Title: People v. Swift
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 91840
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: November 21, 2002

Docket No. 91840-Agenda 13-September 2002.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 
 								AARON D. SWIFT, Appellee.
Opinion filed November 21, 2002.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	In this appeal we are asked to review the constitutionality of
defendant's 80-year extended-term sentence in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). The central issue
is one of construction of the Illinois sentencing statutes that
establish the penalties for first degree murder. Specifically, we
must determine, for purposes of Apprendi analysis, whether the
Illinois "sentencing range" for that crime is 20 to 60 years'
imprisonment, 20 years' to life imprisonment, or 20 years'
imprisonment to death. We conclude that the sentencing range is
20 to 60 years' imprisonment. Because defendant's sentence
exceeded this range, based on a factual finding made by the court,
the sentence cannot stand. Accordingly, we vacate the sentence
and remand the cause for resentencing.

BACKGROUND
	In the circuit court of Winnebago County, a jury convicted
defendant, Aaron Swift, of the first degree murder (720 ILCS
5/9-1(a)(2) (West 1998)) of Karzell Anderson. Although a
detailed recitation of the facts underlying the conviction is not
necessary for our disposition of the case, we note that from the
evidence and testimony adduced at trial, the jury could have found
that in February 1998, defendant stabbed the victim 21 times,
causing his death, as the end result of a drug-related altercation.
	The State did not seek the death penalty for defendant.
However, the State did request the court to impose an extended-term sentence. The court found that the offense was exceptionally
brutal or heinous, and imposed an extended term sentence of 80
years' imprisonment based on that finding. See 730 ILCS
5/5-8-2(a), 5-5-3.2(b)(2) (West 1998). Defendant appealed.
	The appellate court affirmed defendant's conviction, but
vacated his extended-term sentence. In so doing, the court held
that section 5-8-2 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (730
ILCS 5/5-8-2 (West 1998))-the statute authorizing the extended-term sentence the circuit court imposed on defendant-was
unconstitutional under Apprendi, which was decided while the
appeal was pending. 322 Ill. App. 3d 127. This appeal of right
followed. 177 Ill. 2d R. 612(b); 134 Ill. 2d R. 317. For the reasons
that follow, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court that the
sentence imposed in this case cannot stand and remand for resentencing.

ANALYSIS
	As previously noted, this case involves application of the rule
of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). There, the defendant was convicted of
possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, a "second-degree" offense (N.J. Stat. Ann. §2C:39-4(a) (West 1995))
normally punishable by a sentence of 5 to 10 years' imprisonment
(N.J. Stat. Ann. §2C:43-6(a)(2) (West 1995)). However, a New
Jersey "hate crime" statute increased the applicable sentence to 10
to 20 years' imprisonment, based on the trial judge's finding, by
a preponderance of the evidence, regarding the defendant's motive
for committing the crime. N.J. Stat. Ann. §2C:43-7(a)(3) (West
1995). The high court struck down the latter statute, framing the
issue as "whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires that a factual determination authorizing an
increase in the maximum prison sentence for an offense from10 to
20 years be made by a jury on the basis of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt." Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 469, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at
442, 120 S. Ct.  at 2351. The Court answered this question in the
affirmative, concluding that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 490,
147 L. Ed. 2d  at 455, 120 S. Ct.  at 2362-63.
	Defendant argues that Apprendi compels vacatur of his
sentence in the instant case. He contends that based solely on the
facts found by the jury, he was only exposed to a sentence of
between 20 and 60 years' imprisonment for his conviction of first
degree murder. See 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(a) (West 1998). He
notes that his 80-year extended-term sentence, like the sentence
imposed in Apprendi, was based on a factual finding by the trial
judge by a preponderance of the evidence. See 730 ILCS
5/5-8-2(a), 5-5-3.2(b)(2) (West 1998). He argues that a
straightforward application of Apprendi requires that his extended-term sentence be vacated and the cause remanded for resentencing.
	The State disagrees. First, the State attempts to distinguish
Apprendi on its facts, arguing that the Court never intended that
sentences imposed under statutes such as the Illinois extended-term statute be judged according to the rule announced in
Apprendi. In the alternative, the State contends that the statutory
scheme in force in Illinois and the sentence imposed on the
defendant in the instant case do not violate the Apprendi rule. We
shall consider these arguments in turn.
	Initially, the State attempts to limit Apprendi to its facts,
proffering two distinctions between the New Jersey statute struck
down in Apprendi and the extended-term statute under which
defendant was sentenced in the instant case. First, the State notes
that the statute at issue in Apprendi required the court to impose
a longer sentence upon the requisite factual finding concerning the
defendant's motive, whereas the Illinois extended-term statute
merely permits the court to impose an extended-term sentence
upon an appropriate finding. See 730 ILCS 5/5-8-2(a) (West
1998). Second, the State notes that in Apprendi the Court stated
that the New Jersey statute essentially raised the classification of
the underlying offense, from a second-degree offense to a first-degree offense. See Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 494, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at
457, 120 S. Ct.  at 2365. The State contends that the Court was
only truly concerned with statutes which changed offense
classifications and argues that the rule announced in Apprendi was
never intended to apply to statutes that do not have such an effect.
	Neither distinction is persuasive. Although the State correctly
characterizes the statute at issue in Apprendi, the Court's analysis
did not rely on the features by which the State seeks to distinguish
the case. In other words, the State's distinctions make no
difference.
	As we have previously discussed, the rule established by the
Court's decision in Apprendi admits of a relatively simple
statement: Due process requires that all facts necessary to establish
the statutory sentencing range within which the defendant's
sentence falls must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
See People v. Jackson, 199 Ill. 2d 286, 296 (2002); People v.
Ford, 198 Ill. 2d 68, 73 (2001), quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 490,
147 L. Ed. 2d  at 455, 120 S. Ct.  at 2362-63. With respect to the
State's first argument, the mandatory nature of the New Jersey
sentence increase was not germane to the Court's analysis, as is
evident in the Court's framing of the issue-"whether the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a
factual determination authorizing an increase in the maximum
prison sentence for an offense from10 to 20 years be made by a
jury on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt." (Emphasis
added.) Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 469, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 442, 120 S. Ct.  at 2351. The Court did not rely on this feature of the statute in
any portion of its analysis. A defendant's due process rights are
violated by a sentence which exceeds the maximum sentence
authorized by the facts found by the jury, whether imposition of
the invalid sentence is mandatory or discretionary with the judge.
	The State's second basis for distinguishing Apprendi is that
the rule was only intended to apply to statutes which actually
change the classification of the offense. This argument fares little
better than the State's first argument, in light of the Supreme
Court's recent decision Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. __, 153 L. Ed. 2d 556,  122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002). There, the Court held that the
Arizona death penalty scheme did not pass constitutional muster,
because it allowed the judge to make a factual finding which
would determine whether a defendant convicted of first degree
murder would receive the death penalty or life imprisonment. The
statute which the Court invalidated in Ring did not change the
classification of the offense.
	The State's attempts to distinguish Apprendi on its facts are
unavailing. Accordingly, we must proceed to the central issue in
the case, analysis of the penalty scheme for first degree murder in
Illinois. We note that this case squarely presents this court with an
issue we previously left unaddressed. See Ford, 198 Ill. 2d  at 73.
	The central tenet of Apprendi is that the constitution requires
that any facts necessary to authorize the sentence imposed on the
defendant must be proven to the jury, beyond a reasonable doubt.
In this case defendant was sentenced to 80 years' imprisonment
based on a factual finding that the crime was brutal and heinous.
This finding was made by the circuit court judge, not a jury.
Moreover, the burden of proof was merely a preponderance of the
evidence, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v.
Jackson, 199 Ill. 2d 286, 293 (2002) (judge need only find
extended-term sentencing factor by a preponderance of the
evidence). Accordingly, defendant's sentence cannot stand unless
he was eligible for such a sentence without such a finding-i.e.,
based solely on the facts found by the jury beyond a reasonable
doubt. As previously noted, defendant argues that the appellate
court correctly vacated his sentence, because the sentencing range
for first degree murder is 20 to 60 years' imprisonment.
	The State contends that according to the statutes which
establish the sentencing structure for first degree murder,
defendant became eligible for a sentence of 20 years to life-or 20
years to death-upon the jury's finding that he was guilty of first
degree murder, because there is statutory authorization for any
sentence in these ranges. The State urges that it is of no moment
that the judge made a factual finding in the course of sentencing
defendant, because defendant's sentence fell within the sentencing
range for the crime of which the jury found him guilty.
Accordingly, the State argues, the appellate court erred, and
defendant's 80-year sentence should be affirmed.
