Title: Bogle Development Co. v. Buie
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 950065
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: November 3, 1995

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson, Lacy, Hassell, 
Keenan, JJ., and Poff, Senior Justice 
 
BOGLE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC., ET AL. 
 
v.   Record No. 950065 
OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
                                     November 3, 1995 
ROY BUIE 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
William Roy Buie suffered a work-related injury in 1988.  
The Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission) determined 
that his injury was compensable, and that his statutory 
employer, Bogle Development Company, Inc., and its workers' 
compensation carrier, Rockwood Insurance Company (collectively 
"Bogle"), were liable for Buie's lost wages and medical 
expenses.
1
 
In 1991, Bogle refused to pay some of Buie's claims for 
reimbursement of medical expenses, asserting they were 
unauthorized expenses.  On March 9, 1992, the Commission 
entered an order holding that the disputed medical treatment 
was justified and that "the defendants are responsible for 
payment of the treatment."  Based on this order, Buie submitted 
a claim for reimbursement of medical expense payments which he 
and his insurance carrier, Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Tennessee 
(Blue Cross/Blue Shield) had made.  In response to his request 
for payment, Bogle informed Buie that Guaranty Fund Management 
Services (the Fund) had taken over the handling of the claim
2 
                     
    
1Buie's employer, R.G. Excavating, had allowed its workers' 
compensation insurance to lapse. 
    
2In August of 1991, Rockwood Insurance Company became 
insolvent and, pursuant to Code §§ 38.2-1600 through -1623, the 
Guaranty Fund Management Services assumed responsibility for 
 
 
 
 
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and had agreed to reimburse Buie for his "out-of-pocket 
expenditures" upon receipt of satisfactory documentation, but 
refused to reimburse Blue Cross/Blue Shield, asserting that it 
"does not reimburse third-party providers under any 
circumstances." 
 
Buie again sought an order from the Commission requiring 
the Fund to pay his reimbursement claims.  The chief deputy 
commissioner refused Buie's request, stating that the 
Commission did not have jurisdiction to decide the dispute 
because it "involves interpreting Code Sections 38.2-1600 et 
seq." and because "the rights of the claimant are not at stake 
and therefore the litigants must resort to the common-law 
remedies."  Following Buie's request for review, the Commission 
reversed the decision of the chief deputy commissioner and 
determined that it had jurisdiction to enforce its awards and 
"to order reimbursement of those payments both to Blue Cross 
and to the claimant."  The Commission remanded the matter for a 
hearing.  On January 21, 1993, the day after the Commission 
issued its opinion, the Fund paid Buie $1,897.35 as 
reimbursement of his out-of-pocket medical expenses. 
 
On remand, the deputy commissioner held that the Fund was 
also required to reimburse Blue Cross/Blue Shield.  This 
determination was affirmed by the full Commission in an opinion 
issued November 5, 1993.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the 
                                                                
payment of Rockwood's obligations. 
 
 
 
 
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decision of the Commission.  Bogle Dev. Co. v. Buie, 19 Va. 
App. 370, 451 S.E.2d 682 (1994).  Bogle and the Fund filed a 
petition for appeal in this Court.  Finding that the petition 
presented matters of siginficant precedential value, we awarded 
Bogle and the Fund an appeal.  Code § 17-116.07(B). 
 
Bogle and the Fund raise five assignments of error.  Under 
our analysis, however, the dispositive issue in this appeal is 
whether the Commission's jurisdiction over this controversy 
ceased when the Fund reimbursed Buie for his out-of-pocket 
medical expenses.  Bogle and the Fund assert that the Court of 
Appeals erred in holding that the Commission had subject matter 
jurisdiction to consider Buie's request for reimbursement of 
Blue Cross/Blue Shield because, after the Fund paid Buie for 
his out-of-pocket payments for his medical expenses, no issues 
regarding the claimant Buie remained before the Commission.  
Thus, they conclude, the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
affirming the Commission's order that the Fund reimburse Blue 
Cross/Blue Shield must be vacated.  We agree and, for the 
reasons stated below, will reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals. 
 
Code § 65.2-700 vests the Commission with jurisdiction to 
determine all questions "arising under" the Virginia Workers' 
Compensation Act.  This grant of subject matter jurisdiction 
includes the authority of the Commission to enforce its orders 
and to resolve coverage and payment disputes.  The jurisdiction 
 
 
 
 
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is not unlimited, however.  As the Court of Appeals correctly 
stated in Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 3 Va. App. 116, 
121, 348 S.E.2d 416, 419 (1986): 
 
 
Questions between the insurer and the employer 
or another insurer do not "arise under" the Act 
except insofar as they affect the rights of an 
injured employee.  Code § 65.1-92.  When the rights 
of the claimant are not at stake, the Act clearly 
leaves the litigants to their common law remedies 
. . . 
 
Applying this analysis to the facts here, we conclude that once 
Buie was reimbursed for his out-of-pocket expenses, no right of 
the claimant was "at stake."  The only remaining issue involved 
the reimbursement claims of Blue Cross/Blue Shield. 
 
Buie was reimbursed on January 21, 1993.  After that date, 
the Commission did not have subject matter jurisdiction to 
consider Blue Cross/Blue Shield's claims for reimbursement or 
to enter its November 5, 1993 order requiring the Fund to 
reimburse Blue Cross/Blue Shield. 
 
Buie maintains, however, that the jurisdictional issue 
cannot be considered here.  Buie argues that the Fund's appeal 
is actually an untimely collateral attack on the March 1992 
order of the Commission holding that "the defendants are 
responsible for payment for the treatment rendered."  Buie 
maintains that prior to entry of the 1992 order, the Fund knew 
that Blue Cross/Blue Shield had paid portions of the bills for 
the contested medical treatment and, therefore, could have 
asserted its position regarding reimbursement of Blue 
 
 
 
 
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Cross/Blue Shield at that time.  The Fund failed to raise the 
issue or to appeal the decision of the Commission.  Thus, Buie 
maintains, this appeal is no more than a collateral attack on 
that final, binding decision. 
 
Buie's argument overlooks the nature of the 1992 
proceedings before the Commission.  The issue in that 
proceeding was whether Buie had a right to coverage for certain 
medical expenses challenged by Bogle.  A right of the claimant 
was at stake in that proceeding.  Consequently there was 
clearly no basis for the Fund to question the jurisdiction of 
the Commission.  The failure to appeal the 1992 order only 
precluded the Fund from challenging the claimant's right to 
coverage for the contested medical treatment.  Accordingly, the 
jurisdictional issue which arose later and is now asserted by 
the Fund is not an untimely collateral attack on a final 
decision of the Commission. 
 
For the above reasons, we conclude that the Court of 
Appeals erred in determining that the Commission had 
jurisdiction to consider whether Blue Cross/Blue Shield was 
entitled to reimbursement from the Fund when no right of the 
claimant remained in issue. Accordingly, we will reverse the 
decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the November 5, 1993 
order of the Commission, and dismiss the petition. 
 
Reversed and dismissed.