Title: State v. Chandler
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 108625
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: April 6, 2018

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 108,625 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
DANA L. CHANDLER, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
When reversal is appropriate in a criminal case, an appellate court must also 
address a defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence because another trial on 
the same charges would violate the right to be free from double jeopardy if the evidence 
in the first trial could not support a conviction. 
 
2. 
When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, 
the standard of review is whether the appellate court is convinced a rational factfinder 
could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt after reviewing all the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution. The appellate court does not 
reweigh evidence, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or reassess witness credibility when 
reviewing the evidence's sufficiency. 
 
3. 
The State must prove each element of a criminal offense. Circumstantial evidence 
and the logical inferences properly drawn from that evidence can be sufficient to support 
a conviction even for the most serious crime. 
2 
 
 
 
4. 
Presumptions and inferences may be drawn from established facts, but 
presumption may not rest on presumption or inference on inference. This rule means an 
inference cannot be based on evidence that is too uncertain or speculative or that raises 
merely a conjecture or possibility. 
 
5. 
Appellate courts employ a two-step analysis when evaluating claims of reversible 
prosecutorial error. These two steps are simply described as error and prejudice.  
 
6. 
To determine prosecutorial error, an appellate court decides whether the act 
complained of falls outside the wide latitude afforded to prosecutors to conduct the 
State's case in a way that does not offend the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial. 
If it finds error, the appellate court determines if that error prejudiced the defendant's 
right to a fair trial. 
 
7. 
In evaluating the prejudice step for reversible prosecutorial error, an appellate 
court applies the traditional constitutional harmlessness inquiry from Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967). Prosecutorial error 
during a trial is harmless if the State shows beyond a reasonable doubt the error did not 
affect the trial's outcome in light of the entire record, i.e., there is no reasonable 
possibility the error contributed to the verdict. 
 
8. 
Every prosecutorial error will be fact specific, and any judicial review for 
prejudice must allow the parties the greatest possible leeway to argue the particulars of 
each case. An appellate court considers all alleged indicators of prejudice, as argued by 
3 
 
 
 
the parties, and then determines if the State has met its burden, i.e., shown there is no 
reasonable possibility the error contributed to the trial's outcome. 
 
9. 
When a prosecutor argues facts outside the evidence, the first prong of the 
prosecutorial error test is met.  
 
10. 
It is error for a prosecutor to argue the State's case or some aspect of it has judicial 
approval. 
 
11. 
Prosecutorial acts properly categorized as prosecutorial misconduct are erroneous 
acts done with a level of culpability exceeding mere negligence. 
 
Appeal from Shawnee District Court; NANCY E. PARRISH, judge. Opinion filed April 6, 2018.  
Reversed and remanded. 
 
Nancy Ogle, of Ogle Law Office, L.L.C., of Wichita, argued the cause in the original argument 
and was on the original briefs for appellant; Stacey L. Schlimmer, of Schlimmer Law, LLC, of Overland 
Park, argued the cause on reargument, and Adam D. Stolte, of Stolte Law, LLC, of Overland Park, was 
with her on the supplemental brief for appellant; Dana L. Chandler, appellant, was on the pro se 
supplemental brief.  
 
Jacqueline Spradling, chief deputy district attorney, argued the cause in the original argument, 
and Jodi Litfin, assistant district attorney, Chadwick J. Taylor, former district attorney, and Derek 
Schmidt, attorney general, were with her on the original brief for appellee; Jodi Litfin, assistant solicitor 
general, argued the cause on reargument, and Michael F. Kagay, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, 
attorney general, were with her on the supplemental briefs for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
4 
 
 
 
BILES, J.:  In a criminal prosecution, the State's obligation is to ensure its case is 
vigorously, but properly, championed to bring about a just conviction—not merely a win. 
Prosecutors are the State's instrument in fulfilling this duty. When they fail, our system 
fails, and the safeguards protecting the constitutional right to a fair trial strain to the 
breaking point. That is what happened in this case. To its credit, the State belatedly 
concedes one serious prosecutorial error, although there were more. We reverse Dana L. 
Chandler's premediated first-degree murder convictions. We remand this case to the 
district court for further proceedings. 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Mike Sisco and Karen Harkness were found dead in Karen's Topeka home about 2 
p.m. on July 7, 2002. Both were shot at least five times. They were in bed as the shooting 
began. 
 
There was no evidence anything was missing. When the bodies were discovered, 
Karen was wearing jewelry, including a diamond bracelet, a Rolex watch, and a gold 
ring. Mike's wallet was in his shorts. It contained two uncashed checks and $951.83 in 
cash. Karen's purse was on the kitchen counter. It had a billfold and $352.85 in cash. 
Mike's checkbook was on the dining room table. A sliding glass door leading into the 
house from the back was ajar. The gun was never recovered, and no fingerprints were 
found on the empty shell casings. 
 
The pair had been to a casino about 45 minutes from Karen's home until about 
1:30 a.m. on July 7. Several neighbors testified about their observations those early 
morning hours. One said she heard a car idling around 2 a.m. for 15 to 20 minutes. 
Around 3 a.m., she heard a loud pop she thought was a gun shot or car crashing into 
something. Another neighbor got home at 1 a.m. and saw no vehicles near Karen's home. 
5 
 
 
 
At 3 a.m., he heard a car door, saw the taillights of Mike's SUV, and then heard another 
car door. One neighbor testified she noticed Karen's garage door open at 5 a.m., which 
was unusual. 
 
Several family members suspected Chandler, Mike's ex-wife. Mike initiated the 
divorce in 1997 and obtained custody of their children. At the time of the murders, 
Chandler lived in Denver, Colorado. 
 
Topeka Police Department Sergeant Richard Volle called Chandler on July 7 to 
give the death notification. Her failure to ask certain questions, such as where Mike was 
when killed and if anybody else was murdered, struck Volle as suspicious. He obtained 
her phone and financial records. A nine-year investigation ensued. 
 
Timeline, arrest, and trial 
 
 On July 11, 2002, Volle interviewed Chandler at her attorney's office while she 
was in Topeka for Mike's funeral. During that meeting Chandler gave the first 
explanation for her whereabouts on July 6 and 7. A police officer went to Denver on July 
11 and 12 to search her apartment and investigate her alibi. 
 
On July 15, 2002, Chandler was arrested in Topeka on a child support warrant. 
Her black Mitsubishi Eclipse was seized. The car had an Arizona license plate. No 
evidence linking Chandler to the murders was found in the car. 
 
In August 2002, a $30 check forged on Mike's bank account was presented at a 
Kwik Shop. The investigation uncovered that Walt Rogers passed the check, and Terry 
Tignor had given it to Rogers. Both had extensive prior criminal records. At trial, a 
defense theory was that Mike and Karen were killed during a burglary and the police 
6 
 
 
 
failed to investigate similar burglaries in Karen's neighborhood. The check was drawn on 
a different bank account than the ones found in Karen's home. 
 
Volle testified the investigation went cold around the end of 2002, although some 
efforts continued. 
 
In May 2003, Chandler's hair was collected and compared with hair and fiber 
samples from the crime scene. The samples were not hers. Chandler eventually moved to 
Oklahoma. 
 
In July 2011, the Topeka Police Department coordinated a two-week "surveillance 
gathering" in Oklahoma so that a "safe interview could be conducted and at a point after 
that a safe arrest could be made," as it was described by Topeka police detective Douglas 
Searcy. Police searched Chandler's home and her sister's home in Oklahoma. No 
evidence linking Chandler to the crimes was discovered. She was charged with two 
counts of premeditated first-degree murder. See K.S.A. 21-3401(a). 
 
The State recorded Chandler's post-arrest jailhouse phone calls. And on the eve of 
trial, the State sent a limb hair discovered on a shell casing for comparison to known 
samples from Chandler and the victims. The test excluded all three as possible matches 
for the hair. 
 
The trial was held in March 2012. There were 10 days of testimony during which 
the State called over 80 witnesses and had nearly 900 exhibits admitted into evidence. 
Yet despite this testimonial and documentary bulk, the State's case relied on limited 
circumstantial evidence:  (1) Chandler's inconsistent statements concerning her 
whereabouts on July 6 and 7, 2002; (2) her gas purchases on those days; (3) her obsessive 
7 
 
 
 
behavior toward Mike and Karen; and (4) two arguably incriminating post-arrest 
jailhouse phone calls. 
 
The jury convicted her of both premeditated first-degree murders. At the 
sentencing hearing, the district court found Chandler knowingly and purposely killed 
more than one person and that the crimes were committed in a heinous, atrocious, and 
cruel manner. Those findings permitted the court at the time to sentence Chandler to two 
consecutive life sentences, each carrying a mandatory minimum 50-year prison term. See 
K.S.A. 21-4635. 
 
We detail the State's evidence next because its strengths and weaknesses impact 
the outcome. 
 
Inconsistent statements concerning Chandler's whereabouts 
 
Receipts and credit card statements confirm Chandler was in Denver at 2 p.m. on 
July 6. Receipts also confirm she was in Loveland, Colorado, north of Denver, around 5 
p.m. on July 7. She provided at least three explanations about where she was the 27 hours 
in between. 
 
During her July 11, 2002, interview with Volle, Chandler said she left her house 
around 10 a.m., July 7, and drove through the mountains on I-70, travelling west towards 
Dillon, Colorado. She said she hiked near Granby and took Highway 34 to Estes Park. 
The State presented evidence Chandler did not know there was a lake near Dillon visible 
from the road. The State also presented evidence her car was not seen on video taken 
from the guard gates at Rocky Mountain National Park, through which she would have 
had to pass. 
 
8 
 
 
 
In July 2002, Chandler called an acquaintance and asked him for a referral for an 
attorney. During that conversation, she told him she was in Denver all weekend on July 
6-7. 
 
In August 2002, Chandler met in Denver with another acquaintance, Jeff Bailey, 
to ask for money for her defense. She told him she had lied to police about where she was 
because she did not think they would believe her. She gave Bailey a third account, telling 
him she bought gas in Denver and drove to Glenwood Springs, Craig, Steamboat, 
towards Fort Collins, and then back to Denver. He asked if she had seen smoke from 
forest fires he recalled from television reports. Chandler said no. The State presented 
evidence she would have seen smoke along this route. 
 
The State produced evidence Chandler planned as recently as July 2 to come to 
Topeka on July 6 to pick up her son. 
 
Chandler's gas purchases 
 
On July 6, Chandler bought $21.28 in gasoline in Denver. She also purchased a 
cigarette lighter and two 5-gallon gas cans at a Denver AutoZone. Her next known gas 
purchase was at 5 p.m., July 7, for $24.10 in Loveland. 
 
During the July 11, 2002 interview with Volle, Chandler mentioned buying the 
lighter, but not the gas cans. Police found a 5-gallon gas can with a "small amount of gas 
[in it], less than a cup" in her apartment during the July 11-12 search. The State produced 
evidence Chandler could not have driven from Denver to Topeka and back to Loveland 
without stopping for more fuel, even if she had both 5-gallon gas cans and her vehicle's 
full fuel tank. 
 
9 
 
 
 
But this was also too much gas to cover the shorter route through Colorado 
Chandler claimed to have taken. And there is testimony the gas purchases are inconsistent 
with the longer route she also said she took through Colorado, although it is unclear 
whether there was too much or too little gas for that. In her pro se supplemental brief, 
Chandler contends the longer route was 487 miles and within her vehicle's fuel capacity 
without using the 5-gallon cans. 
 
Since Chandler's known gas purchases could not have fueled a trip to Topeka and 
back, police investigated whether she stopped along I-70 between Oakley and Topeka. In 
July 2002, Detective Michael Barron and another detective spoke to Patti Williams and 
Margaret Linden, who were WaKeeney Amoco station employees. Williams died before 
the preliminary hearing and trial. The State was not permitted to prompt Williams' 
hearsay testimony from other witnesses about what she may have said—a point 
repeatedly emphasized by the State at trial. 
 
Linden was asked about a black Mitsubishi she said stopped at the station. She 
testified:  "I saw, I believe it was—I thought it had been Colorado, but it wasn't. If my 
cashier was alive today she would tell you it was West Virginia or Virginia, one or the 
other." Linden continued that she went out and checked to make sure the driver hung up 
the pump because her cashier was worried about the driver "not paying the bill yet and 
buying certain different titled books of some sort." She again testified she thought the car 
had a Colorado tag, but that "was wrong." And she described the Mitsubishi Eclipse as 
"[s]mall, kind of small—medium sized, I would say, maybe." Detective Barron testified 
that when he interviewed Linden, she did not identify Chandler. He said Linden told him 
she thought the black Mitsubishi had a Virginia tag, but also told him the car had a 
Colorado tag. 
 
10 
 
 
 
The State called Marla Pfannenstiel, who worked with Williams and Linden. The 
court permitted the State to ask Pfannenstiel about how Williams behaved while talking 
to Detective Barron. Pfannenstiel testified Williams "was very meticulous in her job . . . 
[and] an observant cashier. . . . [S]he studied people." Pfannenstiel said Williams took 
officers over to a self-help book display and pulled some off a shelf. During this 
testimony the prosecutor prompted five times to the effect:  "Now I want to be sure in my 
questions I'm not asking you what Patti said." 
 
The prohibition on discussing Williams' statements came up again during Volle's 
testimony. The prosecutor asked if he talked to Amoco employees but instructed him not 
to "tell us what they said." He testified he talked to Williams and showed her a photo 
array.  
 
The defense recalled Detective Barron to question him about Linden's car tag 
identification. On cross-examination, the prosecutor segued into testimony about 
Williams without drawing an objection. The prosecutor asked whether Barron spoke with 
Williams and admonished him, "You cannot tell us what . . . Williams said to you 
because she's since passed away. None of my questions—I'm not asking what Patti said 
to you. Okay?" Barron was then asked to describe what happened, and he said he showed 
Williams a photo array and she took him to a stack of books. The prosecutor reiterated to 
the officer "without telling us what Patti said" to describe the books. He said Williams 
handed him titles such as Overcoming Hurts and Anger, Have You Felt Like Giving Up 
Lately, and The Weapons of Prayer.  
 
The State never presented documentation, like a receipt or credit card statement, to 
show Chandler purchased gas or anything else in WaKeeney. 
 
 
11 
 
 
 
Chandler's obsessive behavior toward the victims 
 
The State admitted considerable evidence Chandler engaged in obsessive behavior 
toward Mike and Karen:  (1) making numerous telephone calls to them; (2) verbally 
accosting them; (3) spying on them at their homes and in public places; (4) entering 
Mike's home without permission; and (5) trying to reconcile with Mike up to several 
weeks before the murders. 
 
Chandler told police she only talked to Mike every few months, but contrary 
evidence showed that to be false. Alice Casey, an FBI crime analyst, testified Chandler 
placed 645 calls to Mike's home phone, Mike's cell phone, and Karen's home phone 
between January and July 2002. Some were episodes of "rapid calling." For example, on 
February 27, Chandler made 22 calls in 31 minutes to Mike's home. On April 19, she 
made 12 calls in 13 minutes to Mike's home. And on June 3, she made 17 calls in 18 
minutes to Mike's home, his cell phone, and Karen's home. Casey testified that out of 269 
days of subpoenaed records, only 12 days showed no phone activity, including July 6. 
Chandler had two calls on July 7. 
 
Volle testified that on July 5, Chandler called Mike seven times, and the second 
call lasted five minutes. After that, Chandler called back five times. 
 
Several witnesses testified about Chandler's other behavior toward Mike and 
Karen. For example, Chandler's daughter said Chandler would often show up at places 
she was not expected. The daughter described one instance when Chandler pulled up to 
their car after a theater performance to scream obscenities. She said Chandler would 
sometimes sit with the children in her car outside Mike's house during visitations. 
 
12 
 
 
 
Chandler's son testified he found her snooping through Mike's paperwork in the 
kitchen when she came to pick him up even though he expected her to wait outside. He 
said Chandler made the kids spy on their dad in 1999 or 2000 by sitting in the car outside 
Mike's home. And once after Mike and Karen started dating, Chandler drove from 
Lawrence to Karen's home in Topeka during a visitation, parked outside, and waited for 
an hour or two. Chandler and Mike got into an argument outside the home. 
 
One of Karen's neighbors testified she saw a black Mitsubishi parked along the 
road sometime in the year before the murders. Another testified she observed a 
confrontation between Mike and Chandler two or three years before the murders. 
Chandler's car had been idling outside for a while; two kids were in the car. Chandler 
approached Mike and Karen when they arrived. 
 
Mike's sister and brother testified Mike told them he returned home in May 2002 
to find Chandler sitting inside the breezeway, and Chandler told Mike they should live 
together as a family. 
 
About a month before the murders, Chandler told a friend she entered Mike's 
home through a window. She said Mike's house was filthy and asked if she should call 
child protective services. Chandler said she sat outside Karen's home, but drove back to 
Denver when Mike and Karen did not return. 
 
Chandler's post-arrest jailhouse phone calls 
 
About 12 hours of audio collected from Chandler's jailhouse phone calls were 
admitted into evidence, although nothing was played in the State's case-in-chief. In 
closing, the State used two calls between Chandler and her sister, Shirley Riegel, to argue 
for conviction. The first was recorded after a day when the State presented evidence at 
13 
 
 
 
the preliminary hearing. Chandler and her sister were happy with how things went. 
Chandler said her attorney said "they should cut me loose but they probably won't." 
Later, they discussed learning that Williams, the Amoco worker, had died and could not 
testify: 
 
"[Chandler]:   [The prosecutor] hasn't said anything, but it kind of came up today. You 
know they keep wanting to talk about that Patti Williams? 
"[Riegel]: 
I don't know who that is. 
"[Chandler]:  
She is ah. Remember how we told you about that book in WaKeeney that 
they said I bought, in WaKeeney, Kansas; and I said I didn't. 
"[Riegel]: 
Oh, yeah, yeah that girl. 
"[Chandler]: 
At the Amoco station. 
"[Riegel]:  
Oh yeah, that girl.  
"[Chandler]: 
Well, anyway, she is dead. 
"[Riegel]:  
I know. That is huge for you. Yes, that is huge for you.  
"[Chandler]: 
And [the prosecutor] keeps trying to sneak in what she said because that 
you know little piece of information could potentially put me in Kansas. 
But that is the only thing. 
"[Riegel]:  
Well Dana, that witness that she tried to get to speak for her—  
"[Chandler]: 
Linden. 
"[Riegel]:  
Totally flubbed that up.  
"[Chandler]:  
I know.  
"[Riegel]:  
Tell me what. She didn't even work there at the time. I mean that totally 
screwed that testimony up. So if that is what they are leaning on— 
"[Chandler]: 
Uh, huh. 
"[Riegel]: 
I mean— 
"[Chandler]: 
Because they got to at least put me in Kansas. At least.  
"[Riegel]:  
Absolutely. Absolutely.  
"[Chandler]: 
Yeah, you know.  
"[Riegel]:  
I mean, I am feeling. Today was such a good day. I mean, I was just in 
awe." 
 
14 
 
 
 
The second call occurred a month before trial. Chandler and Riegel discussed 
whether the State would have DNA analysis done on the limb hair found on a shell 
casing: 
 
"[Chandler]: 
You heard about the hearing last week about the infamous hair.  
"[Riegel]:  
Yeah, well. I read it in the paper. I've been pulling up that Capital-
Journal.  
"[Chandler]:  
So, anyway, the results on that DNA analysis is supposed to be back by 
the 5th of March. The day that the trial is supposed to start.  
"[Riegel]:  
Oh, really.  
"[Chandler]:  
Yeah.  
"[Riegel]:  
Well, good luck to them.  
"[Chandler]: 
Yeah. Well, they've got you know some of my hair. 
"[Riegel]:  
I know. I know Dana. 
"[Chandler]: 
The department has access to both the hair and my hair.  
"[Riegel]:  
Yeah, I know. I know. I've definitely thought about that.  
"[Chandler]:  
Yeah, I'm really surprised the judge even granted the motion to have that 
sent off to be tested quite frankly under the circumstances.  
"[Riegel]:  
Well, it is in the paper that there will be no, I don't guess, you know, if 
they take that one hair there won't be nothing left to it.  
"[Chandler]: 
Exactly. They have to consume the whole thing.  
"[Riegel]:  
Well, that just yeah. That was covered in the paper.  
"[Chandler]:  
So. 
"[Riegel]:  
Yep, you know, I'm sure." 
 
