Title: In the Matter of the Adoption of Baby T
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-39-98
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: August 4, 1999

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). COLEMAN, J., writing for the Court . The issue in this wrongful death-medical malpractice case is whether a doctor being sued for causing the death of an adopted infant has standing to challenge the posthumous finalization of the infant's adoption. Baby T was born on December 1, 1993. Prior to his birth, his natural mother selected P.H. and J.H. to be the adoptive parents of her unborn child. Following the infant's birth, on December 4, 1993, P.H. and J.H. took physical custody of Baby T with the intent to adopt him. All subsequent visits by the approved adoption agency indicated that P.H. and J.H. were providing a loving and caring home. On March 31, 1994, the infant was admitted to Robert Wood Johnson University Hospital for same-day surgery to repair an inguinal hernia. During the administration of anesthesia by Dr. Nishat Zedie, the baby became rigid and suffered cardiac arrest. Baby T died later that day. A medical consultant retained by P.H. and J.H. informed them that the baby died because Dr. Zedie administered an anesthetic expressly classified by the Food and Drug Administration as contraindicated for use in children. With the consent of the adoption agency, P.H. and J.H. accepted responsibility for all funeral arrangements and expenses for Baby T. They made the arrangements as the parents of the child and buried him in their family plot under the name they had given him. At the time of Baby T's death, P.H. and J.H. had not yet filed a formal complaint for adoption because the child had resided in their home for only four months, rather than the six months then required by the Adoption Act. That six-month period was subsequently waived by the appropriate licensing authority on November 4, 1994. By that time, however, the Adoption Act had been amended to remove the six-month waiting period for filing a complaint for adoption. P.H. and J.H. apparently filed their complaint for adoption in early 1995. On July 7, 1995, the Family Part entered a final judgment of adoption of Baby T. On March 8, 1995, P.H. filed a wrongful death, survivorship, and medical malpractice complaint against Dr. Zedie and several other defendants. On July 17, 1997, more than two years after the adoption had been finalized, Dr. Zedie filed a motion in the Family Part to vacate the final judgment of adoption of Baby T, pursuant to Rule 4:50-1(d). Based on that rule, she argued that the judgment of adoption was void because it was not permitted by statute and that she had standing to vacate the adoption. In a published opinion, the trial court denied Dr. Zedie's motion based on the Adoption Act and further found that the judgment of adoption was not void, which was a requirement for relief under Rule 4:50-1(d). The trial court further concluded that Dr. Zedie had no standing under the Rule because she was neither a party to the adoption nor a legal representative of a party to the adoption. The court concluded that Dr. Zedie had not suffered any direct harm from the adoption and that she sought to vacate it only as a means of avoiding her potential liability for Baby T's death under the wrongful death and survivorship actions commenced against her. Notwithstanding its finding that Dr. Zedie lacked standing, the trial court addressed the substantive issue concerning the validity of the posthumous adoption. The court concluded that it would be inconsistent with the spirit and intention of the Adoption Act to vacate the adoption where the completion of the six-month placement period was thwarted by the alleged malpractice of the very person seeking to vacate the adoption. The court further rejected Dr. Zedie's contention that the doctrine of equitable adoption was not recognized in New Jersey. A divided panel of the Appellate Division reversed. The majority concluded that Dr. Zedie had standing to question the validity of the adoption judgment because as a defendant in the malpractice action, she had a stake in the validity of the adoption judgment. The majority further concluded that neither the case law nor the doctrine of equitable adoption authorizes posthumous adoption in New Jersey. In the alternative, the majority held that the doctrine of equitable adoption was applicable only to support a claim for benefits that would be available if a legally recognized parent-child relationship existed. The matter is before the Court as of right based on Judge Shebell's dissent in the Appellate Division. HELD: Dr. Zedie, a defendant in a wrongful death-medical malpractice action, lacks standing to collaterally attack the posthumous adoption of Baby T, the victim of the doctor's malpractice. 