Title: Barry v. Ocean Isle Palms, Inc
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 378A14
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: December 18, 2015

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA 
No. COA14-916 
Filed: 21 April 2015 
Guilford County, No. 12-CRS-098772 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
v. 
ANNA LAURA HUCKELBA 
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered on 3 October 2013 by Judge R. 
Stuart Albright in Guilford County Superior Court.  Heard in the Court of Appeals 
on 20 January 2015. 
 
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Catherine F. 
Jordan, for the State. 
 
Edward Eldred for the defendant-appellant.  
 
 
HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge. 
 
 
Anna Laura Huckelba1 (“Defendant”) appeals from a final judgment of the trial 
court, based on a jury verdict finding her guilty of three counts of misdemeanor 
weapon on educational property and one count of felony weapon on educational 
property pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-269.2(b) (2011).  On appeal, Defendant first 
contends that the trial court committed plain error by instructing the jury that 
Defendant was guilty of possessing a weapon on educational property even if she did 
                                            
1 Although the caption on Defendant’s brief and the Record on Appeal spell Defendant’s name 
“Huckleba,” the filings with the trial court (including the indictments and judgment) spell Defendant’s 
name “Huckelba.” We adopt the spelling of Defendant’s name used by the trial court in the judgment.  
STATE V. HUCKELBA 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
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not know she was on educational property.  Second, Defendant argues that her trial 
counsel was ineffective by failing to argue a fatal variance in the indictment.  For the 
following reasons, we reverse and remand for a new trial consistent with this opinion.  
I. Factual & Procedural History 
On 11 February 2013, Defendant was indicted on three counts of misdemeanor 
possession of a weapon on campus or other educational property and one count of 
felony possession of a weapon on campus or other educational property in violation of 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-269.2(b).  Defendant’s case was called for trial in Guilford County 
Superior Court on 1 October 2013.  The evidence presented at trial tended to show 
the following facts: 
On 25 December 2012, Defendant was a senior at High Point University in 
High Point, North Carolina.  Because it was Christmas day, school was not in session, 
and there were few cars on campus.  That evening, sometime after 4:30 P.M., 
Defendant pulled into a parking spot in front of High Point University’s 
Administration Building. In order to get to this parking spot, Defendant had to drive 
past a fence, but she did not have to drive through any security gates.  Had Defendant 
chosen to move her car from its location in front of the Administration Building to the 
residential area of campus, she would have encountered a security gate, and would 
need a security card to drive into the residences.  Instead, Defendant parked her car 
STATE V. HUCKELBA 
 
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in an area that was open to the public, approximately two miles away from “main” 
campus, where most of the academic buildings are located.  
Officer Jeffrey Thomas (“Officer Thomas”), a security officer employed by High 
Point University, noticed Defendant as she parked.  Officer Thomas recognized 
Defendant because the officers were previously instructed to “be on the lookout” for 
Defendant for an unspecified reason.  The officers were directed to call a Student Life 
employee if they saw Defendant on campus.  Officer Thomas approached Defendant 
and spoke to her while she was still in her car.  He asked her whether she had spoken 
to anyone in the Student Life department.  When Defendant responded that she had 
not, Officer Thomas escorted her into the lobby of the Administration Building.  
Defendant’s demeanor was calm.  Officer Thomas left Defendant in the lobby and 
Lieutenant Dennis Shumaker (“Lieutenant Shumaker”), another security officer 
employed by High Point University, joined them in the lobby.   
Lieutenant Shumaker contacted the on-duty resident director of Student Life, 
Lance Dunlap (“Mr. Dunlap”), who arrived at the Administration Building ten to 
fifteen minutes later.  During those ten to fifteen minutes, Lieutenant Shumaker 
asked Defendant why she was on campus.  Defendant responded that she wanted to 
do her laundry in her townhome-style dorm room on campus.  When Mr. Dunlap 
arrived, he asked Defendant if she had a gun.  Defendant responded that she did have 
a gun in her car. Lieutenant Shumaker told Defendant that he needed to retrieve the 
STATE V. HUCKELBA 
 
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gun from her car.  Defendant handed Lieutenant Shumaker her car keys without 
objection.  Before Lieutenant Shumaker left the room, Defendant told him that she 
had a “concealed carry” permit.   
Lieutenant Shumaker went outside to the parking lot of the Administration 
Building, unlocked and opened Defendant’s car.  Initially, Lieutenant Shumaker did 
not see any weapons in the car, only a cardboard box on the back-seat floorboard. 
Lieutenant Shumaker eventually located a loaded gun2 in the glove compartment of 
Defendant’s car and three knives in the cardboard box in the back seat.  The knives’ 
blades were not exposed.  At that point, Lieutenant Shumaker contacted the High 
Point Police Department and waited for an officer to arrive on the scene.  Before 
leaving for the night, Lieutenant Shumaker wrote a report of the incident.  In that 
report, he documented a direct statement made by Defendant: “I know I’m not 
supposed to have [the gun] on campus, but I don’t take it in my room, or anything.”   
High Point Police Officer Ian Stanick (“Officer Stanick”) eventually arrived on 
the scene and immediately secured the weapons in his police vehicle.  He later took 
the weapons to the police department and logged them into evidence.  Once the 
weapons were secure, Officer Stanick arrested Defendant and transported her to the 
police station.  At the station, Defendant waived her Miranda rights and made 
several statements to Officer Stanick about the weapons in her car.  Defendant stated 
                                            
2 The gun was later identified by police as a Ruger 380 pistol.  
STATE V. HUCKELBA 
 
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again that “[s]he knew she was not supposed to have a gun on campus” because “she 
was taught that in her concealed carry class.”  She also indicated that her concealed 
carry permit was valid on the day of her arrest.3  Defendant told Officer Stanick that 
she bought the gun for protection because she works the night shift at a retail clothing 
store in Winston-Salem.  She explained to Officer Stanick that she does not feel safe 
walking through the dark parking lot after work.  Defendant indicated to Officer 
Stanick that “she did not have anywhere else to keep the weapon so she kept it locked 
in the glove compartment of the car.”  Defendant was subsequently charged with one 
count of felony weapon on educational property for the gun and three counts of 
misdemeanor weapon on educational property for the knives.  She spent thirty-nine 
days in jail before she was released on bail.   
Defendant’s case was called for trial in Guilford County Superior Court on 1 
October 2013.  During her opening statements to the jury, Defendant admitted to the 
element of possession for each of the four weapons charges, but adamantly denied 
that she was on educational property.  At the close of the State’s evidence, Defendant 
                                            
3 The evidence suggests that Defendant had a valid permit to carry a concealed handgun at the time 
of her arrest.  We note that had the same incident occurred nine months later, Defendant would have 
been guilty of no crime—at least with regard to the felony gun charge.  Effective 1 October 2013, the 
North Carolina legislature added the following exemption to the statute prohibiting weapons on 
educational property:  “The provisions of this section shall not apply to a person who has a concealed 
handgun permit that is valid . . . who has a handgun in a closed compartment or container within the 
person’s locked vehicle.”  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-269.2(k) (2013).      
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made a motion to dismiss, which the trial court denied.  No evidence was presented 
by Defendant.   
During the charge conference, outside the presence of the jury, the trial court 
proposed to read to the jury North Carolina Pattern Jury Instruction 235.17 for the 
substantive elements of the offenses charged.  Neither party objected.  Accordingly, 
the trial court charged the jury with the following instructions:  
The defendant in this case has been charged with 
knowingly possessing a Ruger pistol on educational 
property. 
 
For you to find the defendant guilty of this offense, 
the State must prove two things beyond a reasonable 
doubt: 
 
First, that the defendant knowingly possessed a 
Ruger pistol. 
 
And second, that the defendant was on educational 
property at the time she possessed the pistol.  
 
Therefore, if you, the jury, find from the evidence 
beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the alleged date 
the defendant knowingly possessed a Ruger pistol, and 
that the defendant was on educational property at the time 
she possessed the pistol, then it would be your duty to 
return a verdict of guilty of knowingly possessing a Ruger 
pistol on educational property.  On the other hand, if you 
fail to so find or you have a reasonable doubt as to one or 
both of these things, then it would be your duty to return a 
verdict of not guilty as to this charge.  
 
