Title: MARRIAGE OF JOHNSON
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 89-139
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: July 11, 1989

NO. 89-139 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1989 IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF SUSAN DRISCOLL JOHNSON, petitioner and Respondent, and THOMAS JOHNSON, Respondent and Appellant. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Second ~udicial ~istrict, In and for the County of silver Bow, The Honorable Arnold Olsen, Judge presiding. COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Brad L. Belke, Butte, Montana For Respondent: Mark A. Vucurovich, ~enningsen, Purcell, Vucurovich and ~ichardson, Butte, Montana Submitted on Briefs: June 8, 1989 Decided: July 11, 1989 I . . - " .. c - ; j ' ~ +. Clerk Mr. Justice L. C. Gulbrandson delivered the Opinion of the Court. The father, Thomas Johnson, appeals from the final custody decree entered by the Second Judicial District Court, Silver Bow County. The court denied the father's motion to modify the current joint custody arrangement so as to appoint him, instead of the mother, the primary physical custodian o f their son. We affirm. The following issues are presented on appeal: 1. Did the District Court err in failing to find that the best interest of the child required a modification of the present custody arrangement? 2. Did the District Court's adoption of the petitioner's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Decree indicate that the court failed to properly consider the facts or render its independent judgment on the matter? The parties married October 23, 1978. A son was born to this marriage. When the marriage was dissolved on October 3, 1984, the court awarded each parent joint custody of their son. The custody arrangement provided that each parent would have physical custody of their son on alternating days. In October of 1985, the mother filed a petition for modification of this alternating physical custody arrangement. The father filed a cross-petition for modification, requesting the court to grant him primary physical custody of their son. He alleged that the best interest of the child demanded such a modification because the mother did not provide proper nourishment or care for their son's physical or educational needs. Following a hearing on the matter, the District Court granted the mother's motion and awarded her primary physical custody of their son. Both parents retained joint legal custody of the c h i l d . The f a t h e r g e n e r a l l y was e n t i t l e d t o v i s i t a t i o n every Tuesday and Thursday, every o t h e r weekend, and f o r one month i n t h e summer. The c o u r t ' s modification decree was i s s u e d a f t e r t h e c o u r t found t h a t t h e mother provided proper c a r e f o r t h e i r son and t h a t t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t o f t h e c h i l d demanded a m o d i f i c a t i o n a s t h e a l t e r n a t i n g p h y s i c a l custody schedule was confusing t o t h e son. The c o u r t a l s o had found t h a t t h e d a i l y c o n t a c t between t h e p a r e n t s because o f t h i s a l t e r n a t i n g custody schedule continued t h e f a t h e r ' s h o s t i l i t y toward t h e mother. I n J u l y o f 1988, t h e mother gave n o t i c e t h a t s h e was moving t o t h e S t a t e o f Washington. H e r reasons f o r moving included wanting t o be c l o s e r t o h e r family and d e s i r i n g a b e t t e r job w i t h o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r f u t u r e advancement. She l e f t h e r son w i t h t h e f a t h e r f o r a few weeks i n J u l y while looking f o r a job and a home i n Washington. She r e t u r n e d t o Montana and began c o l l e c t i n g h e r belongings i n a n t i c i p a t i o n of h e r move with t h e i r son t o Redmond, Washington, i n August. On August 3, 1988, t h e f a t h e r f i l e d a motion t o modify t h e custody o r d e r s o a s t o g r a n t him primary custody and t o p r e v e n t t h e mother from t a k i n g t h e i r son o u t of Montana. A few days l a t e r , t h e mother proceeded w i t h h e r intended move, t a k i n g t h e i r son w i t h h e r . Hearings were n o t held u n t i l January 9, 1989, on t h e f a t h e r ' s modification motion, t h e f a t h e r ' s November 22, 1988 contempt motion, and t h e mother's motion f o r c h i l d support. (The f a t h e r had moved t h e c o u r t t o o r d e r t h e mother i n contempt o f c o u r t because he a l l e g e d she had denied him h i s v i s i t a t i o n r i g h t s . ) Following hearing on t h e motions, t h e c o u r t denied t h e f a t h e r ' s m o d i f i c a t i o n motion. The c o u r t found t h a t t h e s o n ' s b e s t i n t e r e s t would be served by r e t a i n i n g t h e mother a s primary p h y s i c a l custodian. The f a t h e r remained e n t i t l e d t o reasonable and open v i s i t a t i o n w i t h t h e i r son. The c o u r t a l s o ordered t h e p a r t i e s t o n e g o t i a t e c h i l d support o b l i g a t i o n s . The f a t h e r appeals from t h i s f i n a l custody decree. The record i n t h i s c a s e r e v e a l s t h a t both p a r t i e s a r e good p a r e n t s who love t h e i r son and d e s i r e t o have him w i t h them. Both w e r e a b l e t o s h a r e a comparatively e q u a l amount of t i m e w i t h t h e i r son while they both l i v e d i n B u t t e , Montana. However, t h e p a r t i e s now l i v e o v e r 400 m i l e s a p a r t , and t h e r e i n lies t h e r o o t o f t h e problem g i v i n g rise t o t h i s appeal. W e n o t e a t t h e o u t s e t t h a t a p a r e n t w i t h j o i n t custody of a c h i l d i s e n t i t l e d t o change h e r r e s i d e n c e , s u b j e c t only t o t h e power o f t h e c o u r t " t o r e s t r a i n a removal which would p r e j u d i c e t h e r i g h t s o r w e l f a r e o f t h e c h i l d . " S e c t i o n 40-6-231, MCA. Absent such p r e j u d i c e , a move by i t s e l f w i l l n o t c o n s t i t u t e grounds s u f f i c i e n t t o e n a b l e t h e o t h e r p a r e n t t o o b t a i n a m o d i f i c a t i o n o f t h e t e r m s o f a j o i n t custody arrangement. See I n r e Marriage o f P a r a d i s (1984), 213 Mont. 177, 180, 689 P.2d 1263, 1265. The f a t h e r contends t h a t t h e w e l f a r e o f t h e i r son was p r e j u d i c e d by t h e move and t h a t t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t o f t h e i r son n e c e s s i t a t e d awarding t h e f a t h e r primary p h y s i c a l custody because t h e i r son had a l r e a d y been i n t e g r a t e d i n t o t h e f a t h e r ' s family and i n t o t h e Butte community and school. The f a t h e r argues t h a t such an award i s necessary t o p r e v e n t d e s t r u c t i o n o f h i s s o n ' s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h f r i e n d s , family, school, and t h e community o f Butte, a d e s t r u c t i o n t h r e a t e n e d by t h e mother's move o u t o f t h e S t a t e . The c o u r t d i d n o t f i n d t h i s i n t e g r a t i o n argument p e r s u a s i v e a s t o t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t o f t h e c h i l d i n t h i s c a s e , and n e i t h e r do we. The f a t h e r d i d n o t move t o t e r m i n a t e t h e j o i n t l e g a l and p h y s i c a l custody. Rather, t h e f a t h e r moved only t o modify t h e j o i n t custody p r o v i s i o n s s o a s t o provide him, and n o t t h e mother, w i t h t h e primary p h y s i c a l custody o f t h e i r son. The i n t e g r a t i o n r a t i o n a l e found i n S 40-4-219, MCA, which a p p l i e s only t o proceedings t o t e r m i n a t e j o i n t custody, t h e r e f o r e a r e n o t a p p l i c a b l e t o t h i s case. See, e.g., I n re Custody o f A.L.S. (Mont. 1 9 8 7 ) , 747 P.2d 192, 44 St.Rep. 1979; I n r e Marriage o f Gahm (1986), 222 Mont. 300, 722 P.2d 1138. Moreover, t h e son has r e a d i l y a d j u s t e d t o and a l s o become i n t e g r a t e d i n t o h i s extended family, school and community i n Redmond, Washington. This i n t e g r a t i o n o f a c h i l d i n t o t h e homes and community of both p a r e n t s i s t h e necessary outcome and g o a l of a j o i n t custody arrangement; i n t e g r a t i o n t h u s may n o t s e r v e a s a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r a m o d i f i c a t i o n o f t h e t e r m s o f a j o i n t custody decree. See P a r a d i s , 689 P.2d a t 1265. The r e c o r d a l s o f a i l s t o show any o t h e r f a c t o r s , such a s t h o s e l i s t e d i n 5 40-4-212, MCA, which would l e a d t h e c o u r t t o determine t h a t t h e s o n ' s b e s t i n t e r e s t would be served and preserved by g i v i n g primary p h y s i c a l custody o f t h e c h i l d t o t h e f a t h e r . The f a t h e r a l l e g e d t h a t h i s s o n ' s mental, moral and p h y s i c a l h e a l t h was a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t e d by t h e mother's d r i n k i n g and frequenting o f b a r s i n t h e Redmond a r e a . The c o u r t , however, held otherwise. W e w i l l n o t r e v e r s e t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s u n l e s s t h e y a r e c l e a r l y erroneous. A s s t a t e d i n Rule 5 2 ( a ) , M.R.Civ.P.: Findings of f a c t s h a l l n o t be set a s i d e u n l e s s c l e a r l y erroneous, and due r e g a r d s h a l l be given t o t h e o p p o r t u n i t y o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o judge o f t h e c r e d i b i l i t y o f t h e w i t n e s s e s . The evidence i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e mother d i d i n f a c t go o u t w i t h a f r i e n d and have a "couple o f b e e r s " once a week o r so. However, t h e son was n o t l e f t alone a t such t i m e s . H e s t a y e d w i t h h i s grandparents o r h i s a u n t and cousins. F u r t h e r , t h e mother t e s t i f i e d t h a t she d i d n o t d r i n k t o excess. W e t h e r e f o r e hold t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s f i n d i n g t h a t t h e mother was a c a r i n g and loving p a r e n t (Finding #13) was n o t c l e a r l y erroneous, and t h e c o u r t d i d n o t abuse i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n concluding t h a t t h e f a t h e r ' s a l l e g a t i o n s were groundless (Conclusion # 4 ) and t h a t t h e mother's primary p h y s i c a l custody remained i n t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t of t h e c h i l d . The f a t h e r ' s second argument i s t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s adoption o f t h e mother's proposed f i n d i n g s o f f a c t and conclusions o f law i l l u s t r a t e d t h e c o u r t ' s f a i l u r e t o use i t s independent judgment a s i s r e q u i r e d by law. F u r t h e r , t h e f a t h e r argues t h a t s e v e r a l o f t h e f i n d i n g s i s s u e d by t h e D i s t r i c t Court a r e n o t supported by t h e evidence. This Court h a s p r e v i o u s l y s t a t e d t h a t a d i s t r i c t c o u r t may adopt one p a r t y ' s proposed f i n d i n g s o f f a c t . Kowis v . Kowis (1983), 202 Mont. 371, 3 7 9 , 658 P.2d 1084, 1088. The c o u r t errs i n adopting a p a r t y ' s proposed f i n d i n g s only i f t h e c o u r t does s o "without proper c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e f a c t s " and w i t h a l a c k o f independent judgment. I n re Marriage of Callahan (Mont. 1988), 762 P.2d 205, 209, 45 St.Rep. 1639, 1644. T h i s Court w i l l n o t o v e r t u r n a d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s and conclusions simply because they a r e based upon t h o s e submitted by counsel i f : [ t h e ] f i n d i n g s and conclusions a r e s u f f i c i e n t l y comprehensive and p e r t i n e n t t o t h e i s s u e s t o provide a b a s i s f o r d e c i s i o n , and a r e supported by t h e evidence. Kowis, 658 P.2d a t 1088. The r e c o r d i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e c o u r t p r o p e r l y considered a l l t h e p e r t i n e n t f a c t s during a hearing conducted s e v e r a l weeks b e f o r e t h e c o u r t i s s u e d i t s f i n d i n g s and conclusions. The c o u r t ' s conclusion, t h a t t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t o f t h e son e n t a i l e d leaving him i n t h e primary p h y s i c a l custody o f h i s mother, was rendered a f t e r t h e judge himself questioned the child. The findings in this case are sufficiently comprehensive and pertinent to the issue raised by the father. Moreover, the findings, when viewed as a whole, are supported by existing evidence. The father also argued that the court's decision to award primary physical custody of their son to the mother denied him his right to joint custody. This argument would have been a proper subject for an appeal following the 1986 modification decree, which awarded the mother primary physical custody. This appeal, however, is only from the decree denying the father primary physical custody of his son, and as such, the argument is not only irrelevant to this appeal but actually counterproductive to the father's contention that he should have been awarded primary physical custody. We therefore decline to address this argument. The decision of the District Court is affirmed. We concur: