Title: PEOPLE OF MI V THOMAS DAVID CRESS
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 121189
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: July 9, 2003

____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 9, 2003  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v 
No. 121189  
THOMAS DAVID CRESS,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
CORRIGAN, C.J.  
We granted leave to appeal to consider whether the trial  
court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for  
relief from judgment on the basis of a new, third-party  
confession.  We hold that the trial court did not abuse its  
discretion when it concluded that the third-party confessor  
was not credible and that the confession, therefore, did not  
make a different result probable on retrial.  The trial  
court’s decision necessarily hinged on determinations of  
credibility and was supported by the evidence. The Court of  
 
  
Appeals impermissibly substituted its judicial opinion for  
that of the trial court.  We thus reverse the judgment of the  
Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s order denying  
relief from judgment.  
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY  
In 1985, a jury convicted defendant of first-degree  
felony 
murder, 
MCL 
750.316, in the death of seventeen-year-old  
Patty Rosansky.  The victim’s body had been found in a ravine  
covered by a refrigerator door.  Two pieces of tree limbs were  
found in her throat, and the autopsy revealed that the cause  
of death was a brain injury resulting from one or more blows  
to the head with a club-like object.  The victim had defensive  
wounds on her hands and extensive bruising on her legs. She  
was clothed from the waist up, but was naked from the waist  
down, with her underwear around her feet. There was evidence  
of forced anal penetration.  
No physical evidence connected defendant to the murder  
and no eyewitnesses were identified.  Rather, the case against  
defendant consisted primarily of the testimony of several  
witnesses to whom defendant had admitted murdering the  
victim.1  Defendant took the stand and denied that he killed  
1John Moore testified that he lived with defendant and 
heard defendant state in February 1983 after coming home in
the evening, that “he felt a little better because he went and
knocked off a piece.”  He testified that he also heard 
defendant say he had killed the victim. 
2  
 
the victim or that he had told anyone that he did so.  He  
stated that he was delivering papers on February 3, 1983, and  
presented an alibi witness, Doug Moore.
 Defendant also  
presented the testimony of people who claimed to have seen the  
Terry Moore testified that he lived with defendant and 
that, in July 1983, defendant took Terry, his brother Walter, 
and Cindy Lesley to a wooded area and pointed out the location 
of the victim’s body.  The victim’s body was later found in 
that location.  
Candy Moore testified that defendant came to her house 
almost every day in the spring of 1983 and told her on two 
different occasions that he had killed a girl named Patty and 
put her in a ditch.  
Emery DeBruine testified that in May 1983 defendant saw 
him in a bar and told DeBruine that defendant had raped and 
killed a girl because she refused to have sex with him. 
Defendant also said that it was a perfect crime and that no 
one would know about it.  
Walter 
Moore, 
a 
convicted 
felon, 
testified 
that 
defendant 
had stated that he had picked the victim up and that they had 
smoked marijuana. Defendant wanted to have sex and when the  
victim refused, he raped her, killed her, and dumped the body 
in a wooded area.  
Cindy Lesley testified that defendant had taken her out 
to the ravine where the victim was found and told her that he  
had killed the victim and left her body in the ravine after he 
covered her.  Lesley called the police and eventually received 
a monetary reward.  
Officers Nick Pestum and Marion Bagent testified  
regarding prior consistent statements of Walter Moore, Candy 
Moore, and Cindy Lesley, for the limited purpose of refuting 
defendant's charges that the witnesses were influenced.  
Shirley House testified that she was the Moore family's 
landlady.   She testified that when she was at the house  
repairing the steps, she heard defendant say, “I cannot 
believe that I got so hard up I had to kill the bitch for a 
piece of ass.”  
3  
victim with a man other than defendant after the date she  
disappeared.  
The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s conviction on  
direct review. 
Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued  
February 4, 1988 (Docket No. 86748).  This Court denied leave  
to appeal. 431 Mich 856 (1988).  
In 1997, defendant filed a motion for a new trial on the  
basis of newly discovered evidence.  Although defendant  
presented three separate arguments in support of his motion,  
the only argument at issue in this case is that Michael  
Ronning, an inmate in an Arkansas prison, had admitted  
murdering the victim.  
Battle Creek Police Detective Dennis Mullen2 first  
discovered 
Ronning’s 
potential 
involvement 
while 
investigating  
another crime, an August 1982 murder.  Ronning was initially  
reluctant to cooperate, but then agreed to confess to multiple  
murders in exchange for a transfer to a Michigan prison so he  
could be closer to his family.  Ronning passed a polygraph  
test in which he admitted committing three homicides in  
Michigan.  During the polygraph test, however, no questions  
were asked specifically about the murder in this case.  In  
addition to taking the polygraph test, Ronning confessed to  
2Detective Mullen did not personally investigate this 
case.  
4  
 
