Title: State Of Florida v. J.P.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC02-2288
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: May 5, 2005

Supreme Court of Florida 
____________ 
Nos. SC02-2288 & SC02-2452 
____________ 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
J.P., 
Respondent. 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
T.M., et al., 
Respondents. 
 
[November 18, 2004] 
REVISED OPINION 
 
QUINCE, J. 
We have for review two decisions of the Second District Court of Appeal in 
which the district court certified questions of great public importance regarding the 
constitutionality of juvenile curfew ordinances enacted by the city councils of 
Tampa and Pinellas Park.  See J.P. v. State, 832 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) 
 
 
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(finding Tampa curfew ordinance unconstitutional); State v. T.M., 832 So. 2d 118 
(Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (finding Pinellas Park curfew ordinance unconstitutional).  We 
have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. 
History of the Cases 
These cases are before this Court for the second time.  The City of Tampa 
and the City of Pinellas Park enacted similar juvenile curfew ordinances.  J.P. was 
cited for violation of the Tampa ordinance; T.M., A.N., and D.N. were cited for 
violation of the Pinellas Park ordinance.  The State Attorney's Office filed petitions 
for delinquency against these juveniles.  Prior to trial, the juveniles moved to 
dismiss their cases, arguing that the ordinances are unconstitutional because the 
ordinances infringe on their fundamental rights of free speech, association, and 
assembly, are vague and overbroad, and are inconsistent with state law.  In the case 
of J.P., the trial court denied the motion, and J.P. pled no contest but reserved the 
right to appeal the denial of his motion.  In the case of T.M., A.N., and D.N., the 
trial court granted the juveniles’ motions to dismiss.  The trial court reasoned that 
the juveniles’ parents have a fundamental right to raise their children without 
governmental intrusion.  In assessing the constitutionality of the Pinellas Park 
ordinance, the trial court applied the strict scrutiny test.  The trial court determined 
that while Pinellas Park has a compelling interest in reducing juvenile crime and 
 
 
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victimization, the ordinance is not narrowly tailored in the least restrictive manner 
to achieve that interest. 
In both cases, the losing party appealed to the Second District Court of 
Appeal.  In reviewing the ordinances, the Second District applied intermediate or 
heightened scrutiny, rather than strict scrutiny.  Under this standard, the district 
court ruled that both ordinances were constitutional.  State v. T.M., 761 So. 2d 
1140, 1143 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), quashed, 784 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 2001); J.P. v. State, 
775 So. 2d 324, 324 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), quashed, 788 So. 2d 953 (Fla. 2001).  In 
both cases, the Second District also certified two questions to this Court, asking 
what level of scrutiny is applicable in reviewing the constitutionality of a juvenile 
curfew ordinance and whether the ordinances are constitutional.  T.M., 761 So. 2d 
at 1150; J.P., 775 So. 2d at 325. 
In reviewing the decisions in both T.M. and J.P., this Court held that strict 
scrutiny should be applied when reviewing a juvenile curfew ordinance and 
answered the first certified question accordingly.  T.M. v. State, 784 So. 2d 442, 
444 (Fla. 2001); J.P. v. State, 788 So. 2d 953, 953 (Fla. 2001).  However, this 
Court declined to answer the second question regarding the constitutionality of the 
ordinances, quashed the decisions under review, and remanded the cases to the 
Second District for further proceedings.  T.M., 784 So. 2d at 444; J.P., 788 So. 2d 
at 953. 
 
 
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On remand, the Second District applied the strict scrutiny standard and 
concluded that both the Tampa and Pinellas Park juvenile curfew ordinances are 
unconstitutional.  J.P., 832 So. 2d at 114; T.M., 832 So. 2d at 121.  In J.P., the 
Second District concluded that, while the City of Tampa may have a compelling 
governmental interest in controlling the whereabouts of juveniles during late night 
hours, the ordinance is not narrowly tailored to accomplish this goal by the least 
intrusive means available.  832 So. 2d at 112.  The district court concluded that the 
ordinance was not narrowly tailored because it imposes criminal sanctions on a 
juvenile who violates the Tampa ordinance for a second time and because the State 
did not present statistical data to support the expansive scope of the ordinance.  Id. 
at 113-14.  The district court explained that under the Tampa ordinance, 
“[o]therwise innocent conduct by a minor with the permission of his parent(s) is 
criminalized . . . simply because he/she is in a public place or establishment after 
hours.”  Id. at 114. 
In T.M., the Second District noted that the Pinellas Park ordinance is very 
similar to the Tampa ordinance but is even broader in its application because it 
applies to seventeen-year-olds and provides an exception only for errands 
involving emergencies.  832 So. 2d at 120.  Although the State did present 
statistical data showing a decrease in some categories of juvenile crime after the 
ordinance was enacted, the district court concluded that this data did not 
 
 
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necessarily support the conclusion that the ordinance reduced juvenile crime 
during the curfew hours as the data did not indicate the time of day in which the 
criminal events occurred.  Id.  Thus, the district court concluded, the Pinellas Park 
ordinance is not narrowly tailored to meet the test of strict scrutiny.  The district 
court affirmed the trial court’s determination that the Pinellas Park ordinance is 
unconstitutional.  Id. at 121. 
In both J.P. and T.M., the Second District certified a question of great public 
importance to this Court regarding the constitutionality of the juvenile curfew 
ordinances.  This Court granted oral argument and sua sponte consolidated the two 
cases for purposes of oral argument. 
The Ordinances 
Under the Pinellas Park ordinance, it is unlawful for a juvenile to be or 
remain in a public place or establishment between 11:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. of the 
following day, Sunday through Thursday, and 12:01 a.m. through 6:00 a.m. on 
Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays.  The ordinance defines a juvenile as any 
person under eighteen years of age who is not legally emancipated.  Parents also  
violate the ordinance if they knowingly allow their child to violate the curfew.  See 
Pinellas Park, Fla., Code § 16-124.  The Pinellas Park ordinance provides the 
following exceptions for juveniles who are in public during the restricted hours:  
(1) when the juvenile is accompanied by his or her parent or by another adult at 
 
 
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least twenty-one years old who is authorized by the juvenile’s parent to have 
custody; (2) when the juvenile is involved in an emergency or engaged, with his or 
her parent’s permission, in an emergency errand; (3) when the juvenile is attending 
or traveling to or from an activity that involves the exercise of rights protected 
under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution (e.g., religious 
services, government meetings, political party meetings); (4) when the juvenile is 
going to and from lawful employment, or in a public place or establishment in 
connection with or as required by a business, trade, profession, or occupation 
which the juvenile is lawfully engaged in; (5) when the juvenile is returning 
directly home from a school-sponsored, religious, or civic organization function; 
(6) when the juvenile is on the property or on the sidewalk of the juvenile’s own 
residence or an adult next-door neighbor’s residence with that neighbor’s 
permission; (7) when the juvenile is engaged in interstate travel or bona fide 
intrastate travel with the consent of the juvenile's parent; (8) when the juvenile is 
attending an organized event sponsored by a theme park or entertainment complex; 
or (9) when the juvenile is in a public place or establishment as otherwise 
authorized by the city council for an activity or event not specifically outlined in 
the other exceptions and which is sponsored by a school, religious, civic, social, or 
other similar organization or group.  Id. § 16-124(E).  A juvenile is not criminally 
charged until his or her second violation of the ordinance.  The first violation 
 
 
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results in a written warning and contact with the juvenile’s parents.  However, a 
juvenile who is subsequently found in violation can be adjudicated a delinquent 
child and may be supervised by or committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice 
for a period not to exceed six months and can be fined up to $500.  Id. § 16-
124(D)3.  A parent of a juvenile who violates the ordinance receives a written 
warning for the first violation, but may be imprisoned for up to six months and 
fined up to $500 for subsequent violations.  Id. § 16-124(F)2. 
The Tampa juvenile curfew ordinance is essentially the same as the Pinellas 
Park juvenile curfew ordinance.  See Tampa, Fla., Code § 14-26.  The following 
significant differences appear in the Tampa ordinance:  (1) it applies to persons 
under seventeen years of age; (2) it provides an exception for nonemergency 
errands with the written approval of a parent; (3) it provides an exception for 
homeless juveniles who use a public place as their usual abode; (4) it imposes 
criminal liability on business owners or operators for knowingly permitting a 
juvenile to remain on business premises during curfew hours; and (5) and it 
permits a fine of up to $1000 and up to six months’ incarceration for a second or 
subsequent violation.  See Tampa, Fla., Code §§ 1-6(a), 14-26(c)-(g). 
Standard of Review 
The Second District's rulings on the constitutionality of the ordinances are 
subject to de novo review by this Court.  See City of Miami v. McGrath, 824 So. 
 
 
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2d 143, 146 (Fla. 2002) (stating that constitutionality of a state statute is a pure 
question of law subject to de novo review); Lowe v. Broward County, 766 So. 2d 
1199, 1203 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (applying principle to an order determining the 
constitutionality of a municipal ordinance); see also Philip J. Padovano, Florida 
Appellate Practice § 9.4 (2003 ed.).  As we unanimously ruled in our initial review 
of these cases, in Florida “strict scrutiny applies when reviewing a juvenile curfew 
ordinance.”  T.M., 784 So. 2d at 444; see also J.P., 788 So. 2d at 953; R.J.H. v. 
State, 788 So. 2d 952, 952 (Fla. 2001); J.A. v. State, 788 So. 2d 953, 954 (Fla. 
2001); D.N.S. v. State, 788 So. 2d 955, 955 (Fla. 2001); M.R. v. State, 788 So. 2d 
957, 958 (Fla. 2001).1 
                                          
 
1.  In his dissenting opinion, Justice Cantero asserts that this Court merely 
agreed with the State’s concession that the strict scrutiny standard applied and 
failed to make an independent determination of the proper standard for determining 
the statute’s constitutionality.  See Dissenting op. at 39-40 (Cantero, J., dissenting); 
see also Dissenting op. at 38 (Wells, J., dissenting) (“My vote in those earlier cases 
was a recognition of the State’s concession which was made in this Court.”).  
However, the dissenting justices overlook a crucial sentence in our previous 
opinion.  While acknowledging that the State conceded in its answer brief and 
affirmatively maintained at oral argument that strict scrutiny should apply to the 
ordinance in question, we specifically stated that “[w]e agree” with the standard 
and held “that strict scrutiny applies when reviewing a juvenile curfew ordinance.”  
T.M., 784 So. 2d at 444.  This was not an instance in which we assumed, without 
deciding, that strict scrutiny was the proper standard for reviewing the juvenile 
curfew ordinances.  Thus, while the dissent may embrace the rational basis 
standard under the guise of a “concession of error,” it is actually an abandonment 
of the strict scrutiny standard established by the Court’s unanimous holdings in 
T.M. and J.P. 
 
 
- 9 - 
This Court recognizes that foreign jurisdictions addressing the 
constitutionality of juvenile curfew ordinances have incorporated the minors’ 
status into the equal protection framework in three different ways.  See Ramos v. 
Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171, 176-77 (2d Cir. 2003) (outlining the three 
approaches).  “The first approach defines the relevant interest so narrowly that it is 
not deemed a constitutional right and heightened scrutiny does not come into 
play.”  Id. at 176; see also Dissenting op. at 45 (Cantero, J., dissenting) (“Because 
of the many factors that distinguish minors from adults, I do not believe minors 
have such a right at all, and much less that any such right is so fundamental that it 
cannot be circumscribed.”).  Under this methodology, the very characteristic that 
defines the plaintiff class--their age--divests them of a right they would otherwise 
hold.  Ramos, 353 F.3d at 176.  See, e.g., Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 
F.3d 531, 539 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (stating that “unemancipated minors lack some of 
the most fundamental rights--including even the right of liberty in its narrow sense, 
i.e., the right to come and go at will”) (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 
515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995)). 
The second approach recognizes that children, like adults, have a 
constitutional right to free movement, but then reduces the level of scrutiny to 
compensate for children's special vulnerabilities.  See T.M., 761 So. 2d at 1146, 
quashed, 784 So. 2d 442 (“There are three reasons why the constitutional rights of 
 
 
- 10 - 
children are not coextensive with those of adults . . . .”); Dissenting op. at 63 
(Cantero, J., dissenting) (“Intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate level of review, 
even if the ordinances implicate a fundamental right, because the ordinances 
govern the conduct of minors.”).  Courts adopting this approach have ruled that the 
unique interrelationship between minors and the state renders strict scrutiny 
inappropriate.  Ramos, 353 F.3d at 176.  See, e.g., Schleifer v. City of 
Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 847 (4th Cir. 1998) (“[C]hildren do possess at least 
qualified rights, so an ordinance which restricts their liberty to the extent that this 
one does should be subject to more than rational basis review.  Second, because 
children do not possess the same rights as adults, the ordinance should be subject 
to less than the strictest level of scrutiny.”). 
The third approach, which was taken by this Court in T.M. and J.P., assumes 
that once a constitutional right has been recognized, its exercise by minors should 
be protected by strict scrutiny, just as it is for adults.  See T.M., 784 So. 2d at 444; 
J.P., 788 So. 2d at 953.  “Rather than using children’s status to divest them of 
rights or to weaken the formal protections of those rights, courts taking this third 
approach factor in the unique attributes of minors in determining whether the 
government has a compelling interest justifying restrictions on minors’ freedoms.”  
Ramos, 353 F.3d at 177.  See, e.g., Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 
944-46 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding juveniles’ fundamental rights implicated and 
 
 
- 11 - 
applying strict scrutiny); Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 863 (Michael, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he ‘fundamental rights’ of minors are no less fundamental than those of adults 
and, thus, must be protected with the same vigor under a strict scrutiny analysis.”); 
Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 492 (5th Cir. 1993) (assuming, without deciding, that 
a fundamental right to move about freely is implicated by a juvenile curfew 
ordinance and applying strict scrutiny); City of Sumner v. Walsh, 61 P.3d 1111, 
1118 (Wash. 2003) (Chambers, J., concurring) (applying strict scrutiny to a similar 
juvenile curfew ordinance). 
The dissent “believe[s] the rational basis standard should apply to review of 
these ordinances.”  Dissenting op. at 38 (Cantero, J., dissenting).  However, 
accepting the dissent’s analysis would require the Court to recede from its 
precedent of only three years ago, in which we held that the strict scrutiny standard 
is applicable when reviewing juvenile curfew ordinances.  See T.M., 784 So. 2d at 
444; J.P., 788 So. 2d at 953; R.J.H., 788 So. 2d at 952; J.A., 788 So. 2d at 954; 
D.N.S., 788 So. 2d at 955; M.R., 788 So. 2d at 958 (all holding that “strict scrutiny 
applies to juvenile curfew ordinances”). 
This Court adheres to the doctrine of stare decisis.  See, e.g., Muhammad v. 
State, 782 So. 2d 343, 365 n.16 (Fla. 2001); see also Tyson v. Mattair, 8 Fla. 107, 
124 (1858) (“It is an established rule to abide by former precedents, stare decisis, 
where the same points come again in litigation, as well to keep the scale of justice 
 
 
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even and steady, and not liable to waver with every new judge's opinion . . . .”).2  
Stare decisis bends where there has been a significant change in circumstances 
since the adoption of the legal rule, see Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1055 
n.12 (Fla. 1999), or where there has been an error in legal analysis.  See State v. 
Gray, 654 So. 2d 552, 554 (Fla. 1995); see also Brown v. State, 719 So. 2d 882, 
890 (Fla. 1998) (Wells, J., dissenting) (“[I]ntellectual honesty continues to demand 
that precedent be followed unless there has been a clear showing that the earlier 
decision was factually or legally erroneous or has not proven acceptable in actual 
practice.”). 
In the instant case, there has not been a significant change in circumstances 
since our decisions applying the strict scrutiny standard.  Nor has the application of 
the strict scrutiny standard to juvenile curfew ordinances proven clearly legally 
erroneous.  As an institution cloaked with public legitimacy, this Court cannot 
recede from its own controlling precedent when the only change has been the 
membership of the Court.  See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 636 
(1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“A basic change in the law upon a ground no 
firmer than a change in our membership invites the popular misconception that this 
                                          
 
2.  “The doctrine of stare decisis, or the obligation of a court to abide by its 
own precedent, is grounded on the need for stability in the law and has been a 
fundamental tenent of Anglo-American jurisprudence for centuries.”  N. Fla. 
Women's Health & Counseling Servs., Inc. v. State, 866 So. 2d 612, 637 (Fla. 
2003). 
 
 
- 13 - 
institution is little different from the two political branches of the Government.”).  
“[W]hen a Court is asked to overrule a precedent recognizing a constitutional 
liberty interest, individual or societal reliance on the existence of that liberty 
cautions with particular strength against reversing course.”  Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
844 (1992) (“Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.”).  While the 
dissent is correct that some foreign jurisdictions differ on the level of scrutiny 
appropriate to juvenile curfews, Florida law is clear.  Strict scrutiny is the law of 
this state. 
When a statute or ordinance operates to the disadvantage of a suspect class 
or impairs the exercise of a fundamental right, then the law must pass strict 
scrutiny.  See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993); Mitchell v. Moore, 
786 So. 2d 521, 527 (Fla. 2001).  Although the juvenile curfew ordinances target a 
certain age group, the United States Supreme Court has ruled that age is not a 
suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause.  See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 
501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991).  Thus, strict scrutiny is applicable here because 
fundamental rights are implicated by the juvenile curfew ordinances.  A 
fundamental right is one which has its source in and is explicitly guaranteed by the 
federal or Florida Constitution.  See, e.g., T.M., 784 So. 2d at 444 n.1; Reno v. 
Flores, 507 U.S. at 302.  The fundamental rights to privacy and freedom of 
 
 
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movement are implicated by these ordinances.  It is settled law that each of the 
personal liberties enumerated in the Declaration of Rights of the Florida 
Constitution is a fundamental right.  See generally Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957 
(Fla. 1992).  “Florida courts consistently have applied the ‘strict’ scrutiny standard 
whenever the Right of Privacy Clause was implicated, regardless of the nature of 
the activity.”  N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Servs., Inc. v. State, 866 So. 
2d 612, 635 (Fla. 2003).3  To withstand strict scrutiny, a law must be necessary to 
                                          
 
3.  See also Von Eiff v. Azicri, 720 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 1998) (applying the 
strict scrutiny standard in addressing the visitation rights of grandparents when a 
child’s parent is deceased); J.A.S. v. State, 705 So. 2d 1381 (Fla. 1998) (applying 
the strict scrutiny standard in addressing a statutory rape law); Krischer v. McIver, 
697 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1997) (applying the strict scrutiny standard in addressing 
assisted suicide); Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1996) (applying the strict 
scrutiny standard in addressing the visitation rights of grandparents when a child’s 
parents are living together); B.B. v. State, 659 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1995) (applying the 
strict scrutiny standard in addressing a statutory rape law); Jones v. State, 640 So. 
2d 1084 (Fla. 1994) (same); In re Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1993) (applying 
the strict scrutiny standard in addressing a patient’s right to refuse a blood 
transfusion for religious reasons, where the patient is the parent of four minor 
children); In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990) (applying the 
strict scrutiny standard in addressing whether a surrogate may exercise an 
incompetent patient’s right to decline medical treatment); In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 
1186 (Fla. 1989) (applying the strict scrutiny standard in addressing parental 
consent for a minor to obtain an abortion); Public Health Trust v. Wons, 541 So. 
2d 96 (Fla. 1989) (applying the strict scrutiny standard in addressing a patient’s 
right to refuse a life-sustaining blood transfusion); Winfield v. Div. of Pari-Mutuel 
Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1985) (applying the strict scrutiny standard in 
addressing the confidentiality of bank records).  Cf. Renee B. v. Fla. Agency for 
Health Care Admin., 790 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 2001) (declining to apply the strict 
scrutiny standard after determining that the right to privacy was not implicated by 
agency rules that barred public funding for abortions); City of N. Miami v. Kurtz, 
653 So. 2d 1025 (Fla. 1995) (declining to apply strict scrutiny standard after 
 
 
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promote a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to 
advance that interest.  See Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 492 (5th Cir. 1993) 
(applying strict scrutiny to review a Dallas juvenile curfew ordinance).  Strict 
scrutiny requires the State to demonstrate that the challenged regulation serves a 
compelling state interest and accomplishes its goal through the use of the least 
intrusive means.  See Winfield v. Div. of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544 
(Fla. 1985) (explaining that where law intrudes on fundamental right to privacy 
guaranteed in Florida’s Constitution, the State must demonstrate that the 
challenged regulation serves a compelling state interest and accomplishes its goal 
through the use of the least intrusive means). 
Fundamental Rights 
The juvenile respondents claim that the curfew ordinances implicate their 
fundamental rights to privacy, free speech, assembly, and free movement.  They 
also claim that a parent’s right to raise his or her children, sometimes referred to as 
family privacy, is also implicated by the ordinances. 
Minors possess constitutional rights under both the federal and Florida  
constitutions.  See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (plurality 
opinion) (“With respect to [minors’ claims to constitutional protection against 
                                                                                                                                        
determining that plaintiff’s reasonable expectation of privacy was not implicated 
by administrative regulation requiring all job applicants to sign affidavit stating 
they had not used tobacco products during preceding year). 
 
 
- 16 - 
deprivations of liberty or property interests by the State], we have concluded that 
the child’s right is virtually coextensive with that of an adult.”); Planned 
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (“Constitutional rights do not 
mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age 
of majority.  Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and 
possess constitutional rights.”); accord In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1193 (Fla. 
1989).  The United States Supreme Court has consistently protected children from 
governmental infringement of their constitutional rights.  See, e.g., McConnell v. 
Fed. Election Comm’n, 124 S. Ct. 619, 711 (2003) (striking down a provision of 
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 which prohibited political donations 
by minors because it violated minors’ freedoms of expression and association); 
Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975) (holding that the prosecution of a 
defendant as an adult in state court, after an adjudicatory proceeding in juvenile 
court, violated double jeopardy); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975) 
(concluding that students facing temporary suspension from school have a property 
interest in educational benefits that qualifies for certain due process protections); In 
re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41, 55 (1967) (concluding that juvenile who is involved in a 
delinquency proceeding which may result in commitment to a state institution has 
a right to counsel and that “the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is 
applicable in the case of juveniles as it is with respect to adults”); see also Waters 
 
 
- 17 - 
v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125, 1134 (D.D.C. 1989) (characterizing the juvenile 
curfew at issue as “a bull in a china shop of constitutional values”).  However, 
under certain circumstances the rights of minors may be treated differently from 
the rights of adults.  Differential treatment of minors may be based upon “the 
particular vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an 
informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in child rearing.”  
Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634 (plurality opinion).  This Court has also stated that 
“[c]ommon sense dictates that a minor's rights are not absolute.”  In re T.W., 551 
So. 2d at 1193. 
“[T]he First Amendment and article I, section 5 of the Florida Constitution 
protect the rights of individuals to associate with whom they please and to 
assemble with others for political or for social purposes.”  Wyche v. State, 619 So. 
2d 231, 234 (Fla. 1993); see also NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 
449, 466 (1958) (recognizing the right to freedom of association as a separate and 
distinct right within the First Amendment).  The United States Supreme Court has 
“long understood as implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the 
First Amendment a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a 
wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural 
ends.”  Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984).  Moreover, 
“[m]inors enjoy the protection of the First Amendment.”  McConnell v. Fed. 
 
 
- 18 - 
Election Comm’n, 124 S. Ct. at 711.  Notwithstanding these constitutionally 
protected First Amendment rights, we conclude that the ordinances at issue here do 
not implicate the juveniles’ rights to free speech and assembly as these activities 
are specifically exempted from their ambit.  See Tampa, Fla., Code § 14-26(d)(8) 
(stating that the provisions of the ordinance do not apply if a juvenile is 
“[e]xercising First Amendment rights protected by the United States Constitution 
such as freedom of speech, or free exercise of religion”); Pinellas Park, Fla., Code 
§ 16-124(E)3 (same; citing as examples of such activities “religious services, 
governmental meeting, political party meeting”).  Cf. Hodgkins v. Peterson, 355 
F.3d 1048, 1064 (7th Cir. 2004) (striking down a juvenile curfew with similar 
exceptions on First Amendment grounds because “the curfew law, even with the 
new affirmative defenses for First Amendment activity, is not narrowly tailored to 
serve a significant governmental interest and fails to allow for ample alternative 
channels for expression”); Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125, 1134 (D.D.C. 
1989) (concluding that the juvenile curfew ordinance at issue “tramples upon the 
associational and liberty interests of the [minors]”). 
“[T]he Florida Constitution contains, in article I, section 23, a strong right of 
privacy provision.”  Alterra Healthcare Corp. v. Estate of Shelley, 827 So. 2d 936, 
941 (Fla. 2002).  In regard to the juveniles’ privacy rights, this Court has 
specifically held that the privacy right guaranteed by article I, section 23 of the 
 
 
- 19 - 
Florida Constitution extends to minors.  See In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1193 
(explaining that the unambiguous language of the Florida privacy amendment 
extends to “[e]very natural person” and “[m]inors are natural persons in the eyes of 
the law”); B.B. v. State, 659 So. 2d 256, 258 (Fla. 1995).  Further, the Florida 
constitutional privacy right “embraces more privacy interests, and extends more 
protection to the individual in those interests, than does the federal Constitution.”  
In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1192.  However, as this Court has explained, “[t]he rights 
of privacy that have been granted to minors do not vitiate the legislature’s efforts 
and authority to protect minors from conduct of others.”  Jones v. State, 640 So. 2d 
1084, 1087 (Fla. 1994) (upholding the constitutionality of statute prohibiting 
sexual contact between adults and minors even when minors ostensibly consent 
because of State’s compelling interest in protecting minors from sexual 
exploitation).  Thus, the cities’ asserted compelling interest of preventing 
victimization of minors could outweigh the minors’ privacy rights during the 
curfew hours, if the ordinances were narrowly tailored to achieve that goal as 
required by strict scrutiny. 
The juveniles also assert that the curfew ordinances impact their 
constitutional right of freedom of movement.  The freedom to travel throughout the 
United States and the freedom of movement have been recognized as basic rights 
under the federal Constitution.  See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 
 
 
- 20 - 
U.S. 156, 164 (1972) (striking down a vagrancy ordinance which prohibited 
persons from walking, wandering, strolling, or loafing; characterizing these 
activities as “part of the amenities of life” which have “encouraged lives of high 
spirits rather than hushed, suffocating silence”).  Dating back to the Articles of 
Confederation, “the people of each State . . . have [had] free ingress and regress to 
and from any other State.”  Art. IV, Articles of Confederation.  This “freedom to 
travel throughout the United States has long been recognized as a basic right under 
the Constitution” as well.  United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966).   In 
fact, “[t]his freedom of movement is the very essence of our free society, setting us 
apart.  Like the right of assembly and the right of association, it often makes all 
other rights meaningful––knowing, studying, arguing, exploring, conversing, 
observing and even thinking.”  Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 520 
(1964) (Douglas, J., concurring); see also Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498 (1999) 
(describing the constitutional right to interstate travel as “firmly embedded” in the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983) 
(finding that anti-loitering statute that required individuals to provide “credible and 
reliable” identification “implicates consideration of the constitutional right to 
freedom of movement”); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969) (striking 
down a durational residency requirement for welfare benefits for violating the 
“fundamental right of interstate movement”), overruled in part on other grounds, 
 
 
- 21 - 
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).  Cf. Rowell v. Holt, 850 So. 2d 474, 480 
(Fla. 2003) (describing petitioner’s unjust pretrial detention as depriving him of 
“one’s most basic freedoms––the freedom of movement, the right to privacy, and 
the freedom to associate with persons of one’s own choosing”). 
We acknowledge that the United States Supreme Court has never 
definitively ruled that there is a fundamental right to intrastate travel and that the 
federal circuit courts are divided on the issue.  Compare Johnson v. City of 
Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 498 (6th Cir. 2002) (“In view of the historical 
endorsement of a right to intrastate travel and the practical necessity of such a 
right, we hold that the Constitution protects a right to travel locally through public 
spaces and roadways.”), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 915 (2003), with Wright v. City of 
Jackson, 506 F.2d 900, 902 (5th Cir. 1975) (stating that there is no “fundamental 
constitutional ‘right to commute’”).  However, the right to intrastate travel in 
Florida is clear.  In Wyche, this Court wrote: 
Hailing a cab or a friend, chatting on a public street, and simply 
strolling aimlessly are time-honored pastimes in our society and are 
clearly protected under Florida as well as federal law.  All Florida 
citizens enjoy the inherent right to window shop, saunter down a 
sidewalk, and wave to friends and passersby with no fear of arrest. 
619 So. 2d at 235 (footnote and citation omitted) (emphasis added).  As discussed 
above, however, the compelling interests of protecting juveniles and reducing 
juvenile crimes could outweigh the juveniles’ right to travel freely during the 
 
 
- 22 - 
nighttime curfew hours if the ordinances were narrowly tailored to achieve those 
goals. 
Finally, the juveniles argue that the ordinances impinge on parents’ rights to 
raise their children.  In its reconsideration of the constitutionality of the Tampa and 
Pinellas Park ordinances after remand by this Court, the Second District never 
addressed the juveniles’ claims that the ordinances burden parents’ fundamental 
right to raise their children.  Because the Second District never determined whether 
these juveniles have standing to assert the constitutional rights of their parents,4 we 
decline to rule on these claims.  See State v. T.M., 761 So. 2d 1140, 1145 (Fla. 2d 
DCA 2000) (declining to address whether juveniles had standing to challenge the 
ordinance’s impact on their parents’ substantive due process rights).  
Notwithstanding this, for the sake of completeness we discuss, without deciding, 
this issue. 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that “freedom of personal 
choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the 
                                          
 
4.  There are three requirements that constitute the “irreducible constitutional 
minimum” for standing.  Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. 
Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771 (2000).  First, a plaintiff must demonstrate an “injury 
in fact,” which is “concrete,” “distinct and palpable,” and “actual or imminent.”  
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990).  Second, a plaintiff must 
establish “a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of.”  
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).  Third, a plaintiff must 
show “a ‘substantial likelihood’ that the requested relief will remedy the alleged 
injury in fact.”  Stevens, 529 U.S. at 771. 
 
 
- 23 - 
Fourteenth Amendment.”  Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).  
Beginning with Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 397 (1923), the Supreme Court 
has recognized that parents have a constitutionally protected interest in child 
rearing.  For example, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972), the 
Supreme Court stated that the “primary role of the parents in the upbringing of 
their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American 
tradition.”  The Supreme Court has also stated that parents’ right to rear their 
children without undue governmental interference is a fundamental component of 
due process.  See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968).  However, 
these parental rights are not absolute and the state as parens patriae may, in certain 
situations, usurp parental control.  See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 
166 (1944) (stating that “the family itself is not beyond regulation in the public 
interest”). 
Although the United States Supreme Court has not examined the impact of 
juvenile curfew laws on parental rights, several federal courts and courts in other 
states have.  Some of these courts have rejected constitutional challenges to 
juvenile curfews based on the parental right to privacy.  See Hutchins v. District of 
Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 540-41 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (concluding that federal right of 
parental control in upbringing of children does not extend to parental decisions of 
when and if children will be on streets, but only encompasses parents’ control of 
 
 
- 24 - 
home and formal education of children); Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 
F.3d 843, 853 (4th Cir. 1998) (concluding that juvenile curfew ordinance does not 
implicate the kinds of intimate family decisions where state may not interfere; also 
concluding that exemptions to ordinance accommodate rights of parents); Qutb v. 
Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 495-96 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding that only aspect of parenting 
that ordinance bears upon is parent’s right to allow minor to remain in public 
places unaccompanied during hours restricted by ordinance; concluding that parent 
retains right to make decisions regarding child in all other areas due to broad 
exceptions included in ordinance); Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. 
Supp. 1242, 1264 (M.D. Pa. 1975) (concluding that “ordinance constitutes a 
minimal interference with the parental interest in influencing and controlling the 
activities of their offspring,” in light of numerous exceptions specified in 
ordinance, including parental accompaniment exception), aff'd, 535 F.3d 1245 (3d 
Cir. 1976). 
However, other federal and state courts have reached the opposite 
conclusion.  See Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171, 183 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(“[W]e cannot sit in judgment of a parental philosophy allowing late night activity, 
for ‘between parents and judges, the parents should be the ones to choose whether 
to expose their children to certain people or ideas.’”) (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 
530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000)); Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 952 (9th Cir. 
 
 
- 25 - 
1997) (characterizing juvenile curfew as “an exercise of sweeping state control 
irrespective of parents’ wishes”); City of Sumner v. Walsh, 61 P.3d 1111, 1118 n.2 
(Wash. 2003) (Chambers, J., concurring) (“If the ordinance is an unconstitutional 
infringement on the child’s liberties, to enforce it against the parent would 
effectively allow the State to infringe by proxy what it could not infringe 
directly.”); McCollester v. City of Keene, 586 F. Supp. 1381, 1386 (D.N.H. 1984) 
(finding curfew ordinance usurps “parental discretion in supervising a child’s 
activities and imposing parental liability even where the parent exercised 
reasonable control or supervision”); Betancourt v. Town of West New York, 769 
A.2d 1065, 1068 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (concluding that exceptions in 
juvenile curfew ordinance were “not broad enough to recognize the right of parents 
to permit their children to participate in many legitimate activities”); Ex parte 
McCarver, 46 S.W. 936, 937 (Tex. Crim. App. 1898) (“We regard this . . . 
[juvenile curfew ordinance] as an attempt to usurp the parental functions, and as 
unreasonable, and we therefore hold the ordinance in question as illegal and 
void.”). 
“[T]he protection of a person’s general right to privacy--his right to be let 
alone by other people--is, like the protection of his property and of his very life, 
left largely to the law of the individual States.”  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 350-51 (1967) (footnote omitted); accord N. Fla. Women’s Health & 
 
 
- 26 - 
Counseling Servs., Inc. v. State, 866 So. 2d 612, 635 (Fla. 2003).  Notably, the 
Florida Constitution contains an explicit privacy provision which affords Florida 
citizens greater protection in the area of privacy than does the federal Constitution.  
See In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1191-92.  This free-standing right to privacy was 
added to Florida’s Constitution by a citizen vote in 1980.  Article I, section 23 of 
the Florida Constitution provides that “[e]very natural person has the right to be let 
alone and free from governmental intrusion into the person’s private life.”  This 
privacy right includes the right to liberty and self-determination.  See In re 
Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 9 (Fla. 1990).  Because the right to 
privacy is explicit in the Florida Constitution, it has been interpreted as giving 
Florida citizens more protection than the federal right.  See In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 
1186, 1191-92 (Fla. 1989).  Florida’s constitutional right to privacy has been 
implicated in a vast array of cases dealing with personal privacy.   See N. Fla. 
Women’s Health, 866 So. 2d at 619 n.6 (citing a number of cases involving 
Florida’s constitutional right to privacy provision).  This Court has also recognized 
“a longstanding and fundamental liberty interest of parents in determining the care 
and upbringing of their children free from the heavy hand of government 
paternalism.”  Padgett v. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 577 So. 2d 565, 570 
(Fla. 1991).  Moreover, “there is a constitutionally protected interest in preserving 
the family and raising one’s children.”  S.B. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 851 
 
 
- 27 - 
So. 2d 689, 692 (Fla. 2003).  Based upon the Florida Constitution’s explicit 
privacy provision and the Florida case law recognizing that this right encompasses 
family privacy, we conclude that the ordinances may implicate the parental right to 
raise children.  See, e.g., Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271, 1272 (Fla. 1996) 
(invalidating a grandparent visitation statute because “the challenged paragraph 
infringes upon the rights of parents to raise their children free from government 
intervention”).  However, because the juveniles’ parents are not parties to this 
action, we decline to rule on their rights.  Accordingly, we leave resolution of this 
issue for another day.5 
Because the juveniles’ fundamental rights to privacy and freedom of 
movement are burdened by the curfew ordinances, the cities must have a 
compelling governmental interest in regulating the activities of minors during the 
hours of the curfew and the ordinances must be narrowly tailored to accomplish 
their goals by the least intrusive means available.  We address each part of this 
strict scrutiny test in turn below. 
Compelling Governmental Interest 
                                          
 
5.  The dissent may be correct that the juveniles lack standing to assert their 
parents’ rights.  See Dissenting op. at 53.  However, because we base our holding 
on the fact that these ordinances impede the fundamental rights of the juveniles 
themselves, not the rights of their parents, we need not rule on whether the 
juveniles have standing to assert their parent’s claims. 
 
 
- 28 - 
The cities assert that the ordinances serve several compelling interests, 
including reducing juvenile crime, protecting juveniles from victimization, 
protecting all citizens, residents, and visitors from juvenile crime, and promoting 
parental control over juveniles.  The ordinances include legislative findings as to 
these compelling interests.  The Tampa ordinance does not contain a statement of 
factual support, but simply states that the “City of Tampa hereby finds and 
determines as a matter of fact” that the city is faced with a number of problems, 
including “an unacceptable level of crime, including juvenile crime” that threatens 
citizens and visitors, and that this crime level presents “a clear and present danger” 
to “the public order and safety.”  Tampa, Fla., Code § 14-26(a)(1).  The Tampa 
ordinance also includes the following findings to support implementation of the 
juvenile curfew:  effective crime fighting requires focusing on juvenile crime, id. 
§ 14-26(a)(2); there is a substantial number of violent crimes against juveniles in 
Tampa, id. § 14-26(a)(3); and juveniles are particularly vulnerable and unable to 
make critical decisions in an informed and mature manner and parents play an 
important role in child rearing, id. § 14-26(a)(5). 
The Pinellas Park ordinance states that its findings are based on “statistical 
data and reports of law enforcement officials.”  Pinellas Park, Fla., Code § 16-124 
(B)1.  Based upon this “statistical data and reports of law enforcement officials,” 
the Pinellas Park City Council made the following findings:  the reduction of 
 
 
- 29 - 
juvenile crime and victimization and the promotion of juvenile safety and well-
being are matters of compelling governmental interest; a substantial portion of 
crime is committed by juveniles and much of this crime takes place at night; there 
has been a steady increase in crimes by and against juveniles that cannot be 
stemmed without a curfew; juveniles are particularly vulnerable to crime and 
victimization because of their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, 
thoughtful, and mature manner; juvenile crimes have adverse consequences for all 
juveniles; increased juvenile activity has caused apprehension and impacted the 
freedom of law-abiding citizens; there has been a high number of repeat juvenile 
offenses and an escalating juvenile crime rate that the juvenile justice system has 
not been able to deal with effectively; juvenile crime activity decreases with 
parental control and shifting supervisory responsibility to parents results in fiscal 
savings to the public and a more wholesome community; the government has a 
compelling interest to protect juveniles during nighttime hours; juveniles who have 
been suspended or expelled from school must be prevented from disrupting school 
activities; the unacceptable level of juvenile crime threatens citizens and presents 
clear and present danger to the public; and a juvenile curfew ordinance is necessary 
to protect public interest.  Pinellas Park, Fla., Code § 16-124(B)1(a)-(l). 
The juveniles argue that the cities have not offered statistical data to support 
these findings or the need for juvenile curfews and thus have not met their burden 
 
