Title: Magliacane v. City of Gardner
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12736
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: January 22, 2020

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SJC-12736 
 
JANICE MAGLIACANE1  vs.  CITY OF GARDNER & others.2 
 
 
 
Worcester.     October 2, 2019. - January 22, 2020. 
 
Present (Sitting at Barnstable):  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, 
Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Massachusetts Tort Claims Act.  Water.  Municipal Corporations, 
Liability for tort, Water supply, Governmental immunity.  
Governmental Immunity.  Negligence, Governmental immunity.  
Practice, Civil, Presentment of claim under Massachusetts 
Tort Claims Act, Class action. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
December 13, 2017. 
 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Susan E. Sullivan, J., and 
entry of separate and final judgment was ordered by her. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Michelle H. Blauner for the plaintiff. 
 
John J. Davis for the defendants. 
                     
1 Individually and on behalf of all others similarly 
situated. 
 
2 Suez Water Environmental Services, Inc. (formerly known as 
United Water Environmental Services, Inc.); and AECOM Technical 
Services, Inc. (formerly known as Earth Tech, Inc.). 
2 
 
 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
J. Raymond Miyares, Bryan F. Bertram, & Ivria Glass Fried 
for department of public works of Wellesley. 
 
Michele E. Randazzo for Massachusetts Water Works 
Association & another. 
 
Cynthia L. Amara for Massachusetts Municipal Lawyers 
Association. 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  Plaintiff Janice Magliacane is a homeowner in 
the city of Gardner (city) whose hot water heating system failed 
prematurely three times due to corrosion of its copper heating 
coils.  She replaced the coils on the first two occasions but, 
after the third malfunction, switched out her tankless hot water 
system for a water heater to avoid additional replacement costs.  
She was not alone; as alleged, the hot water heating systems of 
hundreds of other homeowners in the city also failed because of 
corroded copper heating coils. 
Magliacane commenced this putative class action suit in the 
Superior Court alleging that the city and its private water 
supply contractors, AECOM Technical Services, Inc. (AECOM), and 
Suez Water Environmental Services, Inc. (Suez) (collectively, 
defendants), were negligent and grossly negligent and created a 
nuisance in knowingly supplying corrosive water to the city's 
residents.  The city moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to 
Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), and for entry 
of separate and final judgment pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 
54 (b), 365 Mass. 820 (1974).  After a hearing, the judge 
3 
 
 
allowed the city's motion to dismiss, concluding that Magliacane 
failed to make timely presentment as required by the Tort Claims 
Act (act), G. L. c. 258, § 4.3  Magliacane filed a notice of 
appeal, and we transferred the appeal to this court on our own 
motion. 
Magliacane contends that her class action claims fall 
outside the scope of the act because a city historically has 
been exempt from sovereign immunity when it acts in a 
"proprietary" or "commercial" capacity by selling water to its 
residents.  She also argues that, even if her claims are covered 
by the act, she made timely presentment because the city 
fraudulently concealed her cause of action, thereby tolling the 
act's presentment requirement until she had actual knowledge of 
her claims. 
We conclude that, apart from the exceptions set forth in 
the act, the act covers all claims brought against a city, even 
those arising from the city's sale of water to its residents.  
We also conclude that the judge erred in dismissing Magliacane's 
complaint for lack of timely presentment, where her complaint 
made specific allegations that, if true, would support factual 
findings (1) that the city fraudulently concealed her cause of 
                     
3 AECOM and Suez filed separate motions to dismiss, which 
are not before us.  This opinion addresses only the city's 
liability. 
4 
 
 
action and (2) that she did not have actual knowledge of the 
city's responsibility for the corrosion of her heating coils 
until less than two years before the date of presentment.  
Because we look to the same record as the motion judge and 
because allowance of a motion to dismiss is a question of law, 
we also reach the arguments that the judge did not address and 
conclude (1) that Magliacane adequately gave notice of her 
nuisance claim in her presentment; (2) that she made proper 
presentment on behalf of the putative class; and (3) that the 
allegations in her complaint suffice to show that the city is 
not entitled to dismissal of the complaint under the statutory 
exceptions to liability under the act that it invoked.4  We 
therefore vacate the judge's allowance of the city's motion to 
dismiss and remand this case for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.5 
Background.  We recite the facts, which are alleged in 
great detail in the complaint, as if they are true, because we 
                     
4 The city claims that it is immune from liability under 
G. L. c. 258, § 10 (j), because the corrosion of the heating 
coils was "not originally caused" by the city, and under G. L. 
c. 258, § 10 (b), because the city's failure to address the 
corrosion problem in its water treatment was "the failure to 
exercise or perform a discretionary function." 
 
5 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the 
Massachusetts Municipal Lawyers Association; the department of 
public works of Wellesley; and the Massachusetts Water Works 
Association and the city of Haverhill. 
5 
 
 
must accept them as true in reviewing the allowance of a motion 
to dismiss.  See Revere v. Massachusetts Gaming Comm'n, 476 
Mass. 591, 595 (2017). 
The city owns two water treatment plants at Crystal Lake 
and Snake Pond, and it sells and distributes water to the city's 
residents, property owners, and businesses.  In 1998, the city 
entered into a contract with defendant AECOM6 that privatized the 
city's water maintenance and distribution operation.  The 
contract guaranteed that AECOM would operate and maintain the 
city's water system in accordance with "Good Industry 
Practices"; "use all reasonable means and methods to insure the 
safety, integrity and quality of the [c]ity's water"; and 
perform its work in conformity with "the highest professional 
standard of care and practice customarily expected" of those 
engaged in comparable work.  Defendant Suez acquired the 
contract and assumed all attendant obligations in 2008.  Suez 
has operated the city's water facilities and distribution system 
since then. 
The defendants knew for years that the water they sold and 
distributed to the city's residents was corrosive.  In a 1994 
report, city consultants stated that "the corrosive nature of 
                     
6 The original party to the contract was Earth Tech, Inc. 
(Earth Tech), a former subsidiary of Tyco International, Ltd.  
AECOM acquired Earth Tech in 2008.  For purposes of clarity and 
consistency, we will not distinguish Earth Tech from AECOM. 
6 
 
 
the source water was causing leaching of lead and copper from 
building plumbing."  The report concluded that "increasing the 
pH of the water entering the distribution system would reduce 
lead and copper solubility," and recommended that the city's 
water treatment facility at Crystal Lake "add a non-zinc based 
orthophosphate to . . . inhibit corrosion of the distribution 
system piping and plumbing."  A 1998 letter from the same 
consultants recommended that the city's other water treatment 
facility at Snake Pond similarly implement "corrosion control 
using caustic soda and poly/orthophosphate blend."  When the 
city constructed the plants at Crystal Lake and Snake Pond in 
the late 1990s, it and AECOM appeared to heed this advice, 
seeking and receiving approval from the Department of 
Environmental Protection (DEP) to incorporate orthophosphate 
into the design of both facilities as a corrosion inhibitor.  
But in 2002, AECOM sent a letter to the DEP stating that it did 
not believe that the corrosion control plan had been optimized 
and that it intended to "further optimize lead and copper 
control with orthophosphate treatment."  Despite this apparent 
decision and DEP approval, the city and AECOM did not implement 
corrosion control plans at that time. 
By 2009 or 2010, the city had received numerous complaints 
about copper water heater coil failures and had initiated an 
investigation into the issue.  In 2011, the city engineer sought 
7 
 
 
the guidance of an expert with the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), who concluded that there were no issues 
with the coils themselves but that the water's alkalinity was 
low and ought to be increased.  Although the city shared this 
information with Suez, neither entity acted on the 
recommendation. 
Meanwhile, the city's residents' heating coils continued to 
fail:  by 2012, the city had received reports of more than 400 
coil failures from 250 residents.  In response, the city and 
Suez retained Microvision Laboratories (Microvision) to examine 
the heating coils and water samples.  Microvision excluded coil 
quality as a cause of the failures and determined that the 
city's switch from chlorine to chloramine (two chemicals 
commonly used to disinfect public water systems) might have 
contributed to the corrosion problem.  In its 2012 report, 
Microvision suggested that the city take "[a]dditional steps" to 
"minimize the risk of aggressive corrosion," specifically "the 
addition of a phosphate corrosion inhibitor."  Based on the 
report, the city engineer stated in a memorandum that "it is 
incumbent upon [the city] as the supplier to improve water 
chemistry to make the water more protective of the copper pipe 
within the boiler heating environment."  The memorandum also 
noted that the "[o]riginal studies in advance of the current 
water treatment facility construction called for the addition 
8 
 
 
[of] soda ash for alkalinity control and non zinc orthophosphate 
for corrosion control.  At some point the orthophosphate 
addition was dropped and is not used today."  Again, the 
defendants took no action to improve the city's water chemistry. 
In 2015, as the city continued to receive complaints, it 
and Suez retained yet another consultant, Corrosion Testing 
Laboratories (CTL), to test the leaking copper coils.  CTL's 
2015 report concluded that the leaks in the coils were caused by 
pinholes and that the pinholes were likely "related to soft 
water low alkalinity, and/or low dissolved inorganic carbon."  
CTL further opined that Suez's use of chloramine treatment was 
"associated with changing the alkalinity and dissolved inorganic 
carbonate levels" in the city's water supply. 
Until September 2015, the city denied that the coil 
corrosion problem was caused by, or related to, the chemistry of 
its water.  Instead, it publicly blamed the problem on the 
quality of the coils, although it knew this to be false.  In 
response to a question about coil corrosion at a meeting of the 
public service committee of the city council in May 2013, the 
city engineer said, "[W]e have the water tested the water and it 
is not showing anything," even though the EPA and Microvision 
studies contradicted that statement.  The defendants did not 
disclose the city consultant's opinions from the 1990s or 
9 
 
 
Microvision's 2012 recommendations that the city ought to add 
orthophosphate to its water to mitigate coil corrosion. 
In September 2015, the city issued a press release 
concerning the CTL study in which it acknowledged that "the soft 
water (low alkalinity) and a low level of Dissolved Inorganic 
Carbons" contributed to the coil failures.  But the same press 
release asserted that "the failure of some copper coils has been 
potentially determined to be due to the natural state of the 
water itself and not due to any additives," notwithstanding 
CTL's opinion that Suez's use of chloramines to disinfect the 
water was a contributing factor to the corrosive water 
conditions.7 
Following the press release, the city's mayor denied that 
the city had any culpability for the corrosion because the CTL 
report attributed the issue to the natural state of the water.  
And at a March 2016 meeting of the public service committee of 
the city council, the city engineer disclaimed the city's 
responsibility for the coil corrosion, stating that "we are not 
doing anything wrong" and that the corrosion occurred because of 
the city's "soft water, which is a natural occurrence." 
Around the same time as the issuance of the press release, 
the city engineer noted in an internal memorandum that the city 
                     
7 The press release was not appended to the complaint and 
was not included in the appellate record. 
10 
 
 
and Suez "have not looked at our corrosion control strategy" in 
years.  The city then directed Suez to conduct such a strategy 
review, and in June 2016, the city and Suez sought approval from 
the DEP (for the second time) to add orthophosphate to the 
city's water treatment plants.  After the DEP approved the 
request in August 2017, the city announced that it would add 
orthophosphates to the water supply to "make the situation go 
away."  When Magliacane filed the present suit in December 2017, 
the city and Suez still had not implemented any coil corrosion 
mitigation plan. 
On October 12, 2017, Magliacane sent a demand letter to the 
defendants, individually and on behalf of a class defined as 
"Gardner residents, property owners and businesses who have had 
to replace/purchase heating coils, boilers and/or hot water 
heaters since 2000 due to coil corrosion."  The city responded 
to the presentment by letter dated December 4, 2017, and denied 
all responsibility and liability for Magliacane's claimed 
injuries.  Magliacane then commenced this putative class action 
on December 13, 2017. 
Discussion.  "We review the allowance of a motion to 
dismiss de novo."  Curtis v. Herb Chambers I-95, Inc., 458 Mass. 
674, 676 (2011).  "For purposes of that review, we accept as 
true the facts alleged in the plaintiffs' complaint and any 
11 
 
 
exhibits attached thereto, drawing all reasonable inferences in 
the plaintiffs' favor."  Revere, 476 Mass. at 595. 
1.  Tort Claims Act.  Responding to the city's argument 
that she did not make timely presentment of her claims as 
required by the act, Magliacane asserts that the act does not 
apply to suits against a municipality acting in a "proprietary" 
or "commercial" capacity, such as with respect to the 
distribution and sale of water.  Magliacane correctly notes 
that, before the enactment of the act in 1978, a municipality 
was not protected by sovereign immunity from liability arising 
from the distribution and sale of water.  See Harvard Furniture 
Co. v. Cambridge, 320 Mass. 227, 229 (1946) ("in undertaking to 
supply water at a price, a municipality is not performing a 
governmental function but is engaging in trade, and is liable 
just as a private company would be for any negligence in the 
laying out of its pipes, in keeping them in repair, or in 
furnishing potable water through them").  See generally Morash & 
Sons, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 612, 620-621 (1973) ("many 
cases have established that a municipality may be held liable 
for the negligence of its employees who are engaged in 
commercial activities of the city" where there is "the element 
of special corporate benefit or pecuniary profit").  She 
contends that, where such liability by a municipality was not 
barred by sovereign liability before the act, it should be 
12 
 
 
deemed to be outside the scope of the act that was intended to 
limit the scope of sovereign immunity. 
To resolve this question, we look to the history of 
sovereign immunity and the passage of the act.  "[S]overeign 
immunity is a judicially created common law" doctrine that our 
Commonwealth adopted from English common law.  Morash & Sons, 
Inc., 363 Mass. at 615.  Based on the antiquated notion that the 
"King can do no wrong" and that "no one else could do wrong on 
his behalf," sovereign immunity prohibited private citizens from 
filing suit against the Commonwealth and its municipalities.  
See J.A. Sullivan Corp. v. Commonwealth, 397 Mass. 789, 793 
(1986); Briggs v. Light-Boat Upper Cedar Point, 11 Allen 157, 
162 (1865); Mower v. Leicester, 9 Mass. 247, 250 (1812). 
But of course, the government can and sometimes does do 
wrong.  Recognizing the unfairness, in some circumstances, of 
preventing those injured by the government's wrongful acts from 
seeking financial compensation though the judicial system, 
courts created a patchwork of exceptions to sovereign immunity.  
See Morash & Sons, Inc., 363 Mass. at 623 ("The judge made 
exceptions reflect a partial and piecemeal adjustment by the 
courts of a doctrine that, if applied in all cases 
indiscriminately, would bring about some unjust results").  In 
particular, courts distinguished between a municipality's acts 
undertaken for the common good of all, which were protected by 
13 
 
 
sovereign immunity, and those undertaken for "special corporate 
benefit or pecuniary profit," which were not.  Id. at 621. 
This distinction seems simple in theory, but it proved 
quite troublesome in application, often leading to arbitrary 
results.  Id. ("An injured person, for example, may recover 
against a city or town because of the fortuitous circumstance 
that the injury was caused by the activity of water department 
employees, rather than by fire department employees" [citations 
omitted]).  As "fine distinctions" and "further refinements" 
were made, id. at 622, the resulting "liability by exceptions" 
was "grounded in factors that [had] no necessary relationship to 
accepted tort principles, equitable principles, or principles of 
sound public policy," id. at 621.  Eventually, the patchwork of 
exceptions became a "crazy quilt" of complex and confusing 
distinctions, Rogers v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 18 Mass. App. 
Ct. 337, 339 (1984), and created such a "convoluted scheme of 
rules and exceptions" that were "unjust and indefensible as a 
matter of logic and sound public policy" that we declared our 
intention to abrogate sovereign immunity unless the Legislature 
"acted definitively as to the doctrine," Whitney v. Worcester, 
373 Mass. 208, 209-210 (1977). 
In response, the Legislature promulgated the act in 1978, 
"the primary purpose of [which] was to replace the common-law 
doctrine of governmental immunity, and its myriad judicially 
14 
 
 
created exceptions, with a comprehensive statutory scheme 
governing the tort liability of public employers."  Morrissey v. 
New England Deaconess Ass'n -- Abundant Life Communities, Inc., 
458 Mass. 580, 590 (2010).  The comprehensive nature of the 
statutory scheme is set forth in G. L. c. 258, § 2, which 
provides, in relevant part: 
"Public employers shall be liable for injury or loss of 
property . . . caused by the negligent or wrongful act or 
omission of any public employee while acting within the 
scope of his office or employment, in the same manner and 
to the same extent as a private individual under like 
circumstances, except that public employers shall not be 
liable . . . for any amount in excess of $100,000 . . . .  
The remedies provided by this chapter shall be exclusive of 
any other civil action or proceeding by reason of the same 
subject matter against the public employer . . . .  Final 
judgment in an action brought against a public employer 
under this chapter shall constitute a complete bar to any 
action by a party to such judgment against such public 
employer or public employee by reason of the same subject 
matter." 
 
If the historical context and this statutory language were 
not enough to clearly demonstrate the legislative intent to 
repeal the common-law patchwork of exceptions to sovereign 
liability, "the enabling legislation of the [a]ct expressed such 
an intent."  Morrissey, 458 Mass. at 590.  It states:  "The 
provisions of this act shall be construed liberally for the 
accomplishment of the purposes thereof but shall not be 
construed to supersede or repeal [G. L. c. 81, § 18, and G. L. 
c. 84, §§ 15-25].  Any other provision of law inconsistent with 
15 
 
 
any other provisions of this chapter shall not apply."  St. 
1978, c. 512, § 18. 
In Morrissey, 458 Mass. at 590-591, we rejected the 
plaintiffs' argument that private nuisance claims against a 
municipality were not within the scope of the act because such 
claims were among the exceptions to sovereign immunity before 
its enactment.  We reject Magliacane's comparable argument that 
the act does not cover claims arising from the city's sale of 
water because such claims were also among the exceptions to 
sovereign liability.  See Wolf v. Boston Water & Sewer Comm'n, 
408 Mass. 490, 492 n.4 (1990) ("distinction between governmental 
and nongovernmental or proprietary functions" was "abrogated" by 
act).  We conclude that the act is the exclusive remedy for 
bringing tort claims against the Commonwealth and its 
municipalities, regardless of whether the tort claim was within 
or outside the scope of sovereign immunity before passage of the 
act.  Because the act applies to Magliacane's claims against the 
city, we therefore turn to whether she complied with the 
statutory requirements for the presentment of those claims. 
2.  Presentment.  a.  Timeliness.  Under the act, "[a] 
civil action shall not be instituted against a public employer 
on a claim for damages . . . unless the claimant shall have 
first presented his claim in writing to the executive officer of 
such public employer within two years after the date upon which 
16 
 
 
the cause of action arose."  G. L. c. 258, § 4.  "This strict 
presentment requirement is a statutory prerequisite for recovery 
under the [a]ct," the purpose of which "is to allow public 
employers the opportunity to investigate and settle claims and 
to prevent future claims through notice to executive officers."  
Shapiro v. Worcester, 464 Mass. 261, 267-268 (2013).  In 
allowing the city's motion to dismiss, the judge concluded that 
Magliacane's cause of action arose no later than September 2015, 
when the city issued its press release acknowledging that the 
city's water chemistry had contributed to the coil failures.  
According to that timeline, Magliacane sent her October 12, 2017 
presentment letter a month too late. 
A cause of action arises for purposes of presentment under 
§ 4 when it accrues under our discovery rule.  See Darius v. 
Boston, 433 Mass. 274, 275 n.3 (2001); Heck v. Commonwealth, 397 
Mass. 336, 340 (1986).  Under our common-law discovery rule, "a 
cause of action accrues when the plaintiff discovers or with 
reasonable diligence should have discovered that (1) [she] has 
suffered harm; (2) [her] harm was caused by the conduct of 
another; and (3) the defendant is the person who caused that 
harm."  Harrington v. Costello, 467 Mass. 720, 727 (2014).  In 
finding that the cause of action accrued no later than the 
issuance of the city's press release, the judge determined that, 
as a result of the press release, Magliacane knew or should have 
17 
 
 
known that the city's water was a potential cause of the 
premature failure of her copper water heating coils and 
therefore "should have known that the [c]ity's conduct 
contributed to that harm." 
Magliacane's complaint, however, alleges in substantial 
detail that the city fraudulently concealed her cause of action 
by declaring in the press release that "the failure of some 
copper coils has been potentially determined to be due to the 
natural state of the water itself and not due to any additives," 
when the city knew that the corrosive condition of the water had 
been caused in part by the city's addition of chloramine to the 
water.  Where there is fraudulent concealment, the common-law 
discovery rule gives way to the statutory discovery rule set 
forth in G. L. c. 260, § 12:  "If a person liable to a personal 
action fraudulently conceals the cause of such action from the 
knowledge of the person entitled to bring it, the period prior 
to the discovery of his cause of action by the person so 
entitled shall be excluded in determining the time limited for 
the commencement of the action."  See Hendrickson v. Sears, 365 
Mass. 83, 89 (1974) ("Legislature has long provided a discovery 
rule for cases of fraudulent concealment"). 
Under this statutory discovery rule, fraudulent concealment 
tolls the statute of limitations where "the defendant[s] 
concealed the existence of a cause of action through some 
18 
 
 
affirmative act done with intent to deceive."  White v. Peabody 
Constr. Co., 386 Mass. 121, 133 (1982).  In such circumstances, 
the limitations period is tolled unless the plaintiff has actual 
knowledge of the claim.  See Stolzoff v. Waste Sys. Int'l, Inc., 
58 Mass. App. Ct. 747, 757 (2003), citing Lynch v. Signal Fin. 
Co. of Quincy, 367 Mass. 503, 508 (1975).  Where there is 
fraudulent concealment, "we have only attributed knowledge to a 
plaintiff who had actual knowledge of the facts, or had the 
means to acquire such facts, in circumstances where the 
probability of wrongdoing was so evident that possession of the 
means was equivalent to actual knowledge."  Demoulas v. Demoulas 
Super Mkts., Inc., 424 Mass. 501, 520 n.25 (1997). 
We conclude that, where the complaint specifically alleged 
fraudulent concealment and alleged facts that, if true, would 
support such a finding, the judge should have applied this 
statutory discovery rule rather than the common-law discovery 
rule.  We recognize that, until now, we have not specifically 
held that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment tolls the 
presentment requirement under § 4 of the act.  But, in deciding 
that the discovery rule governed the interpretation of the act's 
presentment requirement, we intended "to avoid punishing 
'blameless ignorance' of a plaintiff" by barring claims before 
the plaintiff could reasonably know about them.  Heck, 397 Mass. 
at 340.  The same logic applies to fraudulent concealment:  it 
19 
 
 
would be manifestly unfair to prevent plaintiffs from bringing 
claims due to untimely presentment where the defendant has taken 
steps to conceal the cause of action. 
Taking the factual allegations in Magliacane's complaint as 
true and drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor, the 
city took active steps to conceal the fact that its conduct 
contributed to the coil corrosion problem, such as by claiming 
that the failure of the copper coils was "due to the natural 
state of the water itself" and was "not due to any additives."  
As alleged, the city was long aware that its addition of 
chloramines to the water likely contributed to the corrosion 
problem and that its failure to add orthophosphate to the water 
was a separate cause of the problem.  Because the complaint 
sufficiently alleged that the city concealed the existence of 
Magliacane's cause of action through affirmative acts done with 
the intent to deceive, her presentment was timely unless she had 
actual knowledge of the city's responsibility for the corrosion 
problem before October 12, 2015.  According to the complaint, 
Magliacane gained such actual knowledge only when the city 
announced its intention to add orthophosphate to the water to 
"make the situation go away" -- in effect admitting its 
responsibility for the problem -- on August 30, 2017.  Her 
October 12, 2017 presentment letter therefore fell well within 
the act's two-year presentment period.  Consequently, we vacate 
20 
 
 
the judge's allowance of the city's motion to dismiss on the 
ground of untimely presentment.8 
b.  Nuisance claim.  The city also contends that 
Magliacane's nuisance claim must be dismissed for lack of 
presentment under § 4 of the act, because her presentment 
alleged claims of negligence, breach of warranties, and 
violation of G. L. c. 93A, but not of nuisance.  The city argues 
that the presentment letter must identify each legal claim or 
suffer dismissal of any omitted claim.  We disagree. 
The purpose of presentment is to "ensure[] that the 
responsible public official receives notice of the claim so that 
the official can investigate to determine whether or not a claim 
is valid, preclude payment of inflated or nonmeritorious claims, 
settle valid claims expeditiously, and take steps to ensure that 
similar claims will not be brought in the future."  Richardson 
v. Dailey, 424 Mass. 258, 261 (1997), quoting Lodge v. District 
Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 21 Mass. App. Ct. 277, 283 
(1985).  Therefore, a presentment letter "is adequate if it sets 
forth sufficient facts from which public officials reasonably 
can discern the legal basis of the claim, and determine whether 
                     
8 Nothing in this opinion bars the city from claiming on 
summary judgment or at trial that, based on the evidence 
presented, the presentment was not timely because the city did 
not fraudulently conceal the cause of action or because 
Magliacane had actual knowledge of the cause of action at the 
time of or prior to the press release. 
21 
 
 
it states a claim for which damages may be recovered under the 
act."  Murray v. Hudson, 472 Mass. 376, 384 (2015).  Where "all 
theories of liability argued by the plaintiff [a]re based on the 
same facts," the presentation of those facts gives the executive 
officer "the opportunity to investigate the circumstances of 
each claim."  McAllister v. Boston Hous. Auth., 429 Mass. 300, 
305 n.7 (1999).  See Martin v. Commonwealth, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 
526, 530 (2002) ("the presentment requirement is not intended to 
demand such rigid particularization as to . . . bar legitimate 
claims for failing to invoke perfectly the correct 'Open 
Sesame'"). 
In short, where the facts are sufficiently presented, the 
presentment need not identify each and every legal claim the 
plaintiff ultimately includes in her complaint.  Consequently, 
where a plaintiff alleged in a presentment that a housing 
authority was negligent for allowing ice to accumulate on the 
exterior stairs of the property, her breach of implied warranty 
claim was not barred even though not specified in the 
presentment.  See McAllister, 429 Mass. at 301, 305 n.7.  Where 
a presentment alleged that the Commonwealth's failure to 
restrain an individual negligently caused the death of the 
plaintiff's sister, the plaintiff was not barred from pursuing a 
claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, even though 
that claim was not specified in the presentment.  Gilmore v. 
22 
 
 
Commonwealth, 417 Mass. 718, 719-720, 723 (1994).  And where a 
plaintiff's presentment letter alleged that an executive 
department was negligent because, despite its certification that 
the premises were lead-free, the premises contained lead that 
resulted in her children having elevated blood levels of lead, 
it sufficed to provide notice of her claims of negligent 
infliction of emotional distress and loss of consortium arising 
from the children's ingestion of lead paint.  See Martin, 53 
Mass. App. Ct. at 527. 
Magliacane's October 12, 2017 presentment letter laid out, 
in detail, her allegations that the city's use of chloramines 
contributed to the alkalinity of the water, that the city then 
failed to add orthophosphate to its water to correct the 
problem, and that she and other residents of the city sustained 
coil failures as a result.  Her presentment was "not so obscure 
that educated public officials should find themselves baffled or 
misled" with respect to her assertion of a claim of nuisance.  
See Gilmore, 417 Mass. at 723.  Nor would the nature of the 
official's investigation into the corrosion problem have been 
different because Magliacane failed to identify nuisance as a 
possible claim.  Because Magliacane set forth a sufficient 
factual basis to provide the city with notice and to allow 
officials to investigate the city's liability under the act, we 
conclude that she adequately presented her nuisance claim. 
23 
 
 
c.  Class presentment.  The city also asserts that, even if 
Magliacane's letter sufficed as a presentment of her individual 
claims, it could not constitute presentment by the similarly 
situated class members she seeks to represent in a class action.  
The city does not argue that a class action cannot be brought 
under the act, but it does contend that each and every member of 
such a class must individually make a separate presentment to 
give the city the opportunity to investigate or resolve the 
individual claims. 
As an initial matter, and somewhat surprisingly, we have 
yet to address the question whether plaintiffs can bring a class 
action under the act.  Section 2 of the act declares that 
"[p]ublic employers shall be liable for injury or loss of 
property or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or 
wrongful act or omission of any public employee while acting 
within the scope of his office or employment, in the same manner 
and to the same extent as a private individual under like 
circumstances, except that public employers shall not be liable 
to levy of execution on any real and personal property to 
satisfy judgment, and shall not be liable for interest prior to 
judgment or for punitive damages or for any amount in excess of 
$100,000" (emphasis added).  G. L. c. 258, § 2.  Because a class 
action under Mass. R. Civ. P. 23, as amended, 471 Mass. 1491 
(2015), may be brought against "a private individual under like 
24 
 
 
circumstances," and because none of the exceptions precludes 
class relief, we conclude that a class action may be brought 
against a public employer under the act.  The guidance provided 
in the enabling legislation of the act -- that "[t]he provisions 
of this act shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment 
of the purposes thereof" -- supports this conclusion.9  St. 1978, 
c. 512, § 18. 
                     
9 We recognize that a State's tort claims act is a creature 
of statute and that, as we conclude in Massachusetts, the 
language of the statute may dictate whether class actions are 
permitted under the act.  We note that the Supreme Courts of 
Arizona, California, Indiana, and Utah have held that, in the 
absence of statutory language specifically proscribing class 
actions, their States' respective statutes permit class actions 
against public entities.  See Andrew S. Arena, Inc. v. Superior 
Court, 163 Ariz. 423, 425 (1990) ("We find nothing . . . to 
suggest that the legislature intended to exempt public entities 
from either the burdens or the benefits of class actions in 
appropriate cases"); San Jose v. Superior Court of Santa Clara 
County, 12 Cal. 3d 447, 547 (1974) ("We do not believe the 
claims statutes were intended to thwart class relief"); Budden 
v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs of Indianapolis, 698 N.E.2d 1157, 1163 
(Ind. 1998) (Indiana Tort Claims Act not intended to create 
barriers to valid claims, including class actions); Houghton v. 
Department of Health, 2005 UT 63, ¶ 24 (where nothing in tort 
claims statute prohibits class actions, they are allowed).  
Appellate courts in Colorado and Washington have also so held.  
See Crandall v. Denver, 143 P.3d 1105, 1111–1112 (Colo. Ct. App. 
2006), rev'd on other grounds, 161 P.3d 627 (Colo. 2007) (tort 
claims statute implicitly permits class actions where it limits 
amount of attorney's fees that prevailing plaintiff in class 
action may recover against public entity); Oda v. State, 111 
Wash. App. 79, 86-88 (2002) (because tort claims statute "made 
the State liable for tortious conduct to the same extent as if 
it were a private person or corporation," class actions 
permitted [quotation and citation omitted]). 
25 
 
 
 
If, as the city contends, each member of the class must 
serve a letter of presentment to participate in the class 
action, we would have to conclude, for all practical purposes, 
that the Legislature intended to permit class actions in theory, 
but not in fact.  A prerequisite to a class action under Mass. 
R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (1) is that "the class is so numerous that 
joinder of all members is impracticable."  To require every 
member of a class this numerous to make a presentment would 
essentially grant plaintiffs the right under § 2 of the act to 
recover damages through a class action but, in all but the most 
unusual circumstances, deprive them of that right as a result of 
the presentment requirement under § 4 of the act.  See, e.g., 
Crandall v. Denver, 143 P.3d 1105, 1112 (Colo. App. 2006), rev'd 
on other grounds, 161 P.3d 627 (Colo. 2007) ("requiring 
dismissal of all class plaintiffs who have not filed a notice of 
claim before commencement of the suit would make it virtually 
impossible to proceed with a class tort action against a public 
entity"); Houghton v. Dep't of Health, 2005 UT 63, ¶ 24  
("interpreting the notice of claim provision to require 
identification of every potential plaintiff in a class action 
lawsuit would nullify our class action rule"). 
We note that G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (3), also requires a form of 
presentment:  "At least thirty days prior to the filing of any 
such action, a written demand for relief, identifying the 
26 
 
 
claimant and reasonably describing the unfair or deceptive act 
or practice relied upon and the injury suffered, shall be mailed 
or delivered to any prospective respondent."  In Baldassari v. 
Public Fin. Trust, 369 Mass. 33, 42 (1975), we rejected the 
defendant's contention that each claimant must be identified in 
the c. 93A demand letter to seek redress under G. L. c. 93A.  We 
declared, "If a proper demand is made by one plaintiff, 
identifying him as the claimant and reasonably describing the 
act or practice relied on and the injury suffered by him, we 
think he and others similarly situated may join in a class 
action to redress that injury and similar injuries caused by the 
same act or practice.  Multiple demands for relief need not be 
filed on behalf of all the members of the class."  Id.  And we 
added that "[t]he modern class action is 'designed to avoid, 
rather than encourage, unnecessary filing of repetitious papers 
and motions.'"  Id., quoting American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. 
Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 550 (1974).  We conclude that a comparable 
standard applies where a putative class representative makes a 
presentment on behalf of a class prior to filing a class action 
against a public employer under the act.10 
                     
10 We note that Federal courts have reached different, and 
varying, conclusions under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).  
Under the FTCA, a plaintiff may not institute an action against 
the Federal government unless (1) the plaintiff has provided 
written notice of the claim to the appropriate Federal agency, 
27 
 
 
                     
and (2) the agency has denied the claim in writing or by failure 
to make a final disposition of the claim within six months of 
its filing.  28 U.S.C. § 2675(a).  The written claim must demand 
a sum certain in money damages.  28 U.S.C. § 2675(b). 
 
Federal courts have generally recognized that a class 
action is theoretically possible under the FTCA.  See Lunsford 
v. United States, 570 F.2d 221, 227 (8th Cir. 1977); 
Pennsylvania v. National Ass'n of Flood Insurers, 520 F.2d 11, 
23 (3d Cir. 1975).  However, "each of the claimants [must] have 
individually satisfied all of the jurisdictional requirements."  
Lunsford, supra.  Some Federal courts have interpreted this to 
mean that "each claimant must submit an independent and separate 
claim to the appropriate administrative agency for review and 
possible settlement," including "submission of a sum certain."  
National Ass'n of Flood Insurers, supra.  Other Federal courts 
would permit a class representative to file the claim, provided 
that the representative (1) establish his or her authority to 
present claims on behalf of the class, (2) name all the 
individual claimants, and (3) set forth a sum certain for each 
claimant, either by individually identifying the amount sought 
by each claimant or by identifying the lump sum sought by the 
class and asserting that each class member suffered the same 
amount of damages.  See, e.g., Dalrymple v. United States, 460 
F.3d 1318, 1325 (11th Cir. 2006) (dismissing FTCA claims 
because, in part, "the complaint [did] not provide information 
as to the amount of damages the individual plaintiffs in the 
. . . action sought, rather it provide[d] a total amount of 
damages for the multiple plaintiffs"); Luria v. Civil 
Aeronautics Bd., 473 F. Supp. 242, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("Even 
were it possible to amend the claim to allege damages in a sum 
certain . . . , the Notice of Claim would still be defective 
because it listed the names of only about half of the purported 
class"); Kantor v. Kahn, 463 F. Supp. 1160, 1164 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) 
("We do not find that [the lump sum damages demand] meets the 
sum certain requirement.  There is nothing in the Notice of 
Claim which indicates that each consumer suffered the same 
damage").  See generally Lunsford, supra. 
 
Plaintiffs' failure or inability to comply with these 
stringent requirements has generally resulted in the dismissal 
of putative class actions under the FTCA.  See, e.g., Lunsford, 
570 F.2d at 222 (victims of flooding caused by cloud seeding); 
Caidin v. United States, 564 F.2d 284, 285 (9th Cir. 1977) 
(shareholders of failed bank); Blain v. United States, 552 F.2d 
28 
 
 
Here, Magliacane's presentment letter clearly defined the 
claimants as "Magliacane, and a putative class of other 
similarly situated residents, property owners and businesses in 
Gardner who have had to replace heating coils, hot water 
heaters, furnaces and/or boilers since 2000 due to coil 
corrosion."  Her presentment letter satisfied the statutory 
purpose of presentment under the act -- to provide the 
government with "the opportunity to investigate and settle 
claims and to prevent future claims through notice to executive 
officers."  Shapiro, 464 Mass. at 268.  The presentment put the 
city on notice regarding the nature and scope of the class, and 
it enabled the city to investigate or settle the claims and to 
take steps to prevent similar claims from arising in the future.  
We conclude that Magliacane's October 12, 2017 letter adequately 
presented her claims and those of the putative class.  To be 
clear, we do not address whether this action meets the 
requirements of Mass. R. Civ. P. 23 or whether it should be 
                     
289, 290 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (victims of forest fire); 
In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 757, 760 
(E.D.N.Y. 1980) (2.4 million victims of Agent Orange use in 
Vietnam); Kantor, 463 F. Supp. at 1161-1163 (40,000 victims of 
government failure to regulate travel charters). 
 
It bears note that the Federal courts characterize the 
agency notice and sum certain prerequisites as "[t]he 
administrative exhaustion requirement" of the FTCA, rather than 
as a mere presentment requirement.  Lunsford, 570 F.2d at 224.  
See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 107 (1993). 
29 
 
 
certified as a class action against the city; we simply conclude 
that lack of presentment is not a proper basis to dismiss the 
complaint as a class action. 
3.  Exceptions to liability under the act.  The city 
further contends that, even if Magliacane made proper 
presentment on behalf of herself and the putative class, it is 
protected by sovereign immunity from her claims under two 
exceptions to the liability coverage provided by the act:  the 
exception for claims based on a public employer's failure to 
prevent the harmful consequences of a condition not originally 
caused by the public employer, G. L. c. 258, § 10 (j); and the 
discretionary function exception, G. L. c. 258, § 10 (b). 
a.  Section 10 (j) exception.  Section 10 (j) of the act 
bars "any claim based on an act or failure to act to prevent or 
diminish the harmful consequences of a condition or situation 
. . . which is not originally caused by the public employer or 
any other person acting on behalf of the public employer."  The 
purpose of § 10 (j) is to preclude liability where the 
government fails to prevent harm from a privately created 
hazard, as opposed to a hazard that it has caused.  See, e.g., 
Brum v. Dartmouth, 428 Mass. 684, 691-696 (1999) (town not 
liable for stabbing of student based on claim that town failed 
to protect student from known threat); Stahr v. Lincoln Sudbury 
Regional High Sch. Dist., 93 Mass. App. Ct. 243, 247 (2018) 
30 
 
 
(school district not liable for injury to field hockey player 
struck by teammate based on claim that school district was 
responsible due to inadequate instruction and lack of 
supervision). 
The city argues that the alkalinity of the water was caused 
by "thousands of years of evolution," not an affirmative act by 
the city, and therefore it did not "originally cause" the 
corrosion that led to the failure of the copper heating coils.  
It contends that its failure to add orthophosphate to the water 
is the type of "failure to prevent harm" that constitutes an 
exception to liability under § 10 (j) of the act. 
Under this rationale, the city would also be immune from 
liability under the act if it had delivered water to its 
residents that contained unsafe amounts of lead or other 
contaminants dangerous to human health, provided that those 
contaminants were present in the water before it was treated and 
delivered.  The flaw in this rationale, of course, is that where 
a city takes responsibility for the sale and distribution of 
water to its residents, the city is expected to treat the water 
in its reservoirs to ensure the water's safety before delivering 
that water to residents.  The city ultimately is responsible for 
the quality of water that it delivers.  Here, the city delivered 
to its residents water that it knew to be corrosive because of 
both what it added to the water and what it failed to add.  In 
31 
 
 
taking the affirmative act of delivering corrosive water, the 
city, not the water in its reservoirs, was the "original cause" 
of the corrosive water that led to Magliacane's copper coil 
failures.  The § 10 (j) exception does not protect the city from 
liability under the act under these circumstances.11 
b.  Discretionary function exception.  Under the act's 
discretionary function exception, G. L. c. 258, § 10 (b), public 
employers are not liable for "any claim based upon the exercise 
or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function or duty on the part of a public employer 
or public employee, acting within the scope of his office or 
employment, whether or not the discretion involved is abused."  
The exception distinguishes between "discretionary" acts, 
defined as "conduct that involves policy making or planning," 
and "functionary" acts, that is, those actions that simply 
implement established policy.  Harry Stoller & Co. v. Lowell, 
412 Mass. 139, 141-142 (1992).  That distinction is easy to 
articulate in theory, but difficult to apply in practice, 
because the determination whether an act is "discretionary" or 
"functionary" often depends on the particular facts of a case.  
See id. at 143 ("Because each case depends on its facts, the 
                     
11 We leave open the possibility that the exception under 
G. L. c. 258, § 10 (j), might apply if the city's water were 
contaminated by a saboteur in some way after it left the city's 
treatment plants, but that is not the situation before us. 
32 
 
 
design of a comprehensive, all-purpose guide to the limits of 
the exception is not likely"). 
The act itself makes no attempt to define what governmental 
functions are to be deemed discretionary and therefore deserving 
of immunity.  To aid in applying the statute's general language 
to the countless fact patterns that present themselves, we have 
developed a two-step analysis.  First, the court must decide 
"whether the governmental actor had any discretion at all as to 
what course of conduct to follow."  Harry Stoller & Co., 412 
Mass. at 141.  If the actor's conduct is prescribed by statute, 
regulation, or other readily ascertainable standard, the 
government has no discretion, and the exception does not apply.  
Id.  If the first step does not resolve the issue, "[t]he second 
and far more difficult step is to determine whether the 
discretion that the actor had is that kind of discretion for 
which § 10 (b) provides immunity from liability."  Id.  Although 
almost every act involves some degree of discretion, "[t]he 
discretionary function exception is narrow, 'providing immunity 
only for discretionary conduct that involves policy making or 
planning.'"  Greenwood v. Easton, 444 Mass. 467, 470 (2005), 
quoting Harry Stoller & Co., supra.  Discretionary acts do not 
include those that involve only the "carrying out of previously 
established policies or plans."  Barnett v. Lynn, 433 Mass. 662, 
664 (2001), quoting Whitney, 373 Mass. at 218. 
33 
 
 
Here, Magliacane alleges that the city, knowing that its 
water was corrosive, adopted a plan to add orthophosphate to the 
water as early as 1998.  It sought and received approval for the 
plan from the DEP in 1998 and again in 2016, but it had not 
implemented the plan by the time the complaint was filed.  
Magliacane asserts that the policy decision to add the 
orthophosphate was made in 1998 and that the failure to do so 
was a failure to implement the policy, which is the type of 
"functionary" act not entitled to immunity under § 10 (b).  The 
city counters that, even though it had planned to add 
orthophosphate to the water, its decision regarding if and when 
to purchase and install corrosion inhibitors is a separate 
discretionary decision, because "[t]he city has discretion in 
deciding how best to expend its resources in order to provide 
safe and secure conditions."  Barnett, 433 Mass. at 664. 
As these arguments make clear, the determination whether 
the city made a discretionary policy decision not to add 
orthophosphate to its water or simply failed to implement its 
policy decision to do so is too fact-intensive to be decided on 
a motion to dismiss.  We therefore conclude that, at this time, 
based on the allegations in the complaint, the city is not 
entitled to dismissal on the ground of discretionary function 
immunity under § 10 (b) of the act. 
34 
 
 
Conclusion.  We vacate the order allowing the city's motion 
to dismiss and remand the case to the Superior Court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.