the murder in this case.  In his confessions, Ronning claimed:  
(1) Rosansky, the victim, calmly got into Ronning’s car  
without a struggle and crouched down on the floor while he  
drove her to Fort Custer; (2) once at the woods, Ronning had  
Rosansky remove all her clothes except her socks, and they  
smoked a joint; (3) Rosansky was not distressed, but was  
rather “quite comfortable” with him, even laughing and  
giggling; (4) he tried to have sex with Rosansky in the car,  
but specifically remembered that he did not and could not have  
sex because he “was too loaded up on drugs”; (5) he may have  
penetrated Rosansky’s vagina with his fingers, but did not  
penetrate her rectum; (6) when they got out of the car, he  
followed Rosansky as she walked, holding on to her hair; (7)  
he strangled Rosansky with his left arm in a headlock-type  
hold for approximately four minutes; (8) Rosansky did not  
fight back or struggle in any way; and (9) after he thought  
Rosansky was dead, he stood over her and threw a rock at her  
head one time. Ronning also accompanied police on two  
unsuccessful attempts to locate the scene of the crime.  
Ronning later signed an affidavit attesting that he alone had  
murdered Rosansky.  
The trial court originally granted defendant's request  
for a new trial on the basis of Ronning's confession. The  
court held:  
5  
 
  
  
It is important to note some observations 
concerning the trial testimony.  There were no  
eyewitnesses 
to 
the 
murder 
of 
Patricia  
Rosansky. . . .  There was absolutely no physical 
evidence linking the Defendant, Mr. Cress, to this 
crime.  The only evidence connecting him to the 
crime was the testimony of several witnesses . . . 
all of whom testified that Mr. Cress had admitted  
to each of them his involvement in Ms. Rosansky's 
murder.  
* * *  
This Court has had the opportunity to review 
the videotaped statements of Michael Ronning in 
which he confesses to the murder of Patricia  
Rosansky.  Parts of his statements agree with the 
established facts in this case, and parts of his 
statements may not agree with the established 
facts.  
* * *  
It appears to this Court that to deny the 
Motion for a New Trial in this case, one must be 
able to conclude that Mr. Ronning's confession is 
incredible, 
unbelievable, or simply unsubstantiated 
by the established facts. This I cannot do for 
several reasons.  
First, there are portions of Mr. Ronning's 
statements which do conform to the established  
facts in this case.  Second, although there are  
parts of his statements which may not be in 
conformity with the established facts, it must be 
noted that we are dealing with events which  
occurred 14 years ago.  Given that lapse of time, 
it is possible that one's memory of some of the 
specific details may be sketchy.  And finally, 
there is the testimony at the hearing of Battle 
Creek Police Detective Dennis Mullen.  
Detective Mullen testified that he has been  
working on this murder case and two others since 
the 1980s.  He stated under oath at the Hearing 
that he encouraged the Prosecutor's office to issue 
an arrest warrant against Michael Ronning for the 
murder of Patricia Rosansky. The testimony clearly  
6  
 
