Title: Commonwealth v. Blanchard
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12041
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: February 27, 2017

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SJC-12041 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MICHAEL BLANCHARD. 
 
 
February 27, 2017. 
 
 
Practice, Criminal, Jury and jurors, Deliberation of jury, 
Instructions to jury, Voir dire, Mistrial, Confrontation of 
witnesses, Required finding.  Constitutional Law, Jury, 
Confrontation of witnesses.  Jury and Jurors.  Evidence, 
Expert opinion, Cross-examination.  Witness, Cross-
examination.  Firearms.  License. 
 
 
 
In the early morning hours of March 16, 2010, the 
defendant, by his own admission, fired multiple shots into the 
window of the apartment where Stephen Erving, Jr., was asleep, 
and killed him.  The Commonwealth charged the defendant with 
murder in the first degree, armed assault with the intent to 
murder, and carrying a firearm without a license.  At trial, 
there was an issue whether the defendant's actions were 
consistent with manslaughter where he argued that he fired the 
shots to scare, not kill, Erving, who purportedly had threatened 
the defendant and his family.  The jury ultimately convicted the 
defendant of murder in the second degree and carrying a firearm 
without a license.  He appealed from the convictions to the 
Appeals Court. 
 
 
Before the Appeals Court, the defendant argued (among other 
claims) that the trial judge improperly denied his motion for a 
mistrial on the ground that during the jury's deliberations, the 
jurors were exposed to the contents of a binder belonging to the 
judge that contained copies of various motions, photographs, and 
transcripts, and included materials that had been excluded as 
 
 
2 
evidence at trial.1  The defendant's position was that the 
extraneous materials were a factor in the jury's decision to 
convict him of murder in the second degree, and that he was 
therefore prejudiced by the jurors' unauthorized exposure to 
them.  The Appeals Court upheld the judge's denial of the 
defendant's motion for a mistrial, rejected his other claims of 
error, and affirmed the convictions.  Commonwealth v. Blanchard, 
88 Mass. App. Ct. 637 (2016).  We granted the defendant's 
application for further appellate review, and affirm the 
convictions. 
 
 
The principal issue before us is whether the jury's 
exposure to the judge's binder during deliberations should have 
resulted in a mistrial.  Where a jury have been exposed to 
extraneous materials, we have differentiated between cases in 
which the exposure comes to light before a seated jury have 
completed deliberations, and cases where the exposure is 
discovered after jurors have already had been discharged.2  
Compare Commonwealth v. Mejia, 461 Mass. 384, 394 (2012) (still-
deliberating jury inadvertently received exhibit marked for 
identification that had been excluded from evidence at trial); 
Commonwealth v. Kamara, 422 Mass. 614, 616-617 (1996) 
(deliberating juror shared prior knowledge of defendant and 
others involved in case during jury's deliberations), with 
Commonwealth v. Kincaid, 444 Mass. 381, 384-386 (2005) (after 
jury reached verdict and were discharged, information came to 
light that jurors had been exposed to evidence of flight of 
defendant's coventurer); Commonwealth v. Fidler, 377 Mass. 192, 
199-200 (1979) (after verdict and discharge of jury, juror 
claimed that deliberating jurors had been exposed to evidence of 
defendant's prior involvement in shooting).  Although we have 
not yet considered circumstances exactly like those presented by 
this case, where the jurors announced they had completed their 
deliberations, reached verdicts, and were ready to announce them 
in court,3 we consider these circumstances to be substantively in 
                     
 
1 The judge questioned court personnel and determined that 
the binder was inadvertently brought into the jury room during 
jury deliberations. 
 
 
2 In Commonwealth v. Jackson, 376 Mass. 790, 800-801 (1978), 
we established procedures to determine whether a mistrial is 
required where the jury have been exposed to extraneous 
materials during trial. 
 
 
3 The jurors had voted on verdicts with respect to each of 
the charges, but had not yet announced their verdicts.  After 
 
 
3 
keeping with the still-seated jury cases.  In these types of 
cases, the judge is able immediately to question the 
deliberating jurors and assess their actual capacity to restart 
their deliberations and to reach a verdict independently of the 
extraneous materials.  Compare Kamara, supra at 616 (recognizing 
that "our review is to be focused on the jury in this case, not 
on a hypothetical jury"), with Fidler, supra at 201 (where claim 
of extraneous influence on discharged jury is raised, judge 
first assesses "the probable effect of the extraneous facts on a 
hypothetical average jury"). 
 
