Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Michael J. Hicks
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2014AP000007-D
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: February 17, 2016

2016 WI 9 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2014AP7-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Michael J. Hicks, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
     v. 
Michael J. Hicks, 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST HICKS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 17, 2016 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
      
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2016 WI 9
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2014AP7-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Michael J. Hicks, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Michael J. Hicks, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 17, 2016 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.  Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review the report of the referee, 
Attorney James J. Winiarski, who found that Attorney Michael J. 
Hicks had committed 35 counts of professional misconduct and 
recommended that Attorney Hicks' license to practice law in 
Wisconsin be suspended for a period of two years.   
¶2 
The first issue we must address is the status of 
Attorney Hicks' appeal and the nature of our review.  After the 
referee filed his report and recommendation, Attorney Hicks 
No. 
2014AP7-D   
 
2 
 
filed a notice of appeal on February 6, 2015.  On that same 
date, pursuant to its standard practice, the clerk of this court 
issued a notice to the parties acknowledging the filing of the 
notice of appeal, informing Attorney Hicks of the need to file a 
statement on transcript, and advising him of the briefing 
schedule.  Attorney Hicks did not file either a statement on 
transcript or an opening brief.  On April 9, 2015, the clerk's 
office issued an order on behalf of the court advising Attorney 
Hicks that his opening brief was delinquent and that, unless he 
filed the opening brief or a motion for an extension of time 
within five days, the disciplinary case would be resolved 
summarily.  Attorney Hicks did not respond.  On June 15, 2015, 
the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) formally moved for the 
dismissal of Attorney Hicks' appeal.  Attorney Hicks still did 
not respond.  Thus, despite being notified on multiple occasions 
that his failure to respond might result in the dismissal of his 
appeal and/or the court's consideration of the referee's report 
on a summary basis (without the filing of appellate briefs as if 
no appeal had been filed), Attorney Hicks still failed to file 
an opening brief or otherwise respond. 
¶3 
Appeals in attorney disciplinary cases are subject to 
the rules of appellate procedure for civil cases.  Supreme Court 
Rule (SCR) 22.17(3).  Sanctions for failing to comply with those 
rules are likewise available as they would be in other civil 
appeals.  See Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.83(2); In re Disciplinary 
Proceeding Against Crandall, 2011 WI 21, ¶13, 332 Wis. 2d 698, 
798 N.W.2d 183.  Those sanctions include "dismissal of the 
No. 
2014AP7-D   
 
3 
 
appeal, summary reversal, striking of a paper, imposition of a 
penalty or costs on a party or counsel, or other action as the 
court considers appropriate."  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.83(2). 
¶4 
In ordinary civil cases, dismissal of an appeal with 
prejudice is a drastic action because "in many cases it imposes 
a finality to both issues and claims."  State v. Smythe, 
225 Wis. 2d 456, 469, 592 N.W.2d 628 (1999).  When an ordinary 
civil appeal is dismissed by the court of appeals, the circuit 
court's final judgment or order stands without any consideration 
of the merits.  Consequently, this court has authorized 
dismissal of civil appeals only where the appellant "has 
demonstrated bad faith or egregious conduct, or there must be a 
common sense finding that the appeal has been abandoned."  Id. 
¶5 
Whether Attorney Hicks' failure to file any brief in 
this court can be characterized as "egregious" or "bad faith" 
are issues we need not reach.  A stronger argument can be made 
that Attorney Hicks has abandoned his appeal.  In addition to 
the notice provided in the rules of appellate procedure that he 
must file a brief, see Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.19(1), he twice 
received notices from the clerk of this court that reminded him 
of his obligation to file a brief.  Indeed, the April 9, 2015 
order issued through the clerk's office explicitly stated that 
his brief was delinquent and that he had five days to file his 
brief or to seek an extension.  That order did not spur Attorney 
Hicks to any action, even though it advised him that failure to 
comply would result in the court resolving his case in a summary 
manner.  Attorney Hicks' failure to take any action in the face 
No. 
2014AP7-D   
 
4 
 
of the court's order is a clear indication that he had decided 
to abandon his appeal.  That intention was confirmed when the 
OLR subsequently filed a motion to dismiss his appeal, and 
Attorney Hicks failed even to file a response to the motion.  
Thus, this court has received not one communication from 
Attorney Hicks since he filed his short notice of appeal.  
Common sense would seem to require characterizing this pattern 
of conduct as clearly demonstrating an intent to abandon the 
appeal. 
¶6 
At a minimum, Attorney Hicks has failed to file any 
brief even after being informed in April 2015 that this court 
would summarily resolve his case if he failed to file a brief 
within five days.  His prolonged course of inaction and failure 
to communicate with this court constitutes a forfeiture of his 
right to file a brief, even if we do not formally dismiss his 
appeal.   
¶7 
Ultimately, we choose not to formally dismiss Attorney 
Hicks' appeal, but merely to proceed to consider the matter 
without the benefit of briefs.  This choice, however, will have 
no real effect on how we proceed in this disciplinary case.  In 
either case, because this is an attorney disciplinary matter 
that has come to us via a referee's report and recommendation 
rather than a lower court "judgment" that we could simply affirm 
without consideration of the merits, we must proceed to review 
the referee's report and recommendation on the merits.  Because 
there are no briefs and no specific issues presented for our 
review, we will still proceed with our review as if no appeal 
No. 
2014AP7-D   
 
