Title: In the Matter of Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 19S-DI-156
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: May 11, 2020

I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 19S-DI-156 
In the Matter of 
Curtis T. Hill, Jr., 
 Respondent. 
Decided: May 11, 2020 
Attorney Discipline Action 
Hearing Officer Myra C. Selby 
Per Curiam Opinion 
All Justices concur. 
 
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
May 11 2020, 10:58 am
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Per curiam. 
This matter is before the Court on the report of the hearing officer we 
appointed to hear evidence on the Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary 
Commission’s disciplinary complaint filed against Respondent, Curtis 
Hill. We find, as did the hearing officer, that Respondent committed acts 
of misdemeanor battery, conduct that under the circumstances of this case 
violated Indiana Professional Conduct Rules 8.4(b) and 8.4(d).  
Respondent’s 1988 admission to this State’s bar subjects him to this 
Court’s disciplinary jurisdiction. See IND. CONST. art. 7, § 4. For 
Respondent’s professional misconduct, we conclude that Respondent 
should be suspended for 30 days with automatic reinstatement. 
Procedural Background and Facts  
Respondent is, and at all relevant times was, the Attorney General of 
Indiana. 
At the conclusion of the 2018 Indiana legislative session, several 
legislators, lobbyists, and legislative staff attended an event at a local bar. 
Respondent also attended this event at the invitation of a lobbyist with 
whom Respondent had been dining and drinking that evening. While at 
the event, Respondent engaged in acts against four women—a state 
representative and three legislative assistants—that involved various 
forms of nonconsensual and inappropriate touching. More specifically, as 
summarized by the hearing officer, Respondent: 
(a) “Touch[ed] [M.R.’s]1 bare back, rubbing his hand down her back 
down to or just above her buttocks without her consent. He did not 
accidentally or inadvertently rub [M.R.’s] back down to her mid to 
low back.” 
 
1 In keeping with our customary practice in disciplinary opinions, we refer to the women by 
their initials. 
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(b) “Rub[bed] [G.B.’s] back without her consent. He did not 
accidentally or inadvertently rub [G.B.’s] back.” 
(c) “Put[ ] his arm around [S.L.’s] waist and pull[ed] her toward him 
without her consent. He did not inadvertently touch [S.L.] and pull 
her to him.” 
(d) “Touch[ed] [N.D.’s] back, moving his hand down her back and 
moving [N.D.’s] hand toward her buttocks and touching her 
buttocks without her consent. He did not accidentally or 
inadvertently touch [N.D.’s] back and move his hand down her 
back toward her buttocks.” 
(HO’s Report at 25).   
Concerns regarding the events at the bar that night eventually were 
brought to the attention of legislative leaders, who privately 
commissioned a report (“the Taft Report”) from a law firm to examine 
potential employment law issues in connection with those events. After 
the report was prepared the legislative leaders met separately with 
Respondent and with the four women, and Respondent at this juncture 
was generally apologetic. 
Shortly thereafter, the Taft Report was inappropriately leaked to the 
media by a legislative staffer, and the controversy surrounding the events 
at the bar became a matter of significant public discussion. In the ensuing 
days and months, the four women came forward publicly with their 
accounts of what had happened, and Respondent assembled a group of 
employees and outside consultants (collectively, “Respondent’s team”) to 
assist with his own public response in the wake of the unauthorized 
disclosure of the Taft Report.  
In March 2019, the Commission filed a disciplinary complaint against 
Respondent alleging that his conduct at the bar violated Indiana 
Professional Conduct Rules 8.4(b) and 8.4(d) and Indiana Admission and 
Discipline Rule 22 (“Oath of Attorneys”). The disciplinary complaint also 
alleged several aggravating factors, including among other things the 
conduct of Respondent and his team following disclosure of the Taft 
Report. 
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A four-day evidentiary hearing was held in October 2019, followed by 
the parties’ submission of post-hearing briefing. The hearing officer issued 
a detailed 36-page report on February 14, 2020. As discussed further 
below, the hearing officer found that Respondent violated Rules 8.4(b) and 
8.4(d), found in favor of Respondent on the Oath of Attorneys charge, and 
recommended that Respondent be suspended for at least 60 days without 
automatic reinstatement. We extend our deep gratitude to the hearing 
officer for her service and excellent work in this difficult case. 
Discussion and Discipline 
Respondent has petitioned for review of the findings and conclusions 
that he violated Rules 8.4(b) (by committing battery) and 8.4(d). The 
Commission has not sought review of the hearing officer’s determinations 
that Respondent did not commit sexual battery and did not violate the 
Oath of Attorneys.2 Both parties also have briefed the question of 
appropriate sanction should misconduct be found.   