Appellate proceedings 
 
This court first had oral arguments in Chandler's appeal on January 27, 2016. After 
that, we granted her unopposed motion for new counsel and her motion to file a pro se 
supplemental brief. Replacement counsel was appointed in July 2016. The court received 
15 
 
 
 
supplemental briefing. We took these unusual steps because the circumstances indicated 
they were necessary to serve the ends of justice. 
 
In the appeal's current posture, the defense:  (1) renews an insufficient evidence 
argument; (2) renews prosecutorial error claims, while adding others; (3) renews a K.S.A. 
60-455 argument about prior bad acts evidence; and (4) adds a cumulative error claim. 
 
Chandler also challenges her two hard 50 sentences, arguing they were imposed in 
violation of the right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. The State concedes the sentencing errors. See Alleyne v. United States, 570 
U.S. 99, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 186 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2013); State v. Soto, 299 Kan. 102, Syl. ¶ 9, 
322 P.3d 334 (2014) (concluding hard 50 sentencing scheme permitting a judge—rather 
than a jury—to find aggravating circumstances necessary to impose an increased 
mandatory minimum sentence violates right to a jury trial under Alleyne).  
 
Chandler's pro se supplemental brief contains 127 handwritten pages with 
attachments—many not in the record on appeal. She complains her requests for record 
additions were not fulfilled, material was not made available, and the district court failed 
to inform her of her right to present evidence at sentencing. She sets out her own account 
of her divorce; the facts surrounding the murders; the crime scene evidence; the State's 
investigation and her arrest, including the State's alleged misuse of the media; and the 
trial. These arguments go mainly to the evidence's weight, e.g., her behavior and its 
temporal proximity to the murders. Lastly, she supplements her attorneys' prosecutorial 
error arguments. 
 
 
16 
 
 
 
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
 
Chandler argues the State failed to produce sufficient evidence linking her to the 
murders. We consider this first because even though the conceded prosecutorial error 
discussed next warrants reversal, if the evidence during the first trial was insufficient to 
support the convictions, a second trial on the same charges would violate Chandler's right 
to be free from double jeopardy under the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and § 10 of the Kansas Constitution's Bill of Rights. See State v. Jefferson, 
297 Kan. 1151, 1166, 310 P.3d 331 (2013); State v. Hernandez, 294 Kan. 200, 209, 273 
P.3d 774 (2012). This discussion also serves as prelude to the reversibility analysis 
required by the State's prosecutorial error.   
 
Standard of review 
 
   
"When sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a criminal case, the standard 
of review is whether, after reviewing all the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
prosecution, the appellate court is convinced a rational factfinder could have found the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellate courts do not reweigh evidence, 
resolve evidentiary conflicts, or make witness credibility determinations." State v. Lloyd, 
299 Kan. 620, 632, 325 P.3d 1122 (2014). 
 
An appellate court must consider even erroneously admitted evidence from the 
first trial when reviewing a sufficiency challenge. Jefferson, 297 Kan. at 1166 ("Notably, 
even though we have determined that the district court erred in admitting [defendant's] 
videotaped statement, we must nevertheless consider that erroneously admitted evidence 
in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence presented at the first trial."); see also State v. 
Pabst, 268 Kan. 501, 512, 996 P.2d 321 (2000) ("'[A] reviewing court must consider all 
of the evidence admitted by the trial court in deciding whether retrial is permissible under 
17 
 
 
 
the Double Jeopardy Clause.'" [Emphasis added.]) (quoting Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 
33, 41, 109 S. Ct. 285, 102 L. Ed. 2d 265 [1988]). 
 
Discussion 
 
The State must prove each element of an offense. Circumstantial evidence and the 
logical inferences properly drawn from that evidence can be sufficient to support a 
conviction even for the most serious crime. Jefferson, 297 Kan. at 1167. 
 
First-degree premeditated murder is the killing of a human being committed 
intentionally and with premeditation. K.S.A. 21-3401(a). To secure her convictions, the 
State had to prove Chandler intentionally killed Mike and Karen, that the killings were 
done with premeditation, and that the acts occurred on or about July 7, 2002, in Shawnee 
County. The question is whether sufficient evidence existed to establish Chandler was the 
person who killed Mike and Karen. To that end, the State's case relies on:  (1) her 
inconsistent statements for her whereabouts on July 6 and 7, 2002; (2) her gas purchases 
on those days; (3) her obsessive behavior toward the victims; and (4) the two post-arrest 
jailhouse phone calls. 
 
The State's case was founded on inferences—a point Chandler repeatedly 
emphasizes. For example, Detective Volle testified that on July 5, 2002, the records 
showed she called Mike seven times, with the second call lasting about five minutes. But 
there was no evidence about the substance of that five-minute call. Nevertheless, the 
prosecutor said during opening statement, "Mike at this time told the defendant in that 
five-minute phone call that he and Karen were going to be married, that the two were 
engaged and planned to be married." (Emphasis added.) And again in closing statement 
the prosecutor remarked, "After that five-minute conversation where Mike told 
[Chandler] he was engaged, she calls five more times to his home and to his cell." 
18 
 
 
 
(Emphasis added.) The State's theory was that this five-minute call spurred Chandler to 
murder two days later. 
 
Chandler argues the State's assertion that Mike told Chandler about the 
engagement on July 5 is unsupported by any evidence, so an insinuation that news of the 
engagement caused her to drive to Topeka to commit murder is impermissible inference 
stacking. She argues this was especially damaging because "there are no facts in evidence 
that would otherwise lead the jury to conclude that Chandler would go from living her 
life in Denver . . . to driving hundreds of miles to shoot [Mike] and [Karen]." 
 
Curiously, the State tries to deflect this point by referring to two witnesses who 
said Mike actually told Chandler about the engagement months earlier in May 2002. 
From that, it argues the evidence established Chandler knew about the planned marriage 
so no inference was needed. But that sleight of hand does not reasonably justify the 
prosecutor telling the jury Mike informed Chandler about the engagement on July 5, let 
alone that this supposed news provoked her to murder two days later. 
 
Presumptions and inferences may be drawn from established facts, but a 
presumption may not rest on presumption or inference on inference. In other words, an 
inference cannot be based on evidence that is too uncertain or speculative or that raises 
merely a conjecture or possibility. State v. Burton, 235 Kan. 472, Syl. ¶ 3, 681 P.2d 646 
(1984). Reasonable inferences "cannot be drawn from facts and conditions merely 
imagined or assumed." 235 Kan. at 477.  
 
But whether the State's reasoning, i.e., that Mike told Chandler about his 
engagement on July 5 and this caused her to murder Mike and Karen on July 7, requires 
inference stacking is a different question from whether her convictions rest on inference 
stacking. In assessing the evidence's sufficiency, we consider all the evidence at the jury's 
19 
 
 
 
disposal. Lloyd, 299 Kan. at 632. And while Chandler's inference stacking argument 
zeroes in on one piece of motive evidence, there was more, and our analysis must include 
that evidence—even though it was improper to attribute content to that five-minute phone 
call without any proof. 
 
The State showed Mike and Chandler had a long, bitter divorce. Mike was granted 
custody of their children and she was forced to move from the marital home and pay 
child support. The State cites testimony she arrived at places uninvited, insulted the 
victims, and wrote her daughter instant messages and an email expressing hatred for 
Mike. And the State argues jealousy was the only logical motive for the crimes because 
"all of the law enforcement personnel who investigated the crime concluded the motive 
appeared to be murder and not a burglary, robbery, drugs, or sexual assault." The State 
cites evidence Chandler entered Mike's home without permission the month before the 
homicides. 
 
The State also argues Chandler had an opportunity to commit the crimes. It notes 
she gave inconsistent statements about her calling history and whereabouts when the 
murders occurred. It points to evidence suggesting her presence at the WaKeeney Amoco 
station on July 6, 2002, i.e., Margaret Linden's testimony that a black Mitsubishi with 
out-of-state license plates refueled there and Patti Williams' reaction when shown 
Chandler's photo. Finally, the State refers to the two jailhouse phone calls:  one suggested 
Chandler and her sister might be happy Williams could not testify at trial, while the other 
showed Chandler's possible anxiety about the State testing another hair found at the crime 
scene. 
 
The State refers to State v. Flynn, 274 Kan. 473, 55 P.3d 324 (2002), for its 
similarities concerning the modest amount of circumstantial evidence that can support a 
premeditated first-degree murder conviction. In Flynn, the court held sufficient evidence 
20 
 
 
 
existed even though none linked the defendant to the crime scene. 274 Kan. at 485-86. It 
established motive because Flynn was in a child custody dispute with the victim from 
which she "needed a way out" due to unfavorable developments in the case. 274 Kan. at 
484. The court noted shortly before the murder Flynn threatened another man over a 
custody dispute and her codefendant, her brother, threatened the victim. In addition, 
Flynn had an opportunity to commit the crime because she left work early the day of the 
murder, purchased gas, and arranged for someone to pick up her children. And she 
engaged in suspicious post-murder conduct by twice driving her car through an automatic 
car wash, which permitted an inference that the car was soiled with the victim's blood or 
dirt from the road. Finally, Flynn commented after the murder that the victim was "an 
evil, wicked man who deserved to die." 274 Kan. at 486. Somewhat similarly, Chandler 
had motive and opportunity, and engaged in suspicious behavior after the murders. 
 
