Title: Randolph v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 510, 2004
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: June 30, 2005

Pursuant to the provisions of DEL. SUP. CT. R. 7(d), this Court has sua sponte
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selected pseudonyms to identify all family members involved in the action, in addition to the
parties use of a pseudonym to refer to the defendant.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
OLIVER RANDOLPH, 
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§
No. 510, 2004
Defendant Below,
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Appellant,
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Court Below: Family Court
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of the State of Delaware, in and
v.
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for New Castle County
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STATE OF DELAWARE, 
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No. 0308002436
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Plaintiff Below,
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Appellee.
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Submitted: April 13, 2005
Decided: June 30, 2005
Before HOLLAND, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices.
ORDER
This 30  day of June 2005, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties
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and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
(1)
The defendant-appellant, Oliver R.,  appeals from his convictions
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following a juvenile delinquency adjudication in the Family Court of rape in the
second degree and unlawful sexual contact in the second degree.  In support of
his direct appeal, the defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence for
the Family Court to find him competent to stand trial and that the Family Court
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erred in admitting the alleged victim’s out-of-court statements.  We conclude
that there was sufficient evidence in the record for the Family Court to find by
a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was legally competent to
stand trial.  We also conclude that the Family Court’s admission of the out-of-
court statements at issue did not constitute reversible error.  Accordingly, we
affirm.
(2)
At the time of the incident the defendant was thirteen years old.
The alleged victim, Marilyn A., was the defendant’s five-year-old sister.  The
defendant was later arrested and charged with rape in the second degree and
unlawful sexual contact in the second degree.  Defense counsel then filed a
motion for competency to stand trial in the Family Court.  Following a hearing,
the Family Court determined that the defendant was competent to stand trial.
(3)
At the trial conducted in the Family Court, Marilyn A. was unable
to implicate the defendant.  However, Marilyn’s mother, Brenda R., and the
mother’s boyfriend, Steven S., testified at trial concerning incriminating
admissions made by the defendant.  In addition, Marilyn’s out-of-court
statements to her mother, an interviewer at the Child Advocacy Center, Kendra
Malloy, and a sexual assault nurse at the Christiana Hospital, Karen Dougherty,
were admitted pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 3507.  In these statements, Marilyn
  In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 366 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967).
2
 Diaz v. State, 508 A.2d 861, 864 (Del. 1986).
3
 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 404(a) (2005).   
4
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indicated that the defendant had sexually assaulted her.  These out-of-court
statements were admitted into evidence despite the fact that Marilyn  could not
acknowledge that the defendant sexually assaulted her or what statements she
previously made to her mother, or to Ms. Malloy or Ms. Dougherty.   
(4)
Juveniles in delinquency proceedings are entitled to the same
essential and fundamental due process rights as adult criminal defendants.   The
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prosecution bears the burden of proving a defendant’s legal competency by a
preponderance of the evidence.   The test for competency is set forth in 11 Del.
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C. § 404(a), which provides in relevant part:
Whenever the court is satisfied, after hearing, that an accused
person, because of mental illness or mental defect, is unable to
understand the nature of the proceedings against the accused, or
to give evidence in the accused’s own defense or to instruct
counsel on the accused’s own behalf, the court may order the
accused person to be confined and treated in the Delaware
Psychiatric Center until the accused person is capable of standing
trial.  
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Put another way, “the test of legal competency ... is ... [w]hether the defendant
has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree
of rational understanding and whether he has a rational as well as factual
 State v. Shields, 593 A.2d 986, 1004 (Del. Super. Ct. 1990) (citing Dusky v. United
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States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960)).  
 Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975).  
6
 Bailey v. State, 490 A.2d 158, 167 (Del. 1983).
7
 See, e.g., State v. Reed, 2004 WL 2828043 (Del. Super.) (finding the defendant
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competent even though he had an IQ of 64); Sullivan v. State, 636 A.2d 931 (Del. 1994)
(finding the defendant competent even though he had an IQ of 75).
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understanding of the proceedings against him.”   The United States Supreme
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Court has also added the requirement that a defendant be able to “assist in
preparing his defense.”  
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(5)
When the Family Court decides a juvenile’s competency to stand
trial, that determination is entitled to deference by this Court.    The evidence
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in the present record supports the Family Court’s conclusion that the defendant
was legally competent to stand trial.  We  highlight only some of the facts that
support the Family Court’s conclusion. The prosecution’s expert witness
testified that the defendant was not mentally retarded.  In fact, his IQ of 77 is
higher than that of others who have been judged competent to stand trial.   The
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defendant was also aware that he had a lawyer and that his lawyer was there to
help him.  The prosecution’s expert further testified that the defendant
somewhat understood the nature of the proceedings and charges against him
and that he was able, to a limited extent, to assist in his defense.  Because there
was evidence to support the conclusion that the defendant had the ability to
  Capano v. State, 781 A.2d 556, 586 (Del. 2001).  
9
 Hall v. State, 788 A.2d 118, 123 (Del. 2001), (citing Warren v. State, 774 A.2d
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246, 251 (Del. 2001)).  
 Id.
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understand the nature of the proceedings and to assist in his own defense, we
conclude that the Family Court did not abuse its discretion by deciding that the
defendant was competent to stand trial.
(6)
We now consider the defendant’s argument that the complaining
witness’ prior out-of-court statements were improperly admitted.  The
defendant’s argument is two-fold.  First, he claims that the admission of these
statements violated his constitutional confrontation rights.  Second, he contends
that the Family Court abused its discretion in determining that the foundational
requirements of Section 3507 were satisfied. 
(7)
A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is generally
reviewed for abuse of discretion.   We thus use this standard to review the
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defendant’s argument that the foundational requirements of Section 3507 were
not satisfied.  Alleged violations of the United States or Delaware Constitutions
are reviewed de novo.   The defendant’s allegation that his constitutional
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confrontation rights were violated is, therefore, reviewed de novo.   We next
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address the defendant’s arguments in turn.    
 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
12
 Id. at 59.
13
 Burke v. State, 484 A.2d 490, 494 (Del. 1984) (citing Johnson v. State, 338 A.2d
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124, 127 (Del. 1975)). 
 See United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 560 (1988) (indicating that “successful
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cross-examination is not the constitutional guarantee.”).  
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(8)
The defendant first cites Crawford v. Washington  to support his
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constitutional argument.  In Crawford, the United States Supreme Court
determined that under the Sixth Amendment, out-of-court testimonial
statements by witnesses are inadmissible if the witness is unavailable and there
is no opportunity to cross-examine the witness.   The defendant maintains that
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although Marilyn testified, she was unavailable and not subject to cross-
examination because she had difficulty answering questions and most of her
responses on direct examination were nonsensical.
(9)
The defendant’s argument is not persuasive.  In Crawford, the
United States Supreme Court did “not expressly require any specific quality of
cross-examination....”   All that is required is that a defendant have the
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opportunity for effective  cross-examination of the declarant, not effective
cross-examination in whatever way and in whatever manner a defendant may
wish.   In the present case, Marilyn was available for cross-examination and
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defense counsel made a strategic decision not to pursue cross-examination.
Moreover, the mere fact that Marilyn had difficulty answering questions and
 See id. (holding that the defendant’s confrontation rights were not violated when
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the prosecution witness had a loss of memory).  See also Hall v. State, 788 A.2d 118, 124-25
(Del. 2001) (holding that the witness’ memory lapses did not deprive the defendant of his
right of cross-examination).  
 Keys v. State, 337 A.2d 18, 23 (Del. 1975).
17
 Hatcher v. State, 337 A.2d 30, 32 (Del. 1975).
18
 Id. (citations omitted).
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provided nonsensical responses on direct examination does not make her
unavailable for confrontation clause purposes.   Based on the foregoing, we
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conclude that there was no denial of the defendant’s confrontation rights. 
(10)
The defendant next challenges the procedural requirements for
admission of a Section 3507 statement. The foundational requirements of
Section 3507 have evolved since the statute’s inception in 1970.  These
foundational requirements can be summarized as follows:  First, the offering
party must call the declarant as a witness and the direct examination of the
declarant “should touch both on the events perceived and the out-of-court
statement itself.”   Second, the offering party must prove the voluntariness of
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the out-of-court statement during direct examination or, if the witness denies
that the statement was made voluntarily, on voir dire.   The trial court “must
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be satisfied that the offering party has shown by the preponderance of the
evidence that the statement was voluntarily made, ... and must render an explicit
determination on the issue ... before admitting it for the jury’s consideration.”19
 Smith v. State, 669 A.2d 1, 8 (Del. 1995).
20
 Id.
21
 Barnes v. State, 858 A.2d 942, 946 (Del. 2004).
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Third, there must exist an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant about the
out-of-court statement.   As a result, the statement must be offered into
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evidence prior to the conclusion of the direct examination of the declarant.21
Finally, the declarant must be present during the admission of the out-of-court
statement.22
(11)
We find that the procedural requirements of Section 3507 were not
satisfied in this case.  The record clearly shows that Marilyn was not even asked
about the statements she made to Ms. Malloy, Ms. Dougherty or her mother.
However, after a careful review of the record, we conclude that the Family
Court’s error in admitting Marilyn’s Section 3507 statements was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.  There was direct evidence, apart from the
Marilyn’s out-of-court statements, that supported the defendant’s convictions.
Significantly, the defendant himself admitted that he sexually assaulted his
sister.  In particular, the Family Court directly asked the defendant’s mother if
he admitted to her that he had “put his penis on the private parts between the
legs [of Marilyn]” and she answered in the affirmative.  Given the defendant’s
own admissions of delinquency, we conclude that any errors in the admission
 Id. at 946-47; Van Arsdall v. State, 524 A.2d 3, 25 (Del. 1987).
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of the Section 3507 statements were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.    
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS SO ORDERED that the judgments of
delinquency entered against the defendant in the Family Court are AFFIRMED.
By the Court:
   
      
 /s/ Henry duPont Ridgely            
Justice