Title: City of Chelsea v. New England Police Benevolent Ass'n, Local 192
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13331
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: March 8, 2023

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-13331 
 
CITY OF CHELSEA  vs.  NEW ENGLAND POLICE BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, INC., LOCAL 192. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     January 6, 2023. - March 8, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Arbitration, Arbitrable question, Confirmation of award.  Public 
Employment, Collective bargaining, Termination.  Labor, 
Collective bargaining, Grievance procedure, Public 
employment, Arbitration. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
July 26, 2021. 
 
The case was heard by Patrick M. Haggan, J., on motions for 
judgment on the pleadings. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
Strephon Treadway for the plaintiff. 
Thomas E. Horgan for the defendant. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  After the New England Police Benevolent 
Association, Inc., Local 192 (NEPBA), replaced the International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 25 (Local 25), as the exclusive 
2 
 
bargaining representative for the emergency dispatchers in the 
city of Chelsea (city), the NEPBA sought to arbitrate a 
grievance regarding the termination of a dispatcher that 
occurred following the change in union representation.  The 
NEPBA and the city had not yet bargained to a new contract, but 
employees had been working pursuant to the terms and conditions 
of the city's prior collective bargaining agreement with Local 
25, which contained an arbitration provision.  The parties 
submitted to an arbitrator the question whether the dispute was 
arbitrable.  The arbitrator ruled that it was.  The city now 
appeals from a Superior Court order confirming the arbitrator's 
decision. 
 
We determine that the dispute was arbitrable because (1) 
the dispute clearly would have been covered by the broad 
arbitration provision negotiated by the city and the prior 
union, if the contract with the city had remained in effect; (2) 
the arbitrator, acting within her authority, found that the 
contract was extended by the city according to the terms of the 
contract, and we defer to such contractual interpretation by the 
arbitrator; and (3) we conclude that the labor relations act 
entitles a successor union to "step[] into the shoes of its 
predecessor" and enforce an arbitration provision in a 
collective bargaining agreement negotiated by its predecessor.  
3 
 
See Watertown v. Watertown Mun. Employees Ass'n, 63 Mass. App. 
Ct. 285, 291 (2005) (Watertown). 
Background.  The city's emergency dispatchers had been 
represented by Local 25 since 2009.  On January 3, 2020, the 
NEPBA filed a petition to represent the bargaining unit.  On 
January 8, 2020, Local 25 sent a letter disclaiming interest in 
representing the dispatchers.  The NEPBA won the subsequent 
election unanimously; due to Local 25's disclaimer, it was the 
only union on the ballot.  On April 16, 2020, the Department of 
Labor Relations certified the NEPBA as the dispatchers' 
exclusive representative. 
The most recent collective bargaining agreement in effect 
for the dispatchers was negotiated by Local 25.  It contained 
multiple arbitration provisions.  One stated that "[o]nly 
matters involving questions whether the [c]ity is complying with 
its obligations under this [a]greement, including matters 
involving the meaning, application or interpretation of the 
[a]greement" are subject to the grievance and arbitration 
procedure, except that "[n]o matter shall be subject to the 
arbitration procedure of this [a]greement which is subject to 
the authority or jurisdiction of Civil Service or any Retirement 
Board."  More specifically, the agreement also provided:  "Any 
protest against discipline, suspension or discharge shall be 
4 
 
handled under the grievance and arbitration procedure provided 
for in the agreement." 
By its terms, the agreement also had the following 
duration: 
"This [a]greement shall remain in full force and effect 
from July 1, 2016 until midnight June 30, 2019 and shall 
terminate unless extended by mutual consent of the parties, 
or unless either party hereto gives written notice to the 
other not less than sixty (60) days prior to the date of 
expiration, of a desire to change or amend the terms or 
conditions hereof." 
 
