Title: State v. Jene R. Bodoh
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1997AP000495-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 18, 1999

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-0495-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Jene R. Bodoh,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  220 Wis. 2d 102, 582 N.W.2d 440 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1998-Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 18, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
April 13, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Calumet 
 
JUDGE: 
Donald A. Poppy 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs by Michael D. Mandelman and Michael D. Mandelman, S.C., 
Milwaukee and oral argument by Michael Mandelman. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by Gregory M. Posner-Weber, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
No. 
97-0495-CR 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 97-0495-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Jene R. Bodoh,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
FILED 
 
JUN 18, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   The defendant, Jene R. Bodoh 
(Bodoh), was tried and convicted of injury by negligent handling 
of dangerous weapon in violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.24 as a 
result of his two Rottweiler dogs attacking a fourteen-year-old 
boy who was riding his bicycle.  Bodoh requests that this court 
reverse the decision of the court of appeals which upheld his 
conviction.  Bodoh asserts: 1) his dogs are not “dangerous 
weapons” as that phrase is used in the statute; 2) he was not 
“handling” or “operating” his dogs at the time of the attack as 
those words are used in the statute; and 3) he was not 
“criminally negligent” in the handling of his dogs as that 
phrase is used in the statute.  We conclude that a dog can be a 
dangerous weapon if used or intended to be used in a manner 
calculated or likely to cause death or great bodily harm, and 
that Bodoh “handled” his dogs in that he was responsible for 
No. 
97-0495-CR 
 
2 
supervising, directing and controlling them.  Also, we conclude 
there was sufficient and credible evidence to support the jury’s 
verdict finding Bodoh guilty of causing injury by negligent 
handling of a dangerous weapon.  Therefore, we affirm the court 
of appeals.  Bodoh also asserts, for the first time in his 
briefs to this court, that he was subject to selective 
prosecution.  We decline to consider this issue not raised in 
Bodoh’s petition for review.   
¶2 
The facts presented by this case are the following.  
On June 10, 1995, two Rottweiler dogs chased fourteen-year-old 
Gregory L. Burns (Burns) who was riding his bicycle.  The two 
dogs pulled Burns from his bicycle and bit him several times, 
causing him injuries requiring over 300 stitches.  The dogs 
continued to bite as he tried to run away.  A neighbor heard his 
screams and called the police. 
¶3 
When 
officers from 
the 
Calumet County 
Sheriff’s 
Department reached the scene, one dog was laying near Burns on 
the sidewalk.  The dog growled as the officers tried to 
approach, and the officers shot and killed it.  The other dog 
was found nearby at an elementary school.  It also growled when 
approached and was shot and killed. 
¶4 
The officers determined that defendant Jene R. Bodoh 
was the owner of the dogs.  Bodoh was charged with causing 
injury by negligent handling of a dangerous weapon, contrary to 
No. 
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3 
Wis. Stat. § 940.24 (1993-94).1  Further facts will be discussed 
within the opinion. 
¶5 
On June 6, 1996, a jury convicted Bodoh of causing 
injury by negligent handling of a dangerous weapon.  The Calumet 
County Circuit Court, the Honorable Donald A. Poppy presiding, 
denied Bodoh’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
 The court withheld sentence and placed the defendant on five 
years probation and imposed restitution.  The circuit court also 
ordered, as conditions of probation, that Bodoh serve 30 days in 
the county jail and that he not keep any dogs at his residence 
unless approved by his probation agent.  The circuit court 
granted defendant’s motion to stay his 30-day jail term pending 
appeal.  Other conditions of probation were not stayed.  Bodoh 
appealed his conviction to the court of appeals.   
¶6 
The court of appeals, in a split decision, affirmed 
Bodoh’s conviction.  State v. Bodoh, 220 Wis. 2d 102, 582 N.W.2d 
440 (Ct. App. 1998).  Bodoh petitioned this court for review 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(1), which we granted.  
¶7 
Wisconsin Stat. § 940.24 provides that a person is 
guilty of an offense under the statute if the person causes 
bodily harm to another by negligently operating or handling a 
                     
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1993-
94 version unless otherwise indicated.   
Wisconsin Stat. § 940.24 provides: “940.24  Injury by 
negligent handling of dangerous weapon, explosives or fire.  
Whoever causes bodily harm to another by the negligent operation 
or handling of a dangerous weapon, explosives or fire is guilty 
of a Class E felony.”  
No. 
97-0495-CR 
 
4 
dangerous weapon.  The State of Wisconsin (State) must prove 
three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1) that the defendant 
operated or handled a dangerous weapon; 2) that the defendant 
operated or handled the dangerous weapon in a manner that is 
criminally negligent; and 3) that the criminal negligence caused 
bodily harm to the victim.  Wis JICriminal 1260 (1989).   
¶8 
Bodoh asserts: 1) his dogs are not “dangerous weapons” 
as that phrase is used in the statute; 2) he was not “handling” 
or “operating” his dogs at the time of the attack as those words 
are used in the statute; and 3) he was not “criminally 
negligent” in the handling of the dogs as those words are used 
in the statute.  We will address each argument in turn. 
¶9 
To address Bodoh’s arguments, we must interpret Wis. 
Stat. § 940.24.  Statutory interpretation and applying a statute 
to a set of facts are both questions of law which this court 
reviews de novo.  State ex rel. Reimann v. Circuit Court for 
Dane Cty., 214 Wis. 2d 605, 613, 571 N.W.2d 385 (1997); Martin 
v. Richards, 192 Wis. 2d 156, 194, 531 N.W.2d 70 (1995).  Our 
goal with statutory interpretation is to discern the intent of 
the legislature.  Reimann, 214 Wis. 2d at 613.  We rely foremost 
on the plain language of the statute.  Id.  If the plain 
language is ambiguous, we turn to the legislative history, 
context, scope and object of the statute.  Id. at 614.  
¶10 The definition of “dangerous weapon” is: “any other 
device or instrumentality which, in the manner it is used or 
intended to be used, is calculated or likely to produce death or 
great bodily harm.”  Wis. Stat. § 939.22(10) (reprinted in full 
No. 
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5 
below).2  This definition provides a broad category that can 
extend to virtually anything that can cause death or great 
bodily harm3 if used or intended to be used in such a manner.  
Wis JICriminal 910 n.7 (1997).   
¶11 A dog can constitute a “dangerous weapon” under Wis. 
Stat. § 939.22(10).  State v. Sinks, 168 Wis. 2d 245, 252, 483 
N.W.2d 286 (Ct. App. 1992).  The issue presented in Sinks 
mirrored 
the 
statutory 
definition 
of 
“dangerous 
weapon”: 
“whether a dog is an instrumentality that, in the manner it is 
used or intended to be used, is calculated or likely to produce 
death or great bodily harm.”  Id. at 253; see also § 939.22(10). 
 The Sinks court first determined that an “instrumentality” is a 
term broad enough to include animate, as well as inanimate, 
objects.  Sinks, 168 Wis. 2d at 253.  The court of appeals found 
support in a Michigan appellate court decision which determined 
                     
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.22(10) provides in full: 
(10) “Dangerous weapon” means any firearm, whether 
loaded or unloaded; any device designed as a weapon 
and capable of producing death or great bodily harm; 
any electric weapon, as defined in s. 941.295(4); or 
any other device or instrumentality which, in the 
manner it is used or intended to be used, is 
calculated or likely to produce death or great bodily 
harm. 
  
3 “Great bodily harm” is defined as “bodily injury which 
creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes serious 
permanent 
disfigurement, 
or 
which 
causes 
a 
permanent 
or 
protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily 
member or organ or other serious bodily injury.”  Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.22(14).    
No. 
97-0495-CR 
 
