Title: New Jersey in the Interest of D.M.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: May 14, 2019

New Jersey in the Interest of D.M. Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary The State of New Jersey charged fourteen-year-old D.M. with delinquency based on conduct which, if committed by an adult, would constitute first-degree aggravated sexual assault. The State alleged D.M. committed acts of sexual penetration against an eleven-year-old acquaintance, Z.Y. With the parties’ consent, the Family Part judge considered the lesser-related charge of third-degree endangering the welfare of a child. In this appeal, the issue presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's review centered on whether a juvenile could be adjudicated delinquent for endangering the welfare of a child when the juvenile and his alleged victim were fewer than four years apart in age and the Family Part judge made no findings of sexual penetration, force, or coercion. An Appellate Division panel reversed the juvenile adjudication, reasoning that the Legislature did not intend for the endangering statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1), to support a delinquency adjudication based on a juvenile’s sexual contact with another minor fewer than four years younger than he, in the absence of a finding of sexual penetration, force, or coercion. The New Jersey Supreme Court did not concur with the Appellate Division panel’s construction of the endangering statute. Although the Legislature may decide that statute: "nothing in the current text of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1) precludes the adjudication in this case. We decline to rewrite the statute’s plain language in this appeal." The Court concluded, however, that the Family Part court’s adjudication had to be reversed: "When the court, at the disposition hearing, disavowed critical aspects of its previously-stated factual findings and characterized its decision to adjudicate D.M. under the lesser-related offense as a humanitarian gesture, it undermined its determination as to both offenses. In this extraordinary setting, it is unclear whether the State met its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that D.M. violated N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1)." Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUSThis syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized. State in the Interest of D.M., a Juvenile (A-30-17) (079999)Argued October 22, 2018 -- Decided May 14, 2019PATTERSON, J., writing for the Court. The Court considers whether a juvenile can be adjudicated delinquent for endangering the welfare of a child in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1) when the juvenile and his alleged victim are fewer than four years apart in age and the Family Part judge makes no findings of sexual penetration, force, or coercion. The Court also considers the impact of the Family Part’s conflicting characterizations, at the adjudication and disposition hearings, of its factual findings regarding the juvenile’s conduct. According to testimony, Z.Y., eleven, stated that fourteen-year-old D.M. had “made [Z.Y.] suck his penis” and told Z.Y. to “put [D.M.’s] penis in his anus.” Z.Y. ultimately described three encounters with D.M. at which the conduct allegedly occurred. The State charged D.M. with delinquency based on conduct which, if committed by an adult, would constitute first-degree aggravated sexual assault contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:14- 2(a)(1). At trial, the State had the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of that statute. One of those elements is an act of “sexual penetration.” D.M. requested that the judge consider third-degree endangering the welfare of a child as a lesser-related offense. In order to establish a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:24- 4(a)(1), the State had the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that D.M. engaged in “sexual conduct which would impair or debauch the morals of the child.” The State agreed with D.M.’s counsel that there was a rational basis in the evidence for the endangering charge, and consented to the request. In a written decision, the court made detailed credibility findings. The court found that the State failed to prove sexual penetration and accordingly declined to adjudicate D.M. delinquent on the charge of first-degree aggravated sexual assault. The court found, however, that the State had satisfied its burden of proof with respect to the lesser- related offense of third-degree endangering the welfare of a child. The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that D.M. “exposed his penis to Z.Y., sought Z.Y. to touch his penis with his mouth, and had his penis physically touch Z.Y.’s buttocks.” The court found that these acts “would tend to debauch and impair the morals of a child” within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1), and adjudicated D.M. delinquent as to that offense. 1 At a disposition hearing, the court stated, in part: “I adjudicated [D.M.] to a third degree, but quite frankly, the elements of the first[-]degree offense were met.” The court noted that it had “considered a lesser[-]related offense really as a humanitarian gesture to [D.M.] . . . in light of his lack of a prior record, his extremely devoted grandmother, his trials and tribulations, [and] his active and noble extracurriculars,” but that, “if one were to really look at the evidence that was presented and one were to be honest about assessing that evidence, there is no doubt in the eyes of the [c]ourt that the elements of the first[-]degree offense have been made and surely an attempt.” D.M. appealed his juvenile adjudication and disposition. The State and D.M. briefed the issues raised. Neither party requested oral argument. The Appellate Division panel sua sponte ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs on “whether the lack of a finding of penetration or coercion undermines the delinquency finding of endangering the welfare of a child, in light of the four-year age difference required for a delinquency finding of sexual assault” under N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b). 451 N.J. Super. 415, 423 (App. Div. 2017). The State then requested oral argument, and D.M. did not oppose that application. The panel, however, denied the State’s request. The panel reversed D.M.’s delinquency adjudication, based on its resolution of the question it had raised sua sponte. Id. at 426-28. The panel acknowledged that “sexual conduct,” which would impair or debauch the morals of the child, was undefined in N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1). Id. at 426. It concluded, however, that the Legislature sought to limit the endangering statute, as applied to juveniles, to cases in which the juvenile’s conduct also would give rise to a charge of either sexual assault or criminal sexual contact by force or coercion. Id. at 424-25, 428. Noting that coercion was not at issue, id. at 424-25, and citing the sexual penetration element of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a), and the age disparity element of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b), the panel held that “[t]he Legislature did not intend sexual behavior between children close in age not involving penetration, which it specifically exempted from the criminal statutes, to nonetheless be included within the crime of child endangerment,” id. at 427. The Court granted the State’s petition for certification. 