Title: Hart v. Kern
Citation: 268 N.W.2d 136
Docket Number: 9454
State: north-dakota
Issuer: north-dakota Supreme Court
Date: July 17, 1978

268 N.W.2d 136 (1978) R. M. HART, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. G. W. KERN, Defendant and Appellee. Civ. No. 9454. Supreme Court of North Dakota. July 17, 1978. Frederick E. Saefke, Jr., Bismarck, for plaintiff and appellant. Pearce, Anderson, Thames &amp; Durick, Bismarck, for defendant and appellant; argued by B. Timothy Durick, Bismarck. SAND, Acting Chief Justice. This is an appeal by R. M. Hart, plaintiff, from a Burleigh County district court summary judgment dismissing his amended complaint with prejudice. Hart's amended complaint alleged he suffered irreparable and permanent partial damage to his left hand as a result of being "severely and seriously bitten" by Kern's vicious dog on 13 June 1976. Hart sought $5,000 in special damages and $125,000 in general damages for his injuries. The defendant, Kern, served and filed his answer and demanded a trial by jury pursuant to Rule 38(b), North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure.[1] The depositions of Hart and Kern established that on the date of the incident Hart was a dinner guest at the Kerns' residence. Hart and Kern were neighbors. Hart, in his deposition, testified that at the time he and Kern were about to enter the Kern home, Hart's dog, Baron, a Doberman, arrived on the premises. The Kerns' dog, half Labrador and half Chesapeake, was in the garage. He was aware of two previous occasions when the two dogs had gotten into fights. Hart, in his deposition, also testified as to the circumstances leading up to the incident: According to the deposition of Kern, both he and Hart were aware of the fighting propensities of the two dogs when they were together. Kern stated that his dog, if not locked up, would generally follow him, and that the same was true of Hart and Hart's dog. At the time of the incident, he said that he had put the dog in the garage and closed the garage door "but it didn't latch tight probably." Kern, in his deposition, also testified regarding the Labrador's ability to get out of the garage: The trial court awarded Kern summary judgment, stating that there was no genuine issue of fact to be tried regarding the question of Kern's liability. Hart appealed to this Court, contending that the pleadings and depositions raised issues of fact which entitled him to a trial. The incident giving rise to the cause of action took place on 13 June 1976 and since that date the common law categories of licensee and invitee in premises liability cases have been abandoned in this jurisdiction. This Court, on 10 March 1977, ruled to abandon the use of these categories in O'Leary v. Coenen, 251 N.W.2d 746 (N.D. 1977), but did so prospectively, except as to the parties involved in the case under consideration. Because the cause of action occurred prior to the O'Leary decision, the common law categories still applied. The court found Hart to be a social guest on the Kerns' premises and therefore a licensee, and applied the general rule regarding a landowner's duty of care owed to a licensee. As stated in Werth v. Ashley Realty Company, 199 N.W.2d 899, 904 (N.D.1972), the owner or occupant of the premises owes no duty to a licensee other than to refrain from willfully or wantonly injuring him or causing injury to him through such gross negligence as is equivalent to willfulness or wantonness. We stated the test for determining when negligence becomes willful and wanton in Van Ornum v. Otter Tail Power Company, 210 N.W.2d 188, 202 (N.D.1973): An exception to this rule exists, and in Sendelbach v. Grad, 246 N.W.2d 496 (N.D. 1976), this Court repeated the "hidden peril" *138 exception found in Werth v. Ashley Realty Co., supra, at 905: The trial court granted Kern a summary judgment and dismissed Hart's amended complaint with prejudice. The amendment alleged: This Court, in Heasley v. State, 115 N.W.2d 334 (N.D.1962), said that summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact to be tried.[2] In Albers v. NoDak Racing Club, Inc., 256 N.W.2d 355, 359 (N.D.1977), we noted that whenever the court must make a finding of fact, summary judgment is inappropriate. We have previously stated that even where there is no dispute as to the facts, if inferences may be reasonably drawn from the evidence to indicate a genuine issue of fact, summary judgment is improper and a trial should be had. Kirton v. Williams Electric Cooperative, Inc., 265 N.W.2d 702 (N.D.1978); Johnson v. American Motors Corporation, 225 N.W.2d 57 (N.D.1974); Wolff v. Light, 156 N.W.2d 175, 178 (N.D. 1968). This is especially true in cases involving the standard of reasonable men, issues of negligence, assumption of risk, and such related items. Wright &amp; Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2729, p. 570, quoted in Johnson, supra. In Wolff v. Light, supra, we said that generally issues of negligence, including such related issues as wanton or contributory negligence are ordinarily not disposed of by summary judgment for or against the defendant, but are tried by the jury or the court. The pleadings and depositions raise issues of negligence which are questions of fact to be determined by the trier of facts. Kresel v. Giese, 231 N.W.2d 780 (N.D.1975); Seibel v. Symons Corporation, 221 N.W.2d 50 (N.D.1974); and Luithle v. Taverna, 214 N.W.2d 117 (N.D.1973). It was admitted that Kern failed to properly close the garage door and that he had knowledge of his dog's ability to push up the unsecured garage door and escape. A question of fact exists as to whether or not Kern exposed Hart to a "hidden peril" by not warning him that his dog could escape from the garage when Hart's dog *139 was in the area, and both parties knew that the two dogs fought when together. It is also a question of fact whether or not Kern's failure to properly latch the garage door amounted to gross negligence equivalent to willfulness or wantonness under the circumstances. There is also a question of fact whether or not Hart had knowledge that Kern's dog could escape from the garage. However, the depositions established that Kern knew that Hart's dog generally followed him when not tied up. Kern testified: Kern could expect Hart's dog when Hart was on the premises. In anticipation of this, he put his own dog in the garage but failed to properly secure the garage door. Although the duty of care owed to Hart by Kern must be determined upon the basis of Hart's status as a licensee on the premises, we do not believe that the question of Kern's conduct can be resolved by the trial court as a matter of law without any findings of fact. There are genuine issues of fact to be resolved. The fact finder must decide whether Kern's knowledge of his dog's ability to escape from the garage and his failure to warn Hart, under the circumstances, amounted to wanton or willful negligence. It is also a question of fact whether Kern knowingly exposed Hart to a "hidden peril." We conclude that the trial court erred in summarily disposing of Hart's complaint by granting Kern's motion for summary judgment. We express no comments as to the merits of the case. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment and order the case to be tried on its merits. VOGEL, PEDERSON and PAULSON, JJ., and HEEN, District Judge, concur. HEEN, District Judge, sitting in place of ERICKSTAD, C. J., disqualified. [1] Rule 38(d), NDRCivP, in part, provides that "A demand for trial by jury made as herein provided may not be withdrawn without the consent of the parties." [2] Rule 56, North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure.