Title: Geanetta Moore A/k/a Jeanetta Moore V. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC03-2136
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: August 26, 2004

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
____________
No. SC03-2136
____________
GEANETTA MOORE a/k/a JEANETTA MOORE,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
[August 26, 2004]
LEWIS, J.
We have for review a decision of a district court of appeal on the following
question, which the court certified to be of great public importance:
WHEN SENTENCING PURSUANT TO THE CRIMINAL
PUNISHMENT CODE (§§ 921.002- 921.0027, Fla. Stat. (1999)) FOR
A VIOLATION OF A PROBATIONARY TERM ORIGINALLY
IMPOSED TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY TO A PRISON TERM
IMPOSED FOR A DIFFERENT OFFENSE, DO Tripp v. State, 622
So. 2d 941 (Fla. 1993), AND ITS PROGENY REQUIRE THE
TRIAL COURT TO AWARD CREDIT FOR TIME PREVIOUSLY
SERVED ON THE SENTENCE IMPOSED FOR THE DIFFERENT
OFFENSE?
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Moore v. State, 859 So. 2d 613, 618-19 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).  We have
jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The instant matter concerns two separate criminal actions, each involving
two counts, prosecuted against the petitioner, Geanetta Moore.  In case number 99-
2202, Moore was charged with grand theft and felony failure to appear.  In case
number 99-4516 she was also charged with grand theft and felony failure to appear. 
Moore pled no contest to all four counts in the two actions.  A single criminal
punishment code (hereinafter "CPC") scoresheet that included all four counts was
prepared.  The felony failure to appear in case number 99-2202 was used as the
primary offense, with the remaining three offenses considered as "additional
offenses."  Moore's total sentencing points were 46.8, and the scoresheet
established that the lowest permissible prison sentence was 11.1 months.  Moore
was sentenced to a "split" sentence.  With respect to case number 99-2202, she
was sentenced to twenty-four months imprisonment on each count, with the
sentences to run concurrently.  For the two counts in case number 99-4516, Moore
received concurrent terms of five years' probation for each count, to run
consecutively to the prison sentence in case number 99-2202.  Moore completed
her prison sentence for case number 99-2202, and began her probation.  See
1.  A CPC scoresheet was prepared after the violation of probation in case
number 99-4516.  It utilized the felony failure to appear charge as the primary
offense, and the grand theft count was included as an additional offense.  The total
sentencing points were 46.9, and the lowest permissible sentence was 14.175
months.  The scoresheet also noted that the statutory maximum was ten years.
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Moore, 859 So. 2d at 614.
Subsequently, on September 6, 2002, an affidavit was filed asserting that
Moore had violated her probation in case number 99-4516.  At a hearing held on
January 16, 2003, Moore admitted that she had violated her probation.  For both
counts in case number 99-4516, the judge sentenced Moore to thirty-six months in
state prison, with the sentences to run concurrently.  Moore's attorney objected to
the sentence, arguing that Moore was entitled to credit for the time she had served
in case number 99-2202.  The judge refused to grant Moore credit for the time she
served in the separate case.1  
On January 27, 2003, Moore filed a Motion to Correct Sentencing Error
pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(1), asserting that the judge
erred in not granting her credit for the time served in case number 99-2202.  The
trial court denied the motion, holding that the authority relied upon by Moore,
namely Tripp v. State, 622 So. 2d 941 (Fla. 1993), and its progeny, were not
applicable because Moore was sentenced pursuant to the CPC, not the sentencing
guidelines.  The court noted that the rationale behind Tripp was to "prevent a
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Defendant from being sentenced in excess of the sentencing guidelines range on a
[violation of probation]."  A sentence pursuant to the CPC, however, is limited by
only the statutory maximum.  Because Tripp was not applicable to sentences under
the CPC, the court held Moore was not entitled to relief.
On appeal, the First District examined this Court's decision in Tripp, and
outlined the subsequent decisions from this Court applying and extending Tripp,
including Cook v. State, 645 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 1994); Hodgdon v. State, 789 So. 2d
958 (Fla. 2001); and State v. Witherspoon, 810 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 2002).  The
district court affirmed the trial court's denial of relief, holding that Tripp and its
progeny did not constitute binding precedent, as they involved sentencing pursuant
to the sentencing guidelines, while Moore was sentenced under the CPC.  See
Moore, 859 So. 2d at 617.  The court noted that, as had occurred in Tripp, only a
single scoresheet was utilized in Moore's initial sentencing; however, the significant
differences between the sentencing guidelines and the CPC resulted in Tripp being
inapplicable.  See id. at 618.  The court reasoned:
[Moore's] sentences cannot be considered an interrelated unit.  Thus,
when probation on one offense is ordered to run consecutively to
incarceration on another, there is simply no logical reason to award
credit for the prison time previously served for the first offense against
a newly imposed prison sentence on the second offense following a
revocation of probation.  To do so would provide a windfall to the
defendant, in contravention of the Code's relatively clearly expressed
-5-
intent.  Accordingly, we hold that appellant was not entitled to credit
against her sentences in case number 99-4516 for the time she had
previously served in prison on the sentences imposed in case number
99-2202.
Id.  Although the district court affirmed Moore's sentence, it also certified to this
Court a question of great public importance.
TRIPP AND ITS PROGENY
Unquestionably, had the petitioner been sentenced pursuant to the sentencing
guidelines she would have been entitled to credit for the prison time she served in
case number 99-2202 upon sentencing in case number 99-4516 after the violation of
probation related to such charges.  See Tripp, 622 So. 2d at 942.  However, the
trial court declined to grant her credit for the time served in the first case because
Moore was sentenced not under the sentencing guidelines but rather pursuant to the
CPC.  We must now decide whether our decision in Tripp, and the several
subsequent decisions that have clarified and extended Tripp, become applicable to
those sentenced pursuant to the criminal punishment code.  As this is a pure
question of law, the standard of review is de novo.  See Martinez v. Fla. Power &
Light, Co., 863 So. 2d 1204, 1205 n.1 (Fla. 2003); Armstrong v. Harris, 773 So. 2d
7, 11 (Fla. 2000).  Based upon the analysis below, we answer the certified question
in the negative, agree with the district court of appeal below, and hold that Tripp
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and its progeny do not apply to CPC sentences.
In Tripp, this Court answered, in the negative, the following certified
question: "If a trial court imposes a term of probation on one offense consecutive
to a sentence of incarceration on another offense, can jail credit from the first
offense be denied on a sentence imposed after a revocation of probation on the
second offense?"  Tripp, 622 So. 2d at 941.  In Tripp, the defendant pled guilty to
two felony charges, burglary and grand theft.  See id.  He was sentenced to four
years' imprisonment on the burglary charge, and four years' probation, to be served
consecutive to the prison sentence, on the grand theft charge.  See id.  After
serving his prison time, Tripp was released on probation.  Shortly thereafter, he
violated his probation.  See id.  The judge then sentenced him to four and one-half
years' imprisonment on the grand theft charge, but gave him four years' credit for
the time previously served on the burglary charge.  See id.  The district court
reversed Tripp's sentence, and held that he was not entitled to credit for time
served on the burglary charge.  See id.
On review, we agreed with the sentence imposed by the trial court.  Initially,
we noted the purpose of the sentencing guidelines: 
The purpose of the sentencing guidelines is "to establish a
uniform set of standards to guide the sentencing judge in the sentence
decision-making process" so as to eliminate unwarranted variation in
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sentencing.  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.701(b).  One guidelines scoresheet
must be utilized for all offenses pending before the court for
sentencing.  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.701(d)(1).  A sentence must be
imposed for each separate offense, but the total sentence cannot
exceed the permitted range of the applicable guidelines scoresheet
unless a written reason is given.  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.701(d)(12). 
Sentences imposed after revocation of probation must be within the
recommended guidelines range and a one-cell bump.  Fla. R. Crim. P.
3.701(d)(14).
Id. at 942.  The focus of our decision was clearly upon ensuring that the intent and
purpose behind the sentencing guidelines not be violated.  We noted that when
Tripp was originally sentenced, the trial court used one scoresheet, and the
maximum jail time Tripp could have received for the two counts was four and one-
half years.  See id.  Upon a violation of probation, the maximum sentence would
have been five and one-half years.  See id.  However, without credit for time
served, Tripp's total sentence after the violation of probation would have been eight
and one-half years' incarceration (four years for the original burglary charge and
four and one-half years for the grand theft charge after the violation of probation),
three years more than was permitted by the original guidelines sentence.  See id. 
There, we held that a failure to grant credit for time served on the original
sentence of imprisonment would allow trial judges to "easily circumvent the
guidelines."  Id.  The fact that "both offenses were factors that were weighed in the
original sentencing through the use of a single scoresheet" could not be ignored
-8-
and, therefore, the two counts had to continue to be treated together after a
violation of probation on a second, separate count.  Id.  We noted: "We hold that if
a trial court imposes a term of probation on one offense consecutive to a sentence
of incarceration on another offense, credit for time served on the first offense must
be awarded on the sentence imposed after revocation of probation on the second
offense."  Id.
One year after Tripp was decided, this Court again addressed the relevant
issue in Cook v. State, 645 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 1994).  Cook involved a more
complicated factual situation, which varied somewhat from that presented in Tripp. 
In Cook, the defendant was initially convicted of several offenses in 1989.  He was
placed on probation for those offenses.  See id. at 436.  In 1990, he was convicted
of several new offenses, and admitted that he had violated his probation for the
1989 offenses.  See id.  He was sentenced to four and one-half years' incarceration
for the new 1990 offenses, and was again placed on probation for the 1989
offenses, to be served consecutive to his prison sentence for the 1990 offenses. 
See id.  After serving his prison sentence for the 1990 offenses, the defendant was
released and began serving his probation for the 1989 offenses.  See id.  In 1991,
Cook once again violated his probation for the 1989 offenses.  The trial court
sentenced him to three and one-half years' imprisonment for the 1989 crimes, and
-9-
refused to grant credit for time served on the 1990 offenses.  See id. at 437.  As
this Court had not yet rendered its decision in Tripp, the district court affirmed
Cook's sentence.  Following the decision in Tripp, however, this Court quashed the
district court's decision in Cook, and remanded for further proceedings consistent
with Tripp.  See id.  
On remand, the district court again affirmed the sentence imposed by the trial
court, and noted that "[t]o allow Cook 4.5 years credit, for time served on the 1990
offenses, on the concurrent 3.5 year sentences imposed for the 1989 offenses after
he twice violated his probation for those offenses, would result in no sanction for
the second violation of probation.  Surely the sentencing guidelines do not intend
such a result."  Id. (quoting Cook v. State, 635 So. 2d 70, 71 (Fla. 1st DCA
1994)).  The district court concluded that Tripp was not intended to apply in every
situation in which probation for a second, separate offense was imposed
consecutive to a sentence of imprisonment for another offense.  See id.  
We quashed the decision of the district court, and held that pursuant to
Tripp, Cook should have been granted credit for the four and one-half years'
imprisonment he served for the 1990 offenses when he was resentenced for the
1989 offenses following his violation of probation on those offenses.  See id. at
438.  The state argued that Cook's case differed from Tripp because his 1990
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sentence of four and one-half years' imprisonment for the 1990 offenses to be
followed by three years' probation for the 1989 offenses was a "resentencing" for
the 1989 offenses.  See id. at 437-38.  The state further argued that if Cook was
granted four and one-half years' credit for the time served on the 1990 offenses, he
would serve no additional prison time for the second violation of probation, for
which the judge imposed a three and one-half year sentence.  See id. at 438 n.5.  
We were not persuaded by the state's arguments at that time.  Instead, we
held that it was irrelevant that Cook had been "resentenced," in 1990, to probation
for the 1989 offenses after his first violation of probation.  In 1990, one scoresheet
was utilized when Cook was sentenced to prison for the 1990 offenses to be
followed by probation for the 1989 offenses and, therefore, Tripp was applicable. 
See id. at 438.  Further, we noted that Cook had not received an "unwarranted
windfall" because he would not serve any additional jail time for the 1989 offenses,
as the state had asserted.  We analyzed that the trial judge elected to sentence Cook
to three and one-half years following the second violation of probation.  However,
pursuant to the sentencing guidelines range devised from the original scoresheet, the
judge could have sentenced Cook to as many as seventeen years (a two-cell
increase for the two violations of probation above the maximum established on the
1990 scoresheet).  Therefore, if it was the judge's intention that Cook would serve
2.  Had the court followed Hodgdon's argument and applied credit for the
fifteen years' imprisonment to each of the four probationary terms individually,
Hodgdon would not have been required to serve any additional time incarcerated
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three and one-half years' imprisonment for the two violations of probation of the
1989 offenses, he could have sentenced Cook to eight years' imprisonment, applied
the four and one-half years' credit, and Cook would have faced three and one-half
years' imprisonment.  See id. at 438 n.5.  It was only because the judge chose to
sentence Cook to only three and one-half years instead of initiating a permitted
higher sentence that ultimately Cook would not actually serve any additional time
incarcerated.  See id.    
The next instance in which this Court was presented with circumstances to
address a Tripp issue was in Hodgdon v. State, 789 So. 2d 958 (Fla. 2001).  There,
the defendant had been sentenced for numerous counts in 1989 to fifteen years in
prison (fifteen years for one count, five for another, to be served concurrently) to
be followed by twenty years' probation for four separate charges (two ten-year
concurrent probationary terms to be followed by two consecutive terms of five
years each).  See id. at 961.  After serving his prison time, Hodgdon was released
and subsequently violated his probation.  See id.  At sentencing following the
violation of probation, Hodgdon argued that he was entitled to credit for the prison
time served for each individual consecutive sentence of probation.  See id.2  The
following his violation of probation.
-12-
trial court disagreed, and instead sentenced him to a total of forty years in prison
(two fifteen-year sentences and two five-year sentences, all sentences to run
consecutively).  See id. at 962.  The court credited the fifteen years Hodgdon had
previously served against the entire forty-year sentence, rather than each individual
sentence.  See id.  The district court affirmed the sentence.  See id.
We approved Hodgdon's sentence.  Initially, we reviewed our decision in
Tripp and explained: "At the root of our decision [in Tripp] was a desire to
effectuate the intent underlying the sentencing guidelines."  Id. at 959.  We also
noted that, in contrast to Tripp, Hodgdon did not involve a sentence that exceeded
that which was permitted under the sentencing guidelines.  See id. at 962.  That fact
alone, however, did not preclude application of Tripp.  See id.  In Tripp, the
defendant had violated only one term of probation, while the defendant in Hodgdon
had violated four.  We concluded that Tripp stands for the proposition that the
original sentences must be treated as an interrelated unit.  See id. at 963.  Therefore,
we announced: "[W]e clarify our holding in Tripp to emphasize that a defendant
who violates probation on multiple counts imposed consecutive to a prison term is
entitled to credit for the time served on the prison term as to the entire sentence
imposed on the probation violation, not against each individual count on which
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probation was violated."  Id.  Importantly, we further provided that "[T]his Court's
holding in Tripp was intended to prevent the circumvention of the guidelines by
treating sentences computed on one scoresheet as an interrelated unit.  Tripp was
never intended to provide a sentencing boon or windfall to defendants upon
violations of probation."  Id.
The final decision from this Court in the Tripp progeny was State v.
Witherspoon, 810 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 2002).  There, we answered the following
certified question from the Fifth District:
When a defendant is originally sentenced consecutively on a single
scoresheet, does the holding in Tripp v. State, 622 So. 2d 941 (Fla.
1993), require the granting of credit for time served in prison where the
defendant's newly imposed sentence upon revocation of probation
does not exceed the maximum permitted by the sentencing guidelines?
Id. at 872.  We answered the certified question in the affirmative, holding that the
certified question had been answered in Hodgdon.  See id. at 873.  We declared:
"Consistent with Hodgdon, we hold that Tripp should be applied notwithstanding
the fact that the newly imposed sentence is within the guidelines."  Id.   
THOMAS V. STATE
The First District in the instant action not only certified a question for this
Court's consideration and resolution, it also noted apparent conflict with the
Second District's decision in Thomas v. State, 805 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 2d DCA
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2001).  See Moore, 859 So. 2d at 617.  In Thomas, the defendant pled guilty to one
count of driving with a suspended license in case number 99-17486 and he also
pled guilty to one count of driving with a suspended license in case number 99-
20953.  See Thomas, 805 So. 2d at 851.  Thomas was sentenced pursuant to the
CPC rather than under the sentencing guidelines.  See id.  In case number 99-17486
he received a sentence of eighteen months' community control to be followed by
eighteen months' probation.  He was also sentenced to serve weekends in jail as a
condition of his community control.  See id.  In case number 99-20953 he received
the identical sentence, except he was not ordered to serve weekends in jail for that
conviction.  See id.  Subsequently, Thomas violated his probation.  After the
violation he was sentenced to concurrent terms of eighteen months in prison. 
Credit for the weekend jail time served in case number 99-17486 was applied only
to the prison sentence imposed, after the violation, in case number 99-17486.  See
id.
On appeal, Thomas argued that pursuant to Tripp he was entitled to credit
for the weekend jail time in both cases.  The trial court had apparently declined to
apply the Tripp proposition because the probation ordered in case number 99-
20953 was concurrent with, and not consecutive to, the probation ordered in case
number 99-17486.  See id.  The Second District disagreed.  The court opined: "We
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believe the application of Tripp is triggered not by whether a consecutive period of
probation is ordered, but by the fact of offenses being scored on the same
scoresheet and, thus, factored into the computation of a permissible sentence
imposed at the same sentencing proceeding."  Id.  
The Thomas court did not explicitly address the specific issue currently
before us, namely whether Tripp and its progeny are applicable to CPC sentences. 
However, the Second District did implicitly acknowledge the difference between the
CPC and the sentencing guidelines by recognizing: "We observe that the legislative
broadening of permissible guidelines sentencing ranges has virtually eliminated the
circumvention of the guidelines problem with which Tripp was concerned. 
Nevertheless, because Tripp appears to require that credit be granted on both
cases, we reverse and remand for the trial court to award the additional credit."  Id.
at 851-52.  As the Second District did apply the Tripp requirements to Thomas'
CPC sentences, it is in apparent conflict with the instant decision in Moore, in
which the First District expressly held that the Tripp principles were not applicable
to CPC sentences.  
ANALYSIS
When the Legislature adopted the criminal punishment code in 1998, it
substantially altered sentencing in Florida.  As we recently discussed: 
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In Jones v. State, 813 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 2002), we recognized that the
establishment of the Criminal Punishment Code in 1998 made
substantial changes relating to the sentencing guidelines.  See id. at 25. 
Under the former sentencing guidelines, a narrow range of permissible
sentences was determined through a strict mathematical formula.  See
§ 921.0014(2), Fla. Stat. (2000).  It was then within the judge's
discretion to sentence the defendant within that narrow range.  In
contrast, under the now-applicable CPC, "[t]he permissible range for
sentencing shall be the lowest permissible sentence [as determined by
the number of total sentencing points] up to and including the statutory
maximum."  § 921.0024(2), Fla. Stat. (2000).  Conceptually, the CPC
and the former sentencing guidelines are not synonymous, . . . ."
Nettles v. State, 850 So. 2d 487, 492-93 (Fla. 2003).  Therefore, because a CPC
sentence is conceptually different than a guidelines sentence, not all rules that were
applicable to guidelines sentencing are applicable to CPC sentencing.  The rule
established in Tripp is such an example.
We have recognized that our decision in Tripp was grounded upon "a desire
to effectuate the intent underlying the sentencing guidelines."  Hodgdon, 789 So. 2d
at 959.  In Tripp, we noted that if a defendant was not granted credit for time
served, the guidelines could be "easily circumvent[ed]."  Tripp, 622 So. 2d at 942. 
As we explained in Tripp, under the guidelines, while individual sentences were
required to be imposed for each separate offense, the offenses were interrelated
because a single total sentencing guidelines range was to be established on a single
scoresheet.  See id. at 942.  If a defendant subsequently violated probation, the
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judge was restricted to sentencing that defendant within a one-cell increase above
the original guidelines range.  See id.  These restrictions were eliminated by the
CPC.
Under the CPC, "[t]he trial court judge may impose a sentence up to and
including the statutory maximum for any offense, including an offense that is before
the court due to a violation of probation or community control." § 921.002(1)(g),
Fla. Stat. (1999) (emphasis added).  The Legislature expressed that the primary
purpose of sentencing is to be punishment.  See § 921.002(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (1999). 
As with the sentencing guidelines, a single scoresheet for all offenses is used for
CPC sentencing.  However, a single sentencing range is not established under the
CPC as occurred under the prior guidelines.  "The permissible range for sentencing
shall be the lowest permissible sentence up to and including the statutory maximum
. . . for the primary offense and any additional offenses before the court for
sentencing.  The sentencing court may impose such sentences concurrently or
consecutively."  § 921.0024(2), Fla. Stat. (1999).  
Under the prior guidelines, the individual offenses were considered
interrelated because together they were used to establish the minimum and
maximum sentence that could be imposed.  To the contrary, however, under the
CPC, together the individual offenses only establish the minimum sentence that may
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be imposed; a single maximum sentence is not established—each individual offense
has its own maximum sentence, namely the statutory maximum for that offense. 
Under the CPC, multiple offenses are not interrelated as they were previously under
the guidelines.  
In Tripp and its progeny, we addressed concerns unique to the sentencing
guidelines.  We highlighted in Tripp that with the circumstances presented there,
both offenses were factors considered in the original sentence.  See Tripp, 622 So.
2d at 942.  Additionally, unlike application of CPC sentencing, the offenses were
factors that were jointly considered to establish a sentencing range.  Offenses were
required to be addressed as interrelated until all sentences and probationary terms
were satisfied because the offenses together created the initial sentencing
range—the minimum and maximum permissible sentence.  While one scoresheet
may still be utilized in CPC sentencing, a sentencing range is not established under
the CPC; only a minimum permissible sentence is determined.  The maximum
sentence for each offense is determined solely by the statutory maximum for the
individual offenses.  
The concerns previously relevant to the Court's analysis in deciding Tripp
and its progeny are no longer present in CPC sentencing.  The Legislature has now
specifically provided that a defendant may be sentenced up to the statutory
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maximum for any offense, including an offense after a violation of probation; a trial
judge is no longer limited by an established guidelines maximum and a one-cell
bump.  Therefore, because the concerns related to guidelines sentencing are no
longer present in CPC sentencing, and the courts are no longer specifically limited
to a sentencing range under the CPC, there is no justification for continuing to treat
separate offenses as an interrelated unit after the minimum sentence is established. 
The certified question is therefore answered in the negative—defendants who
violate a consecutive term of probation are not entitled to credit for prison time
served on a separate offense.  The First District's thoughtful, articulate, and well-
reasoned decision in Moore is thus approved, and, to the extent it is in conflict, the
Second District's decision in Thomas disapproved.
It is so ordered.        
PARIENTE, C. J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, QUINCE, CANTERO and BELL,
JJ., concur.
PARIENTE, C.J., concurring with an opinion, in which ANSTEAD, J., concurs.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
PARIENTE, C.J., concurring.
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I concur fully in the majority opinion, and write separately to distinguish the
Court's decision today from State v. Witherspoon, 810 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 2002).
In Witherspoon, this Court held that credit for time served under Tripp v.
State, 622 So. 2d 941 (Fla. 1993), should be granted even when the overall
sentence would not otherwise exceed the guidelines maximum.  See 810 So. 2d at
873.  In this case, the Court holds that Tripp credit need not be granted upon
revocation of probation in a Criminal Punishment Code (CPC) sentence because
under the CPC, there is no ceiling on the overall sanction, as there was under the
guidelines.  At first glance, these results might seem inconsistent.  How can the
Court require Tripp credit in a case in which the denial of credit would not cause
the sentence to exceed the guidelines ceiling, but decline to require the credit under
a regime in which the ceiling has been abandoned?  
The different results flow from the fact that under the CPC, unlike the
guidelines, sentences for different offenses need not be imposed as a unit.  We
recognized in Tripp that the guidelines were designed to establish uniform
standards that would eliminate unwarranted sentence variation by limiting the trial
court's discretion to impose sentences outside presumptive sentencing ranges.  See
622 So. 2d at 942.  As the First District stated in this case, the CPC "was intended
to return to trial judges most of the discretion regarding sentencing that they had
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traditionally enjoyed prior to the adoption of the sentencing guidelines."  Moore v.
State, 859 So. 2d 613, 617 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).  In contrast to the guidelines, the
CPC has no ceiling other than the statutory maximum punishment, authorizes any
sentence that may originally have been imposed as a penalty for violation of
community control or probation, and permits a consecutive sentence for each
offense.  We have upheld this sentencing scheme against constitutional challenge. 
See Hall v. State, 823 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 2002).
Accordingly, different offenses pending for sentencing at the same time need
no longer be considered as an interrelated unit for any purpose other than
establishing the minimum sentence.  Because the unitary sentencing policy of the
guidelines that led to our decision in Witherspoon is largely absent from the CPC, I
agree that the trial court may forego Tripp credit upon revocation of community
control or probation in a sentence imposed under the Criminal Punishment Code.  
ANSTEAD, J., concurs.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified
Great Public Importance 
First District - Case No. 1D03-617
(Escambia County)
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Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender and  P. Douglas Brinkmeyer, Assistant Public
Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida
for Petitioner
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Robert R. Wheeler, Tallahassee Bureau
Chief and Alan R. Dakan, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida
for Respondent