231 N.J. 553 (2017).HELD: Although the Legislature may decide that N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1) should not apply in juvenile proceedings based on conduct such as that at issue here, nothing in the current text of that statute precludes the adjudication in this case. The Court declines to rewrite the statute’s plain language in this appeal. However, the Family Part court’s adjudication must be reversed because the court’s disavowal, at the disposition hearing, of critical aspects of its previously-stated factual findings undermined its determination as to both offenses. In this extraordinary setting, it is unclear whether the State met its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that D.M. violated N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1). Accordingly, the Court affirms on other grounds the panel’s judgment. 2 1. The panel should have granted the State’s unopposed motion for oral argument, and the Court cautions appellate courts in similar settings involving expanded issues to seriously consider granting motions for oral argument, even when no party requested argument when it filed its original brief. (p. 16)2. The Appellate Division’s decision relies on Code provisions set forth in three statutes: the sexual assault statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2; the criminal sexual contact statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(b); and the endangering the welfare of a child statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1). D.M. was charged with first-degree aggravated sexual assault pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(1), under which the State must prove that the juvenile committed an act of sexual penetration on a victim less than thirteen years of age, but need not prove that the juvenile is four or more years older than the victim. Under another section of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2 cited by the Appellate Division, a juvenile may be adjudicated delinquent if the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile committed an act of sexual contact -- whether or not that contact involved sexual penetration, force, or coercion -- provided that the juvenile charged is four or more years older than the alleged victim. Finally, if the State seeks a delinquency adjudication pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(b) based on the offense defined in subsection (c)(1) of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2, it must prove that the juvenile committed an act of sexual contact with a victim using “physical force or coercion.” In contrast to the offenses cited by the Appellate Division panel, third-degree endangering the welfare of a child requires proof only that the victim is a child and sexual conduct by any person which “would impair or debauch the morals of the child.” N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1). The phrase “sexual conduct which would impair or debauch the morals of the child” is undefined in the endangering statute, but the Court has observed that “sexual conduct” clearly includes sexual assault and sexual contact. (pp. 17-20)3. There is no evidence in the endangering statute’s plain language that the Legislature intended to incorporate the penetration or age-disparity elements of the sexual assault statute, or the force or coercion elements of the criminal sexual contact statute, into the endangering offense. The Court does not agree that in order for a juvenile, who is fewer than four years older than the victim, to be adjudicated delinquent under N.J.S.A 2C:24- 4(a)(1), there must be proof of sexual penetration, force, or coercion. The endangering statute simply makes no mention of the elements cited by the panel. Had the Legislature intended to limit the application of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1) to cases in which the juvenile has also violated specific provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2 or N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3, as the panel suggests, it would have done so by adding language to that effect. Accordingly, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1) as currently drafted may apply to a juvenile, even when the specific conduct involved does not involve sexual penetration, force, or coercion and the juvenile and alleged victim are fewer than four years apart in age. (pp. 20-23)4. The contrasting interpretations of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1) advanced in this case signal a need for legislative review of the endangering statute as it applies to juvenile settings such as this appeal. As D.M.’s case illustrates, it would be helpful if the statutory 3 language “sexual conduct which would impair or debauch the morals of the child” provided clearer guidance to courts, counsel, and the public in settings involving sexual conduct by juveniles close in age. Should it choose to do so, the Legislature could amend N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1) to clarify its intent with respect to the statute’s application to juvenile adjudications. (pp. 23-24)5. The Family Part judge’s credibility assessment and core factual findings -- that D.M. “exposed his penis to Z.Y., sought Z.Y. to touch his penis with his mouth, and had his penis physically touch Z.Y.’s buttocks,” but that the State fell short of proving oral or anal penetration -- fully supported the judge’s determination on the two offenses considered. Had the court not deviated from its written decision in its later comments, there would be no basis to overturn that determination in this appeal. The court’s statement at the disposition hearing, however, directly contravened the findings set forth in its adjudication. The juvenile’s personal characteristics are an important factor at the disposition stage, but they do not warrant a “downgrade” of his charges at the adjudication stage, or any other finding inconsistent with the proofs. The court sitting as factfinder in a juvenile adjudication must find the facts that the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt; it has no authority to nullify its findings in order to achieve a more lenient disposition, or for any other purpose. In this matter, the court disclosed at the disposition that, although the State proved N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(1)’s sexual-penetration element, the court discounted that proof and adjudicated the juvenile delinquent on the lesser-related offense. That disclosure undermines confidence in both determinations. In its wake, it is simply unclear what facts the court actually found and what facts it did not find. Accordingly, D.M.’s adjudication must be reversed. (pp. 24-26) The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed on other grounds. JUSTICE ALBIN, concurring, agrees that D.M.’s juvenile adjudication for endangering must be reversed and that N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1) is in need of legislative review but expresses the view that the child endangerment statute was never intended to criminalize consensual sexual experimentation between close-in- age juveniles that does not violate the sexual offense statutes, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2 and -3. Without such limitations, Justice Albin observes, the endangering statute is vulnerable to a future as-applied constitutional challenge.CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, FERNANDEZ- VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE PATTERSON’S opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a concurrence. 4 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 30 September Term 2017 079999 State in the Interest of D.M., a Juvenile On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 451 N.J. Super. 415 (App. Div. 2017). Argued Decided October 22, 2018 May 14, 2019 Michele C. Buckley, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant State of New Jersey (Michael A. Monahan, Acting Union County Prosecutor, attorney; Milton S. Leibowitz, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the briefs). Rochelle Watson, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent D.M. (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Rochelle Watson, of counsel and on the brief, and Seon Jeong Lee, Designated Counsel, on the brief). Sarah D. Brigham, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Sarah D. Brigham, of counsel and on the brief). JUSTICE PATTERSON delivered the opinion of the Court. In this appeal, we consider whether a juvenile can be adjudicateddelinquent for endangering the welfare of a child in violation of N.J.S.A. 1 2C:24-4(a)(1) when the juvenile and his alleged victim are fewer than fouryears apart in age and the Family Part judge makes no findings of sexualpenetration, force, or coercion. We also consider the impact of the FamilyPart’s conflicting characterizations, at the adjudication and dispositionhearings, of its factual findings regarding the juvenile’s conduct. The State charged fourteen-year-old D.M. with delinquency based onconduct which, if committed by an adult, would constitute first-degreeaggravated sexual assault, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(1). The Statealleged that D.M. committed acts of sexual penetration against an eleven-year-old acquaintance, Z.Y. With the parties’ consent, the Family Part judge alsoconsidered the lesser-related charge of third-degree endangering the welfare ofa child, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1). Following the trial, the court found that the State had failed to provebeyond a reasonable doubt sexual penetration, an element of the first-degreeaggravated sexual assault charge under N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(1). The courtfound that the State had proven the elements of the third-degree endangeringoffense, including “sexual conduct which would impair or debauch the moralsof the child.” N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1). At the disposition hearing, however, the court contradicted its earlierfindings. The court said that the State had actually met its burden to prove 2 sexual penetration, but that the court instead adjudicated D.M. delinquent onthe third-degree charge “as a humanitarian gesture” warranted by thejuvenile’s personal qualities. An Appellate Division panel reversed the juvenile adjudication. State inInterest of D.M., 451 N.J. Super. 415, 418 (App. Div. 2017). The panelreasoned that the Legislature did not intend for the endangering statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1), to support a delinquency adjudication based on ajuvenile’s sexual contact with another minor fewer than four years youngerthan he, in the absence of a finding of sexual penetration, force, or coercion. We do not concur with the Appellate Division panel’s construction ofthe endangering statute. Although the Legislature may decide that statuteshould not apply in juvenile proceedings based on conduct such as that at issuehere, nothing in the current text of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1) precludes theadjudication in this case. We decline to rewrite the statute’s plain language inthis appeal. We conclude, however, that the Family Part court’s adjudication must bereversed. When the court, at the disposition hearing, disavowed criticalaspects of its previously-stated factual findings and characterized its decisionto adjudicate D.M. under the lesser-related offense as a humanitarian gesture,it undermined its determination as to both offenses. In this extraordinary 3 setting, it is unclear whether the State met its burden to prove beyond areasonable doubt that D.M. violated N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1). Accordingly, we affirm on other grounds the panel’s judgment. I. A. At the time of the alleged incidents that gave rise to this proceeding,D.M. was one of a group of teenage boys who sometimes spent after-schoolhours together at a park adjacent to a school.1 Z.Y. and his younger brotherwould sometimes join the older boys in the park, which was located near abusiness owned by their mother. One evening, Z.Y. was sharing a bedroom with his younger brother anda seven-year-old boy who was staying at his home. Checking on her sons andher young guest, Z.Y.’s mother found Z.Y. and the seven-year-old boy sittingtogether on a bed. She noticed that Z.Y.’s shorts were “shifted” in a mannerthat she considered peculiar. Concerned about what the boys had been doing,Z.Y.’s mother questioned the seven-year-old. She stated that he told her Z.Y.had “rubb[ed] his penis” on him. Z.Y.’s mother, upset by the younger child’s1 We derive our summary of the facts from the transcripts of Z.Y.’s videotaped statement to police, the N.J.R.E. 104 hearing conducted by the Family Part judge to determine the admissibility of Z.Y.’s out-of-court statements under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27), and D.M.’s trial. 4 revelation, asked Z.Y. “what was he doing, and where did he get it from.”According to his mother, Z.Y. responded, “[M]ommy, the boy did it to me.”At that time, Z.Y. did not identify the “boy” to whom he referred. According to the testimony of Z.Y.’s adult sister, who lived in the familyhome, Z.Y. was distraught about the incident and his mother’s reaction to it.She stated that she took Z.Y. to a different room and questioned him, and thatZ.Y. identified D.M. as the boy to whom he had earlier referred. By hissister’s account, Z.Y. stated that D.M. had “made [Z.Y.] suck his penis” andthat D.M. had told Z.Y. to “put [D.M.’s] penis in his anus.” Z.Y.’s parents and sister took him to the police station, where he gave avideotaped statement to a police officer. Z.Y. recounted to the officer twoincidents, both of which allegedly occurred in an outdoor stairwell of theschool adjacent to the park. He stated that in the first incident, D.M. led himdown the stairwell, which provided access to the school’s basement. Z.Y. toldthe officer that D.M., with his pants down, asked Z.Y. to “suck his thingy,”and that he “just did it for . . . two seconds” before leaving the stairwell. Z.Y. told the officer that a second alleged incident occurred two weeksafter the first in the same stairwell. He said that on that occasion, D.M.repeatedly asked him to “suck [his] thingy.” Z.Y. told the officer that hecomplied with D.M.’s request, “but [he] did it for only a second.” Z.Y. said 5 that it made him feel “a little bit weird” and that he quickly left the stairwell.Z.Y. said that the next day, D.M. asked him to go to the stairwell with himagain, but that he had refused. B. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-30, the State charged D.M. withdelinquency based on conduct which, if committed by an adult, wouldconstitute first-degree aggravated sexual assault, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(1). About one week before Z.Y. testified at trial, Z.Y. alleged for the firsttime a third incident. Z.Y. said that on the only occasion in which he had beeninside D.M.’s home, D.M. took him to a secluded corner in the house andasked permission to “[p]ut his thing in [Z.Y.’s] mouth again.” Z.Y. said thathe complied. At trial, the State had the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt theelements of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(1). One of those elements is an act of “sexualpenetration,” defined as “vaginal intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio or analintercourse between persons or insertion of the hand, finger or object into the 6 anus or vagina either by the actor or upon the actor’s instruction.” N.J.S.A.2C:14-2(a)(1); N.J.S.A. 2C:14-1(c).2 To prove that element, the State relied primarily on Z.Y.’s pretrialstatement to the police officer, which was admitted into evidence pursuant toN.J.R.E. 803(c)(27), and on Z.Y.’s testimony before the Family Part judge attrial. At trial, Z.Y. testified about the two incidents reported in his statement.He added to his account of the first incident in the stairwell an allegation that,on that occasion, D.M. attempted anal penetration. Z.Y. said that it “hurt alittle bit,” that he told D.M. to stop, and that D.M. complied. Z.Y. alsotestified about the second alleged incident in the stairwell and the allegedincident at D.M.’s home. On cross-examination, Z.Y. admitted using a video-chat application totry to contact D.M., and admitted sending D.M. a message on that application.A screenshot of the message, which read “[s]o 69, let me c ur cock,” wasadmitted into evidence. D.M. testified that all of Z.Y.’s allegations were false. He stated thatZ.Y. persistently tried to contact him via the video-chat application andidentified the explicit message as a message sent by Z.Y. to him. D.M. and 2 N.J.S.A. 2C:14-1(c) also provides that “[t]he depth of insertion shall not be relevant as to the question of commission of the crime.” 7 two friends who testified on his behalf recounted incidents in which Z.Y.approached D.M. and others and made sexually explicit comments. Following the trial, but prior to the Family Part judge’s adjudicationdecision, D.M. requested that the judge consider third-degree endangering thewelfare of a child, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1), as a lesser-relatedoffense of first-degree aggravated sexual assault. In order to establish aviolation of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1), the State had the burden to prove beyond areasonable doubt that D.M. engaged in “sexual conduct which would impair ordebauch the morals of the child.” N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1). The State agreed with D.M.’s counsel that there was a rational basis inthe evidence for the endangering charge, and consented to the request. Thecourt reopened the matter and heard supplemental closing argumentsaddressing the endangering offense. C. In a written decision, the court made detailed credibility findings.Concluding that Z.Y. provided consistent and specific testimony about thethree alleged incidents, the court found him credible. It commented thatalthough D.M. had testified “confidently, precisely, and articulately,” andappeared to be “a mild-mannered and likable young man,” his credibility wasdiminished because he was “inauthentic” and “trying to sell himself.” The 8 court found Z.Y.’s mother to be highly credible, and viewed the friends whomD.M. called as fact witnesses to be “earnest” witnesses with little informationrelevant to the case. The court found that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubta critical element of the aggravated sexual assault charge: sexual penetration.It found the evidence of oral penetration to be “unclear and undeveloped,”noting that although “there was some evidence of brief oral penetration, it didnot reach the threshold of beyond a reasonable doubt.” The court also foundthe State’s proofs unclear and insufficient with respect to whether D.M. hadanally penetrated Z.Y. Accordingly, the court declined to adjudicate D.M.delinquent on the charge of first-degree aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A.2C:14-2(a)(1).3 The court found, however, that the State had satisfied its burden of proofwith respect to the lesser-related offense of third-degree endangering thewelfare of a child, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1). After noting theundisputed fact that Z.Y. was a “child” within the meaning of that statute, thecourt determined that D.M. knowingly engaged in sexual conduct which would3 The court also declined to adjudicate D.M. delinquent on the lesser-included offenses of attempted aggravated sexual assault under N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(1), N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1, and N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8(d)(2), criminal sexual contact under N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(b), or sexual assault under N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b), citing elements of each of those offenses that were unsupported by the evidence. 9 “impair or debauch” Z.Y.’s morals. The court found beyond a reasonabledoubt that in the two incidents in the school stairwell, D.M. “exposed his penisto Z.Y., sought Z.Y. to touch his penis with his mouth, and had his penisphysically touch Z.Y.’s buttocks.” It further concluded that in the thirdincident, in D.M.’s home, D.M. “sought Z.Y. to touch his penis with hismouth.” The court found that these acts “would tend to debauch and impairthe morals of a child” within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1), andadjudicated D.M. delinquent as to that offense. Three months later, the court held a disposition hearing pursuant toN.J.S.A. 2A:4A:43. Addressing one of the dispositional factors prescribed by N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-43(a), “[t]he nature and circumstances of the offense,” thecourt stated: The record should be very clear. This is a very serious offense. And I will say the following. I adjudicated [D.M.] to a third degree, but quite frankly, the elements of the first[-]degree offense were met. The [c]ourt, in conferring with counsel, considered a lesser[-]related offense really as a humanitarian gesture to [D.M.] and gave him each and every conceivable benefit of the doubt in order to downgrade it to a third[-]degree in light of his lack of a prior record, his extremely devoted grandmother, his trials and tribulations, his active and noble extracurriculars. But if one were