indicates that Detective Mullen, based upon his 
knowledge of the circumstances surrounding Patricia 
Rosansky's murder and his subsequent investigation, 
believes Mr. Ronning's confession is true.  
It is obvious that Detective Mullen and the  
Prosecutor's Office have a difference of opinion 
concerning the believability of Michael Ronning's 
confession.
 That difference simply indicates to 
this Court that the Ronning confession cannot be 
summarily dismissed. Ultimately, at a new trial, 
the jury may believe Mr. Ronning and acquit Thomas 
Cress.
 On the other hand, the jury may totally 
reject Ronning's confession and convict Mr. Cress 
of Murder.  
Considering the fact that at Mr. Cress' trial, 
there was no physical evidence connecting him to 
the crime; that his conviction was based solely 
upon the statements attributed to him by several 
prosecution 
witnesses; 
that 
some 
of 
those  
witnesses may have recanted their trial testimony; 
and that Mr. Ronning's confession cannot be deemed 
incredible or unbelievable, I believe that the 
Defendant has met his burden of establishing the 
four factors . . . required for granting a new 
trial . . . .  
It will be up to a new jury to weigh all the 
evidence 
presented, 
including 
Mr. 
Ronning's 
confession, and then determine whether there is 
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that Thomas 
Cress committed the murder of Patricia Rosansky.  
The prosecutor applied for leave to appeal to the Court  
of Appeals.  Defendant then filed a motion in the trial court  
"for evidentiary hearing and dismissal of the charges,"  
claiming bad-faith destruction of evidence.  
The Court of Appeals denied the prosecutor's application  
for leave to appeal and stated that the trial court had not  
abused its discretion in granting defendant a new trial.  
7  
Referring to evidentiary materials developed after the trial  
court's ruling, however, the Court noted that "denial of leave  
to appeal does not preclude a party from asking the trial  
court to revisit the merits of its order . . . based on  
information developed subsequent to such order," including  
evidence derived from the forensic testing of the decedent's  
remains following exhumation.  
The prosecutor moved in the trial court to reopen the  
proofs regarding defendant's motion for a new trial.  The  
prosecutor sought to present new evidence attacking the  
veracity of Ronning's confession and more evidence regarding  
the allegedly recanting prosecution witnesses.  The trial  
court granted the prosecutor's motion.  At the hearing,  
several prosecution witnesses testified that Ronning had told  
them that he falsely confessed to the victim's murder.  
Ronning testified that he killed Rosansky, but refused to  
answer any questions about the circumstances of the murder,  
claiming that to do so would somehow violate his agreement  
with the government.  As a result, Ronning’s confessions to  
the murder of Rosansky have never been given under oath, and  
have never been subject to the crucible of cross-examination.  
After the hearing, the trial court vacated its December  
1997 decision and denied defendant's motion for new trial.  
The court explained that it no longer found Ronning's  
8  
 
confession persuasive:  
The evidence presented since the Court granted 
the Prosecution's Motion to Re-open Proofs has 
established overwhelmingly and convincingly that 
Michael Ronning is in fact a false confessor to the 
Patricia Rosansky murder. The primary reasons for 
this conclusion are as follows:  
1. Mr. Ronning stated in his confession that 
he strangled Ms. Rosansky, and he demonstrated how 
he struck her one time with a rock to the back of  
her head.  This Court heard from four expert 
witnesses concerning the blow(s) to her head: two 
Forensic Anthropologists . . . and two Forensic 
Pathologists . . . . Some of the professional 
opinions of these witnesses are contradictory. 
When weighing this evidence, one must consider not 
only the expert's qualifications (all of which are 
impeccable), but one must also consider the  
underlying facts and circumstances giving rise to 
those opinions. 
After considering the expert 
testimony presented in this matter, this Court is 
convinced that there were in fact multiple blows to 
the head and neck of Patricia Rosansky. That fact  
finding is important because although Mr. Ronning 
is vague and claimed a lack of memory about many 
details in his description of the murder, he 
consistently claimed striking her in the head only 
one time. The expert testimony, whether it be the 
number of blows to Ms. Rosansky's head, or the 
presence of defensive wounds, or the lack of any 
evidence of strangulation, or the linear, rod-like 
shape of the object used to strike Ms. Rosansky, 
all rebut Mr. Ronning's version of the manner of 
Ms. Rosansky's death.  
2. There were four people who testified in 
December, 1998, that at various times over the  
course of the last several years, Mr. Ronning 
confided in each of them that he was falsely 
confessing to this murder in order to do his prison 
time in Michigan. . . .  
It was an acknowledged fact from the outset 
that Mr. Ronning had a motive to confess to the 
Rosansky murder. . . .  
9  
 
  
Of those four witnesses, Melissa Meyer was 
particularly persuasive. Mr. Ronning had been her 
guardian 
in 
1983-84, 
and 
she 
had 
a 
close  
relationship with him.  She testified that Mr.  
Ronning admitted to her that he had committed the 
murder in Arkansas.  He also told her that his goal 
was to do his time in Michigan and that he had not 
committed the murder of Ms. Rosansky.  She also  
testified that Mr. Ronning told her he had obtained 
information from the secretary of his Michigan 
attorney, had read some transcripts of the court 
proceedings in this matter, and had attempted to 
memorize the facts contained therein.  She also  
testified, based upon her prior relationship with 
him, that Mr. Ronning is a very intelligent and a 
very manipulative person.  
* * *  
The testimony of these four witnesses is a 
direct attack on Michael Ronning's believability. 
It consistently establishes that Mr. Ronning's 
confession is self motivated and untrue.  After  
considering the testimony of these four witnesses, 
their demeanor while testifying, and any motives 
which may have influenced their testimony, this 
Court finds that this evidence is credible and  
believable.  
3. Perhaps the most compelling evidence which 
causes this Court to now conclude that Mr. Ronning 
is a false confessor comes from Mr. Ronning 
himself.  In April, 1997, Detective Mullen and 
others had Mr. Ronning attempt to show them where 
the scene of the crime was.  This was videotaped 
and admitted as Exhibit 54.  Although there was 
evidence that Detective Mullen may have caused some 
confusion by using the wrong two-track to enter the 
area, eventually Mr. Ronning did come to an area 
where he believes the murder occurred.  He stated  
on that videotape that there was a clearing where 
he could turn his car around.  He described where  
the car would have been, where the body was placed 
after he strangled her, from which direction he 
would have thrown the rock, and how far the rock 
would have gone "with the roll."  
The area Mr. Ronning stated "may very well be  
10  
 
the place" is shown on the videotape.  Although Mr. 
Ronning qualified his identification of the crime 
scene by saying "this could be it" and "this has to 
be it, but I don't really recognize it per se," he 
nonetheless was firm and definite in stating that 
if the particular clearing they were in wasn't it, 
it nevertheless "was a place like this." The area  
where Mr. Ronning believes the murder occurred is a 
flat piece of ground, a clearing next to a  
two-track. There are no man-made landmarks in the  
immediate vicinity.  
At the hearing in December, 1998, numerous 
photographs were admitted into evidence of the 
scene of the crime taken in 1983. 
Those  
photographs clearly show that Ms. Rosansky's body 
was not found in a flat, open area as described by 
Mr. Ronning. 
Rather, her body was found in a  
ravine.
 This ravine was not just a slight 
indentation in the ground.  Each side rose to a  
height of seven or eight feet, according to the 
testimony of Trooper Zimmerman.  The body was found 
at the bottom of the ravine, within view of a 
concrete well station.  Mr. Zimmerman testified  
that the ravine and well station look similar in  
appearance today, compared to 1983.  Indeed, Mr. 
Zimmerman testified that a metal roof vent shown in  
the 1983 crime scene photographs is still there. 
He had no difficulty locating the area where Ms. 
Rosansky's body was found.  
When one compares the videotape of the area 
Mr. Ronning concludes was the scene of the crime 
(or as he said, "it was a place like this") to the 
photographs of the scene of the crime, the  
difference in topography and terrain is dramatic. 
This is not a situation where Mr. Ronning's 
recollection is clouded due to a lapse in time.  On  
the 1997 videotape, Mr. Ronning describes the crime 
scene based on his recollection.  When one compares 
his description of the crime scene to the actual 
crime scene, the only reasonable conclusion one can 
draw is that Mr. Ronning didn't know where the 
crime scene was because he did not commit the  
crime.  Indeed, Mr. Ronning was shown the cement 
well station which is located at the beginning of 
the ravine about 40 feet from where the body was 
found.  Mr. Ronning said he would have remembered  
11  
 
  
that well station if it had been visible from the  
scene of the murder.  Mr. Zimmerman testified it is  
easily observable.  
The trial court further rejected its prior reliance on  
Detective Mullen's opinion that Ronning killed the victim,  
noting that other police agencies and detectives disagreed  
with Mullen that Ronning killed three young women in Michigan,  
including the victim. 
The trial court also found it  
significant that Mullen did not investigate the victim’s  
murder, speak with the state police who had initially  
investigated the victim's murder, read defendant's trial  
transcript, or speak with witnesses from defendant's trial or  
with defendant himself before reaching the conclusion that  
Ronning killed Rosansky. The court concluded that “it would  
be inappropriate in effect to enhance the credibility of  
Michael Ronning based upon one investigating officer's  
professional opinion” because apart from Ronning's statement,  
“Detective Mullen's opinion that Mr. Ronning committed the  
Rosansky murder is based primarily upon his professional  
opinion 
and 
instinct, as opposed to any newly-discovered facts  
or evidence obtained during the course of his investigation.”  
The court noted that Ronning "had the ability and opportunity  
over the years to obtain information from various sources  
. . . about relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the  
Rosansky murder . . . .”  The court denied defendant's motion  
12  
 
for new trial because it "no longer believes that a different  
result at a re-trial is probable."  
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of  
defendant’s motion.3  The majority held that the trial court  
erred in (1) finding that Ronning’s confession lacked any  
probative value in establishing defendant’s right to a new  
trial, (2) failing to address the fact that Ronning passed a  
polygraph examination during which he confessed to the  
Rosansky 
murder, 
(3) 
failing to consider evidence that several  
prosecution witnesses had recanted, (4) dismissing the fact  
that Mullen believed Ronning had committed the crime, and (5)  
failing to consider that the prosecutor may have destroyed  
potentially exculpatory physical evidence.  The majority  
stated that although no medical experts had opined that the  
cause of death was strangulation, it could not be definitively  
ruled out as a cause of death. 
The majority remanded for a  
new trial, directing that the jury was to resolve whether the  
prosecutor intentionally or in bad faith authorized the  
destruction of potentially exculpatory evidence.4  
3250 Mich App 110; 645 NW2d 669 (2002). 
4The issue of bad-faith destruction of evidence has been 
resolved and is no longer before the Court.  This Court 
remanded the case to the trial court for an evidentiary
hearing concerning defendant’s allegation of bad-faith 
destruction of evidence, clarifying that that issue was to be
decided by the court and not a jury.  466 Mich 883 (2002).
The circuit court filed its opinion and order on August 16, 
13  
 
The dissenting judge disagreed with the majority’s  
conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion in  
denying the motion for a new trial. The dissent opined that  
although defendant had presented newly discovered evidence  
that was not cumulative, the trial court did not abuse its  
discretion in holding that the evidence would not render a  
different result probable upon retrial.  Although the case was  
a “close call,” 250 Mich App 161, and although the trial  
court’s original decision that defendant was entitled to a new  
trial would not have constituted an abuse of discretion, great  
deference must be accorded to the trial court’s assessment of  
the credibility of witnesses.  The trial court did not make a  
mistake of law in its analysis of the new evidence. Although  
the veracity of the testimony of three prosecution witnesses  
had been questioned, four other nonrecanting witnesses had  
testified regarding “how defendant had admitted in graphic  
terms how he raped and killed the victim.”  250 Mich App 162.  
This 
Court 
granted 
the 
prosecutor’s 
application 
for 
leave  
to appeal, limited to the issue “whether the defendant is  
entitled to a new trial on the basis that there is newly  
discovered evidence in the form of a confession by another to  
2002, finding that the prosecutor’s office did not engage in 
the bad-faith destruction of evidence.  
14  
 
 
 
  
  
the crime of which the defendant was convicted.”5  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW  
This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to grant or  
deny a motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion.  
People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 648 n 27; 576 NW2d 129 (1998). 
 A mere difference in judicial opinion does not establish an  
abuse of discretion. Alken-Ziegler, Inc v Waterbury Headers  
Corp, 461 Mich 219, 228; 600 NW2d 638 (1999).  
A trial  
court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error.  MCR  
2.613(C).  
III. DISCUSSION  
We agree with the dissenting judge in the Court of  
Appeals that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in  
denying defendant’s motion for a new trial on the asserted  
ground of newly discovered evidence.6 
For a new trial to be  
granted on the basis of newly discovered evidence, a defendant  
must show that: (1) “the evidence itself, not merely its  
materiality, was newly discovered;” (2) “the newly discovered  
evidence was not cumulative;” (3) “the party could not, using  
reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced the  
5467 Mich 889 (2002). 
6 Whether the dissent is correct that this case  
constitutes a “close call” is something that we need not 
address in light of our agreement that there was no abuse of 
discretion on the part of the trial court in denying  
defendant’s motion.  
15  
evidence at trial;” and (4) the new evidence makes a different  
result probable on retrial. People v Johnson, 451 Mich 115,  
118 n 6; 545 NW2d 637 (1996);  MCR 6.508(D).   
After considering the conflicts between Ronning’s  
confessions and the facts established at trial, the trial  
court concluded that Ronning was not a credible witness and  
was a false confessor.  A false confession (i.e., one that  
does not coincide with established facts) will not warrant a  
new trial, and it is within the trial court’s discretion to  
determine the credibility of the confessor. People v Simon,  
243 Mich 489, 494; 220 NW 678 (1928); People v Czarnecki, 241  
Mich 696, 699; 217 NW 781 (1928).  
Ronning’s 
confessions 
sharply 
deviated 
from 
the  
established facts regarding the crime: (1) he stated that  
Rosansky did not struggle or resist, but the evidence at trial  
showed that she had defensive wounds and extensive bruising;  
(2) he stated that he strangled Rosansky, but the medical  
experts testified at trial that there was no evidence of  
strangulation and the cause of death was brain injury caused  
by blunt-force trauma to the head; (3) he stated that he hit  
Rosansky once with a round rock, while the medical evidence  
tended to show multiple blows with a linear, club-like object;  
(4) he did not mention the tree-limb pieces placed in  
Rosansky’s throat; (5) he stated that Rosansky was almost  
16  
 
