Title: Heaton v. City of Charlotte
Citation: 178 S.E.2d 352, 277 N.C. 506
Docket Number: 68
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: January 20, 1971

178 S.E.2d 352 (1971)
277 N.C. 506
George D. HEATON and Wife, Emily W. Heaton, Jules A. Buxbaum and wife, Renee N. Buxbaum, William C. Bean and wife, Delores B. Bean, John Cole Hatcher and wife, Anne S. Hatcher, John F. Bos and wife, Beverly G. Bos, Charles F. Mock and wife, Elizabeth Mock,
v.
The CITY OF CHARLOTTE, a municipal corporation, the Ervin Company, a corporation, Crescent Land and Timber Corporation, a corporation, and W. H. Jamison, superintendent of Building Inspection for the City of Charlotte.
No. 68.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.
January 20, 1971.
*356 Paul B. Guthery, Jr., and Ray W. Bradley, Charlotte, for plaintiffs appellants.
Ervin, Horack &amp; McCartha by William E. Underwood, Jr., Charlotte, for The Ervin Co.
William I. Ward, Jr., Charlotte, for Crescent Land and Timber Corp.
Henry W. Underhill, Jr., Charlotte, for City of Charlotte and W. H. Jamison.
BRANCH, Justice:
Appellants first contend that the amendment to the zoning ordinance is invalid because it was altered after the initial hearing without additional notice or further hearing.
The notice of and the proceedings at the initial hearing are not challenged.
A municipality has no inherent power to zone its territory and possesses only such power to zone as is delegated to it by the enabling statutes, G.S. § 160-172 et seq. The authority to enact zoning ordinances is subject to the limitations imposed by the enabling statute and by the Constitution. These limitations forbid arbitrary and unduly discriminatory interference with property rights in the exercise of such power. Zopfi v. City of Wilmington, 273 N.C. 430, 160 S.E.2d 325. Thus, a zoning ordinance or an amendment thereto which is not adopted in accordance with the enabling statutes is invalid and ineffective. Kass v. Hedgpeth, 226 N.C. 405, 38 S.E.2d 164; Eldridge v. Mangum, 216 N.C. 532, 5 S.E.2d 721. However, a municipal zoning ordinance will be presumed to be valid, and the burden is on the complaining party to show it to be invalid. Zopfi v. City of Wilmington, supra; *357 Helms v. City of Charlotte, 255 N.C. 647, 122 S.E.2d 817.
G.S. § 160-175 provides:
According to our research, the precise question here presented has not been decided by this Court. We therefore turn to other jurisdictions for enlightenment.
In Klaw v. Pau-Mar Construction Co., 11 Terry 487, 50 Del. 487, 135 A.2d 123, the Delaware Supreme Court interpreted an enabling statute substantially like our own G.S. § 160-175. The Delaware statute, 22 Del.C. § 304, states:
A public hearing concerning apartment house zoning was held after notice according to the Delaware statute, and the ordinance was finally enacted with two changes which were made after the public hearing, without further hearing or notice. The principal change consisted of reducing the areas in which apartments could be placed and permitted 40% of a lot to be occupied by buildings rather than 30% as originally proposed. In holding that there had been compliance with the notice provisions of the enabling act, the Delaware Court, in part, stated:
In Neuger v. Zoning Board, 145 Conn. 625, 145 A.2d 738, the plaintiffs attacked an amendment to a zoning ordinance on the ground that the adopted amendment differed radically from the originally noticed proposal. They contended that there was no legal hearing according to the City's charter, which required a public hearing on amendments to zoning regulations after notice published in an official paper stating time, place and purpose of the hearing. The notice published set forth that the amendments proposed would define a shopping center and would make possible the location of a liquor store in every such center. The definition of a shopping center included the requirement that it must be on land under single ownership. After a public hearing, the zoning board eliminated from the definition of a shopping center the requirement of single ownership and added a requirement that only one liquor store could be opened in each center. The changes resulted from objections voiced at the public hearing. The Connecticut Court, finding compliance with the provisions for public hearing and notice, in part, stated:
The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals considered the notice provision of a zoning enabling statute similar to our own statute in the case of Ciaffone v. Community Shopping Corp., 195 Va. 41, 77 S.E.2d 817. We quote the pertinent portion of that decision:
In Kalvaitis v. Village of Port Chester, Sup., 235 N.Y.S.2d 44, the changes effected in amendment to a zoning ordinance between initial notice and final enactment consisted of the elimination of certain lots to be rezoned, an increase in the maximum square footage per dwelling, an increase in the maximum permissible height of buildings, an increase in required open space, and an increase in the required distances between buildings. The Court, overruling *359 surrounding landlords' objections as to lack of notice, stated:
Similarly, the notice procedures were upheld in Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 17 Utah 2d 300, 410 P.2d 764, where the notice prior to the public hearing stated that the area in question was subject to be rezoned for "commercial" purposes, but the area was rezoned "business" without further notice or hearing. There the court reasoned that the objecting adjacent landowners had no ground to complain about notice because the originally proposed commercial zone, of which protestants had notice, was less restrictive than the business zone which was finally enacted.
In the case of Aquino v. Tobriner, 112 U.S.App.D.C. 13, 298 F.2d 674, the court upheld a summary judgment against the landowner where the evidence showed that the change originally proposed in the notice imposed no requirements respecting the floor area or limitation of lot occupancy on the landowner's land, but the rezoning ordinance as finally passed contained such requirements. The court stated that the very purpose of a zoning hearing is to explore such subjects, and added that, even assuming that the limitations represented substantial changes in the original proposal, the plaintiff did not claim that the changes as adopted were not fully discussed and aired at the public hearing.
In the case of Hewitt v. County Com'rs of Baltimore County, 220 Md. 48, 151 A.2d 144, the pertinent provisions of the statute required that the county commissioners publish notice of the "place and time of the beginning of such hearing or hearings." The notice as published advised that there would be a hearing at a specified time and place to hear "objections and recommendation with respect to the final report" on the proposed zoning involving several square miles. The notice referred to a map on file which designated the area in question as residential, and the owners appeared at the hearing and requested that the property be classified for non-residential use. The county commissioners allowed this request, and the adjoining property owners attacked the zoning plan on the ground that notice of the hearing before the commissioners had not been sufficiently worded as to give them notice of substantial changes. In holding there had been sufficient notice, the court said that the commissioners could hardly know without prejudgment or prophecy what action they might take at the hearing, and that under the circumstances the notice given could not have been more explicit or informative than it was. The court added that the plaintiffs had no right to assume that the county commissioners, the body entrusted with the sole power to enact zoning ordinances, was bound to adopt the preliminary proposals or recommendations submitted to it by the zoning commissioner.
Thus, the general rule as applied to Chapter 160, Article 14, is that there must be compliance with the statutory requirements of notice and public hearing in order to adopt or amend zoning ordinances. Ordinarily, if the ordinance or amendment as finally adopted contains alterations substantially different (amounting to a new proposal) from those originally advertised and heard, there must be additional notice and opportunity for additional hearing. However, no further notice or hearing is required after a properly advertised and properly conducted public hearing when the alteration of the initial proposal is insubstantial. Alteration of the initial proposal will not be deemed substantial when it results in changes favorable to the complaining parties. Moreover, additional notice and public hearing ordinarily will not be required when the initial notice is broad enough to indicate the possibility of substantial change and substantial changes are made of the same fundamental *360 character as contained in the notice, such changes resulting from objections, debate and discussion at the properly noticed initial hearing.
In instant case the notice was broad enough to give notice of substantial changes in the area in question. A public hearing was held and all parties were given ample opportunity to be heard. The record shows that the changes made did not alter the fundamental character of the proposal heard and discussed at the properly noticed initial hearing. Minutes of the City Council indicate that alterations incorporated in the ordinance as finally adopted were proposed by the Planning Commission and the City Council as a result of expressions made at the public hearing, and were such that additional public hearing could have resulted only in repetitive statements by the same parties or parties similarly situated. The ordinance as adopted decreased the area designated for a shopping center by 48% and increased the area for location of apartments by 16%. This action seems to be favorable to the complaining parties. The very purpose of the public hearing was to guide the City Council in making changes in the original proposal consistent with the views reflected at the public hearing. This is exactly what was done.
In connection with this assignment of error appellants contend that the following portion of Section 23-96(a) of the Zoning Code of the City of Charlotte is unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous:
The ambiguity charged is that the section does not clearly state whether the changed classification would be higher than the requested classification or higher than the existing classification.
This section of the ordinance refers to action to be taken upon a requested change, so the phrase "or to a `higher classification' or classifications" refers to "the classification requested." Recognizing that every presumption is in favor of the validity of a legislative act, we do not find this section of the Charlotte Zoning Code to be so uncertain, vague or indefinite as to require us to declare it void. Lowery v. Board of Graded School Trustees, 140 N.C. 33, 52 S.E. 267.
Section 23-96(d) of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Zoning Code ranks zoning districts from the highest classification (most restrictive) to the lowest classification (least restrictive). This section ranks the classification R-15 as higher than R-15MF, which, in turn, is ranked higher than the classification B-1SCD. The classification R-20MF is not ranked in this section, and appellants contend that consequently R-20MF is not a zoning classification, or, in the alternative, that it is not a "higher" classification than the zoning classifications requested by petitioners.
An examination of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Zoning Code leaves no doubt that it was the intent of the legislative body to classify property by use and to denominate the more restrictive uses as the higher use. Section 23-36.1 of the Zoning *361 Code fully sets out the uses allowed and restrictions imposed under the classification R-20MF. Even the untrained eye can see that the classification R-20MF is less restrictive and thus a lower classification than R-15, and is more restrictive and thus a higher classification than B-1SCD.
The heart of a statute is the intention of the law-making body, and the act will not be invalidated when the meaning can be gathered from the full context of the statute and other statutes related to the subject. Branch Banking &amp; Trust Co. v. Hood, Comr., 206 N.C. 268, 173 S.E. 601.
It is apparent from the legislative history that the omission of R-20MF from the ranking of zoning classifications was inadvertent. We cannot perceive how plaintiffs could have been misled in their preparation for hearings or in any manner prejudiced by this inadvertent omission in the Zoning Code.
We hold that no additional notice or public hearing was required before adoption of Zoning Ordinance 692-Z on 13 July 1970 by the Charlotte City Council.
Appellants next contend that the amendment to the zoning ordinance was invalid because it was not adopted by a favorable vote of three-fourths of all the members of the City Council.
G.S. § 160-176 provides:
Section 23-96 of the Zoning Code of the City of Charlotte incorporates the provisions of G.S. § 160-176.
We accept the proposition that the amendment would be invalid if twenty per cent of the owners of the property within the area designated by the statute protested, and the ordinance did not receive a favorable vote of three-fourths of all the members of the City Council. Appellants contend that they qualified as protestants under G.S. § 160-176 because their properties lie, in relation to the property proposed to be rezoned, "immediately adjacent thereto * * * extending one hundred feet therefrom."