5 
 
had been filed, which means that we will still review the 
referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law and will 
determine an appropriate level of discipline for any misconduct 
that is found.  See SCR 22.17(2).1 
¶8 
We will affirm the referee's findings of fact unless 
they are found to be clearly erroneous, but we will review the 
referee's conclusions of law on a de novo basis.  In re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
Inglimo, 
2007 WI 126, 
¶5, 
305 Wis. 2d 71, 740 N.W.2d 125.  If professional misconduct is 
found, we will determine the appropriate level of discipline to 
impose given the particular facts of each case, independent of 
the referee's recommendation, but benefiting from it.  In re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
Widule, 
2003 WI 34, 
¶44, 
261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686. 
¶9 
After reviewing this matter, we accept the referee's 
findings of fact and legal conclusions that Attorney Hicks 
committed 35 counts of professional misconduct.  Given the 
pattern of Attorney Hicks' misconduct, the number of clients 
affected, and his cavalier attitude toward the lawyer regulation 
system and the resulting temporary suspensions of his license, 
                                                 
1 SCR 22.17(2) states: 
 
If no appeal is filed timely, the supreme court 
shall review the referee's report; adopt, reject or 
modify the referee's findings and conclusions or 
remand the matter to the referee for additional 
findings; 
and 
determine 
and 
impose 
appropriate 
discipline.  The court, on its own motion, may order 
the parties to file briefs in the matter. 
No. 
2014AP7-D   
 
6 
 
we determine that a two-year suspension of his license to 
practice law is appropriate.  We further require Attorney Hicks 
to pay the costs of this disciplinary proceeding, which were 
$10,572.49 as of February 4, 2015. 
¶10 Attorney Hicks was admitted to the practice of law in 
this state in June 1984.  He most recently maintained a private 
law practice in West Allis.   
¶11 Attorney Hicks has been the subject of professional 
discipline on one prior occasion.  In 2012 he received a public 
reprimand after stipulating to nine counts of professional 
misconduct.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hicks, 
2012 WI 11, 338 Wis. 2d 558, 809 N.W.2d 33. 
¶12 As the referee noted, there is a general pattern to 
Attorney Hicks' misconduct.  His practice focused primarily on 
representing indigent defendants in criminal cases through 
appointments by the Office of the State Public Defender (SPD) or 
by a court.  While Attorney Hicks would usually send an initial 
letter to the client notifying him/her of the appointment and 
his representation, he would largely ignore the client for 
extended periods of time.  At times, Attorney Hicks would fail 
to follow through on necessary actions.  At some point the OLR 
would receive a grievance, which they would send to Attorney 
Hicks for a written response.  Attorney Hicks would either never 
respond, or he would provide an initial response that the OLR 
deemed inadequate and he would then fail to respond to the OLR's 
requests for further information.   
No. 
2014AP7-D   
 
7 
 
¶13 On two occasions, the OLR moved for the temporary 
suspension of Attorney Hicks' license due to his willful failure 
to cooperate with the OLR's investigations.  The first such 
motion was filed on June 14, 2012.  This court then issued an 
order directing Attorney Hicks to show cause in writing by 
July 5, 2012, why his license should not be temporarily 
suspended.  On July 17, 2012, Attorney Hicks filed a late 
response asserting that he had submitted a response to the 
grievance to the OLR.  The OLR, however, stated that Attorney 
Hicks' response was insufficient and asked him to provide 
additional information.  The OLR twice asked this court to 
postpone suspending Attorney Hicks' license to allow Attorney 
Hicks more time to provide a complete response to the OLR's 
requests for information.  When the OLR reported that Attorney 
Hicks had failed to provide any additional information, this 
court finally temporarily suspended his license on September 27, 
2012.  Only after the temporary suspension of his license did 
Attorney Hicks submit a response to the grievance that provided 
the information the OLR was seeking.  The court then reinstated 
Attorney Hicks' license on October 16, 2012.   
¶14 The OLR was forced to file a second motion for 
temporary suspension on November 29, 2012, when Attorney Hicks 
failed to provided adequate responses in other grievance 
investigations.  This court again issued an order to show cause.  
Attorney Hicks did not respond to the order, and this court then 
temporarily suspended his license again on February 12, 2013.  
Once that suspension had been ordered, Attorney Hicks began to 
No. 
2014AP7-D   
 
8 
 
cooperate with the OLR's investigations.  The OLR notified the 
court of that fact, and we reinstated Attorney Hicks' license to 
practice law in this state on March 11, 2013.   
¶15 We now turn to the specific factual findings and 
conclusions of professional misconduct.   
Representation of D.S. 
¶16 In 
June 
2011, 
Attorney 
Hicks 
was 
appointed 
to 
represent D.S. in a criminal case pending in the Milwaukee 
County circuit court.  Attorney Hicks did meet with D.S. on at 
least two occasions and also met with D.S.'s wife to discuss 
various issues related to the defense of the case, including the 
execution of a search warrant and a possible motion to suppress 
evidence.  Attorney Hicks and D.S. did not agree on several 
aspects of the motion.  Attorney Hicks did file a motion to 
suppress, but the November 9, 2011 hearing on the motion was 
adjourned to January 26, 2012, because a witness for the state 
was not present.  On November 9, 2011, and in a letter mailed 
the next day, D.S. asked Attorney Hicks to amend the suppression 
motion to add additional arguments, to subpoena additional 
witnesses for the hearing, and to investigate what D.S. believed 
was a faulty affidavit.  The referee found that Attorney Hicks 
did not subpoena the additional witnesses requested by D.S. 
because he believed they would be detrimental to D.S.'s chance 
of obtaining suppression and that he did not pursue the 
additional arguments raised by D.S. because he believed them to 
be without merit.  Attorney Hicks, however, did not communicate 
with D.S. between November 16, 2011, and the adjourned hearing 
No. 
2014AP7-D   
 
