Title: State v. Soto
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 106306
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: April 11, 2014

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 106,306 
 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
ROGELIO SOTO, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1.  
 
K.S.A. 22-3421 requires jury unanimity as to guilt in a criminal case. Jury 
unanimity concerns arise when (1) the court instructs the jury on alternative means of 
committing the crime charged but the State fails to present substantial evidence of both 
means; or (2) the jury hears evidence of multiple acts that could each constitute the crime 
charged, but the State fails to elect the specific act it relies on to support the charge and 
the district court fails to instruct the jury it must unanimously agree on the defendant's 
guilt as to a specific act.  
 
2.  
 
The Kansas aiding and abetting statute does not add distinct material elements to 
the definition of a charged crime, thus creating alternative means of committing that 
crime. Rather, the aiding and abetting statute simply extends criminal responsibility to a 
person other than the principal actor. 
 
2 
 
 
 
3.  
 
In a multiple acts case the State alleges several acts, any one of which could 
constitute the crime charged, and the jury must be unanimous as to which act the 
defendant committed.  
 
4.  
 
When multiple acts jury unanimity is at issue, the threshold question for an 
appellate court is whether it is presented with a multiple acts case. This is a question of 
law subject to unlimited review.  
 
5.  
 
The pattern jury instruction, PIK Crim. 3d 54.05, is a correct statement of Kansas 
law on aiding and abetting.  
 
6.  
 
When a defendant challenges the admission of photographic evidence, an 
appellate court first determines the photographs' relevancy. Photographs depicting the 
extent, nature, and number of wounds inflicted are generally relevant to a murder charge.  
 
7.  
 
When a party argues photographs are overly repetitious, gruesome, or 
inflammatory, i.e., unduly prejudicial, an appellate court reviews for an abuse of 
discretion.  
 
8.  
 
Determining a statute's constitutionality is a question of law subject to unlimited 
review. An appellate court presumes statutes are constitutional and must resolve all 
doubts in favor of a statute's validity. Further, an appellate court must interpret a statute 
3 
 
 
 
in a manner that renders it constitutional if there is any reasonable construction that will 
maintain the legislature's apparent intent. 
 
9.  
 
Kansas' statutory procedure for imposing a hard 50 sentence as provided in K.S.A. 
21-4635 violates the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution as interpreted in 
Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2155, 2160-63, 186 L. Ed. 2d 
314 (2013), because it permits a judge to find by a preponderance of the evidence the 
existence of one or more aggravating factors necessary to impose an increased mandatory 
minimum sentence, rather than requiring a jury to find the existence of the aggravating 
factors beyond a reasonable doubt.  
 
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; DAVID J. KAUFMAN, judge. Opinion filed April 11, 2014. 
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with directions. 
 
Kevin J. Zolotor, of O'Hara & O'Hara LLC, of Wichita, argued the cause, and Charles A. O'Hara, 
of the same firm, was on the briefs for appellant.  
 
Lesley A. Isherwood, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Marc Bennett, district 
attorney, Nola Tedesco Foulston, former district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with 
her on the briefs for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
MORITZ, J.:  Rogelio Soto appeals his jury conviction and sentence for the first-
degree premeditated murder of Arturo Moreno, Jr. Soto seeks a reversal of his conviction 
and new trial, claiming he was denied his statutory right to a unanimous jury verdict, the 
jury was given a clearly erroneous aiding and abetting instruction, and the district court 
4 
 
 
 
abused its discretion in admitting overly gruesome autopsy photographs. We reject each 
of Soto's claims and affirm his conviction.  
 
Soto also challenges his sentence, claiming the district court erred in imposing a 
life sentence without the possibility of parole for 50 years (hard 50). Soto contends 
Kansas' hard 50 statutory procedure as provided in K.S.A. 21-4635 is unconstitutional in 
light of Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 186 L. Ed. 2d 314 
(2013). We agree and conclude Kansas' hard 50 sentencing scheme violates the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution as interpreted in Alleyne because it permits 
a judge to find by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of one or more 
aggravating circumstances necessary to impose an increased mandatory minimum 
sentence, rather than requiring a jury to find the existence of the aggravating 
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Based on this conclusion, we vacate Soto's 
sentence and remand for resentencing.  
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND  
 
On March 17, 2009, Arturo Moreno spent the afternoon and evening at his 
Wichita apartment with his girlfriend, Aurora Tinoco; Aurora's infant son; Aurora's sister, 
Pamela Tinoco; and the Tinoco sisters' friend, Lisa Chavez. Aurora had been dating 
Moreno for about 6 months and knew that he formerly was involved with the Vato Loco 
Boys, or VLBs, a north side Wichita gang.  
 
With Moreno's permission, Pamela invited her boyfriend, Rogelio Soto, to 
Moreno's apartment. Soto arrived at Moreno's apartment sometime after 6 p.m., along 
with his friends Giovanni Gonzalez and Luis Navarrette-Pacheco. Soto and his friends 
were affiliated with the Lopers, a subset of the Surenos, or Sur 13s, a south side Wichita 
gang and known VLB rival.  
5 
 
 
 
 
Officer Jeremy Miller, a gang intelligence officer, testified at Soto's trial about the 
rivalry between the Sur 13s and the VLBs. Miller explained that the rivalry intensified in 
the late 1990s when VLB members killed 8-year-old Tony Galvan, a.k.a. "Little Tony," 
in a drive-by shooting. Although Galvan was not a known gang member, he lived in a 
close-knit south side community that was primarily Sur 13 territory. According to Miller, 
the Sur 13s perceived Galvan's murder both as a sign of disrespect to the Sur 13s and as 
the killing of a family member. Miller explained that just the mention of Galvan's murder 
could "spike violence" between the Sur 13s and the VLBs. 
 
 
On the evening of the murder, Moreno primarily stayed inside his apartment with 
Aurora and her son, while Pamela, Soto, and their friends congregated outside, dancing, 
drinking, and listening to music. Pamela took photographs, several of which depicted 
Soto and Navarrette-Pacheco holding beer cans and bottles and "throwing up gang signs." 
At some point, everyone gathered inside Moreno's apartment and continued drinking and 
listening to music. Pamela and Gonzalez played chess in Moreno's living room. 
According to Aurora and Pamela, Moreno interacted with Soto and his friends, and no 
one argued about gang affiliation.  
  
Aurora and her son, along with Pamela and Chavez, left Moreno's apartment at 
about 9 p.m., while Soto, Gonzalez, and Navarrette-Pacheco remained at the apartment. 
Neither sister was concerned that anything would happen because when they left 
"everything was cool."  
 
Shortly after Aurora and Pamela left Moreno's apartment, Gonzalez and 
Navarrette-Pacheco also left to pick up a fourth friend, Angel Castro. Around 9:25 p.m. 
Soto sent Pamela a text message from Moreno's cell phone and told Pamela he and 
Moreno were alone. When Soto's friends returned to the apartment, Soto told Castro not 
6 
 
 
 
to touch anything. Castro thought Soto was playing around so Castro eventually handled 
a beer can and a remote control. Everyone gathered in the living room.  
 
Not long after Castro arrived, he overheard Moreno talking on the phone. It 
sounded to Castro as though Moreno was either taking responsibility for a young boy's 
killing or talking to someone who was claiming responsibility for the killing.  
 
