Title: Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. James E. Doyle
Citation: 2006 WI 107
Docket Number: 2003AP000421
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 14, 2006

2006 WI 107 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP421 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc.,  
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
James E. Doyle, in his official capacity  
as Governor of the State of Wisconsin,  
and Stephen E. Bablitch, in his official  
capacity as Secretary of the Wisconsin  
Department of Administration,  
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 14, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 7, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Richard J. Callaway 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
CROOKS, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., and BRADLEY, J., join the 
concurrence.   
 
CONCUR/DISSENT: 
PROSSER, J., concurs in part, dissents in part 
(opinion filed). 
WILCOX and ROGGENSACK, J.J., join the 
concurrence/dissent. 
ROGGENSACK, J., concurs in part, dissents in 
part (opinion filed). 
WILCOX and PROSSER, J.J., join the 
concurrence/dissent. 
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant there were briefs by Stephen L. 
Morgan and Murphy Desmond, S.C., Madison, and oral argument by 
Stephen L. Morgan. 
 
For the defendants-respondents the cause was argued by 
Thomas C. Bellavia, Maura FJ Whelan, John S. Greene, Charles D. 
 
 
2
Hoornstra, assistant attorneys general, with whom on the brief 
was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Douglas B.L. Endreson, 
William R. Perry and Sonosky, Chambers, Sachse, Endreson & 
Perry, LLP, Washington, D.C., and Howard Bichler and St. Croix 
Law Office, Webster, on behalf of St. Croix Chippewa Indians of 
Wisconsin; 
Kevin L. Osterbauer and Legal 
Department-Chief 
Blackbird Center, Odanah, on behalf of Bad River Band of the 
Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians; Kris M. Goodwill and 
Lac Courte Oreilles Legal Department, Hayward, on behalf of Lac 
Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of 
Wisconsin; Jeffrey A. Crawford, Milwaukee, and Eric N. Dahlstrom 
and Rothstein, Donatelli, Hughes, Dahlstrom, Schoenburg & Frye, 
LLP, Tempe, AZ, on behalf of Forest County Potawatomi Community; 
Andrew S. Caulum and Caulum Law Office, S.C., Madison, on behalf 
of Sokaogon Chippewa Community (Mole Lake Band of the Lake 
Superior Chippewa Indians), and there was oral argument by 
Douglas B.L. Endreson. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Tori L. Kluess, Jodi L. 
Arndt, and Liebmann, Conway, Olejniczak & Jerry, S.C., Green 
Bay, on behalf of the Green Bay Area Chamber of Commerce. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Michael Murphy and Ho-
Chunk Nation Department of Justice, Black River Falls, and 
Lester J. Marston and Rapport and Marston, Ukiah, CA, on behalf 
of the Ho-Chunk Nation. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Grant Langley, Patrick 
McDonnell, and William J. Domina, Milwaukee, on behalf of the 
City of Milwaukee and the County of Milwaukee. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Raymond P. Taffora, 
Roisin H. Bell, and Michael Best & Friedrich LLP, Madison, on 
behalf of the Metropolitan Milwaukee Association of Commerce and 
Associated General Contractors-Greater Milwaukee. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by E. Michael McCann, 
District Attorney, Milwaukee. 
 
 
 
2006 WI 107
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP421  
(L.C. No. 
01CV2906) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
James E. Doyle, in his official capacity as 
Governor of the State of Wisconsin, and  
Stephen E. Bablitch, in his official capacity 
as Secretary of the Wisconsin Department of  
Administration, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 14, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Dane County, 
Richard J. Callaway, Judge.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   Dairyland Greyhound Park, 
Inc. ("Dairyland") appeals from a decision by the Honorable 
Richard J. Callaway, Dane County Circuit Court, granting summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants, Governor James E. Doyle and 
then-Secretary of Administration Marc J. Marotta, both in their 
No. 
2003AP421   
 
2 
 
official 
capacities1 
(collectively 
referred 
to 
as 
"the 
Governor"), 
concluding 
that 
the 
1993 
amendment 
to 
Article IV, Section 24 of the Wisconsin Constitution ("1993 
Amendment") did not affect the 1991-92 Tribal gaming compacts 
("Original 
Compacts") 
or 
any 
extensions 
to 
the 
Original 
Compacts.  The court of appeals certified the appeal to this 
court to determine the Governor's authority to extend the 11 
Original Compacts.2   
¶2 
We 
conclude 
that 
the 
1993 
Amendment 
to 
Article IV, Section 24 of the Wisconsin Constitution does not 
invalidate the Original Compacts.3  Because the Original Compacts 
contemplated extending the Compacts and amending the scope of 
Indian gaming within the Compacts, we further conclude that the 
parties' right of renewal is constitutionally protected by the 
Contract 
Clauses 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
and 
United 
States 
Constitutions, and that amendments to the Original Compacts that 
                                                 
1 Marc J. Marotta was the Secretary of the Department of 
Administration at the time this action was filed.  Subsequently, 
Stephen E. Bablitch was appointed as the Secretary of DOA in 
September 2005 and the caption of this case has been amended to 
reflect the change.    
2 Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Doyle, certification by 
Wisconsin Court of Appeals (June 2, 2003). 
3 Justice Prosser, in his concurrence/dissent, asserts that 
we conclude that the 1993 Amendment "had no impact on Indian 
gaming."  Justice Prosser's concurrence/dissent, ¶277.  This is 
a misstatement of the holding of this case.  We conclude that 
the 1993 Amendment did not invalidate the Original Compacts.  
Whether the 1993 Amendment has any impact on Indian gaming 
outside the Original Compacts, is not before this court. 
No. 
2003AP421   
 
3 
 
expand the scope of gaming are likewise constitutionally 
protected by the Contract Clauses of the Wisconsin and United 
States Constitutions.  We withdraw any language to the contrary 
in Panzer v. Doyle, 2004 WI 52, 271 N.W.2d 295, 680 N.W.2d 666, 
that would limit the State's ability to negotiate for Class III 
games under the Original Compacts.4  Accordingly, gaming can be 
expanded to the extent that the State and Tribes negotiate for 
additional Class III games. 
¶3 
The essence of what is at issue here is whether 
Wisconsin should break treaties with Tribes by walking away from 
its contractual obligations.5  Rules of contract interpretation 
and the Contract Clauses of the United States and Wisconsin 
Constitutions compel us to conclude that the State must honor 
its contractual obligations in their entirety.  We therefore 
affirm the order of the circuit court.   
¶4 
This case stems from allegations by Dairyland that the 
1993 Amendment deprives the Governor of the authority to permit 
Wisconsin Tribes to continue conducting casino-type gaming in 
                                                 
4 See, e.g., Panzer v. Doyle, 2004 WI 52, ¶¶93, 96, 271 Wis. 
2d 295, 680 N.W.2d 666.  We do not address the Panzer court's 
decision regarding the duration provisions.  Id., ¶¶78-82. 
5  Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1013 (9th Cir. 1976) 
(reversed on other grounds by Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian 
Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (superseded by 25 USC § 1301 
(1979).)) ("Reluctance on the part of the States to accord to 
the Indians rights guaranteed to them by treaties still 
exists.") (citing United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676 (9th 
Cir., 1975)).  See also, Harrison v. Boyd Mississippi, Inc., 700 
So.2d 247, 253 (Miss. 1997); Dille v. Council of Energy Resource 
Tribes, 610 F. Supp. 157, 159 (D.C. Colo. 1985). 
No. 
2003AP421   
 
4 
 
Wisconsin.  Dairyland asserts that Article IV, Section 24 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution renders all types of Class III gaming 
illegal, except for certain games that are specifically exempted 
under the Wisconsin Constitution.6  Therefore, according to 
Dairyland, Class III games that are not specifically exempted 
under the constitution are not lawful subjects of the State-
Tribal Compacts.  Dairyland asks this court to reverse the 
circuit court's decision, to enjoin the Governor from renewing 
the Original Compacts, and to instruct the Governor to exercise 
the State's right of nonrenewal according to the terms of the 
Original Compacts.7 
                                                 
6 Under the Wisconsin Constitution: "Except as provided in 
this section the legislature may not authorize gambling in any 
form."  Wis. Cons. art. IV, § 24, cl. 1.  Various subsections of 
Article IV allow the legislature to authorize specific gambling 
activities.  Id., cl. 3 (2003-04) (authorizing "bingo games 
operated 
by 
religious, 
charitable, 
service, 
fraternal 
or 
veterans' organizations or those to which contributions are 
deductible for federal or state income tax purposes"); id., cl. 
4 (authorizing "raffle games operated by local religious, 
charitable, service, fraternal or veterans' organizations or 
those to which contributions are deductible for federal or state 
income tax purposes"); id., cl. 5 (authorizing pari-mutuel on-
track betting); id., cl. 6 (authorizing the state-operated 
lottery).   
All references to the Wisconsin Constitution and Wisconsin 
Statutes are to the 2003-04 version unless otherwise noted. 
7 Justice Roggensack asserts that the only issue before this 
court is the effect of the 1993 Amendment as it relates to the 
games that were included in the Original Compacts and the 1998-
99 extensions.  Justice Roggensack's concurrence/dissent, ¶285.  
This is an inaccurate statement of the case.  This court has 
been asked to review the impact of the 1993 Amendment on all 
extensions of and amendments to the Original Compacts.   
No. 
2003AP421   
 
5 
 
¶5 
The Governor asserts that the 1993 Amendment was not 
intended to impact the Original Compacts.  Relying on the 
Contract 
Clauses 
of 
the 
Wisconsin8 
and 
United 
States 
Constitutions,9 and federal preemption under the Supremacy Clause 
of the United States Constitution,10 the Governor asserts that 
the 1993 Amendment does not diminish the State's authority to 
renew its gaming Compacts with the Tribes.11 
¶6 
In Panzer, 271 Wis. 2d 295, ¶102, this court concluded 
that the Original Compacts were lawfully entered into and that 
the question of the Compacts' durability after the 1993 
                                                 
8 "No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, nor any law 
impairing 
the 
obligation 
of 
contracts, 
shall 
ever 
be 
passed . . . ."  Wis. Const. art. I, § 12. 
9 "No state shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or 
confederation; . . . pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto 
law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts . . . ."  U.S. 
Const. art. I, § 10. 
10 The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution 
states, in relevant part,  
This constitution, and the laws of the United States 
which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all 
treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme 
law of the land; and the judges in every state shall 
be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or 
laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding. 
U.S. Const. art. VI. 
11 The Governor asserts that the State has contractual 
rights and obligations under the Original Compacts.  We do not 
construe the Governor, as Justice Roggensack asserts, to be 
arguing on behalf of the Tribal Nations against the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  See Justice Roggensack's concurrence/dissent, 
¶287. 
No. 
2003AP421   
 
6 
 
Amendment was a question that may require an analysis under the 
impairment of Contract Clauses under the United States and 
Wisconsin Constitutions, as well as under the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act ("IGRA").  The Panzer majority, however, declined 
to resolve these questions.  Id., ¶102.  We now address the 
impairment of contracts issues raised by the Original Compacts 
and the 1993 change to the Wisconsin Constitution.12   
I 
¶7 
The facts are undisputed for purposes of this appeal.  
Following the 1991 decision in Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake 
Superior Chippewa Indians v. State of Wisconsin, 770 F. Supp. 
480 (W.D. Wis. 1991), appeal dismissed, 957 F.2d 515 (7th Cir. 
1992),13 and pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 USC 
                                                 
12 Because our decision resolves the dispute between the 
parties, we do not reach the issues presented regarding the 
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 USC § 2710(d)(3)(c) (1988), 
("IGRA") or any federal preemption issues the 1993 Amendment may 
raise 
under 
the 
Supremacy 
Clause 
of 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution.   
13 In 1991, United States District Court Judge Barbara Crabb 
concluded that "the state is required to negotiate with 
plaintiffs over the inclusion in a tribal-state compact of any 
activity that includes the elements of prize, chance and 
consideration and that is not prohibited expressly by the 
Wisconsin Constitution or state law."  Lac du Flambeau Band of 
Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. State of Wisconsin, 770 F. 
Supp. 480, 488 (W.D. Wis. 1991), appeal dismissed, 957 F.2d 515 
(7th Cir. 1992).   
No. 
2003AP421   
 
7 
 
§ 2710(d)(3)(c) (1988),14 and Wis. Stat. § 14.035,15 Wisconsin's 
then-Governor Tommy Thompson negotiated gaming compacts with the 
                                                 
14 In 1988, Congress passed IGRA.  IGRA divided gaming into 
three classes: Class I was left unregulated; the National Indian 
Gaming Commission (NIGC) was established to regulate Class II 
gaming, and Indian Tribes and states were authorized to compact 
for the regulation of Class III gaming.  25 USC § 2710.  Class 
III gaming is defined as all forms of gaming that are not Class 
I or Class II gaming, which include lotteries, pari-mutuel on-
track betting, and casino-type games.  § 2703(8) (2001).  Class 
I gaming 
includes 
games 
of 
"minimal 
value" 
as well as 
traditional forms of Indian gaming, § 2703(6), while Class II 
gaming 
includes 
bingo 
and 
certain 
state-authorized 
or 
unregulated card games.  § 2703(7). 
In enacting IGRA, Congress offered states a limited role in 
regulating casino-style gaming.  Congress passed IGRA following 
the United States Supreme Court's decision in California v. 
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987), where the 
United States Supreme Court adopted the prohibitory/regulatory 
distinction for gaming regulations on Tribal lands:  
[I]f the intent of a state law is generally to 
prohibit certain conduct, it falls within Pub.L. 280's 
grant of criminal jurisdiction, but if the state law 
generally permits the conduct at issue, subject to 
regulation, it must be classified as civil/regulatory 
and Pub.L. 280 does not authorize its enforcement on 
an Indian reservation. 
Id. at 209; Panzer, 271 Wis. 2d 295, ¶15, ("IGRA follows the 
spirit of Cabazon by making the permissibility of Class III 
games a function of state law.").  
Congress passed IGRA in an effort to encourage the 
formation of state and Tribal gaming compacts.  IGRA's purpose 
is to serve the Tribal interest "of promoting tribal economic 
development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments" 
and the states' interests in regulating gaming within their 
borders.  25 USC § 2702(1).   
No. 
2003AP421   
 
8 
 
11 Tribes located in the State.  Panzer, 271 Wis. 2d 295, ¶25.  
By June 1992, the State had entered into compacts with each of 
the 11 Tribes.  Id.  The Original Compacts initially lasted for 
seven-year terms, with automatic extensions for five-year terms, 
subject to the right of either party to issue a notice of 
nonrenewal prior to the expiration of the term.16  Id., ¶¶25-26, 
32.  These Original Compacts permitted the Tribes to engage in 
certain Class III17 casino gaming on Tribal land, including 
blackjack tables, electronic gaming machines, and pull-tab 
machines. 
¶8 
In April 1993, Wisconsin voters ratified an amendment 
to the Wisconsin Constitution to limit gaming in Wisconsin.  
Id., ¶28.  The 1993 Amendment changed Article IV, Section 24 to 
                                                                                                                                                             
15 Wisconsin Stat. § 14.035 states: "The governor may, on 
behalf of this state, enter into any compact that has been 
negotiated under 25 USC 2710(d) [IGRA]."  This court has 
subsequently ruled that this legislation is not unconstitutional 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Panzer, 271 Wis. 2d 295, ¶72. 
16 The State entered into compacts with the following 11 
Indian tribes: Bad River Band of Lake Superior Chippewa; Forest 
County Potawatomi 
Community 
of Wisconsin; 
Ho-Chunk 
Nation 
(previously the Wisconsin Winnebago Tribe); Lac Courte Oreilles 
Band of Lake Superior Chippewa; Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake 
Superior Chippewa; Menominee Tribe of Indians of Wisconsin; 
Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wisconsin; Red Cliff Band of Lake 
Superior 
Chippewa; 
Sokaogon 
Chippewa 
Community 
(Mole 
Lake 
Chippewas); 
St. 
Croix 
Chippewa 
Indians 
of 
Wisconsin; 
Stockbridge-Munsee Band - Mohican Nation.  Copies of the 
Original 
Compacts 
are 
available 
at 
http://www.doa.state.wi.us/pagesubtext_detail.asp?linksubcatid=9
22&linkcatid=81&linkid=. 
17 Supra, note 14 for a discussion regarding Class III 
gaming under IGRA. 
No. 
2003AP421   
 
9 
 
(1) prohibit the legislature from authorizing gambling in any 
form except for specific games provided for in the amendment;18 
and (2) narrowly define the nature of the state-operated 
lottery.  1991 EJR 27.  See also Panzer, 271 Wis. 2d 295, ¶¶29-
31.   
¶9 
The initial 1991-92 compacts were subsequently renewed 
in 1998 and 1999, each for a term of five years.  Id., ¶32.  The 
compacts were again renewed in 2003.  Id., ¶33.  Since 1992, 
Class III gaming has continued to be conducted on Tribal land.   
¶10 Dairyland alleges that it began to lose revenue due to 
the Class III games allowed on Tribal land.  Dairyland first 
filed this action against then-Governor Scott McCallum on 
October 23, 2001, claiming that the Governor was not authorized 
to extend the gaming compacts with the Tribes in light of the 
1993 Amendment.  Dairyland sought an injunction preventing the 
Governor from entering into any future compacts and directing 
the Governor to serve a timely notice of nonrenewal to the 
Tribes for the existing compacts.   
¶11 The Dane County Circuit Court, Honorable John C. 
Albert, originally granted the Governor's motion to dismiss, 
ruling that the Tribes were indispensable parties and had not 
been included in the litigation.  Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. 
                                                 
18 Clauses 3 through 6 list exceptions to the broad 
prohibition, including: 1) bingo games operated by charitable 
and religious organizations; 2) raffle games operated by 
charitable and religious organizations; 3) pari-mutuel on-track 
betting; and 4) the state-operated lottery.  Wis. Const. art. 
IV, § 24.   
No. 
2003AP421   
 
10 
 
v. McCallum, 2002 WI App 259, ¶1, 258 Wis. 2d 210, 655 
N.W.2d 474.  The court of appeals concluded that the circuit 
court erred in finding the Tribes to be indispensable parties in 
whose absence the action should not proceed.  Id.  The court of 
appeals reversed the order dismissing the action and remanded 
the case to the circuit court for further proceedings on 
Dairyland's complaint.  Id.   
¶12 On remand, both Dairyland and the Governor moved for 
summary judgment. The circuit court granted the Governor's 
motion for summary judgment, relying heavily upon the civil-
regulatory and criminal-prohibitory distinction from Lac du 
Flambeau Band, 770 F. Supp. at 487-88, and determined that 
because Section 24 does not prohibit Class III Indian gaming, 
the compacts are lawful.  Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. 
Doyle, No. 2001CV2906, Order at 12 (Dane Co. Cir. Ct. Feb. 11, 
2003). 
¶13 Dairyland appealed, and the court of appeals asked 
this court to accept certification on June 2, 2003.  On 
September 12, 2003, this court accepted certification.   
¶14 On March 30, 2004, this court remanded the case to the 
court of appeals because the court was equally divided on 
whether to affirm the judgment of the circuit court.  Dairyland 
Greyhound 
Park, Inc. v. 
Doyle, 2004 
WI 
34, 
¶¶2-4, 270 
Wis. 2d 267, 677 N.W.2d 275.  On November 4, 2004, in light of 
this court's decision in Panzer, the court of appeals again 
certified the appeal to this court, and on January 11, 2005, we 
again accepted certification.  We now affirm. 
No. 
2003AP421   
 
11 
 
 
II 
¶15 This court reviews a grant of summary judgment de 
novo, benefiting from the circuit court's decision, but applying 
the same methodology as the circuit court.  Linden v. Cascade 
Stone Co., Inc., 2005 WI 113, ¶5, 283 Wis. 2d 606, 699 
N.W.2d 189.   
¶16 The interpretation of a constitutional provision, the 
interpretation of a contract, and whether a contract has been 
impaired are questions of law that we also review de novo.  
Wagner v. Milwaukee County Election Comm'n, 2003 WI 103, ¶18, 
263 Wis. 2d 709, 666 N.W.2d 816 (constitutional interpretation); 
Dieter v. Chrysler Corp., 2000 WI 45, ¶15, 234 Wis. 2d 670, 610 
N.W.2d 832 ("We review the interpretation of a warranty or any 
other contract de novo.") (emphasis added); Everson v. Lorenz, 
2005 WI 51, ¶10, 280 Wis. 2d 1, 695 N.W.2d 298 (contract 
interpretation); Pfister v. Milwaukee Economic Develop. Corp., 
216 
Wis. 2d 243, 
261, 
576 
N.W.2d 554 
(1998) 
(contract 
impairment). 
III 
¶17 In 
1989, 
the 
Wisconsin 
Legislature 
granted 
the 
Governor the authority to enter into compacts with the Tribes 
located in Wisconsin, pursuant to IGRA.19  By 1992, Wisconsin's 
Governor entered into the Original Compacts on behalf of the 
                                                 
19 1989 Wis. Act 196 (creating Wis. Stat. § 14.035); Panzer, 
271 Wis. 2d 295, ¶60.   
No. 
2003AP421   
 
12 
 
State,20 thereby creating a contractual relationship between the 
State and all 11 federally-recognized Tribes and bands located 
within the State borders.  Panzer, 271 Wis. 2d 295, ¶25.  These 
compacts were validly executed prior to the change in Wisconsin 
law under the 1993 Amendment.  The parties do not dispute that 
the Original Compacts were valid when they were entered into in 
1991 and 1992.  The parties dispute, however, whether the 1993 
Amendment changes the terms agreed to in the Original Compacts.  
The Governor contends that the 1993 Amendment does not impact 
the terms of the Original Compacts.  In contrast, Dairyland 
asserts that the 1993 Amendment precludes the State from 
renewing or amending the compacts.   
¶18 Whether the 1993 Amendment retrospectively invalidates 
the Original Compacts or any provisions contained therein, 
raises questions of constitutional interpretation and contract 
impairment.  We therefore begin with an analysis of the 1993 
Amendment.  We then evaluate whether the 1993 Amendment affects 
the renewal provision.21  Finally, we evaluate whether the 1993 
                                                 
20 The Wisconsin Governor completed the compact negotiations 
pursuant to the decision in Lac du Flambeau, 770 F. Supp. at 
488.  See supra, note 13. 
21 Ten of the Original Compacts state, in relevant part:  
The duration of this Compact shall thereafter be 
automatically extended for terms of five years, unless 
either party serves written notice of nonrenewal on 
the other party not less than one hundred eighty days 
prior to the expiration of the original term of this 
Compact or any extension thereof.   
No. 
2003AP421   
 
13 
 
Amendment impacts the contractual provisions that address the 
scope of gaming allowed on Tribal land.22   
A 
¶19 The purpose of construing a constitutional amendment 
is to give effect to the intent of the framers and of the people 
who adopted it.  State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶10, 264 
                                                                                                                                                             
Bad River Band of Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians & 
State of Wisconsin Gaming Compact of 1991 § XXV(B); Forest 
County Potawatomi Community of Wisconsin & State of Wisconsin 
Gaming Compact of 1992 § XXV(B); Wisconsin Winnebago Tribe [Ho-
Chunk Nation] & State of Wisconsin Compact of 1992 § XXVI(B); 
Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians & 
State of Wisconsin Gaming Compact of 1991 § XXV(B); Lac du 
Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians & State of 
Wisconsin Gaming Compact of 1991 § XXV(B); Oneida Tribe of 
Indians of Wisconsin & State of Wisconsin Gaming Compact of 
1991 §XXV(B); Red Cliff Band of Lake Superior Chippewas & State 
of Wisconsin Gaming Compact of 1991 § XXV(B); Sokaogon Chippewa 
Community & State of Wisconsin Gaming Compact of 1991 § XXV(B); 
St. Croix Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin & State of Wisconsin 
Gaming Compact of 1991 § XXV(B); Stockbridge-Munsee Community & 
State of Wisconsin Gaming Compact of 1991 § XXV(B) (emphasis 
added).  See also Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin & State of 
Wisconsin Gaming Compact of 1992 § XXVI(1)(B) ("The duration of 
this Compact with respect to on-reservation gaming shall 
thereafter be automatically extended for terms of five years, 
unless either party serves written notice of non-renewal on the 
other party not less than one hundred eighty days prior to the 
expiration of the term specified in subsec. A. or any extension 
thereof.") (emphasis added). 
22 Each of the 11 Original Compacts also states, in relevant 
part, "The Tribe may not operate any Class III gaming not 
expressly enumerated in this section of this Compact unless this 
Compact is amended[.]"  Bad River Compact § IV(B); Forest County 
Potawatomi Community of Wisconsin Compact § IV(B); Winnebago 
[Ho-Chunk] Compact § IV(C); Lac Courte Oreilles Compact § IV(B); 
Lac du Flambeau Compact § IV(B); Menominee Compact § IV(B); 
Oneida Compact § IV(B); Red Cliff Compact § IV(B); Sokaogon 
Chippewa Compact § IV(B); St. Croix Chippewa Compact § IV(B); 
Stockbridge-Munsee Compact § IV(B) (emphasis added). 
No. 
2003AP421   
 
14 
 
Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328 (citations omitted).  Constitutions 
should be construed so as to promote the objects for which they 
were framed and adopted.  Id.  "The constitution means what its 
framers and the people approving of it have intended it to mean, 
and that intent is to be determined in the light of the 
circumstances in which they were placed at the time[.]"  State 
ex rel. Bare v. Schinz, 194 Wis. 397, 404, 216 N.W. 509 (1927) 
(citation omitted).  We therefore examine three primary sources 
in determining the meaning of a constitutional provision: the 
plain meaning, the constitutional debates and practices of the 
time, and the earliest interpretations of the provision by the 
legislature, as manifested through the first legislative action 
following adoption.  Schilling v. Wisconsin Crime Victims Rights 
Bd., 2005 WI 17, ¶16, 278 Wis. 2d 216, 692 N.W.2d 623 (citing 
Wisconsin Citizens Concerned for Cranes & Doves v. DNR, 2004 WI 
40, ¶44, 270 Wis. 2d 318, 677 N.W.2d 612; Cole, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 
¶10). See also Thompson v. Craney, 199 Wis. 2d 674, 680, 546 
N.W.2d 123 (1996) (citations omitted).   
1 
¶20 The 1993 Amendment reads, in relevant part, "Except as 
provided in this section, the legislature may not authorize 
gambling in any form."  Wis. Const. art. IV, § 24(1).  Clauses 3 
through 6 list four exceptions to the broad prohibition: 1) 
bingo games operated by charitable and religious organizations; 
2) 
raffle 
games 
operated 
by 
charitable 
and 
religious 
organizations; 3) pari-mutuel on-track betting; and 4) the 
state-operated lottery.  Id.  Furthermore, as amended, Clause 6 
No. 
2003AP421   
 
15 
 
specifically defines the state-operated lottery to exclude 
casino-style games, explicitly prohibiting blackjack, poker, 
roulette, craps, keno, slot machines, and video gaming.23 
¶21 The Amendment clearly states: "the legislature may not 
authorize gambling in any form."  Wis. Const. art IV, § 24(1) 
(emphasis added).  These words can be construed to mean, simply, 
that all Class III games in Wisconsin, excluding the specific 
games enumerated in the Amendment, were made unconstitutional by 
the 1993 Amendment.  Because the Amendment did not explicitly 
exclude Tribal gaming, the Class III games on Tribal land are, 
arguably, unconstitutional. 
¶22 On the other hand, constitutional amendments that deal 
with the substantive law of the State are presumed to be 
prospective in effect unless there is an express indication to 
the 
contrary. 
 
Kayden 
Industries, 
Inc. 
v. 
Murphy, 
34 
                                                 
23 The Panzer court recognized that "[t]he Tribe's existing 
games such as slot machines and blackjack must be sustained on 
the basis of the validity of the original compacts. . . ."  
Panzer, 271 Wis. 2d 295, ¶93.  The Panzer court noted that the 
Original Compacts were negotiated pursuant to the federal 
district court's order in Lac du Flambeau, and that "[a]ny 
attempt at this point to impair these compacts would create 
serious constitutional questions."  Id., ¶99.  Neither of the 
concurring/dissenting opinions 
in this 
case discusses the 
constitutional prohibition with respect to blackjack, slot 
machines or video gaming, and how they survive the 1993 
Amendment.  See Justice Prosser's concurrence/dissent, ¶¶223, 
239, 240-45; Justice Roggensack's concurrence/dissent, ¶288.  If 
their premise was indeed correct ("the district court was 
incorrect in almost every respect"), the logical extension of 
the concurring/dissenting opinions is that blackjack, slot 
machines and video gaming, in addition to other forms of Class 
III gaming, would not survive the 1993 Amendment.  Compare 
Justice Prosser's concurrence/dissent, ¶205.   
No. 
2003AP421   
 
16 
 
Wis. 2d 718, 731, 150 N.W.2d 447 (1967).  Because the 1993 
Amendment is silent with regard to the issue of the pre-existing 
Tribal gaming compacts, the Amendment is not retrospective in 
operation. 
¶23 We conclude that the 1993 Amendment's failure to 
explicitly address the Original Compacts creates an ambiguity as 
to whether the compacts fall within the Amendment's reach.24  
2 
¶24 As the purpose of construction of an amendment is to 
give effect to the intent of the framers and the people who 
adopted it, a paramount rule of constitutional construction is 
that the intent of the provision "is to be ascertained, not 
alone by considering the words of any part of the instrument, 
but by ascertaining the general purpose of the whole[.]"  Id. at 
730.  "[W]hen the intent of the whole is ascertained, no part is 
to be construed so that the general purpose [is] thwarted, but 
the whole is to be made to conform to reason and good 
discretion."  Id. (citation omitted).  We therefore next examine 
the history surrounding the passage of the 1993 Amendment.  In 
our historical analysis of the 1993 Amendment, we examine the 
legislative 
debates 
and 
the 
ratification 
campaign. 
 
See 
Schilling, 278 Wis. 2d 216, ¶16. 
 
                                                 
24 We therefore disagree with the Panzer holding that "[t]he 
text of the constitution[al amendment] is absolutely clear."  
Panzer, 271 Wis. 2d 295, ¶86.  Any language in Panzer to the 
contrary is hereby withdrawn. 
No. 
2003AP421   
 
17 
 
a 
¶25 In order to amend the Wisconsin Constitution, two 
successive legislatures must pass a proposed constitutional 
amendment 
before 
putting 
the 
measure 
to 
the 
voters 
for 
ratification.  Wis. Const. art. XII, § 1.   
¶26 Prior to the legislature's first consideration of the 
1993 Amendment, the Governor convened a special session of the 
legislature.  During this special session, the legislature 
created Wis. Stat. § 565.01(6m).  1991 Wis. Act 321.  Like the 
1993 Amendment, § 565.01(6m)25 defines the "state lottery."26  
                                                 
25   Wisconsin Stat. § 565.01(6m) reads: 
"The 
state 
lottery" 
means 
an 
enterprise, 
including a multijurisdictional lottery in which the 
state participates, in which the player, by purchasing 
a ticket, is entitled to participate in a game of 
chance in which any of the following applies: 
1. The winning tickets are randomly predetermined 
and the player reveals preprinted numbers or symbols 
from which it can be immediately determined whether 
the ticket is a winning ticket entitling the player to 
win a prize as prescribed in the features and 
procedures for the game, including an opportunity to 
win a prize in a secondary or subsequent chance 
drawing or game. 
2. The ticket is evidence of the numbers or 
symbols selected by the player or, at the player's 
option, randomly selected by a computer, and the 
player becomes entitled to a prize as prescribed in 
the features and procedures for the game, including an 
opportunity 
to 
win 
a 
prize 
in 
a 
secondary 
or 
subsequent chance drawing or game, if some or all of 
the player's symbols or numbers are selected in a 
chance drawing or game, if the player's ticket is 
randomly selected by the computer at the time of 
purchase or if the ticket is selected in a chance 
drawing. 
No. 
2003AP421   
 
18 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
(b) "The state lottery" does not include any of 
the following games or games simulating any of the 
following games: 1. Any game in which winners are 
selected based on the results of a race or sporting 
event. 2. Any banking card game, including blackjack, 
baccarat or chemin de fer. 3. Poker. 4. Roulette. 5. 
Craps or any other game that involves utilizing dice. 
6. Keno. 7. Bingo 21, bingo jack, bingolet or bingo 
craps. 8. Any game of chance that is played on a slot 
machine 
or 
any 
mechanical, 
electromechanical 
or 
electronic device that is generally available to be 
played at a gambling casino. 9. Any game or device 
that is commonly known as a video game of chance or a 
video gaming machine or that is commonly known as or 
considered to be a video gambling machine, except a 
video device authorized by the department to permit 
the sale of tickets by retailers in a game authorized 
under par. (a) if all of the following apply: 
a. 
The 
device 
does 
not 
determine 
whether the player has won a prize. 
b. The device does not indicate whether 
the player has won a prize other than by 
verifying that the player's ticket or some 
or all of the player's symbols or numbers on 
the player's ticket have been selected in a 
chance drawing, or by verifying that the 
player's ticket has been randomly selected 
by a central system computer at the time of 
purchase. 
10. Any game that is similar to a game listed in this 
paragraph. 11. Any other game that is commonly 
considered to be a form of gambling and is not, or is 
not 
substantially 
similar 
to, 
a 
game 
that 
the 
department has the authority to conduct under this 
chapter. 
(c) 
This 
subsection 
shall 
not 
affect 
the 
provisions of any Indian gaming compact entered into 
before January 1, 1993, under s. 14.035. 
Wis. Stat. § 565.01(6m). 
No. 
2003AP421   
 
19 
 
Nevertheless, 
§ 565.01 
explicitly 
preserved 
the 
Original 
Compacts.  Under the statute, the Tribal gaming compacts entered 
into prior to January 1, 1993, are not governed by the remaining 
portions of the statute:  "(c) This subsection shall not affect 
the provisions of any Indian gaming compact entered into before 
January 1, 1993, under s. 14.035." Wis. Stat. § 565.01(6m)(c).   
¶27 In contrast to the statute, the 1993 Amendment defined 
"state lottery" without any explicit statement regarding the 
amendment's impact, or lack thereof, on the pre-existing Tribal 
gaming compacts.  Upon review of the record, we found no 
notations explaining why any reference to the Tribal gaming 
compacts was excluded from the 1993 Amendment proposals.   
¶28 However, the constitutional amendment did not need to 
contain a similar provision in order to accomplish the same 
result as Wis. Stat. § 565.01(6m)(c).  This subsection of the 
statute was intended to exempt the Original Compacts.  Panzer, 
271 Wis. 2d 295, ¶86 n.34 (citing Letter from James E. Doyle, 
Attorney General, to Walter Kunicki, Speaker of the Wisconsin 
Assembly, and John Medinger, Chairperson of the Assembly 
Committee on State Affairs (April 29, 1992) (on file with the 
Wisconsin Historical Society Archives, John D. Medinger Papers, 
Box 6, Folder 1)).  Because constitutional amendments are 
presumed to be prospective, Kayden, 34 Wis. 2d at 732, it would 
have been superfluous for the legislature to exempt the Original 
                                                                                                                                                             
26 As noted previously, both Wis. Stat. § 565.01 and Senator 
Adelman's original draft of 1991 SJR 93, the precursor for the 
1993 Amendment, were drafted in 1992. 
No. 
2003AP421   
 
20 
 
Compacts in order for the 1993 Amendment to achieve the same 
goal.27  
¶29 Because the 1993 Amendment and Wis. Stat. § 565.01 
were passed contemporaneously, we must not interpret the two 
enactments "to indicate a contradictory legislative intent."  
See State ex rel. Teunas v. County of Kenosha, 142 Wis. 2d 498, 
509, 418 N.W.2d 833 (1988) (citation omitted).28  We therefore 
conclude that the legislature did not intend the 1993 Amendment 
to invalidate the Original Compacts.  This is consistent with 
our decision in Panzer, where this court held that the fact that 
§ 565.01(6m)(c) explicitly exempted Tribal compacts from the 
definition of "lottery" prior to the passage of the 1993 
Amendment 
signaled 
legislative 
approval 
of 
the 
Original 
Compacts.  Panzer, 271 Wis. 2d 295, ¶101.   
                                                 
27  We recognize that the legislature rejected an amendment 
to the ballot question that would have explicitly exempted the 
Original Compacts.  This could be interpreted to mean that the 
legislature intended to 
invalidate 
the 
Original 
Compacts.  
However, the rejection of this amendment is only one act by the 
legislature, and does not outweigh the vast majority of other 
legislative records and news reports, discussed in ¶¶25-44 of 
this opinion, that clearly indicate that the 1993 Amendment 
would not affect the Original Compacts.  See Justice Prosser's 
concurrence/dissent, ¶219. 
28 We also note that to find otherwise would invalidate 
Wis. Stat. § 565.01(6m)(c) 
as 
unconstitutional 
because 
the 
statute would directly conflict with the 1993 Amendment, and 
therefore be inconsistent with this court's long-standing policy 
of finding statutes constitutional whenever possible.  Chappy v. 
LIRC, 136 Wis. 2d 172, 185, 401 N.W.2d 568 (1987) ("[E]very 
presumption must be indulged to sustain the law if at all 
possible and, wherever doubt exists as to a legislative 
enactment's constitutionality, it must be resolved in favor of 
constitutionality.") (citation omitted).   
No. 
2003AP421   
 
21 
 
¶30 On June 30, 1992, the legislature considered and 
passed 1992 Assembly Joint Resolution 1.  This was the first 
consideration of the resolution that eventually amended Article 
IV, Section 24.  Approximately seven months later, 1993 Senate 
Joint 
Resolution 
2, 
the 
second 
consideration 
of 
the 
constitutional amendment, was introduced.  On January 26, 1993, 
SJR 2 passed the Senate, and the Assembly on February 17, 1993.  
The two joint resolutions (1992 SJR 1 and 1993 SJR 2) were 
combined into 1991 Enrolled Joint Resolution 27.  The voters of 
Wisconsin ratified the enrolled resolution on April 6, 1993. 
¶31 A review of the drafting files for the constitutional 
amendment indicates that the legislators intended to preserve 
the Original Compacts as they existed at the time.  These files 
demonstrate that the joint resolutions were based on an earlier 
proposal to amend the constitution with regard to gaming and a 
statute that was passed during the same legislative session. 
¶32 In 1991, then-Governor Thompson called a special 
session to address amending the Wisconsin Constitution with 
regard to gaming.  Governor Thompson submitted a drafting 
request for the special session proposal, 1991 AJR 1, requesting 
that the resolution be drafted to mirror an earlier legislative 
proposal29 intended to "freeze" the state of gaming and to take 
                                                 
29 Then-Senator Lynn Adelman introduced 1991 Senate Joint 
Resolution 93, which was the original legislative attempt to 
amend Article IV, Section 24 to make unconstitutional most forms 
of gambling.  Senator Adelman's proposal intended to "freeze" 
the state of gaming in Wisconsin as it existed in 1991.  Jane R. 
Henkel, Senior Staff Attorney, Wisconsin Legislative Council, 
Memorandum to Senator Lynn Adelman (February 6, 1992).   
No. 
2003AP421   
 
22 
 
into 
account 
differences 
between 
that 
proposal,30 
and 
Wis. Stat. § 565.01, which made most forms of gambling illegal, 
but explicitly excluded the Tribal casinos.31  Drafting Request 
by Governor Thompson, June, 1992.  According to the Legislative 
Reference Bureau's analysis of the bill, the constitutional 
amendment was based on that earlier legislation and incorporated 
Wis. Stat. § 565.01.  Dr. H. Rupert Theobald, LRB Drafter's 
Note, June 16, 1992.  Because the LRB's analysis of a bill is 
printed with and displayed on the bill when it is introduced in 
the legislature, the LRB's analysis is indicative of legislative 
intent.  Schilling, 278 Wis. 2d 216, ¶25 n.9.  See also Cole, 
264 Wis. 2d 520, ¶36 n.12. 
¶33 The legislative records also reveal that Wisconsin's 
legislators were uniformly informed that the amendment would not 
affect the Original Compacts.  For example, prior to the June 30 
vote, Attorney Jane Henkel of the Wisconsin Legislative Council, 
responding 
to 
a 
request 
for 
clarification 
from 
State 
Representative 
David 
Travis, 
concluded 
the 
constitutional 
amendment would not "prohibit casino-type gambling under the 
existing 11 compacts between the state and Indian tribes."  Jane 
R. Henkel, Deputy Director, Legislative Council, Letter to 
                                                 
30 This proposed amendment passed the Senate but failed in 
the Assembly due to inaction.  Joint Rule 83(c)(3), as amended 
by 1991 Senate Joint Resolution 1. 
31 Under Wis. Stat. § 565.01(6m)(c), the prohibition on most 
forms of gambling "shall not affect the provisions of any Indian 
gaming compact entered into before January 1, 1993, under s. 
14.035."  Wis. Stat. § 565.01(6m). 
No. 
2003AP421   
 
23 
 
Representative 
David 
Travis, 
June 
19, 
1992 
(emphasis 
in 
original). 
¶34 Similarly, in preparation for the June 30, 1992, 
special session, then-State Representative John Medinger sought 
clarification from then-Attorney General Doyle regarding, among 
other 
things, 
the 
potential 
effects 
of 
the 
proposed 
constitutional amendment on the existing compacts.  John D. 
Medinger, State Representative, Letter to Attorney General James 
E. Doyle, June 22, 1992.  The Attorney General responded on June 
24, 1992, and stated that because the amendment was presumed to 
be prospective and because the compacts did not have a provision 
that made the compacts ineffective upon a change in state law, 
the proposed amendment "would not affect compacts which already 
exist." 
James 
E. 
Doyle, 
Attorney 
General, 
Letter 
to 
Representative Medinger, June 24, 1992.  The Attorney General 
wrote similar letters to this effect to other legislators.  See, 
e.g., Letter to Representative Marlin Schneider, February 3, 
1993. 
¶35 After the June 30, 1992, vote, but prior to the second 
consideration, the Deputy Director for the Assembly Democratic 
Caucus informed the Democratic members of the Assembly that the 
"existing tribal-state gaming compacts will continue for seven 
years and will not be affected by the change."  Dan Rossmiller, 
Assembly 
Democratic 
Caucus 
Deputy 
Director, 
Memorandum to 
Assembly Democrats, July 7, 1992. 
¶36 These records clearly demonstrate that the legislators 
voted 
to 
pass 
the 
constitutional 
amendment 
with 
the 
No. 
2003AP421   
 
24 
 
understanding that the Original Compacts would survive the 
amendment.  We thus conclude that the Wisconsin Legislature did 
not intend the 1993 Amendment to invalidate the Original 
Compacts. 
b 
¶37 We next turn to the ratification campaign that 
surrounded the voters' passage of the 1993 Amendment.  This 
court presumes that, when informed, the citizens of Wisconsin 
are familiar with the elements of the constitution and with the 
laws, and that the information used to educate the voters during 
the ratification campaign provides evidence of the voters' 
intent.  State ex rel. Ekern v. Zimmerman, 187 Wis. 180, 192-94, 
204 N.W. 803 (1925).  "[W]here such intention appears, the 
construction 
and 
interpretation 
of 
the 
acts 
must 
follow 
accordingly."  Id. 
¶38 Wisconsin citizens voted to ratify the 1993 Amendment 
to Article IV, Section 24 on April 6, 1993.  Public statements 
and news accounts leading to the April 6 vote demonstrate that 
voters were informed that the 1993 Amendment would not affect 
the Original Compacts, and polls released days prior to the 
April 6, 1993, vote indicate that most voters did not want to 
make the Tribal gaming casinos illegal.   
¶39 The vast majority of news articles reported to the 
voters that the 1993 Amendment would not impact the Original 
No. 
2003AP421   
 
25 
 
Compacts.32  For example, the Milwaukee Sentinel reported that 
then-Attorney General Doyle did "not believe enactment of the 
amendment would affect Indian casinos operating under terms of 
the current state-tribal gambling compacts signed in 1991 and 
1992."  Amy Rinard, Gaming Question Stays Unanswered, Milw. 
Sent., Mar. 29, 1993.  Then-Governor Thompson and "other state 
lawyers and lawmakers agree[d]."  Id.   
¶40 The Milwaukee Journal also printed a letter to the 
editor by two lawmakers encouraging passage of the amendment, 
explaining that voters need not worry about the amendment 
affecting the existing Tribal casinos because a "'yes' vote 
[would] freeze the current level of gambling in Wisconsin and 
put a constitutional brake on new, expanded forms of gambling."  
Lynn Adelman & Peter Bock, Letter to Editor, Vote 'Yes' on 
Question 7 to Limit Expansion, Milw. Jour., Mar. 29, 1993.   
¶41 Editors and columnists similarly concluded that the 
1993 Amendment would not affect the Original Compacts.  The 
                                                 
32 Some news reports did express concern about what the 
amendment would mean for Indian gaming.  See Dan Ritsche, The 
Evolution of Legalized Gambling in Wisconsin, LRB-00-RB-1, 11-12 
(1999); Ron Seely, You Can Bet on It: Gaming Referendum Is Sure 
to Confuse, Wis. St. Jour., Apr. 4, 1993 ("What, really, will 
happen [to Indian casinos] if the amendment passes? . . . The 
problem is that nobody really knows.")(emphasis in original); 
Steve Schultze, Answers Help Shed Light on Amendment Questions, 
Milw. Jour., Apr. 4, 1993 ("Q. How do I vote if I want to keep 
Indian casinos going but not expand gambling?  A. Neither a yes 
nor a no vote provides any guarantees.").  And, in fact, some 
expressed concern that the amendment could jeopardize the 
existing compacts.  See, e.g., Amy Rinard, Gaming Question Stays 
Unanswered, Milw. Sent., Mar. 29, 1993, quoting Glen Miller, 
then-Chairman of the Menominee Tribe. 
No. 
2003AP421   
 
26 
 
Wisconsin State Journal explained to voters that "[a] 'yes' vote 
on the constitutional amendment is not a vote to board up 
Wisconsin Indian casinos," Tom Still, Gambling Limit Wouldn't 
Hurt Tribes, Wis. St. Jour., Mar. 22, 1993.  The Wisconsin State 
Journal also encouraged any voter who wanted to ensure the 
continuation of Tribal casinos to vote in favor of the 
amendment.  Editorial, Don't Know How to Vote?  Here Are Some 
Guidelines, Wis. St. Jour., Apr. 4, 1993.   
¶42 Voters in Eau Claire were similarly encouraged to vote 
for the amendment to "limit any further expansion of gambling" 
and stressed that "[t]here would be no immediate impact on 
existing casinos because the tribes negotiated compacts with the 
state that ensures the casinos will remain open for the next 
seven years."  Editorial, "Yes" Vote Won't be End to Casinos, 
Eau Claire Leader Telegram, Apr. 2, 1993 (emphasis added).  
Green Bay voters were also informed that the "amendment will not 
affect Indian casinos." Editorial, Vote "Yes" . . . to Freeze 
Gambling, Green Bay Press Gazette, Mar. 30, 1993 (emphasis 
added).   
¶43 In addition, according to a poll conducted by the St. 
Norbert College Survey Center, released just days before the 
April 6 vote, 65 percent of those polled believed that "Indian 
tribes should be allowed to operate gambling casinos on their 
reservations."  John Patrick Hunter, Survey: Taxes Top Worry, 
Gaming Views Split, The Cap. Times, Mar. 30, 1993.  A poll by 
the University of Wisconsin-Extension Survey Research Laboratory 
reported similar findings.  Id. 
No. 
2003AP421   
 
27 
 
¶44 We conclude that the vast number of news articles, 
which informed voters that the amendment would not impact the 
existing Indian gaming, clearly demonstrates that the voters who 
ratified the constitutional amendment were informed that the 
ratification of the 1993 Amendment would not affect the Original 
Tribal Gaming Compacts.  Our "construction and interpretation" 
of the 1993 Amendment must follow accordingly.  Zimmerman, 187 
Wis. at 194. 
3 
¶45 We also 
find that 
subsequent legislative 
action 
demonstrates that the 1993 Amendment did not invalidate the 
Original Compacts.  The legislature's subsequent actions are a 
crucial component of any constitutional analysis because they 
are clear evidence of the legislature's understanding of that 
amendment.  See Schilling, 278 Wis. 2d 216, ¶¶16, 23.  In the 
present case, laws enacted immediately following passage of the 
1993 Amendment clearly relied on the continuation of the 
existing Indian gaming compacts.   
¶46 The 1993 budget, enacted on August 10, 1993, was the 
first action by the Wisconsin Legislature that mentioned the 
Tribal gaming compacts subsequent to passage of the 1993 
Amendment.  The 1993 budget appropriated $330,800 in 1993-94 and 
$329,000 in 1994-95 from "[m]oneys received by the state from 
Indian tribes as reimbursement for state costs of regulation of 
Indian gaming under [the] Indian gaming compacts . . . ."  1993 
Wis. Act 16, §§ 153 & 3544(1m)(a) (emphasis added).  The Budget 
No. 
2003AP421   
 
28 
 
Act, therefore, relied on funds from the Class III games 
authorized by the Original Compacts. 
¶47 The legislature also passed 1993 Wisconsin Act 174, 
which made all gaming contracts (debts) void and unenforceable, 
but which explicitly stated that the "section does not apply 
to . . . state or federal laws relating to the conduct of gaming 
on Indian lands."  1993 Wis. Act 174, Wis. Stat. § 895.055.  
Further, 1993 Wisconsin Act 365 created a requirement for the 
Wisconsin Department of Justice to prosecute violations of the 
Tribal 
gaming 
compacts. 
 
1993 
Wis. 
Act 
365, 
Wis. Stat. § 165.25(3r). 
¶48 Of significance, the legislature passed 1993 Wisconsin 
Act 406, enacted on April 21, 1994, which explicitly validated 
any contract between the State and a federally-recognized Indian 
Tribe that was entered into prior to May 6, 1994.  1993 Wis. Act 
406; Wis. Stat. § 992.20(1).  This statute, passed one year 
after the voters ratified the 1993 Amendment, "signal[s] 
legislative approval of the original compacts."  Panzer, 271 
Wis. 2d 295, ¶100. 
4 
¶49 In sum, based on the 1993 Amendment's history and the 
earliest legislative interpretations of that Amendment, we 
conclude that the 1993 Amendment was not intended to preclude 
the Tribes from conducting Class III games pursuant to the 
Original Compacts.  Because the Original Compacts are not 
invalidated by the 1993 Amendment, the terms agreed to in the 
Original Compacts remain in full effect.   
No. 
2003AP421   
 
29 
 
B 
¶50 We next examine whether the Governor has the authority 
to renew the Original Compacts.  Dairyland contends that the 
Class 
III 
games 
operated 
at 
the 
Tribes' 
casinos 
are 
unconstitutional, and therefore the State cannot lawfully renew 
the compacts.  The Governor asserts that the 1993 Amendment 
cannot force the State to issue a notice of nonrenewal because 
this would unconstitutionally impair the State's compacts with 
the 11 Tribes.   
¶51 Both the Wisconsin and the United States Constitutions 
prohibit states from impairing their contractual obligations.33  
                                                 
33 We note that the Contracts Clause generally applies to 
contracts to which the State is a party.  Russell v. Sebastian, 
233 U.S. 195 (1914).  When a state is acting, "not in its 
capacity as a sovereign, but in its proprietary capacity" as a 
party to a contract, the state "is bound by the same rules as 
those which it applies to its citizens."  Fulton v. First 
Volunteer Co. of Oconto, 204 Wis. 355, 362, 236 N.W. 120 (1931) 
(citation omitted).  Moreover, 
[W]hen the state appears as a suitor in her courts to 
enforce her rights of property, she comes shorn of her 
attributes of sovereignty, and as a body politic, 
capable of contracting, suing, and holding property, 
is subject to those rules of justice and right which 
in her sovereign character, she has prescribed for the 
government of her people.   
Id. (citation omitted).  See also U.S. Trust Co. of New York v. 
New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25 n.23 (1977); Hall v. Wisconsin, 103 
U.S. 5, 11 (1880) ("When a State descends from the plane of its 
sovereignty, and contracts with private persons, it is regarded 
pro hac vice as a private person itself, and is bound 
accordingly.") (citation omitted). 
No. 
2003AP421   
 
30 
 
Article I, Section 12 of the Wisconsin Constitution states: 
"[n]o bill of attainder, ex post facto law, nor any law 
impairing the obligation of contracts, shall ever be passed[.]"  
Similarly, 
Article 
I, Section 
10 
of 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution 
states, 
in 
relevant 
part: 
"No 
state 
shall . . . pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or 
law impairing the obligation of contracts[.]"  Although our 
interpretation 
of 
the 
Contract 
Clause 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution need not parallel federal interpretations of the 
Contract Clause of the United States Constitution, "our prior 
decisions [regarding Contract Clause issues] have relied upon 
the decisions of the United States Supreme Court."  Chappy v. 
LIRC, 136 Wis. 2d 172, 186, 401 N.W.2d 568 (1987) (citations 
omitted). 
¶52 We recognize that the Contract Clause does not place 
an absolute barrier to a state's power to modify its own 
contracts.  See Wisconsin Professional Police Ass'n, Inc. v. 
                                                                                                                                                             
In Russell, the United States Supreme Court precluded a 
state's 
constitutional 
amendment 
from 
being 
applied 
retroactively to a contract between the state and a private 
company that pre-existed the constitutional amendment.  Russell, 
233 U.S. at 210.  The Court concluded that the constitutional 
amendment could not be applied retroactively to a contract to 
which the State was a party in an attempt to "deny the right of 
expansion to a utility already lawfully doing business in the 
municipality after the company had expended large sums in 
preparation for the expansion."  Dixie Elec. Membership Corp. v. 
City of Baton Rouge, 440 F. 2d 819, 822 (5th Cir. 1971) (citing 
Russell, 233 U.S. 195; noting that retroactive application of 
the amendment was an attempt to change the rules of the game at 
the expense of the utility).  Contrast, Justice Roggensack's 
concurrence/dissent, ¶305.   
No. 
2003AP421   
 
31 
 
Lightbourn, 2001 WI 59, ¶149, 243 Wis. 2d 512, 627 N.W.2d 807.  
Indeed, "courts will scrutinize the ability of the State to 
enter into an agreement that limits its power to act in the 
future."  Id. (quotation omitted).  We further recognize that a 
state cannot contract away its police powers.  Stone v. 
Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 818 (1879).  See also City of 
Superior v. Roemer, 154 Wis. 345, 357, 141 N.W. 250 (1913). 
States may similarly adjust their contractual obligations to 
safeguard the public welfare.34  Moreover, a state's power to 
impair pre-existing contracts is not limited to those contracts 
that are hostile to public morals, health, or safety.  Home 
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 437 (1934).   
¶53 Yet, if a state could change the rules governing its 
contractual obligations whenever it saw fit, the Contract Clause 
                                                 
34 See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 
437 (1934) ("[E]conomic interests of the state may justify the 
exercise of its continuing and dominant protective power 
notwithstanding interference with contracts.").  
No. 
2003AP421   
 
32 
 
would offer no protection at all.35  Indeed, as the United States 
Supreme Court has explicitly recognized: 
If the Contract Clause is to retain any meaning at 
all . . . it must be understood to impose some limits 
upon the power of a State to abridge existing 
contractual relationships, even in the exercise of its 
otherwise legitimate police power. . . . Even when the 
public welfare is invoked as an excuse. . . . the 
security of a mortgage cannot be cut down without 
moderation or reason or in a spirit of oppression." 
Wipperfurth v. U-Haul Co. of W. Wisconsin, 101 Wis. 2d 586, 594-
95, 304 N.W.2d 767 (1981) (citing Allied Structural Steel Co. v. 
Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 242-43 (1978) (citations omitted) 
                                                 
35 Justice Roggensack contends that we "choose[] to ignore 
controlling precedent of the United States Supreme Court."  
Justice 
Roggensack's 
concurrence/dissent, 
¶287. 
 
Justice 
Roggensack asserts that the Contracts Clause has "never been 
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court to preclude a 
state 
from 
legislating 
to 
protect 
the 
public 
health 
or 
morals[.]"  Id., ¶308 (emphasis in original) (citing Stone v. 
Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 818 (1879)).  She reviews decisions 
by the United States Supreme Court where, she concludes, the 
court allowed a State's police powers to trump the State's 
contractual 
obligations. 
 
See 
id., 
¶¶309-320. 
 
Justice 
Roggensack's analysis overstates the United States Supreme 
Court's precedent.  The United States Supreme Court has not 
concluded that a State can never limit its right to exercise its 
police powers.   
In addition, Justice Roggensack asserts that this decision 
takes away the State's sovereign police power to regulate 
gambling 
"within 
its 
jurisdiction," 
Justice 
Roggensack's 
concurrence/dissent, ¶318.  However, Tribes are not within the 
State's jurisdiction: States do not have jurisdiction over 
Tribes 
unless 
specifically 
granted 
such 
jurisdiction 
by 
Congress.  Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law § 12.02[5], 
865 (2005 ed.).  Moreover, without a valid compact, state laws 
have no regulatory power over gaming on Tribal land, and states 
have no authority to police Tribal casinos.  See Sycuan Band v. 
Roche, 54 F.3d 535 (9th Cir. 1994); Florida v. Seminole Tribe, 
181 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 1999). 
No. 
2003AP421   
 
33 
 
(emphasis in original)).  An historical analysis of the Contract 
Clause further explains courts' attempts to balance the state's 
police powers against the freedom to contract: 
[T]he [United States Supreme] Court developed the 
theory that with regard to public contracts, there 
were certain attributes of state sovereignty that 
could not be contracted away. . . . The Court, when it 
could, construed the 
underlying 
contract 
as not 
providing 
for 
the 
giving 
up 
of 
the 
sovereign 
power. . . . If the state did in fact contract away 
certain powers, then the Court would hold that certain 
attributes of state power could not be contracted away 
at all.  This Sovereign Power limitation became an 
important gloss on the Contract Clause.  The more 
modern Public Purpose Balancing Test, developed later, 
largely supplants the need for this exception, but it 
is still of some importance. 
James M. McGoldrick, Jr., Limits on States, 17 (2005)  (emphasis 
added). 
¶54 Attempting to strike a balance between the states' 
contractual obligations and the public welfare, the United 
States Supreme Court has established a three-step methodology 
used in analyzing impairment of contract claims.  Lightbourn, 
243 Wis. 2d 512, ¶146 (citation omitted).  This balancing test 
is rooted in "the Framers' intent to protect contract rights 
from the 'fluctuating policy' of the state."  McGoldrick, supra, 
31.36  This court generally follows this three-step methodology 
in evaluating impairment of contract claims.  Lightbourn, 243 
Wis. 2d 512, ¶146. 
                                                 
36 Contrast Justice Roggensack's concurrence/dissent, ¶¶309, 
318-19 (asserting that the Contract Clause analysis is not 
applicable to "legislating to protect the public health or 
morals"). 
No. 
2003AP421   
 
34 
 
¶55 To 
demonstrate 
that 
a 
contract 
has 
been 
unconstitutionally impaired, a complaining party must first 
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the legislature changed 
the law after the formation of the contract and that the 
operation of the contract is substantially impaired by this 
change.  See Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light 
Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411 (1983) (citation omitted); Reserve Life 
Ins. Co. v. La Follette, 108 Wis. 2d 637, 644, 323 N.W. 2d 173 
(Ct. App. 1982).  The impairment must be substantial; a minimal 
change 
of 
contractual 
obligations 
may 
end 
the 
inquiry.  
Lightbourn, 243 Wis. 2d 512, ¶147.  On the other hand, the 
severity of the impairment increases the level of scrutiny to 
which the legislation will be subjected.  Energy Reserves Group, 
459 U.S. at 411.  
¶56 Second, if a law substantially impairs an already 
existing contractual relationship, the state, in justification, 
must have a significant and legitimate public purpose for the 
legislation.  Id.  See also Spannaus, 438 U.S. at 244; 
Lightbourn, 243 Wis. 2d 512, ¶148.   
¶57 Finally, 
if a 
significant 
and legitimate 
public 
purpose exists for the legislation, the question becomes whether 
the legislature's impairment of contract is reasonable and 
necessary to serve that purpose.  Lightbourn, 243 Wis. 2d 512, 
¶149.  In assessing the reasonableness of a constitutional 
amendment, the United States Supreme Court evaluates whether the 
social concerns that prompted the changes were foreseeable when 
the state entered into the compact, and whether the conditions 
No. 
2003AP421   
 
35 
 
have changed sufficiently since the state entered the contract.  
See U.S. Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 31-32 
(1977).   
¶58 In the present case, the State of Wisconsin and the 11 
Tribes have had an ongoing relationship since the parties 
entered into the Original Compacts more than a decade ago.37  As 
this court recognized in Panzer, the parties clearly have a 
reliance interest in the continuation of the Original Compacts, 
and this court has already recognized that "[a]ny attempt at 
this point to impair these compacts would create serious 
constitutional questions."  Panzer, 271 Wis. 2d 295, ¶99.   
¶59 In the following analysis, we examine whether the 1993 
Amendment applies to renewals of the Original Compacts.  We then 
examine whether the Contract Clause precludes interpreting the 
1993 Amendment as a statement of public policy against gaming 
                                                 
37 Pursuant to IGRA, the parties entered into compacts to 
form relationships in an effort to balance the interests of the 
Indian Tribes' desires to become more self-sufficient and the 
State's desires to regulate Class III games.  See, e.g., Bad 
River/State of Wisconsin Gaming Compact of 1991, §XXXI.A.1-2.   
The Tribes' interests in promoting economic development and 
self-sufficiency continue.  The Tribes' casinos have become "a 
means to achieve what no state or federal economic development 
program has been able to achieve for Indian people in 200 years—
—the return of self-respect and economic self-sufficiency."  
Judy Zelio, The Fat New Buffalo, State Legislatures, 38-41 (June 
1994) (quoting JoAnn Jones, Tribal Chair of the Wisconsin 
Winnebago Tribe (renamed the Ho Chunk Nation in November 1994)).   
The State's interest in regulating Class III gaming 
likewise persists.  The State has continually relied on receipts 
from Indian gaming in its budgeting process.  See, e.g., 1993 
Wis. Act 16, 2003 Wis. Act 33.   
No. 
2003AP421   
 
36 
 
that forces the State to exercise its right of nonrenewal.  
Finally, we examine whether the Amendment applies to the scope 
of Class III games negotiated under the terms of the Original 
Compacts. 
1 
¶60 Because we have concluded that the 1993 Amendment does 
not invalidate the Original Compacts, whether the 1993 Amendment 
applies to renewals of the Original Compacts depends upon 
whether 
the 
"renewal" 
constitutes 
a 
new 
contract 
or 
a 
continuation of the pre-existing contractual relationship.  This 
is because, in general, the laws in existence at the time of the 
contract are incorporated into that contract: 
[T]he laws which subsist at the time and place of the 
making of a contract . . . enter into and form a part 
of it, as if they were expressly referred to or 
incorporated in its terms.  This principle embraces 
alike those which affect its validity, construction, 
discharge, and enforcement.  
See Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. 535, 550 n.30 (1866).  
Subsequent changes to a law will not interfere with an existing 
contract.  Reserve Life, 108 Wis. 2d at 645-47.  When a law 
changes, however, contracts entered into after the date of a 
change in law are subject to the new law.  Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 
U.S. 311, 321 (1843). 
¶61 Our 
analysis of 
a 
contractual renewal 
provision 
focuses primarily upon the intent of the parties when they 
No. 
2003AP421   
 
37 
 
entered into the contract.38  Reserve Life, 108 Wis. 2d at 645 
(interpreting 
insurance 
contracts); 
Meyers 
v. 
Wells, 
252 
Wis. 352, 357, 31 N.W. 2d 512 (1948) (interpreting employment 
contracts); 
Seefeldt 
v. 
Keske, 
14 
Wis. 2d 438, 
442, 
111 
N.W. 2d 574 
(1961) 
(interpreting 
lease 
agreements). 
 
The 
parties' intent can be determined through the language of the 
                                                 
38 Because our interpretation of the renewal provision 
contained in the Original Compacts depends upon the parties' 
intent, Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. La Follette, 108 Wis. 2d 637, 
645, 323 N.W. 2d 173 (Ct. App. 1982), the analysis is not one of 
constitutional interpretation and therefore does not require an 
examination of the ratification campaign surrounding the voters' 
passage of the 1993 Amendment.  Compare State ex rel. Ekern v. 
Zimmerman, 187 Wis. 180, 192-94, 204 N.W. 803 (1925).   
We nonetheless note that the history surrounding the 
legislative enactment and voter ratification of the 1993 
Amendment demonstrates that, although the intent was to leave 
the Original Compacts untouched, there was considerably more 
confusion regarding the application of the 1993 Amendment to the 
renewal process.  The general consensus of the news reports to 
voters was that the 1993 Amendment may affect renewal of the 
Original Compacts.  Upon determining that the Original Compacts 
would not be affected, news reporters opined about the potential 
impact of the 1993 Amendment on renewal of the compacts.  For 
example, a Milwaukee Journal reporter concluded that although 
any "threat to closing Wisconsin Indian casinos if the amendment 
passes won't hit for six more years," there was the potential 
that "when the compacts come up for renewal in 1998 and 1999 
that the amendment could be used to shut down the tribal 
casinos."  Schultze, Answers Help Shed Light, supra, at n.7.   
The Wisconsin State Journal similarly noted that passage of 
the Amendment would not affect the compacts for at least six 
years, but that tribal members feared the State would not renew 
the compacts.  Seely, Gaming Referendum is Sure to Confuse, 
supra.  The Milwaukee Sentinel also cautioned that "ratification 
of the amendment . . . could be used to back up the state's case 
should the next governor decide not to renew," Rinard, Gaming 
Question Stays Unanswered,  supra, ¶39.     
No. 
2003AP421   
 
38 
 
contract itself.  See Swan Sales Corp. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing 
Co., 126 Wis. 2d 16, 25, 374 N.W. 2d 640 (Ct. App., 1985); 
Reserve Life, 108 Wis. 2d at 645. 
¶62 In the present case, each of the Original Compacts 
contains a provision that addresses Tribal ordinances and State 
law:  "To the extent that State law or Tribal ordinances, or any 
amendments thereto, are inconsistent with any provision of this 
Compact, this Compact shall control."39 
¶63 Under the plain terms of the Original Compacts, 
therefore, changes in State law do not impact the compacts.  The 
parties clearly intended to preserve the law as it existed in 
1991-92, and to prevent the application of changes to the 
State's or Tribes' laws to the Original Compacts. 
¶64 In addition, if renewals of the compacts constitute 
extensions of the Original Compacts, because the 1993 Amendment 
does not apply to the Original Compacts, the Amendment would not 
apply to extensions of the same.  Courts have found that renewal 
of a contract that contains language which explicitly provides 
for automatic renewal, and does not, therefore, require an 
affirmative act by either party in order to renew, constitutes a 
continuation of the pre-existing contractual relationship and 
not a "fresh decision" to continue.  Swan Sales, 126 Wis. 2d at 
26.  Contrast Kealey Pharm. v. Walgreen Co., 539 F. Supp. 1357, 
1363 (W.D. Wis. 1982), affirmed in part and vacated in part, 761 
F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1985) (concluding the renewal of a pre-
                                                 
39 See, e.g., Forest County Potawatomi Compact § XXVI.   
No. 
2003AP421   
 
39 
 
existing contract constituted a new contract because the 
contract contained no provisions for renewal).  Thus, we begin 
with the language of the Original Compacts to determine whether 
the State and the Tribes intended the renewal at the expiration 
of the compact term to constitute a continuation of the pre-
existing compact, or whether they intended that a renewal 
constitute a new agreement between the parties.     
¶65 The parties' intent is clearly evinced through the 
language of the Original Compacts.  The Original Compacts state 
that the compact is "automatically extended" unless either party 
exercises its right of nonrenewal.40  The plain language of the 
compacts demonstrates that the parties intended the compacts to 
continue unless terminated.  The use of the word "extended" 
signifies a continuation of the existing contract rather than 
the creation of a new one; the pertinent dictionary definition 
of "extended" is "[c]ontinued for a long period of time."  The 
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 55 (3d ed. 
1992).  Renewal occurs automatically, and only an affirmative 
act by one of the parties terminates the continuation of the 
compacts.  Like Swan Sales, the Original Compacts automatically 
renew; subsequent renewals are not "fresh decisions" by the 
                                                 
40 Bad River Band Compact § XXV(B); Forest County Potawatomi 
Compact § XXV(B); Winnebago [Ho-Chunk] Compact § XXVI; Lac 
Courte Oreilles Compact § XXV(B); Lac du Flambeau Band Compact 
§ XXV(B); 
Menominee 
Compact 
§ XXVI(1)(B); 
Oneida 
Compact 
§XXV(B); Red Cliff Compact § XXV(B); Sokaogon Chippewa Compact 
§ XXV(B); St. Croix Chippewa Compact § XXV(B); Stockbridge-
Munsee Compact § XXV(B). 
No. 
2003AP421   
 
40 
 
parties to conduct business, but merely a continuation of pre-
existing relationships.  See Swan Sales, 126 Wis. 2d at 25, 26.   
¶66 We 
therefore 
conclude 
that 
"renewals" 
constitute 
continuations of the Original Compacts and do not constitute 
new, independent contracts.  Because the 1993 Amendment did not 
apply to the Original Compacts, the Amendment does not apply to 
continuations or extensions of the Original Compacts.   
2 
¶67 We have already concluded that the 1993 Amendment does 
not 
invalidate 
the 
Original 
Compacts, 
extensions, 
or 
continuations thereof.  Therefore, the terms agreed upon in the 
Original Compacts, and the laws in effect at the time the 
contract was entered into, control the Tribal casinos operating 
under the authority of Original Compacts.41  Nevertheless, 
Dairyland asserts that the 1993 Amendment forces the State to 
affirmatively exercise its right of nonrenewal.  According to 
Dairyland, because the 1993 Amendment makes the Class III games 
currently operated at the Tribal casinos unconstitutional, even 
if the 1993 Amendment does not apply to the Original Compacts, 
the State cannot continue to operate under a contract that is in 
violation of the constitution and, therefore, the State must 
exercise its right of nonrenewal.  Dairyland contends that 
requiring nonrenewal does not impair the compacts because each 
compact contains a provision that allows either party to 
                                                 
41 See Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. 535, 550 
(1866). 
No. 
2003AP421   
 
41 
 
terminate each compact.  We therefore examine whether forcing 
the State to take the affirmative step and exercise its right of 
nonrenewal constitutes an unconstitutional impairment of the 
Original Compacts. 
¶68 As discussed above, each of the Original Compacts 
includes a provision that allows either party to give a written 
notice of nonrenewal that would require the Tribe to cease all 
Class III gaming upon the expiration date of the compact.42  Upon 
a party's exercising the right of nonrenewal, the compacts 
instruct the parties to enter into negotiations for successor 
compacts.43  A successor compact constitutes a new compact.  
¶69 Assuming that the 1993 Amendment precludes those Class 
III games explicitly prohibited by Art. IV, sec. 2444 in any 
compact negotiated after 1993,45 no Class III casino game can be 
                                                 
42 For example, in the Gaming Compact of 1992 between the 
Forest County Potawatomi Community of Wisconsin and the State, 
section XXV provides that in the event of written notice of 
nonrenewal by either party "as set forth in this section, the 
Tribe shall cease all Class III gaming under this Compact upon 
its expiration date or upon the date the procedures in subsec. 
E. are concluded and a successor compact, if any, is in effect."  
(emphasis added).  Subsection E. allows the parties to enter 
into negotiations for a successor compact if one of the parties 
gives written notice of nonrenewal.   
43 Id. 
44 "Except as provided in this section, the legislature may 
not authorize gambling in any form."  Wis. Const. art. IV, § 24.  
In addition, clause 6 specifically defines the state-operated 
lottery to exclude casino-style games, including blackjack, 
poker, roulette, craps, keno, slot machines, and video gaming. 
45 We note that the 1993 Amendment may impact successor 
compacts and other new gaming compacts between the State and the 
Tribes.   
No. 
2003AP421   
 
42 
 
the proper subject of any new compact negotiation,46 save the few 
specifically exempted Class III games: bingo games operated by 
charitable and religious organizations,47 raffle games operated 
by charitable and religious organizations,48 pari-mutuel on-track 
betting,49 and the state-operated lottery.50  As a result, forcing 
the State to exercise its right of nonrenewal, thereby forcing 
                                                                                                                                                             
However, under the prohibitory/regulatory analysis from Lac 
du Flambeau, the State may nonetheless be required to negotiate 
over all Class III games.  Lac du Flambeau, 770 F. Supp 487-88.  
Although this court in Panzer called into question the Lac du 
Flambeau prohibitory/regulatory distinction, the court did not 
explicitly conclude that Lac du Flambeau was in error.  Panzer, 
271 Wis. 2d 295, ¶92 n.36.  Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit 
recently affirmed the Lac du Flambeau rationale and reasoned 
that Wisconsin's lottery signals the State's broader public 
policy of tolerating gaming.  Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake 
Superior Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin v. United States, 367 
F.3d 650, 664 (7th Cir. 2004).  See also Mashantucket Pequot 
Tribe v. Connecticut, 913 F.2d 1024, 1031 (2nd Cir. 1990) 
(concluding that casino-style games were not totally repugnant 
to the state's public policy, because Connecticut law not only 
allowed charities to conduct "Las Vegas Nights," but also 
permitted other forms of gambling, including a state-operated 
lottery).  Because the resolution of the prohibitory/regulatory 
distinction is a matter of federal law, we decline to further 
address the issue. 
46 See Von Hoffman, 71 U.S. 535, 550 ("[T]he laws which 
subsist 
at 
the 
time 
and 
place 
of 
the 
making 
of 
a 
contract . . . enter into and form a part of it"); Bronson v. 
Kinzie, 42 U.S. 311, 321 (1843) (concluding that contracts 
entered into after the date of a change in law are subject to 
the new law).   
47 Wis. Const. art. IV, § 24, cl. 3. 
48 Id., cl. 4. 
49 Id., cl. 5. 
50 Id., cl. 6. 
No. 
2003AP421   
 
43 
 
the State to negotiate new compacts, would remove the State's 
authority to negotiate for any Class III games, except the 
limited games specifically authorized by the Constitution.   
¶70 The operation of Class III games on Tribal land was a 
material consideration in the compact negotiations: 
The parties acknowledge that the mutual compromises 
with respect to the types of games the Tribe is 
authorized to operate during the term of this Compact 
and with respect to the duration of this Compact were 
significant 
material 
considerations 
in 
reaching 
agreement and are the essence of this Compact.51 
Forcing nonrenewal, thereby requiring the parties to negotiate 
for new compacts under which most forms of Class III games are 
non-negotiable, would therefore constitute a "severe disruption 
of contractual expectations."  See Wipperfurth, 101 Wis. 2d at 
598.  Compare Justice Prosser's concurrence/dissent, ¶262.  The 
compacts 
would 
be 
substantially 
impaired 
because 
forcing 
nonrenewal would put the parties in a position where they could 
no longer contract for the games that were part of the Original 
Compacts because of the Amendment.  Forcing the State to 
negotiate new compacts would thus severely impair, indeed 
eliminate, the State's contractual rights to continue any Class 
III games excluded by the Amendment.  See State ex rel. Cannon 
v. Moran, 111 Wis. 2d 544, 558, 331 N.W.2d 369(1983) (citing 
                                                 
51 This or a similar provision was explicitly included in 
seven of the eleven Original Compacts.  Bad River Compact 
§ XXXI(A)(2); 
Lac 
Courte 
Oreilles 
Compact 
§ XXXI(A)(2); 
Menominee Compact § XXXII(A)(2); Red Cliff Compact § XXXI(A)(2); 
Sokaogon Chippewa Compact § XXXI(A)(2); St. Croix Chippewa 
Compact § XXXI(A)(2); Stockbridge-Munsee Compact § XXXI(A)(2). 
No. 
2003AP421   
 
44 
 
Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234).  Because applying the 1993 Amendment to 
the Original Compacts interferes "with freedom of contract 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment," we have a duty to 
inquire further.  Fairmont Creamery Co. v. State of Minn., 274 
U.S. 1, 11 (1927).   
¶71 The United States Supreme Court has concluded that the 
severe impairment of a contract is entitled to heightened 
scrutiny.  Spannaus, 438 U.S. at 245 ("The severity of the 
impairment 
measures 
the 
height 
of 
the 
hurdle 
the 
state 
legislation must clear.").  Furthermore, because the State is a 
party to the contract in question, this court gives less 
deference to the legislature's "assessment of reasonableness and 
necessity . . . because the State's self-interest is at stake."  
Energy Reserves Group, 459 U.S. at 412-13 n.14 (quotation and 
citation omitted).  Therefore, the remaining analyses as to 
whether the State had a significant and legitimate public 
purpose, and whether the Amendment was reasonable and necessary 
to meet that purpose, are subject to a heightened level of 
scrutiny.  Cannon, 111 Wis. 2d at 559. 
¶72 Under the impairment of contracts analysis, the State 
is not prohibited from passing a law that substantially impairs 
an existing contractual obligation as long as the impairment is 
justified under a significant and legitimate public purpose, and 
the constitutional amendment is reasonable and appropriate to 
advance that purpose.  Lightbourn, 243 Wis. 2d 512, ¶148; 
Cannon, 111 Wis. 2d at 559; U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 25-26.  We 
therefore examine whether any legitimate public purpose would 
No. 
2003AP421   
 
45 
 
justify impairing the State's contractual obligation to the 
Tribes under the Original Compacts, and whether impairment would 
be reasonable. 
¶73 We note that the State's interests are less compelling 
when the inquiry involves Tribal sovereigns because state laws 
and policies do not extend to Tribal lands unless authorized by 
Congress.  Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law, at 865, 
supra, n.35; S. Rep. No. 446, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. 5 (1988), 
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071, 3075.  Congress passed IGRA 
to establish federal standards for gaming on Indian lands, 25 
USC § 2702(3), and to allow state involvement through compacts 
with regard to Class III gaming.  Panzer, 271 Wis. 2d 295, ¶15.  
However, IGRA blocks the operation of state policy with regard 
to a valid compact once that compact has been executed under 
IGRA's authority.  See Gaming Corp. of Am. v. Dorsey & Whitney, 
88 F.3d 536, 544-45 (8th Cir. 1996).  Moreover, without a valid 
compact, state laws have no regulatory power over gaming on 
Tribal land, and states have no authority to police Tribal 
casinos.  See Sycuan Band v. Roche, 54 F.3d 535 (9th Cir. 1994); 
Florida v. Seminole Tribe, 181 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 1999). 
¶74 We 
recognize 
that 
regulation 
of 
gambling 
is 
a 
legitimate public purpose.52  We also recognize that this 
Amendment could be construed as a strong state policy against 
                                                 
52 The United States Supreme Court has concluded that a 
"legitimate public purpose" includes broad and general social or 
economic interests, as opposed to benefiting a narrow special 
interest.  Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light 
Co., 459 U.S. 400, 412 (1983).   
No. 
2003AP421   
 
46 
 
all gaming.  See Panzer, 271 Wis. 2d 295, ¶94.  However, the 
purpose of the 1993 Amendment was to make only some forms of 
Class III games unconstitutional in Wisconsin, but excluded 
pari-mutuel on-track betting, the state lottery, and Class III 
games operated pursuant to the Original Compacts.  Neither the 
legislature nor Wisconsin's citizens intended the 1993 Amendment 
to invalidate the games operated pursuant to the Original 
Compacts.  Therefore, even if the Amendment embodies a strong 
public policy against some games, it does not embody a public 
policy against the games operated by the Tribes under the 
authority of the Original Compacts.  Although Wisconsin was not 
precluded from doing so, the State did not exercise its 
sovereign police power in an effort to ban gaming under the 
Original 
Compacts. 
Contrast 
Justice 
Roggensack's 
concurrence/dissent, ¶¶318-19.  Wisconsin did not abrogate its 
sovereign police powers with regard to gaming; the State simply 
decided to exclude the Original Compacts from the constitutional 
prohibition on gaming.   
¶75 We further conclude that it would be unreasonable for 
the 1993 Amendment to interfere with the provision that allows 
for extending or continuing the Original Compacts.  See 
Lightbourn, 
243 
Wis. 
2d 
512, 
¶148. 
 
To 
determine 
the 
reasonableness 
of 
a constitutional 
amendment, 
we evaluate 
whether the social concerns that prompted the changes were 
foreseeable when the State entered into the compact, and whether 
the conditions have changed sufficiently since the State entered 
the contract.  See U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 31-32.   
No. 
2003AP421   
 
47 
 
¶76 To a certain extent, because gaming had been regulated 
in the past, it was not entirely unforeseeable that the State 
might regulate gaming in the future.53  Yet, the parties 
anticipated future regulations on Tribal gaming and negotiated 
to exclude changes in State and Tribal law from impacting the 
Original Compacts:54  "To the extent that State law or Tribal 
ordinances, or any amendments thereto, are inconsistent with any 
provision of this Compact, this Compact shall control."55  
¶77 It was not foreseeable, however, that the 1993 
Amendment would invalidate the future operations of the Tribal 
casinos. 
 
The 
Governor 
and 
legislature 
considered 
the 
constitutional amendment during the same time period that the 
Governor was engaged in compact negotiations with the Tribes.  
In addition, as discussed above, according to legislative 
records and most news accounts, the 1993 Amendment was not 
intended to invalidate the Original Compacts.  The legislature 
also discussed that the Contract Clause would prevent the 
                                                 
53 Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 357 
(1908) ("One whose rights, such as they are, are subject to 
state restriction, cannot remove them from the power of the 
State by making a contract about them."). 
54 See  James M. McGoldrick, Jr., Limits on States 49 
(2005). 
55 Bad River Compact § XXVI; Forest County Potawatomi 
Community of Wisconsin Compact § XXVI; Winnebago [Ho-Chunk] 
Compact § XXVIII; Lac Courte Oreilles Compact § XXVI; Lac du 
Flambeau Compact § XXVI; Menominee Compact § XXVII; Oneida 
Compact § XXVI; Red Cliff Compact § XXVI; Sokaogon Chippewa 
Compact § XXVI; St. Croix Chippewa Compact § XXVI; Stockbridge-
Munsee Compact § XXVI.  
No. 
2003AP421   
 
48 
 
amendment from closing down Tribal casinos.  See Justice 
Prosser's concurrence/dissent, ¶232.  Moreover, shortly after 
the 1993 Amendment was ratified, the Tribes made significant 
investments to construct and operate casinos pursuant to the 
terms of the Original Compacts,56 and the State legislature 
enacted laws that explicitly validated the Original Compacts and 
relied on proceeds from the casinos.57  These records, and the 
parties' performance following the ratification of the compacts, 
reveal that the parties did not foresee that the 1993 Amendment 
would invalidate the extension provisions. 
¶78 Additionally, 
the 
conditions 
have 
not 
changed 
substantially since passage of the 1993 Amendment.  Neither 
party has altered its reliance on the compacts.  The parties' 
actions demonstrate that there was little doubt as to the 
continued legality of the casino gaming pursuant to the Original 
Compacts.  The State has continued to rely on revenue from the 
compacts,58 and the Tribes have continued to invest in and 
operate the casinos.59   
                                                 
56 See, generally, Wisconsin Gaming Board, Audit by the 
1997-98 Joint Legislative Audit Committee Members, August 1997. 
57 See 1993 Wis. Act 16, §§ 153 & 3544(1m)(a) (appropriating 
$330,800 in 1993-94 and $329,000 in 1994-95 from "[m]oneys 
received by the state from Indian tribes as reimbursement for 
state costs of regulation of Indian gaming under [the] Indian 
gaming compacts . . . .") (emphasis added).   
58 In fiscal year 2003-04, Wisconsin collected $69.6 million 
from the Tribes.  Department of Administration, Division of 
Gaming, Audit at 6 (June 2005).  See also 2005 Wis. Act. 25. 
59 Division of Gaming Audit, at 5, supra, at n.58. 
No. 
2003AP421   
 
49 
 
¶79 Therefore, although the prohibition of casino gaming 
can be a significant and legitimate State interest, we conclude 
that the State's interest in prohibiting gaming does not pass 
the heightened scrutiny test with respect to gaming on Tribal 
land because the 1993 Amendment did not apply to games operated 
pursuant to the Original Compacts, and because a retroactive 
prohibition on Tribal gaming would unreasonably interfere with 
the Original Compacts.  
IV 
¶80 We have concluded, both in this case and in Panzer,60 
that the 1993 Amendment does not invalidate the Original 
Compacts.  We have also concluded that the 1998-99 extensions 
are valid continuations of the Original Compacts, and therefore 
not invalidated by the 1993 Amendment.  Dairyland nonetheless 
asks us to conclude that the 1993 Amendment prohibits the State 
from amending the compacts to include any Class III game that 
was not included in the Original Compacts.61   
                                                 
60 Panzer, 271 Wis. 2d 295, ¶102. 
61 In the present case, we reach the question as to the 
scope of gaming provisions in the Original Compacts because this 
issue is "of sufficient public interest," and because the 
parties have explicitly asked the courts to review the scope of 
gaming issue.  See State v. Moran, 2005 WI 115, ¶31, 284 
Wis. 2d 24, 700 N.W.2d 884 ("[W]hen an issue involves a question 
of law, has been briefed by the opposing parties, and is of 
sufficient public interest to merit a decision, this court has 
discretion to address the issue.").  In its court of appeals 
brief, Dairyland asserted that the Governor had no authority to 
amend or extend compacts authorizing casino gambling in 1998 or 
2003.  The Governor argued that the original compacts, including 
the scope of gaming provisions, continued until they were 
terminated.   
No. 
2003AP421   
 
50 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
We note that the Class III games added in 2003 include: 
roulette, big wheel and other wheel games, craps, poker and 
similar non-house banked card games, games played at blackjack- 
style tables, such as Let-It-Ride, Casino Stud, and Casino War, 
electronic keno, pari-mutuel wagering on live simulcast, horse, 
harness and dog racing events, including participation in 
interstate betting pools, all other banking, percentage and 
pari-mutuel card games, all other banking and non-banking dice 
games, Wheel of Fortune, Baccarat-chemin de fer, all finite 
lottery and lottery games, any other game whether played as a 
table game or played on an electronic or mechanical device, 
including devices that operate like slot machines, which consist 
of the elements of prize, chance and consideration, Caribbean 
Stud Poker, Let-It-Ride, and Pai-Gow Poker. 
In its briefs to this court, Dairyland asserted that the 
amendments in 2003 are invalid.  The Governor advocated that 
this Court overrule the portion of Panzer dealing with the scope 
of permissible Tribal gaming in Wisconsin.  In addition, at oral 
argument Dairyland asserted that the issue and focus of this 
case was "how can a governor in the year 2003 and also in 1998, 
how can that governor authorize casino gaming for anybody when 
the casino gambling had been expressly prohibited by Article IV, 
Section 24 of the Wisconsin Constitution when it was amended in 
1993?"  When asked to clarify which compact extensions Dairyland 
wanted addressed, Dairyland stated: "The one in 1998. I think 
more importantly, the one in 2003."  Later, Dairyland also 
asserted that the 1998 amendments were not valid, but that they 
were not as important as the 2003 amendments.   
Justice 
Prosser 
similarly 
asserts 
that 
the 
1998-99 
amendments were not substantial enough to be unconstitutional, 
and advocates for the conclusion that the 2003 extensions are 
unlawful because the amendments went too far, observing that the 
games that were added in 2003 are explicitly listed in the 
constitution as prohibited forms of gaming under Article IV, 
section 
24, 
clauses 
3 
to 
6. 
 
See 
Justice 
Prosser's 
concurrence/dissent, ¶239. 
Justice Roggensack asserts that "[t]he majority opinion 
concludes that the games added to the compacts in 2003 do not 
violate 
Wisconsin 
law." 
 
Justice 
Roggensack's 
concurrence/dissent, ¶285.  That is incorrect.  We do not reach 
the 2003 gaming compacts.    
No. 
2003AP421   
 
51 
 
¶81 Because the 1993 Amendment does not apply to the 
Original Compacts, the terms of the compacts control whether the 
parties can amend the compact to expand the scope of Class III 
gaming.  This analysis depends upon the intent of the parties 
when they entered into the compact.  See DeWitt Ross & Stevens, 
S.C. v. Galaxy Gaming & Racing Ltd. P'ship, 2004 WI 92, ¶44, 273 
Wis. 2d 577, 682 N.W.2d 839 ("The ultimate aim of all contract 
interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the parties.") 
(citations omitted).  The intent of the contracting parties can 
be evinced through the plain language of the Original Compacts 
and the history of the compact negotiations. 
¶82 The parties included provisions in each of the 
compacts that relate to future amendments to the types of games 
allowed on Tribal land.  Each of the 11 compacts states:  "The 
Tribe may not operate any Class III gaming not expressly 
enumerated in this section of this Compact unless this Compact 
is amended pursuant to section XXX."62  The Compacts further 
provide that: "This Compact shall not be modified, amended or 
otherwise altered without the prior written agreement of both 
                                                                                                                                                             
While we recognize these arguments, we are simply ruling on 
the scope of gaming provisions contracted for in the Original 
Compacts.   
62 Bad River Compact § IV(B); Forest County Potawatomi 
Compact § IV(B); Winnebago [Ho-Chunk] Compact § IV(C); Lac 
Courte Oreilles Compact § IV(B); Lac du Flambeau Compact 
§ IV(B); 
Menominee 
Compact 
§ IV(B); 
Oneida 
Tribe 
Compact 
§ IV(B); Red Cliff Compact § IV(B); Sokaogon Chippewa Compact 
§ IV(B); St. Croix Chippewa Compact § IV(B); Stockbridge-Munsee 
Compact § IV(B) (emphasis added). 
No. 
2003AP421   
 
52 
 
the State and the Tribe."63  This language clearly reveals that 
the Compacts allow the parties to agree to amend the scope of 
Class III games.  These provisions create a contractual 
obligation to allow new games should the parties agree to amend 
the scope of gaming.64  
 
¶83 These provisions demonstrate the parties' intent to 
allow for amendments, including to the scope of gaming; the 
compacts do not contain "an agreement to agree." Contrast Dunlop 
v. Laitsch, 16 Wis. 2d 36, 42, 113 N.W.2d 551 (1962).65  In 
                                                 
63 Bad 
River 
Compact 
§ XXX; 
Forest 
County 
Potawatomi 
Community of Wisconsin Compact § XXX; Winnebago [Ho-Chunk] 
Compact § XXXII; Lac Courte Oreilles Compact § XXX; Lac du 
Flambeau Compact § XXX; Menominee Compact § XXXI; Oneida Compact 
§ XXX; Red Cliff Compact § XXX; Sokaogon Chippewa Compact § XXX; 
St. Croix Chippewa Compact § XXX; Stockbridge-Munsee Compact 
§ XXX. 
64 Justice 
Roggensack 
asserts 
that 
the 
majority 
has 
concluded that the "compacts contain an obligation to amend the 
compacts to permit the addition of new types of gambling[.]"  
Justice Roggensack's concurrence/dissent, ¶323.  This is a 
misstatement of the holding of this case.  We conclude that the 
compacts contain an obligation for the parties to honor 
modifications to the scope of gaming should the parties agree to 
amend the compacts in that regard. 
We also note that should the parties agree to amend the 
scope of gaming and one party violates this agreement, the other 
party may seek contractual remedies.  See, e.g., Bad River 
Compact 
§ XXII 
("Dispute 
Resolution"). 
 
Contrast 
Justice 
Roggensack's concurrence/dissent, ¶328. 
65 The offending provision in the contract at issue in 
Dunlop stated:  
[The parties] shall at a future date mutually agree 
and come to a common understanding as to the use of 
their respective lands surrounding the lake which 
shall be formed on their lands and as to the type and 
No. 
2003AP421   
 
53 
 
Dunlop, the parties promised to form another contract in the 
future.  Id.  In this case, there is no comparable provision.  
The compacts contain a provision stating that the compacts can 
be amended.  There is no putative promise to actually amend the 
Compacts in the future; they simply provide that such an 
amendment is permissible.   
¶84 In 
addition, 
even 
if 
we 
determined 
that 
these 
provisions are indefinite, the parties' subsequent conduct 
clearly evinces their intent to amend the scope of gaming.  See 
Management Computer Servs., Inc. v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 
206 Wis. 2d 158, 179-80, 557 N.W.2d 67 (1996).  Moreover, 
because the scope of gaming is a material provision in the 
compacts, see supra, ¶70, if we were to find these material 
provisions to be indefinite, the compacts would be void and 
unenforceable.  Management Computer, 206 Wis. 2d at 178.  See 
also Dunlop, 16 Wis. 2d at 43a.66  Instead, we conclude that, 
                                                                                                                                                             
structure of any buildings which shall be erected on 
their respective lands surrounding said lake. 
Dunlop v. Laitsch, 16 Wis. 2d 36, 39, 113 N.W.2d 551 (1962). 
66 In Dunlop, this court reasoned: 
If the parties, particularly Dunlop, had not relied on 
Laitsch's agreement to agree (Agreement "B") there 
would have been no Agreement "A" and no dam.  We think 
that the failure to agree goes to the heart of 
Agreement "A" and when Agreement "B" falls because 
unenforceable and void, "A" goes with it because of 
the absence of a meeting of the minds as to an 
essential term. 
Dunlop, 16 Wis. 2d at 43a. 
No. 
2003AP421   
 
54 
 
should the parties agree to amend the scope of gaming, the 
compacts 
clearly 
obligate 
the 
parties 
to 
abide 
by 
such 
amendments.  
¶85 Furthermore, when the Governor and the various Tribes 
first attempted to negotiate gaming compacts, the Governor 
refused to negotiate over Class III games, asserting that such 
games were illegal under Wisconsin law and therefore not a 
proper subject of negotiation.  Lac du Flambeau, 270 F. Supp. at 
481.  The Lac du Flambeau Tribe of Lake Superior Indians and the 
Sokaogon Chippewa Community sued the Governor for failing to 
negotiate in good faith.  Id. at 484.  The United States 
District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin concluded 
that because Wisconsin did not prohibit outright all Class III 
games, Wisconsin was a regulatory state and, therefore, the 
State was required to negotiate with the Tribes for any game of 
prize, 
chance, 
and 
consideration 
that 
was 
not 
expressly 
prohibited by Wisconsin law.  Lac du Flambeau, 270 F. Supp. at 
488; Panzer, 271 Wis. 2d 295, ¶99.  Therefore, the parties 
negotiated for the amendment provision under the auspices of the 
law as interpreted by the court in Lac du Flambeau, under which 
all Class III games are negotiable.67   
                                                 
67 As noted above, Panzer questioned the prohibitory/ 
regulatory distinction from Lac du Flambeau.  Panzer, 271 
Wis. 2d 295, ¶92 n.36.  However, this analysis focuses on the 
intent of the parties during the compact negotiations, and at 
the time of the compact negotiations, Lac du Flambeau was 
controlling. 
See 
Justice 
Prosser's 
concurrence/dissent, 
¶191 n.25 (noting that Lac du Flambeau binds the parties to the 
particular action in which it was issued). 
No. 
2003AP421   
 
55 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
In 
his 
concurrence/dissent, 
Justice 
Prosser 
similarly 
questions the prohibitory/regulatory distinction as applied in 
Lac du Flambeau.  Justice Prosser examines the history of the 
Wisconsin Constitution, and the history of IGRA, in an attempt 
to demonstrate that Lac du Flambeau was incorrectly decided.  
Id., ¶¶139-207.  His analysis is flawed.  Justice Prosser 
asserts that the term "lottery" was intended to be interpreted 
narrowly in the original Wisconsin Constitution, and therefore 
the constitutional amendment to allow a state lottery should not 
have led the Lac du Flambeau court to conclude that Wisconsin 
was a regulatory state.  Id., ¶¶191-205.  However, for over six 
decades, this court, the Wisconsin Attorney General, and the 
Wisconsin 
Legislature 
have 
consistently 
employed 
a 
broad 
interpretation of the term "lottery," to include all games of 
prize or chance.  See State ex rel. Trampe v. Multerer, 234 Wis. 
50, 289 N.W. 600 (1940); Kayden Industries, Inc. v. Murphy, 34 
Wis. 2d 718, 150 N.W.2d 447 (1967).  See also Justice Prosser's 
concurrence/dissent, ¶¶170-71.  Therefore, the Lac du Flambeau 
court merely followed the Wisconsin courts, Attorney General, 
and legislature in concluding that the State was a regulatory 
state because it authorized a state-operated lottery.  
In 
addition, 
Justice 
Prosser's 
analysis 
of 
IGRA 
is 
overstated.  Justice Prosser concludes that Congress clearly 
intended to grant states the authority to limit Tribal gaming to 
the same forms of gaming activity conducted within the state.  
Justice 
Prosser's 
concurrence/dissent, 
¶¶196-205 
(emphasis 
added).  Yet, Congressional intent is not so clear.  As Justice 
Prosser correctly notes, some Senators stated that they intended 
IGRA to prohibit Tribal gaming from exceeding the games allowed 
for non-Indians in that state.  Id., ¶¶196-98.  However, Senator 
Evans explained that IGRA was intended to transfer limited state 
jurisdiction over Tribes.  IGRA Hearing on S. 555, 100th Cong. 
(1988).  Senator Inouye clearly emphasized the importance of 
preserving Tribal sovereignty and that any extension of state 
jurisdiction must be limited: 
Indian tribes are sovereign governments and exercise 
rights 
of 
self-government 
over 
their 
lands 
and 
members.  This bill does not seek to invade or 
diminish 
that 
sovereignty . . . the 
committee 
was 
fully cognizant of the strenuous objections that would 
be raised by tribes to any outright transfer of state 
jurisdiction, 
even 
for 
the 
limited 
purposes 
of 
regulating class III gaming. 
No. 
2003AP421   
 
56 
 
¶86 We therefore conclude that the parties intended to 
allow 
the 
compacts 
to 
be 
amended, 
including 
authorizing 
additional forms of Class III gaming.  
¶87 Justice Prosser, in his concurrence/dissent, contends: 
"if state law prohibits a Class III gaming activity, the 
governor's power to negotiate that activity is circumscribed."  
Justice Prosser's concurrence/dissent, ¶243 (citing Panzer, 271 
Wis. 2d 295, ¶89).  Justice Prosser summarizes his conclusion: 
[T]he Wisconsin state government, including Wisconsin 
governors, may agree to amendments of gaming compacts 
to add forms of gaming activity that are permitted by 
state 
law 
'for 
any 
purpose 
by 
any 
person, 
organization, or entity,' but may not add forms of 
gaming activity that are prohibited by state law for 
all 
purposes 
to all 
persons, organizations, and 
entities. 
Id., ¶107 (citations omitted).   
¶88 Justice Prosser's arguments regarding the scope of 
gaming are structurally unsound.  Although the Wisconsin 
Constitution prohibits blackjack, slot machines, and video 
                                                                                                                                                             
Id.  Justice Prosser's conclusion, therefore, is not the only 
reasonable conclusion that can be drawn from the legislative 
debates regarding Congress's intent in passing IGRA. 
Moreover, if we were to conclude that Lac du Flambeau was 
incorrectly decided, as Justice Prosser advocates, the State and 
Tribes would have illegally authorized blackjack, slot machines, 
and video gaming machines in the Original Compacts, and the 
Original Compacts and 1998-99 extensions would be in violation 
of the Wisconsin Constitution. 
No. 
2003AP421   
 
57 
 
gaming machines, art. IV, sec. 24(6)(c),68 and even though 
Justice Prosser and the Panzer majority conclude that the 
Governor lacks the authority to approve amendments to the 
Original Compacts that are "explicitly prohibited by the 
Wisconsin Constitution," Justice Prosser's concurrence/dissent, 
¶240, 
Panzer, 
271 
Wis. 2d 295, 
¶96, 
these 
conclusions 
conveniently neglect to mention that blackjack, slot machines, 
and video gaming machines are also explicitly prohibited by the 
Constitution.   
¶89 The only way to conclude that the 1993 Amendment 
limits the scope of gaming allowable under the Original Compacts 
is to conclude that the 1993 Amendment applies to the Original 
Compacts.69  Under the analysis proposed by Justice Prosser, if 
the amendment applies to the scope of gaming, then blackjack, 
slot machines, and video gaming machines included in the 
                                                 
68 The 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, 
as 
amended, 
reads, 
in 
relevant part, "Except as provided in this section, the 
legislature may not authorize gambling in any form."  Wis. 
Const. art. IV, § 24.  Clauses 3 through 6 list exceptions to 
the broad prohibition, including: 1) bingo games operated by 
charitable and religious organizations; 2) raffle games operated 
by charitable and religious organizations; 3) pari-mutuel on-
track 
betting; 
and 
4) 
the 
state-operated 
lottery. 
 
Id.  
Furthermore, as amended, Clause 6 specifically defines the 
state-operated lottery to exclude casino-style games, including 
blackjack, poker, roulette, craps, keno, slot machines, and 
video gaming.  Id. (emphasis added). 
69 See Justice Prosser's concurrence/dissent, ¶¶240-45; 
Justice Roggensack's concurrence/dissent, ¶288 (concluding that 
although the 1993 Amendment has no effect on the types of gaming 
compacted prior to 1993 or the 1998-99 compact extensions, the 
1993 Amendment precludes new types of games that were not 
included in the Original Compacts or the 1998-99 extensions). 
No. 
2003AP421   
 
58 
 
Original Compacts are now unconstitutional.  Yet, Justices 
Prosser and Roggensack deem blackjack, slot machines, and video 
gaming machines, authorized under the Original Compacts, to be 
lawful.70  Similarly, if the Amendment applies to the Original 
Compacts, the addition of 800 slot machines to the Potawatomi 
Compact, and the decision to allow for the first time blackjack 
games at the Potawatomi Tribe's casino in Menomonee Valley, 
which were both included in the 1998-99 extensions, are 
constitutionally prohibited forms of Class III gaming.  Taken to 
its logical conclusion, under the analysis proposed by Justice 
Prosser's concurrence/dissent, the Tribes cannot conduct these 
games because they are now unconstitutional.   
¶90 Either the Original Compacts are fully in force or 
they are not——it cannot be both ways.  This court cannot, and 
should not, impose the court's own values by deciding that some 
Class III games are not as substantial, and therefore protected 
by the Original Compacts, and that other games are too 
substantial to be protected.   
¶91 Because we conclude that the Original Compacts were 
not invalidated by the 1993 Amendment, and that the compacts 
have been lawfully extended, the Original Compacts are in full 
force.  The Original Compacts specifically contemplated amending 
the compacts, including the type of Class III games that can be 
                                                 
70 See Justice Prosser's concurrence/dissent, ¶¶106, 239; 
Justice Roggensack's concurrence/dissent, ¶288. 
No. 
2003AP421   
 
59 
 
conducted on Tribal land.71  In addition, as this court has 
previously stated, "if the provision of the constitution or the 
legislative act of a state" impairs a substantial contractual 
right, the constitutional provision or statute is "utterly void.  
They are, for all the purposes of the contract which they 
impair, as if they had never existed."  Peninsular Lead & Color 
Works v. Union Oil & Paint Co., 100 Wis. 488, 493, 76 N.W. 359, 
361 (1898).  In other words, the law at the time the Original 
Compacts were entered into controls the compacts.72  The parties 
negotiated under the Lac du Flambeau decision, under which all 
Class III games were negotiable.  Therefore, the Class III games 
that the State and Tribes agreed to in their compact extension 
                                                 
71 Each of the Compacts states: "To the extent that State 
law or Tribal ordinances, or any amendments thereto, are 
inconsistent with any provision of this Compact, this Compact 
shall control." 
Bad River Compact § XXVI; Forest County Potawatomi Community of 
Wisconsin Compact § XXVI; Winnebago [Ho-Chunk] Compact § XXVII; 
Lac Courte Oreilles Compact § XXVI; Lac du Flambeau Compact 
§ XXVI; Menominee Compact § XXVII; Oneida Compact § XXVI; Red 
Cliff Compact § XXVI; Sokaogon Chippewa Compact § XXVI; St. 
Croix 
Chippewa 
Compact 
§ XXVI; 
Stockbridge-Munsee 
Compact 
§ XXVI. 
72 See also Reserve Life, 108 Wis. 2d at 645-47; Von 
Hoffman, 71 U.S. at 550 ("[T]he laws which subsist at the time 
and place of the making of a contract . . . enter into and form 
a part of it"). 
No. 
2003AP421   
 
60 
 
negotiations are lawful.73  We withdraw any language to the 
contrary in Panzer that would limit the State's ability to 
negotiate for Class III games under the Original Compacts.74   
 
¶92 Justice 
Roggensack 
criticizes 
this 
decision 
for 
failing to follow Panzer in its entirety.  She contends that 
decisions of this court are final unless they are set aside on a 
motion for reconsideration or overturned by a federal court on a 
federal question.  Justice Roggensack's concurrence/dissent, 
¶286.  Because Panzer concluded that the 2003 compact extensions 
were unconstitutional, she asserts that Panzer only left open 
the question as to whether the types of games lawfully compacted 
in 1991-92 retained their lawful status after 1993.  Id., ¶290.  
Justice Roggensack accuses the majority of surrendering the 
judicial independence of the court to the demands of the 
Governor because we address the scope of gaming.  Id., ¶286.   
                                                 
73 Justice Prosser asserts that this decision opens the door 
to an explosion of gaming.  Concurrence/dissent, ¶109.  We share 
Justice Prosser's concern regarding the potential for the 
expansion of gaming in this State.  However, it is up to the 
Governor and the legislature to determine the amount of gaming 
as they see fit.  Gaming can be expanded only to the extent that 
the State and Tribes negotiate for additional Class III games.  
Therefore, the "explosion" will only expand as far as the State 
and Tribes permit.  This court cannot impose its judgment 
regarding what Class III games we believe the State should 
allow.  This would place the court in the activist position of 
imposing our policy judgments over those of the Governor, the 
legislature and the Wisconsin citizens.  We refuse to do so.  
This determination is for the State and the Tribes.   
74 See, e.g., Panzer, 271 Wis. 2d 295, ¶¶93, 96.   
No. 
2003AP421   
 
61 
 
¶93 It is true that, in general, this court adheres to 
stare decisis to maintain confidence in the reliability of court 
decisions, 
promote 
evenhanded, 
predictable, 
and 
consistent 
development of legal principles, and contribute to the actual 
and perceived integrity of the Wisconsin judiciary.  Johnson 
Controls, Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶95, 
264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257 (citations omitted).  However, 
this court has also concluded that prior decisions should not be 
perpetuated if they were wrongly decided in the first place.  
"We do more damage to the rule of law by obstinately refusing to 
admit 
errors, 
thereby 
perpetuating 
injustice, 
than 
by 
overturning an erroneous decision."  Id., ¶100. 
¶94 We again note that these contract impairment concerns 
were explicitly left unresolved by this court in Panzer, 271 
Wis. 2d 295, ¶102.  We find it disingenuous that some members of 
the Panzer majority refused to reach the Contract Clause 
analysis that was properly before it,75 and now criticize the 
                                                 
75 See, e.g., Hilton v. DNR, 2006 WI 84, ___Wis. 2d ___, 
___N.W.2d ___. 
When the Wisconsin Supreme Court elects to hear only 
ten percent of the cases presented to it for review, 
the public expects and deserves that the court "take 
cases to decide the substantive issues presented and 
provide meaningful analysis and guidance on important 
issues, not to avoid deciding them by judicially 
created avoidance doctrines."  
Hilton, ___Wis. 2d ___, ¶54 (Prosser, J. concurrence) (quoting 
Patience D. Roggensack, Elected to Decide: Is the Decision-
Avoidance Doctrine of Great Weight Deference Appropriate in this 
Court of Last Resort?, 89 Marq. L.Rev. 541, 544 (2006)). 
No. 
2003AP421   
 
62 
 
Dairyland majority opinion for deciding the issue.  This 
decision has nothing to do with making one Governor look bad and 
another Governor look good.76  We have simply reached the issue 
left unresolved by this court in Panzer. 
V 
¶95 Upon examining the impairment of contracts issues 
raised by the 1993 Amendment to the Wisconsin Constitution with 
regard to the Original Compacts between the State and Tribes, we 
conclude that the 1993 Amendment to Article IV, Section 24 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution did not invalidate the Original 
Compacts.  Because the Original Compacts contemplated extending 
and amending the scope of Indian gaming, the parties' right of 
renewal is constitutionally protected by the Contract Clauses of 
the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions; and amendments to 
the Original Compacts that expand the scope of gaming are 
likewise constitutionally protected by the Contract Clauses of 
                                                                                                                                                             
We also note that the petitioners in Panzer initially 
conceded that the Contract Clause precluded invalidating a pre-
existing contract: 
Petitioners do not claim that the 1993 Constitutional 
Amendment invalidated any compact in place at that 
time.  This is not an issue in this case in part 
because Wisconsin, under the Impairment of Contracts 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution Art. I, § 10 cl. 1, 
lacks authority to invalidate an existing agreement. 
Page 31 of Brief-in-chief of Petitioners Mary E. Panzer, John G. 
Gard and Joint Committee on Legislative Organization, filed in 
Panzer, 271 Wis. 2d 295 (dated October 22, 2003). 
76 Compare  Justice Roggensack's concurrence/dissent, ¶294-
298. 
No. 
2003AP421   
 
63 
 
the Wisconsin and United States Constitutions.  Therefore, we 
affirm the order of the circuit court.  Accordingly, gaming can 
be expanded to the extent that the State and Tribes negotiate 
for additional Class III games.  We withdraw any language to the 
contrary in Panzer that would limit the State's ability to 
negotiate for Class III games under the Original Compacts.77   
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court for Dane 
County is affirmed. 
 
 
 
                                                 
77 See, e.g., Panzer, 271 Wis. 2d 295, ¶¶93, 96.   
No.  2003AP421.npc 
 
1 
 
 
¶96 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (concurring).  While I join 
the majority, I write separately to reaffirm the conclusions 
reached in our dissent in Panzer v. Doyle, 2004 WI 52, 271 Wis. 
2d 295, 680 N.W.2d 666 (Abrahamson, C.J., Bradley, J. and 
Crooks, J. dissenting), as well as my position in Dairyland 
Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Doyle, 2004 WI 34, 270 Wis. 2d 267, 677 
N.W.2d 275.   
¶97 Our conclusions in Panzer are equally valid with 
regard to the case before us today.  First, "[w]hile the 
amendment to Article IV, § 24 did change Wisconsin's law with 
respect to gaming, it did not affect the compact before us."  
Panzer, 271 Wis. 2d 295, ¶206 (Abrahamson, C.J., Bradley, J. and 
Crooks, J. dissenting).  In fact, the legislative history makes 
clear that Article IV, Section 24 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
was neither intended to apply, nor had the effect of applying, 
to then existing Indian gaming compacts.  See majority op., 
¶¶36, 44, 49, 66. 
¶98 Second, as we determined in our dissent in Panzer, 
"the 
Governor 
properly 
exercised 
his 
power 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 14.035" 
both 
in 
entering 
into 
the 
Original 
Compacts, as well as negotiating the 1998 and 2003 amendments.  
Panzer, 271 Wis. 2d 295, ¶124.  As we explained in that case "as 
long 
as 
a 
compact 
does 
not 
contravene 
a 
statute 
or 
constitutional provision, the governor may enter into it under 
Wis. Stat. § 14.035, embracing those conditions and provisions 
No.  2003AP421.npc 
 
2 
 
the governor deems will best promote the interests of the 
government."  Id., ¶153.   
¶99 Third, in Panzer we concluded that an application of 
the 
1993 
constitutional 
amendment 
to 
the 
compacts 
would 
"substantially impair the contractual relationship between the 
State and the Tribe and violate the impairment of contracts 
clause."  Id., ¶256.  The clear language of the compacts 
demonstrated that the parties intended to be bound by the laws 
of Wisconsin as they existed in 1992.  Id., ¶194.  "Regardless 
of future laws or amendments to preexisting laws, the parties 
agreed 
to 
let 
the 
terms 
of 
the 
compact 
control 
their 
relationship."  Id.   
¶100 "At the time the parties entered into the compact, all 
Class III games could be negotiated for and were permitted under 
the compact."  Id., ¶195.  As our Panzer dissent explained, 
because the state was permitted to negotiate with respect to 
Class III games, "any attempt to read Article IV, § 24 as 
altering the types of games that may be negotiated for under the 
compact would impair the compact to which the parties agreed, 
and would, therefore, run afoul of the United States and 
Wisconsin 
constitutional 
clauses 
against 
impairment 
of 
contract."  Id., ¶209.  
¶101 Our reasoning and conclusions in Panzer are consistent 
with the majority's holding in the case at bar.  Ultimately we 
conclude, as we did in our Panzer dissent, that Article IV, 
Section 24 of the Wisconsin Constitution does not apply to then 
existing Indian gaming compacts, that the Governor properly 
No.  2003AP421.npc 
 
3 
 
exercised his authority to enter into the Original Compacts, and 
negotiate the amendments in both 1998 and 2003, and that any 
application of the 1993 constitutional amendment to the compacts 
violates both the state and federal impairment of contracts 
clause.  Id., ¶¶ 124, 256.   
¶102 For the aforementioned reasons, I join the majority 
opinion, reaffirm our conclusions in our Panzer dissent, and 
respectfully concur.   
¶103 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this concurrence. 
 
 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
1 
 
 
¶104 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring in part, dissenting 
in part).  In Panzer v. Doyle, 2004 WI 52, 271 Wis. 2d 295, 680 
N.W.2d 666, this court was asked to review four amendments to 
the 1992 gaming compact between the State of Wisconsin and the 
Forest County Potawatomi Community.  The court concluded that 
three of the amendments were invalid.  At the same time, the 
court upheld the original gaming compact and, by implication, 10 
similar 
gaming 
compacts; 
and 
it 
implied 
that 
a 
1993 
constitutional amendment restricting gambling in Wisconsin did 
not impair these compacts or bar their extension.1  In this case, 
petitioner seeks a definitive interpretation of the 1993 
constitutional amendment, asking explicitly whether the Governor 
has authority to amend or extend Indian gaming compacts to allow 
forms of gambling that are prohibited under Wisconsin law. 
¶105 My conclusions are as follows. 
¶106 First, 
the 
Wisconsin 
state 
government, 
including 
Wisconsin governors, have not violated and will not violate 
Article IV, Section 24 of the Wisconsin Constitution by 
extending the Original Compacts, so that Wisconsin Indian tribes 
may engage in the same forms of gaming activity that they 
negotiated in their original compacts.  Consequently, Wisconsin 
governors are not obligated to nonrenew these gaming compacts.  
In this regard, the majority opinion is correct. 
                                                 
1 For an extensive discussion of Panzer v. Doyle, 2004 WI 
52, 271 Wis. 2d 295, 680 N.W.2d 666, see James J. Wawrzyn, 
Panzer v. Doyle: Wisconsin Constitutional Law Deals the Governor 
A New Hand, 89 Marq. L.Rev. 221 (2005). 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
2 
 
¶107 Second, the Wisconsin state government, including 
Wisconsin governors, may agree to amendments of gaming compacts 
to add gaming activities that are permitted by state law "for 
any purpose by any person, organization, or entity," 25 U.S.C. 
§ 2710(d)(1)(B), but may not add gaming activities that are 
prohibited by state law for all purposes to all persons, 
organizations, and entities.  Wisconsin governors have no 
authority to approve new gaming activities that are prohibited 
by Article IV, Section 24 of the Wisconsin Constitution or state 
criminal law. 
¶108 Third, the majority's determination that the 1993 
amendment to Article IV, Section 24 had no effect whatever on 
the 11 original Indian gaming compacts is mistaken; and its 
holding that Wisconsin governors have power, by virtue of the 
compacts, to amend the compacts to add any gaming activities not 
prohibited by federal law, contradicts both the Wisconsin 
Constitution and federal law.   
¶109 The majority opinion is far-reaching.  It involves 
much more than overruling portions of the Panzer decision and 
giving Wisconsin tribes the right to play poker, roulette, 
craps, and keno at their casinos in Indian country.  The opinion 
could lead to an explosion of new gaming activities. 
¶110 The majority concludes that a governor's source of 
authority 
to 
negotiate 
new 
gaming 
amendments 
is 
not 
Wis. Stat. § 14.035 but rather the provisions in existing gaming 
compacts buttressed by the impairment of contracts clauses of 
the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions.  Under this 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
3 
 
analysis, a governor's authority is not limited by the Wisconsin 
Constitution or state criminal law.  This determination will 
permit Wisconsin governors to negotiate and approve such major 
gambling expansions as off-track pari-mutuel betting, betting on 
sporting events, jai alai, and all banking card games, which are 
barred by the Wisconsin Constitution but not prohibited by 
federal law. 
¶111 If the majority's determination that the Wisconsin 
Constitution does not check a governor's power to negotiate 
gaming compacts is correct, then the majority has overruled, sub 
silentio, Panzer insofar as it declared invalid the 2003 
duration amendment and the 2003 amendment waiving sovereign 
immunity.  Three of the four members of the majority supported 
these amendments in their Panzer dissent. 
 
¶112 This partial dissent requires a full explanation.  In 
offering this explanation, I believe it is essential to 
understand the history of Article IV, Section 24 and events 
leading up to this litigation.  As sociologist Robert Nisbet 
once observed, "We cannot know where we are, much less where we 
are going, until we know where we have been." 
 
¶113 To assist the reader, my dissent is organized under 
the following headings: 
I. 
Methodology for Interpreting the Wisconsin 
Constitution 
II. Interpreting 
Article 
IV, 
Section 
24 
as 
Created in the 1848 Constitution 
III. Interpreting 
Article 
IV, 
Section 
24 
as 
Amended in 1987 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
4 
 
IV. The United States District Court's Decision 
in the Lac du Flambeau Case  
V. 
The Legislative Response to the Lac du 
Flambeau Decision  
VI. Interpreting 
Article 
IV, 
Section 
24 
as 
Amended in 1993 
VII. The Effect of Article IV, Section 24 on 
Indian Gaming 
I. METHODOLOGY FOR INTERPRETING THE WISCONSIN CONSTITUTION 
 
¶114 This court interprets provisions of the Wisconsin 
Constitution de novo.  Thompson v. Craney, 199 Wis. 2d 674, 680, 
546 N.W.2d 123 (1996) (citing Polk County v. State Pub. 
Defender, 188 Wis. 2d 665, 674, 524 N.W.2d 389 (1994)).  Our 
methodology in interpreting a constitutional provision is not 
identical to our methodology in interpreting a statute.  In 
interpreting a statute, the court focuses on "statutory meaning" 
as opposed to "legislative intent."  See State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶¶36-52, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  In doing so, the court relies 
heavily on "intrinsic" sources such as the words of the statute, 
including dictionary definitions, plus statutory context, scope, 
and purpose.  As a rule, Wisconsin courts do not consult 
"extrinsic" sources of statutory interpretation unless the 
statute is ambiguous, id., ¶50, although extrinsic sources may 
be used to confirm or verify plain statutory meaning.  Id., ¶51.  
The plain meaning rule of statutory interpretation prevents 
courts from tapping legislative history to show that an 
unambiguous statute is ambiguous.  Id. 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
5 
 
 
¶115 Our 
methodology 
in 
interpreting 
a 
constitutional 
provision envisions more intense review of extrinsic sources 
than our methodology in statutory interpretation.  The court has 
explained that: 
The 
purpose of construction 
of 
a constitutional 
[provision] is to give effect to the intent of the 
framers and the people who adopted it; and it is a 
rule of construction applicable to all constitutions 
that they are to be construed so as to promote the 
objects for which they were framed and adopted. 
State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶10, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328 
(quoting Kayden Indus., Inc. v. Murphy, 34 Wis. 2d 718, 729-30, 
150 N.W.2d 447 (1967)).   
¶116 The reasons we employ a different methodology for 
constitutional 
interpretation 
are 
evident. 
 
Constitutional 
provisions do not become law until they are approved by the 
people.  Voters do not have the same access to the "words" of a 
provision as the legislators who framed those words; and most 
voters are not familiar with the debates in the legislature.  As 
a result, voters necessarily consider second-hand explanations 
and discussion at the time of ratification.  In addition, the 
meaning of words may evolve over time, obscuring the original 
meaning or purpose of a provision.  The original meaning of a 
provision might be lost if courts could not resort to extrinsic 
sources.  Finally, interpreting a constitutional provision is 
likely to have a more lasting effect than the interpretation of 
a statute, inasmuch as statutory language can be more easily 
changed than constitutional language.  Thus, it is vital for 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
6 
 
court 
decisions 
to 
capture 
accurately 
the 
essence 
of 
a 
constitutional provision. 
¶117 Against this background, our traditional methodology2 
on constitutional interpretation may be restated as follows: 
 
 
1. 
Courts should give priority to the plain meaning 
of the words of a constitutional provision in the context used.  
Buse v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 568, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976).  The 
plain meaning of the words is best discerned by understanding 
their obvious and ordinary meaning at the time the provision was 
adopted, taking into account other (especially contemporary) 
provisions of the constitution.  See State ex rel. Bare v. 
Schinz, 194 Wis. 397, 403-04, 216 N.W. 509 (1927). 
                                                 
2 This methodology was summarized by Justice Connor T. 
Hansen in Buse v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 568, 247 N.W.2d 141 
(1976):  
In 
its 
interpretation 
of 
constitutional 
provisions this court is committed to the method of 
analysis utilized in Board of Education v. Sinclair, 
[65 Wis. 2d 179, 222 N.W.2d 143 (1974)]. The court 
will view: 
(1) The plain meaning of the words in the 
context used; 
(2) The 
historical 
analysis 
of 
the 
constitutional debates and of what practices were in 
existence in 1848, which the court may reasonably 
presume were also known to the framers of the 1848 
constitution . . .  and 
(3) The earliest interpretation of [the] section 
by the legislature as manifested in the first law 
passed following the adoption of the constitution. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
7 
 
 
 
2. 
Courts may view the "historical analysis of the 
constitutional debates and of what practices were in existence 
in 1848 which the court may reasonably presume were also known 
to the framers of the 1848 constitution."  Id.  This principle 
permits courts to consider the debates surrounding amendments to 
the constitution and the circumstances at the time these 
amendments were adopted.  We have said that courts may examine 
"the history of the times," meaning not only the legislative 
history of a provision (including word changes in the drafts of 
amendments) but also "the state of society at the time," with 
special 
emphasis 
on 
the 
"practices 
and 
usages" 
then 
in 
existence, so as to identify the concerns the provision sought 
to address.  See Bd. of Educ. v. Sinclair, 65 Wis. 2d 179, 184, 
222 N.W.2d 143 (1974) (quoting State ex rel. Zimmerman v. 
Dammann, 201 Wis. 84, 89, 228 N.W. 593 (1930)).  These concerns 
are often illuminated by contemporary debates and explanations 
of the provision both inside and outside legislative chambers. 
 
 
3. 
Courts 
may 
scrutinize 
the 
earliest 
interpretations 
of 
the 
provision 
by 
the 
legislature 
as 
manifested in the first laws passed following adoption of the 
provision.  Buse, 74 Wis. 2d at 568 (citing Payne v. Racine, 217 
Wis. 550, 259 N.W. 437 (1935)).  Legislation that implements a 
constitutional provision is thought to be a fair gauge of 
contemporary interpretation and is entitled to great deference. 
 
¶118 The methodology stated here is the methodology I will 
employ in interpreting Article IV, Section 24 as it was created 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
8 
 
in 1848, as it was amended in 1987, and as it was amended again 
in 1993. 
 
II. INTERPRETING ARTICLE IV, SECTION 24 AS CREATED 
IN THE 1848 CONSTITUTION 
¶119 Article IV, Section 24 originated in the Wisconsin 
Constitution of 1848.3  The original provision was not intended 
to cover all forms of gambling.  This conclusion is based on the 
language of the provision, the purpose of the provision, and the 
historical context of the provision, including legislative 
activity before and after the provision was adopted. 
¶120 First, we focus on the words.  Noah Webster's An 
American Dictionary of the English Language (1828) defined 
"lottery" as follows: 
1. 
A scheme for the distribution of prizes by 
chance, or the distribution itself.  Lotteries are 
often authorized by law, but many good men deem them 
immoral in principle, and almost all men concur in the 
opinion that their effect are pernicious. 
2. 
Allotment. 
Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language 
(1828) (unpaginated).4   
¶121 "A scheme for the distribution of prizes by chance" 
does not implicate all schemes or all games that involve prize, 
chance, and consideration.  For instance, in Webster's 1853 
                                                 
3 In its original form, Article IV, Section 24 provided: 
"The legislature shall not authorize any lottery, or grant any 
divorce." 
4 See also Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the 
English Language 677 (1853). 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
9 
 
dictionary, Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the English 
Language (1853), Webster defined "gambling" and other terms: 
Gamble: "To play or game for money or other stake."  
Webster, supra 492.5 
Gambling: "Gaming for money."  Webster, supra 492.6 
Gaming: "The act or art of playing any game, in a 
contest for a victory, or for a prize or stake." 
2. "The practice of using cards, dice, billiards, and 
the like, according to certain rules, for winning 
money, &c."  Webster, supra 493.7 
Roulette: "A game of chance, in which a small ball is 
made to move round rapidly on a circle divided off 
into red or black spaces, and as it stops on the one 
or the other, the player wins or loses."  Webster, 
supra 965. 
Webster did not use the word "lottery" in these definitions.  He 
did not use "lottery" and "gaming" interchangeably.  In 1848, as 
now, people did not associate dice and billiards with a lottery.  
Moreover, in the mid-1800s, other forms of gaming were not 
"often authorized by law," although some gambling was not 
prohibited.  Thus, Douglas Farnsley was correct when he wrote, 
"In common usage a lottery is synonymous with a raffle, and in 
Wisconsin law the term is usually given this meaning."  Douglas 
Charles Ellerbe Farnsley, Gambling and the Law: The Wisconsin 
Experience, 1848-1980, 1980 Wis. L. Rev. 811, 812. 
                                                 
5 See also Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the 
English Language (1828) (unpaginated). 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
10 
 
 
¶122 Second, we examine the historical context.  Most 
states adopted anti-lottery amendments or legislation because of 
notorious scandals involving lotteries, including the Grand 
National 
Lottery 
authorized 
by 
Congress. 
 
Panzer, 
271 
Wis. 2d 295, ¶7.8  Farnsley explains that: 
Following the Revolutionary War, most states had 
relied heavily on lotteries as a means of financing 
public works and supporting institutions such as 
orphanages and hospitals.  These states had also 
authorized various philanthropic organizations such as 
churches 
and 
universities 
to 
conduct 
lotteries.  
States and organizations had usually relied upon 
management companies to conduct the lotteries.  The 
companies would then turn over a percentage of the 
profits to the sponsor.  Thus, while the lotteries may 
have been fundraising schemes for the sponsor, they 
were commercial gambling in relation to the management 
company.  In 1833, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and 
New York had abolished lotteries due in large measure 
to 
fraudulent 
practices 
by 
lottery 
management 
companies.  Many other states followed their lead.  
Prior to the War Between the States all but three 
states 
had 
barred 
lotteries. 
 
The 
drafters 
of 
Wisconsin's Constitution acted within this historical 
context in banning lotteries. 
Farnsley, supra, at 854 (emphasis added). 
 
¶123 Farnsley's 
observation 
about 
"historical 
context" 
explains why the "lottery" provision is contained within Article 
IV.  Article IV is the constitutional article on "Legislative" 
power.  It is a fundamental precept of state constitutional law 
that state legislative power is plenary in nature.  Cutts v. 
Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 1 Wis. 2d 408, 416, 84 N.W.2d 102 (1957).  
                                                 
8 John Scarne, Scarne's New Complete Guide to Gambling 150, 
152 (1974); see also  Clark v. Washington, 12 Wheat. 40, 25 U.S. 
40 (1827). 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
11 
 
The Wisconsin Constitution does not grant legislative power;9 it 
limits legislative power or directs how legislative power should 
be exercised.  In 1848 Article IV, Section 24 ("The legislature 
shall not authorize any lottery, or grant any divorce") 
contained two specific limitations on legislative power, not 
moral pronouncements on gaming and divorce.10 
¶124 The New York Constitution of 1846 often served as a 
model for the Wisconsin drafters.11  Article I, Section 10 of 
that constitution provided that, "No law shall be passed 
                                                 
9 "We suppose it to be a well-settled political 
principle that the constitution of the state is to be 
regarded not as a grant of power, but rather as a 
limitation upon the powers of the legislature, and 
that it is competent for the legislature to exercise 
all 
legislative 
power 
not 
forbidden 
by 
the 
constitution or delegated to the general government, 
or prohibited by the constitution of the United 
States." 
Cutts v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 1 Wis. 2d 408, 416, 84 
N.W.2d 102 (1957) (quoting Bushnell v. Beloit, 10 Wis. 195, 225 
(1860)). 
10 The Tri-Weekly Express (Madison, Wisconsin) of January 8, 
1848, carried part of the convention debate about the "divorce" 
language in Article IV, Section 24.  The paper reported that 
Edward Whiton, later chief justice of this court, supported the 
prohibition 
on 
legislative 
divorces, 
indicating 
that 
legislatures frequently granted divorces on ex parte evidence or 
on no evidence at all.  Whiton related an instance of a man and 
wife who had lived together many years having been divorced, 
without their knowledge or wish, upon the petition of various 
individuals.  "He said the courts by our law have discretionary 
power."  The Attainment of Statehood 439 (Milo M. Quaife, ed., 
1928).  The constitutional provision on divorce was grounded in 
concern about legislative abuse in granting divorces, not 
outright opposition to divorce. 
11 See, e.g., Attorney Gen. ex rel. Schantz v. Brunst, 3 
Wis. 689 [*787], 692 [*790] (1854). 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
12 
 
abridging the right of the people peaceably to assemble and 
petition the government . . . nor shall any divorce be granted, 
otherwise than by due judicial proceedings; nor shall any 
lottery hereafter be authorized or any sale of lottery tickets 
allowed within this state."  The 1846 New York Constitution 
linked the legislative proscription on authorizing "any lottery" 
to the legislative proscription on granting "any divorce,"12 as 
did the 1848 Wisconsin Constitution.   
¶125 What is especially significant about this probable 
source of Article IV, Section 24 is that the New York lottery 
provision was construed in Reilly v. Gray, 28 N.Y.S. 811 (1894), 
not to apply to betting on horse races.  The court explained the 
purpose of the New York provision: 
 
For many years prior to 1821 there had existed 
laws for the prohibition of all lotteries other than 
such as should be authorized by the Legislature.  The 
Legislature, however, had by special acts authorized 
them to such an extent as to call for a constitutional 
prohibition.  Evidently it was not deemed wise to 
trust the Legislature on the subject. 
 
 . . .  It seems . . . very clear that it was not 
the 
intention 
of 
the 
framers 
of 
the 
Constitution . . . in the use of the word "lottery," 
to include in it the subject of betting as then 
prohibited by statute.  They were distinct subjects 
upon the statute book and in the public mind, and, if 
the design had been to cover both, they would have 
been named. 
                                                 
12 The 
same linkage 
is 
found 
in 
the 
1845 
Louisiana 
Constitution.  Under Title VI (General Provisions) of the 1845 
Constitution, Article 116 provided: "No lottery shall be 
authorized by this State, and the buying or selling of lottery 
tickets within this State, is prohibited."  Article 117 then 
added: "No divorce shall be granted by the Legislature." 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
13 
 
Id. at 815 (citation omitted). 
¶126 There is no record of discussion at Wisconsin's 
Constitutional Convention about the "lottery" language.  The 
absence of controversy suggests that the framers were borrowing 
old concepts from New York and other states rather than 
originating new ones.13 
 
¶127 Farnsley's 
use 
of 
the 
word 
"authorize" 
in 
his 
historical explanation matches the constitutional language in 
Article IV, Section 24.  Farnsley, supra, at 854.  This word 
implies that the Wisconsin framers had a specific concern about 
official legislative authorization of lotteries, as opposed to a 
broad concern about all gambling.  The legislature had ample 
police power to regulate or prohibit all gambling.  Thus, the 
purpose of the constitutional provision was to deny our 
                                                 
13 A recent treatise on the Maryland State Constitution 
describes the Maryland parallel: 
Maryland's history mirrors the national trend.  The 
original 1776 Maryland Constitution did not mention 
lotteries although lotteries to raise funds for local 
government projects were common.  Under these lottery 
grants, the General Assembly would name specific 
individuals who were required to post bond and conduct 
the lottery to raise a stated amount.  As early as 
1817, the legislature began to try to regulate the 
proliferation 
of 
lottery 
grants. 
 
Constitutional 
amendments in 1835 and 1840 provided for the phasing-
out of state lottery grants.  The 1851 constitution 
prohibited lottery grants and provided for a phase-out 
of 
existing 
lottery 
grants 
suggesting 
that 
the 
previous 
amendment 
was 
ineffective 
in 
banning 
lotteries. 
Dan Friedman, The Maryland State Constitution, A Reference 
Guide 120 (2005). 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
14 
 
legislature the authority to give its imprimatur to lotteries as 
a source of government or private revenue because so many 
lotteries had proven to be unreliable or corrupt.  Id. 
 
¶128 Third, building on the second point, the language in 
contemporaneous 
state 
constitutions 
almost 
always 
included 
language on lottery "tickets," indicating mass participation as 
opposed to participation by a small number of people.  For 
instance, 
Article 
12, 
Section 
6 
of 
the 
1835 
Michigan 
Constitution provided: "The legislature shall not authorize any 
lottery nor permit the sale of lottery tickets."  Article IV, 
Section 29 of the 1846 Iowa Constitution stated: "No lottery 
shall be authorized by this State, nor shall the sale of lottery 
tickets be allowed."  The 1849 California Constitution provided 
in Article IV, Section 19 that "No lottery shall be allowed by 
this State, nor shall the sale of lottery tickets be allowed."  
The 1859 Kansas Constitution (Article 15, Section 3) declared 
that "Lotteries and the sale of lottery tickets are forever 
prohibited."14   
                                                 
14 This lottery provision did not bar other types of 
gambling in such frontier towns as Dodge City.  According to a 
September 1, 1877, article in the Dodge City Times, "Gambling 
ranges from a game of five-cent chuck-a-luck to a thousand 
dollar poker pot.  Nothing is secret, but with open doors upon 
the main street the ball rolls on uninterruptedly."  See 
www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/WWdodge.htm. 
This is not a trivial point. Casino-type gambling was 
widespread on riverboats and in much of the West during parts of 
the 19th 
Century, 
notwithstanding 
lottery 
prohibitions in 
individual states.  The familiar image of gambling in old west 
saloons is not a figment of modern imagination. 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
15 
 
 
¶129 In 1870 a revised Illinois Constitution provided in 
Article IV, Section 27: "The General Assembly shall have no 
power to authorize lotteries or gift enterprises, for any 
purpose, and shall pass laws to prohibit the sale of lottery or 
gift enterprise tickets in this State[.]"  (Emphasis added.)  
The Illinois Constitution shows that more than 20 years after 
the Wisconsin Constitution was adopted, our neighbors to the 
south saw lotteries as a specific form of gambling that utilized 
tickets.   
 
¶130 The 
Louisiana 
Constitution 
of 
1921 
is 
also 
instructive.  Article XIX, Section 8 provided: 
Gambling is a vice and the Legislature shall pass 
laws to suppress it. 
 
Gambling in futures on agricultural products or 
articles of necessity, where the intention of the 
parties is not to make an honest and bona fide 
delivery, is declared to be against public policy; and 
the Legislature shall pass laws to suppress it. 
 
Lotteries and the sale of lottery tickets are 
prohibited in this State. 
¶131 The 1921 Louisiana Constitution drew an explicit 
distinction between lotteries and other forms of gambling.  This 
distinction is underscored by the self-executing provision on 
lotteries (but not other gambling) and the reference to "lottery 
tickets."  The reference to tickets was a nearly uniform pattern 
in the states, especially at the time the Wisconsin Constitution 
was adopted.  The fact that the Wisconsin Constitution did not 
refer to "lottery tickets" in 1848 should not be interpreted as 
a departure from that pattern, at least without some evidence to 
support such an interpretation. 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
16 
 
¶132 Finally, 
the 
experience 
outside 
Wisconsin 
is 
consistent with the experience in Wisconsin.  Pre-statehood 
territorial legislation governing gaming tables and gambling 
devices did not address lotteries; post-statehood legislation 
distinguished between lotteries and other forms of gaming.15  
Panzer, 271 Wis. 2d 295, ¶7.16   
 
¶133 In his law review article, Farnsley notes that 
Wis. Stat. ch. 138 § 1 (1849) "uses the term 'lottery' in its 
limited sense."  Farnsley, supra at 855 n.225.  He quotes 
Section 1 as follows: 
 
Every person who shall set up or promote any 
lottery for money . . . and every person who shall aid 
either by printing or writing, or shall in any way be 
concerned in setting up, managing or drawing any such 
lottery, or who shall in any house, shop or building 
owned or occupied by him . . . knowingly permit the 
setting up, managing or drawing any such lottery, or 
                                                 
15 At the First Session of the Legislative Assembly of the 
Territory of Wisconsin, the territorial legislature approved an 
act to prevent and punish gambling. Ch. 65, Laws of the 
Wisconsin Territory, First Session (approved Jan. 18, 1838). The 
act provided criminal penalties for setting up, keeping, and 
permitting any gaming table or gambling device or betting money 
at any gaming table, but it made no reference to lotteries. The 
1839 Statutes of Wisconsin contain "An Act to provide for the 
punishment of offences against public policy." Statutes of the 
Territory of Wisconsin 363-65 (1839). The first seven sections 
of this act deal with lotteries, while sections 8, 9, and 10 
deal with other forms of gaming. This legislation was carried 
over after statehood. Chapter 138, "Of Offences Against Public 
Policy," Revised Statutes of the State of Wisconsin 705-07 
(1849). In these early statutes, table games such as faro, "E 
O," and roulette were treated differently from lotteries. Id. 
16 For a discussion of the history of Wisconsin's lottery, 
see Dan Ritsche, Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau, The 
Evolution of Legalized Gambling in Wisconsin, Research Bulletin 
00-1 (May 2000) (hereinafter Ritsche). 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
17 
 
the sale of any lottery ticket, or share of a 
ticket . . . . 
In other words, the first law passed by the legislature 
following the adoption of the constitution spoke of lotteries 
and "lottery tickets," and of a "drawing," all signifying a 
limited scope to the term.  Moreover, the Index to the 1849 
statutes 
clearly distinguishes lotteries from 
betting and 
gaming.  The two subjects appeared under different headings in 
the index and on different pages in the statutes. 
 
¶134 There is no reference to betting on horse races in the 
1849 statutes.  According to Farnsley, the legislature first 
acted in 1878 to halt gambling at racetracks (Wis. Stat. § 1779 
(1878)), 
and 
in 
1885 
to 
halt 
gambling 
at 
local 
fairs 
(Wis. Stat. § 1463 (1889)).17  Farnsley, supra, at 857.  Thus, 
Richard Current was able to write: "By 1857 horse racing and 
betting on the horses were well established, at least in some 
parts of the state."  Richard N. Current, II The History of 
Wisconsin 128 (1976).  Betting on horses at racetracks and local 
fairs would not have been possible if the public had understood 
Article IV, Section 24 as a ban on all gambling. 
¶135 The distinction between lotteries and the broader 
terms "gaming" and "gambling" is also found in early court 
decisions.  For instance, in State v. Lewis, 12 Wis. 483 [*434] 
(1860), the defendant was indicted "for permitting gaming with 
cards for gain upon his premises."  Id. at 483 [*434] (emphasis 
added).  The decision discusses cards as gaming devices and it 
                                                 
17 See Ritsche, supra, at 5-6 (discussing the history of on-
track betting in Wisconsin). 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
18 
 
mentions euchre, poker, faro bank, and roulette but never uses 
the word "lottery." 
¶136 The first case to use the word "lottery" was Lemon v. 
Grosskopf, 22 Wis. 427, 99 Am. Dec. 58 (1868).18  It involved a 
dispute between the owner of a "lottery scheme in the city of 
Chicago" and his agent in Milwaukee.  The "defendant was 
employed by the plaintiff to sell [ ] lottery tickets, receive 
and retain the money for them until he became satisfied that the 
drawing of the prizes in the scheme was fairly conducted, and 
then account to the plaintiff."  Id. at 431 (emphasis added).  
The 
court's 
decision 
makes 
no 
reference 
to 
"gaming" 
or 
"gambling." 
¶137 Finally, in a third case, we see this court use the 
words "lottery" and "gaming" in the same opinion.  Sperry & 
Hutchinson Co. v. Weigle, State Dairy & Food Comm'r, 166 Wis. 
613, 166 N.W. 54 (1918) ("Trading Stamp cases").  The issue 
presented 
was 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
state 
legislation 
prohibiting the use of trading stamps except for stamps having 
cash value.  The court upheld the legislation as a proper 
exercise of the police power.  It did not cite Article IV, 
Section 24.  Rather, it cited Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 
U.S. 342 (1916), and said: 
[T]he court held that the scheme and practice of 
issuing such trading stamps in connection with the 
conduct of a lawful business . . . and the redemption 
thereof in articles of merchandise or premiums in 
addition to the articles sold is attended with evil 
                                                 
18 See also Everingham v. Meighan, 55 Wis. 354, 13 N.W. 269 
(1882).   
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
19 
 
and pernicious consequences, which have a tendency to 
affect the general welfare similar in effect to the 
evils attending a "lottery" and "gaming." 
Sperry & Hutchinson, 166 Wis. at 622-23 (emphasis added).  The 
court also approvingly quoted Rast: "This may not be called in 
an exact sense a 'lottery,' may not be called 'gaming'; it may, 
however, be considered as having the seduction and evil of 
such . . . ."  Sperry & Hutchinson, 166 Wis. at 623-24 (quoting 
Rast, 240 U.S. at 365) (emphasis added).  The use of trading 
stamps 
involved 
the 
elements 
of 
prize, 
chance, 
and 
consideration, but trading stamps did not fall within the 
lottery statute.  The prohibition of these stamps required 
specific legislation.  Thus, in 1916 this court acknowledged 
that "lottery" was not an all-inclusive term for "gaming." 
¶138 To sum up, after reviewing relevant 19th Century and 
early 20th Century material, I find no evidence that the framers 
of the 1848 Wisconsin Constitution and the people who adopted it 
intended to ban all forms of gambling by approving Article IV, 
Section 24.  They intended to prevent the legislature from 
authorizing a particular mass participation form of gambling 
that had frequently been used as a source of public and private 
revenue.  The historical context shows that the provision 
requires a limiting interpretation. 
III. INTERPRETING ARTICLE IV, SECTION 24 AS AMENDED IN 1987 
 
¶139 Article IV, Section 24 was amended three times between 
1848 and 1986.  The first amendment (1965) permitted certain 
kinds of promotional contests by excluding such actions as 
watching a television program, filling out a coupon, or visiting 
a mercantile establishment from consideration "as an element of 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
20 
 
a lottery."  The second amendment (1973) authorized charitable 
bingo.  The third amendment (1977) authorized charitable 
raffles. 
¶140 In 1987 the constitution was amended twice more to 
authorize pari-mutuel on-track betting and a state operated 
lottery.  In interpreting the latter provision, we begin with 
the words.  The 1987 lottery amendment provided: 
 
(6) The legislature may authorize the creation 
of a lottery to be operated by the state as provided 
by law.  The expenditure of public funds or of 
revenues derived from lottery operations to engage in 
promotional advertising of the Wisconsin state lottery 
is prohibited.  Any advertising of the state lottery 
shall indicate the odds of a specific lottery ticket 
to be selected as the winning ticket for each prize 
amount offered.  The net proceeds of the state lottery 
shall be deposited in the treasury of the state, to be 
used for property tax relief as provided by law. 
¶141 The wording of subsection (6) was consistent with my 
interpretation of subsection (1).  Notwithstanding the general 
bar in subsection (1) on legislative authorization of "any 
lottery," subsection (6) gave the legislature authority to 
permit a single sponsor——the state——to create, operate, and 
advertise a lottery with multiple prizes.  People could make 
themselves eligible for these prizes by purchasing "tickets."  
To be fair, however, the state lottery was required to advise 
people of "the odds of a specific lottery ticket to be selected 
as the winning ticket for each prize amount offered."  For the 
state, the overriding purpose of the lottery was the generation 
of revenue "for property tax relief as provided by law."  The 
professionalism and public scrutiny given to state operation of 
the lottery would protect people from mismanagement or fraud. 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
21 
 
¶142 In 1987 the word "lottery" in subsection (6) gave no 
hint of applying to every gambling enterprise involving prize, 
chance, and consideration. 
¶143 In interpreting the amendment, we are expected to 
consider the history of the times.  By 1987 three of Wisconsin's 
neighboring states——Michigan, Illinois, and Iowa——had approved 
and started up lotteries like Wisconsin's.  Minnesota was soon 
to follow.  At least 26 states had established state lotteries 
before Wisconsin acted. 
¶144 A report on "Gambling in California" produced by the 
California Research Bureau in 1997, explains the background: 
 
Growing opposition to tax increases was a leading 
factor in establishing state-run lotteries in the 20th 
century.  In 1964 New Hampshire was the first state to 
sponsor a lottery, followed by New York in 1967.  New 
Jersey 
launched 
the 
first 
financially 
successful 
modern lottery in 1971. 
 
. . . .  
 
Lotteries are legal now in 37 states and the 
District of Columbia. 
Roger Dunstan, Gambling in California, II-9, III-1, California 
Research Bureau, California State Library (1997) available at 
http://www.library.ca.gov/CRB/97/03/crb97003.html (last visited 
Mar. 2, 2006).  This information provides historical context. 
¶145 In October 1989 the Wisconsin Lottery asked Attorney 
General Donald J. Hanaway to answer two questions: (1) What is 
the scope of gaming in which the Wisconsin Lottery is authorized 
or permitted to engage by Article IV, Section 24 of the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
and 
Chapter 
565 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Statutes; and (2) If the Wisconsin Lottery cannot legally offer 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
22 
 
a particular type of gaming or gambling operation as part of the 
lottery, may such type of game or gambling operation be lawfully 
included in state-tribal gaming compacts within the Indian 
Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2701-2721? 
¶146 Attorney General Hanaway answered these questions in a 
1990 opinion.  79 Op. Att'y Gen. 14 (1990).  He concluded that 
the term "lottery" in the constitution and statutes did not 
include all forms of gaming: 
Betting, 
playing 
gambling 
machines 
and 
operating 
gambling places are not to be considered as included 
within the meaning of the term lottery as used in the 
constitution, and chapters 945 and 565, Stats. (1987-
88).  Therefore, it is clear, that the meaning of the 
term lottery as contained in the constitution and both 
legislative enactments up to the present day does not 
include and is not meant to embrace all the forms of 
gambling. 
Id. at 26. 
¶147 Attorney General Hanaway observed that constitutional 
provisions on the same subject are normally construed together 
and considered to be in pari materia.  Id.  He also asserted 
that 
constitutional 
provisions, 
like 
statutes, 
should 
be 
construed to make sense. 
 
It is apparent to me that during the entire 
legislative 
debate, 
over 
several 
years, 
on 
the 
advisability of adopting a resolution providing for a 
constitutional amendment authorizing a state operated 
lottery, during the public debate prior to the 
ratification 
of 
such 
constitutional 
amendment 
by 
statewide referendum in April of 1987, and during the 
legislative deliberations and debate on the enactment 
of legislation enabling the lottery constitutional 
amendment, chapter 565, there was neither legislative 
or public discussion or debate nor legislative or 
public intent to authorize the playing of roulette, 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
23 
 
blackjack, 
craps, 
slot 
machines, 
video 
gambling 
machines and other types and forms of casino gambling. 
Id. at 26-27. 
¶148 Attorney General Hanaway's reference to Chapter 565 of 
the statutes alluded to the fact that the first legislation 
following the enactment of the amendment dealt with the state 
operated lottery as a specific form of gambling.   
¶149 The 
implications 
of 
Hanaway's 
opinion 
were 
controversial.  In light of the opinion, Wisconsin's 11 Indian 
tribes and bands were not entitled to demand casino gambling 
based on the lottery amendment.  However, the legislature was 
not barred by the constitution from authorizing casino gambling, 
slot machines, and video games.  In fact, the legislature could 
authorize casino gambling "just in Indian country."  Id. at 14, 
32.  A more subtle implication of Hanaway's opinion was that 
previous attorneys general, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, and the 
Legislative Reference Bureau had been reading too much into the 
original 1848 provision.  For diverse reasons, Hanaway's opinion 
was sharply criticized, and he was defeated in the November 1990 
election.19 
¶150 The new attorney general, James E. Doyle, issued a 
second opinion in May 1991.  80 Op. Att'y Gen. 53 (1991).  The 
Assembly Organization Committee asked him: "[D]oes Wisconsin 
Constitution, article IV, section 24, prohibit all forms of 
gambling in Wisconsin, except for those matters specified in the 
                                                 
19 See Editorial, Legislature Should Not Back Gambling, 
Milwaukee Sentinel, Feb. 7, 1990, at 10 ("Hanaway is getting it 
from all sides."); Matt Pommer, Doyle Says Hanaway Flipflopped 
on Gambling, The Capital Times, June 29, 1990, at 3-A. 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
24 
 
Constitution, or does the constitutional term 'lottery' have a 
narrow scope that would allow legislation to be enacted 
legalizing the forms of gambling to which reference is made in 
OAG 3-90?"  Id. at 53. 
¶151 Attorney General Doyle concluded that the legislature 
could not authorize any scheme involving prize, chance, and 
consideration without amending the constitution unless the 
scheme fell within the bingo, raffle, pari-mutuel on-track, or 
state lottery exceptions to the constitution.  Id.20  He added, 
however, that "the Legislature may authorize any type of state-
operated lottery subject only to the advertising, use-of-revenue 
and off-track wagering restrictions.  The Legislature may 
not . . . authorize such lotteries if they are not operated by 
the state, or fall within the bingo, raffle or on-track, pari-
mutuel exceptions."  Id. at 58 (emphasis added).  In short, the 
legislature could permit the state (but only the state) to 
operate casinos with every form of casino gambling.   
¶152 Attorney General Doyle said he based his opinion on 
"prior decisions of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the legislative 
history of the 1955 criminal code revision and the manner in 
which the Legislature has treated the term 'lottery' in 
proposing 
amendments 
to 
our 
constitution 
and 
enacting 
legislation."  Id. at 54. 
¶153 Attorney General Doyle quoted from the familiar three-
part methodology for interpreting a constitutional provision, 
                                                 
20 See Ritsche, supra, at 10-11 (discussing the divergent 
interpretations offered by Hanaway and Doyle). 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
25 
 
id., but his opinion substantially disregarded this methodology 
to reach its conclusion. 
¶154 The Doyle opinion operated from the reasonable premise 
that the term "lottery" in subsection (1) of Article IV, Section 
24 and the term "lottery" in subsection (6) should be construed 
the same.  Id. at 57 (citing United States v. Nunez, 573 F.2d 
769, 771 (2nd Cir. 1978); 2A Singer, Sutherland Statutory 
Construction § 46.06 n.6 (Sands 4th ed. 1984)).  It argued that 
because the term "lottery" in subsection (1) covered all 
gambling, the term "lottery" in subsection (6) also must cover 
all gambling. 
¶155 There were significant problems with this conclusion.  
In focusing on subsection (1), the opinion did not take into 
account the meaning, purpose, history, and interpretation of the 
provision 
in 
1848. 
 
It 
concentrated 
instead 
on 
broad 
interpretations of the term "lottery" many years after the 
provision was adopted.  According to the opinion:  
(1) "The term 'lottery' has been continuously 
and uniformly construed by the courts to include the 
three elements of prize, chance and consideration."  
80 Op. Att'y Gen. at 55 (citing cases).   
(2) "Numerous prior opinions of the attorney 
general have . . . found a violation of the lottery 
statute whenever the three elements of prize, chance 
and consideration were present in any scheme."  Id. 
(3) "As stated by the Wisconsin Supreme Court: 
'The legislature, the courts, and the attorney general 
have traditionally taken a restrictive view of games, 
schemes, and plans involving a prize, chance, and 
consideration, condemning them as lotteries prohibited 
by the constitution.'"  Id. at 55-56 (quoting Kayden 
Indus. 34 Wis. 2d at 724) (emphasis added). 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
26 
 
¶156 In reviewing this analysis, there is no dispute "that 
a lottery involves three elements.  There must be a prize, 
chance, and a consideration."  State ex rel. Cowie v. La Crosse 
Theaters Co., 232 Wis. 153, 158, 286 N.W. 707 (1939).  It does 
not follow, however, that every undertaking that involves prize, 
chance, and a consideration is a lottery. 
¶157 Gambling is a broad term covering many forms.  A 
lottery is one form of gambling.  Pari-mutuel on-track betting 
is another form of gambling.  Roulette is a form of gambling.  
Each of these forms includes the elements of prize, chance, and 
consideration. 
 
But 
each 
of 
these 
forms 
has 
unique 
characteristics.  It is no more logical to say that the term 
"lottery" includes "roulette" than to say that the term 
"roulette" includes "pari-mutuel on-track betting." 
¶158 When we carefully examine the authorities cited in 
Attorney General Doyle's opinion, we can begin to understand how 
constitutional interpretation wandered off course.   
¶159 In 1916 Attorney General Walter Owen was asked by 
officials of the Wisconsin State Fair whether they could sell 
lapel buttons together with a "ticket for admission, upon the 
back of which will be a number.  The holder of the lucky number 
will win an Overland automobile."  5 Op. Att'y Gen. 380, 380 
(1916).  The Attorney General concluded that this scheme 
constituted a lottery in violation of Wis. Stat. §§ 4523 and 
4524.  Id. at 382.  His opinion made no reference to Article IV, 
Section 24 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  He quoted from Monte 
M. Lemann, Lotteries 25, Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure 1633 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
27 
 
(William Mack & Howard P. Nash eds., 1912), that "a lottery is a 
species of gaming which may be defined as a scheme for the 
distribution of prizes by chance among persons who have paid, or 
agreed to pay, a valuable consideration for the chance to obtain 
a prize."  Id. at 381 (emphasis added).  Thus, the state fair 
plan constituted a lottery under the lottery statute.  "State 
agencies charged with the duty of carrying forward state 
enterprises should not adopt methods in the prosecution of their 
work which amount to violation of criminal statutes."  Id. at 
382 (emphasis added). 
¶160 In a 1920 opinion, Attorney General John Blaine 
commented on gift coupons containing four numbers.  These 
numbers could be drawn separately and awarded prizes.  See 9 Op. 
Att'y Gen. 9 (1920).  Both the distribution of the coupons and 
the drawing of the numbers were orchestrated by a local 
newspaper.  After quoting the same definition of lottery quoted 
in the 1916 opinion, the Attorney General said: 
 
If the coupon is obtained without money, without 
consideration or without the rendering of services, as 
some form of valuable consideration, the return merely 
constitutes a method for the distribution of a 
gratuitous gift. 
 
If there was a consideration here for the sale of 
the chance or for the receipt of the coupon, which 
constitutes evidence of chance, a lottery perhaps 
might be shown. 
 
If, in order to receive the coupon, it is 
necessary for one to purchase a newspaper, in such 
case it might be held a lottery scheme. 
Id. at 11.  Attorney General Blaine did not cite Article IV, 
Section 24. 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
28 
 
¶161 In a 1922 opinion, Attorney General William Morgan 
stated: "It is unlawful to sell numbered tickets for general 
admission . . . and make a free gift of an automobile to the 
purchaser and owner of a ticket."  11 Op. Att'y Gen. 396 (1922).  
Then he added: "Whenever prizes are given, the prize winner 
being determined by chance, and there being a consideration paid 
for such chance, it is a violation of our antilottery laws."  
Id. (emphasis added).  The Attorney General's use of the word 
"whenever" in this sentence without reference to the limitations 
of 
either 
the 
constitution 
or 
statutes, 
represented 
a 
substantial broadening of the term "lottery." 
¶162 In subsequent opinions, 23 Op. Att'y Gen 396 (1934) 
("a scheme to sell about 100,000 tickets out of which twenty-
three will be drawn to receive $500 each and the twenty-fourth 
to receive $10,000"); 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 143 (1937) (bank night, 
involving cards bearing numbers entitling holders to prize money 
if they also purchase theater tickets); 28 Op. Att'y Gen. 457 
(1939) (a modified form of bank night); and 28 Op. Att'y Gen. 
556 (1939) (ticket dispenser at movie theater periodically gives 
ticket refunds depending on how many tickets are sold), 
attorneys general concluded that each of the respective schemes 
was a "lottery." 
¶163 In 
most 
of 
the 
above-referenced 
opinions, 
the 
respective attorney general pointed to a specific lottery 
statute, such as Wis. Stat. § 348.01 (1939).  This lottery 
statute was different from the statutes that covered gaming 
devices 
(Wis. Stat. § 348.07 
(1939)), 
betting 
upon 
games 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
29 
 
(Wis. Stat. § 348.08 (1939)), gambling contests of skill, speed, 
or power of man or beast (Wis. Stat. § 348.085 (1939)), "policy" 
games 
(Wis. Stat. § 348.171 
(1939)), 
and 
pool 
selling 
(bookmaking) (Wis. Stat. § 348.172 (1939)).  One deficiency in 
Attorney General Doyle's opinion was that it failed to mention 
the multitude of attorney general opinions that discuss other 
forms of gambling besides lotteries but do not make reference to 
the term "lottery." 
¶164 Attorney General Doyle also cited four cases to 
support the proposition that the term "lottery" has been 
"continuously and uniformly construed by the courts to include 
the three elements of prize, chance and consideration."  80 Op. 
Att'y Gen. at 55 (citing Kayden Indus., 34 Wis. 2d 718; State v. 
Laven, 270 Wis. 524, 71 N.W.2d 287 (1955); State ex rel. Regez 
v. Blumer, 236 Wis. 129, 294 N.W. 491 (1940); and La Crosse 
Theaters, 232 Wis. 153).  Curiously, the opinion omitted State 
ex rel. Trampe v. Multerer, 234 Wis. 50, 289 N.W. 600 (1940). 
¶165 The La Crosse Theaters case involved bank nights at a 
theater.  The State sought to enjoin the practice as a nuisance 
on the ground that a bank night was a lottery.  The defendant 
argued that a bank night did not constitute a lottery.  This 
court 
disagreed, 
stating 
"that 
a 
lottery 
involves 
three 
elements.  There must be a prize, chance and a consideration."  
La Crosse Theaters, 232 Wis. at 158.  It concluded that going to 
a theater either to purchase a ticket or to register to become 
eligible for a prize was "consideration" and part of a "scheme" 
to increase ticket sales at the theater.  When the court 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
30 
 
addressed an additional argument that the state should not seek 
to enjoin the violation of a criminal statute, it noted that the 
state had "abated" a place where liquor was sold during 
Prohibition.  Then it added: "The maintenance of a lottery is as 
much the violation of the public policy of the state as declared 
by its constitution and its criminal statutes as is the sale of 
intoxicating 
liquor 
in 
violation 
of 
its 
criminal 
laws, 
or . . . the Eighteenth Amendment."  Id. at 160-61 (emphasis 
added).  This oblique reference to the constitution added a new 
dimension to the analysis. 
¶166 The Regez and Laven cases did not discuss the 
constitution.  They did nothing more than reiterate the three 
elements of a lottery.  But the uncited case, Multerer, added a 
twist.   
¶167 In Multerer (1940), a private citizen sought to enjoin 
the defendants from maintaining or permitting a gambling house 
and from conducting bingo on the premises.  Multerer, 234 Wis. 
at 51.  The citizen accused the defendants of openly using their 
premises to carry on the game of bingo "or similar and other 
games of chance," and contended that the premises constituted "a 
common gambling resort; [and] that great numbers of persons 
resorted to said premises for the purpose of gaming or 
gambling."  Id.  The defendants acknowledged that their public 
halls "had been rented to various charitable, religious, and 
fraternal organizations who had played bingo and used the 
proceeds for charitable, religious, and fraternal purposes."  
Id. (citing Wis. Stat. § 348.07 (1939)).  The circuit court 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
31 
 
concluded that bingo was "a gambling game" and that the citizen 
was entitled to an injunction. 
¶168 On appeal, the defendants contended that "bingo was 
not gambling as it was played upon the defendants' premises."  
Id. at 55.  But they conceded "that the term 'gamble' is 
sufficiently broad to embrace the game of bingo if played for 
money or prizes and for purposes other than those of raising 
money for charitable or patriotic purposes."  Id. at 55-56.  The 
court responded: 
 
We have no doubt that bingo, as played for about 
a year upon the defendants' premises, was a gambling 
game and was a lottery. . . .  [A] lottery involves 
three elements.  There must be a prize, chance, and a 
consideration. . . .  In the playing of bingo there 
obviously was a consideration . . .  Clearly, bingo as 
played upon the premises was a lottery, and was played 
in violation of the statutes of this state.  Sec. 
348.01, Stats. 
Id. at 56 (emphasis added).   
 
¶169 None of the above-quoted language is suspect.  But the 
court plowed on: "Sec. 24, art. IV, of our constitution 
provides: 'The legislature shall never authorize any lottery.'  
That is a strong declaration of the public policy of this 
state."  Id.  "If a state or its municipalities may not be 
authorized by its legislature to conduct gambling and lotteries 
for their benefit, it seems clear that religious or charitable 
organizations could not be so authorized, in the face of a 
constitutional provision like ours."  Id. at 58. 
 
¶170 What the court did in Multerer——for the first time——
was to assert that the constitution prohibited "gambling," which 
is a much broader term than "lottery."  The decision is notable 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
32 
 
for its total failure to apply any of the methodology we now 
consider proper in interpreting a constitutional provision to 
discern the intent of the framers and the people who adopted the 
provision. 
 
¶171 After 
the 
Multerer 
decision, 
attorneys 
general 
broadened their interpretation of lotteries to include other 
gambling.  See, e.g., 32 Op. Att'y Gen. 181 (1943) (coin-in-the-
slot gambling games and devices of pinball, slot machine or 
similar design type, as well as bingo, are lotteries prohibited 
by Article IV, Section 24, citing Multerer).  Thus, it was not 
surprising when this court stated in Kayden Industries (1967) 
that: "The legislature, the courts, and the attorney general of 
Wisconsin have traditionally taken a restrictive view of games, 
schemes, and plans involving prize, chance, and consideration, 
condemning them as lotteries prohibited by the constitution."  
Kayden Indus., 34 Wis. 2d at 724 (emphasis added). 
 
¶172 Attorney General Doyle's opinion used this quotation 
as the central tenet in its analysis of the original Article IV, 
Section 24, even though none of the court decisions or attorney 
general opinions leading to this statement had ever provided a 
serious analysis of the meaning or intent of the constitutional 
text.  This same mistaken mindset of "lottery equals all 
gambling"——based upon cases like Kayden Industries——prompted the 
Legislative Reference Bureau repeatedly to draft constitutional 
amendments on gambling as exceptions to the prohibition on 
lotteries in Article IV, Section 24. 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
33 
 
 
¶173 Once again, while it is true that a lottery requires 
the elements of prize, chance, and consideration, it is not true 
that every game involving prize, chance, and consideration is a 
lottery.  A lottery is gambling, but not all gambling is a 
lottery, because lotteries are but one species in the larger 
class of gambling. 
 
¶174 Having concluded that the term "lottery" in subsection 
(1) of Article IV, Section 24 covered all gambling, Attorney 
General 
Doyle's 
opinion 
set 
out 
to 
render 
a 
consistent 
interpretation of the term "lottery" in subsection (6).  In 
subsection (6), however, the term "lottery" was surrounded by 
other language such as "specific lottery ticket," "winning 
ticket," "promotional advertising," and "the odds of a specific 
lottery ticket [being] selected as the winning ticket." 
¶175 The opinion tackled the "ticket" dilemma as follows: 
 
[I do not] view the use of the word "ticket" in 
the third sentence . . . as limiting the lottery to 
games employing a ticket as a method of determining 
the winner.  The plain, ordinary definition of ticket 
is "a written, typed, printed, stamped, or engraved 
notice, record, memorandum, or token."  Webster's 
Third New International Dictionary 2389 (1986).  Under 
this definition, a ticket is evidence of participation 
in a lottery game. The word ticket does not require 
that the ticket be in some way used in the play of the 
game or selection of the winner . . . .  Under the 
plain meaning of the word "ticket" as set forth above, 
a note, document or token in writing which serves as a 
permit to participate in any specific game would serve 
as a ticket within the meaning of the constitutional 
provision. 
 
The Lottery Board currently operates three such 
games involving tickets.  The instant game television 
show does not use the ticket to determine the amount 
of the prizes awarded on the television show.  A 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
34 
 
ticket is used to determine the participants in the 
show.  Megabucks and SuperCash tickets are memoranda 
of the numbers selected by the player.  The winners 
are ultimately determined by mechanical selection of 
numbered balls. 
80 Op. Att'y Gen. at 58-59 (emphasis added). 
 
¶176 This rationale covered particular games conducted by 
the Wisconsin Lottery.  It even covered the evidence of a pari-
mutuel bet on a particular horse or dog in a specific race.  But 
it did not explain a person's play with a slot machine or at a 
roulette table.  It did not try to equate tickets and cards. 
¶177 The constitutional requirement that the State provide 
"the odds" that a person will win a specific lottery game, when 
applied to non-lottery games such as roulette or poker, was 
simply explained away with the comment that "implementation of 
some lottery games [will be] more difficult [for the State 
Lottery] than others."  Id. at 58.21 
¶178 The 1991 Attorney General's opinion did not examine 
the 1987 amendment in its historical context, and it did not 
                                                 
21 This analysis is inconsistent with the commentary in 
State ex rel. Martin v. Heil, 242 Wis. 41, 55, 7 N.W.2d 375 
(1941), where the court stated: 
 
It is extremely important in the interpretation 
of 
constitutional 
provisions 
that 
we 
avoid 
determinations based purely on technical or verbal 
argument and that we seek to discover the true spirit 
and intent of the provisions examined.  We must not 
fail 
to 
give 
effect 
to 
plain 
and 
completely 
unambiguous language in the constitution, but where 
there is reasonable ground to differ concerning the 
sense in which language is used, the provision should 
be examined in its setting in order to find out, if 
possible, the real meaning and substantial purpose of 
those who adopted it. 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
35 
 
discuss its legislative intent.  Attorney General Hanaway had 
asserted that there was no evidence that the framers of the 
amendment or the people who adopted it ever intended to 
authorize casino gambling.  79 Op. Att'y Gen. at 26-27.  
Attorney General Doyle never rebutted this assertion.22  There 
                                                 
22 In 1992 the Legislative Reference Bureau prepared an 
extensive legal memorandum discussing Article IV, Section 24 and 
the Hanaway and Doyle opinions.  See Memorandum from Barry J. 
Stern, Legis. Att'y, to Sen. Michael Ellis (Feb. 13, 1992) (on 
file 
with 
the 
Legislative 
Reference 
Bureau) 
(regarding 
"Constitutionality of 1991 Assembly Bill 469").  The memorandum 
argued that the meaning of the term "lottery" in Section 24(6) 
is different from the meaning of the term in Section 24(1).  It 
defended Attorney General Doyle's interpretation of "lottery" in 
subsection (1), citing the same cases cited in the Doyle 
opinion, but disagreed with the interpretation of subsection 
(6).  The memorandum stated: 
The 
Doyle 
opinion 
appears 
to 
have 
given 
substantial 
weight 
... 
to 
the 
presumption 
that 
"lottery" means the same thing in s. 24(6) as it does 
in s. 24(1). It analyzed ways that the "ticket" 
language could make sense if "lottery" in s. 24(6) 
refers to any form of gambling, including casino-type 
gambling, but did not consider any arguments to the 
contrary. It did not examine the legislative history 
of or contemporary news accounts relating to the 
approval 
of 
s. 
24(6), 
the 
referendum 
question 
submitted 
to 
the 
voters 
in 
April 
1987 
or 
the 
legislative history relating to the enactment of ch. 
565. Instead, it identified certain language in ch. 
565 that, in isolation from the rest of ch. 565, 
arguably supports a construction of "lottery" in s. 
24(6) to mean any form of gambling.  
I am fairly certain that a Wisconsin state court 
would not accept the reasoning of the Doyle opinion in 
construing "lottery" in s. 24(6). The literal meaning 
approach taken in the Doyle opinion is an approach 
that, to my knowledge, has never been taken by a 
Wisconsin 
state 
court 
in 
construing 
a . . . constitutional 
provision. 
As 
previously 
discussed in this memorandum, the literal meaning 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
36 
 
was also no discussion in the opinion of the relationship 
between the lottery amendment and the pari-mutuel on-track 
betting amendment adopted the same day.  The lottery amendment 
purportedly gave the legislature authority to permit the State 
Lottery to conduct "casino-type games" as well as other gaming 
activities besides traditional lotteries.  80 Op. Att'y Gen. at 
58.  But the pari-mutuel on-track betting amendment specifically 
provided that, "The state may not own or operate any facility or 
enterprise for pari-mutuel betting, or lease any state-owned 
land to any other owner or operator for such purposes."  Article 
IV, Section 24(5) (1987).  It is hard to reconcile these 
provisions.  Why would the voters ratify state operation of 
casinos and slot machines but prohibit state operation of pari-
mutuel on-track betting? 
                                                                                                                                                             
approach . . . is rarely 
followed 
by a 
court in 
construing a constitutional provision.  
. . . .  
In examining the legislative history relating to 
the approval of s. 24(6) and the enactment of ch. 565, 
the court would be expected to examine the LRB 
drafting 
files 
and 
other 
documents 
prepared 
by 
legislative 
service 
agencies 
relating 
to 
those 
provisions. I have examined those drafting files and 
there is no mention in either file of anything related 
to casino-type gambling or of any intent for the 
legislature to authorize the state to operate any form 
of gambling other than the specific form of gambling 
that was being conducted by various other states and 
that involves the sale of lottery tickets and the 
selection of winning tickets through drawings or 
another method of chance.  
Id. at 10-11, 12-13 (emphasis added). 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
37 
 
¶179 In my view, Attorney General Doyle's opinion was 
grounded on a mistaken premise about the effect of subsection 
(1), followed by a mistaken and tortured interpretation of 
subsection (6) so that it coincided with subsection (1).  His 
interpretation of subsection (6) disregarded historical setting 
and the intent of the framers and the people who adopted it. 
 
IV. THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION 
IN THE LAC DU FLAMBEAU CASE 
¶180 Attorney General Doyle's 1991 opinion contained a 
footnote that "The State of Wisconsin is currently a defendant 
in a lawsuit involving the issue of gambling activities which 
must be the subject of negotiations between the state and Indian 
tribes under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act."  80 Op. Att'y 
Gen. at 54 n.1.  The lawsuit referred to was Lac du Flambeau 
Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. State of Wisconsin, 
770 F. Supp. 480 (W.D. Wis. 1991).  This landmark case resulted 
in an order requiring the state to negotiate Indian casino 
gaming in Wisconsin.23 
¶181 The United States District Court ordered Wisconsin to 
negotiate over all forms of Class III gaming under the Indian 
Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. § 2701.  The court 
stated: 
 
The parties dispute whether the state is required 
to include casino games, video games and slot machines 
in its negotiations with the tribes.  I conclude that 
it is required to negotiate those activities because 
they are permitted under Wisconsin law within the 
meaning of 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B). 
                                                 
23 See Ritsche, supra, at 20-21. 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
38 
 
Lac du Flambeau, 770 F. Supp. at 482. 
¶182 In my view, this conclusion represented a fundamental 
misreading of IGRA.  The critical provision of IGRA reads as 
follows: 
 
(d) Class III gaming activities; authorization; 
revocation; Tribal-State compact 
 
(1) Class III gaming activities shall be lawful 
on Indian lands only if such activities are—— 
 
(A) authorized 
by 
[a 
Tribal] 
ordinance 
or 
resolution . . .  
 
(B) located in a State that permits such gaming 
for any purpose by any person, organization, or 
entity, and 
 
(C) conducted in conformance with a Tribal-State 
compact entered into by the Indian tribe and the State 
under paragraph (3) that is in effect. 
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(A)-(C) (emphasis added). 
 
¶183 In 
Lac 
du 
Flambeau, 
the 
State 
argued 
that, 
irrespective of the Wisconsin Constitution, casino games, video 
games, and slot machines were not permitted for any purpose by 
any person, organization, or entity, and thus Wisconsin was not 
required to bargain over these games.  According to the court:  
Defendants' position is that Congress meant "permits" 
to be given its usual dictionary meaning of formally 
or expressly granting leave; therefore, unless a state 
grants leave expressly for the playing of a particular 
type of gaming activity within the state, that 
activity cannot be lawful on Indian lands. 
Lac du Flambeau, 770 F. Supp. at 484-85.  The court disagreed, 
pointing to alternative definitions of "permits," namely to 
"allow" or to "let" or to "acquiesce."   
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
39 
 
¶184 More significant, however, the court adopted the 
United States Supreme Court's analysis in California v. Cabazon 
Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987), "on which [it 
said] Congress relied in drafting the Indian Regulatory Gaming 
Act [sic]."  Lac du Flambeau, 770 F. Supp. at 485.  It noted 
that Cabazon said, "a court must analyze the state's policy 
toward gambling" to determine whether a state's criminal laws 
would apply to gambling on Indian lands.  Id.  By embracing this 
approach, the court substituted judicial balancing for the 
criteria set out in IGRA.  The court said: 
The initial question in determining whether Wisconsin 
"permits" the gaming activities at issue is not 
whether the state has given express approval to the 
playing of a particular game, but whether Wisconsin's 
public policy toward Class III gaming is prohibitory 
or regulatory. 
Id. at 486.  The court concluded: "The amendments to the 
Wisconsin Constitution evidence a state policy toward gaming 
that is now regulatory rather than prohibitory in nature.  Id.  
"I conclude that [Wisconsin] is required to negotiate [casino 
games] because they are permitted under Wisconsin law within the 
meaning of 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B)."  Id. at 482 (emphasis 
added). 
¶185 In reaching this conclusion, the court leaned heavily 
on Attorney General Doyle's opinion.  Utilizing the opinion's 
truncated historical analysis, the court stated: 
 
The original Wisconsin Constitution provided that 
"[e]xcept as provided in this section, the legislature 
shall never authorize any lottery, or grant any 
divorce."  For more than a century, this prohibition 
against "any lottery" was interpreted as prohibiting 
the operation or playing of any game, scheme or plan 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
40 
 
involving 
the 
elements 
of 
prize, 
chance 
and 
consideration. 
Id. at 486 (emphasis added).24 
 
¶186 The court added: 
 
When 
the 
voters 
authorized 
a 
state-operated 
"lottery," they removed any remaining constitutional 
prohibition against state-operated games, schemes or 
plans involving prize, chance and consideration, with 
minor exceptions.  See Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. 10-91, slip 
op. at 5 ("Under the [state] constitution, the 
Legislature may authorize any type of state operated 
lottery subject only to the advertising, use-of-
revenue and off-track wagering restrictions."). 
 
The amendments to the Wisconsin Constitution 
evidence a state policy toward gaming that is now 
regulatory rather than prohibitory in nature.  See 
[California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 
U.S. 202 (1987)] . . . .  The fact that Wisconsin 
continues 
to 
prohibit 
commercial 
gambling 
and 
unlicensed gaming activities does not make its policy 
prohibitory. 
Id. at 486-87. 
 
¶187 The court used Attorney General Doyle's opinion again 
to rebut the State's argument about distinctions among different 
gaming activities: 
 
Defendants offer no authority for distinguishing 
between the State's current lottery games and the 
[casino game] activities proposed for negotiation by 
the tribes.  Instead the state makes the bald 
statement that casino games "are of a wholly different 
character than a state lottery or on-track pari-mutuel 
wagering."  Defendants' reply brief at 17.  The 
state's current attorney general has rejected the 
imposition of artificial distinctions within the term 
lottery, so long as the activity involves the elements 
of 
prize, 
chance 
and 
consideration 
and 
is 
not 
                                                 
24 These 
passages 
do 
not 
accurately 
quote 
the 
1848 
constitution and they do not accurately report the history of 
judicial interpretation. 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
41 
 
addressed explicitly by the constitutional amendments.  
Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. 10-91, slip op. at 5-7.  I find no 
reason to impose similarly artificial categories in 
applying the Cabazon test and in interpreting the 
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. 
Id. at 487. 
 
¶188 In sum, the court used Attorney General Doyle's 
opinion to conclude that Wisconsin had given a green light to 
nearly comprehensive gambling activity operated by the state, 
thereby moving from a prohibitory to a regulatory policy.  As a 
result, the court said, Wisconsin was required to negotiate all 
Class III gaming with its tribes.25 
 
¶189 The State appealed the district court's decision, but 
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals refused to review the 
merits of the action because the State failed to file a timely 
notice of appeal.  Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior 
Chippewa Indians v. State of Wisconsin, 957 F.2d 515 (7th Cir. 
1992).  The State filed its appeal before the district court 
disposed of a motion to vacate the judgment, and thus the 
State's appeal was dismissed.  The Seventh Circuit said: 
 
Much as we regret visiting the effects of 
counsel's error on the State of Wisconsin in a case 
bearing on its governmental 
powers, the 
current 
version of Rule 4(a)(4) leaves no alternative.  A 
timely notice of appeal is essential to this court's 
jurisdiction. 
 
The 
notice 
defendants 
filed 
is 
                                                 
25 In Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians 
v. State of Wisconsin, 957 F.2d 515, 516 (7th Cir. 1992), the 
Court of Appeals summarized the district court's holding as 
follows: "The district court held that amendments to the state's 
constitution and recent legislation establishing a state lottery 
also authorized other forms of gambling, in which the tribes may 
engage." 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
42 
 
ineffective.  The appeal is dismissed for want of 
jurisdiction. 
Id. at 517. 
 
¶190 Four months after the Seventh Circuit dismissed the 
State's appeal, eight members of the Wisconsin legislature filed 
a petition to commence an original action in this court.  Leann 
v. Wisconsin, 1993 Wisc. LEXIS 16, No. 92-1861-OA (Jan. 20, 
1993).  This court denied the petition on grounds that it 
presented no justiciable controversy.  Id. at *2.  Three members 
of the court, Justices Bablitch, Day, and Wilcox, would have 
heard the matter to clear up the confusion surrounding the 
meaning of the word "lottery."  Id. at *8-9 (Bablitch, J., 
dissenting).  The others refused. 
 
¶191 As a result of these decisions, the district court's 
holding and order were never reviewed.  Not until Panzer v. 
Doyle did a Wisconsin court openly question the correctness of 
the Lac du Flambeau ruling.  Panzer, 271 Wis. 2d 295, ¶92.  Now 
that a majority of this court adopts Lac du Flambeau, it is 
necessary to revisit the decision and show why the court's 
ruling was wrong.26 
                                                 
26 A United States District Court is not the final arbiter 
of the meaning of a state constitution.  In a February 25, 1997, 
letter to State Representative Daniel P. Vrakas, Attorney 
General Doyle wrote that: 
 
Judge Crabb's decision only binds the parties to 
the particular action in which it was issued.  The 
only effect of the decision was to direct the parties 
to that case to enter into negotiations for a compact 
at that time.  However, it did make clear, under the 
law as it existed in 1991, how Judge Crabb would have 
ruled in similar cases. 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
43 
 
 
¶192 Under IGRA, the statutory test for determining whether 
a state is required to negotiate a particular Class III gaming 
activity with Indian tribes is whether the state "permits such 
gaming for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity."  
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B).  The district court rejected a narrow 
interpretation 
of 
"permits," 
that 
is, 
it 
rejected 
any 
requirement for formal authorization of an activity by the 
state.  But the court went well beyond that interpretation by 
construing the phrase "such gaming" in § 2710(d)(1)(B) to refer 
to all "Class III gaming activities" in § 2710(d)(1).  Thus, in 
the court's view, if a state permitted or allowed any Class III 
gaming activity (like a state lottery), it was required to 
negotiate all gaming activities within Class III.  There are 
several reasons why this conclusion was erroneous.   
 
¶193 First, the phrase "such gaming" refers back to "Class 
III gaming activities," 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1), not "Class III 
gaming."  The term "Class III gaming" is defined in 25 U.S.C. 
§ 2703(8).  "Class III gaming" is a very broad term that 
encompasses an entire class of gaming under the statute, made up 
of everything that is not in the two other classes.  By 
contrast, the phrase "Class III gaming activities" is elastic 
enough to cover all or part of the specific gaming activities 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
As a district court opinion, it has no mandatory 
precedential effect over future cases in that or any 
other court.  Any new cases regarding negotiation of 
compacts, even between the same parties, would arise 
under a new fact situation and in a changed legal 
environment, and thus not be directed specifically by 
that prior decision. 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
44 
 
within Class III.  Clearly, "a" Class III gaming activity 
describes one of the gaming activities within that class.   
¶194 Class III gaming activities are lawful only when they 
meet certain conditions.  For instance, "Class III gaming 
activities shall be lawful on Indian lands only if such 
activities" are (A) authorized by a Tribal ordinance or 
resolution and (C) "conducted in conformance with a Tribal-State 
compact entered into by the Indian tribe and the State under 
paragraph (3)."  Significantly, paragraph (3) refers to "a Class 
III gaming activity," a subset of the larger class.  In 
addition, the statute contemplates tribal ordinances and tribal-
state compacts enumerating one or more specific Class III gaming 
activities 
that 
have 
been 
authorized 
by 
a 
tribe 
and/or 
negotiated with a state.  It would make no sense for either a 
tribe or a state to negotiate Class III gaming as a whole 
because neither party would be able to predict everything that 
might someday fall within that exceptionally broad class.  
Likewise, subparagraph (B) makes sense only when the term "such 
gaming" refers to one or more specific gaming activities 
permitted by the state. 
 
¶195 Second, logic and history dictate this construction.  
A number of states permitted certain Class III gaming activities 
(like a 
state-operated 
lottery, pari-mutuel 
betting, 
slot 
machines, or jai alai) long before IGRA was enacted in 1988.  
These states acted before the statutory classification——"Class 
III gaming"——even existed.  Thus, if the district court's 
interpretation of the statute were correct, each of these states 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
45 
 
would have been required——involuntarily——to negotiate all casino 
games with any tribe within its borders, irrespective of whether 
the state permitted any of these games.  (To illustrate the 
district court's theory, if a state permitted or allowed jai 
alai (and only jai alai) before IGRA, it would have been 
required to negotiate pari-mutuel betting, slot machines, and 
casino gaming after IGRA became law.)  It passes belief to 
suppose that members of Congress from a state that had 
previously approved a single gaming activity now classified as a 
Class III gaming activity, would have voted for federal 
legislation 
that 
blew 
the 
doors 
off 
Indian 
gaming 
and 
transferred so much of their state's police power to other 
sovereignties.  It is one thing to argue that a state that opens 
the door a crack to a particular gaming activity must negotiate 
that activity with all its tribes.  See Mashantucket Pequot 
Tribe v. Connecticut, 913 F.2d 1024, 1026, 1029 (2nd Cir. 1990).  
It is quite another thing to argue that opening up the door to 
one gaming activity opens the doors to all gaming activities. 
 
¶196 Third, legislative intent is also revealed in IGRA's 
legislative history.  On June 25, 1987, Senator John McCain of 
Arizona appeared before the House Committee on Interior and 
Insular Affairs for a hearing on IGRA.  Senator McCain said: 
[W]hen we talk about gaming spreading all over this 
country, let's not forget that no tribe will be 
allowed to have gaming operations which exceed that 
which is already allowed in the State. 
 
So, let's not paint the picture, let's not say 
casinos are going to spring up all over this Nation; 
they are not.  No gaming will be allowed which exceeds 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
46 
 
the gaming which is allowed for non-Indians in that 
State. 
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: Hearing on H.R. 964 and H.R. 2507 
Before the Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 100th Cong. 
177 (1987). 
 
¶197 Committee Chairman Morris K. Udall agreed: 
 
Mr. McCain pointed out that one of the basic 
things in our bill, as long as we have been involved 
in this, is that Indians are not going to get any 
better treatment than anybody else, but they are going 
to get as good a treatment as anybody else, and if you 
have j'ai alai and poker parlors and whatnot in 
California, you can have j'ai alai and poker parlors 
in [an Indian] reservation or wherever else. 
Id. at 178. 
 
¶198 These basic assumptions about IGRA were echoed by 
other 
witnesses, 
including 
representatives 
of 
the 
Reagan 
Administration.  See id. at 178 (statement of Rep. James H. 
Bilbray (D-Nev.)); id. at 208 (statement of Victoria Toensing, 
Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal Div., United States Dep't 
of Justice); id. at 222 (statement of Ross O. Swimmer, Assistant  
Secretary Indian Affairs, Bureau of Indian Affairs, United 
States Dep't of Interior).  See also Senate Hearings on S. 555 
and S. 1303 Before the Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 100th 
Cong. 86 (1987) (statement of Sen. Peter V. Dominici). 
 
¶199 The Senate Committee Report on Senate Bill 555, which 
ultimately became the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, explained 
that Congress recognized: 
the need to fashion a means by which different public 
policies of these respective governmental entities 
[tribes 
and 
states] 
can 
be 
accommodated 
and 
reconciled.  This legislation is intended to provide a 
means by which tribal and State governments can 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
47 
 
realize 
their 
unique 
and 
individual 
governmental 
objectives, while at the same time, work together to 
develop a regulatory and jurisdictional pattern that 
will foster a consistency and uniformity in the manner 
in which laws regulating the conduct of gaming 
activities are applied. 
S. Rep. No. 100-446, at 6 (emphasis added). 
 
¶200 This language is not as direct in its guidance as it 
might be, but it recognizes the desirability of "consistency and 
uniformity" in gaming regulation as well as the right of a state 
to protect its governmental objectives.  Thus, although IGRA 
permits a state to negotiate a compact that grants tribes 
exclusive authority to engage in certain Class III gaming 
activities, the state is not required to give its tribes the 
right to engage in these Class III gaming activities when it 
prohibits 
these 
activities 
to 
everyone 
else. 
 
Congress 
established a clear rule that a Class III gaming activity is 
lawful on Indian lands only if the activity is located in a 
state that permits the activity "for any purpose by any person, 
organization, or entity" and only if the activity is conducted 
in conformance with a Tribal-State compact. 
 
¶201 Significantly, IGRA strips federal courts of their 
authority to make subjective evaluations that characterize a 
state's gaming policy as regulatory or prohibitory.  The 
Committee report states: 
 
S. 555 is intended to expressly preempt the field 
in the governance of gaming activities on Indian 
lands.  
Consequently, 
Federal 
courts 
should not 
balance competing Federal, State, and tribal interests 
to determine the extent to which various gaming 
activities are allowed. 
S. Rep. No. 100-446, at 6 (emphasis added). 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
48 
 
 
¶202 The report went on: 
[T]he Committee anticipates that Federal courts will 
rely on the distinction between State criminal laws 
which prohibit certain activities and the civil laws 
of a State which impose a regulatory scheme upon those 
activities to determine whether class II games are 
allowed in certain States. . . .  The Committee wishes 
to make clear that, under S. 555, application of the 
prohibitory/regulatory 
distinction 
is 
markedly 
different from the application of the distinction in 
the context of Public Law 83-280 [as applied in 
Cabazon]. 
 
Here, 
the 
courts 
will 
consider 
the 
distinction between a State's civil and criminal laws 
to determine whether a body of law is applicable, as a 
matter of Federal law, to either allow or prohibit 
certain activities. 
Id. (emphasis added).27 
¶203 This 
statement 
modifies 
the 
ruling 
in 
Cabazon.  
Admittedly, the statement references "class II games," but this 
does not undermine the analysis.  On the contrary, Class II 
gaming does not depend upon a compact.  A tribe's right to a 
Class II gaming activity is determined by whether the state 
permits that gaming activity "for any purpose by any person, 
organization, 
or 
entity." 
 
25 
U.S.C. 
§ 2710(b)(1)(A).  
Consequently, when a dispute arises over whether a certain Class 
II gaming activity is lawful on Indian land, the answer does not 
depend on whether the state has agreed to that activity in a 
                                                 
27 The district court cited this very language.  Lac du 
Flambeau, 770 F. Supp. at 485.  Nevertheless, the district court 
inexplicably applied the prohibitory/regulatory distinction from 
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 
(1987), rather than simply determining whether the gaming 
activity was prohibited by state criminal law, as contemplated 
by the Senate Report.  See Lac du Flambeau, 770 F. Supp. at 485 
(criticizing the State for ignoring the analysis in Cabazon for 
purposes of determining whether a state permits Class III 
gaming). 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
49 
 
formal way.  The answer depends on whether the state has enacted 
criminal laws that prohibit that activity to everyone.  This new 
rule is even more applicable to Class III gaming activities.   
¶204 The original understanding of IGRA from 1987-88 is 
affirmed today by the National Indian Gaming Commission.  In its 
"Indian Gaming Regulatory Act Overview," the Commission states: 
The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, enacted in 1988 
as Public Law 100-497 and now codified at 25 U.S.C. 
§ 2701, establishes the jurisdictional framework that 
presently governs Indian gaming. 
 
. . . .  
 
The definition of class III gaming is extremely 
broad.  It includes all forms of gaming that are 
neither class I nor II.  Games commonly played at 
casinos, such as slot machines, black jack, craps, and 
roulette, 
would 
clearly 
fall 
in 
the 
class 
III 
category, as well as wagering games and electronic 
facsimiles of any game of chance.  Generally, class 
III is often referred to a[s] casino-style gaming.  As 
a compromise, the Act restricts Tribal authority to 
conduct class III gaming. 
 
Before a Tribe may lawfully conduct class III 
gaming, the following conditions must be met: (1) The 
particular form of class III gaming that the Tribe 
wants to conduct must be permitted in the state in 
which the tribe is located; (2) The Tribe and the 
state must have negotiated a compact that has been 
approved by the Secretary of the Interior, or the 
Secretary must have approved regulatory procedures; 
and (3) The Tribe must have adopted a Tribal gaming 
ordinance that has been approved by the Chairman of 
the Commission. 
See National Indian Gaming Commission, Indian Gaming Regulatory 
Act Overview, http://www.nigc.gov/laws/igra/overview.jsp (last 
visited March 1, 2006) (emphasis added).  The phrase "particular 
form of class III gaming" decimates the Lac du Flambeau ruling. 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
50 
 
 
¶205 Looking back, the district court was incorrect in 
almost every respect.  It misread Wisconsin constitutional 
history and it misinterpreted IGRA, first, by engaging in a 
balancing interpretation that wrongly characterized Wisconsin's 
climate toward Class III gaming as regulatory rather than 
prohibitory, even though Wisconsin prohibited all casino games 
by criminal statute; and, second, by concluding that if 
Wisconsin permitted any Class III gaming, it was required to 
negotiate all Class III gaming.   
¶206 The district court's interpretation has been rejected 
by other federal courts.28  In Yavapai-Prescott Indian Tribe v. 
Arizona, 796 F. Supp 1292, 1296 (D. Ariz. 1992), the court said 
the Lac du Flambeau "ruling missed the mark and went too far."  
It quoted a district court in Washington as saying, "frankly, 
                                                 
28 See Rumsey Indian Rancheria of Wintun Indians v. Wilson, 
41 F.3d 421, 427 (9th Cir. 1994), amended, 64 F.3d 1250 (9th 
Cir. 1995) and 99 F.3d 321 (9th Cir. 1996) ("IGRA does not 
require a state to negotiate over one form of Class III gaming 
activity simply because it has legalized another, albeit similar 
form of gaming."); Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 3 
F.3d 273, 279 (8th Cir. 1993) ("The 'such gaming' language of 25 
U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B) does not require the state to negotiate 
with respect to forms of gaming it does not presently permit.  
Because video keno and traditional keno are not the same and 
video keno is the only form of keno allowed under state law, it 
would be illegal, in addition to being unfair to the other 
tribes, for the tribe to offer traditional keno to its 
patrons."); Am. Greyhound, Inc. v. Hull, 146 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 
1067 (D. Ariz. 2001), vacated on other grounds, 305 F.3d 1015, 
1018 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that a compact cannot authorize 
forms of gaming not otherwise legal in state); Coeur d'Alene 
Tribe v. Idaho, 842 F. Supp. 1268, aff'd, 51 F.3d 876, 876 (9th 
Cir. 1995) (holding that state was required to negotiate only 
with respect to specific Class III games that were permitted in 
the state). 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
51 
 
the Lac du Flambeau analysis seems overbroad."  Id. at 1296 n.13 
(quoting Spokane Tribe of Indians v. United States, 782 F. Supp. 
520, 522 n.2 (E.D. Wash. 1991)). 
 
¶207 In addition, it should be noted that the United States 
Supreme Court handed down an important sovereign immunity 
decision in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996).  
In that case, the Court held that the Indian Commerce Clause——
the authority under which Congress enacted IGRA——does not 
empower Congress to abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment 
immunity.  As a result, unless a state consents to suit, an 
Indian tribe may not enforce IGRA against a state in federal 
court.  Panzer, 271 Wis. 2d at 355 n.37.  In other words, 
without Wisconsin's consent, the district court could not issue 
a decision like Lac du Flambeau today. 
V. THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO THE LAC DU FLAMBEAU DECISION 
 
¶208 The Lac du Flambeau decision was issued on June 18, 
1991.  The Court's order "REQUIRED" the State "to conclude a 
tribal-state Class III gaming compact" with the two plaintiff 
tribes "within sixty (60) days from the date of this order."  
Lac du Flambeau, 770 F. Supp. at 488.  By June of 1992 Governor 
Tommy G. Thompson had negotiated compacts with all 11 of the 
State's federally recognized tribes.29  These compacts authorized 
(1) electronic games of chance with video facsimile displays; 
(2) electronic games of chance with mechanical displays; (3) 
blackjack; and (4) pull-tabs or break-open tickets when not 
                                                 
29 For a history and description of the compacts, see 
Ritsche, supra, at 22-28. 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
52 
 
played at the same location where bingo is played.  See Panzer, 
271 Wis. 2d 295, ¶25.  These 11 compacts were scheduled to 
expire seven years after each took effect, but they could be 
extended and amended. 
 
¶209 One of the concluding paragraphs of the district 
court's opinion stated: 
 
I 
conclude 
that 
the 
state 
is 
required 
to 
negotiate with plaintiffs over the inclusion in a 
tribal-state compact of any activity that includes an 
element of prize, chance and consideration and that is 
not prohibited expressly by the Wisconsin Constitution 
or state law. 
Lac du Flambeau, 770 F. Supp. at 488 (emphasis added).  The 
court's language was noted in the legislature and may have 
influenced the legislative response to the decision.  See 
Memorandum from Jane R. Henkel, Deputy Dir. of the Legislative 
Council, to Sen. Lynn Adelman (Feb. 26, 1992) (hereinafter 
Henkel/Adelman Memorandum); and Memorandum from Jane R. Henkel 
to 
Rep. 
David 
Travis 
3 
(June 
19, 
1992) 
(hereinafter 
Henkel/Travis Memorandum) (both on file with the Wisconsin 
Legislative Council, Madison, Wisconsin). 
 
¶210 On April 2, 1992, Governor Thompson announced that he 
would call the legislature into special session on April 14 to 
vote on "a bill that would limit all forms of casino gambling."  
Press Release, Governor Thompson Calls Gambling Special Session 
(Apr. 2, 1992) (on file with Legislative Reference Bureau, 
Madison, Wisconsin).  The news release stated that, as of that 
date, only three tribes did not have compacts.  On April 13 
Governor Thompson issued another news release that stated: 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
53 
 
Governor Tommy G. Thompson and Attorney General 
James Doyle have reached agreement on a bill limiting 
gambling.  The legislature will consider the bill in 
special session tomorrow. 
"The bill before the legislature tomorrow is one 
that both the Attorney General and I support," 
Governor Thompson said.  "This bill will limit 
gambling to exactly what Wisconsin voters intended 
when they approved a state lottery. . . . " 
The bill, as agreed upon, will narrowly define 
lottery to a form of gambling including only the types 
of games currently offered by the State Lottery and 
prohibit casino gambling. 
It will prohibit the legislature from authorizing 
expanded gambling that has not been approved by voters 
in a statewide referendum and will not affect Indian 
gambling compacts agreed to within 30 days after the 
bill takes effect. 
News Release, Governor, Attorney General Agree on Gambling Bill 
(Apr. 13, 1992) (on file with the Legislative Reference Bureau, 
Madison, Wisconsin). 
 
¶211 Governor 
Thompson's 
companion 
bills, 
April 
1992 
Special Session Senate Bill 1 and April 1992 Special Session 
Assembly Bill 1, did not pass, but April 1992 Special Session 
Assembly Bill 6, introduced in May, was approved.30  Analysis 
written by the Legislative Reference Bureau explained that: 
                                                 
30 During consideration of April 1992 Special Session 
Assembly Bill 6, the legislature approved an amendment offered 
by 
Senator 
Tim 
Weeden 
entitled 
"Advisory 
Referendum 
on 
Additional Forms of Gambling."  The amendment provided: 
 
After 
the 
effective 
date 
of 
this 
section . . . neither house of the legislature may 
pass any bill that authorizes the conduct of any game 
specified in s. 565.01(6m)(b), 1991 stats., unless, 
prior to the passage of that bill and during the same 
legislative session, all of the following occur: 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
54 
 
 
The bill [ ] provides that the provisions of the 
bill which prohibit the state from conducting casino-
type games shall not impair the provisions of any 
Indian gaming compact entered into by an Indian tribe 
and the governor before the date that is 30 days after 
the date on which the bill becomes law.  Under the 
federal Indian gaming regulatory act, a casino-type 
game may be lawfully conducted by an Indian tribe on 
tribal lands in Wisconsin only if that activity is 
permitted to be conducted in Wisconsin by any other 
person, organization or entity and if the casino-type 
game is conducted by the tribe in conformance with a 
tribal-state compact that is entered into by the tribe 
and the state (governor) and approved by the secretary 
of the federal department of the interior. 
¶212 The 
exception 
ultimately 
written 
into 
Wis. Stat. § 565.01(6m)(c) reads: "This subsection shall not 
affect the provisions of any Indian gaming compact entered into 
before January 1, 1993, under s. 14.035."  The brevity of this 
exception is notable because, several weeks earlier, April 1992 
Special Session Assembly Bill 3, introduced by the Committee on 
Assembly Organization, had contained an exception that read: 
"This subsection shall not affect the provisions of any Indian 
gaming compact entered into before the effective date of this 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
(1) A 
bill 
requiring 
a 
statewide 
advisory 
referendum on the question of whether the legislature 
should authorize the conduct of such a game has been 
enacted. 
 
(2) The advisory referendum required under sub. 
(1) has been held. 
See drafting file for Wis. A.B. 6, April 1992 Special Session, 
on 
file 
with 
the 
Legislative 
Reference 
Bureau, 
Madison, 
Wisconsin. 
 
This 
amendment 
is 
now 
codified 
as 
Wis. Stat. § 565.015.  This statute was adopted before the 1993 
constitutional amendment when the legislature theoretically had 
the authority to grant either the State Lottery or the tribes 
the right to conduct "additional forms of gambling." 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
55 
 
paragraph . . . under s. 14.035, including any provisions in the 
compact relating to the extension, renewal or renegotiation of 
the compact."  (Emphasis added.)  On May 5, 1992, the Assembly 
adopted 
Assembly 
Amendment 
4 
to 
the 
bill 
striking 
out 
"renegotiation."  The amendment was approved on a voice vote 
after efforts to table and reject the amendment had failed.  The 
Assembly then adopted Assembly Amendment 2, 56 to 43, striking 
everything 
after 
"s. 
14.035." 
 
Hence, 
the 
language 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 565.01(6m)(c) has a meaningful history.31  See 
drafting file for Wis. A.B. 3, April 1992 Special Session, on 
file with the Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, Wisconsin. 
 
¶213 On 
June 
17, 
1992, 
Governor 
Thompson 
issued 
an 
executive order calling a second special session to consider a 
constitutional amendment relating to distinguishing the State 
lottery 
from 
prohibited 
gambling, 
limiting 
"lottery," 
prohibiting lottery expansion to other games, and removing from 
the 
gambling 
section 
of 
the 
constitution 
the 
language 
prohibiting the legislature from granting individual divorces.32 
 
¶214 The Governor's proposed amendment, June 1992 Special 
Session Assembly Joint Resolution 1 (1991 Enrolled Joint 
                                                 
31 Assembly 
Amendment 
2 
was 
introduced 
by 
Republican 
Representatives Welch and Loucks.  An identical amendment, 
Assembly 
Amendment 
5, 
was 
introduced 
by 
Democratic 
Representatives Rohan, Holperin, Young, Reynolds, and Black.  
See drafting file for Wis. A.B. 3, April 1992 Special Session, 
on 
file 
with 
the 
Legislative 
Reference 
Bureau, 
Madison, 
Wisconsin. 
32 A coalition of the majority of the state's Indian tribes 
opposed the amendment, offering to give Wisconsin "a significant 
share of future casino revenues" if the amendment proposal was 
dropped.  Ritsche, supra, at 11-12. 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
56 
 
Resolution 27)33 made no reference to Indian gaming in its text 
or in its Legislative Reference Bureau analysis. 
 
¶215 After his amendment was approved, Governor Thompson 
issued a news release complimenting the legislature.  Governor 
Thompson stated: 
This 
amendment 
begins 
the 
process 
of 
making 
a 
permanent, constitutional change to limit gambling in 
Wisconsin to the level Wisconsin citizens thought they 
approved in 1987.  At that time, people voted for a 
lottery 
and 
parimutuel 
betting 
and 
not 
casino 
gambling.  It is our responsibility to ensure that 
their wishes are upheld[.] 
News Release, Governor Tommy G. Thompson, Governor Compliments 
Legislature On Limiting Gambling (June 30, 1992) (on file with 
the Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, Wisconsin). 
 
¶216 Early in 1993 the legislature took up a second 
consideration 
of 
the 
proposed 
constitutional 
amendment 
restricting gambling.  See 1993 S.J.R. 2 (1993 Enrolled Joint 
Resolution 3).  Again, the text of the amendment and the 
analysis of the amendment made no reference to Indian gaming. 
 
¶217 In its original draft, 1993 Senate Joint Resolution 2 
proposed a ballot question entitled: "No expansion of state 
lottery."  This was amended in the Senate to a question 
innocuously entitled: "Clarify prohibition against gambling." 
 
¶218 In the Assembly, a bipartisan group of legislators 
(Representatives Freese, Stower, Schneider, Ward, Welch, and 
                                                 
33 Senator 
Lynn 
Adelman 
authored 
two 
similar 
joint 
resolutions earlier in the session.  1991 S.J.R. 73 and 1991 
S.J.R. 93.  The Adelman joint resolutions made no reference to 
Indian gaming. 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
57 
 
Brancel) offered a pointed alternative question that was adopted 
and presented to the people.  The new question read: 
 
Question 1: Gambling expansion prohibited.  Shall 
article IV of the constitution be revised to clarify 
that all forms of gambling are prohibited except 
bingo, raffles, pari-mutuel on-track betting and the 
current state-run lottery and to assure that the state 
will not conduct prohibited forms of gambling as part 
of the state-run lottery? 
¶219 Before this amendment was adopted, Representatives 
Schneider, Freese, and Krug offered an amendment to insert the 
words "Indian gaming" into the list of exceptions in the 
question.  This amendment was tabled without a vote.  Then 
Representative Schneider offered a second amendment to modify 
the question by inserting the phrase "forms of gambling allowed 
under current state-tribal gaming compacts" into the list of 
exceptions.  This amendment was rejected by the Assembly by a 
vote of 63 to 35. 
¶220 On 
April 
6, 
1993, 
the 
proposed 
constitutional 
amendment restricting gaming in Wisconsin was approved by the 
people, 623,987 to 435,180.  On the same day, the people voted 
on five advisory referenda related to gambling.  One of these 
referenda asked: "Do you favor a constitutional amendment that 
would restrict gambling casinos in this state?"  This advisory 
referendum was approved 646,827 to 416,722. 
VI. INTERPRETING ARTICLE IV, SECTION 24 AS AMENDED IN 1993 
 
¶221 The principal issue in this case is whether the 1993 
constitutional amendment on gambling affected the compacts 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
58 
 
negotiated with Wisconsin's Indian tribes in 1991-92.34  The 
issue presented requires that we interpret the amendment. 
¶222 Article IV, Section 24, after the 1993 amendment, 
reads in part as follows: 
 
(1) Except as provided in this section, the 
legislature may not authorize gambling in any form. 
 
. . . .  
 
(6)(a) 
The 
legislature 
may 
authorize 
the 
creation of a lottery to be operated by the state as 
provided by law.  The expenditure of public funds or 
of revenues derived from lottery operations to engage 
in promotional advertising of the Wisconsin state 
lottery is prohibited.  Any advertising of the state 
lottery shall indicate the odds of a specific lottery 
ticket to be selected as the winning ticket for each 
prize amount offered.  The net proceeds of the state 
lottery shall be deposited in the treasury of the 
state, to be used for property tax relief for 
residents of this state as provided by law.  The 
distribution of the net proceeds of the state lottery 
may not vary based on the income or age of the person 
provided the property tax relief.  The distribution of 
the net proceeds of the state lottery shall not be 
subject to the uniformity requirement of section 1 of 
article VIII.  In this paragraph, the distribution of 
the net proceeds of the state lottery shall include 
any earnings on the net proceeds of the state lottery. 
 
(b) The lottery authorized under par. (a) shall 
be 
an 
enterprise 
that 
entitles 
the 
player, 
by 
purchasing a ticket, to participate in a game of 
chance if: 1) the winning tickets are randomly 
predetermined 
and 
the 
player 
reveals 
preprinted 
numbers or symbols from which it can be immediately 
determined whether the ticket is a winning ticket 
entitling the player to win a prize as prescribed in 
the features and procedures for the game, including an 
opportunity 
to 
win 
a 
prize 
in 
a 
secondary 
or 
subsequent chance drawing or game; or 2) the ticket is 
                                                 
34 See Ritsche, supra, at 11-12 (discussing the history of 
the 1993 amendment). 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
59 
 
evidence of the numbers or symbols selected by the 
player or, at the player's option, selected by a 
computer, and the player becomes entitled to a prize 
as prescribed in the features and procedures for the 
game, including an opportunity to win a prize in a 
secondary or subsequent chance drawing or game if some 
or all of the player's symbols or numbers are selected 
in a chance drawing or game, if the player's ticket is 
randomly selected by the computer at the time of 
purchase or if the ticket is selected in a chance 
drawing. 
 
(c) Notwithstanding the authorization of a state 
lottery under par. (a), the following games, or games 
simulating any of the following games, may not be 
conducted by the state as a lottery: 1) any game in 
which winners are selected based on the results of a 
race or sporting event; 2) any banking card game, 
including blackjack, baccarat or chemin de fer; 3) 
poker; 4) roulette; 5) craps or any other game that 
involves rolling dice; 6) keno; 7) bingo 21, bingo 
jack, bingolet or bingo craps; 8) any game of chance 
that is placed on a slot machine or any mechanical, 
electromechanical 
or 
electronic 
device 
that 
is 
generally available to be played at a gambling casino; 
9) any game or device that is commonly known as a 
video game of chance or a video gaming machine or that 
is commonly considered to be a video gambling machine, 
unless such machine is a video device operated by the 
state in a game authorized under par. (a) to permit 
the sale of tickets through retail outlets under 
contract with the state and the device does not 
determine some or all of the player's symbols or 
numbers on the player's ticket have been selected in a 
chance drawing, or by verifying that the player's 
ticket has been randomly selected by a central system 
computer at the time of purchase; 10) any game that is 
similar to a game listed in this paragraph; or 11) any 
other game that is commonly considered to be a form of 
gambling and is not, or is not substantially similar 
to, a game conducted by the state under par. (a).  No 
game conducted by the state under par. (a) may permit 
a player of the game to purchase a ticket, or to 
otherwise participate in the game, from a residence by 
using 
a 
computer, 
telephone 
or 
other 
form 
of 
electronic telecommunication, video or technological 
aid.  
Wis. Const. art. IV, § 24. 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
60 
 
 
¶223 Focusing on the language of the amended section, there 
can be no doubt that the amendment established a sweeping 
limitation on the legislature's power to authorize "gambling in 
any form."  The text lists several exceptions to this barrier, 
but it specifically denies the state-operated lottery any 
authority to conduct poker, roulette, craps, keno, and many 
other forms of gambling.  Because these enumerated gaming 
activities are specifically excluded, they constitute forms of 
gambling that the legislature may not authorize. 
 
¶224 The 1993 amendment does not explicitly include Indian 
gaming but it does not exclude Indian gaming either.  Clearly, 
the section's present language is broad enough on its face to 
include Indian gaming.  In these circumstances, the court must 
examine extrinsic materials to interpret the provision and give 
it proper effect.   
¶225 It should be noted at once that the majority's wide-
ranging examination of extrinsic materials——to discern the 
intent of the framers of the amendment and the people who 
adopted it——stands in stark contrast to the tunnel-vision that 
federal and state courts have applied to earlier versions of 
Article IV, Section 24.  If courts had followed the proper 
methodology in interpreting the 1848 constitution and the 1987 
amendment, the Wisconsin experience with Indian gaming would be 
very different. 
 
¶226 The plain truth is that the amended constitution is 
different 
from 
the 
contemporaneously 
enacted 
statute, 
Wis. Stat. § 565.01(6m)(c), in that it contains no exception for 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
61 
 
Indian gaming.  Moreover, if we look beyond the words of the 
amendment 
to 
its 
legislative 
history, 
we 
note 
that 
the 
legislature rejected an opportunity to clarify the amendment's 
impact on Indian gaming by amending the ballot question.   
¶227 Nonetheless, a powerful case can be made that the 
amendment was not intended to close down Indian casinos. 
 
¶228 First, in Wisconsin a constitutional amendment is to 
be given prospective effect unless the amendment specifically 
provides otherwise.  Kayden Indus., 34 Wis. 2d at 731.35  The 
prospective effect of the 1993 amendment suggested to most 
lawmakers that if the amendment had any impact on Indian gaming, 
it would not come until 1998 and 1999, when the time came for 
the state to renew the compacts. 
 
¶229 Second, there is persuasive evidence that legislators 
intended to preserve gaming as it existed in 1992, including 
Indian gaming.  In response to an inquiry, Attorney General 
Doyle 
advised 
Representative 
John 
Medinger 
that 
"a 
constitutional amendment as proposed by the Governor would not 
affect compacts which already exist under the current state of 
the substantive law."  Letter from Att'y Gen. James E. Doyle to 
Rep. John Medinger (June 24, 1992). 
 
¶230 The 
Attorney 
General 
also 
advised 
Representative 
Marlin Schneider on February 3, 1993, that, in his opinion, "the 
                                                 
35 This principle is nearly universal.  See State v. Bates, 
305 N.W.2d 426 (Iowa 1981); People v. Gornbein, 285 N.W.2d 41 
(Mich. 1979); Kadan v. Bd. of Supervisors of Elections of 
Baltimore County, 329 A.2d 702 (Md. 1974); Kneip v. Herseth, 214 
N.W.2d 93 (S.D. 1974); Goff v. Hunt, 80 A.2d 104 (N.J. 1951); 
Luikart v. Higgins, 264 N.W. 903 (Neb. 1936). 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
62 
 
proposed constitutional amendment would not affect Indian gaming 
currently being conducted in this state under the terms of the 
compacts between the various tribes and the Governor . . . .  
[A] constitutional amendment as currently proposed would not 
affect compacts which already exist under the current state of 
the substantive law."  Letter from Att'y Gen. James E. Doyle to 
Rep. Marlin Schneider (Feb. 3, 1993) (emphasis added).  These 
assurances were widely repeated during the ratification campaign 
by proponents of the amendment, and they are reflected in 
newspaper editorials cited in the majority opinion. 
 
¶231 Third, 
the 
legislature 
enacted 
Wis. Stat. § 565.01(6m)(c), 
excepting 
Indian 
gaming 
from 
statutory 
prohibitions 
before 
it 
first 
considered 
the 
constitutional amendment; and it signaled its approval of the 
1991-92 compacts in subsequent legislation such as 1993 Act 406, 
creating Wis. Stat. § 992.20(1) (validating "[a]ll contracts for 
the . . . joint exercise of any power or duty required or 
authorized by law entered into by a municipality, as defined in 
s. 66.0301(1)(a), and a federally recognized Indian tribe or 
band in this state before May 6, 1994"). 
 
¶232 Finally, there was discussion in the legislature that 
the contracts clauses of the United States Constitution, Article 
I, Section 10, and the Wisconsin Constitution, Article I, 
Section 12, would prevent the proposed amendment from closing 
down Indian casinos.  This discussion was fueled by memoranda 
from Jane R. Henkel, Deputy Director of the Legislative Council, 
to Senator Lynn Adelman, dated February 26, 1992, and to 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
63 
 
Representative 
David 
Travis, 
dated 
June 
19, 
1992. 
 
See 
Henkel/Adelman Memorandum and Henkel/Travis Memorandum. 
 
¶233 Based on the evidence at hand, it would be hard to 
argue that either the proponents or opponents of the amendment 
expected or intended the immediate closure of Indian casinos.   
¶234 The intended impact of the amendment on the extension 
of the Indian gaming compacts is not so clear.  The consensus of 
news reports during the amendment's ratification process was 
that the amendment might affect renewal of the compacts.  For 
instance, a Milwaukee Journal reporter concluded that though any 
"threat to closing Wisconsin Indian casinos if the amendment 
passes won't hit for six more years," there was the potential 
"when the compacts come up for renewal in 1998 and 1999 that the 
amendment could be used to shut down the tribal casinos."  Steve 
Schultze, Answers help shed light on amendment questions, Milw. 
J., Apr. 4, 1993, at B-3.  The Wisconsin State Journal noted 
that passage of the amendment would not affect the compacts for 
at least six years but that tribal members feared the state 
would not renew the compacts.  Ron Seely, You can bet on it; 
Gaming referendum is sure to confuse, Wis. St.J., Apr. 4, 1993, 
at 1-A.  This explains why some tribes opposed the amendment. 
¶235 Each of the 11 compacts contained a provision for 
automatic renewal, worded as follows: 
Duration. 
A. 
This Compact shall be in effect for a term 
of seven years after it becomes binding on the 
parties. 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
64 
 
 
B. 
The 
duration 
of 
this 
Compact 
shall 
thereafter be automatically extended for terms of five 
years, unless either party serves written notice of 
nonrenewal on the other party not less than one 
hundred eighty days prior to the expiration of the 
original term of this Compact or any extension 
thereof. 
See St. Croix compact, section XXV (emphasis added). 
 
¶236 In 1998 and 1999 the governor who signed the original 
compacts, Tommy Thompson, was still in office, and he extended 
the compacts by deciding not to serve a notice of nonrenewal on 
the tribes.  Governor Thompson's decision to extend was not 
challenged at that time in court. 
 
¶237 Extensions of the compacts were designed to occur 
automatically, without the necessity of negotiation.  These 
extensions would not expand gambling in any substantive sense.  
They would preserve the status quo.  This was consistent with 
the 
title 
of 
the 
ballot 
question: 
"Gambling 
expansion 
prohibited"——and it was consistent with explanations of the 
amendment by Senator Lynn Adelman and Representative Peter Bock, 
that approval of the amendment would "freeze the current level 
of gambling in Wisconsin and put a constitutional brake on new, 
expanded forms of gambling."  Lynn Adelman & Peter Bock, 
Editorial, "Vote 'yes' on Question 7 to limit expansion," Milw. 
J., Mar. 29, 1993, at A-8.  It was also consistent with Attorney 
General Doyle's assurance that "the proposed constitutional 
amendment would not affect Indian gaming currently being 
conducted."  See Letter from Att'y Gen. James E. Doyle to Rep. 
Marlin Schneider (Feb. 3, 1993). 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
65 
 
 
¶238 Either party had the right to nonrenew existing 
compacts at five-year intervals.  This is undisputed.  However, 
there is little evidence that proponents intended the amendment 
to require a Wisconsin governor to nonrenew the compacts.  In 
fact, some of the opposition to the amendment was based on the 
view that because of the automatic extension provisions in the 
compacts, the tribes were being given a permanent monopoly.  In 
addition, legislators understood that if the amendment forced 
nonrenewal of the compacts, it would trigger lawsuits about the 
impairment 
of 
contracts 
because 
forced 
nonrenewal 
would 
eliminate the great bulk of the revenue-raising activity at 
Indian casinos.  Finally, nonrenewal of compacts, one by one, 
would create problems of consistent treatment among the tribes.  
To illustrate, the compact of the Lac Courte Oreilles Band of 
Lake Superior Chippewa would have ended in mid-August 1998, if 
nonrenewed, but the Ho-Chunk Nation's compact would not have 
ended until June 1999.  All tribes whose compacts would have 
been nonrenewed before the Ho-Chunk compact ended could have 
argued that Wisconsin was violating IGRA, or compact provisions, 
by permitting allegedly prohibited casino games in some Indian 
casinos, but not allowing the same games in the casinos of the 
tribes whose compacts had ended. 
 
¶239 The 
1998-99 
compacts 
did 
have 
some 
amendments.  
However, the 1998-99 amendments did not render any of the 
compacts substantially different from the original compacts.  
For instance, the Forest County Potawatomi compact was amended 
to increase the number of slot machines from 200 to 1000 and to 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
66 
 
permit the playing of blackjack at the tribe's Menomonee Valley 
Casino in Milwaukee.  Panzer, 271 Wis. 2d 295, ¶32.  The 1998-99 
amendments did not give the Forest County Potawatomi (or any 
tribe) a new gaming activity.36  See generally Amendments to the 
Forest County Potawatomi Community of Wisconsin and the State of 
Wisconsin Gaming Compact of 1992, 1-4 (1998).  The Forest County 
Potawatomi's original compact authorized slot machines at the 
Menomonee Valley site, so that only the number of slot machines 
changed; and it authorized blackjack at other Potawatomi tribal 
facilities.  Forest County Potawatomi Compact §§ IV, XV(H).  
Thus, the 1998-99 amendments did not violate the Wisconsin 
Constitution unless the extension by itself violated the 
constitution. 
 
They 
were 
also 
supported 
by 
25 
U.S.C. 
§ 2710(d)(1)(B). 
¶240 This brings us to the issue that was decided in 
Panzer, namely, whether the Governor had authority to approve 
amendments to the original Indian gaming compacts to add new 
games of poker, roulette, craps, and keno, which are explicitly 
prohibited by the Wisconsin Constitution. 
                                                 
36 In the negotiations on initial compact renewal with the 
State, Wisconsin tribes sought an expansion of games, including 
roulette and craps, and promised the State larger shares of 
their gambling revenues in return.  Amy Rinard, Casinos to seek 
roulette, craps, Milw. J.S., Dec. 24, 1996, at A-1.  These 
initiatives were not accepted by Governor Thompson.  The Journal 
Sentinel editorialized against the expansion, suggesting that 
the offer of more money for expanded gaming "smacks a little bit 
of bribery."  Editorial, A risky bet for tribes, Wisconsin, 
Milw. J.Sentinel, Dec. 30, 1996, at 10-A; Editorial, Just say 
'no' to more gaming, Milw. J.Sentinel, Nov. 23, 1997, at 4-J. 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
67 
 
¶241 In 
Panzer, 
the 
Governor 
contended 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 14.035 
gives 
Wisconsin 
governors 
expansive 
authority to enter into and negotiate amendments to gaming 
compacts.  Section 14.035 states: "The governor may, on behalf 
of this state, enter into any compact that has been negotiated 
under 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)."  This court recognized § 14.035 as 
an important delegation of power to the Governor, but it 
concluded that this power is "subject to certain implicit 
limits."  Panzer, 271 Wis. 2d 295, ¶60. 
¶242 The court held that the constitution acts as a 
limitation on both the legislature and the governor, and that 
the criminal code acts as a limitation on the governor. 
¶243 The power delegated to a governor also is limited by 
IGRA, 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B), which provides that "[c]lass 
III gaming activities shall be lawful on Indian lands only if 
such activities are . . . (B) located in a State that permits 
such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization, or 
entity."  (Emphasis added.)  Accordingly, if state law prohibits 
a Class III gaming activity, the governor's power to negotiate 
that activity is circumscribed.  Panzer, 271 Wis. 2d 295, ¶89.37 
¶244 IGRA does not invest a state governor with authority 
to negotiate games that are prohibited to everyone by state law.  
                                                 
37 Counsel for Governor Doyle addressed this issue in Panzer 
v. Doyle, 2004 WI 52, ¶87, 271 Wis. 2d 295, 680 N.W.2d 666.  The 
court responded, beginning at ¶88, quoting with approval the 
analysis in American Greyhound, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 1067: 
"According to the structure of § 2710(d)(1) and its plain terms, 
a compact cannot make legal class III gaming not otherwise 
permitted by state law.  The State must first legalize a game, 
even if only for tribes, before it can become a compact term." 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
68 
 
Instead, IGRA acknowledges the primacy of state law over a Class 
III gaming activity so long as the state does not permit that 
gaming activity to anyone for any purpose.  Thus, a governor 
would contravene federal law if the governor contravened state 
law. 
¶245 In Panzer, the court concluded the 1993 amendment to 
Article IV, Section 24 of the Wisconsin Constitution and 
Wis. Stat. ch. 945, which criminalizes gambling, foreclosed the 
Governor from amending the compacts to include additional types 
of games prohibited by law.  Panzer, 271 Wis. 2d 295, ¶96.  The 
Panzer court held: 
[T]he Governor's agreement to the additional games of 
keno, roulette, craps, and poker in 2003 was contrary 
to criminal/prohibitory sections of state law in 
addition to the constitution.  It is beyond the power 
of any state actor or any single branch of government 
to unilaterally authorize gaming activity in violation 
of the policy in Wisconsin's criminal code.  The 
governor may not carve out exceptions to the state's 
criminal statutes unilaterally.  We are unable to 
conclude that the legislature delegated such power or 
could delegate such power in light of the 1993 
constitutional amendment. 
Panzer, 271 Wis. 2d 295, ¶96.   
 
¶246 The legislature has not changed the criminal statutes 
governing poker, roulette, craps, and keno.  More important, the 
legislature cannot change the statutes on poker, roulette, 
craps, and keno in any way that would permit these games to be 
conducted in Wisconsin.  The legislature may not authorize these 
four games until the people, by constitutional amendment, remove 
the constitutional impediment to legislative action.  Neither 
the present governor nor any other governor may rely on 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
69 
 
Wis. Stat. § 14.035 
as 
authority 
to 
negotiate 
what 
the 
constitution prohibits.  Panzer held that the Governor acted 
ultra vires by negotiating beyond the scope of the power that 
the Wisconsin Legislature gave or could give any governor under 
the present constitution. 
 
¶247 This is not only the holding in Panzer, it is also the 
argument made to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in the 
State's failed appeal of the Lac du Flambeau decision.  In a 
brief submitted by Attorney General James Doyle, the State said: 
[T]he Governor cannot exceed the statutory authority 
which has been delegated to him.  Section 14.035, Wis. 
Stat., provides merely that "[t]he governor may, on 
behalf of this state, enter into any compact that has 
been negotiated under 25 USC 2710(d)."  This statute 
assumes that such a compact will be negotiated based 
on the requirements of that section.  Section 14.035 
does not purport to in any way amend or change the 
public policy of Wisconsin for gaming.  It is merely 
authorization 
for 
the 
Governor 
to 
sign 
legally 
negotiated compacts.  The Legislature has delegated to 
the Governor only such authority as the state statutes 
and the federal law provide.  The Governor cannot 
exceed that delegation by signing a compact which does 
not comport with either 25 U.S.C. s 2710(d) or 
Wisconsin's gaming policy. 
The State's argument was made before the 1993 constitutional 
amendment.  Passage of the 1993 amendment strengthened an 
already unanswerable argument. 
 
¶248 The majority appears to understand the peril in 
relying on Wis. Stat. § 14.035 as the Governor's source of 
authority for agreeing to new games that are prohibited by the 
constitution.  It attempts to fashion an alternative analysis 
that muddles the distinction between extensions and amendments, 
and wraps them both in the protective mantle of "impairment of 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
70 
 
contracts."  Majority op., ¶67.  The gist of the majority's 
analysis is as follows:  
(1) The original compacts are lawful.38  Majority op., 
¶¶6, 77. 
(2) The compacts may be extended automatically and 
will extend automatically unless formal notice of 
nonrenewal is filed.  Majority op., ¶65. 
(3) The compacts may be amended to add new games.  
Majority op., ¶¶2, 82-86. 
(4) The provision for amendment is a fundamental 
feature of each original compact.  See Majority 
op., ¶¶91, 95. 
(5) The parties have a reliance interest in the 
continuation of the original compacts.  Majority 
op., ¶58. 
(6) Nonrenewal 
of 
the 
compacts 
because 
of 
the 
constitutional amendment would unconstitutionally 
impair the compacts.  Majority op., ¶70. 
(7) Because 
the 
original 
compacts 
contemplated 
amendments that add new games, amendments to the 
original 
compacts 
that 
add 
new 
games 
are 
constitutionally 
protected 
by 
the 
contracts 
clauses of the 
Wisconsin 
and United 
States 
Constitutions.  Majority op., ¶95. 
The majority's analysis is both unavailing and dangerous, and it 
does not withstand careful scrutiny. 
¶249 All 
the 
compacts 
contain 
provisions 
authorizing 
amendments.  For example, the original Forest County Potawatomi 
                                                 
38 The 
original 
compacts 
are 
lawful 
because 
(1) 
the 
legislature authorized the governor of Wisconsin to negotiate 
Indian gaming compacts, consistent with IGRA, by its passage of 
Wis. Stat. § 14.035; 
(2) 
the 
United 
States 
District 
Court 
ordered the State to "conclude" compact negotiations; (3) the 
governor of Wisconsin, pursuant to delegated authority and court 
order, agreed to compacts; and (4) the compacts thus negotiated 
were not timely challenged. 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
71 
 
compact, in Section XXX, states: "This Compact shall not be 
modified, amended or otherwise altered without the prior written 
agreement of both the State and the Tribe."  (Emphasis added.) 
¶250 Plainly, this bare-bones provision is a procedural 
rule that permits the parties to agree to changes in the 
compact.  The provision does not authorize the parties to 
disregard their own laws.  It does not give the negotiator for a 
party extra authority beyond the authority the negotiator 
already has. 
¶251 For a compact amendment to be valid, it must be agreed 
to in writing.  After the 1993 amendment to Article IV, Section 
24, however, state officials are denied the authority to bind 
the state to gaming activities that violate the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  The governor has no more authority to violate the 
Wisconsin Constitution than the legislature.  The governor of 
Wisconsin has no more authority to sign a compact approving 
prohibited games than the Badger mascot.   
¶252 A 
second 
provision 
in 
the 
compacts 
mentions 
amendments.  The original Forest County Potawatomi Community 
Compact (1992) provided, in part, in Section IV: 
Authorized Class III Gaming 
A. 
The Tribe shall have the right to operate the 
following Class III games during the term of this 
Compact but only as provided in this Compact: 
1. 
Electronic 
games 
of 
chance 
with 
video 
facsimile displays; 
2. 
Electronic games of chance with mechanical 
displays; 
3. 
Blackjack; and 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
72 
 
4. 
Pull-tabs or break-open tickets when not 
played at the same location where bingo is 
being played. 
B. 
The Tribe may not operate any Class III gaming 
not expressly enumerated in this section of this 
Compact unless this Compact is amended pursuant 
to section XXX. 
Forest County Potawatomi Community of Wisconsin and State of 
Wisconsin Gaming Compact of 1992, Section IV.A. and B. (emphasis 
added).39  Subsection B. refers back to the amendment section 
discussed in ¶249. 
 
¶253 Other subsections of the compact provide that if the 
State commences to operate or license or permit additional 
games, the compact may be reopened for amendment.  See id. at 
Section IV.C., D., and E.   
¶254 These reasonable provisions permit the addition of new 
gaming activities, such as lotteries and pari-mutuel on-track 
betting, so long as they are lawful; but they do not constitute 
an independent grant of authority to approve Class III gaming 
activities not otherwise permitted in Wisconsin.  The governor 
of Wisconsin does not have some "contract" right to disregard 
the state constitution.   
¶255 The majority appears to believe otherwise.  The 
majority opinion states that when the parties agreed upon 
provisions allowing for future amendments to the types of games 
                                                 
39 The 10 other original compacts contained the same 
provisions.  See Bad River Band Compact § IV(B); Winnebago [Ho-
Chunk] Compact § IV(C); Lac Courte Oreilles Compact § IV(B); Lac 
du Flambeau Compact § IV(B); Menominee Compact § IV(B); Oneida 
Compact § IV(B); Red Cliff Compact § IV(B); Sokaogon Chippewa 
Compact 
§ IV(B); 
St. 
Croix 
Chippewa 
Compact 
§ IV(B); 
Stockbridge-Munsee Compact § IV(B). 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
73 
 
that may be conducted in Indian country, "the parties negotiated 
for the amendment provision under the auspices of the law as 
interpreted by the court in Lac du Flambeau, under which all 
Class III games are negotiable."  Majority op., ¶85 (emphasis 
added).  Thus, the governor has the authority to negotiate for 
any games that would have been lawful under Lac du Flambeau in 
1991 and 1992.  The Original Compacts are insulated from the 
1993 Amendment and further changes in Wisconsin's gaming laws 
unless and until the compacts are terminated.  Majority op., 
¶¶65-66. 
 
¶256 To summarize, the majority concludes that the governor 
of Wisconsin has the authority and duty to negotiate all Class 
III games, i.e., all Class III gaming activities, and to act as 
though the 1993 constitutional amendment did not exist.  But 
there is a problem with this position.  "Class III gaming" is a 
very broad term that encompasses all forms of gaming that are 
not Class I gaming or Class II gaming.  The classification "all 
Class III games" includes pari-mutuel betting, both on-track and 
off-track. 
 
Off-track 
pari-mutuel 
betting 
was 
explicitly 
prohibited by the Wisconsin Constitution in 1987, and is 
prohibited by the Wisconsin Constitution today.  Wis. Const. 
art. IV, § 24(1) and (5).  It was not affected by the 1993 
amendment.  Thus, a governor cannot negotiate all Class III 
games without disregarding the constitution as of 1987.   
¶257 A governor has clear authority under the Wisconsin 
Constitution to agree in a compact to permit a Wisconsin tribe 
to operate a dog track or other racing track and to offer pari-
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
74 
 
mutuel betting at that track.  Pari-mutuel on-track betting is 
permitted by both the Wisconsin Constitution and state statutes.  
On the other hand, a governor of Wisconsin has no authority to 
permit a second tribe to take off-track bets on the dog races 
conducted by the first tribe.  Why?  Because off-track pari-
mutuel betting is prohibited by the Wisconsin Constitution.  If 
a compact amendment were negotiated to permit tribes to take 
bets on dog races without operating a track, it would legitimize 
off-track betting in Indian country throughout Wisconsin.  If 
the constitution does not bar gubernatorial approval of such an 
amendment, it would also not bar an amendment approving betting 
on all races and all sporting events, so long as that betting 
activity was not barred by federal law. 
 
¶258 When this court authorizes a governor to disregard the 
state constitution, there is no stopping point . . . except 
federal law.  Jai alai is negotiable.  Any casino game is 
negotiable.  Any gambling activity is negotiable so long as it 
does not violate federal law.  If the governor is authorized to 
disregard the constitution in one compact amendment, it is hard 
to see why the governor may not disregard the constitution in 
other compact amendments.  This could permit the Governor to 
negotiate a perpetual compact and waive the state's sovereign 
immunity.  Three of the four members of the majority supported 
these amendments in their Panzer dissent. 
 
¶259 The impairment of contracts clauses do not save the 
2003 amendments, which add poker, roulette, craps, and keno to 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
75 
 
the Indian gaming compacts, because the tribes understood the 
importance to the state of limiting casino games.   
¶260 Seven 
of 
the 
original 
compacts 
articulated 
the 
parties' intent and material considerations.  For instance, the 
St. Croix Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin Gaming Compact of 
December 1991 stated in Section XXXI: 
A. 
In consideration of: 
1. 
The Tribe's desires to be able to offer 
Class III games that are economically viable 
and provide substantial revenues to support 
tribal 
self-sufficiency 
and 
economic 
development, and to have the confidence that 
such games may be offered for such period of 
time that the Tribe can develop its gaming 
enterprise, recover its capital investments, 
and receive a reasonable return; and 
2. 
The State's desire to limit the types of 
"casino-type" games that may be offered 
within this state to a select number in 
order not to have pervasive broad-scale 
"casino-type" gambling within this state; 
The parties acknowledge the mutual compromises 
with respect to the types of games the Tribe is 
authorized to operate during the term of this 
Compact and with respect to the duration of this 
Compact were significant material considerations 
in reaching agreement and are the essence of this 
Compact. 
St. Croix Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin Gaming Compact, Section 
XXXI (1991) (emphasis added).40 
¶261 A threshold question in any contracts clause analysis 
is whether a contract to which a state is a party surrenders an 
                                                 
40 See also Bad River Band Compact § XXXI; Lac Courte 
Oreilles Compact § XXXI; Menominee Compact § XXXII; Red Cliff 
Compact § XXXI; Sokaogon Chippewa Compact § XXXI; St. Croix 
Chippewa Compact § XXXI; Stockbridge-Munsee Compact § XXXI. 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
76 
 
essential attribute of state sovereignty.  See United States 
Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1977).  
Contracts that limit the exercise of a state's police power or 
eminent domain power are "invalid ab initio under the reserved-
powers doctrine[.]"  Id. at 23; see also Wis. Prof'l Police 
Ass'n v. Lightbourn, 2001 WI 59, ¶149, 243 Wis. 2d 512, 627 
N.W.2d 807.  If a contract does not implicate a state's police 
power or eminent domain power, to establish an unconstitutional 
impairment of contract, it is necessary to show: (1) there was a 
valid, pre-existing contract; (2) the legislation substantially 
impairs the contractual relationship; and (3) either (a) there 
is no significant and legitimate public purpose behind the 
legislation or (b) if there is a significant and legitimate 
public purpose, the legislation is unreasonable and unnecessary 
to serve the public purpose.  See Lightbourn,  243 Wis. 2d 512, 
¶¶147-49. 
¶262 Without addressing the threshold question or the 
validity of the majority's conclusions as to the first and third 
parts of the three-part test——which are ably addressed in 
Justice Roggensack's concurring/dissenting opinion——I disagree 
with the majority's conclusion that the 1993 amendment to 
Article IV, Section 24 substantially impairs the relationships 
created by the original compacts when it applies prospectively 
to the scope of gaming.  See majority op., ¶79. 
¶263 Legislation impairs a contractual relationship when it 
"alters the contractual expectations of the parties."  State ex 
rel. Canon v. Moran, 111 Wis. 2d 544, 555, 331 N.W.2d 369 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
77 
 
(1983).  In determining whether the impairment is substantial, 
"a court should look to the reasonableness of the parties' 
reliance upon the contract affected."  Chappy v. LIRC, DILHR, 
136 Wis. 2d 172, 187, 401 N.W.2d 568 (1987).  Based on the text 
of the original compacts and the historical events that occurred 
before the compacts were renewed in 1998-99, I conclude the 
parties could not reasonably have expected the compacts would be 
amended 
to 
include 
additional 
types 
of 
games 
that 
were 
explicitly prohibited by the Wisconsin Constitution. 
¶264 From the State's perspective, the desire to limit the 
types of casino games offered within the state was deemed "the 
essence" of the compact.  The extension of such compacts would 
preserve the status quo.  The nonrenewal of such compacts would 
alter the status quo, and deprive tribes of substantial revenues 
to support tribal self-sufficiency and economic development.  
Nonetheless, the State had an undisputed right to nonrenew the 
compacts.   
¶265 If the contractual right to nonrenew gaming compacts 
would not have impaired the compacts, how could a refusal by the 
State to agree to four new games that the tribes never had——in 
violation 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, 
state 
criminal 
statutes, and what the State viewed as the "essence" of the 
compact——impair the compacts? 
¶266 The provision allowing amendments to the compacts to 
add new games represented a contingency that might or might not 
occur.  The tribes could not rely on that contingency.  See 
Ochiltree v. R.R. Co., 88 U.S. 249, 252 (1874) ("the obligation 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
78 
 
of contract within the meaning of the Constitution is a valid 
subsisting obligation, not a contingent or speculative one").  
They could not rely on the possibility that the State would 
offer new games that are prohibited for all purposes to all 
persons, organizations, and entities, because to do so would 
violate both state and federal law.  Against this background, it 
is hard to imagine how any court could hold that denying tribes 
the new right to play poker, roulette, craps, and keno at their 
casinos——when no one else has that right——would substantially 
and unconstitutionally impair their compacts. 
¶267 In terms of reliance, the tribes were fully aware of 
Attorney General James Doyle's stated position on new games.  
After the Lac du Flambeau decision was issued, the State 
appealed,41 and that appeal was not dismissed until March 23, 
1992.  Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. 
State of Wisconsin, 957 F.2d 515 (7th Cir. 1992).  By that date, 
7 of the 11 compacts had already been signed. 
¶268 The following month, after Governor Thompson had 
called the April 1992 special session, two state representatives 
asked Attorney General Doyle his opinion on the effect the 
change in statutory law would have on Indian gaming in general 
and on the compacting process in particular.  See Letter from 
                                                 
41 The Associated Press reported the following statement 
from Attorney General Doyle: "The governor, as the client, has 
asked for an appeal.  And I concur in his decision.  There is 
considerable interest throughout the country regarding this 
ruling."  Michael C. Buelow, State gears up for fight to stop 
casino gambling, The Post-Crescent (Appleton), July 18, 1991, at 
B-6. 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
79 
 
James E. Doyle, Att'y Gen., to Walter Kunicki, Speaker of the 
Wis. Assembly, and John Medinger, Chairperson of the Assembly 
Comm. on State Affairs (Apr. 29, 1992) (on file with the 
Wisconsin Historical Society Archives, John D. Medinger Papers, 
Box 6, Folder 1).  
¶269 Representatives Kunicki and Medinger posed a number of 
questions.  For instance, they asked whether "the legislation 
prevent[s] the Governor from entering into compacts that 
authorize blackjack and electronic games with the three tribes 
that currently do not have compacts, if such compacts are not 
entered 
into 
[before 
the 
change 
in 
definition 
becomes 
effective]."  Attorney General Doyle responded in part: 
The legislation will change, on its effective date, 
those games which are permitted in Wisconsin.  After 
the effective date of the legislation the enumerated 
games, roulette, craps, banking card games, etc., will 
no longer be permitted in Wisconsin except as provided 
in the grandfather provision [pursuant to proposed 
§ 565.01(6m)(c) 
regarding 
state-tribal 
gaming 
compacts].  At that point it will be unlawful for 
tribes to whom the statute applies to conduct those 
games and since their conduct is unlawful, the 
Governor is not required to negotiate over them. 
Id. at 2 (emphasis added).   
¶270 The legislators also asked about existing compacts 
that "grant to the tribes the right to request that compacts be 
revised to permit additional games."  They asked the prescient 
question: "Does the legislation prevent the Governor, through 
the negotiation process, from authorizing Indian tribes to 
conduct additional games?"  Attorney General Doyle responded: 
The current legislation would not prevent the Governor 
from negotiating with the tribes over the adding of 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
80 
 
additional games to the compact so long as those games 
are 
permitted 
after 
the 
effective 
date 
of 
the 
legislation, or the additional games were added prior 
to the effective date of the legislation.  If the 
games are not permitted after the effective date, the 
Governor would not be able to add them. 
Id. at 4 (emphasis added).42 
¶271 On July 25, 1994, Attorney General Doyle appeared 
before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs.  The Committee 
was considering Senate Bill 2230, involving proposed (but never 
approved) amendments to IGRA.  Speaking for the National 
Association of Attorneys General, Attorney General Doyle said: 
We are also concerned [with the scope of gaming 
provision in the bill] with the provision which makes 
games not prohibited as a matter of state and criminal 
law subject to negotiation.  This provision neglects 
to recognize that some states have prohibited specific 
games through the use of self-executing constitutional 
provisions.  These types of prohibitions are stronger 
than statements of state public policy and stronger 
than the state's criminal law. 
Hearing on S. 2230 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 103rd 
Cong. 117 (July 25, 1994).  Later, Senator McCain asked the 
following: 
 
Senator McCain.  You've suggested that the bill 
needs to make explicit provisions with regard to 
changes in State law.  Do you think that such 
provisions may give rise to claims under the 5th 
amendment of takings of property without compensation? 
 
Mr. Doyle.  Well, they certainly may give rise to 
the claims.  And I would certainly hesitate to give my 
legal opinion on whether that would be successful.  I 
think it would be very difficult given that we're 
talking about broad social policy of the State to 
declare that that's a taking, as I understand takings 
laws. 
                                                 
42 See ¶211, n.30 infra. 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
81 
 
 
I mean, the same argument could be made, if you 
put aside the Indian question, that if you permitted 
gaming in a State, you could simply change the law to 
say there's no longer gaming in the State.  I don't 
think the operators of gaming concerns would have a 
takings claim under the 5th amendment.  But again, I'm 
giving you a quick, legal, 5th amendment takings 
analysis without any research. 
Hearing on S. 2230 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 103rd 
Cong. 120 (July 25, 1994). 
 
¶272 On August 1, 1994, Attorney General Doyle sent a 
letter to Senator Daniel K. Inouye and Senator McCain amplifying 
his answer.  He wrote: 
 
Change of State Law 
 
We were also asked our views on whether a change-
of-law provision in the Act, which became operative to 
make 
tribal 
gaming 
under 
an 
existing 
compact 
impermissible, could constitute a Taking under the 
Fifth Amendment.  We do not believe there is any merit 
in the suggestion that terminating once-legal gaming 
could constitute a taking in the constitutional sense.  
This is not the kind of property-based expectation the 
constitution protects; state criminal prohibitions 
have never been held to be hostage to plans for 
profits from activities which the state can make 
legal. 
 
The history and cases decided under the Takings 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution simply provide no 
support for the proposition that a ban on Indian 
gaming activities could trigger a compensable taking 
of private property. . . .  
 
. . . .  
 
As the [Supreme] Court noted in . . . recent 
takings decisions, the nature of both the governmental 
action and the regulated industry are crucial factors 
in assessing any Takings Clause claim.  The gaming 
industry is one of the most heavily regulated in the 
United States.  That regulatory system is based on 
important and well-founded concerns of public safety 
and welfare.  Similarly, property owners who willingly 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
82 
 
participate in heavily 
regulated 
fields 
are not 
immunized 
by 
the 
Takings 
Clause 
from 
regulatory 
changes, even those which subsequently change the 
regulatory system in a manner which is financially 
detrimental to the property owner.  In the words of 
the Court, such property owners simply lack any 
reasonable, investment-backed expectations that the 
regulatory environment will be free from change. 
¶273 Although Attorney General Doyle's letter addressed 
"takings" rather than impairment of contracts, the principles he 
espoused are not dissimilar.  In Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 
814 (1879), the Supreme Court examined the effect of a state 
constitutional 
amendment 
banning lotteries 
on 
an existing 
lottery 
previously 
chartered 
by 
the 
state. 
 
The 
Court 
acknowledged the presence of a valid contract, but it declared, 
"All agree that the legislature cannot bargain away the police 
power of a state."  Id. at 817. 
¶274 The Court declared that a legislature, by chartering a 
lottery company, cannot defeat the will of the people, in 
relation to the further continuance of that business.  Id. at 
819.  "No legislature can bargain away the public health or the 
public morals."  Id.  Lotteries, it said, "are a species of 
gambling."  Id. at 821.  "Certainly the right to suppress them 
is governmental, to be exercised at all times by those in power, 
at their discretion."  Id. 
Any one, therefore, who accepts a lottery charter does 
so with the implied understanding that the people in 
their sovereign capacity, and through their properly 
constituted agencies may resume it at any time when 
the public good shall require, whether it be paid for 
or not.  All that one can get by such a charter is a 
suspension of certain governmental rights in his 
favor, subject to withdrawal at will. 
Id. 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
83 
 
 
¶275 The principles of Stone remain good law.  In 1914 the 
Supreme Court stated in Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. City 
of Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548, that: 
[I]t is settled that neither the "contract" clause nor 
the "due process" clause has the effect of overriding 
the power of the state to establish all regulations 
that are reasonably necessary to secure the health, 
safety, good order, comfort, or general welfare of the 
community; that this power can neither be abdicated 
nor bargained away, and is inalienable even by express 
grant; and that all contract and property are held 
subject to its fair exercise. 
Id. at 558.  See also United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 
839 (1996) (providing an important contemporary discussion of 
governmental power to affect a contract). 
 
¶276 In the present case, none of the members of this court 
is seeking to close down Indian casinos.  The primary purpose of 
this dissent is to disavow any power in state officials to amend 
Indian gaming compacts to add games that are explicitly 
prohibited by the constitution and state criminal law and 
thereby expand gambling in Wisconsin.  Giving the Governor this 
unprecedented power is an abdication of state sovereignty and 
rewards those who refused to recognize this court's decision in 
Panzer. 
VII. THE EFFECT OF ARTICLE IV, SECTION 24 ON INDIAN GAMING 
 
¶277 The majority concludes that the 1993 Amendment to 
Article IV, Section 24 had no impact on Indian gaming, the 
Original Compacts, or any continuation of those pre-existing 
contractual relationships.  I disagree. 
 
¶278 In my view, the amendment has the following effects. 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
84 
 
¶279 First, the 1993 amendment prevents the legislature and 
governor from agreeing to any compact amendment that adds new 
forms of gaming activity that are prohibited by state law for 
all purposes to all persons, organizations, and entities.  As a 
result of the amendment, Wisconsin governors have no authority 
to approve new forms of gaming activity that are prohibited by 
Article IV, Section 24. 
 
¶280 Second, neither the State nor the Tribes can ever 
nonrenew a compact without seriously jeopardizing the future of 
Indian gaming in Wisconsin.  The majority acknowledges as much.  
This absurd result is the inevitable consequence of a United 
States District Court ordering the State to agree to gaming that 
the State had never permitted to anyone in Wisconsin, and that 
is now explicitly prohibited by the constitution. 
 
¶281 Third, new Indian gaming compacts to approve casino 
games will be virtually impossible until the people approve a 
change in the constitution. 
 
¶282 No matter which view of the law prevails, this state 
is facing a constitutional crisis.  The cleanest, most honest 
way to correct the situation is to amend the constitution.  If 
the results announced in the majority's decision are what the 
people of Wisconsin want, the people will give their approval.  
They will respect and respond to being asked, instead of having 
a massive expansion of gambling shoved down their throats. 
 
¶283 At present, the United States District Court and this 
court have succeeded in turning IGRA on its head.  In Wisconsin, 
only Indian tribes have the right to conduct most forms of Class 
No.  2003AP421.dtp 
 
85 
 
III gaming.  Apart from the state operated lottery, most gaming 
competition has been driven out of business.  This is not the 
way IGRA was supposed to work.  This is not the way our federal 
system is supposed to work.  The time is long overdue for 
impartial review of this constitutional debacle. 
 
¶284 I am authorized to state that Justices JON P. WILCOX 
and PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK join this opinion. 
 
 
No.  2003AP421.pdr 
 
1 
 
 
¶285 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. (concurring in part and 
dissenting 
in 
part).   Dairyland 
Greyhound 
Park, 
Inc. 
(Dairyland) appeals summary judgment dismissing its complaint, 
which judgment the circuit court rendered in 2001.  Dairyland's 
complaint involved the 1991-92 and the 1998-99 Indian gaming 
compacts.  The majority opinion concludes that the games added 
to the compacts in 2003 do not violate Wisconsin law.  Majority 
op., ¶91.  However, the 2003 gaming compacts were never 
presented to the circuit court and therefore, they are not 
properly brought before this court as we review the circuit 
court decision.  All that we are to decide is the effect of 
Article IV, Section 24 of the Wisconsin Constitution, amended in 
1993, as it relates to games that were included in the 1991-92 
and the 1998-99 Indian gaming compacts. 
¶286 In 2004, we decided the meaning and effect of the 1993 
constitutional amendments and criminal statutes on the new types 
of games that were added to the Indian gaming compacts in 2003; 
the new games violate Wisconsin's criminal statutes.  Panzer v. 
Doyle, 2004 WI 52, ¶96, 271 Wis. 2d 295, 680 N.W.2d 666.  The 
decisions of this court are final if not set aside on a motion 
for reconsideration in the case in which the ruling was issued, 
Wis. Stat. § 809.64 (2003-04),1 or overturned by a federal court 
on a federal question, see State v. Webster, 114 Wis. 2d 418, 
426 n.4, 338 N.W.2d 474 (1983).  Notwithstanding this rule of 
law, at the request of the Governor, the majority opinion takes 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2003-04 version unless otherwise noted. 
No.  2003AP421.pdr 
 
2 
 
up an issue we decided in 2004 and puts it into the appeal of a 
2001 circuit court decision.  In his request, the Governor 
asserts 
that 
Article 
IV, 
Section 
24 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, enacted by the people of Wisconsin, cannot be 
applied to the Tribal Nations that have gambling operations in 
Wisconsin.   
¶287 The majority opinion adopts the view of the Governor, 
wherein he argues on behalf of the Tribal Nations that Article 
IV, Section 24 of the Wisconsin Constitution cannot be applied 
to Indian gambling operations in Wisconsin.  Majority op., ¶¶2, 
91.  In so doing, the majority opinion surrenders the judicial 
independence of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin to the Governor, 
thereby stripping the court of its claim to be an impartial 
decision maker and of its ability to act as a check on the 
political 
branches 
in 
Wisconsin's 
tripartite 
system 
of 
government.  The majority opinion does so under the guise of an 
impairment of contracts discussion based largely on Article I, 
Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution.  Majority op., ¶¶51-95.  In 
its efforts to achieve the result the Governor has requested, 
the majority opinion chooses to ignore controlling precedent of 
the United States Supreme Court, which if applied, would uphold 
the State of Wisconsin's ability to enforce Wisconsin's criminal 
statutes that prohibit any type of Class III gambling that was 
not permitted before the 1993 constitutional amendment to 
Article IV, Section 24 of the Wisconsin Constitution.   
¶288 The 
majority 
opinion 
and 
Justice 
Prosser's 
concurrence/dissent agree that Article IV, Section 24 of the 
No.  2003AP421.pdr 
 
3 
 
Wisconsin Constitution is a substantive constitutional amendment 
that is prospective in effect.  Majority op., ¶22; Justice 
Prosser's concurrence/dissent, ¶¶228-33.  However, the majority 
interprets the 1993 amendment as having no effect on the 
compacts as a whole, majority op., ¶91, and Justice Prosser 
concludes the 1993 amendment has no effect on the types of games 
that were lawfully compacted prior to the 1993 constitutional 
amendment because of the amendment's prospective effect, Justice 
Prosser's concurrence/dissent, ¶¶228-33.  I agree with Justice 
Prosser that the 1993 amendment did not prohibit those types of 
games that were lawfully compacted for in 1991-92.2  Therefore, 
any type of game included in an Indian gaming compact prior to 
1993 remained lawfully compactable subsequent to the 1993 
amendment.  Id.  Because the 1998-99 compact amendments added no 
new types of games, the 1998-99 compacts are lawful as well.3  No 
party has terminated the 1998-99 compacts according to their 
provisions; 
therefore, 
they 
remain 
in 
effect, 
with 
an 
                                                 
2 The majority opinion asserts that I do not discuss the 
prohibition 
of 
Article 
IV, 
Section 
24 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution with regard to the casino games that were agreed 
upon in the 1991-92 compacts, and that failing to do so 
undermines the argument that new types of games added in 2003 
are unconstitutional.  Majority op., ¶20 n.23.  I do not discuss 
the casino games of the 1991-92 compacts because I agree with 
the concurrence/dissent of Justice Prosser:  Article IV, Section 
24 is prospective in its prohibition of the types of casino 
games that can be lawfully operated. 
3 Although the number of slot machines and blackjack tables 
increased in 1998, no new types of games were added to the 
compacts. 
No.  2003AP421.pdr 
 
4 
 
opportunity to amend or to non-renew next occurring in 2008.4  
Accordingly, I concur in the affirmance of the dismissal of 
Dairyland's complaint.  
¶289 However, 
I 
dissent 
from 
the 
majority 
opinion's 
consideration of and decision about the new types of games that 
were added in the 2003 compacts for the following reasons:  (1) 
in acceding to the Governor's request on behalf of the Tribal 
Nations, the majority opinion surrenders this court's judicial 
independence so necessary to protect the people of Wisconsin in 
a tripartite system of government; (2) the gaming compacts are 
not the type of contract that is protected by either Article I, 
Section 12 of the Wisconsin Constitution or Article I, Section 
10 of the U.S. Constitution; (3) there is no obligation to 
contract for new types of games that were not permitted under 
the 1991-92 compacts; therefore, there can be no impairment of a 
contractual obligation in that regard; and (4) the State has a 
significant and legitimate public purpose in controlling the 
type of gambling that occurs within Wisconsin's borders, which 
Article I, Section 10 does not affect.   
                                                 
4 The 1998-99 compacts contain an opportunity to give notice 
of non-renewal every five years.  As no notice was given in 
2003, the compacts are in effect until at least 2008. 
No.  2003AP421.pdr 
 
5 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶290 This appeal is taken from a 2001 circuit court 
decision granting the Governor's5 motion for summary judgment 
dismissing 
Dairyland's 
complaint. 
 
It 
is 
before 
us 
on 
certification from the court of appeals.  Dairyland asserts that 
the Class III casino games included in the 1991-92 gaming 
compacts are prohibited by the 1993 constitutional amendment in 
combination with state criminal statutes.  Dairyland argues that 
this prohibition forms the legal basis for an order requiring 
the Governor to give notice of non-renewal of the compacts.  
Complaint, ¶¶13, 16 and 41-42 (Dane County Cir. Ct. Oct. 22, 
2001).  Accordingly, we are required to establish the meaning 
and effect of Article 
IV, 
Section 
24 of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution in regard to whether the types of casino games that 
were compacted for in 1991-92 may continue after the 1993 
constitutional amendment.  
¶291 In the analysis of the provisions of Article IV, 
Section 24 of the Wisconsin Constitution that relate to the 
issues presented by this appeal, it is important to recognize 
what we decided, and what we did not decide, about the 1993 
constitutional amendment in Panzer.  Panzer concluded that the 
1991-92 compacts were lawful when entered into, Panzer, 271 
Wis. 2d 295, ¶99, but that any new type of game not included in 
those 
compacts 
was 
prohibited 
by 
the 
laws 
of 
Wisconsin 
subsequent to 1993, id., ¶96.  We did not decide whether the 
                                                 
5 For purposes of ease of expression, I refer to the 
Governor and the Secretary of the Department of Administration 
as "the Governor." 
No.  2003AP421.pdr 
 
6 
 
types of games that were lawfully compacted in 1991-92 retained 
their lawful status after the 1993 constitutional amendment was 
ratified by the citizens of Wisconsin because that question was 
not before us.  Id., ¶102.  We also concluded that the 1993 
constitutional amendment, in combination with Wisconsin criminal 
statutes, set out a state policy that prohibited all types of 
Class III games that were not of a type included in the 1991-92 
compacts.  Id., ¶¶96-97.   
¶292 The Governor asks us to hold that those same types of 
games that our 2004 decision in Panzer held were unlawful 
additions to the 2003 compacts are not prohibited by the very 
same constitutional provision.  However, judicial independence, 
the doctrine of stare decisis6 and the application of controlling 
United States Supreme Court precedent require that we reject 
this request.  Because I join the concurrence/dissent of Justice 
David Prosser, which thoroughly explains the meaning and effect 
of the 1993 constitutional amendment in regard to the types of 
                                                 
6 It is a longstanding rule that this court "is bound by its 
own precedent."  State v. Hansen, 2001 WI 53, ¶52, 243 Wis. 2d 
328, 627 N.W.2d 195 (citation omitted).  Failing to abide by 
stare decisis raises serious concerns as to whether the court is 
implementing "principles . . . founded in the law rather than in 
the proclivities of individuals."  Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 
808, 853 (1991) (quoting Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 
(1986)).   
No.  2003AP421.pdr 
 
7 
 
Class III7 games set out in the 1991-92 and 1998-99 compacts, I 
focus my concurrence/dissent on judicial independence and the 
majority opinion's contract impairment discussion. 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. 
Judicial Independence 
¶293 Judicial independence is universally recognized as 
central to a democratic form of government.  But what does that 
phrase, judicial independence, really mean?  We can determine 
its meaning, in part, by what it was designed to accomplish.  
For example, judicial independence is essential in a tripartite 
system of government where the judicial branch is to act as a 
check on the two political branches——executive and legislative.  
All would agree that judicial independence is a pillar of 
American jurisprudence that implies that courts should be 
trusted to issue decisions based on a rule of law, rather than 
                                                 
7 The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) created three 
classes of gaming, which classes are based on types of games.  
25 U.S.C. §§ 2703(6)-(8).  The types of games that Indian tribes 
may offer under Class I are traditional Indian social gaming, 
§ 2703(6), and whether to offer those games is determined solely 
by the tribes, with the states having no control over those 
decisions, 25 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1).  Class II gaming includes 
bingo, whether or not it is electronically or computer assisted 
and if played in the same location, pull-tabs, lotto, punch 
boards, tip jars, instant bingo, and other similar games, as 
well as card games that are explicitly authorized by the state; 
however, it does not include any banking card games, such as 
baccarat, 
chemin 
de 
fer, 
blackjack, 
electronic 
or 
electromechanical facsimiles of the same or slot machines.  
§ 2703(7).  Class II gaming may be operated in a state that 
permits such gaming for any purpose.  § 2710(b)(1).  Class III 
gaming includes all types of games that do not fall within 
Classes I or II, § 2703(8), and Class III games are the types of 
games that the states generally regulate most heavily and may be 
operated only pursuant to a tribal-state compact, § 2710(d). 
No.  2003AP421.pdr 
 
8 
 
permitting pressures from extra judicial sources to drive their 
decisions.  Judicial independence requires a high level of 
judicial integrity and courage to make the "tough decisions," 
without being affected by political favors or reprisals.  The 
integrity of the court as an institution is critical when the 
surrounding political context in which a case arises is highly 
charged or when the other branches of government are under 
particularly strong political pressure in regard to the issues a 
case presents.   
¶294 Judicial independence is often described as being of 
two general types:  decisional independence and institutional 
independence.  Eli M. Salzberger, A Positive Analysis of the 
Doctrine of Separation of Powers, or:  Why Do We Have an 
Independent Judiciary?, 13 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 349, 351-52 
(1993) [hereinafter A Positive Analysis of the Doctrine of 
Separation of Powers].   
¶295 Decisional independence is adherence to the rule of 
law in individual cases, such that decisions of a court or an 
individual judge are not affected by the demands of another 
branch of government or by political agendas.  Id.  "[A]n 
independent judiciary requires also that [its] decisions, once 
given, would not be altered or ignored by the government 
(responsible to enforce them)."  Id. at 352.   
¶296 Institutional independence focuses on independence of 
the entire judicial branch of government from the legislative 
and executive branches.  It is most often associated with the 
separation of powers doctrine, though in reality both decisional 
No.  2003AP421.pdr 
 
9 
 
and 
institutional 
independence 
have 
separation 
of 
powers 
qualities.  For example, the legislature may enact a statute 
that affects the functioning of courts as an institution.  See 
State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 41-47, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1982) 
(concluding 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.20(5) 
(1979-80), 
which 
provides for the preemptory right of substitution of judges, is 
constitutional because the statute was enacted in an area of 
shared power).  Or, the legislature may enact a statute that 
effectively overrules an individual supreme court decision.  See 
Verdoljak v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 200 Wis. 2d 624, 633-34, 547 
N.W.2d 602 (1996).  
¶297 In my view, the majority opinion surrenders the 
decisional independence of this court to the Governor, who heads 
the executive branch, and is arguing against applying Article 
IV, Section 24 of the Wisconsin Constitution to the Tribal 
Nations.  The majority opinion does so by overruling this 
court's decision in Panzer, where we decided that the new types 
of games that were added to the tribal compacts in 2003 violated 
the 
1993 
constitutional 
amendment 
and 
were, 
therefore, 
prohibited by the criminal laws of the State of Wisconsin.  
Panzer, 271 Wis. 2d 295, ¶¶96-97.   
¶298 Panzer was issued on May 13, 2004.  That decision was 
subject to a motion for reconsideration for 20 days from May 13, 
2004.  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.64.  A motion for reconsideration 
made more than 20 days after a decision of the supreme court is 
not timely and will not be heard.  Lobermeier v. Gen. Tel. Co. 
of Wis., 120 Wis. 2d 419, 421-22, 355 N.W.2d 531 (1984).  No 
No.  2003AP421.pdr 
 
10 
 
motion for reconsideration was made in Panzer.8  My research 
shows that no appeal was filed in any federal court.  Therefore, 
the issue of whether the new types of games that were added to 
the compacts in 2003 could be lawfully operated in Wisconsin is 
not subject to further review, unless it were an issue in a case 
that was subsequently before us.   
¶299 The summary judgment dismissing Dairyland's complaint 
was granted by the circuit court in 2001.  That decision did not 
involve the issue of whether the new types of games that were 
added to the compacts in 2003 were prohibited by Article IV, 
Section 24 of the Wisconsin Constitution and the criminal code 
of Wisconsin.  The circuit court decision could not have 
reviewed the new types of games that were added in 2003 because 
those facts were not then in existence for the circuit court to 
address.   
¶300 The 
majority opinion's decision to 
overrule our 
holding in Panzer is the culmination of an ongoing effort by the 
executive branch to undermine the judicial independence of this 
court in regard to Indian gaming compacts.  To explain:  shortly 
after our decision in Panzer was released, the executive branch 
of Wisconsin government sent out a clear message that it would 
not enforce our decision.9  All of the Tribal Nations that have 
                                                 
8 The records at the clerk of the supreme court show that 
the court file in Panzer was closed on July 13, 2004, without 
the filing of a motion for reconsideration. 
9 See Oneida Nation Pays State $20 Million, Capital Times, 
June 30, 2004, at 5A. 
No.  2003AP421.pdr 
 
11 
 
gaming compacts, except one, the Ho-Chunk Nation,10 have picked 
up on this message and, subsequent to our decision in Panzer, 
they have continued to operate games that, according to Panzer, 
violate the criminal laws of Wisconsin.  
¶301 The Governor, as the head of the executive branch of 
Wisconsin government, is charged by Article V, Section 4 of the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution,11 
with 
enforcing 
the 
laws.  
Notwithstanding this constitutional obligation and the oath the 
Governor took upon entering office, the Governor has done 
nothing to enforce our 2004 decision in Panzer.  To the 
contrary, the types of games we concluded were unlawful in 
Wisconsin in our 2004 decision are operated with the full 
knowledge and consent of the Governor.  In my view, the failure 
of the Governor to enforce the law is exactly the type of 
undercutting of judicial 
independence 
that 
Eli 
Salzberger 
cautioned against at the 1993 International Conference when he 
said, "an independent judiciary requires also that [its] 
decisions, once given, would not be altered or ignored by the 
government."  A Positive Analysis of the Doctrine of Separation 
of Powers, at 352.  
                                                 
10 I sincerely appreciate the respect shown to Panzer v. 
Doyle, 2004 WI 52, 271 Wis. 2d 295, 680 N.W.2d 666 by the Ho-
Chunk Nation.  It is the type of mutual respect between the 
courts of the Tribal Nations and the courts of Wisconsin we 
sought to facilitate through the State Court/Tribal Court Forum, 
first begun in 1997.   
11 Article V, Section 4 provides in relevant part: 
The governor . . . shall take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed. 
No.  2003AP421.pdr 
 
12 
 
¶302 The executive branch's public lack of respect for the 
decisions of this court also undermines our tripartite system of 
government, which was created with checks and balances among the 
three branches of government.  Judicial independence is required 
to sustain those checks and balances.  We magnify the executive 
branch's lack of respect for the courts as an independent branch 
of government necessary to a tripartite system of government 
when we disregard our own rules and contort the law in order to 
achieve a particular result, as the majority does here. 
¶303 There are methods by which to affect a decision of 
this court that do not impair the court's independence.  For 
example, if the Governor really thought that this court's 
decision in Panzer was not in accord with Article IV, Section 24 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, 
he 
could 
have 
asked 
the 
legislature to introduce a further constitutional amendment to 
specify that Indian gaming compacts are not within the scope of 
the constitutional prohibition contained in Article IV, Section 
24.  However, when the majority opinion takes up an issue that 
we previously decided and places it in a case where the issue 
never existed, we assist the Governor in tearing apart the 
institutional integrity of this court.  A court that lacks 
institutional integrity does not establish a rule of law; 
rather, it establishes only the personal preferences of the men 
and women who hold office on the court at any given time.  
B. 
Impairment of Contract 
¶304 The 
majority 
opinion 
relies 
mainly 
on 
its 
interpretation 
of 
Article 
I, 
Section 
10 
of 
the 
U.S. 
No.  2003AP421.pdr 
 
13 
 
Constitution.  See majority op., ¶¶2, 51-59, 69-79.  However, 
with no discussion except to assert that "our prior decisions 
[regarding 
Contract 
Clause 
issues] 
have 
relied 
upon 
the 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court," the majority 
refers to Article I, Section 12 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  
Majority op., ¶51.  Neither constitution protects the new types 
of games that were added in 2003. 
1. 
Wisconsin Constitution, Article I, Section 12  
¶305 The Governor enters into compacts with the Tribal 
Nations on behalf of the State.  The Wisconsin Constitution does 
not protect the State from impairing its own contractual 
obligations to itself, although it could potentially protect 
another party who had a contract with the State.  Article I, 
Section 
12 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
protects 
the 
contractual obligations of other contracting parties to be free 
from interference by the State.  Article I, Section 12 provides: 
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, nor any 
law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall ever 
be passed . . . .  
It makes no sense to say that the State of Wisconsin can claim 
that its own obligation of contract that is protected by one 
provision in the Wisconsin Constitution is unconstitutionally 
impaired by another provision of the Wisconsin Constitution.  
Essentially, the State 
would have 
to 
claim 
that 
it is 
interfering with itself.12  Yet this is the conclusion the 
                                                 
12 While the Tribal Nations might have been able to make 
this argument, the Tribal Nations have chosen not to be parties 
to this lawsuit.   
No.  2003AP421.pdr 
 
14 
 
majority opinion reaches.  Majority op., ¶2.  No citations to 
legal authority are given to support this conclusion.   
 
2. 
United States Constitution, Article I, Section 10 
¶306 I begin by setting out a basic principle of Article I, 
Section 10 discussions: 
Although the language of the Contract Clause is 
facially 
absolute, 
its 
prohibition 
must 
be 
accommodated to the inherent police power of the State 
"to safeguard the vital interests of its people." 
Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 
U.S. 400, 410 (1983) (quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. 
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 434 (1934)).  My discussion employs 
this principle to come to three conclusions:  (1) a contract 
that permits gambling is not the type of contract that Article 
I, Section 10 protects; (2) there is no contractual obligation 
to agree to new types of games that were not permitted under the 
1991-92 compacts; therefore, there can be no impairment of a 
contractual obligation in that regard; and (3) even if I were to 
assume that gambling contracts are of a type that potentially 
could be protected under Article I, Section 10 and also assume 
that there is an obligation to contract for additional types of 
games, Article IV, Section 24 of the Wisconsin Constitution does 
not run afoul of the U.S. Constitution because the State of 
Wisconsin has a significant and legitimate public purpose in 
controlling the scope of gambling within its boundaries.  
¶307 The 
majority opinion 
concludes that 
Article IV, 
Section 24 of the Wisconsin Constitution, as interpreted in 
Panzer to prohibit expansion of the types of gambling beyond 
No.  2003AP421.pdr 
 
15 
 
that contracted for in 1991-92, violates Article I, Section 10 
of the U.S. Constitution.  Majority op., ¶2. 
a. 
There is no protection for gambling contracts under 
Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution. 
¶308 The first question that must be answered in any case 
where constitutional protection is sought for a contract under 
Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution is whether the 
contract is of a type for which constitutional protection 
potentially could be afforded.  See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein, 
503 U.S. 181, 187 (1992).  The answer to this question is 
determined by the application of federal law.  See id.  As the 
United States Supreme Court explained, whether a contract comes 
within the scope of those contracts to which Article I, Section 
10 applies is an issue that underlies the oft-repeated question 
of whether a change in state law resulted in a substantial 
impairment of a contractual obligation.  See id. at 186.  This 
question must be answered in the negative in the case before us, 
and that answer should be decisive of the impairment of contract 
question as it relates to the United States Constitution.   
¶309 I begin with the federal constitutional provision, 
Article I, Section 10.  It states in relevant part: 
No state shall . . . pass any . . . law impairing 
the obligation of contracts . . . . 
The above statement seems broad and absolute.  However, it has 
never been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court to 
preclude a state from legislating to protect the public health 
No.  2003AP421.pdr 
 
16 
 
or morals, regardless of what terms a contract with a state 
contains.13  Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 818 (1879).   
¶310 In Stone, the legislature of Mississippi granted a 
charter to a company to run a lottery for 25 years in 
consideration for a stated sum of cash and annual payments of 
additional sums.  Id. at 817.  One year later, the citizens of 
the State of Mississippi adopted a constitutional provision that 
declared that the legislature could not authorize any lottery 
and therefore, the lottery had to be discontinued.  Id. at 819.  
In its analysis, the Supreme Court explained that when an 
impairment of contract argument is made, the first inquiry is 
always "whether a contract has in fact been entered into, and if 
so, what its obligations are."  Id. at 817.  The Supreme Court 
set the inquiry as "whether the State of Mississippi, in its 
sovereign capacity, did by the charter now under consideration 
bind itself irrevocably by a contract to permit [the lottery] 
for twenty-five years."  Id.  The Court concluded that the 
language of the charter was clear so that the question of 
whether the state had bound itself turned on whether the 
legislature had the "authority" to bind the state and its people 
to the charter.  Id.  In concluding that the legislature had no 
such authority, the Court explained that "the legislature cannot 
bargain away the police power of a State.  . . .  [N]o 
                                                 
13 While a state's police power may be exercised in many 
substantive areas, no case cited in the majority opinion, or 
that I could find, holds that Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. 
Constitution provides protection when the contract at issue is 
affected by a state law that regulates in the area of public 
morals.  
No.  2003AP421.pdr 
 
17 
 
legislature can curtail the power of its successors to make such 
laws as they may deem proper in matters of police."  Id. at 817-
18.  In defining what comes within the "police power" of a 
state, the Court explained that while the police power has been 
defined in many ways, it always "extends to all matters 
affecting the public health or the public morals.  Neither can 
it be denied that lotteries are proper subjects for the exercise 
of this power."  Id. at 818 (citation omitted).  In concluding 
that the State of Mississippi could not bargain away its right 
to prohibit lotteries in the future, the court explained: 
[that whether] the legislature of a State can, by the 
charter of a lottery company, defeat the will of the 
people, authoritatively expressed, in relation to the 
further continuance of such business in their midst[,] 
[w]e think it cannot.  No legislature can bargain away 
the public health or the public morals. 
Id. at 819.   
¶311 This same limitation on the authority of a state to 
contract away its police power in the regulation of public 
morals was addressed in Douglas v. Kentucky, 168 U.S. 488 
(1897).  In Douglas, the State of Kentucky, by constitutional 
provision, forbade the operation of lotteries.  Id. at 489.  
Douglas claimed he had a contractually "vested right" to operate 
a lottery by virtue of a written agreement with the City of 
Frankfort, id. at 492, "which the State was forbidden by the 
Constitution of the United States" from impairing, id. at 495.  
One of the initial issues the Court addressed in analyzing 
Douglas's impairment of contract claim was, "whether that which 
the defendant asserts to be a contract was a contract of the 
No.  2003AP421.pdr 
 
18 
 
class to which the Constitution of the United States refers."  
Id. at 500.  Because the regulation of gambling is a regulation 
affecting public morals, which a state always has the power to 
affect, the Supreme Court concluded that a contract to operate a 
lottery was not the type of contract that falls within the scope 
of Article I, Section 10. 
[W]e hold that a lottery grant is not, in any sense, a 
contract within the meaning of the Constitution of the 
United States, but is simply a gratuity and license, 
which the State, under its police powers, and for the 
protection of the public morals, may at any time 
revoke, and forbid the further conduct of the lottery; 
and that no right acquired during the life of the 
grant, on the faith of or by agreement with the 
grantee, can be exercised after the revocation of such 
grant and the forbidding of the lottery, if its 
exercise involves a continuance of the lottery as 
originally authorized.  All rights acquired on the 
faith of a lottery grant must be deemed to have been 
acquired subject to the power of the State . . . . 
Id. at 502-03 (emphasis added).   
¶312 The retention by the sovereign of its authority to 
exercise its police power in matters of public morals and 
safety, notwithstanding an assertion of contract rights to 
curtail the sovereign, was strongly reaffirmed in Atlantic Coast 
Line Railroad Co. v. City of Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548 (1914): 
[I]t is settled that neither the "contract" clause nor 
the "due process" clause has the effect of overriding 
the power of the State to establish all regulations 
that are reasonably necessary to secure the health, 
safety, good order, comfort, or general welfare of the 
community; that this power can neither be abdicated 
nor bargained away, and is inalienable even by express 
grant; and that all contract and property rights are 
held subject to its fair exercise. 
Id. at 558 (emphasis added). 
No.  2003AP421.pdr 
 
19 
 
¶313 The principles of constitutional interpretation that 
were laid down in Stone, Douglas and Atlantic Coast Line were 
reaffirmed by the United States Supreme Court in United States 
v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996).  Winstar involved a claim 
that the United States was contractually obligated to permit 
financial institutions to use special accounting methods that 
were authorized in exchange for the institutions' assumption of 
liabilities of other failed financial institutions, despite 
changes made in the law under FIRREA.14  Id. at 843, 858-61.  
Winstar argued, among other things, that the passage of FIRREA 
violated its rights under Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. 
Constitution.  Id. at 860. 
¶314 In reviewing the common law history of the ability of 
one session of Congress to undo what an earlier session had 
provided, the Supreme Court explained the "unmistakability 
doctrine," which has been used where the regulations at issue 
affected economic interests.  Id. at 871-80.  This doctrine 
permitted the court to side-step the effect of Article I, 
Section 10 on the claimed contract right by concluding that 
absent an unmistakable provision to the contrary, "contractual 
arrangements, including those to which a sovereign itself is a 
party, 'remain subject to subsequent legislation' by the 
sovereign."  Id. at 877 (quoting Bowen v. Public Agencies 
Opposed to Social Security Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 52 (1986)).   
                                                 
14 "FIRREA" is the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, 
and Enforcement Act of 1989.  United States v. Winstar Corp., 
518 U.S. 839, 856 (1996). 
No.  2003AP421.pdr 
 
20 
 
¶315 Winstar explained that the unmistakability doctrine 
was not universally applied because of "the different kinds of 
obligations the Government may assume and the consequences of 
enforcing them."  Winstar, 518 U.S. at 880.  Winstar noted that 
at times a variant of the unmistakability doctrine was referred 
to 
as 
the 
"reserved 
powers 
doctrine," 
wherein 
"a 
state 
government may not contract away 'an essential attribute of its 
sovereignty.'"  Id. at 888 (citing U.S. Trust Co. of New York v. 
New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 23 (1977)).  Winstar went on to explain 
that "a classic example" of the limitations on a state's ability 
to contract for certain provisions was shown by Stone where the 
Supreme Court held that the legislature had no power to contract 
away the sovereign's police power in areas affecting public 
morals.  Winstar, 518 U.S. at 888.  Furthermore, as the Court 
held in U.S. Trust: 
[The 
doctrine 
of 
reserved 
powers] 
requires 
a 
determination 
of 
the 
State's 
power 
to 
create 
irrevocable contract rights in the first place, rather 
than an inquiry into the purpose or reasonableness of 
the subsequent impairment.  In short, the Contract 
Clause does not require a State to adhere to a 
contract that surrenders an essential attribute of its 
sovereignty. 
U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 23. 
¶316 The Indian gaming compacts are contracts to permit 
gambling, pure and simple.  Article IV, Section 24 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution and the criminal laws contained within 
ch. 945 of the Wisconsin Statutes prohibit gambling.  Laws that 
affect gambling of any type operate in regard to public morals 
and are enacted pursuant to the police powers of the State of 
No.  2003AP421.pdr 
 
21 
 
Wisconsin.  City of Milwaukee v. Milwaukee Amusement, Inc., 22 
Wis. 2d 240, 250-51, 125 N.W.2d 625 (1964).   
¶317 In Milwaukee Amusement, we examined a city's action to 
collect a forfeiture from Milwaukee Amusement because its 
pinball machines violated the city's anti-gambling ordinance.  
Id. at 246.  After concluding that the pinball machines were a 
gambling device, we addressed Milwaukee Amusement's contention 
that the ordinance was unlawful.  Id. at 251.  In concluding 
that the ordinance was valid, we clearly explained that the 
regulation of gambling by a governmental body was done in the 
exercise of the police power. 
Ordinances, such as the instant one, proscribing 
gambling devices are enacted pursuant to the city's 
police power.  Estoppel will not lie against a 
municipality so as to bar it from enforcing an 
ordinance enacted pursuant to the police power.   
Milwaukee Amusement, 22 Wis. 2d at 253 (citation omitted).  Also 
in Wisconsin Bingo Supply & Equipment Co. v. Wisconsin Bingo 
Control Board, 88 Wis. 2d 293, 276 N.W.2d 716 (1979), while 
addressing a challenge to a statute that permanently barred 
gambling promoters from obtaining a bingo supplier license, we 
explained that the statute was enacted in the legislature's 
exercise of its police power: 
[A] state may make any reasonable classification which 
it deems necessary to the police purpose intended to 
be attained by the legislation . . . .  
Id. at 307 (citation omitted). 
¶318 By adopting the Governor's argument on impairment of 
contract, the majority abrogates the State of Wisconsin's 
sovereign 
police 
power 
to 
regulate 
gambling 
within 
its 
No.  2003AP421.pdr 
 
22 
 
jurisdiction.  Even though this is a federal question that is to 
be decided based on precedent of the United States Supreme 
Court, the majority opinion ignores this precedent.15  As the 
Supreme Court explained in Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212 (1905):  
The plain object of this legislation is to discourage, 
and, if possible, prevent gambling.  . . .  We are 
aware of no provision in the Federal Constitution 
which prevents this kind of legislation in a State for 
such a purpose. 
Id. at 225.   
¶319 We are required to follow the precedent set by the 
United States Supreme Court on questions of federal law, such as 
the meaning of a provision of the United States Constitution.  
Webster, 114 Wis. 2d at 426 n.4.  And as I noted earlier, it is 
a question of federal law whether a contract has been created 
that is of a type that potentially could be protected by the 
United States Constitution.  Gen. Motors, 503 U.S. at 187.  The 
Court has consistently held that a state cannot create a binding 
contract to which Article I, Section 10 protections attach when 
the subject matter of the contract comes within the scope of the 
state's legislation in areas affecting public morals, as does 
gambling.  Winstar, 518 U.S. at 888; U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 23; 
Atlantic Coast Line, 232 U.S. at 558; Marvin, 199 U.S. at 225; 
Douglas, 168 U.S. at 502-03; Stone, 101 U.S. at 819.   
                                                 
15 Instead of analyzing the cases cited above or other cases 
it deems controlling on this question, the majority opinion 
simply cites one paragraph from a commentator, James M. 
McGoldrick, Jr.  Majority op., ¶53.  However, McGoldrick does 
not dispute that when a state exercises its police power to 
regulate public morals, Article I, Section 10 does not apply. 
No.  2003AP421.pdr 
 
23 
 
¶320 The contract provisions the Governor seeks to protect 
pertain to the operation of certain types of gambling and the 
potential for amendment of the compact to add additional types 
of gambling.  State action in regard to gambling is within the 
state's sovereign police power; this right cannot be abrogated 
by contract, now or in the future.  Stone, 101 U.S. at 819.  
Therefore, it does not matter whether the court examines the 
contracts as a whole, as the majority does, or whether the court 
examines the contracts in regard to the new provisions that 
affect the types of games permitted.  They are contracts that 
affect public morals and therefore, the U.S. Constitution does 
not afford protection to them.  
¶321 The majority opinion puts the cart before the horse, 
when it relies on Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 
U.S. 234 (1978), Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & 
Light Co., 459 U.S. 400 (1983), U.S. Trust Co. and Wisconsin 
Professional Police Ass'n v. Lightbourn, 2001 WI 59, 243 Wis. 2d 
512, 627 N.W.2d 807 for its impairment of contract analysis.  
Majority op., ¶¶55-58.  As explained above, those cases, with 
the exception of a portion of U.S. Trust Co. that the majority 
No.  2003AP421.pdr 
 
24 
 
opinion chooses to ignore,16 have no application to the initial 
contract question presented here.  Accordingly, the majority 
opinion errs when it concludes that Wisconsin has bargained away 
its sovereign right to establish the types of gambling that are 
prohibited within its borders.17  
¶322  In countering the conclusion that the State maintains 
its sovereign authority under its police power to legislate in 
areas affecting public morals, the majority opinion asserts that 
the State has no jurisdiction to enforce its criminal laws on 
tribal land unless such jurisdiction has been granted by the 
federal government.  Majority op., ¶73.  I have no quarrel with 
this assertion; however, it has absolutely no relevance to 
whether the State of Wisconsin can enforce its criminal laws 
that prohibit gambling on tribal land.  The compacts themselves 
recognize the authority of the State to enforce the State's 
criminal laws in regard to gambling on tribal land.   
                                                 
16 United States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 
U.S. 1 (1977), explains, "The initial inquiry concerns the 
ability of the State to enter into an agreement that limits its 
power to act in the future.  . . .  In short, the Contract 
Clause does not require a State to adhere to a contract that 
surrenders an essential attribute of its sovereignty."  Id., 431 
U.S. at 23.  The court also explained that the inability of a 
state to limit its own sovereign powers depended on the subject 
matter of that limitation.  For example, in areas of public 
morals, the state could not create a binding contract that gave 
up its power to act in the future, but a state could enter into 
effective financial contracts that will restrict future state 
action.  Id. at 23-27. 
17 Only if the contract is of a type that may be protected 
by the United States Constitution, does the analysis shift to 
whether there has been a substantial impairment of a contractual 
obligation.  Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 186 
(1992).   
No.  2003AP421.pdr 
 
25 
 
XVIII. ALLOCATION OF JURISDICTION 
. . .  
B.  Criminal jurisdiction. 
 
1.  The State, except as provided in par. B.2. 
and sec. XXIII, shall have jurisdiction to prosecute 
such 
criminal 
violations 
of 
its 
gambling 
laws, 
including amendments thereto, as may occur on tribal 
lands.  This jurisdiction may be exercised in a 
similar manner as the State exercises general criminal 
jurisdiction pursuant to Public Law 280, 18 U.S.C. 
section 1162.  Consent of the Attorney General of 
Wisconsin 
shall 
be 
a 
condition 
precedent 
to 
commencement of any prosecution.  This provision shall 
not survive the term and termination of this Compact.   
Forest County Potawatomi Community of Wisconsin and State of 
Wisconsin Gaming Compact of 1992 (1992 Gaming Compact), Section 
XVIII, B. 1.  
 
b. 
The 1991-92 compacts created no contractual obligation 
to add new types of gambling. 
¶323 The majority opinion also assumes that the compacts 
contain an obligation to amend the compacts to permit the 
addition of new types of gambling that were not permitted under 
the 1991-92 compacts.  Majority op., ¶82.  The majority then 
assumes that the application of Article IV, Section 24 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution to the compacts impairs this obligation 
of contract contrary to Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. 
Constitution.  Majority op., ¶91. 
¶324 The majority opinion's assumptions are incorrect.  It 
misses the first step in basic contract analysis, which is:  did 
the 1991-92 compacts create a contractual obligation to add new 
types of games?  The creation of a property right in a contract 
is determined under state law.  Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n 
No.  2003AP421.pdr 
 
26 
 
v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 519 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting).  Under Wisconsin law, an agreement to reach an 
agreement in the future imposes no contractual obligation on 
either party.  Dunlop v. Laitsch, 16 Wis. 2d 36, 42, 113 N.W.2d 
551 (1962).  In order to have a contractual right, the parties' 
agreement must be "definite" and "certain."  Petersen v. Pilgrim 
Village, 256 Wis. 621, 624-25, 42 N.W.2d 273 (1950).  However, 
the 1991-92 compacts create no contractual obligation to amend 
the compacts to add new types of gambling because no provision 
creates a "definite and certain" obligation in that regard.  The 
majority opinion ignores this basic principle of contract law, 
i.e., it never concludes that the State had a contractual 
obligation to add any new types of games to those that are 
listed in the 1991-92 compacts. 
¶325 To explain why there is no obligation to add new types 
of games, I review the compact provisions that conceivably could 
be interpreted to relate to amending the types of Class III 
gambling that were permitted in the 1991-92 gaming compacts: 
IV.  AUTHORIZED CLASS III GAMING. 
. . .  
 
B.  The Tribe may not operate any Class III 
gaming not expressly enumerated in this section of 
this Compact unless this Compact is amended pursuant 
to section XXX.  
1992 Gaming Compact, Section IV, B. 
XXX.  AMENDMENT. 
This Compact shall not be modified, amended or 
otherwise altered without the prior written agreement 
of both the State and the Tribe. 
No.  2003AP421.pdr 
 
27 
 
Id., Section XXX.  These provisions are too indefinite to create 
a contractual obligation to add additional types of games.  For 
example, Section IV. B. of the compacts is a prohibitory 
provision that expressly restricts the types of gambling that 
the Tribe may offer.  It says that the Tribe cannot operate any 
type of Class III gambling that is not "expressly enumerated" in 
Section IV of the compact.  It creates no state obligation to 
permit any new type of game, and it creates no tribal obligation 
to operate any type of game that is not listed in Section IV.   
¶326 Section XXX provides that only written alterations of 
the compact that are signed by both the State and the Tribe are 
binding.  It is a standard clause in most written contracts.  
Neither Section IV nor Section XXX is a definite provision that 
creates an obligation to add new types of games in the future; 
therefore, neither provision could give rise to a breach of 
contract action in that regard.  At most, those sections imply, 
but do not even promise, the possibility of mutually agreeing 
upon other unspecified games in the future.  Those provisions do 
not create a contractual obligation to add additional types of 
games.  As we have explained: 
To be enforceable a contract must be definite and 
certain as to its basic terms and requirements.  It 
must spell out the essential commitments and the 
obligations of each party with reasonable certainty. 
Witt v. Realist, Inc., 18 Wis. 2d 282, 297, 118 N.W.2d 85 
(1962); see also Shetney v. Shetney, 49 Wis. 2d 26, 39-40, 181 
N.W.2d 516 (1970) (concluding that discussions between the 
parties 
that 
they 
would 
mutually 
assist 
one 
another 
in 
No.  2003AP421.pdr 
 
28 
 
continuing their educations were insufficient to spell out a 
contractual obligation to do so).   
¶327 That the amendment provisions of the compacts are too 
vague to create an enforceable obligation is important because 
in order to have an impairment of contract claim, there must be 
a contract obligation under state law and federal law that is 
being impaired.  See Horwitz-Matthews, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 
78 F.3d 1248, 1250 (7th Cir. 1996).  Article I, Section 10 of 
the U.S. Constitution speaks to interference with contract 
obligations.  As the United States Supreme Court has explained, 
when a court is faced with a claim of impairment of a 
constitutional guarantee, "we begin by identifying the precise 
contractual right that has been impaired."  Keystone Bituminous 
Coal, 480 U.S. at 504.  There is no "precise contractual right" 
to add any new types of games to those included in the 1991-92 
compacts.  
¶328 The "obligation of contracts," to which Article I, 
Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution refers, has been described 
as having two parts:  (1) the obligation to perform the terms of 
the contract; and (2) the obligation to pay damages due to 
nonperformance.  Horwitz-Matthews, 78 F.3d at 1251 (citing 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, "The Path of the Law," 10 Harv. L. Rev. 
457, 462 (1897)).  Therefore, in order to have a claim under the 
constitution for "impairment" of an "obligation of contracts," 
the state law that prevents performance must also prevent a 
remedy for the breach of nonperformance.  Horwitz-Matthews, 78 
F.3d at 1251 (citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 
No.  2003AP421.pdr 
 
29 
 
1016 (1984) (concluding that in order to have a takings claim 
under the United States Constitution, there must be no ability 
to maintain a suit for compensation against the government)).  
As the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit so 
clearly explained: 
[W]hen a state repudiates a contract to which it is a 
party it is doing nothing different from what a 
private party does when the party repudiates a 
contract; it is committing a breach of contract.  It 
would be absurd to turn every breach of contract by a 
state or municipality into a violation of the federal 
Constitution. 
Horwitz-Matthews, 78 F.3d at 1250.   
¶329 What is apparent from the discussion above is that 
even if one were to assume, arguendo, that refusing to add a new 
type of game after the term of the 1991-92 compacts expired was 
a breach of the tribal compacts, that fact cannot form the basis 
for a constitutional claim of interference with a contractual 
obligation unless the State has prevented the Tribal Nations 
from recovering damages for the breach.  However, the circuit 
court, whose summary judgment we are reviewing, made no 
determination about whether the State breached its contract with 
the Tribal Nations by enacting Article IV, Section 24 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution; the circuit court made no determination 
about the damages for a breach.  However, before an impairment 
of contract claim will lie, there must be a breach of contract 
and a preclusion of damages for that breach.  Horwitz-Matthews, 
78 F.3d at 1251.   
¶330 Nevertheless, in order to permit the expansion of 
Indian gambling, the majority opinion completely ignores basic 
No.  2003AP421.pdr 
 
30 
 
precepts of constitutional law.  It never explains how the State 
became obligated to the Tribal Nations to permit additional 
games or what those games are.  In addition, because we are 
reviewing a 2001 decision of the circuit court, the majority 
opinion could not identify whether the State has breached its 
contract with the Tribal Nations and yet it concludes that 
Article IV, Section 24 of the Wisconsin Constitution interferes 
with a contractual obligation under the U.S. Constitution.  As 
we have explained above, before there can be an interference 
with a contract within the meaning of Article I, Section 10 of 
the U.S. Constitution, there must be an "obligation"; there must 
be a breach of that obligation; and the State must have 
precluded a remedy for the breach.  None of those conditions has 
occurred here. 
c. 
Controlling the scope of gambling in Wisconsin is a 
significant and legitimate public purpose.  
¶331 And finally, even if I were willing to ignore all the 
foundational requirements for the commencement of an impairment 
of contract analysis set out above and move into the majority 
opinion's three-part analysis, Article IV, Section 24 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution does not run afoul of the United States 
Constitution for at least two reasons:  (1) Article IV, Section 
24 does not operate as "a substantial impairment"; and (2) the 
State has a "significant and legitimate public purpose" behind 
its prohibition of all types of gambling.  Energy Reserves, 459 
U.S. at 411.   
No.  2003AP421.pdr 
 
31 
 
¶332 When we evaluate whether a state law constitutes a 
substantial impairment of a contract right, we are "to consider 
whether the [] (enterprise) the complaining party has entered 
has been regulated in the past."  Id. (citing Allied Structural, 
438 U.S. at 242 n.13.)   
When he purchased into an enterprise already regulated 
in the particular to which he now objects, he 
purchased subject to further legislation upon the same 
topic. 
Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 411 (quoting Veix v. Sixth Ward 
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32, 38 (1940)).  
¶333 Here, gambling has long been subject to prohibition 
under the criminal laws of Wisconsin.  The Tribal Nations 
acknowledge in the compacts that the State may enforce its 
criminal gambling statutes on tribal lands.  Therefore, there 
has always been an expectation that the "enterprise" of gambling 
could be subject to further legislation.  In addition, as we 
explained above, the Tribal Nations could not mount a breach of 
contract action against the State if the Governor chose not to 
agree to additional types of games.  Therefore, the prohibition 
of new types of games is not a substantial impairment of an 
enforceable right. 
¶334 In 
addition, 
the 
State 
has 
a 
"significant 
and 
legitimate public purpose" behind Article IV, Section 24 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution, which prohibits compacting for types of 
games that were not permitted in the 1991-92 compacts.  The 
State's prohibition is done in the exercise of its police power 
in the area of public morals, which is always a legitimate 
subject 
for state 
laws. 
 
Douglas, 
168 U.S. 
at 502-03.  
No.  2003AP421.pdr 
 
32 
 
Therefore, even if I were to employ the contracts clause 
analysis the majority opinion sets out, Article IV, Section 24 
is not in conflict with Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. 
Constitution.   
¶335 The majority opinion justifies its reversal of our 
decision in Panzer by asserting that the contract impairment 
argument was not discussed in Panzer.  Majority op., ¶94.  It 
laments, "We find it disingenuous that some members of the 
Panzer majority refused to reach the Contract Clause analysis 
that was properly before it, and now criticize the Dairyland 
majority opinion for deciding the issue."  Id.  The majority 
opinion is recreating history as it would like it to be, rather 
than as it was.  The contract impairment issue was never before 
the court in Panzer.  Panzer, 271 Wis. 2d 295, ¶102.  No party 
briefed or argued contract impairment in Panzer; therefore, we 
did not decide it.  As various members of this court have said, 
we should not "reach out and decide issues" that were not 
presented to the court by the parties.  Town of Beloit v. County 
of Rock, 2003 WI 8, ¶72, 259 Wis. 2d 37, 657 N.W.2d 344 
(Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting).  However, in Panzer, the dissent 
did not follow that rule.  Instead, it created and then decided 
the contract impairment issue, without the benefit of briefing 
or argument.  Panzer, 271 Wis. 2d 295, ¶¶210-218 (Abrahamson, 
C.J., dissenting).   
¶336 Panzer turned on whether the Governor had the power to 
enter into compacts for types of games that were not included in 
the 1991-92 compacts.  We concluded that the constitutional 
No.  2003AP421.pdr 
 
33 
 
amendment, Article IV, Section 24 of the Wisconsin Constitution, 
withdrew that power from both the legislature and the Governor.  
Panzer, 271 Wis. 2d 295, ¶¶83-86, 96-97.  Based on this lack of 
power to validly compact for the new types of games that were 
added in the 2003 compacts, we concluded those games were 
unlawful.  Id., ¶96.  The majority opinion never overrules this 
holding of Panzer.  Majority op., ¶80 n.61.   
¶337 In the case before us, no party has argued that the 
people of Wisconsin, by enacting the 1993 constitutional 
amendment, did not withdraw from the legislature and the 
Governor the power to authorize new types of gambling.  All that 
has been argued is that invalidating the new types of games 
added in 2003 would violate Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. 
Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution. 
 
The 
majority 
opinion 
ignores 
the 
Panzer 
limitation on the power of the Governor as though it were the 
same issue as whether the State has a contractual obligation to 
add new types of games.  Analytically, the two issues are very 
different.  Compare Panzer, 271 Wis. 2d 295, ¶¶83-102 with 
¶¶304-34 of this concurrence/dissent.  Accordingly, because I do 
not agree with the analysis set out in the majority opinion or 
its decision to overrule Panzer, I respectfully dissent.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶338 In 
2004, 
we 
decided 
the 
effect 
of 
the 
1993 
constitutional amendments on the new types of games that were 
added to the Indian gaming compacts in 2003; the new games 
violate Wisconsin's criminal statutes.  Panzer, 271 Wis. 2d 295, 
No.  2003AP421.pdr 
 
34 
 
¶96.  The decisions of this court are final, if not set aside on 
a motion for reconsideration made within 20 days in the case in 
which the ruling was issued, Wis. Stat. § 809.64, or overturned 
by a federal court on a federal question, see Lobermeier, 120 
Wis. 2d at 421-22; Webster, 114 Wis. 2d at 426 n.4.  The 
Governor exercised neither option, but instead he asserts that 
Article IV, Section 24 of the Wisconsin Constitution, enacted by 
the people of Wisconsin, cannot be applied to the Tribal Nations 
that have gambling operations in Wisconsin.   
¶339 The majority opinion adopts the view of the Governor, 
wherein he argues on behalf of the Tribal Nations that Article 
IV, Section 24 of the Wisconsin Constitution cannot be applied 
to Indian gambling operations in Wisconsin.  I conclude that the 
majority opinion is in error because:  (1) in acceding to the 
Governor's request on behalf of the Tribal Nations, the majority 
opinion 
surrenders 
this 
court's 
judicial 
independence 
so 
necessary to protect the people of Wisconsin in a tripartite 
system of government; (2) the gaming compacts are not the type 
of contract that is protected by either Article I, Section 12 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution or Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. 
Constitution; (3) there is no obligation to contract for new 
types of games that were not permitted under the 1991-92 
compacts; therefore, there can be no impairment of a contractual 
obligation in that regard; and (4) the State has a significant 
and legitimate public purpose in controlling the type of 
gambling that occurs within Wisconsin's borders, which Article 
I, Section 10 does not affect.   
No.  2003AP421.pdr 
 
35 
 
¶340 I am authorized to state that Justices JON P. WILCOX 
and DAVID T. PROSSER join this concurrence/dissent. 
 
 
No.  2003AP421.pdr 
 
 
 
1