Title: Commonwealth v. West
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12489
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: July 2, 2021

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SJC-12489 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  STEVEN WEST. 
 
 
 
Worcester.     March 5, 2021. - July 2, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Cypher, Kafker, & Wendlandt, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Malice.  Practice, Criminal, Question by jury, 
Instructions to jury, Argument by prosecutor, Capital case.  
Evidence, Prior misconduct, Intent, State of mind, 
Accident.  Intent. 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 20, 2012. 
 
The case was tried before Janet Kenton-Walker, J. 
 
 
Andrew S. Crouch for the defendant. 
Michelle R. King, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
WENDLANDT, J.  The defendant was convicted of murder in the 
first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty, for 
killing his sister-in-law, Alyssa Haden.  At trial, the 
Commonwealth proceeded on a theory that the defendant raped the 
victim, crushing her with his body weight until she died of 
2 
 
asphyxia.  In his defense, the defendant maintained that he and 
the victim, a petite woman who weighed less than one-third of 
his weight, were having an affair, and that her death following 
consensual sexual intercourse was an accident. 
 
On appeal, the defendant argues that there was insufficient 
evidence to support his conviction.  He also contends that the 
judge did not adequately address a jury question, challenges 
some of the judge's evidentiary rulings, and argues that, during 
closing argument, the prosecutor misstated certain evidence.  In 
addition, the defendant asserts that a reduction in the verdict 
would be more consonant with justice, and asks us to exercise 
our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the degree of 
guilt.  We affirm the conviction and discern no reason to grant 
relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  We recite the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the Commonwealth, reserving some details 
for later discussion.  See Commonwealth v. Combs, 480 Mass. 55, 
57 (2018). 
In 2010, the defendant, then nineteen, met the then 
eighteen year old victim, who was approximately four feet, 
eleven inches tall, and weighed 125 pounds, and her twin sister, 
through an online "chat room."1  The defendant, who weighed over 
 
 
1 "A 'chat room' is a public or private Internet site that 
allows people to send 'real time' typed messages to others who 
3 
 
400 pounds, and the victim's sister commenced a romantic 
relationship.  After eight months of conversing over the 
Internet and by telephone, the defendant moved from Indiana to 
Massachusetts to be with her.  Within a year, they moved into an 
apartment together, got married, and had a son.  At trial, the 
sister testified that when she and the defendant engaged in 
sexual intercourse, he did not put his weight on her. 
Early in 2012, the victim moved in with the couple in their 
apartment in Spencer in order to care for their son and to 
assist with rental payments.  In February of that year, the 
victim reported to police that items in her room had been 
vandalized and that her debit card was missing.  The vandalized 
items (among them, a bikini bottom, a diploma, a doll, a Bible, 
and two calendars) had been defaced with vulgar, degrading 
comments, some specifically naming the victim, and two articles 
of clothing had had holes burned through them. 
At trial, the defendant suggested that a former boyfriend 
of the victim had vandalized the items,2 but a handwriting expert 
testified that the handwriting on the vandalized items was 
consistent with the defendant's handwriting and inconsistent 
 
are simultaneously connected to that Internet site."  United 
States v. Tank, 200 F.3d 627, 629 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 
 
2 Two of the writings were signed using the nickname of the 
victim's former boyfriend. 
4 
 
with the former boyfriend's handwriting.  An investigation 
revealed that the missing debit card had been used for purchases 
at a nearby store and also to make calls to "900 numbers."3  The 
defendant later told his wife that he had used the card; he 
claimed that he had mistaken the name on the card and that he 
had paid the victim all of the money spent.  The victim told 
police that the money had been repaid and that she did not want 
the defendant criminally charged for taking or using her card. 
The victim moved out of the apartment in March or April of 
2012.  She complained to her sister and to one of her friends 
about the defendant's personal hygiene, telling her sister that 
the defendant was heavy and smelled, and remarking to her friend 
that the defendant was "disgusting."  The victim also told the 
friend that she did not like the defendant, and mocked the 
defendant's weight, referring to him as "Lardo." 
In September of 2012, the victim moved back in with her 
sister and the defendant.  By then, the victim was dating a new 
boyfriend, and was saving money so that she and her boyfriend 
could move into their own apartment. 
 
 
3 "Designation of a 900 area code reflects that information 
or services (such as sports scores, weather information, 
computer technical support, 'date lines,' or psychic readings) 
are being transferred over the carrier's lines. . . .  When the 
end-consumer dials a 900 number, he or she is charged a fee by 
the information vendor."  AT&T Communications of Md., Inc. v. 
Comptroller of Treasury, 405 Md. 83, 87 (2008). 
5 
 
On October 9, 2012, the victim's sister, who was nearly 
nine months pregnant, was spending the night at a nearby 
hospital.  Late that evening, the victim and her boyfriend were 
exchanging text messages.  At some point, the victim sent a 
message saying that she was afraid; there was no testimony 
explaining the reason for her fear. 
 