The city solicitor wrote to representatives of Local 25 on 
January 31, 2019 (thus "not less" than sixty days before June 
30):  "Our agreements expire on June 30, 2019 and I was hoping 
to schedule our initial meetings for bargaining."  Although 
Local 25 and the city exchanged proposals for a new contract and 
met several times, they did not reach an agreement.  A 
representative from the NEPBA reached out to start contract 
negotiations after the union was certified, but by the time of 
the dispute in question, the parties had not reached an 
agreement.  The city continued to abide by all provisions in the 
contract during this period of time and apparently has done so 
to this day, with the exception of the arbitration provision. 
Nearly one year after the NEPBA was certified, a dispatcher 
allegedly failed to properly dispatch a fire response, and then 
misreported the facts in a subsequent investigation.  As a 
result, the city dismissed her.  The union protested the 
5 
 
discipline and invoked the grievance procedure in the collective 
bargaining agreement, which involves a multistep process that 
culminates in arbitration.  The relevant contract term states: 
"Grievances not settled in the [s]teps of the grievance 
procedure may be referred to an arbitrator agreed upon by 
the parties . . . [or one] designated by the American 
Arbitration Association . . . .  The decision of the 
arbitrator within the scope of his authority shall be final 
and binding upon the parties." 
 
Although the city disputed that it was required to 
arbitrate the grievance, the parties proceeded to arbitration 
and submitted to the arbitrator the question whether the dispute 
was arbitrable.  The arbitrator ruled that it was, because the 
agreement negotiated by Local 25 was still in effect on February 
1, 2021, by its terms.  The arbitrator explained:  "While [the] 
letter [regarding scheduling bargaining] does not use the exact 
language of Article 25 [(the duration provision)], I find that 
it adequately satisfies Article 25, and thus extended that 
contract."  She also relied on the reasoning of the Appeals 
Court decision in Watertown discussing the presumption of 
arbitrability, including when "the arbitration provision being 
interpreted involves expiring contracts and changes in union 
representation."  Watertown, 63 Mass. App. Ct. at 290. 
The city filed a complaint in the Superior Court to vacate 
the arbitration award, arguing that the arbitrator exceeded her 
authority because there was no agreement to arbitrate in effect 
6 
 
once Local 25 disclaimed interest.  See G. L. c. 150C, § 11 (a) 
("the superior court shall vacate an award if . . . the 
arbitrators exceeded their powers").  The union moved to confirm 
the arbitration award.  Both parties moved for judgment on the 
pleadings.  The judge confirmed the arbitration award, allowed 
the union's motion, and denied the city's motion.  The judge 
determined that the collective bargaining agreement, including 
the arbitration provision, "remained in effect when the 
arbitration occurred" because a new bargaining representative 
"'steps into the shoes of its predecessor' for purposes of the 
[agreement]" (quoting Watertown, 63 Mass. App. Ct. at 291). 
The city appealed from the judgment.  This court 
transferred the appeal on its own motion. 
Discussion.  The well-settled background principles for 
resolving this case are summarized in the Appeals Court decision 
in Watertown, and we repeat them here: 
"'The first principle is that "arbitration is a matter of 
contract"' and cannot therefore be imposed if it is not a 
part of the bargained-for exchange.  [Local No. 1710, Int'l 
Ass'n of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO v. Chicopee, 430 Mass. 417, 
420-421 (1999), quoting AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communications 
Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986).]  Courts 
recognize, however, that 'a collective bargaining agreement 
is not an ordinary contract.'  [John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. 
Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 550 (1964).]  A collective 
bargaining agreement governs an entire, evolving labor-
management relationship.  It is negotiated in a highly 
regulated environment that determines the certification and 
decertification of unions and establishes bargaining 
obligations of unions and employers.  A collective 
bargaining agreement also promotes the equitable, 
7 
 
efficient, and peaceful resolution of workplace disputes.  
Arbitration provisions play an important part in the entire 
process, as they provide for the expeditious resolution of 
workplace disputes by decisionmakers with expert knowledge 
of the common law of the shop.  [United Steelworkers of Am. 
v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580-582 
(1960).] 
 
"For these reasons, where the collective bargaining 
agreement 'contains an arbitration clause, there is a 
presumption of arbitrability in the sense that "an order to 
arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied 
unless it may be said with positive assurance that the 
arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation 
that covers the asserted dispute.  Doubts should be 
resolved in favor of coverage . . . particularly . . . 
where the clause is . . . broad" (emphasis added).'  [Local 
No. 1710, Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO, 430 Mass. 
at 421, quoting AT&T Techs., Inc., 475 U.S. at 649.]  In 
addition, when the arbitration provision being interpreted 
involves expiring contracts and changes in union 
representation, courts carefully consider the statutory 
context in which the agreements are negotiated.  See, e.g., 
[Nolde Bros. v. Local No. 358, Bakery & Confectionery 
Workers Union, 430 U.S. 243, 254 (1977)] (discussing how 
parties drafted their arbitration clause 'against a 
backdrop of well-established federal labor policy favoring 
arbitration')." 
 
Watertown, 63 Mass. App. Ct. at 289-290. 
In the instant case, there are three interrelated 
questions.  First, is the issue in dispute (the employee 
discharge) covered by the arbitration provision from the 
collective bargaining agreement?  Second, did the agreement 
expire or was it extended by the parties?  Third, what is the 
effect of the change in union representation?  Although the 
parties, or at least the city, skip over the first two 
questions, we address them, as they inform the answer to the 
8 
 
third.  Indeed, it is the breadth of the arbitration provision 
and the extension of the contract that are the key issues for 
arbitrability of the dispute, not the change in union 
representation. 
1.  Employee discharge.  The first question is clearly not 
disputed in the instant case.  The arbitration provision states:  
"Any protest against discipline, suspension or discharge shall 
be handled under the grievance and arbitration procedure 
provided for in the agreement."  The termination of the 
dispatcher would fit squarely within the language of the 
arbitration provision if the collective bargaining agreement 
were still in effect. 
2.  Extension of agreement.  The second question regarding 
the extension or termination of the agreement is also not 
contested in part, as the city concedes that the contract was 
extended, but contends that the extension ended upon the change 
in union representation, which took place one year before the 
employee was disciplined and sought arbitration.  As the issue 
the city concedes again informs resolution of the issue the city 
contests, particularly regarding deference owed to the 
arbitrator's contractual interpretation, we briefly address it. 
Although the question "whether a party has agreed to 
binding arbitration of a particular dispute is always a question 
for the court," Massachusetts Community College Council v. 
9 
 
Massachusetts Bd. of Higher Educ./Roxbury Community College, 465 
Mass. 791, 795 (2013), threshold or subsidiary questions, such 
as whether the agreement providing for arbitration has been 
terminated or extended, are often questions for the arbitrator, 
particularly under so-called "broad[ly]" drafted arbitration 
provisions, see Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers 
Local #70 v. Interstate Distrib. Co., 832 F.2d 507, 511 (9th 
Cir. 1987) (Teamsters).  That is because "[t]he disagreement 
between the parties . . . is not primarily over what the 
arbitration clause provides, or what its scope is, but rather 
concerns the effect to be given a letter -- or an exchange of 
letters -- under the terms of the termination or expiration 
clause of the parties' collective bargaining agreement.  In 
short, the real dispute is over the proper meaning or 
interpretation of the termination clause."  Id. at 510. 
In broadly worded arbitration provisions -- that is, those 
"covering all disputes concerning the meaning of the terms and 
provisions of the agreement," Teamsters, 832 F.2d at 510 -- this 
interpretation is ordinarily left to arbitrators.  That is 
because "[t]he issue involves the interpretation of the 
expiration or termination provision of the agreement, and 
standard arbitration clauses ordinarily provide that such 
interpretations, like all others necessary to the resolution of 
disputes over the meaning of the contract, shall be made by an 
10 
 
