Title: Garcia v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 49S05-1505-CR-335
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: January 21, 2016

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
Suzanne St. John 
Marion County Public Defener Agency 
Indianapolis, Indiana  
 
Heath Y. Johnson 
Johnson, Gray & Macabee 
Franklin, Indiana 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Gregory F. Zoeller 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
Larry D. Allen 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
Stephen R. Creason 
Deputy Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
No. 49S05-1505-CR-00335 
ANTONIO GARCIA, 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
v. 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
Appellee (Plaintiff below). 
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court, No. 49G14-1208-FD-054147 
The Honorable Jose D. Salinas, Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A05-1402-CR-00061 
January 21, 2016 
David, Justice. 
In August 2012, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Officer Phillip Robinett conducted a 
routine traffic stop.  Upon making the stop, he discovered that the driver, Antonio Garcia, was 
Jan 21 2016, 2:41 pm
 
2 
driving without a valid driver’s license.  Garcia was lawfully placed under arrest.  Before Officer 
Robinett placed Garcia in his police cruiser to be transported to the police station, he conducted a 
quick pat-down search of Garcia’s clothing in order to check for weapons.  A cylinder-shaped pill 
container was found in Garcia’s pocket.  Officer Robinett opened the container to check what it 
contained.  The content was later confirmed to be a single narcotic pill, which Garcia did not have 
a valid prescription for.  
Garcia was charged with driving without a license and possession of a controlled substance.  
At trial, Garcia sought to suppress the admission of the pill container and its contents as the fruit 
of an unlawful search under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.  It was not disputed 
that Officer Robinett was free to conduct a warrantless pat-down search of Garcia’s person incident 
to his arrest.  Rather, Garcia only challenged the opening of the pill container as being an 
unreasonable search.  
We disagree with Garcia’s contention that opening the pill container during the course of 
the pat-down search incident to his arrest constituted an unreasonable search.  As such, we affirm 
the trial court’s denial of Garcia’s motion to suppress and hold that the search of Garcia incident 
to his arrest was reasonable under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.  
Facts and Procedural History 
On August 6, 2012, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Officer Phillip Robinett observed a 
vehicle driving without headlights at approximately 9:00 p.m.  Officer Robinett turned his police 
cruiser around to initiate a traffic stop. The vehicle then turned without signaling into a parking 
spot, even prior to Officer Robinett activating the police cruiser lights and sirens.  
Upon approaching the vehicle, Officer Robinett requested a driver’s license from the 
vehicle driver.  The driver, who was later identified as Antonio Garcia, only had an identification 
 
3 
card from a foreign country.  Officer Robinett confirmed that Garcia did not hold a valid driver’s 
license, and he initiated an arrest for driving without a license.    
Incident to the arrest, Officer Robinett conducted a pat-down search of Garcia to check for 
weapons.  No weapons were found during the search, but a silver cylinder-shaped container was 
recovered from Garcia’s front left pocket.  Through his work as a police officer, Officer Robinett 
had encountered similar containers and recognized that it likely contained either an illegal 
substance or properly prescribed prescriptions.  Upon opening the container, Officer Robinett 
found a single pill.  Garcia was taken into custody, and his vehicle was towed.  The cylinder was 
delivered to the police department property room, and the contents of the container, a single pill, 
was later submitted to the crime lab for testing.  The crime lab report indicated that the pill 
contained Hydrocodone.  Garcia did not have a valid prescription for this medication.  
Garcia was charged with possession of a controlled substance1 and with operating a vehicle 
without a driver’s license.2  A bench trial was held.  At trial, the defense made a motion to suppress 
the cylinder container and its contents from being admitted into evidence.  The defense asserted 
that Officer Robinett did not have the authority to open the container, but conceded that the 
container could have been seized as a search incident to arrest.  The State opposed the motion, 
relying upon U.S. v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), to argue that opening the container found on 
Garcia’s person was a permissible warrantless search incident to arrest.    
At trial, Garcia testified that he had been living with his wife, his wife’s aunt, and child. 
Only three days prior to the traffic stop, his wife’s aunt had passed away.  Garcia explained that 
the cylinder container was only in his possession because that morning he had been cleaning out 
the bedroom of his wife’s recently deceased Aunt, and he had found the container.  He believed it 
                                                 