	We must determine what sentence could be imposed on
defendant for his first degree murder conviction, based solely on
the facts found by the jury. This is a question of statutory
interpretation, and as such the principles guiding our analysis are
well established. In matters of statutory interpretation our standard
of review is de novo. Our primary purpose is to give effect to the
intent of the legislature, and the best evidence of that intent is the
plain language of the statutes. Where the meaning of a statute is
plain on its face, there is no need to resort to other tools of
construction. In interpreting statutes, we must avoid constructions
which would produce absurd results. People v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36, 42 (2000).
	 There are three statutes involved.
	Section 5-8-1(a)(1) of the Code (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)
(West 1998)) provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in the
statute defining the offense," the court shall impose a sentence of
imprisonment for first degree murder within certain constraints:
			"(a) a term shall be not less than 20 years and not more
than 60 years, or
			(b) if the court finds that the murder was accompanied
by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of
wanton cruelty or, except as set forth in subsection
(a)(1)(c) of this Section, that any of the aggravating
factors listed in subsection (b) of Section 9-1 of the
Criminal Code of 1961 are present, the court may
sentence the defendant to a term of natural life
imprisonment, or
			(c) the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of
natural life imprisonment when the death penalty is not
imposed if [various factual predicates obtain with respect
to the defendant, the victim, or the crime.]" 730 ILCS
5/5-8-1(a)(1)(a) through (a)(1)(c) (West 1998).(1)
	Section 9-1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Criminal Code)
(720 ILCS 5/9-1 (West 1998)) defines the crime of first degree
murder and sets out the procedures necessary to impose the death
penalty for the crime. Subsection (a) of section 9-1 provides that
one who kills an individual without lawful justification commits
first degree murder if, in performing the acts which cause the
death,
			"(1) he either intends to kill or do great bodily harm to
that individual or another, or knows that such acts will
cause death to that individual or another; or
			(2) he knows that such acts create a strong probability
of death or great bodily harm to that individual or another;
or
 			(3) he is attempting or committing a forcible felony
other than second degree murder." 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)
(West 1998).
Subsection (b) of section 9-1 provides that a defendant found
guilty of first degree murder who was 18 or older at the time of the
commission of the offense may be sentenced to death if one of
several different aggravating factors obtain. See 720 ILCS
5/9-1(b)(1) through (b)(19) (West 1998). Before a death sentence
may be imposed, however, the court must hold a separate
sentencing hearing. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(d) (West 1998). At this
hearing, a jury-or the court, if defendant waives a jury-must first
determine whether the State has proven one or more of the
enumerated aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. 720
ILCS 5/9-1(g), (h) (West 1998). Even if the fact finder does so
find, it must next consider factors in aggravation and mitigation.
The death penalty can only be imposed if the fact finder
concludes-unanimously, if the fact finder is a jury-that there are
no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the
death sentence. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(g), (h) (West 1998). If the fact
finder does not find the State to have proven one or more of the
aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, or does not
subsequently unanimously find that there are no mitigating factors
sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death penalty, the court
must sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment under
chapter V of the Code. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(g), (h) (West 1998).
	Finally, section 5-8-2(a) of the Code provides that the court
			"shall not sentence an offender to a term of
imprisonment in excess of the maximum sentence
authorized by Section 5-8-1 for the class of the most
serious offense of which the offender was convicted
unless the factors in aggravation set forth in paragraph (b)
of Section 5-5-3.2 were found to be present. Where the
judge finds that such factors were present, he may
sentence an offender to the following:
			(1) for first degree murder, a term shall be not less than
60 years and not more than 100 years[.]" 730 ILCS
5/5-8-2(a) (West 1998).(2)
The court imposed the 80-year sentence in the instant case
pursuant to section 5-8-2(a), based on its finding that the offense
was exceptionally brutal and heinous. See 730 ILCS
5/5-5-3.2(b)(2) (West 1998).
	In essence, the State contends that Illinois has a "unitary"
sentencing scheme for first degree murder. The State urges us to
read all of the statutes as a whole and conclude that any sentence
the legislature has authorized to be imposed on a defendant
convicted of first degree murder is part of the sentencing range.
	We reject this argument. A defendant commits first degree
murder when he kills an individual, intending or knowing that he
is likely to cause death or great bodily harm, or when he commits
the killing in the attempt or commission of a felony other than
second degree murder. See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a) (West 1998). See
also Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 7.02 (4th ed.
2000). According to the plain language of the statutes we set out
above, if only these facts are proven, the sentence imposed must
be between 20 and 60 years' imprisonment. See 730 ILCS
5/5-8-1(a)(1)(a) (West 1998). For any other sentence to be
imposed, be it an extended-term sentence of 60 to 100 years (730
ILCS 5/5-8-2(a)(1) (West 1998)), life imprisonment (730 ILCS
5/5-8-1(a)(1)(b), (a)(1)(c) (West 1998)), or the death penalty (720
ILCS 5/9-1(g), (h) (West 1998)), additional facts must be proven.
