Title: Joel James Johnson v. James R. Blackburn
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1997AP001414
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 30, 1999

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-1414 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
Joel James Johnson,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Respondent, 
Bryana Harkins,  
 
Plaintiff-Co-Appellant-Cross-Respondent-
 
Cross Petitioner, 
 
v. 
James R. Blackburn, Elaine M. Blackburn, and 
Germantown Mutual Insurance Company,  
 
Defendants-Respondents-Cross-Appellants-
 
Petitioners, 
Diane Mullins, Stoney Mullins, DEF Insurance 
Company, Marylyn Smith, and GHI Insurance 
Company,  
 
Defendants. 
__________________________________ 
Joel James Johnson, as Special Administrator of 
the Estate of Joel James Johnson, Jr.,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross- 
 
Respondent, 
 
v. 
James R. Blackburn, Elaine M. Blackburn, and 
Germantown Mutual Insurance Company,  
 
Defendants-Respondents-Cross-Appellants-
 
Petitioners, 
Diane Mullins, Stoney Mullins, DEF Insurance 
Company, Marylyn Smith, and GHI Insurance 
Company,  
 
Defendants.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  220 Wis. 2d 260, 582 N.W.2d 488 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1998, Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 30, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
March 4, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Fond du Lac 
 
JUDGE: 
Peter L. Grimm 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
Wilcox, J., concurs (opinion filed) 
 
 
Bablitch and Crooks, J.J., join 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendants-respondents-cross appellants-
petitioners there were briefs by Elizabeth V. Pavlick and Sager, 
Pavlick, Wirtz & Fry, S.C., Fond du Lac and oral argument by 
Elizabeth V. Pavlick. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-cross respondent 
there was a brief by Jerald P. Donohue and Donohue, Sharpe & 
Casper, S.C., Fond du Lac and oral argument by Jerald P. Donohue. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-co-appellant-cross respondent-
cross-petitioner, there were briefs by Timothy J. Aiken, James C. 
Gallanis and Aiken & Scoptur, S.C., Milwaukee and oral argument 
by Timothy J. Aiken. 
 
 
Amicus curie brief was filed by Thomas A. 
Lorenson and Kubasta, Rathjen, Bickford & Lorenson, Wautoma, for 
the Civil Trial Counsel of Wisconsin and Wisconsin Insurance 
Alliance. 
 
No. 97-1414 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 97-1414 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Joel James Johnson,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross- 
          Respondent, 
 
Bryana Harkins,  
 
          Plaintiff-Co-Appellant-Cross- 
          Respondent-Cross Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
James R. Blackburn, Elaine M. Blackburn,  
and Germantown Mutual Insurance Company,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents-Cross- 
          Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
Diane Mullins, Stoney Mullins, DEF  
Insurance Company, Marylyn Smith, and GHI  
Insurance Company,  
 
          Defendants. 
__________________________________ 
 
Joel James Johnson, as Special  
Administrator of the Estate of Joel James  
Johnson, Jr.,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross- 
          Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
James R. Blackburn, Elaine M. Blackburn,  
and Germantown Mutual Insurance Company,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents-Cross- 
          Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 30, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
No. 97-1414 
 
2 
Diane Mullins, Stoney Mullins, DEF  
Insurance Company, Marylyn Smith, and GHI  
Insurance Company,  
 
          Defendants.  
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE.   This is a 
review of a published decision of the court of appeals, Johnson 
v. Blackburn, 220 Wis. 2d 260, 582 N.W.2d 488 (Ct. App. 1998).  
The Circuit Court for Fond du Lac County, Peter L. Grimm, Judge, 
dismissed the complaints.  The court of appeals reinstated the 
complaints and remanded the causes for further proceedings.  The 
case arises out of a fire that killed four-year-old Joel James 
Johnson, Jr., and seriously injured his one-year-old sister, 
Bryana Harkins. 
¶2 
There are two issues that emerge in this case:  (1) 
Were the two injured children trespassers?  (2) Did the location 
of the smoke detector violate the statutory requirement?  The 
circuit court granted summary judgment to James R. and Elaine M. 
Blackburn (the landlords) and their insurer, Germantown Mutual 
Insurance Company, on the claims of Joel James Johnson, Bryana 
Harkins and the Estate of Joel James Johnson, Jr.1 (the 
plaintiffs), holding that Joel Jr. and Bryana were trespassers 
to whom the landlords owed no duty of ordinary care.  The court 
of appeals concluded that as a matter of law, Joel Jr. and 
                     
