Title: People v. Jamison
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 80967
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: April 19, 2001

Docket No. 80967-Agenda 1-November 2000.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 								ERNEST D. JAMISON, Appellant.
Opinion filed April 19, 2001.
	JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:
	Defendant, Ernest D. Jamison, was convicted on a plea of
guilty to first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 1994))
and armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-2 (West 1994)) in connection
with the June 19, 1995, shooting death of Susan K. Gilmore. He
was found eligible for the death penalty and sentenced to death.
Defendant's death sentence was stayed pending his appeal, which
came directly to this court. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §4(b); 134 Ill.
2d Rs. 603, 609. On direct appeal, this court determined that
defendant had not been properly admonished in accord with
Supreme Court Rule 605(b). While retaining jurisdiction over the
appeal, we remanded the matter to the circuit court of McLean
County so that defendant, after being properly admonished, would
have the opportunity to file a motion to withdraw his plea of
guilty, as provided in Supreme Court Rule 604(d). See People v.
Jamison, 181 Ill. 2d 24 (1998).
	On remand, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty
plea, which the circuit court denied. The matter now is returned to
this court for further review. For the reasons that follow, we affirm
defendant's convictions and sentence.



I. BACKGROUND
	The record shows that, in the early morning hours of June 19,
1995, defendant shot and killed a man in Memphis, Tennessee.
Using this man's automobile, defendant fled the state and headed
toward Minnesota. While driving through Missouri, defendant
shot and killed a gas station attendant.
	The stolen vehicle defendant was driving broke down in
Illinois. Defendant abandoned that vehicle near a Quick Pic store
in McLean, Illinois. He then approached the gas pumps at the front
of that store, where Susan Gilmore had just filled her car with
gasoline. Defendant walked to within three feet of Gilmore, pulled
out a gun, shot Gilmore in the head, and pulled her body out of the
car. Defendant then drove away in Gilmore's car. Soon after, a
McLean County sheriff spotted defendant and pursued him in a
high-speed car chase. Defendant's vehicle swerved into a ditch.
When the sheriff approached defendant's car, defendant apparently
attempted suicide by shooting himself in the head.
	On July 13, 1995, defendant was indicted in the State of
Illinois on three counts of first degree murder in relation to the
shooting of Susan Gilmore and one count of aggravated vehicular
hijacking. The indictments charged that, on June 19, 1995,
defendant knowingly and without lawful justification caused the
death of Susan Gilmore by shooting her in the head with a
handgun and that he "took a motor vehicle, a Honda automobile,
from the presence of Susan Gilmore by the use of force when he
was armed with a dangerous weapon, a handgun." On July 21,
1995, defendant was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty.
	On July 25, 1995, while being held in the McLean County
detention facility, defendant was seen for the first time by Dr.
Bhaskar Damera, a psychiatrist. Dr. Damera determined that
defendant was experiencing feelings of boredom and loneliness
because he had been rendered blind by a self-inflicted gunshot
wound in a failed apparent suicide attempt. Dr. Damera diagnosed
defendant as having "Major depression, single episode" and
prescribed Sinequan,(1) a psychotropic medication.
	In August 1995, defendant advised his attorney he wished to
change his plea to guilty. A hearing was scheduled for September
1, 1995. At the September 1, 1995, hearing, the State notified the
court that, by information, it was adding a charge of armed robbery
to the pending charges against defendant. In this new fifth count
(count V), it was alleged that defendant "knowingly took the
contents of a motor vehicle, said contents belonging to Susan K.
Gilmore, and including clothing and personal effects and plants
and tapes, from the immediate presence of Susan Gilmore by the
use of force when he was armed with a dangerous weapon, a
handgun."
	The court advised defendant that, before proceeding further,
he was entitled to have a grand jury return an indictment on count
V or he could have a preliminary hearing to determine probable
cause for the filing of count V. Defendant waived these rights and,
on the same day the information was filed, entered a plea of guilty
to count I, intentional murder, and to count V, the newly filed
armed robbery count.
	Before the court accepted defendant's plea, defense counsel
advised the court that defendant was taking "an anti-depressant,
Sinequan," which was prescribed for him by Dr. Damera. Counsel
further informed the court that she had spoken with Dr. Damera
"with regard to the effects of Sinequan as far as Mr. Jamison's
judgment, his ability to understand and communicate with regard
to his case, and any other effects that the medication might have
on him, and was informed that in fact [defendant] should react in
a normal fashion. That the only obvious effect would be to deal
with his depression, to some extent help him sleep." Defense
counsel then added, "And I believe from communicating with my
client on a regular basis, that in fact there is no negative influence
insofar as his judgment is concerned and that he is alert."
	The trial court then admonished defendant in accord with
Supreme Court Rule 402, found that defendant's plea was
knowingly and voluntarily made, and accepted defendant's plea of
guilty to first degree murder and armed robbery after hearing the
State's factual basis. The State advised the court that it intended to
seek the death penalty and defense counsel acknowledged
awareness of the State's intention.
	Defendant waived his right to a jury and, on December 4,
1995, a bench trial was held to determine defendant's eligibility
for the death penalty. Three witnesses testified at this first-stage
hearing. The clerk at the Quick Pic store testified to the events
leading up to the shooting of Susan Gilmore on June 19, 1995, and
defendant's departure in Gilmore's car. A McLean County sheriff
testified to the events leading up to defendant's capture, and to
defendant's oral confession to the shooting. The sheriff also
testified that audio tapes, plants, and other items were found inside
the car defendant was driving when he was arrested. Finally,
Gilmore's son testified that on June 19, 1995, he had been living
with his mother in Rockford. At about 8 a.m. that day, he saw his
mother loading up her car, a blue Honda Accord, with plants and
other items, in anticipation of a planned visit to his aunt's home in
Kansas City. That was the last time he saw her alive.