 
The Kamara and Mejia cases offer illustrations of 
appropriate procedures for a judge to follow when still-seated 
jurors are exposed to extraneous materials during their 
deliberations.  As the judges did in those cases, when such a 
claim is made, the judge generally should conduct an individual 
voir dire of each of the deliberating jurors.  See Kamara, 422 
Mass. at 617-618.  See also Mejia, 461 Mass. at 395-396.4  The 
purpose of the voir dire is twofold:  to determine the extent of 
the jury's exposure and the effect of that exposure on the 
jurors' ability fairly to decide the matter.  Kamara, supra.  As 
part of the initial inquiry into the extent of the exposure, the 
judge should ask the juror whether he or she read, saw, heard, 
or otherwise became aware of the extraneous materials during the 
jury's deliberations.  The judge should then inquire into the 
effect of the exposure on the particular juror, with the focus 
of the question or questions being whether the juror can 
                                                                  
consultation with counsel, the judge sealed and impounded the 
jury's original verdict slips.  Later, she allowed the 
Commonwealth's unopposed motion to destroy them. 
 
4 In both the Kamara and the Mejia cases, we referenced the 
procedures set out in Jackson, 376 Mass. at 800-801, as being 
appropriate to use in the case of a still-deliberating jury 
exposed to extraneous material.  See Commonwealth v. Kamara, 422 
Mass. 614, 615-616 (1996).  See also Commonwealth v. Mejia, 461 
Mass. 384, 395 (2012).  Although it is not always an appropriate 
procedure, we noted in Jackson that a judge's inquiry to 
determine whether there was in fact juror exposure to extraneous 
materials may be done by asking the jury collectively; however, 
we further noted that "if any juror indicates that he or she has 
seen or heard the material, there must be individual questioning 
of that juror, outside of the presence of any other juror, to 
determine the extent of the juror's exposure to the material and 
its effects on the juror's ability to render an impartial 
verdict."  Jackson, supra. 
 
 
4 
deliberate without being influenced by the materials.  In asking 
about the effect of the extraneous materials on the individual 
juror, the judge should caution the juror not to speculate about 
the effect on any other juror or on the jury as a whole. 
 
 
It bears emphasis that whenever a judge asks individual 
jurors about the possibility of extraneous influences on jury 
deliberations -- whether of jurors who are still sitting as such 
or jurors who have been discharged -- the purpose of the 
individual voir dire is not to delve into the jury's 
deliberations.  Although the judge should inquire into the 
extent to which the jury considered the extraneous material, 
there should not be an inquiry into a juror's individual or the 
jury's collective thought processes.  See Commonwealth v. Moore, 
474 Mass. 541, 553 (2016).  Of course, there is a possibility 
during individual voir dire that "a juror [may] respond[] to a 
permissible question with an answer that inappropriately reveals 
aspects of the deliberations."  Kincaid, 444 Mass. at 391.  To 
minimize the likelihood of this happening, a prefatory 
instruction by the judge to each juror about the need to avoid 
telling the judge anything about the substance of the jury’s 
deliberations may be useful.  See id. ("Giving cautionary 
instructions to each juror at the outset of the inquiry and, if 
necessary, again during the inquiry will reduce the likelihood 
of answers that stray into revelation of the jury's thought 
process.  The jurors can be instructed to respond about any 
information that was not mentioned during the trial 
[appropriate], but not to describe how the jurors used that 
information or the effect of that information on the thinking of 
any one or more jurors [inappropriate]"). 
 
 
Once the judge completes the individual juror voir dire, 
the judge must determine whether juror exposure to extraneous 
information requires the declaration of a mistrial in order to 
protect the defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial, or 
whether a less drastic remedy is appropriate -- e.g., excusing 
any juror who indicates an inability to decide the case fairly 
in light of the extraneous information, and replacing the juror 
with an alternate.  See Kamara, 422 Mass. at 618.  See also 
Mejia, 461 Mass. at 395-396.  The judge has broad discretion to 
fashion an appropriate remedy, if one is necessary.  See Kamara, 
supra at 620.  It is within the judge's discretion to determine 
that the jury -- the remaining and alternate jurors -- can 
fairly decide the matter, even where the jury's deliberations 
have been partially completed.  See Commonwealth v. Tennison, 
440 Mass. 553, 557 (2003).  In these circumstances, the judge 
should instruct the jury to give new, fresh, and careful 
 