 
- 30 - 
of proving a compelling interest.  Where legislation is intended to serve some 
compelling interest, the “government ‘must do more than simply posit the 
existence of the disease sought to be cured.  It must demonstrate that the recited 
harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate 
these harms in a direct and material way.’”  Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 
159 F.3d 843, 849 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 
U.S. 622, 664 (1994)).  However, this standard has never required scientific or 
statistical proof of the wisdom of the legislature’s course.  Cf. Ginsberg v. New 
York, 390 U.S. 629, 642 (1968) (“We do not demand of legislatures ‘scientifically 
certain criteria of legislation.’”) (quoting Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 
104, 110 (1911)). 
The Second District conceded that the cities “face the challenges of 
protecting juveniles from victimization and reducing juvenile crime.”  T.M., 832 
So. 2d at 120-21.  We likewise conclude that the findings stated in the ordinances 
satisfy the compelling interest prong of the strict scrutiny test.  Thus, the real issue 
presented by these ordinances is whether they are narrowly tailored to meet those 
goals. 
Narrowly Tailored 
In order for an ordinance to be narrowly tailored, “there must be a sufficient 
nexus between the stated government interest and the classification created by the 
 
 
- 31 - 
ordinance.”  Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d at 946.  Thus, in regard to the 
ordinances’ impact on juveniles’ fundamental rights, the constitutionality of the 
ordinances will hinge upon the nexus between the asserted interests and the means 
chosen, and whether this is the least restrictive alternative to achieve the goals. 
In determining whether an ordinance is narrowly tailored, courts have 
looked to the scope of the curfew, including what hours the curfew is in effect and 
what age group is covered.  In several federal cases, the courts have found the 
scope to be “limited” and not restrictive because the curfew restrictions did not 
begin until relatively late at night, ended early in the morning, or only applied to 
minors under seventeen or eighteen years of age.  See, e.g., Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 
852.  However, some of the ordinances that courts have struck as unconstitutional 
have covered the identical age groups and the same hours as those upheld by other 
courts.  See, e.g., Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125, 1141 (D.D.C. 1989) 
(concluding that District of Columbia’s juvenile curfew applicable to persons 
under eighteen years between 11:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. violated the minors’ 
associational rights and liberty interests).  Thus, the scope of the curfew may not 
be the best assessment of whether an ordinance is narrowly tailored for purposes of 
passing strict scrutiny. 
The scope of the exceptions to the curfew is of more significance in 
assessing whether an ordinance is narrowly tailored.  See Qutb, 11 F.3d at 493-94.  
 
 
- 32 - 
Where a curfew sweeps too broadly and includes within its ambit “a number of 
innocent activities which are constitutionally protected,” it does not satisfy the 
narrowly tailored aspect of strict scrutiny.  Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 
1065, 1074 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding that absence of exceptions in juvenile curfew 
ordinance precluded a narrowing construction and rendered the ordinance 
unconstitutionally overbroad). 
In J.P., the Second District concluded that the Tampa ordinance was not 
narrowly drawn to serve the stated purposes of reducing juvenile crime and 
victimization.  832 So. 2d at 113-14.  The district court cited three separate 
problems with the Tampa ordinance:  (1) the ordinance imposes criminal sanctions 
rather than a civil infraction fine; (2) the applicability of the curfew to all persons 
under the age of seventeen unless one of the exceptions applies “necessarily 
includes minors involved in legal, wholesome activities who have the permission 
of their parents”; and (3) “the coverage includes the entire city without any finding 
that there is a city-wide emergency or problem.”  Id. at 114.  In T.M., the Second 
District “follow[ed] the reasoning expressed in J.P.,” and concluded that “the 
Pinellas Park ordinance, which is even broader in its application, must necessarily 
fail the strict scrutiny test.”  832 So. 2d at 120.  The district court noted that the 
Pinellas Park ordinance is more inclusive because it applies to seventeen-year-olds 
 
 
- 33 - 
and only provides an exception involving parental permission for emergency 
errands.  Id. 
We agree with the Second District that the ordinances are not “narrowly 
tailored” because the broad coverage of both curfews includes otherwise innocent 
and legal conduct by minors even where they have the permission of their parents 
and the ordinances impose criminal penalties for curfew violations.  We address 
each of these issues in turn.  However, because we find the ordinances to be 
overbroad and to impose criminal sanctions, we do not address the issue 
concerning statistical data. 
1. Broad Coverage 
In order to accomplish the goals of reducing juvenile crime and juvenile 
victimization, the ordinances forbid juveniles under the specified age (eighteen in 
Pinellas Park and seventeen in Tampa) from being out after the curfew hours 
“anywhere in the city unless the activity is covered by one of the exceptions.”  J.P., 
832 So. 2d at 114.  As the Second District concluded, “[t]his broad coverage 
necessarily includes minors involved in legal, wholesome activities who have the 
permission of their parents.”  Id.  Further, the curfews apply throughout the cities 
without any showing of a city-wide need or problem.  Additionally, the Pinellas 
Park ordinance is even broader in application than is the Tampa ordinance; the 
Pinellas Park ordinance provides no exception for juveniles engaged in 
 
 
- 34 - 
nonemergency errands with parental permission and includes a larger group of 
individuals because it applies to seventeen-year-olds.  Thus, we agree with the 
Second District that both ordinances are not narrowly tailored in their coverage. 
2. Imposition of Criminal Sanctions 
The penalties imposed by the ordinances for second and subsequent 
violations of the curfews are possibly the most troubling aspect of our strict 
scrutiny review.  Under both the Tampa and the Pinellas Park ordinances, juveniles 
and parents can be incarcerated and fined after the first curfew violation.6  In the 
case of the Tampa ordinance, business operators who knowingly permit a juvenile 
to remain on business premises during curfew hours are also subject to the 
sanctions.7  In contrast, the model juvenile curfew ordinance enacted by the Florida 
                                          
 
6.  Under the Tampa ordinance, a juvenile found to be in violation may be 
adjudicated a delinquent child and may be supervised by or committed to the 
Department of Juvenile Justice for up to six months and fined up to $1000.   
Parents or business operators found in violation can be incarcerated for up to six 
months and fined up to $1000.  See Tampa, Fla., Code §§ 1-6(a), 14-26(h).  Under 
the Pinellas Park ordinance, juveniles are also subject to six months of supervision 
or commitment and parents to six months of incarceration for being in violation of 
the curfew.  The Pinellas Park ordinance limits the fines to $500.  See Pinellas 
Park, Fla., Code § 16-124(D)3, (F)2. 
 
7.  The Pinellas Park ordinance does not provide penalties for business 
operators. 
 
 
- 35 - 
Legislature imposes a civil infraction fine of $50 for the second and subsequent 
violations.  See §§ 877.22(3), 877.23(3), Fla. Stat. (2002).8 
The Second District concluded that these criminal penalties indicate that the 
Tampa ordinance does not use the least intrusive means to accomplish its purpose, 
especially when viewed against the model ordinance which accomplishes the same 
goal with only a civil penalty.  J.P., 832 So. 2d at 114.  The State conceded that the 
penalty clause of the Tampa ordinance could not pass strict scrutiny and asked the 
district court to sever this provision from the ordinance.  Id. at 113-14.  However, 
because the district court concluded that there were other provisions that were not 
narrowly drawn to accomplish the stated goals, the court concluded that the 
ordinance could not be saved by merely removing the penalty paragraphs.  Id. at 
114. 
The Dallas ordinance which was upheld by the Fifth Circuit in Qutb 
provides for a $500 fine for each curfew violation, but does not provide for 
incarceration.  Similarly, most of the ordinances that have been upheld as 
constitutional only impose civil fines or community service requirements.  See, 
e.g., Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d at 535 (providing that minor can 
                                          
 
8.  Section 877.22(3), Florida Statutes (2002), provides that a minor who 
violates the model curfew statute “shall receive a written warning for her or his 
first violation.”  A subsequent violation results in a civil infraction and the minor 
must pay a $50 fine for each violation.  Section 877.23(3), Florida Statutes (2002), 
imposes the same civil infraction on a parent who knowingly permits a minor to 
violate section 877.22. 
 
 
- 36 - 
be ordered to perform twenty-five hours of community service and parent can be 
required to perform community service, attend parenting classes, and pay $500 
fine).  But see Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 858 (upholding constitutionality of ordinance 
providing that curfew violation is a class 4 misdemeanor). 
We conclude that the penalty provisions of the instant ordinances do not 
meet strict scrutiny.  The criminal sanctions are antithetical to the stated interests 
of protecting juveniles from victimization.  Further, the imposition of criminal 
sanctions is not narrowly tailored to achieve the stated interests.  The same goals 
could be achieved by imposing a civil penalty.  See J.P., 832 So. 2d at 113-14. 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Cantero contends that the ordinances can 
be saved by severing the criminal penalties from the remaining provisions.  See 
dissenting op. at 77-78 (Cantero, J., dissenting).  While the dissenting opinion 
correctly cites the test for determining severability, it ignores an important 
adjective in the first part of this test, namely that the remaining provisions are 
“valid.”  See Waldrup v. Dugger, 562 So. 2d 687, 693 (Fla. 1990).  Here, we have 
determined that the ordinances suffer from other constitutional failings which 
render them invalid.  Thus, severing the criminal penalty provisions cannot save 
these ordinances. 
Conclusion 
 
 
- 37 - 
In light of the problems discussed above, we conclude that the Tampa and 
Pinellas Park juvenile curfew ordinances are not narrowly tailored and thus fail to 
survive strict scrutiny.9  Accordingly, we answer the certified questions in the 
negative and approve the decisions of the Second District Court of Appeal in J.P. 
and T.M. to the extent that they are consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
 
PARIENTE, C.J., and ANSTEAD and LEWIS, JJ., concur. 
WELLS, J., dissents with an opinion, in which CANTERO, J., concurs. 
CANTERO, J., dissents with an opinion, in which WELLS and BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
WELLS, J., dissenting. 
 
I join in Justice Cantero’s dissent. 
 
I write only in respect to the majority’s footnote 1 and the majority’s 
comments relying upon stare decisis.  I believe it must be noted that although this 
Court’s opinion in T.M. v. State, 784 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 2001), which was the lead 
case and which J.P. v. State, 788 So. 2d 953 (Fla. 2001), followed, did use the 
                                          
 
9.  The juveniles also contend that the ordinances violate their Fourth 
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and their 
Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.  In light of our conclusion that the 
ordinances do not pass strict scrutiny, we need not reach these Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment challenges to the ordinances. 
 
 
- 38 - 
phrase “we agree,” the opinion contains no analysis.  My vote in those earlier cases 
was a recognition of the State’s concession which was made in this Court.  The 
concession had not been made in the district court.  The case was remanded to the 
district court for consideration in light of the State’s concession.  Under the 
circumstances of the limited previous review of this issue in this Court, I do not 
believe that the doctrine of stare decisis should control the present decision. 
 
A comparison of the present majority opinion with the opinion in T.M. 
illustrates my point.  In T.M., the analysis consumed one paragraph.  In the present 
opinion, the analysis is many, many pages, which demonstrates that there is really 
no basis upon which to rely on T.M. as controlling precedent. 
CANTERO, J., concurs. 
 
CANTERO, J., dissenting. 
 
 
Today the majority holds that a minor has a right of privacy to remain on 
public streets literally in the middle of the night.  I cannot agree with such an 
expansive reading of the right to privacy.  In my opinion, the ordinances at issue do 
not even implicate—much less infringe upon—the minors’ constitutional rights to 
privacy or any purported right to “freedom of movement.”  I believe the rational 
basis standard should apply to review of these ordinances.  Even applying the 
standard most federal circuit courts have employed, however—a heightened 
 
 
- 39 - 
review—the ordinances still survive attack, as the Second District Court of Appeal 
originally held in this case four years ago.  Finally, as other courts have found, the 
ordinances survive even strict scrutiny analysis, as they are narrowly tailored to 
serve the compelling interest that even the majority concedes exists. 
 
I. Which Standard Applies? 
 
The first issue in every case considering the constitutionality of a statute or 
ordinance is which standard applies.  Not only is the applicable standard the 
threshold determination in any constitutional analysis; it is often the most crucial.  
In this case, it has made all the difference.  The district court originally reviewed 
these ordinances under a heightened scrutiny, and upheld them.  See State v. T.M., 
761 So. 2d 1140, 1146, 1150 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (T.M. I).  On remand from this 
Court, it applied strict scrutiny, and invalidated them.  See J.P. v. State, 832 So. 2d 
110, 112 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (J.P. III).  Therefore, we should thoughtfully analyze 
the applicable standard. 
 
I recognize that when this Court last reviewed this issue in the prior iteration 
of this case, T.M. v. State, 784 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 2001) (T.M. II), the State conceded 
that strict scrutiny analysis applied because it argued that even under that standard 
the ordinances at issue were constitutional.  Id. at 444; cf. Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 
488, 492 (5th Cir. 1993) (assuming, without deciding, that a juvenile curfew 
ordinance implicated a fundamental right because the ordinance was constitutional 
 
 
- 40 - 
even under strict scrutiny analysis).  We agreed with the State’s concession and, in 
a single sentence, adopted it as our holding.  See T.M. II, 784 So. 2d at 444 (“We 
agree and hold in answer to the first certified question that strict scrutiny applies 
when reviewing a juvenile curfew ordinance.”).  The majority now concludes that 
we “held” that strict scrutiny applied, and concludes that to hold otherwise now 
“would require the Court to recede from its precedent of only three years ago.”  
Majority op. at 11.  Our opinion in T.M. II contains no analysis of the issue 
whatsoever, and nothing in the opinion, other than the single cryptic phrase “we 
agree [with the state’s concession] and hold . . .” even hints at analysis.  To the 
extent this bald, unexplained “holding” can be considered precedent, when 
combined with the fact that the State conceded the issue, I do not believe it is 
worthy of deference.  The standard for reviewing the constitutionality of an 
ordinance is too important to be based on a concession, followed by “we agree and 
hold that . . .”  This is especially true in this case, which is the same case we 
reviewed then, and where the doctrine of the law of the case, not stare decisis, 
applies. 
 
The doctrine of the law of the case generally provides that “all questions of 
law which have been decided by the highest appellate court become the law of the 
case which . . . must be followed in subsequent proceedings.”  Brunner Enters., 
Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 452 So. 2d 550, 552 (Fla. 1984).  Recognizing that 
 
 
- 41 - 
correctness is sometimes more important than consistency, however, this Court has 
carved out an important exception to the doctrine.  Under that exception, “[t]his 
Court has the power to reconsider and correct erroneous rulings in exceptional 
circumstances and where reliance on the previous decision would result in manifest 
injustice, notwithstanding that such rulings have become the law of the case.”  
State v. Owen, 696 So. 2d 715, 720 (Fla. 1997) (citing Preston v. State, 444 So. 2d 
939 (Fla. 1984)).   
 
This case presents an exceptional circumstance in which automatic reliance 
on our previous decision would result in “manifest injustice.”  In T.M. II, we 
ordered the district court to apply strict scrutiny without so much as identifying the 
fundamental right upon which that mandate was based.  We offered no analysis to 
support our holding.  Cf. Fla. Dep’t of Transp. v. Juliano, 801 So. 2d 101, 108 (Fla. 
2001) (“[W]here a previous appellate court has given no explanation for its 
decision, a subsequent appellate court is not bound by the law of the case unless a 
determination concerning the propriety of the trial court’s order is necessarily 
inconsistent with every possible correct basis for the earlier rulings.”).  It would be 
manifestly unjust to perpetuate the erroneous application of strict scrutiny to this 
case purely on the basis of an unexplained, one-sentence holding.  See Owen, 696 
So. 2d at 720 (“[R]eliance upon our prior decision … would result in manifest 
injustice to the people of this state because it would perpetuate a rule which we 
 
 
- 42 - 
have now determined to be an undue restriction of legitimate law enforcement 
activity.”); Preston, 444 So. 2d at 942 (“The interest of justice [and] substantive 
due process requirements … support our decision to review this issue 
[notwithstanding the rule of the case].”). 
 
Even if the doctrine of stare decisis applies, that doctrine does not absolve 
this Court of its responsibility to explain and justify its constitutional 
interpretations, especially when those interpretations address the scope of citizens’ 
fundamental rights.  Cf. State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 (Utah 1994) (“[The] 
stare decisis effect of [the] case is substantially diminished by the fact that the legal 
point therein was decided without argument.”) (quoting 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 
193 (1965)).  The fact that the majority conducts its own lengthy analysis of the 
appropriate standard of review only confirms my conclusion that our one-sentence 
analysis in T.M. II should not resolve––indeed, was never understood by this Court 
as resolving––this important issue for all future cases. 
 
Courts use three different standards for determining a law’s constitutionality: 
rational basis review, intermediate (or heightened) scrutiny, and strict scrutiny.  
These three standards act like lenses of different strength, from simple eyeglasses, 
to a magnifying glass, to a microscope.  At each level, the court more closely 
examines the government’s purpose in enacting the law and the means used to 
attain it. 
 
 
- 43 - 
 
The most common, and least intrusive, standard is the rational basis test.  It 
is used when the law at issue does not involve a suspect classification (such as a 
racial one) or infringe on a fundamental right.  See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 
312, 319-20 (1993).  Under that test, a statute or ordinance must be rationally 
related to a legitimate governmental interest.  Westerheide v. State, 831 So. 2d 93, 
110 (Fla. 2002).  Where fundamental rights of minors are involved, courts 
sometimes invoke “intermediate” or “heightened” scrutiny.  See Schleifer v. City 
of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 847 (4th Cir. 1998).  To withstand such 
heightened review, the ordinance must be substantially related to the achievement 
of important government interests.  See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).  
Finally, when a statute or ordinance infringes on the fundamental rights of adults, 
the law must pass the most exacting standard of review, called strict scrutiny.  See 
Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993).  For an ordinance to withstand strict 
scrutiny, it must be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest and 
must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest.  See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 
216-17. 
 
The majority concludes that strict scrutiny review applies “because 
fundamental rights are implicated by the juvenile curfew ordinances.”  Majority 
op. at 13.  The majority acknowledges that the ordinances do not implicate the 
minors’ freedom of speech and of assembly.  Majority op. at 18.  Nevertheless, it 
 
 
- 44 - 
holds that the ordinances implicate the rights to privacy and freedom of movement.  
Id. at 27.  I will address these in turn. 
 
A.  Minors’ Rights to Privacy 
 
Regarding the minors’ asserted right to privacy, the majority states that “the 
cities’ asserted compelling interest of preventing victimization of minors could 
outweigh the minors’ privacy rights during the curfew hours, if the ordinances 
were narrowly tailored to achieve that goal as required by strict scrutiny.”  
Majority op. at 19.  But the majority never answers whether the juvenile curfew 
ordinances implicate the minors’ privacy rights in the first place.  If they do not, 
then the ordinances need not be considered under a strict scrutiny analysis.  I do 
not see how an ordinance prohibiting minors from remaining in public 
unsupervised during late night hours violates their right to privacy. 
 
In cases involving fundamental rights, the judicial analysis must begin with 
a careful description of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.  See Washington 
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (quoting Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).  Before the strict scrutiny standard is 
applied to right of privacy claims, the court must inquire into whether a reasonable 
expectation of privacy exists.  Winfield v. Div. of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 
2d 544, 547 (Fla. 1985).  This analysis inevitably requires an inquiry into the scope 
and dimensions of the fundamental right at issue and whether the case before us 
 
 
- 45 - 
falls within its dimensions.  Cf. Hutchins v. Dist. of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 537 
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (inquiring into the scope and dimension of parent’s fundamental 
right and determining that the right was not implicated).  In determining the scope 
of a fundamental right, we should remember the general principle that “[b]y 
extending constitutional protection to an asserted right or liberty interest, we, to a 
great extent, place the matter outside the arena of public debate and legislative 
action.”  Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720. 
 
With this principle in mind, the issue is not whether minors have a “right to 
privacy.”  The real question is whether the scope of that right includes a right to 
remain in public unsupervised at any hour of day or night.  Only if minors have a 
fundamental right to such activity may we then ask whether the State has an 
important (intermediate scrutiny) or compelling (strict scrutiny) interest in 
curtailing that right, and whether the law is substantially related (intermediate 
scrutiny) or narrowly tailored (strict scrutiny) toward that interest.  The majority 
never answers this question.  It simply assumes that any fundamental right to 
privacy that minors possess necessarily includes the right to remain unsupervised 
in public late at night.  Because of the many factors that distinguish minors from 
adults, I do not believe that minors have such a right at all, and much less that any 
such right is so fundamental that it cannot be circumscribed. 
 
 
- 46 - 
 
It is well settled that the government has a greater ability to regulate actions 
of children than those of adults.  See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 
(1944).  This difference in how the law treats minors is based on various factors 
that distinguish minors from adults, including the peculiar vulnerability of children 
and their inability to make critical decisions in an informed and mature manner.  
See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (noting that “during the formative 
years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, 
and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them”) 
(plurality opinion); cf. Jones v. State, 640 So. 2d 1084, 1087 (Fla. 1994) 
(recognizing that the state has a compelling interest in protecting children from 
sexual activity before their minds and bodies have sufficiently matured to make it 
appropriate, safe, and healthy for them).  Thus, minors’ rights of privacy do not 
vitiate the legislature’s efforts and authority to protect them from the conduct of 
others or from their own inability to make wise decisions.  Jones, 640 So. 2d at 
1087. 
 
The right to privacy also does not necessarily extend to public acts.  In Stall 
v. State, 570 So. 2d 257, 260 (Fla. 1990), for example, we held that although the 
right to privacy protected the private enjoyment of obscene material in one’s home, 
there was no legitimate reasonable expectation of privacy in being able to publicly 
purchase such material.  The Court noted the State’s legitimate interest “in 
 
 
- 47 - 
stemming the tide of commercialized obscenity.”  Id. at 260 (quoting Paris Adult 
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57 (1973)).  The Court also stated that “we are a 
society of individuals who make a whole community,” id. at 261 (emphasis added), 
and that granting the unfettered ability to publicly obtain such material would 
“affect the world about the rest of us, and . . . impinge on other privacies,” id. at 
261 (quoting Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 59); see also Prince, 321 U.S. at 
166, 168 (distinguishing between the “private realm of family life” and the “evils 
. . . [of] public places”).  Stall rejected the petitioners’ argument that a citizen’s 
private right to possess and enjoy obscene material encompassed the public sale 
and distribution of such material.  Id.  Based on the same reasoning, we should 
reject the argument that the curfew ordinances somehow infringe on a minor’s 
right to privacy.  The ordinances do not in any way limit what minors may do in 
the privacy of their family homes. 
 
The majority, however, concludes that the Florida Constitution’s privacy 
provision “affords Florida citizens greater protection in the area of privacy than 
does the federal Constitution.”  Majority op. at 26.  That Florida’s right of privacy 
may be more expansive than the federal right, however, does not make it all-
encompassing.  The right to privacy is not a wild card that, when played, suddenly 
renders any ordinance unconstitutional.  We have recognized that article I, section 
23 “was not intended to provide an absolute guarantee against all governmental 
 
 
- 48 - 
intrusion into the private life of an individual.”  Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 547 
(quoting Fla. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs re Applicant, 443 So. 2d 71, 74 (Fla. 1983)).  As 
we have noted:  
 
Practically any law interferes in some manner with someone’s 
right of privacy.  The difficulty lies in deciding the proper balance 
between this right and the legitimate interest of the state.  As the 
representative of the people, the legislature is charged with the 
responsibility of deciding where to draw the line.  Only when that 
decision clearly transgresses private rights should the courts interfere. 
 
Stall, 570 So. 2d at 261 (quoting In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1204 (Fla. 1989) 
(Grimes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
 
The majority essentially holds that minors have a fundamental right to roam 
in public unsupervised during any time of the day or night.  This would protect a 
minor’s right to be on the street in the middle of the night, regardless of the costs to 
the community in the form of higher crime rates, law enforcement costs and other 
negative consequences.  Neither the record in this case nor common sense suggests 
that the purported independence of juveniles to be out in the public during the late 
night and early morning hours constitutes such a fundamental right.  As one court 
has emphasized, “[f]orbidding preventive measures such as curfews propels 
localities to the harshest of alternatives—waiting for juveniles actually to commit 
criminal offenses and then apprehending, prosecuting, and punishing them.”  
Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 855.  Neither the State nor its citizens—whether children or 
adults—benefit from relegating the State to such a strictly remedial role. 
 
 
- 49 - 
 
B.  Minors’ Right to Freedom of Movement 
 
The majority also holds that the ordinances implicate the minors’ 
“constitutional right of freedom of movement.”  Majority op. at 19.  I do not find 
any such right in either the Constitution or the cases interpreting it.  It is true that 
the right to interstate travel is “firmly embedded” in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
constitutional jurisprudence.  Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498 (1999); see also 
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969).  This right has been 
characterized as emanating both from the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, see Saenz, 526 U.S. at 489 (grounding at least one 
component of the right on that clause), and on the Commerce Clause, see Edwards 
v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173-74 (1941).  The cases in which the Supreme Court 
has explained the right, however, all concerned interstate or international travel.  
As the majority acknowledges, the Supreme Court has never held that the 
Constitution grants a fundamental right to a generalized freedom of movement.  
See Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 535-39.10  In fact, in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa 
County, 415 U.S. 250, 255 (1974), the Supreme Court specifically declined to 
                                          
 
10 In asserting that the “freedom of movement [has] been recognized as [a] 
basic right[] under the federal Constitution,” Majority op. at 19, the majority relies 
on Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 174 (1972).  That case 
involved a vagrancy ordinance struck down on vagueness grounds.  The flaw in 
such ordinances is that they fail to give fair notice of the forbidden conduct, not 
that they infringe on a fundamental right to free movement. 
 
 
- 50 - 
decide the issue.  Much less has the Court held, or even implied, that such a right 
would extend to minors. 
 
Apparently recognizing this fact, the majority attempts to find such a right in 
our decision in Wyche v. State, 619 So. 2d 231, 235 (Fla. 1993).  The majority 
quotes the following memorable passage from Wyche: 
Hailing a cab or a friend, chatting on a public street, and simply 
strolling aimlessly are time-honored pastimes in our society and are 
clearly protected under Florida as well as federal law.  All Florida 
citizens enjoy the inherent right to window shop, saunter down a 
sidewalk, and wave to friends and passersby with no fear of arrest. 
619 So. 2d at 235 (footnotes and citations omitted).  The majority concludes from 
this passage that “the right to intrastate travel in Florida is clear.”   Majority op. at 
21.  The clarity of that proposition is, however, a function of its abstractness.  Of 
course all Florida citizens have the “inherent right” to stroll and chat, to saunter 
and wave, in the absence of justified legislation to the contrary.  But how strong is 
that right?  Is it “fundamental”?  Do minors have the same right as adults? 
 
Wyche does not answer these questions.  If anything, Wyche indicates that 
the right to intrastate travel in Florida is not a fundamental right, but is instead 
subject to rational basis review.  See Wyche, 619 So. 2d at 237 (“[I]t is impossible 
to say that the ordinance bears a reasonable relation to a permissible legislative 
objective and is not discriminatory, arbitrary, or oppressive.”).  Also, Wyche 
indicates that the right to intrastate travel is merely derivative of the two 
 
 
- 51 - 
constitutional rights I have already discussed: the Florida right to privacy and the 
federal right to interstate travel.  Id. at 235 n.5. 
 
Because, as the majority admits, “the United States Supreme Court has never 
definitively ruled that there is a fundamental right to intrastate travel,” Majority op. 
at 21, it seems safe to assume that Wyche’s oblique reference to an “inherent right” 
that is “clearly protected under Florida as well as federal law” was not intended to 
announce a fundamental right to intrastate travel.  Wyche itself did not involve 
travel at all—it concerned an ordinance that prohibited loitering for the purpose of 
engaging in prostitution.  Id. at 233 n.2. 
 
In sum, the “inherent right” described in Wyche falls in the same category as 
countless other rights that—while undeniably important—are not “fundamental” in 
the constitutional sense.  See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 
U.S. 1, 35-36 (1973) (concluding that childhood education, despite its “undisputed 
importance,” is not a fundamental right for purposes of the Equal Protection 
Clause); Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (holding 
that the right to work is not a fundamental right, even though the Court had said in 
Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915), that employment is “the very essence of … 
personal freedom and opportunity”); Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577, 584 n.9 
(1976) (holding that welfare support is not a fundamental right, even though the 
Court had said in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8, 264 (1970), that 
 
 
- 52 - 
welfare payments are “more like ‘property’ than a ‘gratuity’” and are the “means to 
obtain essential food, clothing, housing, and medical care”); Lite v. State, 617 So. 
2d 1058, 1060 n.2 (Fla. 1993) (holding that the right to drive is not a fundamental 
right).  At any rate, a fundamental right to intrastate travel does not follow 
inevitably from Wyche as a matter of logic.  The majority should at least 
acknowledge what its decision truly represents: the declaration of a new 
fundamental right.    
    
Even if a fundamental right to travel or to movement exists, it does not 
necessarily extend to minors.  Again, Wyche did not involve minors, so it had no 
occasion to determine whether the right involved there applied to them.  The 
Supreme Court has rejected the idea that minors have a right to “come and go at 
will” because “juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of custody.”  
Reno, 507 U.S. at 302 (quoting Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984)).  
“Traditionally at common law . . .  unemancipated minors lack some of the most 
fundamental rights of self-determination—including even the right of liberty in its 
narrow sense, i.e., the right to come and go at will.”  Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. 
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995).  I would hold that this case does not implicate 
any fundamental right of minors to freedom of movement.  See Bellotti, 443 U.S. 
at 634 (articulating factors justifying treating minors and adults differently); 
Metropolitan Dade County v. Pred, 665 So. 2d 252, 253 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) 
 
 
- 53 - 
(noting that U.S. and Florida Constitutions do not give children “same quantum or 
quality of rights as adults”).  Therefore, the correct standard for determining the 
constitutionality of the juvenile ordinances is the rational basis test. 
C. Parents’ Right to Raise their Children 
 
The majority declines to rule on the minors’ claims that the ordinances 
violate their parents’ rights, Majority op. at 22, but nevertheless spends more than 
five pages discussing the issue “for the sake of completeness,” Majority op. at 22, 
at the end of which the majority “conclude[s] that the ordinances may implicate the 
parental right to raise children,” but “leave[s] resolution of this issue for another 
day.”  Majority op. at 27.  Therefore, even though, as the majority admits, its 
discussion of this issue is utter dictum, I respond to it for the sake of the same 
“completeness.” 
 
Because the majority apparently agrees, Majority op. at 27 n.5, I will not 
belabor the point that the minors lack standing to raise their parents’ rights.  Major 
implications would follow from a holding that a minor has standing to assert the 
rights of the parent.  In many cases, the parents’ desires to raise their children the 
way they think best compete with their children’s desires to run their lives the way 
they think best.  Therefore, allowing a minor to assert the parent’s rights 
encourages the manipulation of arguments to further the minor’s purposes as 
against the parent’s.  As one court has recognized, if we accept the argument that 
 
 
- 54 - 
parents’ fundamental rights are implicated in this context, “future litigants could 
simply artfully plead violations of parental rights to avoid the [well-established] 
determination that children do not possess all the freedoms of adults.  Arguments 
based on minors’ rights to engage in particular conduct would be routinely recast 
as arguments based on parents’ rights to allow their children to engage in precisely 
the same conduct.”  Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 852. 
 
Even if the minors had standing to assert this claim, determining “whether 
an individual has a legitimate expectation of privacy in any given case must be 
made by considering all the circumstances, especially objective manifestations of 
that expectation.”  Stall, 570 So. 2d at 260 (quoting Shaktman v. State, 553 So. 2d 
148, 153 (Fla. 1989) (Ehrlich, J., concurring specially)) (emphasis added).  Parents 
do not have an unlimited constitutional right to rear their children any way they see 
fit, regardless of the consequences to the community at large.  Parents have 
responsibilities.  The State already demands a certain threshold level of care under 
its child neglect statutes.  See, e.g., § 39.001(3), Fla. Stat. (2002) (outlining general 
protections for children); § 39.01, Fla. Stat. (2002) (defining abuse and 
abandonment).  Parents must ensure that their children are educated, see § 
1003.21(1)(a)1,  Fla. Stat. (2003) (requiring regular school attendance during the 
entire school term for children between the ages of six and sixteen); § 1003.24, Fla. 
Stat. (2003) (providing that, subject to certain exceptions, “each parent of a child 
 
 
- 55 - 
within the compulsory attendance age is responsible for the child’s school 
attendance as required by law”); they cannot abuse or neglect their children, see § 
39.806(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (2003) (providing for termination of parental rights when 
parent abuses child); and they must give their children a certain level of financial 
support, see § 39.01(30)(f), Fla. Stat. (2003) (stating that the term “neglects the 
child” encompasses a parent’s failure to “supply the child with adequate food, 
clothing, shelter, or health care, although financially able to do so or although 
offered financial or other means to do so”).  An ordinance prohibiting minors from 
remaining in public unsupervised during late-night hours is simply another 
legitimate requirement that parents adequately supervise their children.  Curfew 
ordinances inevitably assume a threshold level of parental responsibility.  See 
Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 851 (noting that the city was entitled to believe that a 
nocturnal curfew would promote parental involvement in a child’s upbringing 
despite evidence that some parents did not support the curfew); Bykofsky v. 
Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1255 (M.D. Pa. 1975) (noting that 
curfews encourage parents who ignore their children’s nighttime activities to take a 
more active role in their children’s lives), aff’d, 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1976). 
 
As the majority acknowledges, Majority op. at 23-24, many courts have held 
that juvenile curfew ordinances either do not implicate parents’ fundamental rights 
or interfere with them only minimally.  See Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 540-41 (holding 
 
 
- 56 - 
that the federal right of parental control only includes parents’ control of the home 
and formal education of children and not parental decisions about when their 
children can be on public streets); Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 853 (concluding that a 
curfew ordinance did not fall within the type of intimate family decisions protected 
from state interference); Qutb, 11 F.3d at 495-96 (holding that a juvenile curfew 
ordinance constituted a minimal intrusion on parents’ rights and only affected a 
parent’s ability to allow the minor to remain in public places, unaccompanied by a 
parent or guardian); Hodgkins v. Peterson, 175 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1162 (S.D. Ind. 
2001) (concluding that parents have no fundamental right to allow their minor 
children to be in public places with parental permission during curfew hours and 
that statute did not infringe on minors’ First Amendment rights), rev’d, 355 F.3d 
1048, 1064-65 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that curfew statute violated minors’ free 
expression rights but declining to reach the merits of parents’ right to privacy 
claim); Bykofsky, 401 F. Supp. at 1264 (concluding that the “ordinance constitutes 
a minimal interference with the parental interest in influencing and controlling the 
activities of their offspring,” in light of numerous exceptions in the ordinance); 
City of Panora v. Simmons, 445 N.W.2d 363, 369-70 (Iowa 1989) (holding that a 
curfew was a minimal infringement on parents’ rights). 
 
I do not contest that parents have a fundamental right in the upbringing of 
their children.  See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (stating 
 
 
- 57 - 
that the “primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now 
established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition”); Von Eiff v. Azicri, 
720 So. 2d 510, 513 (Fla. 1998) (explaining that Florida’s Constitution guarantees 
a right to privacy and that such right includes a parent’s fundamental right to rear 
his or her child).  The issue here, however, is the scope and dimension of the right. 
 
The Supreme Court has rejected the view that a parent’s right to raise a child 
is unqualified, superseding all government regulation.  See Prince, 321 U.S. at 167 
(stating that “the state has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and 
authority in things affecting the child’s welfare”); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 
160, 178 (1976) (stating that parents have no constitutional right to provide their 
children with private school education unfettered by reasonable government 
regulation); Bykofsky, 401 F. Supp. at 1262 (stating that the State may act to 
promote its legitimate interests, despite parents’ fundamental rights, when actions 
concerning the child have a relation to the public welfare); cf. Cramp v. Bd. of 
Pub. Instruction of Orange County, 125 So. 2d 554, 558 (Fla.) (stating that First 
Amendment rights are not absolute and that courts must balance the private right 
against the alleged public interest), rev’d on other grounds, 368 U.S. 278 (1961); 
16A Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 397 (1998) (stating generally that 
fundamental constitutional rights of individuals are not absolute, limitless, or 
unrestricted rights).  
 
 
- 58 - 
 
In the parental context, “[n]ot every state restriction of a child’s freedom 
derivatively abridges the fundamental rights of parents.”  Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 
852.  Parents’ fundamental right to privacy does not encompass allowing their 
children to wander the public streets unsupervised during the late night hours, even 
with parental permission.  The social burdens that accommodating such a decision 
would entail, and the risks to the health and safety of children, justify government 
regulation of that decision.  See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233-34 (stating that parents’ 
fundamental rights are “subject to limitation . . . if it appears that parental decisions 
will jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have a potential for significant 
social burdens”) (emphasis added); cf. People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201 (1903) 
(holding that parent’s right to practice religion did not include liberty to expose the 
community to communicable disease).  As one court has said,  
insofar as a parent can be thought to have a fundamental right, as 
against the state, in the upbringing of his or her children, that right is 
focused on the parents’ control of the home and the parents’ interest in 
controlling, if he or she wishes, the formal education of children.  It 
does not extend to a parent’s right to unilaterally determine when and 
if children will be on the streets—certainly at night.  That is not 
among the “intimate family decisions” encompassed by such a right. 
 
Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 540-41 (plurality opinion) (citing Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 853).  
This is true even in Florida. 
 
II. Application of the Different Standards 
 
 
- 59 - 
 
As I have noted, because I believe that the ordinances do not implicate 
fundamental rights, the correct standard is the rational basis test.  Most federal 
circuit courts and state supreme courts considering this particular issue have held 
that the proper analysis is either rational basis review or intermediate scrutiny.  
See, e.g., Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 176, 180-81 (2d Cir. 2003); 
Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 541; Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 847; Sale ex rel. Sale v. 
Goldman, 539 S.E.2d 446, 455 (W. Va. 2000); People in re J.M., 768 P.2d 219, 
223 (Colo. 1989); City of Panora, 445 N.W.2d at 369.  Therefore, the majority’s 
holding that strict scrutiny applies places this Court in the minority on this issue.  
See, e.g., Treacy v. Municipality of Anchorage, 91 P.3d 252, 265 n.60 (Alaska 
2004) (applying strict scrutiny but acknowledging that precedents in other 
jurisdictions point toward intermediate scrutiny).  
 
In my opinion, under any standard, the ordinances survive.  Below I apply 
(A) rational basis review; (B) intermediate scrutiny; and finally (C) strict scrutiny. 
 
A.  Rational Basis Review 
 
Under the rational basis test, review is limited to determining whether the 
ordinance in question is rationally related to legitimate governmental interests.  
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. at 319-20.  Laws that involve neither a suspect 
classification nor fundamental rights are accorded a strong presumption of validity.  
Id. at 319. 
 
 
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In Bellotti, the Supreme Court noted three established state concerns in 
protecting the well-being of minors: the special vulnerability of children, their 
relative lack of ability to make critical decisions in an informed and mature 
manner, and the importance of parental authority in bringing up children.  443 U.S. 
at 634.  
 
The majority outlines the purposes of both the Tampa and Pinellas Park 
ordinances, as expressed in the ordinances themselves.  Majority op. at 27-29.  I 
will not repeat them here.  The majority acknowledges that both cities have 
established even compelling interests.  Majority op. at 30.  For the same reasons, 
therefore, the government interests are “legitimate” under the rational basis 
standard.   
 
The only remaining question is whether the ordinances are rationally related 
to those legitimate government interests.  See Lane v. Chiles, 698 So.2d 260, 262 
(Fla. 1997) (“Generally, a state statute must be upheld . . . if there is any reasonable 
relationship between the act and the furtherance of a valid governmental 
objective”).  At this level of review, scrutiny is deferential to the legislative 
decision.  Courts applying rational basis review also apply the rule of statutory 
construction that accords legislation a presumption of validity.  See Heller v. Doe, 
509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993); Caple v. Tuttle’s Design-Build, Inc., 753 So. 2d 49, 51 
(Fla. 2000).  The rational basis test protects from court interference legislative 
 
 
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action on most public policy decisions.  The inquiry “employs a relatively relaxed 
standard reflecting the Court’s awareness that the drawing of lines that create 
distinctions is peculiarly a legislative task and an unavoidable one.”  Murgia, 427 
U.S. at 314.   
 
The Tampa and Pinellas Park ordinances seek to further the following 
interests: (1) the protection of juveniles, other citizens, and visitors from late night 
and early morning criminal activity; (2) the reduction of juvenile criminal activity; 
and (3) the enhancement and enforcement of parental control over children.   See 
Pinellas Park, Fla., Code § 16-124(B)(2) (1997); Tampa, Fla., Code § 14-26(a)(6) 
(1996).  
 
Even without statistical data, it is apparent that the ordinances prevent some 
juvenile crime arising from group or gang activity, because groups of juveniles are 
easily detected and can be dispersed under the curfews.  See Bykofsky, 401 F. 
Supp. at 1256.  The curfews promote the public safety and the safety of juveniles 
by preventing the late-night accumulation of juveniles on public streets, thereby 
reducing the attendant risk of criminal activity.   
 
The curfews also encourage parents to supervise and know the whereabouts 
of their children during nighttime hours.  The assumption that the likelihood of 
criminal activity decreases as the amount of parental control over children 
increases is not unreasonable.  Id.; Pinellas Park, Fla., Code § 16-124(B)(1)(h) 
 
 
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(1997) (“The likelihood of criminal activity by juveniles decreases as parental 
control increases.  Legislative incentives to shift supervision of juveniles from 
government to parents . . . creates a more wholesome community environment for 
juveniles, parents, and families.”).  To the extent the curfews induce “parents, 
under the pain of imposition of a criminal penalty, to exercise their control where 
they otherwise might allow their children free rein and ignore their nighttime 
whereabouts and activities, [they are] effective in decreasing nocturnal juvenile 
crime and mischief and in strengthening the family unit.”  Bykofsky, 401 F. Supp. 
at 1256.  
 
For these reasons, the ordinances further the purposes expressed by Tampa 
and Pinellas Park.  Id.; see also City of Panora, 445 N.W.2d at 369  (employing 
rational basis test and concluding that minors’ interests in intracity movement were 
outweighed by city’s interest in providing a prophylactic solution to the perceived 
problems inherent in unrestricted travel by minors); City of Milwaukee v. K.F., 
426 N.W.2d 329, 340 (Wis. 1988) (relying on Bykofsky’s rational basis analysis). 
 
B.  Intermediate Scrutiny 
 
Even if, as the majority holds, the ordinances implicate the fundamental 
rights of minors, they should be subjected only to intermediate scrutiny.  This 
standard asks whether the ordinance is substantially related to important 
 
 
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governmental interests.  See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 
(1996). 
 
Intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate level of review, even if the 
ordinances implicate a fundamental right, because the ordinances govern the 
conduct of minors.  As the Supreme Court has emphasized, the rights of children 
are not co-extensive with those of adults.  See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. 
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986); Prince, 321 U.S. at 169.  Therefore, “although 
children generally are protected by the same constitutional guarantees . . . as are 
adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal system to account for children’s 
vulnerability” by exercising broader authority over their activities.  Bellotti, 443 
U.S. at 635.  For that reason, a lesser degree of scrutiny is appropriate when 
evaluating restrictions on the activities of minors.  See Carey v. Population Servs. 
Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 n.15 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
 
Florida laws, like those of other states, regularly prohibit minors from 
engaging in the same activities as adults.  See, e.g., § 322.05(1), Fla. Stat. (2003) 
(prohibiting minors under 15 from driving, and 15-year-olds from driving 
unaccompanied by an adult); § 562.111(1), Fla. Stat. (2003) (prohibiting persons 
under 21 from possessing alcoholic beverages); § 569.11(1), Fla. Stat. (2003) 
(prohibiting persons under 18 from possessing any tobacco product); § 790.01, Fla. 
Stat. (2003) (prohibiting those under 21 years old from obtaining a license to carry 
 
 
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concealed weapons); § 450.081, Fla. Stat. (2003) (limiting the number of hours 
that minors can work).  The Supreme Court has upheld laws imposing limitations 
on minors that could not be imposed on adults.  See, e.g., Prince, 321 U.S. at 169-
70 (upholding law prohibiting children from selling magazines on the street, even 
when accompanied by a parent or guardian, against a claim that the law violated 
the child’s freedom of religion); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637-43 
(1968) (upholding a ban on the sale of material to minors that would not be 
considered “obscene” for adults). 
 
Based on the state’s greater authority to regulate the actions of minors than 
those of adults, in considering juvenile curfew ordinances many courts have 
employed an intermediate level of scrutiny.  See Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 541 
(employing intermediate scrutiny); Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 847 (employing 
intermediate scrutiny, but noting that the ordinance would also survive strict 
scrutiny); see also Ramos, 353 F.3d at 193 (arguing for rational basis review, but 
noting that the juvenile curfew ordinance survives even under heightened scrutiny) 
(Winter, J., dissenting).  In fact, when the district court first reviewed these cases, 
it employed the heightened scrutiny test.  See J.P. v. State, 775 So. 2d 324, 325 
(Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (J.P. I); T.M. I, 761 So. 2d at 1146.  Under that test, it found 
both ordinances constitutional. 
 
 
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As I noted above, because the majority acknowledges that the cities have 
established compelling interests, Majority op. at 30, which is a higher standard 
than either “legitimate” (rational basis review) or “important” (intermediate 
scrutiny) interests, the cities necessarily have established that their government 
interests are “important” under the intermediate scrutiny standard.  The only 
remaining question is whether the ordinances are substantially related to those 
important government interests.  I would hold that they are.   
 
In addressing the closeness of the relationship between the means chosen 
(the curfew) and the government’s interest, three interrelated concepts must be 
considered: (1) the factual premises that prompted the legislative enactment; (2) 
the logical connection between the remedy and those factual premises; and (3) the 
breadth of the remedy chosen.  Ramos, 353 F.3d at 184 (citing Hutchins, 188 F.3d 
at 542).11  This inquiry seeks to ensure that the municipality has studied the 
contours of the problem it seeks to address and legislates according to its findings.  
See Buzzetti v. City of New York, 140 F.3d 134, 142 (2d Cir. 1998) (making a 
similar observation in the context of an equal protection claim).   However, this 
standard of review has never required statistical certainty about the legislature’s 
wisdom in choosing a particular course of action.  See Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 849.  
                                          
 
11 While Ramos and Hutchins cite these factors in the context of 
intermediate scrutiny, they also apply when considering whether ordinances are 
“narrowly tailored” under a strict scrutiny analysis. 
 
 
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“It is unrealistic to expect either members of the judiciary or state officials to be 
well versed in the rigors of experimental or statistical technique.”  Craig, 429 U.S. 
at 204.  “[The] uncertain nature of remedial legislation is no reason for courts to 
fashion their own cures or scuttle those the legislature has provided.”  Schleifer, 
159 F.3d at 849. 
 
With these general principles in mind, I discuss the ordinances at issue.  In 
the case of the Pinellas Park ordinance, the city evaluated the curfew six months 
after its passage.12  The study highlights Pinellas Park’s juvenile crime problem 
before the curfew and demonstrates that juvenile crime was an issue during late 
night hours, particularly in the areas of burglary, trespass, and loitering.  Therefore, 
Pinellas Park had adequate “factual premises” for its decision.  See Hutchins, 188 
F.3d at 544 (stating that the city did not need to produce data showing where 
juvenile crime occurred and that the city’s data showing a substantial percentage of 
violent juvenile victimizations on the streets adequately supported a relationship 
between government’s interest and imposition of a curfew).  In addition, because 
the data indicates a late night juvenile crime problem, it follows that a curfew 
ordinance would constitute a remedy with a “logical connection” to these factual 
premises.  A restriction on unsupervised juveniles’ ability to wander the public 
                                          
 
12 The study looked at the curfew’s first six months of existence and 
compared it to the same six-month period in 1996.  The relevant periods were June 
7 to November 30, 1996, and June 7 to November 30, 1997. 
 
 
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streets during late night hours logically relates to curbing juvenile crime and 
preventing the victimization of minors.  
 
Finally, the curfew's breadth is best measured against the scope of its 
exceptions.  Here, the Pinellas Park ordinance contains a laundry list of exceptions 
for First Amendment, employment, civic, and religious activities.  Thus, the data 
indicates that a curfew would further the city’s interest in protecting juveniles and 
other citizens from late night criminal activity as well as its interest in reducing 
juvenile crime.  See Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 849 (stating that the city’s reliance on 
data such as police department records, public opinion surveys, and national crime 
reports entitled the legislature to speculate and conclude that keeping juveniles off 
the streets during late night hours would make the community safer).  Thus, I 
would hold that the Pinellas Park ordinance passes intermediate scrutiny. 
 
The Tampa curfew, like the Pinellas Park ordinance, contains many 
exceptions that narrow its scope, thereby strengthening the relationship between 
the curfew and its goals of reducing juvenile crime and victimization.  See 
Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 544-45.  In other words, the exceptions help ensure that the 
ordinances do not sweep too broadly but instead focus on those late night activities 
most likely to result in crime and victimization.  Id.   
 
Statistical data is not necessary to uphold the curfew ordinances under 
intermediate scrutiny.  Common sense and practical experience are enough.  See 
 
 
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Delmonico v. State, 155 So. 2d 368, 370 (Fla. 1963) (applying strict scrutiny to 
substantive due process claim and emphasizing that the legislature’s action must be 
measured against practical experience in order “to determine whether [the means 
chosen] is in fact essential or reasonably necessary in order to achieve the statutory 
objective”); cf. Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 543 (stating that city was not required to 
prove a precise fit between the nature of the problem and the legislative remedy 
and noting that even if data indicated that minors under seventeen were less likely 
to commit crimes, common sense dictated that younger children were more 
vulnerable).  An examination of the curfew ordinances’ stated goals, common 
sense, and the curfews’ exceptions demonstrates that the curfews are substantially 
related to the cities’ stated interests. 
 
C.  Strict Scrutiny 
 
This, the strictest standard, is the one the majority employs based on the “we 
agree and hold” language of T.M. II.  Under this standard, the ordinance must 
promote a compelling (rather than a “legitimate” or “important”) governmental 
interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest.  See, e.g., Plyler v. 
Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1982).  “To be narrowly tailored, there must be a 
nexus between the stated government interest and the classification created by the 
ordinance.”  Qutb, 11 F.3d at 493.  Such an analysis, however, should not be “strict 
in theory, but fatal in fact.”  See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 
 
 
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237 (1995).  In other words, application of strict scrutiny review does not 
automatically render a law unconstitutional.  In fact, some courts have upheld 
juvenile curfew ordinances even under this standard.  See Qutb, 11 F.3d at 492 
(assuming, without deciding, that a juvenile curfew ordinance implicated a 
fundamental right because the ordinance was constitutional even under strict 
scrutiny analysis); Treacy, 91 P.3d at 266 (concluding that “taken as a whole, the 
ordinance is the least restrictive means available to achieve the municipality’s 
[compelling] interests”); see also Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 847 (noting that the 
ordinance would survive strict scrutiny analysis).  Others have not.  See, e.g., 
Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 1997).  In at least some of the 
cases invalidating curfew ordinances, however, the ordinances contained fewer 
exceptions than the ones in this case.  See Nunez, 114 F.3d at 938-39 (invalidating 
an ordinance that did not provide for First Amendment exception); Johnson v. City 
of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1067 (5th Cir. 1981) (invalidating an ordinance that 
did not provide for First Amendment or job-related exceptions).13 
                                          
 
13 But see Hodgkins v. Peterson, 355 F.3d 1048, 1064 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(holding that a curfew ordinance with substantially the same exceptions as the 
Tampa and Pinellas Park ordinances was unconstitutional on First Amendment 
grounds even though it provided affirmative defenses for First Amendment 
activity); Ramos, 353 F.3d at 172 (invalidating a statute with substantially the 
same exceptions as those in the Tampa and Pinellas Park ordinances); City of 
Sumner v. Walsh, 61 P.3d 1111, 1116 (Wash. 2003) (invalidating a statute that 
defined “remain” in a fashion similar to the Tampa ordinance on grounds that 
defining “remain” as “linger or stay” was unconstitutionally vague). 
 
 
- 70 - 
 
Again, the majority acknowledges that the ordinances express valid and 
compelling governmental interests, Majority op. at 27-30, such as: (1) the 
protection of juveniles, other citizens, and visitors from late night and early 
morning criminal activity; (2) the reduction of juvenile criminal activity; and (3) 
the enhancement and enforcement of parental control over children.  See Pinellas 
Park, Fla., Code § 16-124(B)(2) (1997); Tampa, Fla., Code § 14-26(a)(6) (1996). 
 
