Title: Filger v. Filger
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 484, 2000
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: July 30, 2001

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
RUTH L. FILGER,
)
)  No. 484, 2000
Respondent Below,
)
Appellant,
)  Court Below:  Family Court
)  of the State of Delaware in
v.
)  and for New Castle County
)
DENNIS L. FILGER,
)  CN98-09458
)
Petitioner Below,
)
Appellee.
)
Submitted: March 20, 2001
Decided:
July 30, 2001
Before WALSH, HOLLAND and STEELE, Justices.
O R D E R
This 30th day of July 2001, it appears to the Court that:
1.
Dennis L. Filger and Ruth L. Filger married in 1970 and were
divorced by the Family Court of the State of Delaware on October 22, 1998,
ending a marriage of over twenty-eight years.  The Family Court rendered an
Opinion and Order resolving property division and alimony matters on August 27,
1999.  Husband filed a Motion for Reargument and Clarification on September 3,
1999 and the Family Court issued an Order denying the motion on September 28,
1999.
2.
Six weeks later on November 12, 1999 Husband filed a Petition to
Terminate Alimony.  On February 9, 2000, Wife filed a Petition-Rule to Show
2
Cause alleging that Husband stopped paying alimony.  Husband filed a second
Rule to Show Cause on April 18, 2000 alleging a refusal to comply with other
portions of the ancillary decision.
3.
On April 12, 2000, Wife’s then attorney filed a Motion to Dismiss the
Petition to Terminate Alimony alleging that the Family Court did not have
personal jurisdiction over Wife as she lived out of the State of Delaware and that
she had not been served under the Long Arm Statute.
4.
Husband filed a response to the motion on April 24, 2000 and the
Family Court signed an Order on June 7, 20001 denying the motion.
5.
The Court then scheduled a hearing on the Petition to Terminate and
on Wife’s two Rules to Show Cause for Monday, July 17, 2000.  Notices for the
three petitions were issued on June 21, 2000.  Husband acknowledged receipt of
the notices on July 6, 2000.  On Friday, July 14, 2000, Husband filed a Motion for
Default Judgment.  On Monday, July 17, with the parties and attorneys present in
Family Court, and without hearing the merits of any cause, the trial judge granted
the motion and signed the proposed order prepared by Husband’s attorney.  The
Order terminated all alimony obligations of Husband (including past due, present
or future alimony) to Wife and permitted Husband’s attorney to file a claim for
fees and costs within ten days of the order.  Husband’s counsel filed an Affidavit
3
and request for $15,000 in attorney fees and costs.  Wife’s former attorney was
served but Wife was not.
6.
On July 27, 2000, Wife filed a Motion to Reopen the default judgment
pursuant to Family Court Civil Rule 60(b).
7.
Wife filed a response to the application for attorney fees and costs on
August 9, 2000.  On that same date the Family Court signed an order granting
Husband’s counsel’s application in full and denied Wife’s Motion to Reopen.
8.
After a Motion for Reargument of the order of attorney fees and costs
and the response to the motion were filed, the Family Court issued a final order
denying the Motion for Reargument on September 5, 2000.
9.
Wife appealed on October 3, 2000.
10.
We review the Family Court’s rulings under an abuse of discretion
standard.
11.
We conclude that a trial court abuses its discretion by entering a
default judgment and by refusing to reopen pursuant to Family Court Civil Rule
60(b) when cross-petitions for relief are before it and a hearing is scheduled with
all parties present and capable of presenting evidence on the merits.
12.
The trial court here further committed error when it denied the Wife
an opportunity to respond to the Motion for Default Judgment within the time
                                                                                                                                       
1 Although the Order is hand-dated “June 7, 2000,” and signed by the Judge, there is a notation
4
prescribed by the Family Court Rules and abused its discretion by terminating
Wife’s alimony in toto and by awarding Husband attorney fees and costs without
any hearing on the merits of the applications.
13.
It has long been, and continues to be, the policy of the Courts of
Delaware to favor litigating disputes between parties on the merits.2
14.
In this case, Husband filed his Motion for a Default Judgment one
business day before a previously scheduled hearing for which all parties appeared
with counsel.  Although Wife had opted to plead otherwise than by an answer to
Husband’s Petition to Terminate Alimony, a hearing had been scheduled on the
same day that motion had been scheduled to be heard for Wife’s Petitions for a
Rule to Show Cause why Husband had not been complying with the alimony and
property division provisions of the Family Court’s earlier ancillary order.  Husband
filed no answer to these Petitions filed by Wife.
15.
Both parties, despite their respective failures to file answers to the
cross-Petitions, had prepared and were able to proceed on the merits on all
Petitions on the scheduled hearing date of July 17.  Witnesses had in fact appeared
from out of state to testify on that day.
16.
While we can understand the Family Court’s frustration that neither
party had filed answers to the other’s Petition(s) and that Wife had interposed a
                                                                                                                                       
on the Order that it was not mailed by the Family Court clerk until June 21, 2000.
5
procedural jurisdictional defense rather than taking a written position on the
Husband’s Petition on the merits, the Family Court should have forced all parties
to trial on the merits that day rather than dispose of the pending issues in toto by
entering a default judgment in favor of the Husband on all outstanding issues.
17.
On the facts of this case, the Family Court further abused its
discretion by denying Wife’s Motion to Reopen, thereby reaffirming the
improvidently granted default judgment and preventing the issues between the
parties from being decided on their merits.
18.
We conclude that the Family Court’s judgments were arbitrary and
must be reversed.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, the judgments of the Family Court
are, therefore REVERSED and the case is REMANDED with instructions that it be
reassigned to another judge of the Family Court.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Myron T. Steele____________________
Justice
                                                                                                                                       
2 Battaglia v. WFSF, Del. Supr., 379 A.2d 1132 (1977).