6 
that whether an object was animate or inanimate was not 
determinative, but rather, “it is the manner in which the 
instrumentality is used and the nature of the act that 
determines whether the instrumentality is a dangerous weapon.”  
Id. at 254 (citing People v. Kay, 328 N.W.2d 424, 426 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1982)).   
¶12 Having determined that a dog can be a dangerous 
weapon, the court of appeals went on to consider whether there 
was sufficient evidence to prove that the defendant “used or 
intended to use” the dog in a way so as to cause death or great 
bodily harm.  Sinks, 168 Wis. 2d at 254.  The court of appeals 
determined that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to 
reach this conclusion.  Id. at 255.  The defendant, charged with 
sexual assault, first informed the victim that his Doberman 
Pinscher dog had prevented a burglar from escaping after robbing 
his home.  Id. at 248, 254.  The defendant also commanded the 
dog to “guard” and the dog was present throughout the sexual 
assaults.  Id.  The court of appeals concluded that a reasonable 
jury could “believe that Sinks used or threatened the use of his 
dog in such a manner that the dog constituted a dangerous weapon 
and was likely to produce, at the very least, great bodily harm 
. . . .”  Id. at 255.   
¶13 Further support for the conclusion that a dog can be a 
dangerous weapon is found in the legislative history of Wis. 
Stat. § 940.24.  In 1987, the legislature amended § 940.24 to 
delete the terms “firearm, airgun, knife or bow and arrow” and 
replace the terms with “dangerous weapons, explosives or fire.” 
No. 
97-0495-CR 
 
7 
 1987 Wis. Act 399, § 472zkj.  “The definition of the offense is 
broadened 
to 
include 
highly 
negligent 
handling 
of 
fire, 
explosives and dangerous weapons other than a firearm, airgun, 
knife or bow and arrow.”  Judicial Council Committee Note1987 
S.B. 191, Wis. Stat. Ann. § 940.24 (West 1996).  This definition 
of “dangerous weapon” “creates the potential for greatly 
expanding the scope of the statute.  . . .  Section 940.24 as 
revised may apply to injuries caused by any ‘device used in a 
manner likely to cause death or great bodily harm.’”  Wis 
JICriminal 1260 n.2 (emphasis added).   
¶14 Relying on the statutory definition of “dangerous 
weapon” and Sinks, we agree with the court of appeals that a dog 
can be a dangerous weapon.  A dog is an instrumentality which 
can be used or intended to be used to cause death or great 
bodily harm.  It is the manner in which the dog is used and the 
nature of the act that is determinative of whether the dog is a 
dangerous weapon.  See Sinks, 168 Wis. 2d at 254.   
¶15 We must next determine whether there was sufficient 
evidence presented to the jury to prove that Bodoh used or 
intended to use his two Rottweiler dogs in a manner so as to 
produce death or great bodily harm.  In determining the 
sufficiency of the evidence, we must view the evidence most 
favorably to the State and the conviction, and query whether the 
evidence is so insufficient in force and probative value that no 
reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 
493, 501, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990).   
No. 
97-0495-CR 
 
8 
 
When an appellate court independently reviews the 
evidence presented at trial to determine whether, in 
its view, there are reasonable theories consistent 
with the defendant’s innocence, it replaces the trier 
of fact’s overall evaluation of the evidence with its 
own.  A theory of innocence which appears to be 
reasonable to an appellate court on review of the 
record may have been rejected as unreasonable by the 
trier of fact in view of the evidence and testimony 
presented at trial.  It is the function of the trier 
of fact, and not of an appellate court, to fairly 
resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the 
evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic 
facts to ultimate facts.  See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 
U.S. 307, 319 (1979). 
 
