Title: Engweiler v. Board of Parole
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S52165
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: April 13, 2006

FILED: April 13, 2006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
CONRAD ENGWEILER,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
BOARD OF PAROLE
AND POST-PRISON SUPERVISION,
Respondent on Review.
(CA A108469; SC S52165)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted September 8, 2005.
Andy Simrin, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for
petitioner on review.
Janet A. Metcalf, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.  With her
on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H.
Williams, Solicitor General.
Before Carson,** Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
De Muniz,*** Balmer, and Kistler, Justices.
GILLETTE, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  
*Judicial review of order of the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision. 197 Or App 43, 103 P3d 1201 (2005) 
**Chief Justice when case was argued.
***Chief Justice when decision was issued.
GILLETTE, J.
This is one of two related cases, both decided this
date, involving the life sentence that petitioner is serving. 
The dispositive issue in this case is whether a 1999 order of the
Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision (the board) relating
to that sentence that set both a "prison term" and a "murder
review date" for petitioner was subject to judicial review under
ORS 144.335 (1999), amended by Oregon Laws 2001, chapter 661,
section 1; Oregon Laws 2003, chapter 352, section 1.  The Court
of Appeals ultimately concluded that it was not and, accordingly,
dismissed petitioner's petition for judicial review.  Engweiler
v. Board of Parole, 197 Or App 43, 103 P3d 1201 (2005) (Engweiler
IV).  We allowed review and now affirm the decision of the Court
of Appeals.  
In 1990, when petitioner was 15 years old, he raped,
sodomized, and killed a 16-year-old female acquaintance.  The
juvenile court remanded petitioner to the adult court, where he
was tried and convicted of aggravated murder, among other things. 
The trial court initially imposed a life sentence with a 30-year
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment under ORS 163.105(1)(c)
(1989), amended by Oregon Laws 1991, chapter 126, section 8;
Oregon Laws 1995, chapter 421, section 2; Oregon Laws 1999,
chapter 59, section 31; Oregon Laws 1999, chapter 782, section 5.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals vacated that sentence because
another statute, ORS 161.620 (1989), amended by Oregon Laws 1993,
chapter 33, section 306; Oregon Laws 1993, chapter 546, section
119; Oregon Laws 1995, chapter 422, section 131y; Oregon Laws
1999, chapter 951, section 2, prohibited the trial court from
imposing a mandatory minimum sentence on any person remanded from
the juvenile court who had been under the age of 17 when the
person committed the crime for which the person was remanded. 
See State v. Engweiler, 118 Or App 132, 846 P2d 1163 (1993)
(Engweiler I) (so holding).  On remand, the trial court, in
November 1994, imposed an indeterminate sentence of life
imprisonment.  Under such a sentence, petitioner was eligible for
parole at some future date.  
In June 1999, the board held a "prison term hearing,"
at the conclusion of which it issued Board Action Form (BAF) #1. 
In BAF #1, the board established a 480-month "prison term" for
petitioner under a prison term matrix that it had established in
May 1999 to deal specifically with juveniles who had been
convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to life
imprisonment.  BAF #1 also set a "murder review date" of February
22, 2030, and provided that a "murder review hearing" would be
scheduled in December 2029.  
After unsuccessfully pursuing administrative review of
BAF #1, petitioner sought judicial review in the Court of
Appeals.  In that court, petitioner argued, among other things,
that, in applying the 1999 matrix to set a 480-month "prison
term," the board effectively had imposed on him a harsher penalty
than would have been imposed on him at the time that he was
convicted, even had he been an adult.  Doing so, petitioner
asserted, violated his state and federal constitutional right not
to be subject to ex post facto laws under Article I, section 21,
of the Oregon Constitution and Article I, section 10, of the
United States Constitution.  He also argued that doing so
violated his rights under the Oregon privileges and immunities
clause, set out in Article I, section 20, of the Oregon
Constitution, the federal Equal Protection Clause set out in the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and the
cruel and unusual punishments clause set out in Article I,
section 16, of the Oregon Constitution.  
The board moved to dismiss judicial review on the
ground that BAF #1 was unreviewable under ORS 144.335 (1999), set
out post, the statute that then governed review of final board
orders dealing with parole.  Among other things, that statute
generally eliminated judicial review of any order relating to a
release date or a parole consideration hearing date, save for a
subcategory of challenges to orders setting initial release dates
in which a petitioner challenged the crime severity rating,
criminal history score, or aggravation factors that the board had
used to set that initial release date.
The Court of Appeals initially concluded that, because
BAF #1 set a "prison term" and thereby guaranteed petitioner's
parole eligibility on a certain date, and because petitioner's
objection to the board's use of the matrix to set his prison term
essentially was a challenge to the crime severity rating,
criminal history score, or aggravation factors that the board had
used, petitioner's challenge to BAF #1 was subject to judicial
review under ORS 144.335 (1999).  Accordingly, the Court of
Appeals denied the board's motion to dismiss the petition for
judicial review.  Engweiler v. Board of Parole, 170 Or App 653,
13 P3d 1009 (2000) (Engweiler II).  
The Court of Appeals' review proceeded; both sides
filed briefs, the case was argued, and the Court of Appeals took
the matter under advisement.  In January 2005, however, the Court
of Appeals, on its own motion, reconsidered its earlier decision
respecting jurisdiction and determined that its denial of the
board's motion to dismiss had been incorrect.  Upon further
consideration of BAF #1, together with an examination of the
board's administrative rules, the court concluded that the board
actually had not set an initial release date for petitioner,
either when it set the 480-month "prison term" or when it set the
February 22, 2030, "murder review date."  Engweiler IV, 197 Or
App at 47-50.  It followed, in the Court of Appeals' view, that
BAF #1 was not reviewable.  Id. at 50.  The court therefore
granted the board's motion to dismiss judicial review.  Id. at
51.  We allowed petitioner's petition for review to address the
question whether an order like BAF #1 that is issued to a
prisoner in petitioner's circumstances is subject to judicial
review. 
Both parties appear to agree that, in 1999, when the
board issued BAF #1, ORS 144.335 (1999) governed the availability
of judicial review of board orders. (1)  That statute provided,
in part:
"(1) When a person over whom the State Board of
Parole and Post-Prison Supervision exercises its
jurisdiction is adversely affected or aggrieved by a
final order of the board related to the granting,
revoking or discharging of parole, * * * such person is
entitled to judicial review of the final order.
"* * * * *
"(3) Notwithstanding subsection (1) of this
section, the board's order is final and not subject to
judicial review when the board makes any decision
relating to a release date or a parole consideration
hearing date, including:
"(a) Setting an initial release date under ORS
144.120, except that the setting of an initial release
date under ORS 144.120 remains subject to judicial
review if the prisoner contests the crime severity
rating, the history risk score or aggravation factors
found by the board under the rules of the board."  
(Emphasis added.)
We emphasize at the outset the narrow scope of our
inquiry in this case.  The sole issue before us is whether BAF #1
was reviewable by the Court of Appeals under ordinary judicial
review procedures pursuant to ORS 144.335 (1999).  If it were
not, this case is at an end.  But such a holding, even if
correct, would not necessarily mean that petitioner would be
unable to vindicate any legal rights that he may have had vis-à-vis BAF #1.  See, e.g., State ex rel Engweiler v. Cook, ___ Or
___, ___ P3d ___ (decided this date) (illustrating availability
of other forms of judicial scrutiny). (2)
We begin our analysis with the text of ORS 144.335
(1999).  By its express terms, section (1) of that statute
limited the availability of judicial review to final board orders
"related to the granting, revoking or discharging of parole." 
Strictly speaking, BAF #1, which set petitioner's "prison term"
and a "murder review date," was not such an order:  It did not,
by its terms, grant, revoke, or discharge petitioner on parole. 
