Title: MacConnell v. Mitten
Citation: 131 Ariz. 22, 638 P.2d 689
Docket Number: 15346
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: November 23, 1981

131 Ariz. 22 (1981) 638 P.2d 689 Forrest C. MacCONNELL, a single man, Appellant, v. Frederick G. MITTEN and Eileen Mitten, husband and wife, Appellees. No. 15346. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Division. November 23, 1981. Rehearing Denied January 6, 1982. Steven M. Friedman, Phoenix, for appellant. David S. Shughart, II, Phoenix, for appellees. CAMERON, Justice. Plaintiff, Forrest MacConnell, brought an action against defendants Frederick G. Mitten, Eileen Mitten, and other persons who are not part of this appeal, regarding allegedly defamatory statements that were made by Fred Mitten at the time of plaintiff's termination by his employer, the Bureau of Medical Economics. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted with directions that the judgment be entered pursuant to Rule 54(b), Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S. Plaintiff appeals the granting of the motion for summary judgment. We have jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2101(B) and Rule 19(e), Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, 17A A.R.S. We must answer the following questions on appeal: The facts necessary to a determination of this appeal, and viewed in a light most favorable to MacConnell, the party against whom the motion for summary judgment was granted, Mobile Home Estates, Inc. v. Levitt Mobile Homes Systems, Inc., 118 Ariz. 219, 575 P.2d 1245 (1978), are as follows. Frederick Mitten was the Executive Secretary of the Maricopa County Medical Society for 25 years until his retirement in 1976. At that time, his son, Anthony Mitten, assumed his duties as chief administrative officer of the Maricopa County Medical Society and its affiliated collection agency, the Bureau of Medical Economics. Both had worked closely with MacConnell, first in his position as a collector and later as manager of the Bureau of Medical Economics. For the last five years of MacConnell's employment, the Bureau of Medical Economics had sustained losses, and as a result, MacConnell was terminated. Beginning shortly before MacConnell was terminated, a series of acts of vandalism began at Fred Mitten's house. Paint was splashed on the house and cars, and rocks were thrown through the windows. As a result, Fred Mitten's wife, Eileen, was hospitalized twice, once with a heart attack. After each of these attacks, Fred discussed the incidents with his son, Anthony. On more than one occasion, Fred Mitten wondered aloud if MacConnell had done it. The basis of Fred Mitten's suspicion was that the paint used by the vandal was the same color as MacConnell's recently painted house. In addition, Mitten believed that MacConnell was angry at having been terminated, and that he was prone to "violent rages." Following MacConnell's termination, Fred Mitten was asked by doctors associated with Maricopa County Medical Society for the reason for MacConnell's discharge. In response to inquiries from Dr. Kennedy and Dr. Frazier, Mitten stated that he assumed MacConnell was terminated because the Bureau had been losing money for five years. CONVERSATIONS WITH ANTHONY MITTEN When discussing the incidents of vandalism with his son, Fred Mitten speculated over who might have been responsible. Fred Mitten stated in his deposition: We believe that the remarks made by Fred Mitten to his son Anthony were conditionally or qualifiedly privileged. There is, admittedly, no strict formula by which a conditional privilege is applied. Rather, the process is one of weighing the individual's interest in reputation against society's interest in free speech and in encouraging certain beneficial communications. In doing so, we will look to the occasion in which the statement was made and not the statement itself. We believe the family relationship provides a qualified privilege for the statements made by Fred Mitten to his son. Section 597 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states as to family relationships: In the instant case, the Mitten's house had been vandalized on more than one occasion. Paint had been hurled at the house, their cars had been splattered with paint, and rocks had been thrown through the front window. The incidents occurred when the Mittens were gone and in the early hours of the morning. It was evident that these attacks were calculated to be unexplained and frightening to the Mittens. They had achieved the desired effect. Fred Mitten was concerned about the acts of vandalism and worried about his wife, who was ill and suffered a heart attack believed to be caused in large part by her fear and worry about the continuing acts of vandalism. It is to be expected that Fred Mitten would discuss the matter with his son, Anthony. In view of the disturbing occurrences of vandalism and Mrs. Mitten's precarious health, it would indeed be surprising if Fred Mitten had not communicated his concerns to his son. We believe that this communication is an occasion which justifies application of the qualified privilege. We hold that this communication comes within the scope of the conditional privilege of § 597 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See W. Prosser, Law of Torts, § 115 (4th ed. 1971). We find no abuse of this privilege. See Antwerp Diamond Exchange of America, Inc. v. Better Business Bureau, Ariz., 637 P.2d 733 (1981) (filed this day). But MacConnell claims that statements made by Fred Mitten to Vice Chief Justice Holohan of this court were also actionable. MacConnell alleges that Fred Mitten told Justice Holohan that MacConnell had vandalized Mitten's house. The evidence before the court, however, does not indicate that Fred Mitten expressed to Justice Holohan any opinion that MacConnell was responsible for the vandalism. Fred Mitten testified as follows: Even though Frederick Mitten appears at first to have been confused by the questions regarding whether he told Justice Holohan that MacConnell was responsible for the vandalism, when read with the rest of the testimony it is clear that Frederick Mitten did not tell Justice Holohan that MacConnell was the one who committed the vandalism, but merely discussed the vandalism without mentioning his suspicions as to who was responsible. There being no evidence to the contrary, we find no error. DEFAMATORY CONTENT OF THE STATEMENTS REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S TERMINATION MacConnell urges that defendant Fred Mitten's statements to Drs. Kennedy and Frazier that the Bureau of Medical Economics had been losing money for five years tended to reflect negatively on plaintiff's professional competence and therefore constituted actionable defamation. We note that Mitten prefaced his comments, at least to Dr. Frazier, by saying that for years MacConnell had been the best collection agency manager in the country. Facially, the statements are not defamatory. They simply stated that the Bureau had been losing money under plaintiff's management, a fact undisputed by the parties. Frederick Mitten's opinion about the reason for MacConnell's discharge was not laden with any false factual content, nor did it imply undisclosed defamatory facts. It was pure opinion and not actionable. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S. Ct. 2997, 41 L. Ed. 2d 789 (1974); Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 566 and Comments. SUMMARY JUDGMENT On a motion for summary judgment, the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Portonova v. Wilkinson, 128 Ariz. 501, 627 P.2d 232 (1981). Nevertheless, the party opposing the motion for summary judgment may not rest on the pleadings. The adverse party must respond with specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Modla v. Parker, 17 Ariz. App. 54, 495 P.2d 494 (1972); Sewell v. Brookbank, 119 Ariz. 422, 581 P.2d 267 (App. 1978). Rule 56(e), 16 A.R.S. states: The plaintiff has produced no evidence of any alleged defamation other than the statements discussed above. There are no genuine issues of fact that require a trial. Summary judgment affirmed. HAYS and GORDON, JJ., concur.