Title: State v. Billings
Citation: 348 N.C. 169
Docket Number: 216A96
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: May 8, 1998

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 216A96
FILED: 8 MAY 1998
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
ARCHIE LEE BILLINGS
Appeal as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(a) from
a judgment imposing a sentence of death entered by Allen (J.B.,
Jr.), J., on 5 June 1996 in Superior Court, Caswell County, upon
a jury verdict finding defendant guilty of first-degree murder. 
Defendant’s motion to bypass the Court of Appeals as to
additional judgments for first-degree burglary, assault with a
deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury, and
first-degree rape was allowed by the Supreme Court on 2 June
1997.  Heard in the Supreme Court 18 November 1997.
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Thomas S.
Hicks, Special Deputy Attorney General, and Teresa L.
Harris, Associate Attorney General, for the State.
Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender, by
Marshall Dayan, Assistant Appellate Defender, for
defendant-appellant.
MITCHELL, Chief Justice.
On 12 September 1995, defendant was indicted for first-
degree murder, first-degree burglary, assault with a deadly
weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury, first-
degree kidnapping, and first-degree rape.  On 18 September 1995,
defendant filed a motion for change of venue or, in the
alternative, a special venire, which was denied by Judge
W. Osmond Smith, III, after hearing at the 6 November 1995
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Criminal Session of Superior Court, Caswell County.  On 1 May
1996, defendant filed an amended motion for change of venue or,
in the alternative, a special venire, which was denied after
hearing by Judge J.B. Allen, Jr., at the 6 May 1996 Criminal
Session of Superior Court, Caswell County.
Defendant was tried capitally at the 13 May 1996
Criminal Session of Superior Court, Caswell County.  The jury
found defendant guilty of first-degree murder on the basis of
premeditation and deliberation and under the felony murder rule. 
The jury also found defendant guilty of first-degree burglary,
assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting
serious injury, first-degree kidnapping, and first-degree rape. 
After a separate capital sentencing proceeding, the jury
recommended a sentence of death for the first-degree murder
conviction.  On 5 June 1996, the trial court sentenced defendant
to death.  Defendant appealed his conviction for first-degree
murder and death sentence to this Court as of right.  His motion
to bypass the Court of Appeals as to his appeal of the remaining
convictions, except the kidnapping, was allowed by this Court
2 June 1997.
The State’s evidence tended to show inter alia that
Robert Jackson left his Caswell County mobile home at 1:50 a.m.
on 7 July 1995 to gather and ready a herd of cows for milking. 
Jackson left his two children, Bobby, thirteen years old, and
Amy, eleven years old, asleep in their beds.
Sometime between 1:50 a.m. and 4:50 a.m., defendant
entered the mobile home, stabbed Bobby repeatedly with a knife,
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and began his assault on Amy.  Bobby struggled to a telephone in
the kitchen and dialed 911.  When emergency personnel arrived at
5:00 a.m., Bobby was found on the kitchen floor in a pool of his
own blood.  Defendant had stabbed the boy some twenty-three
times.  Bobby identified defendant as the man who stabbed him and
whom he had seen carry his sister out of the mobile home.  It was
not until some twelve hours later that Amy’s body was found in a
field, with her pajama bottoms around her feet and her pajama top
partially torn off.  Amy had died from a stab to her throat that
had severed her carotid artery.  An autopsy revealed that Amy had
also been sexually assaulted.  Defendant worked with Jackson on
the dairy farm, and both children knew him well.  Defendant was
arrested by sheriff’s deputies on the dairy farm the same morning
the children were attacked.
By his first assignment of error, defendant contends
that the trial court erred in denying his pretrial motion to
conduct a voir dire regarding the jury’s perceptions about parole
eligibility.  This Court has consistently decided this issue
contrary to defendant’s contention.  State v. Chandler, 342 N.C.
742, 467 S.E.2d 636, cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 136 L.Ed.2d 133
(1996); State v. Powell, 340 N.C. 674, 459 S.E.2d 219 (1995),
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 133 L. Ed. 2d 688 (1996); State v.
Price, 337 N.C. 756, 448 S.E.2d 827 (1994), cert. denied, 514
U.S. 1021, 131 L. Ed. 2d 224 (1995); State v. Payne, 337 N.C.
505, 448 S.E.2d 93 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1038, 131 L.
Ed. 2d 292 (1995).  As we explained in Payne, the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S.
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154, 129 L. Ed. 2d 133 (1994), does not affect our position on
this issue when, as here, defendant would be eligible for parole
if given a life sentence.  Payne, 337 N.C. at 516-17, 448 S.E.2d
at 99-100.  We continue to adhere to our prior rulings on this
issue.  This assignment of error is overruled.
By another assignment of error, defendant contends that
the trial court erred in denying his pretrial motions for change
of venue or special venire and his renewals of those motions
during jury selection.  The trial court conducted pretrial
hearings and denied the motions.  The trial court indicated,
however, that it would allow defendant to renew his motion and
would reconsider the matter if it became apparent at any time
that a fair and impartial jury could not be selected.
A defendant seeking a new trial on the basis of a trial
court’s denial of a motion for change of venue or special venire
must ordinarily establish specific and identifiable prejudice
against him as a result of pretrial publicity.  As we have stated
in numerous cases, for a defendant to meet his burden of showing
that pretrial publicity prevented him from receiving a fair
trial, he ordinarily must show inter alia that jurors with prior
knowledge decided the case, that he exhausted his peremptory
challenges, and that a juror objectionable to him sat on the
jury.  State v. Barnes, 345 N.C. 184, 204, 481 S.E.2d 44, 54,
cert. denied, ___ U.S. __, __ L.Ed.2d __, 66 U.S.L.W. 3260
(1997), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, __ L.Ed.2d __, 1998 WL 125185
(March 23, 1998) (No. 97-5089); State v. Jerrett, 309 N.C. 239,
255, 307 S.E.2d 339, 347-48 (1983).
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In this case, defendant did not exhaust his peremptory
challenges before the twelve jurors who decided his case were
seated; he used only ten of his fourteen peremptory challenges. 
As the jurors at issue in this case each stated unequivocally
that they would be able to reach a verdict based solely upon the
evidence presented at trial, defendant did not exhaust his
peremptory challenges, and defendant has not offered particular
objections to any individual juror, defendant has not shown any
specific identifiable prejudice that necessitated a change of
venue or special venire.  Barnes, 345 N.C. at 205, 481 S.E.2d at
54.
Our examination of this issue in the present case,
however, must go further.  We indicated in State v. Jerrett that
where the totality of the circumstances reveals that an entire
county’s population is “infected” with prejudice against a
defendant, the defendant has fulfilled his burden of showing that
he could not receive a fair trial in that county even though he
has not shown specific identifiable prejudice.  Jerrett, 309 N.C.
at 258, 307 S.E.2d at 349.  We based this conclusion on the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Sheppard v. Maxwell,
384 U.S. 333, 16 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1966).  Sheppard involved “a
trial infected not only by a background of extremely inflammatory
publicity but also by a courthouse given over to accommodate the
public appetite for carnival.”  Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794,
799, 44 L. Ed. 2d 589, 594 (1975).  The Supreme Court stated in
Sheppard that, while a defendant must ordinarily show specific
prejudice, “‘at times a procedure employed by the State involves
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such a probability that prejudice will result that it is deemed
inherently lacking in due process.’”  Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 352,
16 L. Ed. 2d at 614 (quoting Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532,
542-43, 14 L. Ed. 2d 543, 550 (1965)).
In Jerrett, this Court noted that “the crime occurred
in a small, rural and closely-knit county where the entire county
was, in effect, a neighborhood.”  Jerrett, 309 N.C. at 256, 307
S.E.2d at 348.  Alleghany County, where Jerrett was tried, had a
population at that time of 9,587 people.  Id. at 252 n.1, 307
S.E.2d at 346 n.1 (citing U.S. Census Report).  The voir dire in
Jerrett revealed that one-third of the prospective jurors knew
the victim or some member of the victim’s family, many jurors
knew potential State’s witnesses, four jurors who decided the
case knew the victim’s immediate family or other relatives, six
jurors who decided the case knew State’s witnesses, and the
foreman stated that he had heard a victim’s relative discussing
the case in an emotional manner.  Id. at 257, 307 S.E.2d at
348-49.  The jury in Jerrett was examined collectively on voir
dire rather than individually, thereby allowing prospective
jurors to hear that other prospective jurors knew the victim and
the victim’s family, that some had already formed opinions in the
case, and that some would be unable to give the defendant a fair
trial.  Id. at 257-58, 307 S.E.2d at 349.  Additionally, in
Jerrett, a deputy sheriff of the county, a magistrate of the
county, and a private prosecutor retained by the victim’s family
and appearing as counsel for the State with the district attorney
all expressed the opinion that it would be difficult if not
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impossible to select a jury in Alleghany County comprised of
jurors who had not heard about, discussed, and formed opinions
about the case.  Id. at 252-54, 307 S.E.2d at 346-47.  A majority
of this Court concluded that based on the totality of the
circumstances, there was a reasonable likelihood that Jerrett
would not be able to receive a fair trial before a local jury. 
Id. at 258, 307 S.E.2d at 349.
Several factors distinguish the case sub judice from
both Sheppard and Jerrett.  With a population exceeding 20,000,
North Carolina Manual 1995-1996, at 959 (Lisa A. Marcus ed.),
Caswell County does not constitute a single small “neighborhood”
like that at issue in Jerrett.  Further, the population of the
community from which the jury is to be drawn is not determinative
and should not be the central focus when determining whether a
change of venue is necessary.  See Barnes, 345 N.C. at 206, 481
S.E.2d at 55 (focusing on matters such as the exposure of
prospective jurors to publicity and its potential prejudice in
determining whether prejudicial publicity had “pervaded the
proceedings”).