In viewing evidence which could support contrary 
inferences, the trier of fact is free to choose among 
conflicting inferences of the evidence and may, within 
the bounds of reason, reject that inference which is 
consistent with the innocence of the accused.  See 
Peters [v. State], 70 Wis. 2d [22, 34, 233 N.W.2d 420 
(1975)].  Thus, when faced with a record of historical 
facts which supports more than one inference, an 
appellate court must accept and follow the inference 
drawn by the trier of fact unless the evidence on 
which that inference is based is incredible as a 
matter of law.  See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; State v. 
Wilson, 149 Wis. 2d 878, 894, 440 N.W.2d 534 (1989). 
Id. at 506-07. 
¶16 Evidence presented at trial to show that Bodoh used or 
intended to use his Rottweilers in a manner so as to produce 
death or great bodily harm includes the following.  A Calumet 
County Sheriff’s Department Lieutenant testified regarding a 
letter Bodoh had sent to the Department which referred to his 
dogs as “watch dogs.”  We agree with Bodoh that this 
information, is not, by itself, conclusive that Bodoh’s dogs 
were “attack dogs” or intended to produce death or great bodily 
harm.  However, this letter, combined with other evidence 
No. 
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9 
presented at trial is sufficient for a reasonable jury to reach 
this conclusion.  The State’s expert witness, June Ashford, a 
dog trainer with 20 years of experience, testified that if a dog 
is trained improperly or not trained sufficiently, it can attack 
indiscriminately.  She testified that an example of improper or 
insufficient training is rewarding, or at least failing to 
punish, a dog that has engaged in bad behavior such as biting or 
attacking someone.  Bodoh’s own veterinarian testified that once 
a dog has bitten, it has a higher propensity to bite again. 
¶17 Several 
examples 
of 
the 
aggressive 
and 
vicious 
behavior of Bodoh’s dogs, demonstrating improper or insufficient 
training, were presented at trial.  Earlier the same evening 
that Burns was attacked, two Rottweiler dogs chased another boy 
riding a bicycle.  They were growling and biting at him.  
Fourteen months prior to the dogs attacking Burns, they attacked 
and bit another dog, gripping it by its neck.  This same dog was 
again attacked by one of Bodoh’s Rottweilers a few months later. 
 Both 
attacks 
were 
unprovoked. 
 
In 
February 
1995 
these 
Rottweilers chased a teenage boy as he was jogging.  The dogs 
circled him and one bit at his pants leg.  Additionally, several 
people testified that Bodoh’s dogs acted in an aggressive manner 
if they walked by where the dogs were fenced in. 
¶18 Other than structural modifications to the fence 
(which will be discussed in detail later), there was no evidence 
presented to show that Bodoh did anything to correct the 
aggressive behavior of his dogs.  In fact, one of Bodoh’s 
neighbors, also a dog trainer, testified that she once saw Bodoh 
No. 
97-0495-CR 
 
10
beating one of his dogs.  She confronted him about it.  She 
testified that he was receptive to her criticism, and she did 
not see him repeat that behavior.  
¶19 The jury convicted Bodoh of violating Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.24.  By so doing, the jury had to have found that Bodoh 
used or intended to use his dogs in a manner to cause death or 
great bodily harm.  We determine that, given the evidence, this 
is a reasonable inference for the jury to draw.   
¶20 We now turn to Bodoh’s second argument: that he was 
not “handling” or “operating” his dogs at the time of the attack 
as those words are used in the statute.  To satisfy the first 
element of Wis. Stat. § 940.24, we must also determine if Bodoh 
“operated” or “handled” the dogs as those words are used in the 
statute.  Bodoh relies on dictionary definitions and other 
sections of the criminal code to argue that a temporal or 
physical proximity is necessary to “operate” or “handle” a 
dangerous weapon.  Because he was in Chicago at the time the 
dogs attacked the young boy, Bodoh argues that he could not have 
operated or handled his dogs.  He also distinguishes Sinks 
because the defendant was physically present and personally 
ordered his dog to “guard” during the assault.  Here, Bodoh was 
not present to give any commands to his dogs.   
¶21 We agree with the court of appeals’ analysis.  First, 
the terms “operation” and “handling” are used in the statute in 
the disjunctive: a person may be guilty under Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.24 “by the negligent operation or handling of a dangerous 
weapon . . . .”  § 940.24 (emphasis added).  In other words, a 
No. 
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11
defendant may be guilty under the statute, assuming all the 
statutory elements of the crime are met, for either operating a 
dangerous weapon or for handling a dangerous weapon.   
¶22 Like the court of appeals, we turn to the dictionary 
because neither “operation” nor “handling,” as used in Wis. 
Stat. § 940.24, are defined in the statute.  Dictionary 
definitions may be consulted to establish the common and 
approved usage of words used in a statute.  State v. Sample, 215 
Wis. 2d 487, 499, 573 N.W.2d 187 (1998) (citing Wis. Stat. 
§ 990.01(1); Swatek v. County of Dane, 192 Wis. 2d 47, 61, 531 
N.W.2d 45 (1995)).  The relevant definitions of “operate” 
include: “ intr. 1. To perform a function; work . . . 3.a. To 
exert an influence: forces operating on the economy.  b. To 
produce a desired or proper effect: a drug that operates 
quickly.  . . .   tr. 1. To control the functioning of; run: 
operate a sewing machine.  . . . .”  The American Heritage 
Dictionary of the English Language at 1268 (3d ed. 1992).  We 
agree with the court of appeals that given this dictionary 
definition, a person would normally have to be physically 
present to “operate” a dangerous weapon.  See Bodoh, 220 Wis. 2d 
at 108.  A person would have to be present to perform a function 
with a dog or to control the functioning of a dog.  
¶23 However, the same cannot be said for “handling” a 
dangerous weapon.  Although the dictionary definition of 
“handle” includes “[t]o operate with the hands; manipulate,” the 
dictionary also defines “handle” as “[t]o deal with or have 
responsibility for; conduct.”  The American Heritage Dictionary 
No. 
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of the English Language at 819.  A person need not be physically 
present to “handle” a dog as that term is used in the statute.  
Although Bodoh was not physically present when the dogs attacked 
and bit the young boy, we conclude that he did “handle” the dogs 
as that term is used in the statutes.  There was ample testimony 
that Bodoh was responsible for supervising, directing, and 
controlling his dogs.  We conclude that there is sufficient and 
credible evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that Bodoh 
“handled” a dangerous weapon.  
¶24 Like the court of appeals, we caution that not all 
dogs are dangerous weapons. 
 
The statute requires that a person use or intend to 
use an object, animate or inanimate, as a dangerous 
weapon.  Once that intent is expressed, there is a 
duty to operate or handle that dangerous weapon so as 
to avoid criminal liability.  But a dog does not 
become a dangerous weapon unless the owner intends the 
dog to be used as such. 
Bodoh, 220 Wis. 2d at 113.  In other words, not all dog owners 
whose dogs bite another person can be subject to prosecution 
under Wis. Stat. § 940.24.  It is only when there is sufficient 
evidence that the defendant intended to use his or her dog as a 
dangerous weapon that a person can be liable under § 940.24. 
¶25 We now turn to Bodoh’s third argument: he was not 
“criminally negligent” in the handling of his dogs as that 
phrase is used in the statute.  Criminal negligence is defined 
as “ordinary negligence to a high degree, consisting of conduct 
which the actor should realize creates a substantial and 
No. 
97-0495-CR 
 
13
unreasonable risk of death or great bodily harm to another.”  
Wis. Stat. § 939.25(1).   
¶26 To understand “criminal negligence” we must first 
define ordinary negligence.  
 
A person is negligent when he fails to exercise 
ordinary care.  Ordinary care is the degree of care 
which the great mass of mankind ordinarily exercises 
under the same or similar circumstances.  A person 
fails 
to 
exercise 
ordinary 
care 
when, 
without 
intending to do any harm, he does an act or omits a 
precaution under circumstances in which a person of 
ordinary intelligence and prudence ought reasonably to 
foresee that such act or omission will subject the 
person of another to an unreasonable risk of injury. 
Wis JICriminal 1260 at 1-2 (footnote omitted).  Criminal 
negligence differs from ordinary negligence in that criminal 
negligence requires serious harm, that is, death or great bodily 
injury, rather than just simple harm, and the risk of such harm 
must be unreasonable and substantial.  Id. at 2.  “Criminal 
negligence means the creation of a substantial and unreasonable 
risk of death or great bodily harm to another, of which the 
actor should be aware.”  Judicial Council Committee Note1987 
S.B. 191 to Wis. Stat. § 939.25 (West 1996).   
¶27 In a case challenging Wis. Stat. § 939.25, defining 
criminal negligence, and Wis. Stat. § 940.10, homicide by 
negligent operation of a vehicle, as unconstitutionally vague, 
the court of appeals determined that “the legislature has 
defined [‘]ordinary negligence to a high degree[’ in § 939.25] 
to be conduct that unreasonably and substantially creates a risk 
of death or great bodily harm.”  State v. Barman, 183 Wis. 2d 
No. 
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14
180, 200, 515 N.W.2d 493 (Ct. App. 1994), review denied 520 
N.W.2d 90.  The court of appeals relied on its review of 
legislative 
history 
and 
determined 
that 
the 
statute 
was 
constitutional.  Id. at 199-200.  When § 939.25 was revised to 
its present form, the definition of criminal negligence was 
amended to refer to “‘substantial and unreasonable risk of death 
or great bodily harm’” rather than “‘unreasonable risk and high 
probability of death or great bodily harm.’”  Id. at 200 
(emphasis supplied in Barman).  An article regarding the 
statutory revision suggested that the amendment was not a 
substantive change but enacted to avoid the assumption that 
“high probability” referred to a statistical probability of more 
than 50 percent.  Id. (referring to Walter Dickey et al., The 
Importance of Clarity in the Law of Homicide: The Wisconsin 
Revision, 1989 Wis. L. Rev. 1323, 1374 n.177).   
¶28 Having determined above that a dog can be a dangerous 