The trial court repeated this instruction to the jury for each additional weapon 
charge, substituting the words “Ruger pistol” for the names of the three knives found 
STATE V. HUCKELBA 
 
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in Defendant’s car.  The jury found Defendant guilty of all four weapons charges.  At 
sentencing, because Defendant was a prior record level I with zero points, the trial 
court imposed a suspended sentence of six to seventeen months imprisonment for the 
Class I felony gun charge, and a suspended, consolidated sentence of forty-five days 
imprisonment for the misdemeanor weapons charges.   
On 8 October 2013, five days after the judgment against her was entered, 
Defendant filed a handwritten notice of appeal.  The notice states that Defendant 
“give[s] notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals of Guilford County.”  The bottom right 
hand corner of the notice states: “10/8/13 CC DA,” suggesting that Defendant possibly 
gave the District Attorney’s office the same notice.  On 4 December 2014, the State 
moved this Court to dismiss Defendant’s appeal, citing a violation of Rule 4 of the 
North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure, which requires a defendant-appellant 
to serve the State with a copy of the notice of appeal.  See N.C. R. App. P. 4.  On 15 
December 2014, Defendant filed a response to the State’s motion to dismiss, as well 
as a petition for writ of certiorari with this Court.  On 16 January 2015 we allowed 
the State’s motion to dismiss the appeal, based on the procedural violations.  
However, on 21 January 2015, we granted Defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari 
to decide this case on the merits.   
 
 
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II. Jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction lies in this Court pursuant to Rule 21 of the North Carolina Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, which provides for appellate review under the extraordinary 
writ of certiorari.  “The writ of certiorari may be issued in appropriate circumstances 
by either appellate court to permit review of the judgments and orders of trial 
tribunals when the right to prosecute an appeal has been lost by failure to take timely 
action.”  N.C. R. App. P. 21(a)(1).   
III. Standard of Review 
With regard to the first assignment of error, the allegedly erroneous jury 
instructions, “[i]n order to preserve a question for appellate review, a party must have 
presented the trial court with a timely request, objection or motion, stating the 
specific grounds for the ruling sought if the specific grounds are not apparent.”  State 
v. Eason, 328 N.C. 409, 420, 402 S.E.2d 809, 814 (1991).  “A party may not make any 
portion of the jury charge or omissions therefrom the basis of an issue presented on 
appeal unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires.”  N.C. R. App. P. 
10(a)(2); see also State v. McNeil, 350 N.C. 657, 691, 518 S.E.2d 486, 507 (1999), cert. 
denied, 529 U.S. 1024 (2008).  However,  
[i]n criminal cases, an issue that was not preserved by 
objection noted at trial and that is not deemed preserved 
by rule or law without any such action nevertheless may be 
made the basis of an issue presented on appeal when the 
judicial action questioned is specifically and distinctly 
contended to amount to plain error.   
STATE V. HUCKELBA 
 
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N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(4); see also State v. Goss, 361 N.C. 610, 622, 651 S.E.2d 867, 875 
(2007), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 835 (2008).  Therefore, an unpreserved issue with the 
jury instructions in a criminal case may only be reviewed by this Court if we find that 
the instructions as given by the trial court amounted to plain error.  See State v. 
Gregory, 342 N.C. 580, 584, 467 S.E.2d 28, 31 (1996) (noting that the Supreme Court 
of North Carolina “has elected to review unpreserved issues for plain error when they 
involve . . . errors in the judge’s instructions to the jury[.]”). 
“The North Carolina plain error standard of review . . . requires the defendant 
to bear the heavier burden of showing that the error rises to the level of plain error.”  
State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. 506, 516, 723 S.E.2d 326, 333 (2012).   First, “a defendant 
must demonstrate that a fundamental error occurred at trial.”  Id. at 518, 723 S.E.2d 
at 334.  Second, “a defendant must establish prejudice—that, after examination of 
the entire record, the error ‘had a probable impact on the jury’s finding that the 
defendant was guilty.’ ”  Id. (quoting State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 660, 300 S.E.2d 
375, 378 (1983)).  Finally, “because plain error is to be applied cautiously and only in 
the exceptional case, the error will often be one that seriously affect[s] the fairness, 
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted).  
In this case, Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court erred by 
instructing the jury that Defendant was guilty of possessing a gun on educational 
property even if she did not know she was on educational property.  Defendant did 
STATE V. HUCKELBA 
 
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not object at trial to the proposed jury instructions; however, she now specifically and 
distinctly contends that the instructions amounted to plain error.  Therefore, we 
review the trial court’s instructions to the jury for plain error.  
With regard to the second assignment of error, the alleged ineffective 
assistance of counsel, “a defendant must first show that his counsel’s performance 
was deficient and then that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced his defense.”  
State v. Allen, 360 N.C. 297, 316, 626 S.E.2d 271, 286 (2006) (quotation marks 
omitted).  To establish prejudice, “a defendant must show that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings 
would have been different.  A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome.”  Id.  
IV. Analysis 
Defendant’s two arguments on appeal are:  (1) the trial court committed plain 
error by instructing the jury that Defendant was guilty of possessing a gun on 
educational property even if she did not know she was on educational property; and 
(2) Defendant’s trial counsel was ineffective by failing to argue a fatal flaw in the 
indictment.  We address each assignment of error in turn.  
A. Jury Instructions 
“It is the duty of the trial court to instruct the jury on all substantial features 
of a case raised by the evidence.”  State v. Shaw, 322 N.C. 797, 803, 370 S.E.2d 546, 
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549 (1988).  “Failure to instruct upon all substantive or material features of the crime 
charged is error.”  State v. Bogle, 324 N.C. 190, 195, 376 S.E.2d 745, 748 (1989).   
Here, the statute under which Defendant was convicted provides:  “It shall be 
a class I felony for any person knowingly to possess or carry, whether openly or 
concealed, any gun, rifle, pistol, or other firearm of any kind on educational property 
or to a curricular or extracurricular activity sponsored by a school.”  N.C. Gen. Stat. 
§ 14-269.2(b) (2011).  On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court failed to 
instruct the jury on the proper mental state for the “on educational property” element 
of the crime.  Specifically, Defendant argues that the trial court should have 
instructed the jury that it must find Defendant not guilty of the crime if it finds that 
Defendant was not knowingly on educational property.   
The issue of whether the word “knowingly,” as used in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-
269.2(b), modifies both clauses “possess or carry” and “on educational property” is an 
issue of first impression for this Court.  The plain language of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-
269.2(b) provides us little guidance in determining which words in the sentence 
“knowingly” should modify.  While the clause “whether openly or concealed” is 
separated from the rest of the sentence by commas, there is no punctuation 
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separating the “knowingly to possess or carry” clause from the latter clauses in the 
sentence.4    
Our Supreme Court has addressed the issue of which clauses in a statutory 
sentence the adverbial mental state “knowingly” should modify.  However, in that 
case, the statutory language was much more clear than in the case at bar.  In 1964, 
the Supreme Court of North Carolina analyzed N.C. Gen. Stat. § 18-78.1, which 
governed licenses to sell alcoholic beverages.  See Campbell v. North Carolina State 
Bd. of Alcoholic Control, 263 N.C. 224, 225–26, 139 S.E.2d 197, 199 (1964) (overruled 
on other grounds by Nat’l Food Stores v. North Carolina Bd. of Alcoholic Control, 268 
N.C. 624, 151 S.E.2d 582 (1975)).  Section 5 of the statute provided that no licensee 
shall “sell, offer for sale, possess, or knowingly permit the consumption on the 
licensed premises of any kind of alcoholic liquors the sale or possession of which is 
not authorized by law.”  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 18-78.1(5) (1966).  The Supreme Court 
                                            
4 One criminal law treatise describes this grammatical conundrum in a similarly worded statute:  
 
Still further difficulty arises from the ambiguity which frequently 
exists concerning what the words or phrases in question modify.  What, 
for instance, does “knowingly” modify in a sentence from a “blue sky” 
law criminal statute punishing one who “knowingly sells a security 
without a permit” from the securities commissioner?  To be guilty must 
the seller of a security without a permit know only that what he is 
doing constitutes a sale, or must he also know that the thing he sells is 
a security, or must he also know that he has no permit to sell the 
security he sells?  As a matter of grammar the statute is ambiguous; it 
is not at all clear how far down the sentence the word “knowingly” is 
intended to travel—whether it modifies “sells,” or “sells a security,” or 
“sells a security without a permit.”   
 
