Title: In re Jordan
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: s
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: October 21, 2022

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 124,956 
 
In the Matter of JACK R.T. JORDAN, 
Respondent. 
 
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE 
 
Original proceeding in discipline. Opinion filed October 21, 2022. Disbarment.  
 
Alice L. Walker, Deputy Disciplinary Administrator, argued the cause, and Julia A. Hart, Deputy 
Disciplinary Administrator, and Gayle B. Larkin, Disciplinary Administrator, were with her on the brief for 
petitioner. 
 
Jack R.T. Jordan, respondent, argued the cause and was on the briefs pro se. 
 
PER CURIAM:  This is a contested attorney discipline proceeding against Jack R.T. 
Jordan, of North Kansas City, Missouri, who was admitted to practice law in Kansas in 
2019. A panel of the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys concluded Jordan violated 
the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct during federal court proceedings initiated to 
obtain a document known as the "Powers e-mail" under the federal Freedom of 
Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2018). Across various pleadings, Jordan persistently 
accused multiple federal judges of lying about that e-mail's contents, lying about the law, 
and committing crimes including conspiring with others to conceal the document.  
 
The panel unanimously found Jordan's conduct violated KRPC 3.1 (frivolous 
claims and contentions) (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 390); 3.4(c) (disobeying obligations 
under tribunal rules) (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 395); 8.2(a) (making false or reckless 
statement regarding qualifications or integrity of a judge) (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 432); 
2 
 
 
 
8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice) (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 434); 
and 8.4(g) (conduct adversely reflecting on lawyer's fitness to practice law) (2022 Kan. S. 
Ct. R. at 434). The panel recommends disbarment, and the Disciplinary Administrator's 
office agrees. Jordan filed exceptions to the panel's report and argues discipline cannot be 
imposed because the First Amendment to the United States Constitution protects his 
statements. He also claims his assertions have not been proven false.  
 
We hold clear and convincing evidence establishes Jordan's violations of KRPC 
3.1, 3.4(c), 8.2(a), and 8.4(d) and (g). And based on that, we disbar him from practicing 
law in this state.  
 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
The Disciplinary Administrator filed a formal complaint alleging various KRPC 
violations against Jordan on August 27, 2021. He answered on September 16, 2021. The 
panel conducted a one-day hearing on January 12, 2022. Respondent appeared pro se. 
The Disciplinary Administrator called Jordan and its investigator W. Thomas Stratton Jr. 
as witnesses. Jordan repeatedly invoked the Fifth Amendment when asked about his 
conduct. Stratton's testimony established that Jordan had previously admitted he carefully 
considered his actions, and that Jordan did not supply any evidence he had ever viewed 
the Powers e-mail before accusing federal judges of lying about its contents. The panel 
issued an 87-page report that provides in relevant part: 
 
"Findings of Fact 
 
"42. 
The hearing panel finds the following facts, by clear and convincing 
evidence: 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
"Administrative Proceedings and Lawsuit in District of Columbia 
 
"43. 
The respondent's wife, M.J., was injured at the U.S. Consulate in Erbil, 
Iraq. The respondent represented M.J. in an action under the Defense Base Act. 
 
"44. 
During administrative proceedings, the respondent sought production of 
an email that the respondent referred to as 'Powers' email'. 
 
"45. 
Administrative Law Judge Merck denied production of an unredacted 
version of Powers' email to the respondent based on attorney-client privileged 
information within the email.  
 
"46. 
The respondent filed interlocutory appeals and requests for 
reconsideration of Administrative Law Judge Merck's decision regarding Powers' email.  
 
"47. 
The respondent submitted a Freedom of Information Act ('FOIA') request 
to the U.S. Department of Labor ('DOL') for certain documents, including Powers' email, 
which was denied.  
 
"48. 
On September 19, 2016, the respondent filed a lawsuit against the DOL, 
Jordan v. United States Department of Labor, 17-cv-02702 (U.S. District Court, District 
of Columbia, September 19, 2016).  
 
"49. 
This matter was assigned to the Honorable Judge Rudolph Contreras, 
District Court Judge for the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.  
 
"50. 
Judge Contreras reviewed Powers' email in camera.  
 
"51. 
After Judge Contreras conducted an in camera review of Powers' email, 
he ruled that the email was protected by attorney-client privilege.  
 
"52. 
Judge Contreras' decision was affirmed on appeal to the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals.  
4 
 
 
 
 
"Jordan v. U.S. Department of Labor (18-cv-6129) in Western District of Missouri 
 
"53. 
On August 29, 2018, the respondent filed a lawsuit pro se on his own 
behalf, Jordan v. U.S. Department of Labor, 18-cv-6129, challenging the denial of FOIA 
requests for Powers' email in the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Missouri. 
 
"54. 
The Honorable Judge Ortrie Smith, District Court Judge for the Western 
District of Missouri, presided over this matter. 
 
"55. 
The DOL filed a motion to dismiss a portion of the respondent's 
complaint relating to Powers' email. 
  
"56. 
Judge Smith granted the DOL's motion to dismiss relating to Powers' 
email. 
 
"57. 
On April 9, 2019, the respondent appealed the matter to the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals. 
 
"58. 
On February 21, 2020, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the 
judgment of the District Court. 
 
"[F.T.] v. U.S. Department of Labor (19-cv-00493) in Western District of Missouri 
 
"59. 
On June 26, 2019, F.T. filed a lawsuit against the DOL in the District 
Court for the Western District of Missouri, [F.T.] v. U.S. Department of Labor, 19-cv-
00493, seeking a court order that the DOL release Powers' email. F.T. filed this suit after 
having filed FOIA requests for certain documents, including Powers' email. 
 
"60. 
The Honorable Judge Ortrie Smith presided over this matter. 
 
5 
 
 
 
"61. 
On July 25, 2019, Judge Smith issued an order staying the matter 
pending the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals' resolution of the appeal in Jordan v. U.S. 
Department of Labor, 18-cv-6129. 
 
"62. 
On October 17, 2019, the respondent entered his appearance to represent 
F.T. in [F.T.] v. U.S. Department of Labor, 19-cv-00493. F.T.'s former attorneys were 
granted leave to withdraw the next week. At the time of the former attorneys' withdrawal, 
the respondent was F.T.'s only attorney. 
 
"63. 
On November 19, 2019, the respondent filed a document titled, 
'Plaintiff's Suggestions Supporting Motion to Remedy Judge Smith's Lies and Crimes and 
Lift the Stay or Disqualify Judge Smith'. 
 
"64. 
Within that filing, the respondent wrote headlines that included, in part, 
the following statements: 
 
• 
'Judge Smith Is Knowingly and Willfully Violating Federal Law and 
the Constitution', 
 
• 
'Judge Smith Is Knowingly and Willfully Abusing Any Potential Discretion', 
 
• 
'Judge Smith Is Knowingly and Willfully (Criminally) Failing to Comply 
with the APA and Clear and Controlling Supreme Court Precedent', 
 
• 
'Judge Smith Is Committing Crimes and Helping Ray and other DOL and 
DOJ Employees Commit Crimes', and 
 
• 
'Judge Smith Must Be Disqualified If He Fails to Promptly Remedy His 
Knowing and Willful Violations of the Constitution and Federal Law'. 
  
([T]he respondent acknowledged during his testimony that what is stated in public court 
filings filed by him was indeed written by him. . . .) 
 
6 
 
 
 
"65. 
The respondent wrote in the body of that filing further statements about 
Judge Smith, including: 
 
'Plaintiff, [F.T.], respectfully requests that the Court very 
promptly remedy each knowing and willful falsehood ("Lie") 
and violation of the Constitution or federal law and crime by 
Judge Smith below or promptly disqualify Judge Smith for the 
following reasons. 
 
* * * 
 
'To demonstrate how truly exceptional Judge Smith's conduct 
and contentions are, Plaintiff shows below that each such 
contention was a Lie, and Judge Smith is violating his oaths of 
office and the Constitution and committing crimes, specifically, 
to help DOL and DOJ employees violate their oaths and the 
Constitution and commit crimes. 
 
* * * 
 
'For the foregoing reasons, Judge Smith's mere contention that he 
(secretly and silently) "already considered" every issue and legal 
authority presented by Plaintiff is irrelevant and wholly 
inadequate. It also necessarily is either a Lie or a confession to a 
crime. It certainly could be both. If he "considered" such 
authorities, he necessarily knew that he never had any power to 
knowingly violate or disregard any provision of the Constitution 
or federal law to deny Plaintiff any constitutional or statutory 
right. He swore or affirmed he would not engage in such 
egregious misconduct. Neither Judge Smith nor the DOL or DOJ 
ever even contended that he had any such power under any 
circumstances. He merely pretends to have such power. Such 
pretense has been wholly unjustified, and it cannot be justified. It 
7 
 
 
 
is a violation of federal law; it is a violation of Judge Smith's 
oaths of office; it is criminal; and it is "treason to the 
Constitution." 
 
* * * 
 
'Judge Smith's contentions and conduct for years in Jordan and in 
this case demonstrate that his primary goal is to knowingly 
violate and help the DOL and DOJ knowingly violate federal law 
to conceal evidence that DOL and DOJ employees asserted Lies 
(in a DOL adjudication or to the D.C. District Court or D.C. 
Circuit Court) when they purported to quote a privilege notation 
or they represented that Powers' email contains an express or 
explicit request for legal advice. Judge Smith's actions (and 
refusals to act) are so inimical to our entire systems of 
government and law that they are criminal. 
 
* * * 
 
'Judge Smith committed criminal conspiracy: he and DOJ [sic] 
and DOJ employees "joined in" an "understanding," and each 
"knew the purpose" was to deprive Plaintiff or Jordan of clearly-
established constitutional and statutory rights. 
 
* * * 
 
'Judge Smith implied that he had "broad discretion" and 
"inherent power" to violate or disregard clear plain language of 
the Constitution, federal law, and Supreme Court precedent. But 
Judge Smith's vague references to whatever "discretion" or 
"inherent power" he might have were irrelevant and illusory. 
They were blatantly deceitful declarations of his intent to 
defraud. Judge Smith has openly declared his intent to decide 
8 
 
 
 
this case fraudulently, just as he "decided" Jordan fraudulently. 
A judge who pretends to have "broad discretion" and "inherent 
power" to violate or disregard clear plain language of the 
Constitution, federal law, and Supreme Court precedent must be 
disqualified.' 
 
"66. 
On January 8, 2020, Judge Smith issued an order denying the relief 
sought in the respondent's filing.  
 
"67. 
On January 8, 2020, Judge Smith also issued a separate order titled 
'Order Directing Plaintiff and Plaintiff's Counsel to Show Cause'.  
 
"68. 
Within the January 8, 2020, Order Directing Plaintiff and Plaintiff's 
Counsel to Show Cause, Judge Smith ordered that 'Plaintiff and her counsel must show 
cause why either or both should not be held in contempt' and directed the Clerk of the 
District Court to 'randomly assign this matter to another Article III judge for the limited 
purposes of conducting a show cause proceeding and issuing any order resulting 
therefrom.' 
 
"69. 
Judge Smith further ordered that 'neither Plaintiff nor her counsel shall 
file a motion or other filing responsive to this Order in this Court.' 
 
"70. 
Judge Smith further ordered that 'Plaintiff and her counsel shall await 
further instruction from the judge assigned to conduct the show cause proceeding and 
issue any order resulting therefrom.' 
 
"71. 
On January 13, 2020, the Honorable Chief Judge Beth Phillips of the 
District Court for the Western District of Missouri issued an order in [F.T.] v. U.S. 
Department of Labor (19-cv-00493) wherein Chief Judge Phillips ruled that the 
respondent's motion 'accuses Judge Smith of engaging in intentional wrongdoing: 
knowingly issuing unlawful orders, conspiring with Defendant's counsel, lying, and 
committing crimes' and that the 'Filing does not support these accusations with any facts 
beyond Jordan's and [F.T.'s] disagreement with the Stay Order.' Chief Judge Phillips 
9 
 
 
 
directed the respondent and F.T. 'to respond as detailed in this Order and show cause why 
they should not be held in contempt or sanctioned.'  
 
"72. 
Specifically, Chief Judge Phillips' January 13, 2020, Order required the 
respondent and F.T. to 'show cause why they should not be sanctioned for violating Rule 
11(b)(3),' and to 'show cause why [Missouri's Rules of Professional Responsibility 4- 
8.2(a), 4-3.3(a)(1), 4-8.4(c), and 4-8.4(d), contained in Local Rule 83.6(c)(1)] have not 
been violated and why sanctions are not appropriate.'  
 
"73. 
Chief Judge Phillips' January 13, 2020, Order included 'Attachment A,' 
which contained specific statements from the respondent's November 19, 2019, filing that 
the respondent and F.T. were to address and show cause why they should not be held in 
contempt and sanctioned. 
 
"74. 
On February 18, 2020, the respondent filed an 'Answer to Show Cause 
Order Regarding Contentions That Judge Smith Asserted Lies and Committed Crimes' in 
[F.T.] v. U.S. Department of Labor (19-cv-00493). 
 
"75. 
Attached to the filing were documents titled: 'Supplement A: Analysis of 
Crimes and Lies By Judge Smith and Jeffrey Ray,' 'Supplement B: Analysis of FOIA and 
Related Legal Authorities That Judge Smith Is Evading by Staying Cases Pertaining to 
Powers' Email,' and 'Declaration of Jack Jordan'. 
 
"76. 
Within the Answer to Show Cause Order, the respondent wrote headlines 
that included, in part, the following statements: 
 
• 
'Judge Smith Clearly Illegally Targeted and Threatened [F.T.]', 
 
• 
'Regarding Jordan, Judge Phillips Illegally Refused to Comply with Federal 
Law and Failed to Even Acknowledge the Constitution or Controlling Law', 
 
• 
'Judge Phillips Had No Power to Change, Contradict, Disregard or Violate 
FRCP 83, Local Rule 83.6 or FRCP 53', and 
10 
 
 
 
 
• 
'An Investigation Was Required But Judge Phillips Blocked Respondents' 
Access to Relevant Evidence'. 
 
"77. 
The respondent argued in the Answer to Show Cause Order that the 
respondent and F.T. should not be sanctioned or held in contempt because Chief Judge 
Phillips' Show Cause Order and other related orders denied the respondent and F.T. due 
process. 
 
"78. 
The respondent wrote in the body of that filing further statements about 
Judge Smith and Chief Judge Phillips, including:  
 
'If Judge Phillips believes that [the November 19, 2019, 
"Plaintiff's Suggestions Supporting Motion to Remedy Judge 
Smith's Lies and Crimes and Lift the Stay or Disqualify Judge 
Smith"] was "intended to harass," she must believe that Judge 
Smith's order was intended to harass. Judge Smith's actions 
seemed designed to illegally intimidate [F.T.]—as [F.T.] already 
had addressed in detail even before Judge Smith issued his order 
to cause [sic] the issuance of the [Show Cause Order]. Such 
intimidation and threats were criminal. 
 
* * * 
 
'Jordan also relied on the plain language of federal law, the U.S. 
Constitution, and Supreme Court precedent. In contrast, Judge 
Smith relied on mere indirection and misdirection, including 
pretenses that statements in Eighth Circuit opinions—which did 
not (and did not even purport to) address the legal issues and 
legal authorities presented by Jordan—could somehow change or 
contradict or justify disregarding or violating the plain language 
of federal law, the U.S. Constitution, and Supreme Court 
precedent that Jordan presented. As addressed in [the 
11 
 
 
 
respondent's November 19, 2019 Suggestions Supporting 
Motion] and herein (including Supplements A and B hereto), 
Judge Smith's pretenses were so blatantly illegal that they were 
absurd. They were criminal. 
 
* * * 
 
'Even with respect to Jordan, alone, the issuance of the [Show 
Cause Order]—and the issuance of Judge Smith's order causing 
the issuance of the [Show Cause Order]—were patently illegal. 
 
* * * 
 
'Even before that, Judge Phillips did not even contend that the 
issuance of either the [Show Cause Order] or Judge Smith's 
order was legal. Judge Phillips did not even contend that the 
issuance of either the [Show Cause Order] or Judge Smith's 
order was consistent with (and did not deny Jordan the due 
process required in) FRCP 83, Local Rule 83.6, FRCP 53 or the 
Constitution. Instead, Judge Phillips asserted two irrelevant 
issues and one contention that clearly was false. 
 
* * * 
 
'As a condition of employment, every federal judge and agency 
employee must swear or affirm that he or she will at all times 
"support and defend the Constitution" against "all enemies," 
including "domestic" enemies. Among the most insidious 
domestic enemies of the constitution is a federal judge or a DOJ 
attorney, who—like Judge Smith, Judge Contreras and Ray have 
in cases regarding Powers' email—used his position and 
authority to attack and undermine (1) federal law and the 
Constitution and (2) citizens (like [F.T.] and Jordan) who are 
12 
 
 
 
attempting to support and defend the Constitution. Such a judge 
or DOJ attorney is the equivalent of the inside man in a bank 
heist. He said he would protect; he wears the uniform of a person 
employed to protect; and he pretends to protect. But, in fact, he 
facilitates crimes against the very institutions he pretends to 
protect. 
 
[* * *] 
 
'"Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a lawbreaker, 
it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law 
unto himself; it invites anarchy." The efforts of multiple DOL 
attorneys and ALJs and multiple DOJ attorneys and federal 
judges to conceal evidence at issue in this case is evidence that 
crime is particularly contagious and insidious when DOJ 
attorneys and federal judges conspire to commit them. 
 
[* * *] 
 
'Judge Phillips also is undermining the institutions she swore to 
protect. A judge's decisions failing to apply the standard 
enunciated in federal law are an "evil" that "spreads in both 
directions," avoiding "consistent application of the law" and 
preventing "effective review of" decisions by superior "courts." 
 
* * * 
 
'Judge Phillips knows that her conduct was illegal and criminal.' 
 
"79. 
Supplement A to the respondent's February 18, 2020, Answer to Show 
Cause Order, included a headline that stated: 'Much of the Evidence that the Conduct of 
Judge Smith and Ray (and potentially Garrison) Was Criminal Is Circumstantial.' 
13 
 
 
 
Another headline stated that 'There Is Copious Evidence' that Judge Smith's conduct was 
"Criminal."' 
 