While a number of prospective jurors had heard about
the crimes involved in the present case prior to trial, only one
of the seated jurors had any preconceived notions about the guilt
or innocence of defendant Billings.  That juror stated that she
could put aside anything she had heard outside the courtroom and
could find defendant not guilty should the State fail to prove
him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  Defendant did not
challenge this juror.
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Furthermore, the level of personal familiarity that the
Jerrett jurors had with the victim, the victim’s family, and the
State’s witnesses is not present in this case.  The United States
Supreme Court concluded that the prejudicial influence of the
news media in cases like Sheppard, 384 U.S. 333, 16 L. Ed. 2d
600; Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 14 L. Ed. 2d 543; and Rideau
v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 10 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1963), “pervaded
the proceedings” to the prejudice of the defendant in the
community at large and in the courtroom, and resulted in a
“circus atmosphere” in the courtroom itself during trial. 
Murphy, 421 U.S. at 799, 44 L. Ed. 2d at 594 (discussing Estes). 
The record in this case, on the other hand, does not show that
the legal proceedings or news accounts at issue here were
anything but routine.  Rather, the trial court conducted all of
the proceedings here in an able and commendable fashion, with the
solemnity and gravity befitting a proceeding in which defendant’s 
fate would be determined.  Further, there is no indication here
that news accounts of the crimes or the trial were other than
routine factual accounts.
The United States Supreme Court warned in Murphy that
its prior decisions “cannot be made to stand for the proposition
that juror exposure to information about a state defendant’s
prior convictions or to news accounts of the crime with which he
is charged alone presumptively deprives the defendant of due
process.”  Id.  We have consistently held that factual news
accounts with respect to the commission of a crime and the
pretrial proceedings relating to that crime do not of themselves
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warrant a change of venue.  See, e.g., State v. Soyars, 332 N.C.
47, 53, 418 S.E.2d 480, 484 (1992).  Before a change of venue or
special venire will be required, pretrial publicity must create
“in the county in which the prosecution is pending so great a
prejudice against the defendant that he cannot obtain a fair and
impartial trial.”  N.C.G.S. § 15A-957(1) (1997).
The United States Supreme Court determined in Rideau v.
Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 10 L. Ed. 2d 663, that no matter what
could be shown during the selection of the jury, the community in
which the defendant was tried must be deemed to be so prejudiced
as a result of pretrial publicity that the defendant could not
receive a fair trial.  That case is unique, however, because at a
pretrial hearing on his motion for change of venue, which the
trial court denied, evidence revealed that his lengthy televised
confession without benefit of counsel was participated in by law
enforcement authorities and was broadcast repeatedly to the local
viewing audience in the community from which the jury was drawn.  
The Rideau case is “an aberration which should be confined to its
facts and not brought into play here.”  State v. McDougald, 38
N.C. App. 244, 249, 248 S.E.2d 72, 78 (1978) appeal dismissed and
disc. rev. denied, 296 N.C. 413, 251 S.E.2d 472 (1979).
While at least ten of the seated jurors in this case
had been exposed to some information about the crimes before
trial, there is no indication that these factual accounts were
prejudicial to defendant.  Certainly, nothing in the record in
the present case would permit this Court to conclude that either
the community from which the jury was drawn or the trial
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proceedings were so infected by prejudice that they must be
deemed to have deprived defendant of the opportunity to receive a
fair trial and, thereby, to have denied him due process.  We
therefore conclude that, viewing the totality of the
circumstances in this case, there is not a reasonable likelihood
that pretrial publicity prevented defendant from receiving a fair
trial in Caswell County, and the trial court did not err in
refusing to grant defendant’s motions for change of venue or a
special venire.
By another assignment of error, defendant contends that
the trial court erred by excusing for cause a venire member who
was qualified and fit to serve.  Prospective juror Epling
initially indicated he felt that he would be a fair juror.  Upon
questioning by the prosecutor, Epling stated he thought that he
could find a defendant guilty knowing that there would then be a
capital sentencing proceeding but that he “would have to give
[it] some thought.”  He said he was “kind of split” on the death
penalty.  He stated that he could understand the application of
the death penalty in some circumstances but that he did not know
that he could be the one to make the decision.  He stated that
his feelings toward the death penalty could “probably”
substantially impair his ability to consider voting for the death
penalty.  Epling also stated that his longstanding moral
convictions about the death penalty would substantially impair
him in the sentencing process and prevent him from voting for the
death penalty.
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The standard for determining when a prospective juror
may be excluded for cause because of his views on capital
punishment is whether the prospective “juror’s views would
‘prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as
a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.’” 
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 83 L. Ed. 2d 841, 851-52
(1985) (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45, 65 L. Ed. 2d
581, 589 (1980)); accord State v. Davis, 325 N.C. 607, 621-22,
386 S.E.2d 418, 425 (1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 905, 110 L.
Ed. 2d 268 (1990).  “[B]ecause a prospective juror’s bias for or
against the death penalty cannot always be proven with
unmistakable clarity,” this Court must give great deference to
the trial court’s judgment concerning whether a prospective juror
would be able to follow the law.  State v. Miller, 339 N.C. 663,
679, 455 S.E.2d 137, 145, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 133 L. Ed.