1 Joel James Johnson also filed a separate action as special 
administrator of the Estate of Joel James Johnson, Jr. against 
the same defendants seeking compensation for his son's pain and 
suffering.  The two suits were consolidated.  
No. 97-1414 
 
3 
Bryana were not trespassers and remanded the cause for further 
proceedings on the negligence claims. 
¶3 
The circuit court held that the plaintiffs' negligence 
per se claim against the landlords was established as a matter 
of law because the landlords violated Wis. Stat. § 101.645 
(1993-94)2 by failing to provide a smoke detector in the 
basement. 
 
The 
circuit 
court 
dismissed 
the 
plaintiffs' 
negligence per se claim, however, because it concluded that Joel 
Jr. and Bryana were trespassers and the landlords' statutory 
violation did not rise to the level of willful, wanton or 
reckless conduct. 
¶4 
The court of appeals held that a genuine issue of 
material fact exists concerning whether the landlords' placement 
of the smoke detector located on the ceiling over the open 
stairway leading from the basement to the back hallway complied 
with Wis. Stat. § 101.645.  The court of appeals reinstated the 
complaints and remanded the causes to the circuit court for 
further proceedings.  We affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals, but on different grounds. 
I 
¶5 
For purposes of the motions for summary judgment and 
this review we set forth the following facts that are not in 
dispute.3  On December 10, 1994, Diane and Stoney Mullins (the 
                     
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes will 
be to the 1993-94 version unless otherwise noted.  
3 A more detailed statement of the facts and of the 
procedural posture of the case at the circuit court and court of 
appeals is set forth in the decision of the court of appeals.  
No. 97-1414 
 
4 
tenants) signed a written lease to rent the lower apartment of a 
two-unit rental property in Waupun, Wisconsin, that was owned by 
the landlords.  The lease was for a six-month term beginning 
January 1, 1995. 
¶6 
The lease represents that four people would reside in 
the lower apartment: the tenants and two of their children, 
Richard Smith (21 years of age) and Peggy Smith (17 years of 
age).  The lease further provides that the landlords and tenants 
shall comply with local ordinances; that guests may not stay 
longer than two weeks without the written consent of the 
landlord; that the landlords may make reasonable rules relating 
to the use of the premises; and that the landlords shall give 
the tenants written notice of a breach of the lease requiring 
the tenants to either remedy the breach or vacate the premises. 
 The lease, however, was silent concerning the use of the 
basement.  The pertinent lease provisions are as follows: 
 
CONTROLLING LAW.  Landlord and Tenant understand their 
rights and obligations under the Lease are subject to 
statutes, rules and ordinances including Chapter 704, 
Wisconsin 
Statutes, 
Wisconsin 
Administrative 
Code 
Chapter AG 134, and applicable local ordinances. 
 
Both parties shall obey all governmental orders, rules 
and regulations related to the Premises, including 
local housing codes. 
 
POSSESSION; ABANDONMENT.  Landlord shall give Tenant 
possession of the Premises as provided herein. . . . 
 
USE; GUESTS.  . . . Tenant may have guests residing 
temporarily in the Premises. . . .  No guest may 
remain for more than two weeks without written consent 
of Landlord which will not be unreasonably withheld. 
 
No. 97-1414 
 
5 
RULES.  Landlord may make reasonable rules governing 
the use and occupancy of the Premises and the building 
in which they are located.  Tenant acknowledges 
receipt of these rules prior to signing this Lease.  
Any failure by Tenant to comply substantially with the 
rules is a breach of the Lease. . . . 
 
