Title: Kirk v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.
Citation: 289 S.W.2d 538
Docket Number: N/A
State: Tennessee
Issuer: Tennessee Supreme Court
Date: April 5, 1956

289 S.W.2d 538 (1956) Mrs. Imogene KIRK v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY. Supreme Court of Tennessee. April 5, 1956. Shelton &amp; Shelton, Columbia, for appellant. Beverly Douglas, Jr., Nashville, and MacFarland &amp; Colley, Columbia, for appellee. PREWITT, Justice. In June, 1955, complainant Mrs. Kirk, filed a bill in the Chancery Court of Maury County, seeking to recover of the defendant insurance company the sum of $5,000. The bill charged that the company had issued a policy of automobile insurance to Burton Kirk, Mrs. Kirk's husband, and that while the policy was in force Mrs. Kirk was injured in an automobile wreck. The bill further charged that at the time of the wreck she was riding in an automobile owned by her husband and covered by this policy, which automobile was then being driven by Clovis M. Anderson with the consent and permission of Mrs. Kirk's husband. The bill further charged that Mrs. Kirk sued Anderson and recovered a judgment against him in the sum of $5,000. The bill further charged that Mrs. Kirk, the complainant, is entitled to recover the amount of this judgment against the insurance company, under the terms of the insurance policy issued by the company to her husband, Burton Kirk. Mrs. Kirk attached to her bill as an exhibit a copy of an insurance policy, which was issued to her husband. This policy provides: The policy, however, specifically provides, under the heading "Exclusions", that: The policy defines insured as follows: The insurance company filed a demurrer to the bill defending on the ground that the policy expressly excepted from the coverage claimed any obligation "to the insured or any member of the family of the insured residing in the same household as the insured." The only question before us is whether the family exclusion contained in the policy attached to Mrs. Kirk's original bill as Exhibit A precludes recovery by her against the insurance company on a policy issued to her husband and containing such an exclusion. Under the terms of this policy liability to members of the family of the insured is excluded from coverage, and the policy definition of insured provides that insured shall include the named insured and shall also include certain other persons using the automobile, members of the family of the named insured are precluded from recovery, even if the person driving the car at the time of the accident was not the named insured but was an "additional insured" under the omnibus clause of the policy. Pearson v. Johnson, 215 Minn. 480, 10 N.W.2d 357; Munsert v. Farmers Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 229 Wis. 581, 281 N.W. 671, 119 A.L.R. 1390. We have no Tennessee case on the point in question. In the Pearson v. Johnson, supra [215 Minn. 480, 10 N.W.2d 358], a policy was issued by this same company and containing provisions almost identical to those here under consideration. The wife of the named insured Pearson was injured when an automobile belonging to her husband and driven by one Johnson with his consent was involved in an accident. Mr. Pearson's policy contained an exclusion which stated: "`This policy does not apply: The definition clause provided that: The Court, in holding that Mr. Pearson's insurance company was not liable to answer for his wife's injuries, says: See also Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America v. Geist, 270 Mich. 510, 259 N.W. 143. By the weight of authority, a policy clause excluding from coverage any liability of an "employee of the insured" has been held to preclude recovery against the insurer by an employee of the named insured, even though the vehicle was being operated by an additional insured, when the policy defines "insured" to include the named insured. The Chancellor, in sustaining the demurrer of the insurance company to Mrs. Kirk's original bill, correctly construed the language used by the parties in the contract of insurance as precluding recovery on the policy by the wife of the named insured, and he correctly held that there is no ambiguity in the terms of the policy which could entitle Mrs. Kirk to recover. We are of the opinion therefore that there was no error in the Chancellor sustaining the demurrer to the bill and his decree is affirmed.