Title: The Warehouse II, LLC v. State of Wisconsin Department of Transportation
Citation: 2006 WI 62
Docket Number: 2003AP002865
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 6, 2006

2006 WI 62 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP2865 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
The Warehouse II, LLC,  
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
State of Wisconsin Department of Transportation,  
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 277 Wis. 2d 590, 690 N.W.2d 25 
(Ct. App. 2004-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 6, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 28, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Winnebago   
 
JUDGE: 
William H. Carver   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins the dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Alan Marcuvitz, Andrea H. Roschke and Michael Best & Friedrich 
LLP, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Alan Marcuvitz. 
 
For the defendant-respondent the cause was argued by Pamela 
Magee, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
2006 WI 62
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No. 2003AP2865  
(L.C. No. 
2002CV615) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
The Warehouse II, LLC, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
State of Wisconsin Department of 
Transportation, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 6, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   This case requires us 
to decide whether Wis. Stat. § 32.28(3)(b) (2003-04)1 entitles a 
successful condemnee to litigation expenses when the basis for 
the circuit court ruling in its favor is that the condemnor 
failed 
to 
negotiate 
in 
good 
faith 
before 
issuing 
the 
jurisdictional offer.2  Good faith negotiation prior to issuing a 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2003-04 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 This part of the circuit court's ruling is not contested. 
No. 
2003AP2865   
 
2 
 
jurisdictional offer to purchase3 is not merely a technical 
obligation, 
but 
rather, 
it 
is 
a 
fundamental, 
statutory 
requirement necessary to validly commence condemnation and 
confer jurisdiction on the condemnation commission and the 
courts. 
 
Therefore, 
because 
it 
is 
uncontested 
that 
the 
Department of Transportation (DOT) did not negotiate in good 
faith prior to issuing the jurisdictional offer, the DOT did not 
commence a statutorily sufficient condemnation.  As condemnation 
is a purely statutory procedure, the DOT lacked the right under 
the 
statutes 
to 
condemn 
Warehouse 
II, 
LLC's 
(Warehouse) 
property.  Accordingly, Warehouse is entitled to litigation 
expenses pursuant to § 32.28(3)(b), as set out in § 32.28(1).  
Therefore, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and 
remand to the circuit court to determine reasonable litigation 
expenses.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
The 
facts 
are 
undisputed. 
 
The 
DOT 
commenced 
condemnation proceedings against property owned by Warehouse.  
After the DOT issued its jurisdictional offer to purchase, 
Warehouse 
challenged 
the 
condemnation 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.05(5) in the Winnebago County Circuit Court,4 asserting that 
because the DOT had failed to negotiate in good faith prior to 
                                                 
3 We sometimes refer to the document that is our central 
focus as the "jurisdictional offer to purchase," as Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.05(3) does, and sometimes we refer to it simply as the 
"jurisdictional offer," as Wis. Stat. § 32.05(4) and (5) do.   
4 Judge William H. Carver presided. 
No. 
2003AP2865   
 
3 
 
issuing the jurisdictional offer, it lacked the right to condemn 
Warehouse's property.   
¶3 
The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing; ruled 
that the DOT had not negotiated in good faith; and concluded 
that the DOT's jurisdictional offer to purchase was invalid and 
all subsequent DOT actions were null and void.5  It awarded 
Warehouse 
litigation 
expenses 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.28(3)(b).  Warehouse submitted an itemization of litigation 
expenses to the DOT and the DOT refused to pay.  Warehouse then 
moved the circuit court to order the DOT to pay.  However, after 
consideration of the parties' positions, the circuit court 
accepted the DOT's contention that the circumstances of the case 
did not fall under § 32.28(3)(b), so no litigation expenses were 
due.  Warehouse appealed; the court of appeals affirmed; and we 
granted Warehouse's petition for review. 
                                                 
5 The pertinent language from the circuit court's Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order for Judgment is as 
follows: 
1. 
Prior to the issuance of the Jurisdictional 
Offer, Defendant did not enter into good faith 
negotiations, as required by sec. 32.05(2a), Stats. 
2. 
Because required good faith negotiations are 
a jurisdictional prerequisite to the exercise of 
eminent domain power under sec. 32.05, Stats., the 
absence of such negotiations causes the Jurisdictional 
Offer 
and 
all 
actions 
undertaken 
thereafter 
by 
Defendant, including the Award of Damages, to be null 
and void.   
No. 
2003AP2865   
 
4 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶4 
Our review requires us to construe a statute and apply 
it to the facts of the case.  Statutory interpretation and the 
application of a statute to the facts found are questions of law 
that we review without deference to the circuit court.  State v. 
Reed, 2005 WI 53, ¶13, 280 Wis. 2d 68, 695 N.W.2d 315.  However, 
we benefit from the analyses of the previous courts' decisions.  
State v. Cole, 2003 WI 59, ¶12, 262 Wis. 2d 167, 663 N.W.2d 700.  
Whether a defect in failing to follow a statutory directive is 
fundamental or technical is also a question of law for our 
independent review.  Schaefer v. Riegelman, 2002 WI 18, ¶25, 250 
Wis. 2d 494, 639 N.W.2d 715.   
B. 
Jurisdictional Offer 
¶5 
Wisconsin Stat. § 32.05(2a)6 requires that a condemnor 
negotiate with the property owner in good faith before issuing a 
jurisdictional offer to purchase.  It is not contested for 
purposes of this review that the DOT did not do so.   
¶6 
In Arrowhead Farms, Inc. v. Dodge County, 21 Wis. 2d 
647, 124 N.W.2d 631 (1963), we discussed the effect of failing 
to negotiate in good faith before making a jurisdictional offer 
to purchase.  Id. at 651-52.  We explained that "such 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 32.05(2a) states in relevant part: 
Before making the jurisdictional offer . . . the 
condemnor shall attempt to negotiate personally with 
the owner or one of the owners or his or her 
representative of the property sought to be taken for 
the purchase of the same. 
No. 
2003AP2865   
 
5 
 
negotiation is a necessary condition of conferring jurisdiction 
upon the administrative body and the court to determine just 
compensation . . . ."  Id. at 652.  We grounded the requirement 
of good faith negotiation in a primary purpose of statutory 
condemnation:  to provide just compensation to the property 
owner.  Id. at 651.   
¶7 
In Herro v. Natural Resources Board, 53 Wis. 2d 157, 
192 N.W.2d 104 (1971), we reaffirmed that a failure to negotiate 
before issuing the jurisdictional offer is "a jurisdictional 
defect."  Id. at 171 (citations omitted).  We explained the 
nexus between good faith negotiation prior to issuing a 
jurisdictional offer and the ability to exercise the power of 
eminent domain: 
[U]nless there is a bona fide attempt on the part of 
the condemnor to induce the owner to sell the land at 
a reasonable figure, the condition under which the 
power is granted is not fulfilled, and in such case 
any 
attempted 
exercise 
of 
eminent 
domain 
is 
unauthorized and consequently void and of no effect 
. . . .    
Id. (quoting 6 Nichols, Eminent Domain § 24.62(1) at 85 (3d 
ed.).   
¶8 
In examining the negotiation efforts made in Herro, we 
reiterated that ch. 32 provides the exclusive procedure in 
condemnation actions, including the requirement to negotiate 
before making a jurisdictional offer to purchase.  Herro, 53 
Wis. 2d at 171.  We explained that we strictly construe the 
portions of ch. 32 that apply to condemnation by requiring that 
the condemnor complete all of the statutory steps because 
No. 
2003AP2865   
 
6 
 
condemnation is in derogation of the common law.  Id. (citing 
City of Madison v. Tiedeman, 1 Wis. 2d 136, 83 N.W.2d 694 (1957) 
and Schroedel Corp. v. State Highway Comm'n, 34 Wis. 2d 32, 148 
N.W.2d 691 (1967)). 
¶9 
It cannot be disputed that the DOT must issue a 
jurisdictionally sufficient jurisdictional offer to purchase 
before it 
has the statutory right 
to proceed 
with the 
condemnation 
of 
property. 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 32.05(4) 
establishes that requirement.  It states, in relevant part: 
How notice of jurisdictional offer is given.  The 
giving of such notice is a jurisdictional requisite to 
a taking by condemnation.  . . .  Such notice shall be 
called the "jurisdictional offer."   
¶10 However, not every defect in a jurisdictional offer to 
purchase is a jurisdictional defect.  Jurisdictional defects are 
fundamental defects.  Schaefer, 250 Wis. 2d 494, ¶25.  Other 
defects in a jurisdictional offer to purchase may be merely 
technical defects.  See id.  In order to rise to the level of a 
fundamental defect, the error must go to the "primary purpose" 
underlying the statute that required the action.  See id., ¶¶26, 
28 (citing Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 
167 Wis. 2d 524, 533, 481 N.W.2d 629 (1992); Schlumpf v. 
Yellick, 94 Wis. 2d 504, 288 N.W.2d 834 (1980)).  In contrast to 
a fundamental defect, a technical defect does not go to the 
primary purpose underlying the statutory process, and if it does 
not prejudice the opposing party, it is insufficient to cause 
dismissal of the action.  Schaefer, 250 Wis. 2d 494, ¶27 (citing 
No. 
2003AP2865   
 
7 
 
Gaddis v. La Crosse Prods., Inc., 198 Wis. 2d 396, 407, 542 
N.W.2d 454 (1996)).  
¶11 The analysis of whether a defect is fundamental or 
technical is important to our consideration of the DOT's 
argument that Wieczorek v. City of Franklin, 82 Wis. 2d 19, 260 
N.W.2d 650 (1978), controls the outcome in this case.  In 
Wieczorek, the property owners contested the city's right to 
condemn their property.  Id. at 20.  After they had presented 
their case, the circuit court granted judgment in the property 
owners' favor because of a defect in the jurisdictional offer to 
purchase.  Id. at 20-21.  The defect was the failure to include 
a "proposed date of occupancy," as Wis. Stat. § 32.05(3)(c) 
requires.  Id. at 21.  The Wieczoreks claimed the right to 
litigation expenses based on that defect.  Id. at 22.  The city 
argued that the jurisdictional offer to purchase had only a 
"procedural defect" that could be cured by issuing an amended 
jurisdictional offer and therefore, the Wieczoreks had no right 
to attorney fees.  Id. at 22.  While we did not directly state 
that the failure to indicate a proposed date of occupancy was a 
procedural defect, we quoted United States v. 4.18 Acres of 
Land, 542 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1976) with approval where a 
procedural error was held to be insufficient to sustain an award 
of 
attorney 
fees 
under 
a 
federal 
condemnation 
statute.  
Wieczorek, 82 Wis. 2d at 25.   
¶12 In City of Racine v. Bassinger, 163 Wis. 2d 1029, 473 
N.W.2d 526 (Ct. App. 1991), the court of appeals explained that 
it was possible to have a variety of procedural defects in 
No. 
2003AP2865   
 
8 
 
condemnation proceedings, some of which were jurisdictional and 
some of which were not.  The court of appeals quoted the circuit 
court with approval as saying: 
The procedural steps which [in other cases] have been 
found to be jurisdictional in condemnation proceedings 
all have two significant features in common.  The 
first is that they are contained within the particular 
statute [that] sets forth the condemnation procedure, 
that is, the things [that] must be done to have and to 
exercise the power to acquire property by eminent 
domain in each particular case.  The second is that 
the statute expressly or impliedly denies the power of 
the condemnor to act unless the particular step is 
taken, and no other statutory remedy is provided for a 
failure to perform the particular step.  The only 
remedy [that] exists is to challenge the condemnation 
itself under Sec. 32.05(5) or 32.06(5), Wis. Stats.   
Id. at 1036-37 (footnote omitted; emphasis in original).  This 
reasoning is persuasive.  When we apply it to the procedural 
error in Wieczorek, we conclude that failing to include a 
proposed date of occupancy is not a jurisdictional defect.  
While Wis. Stat. § 32.05(3)(c) requires the jurisdictional offer 
to indicate a proposed date of occupancy, that task relates only 
to stating a "proposed date."  Indicating a proposed date of 
occupancy goes to neither the condemnor's power to act nor to a 
primary purpose of the condemnation procedure, providing just 
compensation to the property owner.  See Arrowhead Farms, 21 
Wis. 2d at 651-52.   
¶13 Therefore, failing to state a proposed date of 
occupancy is not comparable to failing to enter into good faith 
negotiation before issuing a jurisdictional offer.  As we have 
explained, a primary purpose of negotiation is to achieve a 
No. 
2003AP2865   
 
9 
 
consensual sale of the property with fair compensation to the 
property owner.  See Herro, 53 Wis. 2d at 171-73.  Good faith 
negotiation facilitates sales that are not forced by a court 
decision based on the power of eminent domain, but rather, 
consensual sales arrived at through negotiation.  Because 
achieving fair compensation for the property owner is the 
driving force behind the condemnation statutes, failing to 
negotiate prior to issuing a jurisdictional offer strikes at the 
heart of that legislative purpose.  By contrast, failing to list 
a proposed date of occupancy does not undermine the primary 
legislative purpose that drives the condemnation statutes:  
achieving 
just 
compensation 
for 
the 
property 
owner.  
Furthermore, the Wieczoreks were not prejudiced by the lack of a 
proposed 
date 
of 
occupancy 
in 
the 
jurisdictional 
offer.  
Accordingly, we conclude that the defect in the jurisdictional 
offer to purchase in Wieczorek was only a technical, procedural 
defect.  As such, it had no effect on the statutory right to 
condemn the property and does not control our decision in this 
matter.  
C. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 32.28(3)(b) 
¶14 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§32.28(3)(b) 
is 
a 
fee-shifting 
statute.  We interpret it to determine whether a successful 
jurisdictional challenge to a jurisdictional offer to purchase 
entitles the property owner to litigation expenses under 
§ 32.28(3)(b).  To ascertain the meaning of a statute, we employ 
well-known principles of statutory interpretation.  Our purpose 
is to "faithfully give effect to the laws enacted by the 
No. 
2003AP2865   
 
10 
 
legislature."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane 
County, 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  We 
defer to the policy choices of the legislature and we assume 
that the legislature's intent is expressed in the statutory 
language it chose.  Id., ¶44.  
¶15 "Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, and 
accepted meaning, except that technical or specially-defined 
words 
or 
phrases 
are 
given 
their 
technical 
or 
special 
definitional meaning."  Id., ¶45.  If the meaning of the 
language used in a statute is plain, we ordinarily stop our 
inquiry.  Id.  
¶16 Context and the structure of a statute in which the 
operative language appears are important to determining a 
statute's plain meaning.  Therefore, statutory language is 
interpreted in relation to the surrounding language of the 
statute.  Id., ¶46.  Statutory language also should be read "to 
give reasonable effect to every word, in order to avoid 
surplusage."  Id.  If this analysis yields a plain and clear 
statutory meaning, then the statute is unambiguous, and we apply 
it according to this ascertained meaning.  Id.   
¶17 However, a statute is ambiguous if the statutory 
language reasonably gives rise to two or more different 
meanings.  Id., ¶47.  A statute that is plain on its face may 
also be made ambiguous by its interaction with other statutes.  
State v. White, 97 Wis. 2d 193, 198, 295 N.W.2d 346 (1980).  If 
a statute is ambiguous, we may turn to extrinsic sources, such 
No. 
2003AP2865   
 
11 
 
as legislative history, to ascertain the meaning of the statute.  
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶48.  
¶18 Wisconsin Stat. § 32.28(3)(b) states in relevant part: 
In lieu of costs under ch. 814, litigation 
expenses shall be awarded to the condemnee if: 
. . . . 
(b) The court determines that the condemnor does 
not have the right to condemn part or all of the 
property described in the jurisdictional offer or 
there is no necessity for its taking.   
Section 32.28(3)(b) provides for litigation expenses when a 
property owner prevails in proving either that the condemnor 
does not have "the right to condemn" or that "there is no 
necessity for its taking."  Whether Warehouse has proven that 
the DOT did not have the "right to condemn" is at issue here.   
¶19 We begin by assessing the positions of both parties.  
We conclude that it is reasonable to interpret the fee-shifting 
provisions of Wis. Stat. § 32.28(3)(b), as Warehouse advocates, 
as requiring a court determination that the condemnor does not 
have the "right to condemn" a particular property at that time.  
Under 
Warehouse's 
interpretation, 
a 
successful 
condemnee 
challenging a particular condemnation could receive litigation 
expenses, even when the condemnor could eventually issue a 
jurisdictional offer that is sufficient to condemn the property.  
This 
interpretation 
turns 
on 
the 
concept 
that 
only 
a 
jurisdictional offer issued after good faith negotiation is 
statutorily sufficient to support the power of eminent domain.  
No. 
2003AP2865   
 
12 
 
Stated 
otherwise, 
good 
faith 
negotiation 
is 
itself 
a 
prerequisite to a condemnor's statutory right to condemn.   
¶20 We also conclude that it is reasonable to interpret 
the "right to condemn," as the DOT advocates, to require a court 
determination that the condemnor permanently lacks the ability 
to condemn a particular property, before litigation expenses can 
be awarded.  Under that interpretation, the only types of claims 
for which successful parties would receive litigation expenses 
under Wis. Stat. § 32.28(3)(b) would be those in which a court 
determined the condemning authority permanently lacked some 
prerequisite to an eminent domain taking, e.g., an invalid 
purpose for the taking or an inability to condemn the property 
in question.  Accordingly, we conclude that the term "right to 
condemn" of § 32.28(3)(b) is ambiguous because it can reasonably 
be interpreted both ways.  However, we also conclude that these 
two interpretations are not necessarily mutually exclusive.  In 
our view, the effect of the claimed deficiency in the procedure 
controls the analysis.   
¶21 It is undisputed that Wis. Stat. § 32.28(3)(b) is a 
fee-shifting statute.  When we examine the context in which the 
legislature placed § 32.28(3)(b), we can better ascertain the 
meaning of "the right to condemn."  Section § 32.28(1) states: 
In this section, "litigation expenses" means the 
sum 
of 
the 
costs, 
disbursements 
and 
expenses, 
including 
reasonable 
attorney, 
appraisal 
and 
engineering 
fees 
necessary 
to 
prepare 
for 
or 
participate 
in 
actual 
or 
anticipated 
proceedings 
before 
the 
condemnation 
commissioners, 
board 
of 
assessment or any court under this chapter. 
No. 
2003AP2865   
 
13 
 
It sets out a more expansive list of expenses that a condemnee 
could incur than those listed in § 32.28(2).  Section 32.28(2) 
states: 
Except as provided in sub. (3), costs shall be 
allowed under ch. 814 in any action brought under this 
chapter.  If the amount of just compensation found by 
the court or commissioners of condemnation exceeds the 
jurisdictional offer or the highest written offer 
prior to the jurisdictional offer, the condemnee shall 
be deemed the successful party under s. 814.02(2).  
¶22 Wisconsin Stat. § 32.28(2) permits only the usual ch. 
814 
costs. 
 
However, 
paras. 
(3)(a)–(i) 
of 
§ 32.28 
list 
circumstances when the general rule of awarding only ch. 814 
costs to the prevailing party is not applied and the litigation 
expenses set out in § 32.28(1)7 are awarded.  The occasions where 
                                                 
7 The 
other sections 
of 
subsection (3) 
identify the 
following particular types of actions and circumstances for 
which fee-shifting occurs: 
(a) The 
proceeding 
is 
abandoned 
by 
the 
condemnor; 
. . . . 
(c) The judgment is for the plaintiff in an 
action under s. 32.10; 
(d) The award of the condemnation commission 
under 
s. 
32.05(9) 
or 
32.06(8) 
exceeds 
the 
jurisdictional offer or the highest written offer 
prior to the jurisdictional offer by at least $700 and 
at least 15% and neither party appeals the award to 
the circuit court; 
(e) The jury verdict as approved by the court 
under s. 32.05(11) exceeds the jurisdictional offer or 
the highest written offer prior to the jurisdictional 
offer by at least $700 and at least 15%; 
No. 
2003AP2865   
 
14 
 
the property owner is awarded more expenses incurred in 
contesting an action taken by a condemnor are all directed at 
actions that significantly short-change the property owner in 
some respect.  For example, in paras. (3)(d)-(i), if the 
compensation offered by the condemnor was at least $700 and 15% 
too low, the condemnee "shall" be awarded the reasonable 
litigation expenses incurred.  In paras. (3)(a) and (3)(c), 
litigation expenses are awarded when the condemnor either 
started a condemnation it later determined it should not have 
                                                                                                                                                             
(f) The 
condemnee 
appeals 
an 
award 
of the 
condemnation 
commission 
which 
exceeds 
the 
jurisdictional offer or the highest written offer 
prior to the jurisdictional offer by at least $700 and 
at least 15%, if the jury verdict as approved by the 
court under s. 32.05(10) or 32.06(10) exceeds the 
award of the condemnation commission by at least $700 
and at least 15%; 
(g) The condemnor appeals the award of the 
condemnation commission, 
if the 
jury 
verdict as 
approved by the court under s. 32.05(10) or 32.06(10) 
exceeds the jurisdictional offer 
or the 
highest 
written offer prior to the jurisdictional offer by at 
least $700 and at least 15%; 
(h) The 
condemnee 
appeals 
an 
award 
of the 
condemnation commission which does not exceed the 
jurisdictional offer or the highest written offer 
prior to the jurisdictional offer by 15%, if the jury 
verdict as approved by the court under s. 32.05(10) or 
32.06(10) exceeds the jurisdictional offer or the 
highest written offer prior to the jurisdictional 
offer by at least $700 and at least 15%; or 
(i) The 
condemnee 
appeals 
an 
assessment 
of 
damages and benefits under s. 32.61(3), if the 
judgment is at least $700 and at least 15% greater 
than the award made by the city. 
No. 
2003AP2865   
 
15 
 
begun or the condemnor did not commence condemnation proceedings 
when it should have done so.  Paragraph (3)(b) is part of that 
legislative decision to fee-shift, but it sets out circumstances 
that trigger fee-shifting in more general terms, e.g., when the 
court concludes that the condemnor lacks "the right to condemn" 
or that there is "no necessity for its taking."  These 
paragraphs of subsec. (3) level the playing field by shifting 
the obligation to pay expenses that may have been unnecessary if 
the condemnor had shouldered its responsibilities properly.   
¶23 The right to condemn that is at issue here is also 
used in Wis. Stat. §§ 32.05(5) and 32.06(5). There, the 
legislature established claims for relief when the condemnor 
does not have the right to condemn.  Section 32.05(5) pertains 
to 
the 
right 
to 
condemn 
for 
sewers 
and 
transportation 
facilities, the circumstances in which Warehouse's claim arises.  
All of these rights are statutory rights. 
¶24 Wisconsin Stat. § 32.05(5) states in relevant part:  
If an owner desires to contest the right of the 
condemnor to condemn the property described in the 
jurisdictional offer, for any reason other than that 
the amount of compensation offered is inadequate, the 
owner may . . . commence an action in the circuit 
court . . . . 
Section 32.05(5) uses terms identical to that of Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.28(3)(b) regarding the right to condemn, i.e., the "right" 
of the condemnor to condemn the property described in the 
jurisdictional offer.  It permits a condemnee to challenge that 
statutory right for reasons other than an offer of inadequate 
compensation.  As we explained above, paras. (3)(d)–(i) of 
No. 
2003AP2865   
 
16 
 
§ 32.28 all involve inadequate compensation.  Paragraphs (3)(a)–
(c) do not.  The general statement "for any reason other than" 
in § 32.05(5), must be read to exclude from claims that may be 
brought under § 32.05(5) those claims described in paras. 
(3)(d)–(i).  That leaves para. (3)(a), abandonment, and para. 
(3)(b), the lack of the "right to condemn," that could fall 
within the claims permitted by § 32.05(5).8  We note the parallel 
wording in the "right" to condemn in § 32.05(5) and the "right" 
to condemn in § 32.28(3)(b).  They are both part of a common 
statutory scheme, and therefore we assume they refer to the same 
quality.  See City of Milwaukee v. Milwaukee County, 27 Wis. 2d 
53, 59, 133 N.W.2d 393 (1965).  This right appears to us to be a 
statutory right that cannot be invoked without jurisdiction.   
¶25 We now turn to legislative history underlying the 
eminent domain statutes to see if it sheds further light on 
whether Wis. Stat. § 32.28(3)(b) provides litigation expenses 
when the jurisdictional offer is invalid due to a failure to 
negotiate in good faith prior to issuing it.  The legislative 
history, particularly in regard to the 1977 revision to ch. 32, 
demonstrates that one of the legislature's purposes in that 
revision was to increase the types of circumstances in which 
condemnees would receive litigation expenses.  
                                                 
8 We do not address Wis. Stat. § 32.28(3)(c) actions for 
inverse condemnation that are brought under Wis. Stat. § 32.10, 
but we note the court of appeals has concluded that actions 
under 
§ 32.10 
are 
to 
receive 
litigation 
expenses 
under 
§ 32.28(3)(c).  Maxey v. Redevelopment Auth. of Racine, 120 
Wis. 2d 13, 20, 353 N.W.2d 812 (Ct. App. 1984).   
No. 
2003AP2865   
 
17 
 
¶26 We begin with the pre-1977 version of the statute 
relating to litigation expenses in condemnation actions.  The 
final sentence of Wis. Stat. § 32.05(5) (1973), was added by ch. 
244, Laws of 1971.  It had limited applicability as it provided: 
If the final judgment of the court is that the 
condemnor cannot condemn the property described in the 
jurisdictional offer, the judgment shall also award 
the owner such sum as will in the opinion of the court 
reimburse 
the 
owner 
for 
his 
reasonable 
costs, 
disbursements 
and 
expenses 
including 
reasonable 
attorney 
and 
engineering 
fees 
actually 
incurred 
because of the action of the condemnor, but the 
judgment shall not, in addition thereto, award the 
owner taxable costs and disbursements pursuant to ch. 
271.   
(Emphasis added.)  In November of 1977, Assembly Bill 1077 was 
introduced.  It removed the above sentence from § 32.05(5) and 
created Wis. Stat. § 32.28, "Costs."  The new section specified 
what was to be included in litigation costs, § 32.28(1), and 
that generally costs in eminent domain proceedings were to 
follow the usual rules for costs set out in ch. 814, § 32.28(2).   
¶27 The 1977 revisions also created nine exceptions to the 
general rule that only ch. 814 costs are allowed.  They closely 
parallel the nine paragraphs of Wis. Stat. § 32.28(3) that exist 
today.  The exceptions to the general rule on costs expanded the 
opportunities for condemnees to be made whole when they were 
successful 
in 
condemnation 
disputes. 
 
For 
example, 
the 
legislature expanded fee-shifting to condemnees' challenges in 
other than transportation matters, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.06(5), as a note that appeared in the body of the original 
No. 
2003AP2865   
 
18 
 
bill indicates.9  Additionally, while the former provision in 
Wis. Stat. § 32.05(5) granted discretion to the circuit court to 
award litigation expenses, the revised provision established a 
mandate10 that those expenses be paid when the circumstances in 
any paragraph of subsec. (3) of § 32.28 are met.  Furthermore, 
the former provision in § 32.05(5) required a "final judgment" 
before the circuit court had the discretion to award litigation 
expenses.  In contrast, the revised statutory language of 
§ 32.28(3)(b) provides for litigation expenses if "[t]he court 
determines that the condemnor does not have the right to condemn 
part or all of the property described in the jurisdictional 
offer or there is no necessity for its taking," thereby 
eliminating the requirement that the judgment be final before 
the right to litigation expenses arises.  The version of 
§ 32.28(3)(b) created under the 1977 revision is not different 
in any material respect from the current statute.11 
                                                 
9 "Present s. 32.05(5) requires the award of reasonable 
costs, 
disbursements 
and 
expenses 
including 
attorney 
and 
engineering fees in such cases.  This [bill] extends the rule to 
actions under s. 32.06 . . . ."  Legislative Reference Bureau 
Drafting Record for 1977 A.B. 1077. 
10 The word "shall" is normally understood to be mandatory.  
C.A.K. v. State, 154 Wis. 2d 612, 621-622, 453 N.W.2d 897 (1990) 
(citation omitted).   
11 The only difference between the language in the 1977 
version and the current version is the change in the wording 
from subsec. (3):  "the court shall award litigation expenses" 
(1977) to subsec. (3):  "litigation expenses shall be awarded," 
pursuant to 1995 Wis. Act 140.   
No. 
2003AP2865   
 
19 
 
¶28 The legislature recognized that its expansion of fee-
shifting opportunities would have a fiscal impact on those 
entities that had the power of eminent domain.  The drafting 
record indicates the legislature considered the following: 
Litigation.  Local governments may also incur 
significant increased costs as a result of the changes 
which specify four circumstances in which a condemnee 
may receive reasonable "litigation expenses."  Most of 
this cost increase is likely to occur from appealed 
cases where the condemnee receives an award from 
either the condemnation commission or circuit court 
that exceeds the jurisdictional offer by at least 10%.  
The 
size 
of 
this 
increase 
is 
not 
possible 
to 
determine.  . . . 
 
In addition, the broader coverage of the sections 
relating to abandoned condemnation proceedings and 
litigation which challenges either the condemnor's 
authority to condemn or the necessity of the taking 
also is likely to increase local government litigation 
costs.  . . . 
. . .  
The increase in litigation costs for the Division 
of Highways, Department of Transportation is estimated 
in excess of $2,000,000.  This calculation is based on 
increased payments to owners and increased payments 
for owners' attorneys and appraisers.  As a result of 
discussions with members of the Wisconsin Attorney 
General's 
staff, 
we 
believe 
that 
a 
substantial 
increase in litigation activity should be anticipated.  
DOT Fiscal Estimate to 1977 A.B. 1077, at 6, 9. 
¶29 The 1977 amendments demonstrate a legislative policy 
choice to encourage condemnors to take seriously commencing a 
condemnation action, to make fair jurisdictional offers and to 
carefully follow the condemnation statutes.  We have previously 
recognized 
these 
policies 
that 
underlie 
eminent 
domain 
No. 
2003AP2865   
 
20 
 
legislation.  Redevelopment Auth. of Green Bay v. Bee Frank, 
Inc., 120 Wis. 2d 402, 411-12, 355 N.W.2d. 240 (1984). 
¶30 In 
Bee 
Frank, 
we 
held 
that 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.28(3)(d) the tenant-owner of immovable fixtures that were 
taken during the condemnation of the property owner's building 
was entitled to litigation expenses when the condemnation 
commission's award for immovable fixtures exceeded the tenant's 
immovable fixtures portion of the jurisdictional offer.  Bee 
Frank, 120 Wis. 2d at 412-13.  In Bee Frank, we broadly 
interpreted para. (3)(d), holding that the legislature had a 
dual intent in enacting that paragraph:  "(1) to discourage the 
condemnor from making inequitably low jurisdictional offers and 
(2) to make the condemnee, who meets the statutory requirements, 
whole."  Id. at 411.  
¶31 In Bee Frank, we relied heavily on Standard Theatres, 
Inc. v. DOT, 118 Wis. 2d 730, 349 N.W.2d 661 (1984), in which we 
reversed the court of appeals' reduction of the circuit court's 
award of attorney fees under Wis. Stat. § 32.28.  In explaining 
our decision, we said: 
When the owner is deprived of property against his or 
her will, it is obvious that the owner is not justly 
compensated for his or her property if the owner must 
initially be forced to litigate in order to obtain the 
full value of the land, and then must pay for his or 
her attorney fees from this full value.  The attorney 
fees incurred here were, after all, necessitated by 
the owner's attempt to get the fair value of the 
owner's real estate.  Therefore, one must start from 
the premise that the owner is to be compensated for 
the attorney fees.  In other words, the purpose behind 
the statute is to make the owner "whole," through 
compensating the owner for the value of the property 
No. 
2003AP2865   
 
21 
 
taken and for the attorney fees incurred in attempting 
to obtain this value.   
Id. at 744-45.   
¶32 The Bee Frank decision expanded that explanation:  
While Standard Theatres specifically dealt with 
attorney fees, its holding is clearly applicable to 
the other litigation expenses, enumerated in sec. 
32.28(1), Stats.  In permitting recovery of litigation 
expenses, 
the 
legislature 
sought 
to provide the 
condemnee with just compensation by ensuring that he 
or she would not be forced to use part of the award to 
pay for litigation expenses after a successful appeal.   
Bee Frank, 120 Wis. 2d at 412.  Bee Frank also reinforced our 
decision to liberally construe statutory provisions regarding 
compensation for eminent domain takings to favor the property 
owner whose property is taken against his or her will.  Id. at 
409-10 (citing Aero Auto Parts, Inc. v. DOT, 78 Wis. 2d 235, 
241, 253 N.W.2d 896 (1977)).  Our liberal construction of 
condemnation statutes in areas favoring property owners is 
grounded in our concern for the property owner when an entity 
exercises the "extraordinary power" of eminent domain.  Bee 
Frank, 120 Wis. 2d at 409.   
¶33 Accordingly, we conclude that the overall purpose of 
the 1977 amendments was to provide more specific and concrete 
opportunities to recover litigation expenses for condemnees with 
legitimate challenges to the actions of condemnors.  This 
purpose is driven by the legislative decision to make condemnees 
whole through lightening the financial burden of successful 
No. 
2003AP2865   
 
22 
 
challenges and to discourage inequitable jurisdictional offers 
during the exercise of the extraordinary power of condemnation.12   
¶34 Therefore, we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 32.28(3)(b) 
applies when the condemnor's jurisdictional offer to purchase 
was not made after good faith negotiations, thereby causing a 
jurisdictional defect in the jurisdictional offer to purchase.  
This jurisdictional defect causes the condemnor to lack the 
statutory right to condemn.  We note that if a condemnee were 
denied litigation expenses for a successful challenge to the 
negotiation requirement, there would be little to discourage a 
condemnor from making a low-ball offer to save money.  When the 
property owner filed a court action claiming that the condemnor 
did not have the "right to condemn" the property, the condemnor 
could then negotiate with the property owner and make a fair 
offer, with no added expense to the condemnor, but with a cost 
to the property owner.  The obligation to negotiate with the 
property owner before making a jurisdictional offer is a 
valuable right of the property owner, Kultgen v. Mueller, 3 
Wis. 2d 346, 349, 88 N.W.2d 687 (1958), for which the property 
owner should not be forced to incur unrecoverable attorney fees 
and other court costs to actualize.  And finally, were we to 
                                                 
12 This policy choice also is evidenced by the abandonment 
provision, Wis. Stat. § 32.28(3)(a), where a condemnor could 
later commence an action to condemn the same property. 
No. 
2003AP2865   
 
23 
 
conclude, as the DOT requests, we would not be complying with a 
primary purpose of the 1977 revision to ch. 32.13  
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶35 In sum, we conclude that good faith negotiation prior 
to issuing a jurisdictional offer to purchase is not merely a 
technical obligation, but rather, it is a fundamental, statutory 
requirement necessary to validly commence condemnation and 
confer jurisdiction on the condemnation commission and the 
courts.  Therefore, because it is uncontested that the DOT did 
not negotiate in good faith prior to issuing the jurisdictional 
offer, the DOT did not commence a statutorily sufficient 
condemnation.  As condemnation is purely a statutory procedure, 
the DOT lacked the right under the statutes to condemn 
Warehouse's property.  Accordingly, Warehouse is entitled to 
litigation expenses pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 32.28(3)(b), as set 
out in § 32.28(1).  Therefore, we reverse the decision of the 
court of appeals and remand to the circuit court to determine 
reasonable litigation expenses.   
                                                 
13 The dissent contends that because we interpreted the 
phrase "cannot condemn" to mean "has no right to condemn" in 
Wieczorek v. City of Franklin, 82 Wis. 2d 19, 260 N.W.2d 650 
(1978), Wieczorek controls the outcome of this case.  Dissent, 
¶42.  We disagree.  First, the defect in Wieczorek was merely a 
technical defect, not a jurisdictional defect, as is present 
here.  Second, we interpreted a different statute in Wieczorek, 
as we have explained above.  Third, the Legislative Reference 
Bureau's Analysis anticipated an increase in litigation costs 
due to the increased number of circumstances under which a 
property owner could contest the right to condemn under the 1977 
revisions.  Our decision is consistent with that legislative 
policy choice.   
No. 
2003AP2865   
 
24 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause remanded. 
 
 
No.  2003AP2865.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶36 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  I agree 
with the circuit court and the court of appeals: Warehouse II 
does not recover litigation expenses.  
¶37 As the majority 
opinion 
correctly 
explains, the 
primary purpose of the condemnation statute is to achieve just 
compensation.  Litigation expenses are not included in just 
compensation.1  If litigation expenses are to be awarded, the 
legislature must expressly so provide. 
¶38 This is a statutory interpretation case.  The issue is 
what Wis. Stat. § 32.28(3)(b) means when it awards a condemnee 
litigation expenses when the condemnor "does not have the right 
to condemn" the property.  The majority opinion concludes that 
"does not have the right to condemn" means the condemnor 
committed a "jurisdictional" defect in complying with Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.05 rather than a "technical" defect in bringing the 
condemnation proceedings.  I conclude that the phrase means that 
the condemnor does not have the power to condemn the property 
even if it fully complied with the steps set forth in § 32.05.  
¶39 The instant case involves litigation expenses when the 
condemnee objected to the condemnation on the ground that the 
condemnor did not attempt to negotiate before the notice of the 
jurisdictional offer.  The objection was valid, the condemnation 
proceedings were terminated, and the condemnor had to begin 
condemnation proceedings anew.  
                                                 
1 Martineau v. State Conservation Comm'n, 54 Wis. 2d 76, 85, 
194 N.W.2d 664 (1972). 
No.  2003AP2865.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶40 The 
Department 
of 
Transportation 
began 
a 
new 
condemnation proceeding and has successfully condemned Warehouse 
II's property.  The parties currently dispute the amount of the 
condemnation award.  Warehouse II asks the State to pay for 
litigation 
expenses 
Warehouse 
II 
incurred 
to 
delay 
the 
inevitable condemnation.  Unfortunately, the majority opinion 
obliges.  Many of the condemnee's litigation expenses incurred 
in 
the 
first 
proceeding, 
for 
which 
Warehouse 
II 
seeks 
reimbursement, probably allowed Warehouse II to avoid expenses 
in the second proceeding. 
¶41 I 
disagree 
with 
the 
majority 
opinion 
that 
the 
condemnee is entitled to litigation expenses under Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.28(3)(b) (2003-04) when the condemnation proceedings are 
terminated for the condemnor's failure to attempt to negotiate, 
a correctable defect. 
¶42 Wieczorek v. City of Franklin, 82 Wis. 2d 19, 260 
N.W.2d 650 (1978), interpreting Wis. Stat. § 32.05(5) (1971), 
governs this case.2  Wieczorek held that when a jurisdictional 
offer 
is 
defective 
and 
the 
condemnation 
proceedings 
are 
terminated, the condemnor can bring condemnation proceedings 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 32.05(5) (1971) provided in pertinent 
part: "If the final judgment of the court is that the condemnor 
cannot condemn the property . . . , the judgment shall also 
award the owner such sum as will in the opinion of the court 
reimburse the owner for his reasonable costs, disbursements and 
expenses, 
including 
reasonable 
attorney 
and 
engineering 
fees . . . ."  
The court of appeals in Toombs v. Washburn County, 119 
Wis. 2d 346, 350 N.W.2d 720 (Ct. App. 1984), viewed Wieczorek v. 
City of Franklin, 82 Wis. 2d 19, 260 N.W.2d 650 (1978), as 
applicable to the current statute. 
No.  2003AP2865.ssa 
 
3 
 
anew.  No attorney fees may be awarded to the landowner.  
Applying Wieczorek, I conclude that Warehouse II is not entitled 
to litigation expenses under Wis. Stat. § 32.28(3)(b) (2003-04).    
¶43 The majority opinion fails to overturn the Wieczorek 
case or successfully distinguish Wieczorek from the present 
case.  Furthermore, the majority opinion fails to distinguish 
the present statutes from the statutes interpreted in Wieczorek.  
¶44 In interpreting the current statute, the majority 
opinion is internally contradictory and contradicts the text of 
the statute.  The majority opinion muddies the law and will 
foster litigation.  I therefore cannot join the majority 
opinion.      
¶45 The majority opinion errs in at least five ways. 
¶46 ERROR 1. The majority opinion errs in attempting to 
differentiate 
between 
jurisdictional 
defects 
and 
technical 
defects for purposes of condemnation proceedings and for 
purposes of awarding the condemnee litigation expenses.   
¶47 According to the majority opinion, if a defect in the 
condemnation proceedings is jurisdictional (as the majority 
opinion classifies a failure to negotiate), the condemnation 
proceeding 
terminates 
and 
the 
condemnee 
is 
entitled 
to 
litigation expenses.   
¶48 If the defect is technical (as the majority opinion 
classifies a failure to state the proposed date of occupancy, 
the defect in Wieczorek), the condemnation proceeding terminates 
No.  2003AP2865.ssa 
 
4 
 
and the condemnee is not entitled to litigation expenses.  The 
majority opinion thus limits Wieczorek to technical defects.3     
¶49 Whether a jurisdictional defect or technical defect, a 
defect means that the condemnation proceedings cannot proceed 
unless the defect is corrected.  The only difference between a 
jurisdictional defect and a technical defect seems to be that a 
condemnee can receive litigation expenses when a court labels 
the defect jurisdictional.   
¶50 There are several problems with the majority opinion's 
jurisdictional/technical analysis.   
A 
¶51 The majority opinion's use of the words "jurisdiction" 
and "jurisdictional defect" is obscure.   
¶52 "Jurisdictional defect" has many possible meanings, 
with different consequences.  Is the majority opinion using the 
words "jurisdictional defect" to mean the court's competence to 
proceed?4  Or is the majority opinion using the words to mean 
                                                 
3 After concluding 
that 
the defect in 
Wieczorek was 
technical, the majority proceeds to the second step of its 
jurisdictional/technical 
analysis 
and 
declares 
that 
"the 
Wieczoreks were not prejudiced by the lack of a proposed date of 
occupancy in the jurisdictional offer."  Majority op., ¶13.  Did 
the majority review the record, or even the briefs, from 
Wieczorek?  Was this issue even litigated?  The majority has no 
way of knowing whether the Wieczoreks were prejudiced. 
4 Starting in 1981, Eberhardy v. Circuit Court for Wood 
County, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 552, 307 N.W.2d 881 (1981), the court 
has stated numerous times that a circuit court has subject 
matter jurisdiction, as a matter of state constitutional law, in 
all matters.  Thus, the majority opinion must not be referring 
to subject matter jurisdiction. 
 
No.  2003AP2865.ssa 
 
5 
 
personal jurisdiction over the parties?  Or is the majority 
opinion using the words to mean something else?     
¶53 Not only is the majority opinion's meaning of the 
words "jurisdictional defect" unclear, but it is doubtful that 
the cases cited by the majority use the words "jurisdictional 
defect" in the same way that the majority opinion does. 
¶54 The majority opinion relies on Schaefer v. Riegelman, 
2002 WI 18, 250 Wis. 2d 494, 639 N.W.2d 715, to distinguish 
between jurisdictional and technical defects.  Schaefer is not a 
condemnation case; it is a legal malpractice action.  Schaefer 
involved a defectively signed summons and complaint.  The 
summons and complaint were essential to commence the malpractice 
action.5  The question before the circuit court in Schaefer was 
whether it had jurisdiction over the action when the summons and 
complaint were defective.  The supreme court concluded that the 
defect deprived the circuit court of jurisdiction.   
¶55 In the present case the condemnee's action was 
properly commenced in circuit court by summons and complaint.  
No one challenges the circuit court's personal jurisdiction over 
the parties or subject matter jurisdiction over the condemnee's 
suit against the Department of Transportation.   
¶56 The issue before the circuit court in the instant case 
was a question of substantive condemnation law, namely, whether 
the condemnation proceedings must be terminated because the 
                                                 
5 See Wis. Stat. § 801.02(1)-(2) (requiring a summons and 
complaint to commence a civil action). 
No.  2003AP2865.ssa 
 
6 
 
condemnor 
failed 
to 
follow 
the 
statutory 
procedure 
for 
condemnation.  
¶57 The majority opinion tries to make the condemnor's 
failure to negotiate before sending the jurisdictional offer a 
major defect.6  Parties can, however, negotiate after a 
jurisdictional offer is made.  An attempt at negotiation was 
made in the instant case after notice of the jurisdictional 
offer; negotiations failed.  Negotiation apparently also failed 
in the second condemnation proceeding.  
¶58 The failure to negotiate means only that the condemnor 
may correct the error and proceed anew, as it did in the present 
case.  The failure to negotiate is an error that can be 
rectified; the condemnor gets a "do-over."  The condemnor does 
not lose its right to condemn the property. 
¶59 The 
majority 
opinion 
dismisses 
the 
statutory 
requirement of a proposed date of occupancy (at issue in 
Wieczorek).7  Yet the court of appeals has declared that a 
jurisdictional offer without a proposed date of occupancy is a 
defective jurisdictional offer and the jurisdictional offer is a 
jurisdictional requisite to condemnation.8  The condemnor gets a 
do-over.   
¶60 I 
question 
whether 
the 
distinction 
between 
jurisdictional and technical errors in Schaefer (and all the 
cases upon which Schaefer relied) can be extended beyond errors 
                                                 
6 Majority op., ¶13 
7 Id., ¶¶12-13. 
8 Toombs, 119 Wis. 2d at 349.  
No.  2003AP2865.ssa 
 
7 
 
in a summons and complaint commencing an action in circuit court 
to the present case.  In any event, nothing in the case law or 
ch. 32 of the statutes supports this jurisdictional/technical 
distinction for purposes of condemnation proceedings or for 
purposes of awarding litigation expenses. 
B 
¶61 Not only does the majority opinion erroneously create 
a distinction between jurisdictional and technical errors that 
does not exist in the condemnation and litigation expenses 
statutes, it also ignores the fact that the only statutory 
provision that creates a "jurisdictional requisite" is not the 
provision at issue in the instant case, but rather is precisely 
the provision that was at issue in Wieczorek.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 32.05 characterizes only one act required of the condemnor as 
a "jurisdictional requisite," namely, sending the jurisdictional 
offer to the owner. 
¶62 Wisconsin Stat. § 32.05(4) states that "notice [of a 
jurisdictional offer] is a jurisdictional requisite to a taking 
by condemnation" (emphasis added).  In other words, the 
condemnor must send a notice of a jurisdictional offer to the 
owner.  Notice of a jurisdictional offer is a jurisdictional 
requisite for the condemnor to proceed in condemnation, not a 
jurisdictional requisite for the circuit court to hear a 
challenge to a condemnation proceeding.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 32.05(3) requires that the notice of a jurisdictional offer 
state eight matters, one of which is the proposed date of 
occupancy.  
No.  2003AP2865.ssa 
 
8 
 
¶63 Wisconsin Stat. §32.05 sets forth in great detail the 
procedure to be followed for condemning land for highway 
construction.  The condemnor shall take the following steps:      
(1) "Shall" make a relocation order (§ 32.05(1)); 
(2) 
"Shall" 
cause 
an 
appraisal 
of 
the 
property 
(§ 32.05(2)); 
(3) 
"Shall" 
attempt 
to 
negotiate 
before 
making 
a 
jurisdictional offer (§ 32.05(2a)); 
(4) "Shall" send to the owner a jurisdictional offer to 
purchase 
setting 
forth 
an 
itemized 
analysis 
of 
the 
compensation 
offer. 
 
The 
analysis 
"shall" 
state 
(§ 32.05(3)):  
(a) the nature of the project and reference to the 
relocation order and that the condemnor intends to use 
property for public purpose (§ 32.05(3)(a)); 
(b) a description of the property and interest therein 
to be taken (§ 32.05(3)(b)); 
(c) the proposed date of occupancy (§ 32.05(3)(c)); 
(d) 
the 
amount 
of 
compensation 
offered 
(§ 32.05(3)(d)); 
(e) that the appraisal upon which the offer is based 
is available for inspection (§ 32.05(3)(e)); 
(f) that the owner has 20 days to accept or reject the 
jurisdictional offer (§ 32.05(3)(f)); 
(g) that the owner has 40 days from the date of 
completion of service to commence a court action to 
No.  2003AP2865.ssa 
 
9 
 
contest the right of condemnation under § 32.05(5)  
(§ 32.05(3)(g)); and 
(h) that the owner has 2 years from the date of the 
taking in which to appeal for greater compensation 
(§ 32.05(3)(h)). 
(5) "Shall" give notice of the jurisdictional offer by 
personal service in manner of service of a circuit court 
summons or by certified mail (§ 32.05(4)). 
¶64 If any condemnor's error in following the statutory 
procedures requires special attention, it is an error relating 
to the notice of the jurisdictional offer.  Nevertheless, 
nothing in the statutes describes the relative importance of 
these various procedural requirements imposed on the condemnor. 
Nothing in the statutes distinguishes Wis. Stat. § 32.05(3)(c) 
relating to the proposed date of occupancy from any of the other 
listed requirements of a jurisdictional offer or any other 
obligation imposed on the condemnor, including the attempt to 
negotiate.  Indeed, each requirement set forth in § 32.05(1), 
(2), (2a), (3), and (4) is mandatory, and as the cases remind 
us, condemnation statutes applying to the exercise of the 
condemnation power are to be strictly construed.9  
¶65 The 
legislature 
has 
explicitly 
treated 
all 
requirements imposed on the condemnor, including the notice of 
                                                 
9 Aero Auto Parts, Inc. v. DOT, 78 Wis. 2d 235, 241, 253 
N.W.2d 896 (1977) (quoting 1 Nichols, Eminent Domain § 3.213[4] 
(rev. 3d ed. 1976)); Herro v. Natural Resources Bd., 53 
Wis. 2d 157, 171, 192 N.W.2d 104 (1972); City of Racine v. 
Bassinger, 163 Wis. 2d 1029, 1037, 473 N.W.2d 526 (Ct. App. 
1991).  
No.  2003AP2865.ssa 
 
10 
 
the jurisdictional offer, in the same way:  A failure to follow 
a requirement is a flaw that does not affect the condemnation 
proceedings unless raised timely.  The condemnee must raise any 
such defect (except the amount of just compensation) within 40 
days from the date of personal service of the jurisdictional 
offer or be forever barred from raising any such objection.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 32.05(5).   
¶66 The law is clear that a condemnor must attempt to 
negotiate before making a jurisdictional offer.  The law also is 
clear that if the condemnee does not object to the condemnor's 
failure to negotiate within the 40-day period, the condemnee is 
barred from ever raising the objection again.10   
¶67 The majority opinion dismisses the explicit statutory 
requirement that the jurisdictional offer state the proposed 
occupancy date as going to "neither the condemnor's power to act 
nor . . . providing just compensation to the property owner."11  
But the proposed date of occupancy is part of the jurisdictional 
offer;12 without it, an offer made to the condemnee does not 
qualify as a jurisdictional offer.13   
¶68 In light of the explicit characterization in Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.05(4) 
of 
the 
jurisdictional 
offer 
as 
a 
"jurisdictional 
requisite," 
the 
majority 
opinion's 
                                                 
10 Arrowhead Farms, Inc. v. Dodge County, 21 Wis. 2d 647, 
652, 124 N.W.2d 631 (1963). 
11 Majority op., ¶12 
12 Wis. Stat. § 32.05(3)(c). 
13 Toombs, 119 Wis. 2d at 349. 
No.  2003AP2865.ssa 
 
