Title: Day v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 24S05-1606-CR-358
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: August 29, 2016

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Joel C. Wieneke 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gregory F. Zoeller  
Wieneke Law Office, LLC 
 
 
 
 
Attorney General of Indiana 
Brooklyn, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
J.T. Whitehead 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tyler G. Banks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Andrew A. Kobe 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorneys General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court 
_________________________________ 
No. 24S05-1606-CR-358 
MICHAEL DAY, 
 
 
Appellant (Defendant),  
V. 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
Appellee (Plaintiff).  
_________________________________ 
Appeal from the Franklin Circuit Court 2, No. 24C02-1501-CM-70 
The Honorable Clay M. Kellerman, Judge 
_________________________________ 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 24A05-1506-CR-724 
_________________________________ 
August 29, 2016 
Rush, Chief Justice.  
As Michael Day’s marriage dissolved, the family home became increasingly tense, until 
one night Day came home, screamed in his wife’s face, and spat in her eye. Four 911 calls later, 
Day was arrested. He was subsequently convicted of disorderly conduct based on “fighting.”  Here, 
he asks us to interpret the disorderly conduct statute’s “fighting” subsection to require both a public 
disturbance and a physical altercation, claiming the State failed to prove either element. 
Guided by well-established principles of statutory interpretation, we conclude that the 
“fighting” subsection does not contain a public disturbance element but does require a physical 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Aug 29 2016, 10:30 am
 
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altercation. Still, Day’s intentional spitting provided sufficient evidence of a physical altercation. 
We thus affirm his disorderly conduct conviction.    
Facts and Procedural History 
 
Defendant Michael Day and his wife, M.D., were on the brink of divorce. While continuing 
to share their marital home, they often engaged in fiery arguments. Regrettably, these verbal battles 
were often within their two young sons’ earshot. The arguments increasingly turned to one 
subject—what to do with their home. Day wanted to sell it immediately, but M.D. wanted to speak 
with a lawyer first. 
One evening, that argument flared up again. While M.D. was driving their younger son 
home from the movies, Day called her and said, “You f***ing b****. I ought to kill you.” M.D. 
immediately hung up. Upon returning home, she went to bed and locked the door, fearing what 
Day might do. 
About a half hour later, M.D. awoke to Day shouting in the living room. He opened the 
bedroom door and screamed, “You f***ing b****. You will sign these papers for the house.” M.D. 
pleaded with Day to leave her alone, but he refused. Instead, he walked up to the bed where she 
was lying, leaned over, and deliberately spat on her face. M.D. had to wipe the spit away as it ran 
into her eye.  
When Day finally left the bedroom, M.D. called 911 out of fear for herself and the children. 
But she quickly hung up because Day stormed back in, screaming. The 911 operator called back 
and dispatched officers after she heard Day’s screaming and M.D. agreed that she needed help.  
After two more 911 calls, the police arrived. As the officers walked up to the house, they 
heard Day’s continued screaming. Looking through the glass front door, they saw Day cornering 
M.D. with his finger pointed in her face. Even as the officers entered, Day continued his diatribe. 
The State charged Day with B-misdemeanor disorderly conduct, alleging he knowingly or 
intentionally engaged in “fighting and/or tumultuous conduct with [M.D.]” After a bench trial, the 
court found Day guilty and sentenced him to six months, suspended to probation. Day appealed, 
arguing that the disorderly conduct statute requires both a public disturbance and a physical 
 
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altercation and that the State failed to prove those elements.  
The Court of Appeals affirmed in a split decision. Day v. State, 48 N.E.3d 921 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2016). The majority held the “fighting” subsection required neither a public disturbance nor 
a physical altercation, and sufficient evidence supported the conviction. Id. at 924–27. Judge Baker 
dissented, contending that the disorderly conduct statute does not prohibit private, verbal 
altercations. Id. at 927–28 (Baker, J., dissenting).  
Day sought transfer, which we granted, thereby vacating the Court of Appeals opinion. Ind. 
Appellate Rule 58(A).  
Standard of Review 
This case involves two distinct standards of review. We first address whether the “fighting” 
subsection of the disorderly conduct statute includes certain elements. Because this presents a 
matter of statutory interpretation, it receives de novo review. Jackson v. State, 50 N.E.3d 767, 770 
(Ind. 2016). We then determine whether sufficient evidence supports Day’s conviction under the 
statute as interpreted. See Buelna v. State, 20 N.E.3d 137, 141 (Ind. 2014). We consider only the 
probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict, without reweighing evidence 
or reassessing witness credibility. Id. And unless no reasonable factfinder could conclude the State 
proved Day guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, we affirm. Id.  
Discussion and Decision 
Indiana’s disorderly conduct statute prohibits certain types of behaviors. Specifically, the 
statute provides, “A person who recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally: (1) engages in fighting or 
in tumultuous conduct; (2) makes unreasonable noise and continues to do so after being asked to 
stop; or (3) disrupts a lawful assembly of persons; commits disorderly conduct, a Class B 
misdemeanor.” Ind. Code § 35-45-1-3(a) (2014).  
Day argues that the “fighting” subsection is ambiguous on two points: whether it includes 
public and private disturbances and whether it includes physical and verbal altercations. He asks 
that we interpret the subsection narrowly—covering only public disturbances and physical 
altercations. In response, the State argues that the “fighting” subsection unambiguously extends to 
both private and verbal altercations.  
 
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We agree with both arguments in part and hold that although the “fighting” subsection does 
not require a public disturbance, it does require a physical altercation—and that Day’s spitting 
provided sufficient evidence of that element. 
I. Indiana’s Disorderly Conduct Statute’s “Fighting” Subsection Does Not Contain a Public 
Disturbance Element.  
Day contends that the statute’s “fighting” subsection requires a public disturbance. The 
State responds that the General Assembly chose not to include a public element, and this Court 
should decline to engraft one. We agree with the State.  
 
When interpreting a statute, our primary goal is to fulfill the legislature’s intent. Adams v. 
State, 960 N.E.2d 793, 798 (Ind. 2012). And the “best evidence” of that intent is the statute’s 
language. Id. If that language is clear and unambiguous, we simply apply its plain and ordinary 
meaning, heeding both what it “does say” and what it “does not say.” State v. Dugan, 793 N.E.2d 
1034, 1036 (Ind. 2003). 
Here, the “fighting” subsection “does not say” that the State must prove public disturbance. 
Instead, it simply reads, “A person who recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally . . . engages in 
fighting or in tumultuous conduct . . . commits disorderly conduct.” I.C. § 35-45-1-3(a). Certainly, 
our legislature could have included a public element, just as it did for other crimes, such as public 
intoxication, public indecency, and public nudity. Ind. Code § 7.1-5-1-3 (2010); Ind. Code §§ 35-
45-4-1, -1.5 (2014). Yet in crafting the “fighting” subsection, our legislature decided otherwise.  
We could end our discussion here with that straightforward observation: the legislature did 
not include a public disturbance element. See Jackson, 50 N.E.3d at 773. But we note two 
additional indications that the omission was intentional—a public element explicitly appeared both 
in past versions of the disorderly conduct statute and also in the Model Penal Code (“MPC”) 
version, from which the legislature adapted Indiana’s statute.  
From 1943 to 1976, Indiana’s disorderly conduct statute prohibited acting in a “disorderly 
manner so as to disturb the peace and quiet of any neighborhood or family.” See, e.g., Ind. Code 
§ 10-1510 (Burns 1943) (emphasis added). In 1976, however, the General Assembly discarded 
that public requirement. I.C. § 35-45-1-3 (Supp. 1977). And that 1976 version remains almost 
entirely intact today—still devoid of a public disturbance element. Compare id., with I.C. § 35-45-
1-3 (2014).  
 
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Further, the General Assembly patterned much of the 1976 statute on the MPC version—
except for the MPC’s public element language. See Whittington v. State, 669 N.E.2d 1363, 1367 
(Ind. 1996). Specifically, the MPC version prohibits engaging in fighting “with purpose to cause 
public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof.” Model Penal 
Code § 250.2(1) (1980) (containing text of MPC as adopted in 1962). Our legislature could have 
readily adopted the MPC’s public element, but omitted it instead. We conclude that rejection was 
intentional, not accidental.  
In sum, the disorderly conduct statute unambiguously applies to both public and private 
disturbances. Day is not immune from prosecution simply because he confined his “fighting” to 
his house. We turn now to Day’s second claim—that “fighting” is ambiguous as to whether it 
covers both physical and verbal altercations. 
II. Although “Fighting” Covers Only Physical Altercations, Day’s Spitting Satisfies That 
Element.  
Day argues that the term “fighting” is ambiguous because it can be interpreted in two 
reasonable ways—it might include both physical and verbal altercations or it might include only 
physical altercations. He then invokes the rule of lenity, asking us to adopt the narrower 
interpretation, covering only physical altercations. The State responds that “fighting” is not 
ambiguous, but simply broad—including both types of altercations. We agree with Day that 
“fighting” allows two reasonable interpretations, and we adopt the narrower one—that “fighting” 
covers only physical altercations. But even so, Day’s spitting provides sufficient evidence to 
support his conviction.  
Under well-established principles of statutory interpretation, a statute is ambiguous when 
it allows more than one reasonable interpretation. Adams, 960 N.E.2d at 798. If, for example, 
judicial opinions or dictionaries define a term inconsistently, that inconsistency provides evidence 
of ambiguity. In re Howell, 27 N.E.3d 723, 726 (Ind. 2015) (differing judicial opinions); Univ. of 
S. Ind. Found. v. Baker, 843 N.E.2d 528, 534 (Ind. 2006) (differing dictionary entries). And if we 
conclude a statute is ambiguous, then we resort to the rules of statutory interpretation to fulfill the 
legislature’s intent. Suggs v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1190, 1194 (Ind. 2016). In criminal cases, this 
includes the rule of lenity—interpreting the statute in the defendant’s favor as far as the language 
can reasonably support. Meredith v. State, 906 N.E.2d 867, 872 (Ind. 2009) (noting that even under 
 
