Title: Doe v. Isaacs
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 021513
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 17, 2003

PRESENT: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Koontz, Kinser, and Lemons, JJ., 
and Carrico and Compton, S.JJ. 
 
JOHN DOE   
 
OPINION BY 
 
 
 
SENIOR JUSTICE A. CHRISTIAN COMPTON 
v.  Record No. 021513 
 
April 17, 2003 
 
MAUREEN B. ISAACS, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 
Alan E. Rosenblatt, Judge 
 
 
The sole issue in these tort actions is whether the 
evidence supports a judgment for common law punitive damages. 
 
On April 1, 1999, an automobile operated by plaintiff Allen 
Leonard Isaacs, in which his wife, plaintiff Maureen B. Isaacs, 
was a front-seat passenger, was struck from the rear in the City 
of Virginia Beach by an automobile operated by an unknown 
motorist. 
 
Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed separate actions against 
defendant John Doe, seeking compensatory and punitive damages as 
the result of injuries sustained in the accident.  The cases 
were consolidated for trial, and heard by a single jury. 
 
The defendant admitted liability in both cases; they were 
submitted to the jury on the issue of compensatory damages and, 
over defendant's objection, on the issue of punitive damages. 
 
The jury fixed Mrs. Isaacs' compensatory damages at 
$275,000 and her punitive damages at $175,000, and fixed Mr. 
Isaacs' compensatory damages at $125,000 and his punitive 
damages at $175,000.  Overruling defendant's post-trial motion 
to set the punitive damage awards aside, the trial court entered 
judgment on the verdicts. Defendant appeals, assigning error to 
that portion of the judgment awarding punitive damages. 
 
The facts are undisputed.  About 10:25 p.m. on the day in 
question, the plaintiffs' vehicle approached a city intersection 
controlled by traffic signals.  The weather was clear and "a 
little bit dark," the streets were dry, and traffic was "very 
light." 
 
The plaintiff was operating his vehicle east on Shore Drive 
about 45 miles per hour in the right lane.  He slowed as he 
neared the intersection because the traffic light facing him was 
"red" and a vehicle, also travelling east on Shore Drive, was 
stopped ahead of him at the light.  As the plaintiff "was about 
ready to stop, the traffic light changed," and the vehicle ahead 
of him "took off."  At that moment, the plaintiffs' vehicle "got 
hit from the back by a car."  Mrs. Isaacs described the impact 
as "really tremendous" and "awful." 
 
When struck, the plaintiff was "braking" and his "foot went 
down on the pedal to brake harder, even."  "After that," the 
plaintiffs' vehicle stopped at "the far side of the intersection 
in the middle."  He was "really concerned" about his wife's 
condition.  Mrs. Isaacs, who momentarily lost consciousness, 
said, "I'm hurt." 
 
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At that point, as Mr. Isaacs was standing outside his 
vehicle, the unknown motorist approached on foot; "he kind of 
staggered" and Isaacs "was concerned about him."  The defendant 
asked whether anyone was injured and Mr. Isaacs responded, "Yes.  
My wife is hurt." 
 
The defendant then moved "into the doorway where Maureen 
was.  And he started to shake the car, for whatever reason.  It 
looked like he was having trouble standing where he was," 
according to Isaacs. 
 
Next, the defendant, "slurring" his speech, said to Mr. 
Isaacs, "Please don't call the police."  Isaacs responded, "I'm 
gonna have to, because my wife is hurt."  The defendant then 
stated to Mrs. Isaacs, "Don't call the police.  I need to talk 
to you first."  Mr. Isaacs again rejected the request. 
 
Next, defendant said, "You could stop here.  I could bring 
my car down . . . I can park over there, and you can park over 
there, we will be out of the way of everybody, and we can talk."  
When Isaacs said he could not talk further, defendant said, 
"Well, I'll run up and get my car and come down here."  Assuming 
defendant would care for his wife while he went for help, Isaacs 
"walked across the street" and called emergency personnel.  Mrs. 
Isaacs remained in the vehicle, feeling "abandoned and alone and 
scared." 
 
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Neither of the Isaacs saw nor heard again from the 
defendant, who they described as a white male about 35 to 40 
years of age.  They did not observe the defendant's vehicle 
before or after the incident. 
 
The impact of the collision pushed the "back end" of the 
plaintiffs' car forward, and the floor in the rear "popped up;" 
the front seats "ended up all the way down on the floorboard." 
 