to really look at the evidence that was presented and one were to be honest about assessing that evidence, there is no doubt in the eyes of the [c]ourt 10 that the elements of the first[-]degree offense have been made and surely an attempt. So for the purposes of any reviewing court, if a reviewing court is left, as it might be, scratching its head, how come the [c]ourt didn’t adjudicate [D.M.] based upon the overwhelming [evidence] that the [c]ourt credit[ed], there is the [c]ourt’s response. It was -- in the [c]ourt’s judgment the elements were met. It was the [c]ourt[’s] effort to accord the Defense, as he is entitled, every conceivable benefit of the doubt. The court imposed on D.M. three years’ probation, ordered that heundergo treatment in an outpatient residential program, and mandated hiscompliance with Megan’s Law requirements. D. D.M. appealed his juvenile adjudication and disposition, challenging thesufficiency of the evidence supporting the Family Part judge’s finding ofdelinquency with respect to the charge of endangering the welfare of a child,and raising three other issues not germane to this appeal. The State and D.M.briefed the issues raised. Neither party requested oral argument in theAppellate Division pursuant to Rule 2:11-1(b); according to the State, it didnot request oral argument because the issues raised by D.M. were governed bysettled law. The Appellate Division panel sua sponte ordered the parties to submitsupplemental briefs on a question it characterized as an expansion of D.M.’s 11 challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence: “whether the lack of a finding ofpenetration or coercion undermines the delinquency finding of endangering thewelfare of a child, in light of the four-year age difference required for adelinquency finding of sexual assault” under N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b). D.M., 451 N.J. Super. at 423. As a result of the panel’s order, the State requested oralargument pursuant to Rule 2:11-1(b), and D.M. did not oppose thatapplication. The panel, however, denied the State’s request. The panel reversed D.M.’s delinquency adjudication, based on itsresolution of the question it had raised sua sponte. Id. at 426-28. The panelacknowledged that “sexual conduct,” which would impair or debauch themorals of the child, was undefined in N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1). Id. at 426. Itconcluded, however, that the Legislature sought to limit the endangeringstatute, as applied to juveniles, to cases in which the juvenile’s conduct alsowould give rise to a charge of either sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2, orcriminal sexual contact by force or coercion, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(b). Id. at 424-25, 428. Citing the sexual penetration element of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a), and theage disparity element of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b), the panel held that “[t]heLegislature did not intend sexual behavior between children close in age notinvolving penetration, which it specifically exempted from the criminal 12 statutes, to nonetheless be included within the crime of child endangerment.”Id. at 427. Based on a finding that N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1) was ambiguous, andinvoking the rule of lenity, the panel reversed D.M.’s adjudication ofdelinquency. Id. at 428. It reasoned that “[a]lthough D.M. engaged inbehavior that would generally be considered sexual conduct with another child,the sexual contact [in this case] was exempted from criminal liability by aspecific statute.” Id. at 427. The panel did not consider the remaining issuesraised by D.M. Id. at 423. We granted the State’s petition for certification. 231 N.J. 553 (2017).We also granted the Attorney General’s application to appear as amicus curiae. II. A. The State observes that N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1)’s plain language requiresproof of only two elements: that the victim is a child, and that the defendantengages in “sexual conduct” that would impair or debauch the morals of thechild. It argues that because N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1) does not cross-reference N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2, the Court should not infer that the State must prove theelements of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2 when a juvenile is charged under N.J.S.A. 13 2C:24-4(a)(1). It asserts that the Appellate Division panel should have grantedits unopposed motion for oral argument after sua sponte raising a new issue. B. D.M. contends that N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1) and the sexual assaultstatutes should be construed in tandem because they serve the same legislativegoal. He argues that the Legislature did not enact the endangering statute tocriminalize peer-to-peer adolescent sexual experimentation that is expresslyexcluded from the sexual assault statutes. D.M. asserts that in accordance withthe rule of lenity, the Court should resolve any ambiguity in N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1) in his favor. C. The Attorney General asserts that the Legislature’s omission ofpenetration, force, coercion, and age disparity elements from N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1) evinces its intent to exclude those elements from the offense ofendangering the welfare of a child. The Attorney General views the court’scomments at D.M.’s disposition to reveal that the court improperlydowngraded the charge from a first-degree offense to a third-degree offensebased on sentencing factors irrelevant to adjudication. 14 III. A. In the appeal of a juvenile delinquency adjudication, “[o]ur standard ofreview is narrow and is limited to evaluation of whether the trial judge’sfindings are supported by substantial, credible evidence in the record as awhole.” State in Interest of J.P.F., 368 N.J. Super. 24, 31 (App. Div. 2004)(citing State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471 (1999); State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964)). We determine whether those findings “could reasonablyhave been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record as awhole.” State in Interest of S.B., 333 N.J. Super. 236, 241 (App. Div. 2000)(citing Locurto, 157 N.J. at 471; Johnson, 42 N.J. at 162). “If we are satisfiedthat the findings and result meet this criterion, our task is complete, and wemay not disturb the result, even though we may feel we may have reached adifferent conclusion.” Ibid. (citing Locurto, 157 N.J. at 471; Johnson, 42 N.J.at 162). “On the other hand, a trial judge’s interpretation of the law and thelegal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to anyspecial deference.” Ibid. (citing Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. ofManalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)). 15 B. The statutory construction issue raised by the Appellate Division panel --whether a juvenile’s sexual conduct with another juvenile close in age thatdoes not involve sexual penetration, force, or coercion may nonethelessconstitute “sexual conduct which would impair or debauch the morals of thechild” under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1) -- was not discussed by the parties in theiroriginal appellate briefs. That question, first raised by the panel after theinitial briefs were filed, substantially expanded the issues on appeal and thepotential impact of the appeal on other juvenile adjudications. Recognizingthat fact, the panel ordered supplemental briefs. So that counsel could address that important -- and ultimately dispositive-- issue in argument, the panel should have granted the State’s unopposedmotion for oral argument. We caution appellate courts in similar settingsinvolving expanded issues to seriously consider granting motions for oralargument, even when no party requested argument when it filed its originalbrief. C. 1. We review the Appellate Division panel’s interpretation of N.J.S.A.2C:24-4(a)(1) pursuant to familiar principles of statutory construction. Our 16 task is to “ascertain the Legislature’s intent, reflecting its chosen language, andto give the words of the statute 'their generally accepted meaning.’” State v.Bolvito, 217 N.J. 221, 228-29 (2014) (quoting State v. Marquez, 202 N.J. 485,499 (2010)); see also N.J.S.A. 1:1-1. We must “effectuat[e] the legislativeplan as it may be gathered from the enactment [when] read in full light of itshistory, purpose and context.” Bolvito, 217 N.J. at 229 (alterations in original)(quoting Koch v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 157 N.J. 1, 7 (1999)). “When the Legislature’s chosen words lead to one clear andunambiguous result, the interpretive process comes to a close, without the needto consider extrinsic aids.” State v. Shelley, 205 N.J. 320, 323 (2011). Acourt “seek[s] out extrinsic evidence, such as legislative history, for assistancewhen statutory language yields 'more than one plausible interpretation.’” Id.at 323-24 (quoting DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)). If a question concerns more than one statutory provision, “[r]elated partsof an overall statutory scheme can . . . provide relevant context.” Beim v.Hulfish, 216 N.J. 484, 498 (2014) (alterations in original) (quoting DYFS v.A.L., 213 N.J. 1, 20 (2013)). 2. The Appellate Division’s decision relies on Code provisions set forth inthree statutes: the sexual assault statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2; the criminal sexual 17 contact statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(b); and the endangering the welfare of a childstatute, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1). We review each in turn. D.M. was charged with first-degree aggravated sexual assault pursuantto N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(1), which provides, “[a]n actor is guilty of aggravatedsexual assault if he commits an act of sexual penetration with another person ”if that person “is less than 13 years old.” Thus, in a juvenile adjudication premised on an alleged violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(1), the State must prove that the juvenile committed an actof sexual penetration on a victim less than thirteen years of age, but need notprove that the juvenile is four or more years older than the victim. Ibid. Another section of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2 cited by the Appellate Divisioncriminalizes acts of sexual contact on the basis of the age disparity between theactor and the victim. 4 Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b), an actor is guilty ofsexual assault, a second-degree crime, if he “commits an act of sexual contactwith a victim who is less than 13 years old and the actor is at least four yearsolder than the victim.” A juvenile may be adjudicated delinquent under thatprovision if the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile4 “Sexual contact” is defined as the “intentional touching by the victim or actor, either directly or through clothing, of the victim’s or actor’s intimate parts for the purpose of degrading or humiliating the victim or sexually arousing or sexually gratifying the actor.” N.J.S.A. 2C:14-1(d). 18 committed an act of sexual contact -- whether or not that contact involvedsexual penetration, force, or coercion -- provided that the juvenile charged isfour or more years older than the alleged victim. Ibid. Finally, under N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(b), “[a]n actor is guilty of criminalsexual contact,” a fourth-degree offense, “if he commits an act of sexualcontact with the victim under any of the circumstances set forth in [N.J.S.A.2C:14-2(c)] (1) through (4).” If the State seeks a delinquency adjudicationpursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(b) based on the offense defined in subsection(c)(1) of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2, it must prove that the juvenile committed an act ofsexual contact with a victim using “physical force or coercion.” N.J.S.A.2C:14-2(c)(1). In contrast to the offenses cited by the Appellate Division panel, third-degree endangering the welfare of a child requires proof only that the victim isa child and sexual conduct by any person which “would impair or debauch themorals of the child.” N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1). The endangering statuteprovides: Any person having a legal duty for the care of a child or who has assumed responsibility for the care of a child who engages in sexual conduct which would impair or debauch the morals of the child is guilty of a crime of the second degree. Any other person who engages in conduct or who causes harm as described in this paragraph to a child is guilty of a crime of the third degree. 19 [N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1).]5 The phrase “sexual conduct which would impair or debauch the moralsof the child” is undefined in the endangering statute. See ibid. As weobserved in the appeal of an adult defendant’s conviction of child luring andattempted child endangerment, “[a]lthough the term 'sexual conduct’ is notdefined, clearly included are sexual assault[] and sexual contact.” State v.Perez, 177 N.J. 540, 553 (2003) (quoting State v. Perez, 349 N.J. Super. 145,153 (App. Div. 2002)). 3. Against that backdrop, we review the Appellate Division panel’sinterpretation of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1). We concur with the Appellate Division panel that D.M. could not beadjudicated delinquent of the lesser-included offenses of aggravated sexualassault under either N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c), absent proof of sexual penetration, 5 N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4 clearly is not limited to adults and may be applied to juveniles. See N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1) (providing that any “person” who “engages in conduct or who causes harm” to a child, as described in that subsection of the statute, may be found guilty of the offense); N.J.S.A. 30:4- 123.53a(c) (charging Juvenile Justice Commission with the responsibility to provide written notice to the prosecutor when it anticipates the release of a juvenile adjudicated delinquent on a charge of endangering the welfare of a child); see also State in Interest of A.B., 328 N.J. Super. 96, 99, 101 (Ch. Div. 1999) (holding that a juvenile can be adjudicated delinquent pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(3), a provision of the endangering statute that criminalizes child pornography). 20 force, or coercion, or under N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(b), absent proof of force orcoercion. D.M., 451 N.J. Super. at 424-25. We further agree with the panelthat D.M. could not be adjudicated delinquent under N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b), as alesser-included offense of aggravated sexual assault, because D.M. and Z.Y.are fewer than four years apart in age. Id. at 425. We part company with the panel, however, with respect to itsconstruction of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1). We find no evidence in theendangering statute’s plain language that the Legislature intended toincorporate the penetration or age-disparity elements of the sexual assaultstatute, or the force or coercion elements of the criminal sexual contact statute,into the endangering offense. We do not agree that in order for a juvenile, whois fewer than four years older than the victim, to be adjudicated delinquentunder N.J.S.A 2C:24-4(a)(1), there must be proof of sexual penetration, force,or coercion. See id. at 428. The endangering statute simply makes no mentionof the elements cited by the panel. See N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1). Moreover, when the Legislature seeks to import a part of one Codeprovision into another, it expresses that intent in unambiguous terms. See,e.g., N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(a) (explicitly cross-referencing N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(2)-(7)); N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(b) (explicitly cross-referencing N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(1)-(4)); N.J.S.A. 2C:33-12(c) (explicitly cross-referencing N.J.S.A. 2C:34-2, -3, 21 and -4); N.J.S.A. 2C:33-28(a) (explicitly cross-referencing definitionalprovision of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-29). Had the Legislature intended to limit theapplication of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1) to cases in which the juvenile has alsoviolated specific provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2 or N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3, as thepanel suggests, it would have done so by adding language to that effect. It hasnot done so.6 See In re Expungement of the Arrest/Charge Records of T.B., 236 N.J. 262, 275 (2019) (declining to interpret a statute to exclude certainoffenses from a required assessment when the Legislature could haveexpressed its intention to exclude those offenses, “[b]ut it did not”). Accordingly, we do not adopt the Appellate Division’s restrictive viewof the endangering statute. In appropriate settings, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1) ascurrently drafted may apply to a juvenile, even when the specific conduct 6 N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1)’s legislative history confirms that, following its 1979 amendment, the endangering statute was not limited to conduct that would also violate N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2 or -3. Although the Assembly Judiciary Committee’s statement to the statute’s 1979 amendments provides that those amendments “should be read in combination with” the amendments to the sexual assault statute, it does not state or imply that the endangering statute should be limited to offenses set forth in the sexual assault statute amendments. A. Judiciary, Law, Pub. Safety & Defense Comm.’s Statement to A. 3279 78-79 (June 28, 1979). To the contrary, the Statement makes clear that the endangering statute’s 1979 amendments were intended to incorporate “[s]ocially unacceptable sexual conduct between a person over 16 and a person under 16, which may not otherwise be covered by 2C:14-2 or 2C:14-3,” and to make such conduct “a third or fourth degree crime.” Id. at 79. 22 involved does not involve sexual penetration, force, or coercion and thejuvenile and alleged victim are fewer than four years apart in age. 4. The contrasting interpretations of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1) discussedabove signal a need for legislative review of the endangering statute as itapplies to juvenile settings such as this appeal. As D.M.’s case illustrates, itwould be helpful if the statutory language “sexual conduct which would impairor debauch the morals of the child” provided clearer guidance to courts,counsel, and the public in settings involving sexual conduct by juveniles closein age. Indeed, laws with language analogous to that of our currentendangering statute were criticized in the commentary to Model Penal Code(MPC) § 230.4, which addressed the offense of endangering the welfare of achild; the MPC’s drafters rejected language similar to that of N.J.S.A. 2C:24- -4(a)(1), in favor of language tethering the offense to a defendant’s violation of“a duty of care, protection and support.” MPC § 230.4 (Am. Law Inst. 1980). 77 When the Legislature enacted the first version of our Code’s endangering statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1), it based the statute’s language in part on MPC § 230.4. Cannel, N.J. Criminal Code Annotated, cmt. 1 on N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4 (2018). Generally consistent with MPC § 230.4, that version of the statute criminalized conduct by “[a]ny person having a legal duty for the care of a child or who has assumed responsibility for such care,” when that person “causes such child such harm as would make such child an abused or neglected child” as defined in N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21. L. 1978, c. 95. In 1979, the Legislature amended N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1) to expand its reach beyond persons with a 23 As the MPC’s drafters noted, “[s]tatutes broadly condemning any conduct thatcontributes to the delinquency of a minor contravene the general precept thatcriminal laws should state their proscriptions with fair specificity andprecision.” MPC, cmt. 2 on § 230.4, at 449 (1980). Should it choose to do so, the Legislature could amend N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1) to clarify its intent with respect to the statute’s application to juvenileadjudications. D. The Family Part judge’s credibility assessment and core factual findings-- that D.M. “exposed his penis to Z.Y., sought Z.Y. to touch his penis with hismouth, and had his penis physically touch Z.Y.’s buttocks,” but that the Statefell short of proving oral or anal penetration -- fully supported the judge’sdetermination on the two offenses considered. Had the court not deviated fromits written decision in its later comments, there would be no basis to overturnthat determination in this appeal. The court’s statement at the disposition hearing, however, directlycontravened the findings set forth in its adjudication. Addressing aprospective appellate court that might review the case, the court stated that thelegal duty or assumed responsibility for the care of a child, and to criminalize “sexual conduct” by any person “which would impair or debauch the morals of the child.” L. 1979, c. 178, § 46. That language remains in effect today. 24 elements of the first-degree offense were met but that it had “downgrade[d]”the offense to the third-degree charge of endangering the welfare of a child.The court indicated that this “downgrade” was not due to a deficiency in theState’s proofs, but to factors personal to D.M.: the lack of prior offenses onhis record, the grandmother whose devotion to D.M. had impressed the court,D.M.’s “trials and tribulations,” and the juvenile’s admirable extracurricularactivities. The juvenile’s personal characteristics are an important factor at thedisposition stage, but they do not warrant a “downgrade” of his charges at theadjudication stage, or any other finding inconsistent with the proofs. Inaccordance with Rule 1:7-4(a), the court sitting as factfinder in a juvenileadjudication must find the facts that the State has proven beyond a reasonabledoubt; it has no authority to nullify its findings in order to achieve a morelenient disposition, or for any other purpose. See Locurto, 157 N.J. at 470(noting that Rule 1:7-4(a) requires “a trial court sitting without a jury to 'stateclearly its factual findings and correlate them with the relevant legalconclusions’” (quoting Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 570 (1980))). When itconducts a juvenile adjudication proceeding, the Family Part must hold theState to its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. When the State meets 25 that burden, however, the court must make findings consistent with theevidence. In this matter, the court disclosed at the disposition that, although theState proved N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(1)’s sexual-penetration element, the courtdiscounted that proof and adjudicated the juvenile delinquent on the lesser-related offense of endangering under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1). That disclosureundermines our confidence in both determinations. In its wake, it is simplyunclear what facts the court actually found and what facts it did not find. Accordingly, although we do not share the Appellate Division panel’sinterpretation of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1), we concur with its conclusion thatD.M.’s adjudication pursuant to that statute must be reversed. IV. We affirm on other grounds the judgment of the Appellate Division. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE PATTERSON’S opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a concurrence. 26 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 30 September Term 2017 079999 State in the Interest of D.M., a Juvenile JUSTICE ALBIN, concurring. I agree with the majority that D.M.’s juvenile adjudication forendangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1), must be reversed.I also concur with the majority that N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1) is in need oflegislative review, in my view because of its potential to be overread. Unlikethe majority, however, I would give some guidance on the limitations of theendangering statute when applied to children close in age who engage inconsensual sexual conduct. The endangering statute is a very broad and vaguely written statute andtherefore may be susceptible to varying interpretations by different prosecutorsand judges, particularly when applied to close-in-age juveniles involved inconsensual sexual conduct. Therein lies the danger. We should construe theendangering statute in a sensible manner -- consistent with the Legislature’sprobable intent -- so that it does not conflict with related statutes or exceed its 1 constitutional bounds. See State v. Burkert, 231 N.J. 257, 276-77 (2017);Tumpson v. Farina, 218 N.J. 450, 467 (2014). A criminal statute must give fair notice to a reasonable person of theconduct the law prohibits. The vice of vague laws is that they lack explicitstandards and therefore lend themselves to abuse. See Town Tobacconist v.Kimmelman, 94 N.J. 85, 118 (1983) (“A law is void as a matter of due processif it is so vague that persons 'of common intelligence must necessarily guess atits meaning and differ as to its application.’” (quoting Connally v. Gen.Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 , 391 (1926))). Vague laws are constitutionallysuspect because they may ensnare the innocent who are unable to discern thedividing line between permissible and prohibited conduct, because such lawsmay be subject to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, and because theydelegate to prosecutors and judges the resolution of issues on a subjectivebasis. State v. Cameron, 100 N.J. 586, 591 (1985) (citing Grayned v. City ofRockford, 408 U.S. 104 , 108-09 (1972)). The endangering statute criminalizes “sexual conduct which wouldimpair or debauch the morals of the child.” N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1). Themeaning of the endangering statute is far from clear, particularly when appliedto consensual conduct between close-in-age juveniles. The sexual offensestatutes of the Code of Criminal Justice, however, are very clear. Those 2 statutes do not criminalize sexual contact between consenting juveniles whoare less than four years apart in age. N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2, -3. We should assumethat the Legislature did not intend to place in conflict related statutes thatspeak to a common subject. See In re Registrant J.G., 169 N.J. 304, 334(2001) (“When this Court is confronted with conflicting statutory provisionsthat relate to a common subject, we strive to reconcile the inconsistentprovisions and to interpret them harmoniously.”). We cannot ascribe to theLegislature the intent to criminalize under the broadly written endangeringstatute the very conduct that the more specific sexual offense statutes renderpermissible -- sexual contact between close-in-age consenting juveniles. SeeState v. Robinson, 217 N.J. 594, 609 (2014) (“[A] canon of statutoryconstruction directs that a specific statute generally overrides a generalstatute.”). Even in the absence of further legislative direction, I would not leave tothe discretion of prosecutors and judges, for example, whether a consensualsexual act between a seventeen-year-old high school senior and a fifteen-year-old high school sophomore is conduct that debauches the morals of a minorunder N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1) when that conduct is clearly not criminal under N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2 or -3. Whatever else the endangering statute may prohibit, it 3 does not criminalize sexual conduct between consenting juveniles specificallydesignated as not criminal under N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2 or -3. Without such limitations, the endangering statute is vulnerable to afuture as-applied constitutional challenge. Prosecutors therefore must act withcaution. I doubt that most prosecutors would charge a juvenile who engagedin a consensual sexual act with another juvenile of similar age with childendangerment when such conduct does not contravene N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2 or -3.The child endangerment statute was never intended to criminalize consensualsexual experimentation between close-in-age juveniles that does not violateour sexual offense statutes, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2 and -3. The Legislature can now make that point clear. 4