Thus, according to the plain language of the statutes, 20 to 60
years' imprisonment is the sentencing range for first degree
murder. This is the only range of sentence authorized for the basic
elements of the crime.
	The State's argument runs counter to the plain language of
section 5-8-2(a) of the Code in another sense, as well. As
previously noted, section 5-8-2(a) only requires proof of
aggravating factors if the court imposes a sentence "in excess of
the maximum sentence authorized by Section 5-8-1." 730 ILCS
5/5-8-2(a) (West 1998). If the "maximum sentence authorized by
section 5-8-1" were life imprisonment, as the State contends,
section 5-8-2(a) would seem to permit the court to impose an
extended-term sentence without finding any aggravating
factor-because no matter what extended-term sentence the court
imposed, that sentence could not exceed life imprisonment.
Reading section 5-8-1 as authorizing a maximum sentence of 60
years' imprisonment, on the other hand, allows that section and
section 5-8-2(a) to operate in perfect harmony, with the 60-to-100-year extended-term range permitted pursuant to the latter
picking up exactly where the former's 20-to-60-year sentencing
range leaves off. See People v. Hopkins, 201 Ill. 2d 26, 40 (2002)
("when any statutory enhancing aggravating factor is proved to
exist beyond a reasonable doubt, *** the original sentencing
range increases according to the statutory scheme" (emphasis
added)).
	Finally, the State's argument that the Apprendi "sentencing
range" for a crime is any penalty authorized by statute to be
imposed for that crime-regardless of what factual findings the
legislature might require before higher ranges of sentence could be
imposed-has recently been rejected by the Supreme Court. See
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. __, 153 L. Ed. 2d 556, 122 S. Ct. 2428 
(2002).
	In briefing the instant case, the State relied in large part on
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 111 L. Ed. 2d 511, 110 S. Ct. 3047 (1990). There, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the
Arizona death penalty statutes. Under Arizona law, the only two
punishment alternatives for a defendant convicted of first degree
murder were death or life imprisonment. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§13-703(A) (West 2001). A death sentence could be imposed only
if the court found that an aggravating circumstance existed and
that there were "no mitigating circumstances sufficiently
substantial to call for leniency." Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13-703(E)
(West 2001). In Walton, the Court upheld this scheme, rejecting
the argument that a defendant was entitled to have a jury
determine the existence of an aggravating circumstance. In
Apprendi, the Court distinguished and reaffirmed Walton. Key to
the distinction drawn by the Apprendi majority was the premise
that the maximum sentence for first degree murder in Arizona was
death. Reasoning therefrom, the Court concluded that " 'once a
jury has found the defendant guilty of all the elements of an
offense which carries as its maximum penalty the sentence of
death, it may be left to the judge to decide whether that maximum
penalty, rather than a lesser one, ought to be imposed.' " Apprendi,
530 U.S.  at 497, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 459, 120 S. Ct.  at 2366, quoting
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 257 n.2, 140 L. Ed. 2d 350, 377 n.2, 118 S. Ct. 1219, 1237 n.2 (1998) (Scalia,
J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg, JJ.). The
primary dissent in Apprendi labeled the majority's distinction of
Walton "baffling," because the majority's premise was
"demonstrably untrue": a defendant convicted of first degree
murder in Arizona could not receive a death sentence unless the
judge made the additional factual finding that a statutory
aggravating factor existed. Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 538, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 484, 120 S. Ct.  at 2388 (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., Kennedy and Breyer, JJ.).
	The Arizona Supreme Court later concluded that the Apprendi
dissenters had construed the Arizona statutes at issue correctly.
State v. Ring, 200 Ariz. 267, 25 P.3d 1139 (2001). Although a
defendant convicted of first degree murder could ultimately
receive the death sentence, that sentence could not be imposed
unless the court made a factual finding that there existed a
statutory aggravating factor. State v. Ring, 200 Ariz. at 279, 25 P.3d  at 1151.