BREACH; TERMINATION.  If this lease is for a term of 
one year or less, should Tenant neglect or fail to 
perform and observe any of the terms of this Lease, 
Landlord shall give Tenant written notice of such 
breach requiring Tenant to remedy the breach or vacate 
the Premises on or before a date at least five days 
after the giving of such notice, and if Tenant fails 
to comply with such notice, Landlord may declare this 
tenancy terminated and institute action to compel 
Tenant from the leased premises . . . . 
¶7 
On April 8, 1995, Marylyn Smith, the daughter of Diane 
Mullins (one of the tenants), moved into the apartment with her 
three children while she looked for an apartment to rent.  The 
landlords did not know of or consent to the presence of Marylyn 
Smith and her children in the apartment.  Smith's children were 
six-year-old 
Charissa 
Wesenberg, 
four-year-old 
Joel 
James 
Johnson, Jr., and one-year-old Bryana Harkins. 
¶8 
The lower apartment had two bedrooms and one bath.  
From the beginning of the lease the tenants used one bedroom and 
Peggy Smith the other; Richard Smith used the basement as his 
sleeping quarters.  The occupant of the upper apartment never 
used the basement and had surrendered his key to the basement to 
the landlords. 
¶9 
A stairway led from the basement to a back hallway, 
which in turn led to the back door of the kitchen of the lower 
apartment.  A smoke detector was located on the ceiling over the 
open stairway leading from the basement to the back hallway. 
No. 97-1414 
 
6 
¶10 On April 26, 1995, at approximately 8:30 p.m., 18 days 
after Marylyn Smith moved into the apartment, a fire broke out 
in the basement where Joel Jr. and Bryana were present.  They 
had been put down to sleep but it is unclear whether they were 
sleeping at the time of the fire.  Joel Jr. did not ordinarily 
sleep in the basement but Bryana usually did sleep there. 
¶11 Upstairs, Diane Mullins heard Bryana crying and walked 
through the open kitchen door and into the stairway leading to 
the basement.  When she was halfway down the stairs she could go 
no farther because smoke had filled the basement.  Diane Mullins 
then yelled for someone to call the fire department, ran 
outside, broke a basement window with her fists and dove in 
through the window.  Ultimately, she was able to rescue Bryana 
but could not find Joel Jr., who had left the place where he was 
supposed to be sleeping.  Bryana suffered severe burns and Joel 
Jr. died of smoke inhalation.  Diane Mullins stated in her 
affidavit that during the course of the fire the smoke detector 
alarm never sounded. 
¶12 Joel James Johnson filed an action against the 
landlords, the tenants and Marylyn Smith for the wrongful death 
of his son, Joel Jr., and filed a separate action as special 
administrator for the Estate of Joel James Johnson against the 
same defendants seeking compensation for Joel Jr.'s pain and 
suffering.  The complaints alleged that the landlords were 
negligent in failing to install a smoke detector in the basement 
and that the tenants and Marylyn Smith were negligent in 
allowing the two children to sleep in the basement.  Bryana 
No. 97-1414 
 
7 
Harkins intervened and filed a complaint against the landlords 
for her personal injury.  The circuit court ultimately dismissed 
all the complaints; the court of appeals, however, reinstated 
them. 
¶13 The landlords petitioned for review of the court of 
appeals decision that Joel Jr. and Bryana were not trespassers. 
 The plaintiffs cross-petitioned for review of the court of 
appeals decision that a genuine issue of material fact exists 
regarding whether the location of the smoke detector violated 
Wis. Stat. § 101.645. 
II 
¶14 This court reviews a summary judgment using the same 
methodology as the circuit court.  State ex. rel. Auchinleck v. 
Town of LaGrange, 200 Wis. 2d 585, 591-92, 547 N.W.2d 587 
(1996).  The methodology of summary judgment is set forth in 
Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2), which provides that summary judgment 
shall be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law." 
III 
¶15 The first issue presented is whether the children, 
Joel Jr. and Bryana, were trespassers in the basement at the 
time of the fire.  The children's legal status as trespassers or 
non-trespassers is important because the legal status determines 
the scope of the landlords' duty.  As a general matter, a 
No. 97-1414 
 
8 
landlord owes a tenant, as well as guests of a tenant, the duty 
to exercise ordinary care.4  A landlord's duty to trespassers, 
however, is to refrain from willful and intentional injury.5   
¶16 The court has defined a trespasser as "a person who 
enters or remains upon land in the possession of another without 
a privilege to do so created by the possessor's consent or 
otherwise."6 
¶17 The tenants, whose lease clearly covers occupancy of 
the lower apartment, consented to the children using the 
basement at the time of injury.  At the time of the injury Diane 
and Stoney Mullins were tenants in lawful possession of the 
apartment; they had access to the basement and the occupant of 
the upper apartment had relinquished his key to the basement; 
they could allow guests upon the premises and in the basement; 
they expressly consented to allow Marylyn Smith and her three 
children to stay with them on a temporary basis.  Smith and her 
children stayed longer than the two-week period set forth in the 
lease; Richard Smith, one of the four occupants named in the 
lease, used the basement as sleeping quarters from the beginning 
                     
4 Rockweit v. Senecal, 197 Wis. 2d 409, 422-23, 541 N.W.2d 
742 (1995); Pagelsdorf v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 91 Wis. 2d 
734, 745, 284 N.W.2d 55 (1979). 
5 Szafranski v. Radetzky, 31 Wis. 2d 119, 125-26, 141 N.W.2d 
902 (1966). 
6 Antoniewicz v. Reszczynski, 70 Wis. 2d 836, 843, 236 
N.W.2d 1 (1975) (adopting the Restatement (Second) of Torts 2d 
§ 329 (1965) definition of trespasser).  See also Reddington v. 
Beefeaters Tables, Inc., 72 Wis. 2d 119, 124, 240 N.W.2d 363, 
modified, 243 N.W.2d 401 (1976). 
No. 97-1414 
 
9 
of the tenants' occupancy of the premises; the landlords did not 
know the basement was used for sleeping quarters; Smith and some 
of her children slept in the basement; Joel Jr. did not 
ordinarily sleep in the basement. 
¶18 Hypothetically, the parties agree that if the children 
were in the lower apartment and their presence there violated 
the terms of the lease or violated an ordinance because there 
were too many occupants or because the occupants stayed too 
long, the children would not become trespassers.  In other 
words, the parties agree that a violation of the lease or an 
ordinance stemming from the children's presence in the lower 
apartment would not automatically cause the children to become 
trespassers.  They agree that the landlords would have to take 
steps required by the lease for curing a breach of the lease.7  
The parties' agreement, however, does not extend to the use of 
the basement because the parties disagree about what authority 
the tenants had over the basement under the terms of the lease. 
¶19 The circuit court concluded that the tenants had no 
authority under the lease to allow the children to use the 
                     
7 Similarly, the court of appeals held that the status of 
the tenants as lawful possessors was not extinguished by their 
breaches of the lease because the required periods of notice and 
opportunity to remedy prior to termination of a tenancy had not 
yet occurred as was required by the lease and Wis. Stat. 
§ 704.17(2)(b).  The landlords no longer argue that the tenants 
automatically lost lawful possession. 
No. 97-1414 
 
10
basement for sleeping quarters and that therefore the children 
were trespassers.8 
¶20 The circuit court accepted the argument of the 
landlords that the tenants could not, under the lease, take 
possession of the basement.  The landlords' claim is premised on 
the assertion that the basement was not in the exclusive control 
of the tenants.  The landlords assert that the basement was a 
common area available to the occupants of both apartments for 
certain limited purposes and that the landlords retained some 
control over the basement.  The landlords contend that the 
tenants were allowed, along with the occupant of the upper 
apartment, to use the basement for storage, for washing and 
drying clothes, and for other similar short-term uses.  The 
                     
