Title: Rutledge v. State
Citation: 374 So. 2d 975
Docket Number: 48801
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: July 26, 1979

374 So. 2d 975 (1979)
Jesse Raymond RUTLEDGE, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 48801.

Supreme Court of Florida.
July 26, 1979.
Rehearing Denied October 4, 1979.
*976 Peter F. Laird, Gainesville, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Wallace E. Allbritton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, Florida, for appellee.
PER CURIAM.
We have for review by direct appeal Jesse Raymond Rutledge's convictions of two counts of murder in the first-degree and sentences of death and two counts of assault with intent to commit murder. Jurisdiction vests in this Court pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(1).
Rutledge was charged in a four count indictment returned June 9, 1975, with the murder in the first-degree of Anna Williams by cutting and stabbing her with a sharp instrument, murder in the first-degree of Wiley Williams by cutting and stabbing, assault with intent to commit murder upon Harold Williams, and assault with intent to commit murder upon Andrew Williams. He was found guilty by the jury on all counts. After sentence hearing, a majority of the jury recommended that the death penalty be imposed. The trial judge agreed and imposed two consecutive death sentences for the murder convictions and two consecutive fifteen year sentences for the assault to commit murder convictions. While incarcerated on the murder charge, appellant pled guilty to an unrelated crime with which he had been charged prior to the date of the murders and was sentenced on March 17, 1975, to serve a term of five years. On April 7th, he was delivered to custody of the Division of Corrections.
Completely supported by the record, the trial judge, in his sentencing order, gave an excellent detailed analysis of the factual setting of these murders as follows:
Subsequent to the filing of notice of appeal here, this Court by order directed the trial judge to disclose whether he, in imposing the death sentence, considered any information not known to the appellant. A response has been filed by the trial judge which indicates that the death sentence imposed by the court was not done through consideration of any information not known to the defendant/appellant and his counsel. Cf. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 97 S. Ct. 1197, 51 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1977).
Appellant first alleges that the trial court erred in not discharging him pursuant to the speedy trial rule. Review of the record evinces no violation of the speedy trial rule so as to warrant discharge. Inter alia, appellant was still engaged in discovery beyond the speedy trial rule time and, thus, was not continuously available for trial as contemplated by Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191.
Although expressly recognizing that this is not a case of prosecutorial misconduct, appellant next argues that he was prejudiced because the tape recording of the murder was briefly mentioned in the state's opening statement. This recording was subsequently ruled inadmissible in the guilt-innocence portion of the trial because the judge determined that, insofar as having any probative value, it was unintelligible and subject to speculation as to any words spoken having probative value. The judge explained that the only clear and intelligible portion of the tape are the moans, cries and pleas of the victims, none of which have probative value as to the guilt of the defendant. The disputed statement reads:
Prior to opening statements, the judge heard arguments of defense counsel and prosecution as to whether it would be permissible to mention the tape in opening argument. Although not ruling on the admissibility of the tape at this juncture, the trial court permitted the prosecutor to make reference to the tape in opening argument. Prior to the prosecutor's opening argument, the judge explicitly instructed the jury that the opening statements are not to be considered by the jury as evidence in the case. In the commencement of his opening argument, the prosecutor reiterated that nothing he said was to be considered evidence. The defense, in opening argument, also made references to the tape. Upon review of the entire record of evidence before us and the totality of the circumstances, we find no reversible error in the prosecutor's reference to the tape.
Appellant next argues that Harold Williams, the nine year old eyewitness of the crime, who was able to survive thirty-two stab wounds in his body to testify against the appellant and to make a positive identification of appellant as the perpetrator of these crimes, was incompetent to testify as a matter of law. Where a witness of tender years is offered to testify in a criminal case, posits appellant, the law establishes that it is the duty of the trial judge to ascertain whether the child has sufficient intelligence and understanding of the motive and obligation of an oath so as to be a competent witness. It is within the sound discretion of the trial judge to decide whether an infant of tender years has sufficient mental capacity and sense of moral obligation to be competent as a witness, and his ruling will not be disturbed unless a manifest abuse of discretion is shown. Rowe v. State, 87 Fla. 17, 98 So. 613 (1924). Sub judice, the prosecutor examined Harold Williams to determine his competency to testify. In Fernandez v. State, 328 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1976) cert. den. 341 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 1976), the Court determined that questioning by the prosecutor as to competency of a child was an acceptable procedure. *980 An examination of the record indicates no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in permitting Harold's testimony.
The other points raised on appeal by appellant directed to his conviction are likewise without merit.
We have listened carefully to oral argument, examined and considered the record including the voir dire examination, in light of the assignments of error and briefs filed, and we have also, pursuant to Fla.App. Rule 6.16(b), reviewed the evidence to determine whether the interests of justice require a new trial, with the result that we find no reversible error is made to appear and the evidence in the record before us does not reveal that the ends of justice require that a new trial on the issue of guilt be awarded.
Relative to the sentencing portion of the trial, we find that there was nothing violative of appellant's constitutional rights.
The trial judge carefully examined each of the mitigating and aggravating circumstances in his written statement of findings and properly concluded that the death penalty was warranted. As to the atrocious and heinous nature of these crimes, the trial judge explained:
We find that these crimes clearly fall within this Court's contemplation of "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" as enunciated in State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
Accordingly, finding no reversible error and determining the death penalty to be warranted, the judgments and sentences are affirmed.
ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON and SUNDBERG, JJ., concur.
ENGLAND, C.J., dissents.