Title: State v. Starks
Citation: 2013 WI 69
Docket Number: 2010AP000425
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 12, 2013

2013 WI 69 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2010AP425   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Tramell E. Starks, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.   
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 336 Wis. 2d 474, 801 N.W. 2d 348 
(Ct. App. 2011 – Unpublished)     
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 12, 2013 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 9, 2013   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Kevin E. Martens   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., ABRAHAMSON, C.J., CROOKS, J., 
dissent. (Opinion filed.)   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Tricia J. Bushnell, Caitlin Plummer, Lindsey E. Smith and law 
student practitioners Michael Boshardy, R. Warren Beck, and 
Joshua Jarrett, and Frank J. Remington Center, Madison, with 
oral argument by Tricia J. Bushnell.   
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by Sarah 
K. Larson, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Robert R. Henak and 
Henak Law Office, Milwaukee, on behalf of the Wisconsin 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
 
 
2
  
 
 
2013 WI 69
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2010AP425 
(L.C. No. 
2006CF450) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Tramell E. Starks, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 12, 2013 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   This case began with the 
murder of Lee Weddle in his apartment on a spring day in 2005.  
A subsequent police investigation resulted in charges against 
the petitioner in this case, Tramell E. Starks, for first-degree 
intentional homicide as a party to a crime and possession of a 
firearm by a felon.  Following a jury trial, he was convicted of 
the lesser-included offense of reckless homicide and the felon-
in-possession of a firearm charge.1  On direct appeal, Starks's 
                                                 
1 The Honorable William W. Brash, III, presiding.   
No. 
2010AP425   
 
2 
 
convictions were affirmed.  State v. Starks, No. 2008AP790-CR, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2008) (Starks I). 
¶2 
Subsequently, Starks filed a motion pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 974.062 (2011-12)3 with the circuit court,4 alleging that 
the attorney who handled his appeal was ineffective for failing 
to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims.  The 
circuit court dismissed this motion for exceeding the local rule 
on page length limit.  Two days later, Starks filed a motion 
with the circuit court to vacate his assessed DNA surcharge 
pursuant to State v. Cherry, 2008 WI App 80, 312 Wis. 2d 203, 
752 N.W.2d 393 (henceforth "Cherry motion").  This motion was 
denied as untimely.  Starks then refiled his original § 974.06 
motion with the circuit court, this time within the page limit 
requirement.  The circuit court rejected Starks's motion on the 
merits and denied his request for an evidentiary hearing, 
finding that he had not set forth a viable claim for relief. 
¶3 
The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court, 
although on different grounds.  State v. Starks, No. 2010AP425, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. June 14, 2011) (Starks II).  
It held that Starks's second Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion was 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 974.06 sets forth a procedure for a 
defendant to collaterally attack his conviction.  A collateral 
attack is "[a]n attack on a judgment in a proceeding other than 
a direct appeal . . . ."  Black's Law Dictionary 298 (9th ed. 
2009).     
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version.   
4 The Honorable Kevin E. Martens, presiding. 
No. 
2010AP425   
 
3 
 
procedurally barred because Starks could have, but did not, 
raise his ineffective assistance of counsel arguments in his 
Cherry motion.  Starks II, No. 2010AP425, ¶6.     
¶4 
At the outset we note that there is a procedural 
problem in this case.  Starks's Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion, 
which was filed with the circuit court, alleged ineffective 
assistance of postconviction counsel.  However, the attorney who 
represented 
him 
after 
his 
conviction 
did 
not 
file 
any 
postconviction motions and instead pursued a direct appeal.  He 
was thus not Starks's postconviction counsel but was rather his 
appellate counsel.  This is significant because claims of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel must be filed in the 
form of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the court of 
appeals.  State v. Knight, 168 Wis. 2d 509, 520, 484 N.W.2d 540 
(1992).  By bringing his claim in the circuit court, Starks 
pursued his case in the wrong forum.  However, because the 
erroneous filing deprived the circuit court of competency rather 
than jurisdiction, our review of his case is appropriate.   
¶5 
Three issues are presented in this case.  The first is 
whether a Cherry motion to vacate a DNA surcharge is considered 
a "prior motion" under § 974.06(4), such that a defendant is 
required to raise postconviction ineffective assistance of 
counsel arguments in his Cherry motion.  The second issue we 
address is the appropriate pleading standard a court must 
utilize when a defendant alleges in a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus that his appellate counsel was ineffective for 
failing to raise certain arguments.  Finally, we must determine 
No. 
2010AP425   
 
4 
 
whether Starks received ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel.   
¶6 
With respect to the Cherry motion issue, we hold that 
because sentence modification is a distinct procedure from Wis. 
Stat. § 974.06 motions, a defendant is not required to shoehorn 
ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel arguments into 
a Cherry motion.  As to the second issue, the proper pleading 
standard, we hold that a defendant who argues in a habeas 
petition that he received ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel 
because 
certain 
arguments 
were 
not 
raised 
must 
demonstrate that the claims he believes should have been raised 
on appeal were "clearly stronger" than the claims that were 
raised.  On the third and final question of whether Starks 
received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, we hold 
that because the arguments Starks believes should have been 
raised were not clearly stronger than the arguments that were 
raised in his appeal, Starks's appellate attorney was not 
ineffective.  We therefore affirm the court of appeals.           
I. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶7 
On the afternoon of March 31, 2005, Milwaukee police 
officers were dispatched to Lee Weddle's duplex apartment after 
a man in the upper unit called 911 to report that he heard a 
fight in the apartment beneath him followed by several gunshots.5  
When police arrived, they found Weddle lying face down in a pool 
of blood.  He was pronounced dead shortly thereafter.   
                                                 
5 The facts leading up to Starks's trial are taken from the 
criminal complaint and are not contested.   
No. 
2010AP425   
 
5 
 
¶8 
Five days after the shooting, police received an 
anonymous tip that Starks was the killer, and that Antwon 
Nellum, Wayne Rogers, and other unidentified people were present 
during the shooting.  The Milwaukee Police Department notified 
its officers on April 15, 2005 that Starks was a suspect in 
Weddle's murder.  On April 20, Nellum was arrested for a 
domestic 
violence 
matter 
and 
a 
parole 
violation. 
 
When 
questioned about Weddle's murder, Nellum answered that he could 
not disclose what had occurred because police could not 
guarantee his safety and that of his family.   
¶9 
Starks voluntarily spoke with police on April 21, but 
denied knowing Weddle, Nellum, or Rogers, or anything about the 
murder.  Nellum was then interviewed a second time on April 22.  
This time he told the detectives that he had not been candid 
during his first interview about what occurred on March 31 
because he was afraid of Starks.  During the second interview 
Nellum said that he witnessed a fight between Starks and Weddle 
and that he left because he thought that Starks "was going to do 
something real crazy."  Nellum said that as he was running out 
of the apartment, he heard four or five gunshots.   
¶10 Nellum was released from custody on July 7, 2005, and 
found murdered in his car three weeks later, his vehicle riddled 
with two dozen bullet holes.   
¶11 Rogers was arrested on a drug offense and brought into 
custody in August 2005.  He was asked about Weddle's murder and 
opined, "ya'll already know who killed him," although he claimed 
he was asleep in the apartment when the shots were fired and 
No. 
2010AP425   
 
6 
 
thus did not see the shooting.  During a later interview, 
however, his story changed.  At that second interview, Rogers 
noted that Weddle was his best friend and that he wanted to 
"come clean" now that he was no longer scared of what Starks 
would do to him if he told the truth.  According to Rogers, 
Starks was at the apartment complaining to everyone present 
about comments Weddle had made regarding Starks's girlfriend.  
When Weddle arrived, a confrontation between Starks and Weddle 
ensued.  Starks threw the first punch, but Weddle fought back.  
After Weddle pulled out a clump of Starks's hair, Starks accused 
him of "fight[ing] dirty."  Starks was then handed a gun by 
Mario Mills, turned around, and shot Weddle two times.  Before 
Rogers ran out of the apartment, he heard Weddle say, "man, you 
killed me."  Rogers then heard three or four more shots as he 
was leaving the apartment.  Later that day, Rogers called Mills 
to ask if Weddle was all right.  Starks, who was with Mills, got 
on the phone and said, "F--- [Weddle]."   
¶12 Starks and Mills were arrested and both charged with 
first-degree intentional homicide as a party to a crime and 
possession of a firearm by a felon.  Pursuant to a plea 
agreement, Mills admitted to the crime of furnishing a firearm 
to a felon.  Starks, however, pled not guilty as to both counts 
and the case was tried to a jury in December 2006.  The State 
relied on the eyewitness accounts of three men who were present 
when the shooting occurred: Rogers, Devin Ward, and Carvius 
Williams.  Rogers gave the same account of the murder at trial 
as he did to police investigators during his second interview.  
No. 
2010AP425   
 
7 
 
Ward and Williams provided testimony very similar to Rogers', 
although Ward related that he left the apartment during the 
fight and was walking towards his car when he heard shots fired.   
¶13 The State also called Starks's cousin, Trenton Gray, 
to the witness stand.  Gray testified that on the day of 
Weddle's murder Starks called him "in a state of distress."  As 
Gray recounted, "he was asking me if he can go to a place that I 
had been previously in my life up in North Dakota, would he be 
able to take refuge for some things that he believe[d] he had 
done."  When Gray asked Starks what was going on, he said, "I 
don't know, cuz, I think I just murdered somebody."  Gray also 
testified that in a later conversation between the two about the 
murder, Starks told him about the fight and that Mills provided 
the gun to Starks.  Gray further testified that Starks wanted to 
kill Williams because Starks believed that Williams "was telling 
on him about the murder" at a funeral.   
¶14 The jury convicted Starks of the lesser-included 
offense of first-degree reckless homicide and also the felon-in-
possession of a firearm charge.  He was sentenced to a total of 
36 years in prison followed by 19 years of extended supervision.   
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A. 
Starks's Direct Appeal 
¶15 Following 
his 
convictions, 
the 
Public 
Defender's 
Office appointed a new attorney, Robert Kagen, to represent 
Starks in his postconviction matters.  Kagen did not file any 
postconviction motions with the circuit court and instead 
pursued a direct appeal at the court of appeals, in which he 
No. 
2010AP425   
 
8 
 
raised four arguments: (1) the circuit court should have granted 
Starks's request for the lesser-included offense instruction on 
second-degree reckless homicide; (2) a mistrial should have been 
declared when a witness sequestration order was violated; (3) 
the circuit court erred in not dismissing the case based on the 
prosecution's failure to turn over information relating to the 
identity of "Junebug;" and (4) the evidence was inconsistent and 
therefore 
insufficient 
to 
support 
the 
verdict. 
 
In 
an 
unpublished opinion, the court of appeals rejected each of 
Starks's arguments and affirmed his convictions.  Starks I, No. 
2008AP790-CR. 
¶16 On the issue of the jury instruction, Starks argued 
that he was entitled to an instruction on second-degree reckless 
homicide.  As Starks pointed out, the only difference between 
first- and second-degree reckless homicide is that the former 
requires proof of the additional element of "utter disregard for 
human life."  Compare Wis. Stat. § 940.02 with Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.06.  Starks contended that because he shot Weddle below 
the waist and expressed distress when he learned Weddle died, he 
showed at least some regard for Weddle's life.  Starks I, No. 
2008AP790-CR, ¶13.  As Starks fled from the apartment without 
trying to help Weddle or calling 911, however, the court of 
appeals held that Starks showed "a complete lack of concern for 
Weddle's life," and thus was not entitled to a jury instruction 
on second-degree reckless homicide.  Id., ¶15.  
¶17 The court of appeals also rejected Starks's claim that 
a mistrial should have been granted when Gray and Rogers were 
No. 
2010AP425   
 
9 
 
accidently transported to the courthouse in the same sheriff's 
van, in violation of a sequestration order.  When Starks made 
this motion during his trial, the circuit court found that Gray 
and Rogers had not discussed the substance of their testimony 
and thus denied his request for a mistrial.  The court of 
appeals affirmed the circuit court's findings, and held that the 
circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in 
denying Starks's motion for a mistrial.  Id., ¶22.   
¶18 The third issue Starks raised was that the circuit 
court should have declared a mistrial because the prosecution 
failed to disclose "Junebug's" identity.  Junebug was the owner 
of the cell phone that Gray used when he spoke to Starks on the 
day of the murder.  In August 2006, nearly three months before 
trial, Starks asked the State to turn over the identity of 
Junebug so that the defense could examine whether any calls were 
made between Junebug's phone and Starks.  The State turned over 
Gray's cell phone directory, which included Junebug's number.  
The prosecution submitted, though, that it did not know 
Junebug's identity.  At trial, Gray unexpectedly revealed 
"Junebug" to be "Ray Gill."  Starks moved for a mistrial on the 
grounds that, 
because federal agents discovered Junebug's 
identity in September 2006 (more than two months before Starks's 
trial), that knowledge was imputed to the State such that it had 
a duty to turn over the information.  The circuit court found 
that, in addition to providing Junebug's phone number, the State 
also gave the defense documents which showed that the same phone 
number was registered to Gill, but apparently neither the 
No. 
2010AP425   
 
10 
 
defense nor the prosecution pieced the information together to 
deduce that Junebug was Gill.  As Starks possessed the same 
information as the State, the circuit court denied the motion 
for a mistrial.  The court of appeals accepted this factual 
finding and concluded that the circuit court was within its 
discretion to deny Starks's motion.  Id., ¶29.  
¶19 Starks's final argument on direct appeal was that the 
evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because of 
inconsistencies in the testimony of various witnesses.  For 
example, Starks alleged that some of the witnesses who were in 
the apartment at the time of the shooting gave conflicting 
accounts as to who left first, whether people left before or 
after the shooting, and whether Weddle was shot in the living 
room or the kitchen.  Id., ¶30.  In reviewing the record, the 
court of appeals concluded that "the jury could reasonably find 
Starks guilty based on the evidence presented."  Id.  The court 
noted 
that 
eyewitness 
testimony 
often 
produces 
some 
inconsistencies and that in any event, "[t]he State's case was 
strong."  Id., ¶31. 
¶20 After the court of appeals affirmed Starks's judgment 
of conviction, this court denied his petition for review. 
B. 
Starks's Wis. Stat. § 974.06 and Cherry Motions 
¶21 On December 17, 2009, Starks, acting pro se, filed a 
Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion with the circuit court.  Starks 
alleged that Kagen was ineffective for failing to raise numerous 
claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that, 
consequently, he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his 
No. 
2010AP425   
 
11 
 
claims.  The circuit court dismissed the motion on January 4, 
2010, because it exceeded the Milwaukee County Circuit Court 
local rule on page length limit.  Two days later, on January 6, 
2010, Starks filed a Cherry motion to vacate his DNA surcharge.6  
This motion was denied on the grounds that a motion to modify a 
sentence must be brought within 90 days after a sentence is 
imposed.7  See Wis. Stat. § 973.19(1)(a).  Following the 
dismissal of his Cherry motion, Starks refiled his § 974.06 
motion on January 19, 2010, this time within the local page 
limit stricture.   
¶22 The circuit court denied Starks's Wis. Stat. § 974.06 
motion on the merits as "not set[ting] forth a viable claim for 
relief with regards to trial counsel's performance."  In 
reaching that result, the court addressed each of Starks's 
                                                 
6 All defendants convicted of a felony are required to 
provide a DNA sample to the State Crime Laboratory.  State v. 
Ziller, 2011 WI App 164, ¶9, 338 Wis. 2d 151, 807 N.W.2d 241, 
review denied, 2012 WI 45, 340 Wis. 2d 544, 811 N.W.2d 820. 
Unless the felony is sexual assault, the circuit court has 
discretion in deciding whether to impose a $250 DNA surcharge on 
the defendant.  Id.  In State v. Cherry, 2008 WI App 80, ¶10, 
312 Wis. 2d 203, 752 N.W.2d 393, the court of appeals held that 
a circuit court "must do something more than stat[e] it is 
imposing the DNA surcharge simply because it can."  At the very 
least, a circuit court must demonstrate that it went through a 
rational decision-making process.  Id., ¶¶10-11.  A motion 
challenging the circuit court's discretion in imposing a DNA 
surcharge is thus known as a "Cherry motion."         
7 It appears from the record that Starks was challenging a 
DNA surcharge that was imposed in 2001 as the result of a 
previous conviction.  The specifics of that conviction are not 
germane to the present dispute.     
No. 
2010AP425   
 
12 
 
claims individually.8  First, the circuit court dealt with 
Starks's 
contention 
that 
Kagen 
should 
have 
raised 
trial 
counsel's failure to investigate Junebug's identity and phone 
records.  In his motion, Starks averred that if trial counsel 
had done so, he would have found that Starks and Gray did not——
contrary to Gray's testimony——speak on Junebug's phone on March 
31, 2005. The circuit court found that Starks's assertions were 
wholly conclusory, as he did not submit any phone records to 
substantiate his claim.  Starks next averred that his trial 
counsel should have interviewed Dion Anderson, whom Starks says 
was in the same sheriff's van as Gray and Rogers and allegedly 
heard them conspiring to influence each other's testimony.  The 
court found that this claim too was factually unsupported and 
conclusory.   
¶23 Starks's third assertion was that his trial counsel 
should have called Stanley Daniels (his father) and Mary 
McCullum (his grandmother) as witnesses.  Both of them submitted 
affidavits attached to the Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion saying 
that they were at the funeral where Starks allegedly told Gray 
that he wanted to kill Williams because Starks believed that 
Williams "was telling on him about the murder."  In their 
affidavits, Daniels and McCullum swore that they did not see 
Gray and Starks engaged in conversation on that day.  The 
                                                 
8 In his Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion, Starks alleged six 
instances of ineffective assistance of trial counsel that Kagen 
should have raised.  Before this court, Starks raises only four 
of those original claims. We therefore will not review the two 
claims that were dropped.  
No. 
2010AP425   
 
13 
 
circuit held that even if they testified to that effect, there 
was not a "reasonable probability" of a different outcome at 
trial, and Starks therefore could not satisfy the prejudice 
prong of his ineffectiveness claim.   
¶24 Finally, Starks argued that his trial counsel should 
have called Mills as a witness, as he swore in another affidavit 
attached to the motion that he did not see Starks shoot Weddle 
and that Rogers was the only one at the apartment with a gun.  
The circuit court found this claim "speculative," and noted that 
Mills (originally Starks's co-defendant) made this statement 
only after he pled no contest pursuant to a plea agreement and 
was sentenced for furnishing a firearm to a felon, thus 
undermining his credibility.     
¶25 After losing at the circuit court Starks appealed.  In 
an unpublished per curiam opinion, the court of appeals 
affirmed, albeit on procedural rather than substantive grounds.  
Starks II, No. 2010AP425.  The court declined to reach the 
merits of Starks's appeal, holding instead that his Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.06 motion was procedurally barred by this court's decision 
in State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 517 N.W.2d 157 
(1994), because Starks could have raised his ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims in his Cherry motion and failed to 
do so.  Starks II, No. 2010AP425, ¶6.  While ineffective 
assistance of counsel might explain why the issues in Starks's 
§ 974.06 motion were not raised in his direct appeal, there was 
no explanation as to why Starks did not raise these issues in 
No. 
2010AP425   
 
14 
 
his Cherry motion, and so, the court of appeals reasoned, 
Starks's § 974.06 motion was properly denied.  Id.   
¶26 We granted Starks's petition for review. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW  
¶27 The first question we must address is whether we have 
jurisdiction. 
 
We 
apply 
a 
de 
novo 
standard 
to 
such 
jurisdictional questions.  See, e.g., Town of Delafield v. 
Winkelman, 2004 WI 17, ¶14, 269 Wis. 2d 109, 675 N.W.2d 470. 
¶28 The next question in this case is: does a defendant 
who files a Cherry motion forfeit his right to later file a Wis. 
Stat. § 974.06 postconviction motion?  Assuming that Starks's 
§ 974.06 motion was not barred by his earlier Cherry motion, we 
then must determine the proper pleading standard for a court to 
apply when a defendant alleges that his postconviction counsel 
was ineffective for not raising certain arguments.  These issues 
require us to examine § 974.06 along with Escalona-Naranjo and 
its offspring.  The proper interpretation of a statute and case 
law raises questions of law that we review de novo.  Welin v. 
Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2006 WI 81, ¶16, 292 Wis. 2d 73, 717 
N.W.2d 690.   
¶29 Lastly, we address the merits of Starks's Sixth 
Amendment ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim, 
i.e., his habeas claim.  This also presents a mixed question of 
fact and law.  Knight, 168 Wis. 2d at 514 n.2.  The circuit 
court's factual findings are given deference, but whether there 
was ineffective assistance of counsel is a question of law that 
we answer independently.  Id.   
No. 
2010AP425   
 
15 
 
IV. DISCUSSION 
¶30 We first hold that Starks improperly cast his claim of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel as a claim of 
ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel.  Because a 
claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel must be 
filed as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the court 
of appeals, Starks's decision to file a Wis. Stat. § 974.06 
motion with the circuit court was procedurally incorrect.  
However, because the mistake deprived the circuit court of 
competency rather than jurisdiction, our review of Starks's 
claim is appropriate. 
¶31 This is a procedurally complex case that implicates 
two dense and interrelated areas of law.  To clarify the 
following sections at the outset, for purposes of Section B we 
treat Starks's action as a Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion alleging 
ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel, because that 
is what he styled it as and because that is the only way we can 
clarify the important issue presented regarding the relationship 
between Cherry motions and § 974.06 motions.  However, for the 
discussion of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in 
Sections C and D, we treat Starks's action as a petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus filed with the court of appeals in the 
first instance and alleging ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel.  We do so because given the arguments in his claim that 
is what he should have filed, as he was challenging appellate 
and not postconviction counsel.  We explain this in greater 
detail below.  Additionally, treating it as a habeas claim for 
No. 
2010AP425   
 
16 
 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is the only way we 
can clarify the important issue presented regarding the proper 
standard to apply to such claims, and that allows us to dispose 
of his action without wasting unnecessary judicial resources by 
delaying the ultimate resolution of his claim.  Thus, our 
holding in Section B applies to § 974.06 motions, while our 
articulation of the proper pleading standard and our application 
of that standard in Sections C and D apply to habeas claims 
alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.  We 
understand that our approach is an unusual one, but we note that 
it is an unusual case with an unusual procedural posture, and we 
take the only approach that allows us to clarify the difficult 
legal questions presented while disposing of the matter before 
us.      
¶32 We hold as follows: (1) filing a Cherry motion does 
not procedurally bar a defendant from filing a future Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.06 motion; (2) the proper pleading standard required for a 
defendant averring in a habeas petition that his appellate 
counsel was ineffective for not raising certain arguments on 
appeal is that the unraised claims were "clearly stronger" than 
the claims that were raised; and (3) the claims of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel that Starks believes should have 
been raised were not clearly stronger than the claims that were 
raised by his appellate attorney and he thus fails to meet the 
standard and qualify for habeas relief.  Accordingly, we affirm 
the court of appeals.   
A. The Court Has Jurisdiction and Its Review is Appropriate   
No. 
2010AP425   
 
17 
 
¶33 Although no party questions our jurisdiction, we may——
indeed, must——ensure that we have the power to speak on a 
dispute before doing so.  State v. Omernik, 54 Wis. 2d 220, 222, 
194 N.W.2d 617 (1972) ("[J]urisdiction is always a proper 
question to consider, even if we raise it sua sponte.") 
(footnote omitted).      
¶34 In their briefs before this court, Starks and the 
State refer to Starks's second appointed attorney, Robert Kagen, 
as his "postconviction counsel."  This is not an accurate 
description, though, of the tasks Kagen performed.  Kagen did 
not file any postconviction motions with the circuit court and 
instead pursued a direct appeal with the court of appeals.  He 
was thus Starks's "appellate" attorney. 
¶35 The distinction is not merely semantical.  A claim for 
ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel must be filed 
with the circuit court, either as a Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion 
or as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  State ex rel. 
Rothering v. McCaughtry, 205 Wis. 2d 675, 681, 556 N.W.2d 136 
(Ct. App. 1996) (per curiam).  A defendant arguing ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel, conversely, may not seek relief 
under § 974.06 and must instead petition the court of appeals 
for a writ of habeas corpus.  Knight, 168 Wis. 2d at 520.  As 
Starks filed his claim with the circuit court, it should have 
been dismissed and not allowed to proceed to an appeal.  
 
¶36 However, we will address the merits of the issues 
presented in this case for several reasons.  First, the 
defendant's erroneous decision to file in circuit court rather 
No. 
2010AP425   
 
18 
 
than the court of appeals deprived the former of competency to 
proceed, not jurisdiction.  To briefly summarize, jurisdiction 
comes in two varieties:  subject matter and personal.  Subject 
matter jurisdiction refers to the power of a court to decide 
certain types of cases, while personal jurisdiction concerns a 
court's power to enter a judgment against a specific individual.  
State v. Smith, 2005 WI 104, ¶18, 283 Wis. 2d 57, 699 N.W.2d 
508. 
 Because Article VII, Section 8 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution states that, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by 
law, the circuit court shall have original jurisdiction in all 
matters civil and criminal within this state," we have declared 
that "no circuit court is without subject matter jurisdiction to 
entertain 
actions 
of 
any 
nature 
whatsoever." 
 
Vill. 
of 
Trempealeau v. Mikrut, 2004 WI 79, ¶8, 273 Wis. 2d 76, 681 
N.W.2d 190 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
Competency, meanwhile, speaks to "the power of a court to 
exercise its subject matter jurisdiction in a particular case," 
Smith, 283 Wis. 2d 57, ¶18 (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted), a power which we have described as "lesser" than 
that of jurisdiction itself because jurisdiction flows from the 
Wisconsin Constitution whereas competency is set by statute.  
Green Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Servs. v. H.N., 162 Wis. 2d 635, 655-
56, 469 N.W.2d 845 (1991).  Ergo, "the failure to comply with 
any statutory mandate" goes to competence, not jurisdiction.  
Id. at 656.   
¶37 In this case, Starks miscast his claim of ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel as one of ineffective assistance 
No. 
2010AP425   
 
19 
 
of postconviction counsel and thus erroneously filed a Wis. 
Stat. § 974.06 motion with the circuit court.  But as we held in 
Knight, § 974.06 does not provide a mechanism for ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel claims.  168 Wis. 2d at 520.  
Rather, those claims must be raised initially with the court of 
appeals via a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  Id.  
Because Starks did not follow the proper statutory procedure, 
his error is better classified as depriving the circuit court of 
competency rather than jurisdiction.  Furthermore, Knight's 
division of judicial labor was based on a pragmatic assessment 
of the "institutional capabilities of trial and appellate 
courts," an assessment that goes to competence rather than 
jurisdiction.  Id. at 517, 520.    
¶38 Unlike jurisdictional defects, competency issues must 
be raised at the circuit court or they are deemed forfeited.  
Mikrut, 273 Wis. 2d 76, ¶30.  Here, there is no evidence in the 
record that the State challenged the circuit court's competency 
when 
Starks 
filed 
his 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 974.06 
motions.  
Additionally, the question of whether Starks followed the proper 
procedure has not been briefed before this court.  See State v. 
Johnson, 153 Wis. 2d 121, 124, 449 N.W.2d 845 (1990) ("This 
court will not consider the issues respondent wishes to have 
considered unless they are asserted in the brief and fully 
discussed in that brief to this court.").  In sum, it would be 
improper for the court to dismiss the case solely because Starks 
erred when he chose the wrong forum for his initial filing. 
No. 
2010AP425   
 
20 
 
¶39 We are also mindful of prudential concerns and the 
interests of judicial economy.  If we were to dismiss this case 
for want of jurisdiction, presumably Starks would simply refile 
his current claim with the court of appeals, deleting the word 
"postconviction" and replacing it with "appellate."  This case, 
however, 
has 
already 
been 
before 
the 
court 
of 
appeals.  
Additionally, this court is as institutionally well-suited to 
assess the effectiveness of an appellate attorney as the court 
of appeals is, the issues are fully briefed and argued, and 
their resolution will assist attorneys, defendants, and courts 
in a heavily-litigated area of law going forward.  Cf. Hull v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 222 Wis. 2d 627, 640 n.7, 586 
N.W.2d 863 (1998) 
(noting that where one issue may be 
dispositive the court may still "consider additional issues 
which have been fully briefed and are likely to recur" if 
resolution of those issues will improve judicial economy and 
provide guidance to lower courts and litigants) (citations 
omitted); People v. Feliciano, 950 N.E.2d 91, 95 (N.Y. 2011) 
(observing that "appellate courts are uniquely suited to 
evaluate what [constitutes] meaningful [representation] in their 
own arena.") (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation 
omitted).           
¶40 Having settled the jurisdictional question, we turn to 
the disputed issues.      
B. A Cherry Motion Does Not Count as a Prior Motion Under 
Wis. Stat. § 974.06(4) and Escalona-Naranjo 
1. 
Background 
No. 
2010AP425   
 
21 
 
¶41 The Wis. Stat. § 974.06 postconviction procedure was 
enacted in 1969 and was "designed to replace habeas corpus as 
the primary method in which a defendant can attack his 
conviction after the time for appeal has expired."  Howard B. 
Eisenberg, Post-Conviction Remedies in the 1970's, 56 Marq. L. 
Rev. 69, 79 (1972) (footnote omitted).  A defendant may file a 
§ 974.06 motion only after he has "exhausted his direct 
remedies[,] which consist of a motion for a new trial and [an] 
appeal."  Peterson v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 370, 381, 195 N.W.2d 837 
(1972).  Once an imprisoned defendant has pursued all his direct 
remedies, though, § 974.06(1) allows him to move to vacate, set 
aside, or correct his sentence if he contends that: (1) his 
sentence violates the U.S. or Wisconsin Constitution; (2) the 
court imposing the sentence lacked jurisdiction; or (3) his 
sentence exceeded the maximum time set by law or is otherwise 
subject to collateral attack.  State v. Allen, 2010 WI 89, ¶22, 
328 Wis. 2d 1, 786 N.W.2d 124.  A § 974.06 motion "is a part of 
the original criminal action, is not a separate proceeding and 
may be made at any time."  § 974.06(2).  Section 974.06 is 
therefore meant to supplement a criminal defendant's standard 
appellate and postconviction remedies.   
¶42 A defendant's ability to seek relief under Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.06 is not unlimited, though.  Section 974.06(4) provides 
that: 
All grounds for relief available to a person under 
this section must be raised in his or her original, 
supplemental or amended motion. Any ground finally 
adjudicated 
or 
not 
so 
raised, 
or 
knowingly, 
No. 
2010AP425   
 
22 
 
voluntarily and intelligently waived in the proceeding 
that resulted in the conviction or sentence or in any 
other proceeding the person has taken to secure relief 
may not be the basis for a subsequent motion, unless 
the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for 
sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately 
raised in 
the 
original, supplemental or amended 
motion. 
 
 
 
¶43 The language in this subsection was discussed and 
analyzed in the seminal Escalona-Naranjo case.  There, the 
defendant was convicted of multiple drug charges.  Escalona-
Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d at 173-74.  After he was sentenced, 
Escalona-Naranjo sought postconviction relief in the form of a 
new trial, a competency redetermination, and resentencing.  Id. 
at 174.  The circuit court denied his motion and the court of 
appeals affirmed.  Id. at 174-75.  Escalona-Naranjo then filed a 
Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion asserting ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel.  Id. at 175.  The circuit court summarily 
dismissed the motion, concluding that Escalona-Naranjo was 
merely regurgitating issues that had previously been raised in 
his postconviction motion and appeal.  Id.  The court of appeals 
certified the case to this court, stating that even though 
Escalona-Naranjo may have forfeited certain evidentiary issues 
by not objecting at trial, his § 974.06 motion may have raised 
new issues not decided on direct appeal.9  Id. 
                                                 
9 The court of appeals and this court used the term 
"waiver," but "forfeiture" is more accurate because "a mere 
failure to object constitutes a forfeiture of the right on 
appellate review."  State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶30, 315 Wis. 2d 
653, 761 N.W.2d 612.      
No. 
2010AP425   
 
23 
 
¶44 Escalona-Naranjo argued before this court that his 
failure to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel in his 
motion for a new trial or on direct appeal did not preclude him 
from raising it in a subsequent Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion 
because his claim was based on a constitutional right.  Id. at 
180.  In our decision, we began by overruling our own precedent 
in Bergenthal v. State, 72 Wis. 2d 740, 748, 242 N.W.2d 199 
(1976), 
which 
held 
that 
a 
court 
must 
always 
consider 
constitutional claims in a § 974.06 motion, even those that were 
forfeited on direct appeal.  Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d at 
181.  We clarified that a defendant may not raise an issue in 
his § 974.06 motion that was finally adjudicated, waived, or 
forfeited, unless he can provide a "sufficient reason" for why 
the issue was not raised in the "original, supplemental or 
amended 
motion." 
 
Id. 
at 
181-82 
(quoting 
language 
from 
§ 974.06(4)) (footnote omitted).   
¶45 As we said in Escalona-Naranjo, "[w]e need finality in 
our litigation."  185 Wis. 2d at 185.  A defendant may not raise 
some constitutional issues on direct appeal and strategically 
wait a few years to raise additional ones.  Id.  Rather, all 
constitutional issues should be part of the original proceeding, 
barring a "sufficient reason" for not raising them.  Id. at 185-
86. 
2. A Cherry Motion is a Distinct Procedure From a Wis. 
Stat. § 974.06 Motion 
¶46 The first issue presented in this case is whether 
Starks's January 6, 2010 motion to vacate his DNA surcharge, 
No. 
2010AP425   
 
24 
 
i.e., his Cherry motion, counted as a prior motion under Wis. 
Stat. § 974.06(4) and Escalona-Naranjo such that his refiled 
§ 974.06 motion of January 19 was procedurally barred and 
required dismissal.  While the court of appeals concluded that 
Starks's Cherry motion prohibited him from refiling his § 974.06 
motion, our analysis of the interrelationship between the 
criminal appellate and postconviction statutes, as well as 
applicable case law, reveals that sentence modification and 
postconviction relief under Wis. Stat. § 974.06 are separate 
proceedings such that filing one does not result in a waiver of 
the other.  In this case, that means that Starks's Cherry motion 
did not bar his subsequent § 974.06 motion.    
¶47 We begin first by noting a concession on the part of 
the State.  The court of appeals in this case held that Starks's 
Cherry motion barred his subsequent Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion 
because Starks could have raised ineffective assistance of 
counsel in his Cherry motion.  Starks II, No. 2010AP425, ¶6.  
The State concedes that the court of appeals relied upon an 
erroneous premise in reaching this conclusion, as Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.06 
is confined to constitutional and jurisdictional 
challenges, 
and 
Cherry 
motions, 
which 
cannot 
fairly 
be 
categorized as either, are therefore never cognizable under the 
statute.  See State v. Nickel, 2010 WI App 161, ¶7, 330 Wis. 2d 
750, 794 N.W.2d 765.  Consequently, the State reasons, a tardy 
Cherry motion cannot count as a prior § 974.06 motion within the 
meaning of Escalona-Naranjo because a Cherry motion, even when 
timely submitted, cannot be filed pursuant to that statute in 
No. 
2010AP425   
 
25 
 
the first place.10  However, the State asserts that a defendant 
who files a timely Cherry motion would waive his right to 
§ 974.06 relief.  We find this distinction meaningless and hold 
that a Cherry motion, standing alone, can never bar a defendant 
from later filing a § 974.06 motion.  
¶48 Returning to the underlying issue, we start our 
analysis, as we must, by examining the text of the relevant 
statutes.  See State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane 
Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 
(statutory interpretation begins with the language of the 
statute).  Wisconsin Stat. § 973.19(1)(a) provides that "[a] 
person sentenced to imprisonment . . . may, within 90 days after 
the sentence or order is entered, move the court to modify the 
sentence . . . ."  As a Cherry motion is a challenge to a 
defendant's DNA surcharge, it is a type of sentence modification 
motion.  See supra note 6.  A defendant who files a sentence 
modification motion under § 973.19(1)(a) waives his right to 
file "an appeal or postconviction motion under [Wis. Stat. § 
(Rule)] 809.30(2)."  Wis. Stat. § 973.19(5).  Rule 809.30 is 
located in Subchapter III of Chapter 809, which governs criminal 
appellate procedure in the court of appeals.  The definition 
section of that statute defines "postconviction relief" as "an 
appeal or a motion for postconviction relief in a criminal case, 
                                                 
10 Though we are not bound by a party's concession of law, 
State v. St. Martin, 2011 WI 44, ¶14 n.6, 334 Wis. 2d 290, 800 
N.W.2d 858, cert. denied, 565 U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1003 (2012), 
we agree with the State that the court of appeals was mistaken 
on this point.   
No. 
2010AP425   
 
26 
 
other than an appeal, motion, or petition under . . . [Wis. 
Stat. §] 974.06 . . . ."  Rule 809.30(1)(c) (emphasis added).   
¶49 There are two noteworthy conclusions to be drawn from 
this statutory scheme: (1) a defendant who moves to modify his 
sentence pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.19(1)(a) renounces his 
right to a direct appeal and postconviction relief, and (2) a 
Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion is expressly not one of those forms 
of relief.  If the legislature wanted, it certainly could have 
forced 
a 
defendant 
to 
choose 
between 
filing 
a 
sentence 
modification motion or a § 974.06 motion.  But it did not.  Cf. 
Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co., 2009 WI 27, ¶14 n.9, 
316 Wis. 2d 47, 762 N.W.2d 652 (stating the judicial presumption 
that the legislature means what it says and that every word 
excluded from a statute was excluded for a reason).  Our reading 
of these statutes makes clear that a Cherry motion, or any 
sentence 
modification 
motion, 
plainly 
does 
not 
waive 
a 
defendant's right to bring a § 974.06 motion at a later date.      
¶50 Further support for this interpretation is found in 
the statutes governing time limits in criminal appellate and 
postconviction matters.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 
(permitting the court to look at the language of "surrounding or 
closely-related statutes" to guide its interpretation).  A 
defendant 
has 
20 
days 
after 
his 
"sentencing 
or 
final 
adjudication" to file notice in the circuit court that he is 
seeking 
postconviction 
relief. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.30(2)(b).  As previously mentioned, a defendant 
seeking to modify his sentence must file a motion within 90 days 
No. 
2010AP425   
 
27 
 
after 
the 
sentence 
or 
order 
is 
entered. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.19(1)(a).  Wisconsin Stat. § 974.02(1) provides that "[a] 
motion for postconviction relief other than under [Wis. Stat. §] 
974.06 . . . shall be made in the time and manner provided in 
[Wis. Stat. § (Rule)] 809.30."  (Emphasis added).  A § 974.06 
motion, by contrast, "may be made at any time."  § 974.06(2).  
This statutory setup makes manifest that sentence modification 
and § 974.06 motions are two separate forms of relief, such that 
the filing of one does not preclude the filing of the other. 
¶51 In 
addition 
to 
being 
textually 
sound, 
this 
interpretation makes the most logical sense.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 974.06 was meant to supplant habeas corpus as the primary 
method of attacking a conviction after the time for an appeal 
has expired.  Eisenberg, Post-Conviction Remedies in the 1970's, 
56 Marq. L. Rev. at 79.  According to the State's view, a 
defendant who has just been sentenced has 90 days to either: (1) 
make a Wis. Stat. § 974.06 argument, which is usually complex 
given 
that 
it 
involves 
constitutional 
or 
jurisdictional 
arguments, or (2) give up his right to seek a sentence 
modification.  Given that a § 974.06 motion "may be made at any 
time," § 974.06(2), we find it implausible that a defendant 
would have to relinquish his statutorily-protected right to 
challenge his sentence in order to protect his future right to 
challenge the constitutionality of his conviction in state 
court.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 (observing that statutes 
are interpreted to avoid absurd or unreasonable results).  This 
No. 
2010AP425   
 
28 
 
incongruity reaffirms what the statutes make clear: a defendant 
is not required to raise § 974.06 arguments in a Cherry motion.   
¶52 Wisconsin case law also supports the view that Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 974.06 
motions 
and 
Cherry 
motions 
are 
distinct 
mechanisms that do not overlap.  Section 974.06 motions are 
limited to "matters of jurisdiction or of constitutional 
dimensions."  Peterson, 54 Wis. 2d at 381 (footnote omitted).  
As such, "[s]ome grounds for relief are not available under 
§ 974.06."  State v. Lo, 2003 WI 107, ¶37, 264 Wis. 2d 1, 665 
N.W.2d 756 (emphasis removed).  Because of this restriction, a 
defendant may not make a Cherry argument in his § 974.06 motion.  
Nickel, 330 Wis. 2d 750, ¶7.  Another important distinction is 
that a Cherry motion must be made before a criminal conviction 
becomes final, see id., ¶5, whereas, in contrast, a § 974.06 
motion can be made only after "the time for appeal or 
postconviction remedy provided in Wis. Stat. § [974.02] has 
expired . . . ."  § 974.06(1).  In other words, Wisconsin 
precedent further bolsters our understanding of Cherry motions 
and § 974.06 motions as wholly distinct.  Having found no 
justification for the State's position in either the statutory 
text or logic, we similarly determine that the case law likewise 
lends no support.  
¶53 For the reasons stated, Starks's Cherry motion did not 
bar his subsequent § 974.06 motion.  We turn now to the proper 
pleading 
standard 
for ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel claims when a defendant alleges in a habeas petition 
No. 
2010AP425   
 
29 
 
that appellate counsel was deficient for not making certain 
arguments.       
  
C. 
Pleading Standard for Ineffective Assistance of 
Appellate Counsel Claims in Habeas Petitions 
1. 
General Principles of Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel 
¶54 Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution, 
and the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, made 
applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, entitle 
every 
criminal 
defendant 
in 
our 
state 
to 
the 
effective 
assistance of counsel.  State v. Domke, 2011 WI 95, ¶34, 337 
Wis. 2d 268, 805 N.W.2d 364; Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 394-
95 (1985).  This right applies to both a defendant's trial as 
well as his direct appeal.  Evitts, 469 U.S. at 396.  In order 
to establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, the 
defendant 
must 
show: 
(1) 
that 
counsel's 
performance 
was 
deficient, 
and 
(2) 
counsel's 
deficiency 
prejudiced 
the 
defendant.  State v. Balliette, 2011 WI 79, ¶21, 336 Wis. 2d 
358, 805 N.W.2d 334, cert. denied, 565 U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 825 
(2011).  Satisfaction of the first prong requires a showing that 
the defendant's attorney "made errors so serious that counsel 
was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by 
the Sixth Amendment."  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
687 (1984).  In evaluating deficiency, courts indulge in every 
presumption that counsel was effective unless shown otherwise by 
the defendant.  Balliette, 336 Wis. 2d 358, ¶¶27-28.  Similarly, 
reviewing courts must be "highly deferential" when judging an 
No. 
2010AP425   
 
30 
 
attorney's strategic decisions, Domke, 337 Wis. 2d 268, ¶36 
(citation omitted), and any decision made during the course of 
representation is regarded as having been made for "tactical 
reasons" in the absence of evidence to the contrary.  Yarborough 
v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) (per curiam).   
¶55 As to the second prong of the ineffective assistance 
of counsel test, prejudice occurs when the attorney's error is 
of such magnitude that there is a "reasonable probability" that 
but for the error the outcome would have been different.  State 
v. Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d 758, 769, 569 N.W.2d 749 (1999).  
Stated differently, relief may be granted only where there "is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome," 
i.e., there is a "substantial, not just conceivable, likelihood 
of a different result."  Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. __, 131 
S. Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted).  
2. 
Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel 
¶56 Turning to the specific issue here, the parties 
dispute 
the 
appropriate 
standard 
a 
court 
should 
use 
in 
determining whether a defendant received ineffective assistance 
of appellate counsel because of counsel's failure to raise 
certain arguments.  Starks contends that all he must do to 
demonstrate ineffectiveness is to show that appellate counsel's 
performance was deficient and that it prejudiced him.  The 
State, on the other hand, argues that Starks must also establish 
why the unraised claims of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel were "clearly stronger" than the claims that appellate 
No. 
2010AP425   
 
31 
 
counsel raised on appeal.  We hold that the State has 
articulated the proper standard. 
¶57 The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit, in the context of a federal habeas corpus petition 
raising ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, has stated: 
When a claim of ineffective assistance of [appellate] 
counsel is based on failure to raise viable issues, 
the [trial] court must examine the trial record to 
determine whether appellate counsel failed to present 
significant and obvious issues on appeal.  Significant 
issues which could have been raised should then be 
compared to those which were raised.  Generally, only 
when ignored issues are clearly stronger than those 
presented, 
will 
the 
presumption 
of 
effective 
assistance of counsel be overcome. 
Gray v. Greer, 800 F.2d 644, 646 (7th Cir. 1986) (emphasis 
added).   
¶58 Fourteen years later in Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 
(2000), the United States Supreme Court adopted this "clearly 
stronger" standard.  In that case, a California jury convicted 
Robbins 
of 
second-degree 
murder 
and 
grand 
theft 
of 
an 
automobile.  Id. at 266.  Robbins' appointed appellate attorney 
concluded that an appeal would be frivolous and filed the 
equivalent of a "no-merit brief" with the California Court of 
Appeal.   Id. at 266-67.  The appellate court agreed that there 
were no issues of arguable merit and affirmed his conviction.  
Id. at 267.  After the California Supreme Court denied his 
petition for review, Robbins' state postconviction remedies were 
exhausted, so he proceeded to file a habeas corpus petition in 
federal court.  Id.  His habeas petition alleged (among other 
No. 
2010AP425   
 
32 
 
claims) that he received ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel because his appellate attorney's no-merit brief did not 
comply with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), 
which "set forth a procedure for an appellate counsel to follow 
in seeking permission to withdraw from the representation when 
he concludes that an appeal would be frivolous; that procedure 
includes the requirement that counsel file a brief referring to 
anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal."  
Robbins, 528 U.S. at 267-68 (citation omitted).  The district 
court concluded that there were at least two issues that the 
appellate attorney should have raised in his no-merit brief and 
thus reinstated Robbins' appeal.  Id. at 268.  The Ninth Circuit 
affirmed.  Id.    
¶59 After granting certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that  when a defendant (such as Robbins) alleges that his 
appellate attorney was deficient for failing to file a merits 
brief,11 all that a defendant must do to show deficiency is to 
                                                 
11 When an indigent defendant is appointed an attorney to 
represent him on appeal, the attorney can either file a "merits 
brief" (sometimes called a "brief on the merits") or a "no merit 
brief." See, e.g., State ex rel. Seibert v. Macht, 2001 WI 67, 
¶20 n.8, 244 Wis. 2d 378, 627 N.W.2d 881.  A "merits brief" is a 
traditional appellate brief in that it "sets out the issues to 
be decided, the party's position, and the arguments and 
authorities in support."  Black's Law Dictionary 218 (9th ed. 
2009).  An attorney files a no-merit brief, however, when he 
"concludes that a direct appeal on behalf of the [defendant] 
would be frivolous and without any arguable merit within the 
meaning of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967)."  Wis. 
Stat. § (Rule) 809.32(1)(a).  The no-merit brief must "identify 
anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal 
and discuss the reasons why each identified issue lacks merit."  
Rule 809.32(1)(a).         
No. 
2010AP425   
 
33 
 
demonstrate "that a reasonably competent attorney would have 
found one nonfrivolous issue warranting a merits brief . . . ."  
Id. at 288.  However, when a defendant (such as Starks) alleges 
that his appellate attorney was deficient for not raising a 
particular claim, "it [will be] difficult to demonstrate that 
counsel was incompetent" because the defendant must show that "a 
particular nonfrivolous issue was clearly stronger than issues 
that counsel did present."  Id. (emphasis added).  "In both 
cases, however, the prejudice analysis will be the same."  Id. 
(footnote omitted). 
¶60 We now adopt this "clearly stronger" pleading standard 
for the deficiency prong of the Strickland test in Wisconsin for 
criminal defendants alleging in a habeas petition that they 
received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel due to 
counsel's failure to raise certain issues.12  As we have 
previously noted, "[w]e need finality in our litigation."  
Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d at 185.  We also must respect the 
professional judgment of postconviction attorneys in separating 
the wheat from the chaff.  Cf. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 
753 (1983) ("A brief that raises every colorable issue runs the 
                                                 
12 The dissent takes issue with the fact that the "clearly 
stronger" standard cannot be applied to every other type of 
ineffective 
assistance 
claim, 
such 
as 
the 
failure 
to 
investigate.  See dissent, ¶99.  Of course it can't.  By 
definition, the test is limited to claims alleging the failure 
to raise arguments.  Not every test can account for every 
situation.  That inevitable limitation did not trouble the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000), and it 
does not trouble us here.   
No. 
2010AP425   
 
34 
 
risk of burying good arguments . . . in a verbal mound made up 
of strong and weak contentions.") (citation omitted).  The U.S. 
Supreme Court has "emphasized that the right to appellate 
representation does not include a right to present frivolous 
arguments," Robbins, 528 U.S. at 272, and that, in fact, an 
appellate attorney has an ethical obligation not to "advance[e] 
frivolous or improper arguments . . . ."  McCoy v. Wis. Court of 
Appeals, 486 U.S. 429, 435 (1988).  The "clearly stronger" 
standard achieves these objectives while at the same time 
ensuring that a defendant whose appellate attorney did not raise 
meritorious issues may still seek habeas relief.   
3. 
The Dissent Misinterprets United States Supreme Court 
Precedent 
¶61 We are a bit mystified by the dissent's argument that 
we are overlooking the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Cullen, 
specifically the language which states that "strict rules" are 
not appropriate in evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims.  Dissent, ¶¶77, 89 (citing Cullen, 131 S. Ct. at 1406).  
Pace Justice Bradley, she is disfiguring the meaning of this 
quote by taking it grossly out of context.  In Cullen, the 
defendant Pinholster was convicted of first-degree murder and 
sentenced to death by a California state jury.  131 S. Ct. at 
1396-97.  On mandatory appeal, the California Supreme Court 
affirmed the judgment.  Id. at 1396.  Pinholster subsequently 
filed a habeas corpus petition in state court, alleging that his 
trial 
counsel 
was 
ineffective 
for 
failing 
to 
adequately 
investigate 
mitigating 
evidence 
at 
the 
penalty 
phase 
of 
No. 
2010AP425   
 
35 
 
Pinholster's murder trial.  Id.  The California Supreme Court 
summarily dismissed the petition as meritless.  Id.  Pinholster 
then moved for federal habeas relief.  Id.  The district court 
granted Pinholster's petition, finding that his attorney failed 
to adequately "investigate and present mitigation evidence at 
the penalty hearing."  Id. at 1397 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit 
reversed, but the en banc panel reinstated the district court's 
decision to grant Pinholster habeas relief.  Id.   
¶62 One of the issues the Supreme Court granted review on 
was "whether the Court of Appeals properly granted Pinholster 
habeas 
relief 
on 
his 
claim 
of 
penalty-phase 
ineffective 
assistance of counsel."  Id. at 1398.  In reviewing the en banc 
decision, the Supreme Court observed that the Ninth Circuit 
"drew 
from 
[our] 
cases 
a 
constitutional 
duty 
to 
investigate . . .  and the principle that it is prima facie 
ineffective 
assistance 
for 
counsel 
to 
abandon 
their 
investigation 
of the petitioner's background after having 
acquired only rudimentary knowledge of his history from a narrow 
set of sources."  Id. at 1406 (internal quotation marks, 
citations, and alterations omitted).  In reversing the Court of 
Appeals 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
said, 
"[b]eyond 
the 
general 
requirements of reasonableness, specific guidelines are not 
appropriate."  Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  In other words, the Supreme Court was not talking 
about pleading standards, as Justice Bradley believes, but 
rather the Ninth Circuit's incorrect conclusion that Strickland 
No. 
2010AP425   
 
36 
 
imposes a constitutional duty upon counsel to investigate.  See 
id. at 1406-07.    
¶63 What is even more puzzling about the dissent's point 
is that Justice Thomas was the author of both Cullen and 
Robbins, the opinion that adopted the "clearly stronger" 
standard.  In fact, Robbins cited to the Seventh Circuit's 
opinion in Gray as support for the "clearly stronger" standard.  
Robbins, 528 U.S. at 288.  Pinholster does not even mention 
Robbins, let alone suggest that the decision is no longer good 
law.  We assume the Supreme Court chooses its words and the 
cases its cites to carefully, and is aware of its own recently-
decided precedent. 
¶64 Out of convenience, the dissent elects to simply 
ignore Robbins' reasoning and import, mentioning this highly 
relevant case only twice in passing.  See dissent, ¶¶86, 96.  It 
suits the dissent more to recite broad language from Strickland, 
a case that bears no factual similarity to the present one, 
rather than to deal meaningfully with Robbins, a case directly 
on point and one in which the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly 
approved of the "clearly stronger" standard in the specific 
legal context at issue here.  See, e.g., Robbins, 528 U.S. at 
287-88 (making clear that the "clearly stronger" standard is an 
iteration of Strickland's deficiency prong).  The dissent finds 
many words to criticize our analysis but can articulate none to 
explain its departure from clear U.S. Supreme Court precedent.  
No. 
2010AP425   
 
37 
 
¶65 We now turn to whether the claims Starks believes 
should have been raised on appeal are "clearly stronger" than 
the claims he did raise. 
D. 
Assessing the Merits of Starks's Ineffective 
Assistance of Appellate Counsel Habeas Claims 
¶66 As we have mentioned, Attorney Kagen argued on direct 
appeal that: (1) the circuit court should have granted Starks's 
request for the lesser-included offense instruction on second-
degree reckless homicide; (2) a mistrial should have been 
declared when a witness sequestration order was violated; (3) 
the circuit court erred in not dismissing the case based on the 
prosecution's failure to turn over information relating to the 
identity of "Junebug;" and (4) the evidence was inconsistent and 
therefore insufficient to support the verdict.  For Starks to 
succeed on Strickland's deficiency prong with his claim that 
Kagen rendered ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, he 
must first show that the claims of ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel that were not argued were "clearly stronger" than 
the arguments Kagen did pursue.   
¶67 Starks first contends that his trial counsel was 
deficient for not calling Mario Mills as a witness.  Mills, 
recall, was originally Starks's co-defendant, as both were 
charged with first-degree intentional homicide as a party to a 
crime and possession of a firearm by a felon.  Mills accepted a 
plea bargain that reduced his charge to furnishing a firearm to 
a felon.  Starks believes that had Mills been called as a 
witness, he could have undermined the State's case and presented 
No. 
2010AP425   
 
38 
 
a different account of what happened the afternoon of the 
murder.13  His support for this?  An affidavit signed by Mills 
after he took the plea bargain and after Starks was convicted, 
claiming, "I never seen Tramell Starks shoot anyone."  Given 
that Mills was charged with the same crimes as Starks and only 
came out with this version of events after he took a plea 
bargain, the circuit court was correct to dismiss this statement 
as unreliable. 
¶68 The 
second 
purported 
instance 
of 
ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel that Starks points to is his 
attorney's failure to call Dion Anderson as a witness.  Anderson 
was in a sheriff's van with two of the State's key witnesses——
Trenton Gray and Wayne Rogers——who were supposed to be separated 
from one another per a court sequestration order.  After 
Anderson was contacted by a private investigator hired by 
Starks, Anderson wrote back reporting that he heard how Gray and 
Rogers "put everything together" to convict Starks.   
¶69 When the issue of the violated sequestration order 
came up at trial, the circuit court found——based on answers Gray 
                                                 
13 The State asserts that the primary reason Mills was not 
called as a witness at Starks's trial was because Mills 
"unexpectedly took a plea on the morning of Starks's trial, but 
trial counsel did not have enough time at the eleventh-hour to 
interview Mills, or anyone whose testimony was related to Mills' 
statements."  This is not quite accurate.  It is true that 
Starks and Mills were both set to stand trial on August 21, 
2006, and that Mills did take a plea that day.  However, 
Starks's trial was rescheduled to December 4, giving Starks's 
attorney three-and-a-half months to interview Mills should he 
have so chosen.            
No. 
2010AP425   
 
39 
 
gave during his cross-examination——that he and Rogers did not 
talk about the substance of their testimony.  This finding was 
upheld by the court of appeals in Starks's direct appeal.  
Starks I, No. 2008AP790-CR, ¶¶19-22.  Starks is thus asking us 
to give him an opportunity to relitigate a dispositive factual 
finding that has already been adjudicated, and we are not 
permitted to do so on collateral review.  See Allen, 328 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶79.       
¶70 Starks's third contention is that his trial attorney 
should 
have 
investigated 
the 
phone 
records 
of 
Ray 
Gill 
("Junebug").  At trial, Gray testified that he received a call 
from Starks on the day of the murder, but that he called him 
back using Gill's phone because, "I didn't trust my telephone 
for the simple fact that I use it in my legitimate business as 
well as my illegitimate business.  Mr. Starks is important to 
me, so, no, I didn't want to talk to him on my illegitimate 
phone."  Starks asserts that Gill's phone records would reveal 
that no call was made between him and Gray.  However, as the 
circuit court noted, Starks did not actually produce any phone 
records to support the veracity of this claim.  Much like 
Starks's second proposed instance of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, this is nothing more than a conclusory allegation.   
¶71 Finally, 
Starks believes his trial attorney was 
deficient for not calling his father and grandmother——Stanley 
Daniels and Mary McCullum——to testify.  Daniels and McCullum 
were present at the funeral where Gray testified that Starks 
told him he wanted to murder Carvius Williams for talking to the 
No. 
2010AP425   
 
40 
 
police about Starks's involvement in Weddle's death.  Signed 
affidavits by Daniels and McCullum stated that they did not see 
Starks and Gray have a conversation at the funeral.  Starks 
believes their testimony would have undercut Gray's credibility. 
¶72 Had Daniels and McCullum testified, it is possible the 
jury would have been less likely to believe Gray's testimony.  
But it is also possible that a jury would not have believed 
them, especially given their familial connection to Starks.  
Furthermore, the jury may have doubted their omnipresence.  As 
the circuit court nicely put it, "[t]here is not a reasonable 
probability that the jury would have found it reasonable to 
believe that both the defendant's grandmother and his father had 
their eyes on the defendant's every single movement on the day 
of the funeral."  It is easy to imagine why Starks's trial 
counsel opted not, for strategic reasons, to put Daniels and 
McCullum on the stand.  See Domke, 337 Wis. 2d 268, ¶49 ("This 
court 
will 
not 
second-guess 
a 
reasonable 
trial 
strategy . . . .").  Starks's final argument therefore fails as 
well.        
¶73 In short, the instances of ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel that Starks believes Kagen should have argued on 
appeal are either unsubstantiated, unpersuasive, or previously 
adjudicated.  They are in no way "clearly stronger" than the 
arguments Kagen raised.  We therefore hold that Kagen was not 
deficient for failing to make these arguments, and thus need not 
decide whether he was prejudiced.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
697 
(if 
a 
defendant 
cannot 
satisfy 
one 
prong 
of 
the 
No. 
2010AP425   
 
41 
 
ineffectiveness test, a court need not reach the other).  As 
Starks did not receive ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel, we affirm his conviction.   
 
 
 
 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
¶74 We hold that as sentence modification is a distinct 
procedure from Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motions, a defendant is not 
required to shoehorn ineffective assistance of counsel arguments 
into a Cherry motion.  On the question of the proper pleading 
standard, we hold that a defendant who argues he received 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in a habeas petition 
because certain arguments were not raised must show why the 
claims he believes should have been raised on appeal were 
"clearly stronger" than the claims that were raised.       
¶75 Finally, we conclude that because the arguments about 
trial counsel's ineffectiveness are not clearly stronger than 
the arguments Starks made on direct appeal, Starks did not 
receive ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and is not 
entitled to habeas relief.  The decision of the court of appeals 
is therefore affirmed. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.   
              
 
      
No.  2010AP425.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶76 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  I agree with 
the majority that "Starks's Cherry motion did not bar his 
subsequent § 974.06 motion," majority op., ¶53.  However, I part 
ways when it adopts a new bright-line test for evaluating claims 
of deficient performance of counsel.1  
¶77 A 
recent 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
decision 
addressing 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims under 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) declined to adopt 
bright-line standards for evaluating deficiency.  Cullen v. 
Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1406 (2011).  It cautioned against 
"attributing strict rules" to its jurisprudence in this area of 
the law.  Id.   
¶78 Nevertheless, 
the 
majority 
today 
ignores 
the 
admonition of the United States Supreme Court and adopts a new 
threshold bright-line test for evaluating deficient performance. 
It articulates the new test as follows: "a defendant who argues 
in a habeas petition that he received ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel because certain arguments were not raised must 
demonstrate that the claims he believes should have been raised 
on appeal were 'clearly stronger' than the claims that were 
raised."  Majority op., ¶6.  
¶79 The new bright-line test adopted by the majority today 
is 
inconsistent 
with 
the 
Strickland 
test 
for 
deficient 
performance, which requires an evaluation of reasonableness 
                                                 
1 I also part ways with the majority when it declares, 
without the benefit of briefing or argument, that it has 
jurisdiction to determine the issues presented by the parties.  
No.  2010AP425.awb 
 
2 
 
under the totality of the circumstances.  Although the "clearly 
stronger" test is a circumstance to consider under the totality 
of the circumstances and may be a useful tool in determining 
deficient performance, the majority's bright-line, threshold 
application of that test has been rejected by other state 
supreme courts and is unsupported by our own precedent.   
¶80 Additionally, the analysis employed by the majority in 
applying 
its 
new 
test 
is 
unworkable 
because 
it 
cannot 
practically be applied in many circumstances.  The overarching, 
unworkable scope of this test is apparent in the haphazard way 
the majority analyzes Starks's claims in this case.   
¶81 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.   
I 
¶82 In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the 
United States Supreme Court fashioned the quintessential test 
for deficient performance of counsel: whether counsel acted 
unreasonably 
under 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances.2  
                                                 
2 At the outset, the majority recognizes a potential problem 
with the court's jurisdiction in this case.  Majority op., ¶4.  
It acknowledges that because Starks "improperly filed his claim 
with the circuit court, it should have been dismissed and not 
allowed to proceed to an appeal."  Id., ¶35.   
Nevertheless, essentially for reasons of judicial economy, 
the majority decides to address the merits of the issues and in 
a cursory fashion concludes Starks's decision to file in the 
wrong court was a matter of competence, not jurisdiction.  Id., 
¶¶36-40. 
 
It is unclear whether the majority is correct in its 
cursory 
conclusion 
that 
the 
erroneous 
filing 
implicates 
competence rather than jurisdiction.  The issue was neither 
raised nor briefed by the parties.   
No.  2010AP425.awb 
 
3 
 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 ("the performance inquiry must be 
whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the 
circumstances").  Although the majority pays lip service to 
Strickland and decisions of this court applying Strickland, its 
analysis ignores the Strickland test.  Majority op., ¶54.   
                                                                                                                                                             
Article VII, Section 8 of the Wisconsin constitution, 
entitled "Circuit court; jurisdiction" provides that "[e]xcept 
as otherwise provided by law, the circuit court shall have 
original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal[]." 
(emphasis added.)  In State v. Knight, a unanimous decision of 
this court, we concluded that the law provided an ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel claim must be brought in the 
court of appeals.  168 Wis. 2d 509, 522, 484 N.W.2d 540 (1992) 
("We conclude that sec. 974.06 does not authorize a circuit 
court to resolve claims of ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel.").   
Because Knight stated that the circuit court is not 
"authorize[d]" 
to 
hear 
a 
motion 
addressing 
ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel, it arguably falls within the 
constitutional phrase "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law."  
The analysis of the court of appeals in State ex rel. Rothering 
v. McCaughtry, 205 Wis. 2d 675, 677, 556 N.W.2d 136 (Ct. App. 
1996) supports that the Knight court discussed "jurisdiction," 
not competency.  Therefore, the circuit court may have lacked 
jurisdiction to hear Starks's motion. 
If the circuit court lacked jurisdiction, its order 
addressing the merits of Starks's motion was a nullity.  If its 
order was a nullity, then likewise any decision addressing the 
merits by the court of appeals and by this court are likewise 
nullities and would have no precedential value. 
Accordingly, I determine that supplemental briefs should be 
ordered addressing this issue.  Because jurisdiction cannot be 
conferred by mistake or stipulation, this issue is potentially 
dispositive.  Lassa v. Rongstad, 2006 WI 105, ¶34, 294 Wis. 2d 
187, 718 N.W.2d 673.  The majority should not resolve such an 
important question seemingly unfettered by the lack of argument 
or analysis, the words of the constitution, and our prior 
unanimous precedent.            
 
No.  2010AP425.awb 
 
4 
 
¶83 Instead, the majority introduces a new, bright-line 
test inconsistent with the test set out in Strickland.  Rather 
than following the very cases and statutes it cites, it 
introduces a new threshold test: "a defendant who argues he 
received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in a habeas 
petition because certain arguments were not raised must show why  
the claims he believes should have been raised on appeal were 
'clearly stronger' than the claims that were raised."  Majority 
op., ¶74.   
¶84 This 
new 
standard 
is 
wholly 
inconsistent 
with 
Strickland, which requires an evaluation of reasonableness under 
the totality of the circumstances.  466 U.S. at 695.  A bright-
line standard is not only incompatible with Strickland, it is 
its antithesis.  
¶85 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
guarantees that an accused shall "have the Assistance of Counsel 
for his defence."  The United States Supreme Court has 
additionally recognized that the constitutional right to counsel 
is 
"the 
right 
to 
the 
effective 
assistance 
of 
counsel."  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 
U.S. 759, 771 n. 14 (1970)).   
¶86 The Strickland test for ineffective assistance of 
counsel remains the lodestar of all ineffective assistance 
determinations to this day.   The United States Supreme Court 
set forth two elements to establish ineffective assistance of 
counsel: deficient performance and prejudice.  Id. at 687; see 
also Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000) ("the proper 
No.  2010AP425.awb 
 
5 
 
standard for evaluating Robbins' claim that appellate counsel 
was ineffective in neglecting to file a merits brief is that 
enunciated in Strickland . . . .").   
¶87 To establish deficient performance, "the defendant 
must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness" under prevailing professional norms.  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88.  Judicial scrutiny of counsel's 
performance must be "highly deferential."  Id. at 689.  Courts 
are to determine whether "in light of all the circumstances, the 
identified acts or omissions [of counsel] were outside the wide 
range of professionally competent assistance."  Id. at 690.   
¶88 Evaluating whether one argument is "clearly stronger" 
than another is not the test for ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel.  Rather it is a factor to consider when 
applying the Strickland test. 
¶89 A 
recent 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
decision 
addressing 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims under 
Strickland 
declined 
to 
adopt 
bright-line 
standards 
for 
evaluating deficiency, and cautioned against "attributing strict 
rules" to its jurisprudence in this area of the law.  Cullen, 
131 S. Ct. at 1406 ("[b]eyond the general requirement of 
reasonableness, 
'specific 
guidelines 
are 
not 
appropriate. 
[Citing Strickland at 688]'").   
¶90 Other decisions of the United States Supreme Court 
have further emphasized the highly individualized nature of the 
task of evaluating whether counsel rendered constitutionally 
effective assistance.  See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 
No.  2010AP425.awb 
 
6 
 
362, 391 (2000) ("the Strickland test 'of necessity requires a 
case-by-case examination of the evidence[].'"); Premo v. Moore, 
131 S. Ct. 733, 742 (2011) (the deficiency inquiry varies at 
different stages of the case).  A bright-line standard for 
evaluating deficiency is contrary to this United States Supreme 
Court case law.     
¶91 Not only is the majority's bright-line test for 
deficient performance inconsistent with Strickland's test for 
deficient performance, it overstates the case from which it 
borrows the phrase "clearly stronger."  In Gray v. Greer, 800 
F.2d 644 (7th Cir. 1985), the defendant alleged that his 
appellate counsel was ineffective.  The district court concluded 
that appellate counsel was not ineffective based solely on 
review of the defendant's brief on direct appeal.  Id. at 645-
646.   
¶92 The Seventh Circuit concluded that when a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel is based on failure to raise 
viable issues, the district court is to "examine the trial court 
record to determine whether appellate counsel failed to present 
significant and obvious issues on appeal."  Id. at 646.  It 
provided guidance as to how to examine the trial record, stating 
that "[s]ignificant issues that could have been raised should 
then be compared to those which were raised."  Id.  Furthermore, 
the court observed that "[g]enerally, only when ignored issues 
are clearly stronger than those presented, will the presumption 
of effective assistance of counsel be overcome."  Id. (emphasis 
added).   
No.  2010AP425.awb 
 
7 
 
¶93 The majority reads Gray in an overbroad manner.  
Although comparing the arguments and determining that ignored 
claims are clearly stronger than those presented is certainly 
one way of showing deficiency, it is not the only way.3   
¶94 Other state supreme courts have emphasized the word 
"generally" in Gray and have specifically declined to adopt the 
bright-line "clearly stronger" test that is embraced by the 
majority today.  They recognize that a bright-line test is too 
rigid, noting that not even Gray espoused the "clearly stronger" 
standard as the only way to prove deficient performance.  See 
Shorter v. Waters, 571 S.E.2d 373, 376 (Ga. 2002) (the clearly 
stronger test does not always apply because "[s]ituations may 
arise when every error enumerated by appellate counsel on appeal 
presented a strong, nonfrivolous issue but counsel's performance 
was nonetheless deficient because counsel's tactical decision 
not to enumerate one rejected error was an unreasonable one 
which only an incompetent attorney would adopt."); Carpenter v. 
State of Tennessee, 126 S.W.3d 879, 888 (Tenn. 2004) (discussing 
Gray and declining to "hold that the only way to show deficient 
                                                 
3 For example, another way to show deficient performance 
includes showing that the failure to raise an issue was 
unreasonable because it was due to oversight rather than an 
intentional, reasoned strategy.  Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 
534 (2003).  Defense counsel has a "duty to make reasonable 
investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes 
particular 
investigations 
unnecessary." 
 
Strickland 
v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-691 (1984).  If counsel chooses 
issues based on less than a full investigation, the deficiency 
determination turns on whether the failure to investigate was 
itself unreasonable, not on whether that attorney would have 
chosen to raise the issues discovered by such an investigation.  
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. at 522-523. 
No.  2010AP425.awb 
 
8 
 
performance of appellate counsel in a case involving the 
omission of an issue on appeal is to establish that the omitted 
issue was clearly stronger than the issues that counsel did 
present on appeal." (Emphasis in original.)).  
¶95 Furthermore, the bright-line standard is unsupported 
by prior precedent of this court.  This court has long 
recognized Strickland as providing the framework for evaluating 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.  State v. Moffett, 
147 Wis. 2d 343, 352, 433 N.W.2d 572 (1989) ("A claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel brought under the sixth 
amendment of the United States Constitution must meet the test 
articulated in Strickland v. Washington . . . and followed by 
this 
court 
in 
State 
v. 
Pitsch 
. . . 
and 
State 
v. 
Johnson . . . ." (Citations omitted.)).   
¶96 Recently, in a case involving a § 974.06 motion based 
on deficiency of postconviction counsel, this court recognized 
again 
that 
Strickland 
guides 
this 
court's 
analysis 
of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, and allows for various ways 
to show deficient performance.  State v. Balliette, 2011 WI 79, 
¶64, 336 Wis. 2d 358, 805 N.W.2d 334 ("For example, Balliette 
could have alleged such deficiency by showing that counsel's 
performance was 'objectively unreasonable . . . in failing to 
find arguable issues to appeal,' as the Supreme Court described 
it in Smith [v. Robbins].").    
¶97 This recent decision, as well as the substantial body 
of Wisconsin case law interpreting Strickland, shows that this 
court has ably evaluated claims of ineffectiveness of counsel 
No.  2010AP425.awb 
 
9 
 
without inventing a bright-line standard.  The majority's new 
threshold bright-line test is inconsistent with the totality of 
the circumstances test set forth by the United States Supreme 
Court, and as interpreted by other states and prior decisions of 
this court. 
II 
¶98 When the majority turns to evaluate the merits of 
Starks's claims, it is apparent that its new "clearly stronger" 
test is unworkable as a bright-line test because it cannot be 
practically applied in many circumstances.  Although claims of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel may often require a 
court to weigh the relative merits of claims that were raised 
and those that were not raised, that will not always be the 
case. 
¶99 The 
majority's 
"clearly 
stronger" 
test 
has 
no 
practical application in many circumstances.  For example, under 
Strickland, 
counsel 
has 
a 
duty 
to 
"make 
reasonable 
investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes 
particular investigations unnecessary."  466 U.S. at 691.  
Accordingly, a court does not need to determine whether a claim 
that was not raised is "clearly stronger" than those that were 
raised when the allegation of ineffectiveness is premised upon a 
failure to adequately investigate a claim in the first place. 
¶100 Likewise, a failure to raise a claim may simply be due 
to oversight rather than an intentional strategy.  Wiggins v. 
Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003).  Sometimes counsel simply 
forgets to raise claims, irrespective of any evaluation of their 
No.  2010AP425.awb 
 
10 
 
relative strength.  A court does not need to determine whether a 
claim that was not raised is "clearly stronger" than those that 
were raised when counsel acts unreasonably due to oversight. 
¶101 Even if counsel properly identifies an issue that is 
the strongest issue available, his performance may also be 
considered deficient when the claim is not adequately raised——
such as when there is a failure to conduct research sufficient 
to support the claim, a failure to present necessary evidence, 
or a failure to adequately argue the claim.  A court does not 
need to determine whether a claim that was not raised is 
"clearly stronger" than those that were raised when the focus of 
the inquiry is exclusively on the claim that was raised 
inadequately.     
¶102 As the above examples illustrate, the majority's 
"clearly 
stronger" 
test 
is 
simply 
inapplicable 
in 
many 
circumstances.  Yet, its holding appears to premise deficient 
performance on evaluating the relative strength of the claims 
raised and not raised regardless of the reasonableness under the 
totality of the circumstances.  As a practical matter, such a 
test cannot always apply whenever a defendant "argues he 
received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in a habeas 
petition because certain arguments were not raised."  Majority 
op., ¶74. 
¶103 The overarching, unworkable scope of the majority's 
new bright-line test is apparent in the haphazard way it 
evaluates Starks's motion in this case.  After paying lip 
service to Strickland and other cases setting forth a standard 
No.  2010AP425.awb 
 
11 
 
for ineffectiveness, majority op., ¶¶54-55, the only test it 
really applies is its "clearly stronger" test.  Id., ¶73 (the 
claims raised by Starks "are in no way "clearly stronger" than 
the arguments Kagen raised.").     
¶104 Instead of evaluating the underlying allegations of 
ineffectiveness of trial counsel on their merits, the majority 
simply 
dismisses 
them 
out 
of 
hand 
as 
"unsubstantiated, 
unpersuasive, or previously adjudicated."  Majority op., ¶73.  
Because it concludes that the underlying claims of ineffective 
trial counsel must fail——even though it has not really evaluated 
the underlying ineffectiveness claims under Strickland——the 
majority concludes that the claims not raised are not "clearly 
stronger" and no deficient performance exists.  Majority op., 
¶73.     
¶105 Additionally, the majority's analysis disregards or 
dismisses the facts alleged in Starks's motion.  In one 
instance, it evaluates credibility by deriding allegations 
advanced in the motion as "unreliable."  Majority op., ¶67.  By 
making determinations of reliability and credibility, the 
No.  2010AP425.awb 
 
12 
 
majority skips an evidentiary hearing where those very issues 
should be determined.4   
¶106 Later, it speculates that it is "easy to imagine why 
Starks's trial counsel opted not, for strategic reasons," to put 
two potential witnesses on the stand.  Majority op., ¶72.  The 
majority cannot know what reason trial counsel had, if any, for 
failing to call two witnesses.  Those reasons are to be elicited 
at an evidentiary hearing, not in reviewing an initial motion.      
¶107 This type of a half-hearted analysis is not a reasoned 
application of constitutional standards.  It further illustrates 
the overarching, unworkable nature of the bright-line test that 
is adopted by the majority today.   
¶108 Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, I 
respectfully dissent. 
¶109 I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and JUSTICE N. PATRICK CROOKS join this dissent.   
 
 
                                                 
4 The 
majority's 
determination 
of 
reliability 
can 
be 
understood as a determination of credibility.  Credibility 
determinations are a matter for the circuit court at an 
evidentiary hearing, not in reviewing an initial motion.  See 
First Nat. Bank of Appleton v. Nennig, 92 Wis. 2d 518, 529, 285 
N.W.2d 614 (1979).  Although sometimes a statement can be 
considered not credible as a matter of law, there is no 
indication here that the testimony would inherently be "so 
confused, inconsistent, or contradictory" as to be considered 
not credible before anyone has even taken the stand.  State ex 
rel. Brajdic v. Seber, 53 Wis. 2d 446, 450, 193 N.W.2d 43 
(1972). 
No.  2010AP425.awb 
 
 
 
1