"80. 
Supplement A indicates the following 'Documentary Evidence of 
Conspiracy': 'A. DOL Requests and Judge Smith's Orders Regarding Refusing to Join 
[F.T.],' 'B. DOL Requests and Judge Smith's Orders Regarding Staying [(F. T.) v. U.S. 
Department of Labor (19-cv-00493)],' and 'C. DOJ Requests and Judge Smith's Orders  
Regarding Staying [(R.C.) v. U.S. Department of Justice, (19-cv-00905)]'. 
 
"81. 
Notably, in Supplement A, the respondent argued that evidence of his 
allegations about Judge Smith in his November 19, 2019, filing was 'circumstantial,' and 
was based on the respondent's assertion that Judge Smith misrepresented what was 
contained in Powers' email (which the respondent had not read) and also on the 
respondent's assertion that Judge Smith 'knew' that Judge Smith was not abiding by the 
respondent's interpretation of what the law required. Moreover, the respondent argued 
that the fact the unredacted Powers' email was not provided to him was evidence of deceit 
by those withholding the email from him. 
 
"82. 
In Supplement B, the respondent stated in the title of the document that 
Judge Smith was 'evading' legal authorities and later in the document stated that Judge  
Smith 'repeatedly failed or even expressly refused to apply the following law even though 
he knew he was bound to do so.' 
 
 
"83. 
In the 'Declaration of Jack Jordan,' attached to the respondent's February 
18, 2020, Answer to Show Cause Order, the respondent 'declare[d] under penalty of 
perjury' pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, in part, that: 
 
'30. 
In no proceeding involving me has anyone ever even 
identified any word used in any "express" or "explicit" request in 
Powers' email or any factor that he considered to determine that 
any request in Powers' email sought advice that was of a legal 
nature. 
 
14 
 
 
 
'31. 
[The November 19, 2019, "Plaintiff's Suggestions Supporting 
Motion to Remedy Judge Smith's Lies and Crimes and Lift the Stay or 
Disqualify Judge Smith"] was not presented for any improper purpose 
whatsoever. It was not presented to harass anyone, cause any 
unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation. It was 
submitted for the purposes stated in FRCP 1: to secure the just, speedy, 
and inexpensive determination of whether the DOL violated FOIA with 
respect to [F.T.'s] FOIA request. My inquiry into the facts, evidence and 
legal authorities relevant to [the November 19, 2019, filing] in the 
captioned case (as well as my Answer dated February 18, 2020 to Judge 
Phillips' Show Cause Order related to [the November 19, 2019, filing]) 
included all filings in federal court or DOL proceedings and all legal 
authorities that were dated before November 19, 2019 that were included 
in my Answer. My inquiry included far more. Specifically to address 
falsehoods asserted, and violations of law and crimes, by DOL and DOJ 
attorneys, DOL judges and federal judges, before November 19, 2019, I 
devoted more than two years to studying and explaining to courts and 
DOJ adjudicators FOIA and other sections of the APA, their legislative 
history, federal rules of procedure and evidence, the U.S. Constitution, 
the Declaration of Independence of 1776, and Supreme Court precedent 
spanning hundreds of years.' 
 
"84. 
On March 4, 2020, Chief Judge Phillips issued an order sanctioning the 
respondent.  
 
"85. 
In the Order, Chief Judge Phillips ruled that the respondent and F.T. 
were afforded due process in the proceeding. 
 
"86. 
Chief Judge Phillips concluded that the respondent 'violated Rule 11 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and has done so in a manner that demonstrates his 
contempt for the Court' and that the respondent's filing 'contains multiple statements and 
accusations that had no reasonable basis in fact.' Chief Judge Phillips ruled that the 
respondent's 'conduct qualifies under the dictionary-definition of "contempt".' 
15 
 
 
 
 
"87. 
Chief Judge Phillips imposed a sanction on the respondent of $1,000.00, 
to be paid by the respondent to the Clerk of the Court. 
 
"88. 
On April 1, 2020, the respondent filed a document titled 'Notice of 
Noncompliance with Illegal and Criminal Order Purporting to Impose Criminal 
Penalties'. 
  
"89. 
In this filing, the respondent stated that he 'refuses to pay any portion of 
any such penalty because no valid obligation exists requiring Jordan to do so.' 
 
"90. 
The respondent also stated in this filing that 'Judge Phillips [sic] order to 
show cause and her order holding Jordan in criminal contempt were illegal and criminal.'  
 
"91. 
On May 5, 2020, the respondent filed 'Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider 
and Vacate Order Imposing Sanctions and Order Refusing to Disqualify Judge Smith.'  
 
"92. 
In this filing, the respondent stated that 'Judge Smith used Judge Phillips 
(and Judge Phillips and Judge Smith conspired) to violate Jordan's due process rights'. 
 
"93. 
The respondent further stated that 'Judge Smith asserted Lies and 
committed crimes.' 
 
"94. 
The respondent also stated that Judge Smith and attorneys involved in 
the case 'supported and defended enemies of the Constitution to thwart and undermine the 
Constitution.' 
 
"95. 
On May 6, 2020, the respondent filed 'Plaintiff's Supplement to Motion 
to Reconsider and Vacate Order Imposing Sanctions'. This document contained 
statements by the respondent about Judge Phillips and Judge Smith as well as attorneys 
involved in the case similar to those made in his May 5, 2020, filing. 
 
16 
 
 
 
"96. 
On May 13, 2020, the respondent filed 'Plaintiff's Second Supplement to 
Motion to Reconsider and Vacate Order Imposing Sanctions'. This document contained 
statements by the respondent about Judge Phillips and Judge Smith as well as attorneys 
involved in the case similar to those made in his May 5, 2020, and May 6, 2020, filings.  
 
"97. 
On June 29, 2020, the respondent filed 'Plaintiff's Corrected Motion to 
Reconsider and Vacate Judge Smith's Lies and Evidence of Criminal Conspiracy to 
Conceal Material Facts and Dispositive Evidence.' This document contained statements 
by the respondent about Judge Phillips and Judge Smith as well as attorneys involved in 
the case similar to those made in his May 5, 2020, May 6, 2020, and May 13, 2020, 
filings. 
 
"98. 
On June 30, 2020, Judge Smith issued an order denying the respondent's 
Corrected Motion to Reconsider. 
 
"99. 
In the June 30, 2020, order Judge Smith ruled as follows: 
  
'Plaintiff's counsel has filed numerous motions in this matter, 
including but not limited to ten motions to reconsider (not 
including the motions discussed above). These motions, 
including the most recently filed motions, are largely frivolous, 
unprofessional, and scurrilous, if not defamatory, in tone and 
content. The Court refers Plaintiff's counsel to Judge Phillips's 
March 4, 2020 Order wherein Judge Phillips determined 
Plaintiff's counsel violated Rule 11, sanctioned him, and referred 
him to the Kansas Bar Association. 
 
'Three dispositive motions are pending in this matter. Yet, Plaintiff 
continues to file other motions. The Court warns Plaintiff that additional 
frivolous motion practice will be met with additional sanctions, another 
referral to the Kansas Bar Association, and referrals to other jurisdictions 
wherein counsel is licensed to practice law. This warning should not 
17 
 
 
 
come as a surprise to Plaintiff's counsel because other courts recently 
issued similar warnings to counsel.' 
 
"100. 
On July 1, 2020, the respondent filed two documents in the matter. One 
was 'Plaintiff's Motion for Order Stating the Law and Showing Judge Smith did not Lie 
About the Law,' and the second was 'Plaintiff's Motion for Order Stating the Law 
Showing Judge Smith's Threat was not Criminal'. 
 
"101. 
Within these documents, the respondent stated, in part: 
 
'Judge Smith is committing crimes by personally concealing 
evidence of whether or not (1) Powers' email contains either Key 
Phrase and (2) Clubb and Ray acted in bad faith by 
misrepresenting either Key Phrase. 
 
* * * 
 
'To knowingly violate Plaintiff's right to such evidence, Judge 
Smith chose to criminally threaten Plaintiff and Plaintiff's 
counsel if Plaintiff continued to seek evidence of whether or not 
Powers' email contains either Key Phrase. 
 
* * * 
 
'Judge Smith's intimidation also was criminal because he used 
intimidation to personally conceal and help the Culprits conceal 
(and encourage the Culprits to conceal) evidence that he knew 
shows that DOL and DOJ employees (and Judge Contreras) 
committed federal crimes. 
 
 
 
 
 
18 
 
 
 
* * * 
 
'Judge Smith must state the law, not Lie about the law. The fact 
that Judge Smith has again willfully failed to state the law, and 
instead chosen to resort to threats speaks volumes. 
 
 
 
 
[* * *] 
 
'Judge Smith is a traitor to the judiciary and an enemy of the 
Constitution. To personally criminally conceal evidence of two 
phrases on a couple pages of Powers' email—and to help the 
Culprits conceal such evidence—Judge Smith routinely Lies and 
commits crimes, including threatening and attempting to 
intimidate Plaintiff and Plaintiff's counsel.' 
 
"102. 
On July 1, 2020, Judge Smith issued an order striking these two filings 
from the record due to noncompliance with the Court's June 30, 2020, Order. 
 
