Title: Commonwealth v. Cartright
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-10572
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: November 2, 2017

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-10572 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  NORTON CARTRIGHT. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     May 5, 2017. - November 2, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, & Cypher, JJ.1 
 
 
Homicide.  Constitutional Law, Assistance of counsel, Admissions 
and confessions, Voluntariness of statement, Arrest, 
Probable cause.  Evidence, Admissions and confessions, 
Voluntariness of statement.  Arrest.  Probable Cause.  
Larceny.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Assistance of 
counsel, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of 
statement, Arraignment. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 14, 2006. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Patrick 
J. Riley, J.; the case was tried before Christine M. McEvoy, J., 
and a motion for a new trial, filed on November 29, 2013, was 
considered by her. 
 
 
 
Kevin S. Nixon for the defendant. 
 
Paul B. Linn, Assistant District Attorney (David J. 
Fredette, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
                     
 
1 Justice Hines participated in the deliberations on this 
case prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  On Friday, August 25, 2006, the victim, Yolande 
Danestoir, left her home in Chelsea to work the overnight shift 
as a nurse at a hospital in Cambridge.  After leaving work the 
next morning, she was not seen again.  One and one-half weeks 
later, on the evening of Tuesday, September 5, 2006, police 
found the victim's body in her apartment, hidden in a sleeping 
bag at the back of a closet.  The defendant, the victim's son, 
was arrested the same evening on charges of larceny from a 
person for theft of the victim's cellular telephone.  Slightly 
more than six hours after his arrest, following a police 
interview lasting four hours and forty-seven minutes, the 
defendant confessed to having killed his mother. 
 
The defendant's motion to suppress the statement was 
denied, and the statement was played in its entirety at trial.  
The defendant was convicted by a Superior Court jury of murder 
in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and 
extreme atrocity or cruelty.  He appeals from his conviction and 
from the denial of his motion for a new trial.  The defendant's 
primary argument before us is that his confession should have 
been suppressed.  He maintains that suppression was required 
because the waiver of his Miranda rights was involuntary; his 
confession was obtained absent a valid waiver of his right to 
prompt arraignment, and his counsel was ineffective for not 
seeking suppression of the statement on that ground; he was 
3 
 
 
arrested without probable cause; and his confession was coerced, 
and his trial counsel also was ineffective for failing to have 
sought suppression on this basis.  The defendant also seeks 
relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We discern no error by the 
trial judge warranting reversal, and no constitutionally 
ineffective assistance by trial counsel.  Accordingly, we affirm 
the convictions and the denial of the motion for a new trial.  
Having carefully reviewed the entire record, we decline to 
exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to order a new 
trial or reduce the degree of guilt. 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Suppression hearing.  The key evidence 
at the hearing on the motion to suppress was an audio-video 
recording of the defendant's statement to police.  In addition, 
there was testimony by the police officers who conducted the 
interview, concerning their interviewing techniques, and by 
other officers explaining the course of the investigation.  The 
Commonwealth called the defendant's older brother to describe 
generally his family history and their joint upbringing in Haiti 
before coming to the United States.  The defendant introduced 
testimony by an expert on false confessions.  The parties do not 
dispute the facts presented during the live testimony, and agree 
that the judge's decision on the motion should be reviewed de 
novo.  As the officers' testimony and the recorded statement 
were introduced at trial, and the defendant raises the same 
4 
 
 
arguments with respect to that evidence, we reserve discussion 
of the question whether the denial of the motion to suppress was 
error for our discussion of the issues at trial. 
 
b.  Evidence at trial.  We summarize the facts the jury 
could have found, reserving certain details for later 
discussion.  The victim owned a three-story home bordering both 
Chelsea and Everett.  In August, 2006, she lived on the second 
floor with her youngest son, Noah, who was then nine years old.  
They shared the house with the victim's father, who was 
bedridden and confined to the third floor, and an unrelated 
family who rented the first floor apartment. 
 
The defendant was nineteen at the time of the victim's 
death.  Until shortly before then, the defendant had lived with 
the victim in the second-floor apartment, but he had been told 
to leave following an argument.  Subsequently, he spent much of 
his time living with the family downstairs; he was involved in a 
romantic relationship with a member of that family.  His girl 
friend knew of the negative feelings between the defendant and 
his mother, and testified that the defendant had told her "a few 
times" that he wanted to kill his mother.  When the defendant 
was not sleeping in the first-floor apartment, he often would 
hide in the crawlspace on the third floor of the house. 
 
The victim worked her scheduled overnight shift on the 
night of Friday, August 25, and Saturday, August 26, 2006.  
5 
 
 
Hospital surveillance video showed her leaving the parking lot 
at approximately 7 A.M on August 26.  She was not seen alive 
again. 
 
At some point on August 26, 2006, Noah saw the defendant 
cleaning the second-floor bathroom; the defendant told Noah that 
the cleaning solutions being used were dangerous, and to stay in 
his bedroom.  That evening, the defendant called a movie theater 
and the 411 information hotline from his mother's cellular 
telephone.  He and his girl friend went to a movie and then 
slept in the second-floor apartment.  The girl friend was 
worried, as she knew that neither she nor the defendant were 
allowed to be on the second floor, but the defendant assured her 
that his mother would not enter the bedroom. 
 
The following day, August 27, 2006, at the urging of a 
member of the girl friend's family, the defendant called the 
Chelsea police department.  He reported that his mother had not 
come home the previous morning, and that he was concerned that 
no one was available to take care of Noah and his grandfather.  
On the basis of this call, a Chelsea police officer and a social 
worker arrived to perform a well-being check.  In the course of 
this visit, one of the officers asked the defendant for the 
telephone number belonging to Noah's father.  Noah pointed to a 
cellular telephone that had been in the defendant's pocket.  He 
6 
 
 
said it was his "mom's," and that the number would be stored on 
it.  The defendant claimed that the telephone belonged to him. 
 
On Monday, August 28, 2006, the defendant filed a missing 
persons report with the Chelsea police department.  Officer 
Joseph P. Capistran accompanied the defendant into his mother's 
house.  Capistran noted that the closet in the victim's bedroom 
was padlocked.  When he approached the closet and asked to look 
inside, the defendant appeared nervous and told him that his 
mother had the only key.  Capistran placed his nose against the 
closet door and smelled nothing unusual.  Elsewhere in the 
house, however, he noticed a strong smell of cleaning fluid. 
 
Police returned to the victim's apartment on Friday, 
September 1, 2006.  The floor in the victim's bedroom smelled of 
cleaning fluid and appeared as if it had been recently cleaned.  
Near the closet, police smelled decaying flesh.  When the door 
was forced open, police found nothing that could have caused the 
smell.  While inside the house, Chelsea police Detective John 
Coen asked the defendant about any recent cleaning and about his 
mother's cellular telephone.  The defendant explained that he 
had recently cleaned up after Noah's pet rabbit.  When 
questioned about the telephone, which the defendant previously 
had told Coen the victim generally kept on her person, the 
defendant began to shake.  He said that he did not have it and 
then said that his mother practiced voodoo. 
7 
 
 
 
On Tuesday, September 5, 2006, police obtained a search 
warrant and searched the house.  The defendant waited outside 
during this search.  Police found the victim's cellular 
telephone under a couch cushion in the living room.  When they 
entered a hallway off the kitchen, they noticed a foul odor.  
They opened the hallway closet and found it "full from the floor 
almost to the top of the door frame" with items including 
tables, an animal cage, boxes, and clothing.  After removing the 
items, police discovered a human body, later confirmed to be 
that of the victim, wrapped in a sleeping bag. 
 
The defendant was subsequently arrested for larceny from a 
person (with reference to his mother's cellular telephone).2  He 
was not told that police had found a body.  The defendant 
entered an interview room at the Chelsea police station at 
approximately 11:10 P.M.3  A few minutes later, he was joined by 
Sergeant Kevin Condon of the State police and Sergeant William 
J. Dana of the Chelsea police.  Police immediately informed the 
defendant that they wanted to speak to him about the victim's 
                     
 
2 The evidence supporting the arrest for larceny from a 
person included the fact that the defendant had been seen with 
the victim's telephone, that he had claimed it as his own, that 
telephone records showed that it had been used to call a movie 
theater and the 411 information line after the victim was last 
seen, and that the defendant told police the victim usually kept 
the telephone on her person. 
 
 
3 The defendant was arrested at approximately 8:45 P.M. 
8 
 
 
disappearance.  A short while later, Condon reminded him that 
while he had been arrested for larceny of the cellular 
telephone, police wanted to talk "about broader issues."  The 
officers confirmed with the defendant that he wished to have the 
interview audio-video recorded.4  They reviewed his Miranda 
rights; the defendant agreed to speak with them and executed a 
written waiver.  Condon then asked the defendant if he wanted 
anything to drink.  The defendant responded that he had not had 
anything to eat or drink all day, and Dana brought him a cup of 
water. 
 
Over the course of approximately the next two and one-half 
hours, the interrogating officers and the defendant held an 
open-ended discussion; the defendant did the majority of the 
talking.  He said that immediately prior to the victim's 
disappearance, he had begun to live primarily with the family in 
the first-floor apartment.  In response to his relationship with 
the family downstairs, his aunt, his mother's older sister, 
convinced his mother to bar him from the family home.  The 
defendant talked at length about his hostility toward his aunt, 
and the strain that placed on his relationship with his mother.  
The defendant said that he had last seen his mother alive on 
Thursday, August 24, 2006, and that he had telephoned police on 
                     
 
4 The recording was played in full at trial. 
9 
 
 
Sunday, August 27, 2006, when he realized that he could not care 
for Noah or his grandfather without her.  Because she had been 
gone for extended periods in the past, he had not initially been 
concerned by her absence.  The defendant told police that he had 
tried calling his mother a few times, but that he stopped trying 
to reach her when he realized that her cellular telephone was in 
the house. 
 
At approximately 1:25 A.M., police asked the defendant what 
he believed had happened to his mother; he replied that he did 
not know.  Although the officers occasionally challenged certain 
of the defendant's statements, the interview remained 
nonaccusatory until around 1:45 A.M., at which time there was a 
ten-minute break. 
 
After the break, the interview took on a notably different 
tone.  Condon told the defendant that it was "obvious to us that 
you were involved with your mom and her disappearance," and said 
that his mother had been found dead.  After reciting some of the 
evidence tending to inculpate the defendant, Condon noted, 
"there's not a question of who was involved in killing your 
mom."  The officers then began to emphasize their certainty as 
to the defendant's guilt.  They also proffered reasons why he 
might have killed the victim without being "a bad guy," 
including mistake, intoxication, or the possibility that he had 
been provoked by mistreatment from his mother or his aunt.  The 
10 
 
 
officers promised to inform the prosecutor if the defendant was 
cooperative.  The officers acknowledged at trial that they had 
been trained in techniques known as "maximization" -- i.e., 
overstating their certainty of the defendant's guilt -- and 
"minimization" -- i.e., diminishing the severity of the crime 
and implying the possibility of leniency. 
 
In addition to these tactics, police suggested that the 
defendant and his family would find peace if he told them "the 
truth."  One of the officers said that the defendant's recent 
trouble sleeping, and his nightmares, stemmed from his guilt, 
and encouraged him to confess, to stop the guilt from "eat[ing] 
away" at him.  They also encouraged him to confess to provide 
closure for his brothers.  Dana told the defendant, "if you 
don't come forward and be a man and tell us the truth, [Noah] is 
going to grow up not knowing [what happened], and he's going to 
have nightmares, and he's going to have trouble sleeping."  Dana 
also said that the defendant had "the power to relieve the 
burden" on his brothers "by getting [them] closure, so that they 
can get on with their lives."  In addition, Dana repeatedly 
suggested that the victim could not "rest in peace" in the 
"afterlife" unless "the truth is out."  Dana told the defendant 
he believed that he loved his mother, and encouraged him to 
confess to calm her restless soul, calling it "the last thing 
you can do for her." 
11 
 
 
 
At some point at approximately 2:30 A.M., the defendant 
said, "I'm fucking going to jail, huh?" and began giving a 
detailed confession.  He said that he had been banned from his 
mother's apartment, and that, on the evening and night of 
August 25 to 26, 2006, he sneaked into the second-floor 
apartment through the crawlspace.  He eventually fell asleep, 
and later awoke to the sound of his mother's arriving home.  He 
hid until he no longer heard footsteps.  He then got up and 
walked toward the door but, before he was able to leave the 
apartment, his mother saw him.  She threw a glass at him.  The 
glass did not hit him, but the defendant responded by throwing 
the head of a hammer5 at her.6  He then ran to his bedroom and 
stayed there for approximately twenty minutes.  When he left the 
bedroom, he saw the victim "thrashing" and bleeding heavily, and 
saw chairs turned over in a pool of blood.  He saw her prop 
herself against the refrigerator and kitchen door.  She 
eventually fell to the floor again.  The defendant then wrapped 
                     
 
5 The defendant later described the hammerhead in a manner 
consistent with a ball peen hammerhead.  He said that it was not 
a "regular claw hammer."  A ball peen hammer has a rounded head 
opposite the face, while a claw hammer has a split and curved 
end that can be used to extract nails. 
 
 
6 The defendant's admission to police that he had thrown a 
hammerhead at the victim occurred at approximately 2:52 A.M., 
slightly more than six hours after his arrest.  At that point, 
he had not yet waived his right to prompt arraignment, which he 
did shortly thereafter. 
12 
 
 
her in bed linens and put her in a bedroom closet.  At some 
point, he heard her moving around inside the closet.  He took 
chairs and placed them on top of her to prevent her from 
breaking free.  He then hid bloody clothing and other items in 
the basement, and attempted to clean up the blood.  At a later 
point, he moved the victim's body to the closet where police 
found it on September 5, 2006.  The four hour and forty-seven 
minute interview ended at approximately 3:57 A.M. 
 
Physical evidence at the scene was consistent with much of 
the defendant's confession.  Police found dark-colored stains 
that appeared to be blood at various locations in the house, 
including in the bedroom closet, the kitchen, and both inside 
and on the outside of the refrigerator.  Swabs were taken from 
some of these stains and submitted to the State police crime 
laboratory for testing.  A number of other items, including 
stained chairs, four bags found in the basement, a claw hammer 
recovered from one of those bags, and a ball peen hammerhead 
found in a vase in the living room, also were sent to the State 
police laboratory for blood and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) 
testing.  Police took comparison DNA samples from the victim, 
the defendant, his older brother, and his father. 
 
Stains from the kitchen, the refrigerator, and the chairs 
tested positive for human blood and matched the victim's DNA 
13 
 
 
profile.7  The ball peen hammerhead tested negative for human 
blood, but the claw hammer retrieved from the basement ceiling 
tested positive for human blood; DNA found on that hammer 
matched that of both the defendant and the victim.  An autopsy 
indicated that the victim's wounds were consistent with having 
been made with a claw hammer.8 
 
c.  Prior proceedings.  The defendant moved to suppress his 
confession as involuntary.  He argued that his will was 
overborne by the police practices of "maximization" and 
"minimization," combined with their religious references.  A 
copy of the audio-video recording of his statement was played 
for the judge.  In addition, Condon and Dana testified regarding 
the tactics used in the interview, and two other police officers 
testified about the investigation that led to the defendant's 
arrest.  The defendant introduced testimony by an expert on 
false confessions. 
 