As to motive, the evidence supports a conclusion that in the years during and after 
the divorce, Chandler exhibited obsession with Mike, Karen, and their relationship. That 
behavior can be characterized as "increasing" during the time leading up to the murders, 
as there was evidence it escalated from harassing, following, and telephone calls to 
uninvited entry into Mike's home as recently as several weeks before the crimes. As to 
opportunity, her whereabouts were unconfirmed. She made suspicious gas purchases, 
including the two 5-gallon gas cans, a detail she omitted from her first police interview. 
The State also produced evidence suggesting she was not where she said she was when 
the killings occurred. This undermined her statements and tended to show she was in 
Kansas on July 6. 
 
Her inconsistent statements also constitute suspicious post-murder conduct 
demonstrating consciousness of guilt. See State v. Norwood, 217 Kan. 150, 155, 535 P.2d 
996 (1975) ("False exculpatory statements by a defendant are admissible to show 
consciousness of guilt and unlawful intent. . . . 'The fact that a defendant in a criminal 
21 
 
 
 
case resorts to a falsehood is a circumstance which may, in connection with other facts in 
the case, tend to prove guilt.'"). Similarly, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable 
to the State, the jury could have interpreted the second jailhouse phone call as expressing 
apprehension that law enforcement might match Chandler's hair to one found at the crime 
scene. And unlike other statements argued to be inculpatory, in a light most favorable to 
the State there is a difference between expressing frustration about the judge allowing 
testing on the eve of trial and a more particularized concern the State had her hair for 
comparison. 
 
Our standard of review and the caselaw applying it set a rather low bar under 
similar facts. We hold sufficient evidence exists when viewed in the light most favorable 
to the State, such that a rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond 
a reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. 
 
PROSECUTORIAL ERROR 
 
Several claims involving prosecutorial error arise in Chandler's appeal. Most come 
from the supplemental briefing and inquiries by the court. See Tolen v. State, 285 Kan. 
672, 675-76, 176 P.3d 170 (2008) (authority for sua sponte consideration of new issues 
or arguments resulting from the court's questioning). We address several because they 
might otherwise reoccur, but emphasize only the one conceded error was enough to 
reverse these convictions—the prosecutor falsely claiming Mike got a protection from 
abuse order against Chandler from the Douglas County District Court. 
 
 
22 
 
 
 
Standard of review 
 
When the parties first argued this appeal, Kansas courts referred to claims that a 
prosecutor's comments denied a defendant's due process rights to a fair trial as 
"prosecutorial misconduct." See, e.g., State v. Barber, 302 Kan. 367, Syl. ¶ 4, 353 P.3d 
1108 (2015). The then-effective standard of review was a two-step analysis set out in 
State v. Tosh, 278 Kan. 83, 91 P.3d 1204 (2004). 
 
Under Tosh, an appellate court decided first whether the prosecutor's remark being 
complained about was outside the wide latitude allowed in discussing evidence. 278 Kan. 
at 85. If so, the court made what was described as a "particularized harmlessness 
inquiry," assessing:  (1) whether the misconduct was gross and flagrant; (2) whether it 
showed ill will on the prosecutor's part; and (3) whether the evidence against the 
defendant was of such a direct and overwhelming nature that the misconduct likely had 
little weight in the jurors' minds. 278 Kan. at 93. No factor individually controlled, but 
before the third could override the first two, an appellate court had to be able to say the 
harmlessness tests of both K.S.A. 60-261 and Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. 
Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967), were met. 278 Kan. 83, Syl. ¶ 2. 
 
After the first oral arguments, this court articulated a modified two-step analytical 
framework for claims that a prosecutor's trial behavior requires reversal. See State v. 
Sherman, 305 Kan. 88, 378 P.3d 1060 (2016). Sherman renamed these claims 
"'prosecutorial error,'" saving the pejorative "'prosecutorial misconduct'" label for more 
egregious transgressions. 305 Kan. at 90, 114 ("Prosecutorial acts properly categorized as 
'prosecutorial misconduct' are erroneous acts done with a level of culpability that exceeds 
mere negligence."). 
 
23 
 
 
 
Sherman did not disturb the preexisting standard for whether the prosecutorial 
action complained about was improper, i.e., the action was outside the wide latitude 
afforded prosecutors. 305 Kan. at 104 ("The well-developed body of caselaw defining the 
scope of a prosecutor's 'wide latitude' . . . will continue to inform our review of future 
allegations of prosecutorial error."). But under Sherman: 
 
"If error is found, the appellate court must next determine whether the error prejudiced 
the defendant's due process rights to a fair trial. In evaluating prejudice, we simply adopt 
the traditional constitutional harmlessness inquiry demanded by Chapman. In other 
words, prosecutorial error is harmless if the State can demonstrate 'beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the error complained of will not or did not affect the outcome of the trial in 
light of the entire record, i.e., where there is no reasonable possibility that the error 
contributed to the verdict.' [Citation omitted.] We continue to acknowledge that the 
statutory harmlessness test also applies to prosecutorial error, but when 'analyzing both 
constitutional and nonconstitutional error, an appellate court need only address the higher 
standard of constitutional error.' [Citation omitted.]" 305 Kan. at 109. 
 
The Sherman court also noted,  
 
"Multiple and varied individualized factors can and likely will affect the 
Chapman analysis in future cases. Every instance of prosecutorial error will be fact 
specific, and any appellate test for prejudice must likewise allow the parties the greatest 
possible leeway to argue the particulars of each individual case. Thus, appellate courts 
should resist the temptation to articulate categorical pigeonholed factors that purportedly 
impact whether the State has met its Chapman burden. Appellate courts must simply 
consider any and all alleged indicators of prejudice, as argued by the parties, and then 
determine whether the State has met its burden—i.e., shown that there is no reasonable 
possibility that the error contributed to the verdict. The focus of the inquiry is on the 
impact of the error on the verdict. While the strength of the evidence against the 
defendant may secondarily impact this analysis one way or the other, it must not become 
24 
 
 
 
the primary focus of the inquiry. As has often been repeated, prejudice can exist even 'in 
a strong case.' [Citation omitted.]" 305 Kan. at 110-11. 
 
Because Chandler's appeal is not yet final, Sherman applies. See State v. Mitchell, 
297 Kan. 118, Syl. ¶ 3, 298 P.3d 349 (2013) (change in law applies to cases pending on 
direct review and not yet final on date of appellate court decision). The parties had the 
opportunity to address Sherman in their supplemental briefs and discuss it at oral 
argument. That said, the result would have been the same under the pre-Sherman test. 
 
False claim about a protection from abuse order 
 
All agree there is no protection from abuse order in the trial record. Yet, during 
closing argument, prosecutor Jacqueline Spradling told the jury: 
 
"How else do we know the defendant is guilty? Mike got a protection from 
abuse, a court order. He applied and said, hey, Judge, please order this woman to stay 
away from me and the Judge agreed. And in 1998, meaning one year after he filed for 
the divorce, he was continuing to have problems with the defendant not leaving him 
alone. So he got a court order saying she has to stay away. The protection from abuse 
order did not stop the defendant, though." (Emphases added.) 
 
These misstatements conveyed serious adverse impressions to the jury. They 
improperly declared that a judge independently reviewed Chandler's behavior and 
concluded she was dangerous enough to justify a court order for Mike's protection. They 
also told the jury Chandler was so out of control that she violated that court order, i.e., 
accuses her of wrongdoing that would constitute "prior bad acts" if presented as evidence. 
See K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 60-455 (subject to specific exceptions, evidence a person 
committed a crime or civil wrong on a specified occasion is inadmissible as basis to infer 
25 
 
 
 
the person committed another crime or civil wrong on another specified occasion). None 
of this was true. 
 
In its final supplemental brief, the State acknowledges "the prosecutor misspoke 
when she informed the jury that [Mike] Sisco had obtained a 'protection from abuse, a 
court order.'" But that concession, while laudable, was a long time coming—even though 
we would expect the State never to shield something so obviously indefensible. The 
State's journey to this admission deserves some additional chronicling. 
 
In its initial briefing, the State brazenly wrote, "While Defendant proclaims that 
there was no protection from abuse order, the record shows otherwise." (Emphasis 
added.) The State further represented in that brief:  "Sisco was granted a protection from 
abuse order in 1998." (Emphasis added.) These statements were not true. 
 
At the first oral argument, the court challenged these misrepresentations and the 
State's position shifted. Initially, the State allowed it was simply a mistake to have said 
"protection from abuse" order, stressing the prosecutor should have just said "protective 
order." The State then claimed there were two such "protective orders" in the divorce 
case:  (1) an initial, routine, temporary ex parte order directed to both Mike and Chandler 
to keep them from "contacting, bothering, harassing or molesting each other in any 
manner whatsoever, wheresoever . . . pending the final hearing of this matter"; and (2) an 
October 1998 order in the divorce case directed specifically against Chandler. The State 
further explained that a detective testified about the October 1998 order's existence, but 
left out of this explanation how the detective contradicted that testimony in cross-
examination by conceding he had no recollection of any such protective order. And when 
this court insisted there was no 1998 order in the record, the prosecutor finally justified 
that as perhaps something she thought to be true even though it was not in the evidence. 
 
26 
 
 
 
These misstatements and misdirection cause even greater concern on closer 
consideration. For example, the record strongly suggests the prosecutor knew there was 
no protection from abuse order (or even a 1998 "protective" order) before asking the 
detective about it on the stand. As recently as about a month before trial, the State 
accurately described in pleadings what the divorce file contained when asking permission 
to introduce evidence that Mike sought a restraining order. The State's written motion, 
signed by the same prosecutor who questioned the detective at trial, who misstated the 
evidence during closing, and who represented the State in the first oral arguments to this 
court, stated: 
 
"Mike Sisco requested an immediate restraining order on October 15, 1998, indicating 
that this defendant intentionally, maliciously, and repeatedly followed and harassed him, 
destroyed personal property of his acquaintances and had engaged in telephone 
harassment." (Emphasis added.) 
 
