Title: Caveney v. Bower
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 92963
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: May 8, 2003

Docket No. 92963-Agenda 11-November 2002.
JACK CAVENEY et al., Appellees, v. GLEN L. BOWER,
Director of Revenue, et al., Appellants.
Opinion filed May 8, 2003.
 
	JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:
	Plaintiffs, Jack and Margaret Caveney, are shareholders in
Panduit Corporation. For the tax years ending December 31, 1993,
1994, and 1995, Panduit elected to be treated as a subchapter S
corporation for federal and state tax purposes. During the tax years
in question, plaintiffs claimed a credit against their Illinois income
tax liability, pursuant to section 201(k) of the Illinois Income Tax
Act (the Act) (35 ILCS 5/201(k) (West 1996)), for research and
development expenditures incurred by Panduit. The State
disallowed the claims and calculated back taxes and interest in the
amount of $1,091,131.60, which plaintiffs paid under protest.
	Seeking a return of the amounts paid under protest, plaintiffs
filed suit under the State Officers and Employees Money
Disposition Act (30 ILCS 230/1 et seq. (West 2000)). Plaintiffs
first argued that they qualified for the tax credit under the version
of section 201(k) that was in force during the tax years in question.
In the alternative, plaintiffs argued that, if they did not so qualify,
section 201(k) violated the uniformity clause of the Illinois
Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IX, §2). The circuit court of
Du Page County agreed with both of plaintiffs' arguments and
entered summary judgment in plaintiffs' favor. The State appealed.
	Before the appellate court, plaintiffs not only repeated their
previous arguments but also argued for the first time that they
qualified for the research and development tax credit under a 1999
amendment to section 201(k), which was enacted as part of Public
Act 91-644 (Pub. Act 91-644, eff. August 20, 1999). The
appellate court affirmed solely on the basis of the 1999
amendment. Citing this court's decision in First of America Trust
Co. v. Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d 282 (1996), the appellate court
explained that retroactive application of the 1999 amendment was
appropriate because the State had failed to identify any "vested
right" that would be compromised by such an application.
	The State filed a petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R.
315(a)), and this court issued a supervisory order vacating the
appellate court's judgment and remanding the cause for
reconsideration in light of Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Will
County Collector, 196 Ill. 2d 27, 37 (2001). Caveney v. Bower,
195 Ill. 2d 549 (2001) (supervisory order). On remand, and with
one justice dissenting, the appellate court again affirmed the entry
of summary judgment in plaintiffs' favor. 326 Ill. App. 3d 1. We
granted the State's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R.
315(a).



ANALYSIS
Motion to Strike
	At the outset, we must address plaintiffs' motion to strike
certain portions of the State's opening brief. In that brief, the State
argued not only that the 1999 amendment to section 201(k) does
not apply retroactively but also that (1) plaintiffs do not qualify for
the research and development tax credit under the previous version
of section 201(k), and (2) the previous version of section 201(k)
does not violate the uniformity clause of the Illinois Constitution.
Citing Supreme Court Rule 315(b)(3) (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(b)(3)),
plaintiffs argue that we must strike those portions of the State's
brief that address the latter two arguments, as those arguments
were neither addressed by the appellate court nor asserted in the
State's petition for leave to appeal as a basis for reversing the
appellate court's judgment.
	Plaintiffs' motion is utterly without merit. First, the State
clearly preserved these issues for review. The contested arguments
were fully briefed and argued in both the trial court and the
appellate court. The appellate court's decision to affirm on other
grounds does not amount to a procedural default by the State.
Second, the State could not have asserted the contested arguments
as a basis for reversing the appellate court's judgment because, as
plaintiffs concede in their motion, the appellate court did not reach
these issues. Although these issues formed the basis for the trial
court's decision, the appellate court affirmed on a wholly different
basis, namely, the retroactive application of the 1999 amendment.
Given that the retroactive application of the 1999 amendment was
the only issue addressed in the appellate court's decision, it is only
natural that that issue constituted the State's sole basis for
reversing that decision. Finally, and contrary to representations
contained in plaintiffs' motion, the State did raise the contested
arguments in its petition for leave to appeal. The following
footnote appears on page 15 of the State's petition for leave to
appeal:
			"The Caveneys, of course, have maintained that they
were entitled to the tax credits even under the pre-amendment version of section 201(k). The petitioners
have taken the opposite position. The appellate court has
never reached the issue, twice deciding the case on the
ground that the 1999 amendment was retroactive. If this
court grants leave to appeal, the petitioners would
naturally raise the tax issue in addition to the issue of
retroactivity. The petitioners do not raise the tax issue as
a ground for leave to appeal because the appellate court
never decided the issue." (Emphasis added.)
In this footnote, the State did all it reasonably could be expected
to do with respect to the contested arguments, which were
unavailable to the State as bases for reversing the appellate court's
judgment yet remained wholly available to plaintiffs as bases for
affirming the appellate court's judgment. See Schultz v. Northeast
Illinois Regional Commuter R.R. Corp., 201 Ill. 2d 260, 281
(2002) (appellate court's judgment may be affirmed on any basis
in the record). Plaintiffs' motion to strike is denied.
Section 201(k): Original Version
	Turning to the merits, we first address whether plaintiffs
qualify for the research and development tax credit under the
version of section 201(k) that existed prior to the 1999
amendment. Relying upon the statute's plain language, the State
insists that, as Panduit's shareholders, plaintiffs may not
personally claim a tax credit for research and development
expenses actually incurred by Panduit. Plaintiffs counter that,
given both the nature of subchapter S corporations and the clear
public policy underlying section 201(k), the legislature must have
intended to make the research and development tax credit
available to S corporation shareholders. We agree with the State.
	The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain
and give effect to the legislature's intent. Michigan Avenue
National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 503-04 (2000).
The best indication of legislative intent is the statutory language,
given its plain and ordinary meaning. Illinois Graphics Co. v.
Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d 469, 479 (1994). Where the language is clear
and unambiguous, we must apply the statute without resort to
further aids of statutory construction. Davis v. Toshiba Machine
Co., America, 186 Ill. 2d 181, 184-85 (1999). The construction of
a statute is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. In re Estate
of Dierkes, 191 Ill. 2d 326, 330 (2000).
	Prior to the 1999 amendment, section 201(k) provided:
			"Beginning with tax years ending after July 1, 1990, a
taxpayer shall be allowed a credit against the tax imposed
by subsections (a) and (b) of this Section for increasing
research activities in this State. The credit allowed against
the tax imposed by subsections (a) and (b) shall be equal
to 6½% of the qualifying expenditures for increasing
research activities in this State." 35 ILCS 5/201(k) (West
1998).
For purposes of section 201(k), "qualifying expenditures" are
defined as "the qualifying expenditures as defined for the federal
credit for increasing research activities which would be allowable
under Section 41 of the Internal Revenue Code and which are
conducted in this State." 35 ILCS 5/201(k) (West 1998). Section
41 of the Internal Revenue Code, in turn, defines "qualified
research expenses" as those that "are paid or incurred by the
taxpayer during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business of the taxpayer." (Emphasis added.) 26 U.S.C. §41(b)(1)
(2000). The "tax imposed by subsections (a) and (b)" is the Illinois
income tax. 35 ILCS 5/201(a), (b) (West 1998).
	We find no ambiguity in the foregoing statute and conclude
that plaintiffs are ineligible for the research and development tax
credit that existed prior to the 1999 amendment. Prior to that
amendment, section 201(k) authorized a credit only against the
taxpayer's Illinois income tax liability and only for research and
development expenses actually incurred by the taxpayer. Here,
there is no question that the expenses in question were incurred by
Panduit and not by plaintiffs personally. Panduit, however, may
not claim a credit for these expenses, as Panduit is a subchapter S
corporation and therefore exempt from the Illinois income tax. See
35 ILCS 5/205(c) (West 2000). By the same token, plaintiffs are
ineligible for the credit because, although they are subject to the
Illinois income tax, they did not personally incur the expenses. To
be sure, had plaintiffs personally incurred any qualifying expenses
during the years in question, they could have claimed a credit for
those expenses in accordance with section 201(k). What plaintiffs
could not do, however, is claim a credit against their personal
income tax liability for qualifying expenses incurred by a third
party, even if that third party was an S corporation of which
plaintiffs are shareholders.
	This conclusion is supported by the fact that, when the
legislature originally enacted section 201(k) in 1990, section 201
already included two tax credit provisions that did authorize S
corporation shareholders to claim a credit against their personal
Illinois income tax liability for expenses incurred by the S
corporation. Section 201(f)(1), which establishes an income tax
credit for investments in designated "Enterprise Zones,"
specifically provides that:
		"For *** shareholders of Subchapter S corporations[ ]
there shall be allowed a credit under this subsection (f) to
be determined in accordance with the determination of
income and distributive share of income under Sections
702 and 704 and Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue
Code." 35 ILCS 5/201(f)(1) (West 1992).
