Title: Berry v. Volkswagen Group of Am., Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC92770
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: April 9, 2013

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DARREN BERRY, et al., 
 
  
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
Respondents, 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
vs.    
            
 
 
 
) 
No. SC92770 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF  
 
) 
AMERICA, INC., 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appeal from Circuit Court of Jackson County 
Honorable Michael W. Manners, Judge 
 
Opinion issued April 9, 2013 
 
Introduction 
Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. (hereinafter, “Volkswagen”) seeks review of the 
trial court’s judgment awarding the attorneys in the underlying class action lawsuit 
attorneys’ fees.  Volkswagen raises five points on appeal challenging the lodestar amount 
and the multiplier that the trial court applied. 
 
This Court finds that the lodestar amount was within the trial court’s discretion.  
Further, while this is the first time this Court is addressing the use of a multiplier, there is no 
reason to usurp the long-standing principle in Missouri that our trial judges are considered 
experts in determining the proper amount of attorneys’ fees.  Accordingly, the judgment is 
affirmed.   
Facts and Procedural History 
In 2005, Darren Berry filed suit against Volkswagen, alleging violations of the 
Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (hereinafter, “MMPA”), chapter 407 et seq., 
RSMo 2000,1 in that certain Volkswagen vehicles contained defective window 
regulators.  Berry sought to certify a nationwide class on behalf of owners and lessors of 
Volkswagen vehicles.  In 2007, the nationwide class certification was denied, and the 
trial court limited the class to plaintiffs in Missouri (hereinafter, “Class”).   
                                                
 
Class and Volkswagen engaged in lengthy pretrial matters and multiple attempts 
to settle.  On May 17, 2010, as Class prepared to go to trial, Volkswagen offered to settle 
with terms favorable to Class.  The proposed settlement divided Class members into two 
groups.  The first group, who repaired the window regulators in their vehicles, would be 
reimbursed for the repair or replacement and compensated $75 for each incident.  The 
second group contained Class members who had not repaired a window regulator, which 
would receive a payment of $75 and have the window regulator repaired at an authorized 
Volkswagen dealer within ninety days of the date of the mailing of the notice.  
Volkswagen agreed to pay the costs of notifying Class, administering the settlement, and 
payment of reasonable attorneys’ fees to Class counsel. 
 
The trial court preliminarily approved the settlement and ordered notice to be sent 
to Class in June 2010.  A third-party company acted as the claims administrator, 
publishing a Class notice in four Missouri newspapers and mailing notice to 22,304 Class 
 
1  All further statutory references are to RSMo 2000. 
members.  Of the mailed notices, 6,150 were returned as undeliverable; the claims 
administrator later resent notice to 4,083 updated addresses.  
 
Class members were required to submit their claims by October 11, 2010.  Class 
members in the first group were required to submit a receipt for purchase of the part 
and/or to submit “one or more receipts(s) that describe(s) each documented incident or 
workshop visit,” showing that “a Window Regulator failure was diagnosed, repaired, 
replaced or purchased and … contain[ing] the date and location of the facility.”  The 
claims form defined “receipt” and provided for an alternative certification procedure if a 
receipt was not available.  Class members in the second group were required to “set forth 
… a statement of the date, nature and circumstances of each such failure, the reasons why 
[Class member had not] had the failure repaired until now, and the names, addresses and 
telephone numbers of the other persons who have knowledge of these facts and can verify 
them.”   
 
When the claims period terminated, 177 claims had been made, and 130 of those 
were determined to be valid.  The total payout to Class members was $125,261. 
 
After the settlement for Class was approved and paid out, the trial court held a 
three-day hearing regarding attorneys’ fees pursuant to section 407.025.2, which 
authorizes reasonable attorneys’ fees in a class action under the MMPA.  Class counsel 
testified they calculated they expended 7,910 hours during the lengthy litigation.2  Class 
                                                 
2  An approximate breakdown of Class counsels’ time was:  fourteen percent of the time 
was billed at $650 per hour, forty-two percent between $400-500 per hour, fifteen percent 
at $375 per hour, and one percent at $252 per hour.  The remaining twenty-eight percent 
was billed for the professional staff priced at $200 per hour. 
 
3
counsel determined their lodestar3 amount to be $3,087,320.  Additionally, Class counsel 
sought a multiplier of 2.6, arguing that the fee award represented approximately twenty-
five percent of the potential total value of the settlement based upon their expert’s 
calculation that each window regulator would fail 6.5 times over the life of the vehicle. 
Volkswagen argued against the multiplier.  Volkswagen stated it was not arguing 
that Class counsel “billed time that they shouldn’t have billed” and was not “nit-picking 
with them about the number of hours they spent on certain matters or whether they 
should have spent a certain number of hours on the case.”  Further, Volkswagen did not 
dispute the “experience, talent, and lawyering that was done in the case by [Class] 
counsel.” 
 
The trial court determined the hourly rate and amount of time expended by Class 
counsel was reasonable and the lodestar amount was $3,087,320.  The  trial court stated it 
would apply a multiplier of 2.0 to the lodestar amount for a total award of $6,174,640 in 
attorneys’ fees. The trial court further awarded Class counsel all of their expenses and 
assessed court costs against Volkswagen.  Volkswagen appeals the trial court’s judgment. 
Volkswagen brings this five-point appeal, challenging the trial court’s judgment in 
awarding Class counsel attorneys’ fees.  First, Volkswagen claims the trial court abused 
its discretion in its attorneys’ fee award because the fee award was disproportionate to the 
result obtained for Class in that the fee award is forty-nine times the amount of Class 
                                                 
3  The lodestar amount is determined by multiplying the number of hours reasonably 
expended by a reasonable hourly rate in the community.  Alhalabi v. Mo. Dept. of Nat. 
Resources, 300 S.W.3d 518, 530 n.6 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009); Trout v. State, 269 S.W.3d 
484, 487 n.1 (Mo. App. W.D. 2008).   
 
4
recovery.  Second, Volkswagen avers the trial court erred in its attorneys’ fee award 
because the award fails to bear any relation to the award obtained for Class.  Third, 
Volkswagen contends the trial court erred in applying the multiplier to the lodestar 
because there were no rare or exceptional circumstances.  Penultimately, Volkswagen 
asserts the trial court’s award offends public policy and undermines the purposes of a 
class action.  Finally, Volkswagen argues the award violates its due process rights.  Since 
all of Volkswagen’s arguments challenge the trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees, they 
will be addressed together. 
Motion to Dismiss the Appeal 
 
Class filed a motion to dismiss Volkswagen’s appeal, which was taken with the 
case.  Class asserts that the appeal is in direct violation of the plain and unambiguous 
language of the written settlement agreement, which specified Volkswagen would pay 
attorneys’ fees and expenses that were approved by the trial court.   
 
The settlement required Volkswagen to pay Class counsel’s “reasonable” 
attorneys’ fees.  Class counsel focused on the procedure to determine the amount of 
reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses, but nowhere in the settlement is there language 
waiving the right to appeal the final determination of attorneys’ fees.  To the contrary, the 
settlement contemplates an appeal of attorneys’ fees and provides for the finality of the 
settlement, even in the circumstances when there is “any appeal from any order relating 
[to the fee application] or reversal or modification thereof ….”  The motion to dismiss the 
appeal is overruled. 
 
 
5
Federal Use of a Multiplier 
The United States Supreme Court has set forth its guidelines for federal cases in 
Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, --- U.S. ---, 130 S.Ct. 1662 (2010), stating when it is 
appropriate to apply a multiplier after awarding the lodestar amount in fee-shifting cases.   
In Perdue, the Supreme Court stated there is a strong presumption that the lodestar 
amount is the amount of reasonable attorneys’ fees, but that presumption could be 
overcome.  Id. at 1673.  The Court identified six rules when evaluating whether a 
multiplier is appropriate.  First, a reasonable fee is a fee that is sufficient to persuade an 
attorney to commence representation of a meritorious case; it is not to provide an 
economic windfall to the attorney.  Id. at 1672-73.  Second, awarding the lodestar amount 
presumptively achieves the objective of inducing a capable attorney to engage in 
meritorious litigation.  Id. at 1673.  Third, an enhancement to the lodestar amount “may 
be awarded in ‘rare’ and ‘exceptional’ circumstances.”  Id. (internal citations omitted).  
Fourth, “an enhancement may not be awarded based on a factor that is subsumed in the 
lodestar calculation.”  Id.  Accordingly, the rationale that the case was novel or complex 
is not a ground for an enhancement because these factors are reflected in an attorney’s 
billable hours.  Id.  Additionally, the “quality of an attorney’s performance generally 
should not be used to adjust the lodestar because considerations concerning the quality of 
a prevailing party’s counsel’s representation normally are reflected in the reasonable 
hourly rate.”  Id. (internal citation omitted).  Fifth, the burden of proving an enhancement 
is necessary is placed on the fee applicant.  Id.  Finally, “a fee applicant seeking an 
enhancement must produce ‘specific evidence’ that supports the award.”  Id. 
 
6
An enhancement to the lodestar amount may be made when there are superior 
results obtained as a result of superior attorney performance.  Id. at 1674. However, just 
because an attorney prevails, it does not mean axiomatically that the attorney’s 
performance was superior.  The “outcome may result from inferior performance by 
defense counsel, unanticipated defense concessions, unexpectedly favorable rulings by 
the court, an unexpectedly sympathetic jury, or simple luck.”  Id.  None of these 
enumerated circumstances justify an enhanced award. 
 
The Supreme Court noted several specific circumstances when an enhanced award 
should be given.  First, it may be appropriate to enhance the lodestar amount when the 
method of determining the hourly rate “does not adequately measure the attorney’s true 
market value ….”  Id.  Second, it may be appropriate to enhance the lodestar amount 
when “the attorney’s performance includes an extraordinary outlay of expenses and the 
litigation is exceptionally protracted.”  Id.  Third, it may be appropriate to enhance the 
lodestar amount when “an attorney’s performance involves exceptional delay in the 
payment of fees.”  Id. at 1675.  While recognizing that typically, under a fee-shifting 
arrangement, the attorney will not receive compensation until successful resolution of the 
litigation, an enhancement may be proper when there is an unanticipated delay, 
unjustifiably caused by the defense.  Id.   
Attorneys’ Fees Awards in Missouri 
a.  Lodestar Amount 
The trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  
Hill v. City of St. Louis, 371 S.W.3d 66, 81 (Mo. App. E.D. 2012).  The trial court is 
 
7
deemed an expert at fashioning an award of attorneys’ fees and may do so at its 
discretion.  Western Blue Print Co., LLC v. Roberts, 367 S.W.3d 7, 23 (Mo. banc 2012).  
“To demonstrate an abuse of discretion, the complaining party must show the trial court’s 
decision was against the logic of the circumstances and so arbitrary and unreasonable as 
to shock one’s sense of justice.”  Id. (quoting Howard v. City of Kansas City, 332 S.W.3d 
772, 792 (Mo. banc 2011)).   
In Missouri, the general rule is that “attorney fees are not awarded to every 
successful litigant.”  Lucas Stucco & EIFS Design, LLC v. Landau, 324 S.W.3d 444, 445 
(Mo. banc 2010).  However, attorneys’ fees may be awarded when they are provided for 
in a contract or when they are authorized statutorily.  Id.; Essex Contracting, Inc. v. 
Jefferson Cnty., 277 S.W.3d 647, 657 (Mo. banc 2009).   
There is no question the trial court had the authority to award attorneys’ fees to 
Class.  The legislature statutorily authorized recovery of attorneys’ fees in class actions 
brought under MMPA.  Section 407.025.2.4  Additionally, the settlement agreement 
provided for “reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses.”  While the trial court has 
discretion to award reasonable attorneys’ fees, there are factors that may be considered to 
determine the amount of attorneys’ fees to award.  Gilliland v. Missouri Athletic Club, 
273 S.W.3d 516, 523 (Mo. banc 2009).  One consideration in determining the amount of 
attorneys’ fees is the result achieved.  O’Brien v. B.L.C. Ins. Co., 768 S.W.2d 64, 71 (Mo. 
                                                 
4  Section 407.025.2 provides, “In any action brought pursuant to this section, the court 
may in its discretion order, in addition to damages, injunction or other equitable relief and 
reasonable attorney’s fees.” 
 
 
 
 
8
banc 1989); see also Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983).  Other relevant factors 
in determining the reasonable value and amount of statutorily authorized fees include: 
1) the rates customarily charged by the attorneys involved in the case and by other 
attorneys in the community for similar services; 2) the number of hours reasonably 
expended on the litigation; 3) the nature and character of the services rendered; 4) 
the degree of professional ability required; 5) the nature and importance of the 
subject matter; 6) the amount involved or the result obtained; and 7) the vigor of 
the opposition.   
 
Hill, 371 S.W.3d at 81-2.5 
While an award of attorneys’ fees should have some relationship to the award, 
“there is no established principle that the fee may not exceed the damages awarded.”  
O’Brien, 768 S.W.2d at 71.  When the legislature codifies fee-shifting awards for 
attorneys’ fees in legislation that it promulgated to protect the public from harm, there is 
the possibility that the “amount of the verdict or judgment may have little bearing on the 
amount of attorneys’ fees.”  Gilliland, 273 S.W.3d at 523 (discussing the award of 
attorneys’ fees in a human rights action). 
 
In this case, Class counsel were unsuccessful in moving the court to certify a 
nationwide class.  Yet, even in spite of a vigorous defense by Volkswagen, Class counsel 
achieved a high degree of success for Class in Missouri.  Class counsel engaged in 
litigation that would protect the class members from errors made by Volkswagen in the 
production of its vehicles.  The trial court heard evidence regarding the time Class 
counsel spent on this case, their hourly rates, and the expenses they incurred.  The trial 
court considered the benefit conferred to the entire Class, the novel problem and skill 
                                                 
5 Missouri Lawyer’s Weekly has compiled lists of billing rates in its August 6, 2012, 
publication and in its Third Annual Corporate Counsel Desk Book. 
 
9
required to litigate the case, the duration of the case (from filing though the anticipated 
lengthy trial), the experience, reputation, and ability of counsel, time required, and the 
paternalistic legislation that authorized attorneys’ fees.  The trial court found Class 
counsel’s reasonable time spent on the case was 7,190 hours and their rates were 
reasonable.  Accordingly, the trial court calculated the lodestar value to be $3,087,320.  
Given all of the factual findings made by the trial court and noting this was a complex 
class action litigation, this Court cannot say the value of the lodestar awarded was 
arbitrary, unreasonable, or an abuse of discretion.   
b.   Multiplier 
 
