Title: In re: Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics, Docket No. 18-98
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-62-98
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: February 15, 2000

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). O'HERN, J., writing for a majority of the Court. The question in this case is whether an attorney may simultaneously serve as municipal attorney and as clerk administrator for the same municipality. The petitioner attorney had served the Borough of Old Tappan as its borough attorney for ten years when the Mayor and Council expressed its intention to appoint him to the position of clerk-administrator. Petitioner sought an advisory opinion from the Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics (ACPE or Committee) to determine whether he could hold both positions. The ACPE determined that he could not, concluding that such dual office-holding creates an actual conflict of interest and otherwise gives rise to an appearance of impropriety, citing both RPC 1.7(b) and (c). The Committee reasoned that the municipal attorney might fail to bring independent judgment to evaluation of conduct in the office of the clerk-administrator. The Supreme Court granted the attorney's petition for review under R. 1:19-8. HELD: One attorney may not hold both the position of municipal attorney and clerk-administrator for the same municipality because the holding of both offices gives rise to the existence of an impermissible potential conflict of interest. 1. Because the Legislature has expressly held the offices of municipal attorney and municipal clerk and/or manager to be compatible, the 'appearance of impropriety' doctrine does not disqualify petitioner from holding those offices simultaneously. (pp. 6-7) 2. That N.J.S.A. 40:81-11 expressly allows the appointment of one person to the positions of attorney and clerk or manager, is not dispositive of the issue of the ethical propriety of the holding of such multiple offices. (pp. 7-8) 3. The expansive responsibilities of current-day municipal administrators will give rise to the need for legal counsel concerning the propriety of actions already taken or to be taken, and it is not reasonable to expect an attorney to give the municipality candid, objective advice concerning his own conduct as administrator. (pp. 9-10) 4. A borough administrator should have access to independent counsel and advice under all circumstances in which his conduct might be called into question, and the municipality is poorly served by an attorney whose personal interests are potentially in conflict with those of his client. (pp. 10-11) 5. The employment of outside counsel to render advice in situations in which a conflict might arise is not a viable alternative here given the frequency with which such advice would be required. (pp. 11-12) The advisory opinion of the Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics is AFFIRMED as modified. JUSTICE STEIN filed a separate dissenting opinion. Justice Stein viewed the potential conflict of interest the majority perceived between the two offices as remote and speculative. He would have allowed the dual representation because he viewed the petitioner attorney's interest as administrator to be consistent with and complementary to his responsibilities as borough attorney, and believed that there was little realistic likelihood that the attorney's interest in vindicating his performance as administrator materially would limit his ability to represent the municipality as its attorney. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES COLEMAN, LONG, and VERNIERO join in JUSTICE O'HERN's opinion. JUSTICE STEIN has filed a separate dissenting opinion, in which JUSTICE GARIBALDI joins. IN RE: ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, DOCKET NO. 18-98 Argued September 13, 1999 -- Decided February 15, 2000 On Petition for Review of Final Judgment of Advisory Committee of Professional Ethics. Gregory C. Hart argued the cause for appellant, pro se (Hirsch, Cheron &amp; Hart, attorneys). Carol Johnson, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent, Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics (John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; Joseph L. Yannotti, Former Assistant Attorney General, of counsel). The opinion of the Court was delivered by O'HERN, J. The question in this case is whether an attorney may simultaneously serve as municipal attorney and as clerk administrator for the same municipality. The Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics (Committee or ACPE) determined that an attorney may not hold both positions. The Committee concluded that such dual office-holding creates an actual conflict of interest and otherwise gives rise to an appearance of impropriety. The Committee reasoned that the municipal attorney might fail to bring independent judgment to evaluation of the conduct in office of the clerk-administrator. We granted petitioner's request, 157 N.J. 643 (1999), to review the opinion under R. 1:19-8. We agree with the ACPE that an attorney may not simultaneously hold the positions of municipal attorney and clerk-administrator under the circumstances outlined in this petition, although we confine our reasoning to the finding of an impermissible potential conflict of interest. I Petitioner had served the Borough of Old Tappan as its borough attorney for ten years when the Mayor and Council expressed an intention to appoint him to the position of clerk administrator. Petitioner sought an advisory opinion from the Committee to determine whether he could hold both positions. In response to petitioner's inquiry, the Committee ruled that an attorney called upon to serve as both municipal solicitor and municipal administrator would be unable to provide the full panoply of legal services expected of him without such service being affected by the lawyer's own interests, a conflict of interest to which the municipality cannot consent, or otherwise causing an ordinary knowledgeable citizen acquainted with the facts to conclude that multiple service poses a substantial risk of disservice to the public interest. The Committee cited R.P.C. 1.7, which states in pertinent part: (b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected; and (2) the client consents after a full disclosure of the circumstances and consultation with the client, except that a public entity cannot consent to any such representation. When representation of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall include explanation of the implications of the common representation and the advantages and risks involved. (c) This rule shall not alter the effect of case law or ethics opinions to the effect that: (1) in certain cases or categories of cases involving conflicts or apparent conflicts, consent to continued representation is immaterial, and (2) in certain cases or situations creating an appearance of impropriety rather than an actual conflict, multiple representation is not permissible, that is, in those situations in which an ordinary knowledgeable citizen acquainted with the facts would conclude that the multiple representation poses substantial risk of disservice to either the public interest or the interest of one of the clients. Petitioner has furnished us with copies of the relevant Borough ordinances. The duties of the borough clerk are described as follows: [Old Tappan, N.J., Rev. Ordinances 2-6.1 to -6.8 (1975).] The ordinance describes the responsibilities of the borough administrator as follows: [the] borough administrator . . . shall . . . provide a liaison between the governing body and the various departments, bodies and other officials of the Borough of Old Tappan under the supervision and control of the mayor and council and to fulfill such other duties as shall be specifically assigned by the said mayor and council from time to time . . . . The duties of the borough administrator . . . shall not infringe upon the duties, rights and powers of other borough officers designated by statute or by borough ordinance . . . . The office of the borough administrator shall be held by the same person who holds the title of the borough clerk. [Id. at 2-29.1., 2-29.4 (May 1997).] Finally, the Old Tappan ordinance entitled Borough Attorney includes the following: The borough attorney shall be appointed by the mayor with the advice and consent of the council for a term of one year. . . . The attorney shall not receive a fixed salarySee footnote 11, but shall be paid such retainer as may be agreed upon and authorized by the council, plus such fees and charges as shall be deemed reasonable . . . . The attorney shall have such powers and perform such duties as are provided for the office of borough attorney by general law or ordinances of the borough. [The attorney] shall represent the borough in all judicial and administrative proceedings in which the municipality or any of its officers or agencies may be a party or have an interest. [The attorney] shall give all legal counsel and advice where required by the mayor and council or any member thereof, and shall in general serve as the legal advisor to the mayor and council on all matters of borough business . . . . [Id. at 2-13.1, -13.2 (July 1978).] The ordinance also describes the specific duties of the borough attorney that include drafting all legal documents, conducting appeals, entering into agreements, compromises or settlements on behalf of the borough, and rendering any opinions submitted by the mayor or council. The Legislature has provided that a municipal council may appoint a municipal manager, an assessor, an auditor, a treasurer, a clerk, and an attorney. One person may be appointed to two or more such offices, except that the offices of municipal manager and auditor or assessor shall not be held by the same person. N.J.S.A. 40:81-11 (emphasis added). Because the Legislature has expressly held the two offices to be compatible, we do not rely on the appearance of impropriety doctrine to disqualify petitioner on those grounds . After all, the test is whether an ordinary knowledgeable citizen acquainted with the facts would conclude that the multiple representation poses substantial risk of disservice to either the public interest or the interest of one of the clients. R.P.C. 1.7(c). Surely, the members of the Legislature are better informed than an ordinary knowledgeable citizen, yet they did not perceive a potential for conflict. We agree also that the offices are not incompatible. In Reilly v. Ozzard, Chief Justice Weintraub stated the test: Incompatibility is usually understood to mean a conflict or inconsistency in the functions of the office. It is found where in the established governmental scheme one office is subordinate to another, or subject to its supervision or control, or the duties clash, inviting the incumbent to prefer one obligation over another. 33 N.J. 529, 543 (1960)(holding that the common law did not prohibit a state senator from holding the position of municipal attorney); see also, Schear v. Elizabeth, 41 N.J. 321 (1964) (holding that municipal attorney could be a member of the planning board). Although the duties of borough attorney and clerk-administrator do not intrinsically clash, we must analyze this dual office-holding under [t]he New Jersey disciplinary system [that] is [] designed to protect the public and 'the integrity of the profession. Baxt v. Liloia, 155 N.J. 190, 202 (1998). IN RE: ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, DOCKET NO. 18-98 STEIN, J., dissenting. The Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics (Committee or ACPE), without a hearing, see R. 1:19-4, determined that an attorney may not serve simultaneously as municipal attorney and as clerk-administrator for the same municipality. The Court affirms, but rejects the ACPE's conclusion that the simultaneous holding of those offices constitutes an appearance of impropriety. The Court observes, correctly I believe, that the appearance of impropriety doctrine should not bar petitioner from holding the offices in question because the Legislature expressly has determined that the offices are compatible. Ante at _____ (slip op. at 6). The Court also correctly concludes that the offices are not incompatible under the common law, citing with approval, ante at ___ (slip op. at 7), Chief Justice Weintraub's test for common law incompatibility expressed in Reilly v. Ozzard, 33 N.J. 529, 543 (1960), as occurring only when in the established government scheme one office is subordinate to another, or subject to its supervision or control, or the duties clash, inviting the incumbent to prefer one obligation over another. Nevertheless, the Court concludes that petitioner's own interests in vindicating his conduct as municipal administrator would materially limit his ability to represent the municipality. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 10). In other words, the Court is concerned with the hypothetical possibility that the municipal attorney might periodically be required to express an opinion on whether his own conduct as municipal administrator was in accordance with law, and that on such occasions the municipal attorney might not give objective advice out of fear of undermining his personal job security as administrator. Although the Court's concern is plausible, it overlooks the greater likelihood that the strong identity of interests between the positions of attorney and administrator, focused on serving the municipality's best interests, renders remote the likelihood that the petitioner as attorney would compromise his objectivity to protect his job as administrator. Moreover, the likelihood that petitioner would compartmentalize his skills, acting first as an administrator uninformed by his own legal experience, and later as an attorney to review the legality of his earlier action, seems to me to be insubstantial. Our case law concerning both the appearance of impropriety doctrine and the impermissibility of attorney conflicts of interest emphasizes the underlying public interest in instilling and preserving public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession, In re Opinion 415, 81 N.J. 318, 323 (1979), and the lawyers duty of loyalty to his or her clients. In re Opinion 653, 132 N.J. 124, 129 (1993). Nevertheless, the factual context that triggers the application of either doctrine must provide a reasonable basis for concern that involves something more than a fanciful possibility. Id. at 132 (quoting Higgins v. Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, 73 N.J. 123, 129 (1977)). My view is that the potential conflict of interest the Court perceives between the offices at issue here is remote and speculative. I believe the Court's disposition is influenced by its sense that the dual office holding proposed by petitioner is unwise, but that decision is beyond our province. See Ahto v. Weaver, 39 N.J. 418, 432 (1963) ( Whether it is desirable or wise to have an assistant law officer who is precluded from performing all functions or serving in all matters is not a question within the judicial sphere. ) Irrespective of whether the proposed joint office holding is wise from the municipality's perspective, I would allow it because I believe petitioner's interest as administrator to be consistent with and complementary to his responsibilities as borough attorney, and that there is little realistic likelihood that his interest in vindicating his performance as administrator materially would limit his ability to represent the municipality as its attorney, the position that he apparently has diligently fulfilled over the past ten years. I The Court's opinion fairly summarizes the factual context underlying its disposition. The Court refers to the text of the Old Tappan Ordinances defining the duties of the borough administrator and the borough attorney. Ante at ___ - ___ (slip op. at 4-5). The ordinances provide that the borough administrator is required to act as liaison between the governing body of the various borough departments and officials, under the supervision of the mayor and council. Old Tappan, N.J., Rev. Ordinances 2-29.1, 2-29.4 (May 1997). The borough attorney is required to represent the Borough in judicial and administrative proceedings and to provide legal counsel and advice to the mayor and council. Id. at 2-13.1, -13.2 (July 1978). The ordinance governing the administrator expressly provides that his duties shall not infringe on the duties and powers of other Borough officers. Id. at 2-29.1, 2.29-4. Underlying the Court's determination that the dual office holding proposed by Petitioner is barred by RPC 1.7 is the broad principle that no branch of government has the power to authorize, either explicitly or implicitly, conduct by attorneys that violates the ethical standards imposed by the judiciary. In re Opinion 621, 128 N.J. 577, 590 (1992). That principle is unassailable in view of our exclusive jurisdiction over the practice of law [and] the regulation and discipline of attorneys. Id. at 592. Nevertheless, the Court declines to conclude that the appearance of impropriety doctrine, RPC 1.7(c), bars petitioner's simultaneous service as Borough attorney and Borough administrator because, as the Court acknowledges, the Legislature has expressly held the two offices to be compatible. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 6). That concession by the Court emphasizes that the Rules of Professional Conduct are not to be applied in a vacuum, see In re Opinion 415, supra, 81 N.J. at 325, but rather should be interpreted and applied pragmatically and with proper regard to existing legislation as well as to contemporary practices. Similar reasoning supports the Court's conclusion that Petitioner's simultaneous holding of the offices of attorney and clerk-administrator does not violate the common law doctrine of incompatibility of office. The classic description of that doctrine is found in State ex rel. Clawson v. Thompson, 20 N.J.L. 689, 689-90 (Sup. Ct. 1846): Where there is no express provision, the true test is, whether the two offices are incompatible in their natures, in the rights, duties, or obligations connected with or flowing out of them. Offices, says Bacon, are incompatible or inconsistent, when they cannot be executed by the same person; or when they cannot be executed with care, and ability; or where one is subordinate to, or interferes with another, [o]r where one office is under the control of another. Because the mutual interests of Petitioner as Borough Attorney and as administrator in serving the Borough's best interests preponderate over any theoretical personal interest Petitioner may possess in vindicating his performance as administrator, I would allow Petitioner to hold both offices. The guiding principle was clearly stated by this Court in Opinion 552, supra: [I]n situations in which there is no actual conflict of interests, or the likelihood of an actual conflict of interests is remote and poses no realistic threat to the effective representation of such multiple defendants, an attorney should not be prohibited from representing both parties. Justice Garibaldi joins in this opinion. NO. A-62 IN RE: ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS DOCKET NO. 18-98 DECIDED