	After hearing the evidence, the trial court found defendant
eligible for the death penalty pursuant to section 9-1(b)(6)(c) of
the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6)(c) (West
1994)). After determining defendant's eligibility for the death
penalty, the court proceeded to the second stage of the death
penalty hearing and began to receive evidence in aggravation and
mitigation. Additional evidence was presented on December 5 and
7, 1995, and on February 9, 13, 14, 15, 16, and 21, 1996.
	On the morning of February 15, 1996, defense counsel
informed the court that she would be asking her next witness, Dr.
Arthur R. Traugott, "some basic questions with regard to fitness."
She explained that at the time of the plea hearing, on September
1, 1995, no one was aware that defendant had been taking
medication which was classified as psychotropic. Upon learning
the psychotropic nature of the medication, she contacted Dr.
Damera, defendant's treating psychiatrist, and Dr. Traugott, a
psychiatrist she had engaged as a mitigation witness. Dr. Traugott,
whom she planned to call as her next witness, was prepared to
testify on the subject of defendant's fitness while taking
medication.
	It was noted by the trial court that, based on the statutory
provision in effect at the time defendant entered his plea,
defendant's use of psychotropic medication entitled him to a
fitness hearing. That statute, however, had been recently amended,
requiring a fitness hearing only if a bona fide doubt of defendant's
fitness existed. Due to the change in the law, there was a
consensus among the court, the State, and defense counsel that
evidence regarding defendant's fitness should be placed on the
record. Defense counsel then stated:
		"And while I don't believe at any point in these
proceedings, including the time of the defendant's arrest,
that there was any bona fide doubt with regard to his
fitness, and certainly there hasn't been as far as I'm
concerned with my communications with him throughout
the proceeding, I feel more comfortable having some
testimony with regard to that."
	Dr. Traugott then testified that he performed a psychiatric
evaluation of defendant on November 15, 1995. At that time,
defendant was taking the drug, Sinequan, as prescribed by Dr.
Damera. Dr. Traugott testified that he saw no evidence that the
medication affected defendant's ability to understand the charges
or cooperate with his defense. Rather, Dr. Traugott was impressed
by the clarity with which defendant was able to recall and
articulate events, including the events of the plea hearing on
September 1, 1995.
	Dr. Traugott further testified that he had reviewed numerous
documents, including the psychiatric reports prepared by Dr.
Damera both before and after the plea hearing. Based on all the
information available to him, in addition to his own expert
knowledge of, and experience with, the drug Sinequan, Dr.
Traugott believed the medication had no negative effect on
defendant's intellectual functioning. In fact, Dr. Traugott testified,
"I think, if anything, that the Sinequan may have enhanced
[defendant's] ability to cooperate and assist in those proceedings."
Dr. Traugott explained that Sinequan ameliorates the symptoms of
depression, such as sleep and appetite disturbance, and helps the
person become more focused and better able to concentrate. For all
these reasons, Dr. Traugott concluded that defendant was fit for
sentencing and had been fit at the time he entered his plea.
	In addition to rendering his opinion on defendant's fitness, Dr.
Traugott informed the court that his primary diagnosis was that
defendant suffered from antisocial personality disorder, affective
aggressor type. Dr. Traugott explained that affective aggressors
tend to react impulsively when they feel threatened or under stress.
	Dr. Alvin House, a clinical psychologist, also testified in
mitigation. He testified that he met with defendant on November
1 and 8, 1995, and January 5, 1996, and on those occasions,
performed a series of tests to assess defendant's intellect and
mental functioning. Due to defendant's blindness, only the verbal
portion of the Wechsler Intelligence Test could be administered.
Based on this limited test, defendant's IQ was determined to be 80,
which is below average. However, Dr. House also administered
the Wechsler Memory test, which measures short-term and long-term memory and memory function. This test produced an index
number of 102, which is within the average range. Dr. House
testified:
		"In terms of cognitive abilities, on each of the occasions
I met with [defendant], [he] performed elements of a
mental status assessment looking at his tempo orientation,
his attention, different less comprehensive types of short-term recall task[s] like the Wechsler's. Each time
[defendant] showed a clear mental status. He was
consistently oriented within the normal range. He showed
some lapses of attention, but in general was able to focus
on me and my questions for the periods I met with him,
and appeared to be alert and competent."
	Dr. House was aware that defendant was taking Sinequan for
depression. Dr. House was familiar with the drug and testified that
Sinequan can affect short-time reading and recall, but does not
typically affect the type of performances measured on an
intelligence test. He noted, too, that depression can also interfere
with mental performance. In Dr. House's opinion, because
defendant scored within the normal range on the Wechsler
Memory tests, "what was likely going on was that the benefits that
[defendant] was deriving from the medication were outweighing
any effects it was having on his cognitive functioning."
	Dr. House noted that on his January 8, 1996, visit, defendant
reported feeling better and he acknowledged that the medication
seemed to be helping him. Still, defendant became sad when he
spoke about the future and maintained he would rather die than go
to prison because he was afraid of being victimized in prison, due
to his blindness.
	Based on his examination and testing of defendant, Dr. House
reached a determination regarding defendant's mental health using
the DSM-IV classification system. He, like Dr. Traugott,
diagnosed defendant as having antisocial personality disorder,
impulsive type.
