Title: SANDERS v MOUNT HAGGIN LIVESTOCK C
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 12060
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: August 21, 1972

No. 12060 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1972 RICHARD SANDERS and ANNASTELLE SANDERS, P l a i n t i f f s and Respondents, M O U N T HAGGIN LIVESTOCK C O M P A N Y , a Montana corporation, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Third J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Nat Allen, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Poore, McKenzie & Roth, Butte, Montana. Urban L. Roth argued, Butte, Montana. Donald C. Robinson argued, Butte, Montana. For Respondents: Knight, Dahood and Mackay, Anaconda, Montane. Wade J. Dahood argued, Anaconda, Montana. David M. McLean argued, Anaconda, Montana. McKeon & McKeon, Anaconda, Montana. John L. McKeon argued, Anaconda, Montana. Submitted: June 13, 1972 Decided :Aid6 2 1 1972 Nr. J u s t i c e Wesley Castles delivered the Opinion of the Court, This i s an appeal from a judgment of the d i s t r i c t court of the third judicial d i s t r i c t , Deer Lodge County. The jury returned a verdict i n favor of p l a i n t i f f s and awarded damages i n the sum of $96,140. Defendant moved the t r i a l court f o r a new t r i a l and f o r judgment notwithstanding the v e r d i c t ; both motions were denied by the t r i a l court. Defendant appeals from the judgment. I n early May 1969, defendant Mount Haggin Livestock Company owned approximately 600-850 head of Black Angus c a t t l e which were pastured i n a fenced pasture i n the Deer Lodge Valley between Galen and Anaconda, Montana, i n the general proximity of Montana Highway No, 273. This highway i s a l s o known a s the Lost Creek Highway o r the Old Galen Road, The enclosure i n which the c a t t l e were pastured was referred t o throughout the t r i a l as the "Peterson place", O n the three days of M a y 8 t o May 10, 1969, Mount Haggin divided the c a t t l e i n t o two groups, with no attempt being made t o keep the cows with t h e i r respective calves, and then moved each group from the Peterson Place down the Lost Creek Highway, approximately one-half t o three-quarters of a mile, t o a pasture 11 known a s the Swamp Pasture" or the "Poor Farm Pasture". Three cowboys, James Baustadt, J i m Nolan and Donald Martz, who had worked f o r defendant during the herding operation but were employed elsewhere a t the time of t r i a l , t e s t i f i e d a s t o the f a c t s of t h a t herding. They established the operation had taken three days. The f i r s t two days,May 8 and 9, each of the two halves of the herd were driven t o the Poor Farm Pasture. O n Friday, May 9, a " s p i l l back" occurred, i . e . , some of the c a t t l e turned around a t the entrance t o the Poor Farm Pasture t o which they were being moved, and they ran back up the road t o the Peterson Place where they had been originally pastured. On Saturday, M a y PO, the cowboys returned t o the area and picked up the strays which had e i t h e r been l e f t i n the Peterson Place pasture or had "spilled back" and returned t o t h a t pasture. These c a t t l e were e i t h e r driven o r hauled t o the Poor Farm Pasture. On the evening of M a y 10, Rick Barkell, Jr., and Christie Sanders, who was seventeen years of age, planned t o attend a birthday party i n the Modesty Gulch area, They l e f t Anaconda together with Norman Motland a t approximately 4:00 or 5:00 p.m. Their intention Mas t o hunt gophers before they went on t o the area where the party was t o be held, They arrived a t the Modesty Gulch area a t approxi- mately 8:00 or 9:00 p.m., where the party was under way. During the time they were a t the party they both drank some keg beer. They remained a t the party u n t i l approximately 12:30 or 1:00 a.m. Returning home, Rick Barkell and Christie Sanders proceeded td Moatana Highway 273 on a different road than the one they had traveled going t o the party. Suddenly Barkell, who was driving t:he pickup truck, noticed a cow very close t o the front of h i s gehicle. The cow was a truck-length t o a truck-length and a h a l f in front of him, moving across the road i n t o h i s lane of t r a f f i c . Yarkell, a f t e r attempting t o swerve around the cow, h i t i t . A t chis point the pickup s t a r t e d t o r o l l and ended up i n a borrow p i t :o che l e f t of the highway. Barkell found himself lying on the gi-uund outside the pi-ckup cab with the truck on h i s foot. H e freed ;~imself and looked around for Christie, who was lying behind him. she called h i s name and he told her t o l i e s t i l l and he then went sfor assistance. Barkell l e f t the scene of the accident, ran down lo the Poor Farm t o seek help and finding none he eventually caught 3 ride i n t o Anaconda. Highway Patrolman William Steiner investigated the accident. H e arrived a t the scene a t