arbitrator."  Id.  See District No. 1, Pac. Coast Dist., Marine 
Eng'rs' Beneficial Ass'n, AFL-CIO v. Liberty Maritime Corp., 815 
F.3d 834, 845 (D.C. Cir. 2016) ("If the arbitration provision is 
broad, the court presumes that the parties intended to arbitrate 
the duration dispute . . ."); Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n 
Local No. 18 -- Wisc., AFL-CIO & Everbrite, LLC, 359 N.L.R.B. 
1095, 1096 (2013) (arbitration "agreement provides for the 
resolution of contract interpretation disputes" and whether 
"agreement was automatically extended . . . by its terms" is 
such dispute). 
Here, we are likewise dealing with a broadly worded 
arbitration agreement:  the agreement provides that "matters 
involving questions whether the [c]ity is complying with its 
obligations under this [a]greement, including matters involving 
the meaning, application or interpretation of the [a]greement," 
are subject to the grievance and arbitration procedure.1  See 
Massachusetts Correction Officers Federated Union v. Sheriff of 
Bristol County, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 285, 288 (2002), quoting 
United Steelworkers of Am., 363 U.S. at 585 ("Supreme Court 
treated as 'broad' a clause that called for the arbitration of 
any differences 'as to the meaning and application of the . . . 
 
1 Matters covered by the civil service or pension laws were 
excluded. 
11 
 
Agreement'").  The termination and extension provision is a part 
of the collective bargaining agreement and was not distinguished 
from other provisions of the contract.  As interpretation of the 
contract, including the extension and termination provisions, 
has been assigned to the arbitrator by the contracting parties, 
we defer to the arbitrator's interpretation, even if it 
implicates arbitrability.  We distinguish this from when an 
arbitrator relies on public law rather than the contract itself, 
in which case we do not defer.  School Comm. of Lexington v. 
Zagaeski, 469 Mass. 104, 112 (2014), quoting School Dist. of 
Beverly v. Geller, 435 Mass. 223, 229-230 (Cordy, J., 
concurring) (although "an arbitrator may be uniquely qualified 
to interpret the 'law of the shop,'" courts are "better 
positioned to interpret the 'law of the land'"); Watertown, 63 
Mass. App. Ct. at 292 ("The arbitrator's interpretation of the 
agreement was not based on any specific contractual language, 
nor has any contractual language supporting his interpretation 
been brought to our attention by the town"). 
Here, the arbitrator determined that the collective 
bargaining agreement had been extended and was still in effect, 
more than one year after the change in representation, on the 
date of the February 1, 2021 incident.  She explained that the 
agreement contained a specific duration term with "key 
language":  it would terminate on June 30, 2019, unless extended 
12 
 
by mutual consent or if "either party hereto gives written 
notice to the other not less than sixty (60) days prior to the 
date of expiration, of a desire to change or amend the terms or 
conditions."2  The arbitrator found that this condition was 
satisfied via the city solicitor's e-mail message to the union 
on January 31, 2019, not less than sixty days before the 
deadline, where she stated that she "was hoping to schedule our 
initial meetings for bargaining."  The city apparently did not 
contest the determination of extension either at arbitration or 
before the Superior Court judge, except to argue that the 
extension terminated once there was a change in representation:  
the arbitrator stated that "[t]he [c]ity provide[d] no answer 
. . . in its brief" to her analysis that the notice extended the 
contract; and the judge observed that "[t]he [c]ity concede[d] 
that by its own terms the [agreement] was extended beyond its 
nominal termination date by the [c]ity's conduct and therefore 
 
2 This is a type of "evergreen" clause:  language in a 
collective bargaining agreement providing that the terms will 
remain in effect while the parties negotiate a new contract.  
Because the statute limited the express term of a collective 
bargaining agreement to three years, G. L. c. 150E, § 7 (a), 
this court ruled that an agreement could not be extended beyond 
three years via an evergreen clause, see Boston Hous. Auth. v. 
National Conference of Firemen & Oilers, Local 3, 458 Mass. 155, 
164 (2010).  However, the Legislature subsequently amended the 
statute to expressly allow such provisions.  See G. L. c. 150E, 
§ 7 (a), as amended through St. 2011, c. 198, § 1; State Police 
Ass'n of Mass. v. Alben, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 366, 372 (2020). 
13 
 
[did] not argue that the arbitration was invalid because the 
[agreement] had expired." 
The arbitrator appeared to consider the change in 
representation to be of no import regarding her interpretation 
of the continuation of the contract.  For support, she drew on 
the Appeals Court decision in Watertown.  Although we do not 
second-guess her interpretation of the agreement or the law of 
the shop, we do not defer to her additional reliance on public 
law, including the correct application of the Appeals Court 
decision in Watertown, on an issue concerning arbitrability.  
See Zagaeski, 469 Mass. at 111-112; Watertown, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 
at 289.  We agree with her analysis on this issue as well, for 
the reasons discussed infra, but we nonetheless owe her no 
deference in this regard as this raises a public law issue 
regarding arbitrability, which must be decided by the court.  
See Zagaeski, supra at 112.  See also John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 
376 U.S. at 546-547 (requiring court and not arbitrator to 
decide whether arbitration clause in collective bargaining 
agreement survives corporate merger).3 
 
3 Finally, we note that the arbitrator's decision is further 
supported by the city's recognition that all the other 
provisions in the contract continued in force to this day, as 
confirmed by counsel at oral argument. 
14 
 
3.  Change in union representation.  Because the agreement 
negotiated by Local 25 had been extended, it was still in effect 
when the NEPBA sought to arbitrate a dispatcher's termination.  
The question then becomes whether a union can enforce an 
arbitration agreement against an employer, when the employer 
agreed to arbitrate with the predecessor union but not the 
successor union.4 
 
4 This issue has not been consistently resolved under 
analogous Federal law.  The National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB) has ruled that after a change in union representation, 
"the new union may not compel the employer to arbitrate," 
because the employer did not consent to arbitrate with that 
union -- although the employer must still arbitrate with the 
predecessor union grievances that arose before the change in 
union representation.  Children's Hosp. & Research Ctr. of 
Oakland & Serv. Employees Int'l Union, United Healthcare Workers 
-- W., 364 N.L.R.B. 1677, 1680 (2016), citing Arizona Portland 
Cement Co. & Local 296, Indep. Workers of N. Am., 302 N.L.R.B. 
36 (1991).  However, Federal courts have found that a successor 
union can compel the employer to arbitrate pursuant to the 
previous agreement.  See Cincinnati Newspaper Guild, Local 9 v. 
Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc., 863 F.2d 439, 445-446 (6th Cir. 1988) 
(Cincinnati Newspaper) (employees' right to arbitrate "may not 
be abrogated by the employer merely because the employees 
subsequently see fit to change their agent"); Local No. 503 of 
the Graphic Communications Conference of the Int'l Bhd. of 
Teamsters vs. Cascades Containerboard Packaging, U.S. Dist. Ct., 
No. 17-cv-6605 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2017) (following Cincinnati 
Newspaper but denying relief on other grounds); General 
Teamsters Union Local No. 439 vs. Sunrise Sanitation Servs., 
Inc., U.S. Dist. Ct., No. S-05-1208 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2006).  
The NLRB rule would create the awkward situation where the 
employees vote out a union but must still rely on it for 
arbitrations.  Worse, if applied to cases like this one, where a 
grievance arises after a change in representation, employees 
would appear to lack any right to arbitrate grievances. 
15 
 
In a similar context in Watertown, the Appeals Court ruled 
that when the grievance arises before a change in union 
representation, the employer must arbitrate it with the 
successor union, because the successor union "steps into the 
shoes of its predecessor."  Watertown, 63 Mass. App. Ct. at 291.  
In that case, as in this one, the previously negotiated contract 
had been extended by an evergreen clause.  Id. at 288.  As the 
agreement was in effect when the grievance occurred, the 
situation is similar:  the successor union simply seeks to 
enforce an arbitration agreement negotiated with its 
predecessor. 
We determine that the employer must arbitrate the 
grievance, as it has agreed to do so via the collective 
bargaining agreement, and the successor union steps into the 
shoes of its predecessor.  This conclusion is supported by three 
aspects of the labor relations act.  First, the statute favors 
arbitration as a means of resolving employment disputes once 
parties have agreed that the disputed matters are subject to 
arbitration.  See G. L. c. 150E, § 8.  At that point, the 
presumption in favor of arbitration applies and "[d]oubts should 
be resolved in favor of coverage."  Local No. 1710, Int'l Ass'n 
of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO, 430 Mass. at 421, quoting AT&T Techs. 
Inc., 475 U.S. at 649. 
16 
 
Second, the statute provides for employees' free choice in 
union representation.  "[M]ajority rule is a fundamental aspect 
of American democratic government" and Massachusetts labor 
policy.  Branch v. Commonwealth Employment Relations Bd., 481 
Mass. 810, 827 (2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 858 (2020).  To 
preclude a successor union from arbitrating grievances would 
"penalize[] and indirectly intrude[] on the employees' right to 
select new union representation," by forcing them to choose 
between giving up their bargained-for grievance process or 
sticking with a disfavored union.  Watertown, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 
at 292.  The same principles apply here, even though Local 25 
sent a letter disclaiming interest rather than losing an 
election.  The dispatchers unanimously selected the NEPBA as 
their bargaining agent, evidencing their desire to continue 
being represented by a union.  Their right to arbitrate 
grievances cannot be revoked just because they have switched 
representatives. 
Third, an employer cannot unilaterally change terms and 
conditions of employment.  "[T]he public employer and the 
employee organization" must "negotiate in good faith" over 
"terms and conditions of employment."  Somerville v. 
Commonwealth Employment Relations Bd., 470 Mass. 563, 569 
(2015), quoting G. L. c. 150E, § 6.  It is a "prohibited 
practice" under G. L. c. 150E, § 10 (a) (5), for a public 
17 
 
employer to make a unilateral change to a mandatory subject of 
bargaining without first bargaining to impasse.  See Somerville, 
supra at 570.  The terms of a grievance procedure for employment 
disputes that culminates in arbitration is such a mandatory 
subject.  See School Comm. of Newton v. Labor Relations Comm., 
388 Mass. 557, 563 (1983) (implementation of employee 
terminations "involved the very essence of the relationship, the 
employment itself, and not a peripheral matter").  See also 14 
Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 256 (2009) (arbitration 
is mandatory subject under Federal labor law).  Thus, until the 
successor union and the city agree to a new contract or bargain 
to impasse, all the key terms and conditions of the prior 
contract must remain in effect, including the arbitration 
provision. 
 
Conclusion.  The dispute at issue was covered by the 
arbitration provision contained in the contract negotiated by 
the city and the union that previously represented the 
bargaining unit.  As found by the arbitrator within her 
authority to interpret the contract and the law of the shop, the 
contract, including the grievance and arbitration provision, was 
extended and not terminated by the city.  Finally, we conclude 
that the labor relations act empowers the successor union to 
step into the shoes of its predecessor and enforce the 
provisions of the extended contract, including its arbitration 
18 
 
provisions.  For all of these reasons, we affirm the judge's 
order granting the NEPBA's motion for judgment on the pleadings, 
denying the city's motion for judgment on the pleadings, and 
confirming the arbitration award. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.