8 The circuit court held that the basement was for the use 
of the occupants of both apartments and that the tenants had no 
authority under the lease to permit the children to sleep in the 
basement and therefore the children were trespassers, stating: 
Here the basement, in my view, was common property for 
both tenants to use for the basement utilities, 
including the washer and dryer.  The lease itself 
incorporated the requirement that the tenants comply 
with local ordinances and regulations which prohibited 
the use of the basement for sleeping purposes.  Here 
the landlord had no knowledge that the basement was so 
being used by the tenant's son, as well as the guests 
of the tenant. . . .  I'm satisfied that as a matter 
of law, the tenants had no lawful authority to grant 
that consent to make the landlord now liable to the 
plaintiffs as frequenters. . . .  So I do conclude as 
a matter of law that the plaintiffs at the time of the 
fire must be viewed as trespassers in their action 
against the landlord as owner. 
 
No. 97-1414 
 
11
landlords claim, however, that sleeping was not one of the 
permitted uses of the basement. 
¶21 The landlords also contend that they were free to 
enter the basement for any purpose whatsoever, including to make 
non-emergency repairs and perform maintenance, or to allow entry 
to furnace or water heater service personnel or utility meter 
readers. 
¶22 The landlords argue, however, that their obligation to 
exercise reasonable care in the maintenance of common areas does 
not extend to a common area that is being used for an unintended 
purpose at the time of the injury.9  They urge that sleeping was 
an unintended purpose and that only they as landlords had the 
authority to permit people to sleep in the basement.  They 
conclude that if guests of the tenants slept in the basement 
without the landlords' consent, either express or implied, they 
were trespassers as a matter of law.10 
                     
9 See, e.g., Amburgy v. Golden, 557 P.2d 9, 10 (Wash. App. 
1976); Seaman v. Henriques, 95 A.2d 701, 703 (Conn. 1953). 
10 The landlords rely on Cole v. McKey, 66 Wis. 500, 505, 29 
N.W. 279 (1886), which they interpret as holding that when a 
sublessee uses the premises contrary to the express provisions 
of a lease, the injured party is a trespasser.  We are not 
persuaded that Cole assists us in the case at hand.  First, the 
common law and statutes governing landlord-tenant rights and 
responsibilities have changed significantly since 1886.  Second, 
Cole involved a formal sub-leasing arrangement that violated the 
lease; this case does not.  Third, Cole did not expressly refer 
to the injured party as a trespasser and therefore it is 
difficult to conclude that Cole was decided on the basis of the 
injured party's status as a trespasser. 
No. 97-1414 
 
12
¶23 In contrast, the court of appeals concluded that as a 
matter of law, the tenants had authority under the lease to 
consent to the presence of Smith and her children on the 
premises, which included the basement, and that therefore the 
children were not trespassers at the time of injury.  Johnson, 
220 Wis. 2d at 275. 
¶24 The plaintiffs claim that the children were present in 
the basement with the express consent of the tenants, who were 
in fact the lawful, exclusive possessors of the basement.  They 
argue that the lease was silent about the use of the basement 
and that the tenants' right to use the basement was not limited 
to the particular purposes asserted by the landlords.  The 
plaintiffs also argue that even if the basement were a "common 
area," shared by the occupants of both apartments and the 
landlord, the children's presence in and use of the basement at 
the time of injury does not transform them from guests into 
trespassers.  The plaintiffs contend that if the use of the 
basement by the tenants and their guests violated an ordinance 
or building code, such unintended use would constitute a breach 
of the lease but would not make them trespassers. 
¶25 In sum, the parties dispute the factual issues of 
whether the tenants had exclusive use of the basement, whether 
the occupants of both apartments had joint use of the basement 
or whether the basement was a common area for use by occupants 
of both apartments to which the landlord retained some control. 
 The parties also dispute whether the tenants' use of the 
basement was limited to certain purposes, what the children were 
No. 97-1414 
 
13
doing in the basement at the time of injury and whether the 
children's use of the basement at the time of injury was within 
the limited  purposes the landlords assert. 
¶26 We conclude that whether the tenants had exclusive 
possession of the basement or joint possession of the basement 
with the occupant of the upper apartment, whether the basement 
was a common area, whether the landlord limited the use of the 
basement to certain purposes and whether the basement was used 
for an unintended purpose at the time of the injury are all 
factual issues in dispute.  Thus the factual bases that will 
determine the legal status of the children at the time of the 
injury and the duty owed by the landlords are in dispute.  
Because 
genuine 
issues 
of 
material 
fact 
exist 
that 
are 
determinative of the legal issue of the duty owed by the 
landlords to the children, summary judgment was not appropriate. 
 See Kretchman v. Reid, 46 Wis. 2d 677, 680, 176 N.W.2d 301 
(1970). 
¶27 The landlords' final request is that this court 
relieve them of any potential liability on public policy 
grounds.  However, this case is before us on review of summary 
judgment, and no liability has been established.  As we have 
previously done, we decline to reach the public policy question 
because 
it 
is 
generally 
better 
procedure 
to 
submit 
the 
negligence 
and 
cause-in-fact 
issues 
to 
the 
jury 
before 
addressing any public policy concern.  See Bowen v. Lumbermens 
Mut. Cas. Co., 183 Wis. 2d 627, 654-55, 517 N.W.2d 432 (1994); 
No. 97-1414 
 
14
Morgan v. Pennsylvania General Ins. Co., 87 Wis. 2d 723, 738, 
275 N.W.2d 660 (1979). 
¶28 For the reasons set forth, we conclude that the 
circuit court and court of appeals erred in determining the 
status of the children as trespassers or non-trespassers on 
summary judgment when genuine issues of material fact exist.  We 
affirm the decision of the court of appeals, which reversed the 
circuit court's dismissal of the complaints and remanded the 
causes for further proceedings. 
IV 
¶29 The second issue in this case is whether the placement 
of the smoke detector on the ceiling over the open stairway 
leading from the basement to the back hallway violated Wis. 
Stat. § 101.645 as a matter of law.11 
¶30 The circuit court held that, as a matter of law, the 
landlords violated Wis. Stat. § 101.645, as well as the City of 
Waupun Building Code § 13.45(7).  The court of appeals concluded 
that a genuine issue of material fact exists with regard to 
whether the landlords violated Wis. Stat. § 101.645.  Johnson, 
220 Wis. 2d at 282-83.  The court of appeals stated that the 
                     
11 This is the only issue raised in the petition for cross 
review.  Under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(6), the petitioner 
cannot raise or argue issues not set forth in the petition 
unless ordered otherwise by the supreme court. The landlords' 
brief raises the issue of whether Wis. Stat. § 101.645 is a 
safety statute, violation of which constitutes negligence per 
se.  Accordingly, we will not review this issue.  See State v. 
Scheidell, majority op. at 2 n.1 (of even date), authored by the 
author of the concurrence. 
No. 97-1414 
 
15
deposition testimony of the former city of Waupun fire chief 
that was presented by the landlords in opposition to summary 
judgment, although it supports the landlords' assertion of 
compliance, would not necessarily be accepted by the finder of 
fact. 
¶31 Wisconsin Stat. § 101.645 sets forth three provisions 
relating to smoke detectors that come into play in this case.  
First, the owner of a dwelling shall install a functional smoke 
detector in the basement of the dwelling and on each floor level 
except the attic or storage area of each dwelling.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 101.645 (3).  Second, each smoke detector shall be installed 
under the terms of Wis. Stat. § 101.145(2) and (3)(a),12 which 
provide that the owner shall install a smoke detector approved 
by underwriters laboratory according to the directions and 
specifications of the manufacturer of the smoke detector.13  Wis. 
                     
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 101.145 provides in relevant part the 
following: 
(2) APPROVAL. A smoke detector required under this 
section shall be approved by underwriters laboratory. 
 
(3)(a) INSTALLATION AND MAINTENANCE. (a) The owner of 
a 
residential 
building 
shall 
install 
any 
smoke 
detector required under this section according to the 
directions and specifications of the manufacturer of 
the smoke detector. 
 
13 The City of Waupun Building Code § 13.45(7) incorporates 
the substance of the requirement of Wis. Stat. § 101.645(3): 
SMOKE DETECTORS.  Effective October 1, 1985, all 
dwelling units subject to the provisions of this 
subchapter shall be provided with a working, approved, 
listed and labeled smoke detector in the basement and  
No. 97-1414 
 
16
Stat. § 101.645(2).  Third, a municipal authority may inspect 
common areas of dwellings to ensure compliance with this 
section.  Wis. Stat. § 101.645 (4). 
¶32 The full text of Wis. Stat. § 101.645 is as follows: 
 
101.645 Smoke detectors.  (1) DEFINITION.  The 
definition of "smoke detector" under s. 101.145(1)(c) 
also applies to this section. 
 
(2) APPROVAL AND INSTALLATION.  A smoke detector 
required under this section shall be approved and 
installed as required under s. 101.145(2) and (3)(a). 
 
(3) REQUIREMENT.  The owner of a dwelling shall 
install a functional smoke detector in the basement of 
the dwelling and on each floor level except the attic 
or storage area of each dwelling.  The occupant of 
such a dwelling unit shall maintain any smoke detector 
in that unit, except that if any occupant who is not 
the owner, or any state, county, city, village or town 
officer, agent or employe charged under statute or 
municipal ordinance with powers or duties involving 
inspection of real or personal property, gives written 
notice to the owner that the smoke detector is not 
functional the owner shall provide, within 5 days 
after 
receipt 
of 
that 
notice, 
any 
maintenance 
necessary to make that smoke detector functional. 
 
(4) INSPECTION.  The department or a municipal 
authority may inspect new dwellings, may inspect the 
common areas of dwellings and, at the request of the 
owner or renter, may inspect the interior of a 
dwelling unit in a dwelling to ensure compliance with 
this section. 
¶33 It appears that under some circumstances simultaneous 
compliance 
with 
all 
three 
of 
these 
provisionsthat 
is, 
subsection (2), subsection (3) and subsection (4) of Wis. Stat. 
                                                                  
on each floor of the dwelling unit, except in the 
attic or storage area of such dwelling units. 
 
No. 97-1414 
 
17
§ 101.645might not be possible.  For example, the statutory 
requirement that a smoke detector be located in the basement and 
on each floor level might potentially contravene the directions 
and specifications of the manufacturer,14 or the determination of 
a 
municipal 
authority 
of 
what 
location 
might 
constitute 
compliance.  In other words, compliance with the requirements of 
§ 101.645 is a determination to be made by the circuit court 
under the facts and circumstances of the case.   
¶34 Application of these statutory provisions might vary 
from case to case.  The proper location for installation of a 
smoke detector, for instance, might depend on the type and brand 
of 
smoke 
detector, 
the 
manufacturer's 
directions 
and 
specifications for installation, as well as the municipal 
authority's determination of what constitutes compliance with 
the statute. 
¶35 The landlords argue that the smoke detector located 
over the open stairway leading from the basement to the back 
hallway complied with the statute.  They assert, as did the 
former fire chief, that the ceiling of the stairway is part of 
the basement.  The landlords also agree with the former fire 
chief's assertion that this location makes sense because a smoke 
detector placed there would more likely be heard by people in 
                     
14 The plaintiffs argued in the circuit court that the 
installation directions for this brand of smoke detector 
specified that if the detector were to be in the basement it 
should be installed on the basement ceiling near the stairway 
leading up to the first floor. 
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both the lower and upper apartments.15  The fire chief, 
testifying at his deposition, also stated that the location of 
the smoke detector would have passed his inspection.  He stated 
that he in fact at times encouraged placement of "basement" 
smoke detectors over the open stairway based on the particular 
configuration of the stairway.  The landlords also contend that 
a city fire inspector has the authority to interpret the smoke 
detector requirement to determine whether there is compliance 
with the statute. 
¶36 The plaintiffs contend that the location of the smoke 
detector violated the clear and unambiguous language of Wis. 
Stat. § 101.645(3), which states that the owner shall install a 
functional smoke detector in the basement and on each floor 
level.16  According to the plaintiffs, the statute means what it 
says: in the basement means in the basement; no smoke detector 
was located in the basement; and the former fire chief is not 
empowered to change the meaning of the statute. 
¶37 There is no dispute in this case that a smoke detector 
was located on the ceiling over the open stairway leading from 
the basement to the back hallway.  The ceiling of the open 
stairway in the back hallway was apparently somewhat below the 
height of the ceiling of the first floor apartment.  The parties 
                     
