Title: Smith v. Com.
Citation: 599 S.W.2d 900
Docket Number: N/A
State: Kentucky
Issuer: Kentucky Supreme Court
Date: April 22, 1980

599 S.W.2d 900 (1980) Johnny Marshall SMITH, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee. Supreme Court of Kentucky. April 22, 1980. *901 Jack E. Farley, Public Advocate, Donna Boyce Proctor, Timothy T. Riddell, Sara L. Collins, Asst. Public Advocates, Frankfort, for appellant. *902 Robert F. Stephens, Atty. Gen., Reid C. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., Frankfort, for appellee. STERNBERG, Justice. On July 1, 1978, Ronnie Jarvis was killed by three blasts from a .20-gauge shotgun. The shooting took place on a little-used strip mine road, about four miles west of Greenville, Kentucky. On August 16, 1978, the appellant was indicted for having "committed capital murder by shooting and killing Ronnie Jarvis with a shotgun for profit or for hire and during the course of robbing said Ronnie Jarvis." Ricky Simms likewise was indicted for the same offense; however, he confessed to his part in the act and was sentenced to 21 years in prison. After a four-day trial a jury found the appellant guilty as charged and fixed his punishment at death. On this appeal the appellant presents 16 alleged errors. The testimony of Ricky Simms discloses that he had been romantically involved with Carolyn Jarvis, wife of the victim, for over two months prior to the killing. About one month prior to the killing, Carolyn discussed with Simms her desire to have her husband killed. Simms agreed to do the job, but did not carry out the dastardly deed. Carolyn became incensed with him and threatened to get someone else to do the job. A few days before the shooting the appellant was introduced to Carolyn and a second plan was conceived for killing Ronnie Jarvis, with appellant acting as the executioner, for which he was to receive the victim's collection of guns (six). On July 1, 1978, at about 9:00 p. m., Simms went to Jarvis' home and, under the pretense that he was having trouble with his car, solicited Jarvis' help to get it started. The two of them left in Jarvis' car, with Jarvis driving. Under the direction of Simms, Jarvis drove to where Simms' car was parked. Assuming that the battery would not start the car, Jarvis went to check under the hood of the car. Simms moved to the rear of the car so as to be out of the line of the fire. Appellant moved from where he had been hiding to a distance of about twenty feet from Jarvis and fired the first shot into Jarvis' side. Jarvis fell to the ground. While Jarvis pleaded for his life, the appellant approached within three feet of Jarvis and shot him again. He reloaded the gun and shot Jarvis a third time. Together the appellant and Simms removed Jarvis' body from the roadway and drove away in Simms' car. After driving only a short distance, they returned to the victim and robbed him of his wallet which contained only $4. After leaving the scene of the murder, they drove toward Central City. Simms stated that about six miles up the road they stopped by a levy, discarded the shotgun, and then proceeded on to Central City where they ran the car through a car wash. They then went to appellant's apartment where they changed their clothes and discarded Jarvis' wallet in a ditch behind the building. The clothing which they had been wearing was put in an empty box and the box was thrown from the car as they drove to Greenville. Of this clothing, Simms identified a red t-shirt, a pair of bluejeans, a pair of shoes, and a pair of socks as belonging to him. He also identified a pair of shoes, a pair of bluejeans, a pair of socks, a long-sleeve shirt, and some underwear as the clothes Smith had worn the night of the killing. Thus Simms detailed the events leading up to the slaying, the physical acts thereof, and the subsequent conduct. All counsel and the trial judge proceeded throughout the trial under the presumption that Simms was a conspirator to the murder of Ronnie Jarvis. At the conclusion of all of the evidence, counsel for appellant moved the trial judge to make a determination that as a matter of law Simms was an accomplice and to so instruct the jury. Also, he requested that the trial judge instruct the jury that appellant could not be *903 convicted on the testimony of Simms alone; that it must be corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the appellant with the commission of the offense; and that the corroboration would not be sufficient if it merely showed that the offense was committed and the circumstances thereof. Appellant relied on RCr 9.62, which provides: The trial judge refused to so instruct the jury. The court only instructed on presumption of innocence, guilt or innocence of the accused, and that the verdict must be unanimous. The record reflects that while counsel and the trial judge were in chambers discussing the instructions to be given to the jury, the court made the following determination: Evidently, the trial court was laboring under the impression that it had the right and prerogative to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to constitute Simms an accomplice as a matter of law and also to determine as a matter of law whether the evidence met the standards prescribed by RCr 9.62, to negate the submission of the sufficiency of the evidence to corroborate the testimony of Simms. This it did. In Mouser v. Commonwealth, Ky., 491 S.W.2d 821 (1973), in dealing with the necessity of instructions as to whether a person is an accomplice, we said: First of all, the trial judge found as a matter of law that Simms was an accomplice. With this we agree. Having made such a determination, the trial judge should have instructed the jury pursuant to the provisions of RCr 9.62, unless, however, there was sufficient evidence to convict appellant without the testimony of the accomplice Simms. In Mishler v. Commonwealth, Ky., 556 S.W.2d 676 (1977), the trial court had found as a matter of law that the relationship of accomplice existed and instructed the jury pursuant to RCr 9.62. It was therein contended that the question of being an accomplice should have been submitted to the jury. We wrote: We need, therefore, to consider the quality of the evidence offered at the trial to determine whether it, without considering that given by the accomplice, is sufficient to convict. The sufficiency of the *904 evidence to convict is required to be of such quality that under the evidence as a whole it would not be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find the defendant guilty. The evidence, other than that of the accomplice, discloses the following factual situation: In the case at bar, it makes no difference how the four guns found their way into the trunk of appellant's car. They were there and under his control; that is the thing that counts. The double-barrel shotgun was not identified as the murder weapon. There was a hiatus between the time the appellant was displaying and trying to sell the murder weapons and the time when Ronnie Jarvis was killed. It is not necessary that every minute of the gap in time be accounted for. If that was so, the phrase from RCr 9.62, "(t)he corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows that the offense was committed and the circumstances thereof," would have no purpose. The manner in which the guns came into appellant's possession and appellant's efforts to sell them are circumstances to be considered in deciding this issue. Nevertheless, without the evidence brought forth by Ricky Simms, the remaining evidence is not sufficient to support a conviction. We are of the opinion that the refusal of the trial judge to instruct under RCr 9.62 was error. The second issue, therefore, is whether there was evidence other than that of the accomplice which tends to connect the appellant with the commission of the offense. In Deskins v. Commonwealth, Ky., 512 S.W.2d 520 (1974), this court, in dealing with the sufficiency of the evidence under RCr 9.62, said: We must ask ourselves whether, when looking at the evidence as a whole, would it be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find the appellant guilty under any possible theory? The appellant had an alibi defense. He emphatically denied having killed Jarvis and brought forth witnesses who accounted for his time and whereabouts immediately prior to, during and immediately subsequent to the time of the murder. In Commonwealth v. Bowling, Ky., 497 S.W.2d 720 (1973), we stated: When we consider all of the evidence, that of the accomplice as well as that not of the accomplice, it is of such quality that connects the accused with the commission of the crime and supports the verdict. The trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury as requested by the appellant. The appellant requested the court to instruct the jury that before the appellant could be found guilty of murder it must find that he was not acting under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse. The jury was not so instructed. The offense for which appellant was tried, murder, is defined as follows: Instructions in a criminal prosecution must have a source within the framework of the evidence introduced at the trial. Butler v. Commonwealth, Ky., 560 S.W.2d 814 (1978); Pilon v. Commonwealth, Ky., 544 S.W.2d 228 (1977). In the instant case, there is absolutely no evidence that the appellant acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse. Ronnie Jarvis met his death at the hands of a cold, calculating murderer, acting under a prior conceived plan of action, who valued life at six guns and a favor to his friend Rickey Simms and Simms' concubine Carolyn Jarvis. Since there was no evidence that appellant acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable justification or excuse, under the circumstances as he believed them to be, there was absolutely no need for such an instruction to be given. The instructions given by the trial court were proper. This issue and the remaining issues are directed toward the sentencing portion of appellant's bifurcated trial. KRS 532.025 provides as follows: During the guilt or innocence portion of appellant's trial, without objection from anyone, counsel for appellant and the appellant himself engaged in the following dialogue: Ordinarily, the trial judge, before admitting such evidence, would hold an inchambers hearing to determine its propriety. Cotton v. Commonwealth, Ky., 454 S.W.2d 698 (1970). However, here the question was posed by one's own counsel. Such an in-chambers hearing was not necessary nor was it necessary for the judge to interpose. After the appellant had been thoroughly interrogated by his own counsel, he was turned over to the Commonwealth's Attorney for cross-examination, during the course of which the record discloses the following interrogation: During the sentencing portion of the trial, the Commonwealth's Attorney used two witnesses, Joe Pruitt, a State Probation and Parole Officer, and Dr. James G. Bland, Facility Director, Forensic Psychiatry Services. The appellant used only one witness, Dr. Elya Bresler, a professional psychologist. Before proceeding with the sentencing portion, counsel for appellant objected to the use of his prior felony convictions on the ground that the Commonwealth's Attorney did not give prior notice of his intention to use them on the sentencing portion of the trial. The statute requires that "only such evidence in aggravation as the state has made known to the defendant prior to his trial shall be admissible." The purpose of this requirement is to keep the accused fully knowledgeable of what evidence may be relied upon by the Commonwealth so that the accused can make whatever efforts he can to meet it. It was no surprise to appellant that his prior felony convictions were well known to the Commonwealth's Attorney, and this evidence was already presented to the jury on the guilt or innocence phase of the trial. Appellant's criticism of the manner in which this evidence was brought before the jury is without merit for at least two reasons. First, the evidence of appellant's prior felony convictions was, without objections, brought to the knowledge of the jury on the guilt or innocence phase of the case and, secondly, the Probation and Parole Officer was presenting the records of appellant's prior convictions, copies of which had, about ten days prior to the trial, been furnished to counsel for appellant by the Commonwealth's Attorney. In all criminal proceedings where the death penalty is sought, the trial judge must conduct a bifurcated proceeding. The first proceeding is the guilt or innocence phase and the second is the sentencing phase. All evidence introduced in the first phase of the trial is admissible in the latter phase. New or additional evidence, when proposed to be used in aggravation, is that evidence which is required to be made known to the accused prior to the sentencing phase of the trial. KRS 532.025. In the instant case, the same jury that tried the guilt or innocence phase of the trial was the jury that tried the sentencing phase. The trial judge permitted only such evidence as had been made known to the appellant prior to the trial. We find no fault with the action of the trial judge in this instance. The accomplice testified only in the guilt or innocence phase of this case. The evidence properly admitted on the first phase of the trial can be and is, without being further introduced in evidence, considered by the jury in arriving at its decision on the sentencing phase. In the event the sentencing phase of a trial is required to be before a new and different jury, then, *909 and in that event, there may be some justification or excuse to cause the evidence used on the first phase to be brought to the attention of the jury on the second phase of the trial, it not having had the advantage of having heard the evidence on which the jury predicated its verdict of guilty. There is no good reason to repeat to the same jury what it has already heard. The sentencing jury returned a verdict finding, "The defendant committed the offense of murder for himself or another for the purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value or for other profit," and recommended that appellant be sentenced to death. Before making such a recommendation, the jury was instructed that it must believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant committed the offense of murder for himself or another for the purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value or for other profit. This was the finding of the jury. The appellant argues that he is entitled to a favorable finding on the aggravating factors issue since there was no evidence corroborating the accomplice's testimony that would support such a finding. In other words, what appellant argues is that when the evidence brought forth in the guilt or innocence phase of the trial is added to the evidence brought forth in the sentencing phase, it would have been clearly unreasonable for the jury to find the punishment of death. This argument is without credence. We have heretofore opined that it would not have been clearly unreasonable for the jury to find the appellant guilty of murder when all of the testimony was considered. It was not necessary for the sentencing jury to consider only the evidence offered on the second phase of the trial to support its finding. In presenting aggravating or mitigating circumstances, neither the Commonwealth nor the accused is restricted in the use of the evidence which was brought forth on the first phase of the trial. It is the element of justification for the final sentence, as measured by the who, what, when, where, and why of the appellant as developed in both phases of the bifurcated proceeding. In the instant case, we have no hesitation in finding that from all of the evidence presented to the jury, both in the guilt or innocence phase and in the sentencing phase, as required by KRS 532.025, the sentence imposed by it is supported by the evidence and is not clearly erroneous. KRS 532.025, which provides the guidelines for sentencing in a capital case, was adopted by the 1976 Extraordinary Session of the General Assembly. Appellant contends that in the sentencing phase of the trial, as well as in the guilt or innocence phase, the trial judge was required to give the RCr 9.62 accomplice