At the outset, we are compelled to note our strong disapproval and 
extreme disappointment with respect to the tenor of the parties’ briefs in 
this case. The Commission repeatedly refers to Respondent in hyperbolic 
terms of sexual predation, and the Commission—entirely without 
support—accuses Respondent of having committed perjury at the final 
hearing simply because the hearing officer, in endeavoring to reconcile all 
the testimony (including Respondent’s), found that Respondent’s conduct 
amounted to battery. Respondent for his part alternately describes the 
Commission using terms such as “imperialist,” “coddling,” “dismissive,” 
and “arrogant,” and Respondent devotes far too much of his briefing to 
 
2 The Commission did not file its own petition for review. In a single footnote in its response 
to Respondent’s petition, the Commission “submits” that “the crime of sexual battery was 
proved . . . [and] a violation of [the Oath of Attorneys] was also proved.”  (Comm’n Resp. Br. 
at 20 n.10). Although a party “may raise in its response brief any issues for review that were 
not raised in the Petition for Review,” Admis. Disc. R. 23(15)(a)(3), we decline to revisit the 
hearing officer’s determinations on these two points in light of the Commission’s failure to 
develop any argument on either of them. 
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entirely unfounded attacks on the Commission’s motives and integrity. 
There are many legitimate legal arguments to be made in this case, which 
makes the parties’ inappropriate ad hominem attacks on one another a 
particularly frustrating distraction. We expect counsel to behave better in 
future cases. 
 The Commission carries the burden of proof to demonstrate attorney 
misconduct by clear and convincing evidence. See Ind. Admission and 
Discipline Rule 23(14)(g)(1). While our review process in disciplinary 
cases involves a de novo examination of all matters presented to the Court, 
the hearing officer’s findings receive emphasis due to the unique 
opportunity for direct observation of witnesses. See Matter of Henderson, 78 
N.E.3d 1092, 1093 (Ind. 2017). These time-honored standards guide our 
discussion below. 
1. Criminality.  Because it bears upon our analyses of both Rules 
8.4(b) and 8.4(d) in this particular case, we begin by examining whether 
the Commission proved by clear and convincing evidence that 
Respondent committed battery. As relevant here, the criminal act of 
battery is committed when a person “knowingly or intentionally . . . 
touches another person in a rude, insolent, or angry manner.” I.C. § 35-42-
2-1(c)(1).   
The “touch” element is easily satisfied in this case. “Any touching, 
however slight, may constitute battery,” Impson v. State, 721 N.E.2d 1275, 
1285 (Ind. 2000), and Respondent largely acknowledges having made 
physical contact with the four women. The points of dispute in this case 
instead have revolved around the manner of that contact and 
Respondent’s intent. 
Although the battery statute does not separately define “rude, insolent, 
or angry manner,” these disjunctive terms of art have plain and ordinary 
meanings readily susceptible of application by a factfinder. See 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/rude 
[https://perma.cc/SE9X-FNRJ] (defining “rude” in part as “lacking 
refinement or delicacy,” “inelegant, uncouth,” or “offensive in manner or 
action: discourteous”); https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/insolent [https://perma.cc/6H9J-LAXW] (defining 
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“insolent” as “insultingly contemptuous in speech or conduct: 
overbearing” or “exhibiting boldness or effrontery: impudent”). 
The hearing officer’s report does not include a separate finding that 
Respondent’s manner of touching the four women was “rude,” “insolent,” 
or “angry.” However, such a finding is clearly implied in the hearing 
officer’s correct articulation of the elements of battery, her ultimate 
findings and conclusions that Respondent committed battery, and her 
lengthy and detailed discussion of the testimony regarding the particular 
manner in which Respondent touched each of the four women. And 
having reviewed the record, we readily conclude there is ample evidence 
showing that the manner of Respondent’s touches was both “rude” and 
“insolent.” The four women each were clear and unequivocal in their 
testimony regarding Respondent’s specific acts, and to varying extents the 
acts described by the four women (and the women’s reactions in the 
aftermath of those acts) were witnessed by each other and by other people 
at the bar.  