9 
 
on January 26, 2012, when Attorney Hicks' motion to withdraw as 
D.S.'s counsel was granted by the circuit court. 
¶17 On December 24, 2011, D.S. mailed a grievance letter 
to the OLR regarding Attorney Hicks' representation.  The OLR 
twice communicated by letter with Attorney Hicks and asked him 
to respond to D.S.'s grievance.  When Attorney Hicks did not 
respond, the OLR included Attorney Hicks' failure to cooperate 
as a basis for its first motion for a temporary suspension. 
¶18 On the basis of these facts, the referee concluded 
that the OLR had not proven to the requisite standard of clear, 
satisfactory, and convincing evidence that Attorney Hicks had 
violated SCR 20:1.32 by failing to act with reasonable diligence.  
The referee also determined that the OLR had failed to prove 
violations of SCRs 20:1.4(a)(2) and (4)3 and 20:1.4(b),4 but he 
                                                 
2 SCR 20:1.3 provides that "[a] lawyer shall act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client." 
3 SCR 20:1.4(a), as relevant here, provides that a lawyer 
shall:  
(2) reasonably consult with the client about the 
means by which the client's objectives are to be 
accomplished; 
(3) keep the client reasonably informed about the 
status of the matter; [and] 
(4) promptly comply with reasonable requests by 
the client for information. 
4 SCR 20:1.4(b) provides that "[a] lawyer shall explain a 
matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client 
to make informed decisions regarding the representation." 
No. 
2014AP7-D   
 
10 
 
did find that the OLR had proven a failure to communicate with 
D.S., in violation of SCR 20:1.4(a)(3).  In addition, the 
referee concluded that Attorney Hicks' failure to file a 
response to D.S.'s grievance until this court had temporarily 
suspended 
his 
license 
had 
constituted 
a 
violation 
of 
SCR 22.03(2) and (6),5 which are enforced via SCR 20:8.4(h).6 
                                                 
5 SCR 22.03(2) and (6) provide:  
(2)  Upon 
commencing 
an 
investigation, 
the 
director shall notify the respondent of the matter 
being investigated unless in the opinion of the 
director the investigation of the matter requires 
otherwise. The respondent shall fully and fairly 
disclose all facts and circumstances pertaining to the 
alleged misconduct within 20 days after being served 
by ordinary mail a request for a written response. The 
director 
may 
allow 
additional 
time 
to 
respond. 
Following receipt of the response, the director may 
conduct further investigation and may compel the 
respondent to answer questions, furnish documents, and 
present 
any 
information 
deemed 
relevant 
to 
the 
investigation. 
. . . . 
(6)  In the course of the investigation, the 
respondent's 
wilful 
failure 
to 
provide 
relevant 
information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish 
documents and the respondent's misrepresentation in a 
disclosure are misconduct, regardless of the merits of 
the matters asserted in the grievance. 
6 SCR 20:8.4(h) provides that it is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to "fail to cooperate in the investigation of a 
grievance filed with the office of lawyer regulation as required 
by SCR 21.15(4), SCR 22.001(9)(b), SCR 22.03(2), SCR 22.03(6), 
or SCR 22.04(1)." 
No. 
2014AP7-D   
 
11 
 
Representation of C.N. 
¶19 In the fall of 2011, Attorney Hicks was appointed to 
represent client C.N. in a criminal appeal before the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.  The opening 
brief in the appeal was due on November 14, 2011, but Attorney 
Hicks did not file any brief.  Over the next six weeks, the 
Seventh Circuit issued two separate orders to show cause why 
C.N.'s appeal should not be dismissed for want of prosecution.  
Attorney Hicks did not respond to either of the two orders.  
Finally, in an order dated April 19, 2012, the chief judge of 
the Seventh Circuit discharged Attorney Hicks from C.N.'s appeal 
and ordered him to show cause why he should not be censured, 
fined, suspended, or disbarred from practicing in the Seventh 
Circuit due to his defiance of the court's orders and his 
abandonment of his client.  The Seventh Circuit ultimately did 
disbar Attorney Hicks from appearing before it. 
¶20 The OLR sent several letters to Attorney Hicks seeking 
a response regarding his actions in the C.N. representation.  
After the second OLR letter, Attorney Hicks asked for a short 
extension to submit his response, but he did not respond.  After 
the third OLR letter, Attorney Hicks submitted another letter in 
which he merely asserted that his trial schedule had prevented 
him from completing his response, that he was working on 
compiling the necessary documents and information, and that he 
would try to complete his response as soon as he could.  
Attorney Hicks, however, never filed a substantive response.  He 
No. 
2014AP7-D   
 
12 
 
also did not respond to this court's order to show cause, which 
led to the second temporary suspension described above. 
¶21 The referee determined that these facts supported 
three counts of misconduct.  First, Attorney Hicks' failure to 
file a brief, seek an extension of time, or withdraw from 
representing C.N. had constituted a lack of diligence, in 
violation of SCR 20:1.3.  The referee also concluded that 
Attorney Hicks had violated SCR 20:3.4(c)7 by failing to respond 
to the Seventh Circuit's multiple orders to show cause.  
Finally, Attorney Hicks' failure to respond to the OLR's 
requests for a response had violated SCR 22.03(2) and (6), which 
are enforced via SCR 20:8.4(h). 
Representation of R.C. 
¶22 Attorney Hicks was appointed to represent R.C. in 
post-conviction proceedings or on appeal following R.C.'s 
criminal conviction.  Attorney Hicks never had any contact with 
R.C. and failed to take any action on his behalf, causing R.C.'s 
appeal rights to expire without his consent.  Ultimately, the 
SPD was forced to appoint new counsel for R.C. 
¶23 The referee concluded that Attorney Hicks' lack of 
action during the representation of R.C. supported two counts of 
misconduct.  First, Attorney Hicks failed to act with reasonable 
diligence, in violation of SCR 20:1.3.  Second, Attorney Hicks' 
                                                 
7 SCR 20:3.4(c) provides that a lawyer shall not "knowingly 
disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal, except for 
an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation 
exists." 
No. 
2014AP7-D   
 
13 
 
lack of communication with his client constituted violations of 
SCRs 20:1.4(a)(2), (3), and (4) and 20:1.4(b). 
Representation of L.B. 
¶24 Attorney Hicks was also appointed to represent L.B. in 
criminal post-conviction matters.  In a July 30, 2012 order, the 
circuit court ordered Attorney Hicks to file a brief in support 
of a previously filed post-conviction motion by September 4, 
2012.  Attorney Hicks failed to file the brief as ordered or to 
seek an extension of time prior to the temporary suspension of 
his license to practice law in Wisconsin.  Indeed, except for an 
introductory letter to L.B. notifying him of Attorney Hicks' 
appointment, Attorney Hicks did not meet with L.B., respond to 
letters from L.B. requesting information about his case, or 
otherwise keep L.B. informed about the status of his case.  When 
this court issued its first temporary suspension order against 
Attorney Hicks in September 2012, Attorney Hicks failed to 
notify L.B. of his suspension.  Attorney Hicks also failed to 
notify the circuit court or opposing counsel.  Finally, as 
occurred in other matters, Attorney Hicks promised the OLR that 
he would provide a response to L.B.'s grievance, but he failed 
to do so in a timely manner, responding only after this court 
had issued its second temporary suspension order in February 
2013. 
¶25 The referee concluded that the OLR had not proven to 
the requisite standard of proof that Attorney Hicks' failure to 
file a written request for an extension of time to file the 
post-hearing brief had constituted a violation of SCR 20:1.3.  
No. 
2014AP7-D   
 
14 
 
The referee did find that Attorney Hicks had failed to properly 
communicate with L.B., in violation of SCRs 20:1.4(a)(2), (3), 
and (4) and 20:1.4(b).  The referee also determined that 
Attorney Hicks' failure to notify his client of his temporary 
suspension had violated SCRs 22.26(1)(a) and (b)8 and 20:3.4(c).9  
Similarly, Attorney Hicks' failure to notify the circuit court 
and opposing counsel of the temporary suspension violated SCRs 
22.26(1)(c)10 and 20:3.4(c).  Finally, the referee concluded that 
                                                 
8 SCR 22.26(1)(a) and (b) provide that, on or before the 
effective date of a license suspension, an attorney whose 
license is suspended shall "[n]otify by certified mail all 
clients being represented in pending matters of the suspension 
or revocation and of the attorney's consequent inability to act 
as an attorney following the effective date of the suspension or 
revocation," and shall "[a]dvise the clients to seek legal 
advice of their choice elsewhere." 
9 As noted above, SCR 20:3.4(c) provides that a lawyer shall 
not "knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a 
tribunal, except for an open refusal based on an assertion that 
no valid obligation exists."  We question whether an attorney's 
failure to notify the attorney's client, opposing counsel, or a 
court of a temporary license suspension can constitute a 
violation of SCR 20:3.4, which bears the title "Fairness to 
opposing 
party 
and 
counsel." 
 
Multiple 
counts 
alleging 
violations of SCR 22.26 also alleged violations of SCR 20:3.4(c) 
in this matter.  We need not decide this question, however, 
because 
the 
failure 
to 
comply 
with 
the 
obligations 
in 
SCR 22.26(1) to notify clients, opposing counsel, and courts of 
an attorney's temporary license suspension clearly constitutes a 
violation 
of 
SCR 
20:8.4(f), 
which 
provides 
that 
it 
is 
professional misconduct for a lawyer to "violate a statute, 
supreme court rule, supreme court order or supreme court 
decision regulating the conduct of lawyers." 
10 SCR 22.26(1)(c) provides that, on or before the effective 
date of a license suspension, an attorney whose license is 
suspended shall: 
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP7-D   
 
15 
 
Attorney Hicks' failure to respond to L.B.'s grievance until 
after this court had temporarily suspended his license had 
violated 
SCR 
22.03(2) 
and 
(6), 
which 
are 
enforced 
via 
SCR 20:8.4(h). 
Representation of E.B. 
¶26 Attorney Hicks was representing E.B. at the time that 
this court imposed both of the temporary license suspensions (in 
September 2012 and in February 2013).  The referee found that in 
neither instance did Attorney Hicks notify E.B. of the license 
suspension, in violation of SCRs 22.26(1)(a) and (b) and 
20:3.4(c).  The referee also found that Attorney Hicks failed to 
notify the court and opposing counsel of his two license 
suspensions, in violation of SCRs 22.26(1)(c) and 20:3.4(c).  
Finally, the referee determined that Attorney Hicks had failed 
to respond to E.B.'s grievance, in violation of SCR 22.03(2) and 
(6), which are enforced via SCR 20:8.4(h). 
Representation of V.B. 
¶27 In early December 2011, the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin (the Eastern 
                                                                                                                                                             
Promptly provide written notification to the 
court or administrative agency and the attorney for 
each party in a matter pending before a court or 
administrative agency of the suspension or revocation 
and of the attorney's consequent inability to act as 
an attorney following the effective date of the 
suspension or revocation. The notice shall identify 
the successor attorney of the attorney's client or, if 
there is none at the time notice is given, shall state 
the client's place of residence. 
No. 
2014AP7-D   
 
16 
 
District) appointed Attorney Hicks to represent client V.B. in a 
criminal case pending in that court.  V.B.'s sentencing was 
initially scheduled for February 28, 2012.  Except for an 
introductory letter informing V.B. of his appointment and 
despite V.B.'s multiple attempts at contact, Attorney Hicks did 
not communicate with V.B. to discuss the case or prepare for the 
sentencing hearing, causing V.B. to send a letter to that effect 
to the federal court prior to the sentencing hearing.   
¶28 Without consulting V.B., Attorney Hicks sent a letter 
to the court the day before the sentencing hearing, requesting 
an adjournment of the hearing.  In his letter, although he had 
never spoken with V.B., Attorney Hicks stated that V.B. had 
"expressed some concerns about my representation of him, and I 
would like the opportunity to spend more time with [V.B.] to 
discuss his case and address his concerns."  On the same day, 
Attorney Hicks sent a letter to V.B. notifying him that Attorney 
Hicks had unilaterally sought the adjournment of the sentencing 
hearing. 
¶29 When Attorney Hicks still did not communicate with him 
regarding the sentencing hearing, V.B. sent another letter to 
the court asking for the appointment of new counsel.  The court 
responded that it would address V.B.'s request at the sentencing 
hearing now scheduled for April 11, 2012.  The day before the 
sentencing hearing, however, Attorney Hicks again requested an 
adjournment of the sentencing hearing without consulting or even 
notifying V.B.  The referee also found that Attorney Hicks had 
No. 
2014AP7-D   
 
17 
 
not done "any appreciable preparation for [V.B.'s] sentencing" 
by that time.   
¶30 The court adjourned the sentencing hearing, but 
scheduled a status conference for April 19, 2012.  Attorney 
Hicks unsuccessfully attempted to have this status conference 
adjourned.  At the status conference, the Eastern District judge 
removed Attorney Hicks from V.B.'s case and appointed successor 
counsel. 
¶31 V.B. filed a grievance with the OLR, which in turn 
notified Attorney Hicks and asked for a response in a letter 
dated July 24, 2012.  Attorney Hicks requested an extension to 
respond, but he failed to provide any response until after this 
court had imposed the first temporary license suspension in 
September 2012.  The OLR then requested additional information 
from Attorney Hicks regarding the V.B. representation.  Long 
after the deadline for his supplemental response, Attorney Hicks 
faxed a letter to the OLR in late November 2012, claiming that 
his trial schedule had prevented him from responding, but 
assuring the OLR that he was compiling the documents and 
information the OLR requested and promising the OLR that he 
would complete the work on his supplemental response as soon as 
he could.  Attorney Hicks, however, failed to provide any 
supplemental response until after this court had suspended his 
license a second time due to his willful failure to cooperate 
with the OLR's investigations. 
¶32 Based on these facts, the referee concluded that 
Attorney Hicks had violated SCR 20:1.3 due to his failure to 
No. 
2014AP7-D   
 
18 
 
prepare for and proceed with V.B.'s sentencing over a period of 
more than four months, which ultimately resulted in his removal 
from the case and the appointment of new counsel.  Further, the 
referee determined that Attorney Hicks' failure to communicate 
with his client, both to advise the client of his actions and to 
respond to the client's multiple requests for information, had 
violated SCRs 20:1.4(a)(2), (3), and (4) and 20:1.4(b).  In 
addition, the referee again ruled that Attorney Hicks had 
violated 
SCR 
22.03(2) 
and 
(6), 
which 
are 
enforced 
via 
SCR 20:8.4(h), by failing to provide timely responses to the 
OLR's requests for information about V.B.'s grievance.  The 
referee, 
however, 
did 
not 
find 
that 
Attorney 
Hicks 
had 
"engage[d] in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation," in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c), as charged in 
the OLR's complaint. 
Representation of J.M. 
¶33 Attorney Hicks was appointed to represent client J.M. 
in May 2012.  During the period of Attorney Hicks' first 
temporary suspension, he continued to make court appearances on 
J.M.'s behalf.  He also failed to properly notify J.M. of his 
temporary suspensions.  When the OLR notified Attorney Hicks of 
J.M.'s grievance and asked for certain information and documents 
in response to the grievance, Attorney Hicks failed to respond.   
¶34 The referee concluded that Attorney Hicks' failure to 
notify J.M. of either of the temporary suspensions had violated 
SCRs 22.26(1)(a) and (b) and 20:3.4(c).  He also determined that 
Attorney Hicks had violated SCRs 22.26(2) and 20:3.4(c) by 
No. 
2014AP7-D   
 
