Title: Freeto Construction Co. v. American Hoist & Derrick Co.
Citation: 203 Kan. 741, 457 P.2d 1
Docket Number: 45,376
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: July 17, 1969

203 Kan. 741 (1969)
457 P.2d 1
FREETO CONSTRUCTION CO., Appellant,
v.
AMERICAN HOIST &amp; DERRICK CO., and WARNER-SWAZEY MANUFACTURING CO., INC., Appellees.
No. 45,376

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed July 17, 1969.
Lawrence G. Zukel, of Olathe, argued the cause, and John B. Towner, of Pittsburg, was with him on the brief for the appellant.
Perry L. Owsley, of Pittsburg, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellee, American Hoist &amp; Derrick Co.
Douglas G. Hudson, of Fort Scott, argued the cause, and Douglas Hudson and David Mullies, both of Fort Scott, were with him on the brief for the appellee, Warner-Swazey Manufacturing Company, Inc.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
KAUL, J.:
Plaintiff-appellant appeals from an order of the trial court which sustained motions for defendant and third party defendant *742 for dismissal of plaintiff's action. The motions were made at pretrial conference and were based on the ground that plaintiff's action was barred by applicable statutes of limitation.
For convenience the appellant will be referred to as Freeto or plaintiff and appellees as American Hoist and Warner-Swazey or collectively as defendants.
There is no dispute in the facts which are collected from the pleadings, interrogatories and statements of counsel at a pretrial conference.
The action was instituted by Freeto to recover damages sustained by it for repairs and loss of use resulting from the breakdown of a self-propelled truck crane sold to Freeto by American Hoist. The crane carrier was manufactured by Warner-Swazey and delivered to American Hoist, who manufactured the hoist, assembled it on the carrier and sold and delivered the completed crane, through its distributor, to Freeto.
The sole issue presented concerns the application of appropriate statutes of limitation. This necessitates a recitation of events in chronological order.
On March 25, 1958, Warner-Swazey having manufactured the carrier, delivered it to American Hoist.
On May 7, 1959, American Hoist having manufactured the hoist, attached it to the carrier, sold and delivered the assembled truck crane, through its distributor, to Freeto.
On September 25, 1964, when being used in Freeto's business the crane failed while carrying a load which was allegedly within the load limits stated in literature of American Hoist concerning the particular model truck crane. Specifically, two large bolts attaching the outrigger frame of the hoist to the frame of the carrier gave way, causing the load to shift and fall, extensively damaging the crane and the load which consisted of a section of an asphalt plant.
On September 24, 1966, one day short of two years from the date of the crane failure, Freeto filed its petition in abbreviated notice form against American Hoist. Freeto alleged American Hoist was negligent in the construction of the crane and that "this negligence amounted to a breach of express warranty of implied fitness for a particular purpose."
Summons and a copy of the petition were served on American Hoist on September 28, 1966.
On November 9, 1966, American Hoist filed its answer to Freeto's *743 petition and a third party petition against Warner-Swazey. Summons was served on Warner-Swazey on November 23, 1966, making it a third party defendant.
Interrogatories were submitted and answered by which the chronology of events was developed.
On February 6, 1967, American Hoist filed a supplemental answer alleging that Freeto's action was barred by the statute of limitations.
After further interrogatories were submitted and answered, a pretrial conference was convened on September 22, 1967. The dates of events, heretofore recited, were stipulated to by the parties, issues were defined and at the conclusion of the conference the court carefully dictated a pretrial order in the presence of counsel. The court concluded the order with the following directions:
The trial court served the pretrial order upon counsel on October 12, 1967, and filed it October 23, 1967. No objections were made to the order as drawn.
The pretrial order contained the following statement of the court:
Following the pretrial conference, Warner-Swazey filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that as against it the petition and third party petition were barred by the Kansas Statutes of Limitation.
Briefs of all parties dealing with the application of statutes of limitation were submitted and, on February 7, 1968, the trial court filed a memorandum decision. The trial court held that both the action of Freeto and the third party action of American Hoist were founded in contract and barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
Freeto filed a notice of appeal, directed to both American Hoist and Warner-Swazey.
Warner-Swazey contends the appeal as to it should be dismissed since Freeto sought no judgment against it and American Hoist has not appealed from the order dismissing its third party action. Because of our disposition of this appeal, it is not necessary to deal with Warner-Swazey's position in this regard.
*744 In its memorandum decision the trial court recited the chronology of events, as we have related, set out the contentions of the parties and legal principles applicable, and decided the issues as follows:
It should be noted the trial court did not specifically find whether the action was for breach of an express warranty, written or oral, or of an implied warranty. This question was probably not susceptible to determination by the trial court at that stage of the litigation. Apparently, the court considered Freeto's petition and statements by counsel broad enough in this respect to allow proceeding on either premise in the alternative. Be that as it may, the trial court proceeded to dispose of the action on either theory *745 by applying a five-year limitation to an action on a written contract under Laws of 1965, Chapter 354, Section 12, effective January 1, 1966, now K.S.A. 1968 Supp. 60-511 and a three-year limitation to an action on an oral or implied contract under K.S.A. 60-512.
Freeto first takes issue with the trial court's ruling that the action is one founded in contract.
In its brief, Freeto concedes the petition to be admittedly ambiguous but argues that it sufficiently apprises defendant (American Hoist) of the nature of the action so that it could be submitted as a tort action on the theory of ordinary negligence in the design and manufacture of the crane, or on the theory of a breach of warranty for a particular purpose, even though either theory was not strictly framed by the pleadings or pretrial order.
As a tort action, Freeto says its petition was timely filed within the limitation of K.S.A. 60-513(2), now K.S.A. 1968 Supp. 60-513(2), applicable to actions for injury to personal property, since the action was filed one day within the two-year period following the breakdown of the crane. Applying a further proviso of 60-513 Freeto claims its cause of action in tort did not accrue until the breakdown on September 25, 1964, when injury was first caused which was well within the ten-year limitation applicable to an action for injury to personal property under such circumstances. It should be noted the proviso referred to is not found in 60-511, supra, pertaining to actions on written contracts or in 60-512, supra, pertaining to actions on oral or implied contracts.
American Hoist and Warner-Swazey answer Freeto's argument by pointing out that the trial court recorded the statement of Freeto's counsel, that the action was based on contract, and that no objection was made by Freeto when the pretrial order was dictated by the court or later when the order was submitted to counsel. Defendant's claim that since Freeto made no attempt to amend its theory or to modify the pretrial order, the subsequent course of the action is controlled thereby.
We are compelled to agree with the position adopted by defendants.
The purpose and effect of a pretrial order is clearly defined by the statutory and case law of this state. K.S.A. 60-216 provides for procedure and matters to be considered at pretrial conference. With respect to a pretrial order the statute directs:
*746 The force of a pretrial order under the provisions of 60-216, supra, was noted in Brown v. Hardin, 197 Kan. 517, 419 P.2d 912, where we stated:
As we have already noted, Freeto made no attempt before the trial court to amend the theory of its action or to modify the pretrial order. It follows the pretrial order must control the subsequent course of the action. (Trimble, Administrator v. Coleman Co., Inc., 200 Kan. 350, 437 P.2d 219; Evangelist v. Bellern Research Corporation, 199 Kan. 638, 433 P.2d 380; Brown v. Hardin, supra; Owen v. Schwartz, 177 F.2d 641, 14 A.L.R.2d 1337.)
Having determined the action was one for breach of contract, the trial court correctly ruled that whether it be for breach of an express or of an implied warranty the action accrues at the time of breach. In this case the breach occurred when the crane was sold and delivered, having been allegedly designed and assembled in a manner inadequate to sustain the warranted load capacity.
In Crabb v. Swindler, Administratrix, 184 Kan. 501, 337 P.2d 986, the action was against the estate of a deceased plumbing contractor to recover damages sustained by the owner of a new house, resulting from the installation of plumbing fixtures in a negligent and unworkmanlike manner. The controlling question was whether the action survived the death of the deceased plumbing contractor which in turn depended upon when the cause of action accrued. This court resolved the question by holding that an implied warranty stemmed from the contractual relationship between the parties and that the implied warranty was breached when the plumbing was installed and the job completed. In the opinion we find the applicable rule succinctly stated and supported by ample authority:
Although the question in Crabb did not involve the statute of limitations, we believe the factual background there, and the legal issue framed relative to the accrual of an action for breach of warranty, to be so analogous as to be controlling here. It is to be noted the Kansas cases cited in the above quotation from the Crabb opinion deal with the application of the accrual of action rule as applied to either breach of contract or breach of warranty with respect to the application of the appropriate statute of limitations. The observations of the trial court in paragraph No. 7 of its memorandum decision is quite similar to language found in several of the cases mentioned.
The decision in Crabb was discussed and the principles announced therein were applied in the more recent case of Price, Administrator v. Holmes, 198 Kan. 100, 422 P.2d 976, wherein the court was again confronted with a survival of action problem.
Finally, Freeto makes the alternative contention that even though its action is for breach of contract, nevertheless the trial court erred in finding the warranty sued upon to be a present warranty rather than prospective and continuing.
On this point we are again in agreement with the trial court's finding that there are no facts in the record suggesting a warranty as to the condition or capability of the crane on a date more than five years after its sale and delivery. We think it safe to assume that if there were any written or oral warranty as to condition or capability for any specified time, after delivery or any premise upon which such a warranty might be implied, the facts giving rise to a basis therefor would certainly have appeared in the record at the instance of plaintiff.
Freeto cites Naaf v. Griffitts, 201 Kan. 64, 439 P.2d 83. The case involved the proof of a seller's express warranty that heifers would calve during a certain period and timeliness of notice of the alleged breach of warranty. We find nothing in the opinion which would tend to support Freeto's claim of prospective warranty in the instant case.
*748 As noted by the trial court, the Uniform Commercial Code, enacted in 1965, does not effect this action. However, we believe the provisions of K.S.A. 84-2-725 to be substantially in accordance with decisions of this court, in particular with the principles set out in Price, Administrator v. Holmes, supra; Crabb v. Swindler, Administratrix, supra; Challis v. Hartloff, 136 Kan. 823, 18 P.2d 199.
The judgment is affirmed.