Title: In re Wittemyer
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S45376
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: April 29, 1999

Filed: April 29, 1999

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

In re:

Complaint as to the Conduct of

GEORGE WITTEMYER,

	Accused.

(OSB 95-190; SC S45376)

	En Banc

	On review of the decision of a trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board.

	Argued and submitted January 7, 1999.

	George Wittemyer, Portland, argued the cause and filed a
brief in propria persona.

	Jane E. Angus, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Oregon State
Bar, Lake Oswego, argued the cause and filed a brief on behalf of
the Oregon State Bar.

	PER CURIAM

	The accused is suspended from the practice of law for a
period of four months, commencing 60 days from the date of filing
of this decision.

	PER CURIAM

	In this lawyer discipline proceeding, the Oregon State
Bar charged the accused with violating Code of Professional
Responsibility Disciplinary Rule (DR) 5-101(A) (accepting or
continuing employment when the exercise of judgment on behalf of
the client is or may be affected by business, property, or
personal interests) (three counts); DR 5-104(A) (entering into a
business transaction with a client in which the lawyer and client
have differing interests); and DR 5-105(E) (representing multiple
clients with conflicting interests).  A trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board found that the accused had committed all the
alleged violations and determined that the appropriate sanction
was suspension from the practice of law for four months.

	The Bar sought review under ORS 9.536(2) and Bar Rules
of Procedure (BR) 10.1 and 10.4, contending that the trial
panel's sanction was insufficient and that the accused should be
suspended for one year.  The accused disputed the trial panel's
determinations as to two of the alleged violations of DR 5-101(A)
and argued that the appropriate sanction was a reprimand.

	Our review is de novo.  ORS 9.536(3); BR 10.6.  The Bar
has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that
the accused committed the charged violations.  ORS 9.536(1); BR
5.2.  We conclude that the accused committed all the alleged
violations and that the appropriate sanction is, as the trial
panel determined, suspension from the practice of law for four
months.

DISCIPLINARY RULE VIOLATIONS 

	We find the following facts to have been proved by
clear and convincing evidence.  Pacific Chips was incorporated in
April 1989 by Harry Kane and David Fairbairn.  The company was
created to process and sell hardwood timber from the Pacific
Northwest.  Kane recruited the accused to be Pacific Chips' legal
counsel, secretary, and registered agent.  The accused served in
those capacities until July 1991, when Pacific Chips was
dissolved.  The accused was granted stock in Pacific Chips in
August 1989, following assumption of his legal duties for the
company.

	Before representing Pacific Chips, the accused had
represented Robert Harrington in litigation and business matters. 
While representing Harrington, the accused became acquainted with
Harrington's wife, Gloria Harper.  Harrington died in 1988.  In
early 1989, the accused began representing Harper in various
legal matters, including several collection actions and the
drafting of her will.  The accused was then a widower.  In mid-1989, the accused and Harper began a romantic relationship, which
continued until mid-1990.

	Harper became acquainted with Kane and Fairbairn
through the accused.  In the fall of 1989, Kane and Fairbairn
asked Harper to loan Pacific Chips $300,000 to cover
unanticipated costs of starting their business.(1)  Harper
consulted the accused, who encouraged her to make the loan.(2) 
Harper and the accused met with Kane and Fairbairn to discuss the
loan and to tour the Pacific Chips mill in Roseburg.

	Still undecided whether to make the loan, Harper asked
the advice of Norman Fenton, a business associate.  Fenton
suggested that Harper loan Pacific Chips only half the amount
that Kane and Fairbairn had requested, $150,000, on condition
that the accused loan Pacific Chips an equal amount.  Harper
suggested that investment to the accused, who agreed.  That
agreement never was reduced to writing, however.

	Harper and the accused frequently discussed the
venture, and Harper relied on the accused's expertise and
knowledge of Pacific Chips' financial status in making the loan. 
She also relied on the accused's representations that Pacific
Chips had sufficient security for the loan in the form of
unmilled logs.  The accused also advised Harper that he believed
that Kane and Fairbairn, who had agreed to guarantee payment of
the loan, would satisfy the loan if the company defaulted.

	Before the loan was made, the accused and Harper were
talking with another lawyer, Phillip Cobb.  In Cobb's presence,
the accused jokingly told Harper that Cobb had told him that he
should write a letter to Harper explaining the potential conflict
of interest stemming from the loan.  The accused did not write
such a letter.

	The $300,000 loan closed in December 1989.  The accused
prepared loan documents, including a promissory note, a security
agreement granting Harper an interest in Pacific Chips' unmilled
logs, and a UCC financing statement.  All documents described
Harper as the sole creditor on the loan.  The accused told Harper
that he prepared the documents in her name alone because "it
would just look better" if his interest in the loan were not
disclosed.  The accused never disclosed his participation in the
loan to anyone at Pacific Chips, and there is no evidence that
anyone at Pacific Chips knew of his participation when the loan
documents were signed.  Harper wrote the accused a check for
$150,000, which the accused placed in his client trust account. 
The accused then drew a check for $300,000, payable to Pacific
Chips. 

	The loan was structured such that Pacific Chips would
make interest-only payments in January, February, and March of
1990 and commence monthly payments of interest and principal in
April of that year.  However, by April 1990, Pacific Chips was
experiencing financial difficulties.  The accused informed Harper
that Pacific Chips might default on the loan and suggested that
they continue to accept interest-only payments for the time
being, rather than suing Pacific Chips on the note.  Harper
agreed.  In an effort to protect his and Harper's interest in the
loan, the accused filed a UCC-1 financing statement on April 20,
1990, securing Pacific Chips' unmilled logs as collateral for the
loan.  Pacific Chips made interest-only payments on the loan
through August 1990 and then stopped making payments. 

	Between April and November 1990, the accused took other
action to secure repayment of the loan.  He wrote a letter to
another lender, Equifax Mortgage, ostensibly on behalf of Pacific
Chips, explaining the terms of the loan, and mailed a copy of
that letter to Harper.  He also wrote a letter to Harper,
ostensibly on behalf of Pacific Chips and apparently as a
mediator between Pacific Chips, Kane, and Harper, regarding
proposed future payments to Harper in consideration for Harper's
agreement to delay proceeding against Kane as guarantor.  That
letter stated in part:  "I appreciate your courtesy and
cooperation in allowing me to mediate this matter with Pacific
Chips, Harry Kane, yourself and your attorney."  At the time,
Harper was represented in this matter only by the accused. 
Harper testified that she believed the reference in the letter to
"your attorney" was a reference to the accused himself.  In
October and November 1990, the accused, acting in his capacity as
Pacific Chips' lawyer, wrote to Fairbairn and Ralph Johnson, an
investor who had assumed management of Pacific Chips, reminding
them of Harper's security interest in the company's unmilled
logs.  Those letters also referred to Harper's "attorney" in the
third person at a time when the accused was the only lawyer
representing Harper in the matter.

	In November 1990, the accused engaged another lawyer,
Richard Uffelman, to attempt to collect on the loan.  The accused
and Harper each agreed to pay one-half of Uffelman's fee. 
Uffelman was directed to charge Harper his full fee but to send
his bill to the accused.  The accused would then send half the
money owing to Harper, who would pay Uffelman in full.

	Uffelman and the accused agreed that the accused would
assist with the collection, so as to limit the amount of
Uffelman's fee.  Harper eventually decided to sue to collect on
the loan.  The accused prepared the draft complaint in Harper's
collection action, which Uffelman filed.  The accused also
prepared draft letters from Uffelman to Fairbairn's counsel about
the loan.

	At the same time, the accused was attempting to sell
unmilled logs in Pacific Chips' inventory to satisfy the loan. 
The accused directed Uffelman to delay filing the complaint in
Harper's collection action until the accused was certain that the
recovery from log sales would be insufficient to satisfy the
loan.  The proceeds of the log sales ultimately fell far short of
the amount owing, and Uffelman filed the complaint in March 1991. 
The accused accepted service of the complaint on behalf of
Pacific Chips.  The complaint sought recovery of $300,000 plus
interest, as well as punitive damages, in Harper's name only, and
did not reveal the accused's participation in the loan.  The
accused told Uffelman that the reason for proceeding in Harper's
name only was that, in the event that less than half of the
amount due was recovered, the entire recovery would go to Harper,
rather than being divided between Harper and the accused as co-creditors. 

	In July 1991, Uffelman obtained a default judgment
against Pacific Chips for $300,000 plus interest, $50,000 in
punitive damages, and costs and attorney fees.  At the time,
Pacific Chips had no assets with which to satisfy the judgment. 
The accused asserts that he allowed the default because Pacific
Chips had no colorable defense and because corporate officers had
consented to the judgment.

	In late 1991, Harper discharged Uffelman and hired
other counsel to pursue collection of the judgment.  She then
voluntarily reduced the amount of her judgment against Pacific
Chips by $150,000 to reflect the accused's participation in the
loan.  Harper's efforts to collect on the loan eventually
involved her in bankruptcy actions filed on behalf of Pacific
Chips and Kane.  In 1993, Harper also filed a malpractice claim
against the accused and Uffelman.  Harper died in November 1995,
but her estate continued to pursue claims against Pacific Chips,
the loan guarantors, their bankruptcy estates, Uffelman, and the
accused.  Her estate eventually recovered over $162,000 in the
Kane bankruptcy and nearly $6,000 in the Pacific Chips
bankruptcy, but incurred substantial legal fees and failed to
recover most of the interest that had accrued on the loan. 
Harper's malpractice claims against the accused and Uffelman
eventually settled.

	The accused recovered about $25,000 of the $150,000
that he had loaned Pacific Chips.  Although he served as Pacific
Chips' counsel between 1989 and 1991, and billed the company for
more than $63,000 for his work during that period, the accused
received no payment for his services.

	This proceeding against the accused followed.  The
accused does not dispute the trial panel's finding that he
committed the violations detailed in the first and fourth causes
of the Bar's complaint.  In the first cause of the complaint, the
Bar alleged that the accused violated DR 5-101(A)(3) and DR 5-104(A)(4) by holding an undisclosed interest as creditor on an
interest-bearing loan to Pacific Chips, his client.  In the
fourth cause of the complaint, the Bar alleged that the accused
violated DR 5-105(E)(5) by simultaneously representing Pacific
Chips and Harper.  We conclude that the evidence in the record
leaves no doubt that the accused committed those violations.

	The accused disputes the trial panel's finding that he
committed the violations alleged in the second and third causes
of complaint.  In the second cause, the Bar alleged that the
accused violated DR 5-101(A) by representing Harper in the loan
transaction.  As relevant, DR 5-101(A) provides:

		"Except with the consent of the lawyer's client
after full disclosure:

		"(1) a lawyer shall not accept or continue
employment if the exercise of the lawyer's professional
judgment on behalf of the lawyer's client will be or
reasonably may be affected by the lawyer's own
financial business, property, or personal interests."

The trial panel found that the accused violated DR 5-101(A)(1),
because the exercise of his professional judgment on Harper's
behalf was or reasonably might have been affected by his own
financial interests in the loan, by his representation of Pacific
Chips, and by his romantic relationship with Harper.

		The accused first disputes the trial panel's conclusion
that he was Harper's lawyer in the loan transaction.  He argues
that he and Harper were partners in the transaction and that
Harper neither intended that he represent her in that matter nor
relied on his advice in making the loan.  

		On de novo review, we agree with the trial panel that
the accused acted as Harper's lawyer in the loan transaction. 
The existence of a lawyer-client relationship may be inferred
from the circumstances and the conduct of the parties, and does
not depend on a formal agreement.  In re Hassenstab, 325 Or 166,
172, 934 P2d 1110 (1997).  In In re Weidner, 310 Or 757, 770, 801
P2d 828 (1990), this court held that a lawyer-client relationship
may be found to have existed based on the putative client's
objectively reasonable belief that the relationship had been
established.  To establish a lawyer-client relationship on that
basis, the putative client's subjective belief must be
accompanied by evidence showing "that the lawyer understood or
should have understood that the relationship existed, or acted as
though the lawyer was providing professional assistance or advice
on behalf of the putative client * * *."  Ibid.; see also In re
Brown, 326 Or 582, 599-601, 956 P2d 188 (1998) (illustrating
proposition).

		In a deposition taken in her malpractice action against
the accused, Harper stated that she believed that the accused was
her lawyer in the loan transaction and that she had relied on his
advice.  The accused argues that Harper's statements were lies. 
The trial panel, however, explicitly found that Harper's
deposition testimony was credible.  We find no reason to disagree
with the trial panel's finding on that point.  Accordingly, we
find that Harper subjectively believed that the accused was
acting as her lawyer in the loan transaction.

		The question remains whether that belief was
objectively reasonable.  We conclude that it was.  The accused
encouraged Harper to make the loan, made representations to her
about the financial status of Pacific Chips and of the loan
guarantors, and prepared a promissory note, security agreement,
and UCC financing statement in Harper's name.  Further, the
accused represented Harper in other, unrelated, matters
immediately before and after the loan transaction, a fact that
reasonably could have reinforced Harper's belief that the accused
was representing her in the loan matter.  See, e.g., Brown, 326
Or at 599 (finding client's belief of existence of lawyer-client
relationship reasonable under similar circumstances).  We find
that, under the circumstances, it was objectively reasonable for
Harper to believe that the accused was acting as her lawyer in
the loan transaction. 

		The accused also argues that, assuming that he did
represent Harper in the loan transaction, that representation did
not violate DR 5-101(A).  That argument is based on the assertion
that his exercise of professional judgment on Harper's behalf was
not actually or potentially affected by his own financial,
business, property, or personal interests.  The accused's
argument is not well taken.

		DR 5-101(A)(1) prohibits a lawyer from accepting or
continuing representation if the exercise of professional
judgment "will be or reasonably may be affected" by the lawyer's
own interests.  The accused knew that he had business and
personal interests in the loan as Pacific Chips' lawyer and as a
creditor.  He knew, or should have known, that his interests
reasonably might be affected in his representation of Harper. 
Under the circumstances, the accused was required either to
decline to represent Harper or to obtain her consent after full
disclosure of any possible conflict of interest.  In failing to
do either, he violated DR 5-101(A).   

		The third cause of the complaint alleged that the
accused violated DR 5-101(A) by representing Harper in her
efforts to secure collateral and collect on the loan after
Pacific Chips defaulted.  The trial panel found that the accused
violated DR 5-101(A) by representing Harper in the loan
collection at a time when his exercise of professional judgment
on her behalf would or reasonably might be affected by his
simultaneous representation of Pacific Chips and by his personal
interest in collecting the loan.  The accused argues that he did
not represent Harper in the loan collection.

		We agree with the trial panel and find by clear and
convincing evidence that the accused violated DR 5-101(A) as
alleged in the third cause of the complaint.  First, the record
demonstrates that the accused represented Harper in the loan
collection.  Harper subjectively believed that the accused was
representing her in the collection and that belief was
objectively reasonable, because the accused "acted as though [he]
was providing professional assistance or advice on behalf of
[Harper]."  In re Weidner, 310 Or at 770.  Specifically, the
accused wrote the complaint in Harper's collection action against
Pacific Chips and also drafted letters that Uffelman mailed as
part of the effort to collect on the loan.  Further, the accused
told Harper and Uffelman that he would assist in her collection
action.

		We also conclude that the accused's exercise of
professional judgment on Harper's behalf reasonably might have
been affected by his own financial, business, property, or
personal interests.  First, his judgment might have been affected
because he held a property interest in the loan.  There clearly
was a potential conflict between the accused's interest in
collecting the $150,000 that he was owed and his professional
duty as Harper's lawyer to attempt to collect the $150,000 that
she was owed, especially because he knew that Pacific Chips had
insufficient assets to pay its creditors.  Nor could the accused
remedy that conflict by placing Harper's interests ahead of his
own, as he asserts that he did.  DR 5-101(A)(1) required the
accused to decline to represent Harper or to obtain her consent
after full disclosure.  Because he failed to do either, he
violated DR 5-101(A).  We also find that it is clear on this
record that the accused's exercise of professional judgment on
Harper's behalf reasonably might have been affected by his
business interest as counsel for the debtor, Pacific Chips.

		In summary, we agree with the trial panel that the
accused committed the violations charged in the Bar's complaint. 
We turn to the appropriate sanction for the accused's multiple
violations.

SANCTION

		 The purpose of lawyer discipline is not to punish the
lawyer, but to protect the public and the administration of
justice from lawyers who have not discharged, will not discharge,
or are unlikely to discharge properly their professional duties
to clients, the public, the legal system, and the legal
profession.  American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Sanctions (1991) (amended 1992) (ABA Standards), Standard
1.1; see also In re Murdock, 328 Or 18, 24, 968 P2d 1270 (1998)
(to the same effect).  In determining the appropriate sanction
for the violations committed, this court consults the ABA
Standards and Oregon case law.  In re Martin, 328 Or 177, 191,
970 P2d 638 (1998).  The court considers the nature of the
ethical duty violated, the accused's mental state at the time of
the misconduct, the extent of the actual or potential injury
caused by the accused's misconduct, and any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances.  ABA Standard 3.0; Martin, 328 Or at
191.

		The accused committed three violations of DR 5-101(A)
and one violation each of DR 5-104(A) and DR 5-105(E).  In all of
those violations, the accused violated his duty to his clients to
avoid conflicts of interest.  ABA Standard 4.3.