In the case of Penny v. City of Durham, 249 N.C. 596, 107 S.E.2d 72, an owner of lots petitioned for reclassification of his property from residential zone to commercial zone for a shopping center. The City adopted an ordinance rezoning the property lying more than 150 feet from the street (Club Boulevard), thereby leaving unchanged a strip of property 150 feet wide between the zoned property and Club Boulevard. The owners of more than twenty per cent of the area of lots abutting on the opposite side of Club Boulevard from applicant's property protested the change. The protestants contended that the ordinance was invalid because it was not passed by a favorable vote of three-fourths of the members of the City Council, as required by G.S. § 160-176. The protestants were not within the zoned area, and in order for them to file a valid protest their property must have come within the provisions of the statute which provided that it be "signed by owners of twenty per cent of the area of the lots * * * directly opposite thereto, extending one *362 hundred feet from the street frontage of such opposite lots. * * *"
This Court, holding the ordinance valid and ruling that petitioner's property did not come within the provisions of G.S. § 160-176, stated:
After decision in Penny, G.S. § 160-176 was amended by the 1959 General Assembly by Ch. 434, s. 1, and inserted the words `thereto either' immediately after the word `adjacent' and by inserting the phrase `or on either side thereof' after the word `thereto' in the second sentence. The obvious intent of the legislature is clearly stated in Section 2 of the amendatory act as follows:
Subsequent to the passage of this amendment, this Court by its decision in Armstrong v. McInnis, 264 N.C. 616, 142 S.E.2d 670, (1965) approved the creation of a buffer zone 101 feet in width around the outer edge of a tract zoned commercial, thereby separating the commercial zone from a residential zone. The buffer zone was created by allowing the 101 feet zone to remain zoned as residential. Therefore we conclude that the reasoning followed in Penny still prevails, and the fact that petitioners own both the property to be rezoned and the buffer strip will not affect decision in this case.
Appellants urge that the words "immediately adjacent" as used in the statute should be interpreted to mean "next in relation to the property to be zoned," and that it was not the intention of the legislature that "immediately adjacent" as used in the statute should refer to lots abutting or adjoining the property under consideration. They also contend that the words "extending one hundred feet therefrom" as used in the statute refer only to the depth required for lots of protesting owners.
Appellees contend that the words "immediately adjacent" as used in the statute mean "adjoining" or "abutting", and that the words "extending one hundred feet therefrom" refer to the distance to be measured from the zoned property in establishing the ownership of the "area of lots."
*363 We find the following definitions in Webster's Third New International Dictionary:
The courts of other jurisdictions have interpreted the phrase "immediately adjacent" in the context of statutes similar to G.S. 160-176.
In the case of Parsons v. Town of Wethersfield, 135 Conn. 24, 60 A.2d 771, owners of property zoned residential sought to have it rezoned for light industrial use. Subsequent to the original zoning as residential, a heavily traveled highway had been constructed along its east side and its western boundary was a 66-foot strip occupied by a railroad. Owners of property beyond the railroad protested the proposed rezoning, relying on a statutory provision which, in part, provided:
Decision of the principal assignment of error in Parsons turned on the meaning of the words "immediately adjacent." The Court, holding the ordinance valid, stated:
The case of Putney v. Abington Township, Pa., 176 Pa.Super. 463, 108 A.2d 134, is one in which the court construed a statute requiring a three-fourths favorable vote of the Board of Township Commissioners when there was a protest of twenty per cent or more of the owners of lots within the area proposed to be zoned or those "immediately adjacent" extending 100 feet from the lots rezoned. There, the Court held that the words "immediately adjacent" meant "touching the area rezoned."
The term "immediately adjacent" has been defined by the courts in other cases factually different from instant case. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in the case of Superior Steel Products Corporation v. Zbytoniewski, 270 Wis. 245, 70 N.W.2d *364 671, construed a statute requiring motor vehicles to display rear lights when parked upon or in use upon places "immediately adjacent" to the traveled portion of a highway. There the Court stated that the qualifying word "immediately" gave the phrase "immediately adjacent" the meaning of "adjoining or with no space intervening." For other cases so defining the term "immediately adjacent", see Pickens v. Maryland Casualty Co., 141 Neb. 105, 2 N.W.2d 593; Long v. London &amp; Lancashire Indemnity Co., 119 F.2d 628; City of Lawrenceburg v. Maryland Casualty Co., 16 Tenn.App. 238, 64 S.W.2d 69.
We must adopt the sense which promotes the policies and objects of the legislature in enacting the statute. Nance v. Southern Railroad, 149 N.C. 366, 63 S.E. 116.
The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut in Park Regional Corp. v. Town Plan &amp; Zoning Comm., 144 Conn. 677, 136 A.2d 785, interpreted a zoning statute which required a unanimous vote of the zoning commission if protest was filed by owners of twenty per cent or more of the area of lots immediately adjacent in the rear of land included in a proposed zoning change and extending one hundred feet therefrom. There the Court said:
In instant case we cannot agree with appellants that the legislature intended to make the width or depth of lots owned by those seeking to protest one of the standards by which their eligibility to protest would be measured. Such standard would have no reasonable relation to the impact of the zoning ordinance. Conversely, the impact of the zoning ordinance would be greatly diminished by the distance that the area owned by protestants lies from the property proposed for zoning. Certainly the owners of lots immediately outside of (within 100 feet) or adjoining the boundary line of the property to be altered, are the parties most directly affected by the alteration and, therefore, most logically are the "owners of * * * the area of the lots" intended by the legislature to qualify as protestants.
When we give the words "immediately adjacent" their ordinary meaning and significance as applied to the facts of this case, and liberally construe the ordinance in favor of the owner of the property to be zoned, we conclude that the expression means "adjoining" or "abutting." This interpretation creates an area easily determinable which lends itself to definite calculations of the percentage required to invoke the provisions of the statute.
We also note appellants' argument that the definition of the word "lot" in section 23-96, subsection A, of the Zoning Code of the City of Charlotte precludes the proposed buffer zone from becoming operative. We do not find this argument persuasive. Even had it been so, the enactment of the section by the City would be subject to the limitations of the enabling act, Zopfi v. City of Wilmington, supra, and in case of conflict the municipal ordinance would yield to the general law regulating the same matter. Eldridge v. Mangum, supra. Nor do we perceive that the context of the statute (G. S. § 160-176) indicates that the word "lot" has any meaning other than its common and ordinary meaning. City of Greensboro v. Smith, 241 N.C. 363, 85 S.E.2d 292.
*365 We therefore hold that in order for plaintiffs to invoke the provisions of G.S. § 160-176 they must own twenty per cent or more of the area extending 100 feet from the rezoned tract. Plaintiffs do not own lots in such area because of the 100 foot buffer zone.
Finally, appellants contend that the buffer zone is a subterfuge and therefore it does not avoid the right of affected property owners by petition to require the more stringent vote by the City Council in adopting the zoning amendment.
The Law of Zoning and Planning, Rathkopf, Vol. 1, Chap. 28, Section 28-10, contains the following statement:
In Radnor, Ithan &amp; St. David's Civic Assn. Appeal, 5 Dist. &amp; Co.2d 156, 41 Del. Co. 396 (Pa.Quar.Sess.1954), a zoning ordinance was adopted by a simple majority and the zoning code of the township of Radnor contained a section providing that three-fourths of the township commissioners must vote for adoption of the amendment when twenty per cent of the property owners whose property is within one hundred feet of the property to be rezoned file a protest. The property owner filed an amended petition creating a 100-foot buffer zone between his property and the property of protestants. The protestants contended that the creation of the buffer zone was a subterfuge and ineffective to prevent the more stringent vote. Holding that only a majority vote was required, the Court stated:
We see no evidence of evasion in this record. The buffer zone had been proposed *366 before the initial hearing, and it was discussed then. The record leaves the impression that the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Planning Board and the Charlotte City Council recognized their responsibility to meet the demands of growth in the area which they governed and at the same time acted responsively to the objections voiced by the protestants when the ordinance was considered and adopted. The purpose of the "buffer zone" was to lessen the impact between the existing residential area and the newly zoned area. Further, applying the authority above cited, even had the zone been created for the sole purpose of avoiding the three-fourths vote required by G.S. § 160-176, the zoning ordinance would not have been invalidated, since the creation of the buffer zone was in full compliance with the law as enacted by the General Assembly.
The rezoning ordinance No. 692-A adopted by the Charlotte City Council on 13 July 1970 was regularly adopted and is legal and valid.
Affirmed.
MOORE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.