Title: Ryle v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 566, 2015
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: October 11, 2016

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ALEX RYLE, 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
No. 566, 2015 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below – Superior Court 
§  
of the State of Delaware 
v. 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
Cr. ID No. 1404000692 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Submitted:   September 14, 2016 
Decided:     October 11, 2016   
 
Before HOLLAND, VAUGHN, and SEITZ, Justices. 
 
ORDER 
 
 
This 11th day of October, 2016, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and 
the record below, and following oral argument, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
A Superior Court jury convicted Alex Ryle of multiple weapons 
offenses.  After his conviction, the Superior Court granted the State’s motion to 
declare Ryle an habitual offender, and sentenced him to a total of twenty three 
years at Level V, followed by decreasing levels of supervision.  Ryle raises two 
issues on appeal.  First, he claims that the Superior Court Commissioner lacked the 
authority to grant Ryle’s request to represent himself at trial.  Ryle also argues that, 
despite having a colloquy with the Commissioner about the risks of proceeding to 
trial without counsel, he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to 
 
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counsel.  After careful consideration of Ryle’s arguments on appeal, we find them 
to be without merit.  Under the Superior Court rules, the Commissioner had the 
authority to conduct non case-dispositive hearings and thus could hear and then 
grant Ryle’s request to proceed to trial without counsel.  Further, after an 
independent review of the record, we find that the Commissioner adequately 
reviewed with Ryle the risks of proceeding on his own, and are satisfied that his 
waiver of the right to counsel was knowing and voluntary.  We therefore affirm the 
judgment of the Superior Court.      
(2) 
On April 12, 2014, police arrested Ryle for evading probation 
authorities.  When the police searched Ryle incident to his arrest, they found a 
handgun loaded with nine rounds of ammunition.  At the time of his arrest, Ryle 
was a person prohibited from possessing a gun because of prior convictions.  A 
grand jury indicted him on multiple weapons charges.1  Ryle was appointed 
counsel, but strongly disagreed with counsel’s legal strategy.  Counsel moved to 
withdraw on October 16, 2014.  On October 27, 2014, the Commissioner held a 
hearing on counsel’s motion to withdraw, and addressed Ryle’s desire to waive 
counsel and represent himself.    
(3) 
At the hearing, the Commissioner asked Ryle multiple times whether 
he wanted to proceed with new counsel.  She informed him of the charges against 
                                                 
1 The State also charged Ryle with a drug possession offense, but dismissed the charge before 
trial.  
 
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him and explained the potential penalties he was facing.  The Commissioner asked 
about his level of education and advised him that it was unwise to proceed without 
formal legal training.  Further, she explained that the trial court would not help him 
with the rules of evidence, courtroom procedure, or any of the “chores” that a 
trained lawyer would normally do.2  She also explained that the court could, but 
did not have to, appoint a standby lawyer, and that the court would not grant Ryle 
any additional time to prepare for trial.  During the colloquy, Ryle reviewed and 
signed a waiver of counsel form.  The Commissioner then granted counsel’s 
motion to withdraw and authorized Ryle to proceed pro se.   
(4) 
On December 22, 2014, Ryle was reindicted.  At his arraignment, the 
Commissioner immediately asked if she could “talk [Ryle] into counsel.”3  Ryle 
again declined.  The Commissioner asked if Ryle still wanted to represent himself, 
he replied “absolutely.”  Later, she asked, “Are you sure you don’t want counsel?”  
Ryle replied, “No.  We settled that on October 27th, 2014, in front of you.  I’m 
okay.”4  Ryle signed another waiver of counsel form during the arraignment. 
(5) 
Ryle represented himself at trial without standby counsel.  On 
February 11, 2015, a Superior Court jury convicted him of possession of a firearm 
by a person prohibited, possession of ammunition by a person prohibited, and 
carrying a concealed deadly weapon.  The State then moved to sentence Ryle as an 
                                                 
2 App. to Opening Br. at 37. 
3 Id. at 48. 
4 Id. at 55. 
 
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habitual offender.  Ryle asked for a new trial, alleging that the Superior Court 
should have appointed him standby counsel. He also asked for assistance of 
counsel at sentencing.  The Superior Court denied his motion for a new trial, and 
appointed Ryle’s original attorney to serve as counsel during sentencing.  On 
October 8, 2015, the Superior Court granted the State’s motion to declare Ryle an 
habitual offender and sentenced him to a total of twenty three years of level V 
incarceration, followed by decreasing levels of supervision.  This appeal followed. 
(6) 
Ryle argues that the Superior Court Commissioner did not have 
jurisdiction to hear his request to waive his right to counsel and represent himself.  
According to Ryle, the Superior Court Commissioner’s authority derives from 10 
Del. C. § 512 (Jurisdiction and powers of Commissioners of the Superior Court); 
Superior Court Criminal Rule 62 (Commissioners); and Administrative Directive 
2007-5 (Commissioners).  Ryle claims that none of these sources of jurisdiction 
specifically authorize the Commissioner to hear Ryle’s request to discharge 
counsel and represent himself.  Instead, he argues that the authority appears to be 
reserved to the Office Judge, who, under the Superior Court Criminal Case 
Management Plan for New Castle County, addresses “[r]eview of pro se 
applications where the applicant has not been sentenced.”5 
                                                 
5 Id. at 21-23.   
 
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(7) 
Because Ryle did not raise the issue with the Superior Court, we 
would ordinarily apply a plain error standard of review.6  But Ryle couches his 
argument as a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction, which can be raised at any 
time during the proceedings.  Thus, we review his challenge to the Commissioner’s 
subject matter jurisdiction de novo.7     
(8) 
The statute in question, 10 Del. C. § 512, covers the jurisdiction and 
powers of Commissioners of the Superior Court.  Only the provisions relevant to 
this appeal will be discussed.  First, under § 512 (a)(1), a Commissioner has “[a]ll 
powers and duties conferred or imposed upon Commissioners by law or by the 
Rules of Criminal and Civil Procedure for the Superior Court.”  Second, with the 
approval of the President Judge or her designee, the President Judge or a designee 
can “designate” a Commissioner “to hear and determine any pretrial matter 
pending before the Court,” and “to conduct hearings, including evidentiary 
hearings, and to submit proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the 
disposition” to the Superior Court judge.8   In other words, a Superior Court 
Commissioner has the jurisdiction conferred by statute, the Superior Court Rules, 
                                                 
6 Cassidy v. Cassidy, 689 A.2d 1182, 1184 (Del. 1997) (claims not raised in the trial court are 
reviewed only in the interests of justice under Supreme Court Rule 8 and for plain error). 
7 Gunn v. McKenna, 116 A.3d 419, 420-21 (Del. 2015) (questions directed at subject matter 
jurisdiction can be raised for the first time on appeal). 
8 10 Del. C. § 512(b)(1).  The statute sets forth exceptions to the Commissioner’s authority, 
which are not relevant here.  Id. at § 512(b)(1)a. 
 
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and by “designation” by the President Judge or her designee to preside over certain 
pretrial matters.   
(9) 
Ryle argues that a Superior Court judge did not “designate” the 
Commissioner to hear his request to represent himself, and therefore the 
Commissioner did not have jurisdiction to decide the issue.  But Ryle ignores the 
most obvious grant of jurisdiction by the Superior Court Criminal Rules to hear 
Ryle’s request.  Under Rule 62 governing Commissioners, the Commissioner has 
authority to decide “[n]on case-dispositive matters” which are defined as “non 
case-dispositive hearings, including non case-dispositive evidentiary hearings” and 
“any pretrial or other non case-dispositive matter pending before the Court.”9  
Ryle’s request to discharge his counsel and represent himself is a “non case-
dispositive matter pending before the Court” and is therefore not subject to any of 
the Rule’s exceptions.  Thus, the Superior Court had subject matter jurisdiction to 
rule on Ryle’s request to represent himself.10       
(10) Ryle also argues that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his 
right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  
According to Ryle, the Commissioner did not adequately cover the risks of going 
                                                 
9 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 62(a)(4).   
10 Ryle also claims that the Superior Court’s order was defective because the Commissioner did 
not send a copy of the order to the Defendant as required by Rule 62(a)(4)(ii).  Although notice 
was not sent to Ryle, he suffered no prejudice.  The court granted his request to represent 
himself, meaning Ryle would not have challenged the ruling.  The only conceivable prejudice 
would have been to the State, who has not objected to the Commissioner’s order.   
 
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to trial without counsel and did not touch upon all the factors set forth in Briscoe v. 
State.11  He also claims that the Commissioner did not make a specific finding that 
Ryle’s waiver was knowing and voluntary.  We review Ryle’s claim de novo, 
recognizing that the validity of the waiver “depends upon the particular facts and 
circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and 
conduct of the defendant.”12 
(11) In Briscoe, this Court followed the guidelines suggested by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in United States v. Welty13 to assist 
the trial courts in determining whether a defendant’s waiver of his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.14  Although 
it is preferable for the judicial officer to review each of the Briscoe factors with the 
defendant, there is no requirement that they be followed in the same order using 
the same language.15  Rather, the record must show that the court conducted a 
                                                 
11 606 A.2d 103 (Del. 1992). 
12 Id. at 107. 
13 674 F.2d 185 (3d Cir. 1982). 
14 The Briscoe factors are:  
(1) defendant will have to conduct his defense in accordance with the rules of 
evidence and criminal procedure, rules with which he may not be familiar; (2) that 
the defendant may be hampered in presenting his best defense by his lack of 
knowledge of the law; (3) that the effectiveness of his defense may well be 
diminished by his dual role as attorney and accused; (4) the nature of the charges; 
(5) the statutory offenses included within them; (6) the range of allowable 
punishments thereunder; (7) possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in 
mitigation thereof; and (8) all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the 
whole matter. Briscoe, 606 A.2d at 108. 
15 Drummond v. State, 15 A.3d 216, 2011 WL 761522, at *2 (Del. March 3, 2011) (TABLE).  
 
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“searching inquiry” that thoroughly advised the defendant of the risks associated 
with self representation.16    
(12) Our independent review of Ryle’s colloquy with the Commissioner 
leads us to conclude that Ryle’s waiver was knowing and voluntary.  During the 
hearing, the Commissioner explained Ryle’s charges to him and the potential 
penalties he was facing.  She stressed how unwise it was to proceed without formal 
legal training.  She told Ryle that the trial judge would not help him with the rules 
of evidence or courtroom procedure, and that the court would not give Ryle extra 
time to prepare for trial.  During the colloquy, Ryle signed a waiver of counsel 
form which recited the Briscoe factors.  Further, at his reindictment arraignment, 
the Commissioner again tried to persuade Ryle to invoke his right to counsel.  He 
repeatedly acknowledged the hazards of self representation, refused counsel, and 
signed another waiver.17  Thus, Ryle knowingly and voluntarily waived counsel. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                                 
16 Smith v. State, 996 A.2d 786, 790-97 (Del. 2010).  
17 Ryle also argues that the court was required to review anew the Briscoe factors with him upon 
his reindictment.  We explained in Stigars v. State, 674 A.2d 477, 480 (Del. 1996), however, that 
the right to self-representation continues unabated through the proceedings unless revisited by 
the defendant or the trial judge.