On the morning of October 10, 2012, the victim's mother was 
concerned that the victim was not responding to calls to her 
cellular telephone, and asked the victim's brother to check on 
her.  He found the victim's lifeless body lying on her bed, 
partially covered by blankets and a body pillow.  The victim's 
pajamas were askew, and her pants had a hole in the crotch.  
There also was a zig-zag pattern on her back, which matched the 
pattern of the mattress, and a body pillow on the floor that had 
a red-brown stain.  Although the victim's body was positioned on 
the back, face up, lividity was present on the forehead, where 
blood evidently had pooled after the victim's death.  This 
condition indicated that the body likely had been positioned 
face down for a period of time after the victim's death, 
sufficiently long to allow blood to be pulled to the forehead 
after her heart stopped beating.  The lividity also suggested 
that the victim had been turned over onto her back, to the 
position in which her body was found, sometime after her death. 
6 
 
An autopsy revealed that the victim died of "asphyxia due 
to compression of [her] face, neck, and chest."  The compression 
was the result of significant force, such as that which could 
have been provided by the defendant's body weight on top of the 
victim.  The medical examiner testified4 that, if there were a 
"complete" loss of blood flow to the brain, through compression 
of the chest, face, and neck, the victim would have been 
conscious for at least thirty seconds, possibly longer, and 
death from "compression asphyxia" would have taken place five to 
ten minutes after the victim lost consciousness.  If the loss of 
blood flow was not complete, so that some blood, and thus 
oxygen, were reaching the brain, these times would have been 
longer.  On cross-examination, the medical examiner clarified 
that if the compression had been applied "consistently and 
completely," loss of consciousness would have occurred in under 
a minute, and the victim would have ceased moving at that time, 
although death would have occurred from five to ten minutes 
thereafter.5 
 
 
4 Due to scheduling issues and the experts' availability, 
the parties agreed that the defendant's medical expert would 
testify out of order, during the Commonwealth's case.  That 
testimony was followed immediately by the testimony of the 
medical examiner. 
 
 
5 The defendant's expert testified, similarly to the medical 
examiner, that the cause of death was asphyxia "due to 
compression of her torso and her face."  The expert opined that, 
if there were a complete loss of blood flow to the brain, 
7 
 
Sperm cells collected from the victim's vaginal and 
external genital area matched the defendant's deoxyribonucleic 
acid profile.  Forensic examination revealed that the 
defendant's laptop computer, which he shared with the victim's 
sister (his wife), had been used to conduct Internet searches 
that included the victim's name, the word "beastiality," and "I 
wanna fuck my sister-in-law." 
Officers learned that, on the morning the victim's body was 
discovered, the defendant had left his son with a family friend; 
the friend said that the defendant was acting "strangely."  
Police interviewed the defendant that afternoon.  He denied any 
involvement in the victim's death and gave conflicting 
statements to police in response to their questions.  The 
officers asked the defendant whether he was having an affair 
with the victim and suggested that her death might have been an 
accident.  The defendant denied both assertions.  The defendant 
was arrested and charged with misleading a police officer. 
Following his arrest, the defendant continued to make 
conflicting statements to the police, his wife, his mother-in-
 
through "a very complete compression of the torso," and an 
"obstruction of the nose and mouth," the individual would be 
without oxygen "immediately," would be unable to move the chest 
wall, and "would become unconscious in maybe two to three 
minutes."  Death would occur approximately five to ten minutes 
after the loss of consciousness, "depending on the completeness 
of the compression." 
8 
 
law, and his downstairs neighbor.  During one jail visit, the 
defendant told his wife that gang members from Indiana had 
killed the victim in apparent retaliation for a conflict that 
they had with him.  Weeks later, the defendant told police that 
he had fabricated this account, and then said that a man he knew 
named "Jacob Peterson" had killed the victim.  By the end of 
that interview, however, the defendant had agreed that this 
statement also was fabricated. 
The defendant then told the officers that he and the victim 
had been having a months-long affair.  He explained that, on the 
evening of the victim's death, the two had been having sexual 
intercourse.  He was positioned behind the victim, whose face 
was in a pillow, and whose hands were tied, when the victim 
suddenly went limp.  He said that he disposed of the victim's 
cellular telephone.  State police troopers searched for the 
telephone, but it was never found. 
Thereafter, the defendant's explanations concerning what 
had happened to the victim continued to change.  He wrote a 
letter to his mother-in-law stating that he and the victim were 
having an affair and also claiming that the victim drugged and 
raped him; he asserted that the victim blackmailed him into 
beginning, and continuing, the affair.  The defendant also wrote 
to his former downstairs neighbor, saying that the victim had 
raped him and that, on the night of the victim's death, he had 
9 
 
