Title: Welker v. TSPC
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S45211
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: July 19, 2001

FILED: July 19, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STEVEN R. WELKER,
by and through
LESLIE R. BRADBURY, Assignee,
Respondent on Review,
	v.
TEACHERS STANDARDS AND PRACTICES COMMISSION,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 95C-12525; CA A93668; SC S45211)
	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted March 10, 1999.
	Michael C. Livingston, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review. 
With him on the briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and
Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.
	James M. Brown, of Enfield Brown &amp; Collins, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.  With him
on the briefs was Nicole M. Hendricks.
	Harry Auerbach, Portland, Jane Ellen Stonecipher, Salem, and
Cory Streisinger, Portland, filed the briefs for amici curiae
League of Oregon Cities, Association of Oregon Counties, and Port
of Portland.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
and Riggs, Justices.**
	RIGGS, J.
	The petition for review is dismissed.  The decision of the
Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded to the
circuit court for further proceedings.
	*Appeal from Marion County Circuit Court, Paul J. Lipscomb, Judge. 152 Or App 190, 953 P2d 403 (1998).
	**Van Hoomissen, J., retired December 31, 2000, and did not
participate in the decision of this case; Kulongoski, J.,
resigned June 14, 2001, and did not participate in the
consideration or decision of this case; De Muniz, J., did not
participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
		RIGGS, J.
		We allowed review in this case to consider whether a
contract provision that waives a statutory right to indemnity is
void as against public policy.  The Court of Appeals held that
the provision at issue might be void for that reason (depending
on the resolution of certain factual issues on remand).  Welker
v. TSPC, 152 Or App 190, 203, 953 P2d 403 (1998).  After briefing
and oral argument, we noted a potential jurisdictional issue and
requested that the parties answer several questions.  After
considering the record and the parties' arguments, we conclude
that, in its present posture, appellate jurisdiction is lacking
in this case.  Accordingly, we dismiss the petition for review,
vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals, and remand the case
to the trial court for further proceedings.
		Plaintiff filed a civil action against defendant.  The
parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial
court entered an order and a separate judgment in favor of
defendant.  The court entered the judgment in the register on May
30, 1996.
		On May 31, 1996, plaintiff filed a "Motion for Order
Setting Aside Judgment and Reconsideration of Order Dismissing
Third Amended Complaint."  On June 7, 1996, still within the ten-day time limit for filing a motion for new trial under ORCP 64 F,
plaintiff filed a "Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Order Setting Aside Judgment." In the supplemental
memorandum, plaintiff stated that he relied on ORCP 64 C in
support of his motion.  The supplemental memorandum concluded,
"[f]or purposes of clarification[,]" that "plaintiff moves for
reconsideration or, in the alternative, for a new trial following
that order awarding summary judgment to defendant."
		The trial court did not enter an order on plaintiff's
motion.  On June 27, 1996, plaintiff filed his notice of appeal.
		This case requires us first to consider whether
plaintiff's motion was, in fact, a motion for a new trial and, if
so, then to consider the effect that the motion has on
plaintiff's appeal.  ORCP 64 governs motions for new trial. (1)

 
ORCP 64 A defines a new trial as "a re-examination of an issue of
fact in the same court after judgment."  ORCP 64 B sets out the
grounds for granting a new trial when the original trial was by
jury.  ORCP 64 C makes ORCP 64 B applicable, in certain
circumstances, to trials without a jury.  A motion for new trial
generally must be filed within 10 days after the trial court
entered the judgment.  ORCP 64 F.  If the trial court does not
rule on the motion within 55 days from the date that the judgment
was entered, then the motion is deemed to be denied.  Id.
		If a party files a motion for new trial, then the time
to take an appeal from the original judgment does not begin to
run until the trial court enters an order ruling on the motion or
the motion is deemed denied.  Former ORS 19.026(2) (1995),
renumbered as ORS 19.255(2) (1997). (2)  An order granting a motion
for new trial is deemed to be a judgment, former ORS 19.010(2)(d)
(1995), renumbered as ORS 19.205(2)(d) (1997), and thus the
parties have 30 days from the date the order granting a new trial
was entered to file a notice of appeal, former ORS 19.026(1)
(1995), renumbered as ORS 19.255(1) (1997).
		The parties make three arguments as to why plaintiff's
motion was not a motion for new trial, despite the fact that the
supplemental memorandum expressly asserted that it was.  First,
both parties contend that the motion was not a motion for new
trial because it addressed only issues of law.  That argument is
based on ORCP 64 A, which defines a new trial as "a re-examination of an issue of fact in the same court after
judgment."  That rule, however, defines only what a new trial is,
not why a party would be entitled to one.  The reasons why a
party may be entitled to a new trial are set out in ORCP 64 B. 
They include issues of law.  See ORCP 64 B(5) ("Insufficiency of
the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it
is against law." (Emphasis added.)); ORCP 64 B(6) ("Error in law
occurring at the trial and objected to or excepted to by the
party making the application.").