This Court must determine whether the application of the multiplier in this case 
was proper.  This Court has not addressed under what circumstances in Missouri a 
multiplier could be used to enhance the lodestar amount.  While recognizing the rationale 
in Perdue may provide useful guidelines for the initial determination by the trial court, 
this Court declines to adopt the use of those federal guidelines to modify long standing 
Missouri law.6 
In this case, after determining the lodestar amount, the trial court listed seven 
additional factors in its findings of fact that it used to evaluate whether to apply a 
multiplier to the lodestar amount.  The trial court considered:   
(a)  The nature of the defect involved was a novel problem; 
                                                 
6 Other states have reached similar conclusions and have declined to follow Perdue in 
favor of retaining the trial court’s traditional discretion to award attorney fees. See 
Atherton v. Gopin, 272 P.3d 700 (N.M. App. Ct. 2012); Walker v. Gieffre, 209 N.J. 124 
(N.J. 2012).   
 
10
(b)  The skill requisite to prepare and try this case – which the parties estimated 
would take three weeks – was high;  
(c)  Taking this case precluded class counsel from accepting other employment 
that would have been less risky; 
(d)  The experience, reputation, and ability of [C]lass counsel is outstanding; 
(e)  The fee to be received by [C]lass counsel was always contingent, unlike the 
fees received by counsel for [Volkswagen]; 
(f)  The time required by the demands of preparing this cause for trial delayed 
work on [C]lass counsel’s other work; and  
(g)  Class counsel adduced evidence that the fee this Court believes is appropriate 
in this case is not disproportionately excessive in light of the potential benefit 
conferred on member of the class. 
 
The trial court concluded that, considering the facts in this case, awarding a multiplier of 
2.0 would be appropriate for a total reasonable attorneys’ fee award of $6,174,640. 
 
When a trial court must determine whether to apply a multiplier, it should avoid 
awarding a multiplier based upon facts that it considered in its initial determination of the 
lodestar amount.  See Perdue, 130 S.Ct. at 1673.  The trial court premised its use of the 
multiplier on a list of enumerated factors, some of which are duplicative of the factors 
utilized in its calculation of the lodestar amount.  However, at least three of the seven 
factors directly support the application of a multiplier and demonstrate there was no 
abuse of discretion.  The trial judge found “[t]he fee to be received by class counsel was 
always contingent, unlike the fees received by counsel for Defendant;” “[t]aking this case 
precluded class counsel from accepting other employment that would have been less 
risky” and “[t]he time required by the demands of preparing this cause for trial delayed 
work on class counsel’s other work.”  These findings support a finding that a multiplier 
was necessary to ensure a market fee that compensated class counsel for taking this case 
in lieu of working less risky cases on an hourly basis.   
 
11
  The MMPA’s fundamental purpose is the “protection of consumers,” and, to 
promote that purpose, the act prohibits false, fraudulent or deceptive merchandising 
practices.  Huch v. Charter Communications, Inc., 290 S.W.3d 721, 724 (Mo. banc 
2009); section 407.020.  The MMPA is “paternalistic legislation designed to protect those 
that could not otherwise protect themselves.”  Huch, 290 S.W.3d at 725-26 (quoting High 
Life Sales Co. v. Brown-Forman Corp., 823 S.W.2d 493, 498 (Mo. banc 1992) (citations 
omitted)).  The legislature granted discretion to the trial court to award, “in addition to 
damages, injunction or other equitable relief and reasonable attorney’s fees.”  Section 
407.025.  These remedial measures are designed not only to remedy violations of the 
MMPA, but also prospectively to deter prohibited conduct and protect Missouri citizens.  
Scott v. Blue Springs Ford Sales, Inc., 176 S.W.3d 140, 143 (Mo. banc 2005).  The trial 
court assessed Class counsel’s impact to the outcome of the proceedings and determined 
there was specific evidence before the trial court, demonstrating that a multiplier would 
be appropriate.  There was no abuse of discretion. 
Motion for Attorneys’ Fees on Appeal 
 
Prior to submission of this case on appeal, Class filed a motion with this Court for 
attorneys’ fees on appeal.  This motion was taken with the case.   
The legislature intended that in any action filed under the MMPA the trial court 
within its discretion may order an “injunction or other equitable relief and reasonable 
attorney’s fees.”  Section 407.025.2.  Clearly, this reflects the MMPA’s objective of 
protecting consumers and serving as a deterrent to fraudulent and deceptive 
merchandising practices.  Huch, 290 S.W.3d at 724.  Accordingly, refusing to 
 
12
compensate an attorney for the time reasonably spent on appellate work defending the 
settlement below would be inconsistent with the intent of the legislature.   
While “appellate courts have the authority to allow and fix the amount of 
attorney’s fees on appeal, we exercise this power with caution, believing in most cases 
that the trial court is better equipped to hear evidence and argument on this issue and 
determine the reasonableness of the fee requested.”  Rosehill Gardens, Inc. v. Luttrell, 67 
S.W.3d 641, 648 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002).  Hence, on remand the trial court will need to 
determine the reasonableness of Class counsels’ request for attorneys’ fees on appeal.  
Conclusion 
 
The trial court’s judgment as to the multiplier applied to the lodestar amount is 
affirmed.  On remand, the trial court shall make specific findings, consistent with this 
opinion, to determine the appropriate amount of attorneys’ fees on appeal and to enter 
judgment accordingly.   
 
__________________________ 
GEORGE W. DRAPER III, JUDGE 
 
 
 
Teitelman, C.J., Russell and Fischer,  
JJ., concur; Stith, J., concurs in part  
and dissents in part in separate  
opinion filed. Breckenridge and  
Wilson, JJ., not participating. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13
 
14
 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
DARREN BERRY et al., 
 
  
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
Respondents, 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
vs.    
            
 
 
 
) 
No. SC92770 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF  
 
) 
AMERICA, INC., 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART OPINION 
 
I agree with the principal opinion insofar as it holds that the motion to 
dismiss the appeal filed by the class of Missouri plaintiffs (“Class”) should be 
overruled.  I also agree that class counsel are partially successful on appeal and 
that it is appropriate for the trial court to determine on remand the appropriate 
amount of attorneys’ fees incurred on appeal. 
I further agree with the principal opinion that the lodestar amount approved 
by the trial court was reasonable.  The trial court’s findings, however, do not 
indicate that in approving the lodestar amount it considered the factors this Court 
requires a trial court to consider in approving attorneys’ fees.  The findings and 
conclusion suggest that the trial court instead believed that once it approved the 
hours spent, it could simply presume the lodestar amount was reasonable and then 
consider the traditional factors used to determine the reasonableness of a fee in 
deciding whether to enhance the lodestar with a multiplier.  If this is what the trial 
court did, it was an abuse of discretion.  
Alternatively, if the trial court sub silencio considered the necessary factors 
in approving the lodestar, and then considered many of them a second time in 
approving the multiplier, as the principal opinion seems to presume, then this also 
was an abuse of discretion.  The same factors should not have been considered 
twice.   
The trial court also abused its discretion in expressly determining that it 
would not give any weight to the actual benefit to the class from the lawsuit.  This, 
along with the factors the trial court did mention, was an important and necessary 
consideration in enhancing the lodestar with a multiplier.  The principal opinion 
errs in not requiring that actual benefit be one of the many considerations in 
determining whether to approve a multiplier. 
Unlike the majority, I am unable to find any basis on this record to presume 
that, absent duplicate consideration of many factors and without consideration of 
other necessary factors such as actual benefit, the trial court would have adopted a 
multiplier of two.  I therefore would remand for redetermination of the multiplier.   
I. 
FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING LODESTAR. 
The lodestar amount is the product of the hourly rates charged by class 
counsel multiplied by the total number of hours expended on the case.  The record 
indicates that class counsel billed between $252 and $650 dollars per hour and 
 
2
class counsel’s professional staff billed between $75 and $200 per hour.  The total 
number of hours spent on the case, as determined by the trial court, was 7,190 
hours.  Multiplying the hourly rates by the time spent resulted in a total lodestar 
amount of $3,087,320.00.  In addition, the class had expenses of $550,000.  Actual 
recovery by the class was $125, 261. 
In determining the lodestar amount the trial court must consider the 
reasonableness of the amount charged per hour and the reasonableness of the 
hours expended.  As the principal opinion notes, while a trial court has discretion 
in determining reasonable attorneys’ fees, this Court’s cases require it to consider 
various factors in doing so, including the result achieved.  Slip op. at 9.  See, e.g., 
Gilliland v. Missouri Athletic Club, 273 S.W.3d 516, 523 (Mo. banc 2009); 
O’Brien v. B.L.C. Ins. Co., 768 S.W.2d 64, 71 (Mo. banc 1989); Hensley v. 
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983).  The principal opinion cites approvingly to the 
statement of additional factors in Hill v. City of St. Louis, 371 S.W.3d 66 (Mo. App. 
2012): 
Other relevant factors in determining the reasonable value and 
amount of statutorily authorized fees include: 
 
1) the rates customarily charged by the attorneys involved in 
the case and by other attorneys in the community for similar 
services; 2) the number of hours reasonably expended on the 
litigation; 3) the nature and character of the services rendered; 
4) the degree of professional ability required; 5) the nature 
and importance of the subject matter; 6) the amount involved 
or the result obtained; and 7) the vigor of the opposition.   
 
Hill, Id. at 81-82. 
 
3
Rule 4-1.5 of the Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct, adopted by this 
Court, sets out a more extensive list of factors to be considered in determining the 
reasonableness of a fee.  Because this Court uses the Rule 4-1.5 standard to 
evaluate the reasonableness of a fee for disciplinary purposes, it is highly 
instructive: 
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the 
questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal 
service properly; (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the 
acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other 
employment by the lawyer; (3) the fee customarily charged in the 
locality for similar legal services; (4) the amount involved and the 
results obtained; (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by 
the circumstances; (6) the nature and length of the professional 
relationship with the client; (7) the experience, reputation, and 
ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and (8) 
whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
 
A. 
The Trial Court Erred in Identifying Factors Relevant to Lodestar 
versus Factors Relevant to Multiplier. 
 
The trial court was aware of these factors.  Indeed, it largely tracked them. 
The problem is, the trial court did so not in determining whether the basic fee – the 
lodestar amount – was reasonable, but in determining to enhance that award by a 
multiplier of two.  In so doing, the trial court abused its discretion.  
The trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law state very little 
about what it considered in approving the lodestar amount.  He says in the 
statement of facts simply that it was a “hard-fought” case with a “vigorous 
defense” mounted by Volkswagen that was “matched by a vigorous prosecution 
by Plaintiffs’ counsel;” that counsel spent 7,190 hours on this cause with a lodestar 
 
4
value of $3,087,320 and had expenses of $550,000; that the time incurred was 
reasonable in light of the vigorous defense; and that the rates charged were 
reasonable.   
The trial court’s findings explain its approval of the hours as reasonable in 
light of the vigorously pursued defense and prosecution of the case. They do not 
explain his approval of the fees per hour as reasonable.  This leaves an appellate 
court to guess at what the trial court considered in determining the fees per hour to 
be reasonable. 
If one presumes that the trial court did not consider the factors as stated by 
Hill or as set forth by this Court in Rule 4-1.5, this clearly would be an abuse of 
discretion.  See also, Gilliland, 273 S.W.3d at 523 (identifying seven relevant 
factors, encompassing five identified in Hill as well as “nature and importance of 
subject matter” and “vigor of the opposition”).  I do not believe that this 
experienced trial judge would have made this error.   
One could presume as the principal opinion does that the trial court sub 
silencio considered the Hill factors in determining the lodestar and considered 
many of them a second time in determining the multiplier. As the principal 
opinion notes, it is error to consider the same factors twice, once in determining 
the lodestar and again in determining the multiplier (although for reasons not 
really explained, the principal opinion finds this did not affect the determination of 
the multiplier).   
 
5
Alternatively, I believe it may be that the trial court simply believed that 
once it approved the hours, then it should start with the lodestar amount as 
presumptively reasonable and only consider the factors set out in the cases in 
determining whether to enhance it.  This is, in fact, what it seems to say it did, 
saying, “The MMPA permits a court to award a prevailing party ‘reasonable 
attorney fees.’  Sec. 407.025.2.  In doing so, the Court first looks at the lodestar 
amount.”    
If this is what the trial court did, it also was an abuse of discretion.  The 
factors traditionally used by Missouri courts to evaluate the reasonableness of a 
fee must be used to determine the reasonableness of the lodestar before a court 
considers whether to enhance an award with a multiplier.  In either failing to first 
consider whether the lodestar was reasonable, or alternatively in sub silencio 
considering many of the same factors both to approve the lodestar as reasonable 
and to approve a multiplier, the trial court abused its discretion. 
This Court need not remand for the trial court to make a redetermination of 
whether the lodestar itself was reasonable, however.  It can determine whether the 
lodestar was reasonable by examining those factors the trial court considered in 
approving the multiplier that overlap with those that Rule 4-1.5 indicates should 
have been considered in determining the reasonableness of the lodestar. 
B. 
Proper Calculation of Lodestar and Multiplier 
I agree that in considering the factors as found by the trial court – albeit the 
trial court inappropriately considered them in determining the multiplier – and in 
 
6
considering what these factors show about the difficult nature of the case, the 
exceptional skill, reputation and ability of class counsel and the extent of services 
rendered, the lodestar amount is reasonable. 1   
As the trial court found, the time spent was reasonable in light of the 
“vigorous defense,” the defective window regulators presented a novel issue and 
that the skill necessary to prepare and try such a case was necessarily high.  By 
accepting this challenging case, in which recovery always was contingent, class 
                                                 
1 As noted earlier, Rule 4-1.5 says that considerations in determining the 
reasonableness of a fee include: 
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the 
questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal 
service properly; (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that 
the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other 
employment by the lawyer; (3) the fee customarily charged in 
the locality for similar legal services; (4) the amount involved 
and the results obtained; (5) the time limitations imposed by the 
client or by the circumstances; (6) the nature and length of the 
professional relationship with the client; (7) the experience, 
reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the 
services; and (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
   
 The trial court said that in determining that a multiplier of 2.0 was 
appropriate, it considered: 
(a) The nature of the defect involved was a novel problem; (b) The 
skill requisite to prepare and try this case—which the parties 
estimated would take three weeks—was necessarily high; (c) Taking 
this case precluded class counsel from accepting other employment 
that would have been less risky; (d) The experience, reputation, and 
ability of class counsel is outstanding; (e) The fee to be received by 
class counsel was always contingent, unlike the fees received by 
counsel for Defendant; (f) The time required by the demands of 
preparing this cause for trial delayed work on class counsel’s other 
work; and (g) Class counsel adduced evidence that the fee this Court 
believes is appropriate in this case is not disproportionately 
excessive in light of the potential benefit conferred on members of 
the class. 
 
7
counsel was precluded from accepting other less risky employment.  Importantly, 
the trial court further found the experience, reputation and ability of class counsel 
to be outstanding. 
The “fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services” is 
also a relevant consideration under Rule 4-1.5.  Although the trial court did not 
mention it, a Kansas City attorney did testify that the fees charged were within the 
range charged by Kansas City counsel. A broader basis for determining the 
reasonableness of the $252 to $650 hourly fees charged by the Stueve firm can be 
had by reference to the published Missouri Lawyers Weekly yearly survey of 
billing rates across Missouri.   
The August 6, 2012, survey states that the average billing rate in Missouri 
as a whole for 2012 was $339 per hour.  Rates were higher in the state’s largest 
cities, however: the average rate in St. Louis in 2012 was $383 per hour, and the 
average rate in Kansas City was $493.  The survey noted the disparity between 
rates in St. Louis and Kansas City was “thanks in large part to [a particular 
national bankruptcy case and] … Also aiding the Kansas City average was the 
high value Stueve Siegel Hanson attorneys set on their time in a  contingency fee 
case.”  Mo. Lawyers Weekly, Aug 6, 2012, at BR2. See also BR5 (Patrick Stueve 
rate of $650/hr is shown as highest in Kansas City; next highest rate is $575 in 
Kansas City, $500 in St. Louis.)   
I do not disagree that in light of the contingency nature of the fee, the 
special difficulty presented by this litigation, and the other factors just noted, the 
 
8
exceptionally high hourly rates charged are justified in this case.  My 
disagreement is in then considering these same factors to justify multiplying the 
rates by two. The rates already have been stretched to consider these factors in 
setting the lodestar.  Those factors should not again be considered in setting the 
multiplier. 
The principal opinion acknowledges that a trial court “should avoid 
awarding a multiplier based upon facts which it considered in its initial 
determination of the lodestar amount.”   Slip op. at 11.  As the principal opinion 
notes, the multiplier is to be based on the existence of rare or exceptional 
circumstances justifying a greater than otherwise reasonable award.2 
The principal opinion nonetheless defers to the trial court’s discretion in 
explicitly considering in determining the multiplier factors that it should have 
considered only in determining the lodestar, because, it says, at least some of these 
factors may not overlap. But, as noted, it is impossible to determine what 
multiplier the trial court would have awarded if it had known that many of the 
factors – including two of the three identified by the principal opinion – were 
                                                 
2 It is to avoid just such an inequity that the United States Supreme Court has held 
that multipliers should be limited to “rare” and “exceptional” cases where the 
“lodestar fee would not have been adequate to attract competent counsel.” Perdue 
v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542 (2010) (citations omitted).  
 
9
required to be considered in determining the lodestar, not the multiplier.3  This 
alone requires remand. 
The only factor that the trial court identified in determining the multiplier 
that does not overlap with the factors that it should have taken into consideration 
in determining the lodestar amount was the potential benefit to the class.  The trial 
judge said that in making the determination to allow a multiplier of two, “the 
Court believes that the reasonableness of the fees must be measured against the 
benefit conferred by the settlement rather than the actual amount paid out.”  It 
cited in support to Van Gemert v. The Boeing Company, 590 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 
1978), aff’d, 444 U.S. 472 (1980).    
 
Van Gemert and similar cases do support considering the potential benefit 
of an award or settlement as a reason to approve a multiplier.  See e.g., Williams v. 
MGM-Pathe Commun. Co., 129 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 1997) (reversing award based 
upon claimed Benefit Fund and awarding instead based upon amount of available 
Fund). Here, plaintiffs say, if every potential member of the class had made a 
claim for the maximum number of window replacements that plaintiffs’ expert 
said might be required – 6.5 window replacements per vehicle – then the potential 
benefit to the 22,304 class members would be $23,087,320.  The trial court says it 
considered this to the exclusion of considering what actual benefit was conferred 
on the class.    
                                                 
3 The three factors that the majority suggests are new are (1) because taking this 
case precluded counsel from taking other cases; (2) delayed work on other cases; 
and (3) because the resulting fee was contingent. 
 
10
Defendant says this was error and cites numerous cases stating that the 
award of a multiplier should be based on actual benefits paid (including cy pres 
awards) not potential benefit, as potential benefits are merely hypothetical..  See, 
e.g., Strong v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 137 F.3d 844, 852-53 (5th Cir. 1998) 
(affirming district court’s award of attorneys’ fees based strictly on actual claims).  
The trial expressly said it rejected these cases considering “the actual amount paid 
out” – here, only $125,261.  This means that the actual monetary benefit to class 
members amounted to only 0.5% of the alleged “potential” benefit with a mere 
0.6% claims rate.  Neither was there any cy pres award here to make up for the 
small number of actual claimants.4  
Further, defendant notes that the calculation of the potential benefit 
presumes that every one of the class members would experience 6.5 window 
regulator failures. But, this was not agreed to as part of the settlement; defendant 
continued to deny that any failures would occur.  And, the only factual basis for 
determining the number of failures was the number of failures experienced by the 
tiny percentage of the class that did submit the grand total of 130 claims submitted 
by the deadline.  These class members averaged only about 2 regulator failures per 
                                                 
4 Other cases have considered factors such as the risk that a novel legal issue may 
preclude any recovery if determined against the class, and whether a cy pres award 
will be given in addition to compensation to the class.  See, e.g., Charles I. 
Friedman, P.C. v. Microsoft Corp., 141 P.3d 824, 833-34 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006).  
These do not appear to be considerations here. 
 
 
11
claim, not 6.5, thus cutting the potential value of the settlement by two-thirds if 
their experience was typical.   
The tiny actual benefit to the class certainly would not justify an 
enhancement of the lodestar if considered alone, as defendant says was proper.  
The trial court’s decision to consider only the potential $23,087,320 that might 
have hypothetically been paid out rather than the $125,261 that was paid out 
necessarily was crucial to its determination to double the lodestar amount.   
Neither the absolutist approach argued for by class counsel nor that argued 
for by defense counsel is consistent with Missouri law.  The principal opinion 
itself notes that the result achieved must be considered even in determining the 
basic fee.  Slip op. at 9.  Further, Rule 4-1.5 states that a factor to consider is “the 
amount involved and the results obtained.”  Similarly, Hill states that a trial court 
determining a fee award should consider “the amount involved or the result 
obtained.” 371 S.W.3d at 81-82.  The result achieved cannot be considered without 
considering the actual benefit conferred. 
As applied in the context of determining a multiplier, these principles mean 
it would make little sense to have a rule that permits consideration solely of the 
potential benefit to the exclusion of the actual benefit, or solely of the actual 
benefit to the exclusion of any potential benefit, when determining whether the 
result achieved justifies a multiplier. 
Indeed, consideration only of potential benefit would create little incentive 
for class counsel to try to identify class members, and defense counsel certainly 
 
12
would not want a high claims rate, particularly if the value of the attorneys’ fees is 
less than the value saved by having to compensate fewer claims. This creates 
perverse motivations that ultimately do not benefit the individuals who have been 
harmed. 
On the other hand, a court should not base fee awards purely on the actual 
benefit conferred to the class. As the principal opinion recognizes, the 
fundamental purpose of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (“MMPA”) is 
the “protection of consumers” from false, fraudulent and deceptive merchandising 
practices.  Class action lawsuits brought under the MMPA create a useful deterrent 
to this wrongdoing.  There is some non-monetary value to this prevention.  And if 
Missouri courts were to base fee decision awards solely on the actual benefit, 
plaintiff attorneys may no longer have the incentive to bring these claims, 
diminishing the deterrence value of the law.  Further, defense counsel would have 
the perverse incentive of extending litigation unnecessarily, as class counsel 
claims occurred here, in order to make it difficult to identify class members and 
unprofitable for counsel to take the case if the multiplier is based on actual benefit 
only. 5 
Requiring trial courts to consider both the actual and potential benefit when 
setting a fee award maintains the incentive to bring class action claims while also 
                                                 
5 The court does not make any determination that any of these improper 
motivations or scenarios occurred here, it merely notes the potential dangers and 
that the method of determining fees should not encourage them. 
 
13
ensuring that class attorneys are rewarded for devising settlements that achieve 
results that provide real benefits to the class.   
Although the principal opinion notes that the result achieved is a 
consideration, it erroneously does not find error in the trial court’s explicit 
determination that it did not have to consider actual benefit in determining the 
multiplier.  This is what has led to the principal opinion’s failure to require remand 
for a redetermination of the multiplier issue.   
Because the trial court appeared to only have considered the potential 
benefits when it determined the lodestar and multiplier value, I would remand the 
case with the directive that the court take into consideration both the actual and 
potential benefit received by the class.  
In requiring remand, I am not suggesting that no multiplier was appropriate.  
It may be that this is one of those rare and exceptional cases in which a multiplier 
is appropriate.  The potential for recovery was large, even though smaller than 
claimed.  Further, while the actual recovery was low, evidence was presented here 
that defense counsel unreasonably and unnecessarily extended the litigation, 
thereby increasing costs and attorneys’ fees beyond what was reasonable and 
beyond what counsel could have anticipated in taking the case.  It also is argued 
by class counsel that this very delay is what led to a smaller than anticipated 
claims rate, for many owners had quit driving their cars or lost their repair records 
 
14
 
15
                                                
by the time the settlement finally occurred. If proved,6 these types of 
considerations appropriately may be considered in awarding a multiplier.  Perdue, 
130 S. Ct. at 1674 (“an enhancement may be appropriate where an attorney 
assumes [additional] costs in the face of unanticipated delay, particularly where 
the delay is unjustifiably caused by the defense”).  I would hold only that the trial 
court considered inappropriate factors in determining that a multiplier was proper 
and its amount and that this Court, therefore should, remand for redetermination of 
the multiplier issue.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
LAURA DENVIR STITH, JUDGE  
 
6  Whether these claims are supported by the record is a matter for the trial court.