		With respect to the violation of DR 5-104(A), we
conclude that the accused's conduct was intentional, as evidenced
by his purposeful concealment from his client, Pacific Chips, of
his interest in the loan.  As to the other violations, we
conclude that the accused acted knowingly, that is, with
"conscious awareness of the nature or attendant circumstances of
the conduct but without the conscious objective or purpose to
accomplish a particular result."  ABA Standards at 7.

		We may consider both actual and potential injuries in
determining the appropriate sanction.  In re Devers, 328 Or 230,
242, __ P2d __ (1999).  The accused's violations in his
representation of Harper caused her actual injury.  She was
forced into protracted litigation in an attempt to collect on her
loan to Pacific Chips.  Although she eventually recovered the
principal, she incurred substantial legal fees in doing so and
never recovered the majority of the interest that she was owed on
the loan.  The violations arising from the accused's
representation of Pacific Chips caused the company potential
injury. 

		In determining an appropriate sanction, we draw
together the factors of duty, mental state, and injury and
consult the ABA Standards for guidance.  Martin, 328 Or at 192. 
Considering those factors together, we conclude that the
accused's misconduct implicates ABA Standard 4.32, which
provides:

	"Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer
knows of a conflict of interest and does not fully
disclose to a client the possible effect of that
conflict, and causes injury or potential injury to a
client."

Suspension clearly would be an appropriate sanction in this case. 
We next consider aggravating and mitigating factors to determine
whether that sanction should be imposed.  Devers, 328 Or at 243. 

		We find the following aggravating factors:  substantial
experience in the practice of law (ABA Standard 9.22(i));
multiple offenses (ABA Standard 9.22(d)); and a pattern of
misconduct (ABA Standard 9.22(c)).  We find the following
mitigating factors:  cooperative attitude toward the proceedings
(ABA Standard 9.32(e)); and absence of a prior disciplinary
record (ABA Standard 9.32(a)).  In view of the fact that the
accused has practiced law for more than 30 years, the lack of a
prior disciplinary record is a strong mitigating factor.  In re
Schaffner, 323 Or 472, 480, 918 P2d 803 (1996).

		Taken together, the aggravating and mitigating factors
do not alter our preliminary conclusion that suspension is the
appropriate sanction in this case.  The remaining consideration
is this court's case law.  Our review of the case law leads us to
conclude that the trial panel's proposed suspension of four
months is consistent with the sanctions imposed in previous
cases.

		We have imposed a wide range of sanctions, depending on
the circumstances of each case, in discipline proceedings in
which the lawyer violated DR 5-101, DR 5-104, and DR 5-105.  See
In re Moore, 299 Or 496, 703 P2d 961 (1985) (one-year
suspension); In re Baer, 298 Or 29, 688 P2d 1324 (1984) (60-day
suspension); In re Stevenson, 297 Or 452, 683 P2d 550 (1984) (12
violations, stipulated two and one-half year suspension); In re
Scott, 294 Or 606, 660 P2d 157 (1983) (reprimand).  We also are
guided in this proceeding by the following cases:  In re Morris,
326 Or 493, 953 P2d 387 (1998) (120-day suspension for veteran
lawyer with no prior disciplinary record who violated rules
governing conflicts, dishonesty, and false statements of fact);
In re Melmon, 322 Or 380, 908 P2d 822 (1995) (90-day suspension
for inexperienced lawyer who violated rules governing conflicts
and dishonesty); and In re O'Byrne, 298 Or 535, 694 P2d 955
(1985) (four-month suspension for lawyer who violated rules
governing conflicts).

		The Bar argues that the four-month suspension imposed
by the trial panel is insufficient under O'Byrne.  In O'Byrne,
this court discussed the sanctions imposed in previous
disciplinary proceedings involving conflicts of interest and
observed:

		"[T]his court has drawn a line between cases in
which the lawyer is guilty of only a conflict of
interest and cases in which the conflict has been
aggravated by fraud, dishonesty or misappropriation of
funds.  In the former class of cases, the sanctions
have been a public reprimand or a suspension for less
than one year.  In the latter class of cases, the
suspensions have exceeded one year and in one case,
permanent disbarment was ordered."

298 Or at 551.  Although the accused was not charged here with
conduct involving dishonesty under DR 1-102(A)(3), the Bar argues
that his conduct nevertheless was dishonest.  According to the
Bar, that dishonesty, combined with the conflicts of interest of
which the accused is guilty, mandates a suspension of one year or
longer under O'Byrne. 

