Title: Crowell v. Massachusetts Parole Board
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12203
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: May 15, 2017

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SJC-12203 
 
RICHARD CROWELL  vs.  MASSACHUSETTS PAROLE BOARD. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     January 6, 2017. - May 15, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Parole.  Practice, Criminal, Parole.  Americans with 
Disabilities Act.  Practice, Civil, Action in nature of 
certiorari, Motion to dismiss. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
April 2, 2014. 
 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Raffi N. Yessayan, J., and 
a motion for reconsideration was considered by him. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Tabitha Cohen (John D. Fitzpatrick also present) for the 
plaintiff. 
 
Todd M. Blume, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
defendant. 
 
James R. Pingeon, for American Civil Liberties Union of 
Massachusetts & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
BUDD, J.  On April 2, 2014, the plaintiff, Richard Crowell, 
filed a complaint in the nature of certiorari in the Superior 
2 
 
Court, alleging that, in denying his petition for parole, the 
Parole Board (board) had violated the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (ADA), and cognate 
State provisions, art. 114 of the Amendments to the 
Massachusetts Constitution and G. L. c. 93, § 103.  A judge of 
that court allowed the board's motion to dismiss and denied the 
plaintiff's motion for reconsideration.  We reverse and remand 
for further development of the record.1  Further, we conclude 
that, contrary to the plaintiff's assertion, his commuted life 
sentence remains a "life sentence" within the meaning of 120 
Code Mass. Regs. § 301.01(5) (1997). 
 
Background.  The limited record before us, presented in the 
form of exhibits to the plaintiff's complaint, includes the 
following facts, which are undisputed by the parties. 
 
1.  Prior parole proceedings.  The plaintiff pleaded guilty 
to murder in the second degree in 1962 in connection with an 
armed robbery that resulted in a homicide.2  He was sentenced to 
life imprisonment with the possibility of parole pursuant to 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief of the American Civil 
Liberties Union of Massachusetts, the Center for Public 
Representation, the National Disability Rights Network, and 
Prisoners' Legal Services. 
 
2 The plaintiff was the getaway vehicle's driver. 
 
                     
3 
 
G. L. c. 265, § 2.3  In 1974 the plaintiff's life sentence was 
commuted to one that was from "[thirty-six] years to life."  He 
was paroled in November, 1975.  Between 1975 and 1990 the 
plaintiff was returned to custody on five occasions (1977, 1980, 
1982, 1989, and 1990) for failing to adhere to his conditions of 
parole, including repeated problems with alcohol and assaultive 
behavior.  In 1987 he sustained a traumatic brain injury (TBI), 
which caused deficiencies in his memory, speech, and cognition.  
He attributes the loss of his job while on parole as well as an 
exacerbation of his alcohol problems to TBI. 
 
The plaintiff was denied parole following review hearings 
before the board in 1991, 1994, and 1997.  In 2003, he was again 
paroled on the condition that he complete a long-term 
residential program and attend Alcoholics Anonymous meetings at 
least three times per week.  Less than one month later, his 
parole was revoked for failure to complete the residential 
program.  He has been incarcerated since that time. 
 
 2.  2012 parole hearing and decision.  In August, 2012, 
the plaintiff had a review hearing before the board.  During 
that hearing, one of the board members noted that TBI had 
 
3 The plaintiff was also sentenced to serve from fifteen to 
twenty years for assault with intent to rob or murder, from 
three to five years for assault by means of a dangerous weapon, 
and from fifteen to twenty years for armed robbery, all to be 
served concurrently with his life sentence. 
                     
4 
 
"caused cognitive functioning [and] emotional functioning 
deficits," resulting in uncooperative behavior that was 
"secondary to [the plaintiff's] brain injury."  The board member 
stated that this was a chronic, life-long condition that "might 
get worse . . . [s]o [the plaintiff] would need to be in some 
sort of setting where [he] could be managed and cooperate with 
people forever."  She also expressed concern about the fact that 
the programs the plaintiff's counsel had looked into were 
voluntary programs that would require his full cooperation. 
 
Ultimately the board issued its decision denying the 
plaintiff parole, stating that the plaintiff "was unable to 
offer any concrete, viable release plan that could assure the 
[b]oard that he would be compliant on parole after his history 
of defiance and non-compliance" and that he "has not sought or 
achieved the rehabilitation necessary to live safely in the 
community."  The board also stated, "Crowell was unable to 
address the concerns related to his combative attitude and . . . 
gave the clear impression that he feels entitled to parole 
. . . ."  The board denied the plaintiff's request for 
reconsideration. 
 
3.  Certiorari action.  On April 2, 2014, the plaintiff 
timely filed a complaint seeking certiorari review of the 
board's decision by way of G. L. c. 249, § 4, alleging that the 
board's denial was a violation of his rights under the ADA and 
5 
 
cognate State provisions, and that the board's decision to grant 
him a review hearing only every five years (rather than 
annually) was unlawful.  He sought immediate release or a 
hearing at which the board would be prohibited from considering 
his disability as a reason to prevent him from being paroled.  
The plaintiff further asked the court to direct the board to use 
its resources to find an appropriate placement for him in the 
community. 
 
The judge allowed the board's motion to dismiss, concluding 
that the board had not discriminated against the plaintiff in 
its decision denying him parole because it considered many 
factors, only one of which was his disability related to the 
TBI.  The plaintiff appealed and obtained a brief stay of the 
appeal to pursue an unsuccessful motion for reconsideration on 
the limited issue whether he is serving a life sentence or a 
sentence for a term of years.  We transferred the case from the 
Appeals Court on our own motion. 
 
Discussion.  1.  The motion to dismiss.  We review a 
judge's order granting a motion to dismiss de novo.  Boston Med. 
Ctr. Corp. v. Secretary of the Exec. Office of Health & Human 
Servs., 463 Mass. 447, 450 (2012).  The plaintiff asserts that 
the motion judge erroneously allowed the board's motion to 
dismiss because the board failed first to file the 
administrative record pursuant to a standing order of the 
6 
 
Superior Court.  Superior Court Standing Order 1-96(2) applies 
to actions in the nature of certiorari under G. L. c. 249, § 4, 
and requires the agency to file its administrative record within 
ninety days of service of the complaint.4  It also extends the 
deadline for certain motions, including those brought under 
Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) and (e), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), to twenty 
days after service of the record.  The board contends that it 
 
4 The relevant portions of Superior Court Standing Order 1-
96 provide: 
 
 
"2.  The administrative agency whose proceedings 
are to be judicially reviewed shall, by way of answer, 
file the original or certified copy of the record of 
the proceeding . . . within ninety (90) days after 
service upon it of the [c]omplaint. . . . 
 
 
"3.  The following motions raising preliminary 
matters must be served . . . not later than twenty 
(20) days after service of the record by the 
administrative agency. 
 
 
"(a) Motions authorized by Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(b) 
or 12(e). 
 
 
". . . . 
 
 
"Any party failing to serve such a motion within 
the prescribed time limit, or within any court-ordered 
extension, shall be deemed to have waived any such 
motion . . . and the case shall proceed solely on the 
basis of the record. . . . 
 
 
"4.  A claim for judicial review shall be 
resolved through a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings, Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(c), . . . except as 
otherwise provided by this [s]tanding [o]rder, unless 
the [c]ourt's decision on any motion specified in part 
3 above has made such a resolution inappropriate. . . 
." 
                     
