Title: Board of Sup. of Culpeper v. Greengael, L.L.C.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 050461
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: March 3, 2006

Present:  All the Justices 
 
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF CULPEPER COUNTY 
 
v.  Record No. 050461     OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
March 3, 20061
GREENGAEL, L.L.C., ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CULPEPER COUNTY 
J. Howe Brown, Jr., Judge Designate 
 
 
This case involves a decision of the Board of Supervisors 
of Culpeper County denying approval of a preliminary 
subdivision plat and its subsequent decision to rezone that 
property from residential to light industrial use. 
FACTS
In 1999, Ashmeade Company, L.L.C., purchased a parcel of 
approximately 96 acres (the Property) in Culpeper County (the 
County).  The Property was zoned R-4, allowing high-density, 
multi-family residential use.  In 2000, the Culpeper County 
Board of Supervisors (the Board) amended its Comprehensive 
Plan, re-designating the Property as "future industrial."  It 
did not rezone the Property at that time. 
Greengael, L.L.C., (Greengael) became the contract 
purchaser of the Property on August 1, 2002.2  Greengael 
                     
1 This opinion was revised on May 26, 2006. 
2 Ashmeade Company, L.L.C., originally executed a contract 
for sale of the Property with DESYD, L.L.C., on March 5, 2002.  
Douglas Darling, Principal of DESYD, signed the contract.  
Darling formed Greengael, L.L.C., in June 2002, and DESYD 
assigned its March 5, 2002 contract to Greengael.  Darling, as 
a member of Greengael, represented Greengael throughout the 
planned to build a mixed-residential development (the 
Development).  Sections 5C-2-1.1 and 5C-2-1.3 of the County's 
zoning ordinance required that all dwellings in the R-4 zone 
receive "serv[ice from] an approved public water and sewer 
system of adequate capacity . . . operated by a municipality 
or public service corporation duly authorized by the 
Commonwealth of Virginia."  The County's subdivision ordinance 
required the developer to file a preliminary subdivision plan.  
Sections 425.3.1 and 425.4.1 of the subdivision ordinance 
required that the developer include as part of the subdivision 
plan "a letter from the agency, authority, or utility which 
states that it can adequately serve the subdivision" with 
water and sewage facilities, respectively (hereinafter "the 
utility letter"). 
Greengael first approached the County seeking water and 
sewer service for the Development.  In a May 3, 2002 letter to 
the Culpeper County Administrator, Frank Bossio, Greengael 
requested 1,100 water and sewer taps for use "in a mixed 
office/commercial/apartment project."  The Culpeper County 
Planning Director, John C. Egertson, replied to Greengael by 
letter on May 21, 2002, stating that the Development was not 
                                                                
negotiations with the Town and County and the legal 
proceedings.  In this opinion, "Greengael" refers to the 
collective actions of Greengael, L.L.C., and of Douglas 
Darling. 
 
2
"in a position to be served" by the County "at this time."  
Egertson further explained that a Memorandum of Understanding 
between the County and the Town of Culpeper (the Town) was in 
place outlining the potential purchase of water and sewer 
service capacity by the County from the Town, but that a 
formal agreement had not been drafted.  Egertson explained 
that "it would be premature" for him "to speculate" regarding 
whether the Development could receive service.  Egertson 
acknowledged that water and sewer service would be feasible in 
the area but "there are many issues to be resolved," notably 
"[c]apacity will be an issue as will the proposed land use 
which conflicts with the Culpeper County Comprehensive Plan." 
Greengael then went to the Town to secure water and sewer 
service for the Development.  By letter dated September 9, 
2002, the Town Engineer and Planning Director, Charles 
Stephenson, rejected Greengael's first application because it 
was incomplete.  In that letter, Stephenson suggested that 
Greengael "may want to research the area with the County to 
determine whether it is envisioned to be served by Town or 
County utilities and whether the potential development will 
likely be approved."  Greengael submitted a second application 
to the Town on September 18, 2002, along with a letter stating 
that it did "not believe that any notification of the County 
 
3
authorities is necessary" and that it would not contact the 
County. 
In its application to the Town, Greengael stated that the 
Development would use approximately 100,000 gallons of water 
per day and generate the same amount of waste, that it would 
use "the current pump station behind the Teves property," and 
that no change or modification to the facility was 
anticipated.  Greengael also stated it would "undertake . . . 
any necessary modification to public facilities on a pro-rata 
basis."  The application stated that no zoning change would be 
necessary for the Development, but did not address the 
Development's relationship to the County's Comprehensive Plan 
as requested in the application form. 
The Town's Technical Review Committee compiled comments 
on the application from various staff members and departments.  
Comments by these departments expressed concerns that until 
the "new McDevitt relief sewer is constructed," the additional 
wastewater produced by the Development could not be served 
through the Teves pump station, and that "[c]ritical data 
. . . includ[ing] technical and public facilities systems 
data, land use implications, and conformance with the Town 
Comprehensive Plan and the County Comprehensive Plan" were not 
provided.  The comments indicated further that, from a 
planning perspective, the staff had "serious land use 
 
4
concerns" about providing the service to the Development as an 
area "not identified on the [Town's] potential water/sewer 
expansion map," and that service to the Development would 
require " 'leap-frogging' " because the Property did not front 
on "Lover's Lane," a road located just outside of and running 
parallel to the Town's corporate boundary. 
The Town's Public Works Committee reviewed the 
application and staff comments and submitted a report to the 
Town Council.  The report included as appendices Greengael's 
application, the staff comments, and a description of the 
Development.  The report recommended that "Council authorize 
the Town Manager to request approval . . . from the County for 
the extension of public water and sewer service to [the 
Development]."  The report further stated that if "conditional 
approval is granted," Greengael should have to comply with 
certain conditions including commissioning analyses of both 
the water and wastewater systems "with the additional load" 
that the Development would impose, submitting the analyses to 
the Town for review, and obtaining approval of a site plan 
from the County.  Greengael received a copy of the report 
along with notification of the date of the Town Council's 
hearing on its request.  The Town Council considered the 
matter on November 12, 2002 and voted unanimously to deny the 
application. 
 
5
On January 30, 2003, Greengael submitted to the County an 
application for approval of a 12-lot preliminary subdivision 
plat.  The staff of the County Planning Commission reviewed 
Greengael's subdivision request and issued a report addressing 
deficiencies in the application, including the omission of a 
Virginia Department of Transportation study, a storm water 
study, and the required utility letter.  On March 12, 2003, 
the County Planning Commission held a public meeting during 
which Egertson presented the report.  At the meeting 
Greengael's principal, Douglas Darling, who had not previously 
seen the staff report, admitted that he was "sure the comments 
have great merit, . . . but we haven't addressed them quite 
frankly yet."  The Planning Commission recommended that the 
Board deny the application based on Greengael's failure to 
comply with the provisions of the ordinance as identified in 
the report. 
The Board was originally scheduled to review the Planning 
Commission's recommendation on April 1, 2003; however, 
Greengael requested and received two deferrals so that it 
could address the deficiencies mentioned in the report.  The 
hearing was ultimately set for June 3, 2003. 
Prior to the Board's meeting on the application, Egertson 
"wanted to update the information for the Board [regarding the 
Town's denial of Greengael's request for utility service] to 
 
6
make sure that the reasons for their denial were still 
current."  On June 2, 2003, Egertson wrote a letter to J. 
Brannon Godfrey, the Town Manager, asking for confirmation 
that the Town Council had denied a staff-recommended, 
conditional approval of Greengael's application and asking 
whether Greengael had addressed the staff's conditions for 
approval, notably performing impact analyses of the proposed 
Development upon the Town's water and sewer systems and 
offering a plan to fund all or part of any necessary 
improvements to the infrastructure.  Godfrey responded that 
same day, stating that "conditions . . . remain unchanged." 
At its June 3 meeting, the Board reviewed the Planning 
Commission's report and the letters Egertson and Godfrey 
exchanged.  The Board unanimously denied Greengael's 
application.  At that same meeting, the Board entered into a 
Water and Sewer Agreement (formal agreement) with the Town 
which rescinded the Memorandum of Understanding and required 
the Town to sell to the County available excess water and 
sewer capacity, "in amounts to be determined solely at the 
discretion of the County," so that the County could extend 
such services to commercial and industrial users in the 
County. 
On July 1, 2003, the Board passed a resolution directing 
the Planning Commission to make recommendations with regard to 
 
7
rezoning the Property from R-4 to LI, "Light Industrial."  
According to the resolution, the LI zoning designation was 
"more consistent" with the surrounding parcels.  The Planning 
Commission voted to recommend the rezoning on September 10, 
2003, and the Board approved the rezoning on October 7, 2003. 
PROCEEDINGS 
On July 2, 2003, Greengael and Ashmeade Company, L.L.C., 
(collectively "Greengael") filed an appeal and bill of 
complaint appealing the Board's decision denying approval of 
the subdivision application pursuant to Code § 15.2-2260(E) 
and seeking a declaratory judgment, monetary damages, and 
injunctive relief against the Board and its members in their 
individual and official capacities, the Culpeper County Water 
and Sewer Authority and its members in their individual and 
official capacities, the Planning Commission and Egertson in 
his individual and official capacity as Planning Director, and 
the Town Council.  Each defendant filed a demurrer and plea of 
sovereign immunity.  The Board demurred to all counts except 
Count I, Greengael's appeal of the denial of the subdivision 
application, asserting that all claims for monetary damages 
should be dismissed because Greengael failed to submit them 
first to the local governing body in accordance with Code 
§ 15.2-1248, because Greengael did not allege that it lost 
either all economic use of or any specific appurtenant right 
 
