Title: State v. Hilbert
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC99747
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: March 21, 2023

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
) 
Opinion issued March 21, 2023 
 
) 
 
Respondent, 
) 
 
) 
v. 
) 
No. SC99747 
 
) 
JACOB HILBERT, 
) 
 
)  
 
Appellant. 
) 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS 
The Honorable Jason M. Sengheiser, Judge 
 
Jacob Hilbert appeals the circuit court’s judgment finding him guilty of two counts 
of first-degree statutory sodomy and one count of first-degree child molestation.  Hilbert 
claims the circuit court plainly erred by proceeding to a bench trial without obtaining a 
constitutionally sufficient waiver of his right to a jury trial.  Hilbert also contends the circuit 
court plainly erred by admitting a video recording pursuant to section 492.304.1  Finding 
no plain error, this Court affirms the circuit court’s judgment.  
Factual and Procedural Background 
In September 2018, Hilbert was charged with the above crimes.  Hilbert’s case was 
called for a jury trial in January 2020.  Hilbert was present when voir dire commenced.  
                                              
1 All statutory references are to RSMo 2016, unless otherwise specified. 
2 
 
During jury selection, counsel and the prospective jurors engaged in thorough, honest, and 
fervent discussions of what burden of proof the jury would have to abide by and the fairness 
and impartiality that would be required of the jurors who were selected to hear this case 
involving allegations of sexual abuse of a child.  On the second day of jury selection, 
Hilbert’s counsel made an inappropriate remark to the prospective juror panel, which 
rendered proceeding with jury selection unfair.  Consequently, the circuit court dismissed 
the jury panel because it was “blown” and set a new date for Hilbert’s jury trial.  
Several weeks later, a docket entry indicates Hilbert’s case was set for a bench trial.  
The docket entry and record contain no indication of what prompted the shift to a bench 
trial.  Significantly, the following exchange occurred in Hilbert’s presence at a pretrial 
hearing:  
[The Court]: So I think, [defense counsel], you’ve represented that you’re 
wanting a bench trial instead of a jury trial; correct?  
 
[Defense Counsel]: That is correct, your Honor. 
 
[The Court]: I think today we’re just here talking about – so we will do it that 
way starting tomorrow – talking about any motions in limine that either side 
has and anything else you guys have for me.  
 
Hilbert’s bench trial began the following day.  Hilbert did not raise any concerns or object 
to proceeding without a jury.  However, Hilbert was not personally questioned about 
waiving his right to a jury before the bench trial. 
3 
 
 
At trial, the State sought to admit a video recording of the victim’s forensic 
interview pursuant to section 492.304.2  Katherine Knudson, a forensic interviewer with 
the Children’s Advocacy Center, testified she conducted the interview of the victim, 
reviewed the video recording of the interview, and found the video recording to be a true 
and accurate depiction of the interview.  Hilbert’s counsel was asked if he had any objection 
to the video recording’s admission, to which he replied “No objection, your Honor.”  The 
court admitted the video recording at that point.  
At the close of the State’s evidence, in Hilbert’s presence, the court and counsel 
discussed Hilbert’s waiver of the right to a jury trial.  Specifically, the following exchange 
took place:  
[The State]: Your Honor, I don’t know.  Was there ever a written waiver of 
a jury trial filed for this?  Because I want to make sure that’s filed for the 
record.  
 
[Defense Counsel]: I’ll do it.  
 
[The Court]: There wasn’t, but we will do that.  
 
[Defense Counsel]: I think we went on the record and said it.  We were on 
the record and said it.  
 
[The Court]: Yeah. 
 
Nevertheless, a written jury waiver was never filed with the court.   
                                              
2 Prior to Hilbert’s first trial setting, the State filed a notice of intent to admit the video 
recording of the victim’s forensic interview pursuant to section 492.304.  During a pretrial 
hearing on the matter, Hilbert’s counsel objected to the video recording’s admission 
because the forensic interview occurred nearly two years after the date of Hilbert’s alleged 
crimes.  The court overruled Hilbert’s counsel’s objection at that time.   
4 
 
The court found Hilbert guilty on all counts.  During the sentencing hearing, 
Hilbert’s mother made a statement in Hilbert’s presence regarding the jury trial waiver:  
The stress was a major influence in the decision to go with the bench trial.  
[Hilbert]’s trial was moved several times, and each time, it took a toll on 
[Hilbert] and our family.  The first, due to a death in our attorney’s family.  
The second trial was started, but had a hung jury.[3]  The whole process was 
extremely debilitating, and we were all concerned that [Hilbert] could get a 
fair trial, as it seemed a huge pool of the jury had experiences that may lead 
to a conflict.  This led us to ask whether a bench trial should be considered.  
After some research, our attorney advised that a judge would know what 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt is better than anybody, and [Hilbert] 
decided to go that route. 
 
Following the pronouncement of his sentence, the court examined Hilbert regarding 
his assistance of counsel: 
[The Court]: Did [defense counsel] explain your rights in a jury trial rather 
than in a bench trial?  
 
[Hilbert]: I decline to answer.  
 
[The Court]: Was it your decision to go to trial?  
 
[Hilbert]: I decline to answer. 
 
Hilbert also declined to answer all other questions.  Hilbert subsequently filed a motion for 
new trial, which did not include claims of error regarding his alleged jury waiver or the 
admission of the victim’s forensic interview video recording.  The circuit court overruled 
the motion.  This appeal follows.4 
 
 
                                              
3 Hilbert’s mother was presumably referencing the “blown” jury panel following Hilbert’s 
counsel’s inappropriate comment. 
4 After an opinion by the court of appeals, this Court granted transfer.  Mo. Const. art. V, 
sec. 10.   
5 
 
Standard of Review 
 
Hilbert concedes his arguments on appeal are not preserved for review.  
Accordingly, Hilbert requests plain error review pursuant to Rule 30.20.  Rule 30.20 
provides, in pertinent part: “Whether briefed or not, plain errors affecting substantial rights 
may be considered in the discretion of the court when the court finds that manifest injustice 
or miscarriage of justice has resulted therefrom.”  See also State v. Brandolese,  
601 S.W.3d 519, 526 (Mo. banc 2020).  
 
Plain error review is a two-step process: 
The first step requires a determination of whether the claim of error facially 
establishes substantial grounds for believing that manifest injustice or 
miscarriage of justice has resulted.  All prejudicial error, however, is not 
plain error, and plain errors are those which are evident, obvious, and clear.  
If plain error is found, the court then must proceed to the second step and 
determine whether the claimed error resulted in manifest injustice or a 
miscarriage of justice. 
 
State v. Minor, 648 S.W.3d 721, 731 (Mo. banc 2022) (internal quotation omitted).  
Analysis  
I. 
The Sufficiency of Hilbert’s Waiver of His Right to a Jury Trial 
 
In his first point on appeal, Hilbert argues he did not knowingly, voluntarily, and 
intelligently waive his right to a jury trial.  Hilbert contends the record establishes only his 
counsel intended to waive the right to a jury trial.  He claims that, without any affirmative 
actions on his part, the waiver was not constitutionally sufficient and the circuit court 
plainly erred. 
 
 
6 
 
a. Overview of Waiver of the Right to a Jury Trial 
  
The constitutions of the United States and Missouri both guarantee a defendant in a 
criminal case the right to a jury trial.  U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; Mo. Const.  
art. I, secs. 18(a), 22(a).  A defendant may waive this right with the consent of the court.  
Mo. Const. art. I, sec. 22(a).  Not every attempted waiver, however, is sufficient.  See State 
v. Baxter, 204 S.W.3d 650, 653 (Mo. banc 2006).  While a defendant may waive the right 
to a jury trial with the consent of the court, “such waiver by the defendant shall be made in 
open court and entered of record.”  Id at 652; Rule 27.01(b).5  To satisfy this standard, the 
waiver “must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.”  Baxter, 204 S.W.3d at 653.  “The 
best practice for a trial court is to question the defendant personally, on the record, to ensure 
that the defendant understands the right, understands what is lost in the waiver, has 
discussed the issue with defense counsel, and voluntarily intends to waive the right.”  Id. 
at 655.  Even if a defendant is not personally questioned on the record, however, a valid 
waiver may occur if the record establishes a defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and 
intelligently waived his or her right to a jury trial.  Id. at 654-55.6   
                                              
5 All references to Rule 27.01(b) are to the version of the rule effective from January 1, 
1980 to June 30, 2022.  
6 This Court previously stated a waiver must appear in the record with “unmistakable 
clarity.”  See Baxter, 204 S.W.3d at 653 (quoting State v. Bibb, 702 S.W.2d 462, 466 (Mo. 
banc 1985)).  Significantly, the “unmistakable clarity” language that originated in Bibb was 
only used to emphasize the constitution and Rule 27.01(b) require the record to show the 
defendant’s assent to waiver.  702 S.W.2d at 465-66.  This Court’s use of the term 
“unmistakable clarity” did not create a new, heightened standard for establishing a valid 
jury waiver.  An appellate court’s sole focus must be upon whether the record establishes 
a defendant’s waiver was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent and, therefore, 
constitutionally sufficient. 
7 
 
This Court addressed a similar challenge in Baxter.  Id. at 652.  In that case, the 
defendant’s counsel informed the circuit court of an agreement to waive the defendant’s 
right to a jury trial and proceed with a bench trial, in exchange for the State’s agreement to 
reduce an arson charge from a class B to a class C felony.  Id.  The defendant was present 
and remained silent while his counsel announced the agreement and waiver.  Id.  The circuit 
court, however, never personally questioned the defendant about waiving his right to a jury 
trial or whether he had discussed the right with his attorney.  Id.  After the defendant was 
found guilty, he “expressed dissatisfaction with his trial counsel on two issues, neither 
involving the denial of a jury trial.”  Id.  The defendant appealed, arguing his waiver of a 
jury trial did not appear in the record with unmistakable clarity.  Id. 
 
This Court rejected the defendant’s argument, holding his waiver was sufficient 
because certain facts in the record established his waiver was knowing, voluntary, and 
intelligent.  Id. at 654.  Specifically, this Court relied upon two factors to reach its 
conclusion.  Id.  “First is the fact that Baxter has never alleged, even on appeal, that he was 
not informed of the right by trial counsel, that he did not understand the right, that he did 
not voluntarily waive the right, or that he would have asserted the right if questioned by 
the judge.”  Id.  Second, this Court emphasized the defendant “struck a bargain” with the 
State for lesser charges in exchange for his waiver, which presumably required his 
involvement and approval.  Id.  
Conversely, Missouri courts have repeatedly held a waiver is not knowing, 
voluntary, and intelligent when the only evidence of waiver comes from defense counsel’s 
bare assertions.  See, e.g., State v. Feldt, 512 S.W.3d 135, 145 (Mo. App. 2017); State v. 
8 
 
Williams, 
417 
S.W.3d 
360, 
362 
(Mo. 
App. 
2013); 
State 
v. 
Beam,  
334 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Mo. App. 2011) (“The fact that Beam’s counsel may have requested 
a bench trial in her presence, without more, does not demonstrate ‘with unmistakable 
clarity’ that Beam ‘voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently’ waived her right to a jury.”); 
State v. Freeman, 189 S.W.3d 605, 610 (Mo. App. 2006).  In Williams, the sole evidence 
of the defendant’s intent to waive his right to a jury came from a statement by his counsel 
in a pretrial motion and his counsel’s affirmative answer to the court’s opening question of 
whether the jury had been waived.  417 S.W.3d at 363.  Accordingly, the court of appeals 
held the circuit court committed plain error by proceeding to a bench trial because the 
record did not contain “something more” than a bare assertion by defense counsel.7  Id. 
b. Hilbert’s Waiver Was Sufficient 
 
Just as in Baxter, “[t]his case turns on whether there are facts in the record that 
demonstrate that [Hilbert’s] waiver was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.”   
See 204 S.W.3d at 654.  Hilbert argues he did not personally take any affirmative action to 
waive his privilege.  Viewing the record as a whole, however, this Court disagrees and 
finds Hilbert knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial. 
                                              
