Title: Boub v. Township of Wayne
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 84246
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: October 22, 1998

Boub v. Township of Wayne (Ill. 
S.Ct.)
Docket No. 84246-Agenda 34-May 1998.
JON P. BOUB, Appellant, v. TOWNSHIP OF WAYNE 
et al., Appellees.
Opinion filed October 22, 1998.
JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the 
court:
The plaintiff, Jon P. Boub, brought this action in the 
circuit court of Du Page County, seeking recovery against the Township of Wayne 
and its highway commissioner, John Ryvold, for injuries sustained by the 
plaintiff in a bicycle accident on a Wayne Township bridge. The circuit court 
granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, and the appellate court 
affirmed. 291 Ill. App. 3d 713. We allowed the plaintiff's petition for leave to 
appeal (166 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), and we now affirm the judgment of the appellate 
court.
The plaintiff commenced the present action on September 23, 
1993, by filing a complaint in the circuit court of Du Page County. After the 
dismissal of the plaintiff's initial and amended complaints, the plaintiff 
eventually filed a third amended complaint, which superseded a pending second 
amended complaint. According to the allegations in the plaintiff's third amended 
complaint, Boub was riding his bicycle on the morning of September 8, 1992, on 
St. Charles Road in Wayne Township, Du Page County. The accident occurred as 
Boub was traveling across a one-lane bridge. The surface of the bridge consisted 
of wood planking; some time before the accident, asphalt patching between the 
planks had been removed as part of a bridge renovation project, in preparation 
for the installation of a different bridge deck. According to the pleadings, the 
plaintiff was thrown from the bicycle when his front tire became stuck between 
two of the planks on the bridge.
The plaintiff's third amended complaint sought recovery from 
the defendants on several different theories of liability. Counts I and IV, 
sounding in negligence and willful and wanton misconduct, alleged that the 
defendants violated a duty owed to the plaintiff under section 3-102(a) of the 
Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 
10/3-102(a) (West 1996)) (Tort Immunity Act). Counts II and V alleged negligence 
and willful and wanton misconduct for failure to comply with certain statutory 
provisions, including section 3-103 of the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/3-103 
(West 1996)), in making the improvements to the bridge. Finally, counts III and 
VI, alleging negligence and willful and wanton misconduct, sought recovery under 
provisions of the Illinois Vehicle Code for the defendants' asserted failure to 
properly post warning signs at the bridge. The defendants moved for summary 
judgment on all six counts. Following a hearing, the trial judge granted the 
defendants' motion and entered summary judgment in their favor.
The plaintiff appealed, and the appellate court affirmed. 
291 Ill. App. 3d 713. On appeal, the plaintiff challenged only the rulings with 
respect to the negligence counts of his complaint, counts I, II, and III; he did 
not challenge the disposition of the companion counts alleging willful and 
wanton misconduct. Regarding count I, the appellate court concluded that the 
defendants were immune from liability under section 3-102(a) of the Tort 
Immunity Act. Given that result, the appellate court concluded that count II 
must fail as well, for liability under section 3-103, on which count II was 
based, will not be found in the absence of liability under section 3-102(a). See 
Curtis v. County of Cook, 98 Ill. 2d 158, 165 (1983). Finally, the 
appellate court rejected count III, and the plaintiff's argument that the 
defendants were liable for their failure to post or maintain proper warning 
signs at the site. The defendants had appealed separately from an order of the 
circuit court denying their motion to dismiss the action as barred by the 
statute of limitations; the appellate court did not address that question, 
having resolved the other issues in the case in favor of the defendants. We 
allowed the plaintiff's petition for leave to appeal. 166 Ill. 2d R. 315(a). We 
later granted leave to the League of Illinois Bicyclists and the Chicagoland 
Bicycle Federation to submit a joint brief as amici curiae in support 
of the plaintiff. 155 Ill. 2d R. 345.
Orders granting summary judgment are subject to de 
novo review (Crum &amp; Forster Managers Corp. v. Resolution Trust 
Corp., 156 Ill. 2d 384, 390 (1993)), and that standard therefore governs 
our resolution of the present appeal. The plaintiff first argues that the courts 
below erred in ruling that count I of the third amended complaint was barred by 
the immunity provisions of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees 
Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act). Section 3-102(a) of the Tort Immunity Act 
provides:
"Except as otherwise provided in this Article, a local 
public entity has the duty to exercise ordinary care to maintain its property in 
a reasonably safe condition for the use in the exercise of ordinary care of 
people whom the entity intended and permitted to use the property in a manner in 
which and at such times as it was reasonably foreseeable that it would be used, 
and shall not be liable for injury unless it is proven that it has actual or 
constructive notice of the existence of such a condition that is not reasonably 
safe in reasonably adequate time prior to an injury to have taken measures to 
remedy or protect against such condition." 745 ILCS 10/3-102(a) (West 
1996).
In Vaughn v. City of West Frankfort, 166 Ill. 2d 155, 160 (1995), this court explained, "Section 3-102(a) of the Act only imposes 
a duty of ordinary care on municipalities to maintain property for uses that are 
both permitted and intended" (emphasis in original). 
Accordingly, the present plaintiff must qualify as both a permitted and an 
intended user of the property involved in this case if he is to maintain the 
action alleged against the defendants in count I of the third amended complaint. 
In truth, an intended user of property is, by definition, also a permitted user; 
a permitted user of property, however, is not necessarily an intended user. The 
defendants contend that the plaintiff, as a bicyclist, was not an intended user 
of the road and bridge, and that he was, at most, only a permitted user. The 
question before us, then, concerns whether the plaintiff may also be 
characterized as an intended user. The plaintiff asserts that the rights of 
bicycle riders and vehicle drivers are generally coextensive. He observes that 
bicyclists have traditionally used roads and highways without restriction, and 
he cites a state statute provision that grants bicyclists the rights and duties 
of drivers of vehicles. The plaintiff notes further that bicyclists were not 
excluded from riding on the road where the present accident occurred.
To resolve the plaintiff's status under section 3-102(a), it 
is appropriate to look at the property involved in determining whether the 
plaintiff may be considered an intended and permitted user of the road and 
bridge where the accident occurred. "Whether a particular use of property was 
permitted and intended is determined by looking to the nature of the property 
itself." Vaughn, 166 Ill. 2d  at 162-63. Moreover, as the statute makes 
clear, it is the intent of the local public entity that is controlling, for the 
duty expressed by section 3-102(a) is limited to those "whom the [local public] 
entity intended and permitted to use the property" (745 ILCS 10/3-102(a) (West 
1996)).
The scope of this inquiry is demonstrated by our decision in 
Wojdyla v. City of Park Ridge, 148 Ill. 2d 417 (1992). In that case, 
the plaintiff's decedent was struck by a car as he attempted to reach his own 
vehicle by crossing a highway in the middle of a block, outside any marked 
pedestrian crosswalk. The plaintiff argued that the decedent was an intended 
user of the highway where he was crossing and that the city was liable under 
section 3-102(a) of the Tort Immunity Act for failure to provide sufficient 
lighting on that portion of the road. The driver of the vehicle that struck the 
decedent said that he did not see the decedent before the accident occurred. 
This court concluded that the decedent was not an intended user of that portion 
of the highway and upheld a grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant 
city. The court explained:
"To determine the intended use of the property involved 
here, we need look no further than the property itself. The roads are paved, 
marked and regulated by traffic signs and signals for the benefit of 
automobiles. Parking lanes are set out according to painted blocks on the 
pavement, signs or meters on the sidewalk or parkway, or painted markings on the 
curb. Pedestrian walkways are designated by painted crosswalks by design, and by 
intersections by custom. These are the indications of intended use. That 
pedestrians may be permitted to cross the street mid-block does not mean that 
they should have unfettered access to cross the street at whatever time and 
under whatever circumstances they should so choose. Marked or unmarked 
crosswalks are intended for the protection of pedestrians crossing streets, and 
municipalities are charged with liability for those areas. Those areas do not, 
however, include a highway in mid-block." Wojdyla, 148 Ill. 2d  at 
426.
Similar reasoning was employed in Vaughn v. City of West 
Frankfort, 166 Ill. 2d 155 (1995). In that case, the plaintiff was injured 
when she stepped in a hole while crossing a street in the middle of a block. As 
in Wojdyla, the question before the court was whether the injured 
pedestrian was an intended and permitted user of the street where the accident 
occurred. After observing that a person must be both an intended and a permitted 
user to avoid the bar of immunity created by section 3-102(a), this court 
rejected the notion that the manner in which a particular injury occurs is 
relevant in determining the scope of a municipality's duty under that provision. 
The court explained:
"[T]he duty of a municipality depends on whether the 
use of the property was permitted and intended use. [Citation.] Whether 
a particular use of property was permitted and intended is determined by looking 
to the nature of the property itself. (Wojdyla, 148 Ill. 2d  at 426.) 
The Illinois legislature has expressly limited the duty of a municipality with 
regard to maintaining its property to a duty of ordinary care to permitted and 
intended users of the property. Therefore, the question of whether a 
municipality owes a duty does not depend on whether the plaintiff-pedestrian was 
struck by a moving vehicle or tripped over a pothole, but rather depends on 
whether the municipality intended that the plaintiff-pedestrian walk in that 
part of the street where the injury occurred and permitted the 
plaintiff-pedestrian to do so." (Emphasis in original.) Vaughn, 166 Ill. 2d  at 162-63.
The Vaughn court concluded that the plaintiff was 
not an intended user of the street where the accident occurred because she 
crossed in the absence of any pavement markings or other 
designations.
A later case, Sisk v. Williamson County, 167 Ill. 2d 343 (1995), similarly declined to impose liability for injuries sustained by 
an unintended user. The plaintiff in that case struck a bridge with the car he 
was driving and then got out to investigate the damage to his vehicle. The 
plaintiff fell to the creek bed below when he stepped off the edge of the 
pavement, which allegedly was obscured by weeds. This court held that the 
defendant county owed no duty to the plaintiff under section 3-102(a) of the 
Tort Immunity Act. The court found distinguishable cases allowing recovery when 
persons are injured by conditions of the pavement in areas where cars are 
intended to park. The court explained:
"In contrast, there are no such manifestations to indicate 
that Williamson County intended pedestrians to walk on its country roads, much 
less the specific road and bridge complained of by plaintiff in the case at bar. 
As the appellate court noted, there are no walkways or crosswalks on rural 
country roads such as the county-line road in this case. Further, many country 
roads are gravel roads and often have no shoulder. We believe that the inference 
to be drawn from these facts, if any, is that municipalities do not intend that 
pedestrians walk on rural country roads. Although it may become necessary at 
times for pedestrians to walk on country roads, such use is not a manifestation 
of the local municipality's intent that pedestrians walk on its country roads or 
an undertaking by the municipality to make country roads free from defects that 
might injure pedestrians." Sisk, 167 Ill. 2d  at 351-52.
Guided by the preceding discussions in Wojdyla, 
Vaughn, and Sisk, we turn now to the site of the present 
accident. We recognize the factual differences that exist between this case and 
the pedestrian cases surveyed above. Bicyclists, unlike pedestrians, are guided 
by some of the same signs and pavement markings that motorists observe. Still, 
we believe that the same considerations present in our decisions in those cases 
are also relevant here in determining whether the plaintiff was an intended 
user-rather than simply a permitted user-of the road and bridge. In determining 
Wayne Township's intent, it is necessary to look at pavement markings, signs, 
and other physical manifestations of the intended use of the property. Just as 
the presence or absence of special pavement markings and signs is relevant in 
determining whether pedestrians are intended users of streets and highways, so 
too do we believe that the presence or absence of pavement markings and signs is 
relevant here in determining whether the plaintiff was an intended user of the 
road and bridge where the accident occurred. In the present case, there is 
nothing in the roadway or bridge that would suggest that it was intended for use 
by bicycles. No special pavement markings or signs indicated that bicyclists, 
like motorists, were intended to ride on the road or bridge, or that bicycles, 
rather than vehicles, were the intended users of the route. Cf. 
Cole v. City of East Peoria, 201 Ill. App. 3d 756 (1990) (municipality 
liable for injury caused when bicyclist's tire became stuck in sewer grate; 
applying section 3-102(a) of Tort Immunity Act, appellate court concluded that 
special pavement markings showed that city intended and permitted bicyclists to 
travel where accident occurred).
That the township, after the plaintiff's accident, later 
erected signs-a bicycle symbol and the legend, "Slippery when wet"-at the 
approaches to the bridge does not signify to us the township's intent before the 
accident here. Subsequent remedial measures or warnings, of course, may not be 
used as evidence of negligence. Herzog v. Lexington Township, 167 Ill. 2d 288, 300-01 (1995). Similarly, we do not believe that Wayne Township's 
subsequent placement of signs, installed after the accident, is indicative of 
the township's prior intent.
The plaintiff raises several arguments in support of his 
contention that he was an intended user of the road and bridge where his 
accident occurred. The plaintiff notes that section 11-1502 of the state Vehicle 
Code provides that "[e]very person riding a bicycle upon a highway shall be 
granted all of the rights and shall be subject to all of the duties applicable 
to the driver of a vehicle by this Code ***." 625 ILCS 5/11-1502 (West 
1996).
The defendants do not concede that state statutes are 
applicable in determining Wayne Township's intent regarding the use of the road 
and bridge in this case. As we have noted, under section 3-102(a) of the Tort 
Immunity Act it is the intent of the local public entity that controls; 
accordingly, the intent of another public body, whether it is the state, a 
county, or other local entity, should be irrelevant. Nonetheless, the defendants 
argue that statute statutes, to whatever extent they might be relevant to our 
inquiry here, fail to sustain the plaintiff's position in this case. We agree. 
We do not believe that section 11-1502 of the Vehicle Code supports the 
conclusion that bicycle riders are, like drivers of vehicles, intended and 
permitted users of Illinois streets and highways. The provision seems designed 
to ensure that bicyclists, for their own safety and the safety of others, obey 
traffic laws while they are on public streets and highways. In fact, the 
legislature gave that section the title, "Traffic laws apply to persons riding 
bicycles." The provision cited by the plaintiff is entirely consistent with the 
conclusion that bicyclists are permitted, but not intended, users of the roads, 
in the absence of specific markings, signage, or further manifestation of the 
local entity's intent that would speak otherwise.
Moreover, other statutory provisions suggest that bicyclists 
are generally not intended users of Illinois roads, streets, and highways. For 
example, the Vehicle Code defines "highway" as "[t]he entire width between the 
boundary lines of every way publicly maintained when any part thereof is open to 
the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel." 625 ILCS 5/1-126 (West 
1996). The Vehicle Code defines "roadway" as "[t]hat portion of a highway 
improved, designed or ordinarily used for vehicular travel, exclusive of the 
berm or shoulder" (625 ILCS 5/1-179 (West 1996)), and it defines "street" as 
"[t]he entire width between boundary lines of every way publicly maintained when 
any part thereof is open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular 
travel" (625 ILCS 5/1-201 (West 1996)). The Vehicle Code defines "[v]ehicle" as 
"[e]very device, in, upon or by which any person or property is or may be 
transported or drawn upon a highway, except devices moved by human power, 
devices used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks and snowmobiles as 
defined in the Snowmobile Registration and Safety Act." 625 ILCS 5/1-217 (West 
1996). In contrast to "[v]ehicle," the Code defines "[b]icycle" as "[e]very 
device propelled by human power upon which any person may ride, having two 
tandem wheels except scooters and similar devices." 625 ILCS 5/1-106 (West 
1996).
Similarly, the Highway Code defines "highway" in the 
following manner:
"Highway-any public way for vehicular travel which has been 
laid out in pursuance of any law of this State, or of the Territory of Illinois, 
or which has been established by dedication, or used by the public as a highway 
for 15 years ***. The term `highway' includes rights of way, bridges, drainage 
structures, signs, guard rails, protective structures and all other structures 
and appurtenances necessary or convenient for vehicular traffic. A highway in a 
rural area may be called a `road', while a highway in a municipal area may be 
called a `street'." 605 ILCS 5/2-202 (West 1996).
As the defendants contend, the preceding definitions suggest 
that highways, streets, roads and bridges in Illinois are primarily designed and 
intended for use by vehicles, and not by bicycles.
The plaintiff and amici also observe that 
bicyclists have customarily and traditionally used county roads such as the one 
involved in this case. Citing Marshall v. City of Centralia, 143 Ill. 2d 1 (1991), they argue that bicyclists must therefore be deemed both intended 
and permitted users of the road at issue. We do not agree. In Marshall 
the plaintiff, a minor, was injured when he fell into an open sewer manhole on a 
parkway-the grassy area between the sidewalk and the street-in a residential 
area. This court found that the defendant city could be liable for the injury 
under section 3-102(a) of the Tort Immunity Act, concluding that the child's 
walking on the parkway was an intended use. In support of that conclusion, the 
court noted that parkways historically have been used for a number of purposes 
by pedestrians.
We do not construe Marshall as establishing that 
historical practice alone is sufficient to make a particular use of public 
property an intended one. In ruling for the plaintiff, the court 
explained:
"We are not persuaded by defendant's argument that parkways 
are areas of beauty that were constructed with the intention that they only be 
looked at and not walked upon. It is this court's opinion that parkways, while 
beautifying the street, are also intended for the limited use of pedestrians, 
such as the plaintiff in the instant case." Marshall, 143 Ill. 2d  at 
9-10.
The court then noted the different manners in which 
pedestrians have used parkways in the past. Rather than establish historical 
practice as the touchstone by which intended use must be measured, the 
Marshall court simply referred to historical practice in attempting to 
ascertain the intended use, if any, of parkways.
In addition, amici observe that the portion of St. 
Charles Road involved in this case was designated "a through street generally 
suitable for bicycling" by the Du Page County board in 1983. Such a designation, 
however, is consistent with our conclusion that bicyclists are only permitted 
users of the road in question. That bicyclists are not intended users does not, 
of course, mean that they are prohibited from roads and highways, for this 
determination has no effect on their status as permitted users. We note that the 
present case does not involve a street or road with specially marked lanes for 
bicycle use or the opposite situation of signs prohibiting the presence of 
bicyclists. As this court noted in Sisk:
"Second, the appellate court apparently failed to recognize 
the difference between `permitted' and `intended' uses under section 3-102(a) of 
the Act. The court noted that rural country roads are commonly used by persons 
other than drivers of automobiles, listing such uses as horseback riding, 
bicycling, jogging, walking and driving farm equipment. [Citation.] However, 
most of the activities listed are also common uses of city and residential 
streets. Illinois courts have concluded that although pedestrians may be 
permitted users, they are not intended users of streets outside of marked 
crosswalks or other areas designated and intended for the protection of 
pedestrians." Sisk, 167 Ill. 2d  at 349.
As Sisk noted, a broad range of permitted uses by 
different groups of users is compatible with an intended use only by vehicles. 
The county board's designation of this road as one suitable for bicycle riding 
is not inconsistent with our conclusion that bicyclists are not intended users 
of the road. Moreover, we iterate that our inquiry is limited under section 
3-102(a) to determining the intent of the local public entity, Wayne Township in 
this case. The intent of the Du Page County Board is not 
determinative.
The plaintiff argues further that this result is 
inconsistent with the decision in Molway v. City of Chicago, 239 Ill. 486 (1909). Citing Molway, the plaintiff contends that bicyclists must 
be considered intended and permitted users of Illinois streets and highways. The 
plaintiff in that case was injured when the bicycle he was riding hit a hole in 
the street. On appeal, the defendant city sought a new trial on the ground that 
the trial judge erroneously failed to instruct the jury that the city was 
required only to make the streets safe for "ordinary travel" and that "ordinary 
travel" did not include bicycle riding. This court concluded that the trial 
judge acted properly in refusing the city's instructions. From Molway 
the plaintiff would derive the principle that bicyclists are intended users of 
Illinois roads and highways.
We do not find Molway persuasive in the present 
context. As an initial matter, we must observe that the decision in that case 
predates by many years the enactment of the Tort Immunity Act, and the 
Molway court therefore was not required to consider whether that 
plaintiff was an intended and permitted user of the street in question. 
Moreover, the accident in Molway occurred in 1905, long before 
motorized vehicles became the predominant users of Illinois streets and 
highways. The opinion's numerous references to conveyances such as horse-drawn 
wagons and carriages illustrate the vast gulf that separates that case from the 
present one. Molway, 239 Ill.  at 490 ("An asphalt pavement, even when 
level, is practically impassable for a horse ordinarily shod when the pavement 
is covered with a slight coating of ice or sleet, and yet a cyclist, on account 
of his rubber-tired vehicle, can pass over it readily"). In Sisk this 
court also found Molway inapplicable, explaining:
"The plaintiff cites Molway [citation] in support 
of his contention that he was an intended user. In Molway the court 
found that the City of Chicago owed a duty of reasonable care to persons riding 
bicycles on city streets. However, Molway was decided over 50 years 
before the [Tort Immunity Act] was enacted, and at a time when streets were 
being constructed for pedestrians, equestrians and horse-drawn vehicles, and 
when automobiles were just beginning to appear. Consequently, we do not feel 
Molway is applicable to the case at bar." Sisk, 167 Ill. 2d  at 
350-51.
For similar reasons, we do not find Molway 
controlling here. See also Wojdyla, 148 Ill. 2d  at 423-24.
The plaintiff also contends that the appellate court's 
result in this case conflicts with the decisions of the appellate court in 
Filipetto v. Village of Wilmette, 254 Ill. App. 3d 461 (1993), and 
Bauer v. H.H. Hall Construction Co., 140 Ill. App. 3d 1025 (1986). 
Though we are not bound by decisions of the appellate court, we note that the 
cases cited by the plaintiff are distinguishable from the present one, and 
therefore we do not discern the same conflict perceived by the plaintiff. The 
plaintiff in Filipetto, a bicycle rider, was injured when he struck a 
compressor that was located in a lane of the street in which he was riding his 
bicycle. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The appellate 
court discussed section 3-102(a) of the Tort Immunity Act, but did not address 
the plaintiff's status as an intended and permitted user. Bauer, also 
cited by the plaintiff, involved a collision between a bicyclist and a highway 
barricade. The action in that case was brought under a different statute, the 
Road Construction Injuries Act, and no question arose regarding the plaintiff's 
classification as an intended and permitted user under section 3-102(a) of the 
Tort Immunity Act.
Amici also invoke a number of policy considerations 
in support of the imposition of liability in this case. They argue that granting 
the defendants immunity would only serve to create a powerful disincentive to 
the continual upgrading and improvement of bicycle routes in the state. They 
note that the Illinois Department of Transportation has directed that bicycle 
safety concerns should be considered when improvements to roads are made. We 
believe that these questions of public policy, however, are better resolved by 
the legislative branch of government than by the judicial branch.
Indeed, the potential implications of such a shift in policy 
are substantial and far-reaching, and we do not believe that the legislature 
intended to impose liability in these circumstances. Simply put, many road 
conditions that do not pose hazards to vehicles may represent special dangers to 
bicycles, and imposition of liability in this case would, we believe, open the 
door to liability for a broad range of pavement conditions, such as potholes, 
speed bumps, expansion joints, sewer grates, and rocks and gravel, to name but a 
few. By the same token, we believe that imposition of municipal liability in the 
circumstances shown here is more appropriate for the legislature to initiate, if 
it is to be done at all. In this regard, it is appropriate to consider the 
potentially enormous costs both of imposing liability for road defects that 
might injure bicycle riders and of upgrading road conditions to meet the special 
requirements of bicyclists. Vaughn, 166 Ill. 2d  at 164 ("The costs of 
making all public streets and roadways reasonably safe for unrestricted 
pedestrian use would be an extreme burden on municipalities with limited 
resources"); see also Sisk, 167 Ill. 2d  at 352.
In sum, there are no affirmative manifestations here that 
Wayne Township intended-rather than simply permitted-bicyclists to use the road 
and bridge where the accident occurred. We have no quarrel with the proposition 
that bicycle riders are permitted users of the road and bridge involved in this 
case; we do not believe, however, that they must also be considered intended 
users of those facilities, within the scope of section 3-102(a) of the Tort 
Immunity Act. There is no question of fact on this record, and summary judgment 
was appropriately entered in favor of the defendants.
Before this court, the plaintiff briefly raises the 
additional argument that liability may be found under count III of his third 
amended complaint. Count III seeks recovery under section 11-304 of the Vehicle 
Code (625 ILCS 5/11-304 (West 1996)) for the defendants' failure to properly 
post warning signs at the bridge while the renovation project was 
underway.
Our cases have found immunity under section 3-104 of the 
Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/3-104 (West 1996)) for the initial failure to 
provide specific warning devices. Snyder v. Curran Township, 167 Ill. 2d 466 (1995); West v. Kirkham, 147 Ill. 2d 1 (1992). The plaintiff 
contends, however, that trucks parked on the roadway in front of the bridge by 
the construction crew during the workday represented barricades, and that the 
defendants negligently failed to maintain them there after the crew finished 
working and left. Without determining here whether trucks may constitute 
barricades for purposes of section 3-104 of the Tort Immunity Act, we must 
reject this additional basis for recovery. As the appellate court noted and the 
defendants contend, the plaintiff has attempted to introduce a new theory in 
support of liability under this count, for he failed to make the same allegation 
in his third amended complaint. 291 Ill. App. 3d at 725-26. The plaintiff cannot 
now attempt to introduce this new element into the case. Haudrich v. 
Howmedica, Inc., 169 Ill. 2d 525, 536 (1996).
Given our result here, we have no occasion to address the 
defendants' alternative contention that the action is barred by the statute of 
limitations.
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the appellate court, 
affirming the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County, is 
affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
JUSTICE HEIPLE, dissenting:
The majority holds that bicyclists are not intended users of 
roadways. I respectfully dissent from this absurd and dangerous 
proposition.
On September 8, 1992, plaintiff Jon Boub was riding his bike 
along St. Charles Road in Wayne Township. Unbeknown to plaintiff, the Township 
was in the process of resurfacing a bridge over which the road passes. As part 
of this construction project, the Township had removed sections of asphalt 
between wooden planks on the surface of the bridge, leaving empty spaces between 
the planks. As plaintiff rode over the bridge, the front wheel of his bike 
suddenly became stuck in one of these spaces, causing the rear of the bike to 
spring into the air. As a result, plaintiff was thrown off the bike and into the 
bridge's steel railing and support structure, suffering severe 
injuries.
A local public entity has a duty to maintain its roads in a 
safe condition for the roads' intended users. 745 ILCS 10/3-102 (West 1992). The 
majority's conclusion that bicyclists are not intended users of roads defies 
common sense, contravenes statutory authority, and frustrates public 
policy.
Both motorists and bicyclists commonly recognize that, in 
the absence of a designated corridor for bike riding, bikes are intended to 
share the road with automobiles. Even schoolchildren are taught to ride their 
bikes on the right side of the road, to obey all traffic laws, and to use 
appropriate signals to communicate with motorists. The majority's assertion that 
bicyclists are not intended users of roadways therefore contradicts the 
experience, understanding and training of reasonable people.
Numerous statutes and regulations validate this common 
perception that bicyclists are intended to use public roads. First, the Illinois 
Vehicle Code provides that bicyclists "shall be granted all of the rights and 
shall be subject to all of the duties applicable to the driver of a vehicle." 
625 ILCS 5/11-1502 (West 1992). The Vehicle Code then proceeds to specify the 
areas and manner in which bicyclists are required to ride on roadways. 625 ILCS 
5/11-1503 through 11-1514 (West 1992). Second, the State of Illinois has 
officially adopted a policy requiring that the "safe accommodation" of 
bicyclists "be given full consideration during the development of highway 
projects." Illinois Department of Transportation Memorandum §2.00 (August 1, 
1995). Third, local governments frequently designate particular roads as bicycle 
routes, and in fact, the road on which plaintiff in the instant case was injured 
had been so designated by Du Page County. All of the above provisions 
demonstrate that roadways in the State of Illinois are intended to be used by 
bicyclists.
The majority attempts to dismiss these statutory and 
regulatory provisions by arguing that they do not demonstrate the intent of 
Wayne Township, the defendant in the instant case. The cited provisions are, 
however, applicable to roads within the Township. The Township fails to cite any 
evidence indicating that, prior to plaintiff's accident, it objected to the 
policy embodied in these provisions, or in any way attempted to communicate to 
bicyclists that it did not intend for them to use its roads.
The majority also counters the cited provisions with 
statutory definitions establishing that the primary purpose of Illinois highways 
is to facilitate travel by motorized vehicles. There can be no argument with 
this elementary observation. Far more automobiles than bicycles are in regular 
use, and highways are constructed primarily to meet the needs of motorists. This 
fact, however, does not in any way disprove that bicyclists are also intended to 
use public roads. The two propositions are not mutually exclusive. Roads are 
intended to be used primarily by automobiles, but also by 
bicycles.
Finally, the majority's holding is both irrational and 
dangerous as a principle of public policy. The accident which befell plaintiff 
in this case could just as easily have befallen a motorcyclist, but under the 
majority's standard, the latter could recover while the former cannot. There is 
no rational basis for this distinction. Furthermore, under the majority's 
standard, even a road condition which is dangerous to automobiles would not be 
sufficient to create a legal duty to the instant plaintiff. For example, if the 
construction crew had removed the entire bridge without closing off the area to 
traffic, a motorist whose car crashed into the abyss could maintain a suit 
against the Township, while plaintiff, after suffering the same fate on his 
bicycle, could not. This conclusion was conceded by defendant's counsel at oral 
argument. See also Bauer v. H.H. Hall Construction Co., 140 Ill. App. 
3d 1025, 1030 (1986) (noting anomaly of allowing a motorist to bring an action 
for injuries sustained in an accident while precluding a bicyclist from bringing 
an action for the same type of accident). 
Besides depriving injured bicyclists of just compensation 
for their injuries, the principal effect of the majority decision will be to 
discourage municipalities from taking any measures to make roads safer and more 
hospitable for bicyclists. Because the majority precludes liability whenever the 
municipality in question does not intend for bicyclists to use its roads, a 
loss-averse municipality, in order to minimize its exposure to liability, might 
remove from its roads any evidence that bicyclists are intended users, such as 
bike lanes or special signs. Bicyclists would then be in even more jeopardy than 
that occasioned by today's decision. Given the majority's ruling, the only safe 
bicycle in Illinois is a stationary exercise bike located in one's home or at 
the gym.
JUSTICES HARRISON and NICKELS join in this 
dissent.