Title: Fink v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 552, 2010
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: April 7, 2011

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
KENNETH E. FINK,  
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 552, 2010 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below—Superior Court  
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware, in and 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
Cr. ID No. 0804022489 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§   
 
Submitted: January 14, 2011 
Decided: 
April 7, 2011 
 
Before BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 7th day of April 2011, upon consideration of the briefs on appeal and 
the Superior Court record, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Kenneth E. Fink, filed an appeal from the Superior 
Court’s July 30, 2010 denial1 of his motion for postconviction relief as 
procedurally barred pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i) (“Rule 61(i)”).2  
We have determined that there is no merit to the appeal and affirm for the reasons 
stated by the Superior Court. 
                                          
 
1 State v. Fink, 2010 WL 2991579 (Del. Super.). 
2 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (listing procedural bars to relief). 
2 
 
(2) 
On May 27, 2008, Fink was indicted on ten counts of Unlawfully 
Dealing in Child Pornography.3  On December 8, 2008, Fink pled guilty to one 
count of Unlawfully Dealing in Child Pornography, and the State entered a nolle 
prosequi on the remaining nine counts.  On February 13, 2009, the Superior Court 
sentenced Fink to ten years at Level V suspended after three years and six months 
for terms at Levels IV and III.  Fink did not appeal his conviction and sentence. 
(3) 
On February 17, 2010, Fink filed a motion for postconviction relief.  
Fink’s motion was referred to a Commissioner for a recommendation.  By report 
and recommendation dated April 19, 2010, the Commissioner recommended that 
the motion be summarily dismissed. 
(4) 
Fink filed an appeal from the Commissioner’s report and 
recommendation.  Fink contended that the report failed to address a 
“jurisdictional” claim, i.e., that the indictment against him for “dealing” in child 
pornography was illegal because the State was aware that it could prove only 
“possession” of child pornography.4  According to Fink, the illegal indictment 
rendered his guilty plea “unknowing,” and he was entitled to relief. 
                                          
 
3  Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1109(4) (2007).   
4 Compare Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1109(4) (2007) (amended July 2008) (providing that a 
person is guilty of Unlawfully Dealing in Child Pornography when “[t]he person, by means of a 
computer, intentionally compiles, enters, accesses, transmits, receives, exchanges, disseminates, 
stores, makes prints, reproduces or otherwise possesses any photograph, image, file, data or other 
visual depiction of a child engaging in a prohibited sexual act”) with Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 
1111(1) (providing that a person is guilty of Possession of Child Pornography when “[t]he 
person knowingly possesses any visual depiction of a child engaging in a prohibited sexual act”).   
3 
 
(5) 
By memorandum opinion dated July 30, 2010, the Superior Court 
accepted the Commissioner’s April 19, 2010 report and recommendation and 
denied Fink’s postconviction motion.  The Superior Court determined that Fink’s 
postconviction claims were procedurally barred, under Rule 61(i)(3), for his failure 
to show that he was prevented from raising the claims prior to entering his guilty 
plea.5  The court further determined that the claims were without merit and thus did 
not warrant review under Rule 61(i)(5).6 
(6) 
The Court has carefully considered the parties’ positions on appeal 
and has concluded that the denial of Fink’s postconviction motion should be 
affirmed on the basis of the Superior Court’s decision holding that Fink’s claims 
were subject to the procedural bar of Rule 61(i)(3) without exception.7  The Court 
expressly finds no support in the record for Fink’s conclusory claim that the May 
27, 2008 indictment, which charged him with ten counts of Unlawfully Dealing in 
Child Pornography, was illegal on its face.  If Fink wanted to contest whether he 
committed the crime of dealing in child pornography, he was free to do so at trial.8  
Instead, he accepted a generous plea bargain that allowed him to plead guilty to 
                                          
 
5 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3) (barring a claim not previously raised absent cause for 
relief from the procedural fault and prejudice). 
6 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5) (providing that otherwise applicable procedural bars shall 
not apply to a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional 
violation). 
7 State v. Fink, 2010 WL 2991579 (Del. Super.). 
8 E.g., Panuski v. State, 2010 WL 3398945 (Del. Supr.) (affirming Superior Court denial of 
defendant’s post-plea “motion to downgrade counts” on basis that defendant had “no right to 
choose the crime he prefers” (citing Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 61 (Del. 1988))).   
4 
 
only one of the ten counts against him.9  Stated another way, by pleading guilty to 
the charge of Unlawfully Dealing in Child Pornography, Fink is foreclosed from 
challenging the sufficiency of the State’s evidence on that charge.10 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs 
 
 
 
 
 
        Justice 
                                          
 
9 Id. 
10 Hartman v. State, 2007 WL 38401 (Del. Supr.) (citing Miller v. State, 840 A.2d 1229, 1232 
(Del. 2003)).