The remaining question under this test is whether the ordinance is narrowly 
tailored to advance that interest.  In this regard, the curfew is in effect on weekdays 
from 11:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m., and on Friday and Saturday nights from midnight to 
6:00 a.m.  Therefore, the period of the curfew itself is narrow.  It covers, at most, 
seven hours of the day, during the precise time most school-age children will be 
sleeping. 
 
Moreover, because the ordinances contain a laundry list of exceptions, the 
curfew’s scope is even more narrow.  The two curfew ordinances are almost 
identical.14  Both allow minors to remain in public even during curfew hours if: (1) 
they are accompanied by a parent or other responsible adult; (2) they are 
                                          
 
14 The Tampa ordinance is different from the Pinellas Park ordinance in the 
following respects: (1) it does not apply to seventeen-year-olds; (2) it provides an 
exception for nonemergency errands with the written approval of a parent; (3) it 
provides an exception for homeless juveniles who use a public place as their usual 
abode; (4) it imposes criminal liability on business owners or operators who 
knowingly permit a juvenile to remain on business premises during curfew hours; 
and (5) it authorizes a fine of up to $1000 and up to six months’ incarceration for a 
second or subsequent violation. 
 
 
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commuting to or from lawful employment; (3) they are engaged in interstate travel 
(Pinellas Park also includes intrastate travel with the consent of the juvenile’s 
parent); (4) they are engaged in an activity exercising their First Amendment rights 
such as religious services, government meetings, and political meetings; (5) they 
are attending or returning from a school-sponsored function, religious function, or 
a civic organization function; (6) they are on the sidewalk of their own home or an 
adult next-door neighbor’s residence with that neighbor’s permission; (7) they are 
at an event, not provided for in the enumerated exceptions, which the city council 
has approved pursuant to application by a sponsor; or (8) they are married in 
accordance with law. 
 
Despite the many exceptions in the ordinances, the majority finds them not 
narrowly tailored enough.  Majority op. at 33-34.  The majority finds two faults 
with the ordinances: (1) the broad coverage of both curfews includes otherwise 
innocent and legal conduct by minors even where they have the permission of their 
parents; and (2) the ordinances impose criminal penalties for curfew violations.  Id.  
As the majority does, I discuss each of these in turn. 
 
 
A.  The Scope of the Ordinances 
 
The majority finds that the curfews proscribe otherwise innocent and legal 
conduct by minors even with parental permission.  Majority op. at 33.  As noted 
 
 
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above, however, the ordinances contain a laundry list of exceptions.  Through these 
exceptions, parents retain ample authority to exercise parental control, and minors 
retain the ability to engage in a broad range of conduct.  As with the ordinance at 
issue in Hutchins, the broad language of the ordinances’ exceptions contemplates 
flexibility in the administration of the curfews that enhances parental control.  See 
Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 546.15  The exceptions allow parents significant discretion 
over their children’s activities during curfew hours.  For example, the ordinances 
impose no restrictions whatsoever when the minor is accompanied by a parent or 
guardian.  Most importantly, the ordinances protect juveniles’ ability to engage in 
First Amendment conduct.  The ordinances also protect juveniles’ ability to work 
and attend academic, religious, and civic functions.  They also allow minors to go 
to a neighbor’s property and to engage in interstate travel.  Under the Tampa 
ordinances, juveniles are allowed to run errands with parental permission and the 
Pinellas Park ordinance provides a similar exception for emergency errands.  In 
short, the ordinances limit minors to the extent that they lack a specific and 
legitimate purpose for being on the streets in the middle of the night. 
                                          
 
15 In fact, both the Pinellas Park and Tampa ordinances specifically mention 
parental control in the findings, purposes, and intent sections.  See Pinellas Park, 
Fla., Code § 16-124(B)(1)(h) (“The likelihood of criminal activity by juveniles 
decreases as parental control increases.  Legislative incentives to shift supervision 
of juveniles from government to parents . . . creates a more wholesome community 
environment for juveniles, parents, and families.”); Tampa, Fla., Code § 14-
26(a)(6) (stating that one of ordinance’s purposes is “to promote and enhance 
parental control over juveniles”). 
 
 
- 73 - 
 
Despite the breadth of the exceptions, the majority specifically attacks the 
Pinellas Park ordinance on two grounds: (1) its failure to provide for 
nonemergency errands during restricted hours, and (2) its inclusion of seventeen-
year-olds within the ordinance’s scheme.  Neither of these grounds is persuasive. 
 
The provision for strictly emergency errands simply means that 
nonemergency errands will have to be accomplished during the seventeen-hour 
time period between 6:00 a.m. and 11:00 p.m. 
 
More troubling is the majority’s disapproval of the ordinance’s inclusion of 
seventeen-year-olds within the curfew.  Majority op. at 34.  This distinction is 
eminently logical.  Under state law, a seventeen-year-old is still considered a 
minor.  See § 1.01(13), Fla. Stat. (2003) (defining “minor” for purposes of 
statutory construction as any person who has not attained the age of eighteen).  The 
majority’s conclusion that seventeen-year-olds cannot be included within the 
definition of a “minor” for purposes of a juvenile curfew does not bode well for a 
myriad of laws prohibiting seventeen-year-olds from engaging in various forms of 
adult conduct.  Under the majority’s reasoning, seventeen-year-olds must be 
allowed to drink alcoholic beverages, to execute contracts, and to work full-time.  
The majority cites no studies, statistical data, or other evidence demonstrating why 
seventeen-year-olds should not be considered minors.  It also does not explain why 
the cut-off must be at the age of seventeen, and not at sixteen or fifteen. 
 
 
- 74 - 
 
Ultimately, determining which ages of minors to include within a curfew is 
quintessentially a legislative judgment.  Cf. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 
62 (2000) (noting that the Equal Protection Clause permits states to draw lines on 
the basis of age at a class-based level, even if it is probably not true that those 
reasons are valid in the majority of cases); Harper v. Harper, 848 So. 2d 1179, 
1180 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (stating that “[b]y legislative design, children up to the 
age of eighteen are dependent upon their parents”).  “It is not the function of a 
court ‘to hypothesize independently on the desirability or feasibility of any 
possible alternative[s]’ to the statutory scheme . . . .  ‘These matters of practical 
judgment and empirical calculation are for [the State].’”  Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 
259, 274 (1978) (alterations in original) (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 
515 (1976)).  
 
Finally, in attacking the alleged “broad coverage” of the ordinances, the 
majority argues that “the curfews apply throughout the cities without any showing 
of a city-wide need or problem.”  Majority op. at 33.  However, a city-wide curfew 
is a matter of common sense.  First, almost insurmountable problems would exist 
in enforcing a non-citywide curfew.  It would expose municipalities to charges of 
bias or racial profiling.  See Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 544 (rejecting on this basis the 
appellee’s argument that the District was obliged to confine the curfew to high 
crime areas of the city).  Moreover, from a practical perspective, it is doubtful that 
 
 
- 75 - 
a non-citywide curfew could adequately achieve its purpose.  Juveniles could 
easily avoid a non-citywide curfew by going from curfew areas, where presumably 
a juvenile crime problem previously existed, to non-curfew areas, thus creating a 
juvenile crime problem there.  In short, the source of the problems embodied by 
juvenile crime is not grounded strictly in geography.  Again, these are ultimately 
legislative judgments that courts are ill-equipped to second-guess. 
 
B.  The Relevance and Severability of Criminal Penalties 
 
The majority also cites the ordinances’ imposition of criminal penalties as a 
reason for finding that they are not narrowly drawn.  Majority op. at 36 (“[T]he 
imposition of criminal sanctions is not narrowly tailored to achieve the stated 
interests [of the curfew ordinance].”).  This, according to the majority, is “possibly 
the most troubling aspect of our strict scrutiny review.”  Majority op. at 34. 
 
 The majority concludes that the “criminal penalties indicate that the Tampa 
ordinance does not use the least intrusive means . . . especially when viewed 
against the model ordinance which accomplishes the same goal with only a civil 
penalty.”  Majority op. at 35.  The argument appears to be that the ordinance could 
be enforced through a civil fine and that the civil penalty can accomplish the 
necessary deterrent function.  However, we have emphasized that arguments about 
a statute’s deterrent function are “not legal arguments but rather political debate” 
and that “it is not the place of this or any other court to . . . question the political, 
 
 
- 76 - 
sociological, or economic wisdom of [an] enactment.”  Johnson v. State, 660 So. 
2d 637, 646 (Fla. 1995) (using this language in context of defendant’s argument 
that death penalty does not operate well as a deterrent).  This is consistent with the 
legislature’s general power to determine the punishments for offenses.  See Solem 
v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983) (holding that reviewing courts “should grant 
substantial deference to the broad authority that legislatures necessarily possess in 
determining the types and limits of punishments for crimes”); State v. Coban, 520 
So. 2d 40, 41 (Fla. 1988) (stating that in Florida, the plenary power to prescribe the 
punishment for criminal offenses lies with the Legislature, not the courts); State v. 
Keirn, 720 So. 2d 1085, 1086 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (the Legislature has the sole 
authority and responsibility to make the criminal laws, including classifying 
transgressions of the criminal law as either a felony or a misdemeanor).  Therefore, 
that the ordinances impose criminal penalties is irrelevant. 
 
The majority observes that “most of the ordinances that have been upheld as 
constitutional only impose civil fines or community service requirements.” 
Majority op. at 35.  The cases cited, however, do not indicate that the absence of 
criminal penalties was dispositive or that it even factored into the analyses.  See, 
e.g., Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 535 (mentioning the civil penalties and community 
service requirements of ordinance but not analyzing whether criminal penalties 
would have affected the constitutional analysis); Qutb, 11 F.3d at 488 (same).  
 
 
- 77 - 
Moreover, in Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 858, the court upheld the constitutionality of a 
juvenile curfew ordinance even though the ordinance punished a violation as a 
misdemeanor. 
 
Even if the criminal penalties rendered the ordinances unconstitutional, they 
could be severed.  The district court did not analyze severability because it 
concluded that the statute would be unconstitutional anyway.  J.P. III, 832 So. 2d at 
114.  The majority takes a similar approach, concluding that “the ordinances suffer 
from other constitutional failings which render them invalid.”  Majority op. at 36.  
While I also believe that severability is irrelevant—in my case, because the 
criminal penalties do not render the ordinances unconstitutional—I nevertheless 
discuss it because the majority considers the criminal penalties “the most troubling 
aspect” of the ordinances.  Majority op. at 34. 
 
Severability depends on the following test:  
When a part of a statute is declared unconstitutional the remainder of 
the act will be permitted to stand provided: (1) the unconstitutional 
provisions can be separated from the remaining valid provision, (2) 
the legislative purpose expressed in the valid provisions can be 
accomplished independently of those which are void, (3) the good and 
the bad features are not so inseparable in substance that it can be said 
that the Legislature would have passed the one without the other and, 
(4) an act complete in itself remains after the invalid provisions are 
stricken.  
 
Waldrup v. Dugger, 562 So. 2d 687, 693 (Fla. 1990) (quoting Cramp v. Bd. of Pub. 
Instr., 137 So. 2d at 830).   
 
 
- 78 - 
 
Nothing indicates that the criminal penalties, which do not bear on the law’s 
substantive content, cannot be separated from the remaining provisions.  In both 
ordinances the central legislative purpose was the protection of juveniles and the 
reduction of juvenile crime.  The criminal penalties are far from the centerpiece of 
the ordinances.  See Martinez v. Scanlan, 582 So. 2d 1167, 1173 (Fla. 1991) 
(stressing the need, in determining severability, to analyze the provision in relation 
to the statute’s overall legislative intent).  Here, the legislative purpose expressed 
in the ordinances can be accomplished independently from the criminal penalty 
provision.  The criminal penalty provision does not appear to be so inseparable in 
substance that we can say the legislature would not have passed the remainder of 
the statute.  Finally, on its face, severing the criminal penalty provision leaves the 
remainder of each ordinance intact.  Cf. High Ridge Mgmt. Corp. v. State, 354 So. 
2d 377, 381 (Fla. 1977) (holding that deletion of two subsections regarding rating 
of nursing homes did not disturb the valid portions of the act and left intact a 
workable statute where the valid provisions standing alone were complete in 
themselves). 
 
III.  Conclusion 
 
For the reasons stated, I would hold that the Tampa and Pinellas Park curfew 
ordinances are constitutional.  Juveniles do not have a fundamental right to be out 
in public places during the late night hours without adult supervision.  Even if they 
 
 
- 79 - 
did, the state may limit a minor’s fundamental rights to a greater extent than an 
adult’s.  Finally, even if the ordinances infringe on fundamental rights, they 
promote a compelling governmental interest and are narrowly tailored to achieve 
their purposes. 
 
For all these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
 
WELLS and BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
 
 
Two Cases Consolidated: 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Great Public Importance  
 
 
Second District - Case Nos. 2D97-1736 and 2D98-3778 
 
 
(Hillsborough and Pinellas Counties) 
 
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Michael J. 
Neimand, Assistant Attorney General, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, Richard J. Sanders, Assistant Public 
Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida; Bruce G. Howie of Piper, Ludin, 
Howie and Werner, P.A., St. Petersburg; and Robert L. Hambrick, Clearwater, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent