Title: Guy v. Delaware
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 400, 2013
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: November 27, 2013

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
TYRONE GUY, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 400, 2013 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID 0107017041 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: October 2, 2013 
 
 
 
 
  Decided: November 27, 2013 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and RIDGELY, Justices 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Tyrone Guy, pro se, Vaughn Correctional Center, Smyrna, Delaware, 
appellant. 
 
 
Maria T. Knoll, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, 
Wilmington, Delaware, for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
2
 
In this appeal from the Superior Court’s denial of Tyrone Guy’s (“Guy”) 
motion for postconviction relief, we address how the procedural bars of Superior 
Court Criminal Rule 61 apply to Guy’s claims, including his claim of ineffective 
assistance of postconviction counsel.  Guy advances two arguments in this appeal:  
first, that the Superior Court erred during his trial by failing to give the “modified 
Bland”1 jury instruction on accomplice testimony mandated by this Court’s 2012 
decision in Brooks v. State;2 and second, that his appointed counsel was ineffective 
in his first postconviction proceeding for failing to present ten out of eleven claims 
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  We conclude that Guy’s claims are 
untimely and that his first claim was previously adjudicated.  Guy has failed to 
overcome these procedural hurdles.  Accordingly, we affirm the Superior Court’s 
judgment in this case, although we do so on independent and alternative grounds.3   
Facts 
 
In July 2004, a Superior Court jury convicted Guy of Intentional Murder in 
the First Degree, Felony Murder in the First Degree, Possession of a Firearm 
During the Commission of a Felony, Attempted Robbery in the First Degree, and 
Robbery in the Second Degree for the robbery and murder of an ice cream truck 
operator, Abdullah Alameri.  The Superior Court sentenced Guy to two life terms 
                                                 
1 Bland v. State, 263 A.2d 286 (Del. 1970). 
2 Brooks v. State, 40 A.3d 346 (Del. 2012). 
3 See Torrence v. State, 2010 WL 3036742 (Del. Aug. 4, 2010) (citing Unitrin, Inc. v. American 
Gen’l Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1390 (Del. 1995)). 
 
3
of imprisonment plus a term of years.  Guy raised eight issues on direct appeal, 
including a claim that the Superior Court erred in denying defense counsel’s 
request for a jury instruction on accomplice testimony in response to the trial 
testimony of Robert Zayas (“Zayas”), who Guy alleged was an uncharged 
coconspirator in his crimes.  The Superior Court denied defense counsel’s request 
for the jury instruction because “there was no evidence that Zayas participated in 
the attempted robbery or fatal shooting.”4  We affirmed that ruling, as well as 
Guy’s convictions and sentence on direct appeal.5   
 
With the assistance of counsel, Guy filed a motion for postconviction relief 
in January 2008,6 which the Superior Court denied.  While his appeal from that 
ruling was pending, Guy filed a second motion for postconviction relief pro se, 
which the Superior Court rejected because of his pending Supreme Court appeal.  
On September 28, 2009, at the State’s request, this Court remanded Guy’s appeal 
from the denial of his first motion in order to allow Guy to file the claims asserted 
in his second postconviction motion with the assistance of counsel.7  The Superior 
                                                 
4 Guy v. State, 913 A.2d 558, 563 (Del. 2006). 
5 Id. 
6 Guy initially filed his motion pro se in March 2007, but the Superior Court appointed counsel 
at Guy’s request and allowed counsel to file a supplemental motion. 
7 Guy v. State, 2009 WL 3087248 (Del. Sept. 29, 2009). 
 
4
Court denied Guy’s supplemental motion on remand in December 2009.  We 
affirmed the denial of all Guy’s postconviction claims on August 3, 2010.8  
 
In March 2013, Guy filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief.9  He 
asserted in that motion that the Superior Court erred in failing to give a “modified 
Bland” jury instruction at his trial and that his appointed postconviction counsel 
had been ineffective for failing to present ten out of eleven claims of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel.  The Superior Court denied both issues on the merits but 
further concluded that Guy’s claim of ineffective assistance of postconviction 
counsel was procedurally barred for his failure to raise the claim earlier.  This 
appeal followed. 
Standard of Review 
 
We review the Superior Court’s denial of postconviction relief for abuse of 
discretion,10 although questions of law are reviewed de novo.11  Like the Superior 
Court, we first must apply the procedural requirements of Superior Court Criminal 
Rule 61(i) before considering the merits of any postconviction claim on appeal.12  
Rule 61(i)(1) bars any claim for postconviction relief that was not filed within one 
                                                 
8 Guy v. State, 999 A.2d 863 (Del. 2010).  The mandate on appeal issued on August 19, 2010. 
9 Because of the manner in which Guy’s first and second postconviction motions were presented 
by the same attorney and were resolved in one appellate proceeding, we consider his most recent 
motion to be his second postconviction motion, contrary to the Superior Court’s consideration of 
the motion as Guy’s third such motion. 
10 Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1190 (Del. 1996). 
11 Neal v. State, ___ A.3d ___, 2013 WL 5978446 (Nov. 8, 2013). 
12 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
 
5
year after the judgment of conviction became final unless the claim asserts a newly 
recognized, retroactively applicable right that is asserted within one year after the 
right is first recognized13 or unless there is a colorable claim of a miscarriage of 
justice due to a constitutional violation that undermines the reliability of the 
conviction.14   Rule 61(i)(4) provides that any ground for relief that was previously 
adjudicated is thereafter barred unless reconsideration is warranted in the interests 
of justice.15 
Procedurally Barred 
Accomplice Testimony Jury Instruction 
 
 
Guy’s first claim on appeal is that the Superior Court erred at his trial in 
failing to give a “modified Bland” instruction to the jury regarding accomplice 
testimony.  In his direct appeal, Guy argued, among other things, that the Superior 
Court had erred in refusing to grant his request for an accomplice testimony 
instruction.  We affirmed the Superior Court’s denial of the requested instruction 
on the ground that the evidence did not support a factual finding that the identified 
witness, Robert Zayas, participated as an accomplice to Guy’s crimes.  Having 
previously considered and rejected this claim, we are not required to reconsider it 
unless the interests of justice so require.16 
                                                 
13 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. 61(i)(1) (2013).   
14 Id. 61(i)(5). 
15 Id. 61(i)(4). 
16 Id. 
 
6
 
In order to overcome this procedural hurdle, Guy contends that 
reconsideration of his claim is warranted in the interest of justice in light of this 
Court’s 2012 decision in Brooks v. State.17  Guy contends that Brooks announced a 
“new rule” that requires the trial court to give a specific jury instruction on 
accomplice testimony, whether or not it is requested, whenever a self-identified 
accomplice, whether or not charged as an accomplice, testifies at trial.  Guy argues 
that he is entitled to the benefit of this new rule.  
 
There are two flaws in Guy’s argument.  First, in denying Guy’s request at 
trial for a jury instruction on accomplice testimony, the Superior Court held that 
the evidence did not support a finding that Zayas was an accomplice in the 
attempted robbery or murder.  We affirmed that ruling on appeal.  Our decision in 
Brooks did not alter or expand the definition of “accomplice.”18  Thus, the holding 
of Brooks has no bearing on Guy’s case.  Guy simply was not entitled as a matter 
of fact or law to an accomplice testimony instruction under Bland or under Brooks.  
Second, even if the holding of Brooks was relevant to Guy’s case, the mandatory 
instruction set forth in Brooks does not apply retroactively.  We specifically held 
that the modified Bland instruction was required only in cases pending as of March 
                                                 
17 40 A.3d 346 (2012). 
18 See id. at 350 (holding that a “witness qualifies as an accomplice if he or she meets the 
definition of one” under 11 Del. C. § 271(2)b., which is the same statute that applied to Guy’s 
case). 
 
7
15, 2012 or filed thereafter.19  Thus, contrary to Guy’s contention, our holding in 
Brooks did not create a retroactively applicable right in order to overcome the time 
bar of Rule 61(i)(1).  Guy has failed to establish under Rule 61(i)(4) that 
reconsideration of his previously adjudicated claim is warranted in the interest of 
justice.  Accordingly, we conclude that Guy’s first claim on appeal is procedurally 
barred. 
No Procedural Bar 
Ineffective Assistance of Postconviction Counsel 
 
 
Guy’s second argument on appeal is that his postconviction counsel was 
ineffective for failing to raise ten out of eleven claims of ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel.  The Superior Court rejected Guy’s claim as conclusory and also held 
that the claim was procedurally barred by Rule 61(i)(2) for his failure to raise the 
claim in the second postconviction motion he filed in that court. 
 
Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(2) provides that “[a]ny ground 
for relief that was not asserted in a prior postconviction proceeding…is thereafter 
barred, unless consideration of the claim is warranted in the interest of justice.”20 
Because the Superior Court erroneously treated Guy’s latest postconviction motion 
as his third such motion, it concluded that his claims against his postconviction 
counsel should have been raised in his second motion.  The Superior Court failed 
                                                 
19 Id. at 355 (“Effective March 15, 2012, any case involving accomplice testimony, trial judges 
must now give our modified version of the Bland instruction.”) 
20 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2) (2013). 
 
8
to acknowledge, however, that the same appointed counsel represented Guy in 
filing both his first and second postconviction motions in that court and that 
appointed counsel continued to represent Guy in his one and only postconviction 
appeal to this Court from the denial of both motions.  Accordingly, Guy had no 
opportunity in that prior proceeding to raise a claim of ineffectiveness against the 
postconviction counsel who was still representing him.  Accordingly, we do not 
find Guy’s claim of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel to be 
procedurally barred by Rule 61(i)(2). 
Time Bar Applies 
Ineffective Assistance of Postconviction Counsel 
 
 
The State argues that Guy’s claim is barred by the one year time limitation 
of Rule 61(i)(1).  According to the State, Guy had until December 12, 2007, which 
was one year following the issuance of this Court’s mandate on Guy’s direct 
appeal, in order to file all of his postconviction claims.  While we agree that Guy’s 
ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel claim is time-barred in this case, 
we cannot agree that Guy only had until December 12, 2007 to argue this particular 
claim. 
 
Rule 61(i)(1) provides, among other things, that a motion for postconviction 
relief may not be filed more than one year after a judgment of conviction is final.  
We have held that a judgment of conviction is final once this Court issues the 
 
9
mandate following a defendant’s direct appeal.21  In a case such as Guy’s, 
however, in which the Superior Court appointed counsel to represent him in his 
first postconviction proceeding, a defendant’s first chance to raise a claim that 
appointed postconviction counsel was constitutionally ineffective will not occur 
until the defendant has the opportunity to pursue a second postconviction motion.  
It is implausible that a second postconviction motion could ever be filed within one 
year after the judgment of conviction becomes final.  Accordingly, we reject the 
State’s assertion that Guy was required to file his ineffective assistance of 
postconviction counsel claim within one year following the conclusion of his direct 
appeal. 
 
Instead, we conclude that fairness requires that the one-year time limitation 
on a claim of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel shall be begin to run 
when the defendant’s appeal to this Court from the Superior Court’s denial of his 
first motion for postconviction relief is concluded or, if no appeal was taken, 
within 30 days following the Superior Court’s denial of the defendant’s first 
motion for postconviction relief.  This rule recognizes, as the United States 
Supreme Court recently noted, that in a jurisdiction like Delaware, where 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel may not be raised on direct appeal, the first 
                                                 
21 Staats v. State, 961 A.2d 514, 517 (Del. 2008).  We held in Staats that, “If the defendant filed 
a direct appeal of his convictions, the time period under Rule 61(i)(1) ‘begins to run when the 
direct appeal process is complete, which for this Court, is the date of the issuance of the mandate 
under Supreme Court Rule 19.’” Id. (quoting Jackson v. State, 654 A.2d 829, 832-33 (Del. 
1995)). 
 
10
postconviction “proceeding is in many ways the equivalent of a prisoner’s direct 
appeal as to the ineffective-assistance claim.”22  Accordingly, when a defendant 
subsequently claims that his postconviction counsel was ineffective in pursuing his 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, we hold that those claims must be 
filed within one year following the conclusion of the defendant’s first 
postconviction proceeding.   
 
In this case, the mandate in Guy’s first postconviction appeal was issued on 
August 19, 2010.  Guy did not file his second motion for postconviction relief 
raising his claims of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel until March 
11, 2013, more than two-and-a-half years after his postconviction appeal was 
decided.  Thus, we conclude that Guy’s ineffective assistance of postconviction 
counsel claims were untimely.  Moreover, we agree with the Superior Court’s 
finding that Guy’s claims of ineffectiveness were so conclusory as to fail to 
overcome this procedural hurdle under Rule 61(i)(5).   
Conclusion 
 
The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
                                                 
22 Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2012).