8
in the Property as a result of the Board's denial of the 
preliminary subdivision plat, and because a party appealing 
under Code § 15.2-2260(E) is not entitled to damages.  
Following a hearing on September 4, 2003, the trial court 
sustained the defendants' demurrers and pleas for the reasons 
stated in those pleadings.  The trial court also dismissed all 
defendants except the Board. 
On October 8, 2003, Greengael filed its second bill of 
complaint seeking reversal of the Board's rezoning action, 
asserting that the Board's action violated the procedural and 
notice requirements for rezoning.  Code §§ 15.2-2204, -285. 
The trial court consolidated Greengael's appeal in the 
subdivision case with its appeal of the rezoning case.  
Following a bench trial, the trial court issued a letter 
opinion in which it concluded that the preliminary subdivision 
plat "should have been approved" and the rezoning should be 
invalidated, not because the rezoning was unreasonable or a 
piecemeal downzoning, but because Greengael had vested rights 
to develop the property under R-4 zoning.  The trial court 
stated: 
The evidence shows that the developer tried 
diligently to obtain the letters, first from the 
County, then from the Town, then again from the 
County.  Darling was caught in a bureaucratic 
nightmare in which he was told by the County to go 
to the Town, told by the Town to go to the County, 
told by the County that he could not obtain 
 
9
approval because the Town turned him down, and all 
the while told by the County that he was wasting 
his time because the County wanted industrial and 
not residential development on the site. . . .  The 
County knew when the plan was disapproved that 
there was in the planning stage improvements to the 
water and sewer facilities which would in the 
foreseeable future provide adequate service to the 
entire Ashmeade project.  If Ashmeade had been an 
industrial project the County itself could have 
supplied the water and sewer under an agreement 
between the Town and County, ironically signed the 
same day as the Board rejected Ashmeade's 
subdivision, June 3, 2003. . . .  An example of how 
cooperation between the County and the Town results 
in water and sewer service to projects the County 
wants to approve may be found in Plaintiff's 
Exhibit #95. . . .  A fair reading of the minutes 
of the Town Council meeting . . . demonstrates that 
the Town was willing to make water and sewer 
available provided the County approved, and 
provided the developer did studies to help 
determine exactly what improvements were necessary.  
The Town's real objective was to coordinate with 
the County.  The County used the Town's action as a 
shield to avoid approving the plan, knowing that 
water and sewer soon would be available. 
 
On December 10, 2004, the trial court entered a final order 
approving the subdivision plat, requiring the County to "work 
with" Greengael to secure water and sewer from the Town, and 
invalidating the rezoning to LI use. 
The Board appealed from the trial court's rulings 
approving the preliminary subdivision plat and striking the 
rezoning of the Property.  Greengael assigned cross-error to 
the trial court's finding that the rezoning was not piecemeal 
downzoning and its dismissal of "all damage and other counts 
 
10
(except one) of the Bill of Complaint in the Subdivision Case 
without a hearing on the merits and without leave to amend." 
DISCUSSION
I.  Board's Appeal 
 
A.  Approval of Subdivision Plat 
We begin with the Board's contention that the trial court 
erred in reversing the decision of the Board and approving the 
preliminary subdivision plat. 
When a local governing body's decision regarding an 
application for approval of a preliminary subdivision plat is 
appealed, a trial court must sustain the decision unless the 
local governing body failed to comply with the applicable 
subdivision ordinances or acted arbitrarily and capriciously 
in denying the application.  Code § 15.2-2260(E); Hanover 
County v. Bertozzi, 256 Va. 350, 355, 504 S.E.2d 618, 620 
(1998).  On appellate review, the trial court's judgment is 
presumed correct and will not be set aside unless the judgment 
is plainly wrong or unsupported by the evidence.  Ravenwood 
Towers, Inc. v. Woodyard, 244 Va. 51, 57, 419 S.E.2d 627, 630 
(1992). 
The Board claims that the trial court did not make an 
explicit finding that the Board either failed to comply with 
the applicable subdivision ordinances or acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously.  Regardless, the Board asserts that it rejected 
 
11
Greengael's preliminary subdivision plat based on the 
undisputed fact that Greengael failed to comply with the 
requirement of the subdivision ordinance regarding submission 
of the utility letter.  Therefore, the Board contends that its 
action was in accordance with the subdivision ordinance, was 
not arbitrary and capricious, and should have been sustained 
by the trial court. 
 
Greengael claims that the trial court's discussion in its 
letter opinion of the actions of the Board and County 
officials constituted a finding of arbitrary and capricious 
behavior sufficient to justify reversal of the Board's 
decision.  The premise of Greengael's argument and the trial 
court's decision is that although Greengael "diligently" tried 
to obtain the utility letter from both the County and the 
Town, the Board and County officials manipulated the 
subdivision process to prevent Greengael from obtaining the 
utility letter and to avoid approving the subdivision plat for 
residential use.  Greengael supports this conclusion by citing 
the trial court's recitation that the Board knew that ongoing 
improvements to the infrastructure surrounding the property 
would make adequate water and sewer services available in the 
"foreseeable future," the Board wanted to service industrial 
and commercial users with water and sewer as evidenced by its 
formal agreement with the Town executed the same day as the 
 
12
denial of Greengael's subdivision application, and finally the 
Board used the Town's denial of Greengael's application as a 
"shield" for the Board's own denial, when a fair reading of 
the Town Council's meeting minutes indicated the Town only 
denied the application because it wanted to cooperate with the 
Board to bring service to the Development. 
Although we accord the trial court's findings of fact a 
presumption of correctness, Sansom v. Board of Supervisors, 
257 Va. 589, 595, 514 S.E.2d 345, 349 (1999), we conclude that 
the record in this case does not support the trial court's 
conclusion that the Board manipulated or "used" the Town's 
actions as a "shield" to avoid approving the application, nor 
does it support the conclusion that the Board otherwise acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously in denying the application. 
Greengael argues, and the trial court's letter opinion 
implies, that County officials were involved in Greengael's 
failure to secure the utility letter.  The record does not 
support this proposition.  The County denied Greengael's 
initial request for water and sewer service because of the 
undisputed fact that the County operated no such service 
beyond that to its airport and because it had no formal 
agreement with the Town to resell such service to County 
customers.  Though the Town, which Greengael next approached 
to request service, did operate water and sewer facilities, it 
 
13
was not required to provide service to customers in the County 
located outside Town boundaries.  Provision of such utility 
services is a proprietary decision, exercised at the 
discretion of a town.  Town of Rocky Mount v. Wenco of 
Danville, Inc., 256 Va. 316, 320, 506 S.E.2d 17, 20 (1998). 
As the trial court observed, the minutes of the Town 
Council's meeting regarding Greengael's application to the 
Town include a discussion as to whether, under the Memorandum 
of Understanding then in place between the County and the 
Town,3 Greengael's request for water and sewer service should 
first be presented to the County to determine whether the 
County wanted to provide the service; however, nothing in the 
minutes indicates that the County influenced this discussion 
or the vote of the Town rejecting the request.4  Accordingly, 
the record, while showing that the Town wanted to cooperate 
with the County, illustrated that such cooperation was related 
                     
3 The Memorandum of Understanding addressed the ability of 
the County to provide water and sewer service directly to 
customers through a proposed capacity purchase from the Town.  
It did not address County approval of utility service the Town 
proposed to provide to County customers. 
4 The Board assigned error to the admission of the minutes 
of the Town Council arguing that the action of the Council was 
legislative and the opinions expressed in the minutes were 
irrelevant.  As stated, the action of the Council was a 
discretionary, proprietary act and the trial court did not err 
in admitting the minutes into evidence.  See Wenco, 256 Va. at 
319, 506 S.E.2d at 19. 
 
14
to process, not to rejection of the request for water and 
sewer service. 
Regardless of the Town's reasons for rejecting 
Greengael's request, nothing in the record supports the 
conclusion that the County "manipulated" this process.  The 
record shows that from the time of Egertson's letter until the 
Town's denial of Greengael's request for water and sewer 
services, there was no communication between Town and County 
officials or any of their respective agents.5  Thus, there is 
no support for the trial court's finding that members of the 
Board or County officials influenced the Town's decision to 
reject Greengael's application for water and sewer services. 
Greengael cites several other circumstances referenced in 
the trial court's letter opinion to support the trial court's 
decision.  First, the County denied Greengael's application 
with knowledge that the upgrades to the Town's utility 
services were "in the planning stage" and would "in the 
foreseeable future" provide adequate service to the 
development.  The trial court further commented that based on 
the formal agreement between the County and Town signed 
"ironically" the same day the County rejected Greengael's 
application, the County could have provided the service itself 
                     
5 Egertson testified he learned of the Town's decision 
from a newspaper article. 
 
15
if the Development was an industrial project.  Neither of 
these circumstances supports a conclusion that the County 
acted in a capricious or arbitrary manner. 
The subdivision ordinance does not require that utility 
facilities be in place at the time an application for 
preliminary subdivision approval is presented.  It only 
requires that an applicant produce evidence of an agreement to 
provide such services.  Neither the County's knowledge of 
planned upgrades in Town water and sewer facilities nor the 
execution or substance of the formal agreement provides an 
adequate basis for establishing the required assurance that 
the Town or County could or would provide water and sewer 
services to the Development. 
The record is clear that at the time of Greengael's 
application, the Town had insufficient wastewater treatment 
and pumping capacity to serve the Development and would need 
to undertake significant line extensions, such as the 
completion of the "new McDevitt relief sewer."  Even though 
certain system upgrades to enhance capacity were in the 
"planning stage," as the trial court noted, the record is also 
clear that such system upgrades had not occurred even at the 
time of trial. 
The formal agreement between the County and Town allowed, 
but did not obligate, the County to purchase capacity from the 
 
16
Town, even for industrial customers.  Finally, Greengael's 
application was originally scheduled for consideration on 
April 1, 2003.  Execution of the formal agreement on the same 
day the Board rejected Greengael's application, June 3, 2003, 
was a function of the two deferrals Greengael requested and 
received for consideration of its application, not a function 
of nefarious action by the Board. 
Greengael also cites as support for the trial court's 
decision, the trial court's statements that County officials 
told Greengael that it was "wasting its time" in seeking to 
develop the Property as residential "because the County wanted 
industrial and not residential development on the site."6  
Regardless of any statements made by individual county 
officials, the County had determined in 2000 that commercial 
and industrial development of the Property was more desirable 
for the County and amended its Comprehensive Plan accordingly.  
After the adoption of the Plan, the planned commercial and 
industrial development in the area was public knowledge to all 
                     
6 Supervisor John Coates stated that because of the 
comprehensive plan and the industrial and commercial character 
of developments adjacent to the Property, the Property "to me, 
presented itself to be industrial property."  However, he 
testified that he voted against the subdivision application 
"because water and sewer was not available."  Supervisor 
William C. Chase stated he believed the "die was cast" for 
industrial or commercial development in the area, but he 
claimed he did not vote to deny Greengael's application on 
that basis. 
 
17
investors who purchased property, including Greengael.  This 
preference by the County is not arbitrary or capricious. 
Finally, the trial court discussed as part of its 
rationale examples of "cooperation" between the County, Town, 
and other developers that resulted in provision of water and 
sewer service for "projects that the County wants to approve."  
Greengael argues that this cooperation resulted in three-party 
agreements, which the County accepted thereby "waiving" the 
utility letter requirement.  The County's failure to "waive" 
the requirement in a similar manner for Greengael or to 
consider the requirement satisfied by its own investigation, 
according to Greengael, was arbitrary and capricious. 
Greengael's "waiver" argument is unavailing.  The Board 
cannot waive a provision of a subdivision ordinance.7  Code 
§ 15.2-2254 provides that a developer cannot subdivide land 
"without fully complying with the provisions" of the 
subdivision ordinance.  See Parker v. County of Madison, 244 
Va. 39, 42, 418 S.E.2d 855, 856 (1992).  Any independent 
investigation regarding the provision of water and sewer 
service undertaken by the County, regardless of the 
                     
7 Section 960 of the County Subdivision Ordinance allowed 
for variations or exceptions to general subdivision ordinance 
regulations under certain circumstances.  See Code § 15.2-
2242(1).  However, Greengael did not seek relief from the 
Board under this section. 
 
18
information acquired, cannot substitute for the written 
assurance that water and sewer would be provided.8
Furthermore, the projects to which the trial court and 
Greengael refer as examples of "cooperation," including a 
Lowes Homestore, a Ryan Homes regional office, and a Richmond 
American Homes residential development, have little in common 
with the circumstances of this case.  While the exhibits and 
testimony regarding these projects do not always make clear 
whether the developers first approached the Town or County for 
service, they do illustrate that each project conformed to the 
County's Comprehensive Plan, that the Town approved extension 
of water and sewer service based on its determination that it 
could presently or in the near future provide adequate water 
and sewer service to the proposed developments, and that the 
developers sought County approval for the Town's agreements to 
extend water and sewer service.  In contrast, Greengael's 
project did not conform to the Comprehensive Plan, Greengael 
did not receive Town approval of its request for extension of 
water and sewer service, and Greengael categorically refused 
to include the County as a party to its negotiations with the 
Town.9  The trial court's discussion of cooperation therefore 
                     
8 Egertson testified that written approval was always 
required under the subdivision ordinance. 
9 Correspondence between Town Engineer Stephenson and 
Greengael's counsel illustrates that Greengael rejected 
 
19
does not support a finding of arbitrary and capricious 
behavior on the part of the Board. 
In sum, the County had no means of providing water and 
sewer service to Greengael when asked to do so; the County was 
not asked to approve or acquiesce in the Town's provision of 
such service to Greengael; the Town had no obligation to 
provide water and sewer service to Greengael; and there is no 
evidence that the County influenced the Town's decision to 
reject Greengael's application.  Because Greengael's 
application did not contain the utility letter required for 
approval of a preliminary subdivision application, the Board 
acted in compliance with the applicable subdivision ordinance 
in denying approval, and its decision was not arbitrary and 
capricious.  Accordingly, we will reverse that part of the 
trial court's judgment overturning the Board's decision and 
approving the preliminary subdivision plat. 
B.  Rezoning 
The trial court declared invalid the Board's action 
rezoning Greengael's property from an R-4 designation to an LI 
                                                                
Stephenson's suggestion of notifying the County of its request 
and "research[ing]" whether the County desired to serve the 
project.  Counsel responded that the Town was not legally 
required to obtain County approval for extensions to County 
customers and that he desired not to inform the County because 
the County sought to "use water and sewer as a land use 
control" and to prevent any development "without a commercial 
component."  
 
20
designation, stating that because Greengael "had a vested 
right to the subdivision plan under the then-current zoning, 
the Board could not take away that right by rezoning the 
property."  The Board argues that the trial court erred in 
holding that Greengael had a vested right to develop the 
proposed subdivision and that even if such right existed, it 
would not preclude the Board from rezoning the property.  The 
Board is correct. 
A local governing body is not precluded from rezoning 
property because a property owner has established vested 
rights to use the property in a manner allowed under the 
former zoning designation but prohibited under the new 
designation.  Code § 15.2-2307 provides that vested rights of 
a landowner established pursuant to that section "shall not be 
affected by a subsequent amendment to a zoning ordinance."  
Vested rights only protect a landowner's right to develop a 
specific project under existing zoning conditions and allow 
continuation of the non-conforming use when that zoning 
designation is amended or changed. 
The trial court also erred in holding that Greengael had 
a vested right to develop the Property as described in the 
subdivision plan.  A landowner has a vested right in a 
specific use of property if it "(i) obtains or is the 
beneficiary of a significant affirmative governmental act 
 
21
which remains in effect allowing development of a specific 
project, (ii) relies in good faith on the significant 
affirmative governmental act, and (iii) incurs extensive 
obligations or substantial expenses in diligent pursuit of the 
specific project in reliance on the significant affirmative 
governmental act."  Code § 15.2-2307.  The "significant 
affirmative governmental act" relied upon by the trial court 
in this case was its own order approving the subdivision plat.  
Without deciding whether such an order could qualify as a 
significant affirmative governmental act under Code § 15.2-
2307, the claim of a vested right based on that order fails in 
this case because of our holding reversing such order. 
Greengael claims as an alternate argument that the R-4 
zoning designation qualified as a significant affirmative 
governmental act for purposes of establishing vested rights 
under City of Suffolk v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 266 Va. 137, 
580 S.E.2d 796 (2003).  We reject this argument.  In City of 
Suffolk, the developer and an adjacent property owner 
requested and received in 1988 a rezoning of their properties 
from "Rural Residential" to "Planned Development Housing" for 
the purpose of constructing a mixed commercial and residential 
development.  Id. at 141, 580 S.E.2d at 797.  Proceeding 
without the neighbor, the developer then received approval for 
a Master Land Use Plan and submitted to the City, among other 
 
22
things, a preliminary recreation plan, preliminary site plan, 
and a traffic study, before the City rezoned the property for 
commercial or office park use.  Id. at 141-42, 580 S.E.2d at 
797-98.  We held that under Code § 15.2-2307, which lists as a 
specific governmental act approval by a governing body of "an 
application for rezoning for a specific use or density," the 
developer had established vested rights because it obtained 
the rezoning for "an identifiable property and project."  Id. 
at 146, 580 S.E.2d at 800. 
In contrast, the facts of this case contain none of the 
elements that qualified the 1988 rezoning in City of Suffolk 
as a significant affirmative governmental act.  The R-4 zoning 
designation was a general rezoning, was not enacted at 
Greengael's request, and was not directed specifically to 
Greengael's project. 
For these reasons we will reverse that part of the trial 
court's judgment that Greengael had a vested interest in the 
subdivision plan and that the rezoning of the property to an 
LI designation was invalid.10
II.  Cross-Error 
 
Greengael raises two assignments of cross-error:  (1) The 
trial court erred in holding that the rezoning of the property 
                     
10 In the light of these rulings, we need not reach the 
Board's remaining assignment of error. 
 
23
from R-4 to LI was valid and did not constitute illegal 
piecemeal downzoning; and (2) The trial court erred in 
granting the defendants' demurrers and pleas and dismissing 
Counts II through VI of its Appeal and Bill of Complaint 
without leave to amend and without a hearing on the merits.  
We consider these in order. 
A.  Piecemeal Downzoning 
Greengael assigns cross-error to the trial court's 
finding that the Board's rezoning of its Property was 
reasonable and not piecemeal downzoning. 
When a court reviews the legitimacy of a zoning 
amendment, it presumes the action is "valid so long as it is 
not unreasonable and arbitrary."  Board of Supervisors of 
Fairfax County v. Snell Construction Corp., 214 Va. 655, 658, 
202 S.E.2d 889, 892 (1974) (quoting Board of Supervisors v. 
Carper, 200 Va. 653, 660, 107 S.E.2d 390, 395 (1959)).  The 
opponent of the action bears the burden of proving that the 
action is "clearly unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and 
that it bears no reasonable or substantial relation to the 
public health, safety, morals, or general welfare."  Id., 202 
S.E.2d   at 892-83.  The court will uphold the ordinance if 
its reasonableness is "fairly debatable."  Id., 202 S.E.2d 
893.  
 
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A court conducts a more expansive review, however, when a 
rezoning is a piecemeal downzoning, which is defined as a 
rezoning (1) that the local governing body initiates on its 
own motion, (2) that selectively addresses the landowner's 
single parcel, and (3) that "reduces the permissible 
residential density below that recommended by a duly-adopted 
master plan."  Id. at 658, 202 S.E.2d at 893.  An aggrieved 
landowner can make a prima facie case that the rezoning is 
piecemeal downzoning upon a showing that "since the enactment 
of the prior ordinance there has been no change in 
circumstances substantially affecting the public health, 
safety, or welfare."  Id. at 659, 202 S.E.2d at 893.  At that 
point, the burden shifts to the governing body to offer 
evidence of mistake, fraud, or changed circumstances 
"sufficient to make reasonableness fairly debatable."  Id.
We must first examine whether Greengael established a 
prima facie case for a piecemeal downzoning.  Greengael 
sufficiently pleads two of the elements of a piecemeal 
downzoning discussed in Snell:  the Board initiated the zoning 
amendment on its own motion, and it selectively directed that 
amendment to Greengael's Property.  However, the trial court 
held, and we agree, that Greengael has not established that 
the rezoning reduced the density of development below that 
recommended by the Comprehensive Plan.  Id.
 
25
Greengael argues that the rezoning was a piecemeal 
downzoning because it was "against [Greengael's] will" and 
violative of what Snell referred to as a landowner's 
" 'legitimate profit prospects.' "  Id.  According to 
Greengael, its profit prospects are especially important 
because this rezoning makes a drastic shift from residential 
to industrial, rather than simply a change in intensity of 
land use within the same zoning classification, such as the 
higher intensity to lower intensity residential change 
featured in Snell.  Greengael claims that the Property was far 
more valuable when zoned R-4 and discusses the "glut[] of 
vacant industrial land [in Culpeper County] with no 
foreseeable prospects for users." 
Greengael's arguments are not availing.  We agree with 
the trial court that the use of the land, rather than the 
profit expectation, is determinative of whether a rezoning is 
a downzoning.  See, e.g., Turner v. Board of County 
Supervisors, 263 Va. 283, 289, 559 S.E.2d 683, 686 (2002) 
(finding a piecemeal downzoning partly based on reduction of 
residential density below that recommended by County's master 
plan); Code § 15.2-2286(A)(11) (defining downzoning in context 
of agreements between localities and landowners to mean a 
zoning action resulting "in a reduction in a formerly 
permitted land use intensity or density").  Further, we agree 
 
26
with the Board's argument that adopting Greengael's definition 
of downzoning would require governing bodies desiring to enact 
zoning amendments to undertake speculative and costly analyses 
of the future profit potential of the affected properties 
under multiple development scenarios. 
Applying the intensity of use analysis, we find the 
rezoning was not a downzoning because the LI designation 
allows more intense coverage of land than the R-4 designation, 
50% versus 35% respectively, and more expansive uses than R-4, 
including manufacturing, dry cleaning, fabricating metal 
products, printing and publishing, broadcasting, and disposing 
of waste.  We also conclude that in rezoning the Property, the 
Board acted reasonably.  As the trial court ruled, the 
amendment "brought the property into conformance with the 
comprehensive plan," which first designated the property as 
"future industrial" in 2000, and the Board followed proper 
procedure by first passing a resolution, then considering the 
Planning Commission's recommendation, and finally holding a 
public meeting after providing proper notice.  Thus, we reject 
Greengael's assignment of cross-error. 
B.  Dismissal of Counts II through VI 
Greengael asserts that the trial court erred in 
sustaining the defendants' demurrers and pleas to Counts II 
 
27
through VI.11  Greengael divides the dismissed counts into two 
categories:  (1) allegations that certain portions of the 
Culpeper County Subdivision Ordinance were invalid; and (2) 
allegations that Greengael was entitled to damages for harm it 
suffered because the County, Board, and Egertson violated 
principles of due process and equal protection and engaged in 
willful misconduct. 
With regard to the validity of the subdivision ordinance, 
Greengael pled that Sections 425.3.1 and 425.4.1 of the 
ordinance were invalid because they 
fail to provide 'reasonable' provisions in that, as 
applied, they do not permit any installed water and 
sanitary sewer facilities for residential 
subdivision that the County arbitrarily and 
capriciously chooses not to approve. 
 
Greengael argues the provisions were invalid as applied to it 
because the Board arbitrarily and capriciously chose not to 
                     
11 The dismissed Counts asserted claims that provisions of 
the Culpeper zoning ordinance violated the Dillon Rule and the 
due process and equal protection provisions of the Virginia 
and United States Constitutions, (Count II), that in denying 
the subdivision plat application, the County, Board, and 
Egertson committed an unlawful taking of Greengael's property 
in violation of the equal protection and due process clauses 
of the Virginia and United States Constitutions, (Count III), 
that the County, Board, and Egertson unlawfully withheld 
utility service as a mechanism for land use control 
constituting an illegal moratorium on development, (Count IV), 
that Egertson committed fraud and acted ultra vires, (Count 
V), and that the members of the Board and Egertson were liable 
in their official and individual capacities to Greengael for 
damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (Count VI). 
 
 
28
approve water and sewer facilities.  First, we note that 
nothing in the cited ordinance provisions involves County 
approval of water and sewer facilities in conjunction with its 
approval of a preliminary subdivision plat.  More importantly, 
Greengael's arguments fail because, as we have concluded, the 
Board's denial of the preliminary subdivision plat application 
based on Greengael's failure to comply with these provisions 
was not arbitrary or capricious.12
The second set of allegations Greengael contends the 
trial court improperly dismissed were the alleged actions of 
the County, Board, and Egertson that manipulated the 
subdivision process and constituted fraud and violations of 
due process and equal protection.  According to Greengael, in 
finding that "the County and certain of its officials acted in 
an arbitrary and capricious manner," the trial court "found, 
in sum, that County conduct constituted willful misconduct."  
As we have held, however, the denial of the preliminary 
subdivision plat was not arbitrary and capricious and, as 
Greengael conceded at oral argument, claims based on that 
conduct are moot. 
                     
12 We do not consider whether the ordinance provisions are 
facially invalid, an argument Greengael raised in its brief 
filed in this Court in support of the trial court's order 
approving the preliminary subdivision plat.  Greengael did not 
assert this argument in its pleadings, memoranda, or argument 
of counsel in the trial court.  Rule 5:25. 
 
29
Finally, we address Greengael's allegation in its 
pleading that the denial of the preliminary subdivision plat 
based on its failure to comply with the requirement of a 
utility letter was an unconstitutional taking in violation of 
its rights under the Virginia and United States Constitutions.  
To establish an unconstitutional taking, a landowner must 
suffer either a categorical taking or a regulatory taking.  A 
categorical taking is a deprivation of all economic use of 
property.  A regulatory taking "places limitations on land 
that fall short of eliminating all economically beneficial use 
[but render an] economic effect on the landowner [and] 
interfere[] with reasonable investment-backed expectations," 
among other harms.  Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 
617 (2001) (citing Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 
438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)). 
Greengael does not assert a categorical taking because it 
has not been denied all economic use of its property.  It does 
claim that the Board's action resulted in a regulatory taking. 
In evaluating allegations of regulatory takings, a court 
uses the principles originally set out in Penn Central.  Id. 
at 630.  Though there is no "set formula" for such 
evaluations, the United States Supreme Court has identified 
three "significan[t]" factors:  "The economic impact of the 
regulation on the claimant, . . . the extent to which the 
 
30
regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed 
expectations, . . . and the character of the governmental 
action."  Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. 
Though the regulations Greengael challenges were in 
effect when it acquired the property, this fact does not per 
se preclude Greengael from raising a regulatory taking claim.  
Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 627 (allowing challenge to preexisting 
regulation when landowner "assert[s] that a particular 
exercise of the State's regulatory power is so unreasonable or 
onerous as to compel compensation").13  However, in applying 
the relevant principles, we conclude that Greengael's 
challenge here has no merit. 
The R-4 zoning ordinance requires that residential 
dwellings be served by an approved public water and sewer 
system of adequate capacity, operated by a municipality or 
public service corporation.  The subdivision ordinance 
requires that written evidence of an agreement to provide such 
service accompany the request for preliminary subdivision 
approval.  No credible argument can be made that these 
regulations place unreasonable restrictions on the use of land 
                     
13 To the extent our decision in Board of Supervisors v. 
Omni Homes, 253 Va. 59, 68-69, 481 S.E.2d 460, 464-65 (1997), 
precludes landowners from prevailing on a regulatory taking 
claim if they acquired their property subject to the ordinance 
they subsequently challenge as a taking, Palazzolo has 
overruled that per se preclusion. 
 
31
for residential purposes.  Indeed, in seeking to develop land 
for residential purposes, one expects that provision of water 
and sewer service will be necessary.  Reasonable investment-
backed expectations for property that does not include such 
service then necessarily would include an understanding that 
such service must be acquired or otherwise made available and 
that risk accompanies the acquisition of that service.  As the 
trial court stated, Greengael "assumed the risk that there 
might not be sewer and water available" when it purchased the 
Property.14
SUMMARY 
For the reasons stated, we will affirm the trial court's 
judgment sustaining the defendants' demurrers to Counts II 
through VI and dismissing all defendants but the Board of 
Supervisors and reverse the trial court's judgment approving 
the preliminary subdivision plat and invalidating the LI 
zoning ordinance. 
Affirmed in part,
reversed in part, 
and final judgment. 
                     
14 We repeat our previous holding that the denial of the 
preliminary subdivision plat based on the absence of a utility 
letter was not arbitrary and capricious, and to the extent 
Greengael's taking argument is based on the ordinance as 
applied to Greengael, that argument is rejected. 
 
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