Title: Commonwealth v. Barros
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13506
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: June 3, 2024

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-13506 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  NELSON BARROS. 
 
 
 
Bristol.     February 7, 2024. - June 3, 2024. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Kafker, Wendlandt, Georges, 
& Dewar, JJ. 
 
 
Constitutional Law, Plea, Assistance of counsel, Retroactivity 
of judicial holding.  Practice, Criminal, Plea, Assistance 
of counsel, Waiver, Retroactivity of judicial holding.  
Waiver.  Alien.  Retroactivity of Judicial Holding. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Fall River Division 
of the District Court Department on December 15, 2017. 
 
 
A motion to withdraw an admission to sufficient facts, 
filed on March 9, 2023, was considered by Kevin J. Finnerty, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Edward Crane for the defendant. 
 
Alysia V. Sanchez, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Rebecca Kiley & Wendy S. Wayne, Committee for Public 
Counsel Services, Hannah L. Kilson, & Chauncey Wood, for 
Committee for Public Counsel Services & others, amici curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
 
2 
 
 
DEWAR, J.  Under art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration 
of Rights, a criminal defendant's waiver of the right to counsel 
must be made knowingly and intelligently, with "adequate[] 
aware[ness] of [(1)] the seriousness of the charges, [(2)] the 
magnitude of [the] undertaking, [(3)] the availability of 
advisory counsel, and [(4)] the disadvantages of self-
representation."  Commonwealth v. Martin, 425 Mass. 718, 720 
(1997), quoting Commonwealth v. Jackson, 376 Mass. 790, 795 
(1978).  Today we confirm that, whenever a defendant elects to 
waive the right to counsel -- whether at arraignment or at a 
plea hearing -- a trial court judge bears the "serious and 
weighty responsibility" of ascertaining whether that waiver is 
made knowingly and intelligently.  Commonwealth v. Cavanaugh, 
371 Mass. 46, 53 (1976), quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 
458, 465 (1938).  As we have long held, the inquiry required 
will depend on the individual defendant and the circumstances of 
the case, but the judge should ascertain that each element of 
the standard for a knowing and intelligent waiver is met.  
Because it bears on our assessment of the waiver of counsel in 
this case, today we also recognize that the significant 
disadvantages of self-representation pertinent to the fourth 
element of this standard include, for a noncitizen defendant, 
forgoing counsel's advice about the immigration consequences of 
a disposition.  A trial court judge therefore should ensure a 
3 
 
defendant seeking to waive counsel is aware of this disadvantage 
of proceeding without counsel. 
 
Applying these principles as well as the applicable 
standard of review, we affirm the judgment below on alternate 
grounds.  We conclude that the defendant's waiver of counsel was 
invalid, in violation of his art. 12 right to counsel.  While 
the judge alerted the defendant to the existence of the right to 
counsel and confirmed that the defendant wished to represent 
himself, the judge conducted no further inquiry to determine 
whether the defendant's waiver of counsel was made knowingly and 
intelligently at either his arraignment or his plea hearing, and 
nothing else in the record before us establishes that the 
defendant's waiver was sufficiently informed to comport with 
art. 12.  The defendant did not, however, challenge this waiver 
of counsel in his first motion to withdraw his admission to 
sufficient facts, on which he was represented by counsel.  The 
defendant therefore must establish a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice in order to prevail on appeal from the 
trial court's denial of his second motion to withdraw his 
admission.  Applying that standard to the record before us, we 
conclude that the defendant has not raised a serious doubt that 
4 
 
the result of the proceeding might have been different had his 
waiver of counsel been adequately informed.1 
 
1.  Background.  The defendant, Nelson Barros, was born in 
Angola in 1973 and, amidst the civil war that began there in 
1975, moved with his parents to Portugal in 1977.  He 
subsequently moved to the United States in 2015 to reside with 
his now-wife and became a lawful permanent resident in 2016.  In 
2017, the defendant was arrested and charged with one count of 
assault and battery on a household member in violation of G. L. 
c. 265, § 13M (a), on an allegation that he punched his wife in 
the face. 
 
At the defendant's arraignment the next day, the judge 
asked the defendant if he wished to have an attorney represent 
him.  The following exchange between the judge and the defendant 
took place: 
The judge:  "So do you intend to hire a lawyer, or are you 
asking the Court to appoint[] an attorney for you?" 
 
