Title: Nielson v. King County
Citation: 435 P.2d 664, 72 Wash. 2d 720
Docket Number: 39072
State: Washington
Issuer: Washington Supreme Court
Date: December 14, 1967

72 Wn.2d 720 (1967) 435 P.2d 664 EUGENE R. NIELSON et al., Appellants, v. KING COUNTY et al., Respondents.[*] No. 39072. The Supreme Court of Washington, Department Two. December 14, 1967. Eugene R. Nielson, for appellants. Charles O. Carroll, James E. Kennedy, and J. Hartly Newsum, for respondents. DONWORTH, J. This action was instituted by Eugene R. Nielson and his wife against King County and its county engineer to recover $150 damages[1] to their real property *721 (owned by them and on which they reside), allegedly caused by an obstruction to the natural flow of Clough Creek. Plaintiffs Nielson further seek a court order enjoining defendants to remove the unlawful obstruction they maintain in the watercourse as described in the complaint, on the theory that it constitutes a nuisance. It is alleged in the complaint in paragraphs 2 and 6 as follows: The answer of defendants (herein referred to as the county) admitted that it was maintaining three concrete culverts to convey the natural flow of the creek under the county road in proximity to plaintiffs' property, and that the latter are riparian landowners. The county denied the remaining allegations of the complaint and affirmatively alleged that the damage to the plaintiffs' property "is the direct consequence of an act of God." At the trial, each party presented evidence including the testimony of 9 witnesses and 26 exhibits (mostly pictures and maps of the area). After the trial was concluded, the court entered 14 findings of fact and 5 conclusions of law. In accordance therewith, the court entered its judgment, which recited that the defendants having been found not liable, the plaintiffs' complaint be dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiffs have appealed from that judgment to this court. The trial court found that, since 1949, the county had maintained 3 culverts under the county road near the southwest corner of appellants' property where the road crosses Clough Creek. As the result of heavy rains occurring in the watershed area of the creek for 8 days preceding and including November 30, 1964, a substantial amount of debris[2] (including gravel, large pieces of wood, logs, and *723 branches) came down from the watershed area, filling up the reservoir of the city of North Bend, which is located approximately one quarter mile upstream from appellants' property. Some of this debris flowed over the retaining wall of the reservoir down the creek toward appellants' property, forming dams or jams which sometimes created overflowing of the creek's floodwater which resulted from the heavy rains. Findings Nos. 6 and 7 stated: With respect to the flooding which occurred on January 29 and 30, 1965, the trial court found that, for 8 days preceding that time, heavy rains occurred in the area, and that heavier rains had occurred in prior years.[3] In findings Nos. 9, 10, and 11, the court found: The last two findings stated: Appellants have assigned error to portions of the findings of fact, to all of findings Nos. 6 and 7, quoted above, and to the court's conclusions of law Nos. 2 through 5. [1] We have held innumerable times that we will not substitute our evaluation of the evidence for that contained in the trial court's findings. Thorndike v. Hesperian Orchards, Inc., 54 Wn.2d 570, 343 P.2d 183 (1959), Sigman v. Stevens-Norton, Inc., 70 Wn.2d 915, 425 P.2d 891 (1967), Sander v. Wells, 71 Wn.2d 25, 426 P.2d 481 (1967). In the present case, there was substantial evidence to support the findings to which error has been assigned, and hence we accept them as verities. Appellants, in their brief, after citing several of our former decisions relating to flooding, state: We would find ourselves in agreement with the holdings alluded to by appellants if the debris which so accumulated was a part of what might be termed the natural state of the stream, or where the presence of such debris was reasonably foreseeable. Clearly, a certain amount of debris is normal in such streams as that involved in this case. Appellants, in their brief, recognize the distinction to which we refer. They state that: Appellants' position seems to be that the debris which resulted from the landslide and which clogged the culverts was a part of the natural flow of the stream. We do not agree. [2] It is clear that the county would not be liable for flooding which resulted from acts of God or the happening of events not reasonably foreseeable. Harkoff v. Whatcom Cy., 40 Wn.2d 147, 241 P.2d 932 (1952). The burden of proving foreseeability was on appellants. The culverts in their present state had never caused flooding of the creek before the times here complained of. For approximately 15 years, they had proven adequate to carry the waters of Clough Creek, including the "normal" debris found therein, without mishap. As the trial court stated in its conclusion of law No. 2: We are satisfied, as was the trial court, that no flooding would have occurred at the times complained of but for the very excessive amount of debris, suddenly and unexpectedly deposited in the stream by the landslide which occurred above the North Bend reservoir in 1964. [3] We are also in agreement with the trial court's conclusion regarding the injunctive relief sought by appellants. It is clear that when relief by temporary or permanent injunction is sought, the one asking such relief must show a well-grounded fear of invasion of a right, and the acts complained of must establish an actual and substantial injury or an affirmative prospect thereof. King Cy. v. Port of Seattle, 37 Wn.2d 338, 223 P.2d 834 (1950). In the present case, appellants have shown no harm to their property for which the county may be held responsible, nor have they established that, unless the injunctive relief they seek is granted, additional damage of a substantial *726 nature will be incurred by them. We find nothing in the arguments advanced by appellants or in the cases cited by them which compels us to a different conclusion in this case. We, therefore, conclude that the judgment of the trial court dismissing appellants' complaint for damages and denying the injunctive relief sought should be, and the same is, hereby affirmed. FINLEY, C.J., HUNTER and NEILL, JJ., and WARD, J. Pro Tem., concur. [*] Reported in 435 P.2d 664. [1] It is to be noted that, if it were not for appellants' prayer for a mandatory injunction directing the county to abate an alleged nuisance, this court would not have jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. This result follows from the fact that this is a constitutional court, created by the Washington Constitution, article 4, and its jurisdiction, both original and appellate, is derived from article 4, section 4. Kennedy v. Real Estate Salesmen Local 154A, 53 Wn.2d 223, 332 P.2d 939 (1958). Article 4, section 4 of our constitution provides that this court shall have appellate jurisdiction in all actions and proceedings, excepting: "... that its appellate jurisdiction shall not extend to civil actions at law for the recovery of money or personal property when the original amount in controversy, or the value of the property does not exceed the sum of two hundred dollars ($200) unless the action involves the legality of a tax, impost, assessment, toll, municipal fine, or the validity of a statute." Therefore, this court is without jurisdiction to entertain an appeal where the amount in controversy is less than two hundred dollars, Dygert v. Hansen, 31 Wn.2d 858, 199 P.2d 596 (1948), Green v. Nichols, 40 Wn.2d 661, 245 P.2d 468 (1952), and such an appeal will be dismissed on our own motion. Kerr v. King Cy., 42 Wn.2d 845, 259 P.2d 398 (1953). We have held, however, that this constitutional limitation as to the amount involved does not apply in equitable proceedings. Schmelling v. Hoffman 124 Wash. 1, 213 Pac. 478 (1923), and cases cited therein. [2] The extreme amount of debris in this instance appears to have been the result of a landslide in the watershed area. There is no evidence in the record of a previous slide of similar nature and extent. Nor is there any evidence that any action or failure to act on the part of the county in any way contributed to the landslide or the presence of excessive debris in the stream. This factor distinguishes the present case from many of those cited by appellant involving flooding resulting from logging operations. [3] Flooding of this area apparently occurred in 1949 just after the county placed culverts beneath the road. However, the county made changes in the culverts and bank, and no difficulties of this nature were experienced for the next 15 years (i.e. until the flooding on November 30, 1964).