Title: Cole v. Cole Tomato Sales, Inc.
Citation: 310 So. 2d 210
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: March 27, 1975

310 So. 2d 210 (1975)
In re Docia Earline COLE, as Administratrix of the Estate of C. F. Cole, Jr.
v.
COLE TOMATO SALES, INC., et al. Ex parte COLE TOMATO SALES, INC., et al.
SC 1023.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
March 13, 1975.
As Modified on Denial of Rehearing March 27, 1975.
Rehearing Denied April 10, 1975.
Fred Blanton, Birmingham, for petitioners.
Izas Bahakel, Birmingham, for respondent, Circuit Judge William C. Barber.
PER CURIAM.
This is an original petition for mandamus which seeks to have this Court order Circuit Judge William Barber to modify or rescind his order compelling the petitioners to produce certain documents. This Court granted a rule nisi. The trial judge has answered, and oral arguments have been heard. We now deny the petition for a peremptory writ of mandamus.
Briefly stated, the facts are as follows: Docia Earline Cole, as administratrix of *211 the estate of her late husband, C. F. Cole, Jr., filed an action on 5 August 1974, in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, in which she alleged that her late husband died on 22 June 1973, and that at the time of his death, he was an officer, director and stockholder (29% of the capital stock) of a corporation known as Cole Tomato Sales, Inc. She alleged, upon information and belief, that C. F. Cole, Sr. Produce, Inc. was merged with Cole Tomato Sales, Inc., and were being operated as one corporate entity. She also claimed her late husband was entitled to $5,000 as compensation at the time of his death and that this sum had not been paid. She also alleged as follows:
The administratrix asked the court to determine the profits of the corporation, that an accounting be made to determine what her late husband was entitled to receive as profits or dividends. She also asked that a receiver be appointed to run the business until it could be dissolved and the assets distributed as provided by law.
Motions to dismiss the complaint were filed by C. F. Cole, Sr. Produce Company, Inc. and Cole Tomato Sales, Inc. and James Cole. The court denied each motion to dismiss.
On 17 October 1974, the administratrix had filed a motion to require the production of documents under Rule 34, ARCP. The items requested were as follows:
Defendants' counsel advised them not to respond to the motion to produce, and the trial court, on 1 November, 1974, entered an order compelling production of the documents within one week. Defendants filed this original petition for mandamus on 5 November 1974, and claims that the order permits discovery outside the scope of Rule *212 26(b), ARCP, that it permits an invasion of the privacy of James Cole and his wife, and that James Cole's wife is not a party to the action. Both James Cole and his wife allege that to permit the discovery will cause them immediate and irreparable injury. This Court issued a rule nisi.
Judge William Barber answered the rule nisi and says that there was no request made by the petitioners for a protective order under Rule 26(c), ARCP, to limit or prohibit discovery, and defendants should not be permitted to raise for the first time, by petition for writ of mandamus, matters which might have been, but were not raised in the Circuit Court. Regarding the complaint that Mrs. James Cole was not a party to the action, Judge Barber said:
The whole concept of our new procedural rules is that they will secure "the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action." Rule 1, ARCP.
Petitioner's counsel, during oral argument, stated that the administratrix had not built a pier (stated a cause of action) in order to begin fishing (discovery). The mandate of Rule 1 that we construe all the rules to "secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action" is probably the most important mandate in the rules.
As was said in Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181, 83 S. Ct. 227, 230, 9 L. Ed. 2d 222, 225-6 (1962):
The discovery rules must be broadly and liberally construed. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 S. Ct. 385, 91 L. Ed. 451 (1947).
Rule 26(c) provides the efficient procedural device for limiting or prohibiting discovery. The petitioners did not avail themselves of it. Consequently, we deny their request for the extraordinary relief of mandamus.
Peremptory writ of mandamus denied.
HEFLIN, C. J., and MERRILL, MADDOX, JONES and SHORES, JJ., concur.
PER CURIAM.
Petitioners for the first time on application for rehearing raise the point that the original request filed by the plaintiff for production asked the defendant "to respond within 14 days."
In brief, on application for rehearing, petitioners claim:
Stated succinctly, petitioners for the first time argue that Rule 34(b) allows a party upon whom a request is served 30 days within which to serve a response, and that the motion to produce which the plaintiff filed in this case requested the defendant to respond within 14 days. We cannot sanction the practice of bringing up new questions for the first time in applications for rehearing. Kirkland v. Kirkland, 281 Ala. 42, 198 So. 2d 771 (1967).
We set forth some of the basic facts to show that the Court is of the opinion that this point was not previously raised. Plaintiff filed a request for the production of documents under Rule 34 on October 1, 1974. Plaintiff requested the defendant "to respond within 14 days." We do not know when counsel for the petitioners informed the plaintiff that her request would not be honored, but we quote from the original petition for mandamus and from the original brief of counsel for the petitioners to show that the request would not be honored.
Paragraph 5 of the original petition for mandamus reads:
In a brief filed on original submission, counsel stated:
We understood that petitioners' original argument before submission was that the complaint in this cause failed to state a cause of action; therefore, no discovery was appropriate. Petitioners never claimed in their petition, in brief, or on oral argument that they had 30 days within which to make a written response. Insofar as we are advised, no objection was made in the trial court or in this Court previously that the request for production shortened the time within which the defendant could respond. The record shows that even if we assume that the point was raised generally by petitioners' original petition in this Court, no written response was filed within the 30 day period. Therefore, the question is moot.
Since the original request for production by plaintiff was made pursuant to Rule 34, we will extend our original opinion to discuss the underlying policy of the rule, and to show further that petitioners should have served a written response to the original request.
*214 Rule 34 is designed to operate insofar as possible without court intervention. In providing that documents shall be sought by request rather than by motion and that a written response must be served setting forth the reasons for any objections, the rule contemplates that in most instances details of production can be worked out among the lawyers without recourse to the court. Moore's Federal Practice, Vol. 4A, § 34.05[3]. As stated in Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Vol. 8, § 2213, p. 639:
The record shows that the petitioners neither served a written response to the request within 30 days nor applied for a protective order.
On March 19, 1975, petitioners' counsel filed a motion to strike the order and judgment entered on March 13, 1975, because a majority of the Court had not taken part in the decision. The official endorsement on the transcript of the record shows, and the Court judicially knows that a majority of this Court, in conference assembled, did take part in the decision. The motion to strike is overruled and denied.
The original opinion is modified, corrected, and extended and the application for rehearing is overruled and denied.
Original opinion modified, corrected and extended. Application for rehearing overruled and denied.
HEFLIN, C. J., and MERRILL, MADDOX, JONES and SHORES, JJ., concur.