Bryan Duran, Moreno's friend and coworker, testified that at about 10 p.m. the 
night of the murder he spoke on the phone with Moreno, who sounded as if he had been 
drinking. At one point, Moreno told Duran he loved him and would die for him. Moreno 
asked Duran about Tony Galvan's murder, and Duran responded that Galvan's killers 
were caught almost immediately after the shooting. In the background, Duran could hear 
music and people conversing in Spanish. Duran asked Moreno if everything was okay 
and whether Moreno wanted Duran to come over. Moreno said he was fine.  
 
Shortly after Moreno ended his phone call, Castro looked up and saw Soto holding 
a knife. Castro stood up to walk outside, and as he did so he heard Moreno twice ask, 
"Why?" Castro walked outside to a fence in the backyard, urinated, and stayed outside for 
a "short time." When he returned to the apartment, he could see blood on the floor of the 
living room. 
 
Castro entered the living room to retrieve the beer can and remote control he had 
touched, and as he did so, he could see Moreno's body lying on the floor in a pool of 
blood. Castro took the items outside and placed them in Gonzalez' truck and watched as 
Soto, who had bloody hands, placed a black trash bag in the bed of the truck. Castro did 
not know the contents of the trash bag, but he thought it might contain the murder 
weapons. All four men got into the truck, and Castro drove away from the apartment. At 
some point, Castro asked Soto "why'd he do it, why did they do it, and [Soto] just said, 
7 
 
 
 
[Be]cause of Little Tony." The group discussed the need to clean Gonzalez' truck and 
someone suggested they check their shoes for blood.  
 
Castro drove to an area of south Wichita near the Arkansas River where Soto, 
Gonzalez, and Navarrette-Pacheco disposed of the black trash bag and other items taken 
from Moreno's apartment, including the remote control and beer can. Castro then drove 
the group to Soto's home where Soto, Gonzalez, and Navarrette-Pacheco changed clothes 
and placed their soiled clothing in Soto's washing machine. Gonzalez left Soto's house 
around 11 p.m., and Castro and Navarrette-Pacheco left around midnight.  
 
Sometime after 11:30 p.m., Moreno's brother, David Moreno, discovered 
Moreno's body and flagged down a police officer driving through the neighborhood. 
Based on information from David, Aurora, and Pamela, officers quickly developed four 
suspects:  Soto, Gonzalez, Navarrette-Pacheco, and Castro.  
 
Through investigation, law enforcement officers discovered Moreno's blood on 
several items:  Gonzalez' shoes, Soto's left shoe, Navarrette-Pacheco's shorts, Castro's 
jeans, and the exterior of Gonzalez' truck near the passenger side door. They also 
discovered that zigzag patterns on the soles of both Castro's and Soto's shoes were 
consistent with zigzag shoe patterns found in blood on Moreno's apartment floor. 
Additionally, after Castro led officers to the location where he and the others disposed of 
items from Moreno's apartment, officers recovered a torn black trash bag containing a 
black shirt, beer cans, a beer bottle, and a remote control; a paper sack containing a knife; 
a DVD player; and several chess pieces. 
 
Detective Wendy Hummell testified she interviewed Castro twice. During the 
second interview, Castro said he and Soto talked in Gonzalez' truck after the murder and 
Soto told Castro that Soto and Moreno had discussed Little Tony's murder while they 
8 
 
 
 
were alone in the apartment. Further, Soto told Castro that Moreno confessed to killing 
Little Tony and that Soto "'just kept keeping it cool'" until the others returned to Moreno's 
apartment.  
 
Dr. Bamidele Adeagbo performed Moreno's autopsy and testified at trial that 
Moreno bled to death from a combination of 79 stab wounds and cuts, including cuts to 
main arteries on both sides of his neck and several deep stab wounds to his right lung, 
liver, intestines, and diaphragm. Adeagbo explained that while it was difficult to 
determine from Moreno's injuries whether he had been stabbed by more than one person, 
the different wound sizes suggested the use of more than one weapon.  
 
Gary Miller, a firearm and toolmark examiner, examined several knives recovered 
during the investigation. Miller compared each knife to a cast made from one of Moreno's 
deep stab wounds. Miller could not exclude three of the knives as the weapon that caused 
that particular injury—a knife found on Moreno's bookshelf, a multipurpose tool found in 
Gonzalez' truck, and the knife found near the river.  
 
In an interview with Detective Robert Chisholm the day following the murder, 
Soto admitted he was at Moreno's apartment on the night of the murder and he was 
affiliated with the Lopers. But Soto maintained he and his friends left the apartment 
immediately after Aurora and Pamela left. When asked to explain the blood found on his 
shoes, Soto suggested it appeared through "witchcraft or something." During the 
interview, Chisholm did not see any injuries on Soto's hands.  
 
After the State charged Soto, Gonzalez, and Navarrette-Pacheco with first-degree 
premeditated murder, Castro pled guilty to aiding a felon and agreed to testify at Soto's 
trial. The district court granted the State's motion to prosecute Soto, who was 16 years old 
9 
 
 
 
at the time of the murder, as an adult and tried him separately from the other defendants. 
A jury found Soto guilty of first-degree premeditated murder.  
 
The State filed notice of its intent to seek a hard 50 sentence, alleging Soto 
committed the crime in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner. After an 
evidentiary hearing at which the State presented evidence related to Soto's gang activities 
before and after the murder and Soto presented evidence of multiple mitigating 
circumstances, the district court agreed that Soto committed the murder in a heinous, 
atrocious, and cruel manner and found only one mitigating circumstance, Soto's age. The 
court then imposed a hard 50 sentence after determining the aggravating circumstance 
was not outweighed by the mitigating circumstance. This court's jurisdiction over Soto's 
direct appeal arises under K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 22-3601(b)(3) (life sentence imposed).  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Soto Was Not Denied His Statutory Right to a Unanimous Jury Verdict 
 
On appeal, Soto argues he was denied his statutory right to a unanimous jury 
verdict in two respects. First, he argues the district court instructed the jury it could find 
him guilty of committing first-degree murder based on alternative means and the 
evidence was insufficient to support either means. Second, he contends the State 
presented evidence of multiple acts to support the murder charge but failed to elect a 
specific act, and the district court failed to instruct the jury it must unanimously agree on 
the specific act supporting the charge. 
 
 
K.S.A. 22-3421 requires jury unanimity as to guilt in a criminal case. Jury 
unanimity concerns arise when the court instructs the jury on alternative means of 
committing the crime charged but the State fails to present substantial evidence of both 
means. See State v. Brown, 295 Kan. 181, 188, 284 P.3d 977 (2012) (discussing 
10 
 
 
 
alternative means rule and its corollary super-sufficiency requirement). Jury unanimity 
concerns may also arise when the jury hears evidence of multiple acts that could each 
constitute the crime charged but the State fails to elect the specific act it relies on to 
support the charge and the district court fails to instruct the jury it must unanimously 
agree on the defendant's guilt as to a specific act. See State v. Ultreras, 296 Kan. 828, 
854-55, 295 P.3d 1020 (2013) (discussing multiple acts cases and three-part analysis). 
Contrary to Soto's argument, neither jury unanimity concern presents itself here. 
 
The jury was not instructed on alternative means of committing first-degree 
murder, and the evidence is sufficient to support Soto's conviction. 
 
Relying on State v. Boyd, 46 Kan. App. 2d 945, 268 P.3d 1210 (2011), Soto argues 
the court instructed the jury on alternative means of committing first-degree murder 
because he could have been convicted of that crime as a principal or as an aider and 
abettor. See 46 Kan. App. 2d at 953 (concluding that instructing jury on aiding and 
abetting as set out in K.S.A. 21-3205[1] creates alternative means issue). Based on his 
assumption that these were alternative means, Soto argues the evidence was insufficient 
to support either means and his murder conviction must be reversed.  
 
Our decision in State v. Betancourt, No. 106,318, 299 Kan. __, __ P.3d __ (April 
11, 2014), forecloses Soto's argument. There, we explained that the Kansas aiding and 
abetting statute does not add distinct material elements to the definition of the charged 
crime, thus creating alternative means of committing that crime. Rather, the aiding and 
abetting statute simply extends criminal responsibility to a person other than the principal 
actor. Slip op. at 11-12. Thus, we reject Soto's argument that the jury instructions in this 
case created an alternative means problem. 
 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to consider Soto's argument regarding the "super-
sufficiency" of the evidence, as he claims the evidence is insufficient to support his guilt 
11 
 
 
 
either as an aider or abettor or as a principal. Given that these were the only two theories 
of criminal liability presented to the jury, we construe Soto's argument as a general 
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. We recently 
reiterated the standard of review applied to a sufficiency challenge: 
 
 
"When sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a criminal case, the standard 
of review is whether, after reviewing all the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
prosecution, the appellate court is convinced a rational factfinder could have found the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellate courts do not reweigh evidence, 
resolve evidentiary conflicts, or make witness credibility determinations. [Citation 
omitted.]" State v. Remmert, 298 Kan. 621, 629, 316 P.3d 154 (2014). 
 
 
Here, to establish Soto's guilt for premeditated first-degree murder, the State was 
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Soto premeditated and intended 
Moreno's death and that Soto either committed the physical acts that led to Moreno's 
death or facilitated another in committing those acts. See K.S.A. 21-3401(a) (defining 
premeditated first-degree murder); K.S.A. 21-3205(1) (defining liability for intentional 
crimes of another); State v. Baker, 287 Kan. 345, 366, 197 P.3d 421 (2008) (stating that 
to establish guilt on basis of aiding and abetting, State must show that defendant 
knowingly associated with unlawful venture and participated in a manner indicating he or 
she was facilitating success of venture); State v. Engelhardt, 280 Kan. 113, 132, 119 P.3d 
1148 (2005) ("[A] person guilty of aiding and abetting a premeditated first-degree murder 
must be found, beyond a reasonable doubt, to have had the requisite premeditation to 
murder the victim.").  
 
Based on the evidence presented by the State, as previously detailed in this 
opinion, we are firmly convinced that a rational jury could have concluded, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that Soto was guilty either as a principal or an aider and abettor. 
 
12 
 
 
 
The district court did not err in failing to give a jury unanimity instruction because 
this is not a multiple acts case. 
 
Alternatively, Soto argues the district court erred in failing to give a unanimity 
instruction because the State presented evidence of multiple acts but failed to elect a 
specific act to support the charge.  
 
We have explained that in a multiple acts case the State alleges several acts, any 
one of which could constitute the crime charged, and the jury must be unanimous as to 
which act the defendant committed. See State v. Jones, 295 Kan. 1050, Syl. ¶ 3, 288 P.3d 
140 (2012). When jury unanimity is at issue on this basis, the threshold question is 
whether we are presented with a multiple acts case. We exercise unlimited review over 
this question of law. State v. Voyles, 284 Kan. 239, 244, 160 P.3d 794 (2007).  
 
Soto's argument as to the existence of multiple acts is unclear. He points out that 
the State presented evidence that Soto directed Castro not to touch anything when Castro 
arrived at the apartment and that Soto and his friends cleaned up everything they touched 
in the apartment, took several items from the apartment, and threw the items in the river. 
Soto appears to suggest that these actions were "multiple acts" that independently would 
have supported the charge of first-degree premeditated murder based on the theory of 
aiding and abetting. We disagree. 
 
Regardless of whether the State proved Soto acted as a principal or an aider and 
abettor, this case cannot be a multiple acts case because there was only one killing.  
Stated another way, none of the "acts" Soto relies upon to support his multiple acts 
argument are factually and legally sufficient to satisfy all of the elements of first-degree 
premeditated murder. See State v. Trujillo, 296 Kan. 625, 629-30, 294 P.3d 281 (2013) 
(threshold question is "whether the defendant's actions could have given rise to multiple 
counts of the charged crime"); State v. Zabrinas, 271 Kan. 422, 439, 24 P.3d 77 (2001) 
13 
 
 
 
("Multiple acts instructions are only necessary where the facts show separate incidents 
that are factually and legally sufficient to satisfy all of the elements of the crime.").  
 
Because this is not a multiple acts case, we conclude the district court did not err 
in failing to give a jury unanimity instruction.  
 
The Aiding and Abetting Instruction Was Not Clearly Erroneous 
 
Next, Soto argues the district court improperly instructed the jury on aiding and 
abetting.  
 
The jury received the following aiding and abetting instruction, which conforms 
with PIK Crim. 3d 54.05 (responsibility for crimes of another): 
 
 
"A defendant who, either before or during its commission, intentionally aids or 
abets another to commit a crime with intent to promote or assist in its commission is 
criminally responsible for the crime committed regardless of the extent of the defendant's 
participation, if any, in the actual commission of the crime."  
 
Soto argues this instruction misstated the law because it used the phrase "a crime" 
followed by the phrase "the crime." Specifically, he reasons that the instruction permitted 
a reasonable juror to conclude that if Soto aided or abetted another to commit "a crime," 
then he is guilty of "the crime" committed even if it was a different crime than he aided 
or abetted.  
 
Because Soto failed to object below, we review for clear error. See K.S.A. 2013 
Supp. 22-3414(3); State v. Robinson, 293 Kan. 1002, 1036, 270 P.3d 1183 (2012). 
Applying that review, we first determine whether the given instruction was erroneous. 
14 
 
 
 
This is a legal question subject to de novo review. State v. Williams, 295 Kan. 506, 515-
16, 286 P.3d 195 (2012). 
 
As the State points out, this court has repeatedly approved PIK Crim. 3d 54.05 as a 
correct statement of Kansas law on aiding and abetting. See, e.g., Betancourt, 299 Kan. at 
__ (slip op. at 5-8); State v. Llamas, 298 Kan. 246, 258-60, 311 P.3d 399 (2013) (citing 
cases); Engelhardt, 280 Kan. at 132. Soto provides no persuasive argument for 
reconsideration of these recent decisions, and we reject his claim of error. 
 
The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Admitting Autopsy Photographs 
 
Over Soto's objections, the district court admitted 32 autopsy photographs. On 
appeal, Soto claims the district court abused its discretion in admitting 6 of the 32 
photographs—State's Exhibits 28T, 28U, 28V, 28W, 28Z, and 28AA. He argues these 
photographs were overly gruesome, not natural, inflammatory, and prejudicial, and their 
erroneous admission was not harmless.  
 