7 In Williams, the court of appeals appears to have created a “something more” test when 
the waiver of a jury trial is not made by the defendant in open court and entered on the 
record.  While there may need to be evidence in the record indicating the defendant 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial when his counsel 
waives the right on the record without comment from the defendant, there is no basis in 
this Court’s prior caselaw articulating a “something more” test.   Baxter and this Court’s 
prior cases merely require the facts and circumstances from the record establish  the waiver 
was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered.  Baxter, 204 S.W.3d at 653.  To the 
extent Williams and other court of appeals cases suggest a “something more” test, they 
should no longer be followed. 
9 
 
 
Crucially, like in Baxter, Hilbert “has never alleged, even on appeal, that he was not 
informed of the right by trial counsel, that he did not understand the right, that he did not 
voluntarily waive the right, or that he would have asserted the right if questioned by the 
judge.”  Id.  Additionally, as in Baxter, Hilbert was present both times his counsel 
acknowledged the waiver of his right to a jury trial and never objected.  Id.8  While this 
Court acknowledges “the failure to object, in many circumstances, may not be 
determinative,” id., Hilbert did not just fail to object to his counsel’s statements during the 
proceedings.  Following sentencing, the court directly questioned Hilbert as to whether his 
counsel explained the distinctions between a bench trial and jury trial.  Tellingly, Hilbert 
neither asserted a negative answer nor expressed concern or confusion.  In fact, this point 
weighs more heavily against Hilbert than it did in Baxter because of the specific questions 
the court asked Hilbert.  This Court is not persuaded by Hilbert’s argument that it is 
pertinent he raised no other complaints.  Regardless of whether Hilbert raised other 
complaints, the court examined him on a waiver-related topic, and he could have 
complained or expressed a lack of understanding if he never intended for his then-
completed trial to have been conducted without a jury.  See State v. Groomes, 656 A.2d 
646, 655 (Conn. 1995) (“We decline to allow the defendant to preserve a ground for appeal 
                                              
8 See also State v. Seibert, 103 S.W.3d 295, 299 (Mo. App. 2003) (holding the circuit court 
did not plainly err because the defendant admitted to committing the underlying criminal 
acts and “the announcement of the waiver, and the trial court’s acceptance of it, were in 
the record of the proceedings, as was the fact that Defendant was present and voiced no 
objection”); United States v. Leja, 448 F.3d 86, 95 (1st Cir. 2006) (finding a valid waiver 
when “Leja’s counsel represented that Leja wanted a bench trial, and Leja’s conduct 
reflected no objection and, in fact, according to the district court, demonstrated his assent 
through his facial expression”).   
10 
 
merely by refusing to respond to the court’s questions regarding whether he waived his 
right to a jury trial.”).  
 
Furthermore, when viewed collectively, several other factors also establish Hilbert’s 
waiver was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.  For one, the procedural history of this 
case is crucial.  Hilbert was present for the jury selection process and the jury panel’s 
dismissal in his first trial setting.  In other words, Hilbert possessed firsthand knowledge 
of when and how a jury was to be selected.  See United States v. Page, 661 F.2d 1080, 1083 
(5th Cir. 1981) (holding, although the defendant neither signed a written waiver nor made 
any affirmative statement to the court regarding waiver, his waiver was valid because, 
among other reasons, he was a “learned, articulate man suffering neither language nor 
perceptive difficulty”).  This was not a situation in which Hilbert may not have realized, 
until too late, that his case was proceeding without a jury.  Given his participation in the 
previous jury selection process, Hilbert necessarily understood and acquiesced to his 
second trial setting being conducted without a jury.  Moreover, Hilbert’s mother’s 
statement provides some additional support for the notion that Hilbert knew of and 
discussed his right to a jury trial with his counsel.9  
                                              
9 To be clear, this Court is not placing great significance upon the testimony of Hilbert’s 
mother and is not relying upon her statement as evidence of Hilbert’s intent.  Evident from 
the “blown” jury selection process, Hilbert’s mother’s statement, however, acknowledged 
the difficulty of selecting an impartial jury due to the offenses for which Hilbert was 
charged.  She stated this led to a discussion with Hilbert’s counsel as to whether a bench 
trial was a better option, which led Hilbert to take this path.  At most, her statement provides 
additional evidence that Hilbert had been informed of his right to a jury trial and discussed 
the topic with his counsel.   
11 
 
 
Accordingly, even though there was no sentence reduction agreement like in Baxter, 
the collective circumstances found in the record establish Hilbert’s waiver was knowing, 
voluntary, and intelligent.  204 S.W.3d at 654-55; see also Groomes, 656 A.2d at 656 
(holding that, in light of the totality of the circumstances, “[w]hat is reflected on the record 
is not a ‘bare’ assertion by counsel, but rather a silent defendant who, through his attorney, 
made a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to a jury trial”).  For these 
same reasons, Hilbert’s case is readily distinguishable from cases like Williams, 417 
S.W.3d at 363-64, and Beam, 334 S.W.3d at 706.10  Hilbert’s waiver, therefore, was 
constitutionally sufficient, and the circuit court did not plainly err. 
II. 
Admission of the Interview Recording 
 
In his second point on appeal, Hilbert claims the circuit court plainly erred by 
admitting the video recording of the victim’s forensic interview pursuant to section 
492.304.  Specifically, Hilbert contends the State failed to provide evidence establishing 
the recording equipment was capable of making an accurate recording, the operator of the 
                                              
10 This Court reiterates:  
 
The best practice for a trial court is to question the defendant personally, on 
the record, to ensure that the defendant understands the right, understands 
what is lost in the waiver, has discussed the issue with defense counsel, and 
voluntarily intends to waive the right.  If this is done, the defendant will have 
no grounds later to contend that his [or her] waiver was ineffective. 
 
Baxter, 204 S.W.3d at 655.  As in Baxter, “[t]he mere fact that this on-the-record exchange 
did not take place in this case, however, does not mean that plain error occurred.”  Id. 
12 
 
equipment was competent, and the recording was accurate and had not been altered.  See 
section 492.304.1(3).11  
This Court analyzed a similar challenge to the admission of a tape recording under 
the common law in State v. McFadden, 369 S.W.3d 727, 752-53 (Mo. banc 2012).  In 
McFadden, the State sought to admit a tape recording of a jailhouse phone conversation 
among three individuals.  Id. at 752.  One of the three participants on the call testified the 
tape recording was a fair and accurate recording of their conversation.  Id. at 753.  
Consequently, when examining the common law foundational requirements for the 
admission of a tape recording, this Court found “the fact a tape recording exists 
demonstrates the device was capable of recording[.]”  Id.  Additionally, the participant’s 
testimony about the fairness and accuracy of the recording established the recording was 
authentic and correct, with no changes, additions or deletions.  Id.  Finally, this Court held 
the existence of the recording, combined with the participant’s testimony as to its fairness 
and accuracy, created a reasonable inference that the operator of the recording equipment 
was competent.  Id. 
                                              
11 Section 492.304 states, in pertinent part:  
1. In addition to the admissibility of a statement under the provisions of 
section 492.303, the visual and aural recording of a verbal or nonverbal 
statement of a child when under the age of fourteen who is alleged to be a 
victim of an offense under the provisions of chapter 565, 566 or 568 is 
admissible into evidence if: 
…. 
(3) The recording equipment was capable of making an accurate recording, 
the operator of the equipment was competent, and the recording is accurate 
and has not been altered[.] 
13 
 
Similar to McFadden, the video recording’s existence, combined with Knudson’s 
testimony, satisfied the requirements of section 492.304.1(3).  First, the video recording’s 
existence, combined with Knudson’s testimony, as to its accuracy, demonstrated the 
recording device was capable of accurately recording.  See id.  Second, Knudson’s 
testimony established the recording was accurate and had not been altered.  See id.  Finally, 
the recording’s existence, combined with Knudson’s testimony, created a reasonable 
inference that the operator of the equipment was competent.  See id.  Therefore, the circuit 
court did not plainly err by allowing the video recording’s admission pursuant to section 
492.304. 
Conclusion 
For the reasons set forth above, the circuit court’s judgment is affirmed.  
______________________________ 
Robin Ransom, Judge 
 
All concur.