approximately 2:30 t o 3:00 a.m. and - 3 - discovered the body of the deceased Christie Sanders. After c a l l i n g an ambulance, he began h i s investigation which continued i n t o the following day. The cow t h a t was struck was a mature Black Angus owned by the Mount Haggin Livestock Company. P l a i n t i f f s , parents of Christie Sanders, contend the negligence of the Mount Haggin Livestock Company was the proximate cause of t h e i r daughter's death. Defendant presents several issueson appeal. The f i r s t issue contends defendant was e n t i t l e d t o a directed verdict or i n the a l t e r n a t i v e f o r a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, for these reasons : A. Defendant owed no duty t o fence i n the cow which had wandered onto the highway; or B. The evidence was i n s u f f i c i e n t t o support the verdict o~ judgment; o r C , The jury was improperly instructed on negligent herding and damages, W e cannot agree with defendant's contentions on the f i r s t issue, P l a i n t i f f s established a prima f a c i e case and the jury had a r i g h t and duty t o examine the evidence and t o hear the testimony % ~ f the witnesses. Sufficient testimony was brought before the jury t o e s t a b l i s h a prima f a c i e case of negligence; consequently, ?he t r i a l court did not e r r i n refusing t o grant defendant's motions. Testimony was introduced a s t o whether or not the herding was done i n a negligent manner. Conflicts i n the testimony existed, but the iury was the ultimate finder of f a c t . d N o one w i l l dispute t h a t Montana i s an open range s t a t e , fhis Court has many times so ruled, But, a s with every r u l e of law, f e f i n i t e exceptions do e x i s t . The exception t o the open range r u l e zxists when the animals i n question a r e i n charge of herders. This Court s t a t e d t h i s exception i n Jenkins v. Valley Garden Ranch Inc., 151 Mont. 463, 465, 443 P,2d 753, c i t i n g from Montgomery v. Gehring, 145 Mont. 278, 283, 400 P.2d 403: "'One releasing h i s livestock onto lands where he has a r i g h t t o do so i s under no duty t o r e s t r a i n them from entering another's unenclosed land. Such livestock owner i s not responsible f o r damages occa- sioned by the entry of h i s livestock on such unfenced hand through following t h e i r natural i n s t i n c t s . - The exception t o t h i s , of course, i s w i l l f u l or intentional herding or driving livestock onto another's unfenced land or placing them so near t h a t trespass i s bound t o occur. I ' ( -- Emphasis supplied) I n Estate of Bartsch, 149 Mnnt. 405, 427 P.2d 302, the Court plainly indicated t h a t i f an animal i s w i l l f u l l y or in- tentionally driven onto the highway right-of-way a duty i s created, he breach of which constitutes negligence. Here, the testimony and evidence presented c l e a r l y indicates t h a t Mount Haggin may have w i l l f u l l y , intentionally and deliberately driven the animals upon the highway right-of-way and l e f t them there once they had escaped from the control of the herders. There i s nothing i n the record t o indicate t h a t action was taken t o warn motorists of the hazard t h a t may have been created upon the highway. I n t h i s case, a duty may have been violated constituting negligence, and the t r i a l court was correct i n allowing it t o go t o the jury f o r f i n a l determination. Defendant's second issue on appeal i s whether o r not the t r i a l court erred i n refusing t o exclude the testimony of plain- t i f f s ' witnesses whose i d e n t i t y had not been disclosed, despite interrogatories requesting t h e i r identity. W e find such r e f u s a l was error. A basic physical f a c t of t h i s case was t h a t the accident which took the l i f e of Christie Sanders occurred i n the Deer Lodge Valley near the old "Poor Farmrq, and t h a t defendant had moved a herd of c a t t l e past t h a t farm, through an adjacent gate, shortly before the accident. This elementary f a c t was known t o p l a i n t i f f s ' counsel soon a f t e r they began investigation of the case. Plaintiffs subsequently filed their complaint alleging defendant was guilty of negligently conducting a herding operation which caused the death of their daughter. Thereafter, discovery was initiated by counsel for plaintiffs and defendant. At the same time, plaintiffs' counsel employed a private investigator to interview witnesses or possible witnesses in the area where the accident occurred. About one month after the accident, this investigator interviewed Ethel and Doug Davis, a married couple who live at the old "Poor arm" and who subsequently became key witnesses for plaintiffs. The investigator, a police officer regularly employed by the city of Anaconda, interviewed Ethel and Doug Davis again two or three months later. They related to him the information they subsequently gave at the trial, Months after this investigative activity by plaintiffs' counsel, counsel for defendant propounded and submitted interroga- tories to plaintiffs and their counsel which requested inter - 9 alia the following information: "INTERROGATORY NO. 59: Give the name, addresses, places of employment, home and business telephone, numbers, job titles and capacities and Last known whereabouts of: I1 a, Any person known to you, your agents, employees or attorneys who witnessed the acci- dent, or was in its vicinity before, at the time of or just after its occurrence * i k *." "INTERROGATORS NO. 60: What is the name and address of each person who has knowledge of one or more facts or- circumstances upon which you base your allegations of: "a. Negligence of the Defendant, but who did not actually see the accident; "c. Any other matters which relate to the accident or to damages or causation, I1 "INTERROGATORY NO. 61: Have any persons made any statements. written or otherwise. while being inter- viewed or questioned by you or on your behallf, in- cluding your attorneys, insurance adjuster, agents or representatives of your attorneys, in connection with the accident complained of?" "INTERROGATORY NO, 62: If so, for each statement indicate : 11 a. The name, address, occupation and relation- ship to you of the person taking it; "b. The date of making; "c. The place of making; , , > ' t "d. Whether signed or unsigned; * " 1 I "INTERROGATORY NO. 63: What is the name, last known address. present whereabouts, if known. of each person whom yo& b r anyone acting insyour behaif, including attorneys, agents, insurance adjusters, or other per- sons, knows or believes to have any relevant knowledge of the conditions at the scene of the accident existing prior to, at, or immediately after the same. It The names of Ethel and Doug Davis were not listed in the answers given to the above quoted interrogatories. These witnesses, whom the investigator discovered and interviewed, fell within the scope of the answers to the interrogatories which plaintiffs subsequently submitted to defendant, in that Ethel and Doug Davis were : I . Persons who had "knowledge of one or more facts or upon circumstances hhich" plaintiffs base their allegations of " a . Negligence of the Defendant", (Interrogatory No, 6 0 ) . 2. Persons who had "knowledge of one o n : more facts or circumstances upon which" plaintiffs base their allegations of ' t l c. Any other matters which relate to the accident 9 : * or causation. If (Interrogatory No. 6 0 ) 3 , Persons who had "made any statements, written or otherwise, while being interviewed or questioned by * * * agents or representatives of [plaintiffs'] attorneys ; k * *I1, (Interrogatory No. 6 1 ) . 4 . Persons whom plaintiffs "or anyone acting in [their] behalf, including attorneys, agents * * * or other persons, knows or believes to have any relevant knowledge of the condi-tions at t h e scene of the accident existing p r i o r t o , a t , or immediately a f t e r the same." (Interrogatory No. 63). The investigator was not mentioned i n the answers t o these i.nterrogatories a s a person who knew, f o r instence, of the "conditions a t the scene of the accident", although he interviewed people and took photographs, Then, on September 10, 1970, some 46 days before the t r i a l began, defendant propounded supplementary interrogatories t o the p l a i n t i f f s . They requested t h a t p l a i n t i f f s l i s t a l l of the w i t - nesses they intended t o c a l l a t the t r i a l and the names of " a l l persons from whom statements have been taken by attorneys, agents, investigators or any other persons on behalf of the p l a i n t i f f s and specify whether the statement i s written or o r a l and the name of the person taking such statement. " P l a i n t i f f s , although re- quired by Rule 33, M.R,Civ.P., t o answer those interrogatories within 20 days,failed t o respond, Thus, despite the foregoing account of the investigation and discovery procedures by counsel the i d e n t i t y of Ethel Davis was not disclosed u n t i l four days before the t r i a l . The i d e n t i t y of her husband, Doug Davis, was not disclosed t o defense counsel u n t i l the morning of the t r i a l , The t r i a l began on Monday morning, October 26, 1970. On Thursday before the t r i a l , counsel f o r defendant exchanged a l i s t of witnesses with counsel f o r p l a i n t i f f s . A t t h a t time and f o r the f i r s t time, the i d e n t i t y of Ethel Davis was disclosed. When defense counsel asked f o r the address of witness Ethel Davis, he was informed she lived "somewhere out i n the (Deer Lodge) valley." Some hours p r i o r t o t h i s disclosure, counsel f o r p l a i n t i f f s had issued a subpoena f o r Ethel Davis directing her t o appear and t e s t i f y a s a witness f o r the p l a i n t i f f s . Yet, a few hours l a t e r , counsel f o r the defense was advised t h a t p l a i n t i f f s ' counsel did not know where she lived. The record shows the testimony of Ethel and Doug Davis came a s a complete surprise t o defendant, Defense counsel were forced t o r e l y upon a t r a n s c r i p t of a tape recording taken by counsel f o r p l a i n t i f f s and then, subsequently, a recording taken by two members of t h e i r own law firm who had no knowledge o r background of the case. Neither Ethel o r Doug Davis had been interviewed o r deposed by counsel representing defendant prior t o t h e i r actual appearance on the witness stand. This s i t u a t i o n j u s t i f i e d and required the exclusion of the witnesses' testimony. A motion t o exclude and disallow any testimony of these witnesses was made, supported, and elaborated upon with a complete statement of the surrounding f a c t s . The t r i a l court was i n e r r o r t o refuse t h i s sanction f o r f a i l u r e t o make proper and accurate responses t o interrogatories t h a t were designed t o e l i c i t exactly the information which was withheld. The interrogatories propounded to p l a i n t i f f s were continuing in nature and specifically stated the information requested of p l a i n t i f f s and t h e i r attorneys, and a l s o extended t o f a c t s within the knowledge of the p a r t i e s , t h e i r "agents and representatives", A s the testimony a t the t r i a l and the a f f i d a v i t s submitted by p l a i n t i f f s ' counsel c l e a r l y show, the investigator was an agent of the law firm of Knight, Dahood & MacKay, and conducted an investigation of the accident f o r t h a t law firm. Mrs. Davis v e r i f i e d , i n her own testimony, t h a t she had told the investigator the same story she t e s t i f i e d t o a t the t r i a l . P l a i n t i f f s ' counsel considered her testimony most c r u c i a l t o t h e i r case, and they argued t o the jury t h a t her testimony had a d i r e c t bearing on the question of whether Mount Haggin conducted negligent herding opera- tions, Counsel f o r defendant correctly c i t e s Smith v. Babcock, 157 Kont. 81, 91, 482 P.2d 1014, a s authority f o r excluding the Davis testimony. In Smith, t h i s Court held t h a t the exclusion of the testimony of a witness should have been required when the party who introduced h i s testimony f a i l e d t o supply the name of the witness i n answer t o an interrogatory which requested "names and addresses of a l l persons who have any knowledge o r information I I r e l a t i n g t o the accident o r i t s cause.. Counsel f o r p l a i n t i f f s c i t e Wolfe v. Northern Pac, Ry., 147 Mont, 29, 40, 409 P.2d 528: "Rule 33, M.R.Civ,P., authorizing the use of interrogatories f o r purposes of p r e - t r i a l dis- I covery from any adverse party,' although l i b e r a l l y construed t o make a l l relevant f a c t s available t o p a r t i e s i n advance of t r i a l and t o reduce the pos- s i b i l i t i e s of surprise and unfair advantage 5 : * * cannot become a weapon f o r punishment o r f o r f e i t u r e i n the hands of a party, or an instrument f o r avoidance of a t r i a l on the merits. 5 : * *. l 1 The r u l e s t a t e d i n Wolfe i s v a l i d and we agree with p l a i n t i f f s ' interpretation; however, i n Wolfe the Court a l s o stated: "In interpreting these r u l e s [Montana Rules of C i v i l Procediire] we w i l l reverse the t r i a l judge only when h i s judgment may materially a f f e c t the substantial r i g h t s of the appellant and allow a possible mis- carriage of j u s t i c e , I I Under the f a c t s here, we believe a possible miscarriage of j u s t i c e has substantially affected the r i g h t s of defendant. From the testimony given a t t r i a l , one readily discerns the importance of the testimony of Ethel and Doug Davis. Both t e s t i f i e d they were able t o observe the herding operation of the Mount Haggin cowboys and t h a t it was carried on i n a negligent and i n e f f i c i e n t manner. Both t e s t i f i e d t h a t some of the c a t t l e , a s they w e r e driven down the highway, refused t o enter the Poor Farm (Swamp) pasture and e i t h e r "stampeded1' o r "spilled back" t o the Peterson Place. They a l s o t e s t i f i e d they believed t h a t c a t t l e were present on the highway the night of the accident. Due t o the f a c t t h a t Doug Davi-s had had a s e r i e s of h e a r t attacks he was unable t o come t o the courtroom, so the t r i a l judge ordered the jury t o go eo the residence of Doug Davis and h i s testimony was taken i n the Poor Farm building which i s located immediately adjoining the Swamp Pasture area. This Court agrees with defendant's contention t h a t the testimony of the witnesses Davis was c r u c i a l t o the p l a i n t i f f s ' case and from the verdict returned by the jury we a r e compelled t o believe t h i s testimony was significant t o the jury during i t s deliberations. Since proper discovery procedures were not f o l - lowed, we find the t r i a l court did commit e r r o r i n allowing the testimony of Ethel and Doug Davis. Counsel f o r defendant made three formal objections during che course of the t r i a l i n order t o obtain the quashing of the Davis testimony. The f i r s t objection was made immediately a t the commencement of the t r i a l : "MR. ROTH [Counsel f o r defendant] : Now, may it please the court. The Defendant w i l l now object t o the additional witnesses t h a t have been l i s t e d by the P l a i n t i f f s , and the use of t h e i r testimony i n the t r i a l of t h i s case, on the ground and f o r the reason t h a t a t the p r e - t r i a l con- ference the names and addresses of a l l witnesses were t o be exchanged between counsel f o r the p a r t i e s a t l e a s t ten days p r i o r t o t r i a l , and t h i s was agreed t o by the parties. Now, then, your honor, the P l a i n t i f f s had a duty i n t h i s case t o prepare the p r e - t r i a l order, and i t wasn't prepared within the time i t was supposed t o have been prepared, and so the names of these witnesses comes as a complete surprise t o the Defendant, your honor, a t t h i s l a t e date, f o r we have not had an opportunity t o consult and investigage the testimony of Mrs. Ethel Davis, o r the other additional witnesses named, Dick Harris, Dan Jancic, o r Margaret Durkin. 1 1 This objection was overruled. The second objection raised by M r . Roth was a t the time M r s . Ethel Davis was about t o t e s t i f y : "MR. ROTH: May it please the court, Comes now the Defendant, Mount Haggin Livestock Company, i n the cause now being t r i e d before t h i s court, and respect- f u l l y moves the court t o quash and disallow any t e s t i - mony of e i t h e r of the witnesses, Ethel Davis and Doug Davis, upon the following grounds, and f o r the following reasons: (1) t h a t the following interrogatories were propounded t o the p l a i n t i f f s on November 21st, 1969, among which interrogatories were the following: I n t e r - rogatory Number 59: Give the names, addresses, places of employment, home and business telephone numbers, job t i t l e s , and capacities, and l a s t known whereabouts of: (a) any person known t o you, your agents, employees, o r attorneys, who witnessed the accident, or was i n i t s v i c i n i t y before, a t the time o f , o r j u s t a f t e r i t s occurrence. Interrogatory Number 60: What i s t h e name and address of each person who has knowledge of one o r more f a c t s o r circumstances upon which you base your allegation of: (a) negligence of the defendant, but who did not actually see the accident; and, further, (c) any other matters which r e l a t e t o the accident, or t o damages o r causation. Interrogatory Number 61: Have any persons made any statements, written or otherwise, while being interviewed or questioned by you, or on your behalf, including your attorneys, insurance a d j u s t e r , agents or representatives of your attorneys, i n connec- t i o n with the accident complained of. Interrogatory Number 62: I f so, f o r each statement, indicate: (a) the name, address, occupation, and relationship t o you, of the person taking it; (b) the date of making; (c) whether signed o r unsigned. Interrogatory Number 63: What i s the name, l a s t known address, present whereabouts, i f known, of each person whom you, o r anyone acting on your behalf, including attorneys, agents, insurance adjusters, or other persons, knows or believes t o have any relevant knowledge, of the conditions a t the scene of the accident, existing p r i o r t o , a t , or immediately a f t e r the same, (2) t h a t answers t o these interrogatories were received by the defendant on January 23, 1970, but t h a t nowhere i n the answers t o the foregoing interrogatories .was there any information with regard t o the existence o r whereabouts of Ethel Davis or Doug Davis. (3) t h a t the i d e n t i t y of Ethel Davis and Doug Davis was known t o the p l a i n t i f f s , and t h e i r attorneys, one month a f t e r t h e accident, through M r . Daniel Jancic, an employee and agent of said attorneys, and again four months a f t e r the acci- dent. (4) t h a t counsel f o r the defendant have interviewed the said M r . Daniel Jancic, the employee and agent of the attorneys f o r the p l a i n t i f f s , and the man who investi- gated the accident f o r Wade J. Dahood, and h i s firm, and t h a t M r . Jancic advised t h a t he interviewed Mrs. Ethel Davis, and saw Doug Davis, a t t h e i r farm, approximately one month a f t e r the accident, and, again, approximately four months a f t e r the accident, and t h a t a t each such interview, Ethel Davis told N r . Jancic substantially the same things she told John L. "Luke" McKeon, and M r . Jancic, on October 25, 1970, but, we submit, your honor, t h a t the very f i r s t time the defendant was advised of the existence of Ethel Davis was on Thursday, October 22nd, 1970, a t which t i m e , i n a conversation between Donald C. Robinson and David L. NcLean, M r . Robinson asked for the address of Mrs. Ethel Davis, and was advised i n response t o t h a t inquiry t h a t she lived 'somewhere out i n the valley. 1 (5) we further submit, your honor, t h a t recorded s t a t e - ments were taken from Ethel and Doug Davis, but t h a t counsel f o r the defendant were not given a copy of these recorded statements u n t i l Tuesday, October 27tI;, 1970, and, of course, up t o t h a t time did not have an opportunity t o interview e i t h e r of these people. (6) t h a t during the t r i a l of t h i s case, the counsel trying the case f o r defendant, Urban L. Roth, Donald C , Robinson, o r , Robert J. Boyd, would not have time t o personally interview said witnesses, nor t o carefully interrogate these witnesses on the s t a t e r ~ e n t s t h a t they had given t o E4.r. McICeon; (7) further, they would not have an opportunity t o in- vestigate the backgrounds of these witnesses t o de- termine what animosity, i f any, they held toward fdiount Haggin Livestock Company, or any of i t s em- ployees. (8) t h a t they would not have an opportunity t o prepare f o r an exhaustive deposition of these witnesses, (9) t h a t M r . Jancic had advised counsel for defendant, Urban Roth and Don Robinson, t h a t the names of Ethel and Doug Davis were given t o Wade J. Dahood a t or shortly a f t e r the time he originally interviewed them. (10) t h a t the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure, upon which the Montana Rules of C i v i l Procedure a r e patterned, require f u l l and complete disclosure of a l l information requested i n interroga- t o r i e s propounded t o one party by the other, and we respectfully submit t o the court t h a t c e r t a i n sanctions may be imposed by the court where there i s a v i o l a t i o n of the s p i r i t of the r u l e s of procedure f o r discovery, and we respectfully move the court t h a t such sanction be imposed upon counsel for t h e p l a i n t i f f s f o r t h e i r u t t e r disregard and v i o l a t i o n of t h i s r u l e of procedure f o r discovery, and t h e i r f a i l u r e t o disclose t h i s in- formation, and based upon the information t h a t I have just submitted t o the court, we submit t h a t t h i s sanction - I i s most appropriate under these circumstances. I I This second objection was a l s o overruled. t o The t h i r d objectionlthe Davis testimony was made by Mr. Roth i n h i s motion f o r a directed verdict: " (9) Now, furthermore, your honor, we submit t h a t the motion t o quash the testimony of Ethel and Douglas Davis should be granted, and t h a t the court, i n determining the merits of Defendant's motion f o r a directed v e r d i c t , should completely disregard the testimony of Ethel and Douglas Davis, on the grounds previously stated i n t h i s record, t h a t i s , t h a t the P l a i n t i f f s , and t h e i r attorneys, f a i l e d t o respond t o specific interrogatories, which would have disclosed the names and existence of Ethel and Doug Davis months before the t r i a l of the case, and t h a t there was absolutely no excuse f o r t h e i r f a i l u r e t o name Ethel and Doug Davis i n response t o interrogatories, and t h a t t h e i r testimony should be completely disregarded i n ruling on the motion f o r directed verdict. This third objection was a l s o denied. From t h i s record, i s c l e a r t h a t defendant's counsel took every opportunity t o object t o the Davis testimony. A l l these objections, even though well taken, were denied by the t r i a l court. M r . Roth did a l l t h a t a counsel could do under the circumstances t o exclude the Davis testimony. He correctly believed t h a t any further objection would hinder h i s c l i e n t ' s case; therefore, he decided t o r a i s e t h i s e r r o r on appeal. This Court w i l l correct Chis e r r o r . A new t r i a l is ordered. I n conclusion, we believe it necessary t o mention one other issue. Since t h i s case i s being remanded f o r a new t r i a l , i t i s not riecessary LLO f u l l y develop the issue, however, i t does merit some discussion. That issue i s damages. The jury returned a verdict i n the amount of $96,140. This Court finds a strong p o s s i b i l i t y e x i s t s t h a t the amount was excessive, In the record there i s no evidence t h a t Christie Sanders would have remained i n the Anaconda area a f t e r graduation from high school; no evidence was introduced a s t o what her future plans were so f a r a s residence or school; there was no evidence offered t h a t she had ever given her family any pecuniary support or t h a t she was motivated i n t h a t direction; and, very l i t t l e evidence was offered a s t o the relationship between her and her parents. The paucity of evidence a s t o damages indicates a strong p o s s i b i l i t y the verdict was prompted by passion and preju- dice; o r , the jury was improperly instructed a s t o the proper c r i t e r i o n of damages. I n Wyant v. Dunn, 140 Mont. 181, 368 P.2d 917, the Court recognized the universal r u l e t h a t damages i n t h i s type of action are f i r s t presented t o the sound discretion of the jury, then reviewed by the t r i a l judge, who must s e t aside or modify the ver- d i c t on a motion f o r a new t r i a l i f the amount of the verdict i s not j u s t . Only i n r a r e cases should a decision b e reversed where the t r i a l judge and the jury agree t h a t the verdict i s proper. The present factual s i t u a t i o n suggests a strong p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h i s i s such a case. I n Montana i n a wrongful death action, such as t h i s , dzmages a s under a l l the circumstances of the case may be j u s t may be recovered; but, a verdict f o r damages must be based upon admissible evidence. Krohmer v. Dahl, 145 Mont. 491, 402 P.2d 979; Davis v. Smith, 152 Mont. 170, 448 P.2d 133. Nevertheless, though the amount of damages i s solely within the province of the jury, the jury i s not given c a r t e blanche. Some substantial evidence must e x i s t upon which the award of $96,140 can be predicated. I n Miller v. Boeing Company, (D.C.Mont.1965) 245 F.Supp. 178, Judge Jameson, applying Montana law, concluded t h a t a verdict of $52,700 t o p l a i n t i f f widow f o r the wrongful death of her husband was excessive. The verdict was reduced t o $37,500. involved The court noted t h a t the Montana statutelwas adopted from California and quoted from Ure v. Maggio Bros. Co., 24 Cal.App.2d 490, 75 P.2d " ' ~ u t while loss of society, comfort, and protection may be an element of the injury sustained by the statutory beneficiaries, i t i s only the pecuniary, and not the sentimental, value of such l o s s which may be taken i n t o consideration i n the assessment of damages. Nothing can be recovered a s a solatium f o r wounded feelings. ( 1 1 The court quoted further from Dickinson v. Southern Pacific Co., 11 1 It i s not possible t o measure i n exact terms of money the l o s s which a surviving husband, wife, o r c h i l d may have sustained through being deprived of the comfort and society of the deceased spouse o r parent, For t h i s reason, some play i s allowed t o the discretion of the jury by the provision of section 377 t h a t such damages may be allowed, a s under a l l t h e circumstances of the case may be j u s t . But, i n fixing the amount, the jury i s always bound by the fundamental r u l e t h a t ecuniary damage i s the l i m i t of recovery, and the :mount allowed must bear some reasonable r e l a t i o n t o the ecuniary l o s s shown by the evidence ."' :Emphasis supplied') . gee also: Section 93-2810, R.C.M. 1947. The court further commented upon the duty of a judge t o review a verdict and declare a verdict excessive when he conscientiously believes "that the jury has exceeded the bounds of propriety. I I Dellaripa v. N e w York, N e w Haven & Hartford R..Co., 257 F.2d 733, 735. After noting t h a t the evidence a s t o the pecuniary value of loss of society, comfort, protection and companionship was inadequate, the court concluded t h a t any recovery i n excess of $37,500 was j u s t not j u s t i f i e d . In two recent cases t h i s Court considered verdicts f o r wrongful deaths of minors, Davis ---$4,000, ~rohmer---$35,000, but i n both cases substantial evidence was introduced a s t o damages. I n the i n s t a n t case we have a verdict of $96,140, i almost three times the award i n Krbhmer, f o r the wrongful death of a minor unsupported by any evidence of earning capacity, support t o the parents, o r any damage other than l o s s of comfort, society, companionship, e t c . The amount of the award can be accounted f o r only upon the basis the jury (1) was not properly instructed, (2) was given an improper standard i n o r a l argument upon which t o compute pecuniary value of l o s s of comfort, society and companionship, o r (3) i t was actuated and motivated by passion o r prejudice. The judgment i s reversed and the cause remanded f o r a new t r i a l . ~ s s o c i y t e J u s t i c e We boncur: t . ' $ .r . ' ; . * v----------------- Associate Justices Mr. Justice Daly and Hr. Justice Haswell, dissenting: We dissent. The majority grant a new trial to defendant because of failure of plaintiffs to list the names and addresses of two witnesses in response to defendant's pretrial interrogatories. It is clear that this failure constituted a violation of pretrial discovery rules. It is equally clear that the names of these witnesses were communicated by plaintiffsf counsel to defendant's counsel several days before trial; that the witnesses' exact address was not given but only that they lived somewhere in the valley; and that plaintiffs' counsel furnished defendant's counsel with a tape of the witnesses! statements and defendant's counsel interviewed them and had a transcript of the statements of such witnesses prior to their examination at the trial. During the course of trial when plaintiffs called the first of such witnesses to testify, defendant moved to exclude the testi- mony on the grounds of surprise occasioned by plaintiffs' violation of pretrial discovery rules and requested the court to impose sanctions for such violation by excluding the testimony of such witnesses. The district court denied defendant's motion in the following manner: "THE COURT: Well, I am not going to invoke or impose this sanction, because I feel that this is pretty im- portant testimony from their viewpoint. The sanction will not be imposed, and the motion will be denied. "MR. ROTH: [defendant's counsel] If your honor please, may we have the benefit of the use of a recorded statement that we have of this witness, which has not been transcribed as yet, and we would like the oppor- tunity to review that testimony before her testimony is given, and we must cross examine. "MR. McKEON: [plaintiffs' counsel] We will have no objection to that. "THE COURT: All right, that may be done, and this witness may be called at another time. If that is all, then we can return to the courtroom. "THE COURT: All right, the record may show that the court is again in session, and in the presence of the jury. You may proceed, "MR.M~KEON: Your honor, as the court knows, counsel for the defendant have advised that they have a state- ment which they took this morning of Mrs. Ethel Davis, and which has not as yet been prepared and transcribed, and they would like to have the advantage of this statement when conducting cross examination of Mrs. Davis, and so we would be very happy to wait and call Mrs. Davis tomorrow morning, so that they will have the advantage of that particular statement at that time, "MR. ROTH: Yes, that is our position in this matter, if the court please. "THE COURT: Very well, that may be done, and the witness may be called tomorrow morning. "MR. ROTH: Thank you, your honor, and thank you, again, Mr. bfcKeon. I I Following this colloquy, no further continuance was requested. ~efendant's counsel received his request for a day's delay in the examination of these witnesses. These witnesses were exhaustively examined and cross-examined the following day. The case was sub- mitted t o the jury i n t h i s posture without further objection by defendant. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiffs. Defendant moved for a new t r i a l on the basis of surprise which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against. The d i s t r i c t court denied defendant's motion for a new t r i a l , The majority of t h i s Court has reversed t h i s ruling of the t r i a l judge. Section 93-5603, R.C.M. 1947, s e t s forth the grounds on which a new t r i a l may be granted. Subsection (3) provides for a new t r i a l where the moving party was surprised by the testimony offered a t the t r i a l . In H i l l v, McKay, 36 Mont. 440,446, 93 P. 345, t h i s Court s e t down the following c r i t e r i a for granting a new t r i a l on t h i s ground: ''iv * it i s the general rule that a new t r i a l w i l l be granted'on the ground of surprise, only when i t i s clearly shown that the movant was actually surprised, that the facts from which the surprise resulted had a material bearing on the case, that the verdict or decision resulted mainly from these facts, that the alleged condition i s not the r e s u l t of movant's own inattention or negligence, that he has acted promptly and claimed r e l i e f a t the earli-est opportunity, that he has used every means reasonably available a t the time of the surprise t o remedy the disaster, and that the result of a new t r i a l w i l l probably be different. 11 These c r i t e r i a were cited with approval recently i n Morris v. Corcoran Pulpwood Co., 154 Mont. 468, 465 P. 2d 827. In our view a party may not secure a one day continuance i n the witnesses' testimony t o prepare for cross-examination, f a i l t o request a further continuance, permit the case t o be the submitted tc/jury without further objection, and a f t e r an adverse verdict secure a new t r i a l on the grounds of surprise. Under ~ k c h circumstances the party seeking a new t r i a l has not used every means reasonably available a t the time of surprise t o remedy the situation, one of the required c r i t e r i a for securing a new t r i a l on t h i s ground. This i s particularly true where, as here, the trial judge has denied movant a new trial under these circum- stances. Additionally, the refusal of the trial judge to impose the sanction of exclusion is not an abuse of discretion here nor is it an independent ground for granting a Associate Justices