		Assuming, without deciding, that the Bar is correct
that the accused's conduct in this case constituted dishonesty,
we disagree that O'Byrne announced a rule of law applicable to
such circumstances.  O'Byrne did not purport to create a
framework governing lengths of suspensions; it merely summarized
the range of sanctions that had been imposed in similar cases and
selected a sanction that, in light of the evidence, appeared to
be appropriate.  O'Byrne illustrates the general proposition that
conflicts of interest are punished more severely when aggravated
by dishonesty.(6)  However, the appropriate sanction in each
discipline proceeding always depends on the facts and
circumstances of that proceeding.

		Our cases since O'Byrne demonstrate that this court has
treated the quoted text from that case as a summary of prior
sanctions, not a bright-line rule.  In some proceedings, we have
imposed suspensions of one year or more for conflicts of
interests accompanied by dishonesty.  See, e.g., In re Claussen,
322 Or 466, 909 P2d 862 (1996) (one-year suspension for conflict
of interest aggravated by conduct involving dishonesty in
violation of DR 1-102(A)(3)).  In other such proceedings,
however, we have imposed shorter suspensions.  See Morris, 326 Or
at 493 (120-day suspension for conflict of interest aggravated by
"misrepresentation" in violation of DR 1-102(A)(3)); Melmon, 322
Or at 380 (90-day suspension for conflict of interest aggravated
by conduct involving dishonesty in violation of DR 1-102(A)(3));
In re Hockett, 303 Or 150, 734 P2d 877 (1987) (63-day suspension
for conflict of interest aggravated by conduct involving
dishonesty in violation of DR 1-102(A)(3)).  In those
proceedings, as here, the sanctions reflected our analysis of the
individual facts and circumstances of the case.  O'Byrne provides
guidance in that analysis but, contrary to the Bar's assertion,
does not establish a minimum period of suspension in this class
of proceedings.  Considering the facts and circumstances of this
case, we conclude that a four-month suspension is the appropriate
sanction. 

		The accused is suspended from the practice of law for a
period of four months, commencing 60 days from the date of filing
of this decision.

1. 	The trial panel found that the accused arranged the
meeting between Harper, Kane, and Fairbairn so that Harper could
be solicited for the loan.  Our review of the record suggests
otherwise.  Evidence for the trial panel's finding is found in
Harper's deposition.  The accused denies the scenario described
in Harper's deposition, and we find the accused's version of
events at this juncture to be more likely and therefore more
credible, because there is ample independent testimony favoring
the accused's version and none favoring Harper's version. 
Specifically, Kane testified that he and Fairbairn first
approached Harper about the loan on their own, without any help
from the accused and, indeed, without informing the accused of
their plans.  In other words, Kane's testimony directly supports
the accused's version of this part of the story and controverts
Harper's.  The trial panel made no finding that Kane was not
credible.  Moreover, Harper's deposition on this point is not
convincing.  She had little memory of the details of the meeting
-- date, location, etc. 

2. 	The accused denies encouraging Harper to make the loan;
nonetheless, he acknowledges his own belief that Pacific Chips
was an extremely successful operation and that Pacific Chips'
attorney would make him wealthy at the time he and Harper were
romantically involved.

3. 	DR 5-101(A) provides, in part:

		"Except with the consent of the lawyer's client
after full disclosure,

		"(1) a lawyer shall not accept or continue
employment if the exercise of the lawyer's professional
judgment on behalf of the lawyer's client will be or
reasonably may be affected by the lawyer's own
financial business, property, or personal interests.

	* * *"

4. 	DR 5-104(A) provides:

		"A lawyer shall not enter into a business
transaction with a client if they have differing
interests therein and if the client expects the lawyer
to exercise the lawyer's professional judgment therein
for the protection of the client, unless the client has
consented after full disclosure."

5. 	DR 5-105(E) provides, in part:

		"* * * * *

		"Current Client Conflicts - Prohibition.

	Except as provided in DR 5-105(F), a lawyer shall not
represent multiple current clients in any matters when
such representation would result in an actual or likely
conflict."

6. 	This court has never cited O'Byrne to justify a
suspension of one year or more for conflicts of interest
aggravated by dishonesty in a proceeding in which the accused was
not charged with misappropriation of funds or conduct involving
dishonesty or misrepresentation under DR 1-102.  As noted, the
accused was not so charged in this proceeding.