1. One must establish that he or she is likely to suffer some harm in order to establish his or her standing, which is a term that refers to one's ability or entitlement to maintain an action before the court. (pp. 10-11) 2. To determine who has standing to challenge a judgment of adoption, reference must be made to the Adoption Act, to the Rules of Court, and to case law. Neither the Adoption Act nor the relevant Rules of Court provide any basis on which to confer standing to Dr. Zedie to challenge the judgment of adoption, and judicial decisions concerning standing to vacate or reopen a judgment of adoption have accorded standing only to those individuals who were a party to the original adoption judgment. (pp. 11-12) 3. Standing cannot be waived or conferred by consent of the parties to an action. (p. 12) 4. Rule 4:50-1(f) does not permit a collateral attack on the judgment of adoption because Dr. Zedie was neither a party nor a legal representative of a party to the final judgment of adoption. (pp. 12-13) 5. Dr. Zedie suffers no direct harm as a result of the judgment of adoption because that judgment affects only those who may be entitled to the proceeds of the wrongful death and survivorship actions, if successful. Furthermore, he is not precluded from asserting any defenses she might have in the malpractice action. (pp. 13-14) 6. The Court's opinion should not be interpreted generally to deny standing to Dr. Zedie and the other defendants in the wrongful death and survivorship actions to challenge P.H.'s and J.H.'s status of next-of-kin. Rather, the Court's holding only denies Dr. Zedie standing to collaterally attack the judgment of adoption, the effect of which is to allow the trial court in the wrongful death and survivorship actions to take judicial notice of the judgment of adoption. (p. 14) 7. The issue of whether Dr. Zedie is equitably estopped from collaterally challenging the legal effect of the judgment of adoption is interwoven with the issue of equitable adoptions, and the Court, therefore, declines to use it as an additional basis for refusing to vacate the judgment of adoption. (pp. 14-15) Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED, and the judgment of adoption is REINSTATED. JUSTICE HANDLER filed a separate concurring opinion agreeing with the Court's disposition, but stressing that the Court's opinion should not be interpreted to deny Dr. Zedie and the other defendants in the wrongful death actions the right to challenge P.H.'s and J.H.'s status of next of kin. In addition, noting that the legal effect of the judgment of adoption will determine whether Dr. Zedie can succeed in disputing P.H.'s and J.H.'s next-of-kin status, Justice Handler believes that principles of equitable estoppel, and not standing, should be invoked and applied in determining whether Dr. Zedie should be entitled to set aside or neutralize its legal effect. JUSTICE O'HERN also filed a separate concurring opinion agreeing with the Court's disposition, but disagreeing with the basis of the disposition. Rather, Justice O'Hern believes that the posthumous adoption properly recognized the substantive rights of the parties. Thus, he believes that the Court should consider the merits now and determine whether Dr. Zedie may attack the validity of the adoption judgment in the context of the wrongful death action. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES POLLOCK, GARIBALDI, and STEIN join in JUSTICE COLEMAN's opinion. JUSTICE HANDLER and JUSTICE O'HERN filed separate concurring opinions. IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF BABY T Argued March 15, 1999 -- Decided August 4, 1999 On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 311 N.J. Super. 408 (1998). David M. Fried argued the cause for appellants P. and J.H. (Blume, Goldfaden, Berkowitz, Donnelly, Fried &amp; Forte, attorneys). Louis John Dughi, Jr. argued the cause for respondent Nishat Zedie, M.D. (Dughi and Hewit, attorneys; Marie Judith McCormack and Gary L. Riveles, on the brief). The opinion of the Court was delivered by COLEMAN, J. The issue in this wrongful death-medical malpractice case is whether a doctor being sued for causing the death of an adopted infant has standing to challenge the posthumous finalization of the infant's adoption. The Chancery Division, Family Part, concluded that there is no standing. A divided panel of the Appellate Division held that under the factual matrix of this case there is standing. 311 N.J. Super. 408, 411 (1998). This appeal is before us as of right based upon a dissent in the Appellate Division. R. 2:2-1(a)(2). We now reverse, holding that a defendant in a wrongful death-medical malpractice action lacks standing to collaterally attack the posthumous adoption of the victim of the alleged malpractice. III SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 39 September Term 1998 IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF BABY T HANDLER, J., concurring. In this case, the defendant, an anesthesiologist, is being sued for malpractice in the death of an infant under the Wrongful Death Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:31-1 to -6. The suit was brought by plaintiffs who claim to be the infant's next-of-kin by virtue of a judgment of adoption obtained after the infant's death. The Court holds that defendant lacks standing to challenge the posthumous judgment of adoption. I agree with the disposition of this case, but write to emphasize that the majority opinion should not be interpreted to deny defendants in wrongful death suits the standing to challenge plaintiffs' status as next-of kin. An analysis permitting defendant the right to challenge plaintiffs' status as next-of-kin, however, would not in the circumstances of this case lead to the conclusion that this defendant may collaterally attack the judgment of adoption at issue here. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 39 September Term 1998 IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF BABY T O'HERN, J., concurring. I concur in the judgment not because Dr. Zedie lacks standing to challenge the adoption of Baby T., but because the posthumous adoption properly recognized the substantive rights of the parties. As Judge Shebell noted in his dissent below, it is inescapable that we cannot foreclose Dr. Zedie from defending herself in the wrongful death action, both by contesting the allegations of negligence and by challenging the nature of the relationship between Baby T. and his adoptive parents. Judge Shebell reasoned that any issues remaining after the adoption judgment would be considered by a jury in the wrongful death action by taking into account ' . . . whether there was such a well founded expectation of pecuniary benefit to the decedent's next-of-kin to be derived from a continuance of the life of the decedent as could be estimated in money . . .' In re Adoption of Baby T., 311 N.J. Super. 408, 418 (1998) (Shebell, J., dissenting) (quoting Capone v. Norton, 21 N.J. Super. 6, 9-10 (App. Div. 1952)). I believe that we should consider the merits now and determine whether Dr. Zedie may attack the validity of the adoption judgment in the context of the wrongful death action. The situation in which P.H. and J.H. found themselves is akin to the black hole described in Carr v. Carr, 120 N.J. 336, 340 (1990). Because Baby T. died before the then-six-month statutory waiting period had passed, his adoptive parents faced the possibility that the State was the only party able to obtain compensation through a wrongful death action against Dr. Zedie. Under the circumstances, these adoptive parents did not need a certified copy of the adoption judgment to have suffered emotional harm. A bystander may recover for emotional distress even if the bystander's relationship to the injured person is not by marriage or by blood. See Dunphy v. Gregor, 136 N.J. 99, 115 (1994) (holding that familial relationship between unmarried cohabitants will support emotional distress claim, so long as relationship was stable, enduring, substantial, and mutually supportive ). Similarly, although P.H. and J.H. cannot claim emotional distress here, an adoption need not be final for adoptive parents to develop a stable, enduring and substantial relationship with their adoptive child such that fair and just compensation may be awarded under the Wrongful Death Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:31-1 to -6. In granting the adoption, the Family Part simply did what the Legislature would undoubtedly intend that it do in the circumstances -- achieve essential and fundamental justice. In re Adoption of a Child by H.C., 284 N.J. Super. 202, 207 (Ch. Div. 1994) (quoting Crane v. Bielski, 15 N.J. 342, 349 (1954)). Based on these equitable principles, and the facts and circumstances uniquely presented by this case, the chancery judge's equitable adoption holding was properly made in the adoption proceeding and should stand. Baby T should not be allowed to be placed in some sort of legal limbo. Equity should not and cannot permit such a bizarre result in this case. [Baby T., supra, 311 N.J. Super. at 420 (Shebell, J., dissenting) (quoting In re Adoption of Baby T., 308 N.J. Super. 344, 364 (Ch. Div. 1997)).] NO. A-39 IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF BABY T DECIDED August 4, 1999 Chief Justice Poritz