		Second, defendant contends that plaintiff's motion was
not a motion for new trial because it did not state plainly its
grounds.  Assuming arguendo that the motion was defective in that
respect, such a defect would not make any difference.  Former ORS
19.026(2) (1995) applies to a motion for new trial whether or not
the motion has merit.
		Third, defendant argues that the motion was not a
motion for new trial because it was not captioned as such.  See
Alternative Realty v. Michaels, 90 Or App 280, 285, 753 P2d 419
(1988) (stating such a requirement).  Again, we cannot agree. 
Defendant identifies no statute or rule that requires a motion
for new trial to use particular words in its caption.  This court
has held that a motion is controlled by its substance, not its
caption.  See, e.g., State v. Barone, 329 Or 210, 221, 986 P2d 5
(1999) ("We address defendant's motion according to its
substance, not its caption."), cert den 528 US 1086 (2000).  More
specifically, this court has held that a motion was a motion for
new trial although it was not denominated as such.  See Carter v.
U.S. National Bank, 304 Or 538, 546, 747 P2d 980 (1987) (motion
to reconsider grant of summary judgment was motion for new trial;
therefore, order granting motion was appealable as order granting
new trial); Cooley v. Roman, 286 Or 807, 811, 596 P2d 565 (1979)
(motion to set aside summary judgment was motion for new trial). 
In sum, we conclude that plaintiff's motion was a motion for new
trial.
		As noted, former ORS 19.026(2) (1995) provides that, if
a motion for new trial is filed, then the time to take an appeal
from the original judgment does not begin to run until the trial
court enters an order ruling on the motion or the motion is
deemed denied.  Plaintiff's motion for new trial in this case had
not been denied by order or deemed denied by the passage of 55
days when plaintiff filed his notice of appeal.  The trial court
did not enter an order in the register ruling on the motion, as
required by former ORS 19.026(2)(a) (1995).  Neither was the
motion deemed denied before the notice of appeal was filed, as
required by former ORS 19.026(2)(b) (1995), as June 27, 1996, the
date on which plaintiff filed his notice of appeal, was only 28
days after the court had entered judgment, well before the 55-day
limit set out in ORCP 64 F.  Because plaintiff's motion for new
trial has not been resolved, plaintiff failed to comply with
former ORS 19.026(2) (1995):  He did not file the notice of
appeal "within 30 days after" the motion for new trial was denied
by order or deemed denied by the passage of 55 days.  (Emphasis
added.)
		A notice of appeal filed before the time to appeal
begins to run is jurisdictionally defective.  See State ex rel
Juv. Dept. v. Dahl, 310 Or 59, 791 P2d 132 (1990) (vacating
decision of Court of Appeals when notice of appeal was filed
before entry of judgment in register); Ellis v. Roberts, 302 Or
6, 8-9, 725 P2d 886 (1986) (notice of appeal filed two days
before judgment was entered was premature); Johnson v. Assured
Employment, 277 Or 11, 14, 558 P2d 1228 (1977) ("The great weight
of authority of both old and recent cases is that a premature
appeal will not * * * ripen and that if the party attempting to
appeal does not file a new notice of appeal when the impediment
to ripeness is removed, the appellate court lacks
jurisdiction.").  Here, the time to file a notice of appeal had
not yet begun to run, because the motion for new trial remained
unresolved.  Therefore, plaintiff's notice of appeal was
ineffective to confer jurisdiction on the appellate court to
decide the merits of the appeal.  
		The parties have asked this court to grant leave to the
trial court under ORS 19.270(4) to enter an appealable judgment. 
ORS 19.270(4) provides:
		"Notwithstanding the filing of a notice of appeal,
the trial court shall have jurisdiction, with leave of
the appellate court, to enter an appealable judgment if
the appellate court determines that:
		"(a) At the time of the filing of the notice of
appeal the trial court intended to enter an appealable
judgment; and
		"(b) The judgment from which the appeal is taken
is defective in form or was entered at a time when the
trial court did not have jurisdiction of the cause
under subsection (1) of this section, or the trial
court had not yet entered an appealable judgment."
		Under ORS 19.270(4)(a), the trial court must have
intended to enter an appealable judgment at the time of the
filing of the notice of appeal.  The facts in this case satisfy
paragraph (a) because, when plaintiff filed his notice of appeal
on June 27, 1996, the trial court, on May 30, 1996, had entered a
judgment that the court intended to be final and, therefore,
appealable.  The judgment and the rest of the trial court record
give no indication that the judgment was merely interlocutory in
character.
		ORS 19.270(4)(b) describes three kinds of procedural
defects that can undermine appellate jurisdiction.  The word
"or," which appears in paragraph (b), makes it clear that the
three procedural defects are alternatives and that a showing that
any one of the listed defects exists satisfies the requirement of
paragraph (b).
		None of the procedural defects set out in paragraph (b)
exists in this case.  The judgment entered on May 30, 1996, was
not defective in form.  When the trial court entered that
judgment, it had jurisdiction of the cause under former ORS
19.033(1) (1995), renumbered as ORS 19.270(1) (1997).  It is true
that, when plaintiff filed the notice of appeal, plaintiff had
moved for a new trial, that motion was unresolved, and a decision
by the trial court to grant a new trial would have been deemed an
appealable judgment under former ORS 19.010(2)(d) (1995). 
However, those facts do not alter the appealability of the
judgment entered on May 30, 1996.
		Plaintiff's appeal was defective solely because
plaintiff filed the notice of appeal before commencement of the
appeal period that governs when a party files a motion for a new
trial.  Former ORS 19.026(2) (1995).  That defect is not among
those that this court may address through the procedure set out
in ORS 19.270(4).  As a consequence, we decline to grant leave to
the trial court to enter an appealable judgment under ORS
19.270(4).
		The foregoing conclusion does not prohibit the parties
from taking an appeal, however.  ORCP 64 F grants the trial court
55 days in which to rule on a motion for new trial.  Even if
premature, a notice of appeal deprives the trial court of
jurisdiction to rule on a motion for new trial while the appeal
is pending before the appellate court.  See Ellis, 302 Or at 9
(notice of appeal filed before entry of judgment deprived trial
court of jurisdiction to enter judgment).  Thus, the premature
notice of appeal filed in this case terminated the trial court's
jurisdiction to rule on the motion at day 28 of the 55-day
period.  
		Neither ORCP 64 nor former ORS 19.026(2) (1995)
expressly provides that the filing of a premature notice of
appeal tolls the time for the trial court to rule on the motion
for new trial.  The plain wording of ORCP 64 F, however,
manifests an intent that the trial court be allowed 55 days to
rule on a motion for new trial.  Therefore, the time during which
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the motion for new
trial does not count toward the 55 days allowed to rule on the
motion under ORCP 64 F.
		Jurisdiction in this case will be vested with the trial
court "when a copy of the appellate judgment is mailed by the
State Court Administrator to the court from which the appeal was
taken * * *."  ORS 19.270(6).  Once jurisdiction is returned to
the trial court, the time to rule upon the motion for new trial
will resume with the first full day following the return of
jurisdiction counting as day 29.  Following that, one of three
events may happen:  The trial court may grant plaintiff's motion
for new trial; the trial court may deny the motion for new trial;
or the trial court may take no action, and the motion will be
deemed denied under ORCP 64 F.  If the trial court grants the
motion for new trial, then defendant may file a notice of appeal
from that order within 30 days.  ORS 19.205(2)(d) (order granting
motion for new trial is deemed a judgment); ORS 19.255(1) (time
to appeal is 30 days).  If the trial court denies the motion, or
if the trial court takes no action and the motion is deemed
denied, then plaintiff may take an appeal from the original
judgment by filing a notice of appeal within 30 days after the
date that the trial court enters its order denying the motion for
new trial or the motion is deemed denied.  ORS 19.255(2)(a) to
(b).
		The petition for review is dismissed.  The decision of
the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded to the
circuit court for further proceedings.



1. ORCP 64 provides, in part:
		"A  New Trial Defined.  A new trial is a
re-examination of an issue of fact in the same court
after judgment.
		"B  Jury Trial; Grounds for New Trial.  A former
judgment may be set aside and a new trial granted in an
action where there has been a trial by jury on the
motion of the party aggrieved for any of the following
causes materially affecting the substantial rights of
such party:
		"* * * * *
		"B(5) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the
verdict or other decision, or that it is against law.
		"B(6) Error in law occurring at the trial and
objected to or excepted to by the party making the
application.
		"C  New Trial in Case Tried Without a Jury.  In an
action tried without a jury, a former judgment may be
set aside and a new trial granted on motion of the
party aggrieved on any grounds set forth in section B
of this rule where applicable. * * *
		"D  Specification of Grounds of Motion; When
Motion Must Be on Affidavits.  In all cases of motion
for a new trial, the grounds thereof shall be plainly
specified, and no cause of new trial not so stated
shall be considered or regarded by the court. * * *
		"* * * * *
		"F  Time of Motion; Counteraffidavits; Hearing and
Determination.  A motion to set aside a judgment and
for a new trial, with the affidavits, if any, in
support thereof, shall be filed not later than 10 days
after the entry of the judgment sought to be set aside,
or such further time as the court may allow.  * * * 
The motion shall be heard and determined by the court
within 55 days from the time of the entry of the
judgment, and not thereafter, and if not so heard and
determined within said time, the motion shall
conclusively be deemed denied."
(Boldface in original.)
2. Former ORS 19.026 (1995) presently is numbered as ORS
19.255 and provides, in part:
		"(2) Where any party has served and filed a motion
for a new trial or a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, the notice of appeal of
any party shall be served and filed within 30 days
after the earlier of the following dates:		
		"(a) The date that the order disposing of the
motion is entered in the register.
		"(b) The date on which the motion is deemed
denied, as provided in ORCP 63 D or 64 F."
ORS 19.255(2) is identical.