The defendant:  "Sorry, excuse me?" 
 
The judge:  "Excuse me?" 
 
The defendant:  "I didn't understand." 
 
The judge:  "Do you have any trouble speaking and 
understanding --" 
 
The defendant:  "No, I understand English." 
 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief of the Committee for 
Public Counsel Services, Boston Bar Association, and 
Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Attorneys. 
5 
 
 
The judge:  "All right.  You have an option to hire an 
attorney on this case if you'd like. 
 
"The Court would consider appointing a lawyer for you if 
you cannot afford one on your own, or you can handle the 
case yourself without an attorney, and that's your choice." 
 
The defendant:  "Myself." 
 
The defendant then signed a form, pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 3:10, 
as appearing in 475 Mass. 1301 (2016), acknowledging he had 
waived his right to counsel.  The defendant proceeded to speak 
to the prosecutor.  After recalling the case later that day, the 
judge again asked the defendant if he intended to proceed 
without counsel.  The defendant responded affirmatively, and the 
judge informed him that he could change his mind at any time. 
 
At the next pretrial hearing, the prosecutor made an offer 
to the defendant to admit to sufficient facts in exchange for 
one year of probation.  Once the case had been called, the judge 
again inquired whether the defendant was representing himself, 
and the defendant stated he was.  Another hearing was scheduled 
to give the defendant time to consider the Commonwealth's offer. 
 
At his subsequent court appearance, the defendant admitted 
to sufficient facts to warrant finding him guilty and was placed 
on one year of probation.  At the start of the hearing, the 
judge again asked the defendant if he understood that he had a 
right to have an attorney, asked the defendant to confirm that 
he signed the waiver of counsel form, and asked the defendant 
6 
 
whether he still wished to "handle this without an attorney."  
The defendant gave brief affirmative responses to each question. 
 
The judge then confirmed with the defendant that he 
understood he was giving up the right to a jury trial, outlined 
the rights the defendant would be forgoing by admitting to 
sufficient facts, and confirmed the defendant felt he had had 
enough time to think about his plea and "underst[oo]d the 
charge."  At the conclusion of the colloquy leading up to the 
defendant's admission, the trial court judge provided the 
defendant with the following warning about potential immigration 
consequences: 
"If you're not a citizen of the United States you're hereby 
advised of the acceptance by this Court of your admission 
of sufficient facts or plea of guilty may have the 
consequences of deportation and exclusion from admission to 
the United States or denial of naturalization pursuant to 
the laws of the United States and that the offenses would 
have presumptively mandate [sic] removal from the U.S., and 
[F]ederal officials sought your removal [sic], it is 
practically inevitable that this plea would result in your 
deportation, exclusion from admission, or denial of 
naturalization." 
The defendant responded that he understood the warning.  The 
judge accepted the defendant's admission, and the case was 
continued without a finding.  One year later, the defendant 
completed his probation, and the charge was dismissed. 
 
In 2022, the defendant was detained by Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement officers upon his return to the United 
States from a trip to visit his mother in Portugal.  A notice 
7 
 
from the United States Department of Homeland Security declared 
the defendant removable for a "crime of domestic violence" under 
the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), due to his admission to sufficient facts to 
find him guilty of assault and battery on a household member. 
 
While awaiting his hearing before the Immigration Court, 
the defendant, now represented by counsel, filed a motion to 
withdraw his plea pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), as 
appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001).  The defendant argued in 
part that his plea was not made knowingly and voluntarily, 
stating in an affidavit that he "did not understand that by 
taking this plea, [he] would be in danger of deportation."  
After a hearing, the motion judge, who was not the plea judge, 
denied the defendant's motion to withdraw his plea. 
 
Represented by new counsel, the defendant then filed a 
second motion to withdraw his plea.  The second motion alleged 
that the defendant did not validly waive his right to counsel 
before his admission to sufficient facts because the judge 
failed to conduct a colloquy to ensure the defendant understood 
the consequences of forgoing representation by counsel.  The 
motion judge denied the motion, finding that the defendant's 
waiver of the right to counsel was knowing and voluntary.  The 
defendant timely appealed, and we granted his application for 
direct appellate review. 
8 
 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Waiver of the right to counsel.  
"There is no question that the right to counsel in a criminal 
prosecution is a fundamental constitutional right" under both 
art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  Lavallee v. 
Justices in the Hampden Superior Court, 442 Mass. 228, 234 
(2004).  This right "embodies a realistic recognition of the 
obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the 
professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before 
a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty, wherein the 
prosecution is presented by experienced and learned counsel."  
Johnson, 304 U.S. at 462-463.  At the same time, criminal 
defendants also have a constitutional right to represent 
themselves.  Commonwealth v. Means, 454 Mass. 81, 89 (2009), 
citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 821, 834 (1975).  A 
defendant may therefore voluntarily elect to waive the right to 
counsel.  Means, supra. 
Because a defendant's waiver of counsel "relinquishes, as a 
purely factual matter, many of the traditional benefits 
associated with the right to counsel," the defendant "must 
'knowingly and intelligently' forgo those relinquished 
benefits."  Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, quoting Johnson, 304 U.S. 
at 464-465.  While a knowing and intelligent choice to waive 
counsel does not require having "the skill and experience of a 
9 
 
lawyer," the defendant "should be made aware of the dangers and 
disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will 
establish that 'he knows what he is doing and his choice is made 
with eyes open.'"  Faretta, supra, quoting Adams v. United 
States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942).  A judge thus 
bears a "serious and weighty responsibility" to ensure a waiver 
of counsel is knowing and intelligent before accepting it.  
Cavanaugh, 371 Mass. at 53, quoting Johnson, supra at 465.  And 
the United States Supreme Court has confirmed that, under the 
Sixth Amendment, a waiver of counsel must always be knowing and 
intelligent, even if the self-represented defendant ultimately 
enters a guilty plea rather than going to trial without the 
assistance of counsel.  Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 81 (2004). 
In cases where defendants did ultimately represent 
themselves at a trial, we have long held that our review of a 
defendant's waiver must give us confidence "that the defendant 
was 'adequately aware of [(1)] the seriousness of the charges, 
[(2)] the magnitude of [the] undertaking, [(3)] the availability 
of advisory counsel, and [(4)] the disadvantages of self-
representation.'"  Martin, 425 Mass. at 720, quoting Jackson, 
376 Mass. at 795.  And we have recognized that meeting this 
standard requires a judge to conduct an appropriate inquiry 
before accepting a defendant's waiver of the right to counsel.  
Means, 454 Mass. at 89-90.  We have not, however, "prescribed 
10 
 
the questions that a judge must pose . . . nor is there any 
'particular piece of information that is essential to an 
effective waiver of counsel.'"  Martin, supra at 719-720, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Barnes, 399 Mass. 385, 390 (1987).  
Rather, the nature and extent of the inquiry required "depends 
on the particular facts and circumstances of each case," 
including the "background, experience and conduct" of the 
individual defendant (citation omitted).  Barnes, supra at 390-
391.  A defendant "should be made aware" of the consequences of 
choosing self-representation, if not evidently already aware.  
Commonwealth v. Francis, 485 Mass. 86, 95 n.4 (2020), cert. 
denied, 141 S. Ct. 2762 (2021), quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 
835.  On review, our "focus . . . is the defendant's subjective 
understanding of his decision and its consequences."  Martin, 
supra at 720, quoting Barnes, supra at 391. 
 
Here, we are asked whether a judge must conduct this 
inquiry into the defendant's understanding when a defendant 
seeks to waive the right to counsel at an arraignment or plea 
hearing, rather than on the eve of a trial.2  We confirm that 
 
 
2 Rather than entering a guilty plea, the self-represented 
defendant in this case received an offer from the prosecutor for 
a continuation without a finding and chose to admit to 
sufficient facts to find him guilty.  We discern no relevance to 
the distinction between the two ultimate dispositions for 
purposes of deciding whether a trial court judge may forgo 
ascertaining that a defendant's waiver of counsel is knowing and 
intelligent.  For simplicity's sake, we follow the parties in 
11 
 
art. 12 always requires this inquiry to ensure that a 
defendant's waiver of counsel is knowing and intelligent, at any 
stage of a case. 
 