7 
 
complied with both Superior Court Standing Order 1-96 and rule 
12 (b) ("A motion making any of these defenses shall be made 
before pleading . . .").  Although the board was free to file a 
motion to dismiss, it was error for the judge to allow it as the 
plaintiff had stated a claim upon which relief could be granted.  
That is, he alleged in his complaint that the result of the 
parole board hearing (a quasi judicial administrative 
proceeding) was arbitrary or capricious, unsupported by 
substantial evidence, or otherwise an error of law.  See Hoffer 
v. Board of Registration in Med., 461 Mass. 451, 458 n.9 (2012) 
(discussing what plaintiff must show to obtain certiorari 
review).5 
 
Given the plaintiff's allegations, the only appropriate way 
for the court to evaluate the claim is through a review of the 
administrative record upon a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings.  See School Comm. of Hudson v. Board of Educ., 448 
Mass. 565, 575-576 (2007), citing St. Botolph Citizens Comm., 
Inc. v. Boston Redev. Auth., 429 Mass. 1, 7 (1999) ("Certiorari 
is a limited procedure reserved for correction of substantial 
errors of law apparent on the record created before a judicial 
 
5 A motion to dismiss may be appropriate, however, where a 
plaintiff has not met the time limitations for certiorari 
review, where the claim is moot, where a plaintiff lacks 
standing, or where certiorari review is not otherwise proper.  
See, e.g., Indeck v. Clients' Sec. Bd., 450 Mass. 379, 380-381 
(2008). 
                     
8 
 
or quasi-judicial tribunal").  Requiring a defendant agency to 
file the administrative record as a matter of course is an 
implicit acknowledgement of that fact.6  See Firearms Records 
Bur. v. Simkin, 466 Mass. 168, 180 (2013), citing Cambridge 
Hous. Auth. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 586, 587 
(1979).  For this reason, we vacate the dismissal and remand for 
further proceedings. 
 
2.  The disability claim.  In his Superior Court complaint, 
the plaintiff asserted that the board's decision to deny his 
parole petition was unlawful to the extent that the decision 
relied on his disability and faulted him for failing to seek out 
an appropriate release plan.  He claimed that the decision 
violated the ADA,7 as well as art. 1148 and G. L. c. 93, § 103.9  
 
6 Although it did not explain its reasoning, the Appeals 
Court came to the same conclusion in Doucette v. Massachusetts 
Parole Bd., 86 Mass. App. Ct. 531, 541 n.10 (2014).  There, the 
Superior Court judge had a "near complete record" before him by 
the time he considered the board's motion to dismiss for failure 
to state a claim, and the Appeals Court affirmed the judge's 
decision, citing the parties' agreement to proceed on a partial 
record.  Id.  The court cautioned, however, that "[i]n future 
cases, certiorari review should be conducted under [Mass. R. 
Civ. P.] 12(c), in accordance with Superior Court Standing Order 
1-96, and not under rule 12(b)(6)."  Id. 
 
 
7 Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 
provides:  "[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, 
by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in 
or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or 
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination 
by any such entity."  42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012). 
 
                     
9 
 
Because we vacate the dismissal on procedural grounds, we need 
not reach the merits of the plaintiff's disability claim.  That 
being said, it is clear from the limited information we have -- 
i.e., a partial transcript and the board's written decision -- 
that the board's decision to deny the parole petition does not 
appear to have considered adequately the application of the ADA 
and our own relevant constitutional and statutory provisions.  
We therefore make the following observations. 
 
The ADA and State provisions "prohibit the same conduct:  
disabled persons may not be 'excluded from participation in or 
be denied the benefits of' services, programs, or activities [of 
a public entity], and they may not 'be subjected to 
discrimination'" (citation omitted).  Shedlock v. Department of 
Correction, 442 Mass. 844, 854 (2004).  The plaintiff alleges, 
and the board clearly assumed (both during the review hearing 
and in its decision denying his petition for parole), that the 
 
8 Article 114 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts 
Constitution provides:  "No otherwise qualified handicapped 
individual shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded 
from the participation in, denied the benefits of, or be subject 
to discrimination under any program or activity within the 
commonwealth." 
 