1 Indiana Code § 35-48-4-7 (2008).  
2 Indiana Code § 9-24-18-1 (2008). 
 
4 
could contain pills, but Garcia never looked inside the container.  He had picked it up to keep it 
out of reach from his young son.  Contrary to this account, Officer Robinett testified that after he 
found the pill inside the container Garcia voluntarily stated that the pill was his “narcotic for pain.”  
(Tr. at 29.)  There were no other testifying witnesses.  
After both the State and Defense rested, defense counsel conceded to the fact that Garcia 
was driving without a license.  Then, the trial court returned to the issue of whether the cylinder 
container should be suppressed, noting that the Robinson case seemed to be “on point.”  (Tr. at 
44.)  The defense argued that the contents of the container was not obviously contraband, there 
was no concern for officer safety, no exigent circumstances, and a warrant could have been 
obtained if the police wanted to examine the contents of the container.   
The court denied the motion to suppress the container, finding Robinson controlling. 
Garcia was found guilty of possessing a controlled substance and driving while never receiving a 
license.  Garcia was sentenced to 180 days in Marion County jail with 176 days suspended.  
Garcia appealed, asserting that the search of the container was outside the scope of a 
permissible search incident to arrest and was unreasonable under Article 1, Section 11 of the 
Indiana Constitution.  The Court of Appeals agreed with Garcia.  Garcia v. State, 25 N.E.3d 786 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2015).  In reaching this decision, the court applied the Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 
356, 361 (Ind. 2005), factors “to the search of the container.”  Id. at 790.  The court reasoned that 
the degree of suspicion that a criminal violation had occurred was low, both arguments about the 
degree of intrusion were meritorious, and the need of law enforcement was also low given that 
there was no concern for officer safety or suspicion of criminal activity.  Id.  Thus, it was 
unreasonable to open the container found in Garcia’s pocket during a search incident to arrest.  Id. 
at 791.  The pill was inadmissible, and Garcia’s conviction for class D felony possession of a 
schedule III controlled substance was reversed.  Id.  
This Court granted the State’s petition for transfer, thereby vacating the Court of Appeals 
opinion.  Ind. Appellate Rule 58(a).  We affirm the trial court’s denial of Garcia’s motion to 
 
5 
suppress.  We hold that the search of the container found on Garcia’s person was within the scope 
of a search incident to a lawful arrest and was reasonable under Article 1, Section 11.  
Standard of Review 
 
The standard of review for a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is similar to other 
sufficiency issues.  Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 358 (internal citation omitted).  “We determine 
whether substantial evidence of probative value exists to support the trial court’s ruling.”  Id.  
Evidence will not be reweighed, and we “consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the trial 
court’s ruling.”  Id.  However, this Court reviews de novo a trial court’s ruling on the 
constitutionality of a search or seizure.  Belvedere v. State, 889 N.E.2d 286, 287 (Ind. 2008) 
(internal citation omitted).   
 
Discussion 
 
 
Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution reads: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and person or thing to be seized.  
This Section has long served to protect Hoosiers from unreasonable searches and seizures.  
Reasonableness of a search under the Indiana Constitution “turns on an evaluation of the 
reasonableness of the police conduct under the totality of the circumstances.”  Litchfield, 824 
N.E.2d at 361 (citing Moran v. State, 644 N.E.2d 536, 539 (Ind. 1994)) (emphasis added).  In 
considering the totality of the circumstances, the perspectives of both the investigating officer and 
subject of the search are considered.  Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 360. Three factors must be 
balanced: “1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the 
degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen’s ordinary activities, 
and 3) the extent of law enforcement needs.”  Id. at 361.   
 
6 
 
In considering the three Litchfield factors, the context in which the search occurs is highly 
relevant.  As early as 1914, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the validity of a search incident to 
a lawful arrest, noting that the government has “always recognized under English and American 
law” that it is permissible “to search the person of the accused when legally arrested to discover 
and seize the fruits or evidences of crime.”  Weeks v. U.S., 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).  Likewise, 
Indiana has also recognized that a search may be conducted “without a warrant if it is incidental 
to a lawful arrest.”  Townsend v. State, 460 N.E.2d 139, 141 (Ind. 1984).  In the present case, it is 
not disputed that Garcia was searched incident to a valid arrest. 
 