11 
 
characterization of a proposed occupancy date as a technical 
defect is problematic. 
¶69 Case law has recognized that the crucial issue in any 
public taking is just compensation and has described the 
mandatory steps set forth in Wis. Stat. § 32.05 as "collateral 
procedural matters" to be raised promptly.14  In other words, a 
violation of any of these provisions (including the negotiation 
requirement, the failure to send a jurisdictional offer, or any 
of the other requirements) may, under the statute, invalidate 
the condemnation proceeding, as long as the condemnee challenges 
the condemnation within 40 days.  As the court explained in 
Arrowhead Farms, Inc. v. Dodge County, 21 Wis. 2d 631, 124 
N.W.2d 631 (1963), the point of judicial review under Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.05(5) is to decide challenges to the condemnation and to 
resolve 
these 
collateral 
procedural 
matters 
before 
the 
condemnation commission or a court turns to the matter of just 
compensation.15  Until today, neither the statute nor case law 
had recognized different remedies for failing to follow the 
requirements of different paragraphs of Wis. Stat. § 32.05. 
¶70 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 32.28(3)(b) 
awards 
litigation 
expenses to the condemnee when the condemnor does not have the 
right to condemn, not when the condemnor has failed to comply 
with the statutorily mandated steps and the condemnor may 
correct its errors.      
                                                 
14 Arrowhead Farms, 21 Wis. 2d at 651. 
15 Id. 
No.  2003AP2865.ssa 
 
12 
 
¶71 As a result of the majority opinion, a defect in the 
jurisdictional offer (such as the omission of the proposed date 
of occupancy) does not justify the award of litigation expenses 
but the failure to attempt to negotiate does.  How does this 
result make sense when the statute states that sending the 
jurisdictional 
offer 
to 
the 
owner 
is 
a 
"jurisdictional 
requisite," but does not so label the attempt to negotiate? 
¶72 The 
majority 
opinion 
rests 
its 
jurisdictional/technical analysis on the precarious precipice of 
the "primary purpose" of the condemnation statutes, namely fair 
compensation.  Not permitting the award of litigation expenses 
in the present case does nothing to interfere with that primary 
purpose. 
C 
¶73 The majority opinion fails to follow the rules set 
forth in the cases it cites.  The case law makes clear that the 
remedy for the condemnor's failure to follow all the statutorily 
required 
steps 
is 
that 
the 
condemnee 
may 
challenge 
the 
condemnation proceedings in court and force the condemnor to 
correct the error.     
¶74 The cases explain that if a statute imposes steps on 
the condemnor and expressly or impliedly denies the condemnor 
the power to act unless the particular step is taken and no 
other remedy is provided for a failure to perform the particular 
No.  2003AP2865.ssa 
 
13 
 
step, the remedy is to challenge the condemnation under Wis. 
Stat. § 32.05.16  
¶75 The majority opinion refuses to acknowledge that each 
paragraph in Wis. Stat. § 32.05 "sets forth the condemnation 
procedure," 
and 
"expressly . . . denies 
the 
power 
of 
the 
condemnor to act unless the particular step is taken," and that 
"no other statutory remedy is provided for a failure to perform 
the particular step."17  These are the requirements for a 
procedural step to be "found to be jurisdictional" set forth by 
the court of appeals in City of Racine v. Bassinger, 163 
Wis. 2d 1029, 1036-37, 473 N.W.2d 526 (Ct. App. 1991), the case 
relied upon by the majority for the rationale that failure to 
negotiate must be jurisdictional.   
¶76 The majority opinion cites this principle of law at 
¶12, but refuses to apply it.  Wisconsin Stat. § 32.05 mandates 
numerous steps that the condemnor must take and denies the 
condemnor the power to proceed with the condemnation unless the 
steps are taken.  Furthermore, the statute provides no other 
remedy for a failure to take the particular step except for the 
condemnee to challenge the condemnation under § 32.05 and 
require the condemnor to comply with the statutory mandate.   
¶77 The majority opinion is thus internally contradictory.  
 
                                                 
16 Bassinger, 163 Wis. 2d at 1036-37.  In Bassinger the 
requirements set forth in the regulations or statutes other than 
§ 32.05 were distinguished from the requirements set forth in 
Wis. Stat. § 32.05. The latter were labeled jurisdictional.   
17 Bassinger, 163 Wis. 2d at 1036-37; majority op., ¶12. 
No.  2003AP2865.ssa 
 
14 
 
D 
¶78 The 
majority 
opinion's 
attempt 
to 
differentiate 
between jurisdictional defects and technical defects fails to 
follow United States v. 4.18 Acres of Land, 542 F.2d 786, 789 
(9th Cir. 1976), which interpreted a federal statute similar to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.05(5) 
(1971) 
(and 
therefore 
similar 
to 
§ 32.28(3)(b) (2003-04)).  In Wieczorek, we examined 4.18 Acres 
of Land and concluded that its reasoning was persuasive.18 
¶79 In 4.18 Acres of Land, the federal court of appeals 
dismissed a condemnation proceeding that was premature because 
of a correctable procedural flaw.  The federal court explained 
that the dismissal did not prevent the federal agency from 
acquiring the land by eminent domain.  Accordingly, the federal 
court of appeals concluded that the "cannot acquire" language of 
the federal statute governing the award of attorney fees 
suggests a case in which the federal agency has moved to condemn 
property without any authority to do so.  The federal court of 
appeals 
explained 
the 
fallacy 
of 
the 
majority 
opinion's 
reasoning in allowing recovery of litigation expenses when the 
condemnor has authority to condemn the property if it follows 
the statutory procedure:  
Were we to construe [the federal statute] as requiring 
an award of litigation expenses whenever the initial 
proceeding was dismissed for whatever reason, the 
award would often be largely fortuitous, depending 
upon the effect given by the trial court to errors 
committed during or prior to trial.  Had the district 
court in this case permitted the government to amend 
the complaint to reflect the correction of the 
                                                 
18 Wieczorek, 82 Wis. 2d at 25-26. 
No.  2003AP2865.ssa 
 
15 
 
procedural error, rather than dismissing the action, 
appellants 
would 
not 
be 
entitled 
to 
expenses.  
Congress could not have intended that the right to 
recover expenses turn upon such a difference.19 
¶80 This reasoning for not allowing an award of litigation 
expenses 
when 
the 
condemnor 
has 
committed 
a 
correctable 
procedural flaw is consistent with Wieczorek's holding and with 
Toombs v. Washburn County, 119 Wis. 2d 346, 349, 350 N.W.2d 720 
(Ct. App. 1984), holding that a condemnee has a right to 
attorney fees only if the condemnee prevails on the merits and 
the condemnation cannot proceed even if procedural defects are 
cured.  
¶81 Other state courts have adopted this reasoning in 
interpreting their condemnation statutes that award litigation 
expenses to the condemnee.  These cases conclude that the owner 
is not awarded expenses when a condemnation proceeding is 
dismissed based on correctable procedural flaws and the court 
                                                 
19 United States v. 4.18 Acres of Land, 542 F.2d 786, 789 
(9th Cir. 1976); see also United States v. 5,553.80 Acres of 
Land, 451 F. Supp. 220, 222 (W.D. La. 1978) ("[T]he condemnee 
can recover costs and appraisal and attorneys fees only if the 
court determines that the government is not entitled to condemn 
the property."). 
No.  2003AP2865.ssa 
 
16 
 
does not rule that the property can never be acquired by 
condemnation.20 
¶82 The majority opinion provides no reason why only 
certain condemnees who identify only certain flaws are entitled 
to litigation expenses.  Nothing in Wis. Stat. § 32.05 or 
§ 32.28(3)(b) supports the distinction between jurisdictional 
and technical defects. 
¶83 ERROR 2.  The majority opinion errs in interpreting 
the words "the condemnor does not have the right to condemn" in 
Wis. Stat. § 32.28(3)(b) by failing to examine this provision in 
the context of § 32.28.  See majority op., ¶¶21-24.  The context 
and structure of a statute are important in determining its 
meaning. 
¶84 The general rule is that condemnees pay their own 
litigation expenses.  Litigation expenses are not included as 
just compensation for the taking of property by eminent domain.  
This rule makes sense because sellers of real property generally 
incur expenses such as broker fees, attorney fees, and appraisal 
fees for which the buyers do not compensate the sellers.  
                                                 
20 See, e.g., Bd. of Comm'rs v. Wyant, 672 N.E.2d 77 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1996) (owner not entitled to attorney fees when 
condemnation 
dismissed 
because 
of 
correctable 
procedural 
defect); Sorenson v. Lower Niobrara Natural Res. Dist., 340 
N.W.2d 164 (Neb. 1983) (owner not entitled to attorney fees when 
dismissal of condemnation based on procedural flaw); Dep't of 
Transp. v. Winston Container Co., 263 S.E.2d 838 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1980) (dismissal of condemnation proceeding because resolution 
of department was insufficient did not justify award of fees to 
owner); Town of Wheatland v. Bellis Farms, Inc., 806 P.2d 281, 
285 (Wyo. 1991) (owners not entitled to attorney fees when court 
did not rule that land could never be acquired by condemnation). 
No.  2003AP2865.ssa 
 
17 
 
Awarding litigation expenses to a condemnee is a matter of 
policy to be determined by the legislature.21    
¶85 Wisconsin Stat. § 32.28 sets forth the four special 
circumstances in which litigation expenses are to be awarded to 
the condemnee: 
(a) 
 
The 
proceeding 
is 
abandoned 
by 
the 
condemnor 
(§ 32.28(3)(a)); 
(b)  The condemnor does not have the right to condemn the 
property 
described 
in 
the 
jurisdictional 
offer 
(§ 32.28(3)(b)); 
(c)  The judgment is for the plaintiff when the property 
owner 
institutes 
condemnation 
proceedings 
(inverse 
condemnation——§ 32.28(3)(c)); 
(d)  The amount the property owner receives exceeds a 
prescribed amount or percentage of the jurisdictional 
offer, award by the city, or award by the condemnation 
commission (§ 32.28(3)(d)-(i)). 
¶86 These four special circumstances evidence recurring 
themes.  In each of the circumstances a condemnee incurs extra 
expenses over the expenses ordinarily incurred by a condemnee in 
obtaining just compensation.   
¶87 When 
the 
condemnor 
abandons 
the 
condemnation 
proceeding, the owner retains the property.  Because the 
condemnor has forced the owner to incur litigation expenses and 
the condemnor did not take the property, the condemnor should 
reimburse the owner for litigation expenses.   
                                                 
21 Martineau, 54 Wis. 2d at 85. 
No.  2003AP2865.ssa 
 
18 
 
¶88 When the condemnor does not have the right to condemn 
the property, the owner retains the property.  Because the 
condemnor has forced the owner to incur litigation expenses and 
the condemnor did not take the property, the condemnor should 
reimburse the owner for litigation expenses.   
¶89 Thus, the requirement that the court determine that 
the condemnor "does not have the right to condemn" before 
awarding litigation expenses, properly interpreted, supports the 
same legislative policy as awarding litigation expenses when the 
condemnor abandons the commendation. 
¶90 If the condemnor can correct the flaws in its 
condemnation procedure and take the property by eminent domain, 
the condemnor has not forced the property owner to incur 
expenses even if it fails to follow the proper condemnation 
procedures.  If the owner wants to expend funds to delay the 
taking instead of litigating the primary issue in eminent 
domain, namely just compensation, the condemnor should not be 
forced to reimburse the owner for the owner's expenditures 
incurred in delaying the inevitable condemnation.    
¶91 When the owner brings the condemnation suit (i.e., 
inverse condemnation) and wins, the owner is awarded litigation 
expenses.  In inverse condemnation, the condemnor forces the 
owner to incur extra expenses in order to be able to receive 
just compensation for the condemnor's exercise of eminent 
domain.  This situation is unlike the failure to negotiate 
because, in inverse condemnation cases, condemnees would receive 
No.  2003AP2865.ssa 
 
19 
 
no compensation from the condemnor if they did not bring an 
inverse condemnation action under § 32.10. 
¶92 Finally, 
when 
the 
ultimate 
award 
exceeds 
a 
jurisdictional offer by a certain percentage or amount, an owner 
is awarded litigation expenses.  The legislative history of 
Wis. Stat. § 32.28 
makes clear 
that 
these provisions 
were 
enacted to induce the condemnor to offer just compensation or 
reimburse the condemnee for litigation expenses associated with 
an offer of compensation that is significantly less than just 
compensation.  
¶93 Wisconsin Stat. § 32.28 read as a whole evinces the 
plan to ensure that the owner is compensated for litigation 
expenses 
when 
the 
condemnor 
abandons 
the 
condemnation 
proceeding, does not have the power to take the property, should 
have taken the property but did not, or has offered an 
unreasonable sum as just compensation.   
¶94 The majority opinion's interpretation of "does not 
have the right to condemn" contravenes not only the words of the 
statute but the context of the statute.     
¶95 ERROR 3.  The majority opinion errs in trying to 
distinguish Wis. Stat. § 32.28(3)(b) (2003-04), the present 
statute governing litigation expenses, from § 32.05(5) (1971), 
the 
predecessor 
statute 
governing 
litigation 
expenses.  
Wieczorek interpreted the predecessor statute as not authorizing 
litigation expenses when the condemnor may, following correct 
procedures, take the property. 
No.  2003AP2865.ssa 
 
20 
 
¶96 The 
predecessor 
statute 
provided 
for 
awarding 
litigation expenses when a condemnor "cannot condemn the 
property."  The present statute, Wis. Stat. § 32.28(3)(b) (2003-
04), uses the phrase "does not have the right to condemn" the 
property.22  Wieczorek interpreted the predecessor statute's 
language "cannot condemn the property" to mean "has no right to 
condemn."23 
 
¶97 The statute awarding litigation expenses at issue in 
Wieczorek, Wis. Stat. § 32.05(5) (1971), stated in relevant part 
as follows:  
                                                 
22 For an example of no right to condemn the property, see 
Mitton v. DOT, 184 Wis. 2d 738, 740, 516 N.W.2d 709 (1994), in 
which the court held that the Department lacked authority to 
condemn part of a property because the authorizing statute did 
not permit the Department to condemn land for the Department's 
stated purpose. 
23 In Wieczorek, 82 Wis. 2d at 24 ("[T]he phrase 'cannot 
condemn' means 'has no right to condemn' . . . .") we quoted 
Wisconsin Town House Builders, Inc. v. City of Madison, 37 
Wis. 2d 44, 154 N.W.2d 232 (1967), stating: 
We think the jurisdictional offer is so defective that 
it cannot stand and must be declared void.  However, 
it does not follow . . . that the condemnation process 
is thereby void ab initio including the lay out of the 
street as a controlled-access street.  The relocation 
order is a determination of necessity and of the 
purpose of the condemnation and remains unaffected.  
We think the relocation order, appraisal, and the 
negotiation are valid steps in the process for the 
purpose of compensating the plaintiff for the property 
taken.  The City of Madison should make a new and 
proper 
jurisdictional 
offer 
to 
purchase 
the 
plaintiff's 
land 
and 
the 
condemnation 
proceeding 
should continue from that point.   
Wieczorek, 82 Wis. 2d at 21 n.2 (quoting Wisconsin Town House 
Builders, 37 Wis. 2d at 55). 
No.  2003AP2865.ssa 
 
21 
 
 
32.05(5) . . . If the final judgment of the court 
is that the condemnor cannot condemn the property 
described in the jurisdictional offer, the judgment 
shall also award the owner such sum as will reimburse 
the owner for his reasonable costs, disbursements and 
expenses including reasonable attorney and engineering 
fees actually incurred because of the action of the 
condemnor. . . . (emphasis added). 
 
¶98 The present counterpart to this sentence in Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.05(5) (1971) is Wis. Stat. § 32.28(3)(b) (2003-04).  It 
reads in relevant part as follows:  
 
32.28 (3) In lieu of costs under ch. 814, 
litigation expenses shall be awarded to the condemnee 
if: 
 
 . . . . 
 
(b) The court determines that the condemnor does 
not have the right to condemn part or all of the 
property described in the jurisdictional offer or 
there 
is 
no 
necessity 
for 
this 
taking . . . . 
(emphasis added).  
¶99 Even a cursory reading of both statutes, let alone a 
careful 
reading, 
evidences 
that 
the 
current 
statute 
is 
essentially the same as the predecessor statute interpreted in 
Wieczorek.  Indeed, the majority opinion even concedes that 
Wieczorek is a reasonable interpretation of the statute at issue 
in the present case.24  
¶100 According to the majority opinion, the statutory 
change of language in § 32.28(3)(b) (2003-04) from the 1971 
version "cannot condemn" to read "right to condemn" changed the 
substance of the statute.  Majority op., ¶¶25-27.  The majority 
opinion 
concludes 
that 
the 
words 
"right 
to 
condemn" 
in 
§ 32.28(3)(b) (2003-04) must be interpreted in the same way as 
                                                 
24 Majority op., ¶22. 
No.  2003AP2865.ssa 
 
22 
 
the 
words 
"right 
to 
condemn" 
in 
§ 32.05(5) 
governing 
a 
condemnee's commencement of a lawsuit.  Majority op., ¶24. 
¶101 The majority ignores the fact that the language of 
Wis. Stat. § 32.05(5) (1971) and § 32.05(5) (2003-04) is the 
same; both speak of the "right to condemn," governing a 
condemnee's commencement of a lawsuit.  
¶102 The predecessor statute, Wis. Stat. § 32.05(5) (1971), 
provided in relevant part as follows (emphasis added):   
32.05(5) When an owner desires to contest the right of 
the condemnor to condemn the property described in the 
jurisdictional offer for any reason other than that 
the amount of compensation offered is inadequate, such 
owner may . . . commence an action in the circuit 
court 
of 
the 
county 
wherein 
the 
property 
is 
located . . . .     
¶103 The current statute, Wis. Stat. § 32.05(5) (2003-04), 
provides in relevant part as follows (emphasis added): 
32.05(5) If an owner desires to contest the right of 
the condemnor to condemn the property described in the 
jurisdictional offer, for any reason other than that 
the amount of compensation offered is inadequate, the 
owner may . . . commence an action in the circuit 
court of the county wherein the property is located. 
¶104 Both the predecessor and current statutes describe how 
an owner who contests the right of the condemnor to condemn the 
property commences a lawsuit.  Accordingly, I conclude that Wis. 
Stat. § 32.28(3)(b), using the words "has no right to condemn," 
does not change the allocation of litigation expenses set forth 
in Wieczorek. 
¶105 In both Wieczorek and the present case, a judgment for 
the condemnee was entered in the condemnee's action under Wis. 
Stat. § 32.05(5) (1971) and (2003-04), respectively, dismissing 
No.  2003AP2865.ssa 
 
23 
 
the condemnation proceeding.  The judgments for the condemnee 
were final regarding the proceeding brought by the condemnee.  
In both Wieczorek and the instant case, the condemnor could 
initiate another condemnation action against the condemnee.  In 
both cases the judgment for the condemnee was not the final 
judgment in the sense that it did not finally determine that the 
condemnor did not have the right to condemn the property if all 
the procedural prerequisites for condemnation were satisfied.25   
¶106 I conclude that the majority opinion makes much ado 
about nothing in trying to distinguish the 1971 and 2003-04 
statutes governing litigation expenses.  
¶107 ERROR 4. The majority opinion errs in its view of the 
legislative history of the amendment creating Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.28(3)(b) (2003-04).  See majority op., ¶¶25-29.  Although 
the majority opinion characterizes Wis. Stat. § 32.28(3)(b) 
(2003-04) 
as 
ambiguous, 
requiring 
an 
examination 
of 
the 
legislative history,26 the legislative history does not support 
the majority opinion's interpretation of § 32.28(3)(b) (2003-
04). 
                                                 
25 In 
interpreting 
the 
predecessor 
statute, 
Wieczorek 
interpreted the words "final judgment . . . that the condemnor 
cannot condemn the property" in Wis. Stat. § 35.05(5) (1971).  
Similarly, the words "the condemnor does not have the right to 
condemn" the property in § 32.28(3)(b) (2003-04) refer to an 
ultimate conclusion that the condemnor does not have the right 
to condemn the property at all.  The circuit court reached no 
such decision on the merits in either Wieczorek or the present 
case. 
26 Majority op., ¶20. 
No.  2003AP2865.ssa 
 
24 
 
¶108 The majority opinion ignores a note to 1977 Assembly 
Bill 1077 (1978) in the drafting file of ch. 440, Laws of 1977.  
The note explains that the substance of the final sentence of 
Wis. Stat. § 32.05(5) (1971) (quoted above) is retained as new 
§ 32.28(3)(b) (2003-04) to allow recovery of reasonable and 
necessary expenses "when the court determines that the condemnor 
lacks power to condemn the property in question, or that the 
necessity of the taking has not been established."  The note 
goes on to explain that § 32.05 (1971) requires the award of 
such costs in the same kind of cases as set forth in the new 
§ 32.28(3)(b) (2003-04).27 
¶109 The majority opinion also ignores the Legislative 
Council staff briefs and reports, which are part of the 
legislative history of the current statute.  These documents 
repeatedly indicate that the goal of the Legislative Council 
Special Committee on Eminent Domain was to change the law to 
allow litigation expenses when the condemnee receives more money 
through litigation or appeal than was originally offered.  The 
Special Committee concluded that it was not fair that a 
condemnee had to pay the expenses of litigation to receive a 
fair and reasonable amount of compensation.28 
                                                 
27 Drafting Record for ch. 440, Laws of 1977, re: A.B. 1077 
(available at Wis. Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, Wis.). 
28 See, e.g., Legislative Council Report no. 77-28, at 5 
(Dec. 12, 1977): 
[T]he Bill awards statutory costs to the successful 
party in condemnation actions . . . .  The condemnee 
is the "successful party" whenever the award of the 
commissioners or verdict of the court exceeds the 
jurisdictional offer. . . .  
No.  2003AP2865.ssa 
 
25 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
The costs of condemnation actions are often a 
problem when the condemnation proceedings involve a 
condemnation commission.  When the condemnee appeals 
the basic award, the condemnation commission's award 
is often higher than the jurisdictional offer.  If the 
condemnor then appeals, the jury verdict is often less 
than the condemnation commission's award, although 
still more than the basic award.  Under these facts, 
the current statutes provide that the condemnee must 
pay the costs of the appeal by the condemnor to the 
court.   
This Bill changes this result and requires the 
condemnor to pay the costs of the condemnee's appeal 
if either the award of the commissioners or the 
verdict of the court is more than the jurisdictional 
offer.  The Bill thus assures that the condemnee need 
not bear the cost of obtaining a fair amount of 
compensation for property taken. 
Legislative Council Staff Brief 77-7, at 3, 4 (June 13, 1977): 
Present Wisconsin Statutes do not permit recovery 
of any costs or expenses where the purchase price is 
negotiated or where the award of the condemnation 
commissioners is accepted by the condemnee.  The 
condemnee bears his own expenses even when the circuit 
court judge or jury find the jurisdictional award too 
low. 
 . . . . 
 . . . [M]any landowners may settle out of court 
for less than full compensation, in the knowledge that 
the cost of obtaining a fair price may exceed the 
difference between such price and the condemnor's 
offer. 
The intent of the attorney fee statutes is thus 
not to encourage litigation, but to equalize the 
bargaining position of condemnor and condemnee so that 
the former's offers and settlements will more nearly 
reflect full value. 
Legislative Council materials are on file with the 
Wis. Legislative Council and the Wis. Legislative Reference 
Bureau, Madison, Wis. 
No.  2003AP2865.ssa 
 
26 
 
¶110 The Department of Transportation fiscal estimate upon 
which the majority opinion relies does not attribute the 
increased costs to Wis. Stat. § 32.28(3)(b) (2003-04), the 
carryover provision from § 32.05 (1971).  As the majority 
opinion 
points 
out, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.28(3) 
contains 
nine 
circumstances in which condemnees are entitled to litigation 
expenses.29  Eight of these nine circumstances were new, namely, 
abandonment, inverse condemnation actions, and six types of low-
ball jurisdictional offers or compensation awards.  Section 
32.28(3)(b), awarding litigation expenses when the condemnor 
does not have the right to condemn, was retained from the 
predecessor statute.     
¶111 Low-ball jurisdictional offers are the primary cost 
increases under the litigation expense shifting provisions that 
are identified in the fiscal note.  The fiscal estimate explains 
that "[m]ost of [the] cost increase is likely to occur from 
appealed cases where the condemnee receives an award . . . that 
exceeds the jurisdictional offer by at least 10%."30 
¶112 The legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 32.28 is 
consistent with Wieczorek's holding that a condemnee has a right 
to attorney fees only if the condemnee prevails on the merits by 
                                                 
29 Wis. Stat. § 32.28(a)-(i); see majority op., ¶27. 
30 Drafting Record for ch. 440, Laws of 1977, re: A.B. 1077, 
(available at Wis. Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, Wis.).  
The fiscal estimate also points to increases in costs due to 
abandoned 
condemnation 
proceedings 
and 
challenges 
to 
the 
"condemnor's authority to condemn."  Drafting Record for ch. 
440, Laws of 1977, re: A.B. 1077 (available at Wis. Legislative 
Reference Bureau, Madison, Wis.). 
No.  2003AP2865.ssa 
 
27 
 
establishing that the condemnation cannot proceed even after any 
procedural defects have been cured.  The majority opinion errs 
in its reading of the legislative history. 
¶113 ERROR 5. The majority opinion errs in concluding that 
the legislative policy in Wis. Stat. § 32.28(3)(b) is to award a 
condemnee litigation expenses to encourage the condemnor to 
follow the condemnation statutes.  See majority op., ¶29.31  Yet 
the majority opinion contravenes this policy by allowing the 
condemnor to make "technical" errors without paying litigation 
expenses.   
¶114 The majority opinion offers no support for its broad 
statement of legislative policy in the text of Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.28(3)(b) or the context of the statute, the legislative 
history, or the case law.   
¶115 The text of Wis. Stat. § 32.28(3)(b) does not state 
that if the condemnor fails to follow carefully the condemnation 
statutes, the condemnee will be awarded litigation expenses.   
¶116 The legislative history does not support the majority 
opinion's statement of legislative policy.  The Wisconsin 
Legislative Council Summary of the Proceedings of the Special 
Committee on Eminent Domain (Sept. 9, 1977) demonstrates the 
error 
of 
the 
majority 
opinion's 
broad 
view 
of 
shifting 
litigation expenses from the condemnee to the condemnor.  In 
                                                 
31 I agree with the majority opinion that the legislative 
policy choice in the current statute shifting litigation 
expenses is to force condemnors to make fair jurisdictional 
offers and avoid unreasonably low-ball offers as defined by Wis. 
Stat. §§ 32.28(3)(d)-(i) (2003-04).  See majority op., ¶¶13, 34. 
No.  2003AP2865.ssa 
 
28 
 
discussing proposed legislation for litigation expenses in 
eminent domain proceedings, some members of the Legislative 
Council urged that litigation costs should be recovered at each 
stage of litigation.  "Other members expressed a concern that 
such a provision would encourage litigation and expressed 
approval of the bill as drafted."32  Ultimately, the legislature 
did not allow recovery of litigation expenses at each stage of 
the litigation.   
¶117 Other Legislative Council materials indicate that the 
purpose 
of 
shifting 
litigation 
expenses 
is 
to 
equalize 
bargaining positions and encourage the condemnor's offers to be 
close to full value.33  The errors in the present case and in 
Wieczorek do not involve value.  Value is not an issue in a Wis. 
Stat. § 32.05(5) proceeding.  
¶118 The cases the majority opinion relies on to support 
its 
conclusion 
that 
the 
legislative 
policy 
underlying 
Wis. Stat. § 32.28(3)(b) is to encourage condemnors to follow 
carefully the condemnation statutes do not support the majority 
opinion's thesis.   
¶119 Redevelopment Authority of Green Bay v. Bee Frank, 120 
Wis. 2d 402, 355 N.W.2d 240 (1984), and Standard Theaters, Inc. 
v. Department of Transportation, 118 Wis. 2d 730, 349 N.W.2d 661 
(1984), relied upon by the majority opinion, see majority op., 
                                                 
32 Legislative Council, Summary of Proceedings, Special 
Committee on Eminent Domain (Sept. 9, 1977), at 6.  
33 Legislative Council Staff Brief 77-7, at 3, 4 (June 13, 
1977) (quoted at note 28, supra). 
No.  2003AP2865.ssa 
 
29 
 
¶¶29-32, explain that the public policy underlying awarding 
litigation expenses to the condemnee is to discourage the 
condemnor from making a low-ball offer.  These cases do not 
describe 
a 
broad 
legislative 
policy 
supporting 
shifting 
litigation expenses generally in condemnation cases whenever the 
condemnee is successful in a lawsuit. 
¶120 The majority's reliance on Bee Frank and Standard 
Theatres is spurious.  The present case and Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.28(3)(b) (2003-04), the statutory provision at issue in the 
present case, do not involve "low-ball offers." 
¶121 Indeed, the majority opinion fails to recognize that 
the statute does not even shift litigation expenses for every 
landowner 
who 
successfully 
challenges 
a "low-ball offer."  
Sections 32.28(d)-(i) (2003-04) provide for shifting litigation 
expenses 
only 
when 
the 
condemnee 
meets 
the 
mathematical 
requirements set forth in the statutes.  Thus, even the 
statutory provisions that expressly address "low-ball offers" 
are not designed to make the landowner "whole" in every 
situation in which the condemnee litigates. 
¶122 If 
the 
majority 
opinion's 
explanation 
of 
the 
legislative 
policy 
is 
correct, 
the 
majority 
opinion's 
distinction between jurisdictional and technical flaws does not 
fulfill the legislative policy.  It does not award litigation 
expenses for statutory violations it deems "technical," and 
therefore the condemnor is not encouraged to follow the 
condemnation statutes. 
*  *  *  * 
No.  2003AP2865.ssa 
 
30 
 
¶123 In sum, no reason exists to distinguish between a 
failure 
to 
negotiate 
in 
good 
faith 
prior 
to 
making 
a 
jurisdictional offer, as in the present case, and a failure to 
state a proposed date of occupancy in the jurisdictional offer, 
as in Wieczorek.    
¶124 In each of these contexts, the condemning authority 
need do no more than correct the error.  The inevitable result 
in both situations is condemnation, and Wis. Stat. § 32.28 and 
the predecessor statute retain the American rule that a 
plaintiff, here the condemnee, pays its own litigation expenses 
unless the case falls within one of the specified statutory 
exceptions.  
¶125 For the reasons stated, I would hold that Wieczorek 
governs the case at bar.  The circuit court and court of appeals 
got it right.  Accordingly, I dissent.  
¶126 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
 
No.  2003AP2865.ssa 
 
 
 
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