Title: Shelley Johnson v. State of Indiana
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 49S05-0510-PC-470
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: October 13, 2005

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Susan K. Carpenter 
Steve Carter 
Public Defender of Indiana 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
 
Richard Denning 
Nicole M. Schuster 
Deputy Public Defender 
Deputy Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 49S05-0510-PC-470 
 
SHELLEY JOHNSON, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant (Petitioner below), 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Respondent below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court, No. 49G01-9801-PC-9721  
The Honorable Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A05-0303-PC-101 
_________________________________ 
 
October 13, 2005 
 
Shepard, Chief Justice. 
 
 
Shelley Johnson appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.  We address 
only a single issue, whether Johnson was entitled to the retroactive benefit of our decision in 
Ross v. State, 729 N.E.2d 113 (Ind. 2000). As we hold today in Jacobs v. State, __ N.E.2d __ 
(Ind. 2005), as a change in substantive law, Ross is to be applied retroactively on collateral 
review.  We thus reverse the post-conviction court. 
 
 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
 
In January 1998, the State charged Shelley Johnson with carrying a handgun without a 
license as a class A misdemeanor, resisting arrest, and possession of a controlled substance.  The 
charges stemmed from an incident that occurred on November 21, 1997.  The State later sought 
to enhance the handgun charge to a class C felony citing Johnson’s earlier conviction for 
robbery.  In March 1998, the State sought further enhancement under the general habitual 
offender statute, section 35-50-2-8 of the Indiana Code. 
 
 
In September 1998, a jury found Johnson guilty of the misdemeanor handgun charge, 
resisting arrest, and possession of a controlled substance.  Johnson then stipulated to the 
enhancement of the handgun offense to a class C felony, and to the general habitual offender 
enhancement.  The trial court imposed a sentence of six years for the class C handgun 
conviction, one year concurrent for possession, and one year for resisting, served consecutively.  
It added eight years to the handgun conviction by virtue of the habitual offender finding.  It 
ordered the sentence in this case to run consecutively to a sentence in another criminal matter. 
 
 
On direct appeal, Johnson challenged his conviction.  The Court of Appeals affirmed.  
Johnson v. State, 49A02-9811-CR-920 (Ind. Ct. App. Nov. 16,  1999).  
 
 
In May 2000, we announced our decision in Ross v. State, 729 N.E.2d 113, 116-17 (Ind. 
2000), which held that a misdemeanor handgun charge enhanced to a felony could not be further 
enhanced by using the general habitual offender statute.  In June 2000, Johnson filed a petition 
for post-conviction relief that was amended in August 2002.  In the amended petition, Johnson 
sought relief by arguing, among other claims, that Ross should be applied retroactively and that 
the eight years added to his sentence under the general habitual offender statute should be 
removed. 
 
 
The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.  
Johnson v. State, 49A05-0303-PC-101 (Ind. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 2004).  We grant transfer solely to 
 
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address the issue of Ross’s retroactivity.  We otherwise summarily affirm the decision of the 
Court of Appeals.  Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A). 
 
 
This Case Is Like Jacobs
 
 
As we hold in Jacobs v. State, __ N.E.2d __, __ (Ind. 2005), because our decision in Ross 
affects the substantive law controlling application of the general habitual offender statute, it 
applies retroactively on collateral review to those cases final at the time Ross was announced.  
Thus, the eight-year enhancement added to Johnson’s sentence under the general habitual 
offender statute is vacated. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
We direct the post-conviction court to remove the eight-year enhancement under the 
general habitual offender statute from Johnson’s sentence. 
 
Dickson, Sullivan, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur. 
 
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