After the motion had been denied, the defendant sought to 
introduce at trial the testimony of the same expert on false 
confessions.  The trial judge, a different judge from the one 
                     
 
7 The probability of a random individual matching the 
victim's DNA profile was "approximately 1 in 6.075 quintillion 
of the Caucasian population, 1 in 64.47 quadrillion of the 
African-American population, and 1 in 19.18 quintillion of the 
Hispanic population." 
 
 
8 At least some of the wounds were not consistent with 
having been made with a ball peen hammerhead. 
14 
 
 
who had ruled on the motion to suppress, determined that the 
proffered expert testimony was not sufficiently reliable within 
the meaning of Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 25-26 
(1994). 
 
The theory of defense was that the confession was coerced 
and should not be credited.  Defense counsel also attempted to 
suggest, through cross-examination, that the defendant's older 
brother had a stronger motive to kill the victim than did the 
defendant.  The defendant was convicted of murder in the first 
degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme 
atrocity or cruelty. 
 
2.  Discussion.  The defendant argues that his confession 
should have been suppressed because police failed to inform him 
of the true ground for his arrest, rendering his subsequent 
Miranda waiver involuntary;9 he did not adequately waive the 
right to prompt arraignment, and counsel was ineffective for 
failing to seek suppression on this basis; he was arrested 
without probable cause, tainting the subsequent confession, and 
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek suppression on 
that ground; and his confession was the product of police 
                     
9 This issue was not raised in the motion to suppress or at 
trial.  The defendant does not contend that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to raise the issue, instead arguing that 
the involuntary waiver created a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice. 
15 
 
 
coercion and consequently involuntary.  We discuss each 
contention in turn. 
 
a.  True grounds for arrest.  The defendant argues that by 
arresting him on the ground of larceny from a person, 
notwithstanding that police already suspected him of involvement 
in his mother's death, the arresting officers violated G. L. 
c. 263, § 1.  That statute provides that "whoever is taken into 
custody . . . has a right to know from the officer who arrests 
or claims to detain him the true ground on which the arrest is 
made."  The defendant does not contend that a violation of G. L. 
c. 263, § 1, by its terms, requires the suppression of any 
postarrest statement.  Rather, he maintains that the dishonesty 
inherent in a violation of the statute renders invalid the 
subsequent waiver of rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436 (1966). 
 
We have not confronted directly the question whether G. L. 
c. 263, § 1, limits the ability of police to make valid arrests 
for minor charges when they suspect the defendant of more 
serious crimes.10  Even if it did, however, any lack of 
disclosure regarding the ground for an arrest is not the type of 
"trick[ery]" that would prevent the defendant's waiver from 
being knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  See Commonwealth v. 
                     
 
10 As discussed, infra, there was probable cause to arrest 
the defendant for the offense of larceny from a person. 
16 
 
 
Medeiros, 395 Mass. 336, 345 (1985).  The law "does not require 
police to inform a suspect of the nature of the crime about 
which he is to be interrogated."  Id.  See Colorado v. Spring, 
479 U.S. 564, 574 (1987) ("The Constitution does not require 
that a criminal suspect know and understand every possible 
consequence of a waiver of the Fifth Amendment [to the United 
States Constitution] privilege").  As has the United States 
Supreme Court, see, e.g., id. at 575-576, we repeatedly have 
held that a waiver obtained from a defendant who had been 
accused of a relatively minor offense, or had yet to be accused 
of any offense, remains valid when the questioning turns to a 
more serious offense.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Raymond, 424 
Mass. 382, 393 (1997), S.C., 450 Mass. 729 (2008); Commonwealth 
v. Wills, 398 Mass. 768, 777 (1986); Medeiros, supra at 345. 
 
Moreover, in these circumstances, police did not deceive 
the defendant about the nature of the intended questioning.  
Although they told him that he had been arrested for larceny 
from a person, they also informed him, before he agreed to waive 
his Miranda rights, that "we want to speak to you . . . about 
broader issues," and explained these issues as wanting to talk 
about the "disappearance of your mom."  "We are not confronted 
with a case in which the police surprised the accused by 
providing warnings with regard to one offense and then shifting 
the interrogation to the subject of a totally unrelated crime," 
17 
 
 
Medeiros, 395 Mass. at 346, and the defendant was "unlikely to 
have been misled."  Id. 
 
b.  Ineffective assistance.  The defendant contends that 
his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to include 
in his motion to suppress two additional grounds for 
suppression:  that the defendant was arrested without probable 
cause, and that police obtained his confession more than six 
hours after his arrest without first obtaining a proper waiver 
of prompt arraignment.  We conclude that any claim seeking 
suppression on either ground would have been of little merit, 
and thus that counsel could not have been ineffective for 
failing to raise these issues.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Conceicao, 388 Mass. 255, 264 (1983), and cases cited. 
 
Where a defendant has been convicted of murder in the first 
degree, to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, he or she must show that there was error by trial 
counsel, and that this error likely influenced the verdict.  
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Weaver, 474 Mass. 787, 808 (2016), 
aff'd, 137 S. Ct. 1899 (2017).  Where the asserted error 
involves the failure to raise an objection, the standard 
governing the ineffective assistance claim is essentially the 
same as that for reviewing the underlying unpreserved error, 
see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Azar, 435 Mass. 675, 686 (2002), 
S.C., 444 Mass. 72 (2005), and cases cited.  Failure to raise a 
18 
 
 
nonmeritorious objection does not constitute ineffective 
assistance. 
 
i.  Probable cause to arrest.  The defendant contends that 
his arrest was unlawful and his statement to police should have 
been suppressed because police lacked probable cause to arrest 
him at the time they did so.  We agree with the Commonwealth 
that, when the defendant was arrested, police had probable cause 
to arrest him on the charge of larceny from a person because of 
the theft of the victim's cellular telephone that police found 
under a couch cushion. 
 
An arrest is supported by probable cause, and therefore 
lawful, "where, at the moment of arrest, the facts and 
circumstances within the knowledge of the police are enough to 
warrant a prudent person in believing that the individual 
arrested had committed . . . an offense" for which arrest is 
authorized.  Commonwealth v. Jewett, 471 Mass. 624, 629 (2015), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Franco, 419 Mass. 635, 639 (1995).  
Probable cause to arrest "requires more than mere suspicion but 
something less than evidence [that would be] sufficient to 
[sustain] a conviction."  Jewett, supra at 629, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Hason, 387 Mass. 169, 174 (1982).  "In dealing 
with probable cause . . . we deal with probabilities.  These are 
not technical; they are . . . practical considerations of 
everyday life, on which reasonable and prudent [people], not 
19 
 
 
legal technicians, act."  Jewett, supra, quoting Hason, supra.  
"Probable cause does not require . . . that police [have] 
resolved all their doubts."  Commonwealth v. Warren, 418 Mass. 
86, 90 (1994). 
 
To establish larceny from a person requires that the 
Commonwealth prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that (i) a 
defendant took property; (ii) the property was owned or 
possessed by another; (iii) the defendant took the property from 
the person of the possessor or from the possessor's area of 
control; and (iv) the defendant did so with the intent to 
deprive the possessor of the property permanently.11  See G. L. 
c. 266, § 25;  Commonwealth v. Subilosky, 352 Mass. 153, 166 
                     
 
11 Larceny from a person is a felony regardless of the value 
of the items stolen.  See G. L. c. 266, § 25 (outlining possible 
sentence of incarceration in State prison); G. L. c. 274, § 1 
("crime punishable by . . . imprisonment in the [S]tate prison 
is a felony").  Cf. Commonwealth v. Nolan, 5 Cush. 288, 288 
(1850) ("The offen[s]e . . . is that of stealing from the 
person[,] and the degree of punishment is not . . . made to 
depend on the value of the property stolen").  Simple larceny, 
by contrast, which includes the first, second, and fourth 
elements of larceny from a person but not the third, is a 
misdemeanor unless the items stolen are valued at more than $250 
or where the property consists of at least one firearm.  See 
G. L. c. 266, § 30 (sentence in State prison only in those 
circumstances); Commonwealth v. Willard, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 650, 
654 n.5 (2002); Model Jury Instructions for Use in the District 
Court § 8.520 (2009).  As a general matter, warrantless arrest 
is not permissible for a misdemeanor, such as simple larceny, 
that does not include a breach of the peace.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Jewett, 471 Mass. 624, 630 (2015), citing 
Commonwealth v. Howe, 405 Mass. 332, 334 (1989) (explaining 
limited circumstances in which warrantless arrests for 
misdemeanors are permissible). 
20 
 
 
(1967); Model Jury Instructions for Use in the District Court 
§ 8.560 (2009).  The third prong can be satisfied either by 
taking the property directly from the victim's person or by 
taking it from his or her "area of control."  See Subilosky, 
supra; Model Jury Instruction for Use in the District Court 
§ 8.560. 
 
When the defendant was arrested, police had probable cause 
as to all four elements.  The defendant had been seen in 
possession of the victim's cellular telephone; there was 
evidence that he had used it to place at least two calls after 
the victim's disappearance; and, when Noah identified the 
telephone the defendant was carrying as belonging to the victim, 
the defendant falsely asserted that it belonged to him.  In 
light of this evidence, the defendant does not challenge the 
determination that there was probable cause for the first, 
second, and fourth elements of the offense.12  The defendant 
contends, however, that police could not have concluded that he 
had taken the telephone from the victim's "person," "presence," 
or "area of control."  This claim is unavailing.  The defendant 
                     
 
12 In other words, the defendant concedes that there was 
probable cause that he had committed a simple larceny.  He 
argues, however, that because police had no reason to believe 
that the value of the cellular telephone, later determined to be 
$200, surpassed the threshold value separating the misdemeanor 
offense of simple larceny from the felony of larceny from a 
person, the existence of probable cause for the former would not 
justify his warrantless arrest. 
21 
 
 
previously had told police that the victim usually carried her 
telephone on her person.  That is enough to "warrant a prudent 
person in believing" that she had had it on her person when the 
defendant took it from her.  See Jewett, 471 Mass. at 629. 
 
While the defendant essentially concedes that there was 
probable cause to believe he took the cellular telephone from 
his mother's body, he argues that there was no evidence that she 
was alive, or, if alive, conscious, at the time he did so.  He 
maintains that such evidence is required to establish that he 
took the telephone from her "person."  We have not previously 
had occasion to confront the question whether taking property 
from a deceased or unconscious victim constitutes taking 
property from the victim's "person" within the meaning of G. L. 
c. 266, § 25.  For purposes of the armed robbery statute, 
however, taking property from a deceased or unconscious victim 
may constitute stealing from the victim's "person."  See G. L. 
c. 265, § 17.  See also, e.g., Commonwealth v. Christian, 430 
Mass. 552, 555 (2000), overruled on other grounds by 
Commonwealth v. Paulding, 438 Mass. 1 (2002) (evidence supported 
armed robbery conviction where defendant stole from victim's 
pockets after coventurer had shot and killed victim); 
Commonwealth v. Olivera, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 907, 908 (1999) 
(unconscious victim); Commonwealth v. Hamm, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 
72, 74 (1984) (same). 
22 
 
 
 
Larceny from a person is a lesser included offense of both 
armed and unarmed robbery.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dean-
Ganek, 461 Mass. 305, 306 n.2 (2012); Commonwealth v. 
Drewnowski, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 687, 693 (1998).  The offense of 
larceny from a person includes all of the elements of robbery 
"except the element that the taking was accomplished by force or 
fear."13  Drewnowski, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Santo, 375 
Mass. 299, 307 (1978).  Therefore, we see no reason to interpret 
the requirement of being taken "from a person" differently for 
purposes of the offense of larceny under G. L. c. 266, § 25, 
than for the offenses of armed and unarmed robbery under G. L. 
c. 265, § 17. 
 
The Appeals Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Willard, 
53 Mass. App. Ct. 650, 655 (2002), on which the defendant 
relies, is not to the contrary.  In that case, the Appeals Court 
held that property stolen from the living room of a sleeping 
family was under "the protection of the building," rather than 
the persons therein, and therefore affirmed a burglary 
conviction based on an attempted larceny from a building, G. L. 
c. 266, § 30.  Willard, supra.  That case does not, as the 
                     
 
13 In addition, in the case of armed robbery, the 
Commonwealth must establish possession of a weapon.  See 
generally Commonwealth v. Olivera, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 907, 908 
(1999) (explaining relationship between armed robbery, robbery, 
and larceny from person). 
23 
 
 
defendant claims, stand for the broad proposition that larceny 
from a deceased or unconscious victim may never constitute 
larceny from a person. 
As an initial matter, Willard does not directly address 
whether the defendant's actions in that case violated G. L. 
c. 266, § 25, prohibiting larceny from a person statute.  It 
holds only that the defendant violated the statute prohibiting 
larceny from a building, G. L. c. 266, § 30, because the 
sleeping victims were "relying on" the building "to safeguard 
their possessions."  Willard, supra.  To the extent that Willard 
suggested that the property stolen in that case was not within 
the victims' "area of control," because they were unconscious, 
the holding has no bearing on this case, where there was 
probable cause to believe that the defendant took the property 
directly from the victim's body, i.e., her person.  Cf. Model 
Jury Instruction for Use in the District Court § 8.560 
(explaining two separate ways to satisfy "from a person" 
requirement).  Therefore, the defendant properly was arrested 
for larceny from a person, and any motion seeking to suppress 
his subsequent confession on this ground stood little chance of 
success.  Accordingly, counsel was not ineffective for failing 
to raise this argument. 
ii.  Waiver of prompt arraignment.  The defendant contends 
also that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to have 
24 
 
 
sought suppression on the ground that the defendant's confession 
was obtained more than six hours after his arrest, that is, 
beyond the "safe-harbor" period for police interrogations 
established by Commonwealth v. Rosario, 422 Mass. 48, 56 (1996).  
The defendant acknowledges that he did waive his right to a 
prompt arraignment, but emphasizes that the waiver itself was 
executed more than six hours after his arrest and, accordingly, 
was invalid. 
Because an informed and voluntary waiver of the right to 
prompt arraignment ordinarily is effective, regardless of when 
it is executed, trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to 
seek suppression on this ground. 
 
Pursuant to the safe harbor rule in Rosario, 422 Mass. at 
56, an "otherwise admissible statement is not to be excluded on 
the ground of unreasonable delay in arraignment if the statement 
is made within six hours of the arrest (day or night), or if (at 
any time) the defendant made an informed and voluntary . . . 
waiver of his right to be arraigned without unreasonable delay" 
(emphasis supplied).  While such a waiver ordinarily should be 
obtained expeditiously, we have given effect to waivers of the 
right to prompt arraignment executed more than six hours after a 
defendant's arrest.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Spray, 467 Mass. 
456, 461, 468 (2014); Commonwealth v. Morgan, 460 Mass. 277, 281 
(2011). 
25 
 
 
In this case, the defendant signed a waiver of his right to 
prompt arraignment approximately six and one-half hours after 
being arrested, just after the expiration of the safe-harbor 
period.  The waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily and was, 
therefore, fully valid.  Any motion seeking to suppress his 
statement under Rosario would have been unlikely to succeed, and 
trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to file such a 
motion. 
c.  Involuntary confession.  Finally, the defendant argues 
that his confession was involuntary because it was obtained 
through police coercion, and therefore that his motion to 
suppress on this ground should have been allowed.  The defendant 
maintains that police obtained his confession by overstating the 
strength of the case against him ("maximization"), minimizing 
the severity of the offense and impliedly promising leniency 
("minimization"), and, above all, appealing to the defendant's 
religious sensibilities.  Having carefully reviewed the audio-
video recording, we discern no indication that the defendant's 
will was overborne.  We conclude, as did the motion judge, that 
the defendant's confession was voluntary, and therefore 
admissible.14 
                     
 
14 The parties agree that the judge's decision on this claim 
should be reviewed de novo.  The primary evidence at the hearing 
on the motion to suppress was a recording of the police 
 
26 
 
 
 
Where the Commonwealth intends to rely on a defendant's 
confession, it bears the burden of establishing that the 
confession was voluntary.  Spray, 467 Mass. at 467, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Baye, 462 Mass. 246, 256 (2012).  "In meeting 
this burden, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that, in light of the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the making of the statement, the will of the 
defendant was [not] overborne, but rather the statement was a 
free and voluntary act" (quotations omitted).  Spray, 467 Mass. 
at 467, quoting Baye, supra. 
 
We turn first to the techniques of "maximization" and 
"minimization," which the defendant contends contributed to his 
purportedly involuntary confession.  As mentioned, the 
investigating officers told the defendant that they were certain 
that he had killed his mother.  They suggested, however, that 
her death might have been an accident, or that, if intentional, 
the defendant might have been provoked or under the influence of 
alcohol.  The officers also told the defendant that, if he 
cooperated, they would "speak to the district attorney" and tell 
the prosecutor of his cooperation. 
                                                                  
interview, which also is before us.  See Commonwealth v. Novo, 
442 Mass. 262, 266 (2004).  The parties do not dispute the facts 
in any of the live testimony before the motion judge. 
27 
 
 
 
A false comment concerning the strength of the 
Commonwealth's case, in conjunction with minimization of the 
severity of the charges, may in some cases render a confession 
involuntary and thus inadmissible.  See Commonwealth v. 
DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. 423, 439 (2004).  That being said, we 
have not acted to prevent police investigators from suggesting 
to a suspect being interviewed that the investigators are 
convinced, based on evidence, of the defendant's guilt.  See 
Spray, 467 Mass. at 467-468.  Nor have we concluded that an 
interviewing officer's efforts to minimize a suspect's moral 
culpability, by, for example, suggesting theories of accident or 
provocation, are inappropriate, or sought to preclude 
suggestions by the interviewers "broadly that it would be better 
for a suspect to tell the truth, [and] . . . that the person's 
cooperation would be brought to the attention of [those] 
involved."  Commonwealth v. O'Brian, 445 Mass. 720, 725, cert. 
denied, 549 U.S. 898 (2006), quoting Commonwealth v. Meehan, 377 
Mass. 552, 564 (1979), cert. dismissed, 445 U.S. 39 (1980). 
 
In this case, even if police expressed an unwarranted level 
of certainty about the defendant's guilt, their statements fell 
"far short of an intentional misrepresentation that 'may 
undermine the defendant's ability to make a free choice.'"  See 
Spray, 467 Mass. at 467-468, quoting Commonwealth v. Scoggins, 
439 Mass. 571, 576 (2003).  Indeed, in describing their view of 
28 
 
 
the defendant's guilt, the investigating officers pointed 
accurately at the evidence arrayed against him.  Contrast, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Edwards, 420 Mass. 666, 669, 673-674 (1995) 
(false claim that defendant's hand print had been identified at 
crime scene was factor in favor of, but not alone requiring, 
suppression).  Similarly, the suggestion by investigating 
officers that mitigating factors might have led to the killing, 
and the promise to communicate any cooperation to the district 
attorney, were within the bounds of acceptable interrogation 
methods.  See O'Brian, 445 Mass. at 725-727 (suggesting to 
defendant possibility of accidental killing and that cooperation 
would be communicated to district attorney such that defendant 
"may see the light of day"). 
 
Our decision in DiGiambattista is not to the contrary.  In 
that case, we held only that minimization techniques, combined 
with intentionally false statements of fact, rendered a 
confession involuntary.  See DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. at 432 
(labeling such techniques "calculated trickery").  Moreover, we 
note that the DiGiambattista court itself expressly disclaimed 
the suggestion that "an officer's use of the standard 
interrogation tactic of 'minimization,' by itself, compels the 
conclusion that a confession is involuntary."  Id. at 438-439. 
 
In addition to the common interrogation tactics of 
"maximization" and "minimization," which we have had repeated 
29 
 
 
occasion to consider, this case also presents a less common 
scenario:  the invocation of religion in an effort to obtain a 
confession.  Over the course of the interview, police mentioned 
several times that the victim could not "rest in peace" without 
the closure that would come from telling "the truth."  Dana 
explicitly said that he was referring to the victim's soul, 
which was "restless" in the "afterlife."15 
 
The parties do not cite any published Massachusetts case 
dealing with this situation, nor are we aware of any.  A review 
of the law in other jurisdictions suggests that, while such 
questioning should be approached with caution, in the 
circumstances here it did not render the defendant's statement 
involuntary.  In general, courts condemn "the tactic of 
exploiting a suspect's [specific] religious anxieties," but will 
not order suppression where the commentary on religion is 
limited and not "calculated to exploit a particular 
psychological vulnerability of the defendant."  People v. Kelly, 
51 Cal. 3d 931, 953 (1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 842 (1991).  
Compare id. (generalized appeal to Christianity did not render 
                     
 
15 The defendant also cites multiple statements in which he 
claims police threatened his brothers with the "vengeful 
spirit[]" of the victim.  The statements he cites do not support  
his claim.  In them, police simply suggest that his brothers 
would be better off without the burden of not knowing what 
happened to their mother.  There is nothing in itself improper 
about appeals to the well-being of a defendant's family.  See 
Commonwealth v. Berg, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 200, 203-204 (1994). 
30 
 
 
statement involuntary); People v. Bowen, 87 Ill. App. 3d 221, 
223 (1980) ("now is the time to make peace with yourself, your 
God, and your [deceased] children" did not render statement 
involuntary); Thong Le v. State, 913 So. 2d 913, 930-931, 934, 
cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1004 (Miss. 2005), overruled on other 
grounds by Bonds v. State, 138 So. 3d 914 (Miss. 2014) (calling 
on Buddhist defendant to "give [victims] back [their] soul[s]" 
by confessing did not render statement involuntary); with People 
v. Montano, 226 Cal. App. 3d 914, 935 (1991) (discussion with 
known Catholic of Catholic divine punishment was factor 
rendering statement involuntary); People v. Adams, 143 Cal. App. 
3d 970, 979, 983 (1983) (using member of defendant's church to 
exploit defendant's particular religious insecurities rendered 
statement involuntary).  Cf. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 
392, 397-398 (1977) (appeal to religion in form of "Christian 
burial speech" interfered with right to counsel; Court did not 
reach question whether this also rendered confession 
involuntary). 
 
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the religious 
references here were of a type that other courts have concluded 
were permissible.  Nothing indicates that police took advantage 
of, or knew of, the defendant's personal religious beliefs, or 
of any special susceptibility he might have had to religious 
appeals.  While the defendant argues that police exploited his 
31 
 
 
fear of voodoo, the record suggests that the defendant mentioned 
voodoo to police on two occasions, once before his arrest and 
once during the police interview.  Both times he made reference 
only to his mother's and aunt's participation in voodoo and did 
not mention his own religious beliefs.  During the interview, 
police did not mention voodoo, or any beliefs specific to that 
faith, and did not belabor the theme of religion.  While they 
mentioned restlessness in the afterlife repeatedly over the 
course of the nearly five-hour interview, each mention was 
relatively brief. 
 
We emphasize that any discussion of religion cannot be 
taken alone, but must be considered in the "totality of the 
circumstances."  Spray, 467 Mass. at 467.  In considering the 
totality of the circumstances here, we look to the decision of 
the California Supreme Court in a substantially similar case.  
See People v. Carrington, 47 Cal. 4th 145 (2009), cert. denied, 
559 U.S. 1094 (2010). 
 
In that case, the defendant was interviewed by a series of 
police officers over the course of eight hours.  See id. at 175. 
The defendant in that case, as here, was arrested on a lesser 
charge, and then informed that police wanted to speak with her 
about a homicide.  See id. at 169.  Over the course of the 
lengthy interview, police employed a number of the tactics at 
issue here.  They suggested that the case against the defendant 
32 
 
 
was airtight, id. at 173, that cooperation with the 
interrogators would be in the defendant's best interest, id. at 
169; that confession would make the defendant feel better, id. 
at 173, 174; and that it would provide peace to the defendant's 
family, id. at 170.  They also minimized the defendant's 
culpability by suggesting the possibility of mistake, id. at 
173.  Moreover, as in this case, police appealed to religion, 
telling the defendant, "there's someone up above, bigger than 
both of us looking down and saying [Defendant], you know you 
shot that person in San Carlos and it's time to purge it all."  
Id. at 176.  The California Supreme Court determined that the 
totality of the circumstances in that case did "not reflect 
coercive tactics."  Id.  We conclude similarly here. 
 
Finally, we note that nothing about the defendant's 
personal characteristics made him particularly vulnerable to 
coercive tactics.  Our review of the audio-video recording 
indicates that the defendant was alert and responsive, and that 
he spoke fluently in English.  Although he is an immigrant, he 
had lived in the United States since childhood.  In sum, the 
defendant's will was not overborne, and the judge correctly 
determined that his confession was voluntary. 
 
3.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Having reviewed the 
entire record in accordance with our duty under G. L. c. 278, 
33 
 
 
§ 33E, we discern no reason to reduce the degree of guilt or to 
order a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.