2d 169 (1995).  Here, the record on appeal will support only one
conclusion; the prospective juror’s views would have prevented
his proper performance of the duties of a juror.  The trial court
did not err in excusing him for cause, and this assignment of
error is overruled.
By another assignment of error, defendant contends that
the trial court erred in denying him the opportunity to question
prospective jurors regarding their ability to fairly and
impartially consider statutory mitigating circumstances. 
Specifically, defendant contends that the trial court improperly
limited his voir dire of prospective juror Massey.
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Counsel for defendant asked prospective juror Massey
whether the statutory mitigating circumstance concerning
defendant’s impairment by cocaine use, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(6)
(1997), would in his opinion be mitigating.  Upon Massey’s answer
that his feeling would be so strong that it would almost be
impossible for him to consider this circumstance to be
mitigating, defendant challenged Massey for cause.  The trial
court then instructed Massey on the law concerning aggravating
and mitigating circumstances, and Massey stated that he could
follow the law and consider statutory mitigating circumstances. 
Counsel for defendant then resumed questioning:
Q
Mr. Massey, do you understand that it’s
okay to have an opinion different from the
law, and many of us do concerning this same
issue, sir?
A
Well, yeah, as a feeling, conviction,
moralities, yeah.
Q
The question I have for you, would it
substantially impair your ability to consider
the mitigating evidence that we are
discussing here, sir, the evidence of self-
induced cocaine use?
The prosecutor then objected, and the trial court sustained the
objection on the ground that defendant’s questioning was an
attempt to “stake out” the juror.
Defendant exercised a peremptory challenge to excuse
prospective juror Massey, but defendant did not exhaust his
peremptory challenges during jury selection.  Thus, defendant
cannot show prejudice resulting from the trial court’s ruling. 
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1214(h) (1997); State v. McCarver, 341 N.C. 364,
378, 462 S.E.2d 25, 32 (1995) (no prejudice to defendant results
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from a trial court’s failure to allow defense counsel to elicit
additional information from a prospective juror where defendant
does not exhaust his peremptory challenges), cert. denied, 517
U.S. 1110, 134 L.Ed.2d 482 (1996); State v. Conner, 335 N.C. 618,
633, 440 S.E.2d 826, 834 (1994) (same); State v. Avery, 315 N.C.
1, 21, 337 S.E.2d 786, 797 (1985) (same).  This assignment of
error is overruled.
By another assignment of error, defendant contends that
the trial court erred in denying his request for a jury
instruction on voluntary intoxication.  He also contends for the
first time on appeal that failure to give the instruction denied
him due process of law in violation of both the state and federal
constitutions.  Defendant, having failed to raise these
constitutional claims at trial, is barred from asserting them for
the first time on appeal to this Court.  State v. Hester, 343
N.C. 266, 271, 470 S.E.2d 25, 28 (1996); State v. Hutchins, 303
N.C. 321, 341, 279 S.E.2d 788, 801 (1981).  Therefore, we address
this assignment of error only in the context of state common law.
It is “well established that an instruction on
voluntary intoxication is not required in every case in which a
defendant claims that he killed a person after consuming
intoxicating beverages or controlled substances.”  State v.
Baldwin, 330 N.C. 446, 462, 412 S.E.2d 31, 41 (1992).  Evidence
of mere intoxication is not enough to meet defendant’s burden of
production.  State v. Mash, 323 N.C. 339, 346, 372 S.E.2d 532,
536 (1988).  Before the trial court will be required to instruct
on voluntary intoxication, defendant must produce substantial
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evidence which would support a conclusion by the trial court that
at the time of the crime for which he is being tried
“defendant’s mind and reason were so
completely intoxicated and overthrown as to
render him utterly incapable of forming a
deliberate and premeditated purpose to kill. 
In absence of some evidence of intoxication
to such degree, the court is not required to
charge the jury thereon.”
State v. Strickland, 321 N.C. 31, 41, 361 S.E.2d 882, 888 (1987)
(quoting State v. Medley, 295 N.C. 75, 79, 243 S.E.2d 374, 377
(1978)) (citations omitted).
The trial court’s careful consideration of the evidence
is clear from its forty-page order which concluded that there was
sufficient evidence to support a finding that defendant was
intoxicated but not sufficient evidence to support a finding that
the intoxication was to the degree required for an instruction on
voluntary intoxication.  We agree.  This assignment of error is
overruled.
By another assignment of error, defendant contends that
the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial and in
allowing the prosecutor to engage in misconduct.  Defendant
complains that the prosecutor’s direct examination of a witness
and his arguments both during the guilt determination and capital
sentencing phases of the trial were designed to improperly fan
the flames of passion that marked the nature of the crimes for
which he was on trial.  We disagree.
Defendant contends in support of this assignment that
the prosecutor persisted in attempting to elicit testimony of a
witness after the trial court had sustained an objection to
-15-
similar testimony and had instructed the jury to disregard the
testimony.  Examination of the trial transcript reveals that upon
questioning Eric Taylor, the prosecutor asked what observations
he had made at the crime scene.  The witness described the
conditions he had observed at the scene and then volunteered his
opinion that conditions he had observed indicated a struggle. 
Defendant objected, and the trial court promptly sustained his
objection and allowed his motion to strike the opinion testimony. 
The trial court then instructed the jury to disregard the
conclusory statement made by the witness.  The prosecutor then
rephrased the question so as to avoid eliciting the opinion
testimony that had been stricken.  The witness failed to limit
his response to the information sought by the prosecutor’s
question, however, and again gave an answer that included the
previously stricken statement of opinion.  The trial court again
sustained defendant’s objection, instructed the jury to disregard
the witness’ conclusory statement, and admonished the witness to
testify only as to what he had seen.  The jury is presumed to
have followed the instructions of the trial court.  State v.
Best, 342 N.C. 502, 516, 467 S.E.2d 45, 54, cert. denied, __ U.S.
__, 136 L.Ed.2d 139 (1996).
In further support of this assignment, defendant
complains of two portions of the prosecutor’s closing argument to
the jury during the guilt determination phase of the trial. 
Defendant first contends that the prosecutor erroneously stated
to the jury that it could find that intoxication prevented
defendant from forming a premeditated and deliberate intent to
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kill only if defendant had borne the burden of showing that his
intoxication “rendered him utterly incapable of forming a
deliberated and premeditated intent to kill.”  Defendant
correctly contends that the prosecutor was describing the burden
of production defendant must meet in order to be entitled to a
jury instruction on voluntary intoxication that would permit the
jury to determine whether defendant’s intoxication negated such
intent.  Mash, 323 N.C. 339, 372 S.E.2d 532.  Defendant also
correctly contends that this is not the standard to be applied by
the jury in determining whether defendant formed a premeditated
and deliberate intent to kill.  The burden always rests with the
State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
formed a premeditated and deliberate intent to kill.
Defendant did not object to the prosecutor’s argument
concerning voluntary intoxication, nor did he allege that it was
a basis for his motion for a mistrial.  The scope of review when
a defendant fails to object at trial is whether the argument
complained of was so grossly improper that the trial court erred
in failing to intervene ex mero motu.  State v. Holden, 346 N.C.
404, 431, 488 S.E.2d 514, 528 (1997), cert. denied, __ U.S. __,
__ L.Ed.2d __, 118 S.Ct. 1074  (1998).
The prosecutor’s argument here really was no more than
a statement that defendant had not produced sufficient evidence
of intoxication to justify even an instruction on voluntary
intoxication.  Nevertheless, it was improper for the prosecutor
or counsel for defendant to make any argument in the guilt
determination phase of the trial as to whether voluntary
-17-
intoxication may have prevented defendant from forming a
premeditated and deliberate intent to kill, since the evidence at
trial did not permit the trial court to submit that issue for the
jury’s consideration.  However, it is difficult to imagine how
the ill-advised argument of the prosecutor could have been
anything but helpful to defendant, since it raised a question
about the possibility of an additional defense as to which the
jury was not instructed and which defendant was not entitled to
have considered by the jury.  Apparently, defense counsel
recognized this fact and, accordingly, allowed the prosecutor to
make the argument without objection.  Therefore, in the context
of this case, we conclude that the prosecutor’s argument was not
so grossly improper as to require the trial court to intervene ex
mero motu.
Defendant next contends in support of this assignment
that the prosecutor’s use of overhead photographic projections
during his closing argument in the guilt determination phase was
error.  The prosecutor stated for the record that he had used
some “overheads” during his argument.  The record does not
describe these overheads.  Defendant has the duty to provide a
proper and complete record.  State v. Alston, 307 N.C. 321, 341,
298 S.E.2d 631, 644 (1983); N.C. R. App. P. 9.  Nothing in the
record indicates that whatever may have been displayed to the
jury was improperly prejudicial.  “‘An appellate court is not
required to, and should not, assume error by the trial judge when
none appears on the record before the appellate court.’”  Alston,
307 N.C. at 341, 298 S.E.2d at 644 (quoting State v. Williams,
-18-
274 N.C. 328, 333, 163 S.E.2d 353, 357 (1968)).  Nevertheless,
defendant appears to contend that any use of “large, overhead
slides” by the prosecution has been strictly forbidden by this
Court.  This simply is not the law.  See State v. Hennis, 323
N.C. 279, 372 S.E.2d 523 (1988).  As defendant has pointed to
nothing in the record indicating error by the trial court in this
regard, we will find none.
Defendant further contends in support of this
assignment that during the capital sentencing proceeding, the
prosecutor improperly argued the facts of other reported cases in
which jurors had found the aggravating circumstance that the
murder was part of a course of conduct which included the
commission of violence against another person.  N.C.G.S. §
15A-2000(e)(11).  This Court has pointed out that “counsel may
not read the facts contained in a published opinion together with
the result to imply that the jury in his case should return a
favorable verdict for his client.”  State v. Gardner, 316 N.C.
605, 611, 342 S.E.2d 872, 876 (1986).  Here, the prosecutor’s
argument that defendant complains of was, “Prior cases [have]
found course of conduct when a woman was kidnapped from the car
and raped.”  Defendant did not object to this argument.  Assuming
arguendo that the argument was improper, we conclude that this
brief reference to other unspecified cases with no indication as
to whether those cases had been upheld on appeal did not amount
to an argument so grossly improper as to require the trial court
to intervene ex mero motu.
-19-
Defendant also complains in support of this assignment
that the prosecutor improperly argued to the jury that defendant
had requested submission of the mitigating circumstance that he
had no significant history of prior criminal activity.  N.C.G.S.
§ 15A-2000(f)(1).  Defendant argues that the prosecutor knew that
defendant had not requested this mitigating circumstance and had,
in fact, urged the trial court not to submit it to the jury.
The argument complained of was as follows:
The first [mitigating circumstance] that
will be submitted for your consideration, and
it is no opinion of the Court that these are
there.  These mitigating factors have been
requested by the defendant.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Objection, Your
Honor.
THE COURT:  Well, ladies and gentlemen,
these arguments of these attorneys are in no
way evidence to be considered, and this is
not your instructions on the law.
The attorneys may argue their
contentions, but this is not evidence, and
this is not your law.  You will take the law
from the Court.
The prosecutor then argued that there was no evidence to support
the (f)(1) mitigating circumstance.
As can readily be seen, the prosecutor’s argument that
the mitigating circumstance had been requested by defendant was
not directed specifically toward the (f)(1) mitigator, but to the
mitigating circumstances in their totality.  He did not focus on
the (f)(1) mitigator until he began to argue that there was no
evidence to support that mitigating circumstance.  In any event,
we conclude that the prosecutor’s argument could not have
-20-
prejudiced defendant, as one or more jurors found this mitigator
to exist and weighed it in favor of defendant.
Defendant further contends in support of this
assignment that the prosecutor urged the jurors to reject
mitigating circumstances because many people had the same
problems in their lives as defendant but did not commit murder,
and even if the mitigating circumstances were found to exist,
they did not justify the killing.  Defendant did not object to
these arguments at trial but now contends that they were so
grossly improper as to require the trial court to intervene ex
mero motu.  “[P]rosecutors may legitimately attempt to deprecate
or belittle the significance of mitigating circumstances.”  State
v. Basden, 339 N.C. 288, 305, 451 S.E.2d 238, 247 (1994), cert.
denied, 515 U.S. 1152, 132 L. Ed. 2d 845 (1995).  This was the
effect of the arguments complained of here, and we conclude that
they were not grossly improper and did not require intervention
by the trial court on its own motion.
Defendant also contends in support of this assignment
that during the capital sentencing proceeding, the prosecutor
argued that the law is divinely inspired by referring to the law
as a “statute of judgment.”  Defendant did not object.  This
Court has noted the wide latitude allowed counsel in closing
arguments.  State v. Artis, 325 N.C. 278, 331, 384 S.E.2d 470,
500 (1989), sentence vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1023, 108
L.Ed2d 601 (1990).  The prosecutor merely contended to the jury
that the Bible did not prohibit the death penalty, but he did not
ask the jury to impose divine law.  The prosecutor’s argument was
-21-
not so grossly improper as to require the trial court to
intervene ex mero motu.
Defendant also contends in support of this assignment
that the prosecutor improperly argued that defense counsel had
“contrived” a defense.  It is clear that trial counsel “may not
make uncomplimentary comments about opposing counsel, and should
‘refrain from abusive, vituperative, and opprobrious language, or
from indulging in invectives.’”  State v. Sanderson, 336 N.C. 1,
10, 442 S.E.2d. 33, 39 (1994) (quoting State v. Miller, 271 N.C.
646, 658-59, 157 S.E.2d. 335, 346 (1967)).  However, defendant
misconstrues the record.  The prosecutor did not argue that
defense counsel had contrived a defense; he argued that defendant
had done so.  Immediately before he characterized the defense as
contrived, the prosecutor argued that defendant was not
unintelligent.  He said defendant was clever in concealing his
identity.  The prosecutor then contended that the defense was
something that came into existence after defendant learned that
Bobby had survived.  The prosecutor accused defense counsel of
nothing.  This argument was proper.
Defendant also argues in support of this assignment
that the prosecutor’s argument that defendant had not shown any
remorse for his actions was an improper comment on defendant’s
exercise of his right to silence.  The State is allowed to
comment upon a defendant’s demeanor in the courtroom during
closing arguments, as the prosecutor did here.  The jurors are
allowed to consider both the evidence and what they observe in
the courtroom.  State v. Myers, 299 N.C. 671, 679-80, 263 S.E.2d
-22-
768, 773-74 (1980).  Bringing defendant’s lack of any
demonstration of remorse to the attention of the jury is proper,
so long as the prosecutor does not urge the jury to consider lack
of remorse as an aggravating circumstance.  State v. Brown, 320
N.C. 179, 199, 358 S.E.2d. 1, 15, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 970, 98
L.Ed.2d 406 (1987).
Defendant further contends in support of this
assignment that it was grossly improper for the prosecutor to
argue in the capital sentencing proceeding that if the jury
failed to recommend death, defendant might get out of prison and
hurt other people or the surviving victim, Bobby.  When the
prosecutor made this argument, defendant objected, and the trial
court instructed the jury to disregard the argument.  The
prosecutor then argued that Bobby would not be able to sleep
peacefully if the jury came back with a recommendation of
anything other than death, because defendant would not be locked
up tight on death row.  Defendant objected, and the trial court
stated to the prosecutor, “I’ll ask that you don’t argue that
point.”  The prosecutor’s arguments in this regard were not
improper.  State v. Alston, 341 N.C. 198, 250-52, 461 S.E.2d 687,
717 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1148, 134 L.Ed.2d 100 (1996). 
Further, any possible impropriety was cured by the trial court’s
prompt actions.
Defendant finally contends in support of this
assignment that during the prosecutor’s argument at the
conclusion of the capital sentencing proceeding, the prosecutor
improperly replayed the audiotape of the call that Bobby Jackson
-23-
made to the 911 emergency communications center.  Trial counsel
is allowed wide latitude in argument to the jury and may argue
all of the evidence and the reasonable inferences that arise
therefrom.  State v. Williams, 317 N.C. 474, 481, 346 S.E.2d 405,
410 (1986).  The audiotape was introduced into evidence without
objection by defendant.  In a capital sentencing proceeding, the
jury may consider all of the circumstances surrounding the
murder.  State v. Thomas, 344 N.C. 639, 647, 477 S.E.2d 450, 453
(1996), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 139 L.Ed2d 41 (1997).  As the
audiotape was admitted into evidence in the guilt phase of
defendant’s trial, it was proper to play it during closing
arguments in the capital sentencing proceeding for the jury’s
consideration.
For all of the foregoing reasons, this assignment of
error is without merit and is overruled.
By another assignment of error, defendant contends that
the trial court erred during his capital sentencing proceeding by
submitting as a mitigating circumstance that defendant had no
significant history of prior criminal activity, N.C.G.S. §
15A-2000(f)(1), because defendant had been previously convicted
of attempted second-degree murder and had a history of drug-
dealing.  Defendant specifically requested that this circumstance
not be submitted.
The test governing submission of the (f)(1) mitigator
is “whether a rational jury could conclude that defendant had no
significant history of prior criminal activity.”  State v.
Wilson, 322 N.C. 117, 143, 367 S.E.2d 589, 604 (1988).  If so,
-24-
the trial court has no discretion; the statutory mitigating
circumstance must be submitted to the jury, without regard to the
wishes of the State or the defendant.  State v. Lloyd, 321 N.C.
301, 364 S.E.2d 316, sentence vacated on other grounds, 488 U.S.
807, 102 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1988).
Evidence in the present case tended to show that
defendant had been convicted of five misdemeanors and two
felonies as well as the unlawful consumption of drugs and alcohol
as a child and adult.  Based on the evidence of record, the trial
court concluded that a reasonable juror could find that defendant
had “no significant history of prior criminal activity” within
the meaning of the statute and, therefore, that it was required
to submit the (f)(1) statutory mitigating circumstance for the
jury’s consideration.  The trial court was correct; in fact, one
or more jurors found this mitigating circumstance to exist and
weighed it in defendant’s favor.  This assignment of error is
without merit and is overruled.
PRESERVATION ISSUES
Defendant also raises for “preservation” the following
three issues, which he acknowledges this Court has previously
found without merit in other cases.
(1)
The trial court erred when it instructed the jury on
the aggravating circumstance that the murder was
“especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel” in terms that
were unconstitutionally vague.
-25-
(2)
The trial court erred in requiring the jury to find
that nonstatutory mitigating circumstances had
mitigating value before considering factually proved
evidence offered in mitigation of the sentence of
death.
(3)
The trial court erred in instructing the jury that each
juror was allowed, rather than required, to consider
mitigating circumstances he or she found at Issue Two
when weighing the aggravating circumstance against the
mitigating circumstances at Issues Three and Four.
We have considered defendant’s arguments on these issues and find
no reason to depart from our prior holdings.  Therefore, we
overrule each of these assignments of error.
PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW
Having concluded that defendant’s trial and capital
sentencing proceeding were free of prejudicial error, it is our
duty to ascertain:  (1) whether the evidence supports the jury’s
findings of the aggravating circumstances on which the sentence
of death was based; (2) whether the sentence was entered under
the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary
consideration; and (3) whether the sentence is excessive or
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases,
considering both the crime and the defendant.  N.C.G.S. §
15A-2000(d)(2).  The jury found three aggravating circumstances
in the present case.  The record fully supports these findings. 
-26-
Further, we find no indication that the sentence of death was
imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other
arbitrary consideration.  We turn then to our final statutory
duty of proportionality review.
In the present case, defendant was convicted of first-
degree murder based on the theory of premeditation and
deliberation and under the felony murder rule.  The jury also
found defendant guilty of first-degree burglary, assault with a
deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury,
first-degree kidnapping, and first-degree rape.  The jury found
as aggravating circumstances:  (1) that the murder was committed
by defendant while he was engaged in committing the felony of
rape, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(5); (2) that the murder was
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, N.C.G.S. §
15A-2000(e)(9); and (3) that the murder for which defendant
stands convicted was part of a course of conduct in which
defendant engaged and which included the commission by defendant
of other crimes of violence against another person or persons,
N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(11).
Of the sixteen mitigating circumstances submitted, one
or more jurors found the following mitigating circumstances: 
(1) defendant had no significant history of prior criminal
activity, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(1); (2) defendant’s mother drank
alcohol to excess during defendant’s formative years and did not
provide proper supervision, moral teaching, and nurturing of
defendant when defendant was a child; (3) defendant’s father, who
was sixty-eight years old at the time of defendant’s birth, drank
-27-
alcohol to excess during defendant’s formative years and did not
provide proper supervision, moral teaching, and nurturing of
defendant when defendant was a child; (4) defendant’s father died
when defendant was approximately age eleven, leaving him without
proper supervision, nurturing, and moral teachings; (5) defendant
has a long history of alcohol and illegal drug abuse beginning
when defendant was approximately eleven years of age;
(6) defendant’s use of alcohol and illegal drugs was condoned by
defendant’s mother prior to defendant attaining sixteen years of
age; and (7) defendant lacked any law abiding role model in his
immediate family.
In conducting our proportionality review, it is proper
to compare the present case with other cases in which this Court
has concluded that the death penalty was disproportionate.  State
v. McCollum, 334 N.C. 208, 240, 433 S.E.2d 144, 162 (1993), cert.
denied, 512 U.S. 1254, 129 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1994).  We have found
the death penalty disproportionate in seven cases.  State v.
Benson, 323 N.C. 318, 372 S.E.2d 517 (1988); State v. Stokes, 319
N.C. 1, 352 S.E.2d 653 (1987); State v. Rogers, 316 N.C. 203, 341
S.E.2d 713 (1986), overruled on other grounds by State v. Gaines,
345 N.C. 647, 483 S.E.2d 396, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, ___ L.
Ed. 2d ___, 66 U.S.L.W. 3262 (1997), and by State v. Vandiver,
321 N.C. 570, 364 S.E.2d 373 (1988); State v. Young, 312 N.C.
669, 325 S.E.2d 181 (1985); State v. Hill, 311 N.C. 465, 319
S.E.2d 163 (1984); State v. Bondurant, 309 N.C. 674, 309 S.E.2d
170 (1983); State v. Jackson, 309 N.C. 26, 305 S.E.2d 703 (1983). 
This case is distinguishable from those cases.
-28-
This case has several features which distinguish it
from the cases in which we have found the death penalty to be
disproportionate.  They include the fact that defendant raped the
eleven-year-old female victim in her home and then kidnapped and
killed her and the fact that defendant repeatedly stabbed the
brother of the victim.  We find it significant that none of the
cases in which this Court has found the death penalty
disproportionate involved multiple child victims or multiple
violent felonies committed against children during the course of
the murder.  We have further noted that a conviction upon both
theories of premeditation and deliberation and felony murder is
significant in finding a death sentence proportionate.  State v.
Harris, 338 N.C. 129, 161, 449 S.E.2d 371, 387 (1994), cert.
denied, 514 U.S. 1100, 131 L. Ed. 2d 752 (1995).
We also compare this case with the cases in which we
have found the death penalty to be proportionate.  Although we
review all of the cases in the pool of “similar cases” when
engaging in our statutorily mandated duty of proportionality
review, we have previously stated, and we reemphasize here, that
we will not undertake to discuss or cite all of those cases each
time we carry out that duty.  State v. Williams, 308 N.C. 47, 81,
301 S.E.2d 335, 356, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865, 78 L. Ed. 2d 177
(1983).  It suffices to say that the present case is more similar
to cases in which we have found the sentence of death
proportionate than to those in which we have found it
disproportionate.
-29-
After comparing this case to similar cases as to the
crime and the defendant, we conclude that this case has the
characteristics of first-degree murders in which we have
previously held the death penalty proportionate.  Accordingly, we
cannot conclude that this death sentence is excessive or
disproportionate.  Therefore, the judgment of the trial court,
including the sentence of death, must be and is left undisturbed.
NO ERROR.