W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law § 27 (1972). 
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noted that “it appears by the punctuation that the word ‘knowingly’ does not modify 
sell, offer for sale, or possess but does modify ‘permit the consumption of the licensed 
premises.’ ”  Campbell, 263 N.C. at 226, 139 S.E.2d at 199.  This interpretation of the 
statute is clear from its plain language.  The word “knowingly” is placed after the 
clauses “sell, offer for sale, and possess,” but before the clause “permit the 
consumption.”  The statutory language of  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-269.2(b) is far less 
clear because the modifying word “knowingly” is placed before all of the other clauses 
in the statutory sentence.  Thus, Campbell provides us little guidance in our analysis 
of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-269.2(b).   
Although our State court decisions provide little guidance, this issue has been 
raised several times in the federal courts of appeal and in the United States Supreme 
Court.  See, e.g., United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994); United 
States v. Staples, 511 U.S. 600 (1994); Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985); 
United States v. Figueroa, 165 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Langley, 
62 F.3d 602, 604 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Forbes, 64 F.3d 928 (4th Cir. 1995).  
Therefore, we look to these cases as persuasive authority for our inquiry.  In all of the 
cases addressing this issue, the Courts resolve the grammatical ambiguity by looking 
to other principles of statutory construction.   
In accordance with United States Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit cases, 
and our State law presumptions, we analyze N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-269.2(b) under the 
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following principles of statutory construction: (1) the common law presumption 
against criminal liability without a showing of mens rea; (2) the General Assembly’s 
intent in enacting and amending the statute; and (3) the rule of lenity.  We hold under 
each relevant principle of statutory construction, the “knowingly” mental state in 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-269.2(b) must modify both clauses “possess or carry” and “on 
educational property.”   
1. 
Mens Rea 
The first principle of statutory construction articulated by the federal courts is 
the common law presumption that criminal culpability requires a guilty mind, or 
some knowledge that the actor is performing a wrongful act.5  See Staples v. United 
States, 511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994) (“[W]e must construe the statute in light of the 
background rules of the common law, in which the requirement of some mens rea for 
a crime is firmly embedded.”) (internal citations omitted).   
The United States Supreme Court first addressed the issue of the extent to 
which a mental state requirement should be “read into” a statute in Liparota v. 
United States.   471 U.S. 419 (1985).  In Liparota, the defendant was convicted under 
a federal statute which was similarly ambiguous as to how much of the sentence the 
word “knowingly” should modify.  Id. at 420.  The statute in Liparota prohibited the 
unauthorized use of federal food stamps, and provided that “whoever knowingly uses, 
                                            
5 See 1 Wharton’s Criminal Law § 27 (15th ed. 1993) (“In the ordinary case, an evil deed, without more, 
does not constitute a crime; a crime is committed only if the evil doer harbored an evil mind.”). 
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transfers, acquires, alters or possesses coupons or authorization cards in any manner 
not authorized by [the statute] or the regulations is subject to a fine and 
imprisonment.”  Id. at 420–21 (quotation marks omitted). The issue, then, was 
whether the Government must prove only knowing use, transfer, acquisition, 
alteration, or possession of the foods stamps, or whether the Government must also 
prove that the defendant knowingly violated the statute or the regulations.  Id.   
The Court held that the Government must prove that the defendant not only 
knowingly used, transferred, acquired, altered, or possessed food stamps, but also 
that the defendant knowingly acted in violation of the food stamp statutes.  Id. at 
425.  In support of its decision, the Supreme Court cited the “universal and persistent” 
presumption that “an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by 
intention[.]”  Id.  This presumption is especially true, the Court held, in cases where 
“to interpret the statute otherwise would be to criminalize a broad range of 
apparently innocent conduct.”  Id.   
After Liparota, the federal courts of appeal rendered several decisions 
consistent with that opinion.  For example, in 1998, the Second Circuit considered a 
similarly ambiguously worded statute with a knowingly mental state requirement.  
See Figueroa v. United States, 165 F.3d 111 (1998).  In Figueroa, the criminal statute 
at issue was 8 U.S.C. § 1327, which provided that “[a]ny person who knowingly aids 
or assists any excludable alien . . . to enter the United States” shall be fined or 
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imprisoned.  Id. at 114.  The issue on appeal was whether the Government was 
required to prove that the defendant had knowledge of not only his act of aiding and 
assisting entrance to the United States, but also of the excluability of the alien to 
whom he knowingly gave aid or assistance.   
Writing for the majority, Judge Sotomayor held that “[a]bsent clear 
congressional intent to the contrary, statutes defining federal crimes are . . . normally 
read to contain a mens rea requirement that attaches to enough elements of the crime 
that together would be sufficient to constitute an act in violation of the law.”  Id. at 
116.  The Second Circuit held, in accordance with Liparota, that because it is 
normally not a crime to aid or assist an alien in entering the United States unless 
that alien is for some reason “excludable,” the “knowingly” mental state must also 
modify the “excludability” element of the statute.  Id.  
Therefore, in interpreting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-269.2(b), we adhere to the 
presumption that the “knowingly” mens rea requirement must attach to enough 
elements of the statute to make the commitment of that act illegal.  In North 
Carolina, the act of “knowingly possessing or carrying . . . a gun” is not, on its own, a 
criminal act unless the gun is possessed or carried in violation of one of North 
Carolina’s other gun laws.6  In fact, the mere act of possessing or carrying a gun in 
                                            
6 See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. Ch. 14, Art. 52A (governing sale of weapons); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ch. 14, Art. 
53 (governing purchase of weapons); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ch. 14, Art. 54B (governing concealed handgun 
permits).    
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accordance with the law is stringently protected by both the United States and North 
Carolina Constitutions.  See U.S. Const. amend. II; N.C. Const. art I, § 30.  Thus, the 
“knowingly” mens rea requirement in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-269.2(b) must attach to the 
“on educational property” element of the crime in order to sufficiently constitute an 
act in violation of the law.   
There is, however, an exception to the general presumption favoring a mens 
rea requirement which we must address before we may conclude that the “knowingly” 
mental state should be read to modify the entire statutory sentence in this case.  The 
United States Supreme Court has recognized that in certain cases, where the 
prohibited activity deals with “public welfare” or “regulatory” offenses, Congress may 
impose a form of strict criminal liability.  Typically, these cases “involve statutes that 
regulate potentially harmful or injurious items.”  Staples, 511 U.S. at 607.  For the 
following reasons, we hold that the “public welfare” exception does not apply in this 
case.  
In United States v. Freed, the United States Supreme Court upheld a criminal 
conviction without requiring the Government to prove that the defendant had a 
culpable mental state for one element of the offense.  In Freed, the defendant was 
indicted for possession of unregistered grenades in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), 
which makes it unlawful for any person “to receive or possess a [grenade] which is 
not registered to him.”  United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971).  The defendant 
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argued that, in accordance with the presumption favoring a mens rea requirement for 
every criminal act, the Government must prove not only knowing receipt or 
possession of a grenade, but also knowledge that the grenade was unregistered.  Id. 
at 607.  
The Court agreed that the Government must prove knowledge of receipt or 
possession of the grenade, but the Court refused to read the mens rea requirement 
into the registration element.  Id. at 612.  The Court held that the Government need 
only prove that the defendant knew that the items in his possession were grenades—
not that the defendant knew that the grenades were unregistered.  Id. at 609.  The 
Court identified the statute requiring grenade registration as “a regulatory measure 
in the interest of public safety.”  Id.  Thus, with regard to knowledge of registration, 
the Court reasoned that proof of a guilty mind was not required, because “one would 
hardly be surprised to learn that possession of a hand grenade is not an innocent act.”  
Id.   
Later, though, in Staples v. United States, the United States Supreme Court 
explicitly refused to extend its holding in Freed to statutes criminalizing certain gun 
use.   Staples, 511 U.S. 600.  In Staples, the defendant was convicted under a federal 
statute that required certain “automatic” firearms to be registered under the 
National Firearms Act.  Id. at 602.  The evidence presented at trial showed the 
defendant knew he possessed a firearm, but did not know about the firearm’s 
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automatic firing capabilities.   Id. at 603–04.  The Government asked the Court to 
rule in accordance with Freed that no proof of mens rea regarding the “automatic” 
qualities of the gun is required because the defendant should have known that 
possession of a gun is not an innocent act.  The Court refused, holding that  
the gap between Freed and this case is too wide to bridge.  
In glossing over the distinction between grenades and 
guns, the Government ignores the particular care we have 
taken to avoid construing a statute to dispense with mens 
rea where doing so would “criminalize a broad range of 
apparently innocent conduct.” 
 