19 
 
making court appearances on behalf of J.M. at a time when his 
license had been temporarily suspended.  Finally, Attorney 
Hicks' failure to respond to the OLR's request for information 
violated 
SCR 
22.03(2) 
and 
(6), 
which 
are 
enforced 
via 
SCR 20:8.4(h). 
Representations of K.L. and F.W. 
¶35 In 
August 
2011, 
the 
Eastern 
District 
appointed 
Attorney Hicks to represent K.L. in a criminal case pending in 
that court.   
¶36 On April 19, 2012, while K.L's case was still pending, 
the Seventh Circuit removed Attorney Hicks as counsel for C.N., 
as noted above.  It also removed his name from the list of 
counsel eligible to receive appointments under the federal 
Criminal Justice Act and disbarred him from practicing before 
that court.  The Seventh Circuit's orders, however, did not 
remove him as counsel in federal district court cases where he 
had 
already 
been 
appointed, 
nor 
did 
they 
terminate 
his 
eligibility to practice in the Eastern District. 
¶37 On July 25, 2012, K.L. sent a letter to the Eastern 
District requesting that the court advise him of the date and 
time for his next court appearance.  The court subsequently 
notified him that his change of plea hearing was scheduled for 
September 6, 2012.  Attorney Hicks, however, failed to appear 
for that hearing, which led to a lengthy expression of 
frustration by the district court judge.  The judge stated that 
this was the second time that Attorney Hicks had failed to 
appear for a district court hearing following his Seventh 
No. 
2014AP7-D   
 
20 
 
Circuit disbarment, that Attorney Hicks apparently held the 
mistaken view that the Seventh Circuit disbarment had also 
suspended him from practicing before the Eastern District, and 
that Attorney Hicks had not bothered to seek clarification from 
the Eastern District before deciding not to appear for hearings 
in which he represented the defendant.  The judge noted that 
Attorney Hicks' actions were causing disruptions with both the 
U.S. Marshal's Service, which brings defendants from custody to 
the district court for appearances, and the court's calendar.  
The 
judge 
indicated 
that 
he 
would 
hold 
Attorney 
Hicks 
responsible for some or all of the expenses connected with his 
failure to appear because Attorney Hicks had been "totally 
irresponsible in his obligations as an officer of this court in 
not communicating not only with the Court but more significantly 
with his clients."  The district court terminated Attorney 
Hicks' appointment for K.L. and appointed successor counsel. 
¶38 On that same date, Attorney Hicks was also scheduled 
to appear on behalf of client F.W., whom Attorney Hicks had been 
representing since September 2008.  Since the beginning of 2012 
F.W. had sent three letters to the Eastern District complaining 
that Attorney Hicks had not been responding to his requests for 
information and to discuss his upcoming sentencing hearing.  In 
one such letter, F.W. requested that new counsel be appointed to 
replace 
Attorney 
Hicks 
due 
to 
his 
inattentiveness. 
 
On 
September 6, 2012, when Attorney Hicks failed to appear for 
K.L.'s hearing, the district court also removed him from 
representing F.W. and appointed successor counsel for F.W. 
No. 
2014AP7-D   
 
21 
 
¶39 Several weeks after Attorney Hicks was removed from 
representing K.L. and F.W., the chief judge of the Eastern 
District entered an order removing Attorney Hicks from the list 
of attorneys eligible to receive appointments to represent 
indigent defendants in the Eastern District. 
¶40 When 
the 
OLR 
notified 
Attorney 
Hicks 
of 
its 
investigation of his conduct in these matters in October 2012, 
Attorney Hicks initially responded by asserting that he was 
working on compiling the necessary documents and information, 
that he had "limited time to work on the grievances," and that 
he would try to complete his work on the responses as soon as he 
could. 
 
He 
did 
not, 
however, 
submit 
a 
response 
until 
February 26, 2013, after this court had imposed the second 
temporary suspension of his license due to his failure to 
cooperate with the OLR's investigations.  When the OLR requested 
additional information, Attorney Hicks again failed to respond.  
¶41 The referee determined that the OLR had failed to 
prove by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence that 
Attorney Hicks had violated SCR 20:1.16(d)11 by failing to file 
                                                 
11 SCR 20:1.16(d) provides: 
Upon termination of representation, a lawyer 
shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable 
to protect a client's interests, such as giving 
reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for 
employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and 
property to which the client is entitled and refunding 
any advance payment of fee or expense that has not 
been earned or incurred. The lawyer may retain papers 
relating to the client to the extent permitted by 
other law. 
No. 
2014AP7-D   
 
22 
 
motions to withdraw from representing K.L. and F.W.  The referee 
did conclude, however, that the OLR had adequately proven two 
counts of failing to provide timely responses to the OLR, in 
violation of SCR 22.03(2) and (6), which are enforced via 
SCR 20:8.4(h). 
Representation of Q.W. 
¶42 In 
March 
2012 
Attorney 
Hicks 
was 
appointed 
to 
represent Q.W. in a criminal case pending in the Milwaukee 
County circuit court.  Over the next approximately eleven 
months, Attorney Hicks sent only two letters to Q.W.  One letter 
advised Q.W. of Attorney Hicks' appointment.  The second letter 
responded to one of Q.W.'s concerns regarding the evidence 
against him.  Attorney Hicks, however, failed to respond to four 
letters that Q.W. sent to him, failed to send specific 
information that Q.W. had requested, and failed to keep him 
informed of developments in his case, all of which resulted in 
Q.W. not knowing the status of his case by February 2013. 
¶43 In addition, during the time that Attorney Hicks 
represented Q.W., his license to practice law was twice 
temporarily suspended due to his failure to cooperate with OLR 
investigations concerning other matters.  Attorney Hicks failed 
to notify Q.W. of either temporary suspension.  He also failed 
to notify the court and opposing counsel of the temporary 
suspensions.  In fact, during the second temporary suspension 
Attorney Hicks participated in a hearing on a motion filed by 
Q.W. seeking to terminate Attorney Hicks' representation and to 
obtain new counsel.  At no time during the hearing did Attorney 
No. 
2014AP7-D   
 
23 
 
Hicks indicate that his license was then suspended.  Ultimately, 
unaware of Attorney Hicks' license status, the circuit court 
denied Q.W.'s motion and kept Attorney Hicks on Q.W.'s case. 
¶44 Attorney Hicks again failed to respond to the OLR's 
request for a response to the grievance that Q.W. subsequently 
filed.   
¶45 The referee concluded that the OLR had proven five 
counts of misconduct regarding Attorney Hicks' representation of 
Q.W. and his response to the OLR's investigation.  Attorney 
Hicks violated SCRs 20:1.4(a)(2), (3), and (4) and 20:1.4(b) by 
failing to properly communicate with Q.W. regarding the status 
of his case, developments in his case, and the means by which 
Attorney Hicks intended to defend him.  Attorney Hicks' failure 
to notify Q.W. of his two temporary license suspensions 
constituted a violation of SCRs 22.26(1)(a) and (b) and 
20:3.4(c).  Similarly, Attorney Hicks' failure to notify the 
court and opposing counsel of those same license suspensions 
also violated SCRs 22.26(1)(c) and 20:3.4(c).  When Attorney 
Hicks appeared on Q.W.'s behalf while his license to practice 
law in Wisconsin was suspended, he violated SCRs 22.26(2) and 
20:3.4(c).  Finally, Attorney Hicks' failure to submit a timely 
response to Q.W.'s grievance violated SCR 22.03(2) and (6), 
which are enforced via SCR 20:8.4(h). 
Grievance Investigations Regarding M.W. and T.T. 
¶46 Attorney Hicks was appointed to represent M.W. and 
T.T. in their respective cases.  The referee's findings did not 
involve 
Attorney 
Hicks' 
representations 
of 
those 
two 
No. 
2014AP7-D   
 
24 
 
individuals, but rather focused on Attorney Hicks' failure to 
respond to their grievances.  The referee concluded that by 
failing to submit timely responses to their grievances and doing 
so only after the court had temporarily suspended his license, 
Attorney Hicks had violated SCR 22.03(2) and (6), which are 
enforced via SCR 20:8.4(h).   
Conduct Following Second Temporary Suspension 
¶47 Finally, the referee addressed a series of alleged 
violations stemming from Attorney Hicks' conduct following the 
second temporary suspension of his license on February 12, 2013.  
By this time, Attorney Hicks had already been through the 
process 
of 
having 
his 
license 
temporarily 
suspended 
and 
obtaining the reinstatement of his license.  One requirement 
imposed on an attorney whose license is suspended, even on a 
temporary basis, is to submit an affidavit to the OLR listing 
the clients involved in pending matters at the time of the 
suspension and demonstrating the attorney's compliance with the 
suspension order and applicable rules, which would include 
providing proper notice to clients, opposing counsel, and 
courts.  SCR 22.26(1)(e).12  On March 6, 2013, Attorney Hicks 
                                                 
12 SCR 22.26(1)(e) provides that, on or before the effective 
date of a license suspension, an attorney whose license is 
suspended shall:  
Within 25 days after the effective date of 
suspension or revocation, file with the director an 
affidavit showing all of the following:  
(i) Full compliance with the provisions of the 
suspension or revocation order and with the rules and 
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP7-D   
 
25 
 
filed an affidavit pursuant to that rule, which he himself 
purported to notarize, that claimed that he had mailed written 
notice of his temporary suspension to all of his clients, 
notified the SPD, and notified each court in which he had a 
pending case.  He included a list of 14 clients that he asserted 
showed "all clients and pending court matters."   
¶48 Attorney Hicks' affidavit was false in multiple 
respects.  He had not provided proper notice to all of his 
clients and to opposing counsel.  He also had not notified a 
number of judges before whom he had pending cases that his 
license had been suspended.  He also failed to list at least 
nine pending cases in which he was counsel.   
¶49 In addition, during his temporary suspension, Attorney 
Hicks appeared in court of behalf of clients on at least 12 
occasions.  He did not advise those courts that he was 
ineligible to appear at that time.   
¶50 When the OLR asked Attorney Hicks for information 
regarding his compliance with the post-suspension obligations 
imposed by SCR 22.26, he again failed to respond. 
                                                                                                                                                             
procedures regarding the closing of the attorney's 
practice.  
(ii) A list of all jurisdictions, including 
state, federal and administrative bodies, before which 
the attorney is admitted to practice.  
(iii) A list of clients in all pending matters 
and a list of all matters pending before any court or 
administrative agency, together with the case number 
of each matter. 
No. 
2014AP7-D   
 
26 
 
¶51 The referee concluded that Attorney Hicks' post-
suspension conduct and his affidavit supported six counts of 
misconduct.  On two counts, the referee concluded that Attorney 
Hicks had violated SCR 20:8.4(c)—once for purporting to notarize 
his own affidavit and once for making multiple false statements 
of fact within that affidavit.  The referee also found that by 
failing to notify his clients of his temporary suspension, 
Attorney Hicks had violated SCRs 22.26(1)(a) and (b) and 
20:3.4(c).  Similarly, by failing to provide notice to both the 
applicable courts and opposing counsel, Attorney Hicks violated 
SCRs 22.26(1)(c) and 20:3.4(c).  Attorney Hicks' repeated 
appearances in court on behalf of clients during his temporary 
suspension violated SCRs 22.26(2) and 20:3.4(c).  Further, 
Attorney Hicks' failure to respond to the OLR's inquiries again 
violated 
SCR 
22.03(2) 
and 
(6), 
which 
are 
enforced 
via 
SCR 20:8.4(h). 
¶52 Thus, in total the referee found violations on 3513 
separate counts involving 12 client representations.  Three 
counts were withdrawn by the OLR.  On four other counts and on 
part of a fifth count, the referee concluded that the OLR had 
not satisfied its burden of proof. 
¶53 The 
referee 
commented 
that 
there 
were 
"several 
disturbing patterns" in Attorney Hicks' misconduct.  First, 
                                                 
13 On one of those counts, the referee did find that 
Attorney Hicks had committed only part of the misconduct alleged 
by the OLR. 
No. 
2014AP7-D   
 
27 
 
Attorney Hicks failed to engage in the necessary communication 
with his clients.  He would often send initial letters advising 
them of his appointment, but then would repeatedly ignore 
letters and telephone calls from those clients, resulting in a 
failure to advise the clients of his strategy or to answer their 
questions and concerns.  The referee rejected Attorney Hicks' 
excuse that he was too busy with jury trials and a high case 
load to communicate with his clients.  While he may indeed have 
been forced by economic circumstances to carry a large case 
load, the referee indicated that he still must comply with his 
ethical 
obligation 
to 
share 
information 
with 
and 
answer 
inquiries from his clients.   
¶54 The second disturbing pattern noted by the referee was 
Attorney Hicks' disregard for his obligation to provide timely 
responses to the OLR.  Indeed, the referee noted that Attorney 
Hicks generally waited for his license to be temporarily 
suspended before submitting a response.  The referee noted that 
he asked Attorney Hicks for an explanation as to his failure to 
promptly 
respond 
and 
that 
Attorney 
Hicks 
"had 
no 
good 
explanation."   
¶55 The third disturbing pattern was Attorney Hicks' 
repeated disregard of this court's rules regarding temporary 
license suspensions.  He blatantly continued to represent 
clients and to appear in court as if nothing had changed.  He 
did not notify his clients, opposing counsel or the courts that 
his license had been suspended.   
No. 
2014AP7-D   
 
28 
 
¶56 The referee indicated he was at a loss to explain this 
conduct of Attorney Hicks, who otherwise appeared to be an 
intelligent and competent attorney.  Nonetheless, the referee 
agreed with the OLR that Attorney Hicks' repeated and willful 
disregard of his clients, his intentional refusal to respond to 
the OLR, his intentional and repeated practice of law after his 
license had been suspended, and his repetition of misconduct 
that led to the 2012 public reprimand warranted a lengthy 
suspension.  Ultimately, the referee recommended that Attorney 
Hicks' license to practice law in Wisconsin be suspended for a 
period of two years. 
¶57 After reviewing this matter and in light of the lack 
of any argument from Attorney Hicks to the contrary, we find no 
basis to conclude that the referee's findings of fact are 
clearly erroneous, and we therefore adopt them.  We further 
agree with the referee that those detailed findings support 
legal conclusions that Attorney Hicks engaged in 35 counts of 
professional misconduct.   
¶58 The issue then becomes what is the appropriate 
discipline that is warranted by this misconduct.  In light of 
the pattern of misconduct that Attorney Hicks has exhibited and 
his 
disregard 
for 
both 
his 
vulnerable 
clients 
and 
his 
obligations as an officer of the court, we determine that a two-
year suspension of his license is required to impress upon him 
the seriousness of his misconduct.  See In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Lucius, 2008 WI 12, 307 Wis. 2d 255, 
744 N.W.2d 605 (imposing two-year suspension on attorney found 
No. 
2014AP7-D   
 
29 
 
to 
have 
lacked 
diligence 
and 
failed 
to 
communicate 
in 
representing multiple indigent criminal defendants). 
¶59 We next turn to the issue of costs.  The referee 
recommended that the court impose the full costs of this 
proceeding on Attorney Hicks.  Our general policy is to do so, 
and we see no reason to divert from that policy in this case, 
especially where Attorney Hicks has not challenged the OLR's 
statement of costs. 
¶60 Finally, we do not impose any restitution obligation 
on Attorney Hicks.  The OLR has not sought restitution with 
respect 
to 
any 
of 
Attorney 
Hicks' 
clients. 
 
See 
SCR 
21.16(1m)(em) and (2m)(a)1 (the court may impose restitution in 
instances of misappropriation or misapplication of funds).  
¶61 IT IS ORDERED that the motion filed on behalf of the 
Office of Lawyer Regulation to dismiss the notice of appeal 
filed by Attorney Michael J. Hicks is denied, but due to the 
failure of Michael J. Hicks to file an opening brief, this 
matter has been considered by the court on a summary basis 
without the benefit of briefs. 
¶62 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the license of Michael J. 
Hicks to practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of 
two years, effective March 18, 2016.  
¶63 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Michael J. Hicks shall 
comply with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of 
a person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been 
suspended. 
No. 
2014AP7-D   
 
30 
 
¶64 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Michael J. Hicks shall pay to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding. 
¶65 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all 
conditions of this order is required for reinstatement.  See 
SCR 22.29(4)(c). 
 
 
No. 
2014AP7-D   
 
 
 
1