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the rule of lenity, “statutes ‘are not to be overly narrowed so as to exclude cases they fairly cover’” 
(quoting Cape v. State, 272 Ind. 609, 613, 400 N.E.2d 161, 164 (1980))).  
Here, “fighting” is ambiguous because it can reasonably cover either interpretation Day 
offers: narrowly covering only physical altercations or broadly covering both physical and verbal 
altercations. As evidence of that ambiguity, we note inconsistent definitions among judicial 
opinions and even among editions of Black’s Law Dictionary.  
State appellate courts disagree about the meaning of “fighting.” For example, Connecticut 
and Oregon interpret “fighting” narrowly—covering only altercations involving “physical force” 
and “physical acts of aggression,” respectively. State v. Indrisano, 640 A.2d 986, 995 (Conn. 
1994); State v. Cantwell, 676 P.2d 353, 356 (Or. Ct. App. 1984). However, our Court of Appeals 
interprets the word much more broadly—covering a “[h]ostile encounter; either physical or verbal 
in nature.” J.S. v. State, 843 N.E.2d 1013, 1016 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (alteration in original) 
(emphasis added) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 565 (5th ed. 1979)), trans. denied. This 
divergence among courts points to ambiguity.  
Likewise, Black’s Law Dictionary has defined “fight” inconsistently. Although early 
editions of Black’s Law defined the word narrowly, later editions defined it broadly. For example, 
the Second and Third Editions, published in 1910 and 1933, respectively, defined “fight” narrowly 
in terms of a solely physical altercation: “An encounter, with blows or other personal violence, 
between two persons.” Black’s Law Dictionary 497 (2d ed. 1910); Black’s Law Dictionary 777 
(3d ed. 1933). But, the Fifth and Sixth Editions broadened the definition to cover verbal 
altercations as well. The Fifth Edition, published in 1979, defined “fight” expansively as a 
“[h]ostile encounter; either physical or verbal in nature.” Black’s Law Dictionary 565 (5th ed. 
1979). Similarly, the Sixth Edition, published in 1990, defined “fight” as a “hostile encounter, 
affray, or altercation; a physical or verbal struggle for victory.” Black’s Law Dictionary 627 (6th 
ed. 1990). Both of these editions, however, are now outdated—Black’s Law no longer defines the 
term “fight” or any variation. See Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
Because “fighting” ambiguously permits two interpretations—one narrow and the other 
broad—we consult rules of statutory construction to resolve the ambiguity. In particular, we 
consider two rules, noscitur a sociis and the rule of lenity. Both counsel in favor of interpreting 
“fighting” narrowly to cover only physical altercations.   
 
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First, under noscitur a sociis,1 if a statute contains a list, each word in that list “should be 
understood in the same general sense.” State v. D.M.Z., 674 N.E.2d 585, 588 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), 
trans. denied; see also Dole v. United Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26, 36 (1990). Here, subsection (a)(1) 
lists two items: “fighting” and “tumultuous conduct.” And since “tumultuous conduct” is defined 
as “serious bodily injury to a person or substantial damage to property,” I.C. § 35-45-1-1—
“fighting” should be understood to entail physical violence as well.  
Second, under the rule of lenity, we interpret ambiguous criminal statutes narrowly in the 
defendant’s favor. Meredith, 906 N.E.2d at 872. That rule is grounded in two principles: criminal 
statutes should give fair warning about what conduct they prohibit; and legislatures, not courts, 
should decide what conduct is criminal. Healthscript, Inc. v. State, 770 N.E.2d 810, 816 (Ind. 
2002). We find these principles especially compelling here, where interpreting “fighting” to 
include verbal altercations would apply much too broadly. Indeed, verbal altercations are 
commonplace. On any street, couples argue, relatives argue, and friends argue. Judicially 
stretching the word “fighting” to cover those arguments would deprive Hoosiers of fair notice and 
impinge upon our legislature’s power to define the law. Thus, applying the rule of lenity, we adopt 
the narrower interpretation of “fighting,” covering only physical altercations.  
But even under our narrow interpretation of “fighting,” Day’s intentional, point-blank 
spitting on M.D. constitutes sufficient evidence to support his conviction. After Day berated M.D. 
for ten minutes, he leaned over the bed where she was lying and deliberately spat in her face. Some 
of the spit entered her eye, forcing her to wipe it away. A reasonable factfinder certainly could 
have found Day’s conduct constituted a physical altercation. 
Conclusion 
Given its plain language, we conclude that the disorderly conduct statute’s “fighting” 
subsection contains no public disturbance element. And even though we interpret the ambiguous 
word “fighting” narrowly to cover only physical altercations, Day’s spitting satisfied that element. 
We thus affirm Day’s conviction for B-misdemeanor disorderly conduct. 
Rucker, David, Massa, and Slaughter, JJ., concur. 
                                                 
1 This Latin term is often translated as “it is known by its associates.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1224 (10th ed. 2014).