The "right to trial counsel under art. 12 attaches at least 
by the time of arraignment."  Lavallee, 442 Mass. at 234-235.  
Before a trial ever takes place, counsel provides "myriad" 
benefits to a defendant.  Id. at 235.  Counsel will investigate 
the case, including interviewing witnesses, reviewing and 
developing evidence, and identifying potential defenses and 
strategies.  Id.  See Commonwealth v. Baker, 440 Mass. 519, 529 
(2003).  Counsel will also conduct legal research and file 
motions, including those seeking to suppress evidence obtained 
illegally.  See Commonwealth v. Comita, 441 Mass. 86, 90 (2004).  
Indeed, when a defendant is represented by counsel, counsel's 
failure to perform these tasks may amount to ineffective 
assistance in violation of art. 12 and the Sixth Amendment.  See 
Lavallee, supra at 236; Comita, supra at 90-91. 
 
A defendant is also constitutionally entitled to the 
effective assistance of counsel in negotiating and entering a 
 
referring to a "plea" in framing the question.  See E.B. Cypher, 
Criminal Practice and Procedure § 24:17 (4th ed. 2014) (noting 
that admission to sufficient facts, although "technically not 
called a plea" and not conviction under Massachusetts law, is 
"treated as a guilty plea," both with respect to colloquy judge 
must perform before accepting admission and under Federal 
immigration law). 
12 
 
plea if the defendant chooses not to proceed to trial.  See 
Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 140 (2012); Commonwealth v. 
Mahar, 442 Mass. 11, 14-15 (2004).  "It is standard practice 
that 'the attorney should explore all alternatives to trial, 
including the possible resolution of the case through a 
negotiated plea or admission to sufficient facts.'"  
Commonwealth v. Marinho, 464 Mass. 115, 127 (2013), quoting 
Committee for Public Counsel Services, Assigned Counsel Manual 
c. 4, at 46 (rev. June 2011).  Depending on the particular facts 
and circumstances of a case, deficient performance by counsel in 
advising the defendant regarding a potential plea may rise to 
the level of a constitutional violation, including through 
"incorrect advice pertinent to the plea" or "the course of legal 
representation that preceded it with respect to other potential 
pleas and plea offers."  Frye, supra at 141-142.  See Marinho, 
supra at 126-127; Mahar, supra. 
 
And, whether a defendant chooses to enter a plea or go to 
trial, counsel is obliged to inquire into the defendant's 
immigration status and to inform a noncitizen defendant of any 
immigration consequences that may result from a conviction, 
plea, or admission to sufficient facts.  Marinho, 464 Mass. at 
125-126.  See Commonwealth v. Clarke, 460 Mass. 30, 46 (2011), 
abrogated in part by Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342 
(2013).  As we acknowledged in Clarke, Congress's 1996 
13 
 
amendments to our Federal immigration laws created a system in 
which deportation became a "near-mandatory consequence of many 
convictions."  Clarke, supra at 41, citing the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104–208, 110 Stat. 3009–546 (effective Apr. 1, 
1997).  Consequently, we recognized, "[t]he importance of 
accurate legal advice for noncitizens accused of crimes has 
never been more important."  Clarke, supra, quoting Padilla v. 
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364 (2010).  Potential deportation is 
"an integral part –- indeed, sometimes the most important part 
–- of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants."  
Clarke, supra, quoting Padilla, supra.  We therefore require 
counsel to provide adequately detailed warnings to a defendant 
about the potential immigration consequences of a conviction, 
plea, or admission to sufficient facts.  See Commonwealth v. 
DeJesus, 468 Mass. 174, 181-182 (2014) (counsel's warning that 
defendant was "eligible for" and would "face deportation" 
insufficient where guilty plea gave defendant "virtually no 
avenue for discretionary relief" from removal). 
 
A defendant's waiver of the right to counsel relinquishes 
these benefits of effective representation by counsel even if 
the defendant ultimately decides to enter a plea rather than go 
to trial.  Moreover, just as in cases that go to trial, an 
average defendant who intends to enter a plea may be unlikely to 
14 
 
know "the disadvantages of self-representation."  Martin, 425 
Mass. at 720, quoting Jackson, 376 Mass. at 795.  For example, a 
defendant may be unaware that counsel could advise the defendant 
regarding potential favorable alternative dispositions.  See, 
e.g., Charbonneau v. Presiding Justice of the Holyoke Div. of 
the Dist. Court Dep't, 473 Mass. 515, 518-519, 522 (2016) 
(describing procedure for defendant-capped pleas as "an 
essential part of the fairness calculus in the guilty plea 
process").  Or, as relevant here, a noncitizen defendant may be 
unaware that counsel would be obliged to provide the defendant 
with advice regarding the immigration consequences of a 
particular conviction or admission.  See Clarke, 460 Mass. at 
45-46. 
 
Thus, a trial court judge may not forgo ascertaining that a 
defendant's waiver of counsel is made knowingly and 
intelligently at any stage of a case -- even if a defendant 
expresses an intent to enter a plea as opposed to going to 
trial.  See Tovar, 541 U.S. at 81 (recognizing, in case where 
defendant pleaded guilty, that "[w]aiver of the right to counsel 
. . . must be a knowing, intelligent ac[t] done with sufficient 
awareness of the relevant circumstances" [quotation and citation 
omitted]).  Whenever a defendant wishes to waive the right to 
counsel, a judge must ascertain that the defendant is 
"adequately aware of [(1)] the seriousness of the charges, [(2)] 
15 
 
the magnitude of [the] undertaking, [(3)] the availability of 
advisory counsel, and [(4)] the disadvantages of self-
representation."  Martin, 425 Mass. at 720, quoting Jackson, 376 
Mass. at 795.  The judge should therefore inquire into the 
defendant's understanding in each of these respects.  And, as to 
the fourth -- that the defendant understand the significant 
disadvantages of proceeding without counsel -- the judge should 
ensure the defendant is aware that a waiver means forgoing 
counsel's advice concerning immigration consequences.3 
As ever, the trial court's inquiry into whether a 
particular defendant's voluntary waiver of counsel is knowing 
and intelligent remains a fact-specific inquiry particular to 
the "background, experience and conduct" of the individual 
defendant and the circumstances of the case (citation omitted).  
Barnes, 399 Mass. at 391.  Accordingly, for example, when a 
defendant waives the right to counsel and states an intention to 
enter a plea, it may be less pertinent for a trial court judge 
to ascertain at that juncture that the defendant understands 
"the magnitude of [the] undertaking" entailed in self-
 
 
3 We note that, as with warnings under G. L. c. 278, § 29D, 
trial courts should undertake to ensure that all defendants are 
aware of this disadvantage, without requiring the defendant to 
disclose the defendant's immigration status.  See id. ("The 
defendant shall not be required at the time of the plea to 
disclose to the court his legal status in the United States"). 
 
16 
 
representation at a jury trial in particular.  Martin, 425 Mass. 
at 720, quoting Barnes, supra.  It will be necessary, however, 
for the trial court judge to ascertain that the defendant 
understands the "disadvantages of self-representation" in the 
early stages of a case and in pleading guilty or admitting to 
sufficient facts.  Martin, supra, quoting Barnes, supra.  And, 
on review, our focus remains "the defendant's subjective 
understanding of his decision and its consequences" in the 
particular case at hand.  Martin, supra, quoting Barnes, supra. 
 
In defending the adequacy of the waiver in this case, 
discussed in further detail below, the Commonwealth relies 
heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in Tovar, 541 U.S. at 
90.  Tovar presented what the Supreme Court itself characterized 
as a "narrow[]" question:  whether the Sixth Amendment requires 
a judge to issue "a rigid and detailed admonishment" to all pro 
se defendants entering a plea that their waiver of the right to 
counsel involves a risk both that "a viable defense will be 
overlooked" and that the defendant will forfeit an attorney's 
independent advice about the wisdom of the plea (citation 
omitted).  Id. at 91-92.  The court rejected the argument that 
the Sixth Amendment requires these particular admonitions in all 
instances.  Id. at 92, 94.  And, examining the facts and 
circumstances of the defendant's waiver of counsel, the Supreme 
Court concluded that he had failed to meet his burden to show he 
17 
 
had not intelligently waived his right to counsel.  Id. at 92-
93.4 
 
We are not asked to adopt in this case, nor do we adopt, 
the uniform specific admonitions that the Supreme Court rejected 
under the Sixth Amendment in Tovar.  Rather, we simply confirm 
that art. 12 always requires a judge to ascertain, before 
accepting a defendant's waiver of counsel, that the defendant is 
"adequately aware of [(1)] the seriousness of the charges, [(2)] 
the magnitude of [the] undertaking, [(3)] the availability of 
advisory counsel, and [(4)] the disadvantages of self-
representation" -- whether a defendant ultimately enters a plea 
 
 
4 The Commonwealth also relies on the Supreme Court's 
observation in the course of these holdings in Tovar that the 
Sixth Amendment "require[s] less rigorous warnings" before 
accepting a waiver of counsel pretrial, "not because pretrial 
proceedings are 'less important' than trial, but because," in 
the court's view, "at that stage, 'the full dangers and 
disadvantages of self-representation . . . are less substantial 
and more obvious to an accused than they are at trial.'"  Tovar, 
541 U.S. at 90, quoting Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 299 
(1988).  While there are disadvantages of self-representation 
that are distinct to the trial stage, the disadvantages in 
pretrial proceedings are certainly not insubstantial, and it is 
not apparent to us that the pretrial disadvantages are "more 
obvious" to an average defendant.  In any case, for our art. 12 
purposes, it is immaterial precisely how substantial or obvious 
the disadvantages may be on average, as we agree that the 
inquiry whether a defendant's waiver was sufficiently informed 
"will 'depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and 
circumstances surrounding that case,'" including what the record 
shows the defendant understood.  Tovar, supra at 92, quoting 
Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464.  Accord Martin, 425 Mass. at 720; 
Barnes, 399 Mass. at 390-391. 
 
18 
 
or goes to trial.  Martin, 425 Mass. at 720, quoting Jackson, 
376 Mass. at 795.  We reiterate that the extent of the required 
inquiry of the defendant will depend on the particular 
circumstances of the defendant and the case at hand.  As 
relevant here, for example, the judge should ensure the 
defendant understands that giving up the advice of counsel on 
immigration consequences may be a significant disadvantage of 
self-representation on the charges at issue.  Ultimately, if the 
record does not demonstrate that the defendant's waiver of the 
right to counsel was adequately informed, we must conclude that 
the waiver violated the defendant's art. 12 right to counsel.  
See Means, 454 Mass. at 88-89. 
 
b.  Retroactivity.  Having confirmed that art. 12 requires 
that a defendant's voluntary waiver of counsel be made knowingly 
and intelligently before a defendant enters a plea, we must next 
determine whether this holding applies retroactively to cases 
such as the defendant's.5  We conclude that it does. 
 
Under the Supreme Court's decision in Teague v. Lane, 489 
U.S. 288 (2013), and its progeny, "new constitutional rules of 
criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which 
 
 
5 This issue was not raised by either party's briefing, but 
at oral argument we asked the parties to clarify their positions 
on retroactivity.  After argument, the parties each submitted 
postargument letters, the substance of each of which is 
addressed infra. 
19 
 
have become final before the new rules are announced," while 
"old rule[s] appl[y] both on direct and collateral review" 
(citations omitted).  Commonwealth v. Sylvain, 466 Mass. 422, 
428 (2013), S.C., 473 Mass. 832 (2016).  We have stated that, 
under our State Constitution, a rule will be new only "when the 
result is 'not dictated by precedent.'"  Id. at 434, quoting 
Teague, supra at 301. 
 
We agree with the defendant that the requirement we 
describe today is not a new rule because it is dictated by our 
precedent.  While the Commonwealth's postargument submission 
argues that we would be announcing a new rule if we were to hold 
that art. 12 requires particular admonishments like those 
rejected under the Sixth Amendment in Tovar, we make no such 
rule today.  Indeed, the Commonwealth's principal brief to this 
court itself recited, as applying here, the familiar waiver 
standard we reaffirm today, including our case law's long-
standing requirement that the judge ensure that a defendant 
understand the disadvantages of self-representation before 
waiving the right to counsel.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Najjar, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 569, 581 (2019) (likewise assessing 
waiver of counsel before defendant entered plea under this 
standard). 
Because the rule we articulate is not a new rule, it 
applies retroactively, including to the defendant's case. 
20 
 
 
c.  The defendant's case.  A motion to withdraw a plea is 
treated as a motion for a new trial under Mass. R. Crim. P. 
30 (b).  Commonwealth v. Sylvester, 476 Mass. 1, 5 (2016).  We 
"review the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea to 
determine whether there has been a significant error of law or 
other abuse of discretion" (quotation and citation omitted).  
Id.  "When, as here, the motion judge did not preside at [the 
plea], . . . we regard ourselves in as good a position as the 
motion judge to assess the . . . record."  Commonwealth v. 
Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 307 (1986).  For the reasons that follow, 
while we disagree with the motion judge's assessment that the 
record shows a constitutionally adequate waiver of counsel, we 
affirm the denial of the defendant's second motion for a new 
trial, because the defendant has failed to establish a 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice on the record 
before us. 
The record does not leave us "confident" that this 
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his constitutional 
right to assistance of counsel.  Martin, 425 Mass. at 720.  At 
the defendant's arraignment, the judge conducted no inquiry into 
the defendant's understanding of the responsibilities of 
representing himself or the disadvantages of forgoing an 
attorney.  The judge did not inquire of the defendant regarding 
what he understood about the charge against him; what self-
21 
 
representation would entail; or the advantages of the assistance 
of counsel, including advice regarding the immigration 
consequences of a disposition.  Instead, the judge simply 
informed the defendant of the existence of the right to counsel, 
including appointed counsel if necessary, and, when the 
defendant succinctly stated he would represent himself, had him 
read and sign the S.J.C. Rule 3:10 waiver of counsel form 
without further question.6  Similarly, at the plea hearing, the 
judge confirmed that the defendant knew of the existence of the 
right to counsel and still wished to waive counsel as stated in 
the form he had signed, without further discussion of the 
waiver.  Although the judge at the conclusion of the plea 
colloquy provided the defendant with a warning that, while 
seemingly garbled on the record before us, may have alerted the 
defendant that his plea could carry immigration consequences, 
the defendant was not informed that, by waiving his right to 
counsel, he was forgoing the immigration advice of counsel. 
 
Moreover, and no doubt related to the judge's failure to 
make inquiries to ascertain that the defendant was "mak[ing] the 
choice 'with eyes open,'" nothing else in the record otherwise 
 
6 The defendant's signature on the standard S.J.C. Rule 3:10 
waiver of counsel form accurately attested that he had been told 
of the right to counsel and that the court would appoint counsel 
for him if he could not afford to hire his own lawyer. 
 
22 
 
suggests that the defendant waived his right to counsel 
knowingly and intelligently.  Martin, 425 Mass. at 721.  For 
example, the defendant did not say anything to demonstrate that 
he understood the advantages of counsel he was forgoing.  
Contrast, e.g., id. at 719-721 (finding waiver adequate where 
judge engaged in colloquy with defendant in which defendant 
stated he had thought carefully about decision, was aware of 
"technical rules governing the conduct of a trial," and 
understood he was facing serious charges and potentially lengthy 
prison sentence).  And this defendant had no history with the 
criminal justice system.  Contrast, e.g., Barnes, 399 Mass. at 
387, 391-392 (finding waiver adequate based in part on 
defendant's prior experiences with criminal justice system, as 
well as judge's colloquy regarding disadvantages of self-
representation, defendant's representation by counsel in 
pretrial proceedings, and availability of standby counsel at 
trial). 
 
The motion judge below therefore erred in concluding that, 
because this defendant had not gone to trial, the record here 
sufficed to establish a knowing and intelligent waiver.  In all 
cases, a judge faced with a defendant requesting to waive the 
right to counsel bears a "serious and weighty responsibility" to 
ascertain whether the waiver is knowing and intelligent.  
Cavanaugh, 371 Mass. at 53, quoting Johnson, 304 U.S. at 465.  
23 
 
Simply informing the defendant of the existence of the right to 
counsel without further elaboration falls far short of ensuring 
that the defendant is "adequately aware of [(1)] the seriousness 
of the charges, [(2)] the magnitude of [the] undertaking, [(3)] 
the availability of advisory counsel, and [(4)] the 
disadvantages of self-representation."  Martin, 425 Mass. at 
720, quoting Jackson, 376 Mass. at 795.  In the absence of a 
record establishing that this defendant's waiver of counsel was 
knowing and intelligent, we conclude that the waiver was not 
valid under art. 12. 
 
Ordinarily, if the record reveals a waiver of counsel was 
not knowing and intelligent, vacatur of the plea will be 
required for structural error.  See Means, 454 Mass. at 88-89 
(violations of right to counsel are not subject to harmless 
error analysis).  Here, however, all parties agree that the 
defendant failed to raise this claim in his first motion for a 
new trial and thereby waived the claim.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 
30 (c) (2).  The defendant therefore bears the burden of 
establishing a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice in 
order to obtain relief.  See Francis, 485 Mass. at 106.  In 
reviewing for a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice, we 
determine "if we have a serious doubt whether the result . . . 
might have been different had the error not been made."  
Commonwealth v. Azar, 435 Mass. 675, 687 (2002), S.C., 444 Mass. 
24 
 
72 (2005), quoting Commonwealth v. LeFave, 430 Mass. 169, 174 
(1999).7 
 
The record in this case is insufficient to establish a 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  The defendant has 
not shown how the result of this proceeding "might have been 
different" if the judge had taken steps to ensure his waiver of 
counsel was knowing and intelligent, with adequate awareness of 
the disadvantages of proceeding without counsel.  See Azar, 435 
Mass. at 687.  Importantly, neither of the affidavits submitted 
with the defendant's two motions to withdraw his plea states 
that he would have actually elected to be represented by counsel 
if he had more fully understood the consequences of waiving his 
right to counsel.  Nor does the defendant state that he would 
have rejected the Commonwealth's plea offer if he had had the 
benefit of counsel, including counsel's immigration-related 
advice regarding potential deportation to Portugal.  The 
 
7 For the same reasons that we consider an invalid waiver of 
counsel to be structural error, reviewing for a substantial risk 
of a miscarriage of justice in this context is necessarily "a 
speculative inquiry into what might have occurred in an 
alternate universe" in which the defendant may have elected to 
proceed with counsel.  Francis, 485 Mass. at 101, quoting United 
States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 150 (2006).  While we 
have not previously elaborated on how to apply the standard in 
circumstances like these, we need not do so here, because the 
defendant has plainly failed to raise "a serious doubt whether 
the result . . . might have been different had the error not 
been made."  Azar, 435 Mass. at 687, quoting LeFave, 430 Mass. 
at 174. 
25 
 
defendant was charged with assault and battery on a household 
member, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13M (a), after he 
allegedly punched his wife in the face, and, through his 
negotiations with the Commonwealth, he was able to obtain an 
offer of a continuance without a finding with one year of 
probation.  While the defendant now assertedly regrets the 
potential immigration consequences of his plea,8 the continuance 
without a finding was in other respects a beneficial disposition 
that allowed him to avoid a conviction, and he has not presented 
anything to suggest that he could have obtained a more favorable 
result with the benefit of representation by counsel.  We 
therefore conclude that the defendant has not met his burden to 
show a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  Because we 
agree that the defendant is not entitled to relief, we affirm 
the motion judge's denial of the defendant's second motion to 
withdraw his admission to sufficient facts. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  Before accepting a defendant's voluntary 
waiver of the right to counsel at any stage of a case, art. 12 
requires a judge to ascertain that the defendant is "adequately 
 
 
8 While the defendant's appeal in this case was pending, a 
Federal Immigration Court judge terminated the removal 
proceedings against him, after concluding that the crime of 
assault and battery on a household member does not categorically 
qualify as a crime of domestic violence under the governing 
Federal statute because it can be committed via an offensive 
touching. 
26 
 
aware of [(1)] the seriousness of the charges, [(2)] the 
magnitude of [the] undertaking, [(3)] the availability of 
advisory counsel, and [(4)] the disadvantages of self-
representation."  Martin, 425 Mass. at 720, quoting Jackson, 376 
Mass. at 795.  The nature and extent of the required inquiry 
depends on the individual defendant and all the circumstances of 
the case.  For noncitizen defendants, the disadvantages of self-
representation include forgoing counsel's advice about the 
immigration consequences of a disposition, and a judge should 
therefore ensure that a defendant is aware of this disadvantage 
where a defendant seeks to waive the right to counsel. 
 
In this case, the record does not demonstrate a knowing and 
intelligent waiver of counsel consistent with art. 12.  However, 
the defendant failed to challenge the validity of his waiver of 
counsel in his first motion to withdraw his admission to 
sufficient facts and therefore bears the burden of showing a 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice in order to obtain 
relief upon his second such motion.  Because he did not meet 
this burden, on this alternate ground we affirm the denial of 
the defendant's second motion to withdraw his admission to 
sufficient facts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.