Title: People v. Schmitt
Citation: 126 Colo. 546, 251 P.2d 915
Docket Number: 16856
State: Colorado
Issuer: Colorado Supreme Court
Date: December 15, 1952

251 P.2d 915 (1952) 126 Colo. 546 PEOPLE ex rel. DUNBAR, Atty. Gen. v. SCHMITT. No. 16856. Supreme Court of Colorado, en Banc. December 15, 1952. Rehearing Denied January 5, 1953. Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., H. Lawrence Hinkley, Deputy Atty. Gen., Frank A. Wachob, Asst. Atty. Gen., William Rann Newcomb, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., and Philip A. Rouse, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., for petitioner. McDougal, Klingsmith &amp; Rogers, Denver, for respondent. *916 ALTER, Justice. This is an original proceeding brought in the Supreme Court of Colorado by the Attorney General in his official capacity, charging the respondent Schmitt, individually and as manager, with a violation of the provisions of section 21, chapter 14, '35 C.S.A., relating to the unauthorized practice of law. When the charges had been answered and the cause was at issue, it was referred to Hon. Haslett P. Burke as referee to hear and report thereon. The referee's report contains the following, inter alia: "The thing that stands out like a mountain peak in all this accumulated mass of evidence is that business men are not lured into disposing of all control over their property, of embarking into unheard of schemes to escape personal liability, taxes, court costs, attorneys' fees, etc., until they are assured by some reputed expert that the whole novel plan has been time-tested *917 and found legally water tight. It cannot be doubted that the inducement for the so-called `purchases' of this `service' was legal advice, nothing else, and it makes no difference whether the Chicago concern was legitimate or otherwise, or whether its representations were true or false. It was practicing law in Colorado without authority, and defendant, who was reenforcing its claims and making representations on his own behalf and his own authority, was doing the same thing, both in direct violation of our statutes and in defiance and contempt of this court. Reference is made by the referee in his report to Exhibits N, H and S which are attached thereto. It would unduly prolong this opinion to set forth these exhibits; however, in Exhibit N we find the following, written to a certified public accountant and bearing the signature of defendant: Immediately following the last quoted portion of this exhibit the author quotes from an opinion of the United States Supreme Court which, he says, is applicable to a pure trust. Exhibit H pertains to partnerships, is signed by D. W. Schmitt, Manager, and reads as follows: Exhibit S consists of four pages, and with reference thereto defendant states that it was a carbon copy of a brief that he prepared for an attorney in The Denver National Bank. This exhibit reads as follows: "Laws in each State provide procedure upon the death for dissolution and distribution of all assets. They throw open the estate to bona fide and unscrupulous creditors; deductions are made for court costs, publication, appraisers, attorneys and taxes both state and federal. There may be minor children or grand children; there may be handicapped beneficiaries; there may *919 be fee-eating representatives with no regard to others' feelings or rights. Defendant admitted that he had prepared and distributed copies of Exhibits H and S to prospective purchasers. The transcript of evidence before the referee and exhibits introduced, as well as the briefs filed, have been read and studied, and we are persuaded that there is ample competent evidence in the record to warrant and support the findings of the referee, and the same are hereby approved. We find respondent, D. W. Schmitt, guilty of contempt of this court; adjudge and decree that he be fined therefor in the sum of $500; that the sum be paid into the office of the clerk of this court within twenty days from the announcement hereof; and that in default of said payment defendant be incarcerated in the county jail of the City and County of Denver and there held for a period of ninety days or until the fine has been paid. CLARK, J., does not participate.