Section 201(j), which authorizes an income tax credit for certain
educational and vocation training expenses, contains the identical
pass-through provision. 35 ILCS 5/201(j) (West 1992).
Significantly, sections 201(f)(1) and 201(j) were enacted five years
prior to the adoption of section 201(k). Conversely, even after
enactment of the 1999 amendment to section 201(k), section 201
continues to include tax credit provisions that do not include pass-through provisions. See, e.g., 35 ILCS 5/201(h), (l) (West 2000).
Of course, it is well established that, when the legislature uses
certain language in one part of a statute and different language in
another, this court will presume that different results were
intended. In re K.C., 186 Ill. 2d 542, 549-50 (1999). Thus, we may
presume that the legislature's failure to include a pass-through
provision in the original version of section 201(k) was deliberate,
and that the original version of section 201(k) was never meant to
apply to S corporation shareholders. Moreover, were we to agree
with plaintiffs and hold that section 201(k)'s tax credit passed
through to S corporation shareholders even before the 1999
amendment, the pass-through provisions contained in sections
201(f)(1) and 201(j) would be rendered "meaningless surplusage."
We therefore will not adopt such a reading. See In re K.C., 186 Ill. 2d  at 550.
Section 201(k): Amended Version
	We next consider whether plaintiffs qualify for the research
and development tax credit under the 1999 amendment to section
201(k). Under that amendment, which was enacted as part of
Public Act 91-644 (Pub. Act 91-644, eff. August 20, 1999), the
legislature added the following pass-through provision to section
201(k), thereby specifically extending section 201(k)'s benefits to
S corporation shareholders:
		"For partners, shareholders of subchapter S corporations,
and owners of limited liability companies, if the liability
company is treated as a partnership for purposes of federal
and State income taxation, there shall be allowed a credit
under this subsection to be determined in accordance with
the determination of income and distributive share of
income under Sections 702 and 704 and subchapter S of
the Internal Revenue Code." 35 ILCS 5/201(k) (West
2000).
Plaintiffs insist that, although this amendment was enacted in
1999, it nevertheless applies retroactively because the State does
not a possess a "vested right" to collect taxes owed under the prior
version of the law. The State disagrees, arguing that, under this
court's recent decision in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Will
County Collector, 196 Ill. 2d 27 (2001), retroactive application of
the amendment is prohibited because such an application would
attach new legal consequences to previously completed acts. We
agree with the State, but we do so for different reasons.
	In Commonwealth Edison, this court for the first time adopted
the United States Supreme Court's retroactivity analysis, as set
forth in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 128 L. Ed. 2d 229, 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994). Under the Landgraf analysis, as
adopted by this court, the first question is whether the legislature
has clearly indicated the temporal reach of an amended statute.
Commonwealth Edison, 196 Ill. 2d  at 38. If so, then, absent a
constitutional prohibition, that expression of legislative intent
must be given effect. Commonwealth Edison, 196 Ill. 2d  at 38. If
not, then the court must determine whether applying the statute
would have a retroactive impact, i.e., whether it would impair
rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability
for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions
already completed. Commonwealth Edison, 196 Ill. 2d  at 38. If
there would be no retroactive impact, then the amended law may
be applied retroactively. Commonwealth Edison, 196 Ill. 2d  at 38.
If there would be a retroactive impact, however, then the court
must presume that the legislature did not intend that it be so
applied. Commonwealth Edison, 196 Ill. 2d  at 38.
	As it turns out, despite the analytical challenges typically
posed by a phrase like "retroactive impact," application of the
Landgraf approach in Illinois should prove uneventful. This is
because, as this court recently acknowledged in People v. Glisson,
202 Ill. 2d 499 (2002), the legislature has clearly indicated the
"temporal reach" of every amended statute. In section 4 of the
Statute on Statutes (5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2000)), which this court
describes as "the general saving clause of Illinois" (Glisson, 202
Ill. 2d at 505), the legislature mandated that:
			"No new law shall be construed to repeal a former law,
whether such former law is expressly repealed or not, as
to any offense committed against the former law, or as to
any act done, any penalty, forfeiture or punishment
incurred, or any right accrued, or claim arising under the
former law, or in any way whatever to affect any such
offense or act so committed or done, or any penalty,
forfeiture or punishment so incurred, or any right accrued,
or claim arising before the new law takes effect, save only
that the proceedings thereafter shall conform, so far as
practicable, to the laws in force at the time of such
proceeding." 5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2000).
In Glisson, this court construed the foregoing language as
authorizing the "retroactive application of amendments or repeals
in criminal statutes *** only if such changes are procedural in
nature." Glisson, 202 Ill. 2d  at 507. Conversely, section 4 "forbids
retroactive application of substantive changes to statutes." Glisson,
202 Ill. 2d  at 507. Thus, section 4 represents a clear legislative
directive as to the temporal reach of statutory amendments and
repeals: those that are procedural in nature may be applied
retroactively, while those that are substantive may not.
	Of course, in Glisson, we spoke only of "amendments or
repeals in criminal statutes" (emphasis added) (Glisson, 202 Ill. 2d
at 507), whereas the present case is clearly a civil matter. This is
of no consequence, however, as nothing on the face of section 4
confines its application to criminal statutes.(1) More importantly,
this court has never hesitated to utilize section 4 in ascertaining the
temporal reach of a civil statute. In fact, in a case nearly identical
to the present appeal, this court held that section 4 precludes the
retroactive application of a recently enacted tax benefit, as such a
measure is clearly substantive in nature. See Connell v. Crosby,
210 Ill. 380 (1904).
	In Connell, the decedent's will provided that a certain portion
of his estate be devoted to the founding of a college. At the time
of the decedent's death in 1897, bequests for educational purposes
were subject to the Illinois inheritance tax. In 1901, and before a
petition for the collection of decedent's estate taxes had been filed,
the legislature amended the Inheritance Tax Act to exempt
bequests for educational purposes. In rejecting the executor's
argument that the 1901 exemption should apply retroactively to
the decedent's educational bequest, this court explained:
			"The amendatory act of 1901 does not, in terms, repeal
the former act. It contains no saving clause, nor does it in
terms purport to affect, in any way, any right, whether
vested or inchoate, which might then exist. Section 4 of
chapter 131 (Hurd's Stat. 1899, p. 1650) furnishes the
guide for determining the effect to be given the
amendatory enactment. That section provides: 'No new
law shall be construed to repeal a former law, whether
such former law is expressly repealed or not, as to any
*** right accrued or claim arising under the former law,
or in any way whatever to affect *** any right accrued or
claim arising before the new law takes effect, save only
that the proceedings thereafter shall conform, so far as
practicable, to the laws in force at the time of such
proceedings.' It is to be assumed the amendatory act was
framed in view of the provisions of said section 4 of
chapter 131, and that it was the legislative intent the
amendatory act should have prospective operation, only.
Statutes declaring the effect of or the construction to be
given subsequently enacted repealing acts will be deemed
operative and effective by the courts unless a contrary
intent is plainly manifested in the later enactment.
[Citations.] The right which accrued or the claim which
arose to the tax, under the statute in force at the time of
the death of the testator, was therefore unaffected, and
remained enforcible notwithstanding the subsequent
enactment exempting bequests for educational purposes
from the tax. [Citations.]" Connell, 210 Ill.  at 386-87.
Significantly, section 4 reads exactly the same today as it did on
July 1, 1874, the day it was enacted.
	In light of section 4, the Landgraf analysis in Illinois becomes
quite simple. Indeed, with respect to a statutory amendment or
repeal, it is virtually inconceivable that an Illinois court will ever
go beyond step one of the Landgraf approach. Again, step one
requires a court to ascertain whether the legislature has clearly
indicated the temporal reach of the amended statute.
Commonwealth Edison, 196 Ill. 2d  at 38. If so, then, absent a
constitutional prohibition, that expression of legislative intent
must be given effect. Such was the case in Commonwealth Edison,
where this court concluded that the amendatory act at issue
contained an "unequivocal expression of legislative intent"
authorizing retroactive application. Commonwealth Edison, 196 Ill. 2d  at 42. If the amendatory act does not contain a clear
indication of legislative intent, then "[i]t is to be assumed the
amendatory act was framed in view of the provisions of said
section 4." Connell, 210 Ill.  at 386. Again, "[s]tatutes declaring the
effect of or the construction to be given subsequently enacted
repealing acts will be deemed operative and effective by the courts
unless a contrary intent is plainly manifested in the later
enactment." (Emphasis added.) Connell, 210 Ill.  at 387; see also
Commonwealth Edison, 196 Ill. 2d  at 38 ("if the legislature has
clearly indicated what the temporal reach of an amended statute
should be, then *** that expression of legislative intent must be
given effect"). As Glisson teaches, section 4 represents a clear
legislative indication that the retroactive application of substantive
statutory changes is forbidden. Thus, for purposes of Landgraf's
first step, the legislature always will have clearly indicated the
temporal reach of an amended statute, either expressly in the new
legislative enactment or by default in section 4 of the Statute on
Statutes.
	Turning back to the question at hand, then, we must decide
whether the 1999 amendment to section 201(k) may be applied
retroactively to plaintiffs' 1993, 1994, and 1995 research and
development expenditures. Our first task, of course, is to ascertain
whether the legislature has clearly indicated the temporal reach of
the 1999 amendment. See Commonwealth Edison, 196 Ill. 2d  at
38. Unquestionably, it has. Unlike in Commonwealth Edison,
however, the legislature's clear indication is not found in the
amendatory act itself. Indeed, the 1999 amendment to section
201(k) specifically states that "[n]o inference shall be drawn from
this amendatory Act *** in construing this Section for taxable
years beginning before January 1, 1999." 35 ILCS 5/201(k) (West
2000). Rather, the legislature's clear pronouncement is found in
section 4 of the Statute on Statutes, which "forbids retroactive
application of substantive changes to statutes." Glisson, 202 Ill. 2d 
at 506-07. Clearly, the 1999 amendment to section 201(k) is a
substantive change in the law, as it establishes an income tax
credit for S corporation shareholders that previously did not exist.
This being the case, "[i]t is to be assumed the amendatory act was
framed in view of the provisions of said section 4 ***, and that it
was the legislative intent the amendatory act should have
prospective operation, only." See Connell, 210 Ill.  at 386-87.
Uniformity Clause
	Finally, we are asked to consider whether the version of
section 201(k) that existed prior to the 1999 amendment violates
the uniformity clause of the Illinois Constitution. See Ill. Const.
1970, art. IX, §2. We hold that it does not.
	The uniformity clause of the Illinois Constitution provides as
follows:
			"In any law classifying the subjects or objects of non-property taxes or fees, the classes shall be reasonable and
the subjects and objects within each class shall be taxed
uniformly. Exemptions, deductions, credits, refunds and
other allowances shall be reasonable." Ill. Const. 1970,
art. IX, §2.
In light of the foregoing language, we are hard pressed to identify
even the basis for a uniformity challenge to the preamended
version of section 201(k). The gravamen of a uniformity clause
challenge is a classification, and the preamended version of
section 201(k) contains no such thing. Prior to the 1999
amendment, section 201(k) granted all taxpayers subject to the
income tax a credit for qualifying research and development
expenditures incurred by the taxpayer. Such a credit is perfectly
uniform. In fact, the first and only time a classification crept into
section 201(k) was in 1999, when the legislature authorized only
certain classes of Illinois income taxpayers to claim a credit for
qualifying research and development expenditures incurred not by
the taxpayer but by a third party. As this classification does not
form the basis of the uniformity challenge in this case, however,
we need not explore this issue any further.
CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the appellate
court and the circuit court are reversed, and the cause is remanded
to the circuit court with directions to enter summary judgment for
the State.

Judgments reversed;
cause remanded with directions.
	Although I agree with the result the court reaches, I write
separately to note my disagreement with the analysis utilized with
respect to whether amended section 201(k) applies retroactively to
this case.
	In Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Will County Collector, 196 Ill. 2d 27 (2001), this court adopted the retroactivity test developed
by the United States Supreme Court in Landgraf v. USI Film
Products, 511 U.S. 244, 128 L. Ed. 2d 229, 114 S. Ct. 1483
(1994). According to these cases, the first step in undertaking the
retroactivity analysis is to determine whether the legislature has
prescribed the statute's proper reach. If there is no legislative
directive on the temporal reach of the statute, we must then
establish whether the application of the statute to the conduct at
issue would result in a retroactive effect. If so, then we must
presume that the statute does not apply to that conduct. See
Commonwealth Edison, 196 Ill. 2d  at 38, citing Landgraf, 511 U.S.  at 280, 128 L. Ed. 2d  at 261-62, 114 S. Ct.  at 1505.
	Despite the fact that the United State Supreme Court has
warned that "deciding when a statute operates 'retroactively' is not
always a simple or mechanical task" (Landgraf, 511 U.S.  at 268,
128 L. Ed. 2d  at 254, 114 S. Ct. at 1498), my colleagues today
hold that, in Illinois, the task is indeed simple: "[A]pplication of
the Landgraf approach *** should prove uneventful." Slip op. at
7. This is so "because, as this court recently acknowledged in
People v. Glisson, 202 Ill. 2d 499 (2002), the legislature has
clearly indicated the 'temporal reach' of every amended statute."
(Emphasis in original.) Slip op. at 7. The legislature does so either
expressly in the new legislative amendment or by default in
section 4 of the Statute on Statutes, which serves, according to the
court, as a "clear legislative directive as to the temporal reach of
statutory amendments." Slip op. at 8. The court concludes that "it
is virtually inconceivable that an Illinois court will ever go beyond
step one of the Landgraf approach." Slip op. at 10. In this way,
"for purposes of Landgraf's first step, the legislature always will
have clearly indicated the temporal reach of an amended statute,
either expressly in the new legislative enactment or by default in
section 4 of the Statute on Statutes." (Emphasis in original.) Slip
op. at 10. I am wary of this expansive holding for several reasons,
which I address seriatum.
	As an initial matter, the application of section 4 of the Statute
on Statutes to this case is not before us. The appellate court did not
rely on the statute in reaching its conclusion, and none of the
parties have ever argued that the statute has any bearing on this
case. I further note that, even though we entertained oral argument
in this case in November 2002 and our decision in People v.
Glisson, 202 Ill. 2d 499 (2002), was handed down just weeks later,
neither party has moved to cite Glisson as supplemental authority
in this case. If Glisson holds that "the legislature has clearly
indicated the 'temporal reach' of every amended statute," as the
court says it does (emphasis in original) (slip op. at 7), then I find
it somewhat surprising that the case has not been cited to us,
especially by the State, because it has been the position of both
parties in this appeal that the legislature did not clearly express the
temporal reach of the amended section 201(k).
	Moreover, the attorneys representing both parties in this
matter have prepared very thorough and comprehensive briefing,
so I do not believe that the failure to cite Glisson as supplemental
authority was an oversight. Rather, I believe that the parties did
not cite Glisson because, with all due respect to my colleagues in
the majority, Glisson does not contain the statement that the court
today says it contains, as a review of the case amply demonstrates.
In Glisson, the defendant was convicted of chemical breakdown
of illicit controlled substance pursuant to section 401.5(a-5) of the
Illinois Controlled Substances Act. Glisson, 202 Ill. 2d  at 501.
Several weeks after the defendant's conviction was entered, the
General Assembly added a subsection to the Illinois Controlled
Substances Act that exempted the defendant's conduct from
criminal liability. Glisson, 202 Ill. 2d  at 501. In essence, the new
subsection repealed the crime of which the defendant had been
convicted. The question presented for this court was what effect,
if any, the repealer had on the conviction. We held that section 4
"bars retroactive application of the statutory change repealing the
offense of which defendant was convicted." Glisson, 202 Ill. 2d  at
508. Our specific holding in Glisson was "retroactive application
of amendments or repeals in criminal statutes is permissible only
if such changes are procedural in nature." Glisson, 202 Ill. 2d  at
507. In my view, our holding comports with the second prong of
the Landgraf test, not the first, as the court today suggests.(2)
Furthermore, we, in Glisson, did not intimate, in any way, that
there existed a relationship between section 4 and the Landgraf
test. Nor did we expressly hold that section 4 speaks to the
temporal reach of every amendment.
	More fundamentally, however, I believe the court errs when
it holds that section 4 serves as the clear expression of legislative
intent that is contemplated in the first step of the Landgraf
analysis. Under Landgraf, the initial inquiry is fairly
straightforward-did the legislative body identify, with clarity, the
conduct, past or future, to which the newly enacted statute was to
apply? Stated differently, we must ask whether the legislature
expressed an intent that the statute be applied to events which
occurred before the statute was enacted.(3) This inquiry must be
distinguished from the second step of the analysis, which is
whether the statute will have an impermissible retroactive impact
or effect on past conduct. This comports with the Supreme Court's
observation in Landgraf:
			"A statute does not operate 'retrospectively' merely
because it is applied in a case arising from conduct
antedating the statute's enactment [citation] or upsets
expectations based in prior law. Rather, the court must
ask whether the new provision attaches new legal
consequences to events completed before its enactment.
The conclusion that a particular rule operates
'retroactively' comes at the end of a process of judgment
concerning the nature and extent of the change in the law
and the degree of connection between the operation of the
new rule and a relevant past event. Any test of
retroactivity will leave room for disagreement in hard
cases, and is unlikely to classify the enormous variety of
legal changes with perfect philosophical clarity. However,
retroactivity is a matter on which judges tend to have
'sound ... instinct[s],' [citation] and familiar
considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and
settled expectations offer sound guidance." Landgraf, 511 U.S.  at 269-70, 128 L. Ed. 2d  at 254-55, 114 S. Ct.  at
1499.
I must point out that just because a newly enacted statute might
reach back to antecedent events does not mean that the statute is
impermissibly retroactive. Therefore, the first step of the Landgraf
analysis is concerned with fixing the temporal reach of the statute
while the second step, undertaken only if the temporal reach
extends to past events, examines the impact the newly enacted
statute will have on the past conduct. If that impact is
"impermissibly retroactive," it will not be allowed. Section 4 of
the Statute on Statutes does not expressly prescribe the temporal
reach of every amendment in any way. Rather, the section is
concerned with whether the new legislation will impact upon past
conduct in an impermissibly retroactive manner.
	In addition, I think it important to stress that the United States
Supreme Court has not utilized the federal general savings statute
(1 U.S.C. §109 (2000)), a statute similar to our section 4, in cases
where the language of the statute in question failed to denote
legislative direction as to the temporal reach of a statute. In other
words, the Supreme Court has not looked to the general savings
statute as a "default" expression of legislative intent in cases
where the language of the statute was silent as to temporal reach.
The recent case Immigration &amp; Naturalization Service v. St. Cyr,
533 U.S. 289, 150 L. Ed. 2d 347, 121 S. Ct. 2271 (2001),
illustrates this point. In that case, St. Cyr, who had been admitted
to the United States as a lawful permanent resident, pleaded guilty,
in state court, to selling a controlled substance. The subsequent
conviction on the charge made him eligible for deportation.
However, at the time of his conviction, St. Cyr would have been
eligible, under a section of the Immigration and Nationality Act,
for a waiver of deportation at the discretion of the United States
Attorney General. At the time the removal proceedings had
commenced against St. Cyr, the section of the Immigration and
Nationality Act that had allowed for the waiver had been repealed
and the Attorney General no longer possessed the discretion to
waive the alien's deportation. St. Cyr petitioned for a federal writ
of habeas corpus, alleging that, because he pleaded guilty before
the waiver statute was repealed and the new legislation went into
effect, the new legislation did not apply to him. The Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) argued that the statute itself
resolved the issue because its language unambiguously
communicated Congress' intent to apply the new provisions to all
removals initiated after the date effective date of the statute.
	In addressing these arguments, the Supreme Court noted that
"the first step in determining whether a statute has an
impermissible retroactive effect is to ascertain whether Congress
has directed with the requisite clarity that the law be applied
retrospectively." St. Cyr, 533 U.S.  at 316, 150 L. Ed. 2d  at 372,
121 S. Ct.  at 2288. The Supreme Court rejected the INS's
arguments that the comprehensiveness of the legislation, its
effective date, and the inclusion of a saving provision within the
legislation itself dictated the temporal reach of the amendment in
question. St. Cyr, 533 U.S.  at 317-20, 150 L. Ed. 2d  at 372-74, 121 S. Ct.  at 2288-90. Critically, the Supreme Court did not resort to
the federal general saving statute in the absence of the requisite
clear expression of congressional intent. Rather, the Supreme
Court "proceed[ed] to the second step of Landgraf's retroactivity
analysis in order to determine whether depriving removable aliens
of consideration for [discretionary] relief produces an
impermissible retroactive effect for aliens who, like respondent,
were convicted pursuant to a plea agreement at a time when their
plea would not have rendered them ineligible for [discretionary]
relief." St. Cyr, 533 U.S.  at 320, 150 L. Ed. 2d  at 374, 121 S. Ct. 
at 2290.
	The Supreme Court's analysis in St. Cyr is instructive on the
type of analysis a court is to employ in the first step of the
Landgraf test. It would appear that a court is to focus on the
language of the Act itself (St. Cyr, 533 U.S.  at 317-19, 150 L. Ed. 2d  at 372-73, 121 S. Ct. at 2288-89) and its legislative history (St.
Cyr, 533 U.S.  at 320 n.44, 150 L. Ed. 2d  at 374 n.44, 121 S. Ct.  at
2290 n.44). I note that the Supreme Court did not look to the
federal savings statute after it determined that the language of the
amendment was silent as to temporal reach. This suggests that a
general savings statute, such as section 4, has little relevance in
this step of the analytical process. In fact, my independent research
has failed to unearth a single case in which a savings statute such
as section 4 has been used in the manner advanced by the court
today. This court adopted the Landgraf analysis in Commonwealth
Edison just two years ago; however, the analysis has been applied
in the federal courts since 1994. It would seem to me that if a
general savings statute has the applicability to the analysis that the
court posits here, some federal jurist would have noted it over the
course of time. The fact that not one has done so, coupled with the
inapplicability of Glisson, causes me to regard the broad
conclusions reached today with a skeptical eye.
	In view of the foregoing, I believe the better approach in this
case is to apply the Landgraf test as suggested by the parties and
in the manner set forth by the United State Supreme Court. As I
noted previously, neither party contends that the General
Assembly provided a clear expression of the temporal reach of the
amended section 201(k). Indeed, it is difficult to argue to the
contrary, as the amendment itself contains the following statement:
"No inference shall be drawn from this amendatory Act *** in
construing this Section for taxable years beginning before January
1, 1999." 35 ILCS 5/201(k) (West 2000). I agree with the appellate
court that this language is neutral-it indicates neither prospective
nor retrospective application. 326 Ill. App. 3d at 4. In light of the
fact that the General Assembly did not unambiguously direct that
the amendment should be applied retroactively, the question
becomes " 'whether the new statute would have retroactive effect'
" if applied to past tax years. Commonwealth Edison, 196 Ill. 2d 
at 37, quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S.  at 280, 128 L. Ed. 2d  at 261-62,
114 S. Ct.  at 1505. As we stated in Commonwealth Edison, " '[a]
statute does not operate "retrospectively" merely because it is
applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the statute's
enactment [citation] or upsets expectations based in prior law.' "
Commonwealth Edison, 196 Ill. 2d  at 39, quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S.  at 269, 128 L. Ed. 2d  at 254-55, 114 S. Ct.  at 1499. Instead,
we " 'must ask whether the new provision attach[es] new legal
consequences to events completed before its enactment.' "
Commonwealth Edison, 196 Ill. 2d  at 39, quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S.  at 269-70, 128 L. Ed. 2d  at 254-55, 114 S. Ct.  at 1499.
	After reviewing the arguments of the parties in this case, I
believe that to grant a retroactive tax credit would "attach new
legal consequences" to completed events. See Commonwealth
Edison, 196 Ill. 2d  at 39. Retroactive application of the
amendment would give plaintiffs new rights to tax credits, take
away the Department's old rights to tax revenues, and impose new
obligations on the Department to refund taxes. As the United
States Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized,
"[c]hanging today's financial consequences of an earlier
transaction is the paradigm of retroactivity." Jahn v. 1-800
Flowers.com, Inc., 284 F.3d 807, 811 (7th Cir. 2002). Therefore,
in the absence of a clear legislative indication of retroactivity, I
would employ the traditional presumption against retroactivity in
this case.

	CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW and JUSTICE KILBRIDE
join in this special concurrence.
1.      1To be sure, in West's edition of the Illinois Compiled Statutes
section 4 bears the title, "Rights, etc., saved-Criminal
cases-Application of new law by consent." (Emphasis added.) 5 ILCS
70/4 (West 2000). This title, however, represents an unofficial,
publisher-generated caption and therefore is wholly irrelevant in
construing the scope of section 4. See Michigan Avenue National Bank
v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 506 (2000).

2.      2Our interpretation of section 4 in Glisson is consistent with this
court's historical use of the statute. See Merlo v. Johnston City &amp; Big
Muddy Coal &amp; Mining Co., 258 Ill. 328, 338 (1913) (explaining that the
doctrine of earlier cases, including Connell v. Crosby, 210 Ill. 380
(1904), was the "well established rule that no one has a vested right in
a particular remedy or mode of procedure for the redress of grievances,
and the legislature may change these, and the changed procedure may
be applied to pending cases").

3.      3In Landgraf, the Supreme Court gave an example of the type of
language that might be used to convey such intent: "[T]he new
provisions 'shall apply to all proceedings pending on or commenced
after the date of enactment ***.' " Landgraf, 511 U.S.  at 260, 128 L. Ed. 2d  at 249, 114 S. Ct.  at 1494.