Title: Fleming v. Jackson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 228, 2005
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: November 23, 2005

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
SERENA FLEMING, individually and as 
) 
agent for SEBRON FLEMING,  
 
)  No. 228, 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Appellants/Defendants,  
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
Below, 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for New Castle County 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  C.A. No. 04C-07-028 
IRENE JACKSON and TIFFANY 
 
) 
HUNTER, individually and as Next 
 
) 
Friend for JAMIYAH GRIFFIN, a minor, 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Appellees/Plaintiffs, 
 
) 
 
 
Below, 
 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  November 10, 2005 
Decided:  November 23, 2005 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 23rd day of November 2005, upon consideration of the briefs of the 
parties, it appears to the Court as follows: 
1. 
On July 6, 2004, the plaintiffs-below and appellees, Irene Jackson, 
Tiffany Hunter and Jamiyah Griffin, filed a complaint in Superior Court against the 
defendants-below and appellant, Serana Fleming and Sebron Fleming for injuries 
resulting from an automobile collision that occurred on July 3, 2002.1  Fleming 
                                                 
1  
For ease of discussion, any reference to “Jackson” includes the two other plaintiffs, 
Hunter and Griffin.  Likewise, any reference to “Fleming” includes both defendants, Serana and 
Sebron Fleming. 
2 
filed a motion to dismiss in Superior Court claiming that the two-year statute of 
limitations period for personal injury claims pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 8119 barred 
Jackson’s suit because the suit was not filed by Saturday July 3, 2004.  A Superior 
Court judge denied the motion and held that Delaware Superior Court Civil Rule 
6(a) extended the time period permitting Jackson to file her suit on July 6, 2004.  
Fleming, claiming that Delaware Superior Court Civil Rule 6(a) is inapplicable, 
filed this interlocutory appeal.  Because the last day to file this timely suit under 10 
Del. C. § 8119 was a Saturday, Delaware Superior Court Civil Rule 6(a) extended 
the statute of limitations period to the next day the Prothonotary was open, July 6, 
2004.  Accordingly, the trial judge’s ruling is AFFIRMED.   
2. 
Fleming argues Delaware Superior Court Civil Rule 6(a) cannot be 
applied to extend the statute of limitations.  Citing Bivens v. Mattero,2 Fleming 
suggests that courts may recognize exceptions to the limitations period only when 
(1) the court prevented the plaintiff from exercising a legal right; and (2) the 
plaintiff acted with due diligence.3  In response Jackson argues that Delaware 
Superior Court Civil Rule 6(a) appropriately tolled the two-year statute of 
limitations period provided under 10 Del. C. § 8119 because the last day of the 
limitations period was a Saturday. 
                                                 
2  
Bivens v. Mattero, 2004 Del. Super. LEXIS 236 (Del. Super. Ct. 2004).   
3  
Id. at *2.   
3 
 
3. 
The Superior Court’s construction of a statute is a determination of 
law and is reviewed de novo.4  This Court will determine whether the Superior 
Court judge “erred in formulating or applying legal precepts.”5 
 
4. 
Pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 561(a), the Superior Court Rules govern 
practice and procedure with respect to the “commencement, trial, hearing and 
determination of civil actions in the Superior Court.” Under 10 Del. C. § 561(c), 
once rules are adopted, they “supersede all statutory provisions in conflict or 
inconsistent therewith.”  Further, 10 Del. C. § 561(d) provides that any 
inconsistency or conflict between a court rule and a statute be resolved in favor of 
the court rule.   
 
5. 
The relevant statute here, 10 Del. C. § 8119, provides that “[n]o action 
for the recovery of damages upon a claim for alleged personal injuries shall be 
brought after the expiration of two years from the date upon which it is claimed 
that such alleged injuries were sustained.”  The computation of the two-year 
period, however, is governed by Delaware Superior Court Rule 6(a) which reads: 
In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these Rules, by 
order of court, or by statute, the day of the act, event or default after which 
the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last 
day of the period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday or 
Sunday, or other legal holiday, or other day on which the office of the 
                                                 
4  
Colonial Ins. Co. of Wisconsin v. Ayers, 772 A.2d 177, 179 (Del. 2001). 
5  
Id. 
4 
Prothonotary is closed, in which event the period shall run until the end of 
the next day on which the office of the Prothonotary is open. 
 
6. 
Here, the accident occurred on July 3, 2002; therefore, the last day to 
file timely under 10 Del. C. § 8119 would be July 3, 2004.  July 3, 2004, however, 
fell on a Saturday and thus was not included in the computation of the two-year 
period under the rule.  Further, Monday July 5, 2004 was a recognized legal 
holiday6 and was likewise not included in the computation.  Thus, Tuesday July 6, 
2004, was the last day Jackson could file her case.  Jackson properly filed her case 
on July 6, 2004 and her claim is not barred by the two-year statute of limitations 
period.   
7. 
Fleming relies on Bivens7 for her claim that Delaware Superior Court 
Rule 6(a) does not apply here.  In Bivens, the plaintiff, Jacqueline Bivens, brought 
suit in the Superior Court for injuries arising from a motor vehicle accident.  There, 
as here, 10 Del. C. § 8119 provided for a two-year statute of limitations period.  
The final day of the two-year period was Saturday, March 15, 2003.  Bivens 
attempted to use the Saturday filing procedures on March 15, 2003 but was unable 
to gain entry to the courthouse.  Bivens then filed her suit on Monday, March 17, 
2003, the next day the courthouse was open.  The defendant filed a motion for 
summary judgment claiming that the statute of limitations barred the lawsuit.  The 
                                                 
6  
July 5, 2004 was a legal holiday because Independence Day fell on a Sunday.   
 
7  
Bivens, 2004 Del. Super. LEXIS 236. 
 
5 
Superior Court denied the motion for summary judgment.  While recognizing that 
statutes of limitations are generally to be strictly construed the court stated:  
[C]ourts have inherent authority under certain circumstances to recognize 
implied exceptions where legislative intent is not contravened. Such 
exceptions are warranted where an authority such as a court or its staff 
prevents the exercise of a legal right by a plaintiff. To justify such an 
exception, a party must show that the action of the court itself prevented the 
exercise of the right and that plaintiff acted with due diligence.8 
 
Finding that Bivens exercised due diligence in attempting to file her suit on 
Saturday, and that the locked courthouse doors made filing an impossibility, the 
court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.9 
8.  Fleming suggests that because Jackson did not attempt to file on 
Saturday, July 3, 2004, Jackson cannot meet the exception applied in Bivens.  
Thus, Fleming claims, Jackson’s suit is barred by the statute of limitations. 
Fleming’s reliance on Bivens is misplaced.  The recognized implied exception in 
Bivens10 is not an exclusive exception that renders Delaware Superior Court Rule 
6(a) inapplicable.   
9. 
Fleming also argues a Superior Court drop box and modern 
technology have made Rule 6(a) superfluous because the Prothonotary is “always 
                                                 
8  
Bivens,  
 
9  
While the trial judge in Bivens could have applied Delaware Superior Court Rule 6(a) 
because the last day to file under 10 Del. C. § 8119 fell on a Saturday, it does not appear that the 
argument was before the court. 
 
10  
The implied exception the trial judge applied has been recognized in several cases.  
Wilson v. King, 673 A.2d 1228, 1231 (Del. Super. 1996) (citing Mergenthaler v. Asbestos Corp. 
of Am., 500 A.2d 1357, 1365 (Del. Super. 1985)).   
6 
open.”  Even if, as Fleming suggests, the Prothonotary is “always open” and Rule 
6(a) is, therefore, arguably superfluous, Rule 6(a) remains applicable here because 
the rule only applies, in relevant part, when the last day of the limitations period 
falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.  Jackson’s reliance on this long-
standing rule is therefore justified,11 and this Court will not bar Jackson’s suit 
based on a theory that the rule lacks any meaningful purpose.  Moreover, the rule 
still appears to be functional as the situation in Bivens does indicate that the 
Superior Court is not “always open.”  Until and if the Superior Court modifies 
Rule 6(a), its language cannot be deemed superfluous.   
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice 
 
                                                 
11  
Associated Transport, Inc. v. Pusey, 118 A.2d 362, 365 (Del. Super. Ct. 1955)(stating 
that Delaware Superior Court Rule 6(a) “has had the force and effect of legislative enactment 
since 1948.”).