Notably, this motion did not allege any court order resulted from Mike's request, 
nor did it seek permission to admit such an order into evidence—something the State 
surely would have done if it had a good faith belief this order really existed. But there is 
more. 
 
The State's questioning of the detective about a "protection from abuse" order 
supports a conclusion this was preplanned. The trial transcript reflects: 
 
 "Q [Prosecutor]:  To your knowledge, did either of the Basgalls ever jump on Mike's 
trampoline in the middle of the night? 
"A [Volle]:  No.  
"Q:  Did either Mike or Karen say they were afraid of the Basgalls? 
"A:  No. 
"Q:  Did either of the Basgalls to your knowledge stalk Mike or Karen? 
27 
 
 
 
"A:  No. 
"Q:  Either of them harass Mike or Karen? 
"A:  No, they did not.  
"Q:  Either of them try to prevent the relationship of Mike and Karen? 
"A:  No. 
"Q:  Did either Mike or Karen get a protection from abuse against the Basgalls?  
"A:  No.  
"Q:  Will you tell the jury what a production [sic] from abuse or PFA is[?]  
"A:  It's a document signed by the Court that says you are not able to have contact with 
another person, you're not supposed to call them, write them, contact them in any 
manner.  
"Q:  A court order precluding one person from contacting another?  
"A:  Yes. 
"Q:  Did Mike get a protection from abuse? 
"A:  Yes, he did.  
"Q:  Against who?  
"A:  Against the defendant. 
"Q:  In 1998? 
"A:  That's correct. 
"Q:  Did Mike get a PFA or protection from abuse against anybody other than the 
defendant?  
"A:  No one else." (Emphasis added.) 
  
The above belies the State's assertions that references to a "protection from abuse" 
order in its closing were somehow a slip of the tongue or the product of counsel's 
confusion given the trial record's hefty volume. The prosecutor specifically and 
intentionally referred to "protection from abuse" orders—not just routine, ex parte 
temporary orders often entered initially in divorce cases and directed to both parties. And 
this is further underscored by the reasonable assumption that experienced prosecutors 
know the difference and understand that protection from abuse orders are specific 
28 
 
 
 
creatures under state law, entered after judicial review, and based on specific evidence in 
separate court proceedings. See Protection from Abuse Act, K.S.A. 60-3101 et seq. 
 
Also puzzling is why this nonexistent order would even be mentioned in closing 
after the detective was challenged about it by defense counsel and could not confirm its 
existence: 
 
"Q [defense counsel]:  Was it actually signed by a judge and filed or was it a motion or a 
request for one that wasn't— 
"A [Volle]:  I don't recall." (Emphasis added.)  
  
The detective admitted he could not say any such order existed, which put the 
prosecutor on notice that the detective's testimony could not establish this as fact. And 
this makes it further confounding why the State during its first oral argument would 
represent to this court that the detective's testimony established the order's existence 
when it most certainly did not. 
 
Finally, there can be no pretext by which the prosecutor confused a made-up 
"protection from abuse" order with the only order in the divorce file—the temporary 
order directed to both parties. The State argues in its supplemental brief:  "It is possible 
the prosecutor thought she was referring to the correct order since there were several 
documents referring to a restraining order admitted into evidence." This is an untenable 
position.  
 
Even if the prosecutor was meaning to reference the initial ex parte order, her 
statement would remain seriously misleading because she did not mention the order was 
routine, temporary, or directed to both parties. These are critical distinctions. Instead, the 
prosecutor made it appear Chandler was the order's target and her behavior the reason for 
29 
 
 
 
the judge to enter it—none of which would have been true, even if the prosecutor got 
mixed up. And the State's speculation about possible confusion ignores the specific 
"protection from abuse" references made in questioning the detective and the timeline 
presented, i.e., one year after Mike filed for divorce.   
 
This court cannot understand why so much energy had to be expended by all 
concerned to get us to the State's belated admission about something that never existed in 
the trial record. Nevertheless, the concession establishes the first element of the 
prosecutorial error test, i.e., action outside the wide latitude afforded to prosecutors. See 
State v. Hall, 292 Kan. 841, 848, 257 P.3d 272 (2011) (when prosecutors argue facts not 
in evidence, the argument is outside the wide latitude given to them). We explain next 
why this error prejudiced Chandler's due process right to a fair trial and requires reversal. 
 
Reversibility   
 
As mentioned, we apply the harmless error test from Chapman, 386 U.S. 18. 
Sherman, 305 Kan. at 109. Having benefitted from the error, the State has the burden to 
show there is no reasonable possibility that error contributed to the verdict.  
 
The State argues any "protection from abuse" reference was not critical and that 
"strong circumstantial evidence established motive and opportunity." It notes the jury was 
instructed to disregard statements unsupported by evidence and reasons "[t]he fact that 
the prosecutor made an inadvertent error, during a lengthy closing argument summarizing 
86 witness[es'] testimony and hundreds of exhibits does not amount to reversible error." 
The State contends "[t]here is no likelihood that the verdict would be different had the 
prosecutor not made the comment." And in its original brief, the State argued simply that 
"[a]lthough the evidence was circumstantial, there was overwhelming evidence 
presented." 
30 
 
 
 
Our previous discussion about the evidence's sufficiency calls into question the 
State's argument that it presented overwhelming evidence of guilt, even though it was 
sufficient under our standard of review to convict. And the State's assertion that there is 
"no likelihood that the verdict would be different had the prosecutor not made the 
comment" tries to substitute a different test. Prejudice can exist even in a strong case. 
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 240, 60 S. Ct. 811, 84 L. Ed. 
1129 (1940); Sherman, 305 Kan. at 111 ("The focus of the inquiry is on the impact of the 
error on the verdict. While the strength of the evidence against the defendant may 
secondarily impact this analysis one way or the other, it must not become the primary 
focus of the inquiry.").  
 
In State v. Akins, 298 Kan. 592, 601-05, 315 P.3d 868 (2014), the prosecutor 
improperly bolstered the State's evidence in a sex abuse case by gratuitously—and 
falsely—telling the jury about a court decision that supposedly contradicted a defense 
expert and argued without evidentiary foundation that defendant "groomed" the victims 
for abuse. As in Chandler's case, the Akins prosecutor's false characterization of a court 
decision as supporting authority "essentially implies that this aspect of the prosecutor's 
case . . . already had judicial approval." 298 Kan. at 601. The court held the improprieties 
required reversal, reasoning that the misconduct 
 
"was not ameliorated by evidence which was so overwhelming that the misconduct could 
not have influenced the jury's decision. There was no physical evidence of [defendant's] 
guilt, and he consistently and steadfastly maintained that he was innocent. So the jury 
was charged with deciding the case based on the testimony of witnesses, making their 
credibility of paramount importance." 298 Kan. at 613. 
 
In State v. Pabst, 268 Kan. 501, 511, 996 P.2d 321 (2000), the court reversed a 
first-degree murder conviction when the prosecutor told the jury the defendant lied, and 
31 
 
 
 
argued, inaccurately, that the jury "'heard him agree that if he—this jury found that he 
lied, then you would find him guilty of first degree murder. He agreed with that. So you 
have to believe him. If you don't believe him, then he's guilty. And he admits it.'" The 
court reasoned: 
 
"The jury could have found, based on the physical evidence, that Pabst was 
guilty. However, the jury also might have decided Pabst was guilty because the 
prosecutor told it Pabst was lying, and if he was lying, it could convict him. Evidence of 
premeditation was sufficiently convincing under our standard of review, but not 
overwhelming. We therefore hold that the cumulative nature of the prosecutor's errors, 
coupled with the action of the district court in overruling Pabst's timely objection to the 
accusations of lying, requires a reversal." 268 Kan. at 511.    
 
 In State v. McBride, 307 Kan. 60, 71-72, 405 P.3d 1196 (2017), the court held in a 
credibility contest that the prosecutor committed reversible error by improperly bolstering 
the complaining witness' testimony when, after pointing out the defendant enjoyed a 
presumption of innocence, the prosecutor asked "'doesn't [the victim] deserve a certain 
presumption as well?'" The court reasoned the evidence against McBride was "not a 
strong case" due to a lack of corroboration and that the improper comment "reasonably 
could have caused the jury to accept [the victim's] testimony in the absence of anything 
else to support it." 307 Kan. at 72. And it noted a previous jury was unable to reach a 
verdict on the same evidence. 307 Kan. at 72. 
 
In Chandler's case, there is no direct evidence of guilt, unlike in Akins and 
McBride. As in Pabst, the circumstantial evidence is sufficient, but not overwhelming. 
The record has no physical evidence tending to place Chandler at the crime scene. The 
State's route to conviction rested on convincing the jury she had an opportunity to 
commit the crime and that her obsessive and sometimes criminal behavior escalated to 
murder. The State produced evidence it was possible for Chandler to have been in 
32 
 
 
 
Topeka on July 6, but the key question for the jury remained whether she did commit the 
killings. The false statements about this made-up protection from abuse order helped the 
State fill in the blanks to its narrative.  
 
This case is analogous to Akins, Pabst, and McBride in that the error intruded into 
the jury's decision on paramount elements to the State's theory. The prosecutor traded on 
an untrue statement about a protection from abuse order. And this carried with it the 
incendiary assertion realized from another untruth that an independent judge validated 
Mike's fear that Chandler was dangerous, capable of inflicting harm, and so 
uncontrollable that judicial intervention was required for Mike's protection. The 
prosecutor then piled on with yet another falsehood—that Chandler violated this fictional 
order. 
 
In In re Care & Treatment of Foster, 280 Kan. 845, 127 P.3d 277 (2006), a 
decision rendered six years before Chandler's trial, the court held it was reversible error 
for the State's counsel to argue some aspect of its case had judicial approval. The Foster 
court noted the State's attorney truthfully advised the jury that a judge had determined 
there was probable cause to believe Foster was a sexually violent predator. 280 Kan. at 
858. But despite the statement's accuracy, the court held, it was reversible error because it 
"'stack[ed] the deck.'" 280 Kan. at 857. The court observed "an attorney's reference to a 
judge's prior decision supporting the attorney's case can certainly influence a jury to the 
extent that reversal is required." 280 Kan. at 859. It ordered a new trial despite 
"admittedly strong evidence against Foster." 280 Kan. at 861. 
 
Our court has long recognized juries "can be easily influenced by the slightest 
suggestion coming from the court, whether it be a nod of the head, a smile, a frown, or a 
spoken word." State v. Wheat, 131 Kan. 562, 569, 292 P. 793 (1930); see also Foster, 280 
Kan. at 857-58; State v. Plunkett, 257 Kan. 135, 137, 139, 891 P.2d 370 (1995) (noting 
33 
 
 
 
trial judges should be the exemplar of dignity and impartiality and discussing their 
influence on a jury); State v. Hamilton, 240 Kan. 539, 545, 731 P.2d 863 (1987) 
(discussing impact of a trial judge's statements and conduct on a jury in a criminal 
proceeding) (quoting Wheat, 131 Kan. at 569); State v. Boyd, 222 Kan. 155, 159, 563 
P.2d 446 (1977) (discussing the trial judge's influence); State v. Winchester, 166 Kan. 
512, 518, 203 P.2d 229 (1949) ("A juror is prone to watch any indication by the judge as 
to how he regards any part of the testimony or the credibility of a witness and for that 
reason a trial judge must scrupulously avoid the slightest indication as to his personal 
feelings concerning the matter in issue."). 
 
In Chandler's case, the prosecutor apparently understood the value of feigning 
judicial endorsement for the State's theory about Chandler's uncontrollable 
dangerousness. The prosecutor used the word "judge" twice, the term "court order" twice, 
and the word "order" once in the five-sentence span following her rhetorical question, 
"How else do we know the defendant is guilty?" The prosecutor might just as well have 
said:  "How else do we know the defendant is guilty? Because a judge has told us so." 
Even more prejudicially than in Foster, Chandler's prosecutor used an untruth about 
judicial approval to stack the deck. 
 
The State's final effort to minimize its misrepresentations is to deflect 
responsibility. First, it asserts its misstatements must not have been too bad because the 
trial judge did not intervene to correct them, noting a trial judge has an independent 
responsibility to guard the defendant's right to a fair trial. See State v. Ruff, 252 Kan. 625, 
634-35, 847 P.2d 1258 (1993) (trial judges have a duty "to interfere in all cases, on their 
own motion, where counsel forget themselves so far as to exceed the limits of 
professional freedom of discussion."); see also State v. Wilson, 188 Kan. 67, 73, 360 P.2d 
1092 (1961). But this cannot end our reversibility analysis because nearly every error 
determined in an appeal is one that escapes the trial judge. See Ruff, 252 Kan. at 635-36 
34 
 
 
 
(rejecting State's claim that trial judge was in a far better position to assess prosecutor's 
conduct than an appellate court). And there is no authority for diminishing the prejudice 
caused from prosecutorial error by blaming the trial judge for not catching the State in the 
act red-handed.  
 
Similarly, the State claims any significance to its error is weakened by the lack of 
a defense objection. But even if a failure to object somehow establishes defense counsel 
did not recognize the misstatements in real time, counsel's perception is a different 
question than whether the misstatements impacted the jury's verdict once they occurred. 
We do not require defense objections during the State's closing to preserve error claims. 
State v. Martinez, 290 Kan. 992, Syl. ¶ 10, 236 P.3d 481 (2010).   
 
Third, the State notes the jury was instructed to review the evidence and argues 
had it done so it would have seen there was no protection from abuse order and 
disregarded what the prosecutor said. This is both unrealistic and unavailing. The State 
inundated the jury with thousands of exhibit pages, including 1,200 pages of divorce 
records. This mass of divorce pleadings—necessary or not for the prosecution—was not 
explained to the jury except when the State asserted in closing that somewhere in the pile 
was this imaginary protection from abuse order. 
 
To expect any lay jury to unmask the State's falsehoods under such circumstances 
is too much. Worse yet, accepting its premise would abdicate the prosecutor's obligations 
as an officer of the court. Ruff, 252 Kan. at 636 ("The prosecutor is under a duty to insure 
that only competent evidence is submitted to the jury. Above all, the prosecutor must 
guard against anything that could prejudice the minds of the jurors and hinder them from 
considering only the evidence adduced."); State v. Majors, 182 Kan. 644, 647-48, 323 
P.2d 917 (1958) ("It is the duty of a county attorney in a criminal prosecution to see that 
the state's case is properly presented with earnestness and vigor and to use every 
35 
 
 
 
legitimate means to bring about a just conviction, but he should always bear in mind that 
he is an officer of the court and as such he occupies a quasi-judicial position whose 
sanctions and traditions he should preserve."); see also Pabst, 268 Kan. at 510-11 
(discussing a prosecutor's influence as a servant of the law and representative of the 
people of Kansas, jury may be misled into thinking prosecutor's statements are validated 
by the weight of the State of Kansas). A criminal prosecution is not a game of hide-and-
seek for the jury to have to play.   
 
The irony, of course, is apparent. The State bannered these provocative 
misrepresentations by proclaiming, "How else do we know the defendant is guilty?" 
Now, having conceded its error, the State has the burden to explain how these false 
claims about evidence it said would answer that key question could reasonably not have 
contributed to the resulting guilty verdicts. For the reasons explained, we hold the State 
failed to meet its burden. We reverse Chandler's convictions and remand the case to the 
district court for further proceedings. 
 
OTHER PROSECUTORIAL ERRORS 
 
Our decision to reverse due to the acknowledged prosecutorial error makes it 
unnecessary as a practical matter to consider additional errors claimed, but we will 
discuss some to avoid their repetition. See Foster, 280 Kan. at 857. We will not perform a 
prejudice analysis because that is moot at this point. 
 
 
36 
 
 
 
Claiming Chandler drove to Nebraska 
 
During its opening statement, the State explained its evidence would show: 
 
"Somewhere along that route, probably around Salina, the defendant would have had to 
have used the ten gallons of gas that were in the two five-gallon gas cans she purchased 
at the AutoZone before she committed the murders. The defendant's actual route included 
that she went from Denver to Topeka, Mike and Karen's house, and after killing both 
Mike and Karen in an interest to get out of the state as quickly as she could, she drove 
directly up to Nebraska. After she gets to Nebraska, she turns around and goes home 
heading towards Denver. This route matches the defendant's gas purchases and the 
defendant's gas consumption by her credit card receipts. It is the only route that matches 
that she's attributed to. Meaning, what we know she bought in gas is not consistent with 
what she told Detective Volle she did. It is not consistent with what she told Jeff Bailey 
she did the weekend of the murder." (Emphasis added.) 
 
During trial, no evidence was admitted supporting the State's opening statement 
that Chandler fled to Nebraska and drove from there back home to Colorado. The district 
court sustained an objection when the prosecutor asked Volle whether "there [is] a route 
other than going east that would have taken a person out of Topeka into another state 
that's the quickest route to get out of Kansas." That objection was on the grounds there 
was no evidence Chandler went north, south, or any other direction, so the question 
solicited "nothing but speculation, conjecture and a wild guess." 
 
In response, the prosecutor explained: 
 
"Your honor, what I'm trying to explain is that if a person heads north, they can get out of 
[the] state into Nebraska, and it may be that I asked it inartfully, but I will not be asking 
for a route, only that heading north out of Topeka you get out of the state." 
 
37 
 
 
 
The questioning resumed with no inquiry about the gas required to get to 
Nebraska, that heading to Nebraska was the quickest route out of Kansas, or—more 
importantly—that Chandler drove to Nebraska. In other words, there was nothing 
supporting the factual representation that "she drove directly up to Nebraska. After she 
gets to Nebraska, she turns around and goes home heading towards Denver." This was 
obviously never anything but conjecture. 
 
The court observed in Miller v. Braun, 196 Kan. 313, 317, 411 P.2d 621 (1966): 
 
"'It is generally held that statements by counsel that certain evidence will be 
introduced are not improper if made in good faith and with reasonable ground to believe 
that the evidence is admissible, even though the intended proof referred to is afterward 
excluded. However, in the absence of good faith, or where prejudice is clearly produced, 
whether as the result of accident, inadvertence, or misconception, the rule is to the 
contrary.'" (quoting 53 Am. Jur., Trial § 456, p. 358).  
 
In State v. Love, 305 Kan. 716, 387 P.3d 820 (2017), the court confirmed counsel 
is accountable for what is said in opening, explaining: 
 
"The 'opening statement has a narrow purpose and scope. It is not evidence; and 
it is given only to assist the jury in understanding what each side expects its evidence to 
establish and to advise the jury what questions will be presented for its decision.' 
[Citation omitted.] Generally speaking, counsel may outline in opening statement what is 
expected to be proved 'unless it is manifest that such proof would be incompetent, or the 
statement is made for the purpose of creating prejudice.'" Love, 305 Kan. at 728 (quoting 
Miller, 196 Kan. at 317). 
   
The Love court held there was no prosecutorial error when the prosecutor told the 
jury two doctors who treated a child for fatal injuries resulting from child abuse would 
testify that the child's mother—defendant's girlfriend—"'was acting "appropriately" and 
38 
 
 
 
being "cooperative."'" 305 Kan. at 727. At trial, the doctors testified as outlined by the 
prosecutor, and defendant did not object. The court concluded improper witness 
commentary on the mother's credibility by expressing a personal opinion on her 
"'appropriateness'" or "'cooperativeness'" was not manifest in the expected testimony 
because on its face it went to the mother's demeanor during her interactions with the two 
doctors. 305 Kan. at 728-29. 
 
But the State's opening in Chandler's case was different. The prosecutor told the 
jury something as fact that had no basis, i.e., "she drove directly up to Nebraska. After 
she gets to Nebraska, she turns around and goes home heading towards Denver." And the 
prosecutor's supposed Denver-via-Nebraska itinerary was apparently premised on the 
flimsy notion the detective could testify a person driving north from Topeka will 
eventually cross into Nebraska and that this would be enough evidentiary foundation for 
the statements made. 
 
Reasonable inferences "cannot be drawn from facts and conditions merely 
imagined or assumed." State v. Burton, 235 Kan. 472, 477, 681 P.2d 646 (1984). We hold 
there could be no reasonable good-faith basis for the prosecutor to believe there was 
substantive evidence to connect Chandler to Nebraska as was represented. It was error to 
include this in opening statement. 
 
A related problem infected the closing when the prosecutor said: 
 
"What these two gas cans [do] match up with is it gives her enough fuel to get from 
Denver to Topeka to do the killing and get out of the state. That's the significance of the 
gas cans. Otherwise her 27-mile-per-gallon can't be done." (Emphasis added.) 
 
39 
 
 
 
During the first oral argument before this court, the State admitted the italicized 
comment refers to the prosecutor's theory that Chandler left Topeka and drove north to 
Nebraska. Two problems are obvious. First, the statement flouts the trial court's earlier 
ruling that evidence of this theory was too speculative and inadmissible. Second, it is 
contrary to the record because no evidence was admitted supporting it. It was 
prosecutorial error to repeat this theme in closing. 
 
False claims about Internet searches 
 
In her pro se supplemental brief, Chandler challenges the prosecutor telling the 
jury in opening statement that KBI computer analyst John Kite would testify Chandler 
"accessed articles on CJ Online that dealt with how to defend against murder charges 
and articles that dealt with sentencing in murder charges." (Emphasis added.) Chandler 
correctly points out Kite gave no such testimony. The State does not address this in its 
supplemental briefing. 
 
At trial, when asked about Chandler's Topeka Capital Journal online searches, Kite 
said he only found "HTML fragments that produced search results for CJ online that had 
related articles about the homicide and the investigations into them" and "a story which 
was the one-year anniversary story." Curiously, the State's direct examination of Kite 
never tried to elicit testimony that Chandler searched for information about how to 
defend against murder charges or sentencing in murder cases. This failure to inquire 
indicates a lack of any reasonable good-faith basis for the prosecutor to make these 
claims in opening.  
 
Adding to the factual inaccuracy Chandler identifies, the prosecutor began her 
remarks about Kite's testimony by saying "he had found some things that had been done 
by the defendant on [her] work computer but thereafter deleted." The prosecutor did not 
40 
 
 
 
say when this occurred, i.e., before or after the crimes. The Topeka Capital Journal 
articles to which Kite referred all related to Mike's and Karen's murders, so those 
particular searches must have occurred after the crimes. Kite admitted on cross-
examination he found nothing "significant to [him] that occurred prior to July 7, 2002." 
 
But without context, a juror could easily construe the prosecutor's misstatements 
as suggesting Chandler did these things in preparation for murder, amplifying the impact 
of the State's motive evidence. We hold it was error for the prosecutor to tell the jury in 
opening statement that a State witness would testify Chandler searched for information 
about how to defend against murder charges or sentencing in murder cases. 
 
Arguments about Chandler outsmarting others 
 
During closing argument, the prosecutor said: 
 
"[T]he lack of forensic evidence is proof of premeditation. She planned it in advance. 
You know why, you heard the evidence, she's smart, she's got high intelligence and she 
thought she was smarter than the police department and she thought she was smarter 
than the jurors and it's not true, because we are lucky enough to have law enforcement 
officers who didn't torture her. She's still playing the victim. They wanted justice. And we 
have you. She's not smarter than the cops, [and] she's not smarter than you." (Emphases 
added.) 
 
Chandler asserts the italicized statements were error. She notes there was no 
evidence she had "high intelligence," although she concedes a witness testified her 
intelligence is "'probably above average.'" More importantly, Chandler argues there was 
no evidence she thought she was smarter than the police department or jury. And the 
State provides no justification for this. Evidence indicating Chandler's intelligence may 
41 
 
 
 
be above average does not support an inference she thought she was smarter than the 
police or jury. 
 
But beyond this obvious problem, the commentary suggests the jurors should take 
Chandler's behavior as a personal affront. As she correctly points out, "The only purpose 
of the prosecutor's comment was to inflame the jury." 
 
"The wide latitude permitted a prosecutor in discussing the evidence during 
closing argument in a criminal case includes at least limited room for rhetoric and 
persuasion, even for eloquence and modest spectacle." State v. Carr, 300 Kan. 1, 250, 
331 P.3d 544 (2014), rev'd and remanded on other grounds by 577 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 
633, 193 L. Ed. 2d 535 (2016). But "'expressions of personal opinion by the prosecutor 
are a form of unsworn, unchecked testimony, not commentary on the evidence of the 
case.'" State v. Brown, 300 Kan. 542, 560, 331 P.3d 781 (2014). 
 
"A prosecutor may not encourage the jury to decide a case based on a personal 
interest instead of neutrality or distract the jury from its duty to make decisions based on 
the evidence and the controlling law. See State v. Corbett, 281 Kan. 294, 313, 130 P.3d 
1179 (2006). But a prosecutor may use '"picturesque speech" as long as he or she does 
not refer to facts not disclosed by the evidence.' State v. Crawford, 300 Kan. 740, 748-49, 
334 P.3d 311 (2014)." State v. Fisher, 304 Kan. 242, 254, 373 P.3d 781 (2016). 
 
In another part of the closing, the prosecutor said: 
 
"Now, as to the statement to Bailey and to Sergeant Volle, the nice thing is if 
you're always telling the truth, you don't have to remember the details about what you 
said. But this gal talked to Sergeant Volle on July 11, 2002, she didn't give the details of 
where she had been to Bailey until August 12th, 2002, and you know what, [f]olks, she's 
not as smart as she thought. She forgot what she told Volle." (Emphasis added.) 
42 
 
 
 
The State argues this was proper because it addressed inconsistencies in 
Chandler's statements. And the first part appears to fall within the bounds of evidence-
based argument about the credibility of Chandler's alibi statements. See State v. Duong, 
292 Kan. 824, 831-32, 257 P.3d 309 (2011) (permissible for prosecutor to argue 
defendant's statements not credible based on references to evidence rebutting the 
statements). But the second part—in which the prosecutor argued Chandler was "not as 
smart as she thought" because "[s]he forgot" her prior version of the alibi—was just a 
euphemistic way of saying she lied. See Duong, 292 Kan. at 830 ("[A]ccusing a 
defendant of lying is outside the wide rhetorical latitude afforded prosecutors in closing 
argument."). And the manner in which the prosecutor expressed this further relied on the 
prosecutor's personal opinion that Chandler lied because she thought she could outsmart 
the police and the jury. 
 
A prosecutor is forbidden from offering personal opinion that a defendant's 
testimony is untruthful. See, e.g., Brown, 300 Kan. at 560 (holding prosecutorial remark 
that defendant "had the weekend to 'decide'" how to testify in response to evidence 
against her was error); State v. Akins, 298 Kan. 592, 607-08, 315 P.3d 868 (2014) (error 
when prosecutor asked did the jury "'buy'" defendant's story and said his testimony was 
"'not credible'"); State v. Elnicki, 279 Kan. 47, 63, 105 P.3d 1222 (2005) (error for 
prosecutor to call defendant's statement "a 'fabrication,' 'yarn,' 'final yarn,' and 'the yarn 
spun here, the four-part yarn.'"). 
 
We hold these comments were error. They not only were unsupported by the 
evidence, but they conveyed the prosecutor's unfounded, gratuitous belief that Chandler 
thought the jury was not smart enough to figure out the crime. In effect, the prosecutor 
urged jurors to convict Chandler to keep her from getting the better of them.  
 
 
43 
 
 
 
Leaving children without their dad and his fiancée 
  
In the rebuttal portion of closing arguments, the prosecutor said, 
 
"Now the State, just like the defense, would also like to implore you not to 
convict an innocent person. That would be horrible. Don't convict an innocent person. 
Instead, convict her because she killed Mike Sisco, she killed Karen Harkness, and she 
robbed her own children of their father and his fianc[ée]. You're at the end of the story. 
Come back to us and tell us the words we all want to hear and we want to hear it twice. 
Tell us guilty, she did it. Don't tell us we know. Tell us." (Emphases added.) 
 
The italicized comment is concerning because it elicits sympathy for the children. 
In State v. Holt, 300 Kan. 985, 992, 336 P.3d 312 (2014), the court held it was improper 
for the prosecutor to comment during a murder trial that "'now there is a 9-year-old boy 
and a newborn boy both with no dad.'" The court noted the fact the victim was a father 
was relevant to the State's theory the murder was motivated by jealousy. 300 Kan. at 993. 
"But the prosecutor took a step beyond reciting this evidence and noting its significance; 
the prosecutor emphasized that the children were left without a father, a fact not relevant 
to proving the charged crimes and significant only as an appeal to sympathy." 300 Kan. at 
993; see also State v. Adams, 292 Kan. 60, 67-68, 253 P.3d 5 (2011) (improper for 
prosecutor to argue trial was only chance to have someone held accountable for taking 
victim's life, so day of deliberations was "'as much about him if not more than anyone 
else'"); State v. Henry, 273 Kan. 608, 640-41, 44 P.3d 466 (2002) (improper for 
prosecutor to urge jury to think about how murder victim's mother must have felt on 
Mother's Day). 
 
The prosecutor expressly urged the jury to convict Chandler "because . . . she 
robbed her own children of their father and his fianc[ée]." We hold this comment was 
error. 
44 
 
 
 
Disobeying court order not to refer to people in the gallery 
 
This court raised this issue sua sponte during the first oral argument. To put our 
concern in context, the district court noted before closing arguments there were observers 
in the courtroom's public seating area. The judge then directed, "I do not want any of the 
folks that are in the gallery to be asked to stand up at any time during the closings." The 
prosecutor stated, "I got you." This was an apparent reference to a prior trial the judge 
presided over with the same prosecutor. The court continued: 
 
"The Court:  Ms. Spradling knows what I'm talking about. 
"[Prosecutor]:  Yes, I do, your honor. 
"The Court:  I will [be] jumping on you big time, if you do that. Do not do that in this  
case. I don't want references to folks here at all." (Emphasis added.) 
 