	Other mitigation witnesses testified. Melinda Meyer Felner,
an officer at the McLean County detention facility, testified that
defendant was placed in a holding cell directly across from the
control room. Initially, defendant was placed there because he was
considered a suicide risk, but he remained there due to his
blindness. Felner testified that defendant had adjusted well to his
situation. He was provided with audio and music tapes, as well as
books on tape, to help him alleviate his boredom. Felner also
noted that defendant had begun writing rap songs.
	Casey Kruse Goldberg, a social worker at the detention
facility, testified that she visited with defendant 16 times,
beginning on July 25, 1995. Recognizing that defendant seemed
depressed, she referred defendant to Dr. Damera, the facility's
psychiatrist. After Dr. Damera placed defendant on medication,
defendant's depression seemed to decrease. Goldberg testified that
defendant enjoyed "witnessing" his faith to other cellmates and
wrote rap songs as a hobby, to help "him think out what was in his
head."
	Dr. Damera, defendant's treating psychiatrist who had
prescribed Sinequan for defendant's depression, testified on
February 16, 1996. When asked about defendant's fitness while
taking this medication, Dr. Damera explained that the drug is
"supposed to uplift your spirits, and it has other affects [sic] such
as calming down, anti-anxiety, and also helps you to sleep." Dr.
Damera said the drug typically increases a person's self-esteem
and brings about greater clarity of thought.
	According to Dr. Damera, the dosage defendant received was
relatively small-25 milligrams twice during the day and 50
milligrams at night, to aid sleep. On September 19, 1995, the
dosage was increased to 100 milligrams at night because defendant
was still having difficulty sleeping.
	When asked if he had an opinion as to defendant's fitness, Dr.
Damera replied:
		"Well, I did not examine him specifically with that intent,
but in my experience with the patient I never got the
impression that he was unfit in any way. He understood
everything, our conversation, the treatment, the charges."
	The prosecutor then entered into the record the following
stipulations: (1) that on the date defendant entered his guilty plea
on September 1, 1995, and continuing on through early December
1995, neither the State nor defense counsel was aware that the
medication taken by defendant was classified as psychotropic. The
psychotropic nature of the medication was not realized until late
December 1995 or early January 1996; (2) that the amendment to
the statute (725 ILCS 5/104-21 (West 1996)), which became
effective in December 1995 and required a fitness hearing only if
there was a bona fide doubt as to defendant's fitness, was
applicable and, therefore, no fitness hearing was required in this
case; and (3) if a higher court should find that the amended statute
is inapplicable and a fitness hearing is required, the evidence and
testimony already received by the court "is in substance a fitness
hearing" which "substantially complies with the statute."
	The prosecutor further advised the court that, even before it
was known that defendant was taking psychotropic medication,
defendant's fitness had been a consideration due to his suicide
attempt. He explained, however, "it has been the consistent
position of defense counsel in this case, who is in the best position
to know that the defendant has been able to understand what
has-what is going on in these proceedings, what he is charged
with, what the consequences are, and that the defendant has, in
fact, been able to fully cooperate with his counsel in these matters,
and that is the reason why there has not been a fitness hearing
requested by the defense counsel, and there is still not a fitness
hearing requested by defense counsel."
	The trial court ruled as follows:
		"The court would note, based on stipulation of counsel,
that in accordance with the statute as amended, which is
effective in mid-December, 1995, and I refer to Ch. 725,
§5/104-21, the court in reviewing the record in this case
finds that there is no bona fide doubt of the defendant's
fitness that would require the court to conduct a fitness
hearing in accordance with the amended statute. The court
further finds in light of the testimony of both Doctor [sic]
Traugott and Damera that the defendant is fit and has
been fit throughout all proceedings in this case."
	On February 21, 1996, after ruling that the mitigating factors
were insufficient to preclude the imposition of the death penalty,
the court sentenced defendant to death on the murder conviction
and imposed a consecutive term sentence of 30 years'
imprisonment for the armed robbery conviction. Defendant filed
a motion for reconsideration of his sentence, which the trial court
denied on April 1, 1996. Defendant then filed this appeal.
	As noted earlier, when this court initially addressed
defendant's direct appeal, we remanded the cause to the circuit
court so that defendant could be properly admonished, as required
by Supreme Court Rule 605(b). On remand, defendant moved to
withdraw his guilty plea. In support of this motion, defendant
claimed: (1) it was mandatory that the trial court conduct a hearing
to determine defendant's fitness prior to accepting defendant's
guilty plea because defendant was taking psychotropic medication;
(2) the factual basis proffered by the State was insufficient to
support defendant's guilty plea as to armed robbery; and (3)
defendant's plea of guilty as to armed robbery was not knowingly
made.
	On August 28, 1998, the circuit court conducted an
evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion. At that hearing,
defendant testified that he had been taking Sinequan continuously
from July 1995 through August 1997. In August 1997, he asked to
be taken off the medicine because it was causing him to
hallucinate. According to defendant, when he took Sinequan in
1995, it caused his thinking processes to become "clogged up" and
made it difficult for him to remember things. He also testified that
when he entered his plea he was "depressed a lot, [and had] no
will to live." He now wanted to withdraw his guilty plea, he said,
because he was off medication and was thinking clearer.
	Defendant also claimed his plea was not knowingly and
voluntarily made because he had been misinformed about the
State's purpose in charging him with armed robbery. He testified
that his trial attorney never told him that, under the laws in effect
at the time, the commission of murder in conjunction with armed
robbery made him eligible for the death penalty, but that the
commission of murder in conjunction with aggravated vehicular
hijacking did not. On this point, defendant's memory apparently
was clear. He said he spoke with his attorney one or two days
before the plea hearing and asked her about the change in the
charges and for an explanation of the difference. Defendant
recalled that his attorney told him "it really don't make a
difference, it's just that aggravated carjacking wasn't in effect and
I took it as she meant it wasn't a charge."
