Title: Lowe v. Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 21S-CT-00295
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: December 16, 2021

I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 21S-CT-295 
Clarence Lowe, 
Appellant, 
–v– 
Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District, 
Appellee. 
Argued: September 16, 2021 | Decided: December 16, 2021 
Appeal from the Porter Superior Court 
No. 64D02-1901-CT-682 
The Honorable Jeffrey W. Clymer, Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals 
Case No. 20A-CT-1584 
Opinion by Justice Slaughter 
Chief Justice Rush and Justices David, Massa, and Goff concur. 
 
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Dec 16 2021, 10:24 am
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 21S-CT-295 | December 16, 2021 
Page 2 of 14 
Slaughter, Justice. 
Clarence Lowe, an employee of the Northern Indiana Commuter 
Transportation District, claims he was injured at work. We must decide 
whether the District, which operates a government-owned railroad, is a 
“state agency” or “political subdivision” under the Indiana Tort Claims 
Act. If the District is a state agency, the Act requires that pre-suit notice be 
served within 270 days of the injury; if it is a political subdivision, pre-suit 
notice must be served within 180 days. We hold that the District is a 
political subdivision under the Act. Thus, it was entitled to notice within 
180 days of Lowe’s alleged injury. Because Lowe did not provide notice 
until 263 days after his injury, his notice was untimely, and his suit is 
time-barred.  
I 
In early 2018, Clarence Lowe was working for the District, which owns 
and operates a passenger rail line between Chicago and South Bend. Lowe 
claims he was injured while manually hammering spikes into frozen track 
ties. He sent a notice of tort claim to the Indiana attorney general, who 
received the notice 263 days after Lowe’s injury. The attorney general 
responded that the State of Indiana “does not appear” to have “any 
connection with this case” because the State was not a named party. Lowe 
then filed a complaint against the District under FELA, the Federal 
Employers’ Liability Act. The District moved for summary judgment, 
arguing that although Indiana has waived sovereign immunity for FELA 
actions, such suits are subject to the Indiana Tort Claims Act. The District 
further argued that for purposes of the Act, it is a political subdivision, not 
a state agency, and because Lowe failed to serve it with a notice of tort 
claim within 180 days after his injury, the Act bars his FELA claim. The 
trial court granted summary judgment to the District and against Lowe.  
Lowe appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the 
District is a political subdivision under the Act, and that his notice of tort 
claim was untimely. Lowe v. N. Indiana Commuter Transp. Dist., 167 N.E.3d 
290, 291–92 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). Lowe then sought transfer, which we 
granted to answer this important question of first impression, thus 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 21S-CT-295 | December 16, 2021 
Page 3 of 14 
vacating the appellate opinion. Lowe v. N. Indiana Commuter Transp. Dist., 
169 N.E.3d 1119 (Ind. 2021).   
II 
FELA, codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60, makes a common-carrier railroad 
liable for injuries an employee suffers on the job due to the railroad’s 
negligence. Beckley v. Beckley, 822 N.E.2d 158, 161 (Ind. 2005) (citing Consol. 
Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 542 (1994)). On summary judgment, the 
District argued that Lowe’s FELA claim was time-barred because he failed 
to comply with the 180-day notice requirement in Indiana’s Tort Claims 
Act. Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of 
material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Griffin v. Menard, Inc., 175 N.E.3d 811, 813 (Ind. 2021). Here, the parties do 
not raise disputed issues of fact; what they dispute, as a matter of law, is 
whether the Act applies and, if so, which notice requirement governs.  
As a threshold matter, we ask first whether the Act applies to FELA 
suits against state entities and hold that it does. Lowe argues that the Act 
cannot apply to a FELA lawsuit because a state statute cannot abrogate a 
right to file an action granted by a federal statute. But he cites no case 
from any jurisdiction holding that a state’s tort-claims act does not apply 
to a FELA action. To the contrary, we note at the outset that Congress 
enacted FELA under its Article I powers. See, e.g., Parden v. Terminal 
Railway of the Alabama State Docks Dep’t, 377 U.S. 184, 190–92 (1964), 
overruled on other grounds by College Savs. Bank v. Florida Prepaid 
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 680 (1999). Congress does not 
have the power under Article I to subject nonconsenting states to private 
suits for damages in state courts. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999). 
To determine whether Indiana has consented to suit under FELA, and 
under what circumstances, we would turn to the Act. Esserman v. Indiana 
Dep’t of Env’t Mgmt., 84 N.E.3d 1185, 1190 (Ind. 2017). Thus, the mere fact 
that FELA is a federal statute does not automatically exclude from 
consideration the procedural constraints of our state’s Tort Claims Act. 
We note further that Lowe has not argued that FELA preempts the Act; 
nor have we discerned from FELA’s text that Congress intended to occupy 
the field of negligence claims against railway employers. Thus, we see no 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 21S-CT-295 | December 16, 2021 
Page 4 of 14 
reason not to apply here the general rule allowing states to “apply their 
own neutral procedural rules to federal claims, unless those rules are pre-
empted by federal law”. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 372 (1990); accord 
Mondou v. New York, New Haven, & Hartford Railroad Co., 223 U.S. 1, 2, 59 
(1912) (requiring states to adjudicate issues under FELA assuming “their 
jurisdiction, as prescribed by local laws, is adequate to the occasion”).   
Finding no reason under federal law to bypass our Tort Claims Act, we 
turn to its text. By its own terms, the Act applies to “a claim or suit in 
tort”, Ind. Code § 34-13-3-1(a), against governmental entities and their 
employees, Burton v. Benner, 140 N.E.3d 848, 852 (Ind. 2020). We find the 
reasoning in Oshinski v. Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District, 
843 N.E.2d 536 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), persuasive. There, our court of 
appeals concluded that the Act applies to FELA claims against the District 
because the Act governs tort claims against governmental entities, and 
FELA claims are tort claims. Id. at 543–44. Although FELA does not use 
the word “tort”, by its terms, it applies to causes of action arising from 
“negligence”. 45 U.S.C. § 51. And negligence is a type of tort. Oshinski, 843 
N.E.2d at 544 (citing Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union Railway, 321 U.S. 29, 
32 (1944), and Simpson v. N.E. Illinois Reg’l Commuter R.R. Corp., 957 F. 
Supp. 136, 138 (N.D. Ill. 1997)). A later court of appeals opinion, Rudnick v. 
Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District, 892 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2008), relying on Oshinski, also applied the Act in a FELA suit 
against the District. We follow these cases and hold that where, as here, a 
state entity is sued under FELA, the Act applies.  
Next, we ask whether the District is a state agency or political 
subdivision under the Act. We hold that the legislature defines the District 
as a political subdivision for purposes of the Act, and thus Lowe was 
subject to its 180-day notice requirement. We then address Lowe’s 
arguments that even if the Act applies to FELA claims against state 
entities in general, we should not apply the Act’s 180-day notice 
requirement here. Finding Lowe’s arguments unavailing, we affirm the 
trial court’s order granting summary judgment to the District. 
 
 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 21S-CT-295 | December 16, 2021 
Page 5 of 14 
A 
The parties agree that Lowe did not serve a tort-claims notice until 263 
days after his alleged injury. Whether his notice was timely turns on 
which provision of the Act applies. Under Indiana Code subsection 34-13-
3-8(a), a would-be claimant must give notice within 180 days to a 
“political subdivision”; under subsection 34-13-3-6(a), on the other hand, a 
would-be claimant has 270 days to give notice to a “state agency”. The Act 
defines both terms. A political subdivision is one of thirteen categories, 
including a “separate municipal corporation”. I.C. § 34-6-2-110(5). Here, 
Lowe concedes that the District is a political subdivision under the Act: 
“[The District] is defined by Indiana’s legislature as a political subdivision 
under the [Act]”. Lowe’s concession follows from the District’s enabling 
statute, which defines the District as a “distinct municipal corporation”. 
I.C. § 8-5-15-2(b). We thus treat a “distinct” municipal corporation as a 
“separate” municipal corporation under the Act and hence a political 
subdivision. As a political subdivision, the District is not a state agency. 
I.C. § 34-6-2-141.  
Prior Indiana opinions involving FELA claims against the District are 
inconsistent as to whether the District is a state agency or political 
subdivision under the Act. In Oshinski, 843 N.E.2d at 539, our court of 
appeals concluded in dicta that the District is a state agency: “The parties 
do not dispute, the trial court found, and we agree that [the District] is a 
state agency.” But Oshinski cited Gouge v. Northern Indiana Commuter 
Transportation District, 670 N.E.2d 363 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), which did not 
address the Act. Oshinski, 843 N.E.2d at 539. Rather, Gouge concluded the 
District is a state agency under Trial Rule 54(D) (permitting award of costs 
against state agency only if specifically authorized by law). Gouge, 670 
N.E.2d at 368–69. Because Oshinski relied on a case interpreting a trial rule 
and not the Act’s plain text, we part ways with Oshinski on this point.  
Instead, we share the view of two more recent appellate cases, Rudnick, 
892 N.E.2d at 204, and Januchowski v. Northern Indiana Commuter 
Transportation District, 905 N.E.2d 1041 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Rudnick, in 
dicta, said that the definition of “political subdivision” includes municipal 
corporations under Indiana Code section 34-6-2-110, and that the District 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 21S-CT-295 | December 16, 2021 
Page 6 of 14 
is a separate municipal corporation according to its enabling statute. 892 
N.E.2d at 209 n.3. Rudnick went on to note that the Act’s definition of 
“state agency” specifically excludes political subdivisions under section 
34-6-2-141. Ibid. And the Januchowski court, again in dicta, relied on 
Rudnick to find that the District is a political subdivision. 905 N.E.2d at 
1044 n.1.  
Lowe contends that if the Court holds that the District is a political 
subdivision, it should do so only prospectively and not as to Lowe. 
According to Lowe, Oshinski set out a clear rule of law that he was entitled 
to rely on. We disagree. Oshinski’s conclusion that the District is a state 
agency is dicta. Moreover, even had that been Oshinski’s holding, it would 
have been called into question by the later reasoning in Rudnick and 
Januchowski. Prospective application is an extraordinary measure that we 
decline to apply here.  
Because the District is a political subdivision, Lowe needed to provide 
notice within 180 days of his injury, but he did not. Thus, his notice was 
untimely, and his suit is barred.  
B 
Despite the Act’s plain terms and Lowe’s concession that the District is 
a political subdivision under the Act, Lowe argues that he is not subject to 
the 180-day requirement. First, he argues that he substantially complied 
with the Act by filing within 270 days. Second, he argues that he is 
entitled to relief under the Eleventh Amendment for alternative reasons: 
either Indiana consented to suit under FELA or the District cannot enjoy 
sovereign immunity as an arm of the state under the Eleventh 
Amendment while simultaneously being a political subdivision under the 
Act. Because we find Lowe’s arguments unavailing, he is not entitled to 
relief.  
1 
Indiana Code section 34-13-3-8(a) provides that: 
[A] claim against a political subdivision is barred unless 
notice is filed with: 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 21S-CT-295 | December 16, 2021 
Page 7 of 14 
(1) the governing body of that political subdivision; and  
(2) the Indiana political subdivision risk management 
commission created under IC 27-1-29; 
within one hundred eighty (180) days after the loss occurs. 
Here, this means Lowe needed to provide notice to the District’s 
governing body and Indiana’s political subdivision risk management 
commission within 180 days. He did not do so but instead provided notice 
to the attorney general within 270 days. In other words, he noticed the 
wrong actor and observed the wrong timeframe. Yet on appeal, Lowe 
argues that providing notice to the attorney general fewer than 270 days 
after his accident substantially complied with the Act. But our substantial-
compliance doctrine is clear: substantial compliance is a question of 
content not timing. See, e.g., Collier v. Prater, 544 N.E.2d 497, 499 (Ind. 
1989) (“[N]otice is sufficient if it substantially complies with the content 
requirements of the statute.”); City of Indianapolis v. Cox, 20 N.E.3d 201, 208 
n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (“While . . . non-compliance is sometimes excused 
where the plaintiff has substantially complied with the [Act] . . . notice 
must still be timely.”). Lowe conceded at the summary-judgment hearing 
that under existing precedent, substantial compliance concerns the 
notice’s content, not its timing. We see no reason to revisit our settled 
doctrine. Because Lowe’s notice was untimely (occurring after 180 days), 
he did not substantially comply, and he is not entitled to relief on this 
basis.  
2 
Lowe’s second and third arguments rest, in substantial part, on 
concepts of sovereign immunity developed in federal courts. He argues 
that Indiana has consented to suit under the relevant federal statute, 
FELA, and thus waived sovereign immunity. He also argues that the 
District cannot enjoy sovereign immunity as an arm of the state under the 
Eleventh Amendment while simultaneously being a political subdivision 
under the Act. Because Lowe’s arguments and desired application of 
sovereign immunity confuse its two distinct bases—one under federal law 
for federal courts and one under state law for state courts—we find his 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 21S-CT-295 | December 16, 2021 
Page 8 of 14 
arguments unavailing. Moreover, even under the doctrinal framework he 
would have us use, that of Eleventh Amendment immunity jurisprudence, 
we find that Lowe’s arguments would fail.  
State sovereign immunity, as a general term, protects states within our 
federal system in four vital ways: it protects states from suits by their own 
citizens or those of another state in federal court; it protects states from 
suits by their own citizens or those of another state in other state courts; it 
protects states from being sued by citizens of other states in their own 
courts; and it protects states from being sued by their own citizens in their 
own courts. See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 712; accord Esserman, 84 N.E.3d at 
1188–89. Federal sovereign-immunity doctrine derives from the 
constitution and the plan of the convention. See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 
713, 730. This basis of sovereign immunity is often referred to as “Eleventh 
Amendment immunity”—a useful, but incomplete, shorthand because its 
protections “neither derive[] from, nor [are] limited by, the terms of the 
Eleventh Amendment.” Id. at 713. This body of Eleventh Amendment 
immunity doctrine ensures that federal courts do not dislodge states as the 
national government’s co-sovereigns, and thereby breach the delicate 
federal-state balance established by our framers.  
At the same time, states like Indiana, as sovereigns in their own right, 
have developed their own sovereign-immunity doctrines for use in their 
own courts. Indiana adopted the principle of sovereign immunity from its 
very beginning. Esserman, 84 N.E.3d at 1189. Under this common-law 
doctrine, the state and its various entities generally could not be sued in 
tort. Ibid. Our Court eventually abolished this immunity in Campbell v. 
State, 259 Ind. 55, 284 N.E.2d 733 (1972), with narrow exceptions 
inapplicable here, but the legislature replaced it in 1974 with a limited 
immunity from tort claims via the Act. Esserman, 84 N.E.3d at 1190. Thus, 
when applying our state’s sovereign-immunity doctrine vis-à-vis tort 
claims, where we once looked to our common-law tradition, we now look 
to the Act.  
Alden v. Maine does not alter the fact that federal law and state law 
provide two independent bases of sovereign immunity. There the 
Supreme Court corrected the misapprehension that the “Eleventh 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 21S-CT-295 | December 16, 2021 
Page 9 of 14 
Amendment is inapplicable in state courts.” 527 U.S. at 735. Although 
Lowe does not argue this, Alden’s statement, taken in isolation, could be 
understood to require state courts to analyze the sovereign-immunity 
claims of their states under federal Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. 
But that is not the holding in Alden. There the Supreme Court applied 
Eleventh Amendment sovereign-immunity principles on review of a state-
court decision to protect a state from suit in its own courts. Id. at 712. In 
other words, Alden permits states to claim sovereign immunity under the 
Eleventh Amendment—but it does not require that they do so. Alden 
instead discussed with approval the “distinction drawn between a 
sovereign’s immunity in its own courts and its immunity in the courts of 
another sovereign”. Id. at 739. Likewise, the Maine Supreme Court’s 
opinion made clear its view that Eleventh Amendment immunity was not 
“directly applicable” to its proceedings, although its state sovereign-
immunity doctrine, at least as relevant there, coincided with federal 
Eleventh Amendment doctrine. Alden v. State, 715 A.2d 172, 174 (Me. 
1998). 
Here, Lowe sued the District in an Indiana court. Yet his sovereign-
immunity arguments tend to ignore state-law concepts of sovereign 
immunity and would require our courts to apply federal Eleventh 
Amendment immunity instead. But we are not a federal court. And Lowe 
fails to argue, let alone persuade us, that an Indiana court is beholden to 
police its exercise of jurisdiction against its sovereign state in the same 
way that a federal (or a sister state court) must. Nor does he point to a case 
where we, as Maine’s supreme court did, have identified our state’s 
sovereign-immunity doctrine as mirroring that of the federal 
constitution’s. He thus waives these arguments and cannot prevail. But 
even had he raised them, we would be hard-pressed to find that the 
primary concern permeating Eleventh Amendment immunity—protecting 
states as sovereigns in the federal system—justifies a federal mandate that 
state courts adjudicating private suits against their respective states must 
apply federal sovereign-immunity principles in lieu of their state’s own 
protections. Cf. Federal Maritime Comm’n v. South Carolina State Ports Auth., 
535 U.S. 743, 765 (2002) (endorsing the view that the purpose of sovereign-
immunity doctrine is to afford states the “respect owed them as joint 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 21S-CT-295 | December 16, 2021 
Page 10 of 14 
sovereigns”) (cleaned up). Thus, Lowe’s last two arguments, both 
premised on Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, must fail. And as we 
find below, even were we—a sovereign state’s highest court—beholden to 
the federal courts’ Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, we would still 
find Lowe’s arguments without merit.   
a 
Lowe argues that Indiana has given a blanket consent to be sued under 
FELA, notwithstanding the Act, because it owns a railroad operated in 
two states and has incorporated by reference federal protections for 
railroad employees. Lowe makes the type of constructive-waiver 
argument from Parden, 377 U.S. at 192, that the Supreme Court expressly 
overruled in College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. at 680. In Parden, the Court held 
that Alabama had constructively waived its immunity from suit under 
FELA: 
[B]y enacting [FELA] . . . Congress conditioned the right to 
operate a railroad in interstate commerce upon amenability 
to suit in federal court as provided by the Act; by thereafter 
operating a railroad in interstate commerce, Alabama must 
be taken to have accepted that condition and thus to have 
consented to suit. 
377 U.S. at 192. The Court soon began limiting Parden until it finally 
overruled its last vestige—the constructive-waiver reasoning—in College 
Savings. There the Court explained that Parden’s “constructive-waiver 
experiment” was “ill conceived” and an “anomaly” in its sovereign-
immunity jurisprudence. College Savings, 527 U.S. at 680. Thus, the Court 
concluded that it would not try to “salvage any remnant” of Parden’s 
constructive-waiver analysis. Ibid. 
The Court’s post-Parden case law makes clear that a state can waive its 
sovereign immunity (under Eleventh Amendment doctrine) only by “clear 
declaration”. See, e.g., id. at 675–76. Here, Lowe points to nothing that we 
can construe as Indiana’s “clear declaration” that it is consenting to suit—
and thus waiving any vestige of sovereign immunity—under FELA. 
Accord Oshinski, 843 N.E.2d at 543–44 (holding that “Indiana has not 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 21S-CT-295 | December 16, 2021 
Page 11 of 14 
given blanket consent to be sued under FELA in Indiana courts” because 
Indiana’s consent to be sued is subject to the Act’s requirements). Thus, 
even were we to apply the federal courts’ Eleventh Amendment 
jurisprudence, Lowe’s argument would fail.  
Lowe also seems to argue that the Supreme Court has already held 
that Indiana has waived its immunity from FELA suits. His argument 
rests on Hilton v. South Carolina Public Railways Commission, 502 U.S. 197 
(1991), which is now understood to have held, based on stare decisis, that 
“certain States had consented to be sued by injured workers covered by     
. . . FELA”, Alden, 527 U.S. at 737–38. But Lowe does not cite any authority 
for the proposition that Indiana is one of the “certain States” that Hilton 
continued to hold had waived immunity, and we are aware of none. Thus, 
this argument also fails.  
Moreover, to the extent Lowe asks us to hold that Indiana waived 
immunity as a matter of Indiana law, we decline to do so. Lowe seems to 
rely on our precedent in Esserman v. Indiana Department of Environmental 
Management for the proposition that Indiana can waive immunity in any 
manner that “clearly evince[s]” or “unequivocally express[es]” its 
intention to do so. He then suggests that by enacting Indiana Code section 
8-5-15-17, the legislature clearly evinced its intent to waive immunity from 
suits arising under all federal statutes applying to railroad employees. But 
section 8-5-15-17 merely requires the District’s board to “act in such a 
manner as to insure the continuing applicability to affected railroad 
employees of the provisions of all federal statutes applicable to them prior 
to April 1, 1984”. I.C. § 8-5-15-17(3). While this statute reflects the 
legislature’s desire to protect railroad employees, it does not “clearly 
evince” or “unequivocally express” doing so at the expense of the state’s 
sovereign immunity. Cf. Esserman, 84 N.E.3d at 1192 (explaining that 
Indiana’s False Claims and Whistleblower Protection Act did not clearly 
evince or unequivocally express the legislature’s waiver of sovereign 
immunity because it did not, for instance, name the state, its agencies, or 
its officials as permissible defendants). Lowe is not entitled to relief on this 
ground.  
 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 21S-CT-295 | December 16, 2021 
Page 12 of 14 
b 
Finally, Lowe argues that the Act should not apply to his claim against 
the District because if it is a political subdivision under the Act, it cannot 
simultaneously be an arm of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes. 
As with Lowe’s consent argument, his argument here assumes incorrectly 
that Indiana courts apply federal Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence to 
adjudicate all questions of state sovereignty. We do not. But even if we 
did, Lowe cites no authority holding that a state entity cannot be an arm 
of the state under the Eleventh Amendment while also a political 
subdivision under the Act (or under any state’s tort-claims act). Instead 
Lowe discusses Lewis v. Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District, 
898 F. Supp. 596 (N.D. Ill. 1995), a district court case holding the opposite. 
There the court explained that although the Act defined the District as a 
political subdivision, it was a state agency for purposes of Eleventh 
Amendment immunity. Id. at 601–02. In doing so, the court relied in part 
on Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 
(1977). Lewis, 898 F. Supp. at 600. In Mt. Healthy, the state legislature had 
defined local school boards as political subdivisions. 429 U.S. at 280. But 
the Supreme Court nonetheless asked whether the local school board was 
“more like a county or city” or “an arm of the State” under its Eleventh 
Amendment immunity doctrine, ultimately holding that the board was 
not an arm of the state. Id. at 280–81.  
Lewis also relied on the Seventh Circuit’s analysis in Kashani v. Purdue 
University, 813 F.2d 843 (7th Cir. 1987). 898 F. Supp. at 600. There the court 
was tasked with deciding whether a public university was an arm of the 
state for Eleventh Amendment purposes. Kashani, 813 F.2d at 845. While 
deciding “the nature of the entity created by state law”, the court 
encountered statutes that sometimes referred to the university as a state 
agency and sometimes, including under the Act, as a political subdivision. 
Id. at 847 (quoting Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 280). The Seventh Circuit thus 
“look[ed] to substance rather than form” to hold that Purdue was an arm 
of the state. Id. at 847–48. If Lowe’s contention were true, that is, if an 
entity’s status under state statute governed the entity’s status under the 
Eleventh Amendment, the Lewis and Kashani courts would have looked no 
further. But they did look further, thus showing that an entity may be an 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 21S-CT-295 | December 16, 2021 
Page 13 of 14 
arm of the state in federal courts for Eleventh Amendment purposes while 
simultaneously a political subdivision in state courts for other purposes.  
Alternatively, Lowe argues that Lewis was wrongly decided. We are 
not persuaded this is so. But even if we were, federal courts, not state 
courts, are better positioned to define the contours of federal jurisdiction 
under the Eleventh Amendment. And the federal courts that have 
addressed whether the District is an arm of the state for Eleventh 
Amendment purposes have held that it is. See Kelley v. City of Michigan 
City, 300 F. Supp. 2d. 682, 687 (N.D. Ind. 2004); Lewis, 898 F. Supp. at 602; 
Phillips v. N. Indiana Commuter Transp. Dist., No. 2:92-CV-286, 1994 WL 
866082, at *3 (N.D. Ind. May 11, 1994). Even if we agreed that Lewis was 
wrongly decided, as a state court properly exercising jurisdiction here, we 
have no reason to police how a federal court exercised federal jurisdiction 
there. 
*          *          * 
Under the Act, the District is a political subdivision, and any claim 
against it is barred unless a claimant provides notice within 180 days of 
the injury. Lowe’s arguments neither legally nor factually excuse his 
failing to provide timely notice. Thus, we affirm the trial court’s grant of 
summary judgment for the District and against Lowe. 
Rush, C.J., and David, Massa, and Goff, JJ., concur.  
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LA N T  
Michael P. Massucci 
Kelly Law Offices LLC 
Schererville, Indiana 
Thomas A. Kelliher 
Horwitz Horwitz & Associates 
Chicago, Illinois 
 
 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 21S-CT-295 | December 16, 2021 
Page 14 of 14 
A T T O R N E Y S F O R A P P E L L E E 
Robert A. Welsh 
L. Charles Lukmann, III
Connor H. Nolan 
Harris Welsh & Lukmann 
Chesterton, Indiana 
A T T O R N E Y S F O R AM I C I C U R I A E A C C E L E RA T E I N D I A NA 
M UN I C I P A L I T I E S A ND I N D I AN A M UN I C I P A L L AW Y E R S 
A S S OC I A T I O N 
Peter J. Rusthoven 
Mark J. Crandley 
Barnes & Thornburg LLP 
Indianapolis, Indiana