Title: MACOMB COUNTY PROSECUTOR V SHERRI MURPHY
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 114444
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: May 30, 2001

____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________ 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED MAY 30, 2001  
MACOMB COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v  
No. 114444  
SHERRI MURPHY,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
CORRIGAN, C.J.  
We granted leave in this case to consider whether  
defendant violated 
the incompatible offices act, MCL 15.181 et  
seq.; MSA 15.1120(121) et seq., by simultaneously holding  
positions as the delinquent personal property tax coordinator  
in the Macomb County treasurer’s office and as an elected  
member of the Harrison Township Board of Trustees.  On review  
of the incompatible offices act as a whole, we conclude that  
the phrase “public offices held by a public official,” MCL  
15.181(b); MSA 15.1120(121)(b), encompasses positions of  
public employment.  However, we conclude that defendant’s  
positions are not inherently incompatible because only a  
potential breach of duty of public office arises from the  
ability of the township to contract with the county for the  
collection of its delinquent personal property taxes.  We  
therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and  
remand to the circuit court for entry of an order granting  
summary disposition for defendant.  
I. Factual Background and Procedural Posture  
Defendant is an elected trustee of Harrison Township.  
She is also the delinquent personal property tax coordinator  
in the Macomb County treasurer’s office.  Under MCL 211.56(3);  
MSA 7.100(3), a township board of trustees and the board of  
county commissioners, with the concurrence of the county  
treasurer, may agree that the county treasurer will collect  
the township’s delinquent personal property taxes.  The  
Harrison Township Board of Trustees considered such an  
arrangement in March 1994.  A trustee eventually moved that  
the township continue to collect its delinquent taxes.  
Defendant supported that motion. The motion carried.  
The possibility of having the county treasurer collect  
the township taxes was, however, raised again five months  
later. A trustee requested additional information about the  
revenue generated if the township were to collect its own  
2  
 
delinquent taxes.  In light of this development, the board  
requested plaintiff Macomb County Prosecuting Attorney’s  
opinion whether defendant had a conflict of interest because  
of her dual positions.  
Plaintiff opined that defendant’s offices were “not  
necessarily incompatible, but . . . will be deemed to be  
incompatible if the township trustee is presented with a  
situation in which he or she is required to vote on a proposal  
to have the county collect delinquent personal property  
taxes.”  In this case, plaintiff concluded that even though  
the board had already voted to continue collecting the taxes,  
defendant’s offices were incompatible because the board was  
still exploring the possibility of entering into an agreement  
with the county.  Defendant declined to follow plaintiff’s  
suggestion that she resign from one of her positions.  
Plaintiff 
then 
sought 
a 
declaratory 
ruling 
that 
defendant  
had violated the incompatible offices act by breaching a duty  
of public office.  The trial court granted summary disposition  
for plaintiff under MCR 2.116(C)(10).  The court concluded  
that defendant’s positions were incompatible offices because  
the board of trustees had considered the question whether the  
county 
treasurer 
should 
collect 
delinquent 
taxes and  
defendant’s vote affected her interest as tax coordinator.  
The trial court directed that defendant vacate one of the  
positions.
 The court denied defendant’s motion for  
3  
 
 
  
reconsideration, but stayed enforcement of its order pending  
appeal.  
The Court of Appeals granted defendant’s delayed  
application for leave to appeal and affirmed.1
 The Court  
concluded that a breach of duty arises when a public official  
“‘cannot protect, advance, or promote the interest of both  
offices simultaneously.’”  233 Mich App 381, quoting OAG,  
1997-1998, No 6931, p 5 (February 3, 1997).  The Court further  
reasoned that a breach occurs when an “issue arises in which  
one constituency’s interests may conflict with the interests  
of a separate constituency represented by the official.” Id.  
at 382.  It rejected defendant’s arguments that the extent of  
conflict between her positions was minimal and that a question  
of fact existed regarding how a township-county agreement  
would affect her position as tax coordinator.  The Court also  
concluded that the trial court properly found that defendant  
voted on a proposal to have the county collect the township  
taxes.  The Court reasoned that defendant implicitly voted not  
to enter into an agreement with the county when she voted in  
favor of the township collecting its own taxes.2  
1  233 Mich App 372; 592 NW2d 745 (1999).  
2  Defendant additionally argued that the trial court 
erred in denying her motion to disqualify plaintiff because of 
a conflict of interest.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the 
trial court’s ruling.  Defendant does not challenge that 
portion of the Court of Appeals decision.  
4  
 
This Court granted defendant’s application for leave to  
appeal. 462 Mich 854 (2000).  
II. Discussion  
The question presented is whether defendant violated the  
incompatible offices act by simultaneously holding positions  
as the delinquent personal property tax coordinator in the  
Macomb County treasurer’s office and as an elected member of  
the Harrison Township Board of Trustees.  We conclude that  
defendant’s positions are not inherently incompatible because  
only a potential breach of duty of public office arises from  
the ability of the township to contract with the county for  
the collection of its delinquent personal property taxes.  
A. The Incompatible Offices Act  
The incompatible offices act3, at MCL 15.182; MSA  
15.1120(122), 
contains 
the 
general 
prohibition 
against 
holding  
incompatible offices.  It provides that “[e]xcept as provided  
in [MCL 15.183; MSA 15.1120(123)], a public officer or public  
employee shall not hold 2 or more incompatible offices at the  
same time.”4  
3 The Legislature enacted the incompatible offices act in 
1978, apparently in response to a 1978 opinion of the Attorney 
General 
that 
the 
positions of public school superintendent and 
state university board member were incompatible offices under 
the common law.  House Legislative Analysis, HB 6699, January  
22, 1979.  
4 
 Under MCL 15.181(d); MSA 15.1120(121)(d), a “public 
employee” is  
(continued...)  
5  
The 
Legislature 
defined 
the 
phrase 
“incompatible 
offices”  
for purposes of the act.  MCL 151.181(b); MSA 15.1120(121)(b)  
provides:  
“Incompatible offices” means public offices 
held by a public official which, when the official 
is performing the duties of any of the public 
offices held by the official, results in any of the 
following with respect to those offices held:  
(i) The subordination of 1 public office to 
another.  
(ii) The supervision of 1 public office by  
4(...continued) 
an employee of this state, an employee of a city, 
village, township, or county of this state, or an 
employee 
of 
a 
department, 
board, 
agency, 
institution, 
commission, 
authority, 
division, 
council, college, university, school district, 
intermediate school district, special district, or 
other public entity of this state or of a city, 
village, township, or county in this state, but 
does not include a person whose employment results 
from election or appointment.  
A “public officer,” in contrast, is  
a person who is elected or appointed to any of the 
following:  
(i) An office established by the state  
constitution of 1963.  
(ii) A public office of a city, village, 
township, or county in this state.  
(iii) 
A 
department, 
board, 
agency, 
institution, 
commission, 
authority, 
division, 
council, college, university, school district, 
intermediate school district, special district, or 
other public entity of this state or a city, 
village, township, or county in this state. [MCL 
15.181(e); MSA 15.1120(121)(e).]  
6  
 
 
 
another.  
(iii) A breach of duty of public office.  
The Legislature also created exceptions to the general  
prohibition on holding incompatible offices.  MCL 15.183; MSA  
15.1120(123)5 now generally allows public officers and  
5  MCL 15.183; MSA 15.1120(123) provides:  
(1) Section 2 does not prohibit a public 
officer’s or public employee’s appointment or  
election to, or membership on, a governing board of 
an institution of higher education.  However, a 
public officer or public employee shall not be a 
member of governing boards of more than 1  
institution of higher education simultaneously, and 
a public officer or public employee shall not be an 
employee and member of a governing board of an 
institution of higher education simultaneously.  
(2) Section 2 does not prohibit a member of a 
school board of 1 school district from being a 
superintendent 
of 
schools 
of 
another 
school  
district.  
(3) Section 2 does not prohibit a public 
officer or public employee of a city, village, 
township, 
school 
district, 
community 
college 
district, or county from being appointed to and 
serving as a member of the board of a tax increment 
finance authority established pursuant to the tax 
increment finance authority act, Act No. 450 of the 
Public Acts of 1980, being sections 125.1801 to 
125.1830 of the Michigan Compiled Laws, a downtown 
development authority established pursuant to Act 
No. 197 of the Public Acts of 1975, being sections 
125.1651 to 125.1681 of the Michigan Compiled Laws, 
or 
a 
local 
development 
finance 
authority 
established pursuant to the local development 
financing act, Act No. 281 of the Public Acts of 
1986, being sections 125.2151 to 125.2174 of the 
Michigan Compiled Laws.  
(4) Section 2 does not do any of the  
(continued...)  
7  
5(...continued) 
following:  
(a) 
Prohibit 
public 
officers 
or 
public 
employees of a city, village, township, or county 
having a population of less than 25,000 from 
serving, with or without compensation, as emergency 
medical services personnel as defined in section 
20904 of the pubic health code, Act No. 368 of the 
Public Acts of 1978, being section 333.20904 of the 
Michigan Compiled Laws.  
(b) 
Prohibit 
public 
officers 
or 
public 
employees of a city, village, township, or county 
having a population of less than 25,000 from 
serving, with or without compensation, as a  
firefighter in that city, village, township, or 
county if that firefighter is not any of the 
following:  
(i) A full-time firefighter.  
(ii) A fire chief.  
(iii) A person who negotiates with the city, 
village, township, or county on behalf of the 
firefighters.  
(c) Limit the authority of the governing body 
of a city, village, township, or county having a 
population of less than 25,000 to authorize a 
public officer or public employee to perform, with 
or without compensation, other additional services 
for the unit of local government.  
(5) This section does not relieve a person 
from otherwise meeting statutory or constitutional 
qualifications for eligibility to, or the continued 
holding of, a public office.  
(6) This section does not apply to allow or 
sanction activity constituting conflict of interest 
prohibited by the constitution or laws of this 
state.  
(7) This section does not allow or sanction 
(continued...)  
8  
 
employees to serve on boards of institutions of higher  
education and permits a school superintendent to serve as a  
member of a school board of another district.  The statute  
also allows public officers and employees of local units of  
government to serve as members of boards of tax increment  
finance authorities, downtown development authorities, and  
local development finance authorities.  Finally, the statute  
generally allows public officers and employees of units of  
local government having small populations to serve as  
emergency medical services personnel, firefighters, and  
perform other services for that unit of government.  
The act does not create a private cause of action. MCL  
15.184; MSA 15.1120(124).  Rather, it grants the Attorney  
General and county prosecuting attorneys the authority to  
apply to the circuit court “for injunctive or other  
appropriate judicial relief or remedy.” Id.  A violation of  
the act does not render an action of a public officer or  
public 
employee 
absolutely 
void. 
MCL 
15.185; 
MSA  
15.1120(125).  Instead, the decision to void an action lies  
within the discretion of the circuit court. Id.  
5(...continued) 
specific actions taken in the course of performance 
of duties as a public official or as a member of a 
governing 
body 
of 
an 
institution 
of 
higher 
education that would result in a breach of duty as 
a public officer or board member.  
9  
 
 
 
 
B. Public Offices Held By A Public Official  
We reject defendant’s initial argument6 that her  
positions are not “incompatible offices” because her position  
as delinquent personal property tax coordinator is not a  
“public office.” 
The question is one of statutory  
construction, which we review de novo.  The Herald Co v Bay  
City, 463 Mich 111, 117; 614 NW2d 873 (2000). 
Our task is  
made difficult by the Legislature’s inartful draftsmanship.  
In 
particular, 
the 
Legislature used the undefined term “public  
official” in defining the phrase “incompatible offices”  
instead of the defined terms “public officer” and “public  
employee.”
 Construing the act as a whole, however, we  
conclude that the phrase “public offices held by a public  
official” encompasses public employment.  
In 
considering 
a 
question 
of 
statutory 
construction, 
this  
Court begins by examining the language of the statute.  Sun  
Valley Foods Co v Ward, 460 Mich 230, 236; 596 NW2d 119  
(1999).  We read the statutory language in context to  
determine whether ambiguity exists.  Id. at 237; see Consumers  
Power Co v Public Service Comm, 460 Mich 148, 163, n 10; 596  
NW2d 126 (1999).  If the language is unambiguous, judicial  
6 This issue is not properly preserved because defendant 
first raised it in her application for leave to appeal to this 
Court.  See Kratze v Independent Order of Oddfellows, 442 Mich  
136, 142; 500 NW2d 115 (1993). We address it nonetheless in  
the interest of completeness.  See Blackwell v Citizens Ins  
Co, 457 Mich 662, 672; 579 NW2d 889 (1998).  
10  
 
  
  
construction is precluded.  Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co v Marlette  
Homes, Inc, 456 Mich 511, 515; 573 NW2d 611 (1998).  We  
enforce an unambiguous statute as written. Sun Valley Foods,  
supra at 236.  Where ambiguity exists, however, this Court  
seeks to effectuate the Legislature’s intent through a  
reasonable construction, considering the purpose of the  
statute and the object sought to be accomplished.  Frankenmuth  
Mut Ins, supra at 515.  
The statute involved in this case defines the phrase  
“incompatible offices” as “public offices held by a public  
official which, when the official is performing the duties of  
any of the public offices held by the official, results in”  
the subordination of one public office to another, the  
supervision of one public office by another, or a breach of  
duty of public office. MCL 151.181(b); MSA 15.1120(121)(b).  
We construe the undefined terms “public office” and  
“public official” according to the common usage of the  
language. 
Consumers Power, supra at 163. 
The dictionary  
definitions of the words “public,” “official,” and “officer”  
suggest that the terms “public official” and “public officer”  
are synonymous.7  Words, however, are given meaning by context  
7  This Court often consults dictionary definitions to 
ascertain the generally accepted meaning of words.  Consumers  
Power, supra at 163, n 10. 
Random House Webster’s College  
Dictionary, p 1091, defines the word “public” as meaning “of, 
pertaining to, or being in the service of a community or 
(continued...)  
11  
 
or setting.  Id. at 163, n 10. 
In defining the phrase  
“incompatible offices,” the Legislature used the term “public  
official,” 
rather 
than 
the 
term 
it 
defined 
in 
the  
statute—“public officer.”  The Legislature’s use of this  
undefined term when it could have easily employed the defined  
term suggests that the terms are not synonymous for purposes  
of this statute. See 82 CJS, Statutes, § 310, pp 400-401. We  
therefore 
conclude 
that 
the 
statutory 
language 
“public 
offices  
held by a public official” is ambiguous.  
To resolve this ambiguity, we examine the other  
provisions of the act to ascertain whether the Legislature  
intended to include positions of public employment within the  
prohibition on incompatible offices.  We construe an act as a  
7(...continued) 
nation.”  That dictionary includes the following among its 
definitions of “office”:  
1. a place where business is conducted. . . .  
4.  the staff that works in a place of business.  
5. a position of duty, trust, or authority; the  
office of president. 6. employment or position as 
an official: to seek office. . . . [Id. at 939, 
emphasis in original.]  
It defines the word “official” as follows:  
n. 1. a person appointed or elected to an 
office or charged with certain duties.  –adj. 2. of  
or pertaining to an office or position of duty, 
trust, or authority: official powers. 3. appointed, 
authorized, 
or 
approved 
by 
a 
government 
or  
organization. 4. holding office. 5. public and 
formal; ceremonial. [Id, emphasis in original.]  
12  
  
whole to harmonize its provisions and carry out the purpose of  
the Legislature. Farrington v Total Petroleum, Inc, 442 Mich  
201, 209; 501 NW2d 76 (1993); Gusler v Fairview Tubular  
Products, 412 Mich 270, 291; 315 NW2d 388 (1981), reh gtd 414  
Mich 1102 (1982), app dis 414 Mich 1102 (1983).  “[T]he  
interpretation to be given to a particular word in one section  
[is] arrived at after due consideration of every other section  
so as to produce, if possible, a harmonious and consistent  
enactment as a whole.”  Grand Rapids v Crocker, 219 Mich 178,  
182-183; 189 NW 221 (1922).  
We conclude that §§ 2 and 3 of the incompatible offices  
act evince a legislative intent to include positions of public  
employment within the scope of the act.  MCL 15.182; MSA  
15.1120(122) provides that “a public officer or public  
employee shall not hold 2 or more incompatible offices at the  
same 
time.” 
 
The 
section prohibits particular individuals from  
holding two or more incompatible offices at the same time.  
The Legislature could have simply omitted any reference to  
public employees if it intended that the prohibition apply  
only to positions held by public officers.  The statute would  
have provided that “a public officer shall not hold 2 or more  
incompatible offices at the same time.” Under this alternate  
language, a public employee would not have been prohibited  
from holding one public office because the employee would not  
become a “public officer” until elected or appointed to the  
13  
 
 
first office.  The employee would then only hold one public  
office, not two.  Accordingly, on review of § 2 of the act, we  
conclude that the Legislature’s inclusion of public employees  
within the prohibition evinces an intent that positions of  
public employment are “public offices held by a public  
official.”8  
The exceptions contained in the act, MCL 15.183; MSA  
15.1120(123), similarly reveal a legislative intent that  
positions of public employment fall within the scope of the  
act.  
Exceptions (1), (3) and (4) expressly apply to public  
officers or public employees. Moreover, the prefatory phrase  
of those exceptions (“Section 2 does not . . .”)  signals that  
the prohibition contained in § 2 generally applies to both  
public officers and public employees. If the prohibition did  
not apply to public employees, no need would exist to include  
public employees within the exception.  
On review of the statute as a whole, we thus conclude  
8 The Legislature’s inclusion of public employees within 
the scope of the prohibition comported with the Attorney 
General’s historical approach to common-law incompatibility. 
In OAG, 1963-1964, No. 4309, p 459 (September 11, 1964), the 
Attorney General opined that the common-law rule against 
incompatibility extended to public employment or position. 
The Attorney General reiterated that conclusion in OAG, 1967­
1968, No. 4620, p 278, 279 (August 7, 1968), stating that 
“[t]he rule of incompatibility has been extended to public 
employment where the duties of the public employment and the 
public office are incompatible so that they may not be 
simultaneously exercised by the same person.”  
14  
 
 
 
 
that the phrase “public offices held by a public official”  
encompasses positions of public employment. 
Although the  
Legislature could have evinced its intent in clearer terms, we  
join the Attorney General9 and the Court of Appeals10 in  
adopting this reasonable construction of the statutory  
language 
because 
it 
best furthers the Legislature’s intent, as  
reflected in the other provisions of the act.11  We therefore  
conclude 
that 
defendant’s 
positions 
as 
delinquent 
property 
tax  
coordinator 
and 
township trustee both are “public offices held  
by a public official” for purposes of the incompatible offices  
act.
 We thus turn to the question whether defendant’s  
9  OAG, 1979-1980, No 5626, p 537, 541, (January 16,  
1980).  
10  Wayne Co Prosecutor v Kinney, 184 Mich App 681, 683; 
458 NW2d 674 (1990).  
11  Our construction of the statutory language is also 
consistent with the words chosen by the Legislature in 
amending the act. 
The Legislature has amended the  
incompatible offices act three times.  1984 PA 72; 1992 PA 10; 
1994 PA 317.  The 1984 amendment added an exception that 
allows public officers and employees of a city, school 
district, community college district or county to serve as a 
member of the board of tax increment finance authority. The  
1992 amendment extended that exception to membership on 
downtown 
development 
authorities 
and 
local 
development 
finance 
authorities. The 1992 amendment also added an exception for 
public officers and public employees of local units of 
government having populations less than 25,000.  The 1994  
amendment made stylistic changes and extended the exception 
for development and finance authorities to employees and 
officers of villages and townships.  As with the exceptions 
contained in the original act, these exceptions use language 
that suggests that public employment constitutes a public 
office 
for 
purposes 
of the prohibition on holding incompatible 
offices.  
15  
performance of the duties of one of the offices resulted in  
one of the three situations set forth in MCL 151.181(b); MSA  
15.1120(121)(b).  
C. Breach of Duty of Public Office  
The statute defines “incompatible offices” as “public  
offices held by a public official which, when the official is  
performing the duties of any of the public offices held by the  
official, results in” the subordination of one public office  
to another, the supervision of one public office by another,  
or “[a] breach of duty of public office.”  MCL 151.181(b); MSA  
15.1120(121)(b).  The parties agree that this case does not  
involve the first two prohibited situations.  We therefore  
limit 
our 
review 
to 
determining 
whether 
defendant’s  
performance of her duties resulted in a breach of duty of  
public office.  We conclude that defendant’s positions are not  
inherently incompatible because only a potential breach of  
duty of public office arises from the ability of the township  
to contract with the county for the collection of its  
delinquent personal property taxes.  
Under the statute, incompatibility exists only when the  
performance of the duties of one of the public offices  
“results in” one of the three prohibited situations.  By using  
the phrase “results in,” the Legislature clearly restricted  
application of the statutory bar to situations in which the  
specified outcomes or consequences of a particular action  
16  
 
 
 
 
 
actually occur.12
 That a breach of duty may occur in the  
future or that a potential conflict exists does not establish  
incompatible offices. 
The official’s performance of the  
duties of one of the offices must actually result in a breach  
of duty.  
The Attorney General recognized this limitation in 1979­
1980 OAG No 5626, pp 537-542 (January 16, 1980).  The Attorney  
General explained:  
[I]n many situations the public official may 
be able to perform the functions of two public 
offices without breaching a duty of either office 
by simply not performing a function which may 
constitute a breach of duty.  
By way of illustration, under the common law 
the authority of two public entities to contract 
with each other would prohibit the same person from 
serving 
both 
in 
positions 
of 
influence 
in  
determining whether to approve, amend or implement 
the contract since the person could not give 
complete loyalty to one entity without some  
sacrifice of loyalty to the other.  This would be  
true even if the two public entities had not 
contracted with each other in the past or  
contemplated doing so in the foreseeable future. 
It was the potential for conflict which was  
determinative, even though no actual conflict of 
duties has occurred. . . .  
Where, however, incompatibility arises only 
when the performance of the duties of the two  
offices results in a breach of duty of a public 
office, there is not incompatibility until the two 
public entities actually enter into contractual  
12 
 Random House Webster’s College Dictionary, p 1148, 
defines the verb “result” as “1. to arise or proceed as a 
consequence from actions, circumstances, premises, etc.; be 
the outcome.  2. to terminate or end in a specified manner or 
thing: to result in failure.”  
17  
 
negotiations with each other. Also, in such cases, 
the public officer or employee may avoid breaching 
his or her duty of loyalty by abstaining from 
participating in the consideration of the contract.  
We agree with the Court of Appeals that a breach of duty  
arises when a public official holding dual offices cannot  
protect, advance, or promote the interest of both offices  
simultaneously. Public officers and employees owe a duty of  
loyalty to the public.  63C Am Jur 2d, Public Officers and  
Employees, § 247, p 690.  “All public officers are agents, and  
their official powers are fiduciary.  They are trusted with  
public functions of the good of the public; to protect,  
advance and promote its interests . . . .”  People ex rel  
Plugger v Twp Bd of Overyssel, 11 Mich 222, 225 (1863)  
(opinion of Manning, J.).  
The Court of Appeals, however, erroneously held that a  
breach of duty exists when “an issue arises in which one  
constituency’s interests may conflict with the interests of a  
separate constituency represented by the official.” 233 Mich  
App 382.  In so concluding, the Court failed to recognize that  
the statute focuses on the manner in which the official  
actually performs the duties of public office.  The Court thus  
disregarded the statutory language requiring an actual breach  
of duty.13  
13 
 The dissent would “focus” the breach of duty inquiry 
beyond contract negotiations or contract formation.  The  
(continued...)  
18  
 
In this case, the circuit court erred in granting summary  
13(...continued) 
dissent asserts that contract negotiations and formation are 
merely examples of situations where conflicts of interest and 
breaches of duty may occur.  The dissent concedes that an  
actual, not potential, conflict of interest must exist. Slip 
op at 6. It finds nothing in the statutory language of the act 
that 
justifies, 
much 
less 
compels, 
the 
contract-or-negotiation 
limitation on the breach of duty inquiry, and thus the inquiry 
must transcend that artificial barrier.  
The dissent’s interpretation of the act is an invitation  
for political mischief. 
If the act reaches potential 
conflicts 
of 
interest, 
the 
likelihood 
of 
political 
shenanigans 
escalates.  For example, a township board member could compel 
the removal of another board member who is also an employee of 
a public university by forcing a vote on a proposal that the 
board consider entering into a contract with the university 
for the study of grass diseases around the township hall.  The  
dissent would hold that a mere proposal to consider entering 
into negotiations for such a contract raises a potential 
conflict of interest requiring that board member to choose 
which position to abandon.  
On the contrary, the statutory language defining 
“incompatible offices” as offices that, “when the official is  
performing the duties of . . . office . . . results in . . .  
(iii) a breach of duty” reflects a legislative intent to 
eschew the common-law focus on potential conflicts in favor of  
actual breaches of duty. This legislative choice encourages 
civic-minded individuals to engage in public service in as 
many capacities as they choose, without limiting their  
involvement through concerns about potential conflicts of  
interest.  The Legislature has focused on actual breaches, 
recognizing the value of enabling public employees to serve in 
public offices when they are off duty.  The act is, in effect, 
a public employees enabling act.  Thus, our interpretation is 
consistent with the plain language of the statute.  
The dissent asserts that defendant’s vote constitutes a  
breach of duty even if the contract-or-negotiation limitation 
is valid, characterizing the vote essentially as a contract or 
negotiation 
decision. 
We 
reject 
the 
dissent’s  
characterization of defendant’s preliminary vote as a  
negotiation-or-contract decision.  
19  
 
 
 
disposition for plaintiff under MCR 2.116(C)(10).14
 The  
township and the county unquestionably may contract for the  
collection of delinquent personal property taxes. 
MCL  
211.56(3); MSA 7.100(3). Defendant coordinates the division  
of the county treasurer’s office that handles day-to-day  
collection matters.  Although defendant potentially could be  
placed at both ends of a contract between the county and a  
local unit of government, the record reflects that Harrison  
Township had no existing contract with the county and was not  
negotiating a contract with it.  
Under these circumstances, no incompatibility exists  
between defendant’s positions until the public entities  
actually enter into contractual negotiations.  A public  
official in defendant’s position may avoid breaching the duty  
of 
loyalty 
by 
not 
participating 
in 
the 
preliminary  
consideration of a possible agreement with the county.15  The  
14 In 
reviewing 
a motion for summary disposition under MCR 
2.116(C)(10), the trial court considers the documentary 
evidence submitted by the parties in a light most favorable to 
the party opposing the motion.  Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460  
Mich 446, 454; 597 NW2d 28 (1999).  The trial court may grant 
the motion if the documentary evidence creates no genuine 
issue of material fact for trial and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 454-455. We  
review de novo the trial court’s ruling on a motion for 
summary disposition. Id. at 454.  
15 
 Defendant should have abstained from voting on the 
motion that the township continue to collect its delinquent 
personal property taxes. By voting on the motion, defendant 
breached a duty of loyalty to Macomb County.  We do not, 
(continued...)  
20  
 
circuit court therefore erred in granting summary disposition  
for plaintiff. In light of the absence of any genuine issue  
of material fact, the court should have granted summary  
disposition 
for 
defendant 
under 
MCR 
2.116(I)(2). Accordingly,  
we remand to the circuit court for entry of an order granting  
summary disposition for defendant.  
III. Conclusion  
We 
conclude 
that 
defendant’s 
positions 
are 
not 
inherently  
incompatible because only a potential breach of duty of public  
office arises from the ability of the township to contract  
with the county for the collection of its delinquent personal  
property taxes. 
Under the circumstances of this case,  
15(...continued) 
however, view this action as necessitating that defendant 
vacate one of her positions because the township never 
negotiated with the county and has not entered into an 
agreement with the county.  Under these circumstances, the 
circuit court had discretion whether to void the defendant’s  
action in voting on the motion.  MCL 15.185; MSA 15.1120(125). 
In light of the passage of time and the absence of any 
indication in the record that defendant cast the deciding 
vote, we conclude that the circuit court should not void 
defendant’s action.  
The dissent asserts that if the contract-or-negotiation 
limitation is invalid, the vote manifests an actual conflict 
of interest and thus a violation of the incompatible offices 
act (part II).  We decline to characterize defendant’s vote as  
a negotiation-or-contract decision.  Moreover, although MCL 
211.56(3); MSA 7.100 allows a county treasurer to reimburse 
itself for the costs of collecting the delinquent taxes, and 
to transfer to the county’s general fund any funds exceeding 
the costs of collection, the record in this case contains no 
proof the Macomb County Treasurer’s best interest was to 
contract with the township.  
21  
 