Id. at 610 (quoting Liparota, 471 U.S. at 426).  The Court went on to explain that 
“there is a long tradition of widespread lawful gun ownership by private individuals 
in this country,” id., and “[e]ven dangerous items can, in some cases, be so 
commonplace and generally available that we would not consider them to alert 
individuals to the likelihood of strict regulation.”  Id. at 611.  Thus, in Staples, the 
United States Supreme Court specifically removed gun possession from the category 
of “public welfare” or “regulatory” offenses that would allow for strict criminal 
liability.  
Six months after Staples, the United States Supreme Court once again read a 
“knowingly” mental state requirement into a statute prohibiting dissemination of 
child pornography, even though the statute was ambiguous.  See United States v. X-
Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994).  In X-Citement Video, the defendant was 
convicted under a statute providing:  
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Any person who . . . knowingly receives, or distributes, any 
visual depiction . . . if the producing of such visual depiction 
involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit 
conduct; and such visual depiction is of such conduct . . . 
shall be punished as provided in [this statute]. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 2252 (1988).  The defendant argued that the Government must prove not 
only knowing receipt or distribution of the prohibited depiction, but also that the 
defendant knew that the depiction involved a minor.  The Supreme Court agreed.  Id. 
at 78.  The Court first pointed out that the crime in X-Citement Video is not a public 
welfare offense because “[p]ersons do not harbor settled expectations that the 
contents of magazines and film are generally subject to stringent public regulation. 
In fact, First Amendment constraints presuppose the opposite view.”   Id. at 71.  Next, 
the Court cited Liparota and Staples, and held that the “knowingly” mental state 
must modify the “minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct” element because “the 
age of the performers is the crucial element separating legal innocence from wrongful 
conduct.”  Id. at 73.   
Immediately following the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Staples 
and X-Citement Video, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals heard three cases on this 
issue.  See United States v. Cook, 76 F.3d 596 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Forbes, 
64 F.3d 928 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602 (4th Cir. 1995).  
Our decision today is in line with that trilogy of Fourth Circuit cases.  
STATE V. HUCKELBA 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
- 21 - 
First, in United States v. Langley, the Fourth Circuit considered the mental 
state requirement for a federal statute prohibiting felons from possessing firearms 
which have been shipped or transported through interstate commerce.  See Langley, 
62 F.3d 602.  The issue in Langley was whether a mental state requirement should 
be read into the statute, and if so, whether the mental state requirement should be 
read into only the possession element, or all three elements of the crime:  (1) 
possession of a firearm; (2) status as a felon; and (3) movement of the firearm through 
interstate commerce.  Id. at 604–05.  The Fourth Circuit read a mental state 
requirement into the “possession” element, but refused to read a mental state 
requirement into the other two elements of the crime.  Id. at 606.  The Court reasoned 
in Langley that courts across the country have consistently and explicitly “rejected 
the notion that the Government is required to prove either knowledge of felony status 
or interstate nexus” in prosecutions under this statute.  Id. at 606.  The Court stated 
that “[i]f Congress intended such a revolutionary change in the law, a change that 
involves the perniciousness of felons possessing firearms, it would have made clear 
the intention to do so.”  Id.  With regard to the congressional intent of the statute, the 
Court noted that “it is highly unlikely that Congress intended to make it easier for 
felons to avoid prosecution.”  Id.      
Although the case at bar and Langley both involve firearm possession, this case 
is distinguishable from Langley.  Here, there is no similar history of courts 
STATE V. HUCKELBA 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
- 22 - 
consistently providing for strict criminal liability under the statute.  Additionally, the 
“perniciousness of felons possessing firearms” concern articulated by the Court is 
simply not present here.   
Second, in United States v. Forbes, the Fourth Circuit analyzed a federal 
statute making it unlawful for “any person who is under indictment for a crime 
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year to ship or transport in 
interstate or foreign commerce any firearm . . . or receive any firearm . . .”  Forbes, 64 
F.3d at 931.  The issue was whether the Government must prove the defendant’s 
knowledge of being “under indictment.”  Although the statute in Forbes lacked a 
specific mens rea requirement, the Fourth Circuit held that “[t]he defendant must 
have knowledge of the fact or facts that convert this innocent act into a crime.  Here, 
that fact is the existence of a pending indictment.”   Id. at 932.  
This case presents essentially the same issue as Forbes.  In this case, the fact 
that “convert[s] th[e] innocent act into a crime” is Defendant’s presence on 
educational property.  Thus, in accordance with Forbes, the State must be required 
to prove knowledge of such a fact at trial.  
Finally, in United States v. Cook, the Fourth Circuit considered a federal 
statute that provided:  “It shall be unlawful for any person at least eighteen years of 
age to knowingly and intentionally . . . receive a controlled substance from a person 
under 18 years of age, other than an immediate family member.”  21 U.S.C. § 861 
STATE V. HUCKELBA 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
- 23 - 
(1996); see also Cook, 76 F.3d at 598.  In Cook, the evidence showed that the defendant 
sold crack cocaine in partnership with another person who was under the age of 
eighteen; he was convicted under the statute.  See id. at 598–99.  The defendant 
alleged on appeal that the he did not know that his criminal cohort was under 
eighteen years old.  See id.  He asked the Fourth Circuit to overturn his conviction 
because the trial court did not instruct the jury as to any mental state requirement 
for the “under eighteen years of age” element of the crime.  The Fourth Circuit 
refused, distinguishing the case from X-Citement Video because the statute in Cook 
“applies to persons who should be well aware that their conduct is subject to public 
regulation, i.e., those receiving illegal drugs.”   Id. at 601.  The Court also noted that 
“the statute does not impinge on constitutionally protected conduct.”  Id.  
This case is easily distinguishable from Cook.   Here, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-
269.2(b) does not implicate conduct that is subject to public regulation (lawful gun 
possession, as described in Staples), and the statute here does impinge on 
constitutionally protected conduct (lawful gun possession pursuant to the Second 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Section 30 of the North Carolina 
Constitution).   
Therefore, in accordance with United States Supreme Court and Fourth 
Circuit precedent, as well as the well-settled presumption favoring proof of mens rea 
for criminal  liability, we cannot allow for a conviction under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-
STATE V. HUCKELBA 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
- 24 - 
269.2(b) without proof that Defendant both knowingly entered educational property 
and knowingly possessed a firearm or prohibited weapon when she did so.  As the age 
of the performers was the “crucial element separating legal innocence from wrongful 
conduct” in X-Citement Video, here, the actor’s presence on educational property is 
the crucial element, and thus the State must be required to prove a defendant’s guilty 
mind for that element of the offense.  See X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 73.   
Such a reading of the N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-269.2(b) not only adheres to our age-
old principles of criminal law, but it is also entirely workable within our criminal 
justice framework.  With regard to the burden of proof that the Government must 
bear in these cases, the Supreme Court held in Liparota that  
the Government must prove that the defendant knew that 
his acquisition or possession of food stamps was in a 
manner unauthorized by statute or regulations.  This 
holding does not put an unduly heavy burden on the 
Government in prosecuting violators of § 2024(b)(1).  To 
prove that petitioner knew that his acquisition or 
possession of food stamps was unauthorized, for example, 
the Government need not show that he had knowledge of 
specific regulations governing food stamp acquisition or 
possession. Nor must the Government introduce any 
extraordinary 
evidence 
that 
would 
conclusively 
demonstrate petitioner’s state of mind.  Rather, as in any 
other criminal prosecution requiring mens rea, the 
Government may prove by reference to facts and 
circumstances surrounding the case that petitioner knew 
that his conduct was unauthorized or illegal.   
 
Liparota, 471 U.S. at 419.   
STATE V. HUCKELBA 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
- 25 - 
Under our reading of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-269.2(b), the State is not saddled 
with an unduly heavy burden of proving a defendant’s subjective knowledge of the 
boundaries of educational property.  Rather, the State need only prove a defendant’s 
knowledge of her presence on educational property “by reference to the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the case.”  If, for example, the evidence shows that a 
defendant entered a school building and interacted with children while knowingly 
possessing a gun, the State would have little difficulty proving to the jury that the 
defendant had knowledge of her presence on educational property.  If, however, the 
evidence shows that a defendant drove into an empty parking lot that is open to the 
public while knowingly possessing a gun—as in this case—the jury will likely need 
more evidence of the circumstances in order to find that the defendant knowingly 
entered educational property.   
Thus, when considering a conviction under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-269.2(b), a jury 
must consider whether the defendant was knowingly on educational property by 
analyzing the facts and circumstances surrounding the event.  In this case, the trial 
court precluded exactly that type of analysis in its instructions to the jury. 
 
 
2. 
Legislative Intent of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-269.2(b) 
STATE V. HUCKELBA 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
- 26 - 
The second principle of statutory construction that we consider in analyzing 
the mens rea requirement of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-269.2(b) is the probable legislative 
intent of the statute.  In North Carolina, the “cardinal principle of statutory 
interpretation is to ensure that the legislative intent is accomplished.”  McLeod v. 
Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 115 N.C. App. 283, 288, 444 S.E.2d 487, 490 (1994).  
Generally, “[t]he intent of the General Assembly may be found first from the plain 
language of the statute, then from the legislative history, the spirit of the act and 
what the act seeks to accomplish.”  Lenox, Inc. v. Tolson, 353 N.C. 659, 664, 548 S.E.2d 
513, 517 (2001).  As we discussed above, the plain language of the statute is 
ambiguous—it does not make clear which clauses the mental state “knowingly” 
should modify.  Therefore, in interpreting the mens rea requirement of N.C. Gen. Stat. 
§ 14-269.2(b), we look to the legislative history of the statute and “the circumstances 
surrounding its adoption which throw light upon the evil sought to be remedied.”  
State ex rel. North Carolina Milk Comm’n v. Nat’l Food Stores, Inc., 270 N.C. 323, 
332, 154 S.E.2d 548, 555 (1967).  For the following reasons, we hold that both the 
legislative history of the statute and the plain purpose of its enactment require proof 
of mens rea for the “on educational property” element.    
In 1993, the North Carolina legislature amended the existing gun laws to make 
bringing a gun onto educational property a Class I felony.  The 1993 version of N.C. 
Gen. Stat. § 14-269.2(b) read as follows:  “it shall be a Class I felony for any person to 
STATE V. HUCKELBA 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
- 27 - 
possess or carry, whether openly or concealed, any gun, rifle, pistol, or other firearm 
of any kind . . . on educational property.”  1993 N.C. Sess. Laws 558, HB 1008.  
Notably, the 1993 version of the statute contained no mental state requirement.  In 
2003, though, after the United States Supreme Court’s rulings in X-Citement Video, 
Staples, and Liparota, and the Fourth Circuit’s rulings in Forbes, Langley, and Cook, 
the issue of whether a mental state requirement should be “read into” N.C. Gen. Stat. 
§ 14-269.2(b) was litigated in this Court.  See State v. Haskins, 160 N.C. App. 349, 
585 S.E.2d 766 (2003).   
In Haskins, the defendant, a licensed “bail runner,” was in pursuit of a fugitive 
facing felony drug charges.  Id. at 351, 585 S.E.2d at 767.  The defendant followed the 
fugitive onto an elementary school campus with a gun in his holster, entered the 
school building, and asked a faculty member if she had seen anyone.  See id., 585 
S.E.2d at 768.  School personnel called the police, and the defendant was arrested 
and eventually convicted under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-269.2(b).  See id.  Haskins argued 
that “although N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-269.2(b) does not explicitly contain an element of 
criminal intent or mens rea, willfulness or unlawfulness should be read into the 
statute because . . . strict liability offenses are disfavored in our criminal justice 
system.”  Id.  This Court disagreed.   
In Haskins, we refused to read any mental state requirement into N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 14-269.2(b).  In support of our holding, we cited the “public health, safety, and 
STATE V. HUCKELBA 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
- 28 - 
welfare” exception—despite the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Staples 
which arguably removed lawful gun possession from that exception.7  See id. at 352, 
585 S.E.2d at 768.  We reasoned that the statute was enacted “because of the 
increased necessity for safety in our schools,” and therefore, it falls under the subset 
of crimes for which “the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld the imposition of criminal 
penalties without the finding of criminal intent.”  Id.  The Supreme Court of North 
Carolina subsequently denied review,8 and our holding in Haskins remained 
undisturbed for eight years.  
In 2011, though, the General Assembly passed a bill that greatly expanded 
many rights regarding individual use of firearms in our State.9  See 2011 N.C. Sess. 
Laws 268, HB 650.  Among other things, the bill added the “knowingly” mental state 
requirement to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-269.2(b), as follows:  “It shall be a Class I felony 
for any person knowingly to possess or carry, whether openly or concealed, any gun, 
                                            
7 Staples is not cited by the Court in Haskins.   
8 Haskins petitioned the Supreme Court of North Carolina for discretionary review of his case 
under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-31.  He also moved to appeal his case under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-30 on the 
grounds that it involved a substantial constitutional question.  The State opposed the petition for 
discretionary review and moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of a substantial constitutional question.  
The Supreme Court of North Carolina denied Haskins’ petition for discretionary review and allowed 
the State’s motion to dismiss the appeal.  See State v. Haskins, 357 N.C. 580, 580, 589 S.E.2d 356, 356 
(2003).   
9 Most significantly, the bill provided for the codification of the “Castle Doctrine,” guaranteeing the 
right of citizens to use deadly force in defense of one’s home, motor vehicle, or workplace, and 
abolishing the duty to retreat.  See 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 268, HB 650, at Section 1.  The bill also 
expanded the rights of individuals with concealed handgun permits, allowing permit holders to carry 
guns at State parks and State-owned rest stops, see id. at Section 14, and allowing certain non-law 
enforcement State officials to carry concealed handguns without regard to many of the limitations to 
which other permit holders are subject.  See id. at Section 22(b). 
STATE V. HUCKELBA 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
- 29 - 
rifle, pistol, or other firearm of any kind on educational property or to a curricular or 
extracurricular activity sponsored by a school.”  2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 268, HB 650, 
at Section 4 (emphasis added).10  The 2011 version of the statute is the version under 
which Defendant in this case was convicted.  
The General Assembly’s 2011 addition of the word “knowingly” in front of 
“possess or carry” reflects a clear intent to prevent convictions under N.C. Gen. Stat. 
§ 14-269.2(b) where the actor unknowingly possesses or carries a gun, and brings that 
gun onto educational property.  In that instance, because of the unknowing 
possession, the actor harbors no evil mind.  She could not maliciously use the gun if 
she does not know that she possesses it.  The same must be true, then, for an actor 
who unknowingly enters educational property.  She may not be convicted under the 
2011 statute if she knowingly possesses or carries a gun, but unknowingly brings that 
gun onto land which the statute happens to deem “educational property.”11   
It is particularly instructive here that—in the same breath—the legislature 
expanded the right to use and possess guns in North Carolina and also added the 
“knowingly” mental state requirement to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-269.2(b).  The spirit of 
the 2011 act was to enhance the Second Amendment rights of North Carolina citizens, 
                                            
10 The bill was ratified on 17 June 2011 and became effective on 1 December 2011. 
11 The statute provides that “educational property” is defined as “[a]ny school building or bus, school 
campus, grounds, recreational area, athletic field, or other property owned, used, or operated by any 
board of education or school board of trustees, or directors for the administration of any school.”  N.C. 
Gen. Stat. § 14-269.2(a)(1) (2013).   
STATE V. HUCKELBA 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
- 30 - 
not to hinder those rights by allowing for convictions under the statute without proof 
of an evil mind.  Therefore, the legislative history of the statute reveals an intent that 
the word “knowingly” modify both the “possess or carry” element and the “on 
educational property” element of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-269.2(b).  We hold that the 2011 
version of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-269.2(b) outlaws the act of bringing a gun—which the 
actor knowingly possesses or carries—onto property which she knows is educational 
property, or to a curricular or extracurricular activity which she knows is sponsored 
by a school.   
Furthermore, the spirit and purpose of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-269.2(b) instructs 
that we should read a mental state requirement into the “on educational property” 
element of the crime.  After all, the plain reason that the General Assembly enacted 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-269.2(b) was to prevent the presence of guns on educational 
property—not to prevent individuals from possessing or carrying guns.  The actor’s 
presence on educational property is the very crux of the criminal act.  The General 
Assembly could not have simultaneously intended to expand the rights of individuals 
to use and possess guns while also permitting strict liability for unknowing violators 
of one of our State’s gun laws.   
Finally, we note that our holding in Haskins was at least abrogated by the 
General Assembly’s 2011 addition of the mental state requirement to N.C. Gen. Stat. 
STATE V. HUCKELBA 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
- 31 - 
§ 14-269.2(b).  To the extent that Haskins conflicts with this opinion, it is now 
overruled.  
3. 
The Rule of Lenity 
The third and final principle of statutory construction under which we analyze 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-269.2(b) is the rule of lenity.  The rule of lenity provides 
additional support for our conclusion that the “knowingly” mental state must modify 
the presence on educational property element.   
The rule of lenity is a principle of statutory construction that only applies when 
an appellate court is charged with interpreting an ambiguous criminal statute.  
“[W]hen applicable, the rule of lenity requires that ‘ambiguity concerning the ambit 
of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity[.]’ ”  State v. Heavner, ___ 
N.C. App. ___, ___, 741 S.E.2d 897, 901–02 (2013) (quoting Rewis v. United States, 
401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971)); see also State v. Abshire, 363 N.C. 322, 332, 677 S.E.2d 444, 
451 (2009) (“The rule of lenity requires that we strictly construe ambiguous criminal 
statutes.”).  However, in order for the rule of lenity to apply, there must be more than 
one “plausible reading that comports with the legislative purpose in enacting [the 
statute].”  See Abshire, 363 N.C. at 332, 677 S.E.2d at 451 (refusing to apply the rule 
of lenity after determining that there was only one plausible construction of the 
statute).     
STATE V. HUCKELBA 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
- 32 - 
Here, the question is whether the “knowingly” mental state requirement in 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-269.2(b) modifies both clauses of the sentence:  “possess or carry” 
and “on educational property.”  As discussed above, based on the word’s placement in 
the sentence, it is plausible that the legislature either:  (1) intended for “knowingly” 
to modify only the clause immediately following it, which is “possess or carry,” or (2) 
intended for “knowingly” to modify both clauses following it in the sentence, “possess 
or carry” and “on educational property.”  See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-269.2(b) (2011).    
Because there are at least two plausible ways to interpret the mental state 
requirement of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-269.2(b), we hold that the rule of lenity applies.  
Accordingly, we must resolve this issue in favor of lenity for Defendant, and we hold 
that the State bears the burden of proving a defendant’s mental state not only for the 
“possess or carry” element of the statute, but also for the presence on educational 
property element.   
4. 
Plain Error 
Finally, we must determine whether, in this case, the trial court’s failure to 
instruct the jury on the mental state requirement for the “on educational property” 
element amounted to plain error.  For the following reasons, we hold that it did.  
In 2012, our Supreme Court clarified how plain error review applies to 
unpreserved error in criminal cases where the trial court omits an element of the 
crime in its jury instructions.  See State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. 506, 518, 723 S.E.2d 
STATE V. HUCKELBA 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
- 33 - 
326, 334 (2012).  In Lawrence, the Supreme Court analyzed the evolution of both 
federal and State plain error review and developed a framework for future application 
of the plain error rule in North Carolina.  See id.  The dissenting opinion in this case 
concludes that the trial court’s instructions did not rise to the level of plain error 
under Lawrence.  We disagree.     
In Lawrence, the defendant was indicted for two counts each of attempted 
robbery with a dangerous weapon, attempted kidnapping, attempted breaking and 
entering, and conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon.  See id. at 510, 
723 S.E.2d at 329.  The defendant was tried and convicted of all charges.  See id.  On 
appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erroneously omitted from the jury 
instructions the element of robbery with a dangerous weapon that “the weapon must 
have been used to endanger or threaten the life of the victim.”  Id. at 510–11, 723 
S.E.2d at 329.  The State conceded the trial court’s instruction failed to set forth all 
of the elements of robbery with a dangerous weapon.  See id.  The Court of Appeals 
held the trial court’s erroneous omission of an element of the crime amounted to plain 
error.  See State v. Lawrence, 210 N.C. App. 73, 92, 706 S.E.2d 822, 836 (2011).  The 
Supreme Court reversed.  See Lawrence, 365 N.C. at 519, 723 S.E.2d at 335. 
The Supreme Court set forth the following framework for plain error review: 
For error to constitute plain error, a defendant must 
demonstrate that a fundamental error occurred at trial.  To 
show that an error was fundamental, a defendant must 
establish prejudice that, after examination of the entire 
STATE V. HUCKELBA 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
- 34 - 
record, the error had a probable impact on the jury’s 
finding that the defendant was guilty.  Moreover, because 
plain error is to be applied cautiously and only in the 
exceptional case, the error will often be one that seriously 
affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of 
judicial proceedings[.] 
 
Id. at 518, 723 S.E.2d at 334 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  The 
Supreme Court held that although the trial court’s instruction to the jury was 
erroneous, see id., it did not amount to plain error because the jury was presented 
with “overwhelming and uncontroverted” evidence of the defendant’s guilt on the 
element of the crime which the trial court omitted from its instruction.  See id. at 519, 
723 S.E.2d at 335.  The Court noted that “[t]he record contains testimony by multiple 
witnesses describing the efforts of the group, which included defendant, to kidnap, 
threaten, and rob [the victim] Ms. Curtis.”  Id. at 519, 723 S.E.2d at 334.  The Court 
held that the defendant could not show the prejudicial effect necessary to establish 
fundamental error; thus, the error did not amount to plain error.  See id. at 519, 723 
S.E.2d at 335. 
This case is similar to Lawrence in that the trial court erroneously failed to 
instruct the jury on an element of the crime—the mens rea requirement.  Here, the 
trial court instructed the jury that “the State must prove two things beyond a 
reasonable doubt:  First, that the defendant knowingly possessed a Ruger pistol.  And 
second, that the defendant was on educational property at the time she possessed the 
pistol.”  For the reasons stated above, these jury instructions improperly relieved the 
STATE V. HUCKELBA 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
- 35 - 
State of its burden to prove that Defendant was knowingly on educational property 
at the time she possessed the gun.  However, this case differs from Lawrence in that 
the evidence of Defendant’s knowledge of her presence on educational property was 
neither “overwhelming” nor “uncontroverted.”   
Here, the trial court’s error in its jury instructions amounted to fundamental 
error because the jury was presented with sufficient evidence that Defendant lacked 
knowledge of her presence on educational property.  The evidence presented at trial 
showed that Defendant knew that she was not allowed to bring her gun onto 
“campus,” and does not bring the gun into her dorm room.  Further, on the day in 
question, Defendant chose not to drive into the gated, residential area of campus with 
the gun in her glove compartment, even though her stated purpose for being in the 
parking lot was to do her laundry in her dorm room.  Rather, Defendant chose to park 
her car in an area open to the public, requiring no special permit to enter.  This 
evidence suggests that Defendant knew that the gated, residential area of campus 
was “educational property,” but that the public parking lot—which was mostly empty 
at the time—was not.   
According to the trial court’s erroneous jury instructions, these facts would be 
irrelevant to the jury’s analysis of Defendant’s guilt because they pertain only to 
Defendant’s knowledge of her presence on educational property.  Proper 
consideration of such facts probably would have impacted the jury’s finding of guilt 
STATE V. HUCKELBA 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
- 36 - 
in this case.  This evidence establishes the prejudicial effect, and thus the 
fundamental error, that was lacking in Lawrence.   
Lastly, “because plain error is to be applied cautiously and only in the 
exceptional case, the error will often be one that seriously affect[s] the fairness, 
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted).  
Here, the trial court’s erroneous instructions to the jury seriously affected the fairness 
of Defendant’s trial.  Defendant admitted to the element of possession in her opening 
statement.  Thus, the only element of the crime which the jury could consider in 
determining guilt or innocence was the “on educational property” element.  It was 
crucial in this case that the trial court properly instruct the jury on the only element 
of the crime at issue.  Nevertheless, based on the trial court’s instructions, the jury 
was only permitted to consider whether the State proved that Defendant was, in fact, 
on educational property—not whether she knew she was on educational property.   
We therefore find that the trial court committed plain error by failing to 
require the jury to consider whether the State met its burden of proving that 
Defendant was knowingly on educational property when she possessed the Ruger 
pistol.  Our reading of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-269.2(b) requires the State to prove that 
a defendant both knowingly possessed or carried a prohibited weapon and knowingly 
entered educational property with that weapon.  This interpretation of the statute 
STATE V. HUCKELBA 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
- 37 - 
safeguards the rights of lawful gun owners in our State while also protecting 
vulnerable citizens present on educational property.     
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
Defendant’s second assignment of error on appeal is that her trial counsel was 
ineffective by failing to argue an allegedly fatal variance in the indictment.  
Defendant asserts that the indictment against her was flawed because it stated that 
she possessed weapons at “High Point University, located at 833 Montlieu Avenue” 
but the evidence presented at trial showed that she possessed the weapons two miles 
away from that address, at “1911 North Centennial Street.”  We are not persuaded.  
“When a defendant attacks his conviction on the basis that counsel was 
ineffective, he must show that his counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard 
of reasonableness.”  State v. Braswell, 312 N.C. 553, 561–62, 324 S.E.2d 241, 248 
(1985).  Furthermore, “[t]he fact that counsel made an error, even an unreasonable 
error, does not warrant reversal of a conviction unless there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, there would have been a different result in 
the proceedings.”  Id. at 563, 324 S.E.2d at 248.  Finally, a reviewing court “should 
avoid the temptation to second-guess the actions of trial counsel[;] . . . judicial review 
of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.”  State v. Gainey, 355 N.C. 73, 
113, 558 S.E.2d 463, 488 (2002).   
 
An indictment must contain 
STATE V. HUCKELBA 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
- 38 - 
[a] plain and concise factual statement in each count 
which, without allegations of an evidentiary nature, 
asserts facts supporting every element of a criminal offense 
and the defendant’s commission thereof with sufficient 
precision clearly to apprise the defendant or defendants of 
the conduct which is the subject of the accusation. 
 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-924(a)(5) (2013).  Our Supreme Court has held that “it is not 
the function of an indictment to bind the hands of the State with technical rules of 
pleading; rather, its purposes are to identify clearly the crime being charged, thereby 
putting the accused on reasonable notice to defend against it and prepare for trial[.]”  
State v. Sturdivant, 302 N.C. 293, 311, 283 S.E.2d 719, 731 (1981).   Furthermore, we 
have consistently held that, as long as the indictment contains all of the essential 
elements of the crime, mere surplusage in the indictment language does not render a 
variance in the indictment fatal.  See State v. Pickens, 346 N.C. 628, 645, 488 S.E.2d 
162, 172 (1997) (upholding the indictment language as surplusage where the 
indictment alleged that the defendant discharged a “shotgun” and the evidence at 
trial showed he discharged a “handgun”);  State v. Bollinger, 192 N.C. App. 241, 243, 
665 S.E.2d 136, 138 (2008) (upholding the indictment language as surplusage where 
the indictment alleged that the defendant unlawfully carried “metallic knuckles” and 
the evidence at trial showed he carried a knife).   
Here, the indictment stated: 
The jurors for the State upon their oath present that on or 
about the date of offense and in the county named above 
the defendant named above unlawfully, willfully and 
STATE V. HUCKELBA 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
- 39 - 
feloniously did knowingly possess a pistol, Ruger 380 semi-
automatic pistol, on educational property, High Point 
University located at 833 Montlieu Avenue, High Point, 
North Carolina.  
 
The indictment charged all of the essential elements of the crime: that Defendant 
knowingly possessed a Ruger pistol on educational property—High Point University.  
We agree with the State that the physical address for High Point University listed in 
the indictment is surplusage because the indictment already described the 
“educational property” element as “High Point University.”  Because the indictment 
properly contained all of the essential elements of the crime, Defendant has failed to 
establish any fatal variance in her indictment.  Therefore, her assertion that her 
attorney’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness for 
failure to argue this purported fatal variance must fail.   
V. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the trial court committed plain error 
while instructing the jury in this case.  As such, we reverse Defendant’s conviction, 
and remand for a new trial consistent with this opinion.  
REVERSED and REMANDED. 
Judge STROUD concurs. 
Judge BRYANT concurs in part, dissents in part. 
No. COA14-916 – State v. Huckelba 
 
 
BRYANT, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
I concur in the portion of the majority opinion overruling defendant’s challenge 
based on her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.   However, as to the main 
portion of the majority opinion, because I do not believe the trial court’s instruction 
to the jury amounted to the level of plain error, I respectfully dissent. 
The majority reverses the verdict of the jury and the judgment of the trial 
court, and remands the matter for a new trial on the premise that the trial court 
committed plain error in failing to instruct the jury on an element in a statutory 
offense that is not clearly set forth in the statute and was not presented to the trial 
court for its consideration.  “This case presents the question of how the . . . plain error 
standard of review should be applied to error that is not preserved for appellate 
review.”  State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. 506, 511, 723 S.E.2d 326, 330 (2012). 
Under our adversarial system, parties are to present their evidence and 
arguments at trial, and “have an obligation to raise objections to errors at the trial 
level.  Any other approach would place an undue if not impossible burden on the trial 
judge. . . .  If parties do not timely object, they waive the right to raise the alleged 
error on appeal.”  Id. at 512, 723 S.E.2d at 330 (citations and quotations omitted).  In 
a criminal case, error that is not preserved at trial, is reviewed on appeal only for 
plain error.  Id. (citing N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(4) (2012)). 
STATE V. HUCKELBA 
BRYANT, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part 
 
 
2 
“[Our North Carolina Supreme Court] and the United States Supreme Court 
have emphasized that plain error review should be used sparingly, only in exceptional 
circumstances, to reverse criminal convictions on the basis of unpreserved error[.]”  
Id. at 517, 723 S.E.2d at 333 (citing State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 660—61, 300 S.E.2d 
375, 378 (1983) (quoting Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154, 97 S.Ct. 1730, 1736, 
52 L.Ed.2d 203, 212 (1977), and United States v. Ostendorff, 371 F.2d 729 (4th Cir.) 
(1967))).  “[T]he North Carolina plain error standard of review applies only when the 
alleged error is unpreserved, and it requires the defendant to bear the heavier burden 
of showing that the error rises to the level of plain error.”  Id. at 516, 723 S.E.2d at 
333 (citation omitted). 
For error to constitute plain error, a defendant must 
demonstrate that a fundamental error occurred at trial. To 
show that an error was fundamental, a defendant must 
establish prejudice—that, after examination of the entire 
record, the error had a probable impact on the jury's 
finding that the defendant was guilty.  
 
Id. at 518, 723 S.E.2d at 334 (citation omitted). 
 
The question here regards whether the trial court committed plain error when 
instructing the jury on the felony charge of possessing a weapon on campus or other 
educational property in violation of N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b).  The burden is on 
defendant to show that the instructional error had a probable impact on the jury 
verdict. 
STATE V. HUCKELBA 
BRYANT, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part 
 
 
3 
Pursuant to General Statutes, section 14-269.2(b), “[i]t shall be a Class I felony 
for any person knowingly to possess or carry, whether openly or concealed, any gun, 
rifle, pistol, or other firearm of any kind on educational property or to a curricular or 
extracurricular activity sponsored by a school.”  N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b) (emphasis 
added). 
The majority opinion carefully considers whether “knowingly” modifies only 
“possess or carry” or whether it extends to the phrase “on educational property.”  
Using principles of statutory construction addressing the common law presumption 
against criminal liability without a showing of mens rea, the General Assembly’s 
intent in enacting and amending section 14-269.2(b), and the rule of lenity, as well as 
case law precedent from the United States Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, the majority holds that “the ‘knowingly’ mental state in N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 14-269.2(b) must modify both clauses – ‘possess or carry’ and ‘on educational 
property.’ ”  I do not necessarily take issue with the analysis of the statute.  However, 
even accepting that a conviction pursuant to this statute requires that a defendant is 
knowingly on educational property and knowingly in possession of a firearm, the 
critical inquiry here is whether in failing to instruct the jury they had to find 
defendant was knowingly on educational property to find defendant guilty of 
possessing a weapon on campus or other educational property in violation of N.C.G.S. 
§ 14-269.2(b) the trial court’s error amounted to plain error.  I submit that it does not. 
STATE V. HUCKELBA 
BRYANT, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part 
 
 
4 
We are required to apply the plain error rule cautiously.  The prejudicial prong 
of plain error review requires that, even upon a showing of error, defendant can 
prevail only if she can establish that “after examination of the entire record, the error 
had a probable impact on the jury's finding that the defendant was guilty.”  Lawrence, 
365 N.C. at 518, 723 S.E.2d at 334 (citation and quotations omitted); see also  State 
v. Smith, 152 N.C. App 29, 37—38, 566 S.E.2d 793, 799 (2002).  Such is not the case 
on this record.  The trial court’s failure to instruct the jury that in order to find 
defendant guilty it must find defendant was knowingly on educational property was 
not an error that had a probable impact on the jury verdict. 
The majority opinion states that defendant “adamantly denied that she was on 
educational property.”  The record reflects that outside of the jury’s presence, prior to 
and during a Harbison inquiry, defendant confirmed to the trial court that she 
knowingly and willingly allowed her counsel to make an admission before the jury 
that she was in possession of a firearm and three knives.  And, in a statement before 
the court made outside the presence of the jury, and in opening statements made 
before the jury, defendant denied she was on educational property at the time she 
possessed the weapons.  Other than during the Harbison inquiry and assertion during 
opening statements, and likely closing arguments, there is no indication in the record 
that defendant put forth any direct evidence before the jury that she was not on 
educational property.  I do not consider this an adamant denial.  It is clear however, 
STATE V. HUCKELBA 
BRYANT, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part 
 
 
5 
that given defendant’s general admission to possession of the weapons, her only 
defense at trial was that she was not on educational property. 
In its case-in-chief, the State presented four witnesses: a security officer with 
High Point University; a security supervisor of officers in the Security Department 
at High Point University; and two law enforcement officers with the High Point Police 
Department.  The security officer testified he encountered defendant in the parking 
lot of the Administration Building—High Point University property.  At the time, 
there were two entrances to the parking lot; one required passing an automatic 
security arm and the other was an open entrance that did not require passing through 
security.  The security officer testified that “the whole building [was] surrounded by 
security” and that fences stood on both sides of the open entrance to the parking lot. 
Q. 
Now just from your recollection – you’re pretty 
familiar with the campus for this section where you 
encountered [defendant] . . . . 
 
 
. . . 
 
Were there any signs stating that this is campus 
property, no public allowed, anything of that nature? 
 
A. 
There are signs posted that [it] is High Point 
University property. 
 
A supervisor of High Point University security officers also testified that there 
was a “signature fence” around the Administration Building, and he believed there 
was signage indicating High Point University at or near the entrance to the 
Administration Building parking lot defendant used. 
STATE V. HUCKELBA 
BRYANT, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part 
 
 
6 
 
Q. 
Okay. But at the  -- on December 25, 2012, was 
there the High Point University fence around that 
area? 
 
A. 
Yes.  
 
(Emphasis added).  Additionally, 
 
Q. 
All right. Was [defendant’s] car located on 
campus? 
 
A. 
Yes. It was in our parking lot of the 
Administration Building. 
 
(Emphasis added) 
 
In response, defendant put forth no direct evidence that she was not on High 
Point University property.  Furthermore, defendant presented no evidence that when 
she parked in the Administration Building parking lot to access her nearby on-
campus apartment, she did not know she was on High Point University property. 
The record evidence clearly shows that defendant was on High Point 
University Property when she entered the Administration Building parking lot 
encompassed by fencing with signage indicating the property belonging to High Point 
University, and that she was on notice she was on educational property.  This 
evidence tends to show that not only was notice posted, but that defendant knew she 
was on High Point University property.  Specifically, defendant was a senior at High 
Point University.  On Christmas night she was going to her on-campus apartment to 
do laundry.  So, she drove her car to the Administration Building parking lot, driving 
STATE V. HUCKELBA 
BRYANT, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part 
 
 
7 
through one of two entrances surrounded by a fence and marked as High Point 
University property.   
Evidence of defendant’s knowledge that she was on High Point University 
property is further supported by defendant’s statement to law enforcement.  In 
defendant’s statement to High Point Police Department officers, she stated that she 
had taken a concealed weapons class and knew she wasn’t supposed to have a gun on 
campus.  She said she didn’t have anywhere else to keep the handgun, so she kept it 
locked in the glove compartment of her car.  “I know I’m not supposed to have it on 
campus, but I don’t take it in my room, or anything.” 
Defendant’s written statement to law enforcement officers was admitted into 
evidence without objection.  However, at some point later, after recognizing that the 
statement was prejudicial, and not at all helpful to her defense, defendant sought to 
make a late objection and rescind her earlier lack of objection to the admission of her 
statement.  The trial court noted that the objection was untimely and that it was a 
late objection.  The court also noted that defendant’s statement was a confession, and 
that no motion to suppress had been filed.  Defendant’s objection to her statement 
was overruled by the trial court as being  late and therefore waived. 
Our plain error standard of review requires that defendant bear the heavy 
burden of establishing plain error.  Lawrence, 365 at 518, 723 S.E.2d at 334.  In order 
to meet her burden on plain error review, defendant had to show there was sufficient 
evidence before the jury to enable them to find that she did not know she was on 
STATE V. HUCKELBA 
BRYANT, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part 
 
 
8 
educational property.  No such evidence was presented in this trial.  On the contrary, 
there was substantial and sufficient evidence for a jury to find not just that defendant 
was on educational property but that defendant knew she was on educational 
property.  Therefore, defendant has failed to establish that but for the trial court’s 
alleged error in its jury instructions, the jury probably would not have found her 
guilty of felony possession of a weapon on campus or other educational property, in 
violation of N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b).  Thus, defendant has failed to establish 
fundamental error and, therefore, plain error.  See id. 
Because defendant cannot establish plain error, defendant is not entitled to a 
new trial.  Accordingly, I would overrule defendant's argument, acknowledge the 
verdict of the jury, and affirm the judgment of the trial court.