instruction. The sentencing phase of the bifurcated trial is not in any way a proceeding in which there is a conviction. The conviction had already taken place. RCr 9.62 does not apply in the sentencing phase. Counsel for appellant tendered instructions on the sentencing phase of the trial in which he sought to have the trial judge instruct the jury on the element of the presumption of innocence. The instructions were couched in such language that would, of necessity, have prohibited the jury from recommending the imposition of the death penalty. On the element of sentencing, the trial judge informed the jury as follows: Subsequently, the court instructed the jury in writing as follows: The jury returned its written recommendation that, "The defendant committed the offense of murder for himself or another for the purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value or for other profit." The trial of this action commenced on September 26, 1978, and concluded on September 29, 1978, at which time RCr 9.56(2) provided that, "The instructions should not attempt to define the term `reasonable doubt.'" The appellant complains that the trial court did not properly define "reasonable doubt." Counsel for appellant offered instructions in which "reasonable doubt" was attempted to be defined; however, the trial court refused to give them, and properly so. The appellant argues that the trial judge should have (1) instructed the jury that it must consider any evidence of mitigating circumstances and (2) that it cannot consider any aggravating factors not enumerated in KRS 532.025(2). The court is not limited by the statutory definition of mitigating circumstances, but all evidence that would tend to excuse or alleviate appellant's responsibility is competent, and the court so instructed the jury. The court properly declined to instruct the jury that it could not consider any aggravating factors not enumerated in KRS 532.025(2). Such an instruction would have been improper. The appellant argues that the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the nonexistence of every statutory mitigating circumstance before the jury could find that such circumstance did not exist. The statute does not require such an onerous undertaking. The nonexistence of every mitigating circumstance is tantamount to a finding of not guilty on the principal offense. Counsel for appellant pits mitigating factors against aggravating factors. He tendered an instruction as follows, "If the weight of the mitigating circumstance(s) approaches or exceeds the *912 weight of aggravating circumstance(s), then you cannot sentence Johnny Marshall Smith to death by electrocution." As a matter of fact, each and every mitigating circumstance, by reason that it is mitigating, is pitted against aggravating circumstances. This is so in every case where one set of facts is pitted against the other, and the jury must decide whom to believe. KRS 532.025(3) provides that such instructions should be given to the jury as are warranted by the evidence, and only one of the statutory aggravating circumstances is required to exist to justify a recommendation from the jury. So long as we have properly instructed jurors to weight the evidence in their deliberations, without the court having to encroach on their prerogatives, we do not need to instruct the jury on the weight of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Counsel for appellant further argues that if only one mitigating circumstance exists, the death penalty may not be imposed. Not so. The death penalty shall not be imposed unless at least one of the statutory aggravating circumstances is found to exist, not that if only one mitigating circumstance exists that the death penalty cannot be imposed. Appellant's counsel tendered an instruction requiring the foreman of the trial jury to put in writing whether each mitigating circumstance exists or does not exist. KRS 532.025(3) provides in this respect, "* * * The jury, if its verdict be a recommendation of death, shall designate in writing, signed by the foreman of the jury, the aggravating circumstance or circumstances which it found beyond a reasonable doubt. * * *" We are of the opinion that where the recommendation is death, then, and in that event, the jury shall designate in writing the aggravating circumstances which it found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt. We do not find that the court erred in this respect. In view of the fact that the judgment of the Muhlenberg Circuit Court is being reversed and the case remanded for a new trial, we need not reach the issues of the propriety of the manner of the selection of the veniremen; nor whether the sentence of death was inappropriate in this case; not whether the imposition of the death penalty violates the Kentucky and the United States Constitutions; nor whether the trial judge exercised discretion in sentencing the appellant; nor whether the condition of the court record was deficient; nor whether the failure of the trial court to allow appellant access to data collected pursuant to KRS 532.075 was error. No objections were made to the action of the Commonwealth's Attorney in introducing testimony that Simms, the coindictee, had been sentenced to 21 years in prison, to the introduction of testimony tending to show that the appellant worked at a bootleg joint, and to the comments of the Commonwealth's Attorney in his closing argument on the guilt and sentencing phases of the proceedings. In the absence of an issue being brought before the trial judge so that he would have an opportunity to pass on the competency of the question, the issue is not preserved for appellate review and there is no error. McDonald v. Commonwealth, Ky., 554 S.W.2d 84 (1977); Hopper v. Commonwealth, Ky., 516 S.W.2d 855 (1974). The judgment is reversed, and this action is remanded to the Muhlenberg Circuit Court for a new trial in keeping with this opinion. PALMORE, C. J., and AKER, CLAYTON, LUKOWSKY, STEPHENSON and STERNBERG, JJ., sitting. PALMORE, C. J., and AKER, LUKOWSKY and STERNBERG, JJ., concur. CLAYTON and STEPHENSON, JJ., dissent, and each files a separate dissenting opinion. PALMORE, C. J., files a separate concurring opinion in which LUKOWSKY and STERNBERG, JJ., join. *913 CLAYTON, Justice, dissenting. I disagree with the majority. One of the reasons behind RCr 9.62 is to prevent an accomplice from "pointing the finger" at the principal defendant and, by so doing, nullifying his own guilt. Professor Wigmore, in his treatise on evidence law, criticized the soundness of the accomplice rule when he wrote: Additionally, this court recognizes this technical rule to be so weak that we are tentatively disposed to abolish it. This case does not present the appropriate legal context in which the rule becomes operative. There was evidence "tending to connect the defendant (appellant) with the commission of the crime" which corroborated the accomplice's testimony. Once this fairly minimal standard of corroboration has been met, as it was here, the question then becomes one of the accomplice's credibility in the eyes of the jury. And, as Wigmore points out, "credibility is a matter of elusive variety, and it is impossible and anachronistic to determine in advance that. . . a given man's story must be distrusted." 7 Wigmore, supra. I would hold that under this particular fact situation the trial judge was in a better position to make the determination that he did and that he acted properly. I believe the court is mistaken in this case to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. It is even a greater mistake when the case is this serious and the grounds for reversal are this thin. I would affirm the judgment of conviction and the sentence of the trial court. STEPHENSON, Justice, dissenting. Ordinarily I would agree with the reversal of this case for failure to give an accomplice instruction. However, we have tentatively decided to abolish the accomplice rule after a lengthy period of reflection on the viability of the rule. The instruction the trial court failed to give would have, according to the rule, informed the jury that it could not convict on the testimony of the accomplice alone, that in addition there must be some other evidence tending to connect the crime. We have held as a matter of law that there is sufficient other evidence tending to connect the appellant with the crime. Thus, the jury did not convict on the accomplice testimony standing alone. Consequently, the failure of the trial court to give the accomplice instruction is a formal error with absolutely no prejudice to the appellant at all. With the accomplice rule being abandoned there is no longer a valid reason to enforce the giving of the instruction; accordingly, I would not reverse on this formal error. PALMORE, Chief Justice, concurring. It is regrettable that this case must be reversed on grounds that to a layman would appear merely technical. RCr 9.62, the purpose of which is to prevent an accused from being convicted solely on the testimony of an accomplice without other evidence tending to connect him with the commission of the offense charged, has a long history of some 200 years. It was expressly made a part of our law by the General Assembly in 1854, and remained in the Code of Criminal Practice until carried into the Rules in 1963. Until fairly recent times it was rigorously enforced, in that it was invariably held a reversible error for the trial court not to instruct on it in any case in which there was evidence suggesting that a witness for the prosecution was an accomplice. A fortiori, when the witness was found as a matter of law to have been an accomplice it was absolutely necessary to instruct the jury not to convict on his testimony alone. That, of course, is this case. *914 Over the past few years the rule has been eroded to the extent that this court has declined to reverse for failure to instruct on the point when the corroborating evidence was strong enough to support a conviction without the accomplice testimony. That, unfortunately, is not this case. The members of our court as presently constituted share Wigmore's misgivings regarding the soundness of the accomplice rule. We recognize also that recent decisions have fudged on it. Indeed, we are disposed to abolish it by eliminating the rule. Nevertheless, as of now it is the law, and it was the law when this man was tried. Though he may richly deserve the electric chair, those of us who join in reversing this judgment do so because the principle that a man or woman on trial has the right to be tried in accordance with the law is more important than any individual case. The accomplice rule may not be sound, and it may not be the law very much longer, but it was the law when this man was tried, and, for whatever it may be worth, he is entitled to its protection. Lukowsky and Sternberg, JJ., join in this concurring opinion.