Title: In re Rankin video
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 113235
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: June 12, 2015

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 113,235 
 
In the Matter of RUSTIN K. RANKIN, 
Respondent. 
 
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE 
 
Original proceeding in discipline. Opinion filed June 12, 2015. Disbarment. 
 
Alexander M. Walczak, Deputy Disciplinary Administrator, argued the cause, and Kate F. Baird, Deputy 
Disciplinary Administrator, and Stanton A. Hazlett, Disciplinary Administrator, were on the formal complaint for 
the petitioner.   
 
John J. Ambrosio, of Ambrosio & Ambrosio, Chtd., of Topeka, argued the cause, and Rustin K. 
Rankin, respondent, argued the cause pro se. 
 
Per Curiam:  This is an attorney discipline proceeding against Rustin K. Rankin, 
of Fredonia, an attorney admitted to the practice of law in Kansas in 1999.   
 
On August 12, 2014, the office of the Disciplinary Administrator filed a formal 
complaint against the respondent alleging violations of the Kansas Rules of Professional 
Conduct (KRPC). The respondent answered on September 4, 2014, admitting some 
allegations and denying others.  
 
A panel of the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys held a hearing on October 
29 and 30, 2014, at which the respondent appeared in person and through counsel. The 
hearing panel determined the respondent violated KRPC 1.5(a) and (b) (2014 Kan. Ct. R. 
Annot. 515) (fees); 1.7(a)(2) (2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 531) (conflict of interest); 1.8(a) 
2 
 
 
 
(2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 542) (conflict of interest); 1.15(a) (2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 
567) (safekeeping property); and 8.4(c) (2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 680) (engaging in 
conduct involving misrepresentation) and (g) (engaging in conduct adversely reflecting 
on lawyer's fitness to practice law). 
 
Upon conclusion of the hearing, the panel made the following findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and disciplinary recommendation. The respondent took no exceptions 
to the hearing panel's report. We quote the report's pertinent parts below.  
 
"Findings of Fact 
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
"7. 
In addition to practicing law, the respondent is involved in a family 
farming operation, Rankin Family Farms. The respondent's family farms land near 
Fredonia, Kansas. 
 
 
"8. 
In 2006, a representative from Wells Fargo contacted the respondent and 
asked him if he would serve as the closing agent in a real estate transaction. The real 
estate transaction involved P.M.'s purchase of 360 acres of property in Benedict, Kansas. 
At that time, P.M. was a 73-year-old widow. The respondent met P.M. for the first time at 
the closing. 
 
 
"9. 
Following that contact, the respondent and P.M. discovered that they had 
many things in common. During the period of time that followed, P.M. engaged the 
respondent as her attorney, they became friends, and they became business associates. On 
a number of occasions, the respondent and his family traveled on vacations with P.M. 
Respondent testified he grew to care more for P.M. than his own mother. [Footnote:  
P.M. testified at the hearing on the formal complaint. She was 82 years old at the time. 
P.M. suffered an injury in her home in August 2014, and was still in the process of 
recovering from the injury. The respondent objected to her testimony on the grounds of 
3 
 
 
 
competency. The competency objection was overruled. P.M. was unable to recall many 
facts but despite having a faulty memory contributed to by age and physical maladies, she 
appeared to understand her duty to tell the truth and she was capable of expressing herself 
to the hearing panel and counsel. However, the hearing panel has placed little weight on 
P.M.'s appearance, as it was apparent P.M.'s physical and mental capacities had 
significantly deteriorated since P.M.'s attorney-client and business relationships with her 
from 2007 through 2012.] 
 
 
"10. 
In 2007, the respondent became P.M.'s attorney. The respondent did not 
send P.M. an engagement letter. There is no evidence that the respondent communicated 
the rate of his attorney fees to P.M. 
 
 
"11. 
On October 10, 2008, the respondent drafted and P.M. executed a limited 
power of attorney, in favor of the respondent. The power of attorney granted the 
respondent extensive authority to act on behalf of P.M. 
 
 
"12. 
On June 1, 2009, P.M. provided the following written statement:   
 
 
'To Whom It May Concern: 
 
'I, [P.M.], have chosen to enter into a business relationship with my 
friend Rustin Rankin. I have not been forced or coerced into this 
relationship and enter it with a sound and clear mind. Over the past 
several years, Mr. Rankin has helped me in numerous ways and I trust 
him fully and completely. He has advised me that it is my right to consult 
with another attorney regarding this relationship and have now decline 
[sic] to do that. I understand that large sums of money will be involved in 
this partnership and will be transferred from time to time. It is my desire 
to allow these transactions and have communicated my wishes to Mr. 
Rankin and I believe that he has a clear understanding of them. 
 
'We will be engaged in property management as well as various farming 
and ranching pursuits. I clearly understand that I will be contributing 
4 
 
 
 
more capital to our project and Mr. Rankin will be providing more 
management and oversight. I believe this to be fair and reasonable. I 
have known Mr. Rankin and his family for several years and have always 
enjoyed a fair and beneficial relationship.' 
 
 
"13. 
At some point in time, P.M. created an entity called Madden Ventures. 
P.M. opened a checking account for the entity at the First National Bank in Fredonia . . . . 
The first check written on [the] account . . . was written by the respondent on April 24, 
2009. (A typographical error occurred and checks were issued under the name Madden 
Adventures. Any references to Madden Adventures in the record should be recognized as 
synonymous with Madden Ventures. Later, Madden Ventures evolved into Madden 
Ventures, LLC.) 
 
 
"14. 
On July 15, 2009, the respondent obtained a personal loan for $15,000 
from P.M. The respondent repaid P.M. with $7,500.00 in cash and $7,500 in 'in kind 
services.' (The respondent stipulated that he violated KRPC 1.8 when he obtained the 
loan from P.M.) 
 
 
"15. 
P.M. wished to own property located near the Rankin Family Farm 
property.  Thereafter, a neighbor to the Rankin Family Farm property offered to sell 75 
acres (the 'Donahey property') to the respondent and his family for $125,000. On October 
1, 2009, the respondent and his brother purchased the property using $125,000 from P.M. 
 
 
"16. 
Immediately after purchasing the Donahey property, the respondent and 
his brother sold the property to Madden Ventures for $125,000. Further, the respondent 
and his brother had an agreement with P.M. that if she chose to sell the Donahey property 
at a future date, she would sell it to the respondent and his brother for the same purchase 
price, $125,000. 
 
 
"17. 
There was no closing statement offered into evidence to prove the 
financial transaction wherein the respondent and his brother, Richard Rankin, sold the 
property to Madden Ventures. However, the following financial transactions do evidence 
the same. 
5 
 
 
 
 
a. 
On September 22, 2009, the respondent caused to be transferred, 
the sum of $75,000 from P.M.'s Individual Retirement Account (hereinafter 
'IRA') funds . . . unto [sic] the Madden Adventures account . . . . 
 
b. 
On September 22, 2009, the respondent caused $50,000 from the 
Madden Adventures account . . . to be transferred to and deposited in the Rankin 
Law Offices Trust Account . . . . 
 
c. 
On October 2, 2009, the respondent caused a check of $140,000 
to be written on [the Madden Adventures] account . . . and deposited in the 
Rankin Law Offices Trust Account. . . . 
 
d. 
On October 22, 2009, the respondent caused to be transferred the 
sum of $125,000 from P.M.'s IRA . . . unto [sic] the Madden Adventures account. 
. . . 
 
 
"18. 
In addition, the respondent testified that the funds ($125,000) went from 
P.M.'s IRA account to the Madden Adventures account to Rankin Law Offices Trust 
Account to the sellers, Donahey. 
 
 
"19. 
On October 7, 2009, the respondent formally established a limited 
liability company with P.M., called Madden Ventures, LLC. The respondent and P.M. 
were each 50% owners of Madden Ventures, LLC. Additionally, there is evidence and 
testimony that the parties formed a business relationship and acted as partners prior to 
this date. 
 
 
"20. 
P.M. contributed all the capital to Madden Ventures, LLC, including the 
proceeds from an IRA. Additionally, the respondent effected the transfer of real property, 
located in Kansas and elsewhere, owned by P.M. to Madden Ventures, LLC. (The 
respondent stipulated that he violated KRPC 1.8 by transferring his client's property to an 
entity in which he was an owner.) 
 
6 
 
 
 
 
"21. 
Despite the 50% ownership interest, the respondent did not contribute 
any capital to Madden Ventures, LLC. Likewise, the respondent did not transfer any of 
his real property into Madden Ventures, LLC. Respondent testified his contributions to 
Madden Ventures, LLC, were his management skills and his financial standing enabling 
him to guarantee loans for the LLC. Thus, with regard to the Donahey property, 
notwithstanding that respondent was the seller, settlement agent, and attorney for P.M., 
the respondent also acquired an ownership interest in the Donahey property as a buyer 
because of his 50% interest in Madden Ventures LLC. 
 
 
"22. 
Madden Ventures, LLC, purchased additional real property, which 
included working farm land, established a cattle ranching operation, and received income 
from a hunting lease. P.M. built a house on a portion of the real property owned by 
Madden Ventures, LLC. 
 
 
"23. 
P.M. informed the respondent that she wished to make a change to her 
will and leave all her property upon her death to the respondent. The respondent informed 
P.M. that he could not draft a new will for her which named him as her heir. The 
respondent referred P.M. to John Chenoweth, a local attorney. P.M. consulted with Mr. 
Chenoweth and on November 24, 2009, P.M. executed a new will, naming the respondent 
as the executor and sole heir of her estate upon her death. The respondent paid Mr. 
Chenoweth's bill and then sought reimbursement from P.M. 
 
 
"24. 
Respondent testified he was reluctant to be the sole beneficiary of P.M.'s 
will because, 'He had enough money.' 
 
 
"25. 
From the time the respondent formed Madden Ventures, LLC, and 
continuing into 2012, the respondent maintained money belonging to Madden Ventures, 
LLC, in his attorney trust account. Additionally, throughout that same time period, the 
respondent was a 50% owner of Madden Ventures, LLC. 
 
 
"26. 
At the hearing on the formal complaint, the respondent testified that he 
stopped providing P.M. with legal services at the end of 2009.  However, the record does 
not support the respondent's testimony. The respondent continued to engage in activity on 
7 
 
 
 
behalf of P.M. which constitutes the practice of law. Further, the respondent continued to 
deposit funds of Madden Ventures, LLC, owned by himself and P.M., into his attorney 
trust account, and continued to write checks on behalf of P.M. from his attorney trust 
account until sometime in 2012. At no time, did the respondent notify P.M. that he was 
no longer acting as her attorney. 
 
 
"27. 
P.M.'s accountant, Joe Bambrick, had been receiving and paying P.M.'s 
bills for her. In April or May, 2010, the respondent's law office took over that role and 
began receiving and paying P.M.'s bills for her. 
 
 
"28. 
On November 10, 2010, P.M. executed an IRA Change of Beneficiary 
form, changing the primary beneficiary of her IRA to Madden Ventures, LLC. On 
November 15, 2010, P.M. added the respondent as a user on two of her credit cards with 
Chase Bank. 
 
 
"29. 
In 2011, at P.M.'s request, the respondent transferred the ownership of 
the 360 acres in Benedict, Kansas, to Madden Ventures, LLC. 
 
 
"30. 
In December, 2011, the respondent, his family, and P.M. went on a 
Christmas cruise. Following the cruise, P.M. and the respondent had a falling out. 
According to the respondent, following the cruise, P.M. wanted the respondent and his 
family to travel to Tampa, Florida, to inspect a condominium which she wished to 
purchase. The respondent advised P.M. against the purchase. Additionally, the 
respondent refused to travel to Tampa because he and his family were tired from the 
cruise. P.M. went to Tampa and the respondent and his family returned home. Following 
his return home, (other than during her testimony at the formal hearing), the respondent 
saw P.M. on only one additional occasion, at a chance meeting in the grocery store. 
 
 
"31. 
On January 19, 2012, without P.M.'s knowledge or permission, the 
respondent executed a contract, effecting the transfer of the Donahey property from 
Madden Ventures, LLC, to the respondent. Further, the respondent's law office was listed 
as the escrow agent. The respondent was a member of the seller, Madden Ventures, LLC, 
he was the buyer, and he acted as agent for the buyer. On the contract, the respondent 
8 
 
 
 
signed as both the seller and the buyer. The respondent received $110,000 upon the 
closing of the sale. 
 
 
"32. 
On February 1, 2012, the respondent and his brother borrowed $600,000 
to refinance the Rankin Family Farm operation. According to the settlement sheet, two 
loans were paid off, totaling $74,968.89. The purchase of the Donahey land was included 
in the loan. It appears that the respondent received $125,000 in cash from the transaction 
to pay to Madden Ventures, LLC, for the Donahey property. 
 
 
"33. 
The Settlement Statement and supporting documents for the $600,000 
loan contained the following language: 
 
'Contingent Liabilities:  Rustin is a 50/50 partner in Madden Ventures, 
LLC. This is basically a R/E company that owns several condos in 4 
states and farmland around Longton Kansas. Rustin's partner is an older 
widowed lady by the name of [P.M.]. She and Rustin became business 
partners a few years back (basically because she took a liking to Rustin's 
Family vs. her own) and Rustin has basically invested nothing, and been 
made partner at 50/50. Total debt on the LLC is $290,000 in MTG loans 
on 3 properties that rent covers in full so Rustin has no out of pocket 
expense and a $1.25m IRA that could be cashed out at any time to fulfill 
obligations if need be owned by [P.M.]. Madden Ventures has assets of 
roughly $2,650,000 that Rustin is half owner of but is not counted Net 
Worth for this request, simply additional peace of mind on capital 
strength for this credit package.' 
 
 
"34. 
On March 17, 2012, P.M. wrote to the respondent. The letter provided: 
 
'Dear Rustin: 
 
'I am very concerned and disappointed with our current situation. I have 
requested time and again to be advised about my financial affairs. You 
have not kept me informed in any way concerning my finances. I do not 
9 
 
 
 
know how much cash I have available for my personal use and this 
sometimes creates embarrassing situations for me. I have found myself 
without even funds on my credit card. You are not keeping me informed 
when you make a business decision or purchase. You do not send me any 
financial statements. I do not know how much I have paid in taxes.  I 
don't know how much I am paying you. 
 
'Therefore I plan to hire a CPA to obtain this information and relay it to 
me in a timely manner. 
 
'Rustin, I appreciate all you have done for me and there would not be a 
problem if you would just keep me "in the loop" and not do things 
without discussing them with me first. After all, just like you told Wells 
Fargo, it is my money. And since I am not senile yet I want to know what 
is going on. 
 
'I further wish to revoke the power of attorney that I gave you over my 
affairs and well being. I find I no longer trust your motives and wonder if 
you really have my best interests at heart. I want proof that this has been 
done. I would like it to be effectively immediately on recipt [sic] of this 
letter. 
 
'Please send copies of the paperwork for my Madden Ventures LLC and 
my living trust to my Mailbox Etc. in Corpus Christi. Send this registered 
with a return receipt request. 
 
'Just because I put your name on my checking accounts does not give 
you the right to write checks and purchase items, services without 
informing me first.   
 
'There will have to be some changes made in order for us to consider a 
future business relationship.' 
 
10 
 
 
 
 
"35. 
In an undated letter, the respondent responded to P.M.'s March 12, 2012, 
[sic] letter. (In the body of the letter, the respondent stated that he received her letter 
'yesterday.' Thus, it appears that the respondent's undated letter was written shortly after 
receiving P.M.'s March 12, 2012, [sic] letter.) With his response, the respondent enclosed 
a revocation of power of attorney. 
 
 
"36. 
In the response, the respondent stated that he 'quit charging [P.M.] any 
attorney's fees when [their] relationship went from attorney/client to friends about 3 years 
ago. [He] couldn't charge one of [his] best friends.' About 3 years' prior would be March 
2009. The record is replete with evidence that the respondent charged P.M. attorney fees 
throughout 2009. 
 
 
"37. 
In a nine (9) month period from April 2009 to December 2009, the 
respondent transferred $498,820.57 from Madden Ventures, LLC's account into the 
respondent's trust account or to himself personally, for legal fees, expenses associated 
with operation of Madden Ventures, LLC, a loan to the respondent, or for reasons not 
documented on a check. 
 
 
"38. 
Further, the respondent's statement in his letter varied from his testimony 
at the hearing on the formal complaint. In that, he testified that he stopped representing 
her following 2009 but in his letter he stated that he stopped billing her for the 
representation. 
 
 
"39. 
Additionally, the respondent's billing records from his law office to P.M. 
and Madden Ventures, LLC, indicate that the respondent charged Madden Ventures, 
LLC, at least $60,000 in retainers for legal services in 2010, as follows: 
 
'January 6, 2010 
Madden Ventures, LLC $20,000 
January 25, 2010 
Madden Ventures, LLC $10,000 
March 4, 2010  
Madden Ventures, LLC $10,000 
April 16, 2010  
Madden Ventures, LLC $10,000 
May 21, 2010  
Madden Ventures, LLC $10,000' 
 
11 
 
 
 
All of the above bills were billed to Madden Ventures, LLC, c/o Rankin Law Offices, 
P.O. Box 425, Fredonia, Kansas 66736. 
 
 
"40. 
At the hearing on the formal complaint, the respondent explained that 
despite his records, he did not provide legal services to P.M. in 2010. He asserted that the 
$60,000 was for restaurant consulting fees and that his legal assistant 'mislabeled' the 
services on the invoices. Further, the respondent testified that he instructed his legal 
assistant to create the invoices in 2012, to account for monies received by him from P.M., 
as documentation of income for tax purposes. The respondent testified that he had failed 
to report $60,000 of income and therefore needed the bills to account for income so he 
could file an amended tax return. The creation of the bills occurred after P.M. had sent 
Disciplinary Administrator's Exhibit 4 to the respondent. The respondent never provided 
P.M. with a copy of the invoices found in Disciplinary Administrator's Exhibit 13, pp. 
192-96. No restaurant was ever opened by P.M. 
 
 
"41. 
The memo line of the checks does not indicate that it was restaurant 
consulting fees. Rather, on two of the five checks, the respondent noted 'transfer' in the 
memo line. On the other three, the respondent made no notation. The respondent's 
notation of 'transfer' was common to many of the checks he wrote to his law office from 
the Madden Adventures account; 10 additional checks are noted in the same fashion. 
 
 
"42. 
Other than the respondent's testimony, there is no other evidence in the 
record that the payments were for restaurant consulting fees. The hearing panel finds the 
respondent's testimony that the $60,000 was for restaurant consulting fees, rather than 
legal fees, to lack credibility. The respondent possessed no unique skills or experience to 
act as a restaurant consultant. The respondent maintained no record of his time associated 
with his restaurant consulting services, although he did indicate he gave records of his 
time to P.M. Based on all the evidence, the hearing panel finds that the invoices were for 
what they state that they were for—legal services or were simply a transfer of funds to 
the respondent for no reason other than the personal financial benefit of the respondent. 
 
12 
 
 
 
 
"43. 
On April 24, 2012, the respondent self-reported misconduct in 
connection with his representation of P.M. to the disciplinary administrator. The 
respondent's letter provides: 
 
'I feel it is my obligation to file a report to your office about my potential 
ethical lapses that have been made. They are in regard to a client I had 
named [P.M.] 
 
1. 
I failed to have a proper engagement letter with [P.M.]. 
 
2. 
I failed to have a proper disengagement letter with [P.M.]. 
 
3. 
I failed to write a letter explaining to [P.M.] that I would not do 
her taxes for her for the years 2009 and 2010. 
 
4. 
I drafted an LLC for a client in which I am a partner and this was 
not an arms [sic] length transaction in that she did not obtain separate 
legal counsel. 
 
5. 
I drafted deeds that transferred property of a Client's into an LLC 
in which I am a partner and this was not an arms [sic] length transaction 
in that she did not obtain separate legal counsel. 
 
6. 
I accepted a loan from [P.M.], drawn on an account that I was a 
co-owner, and [P.M.] was a client at the time. 
 
'I look forward to hearing from you in this matter so that it can be 
resolved.' 
 
 
"44. 
In May, 2012, after accounting for disbursements, the respondent held 
$169,653 of P.M.'s money, which could not be accounted for by the respondent. 
 
13 
 
 
 
 
"45. 
On March 13, 2014, P.M. filed a federal district court lawsuit against the 
respondent. In the suit, P.M. alleged that the respondent engaged in legal malpractice 
under the theories of breach of fiduciary duty, conflict of interest, breach of trust, 
wrongful conversion, and negligence. Without admitting liability or any wrongdoing, the 
respondent settled the suit with P.M. in the amount of $150,000. The respondent 
contributed $50,000 and the respondent's malpractice carrier paid the remaining $100,000 
of the settlement amount. At the hearing on the formal complaint, the respondent testified 
that he agreed to pay $50,000 because it was a 'fair and reasonable approximation of the 
potential risk [he] stood.' 
 
 
"46. 
At the hearing on this matter, the respondent's testimony was 
inconsistent. Further, the respondent's testimony was inconsistent with his answer to the 
formal complaint. Specifically, in his answer, the respondent admitted that he has been 
unable to provide an adequate accounting of the funds held for P.M. In contrast, during 
questioning by Mr. Cohen, the following exchange occurred: 
 
'Q. 
(BY MR. COHEN) Look at paragraph 29. It alleges that not less 
than $594,150 of [P.M.]'s money was transferred to accounts of 
Madden Ventures, LLC or Rustin Rankin or Rankin Law Offices 
and that you have been unable to provide an adequate accounting 
of funds held for [P.M.] to her or the Disciplinary Administrator. 
. . .  Is that correct? 
 
 
. . . .  
 
'A. 
[BY THE RESPONDENT] I would say that it is—I would say 
that it is an adequate accounting. We have an accountant. We've 
accounted for all the checks. I think the question comes down to 
invoices that I wouldn't have or would have in my possession. 
But it's my understanding that all that money has been accounted 
for and we've slotted it into wherever it went.' 
 
14 
 
 
 
 
"47. 
The respondent retained a CPA, Thomas H. Sewell, to review P.M.'s 
accounts. Mr. Sewell provided an Independent Accountants' Report on Applying Agreed 
Upon Procedures for the year ending December 31, 2009. Mr. Sewell did not conduct an 
audit. In the report, Mr. Sewell determined that there were 'uninvoiced amounts' of 
$65,364.27. But see paragraph 44. 
 
 
"48. 
Mr. Sewell reviewed the deposits and checks for the year 2009 for P.M.'s 
personal checking account . . . and the Madden Adventures checking account, . . . both 
with the First National Bank in Fredonia. 
 
 
"49. 
As to [P.M.'s personal checking] account . . . , Mr. Sewell found that 
checks were written to the Rankin Law Office trust account totaling $20,000 and there 
was no supporting documents for the payments. 
 
 
"50. 
Total deposits/receipts made to [the Madden Adventures] account . . . by 
the respondent for 2009 were $521,710.57. Disbursements and checks totaled 
$521,330.39, leaving an ending balance of $380.18 on December 31, 2009. Of the 
$521,330.39 in disbursements, the sum of $173,820.57 [was] written to the respondent 
and the sum of $329,000 was written to the Rankin Law Office trust account. 
 
 
"51. 
Mr. Sewell examined the payments made to the respondent and the 
Rankin Law Office trust account through [P.M.'s personal checking account] and [the 
Madden Adventures account]. The total payments to the respondent or the Rankin Law 
Office trust account were $522,820.57. Of that amount, P.M. was invoiced for 
$41,116.98 in attorney's fees and expenses, P.M. was invoiced for $124,308.66 (which 
represents the purchase of the Donahey property by Madden Ventures LLC) and P.M. 
was invoiced for other moving, farm and ranch and house expenses. The sum of 
$65,364.27 represents the 'Uninvoiced Amounts'. This amount does include the $20,000 
discussed above. 
 
 
"52. 
There was no evidence from the Disciplinary Administrator that these 
funds were used inappropriately. Conversely, there was no evidence that the respondent 
could account for the funds. 
15 
 
 
 
 
"Conclusions of Law 
 
 
"53. 
Based upon the findings of fact, the hearing panel concludes as a matter 
of law that the respondent violated KRPC 1.5, KRPC 1.7, KRPC 1.8, KRPC 1.15, and 
KRPC 8.4, as detailed below. 
 
"KRPC 1.5 
 
 
"54. 
Lawyers must charge reasonable fees. KRPC 1.5(a). In this case, the 
respondent failed to charge reasonable fees. Applying the factors in KRPC 1.5(a)(1)-(8), 
there is no way for the respondent to reasonably account for the amount of fees assessed 
to P.M. In one attempt to justify fees charged or to try to account for money transferred to 
him, the respondent created invoices approximately 2 years after the work was 
purportedly done. The respondent charged P.M. $60,000 and provided no written 
documentation for what work was being billed for, nor did he ever provide the invoices to 
his client. As stated above, the hearing panel finds the respondent's testimony that the 
$60,000 was for restaurant consulting fees to lack credibility. Moreover, the $60,000 
came out of his attorney trust account. Charges for a total of $60,000 without explanation 
is per se unreasonable. The cavalier attitude shown by the respondent during his 
testimony about a substantial amount of money being paid to him, unbeknownst to his 
client and business partner, causes the hearing panel to place little weight on his attempt 
to explain the total mismanagement of his trust account and P.M.'s money. Accordingly, 
the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 1.5(a) by charging P.M. 
an unreasonable fee. 
 
 
"55. 
KRPC 1.5 also requires lawyers to communicate the basis of the fee to a 
client, when the lawyer has not regularly represented the client. 
 
'When the lawyer has not regularly represented the client, the basis or 
rate of the fee shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, 
before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation.' 
 
16 
 
 
 
KRPC 1.5(b). In this case, the respondent admitted that he failed to provide an 
engagement letter to P.M. Based upon the respondent's admission that he failed to 
provide P.M. with an engagement letter and the lack of other evidence establishing that 
the respondent otherwise communicated the rate of his fee to P.M., whether it was for 
legal services or the nebulous restaurant consulting fee, the hearing panel concludes that 
the respondent violated KRPC 1.5(b). 
 
"KRPC 1.7 
 
 
"56. 
In this case, the respondent represented P.M. when he had a concurrent 
conflict of interest, in violation of KRPC 1.7. According to KRPC 1.7(a)(2), a concurrent 
conflict of interest exists if there is 'a substantial risk that the representation of one or 
more clients will be materially limited by . . . a personal interest of the lawyer.' There was 
a substantial risk that the representation of P.M. would be materially limited by the 
respondent's own interests after the respondent became business partners with P.M., the 
sole heir under her will, and the beneficiary of her IRA. 
 
 
"57. 
In order to continue to represent P.M. following the existence of the 
conflict, the respondent had to take certain steps, identified in KRPC 1.7(b): 
 
 
'Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest 
under paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if: 
 
(1) 
the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer 
will be able to provide competent and diligent 
representation to each affected client;  
 
(2) 
the representation is not prohibited by law; 
 
(3) 
the representation does not involve the assertion 
of a claim by one client against another client 
represented by the lawyer in the same litigation 
or other proceeding before a tribunal; and  
17 
 
 
 
 
(4) 
each affected client gives informed consent, 
confirmed in writing.' 
 
Although Disciplinary Administrator's Exhibit 7 could be construed as P.M.'s informed 
consent, confirmed in writing, the record is replete with transactions that clearly show 
respondent's representation of P.M., as her attorney, was materially limited by 
respondent's personal interests to financially benefit from his unfettered access to, and 
use of, P.M.'s assets. Further, P.M.'s March 17, 2012, letter clearly establishes that the 
respondent failed to properly inform P.M. as to the business transactions. As such, based 
on the totality of the circumstances, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent 
violated KRPC 1.7(a)(2). 
 
"KRPC 1.8 
 
 
"58. 
KRPC 1.8(a) limits the types of relationships an attorney can enter with 
clients: 
 
 
'A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client 
or knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other 
pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless:  
 
(1) 
the transaction and terms on which the lawyer 
acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to 
the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted 
in writing to the client in a manner which can be 
reasonably understood by the client; and 
 
(2) 
the client is advised in writing of the desirability 
of seeking and is given a reasonable opportunity 
to seek the advice of independent legal counsel 
on the transaction; and 
 
18 
 
 
 
(3) 
the client gives informed consent, in a writing 
signed by the client, to the essential terms of the 
transaction and the lawyer's role in the 
transaction, including whether the lawyer is 
representing the client in the transaction.' 
 
The respondent stipulated that his conduct violated KRPC 1.8(a) in two respects. First, 
the respondent stipulated that he violated KRPC 1.8(a) by receiving a loan of $15,000, 
from P.M. Second, the respondent stipulated that he violated KRPC 1.8(a) by transferring 
P.M.'s property into Madden Ventures, LLC, in which he was an owner. This was not a 
business relationship where the respondent had contributed a substantial amount of assets 
to the LLC. He had contributed none. All the risk of loss was on P.M.  The hearing panel 
accepts the respondent's stipulations and concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 
1.8(a). 
 
"KRPC 1.15 
 
 
"59. 
Lawyers must safeguard client's property. KRPC 1.15. In this case, the 
respondent failed to properly safeguard P.M.'s property—he was unable to account for at 
least $65,364 or as much as $169,653. Based upon the respondent's failure to properly 
account for P.M.'s funds, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 
1.15. 
 
 
"60. 
Additionally, the respondent violated KRPC 1.15 in two additional ways. 
According to KRPC 1.15(a): 
 
'A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a 
lawyer's possession in connection with a representation separate from the 
lawyer's own property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account 
maintained in the state of Kansas. Other property shall be identified as 
such and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of such account 
funds and other property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be 
19 
 
 
 
preserved for a period of five years after termination of the 
representation.' 
 
From the time the respondent established Madden Ventures, LLC, in 2009, and 
continuing into 2012, the respondent maintained Madden Ventures, LLC, funds in his 
attorney trust account. The respondent was an owner of Madden Ventures, LLC. 
Additionally, the respondent maintained other clients' funds, his own personal funds, and 
funds of the Rankin Family Farm in the account. Thus, the respondent commingled his 
funds with those of his clients in his attorney trust account. Further, the respondent failed 
to keep complete records of his attorney trust account by failing to maintain invoices 
which related to his representation of P.M. The manner in which the respondent kept 
records and accounted for P.M.'s money in his trust account, pales in comparison to the 
standards expected of attorneys when handling client funds. The extraordinarily difficult 
task experienced by the respondent, Larry Pfannenstiel, Mr. Sewell, or the disciplinary 
administrator to account for P.M.'s money is the reason the exacting standards required 
for client trust accounts were imposed. Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes that the 
respondent violated KRPC 1.15(a) by commingling his funds with his client's funds and 
by failing to maintain proper records. 
 
"KRPC 8.4 
 
 
"61. 
'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation [and to] engage in any other 
conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.' KRPC 8.4(c) and 
KRPC 8.4(g). The respondent engaged in conduct that involved dishonesty and adversely 
reflected on his fitness to practice law when he back-dated billing records in 2012 to 
attempt to justify the transfer of $60,000 to him in 2010. Further, the respondent engaged 
in conduct that involved dishonesty and adversely reflected on his fitness to practice law 
when he transferred the Donahey property from Madden Ventures, LLC to himself 
without the knowledge or permission of P.M. The respondent engaged in a number of 
transactions, which, when considering each individually may not be inappropriate on its 
own accord, but become self-serving and self-enriching when considering the totality of 
the circumstances and the amount of funds involved over a period of time from 2008 
20 
 
 
 
through 2012. The respondent had total control over P.M.'s money and other assets, while 
acting as P.M.'s attorney, business partner, and close personal friend. The conduct was 
detrimental to his client and troubling to the panel. Thus, the hearing panel concludes that 
the respondent violated KRPC 8.4(c) and KRPC 8.4(g). 
 
"American Bar Association 
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 
 
 
"62. 
In making this recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel 
considered the factors outlined by the American Bar Association in its Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (hereinafter 'Standards'). Pursuant to Standard 3, the factors 
to be considered are the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the potential or actual 
injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and the existence of aggravating or mitigating 
factors. 
 
 
"63. 
Duty Violated.  The respondent violated three duties owed to his client. 
First, the respondent violated his duty to properly safeguard his client's property. Next, 
the respondent violated his duty to charge reasonable attorney fees. Finally, the 
respondent violated his duty to his client to refrain from engaging in conflicts of interest. 
In addition, to violating duties owed to his client, the respondent also violated his duty to 
the public and to the legal profession to maintain his personal integrity. 
 
 
"64. 
Mental State.  The respondent knowingly violated his duties. 
 
 
"65. 
Injury.  As a result of the respondent's misconduct, the respondent caused 
actual serious injury to P.M. and to the legal profession.   
 
"Aggravating and Mitigating Factors 
 
 
"66. 
Aggravating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may 
justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its 
recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following 
aggravating factors present: 
21 
 
 
 
 
 
"67. 
Dishonest or Selfish Motive.  The respondent's misconduct included both 
dishonest conduct and selfish conduct. The hearing panel concludes, therefore, that the 
respondent's misconduct was motivated by both dishonesty and selfishness. 
 
 
"68. 
A Pattern of Misconduct.  Over a period of years, the respondent failed to 
properly safeguard and account for P.M.'s property. Additionally, the respondent's 
conflicts of interest also spanned years. Thus, the hearing panel concludes that the 
respondent engaged in a pattern of misconduct. 
 
 
"69. 
Multiple Offenses.  The respondent committed multiple rule violations. 
The respondent violated KRPC 1.5, KRPC 1.7, KRPC 1.8, KRPC 1.15, and KRPC 8.4. 
Further, the respondent violated some of the rules in multiple ways. Accordingly, the 
hearing panel concludes that the respondent's committed multiple offenses. 
 
 
"70. 
Refusal to Acknowledge Wrongful Nature of Conduct.  The respondent 
has refused to acknowledge that he violated KRPC 1.5, KRPC 1.7, KRPC 1.15, and 
KRPC 8.4. The respondent, however, acknowledged that his conduct violated KRPC 1.8. 
Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent refused to completely 
acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct. 
 
 
"71. 
Vulnerability of Victim.  P.M. was vulnerable to the respondent's 
misconduct if only because she had misplaced her trust in the respondent. She was often 
traveling and relied on the respondent to manage her affairs. The respondent testified 
P.M. was sharp, witty, and active all the time. He also testified P.M. was not a 
sophisticated client. Finally, the respondent referred to P.M. as 'a lonely woman scared of 
being alone.' 
 
 
"72. 
Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may 
justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its 
recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following 
mitigating circumstances present: 
 
22 
 
 
 
 
"73. 
Absence of a Prior Disciplinary Record. The respondent has not 
previously been disciplined. 
 
 
"74. 
Previous Good Character and Reputation in the Community Including 
Any Letters from Clients, Friends, and Lawyers in Support of the Character and General 
Reputation of the Attorney. The respondent is an active and productive member of the bar 
of Fredonia, Kansas. The respondent also enjoys the respect of his peers and generally 
possesses a good character and reputation as evidenced by many letters received by the 
hearing panel. The hearing panel would recognize that the support letters are from 
members of the public, former or current clients, distinguished members of the bar, 
prosecutors, and a retired District Court Judge. All found the respondent to be a caring, 
professional attorney, who practices law honestly and with high ethical standards. Many 
of the letters emphatically emphasize the respondent's outstanding, uncompromising 
character, and his adherence to personal and community values beyond reproach. It is 
difficult for the hearing panel to perceive the person praised in the support letters to be 
the same person who engaged in the conduct giving rise to the instant disciplinary case. 
 
 
"75. 
In addition to the above-cited factors, the hearing panel has thoroughly 
examined and considered the following Standards: 
 
'4.12 
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows or 
should know that he is dealing improperly with client property 
and causes injury or potential injury to a client. 
 
'4.32 
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows of a 
conflict of interest and does not fully disclose to a client the 
possible effect of that conflict, and causes injury or potential 
injury to a client. 
 
'4.62 
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly 
deceives a client, and causes injury or potential injury to the 
client. 
 
23 
 
 
 
'5.11(b) Disbarment is generally appropriate when . . . a lawyer engages 
in any other intentional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on 
the lawyer's fitness to practice.' 
 
"Recommendation 
 
 
"76. 
The disciplinary administrator recommended that the respondent be 
disbarred. Counsel for the respondent characterized the matter as an atrocious record 
keeping situation, and recommended that the respondent be censured and that the censure 
be published in the Kansas Reports. 
 
 
"77. 
The hearing panel is called upon to weigh the evidence, determine 
credibility, and assess the tone and quality of each witnesses' testimony. In the hearing 
panel's observation, it appeared that the respondent was cavalier in his approach and he 
failed to grasp the gravity of his failure to adhere to the applicable sections of the KRPC. 
Overall, it appeared that the respondent failed to appreciate the situation in which he now 
finds himself and, more importantly, he failed to understand the substantial injury he 
caused to P.M. and to the legal profession as a whole by his egregious misconduct. The 
hearing panel is troubled by the respondent's attitude. 
 
 
"78. 
The nature of the respondent's misconduct is very extreme and 
disbarment is warranted. However, because the respondent has not previously been 
disciplined, the hearing panel recommends that the Supreme Court indefinitely suspend 
the respondent's license to practice law in Kansas. 
 
 
"79. 
Costs are assessed against the respondent in an amount to be certified by 
the Office of the Disciplinary Administrator." 
 
24 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
In a disciplinary proceeding, this court considers the evidence, the disciplinary 
panel's findings, and the parties' arguments to determine whether KRPC violations exist 
and, if they do, what discipline should be imposed. Attorney misconduct must be 
established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Foster, 292 Kan. 940, 945, 258 P.3d 
375 (2011); see Supreme Court Rule 211(f) (2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 363). Clear and 
convincing evidence is "'evidence that causes the factfinder to believe that "the truth of 
the facts asserted is highly probable."'" In re Lober, 288 Kan. 498, 505, 204 P.3d 610 
(2009) (quoting In re Dennis, 286 Kan. 708, 725, 188 P.3d 1 [2008]). 
 
Respondent was given adequate notice of the formal complaint, to which he filed 
an answer. As noted, respondent filed no exceptions to the final hearing report. As such, 
the panel's findings of fact are deemed admitted. Supreme Court Rule 212(c) and (d) 
(2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 383). 
 
 
The evidence before the hearing panel establishes by clear and convincing 
evidence the charged misconduct violated KRPC 1.5(a) and (b) (2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 
515) (fees); 1.7(a)(2) (2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 531) (conflict of interest); 1.8(a) (2014 
Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 542) (conflict of interest); 1.15(a) (2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 567) 
(safekeeping property); and 8.4(c) (2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 680) (engaging in conduct 
involving misrepresentation) and (g) (engaging in conduct adversely reflecting on 
lawyer's fitness to practice law). The evidence also supports the panel's conclusions of 
law. We adopt the panel's conclusions. 
 
The only remaining issue for this court is determining the appropriate discipline 
for respondent's violations. At the hearing before this court, the office of the Disciplinary 
Administrator recommended respondent's disbarment. The respondent recommended a 
25 
 
 
 
finite 2-year suspension, subject to a reinstatement hearing. The hearing panel 
recommended respondent be indefinitely suspended. The hearing panel's 
recommendations are advisory only and do not prevent us from imposing greater or lesser 
sanctions. Supreme Court Rule 212(f) (2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 383); see In re Kline, 
298 Kan. 96, 212-13, 311 P.3d 321 (2013). 
 
After careful consideration, a majority of the court agrees with the office of 
Disciplinary Administrator that disbarment is the appropriate sanction. The facts, which 
are undisputed before this court, show a flagrant pattern of misrepresentation, conflict of 
interest, and exploitation of a vulnerable client over a number of years, all of which 
resulted in a substantial loss of the client's property. This is not simply a matter of 
"atrocious" record keeping, as the respondent characterized it. A minority of the court 
would follow the hearing panel's recommendation of indefinite suspension.  
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCIPLINE 
 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Rustin K. Rankin be disbarred from the practice 
of law in the state of Kansas, effective on the filing of this opinion, in accordance with 
Supreme Court Rule 203(a)(1) (2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 306). 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondent shall comply with Supreme Court Rule 
218 (2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 414).  
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the costs of these proceedings be assessed to the 
respondent and that this opinion be published in the official Kansas Reports.