At the scene, Mr. Isaacs did not complain of injury to the 
investigating police officer while Mrs. Isaacs "complained of 
back and leg injuries."  She testified that, after the impact, 
she had blood on her face and hand. 
 
Virginia law applicable under these circumstances is clear.  
"[N]egligence which is so willful or wanton as to evince a 
conscious disregard of the rights of others, as well as 
malicious conduct, will support an award of punitive damages in 
a personal injury case."  Booth v. Robertson, 236 Va. 269, 273, 
374 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1988).  See Code § 8.01-44.5 (provides for 
exemplary damages for injury or death caused by intoxicated 
driver). 
 
In Woods v. Mendez, 265 Va. 68, 574 S.E.2d 263 (2003), the 
Court noted the definition of "willful and wanton negligence" 
set forth in Harris v. Harman, 253 Va. 336, 340-41, 486 S.E.2d 
99, 101 (1997), as "action undertaken in conscious disregard of 
another's rights, or with reckless indifference to consequences 
 
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with the defendant aware, from his knowledge of existing 
circumstances and conditions, that his conduct probably would 
cause injury to another."  265 Va. at 76-77, 574 S.E.2d at 268.  
However, "the intentional violation of a traffic law, without 
more, will not support a finding of willful and wanton 
negligence."  Alfonso v. Robinson, 257 Va. 540, 545, 514 S.E.2d 
615, 618 (1999). 
 
On appeal, the plaintiffs contend the trial court did not 
err in deciding that a jury question was presented on the issue 
of punitive damages.  They argue that defendant's conduct in 
"leaving the scene under the circumstances of this case is alone 
grounds for an award of punitive damages." 
 
Continuing, plaintiffs say that because defendant "knew the 
seriousness of" their injuries, "he enhanced their damages by 
virtue of his leaving," committing "felony hit-and-run with the 
intent to place his self interest above" their needs.  These 
actions, plaintiffs maintain, were "sufficient to permit the 
jury to find his conduct so willful and wanton as to show a 
conscious disregard of the plaintiffs' rights."  We do not 
agree. 
 
An analysis of this Court's relevant cases on common law 
punitive damages will demonstrate that such damages are not 
recoverable here as a matter of law. 
 
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Parenthetically, we observe there is abundant law on this 
subject in the opinions of this Court.  Therefore, we do not 
need guidance from the cases of other jurisdictions relied upon 
by the plaintiffs.  Indeed, they urge upon us an unpublished 
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit, Clark v. Torres, No. 90-3039, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 2736 
(4th Cir. Feb. 27, 1992) (per curiam).  But the Fourth Circuit's 
Local Rule 36(c) provides, in part:  "Citation of this Court's 
unpublished dispositions in briefs and oral arguments in this 
Court and in the district courts within this Circuit is 
disfavored, except for the purpose of establishing res judicata, 
estoppel, or the law of the case."  If reliance on such a 
disposition is disfavored in the federal system, surely such 
reliance will not be favored in the state system. 
 
In Baker v. Marcus, 201 Va. 905, 114 S.E.2d 617 (1960), 
this Court held that the trial court erred in submitting the 
question of punitive damages to the jury.  There, an intoxicated 
defendant caused a rear-end collision on a city street. 
 
The Court reviewed the purpose of punitive damages:  
"Exemplary damages are something in addition to full 
compensation, and something not given as plaintiff's due, but 
for the protection of the public, as a punishment to defendant, 
and as a warning and example to deter him and others from 
committing like offenses."  Id. at 909, 114 S.E.2d at 620 
 
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(quoting Zedd v. Jenkins, 194 Va. 704, 707, 74 S.E.2d 791, 793 
(1953)). 
 
Further, in the general discussion of the subject, the 
Court said:  "Exemplary damages are allowable only where there 
is misconduct or malice, or such recklessness or negligence as 
evinces a conscious disregard of the rights of others.  But 
where the act or omission complained of is free from fraud, 
malice, oppression, or other special motives of aggravation, 
damages by way of punishment cannot be awarded, and compensatory 
damages only are permissible."  Id. at 909, 114 S.E.2d at 621 
(quoting Wood v. Am. Nat. Bank, 100 Va. 306, 316, 40 S.E. 931, 
934 (1902)).  Accord PGI, Inc. v. Rathe Prod. Inc., 265 Va. 334, 
345, 576 S.E.2d 438, 444 (2003). 
 
In Booth, the Court reversed a trial court's judgment in 
striking the plaintiff's evidence on the issue of punitive 
damages.  There, the defendant drove his motor vehicle after 
dark the wrong way down an exit ramp of an interstate highway; 
continued driving the wrong way on the highway; met and passed 
an approaching truck, the driver of which blew his air horns, 
blinked his lights, and took evasive action avoiding a 
collision; and continued at a high rate of speed until he 
collided head-on with a vehicle operated by the plaintiff.  The 
defendant had a blood alcohol content of 0.22% by weight by 
volume, exceeding the .10% reading then establishing a 
 
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presumption of intoxication.  236 Va. at 270-71, 374 S.E.2d at 
3. 
 
Building on Baker v. Marcus, the Court stated "that a 
conscious disregard of the rights of others" necessary to 
support punitive damages may be proved by objective facts.  "The 
objective fact that the defendant . . . voluntarily consumed 
enough intoxicants to produce a reading of 0.22% blood alcohol 
content, causing him to drive as he did on the night in 
question, provides sufficient proof of his conscious disregard 
of the rights of others."  Booth, 236 Va. at 273, 374 S.E.2d at 
3. 
 
Concluding, the Court stated:  "We do not intend by this 
decision to indicate a lessening of this Court's general 
reluctance to allow punitive damages in run-of-the-mill personal 
injury cases.  We merely hold that, upon the egregious set of 
facts presented in this case, the plaintiff is entitled to have 
a jury consider her claim of punitive damages."  Id.
 
In Hack v. Nester, 241 Va. 499, 404 S.E.2d 42 (1991), 
reversing part of a trial court's judgment, we held that the 
evidence failed to establish "the conscious disregard for [the 
plaintiff's] safety necessary to sustain an award of punitive 
damages."  241 Va. at 507, 404 S.E.2d at 45.  In that case, the 
defendant consumed most of a pitcher of beer shortly before the 
accident and had two prior drunk driving convictions.  He 
 
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operated a vehicle at night without a left headlight and while 
suffering from night blindness.  His vehicle collided head-on 
with the plaintiff's vehicle on a curve while on the plaintiff's 
side of the highway. 
 
In Puent v. Dickens, 245 Va. 217, 427 S.E.2d 340 (1993), 
the Court held the evidence was insufficient to permit an award 
of punitive damages.  There, an intoxicated defendant rear-ended 
at night a stopped vehicle occupied by the plaintiff.  We said 
that a jury could have found defendant was travelling "very 
fast" just prior to the collision, that there was no indication 
he applied his brakes before impact, and "that he attempted to 
leave the scene of the collision."  245 Va. at 220, 427 S.E.2d 
at 342.  The Court stated:  "[T]hese combined factors are 
insufficient to justify a finding of the wanton negligence 
necessary for an award of punitive damages."  Id.
 
Finally, in Huffman v. Love, 245 Va. 311, 427 S.E.2d 357 
(1993), the Court held the evidence was sufficient to create a 
jury issue on punitive damages.  In that case, an intoxicated 
defendant drove his vehicle into an oncoming lane of traffic and 
sideswiped a car operated by the plaintiff.  Defendant had 
caused an earlier collision, immediately prior to the accident 
in question, when he rear-ended another vehicle. 
 
At the time of the accident sued upon, the defendant was 
driving 25 miles per hour in a 15 mile per hour zone.  He failed 
 
9
to stop at the scene, but continued to drive for three miles.  
When he was stopped, he could not talk, walk, or stand without 
assistance.  His blood alcohol level was 0.32%.  Prior to the 
incident, he had been convicted twice for drunk driving.  245 
Va. at 313, 427 S.E.2d at 359.  See Webb v. Rivers, 256 Va. 460, 
507 S.E.2d 360 (1998) (jury issue presented on punitive damages 
when defendant drove through a red light at 90 m.p.h. in 25 
m.p.h. speed zone with .21% blood alcohol level and was so drunk 
he did not know where he was or the time of night). 
 
In the present case, considering defendant's conduct in its 
entirety, we hold that, like in Baker, Hack, and Puent, 
defendant's behavior was not so willful or wanton as to show a 
conscious disregard for the rights of others. 
 
Clearly, the defendant's actions, involving violation of 
traffic laws and rules of the road, demonstrated a disregard of 
prudence to the level that the safety of others was completely 
neglected.  But this conduct amounts to gross negligence, which 
shocks fair-minded people; it is less than willful recklessness.  
See Harris v. Harman, 253 Va. at 340, 486 S.E.2d at 101.  The 
required "actual or constructive consciousness that injury will 
result from the act done or omitted," Alfonso, 257 Va. at 545, 
514 S.E.2d at 618, is lacking in the proof. 
 
At the most from the plaintiffs' standpoint, the defendant 
did not keep a proper lookout for vehicles nearly stopped ahead 
 
10
of him, he did not keep his vehicle under proper control, he 
probably was intoxicated to some extent, and he feloniously left 
the scene of the accident in violation of Code § 46.2-894.  
There is no evidence that defendant exceeded the speed limit or 
a reasonable speed under the circumstances.  He was driving on 
his proper side of the street, apparently operating a properly 
functioning vehicle.  In sum, the defendant's behavior was not 
the "egregious" conduct spoken of in our cases. 
 
The plaintiffs dwell on the contention that this is "a case 
of felony hit-and-run which increased the plaintiffs' damages."  
Continuing, they argue that "Mrs. Isascs was caused to be 
fearful and felt scared and abandoned, and both were greatly 
inconvenienced.  The defendant intentionally disregarded the 
plaintiffs' rights to get the appropriate information from the 
defendant, to have a proper investigation of the accident, to 
have criminal and civil liabilities addressed under our rule of 
law, to receive timely medical care and assistance, and to avoid 
the annoyance and outrage any injured plaintiff would feel from 
the abandonment and flight of the defendant responsible for the 
accident and injury." 
 
This contention overlooks the settled principle that 
punitive damages "are something in addition to full 
compensation, and something not given as plaintiff's due."  
Baker v. Marcus, 201 Va. at 909, 114 S.E.2d at 620.  In other 
 
11
words, punitive damages are allowed not so much as compensation 
for a plaintiff's loss as to warn others.  Id.  Indemnity for a 
plaintiff's losses is the function of compensatory, not 
punitive, damages. 
 
Consequently, we conclude that the trial court erred in 
permitting recovery of punitive damages in these actions.  
Therefore, affirming the judgment below for compensatory 
damages, we will reverse that portion of the judgment which 
provides for recovery of punitive damages, and final judgment 
will be entered here for the defendant on that issue. 
Reversed and final judgment. 
SENIOR JUSTICE CARRICO, with whom Justice Lemons joins, 
dissenting. 
 
 
I would affirm the award of punitive damages in this case. 
I acknowledge that punitive damages may be awarded only when 
conduct is so willful and wanton as to evince a conscious 
disregard of the rights of others.  This raises an interesting 
question:  Was John Doe unconscious when he fled the scene of 
the accident in this case?  To ask the question is to answer it; 
of course John Doe was not unconscious. 
 
Rather, with full knowledge that his conduct had caused 
personal injury, John Doe deliberately and feloniously fled the 
scene without, as Code § 46.2-894 requires, rendering reasonable 
assistance to the person injured and providing his name, 
 
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address, driver's license number, and vehicle registration 
number forthwith to the driver of the vehicle he struck.  
Additionally, as the majority recites, John Doe told Mr. Isaacs 
that he would come back to Mrs. Isaacs and their automobile 
after he brought his own car back to the scene.  Relying upon 
this representation, Mr. Isaacs went to find a telephone to 
summons emergency assistance.  Contrary to his representation, 
John Doe did not return and he left an injured victim "abandoned 
and alone and scared" in the car at "the far side of the 
intersection in the middle." 
 
If this is not conduct so willful and wanton as to evince a 
conscious disregard of the rights of others, it is difficult to 
discern what is.  Indeed, I think leaving the scene of an 
accident involving personal injury without rendering assistance 
to the injured person, and doing the other things the law 
requires, is about as reprehensible as conduct on the highway 
can get, and it should not go unpunished.  Yet, in this case, 
John Doe has subverted the criminal process by doing the very 
things the law prohibits – fleeing the scene, withholding 
information about his identity, and leaving no evidence of where 
he can be found.  It is not only appropriate but also necessary, 
therefore, to invoke the civil process and impose punitive 
damages upon John Doe as punishment for his conduct and as a 
lesson to others to refrain from similar behavior.  As this 
 
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Court said in Baker v. Marcus, 201 Va. 905, 114 S.E.2d 617 
(1960): 
"Exemplary damages are something in addition to full 
compensation, and something not given as plaintiff's due, 
but for the protection of the public, as a punishment to 
defendant, and as a warning and example to deter him and 
others from committing like offenses." 
 
Id. at 909, 114 S.E.2d at 620 (quoting Zedd v. Jenkins, 194 Va. 
704, 707, 74 S.E.2d 791, 793 (1953)). 
 
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
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