Title: Evans v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 501, 2010
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: May 9, 2011

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
RONALD L. EVANS, JR., 
 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 501, 2010 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for Kent County 
§  Cr. ID Nos. 0808023433 
§  and 0807012992 
§ 
 
Submitted:  March 11, 2011 
Decided:  May 9, 2011 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 9th day of May 2011, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and the 
record below, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Ronald Evans, filed this appeal from the Superior 
Court’s denial of his first motion for postconviction relief.  After careful review, 
we find no merit to the issues Evans has raised on appeal.  Accordingly, we affirm 
the Superior Court’s judgment. 
(2) 
The record reflects that Evans was arrested in July 2008 and again in 
August 2008 and charged in separate indictments with twenty-five criminal 
offenses, which were consolidated.  In January 2009, Evans’ counsel filed a motion 
to dismiss and motions to suppress evidence.  In March 2009, Evans pled guilty to 
 
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one count of trafficking cocaine (10 to 50 grams) and three counts of possession 
with intent to deliver cocaine.  In exchange for his guilty plea, the State dismissed 
the remaining charges and agreed not to seek habitual offender status or sentencing 
for Evans.  The State also agreed to recommend a total sentence of seventy years, 
to be suspended after serving twelve years for decreasing levels of supervision.  
The Superior Court sentenced Evans in accordance with his plea agreement.  Evans 
did not file a direct appeal to this Court.  Instead, he filed a motion for 
postconviction relief,1 which was referred to a Commissioner for findings and a 
recommendation.  After obtaining responses from defense counsel and counsel for 
the State, the Commissioner recommended denial of the motion.  The Superior 
Court accepted the Commissioner’s report and recommendation and denied Evans’ 
motion for postconviction relief on August 4, 2010.  This appeal followed. 
(3) 
Evans raises six issues in his opening brief on appeal: (i) the Superior 
Court abused its discretion in denying his motion for postconviction relief; (ii) his 
due process rights were violated when the Superior Court allowed the State to file 
a response to his postconviction motion out of time; (iii) his convictions and 
sentences for trafficking and possession with intent to deliver violate double 
jeopardy principles; (iv) the prosecutor engaged in misconduct; (v) he was denied 
his right to the effective assistance of counsel; and (vi) the Superior Court violated 
                                                 
1 Evans presented the following claims in the postconviction motion he filed in the Superior Court: (i) illegal 
detention and arrest; (ii) illegal search and seizure; (iii) double jeopardy violations; and (iv) prosecutorial 
misconduct; and (v) ineffective assistance of counsel. 
 
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his constitutional rights when it allowed defense counsel to appear before the Court 
several times prior to accepting his guilty plea.  This last issue was not raised in the 
motion Evans filed in the Superior Court.  Accordingly, we will not consider this 
claim for the first time on appeal.2  We address his remaining claims below. 
(4) 
To support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel following the 
entry of a guilty plea, a defendant must demonstrate that: (a) counsel’s conduct fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (b) there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the defendant would not have pled guilty 
but would have insisted on going to trial.3  A defendant must make concrete 
allegations of cause and actual prejudice to substantiate a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.4  Evans essentially argues in this case that his counsel was 
ineffective for advising him to plead guilty before she had received all of the 
discovery materials from the State, which were necessary to evaluate the merits of 
his case.  
(5) 
In response to Evans’ allegations, counsel stated in her affidavit that 
she initially did not receive all of the necessary discovery materials prior to her 
filing motions to suppress and dismiss on Evans’ behalf.  After the motions to 
suppress were denied without prejudice for lack of factual specificity, the Superior 
Court set deadlines for the State to provide the necessary discovery.  Counsel 
                                                 
2 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 8 (2011). 
3 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). 
4 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1980). 
 
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asserts that, upon receipt of those discovery materials, she was able to refile the 
motions to suppress, which were scheduled to be heard on the day of trial.  Given 
the evidence against Evans, which included his videotaped admissions, and the 
possible life sentence he was facing as a habitual offender if he were convicted of 
any one of the felony charges against him, counsel advised Evans that the plea 
offered by the State was in his best interest but that she was prepared to go to trial 
if Evans rejected the plea offer.  In reviewing Evans’ allegations of ineffectiveness 
and counsel’s response thereto, the Superior Court found counsel’s response to be 
more credible than Evans’ unsubstantiated allegations that his attorney was not 
fully prepared.  The Superior Court concluded, and we agree, that under the 
circumstances, counsel’s performance was well within the standards of 
reasonableness.   
(6) 
Moreover, Evans’ expressed satisfaction with his counsel’s 
representation and stated under oath that he was pleading guilty because he was, in 
fact, guilty of the charged offenses.  In the absence of clear and convincing 
evidence to the contrary, Evans is bound by these statements.5  We thus reject 
Evans’ claim that his guilty plea was involuntary due to his counsel’s ineffective 
assistance.   
                                                 
5 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997). 
 
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(7) 
Because we find that Evans entered his guilty plea knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily, we need not consider his claims of illegal search and 
seizure, double jeopardy/multiplicity violations, or prosecutorial misconduct.  A 
voluntary guilty plea waives any claims of errors occurring prior to the entry of the 
plea.6  Evans, through his voluntary plea, has waived his right to raise those 
arguments now. 
(8) 
Finally, we find no merit to Evans’ contention that his constitutional 
rights were violated when the Superior Court granted the State’s request to file a 
response to Evans’ postconviction motion out-of-time.  The Superior Court has 
discretion to grant such extension requests.7   Evans can establish no prejudice 
from the Superior Court’s decision to allow the State several extra days to file its 
response. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice 
                                                 
6 See Benge v. State, 945 A.2d 1099, 1201 (Del. 2008) (“Under Delaware law, a voluntary guilty plea constitutes a 
waiver of any alleged errors or defects occurring prior to the entry of the plea, including a multiplicity defect.”). 
7 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 45(b) (2011).