Title: State of New Jersey v. Ronald Sexton
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-23-98
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: July 15, 1999

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). O'HERN, J., writing for a unanimous Court. In this appeal, the Court considers whether a mistake of fact was a defense to a charge of reckless manslaughter. Defendant, Ronald Sexton, was charged with and indicted for purposeful or knowing murder, possession of a handgun without a permit, and possession of a handgun for an unlawful purpose. He and decedent, Matthews, had been engaged in what was described by a witness as a typical argument, when Sexton pointed a gun at Matthews that Matthews had earlier handed him to examine. The gun belonged to Matthews's grandmother. When Sexton pointed the gun at Matthews, Matthews commented that the gun was not loaded. Sexton said to Matthews, you think there are no bullets in this gun? Matthews replied, yeah, and the witness heard the gun fire. A single bullet killed Matthews. Sexton's version of the encounter was that the gun simply went off while he was examining it. Matthews, he said, had assured him that it was not loaded. Sexton, who had never before owned or shot a gun, never unloaded the gun or checked to see if there were any bullets in it. At trial, at the close of the State's case, Sexton's attorney moved to dismiss the murder charge because the victim had told him that the gun was not loaded. The trial court denied the motion and charged the jury on the charges of murder and the lesser-included offenses of aggravated manslaughter and reckless manslaughter. The jury found Sexton not guilty of murder, aggravated manslaughter, or possession of a handgun for an unlawful purpose, but guilty of reckless manslaughter and unlawful possession of a handgun without a permit. The Appellate Division reversed Sexton's conviction on two grounds. First, the court found that the trial judge erroneously charged the jury on first degree murder, despite the absence of any credible evidence that Sexton intended to kill or seriously injure Matthews. The court concluded that the unwarranted charge had the potential of leading the jury to a compromise verdict on reckless manslaughter, instead of acquitting him entirely. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court should have charged the jury that the State bore the burden of disproving beyond a reasonable doubt defendant's mistake-of-fact defense, and that the failure to do so was plain error. Although the Appellate Division reversed the conviction on several other grounds, the Supreme Court granted the State's petition for certification, limited to the issue of whether mistake of fact was a defense to the charge of reckless manslaughter. HELD: A mistake of fact can be a defense to a charge of reckless manslaughter if the mistake was reasonable and it negates the culpable mental state required to establish the offense. 1. The 1979 New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice (the Code) followed the mental-state formulation of the Model Penal Code, which provides that no person should be guilty of an offense unless the person acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law may require, with respect to each material element of the offense. (pp. 7-9) 2. The Model Penal Code expressly recognizes that the mistake of an accused need not be a reasonable mistake unless the Legislature has expressly decided that the requisite culpable mental state was minimal. (pp. 9-10) 3. Under the Model Penal Code, a mistake of fact may negate criminal culpability. Whether a mistake negates a required element of the offense depends on the nature of the mistake and the state of mind that the offense required. (pp. 10-12) 4. Most states require the state to disprove, beyond a reasonable doubt, a defendant's mistake-of-fact defense. (pp. 14-15) 5. N.J.S.A. 2C:2-4a allows a defense of ignorance or mistake if the defendant reasonably arrived at the conclusion underlying the mistake and the mistake either negatives the culpable mental state required to establish the offense or the law provided that the state of mind established by such ignorance or mistake constitutes a defense. (pp. 15-16) 6. Of itself, a belief that the gun is loaded or unloaded does not negate the culpable mental state for the crime of manslaughter. (pp. 16-17) 7. The jury charge in respect of liability should be tailored to the factual circumstances of the case and should explain precisely how the offered defense plays into the element of recklessness. (pp. 19-20) 8. Evidence of an actor's mistaken belief relates to whether the State has failed to prove an essential element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. (pp. 21-22) Judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED, and the matter is REMANDED to the Law Division for further proceedings in accordance with the Court's opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, GARIBALDI, STEIN, and COLEMAN join in JUSTICE O'HERN's opinion. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 23 September Term 1998 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RONALD SEXTON, Defendant-Respondent. Argued May 4, 1999 -- Decided July 15, 1999 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 311 N.J. Super. 70 (1998). Teresa A. Blair, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant (Peter Verniero, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney). Judith L. Borman, First Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent (Ivelisse Torres, Public Defender, attorney). The opinion of the Court was delivered by O'HERN, J. Once again, we must reconcile anomalies and ambiguities that inhere in the Code of Criminal Justice . . . occasioned by the Legislature's selective inclusion and omission of provisions of its conceptual source, the Model Penal Code (MPC). Richardson v. Nickolopoulos, 110 N.J. 241, 242 (1988). The anomalies and ambiguities presented in this appeal concern the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2C:2-4, governing the so-called mistake-of-fact defense to a criminal charge. Specifically, the question is how to explain to the jury the effect of a mistake of fact on a charge of reckless conduct. The context is that of an accusation of aggravated or reckless manslaughter, after a gun went off, killing the seventeen-year-old victim, Alquadir Matthews. From the evidence, a jury could have found that the then fifteen-year-old defendant had pointed a gun at another and pulled the trigger. Defendant claims that he mistakenly believed the gun was not loaded. If, after considering all the evidence in this case, including the evidence presented by the defense as well as the evidence presented by the State, if you have a reasonable doubt in your mind as to whether the State has proven all the elements of any of these crimes: murder, aggravated manslaughter, or reckless manslaughter, you must find the defendant not guilty of those crimes. The jury found defendant not guilty of murder, aggravated manslaughter, or possession of a handgun for an unlawful purpose, but guilty of reckless manslaughter and unlawful possession of a handgun without a permit. On the charge of reckless manslaughter, the court sentenced defendant to the presumptive term of seven years, three of which were parole ineligible. For possession of a handgun without a permit, the court sentenced defendant to a concurrent four-year term with no period of parole ineligibility. The court recommended that defendant serve his sentence at the Youth Correction and Reception Center. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed defendant's conviction on multiple grounds. The court found that the trial judge erroneously charged the jury on first degree murder, despite the absence of any credible evidence that defendant intended to kill or seriously injure Matthews. The court concluded that the unwarranted charge had the potential of leading the jury to a compromise verdict on reckless manslaughter instead of acquitting him entirely. 311 N.J. Super. at 81-82 (citing State v. Christener, 71 N.J. 55 (1976)). The Appellate Division also held that the trial court should have charged the jury that the State bore the burden of disproving beyond a reasonable doubt defendant's mistake-of-fact defense, and that the failure to do so was plain error. The Appellate Division relied on Wilson v. Tard, 593 F. Supp. 1091 (D.N.J. 1984), in which Judge Stern, applying New Jersey law, reversed a conviction of aggravated manslaughter because the trial court had charged the jury that defendant carried the burden of establishing his mistake-of-fact defense by a preponderance of the evidence. The Appellate Division noted that [t]he critical holding of Wilson is that once the defendant, as here, presents evidence of a reasonable mistake of fact that would refute an essential element of the crime charged, the State's burden of proving each element beyond a reasonable doubt includes disproving the reasonable mistake of fact. 311 N.J. Super. at 83. The Appellate Division also held that, by failing to disclose material evidence that the gun was owned by Matthews's grandmother, the State had violated its obligation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963). Finally, the Appellate Division found that defendant's counsel was ineffective for failing to have requested the ownership information from the prosecutor. We granted the State's petition for certification, limited to the issue of whether mistake of fact was a defense to the charge of reckless manslaughter. __ N.J. __ (1998). See also Wayne R. LaFave &amp; Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law, 5.1a (2d ed. 1986) ( Instead of speaking of ignorance or mistake of fact . . . as a defense, it would be just as easy to note simply that the defendant cannot be convicted when it is shown that he does not have the mental state required by law for commission of that particular offense. ) The Commentary to the Hawaii Criminal Code gives an easy example of how, under the MPC, a mistake of fact may negate culpability. [I]f a person is ignorant or mistaken as to a matter of fact . . . the person's ignorance or mistake will, in appropriate circumstances, prevent the person from having the requisite culpability with respect to the fact . . . as it actually exists. For example, a person who is mistaken (either reasonably, negligently, or recklessly) as to which one of a number of similar umbrellas on a rack is the person's and who takes another's umbrella should be afforded a defense to a charge of theft predicated on either intentionally or knowingly taking the property of another. . . . A reckless mistake would afford a defense to a charge requiring intent or knowledge--but not to an offense which required only recklessness or negligence. Similarly, a negligent mistake would afford a defense to a charge predicated on intent, knowledge, or recklessness--but not to an offense based on negligence. [State v. Cavness, 911 P.2d 95, 99-100 (Haw. Ct. App. 1996).] [Robinson &amp; Grall, supra, 35 Stan. L. Rev. at 729.] Thus, to disprove a reasonable mistake by proving that it is unreasonable, will turn out to be a mixed blessing for defendant. If the State may disprove a reasonable mistake by proving that the mistake was unreasonable, defendant may be convicted because he was negligent, as opposed to reckless, in forming the belief that the gun was unloaded. If recklessness is required as an element of the offense, a merely negligent or faultless mistake as to that circumstance provides a defense. Id. at 728.See footnote 5 Correctly understood, there is no difference between a positive and negative statement on the issue -- what is required for liability versus what will provide a defense to liability. Id. at 732. What is required in order to establish liability for manslaughter is recklessness (as defined by the Code) about whether death will result from the conduct. A faultless or merely careless mistake may negate that reckless state of mind and provide a defense. How can we explain these concepts to a jury? We believe that the better way to explain the concepts is to explain what is required for liability to be established. The charge should be tailored to the factual circumstances of the case. The court should explain precisely how the offered defense plays into the element of recklessness. See State v. Concepcion, 111 N.J. 373, 379-80 (1988) (explaining that trial courts should mold jury instructions in a manner that explains the law to the jury in the context of the material facts of the case, and holding that jury should have been told to measure all of defendant's relevant conduct against the legal standard for reckless manslaughter ) (emphasis added). Something along the following lines will help to convey to the jury the concepts relevant to a reckless manslaughter charge: In this case, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the defendant contends that he mistakenly believed that the gun was not loaded. If you find that the State has not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was reckless in forming his belief that the gun was not loaded, defendant should be acquitted of the offense of manslaughter. On the other hand, if you find that the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was reckless in forming the belief that the gun was not loaded, and consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a killing would result from his conduct, then you should convict him of manslaughter. Undoubtedly, our Committee on Model Criminal Charges can improve the formulation. To sum up, evidence of an actor's mistaken belief relates to whether the State has failed to prove an essential element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. As a practical matter, lawyers and judges will undoubtedly continue to consider a mistake of fact as a defense. When we do so, we must carefully analyze the nature of the mistake in relationship to the culpable mental state required to establish liability for the offense charged. Despite the complexities perceived by scholars, the limited number of appeals on this subject suggests to us that juries have very little difficulty in applying the concepts involved. We may assume that juries relate the instructions to the context of the charge. For example, in the case of the carelessly purloined umbrella, we are certain that juries would have no difficulty in understanding that it would have been a reasonable mistake (although perhaps a negligent mistake) for the customer to believe that he or she was picking up the right umbrella. To require the State to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt defendant's reasonable mistake of fact introduces an unnecessary and perhaps unhelpful degree of complexity into the fairly straightforward inquiry of whether defendant consciously disregard[ed] a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death would result from his conduct and that the risk was of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involve[d] a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation. N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b(3); N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4b. The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed. The matter is remanded to the Law Division for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, GARIBALDI, STEIN, and COLEMAN join in JUSTICE O'HERN's opinion. NO. A-23 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RONALD SEXTON, Defendant-Respondent. DECIDED