weapon and that there was sufficient evidence presented to the 
jury that Bodoh’s Rottweiler dogs were dangerous weapons, and 
that he “handled” them, we must determine whether there is 
sufficient evidence to prove that he handled them in a 
criminally negligent manner.  In other words, we must determine 
if there was sufficient and credible evidence for the jury to 
conclude that Bodoh’s actions or omission of a precaution 
unreasonably and substantially created a risk of death or great 
bodily harm. 
¶29 There was considerable testimony that Bodoh’s dogs 
were frequently loose and running at large in the community.  At 
No. 
97-0495-CR 
 
15
one time Bodoh received a citation for allowing his dogs to run 
at large.  There was also testimony that months before the 
attack on Burns, Bodoh’s dogs had twice attacked another dog and 
once attacked a child who was running by.  There was testimony, 
not contradicted, that none of these attacks were provoked.  The 
State’s expert testified that a Rottweiler, especially one which 
has attacked before, is capable of causing death or great bodily 
harm.  Also, although Bodoh never informed his veterinarian that 
his Rottweilers had this history of attacking, the veterinarian 
testified that if a dog owner informs him of such a dog, he 
suggests that the dog may have a tendency to be a biter and that 
the owner should keep the dog under observation and control. 
¶30 Although Bodoh took steps to contain the dogs, the 
jury had to have determined that he omitted taking adequate 
steps to effectively contain his dogs given their nature and 
history of getting loose and attacking.  There was testimony 
that Bodoh constructed a chain-link fence using metal stakes 
driven into the ground, placed a board around the bottom of the 
fence, and placed electric wire along the bottom of the fence.  
However, there was no evidence that the boards and electric wire 
around the bottom of the fence were in place the night Burns was 
attacked.  There was evidence that the dogs went under the fence 
at one point and that the hole in the fence was there the night 
the dogs attacked Burns.   
¶31 The 
State’s 
expert, 
Ashford, 
testified 
that 
an 
untrained Rottweiler should be contained in a chain-link fence 
with a concrete base.  She also stated that if a dog has a 
No. 
97-0495-CR 
 
16
history of biting, there should be an inner fence with an outer 
fence.  After being shown a picture of Bodoh’s fence where the 
dogs apparently escaped, Ashford testified that it was her 
opinion that the fence was not adequate to contain the dogs.   
¶32 There was also evidence that Bodoh chained the dogs 
with double choke collars, one to a tree and the other to a 
stake of the chain-link fence.  However, Ashford testified that 
such collars were not sufficient to contain a Rottweiler, 
especially an agitated adult. 
¶33 Given the apparent nature of the dogs and their 
history, as well as the size and power of Rottweiler dogs, there 
is sufficient and credible evidence in the record to support the 
jury’s determination that a person of ordinary intelligence and 
prudence 
would 
reasonably 
foresee 
that 
failure 
to 
more 
adequately contain the dogs, especially when out of town, would 
subject other persons to an unreasonable and substantial risk of 
death or great bodily harm. 
¶34 Bodoh relies on other statutes for his argument that 
he was not criminally negligent under Wis. Stat. § 940.24.  
Specifically, he relies on Wis. Stat. § 940.07 (reprinted 
below),4 homicide resulting from negligent control of vicious 
                     
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 940.07 provides: 
940.07 Homicide resulting from negligent control of 
vicious 
animal. 
 
