Title: Carl Kaminski v. David H. Schwarz
Citation: 2001 WI 94
Docket Number: 1999AP003040
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 9, 2001

2001 WI 94 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-3040 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel Carl Kaminski,  
 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
v. 
David H. Schwarz, Administrator, Division of 
Hearings and Appeals,  
 
Respondent-Respondent-Petitioner.  
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2000 WI App 159 
Reported at:  238 Wis. 2d 16, 616 N.W.2d 148 
(Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 9, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
January 5, 2001 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Trempealeau 
 
JUDGE: 
John A. Damon 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
BABLITCH and BRADLEY, J.J., join dissent. 
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the respondent-respondent-petitioner the 
cause was argued by William C. Wolford, assistant attorney 
general, with whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney 
general. 
 
 
For the petitioner-appellant there was a brief 
and oral argument by Donald T. Lang, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
2 
 
2001 WI 94 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 99-3040  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Carl Kaminski,  
 
          Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
David H. Schwarz, Administrator, Division  
of Hearings and Appeals,  
 
          Respondent-Respondent- 
          Petitioner. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals, State ex rel. Kaminski v. 
Schwarz, 2000 WI App 159, 238 Wis. 2d 16, 616 N.W.2d 148.  The 
court of appeals reversed a judgment of the Trempealeau County 
Circuit Court, John A. Damon, Judge, affirming the revocation of 
Carl Kaminski's probation.  The revocation was based on 
Kaminski's violation of two rules of probation imposed by his 
probation agent.  The rules required Kaminski to inform his 
immediate neighbors of his status as a convicted sex offender, 
and 
to 
inform 
his 
agent 
before 
beginning 
an 
intimate 
relationship with another person so that the agent could ensure 
FILED 
 
JUL 9, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 99-3040 
 
2 
that the other person knew Kaminski was a convicted sex 
offender. 
¶2 
After Kaminski's probation was revoked for violating 
these rules, the court of appeals determined that the rule 
requiring Kaminski to inform his immediate neighbors of his sex 
offender status was contrary to Wis. Stat. § 301.46 (1997-98),1 
which relates to access to information in Wisconsin's sex 
offender registry.  Kaminski, 238 Wis. 2d 16, ¶11.  The court of 
appeals therefore remanded the case to the Department of 
Corrections (DOC) to determine whether Kaminski's violation of 
the other rule, requiring him to notify his agent before 
beginning an intimate relationship with another person, was 
sufficient to warrant revocation.  Id. at ¶12. 
¶3 
The issue presented is whether the probation rule 
requiring Kaminski to notify his immediate neighbors that he is 
a sex offender is valid.  We determine that Wis. Stat. §§ 301.45 
and 
301.46 
do 
not 
occupy 
the 
field 
in 
regulating 
the 
dissemination of sex offender registration information, or 
prohibit a probation agent from imposing a rule requiring a 
convicted sex offender to notify his or her immediate neighbors 
of his or her sex offender status.  We also find that the rule 
                     
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1997-98 version unless otherwise indicated. 
The sex offender registration law embodied in Wis. Stat. 
§§ 301.45 and 301.46 has undergone extensive revision since 
1998.  While we refer in this opinion to the 1997-98 statutes, 
we will also refer to amendments to the statutes when relevant. 
No. 99-3040 
 
3 
imposed on Kaminski was not unreasonable.  Accordingly, we 
reverse the decision of the court of appeals. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
 
¶4 
The facts of this case are not disputed.  Kaminski 
pled guilty to a charge of second-degree sexual assault of a 
child contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2), and was convicted and 
sentenced to ten years imprisonment on April 23, 1996.2  The 
circuit court imposed and stayed Kaminski's sentence, and placed 
him on probation for ten years. 
¶5 
As a condition of probation, the circuit court 
sentenced Kaminski to one year in the Trempealeau County Jail.  
It also imposed other conditions of probation, including 
prohibitions on contact with the victim of his crime and the 
victim's family, or with any person under 18 years of age unless 
the person is a family member and the contact is supervised.  
The court also ordered that after his release from jail, 
Kaminski was to report to a group home, submit to a chemical 
dependency 
evaluation, 
undergo 
treatment 
for 
suicidal 
                     
2 The victim was an eight-year-old girl.  Kaminski pled 
guilty to having sexual intercourse with her in her home. 
The Judgment of Conviction states that Kaminski pled guilty 
to a charge of first-degree sexual assault of a child, contrary 
to Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1).  Kaminski was originally charged with 
first-degree sexual assault of a child, but the Division of 
Hearings and Appeals declared in sustaining the revocation of 
Kaminski's probation that he actually pled guilty to second-
degree sexual assault of a child.  
No. 99-3040 
 
4 
tendencies, and complete sexual offender treatment, an education 
program, and a relapse prevention program. 
¶6 
When Kaminski was released from jail, he was initially 
supervised by Tony Lessard.  On June 25, 1997, Kaminski 
registered as a sex offender, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 301.45. 
¶7 
Kaminski 
completed 
sex 
offender 
treatment 
and 
inpatient alcohol and other drug addiction (AODA) treatment, but 
he was later terminated from an AODA residential aftercare 
program for rules violations. 
¶8 
In November 1997 Kaminski's case was transferred from 
Trempealeau County to Chippewa County, and Ellen O'Connell 
replaced Tony Lessard as Kaminski's probation agent.  She issued 
Kaminski 16 standard rules of probation, in writing.  Rule 1 
stated: "You shall avoid all conduct which is in violation of 
federal or state statute, municipal or county ordinances or 
which is not in the best interest of the public welfare or your 
rehabilitation."  Rule 16 stated: 
 
You shall follow any specific rules that may be 
issued by an agent to achieve the goals and objectives 
of your supervision.  The rules may be modified at any 
time, as appropriate.  The specific rules imposed at 
this time are stated on the back of this form.  You 
shall place your initials at the end of each specific 
rule to show you have read the rule. 
Five additional rules specific to Kaminski's sex offender 
treatment were imposed by Agent O'Connell and written on the 
back of the page of rules.  Kaminski agreed to and signed this 
list of rules. 
No. 99-3040 
 
5 
¶9 
In January 1998 Kaminski was charged with misdemeanor 
battery against his wife, [S.K.].  He entered a halfway house 
for substance abuse treatment, and sporadically attended an 
"Alternative to Abuse" program.  After a restraining order was 
issued prohibiting him from having any contact with S.K., 
Kaminski was convicted of battery on March 18, 1998, and 
sentenced to 18 months probation.  After numerous violations of 
the restraining order, Kaminski was returned to jail.  When he 
was released, he returned to the halfway house, but continued to 
contact S.K.  He was therefore discharged from the halfway house 
and returned to jail.  At this point, Kaminski's probation on 
the battery conviction was revoked, and he was sentenced to nine 
months in jail with credit for time served. 
¶10 With Kaminski due to be released from the Chippewa 
County Jail on December 19, 1998, Agent O'Connell issued him 
additional rules of probation, numbered 16-1 through 16-25.  
These rules included a prohibition of contact with S.K.,3 and a 
requirement that he register as a sex offender, pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. §§ 301.45 and 301.46.  Also included was rule 16-3 which 
stated: "You shall notify your agent of any involvement in an 
intimate relationship at its beginning and you shall introduce 
the person to your agent to disclose your past sexual offenses 
prior to engaging in any type of sexual activity with that 
person."  Rule 16-25, which was handwritten, stated: "You will 
                     
3 Agent O'Connell stated in the revocation summary that 
Kaminski was served with divorce papers in February 1998.   
No. 99-3040 
 
6 
notify the neighbors on each side that you are a convicted sex 
offender by Dec. 24, 1998.  You will report to your agent on 
Jan. 4, 1999 at 9 AM."  Kaminski agreed to and signed these 
rules on December 18, 1998. 
¶11 Upon his release from jail the next day, Kaminski 
moved into a trailer park in Chippewa Falls.  Nine days later, 
on December 28, 1998, Agent O'Connell was notified that Kaminski 
had allegedly sexually assaulted Tamala B., an Eau Claire woman, 
the night before.  Agent O'Connell contacted Kaminski after he 
was taken into custody.  Kaminski admitted in writing that he 
had sexual relations with Tamala B. without notifying his 
probation agent, but he denied sexually assaulting the woman.  
He also admitted in writing that he had not informed his 
neighbors of his sex offender status.  When Agent O'Connell 
learned that Kaminski was being charged with second degree 
sexual assault, she initiated probation revocation proceedings, 
and Kaminski was transferred to the Trempealeau County Jail. 
¶12 Agent 
O'Connell 
filed 
a 
"Violation 
Investigation 
Report," claiming that Kaminski had violated three rules of 
probation.  She alleged that by sexually assaulting Tamala B., 
Kaminski violated a statute, contrary to rule 1, and engaged in 
sexual relations without informing his agent, contrary to rule 
16-3.  Agent O'Connell also alleged that Kaminski failed to 
inform the neighbors immediately on either side of his trailer 
of his status as a sex offender, contrary to rule 16-25. 
¶13 A probation revocation hearing was held on February 
23, 1999.  An administrative law judge (ALJ) heard testimony 
No. 99-3040 
 
7 
from Kaminski, Tamala B., and other witnesses, and received 
Agent 
O'Connell's 
"Violation 
Investigation 
Report" 
and 
revocation summary.  Kaminski testified that he had sexual 
relations with Tamala B., but characterized the incident as 
consensual.  He admitted that he had not first contacted his 
agent to assure that Tamala B. would be informed of his 
conviction.  He also admitted that he had not told his neighbors 
about his status as a sex offender, but claimed that telling 
them was unnecessary because they did not have children. 
¶14 On March 8, 1999, the ALJ issued a written decision, 
determining that Kaminski had not sexually assaulted Tamala B. 
but had engaged in sexual relations with her without first 
telling his agent, in violation of rule 16-3.  The ALJ also 
found that Kaminski had violated probation rule 16-25 by not 
informing his immediate neighbors of his status as a convicted 
sex offender.  The ALJ concluded that these two rule violations 
were sufficiently serious to warrant revocation of Kaminski's 
probation. 
¶15 The Division of Hearings and Appeals (DHA) sustained 
the ALJ's decision on March 23, 1999. 
¶16 Kaminski appealed the decision of the DHA to the 
Trempealeau County Circuit Court via a writ of certiorari.  The 
circuit court affirmed the revocation of Kaminski's probation, 
stating 
that 
it 
could 
not 
"find 
these 
rules 
inherently 
unreasonable" and could not "find that the rules were so 
unreasonable that the decision to revoke was arbitrary and 
unreasonable or beyond the law." 
No. 99-3040 
 
8 
¶17 Kaminski then appealed to the court of appeals, which 
reversed the circuit court judgment.  Kaminski, 238 Wis. 2d 16, 
¶11.  The court of appeals decision focused on rule 16-25, which 
required Kaminski to inform his immediate neighbors of his sex 
offender status.  Id. at ¶¶8-12.  The court of appeals stated 
that "by enacting Wis. Stat. § 301.46, the legislature provided 
limitations on access to sex offender registration information." 
 Id. at ¶11.  It determined that rule 16-25 is inconsistent with 
Wis. Stat. § 301.46, and that a violation of the rule cannot 
form the basis for revocation of probation.  Id.  
¶18 The court of appeals concluded that Kaminski had 
admitted to having sexual relations without first informing his 
agent, in violation of rule 16-3.  It therefore remanded the 
case to the DOC to determine whether that single rule violation 
warranted revocation.  Id. at ¶12. 
¶19 Judge Hoover dissented, asserting that nothing in Wis. 
Stat. §§ 301.45 or 301.46, or in the legislative history of 
those statutes indicates that the legislature intended "to limit 
the authority to impose conditions of probation that are 
otherwise reasonable and appropriate."  Id. at ¶16 (Hoover, J., 
dissenting).  He declared that requiring Kaminski to notify his 
neighbors of his sex offender status promoted the goals of 
rehabilitating Kaminski and of protecting the public, and was 
reasonable and appropriate.  Id. at ¶17. 
¶20 This court granted the State's petition for review. 
 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
No. 99-3040 
 
9 
 
 
¶21 The issue presented in this case requires us to review 
a probation revocation by the DOC.  Our review is therefore 
limited to determining: 
 
(1) whether the Department acted within the bounds of 
its jurisdiction; (2) whether it acted according to 
law; (3) whether its action was arbitrary, oppressive, 
or unreasonable and represented its will, not its 
judgment; and (4) whether the evidence was sufficient 
that 
the 
Department 
might 
reasonably 
make 
the 
determination that it did. 
State ex rel. Warren v. Schwarz, 219 Wis. 2d 615, 628-29, 579 
N.W.2d 698 (1998).   
¶22 Kaminski's revocation was based on findings that he 
violated two rules of probation.  He does not challenge these 
findingshe admits both violations.  He instead claims that the 
DOC did not act according to law in imposing one of these rules 
of probation, and that the rule was unreasonable.  Whether a 
condition or rule of probation is contrary to law is a question 
of law, which this court reviews de novo.  Id. at 629. 
¶23 Whether 
a 
condition 
or 
rule 
of 
probation 
is 
unreasonable is dependent on whether the condition or rule 
serves 
the 
dual 
goals 
of 
probation: 
rehabilitation 
and 
protection of the community.  State v. Heyn, 155 Wis. 2d 621, 
629, 456 N.W.2d 157 (1990).  
 
III. ANALYSIS 
 
No. 99-3040 
 
10
¶24 To resolve the issue in this case, we must determine 
whether probation rule 16-25 requiring Kaminski to inform his 
neighbors of his sex offender status was either contrary to Wis. 
Stat. §§ 301.45 and 301.46, or otherwise unreasonable.  We begin 
by examining a probation agent's authority to impose rules of 
probation. 
 
A. Probation Agents' Authority to Impose Rules of Probation 
 
¶25 Probationers in Wisconsin are subject to court-imposed 
conditions of probation, as well as DOC- and agent-imposed rules 
of probation.  Wis. Stat. §§ 973.09 and 973.10.  Courts are 
authorized under § 973.09 to "impose any conditions which appear 
to be reasonable and appropriate."  Wis. Stat. § 973.09(1)(a).  
The DOC is authorized under § 973.10(1) to establish rules and 
regulations 
for 
probationers, 
supplementing 
court-imposed 
conditions of probation.4  In accordance with § 973.10, the DOC 
has developed 16 standard rules of probation that a probation 
                     
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.10(1) provides: 
 
Imposition of probation shall have the effect of 
placing the defendant in the custody of the department 
and shall subject the defendant to the control of the 
department under conditions set by the court and rules 
and regulations established by the department for the 
supervision of probationers, parolees and persons on 
extended supervision. 
No. 99-3040 
 
11
agent is to explain to the probationer, and to implement.  Wis. 
Admin. Code § DOC 328.04(3) (May, 2001).5  
¶26 The DOC also has established rules to guide probation 
agents in supervising probationers.  Probation agents are to 
"provide individualized supervision of clients in a manner 
consistent with the goals and objectives of this chapter."  Wis. 
Admin. Code § DOC 328.04(1).  They are also expected to "attempt 
to help the client be successfully reassimilated into the 
community, help the client adjust to and cope with community 
living, reduce crime, and protect the public."  Id.  One of an 
agent's 
responsibilities 
in 
supervising 
a 
client 
is 
"[e]stablishing 
written 
rules 
of 
supervision 
that 
are 
supplemental to existing court-imposed . . . conditions."  Wis. 
Admin. Code § DOC 328.04(2)(d) (emphasis added). 
¶27 It is undisputed that Agent O'Connell had authority to 
impose rules of probation on Kaminski, and that Kaminski agreed 
to the rules Agent O'Connell imposed.  The question is whether 
                     
5 The standard rules established in Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 
328.04(3) include requirements that the client: 
(a) Avoid all conduct which is in violation of state 
statute, municipal or county ordinances or which is not in the 
best 
interest 
of 
the 
public 
welfare 
or 
his 
or 
her 
rehabilitation; 
. . . . 
(L) Follow any specific rules that may be issued by an 
agent to achieve the goals and objectives of this chapter. The 
rules may be modified at any time as appropriate. 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Administrative 
Code are to the May, 2001 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 99-3040 
 
12
rule 16-25, requiring Kaminski to inform his immediate neighbors 
of his sex offender status, is contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 301.45 
or 301.46.  An administrative rule that contravenes the words of 
an unambiguous statute is invalid.  Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 
76, ¶28, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659.  For the same reason, 
a rule of probation imposed by a probation agent, intended to 
supplement 
court-imposed 
conditions 
of 
probation, may not 
validly contravene the directive of a statute.  See id.   
 
B. Wisconsin's Sex Offender Registration Law 
 
¶28 Resolving this case requires us to examine and 
interpret Wis. Stat. §§ 301.45 and 301.46, to determine whether 
they occupy the field regulating the dissemination of sex 
offender registration information or prohibit rule 16-25 in 
these circumstances.  When interpreting a statute, we aim to 
discern the intent of the legislature, and to give effect to 
that intent.  County of Jefferson v. Renz, 231 Wis. 2d 293, 301, 
603 N.W.2d 541 (1999). 
¶29 We begin with the language of the statute.  State v. 
Piddington, 2001 WI 24, ¶14, 241 Wis. 2d 754, 623 N.W.2d 528.  
If the statutory language is clear, we need not look beyond it 
to determine legislative intent.  HMO-W Inc. v. SSM Health Care 
Sys., 2000 WI 46, ¶19, 234 Wis. 2d 707, 611 N.W.2d 250.  
However, if the statute is unclear or ambiguous, Teague v. Bad 
River Band of the Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 2000 
WI 79, ¶17, 236 Wis. 2d 384, 612 N.W.2d 709, we may utilize 
No. 99-3040 
 
13
extrinsic aids such as legislative history and statutory purpose 
for guidance.  McDonough v. DWD, 227 Wis. 2d 271, 277, 595 
N.W.2d 686 (1999).  Statutory language is ambiguous if it is 
capable of being understood in more than one way or in more than 
one sense by reasonably well-informed persons.  Teague, 236 
Wis. 2d 384, ¶17. 
 
1. Language of Wisconsin Stat. §§ 301.45 and 301.46 
 
¶30 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§§ 301.45 
and 
301.46 
govern sex 
offender registration and access to information in the sex 
offender registry.  Section 301.45 requires certain persons who 
have committed sex offenses or sexually motivated crimes to 
"comply with the reporting requirements" set forth in the 
statute.  Wis. Stat. § 301.45(1).6  A person required to register 
must supply information including his or her name and aliases, 
and physical characteristics such as date of birth, gender, 
race, height, weight, hair color, and eye color.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 301.45(2)(a).  The person must also supply information 
                     
6 Section 301.45 applies to various persons, including those 
convicted of: 
any violation, or for the solicitation, conspiracy or 
attempt to commit any violation, of s. 940.22(2), 
940.225(1), (2) or (3), 944.06, 948.02(1) or (2), 
948.025, 948.05, 948.055, 948.06, 948.07, 948.08, 
948.11 or 948.30, or of s. 940.30 or 940.31 if the 
victim was a minor and the person was not the victim's 
parent. 
 
Wis. Stat. § 301.45(1)(a). 
No. 99-3040 
 
14
regarding his or her conviction; supervision; and supervising 
agency; the addresses of the person's residence, workplace, and 
school; and the date the person's information was last updated. 
 Id. 
¶31 A registry of each person's information is maintained 
by the DOC.  Id.  The DOC is required to keep the information 
confidential, "except as provided in . . . [§] 301.46, [and] 
except as needed for law enforcement purposes."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 301.45(7)(a).7  
¶32 Wisconsin Stat. § 301.46 governs access to information 
contained in the sex offender registry.  It requires that the 
DOC notify law enforcement agencies and the interested victims 
of a sex offender's previous crimes.  It also allows community 
agencies and the general public to request sex offender registry 
information. 
¶33 When a sex offender registers under Wis. Stat. 
§ 301.45, the DOC must immediately make all the information that 
the registrant supplies available to the chief of police of the 
community and the sheriff of the county in which the person is 
                     
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 301.45(7) also allows limited disclosure 
of information for the purposes of Wis. Stat. §§ 301.03(14), 
49.22(2m), and 59.53(5).  These statutes concern the release of 
information to the department of revenue to assist it in 
locating persons who have not properly filed tax returns, the 
department of workforce development in regards to child or 
spousal support obligations, and to county child support 
agencies, respectively.  These provisions are inapplicable to 
this case.   
No. 99-3040 
 
15
residing, 
working, 
or 
attending 
school. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 301.46(2)(a).8 
¶34 Upon request, a victim of a registered person's crimes 
and members of the victim's family are also entitled to 
notification of information including the registered person's 
name and address, the agency supervising the person, and the 
date of the most recent update of the information.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 301.46(3)(c). 
¶35 Numerous agencies and organizations other than law 
enforcement agencies (including schools; day care providers; 
group homes; and the departments of justice, public instruction, 
and health and family services) are entitled to information 
about 
specific 
sex 
offenders 
upon 
request. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 301.46(4).9  The DOC is required to provide to these entities 
                     
8 Hereinafter, we use the terms "police chief" or "sheriff" 
to refer to the police chief of the community or the sheriff of 
the county in which a registered person resides, is employed, or 
attends school.  
The DOC is also required to provide the police chief or 
sheriff with bulletins regarding any registrant who is about to 
be released from confinement if the registrant has been 
convicted of two or more sex offenses, or has been committed 
under Wis. Stat. Ch. 980.  Wis. Stat. § 301.46(2m).  The DOC has 
discretion to decide whether to issue notification bulletins 
prior to the release of registrants who have been convicted of 
only one sex offense and have not been committed under Chapter 
980.  Id. 
9 Neighborhood watch programs are entitled upon request to 
the names and information of all registered persons residing, 
employed, or attending school in the "community, district, 
jurisdiction or other applicable geographical area of activity." 
 Wis. Stat. § 301.46(4)(ar).  
No. 99-3040 
 
16
the name and any aliases of a registered sex offender, the date 
of the person's conviction or commitment, and the date the 
information 
was 
most 
recently 
updated. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 301.46(4)(b). 
¶36 Members of the general public may also receive sex 
offender registry information.  The DOC, a police chief, or a 
sheriff may disclose sex offender registry information to any 
person who requests information about a specific registered 
person.10  Information may be provided if "in the opinion of the 
department or the police chief or sheriff, providing the 
information is necessary to protect the public."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 301.46(5). 
¶37 The police chief or sheriff has discretion to disclose 
information about a registered sex offender to a victim, an 
organization, or to the general public if the police chief or 
sheriff believes the information is necessary to protect the 
public.11  Wis. Stat. § 301.46(2)(e).  This disclosure may be 
made without any request.  Id. (emphasis added). 
                     
10 The DOC, a police chief or a sheriff may prescribe a 
particular form and manner of request and may require that the 
requester state the purpose for the request.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 301.46(5)(a)(1).  
11 Police chiefs and sheriffs may not disclose information 
"concerning a child who is required to register under s. 
301.45," or "any information concerning a juvenile proceeding" 
which 
a 
registered 
adult 
has 
provided. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 301.46(4)(ag) and (5)(c).  This information must be provided 
by the DOC to police chiefs and sheriffs, but otherwise may not 
be disclosed.  Id. 
No. 99-3040 
 
17
¶38 Finally, the DOC is authorized to provide sex offender 
registration information to anyone who makes an open records 
request for that information.  Wis. Stat. § 301.46(9). 
¶39 The parties urge different interpretations of Wis. 
Stat. §§ 301.45 and 301.46.  Kaminski asserts that §§ 301.45 and 
301.46 occupy the field regarding access to sex offender 
registry information, by establishing detailed notification and 
access policies and procedures.  He claims that in creating 
§§ 301.45 and 301.46, the legislature intended to balance the 
public's interest in safety and protection with the offender's 
right to 
privacy, 
and 
to 
limit 
access to 
sex offender 
registration information.  He contends that pursuant to this 
goal, § 301.45(7) requires that all sex offender registration 
information shall be kept confidential except as provided in 
§ 301.46.  Kaminski argues that the legislature intended to 
restrict notification or access to information to only those 
persons or entities specified in § 301.46, and gave the general 
public access only upon request and at the discretion of the 
police chief or sheriff. 
¶40 The State counters that nothing in the language of 
Wis. Stat. §§  301.45 and 301.46 demonstrates an intent by the 
legislature to occupy the field of sex offender notification, or 
to restrict the authority of the DOC or a probation agent to 
impose reasonable rules of probation on probationers who are 
also registered sex offenders. 
¶41 This court has determined that Wis. Stat. §§ 301.45 
and 301.46 reflect an "intent to protect the public and assist 
No. 99-3040 
 
18
law enforcement" and are "related to community protection."  
State v. Bollig, 2000 WI 6, ¶¶21-22, 232 Wis. 2d 561, 605 N.W.2d 
199.  Mindful of these legislative intentions, we think it 
unlikely that the legislature intended, by creating §§ 301.45 
and 
301.46, 
to 
prohibit 
probation 
agents 
from 
requiring 
actively-supervised convicted sex offenders to disclose limited 
information to specified persons or narrow categories of persons 
such 
as 
employers, 
landlords, 
neighbors, 
and 
new 
social 
acquaintances, whom offenders are likely to encounter, perhaps 
on a daily basis.  Such a prohibition would undercut the mission 
of probation and parole and contradict the legislature's intent 
of protecting the public.  We would find it incongruous for 
curious strangers to have access to information because the 
"general public" is listed in the statute, but for unsuspecting 
next-door 
neighbors 
with 
children 
not 
to 
have 
the 
same 
information because they were not specifically listed by 
category and were not on alert to make a request. 
¶42 Kaminski rather overstates the implications of this 
court's decision in Bollig.  Bollig states that the primary 
purpose of the sex offender registration statute is to protect 
the public and assist law enforcement.  232 Wis. 2d 561, ¶21.  
It explains that the DOC convened a Sex Offender Community 
Notification workgroup to assist legislators in developing 
balanced community notification legislation——legislation that 
balanced "community protection with the offender's community 
reintegration needs."  Id. at ¶22.  We noted in Bollig that Wis. 
Stat. § 301.46 "does not automatically grant the public carte 
No. 99-3040 
 
19
blanche 
access 
to 
the 
information 
[in 
the 
sex 
offender 
registry]."  Id. at ¶24.  However, this is a far cry from saying 
that the DOC engineered legislation to curtail the supervisory 
powers of its own agents and created for sex offenders some 
right of privacy in information that is fundamentally public 
record. 
¶43 Wisconsin Stat. § 301.46 grants both law enforcement 
and the DOC broad authority to disseminate information to the 
general public if either determines that such disclosure is 
necessary to protect the public.  This broad discretion to 
disclose 
registry 
information 
is 
evident 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 301.46(2)(e), 301.46(5)(a), and 301.46(5)(b)(4).  Section 
301.46(2)(e) affords the police chief or sheriff the authority 
to "provide any of the information to which he or she has access 
under this subsection . . . to members of the general public if, 
in the opinion of the police chief or sheriff, providing that 
information is necessary to protect the public."  § 301.46(2)(e) 
(emphasis added). 
¶44 A number of law enforcement agencies in Wisconsin 
communities, including the police departments in the cities of 
Milwaukee, Madison, Waukesha, and Kenosha, have made sex 
offender information available to the general public by use of 
Internet sites listing the registered sex offenders residing in 
No. 99-3040 
 
20
the respective communities, and providing extensive information 
about them.12 
¶45 Additionally, both law enforcement officials and the 
DOC are authorized to disclose any information they deem 
appropriate about any registered person, to any person who 
requests it, if "in the opinion of the DOC or the police chief 
or sheriff, providing the information is necessary to protect 
the public."  Wis. Stat. § 301.46(5)(a); see also Wis. Stat. 
§ 301.45(5)(b)(4). 
¶46 We cannot conclude from the language of Wis. Stat. 
§§ 301.45 and 301.46 that the legislature, in giving such broad 
discretion to the DOC to give any information about any sex 
offender to anyone who requests it, intended to prohibit the DOC 
from imposing a rule of probation requiring a convicted sex 
offender to inform specified persons of his or her status. 
¶47 Recently, the legislature amended Wis. Stat. § 301.46 
to broaden the authority of the DOC to disseminate sex offender 
information.  1999 Wis. Act 89.  The newly created subsection 
(5n) of § 301.46 requires that the DOC "provide access to 
information concerning persons registered under s. 301.45 by 
                     
12 The Internet sites maintained by the Milwaukee, Madison, 
and Waukesha police departments each state that the sex offender 
registration 
lists 
are 
provided 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 301.46(2m) to protect the public. 
The City of Kenosha Police Department's Internet site 
listing registered persons residing in Kenosha is based on the 
open records law, rather than on Wis. Stat. § 301.46(2m). 
No. 99-3040 
 
21
creating and maintaining an Internet site13 and by any other 
means that the department determines is appropriate."  Wis. 
Stat. § 301.46(5n) (1999-2000) (emphasis added).  The DOC is to 
provide any person using the Internet site the information to 
which the person is otherwise entitled under §§ 301.45 and 
301.46, and is also authorized to provide any user with "other 
information that the DOC determines is necessary to protect the 
public."  Id. 
¶48 While we determined the legislative intent of Wis. 
Stat. §§ 301.45 and 301.46 in Bollig, we did not address whether 
the legislature intended that the statutes occupy the field 
regarding sex offender registration notification.  232 Wis. 2d 
561, ¶¶21-22.  Here we must ascertain whether the legislature 
intended to "supplant[] or preempt[]" the authority of probation 
agents to impose rules of probation on probationers.  See 
Holtzman v. Knott, 193 Wis. 2d 649, 667, 533 N.W.2d 419 (1995). 
¶49 This question requires a broader inquiry than the text 
of the statutes.  Kaminski argues the policy of the statutes 
based upon extrinsic sources.  The State wages a similar 
campaign.  Our goal is to discern what the legislature intended. 
 We therefore will examine the history, object, and context of 
Wisconsin's sex offender registration law. 
 
                     
13 The DOC Sex Offender Registry Internet site was required 
by statute to be operational by June 1, 2001.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 301.46(5n) (1999-2000).  It is accessible at http://public-
sor.doc.state.wi.us/static/ (last visited July 3, 2001). 
No. 99-3040 
 
22
2. History, Object, and Context 
 
¶50 Wisconsin Stat. § 175.45 (1993-94) was the first 
Wisconsin statute to require persons convicted of certain sex 
crimes to register with the State.  Bollig, 232 Wis. 2d 561, 
¶21.  Section 175.45 required a convicted sex offender to 
provide "information about his or her home address, place of 
school enrollment, place of employment and employment duties" to 
the Department of Justice (DOJ).  Wis. Stat. § 175.45(2) (1993-
94).  The DOJ was required to maintain the information.  Wis. 
Stat. § 175.45(7)(a) (1993-94). 
¶51 At that time, neither Wis. Stat. § 175.45 (1993-94) 
nor any other statute provided for any access to a sex 
offender's information, or any notification of that information. 
 Instead, § 175.45 required the DOJ to "keep the information 
confidential except as needed for law enforcement purposes."  
Wis. Stat. § 175.45(7)(a) (1993-94).  Section 175.45(6)(b) 
stated that: "[w]hoever knowingly fails to keep information 
confidential as required under sub. (7) may be fined not more 
than $500 or imprisoned for not more than 30 days or both."  
Wis. Stat. § 175.45(6)(b) (1993-94). 
¶52 In 1996, the legislature revised and renumbered the 
sex offender registration system by enacting 1995 Wis. Act 440, 
creating Wis. Stat. §§ 301.45 and 301.46.  Bollig, 232 Wis. 2d 
561, ¶21.  The new sex offender registration law transferred the 
sex offender registry to the DOC, required the DOC to maintain 
No. 99-3040 
 
23
the 
sex 
offender 
registry 
information, 
and 
provided 
for 
extensive access to that information. 
¶53 As we noted in Bollig, the legislative intent behind 
the creation of Wis. Stat. §§ 301.45 and 301.46 can be gleaned 
from a proposal found in the Legislative Reference Bureau's 
drafting file for 1995 Wis. Act 440.  232 Wis. 2d 561, ¶22.  The 
proposal, prepared by the Wisconsin Department Of Corrections 
"Sex Offender Community Notification workgroup" (DOC workgroup), 
is entitled Sex Offender Community Notification Proposed Program 
Components, 
Executive 
Summary 
and 
Final 
Report 
(1994) 
[hereinafter Final Report].14  The DOC workgroup was "formed in 
response to efforts by legislators to introduce community 
notification legislation based on a revision and expansion of 
the then existing registration statute."  Bollig, 232 Wis. 2d 
561, 
¶22.15 
 
The 
DOC 
workgroup's 
Final 
Report 
made 
recommendations and laid out a framework for the new sex 
                     
14 The DOC workgroup consisted of representatives of the 
DOC, Probation and Parole, the Office of Sex Offender Programs, 
the DOJ Office of Crime Victim Services, the Wisconsin Chiefs of 
Police Association, Adult Institutions, Intensive Sanctions, and 
Program Services, and also had a legislative liaison.  Wisconsin 
Department Of Corrections Sex Offender Community Notification 
Workgroup, Sex Offender Community Notification Proposed Program 
Components, 
Executive 
Summary 
and 
Final 
Report 
(1994) 
[hereinafter Final Report].  
15 The DOC workgroup's Final Report was prepared for Senator 
Alberta Darling who introduced the bill (1995 S.B. 182), which 
became 1995 Wis. Act 440, and Representative Lolita Schneiders 
who co-authored S.B. 182. 
 