 
9 General Laws c. 93, § 103, provides in relevant part that 
"[a]ny person within the commonwealth, regardless of handicap 
. . . shall, with reasonable accommodation, have the same rights 
as other persons . . . to the full and equal benefit of all laws 
and proceedings . . . , including, but not limited to, the 
rights secured under [art. 114]." 
                                                                  
10 
 
plaintiff suffers from a disability:  cognitive and behavioral 
limitations resulting from TBI.  The plaintiff also alleges that 
he has been denied the benefits of a State program, i.e., a fair 
hearing and parole review decision process, to which he was 
statutorily entitled.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(B) (2012) 
("public entity" includes State agencies); Pennsylvania Dep't of 
Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998) (ADA applies to 
prisoners); Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 896-897 (9th Cir. 
2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 921 (2003) (ADA applies to parole 
proceedings, including substantive decision-making).10  
Therefore, the only open question is whether the plaintiff was 
excluded from the program, or discriminated against in the form 
of denial of parole, by reason of his disability.  
See Thompson, supra at 896, 898 n.4 (describing this inquiry as 
 
10 See also United States Department of Justice, Civil 
Rights Division, Examples and Resources to Support Criminal 
Justice Entities in Compliance with Title II of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (Jan. 2017), https://www.ada.gov/cjta.html 
[https://perma.cc/4W6S-9T5N] (DOJ Examples) (State programs may 
include "determining whether to revoke probation or parole, 
. . . parole and release programs, and re-entry planning").  The 
guidance document further explains that State entities must 
"[e]nsure that people with mental health disabilities . . . have 
an equal opportunity to participate in and benefit from the 
entities' programs, services, and activities."  Id.  To provide 
equal opportunities, State entities must "[m]ake reasonable 
modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when 
necessary to avoid disability discrimination in all interactions 
with people with mental health disabilities . . . , unless the 
modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the 
service, program, or activity."  Id. 
                     
11 
 
asking whether prisoner was "otherwise qualified"). 
 
The board's decision to grant parole is limited by statute; 
it may only do so where it finds, "after consideration of a risk 
and needs assessment, that there is a reasonable probability 
that, if the prisoner is released with appropriate conditions 
and community supervision, the prisoner will live and remain at 
liberty without violating the law and that release is not 
incompatible with the welfare of society."  G. L. c. 127, 
§ 130.11  No prisoner is entitled to parole, Deal v. Commissioner 
of Correction, 475 Mass. 307, 322 (2016), and we give the 
board's determination "considerable deference," Greenman 
v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 405 Mass. 384, 387 (1989). 
 
However, this deference is not without limits.  First, the 
board clearly may not categorically exclude any prisoner by 
reason of his or her disability.  See Thompson, 295 F.3d at 898 
n.4.  Second, both the ADA and the parole statute, G. L. c. 127, 
§ 130, require the board to take some measures to accommodate 
prisoners with disabilities.  Where the board is aware that a 
 
11 General Laws c. 127, § 130, further provides: 
 
 
"In making this determination, the parole board shall 
consider whether, during the period of incarceration, the 
prisoner has participated in available work opportunities 
and education or treatment programs and demonstrated good 
behavior.  The board shall also consider whether risk 
reduction programs, made available through collaboration 
with criminal justice agencies would minimize the 
probability of the prisoner re-offending once released." 
                     
12 
 
mental disability may affect a prisoner's ability to prepare an 
appropriate release plan in advance of a parole hearing, the 
board should make reasonable modifications to its policy, for 
example, by providing an expert or other assistance to help the 
prisoner identify appropriate postrelease programming.  See 28 
C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2016);12 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(8) (2016).13  
In accommodating prisoners with mental disabilities, the board 
should also consider whether there are risk reduction programs 
designed to reduce recidivism in those who are mentally 
disabled.  See G. L. c. 127, § 130. 
 
These provisions do not require the board to make 
modifications that would "fundamentally alter" the nature of 
parole.  28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7).  See 28 C.F.R. § 35.139 
 
12 Title 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2016) provides: 
 
 
"A public entity shall make reasonable modifications 
in policies, practices, or procedures when the 
modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the 
basis of disability, unless the public entity can 
demonstrate that making the modifications would 
fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or 
activity." 
 
 
13 Title 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(8) (2016) provides: 
 
 
"A public entity shall not impose or apply eligibility 
criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an 
individual with a disability or any class of individuals 
with disabilities from fully and equally enjoying any 
service, program, or activity, unless such criteria can be 
shown to be necessary for the provision of the service, 
program, or activity being offered." 
                     
13 
 
(2016).  To the contrary, those who would pose a danger to 
society even with risk reduction programs should not be released 
on parole.  G. L. c. 127, § 130.  In addition, the board's 
important role in protecting society from the early release of 
dangerous persons means that the board must be able to consider 
whether the symptoms of a prisoner's disability mean that he or 
she has a heightened propensity to commit crime while released 
on parole.  See Thompson, 295 F.3d at 898 n.4. 
 
The interaction of these requirements means that once the 
board became aware that the plaintiff's disability could 
potentially affect his ability to qualify for parole, it had the 
responsibility to determine whether reasonable modifications 
could enable the plaintiff to qualify, without changing the 
fundamental nature of parole.14  Here, the board indicated its 
 
14 In interpreting art. 114 and the ADA, we have previously 
examined whether the disabled individual requested reasonable 
accommodations from a State prison.  See Shedlock v. Department 
of Correction, 442 Mass. 844, 856-859 (2004).  In that case, 
however, we noted that prison officials, while aware of the 
prisoner's disability, might have been unaware that he needed 
further accommodation.  Id. at 856-857.  Here, the board -- as 
reflected in the board member's comments and in the board's 
written decision -- was clearly aware of the plaintiff's 
disability and that he would need further accommodation if 
parole were to work.  As a result, the board had an obligation 
to consider whether reasonable modifications could mitigate any 
risk that the plaintiff would pose were he released on parole.  
See DOJ Examples, supra ("The reasonable modification obligation 
applies when an agency employee knows or reasonably should know 
that the person has a disability and needs a modification 
. . ."). 
                     
14 
 
awareness both of the plaintiff's disability and of how symptoms 
stemming from that disability could affect his behavior both in 
the parole hearing and on parole.  In addition, while one board 
member discussed the possibility that the plaintiff would need 
to be in a "very structured setting" while on parole, there is 
no indication in the limited record before us whether the board 
actually considered any such modification and whether it would 
make him a more qualified candidate for parole.  Further, the 
board negatively considered the plaintiff's attitude during the 
parole hearing and his own failure to identify what the board 
considered to be appropriate parole programs, without 
considering whether these behaviors were the result of his TBI. 
 
In short, while the judge correctly noted that in its 
decision, the board had considered a broad set of factors, 
including the plaintiff's behavior before his TBI, the record 
before us shows no consideration of how the plaintiff's 
limitations affect his parole eligibility, whether these 
limitations could be mitigated with reasonable modifications,15 
and whether other factors would nevertheless disqualify him from 
 
15 To the extent that the plaintiff's disability prevents 
him from seeking out such reasonable modifications himself, it 
may be inappropriate for the board to place the burden on him to 
put forward his own parole programming proposal. 
 
                     
15 
 
parole.16  More importantly, it is impossible to determine the 
weight the board gave to the disability and associated 
limitations relative to other factors in its analysis.  Once the 
board has submitted the administrative record, upon a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings, the motion judge will have a better 
basis for considering the plaintiff's claims.17 
 
3.  Frequency of parole review.  General Laws c. 127, 
§ 133A, governs parole eligibility for "[e]very prisoner who is 
serving a sentence for life," with limited exceptions.  It 
provides for an initial hearing fifteen years into a life term, 
and rehearings every five years if parole is not granted.  Id.  
120 Code Mass. Regs. § 301.01(5).  In contrast, with limited 
 
16 In this case, at least with respect to the plaintiff's 
limitations due to TBI and how those limitations interact with 
the criteria for parole, it is difficult to see how the board 
could proceed without a professional evaluation of the 
plaintiff's condition and recommendation regarding a postrelease 
plan that might diminish the risk of recidivism.  See 28 C.F.R. 
§ 35.130(h) (2016) (assessment whether safety requirements that 
exclude persons with disabilities are nevertheless legitimate 
must be "based on actual risks, not on mere speculation, 
stereotypes, or generalizations about individuals with 
disabilities"); 28 C.F.R. § 35.139(b) (2016) (assessment of 
whether individual poses "direct threat" must rely "on current 
medical knowledge or on the best available objective evidence 
. . . to ascertain" nature of risk and whether it could be 
reasonably mitigated). 
 
 
17 We note that, even if the plaintiff is successful in 
demonstrating a violation of the ADA upon a motion for judgment 
on the pleadings, he is not automatically entitled to the relief 
he seeks (release on parole), but rather to a parole hearing and 
decision that considers reasonable modifications in light of his 
disability. 
                     
16 
 
exceptions not relevant here, all other prisoners denied parole 
are entitled to a rehearing on an annual basis.  120 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 301.01(2) (1997).  The plaintiff argues that the 
commutation of his original sentence from life with the 
possibility of parole to thirty-six years to life reduced his 
sentence to an indeterminate one, such that it is no longer 
governed by § 133A, and that he is entitled to review on an 
annual basis.18  We disagree. 
 
The case to which the defendant cites undermines his 
argument, as the court held that the nature of a prisoner's 
sentence depends on the maximum term, which sets "the maximum 
amount of time that the prisoner will serve in prison if he 
. . . is not granted parole," whereas the minimum term "serves 
 
18 The plaintiff also argues that because his commuted 
sentence is similar to that described in the home invasion 
statute, G. L. c. 265, § 18C ("for life or for any term of not 
less than twenty years"), his sentence should be governed by 
G. L. c. 127, § 133 (annual review), rather than G. L. c. 127, 
§ 133A (review every five years).  He reasons that in 
Commonwealth v. Brown, 431 Mass. 772, 774-777 (2000), we 
mentioned that a defendant convicted under the home invasion 
statute was subject to § 133.  However, the plaintiff ignores 
the fact that unlike himself, the defendant in Brown was not 
sentenced to life, but instead to from twenty years to twenty 
years and one day.  Id. at 773. 
 
 
The plaintiff further argues that we should adopt 
California's rule, citing three decisions in which that State's 
highest court held that a sentence of from a term of years to 
life is not a life sentence.  These decisions are 
distinguishable from the plaintiff's case, however, as all three 
involved crimes committed when the defendants in question were 
minors. 
                     
17 
 
as a base for determining his parole eligibility date."  Connery 
v. Commissioner of Correction, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 253, 254 
(1992), S.C., 414 Mass. 1009, 1011 (1993), citing Commonwealth 
v. Hogan, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 186, 189 (1983), and Commonwealth 
v. Haley, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 10, 18 (1986).  Because judges 
sentencing on convictions for murder in the second degree now 
must fix a minimum term as a parole eligibility date, G. L. 
c. 279, § 24, if we adopted the defendant's view it would 
essentially mean that no sentences other than a life sentence 
without the possibility of parole would be a "life sentence."  
This would render § 133A meaningless.  See Boston Police 
Patrolmen's Ass'n v. Boston, 435 Mass. 718, 721 (2002), 
quoting Victory Distribs., Inc. v. Ayer Div. of the Dist. Court 
Dep't, 435 Mass. 136, 140 (2001) ("We interpret statutes so as 
to avoid rendering any part of the legislation meaningless").  
Instead, the board has determined that § 133A and the associated 
regulations govern parole hearings for all "individuals serving 
a sentence that contains life as the maximum term of the 
sentence."  120 Code Mass. Regs. § 100.00 (2001).  Therefore, 
the plaintiff's sentence remains a "life sentence," and his 
parole is governed by § 133A. 
 
Conclusion.  We reverse the dismissal of the complaint and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.