Title: Smit v. Shippers' Choice
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 081131
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 17, 2009

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Goodwyn, and 
Millette, JJ., and Lacy, S.J. 
 
D.B. SMIT1, COMMISSIONER,  
VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES 
 
v.  Record No. 081131 
 
 
OPINION BY SENIOR JUSTICE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    ELIZABETH B. LACY 
SHIPPERS’ CHOICE OF VIRGINA, INC.      APRIL 17, 2009 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
In this appeal we consider whether the Court of Appeals 
erred in determining that a person who does not receive 
compensation for conducting a class in a commercial driver 
training school is not an “instructor” as that term is defined 
in Code § 46.2-1700. 
Shippers’ Choice of Virginia, Inc. (Shippers’ Choice) is a 
commercial driver training school licensed by the Department of 
Motor Vehicles (DMV) pursuant to Code § 46.2-1701.  In December 
2005, two DMV agents visited Shippers’ Choice and observed 
Robert “Bobby” Garrison conducting a class.  Charles R. Longo, 
the president of Shippers’ Choice, explained to the DMV agents 
that Garrison was “participating in the school’s instructor 
training program, [and] was not covering new material.”  
                                                 
1 The circuit court and the Court of Appeals of Virginia 
styled this case as Shippers’ Choice of Virginia, Inc. v. D.B. 
Smith, Commissioner, Department of Motor Vehicles based upon 
pleadings filed by the parties in those courts.  The record 
reflects, however, that the correct spelling of the 
Commissioner’s name is “Smit.”  The Order granting this appeal 
and the papers on the present appeal use that name, and we adopt 
that spelling in this case. 
Garrison was employed and compensated by Shippers’ Choice as a 
mechanic and was not licensed as an instructor pursuant to Code 
§ 46.2-1701. 
The DMV issued an order of suspension to Shippers’ Choice 
on January 5, 2006 for a violation of former 24 VAC § 20-120-
180(A)(10)2 of the Virginia Administrative Code which prohibited 
“[e]mploying or otherwise engaging an instructor not properly 
licensed” by the DMV.  The order suspended the school’s license 
for six months and assessed a civil penalty of $500 pursuant to 
Code §§ 46.2-1705(A) and -1706 and 24 VAC § 20-120-180(A)&(C). 
 
Shippers’ Choice requested an administrative review. 
Following a hearing, the hearing officer filed a recommended 
decision concluding that Shippers’ Choice had violated 24 VAC 
§ 20-120-180(A)(10).  The hearing officer also recommended 
reducing the term of suspension to 30 days.  DMV Commissioner 
Demerst B. Smit considered the hearing officer’s recommended 
decision and Shippers’ Choice’s exceptions.  The Commissioner 
issued a hearing decision on January 5, 2007, holding that 
Shippers’ Choice failed to comply with 24 VAC § 20-120-
180(A)(10) because it permitted Garrison “to provide classroom 
instruction without a license” and ordering that the school’s 
                                                 
2 Chapter 120 of Title 24 of the Virginia Administrative 
Code was repealed on October 29, 2007 and a replacement chapter 
regulating driver training schools was promulgated.  See 24 VAC 
§ 20-121-10 et seq. and 24 Va. Register No. 4 (January 1, 2008). 
 
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license be suspended for 30 days.  Commissioner Smit also 
imposed a $500 penalty on the school. 
 
Shippers’ Choice appealed the Commissioner’s decision to 
the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond pursuant to Code 
§ 2.2-4025.  Following consideration of the record and argument 
of counsel, the circuit court upheld the agency’s decision, 
finding that the agency’s decision was supported by substantial 
evidence and was not arbitrary or capricious.  The Court of 
Appeals granted Shippers’ Choice’s petition for appeal and, in a 
published opinion, reversed the judgment of the circuit court, 
finding that Shippers’ Choice had not violated 24 VAC § 20-120-
180(A)(10) because Garrison was not compensated for teaching and 
therefore did not come within the definition of “instructor” 
contained in Code § 46.2-1700.  Shippers’ Choice of Va., Inc. v. 
Smith, 52 Va. App. 34, 660 S.E.2d 695 (2008).  We awarded the 
DMV an appeal. 
DISCUSSION 
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the Court of 
Appeals properly applied the definition of “instructor” 
contained in Code § 46.2-1700.  The statute provides in relevant 
part: 
“Instructor” means any person, whether acting for 
himself as operator of a driver training school or for 
such school for compensation, who teaches, conducts 
classes, gives demonstrations, or supervises persons 
learning to operate or drive a motor vehicle.  
 
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The Court of Appeals did not find that this statute was 
ambiguous but rather concluded that the statute “clearly defines 
an ‘instructor’ as someone who receives compensation for 
teaching at a driving school.”  Shippers’ Choice, 52 Va. App. at 
39, 660 S.E.2d at 697.  Applying this construction of the 
statutory definition, the Court of Appeals held “as a matter of 
law that Garrison was not an ‘instructor’ . . . because he was 
not compensated for his instruction of the class.”  Id.  The 
Court of Appeals concluded that Shippers’ Choice did not violate 
the relevant statutes or DMV regulations when it allowed 
Garrison to teach the class observed by the DMV agents in 
December, 2005.   Id. at 39-40, 660 S.E.2d at 697. 
In construing Code § 46.2-1700 we are guided by well 
established principles.  “When the language of a statute is 
clear and unambiguous, we are bound by the plain meaning of that 
language.”  Industrial Dev. Auth. v. Board of Supervisors, 263 
Va. 349, 353, 559 S.E.2d 621, 623 (2002).  Furthermore, 
statutory construction is a question of law which we review de 
novo.  Parker v. Warren, 273 Va. 20, 23, 639 S.E.2d 179, 181 
(2007). 
Application of basic principles of English grammar 
demonstrates that the statutory definition of “instructor” 
recited above contains two clauses, both of which modify or 
refer to “any person.”  One clause describes the activities in 
 
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which a person must engage to come within the definition of 
“instructor” - conducting classes, giving demonstrations, or 
supervising persons learning to operate or drive a motor 
vehicle.  The other clause describes the status a person must 
occupy to come within the definition - acting for himself as the 
operator of a driver training school or acting for such school 
for compensation.  These two clauses establish independent 
prerequisites, both of which must be met to come within the 
definition of “instructor.” 
By defining an “instructor” as a person who is compensated 
for instructional activities, the Court of Appeals conflated the 
status prerequisite relating to compensation with the activity 
prerequisite and therefore effectively rewrote the statutory 
definition of “instructor.”  See Parker, 273 Va. at 24, 639 
S.E.2d at 181. 
Accordingly, we reject the Court of Appeals’ construction 
and hold that a person qualifies as an “instructor” under Code 
§ 46.2-1700 if that person is teaching, conducting classes, 
giving demonstrations, or supervising persons learning to 
operate or drive a motor vehicle and is acting on behalf of a 
driver training school for compensation, regardless of the basis 
for the compensation received.  This construction of the 
definition is consistent with a legislative intent that 
employees of a driver training school may engage in 
 
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instructional activities at the school only if they are licensed 
as instructors pursuant to Code § 46.2-1701. 
The record in this case established that Garrison was 
acting for Shippers’ Choice and was compensated by Shippers’ 
Choice.  The record also establishes that Garrison was engaged 
in instructional activities identified in Code § 46.2-1700 but 
was not licensed as an instructor under Code § 46.2-1701.  
Because Garrison was not licensed as an instructor, Shippers’ 
Choice violated former 24 VAC § 20-120-180(A)(10) of the 
Virginia Administrative Code by allowing Garrison to teach a 
class in December of 2005.  Accordingly, we will reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals and enter a final judgment 
reinstating the judgment of the circuit court sustaining the 
decision of the Commissioner. 
Reversed and final judgment. 
 
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