Title: Sorrell v. Borner
Citation: 593 So. 2d 986
Docket Number: 90-CA-0250
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: September 4, 1991

593 So. 2d 986 (1991) Jerry SORRELL v. Joyce Ann Sorrell BORNER. No. 90-CA-0250. Supreme Court of Mississippi. September 4, 1991. Rehearing Denied March 18, 1992. Joseph C. Langston, Langston Langston Michael &amp; Bowen, Booneville, for appellant. Phil R. Hinton, Wilson &amp; Hinton, Corinth, for appellee. Before ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., and SULLIVAN and BANKS, JJ. ROY NOBLE LEE, Chief Justice, for the Court: Jerry Sorrell has appealed from a judgment of the Chancery Court of Alcorn County, Mississippi, denying modification of support payments for children in his custody. He presents four (4) issues for decision by this Court. Jerry Sorrell, appellant, and Joyce Ann Sorrell Borner, appellee, were divorced on May 5, 1981. Borner was awarded custody of the minor children of the parties, a four year old daughter and a one year old son. Sorrell was ordered to pay $125.00 per month in child support. On May 30, 1989, Sorrell filed a petition for modification of the decree seeking change of custody. Borner counterclaimed alleging that Sorrell owed her $9,160.00 in past due child support. The lower court held that Sorrell was in arrears in child support in the amount of $9,222.64 and granted Borner a judgment in that amount. The court also held that there had been a material and substantial change in circumstances and that it was in the best interest of the children to modify the final divorce decree and change custody from Borner to Sorrell. Borner was ordered to pay $40.00 per week for child support. Neither party appealed from that order of the lower court. Borner garnished Sorrell's wages in an attempt to satisfy the judgment awarded her by the court. Thereupon, Sorrell filed a petition for modification of that final order. He claimed that there had been a substantial change in circumstances since the order was entered and sought modification of the order so that the child support *987 owed by Borner would be set off against the judgment. On February 1, 1990, the lower court held that there had not been a substantial change in circumstances and it could not interfere with Borner's right to collect the judgment. Sorrell appeals to this Court from the lower court's order with supersedeas. Issue number one is well established in the affirmative and does not merit discussion. Also, issue number two has been settled by previous decisions of this Court. Wilson v. Wilson, 464 So. 2d 496, 498 (Miss. 1985). See also Alexander v. Alexander, 494 So. 2d 365 (Miss. 1986). Sorrell correctly states that child support belongs to the child. However, in the case at bar, Borner was awarded a judgment for past due child support. Sorrell did not appeal the judgment. The record does not reflect that Borner expended the amount of the award on the children, while she had custody, but Sorrell does not appear to dispute the judgment itself, only the means of paying it. At the hearing on the petition for modification, Sorrell's attorney made the following argument: Issues one and two are answered in the affirmative and are affirmed. On October 3, 1989, Sorrell was awarded custody of the two children. Borner was awarded a $9,222.64 judgment against Sorrell, but she was also ordered to pay $40.00 per week for child support. The lower court held her child support payments in abeyance until Sorrell fully paid the arrearage. (emphasis added) Sorrell did not appeal the order. On November 15, 1989, Borner filed a suggestion of garnishment. Borner obtained a 65% garnishment on Sorrell's wages beginning on December 17, 1989, pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 85-3-4(3)(b)(iii) (Supp. 1990). As a result, Sorrell had to support himself and his children on 35% of his wages. He complains that the lower court erred in failing to limit the garnishment to only 25% of his wages. Miss. Code Ann. § 85-3-4 establishes the maximum amount of wages that can be garnished. Section 85-3-4 reads in pertinent part as follows: The 25% restriction, however, does not apply in cases where the judgment is for the support of another person. Miss. Code Ann. § 85-3-4 (emphasis added). The judgment awarded was for past due child support, but Borner no longer had custody of the children. In our opinion, the legislature did not contemplate the exception language to be used in this situation, and are of the opinion that the restriction listed in § 85-3-4(2)(a) should apply to the garnishment here. *989 Sorrell filed a petition for modification of the order issued on October 3, 1989, claiming that the order should be modified because there had been a substantial change in circumstances due to the garnishment of 65% of his wages and the failure of Borner to pay any child support. Sorrell did not attack the garnishment in his pleadings, but, from the transcript of the hearing on the petition, it is clear that Sorrell wanted the Writ of Garnishment reduced. The order of October 3, 1989, held Borner's payment of child support in abeyance until the entire judgment had been paid in full. In denying the petition for modification, the lower court stated: (emphasis added). The Writ of Garnishment is the instrument, which precipitated the issues and problems in this case today. It resulted from the judgment of October 3, 1989, and surely was issued from the same court in the same cause number on the same judgment. Without the correct interpretation of the garnishment statute, there was a material change in the circumstances of the parties, which adversely affected the interest and welfare of the children, e.g., Sorrell's income had been reduced by 65% and his situation rendered him unable to support the children on 35% of his income. The record reflects that, with the garnishment, as interpreted, Sorrell was bringing home only $78.75 per week, where previously his take home pay was $225.00 per week. We are of the opinion that the judgment of the lower court must be, and is, reversed and remanded in part as to this element of support for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and is affirmed as to all other issues. AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART. HAWKINS and DAN M. LEE, P.JJ., and PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN, PITTMAN, BANKS and McRAE, JJ., concur.