completely naked, wearing only her socks, when in fact she had  
been found clothed from the waist up; (6) he stated that he  
“specifically remembered” not having or being able to have  
intercourse 
with 
Rosansky 
and 
denied 
digitally 
penetrating 
her  
rectum, although the medical evidence showed evidence of  
forced anal penetration; and (7) he could not find the  
location where the body was found, even when that location was  
shown to him and despite the fact that he claimed that he left  
Rosansky’s body in an area that he lived near as an adult.7  
Further, it was not disputed that Ronning had an incentive to  
confess, 
and 
several 
witnesses testified that he admitted that  
he fabricated the confession. Finally, Ronning also refused  
to testify regarding any details concerning Rosansky’s murder  
at the evidentiary hearing, thereby casting doubt on whether  
he would testify at a new trial. 
In light of the above  
inconsistencies 
between 
Ronning’s 
confession 
and 
the  
7 Further, as the prosecutor observed in his brief, 
Nor can Ronning’s total inability to locate 
the scenes be attributed to a failed memory or a 
change in geography. This is so for the following 
reason[] . . . Exhibit 25, the map drawn by Michael 
Ronning clearly shows an area identified by Ronning 
as the crime scene and site of the body.  The map 
places the scene and the body near the V. A. 
Hospital at Fort Custer.  It actually appears to be 
right near the entrance to Fort Custer.  The map is 
wrong.  The map does, however, mirror Detective 
Mullen’s testimony of what he told Ronning about 
where the murder took place . . . .  
17  
established facts, the trial court did not abuse its  
discretion in deciding that Ronning was a false confessor and  
that his testimony (even presuming he would testify at a new  
trial) would not make a different result probable on retrial.  
The Court of Appeals erred in substituting its judicial  
opinion regarding Ronning’s credibility for that of the trial  
court. See Alken-Ziegler, supra.  
Further, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the  
trial 
court 
erred 
in 
not 
considering 
the 
polygraph-examination  
results.  
Although 
Ronning was questioned regarding the number  
of murders committed in Michigan, none of the polygraph  
questions specifically mentioned Patty Rosansky. Therefore,  
the 
results 
are 
simply irrelevant to a determination regarding  
the veracity of Ronning’s confession to the Rosansky murder.  
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to  
consider the polygraph results.  
Finally, the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that  
the trial court had impermissibly rejected Detective Mullen’s  
testimony.  The trial court’s opinion demonstrated that the  
trial 
court 
heard 
and 
considered 
Detective 
Mullen’s 
testimony.  
The court found that Detective Mullen’s testimony was not  
likely to make a different result probable on retrial because  
(1) Detective Mullen was not involved in the Rosansky  
investigation; (2) other police agencies and detectives who  
18  
 
 
were involved in the investigation disagreed with Mullen that  
Ronning killed three young women in Michigan, including the  
victim; and (3) Mullen did not speak with those in the state  
police 
who 
initially 
investigated the victim's murder, did not  
read defendant's trial transcript, and did not speak with  
witnesses from defendant's trial or with defendant himself  
before concluding that Ronning murdered Rosansky.8  The trial  
court did not abuse its discretion, and the Court of Appeals  
erred in merely substituting its view of the weight of  
Detective Mullen’s evidence for that of the trial court.  
IV. CONCLUSION  
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying  
defendant’s motion for a new trial based on newly discovered  
evidence in the form of Michael Ronning’s confession.  
Ronning’s confession contradicted many of the established  
facts surrounding the Rosansky murder, and he told several  
witnesses that his confession was a lie. It was well within  
the trial court’s discretion to find Ronning’s confession  
8 According to Timothy Dixon, one of those who testified
that Ronning told him that he was falsely confessing to the
Rosansky murder, Ronning also told him that Detective Mullen
was 
unknowingly 
giving 
Ronning 
information 
about 
the 
circumstances and details of the murder that he was merely
stating back to investigators.  See, e.g., n 7. 
In this 
regard, it is noteworthy that Detective Mullen apparently
suspected Ronning of four murders, including that of Cheri
Edwards, but only told Ronning about three of these murders,
including Rosansky’s.  Ronning testified about only the three
murders, not including that of Edwards. 
19  
incredible and to determine that he was a false confessor. It  
was similarly within the court’s discretion to refuse to  
consider irrelevant polygraph evidence that did not refer to  
the Rosansky murder. Finally, the trial court did not abuse  
its 
discretion 
in 
concluding 
that 
Detective 
Mullen’s  
professional opinion, in light of the factors surrounding the  
formation of that opinion and the above determination  
regarding Ronning’s veracity, did not make a different result  
probable on retrial.  The Court of Appeals impermissibly  
substituted its judicial opinion for that of the trial court.  
Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and  
reinstate 
the 
circuit court’s denial of defendant’s motion for  
a new trial.  
Maura D. Corrigan 
Elizabeth A. Weaver  
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman  
20  
 
 
___________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
No. 121189  
THOMAS DAVID CRESS,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
CAVANAGH, J. (concurring).  
While I share the principles espoused by the dissent,  
because this Court’s review is confined to the record and to  
the evidence therein, I cannot conclude that the trial court  
abused its discretion in refusing to grant a new trial.  
Michael F. Cavanagh  
___________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
No. 121189  
THOMAS DAVID CRESS,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
KELLY, J. (dissenting).  
I respectfully dissent because the record shows a  
significant possibility that defendant may be innocent.  
Consequently, the Court of Appeals majority did not clearly  
err when it held that the trial court abused its discretion in  
denying him a new trial.  
This is a case in which there was no physical evidence  
that defendant committed the crime. After he was convicted,  
another person confessed to having done it. Law enforcement  
authorities destroyed evidence on which DNA tests could have  
been performed that might have exonerated defendant.  And  
judges considering his appeal have disagreed about whether a  
new trial should be granted.  
Surely there are here facts and circumstances that  
  
  
justify a new trial. The destruction of the DNA evidence is  
particularly troublesome in my view.  DNA evidence has become  
a prominent tool in our search for the truth in the criminal  
justice system.  For nearly three years, Congress has been  
considering the innocence protection act, which would create  
procedural rules governing when law enforcement authorities  
could destroy DNA evidence.  The bill, written by Senator  
Patrick 
Leahy 
of 
Vermont, has attracted bipartisan support and  
seeks to prevent exactly what occurred in this case.  
Unfortunately, defendant does not have the benefit of  
legislation that would have prevented the destruction of the  
physical evidence gathered from the crime scene. We remanded  
the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to  
determine whether the destruction was ordered in bad faith.  
In August of 2002, the court concluded that there was no  
evidence of bad faith. I do not dispute this finding. But  
the fact that the evidence may not have been destroyed in bad  
faith makes this situation no less devastating to defendant,  
if he is actually innocent. 
He lost the possibility of  
exculpation.1  A new trial could remedy the loss.  At the  
1This is not a remote possibility.  On June 17, 2003, in
Macomb County, another Michigan prisoner was released from
prison after being exonerated by DNA evidence. 
Kenneth 
Wyniemko was wrongly convicted of robbery and rape in 1994,
largely on the statements of witnesses and in the absence of
physical evidence. Here, the case against defendant was based
(continued...) 
2  
least, should defendant again be convicted, it would be done  
with due regard for the newly discovered evidence that has  
been uncovered.  
Michael Ronning has confessed to the crime.  He has been  
convicted of other murders. Of course, he may be lying when  
he maintains that he killed Patty Rosansky.  But I believe  
that a jury should make that determination.  
As the decisions of the courts below show, reasonable  
minds can differ regarding the proper course of action in this  
case.  However, in my judgment, everything considered, this is  
an instance where judges abuse their discretion when they  
refuse to grant relief.  I agree with the Court of Appeals  
that defendant should have a new trial.  The aggregation of  
facts and circumstances has created a very real possibility  
that an injustice has occurred.  
Marilyn Kelly  
1(...continued)
on similar evidence.  
3