 
5 
consideration to the evidence admitted during trial with the 
extraneous material affirmatively excised from their 
consideration, and to keep in mind as well all of the 
instructions previously provided by the judge.5 
 
 
In the present case, the judge adhered to the still-sitting 
jury procedures followed in the Kamara and Mejia cases, and 
assessed the extent of the jurors' exposure to the judge's 
binder.  The record indicates that the judge's questions to each 
juror appropriately avoided asking about the content of the 
jury's deliberations or the particular juror's thought process.  
The defendant points out that some jurors told the judge about 
the jury's deliberations, including specific discussions about 
the contents of the judge's binder, and also offered assessments 
that the materials had little or no effect on their 
deliberations.6  These statements by the jurors were 
inappropriate and unfortunate responses to properly focused 
questions by the judge, but the fact that these statements were 
made did not mean automatically that a mistrial was required.  
The judge obtained assurances from all of the jurors that they 
could decide the matter without consideration of the extraneous 
materials and exclusively on the evidence and the judge's 
instructions.  Before they resumed their deliberations, the 
judge instructed the jury accordingly.7 
                     
5 It is important, however, that the judge make it clear to 
the jury that they are to begin deliberations completely anew in 
circumstances where, as a result of the extraneous material, a 
juror has been excused so that there is a change in the 
membership of the deliberating jury, with an alternate replacing 
the discharged juror. 
 
 
6 The individual voir dire of the jury's foreperson is an 
example.  In response to whether she could reach a verdict by 
disregarding the binder and by considering the evidence and her 
instructions, the foreperson stated, "Yes.  I think the verdict 
we did reach was not really -- though [the binder] was seen, I 
don't think it was really material to the discussion of our 
reaching a verdict."  On receiving this response, the judge 
appropriately redirected the foreperson's testimony. 
 
 
7 The judge instructed the jury to deliberate based on "the 
[e]xhibits that were offered in evidence," "the testimony given 
at . . . trial," and her "instructions . . . on the law," and 
not on "anything" in the judge's binder.  Although it would have 
been preferable for the judge to instruct the jury to engage in 
"new" or "fresh" deliberations rather than to "resume" their old 
 
 
6 
 
 
The defendant contends that this case is more like those in 
which the jury already had been discharged, because the jury 
here had voted on their verdicts on all of the charges when the 
issue of extraneous materials first came to light.  See Fidler, 
377 Mass. at 201.  See also Kincaid, 444 Mass. at 383.  As we 
recognized in Kamara, 444 Mass. at 619, where the jury are still 
empanelled, "the issue need not be considered in the abstract."  
Although it was appropriate to consider that the jury had voted 
on their verdicts, this fact was not in and of itself conclusive 
of the jurors' capacity to restart deliberations and newly to 
decide the matter in a fair and impartial manner.  Based on our 
review of the judge's voir dire and findings, and for the 
reasons discussed above, we conclude that the judge did not 
abuse her discretion in declining to declare a mistrial, and in 
handling the unfortunate circumstance presented as she did. 
 
 
The defendant's remaining claims of error do not require 
extended discussion.  To the extent that he claims that his 
confrontation rights were violated by the admission of the 
testimony of a substitute medical examiner, the medical examiner 
permissibly provided his opinion that Erving died from gunshot 
wounds to the head based on autopsy photographs that were 
admitted and authenticated.  See Commonwealth v. DiPadova, 460 
Mass. 424, 438 n.17 (2011).  There is no merit to the 
defendant's claim that the judge erred in limiting the cross-
examination of Erving's sister where she testified that she 
received the defendant's text messages, but where it was 
apparent from her testimony that she did not have personal 
knowledge of the meaning of the messages.  See Commonwealth v. 
Andrews, 403 Mass. 441, 461-462 (1988).  Finally, the defendant 
cannot prevail on his claim that there was insufficient evidence 
to support the firearm conviction where he did not produce any 
evidence that he had a license to carry a firearm and, 
therefore, the burden did not shift to the Commonwealth to prove 
that he did not have one.  See Commonwealth v. Humphries, 465 
Mass. 762, 769 (2013), citing Commonwealth v. Gouse, 461 Mass. 
787, 806 (2012). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed. 
 
 
 
William S. Smith for the defendant. 
                                                                  
ones, we think it unlikely that this instruction made a 
difference in the circumstances of this case, where there had 
not been a change in the membership of the jury. 
 
 
7 
 
Pamela Alford, Assistant District Attorney (Gregory P. 
Connor, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth.