Title: Garlock Sealing Technologies v. Little
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 050002
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: November 4, 2005

Present:  All the Justices 
 
GARLOCK SEALING TECHNOLOGIES, LLC 
 
 
 
      OPINION BY CHIEF JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
v.  Record No. 050002 
 November 4, 2005 
 
MICHAEL LITTLE, EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE 
OF ZEBULON A. LITTLE, JR. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS 
H. Vincent Conway, Jr., Judge 
 
I. 
 
The primary issue that we consider in this appeal is 
whether federal maritime principles apply to plaintiff's cause 
of action against a manufacturer of products used during the 
construction and repair of submarines situated in navigable 
waters. 
II. 
 
Zebulon A. Little, Jr., filed his motion for judgment 
against Garlock Sealing Technologies ("Garlock Sealing") and 
14 other defendants.  Plaintiff alleged in his motion that he 
was exposed to asbestos contained in products manufactured by 
Garlock Sealing and that he contracted mesothelioma as a 
result of such exposure.  Little died before trial and his 
action was revived as a wrongful death action by the executor 
of his estate, hereinafter referred to as plaintiff. 
 
Prior to trial, plaintiff settled, nonsuited, or 
dismissed his claims against all defendants except Garlock 
 
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Sealing.  Plaintiff proceeded against Garlock Sealing, the 
sole defendant. 
Plaintiff presented the following evidence at a jury 
trial.  Little began work as a machine installation worker at 
the Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company in April 
1961.  He left his employment at the Newport News Shipbuilding 
and Drydock Company in December 1963 and served in the United 
States Marine Corps.  He returned to the Newport News 
Shipbuilding and Drydock Company in February 1968 and resumed 
his duties as a machine installation worker. 
 
Little performed repairs on submarines, and he worked on 
construction of submarines that were located on the navigable 
waters of the James River.  The submarines were moored to the 
piers owned by the Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock 
Company.  He worked for almost a year on a project that 
overhauled the submarine named the Shark.  He also performed 
work on the following vessels:  the Henry Clay, the John 
Marshall, the Sam Houston, the Sam Rayburn, the Hunley, and 
the Thomas Jefferson. 
 
Little installed and repaired valves and replaced packing 
in valves to prevent or repair leaks.  He also installed and 
replaced gaskets on flanges.  A flange is a connection between 
two sections of pipe, and a gasket is used to seal that 
connection. 
 
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On a daily basis, Little constructed gaskets from sheets 
of gasket material by cutting the material to a desired size 
with a knife or saw, punching holes in the gaskets, and 
grinding the edges of the gaskets.  The creation of the 
gaskets created visible airborne dust that contained asbestos.  
This dust covered Little's hands and clothing, and he inhaled 
asbestos-laden dust.  Garlock Sealing manufactured the 
material that Little used to create the gaskets. 
 
Little was also exposed to asbestos when he repaired or 
replaced gaskets or packing.  He removed asbestos pipe 
covering that was attached to valves or flanges.  The removal 
of these materials, which were not manufactured by Garlock 
Sealing, caused Little to be exposed to asbestos dust. 
Little contracted mesothelioma, which is a fatal form of 
cancer in the lining of the lungs or stomach.  Mesothelioma is 
"a signal tumor" for asbestos exposure, and there is 
"virtually no other cause of mesothelioma."  Mesothelioma has 
a latency period of 15 to 50 years or more following the first 
exposure to asbestos fiber. 
Even though Garlock Sealing was the only defendant at 
trial, Garlock Sealing presented evidence that Little had been 
exposed to asbestos contained in products that had been 
manufactured or distributed by other entities.  Garlock 
Sealing, over plaintiff's objection, requested that the jury 
 
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apportion damages among several entities that had manufactured 
products that contained asbestos that Little may have 
encountered when he worked on submarines, including three 
entities that were bankrupt.  Some of these manufacturers of 
products that contained asbestos were not defendants in the 
circuit court and other manufacturers settled with plaintiff 
before trial.  The circuit court permitted the jury to 
apportion damages among Garlock Sealing, manufacturers who 
settled before trial, and manufacturers who were never parties 
to this litigation. 
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the 
amount of $467,818.59 and apportioned 30% of the damages to 
Garlock Sealing and 29% of the damages to three entities that 
were bankrupt.  The circuit court entered a final judgment 
that required that Garlock Sealing pay the 29% of damages 
apportioned to the bankrupt entities as well as the 30% of 
damages apportioned to Garlock Sealing.  Thus, Garlock 
Sealing's total liability was 59% of the verdict or 
$276,012.96.  Garlock Sealing appeals. 
III. 
A. 
 
Garlock Sealing assigned the following error in its 
brief:  "The trial court erred in allowing evidence that 
Garlock Sealing was responsible for other manufacturers' 
 
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products."  However, in its brief, Garlock Sealing argues that 
a manufacturer of a product has no duty to warn of the dangers 
or defects of products manufactured by others.  We will not 
consider this assignment of error because Garlock Sealing's 
legal argument in its brief – whether the circuit court 
improperly imposed certain legal duties against Garlock 
Sealing – is different from its assignment of error that 
challenges whether the circuit court properly admitted certain 
evidence.  See Rule 5:17(c). 
B. 
 
Garlock Sealing argues that maritime principles of law 
should not control the resolution of plaintiff's claims 
because purportedly Little's exposure to "asbestos-containing 
products while working aboard ships either pre- or post-
launch, has no effect on maritime activities."  Continuing, 
Garlock Sealing asserts that because of "the uncertainty of 
contracting disease following exposure and the latency between 
exposure and disease, there can be no relationship between the 
alleged tort of negligent failure to warn and/or breach of 
warranty by an asbestos product manufacturer and traditional 
maritime activity."  We disagree with Garlock Sealing. 
 
A litigant seeking the application of federal maritime 
tort law must satisfy both a locality test, demonstrating that 
the alleged negligence occurred on the navigable waters of the 
 
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United States, and a nexus test, demonstrating that the wrong 
bears a significant relationship to traditional maritime 
activity and has a potentially disruptive impact upon maritime 
commerce.  Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & 
Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 534 (1995); Matthews v. Commonwealth, 
253 Va. 180, 182, 482 S.E.2d 810, 811-12 (1997); Mizenko v. 
Electric Motor & Contracting Co., 244 Va. 152, 156, 419 S.E.2d 
637, 640 (1992) (citing East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica 
Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 863-64 (1986)). 
 
The Supreme Court held in Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 
364 (1990), that in order to determine whether an activity has 
a significant relationship to a traditional maritime activity 
and a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce, the 
relevant activity is not defined by the particular 
circumstances of the incident.  Rather, the relevant activity 
is determined by the general conduct from which the incident 
arose. 
 
The record in the case before this Court shows that 
Little performed work with gaskets on at least 10 submarines 
lying in navigable waters and that he was injured while 
performing this work.  The installation and maintenance of 
these gaskets was necessary to enable the submarines to 
operate properly.  The Supreme Court has uniformly and 
consistently held that ship repair is a maritime activity.  
 
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John Baizley Iron Works v. Span, 281 U.S. 222, 232 (1930); 
Messel v. Foundation Co., 274 U.S. 427, 432 (1927); Robins Dry 
Dock & Repair Co. v. Dahl, 266 U.S. 449, 457 (1925); Great 
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Kierejewski, 261 U.S. 479, 480-81 
(1923).  We hold that plaintiff's cause of action is governed 
by maritime tort principles.  Plaintiff has shown that:  
Garlock Sealing's tortious acts or omissions were a proximate 
cause of Little's injuries; that the acts or omissions 
occurred on navigable waters; that the acts or omissions had a 
significant connection with maritime activity; and that 
Garlock Sealing's tortious conduct has a potentially 
disruptive impact upon maritime commerce. 
 
We find no merit in Garlock Sealing's argument that its 
wrongful act and the manifestation of injury in Little were 
not sufficiently close in time to satisfy the exercise of 
admiralty jurisdiction.  The Supreme Court specifically 
rejected this argument in Grubart.  513 U.S. at 536-38. 
In Grubart, the City of Chicago hired a contractor to 
replace wooden pilings around the piers of certain bridges 
spanning the Chicago River.  In 1991, the contractor replaced 
the pilings.  Approximately seven months later, an eddy formed 
in a river near a bridge, and the walls and ceiling of a 
freight tunnel that extended beneath the river collapsed, 
thereby causing a flood.  The Supreme Court rejected the 
 
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City's argument that admiralty jurisdiction did not lie 
because the damage must be close in time and space to the 
activity that caused the damage.  The Court stated that in 
admiralty jurisdiction, the classic principles of proximate 
causation are applicable, and the use of proximate causation 
principles "should obviate not only the complication but even 
the need for further temporal or spatial limitations" between 
the defendant's negligence and damage caused by that act.  513 
U.S. at 536.  See also id. at 538. 
 
We also note that in Mizenko, we held that a pipefitter 
who inhaled toxic solvent fumes while engaged in ship repair 
aboard a vessel lying in navigable waters could assert a 
maritime tort claim.  244 Va. at 156.  The facts of this case 
are distinguishable from those of Mizenko only on the basis 
that the harm resulting from Little's injury was not immediate 
– a distinction that the Supreme Court rejected in Grubart.  
Grubart, 513 U.S. at 535-38. 
C. 
 
Garlock Sealing argues that the circuit court erred in 
its apportionment of damages.  Garlock Sealing asserts that 
pursuant to principles of maritime law, damages are assessed 
according to the percentage of fault assigned by a jury and 
that principles of joint and several liability do not apply.  
Continuing, Garlock Sealing claims that once the jury 
 
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apportioned fault to three bankrupt insolvent entities, the 
circuit court erred by requiring that Garlock Sealing 
compensate the plaintiff for damages apportioned to those 
insolvent entities. 
 
We will not consider Garlock Sealing's contentions.  We 
note that the procedural posture of this case is very unusual.  
As we have already stated, Garlock Sealing, over the 
plaintiff's objections, convinced the circuit court to permit 
the jury to apportion fault among certain entities that were 
not parties to this litigation.  We will not permit Garlock 
Sealing to obtain an apportionment of liability among itself 
and 10 entities that were not parties to this litigation and 
then complain about the method of apportionment.  As we have 
repeatedly stated, "no litigant . . . will be permitted to 
approbate and reprobate – to invite error . . . and then to 
take advantage of the situation created by his own wrong."  
Cohn v. Knowledge Connections, Inc., 266 Va. 362, 367, 585 
S.E.2d 578, 581 (2003) (quoting Fisher v. Commonwealth, 236 
Va. 403, 417, 374 S.E.2d 46, 54 (1988)); Hansen v. Stanley 
Martin Cos., 266 Va. 345, 358, 585 S.E.2d 567, 575 (2003).  We 
also observe that we have serious reservations whether federal 
maritime principles permit a court to enter a judgment 
reflecting a jury's apportionment of damages among entities 
who were never named defendants in the lawsuit before the 
 
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court and from whom plaintiff has received no compensation for 
his injuries.* 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of 
the circuit court. 
Affirmed. 
                     
* The Supreme Court has held that the principle of joint 
and several liability is applicable in admiralty jurisdiction 
and that principle was not abrogated by the proportionate 
share approach rule.  And, we note, that the Supreme Court 
stated that this principle can result in "one defendant's 
paying more than its apportioned share of liability when the 
plaintiff's recovery from other defendants is limited by 
factors beyond the plaintiff's control, such as a defendant's 
insolvency."  McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 220-21 
(1994).