15 A statute applying to larger apartment houses provides 
for a functional smoke detector in the basement and at the head 
of each floor level of the building.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 101.145(4). 
16 Bryana Harkins does not raise or address this issue. 
No. 97-1414 
 
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disagree about whether this location is properly characterized 
as being in the basement or on the first floor. 
¶38 The parties thus disagree about whether the phrase "in 
the basement" used in Wis. Stat. § 101.645(3) can be interpreted 
broadly enough to encompass the location of the smoke detector 
in this case, whether the instructions for installing this 
particular First Alert smoke detector, as well as the National 
Fire 
Protection 
Association 
Standard 
referenced 
in 
those 
instructions, permitted placement of the smoke detector where it 
was installed, and whether a municipal authority would conclude 
that the installation location was in compliance with the 
statute.  In other words, this case contains disputed matters of 
fact as well as questions of the application of the statutory 
provisions to those disputed facts. 
¶39 Accordingly, we agree with the court of appeals that 
because genuine issues of material fact exist, summary judgment 
was not appropriate.  We therefore affirm the decision of the 
court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
97-1414.jpw 
 
1 
¶40 JON P. WILCOX, J. (concurring).   While I agree with 
the majority that there are genuine issues of material fact on 
both issues, I believe the majority has side-stepped its duty by 
failing to clearly set forth standards courts should apply when 
reviewing whether there has been a violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 101.645.  The majority indicates that there are three 
provisions of § 101.645 which come into play in this case—
§ 101.645(2), (3), and (4).17  Majority at 15-17.  The majority 
submits that "under some circumstances simultaneous compliance 
with . . . these 
provisions . . . might 
not 
be 
possible."  
Majority at 17.  The majority does not explain, however, what 
constitutes a violation of the statute:  does a violation of one 
of these provisions establish a violation of the statute or does 
compliance with one of these provisions constitute compliance 
with the statute.   
¶41 While this strikes me as a question of statutory 
interpretation, the majority seemingly leaves it to the circuit 
                     
17 Wisconsin Stat. 101.645 provides in part: 
(2)  APPROVAL AND INSTALLATION.  A smoke detector required under 
this section shall be approved and installed as required under 
§ 101.145(2) and (3)(a). 
(3)  REQUIREMENT.  The owner of a dwelling shall install a 
functional smoke detector in the basement of the dwelling and on 
each floor level except the attic or storage area of each 
dwelling unit. . . .  
(4)  INSPECTION.  The department or a municipal authority may 
inspect new dwellings, may inspect the common areas of dwellings 
and, at the request of the owner or renter, may inspect the 
interior of a dwelling unit in a dwelling to ensure compliance 
with this section. 
97-1414.jpw 
 
2 
courts to answer.  Yet, the supreme court is the law-declaring 
court whose purpose is "to oversee and implement the statewide 
development of the law."  Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 189, 
560 N.W.2d 246 (1997) (quotations omitted).18  Because the 
majority eschews the question, I respectfully concur. 
¶42 I am authorized to state that Justices William A. 
Bablitch and N. Patrick Crooks join this concurring opinion. 
 
 
                     
18 The majority also leaves the development of the law to 
the court of appeals by affirming its conclusion that § 101.645 
is a safety statute, a violation of which constitutes negligence 
per se.  See Johnson v. Blackburn, 220 Wis. 2d 260, 282, 582 
N.W.2d 488 (Ct. App. 1998). 
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