When a defendant challenges the admission of photographic evidence, we first 
determine the photographs' relevancy. Photographs depicting the extent, nature, and 
number of wounds inflicted are generally relevant to a murder charge. State v. Burnett, 
293 Kan. 840, 853, 270 P.3d 1115 (2012). When a party argues photographs are overly 
repetitious, gruesome, or inflammatory, i.e., unduly prejudicial, we review for an abuse 
of discretion. State v. Rodriguez, 295 Kan. 1146, 1156, 289 P.3d 85 (2012). "The 
admission of photographs in a murder case has rarely been held to be an abuse of 
discretion." Rodriguez, 295 Kan. at 1157. 
 
The State admitted through Dr. Adeagbo all six of the photographs of which Soto 
now complains. Dr. Adeagbo described Exhibit 28T as a photograph depicting the inside 
15 
 
 
 
of Moreno's neck to show damage to the internal jugular vein and Exhibit 28U as a 
photograph depicting a closer view of the same injury. Dr. Adeagbo testified this 
particular injury encompassed both a deep stab wound that penetrated the jugular vein 
and an internal cut that caused a major tear of the vein. Dr. Adeagbo described Exhibits 
28V and 28W as photographs depicting the thyroid cartilage he removed from Moreno's 
neck during the autopsy to demonstrate a stab wound that cut through the cartilage. 
Notably, the thyroid cartilage stab wound depicted in these photographs is the same 
wound from which Gary Miller made a cast for comparison with potential murder 
weapons. Finally, Dr. Adeagbo described Exhibits 28Z and 28AA as photographs 
depicting the inside of the chest cavity, with organs removed, to show one or two stab 
wounds that penetrated through the skin and muscle and into the chest cavity.  
 
As Soto suggests, the cause of death in this case was neither disputed nor 
complex; Moreno bled to death from 79 stab wounds. But even when the cause of death 
is not disputed, the State is allowed to introduce photographic evidence in murder cases 
to demonstrate the fact and manner of death and the violent nature of the crime. See 
Burnett, 293 Kan. at 853-54. Here, the six autopsy photographs Soto challenges 
demonstrate the manner of death and the violent nature of the crime and depict only a few 
of Moreno's 79 wounds. Based on our review, we find these photographs relevant and not 
overly gruesome, inflammatory, or unduly prejudicial. Accordingly, the district court did 
not abuse its discretion in admitting the photographs. 
 
The District Court Erred in Imposing a Hard 50 Sentence 
  
After Soto's conviction, the State filed notice of its intent to seek a hard 50 
sentence, alleging Soto committed the crime in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel 
manner. See K.S.A. 21-4636(f). In response, Soto argued imposition of a hard 50 
sentence against a juvenile offender was prohibited under the Eighth Amendment to the 
16 
 
 
 
United States Constitution and Section 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. 
Alternatively, Soto argued a hard 50 sentence would be unconstitutionally 
disproportionate under the facts of his case. Finally, Soto asserted the evidence did not 
support the aggravating circumstance alleged by the State and several mitigating 
circumstances weighed against imposition of a hard 50 sentence.  
 
After receiving evidence and hearing arguments from both parties, the district 
court rejected Soto's constitutional challenges to imposition of a hard 50 sentence. Next, 
the court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Soto committed the crime in an 
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner, noting the victim was aware of his fate, 
Soto committed continuous acts of violence before the killing, and Soto desecrated the 
body in a manner indicating a particular depravity of mind. See K.S.A. 21-4636(f)(5) and 
(6). The court inferred from the evidence that even if Moreno's wounds were inflicted by 
more than one knife, Soto "was the sole actor if not the primary actor." Finally, the court 
found Soto's age to be the only mitigating circumstance and concluded this mitigating 
circumstance did not outweigh the aggravating circumstance. Accordingly, the court 
imposed a hard 50 sentence.  
 
In his initial appeal brief, Soto argued the district court erroneously imposed a 
hard 50 sentence because the evidence was insufficient to establish the aggravating factor 
that Soto personally committed the crime in a heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner. See 
K.S.A. 21-4636(f). Additionally, he argued the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution prohibited imposition of the hard 50 sentence either as a matter of law 
because he committed the murder as a juvenile or because it was a disproportionate 
sentence under the facts of this case. 
 
After the parties filed their initial briefs, the United States Supreme Court 
extended the rule announced in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 
17 
 
 
 
147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000), and held that the Sixth Amendment's right to a jury trial 
requires that any fact that increases a mandatory minimum sentence increases the penalty 
for a crime and, therefore, is an "'element'" that must be submitted to a jury and proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 
2162-63, 186 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2013).  
 
After Alleyne, we granted Soto's motion to file a supplemental brief challenging 
the constitutionality of his hard 50 sentence as violative of his right to a jury trial. In that 
brief, Soto argues Kansas' statutory procedure for imposing a hard 50 sentence, K.S.A. 
21-4635, clearly violates Alleyne because it permits imposition of an increased mandatory 
minimum sentence based on judicial factfinding by a preponderance of the evidence. In 
its response, the State concedes Kansas' hard 50 sentencing scheme contains a "judicial 
factfinding component" in that it requires a judge to find the existence of aggravating 
factors. But the State attempts to distinguish the hard 50 sentencing scheme from the 
sentencing scheme at issue in Alleyne and maintains that Alleyne did not implicate the 
constitutionality of K.S.A. 21-4635.  
 
Before oral argument in this case, we directed the parties to file additional 
supplemental briefs addressing whether an Alleyne error is subject to harmless error 
review and, if so, whether any error in this case was harmless. Soto's supplemental brief 
generally contends an Alleyne error is not amenable to a harmless error analysis. 
Alternatively, he argues the error in this case was not harmless. In contrast, the State 
contends harmless error review is appropriate and the error here was harmless.  
 
1.  Overview of hard 50 sentencing scheme and post-Apprendi and pre-Alleyne 
developments 
 
In Kansas, the statutorily authorized maximum sentence for a conviction of first-
degree premeditated murder is life imprisonment. K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-6806(c). 
18 
 
 
 
Ordinarily, the mandatory minimum sentence is 25 years. K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 22-
3717(b)(1); see also State v. Warledo, 286 Kan. 927, 955, 190 P.3d 937 (2008) ("In 
determining whether to impose a hard 50 sentence, the sentencing court is considering the 
minimum sentence, not the maximum."). But, in some cases, the sentencing court may 
impose an increased mandatory minimum sentence of either 40 or 50 years.  
 
The hard 50 sentencing scheme in effect at the time of Soto's offense provided that 
for any defendant convicted of first-degree premeditated murder committed on or after 
July 1, 1999, the sentencing court "shall determine whether the defendant shall be 
required to serve a mandatory term of imprisonment of . . . 50 years or sentenced as 
otherwise provided by law." K.S.A. 21-4635(b). To make that determination, the court 
considered evidence relevant to any statutory aggravating circumstances alleged by the 
State and any mitigating circumstances. K.S.A. 21-4635(c). But if the court made certain 
findings, it was required to impose a hard 50 sentence:   
 
 
"If the court finds that one or more of the aggravating circumstances enumerated 
in K.S.A. 21-4636 and amendments thereto exist and, further, that the existence of such 
aggravating circumstances is not outweighed by any mitigating circumstances which are 
found to exist, the defendant shall be sentenced pursuant to K.S.A. 21-4638 and 
amendments thereto; otherwise, the defendant shall be sentenced as provided by law. The 
court shall designate, in writing, the statutory aggravating circumstances which it found." 
(Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 21-4635(d). 
 