Final 
Report, 
supra, 
at 1; 
Legislative Reference Bureau Drafting File for 1995 Wis. Act 
440, Bill History for 1995 S.B. 182. 
No. 99-3040 
 
24
offender registration and notification law.  Final Report, 
supra.  It recommended expanding the then current sex offender 
registration law to comply with Title XVII of the 1994 Federal 
Crime Bill.16  Id. at ii. 
¶54 The DOC workgroup's goals were to: 
 
[A]nalyze current DOC, local law enforcement, and 
other 
state 
laws/practices 
related 
to 
community 
notification of sex offenders, and; 
 
[F]ormulate 
recommendations 
and/or 
options 
to 
be 
communicated to the Legislature related to the most 
effective model for community notification.  This 
model will need to balance community protection with 
the offender's community re-integration needs. 
Id. at 1. 
¶55 A 
section 
of 
the 
DOC 
workgroup's 
Final 
Report 
summarized the then current notification practices under Wis. 
Stat. § 175.45 (1993-94).  It stated in part that "for cases 
supervised under a high risk caseload, probation and parole may 
provide extended notification within the neighborhood, schools, 
employers, etc. . . . as deemed appropriate and necessary."  Id. 
at 3 (emphasis added). 
                     
16 Title XVII of the 1994 Federal Crime Bill, also known as 
the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually 
Violent Offender Registration Act, conditioned federal funding 
on 
whether 
states 
enacted 
sex 
offender 
registration 
and 
notification laws.  42 U.S.C. § 14071(g)(2)(a) (Supp. 1996).  
The federal law and similar laws passed in each of the 50 states 
resulted from "Megan's Law," passed in New Jersey in 1994, 
requiring community notification of sex offenders residing in 
any community.  State v. Bollig, 2000 WI 6, ¶19 n.4, 232 Wis. 2d 
561, 605 N.W.2d 199. 
No. 99-3040 
 
25
¶56 Kaminski contends that the legislature intended to 
discontinue this practice, as evidenced by language in Wis. 
Stat. § 301.45(7) stating that: "The department shall keep the 
information confidential except as provided in . . . [§] 301.46, 
[and] except as needed for law enforcement purposes," found in 
Wis. Stat. § 301.45(7)(a). 
¶57 We disagree.  The 1996 legislation lifted many 
provisions from the 1993 law.  Wisconsin Stat. § 175.45(7)(a) 
(1993-94) read: 
 
The department of justice shall maintain information 
provided under sub. (2).  The department shall keep 
the information confidential except as needed for law 
enforcement purposes. 
¶58 Most of this language was carried over to Wis. Stat. 
§ 301.45(7)(a) where it is applied in a different context to a 
different department. 
 
The 
department 
[of 
corrections] 
shall 
maintain 
information provided under sub. (2). The department 
shall keep the information confidential except as 
provided . . . . 
The subsection then uses the word "except" three times, listing 
numerous statutes.  The subsection includes the phrase "except 
as needed for law enforcement purposes." 
 
¶59 In the 1993 law, the DOC and the Department of Health 
and Social Services were required to share information with the 
DOJ.17  Wis. Stat. § 175.45(9) (1993-94).  Nothing in the 1993 
                     
17 The 
Department 
of 
Health 
and 
Social 
Services 
was 
subsequently renamed the Department of Health and Family 
Services.  
No. 99-3040 
 
26
law 
prevented 
the 
two 
departments 
from 
using 
their 
own 
information in the normal course of business under other 
statutes. 
 
¶60 When the law transferred the sex offender registry to 
the DOC, it did not prevent the DOC from using its own 
information to carry out its mission in probation and parole. 
 
¶61 The most significant change in the 1996 legislation 
was that a sex offender registration law became a modified sex 
offender notification law, expanding access to information.  
There is no evidence to suggest that the legislature intended to 
curtail the DOC's ordinary operating procedures. 
¶62 During 1993 and 1994, probation and parole officers 
could notify certain people in a high risk sex offender's 
neighborhood, as well as schools and employers, about the sex 
offender.  Final Report, supra, at 3.  In this work, the agents 
were utilizing their own information. 
¶63 "One precept of the DOC workgroup was to build upon 
these current systems or practices."  Id.  The DOC workgroup's 
recommended 
model 
was 
to 
"improve 
or 
expand 
on 
current 
practices," and to "provide flexibility to the agency of 
jurisdiction and law enforcement in order to expand or reduce 
community notification based on case-by-case factors——leaving 
discretion to individualize notification strategies."  Id. at 2. 
¶64 Nothing in the Final Report or elsewhere in the 
legislative history of 1995 Wis. Act 440 indicates that by 
enacting the 1996 revision, the legislature intended to limit 
the ability of probation agents to disclose sex offender 
No. 99-3040 
 
27
information if necessary to supervise clients who were sex 
offenders.  Instead, the legislature pointedly gave the DOC 
authority to maintain the sex offender information, broad 
discretion to disclose the information, and broad discretion to 
write its own rules.   
¶65 We cannot conclude that in granting the DOC broad 
authority 
to 
notify 
the 
general 
public 
under 
certain 
circumstances, 
and 
in 
expanding 
notification 
procedures 
generally, the legislature intended to usurp probation agents' 
authority to impose probation rules requiring notification of 
people in close proximity to a specific sex offender.  Such 
action would run contrary to the goal of "protection of the 
public from sex offenders," which the DOC workgroup deemed "a 
paramount governmental interest."  Id. at i. 
¶66 Kaminski also points out that Wis. Stat. § 301.46 
originally did not specifically provide for any notification of 
the general public absent a request for information.  He notes 
that the legislature amended § 301.46 in 1997 to authorize the 
police and sheriff to provide information to the general public 
even without a request for the information.  1997 Wis. Act 6.  
Kaminski asserts that when the legislature did not extend this 
authority to the DOC, the legislature expressed an intention 
that the DOC not have authority to notify the general public of 
a registered person's status as a sex offender. 
¶67 We agree that Wis. Stat. § 301.46 did not originally 
authorize the DOC to notify the public at large.  It does not 
follow, however, that the legislature intended in enacting 1995 
No. 99-3040 
 
28
Wis. Act 440 to prohibit a particular probation agent from 
imposing rules of probation requiring a probationer to inform 
specified persons of the probationer's status as a sex offender. 
¶68 It is clear that prior to the enactment of Wis. Stat. 
§§ 301.45 
and 
301.46, 
neither 
law 
enforcement 
nor 
the 
Departments of Corrections or Justice was authorized under Wis. 
Stat. § 175.45 to notify any member of the general public of a 
registered sex offender's personal information.  Yet, prior to 
1996 probation agents could notify certain persons of a client's 
sex offender status.  Final Report, supra, at 3.  In enacting 
Wis. Stat. §§ 301.45 and 301.46, the legislature intended to 
"build upon current systems or practices," id. at 3, and to 
"improve or expand on current practices."  Id. at 2.  The DOC 
workgroup recommended that "relevant offender information should 
be made available for the purpose of . . . screening of current 
or prospective employees or volunteers . . . and to offer the 
general public greater access to this information for their 
protection."  Id. at i.  
¶69 We find it unlikely that in enacting 1995 Wis. Act 
440, the legislature intended to prohibit the only method the 
DOC or law enforcement had of notifying anyone——including the 
convicted 
sex 
offender's 
employer, 
landlord, 
immediate 
neighbors, or a person with whom the sex offender might begin an 
No. 99-3040 
 
29
intimate relationship——of the convicted sex offender's status, 
if these persons did not request the information.18 
¶70 We cannot agree that the legislature intended to 
prohibit notification of potentially vulnerable persons; nothing 
in the language of the statutes or in the legislative history 
supports such a conclusion.  Such a conclusion would invalidate 
the notice in rule 16-3 for persons with whom the offender may 
become intimate, and would make it difficult for agents to work 
with potential employers, landlords, social service agencies, 
and 
professionals 
not 
specifically 
listed 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 301.46, 
without 
going 
through 
separate 
law 
enforcement 
agencies to convey information about offenders. 
¶71 We conclude instead that when the legislature enacted 
1997 Wis. Act 6 it acted on an intent to expand notification and 
protect the public.  It augmented the then current practice of 
probation agent notification by allowing law enforcement to 
inform anyone in the general public of information regarding the 
sex offenders in a community, even without a request.  This 
amendment has resulted in wide-scale notification, such as on 
publicly accessible Internet sites. 
¶72 We conclude that the legislature did not intend that 
Wis. Stat. §§ 301.45 and 301.46 occupy the field of sex offender 
registry notification and access, and did not intend to prohibit 
the DOC and probation agents from imposing rules of probation.  
                     
18 Law enforcement did not have the specific statutory 
authority to notify the general public, absent a specific 
request, until the legislature enacted 1997 Wis. Act 6.   
No. 99-3040 
 
30
¶73 Our conclusion is supported not only by the object, 
legislative history, and context of the statutes, but also by 
current practice.  On its sex offender registration Internet 
site, the DOC states that: "Public Safety is the primary 
objective of sex offender supervision" and the "[o]ffender is 
not allowed to remain anonymous."  Wisconsin Department of 
Corrections, 
Sex 
Offender 
Registry 
Program, 
Sex 
Offender 
Supervision 
and 
Rules 
(2001), 
at 
http://public-
sor.doc.state.wi.us/static/rules.html 
(last 
visited 
July 
3, 
2001). 
¶74 The 
DOC 
declares 
on 
its 
Internet 
site 
that 
"[s]upervising 
sex 
offenders 
is 
a 
multifaceted 
activity, 
requiring agents to adopt various roles and to work closely 
with a variety of other professionals as well as family members, 
employers and others who routinely interact with the offender." 
 Id. 
It 
further 
stresses 
the 
need 
for 
the 
"[u]se 
of 
personal/community and professional supervision networks to help 
monitor, modify, and control offender's behavior."  Id. 
¶75 "Probation/parole 
field 
units 
bear 
the 
onus 
of 
locating housing in the community for sex offenders, a time-
consuming and frequently frustrating task.  Supervision; home 
visits; collateral contacts with landlords, employers, and so 
forth. . . . "  Richard G. Zevitz & Mary Ann Farkas, Sex 
Offender 
Community 
Notification: 
Assessing 
the 
Impact 
in 
Wisconsin 10 (2000) (study conducted by the National Institute 
of Justice) (on file at the Wisconsin State Law Library) 
(emphasis added). 
No. 99-3040 
 
31
¶76 To ensure that a registered sex offender obtains 
employment and housing, a probation agent might need to interact 
with the sex offender's prospective employer or landlord and 
advise that person of the sex offender's status.  It is 
difficult to imagine that a probation/parole officer, required 
by the dictates of supervising a registered sex offender to make 
contact with the person's landlord and employer, would be 
prohibited by the legislature from divulging that the person is 
a sex offender or requiring the offender to inform his or her 
landlord or employer of his or her status.  
¶77 The same reasoning holds true for the person's 
neighbors or for a person with whom the registered person might 
become intimate.  We do not read Wis. Stat. §§ 301.45 and 301.46 
as reducing a probation agent's supervisory role for convicted 
sex offenders.  
¶78 Clearly a circuit court, the DOC, or a probation agent 
could impose conditions or rules of probation requiring a 
probationer who is not a registered sex offender to inform his 
or her employer, landlord, neighbors, or a person with whom the 
probationer might become intimate, of his or her status.  See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 973.09 
and 
973.10; 
Wis. 
Admin. 
Code § DOC 
328.04(3).  We do not discern a legislative intent to grant 
registered sex offenders more privacy and greater rights than 
other probationers.  As the DOC workgroup stated: "Persons found 
to have committed a sexual offense have a reduced expectation of 
privacy because of the public's interest in public safety."  
Final Report, supra, at i (emphasis added). 
No. 99-3040 
 
32
¶79 In summary, we find nothing in the language, the 
legislative history, the object, or the context of Wis. Stat. 
§§ 301.45 and 301.46 to indicate that the legislature intended 
in enacting 1995 Wis. Act 440 to prohibit probation agents from 
imposing rules requiring registered sex offenders to inform 
specified persons of their status.  We conclude that Wis. Stat. 
§§ 301.45 and 301.46 were not intended to occupy the field of 
sex offender registration information notification, and do not 
preclude a probation agent from imposing a rule requiring a 
probationer to inform others of the probationer's status as a 
sex offender. 
 
C. Reasonableness of Neighbor Notification Rule 
 
 
¶80 Having determined that Kaminski's probation agent was 
not prohibited by Wis. Stat. §§ 301.45 or 301.46 from imposing a 
rule of probation requiring Kaminski to inform his immediate 
neighbors of his status as a sex offender, we turn to the 
reasonableness of the rule in this case.   
¶81 Kaminski contends that rule 16-25 requiring him to 
inform his immediate neighbors that he is a convicted sex 
offender was neither reasonable nor appropriate, but was instead 
"potentially irresponsible, as well as unreasonable."  He 
asserts that the purpose of Wis. Stat. § 301.46 is to prevent 
the risk of conflict, violence, or retaliation, and claims that 
rule 
16-25 
"invites 
the 
type 
of 
fear, 
anger, 
conflict, 
humiliation 
and 
vigilante 
retaliation 
the 
legislature's 
No. 99-3040 
 
33
notification scheme was designed to discourage."  He further 
argues that rule 16-25 poses an unreasonable danger to a 
registered person's neighbors, as they necessarily come into 
contact with the registered person, who is presumed to pose a 
threat. 
¶82 We disagree with Kaminski's arguments.  The primary 
purpose of Wis. Stat. § 301.46 is not to protect registered sex 
offenders——it is to protect the public.  Bollig, 232 Wis. 2d 
561, ¶22.  The DOC workgroup stated that "[p]ersons found to 
have committed a sexual offense have a reduced expectation of 
privacy because of the public's interest in public safety" and 
that "protection of the public from sex offenders is a paramount 
governmental interest."  Final Report, supra, at i (emphasis 
added). 
¶83 We find that the rule requiring Kaminski to notify his 
immediate neighbors of his sex offender status was reasonably 
tailored to further the dual goals of probation, which are "to 
protect the public from criminal conduct and to help the 
probationer become a useful member of society."  Wagner v. 
State, 89 Wis. 2d 70, 77, 277 N.W.2d 849 (1979).  In Krebs v. 
Schwarz, the court of appeals determined that requiring a 
probationer to inform his or her agent before beginning an 
intimate relationship was consistent with the goals of probation 
because it required the probationer to confront and admit his 
sexually deviant behavior, and would help prevent relapse.  212 
Wis. 2d 127, 131, 568 N.W.2d 26 (Ct. App. 1997).  Similarly, 
rule 16-3 served to protect the public by ensuring that a person 
No. 99-3040 
 
34
about to begin an intimate relationship with the probationer 
would make an informed decision.  See id. at 132. 
¶84 The same reasoning applies in this case.  Requiring 
Kaminski to admit to his behavior and status will serve to help 
his rehabilitation by making him take responsibility for his 
actions.  It will also ensure that his neighbors know Kaminski's 
status before making any decision regarding their interaction 
with him.  Whether his neighbors want to socialize with Kaminski 
or avoid him, the legislature intended that the public be 
informed about sex offenders in their communities and protected 
from them.  Final Report, supra, at i. 
¶85 Finally, rule 16-25 is also narrowly tailored to meet 
the goals of probation.  It does not require Kaminski to inform 
his 
neighbors 
of 
all 
of 
his 
sex 
offender 
registration 
information, only his status as a sex offender.  It requires 
only that he give one piece of the information that is part of 
the public record, available to anyone in the general public if 
the police chief or sheriff decides to dispense it, and 
available from the DOC to any person who requests information 
about Kaminski.  Kaminski does not allege that he questioned the 
wisdom of the rule, that he asked his agent to go with him in 
notifying his neighbors, or even that he refused to comply with 
the rule.  He does not claim that he thought notifying his 
immediate neighbors was unreasonable.  He instead agreed to and 
signed the rule, and then decided to ignore it.  We cannot 
conclude that rule 16-25 is unreasonable as applied to Kaminski. 
 
No. 99-3040 
 
35
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
¶86 We hold that Wisconsin's sex offender registration 
statutes, Wis. Stat. §§ 301.45 and 301.46, do not occupy the 
field 
in 
regulating 
the 
dissemination 
of 
sex 
offender 
registration information, and do not prohibit a probation agent 
from imposing a rule of probation requiring a probationer to 
inform the probationer's immediate neighbors of his or her 
status as a convicted sex offender.  We further hold that rule 
16-25, requiring Kaminski to notify his immediate neighbors that 
he is a convicted sex offender, was not unreasonable as applied 
to Kaminski.  We therefore reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals, and affirm the revocation of Kaminski's probation.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
 
No. 99-3040.ssa 
 
1 
¶87 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (dissenting).  I 
confess that I came close to joining the majority opinion in 
this case.  Its explanation of the report and recommendations of 
the 
Department 
of 
Corrections 
(DOC) 
workgroup 
is 
very 
persuasive.  Were the DOC workgroup's report and recommendations 
law, I would have no problem allowing Kaminski's probation agent 
to require Kaminski to disclose his sex offender status to his 
immediate neighbors. 
¶88 But, of course, our focus is not on what the DOC 
workgroup recommended to the legislature.  Rather, we are asked 
whether the relevant statutes, Wis. Stat. §§ 301.45 and 301.46 
(1997-98), enacted by the legislature, allow a probation agent 
to 
require 
a 
sex 
offender 
to 
disclose 
information 
kept 
confidential by the statute.  If the legislature wanted to 
incorporate the entirety of the DOC's report and recommendations 
into the statute governing sex offender registry, it could have 
done so.  Had the legislature done so, this case would not have 
reached this court.  
¶89 Instead, 
the legislature 
crafted 
a 
detailed and 
extensive law that expressly sets forth who can release sex 
offender information, to whom it can be released, and the 
circumstances under which it can be released.  Violations of the 
statute's requirement that the information be kept confidential 
are punishable by a fine or imprisonment or both.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 301.45(6)(b) (1997-98).  The statute does not fully 
incorporate the DOC workgroup's recommendations.  In particular, 
the exceptions to the statute's requirement that the information 
No. 99-3040.ssa 
 
2 
be kept confidential do not authorize the probation agent to 
disclose 
the 
confidential 
information 
to 
the 
offender's 
immediate neighbors. 
¶90 The court of appeals concluded that because the 
statute plainly prohibits 
Kaminski's 
probation 
agent 
from 
disclosing the confidential information to Kaminski's immediate 
neighbors, the probation officer cannot require Kaminski to do 
what the probation agent may not do under the statute.  See 
State ex rel. Kaminski v. Schwarz, 2000 WI App 159, 238 Wis. 2d 
16, 616 N.W.2d 148.  I agree with the court of appeals. 
¶91 For the reasons set forth by the court of appeals, I 
dissent. 
¶92 I am authorized to state that Justices WILLIAM A. 
BABLITCH and ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this opinion. 
 
No. 99-3040.ssa 
 
1