been hit on the head by a third party, regained consciousness, 
and awakened to find the victim dead. 
b.  Trial proceedings.  The defendant was indicted on one 
count of murder in the first degree.  At trial, the Commonwealth 
proceeded on theories of deliberate premeditation, extreme 
atrocity or cruelty, and felony-murder.  The theory of the 
defense was that the defendant and the victim had been having a 
consensual affair.  The defendant maintained that the victim's 
death was an accident, following sexual intercourse during which 
the victim voluntarily allowed herself to be tied up.  The 
defendant moved for a required finding of not guilty at the 
close of the Commonwealth's case and at the end of all the 
evidence.  The former motion was allowed with respect to the 
offense of murder in the first degree on a theory of felony-
murder and denied on all of the other charges, and the latter 
was denied. 
The case went to the jury on murder in the first degree on 
theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or 
cruelty; murder in the second degree based on malice and felony-
murder; and involuntary manslaughter.  The judge instructed the 
jury that in order to convict the defendant of murder in the 
first degree, the Commonwealth had to prove beyond a reasonable 
10 
 
doubt that the victim's death was not an accident.6  Following a 
question concerning the jury instructions, discussed infra, the 
jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree 
on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  The 
defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence to 
support a finding of extreme atrocity or cruelty, and thus that 
his motions for a required finding of not guilty should have 
been allowed.  In reviewing the denial of a motion for a 
required finding, the court must determine "whether the 
evidence, in its light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 
notwithstanding the contrary evidence presented by the 
defendant, is sufficient . . . to permit the jury to infer the 
existence of the essential elements of the crime charged."  
Commonwealth v. O'Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 198 (2006), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676–677 (1979).  
"Because the defendant moved for required findings at the close 
of the Commonwealth's case and again at the close of all the 
evidence, '[w]e consider the state of the evidence at the close 
of the Commonwealth's case to determine whether the defendant's 
motion should have been granted at that time.  We also consider 
 
6 The judge also informed the jury that her instructions on 
accident were applicable to the offense of murder in the second 
degree based on malice, as well as involuntary manslaughter. 
11 
 
the state of the evidence at the close of all the evidence, to 
determine whether the Commonwealth's position as to proof 
deteriorated after it closed its case.'"  O'Laughlin, supra, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Sheline, 391 Mass. 279, 283 (1984).  To 
meet its burden, the Commonwealth may rely entirely upon 
circumstantial evidence.  See Commonwealth v. Lao, 443 Mass. 
770, 779 (2005), S.C., 450 Mass. 215 (2007) and 460 Mass. 12 
(2011).  Proof of the essential elements of the crime may be 
based on reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence, see 
Combs, 480 Mass. at 61-62, and the inferences a jury may draw 
"need only be reasonable and possible and need not be necessary 
or inescapable," Commonwealth v. Casale, 381 Mass. 167, 173 
(1980). 
At the time of the defendant's trial, to convict a 
defendant of murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme 
atrocity or cruelty, the jury had to find beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed an unlawful killing with 
malice aforethought and the presence of at least one of the so-
called Cunneen factors indicating extreme atrocity or cruelty.  
See Commonwealth v. Williams, 475 Mass. 705, 712-713 (2016); 
Commonwealth v. Cunneen, 389 Mass. 216, 227 (1983).7  The 
 
 
7 The Cunneen factors include "indifference to or taking 
pleasure in the victim's suffering, consciousness and degree of 
suffering of the victim, extent of physical injuries, number of 
blows, manner and force with which delivered, instrument 
12 
 
defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to 
malice and the presence of the factors set forth in Cunneen.8 
i.  Malice.  Malice is "an intent to cause death, to cause 
grievous bodily harm, or to do an act which, in the 
circumstances known to the defendant, a reasonable person would 
have known created a plain and strong likelihood that death 
would follow."  Commonwealth v. Sokphann Chhim, 447 Mass. 370, 
377 (2006).  The evidence before the jury, viewed in the light 
most favorable to the Commonwealth, was that the defendant raped 
the victim and, while doing so, intentionally placed his heavy 
weight on top of her so as to smother her.  The victim lost 
consciousness after at least thirty seconds, ceased moving, and 
died five to ten minutes later, all while the defendant 
continued to compress her.  Contrary to the defendant's 
assertions, this evidence would have permitted the jury to find 
malice beyond a reasonable doubt, that is, that the defendant 
 
employed, and disproportion between the means needed to cause 
death and those employed."  Commonwealth v. Cunneen, 389 Mass. 
216, 227 (1983). 
 
8 In Commonwealth v. Castillo, 485 Mass. 852, 865-866 
(2020), the court reformulated application of the Cunneen 
factors to focus on the intentional acts of the defendant, and 
to preclude a conviction on a theory of extreme atrocity or 
cruelty "based only on the degree of a victim's suffering, 
without considering whether the defendant's conduct was extreme 
in either its brutality or its cruelty."  This reformulation, 
however, was prospective only, and is inapplicable here.  See 
id. at 867. 
13 
 
intended to act knowing (as a reasonable person would have 
known) that the circumstances created a plain and strong 
likelihood that death would follow.  See Commonwealth v. Forde, 
392 Mass. 453, 456 (1984) ("An inference of malice arises from 
the intentional doing of an act likely to cause death or 
grievous harm"). 
Although the defendant argued that the victim's death was 
an accident during a consensual sexual encounter, the jury heard 
evidence that would have allowed them to conclude that the 
encounter was not voluntary, that the defendant raped the 
victim, and that her death was intentional.  The victim's 
defaced and burned personal property would have allowed the jury 
to infer that the defendant harbored rage toward the victim.  
The jury also could have found that the defendant's Internet 
searches suggested an obsession with the victim that was sexual 
in nature.  Compare Commonwealth v. Bregoli, 431 Mass. 265, 269-
270 (2000) (evidence of defendant's obsessive and increasingly 
hostile attitude toward victim supported inference of malice).  
Moreover, the evidence before the jury concerning the victim's 
attitude toward the defendant included her repeated comments 
about his weight and body odor, and her distaste for him, 
including her references to him as "Lardo" and "a lazy sack of 
shit."  In response to a question whether the victim had wanted 
to have a sexual relationship with the defendant, one of the 
14 
 
victim's friends responded, "Not even close."  The jury heard no 
evidence of statements or actions by the victim indicating that 
she found the defendant attractive or was interested in having a 
sexual relationship with him. 
The jury also reasonably could have concluded from the 
evidence before them that the defendant purposefully pressed his 
weight of more than 400 pounds against the upper half of the 
victim's body, knowing that doing so would create a plain and 
strong likelihood that death would follow, and remained in that 
position for five to ten minutes after the victim had stopped 
moving.  The jury heard from the medical examiner that the 
defendant applied a "significant amount of force" to the victim, 
and that the defendant would have had to compress the victim for 
five to ten minutes, continuing even after she lost 
consciousness and stopped moving, in order for the complete lack 
of blood flow and oxygen to result in her death. 
The defendant's wife (the victim's twin sister) testified 
that when she and the defendant were engaged in sexual 
intercourse, he did not to put his weight on her and, indeed, 
that she often was positioned "on top" or on her "hands and 
knees," rather than under him, due to his weight.  In other 
words, the defendant likely knew that putting his body weight on 
his wife during sexual intercourse was dangerous.  The jury 
reasonably could have inferred that the defendant's position on 
15 
 
top of the victim was no accident and that, as he put his full 
weight on the victim's upper body for such an extended period, 
he would have known that the victim's chest and neck would be 
crushed and she would die from being smothered.  See 
Commonwealth v. Perry, 432 Mass. 214, 222 (2000); Forde, 392 
Mass. at 456 (evidence that victim died because of manual 
strangulation lasting minimum of one to two minutes was 
sufficient to raise inference of malice).  Compare Commonwealth 
v. Vizcarrondo, 427 Mass. 392, 397-398 (1998), S.C., 431 Mass. 
360 (2000) and 447 Mass. 1017 (2006) (evidence may be sufficient 
to permit inference of malice, even if malice is not 
"ineluctably inferred"). 
Taken together, the evidence supported a finding beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with the requisite 
malice. 
 
ii.  Cunneen factors.  Turning to the Cunneen factors, we 
conclude that the evidence of the victim's "consciousness and 
degree of suffering" was sufficient to support the jury's 
verdict that the defendant killed the victim with extreme 
atrocity or cruelty.  See Cunneen, 389 Mass. at 227.  In similar 
circumstances, where juries have heard evidence of access to air 
being cut off for an extended period, we have concluded that the 
evidence supported such a verdict.  See, e.g., Williams, 475 
Mass. at 713-714 (testimony that it would have taken eight to 
16 
 
ten seconds of sustained strangulation before victim lost 
consciousness, and several more minutes for strangulation to 
cause death); Commonwealth v. Mejia, 461 Mass. 384, 393 (2012) 
(one victim's strangulation and another victim's asphyxiation 
caused both victims to endure conscious suffering for at least 
three minutes); Commonwealth v. Smith, 460 Mass. 318, 324 (2011) 
(evidence that victim would have been conscious for thirty to 
sixty seconds while being strangled); Commonwealth v. Linton, 
456 Mass. 534, 546-547 (2010), S.C., 483 Mass. 227 (2019) 
(ninety seconds of constant or near-constant pressure on the 
victim's airway before victim lost consciousness and ceased 
breathing).  See also Commonwealth v. Witkowski, 487 Mass. 675, 
683 (2021) (victim would have been conscious and "felt fear and 
terror" for sixty seconds as she was being strangled). 
Contrary to the defendant's argument, the fact that the 
defendant used his body weight alone, rather than his hands or 
another instrument to asphyxiate the victim, did not preclude 
the jury from resting their finding of extreme atrocity or 
cruelty on the slow and painful nature of the killing.  See 
Linton, 456 Mass. at 547 ("A murder committed through a method 
of killing that is by its nature slow and painful need not be 
shown slower or more painful than the average murder employing 
that method to be found extremely atrocious or cruel").  
17 
 
Accordingly, the judge did not err in denying the defendant's 
motions for required findings. 
 
b.  Supplemental jury instruction.  After one and one-half 
days of deliberating, the jury sent a note to the judge asking, 
"Is causing and/or allowing someone's death to take place 
synonymous with killing?"  The judge consulted with counsel and 
responded with a written note referring the jury back to her 
prior instructions on murder and manslaughter, highlighting her 
instructions on accident, and emphasizing, "In order to prove 
any of these crimes the Commonwealth must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that [the defendant] caused the death of [the 
victim]" (emphasis in original).9  The defendant objected to the 
instruction insofar as it did not specifically instruct that 
"allowing" a death was not a crime. 
 
Less than two hours later, the jury returned a verdict of 
guilty of murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme 
atrocity or cruelty.  On appeal, the defendant contends that the 
judge's response was prejudicial error because it permitted the 
 
9 The full instruction explained, "Please refer to my 
instructions on murder in the First Degree (both theories) & 
murder in the Second Degree -- the first theory, as well as 
Involuntary Manslaughter.  In order to prove any of these crimes 
the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [the 
defendant] caused the death of [the victim].  Also, refer to all 
of my instructions regarding accident (pp. 21-22), as those 
instructions are fully applicable here.  This does not apply to 
murder in the Second Degree under the theory of felony-murder." 
18 
 
jury to find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree 
simply for allowing the victim's death and not calling for 
assistance once the victim lost consciousness. 
 
The response to a jury question is within the sound 
discretion of the trial judge.  See Commonwealth v. Stokes, 440 
Mass. 741, 750 (2004); Commonwealth v. Watkins, 425 Mass. 830, 
840 (1997), S.C., 460 Mass. 311 (2011) ("The necessity, scope, 
and character of a judge's supplemental jury instructions are 
within his or her discretion").  "The proper response to a jury 
question must remain within the discretion of the trial judge, 
who has observed the evidence and the jury firsthand and can 
tailor supplemental instructions accordingly."  Commonwealth v. 
Waite, 422 Mass. 792, 807 n.11 (1996).  We evaluate the adequacy 
of a supplemental instruction in the context of the entire 
charge.  See Commonwealth v. Santiago, 485 Mass. 416, 429 
(2020).   Because the defendant objected to the supplemental 
instruction, we review for prejudicial error.  See Commonwealth 
v. Kelly, 470 Mass. 682, 687 (2015). 
 
Here, when viewed along with the judge's earlier 
instructions on the burden of proof, accident, and murder in the 
first degree, there was no abuse of discretion in the judge's 
supplemental response.  See Commonwealth v. Andrade, 481 Mass. 
139, 144-145 (2018).  The response addressed any potential 
confusion between "causing" and "allowing" in the jury's note; 
19 
 
it emphasized that the Commonwealth had to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant "caused" the victim's death.  
See Commonwealth v. Santiago, 425 Mass. 491, 503-504 (1997), 
S.C., 427 Mass. 298 and 428 Mass. 39, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 
1003 (1998).  In conjunction with the judge's prior 
instructions, to which she referred, it also was made clear that 
the jury had to find that the defendant caused the victim's 
death, not that the defendant merely allowed it to happen.  The 
instructions on extreme atrocity or cruelty, for example, 
explained that the Commonwealth had to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant caused the victim's death, and that the 
defendant acted with the requisite intent.  Moreover, the 
instruction on accident provided that "an accident is an 
unintentional event occurring through inadvertence, mistake, or 
negligence.  If an act is accidental, it is not a crime."  We 
presume that the jury followed the judge's instructions.  See 
Commonwealth v. Silva, 482 Mass. 275, 290 (2019).  Because the 
supplemental instruction appropriately responded to the jury's 
question by clarifying that the defendant had to have caused the 
victim's death, there was no error.  See Commonwealth v. Cannon, 
449 Mass. 462, 472 (2007). 
 
c.  Prior bad acts.  The defendant contends that the judge 
erred in allowing the introduction of prior bad act evidence.  
The challenged evidence included an incident of vandalism, in 
20 
 
which the victim's personal property was defaced and her debit 
card went missing, as well as a portion of the defendant's 
Internet search history.10  Before trial, the Commonwealth moved 
in limine to admit this and other evidence on the ground that it 
was relevant to the defendant's intent, state of mind, and 
pattern of conduct.  The judge allowed the motion with respect 
to this evidence, over the defendant's opposition.  At the 
hearing on the motion, the judge stated that the evidence of 
vandalism was relevant and material, and that its probative 
value outweighed its risk of prejudice.  The judge further 
stated that the Internet searches were relevant and material.11 
Evidence of a defendant's prior bad acts is not admissible 
to demonstrate the defendant's bad character or propensity to 
commit the crime charged.  See Commonwealth v. Almeida, 479 
Mass. 562, 568 (2018); Mass G. Evid. § 404(b)(1) (2021).  Such 
 
10 Approximately eight months prior to the victim's death, 
she reported to police that there had been a break-in at the 
apartment she shared with her sister and the defendant.  Several 
items of the victim's personal property had been defaced with 
vulgar, demeaning comments directed at the victim.  Among the 
vandalized items were scrawled markings such as, "BIG CUNT," 
"FUCK ALYSSA," "FAKE Pussy," and "ALY = CUNT."  The victim also 
told police that her debit card was missing.  The defendant's 
Internet searches, which took place sometime after July 28, 
2012, included the victim's name, the victim's name and the word 
"beastiality," and "I wanna fuck my sister in-law." 
 
11 The judge denied the motion with respect to certain 
additional evidence, as more prejudicial than probative, and 
reserved rulings on some other evidence. 
21 
 
evidence may be admissible, however, for other purposes, such as 
to establish motive, opportunity, or intent.  See Commonwealth 
v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 249 (2014); Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 404(b)(2).  Even where relevant for a permissible purpose, the 
evidence is admissible only if its probative value is not 
outweighed by its prejudicial effect.  See Commonwealth v. Peno, 
485 Mass. 378, 385-386 (2020).  In order for evidence to be 
sufficiently probative, there must be a "logical relationship" 
between the prior bad act and the crime charged.  See 
Commonwealth v. Facella, 478 Mass. 393, 405 (2017). 
Evidentiary rulings determining relevance, probative value, 
and prejudice are left to the sound discretion of the trial 
judge.  See Commonwealth v. Spencer, 465 Mass. 32, 48 (2013).  
We will affirm a judge's decision to allow the admission of 
prior bad act evidence unless the judge "made a clear error of 
judgment in weighing the factors relevant to the decision, such 
that the decision falls outside the range of reasonable 
alternatives."  Facella, 478 Mass. at 407.  Because the 
defendant objected, we review for prejudicial error.  See Peno, 
485 Mass. at 387 n.5; Commonwealth v. Cruz, 445 Mass. 589, 591 
(2005). 
Here, the evidence was relevant for a permissible purpose, 
to show the defendant's intent and state of mind toward the 
victim.  A central issue at trial was whether the defendant and 
22 
 
the victim were engaged in a consensual sexual relationship.  
Evidence that the defendant vandalized the victim's personal 
property, and covered it with threatening comments, supported 
the Commonwealth's contention that the defendant harbored 
animosity or rage toward the victim.12  See Almeida, 479 Mass. at 
568.  Similarly, the defendant's Internet searches also 
supported the Commonwealth's theory that this animosity was, or 
had become, sexual in nature.  See Commonwealth v. Vera, 88 
Mass. App. Ct. 313, 321 (2015) (relevance of Internet searches 
for certain pornography was not outweighed by prejudicial effect 
to defendant of jury learning of these searches, where defendant 
was charged with sex offenses).  Evidence of a hostile 
 
12 The defendant argues that the evidence of vandalism was 
not sufficiently connected to the defendant to be admissible; 
this argument is unavailing.  The Commonwealth's handwriting 
expert pointed to a number of similarities between the 
defendant's handwriting and the handwriting on the vandalized 
items, including discussing the manner in which certain letters 
were formed.  The expert's description of specific upper and 
lower case letters showed that the style in which they were 
written was distinct from the way in which the victim's former 
boyfriend wrote those letters.  The jury reasonably could have 
concluded from this testimony that the defendant vandalized the 
victim's property; in any event, it was for the jury to decide 
the weight and credibility of this testimony.  See Commonwealth 
v. Teixeira, 486 Mass. 617, 627-629 (2021) ("Before evidence of 
a prior bad act may be introduced against a defendant, 'the 
Commonwealth must satisfy the judge that the "jury . . . 
reasonably [could] conclude that the act occurred and that the 
defendant was the actor"'" [citation omitted]); Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 104(b) (2021).  The defendant also was connected to the 
evidence of vandalism by virtue of having acknowledged taking 
the victim's missing debit card, which the victim reported 
missing at the same time she reported the defaced property. 
23 
 
relationship "that tends to explain the purpose of a crime is 
relevant to the issue of malice or intent," regardless of 
whether that hostility was homicidal.  See Commonwealth v. 
Carlson, 448 Mass. 501, 508-509 (2007). 
In addition, the evidence tended to negate the defendant's 
contention that the sexual intercourse was consensual and that 
the victim's death was accidental.  This was so even though the 
vandalism took place at least eight months prior to the 
suffocation, and the timing of the Internet searches could not 
be defined more clearly than that they had occurred after July 
28, 2012, two and one-half months before the killing.  Cf. 
Facella, 478 Mass. at 405 (conduct from thirteen to twenty-four 
years prior to charged offense was admissible to show that 
defendant's capacity to restrain himself from violence was not 
meaningfully altered by medication he took seven to eight years 
before charged offense); Commonwealth v. Helfant, 398 Mass. 214, 
228 (1986) (conduct from three years prior to offense was 
admissible due to "distinctiveness and near-identicality" of 
prior conduct and charged conduct). 
"When assessing whether the risk of unfair prejudice 
outweighs the probative value of the challenged evidence, the 
factors a reviewing court considers may include (1) whether the 
trial judge carefully weighed the probative value and 
prejudicial effect of the evidence introduced at trial . . . ; 
24 
 
(2) whether the judge mitigated the prejudicial effect through 
proper limiting instructions . . . ; (3) whether the challenged 
evidence was cumulative of other admissible evidence, thereby 
reducing the risk of any additional prejudicial effect . . . ; 
and (4) whether the challenged evidence was so similar to the 
charged offense as to increase the risk of propensity reasoning 
by the jury."  Peno, 485 Mass. at 386. 
Here, the judge appeared carefully to consider the 
Commonwealth's motion to introduce prior bad act evidence.  
After two hearings, the judge allowed the motion with respect to 
three categories of prior bad act evidence, and denied it as to 
others.  This is not a case "where the judge failed to exercise 
any discretion by making no effort at all to scrutinize the 
contested evidence."  Peno, 485 Mass. at 394-395.  Contrast 
Commonwealth v. Carey, 463 Mass. 378, 391-392 (2012) (error 
where judge did not personally review video recording of victim 
being strangled and instead simply accepted Commonwealth's 
description of recording); Commonwealth v. Manning, 47 Mass. 
App. Ct. 923, 923 (1999) (error where judge did not weigh 
evidence, based on judge's mistaken belief that judge was 
required to allow introduction of that evidence).  In addition, 
the judge provided limiting instructions at multiple points 
throughout the trial, including when evidence of the vandalism 
incident was introduced, when the Commonwealth's expert 
25 
 
testified that the handwriting on the vandalized items matched 
the defendant's handwriting, and in the final charge.  See 
Almeida, 479 Mass. at 569; Commonwealth v. Forte, 469 Mass. 469, 
480-481 (2014). 
Furthermore, the victim's comments about the defendant's 
weight, poor hygiene, and laziness supported the Commonwealth's 
view that the victim and the defendant were unlikely to have 
engaged in a consensual sexual relationship.  The challenged 
evidence thus was cumulative of other properly admitted 
evidence, thereby reducing the risk of added prejudice.  Compare 
Commonwealth v. Wilson, 427 Mass. 336, 348 (1998).  Moreover, 
the challenged evidence was not so similar to the charged 
offense so as to increase the risk of impermissible propensity 
reasoning.  See Peno, 485 Mass. at 389-390. 
Notwithstanding the defendant's contention, the prior bad 
act evidence did not overwhelm the case.  Compare Commonwealth 
v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122, 128-129 (2006) (prejudicial error where 
jury heard more about uncharged crimes than charged offenses).  
The trial featured extensive testimony about the discovery of 
the victim's body and its appearance; medical testimony 
regarding the victim's cause of death; forensic testimony 
concerning the crime scene; testimony from the victim's family 
and friends about the victim's relationship with the defendant; 
testimony about the victim's sex life; and more than six hours 
26 
 
of recorded statements of the defendant, in which he gave 
varying accounts of the events that evening.  Accordingly, the 
judge did not abuse her discretion in allowing admission of the 
prior bad act evidence. 
 