	Defendant's trial counsel, Amy Davis, was then called as a
witness. She testified that she told defendant that the State was
charging him with armed robbery because it was one of the
predicate offenses which made him death-eligible. Although Davis
did not have a specific recollection of her conversation with
defendant, she believed that she explained everything to him. She
said she had anticipated that the State would be charging
defendant with armed robbery due to the "problem" with the
aggravated hijacking charge and had spoken to defendant about
that situation even before the charges were amended.
	On the subject of defendant's fitness, Davis conceded that
defendant had insisted on pleading guilty, against her advice.
Nevertheless, Davis testified she always believed defendant was
mentally fit and understood what he was doing. When asked about
her failure to request a fitness hearing, Davis responded that a
fitness hearing was held. Although it was not a "conventional"
fitness hearing, she said, two doctors testified and attested to
defendant's fitness. This, she believed, "comported with the
statute."
	Finally, defendant called Dr. Lee, a licensed psychiatrist and
the medical director of psychiatry at Silver Cross Hospital. Dr. Lee
testified that he was on the speaker's board at Eli Lilly and Bristol-Meyers and he was part of the national lecturing board for other
pharmaceutical companies. In this capacity, he educated
physicians regarding new medications developed to treat
depression, psychosis, and anxiety.
	Dr. Lee never examined defendant or reviewed his medical
records. Instead, Dr. Lee testified about what "potentially could be
the affects [sic] of doxepin on an individual such as [defendant]."
Dr. Lee was made aware that defendant had a self-inflicted
gunshot wound to the head. Based on that fact, he assumed
defendant had been suffering from brain trauma. Dr. Lee then
testified that, based on his understanding of the clinical effects of
Sinequan (doxepin), the doxepin, "especially in a person with
brain trauma, could impair the person's higher cognitive function
to a degree that would make it difficult to be legally fit to be able
to assist in their defense."
	Defense counsel also resubmitted for the court's consideration
the written reports of two mitigation witnesses, Casey Kruse
Goldberg and Dr. Damera.
	The circuit court denied defendant's motion to withdraw his
guilty plea in an order dated October 9, 1998, and defendant filed
a motion for reconsideration. In this motion, defendant argued that
his guilty plea had been the product of depression and was not
voluntarily made. Defendant also claimed his trial counsel had
been ineffective and had assumed the role of prosecutor on the
subject of his fitness to plead guilty. The motion to reconsider was
denied in an order dated February 17, 1999.
	Because we retained jurisdiction, the cause was returned to
this court for further review. The issues before us now are: (1)
whether defendant should be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea
(a) because defendant did not receive a fitness hearing, (b) because
defendant was deprived of effective assistance of counsel on the
issue of his fitness because counsel took on the burden of
establishing defendant's fitness, and (c) because defendant's
decision to plead guilty was not voluntary, having been the
product of his depression and the medication he was taking; (2)
whether defendant should be found ineligible for the death penalty
because the State presented an inadequate factual basis to support
defendant's guilty plea as to armed robbery; (3) whether
defendant's guilty plea violated due process because (a) his plea
of guilty to armed robbery was not knowingly made or based on an
accurate understanding of the facts or the law, and (b) he received
ineffective assistance of counsel with regard to his decision to
plead guilty to armed robbery; and, finally, (4) whether the Illinois
death penalty statute is unconstitutional.(2)
II. ANALYSIS
Fitness to Plead and Be Sentenced
	Defendant advances three arguments related to his fitness in
support of his contention that the trial court erred when it denied
his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. First, defendant contends
he must be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because he did not
receive a fitness hearing before he entered his plea and because the
hearing held during the course of his sentencing did not strictly
conform with the requirements of section 104-10 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure of 1963 (the Code) (725 ILCS 5/104-10 et
seq. (West 1998)). He claims entitlement to a fitness hearing based
on his assertion that the trial court, on remand, "implicitly
recogniz[ed] that [defendant] raised a bona fide doubt of his
fitness at the time he pled guilty." We find no merit to defendant's
claim that a bona fide doubt of his fitness ever existed.
Consequently, defendant was not entitled to a fitness hearing.
	Every defendant is presumed to be fit to stand trial, or to
plead, and be sentenced. 725 ILCS 5/104-10 (West 1998). If
circumstances suggest that a defendant, because of physical or
mental disability, is unable to understand the nature and purpose
of the proceedings against him or to assist in his defense, the issue
of defendant's fitness may be raised by the defense, the State, or
the court. 725 ILCS 5/104-10, 104-11(a) (West 1998). If
information made known to the court causes the court to believe
that a bona fide doubt of the defendant's fitness exists, the court
must suspend proceedings until the defendant can be examined
and his fitness determined. 725 ILCS 5/104-11 (West 1998). Once
a bona fide doubt of the defendant's fitness has been
demonstrated, the State has the burden of proving, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that defendant is fit before the
proceedings may continue. 725 ILCS 5/104-11(c) (West 1998).
	This statutory scheme, which requires a fitness hearing only
when a bona fide doubt of defendant's fitness is demonstrated, has
been held constitutionally adequate to protect a defendant's right,
guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
(U.S. Const., amend. XIV), to be prosecuted only when fit to stand
trial. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 43 L. Ed. 2d 103, 95 S. Ct. 896 (1975); People v. Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d 312 (2000).