 
 
 
defendant’s holding of dual offices did not violate the  
incompatible offices act because the governmental entities  
never entered into contractual negotiations.  We therefore  
reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand to the  
circuit court for entry of an order granting summary  
disposition for defendant.  
TAYLOR, 
YOUNG, 
and MARKMAN, 
JJ., concurred with CORRIGAN, C.J.  
22  
___________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
MACOMB COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
No. 114444  
SHERRI MURPHY,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
CAVANAGH, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
I agree with the majority that the phrase “public offices  
held by a public official” encompasses positions of public  
employment. Also, I agree that the defendant’s positions as  
delinquent property tax coordinator and township trustee both  
constitute “public offices held by a public official” as  
defined in the incompatible offices act (IOA), MCL 15.181(b);  
MSA 15.1120(121)(b).  Therefore, I join parts II (A) and II  
(B) of the majority opinion. 
However, I disagree with the  
majority’s conclusion that the defendant’s holding of dual  
offices did not violate the IOA.  Rather, I agree with the  
courts below that the defendant’s offices were impermissibly  
incompatible, 
and 
would affirm summary disposition in favor of  
the plaintiff.  Therefore, I respectfully dissent from part II  
(C) and the result of the majority opinion.  
I  
Section (2) of the incompatible public offices act  
prohibits a public officer or public employee from holding two  
or more incompatible offices simultaneously.  MCL 15.182; MSA  
15.1120(122).  “Incompatible public offices” are defined at  
MCL 15.181(b); MSA 15.1120(121)(b) as follows:  
“Incompatible offices” mean public offices 
held by a public official which, when the official 
is performing the duties of any of the public 
offices held by the official, results in any of the 
following with respect to those offices held:  
(i) The subordination of one public office to 
another.  
(ii) The supervision of one public office by 
another.  
(iii) A breach of duty of public office.  
Only 
subsection 
(iii) 
is 
presently 
at 
issue.  
Specifically, we are faced with whether a violation of the IOA  
occurred when the defendant, in her capacity as township  
trustee, chose to vote in favor of a motion to have the  
township continue to collect its own taxes.  
The majority holds that the defendant did not breach a  
duty of public office by voting in favor of allowing the  
township to continue collecting its own taxes because the vote  
2  
did not result in contractual negotiations or create a  
contractual relationship between the county and the township.  
The majority’s position springs from 1979-1980 OAG No 5626,  
537 (January 16, 1980), in which the Attorney General  
distinguished the common law from the IOA. According to the  
Attorney General, the common law prohibited a single person  
from holding dual positions of influence with public entities  
that had authority to contract with one another, whereas the  
IOA finds incompatibility only when the performance of the  
duties of the offices results in a breach of duty of public  
office.  
The 
primary 
distinction, the Attorney General opined,  
is that the common law focused on the offices themselves,  
while the IOA focuses on the officer’s actions. As such, the  
Attorney General reasoned that incompatibility does not arise  
until the two public entities actually enter into contractual  
negotiations with each other.  Also, the Attorney General  
noted that, in such cases, the public officer can avoid  
breaching 
the 
duty 
of loyalty by abstaining from consideration  
of the contract.  
I cannot agree with the majority that the statutory  
violation in this case arose merely from the fact that the  
township and the county had the ability to contract with one  
another.  Further, I disagree with 1979-1980 OAG No 5626, 537  
(January 16, 1980), to the extent that it implies that, in  
3  
cases involving an officer who holds positions with two  
entities that have the ability to contract with one another,  
the performance of an officer’s duties can only result in a  
breach at the point at which two entities enter into contract  
negotiations with each other.  Nowhere does the IOA provide  
that public offices will be incompatible only when a party  
holding the public offices is placed on the competing ends of  
a contract or contract negotiations.  The focus is instead on  
whether a duty has been breached.  
Public officials are charged with a variety of duties,  
the breach of which may potentially result in an IOA  
violation.  
Though 
a 
public official’s decision to participate  
in contract negotiations is one example of a situation where  
a breach of duty of public office may arise, the statutory  
language simply does not support the assertion that it is the  
only example.  
Even 
assuming 
that subsection (iii) supports a finding of  
incompatibility only when an officer’s performance of his  
duties bears upon the competing entities’ abilities to  
contract with one another, the majority fails to recognize  
that a vote to decide whether the township should be allowed  
to continue collecting its own taxes is a decision against  
entering a contract to have someone else collect taxes.  
Though the vote in question did not explicitly mention the  
4  
possibility that the township could alternatively enter into  
a contract allowing Macomb County to collect taxes, the result  
of the vote was the same as if the question had been “should  
the township collect its own taxes or should the township  
contract with Macomb County?”  In either case, the vote  
foreclosed the possibility that the county would be enabled to  
collect taxes.  
For these reasons, I believe that our focus must extend  
beyond the question whether a contractual relationship has  
been entered between the county and the township.  Instead, we  
should consider whether the contested action, here a vote to  
decide who is responsible for collecting taxes, amounts to the  
performance of one duty and the breach of another.1  
II  
Having decided that our focus should be on the statutory  
language, we must next determine what constitutes a breach and  
whether a breach occurred in this case. The majority adopts  
the Court of Appeals view that “a breach of duty arises when  
a public official holding dual offices cannot protect,  
advance, 
or 
promote 
the 
interest 
of 
both 
offices  
simultaneously.”  Slip op at 19. 
The cited basis for this  
1 
 While the majority believes that my approach invites 
mischief, I believe that it is an approach required by the 
legislative 
language.  Cries of mischief should, therefore, be 
directed toward the Legislature.  
5  
premise is that public officers are fiduciaries who owe a duty  
of loyalty to the public.  The majority then concludes that  
two public offices will not be deemed incompatible simply  
because one official represents two constituencies, each of  
which may have interests that conflict with the other’s  
interests.  Instead, the majority holds, an actual breach must  
exist.  
I agree with the majority that the question under  
subsection (iii) of the IOA is not whether a particular  
officer might potentially face a conflict of interest or  
breach of duty at some undetermined point in the future.  The  
statutory use of the word “breach” and the phrase “is  
performing the duties” imply that an officer’s performance is  
relevant to whether an IOA violation has occurred.  Similarly,  
the use of the word “results” implies that a situation  
actually must have arisen in which the officer has breached  
one duty through the performance of another.  For this reason,  
the IOA does seem to support the proposition that an actual  
event must trigger the breach contemplated by subsection  
(iii).  For example, had the township never considered whether  
it should collect its own taxes, the defendant’s duties as tax  
coordinator 
would 
only potentially conflict with her duties as  
township trustee.  However, at the moment the township took up  
the tax question, the vote that occurred had an effect on the  
6  
 
 
township itself and on the township’s relationship (or  
nonrelationship) with the county.  I believe that the majority  
errs in concluding that no breach existed in this case.  
The circuit court recognized a problem that the majority  
does not. It held:  
In the instant matter, a situation has arisen 
involving both of defendant’s offices which has 
resulted in a breach of her public duty.  The issue  
of whether to allow Macomb County to collect 
delinquent 
property 
taxes–and 
related 
fees, 
expenses, interest, penalties and other charges– 
has been presented to the Harrison Township Board  
of Trustees.  Defendant’s vote on this issue as a  
township trustee impacts her interests as a  
delinquent personal property tax coordinator for 
the county.  This conflict is unavoidable and  
defendant can not protect, advance, or promote the 
interests of both her offices with disinterested  
skill, zeal and diligence. [Emphasis added.]  
The circuit court decision was based on the premise that the  
defendant’s decision to vote on the measure resulted in the  
breach of her duty to the county.2  I do not believe that the  
circuit 
court 
committed an error requiring reversal in holding  
that the defendant’s decision to vote in her capacity as  
trustee affected her duties as delinquent property tax  
2 As the circuit court recognized, a township trustee is 
duty bound to carry out the business of the township as an 
agent and fiduciary of the township. 
See People v  
Hirschfield, 271 Mich 20, 25; 260 NW 106 (1935).  In the  
present controversy, the question is whether the defendant’s 
decision to carry out the business of the township by voting 
on a motion to continue the township’s tax collection policy 
breached a duty she owed either to the township or to the 
county.  
7  
 
 
coordinator.  
Even the majority acknowledges that “by voting on the  
motion defendant breached a duty of loyalty to Macomb County.”  
Slip op at 21, n 14.  The majority further implicitly  
recognizes the predicament created by the vote when it submits  
that the defendant “should have abstained from voting on the  
motion.” Id. However, the majority summarily dismisses the  
defendant’s breach in a footnote. Id.3  
I 
cannot 
join 
the majority’s dismissal of the defendant’s  
breach.4
 Given the statutory language, I fail to see how the  
breach can be excused.
 Rather, the defendant’s actions  
constitute a breach under the majority’s own test.  She could  
not “protect, advance, or promote the interest of both offices  
simultaneously” as the majority purports to require. Slip op  
at 19.  Unlike the majority, I believe that the defendant’s  
3 Contrary to the majority’s assertion, I believe that an 
actual, rather than potential, breach occurred in this case.  
4 Similarly, I cannot agree that the harm can be remedied 
by declaring that the defendant “should have abstained.” In  
so concluding, the majority implicates a number of questions 
that are not before this Court.  Arguably, the defendant 
became unable to avoid a breach of duty once the vote arose.  
It is also arguable that a decision to abstain would have, in 
itself, illustrated the defendant’s inability to serve the 
interests of the township.  See, e.g., Contesti v Attorney  
General, 164 Mich App 271; 416 NW2d 410 (1987), quoting OAG 
1979-1980, No 5626, 545 (January 16, 1980), for the  
proposition that abstention may eliminate a conflict of 
interest, but not incompatibility of offices. In any event, 
we need not decide the issue because the defendant did  
actually vote.  
8  
decision to vote triggered the IOA, and that her offices are  
incompatible. Therefore, I would affirm summary disposition  
in favor of the plaintiffs.  
WEAVER and KELLY, JJ., concurred with CAVANAGH, J.  
9