Arguably, then, BAF #1 was not subject to review under ORS
144.335 (1999).    
It is true that BAF #1 indirectly "related" to the
granting of parole, at least to the extent that any order that
somehow touched on any matter, circumstance, or condition that
could be considered in connection with a prisoner's eventual
eligibility for parole was an order "related" to the granting of
parole.  However, this case does not require us to determine the
specific scope of that "related to" clause in ORS 144.335 (1999)
because, to the extent that BAF #1 can be said to be "related" to
the granting of parole, it falls squarely within the category of
orders "relating to a release date or a parole consideration
hearing date" that expressly was excluded from review by ORS
144.335(3) (1999).  Thus, by its text read in context, ORS
144.335(3) (1999) appears to be the complete answer to
petitioner's effort to raise certain issues through the vehicle
of judicial review of BAF #1.
Petitioner argues that, notwithstanding the broad
exclusion from judicial review set out in ORS 144.335(3) (1999),
BAF #1 is reviewable because it fell within a subcategory of
orders that remained subject to judicial review, viz., those
orders "setting an initial release date under ORS 144.120 * * *
if the prisoner contests the crime severity rating, the history
risk score or aggravation factors found by the board under the
rules of the board."  ORS 144.335(3)(a) (1999).  As noted, the
Court of Appeals concluded, after an extensive review of the
board's rules, that that statutory provision was inapplicable
because BAF #1 did not set an initial release date.  Engweiler
IV, 197 Or App at 50.  We turn to that issue. (3) 
Examining the question whether the board in BAF #1 "set
an initial release date under ORS 144.120," as that phrase is
used in ORS 144.335(3)(a) (1999), requires us to consider both
the history of petitioner's incarceration and the evolution of
certain statutes since petitioner committed his crime.  In 1990,
when petitioner committed his crime, ORS 144.120 (1989) provided,
in part:
"(1)(a) Within six months of the admission of a
prisoner to any Department of Corrections institution,
with the exception of those prisoners sentenced to a
term of imprisonment for life or for more than five
years, the board shall conduct a parole hearing to
interview the prisoner and set the initial date of
release on parole pursuant to subsection (2) of this
section.  For those prisoners sentenced to a term of
imprisonment for more than five years but less than 15
years, the board shall conduct the parole hearing and
set the initial date of release within eight months
following admission of the prisoner to the institution. 
For those prisoners sentenced to a term of imprisonment
for life or for 15 years or more, the board shall
conduct the parole hearing, and shall set the initial
release date, within one year following admission of
the prisoner to the institution.  Release shall be
contingent upon satisfaction of the requirements of ORS
144.125."
(Emphasis added.)  The emphasized part of the statute
notwithstanding, petitioner never received the parole hearing
contemplated by the statute, possibly because his initial
sentence was on appeal in what eventually would lead to the Court
of Appeals decision in Engweiler I.
By 1994, when petitioner was resentenced after remand,
ORS 144.120(1)(a) had been amended by 1991 Oregon Laws, chapter
126, section 6, to exclude from the emphasized parole hearing
requirement those individuals who had been sentenced for
aggravated murder. (4)  After that amendment, ORS 144.120(1)(a)
(1993) provided, in part:
"Within six months of the admission of a prisoner
to any Department of Corrections instruction, with the
exception of those prisoners sentenced to a term of
imprisonment for life or for more than five years, the
[board] shall conduct a parole hearing to * * * set the
[prisoner's] initial date of release on parole(.) * * *
For those prisoners sentenced to a term of imprisonment
for life or for 15 years or more, with the exception of
those sentenced for aggravated murder, the board shall
conduct the parole hearing, and shall set the initial
release date, within one year following admission of
the prisoner to the institution."
(Emphasis added.)  Under that version of ORS 144.120(1)(a), which
continues in effect unchanged in any pertinent respect today, the
board was not required to set an initial release date for
prisoners who, like petitioner, had been sentenced for aggravated
murder. (5)  Still another statute, ORS 163.105(1)(c) and (2)
(1989), made certain prisoners who had been convicted of
aggravated murder as adults eligible for parole after 30 years
and directed the board to conduct a rehabilitation hearing for
such prisoners after 20 years but, after 1991, no similar statute
required the board to set an initial release date for persons
like petitioner.
Petitioner has contended, and the board concedes for
purposes of argument here, that the version of ORS 144.120 that
was in effect when petitioner committed his crimes -- ORS 144.120
(1989) -- is the version that applies in this case.  In so
contending and conceding, however, neither party has explained
why it necessarily is the case that a procedural statute such as
ORS 144.120, which does not increase petitioner's punishment in
any way, would continue to apply after it was changed by the
legislature.  We need not decide that issue, however, because it
is undisputed that, notwithstanding the statute's mandatory
wording, the board did not conduct a parole hearing under ORS
144.120(1)(a) (1989) for petitioner within one year following his
admission to prison.
Instead of receiving a parole hearing during the year
following his admission to prison, when the board was required
under ORS 144.120(1)(a) (1989) to conduct it, petitioner was
serving an unlawful mandatory minimum sentence and was actively
pursuing an appeal.  His initial misfortune, it could be argued,
lay in winning that appeal.  As noted, by the time that the
sentencing court resentenced him on remand in 1994, ORS 144.120
had been amended to exclude those prisoners serving sentences for
aggravated murder from the hearing requirement.  We express no
opinion whether either or both of those factors obviated the
necessity for the board to conduct the hearing contemplated by
the 1989 version of the statute.  However, to the extent that
petitioner had (or continues to have) a right to enforce the
board's obligation under ORS 144.120(1)(a) (1989) to conduct a
parole hearing and to set an initial release date, this
proceeding is not the way to do it.  The proper avenue for
vindicating that right is to seek a writ of mandamus or, if the
facts otherwise justify it, a writ of habeas corpus.
Petitioner suggests, without arguing directly, that,
even after the legislature amended ORS 144.120(1)(a) in 1991 to
exclude from the mandatory parole hearing requirements those
prisoners who had been sentenced for aggravated murder, the board
still was required to conduct a parole hearing for juveniles
sentenced for aggravated murder, because those particular
convicted persons remained eligible for parole.  If the board
simply were to decline to conduct a parole hearing, petitioner
argues, the board effectively would violate ORS 161.620 (1989),
which prohibited the imposition on certain juveniles of either
sentences of life without the possibility of parole or mandatory
minimum sentences.  Petitioner concedes that the 1991 amendment
did not establish a time frame for conducting any such hearings. 
In that connection, petitioner assumes that the "prison term
hearing" that the board conducted in 1999 in his case essentially
amounted to the "parole hearing" that the board was required to
conduct under ORS 144.120(1)(a). (6)  Importantly, however,
petitioner stops short of arguing that, after the legislature
amended it in 1991, ORS 144.120(1)(a) still required the board to
set an initial release date at the parole hearing.  Instead,
petitioner argues that, in setting a 480-month "prison term," the
board implicitly and necessarily did set such an initial release
date.  As petitioner argues, "[t]o be didactic, after an inmate
finishes his 'prison term' by completing his 'time to be served,'
he is released from physical custody."  Therefore, according to
petitioner, an initial release date, "de facto, is the tail end
of the 'prison term.'"  
There are two problems with that argument.  First, we
are not satisfied that the "prison term hearing" that the board
conducted in 1999 in fact was a "parole hearing" under ORS
144.120(1)(a) (1989) or (1993).  The mere fact that no statute
appears expressly to authorize the board to conduct "prison term
hearings" does not lead inexorably to the conclusion that the
board's only authority to conduct that hearing arose out of ORS
144.120.  In fact, the board purported to conduct the 1999 prison
term hearing not under the authority of ORS 144.120 but, instead,
pursuant to regulations that it had adopted earlier that year, on
the recommendation of the Attorney General and under the board's
rulemaking authority in ORS 144.140(1) (board has authority to
"adopt rules to carry out its responsibilities under the
sentencing guidelines").   
Second, the board not only did not itself purport to
"set" an initial release date under ORS 144.120 in BAF #1, it
does not appear on this record that the board took an important
step that ORS 144.120 required it to take in the event that it
did set an initial parole release date, viz., inform the
sentencing court of the date.  ORS 144.120(6).  Instead, the
wording of BAF #1 provided only that the "board will conduct a
progress review" pursuant to administrative rules in February
2025 and that the board will schedule a "murder review hearing"
in December 2029.  Such wording necessarily contemplates further
review before an initial parole release date would be set.  The
Court of Appeals thus was correct when it held that the board's
actions established a date for further parole review, but did not
establish a date on which petitioner was to be released on
parole.  See Engweiler IV, 197 Or App at 50 (so holding).  It
follows that BAF #1 was not an order "setting * * * an initial
release date under ORS 144.120."  Petitioner therefore cannot
successfully argue that the order was one subject to judicial
review under ORS 144.335(3)(a) (1999), whether or not he wished
to contest the "crime severity rating, the history risk score or
aggravation factors found by the board."
Petitioner argues in the alternative that, to the
extent that BAF #1 was not an order setting an initial release
date, then it was not one "relating to a release date" at all. 
It was, rather, "an order that established when the Board would
weigh in on whether Petitioner had transformed himself into a
parole eligible candidate" -- petitioner's own description -- and
the exclusion from judicial review set out ORS 144.335(3) would
not apply.  As discussed above, however, ORS 144.335(3) (1999)
excludes from judicial review "any decision relating to * * * a
parole consideration hearing date."  (Emphasis added.)  The date
that the board would "weigh in on whether petitioner had
transformed himself into a parole eligible candidate" inescapably
is a "parole consideration hearing date."  It follows that the
order is not subject to judicial review, even under petitioner's
alternative view of the effect of BAF #1. 
Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude that
petitioner has no right to judicial review of BAF #1 pursuant to
ORS 144.335 (1999).  The Court of Appeals was correct in so
holding. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. 
1. ORS 144.335 continues today to govern the availability
of judicial review but the statute was significantly modified in
2001 to broaden the types of orders subject to judicial review. 
Or Laws 2001, ch 661, § 1.
2. In State ex rel Engweiler v. Cook, we affirm the Court
of Appeals' decision in State ex rel Engweiler v. Cook, 197 Or
App 32, 103 P3d 1205 (Engweiler III).
3. Of course, even were we to disagree with the Court of
Appeals on this issue, the question would remain whether
petitioner actually contested "the crime severity rating, the
history risk score or aggravation factors found by the board." 
However, because, for the reasons set out in the text below, we
agree with the Court of Appeals' view on the "initial release
date" issue, we need not address the other question.
4. ORS 144.120 has been amended on several additional
occasions over the years.  Or Laws 1993, ch 294, § 5; Or Laws
1999, ch 782, § 3; Or Laws 2001, ch 104, § 48.
5. In Engweiler II, the Court of Appeals assumed for
purposes of its decision there that the board in BAF #1 had set
an "initial release date" under ORS 144.120.  Engweiler II, 170
Or App at 657-58.  It made that assumption because the board had
stated in its response to petitioner's request for judicial
review that the Department of Justice had advised it in 1994 that
"'the Board had the authority to conduct a hearing and set an
initial release date pursuant to ORS 144.120 for juveniles
convicted of aggravated murder.'" Engweiler II, 170 Or App at 657
(emphasis in original).  However, the board never conceded that
it in fact had set an initial release date for petitioner in BAF
#1, and nothing in BAF #1 can be construed as doing so expressly.

6. He then goes on to assert that he does not object to
the board's timing in this appeal.