Title: Dyck-O'Neal, Inc. v. Heather Lanham
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC17-975
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: July 6, 2018

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC17-975 
____________ 
 
DYCK-O’NEAL, INC., 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
HEATHER LANHAM, 
Respondent. 
 
[July 5, 2018] 
 
LAWSON, J. 
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the First District 
Court of Appeal in Dyck-O’Neal, Inc. v. Lanham, 214 So. 3d 802 (Fla. 1st DCA 
2017).  The district court certified that its decision is in direct conflict with 
decisions of every other district court of appeal—Garcia v. Dyck-O’Neal, Inc., 178 
So. 3d 433 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015), Dyck-O’Neal, Inc. v. Hendrick, 200 So. 3d 181 
(Fla. 5th DCA 2016), Gdovin v. Dyck-O’Neal, Inc., 198 So. 3d 986 (Fla. 2d DCA 
2016), and Dyck-O’Neal, Inc. v. McKenna, 198 So. 3d 1038 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016), 
regarding whether a complainant may pursue a separate action at law to recover a 
deficiency judgment when the foreclosure court reserved jurisdiction in its final 
judgment to adjudicate the deficiency claim.  We have jurisdiction, see art. V,        
 
 
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§ 3(b)(3), Fla. Const., and hold that when a foreclosure court reserves jurisdiction 
to adjudicate a deficiency judgment claim but has not adjudicated the claim, 
section 702.06, Florida Statutes (2014), permits the lender or its assignee to bring 
its deficiency claim in a separate action at law.  Because the First District held 
otherwise, we quash the decision below and approve the certified conflict decisions 
of the Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth District Courts of Appeal. 
BACKGROUND 
Heather Lanham’s residential property in Gadsden County, Florida, was 
foreclosed by final judgement.  That judgment expressly reserved jurisdiction to 
rule on any future deficiency claim, although no one sought to adjudicate the claim 
in that forum.  Instead, Dyck-O’Neal, Inc. (O’Neal), which was assigned the 
mortgage and note, filed a separate action at law seeking a deficiency judgment 
against Lanham.  The trial court granted summary judgment for Lanham on an 
issue relating to the validity of O’Neal’s assignment, and O’Neal appealed.  The 
First District quashed the trial court’s decision without reaching the assignment 
issue based upon its conclusion that the trial court lacked subject-matter 
jurisdiction over the suit under section 702.06, Florida Statutes (2014), because the 
foreclosure court had previously reserved jurisdiction to handle the deficiency 
claim.  In so holding, the First District certified conflict with decisions from all 
four of the other district courts of appeal, and we accepted discretionary review. 
 
 
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ANALYSIS 
The sole issue in this case is governed by section 702.06, Florida Statutes 
(2014), which every district court of appeal except for the First District has read as 
permitting a separate action at law for a deficiency judgment unless the foreclosure 
court has already granted or denied a deficiency claim.  Questions of statutory 
interpretation are reviewed de novo.  See Borden v. East-European Ins. Co., 921 
So. 2d 587, 591 (Fla. 2006). 
Section 702.06 reads in relevant part: 
In all suits for the foreclosure of mortgages heretofore or 
hereafter executed the entry of a deficiency decree for any portion of a 
deficiency, should one exist, shall be within the sound discretion of 
the court . . . .  The complainant shall also have the right to sue at 
common law to recover such deficiency, unless the court in the 
foreclosure action has granted or denied a claim for a deficiency 
judgment.   
 
§ 702.06, Fla. Stat. (2014) (emphasis added).   
“When the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a 
clear and definite meaning, . . . the statute must be given its plain and obvious 
meaning.”  Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984) (quoting A.R. Douglass, 
Inc. v. McRainey, 137 So. 157, 159 (Fla. 1931)).  Here, the statute plainly allows 
the foreclosure court to adjudicate the deficiency claim but also gives the 
complainant “the right to sue at common law to recover such deficiency, unless the 
court in the foreclosure action has granted or denied a claim for a deficiency 
 
 
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judgment.”  (Emphasis added.)  A reservation of jurisdiction is not a grant or 
denial of the claim.  The foreclosure court would have only “granted or denied” the 
deficiency judgment if it had adjudicated the claim.  Therefore, this statute plainly 
precludes the separate action only where the foreclosure court has actually ruled on 
the claim—as held by the Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth District Courts of 
Appeal.   
In reaching a different result below, the First District relied on its prior 
decision in Higgins v. Dyck-O’Neal, Inc., 201 So. 3d 157 (Fla. 1st DCA 
2016).  See O’Neal, 214 So. 3d at 802.  However, in Higgins, the First District 
examined this Court’s precedent interpreting an older version of section 702.06 
that did not contain the “granted or denied” language.  See Higgins, 201 So. 3d at 
159-63.  As correctly explained by the dissent in Higgins: “The clarity of the 2013 
statutory language decides this case . . . . [and the cases relied upon by the majority 
of the First District panel are] immaterial because the 2013 statutory language at 
issue trumps whatever perceived inconsistency . . . [exists] with prior precedents.”  
Id. at 167 (Makar, J., dissenting). 
CONCLUSION 
We quash the decision below in O’Neal, disapprove Higgins, approve 
Garcia, Hendrick, Gdovin, and McKenna, and hold that section 702.06, Florida 
Statutes (2014), permits an independent action at law for a deficiency judgment 
 
 
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when the foreclosure court has expressly reserved jurisdiction to handle a 
deficiency claim but has not actually decided the merits of the claim. 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, and 
LABARGA, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions  
 
 
First District - Case No. 1D16-1624  
 
 
(Gadsden County) 
 
David M. Snyder, Tampa, Florida; Susan B. Morrison of Law Offices of Susan B. 
Morrison, P.A., Tampa, Florida; and Joshua D. Moore of Law Offices of Daniel C. 
Consuegra, Tampa, Florida,  
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Rick A. Savage of Savage Law Office, PLLC, Tallahassee, Florida; and Jacob D. 
Flentke of Flentke Legal Consulting, PLLC, Orlando, Florida,  
 
 
for Respondent 
 
Natasha Shaikh of Shaikh & Shaikh, P.A., Orlando, Florida, 
 
Amicus Curiae