But despite this admonition, the prosecutor violated the court's order after playing 
a recorded jailhouse phone call between Chandler and Riegel by stating, "That's the 
defendant and her close friend Shirley Riegel that I'm getting a look from talking about 
what a great day it was because Patti Williams was dead and can't put the defendant in 
Kansas." (Emphasis added.) 
  
The trial court later ruled the prosecutor disregarded its order, but declined to 
declare a mistrial, stating: 
 
"With regard to the comment that Ms. Spradling made about Shirley Riegel, 
that's what I meant to direct everybody yesterday to do. Let's don't bring the folks that are 
in the gallery, the audience into this in one way or the other negatively, positively, 
sympathetically or in any way. I'm going to deny the motion for mistrial because I don't 
believe it rises to that level. Let us not do that, we don't need that. Folks are sensitive. 
This is so important . . . to all of these people in the room. I don't believe we need to cast 
45 
 
 
 
[a]spersions upon anyone or bring attention to that. So I would agree with Mr. Bennett's 
comment, but I don't believe it rises to the level of mistrial." 
 
This court asked about the gallery comment during the first oral argument. The 
State's counsel, who was also the prosecutor, declared she did not violate the order. She 
explained she did not ask half the gallery to stand up, noting that talking about the 
defendant's sister was not the same thing. But this response reflected a disquieting lack of 
candor with this court because it is obvious the trial court's instruction included not 
referring to people in the gallery. And counsel also knew the trial court had concluded her 
comment violated that instruction, yet she claimed no violation occurred. It goes without 
saying prosecutors, as officers of the court, are obligated to follow a court's directive. In 
re Kline, 298 Kan. 96, 137, 311 P.3d 321 (2013). 
 
Comment on post-arrest silence 
 
Chandler argues the prosecutor improperly commented on her post-arrest silence 
during closing argument: 
 
"How else do we know the defendant is guilty? She was arrested eight days after the 
murders on something else, not the murders, something else. And does she say to the 
police officers, Officer Roberts, Officer Noonan, Officer Walter[] or Detective Mike 
Barron, does she ask any of those four why am I under arrest? Nope. You know she never 
asked why she was under arrest, because she already knew. She knew, because she knew 
what she had done eight days earlier." (Emphasis added.) 
   
Chandler contends this commentary was contrary to the evidence and violated her 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel and Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, citing 
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976). Some additional 
background is necessary. 
46 
 
 
 
The prosecutor was referring to a July 15, 2002, traffic stop when police arrested 
Chandler on a child support warrant. During Detective Barron's examination, the State 
requested a sidebar to proffer his testimony that when arrested, Chandler did not ask why. 
The court ruled this was irrelevant, i.e., inadmissible. Even so, the State circled back to 
this topic with different witnesses. The State called Officer Tammy Walter for the sole 
purpose of asking about Chandler's silence. Walter transported her back to the police 
station after the arrest. Walter testified Chandler did not ask why she was being placed in 
the police car. Defense counsel failed to object to this testimony, but cross-examined 
Walter about whether Walter was present during the entire arrest. Walter made clear she 
was not. 
 
 
Later, when presenting evidence in her defense, Chandler called Officer Kelly 
Roberts, who conducted the traffic stop. On cross-examination, the State asked Roberts 
whether any officer present at the stop told Chandler why she was under arrest. He said 
no. The State then asked, "And she never asked why she was being arrested, right?" The 
officer answered, "No." 
 
Neither testimony fully supports what the prosecutor said in closing:  "And does 
she say to the police officers, Officer Roberts, Officer Noonan, Officer Walter[] or 
Detective Mike Barron, does she ask any of those four why am I under arrest? Nope." 
 
Had the evidence been limited to what Walter said, it would not support the 
prosecutor's claim because Walter said she was not present during the entire arrest. 
Roberts' testimony presents a much closer call. The issue is whether the prosecutor 
reasonably could infer Chandler did not ask any of the four officers named why she was 
under arrest. It is possible to read Roberts' testimony to mean he was referring only to 
himself. There was no foundation laid by the State to explain why Roberts might know 
what Chandler may have asked the other officers (Noonan and Barron). Worse yet, the 
47 
 
 
 
district court already ruled during Barron's testimony it was irrelevant whether Chandler 
asked why she was under arrest, so why would the State even try to infer this "fact" based 
on that ruling and this limited testimony? In the end, we decline Chandler's request to 
categorize the prosecutor's statement as being wholly outside the evidence, but her point 
is well taken.  
 
The far more serious constitutional question is the State's argument that the jury 
could infer Chandler committed two premediated first-degree murders if she did not ask 
why she was under arrest. Chandler asserts this was a Doyle violation, but that is not 
necessarily the problem. In Doyle, the United States Supreme Court explicitly held "that 
the use for impeachment purposes of [the defendants'] silence, at the time of arrest and 
after receiving Miranda warnings, violate[s] the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment." (Emphasis added.) Doyle, 426 U.S. at 619. The Court noted Miranda 
warnings are "a prophylactic means of safeguarding Fifth Amendment rights" and must 
be immediately administered to a person taken into custody. 426 U.S. at 617. In other 
words, Doyle and its progeny highlight a due process limitation on the State using post-
Miranda silence for impeachment purposes. State v. Wilkerson, 278 Kan. 147, 157, 91 
P.3d 1181 (2004). 
 
But Chandler did not testify, so the State was trying to use her silence at the traffic 
stop as evidence of her guilt—not for impeachment. The State went so far as to identify 
this silence as a reason the jury would "know the defendant is guilty." And in this 
context, this court has more broadly held that it is improper for a prosecutor to argue a 
defendant's guilt can be inferred from silence at a custodial interview because the 
defendant is not obligated to respond to questioning. State v. Stafford, 296 Kan. 25, 58, 
290 P.3d 562 (2012). 
 
48 
 
 
 
The State contends the prosecutor's comment was proper because the State claims 
Chandler's silence was before her Miranda warnings. The State's problem is that the 
record is silent about when Miranda warnings may have been given during this arrest. 
And based on the lack of a record, the State asks us to assume the officers did not 
immediately administer Chandler's Miranda warnings and then conclude based on this 
assumption that the State based its closing argument only on pre-Miranda silence. This 
asks too much given the constitutional rights at stake. 
 
There is a split of authority in the federal courts as to whether using a defendant's 
post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as evidence of guilt violates the right against self-
incrimination when the silence is not preceded by police questioning. See United States v. 
Salinas, 480 F.3d 750, 758-59 (5th Cir. 2007) (declining to resolve whether Fifth 
Amendment violated when defendant's post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence is used as 
substantive evidence of guilt; noting Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits hold this practice 
is prohibited, First and Sixth Circuits hold even some pre-arrest silence is protected, but 
Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits disagree); United States v. Whitehead, 200 F.3d 
634, 638-39 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding prosecutor's comment on post-arrest, pre-Miranda 
silence violated right against self-incrimination because this would constitute "'an 
impermissible penalty on the exercise of the . . . right to remain silent'"); United States v. 
Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 385, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("[N]either Miranda nor any other case 
suggests that a defendant's protected right to remain silent attaches only upon the 
commencement of questioning as opposed to custody" and "the law is plain that the 
prosecution cannot, consistent with the Constitution, use a defendant's silence against him 
as evidence of his guilt."). 
 
We have not addressed this exact question, and we need not weigh in on it today 
based on the existing trial record. We observe only that for the State's argument to have 
even potential viability, it would first need to establish when the Miranda warnings were 
49 
 
 
 
given, and then convince a court the legal position taken by the Fourth, Eighth, and 
Eleventh Circuits is superior to the opposing view staked out by the Seventh, Ninth, and 
D.C. Circuits. Given the lack of foundation presented by this record, the remark about 
Chandler's silence was at best cavalier as to the defendant's constitutional right to a fair 
trial.  
 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
 
 In State v. Sherman, 305 Kan. 88, 378 P.3d 1060 (2016), the court emphasized 
that despite its decision to move from the term "prosecutorial misconduct" to 
"prosecutorial error" when considering these appeals, the court was not abandoning 
prosecutorial misconduct as a descriptor for more serious occurrences, explaining: 
 
"[W]e are all too aware that the behaviors properly described as prosecutorial misconduct 
do still occur in Kansas. The power of the State to charge and prosecute its citizens for 
criminal violations of the law is a fearsome one, and it is vested exclusively in a 
prosecutor who is given vast discretion to make both charging decisions and the myriad 
of practical and strategic decisions that occur in the course of a prosecution. 'The 
prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other person in 
America.' Robert H. Jackson, U.S. Attorney Gen., The Federal Prosecutor, Address 
Before the Second Annual Conference of United States Attorneys (April 1, 1940). To 
suffer an abuse of this power at the hands of an unethical prosecutor is one of the grossest 
inequities and indignities that can be visited upon a citizen by the State. Such abuse 
cannot be tolerated in a free society." 305 Kan. at 92. 
 
In Sherman, we said, "Prosecutorial acts properly categorized as 'prosecutorial 
misconduct' are erroneous acts done with a level of culpability that exceeds mere 
negligence." 305 Kan. at 114. We have those in Chandler's case. The prosecution's lapses 
compel the harsher prosecutorial misconduct label. The errors outlined in this decision 
50 
 
 
 
are not "minor aberrations in a prolonged trial." United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 
310 U.S. 150, 240, 60 S. Ct. 811, 84 L. Ed. 1129 (1940).  
 
Taken as a whole, this prosecution unfortunately illustrates how a desire to win 
can eclipse the State's responsibility to safeguard the fundamental constitutional right to a 
fair trial owed to any defendant facing criminal prosecution in a Kansas courtroom. 
 
Our rulings make it unnecessary to consider Chandler's remaining issues on 
appeal.  
 
Reversed and remanded.