Shortly after the Supreme Court issued its decision in Apprendi, this court in State 
v. Conley, 270 Kan. 18, 30-35, 11 P.3d 1147 (2000), cert. denied 532 U.S. 932 (2001), 
considered the constitutionality of the hard 40 sentencing scheme—amended in 1999 to a 
hard 50 scheme. See K.S.A. 21-4635 (Furse 1995) (permitting imposition of 40-year 
mandatory minimum sentence for first-degree premeditated murder); K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 
21-4635 (reflecting hard 50 amendment). The Conley court acknowledged Apprendi's 
19 
 
 
 
holding that "'other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty 
for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.' (Emphasis added.) 147 L. Ed. 2d at 455." Conley, 
270 Kan. at 34. However, the court found McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 106 S. 
Ct. 2411, 91 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1986), rather than Apprendi, controlled this issue. See also 
State v. Johnson, 284 Kan. 18, 23, 159 P.3d 161 (2007) (upholding constitutionality of 
hard 50 scheme under McMillan rationale), cert. denied 552 U.S. 1104 (2008).  
 
In McMillan, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Pennsylvania's Mandatory 
Minimum Sentencing Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9712 (1982). The Act applied to 
convictions of several enumerated felonies and required a sentencing judge to impose a 
mandatory minimum sentence of 5 years if the judge found by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the defendant "visibly possessed a firearm" during the commission of the 
underlying felony. 477 U.S. at 81-82. The McMillan Court ultimately concluded the 
visible possession of a firearm represented a "sentencing factor" to be considered by the 
sentencing court rather than an "element" the State must prove to a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 477 U.S. at 85-93. 
 
Two years after this court's decision in Conley, the United States Supreme Court in 
Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 568, 122 S. Ct. 2406, 153 L. Ed. 2d 524 (2002), 
reaffirmed McMillan in light of Apprendi. The statutory sentencing scheme at issue in 
Harris, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2012), provided ascending mandatory minimum sentences 
depending on whether the defendant possessed (5 years), brandished (7 years), or 
discharged (10 years) a firearm during the commission of an enumerated felony. 536 U.S. 
at 550-51. Relying on McMillan's distinction between factual findings that increase a 
maximum sentence beyond what the jury verdict would allow, which the Court 
characterized as "elements," and factual findings that increase a mandatory minimum 
sentence, which the Court characterized as "sentencing factors," the Harris Court 
20 
 
 
 
reconciled Apprendi and McMillan. Harris, 536 U.S. at 557, 564-65; see also McMillan, 
477 U.S. at 85-86, 91.  
 
The same year the Court issued Harris, it relied on Apprendi to hold Arizona's 
capital sentencing scheme unconstitutional in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S. Ct. 
2428, 153 L. Ed. 2d 556 (2002). Under that sentencing scheme, the death penalty could 
be imposed following a bifurcated trial if, (1) during the guilt phase, a jury convicted the 
defendant of capital murder and, (2) during the penalty phase, the trial judge found, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of at least one aggravating circumstance and 
"'no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.'" 536 U.S. at 
592-93.  
 
Before Apprendi, the United States Supreme Court had upheld the 
constitutionality of the same Arizona capital sentencing scheme in Walton v. Arizona, 
497 U.S. 639, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 111 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1990). In Walton, the Court 
specifically rejected the defendant's argument that Arizona's aggravating factors were 
"'elements' of the offense" that must be submitted to and found by a jury to satisfy the 
Sixth Amendment. 497 U.S. at 648-49. Relying on Walton, the Arizona Supreme Court 
had upheld the scheme and Ring's death sentence. See State v. Ring, 200 Ariz. 267, 280, 
25 P.3d 1139 (2001).  
 
But in Ring v. Arizona, the Court overruled Walton in part, specifically rejecting 
the distinction drawn in Walton between elements of an offense and sentencing factors. 
Ring, 536 U.S. at 608-09. The Ring Court noted:  "Apprendi repeatedly instructs [that as 
to elevation of the maximum punishment] the characterization of a fact or circumstance 
as an 'element' or a 'sentencing factor' is not determinative of the question 'who decides,' 
judge or jury." 536 U.S. at 604-05. The Court ultimately held:  "Because Arizona's 
enumerated aggravating factors operate as 'the functional equivalent of an element of a 
21 
 
 
 
greater offense,' . . . the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury." 536 
U.S. at 609.  
  
Two years later, in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 299, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 
159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004), the Court considered Apprendi's application to a Washington 
statute that permitted imposition of an "exceptional" sentence, i.e., a sentence exceeding 
the standard sentencing range under Washington's sentencing guidelines, if the judge 
found "'substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence.'" The 
Blakely Court briefly summarized its holdings in Apprendi and Ring, stating:  "In each 
case, we concluded that the defendant's constitutional rights had been violated because 
the judge had imposed a sentence greater than the maximum he could have imposed 
under state law without the challenged factual finding." Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303. The 
Court clarified that the "'statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum 
sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict 
or admitted by the defendant." Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303.  
 
Significantly, the Blakely Court rejected the State's attempt to distinguish 
Apprendi and Ring based on the fact "that the enumerated grounds for departure in its 
regime are illustrative rather than exhaustive," stating: 
 
"Whether the judge's authority to impose an enhanced sentence depends on finding a 
specified fact (as in Apprendi), one of several specified facts (as in Ring), or any 
aggravating fact (as here), it remains the case that the jury's verdict alone does not 
authorize the sentence. The judge acquires that authority only upon finding some 
additional fact." Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305.  
 
Ultimately, the Blakely Court concluded that "[b]ecause the State's sentencing 
procedure did not comply with the Sixth Amendment, petitioner's sentence is invalid." 
542 U.S. at 305. 
22 
 
 
 
 
In sum, before Alleyne, the United States Supreme Court held that any additional 
facts necessary to increase the punishment for a crime beyond the maximum punishment 
a judge could impose based solely on the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by 
the defendant must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In 
contrast, additional facts necessary to increase the mandatory minimum sentence were 
merely sentencing factors that could be found by a judge rather than a jury. 
 
In several cases decided after Harris and Ring, this court maintained its reliance 
on McMillan to uphold the constitutionality of the hard 40/50 sentencing scheme, noting 
that Harris reaffirmed McMillan even after Apprendi. See State v. Astorga, 295 Kan. 339, 
354, 284 P.3d 279 (2012), ("We have consistently upheld the constitutionality of the hard 
40/hard 50 sentencing scheme in light of both Ring and Apprendi, and we decline 
Astorga's invitation to reconsider our prior decisions."), cert. granted, judgment vacated 
by Astorga v. Kansas, 133 S. Ct. 2877 (2013); State v. McCaslin, 291 Kan. 697, 729-30, 
245 P.3d 1030 (2011) (citing cases); State v Albright, 283 Kan. 418, 423-24, 153 P.3d 
497 (2007) (same); see also Johnson, 284 Kan. at 23 (upholding constitutionality of hard 
50 scheme after noting McMillan had not been overruled despite several post-Apprendi 
decisions invalidating judicial factfinding exposing defendants to increased maximum 
sentences). 
 
2.  The changed landscape after Alleyne v. United States 
 
In Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2160-63, the Supreme Court considered the 
constitutionality of the same statute at issue in Harris, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and overruled 
both Harris and McMillan.  
 
23 
 
 
 
Relying on Harris, the lower courts rejected Alleyne's Sixth Amendment 
challenge to his mandatory minimum sentence of 7 years, a sentence based on a judicial 
finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he had brandished a firearm. Notably, 
the jury's verdict form indicated the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Alleyne 
used or carried a firearm, but it did not find that Alleyne brandished a firearm. Thus, the 
jury's verdict authorized a mandatory minimum sentence of only 5 years rather than 7 
years. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) and (ii).  
 
The Alleyne Court found Harris' "distinction between facts that increase the 
statutory maximum and facts that increase only the mandatory minimum" inconsistent 
with Apprendi and overruled Harris. Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2155, 2163. The Court noted 
that "facts increasing the legally prescribed floor aggravate the punishment," and 
explained that "the core crime and the fact triggering the mandatory minimum sentence 
together constitute a new, aggravated crime, each element of which must be submitted to 
the jury." 133 S. Ct. at 2161.  
 
Applying its holdings to the facts of the case before it, the Alleyne Court 
concluded: 
 
 
"Here, the sentencing range supported by the jury's verdict was five years' 
imprisonment to life. The District Court imposed the 7-year mandatory minimum 
sentence based on its finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the firearm was 
'brandished.' Because the finding of brandishing increased the penalty to which the 
defendant was subjected, it was an element, which had to be found by the jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The judge, rather than the jury, found brandishing, thus violating 
petitioner's Sixth Amendment rights." 133 S. Ct. at 2163-64. 
24 
 
 
 
 
3.  Application of Alleyne to Kansas' hard 50 sentencing scheme 
  
In his supplemental brief addressing Alleyne's application in this case, Soto argues 
Alleyne renders Kansas' statutory procedure for imposing a hard 50 sentence, K.S.A. 21-
4635, unconstitutional because the statute permits a judge to find the aggravated facts 
necessary to impose an increased mandatory minimum sentence of 50 years by a 
preponderance of the evidence rather than requiring a jury to make the necessary findings 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  
 
In response, the State contends Alleyne's holding does not apply to Kansas' hard 50 
statute because the Kansas scheme prescribes no mandatory minimum sentence. 
Alternatively, the State concedes that while Kansas' hard 50 sentencing scheme contains 
a "judicial factfinding component," in that it requires a judge to find the existence of 
aggravating factors, Alleyne did not implicate the constitutionality of K.S.A. 21-4635 
because "that piece [of K.S.A. 21-4635 that requires the finding of aggravating factors] 
merely serves to inform judicial sentencing discretion."  
 
a.  Standard of review 
 
Determining a statute's constitutionality is a question of law subject to unlimited 
review. We presume statutes are constitutional and must resolve all doubts in favor of a 
statute's validity. Further, we must interpret a statute in a manner that renders it 
constitutional if there is any reasonable construction that will maintain the legislature's 
apparent intent. State v. Gaona, 293 Kan. 930, 957-58, 270 P.3d 1165 (2012).  
 
b.  Kansas' hard 50 sentencing scheme includes a mandatory minimum sentence.  
 
 
25 
 
 
 
Preliminarily, the State suggests Alleyne's holding does not apply to Kansas' hard 
50 scheme because, unlike the mandatory minimum sentence at issue in Alleyne, Kansas' 
hard 50 statute prescribes no mandatory minimum sentence. Instead, the State maintains 
that under K.S.A. 21-4706(c), the statutorily required sentence for premeditated first-
degree murder is life in prison regardless of whether the court finds aggravating or 
mitigating factors during sentencing.  
 
We reject the State's suggestion that the hard 50 scheme does not contemplate a 
mandatory minimum sentence for two reasons. First, we note that in several pre-Alleyne 
cases the State consistently urged this court to uphold the constitutionality of the hard 50 
scheme under the rationale of State v. Conley, 287 Kan. 696, 197 P.3d 837 (2008), and its 
progeny. In those cases, this court found the hard 50 scheme constitutional because it 
only increased the "mandatory minimum sentence," as permitted by McMillan. See, e.g., 
Conley, 287 Kan. at 700-01 (discussing McMillan and Kansas cases upholding 
constitutionality of hard 40/50 scheme on grounds it only increases minimum sentence).  
 
Second, even if the State's current posture was not wholly inconsistent with its pre- 
Alleyne position, we would reject the State's argument on its merits based on the express 
language of the hard 50 scheme which contemplates a mandatory minimum sentence of 
50 years. See K.S.A. 21-4635(b) (requiring court to determine "whether the defendant 
shall be required to serve a mandatory term of imprisonment of . . . 50 years"); K.S.A. 
21-4638 (defendant sentenced under hard 50 scheme "shall not be eligible for parole prior 
to serving 50 years' imprisonment" and "[f]or crimes committed on or after July 1, 2006, 
a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 50 years shall not apply" if court finds 
defendant would be subject to longer term of imprisonment under sentencing guidelines 
[emphasis added]).  
 
26 
 
 
 
c.  Kansas' hard 50 sentencing scheme violates the Sixth Amendment. 
 
The State concedes, as it must, that Kansas' hard 50 sentencing scheme contains a 
"judicial factfinding component" in that it requires a judge to find the existence of 
aggravating factors. Nevertheless, the State contends Alleyne did not implicate the 
constitutionality of K.S.A. 21-4635 because the judge's finding of aggravating factors 
merely "informs" judicial sentencing discretion.  
 
But the Supreme Court's collective rationale in Ring and Alleyne precludes the 
State's position. Under Ring's rationale, Kansas' enumerated hard 50 aggravating 
circumstances operate as the functional equivalent of "elements" of a greater offense. See 
536 U.S. at 609. And under Alleyne's rationale, we can no longer distinguish between a 
fact that exposes a defendant to an increased maximum sentence and a fact that exposes a 
defendant to an increased mandatory minimum sentence. See Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2160 
("the principle applied in Apprendi applies with equal force to facts increasing the 
mandatory minimum"). For Sixth Amendment purposes, both types of facts are now 
"elements" that must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2158, 2160. 
 
Despite this seemingly straightforward application of Ring and Alleyne, the State 
points to two sentences from Alleyne to suggest that under Kansas' hard 50 scheme, the 
aggravating factors found by the judge merely "inform judicial factfinding." Specifically, 
the State points out that after concluding facts necessary to increase a mandatory 
minimum sentence must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, the Alleyne Court 
noted:  "Our ruling today does not mean that any fact that influences judicial discretion 
must be found by a jury. We have long recognized that broad sentencing discretion, 
informed by judicial factfinding, does not violate the Sixth Amendment. " 133 S. Ct. at 
2163. 
27 
 
 
 
 
We are not persuaded that the Alleyne Court intended this statement to undermine 
its holding that the facts necessary to increase the mandatory minimum punishment must 
be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, the cases cited immediately 
following the Court's comment simply clarify that Alleyne's holding does not implicate 
judicial factfinding within a legislatively established sentencing range. See Alleyne, 133 
S. Ct. at 2163 (citing cases that discuss the exercise of judicial discretion within an 
established sentencing range and noting:  "Our decision today is wholly consistent with 
the broad discretion of judges to select a sentence within the range authorized by law." 
[Emphasis added.]).  
 
Thus, we interpret the Court's comments in Alleyne to refer to judicial factfinding 
and the exercise of judicial discretion when imposing, for example, an aggravated 
presumptive sentence under the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act, K.S.A. 21-4701 et 
seq. In that circumstance, judicial factfinding increases neither the floor nor the ceiling of 
the statutorily authorized sentencing range; instead, it merely informs judicial discretion 
to sentence within that range. In contrast, Kansas' hard 50 scheme undeniably and 
appreciably increases the mandatory punishment imposed for first-degree premeditated 
murder from 25 years' imprisonment to 50 years' imprisonment.  
 
We conclude that under the combined force of Ring and Alleyne, the statutory 
procedure for imposing a hard 50 sentence violates the Sixth Amendment because it 
permits a judge to find by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of one or more 
aggravating factors necessary to impose an increased mandatory minimum sentence, 
rather than requiring a jury to find the existence of the aggravating factors beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  
 
28 
 
 
 
Because Soto's hard 50 sentence violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial 
as interpreted in Ring and Alleyne, we vacate his sentence.  
 
Remedy on Remand 
 
Having vacated Soto's sentence based on the unconstitutionality of the hard 50 
scheme, we now turn to the parties' arguments regarding the appropriate action on 
remand.  
 
Soto urges us to remand for imposition of a hard 25 sentence because that is the 
only sentence supported by the jury's verdict, while the State urges us to remand to the 
district court for resentencing under the amended hard 50 statute enacted by the 
legislature following Alleyne. See K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-6620. Soto responds that 
retroactive application of the amended statute would violate the constitutional prohibition 
against ex post facto laws, while the State disagrees and argues the Ex Post Facto Clause 
is not implicated because the new statute does not alter the definition of criminal conduct 
or increase the potential criminal penalty beyond that in place when Soto committed the 
crime.  
 
1.  Consideration of harmless error review 
 
Because an Alleyne error is also an Apprendi error and this court has recognized 
that an Apprendi error may be subject to harmless error review, we asked the parties to 
brief whether a harmless error analysis can be applied in the hard 50 context. See, e.g., 
Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 222, 126 S. Ct. 2546, 165 L. Ed. 2d 466 (2006) 
(concluding the "[f]ailure to submit a sentencing factor to the jury, like [the] failure to 
submit an element to the jury, is not structural error," rather it is subject to review for 
harmless error under the framework set out in Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 119 S. 
Ct. 1827, 144 L. Ed. 2d 35 [1999]); State v. Reyna, 290 Kan. 666, 681-82, 234 P.3d 761 
29 
 
 
 
(2010) (applying Neder framework to find Apprendi-type error harmless), cert. denied 
131 S. Ct. 532 (2010); State v. Daniels, 278 Kan. 53, 64-65, 91 P.3d 1147 (noting 
decisions of United States Supreme Court have clarified that Apprendi errors are subject 
to harmless error review), cert. denied 543 U.S. 982 (2004). Thus, before considering the 
parties' arguments regarding remand, we first address harmless error, which, if it applies, 
would moot the remand issue.  
 
 
Soto argues that a hard 50 sentencing error is not subject to harmless error review 
because the court applied a preponderance of the evidence standard when considering the 
existence of aggravated circumstances, and the findings of fact were never found beyond 
a reasonable doubt, as Alleyne requires. See State v. Spain, 263 Kan. 708, 714, 953 P.2d 
1004 (1998) (concluding that although K.S.A. 21-4635(c) specifies no particular standard 
of proof, statute implicitly requires judge to apply preponderance of evidence standard 
when finding aggravating circumstances); see also State v. Nelson, 291 Kan. 475, 487-88, 
243 P.3d 343 (2010) (clarifying standard of proof for finding aggravating circumstances 
is preponderance of evidence rather than beyond reasonable doubt). Alternatively, if 
harmless error review applies, Soto urges this court to conclude the Alleyne error was not 
harmless because we cannot find beyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence of the 
aggravating circumstance is both overwhelming and uncontested. 
 
 
Citing Reyna, 290 Kan. at 681, the State contends this court can apply a harmless 
error review to the omission of an element from the jury instruction and, therefore, it can 
apply a harmless error review in the hard 50 context to the failure of a jury to decide an 
aggravating circumstance, which Alleyne holds is an "element" rather than a sentencing 
factor. The State further maintains that this review results in a conclusion beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the omitted element (i.e., the aggravating circumstance at issue 
here, K.S.A. 21-4636[f]), was supported by overwhelming evidence such that the jury 
verdict would have been the same absent the error.  
30 
 
 
 
 
 
In Reyna, a jury convicted the defendant of multiple counts of aggravated indecent 
liberties with a child and the district court sentenced him, under Jessica's Law, to a term 
of life imprisonment with no possibility of parole for 25 years. On appeal, Reyna argued 
the State's failure to allege or instruct the jury on the element of his age—an element 
essential to the enhanced Jessica's Law sentence—violated his Sixth Amendment right to 
a jury trial as interpreted in Apprendi. Reyna, 290 Kan. at 678-79. Relying in part on 
Recuenco, the Reyna court held:  
 
"[T]his court will apply the harmless error analysis to the omission of an element from 
the instructions to the jury when a review of the evidence leads to the conclusion beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the omitted element was uncontested and supported by 
overwhelming evidence, such that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the 
error. And Recuenco stands for the proposition that characterizing the omission as an 
Apprendi-type error, i.e., judicial factfinding of the omitted element when that element 
enhances the maximum applicable sentence, does not change that analysis." Reyna, 290 
Kan. at 681.  
  
The Reyna majority eventually found the error harmless based on uncontroverted 
and overwhelming evidence of the material element, i.e., Reyna testified he was 37 years 
old. See Reyna, 290 Kan. at 682 (relying on framework partially articulated in Neder). 
 
Ultimately, we conclude we need not decide here whether a harmlessness analysis 
applies to a hard 50/Alleyne error, because even assuming the application of Reyna's 
modified harmless error analysis, the error here does not come close to meeting that test. 
 
First, we would have to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence 
Soto "committed the crime in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner," K.S.A. 
21-4636(f), was uncontroverted and supported by overwhelming evidence such that a 
31 
 
 
 
jury would have found the existence of the aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable 
doubt. See K.S.A. 21-4635(c). See also Reyna, 290 Kan. at 681; Neder, 527 U.S. at 17 
("[W]here a reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the omitted 
element was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence, such that the jury 
verdict would have been the same absent the error, the erroneous instruction is properly 
found to be harmless.").  
 
 
Assuming we moved beyond this difficult standard, application of the second step 
of the analysis in the Alleyne/hard 50 context would require us to conclude beyond a 
reasonable doubt that no rational jury would have determined that any mitigating 
circumstances outweighed any aggravating circumstances. See K.S.A. 21-4635(d); see 
also State v. Ring, 204 Ariz. 534, 565, 65 P.3d 915 (2003) (concluding that because 
Arizona's capital sentencing scheme required weighing of mitigating circumstances, court 
would affirm capital sentence only if it could conclude, "beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
no rational trier of fact would determine that the mitigating circumstances were 
sufficiently substantial to call for leniency").  
 
Here, Soto presented evidence regarding several mitigating circumstances 
including:  He was only 16 at the time of the crime; his juvenile record demonstrated his 
amenability to rehabilitation; he lacked a significant criminal history or school discipline 
record; the killing was motivated by peer pressure and a gang mentality; and his 
accomplices received lesser sentences. Additionally, Soto's mother testified Soto was 
bullied in middle school; he was a good son who helped around the house; he was a good 
student; his father was an alcoholic; and Soto witnessed his father's abusive behavior 
toward Soto's mother. Although the district court found only one mitigating 
circumstance—Soto's age—we cannot conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that no 
rational jury would have determined Soto's age to be the only mitigating circumstance. 
32 
 
 
 
Nor can we say that no rational jury would have determined that the mitigating 
circumstance outweighed the aggravating circumstance.  
 
Finally, we note that because Kansas' hard 50 scheme requires the sentencing 
court to not only find aggravating and mitigating circumstances, but to weigh any 
mitigating circumstances against aggravating circumstances, only in a rare instance could 
a hard 50/Alleyne error be harmless. See Marceau, Arizona's Ring Cycle, 44 Ariz. St. L.J. 
1061, 1078-80 (2012) (noting that of 30 capital sentences reconsidered by Arizona 
Supreme Court after Ring, the court affirmed only two sentences under harmless error 
rule and in both cases, "the deaths were unusually brutal or the corpse mutilation 
unusually heinous, and the mitigation in both cases was either waived by the defendant at 
sentencing or deemed to be truly de minimis"). Accordingly, we will defer any decision 
as to whether a modified harmless error standard can apply to a hard 50 error until a case 
presents itself in which the evidence approaches meeting this exacting test.  
 
2.  We decline to issue an advisory opinion as to the appropriate course of action 
on remand. 
 
Because this case must be remanded for resentencing, we now turn to Soto's 
arguments regarding the procedure to be applied on remand. Soto argues the district court 
on remand must impose a hard 25 sentence because that is the only sentence supported by 
the jury's verdict. However, the State argues the district court must resentence Soto under 
the amended hard 50 statute enacted by the legislature following Alleyne. See K.S.A. 
2013 Supp. 21-6620. 
 
Following Alleyne, the Kansas Legislature held a special session in September 
2013 to amend Kansas' hard 50 sentencing scheme. See L. 2013, ch. 1, § 1 (Special 
Session). The amended version includes express provisions for retroactive application. 
K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-6620. Specifically, K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-6620(e) provides:  
33 
 
 
 
 
"[F]or all cases on appeal on or after the effective date of this act, if a sentence imposed 
under . . . K.S.A. 21-4635, prior to its repeal, is vacated for any reason other than 
sufficiency of the evidence as to all aggravating circumstances, resentencing shall be 
required under this section, as amended by this act, unless the prosecuting attorney 
chooses not to pursue such a sentence." 
  
Soto argues retroactive application of the amended hard 50 statute would violate 
the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. Citing Dobbert v. Florida, 432 
U.S. 282, 293, 97 S. Ct. 2290, 53 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1977), the State counters that 
resentencing would not implicate the Ex Post Facto Clause because the new statute 
neither alters the definition of criminal conduct nor increases the potential criminal 
penalty beyond that in place when Soto committed the crime.  
 
Both parties concede that their arguments related to the constitutionality of 
applying the amended hard 50 statute on remand are not ripe because the State has not yet 
sought application of the amended hard 50 statute. We agree, and thus we decline the 
parties' invitation to issue an advisory opinion on these issues. See State v. Montgomery, 
295 Kan. 837, Syl. ¶ 2, 286 P.3d 866 (2012) (noting that Kansas appellate courts 
generally do not render advisory opinions); State v. Burnett, 293 Kan. 840, 850, 270 P.3d 
1115 (2012) (declining to issue advisory opinion on double jeopardy issue that was not 
yet ripe).  
 
Instead, we hold only that because Soto's sentence was imposed in violation of his 
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, his sentence must be vacated and the case 
remanded for resentencing. Our decision does not foreclose the parties from presenting 
their arguments regarding application of the amended statute to the district court at 
resentencing. 
 
34 
 
 
 
3.  The evidence was sufficient to support the aggravating circumstance. 
  
In the event the district court were to determine the amended statute applies at 
resentencing, section (e) of K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-6620 suggests the State would be 
precluded from pursuing a hard 50 sentence if this court had vacated Soto's sentence for 
lack of sufficient evidence to support the aggravating circumstance. While we decline to 
decide at this juncture whether Soto could be resentenced under the amended hard 50 
statute, we find it prudent to address Soto's claim that the evidence of the aggravating 
circumstance was insufficient. 
 
In the past, when a criminal defendant has challenged the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support a hard 50 aggravating circumstance, we have considered whether, 
after review of all the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational 
factfinder could have found the existence of the aggravating circumstance by a 
preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., State v. McCaslin, 291 Kan. 697, 727, 245 P.3d 
1030 (2011). However, in light of Alleyne, we will apply the beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard of proof in considering the sufficiency challenge.  
 
The cause and manner of Moreno's death was undisputed at trial; Moreno bled to 
death from dozens of stab wounds. More specifically, Soto, either acting alone or with his 
accomplices, attacked Moreno with one or more knives, cutting Moreno's jugular veins 
on both sides of his neck, slashing one of his carotid arteries, penetrating his thyroid 
cartilage, and significantly damaging several internal organs. All together, the attacker(s) 
inflicted 79 stab wounds and cuts. As the district court noted, even if the stabbing lasted 
only one minute, the number of stab wounds demonstrated the savagery of the attack 
because the wounds would have had to have been inflicted at a rate exceeding one wound 
per second. Cf. State v. Engelhardt, 280 Kan. 113, 143-44, 119 P.3d 1148 (2005) 
(affirming district court's preponderance of evidence finding that defendant committed 
35 
 
 
 
murder in heinous, atrocious, and cruel manner when victim was stabbed approximately 
55 times over course of 20 minutes and defendant bragged to his friends about victim's 
slow death). 
 
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude 
that a rational factfinder could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Soto 
committed the murder in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner. Consequently, 
the sole reason we are vacating Soto's sentence is because it was imposed in violation of 
his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, as interpreted in Alleyne. 
 
Finally, because we are vacating Soto's sentence, we decline to consider Soto's 
claim that a hard 50 sentence violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, either as a matter of law based on his juvenile status or as applied in this 
case. See State v. Jones, 293 Kan. 757, 762, 268 P.3d 491 (2012) (declining to reach 
Eighth Amendment challenge to lifetime postrelease supervision because court vacated 
defendant's sentence on other grounds).  
 
 
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for resentencing.