Title: Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 89492
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: August 16, 2001

Docket No. 89492-Agenda 17-March 2001.
REX R. SPRIETSMA, Adm'r of the Estate of Jeanne Sprietsma, 
Deceased, Appellant, v. MERCURY MARINE, a Division of 
Brunswick Corporation, Appellee.
Opinion filed August 16, 2001.

	JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court: 
	The issue in this case is whether the Federal Boat Safety Act
of 1971 (FBSA) (46 U.S.C. §4301 et seq. (1994)) preempts state
common law causes of action based on the manufacturer's failure
to install propeller guards on boat engines. In July 1995, while
boating in Tennessee, plaintiff's decedent, Jeanne Sprietsma, fell
from a motor boat and was struck by the motor's propeller blades.
As a result, she suffered serious injuries that resulted in her death.
The boat was equipped with a 115-horsepower outboard motor,
which did not contain a propeller guard. The motor was designed,
manufactured, and sold by Mercury Marine.
	The decedent's husband, Rex Sprietsma, filed a wrongful-death action against, among others, Mercury Marine, seeking to
recover damages for decedent's pain and suffering along with the
pecuniary loss suffered by himself and his son. Mercury Marine
filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of
Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 1998)) on the grounds
that Sprietsma's claims were expressly preempted by the language
of the FBSA's preemption clause and were also impliedly
preempted. The circuit court of Cook County granted Mercury
Marine's motion to dismiss, finding the claims to be impliedly
preempted. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the common
law claims for failure to install propeller guards were expressly
preempted. 312 Ill. App. 3d 1040. We granted Sprietsma's petition
for leave to appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 315 (177 Ill.
2d R. 315). As this case is an appeal from a section 2-619 motion
to dismiss, our review is de novo. Carver v. Nall, 186 Ill. 2d 554,
557 (1999).


A. The Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971 and the Coast Guard's
Decision Regarding Propeller Guards
	Congress enacted the FBSA "to improve boating safety by
requiring manufacturers to provide safer boats and boating
equipment to the public through compliance with safety standards
to be promulgated by the Secretary of the Department in which the
Coast Guard is operating-presently the Secretary of
Transportation." S. Rep. No. 92-248 (1971), reprinted in 1971
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1333. Due to an increase in the number of boat-related accidents and fatalities, Congress enacted the FBSA to
establish "a coordinated national boating safety program." S. Rep.
No. 92-248 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1331, 1334-35. To implement this goal, the FBSA authorized the Secretary of
Transportation (Secretary) to prescribe regulations necessary to
establish minimum safety standards for recreational boats. 46
U.S.C. §4302(a) (1994). The Secretary may delegate regulatory
functions to an organization or agency under his supervision (46
U.S.C. §4303(a) (1994)) and, in fact, has delegated the regulatory
authority to the Commandant of the United States Coast Guard (49
C.F.R. §1.46(n)(1) (1999)). Before issuing a regulation, the Coast
Guard must consult with the National Boating Safety Advisory
Council (Advisory Council) to consider the need for a regulation
and the extent to which the regulations will contribute to
recreational boating safety. 46 U.S.C. §4302(c)(1) through (c)(4)
(1994).
	In 1988, the Coast Guard considered whether to require
manufacturers to install propeller guards on their boat motors. The
Coast Guard directed the Advisory Council to review the available
data on prevention of propeller-strike accidents and to assess the
feasibility and potential safety advantages and disadvantages of
propeller guards. The Advisory Council appointed a Propeller
Guard Subcommittee (Subcommittee) to review and analyze the
data and to consider whether the Coast Guard should move toward
a federal propeller guard requirement. National Boating Safety
Advisory Council, Report of the Propeller Guard Subcommittee,
November 7, 1989, at Appendix A.
	After studying the issue and conducting public hearings, the
Subcommittee unanimously recommended that the "Coast Guard
should take no regulatory action to require propeller guards."
Report of the Propeller Guard Subcommittee, at 24. The
Subcommittee made this recommendation after finding that
propeller guards could create other safety concerns, including: (1)
adversely affecting boat operations at speeds greater than 10 miles
per hour; (2) increasing the chance of blunt force contact to a
person in the water; and (3) creating a new hazard in that an arm
or leg could be caught between the guard and the propeller blades.
Report of the Propeller Guard Subcommittee, at 19-21.
	The Subcommittee's report was presented to the Advisory
Council, which accepted and adopted the recommendations.
Minutes of the 44th Meeting of the National Boating Safety
Advisory Council 19 (November 6-7, 1989). The report and
recommendations were then sent to the Coast Guard, which
adopted the Advisory Council's recommendations, including its
recommendation that no regulatory action should be taken to
require propeller guards because "[a]vailable propeller guard
accident data [does] not support imposition of a regulation
requiring propeller guards on motorboats." Letter from Robert T.
Nelson, Rear Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard, Chief, Office of
Navigation Safety and Waterway Services, to A. Newell Garden,
Chairman, National Boating Safety Advisory Council (February 1,
1990).



B. Federal Preemption
	Pursuant to the supremacy clause of article VI of the United
States Constitution, the laws of the United States "shall be the
supreme Law of the Land *** any thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. Const.,
art. VI, cl. 2. Thus, state law is without effect if it conflicts with
federal law. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516,
120 L. Ed. 2d 407, 422, 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2617 (1992).
Consideration of issues arising under the supremacy clause begins
with the assumption that the historic state police powers are not to
be superseded by federal law unless that is the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress. Cipollone, 505 U.S.  at 516, 120 L. Ed. 2d  at
422, 112 S. Ct.  at 2617. Thus, the ultimate question in any
preemption analysis is to determine the intent of Congress.
Cipollone, 505 U.S.  at 516, 120 L. Ed. 2d  at 422, 112 S. Ct.  at
2617.
	Federal law can preempt state law under the supremacy clause
in three circumstances: (1) where Congress has expressly
preempted state action (express preemption); (2) where Congress
has implemented a comprehensive regulatory scheme in an area,
thus removing the entire field from state realm (implied field
preemption); or (3) where state action actually conflicts with
federal law (implied conflict preemption). Cipollone, 505 U.S.  at
516, 120 L. Ed. 2d  at 422-23, 112 S. Ct.  at 2617; English v.
General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79, 110 L. Ed. 2d 65, 74,
110 S. Ct. 2270, 2275 (1990). Our focus in this case will deal with
express and implied conflict preemption.
	The parties dispute whether our analysis should begin with a
presumption that federal law does not preempt Sprietsma's
common law tort claims against Mercury Marine. Sprietsma
contends that there is a strong presumption against preemption
here because federal preemption would displace state police
powers that protect the health and safety of its citizens.
Conversely, Mercury Marine argues that this case does not involve
the historic police powers of the state but derives from federal
maritime jurisdiction.
	The United States Supreme Court has stated that "an
'assumption' of nonpre-emption is not triggered when the State
regulates in an area where there has been a history of significant
federal presence." United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108, 146 L. Ed. 2d 69, 88, 120 S. Ct. 1135, 1147 (2000). However, an
assumption of nonpreemption is triggered when the state regulates
health and safety matters which have traditionally come within the
jurisdiction of the state through its police powers. Medtronic, Inc.
v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 474, 135 L. Ed. 2d 700, 709, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2245 (1996). We recognize that Sprietsma's claim that
Mercury Marine designed a defective motor by failing to install a
propeller guard relates to health and safety concerns. However, the
claim also encompasses maritime activity, which is traditionally
within the realm of federal regulation. Southern Pacific Co. v.
Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215, 61 L. Ed. 1086, 1098, 37 S. Ct. 524,
528 (1917) ("Congress has paramount power to fix and determine
the maritime law which shall prevail throughout the country");
Lady v. Neal Glaser Marine, Inc., 228 F.3d 598, 607 (5th Cir.
2000).
	Section 4301(a) states that the FBSA and its regulations apply
"to a recreational vessel and associated equipment carried in the
vessel on waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
and, for a vessel owned in the United States, on the high seas." 46
U.S.C. §4301(a) (1994). Furthermore, the FBSA's "[g]eneral
jurisdictional applicability is to vessels within the historic federal
maritime jurisdiction." S. Rep. No. 92-248 (1971), reprinted in
1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1333, 1338. In deciding whether the claims in
this case relate to federal maritime activity, we note that the
United States Supreme Court has held that a collision between two
pleasure boats on navigable waters had a sufficient nexus to
traditional maritime activity to come within the admiralty
jurisdiction of the federal courts. Foremost Insurance Co. v.
Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 674, 73 L. Ed. 2d 300, 306, 102 S. Ct. 2654, 2658 (1982). Thus, Sprietsma's claims bear upon an area
historically regulated by the federal government. When "state laws
*** bear upon national and international maritime commerce, ***
there is no beginning assumption that concurrent regulation by the
State is a valid exercise of its police powers." Locke, 529 U.S.  at
108, 146 L. Ed. 2d  at 88-89, 120 S. Ct.  at 1148. Although
Sprietsma's claims bear upon state and federal concerns, we
believe the federal concerns predominate in this case. Therefore,
in deciding whether Sprietsma's claims are preempted by the
FBSA, we will not apply a presumption against preemption.
	In addition, as we address the preemption issue, we will look
to the decisions of federal district and circuit courts. Although we
have stated in the past that the decisions of federal courts
interpreting a federal statute are controlling on Illinois courts (see
Busch v. Graphic Color Corp., 169 Ill. 2d 325, 335 (1996)), this
overstates the degree of deference this court must pay to federal
decisions. Thus, in Wilson v. Norfolk &amp; Western Ry. Co., 187 Ill. 2d 369, 381 (1999), we elected to follow the precedent of the
Seventh Circuit with regard to its interpretation of the Federal
Employer's Liability Act (FELA) (45 U.S.C. §51 et seq. (1994)),
because we found the Seventh Circuit analysis to be "reasonable
and logical." More recently, however, we declined to follow
Seventh Circuit precedent in a case involving a preemption issue
under FELA when there was a split of authority among the federal
circuits and we believed the Seventh Circuit case was wrongly
decided. See Weiland v. Tectronics Pacing Systems, Inc., 188 Ill. 2d 415, 423 (1999).
	Nevertheless, as we have repeatedly recognized, uniformity
of decision is an important consideration when state courts
interpret federal statutes. See Weiland, 188 Ill. 2d  at 422; Wilson,
187 Ill. 2d  at 383; Busch, 169 Ill. 2d  at 335. Uniformity is
particularly important where, as here, the federal statute relates to
a product that is inherently mobile and thus likely to move from
state to state. Indeed, this suit was brought to recover damages in
an Illinois court, under Illinois law, for a death that took place in
Tennessee. Boats also frequently navigate in lakes or rivers that
mark the boundary between two states. Thus, it is essential that a
uniform body of law be developed. In the absence of a decision of
the United States Supreme Court, which would definitively answer
the question presented by this case, we elect to give considerable
weight to the decisions of federal courts of appeals and federal
district courts that have addressed this issue.



C. Express Preemption
	Keeping in mind the preceding preemption principles, we first
address whether the FBSA expressly preempts Sprietsma's
common law tort claims against Mercury Marine. Because
Congress has demonstrated its intent to preempt some aspects of
state law under section 4306 (46 U.S.C. §4306 (1994)), we must
determine the scope of preemption under that provision by
focusing on its text. See CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood,
507 U.S. 658, 664, 123 L. Ed. 2d 387, 396, 113 S. Ct. 1732, 1737
(1993) ("If the statute contains an express pre-emption clause, the
task of statutory construction must in the first instance focus on
the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the
best evidence of Congress' pre-emptive intent"). 
	Section 4306 states:
			"Unless permitted by the Secretary under section 4305
of this title, a State or political subdivision of a State may
not establish, continue in effect, or enforce a law or
regulation establishing a recreational vessel or associated
equipment performance or other safety standard or
imposing a requirement for associated equipment (except
insofar as the State or political subdivision may, in the
absence of the Secretary's disapproval, regulate the
carrying or use of marine safety articles to meet uniquely
hazardous conditions or circumstances within the State)
that is not identical to a regulation prescribed under
section 4302 of this title." 46 U.S.C. §4306 (1994).
Section 4306 preempts state laws or regulations that are not
identical to the regulations promulgated under the FBSA.
Although the FBSA does not define "law or regulation," the
phrase clearly indicates an intent to include common law claims.
Cipollone, 505 U.S.  at 522, 120 L. Ed. 2d  at 426, 112 S. Ct.  at
2620 (state law includes common law as well as statutes and
regulations); Lewis v. Brunswick Corp., 107 F.3d 1494, 1501 (11th
Cir. 1997) (language demonstrates intent to include common law
claims); Farner, 239 Ill. App. 3d at 891. We also note that both
state and federal courts have held that the preemption provision of
the FBSA expressly preempts common law tort claims. See, e.g.,
Carstensen v. Brunswick Corp., 49 F.3d 430, 433 (8th Cir. 1995);
Moss v. Outboard Marine Corp., 915 F. Supp. 183, 186 (E.D. Cal.
1996); Shield v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 822 F. Supp. 81, 84 (D.
Conn. 1993); Mowery v. Mercury Marine, 773 F. Supp. 1012,
1017 (N.D. Ohio 1991); Farner v. Brunswick Corp., 239 Ill. App.
3d 885, 891-92 (1992); Ryan v. Brunswick Corp., 454 Mich. 20,
39, 557 N.W.2d 541, 551 (1997).
	However, we must examine section 4306 in conjunction with
the FBSA's savings clause provision of section 4311(g) (46 U.S.C.
§4311(g) (1994)), which states: "[c]ompliance with this chapter or
standards, regulations, or orders prescribed under this chapter does
not relieve a person from liability at common law or under State
law." 46 U.S.C. §4311(g) (1994). Although section 4306, the
preemption provision, evinces Congress' intent to expressly
preempt state laws or regulations not identical to those
promulgated in the FBSA, this provision prevents us from finding
express preemption.
	The United States Supreme Court in Geier v. American
Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 868, 146 L. Ed. 2d 914, 923, 120 S. Ct. 1913, 1918 (2000), stated that the inclusion of a savings
clause prohibits a broad reading of the express preemption
provision. The Court noted that the presence of a savings clause
"assumes that there are some significant number of common-law
liability cases to save." Geier, 529 U.S.  at 868, 146 L. Ed. 2d  at
923, 120 S. Ct.  at 1918. We agree that section 4311 limits section
4306. Consequently, we find no express preemption. See Lady,
228 F.3d  at 611 (unable to conclude that section 4306 expressly
preempted common law tort action); Lewis, 107 F.3d  at 1502
(express terms of FBSA fail to show Congress' intent to preempt
common law claims).



D. Implied Conflict Preemption
	Although we find Sprietsma's action not to be expressly
preempted by the FBSA, we are not prohibited from finding
implied preemption. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee,
531 U.S. 341, ___, 148 L. Ed. 2d 854, 863-64, 121 S. Ct. 1012,
1019 (2001) ("[N]either an express pre-emption provision nor a
savings clause 'bar[s] the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption
principles' "), quoting Geier, 529 U.S.  at 869, 146 L. Ed. 2d  at
924, 120 S. Ct.  at 1919; Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 288, 131 L. Ed. 2d 385, 393, 115 S. Ct. 1483, 1488 (1995)
(the inclusion of an express preemption provision "does not mean
that the express clause entirely forecloses any possibility of
implied pre-emption").
	The United States Supreme Court has found implied conflict
preemption where it is "impossible for a private party to comply
with both state and federal requirements" (English, 496 U.S.  at 79,
110 L. Ed. 2d  at 74, 110 S. Ct. at 2275), or where state law "stands
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress" (Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67-68, 85 L. Ed. 581, 587, 61 S. Ct. 399, 404 (1941); see
also Freightliner, 514 U.S.  at 287, 131 L. Ed. 2d  at 392, 115 S. Ct.
at 1487). Since it is not impossible for a manufacturer to comply
with a state common law rule requiring propeller guards and the
Coast Guard's decision not to require them, we will address
whether a state common law tort claim based on failure to install
the guards stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the
purposes and objectives Congress sought to achieve in enacting
the FBSA.
	Initially, Sprietsma maintains that the Supreme Court's
decision in Freightliner precludes a finding of implied preemption
in this case. In Freightliner, the Supreme Court considered
whether common law claims based on the failure to install antilock
brakes on 18-wheel tractor-trailers were expressly or impliedly
preempted by the preemption clause of the Vehicle Safety Act.
Freightliner, 514 U.S.  at 282, 131 L. Ed. 2d  at 389, 115 S. Ct.  at
1485. The defendant tractor-trailer manufacturers argued that the
failure-to-install claims were preempted because the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) had indicated its
intent to regulate braking systems by issuing a regulation on the
matter. Freightliner, 514 U.S.  at 284-86, 131 L. Ed. 2d  at 390-91,
115 S. Ct.  at 1486-87. That regulation was struck down by the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, but the defendant
manufacturers argued it still had preemptive effect because it
showed the NHTSA's intent to forbid state regulation of braking
systems. Freightliner, 514 U.S.  at 286, 131 L. Ed. 2d  at 391-92,
115 S. Ct.  at 1487.
	The Supreme Court rejected the manufacturers' argument,
stating that there was no federal standard on stopping distances or
vehicle stability for trucks or trailers, and there was "no evidence
that NHTSA decided that trucks and trailers should be free from
all state regulation of stopping distances and vehicle stability."
Freightliner, 514 U.S.  at 286, 131 L. Ed. 2d  at 392, 115 S. Ct.  at
1487. The Court stated that "the lack of federal regulation did not
result from an affirmative decision of agency officials to refrain
from regulating air brakes." Freightliner, 514 U.S.  at 286, 131 L. Ed. 2d  at 392, 115 S. Ct.  at 1487. Thus, states could implement
safety standards and, without any federal standards, a liability
claim would not be in conflict with or frustrate the objectives of
Congress. Freightliner, 514 U.S.  at 289, 131 L. Ed. 2d  at 394, 115 S. Ct.  at 1488.
	In contrast to Freightliner, where the lack of federal
regulation was not the result of an affirmative decision not to
regulate, here, the Coast Guard did make an affirmative decision
to refrain from promulgating a propeller guard requirement. See
Lady, 228 F.3d  at 612 ("the lack of a regulation mandating
propeller guards on recreational boats came after the Coast Guard
studied the matter and affirmatively determined that requiring
propeller guards was substantively inappropriate"); Lewis, 107 F.3d  at 1504 ("[w]hile an absence of regulation under the Vehicle
Safety Act does not prevent states from regulating motor vehicle
safety standards, an absence of federal regulation under the FBSA
means that no regulation, state or federal, is appropriate[;]
Freightliner is distinguishable for that reason"). As we agree with
the federal decisions in Lady and Lewis, the ruling in Freightliner
does not preclude a finding of implied preemption in this case.
	 In Geier, the Supreme Court determined whether Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 (Safety Standard 208)
preempted a common law tort action based on the failure to install
a driver's side airbag. The Department of Transportation stated
that the purpose of Safety Standard 208 was to provide auto
manufacturers with a choice of whether or not to install airbags
with a gradual phase-in of passive restraint devices. Geier, 529 U.S.  at 878-79, 146 L. Ed. 2d  at 930, 120 S. Ct.  at 1924. Under an
implied conflict preemption analysis, the Court stated that Geier's
tort action depended upon her claim that auto manufacturers had
a duty to install an airbag in her car when it was made. Geier, 529 U.S.  at 881, 146 L. Ed. 2d  at 931-32, 120 S. Ct.  at 1925. This
alleged duty would have required other auto manufacturers to
install airbags in similar cars rather than other safety restraint
systems, such as automatic seatbelts or passive interiors. Geier,
529 U.S.  at 881, 146 L. Ed. 2d  at 932, 120 S. Ct.  at 1925. This
claim "would have presented an obstacle to the variety and mix of
devices that the federal regulation sought *** [and] also would
have stood as an obstacle to the gradual passive restraint phase-in
that the federal regulation deliberately imposed." Geier, 529 U.S. 
at 881, 146 L. Ed. 2d  at 932, 120 S. Ct.  at 1925. The Court thus
concluded that Safety Standard 208 preempted Geier's tort claim
because of the obstacle it presented to the accomplishment of
federal objectives. Geier, 529 U.S.  at 881, 146 L. Ed. 2d  at 932,
120 S. Ct.  at 1925.
	Mercury Marine maintains that we should apply Geier's
ruling that Safety Standard 208 preempted conflicting state laws
to this case in order to preempt Sprietsma's tort claim. Sprietsma,
on the other hand, argues that there is no regulation by the Coast
Guard with which his claim could conflict, only a decision not to
prescribe a standard. According to Sprietsma, the absence of a
regulation does not in itself constitute a regulation. See
Freightliner, 514 U.S.  at 286, 131 L. Ed. 2d  at 392, 115 S. Ct.  at
1487. However, the Supreme Court has stated that "a federal
decision to forgo regulation in a given area may imply an
authoritative federal determination that the area is best left
unregulated, and in that event would have as much pre-emptive
force as a decision to regulate." (Emphases omitted.) Arkansas
Electric Cooperative Corp. v. Arkansas Public Service Comm'n,
461 U.S. 375, 384, 76 L. Ed. 2d 1, 10, 103 S. Ct. 1905, 1912
(1983); see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,
489 U.S. 141, 151-52, 103 L. Ed. 2d 118, 135, 109 S. Ct. 971, 978
(1989). The Supreme Court has also concluded that " 'where [the]
failure of ... federal officials affirmatively to exercise their full
authority takes on the character of a ruling that no such regulation
is appropriate or approved pursuant to the policy of the statute,'
States are not permitted to use their police power to enact such a
regulation." Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 178, 55 L. Ed. 2d 179, 201, 98 S. Ct. 988, 1004-05 (1978), quoting
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board,
330 U.S. 767, 774, 91 L. Ed. 1234, 1246, 67 S. Ct. 1026, 1030
(1947).
	In determining whether the Coast Guard's failure to
promulgate a propeller guard requirement compels the conclusion
that no such regulation is appropriate, we find helpful the Supreme
Court's decision in Ray. In that case, the Supreme Court
considered whether federal law preempted the State of
Washington's enactment of a law regulating standard safety
features and weight of oil tankers navigating Puget Sound. The
Washington "Tanker Law" sought to exclude tankers in excess of
125,000 DWT (dead weight tons) from Puget Sound. Ray, 435 U.S.  at 173, 55 L. Ed. 2d  at 198, 98 S. Ct.  at 1002. Shipbuilders
alleged these requirements were preempted by section 1222(b) of
the federal Ports and Waterways Safety Act (PWSA) which
prohibited states from imposing higher safety standards than those
prescribed by the Transportation Secretary. The Court stated that
enforcement of the state's design requirements "would at least
frustrate *** the evident congressional intention to establish a
uniform federal regime controlling the design of oil tankers." Ray,
435 U.S.  at 165, 55 L. Ed. 2d  at 193, 98 S. Ct.  at 998.
	The Court then looked at the PWSA and the state's exclusion
of vessels in excess of 125,000 DWT. Ray, 435 U.S.  at 173, 55 L. Ed. 2d  at 198, 98 S. Ct.  at 1002. The Court found that section
1222(b) of the PWSA was intended to have a preemptive impact.
Further, even without section 1222(b), it would be reluctant to
uphold the Tanker Law's absolute ban on tankers in excess of
125,000 DWT. Ray, 435 U.S.  at 178, 55 L. Ed. 2d  at 201, 98 S. Ct. 
at 1004. The Court based this conclusion on the Coast Guard's
vessel traffic control system for the Rosario Strait. Ray, 435 U.S. 
at 178, 55 L. Ed. 2d  at 201, 98 S. Ct.  at 1004-05. The
Transportation Secretary, through the Coast Guard, promulgated
the "Puget Sound Vessel Traffic System containing general rules,
communication rules, vessel movement reporting requirements, a
traffic separation scheme, special rules for ship movement in the
Rosario Strait, descriptions and geographic coordinates of the
separation zones and traffic lanes, and a specification for
precautionary areas and reporting points." Ray, 435 U.S.  at 170, 55 L. Ed. 2d  at 196, 98 S. Ct.  at 1001. A local Coast Guard rule
prohibited the passage of more than one 70,000 DWT vessel in
Rosario Strait in either direction at a given time, and in bad
weather, the restriction was reduced to 40,000 DWT. Ray, 435 U.S.  at 171, 55 L. Ed. 2d  at 197, 98 S. Ct.  at 1001.
	The Court stated the question then was whether the
Transportation Secretary, through the Coast Guard, had addressed
the size limitation question. Ray, 435 U.S.  at 174, 55 L. Ed. 2d  at
199, 98 S. Ct.  at 1003. Because of the navigation rules pertaining
to the Rosario Strait, the Court held that the Secretary's failure to
promulgate a ban on the operations of oil tankers in excess of
125,000 DWT took on the character of a ruling that no such
regulation is appropriate pursuant to the policy of the PWSA. Ray,
435 U.S.  at 178, 55 L. Ed. 2d  at 201, 98 S. Ct.  at 1004-05.
	The Supreme Court reaffirmed the framework and holding of
Ray in Locke, 529 U.S.  at 103-04, 146 L. Ed. 2d  at 85-86, 120 S. Ct.  at 1145. There, the Court stated that "Ray defined the relevant
inquiry for *** pre-emption as whether the Coast Guard has
promulgated its own requirement on the subject or has decided
that no such requirement should be imposed at all." Locke, 529 U.S.  at 110, 146 L. Ed. 2d  at 89, 120 S. Ct.  at 1148.
	We believe that the Coast Guard's failure to promulgate a
propeller guard requirement here equates to a ruling that no such
regulation is appropriate pursuant to the policy of the FBSA. The
Coast Guard made an informed decision that no regulatory action
should be taken to require propeller guards after studying the
findings and recommendations of the Advisory Council and the
Propeller Guard Subcommittee. A damage award would, in effect,
create a propeller guard requirement, thus frustrating the
objectives of Congress in promulgating the FBSA. See Lady, 228 F.3d  at 614 (damage award "would effectively require boat
manufacturers to install propeller guards, in direct contravention
to the Coast Guard's policy against mandating such a device in
favor of affording manufactures flexibility in the matter"); Lewis,
107 F.3d  at 1505 (plaintiffs' "product liability claims seek to
impose a propeller guard requirement"). Thus, Sprietsma's claim
would present an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the purposes and objectives Congress sought in enacting the
FBSA.
	We stated earlier that in an effort to give uniform application
to the FBSA, we would give great weight to federal decisions on
this matter. In that regard, we note that several federal district
courts and courts of appeals have found preemption, express or
implied, in similar propeller guard cases. See, e.g., Lady v. Neal
Glaser Marine, Inc., 228 F.3d 598 (5th Cir. 2000); Lewis v.
Brunswick Corp., 107 F.3d 1494 (11th Cir. 1997); Carstensen v.
Brunswick Corp., 49 F.3d 430 (8th Cir. 1995); Moss v. Outboard
Marine Corp., 915 F. Supp. 183 (E.D. Cal. 1996); Davis v.
Brunswick Corp., 854 F. Supp. 1574 (N.D. Ga. 1993); Shield v.
Bayliner Marine Corp., 822 F. Supp. 81 (D. Conn. 1993); Shields
v. Outboard Marine Corp., 776 F. Supp. 1579 (M.D. Ga. 1991);
Mowery v. Mercury Marine, Division of Brunswick Corp., 773 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ohio 1991). 
	The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Lady dealt with a jet ski
operator who was severely injured by the propeller blades of a boat
with which he had collided. Lady, 228 F.3d  at 600. The court of
appeals held that the operator's claims, based on the
manufacturer's failure to install propeller guards on its boat, were
impliedly preempted by the FBSA. Lady, 228 F.3d  at 615. The
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Lewis dealt with a passenger
on a boat who was killed after she fell in the water and was struck
by the propeller blades. Lewis, 107 F.3d  at 1497. The court of
appeals held that her parents' claims, based on the engine's being
defective because it lacked a propeller guard, were impliedly
preempted because they conflicted "with the regulatory uniformity
purpose of the FBSA." Lewis, 107 F.3d  at 1506.
	On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the Solicitor
General in Lewis argued that the Coast Guard's failure to issue a
regulation concerning propeller guards was not a basis for implied
conflict preemption of common law tort claims.(1) Sprietsma argues
that this court should adhere to the argument presented by the
Solicitor General, urging reversal in Lewis. In support of this
contention, Sprietsma points out that in Geier, the Supreme Court
placed "some weight upon DOT's [Department of
Transportation's] interpretation of [Safety Standard] 208's
objectives and its conclusion, as set forth in the Government's
brief." Geier, 529 U.S.  at 883, 146 L. Ed. 2d  at 933, 120 S. Ct.  at
1926. The Court concluded that it had "no reason to suspect that
the Solicitor General's representation of DOT's views reflects
anything other than 'the agency's fair and considered judgment on
the matter.' " Geier, 529 U.S.  at 884, 146 L. Ed. 2d  at 933, 120 S. Ct.  at 1927, quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462, 137 L. Ed. 2d 79, 91, 117 S. Ct. 905, 912 (1997). We do not believe that
Sprietsma's reliance on the United States' position in Lewis
warrants our deference on the matter.
	First, the Solicitor General has not presented his argument
concerning the Lewis case or the Sprietsma claim to this court. See
Lady, 228 F.3d  at 615 n.23 (absent his appearance, Solicitor
General's views on the matter not before the court). Second, the
Court in Geier stated that it would place "some weight" on the
DOT's interpretation. Geier, 529 U.S.  at 883, 146 L. Ed. 2d  at
933, 120 S. Ct.  at 1926. Thus, even if we were to consider the
Solicitor General's argument in Lewis, we do not believe the
weight given to it would overcome the application of our implied
preemption analysis. See Lady, 228 F.3d  at 615 n.23. Third,
arguments made in the Lewis brief have been rejected by the
Supreme Court in Geier. For example, the Solicitor General in the
Lewis brief argued that the existence of the savings clause (section
4311(g)) "makes clear Congress's explicit intent to preserve tort
liability." But the Geier Court found implied preemption in the
presence of the savings clause and rejected the argument that this
clause "bar[red] the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption
principles." Geier, 529 U.S.  at 869, 146 L. Ed. 2d  at 924, 120 S. Ct.  at 1919.
	In considering the federal decisions on this matter, we find the
Fifth Circuit's opinion in Lady persuasive and agree that: "where
the Coast Guard has been presented with an issue, studied it, and
affirmatively decided as a substantive matter that it was not
appropriate to impose a requirement, that decision takes on the
character of a regulation and the FBSA's objective of national
uniformity mandates that state law not provide a result different
than the Coast Guard's." Lady, 228 F.3d  at 615. 
	Furthermore, we are not persuaded by the two state court
decisions that have held that federal law does not preempt state
law in this type of case. See Moore v. Brunswick Bowling &amp;
Billiards Corp., 889 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. 1994); Ard v. Jensen, 996 S.W.2d 594 (Mo. App. 1999). As these cases represent the
minority view on this matter, we believe a finding of preemption
is warranted here in order to continue the line of uniformity laid
down by the federal courts that have found preemption under the
FBSA. Therefore, based on the preceding analysis, we find that
Sprietsma's common law tort claims are impliedly preempted by
the FBSA.
	As a final note, Mercury Marine filed a motion to strike the
first five pages of Sprietsma's reply brief insofar as it argued that
the preemption defense was unavailable because the boat motor
was manufactured in 1988, more than a year before the Coast
Guard's 1990 decision not to take regulatory action. Sprietsma's
argument was never addressed or ruled upon by the circuit or
appellate courts. Also, Sprietsma did not raise the argument in his
brief to this court but raised it for the first time in his reply brief.
Under Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7), points not argued in the
appellant's brief are waived and shall not be raised in the reply
brief. 177 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7). Therefore, this argument is waived.
Mercury Marine's motion to strike portions of Sprietsma's reply
brief, which was taken with the case, is allowed.
	For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the appellate court's
judgment that the FBSA preempts Sprietsma's common law
claims for failure to install propeller guards.



Affirmed.
	JUSTICE THOMAS took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
	Under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution
(U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2), state law must yield to federal law, but
neither federal supremacy nor any other principle of federal law
requires that a state court's interpretation of federal law give way
to a lower federal court's interpretation. A state court's
interpretation of federal law is no less authoritative than that of the
federal court of appeals in whose circuit the trial court is located.
The only federal court whose interpretation of federal law is
binding on the courts of Illinois is the United States Supreme
Court. If the courts of this state follow a lower federal court's
interpretation of federal law, they do so only because they choose
to, not because they must. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364,
376, 122 L. Ed. 2d 180, 193, 113 S. Ct. 838, 846 (1993) (Thomas,
J., concurring). 
	Notwithstanding the view expressed by former Justice
Bilandic in his opinion in Busch v. Graphic Color Corp., 169 Ill. 2d 325, 335 (1996), the most recent decisions of our court have
adhered to this view. In the absence of controlling United States
Supreme Court precedent, we may "elect" to follow Seventh
Circuit precedent construing a federal statute. Wilson v. Norfolk &amp;
Western Ry. Co., 187 Ill. 2d 369, 383-84 (1999). We are not
required to do so, however, and are free to depart from that
precedent whenever we believe it is wrongly decided. Weiland v.
Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc., 188 Ill. 2d 415, 423 (1999). See
also People v. Kokoraleis, 132 Ill. 2d 235, 293-94 (1989)
("decisions of lower Federal courts are not conclusive on State
courts, except insofar as the decision of the lower Federal court
may become the law of the case").
	Contrary to my colleagues' view, this is not a case where our
authority to make an independent interpretation of federal law
should yield to considerations of uniformity. If our view of federal
law differs from that of the lower federal courts and the conflict
proves problematic, the United States Supreme Court may grant
review to resolve the conflict. We should not perpetuate an
erroneous interpretation of the law merely because it has been
endorsed by some lower federal court judges. Uniformity is no
virtue if it means being uniformly wrong.
	I also disagree with the result the majority reaches on the
merits. My colleagues go to enormous lengths to uphold a finding
of preemption when they should be doing exactly the opposite.
Preemption is disfavored. As our court has previously held, a
presumption exists in every preemption case that Congress did not
intend to supplant state law. Scholtens v. Schneider, 173 Ill. 2d 375, 379 (1996). 
	In ascertaining congressional intent, our inquiry necessarily
begins with an analysis of the language of the statute. Scholtens,
173 Ill. 2d  at 380. The language employed by Congress here could
not be more clear. Section 4311(g) of the FBSA expressly
provides:
			"[C]ompliance with this chapter or standards,
regulations, or orders prescribed under this chapter does
not relieve a person from liability at common law or
under State law." 46 U.S.C. §4311(g) (1994).
If we are to give this provision its plain and ordinary meaning, as
we must, Mercury Marine's compliance with the standard adopted
by the Coast Guard, which was not to require propeller guards,
clearly does not bar the common law tort claims asserted against
it by Sprietsma in this case. Indeed, it is difficult to see how
Congress' intention to preserve such tort claims could have been
expressed any more explicitly.
	The Supreme Court of Texas (Moore v. Brunswick Bowling
&amp; Billiards Corp., 889 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. 1994)) and the Missouri
Court of Appeals (Ard v. Jensen, 996 S.W.2d 594 (Mo. App.
1999)) have reached the same conclusion on similar facts: the
FBSA does not preempt common law tort claims based on failure
to install propeller guards. Although our appellate court took a
contrary position in Farner v. Brunswick Corp., 239 Ill. App. 3d
885 (1992), that case is premised on a narrow construction of
section 4311, which cannot be justified given the broad language
Congress employed when it drafted the statute. See Ard, 996 S.W.2d  at 600. Farner should be overruled.
	While allowing common law tort claims to go forward may
seem to create a tension with the Coast Guard's policy against
propeller guards, that is a circumstance we must assume Congress
considered when it adopted section 4311(g). If section 4311(g)
ultimately proves unworkable when applied as written, that is a
matter for Congress and not this court to remedy. 
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court
affirming the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint should be reversed,
and the cause should be remanded to the circuit court for further
proceedings. I therefore dissent.