The question before the Court today goes beyond the general acceptance that a warrantless 
search incident to a valid arrest is reasonable under both the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, 
Section 11.  Garcia does not dispute that the search of his person was permissible as a search 
incident to arrest.  Rather, he challenges the permissible scope of such a search.  Garcia contends 
that while the pill container found on his person during the pat-down search could be seized, a 
search incident to arrest under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution does not permit 
the officer to open the container found on his person without a warrant or reasonable suspicion of 
illegal activity.  After consideration of the three Litchfield factors and federal precedent on this 
very issue, we disagree.  In the present case, opening the container found on Garcia’s person during 
the course of a search incident to a valid arrest was reasonable under the Indiana Constitution.  
Article 1, Section 11—Reasonableness of Search Incident to Valid Arrest 
As recited above, the reasonableness of a search requires consideration of the totality of 
the circumstances, which is done by balancing the three Litchfield factors.  Although Garcia puts 
great emphasis upon the lack of suspicion surrounding the search of the container itself, the degree 
of suspicion is but one factor to be considered.  Additionally, these factors must be considered in 
light of the fact that the search occurred in the context of a search incident to a lawful arrest, and 
this Court has long recognized that “[a] search incident to a valid arrest is lawful regardless of 
what it reveals.”  Farrie v. State, 251 Ind. 681, 683, 266 N.E.2d 212, 214 (1971).  We address each 
factor in turn.  
 
7 
A. Degree of concern, suspicion or knowledge that an offense has occurred  
This factor may be assessed quickly and ultimately falls in favor of the State.  We have 
previously recognized that “once a lawful arrest has been made, authorities may conduct a ‘full 
search’ of the arrestee for weapons or concealed evidence.  No additional probable cause for the 
search is required, and the search incident to arrest may ‘involve a relatively extensive exploration 
of the person.’”  Edwards v. State, 759 N.E.2d 626, 629 (Ind. 2001) (citing Robinson, 414 U.S. at 
227, 235) (internal quotation and citation omitted).  In the present situation, we read Edwards to 
support the conclusion that Officer Robinett did not need any additional degree of suspicion 
specifically in relation to the cylinder container found on Garcia in order to open that container 
incident to Garcia’s lawful arrest.   
Furthermore, as Edwards demonstrates, we have seen fit to consider Robinson on prior 
occasions when addressing searches incident to arrest.  We continue to be persuaded by Robinson 
regarding the degree of suspicion necessary to conduct a search incident to arrest. The United 
States Supreme Court set out a clear standard in Robinson.  “A custodial arrest of a suspect based 
on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion . . . that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the 
arrest requires no additional justification.”  414 U.S. at 235.  We similarly conclude that it is “the 
lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search.”3 Id.  
 
Here, Garcia was lawfully placed under arrest for driving his vehicle without a valid 
driver’s license.  It is not disputed that the pat-down search of his person incident to his arrest was 
permissible.  Under these circumstances, it is likewise true that no additional suspicion was needed 
                                                 
3 Although this Court in Paxton v. State, 263 N.E.2d 636 (Ind. 1970), indicated that something more than a 
mere arrest is needed to justify a warrantless search, we note two points.  First, Paxton involved the 
subsequent search of a vehicle, which encompasses a different analysis than when the person of an arrestee 
is searched incident to arrest.  Second, Paxton was decided prior to multiple Indiana and U.S. Supreme 
Court cases that have helped clarify the scope of warrantless searches incident to arrest. 
 
8 
to search the container found in Garcia’s pocket during the normal course of the pat-down search.  
Again, as provided in Edwards, once a lawful arrest occurs, no additional probable cause is 
necessary to conduct a “relatively extensive exploration of the person.”  759 N.E.2d at 629 (internal 
citations omitted).  Thus, the degree of suspicion weighs in favor of the State.  
B. Degree of intrusion upon the citizen’s ordinary activities 
Next, we consider the degree to which the search intruded upon Garcia’s ordinary 
activities.  In doing so, we continue to look to the totality of the circumstances.  First, Garcia had 
already been subjected to a traffic stop.  He was then lawfully arrested, at which time Officer 
Robinett decided to take him into custody and have his vehicle towed.  The brief delay needed to 
conduct a pat-down search prior to Garcia being taken into custody would have had little to no 
additional impact on Garcia’s ordinary activities, given that he was already being placed under 
arrest.  The arrest alone was a significant intrusion into Garcia’s ordinary activities.  A pat-down 
is minimally intrusive in comparison to Garcia being detained, transported to the police station, 
booked, and held in jail while criminal charges are potentially brought against him.  
Second, even if the pat-down were considered in isolation, we similarly conclude that the 
search was minimally intrusive.  In Edmond v. State, the Court of Appeals addressed the 
reasonableness of a search that occurred after a driver was arrested for not having a valid license.  
951 N.E.2d 585, 587 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).  The police officer planned to have the vehicle towed, 
and he asked the driver to exit the vehicle.  Id.  At all times, the driver was cooperative and did not 
make any threats or furtive movements.  Id.  The officer conducted a pat-down search of the driver 
and felt a bulge in his pocket.  Id.  The officer believed that the bulge could be marijuana, and 
upon removing the item, discovered a baggie containing a substance that was later confirmed to 
be marijuana.  Id.  As a result, the driver was subsequently charged with possession of marijuana. 
Id. 
In affirming the reasonableness of the search under Article 1, Section 11, the court 
conceded that “the search of a person’s body is a substantial intrusion.”  Id. at 592.  However, “a 
 
9 
police officer is authorized to conduct a thorough search of an arrestee,” and where the police carry 
out “only a pat-down search of [an arrestee’s] clothing . . . the degree of intrusion [is] minimal . . 
. .”  Id.   
Moreover, the degree of intrusion in the present case is easily distinguishable from the 
unreasonable search in Edwards, 759 N.E.2d at 629.  Edwards involved the strip search of an 
arrestee, who had not been charged with any criminal activity, and any charges he potentially faced 
were all for nonviolent misdemeanor offenses.  Id.  After considering the highly intrusive nature 
of being strip searched, the Court concluded that “[w]e do not believe that routine, warrantless 
strip searches of misdemeanor arrestees, even when incident to lawful arrests, are reasonable . . . 
.”  Id.  Edwards exemplifies when a search may be deemed unreasonable and outside the scope of 
a valid search incident to an arrest.  
Garcia attempts to argue that only the opening of the pill container should be considered in 
conducting the reasonableness analysis, and goes on to claim that a pill container is especially 
private, making the intrusion in opening the container great.  We are not persuaded.  As Edmond 
and Edwards demonstrate, it is the type of search, and all of the attendant circumstances, which is 
relevant to assessing the degree of intrusion.  In addition to our own precedent, this conclusion is 
also supported by the United States Supreme Court, which has directly provided that:  
A police officer’s determination as to how and where to search the 
person of a suspect whom he has arrested is necessarily a quick ad 
hoc judgment which the Fourth Amendment does not require to be 
broken down in each instance into an analysis of each step in the 
search.   
Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235 (emphasis added).  Again, it is not a single aspect of the search that is 
considered, but the entirety of the search.   
 
10 
Here, Garcia was already subjected to a lawful arrest. The arrest alone would result in 
Garcia’s vehicle being towed and Garcia being detained by police, transported to the police station, 
booked, and detained at the police station for some additional period of time. The U.S. Supreme 
Court recognized the intrusive nature of an arrest in Terry v. Ohio by explaining that “[a]n arrest 
is the initial stage of a criminal prosecution . . . and it is inevitably accompanied by future 
interference with the individual’s freedom of movement, whether or not trial or conviction 
ultimately follows.”  392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968).  Thus, a brief pat-down search of Garcia’s clothing 
was not an extensive intrusion, especially considering Garcia’s arrest.  See Stark v. State, 960 
N.E.2d 887, 892 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (explaining that “the degree of intrusion was minimal” when 
the defendant “had already been arrested, and [the officer] merely retrieved [the defendant’s] coat 
from the vehicle,” which lead to the discovery of a loaded handgun) (emphasis added).   Because 
the search of Garcia was brief and minimal, the degree of intrusion also weighs in favor of the 
State.  
C. The extent of law enforcement needs  
The needs of law enforcement to conduct a search can vary greatly depending upon the 
circumstances.  Among the most commonly recognized bases for conducting a search includes 
“ensuring that the arrestee is unarmed, preventing the arrestee from brining contraband into jail, 
and preventing the destruction of evidence.”  Edmond, 951 N.E.2d at 592. (internal citation 
omitted).  It is not disputed that Officer Robinett was justified in doing a pat-down search for 
weapons before placing Garcia into his police cruiser.  Officer safety is a paramount concern when 
an arrestee is taken into custody.  Moreover, a search incident to arrest is not limited based on “an 
assumption that persons arrested for the offense of driving while their licenses have been revoked 
are less likely to possess dangerous weapons than are those arrested for other crimes.”  Robinson, 
414 U.S. at 234.  Rather, “all custodial arrests [are treated] alike for purposes of search 
justification.”  Id. at 235.  
When the pill container was discovered on Garcia’s person, it is insignificant that Officer 
Robinett acknowledged that the container could contain legal or illegal substances or that he did 
 
11 
not subjectively view Garcia or the container as dangerous.  First, we have continually reiterated 
that “[a] search incident to a valid arrest is lawful regardless of what it reveals.”  Farrie, 251 Ind. 
at 683, 266 N.E.2d at 214.  Second, the objective reasonableness of the search is controlling, not 
Officer Robinett’s subjective views.  Even under a brief stop and frisk, it is well established that 
the reasonableness of an officer’s suspicion turns upon whether “the totality of the circumstances 
presented a particularized and objective basis for the officer’s belief. . . .”  State v. Keck, 4 N.E.3d 
1180, 1184 (Ind. 2014) (internal citation and quotation omitted) (emphasis added). Under an 
objective standard, we agree that “unknown physical objects may always pose risks, no matter 
how slight, during the tense atmosphere of a custodial arrest.”  Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 
2485 (2014).  In fact, these risks continue to some extent into the ensuing time thereafter the arrest.  
For example, a risk may still exist while police are transporting an arrestee to a secure location and 
during booking of that individual at the police station. See Chambers v. State, 422 N.E.2d 1198, 
1203 (Ind. 1981) (upholding the validity of a search incident to arrest, regardless of the fact that 
the search did not occur at the exact time and place of the arrest, but occurred once the police 
arrived at the police station with the defendant.)    
We also seek to reiterate our recent statement in Guilmette.  As background, in Guilmette, 
the defendant challenged the admission of DNA evidence recovered from his shoe because police 
arrested him for one crime but seized his shoe to search for evidence of a different crime.  14 
N.E.3d 38, 41 (Ind. 2014).  The defendant argued that the DNA test was an unreasonable search 
incident to arrest.  Id.  After upholding the DNA testing of the shoe, the Court explained the 
practical rationalization for allowing the search: “[I]t would be extremely cumbersome to require 
law enforcement to take the ‘belt-and-suspenders’ approach of applying for an independent 
warrant anytime they wish to examine or test a piece of evidence they have already lawfully 
seized.”  Id. at 42.  Similarly, we see no basis in the present circumstances why an independent 
warrant should be required to search an item already lawfully seized.  
Thus, we conclude that the final Litchfield factor also weighs in favor of the State.  When 
taking an individual into custody, officer safety is a primary concern.  Small and seemingly 
 
12 
innocuous items have the potential to pose a threat.  We see no reason to delay the officer’s ability 
to inspect such items once they have already been lawfully seized.   
Although our analysis could conclude here, having found that all three of the Litchfield 
factors weigh in favor of the State, we find it worth noting other persuasive authority that is 
consistent with our conclusion.  
First, this Court has previously upheld, as a valid search incident to arrest, a search that 
included opening a closed item found on the person of the arrestee.  In Chambers, the defendant 
abducted, sexually assaulted, and then released his victim only after removing her military 
identification card from her wallet so he could subsequently harass the victim with threatening 
phone calls. 422 N.E.2d at 1200.  Upon further investigation into this offense, police ultimately 
arrested the defendant at a local tavern.  Id. at 1201.  Once at the police station, the defendant was 
ordered to hand over the contents of his pockets, and his wallet was searched in the hope of 
discovering the victim’s military identification card.  Id. at 1202.  The police instead found a piece 
of paper with the victim’s name, telephone number, and address written on it.  Id.  The search of 
the defendant’s wallet was upheld as a valid search incident to arrest.  Id. at 1203.  Even though 
the police in Chambers had some degree of suspicion regarding what could have been found in the 
defendant’s wallet, the degree of suspicion was not the basis of the Court’s holding.  Rather, the 
court provided that “[t]he search of [the defendant’s] wallet in the instant case was proper since it 
was searched as part of a search of his person.”  Id. at 1203.  “The search was incident to the arrest 
since the wallet . . . was immediately associated with the person of the [arrestee].”  Id.  
We decline to reach a different conclusion in the present case.  Similar to Chambers, the 
container found on Garcia’s person occurred during a valid search incident to arrest.  As such, it 
was permissible for that container to be opened and the contents examined without going to the 
extent of obtaining an individual warrant.  
 
13 
Additionally, when addressing Fourth Amendment challenges, Indiana courts have upheld 
searches incident to arrest in which containers found upon the arrestee have been opened.  In 
Klopfenstein v. State, officers detained and arrested the driver and passengers in a vehicle where 
multiple weapons were in plain view.  439 N.E.2d 1181, 1184 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).  When the 
driver was subjected to a pat-down search, a closed Tylenol pill bottle in a clear plastic bag was 
discovered.  Id.  The officer removed and opened the Tylenol bottle.  Id.  Inside, the officer 
discovered a greenish substance, later identified as hashish.  Id.  After considering both U.S. 
Supreme Court and Indiana precedent, the court concluded that the search of the Tylenol bottle 
was a valid search of the person incident to arrest.  Id. at 1188.  See also Shirley v. State, 803 
N.E.2d 251, 253-54, 256 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (upholding the validity of a search incident to arrest 
when an unlabeled pill bottle was found during the search, and the bottle was opened); and Wilson 
v. State, 754 N.E.2d 950, 953, 957 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (upholding the validity of a search incident 
to arrest after the defendant was arrested for driving with a suspended license, and the pat-down 
search resulted in finding, among other things, a cigar box, which was opened and found to contain 
marijuana).   
Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court’s clear guidance on this issue in Robinson is also 
persuasive. In Robinson, police conducted a traffic stop and lawfully arrested the driver for 
operating a motor vehicle after having his license revoked.  414 U.S. at 220.  Incident to this arrest, 
police conducted a pat-down search of the individual’s clothing, at which time an object was felt 
in the breast pocket of the individual’s coat.  Id. at 222-23.  The officer removed the object and 
discovered that it was a cigarette packet, but at this point, the officer was still unsure what the 
packet may contain.  Id. at 223.  Upon opening the cigarette packet, the officer discovered multiple 
capsules, which were later determined to be heroin.  Id.  
The Supreme Court first noted that “a search incident to a lawful arrest is a traditional 
exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment,” and encompasses searching the 
person of the arrestee.  Id. at 224.  While many reasons support the validity of a search incident to 
arrest, the Robinson court disagreed with the “suggestion that there must be litigated in each case 
 
14 
the issue of whether or not there was present one of the reasons supporting the authority for a 
search of the person incident to a lawful arrest,” and declined to find “such a case-by-case 
adjudication” necessary.  Id. at 235.  The authority to search incident to arrest does not depend 
upon “what a court may later decide was the probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons 
or evidence would in fact be found upon the person of the suspect.”  Id.  The Court concluded that 
the arrest gave rise to the authority to search the individual, and “it is of no moment that [the 
officer] did not indicate any subjective fear of the respondent or that he did not himself suspect 
that respondent was armed.”  Id. at 236.  The discovery of the cigarette packet during the course 
of the lawful search, “entitled [the officer] to inspect it; and when his inspection revealed the heroin 
capsules, he was entitled to seize them as fruits, instrumentalities, or contraband probative of 
criminal conduct.”  Id. (internal quotation and string citation omitted).  
Although the federal interpretation of reasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment is 
not binding upon this Court’s reasonableness analysis under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana 
Constitution, in the present situation, we reach the same conclusion.  Under Article 1, Section 11, 
opening a container found on the person of an arrestee in the course of a search incident to valid 
arrest will not automatically be deemed unreasonable. In the present case, the search of the 
container found on Garcia’s person during the course of a pat-down search was reasonable under 
Article 1, Section 11.   
Conclusion 
We affirm the trial court’s denial of Garcia’s motion to suppress the pill container found 
on his person during a search incident to a valid arrest.  In doing so, we hold that the search of 
Garcia’s person, which included opening the container, was within the scope of a search incident 
to a lawful arrest and reasonable under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.  
 
Rush, C.J., Dickson and Massa, J.J., concur. 
 
Rucker, J., concurs in result only.