Title: Bryson v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 100, 2002
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: April 30, 2003

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
VICTOR L. BRYSON,
§
§
No. 100, 2002     
Defendant Below,
§
Appellant,
§
Court Below:  Superior Court of 
§
the State of Delaware in and for
              v.
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New Castle County
§
STATE OF DELAWARE,
§
Cr. I.D. No. 0101004147
§
Plaintiff Below,
§
Appellee.
§
Submitted: March 18, 2003
Decided:
April 30, 2003
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH, HOLLAND, BERGER and STEELE,
Justices, constituting the Court en Banc.
Upon appeal from Superior Court after Rehearing on Briefs en Banc.
AFFIRMED. 
Bernard J. O'Donnell, Esquire, Office of the Public Defender, Wilmington,
Delaware, for Appellant.
William M. Kelleher, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware,
for Appellee.
Per Curiam:
By order dated January 16, 2003, a panel of this Court affirmed the sentence of
the defendant, Victor Bryson, in Superior Court based on a jury verdict convicting the
defendant of possession of ammunition by a person prohibited in violation of 11 Del.
C. § 1448.  The defendant was also convicted and sentenced for discharging a gun in
violation of 16 Del. C. § 6909.
One of the points raised by defendant on the appeal relates to the application
of affirmative defenses in criminal cases.  In the January 16, 2003 order we held that
the trial judge correctly described the defendant's claim of mistake of law as an
affirmative defense, and we affirmed the judgment of the trial court which had so
instructed the jury.  The defendant moved for reargument and rehearing en Banc,
contending that both the trial court and this Court incorrectly determined that the
defendant's claim of mistake of law was an affirmative defense which the defendant
had the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence.  We ordered rehearing
en Banc to address this legal issue.  We conclude that our January 16, 2003 order was
correctly decided and we again affirm the sentence of the Superior Court.
Facts
As a juvenile, Bryson entered a guilty plea in Family Court to a felony on two
separate occasions.  As a result, he was prohibited from owning firearms or
ammunition until reaching the age of twenty-five.  On January 1, 2001, several years
before attaining the age of twenty-five, Bryson allegedly discharged a firearm within
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the town limits of New Castle, Delaware.  The police responded and found spent
shotgun shells.  Bryson complained to the police that because it was New Year's Eve,
"everybody is shooting, why are you picking on us."  Immediately after Bryson made
that statement, the police had to leave the scene abruptly in order to respond to an
unrelated emergency.  On January 5, 2001, the police executed a search warrant at the
Bryson residence and found various weapons, including a shotgun.  The police
arrested Bryson outside and during a post-arrest search, found thirty-six unspent shells
in his clothing and a hunting license in his name.
At trial, the prosecution contended that the defendant, now an adult, was
prohibited from legally possessing weapons or ammunition because he had previously
been adjudicated a delinquent in 1996 in the Family Court.  When the defendant was
fourteen years old, he entered a plea to a felony delinquency in Family Court.  In
1996, when he was sixteen he entered a plea to another felony level delinquency.  At
neither proceeding was he advised that, as a consequence of the plea, he would be
prohibited from possessing firearms or ammunition as an adult.  In fact, at the first
delinquency proceeding, Bryson claims that he and his parents were affirmatively but
mistakenly advised by his trial counsel that the plea would only affect his ability to
possess firearms or ammunition until he was an adult.  Hence, he asserts mistake of
law as a defense.
111 Del. C. § 1448(c).
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Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
After completion of the presentation of the State's case, the defendant's counsel
moved for judgment of acquittal as to the charge of possession of ammunition by a
person prohibited.  This claim was based on the ground that the State had presented
evidence only that the alleged shotgun ammunition looked like shotgun ammunition
by outward appearance, and that the State had not offered any evidence that any of the
alleged ammunition were live rounds that would fire a shot or a projectile such as, for
example, by test-firing a round.  The State responded that the shotgun shells did not
appear to be spent, although admitting that none had been test-fired, and that the jury
could decide on its own whether the shells were functional ammunition.
The Superior Court ruled that the State had made out a prima facie case because
the shells introduced into evidence looked like shotgun ammunition and because the
defense could argue to the jury that the State had not met its burden to prove that it
was ammunition.
The definition of "ammunition" within the relevant statute is "one or more
rounds of fixed ammunition designed for use in and capable of being fired from a
pistol, revolver, shotgun or rifle but shall not mean inert rounds, or expended shells,
hulls or casings."1  Bryson argues that the shells the police found only looked like
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shotgun ammunition, and the State did not offer any evidence that any of the
ammunition were live rounds, for example, by test-firing a round.  Bryson assigns
error to the trial judge for not granting his motion to acquit.
The trial judge denied the motion, ruling that the State had made out a prima
facie case because the shells introduced into evidence looked like shotgun
ammunition, and therefore, the case should go to the jury.  Bryson could have argued
to the jury that the State did not meet its burden to prove that the shells were
"ammunition" as defined under the statute.  We believe that a rational trier of fact
could have found that guilt was established through the outward appearance of the
shells, and Bryson's statement that "everybody is shooting, why are you picking on
us."  A rational jury, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State,
could have found that the shells Bryson possessed were "ammunition" as defined by
the statute without the State test-firing the shells.
With respect to Bryson's motion for judgment of acquittal, we conclude that the
trial judge correctly denied the motion.  The standard of review in assessing an
insufficiency of evidence claim is whether any rational trier of fact, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could find a defendant guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt.  In making this determination, the court does not distinguish
2Monroe v. State, 652 A.2d 560, 563 (Del. 2001).
3Kipp v. State, 704 A.2d 838, 842 (Del. 1988) (emphasis added).
4Miller v. Commonwealth, 492 S.E.2d 482 (Va. App. 1997).
5Id. at 488.
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between direct and circumstantial evidence.2  Accordingly, the trial judge properly
denied Bryson's motion.
Defendant's Claim of Mistake of Law
With respect to Bryson's mistake of law defense, we conclude that the trial
judge properly described the mistake of law defense as an affirmative defense to the
jury.  We stated in Kipp v. State, that "[a] mistake of law defense is appropriately
recognized when the defendant demonstrates that he has been misled by information
received from the state."3  The language, "defendant demonstrates," suggests that, at
common law, the mistake of law defense is the defendant's to prove, and therefore, an
affirmative defense.  In making the statement, we cited Miller v. Commonwealth.4
Miller noted that the defendant bears the burden of establishing the affirmative
defense of mistake of law.5  Accordingly, the mistake of law defense is an affirmative
defense in Delaware, and therefore, the trial judge properly described it as such.
The defendant's argument rests on a misapplication of 11 Del. C. § 441, which
defines the defense of mistake of fact, and upon 11 Del. C. § 304, which relates to the
allocation of the burden of proof of statutory affirmative defenses.  The defense raised
6Long v. State, 65 A.2d 489 (Del. 1949).
7Id. at 498.
8Id. at 499.
9In Baez v. State, Del. Supr., No. 77, 1986, Christie, C.J. (July 30, 1986) (Order), this Court, citing Long, ruled
that the trial judge did not err in refusing to deliver a mistake of law instruction to the jury where the defendant failed
to meet his burden of proving the defense.
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at trial, however, was mistake of law, which is not covered by Section 441 or any
other statute.  The defense of mistake of law is not defined in the Delaware Criminal
Code.  Rather, it is a creature of Delaware common law. 
An early case defining the mistake of law defense is the 1949 case of Long v.
State,6 a bigamy prosecution in which the trial court excluded evidence that the
defendant, at the time of his second marriage, reasonably believed that his prior, out-
of-state divorce was valid.  In ordering a new trial at which the defendant would be
allowed to raise his mistake of law defense, this Court cautioned that the defendant
would be required to make "an affirmative showing of effort to abide by the law,
tested by objective standards rather that the defendant's subjective state of mind,"7 and
that "[t]he defendant would have the burden of demonstrating that his efforts were
well nigh exemplary."8  In light of the heavy burden Long places on a defendant to
prove a mistake of law defense,9 the defendant's present contention that the defense
is a simple defense rather than an affirmative defense cannot be maintained.
10See, e.g., Kipp, 704 A.2d at 842 (holding, “A mistake of law defense is appropriately recognized where the
defendant demonstrates that he has been misled by information received from the State.”).
1111 Del. C. § 303(c).
1211 Del. C. § 304(a).
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Chapter 4 of the Delaware Criminal Code lists numerous defenses and
affirmative defenses to criminal liability.  Nowhere in Chapter 4 is it mentioned,
however, that these defenses or affirmative defenses are exhaustive of all defenses or
affirmative defenses that a defendant may assert.  In fact, Bryson used the defense of
mistake of law which is not codified anywhere in the Code.  This Court, however, has
recognized the defense of mistake of law.10
Within Chapter 4 some defenses are characterized merely as a “defense” while
others are characterized as an “affirmative defense.” A simple defense raises
reasonable doubt,11 whereas an affirmative defense must be established by the
defendant by a preponderance of the evidence.12  Bryson argues that because mistake
of fact is characterized in 11 Del. C. § 441 as merely a “defense,” the defense of
mistake of law is also a simple defense and not an affirmative one.
Bryson’s reliance on Section 441 is a non sequitur.  Mistake of fact and mistake
of law are two different defenses.  It cannot, therefore, be said that because mistake
of fact is deemed a “defense,” that mistake of law is as well.  Thus Section 441 has no
bearing on whether mistake of law is an affirmative defense.
1311 Del. C. § 304(a).
1411 Del. C. § 202.
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Bryson also contends mistake of law is not an affirmative defense because 11
Del. C. § 304(a) distinguishes defenses and affirmative defenses.  Title 11, Section
304(a) of the Delaware Code states, “When a defense declared by this Criminal Code
or by another statute to be an affirmative defense is raised at trial, the defendant has
the burden of establishing it by a preponderance of the evidence.”13  Bryson’s reliance
on this section is also in error.  Section 304(a) does not provide that it is exhaustive
of all affirmative defenses.  The statute does not state that only those defenses listed
as affirmative defenses are to be considered affirmative defenses.  It merely states that
where an affirmative defense is declared so by statute the defendant has the burden of
establishing the affirmative defense, although the State must nevertheless prove the
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  The statute does not purport to set forth
the universe of defenses that are to be considered affirmative defenses.  Rather its
purpose is to dictate the burden of proof for statutory affirmative defenses.
In understanding the scope of Section 304 it is important to compare it to 11
Del. C. § 202.  Section 202 provides that, “No conduct constitutes a criminal offense
unless it is made a criminal offense by this Criminal Code or by another law.”14  Thus
the statute clearly indicates that only those offenses listed in the statutory law are
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criminal offenses.  Chapter 4, relating to statutory defenses and affirmative defenses,
on the other hand, does not have such “all inclusive” language.  Therefore, Chapter
4 does not exclude affirmative defenses developed at common law, such as the
defense of mistake of law.  Rather Chapter 4 relates only to statutory affirmative
defenses and Section 304 implicitly refers only to those statutory affirmative defenses.
The 1973 Commentary to the Delaware Criminal Code sheds further light on
the use of mistake of law as an affirmative defense.  It states:
As originally proposed [in the 1967 recommended revision], this
Criminal Code contained a section granting, in certain limited instances,
an affirmative defense based on ignorance or mistake of law.  The
defense was confined to cases in which the statute defining the offense
had not been published or otherwise reasonably made available prior to
the conduct charged and cases in which the defendant relied on an
official interpretation of the law, afterward determined to be invalid or
erroneous.  Prior Delaware case law appears to have recognized the
defense of mistake of law where the mistake negatives the specific intent
required for commission of a crime, where it negatives "general criminal
intent," and where the defendant has made "a diligent effort, in good
faith, by means as appropriate as any available under our legal system,
to acquire knowledge of the relevant law."  Absent such circumstances,
the prevailing view is that ignorance or mistake of law is not a defense
because of the public policy requiring all men to inform themselves
reliably about the law.  Since the proposed provision on ignorance or
mistake of law was not enacted as part of the Criminal Code, the Long
case, which provides a more liberal definition of the defense than the
proposed provision, will continue to be the law of Delaware.  This is so
because, while the Code expressly declares that no conduct constitutes
15Del. Crim. Code with Commentary, Section 441 (1973) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).  Compare the
1973 Code with the 1967 recommendation of the Governor's Committee for Revision of the Criminal Law which
expressly recommends an affirmative statutory defense of mistake of law.  Proposed Delaware Criminal Code, Section
250 (1967).
16Long, 65 A.2d at 497.
17Id. at 499.
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an offense unless defined by statute, there is no similar limitation on the
availability of defenses.15
In Long v. State this Court found that mistake of law was an available defense in a
bigamy case.  The Court ruled that mistake of law exists where a defendant is:
[A]ware of the existence of criminal law relating to the subject of such
conduct, or to some of its aspects [but] erroneously concludes (in good
faith) that his particular conduct is for some reason not subject to the
operation of any criminal law. [It must also appear] that before engaging
in the conduct, the defendant made a bona fide, diligent effort, adopting
a course and resorting to sources and means at least as appropriate as any
afforded under our legal system, to ascertain and abide by the law, and
where he acted in good faith reliance upon the results of such effort.16
The Court then went on to rule that, “The defendant would have the burden of
demonstrating that his efforts were well nigh exemplary.”17  Thus, Long indicates that
mistake of law is an affirmative defense at common law and the defendant has the
burden of proof.
Conclusion
Mistake of law was recognized as an affirmative defense at common law.  The
Delaware Criminal Code makes no mention of mistake of law as a defense.  The Code,
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however, does not indicate that all the defenses it lists are exhaustive.  Rather the
Code states that, of the defenses it has made statutory, those that are described as
being affirmative defenses must be proved by the defendant by a preponderance of the
evidence.  Mistake of law is neither discussed nor ruled out as being an affirmative
defense.  In fact, the Commentary to the Delaware Criminal Code indicates that
mistake of law is an affirmative defense made available by the common law to the
defendant, subject to the requirements of the Long case.
The sentence of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  The mandate shall issue
immediately.