Turning to the question of mens rea, we note that much of Respondent’s 
defense in this case is predicated on the notion that in a social or quasi-
social gathering amongst friends or colleagues in a celebratory and 
somewhat crowded setting, a certain amount of physical contact is de 
rigeur and to be expected. (See Tr. Vol. 4 at 59 (“I had contact—I had 
physical contact with a host of people in connection with meeting them, 
either shaking hands, putting a hand on their shoulder, putting a hand 
around a shoulder, around a waist, all incidental to contact 
communication.”)). To be sure, purposeful physical contact can take a 
variety of forms, and the appropriateness of each form often will depend 
heavily on both nuance and context.  It is precisely because of this 
variability that we vest responsibility in our factfinders to evaluate “the 
reasonable inferences based upon an examination of the surrounding 
circumstances to determine whether—from the person’s conduct and the 
natural consequences therefrom—there is a showing or inference of the 
requisite criminal intent.” Diallo v. State, 928 N.E.2d 250, 253 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2010) (internal quotation omitted). At the end of the day, whether 
Respondent possessed the requisite mens rea was a question of fact to be 
determined by the hearing officer; and the long, lingering, and 
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meandering touches described by the four women and others, the various 
reactions of those who experienced or observed those touches, and the 
numerous other accounts of Respondent’s conduct at the bar, all offer 
ample support for the hearing officer’s ultimate finding on this point. 
In sum, we find and conclude, as did the hearing officer, that the 
Commission proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent 
committed the criminal act of battery.3 
2. Rule 8.4(b). This Rule provides that it is misconduct to “commit a 
criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, 
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.” Our 
determination that Respondent committed a criminal act, standing alone, 
is not enough to establish a violation of this Rule. We also must examine 
the nexus (if any) between that criminality and one or more of the three 
 
3 Respondent draws our attention to the fact that prior to the initiation of these disciplinary 
proceedings, a special prosecutor issued a report in which he declined to bring criminal 
charges against Respondent. The report itself was excluded from evidence in this case (a 
ruling Respondent challenges), but the special prosecutor’s ultimate determination 
nonetheless was established by other evidence. For several reasons though, the special 
prosecutor’s declination of prosecution is of no moment to our analysis. “It is the exclusive 
province of this Court to regulate professional legal activity.” Matter of Mittower, 693 N.E.2d 
555, 558 (Ind. 1998). “A disciplinary action is not a criminal proceeding; the discipline of a 
member of the Bar of this State is independently determined from any other proceeding, even 
if the alleged professional impropriety involves criminal conduct.” Matter of Sheaffer, 655 
N.E.2d 1214, 1217 (Ind. 1995); accord Matter of Smith, 60 N.E.3d 1034, 1036 (Ind. 2016). As 
Respondent himself emphasizes throughout his briefing, criminal, civil, disciplinary, 
legislative, and electoral accountability mechanisms each have their own distinct aims and 
purposes. Moreover, a prosecutor may decline to pursue a prosecution for any number of 
reasons unrelated to whether the subject of the investigation committed a criminal act; and 
indeed, the special prosecutor’s report proffered by Respondent cited some of those reasons. 
(See Pet. for Rev., Ex. 1 at 6 (citing prosecutorial burden of proof of intent beyond a reasonable 
doubt and the lack of a public benefit to criminal prosecution under these circumstances)). 
Further, Respondent concedes, in reference to a prior disciplinary case, that an attorney’s 
“acquittal would not have barred a discipline charge based on Rule 8.4(b) because acquittal 
only signifies the existence of reasonable doubt rather than the absence of clear-and-
convincing evidence.” (Br. in Supp. of Pet. for Rev. at 31 n.15 (citing Matter of Mears, 723 
N.E.2d 873 (Ind. 2000))). If an acquittal based on an adjudged lack of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt does not preclude a Rule 8.4(b) charge, it follows that a declination of 
prosecution based on a perceived lack of proof beyond a reasonable doubt fares no 
differently. 
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characteristics enumerated in the Rule—honesty, trustworthiness, or 
“fitness as a lawyer in other respects.” And as the parties have done in 
their briefing, we focus our attention here on the fitness element. 
Our leading case addressing this nexus requirement is Matter of Oliver, 
493 N.E.2d 1237 (Ind. 1986). That case involved an attorney who crashed 
his car into a tree after driving while intoxicated (“OWI”) on his way 
home from a bar, was charged with misdemeanor OWI, pled guilty, and 
had acceptance of the plea withheld pending successful completion of 
community service and other conditions of an informal probation. Oliver 
was charged with violating three provisions of our former Code of 
Professional Responsibility. One was the predecessor to what is now Rule 
8.4(d), which we discuss below. The other two provisions addressed, 
respectively, illegal conduct involving “moral turpitude” and conduct 
adversely reflecting on fitness to practice. These two Code provisions later 
were consolidated into Rule 8.4(b), with the “moral turpitude” component 
being replaced with the three specific characteristics now enumerated in 
Rule 8.4(b).   
In finding no violation of the Code provision addressing criminal 
conduct involving moral turpitude, we emphasized the “objective of the 
rule” over the “problem of definition” and noted that Oliver was not a 
multiple offender or someone with a chronic alcohol problem, his criminal 
act was isolated and did not result in any personal injury or property 
damage except to himself, and he had readily admitted his guilt and 
successfully discharged the conditions of his informal probation. Oliver, 
493 N.E.2d at 1241. We likewise found no violation of the Code provision 
addressing conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practice after finding 
that the evidence adduced in that case “demonstrated that Oliver’s sole 
act did not affect his practice or lead to any reasonable question about his 
suitability as a practitioner[.]” Id. at 1242-43.   
The principles articulated in Oliver survived the adoption of the Rules 
of Professional Conduct, see Matter of Eddingfield, 572 N.E.2d 1293, 1295 
(Ind. 1991), and are encapsulated in our Commentary to Rule 8.4: 
Although a lawyer is personally answerable to the entire criminal 
law, a lawyer should be professionally answerable only for offenses 
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that indicate lack of those characteristics relevant to law practice. 
Offenses involving violence, dishonesty, breach of trust, or serious 
interference with the administration of justice are in that category. 
A pattern of repeated offenses, even ones of minor significance 
when considered separately, can indicate indifference to legal 
obligation. 
These principles likewise are reflected throughout our post-Oliver 
disciplinary jurisprudence. Crimes involving theft, fraud, or the like—
even if they involve an isolated act committed outside of one’s legal 
practice—have been held to be attorney misconduct because they 
inherently bear on an attorney’s honesty or trustworthiness. See, e.g., 
Matter of Page, 8 N.E.3d 199 (Ind. 2014) (attorney aided and abetted fraud 
in connection with a loan application). Crimes of violence—even those 
involving a single act committed outside of one’s legal practice—have 
been held to be attorney misconduct on the premise that such an act bears 
on “fitness as a lawyer in other respects.” See, e.g., Matter of Smith, 97 
N.E.3d 621 (Ind. 2018) (attorney committed felony intimidation against his 
estranged wife); Matter of Coleman, 67 N.E.3d 629 (Ind. 2017) (attorney 
committed domestic battery of wife in presence of four children). And of 
course, crimes committed by an attorney during the performance of his or 
her legal work have been treated as having an immediate and self-evident 
nexus to the attorney’s fitness to practice law. See, e.g., Matter of Robertson, 
78 N.E.3d 1090 (Ind. 2016) (attorney committed OWI while driving to the 
courthouse for a scheduled hearing and battery against a court 
receptionist); Matter of May, 992 N.E.2d 684 (Ind. 2013) (attorney battered 
his client in the courthouse after a hearing).   
In certain circumstances, an attorney’s particular field of practice also 
has informed our nexus analysis. For example, in Matter of Walker, 597 
N.E.2d 1271 (Ind. 1992), a part-time prosecutor who also practiced in 
family law committed domestic battery against his partner. In finding a 
violation of Rule 8.4(b) and rejecting Walker’s argument that the requisite 
nexus was lacking because the battery arose as part of a “private, adult 
relationship,” we observed that Walker’s act of domestic battery “calls 
into question his ability to zealously prosecute or to effectively work with 
the victims of such crimes” and similarly compromised his effectiveness 
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with his private clients or with adversaries in situations involving issues 
of domestic violence. Id. at 1272. 
Other jurisdictions have wrestled with similar questions. Some 
decisions have highlighted the deleterious effect any violation of the law 
necessarily has on the perception of individuals whose tradecraft is 
premised upon respect for, and adherence to, the rule of law. See, e.g., 
Matter of Horwitz, 180 Ariz. 20, 24, 881 P.2d 352, 356 (1994) (“[T]he public 
has a right to expect that lawyers will, in general, live as law-abiding 
citizens”). Other decisions have focused on how an attorney’s criminality 
bears on his or her ability to perform discrete legal tasks, drawing 
parallels between “fitness” and “competency.” See, e.g., Matter of 
Disciplinary Proceeding Against Curran, 115 Wash.2d 747, 768, 801 P.2d 962, 
972 (1990) (“The rule is not concerned with maintaining public confidence 
in the bar by disciplining lawyers harming the public image of the bar. 
Rather, it is concerned with protecting the public from incompetent 
practitioners”). And still others have focused on an attorney’s professional 
duties writ large. See, e.g., Matter of Peters, 428 N.W.2d 375, 380 (Minn. 
1988) (“A lawyer’s professional capacity, moreover, extends well beyond 
the attorney-client relationship, and it seems to us abundantly clear that a 
law school dean or law professor acts in the professional capacity of a 
lawyer in dealing with the law school’s students and staff”). 
The pragmatic line drawn by Oliver and its progeny reflects measured 
consideration of all of these concerns and recognizes that the purposes of 
attorney discipline include both the need to protect the public and the 
need to preserve public confidence in the legal system. It also is consistent 
with our bar admission standards, which require separate demonstrations 
of both competency and fitness. See Ind. Admis. Disc. R. 12. The Oliver 
doctrine has served Indiana well for over three decades, and neither the 
Commission nor Respondent asks us in these proceedings to revisit it.   
Accordingly, we turn to the question presented here: Do Respondent’s 
criminal acts of battery against the four women during the event at the bar 
have the requisite nexus to his fitness as a lawyer to be actionable under 
Rule 8.4(b)? 
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Echoing our earlier discussion of criminality, we note that although the 
hearing officer’s report does not include an explicit finding of a nexus 
within her discussion of Rule 8.4(b), such a finding is clearly implied in 
the hearing officer’s correct articulation of the elements of Rule 8.4(b), her 
ultimate findings and conclusions that Respondent violated this Rule, and 
her detailed findings and conclusions elsewhere in her report addressing 
the relationship between Respondent’s professional role and his 
attendance and conduct at the bar.   
Much like the part-time prosecutor who committed domestic battery in 
Walker, Respondent argues that the event at the bar was a private function 
disconnected from his practice of law or the performance of any act 
formally within the scope of his office. Indeed, several attendees testified 
that the party was an unofficial and informal event to celebrate the end of 
the legislative session. However, whether something is “unofficial” or 
“informal” does not answer the question of whether it involved the 
performance of the attorney’s professional duties. 
The hearing officer found generally that “the important business of 
developing and nurturing goodwill by and between legislators, legislative 
staff and lobbyists occurs at the party,” and found more specifically that 
“Respondent went to the party intending to conduct some business with 
key legislators about a bill that concerned the Office of Attorney General.”  
(HO’s Report at 22-23). These findings are borne out by Respondent’s own 
testimony during the final hearing:  
That piqued my interest after [the lobbyist] invited me to the party 
because it was my understanding that perhaps Senator Taylor 
would be there and I thought it would be great to go in and thank 
him for being the champion for trying to oppose that particular bill. 
. . . [F]rom my standpoint it was an opportunity to go in and not 
only see Senator Taylor and thank him for his efforts but also to 
continue to do what I try to do everywhere and that’s build 
relationships. I understood that there were going to be legislators 
there. In my tenure there are several legislators that I’ve met, there 
are several more that I’ve not met and it’s always good to have 
relationships and so I thought it was a great opportunity to go say 
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“hello” to old friends, meet new friends, and continue to do what I 
do in terms of connect. 
(Tr. Vol. 4 at 21-22, 25). And Respondent similarly described in work-
related terms his motivations and conduct while at the party: 
I had some conversations, I recall having a conversation with Jeff 
Phillips, who’s a lobbyist, talking about the function of the office. In 
particular I had a conversation with Senator Taylor, I did track him 
down and we sat down at the bar and spoke for several minutes 
about what had happened that evening at the General Assembly, 
and of course I did thank him for that. I sat down and talked to 
Senator Randolph, Lonnie Randolph, and a few more I spoke to, 
Senator Mishler. Senator Mishler, when he saw me, he introduced 
me to some of the folks he was with, but he made a point of letting 
me know that he was prepared to work with us moving forward, 
despite the fact that his bill was passed and the outcome, he 
wanted to assure me that we were going to continue to work 
together and that there would be access for my office to funds to, I 
don’t want to say replace, but to basically make up for any needs 
that we required. 
. . . [I also did] a lot of what I would call quick-hits, “How are you? 
What’s your name? What do you do?” and then move on, much 
like when I work a political event and my purpose is to meet as 
many people as possible. 
(Id. at 30-31). 
Respondent’s own testimony brings his criminal conduct directly 
within the ambit of the performance of his professional duties. 
Respondent went to the party with the purpose of discussing a bill 
affecting his office with key legislators and nurturing goodwill, he spent 
time at the party doing precisely these things, and while there he 
committed battery against a legislator and three legislative staffers. The 
nexus in this case is little different than the nexus in Robertson (OWI on the 
way to the courthouse for a hearing and battery on a court receptionist) or 
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in May (battery in the courthouse following a hearing), and it is more than 
sufficient to establish a violation of Rule 8.4(b).   
3. Rule 8.4(d). This Rule proscribes engaging “in conduct that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice.” Once again, our discussion is 
guided by Oliver and its progeny. 
Although we found the requisite nexus between fitness and criminality 
to be lacking in Oliver based on the evidence adduced in that case, we 
nonetheless concluded that Oliver’s criminal act of OWI violated the 
proscription against conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice 
because Oliver was serving in a prosecutorial role at the time he 
committed his criminal act:  
The duty of judges and prosecutors to conform their behavior to 
the law does not arise solely out of their status as attorneys. As 
officers charged with administration of the law, their own behavior 
has the capacity to bolster or damage public esteem for the system 
different than that of attorneys otherwise in practice. 
Id. at 1242. In the years since Oliver, we have consistently held that 
criminal conduct committed by prosecutors or their deputies is conduct 
inherently prejudicial to the administration of justice due to their status as 
“officers charged with administration of the law.” Further, we have 
applied this same principle to a deputy attorney general. Matter of Junk, 
815 N.E.2d 505 (Ind. 2004). 
Noting that Junk was an agreed disposition, Respondent briefly argues 
in a footnote that an Attorney General should be treated differently than a 
prosecutor under the Oliver doctrine because the Attorney General in most 
instances does not directly charge crimes. (Br. in Supp. of Pet. for Rev. at 
43 n.20). But Respondent does not explain how exercising the broad 
statutory authority of the office to assist prosecutors and crime victims, 
and defending convictions on appeal on behalf of the State, are 
meaningfully different in terms of the administration of justice than 
charging and prosecuting those crimes on behalf of the State; or how, in 
Oliver’s parlance, the Attorney General is not also an “officer[ ] charged 
with administration of the law.” In fact, the Attorney General’s role in the 
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administration of justice—which extends statewide and encompasses a 
wide range of criminal, civil, administrative and regulatory matters—
greatly exceeds that of a county prosecutor. See generally I.C. § 4-6-1-6 
(setting forth rights, powers, and duties of Attorney General). Put simply, 
the Attorney General is the “chief legal officer of the State of Indiana.” (Tr. 
Vol. 3 at 102). 
In short, the Attorney General is an “officer charged with 
administration of the law” at least to the same extent as a prosecutor, if 
not substantially more so. Accordingly, Respondent’s criminal conduct 
was prejudicial to the administration of justice, in violation of Rule 8.4(d). 
4. Sanction. Isolated misdemeanor acts of OWI or public intoxication 
committed by those in prosecutorial roles frequently have been sanctioned 
by public reprimand. See, e.g., Matter of Janeway, 981 N.E.2d 548, 549 (Ind. 
2013) (OWI by deputy prosecutor); Junk, 815 N.E.2d at 506 (OWI by 
deputy attorney general); Matter of McFadden, 729 N.E.2d 137, 138 (Ind. 
2000) (public intoxication by deputy prosecutor). Acts of misdemeanor 
battery committed by attorneys have garnered either a public reprimand 
or short suspension with automatic reinstatement. See, e.g., May, 992 
N.E.2d at 685 (60-day suspension with automatic reinstatement for battery 
committed by attorney against client); Matter of Scott, 989 N.E.2d 1249 
(Ind. 2013) (public reprimand for domestic battery by attorney); Walker, 
597 N.E.2d at 1272 (60-day suspension with automatic reinstatement for 
domestic battery committed by part-time prosecutor).4 We think this line 
of cases serves as a useful starting point for the question of appropriate 
sanction here. 
The hearing officer similarly recommended a 60-day suspension here. 
However, she recommended that suspension be served without automatic 
 
4 Disciplinary actions against judges for similar acts committed in violation of our Code of 
Judicial Conduct have reached similar results. See, e.g., Matter of Adams, et al., 134 N.E.3d 50 
(Ind. 2019) (60-day suspension for judge who committed misdemeanor battery and 30-day 
suspensions for two other judges who participated in the same incident at levels falling short 
of criminality); Matter of Page, 69 N.E.3d 470 (Ind. 2017) (public reprimand for OWI); Matter of 
Hughes, 947 N.E.2d 418 (Ind. 2011) (same). 
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reinstatement, based largely on actions taken by Respondent and 
members of his team in the wake of the unauthorized disclosure of the 
Taft Report, actions the hearing officer viewed as significantly aggravating 
in nature. 
Because those actions are established in the record primarily through a 
series of emails and attachments admitted into evidence over 
Respondent’s objection, and Respondent has renewed those objections in 
his petition for review, we must first briefly address the admissibility of 
those exhibits. Prior to and during the final hearing, Respondent 
alternately objected to these emails on grounds of hearsay, relevance, and 
attorney-client privilege. Rather than developing these arguments with 
respect to each email in his petition for review though, Respondent merely 
incorporates a chart listing each item and each ground for objection. (Br. in 
Supp. of Pet. for Rev. at 20 & Ex. 2). We likewise need not pause long on 
the admissibility of each individual email, and we find the hearing officer 
did not abuse her discretion in admitting them. Respondent’s claim of 
privilege, based on the notion that the emails contain legal advice 
rendered to him in his capacity as Attorney General by counsel within his 
office, is fundamentally at odds with Respondent’s insistence that only his 
private conduct is at issue and that his office employees participated in 
these team endeavors on their own personal time, using their own private 
email accounts, and in their personal capacities as Respondent’s political 
supporters. Simply put, Respondent cannot have it both ways. 
Respondent’s hearsay objections likewise are unpersuasive because the 
emails were not admitted for the truth of the matters asserted therein but 
rather the implications that may be drawn from them regarding 
Respondent’s alleged lack of insight or remorse into his misconduct. And 
for this same reason, these emails are relevant enough to factors bearing 
on sanction to survive an admissibility challenge. 
However, upon careful review of these emails and attachments, we find 
them only minimally relevant to the question of an appropriate sanction. 
Importantly, Respondent’s own degree of participation in the email chains 
admitted into evidence is minimal and perfunctory. And while several 
emails indeed reflect extremely poorly on various members of 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-DI-156 | May 11, 2020 
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Respondent’s team,5 there is little evidence linking those team members’ 
musings to Respondent’s direction beyond whatever presumption might 
be drawn from the agency relationship. The Commission argues it “strains 
credulity” to believe “that Respondent was not in control of what his team 
was doing on his behalf[.]” (Resp. to Pet. for Rev. at 27 n.13). While this is 
undoubtedly true in a general sense, we do not believe Respondent is 
personally responsible for every poor word choice or ill-conceived idea 
proposed by individual team members in emails or draft documents, 
many of which were voted down by other team members and never made 
their way into publicly-disseminated materials. 
We also find that certain actions taken by team members—and, with 
some exception, Respondent’s own actions—were intended to address the 
particular process that led to the public accusations against Respondent 
rather than to directly impugn the credibility of the four women 
themselves. All involved in this process—the four women, Respondent, 
and legislative leaders—appropriately decried the unauthorized leaking 
of the Taft Report by a legislative staffer. Respondent’s public criticisms of 
that process are valid and do not speak to any negative characteristics 
relevant to sanction. The Taft Report was privately commissioned by 
legislative leaders to examine potential employment-law issues arising 
from the events of the party. Its purpose was not to test the credibility of 
the four women or to conduct a detailed factual investigation against 
Respondent. Yet, when the report was leaked into the public domain, it 
was received by the public as a report finding and exposing misconduct 
 
5 These include press releases drafted by one team member and edited by another intended to 
“expose [N.D.]” (Ex. 15-16); another team member’s suggestion to refer to declarants and 
others involved with the Taft Report commissioned by the Legislature as “Leakers and Liars” 
(Ex. 24-27); a rejected suggestion by a team member to refer to the allegations against 
Respondent as a “lynching” (Ex. 28); phony letters to the editor and editorials drafted by team 
members (Ex. 35-37, 39, 57-58); and hired consultants’ suggestion after the Commission filed 
its disciplinary complaint against Respondent to dig up negative background on Commission 
members and then “shop portions of research enclosed no fingerprints to national 
conservative outlet to generate piece that friends would use with grassroots folks,” to which a 
team member within the Attorney General’s office responded “I think it would be a good 
idea” (Ex. 56). 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-DI-156 | May 11, 2020 
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by Respondent. Respondent was fully entitled at this point to mount a 
public defense against the process that led to the matter being 
inappropriately released into the public domain. And to the extent 
Respondent’s public defense also involved a simple, straightforward 
denial of some of the behaviors attributed to him in the Taft Report, he 
was entitled to do that as well.6 
However, in terms of his own direct actions, Respondent went a step 
too far in decrying the allegations against him as not only “false” but 
“vicious” in a press release issued shortly after the Taft Report was leaked. 
(Exs. 1-2). Read in context, Respondent’s use of the word “vicious,” 
bookended by references to the allegations against him, implied malice or 
bad faith by the four women. Respondent claimed at the final hearing that 
his use of the term “vicious” was directed at the process and not at the 
individual accusers (Tr. Vol. 4 at 176), but the hearing officer was not 
persuaded and we defer to her first-hand assessment of that testimony. 