	At the time defendant entered his plea of guilty, our
legislature afforded a defendant taking psychotropic medication a
statutory right to a fitness hearing. See 725 ILCS 5/104-21(a)
(West 1994). Defendant never requested a fitness hearing pursuant
to this statute because the psychotropic nature of the medication
he was taking was not known at the time he entered his plea.
	The failure to receive a fitness hearing pursuant to section
104-21(a), defendant concedes, does not require automatic
reversal.(3) In recognition of People v. Mitchell, defendant also
acknowledges that the use of psychotropic medication is not
equivalent to a bona fide doubt of his fitness. See People v.
Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d 312 (2000). He claims, however, that, in this
case, his use of psychotropic medication, when considered in
conjunction with evidence of his suicide attempt and depression,
and the additional evidence presented at the hearing on his motion
to withdraw his guilty plea, established that at the time he entered
his plea there was a bona fide doubt of his fitness which required
a fitness hearing. Defendant also claims the presentation of
evidence in the course of his sentencing proceedings was not a
sufficient substitute for a fitness hearing in strict compliance with
article 104 of the Code.
	In essence, defendant asks us to review the trial court's ruling
on his fitness. A circuit court's ruling on the issue of fitness will
not be reversed unless it is against the manifest weight of the
evidence. People v. Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d 204, 226 (1996); People
v. Mahaffey, 166 Ill. 2d 1, 18 (1995). Our review of the record
convinces us that defendant has not met this burden. The evidence
presented to the trial court established that no bona fide doubt of
defendant's fitness existed, with or without medication.
	The record shows that sometime in late December 1995 or
early January 1996 the psychotropic nature of the medicine was
discovered and defendant's fitness was placed in issue. At about
the same time, section 104-21(a) was amended (see Pub. Act
89-428, §605, eff. December 13, 1995 (amending 725 ILCS
5/104-21(a)) to state "no hearing is required unless the court finds
there is a bona fide doubt of the defendant's fitness."(4)
	Based on the unsettled nature of the law, neither the court nor
counsel was certain of the proper procedure to follow.
Nevertheless, an inquiry was made into defendant's legal
competency while receiving psychotropic medication.
Documentary and testamentary evidence was introduced during
the course of defendant's sentencing hearing, which provided the
court with information concerning defendant's ability to
comprehend the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him
and his ability to assist in his defense, as well as the impact, if any,
that psychotropic medication had on defendant's fitness. Based on
the evidence presented, the trial court explicitly ruled there was no
bona fide doubt of defendant's fitness and that defendant had been
fit at the time he entered his plea and throughout the sentencing
proceedings. Defendant's ingestion of Sinequan, the trial court
held, could not have impaired defendant's fitness to plead or be
sentenced.
	On remand, the trial court reviewed its earlier proceedings and
found that the post-plea inquiry into the matter of defendant's
fitness, which was undertaken in the course of defendant's
sentencing, had been sufficient to establish defendant's fitness
with medication, in accord with our Burgess line of cases. See
People v. Burgess, 176 Ill. 2d 289 (1997); People v. Neal, 179 Ill. 2d 541 (1997); People v. Kinkead, 182 Ill. 2d 316 (1998). The trial
court was unpersuaded by the additional evidence presented at the
remand hearing and declined the invitation to depart from its
earlier ruling that defendant had been fit.
	Contrary to defendant's assertions, the trial court's rulings are
not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The evidence
presented during the sentencing proceedings showed that
defendant began receiving medication for his depression on July
25, 1995. The medication, along with the introduction of books on
tape and other diversions, relieved some of the boredom defendant
was feeling due to his blindness and improved defendant's mental
health. Defendant was not considered a suicide risk at the
detention facility. He attended Bible study sessions, wrote rap
songs, and enjoyed witnessing his faith to fellow inmates.
Furthermore, the medication he was taking actually appeared to
improve defendant's clarity of thought. Testing showed that
defendant's recall and memory were intact while taking
medication. His attorney repeatedly acknowledged defendant's
ability to understand, as well as his cooperation with his defense.
	Admittedly, defendant did not receive a fitness hearing in
strict compliance with article 104 of the Code. However, the need
for a fitness hearing is triggered by evidence which creates a bona
fide doubt of a defendant's fitness. In the case at bar, the issue of
defendant's fitness never was raised until it was learned that he
was taking psychotropic medication. Once this became known, the
court ascertained that defendant's use of this medication had no
effect on his ability to plead or be sentenced. The evidence clearly
supports that finding. The procedures followed by the trial court
in this case were adequate to protect defendant's due process right
to be tried only when fit. There is no basis shown for granting
defendant relief from his guilty plea.
	We further determine that the additional evidence presented
on remand was insufficient to overcome the presumption of fitness
which had already been established. Defendant's testimony that
his memory was "clogged" while on medication was belied by the
copious evidence presented during his sentencing hearing which
indicated that defendant's ability to recall was unaffected by the
relatively small dosage of Sinequan he was taking. Also, the
testimony of Dr. Lee, who never examined defendant or reviewed
his medical records, does little to negate the clear and convincing
testimony of Drs. Damera and Traugott, that defendant's ability to
understand the proceedings and assist in his defense was
unaffected by his ingestion of the Sinequan.
	In a related argument, defendant contends his counsel was
ineffective because she did not insist that the trial court hold a
fitness hearing and, instead, facilitated the court's finding of
fitness by presenting the testimony of two psychiatrists who
attested to defendant's fitness.
	To prevail on an ineffective-assistance claim, a defendant
must show both deficient performance by his attorney and
prejudice resulting from the deficient performance. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052
(1984); People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 524-25 (1984). In the
case at bar, there are no grounds for finding defendant received
ineffective assistance of counsel.
	The argument defendant presents here is similar to one
advanced in People v. Burton, 184 Ill. 2d 1 (1998). In Burton,
defendant claimed he received ineffective assistance of counsel
because his defense attorney stipulated to the testimony of two
psychiatrists at a fitness hearing before the defendant entered his
plea. We found trial counsel's performance was not per se
deficient and that defendant had not shown any prejudice
stemming from his counsel's conduct. Burton, 184 Ill. 2d  at 17.
	Here, as in Burton, defendant does not argue that he was
prejudiced by his attorney's conduct, nor is he able to point to any
information or argument that might have been offered to support
a finding of unfitness. Without a showing of prejudice, the claim
of ineffectiveness must fail.
	In another related claim, defendant argues that he should be
allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because his plea was not
voluntary. He claims the decision to plead guilty was a product of
his depression and the medication he was taking.
	Defendant cites one case in support of this claim, People v.
Lego, 168 Ill. 2d 561 (1995), which is distinguishable. In Lego,
defendant waived his right to counsel and represented himself at
trial. It became apparent at trial that defendant was ill-equipped to
represent himself and it was later learned that two psychiatrists
diagnosed defendant as suffering from a mixed organic disorder
which included organic affective syndrome, organic brain
syndrome, dementia and personality disorder. Defendant's mental
deficiencies caused him to have a lack of judgment, inability to
comprehend legal principles, and failure of memory. In light of
defendant's deficiencies, it was determined that his waiver of
representation could not have been knowingly or intelligently
made. Lego, 168 Ill. 2d  at 576-77.
	Conversely, in the present case, all of the psychiatric evidence
indicated that defendant, though he suffered from depression, was
able to comprehend the consequences of his decision to plead
guilty. Furthermore, additional evidence showed that defendant
made a conscious choice to plead guilty, knowing that he would
be eligible for the death penalty. Defendant told Dr. House he
preferred the death penalty because he feared that, if he remained
in jail, he would be victimized due to his blindness.
	The fact that defendant would no longer choose to plead
guilty does not compel us to find his earlier decision to plead
guilty was not voluntarily made.
Eligibility for the Death Penalty
	Defendant next contends that he should not have been found
eligible for the death penalty. Although defendant pleaded guilty
to murder and armed robbery, which, he admits, rendered him
eligible for the death penalty, he now claims the State
"manufactured" the armed robbery charge "in order to subject
[him] to the death penalty," when "the only charge supportable
under the facts" was aggravated vehicular hijacking, an offense
which would not have made him death-eligible. He contends the
trial court erred when it accepted the State's proffered factual basis
in support of his plea because it was "legally and factually
inadequate."
	To better understand defendant's argument on this issue, some
background is useful. On June 19, 1995, when the events giving
rise to defendant's conviction occurred, Illinois statutes provided
that a person committed the offense of armed robbery when "he or
she violates Section 18-1 [of the Criminal Code of 1961] while he
or she carries on or about his or her person, or is otherwise armed
with a dangerous weapon." Section 18-1 of the Code defined the
offense of robbery and provided that "[a] person commits robbery
when he or she takes property, except a motor vehicle covered by
Section 18-3 or 18-4, from the person or presence of another by
the use of force or by threatening the imminent use of force."
(Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/18-1 (West 1996).
	The robbery statute was amended in August 1993 to include
the phrase "except a motor vehicle covered by Section 18-3 or
18-4." See Pub. Act 88-351, §5, eff. August 13, 1993. At the
same time, the legislature enacted laws creating the offenses of
vehicular hijacking (720 ILCS 5/18-3 (West 1994)) and
aggravated vehicular hijacking (720 ILCS 5/18-4 (West 1994)).
See Pub. Act 88-351, §5, eff. August 13, 1993. As a result of this
legislation, beginning in August 1993, a person who took a motor
vehicle from the person or immediate presence of another, by use
of force and while armed with a weapon, committed the offense of
aggravated vehicular hijacking, not armed robbery.
	At the same time, section 9-1(b)(6) of the Criminal Code of
1961 provided that a person who committed the offense of first
degree murder in the course of one of several specified felonies
would be eligible for the death penalty. While armed robbery was
one of the listed felonies, aggravated vehicular hijacking was not.
Aggravated vehicular hijacking was added to the list of predicate
offenses in July 1995. See Pub. Act 88-678, §10, eff. July 1, 1995.
Consequently, during a nearly two-year period, between August
1993 and July 1995, first degree murder committed in the course
of an armed robbery of any property other than a motor vehicle
supported the imposition of the death penalty.
	Defendant was indicted on July 13, 1995, and was charged
with the commission of first degree murder and aggravated
vehicular hijacking. At the same time, the State declared its intent
to seek the death penalty against defendant-this intention was
announced to the public in a July 14, 1995, press release. At some
point, the State became aware that, due to the anomalous statutory
scheme which existed at the time defendant committed the
offenses with which he was charged, aggravated vehicular
hijacking was not a predicate offense for the imposition of the
death penalty. The State then amended the charges against
defendant, adding a charge of armed robbery and alleging that
defendant, in addition to taking Gilmore's automobile, took the
contents of the automobile.
	As noted earlier, defendant pleaded guilty to the charges of
first degree murder and armed robbery. He did not plead guilty to
aggravated vehicular hijacking. At the plea hearing, the State
presented a factual basis in which it was shown that defendant shot
Gilmore, pulled her from her automobile, and then drove away
with her car and personal belongings, including clothing, plants,
and audio cassette tapes.
	Initially, we address defendant's claim that the trial court
erred by accepting the factual basis proffered by the State. The
requirement of a factual basis for a guilty plea is embodied in
Supreme Court Rule 402(c), which states: "The court shall not
enter final judgment on a plea of guilty without first determining
that there is a factual basis for the plea." 134 Ill. 2d R. 402(c).
	In People v. Barker, 83 Ill. 2d 319 (1980), this court discussed
the factual basis requirement and concluded:
		"[T]he quantum of proof necessary to establish a factual
basis for the plea is less than that necessary to sustain a
conviction after a full trial. [Citations.] All that is required
to appear on the record is a basis from which the judge
could reasonably reach the conclusion that the defendant
actually committed the acts with the intent (if any)
required to constitute the offense to which the defendant
is pleading guilty. [Citations.] In evaluating the
sufficiency of the factual basis to support a plea of guilty,
a trial judge is in much the same position and would apply
similar standards as those used in determining the
sufficiency of the State's evidence at trial to withstand a
motion for a directed verdict of not guilty." Barker, 83 Ill. 2d  at 327-28.
	We note, too, that armed robbery is a general intent crime.
People v. Banks,  75 Ill. 2d 383, 391 (1979). Consequently, armed
robbery is proven if "the prohibited result may reasonably be
expected to follow from the offender's voluntary act even without
any specific intent by the offender." People v. DeBusk, 231 Ill.
App. 3d 229, 241 (1992).
	In the case at bar, the factual basis proffered by the State in
support of defendant's plea of guilty to armed robbery consisted
of evidence that defendant took Gilmore's belongings which were
contained in her car. We conclude that the State set forth sufficient
facts from which the court could have found that the offense of
armed robbery took place.
	Defendant argues, however, that the State "circumvented the
intent of the legislature" by charging him with the armed robbery
of the contents of Gilmore's car. He claims the State "did an end-run around the language" of the statutes and took "what is
essentially a lesser included offense of aggravated vehicular
hijacking and imbued it with far graver consequences than the
principle offense." The taking of Gilmore's belongings, he says,
should have been subsumed by the taking of the automobile. In
other words, defendant contends aggravated vehicular hijacking
was the more appropriate charge under the circumstances.
	We interpret this portion of defendant's argument as alleging
that the State acted improperly by electing to charge defendant
with armed robbery because of the sentencing option it would
provide. This claim, however, must be rejected.
	It has long been recognized by this court that the State's
Attorney is endowed with the exclusive discretion to decide which
of several charges shall be brought, or whether to prosecute at all.
In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d 1, 6-7 (1991); People ex rel. Daley v. Moran,
94 Ill. 2d 41, 45-46 (1983). A prosecutor's discretion extends to
decisions about whether or not the death penalty should be sought.
People v. Heard, 187 Ill. 2d 36 (1999); People v. Williams, 147 Ill. 2d 173, 265 (1991). It is not a constitutional violation for a
prosecutor to consider the respective penalties when choosing
which of several applicable charges to pursue. United States v.
Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123-24, 60 L. Ed. 2d 755, 764, 99 S. Ct. 2198, 2204 (1979) ("when an act violates more than one criminal
statute, the Government may prosecute under either so long as it
does not discriminate against any class of defendants"). When
conduct violates more than one statute, each of which requires
different proof or provides different defenses, a defendant is not
denied equal protection of the laws if he is prosecuted under the
statute which provides the more severe penalty. People v. Barlow,
58 Ill. 2d 41 (1974). "[A] defendant has no constitutional right to
compel his prosecution for the lesser, rather than the greater,
offense." People v. Bogan, 185 Ill. App. 3d 129, 134 (1989).
	In the case at bar, it was within the State's discretion to
prosecute the armed robbery charge to the exclusion of the
allegedly greater aggravated vehicular hijacking charge,
irrespective of which charge may be more appropriate under the
facts of this case. There is no basis for finding that defendant was
ineligible for the death penalty.
Denial of Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea
	Defendant contends he should be allowed to withdraw his
guilty plea because he entered his plea under a misapprehension of
the law. Specifically, defendant contends he did not understand the
significance of the State's election to charge him with armed
robbery and "believed the consequences of pleading guilty to
aggravated vehicular hijacking and armed robbery essentially were
the same." This misapprehension of the law, he says, requires a
finding that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily
made and, consequently, entered in violation of his due process
rights. He further contends he was denied the effective assistance
of counsel based on his trial attorney's alleged failure to explain
to him the significance of the State's decision to charge him with
armed robbery.
	A defendant does not have an automatic right to withdraw a
plea of guilty. Rather, he must show "a manifest injustice under
the facts involved" to obtain leave to withdraw his plea. People v.
Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36, 39 (2000). It is within the sound discretion
of the trial court to decide whether a plea of guilty may be
withdrawn under Rule 604(d) (145 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)), and that
decision will not be disturbed unless it appears that the guilty plea
was entered through a misapprehension of the facts or of the law,
or that there is doubt of the guilt of the accused and the ends of
justice would better be served by submitting the case to a trial.
People v. Hillenbrand, 121 Ill. 2d 537, 545 (1988); People v.
Hale, 82 Ill. 2d 172 (1980). The trial court's decision is reviewed
only for abuse of discretion. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d  at 40; People v.
Gosier, 145 Ill. 2d 127, 143 (1991); People v. Kidd, 129 Ill. 2d 432, 447 (1989).
	In the case at bar, defendant's claim of misapprehension was
presented to the trial court on remand, when he sought leave to
withdraw his guilty plea. As noted earlier, while defendant
testified at the evidentiary hearing that he was not made aware that
aggravated vehicular hijacking was not a predicate offense which
would support the imposition of the death penalty, defendant's
trial attorney testified to the contrary. The trial court resolved the
conflict against defendant and found no manifest injustice which
would require granting defendant the relief he sought. We see no
reason to disturb the trial court's determination.
	Defendant's misapprehension regarding the aggravated
vehicular hijacking charge, if indeed it existed, does not require
withdrawal of his guilty plea. Whether or not defendant
understood that aggravated vehicular hijacking was not a predicate
offense is not relevant to the issue of the voluntariness of his plea.
In People v. Walker, 91 Ill. 2d 502, 512 (1982), this court noted:
			"[S]ection 9-1(b) of our death penalty statute requires
only that the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt, inter
alia, that the murder was committed in the course of one
of the felonies enumerated in section 9-1(b)(6)(c). The
phrase 'in the course of' does not require that the
defendant complete one of the enumerated felonies or that
he be charged and convicted of any offense other than
murder to be eligible for the death penalty."
	Furthermore, it is undisputed that defendant was fully
admonished by the trial court in accord with Supreme Court Rule
402(a) before he tendered his plea. The record shows that
defendant was advised that a plea of guilty to murder and armed
robbery exposed him to the death penalty. Defendant
acknowledged on the record that he understood the implications
of his guilty plea. Moreover, evidence subsequently adduced at the
sentencing hearing supports the position that defendant understood
he was eligible for the death penalty based on the plea he entered.
There is no evidence that defendant's plea was not knowingly and
voluntarily made. As a result, we find the trial court did not abuse
its discretion by denying defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty
plea.

Constitutionality of the Death Penalty Statute
	Defendant's final issue is a challenge to the constitutionality
of the death penalty statute. This court has already considered and
rejected the arguments raised by the defendant here: (1) that the
statute places on the defendant the burden of proving that the
mitigation evidence is sufficient to preclude the imposition of the
death penalty (see, e.g., People v. Emerson, 189 Ill. 2d 436, 514
(2000); People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 177-78 (1998); People v.
Johnson, 182 Ill. 2d 96, 112 (1998); People v. Simpson, 172 Ill. 2d 117, 152 (1996)); (2) that the statute is unconstitutionally vague
because it allows the sentencer, when hearing evidence in
aggravation, to consider "any other reason" (see, e.g., People v.
Buss, 187 Ill. 2d 144, 248 (1999); Johnson, 182 Ill. 2d at 112-13;
People v. Hope, 168 Ill. 2d 1, 48 (1995)); and (3) that the statute
fails to minimize the risk of arbitrarily imposed death sentences
(see, e.g., Emerson, 189 Ill. 2d  at 514; Johnson, 182 Ill. 2d  at 113;
People v. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d 297, 333 (1998); People v. Brown,
172 Ill. 2d 1, 62-63 (1996)).
	Defendant's repetition of previously rejected arguments fails
to persuade us to abandon our determination of constitutionality.
We reject defendant's constitutional challenge to the Illinois death
penalty statute.
III. CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the circuit court is
affirmed. The clerk of this court is directed to enter an order
setting Tuesday, September 11, 2001, as the date on which the
sentence of death, entered by the circuit court of McLean County,
shall be carried out. Defendant shall be executed in the manner
provided by law. 725 ILCS 5/119-5 (West 1996). The clerk of this
court shall send a certified copy of this mandate to the Director of
Corrections, to the warden of Tamms Correctional Center, and to
the warden of the institution where defendant is now confined.
Affirmed.
	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, concurring in part and
dissenting in part:
	I agree with the majority that Jamison's convictions should be
affirmed. In my view, however, his sentence of death cannot be
allowed to stand. For the reasons set forth in my partial
concurrence and partial dissent in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179
(1998), the Illinois death penalty law violates the eighth and
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S.
Const., amends. VIII, XIV) and article I, section 2, of the Illinois
Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2). Jamison's sentence of
death should therefore be vacated, and he should be sentenced to
a term of imprisonment. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(j) (West 1994).
	 
	 
1.      1The drug, Sinequan, also is known by the names Adepin and
doxepin.

2.      2Based on our decision in People v. Fitzgibbon, 184 Ill. 2d 320
(1998), defendant abandoned the argument, raised in his initial appeal,
that the cause must be remanded because his attorney failed to provide
a certificate indicating that she had reviewed a transcript of the entire
sentencing hearing prior to filing the motion for reconsideration.

3.      3On remand, defendant claimed automatic entitlement to withdraw
his plea, based on our earlier decisions in People v. Brandon, 162 Ill. 2d 450 (1994); People v. Gevas, 166 Ill. 2d 461 (1995); People v. Birdsall,
172 Ill. 2d 464 (1996). In light of subsequent case law, he has
abandoned this argument.

4.      4This amendment was struck down by this court in Johnson v. Edgar,
176 Ill. 2d 499 (1997), because it was included in a bill which violated
the single subject requirement of the Illinois Constitution. Section
104-21(a) was amended again in 1996 to state: "[a] defendant who is
receiving psychotropic drugs shall not be presumed to be unfit to stand
trial solely by virtue of the receipt of those drugs or medications." Pub.
Act 89-689, §90, eff. December 31, 1996 (amending 725 ILCS
5/104-21(a)). We previously held this amendment could not be given
retroactive application in a case involving a direct appeal. See People
v. Kinkead, 182 Ill. 2d 316 (1998); People v. Cortes, 181 Ill. 2d 249
(1998). Consequently, neither of the amended provisions applies in the
present case.