d.  Prosecutor's closing argument.  The defendant argues 
that the prosecutor misstated the evidence during his closing 
argument.  The prosecutor stated: 
"You heard [the victim's boyfriend].  He took the stand, 
and he had to talk about his sex life.  He tells you they 
had sex, and she was tied up a couple of times at his 
suggestion.  And she was always on her back, never face 
down. 
 
"Now, why, why is the fact she is face down important?  Why 
does that matter to the defendant's lie?  Because he knows 
what happened.  He knows.  He put a pillow over her face.  
He has to explain why the pillow is there.  And so, 
suddenly, they are having sex face down from behind, and 
it's rough. 
 
"What do we know about [the victim]?  She never had sex 
that particular way; and she never did it in her apartment, 
certainly not when her nephew is down the hallway.  That 
evidence is a distraction; nothing more, nothing less, just 
an attempt to get you to look away from the actual 
evidence." 
 
The defendant argues that the statement that the victim "never" 
had sexual intercourse in the way the prosecutor described was 
error. 
A prosecutor's closing argument must be limited to the 
facts in evidence and the fair inferences to be drawn therefrom.  
See Commonwealth v. Rutherford, 476 Mass. 639, 643 (2017).  
"Such inferences need only be reasonable and possible based on 
27 
 
the evidence before the jury."  Commonwealth v. Parker, 481 
Mass. 69, 74 (2018).  A prosecutor may not misstate the 
evidence.  See id.  Because the defendant did not object to the 
challenged statement at trial, we review for a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. 
Walters, 485 Mass. 271, 292 (2020). 
The challenged statement was consistent with the evidence 
before the jury.  In context, see Commonwealth v. Whitman, 453 
Mass. 331, 347 (2009) (prosecutor's remarks must be read in 
context), it appears that the prosecutor's statement that the 
victim "never had sex that particular way" referred to sexual 
intercourse while she was tied and face down.  The victim's 
boyfriend testified that sometimes he and the victim engaged in 
sexual intercourse during which the victim would be positioned 
on her back with her hands tied.  The boyfriend also testified 
that he and the victim would not engage in this particular type 
of sexual interaction when they were at the victim's apartment 
and that, whenever they did engage in sexual intercourse while 
the boyfriend was visiting, they would keep quiet so as not to 
wake the defendant's young son.  No testimony suggested that the 
victim had engaged in sexual intercourse while tied and face 
down. 
 
Even if the prosecutor's statement crossed a line of 
hyperbole, there was no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage 
28 
 
of justice.  Whether a misstatement of the evidence in a 
prosecutor's closing argument results in reversible error 
depends on consideration of four factors:  "(1) whether the 
defendant seasonably objected; (2) whether the error was limited 
to collateral issues or went to the heart of the case; (3) what 
specific or general instructions the judge gave the jury which 
may have mitigated the mistake; and (4) whether the error, in 
the circumstances, possibly made a difference in the jury's 
conclusions" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Reyes, 483 
Mass. 65, 77 (2019). 
 
Here, the defendant did not object.  At the beginning of 
trial and in her final charge, the judge instructed the jury 
that the attorneys' arguments were not evidence.  The possible 
exaggeration by the prosecutor -- that the victim never had 
sexual intercourse in the manner the defendant claimed -- in the 
context of accurately describing the victim's sexual 
relationship with her boyfriend likely would not have influenced 
the jury's thinking.  See Parker, 481 Mass. at 75; Commonwealth 
v. Marquetty, 416 Mass. 445, 451 (1991) (jury are assumed to be 
capable of sorting out hyperbole and speculation).  Accordingly, 
there was no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice 
in the jury having heard the challenged statements. 
 
e.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  After a review of 
the entire record, we discern no error warranting relief under 
29 
 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  The fact that the defendant was only 
twenty-one years of age at the time of the victim's death does 
not, as the defendant argues, without more, render the verdict 
not consonant with justice.  See Commonwealth v. Tate, 486 Mass. 
663, 677 (2021). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.