Respondent also went a step too far in issuing a subsequent press 
release in which he drew attention to, and published, a message written 
by N.D. to a friend but mistakenly sent to an email account associated 
with the Office of Attorney General. (Ex. 7). In that press release, 
Respondent referred to N.D.’s account as a “draft story” and an 
“editorialized . . . recollection of events,” and Respondent characterized 
the email as evidence of “various stories . . . coordinated and changed 
under the direction of others.” (Id.) Like Respondent’s use of the word 
“vicious” in the earlier press release, this press release in context contains 
a clear implication of malice and bad faith by the women and not mere 
disagreement regarding the substance of the accusations. Moreover, as 
observed by the hearing officer, Respondent’s gratuitous publication of 
N.D.’s email “could serve only to intimidate [N.D.] and anyone else 
thinking of stepping forward.” (HO’s Report at 35). 
 
6 As noted by the hearing officer, “[n]either the Respondent nor [the four women] were 
satisfied with the accuracy of the Taft Report.” (HO’s Report at 16 n.2). 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-DI-156 | May 11, 2020 
Page 18 of 19 
In sum, we find Respondent’s actions in the wake of the disclosure of 
the Taft Report do carry some aggravating weight, but not to an extent 
that entails the type of wholesale lack of insight or lack of remorse that 
ordinarily would prompt us to require a respondent attorney to undergo 
the reinstatement process in order to prove his fitness to resume the 
practice of law. Many of our past disciplinary dispositions have not had 
occasion to expound in great detail upon an attorney’s demonstrations of 
insight or remorse, or lack thereof, and have simply cited the aggravating 
or mitigating factor without further discussion. Respondent correctly 
observes, though, that questions of insight and remorse in many cases are 
more appropriately weighed on a spectrum rather than as binary, all-or-
nothing propositions. (See Respondent’s Reply Br. at 8). This is one of 
those cases. Although Respondent strayed past an appropriate line in 
some of his conduct after the Taft Report was leaked, he was apologetic in 
his initial discussions with legislative leaders before the leak, and in a 
press release after the leak Respondent maintained his innocence but 
simultaneously emphasized that “[v]ictims of sexual abuse and/or sexual 
harassment deserve to have their voices heard.” (Ex. 3). 
The hearing officer’s report and the parties’ briefs point to additional 
factors that are aggravating or mitigating to varying degrees. 
Respondent’s acts of misconduct were committed against four women, 
albeit on a single occasion. The victims have suffered significant harm 
that, while certainly exacerbated by other events, was caused most 
proximately by Respondent’s misconduct. Respondent’s substantial 
experience in the practice of law, almost all of which has been spent in a 
prosecutorial capacity, counsels that he should have known better than to 
conduct himself at the bar in the manner he did; but that same experience, 
consisting of roughly three decades of public service without prior 
discipline, also carries mitigating weight. 
At the end of the day, Respondent urges that “similar cases should be 
treated similarly” and that we should treat him no better or no worse than 
any other attorney. (Br. in Supp. of Pet. for Rev. at 51-52). In light of our 
consideration of the nature of Respondent’s misconduct, the aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances, and the short suspensions with automatic 
reinstatement we imposed on the attorney who battered his client (May), 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-DI-156 | May 11, 2020 
Page 19 of 19 
the prosecutor who battered his romantic partner (Walker), and the judge 
who battered a third party (Adams), we conclude that a similar result 
should obtain here. 
Conclusion 
The Court concludes that Respondent violated Professional Conduct 
Rules 8.4(b) and 8.4(d). The Court finds in favor of Respondent on the 
Oath of Attorneys charge. 
For Respondent’s professional misconduct, the Court suspends 
Respondent from the practice of law in this state for a period of 30 days, 
beginning May 18, 2020. Respondent shall not undertake any new legal 
matters between service of this opinion and the effective date of the 
suspension, and Respondent shall fulfill all the duties of a suspended 
attorney under Admission and Discipline Rule 23(26). At the conclusion of 
the period of suspension, provided there are no other suspensions then in 
effect, Respondent shall be automatically reinstated to the practice of law, 
subject to the conditions of Admission and Discipline Rule 23(18)(a). The 
costs of this proceeding are assessed against Respondent, and the hearing 
officer appointed in this case is discharged with the Court’s appreciation. 
 
All Justices concur. 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  RES P O N DE N T  
Donald R. Lundberg 
James H. Voyles 
Jennifer M. Lukemeyer 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  I ND I A NA SU P RE ME CO U R T 
D I SC I PL I NA R Y C OMM ISS I O N 
Charles M. Kidd, Acting Executive Director 
Seth T. Pruden, Staff Attorney 
Angie Ordway, Staff Attorney 
Indianapolis, Indiana