Whoever 
knowing 
the 
vicious 
propensities of any animal intentionally allows it to 
go at large or keeps it without ordinary care, if such 
animal, while so at large or not confined, kills any 
human being who has taken all the precautions which 
No. 
97-0495-CR 
 
17
animal.  Bodoh argues that because there is no counterpart to 
§ 940.07 relating to injury (rather than homicide) resulting 
from negligent control of a vicious animal, the legislature must 
have meant for such action to not be subject to criminal 
liability.  Bodoh also relies on Wis. Stat. § 174.02 (reprinted 
in part below)5 to argue that the legislature intended that there 
be only strict civil liability for injury caused by an animal.  
We disagree.  There is absolutely no legislative history 
regarding § 940.07, or § 174.02 to support Bodoh’s arguments.  
We cannot agree with Bodoh based only on his bare assertions. 
¶35 In sum, we hold that a dog can be a dangerous weapon 
if it is used or intended to be used in a manner calculated or 
likely to cause death or great bodily harm.  We also agree with 
the court of appeals’ interpretation of “handle” and hold that a 
dog owner can “handle” a dog in the manner by which he or she 
                                                                  
the circumstances may permit to avoid such animal, is 
guilty of a Class C felony. 
 
5  Wisconsin Stat. § 174.02 provides in part: 
174.2 Owner’s liability for damage caused by dog; 
penalties; court order to kill a dog.  (1) LIABILITY FOR 
INJURY.  (a) Without notice.  Subject to s. 895.045, the 
owner of a dog is liable for the full amount of 
damages caused by the dog injuring or causing injury 
to a person, domestic animal or property. 
 
(b) After notice.  Subject to s. 895.045, the owner 
of a dog is liable for 2 times the full amount of 
damages caused by the dog injuring or causing injury 
to a person, domestic animal or property if the owner 
was notified or knew that the dog previously injured 
or caused injury to a person, domestic animal or 
property. 
(c)  
No. 
97-0495-CR 
 
18
supervises, directs, and controls the dog.  Our review of the 
record convinces us that there is sufficient and credible 
evidence to support the jury’s verdict finding the defendant 
guilty of causing injury by negligent handling of a dangerous 
weapon.  
¶36 Bodoh raises one further objection: whether charging 
him with violating Wis. Stat. § 940.24 subjected him to 
selective prosecution in violation of his constitutional right 
to equal protection.  Bodoh argues that he was the victim of 
selective prosecution because this is the first time this 
statute 
has 
been 
used 
to 
charge 
someone 
under 
these 
circumstances. 
¶37 We decline to address this issue.  Bodoh did not raise 
this issue in his petition for review.  When this court grants a 
petition for review, “the petitioner cannot raise or argue 
issues not set forth in the petition unless ordered otherwise by 
the supreme court.”  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(6).  This court 
did not order Bodoh to address any issues not raised in his 
petition.  His petition was granted only on the issues he raised 
which have been addressed above.  
¶38  “It is the often-repeated rule in this State that 
issues not raised or considered in the trial court will not be 
considered for the first time on appeal.”  Wirth v. Ehly, 93 
Wis. 2d 433, 443, 287 N.W.2d 140 (1980) (citations omitted).  An 
exception to this rule is usually made only when the new issue 
raised is a question of law, the parties have thoroughly briefed 
No. 
97-0495-CR 
 
19
the issue, and there are no disputed issues of fact regarding 
the new issue.  Id. at 444.   
¶39 Because Bodoh failed to raise the issue of selective 
prosecution in his petition for review, we decline to address 
Bodoh’s argument that he was subject to selective prosecution in 
violation of his constitutional right to equal protection. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
  
 
 
 
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