Title: Garney v. Mass. Teachers' Ret. Sys.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11493
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: August 18, 2014

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SJC-11493  
 
 
RONALD T. GARNEY  vs.  MASSACHUSETTS TEACHERS' RETIREMENT 
SYSTEM. 
 
 
 
Worcester.     April 10, 2014. - August 18, 2014. 
 
Present:  Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, 
& Lenk, JJ.1 
 
Retirement.  Public Employment, Forfeiture of retirement 
benefits.  School and School Committee, Retirement 
benefits. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
January 14, 2010.  
 
 
The case was heard by John S. McCann, J., on motions for 
judgment on the pleadings. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
Robert G. Fabino (James H. Salvie, Special Assistant 
Attorney General, with him) for the defendant. 
 
Michael C. Donahue for the plaintiff. 
 
 
                     
 
1 Chief Justice Ireland participated in the deliberation on 
this case prior to his retirement. 
2 
 
 
CORDY, J.  This case concerns the scope of the pension 
forfeiture requirement of G. L. c. 32, § 15 (4), and 
specifically whether forfeiture is warranted where a teacher has 
engaged in criminal activity that endangers children generally, 
but does not involve the students whom he taught, the school 
district for which he worked, or the use of his status as a 
teacher.  The plaintiff, Ronald T. Garney, a ninth grade science 
teacher, was arrested in 2006 for the purchase and possession of 
child pornography.  Shortly after his arrest, he received notice 
that he would be dismissed from his position for conduct 
unbecoming a teacher and resigned prior to his dismissal.  He 
subsequently pleaded guilty to purchasing and possessing child 
pornography.  In August, 2007, when he reached retirement age, 
Garney filed a retirement application with the defendant, the 
Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System (MTRS), and received 
retirement benefits until 2009, when the MTRS board (board) 
issued a decision concluding that Garney's benefits were 
forfeited by operation of G. L. c. 32, § 15 (4), due to his 
convictions.2  A District Court judge affirmed the board's 
decision, and Garney petitioned for certiorari review in the 
Superior Court pursuant to G. L. c. 249, § 4.  A Superior Court 
                     
 
2 The board also concluded that Ronald T. Garney did not 
have a right to a superannuation retirement allowance under 
G. L. c. 32, § 10 (1), because of his convictions.  This issue 
was disposed of during the Superior Court proceedings and is not 
before us.  See note 6, infra. 
3 
 
judge reversed the decision of the District Court and vacated 
the decision of the board.  MTRS appealed, and we transferred 
its appeal to this court on our own motion. 
 
Although cognizant of the severity of the offenses of which 
Garney was convicted, we conclude that on the specific facts of 
this case, those offenses neither directly involved his position 
as a teacher nor contravened a particular law applicable to that 
position, and therefore did not come within the forfeiture 
provision of G. L. c. 32, § 15 (4).  Consequently, we affirm the 
decision of the Superior Court judge allowing Garney's motion 
for judgment on the pleadings and vacating the board's decision 
otherwise. 
 
Background.  For over twenty years, Garney worked as a 
ninth grade science teacher and served as a coach and referee at 
sporting events for the Amherst-Pelham regional school district 
(district).3  In November, 2004, the office of the United States 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement identified Garney as a 
purchaser of child pornography in the course of an investigation 
into Web sites that sold such illicit material.4  It informed the 
                     
 
3 Garney taught in the Amherst-Pelham regional school 
district from 1984 until his resignation in 2006.  In the early 
1970s, he worked briefly for the Hingham and Bridgewater public 
schools. 
 
 
4 Garney had been identified through the electronic mail (e-
mail) address and credit card numbers he submitted to the Web 
4 
 
Amherst police department, which monitored Garney's postal mail, 
electronic mail (e-mail) address, and credit card activity until 
November 28, 2006, when it executed a warrant to search Garney's 
apartment.  There, police found images of child pornography on 
his home computer, as well as several hand-labeled compact discs 
and video recordings, on either videotape cassettes or digital 
video discs, containing child pornography.   
 
Garney admitted to viewing child pornography since as early 
as 1994, to purchasing and possessing child pornography, and to 
joining several child pornography Web sites as early as 2000 or 
2001.  He indicated that he had renewed his membership to one 
such Web site in the weeks prior to his arrest and had last 
visited one of the Web sites the day prior to his arrest.  
Although Garney occasionally used an e-mail address issued to 
him by the Department of Elementary and Secondary Education to 
access the Web sites, there were no other connections to his 
position as a teacher.  He accessed and stored the illicit 
material on his home computer, purchased it using his own funds, 
and did not possess or view material that depicted any of his 
students or otherwise involve them.5   
                                                                  
sites, and by the unique Internet Protocol (IP) address of his 
computer. 
  
 
5 At the time of Garney's plea, twenty-one children in the 
photographs and video recordings had been identified.  The 
children ranged from four to fifteen years of age at the time 
5 
 
 
As a result of the investigation and Garney's arrest for 
the purchase and possession of child pornography, the 
superintendent of the school district informed Garney that the 
district intended to dismiss him for conduct unbecoming a 
teacher, pursuant to G. L. c. 71, § 42.  Two days prior to the 
effective date of his dismissal, on December 13, 2006, Garney 
resigned his position.   
 
Garney was thereafter indicted and, on December 20, 2007, 
pleaded guilty to eleven counts of purchasing and possessing 
child pornography, in violation of G. L. c. 272, § 29C.  He was 
sentenced to from two and one-half to three years in a house of 
correction, followed by probation, registration as a sex 
offender, and other penalties.   
 
On August 7, 2007, after his arrest but prior to his plea 
and sentencing, Garney filed a retirement application with MTRS.  
His retirement became effective on August 22, 2007, at which 
time he had twenty-two years and three months of retirement 
credit, and he began to receive a gross monthly retirement 
benefit of $2,393.78.  On May 22, 2008, after his convictions, 
MTRS notified Garney that it was initiating proceedings to 
consider whether his convictions triggered the operation of 
                                                                  
the material was created, and were known to be located in a 
variety of jurisdictions, primarily outside the United States.  
None were from the school or the school district where Garney 
taught. 
6 
 
G. L. c. 32, § 15 (4), which requires forfeiture of public 
employee retirement benefits "after final conviction of a 
criminal offense involving violation of the laws applicable to 
[the employee's] office or position." 
 
After receiving recommended findings of fact from a hearing 
officer, the board concluded on March 27, 2009, that Garney's 
retirement was forfeited by operation of both G. L. c. 32, 
§§ 10 (1) and 15 (4).6  The board determined that there was "a 
direct link between Mr. Garney's employment and his possession 
of child pornography," in part because he used an e-mail address 
provided by the Department of Elementary and Secondary 
Education, and that therefore he met the requirements of G. L. 
c. 32, § 15 (4), warranting forfeiture.  
 
On Garney's petition for review pursuant to G. L. c. 32, 
§ 16 (3), a District Court judge affirmed the board's decision.  
The judge observed that teachers occupy a position of special 
trust, see Perryman v. School Comm. of Boston, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 
346, 349 (1983), and that the crime Garney committed directly 
contravened his duty to protect the welfare of children.  
                     
 
6 General Laws c. 32, § 10 (1), provides a right to a 
superannuation retirement allowance for certain public employees 
but prohibits that allowance where an employee "is removed or 
discharged from his office or position" with "moral turpitude on 
his part."  This allowance is permitted, however, if the 
employee "resigns or voluntarily terminates his service," as 
Garney did.  See id.  During the subsequent Superior Court 
proceedings, the parties agreed that G. L. c. 32, § 10 (1), is 
inapplicable, and this ground is not raised on appeal.   
7 
 
Therefore, the requisite link between his criminal convictions 
and his public position was established, such that his crimes 
"involv[ed] violation of the laws applicable to his office or 
position."  See G. L. c. 32, § 15 (4).  Relying on State Bd. of 
Retirement v. Bulger, 446 Mass. 169, 175 (2006), the judge noted 
that the private nature of the crime, and the fact that it did 
not involve any school resources or any of Garney's students,7 
did not call for a different result where the welfare of 
children is a core tenet of the teaching position, and the crime 
that Garney committed was directly at odds with this tenet.   
 
Garney then petitioned the Superior Court for certiorari 
pursuant to G. L. c. 249, § 4.  A Superior Court judge allowed 
Garney's motion for judgment on the pleadings, reversed the 
decision of the District Court judge, and vacated the decision 
of the board that Garney's pension was forfeited under G. L. 
c. 32, § 15 (4).  Relying on our decisions in Bulger, 446 Mass. 
at 171, and Gaffney v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 423 
Mass. 1, 4-5 (1996), the judge reasoned that, although Garney's 
crimes were severe and undoubtedly warranted both criminal 
                     
 
 
7 Although the judge observed that Garney occasionally used 
an e-mail address issued to him by the Department of Elementary 
and Secondary Education in accessing the Web sites containing 
child pornography, he otherwise noted that there was no evidence 
that Garney used school funds, engaged in the activity at 
school, used school computers, or "created or disseminated child 
pornography or involved any students from the school district in 
his illegal behavior or displayed any illicit material to them."   
8 
 
prosecution and dismissal from his position, there was not a 
direct link between his convictions and his position as a 
teacher, because his criminal offenses did not involve the use 
of school resources and he did not use his position as a teacher 
to facilitate his crime.  Further, the judge rejected the 
District Court judge's interpretation of Bulger, supra at 175, 
179-180, and the argument of MTRS that because teachers fill a 
special societal role, a conviction of possession of child 
pornography necessarily violates the laws applicable to that 
role.  MTRS appealed, and we transferred the case from the 
Appeals Court on our own motion to clarify the scope of our 
decision in Bulger, supra at 178-180.   
 
Discussion.  Our review of the board's decision pursuant to 
G. L. c. 249, § 4, is a limited one.  See Bulger, 446 Mass. at 
173.  We may "correct only a substantial error of law, evidenced 
by the record, which adversely affects a material right of the 
plaintiff. . . . [and] may rectify only those errors of law 
which have resulted in manifest injustice to the plaintiff or 
which have adversely affected the real interests of the general 
public . . . ."  Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth. v. Auditor of 
the Commonwealth, 430 Mass. 783, 790 (2000), quoting Carney v. 
Springfield, 403 Mass. 604, 605 (1988).   
 
The parties' dispute pertains to the scope of G. L. c. 32, 
§ 15 (4), which directs the forfeiture of a pension following 
9 
 
certain criminal conduct by a member of a contributory 
retirement system for public employees.  See Retirement Bd. of 
Somerville v. Buonomo, 467 Mass. 662, 663 (2014).  Section 
15 (4) provides in relevant part:  "In no event shall any member 
after final conviction of a criminal offense involving violation 
of the laws applicable to his office or position, be entitled to 
receive a retirement allowance . . . ."   
Where we must interpret the terms of a statute, we look "to 
the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all [the 
statute's] words construed by the ordinary and approved usage of 
the language, considered in connection with the cause of its 
enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the 
main object to be accomplished."  Hanlon v. Rollins, 286 Mass. 
444, 447 (1934), and cases cited.  See Sullivan v. Brookline, 
435 Mass. 353, 360 (2001).  Because G. L. c. 32, § 15, involves 
the forfeiture of property, it is penal in nature, and we must 
draw its limits narrowly, so as not to exceed the scope or reach 
of the penalty as contemplated by the Legislature.  Bulger, 446 
Mass. at 174-175.  See Gaffney, 423 Mass. at 3 & n.3; Collatos 
v. Boston Retirement Bd., 396 Mass. 684, 686-687 (1986) (General 
Laws c. 32, § 15 "imposes a penalty on employees" and 
"enforce[s] the criminal law by suspending the sword of 
retirement benefits forfeiture over those employees who 
otherwise might be tempted to transgress").   
10 
 
 
We have observed previously that "[t]he substantive 
touchstone [of G. L. c. 32, § 15 (4),] intended by the General 
Court is criminal activity connected with the office or 
position. . . .  [T]he General Court did not intend pension 
forfeiture to follow as [an automatic consequence] of any and 
all criminal convictions.  Only those violations related to the 
member's official capacity were targeted.  Looking to the facts 
of each case for a direct link between the criminal offense and 
the member's office or position best effectuates the legislative 
intent of § 15 (4)" (emphasis added).  Gaffney, 423 Mass. at 4-
5.  This "direct link" requirement "does not mean that the crime 
itself must reference public employment or the employee's 
particular position or responsibilities," Maher v. Justices of 
the Quincy Div. of the Dist. Court Dep't, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 612, 
616 (2006), S.C., Maher v. Retirement Bd. of Quincy, 452 Mass. 
517 (2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1166 (2009), or that the 
crime necessarily must have been committed at or during work.  
Durkin v. Boston Retirement Bd., 83 Mass. App. Ct. 116, 119 
(2013).  However, where the crime itself does not reference 
public employment or bear a direct factual link through use of 
the position's resources, there must be some direct connection 
between the criminal offense and the employee's official 
capacity by way of the laws directly applicable to the public 
position.  See Gaffney, supra at 5. 
11 
 
 
It is clear that the criminal offenses for which Garney was 
convicted neither referenced public employment nor bore a direct 
factual link to his teaching position.  See G. L. c. 279, § 29C.  
Garney committed his crimes outside of school, without using 
school resources or otherwise using his position to facilitate 
his crimes, and without involving students in his illicit 
activities.8  In numerous cases, this lack of a factual link has 
been fatal to the retirement board's claim that forfeiture is 
warranted.  See, e.g., Retirement Bd. of Maynard v. Tyler, 83 
Mass. App. Ct. 109, 113 (2013) (no forfeiture where fire fighter 
sexually abused boys because offenses were "personal in nature, 
occurring outside the firehouse while [fire fighter] was not on 
duty," and "no evidence that [fire fighter] used his position, 
uniform, or equipment for the purposes of his indecent acts"); 
Scully v. Retirement Bd. of Beverly, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 538, 543, 
545 (2011) (no forfeiture where public library employee 
convicted of possession of child pornography because offenses 
occurred at home on personal computer, and employee did not use 
position to facilitate crime); Herrick v. Essex Regional 
Retirement Bd., 77 Mass. App. Ct. 645, 646-647, 654 (2010) (no 
                     
 
8 Although Garney did use an e-mail address issued by the 
Department of Elementary and Secondary Education to access at 
least some of the pornography Web sites, this fact does not 
appear to have persuaded either the District Court judge or the 
Superior Court judge that there was a sufficient factual link 
between his criminal offenses and his teaching position.  We 
agree. 
12 
 
forfeiture where housing authority custodian convicted of 
indecent assault and battery of daughter because offense not 
committed on public property or against anyone who resided 
there, and otherwise had no connection to custodian's official 
position).  See also Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement Bd. vs. 
Lambert, Mass. Super. Ct., No. SUCV2005-02540B, slip op. at 1-2, 
9 (Mar. 26, 2007) (Superior Court judge held forfeiture not 
warranted where teacher convicted of possession of child 
pornography because offense committed at home, on personal 
computer, without involvement of any students or children known 
to teacher).  Contrast Gaffney, 423 Mass. at 4, 5 (forfeiture 
where superintendent of town water and sewer department 
convicted of larceny because superintendent tasked with managing 
budget and stole from own department); Durkin, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 
at 116-117, 119 (forfeiture where police officer convicted of 
assault and battery by means of dangerous weapon for shooting 
another officer with department-issued firearm while intoxicated 
off duty); Maher, 67 Mass. App. Ct. at 616-617 (forfeiture where 
city inspector convicted of breaking into city hall and stealing 
documents from own personnel file because "multiple, direct 
links" between offenses and position).   
Relying on our decision in Bulger, 446 Mass. at 179-180, 
MTRS argues that, despite the lack of a factual connection 
between Garney's crimes and his public position, there is a 
13 
 
direct link here because the position of a teacher is one that 
holds a special public trust, and Garney's criminal conduct of 
possessing child pornography strikes at the "heart" of this 
position by violating one of its "fundamental tenets," as 
embodied in the professional standards for teachers.  As a 
result, MTRS contends, the board and the District Court judge 
correctly concluded that forfeiture was warranted.  Garney 
asserts that creating a distinct forfeiture category for 
teachers because of their special obligations to society would 
expand G. L. c. 32, § 15 (4), "to accomplish an unexpressed 
result," Bulger, supra at 175, and accordingly asks us to affirm 
the Superior Court judge's determination that there was no 
direct link between Garney's conduct and his position.  We 
conclude that the fact that Garney's position is one of special 
public trust, and that criminal conduct of the type committed by 
Garney violates that trust, is insufficient in and of itself to 
warrant forfeiture under G. L. c. 32, § 15 (4).  Rather, the 
conduct must either directly involve the position or be contrary 
to a central function of the position as articulated in 
applicable laws, thereby creating a direct link to the position. 
1.  Special public trust.  Undoubtedly, teachers hold a 
position of special public trust; they must impart "the basic 
values of our society" to students and ensure their well-being 
in the process.  Perryman, 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 351.  See Brum 
14 
 
v. Dartmouth, 428 Mass. 684, 709 (1999) (Ireland, J., 
concurring); Dupree v. School Comm. of Boston, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 
535, 538 (1983).  Indeed, "conduct consistent with this special 
trust is an obligation of the employment."  Perryman, supra at 
349.  It is for this reason that teachers must demonstrate 
"sound moral character" to acquire teacher certification, G. L. 
c. 71, § 38G, and may be suspended or dismissed from service 
where they engage in "conduct unbecoming a teacher," G. L. 
c. 71, §§ 42 and 42D, or have been convicted "of a crime 
involving moral turpitude" or that otherwise "discredits the 
profession" or demonstrates a lack of "good moral character," 
603 Code Mass. Regs. § 7.15(8)(a)(1)(c) (2012).  However, these 
parameters for entering or remaining in the profession are not 
the same as the standard for forfeiting a pension to which an 
employee has contributed and that he or she earned over the 
course of many years of public service.  See Bulger, 446 Mass. 
at 178-179 ("standard for pension forfeiture based on 
dereliction of duty is more narrow and specific" than standard 
for dismissal, and not every offense implicating norms and 
expectations of position necessarily violates applicable law and 
requires forfeiture); Durkin, 83 Mass. App. Ct. at 119 n.5 ("not 
every off-duty illegal act qualifies" for forfeiture).  See also 
Gaffney, 423 Mass. at 3 & n.3 (language of G. L. c. 32, 
15 
 
§ 15 [4], must be construed narrowly because of its penal 
character). 
In advocating for a reading of G. L. c. 32, § 15 (4), that 
requires forfeiture where a teacher's criminal conduct violates 
the special public trust placed in teachers, MTRS misinterprets 
Bulger, 446 Mass. at 176-180, as adopting a broader reading of 
G. L. c. 32, § 15 (4), than the narrow language of the statute 
permits.  Our decision in Bulger, supra, did not call for 
forfeiture whenever a special public trust is violated.  Rather, 
the court concluded that forfeiture was warranted where a clerk-
magistrate's specific criminal conduct, perjury and obstruction 
of justice, was directly contrary to the most fundamental tenets 
of his position, to ensure truth-telling in judicial matters and 
proceedings and to uphold the integrity of the judicial system.  
Id.  These tenets and responsibilities were embodied in the Code 
of Professional Responsibility for Clerks of the Courts, S.J.C. 
Rule 3:12, as amended, 427 Mass. 1322 (1998) (code), a law 
applicable to his position.9  See Bulger, supra at 176-177.  See 
                     
 
9 In State Bd. of Retirement v. Bulger, 446 Mass. 169, 169, 
171 (2006), a clerk-magistrate of the Boston Juvenile Court was 
convicted of perjury and obstruction of justice in Federal court 
during grand jury investigations of alleged criminal offenses 
committed by his brother, James "Whitey" Bulger, and others, and 
of criminal offenses related to harboring and concealing James 
Bulger.  In assessing whether the clerk-magistrate had violated 
a law applicable to his office in engaging in this criminal 
conduct, the court first identified the central functions of the 
clerk-magistrate position underlying its daily tasks:  to 
16 
 
also Berkwitz, petitioner, 323 Mass. 41, 47 (1948) (court rules 
have force of law).   
 
We reached a similar conclusion in a more recent case, 
Buonomo, 467 Mass. at 670-671.  There, we concluded that a 
register of probate violated the laws applicable to his office 
by committing larceny, embezzlement, and associated crimes, 
because the code requires clerks and registers "to contribute to 
the preservation of public confidence in the integrity, 
impartiality, and independence of the courts" and to "comply 
with the laws of the Commonwealth."  S.J.C. Rule 3:12, Canons 1 
                                                                  
administer oaths, thereby ensuring truth-telling; to ensure "the 
effective functioning of the courts"; and to preserve the 
integrity of judicial processes.  See id. at 176-177, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Clerk-Magistrate of the W. Roxbury Div. of the 
Dist. Court Dep't, 439 Mass. 352, 359 (2003).   
 
 
The court observed that the Code of Professional 
Responsibility for Clerks of the Courts (code), in "enunciating 
the high standards to which clerks are held," forbids a broader 
range of conduct than that which merits forfeiture.  Bulger, 446 
Mass. at 177 & n.6, 178.  Among the code's requirements are that 
clerk-magistrates "comply with the laws of the Commonwealth 
[and] rules of the court" and "conduct personal affairs in such 
a way as not to cause public disrespect for the court and the 
judicial system."  S.J.C. Rule 3:12, Canons 2 and 4(B), as 
appearing in 407 Mass. 1301 (1990).  After considering the 
relationship between the code and the clerk-magistrate's crimes, 
the court concluded that his specific criminal offenses 
constituted an identifiable "violation of [a] law[] applicable 
to [the] office or position," G. L. c. 32, § 15 (4), because 
they contradicted the "fundamental tenets of the code and of his 
oath of office."  Bulger, supra at 179-180.  His crimes were so 
connected to the core function of his position in preserving the 
integrity of the judicial system and ensuring truth-telling that 
they could not be "separated from the nature of his particular 
office."  Id. at 180. 
17 
 
and 2, as appearing in 407 Mass. 1301 (1990).  His conduct, we 
determined, "compromised the integrity of and public trust in 
the office of register of probate" and therefore explicitly 
violated the core function of his position as embodied in the 
provisions of the code.  See Buonomo, supra at 671.   
 
The narrow basis for our holdings in Bulger and Buonomo 
demonstrates that G. L. c. 32, § 15 (4), requires something more 
specific than a violation of a special public trust in the 
particular public position.  The plain language of G. L. c. 32, 
§ 15 (4), clearly requires a direct link between the criminal 
offense and a violation of the laws applicable to the office.  
Gaffney, 423 Mass. at 4-5.  See Bulger, 446 Mass. at 179 (where 
member is "convicted of a criminal offense that does not involve 
any violation of the laws applicable to his office or position 
. . . the member does not forfeit his entitlement to a 
retirement allowance").  Criminal conduct that is merely 
inconsistent with a concept of special public trust placed in 
the position or defiant of a general professional norm 
applicable to the position, but not violative of a fundamental 
precept of the position embodied in a law applicable to it, may 
be adequate to warrant dismissal, but it is insufficient to 
justify forfeiture under G. L. c. 32, § 15 (4).  See Bulger, 
supra at 179-180; Gaffney, 423 Mass. at 4-5.  See also Tyler, 83 
18 
 
Mass. App. Ct. at 109-110, 113; Scully, 80 Mass. App. Ct. at 
543, 545; Herrick, 77 Mass. App. Ct. at 654.   
Were we to hold otherwise, and conclude that where a 
teacher's criminal conduct violates the special public trust 
placed in teachers, forfeiture is warranted, we would permit 
forfeiture nearly any time a teacher engages in criminal 
conduct.  This would expand the parameters of G. L. c. 32, 
§ 15 (4), well beyond what the Legislature intended for it to 
encompass.  Cf. Tyler, 83 Mass. App. Ct. at 112 (considerations 
of fire fighter's general obligation to protect the public 
"while understandable, are so broad . . . as to engulf nearly 
every public official, especially police officers and fire 
fighters, convicted of any crime.  The reach of the statute as 
currently written is not so broad").  Cf. also Lambert, Mass. 
Super. Ct., No. SUCV2005-02540B, slip op. at 9 (application of 
G. L. c. 32, § 15 [4], cannot extend to any "violation of broad 
standards of fitness to serve as a teacher" because this would 
expand scope beyond that intended by Legislature, as 
"[v]irtually every criminal conviction of a teacher puts in 
question the soundness of his moral character and fitness for 
the position").  Our reading of the statute is consistent with 
19 
 
the mandate that we interpret the statute narrowly.  See Bulger, 
446 Mass. at 174-175.10 
 
2.  Laws applicable to teaching position.  We turn next to 
whether Garney's conduct violated any laws applicable to his 
position as a teacher, and conclude that it did not.   
 
At its core, the function of a teacher is that of educator.  
See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 723, 2346 
(1993) (defining "educate" as "to bring up" or "to train by 
formal instruction and supervised practice"; defining "teacher" 
as "one that teaches or instructs"; and defining "teach" as "to 
show, instruct," "to cause to know a subject," and "to impart 
the knowledge of").  Teachers must give effect to the mandate 
embodied in Part II, c. 5, § 2, of the Constitution of the 
Commonwealth, that "the magistrates and Legislatures of this 
Commonwealth . . . provide education in the public schools."  
McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Educ., 415 Mass. 
545, 621 (1993).  This mandate derives from the belief that an 
educated people is "essential to the preservation of . . . [a] 
                     
 
10 As noted above, the penal character of the forfeiture 
required by G. L. c. 32, § 15 (4), compels us to interpret the 
statutory language narrowly.  See Gaffney v. Contributory 
Retirement Appeal Bd., 423 Mass. 1, 3 & n.3 (1996).  If the 
Legislature desires a different result, it must state so clearly 
in amended legislation.  See Retirement Bd. of Somerville v. 
Buonomo, 467 Mass. 662, 672 (2014) (Legislature expanded 
applicability of forfeiture to "broader range of circumstances" 
with St. 1987, c. 679, § 47, in response to Collatos v. Boston 
Retirement Bd., 396 Mass. 684, 687-688 [1986], which interpreted 
predecessor statute narrowly). 
20 
 
democratic State."  Id. at 561.  Since 1789, teachers have been 
instructed to "exert their best endeavors to impress on the 
minds of children and youth committed to their care and 
instruction the principles of piety and justice[,] . . . a 
sacred regard for truth," and other virtues, such as humanity, 
sobriety, moderation, and temperance, and "to point out to 
[students] the evil tendency of the opposite vices."  G. L. 
c. 71, § 30.  See McDuffy, supra at 594 & n.66, quoting 
St. 1789, c. 19, § 4.   
 
Private possession of child pornography by a secondary 
school teacher does not directly contravene this central 
function where there is no indication that this possession 
compromised the safety, welfare, or learning of the children 
whom he was tasked with teaching or impeded his ability to 
provide adequate educational lessons to his students.  As 
reprehensible as Garney's crimes may be, the entirely private 
nature of his conduct does not call into question the 
effectiveness of the educational system of the Commonwealth.   
 
The central function of the teaching position is buttressed 
by additional, important principles, the violation of which may 
be a ground for dismissal from a teaching position, see G. L. 
c. 71, § 42, but whose fulfilment is not so central to the role 
of the teacher in ensuring students' education that a violation 
justifies forfeiture of retirement benefits.  For example, 
21 
 
teachers are expected to "[u]nderstand[ ] [their] legal and 
moral responsibilities" and "[u]nderstand[ ] legal and ethical 
issues as they apply to responsible and acceptable use of the 
Internet and other resources."  See 603 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 7.08(2)(e)(1), (7) (2005).11  Even if Garney's criminal 
offenses suggest a lack of understanding of these ethical 
obligations and responsibilities, his personal possession of 
pornography, without any known impact on his teaching or his 
students, cannot be said to violate the core function of 
teaching so as to create the direct link required between 
conduct and office for forfeiture under G. L. c. 32, § 15 (4).  
The critical alignment of crime and office through an applicable 
law, as required by this narrow statute, is simply not present.12 
                     
 
11 Although this older version of the regulations was in 
place at the time of Garney's convictions and the board's 
decision, a more recent version of 603 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 7.08(2) (2014) sets forth four categories of professional 
standards for teachers:  curriculum, planning, and assessment; 
teaching all students; family and community engagement; and 
professional culture.  This final category articulates the 
expectation that teachers will "[p]romote[ ] the learning and 
growth of all students through ethical, culturally proficient, 
skilled, and collaborative practice."  603 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 7.08(2)(d). 
 
 
12 This is in stark contrast to the relationship between the 
criminal offenses and the core responsibilities of the position 
in Bulger, 446 Mass. at 175-180.  There, the clerk-magistrate's 
convictions of perjury and obstruction of justice struck at the 
very core of the role of the clerk-magistrate and compromised 
the integrity of the judicial system; this close nexus is what 
warranted forfeiture.  See id. at 179-180.   
22 
 
 
In this respect, a teacher's conduct that fails to reach 
inside the schoolhouse doors does not satisfy the standard for 
forfeiture under G. L. c. 32, § 15 (4).  For this reason, MTRS's 
claim that Garney's status as a mandated reporter of child abuse 
provides the requisite connection for forfeiture also must fail.  
As a mandated reporter, G. L. c. 119, § 21, a teacher who, "in 
his [or her] professional capacity, has reasonable cause to 
believe that a child is suffering physical or emotional injury 
resulting from [abuse, neglect, or sexual abuse] . . . shall 
immediately communicate with the [Department of Children and 
Families] . . . [and] file a written report . . . detailing the 
suspected abuse or neglect" or "notify the person or designated 
agent in charge of [the school]."  G. L. c. 119, § 51A (a).  See 
Matter of a Grand Jury Investigation, 437 Mass. 340, 352-353 
(2002).  The report filed must contain the names and addresses 
of the child and the adults responsible for the child's care, as 
well as the child's age, sex, extent of injuries or abuse, and 
other relevant information.  G. L. c. 119, § 51A (d).   
 
Although mandated reporters may report suspected abuse or 
neglect of which they become aware at any time, the duty to 
report applies only to information learned in one's professional 
capacity, in this case while Garney was fulfilling his teaching 
and coaching responsibilities.  G. L. c. 119, § 51A (a) (duty 
applies when mandated reporter learns of abuse or neglect "in 
23 
 
his [or her] professional capacity").  Not only did Garney not 
know the identities of the children in the pornography and 
therefore did not have the requisite information, but he also 
did not learn of this abuse in his professional capacity.  As 
Garney's criminal conduct was independent of his role as a 
teacher, he was not required under the plain meaning of G. L. 
c. 119, § 51A, to report this conduct.13,14   
                     
 
13 The mandated reporter statute was clearly intended to 
ensure the immediate care and protection of identifiable 
endangered children within the Commonwealth, as the statutory 
scheme instructs the Department of Children and Families 
(department) to investigate reports promptly and in person.  See 
Covell v. Department of Social Servs., 439 Mass. 766, 772 
(2003); B.K. v. Department of Children & Families, 79 Mass. App. 
Ct. 777, 782 (2011) (General Laws c. 119, § 51A, intended to 
provide department with information to protect children's health 
and safety before harm occurs); Cooney v. Department of Mental 
Retardation, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 378, 382-383 (2001) (social 
policy of G. L. c. 119, § 51A, is "to encourage certain 
professionals to report known or suspected abuse so that those 
who are vulnerable and at risk . . . may be protected").  
Investigation into the well-being of the child subjects of 
pornography is likely beyond the investigative and protective 
functions of the department where, as here, the identities of 
the majority of the children are unknown, and those who had been 
identified at the time of Garney's plea and whose locations were 
known were located in other, primarily foreign, jurisdictions. 
 
 
14 We agree with the Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement 
System that a particular public position's status as a mandated 
reporter suggests that the position may hold a special public 
trust.  See Retirement Bd. of Maynard v. Tyler, 83 Mass. App. 
Ct. 109, 114-115 (2013) (Graham, J., dissenting) (mandated 
reporter status is "[i]llustrative of the special trust 
conferred on firefighters and [emergency medical technicians]").  
However, we have concluded that a violation of the special 
public trust placed in teachers is not determinative to the 
analysis under G. L. c. 32, § 15 (4). 
24 
 
 
In sum, we recognize that Garney's possession of child 
pornography, in violation of G. L. c. 279, § 29C, was violative 
of children's safety, rights, and dignity overall, and further 
violative of the special public trust placed in teachers to 
ensure the welfare of children in the Commonwealth.  See G. L. 
c. 71, § 30; St. 1997, c. 181, §§ 1, 2 (enacting G. L. c. 279, 
§ 29C).  Nonetheless, there is no reference to public employment 
in the criminal statute under which Garney was convicted, no 
direct factual link between Garney's conduct and his teaching 
position, and no violation of any identifiable law applicable to 
that position.  Consequently, we must conclude that forfeiture 
of Garney's retirement benefits under G. L. c. 32, § 51 (4), was 
not warranted.   
 
Conclusion.  We affirm the decision of the Superior Court 
reversing the decision of the District Court and vacating the 
decision of the board. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.