y construction t h a t t h e function of t h e c o u r t is t o i n t e r p r e t t h e i n t e n t i o n of t h e l e g i s - l a t u r e , i f a t a l l possible, from t h e p l a i n meaning of t h e words used; t h e c o u r t is not a t l i b e r t y t o add o r d e t r a c t language from t h e s t a t u t e i n question. Sections 93-401-15, 93-401-16, R.C.M. 1947; Nice v. S t a t e Board of Equalization, 161 Mont. 448, 507 P.2d 527, 30 St.Rep. 284. The language of s e c t i o n 95-1116, R.C.M. 1947, c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e defendant o r h i s b a i l (surety) must appear within t h i r t y (30)days a f t e r f o r f e i t u r e and s a t i s f a c t o r i l y excuse h i s negligence o r f a i l u r e t o comply with t h e conditions of t h e b a i l i n order t o be granted a discharge of f o r f e i t u r e . If so done within t h i r t y days, t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , i n its d i s c r e t i o n , "may" d i r e c t t h e f o r f e i t u r e of t h e b a i l t o be discharged. The s t a t u t e is equally c l e a r , however, by t h e use of t h e word " s h a l l " i n t h e l a s t sentence of t h e s e c t i o n , t o r e q u i r e t h e court t o e n t e r judg- ment f o r t h e s t a t e a g a i n s t t h e accused and h i s s u r e t i e s f o r t h e amount of t h e b a i l and c o s t s of t h e proceedings i f t h e for- f e i t u r e is not discharged within t h e t h i r t y day l i m i t . O n March 1 4 , 1973, t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ordered t h e bond f o r f e i t e d when defendant d i d not appear. Four and one-half months l a t e r defendant appeared i n c o u r t under a bench warrant f o r h i s a r r e s t . O n August 1 4 , 1973, t h e bonding company f i l e d a motion t o vacate t h e previous order f o r f e i t i n g b a i l on t h e de- fendant--four months too l a t e . The a u t h o r i t y of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t t o discharge t h e f o r f e i t u r e of b a i l ceases upon expiration of t h e t h i r t y day s t a t - utory l i m i t a t i o n period. I f t h e r e i s a s a t i s f a c t o r y excuse f o r t h e absence of t h e defendant, t h i r t y days is s u f f i c i e n t time f o r t h e s u r e t y t o discover t h e excuse. A longer period would only prolong t h e cause and unduly burden t h e c o u r t . It i s c l e a r from t h e p l a i n meaning of t h e words used t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e intended t h a t a defendant be foreclosed from r a i s i n g an excuse a f t e r t h e t h i r t y day s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s has expired. Since the d i s t r i c t c o u r t had no j u r i s d i c t i o n t o vacate t h e order of f o r f e i t u r e a f t e r t h e t h i r t y days, t h e second i s s u e becomes i r r e l e v a n t . For these reasons, t h e order of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i s affirmed. J u s t i c e W e concur: