Title: State v. Bowden
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 514PA08-3
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: December 19, 2014

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. SAMUEL KRIS HUNT, Defendant. 
 
NO. COA10-666 
 
(Filed 3 May 2011) 
 
1. 
Sexual Offenses — second-degree — mentally disabled victim 
— evidence not sufficient 
 
 
The trial court erred by denying defendant's motion to 
dismiss a charge of second-degree sex offense where 
defendant contended that there was insufficient evidence 
that the victim was mentally disabled.  The first element 
of mental disability under N.C.G.S. § 14-27.1(1) is "mental 
retardation;" however, there is a wide range of abilities 
among those with such a diagnosis and the evidence must 
also show that the victim was substantially incapable of 
appraising the nature of his or her conduct, of resisting a 
sexual act, or of communicating unwillingness to submit to 
a sexual act.  The State's evidence did not satisfy the 
latter requirement. 
 
2. 
Sexual Offenses — crime against nature — mentally disabled 
victim — evidence not sufficient 
 
 
The trial court erred by denying defendant's motion to 
dismiss the charge of crime against nature where the 
State's theory was that defendant committed the offense 
against a mentally disabled person who was incapable of 
consenting to any sexual acts.  There was insufficient 
evidence that she was incapable of consenting. 
 
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered on 8 October 2009 
by Judge Edwin G. Wilson, Jr. in Superior Court, Randolph 
County.  Heard in the Court of Appeals 26 October 2010. 
 
Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney 
General Elizabeth J. Weese, for the State. 
 
M. Alexander Charns, for defendant-appellant. 
 
 
STROUD, Judge. 
 
 
 
-2- 
 
 
Samuel Kris Hunt (“defendant”) appeals from a trial court’s 
order convicting him of second-degree sexual offense and a crime 
against nature.  Because the State failed to present sufficient 
evidence of the victim’s mental disability, we reverse and 
vacate defendant’s convictions. 
I.  Background 
On 21 July 2008, defendant was indicted for second-degree 
sexual offense and a crime against nature.  On 6 October 2009, 
defendant was tried on these charges during the Criminal Session 
of the Superior Court, Randolph County.  The State’s evidence 
tended to show that defendant lived with his wife and five 
children in Asheboro, North Carolina.  On 25 May 2008, 
defendant’s daughter Madison1 had her sixteenth birthday party in 
the park, and her friend, Clara2, age seventeen, attended the 
party.  Clara and another girl decided to spend the night at 
defendant’s house watching movies with Madison.  Defendant and 
his wife left the house around 9:00 p.m. and did not return 
until around 3:00 a.m. the next morning.  Clara testified that 
when defendant returned, she was in the living room watching a 
movie with Madison and the other children in the house.  
                     
1 We will refer to the defendant’s minor daughter by the 
pseudonym Madison to protect her identity and for ease of 
reading. 
2 We will refer to the victim by the pseudonym Clara to protect 
her identity and for ease of reading. 
 
 
 
-3- 
Defendant first went to the bedroom but came back and sat down 
in the living room.  Defendant then tapped Clara on the arm and 
motioned for her to follow him into the kitchen.  Once in the 
kitchen, defendant began touching Clara on her breasts, vagina, 
and her “[b]utt.”  Defendant then “took his penis out[,]” and 
forced Clara’s head down to his penis and she “[t]ried to pull 
away.”  Clara then put defendant’s penis in her mouth and when 
she tried to raise her head, defendant pushed her head back down 
to his penis a second time and it went into her mouth again.  
Defendant then told her “Don’t tell nobody.  I can get in 
serious trouble.”  Defendant told Clara to go to his bedroom but 
instead she returned to the living room.  Five minutes later 
Clara told the other girl spending the night with them what 
defendant had done.  Later that morning, Clara told Madison that 
Madison’s father had touched her and she had “sucked his dick.” 
Clara left defendant’s residence, returned home, and told her 
father what had happened.  Her father took her to the police 
station to give a statement about what happened.  Defendant was 
subsequently detained by police. 
The State also presented evidence of Clara’s mental 
disability.  Clara testified that at the time of trial, she was 
in 12th grade, that she was getting A’s and B’s in school, 
planning to get a driver’s license, and planning to attend the 
local community college after graduation.  Clara testified that 
 
 
 
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she had babysat for “a lot of people” in her neighborhood and 
paid her own bills.  There was evidence presented that at the 
time of trial, she was living with her boyfriend and his mother. 
Additionally, the State presented testimony from Asheboro 
Police Department Investigator Deborah McKenzie that she knew 
Clara from when she served as a school resource officer at 
Clara’s middle school and she testified that Clara acted “child-
like for her age group[.]”  Lisa Cheek, a social worker with the 
Asheboro City School System, testified that she had known Clara 
for more than three years.  Ms. Cheek testified that there were  
three levels at the school [for] children 
with exceptional disabilities, some with the 
higher levels, IQ levels, can be placed in 
the regular classrooms. Some who fall where 
they can’t be in the regular classrooms and 
learn, go to the occupational skills course 
of study. And then those who cannot go out 
into the workforce or have really severe 
problems 
go 
into 
the 
functional 
skills 
class. 
 
Ms. Cheek further testified that  
[a]s long as I’ve known [Clara], she’s been 
in the occupational course of study level 
[the middle range], which is a class for 
special–for 
kids 
that 
have 
learning 
disabilities that kind of go at a slower 
pace.  And . . . they go out into the 
workforce and they work hours and come back 
in.  They have to have so many hours to 
graduate.   
 
Ms. Cheek also testified that contrary to Clara’s testimony, the 
Randolph County Department of Social Services (“DSS”) paid her 
 
 
 
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bills for her.  Cheryl Lackey from the Randolph County DSS 
confirmed that DSS did pay Clara’s bills and she further 
testified that Clara had a developmental disability and “her IQ 
is lower than 70.”  Heather Cox, a special education teacher at 
Asheboro High School, testified that Clara was “classified as 
intellectually disabled in the mild category” and that “IQ-wise 
100 is average” and Clara has an IQ of 61.  Ms. Cox also 
testified that Clara was in a  
modified curriculum.  They still do English, 
math, social studies, science, but it’s–it’s 
more job skill oriented.  They learn how to 
write a resume.  They learn how to make 
change.  They learn how to balance a 
checkbook, basic things.  They’re not headed 
to college; this group is not.  So it’s 
things that they will use in the workforce 
as well as, you know, in their life after 
they graduate. 
 
Ms. Cox further testified that it would be “really difficult” 
but not impossible for Clara to get an associate’s degree from 
Randolph Community College and she was in the top range of her 
level of achievement at school in her classes.  Following the 
State’s presentation of evidence, defendant moved for dismissal 
based on insufficiency of the evidence and the trial court 
denied defendant’s motion. 
Defendant testified that on the night in question he had 
gone out drinking with his wife and another couple.  He 
testified that when he returned home, he believed that Clara was 
 
 
 
-6- 
interested in a sexual encounter.  Defendant admitted that Clara 
performed oral sex on him but claimed that this contact was 
consensual.  Defendant testified that Clara had been to his 
house before to call boyfriends. He had talked to Clara’s father 
on about three occasions and her father said that he was proud 
of Clara and she was a “straight A student.”  On 26 May 2008, 
the morning after the alleged incident with Clara, defendant 
drove to the Asheboro police station and gave a statement 
admitting that he engaged in fellatio with Clara in the kitchen 
of his home but the encounter was consensual.  Defendant denied 
knowing that Clara had any mental disability until the police 
informed him that she did.  At the close of the presentation of 
all evidence, defendant again moved for dismissal based on 
insufficiency of the evidence, which was subsequently denied by 
the trial court. 
On 8 October 2009, a jury found defendant guilty of second-
degree sexual offense and a crime against nature.  The trial 
court consolidated the two convictions and sentenced defendant 
to a term of 73 to 97 months imprisonment.  Defendant gave 
notice of appeal in open court. 
On appeal defendant contends that his judgments should be 
vacated and his convictions reversed because (1) the trial court 
erred by not granting defense counsel’s motion for a mistrial 
after his conflict of interest became apparent, as he was 
 
 
 
-7- 
accused of suborning perjury, coaching a child witness, and 
making false statements to the court; (2) the trial court erred 
by not granting defendant’s motion to dismiss the charges based 
on the insufficiency of the evidence; and (3) he was provided 
ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.  We find the issue 
of insufficiency of the evidence dispositive and thus we will 
address only this issue. 
II.  Insufficiency of the evidence 
[1] Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence 
presented by the State to show that Clara was “mentally 
disabled” for the purposes of establishing second-degree sexual 
offense.  Specifically, defendant argues that “there was no 
expert testimony that [Clara] was so substantially incapable of 
appraising the nature of her conduct or resisting any sexual act 
or communicating unwillingness to submit to any sexual act[,]”  
but, to the contrary, the State’s evidence showed that she 
performed well in high school, babysat neighborhood children, 
planned to attend community college, was living with her 
boyfriend, and there was some indication that she was pregnant 
at the time of trial, but DSS had not raised any objection to 
her sexual relations with her boyfriend.  The State, citing 
testimony from Clara’s special education teacher, the police 
investigator, and the high school and DSS social workers, argues 
 
 
 
-8- 
that “there was substantial evidence that [Clara] was mentally 
disabled.” 
A. 
Standard of review 
It is well established that  
[t]he proper standard of review on a motion 
to dismiss based on insufficiency of the 
evidence is the substantial evidence test. 
The substantial evidence test requires a 
determination 
that 
there 
is 
substantial 
evidence (1) of each essential element of 
the offense charged, and (2) that defendant 
is 
the 
perpetrator 
of 
the 
offense. 
Substantial 
evidence 
is 
such 
relevant 
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept 
as adequate to support a conclusion. If 
there 
is 
substantial 
evidence 
of 
each 
element of the charged offense, the motion 
should be denied. 
 
State v. Martin, 195 N.C. App. 43, 50, 671 S.E.2d 53, 59 (2009) 
(citation omitted). “In reviewing challenges to the sufficiency 
of evidence, we must view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of all 
reasonable inferences.  Contradictions and discrepancies do not 
warrant dismissal of the case but are for the jury to resolve.”  
State v. Fritsch, 351 N.C. 373, 378-79, 526 S.E.2d 451, 455 
(citations, and quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 
890, 148 L.Ed. 2d 150 (2000). 
B. 
Second-degree sexual offense 
Defendant was charged with second-degree sexual offense. 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.5 (2007), in pertinent part, states that 
 
 
 
-9- 
(a) A person is guilty of a sexual offense 
in the second degree if the person engages 
in a sexual act with another person: 
 
(1) 
By force and against the will 
of the other person; or 
 
(2) 
Who 
is 
mentally 
disabled, 
mentally 
incapacitated, 
or 
physically helpless, and the 
person 
performing 
the 
act 
knows or should reasonably 
know that the other person is 
mentally 
disabled, 
mentally 
incapacitated, or physically 
helpless. 
 
See State v. Williams, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 698 S.E.2d 542, 
544 (2010) (“To support the charge of second-degree sexual 
offense, the State was required to present substantial evidence 
that the defendant (1) engaged in a sexual act; (2) with a 
person who is mentally disabled, mentally incapacitated, or 
physically helpless; and (3) knew or should reasonably have 
known that the other person is mentally disabled, mentally 
incapacitated, or physically helpless.”) “One who is mentally 
disabled under the sex offense laws is statutorily deemed 
incapable of consenting to intercourse or other sexual acts.” 
Williams, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 698 S.E.2d at 544. (citation, 
brackets, and quotation marks omitted).  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-
27.5(a)(1) is not applicable to the facts before us, as the 
trial court did not instruct the jury on the use of force.  
Additionally, there was no evidence presented showing that Clara 
 
 
 
-10- 
was 
“mentally 
incapacitated, 
or 
physically 
helpless[.]” 
Therefore, those portions of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.5 are not 
relevant to our analysis. 
The trial court did give the jury the following instruction 
as to “mental disability[:]” 
Second, that the victim was mentally 
disabled. A person is mentally disabled if 
she suffers from a mental retardation or 
mental disorder and this mental retardation 
or 
mental 
disorder 
temporarily 
or 
permanently 
renders 
her 
substantially 
incapable of appraising the nature of her 
conduct, or resisting a sexual act or 
communicating unwillingness to submit to a 
sexual act. 
   
According to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.1(1) (2007), “mentally 
disabled” means:  
(i) 
a 
victim 
who 
suffers 
from 
mental 
retardation, or (ii) a victim who suffers 
from a mental disorder, either of which 
temporarily 
or 
permanently 
renders 
the 
victim substantially incapable of appraising 
the nature of his or her conduct, or of 
resisting . . . a sexual act, or of 
communicating unwillingness to submit to . . 
. a sexual act.   
 
 
 
The State did not contend that Clara had a “mental disorder” 
which 
“temporarily 
or 
permanently 
renders 
the 
victim 
substantially incapable of appraising the nature of his or her 
conduct, or of resisting . . . a sexual act, or of communicating 
unwillingness to submit to . . . a sexual act.” See id. 
Therefore, the dispositive issue before us is whether the 
 
 
 
-11- 
evidence presented by the State was sufficient to show that 
Clara 
suffered 
from 
(1) 
mental 
retardation; 
(2) 
which 
“temporarily or permanently render[ed] [her] . . . substantially 
incapable of appraising the nature of . . . her conduct, or of 
resisting . . . a sexual act, or of communicating unwillingness 
to submit to . . . a sexual act.” See id.  We hold that the 
State’s evidence was not sufficient to satisfy this element of 
the crime of second-degree sexual offense.  
1. 
Mental retardation 
The first element of “mental disability” under N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 14-27.1(1) is “mental retardation.”  The phrase “mental 
retardation” is not further defined in Article 7A of our General 
Statutes; therefore, we must assume that the legislature 
intended its ordinary meaning to apply.  See 1 Lafayette Transp. 
Serv., Inc. v. Robeson Cty., 283 N.C. 494, 500, 196 S.E.2d 770, 
774 (1973) (“Unless the contrary appears, it is presumed that 
the Legislature intended the words of the statute to be given 
the meaning which they had in ordinary speech at the time the 
statute was enacted.”).  The ordinary meaning of “mental 
retardation” is  
subaverage intellectual ability equivalent 
to or less than an IQ of 70 that is 
accompanied 
by 
significant 
deficits 
in 
abilities (as in communication or self-care) 
necessary for independent daily functioning, 
is present from birth or infancy, and is 
manifested 
esp. 
by 
delayed 
or 
abnormal 
 
 
 
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development, by learning difficulties, and 
by problems in social adjustment. 
 
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 775 (11th ed. 2005).  
Courts have considered the definition of mental retardation in 
many contexts, both criminal and civil.  The United States 
Supreme Court in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 153 L.Ed. 2d 
335 (2002), which held that capital punishment of mentally 
retarded defendants is a cruel and unusual punishment prohibited 
by 
the 
8th 
Amendment 
of 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution,  
discussed this definitional problem, noting that: 
The 
American 
Association 
on 
Mental 
Retardation 
(AAMR) 
defines 
mental 
retardation as follows: “Mental retardation 
refers to substantial limitations in present 
functioning. 
It 
is 
characterized 
by 
significantly 
subaverage 
intellectual 
functioning, 
existing 
concurrently 
with 
related limitations in two or more of the 
following applicable adaptive skill areas: 
communication, 
self-care, 
home 
living, 
social 
skills, 
community 
use, 
self-
direction, health and safety, functional 
academics, 
leisure, 
and 
work. 
Mental 
retardation manifests before age 18.” Mental 
Retardation:  Definition, Classification, 
and Systems of Supports 5 (9th ed. 1992). 
The American Psychiatric Association’s 
definition 
is 
similar: 
“The 
essential 
feature 
of 
Mental 
Retardation 
is 
significantly 
subaverage 
general 
intellectual functioning (Criterion A) that 
is accompanied by significant limitations in 
adaptive functioning in at least two of the 
following skill areas:  communication, self-
care, 
home 
living, 
social/interpersonal 
skills, use of community resources, self-
direction, functional academic skills, work, 
leisure, health, and safety (Criterion B). 
 
 
 
-13- 
The onset must occur before age 18 years 
(Criterion C).  Mental Retardation has many 
different etiologies and may be seen as a 
final common pathway of various pathological 
processes that affect the functioning of the 
central 
nervous 
system.” 
American 
Psychiatric 
Association, 
Diagnostic 
and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 41 
(4th ed.2000). “Mild” mental retardation is 
typically used to describe people with an IQ 
level of 50–55 to approximately 70. Id., at 
42–43.  
 
Id. at 308 n.3, 153 L.Ed 2d at 342 n.3.  The United States 
Supreme Court recognized that the determination of mental 
retardation is essentially a medical diagnosis which is based 
upon a combination of factors.   
[C]linical definitions of mental retardation 
require not only subaverage intellectual 
functioning, 
but 
also 
significant 
limitations 
in 
adaptive 
skills 
such 
as 
communication, self-care, and self-direction 
that 
became 
manifest 
before 
age 
18.  
Mentally retarded persons frequently know 
the difference between right and wrong and 
are competent to stand trial. Because of 
their impairments, however, by definition 
they 
have 
diminished 
capacities 
to 
understand 
and 
process 
information, 
to 
communicate, to abstract from mistakes and 
learn from experience, to engage in logical 
reasoning, 
to 
control 
impulses, 
and 
to 
understand the reactions of others. . . . 
[T]here is abundant evidence that they often 
act on impulse rather than pursuant to a 
premeditated 
plan, 
and 
that 
in 
group 
settings they are followers rather than 
leaders.  
 
Id. at 318, 153 L.Ed 2d at 348 (footnotes omitted).  For the 
purpose of sentencing in a capital punishment case, our 
 
 
 
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legislature has defined “mentally retarded” as “[s]ignificantly 
subaverage 
general 
intellectual 
functioning, 
existing 
concurrently 
with 
significant 
limitations 
in 
adaptive 
functioning, both of which were manifested before the age of 
18.”  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-2005(a)(1)(a) (2007). 
All of the definitions of “mental retardation” noted in the 
statutes and caselaw above are generally consistent with the 
dictionary definition.  All of the definitions include three 
elements: (1) subaverage intellectual ability; (2) significant 
deficits in abilities needed for independent daily functioning; 
and (3) the condition was present from a young age.  The State 
presented evidence that Clara had a low I.Q., below 70, or 61, 
which would be in the range of mental retardation.  The State 
also presented evidence that Clara had some deficits in 
abilities needed for daily living, although whether they were 
substantial or significant deficits may be debatable.  In 
addition, her condition was present from a young age.  But even 
if 
the 
evidence 
was 
sufficient 
to 
establish 
“mental 
retardation[,]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.1(1) requires not just a 
diagnosis of mental retardation, but also evidence that the 
mental retardation is of such a degree that it “temporarily or 
permanently renders the victim substantially incapable of 
appraising the nature of his or her conduct, or of resisting . . 
. a sexual act, or of communicating unwillingness to submit to . 
 
 
 
-15- 
. . a sexual act.”  N.C. Gen. Stat.  § 14-27.1(1)  thus 
recognizes that there is a wide range of abilities among those 
who have a diagnosis of mental retardation.  Some are able to 
function well in society and live independently or with minimal 
assistance, while others cannot. 
2. 
Renders victim substantially incapable of resistance 
The second element of the definition of “mental disability” 
addresses the victim’s ability to resist a sexual advance.  Even 
if the State’s evidence satisfied the ordinary definition of 
“mental retardation,” it did not demonstrate that Clara was 
“substantially incapable of appraising the nature of . . . her 
conduct, or of resisting . . . a sexual act, or of communicating 
unwillingness to submit to . . . a sexual act[,]”  as stated in 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.1(1).  The State presented the following 
evidence regarding Clara’s mental capacity:  Clara was in the 
top range of her level of achievement at high school in her 
classes, making A’s and B’s; she babysat neighborhood children; 
she planned to get her driver’s license and to attend community 
college after graduation; at the time of trial, she was living 
with her boyfriend and his mother; and there was some indication 
that she was pregnant but there had been no DSS intervention or 
charges filed against the boyfriend.3  Clara was also described 
                     
3 Were we to accept the State’s argument that Clara’s diagnosis 
of 
mental 
retardation 
along 
with 
the 
evidence 
of 
her 
 
 
 
-16- 
as “childlike”; she attended classes for children with learning 
disabilities; she was classified as intellectually disabled in 
the mild category, with an I.Q. of 61; DSS paid her bills for 
her; and it would be difficult for her to get an associate’s 
degree from the local community college. 
In State v. Williams, ___ N.C. App. ___, 698 S.E.2d 542 
(2010), and State v. Washington, 131 N.C. App. 156, 506 S.E.2d 
283 (1998), this Court addressed the issue of whether there was 
sufficient evidence to establish the victim’s mental disability.  
In Williams, the defendant was convicted on one count of second-
degree sexual offense and one count of a crime against nature.  
Id. at ___, 698 S.E.2d at 544.  On appeal, the defendant 
contended that the trial court erred as “there was insufficient 
evidence that [the victim] was mentally disabled pursuant to 
North Carolina General Statutes, section 14-27.1(1).” Id. 
Specifically, the defendant argued that there was insufficient 
evidence to show that the victim was substantially incapable of 
resisting a sexual act, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-
27.1(1). Id. at ___, 698 S.E.2d at 545.  Citing State v. Oliver, 
                                                                  
capabilities as presented at trial are sufficient to show that 
she is unable to consent to a sexual act under N.C. Gen. Stat.  
§ 
14-27.1(1), 
Clara 
would 
be 
legally 
incapable 
of 
ever 
consenting to sexual acts with anyone, including her boyfriend, 
and he -- or even her future husband, should she ever marry-- 
would be subject to criminal liability for any sexual activity 
with Clara.  
 
 
 
-17- 
85 N.C. App. 1, 20, 354 S.E.2d 527, 538 (1987), this Court noted 
that  
the element of “substantially incapable of . 
. . resisting the . . . sexual act” is not 
negated by the victim’s ability to verbally 
protest or even to engage in some physical 
resistance 
of 
the 
abuse. 
The 
words 
“substantially 
incapable” 
show 
the 
Legislature’s intent to include within the 
definition of “mentally [disabled]” those 
persons who by reason of their mental 
retardation or disorder would give little or 
no physical resistance to a sexual act. 
 
Id. The trial court noted that expert testimony showed that the 
victim  
had a full scale I.Q. of fifty-eight, 
placing him in the range of mild mental 
retardation[;] 
. 
. 
. 
had 
difficulty 
expressing himself verbally; was able to 
read very simple words like go, cat, and in; 
was able to solve very simple addition and 
subtraction problems; and had difficulty 
answering questions about social abilities, 
every-day-life tasks. 
  
Id. (quotation marks and brackets omitted).  The victim’s sister 
testified that the victim “needed daily assistance with cooking, 
washing his clothes, and making sure he brushed his teeth.” Id. 
(quotation marks and brackets omitted).  The victim testified 
that he did not want the defendant to perform oral sex on him 
and also told police that “he did not want the incident to take 
place.” Id.  This Court concluded that nothwithstanding the 
victim’s unwillingness to receive oral sex, “defendant completed 
the sexual act, allowing an inference that [the victim] was 
 
 
 
-18- 
unable to resist the sexual act.”  Id.  This Court then held 
that “[w]hen taken in the light most favorable to the State, a 
reasonable juror could find that [the victim] was substantially 
incapable of resisting a sexual act and was ‘mentally disabled’ 
pursuant to North Carolina General Statutes, section 14-
27.1(1).” Id. at ___, 698 S.E.2d at 546.   
  
Likewise in Washington, the defendant was indicted on two 
counts of second-degree rape4 and two counts of second-degree 
sexual offense.  Id. at 159, 506 S.E.2d at 285.  At trial, the 
State presented expert witness testimony from Dr. Monty Grubb, 
as an expert “in the field of psychology, specifically in the 
field of working with, counseling, and treating mentally 
retarded people.”  Id. at 164, 506 S.E.2d at 288. For over a 
year, Dr. Grubb had met with the victim “once a month for 
counseling sessions lasting twenty to thirty minutes.”  Id. at 
164, 506 S.E.2d at 289.  Dr. Grubb testified 
that [the victim] was mentally retarded. 
Based on his experiences and on his review 
of psychological evaluations performed on 
[the victim], Dr. Grubb testified that [the 
victim] functions around the level of an 
eight-year-old, 
both 
mentally 
and 
emotionally. 
He 
testified 
that 
[the 
                     
4 A person can be found guilty of second-degree rape pursuant to 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.3 (2007) “if the person engages in 
vaginal intercourse with another person: . . . . Who is mentally 
disabled, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless, and 
the person performing the act knows or should reasonably know 
the other person is mentally disabled, mentally incapacitated, 
or physically helpless.” (Emphasis added). 
 
 
 
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victim’s] ability to make informed decisions 
about 
“anything 
complicated” 
is 
significantly 
decreased 
by 
her 
mental 
retardation.  In Dr. Grubb’s words, “She 
can’t evaluate a lot of different things and 
put it together and make a decision in her 
own 
best 
interest 
most 
of 
the 
time.  
Weighing all the consequences and all the 
information is something that she is not 
very capable of doing.” 
 
Id. at 164-65, 506 S.E.2d at 289.  In response to the State’s 
question as to how the victim “would react to a sexual advance 
made by an adult with whom she was only vaguely familiar[,]” Dr. 
Grubb answered that the victim “might ‘freeze,’ because her 
‘initial reaction could be so emotionally laden, not realizing 
what was happening, . . . given the emotional nature of the 
situation[,]’” and, consequently, she “might easily be taken 
advantage of by a stranger.”  Id. at 165, 506 S.E.2d at 289.  On 
appeal from his conviction on all charges, the defendant 
contended that “the trial court erred by denying his motion to 
dismiss all charges.”  Id. at 166, 506 S.E.2d at 290.   This 
Court noted that  
if there is substantial evidence that a 
person has engaged in prohibited sexual 
conduct in violation of G.S. 14-27.3 or 14-
27.5, and that the victim was mentally 
defective, and that the person performing 
the act knew or reasonably should have known 
that the victim was mentally defective, then 
ipso facto, there is substantial evidence 
that the person has engaged in such conduct 
“by force and against the will” of the 
victim.   
 
 
 
 
-20- 
Id. at 167, 506 S.E.2d at 290.  In affirming the denial of the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss, this Court held that  
there 
was 
substantial 
evidence 
that 
defendant 
engaged 
in 
both 
vaginal 
intercourse and a “sexual act” with [the 
victim;] . . . . that [the victim] was 
mentally retarded, and that defendant knew 
of [the victim’s] retardation[;] . . . . 
[and] that [the victim’s] mental retardation 
rendered 
her 
substantially 
incapable 
of 
“resisting the act of vaginal intercourse or 
a sexual act.”  
Id.  
We first note that the Court in Williams inferred from the 
victim’s actions that he “was unable to resist the sexual 
act[,]” as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.1(1) because the 
victim testified that he did not want the sexual act performed 
but ultimately allowed the defendant to perform the sexual act. 
___ N.C. App. at ___, 698 S.E.2d at 545.  Yet this inference was 
based in part on the expert’s testimony that the victim “had 
difficulty expressing himself verbally; was able to read very 
simple words like go, cat, and in; was able to solve very simple 
addition and subtraction problems; and had difficulty answering 
questions about social abilities, every-day-life tasks.” Id.  
Here, defendant forced Clara’s head down to his penis and she 
“[t]ried to pull away[,]” indicating that she did not want to 
perform the sexual act but ultimately did perform oral sex on 
defendant.  There was no evidence that Clara had difficulty with 
communication; she also promptly reported defendant’s acts to 
 
 
 
-21- 
her friend, Madison, her father and the police on the day of the 
incident and testified at trial clearly, with little if any 
indication that she had difficulty understanding or answering 
questions from counsel. We cannot draw an inference regarding 
Clara’s inability to resist a sexual advance, as did the court 
in Williams, as there was no expert testimony regarding the 
effect of her mental retardation upon her ability to communicate 
resistance to sexual advances.  The evidence here demonstrates 
that Clara was functioning at a much higher level that the 
victim in Williams, as she was performing well in school and 
social situations.  The expert witnesses in Williams and 
Washington testified about the nature and extent of each 
victim’s mental retardation, noting the victim’s communication 
and reading skills, social abilities, mental and emotional age, 
cognitive limitations, decision-making skills, and responses to 
sexual advances by adults.  This expert testimony was based on 
their 
professional 
knowledge, 
psychological 
evaluations 
performed on the victims, and from observations made during 
counseling sessions.  Here, unlike Williams or Washington, all 
of the State’s witnesses were lay witnesses and none were 
qualified as experts in evaluating or treating persons with 
mental disabilities.5  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 701 (2007) 
                     
5 Although we recognize that a teacher or a social worker may 
have specialized training which could permit her to testify as 
 
 
 
-22- 
limits lay witnesses’ testimony to “the form of opinions or 
inferences . . . to those opinions or inferences which are (a) 
rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) 
helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the 
determination of a fact in issue.”  It is possible that in some 
cases 
a 
lay 
witness 
may 
have 
sufficient 
knowledge 
and 
understanding of the victim or the victim’s disability may be so 
severe 
and 
obvious 
that 
“rationally 
based 
on 
[his] 
perception[s][,]” see id, he could provide evidence to support a 
finding that the victim’s mental retardation or mental disorder 
was such that the victim was “substantially incapable of 
appraising the nature of his or her conduct, or of resisting . . 
. a sexual act, or of communicating unwillingness to submit to . 
. . a sexual act.”  See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.1(1).   In this 
case, the witnesses did not, and as lay witnesses could not, 
give an opinion that Clara, who has mild mental retardation but 
is also functional enough to perform well in school and 
communicate well with others is “[m]entally disabled” as defined 
by 
N.C. 
Gen. 
Stat. 
§ 
14-27.1(1), 
based 
only 
on 
their 
perceptions.  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 702(a) (2007) states 
that “[i]f scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge 
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
                                                                  
an expert witness, no witness in this case was proffered as an 
expert or presented testimony as an expert witness. 
 
 
 
-23- 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may 
testify thereto in the form of an opinion.”  As illustrated by 
Williams and Washington, an expert witness qualified to evaluate 
the victim’s mental retardation and ability to function was 
necessary 
in 
this 
situation 
to 
provide 
the 
“scientific, 
technical or other specialized knowledge[,]” see id., to assist 
the jurors in understanding the extent of Clara’s mental 
retardation and to discern whether she was “substantially 
incapable of appraising the nature of . . . her conduct, or of 
resisting . . . a sexual act, or of communicating unwillingness 
to submit to . . . a sexual act.”  See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-
27.1(1).   
We note that in cases where a defendant who is charged with 
a crime claims to be mentally retarded, our Courts have 
frequently relied on expert opinions to determine the existence 
and extent of a defendant’s mental retardation.  See State v. 
Ortez, 178 N.C. App. 236, 247-48, 631 S.E.2d 188, 196-97 (2006) 
(the Court considered contrasting expert witness testimony 
regarding the extent of the defendant’s mental retardation in 
determining whether defendant knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily waived his Miranda rights), appeal dismissed and 
disc. review denied, 361 N.C. 434, 649 S.E.2d 642 (2007); State 
v. Nicholson, 355 N.C. 1, 56, 558 S.E.2d 109, 145-46 (2002) 
 
 
 
-24- 
(holding no error in the trial court not giving a peremptory 
instruction on the mitigating factor--“The age of the defendant 
at the time of the crime”--for purposes of capital punishment 
sentencing pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-2000(f)(7) because 
the defendant’s “mental age was by no means established by a 
consensus of experts” as the defendants’ experts testified that 
the 32 year old defendant’s mental age was between 12 1/2 and 13 
years of age and between “mild mental retardation and borderline 
IQ” but other expert witnesses testified that “his social skills 
were 
described 
as 
‘pretty 
good’ 
and 
as 
‘his 
biggest 
strength.’”); State v. Zuniga, 348 N.C. 214, 217-18, 498 S.E.2d 
611, 613 (1998) (because expert witness testimony established 
that the defendant had “a history of mild to moderate mental 
retardation and organic brain syndrome of moderate range[;]” and 
an IQ of 56 or 64, indicating a mental age of 7.4 years; and had 
very low impulse control, it was prejudicial error for the trial 
court not to submit the N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-2000(f)(7) 
mitigating circumstance regarding the defendant’s age at the 
time of the crime to the jury).  In addition, the expert 
evaluation of mental retardation normally requires specialized 
testing, including IQ tests and other psychological tests, as 
well as observation of the person who is being evaluated, to 
determine the existence and degree of mental retardation.   
 
 
 
-25- 
Likewise in civil cases, our Courts have relied on expert 
opinions to determine the existence and extent of a party’s 
mental retardation.  See In re LaRue, 113 N.C. App. 807, 811-12, 
440 S.E.2d 301, 303-04 (1994) (the trial court erred in 
terminating the parental rights of the parents as the expert 
witness testimony that they had “IQ scores of 71 and 72[,]” were 
“borderline” mentally retarded, and did not exhibit “significant 
defects in adaptive behavior” did not support a conclusion “that 
they are mentally retarded within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. 
§ 7A-289.32(7)”); Gilliam v. Perdue Farms, 112 N.C. App. 535, 
537, 435 S.E.2d 780, 781 (1993) (the trial court in holding that 
there 
was 
competent 
evidence 
to 
support 
the 
Industrial 
Commission’s conclusion that the claimant was disabled relied in 
part on expert testimony that the claimant’s “functional 
capacity 
assessment” 
revealed 
that 
he 
was 
“cognitively 
dysfunctional and appear[ed] to be mentally retarded”); Suggs v. 
Snow Hill Milling Co., 100 N.C. App. 527, 530-31, 397 S.E.2d 
240, 241-42 (1990) (this Court relied in part on expert 
testimony that the plaintiff “had [a] considerable mental 
handicap” in determining that competent evidence supported the 
Industrial Commission’s findings). 
In this case, the necessity for expert testimony is 
highlighted by defendant’s claim that he did not know and 
reasonably would not know from his observations of Clara that 
 
 
 
-26- 
she was mentally disabled, as his knowledge of her disability is 
also an element of second-degree sexual offense under N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 14-27.5.  Defendant claimed, and Clara’s own testimony 
confirmed, that he knew Clara as one of his daughter’s friends 
who attended school, was a good student, and appeared to 
function as a normal 17 year old girl. 
Accordingly, we hold that in situations such as presented 
by this case, where the victim’s IQ falls within the range 
considered to be “mental retardation[,]” but who is highly 
functional in her daily activities and communication, the State 
must present expert testimony as to the extent of the victim’s 
mental disability as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.5.  Here 
no expert witness testified as to the extent of Clara’s mental 
disability.  Even when viewed in the light most favorable to the 
State, see Fritsch, 351 N.C. at 378, 526 S.E.2d at 455, the 
State’s lay witness testimony was insufficient to establish that 
Clara’s 
mental 
retardation 
“temporarily 
or 
permanently 
render[ed] [her] . . . substantially incapable of appraising the 
nature of . . . her conduct, or of resisting . . . a sexual act, 
or of communicating unwillingness to submit to . . . a sexual 
act.”  See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.1(1).   Thus, we hold there 
was insufficient evidence to satisfy this required element of 
second-degree sex offense.  See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.5.  
Therefore, the trial court erred in not granting defendant’s 
 
 
 
-27- 
motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence as to this charged 
offense. 
C. 
Crime against Nature 
 
[2] Defendant, citing State v. Whiteley, 172 N.C. App. 772, 616 
S.E.2d 576 (2005), argues that since there was insufficient 
evidence of second-degree sexual offense, there was also 
insufficient evidence of the crime against nature, so the trial 
court erred in denying his motion to dismiss on that charge.  
The State counters that the trial court properly denied 
defendant’s motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence 
as to the crime against nature charge, as this charge “was based 
on non-consensual sexual acts[.]” 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-177 (2007) states that “[i]f any 
person shall commit the crime against nature, with mankind or 
beast, he shall be punished as a Class I felon.”  “[T]he 
legislative intent and purpose of G.S. 14-177 . . . is to punish 
persons who undertake by unnatural and indecent methods to 
gratify a perverted and depraved sexual instinct which is an 
offense against public decency and morality.”  State v. Stubbs, 
266 N.C. 295, 298, 145 S.E.2d 899, 902 (1966). The act of 
fellatio is considered a crime against nature.  State v. Poe, 40 
N.C. App. 385, 387-88, 252 S.E.2d 843, 844-45, cert. denied and 
appeal dismissed, 298 N.C. 303, 259 S.E.2d 304 (1979), appeal 
dismissed, 445 U.S. 947, 63 L.Ed. 2d 782 (1980). 
 
 
 
-28- 
In Whiteley, the defendant challenged the constitutionality 
of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-177 in light of the United States 
Supreme Court’s holding in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 156 
L.Ed. 2d 508 (2003).  172 N.C. App. at 773, 616 S.E.2d at 577-
78. The Court in Whiteley noted that in Lawrence the Court held 
that a Texas law “prohibiting ‘deviate sexual intercourse’ with 
a member of the same sex violated the due process clause, where 
the individuals charged were adults engaging in consensual, 
private sexual activity[,]” and that the holding in Lawrence was 
“based on the unconstitutional infringement of the liberty 
interest in private, intimate acts between consenting adults.”  
172 N.C. App. at 776, 616 S.E.2d at 579 (citing Lawrence, 539 
U.S. at 574-75, 578, 156 L.Ed. 2d at 523, 525).  The Court in 
Whiteley also noted that the “liberty interest in personal 
relations” in Lawrence did have limitations as the opinion 
“clearly indicates that state regulation of sexual conduct 
involving minors, non-consensual or coercive conduct, public 
conduct, and prostitution falls outside the boundaries of the 
liberty interest protecting personal relations and is therefore 
constitutionally permissible.”  Id. at 776-77, 616 S.E.2d at 
579-80. 
In 
holding 
that 
N.C. 
Gen. 
Stat. 
§ 
14-177 
was 
constitutional on its face, in light of the holding in Lawrence, 
the Court held “that section 14-177 may properly be used to 
prosecute conduct in which a minor is involved, conduct 
 
 
 
-29- 
involving non-consensual or coercive sexual acts, conduct 
occurring in a public place, or conduct involving prostitution 
or solicitation[.]”  Id. at 779, 616 S.E.2d at 581.  In 
addressing the defendant’s argument as to the application of 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-177 to the facts before them, the Court 
held that “in order for the application of section 14-177 to be 
constitutional post-Lawrence . . . the State must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that defendant committed the sexual act,  . . . 
and that such an act was non-consensual.”  Id. at 779, 616 
S.E.2d at 581.  In applying this rule, the Court held that the 
trial court had erred in its instructions to the jury “[a]s the 
jury was not instructed to consider whether the act was 
committed without [the victim’s] consent[.]”  Id. at 780, 616 
S.E.2d at 581. 
The State alleged that defendant committed the crime of 
second-degree sexual offense because he engaged in a sexual act 
with Clara, a mentally disabled person who was incapable of 
consenting to any sexual acts.  See Williams, ___ N.C. App. at 
___, 698 S.E.2d at 544.  Thus, the State’s proof of the lack of 
consent is based solely upon Clara’s inability to consent 
because of her mental disability.  Yet we held above that the 
State presented insufficient evidence to meet N.C. Gen. Stat.  § 
14-27.1(1)’s definition of “mentally disabled.”  Just as there 
was insufficient evidence to show that Clara was incapable of 
 
 
 
-30- 
consenting for purposes of proving the charged crime of second-
degree sexual offense, there was also insufficient evidence to 
prove that Clara was incapable of consenting for purposes of a 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-177 crime against nature charge, under the 
standard established by Whiteley.  Thus, the State did not 
present sufficient evidence to “prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that defendant committed the sexual act,  . . . and that such an 
act was non-consensual.”  Whiteley, 172 N.C. at 779, 616 S.E.2d 
at 581.  Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying 
defendant’s motion to dismiss as to the crime against nature 
charge.  As there was insufficient evidence of both of the 
charges against defendant and the trial court erred in not 
granting defendant’s motion to dismiss, we reverse and vacate 
defendant’s convictions for second-degree sexual offense and the 
crime against nature. 
 
VACATED. 
 
 
Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge STEPHENS concur.