Title: New Jersey in the Interest of J.A.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: June 6, 2018

New Jersey in the Interest of J.A. Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary The issue before the New Jersey Supreme Court in this matter centered on the admissibility of evidence procured from a home after police officers’ warrantless entry. A man was attacked at a bus stop in Willingboro and his cell phone was stolen. He and a police officer tracked the phone’s location to a nearby house using a phone tracking application. Several officers arrived at the house, and one spotted the stolen cell phone’s case through a window. When no one responded to their knocks on the door, the officers entered the house through an unlocked window. Once inside, they performed a protective sweep to determine whether the suspect was inside, and they found defendant, J.A., then seventeen years of age, under the covers of a bed. Shortly thereafter, defendant’s mother and brother arrived home. After the officers explained their investigation, defendant’s mother consented to a search of the house, and defendant’s brother voluntarily retrieved the stolen phone. Defendant was later charged with second-degree robbery for theft of the phone. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the officers’ entry into his home was unconstitutional because the officers entered without a warrant and there were no circumstances that would justify an exception to the warrant requirement. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress, finding that although the officers’ search procedure may have been imprudent, it was ultimately defendant’s brother - without any coercion or duress from law enforcement - who retrieved the cell phone. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate panel’s determination that the officers’ warrantless entry was justified by the claimed exigency faced by the officers. However, the Court agreed defendant’s brother’s actions did not constitute state action and were sufficiently attenuated from the unlawful police conduct. Because we find that the brother’s independent actions operated to preclude application of the exclusionary rule to the evidence, the Court did not reach the question of defendant’s mother’s consent to search. Accordingly, the Court modified and affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Division. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUS(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.) State of New Jersey in the Interest of J.A. (A-38-16) (077383)Argued January 2, 2018 -- Decided June 6, 2018FERNANDEZ-VINA, J., writing for the Court. In this case, the Court considers the admissibility of evidence procured from a home after police officers’ warrantless entry. The victim was standing at a bus stop in Willingboro when he was approached by a young man in a hooded black sweatshirt and camouflage shorts, who asked to use his cell phone. The man punched the victim in the arm, took the phone, and ran. A Willingboro Police Officer was dispatched to meet the victim at the bus stop. The victim explained that the phone was an Apple iPhone, which had been in a pink glittery case. The officer and the victim used the “Find My iPhone” application to track the location of the phone. The application immediately identified a house about three blocks from the bus stop as the phone’s whereabouts. After about two minutes, the phone was shut off, which prevented the application from further tracking the phone’s location. Police officers decided to secure the perimeter of the house. While performing an exterior security check, an officer peered through a first-floor window and noticed a pink glittery phone case matching the victim’s description on a nearby bed. At that point, the police thought that the young man who took the victim’s phone may have been inside the house. No one responded to the officers’ several knocks on the front door. One officer found an unlocked window on the first floor, through which he and another officer entered the house. The officers found defendant, unarmed, upstairs in the master bedroom, lying under a blanket on the bed. The officers also found a hooded sweatshirt and a pair of camouflage shorts nearby. The officers handcuffed defendant, brought him downstairs, and questioned him about his knowledge of the robbery. Defendant’s family members subsequently arrived at the house, including his older brother and mother, who lived there. The latter informed the officers that they could search the house for the missing phone. The brother asked if the officers had found the phone, and when they responded that they had not, he said that if it was not in defendant’s bedroom, it was probably in the younger brother’s room. Without encouragement from the police, he went to their younger brother’s room accompanied by an officer, found a phone, and gave it to the officer. The phone matched the victim’s description of his stolen phone. Defendant’s mother later provided written consent to search the house. Defendant was charged with an act that would have constituted second-degree robbery had he been an adult at the time. He filed a motion to suppress the phone. The court held that because defendant’s brother retrieved the phone, and because he did not act as an agent of the officers, defendant could not bring a constitutional claim to challenge the seizure of the phone. Therefore, the court denied defendant’s suppression motion. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the officers had probable cause to search and faced exigent circumstances, which justified their warrantless entry into defendant’s home. The panel stated that “[t]he technology that led police to [defendant’s] home provided some of the exigency supporting their entry” and concluded that the record supported a finding that the hot pursuit exception to the warrant requirement rendered the officers’ action constitutional. The panel found that because defendant’s brother, a non-state actor, uncovered the phone, defendant’s mother’s consent was not significant to the constitutional analysis of this search. The Court granted certification. 229 N.J. 164 (2017).HELD: Neither exigency nor the hot pursuit doctrine justified the officers’ warrantless entry here. However, defendant’s brother’s actions did not constitute state action and were sufficiently attenuated from the unlawful police conduct to preclude application of the exclusionary rule to the evidence. 1 1. A warrantless entry into a home is presumptively invalid unless the State can show that it falls within one of the specific, delineated exceptions to the general warrant requirement. Evidence found pursuant to a warrantless search not justified by an exception to the warrant requirement is subject to suppression under the exclusionary rule. However, the exclusionary rule applies to preclude the admission of evidence only when such evidence is suitably linked to the police misconduct. Therefore, when evidence is acquired by constitutionally valid means after initial unconstitutional action by law enforcement, courts must consider whether the exclusionary rule is applicable. Such evidence is admissible when the connection between the unconstitutional police action and the secured evidence becomes so attenuated as to dissipate the taint from the unlawful conduct. (pp. 13-16)2. One recognized exception to the warrant requirement is the presence of exigent circumstances. To invoke that exception, the State must show that the officers had probable cause and faced an objective exigency, of which police safety and the preservation of evidence remain the preeminent determinants. For a “hot pursuit” to justify an exception to the warrant requirement, officers must have had probable cause and have been in immediate or continuous pursuit of the suspect from the scene of the crime. Because the “hot pursuit” doctrine is a subset of the exigent-circumstances exception, the touchstones that would justify a warrantless entry remain the possible destruction of evidence and the threat of violence by the suspect. In State v. Bolte, hot pursuit could not justify the police entry when the defendant was unarmed and the police had no reason to believe he posed a danger or would destroy evidence—a justification usually reserved for narcotics cases. 115 N.J. 579, 593-94 (1989). (pp. 16-19)3. Here, the Court does not need to consider whether the officer’s pursuit of defendant, facilitated by his use of the Find My iPhone application, falls within the purview of the hot pursuit doctrine because the doctrine does not apply for other reasons. The State failed to prove that the police had any basis to believe defendant would injure anyone inside the house or the officers themselves, so that waiting to obtain a warrant would have been unreasonable. Likewise, the State did not show that the officers had any reason to believe that defendant would (or could) destroy the phone. Neither exigency nor the hot pursuit doctrine justified the officers’ warrantless entry here. (pp. 20-21)4. The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures operates as a restraint only upon sovereign authority. State v. Scrotsky, 39 N.J. 410, 416 (1963). Thus, “where a private person steals or unlawfully takes possession of property from the premises of the owner and turns it over to the government, which did not participate in the taking, it may be used as incriminating evidence against the owner in a subsequent criminal prosecution.” Ibid. When a private person acts “as an arm of the police,” however, the private person’s seizure of property constitutes state action for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Ibid. In Scrotsky, the landlady of an apartment building suspected that one of her tenants had been stealing personal effects from her home and entered the tenant’s apartment accompanied by a police detective. Id. at 413-14. The landlady “went into the apartment with the [police] and seized the property under color of their authority and as a participant in a police action.” Id. at 415. Therefore the evidence seized by the landlady could not be introduced. Id. at 417-18. (pp. 21-23)5. Here, defendant’s brother was clearly not acting as an agent of the State when he searched for the phone. Unlike in Scrotsky, defendant’s brother’s actions were completely independent of the officer’s investigation. The mere presence of an officer does not by itself indicate police coercion or influence, and no evidence in the record supports that defendant’s brother’s search was causally or temporally connected to the police misconduct. Defendant’s brother’s unprovoked decision to search for the phone himself is an intervening circumstance that breaks the causal connection between the unlawful police entry and the finding of the phone. The brother’s actions were voluntary and unsolicited by the police, and the phone is immune from the exclusionary rule. (pp. 23-26) The judgment of the Appellate Division is MODIFIED and AFFIRMED. JUSTICE ALBIN, DISSENTING, notes that the State bears the burden of proving attenuation. According to Justice Albin, the State failed to show that the unlawful police occupation of the family home did not heavily influence the brother’s decision to fetch the phone and that, absent the unlawful police presence, the brother would have volunteered to look for the phone. The taint from the unconstitutional police occupation of defendant’s home was not purged by the brother’s cooperation with the police, in Justice Albin’s view. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA’s opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a dissenting opinion, in which JUSTICE LaVECCHIA joins. 2 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 38 September Term 2016 077383STATE OF NEW JERSEYIN THE INTEREST OF J.A., Juvenile–Appellant. Argued January 2, 2018 – Decided June 6, 2018 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Peter T. Blum, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant J.A. (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Peter T. Blum, of counsel and on the briefs). Steven A. Yomtov, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent State of New Jersey (Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney; Steven A. Yomtov, of counsel and on the briefs). Alexander Shalom argued the cause for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (Edward L. Barocas, Legal Director, and Rutgers Constitutional Rights Clinic, attorneys; Alexander Shalom, Edward L. Barocas, Jeanne LoCicero, of counsel and on the brief, and Ronald K. Chen, on the brief). Jonathan Romberg argued the cause for amicus curiae Seton Hall University School of Law Center for Social Justice (Seton Hall University School of Law Center for Social Justice, attorney; Jonathan Romberg, on the brief). 1 JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case, we consider the admissibility of evidenceprocured from a home after police officers’ warrantless entry. A man was attacked at a bus stop in Willingboro and hiscell phone was stolen. He and a police officer tracked thephone’s location to a nearby house using a phone trackingapplication. Several officers arrived at the house, and one spotted thestolen cell phone’s case through a window. When no oneresponded to their knocks on the door, the officers entered thehouse through an unlocked window. Once inside, they performed aprotective sweep to determine whether the suspect was inside,and they found defendant, J.A., then seventeen years of age,under the covers of a bed. Shortly thereafter, defendant’smother and brother arrived home. After the officers explainedtheir investigation, defendant’s mother consented to a search ofthe house, and defendant’s brother voluntarily retrieved thestolen phone. Defendant was later charged with second-degreerobbery for theft of the phone. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that theofficers’ entry into his home was unconstitutional because theofficers entered without a warrant and there were nocircumstances that would justify an exception to the warrantrequirement. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to 2 suppress. The court found that, although the officers’ searchprocedure may have been imprudent, it was ultimately defendant’sbrother -- without any coercion or duress from law enforcement -- who retrieved the cell phone. The court reasoned thatdefendant could not challenge the seizure of the cell phone inlight of that lack of state action. Defendant appealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed.The panel held that the officers had probable cause to searchand found that exigent circumstances justified the officers’warrantless entry into defendant’s home. The panel also foundthat the fact that defendant’s brother, and not law enforcementofficers, retrieved the phone neutralized any potential problemswith his mother’s consent. We disagree with the panel’s determination that theofficers’ warrantless entry was justified by the claimedexigency faced by the officers. However, we agree thatdefendant’s brother’s actions did not constitute state actionand were sufficiently attenuated from the unlawful policeconduct. Because we find that the brother’s independent actionsoperate to preclude application of the exclusionary rule to theevidence, we do not reach the question of defendant’s mother’sconsent to search. Accordingly, we modify and affirm thejudgment of the Appellate Division. I. 3 A. On May 30, 2014, the victim was standing at a bus stop inWillingboro when he was approached by a young man in a hoodedblack sweatshirt and camouflage shorts. The young man asked touse the victim’s cell phone, explaining that he was locked outof his house. The victim hesitated, then reached to take outhis phone. As the victim was facing the other direction, theman punched him in the arm, took the phone, and ran. A Willingboro Police Officer was dispatched to meet thevictim at the bus stop. The victim explained that the phone wasan Apple iPhone, which had been in a pink glittery case. The officer and the victim used the “Find My iPhone”application to track the location of the phone. The applicationimmediately identified a house about three blocks from the busstop as the phone’s whereabouts. After about two minutes, thephone was shut off, which prevented the application from furthertracking the phone’s location. The officer went to the house, and other police officerswere dispatched there as well. The officers decided to securethe perimeter of the house. While performing an exteriorsecurity check, an officer peered through a first-floor windowand noticed a pink glittery phone case matching the victim’sdescription on a nearby bed. At that point, the police thought 4 that the young man who took the victim’s phone may have beeninside the house. The officers believed that the house was abandoned:curtain blinds covered most of the windows, there were no signsof life inside or cars in the driveway, and no one responded tothe officers’ several knocks on the front door. One officer found an unlocked window on the first floor,through which he and another officer entered the house. Anotherofficer subsequently entered through the front door. Onceinside, the officers began searching the house for the suspect.During their search, they observed the phone case that waspreviously seen through the first floor window, but did not takepossession of it. The phone was not found during that initialsearch. The officers found defendant, unarmed, upstairs in themaster bedroom, lying under a blanket on the bed. The officersalso found a hooded sweatshirt and a pair of camouflage shortsnearby. The officers handcuffed defendant, brought him downstairs,and questioned him about his knowledge of the robbery.Defendant’s family members subsequently arrived at the house,including his older brother and mother, who lived there. Thelatter appeared irate at defendant upon her arrival. She askedthe police “what did [defendant] do now?” and said that she was 5 “sick” of his antics and that she previously “told him if hecomes here acting up he’s got to go.” She angrily informed theofficers that they could search the house for the missing phone. The officers explained to defendant’s brother that theysuspected that defendant had stolen the phone. Defendant’sbrother irritably responded that stealing a phone is somethingthat defendant would be inclined to do. The brother asked ifthe officers had found the phone, and when they responded thatthey had not, he said that if it was not in defendant’s bedroom,it was probably in the younger brother’s room. Withoutencouragement from the police, he went to their youngerbrother’s room accompanied by an officer, found a phone, andgave it to the officer. The phone matched the victim’sdescription of his stolen phone. Defendant’s mother later provided written consent to searchthe house. B. Defendant was charged with an act that would haveconstituted second-degree robbery, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(1), had he been an adult at the time. He filed a motion tosuppress the phone, arguing that it was found as a result of anunconstitutional search and seizure. At the suppression hearing, the court found that the policedid not conduct a search of the residence until his mother gave 6 consent. The court also found that defendant’s brother’s searchwas not driven by “coercion or duress from law enforcement,”explaining that although “third parties acting on behalf of theState are bound by constitutional strictures,” the brother’sactions here did not constitute state action. The court opinedthat the officers’ behavior in the house may have amounted to“sloppy search procedure.” It held, however, that becausedefendant’s brother retrieved the phone, and because he did notact as an agent of the officers, defendant could not bring aconstitutional claim to challenge the seizure of the phone.Therefore, the court denied defendant’s suppression motion. The case went to trial and defendant was adjudicateddelinquent and sentenced to two years of house arrest. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court shouldhave suppressed the cell phone evidence because the policeofficers’ entrance into his home and subsequent search wereunconstitutional. The Appellate Division affirmed. The panelconcluded that the officers had probable cause to search andfaced exigent circumstances, which justified their warrantlessentry into defendant’s home. The panel explained that the “novel aspect of cutting-edgetechnology” -- the Find My iPhone application -- allowed thepolice to track the stolen iPhone, and that the police confirmedthat the phone was inside the house when they spotted its case 7 through a window. Together, those facts gave the officers “areasonable and well-grounded belief that the person who robbedthe victim minutes earlier was inside the home.” The panel stated that “[t]he technology that led police to[defendant’s] home provided some of the exigency supportingtheir entry.” In particular, the court found it significantthat two minutes after the officer activated the “Find MyiPhone” application, the phone was turned off. That led theofficer to feel that “immediate action was required because oncethe phone was turned off, it could be moved and the GPScapabilities would not function.” The panel found that thisconcern was reasonable, “as the small cell phone could easilyhave been destroyed or hidden, and was the only physicalevidence linking [defendant] to the robbery.” Thus, the panelconcluded that, “in entering the residence to secure the area,determine whether there was any danger to anyone in the house,and prevent destruction of the proceeds of the robbery,” thepolice acted reasonably and within the confines of the FourthAmendment. The panel reasoned that had the officers identifieddefendant as a suspect immediately following the taking of thevictim’s phone and then physically followed him to the house,the “hot pursuit” doctrine, in all likelihood, would havepermitted the warrantless entry. The panel found that, though 8 those facts are not present here, there “was a close temporallink between a serious criminal event, during which physicalforce was used against the victim, and the police pursuit thatresulted in a warrantless entry.” The panel also found thatthere was “a reasonable expectation that a delay in obtaining awarrant would result in the destruction of evidence.”Therefore, the panel concluded that the record supported afinding that the hot pursuit exception to the warrantrequirement rendered the officers’ action constitutional. Moreover, the panel noted that defendant’s brothervoluntarily retrieved the phone and handed it to police. Thepanel found that because defendant’s brother, a non-state actor,uncovered the phone, defendant’s mother’s consent was notsignificant to the constitutional analysis of this search. Thepanel consequently affirmed. Defendant filed a petition for certification with thisCourt, again challenging the trial court’s denial of hissuppression motion. We granted certification. 229 N.J. 164(2017). We also granted amicus curiae status to the AmericanCivil Liberties Union of New Jersey (ACLU) and the Seton HallUniversity School of Law Center for Social Justice. II. A. 9 First, defendant argues that the hot pursuit doctrinecannot validate the officers’ warrantless entry into his home.For the hot pursuit doctrine exception to apply, defendantasserts, the State must show that the “suspect (1) was armed andimmediately dangerous or (2) knew that the police were inpursuit and therefore had a reason to immediately dispose ofevidence.” Defendant contends that the State has failed toprove that he posed a danger to anyone or that he knew that hewas being trailed and would thus be motivated to destroyevidence. Additionally, defendant suggests that whether his brotherled the police to the phone is “legally insignificant” becausethe “police were not lawfully present in the home.” Defendantadds that his brother was not acting as a private citizenbecause a police officer was “right beside” him as they searchedthe house together. Therefore, defendant asserts, his brotherwas acting on behalf of the State for constitutional purposes. B. As does defendant, amici Seton Hall University School ofLaw Center for Social Justice and the ACLU claim that theofficers’ entry into defendant’s home was not justified underany exception to the warrant requirement. Amici argue that thehot pursuit doctrine is not applicable because the police werenever in pursuit of defendant and there was no basis to believe 10 that the suspect either posed a danger to officers or anyone inthe house or knew that he was being followed and would thereforebe likely to destroy the phone. Seton Hall University School ofLaw Center for Social Justice also posits that the destructionof the phone was not even possible, distinguishing it fromevidence in other cases, such as controlled substances, whichcan actually be disposed of completely via flushing or burning.Therefore, Seton Hall University School of Law Center for SocialJustice suggests that there could be no fear that the phonewould lose its evidentiary value. Seton Hall University School of Law Center for SocialJustice further asserts that the officers were not justified inentering the home based on any other exigency because the theftof a phone does not alone present sufficiently dangerouscircumstances and the officers could have safely waited toobtain a telephonic warrant while securing the house. As to defendant’s brother’s search, amici argue it was theproduct of the unlawful police entry. Amici contend thatdefendant’s brother acted only after he discovered that thepolice had -- as far as he knew, lawfully -- entered the home,gathered inculpatory evidence, and seized defendant. Thus,amici claim, the search was the inadmissible fruit of theillegal entry’s poisonous tree. C. 11 The State contends that objectively exigent circumstancesexisted to justify the officers’ entry because the officersentered the house “shortly after learning that evidence of arobbery was in the house.” The State also asserts the officers’reasonable concern that evidence might be destroyed if theywaited to obtain a warrant because the “suspect had alreadychanged the appearance of the stolen iPhone by removing it fromits case” and had “turned the phone off.” The State stressesthat because the officers were investigating a violent robberyand did not know the seriousness of the threat that they or theoccupants of the house faced from the suspect, they needed toenter the house in order to protect themselves and others.Additionally, the State disputes amici’s argument that the hotpursuit doctrine can never be applied where the perpetrator isunarmed or where there is no actual “chase.” Finally, the State emphasizes that defendant’s brothervoluntarily located the stolen phone and gave it to theofficers. The State contends that defendant’s brother’s actionswere independent, non-state actions that were sufficientlyattenuated from any alleged misconduct related to the officers’entry. Thus, according to the State, the trial court properlyheld that the phone was admissible at trial. III. A. 12 When an appellate court reviews a trial court’s decision ona motion to suppress, the reviewing court defers to the trialcourt’s factual findings, upholding them “so long as sufficientcredible evidence in the record supports those findings.” Statev. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 101 (2016). “An appellate court'should give deference to those findings of the trial judgewhich are substantially influenced by [the] opportunity to hearand see the witnesses and to have the feel of the case, which areviewing court cannot enjoy.’” State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224,244 (2007) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964)). However, the reviewing court need not defer to the trialcourt’s legal conclusions, State v. Bryant, 227 N.J. 60, 71-72(2016), which appellate courts review de novo, State v.Hathaway, 222 N.J. 453, 467 (2015). B. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution andArticle 1, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution bothsafeguard the right to privacy and forbid warrantless entry intoa home except under certain circumstances. State v. Davila, 203 N.J. 97, 111-12 (2010); see also State v. Cassidy, 179 N.J. 150,160 (2004) (“[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evilagainst which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.”(quoting State v. Hutchins, 116 N.J. 457, 463 (1989))).Therefore, a warrantless entry into a home is presumptively 13 invalid unless the State can show that it falls within one ofthe specific, delineated exceptions to the general warrantrequirement. Davila, 203 N.J. at 111-12. Courts subjectwarrantless entries to “particularly careful scrutiny,” and“only in extraordinary circumstances may . . . [such entries] bejustified.” State v. Bolte, 115 N.J. 579, 583-84 (1989) (citingWelsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984)). Evidence found pursuant to a warrantless search notjustified by an exception to the warrant requirement is subjectto suppression, see State v. Edmonds, 211 N.J. 117, 121-22(2012), under the exclusionary rule -- “'a judicially createdremedy designed to safeguard’ the right of the people to be tobe free from 'unreasonable searches and seizures,’” State v.Williams, 192 N.J. 1, 14 (2007) (quoting United States v.Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 , 348 (1974)). The exclusionary ruleprohibits the State from “introducing into evidence the 'fruits’of” unlawful police conduct, State v. Badessa, 185 N.J. 303, 311(2005), and thus denies “the prosecution the spoils ofconstitutional violations,” id. at 310 (citing State v. Evers,175 N.J. 355, 376 (2003)). However, the exclusionary rule applies to preclude theadmission of evidence only when such evidence is suitably linkedto the police misconduct. Id. at 311. Therefore, when evidenceis acquired by constitutionally valid means after initial 14 unconstitutional action by law enforcement, courts must considerwhether the exclusionary rule is applicable. The appropriate inquiry for courts assessing theadmissibility of the evidence is whether the evidence was “theproduct of the 'exploitation’ of [the unconstitutional policeaction] or of a 'means sufficiently distinguishable’ from theconstitutional violation such that the 'taint’ of the violationwas 'purged.’” State v. Shaw, 213 N.J. 398, 414 (2012) (quotingHudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 592 (2006)). Such evidence isadmissible “when the connection between the unconstitutionalpolice action and the secured evidence becomes 'so attenuated asto dissipate the taint’ from the unlawful conduct.” Ibid.(quoting Badessa, 185 N.J. at 311). In Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 , 593-94 (1975), theUnited States Supreme Court identified three factors that courtsshould consider in evaluating attenuation between the valid andviolative police actions. We summarized them in Shaw: “(1)'the temporal proximity’ between the illegal conduct and thechallenged evidence; (2) 'the presence of interveningcircumstances’; and (3) 'particularly, the purpose and flagrancyof the official misconduct.’” 213 N.J. at 415 (quoting Brown,422 U.S. at 603-04). The determination of whether evidence isthe fruit of unlawful police conduct is a factual matter forcourts to decide on a case-by-case basis. State v. Johnson, 11815 N.J. 639, 653 (1990) (citing Brown, 422 U.S. at 604 n.10;Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 , 218 (1979); State v. Worlock,117 N.J. 596, 625 (1990)). In sum, evidence seized without a warrant and in theabsence of an exception to the warrant requirement is subject tosuppression unless the exclusionary rule is inapplicable. Thatrule does not apply when the conduct through which the evidenceis obtained was too attenuated from the unlawful police conductto be subject to its “taint.” IV. Here, the State argues that the warrantless entry waslawful because it was justified by the exigency faced by theofficers.1 A. One recognized exception to the warrant requirement is thepresence of exigent circumstances. State v. Johnson, 193 N.J. 528, 552 (2008). To invoke that exception, the State must showthat the officers had probable cause and faced an objectiveexigency. Bolte, 115 N.J. at 585; accord State v. Dunlap, 185 N.J. 543, 551 (2006).1 As a threshold matter, although the State claims that the police officers may have believed the home was vacant, the State has not shown a reasonable basis to believe the house was abandoned. The State, in fact, concedes that it is not challenging the juvenile’s standing based on a theory of abandonment. See State v. Brown, 216 N.J. 508 (2014). 16 The latter inquiry is fact-sensitive. State v. Nishina,175 N.J. 502, 516-17 (2003). In that evaluation, a courtconsiders the totality of the circumstances, see State v.DeLuca, 168 N.J. 626, 632 (2001), including: “the urgency ofthe situation, the time it will take to secure a warrant, theseriousness of the crime under investigation, and the threatthat evidence will be destroyed or lost or that the physicalwell-being of people will be endangered unless immediate actionis taken,” Johnson, 193 N.J. at 552-53. Regarding the weightassigned to the respective considerations, we have recognizedthat “[p]olice safety and the preservation of evidence remainthe preeminent determinants of exigency.” Dunlap, 185 N.J. at 551. “The 'hot pursuit’ of a defendant who poses a threat topublic safety may in certain contexts constitute an exigentcircumstance sufficient to support a warrantless homeentry . . . .” Bolte, 115 N.J. at 598; see also Steagald v.United States, 451 U.S. 204 , 218 (1981) (noting the Court’slongstanding recognition that “'hot pursuit’ cases fall withinthe exigent-circumstances exception to the warrantrequirement”). For a “hot pursuit” to justify an exception to the warrantrequirement, officers must have had probable cause, Bolte, 115 N.J. at 593, and have been “in immediate or continuous pursuit 17 of the [suspect] from the scene of [the] crime,” id. at 592(quoting Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753). However, although “'hotpursuit’ means some sort of a chase, . . . it need not be anextended hue and cry in and about the public streets.” UnitedStates v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 , 43 (1976) (internal quotationmarks and brackets removed) (validating warrantless entry afterpolice were told of suspect’s location by third party, traveledto her location, saw her on front porch of her house, andfollowed her in as she retreated). Because the “hot pursuit” doctrine is a subset of theexigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, thetouchstones that would justify a warrantless entry remain thepossible destruction of evidence, ibid.; Bolte, 115 N.J. at 594,and the threat of violence by the suspect, Bolte, 115 N.J. at 598. In Bolte, for example, a police officer observed thedefendant driving erratically for approximately one mile. Id.at 581. The officer followed the defendant home and when thedefendant exited his car and entered his home through a garagedoor, the officer followed him into the garage and house. Ibid.The officer continued upstairs and arrested the defendant in hisbedroom. Ibid. The defendant refused to submit to abreathalyzer test at the police station and was charged withmotor vehicle and disorderly persons offenses. Ibid. The 18 defendant moved to suppress evidence of his refusal to submit tothe breathalyzer test, claiming that he had been subject to anunlawful arrest when the officer entered his home without awarrant. Ibid. The trial court held that the officer’s entry into thehouse was justified under the hot pursuit exception to thewarrant requirement. Ibid. The Appellate Division reversed,finding that the hot pursuit doctrine applies only when thesuspect has committed a serious offense, and also holding thatexigent circumstances did not exist in the case. Id. at 583. This Court affirmed, finding that hot pursuit could notjustify the police entry. Id. at 593. We emphasized that thedefendant there was unarmed, and the police had no reason tobelieve that he posed a danger to the police or the public.Ibid. We found that after the defendant had entered his home,there was no indication that he would hurt anyone inside or“leave the house to resume his erratic driving behavior.” Id.at 593-94. Finally, we highlighted that the officers also hadno reason to believe that the defendant would destroy evidence -- a justification usually reserved for narcotics cases. Id. at594 (comparing facts to those of Santana, 427 U.S. at 96, whichinvolved the “threatened destruction of the narcotics”). Weconsequently affirmed the Appellate Division’s determinationthat the evidence should be suppressed. Id. at 598. 19 B. With those principles in mind, we turn to the facts of thiscase and hold that the officers’ warrantless entry intodefendant’s house was not justified by exigent circumstances.Although we agree with the Appellate Division’s finding that theofficers had probable cause, we reject its application of thehot pursuit doctrine. Initially, we need not consider whether the officer’spursuit of defendant, facilitated by his use of the Find MyiPhone application, falls within the purview of the hot pursuitdoctrine because the doctrine does not apply for other reasons.Our analysis of the circumstances surrounding this pursuitinforms our conclusion that it cannot constitute an exigencysufficient to justify the suspension of the warrant requirement.Although the crime committed was arguably a violent one, theState has failed to prove that the police had any basis tobelieve that defendant would injure anyone inside the house orthe officers themselves, so that waiting to obtain a warrantwould have been unreasonable. Likewise, the State has not shown that the officers had anyreason to believe that defendant would (or could effectively)destroy the phone. There is no evidence supporting thatdefendant knew that he was being followed and would thus havehad an impetus to dispose of the phone. And even if he did, 20 unlike controlled substances or narcotics, a phone cannot beeasily flushed down a drain or destroyed by burning. While itis possible that defendant powered down the phone so that hecould not be as easily traced, deactivating a tracking device onan electronic piece of evidence simply reduces the trackableevidence to an average piece of evidence; the mere presence ofevidence in a home does not alone justify a warrantless entry. In the absence of any danger that defendant would commitviolent acts or that he would destroy the desired evidence, wefind that the officers’ pursuit of defendant was not an exigencyoverriding the warrant requirement. We therefore find thatneither exigency nor the hot pursuit doctrine justified theofficers’ warrantless entry here. However, for the followingreasons, as a result of defendant’s brother’s attenuated, non-state actions, we affirm the trial court’s denial of defendant’smotion to suppress. V. A. The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonablesearches and seizures operates as a restraint only uponsovereign authority. State v. Scrotsky, 39 N.J. 410, 416(1963). Thus, “where a private person steals or unlawfullytakes possession of property from the premises of the owner andturns it over to the government, which did not participate in 21 the taking, it may be used as incriminating evidence against theowner in a subsequent criminal prosecution.” Ibid. When a private person acts “as an arm of the police,”however, the private person’s seizure of property constitutesstate action. Ibid. In other words, when a private citizenacts “in concert” with police officers, the private citizen’sactions are treated as state action for purposes of the FourthAmendment. See ibid. In Scrotsky, the landlady of an apartment buildingsuspected that one of her tenants had been stealing personaleffects from her home located within the building. Id. at 413.After two previous visits to the tenant’s apartment, duringwhich she discovered her possessions, the landlady entered thetenant’s apartment a third time, accompanied by a policedetective. Id. at 413-14. At the direction of the detective,the landlady found and reclaimed her stolen property and broughtit to police headquarters before returning home with it. Id. at414. The tenant was not home during any of the three visits.Ibid. He was arrested for theft of the landlady’s property andwas eventually convicted. Ibid. On appeal to this Court, the tenant argued that theevidence taken by the landlady from his apartment, which wasused at trial to prove the State’s case, was procured by anunconstitutional search and seizure. Id. at 412. The State 22 contended that the evidence was not vulnerable to constitutionalchallenge and hence admissible because the landlady, a non-stateactor, effectuated the search and removed her stolenpossessions. Id. at 414-15. We disagreed, finding that the landlady “went into theapartment with the [police] and seized the property under colorof their authority and as a participant in a police action.”Id. at 415. Reasoning that “the detective and [the landlady]went to the apartment . . . for a dual purpose, she to recoverher property, he to investigate and obtain evidence of [the]crime,” id. at 415-16, we determined that “[t]he search andseizure by one served the purpose of both, and must be deemed tohave been participated in by both,” id. at 416. We concludedthat it would have been “idle to say that the officers did notconduct the search or seizure,” because the landlady had to beconsidered the instrument of the police. Id. at 415. Wetherefore remanded for a new trial, ordering that the evidenceseized by the landlady could not be introduced. Id. at 417-18. B. Guided by those principles, we turn to the State’s argumentthat defendant’s brother’s search for the missing phone wasindependent non-state action free from constitutionalrestrictions and sufficiently attenuated from the police’sillegal entry to be permissible. We agree. 23 Defendant’s brother was clearly not acting as an agent ofthe State when he searched the house for the phone. Unlike inScrotsky, where the landlady and the police detective traveledto the tenant’s apartment together with the sole purpose ofdiscovering and retrieving the landlady’s stolen property,defendant’s brother’s actions were completely independent of theofficer’s investigation. Frustrated with yet another incidentof defendant’s misconduct, defendant’s brother decided to searchthe house without solicitation or even encouragement from theofficers present. And when the brother successfully recoveredthe victim’s phone, he offered it to the police without request.The mere presence of an officer during the brother’s self-imposed investigation does not by itself indicate policecoercion or influence. Moreover, defendant’s brother’s actions were voluntary andsufficiently attenuated from the officers’ unlawful entry. Noevidence in the record supports a finding that defendant’sbrother’s search was causally or temporally connected to thepolice misconduct. Contrary to the dissent’s assertions, it isuncontroverted that defendant’s brother arrived some time afterthe police without knowledge that the police lacked a warrant.Further, the dissent’s conclusions that the police’sunconstitutional presence “surely heavily influenced” andmotivated the brother’s decision to search for the phone and 24 that it was “not likely” that the brother would have looked forevidence in the parents’ home without the presence of the policeare unsupported by the record. Post at ___ (slip op. at ___).Defendant’s brother’s unprovoked decision to search for thephone himself is an intervening circumstance that breaks thecausal connection between the unlawful police entry and thefinding of the phone. The dissent’s reliance on State v. Smith, 155 N.J. 83(1998), is misplaced. There, the police knowingly andintentionally elicited consent to search the apartment shortlyafter gaining access to it by unconstitutional means. Here, thebrother’s actions were purely voluntary and unsolicited by thepolice. Id. at 89-90. Here, even if we were to characterizethe officers’ action as flagrant, the entry never led to apolice-enacted search for the phone. Defendant’s brother choseto undertake his search on his own, motivated by his displeasurewith defendant’s actions -- not by any encouragement, request,or intimidation by the police. Therefore, his actionsconstituted “means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged ofthe primary taint” of the police misconduct. Shaw, 213 N.J. at 413 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 , 488 25 (1963)). Consequently, we hold that the phone is immune fromthe reach of the exclusionary rule.2 VI. Accordingly, we modify and affirm the judgment of theAppellate Division. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA’s opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a dissenting opinion, in which JUSTICE LaVECCHIA joins.2 Because we find that the brother’s independent actions operate to remove the evidence from the ambit of the exclusionary rule, we do not reach the question of defendant’s mother’s consent to search. 26 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 38 September Term 2016 077383STATE OF NEW JERSEYIN THE INTEREST OF J.A., Juvenile–Appellant. JUSTICE ALBIN, dissenting. I concur with the majority that four officers of theWillingboro Police Department unlawfully entered the home ofdefendant’s family in violation of the Fourth Amendment of theUnited States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the NewJersey Constitution. However, I disagree with the majority’sconclusion that the cell phone retrieved from the home was notthe product of unconstitutional police conduct subject to theexclusionary rule. During their unlawful presence in defendant’s home, theofficers swept through various rooms, confronted defendant’ssister who had just awakened, located and arrested defendant forthe alleged robbery of a cell phone, and seized evidence. Thepolice then remained unlawfully on the premises untildefendant’s mother, stepfather, and brother returned. The threefamily members found their home occupied by the police and theseventeen-year-old defendant in handcuffs seated on a couch inthe living room. The mother, stepfather, and brother did not 1 know that the police had unlawfully broken into their home andhad no right to be there. An officer explained to the family members that they wereinvestigating the theft of a cell phone by defendant. Whenasked by the brother whether they had found it, the officeranswered, “nope.” In response to the surreal situation heencountered, the brother offered to look for the cell phone --and did so while shadowed by an officer. He discovered thephone in another brother’s room and gave it to the officer. I cannot conclude, as the majority does, that the brother’sact of recovering the cell phone was independent of orsufficiently attenuated from the unconstitutional policepresence in his home. The State failed to show that theunlawful police occupation of the family home did not heavilyinfluence the brother’s decision to fetch the phone and that,absent the unlawful police presence, the brother would havevolunteered to look for the phone. Because there was no break in the causative chain betweenthe officers’ unconstitutional presence in the home and theultimate discovery of the cell phone, evidence of the phoneshould have been suppressed. I therefore respectfully dissent. I. A. 2 The Fourth Amendment and Article I, Paragraph 7 of ourState Constitution are intended to protect the home from“unreasonable searches and seizures” by the police. State v.Brown, 216 N.J. 508, 526 (2014). The home is the singular placewhere the privacy interests of people are most profound. Ibid.“Indeed, 'physical entry of the home is the chief evil againstwhich the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.’” Statev. Vargas, 213 N.J. 301, 313 (2013) (quoting United States v.U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 , 313 (1972)). “The exclusionary rule 'is a judicially created remedydesigned to safeguard’ the right of the people to be free from'unreasonable searches and seizures.’” State v. Williams, 192 N.J. 1, 14 (2007) (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 , 348 (1974)). The rule requires the suppression of evidencesecured through the violation of constitutional rights. Id. at16-17. It is intended “'to deter future unlawful policeconduct’ by denying the prosecution the spoils of constitutionalviolations,” State v. Badessa, 185 N.J. 303, 310 (2005) (quotingState v. Evers, 175 N.J. 355, 376 (2003)), and “to upholdjudicial integrity by serving notice that our courts will notprovide a forum for evidence procured by unconstitutionalmeans,” State v. Shaw, 213 N.J. 398, 413-14 (2012) (quotingWilliams, 192 N.J. at 14). At its core, the exclusionary ruleensures that “the Fourth Amendment is not reduced to 'a form of 3 words.’” Evers, 175 N.J. at 376 (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 648 (1961)). An exception to the exclusionary rule is the attenuationdoctrine. Shaw, 213 N.J. at 414. If the seizure of evidence isso attenuated from unconstitutional police conduct that thetaint from the unlawful conduct is sufficiently purged, theexclusionary rule will not apply. Ibid. The State bears theburden of proving attenuation. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 ,604 (1975). To determine whether seized evidence issufficiently attenuated from police misconduct to justify notinvoking the exclusionary rule, we look to three factors: “(1)'the temporal proximity’ between the illegal conduct and thechallenged evidence; (2) 'the presence of interveningcircumstances’; and (3) 'particularly, the purpose and flagrancyof the official misconduct.’” Shaw, 213 N.J. at 415 (quotingBrown, 422 U.S. at 602-04). In State v. Smith, a case comparable to the present one, weapplied the Brown factors and rejected the attenuation doctrineas a basis for upholding the search of a home. 155 N.J. 83,100-01 (1998). There, based on an informant’s unreliable tip,the police unconstitutionally detained the defendant onsuspicion of drug dealing and seized from him the keys to hisapartment, where he lived with his sister. Id. at 88-90, 101.The police learned that no one was in the apartment and that the 4 defendant’s sister was hospitalized. Id. at 89. The policecalled and advised the sister that they had the apartment keysand secured her consent to enter and search the apartment. Id.at 89-90, 101. Using the keys unlawfully seized from thedefendant, the police entered the apartment and discovered drugs-- the evidence used to bring criminal charges issued againsthim. Id. at 90. Applying the Brown factors, we held that “the discovery ofthe drugs was a product of the unlawful seizure of the keys,”despite the sister’s consent, and suppressed the evidence. Id.at 100-01. We reasoned that although the sister’s consent couldnot “be ascribed to a single reason or motive, it is clear thatit was heavily influenced by the unlawful seizure of the keysfrom defendant.” Id. at 101 (emphasis added). Accordingly, thesister’s “consent was not an independent interveningcircumstance” breaking the chain of causation stemming from theunlawful seizure of the defendant’s keys. Ibid.; see alsoUnited States v. Damrah, 322 F. Supp. 2d 892 , 901 (N.D. Ohio2004) (suppressing evidence found in defendant’s home becausewife’s consent to search was not intervening circumstance that“purged the taint of the agents’ unlawful presence” indefendant’s home). B. 5 Applying those principles to the facts of this case leadsto the ineluctable conclusion that the police misconduct isdirectly linked to the discovery of the cell phone, whichtherefore must be suppressed. Importantly, the State had theburden of proving attenuation -- a point ignored by the majority-- and failed to do so. First, there was no temporal break between the officers’unconstitutional entry and presence in the home and thebrother’s search for the phone. When the brother arrived, thepolice officers had already unconstitutionally entered andoccupied the home, conducted a sweep, gathered incriminatingevidence (the cell phone case and defendant’s camouflageshorts), and handcuffed defendant, who was seated on the livingroom couch. As soon as the brother and his parents came home,the officers stated that they were investigating the allegedtheft of a cell phone by defendant. The brother asked anofficer whether the police had found the cell phone, and theofficer responded, no. Apparently, the brother believed thepolice had conducted an initial search. He had no way ofknowing at the time that the four police officers wereunlawfully on the premises. Second, the State was required to prove that theconstitutional violation of the family’s home “did not lead toor significantly influence” the brother’s actions. See Smith, 6155 N.J. at 101. Whatever displeasure the brother might haveexpressed about defendant to the officers, his offer to find thecell phone cannot be disentangled from the presence of theofficers as an occupying force in his family’s home. The Statedid not show that the unconstitutional presence of the officersdid not “heavily influence[]” the brother’s decision tocooperate -- or at least was not one motive to do so. See ibid.It would hardly be surprising that the brother would want tohasten the departure of the police from his parent’s home. TheState did not show that the brother’s action was voluntary, anact of unconstrained free will, given that the officers appearedunlikely to leave until they accomplished their mission. Wouldthe brother have looked for incriminating evidence to damn hisseventeen-year-old sibling in the absence of theunconstitutional police presence in his parent’s home? Notlikely. Cast in that light, there are no true interveningcircumstances breaking the unconstitutional chain of causation. Third, the officers’ entry and occupation of the home was aflagrant violation of the family’s -- not just defendant’s --constitutional rights under our Federal and State Constitutions.Without the justification of exigent circumstances, officersentered through a house window, went from room to room,surprised defendant’s recently awakened sister, took defendantinto custody, and gathered evidence. The exclusionary rule, if 7 nothing else, is directed at deterring the police fromunlawfully entering the sanctity of the home and exploitingtheir unconstitutional conduct, as occurred in this case. II. In conclusion, the State failed to carry the burden ofproving that the police misconduct did not significantlyinfluence the brother’s decision to search for the cell phone.Because the taint from the unconstitutional police occupation ofdefendant’s home was not purged by the brother’s cooperationwith the police, the ultimate seizure of the phone by the policeviolated both the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Paragraph 7 ofour State Constitution. Unlike the majority, I would apply theexclusionary rule to this flagrant violation of the right of afamily to be secure in their home from unreasonable searches andseizures. I therefore respectfully dissent. 8