Title: New Jersey v. Njango
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: August 3, 2021

New Jersey v. Njango Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary The issue presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's review in this case was whether defendant Paulino Njango, whose time in prison exceeded the permissible custodial term authorized by his sentence, was entitled to have the excess prison time he served reduce the period of parole supervision he had to serve under the New Jersey No Early Release Act (NERA). The post-conviction relief court found that the excess time Njango served in custody was “unfortunate” but could not “be given back.” The Appellate Division affirmed, determining that the period of Njango’s NERA parole supervision could not be reduced, even though “[Njango] was imprisoned longer than he should have been due to a failure to properly award” him prior service credits. The Supreme Court reversed. "We do not agree that relief cannot be granted to Njango. The fundamental fairness doctrine is an integral part of the due process guarantee of Article I, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution, which protects against arbitrary and unjust government action." The Court held that the excess time that Njango erroneously served in prison had to be credited to reduce the period of his parole supervision. The case was remanded to the New Jersey Parole Board for a calculation of the excess time Njango served in prison and a credit toward his period of parole supervision. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUSThis syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized. State v. Paulino Njango (A-79-19) (084286)Argued March 16, 2021 -- Reargued April 26, 2021 -- Decided August 3, 2021ALBIN, J., writing for a unanimous Court. The issue in this case is whether defendant Paulino Njango, whose time in prison exceeded the permissible custodial term authorized by his sentence, is entitled to have the excess prison time he served -- known as service credits -- reduce the period of parole supervision he must serve under the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. In 2007, in accordance with a plea agreement with the State, Njango pled guilty to certain counts in a 2006 indictment and a 2007 indictment. In November 2007, the trial court imposed concurrent sentences on all of the charges to which Njango pled guilty in the two indictments. Njango’s overall sentence was an eighteen-year NERA term -- meaning that he was parole-ineligible until he completed eighty-five percent of that eighteen-year term -- followed by a five-year period of parole supervision. Njango filed a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR), which was denied. He also filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, in which he advanced the surprising argument that the trial court should have imposed consecutive sentences rather than concurrent sentences under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(h). The trial court found the statute inapplicable in light of the plea agreement, but the Appellate Division reversed because the sentencing court had not made the “serious injustice” finding necessary to justify its decision not to impose consecutive sentences for the offenses defendant committed while released on bail. The State and Njango entered into a superseding plea agreement in August 2015. In accordance with the new agreement, Njango pled guilty to certain offenses from both the 2006 and 2007 indictments. The court sentenced Njango on the 2006 indictment to an overall ten-year NERA term (subject to a five-year period of parole supervision) to run consecutive to the sentences imposed on the 2007 indictment. On the 2007 indictment, the court imposed an overall eight-year NERA term (subject to a three-year period of parole supervision). Njango’s aggregate sentence was an eighteen-year term, with a fifteen-year, three-month, and eighteen-day parole disqualifier pursuant to NERA. He also was subject to an eight-year period of parole supervision after completing the custodial portion of his sentence. See N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(c). 1 The court rejected Njango’s request to credit him for the time served on each offense during the period the sentences on those offenses ran concurrently. Instead, the court applied Njango’s total 2,692 days (approximately seven-and-a-half years) of prior service credits to the front-end of his aggregate eighteen-year sentence. In a February 2017 decision, the Appellate Division reversed, determining that Njango should be credited for the time he simultaneously served on the two indictments. The Court denied the State’s petition for certification challenging that decision. On remand, the trial court awarded Njango 2,692 days of service credits on both indictments. The next day, Njango was released from prison. Njango filed a PCR petition, claiming that had he received the proper number of service credits at the time of his second sentencing, he should have been immediately released from prison. He maintained that, as a result of the second sentencing court’s error, he served an additional one year and seven months in prison. As a remedy, he sought to have the period of parole supervision reduced by the excess time he served in prison or, alternatively, to withdraw his plea. The PCR court denied the motion and the Appellate Division affirmed, holding “that mandatory periods of parole supervision imposed under NERA cannot be reduced by prior service credits, even where the defendant was imprisoned longer than he should have been due to a failure to properly award such credit.” 463 N.J. Super. 1, 10 (App. Div. 2020). The Court granted certification. 243 N.J. 264 (2020).HELD: The mandatory period of parole supervision imposed under NERA is part of a unitary sentence that is penal in nature. The State has kept Njango in prison for more than a year beyond his release date. Without credit for the excess prison time, Njango would serve more time in the custody of the Department of Corrections than authorized by his sentence. Under the fundamental fairness doctrine -- an integral part of the due process guarantee of the New Jersey Constitution -- the excess time Njango erroneously served in prison must be credited to reduce the period of his parole supervision.1. The Court does not reach the question, addressed on reargument, of whether defendant is entitled to service credits on each count for which he was sentenced, or whether the principles of State v. C.H., 228 N.J. 111 (2017), apply. In C.H., the Court determined that, pursuant to Rule 3:21-8, the defendant was not entitled to the double counting of pre-sentence jail credits “for time simultaneously spent in custody” on charges in two separate indictments for which he received consecutive sentences. Id. at 118, 121. The Court’s denial of certification as to the 2017 Appellate Division decision should not be read as a determination or commentary on the merits of that decision. See State v. Hodge, 105 N.J. 518, 519 (1986). Nevertheless, Njango had an expectation of finality in that prior determination, and the Court thus confines its discussion to whether the excess time Njango served in prison can offset the time he must serve under parole supervision pursuant to NERA. The Court reviews the parties’ arguments on that issue. (pp. 11-15) 2 2. Based on the Appellate Division’s 2017 decision, Njango served at least one year and seven months in prison beyond his release date. From the State’s public-safety perspective, one year and seven months of prison surely is the equivalent of the same period under parole supervision. A defendant is in the custody of the Department of Corrections when serving a term of imprisonment under NERA. And, while serving a NERA period of parole supervision, the defendant remains “in the legal custody of the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections, and shall be supervised by the Division of Parole of the State Parole Board as if on parole.” N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51b(a). Under New Jersey jurisprudence, parole is “in legal effect imprisonment” and therefore punishment. Riley v. State Parole Bd., 219 N.J. 270, 288 (2014). Accordingly, if Njango does not receive service credits for the excess time served in prison, he will remain in the custody of the Department of Corrections for a year and seven months beyond the maximum sentence imposed by the trial court. (pp. 15-18)3. The Court has “construed the expansive language of Article I, Paragraph 1 [of the New Jersey Constitution] to embrace the fundamental guarantee of due process.” Jamgochian v. State Parole Bd., 196 N.J. 222, 239 (2008). An “integral part” of that guarantee of due process is the doctrine of fundamental fairness, which “serves to protect citizens generally against unjust and arbitrary governmental action, and specifically against government procedures that tend to operate arbitrarily.” Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 108 (1995) (emphasis omitted). (pp. 18-20)4. No persuasive reason has been advanced to explain why Njango’s serving an extra one year and seven months in prison -- when he should have been serving that time on parole supervision -- should not be credited towards his parole supervision period. The objective of parole supervision -- to protect the public from the risk from violent offenders -- was certainly satisfied when he was mistakenly or erroneously incarcerated beyond the prescribed time for his release. If Njango were incarcerated for a violation of his parole supervision, he would be entitled to use his excess service credits to reduce his custodial time and therefore the overall period of his parole supervision. That a defendant who violates parole can benefit from excess service credits while a defendant who complies with parole cannot is an absurd result that the Legislature could not have had in mind. The fundamental fairness doctrine is intended to provide a remedy for inequitable and arbitrary decisionmaking. See ibid. Here, notions of fundamental fairness compel conforming NERA to the State Constitution in a way that the Legislature would likely have intended. Njango’s eight-year period of parole supervision must be reduced by the excess time he served in prison (pp. 20-22) REVERSED and REMANDED to the Parole Board.CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and PIERRE-LOUIS join in JUSTICE ALBIN’s opinion. 3 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 79 September Term 2019 084286 State of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Paulino Njango, a/k/a Paulino Niango, and Paulino Ernesto Njango, Defendant-Appellant. On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 463 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2020). Argued Decided March 16, 2021 August 3, 2021 Reargued April 26, 2021Cody T. Mason, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Cody T. Mason, of counsel and on the briefs).Barbara A. Rosenkrans, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Theodore N. Stephens, II, Acting Essex County Prosecutor, attorney; Barbara A. Rosenkrans, of counsel and on the briefs, and Frank J. Ducoat, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, on the briefs). 1 Jennifer E. Kmieciak, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (Andrew J. Bruck, Acting Attorney General, attorney; Jennifer E. Kmieciak, of counsel and on the briefs). JUSTICE ALBIN delivered the opinion of the Court. The issue in this case is whether defendant Paulino Njango, whose timein prison exceeded the permissible custodial term authorized by his sentence,is entitled to have the excess prison time he served -- known as service credits-- reduce the period of parole supervision he must serve under the No EarlyRelease Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. The post-conviction relief court found that the excess time Njangoserved in custody was “unfortunate” but could not “be given back.” TheAppellate Division affirmed, determining that the period of Njango’s NERAparole supervision could not be reduced, even though “[Njango] wasimprisoned longer than he should have been due to a failure to properly award ”him prior service credits. State v. Njango, 463 N.J. Super. 1, 10 (App. Div.2020). We now reverse. The mandatory period of parole supervision imposedunder NERA is part of a unitary sentence that is penal in nature. Njango wassentenced to an aggregate eighteen-year custodial term and, upon his release 2 from prison, ordered to serve an aggregate eight-year period of parolesupervision. During the entirety of Njango’s prison sentence and his period ofparole supervision, he has been in the custody of the Department ofCorrections. The State has kept Njango in prison for more than a year beyondhis release date. Without credit for the excess prison time, Njango wouldserve more time in the custody of the Department of Corrections thanauthorized by his sentence. We do not agree that relief cannot be granted to Njango. Thefundamental fairness doctrine is an integral part of the due process guaranteeof Article I, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution, which protectsagainst arbitrary and unjust government action. See Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1,108 (1995). We hold that the excess time that Njango erroneously served inprison must be credited to reduce the period of his parole supervision. We remand to the New Jersey Parole Board for a calculation of theexcess time Njango served in prison and a credit toward his period of parolesupervision. I. A. We begin by recounting the pertinent parts of the strange and tortuousprocedural path this case has taken to reach this Court. 3 On September 24, 2007, in accordance with a plea agreement with theState, Njango pled guilty to certain counts in two separate indictments, whichwe will call the 2006 and 2007 indictments. In the 2006 indictment, Njangopled guilty to first-degree kidnapping, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(b)(1); first-degreeattempted murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3; second-degreeburglary, N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2; and fourth-degree unlawful possession of aweapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d). Those charges relate to crimes Njangocommitted against his ex-mother-in-law in June 2006. In the 2007 indictment, Njango pled guilty to first-degree attemptedmurder, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3; fourth-degree unlawfulpossession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d); and third-degree terroristicthreats, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a). Those charges relate to crimes Njangocommitted against his ex-wife in May 2007 while he was released on bail forthe charges in the 2006 indictment. On November 30, 2007, the trial court imposed concurrent sentences on-- of the charges to which Njango pled guilty in the two indictments. Njango allwas sentenced on the attempted murder charges in the two indictments and onthe kidnapping charge in the 2006 indictment to concurrent eighteen-yearterms of imprisonment, subject to NERA, which rendered Njango parole-ineligible until he completed eighty-five percent of that sentence. As part of 4 that NERA sentence, the court “ordered [Njango] to serve a 5 year term ofparole supervision which term shall begin as soon as defendant completes thesentence of incarceration.” --- N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(c). See In addition, the court imposed an eighteen-month term for unlawfulpossession of a weapon and merged the burglary charge on the 2006indictment and an eighteen-month term for unlawful possession of a weaponand a five-year term for terroristic threats on the 2007 indictment. Njango wasalso ordered to pay fines and penalties, and all remaining charges in the twoindictments were dismissed. Njango’s overall sentence was an eighteen-yearNERA term with a five-year period of parole supervision. B. Njango filed a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR), claiming that hewas “under the influence of prescription medication at the time of the plea”and ineffectively assisted by counsel. His petition was ultimately denied. While that PCR petition was pending, Njango filed a motion to correctan illegal sentence and advanced the surprising argument that the trial courtshould have imposed consecutive sentences rather than concurrent sentencesunder N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(h). That statute provides that when a defendantcommits an offense while released on bail for a prior offense, sentences ofimprisonment for the offenses “shall run consecutively . . . unless the court . . . 5 finds that imposition of consecutive sentences would be a serious injusticewhich overrides the need to deter such conduct by others.” N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(h). The trial court found the statute inapplicable because Njango’s sentencewas imposed pursuant to a plea agreement, but the Appellate Division reversedbecause the sentencing court had not made the “serious injustice” findingnecessary to justify concurrent terms of imprisonment. The Appellate Divisionremanded to the sentencing court either to justify the imposition of concurrentsentences or to vacate the plea agreement and reinstate the charges. The trial court never addressed the remand issue because the State andNjango entered into a superseding plea agreement in August 2015. Inaccordance with the new agreement, Njango pled guilty to the first-degreeattempted murder, second-degree burglary, and fourth-degree unlawfulpossession of a weapon charges in the 2006 indictment, and to the second-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1), fourth-degree unlawfulpossession of a weapon, and third-degree terroristic threats charges in the 2007indictment. The court sentenced Njango on the 2006 indictment to a ten-yearNERA term for attempted murder (subject to a five-year period of parolesupervision), a concurrent ten-year term for burglary, and to a concurrenteighteen-month term for unlawful possession of a weapon all to run 6 consecutive to the sentences imposed on the 2007 indictment. On the 2007indictment, the court imposed an eight-year NERA term for aggravated assault(subject to a three-year period of parole supervision), a concurrent term ofeighteen months for unlawful possession of a weapon, and a concurrent termof five years for terroristic threats. Fines and penalties were imposed, and allremaining charges were dismissed. Njango’s aggregate sentence was an eighteen-year term, with a fifteen-year, three-month, and eighteen-day parole disqualifier pursuant to NERA. Healso was subject to an eight-year period of parole supervision after completingthe custodial portion of his sentence. See N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(c). The courtrejected Njango’s request to credit him for the time served on each offenseduring the period the sentences on those offenses ran concurrently. Instead,the court applied Njango’s total 2,692 days (approximately seven-and-a-halfyears) of prior service credits to the front-end of his aggregate eighteen-yearsentence. 11 Defendant was also awarded 660 days of jail credit. Service credits are awarded to a defendant for time served on a custodial sentence following the entry of a judgment of conviction. Jail credits are awarded to a defendant for time served in custody prior to the entry of a judgment of conviction. See State v. C.H., 228 N.J. 111, 117 (2017). 7 On February 1, 2017, the Appellate Division reversed “the trial court’sdecision not to award prior service credit” on the concurrent sentencesimposed on the two indictments at the first sentencing. In determining thatNjango should be credited for the time he simultaneously served on the twoindictments, the Appellate Division looked to North Carolina v. Pearce, whichheld that the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy “requiresthat credit must be given for punishment already endured” and that“punishment already exacted must be fully 'credited’ in imposing sentenceupon a new conviction for the same offense,” 395 U.S. 711 , 717, 718-19(1969). From Pearce, the Appellate Division reasoned “that failing to award[Njango] prior service credit from the two vacated concurrent sentences toboth of the resentenced consecutive terms would violate [his] FifthAmendment rights.” We denied the State’s petition for certification. 230 N.J. 363 (2017).On May 9, 2017, the trial court amended the judgments of conviction andawarded Njango 2,692 days of service credits on both indictments. The nextday, Njango was released from prison. We later denied the State’s motion forreconsideration of our order denying certification. 8 C. Njango filed a PCR petition, claiming that had he received the propernumber of service credits at the time of his second sentencing, he should havebeen immediately released from prison. He maintained that, as a result of thesecond sentencing court’s error, he served an additional one year and sevenmonths in prison. 2 As a remedy, he sought to have the period of parolesupervision reduced by the excess time he served in prison or, alternatively, towithdraw his plea. The PCR court stated, “[T]hat the defendant had to spend more time incustody is unfortunate, but it is sometimes the nature of appeals. And that’snot time that can be given back.” The court noted that the calculation ofservice credits is a matter for the Department of Corrections and the ParoleBoard and that further review must be sought in the Appellate Division.Determining that Njango’s sentence was not illegal, the court denied Njango’spetition.2 The one year-and-seven-month period covers the time between Njango’s October 1, 2015 sentencing and his release from prison on May 10, 2017, after the Appellate Division awarded the service credits due to him. 9 D. The Appellate Division affirmed the PCR court, holding “that mandatoryperiods of parole supervision imposed under NERA cannot be reduced by priorservice credits, even where the defendant was imprisoned longer than heshould have been due to a failure to properly award such credit.” Njango, 463 N.J. Super. at 10. The Appellate Division emphasized that NERA’s impositionof a five-year period of parole supervision for a first-degree crime and three-year period of parole supervision for a second-degree crime is “mandatory,”citing N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(c). Id. at 8-9. The court asserted that “theLegislature’s objective in requiring mandatory parole supervision for NERAoffenses was 'to protect the public from the risk posed by the release of violentoffenders from incarceration.’” Id. at 9 (quoting State v. Friedman, 209 N.J. 102, 120 (2012)). It reasoned that allowing a defendant to “trade unused priorservice credit for mandatory parole supervision time on a NERA offense . . .would be contrary to the Legislature’s purpose in enacting the mandatoryparole supervisory period.” Id. at 10. The Appellate Division also rejected Njango’s bid to withdraw his guiltyplea “at this late date,” stating that he had not sought to do so when thesentencing court ruled against his request to apply service credits to bothindictments and that a plea withdrawal would not “remedy [the] situation.” Id. 10 at 10-11. Last, the Appellate Division found no merit in Njango’s doublejeopardy argument, explaining that “there is no way the years he spent inprison can be returned to him.” Id. at 11 (quoting Pearce, 395 U.S. at 719). E. We granted Njango’s petition for certification, which framed the“question presented” as “[w]hether prior service credits for time that a personwas wrongfully imprisoned beyond the term of incarceratio n may be applied toperiods of parole supervision required under the No Early Release Act.” See 243 N.J. 264 (2020). We also granted the motion of the New Jersey AttorneyGeneral to participate as amicus curiae. After we heard argument on the question presented, we requestedsupplemental briefing to address “whether defendant is entitled to servicecredits on each count for which he was sentenced, or whether the principles ofState v. C.H., 228 N.J. 111 (2017) apply.” 3 The case was then re-argued. Despite the fine presentations on re-argument, we will not revisit theAppellate Division’s decision, issued four years ago, which granted Njangoservice credits for the time he simultaneously served on the two indictments3 In C.H., we determined that, pursuant to Rule 3:21-8, the defendant was not entitled to the double counting of pre-sentence jail credits “for time simultaneously spent in custody” on charges in two separate indictments for which he received consecutive sentences. 228 N.J. at 118, 121. 11 while the sentences ran concurrently -- a decision resulting in Njango’s releasefrom prison and the commencement of his parole supervision. To be sure, ourdenial of certification as well as our denial of the motion for reconsiderationshould not be read as a determination or commentary on the merits of thatprior Appellate Division decision. Our jurisprudence makes clear that thedenial of a petition for certification is not an expression of approval ordisapproval of an opinion or judgment of the Appellate Division. State v.Hodge, 105 N.J. 518, 519 (1986). Nevertheless, Njango had an expectation offinality in that Appellate Division determination. Accordingly, we view the Appellate Division’s 2017 ruling as the law ofthis case. See State v. K.P.S., 221 N.J. 266, 276-77 (2015). “The law-of-the-case doctrine is a non-binding rule intended to prevent relitigation of apreviously resolved issue in the same case.” Id. at 276 (emphasis andquotation omitted). The doctrine is “guided by the 'fundamental legalprinciple . . . that once an issue has been fully and fairly litigated, it ordinarilyis not subject to relitigation between the same parties either in the same or insubsequent litigation,’” id. at 277 (omission in original) (emphasis omitted)(quoting Morris Cnty. Fair Hous. Council v. Boonton Township, 209 N.J.Super. 393, 444 n.16 (Law Div. 1985)). 12 With that approach in mind, we will confine our discussion to the issueon which we originally granted certification -- whether the excess time Njangoserved in prison can offset the time he must serve under parole supervisionpursuant to NERA. II. A. Njango argues that the Appellate Division’s determination that he is notentitled to apply his service credits -- the excess time he served in prison -- toreduce the remaining portion of his eight-year period of parole supervisionviolates the double jeopardy principles of the United States and New JerseyConstitutions. Njango maintains that parole supervision “is a component of,and not separate from,” an overall NERA sentence. Because NERA parole ispunishment, akin to imprisonment, Njango reasons NERA parole extends theperiod of his punishment. If his excess prison time does not reduce his periodof parole supervision, Njango asserts that the time he will have served inprison and on parole supervision will exceed the maximum permissible limit ofhis sentence. He insists that whatever the Legislature’s intent may be, it“cannot override the constitution.” Denying him the right to apply the servicecredits accumulated on his first sentence toward his second sentence, heasserts, contravenes the double jeopardy prohibition against receiving 13 “multiple punishments for the same offense,” quoting State v. Miles, 229 N.J. 83, 92 (2017) (citing, in turn, Pearce, 395 U.S. at 717). B. The State and the Attorney General (collectively, the State) advancemany of the same arguments in urging this Court to affirm the AppellateDivision. The State explains that Njango “spent more time incarceratedbecause of the appellate process -- and no other reason,” and that “[t]hecriminal justice system can’t provide a remedy.” The State contends that,under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(c), “the mandatory period of parole supervision [fora NERA offense] does not commence until the defendant’s release fromincarceration” and that Njango cannot apply “unused prior-service credits toreduce [a] mandatory supervision period” without contravening the plainlanguage of the statute and the Legislature’s intent. The State emphasizes that parole supervision begins when a defendant isactually released from prison -- “not some hypothetical date he should havebeen freed.” The State also posits that incarceration serves a different purposefrom mandatory parole supervision, which is intended to monitor andsupervise released offenders for public safety and rehabilitative purposes.Additionally, the State claims that reducing Njango’s eight -year period ofsupervised release “would shatter the expectations of the State and the trial 14 court.” In its view, Njango received double service credits, and such awindfall does not implicate double jeopardy concerns. III. A. We accept this case as it has come to us, from a determination by theAppellate Division in 2017 that the trial court mistakenly denied Njangoservice credits toward his second sentence. Based on that decision, Njangoserved at least one year and seven months in prison beyond his release date. 4Had he been timely released from prison, he would have completed one yearand seven months of parole supervision. From the State’s public-safetyperspective, one year and seven months of prison surely is the equivalent ofthe same period under parole supervision. The question is whether, within the constitutional framework of oursystem of justice, there is no remedy -- as the State asserts -- for the timeNjango should not have spent in prison. We begin with a review of therelevant provisions of the No Early Release Act.4 We note here that Njango also claims that at the time of sentencing, he had already served approximately an extra 1.3 years beyond the point at which he should have been paroled. We are not in a position to pass judgment on the accuracy of his calculation. That calculation must be made by the New Jersey State Parole Board and/or the Department of Corrections. 15 N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(a) provides that a court sentencing a defendant to aterm of incarceration for a first- or second-degree crime enumerated insubsection (d) “shall fix a minimum term of 85% of the sentence imposed,during which the defendant shall not be eligible for parole.” The eighty-fivepercent period of parole ineligibility is known as a NERA sentence. Amongthe crimes enumerated in subsection (d) of N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2 are first-degreeattempted murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3; and second-degreeaggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1) -- crimes to which Njango pledguilty. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(c) further provides that a court meting out a NERAsentence “shall also impose a five-year term of parole supervision if thedefendant is being sentenced for a crime of the first degree, or a three-yearterm of parole supervision if the defendant is being sentenced for a crime ofthe second degree.” Under subsection (c), a defendant’s NERA parolesupervision begins upon the completion of the sentence of incarceration imposed by the court pursuant to [ N.J.S.A. 2C:43- 7.2(a)] unless the defendant is serving a sentence of incarceration for another crime at the time he completes the sentence of incarceration imposed pursuant to subsection (a), in which case the term of parole supervision shall commence immediately upon the defendant’s release from incarceration. [N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(c).] 16 A defendant is in the custody of the Department of Corrections whenserving a term of imprisonment under NERA. Ibid.; N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51b(a).While serving a NERA period of parole supervision, the defendant remains “inthe legal custody of the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections, andshall be supervised by the Division of Parole of the State Parole Board as if onparole.” N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51b(a); see also N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(c). If adefendant fails to abide by the conditions of his parole, the board panel has theauthority to “revoke [his] release status and return [him] to custody for theremainder of the term” or until he again becomes eligible for release. N.J.S.A.30:4-123.51b(a). B. Under our jurisprudence, parole is “in legal effect imprisonment” andtherefore punishment. Riley v. State Parole Bd., 219 N.J. 270, 288 (2014)(quoting Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193 , 196 (1923)); see also State v.Rosado, 131 N.J. 423, 428 (1993) (“[P]arole is the legal equivalent ofimprisonment . . . .”). We have described NERA’s mandatory period of parolesupervision as having a “penal impact” and a “penal consequence” to a plea toa NERA offense. State v. Johnson, 182 N.J. 232, 240 (2005). Indeed, one ofthe “harsh consequences” of the mandatory period of parole supervision is thata parole violation “could subject defendant to additional incarceration for a 17 length of time that could make the custodial sentence, in the aggregate, farexceed the original sentence imposed as part of the plea bargain.” Ibid. As noted, a defendant who is imprisoned for a NERA offense remains inthe custody of the Department of Corrections when placed on NERA parolesupervision. Accordingly, if Njango does not receive service credits for theexcess time served in prison, he will remain in the custody of the Departmentof Corrections for a year and seven months beyond the maximum sentenceimposed by the trial court. Clearly, the Legislature did not contemplatewhether a defendant wrongly or mistakenly compelled to remain in prisonbeyond his prescribed sentence should be mandated to serve the entire periodof parole supervision without a remedy. The arbitrary governmentdecisionmaking that has denied Njango a remedy for a wrong is addressed bythe fundamental fairness doctrine. C. The fundamental fairness doctrine finds its source in Article I, Paragraph1 of the New Jersey Constitution, which “sets forth the first principles of ourgovernmental charter -- that every person possesses the 'unalienable rights’ toenjoy life, liberty, and property, and to pursue happiness.” Lewis v. Harris, 188 N.J. 415, 442 (2006). Despite the absence of the phrase due process inthat paragraph, this Court has “construed the expansive language of Article I, 18 Paragraph 1 to embrace the fundamental guarantee of due process.”Jamgochian v. State Parole Bd., 196 N.J. 222, 239 (2008). An “integral part” of that guarantee of due process is the doctrine offundamental fairness. See State v. Shaw, 241 N.J. 223, 239 (2020) (quotingState v. Saavedra, 222 N.J. 39, 67 (2015)); see also State v. Abbati, 99 N.J. 418, 429 (1985). The doctrine “serves to protect citizens generally againstunjust and arbitrary governmental action, and specifically against governmentprocedures that tend to operate arbitrarily.” Doe, 142 N.J. at 108 (emphasisomitted) (quoting State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 377 (1987) (Handler, J.,dissenting)). The “one common denominator” in our fundamental fairnessjurisprudence is “that someone was being subjected to potentially unfairtreatment and there was no explicit statutory or constitutional protection to beinvoked.” Id. at 109. The fundamental fairness doctrine “promotes the valuesof 'fairness and fulfillment of reasonable expectations in the light of theconstitutional and common law goals.’” State v. Vega-Larregui, 246 N.J. 94,132 (2021) (quoting Saavedra, 222 N.J. at 68). We apply the fundamentalfairness doctrine “'sparingly’ and only where the 'interests involved are especiallycompelling.’” Saavedra, 222 N.J. at 67 (quoting Doe, 142 N.J. at 108). “Because we have, from time to time, construed Article I, Paragraph 1 toprovide more due process protections than those afforded under the United 19 States Constitution,” Jamgochian, 196 N.J. at 239, we will rely on thefundamental fairness doctrine to resolve the issue before us. IV. At Njango’s second sentencing, the trial court imposed an aggregateeighteen-year NERA term to be followed by an aggregate eight-yearmandatory period of parole supervision. That unitary sentence placed Njangoin the custody of the Department of Corrections for a maximum of twenty-sixyears. The failure of the PCR court and the Appellate Division to creditNjango with the excess prison time served, in effect, has extended Njango’speriod in the custody of the Department of Corrections to twenty-seven yearsand seven months. That means that Njango’s actual sentence now exceeds thesentence imposed by the trial court. Although the Appellate Division is correct that “the Legislature’sobjective in requiring mandatory parole supervision for NERA offenses was'to protect the public from the risk posed by the release of violent offendersfrom incarceration,’” Njango, 463 N.J. Super. at 9 (quoting Friedman, 209 N.J.at 120), the NERA term of incarceration serves precisely the same objective. As noted earlier, “parole is the legal equivalent of imprisonment,”Rosado, 131 N.J. at 428, and NERA’s mandatory period of parole supervisionis deemed a “penal consequence” of a NERA offense, Johnson, 182 N.J. at 20 240. Parole supervision constitutes a loss of liberty of a kind, if not to thedegree of incarceration. No persuasive reason has been advanced to explainwhy Njango’s serving an extra one year and seven months in prison -- when heshould have been serving that time on parole supervision -- should not becredited towards his overall sentence, in particular the parole supervisionperiod. The objective of parole supervision -- to protect the public from therisk from violent offenders -- was certainly satisfied when he was mistakenlyor erroneously incarcerated beyond the prescribed time for his release. SeeNjango, 463 N.J. Super. at 9. As pointed out by Njango, if he were incarcerated for a violation of hisparole supervision, he would be entitled to use his excess service credits toreduce his custodial time and therefore the overall period of his parolesupervision. That a defendant who violates parole can benefit from excessservice credits while a defendant who complies with parole cannot is an absurdresult that the Legislature could not have had in mind. We must construe a statute, such as NERA, in a commonsense way “sothat its reach does not exceed its constitutional limits.” See State v. Garron, 177 N.J. 147, 172 (2003). The fundamental fairness doctrine is intended toprovide a remedy for the inequitable and arbitrary decisionmaking that, in thiscase, has resulted in a year-and-seven-month loss of liberty for which the State 21 will not give Njango credit toward his eight-year mandatory period of parolesupervision. See Doe, 142 N.J. at 108. Here, notions of fundamental fairnesscompel us to conform NERA to our State Constitution in a way that theLegislature would likely have intended. See State v. Natale, 184 N.J. 458, 485(2005). Accordingly, we conclude that Njango’s eight-year period of parolesupervision must be reduced by the excess time he served in prison. V. For the reasons expressed, we reverse the judgment of the AppellateDivision. We remand to the New Jersey State Parole Board to calculate theexcess time Njango served in prison and to credit that time toward theremaining period of his parole supervision.5 The Parole Board will conduct --consistent with this opinion -- any proceedings that may be necessary. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and PIERRE-LOUIS join in JUSTICE ALBIN’s opinion.5 We do not suggest that the Parole Board may not rely on or be assisted by the Department of Corrections in making the appropriate calculation. 22