Title: L. H. Jones Equipment Co. v. Swenson Spreader, LLC
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 34745
State: west-virginia
Issuer: west-virginia Supreme Court
Date: November 18, 2009

______________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________ IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA September 2009 Term FILED November 18, 2009 No. 34745 released at 3:00 p.m. RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA L.H. JONES EQUIPMENT COMPANY, a West Virginia corporation, Plaintiff, V. SWENSON SPREADER LLC, Defendant, Upon Certified Question from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia The Honorable Irene M. Keeley, Judge Civil Action No. 1:08-CV-109 CERTIFIED QUESTION ANSWERED Submitted: October 7, 2009 Filed: November 18, 2008 Amy M. Smith, Esquire Sandra K. Law, Esquire Christi R. Stover, Esquire Schader, Byrd & Companion, PLLC Steptoe & Johnson, PLLC Wheeling, West Virginia Morgantown, West Virginia Attorney for Plaintiff W. Michael Hanna, Esquire Squire, Sanders & Dempsey Cleveland, Ohio Attorneys for Defendant CHIEF JUSTICE BENJAMIN delivered the opinion of the Court. JUSTICE KETCHUM dissents and reserves the right to file a dissenting opinion. SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 1. “ ‘A de novo standard is applied by this [C] ourt in addressing the legal issues presented by a certified questions from a federal or appellate court.’ Syl. Pt. 1 , Light v. Allstate Ins. Co., 203 W. Va. 27, 506 S.E.2d 64 ( 1998).” Syllabus Point 2, Aikens v. Debow, 208 W. Va. 486, 541 S.E.2d 576 (2000). 2. “It is presumed the legislature had a purpose in the use of every word, phrase and clause found in a statute and intended the terms so used to be effective, wherefore an interpretation of a statute which gives a wo rd, phrase or clause thereof no function to perform, or makes it, in effect, a mere repetition of another word, phrase or clause thereof must be rejected as being unsound, if it be possible so to c onstrue the statute as a whole, as to make all of its parts operative and effective.” Syllabus point 7, Ex parte Watson, 82 W. Va. 201, 95 S.E. 648 (1918). 3. “ ‘ “The primary object in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.” Syllabus Point 1, Smith v. State Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner, 159 W. Va. 108, 219 S.E.2d 361 (1975).’ Syllabus point 2, Anderson v. Wood, 204 W. Va. 558, 514 S.E.2d 408 (1999).” Sy llabus point 2, Expedited Transportation Systems, Inc., v. Vieweg, 207 W. Va. 90, 529 S.E.2d 110 (2000). i 4. “In construing an ambiguity in a statute, this Court will exam ine the title to the Act of the Legislature as a means of ascert aining the legislative intent, and the overall purpose of the legisla tion. Syl. Pt .2, City of Huntington v. State Water Comm’n, 135 W. Va. 568, 64 S.E.2d 225 (1951).” 5. “Where the language of a statute is clear and without ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted without resorting to the rules of interpretation.” Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Elder, 152 W. Va. 571, 165 S.E.2d 108 (1968). 6. The West Virginia Farm Equipment Dealer Contract Act is not limited in its scope and application to “dealers” a nd “suppliers” of “farm equipment” only, as m ight mistakenly be inferred by reference only to the Act’s statut ory short title. Rather, the protections of the Act extend to “dealers” and “s uppliers” of “farm, construction, industrial or outdoor power equipment or any combination of the foregoing,” as provided in the definition of “dealer,” found in the Act at West Virginia Code §47-11F -2 (1989), consistent w ith the actual full title of the Act. ii Benjamin, Chief Justice: This case is before the Court upon the February 9, 2009, Order from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, which certified a question pursuant to West Virginia Code §51-1A-3 (2005)1. The question certified to this Court is as follows: Recognizing that Article 6, Section 30, of the West Virginia Constitution provides that “[n]o act hereafter passed, shall embrace more th an one object, and that shall be expressed in the title,” and that an act shall be void as to any object in it which is not so e xpressed, and also acknowledging the long-standing precedent of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia that “[t]he title of an act should be construed most liberally and comprehensively in order to give validity to all parts of the act,” Syl. Pt. 2, Brewer v. City of Point Pleasant, 114 W. Va. 572 (1934), and that “[w]hen the principal object of an act is fairly expressed in its title, other incidental or auxiliary objects which are germane to the principal object m ay be included in the act without titular specification,” id. at Syl Pt. 3, is 1West Virginia Code §51-1A-3 (2005) provides, in pertinent part: The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia may answer a questions of law certified to it by any court of the United States or by the highest appellate court or the intermediate appellate court of another state or of a tribe of Canada, a Canadian province or territory, Mexico or a Mexican state, if the answer m ay be determinative of an issue in a pending cause in the certifying court and if there is no controlling appellate decision, constitutional provision or statute of this state. 1 the West Virginia Farm Equipment Dealer Contract Act, W. Va. Code §47-11F-1, et. seq. (“the Act”), limited in its scope and application to “dealers” and “suppliers ” of “farm equip ment,” as stated in the Act’s title, or do the protections of the Act exten d to “dealers” and “suppliers” of “farm, construction, industrial or outdoor power equipment or any com bination of the foregoing,” as provided in the definition of “dealer,” found in the Act at §47-11F-2? By order dated March 12, 2009, this Court accepted the certified question and docketed the matter for resolution. As set fo rth more fully below, we find that the West Virginia Farm Equipment Dealer Contract Act is not limited in its scope and application to “dealers” and “suppliers” of “f arm equipment” only, as m ight mistakenly be inferred by reference only to the Act’s statutory short title. Rather, the protections of the Act extend to “dealers” and “suppliers” of “farm, construction, industrial or outdoor power equipment or any combination of the foregoing, ” as provided in the definition of “dealer,” found in the Act at West Virginia Code §47-11F-2 (1989), consistent with the actual full title of the Act. I. Factual and procedural background This matter arises from a pr oceeding in the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia instituted by L.H. Jones Equipment Company, a West Virginia corporation (hereinafter referred to as the “L.H. Jones”). L. H. Jones sued Swenson Spreader, LLC, (hereinafter referred to as “Swenson”) a limited liability corporation under 2 the laws of the State of Ohio, on several theo ries, including violations of the West Virginia Farm Equipment Dealer Contract Act. 2 Other theories alleged br each of contract, violations of the West Virginia Uniform Commercial Code and tortious interference with a business relationship. The district court acknowledged in its certification order that the case was at an early stage in the proceedings and that no discovery had been undertaken. The district court’s certification order stated that the ques tion to this Court was certified so that the question of law could be resolved prior to continuing with the re st of this case. The relevant facts 3 as stated in the certification order to this Court, are as follows: 2The West Virginia Farm Equipment Dealer Contract Act is codified in West Virginia Code §47-11F-1 et seq. 3This Court is bound by the facts contained in the district court’s certification order. West Virginia Code §51-1A-6 (year) states as follows: (a) A certification order must contain: (1) The question of law to be answered; (2) The facts relevant to the question, showing fully the nature of the controversy out of which the question arose; (3) A statem ent acknowledging that the receiving court m ay reformulate the question; and (4) The names an addresses of counsel of record and unrepresented parties. (b) If the parties cannot agree upon a statem ent of facts, then the certifying court shall (continued...) 3 The defendant, Swenson, designs and m anufactures spreaders, liquid spray de ­ icing systems and other equipmen t and products. The plaintiff, L. H. Jones, is a retailer who sells snow plows, snow plow attachm ents, spreaders and related parts and equipm ent. From at least early 1982, until September 10, 2007, L.H. Jones was an authorized distributor of Swenson’s products in West Virginia. In its complaint filed in the district cour t, L.H. Jones alleges that since at least 1982, as an authorized dealer of Swenson equi pment, it had been awarded contracts with the State of West Virginia to supply the State with Swenson-brand ice removal equipment and replacement parts. L.H. Jones alleges that in 2005 and 2007, following a competitive bidding process, the State of West Virginia awarded L.H. Jones two open purchase orders to supply it with two kinds of Swenson spreaders capable of sp reading salt or other anti-skid material, which the State would use in highway and road maintenance. L.H. Jones alleges that after being awarded these open purchase orders, on September 10, 2007, Swenson term inated it as an authorized dist ributor of Swenson products. As a result, L.H. Jones allegedly was unable to fulfil its orders from the State of West Virginia. 3(...continued) determine the relevant facts and shall state them as part of the certification order. 4 Swenson does not dispute that it sold spreaders and other ice rem oval equipment and parts to L.H. Jones or that it terminated its relationship with the plaintiff on September 10, 2007. Swenson does dispute that the spreaders in question in this lawsuit are the type of equipment covered by the Act, and thus contends that L.H. Jones’ claims under the Act should be dismissed as a matter of law. II. Standard of review We have consistently recognized that “ ‘[a] de novo standard is applied by this court in addressing the legal issues presente d by a certified questions from a federal district or appellate court.’ Syl Pt. 1, Light v. Allstate Ins. Co., 203 W. Va. 27, 506 S.E.2d 64 (1998).” Syllabus point 2, Aiken v. Debow, 208 W. Va. 486, 541 S.E.2d 576 (2000). See also Syl. Pt. 1, Feliciano v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 210 W. Va. 740, 559 S.E. 2d 713 (2001); Syl. Pt. 1, T. Weston Inc. v. Mineral County, 219 W. Va. 564, 638 S.E.2d 167 (2006). Accordingly, we proceed with plenary review of the legal issues arising from the certified question. III. Discussion a. The West Virginia Farm Equipment Dealer Act At the heart of this certified question is interpretation of W. Va. Code §47-1F ­ 1, et seq. (1989), also known by its statutory short title, the West Virginia Farm Dealers 5 Equipment Act, (hereinafter referred to as th e Act), and its applicability to the agreement between L.H. Jones and Swenson. The Act provides statutor y guidance regarding termination of contracts or agreem ents between dealers and suppliers of farm, construction, industrial and outdoor power equi pment. The Act requires certain notice requirem ents from suppliers to dealers when te rminating their agreements, 4 requires suppliers to repurchase dealer inventory when the contractual relationship has terminated,5 provides exceptions to the repurchasing requirem ents upon term ination of a contract or agreem ent6 and provides for civil remedies for breach of the Act, including monetary damages, attorney’s fees and costs as well as interest.7 For the purposes of the Act, the word dealer: [M]eans any person, firm , partnership, association, corporation or other business entity engaged in the business of selling, at retail, farm, construction, industr ial or outdoor power equipment or any com bination of the foregoing and who m aintains a total inventory of new equipment and repair pa rts having an aggregate value of not less than twenty-five thousand dollars at current net price and who provides 4W. Va. Code §47-11F-3 (1989). 5W. Va. Code §47-11F-4 (1989) 6W. Va. Code §47-11F-7 (1989). 7W. Va. Code §47-11F-8 (1989). 6 repair service for such equipment. W. Va. Code §47-11F-2(3) (1989). A supplier is defined as “a wholesaler, m anufacturer or distributor who enters into an agreement with a dealer and who supplies inventory to such dealer.” W. Va. Code §47-11F-2(6) (1989). The Act further defi nes the term s “farm, “construction,” “industrial,” or “ outdoor power,” when used to re fer to tractors, im plements, attachments or repair parts, as having “t he meaning commonly used and understood am ong dealers and suppliers subject to this article.” W. Va. Code §47-11F-2(b) (1989). The Act was codified in 1989 and was pa ssed by the West Virginia Legislature on March 15, 1989. The bill went into effect 90 days from its passage. As contained in section one itself, the short title of the Act is the “West Virginia Farm Equipment Dealer Contract Act.” W. Va. Code §47-11F-1 (1989). The actual title to the bill, however, as set forth in the legislative bill that was passed, is as follows: An Act to amend chapter forty-seven of the code of West Virginia, one thousand nine hundred thirty-one, as amended, by adding thereto a new article, designated article eleven-f, relating to the contractual relationship between farm, construction, industrial or outdoor power equipment retail dealers and their suppliers generally; providing a sho rt title by which the article may be known and cited; providing certain definitions of term s used with respect thereto; requiring certain notices to be given by one party to such contracts to the other party thereto with respect to the term ination of any contractual 7 arrangement between them and the tim e requirements with resp ect to such notice; providing for certain exceptions with respect to such terminations; the manner, form and content of such notifications; requiring the supplier to repurchase dealer inventory at th e time of such termination and the term s of such repurchase; providing exceptions with respect to such repurchase requirem ents; providing for certain rules with resp ect to the applicability of the uniform commercial code; providing certain rules with respect to outstandi ng warranty claim s at the time of termination; certain civil remedies against the suppliers available to such d ealers and the amounts of recovery with respect to actions brought in such cases; providing for the applicability of certain other legal remedies; and providing for a period of limitations with respect to any actions brought pursuant to said article. 1989 W. Va. Acts 1304 (emphasis added). b. Arguments of the Parties Swenson argues that the Act as passed by the West Virginia Legislature and codified in the W. Va. Code should be limited to dealers of farm equipment because of its codified short title. To interp ret the Act more broadly, Swens on contends, would be violative of Article VI, Section 30 of the West Virginia Constitution. Article VI, Section 30 of th e West Virginia Constitution states, in pertinent part: 8 No act hereafter passed, shall embrace more than one object, and that shall be expressed in the title. But if any object shall be em braced in an act which is not so expresse d, the act shall b e void only as to so much ther eof, as shall not be so expressed, and no law shall be revived, or amended, by reference to its title only; but the law revived, or the section am ended, shall be inserted at large, in the new act. Swenson argues that the purpose of the statute must be expressed in its title and, that fundamental tenets of statutory construction support their c ontention that the Act applies only to dealers of farm equipment. L.H. Jones counte rs t hat t he Ac t s hould be c onstrued t o e xtend t o t he contractual relationship between it and Swenson Spreader. First, L.H. Jones argues that the word “dealer” is plainly and expansively de fined as meaning any business entity “engaged in the business of selling, at retail, farm , construction, industrial or outdoor power equipm ent or any combination of the foregoing.” Second, L.H. Jones assets that the intent of the West Virginia Legislature was clearly expressed in the Act’s original title as contained in the original bill passed by that body, not in the s hort title as arg ued by Sw enson. It is this original longer title to which A rticle VI, Section 30, of the West Virginia Constitution applies, according to L.H. Jones. Finally, L.H. Jones submits th at familiar rules of statutory construction support the result that the Act extends beyond dealers of farm equipment. 9 Collectively, L.H. Jones argues for an expa nsive definitio n of the terms “dealer” and “supplier” under the Act. c. Discussion This Court’s long-standing rules of interpretation begin with the question of whether the statute being interpreted is clear and without ambiguity. Where the language of a statute is clear and without am biguity the plain m eaning is to be accepted without resorting to the rules of in terpretation. Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Elder, 152 W. Va. 571, 165 S.E.2d 108 (1968). It is also well established that ever y word in a statute should be given its typical meaning. “It is presumed that the le gislature had a purpose in the use of every word, phrase and clause found in a statute and intended th e terms so used to be effective, wherefore an interpretation of a statute which gives a word, phrase or clause thereo f no function to perform, or makes it, in effect, a mere repetition of another word, phrase or clause thereof must be rejected as being unsound, if it be possible so to construe the statute as a whole, as to make all of its parts operative a nd effective.” Syllabus point 7, Ex parte Watson, 82 W. Va. 201, 95 S.E. 648 (1918). Finally, our rules of construction mandate that the intent of the legislature be 10 acknowledged when interpreting a statute. “The primary object in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.” Syllabus Point 1, Smith v. State Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner, 159 W. Va. 108, 219 S.E.2d 361 (1975).’ Syllabus point 2, Anderson v. Wood, 204 W. Va. 558, 514 S.E.2d 408 (1999).” Syllabus point 2, Expedited Transportation Systems, Inc., v. Vieweg, 207 W. Va. 90, 529 S.E.2d 110 (2000). If, however, there is ambiguity in a stat ute, this Court may look to the title of the Act of the Legislature as a means of dete rmining legislative intent. In construing an ambiguity in a statute, this Court will examin e the title to the Act of the L egislature as a means of ascertaining the legislative intent, and the overall purpose of the legislation. Syl. Pt .2, City of Huntington v. State Water Comm’n, 135 W. Va. 568, 64 S.E.2d 225 (1951). Here, the clear and unambiguous expression of the Legislature’s intent in the title of the Act is that this article relates to “the contractual re lationship between farm, construction, industrial or outdoor power equipm ent retail dealers and their suppliers generally.” 1989 W. Va. Acts 1304, supra. This expression in turn comports with the plain language of the statute, especially the definiti ons of “dealer” and “s upplier” found at W. Va. Code §4-11F-2 (1989). The statute defines “dealer” simply and concisely as “any person, firm, partnership, association, corporation or other business entity engaged in the business of selling at retail, farm, cons truction, industrial or outdoor power equipment...” W. Va. 11 Code §47-11F-2 (1989). Thus we conclude that the Legislature’s intent in passing the Act was to create a mechanism for dealing with th e contractual relationships between suppliers and dealers of certain categories of equipm ent, not just farm equipment as mentioned in the short title. We find that the more expansive applicability found in the bill’s actual full title, rather than the more restri ctive applicability found in th e statutory short title, to be determinative to this certified question. We do not agree with Swenson’s concerns that the title of the Act is violative of the constitutional protections requiring that the object of an act be expressed clearly in its title. When reviewing the actual full title of the bill, as presented to the Legislature, it is clear that the title sufficiently expresses the subject matter of the act. Thus, any concerns about unintended provi sions being read into this bill are not apparent, because the title of the Act as viewed by the Legislatur e when the statute was passed wa s sufficient to impart to the reader the Act’s object. Thus, the said constitutional provision is designed to ensure that legislators know upon what they are voting. The actual full title of the bill serves this purpose. In the case at bar, we conclude that a ny ambiguity within the statute is not so much between the contents of the statute but between the statutory short title of the act and the definitions contained therei n. The reliance of Swenson upon the statutorily created short title of the Act is misplaced, as the actual full title of the Act is in full agreement and 12 compatible with the provisions contained therein. IV. Conclusion In the interest of providing consistent guidance to the district on the question of law so presented, we reformulate8 and answer the certified question as follows: The West Virginia Farm Equipment Dealer Contract Act is not limited in its scope and application to “dealers” and “suppliers” of “farm equipment” only, as m ight mistakenly be inferred by reference only to the Act’s statutory short title. Rather, the protections of the Act extend to “dealers” and “suppliers” of “farm, construction, industrial or outdoor power equipm ent or any combination of the foregoing,” as provided in the definition of “dealer,” found in the Act at West Virginia Code §47-11F-2 (1989), consistent with the actual full title of the Act. Certified question answered. 8W. Va. Code §51-1A-4 authorizes this Court to reform ulate questions certified to it. 13