	Faced with Arizona's construction of its own statutes, the
Court reconsidered its earlier conclusion that Walton and Apprendi
could peacefully coexist. After briefing had concluded in the
instant case, the Court overruled Walton. Ring v. Arizona, 536
U.S. __,  153 L. Ed. 2d 556, 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002). The Court
concluded that Walton and Apprendi were irreconcilable, and
reversed the defendant's death sentence on the grounds that the
Arizona death penalty scheme was unconstitutional because it
removed from the jury the determination of facts required to
establish the defendant's eligibility for that sentence. "Because
Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors operate as 'the
functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense,'
Apprendi, 530 U.S., at 494, n.19, the Sixth Amendment requires
that they be found by a jury." Ring, 536 U.S. at __, 153 L. Ed. 2d 
at 577, 122 S. Ct.  at 2443.
	One of the arguments raised in Ring was that the defendant
was "sentenced within the range of punishment authorized by the
jury verdict" because he "was convicted of first-degree murder, for
which Arizona law specifies 'death or life imprisonment' as the
only sentencing options." Ring, 536 U.S. at __, 153 L. Ed. 2d  at 
573, 122 S. Ct.  at 2440. The Court rejected this argument,
recalling the admonition in Apprendi that " 'the relevant inquiry
is one not of form, but of effect.' " Ring, 536 U.S. at __, 153 L. Ed. 2d  at 573, 122 S. Ct.  at 2440,  quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at
494, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 457, 120 S. Ct.  at 2365. A finding of an
aggravating circumstance would expose the defendant to a penalty
greater than that authorized by the jury's guilty verdict standing
alone, the Court stated; the Arizona statutory scheme " 'authorizes
a maximum penalty of death only in a formal sense." Ring, 536
U.S. at __, 153 L. Ed. 2d  at 573-74,  122 S. Ct.  at 2440, quoting
Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 541, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 486, 120 S. Ct.  at
2389 (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J.,
Kennedy and Breyer, JJ.). The Court concluded that to endorse
this argument would reduce Apprendi "to a 'meaningless and
formalistic' rule of statutory drafting." Ring, 536 U.S. at __, 153 L. Ed. 2d  at 574, 122 S. Ct.  at 2441, quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. 
at 541, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 486, 120 S. Ct.  at 2390 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Kennedy and Breyer, JJ.).
	We conclude that for purposes of Apprendi analysis, the
"sentencing range" for first degree murder in Illinois is 20 to 60
years' imprisonment. This is the only range of sentence
permissible based on an ordinary jury verdict of guilt. Although
there is statutory authorization for higher sentences to be imposed
for this crime, any sentence longer than 60 years requires
additional factual findings. See 730 ILCS 5/5-8-2(a) (West 1998)
(extended-term sentence); 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(b), (a)(1)(c)
(West 1998) (life imprisonment); 720 ILCS 5/9-1(g), (h) (West
1998) (death penalty). According to Apprendi, any factual findings
which take a sentence above the sentencing range must be proven
to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. In this case, the factual
finding that defendant's crime was brutal and heinous was made
by the circuit court, and the State was not held to the appropriate
burden of proof. Accordingly, defendant's sentence cannot stand.
	However, section 5-8-2(a)(1) is not facially unconstitutional.
See People v. Jackson, 199 Ill. 2d 286, 301 (2002) ("A statute is
facially unconstitutional only if ' "no set of circumstances exists
under which the Act would be valid" ' "), quoting In re C.E., 161 Ill. 2d 200, 210-11 (1994), quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 95 L. Ed. 2d 697, 707, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2100
(1987); Ford, 198 Ill. 2d 68 (upholding constitutionality of
application of section 5-8-2(a)(1)). Accordingly, we vacate that
portion of the appellate court's opinion which so held.

CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the result reached by the
appellate court, that the sentence in this case cannot stand.
However, we vacate the appellate court's conclusion that section
5-8-2 of the Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-8-2 (West
1998)) is facially unconstitutional. The conviction entered by the
circuit court is affirmed, but the sentence entered is vacated, and
the cause is remanded to the circuit court for resentencing.
Appellate court judgment affirmed
in part and vacated in part;
circuit court judgment affirmed
in part and vacated in part;
cause remanded.
 
 
1.      1While this case was pending on appeal, the legislature amended
subsection (a)(1)(b) so as to require "a trier of fact" to make the
requisite factual finding "beyond a reasonable doubt" before allowing
imposition of a sentence of natural life imprisonment. Pub. Act 91-953,
§10, eff. February 23, 2001.

2.      2The legislature has amended section 5-8-2 so as now to require that
before an extended-term sentence may be imposed, a "trier of fact" must
find "beyond a reasonable doubt" that "the factors in aggravation set
forth in paragraph (b) of Section 5-5-3.2" are present. Pub. Act 91-953,
§10, eff. February 23, 2001.