"103. 
On July 6, 2020, Judge Smith issued an Order wherein he ruled that:  
 
'Despite the Court's directive [in its June 30, 2020, order], 
Plaintiff's counsel filed two motions on July 1, 2020; (1) 
"Plaintiff's Motion for Order Stating the Law and Showing Judge 
Smith Did Not Lie About the Law," and (2) "Plaintiff's Motion 
for Order Stating the Law Showing Judge Smith's Threat Was 
Not Criminal." These motions are the precise type of filings 
prohibited by the Court. That is, the motions are "frivolous, 
unprofessional, and scurrilous, if not defamatory, in tone and 
content."' 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19 
 
 
 
"104. 
Judge Smith ruled that: 
 
'Plaintiff and her counsel are prohibited from filing anything 
further in this matter without the Court's prior approval. 
Moreover, the Court will not allow Plaintiff and her counsel to 
file motions that seek the same relief sought in other motions, 
rehash arguments previously presented, or include frivolous, 
unprofessional, or scurrilous tone or content.' 
 
"105. 
Judge Smith also ordered the respondent to provide a copy of the July 6, 
2020, Order to his client, F.T. 
 
"106. 
On July 6, 2020, the respondent filed 'Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File 
Notice of Appeal.' 
 
"107. 
This filing included, in part, the following statements by the respondent: 
 
'Judge Smith has . . . (3) knowingly misrepresented that 
something about FOIA precludes all discovery in this case 
regarding anything more than the DOL's searches for records and 
(4) criminally threatened Plaintiff and Jordan for the purpose of 
helping the DOL and Ray conceal evidence of the Key Phrases. 
 
* * * 
 
'The efforts by Judge Smith and Ray to conceal (from Plaintiff 
and Jordan) such material facts and relevant evidence is 
criminal.' 
 
"108. 
On July 20, 2020, Judge Smith issued another order sanctioning the 
respondent in the amount of $500.00 '[f]or his repeated violations of [the] Court's Orders, 
including but not limited to the Court's Orders prohibiting Plaintiff's counsel from 
emailing Chambers staff and Clerk's Office staff.' Judge Smith further ordered that 
20 
 
 
 
'Plaintiff and her counsel are permitted to file a Notice of Appeal pertaining to this Order 
but shall not file anything further in this matter. The Court reiterates Plaintiff and her  
counsel are prohibited from contacting Chambers staff and Clerk's Office staff.' 
 
"109. 
Within his July 20, 2020, Order, Judge Smith also directed 'the Clerk's 
Office to transmit this Order to the Office of the Kansas Disciplinary Administrator and 
the New York Attorney Grievance Committee.' 
 
"[R.C.] v. U.S. Department of Labor (19-cv-00905) in Western District of Missouri 
 
"110. 
In February 2019, the respondent filed a FOIA request on behalf of 
another client, R.C., for Powers' email. The request was denied that same month. 
 
"111. 
While the respondent represented F.T. in [F.T.] v. U.S. Department of 
Labor, 19-cv-00493, he also represented R.C. in a lawsuit filed November 9, 2019, in the 
District Court for the Western District of Missouri seeking injunctive relief allowing R.C. 
to obtain Powers' email, [R.C.] v. U.S. Department of Justice, 19-cv-00905. 
 
"112. 
On February 11, 2020, Judge Smith stayed proceedings in [R.C.] v. U.S. 
Department of Justice, 19-cv-00905 pending the Eighth Circuit's disposition of [F.T.] v. 
U.S. Department of Labor, 19-cv-00493, which was stayed pending the Eighth Circuit's 
disposition of Jordan v. U.S. Department of Labor,18-cv-6129. 
 
"113. 
On May 6, 2020, the court lifted the stay. 
 
"114. 
On July 13, 2020, Judge Smith denied R.C.'s motion for judgment on the 
pleadings and granted the Department of Justice's motion for summary judgment.  
 
"115. 
On July 13, 2020, the respondent filed a notice of appeal on behalf of 
F.T. On July 14, 2020, the respondent filed a notice of appeal on behalf of R.C. 
 
"116. 
On July 14, 2020, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals docketed case 
number 20-2430, [R.C.] v. U.S. Department of Labor. On July 16, 2020, the Eighth 
21 
 
 
 
Circuit Court of Appeals docketed case number 20-2439, [F.T.] v. U.S. Department of 
Labor. On July 23, 2020, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals docketed case number 20-
2494, Jordan v. U.S. Department of Labor. 
 
"117. 
On the court's own motion, R.C. and F.T.'s cases were consolidated for 
briefing, submission, and disposition. The Jordan case was treated as a back-to-back 
appeal and submitted to the same Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals panel. 
  
"118. 
On January 19, 2021, the respondent filed 'Appellant's Motion to Order 
the DOL and DOJ to Publicly File Parts of Powers' Email' in the Jordan case 20-2494. 
 
"119. 
Within this filing in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, the respondent 
claimed that Judge Smith, Judge Contreras, and other federal district court judges and 
administrative law judges communicated to the respondent 'lies, threats, intimidation or 
punishment.' The respondent also claimed that Judge Smith and Judge Contreras violated 
canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct, violated federal law, committed crimes, and 
concealed evidence, among other allegations. 
 
"120. 
On January 20, 2021, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered that 
the respondent's January 19, 2021, motion be taken with the case for consideration by the 
panel.  
 
"121. 
On July 30, 2021, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the 
sanctions imposed on the respondent by the District Court. 
 
"122. 
On August 1, 2021, the respondent filed 'Appellant's Motion for the 
Issuance of a Published (Or At Least Reasoned) Opinion' in the Jordan case 20-2494. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22 
 
 
 
"123. 
Within this August 1, 2021, filing, the respondent stated, in part: 
 
'Standing alone, the [Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals] Opinion 
shows no more ability to comprehend clear commands in federal 
law or the Constitution, or to write about the foregoing, than 
would be expected of a young college student who had either no 
real aptitude for or no genuine interest in even practicing law. 
The Opinion showed absolutely no comprehension of, much less 
respect for, the limits that all three judges knew Appellants 
clearly showed federal law, the Constitution and copious U.S. 
Supreme Court precedent imposed on their powers. 
 
* * * 
 
'As the product of at least two circuit court judges, the opinion 
shows blatant disrespect for clearly controlling authority . . . . 
 
* * * 
 
'The judges lied repeatedly. 
 
* * * 
 
'The judges responsible for the Judgment and Opinions above are 
abusing the legitimacy and confidence that many federal judges 
have earned . . . . 
 
* * * 
 
'They [the judges on the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals panel] 
are essentially con men perpetrating a con, i.e., playing a 
confidence game.' 
 
23 
 
 
 
"124. 
On August 2, 2021, the respondent filed 'Appellant's Motion for the 
Issuance of a Published (Or At Least Reasoned) Opinion' in the F.T. case 20-2439. In this 
filing, the respondent made the same types of statements as those made in the August 1, 
2021, filing in the Jordan case 20-2494. 
 
"125. 
On August 6, 2021, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals denied the 
August 1 and 2, 2021, motions. The Court directed the Clerk of the Court to serve copies 
of this August 6, 2021, order and the respondent's motion on the pertinent disciplinary 
bar authorities.  
 
"126. 
On August 8, 2021, the respondent filed 'Appellant's Supplemental 
Memorandum Supporting Motion for the Issuance of a Published (Or At Least Reasoned) 
Opinion' in the Jordan case 20-2494. 
 
"127. 
Within this filing, the respondent made similar statements as those made 
in his August 1 and 2, 2021 filings, including, in part: 
 
'In a truly evil and utterly loathsome manner such [Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals panel] judges have attacked and undermined 
the very same federal law and Constitution that such judges 
swore they would "support and defend" every way possible in 
every appeal by bearing "true faith and allegiance to the" 
Constitution. 
  
* * * 
 
'The judges of this Court, themselves, deliberately fabricated that 
lie—because they knew Judge Smith and senior U.S. Department 
of Justice ("DOJ") attorneys blatantly and knowingly violated 
federal law (including FRCP Rules 43 and 56) and the First and 
Fifth Amendments and two FOIA requesters' rights thereunder. 
 
 
24 
 
 
 
* * * 
 
'They [the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals panel judges] are 
attacking the Constitution in an evil, violent, cowardly, 
loathsome manner by failing to address in this forum at this time 
the clear, emphatic Supreme Court precedent and provisions of 
federal law and the Constitution that have been presented to 
them repeatedly. 
 
* * * 
 
'The responsible judges' pretense that tacking a few citations 
onto their lies, above, somehow countered all the clear 
commands and prohibitions above was a blatant con job. It 
blatantly played on the confidence of Americans that federal 
circuit court judges would not knowingly and deliberately violate 
the Constitution and their oaths. It is impossible to show that any 
statement in anything these judges cited in any way countered 
anything that Appellant presented. Such citations were intended 
solely to deceive and lend false legitimacy to evil and violent 
attacks on the Constitution. They deceitfully purported to use 
Supreme Court decisions to attack and undermine the 
Constitution and other Supreme Court decisions directly on 
point. Those were the actions of devious, deceitful con men.' 
 
"128. 
On August 9, 2021, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals issued an Order 
denying the pending motions, ruled that no further filings from the respondent would be 
accepted in 20-2430, 20-2439, or 20-2494, 'except for a proper petition for rehearing,' and 
ordered the respondent 'to show cause within 30 days why he should not be suspended or 
disbarred from practicing law in this court.' 
 
"129. 
After this disciplinary matter was docketed, the respondent sent letters in 
response to the docketed complaint on April 7, 2020, June 12, 2020, July 10, 2020, July 
25 
 
 
 
27, 2020, December 9, 2020, December 11, 2020, December 21, 2020, and August 21, 
2021. 
 
"130. 
Within the respondent's response letters, the respondent stated, in part:  
 
'I reasonably believed every assertion I made about Judge Smith.  
 
'Judge Phillips knowingly and willfully violated clear provisions 
of the U.S. Constitution and federal law governing her powers 
and duties as a judge or Chief Judge. See id. In connection with 
the foregoing, Judge Phillips knowingly and willfully committed 
crimes.  
 
'The evidence shows that Judge Smith (and Deputy U.S. 
Attorney Jeffrey Ray and Judge Phillips) are using their 
positions to commit many crimes. 
 
'The following tricks and devices used by Judge Smith were 
criminal attempts to conceal facts that were material to, and 
evidence that was relevant to, DOL and DOJ proceedings. 
 
'It is an irrefutable fact that any government employee (including 
any DOJ attorney and any judge) involved in any of the FOIA 
cases pertaining to Powers' email is committing at least one 
federal crime by concealing the portions of Powers' email 
proving whether DOL ALJ Larry Merck in a DOL adjudication 
(to help defraud an employee who was seriously injured serving 
this country's interests working under difficult and dangerous 
conditions in Iraq) and then DOL or DOJ employees and Judge 
Contreras and Judge Smith (to defeat FOIA and undermine 
multiple courts and use courts for the same fraudulent purposes 
as ALJ Merck) knowingly misrepresented particular phrases and 
words in Powers' email. Such conduct clearly is criminal. 
26 
 
 
 
 
'Judges Smith and Phillips cannot circumvent and violate 
Respondent's constitutional rights by enlisting the aid of any 
state disciplinary authority. 
 
'Judges Smith and Phillips clearly and irrefutably illegally and 
criminally sought to violate Respondent's rights under the 
Constitution and federal law by failing to address Respondent's 
conduct in compliance with the Constitution and federal law. 
They sought to make employees of the Kansas Court system 
their accomplices by shifting this matter to Kansas disciplinary 
proceedings. 
 
'As you know, I have appealed to the Eighth Circuit the 
egregious efforts by Judges Smith and Phillips to abuse the 
Kansas Disciplinary Administrator to knowingly violate my 
rights under clear and mandatory federal law and the U.S. 
Constitution . . . . Please understand that Judges Smith and 
Phillips and DOJ attorneys are attempting to abuse state 
authorities to violate my rights under federal law (including 
federal criminal law) and the U.S. Constitution.' 
 
"131. 
On November 2, 2021, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals issued an 
order disbarring the respondent from practicing law in the Eighth Circuit. 
 
"132. 
On November 17, 2021, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals issued an 
order ruling that: 
 
'[The respondent's] motion to vacate the Court's order of 
November 2, 2021 disbarring him from practicing law in this 
Court has been considered by the court, and the motion is 
denied. It is further ordered that Mr. Jordan is barred from 
27 
 
 
 
making any further filings in this case, including any filings 
related to his disbarment.' 
 
"133. 
During the hearing on this matter, the respondent testified that he 
carefully considered his filings in front of Judge Smith and Judge Phillips prior to filing 
them. 
 
"134. 
The respondent also stated during his testimony that: 
 
'Judges have lied about Powers e-mail. They have never ruled. 
You cannot show me any decision where any judge has 
addressed any evidence that Powers e-mail could possibly be 
privileged. Not one. That's not a ruling, those are lies and 
crimes.' 
 
"135. 
Further, the respondent testified: 
 
'What I have said is that they lied by saying things that they 
knew or believed were false, and I've said they've committed 
crimes by knowingly and willfully violating litigants' and 
lawyers' rights and privileges under the U.S. Constitution by 
concealing evidence that they knew was relevant. So it's—it's 
extremely false to say that what I said that they did was criminal 
was related exclusively to the content of Powers e-mail. It 
wasn't. It was—it was related first and foremost to the content of 
their judgments and opinions and the motions that were filed by 
the—by litigants, the filings—.' 
 
"136. 
When asked whether he 'truly believed that' his filings containing 
allegations against Judge Smith and Judge Phillips 'were necessary to get the evidence 
[he was] denied for years,' i.e., an unredacted copy of Powers' email, the respondent 
asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege and declined to testify. After asserting his Fifth 
Amendment privilege, the respondent was asked, '[b]ut you did not deny to answer that to 
28 
 
 
 
Mr. Stratton during the interview on July 9, 2020?' The respondent stated: 'Wait a minute. 
This is hearsay. If you want Mr. Stratton to come testify about what I said to him, get him 
to testify.' 
 
"137. 
The hearing panel concluded that the respondent waived his Fifth 
Amendment privilege regarding statements he made previously to Mr. Stratton during the 
disciplinary investigation. 
 
"138. 
Deputy disciplinary administrator W. Thomas Stratton, Jr., who 
conducted an investigation in this disciplinary matter, testified that he interviewed the 
respondent on July 9, 2020, and that the respondent 'sought to assure me he had carefully 
considered the course of action that he should take prior to making the allegations against 
Judge Smith, or any of the judges who were part of the Powers' e-mail litigation and 
against whom allegations have been made.' Further, Mr. Stratton testified the respondent 
'said the allegations had not been made lightly at all. He truly believed they were 
necessary to get the evidence that has been denied for years and on which he has briefed 
many times to many courts.' Specifically, the evidence the respondent sought for years 
was '[t]he unredacted Powers e-mail in its entirety.' 
 
"139. 
Mr. Stratton testified that the respondent asked Mr. Stratton to obtain 
Powers' email and the respondent provided Mr. Stratton no evidence that the respondent 
or someone he associated with had viewed an unredacted version of Powers' email. 
Further, the respondent provided Mr. Stratton with no evidence to support the 
respondent's assertion that the judges had lied about the contents of Powers' email.  
 
"140. 
The respondent called no witnesses to testify and offered no exhibits for 
admission during the hearing. 
 
"Conclusions of Law 
 
"141. 
Based upon the findings of fact, the hearing panel concludes as a matter 
of law that the respondent violated KRPC 3.1 (meritorious claims and contentions), 
29 
 
 
 
KRPC 3.4(c) (fairness to opposing party and counsel), KRPC 8.2(a) (judicial and legal 
officials), and KRPC 8.4(d) and (g) (professional misconduct) as detailed below. 
 
"KRPC 3.1 
 
"142. 
'A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert 
an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a 
good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.' KRPC 
3.1. 
  
"Applying Rule 220(b) 
 
"143. 
Pursuant to Rule 220(b) (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 275), if based on a 
standard less than clear and convincing evidence, 'a certified copy of a judgment or ruling 
in any action involving substantially similar allegations as a disciplinary matter is prima 
facie evidence of the commission of the conduct that formed the basis of the judgment or 
ruling, regardless of whether the respondent is a party in the action.' 
 
"144. 
'The respondent has the burden to disprove the findings made in the 
judgment or ruling.' Rule 220(b) (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 275). 
 
"145. 
Here, Chief Judge Phillips ruled on January 13, 2020, that the 
respondent's motion 'accuses Judge Smith of engaging in intentional wrongdoing: 
knowingly issuing unlawful orders, conspiring with Defendant's counsel, lying, and 
committing crimes,' and that the 'Filing does not support these accusations with any facts 
beyond Jordan's and [F.T.'s] disagreement with the Stay Order.' Chief Judge Phillips 
further found that 'it appears the Filing is intended to harass.' 
 
"146. 
The respondent had an opportunity to, and did answer Chief Judge 
Phillips' January 13, 2020, show cause order via an answer filed February 18, 2020 (with 
supplements and a declaration attached).  
 
30 
 
 
 
"147. 
On March 4, 2020, Chief Judge Phillips considered the respondent's 
answer and attached supplements and declaration and found the respondent's 'defense of 
his actions unpersuasive.' Chief Judge Phillips further ruled that the respondent presented 
no 'evidentiary support or the likelihood of evidentiary support for his accusations.'  
 
"148. 
Chief Judge Phillips concluded that the respondent 'violated Rule 11 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and has done so in a manner that demonstrates his 
contempt for the Court' and that the respondent's filing 'contains multiple statements and 
accusations that had no reasonable basis in fact.' Chief Judge Phillips ruled that the 
respondent's 'conduct qualifies under the dictionary-definition of "contempt".'  
 
"149. 
Chief Judge Phillips sanctioned the respondent and ordered him to pay 
$1,000.00 to the Clerk of the Court.  
 
"150. 
Both the January 13, 2020, and March 4, 2020, orders were certified by 
the Clerk of the District Court for the Western District of Missouri.  
 
"151. 
The respondent presented no evidence during the formal hearing to 
disprove the findings in Chief Judge Phillips' rulings. 
 
"152. 
Applying Rule 220(b), based upon Chief Judge Phillips' rulings in her 
January 13, 2020, and March 4, 2020, orders, the hearing panel concludes that there is 
clear and convincing evidence that the respondent violated KRPC 3.1. 
  
"Absent Application of Rule 220(b) 
 
"153. 
Even without applying Rule 220(b), the hearing panel concludes that 
there is clear and convincing evidence that the respondent violated KRPC 3.1. 
 
"154. 
Since becoming licensed to practice law in the state of Kansas in October 
2019, the respondent made frivolous claims in [F.T.] v. U.S. Department of Labor, 19-cv- 
00493 in the following filings (filed in the District Court for the Western District of 
Missouri, unless otherwise indicated): 
31 
 
 
 
 
• 
'November 19, 2019, "Plaintiff's Suggestions Supporting Motion 
to Remedy Judge Smith's Lies and Crimes and Lift the Stay or Disqualify 
Judge Smith"; 
 
• 
'February 18, 2020, "Answer to Show Cause Order Regarding 
Contentions That Judge Smith Asserted Lies and Committed Crimes",  
"Supplement A: Analysis of Crimes and Lies By Judge Smith and Jeffrey 
Ray", "Supplement B: Analysis of FOIA and Related Legal Authorities 
That Judge Smith is Evading by Staying Cases Pertaining to Powers' 
Email", and "Declaration of Jack Jordan"; 
 
• 
'April 1, 2020, "Notice of Noncompliance with Illegal and 
Criminal Order Purporting to Impose Criminal Penalties"; 
 
• 
'May 5, 2020, "Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider and Vacate 
Order Imposing Sanctions and Order Refusing to Disqualify Judge 
Smith"; 
 
• 
'May 6, 2020, "Plaintiff's Supplement to Motion to Reconsider 
and Vacate Order Imposing Sanctions"; 
 
• 
'May 13, 2020, "Plaintiff's Second Supplement to Motion to 
Reconsider and Vacate Order Imposing Sanctions"; 
 
• 
'June 29, 2020, "Plaintiff's Corrected Motion to Reconsider and 
Vacate Judge Smith's Lies and Evidence of Criminal Conspiracy to 
Conceal Material Facts and Dispositive Evidence"; 
 
• 
'July 1, 2020, "Plaintiff's Motion for Order Stating the Law and 
Showing Judge Smith did not Lie About the Law"; 
 
32 
 
 
 
• 
'July 1, 2020, "Plaintiff's Motion for Order Stating the Law 
Showing Judge Smith's Threat was not Criminal"; 
 
• 
'January 19, 2021, "Appellant's Motion to Order the DOL and 
DOJ to Publicly File Parts of Powers' Email" filed in the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals; 
 
• 
'August 1, 2021, "Appellant's Motion for the Issuance of a 
Published (Or At Least Reasoned) Opinion" filed in two cases in the 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals; and 
 
• 
'August 8, 2021, "Appellant's Supplemental Memorandum 
Supporting Motion for the Issuance of a Published (Or At Least 
Reasoned) Opinion" filed in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.' 
 
"155. 
Only a portion of the frivolous statements the respondent made are 
quoted in the findings of fact above. There were many other frivolous statements made 
by the respondent about the presiding judges and others involved in the referenced 
litigation, but for the sake of brevity, those are not explicitly quoted in this report. The 
hearing panel concludes that, at minimum, all of the statements by the respondent in these 
filings that are quoted or cited in the findings of fact section contain an assertion or 
controvert an issue therein that is frivolous. 
 
"156. 
Within these filings, the respondent repeatedly made frivolous claims 
that Judge Smith lied, violated his oath of office, violated the U.S. Constitution, was 
committing crimes, confessed to committing a crime, committed 'treason to the 
Constitution,' was 'blatantly deceitful,' declared his intent to defraud or decide the case 
fraudulently, illegally targeted and threatened F.T., engaged in actions that were designed 
to illegally intimidate F.T., used his position and authority to attack and undermine the 
U.S. Constitution and federal law, used and conspired with Chief Judge Phillips to violate 
the respondent's due process rights, supported and defended enemies of the Constitution, 
violated canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and concealed evidence. 
 
33 
 
 
 
"157. 
Regarding Chief Judge Phillips, within these filings the respondent 
repeatedly made frivolous claims that Chief Judge Phillips blocked the respondent's 
access to relevant evidence, issued a show cause order that was patently illegal, asserted 
issues that were irrelevant and asserted one contention that was false, was undermining 
the institutions she swore to protect, knew her conduct was illegal and criminal, issued an 
order to show cause and order holding the respondent in criminal contempt that were 
illegal and criminal, and conspired with Judge Smith to violate the respondent's due 
process rights. 
 
"158. 
The respondent repeatedly made frivolous claims about the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals judges who sat on the panel to decide the respondent's appeals, 
including his assertions that the panel judges lied repeatedly, abused the 'legitimacy and 
confidence that many federal judges have earned,' were 'con men perpetrating a con, i.e., 
playing a confidence game,' attacked and undermined federal law and the U.S. 
Constitution, deliberately fabricated a lie, attacked the Constitution 'in an evil, violent, 
cowardly, loathsome manner,' and cited to Supreme Court decisions to undermine other 
Supreme Court decisions the respondent deemed directly on point and 'to deceive and 
lend false legitimacy to evil and violent attacks on the Constitution.' 
 
"159. 
These statements were all made by the respondent and were all contained 
in the respondent's filings in the District Court for the Western District of Missouri and/or 
in the respondent's filings in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
 
"160. 
Further, during the disciplinary investigation in this matter, the 
respondent submitted numerous letters to the disciplinary administrator's office making 
the same frivolous claims as he made in his court filings. 
 
"161. 
The respondent provided no evidence to support the claims he made in 
his November 19, 2019, filing or later filings and did not establish that there was likely 
any evidence to support these claims. An attorney's own belief in his accusations about a 
judge, when unsupported by the record, does not support his claim. See In re Landrith, 
280 Kan. 619, 644, 124 P.3d 467 (2005). 
 
34 
 
 
 
"162. 
During the formal hearing, the respondent presented no evidence to show 
he had a basis to make these claims that was not frivolous. 
 
"163. 
Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes, without applying Rule 220(b), 
that there is clear and convincing evidence that the respondent violated KRPC 3.1. 
 
"KRPC 3.4(c) 
 
"164. 
Clearly, lawyers must comply with court rules and orders. Specifically, 
KRPC 3.4(c) provides: '[a] lawyer shall not . . . knowingly disobey an obligation under 
the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid 
obligation exists.' 
  
"165. 
In this case, the respondent violated KRPC 3.4(c) by repeatedly violating 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ('FRCP') 11 and filing motions in the District Court for 
the Western District of Missouri that were prohibited by court order. 
 
"Applying Rule 220(b)—Violation of FRCP 11 
 
"166. 
Pursuant to Rule 220(b) (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 275), if based on a 
standard less than clear and convincing evidence, 'a certified copy of a judgment or ruling 
in any action involving substantially similar allegations as a disciplinary matter is prima 
facie evidence of the commission of the conduct that formed the basis of the judgment or 
ruling, regardless of whether the respondent is a party in the action.' 
 
"167. 
'The respondent has the burden to disprove the findings made in the 
judgment or ruling.' Rule 220(b) (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 275). 
 
"168. 
On January 13, 2020, Chief Judge Phillips ordered the respondent to 
show cause why he and F.T. 'should not be sanctioned for violating Rule 11(b)(3).' 
 
35 
 
 
 
"169. 
The respondent had an opportunity to, and did answer Chief Judge 
Phillips' January 13, 2020, show cause order via an answer filed February 18, 2020 (with 
supplements and a declaration attached). 
 
"170. 
On March 4, 2020, Chief Judge Phillips ruled that the respondent 
'violated Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and has done so in a manner 
that demonstrates his contempt for the Court' and that the respondent's filing 'contains 
multiple statements and accusations that had no reasonable basis in fact.' Chief Judge 
Phillips ruled that the respondent's 'conduct qualifies under the dictionary-definition of 
"contempt"'. 
 
"171. 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)(3) provides: 
 
'By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other 
paper—whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later 
advocating it—an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to 
the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, 
formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances: . . . 
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if 
specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support 
after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or 
discovery . . . .' 
 
"172. 
Chief Judge Phillips imposed a sanction on the respondent for his 
violation of FRCP 11(b)(3) in the amount of $1,000.00, to be paid to the Clerk of the 
Court. 
 
"173. 
Chief Judge Phillips' March 4, 2020, order is prima facie evidence that 
the respondent 'knowingly disobey[ed] an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except 
for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists.' See KRPC 
3.4(c); Rule 220(b) (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 275). 
 
36 
 
 
 
"174. 
The March 4, 2020, order was certified by the Clerk of the District Court 
for the Western District of Missouri. 
  
"175. 
The respondent presented no evidence during the formal hearing to 
disprove the findings in Chief Judge Phillips' ruling and none is found in the record. 
 
"176. 
Applying Rule 220(b), based upon Chief Judge Phillips' rulings in her 
March 4, 2020, order, the hearing panel concludes there is clear and convincing evidence 
that the respondent violated KRPC 3.4(c). 
 
"Absent Application of Rule 220(b)—Violation of FRCP 11 
 
"177. 
Even without applying Rule 220(b), the hearing panel concludes that 
there is clear and convincing evidence that the respondent violated KRPC 3.4(c) by 
violating FRCP 11. 
 
"178. 
In his filings in the District Court for the Western District of Missouri, 
including his answer and attached documents to Chief Judge Phillips' January 13, 2020, 
show cause order, the respondent provided no evidence to support his claims in his 
November 19, 2019, filing and did not establish that there was likely any evidence to 
support these claims. 
 
"179. 
During the formal hearing, the respondent presented no evidence to show 
the factual contentions he made in his November 19, 2019, filing had evidentiary support 
or would likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further 
investigation or discovery. 
 
"180. 
The hearing panel concludes that the respondent's violation of KRPC 
3.4(c) was knowing (and intentional) because the respondent testified during the formal 
hearing that he carefully considered his filings in front of Judge Smith and Chief Judge 
Phillips prior to filing them and continued to assert during his testimony at the formal 
hearing that these judges lied about Powers' email, concealed evidence, and committed 
crimes despite an absence of evidence to support his contentions. 
37 
 
 
 
 
"181. 
Further, the hearing panel concludes based on the evidence that the 
respondent's conduct was knowing (and intentional) because the respondent had not read 
an unredacted version of Powers' email at the time he made the allegations in his 
November 19, 2019, filing. See Rule 240 (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 323) ('[t]he Rules 
presuppose that disciplinary assessment of a lawyer's conduct will be made on the basis 
of the facts and circumstances as they existed at the time of the conduct in question.'). 
Thus, the respondent's allegations about Judge Smith in his November 19, 2019, filing 
was based on the respondent's knowledge that he lacked evidence of what Powers' email 
actually said. 
 
"182. 
Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes, without applying Rule 220(b), 
there is clear and convincing evidence that the respondent violated KRPC 3.4(c) by 
knowingly disobeying FRCP 11(b)(3). 
  
"Applying Rule 220(b)—Violation of Court Order 
 
"183. 
Pursuant to Rule 220(b) (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 275), if based on a 
standard less than clear and convincing evidence, 'a certified copy of a judgment or ruling 
in any action involving substantially similar allegations as a disciplinary matter is prima 
facie evidence of the commission of the conduct that formed the basis of the judgment or 
ruling, regardless of whether the respondent is a party in the action.' 
 
"184. 
'The respondent has the burden to disprove the findings made in the 
judgment or ruling.' Rule 220(b) (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 275). 
 
"185. 
Here, Judge Smith ruled on July 6, 2020, that: 
 
'Despite the Court's directive [in its June 30, 2020, order], 
Plaintiff's counsel filed two motions on July 1, 2020; (1) 
"Plaintiff's Motion for Order Stating the Law and Showing Judge 
Smith Did Not Lie About the Law," and (2) "Plaintiff's Motion 
for Order Stating the Law Showing Judge Smith's Threat Was 
38 
 
 
 
Not Criminal." These motions are the precise type of filings 
prohibited by the Court. That is, the motions are "frivolous, 
unprofessional, and scurrilous, if not defamatory, in tone and 
content.''' 
 
"186. 
Further, on July 20, 2020, Judge Smith issued an order sanctioning the 
respondent in the amount of $500.00 '[f]or his repeated violations of [the] Court's Orders, 
including but not limited to the Court's Orders prohibiting Plaintiff's counsel from 
emailing Chambers staff and Clerk's Office staff.' 
  
"187. 
The July 6, 2020, and July 20, 2020, orders were certified by the Clerk of 
the District Court for the Western District of Missouri. 
 
"188. 
The respondent presented no evidence during the formal hearing to 
disprove the findings in Judge Smith's rulings and none is found in the record. 
 
"189. 
Applying Rule 220(b), based upon Judge Smith's rulings in his July 6, 
2020, and July 20, 2020, orders, the hearing panel concludes there is clear and convincing 
evidence that the respondent violated KRPC 3.4(c). 
 
"Absent Application of Rule 220(b)—Violation of Court Order 
 
"190. 
Even without applying Rule 220(b), the hearing panel concludes that 
there is clear and convincing evidence that the respondent violated KRPC 3.4(c) by 
violating Judge Smith's June 30, 2020, court order. 
 
"191. 
On June 30, 2020, Judge Smith issued an order ruling as follows: 
 
'Plaintiff's counsel has filed numerous motions in this matter, 
including but not limited to ten motions to reconsider (not 
including the motions discussed above). These motions, 
including the most recently filed motions, are largely frivolous, 
unprofessional, and scurrilous, if not defamatory, in tone and 
39 
 
 
 
content. The Court refers Plaintiff's counsel to Judge Phillips's 
March 4, 2020 Order wherein Judge Phillips determined 
Plaintiff's counsel violated Rule 11, sanctioned him, and referred 
him to the Kansas Bar Association. 
 
'Three dispositive motions are pending in this matter. Yet, 
Plaintiff continues to file other motions. The Court warns 
Plaintiff that additional frivolous motion practice will be met 
with additional sanctions, another referral to the Kansas Bar 
Association, and referrals to other jurisdictions wherein counsel 
is licensed to practice law. This warning should not come as a 
surprise to Plaintiff's counsel because other courts recently 
issued similar warnings to counsel.' 
 
"192. 
On July 1, 2020, the respondent filed two documents in the matter. One 
was 'Plaintiff's Motion for Order Stating the Law and Showing Judge Smith did not Lie 
About the Law,' and the second was 'Plaintiff's Motion for Order Stating the Law 
Showing Judge Smith's Threat was not Criminal'. 
 
"193. 
Within these documents, the respondent stated, in part: 
 
'Judge Smith is committing crimes by personally concealing 
evidence of whether or not (1) Powers' email contains either Key 
Phrase and (2) Clubb and Ray acted in bad faith by 
misrepresenting either Key Phrase. 
 
* * * 
 
'To knowingly violate Plaintiff's right to such evidence, Judge 
Smith chose to criminally threaten Plaintiff and Plaintiff's 
counsel if Plaintiff continued to seek evidence of whether or not 
Powers' email contains either Key Phrase. 
 
40 
 
 
 
* * * 
 
'Judge Smith's intimidation also was criminal because he used 
intimidation to personally conceal and help the Culprits conceal 
(and encourage the Culprits to conceal) evidence that he knew 
shows that DOL and DOJ employees (and Judge Contreras) 
committed federal crimes. 
 
* * * 
 
'Judge Smith must state the law, not Lie about the law. The fact 
that Judge Smith has again willfully failed to state the law, and 
instead chosen to resort to threats speaks volumes. 
 
* * * 
 
'. . . Judge Smith is a traitor to the judiciary and an enemy of the 
Constitution. To personally criminally conceal evidence of two 
phrases on a couple pages of Powers' email—and to help the 
Culprits conceal such evidence—Judge Smith routinely Lies and 
commits crimes, including threatening and attempting to 
intimidate Plaintiff and Plaintiff's counsel.' 
 
"194. 
The hearing panel concludes that the respondent's July 1, 2020, filings 
were filed in violation of the court's June 30, 2020, order. 
 
"195. 
Further, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent's violation of 
KRPC 3.4(c) was knowing (and intentional) because the respondent testified during the 
formal hearing that he carefully considered his filings in front of Judge Smith and Chief 
Judge Phillips prior to filing them and continued to assert during his testimony at the 
formal hearing that these judges lied about Powers' email, concealed evidence, and 
committed crimes despite an absence of evidence to support his contentions. 
 
41 
 
 
 
"196. 
Further, the hearing panel concludes based on the evidence that the 
respondent's conduct was knowing (and intentional) because the respondent had not read 
an unredacted version of Powers' email at the time he made the allegations in his 
November 19, 2019, filing. See Rule 240 (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 323) ('[t]he Rules 
presuppose that disciplinary assessment of a lawyer's conduct will be made on the basis 
of the facts and circumstances as they existed at the time of the conduct in question . . .'). 
 
"197. 
KRPC 3.4(c) provides an exception for where a lawyer disobeys an 
obligation of a tribunal when the lawyer presents 'an open refusal based on an assertion 
that no valid obligation exists.' The panel finds that the respondent provided no evidence 
to show that the order he refused to obey was anything other than a valid obligation as set 
out in the rule. 
 
"198. 
Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes, without applying Rule 220(b), 
there is clear and convincing evidence that the respondent's July 1, 2020, filings made 
claims that were frivolous and that the respondent violated KRPC 3.4(c) by knowingly 
disobeying the court's order that he cease filing further frivolous motions.  
 
"KRPC 8.2(a) 
 
"199. 
KRPC 8.2(a) provides: 
 
'A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be 
false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity 
concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory 
officer or public legal officer, or of a candidate for election or 
appointment to judicial or legal office.' 
 
"200. 
The respondent asserts that the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and United States Supreme Court case law such as New York Times v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 
U.S. 64, 85 S.Ct. 209, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964), N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 83 
S.Ct. 328, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963), In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 98 S.Ct. 1893, 56 L.Ed.2d 
42 
 
 
 
417 (1978), and Pickering v. Board of Ed., 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 
(1968), requires that the disciplinary administrator's office prove that the statements he 
made about judges in his filings were false. Further, the respondent argues that the 
disciplinary administrator's office must not only prove that he asserted a falsehood, but 
that he did so with actual malice. He argues that the disciplinary administrator's office 
failed to prove that he made any false statement with actual malice. The respondent's 
arguments are not supported by United States Supreme Court and Kansas Supreme Court 
case law surrounding attorney discipline matters. 
 
"201. 
'[B]oth the United States Supreme Court and this court have previously 
recognized that the freedom of speech is not inevitably without limitation. Lawyers, in 
particular, trade certain aspects of their free speech rights for their licenses to practice.' In 
re Comfort, 284 Kan. 183, 202, 159 P.3d 1011 (2007). 
  
"202. 
In In re Pyle, 283 Kan. 807, 821, 156 P.3d 1231 (2007), the Supreme 
Court held that it was required 'to navigate the tension between First Amendment 
freedom of speech, enjoyed by all citizens, and the limits that can be placed on exercise 
of that freedom because a particular citizen chose to become a Kansas lawyer.' 
 
"203. 
The Court held: 
 
'A lawyer, as a citizen, has a right to criticize a judge or other 
adjudicatory officer publicly. To exercise this right, the lawyer 
must be certain of the merit of the complaint, use appropriate 
language, and avoid petty criticisms. Unrestrained and 
intemperate statements against a judge or adjudicatory officer 
lessen public confidence in our legal system. Criticisms 
motivated by reasons other than a desire to improve the legal 
system are not justified.' 
 
Pyle, 283 Kan. at 821, quoting In re Johnson, 240 Kan. 334, 336, 729 P.2d 1175 (1986). 
 
43 
 
 
 
"204. 
'[E]ven a statement cast in the form of an opinion ("I think that Judge X 
is dishonest") implies a factual basis, and the lack of support for that implied factual 
assertion may be a proper basis for a penalty.' Pyle, 283 Kan. at 821, quoting Matter of 
Palmisano, 70 F.3d 483,487 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied 517 U.S. 1223, 116 S.Ct. 1854, 
134 L.Ed.2d 954 (1996). 
 
"205. 
The Pyle court discussed In re Landrith, 280 Kan. 619, 124 P.3d 467 
(2005), in which case the Court 'disbarred an attorney for, among other violations, his 
repeated baseless, inflammatory, and false accusations against opposing counsel, judges, 
state district court employees, Court of Appeals staff, and municipal officers and 
employees.' Pyle, 283 Kan. at 822. 
 
"206. 
The Pyle court noted that in Landrith: 
 
'Landrith produced no evidence to support any of his accusations 
but argued that the First Amendment protected his speech. We 
rejected his argument, emphasizing that, in those instances where 
a lawyer's unbridled speech amounts to misconduct that threatens 
a significant State interest, it is clear that a State may restrict the 
lawyer's exercise of personal rights guaranteed by the federal and 
state Constitutions.' 
 
Pyle, 283 Kan. at 822, citing N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438, 83 S.Ct. 328, 9 
L.Ed.2d 405 (1963). 
 
"207. 
'A lawyer's right to free speech is tempered by his or her obligations to 
the courts and the bar, obligations ordinary citizens do not undertake.' Pyle, 283 Kan. at 
822-823, citing State v. Nelson, 210 Kan. 637, 504 P.2d 211 (1972); see Gentile v. State 
Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 115 L.Ed.2d 888 (1991); see also In re 
Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 79 S. Ct. 1376, 3 L.Ed.2d 1473 (1959). 'It is unquestionable that in 
the courtroom itself, during a judicial proceeding, whatever right to "free speech" an 
attorney has is extremely circumscribed. An attorney may not, by speech or other 
conduct, resist a ruling of the trial court beyond the point necessary to preserve a claim 
44 
 
 
 
for appeal.' Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1071, citing Sacher v. United Sates, 343 U.S. 1, 8, 72 S. 
Ct. 451, 96 L. Ed. 717 (1952); see Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155, 69 S. Ct. 425, 93 L. Ed. 
569 (1949). 
 
"208. 
Courts weigh 'the State's interest in the regulation of a specialized 
profession against a lawyer's First Amendment interest in the kind of speech that was at 
issue.' Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1073.  
 
'Appellant as a citizen could not be denied any of the common 
rights of citizens. But he stood before the inquiry and before the 
Appellate Division in another quite different capacity, also. As a 
lawyer he was an "officer of the court, and, like the court itself, 
an instrument . . . of justice . . . ."' 
 
Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1074, quoting In re Cohen, 7 N.Y.2d 488, 495, 199 N.Y.S.2d 658, 
166 N.E.2d 672 (1960), also quoted in Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 126, 81 S.Ct. 954, 
6 L.Ed.2d 156 (1961). 
 
"209. 
KRPC 8.2(a) is violated if a lawyer makes a statement that the [lawyer] 
knows to be false, or if the lawyer makes a statement 'with reckless disregard as to its 
truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge . . . .' KRPC 8.2(a). 
The hearing panel concludes that KRPC 8.2(a) is sufficiently clear in the conduct it 
proscribes and that KRPC 8.2(a) is not unconstitutional. 
 
"210. 
Thus, the hearing panel disagrees with the respondent's assertion that the 
disciplinary administrator's office must prove that the respondent made a false statement 
with actual malice. United States Supreme Court and Kansas Supreme Court case law is 
clear that a lawyer may be held to the requirements of KRPC 8.2(a) in an attorney 
discipline matter without infringing on the lawyer's rights under the First Amendment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45 
 
 
 
"Applying Rule 220(b) 
 
"211. 
Pursuant to Rule 220(b) (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 275), if based on a 
standard less than clear and convincing evidence, 'a certified copy of a judgment or ruling 
in any action involving substantially similar allegations as a disciplinary matter is prima 
facie evidence of the commission of the conduct that formed the basis of the judgment or 
ruling, regardless of whether the respondent is a party in the action.' 
 
"212. 
'The respondent has the burden to disprove the findings made in the 
judgment or ruling.' Rule 220(b) (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 275). 
 
"213. 
On March 4, 2020, Chief Judge Phillips ruled that: 
 
'Jordan has made baseless allegations that Judge Smith 
intentionally and knowingly issued legally incorrect rulings, 
engaged in criminal misconduct, lied, and conspired with one of 
the parties in a case to the detriment of the other. Thus, Jordan 
has made statements about Judge Smith's qualifications and 
integrity that he knew were false or, at least, he acted with 
reckless disregard to their truth or falsity when he signed and 
submitted the [November 19, 2019] Filing. This violates Rule 4-
8.2(a).' 
 
"214. 
Missouri Rule of Professional Conduct 4-8.2(a) contains the exact same 
language as KRPC 8.2(a). 
  
"215. 
Chief Judge Phillips' March 4, 2020, order is prima facie evidence that 
the respondent made 'a statement that [the respondent knew] to be false or with reckless 
disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of' Judge 
Smith. See KRPC 8.2(a); Rule 220(b) (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 275). 
 
"216. 
The March 4, 2020, order was certified by the Clerk of the District Court 
for the Western District of Missouri. 
46 
 
 
 
 
"217. 
The respondent presented no evidence during the formal hearing to 
disprove the findings in Chief Judge Phillips' ruling and none is found in the record. 
 
"218. Applying Rule 220(b), based upon Chief Judge Phillips' rulings in her 
March 4, 2020, order, the hearing panel concludes there is clear and convincing evidence 
that the respondent violated KRPC 8.2(a). 
 
"Absent Application of Rule 220(b) 
 
"219. 
Even without applying Rule 220(b), the hearing panel concludes that 
there is clear and convincing evidence that the respondent violated KRPC 8.2(a) with his 
statements about Judge Smith, Chief Judge Phillips, and the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals panel judges. 
 
"220. 
In around a dozen filings from 2019 to 2021, the respondent repeatedly 
made serious derogatory allegations about the qualifications and integrity of Judge Smith, 
Chief Judge Phillips, and the panel judges of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. These 
included allegations of criminal activity, lies, misrepresentations, conspiracy with parties 
to matters pending before the court, violations of the judicial canons, and even treason to 
the Constitution. All of these allegations stem, in one way or another, from these judges' 
rulings in connection with decisions to decline to order disclosure of Powers' email, 
which these judges concluded was protected from disclosure by attorney-client privilege. 
 
"221. 
The hearing panel concludes that the respondent's violation of KRPC 
3.4(c) was knowing (and intentional) because the respondent testified during the formal 
hearing that he carefully considered his filings in front of Judge Smith and Chief Judge 
Phillips prior to filing them and continued to assert during his testimony at the formal 
hearing that these judges lied about Powers' email, concealed evidence, and committed 
crimes despite an absence of evidence to support his contentions. 
 
"222. 
Further, the hearing panel concludes based on the evidence that the 
respondent's conduct was knowing (and intentional) because the respondent had not read 
47 
 
 
 
an unredacted version of Powers' email prior to these statements about Judge Smith, 
Chief Judge Phillips, and the panel judges. See Rule 240 (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 323) 
('[t]he Rules presuppose that disciplinary assessment of a lawyer's conduct will be made 
on the basis of the facts and circumstances as they existed at the time of the conduct in 
question . . .'). 
 
"223. 
The respondent's allegations that any judge lied about the privileged 
status of or what was contained in the unredacted version of Powers' email (or any of his 
other allegations stemming from that premise, including criminal activity, conspiracy, 
treason, etc.) were, at the very least, made with reckless disregard for the truth or falsity 
of the qualifications or integrity of Judge Smith, Chief Judge Phillips, and the panel 
judges. See KRPC 8.2(a). 
 
"224. 
The hearing panel concludes that the reasoning the respondent provided 
in argument for why he made those allegations against Judge Smith, Chief Judge Phillips, 
and the panel judges is unpersuasive. 
 
"225. 
Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes there is clear and convincing 
evidence that the respondent repeatedly violated KRPC 8.2(a) in his filings in the District 
Court for the Western District of Missouri in [F.T.] v. U.S. Department of Labor, 19-cv-
00493 and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in docket numbers 20-2439, [F.T.] v. U.S. 
Department of Labor and 20-2494, Jordan v. U.S. Department of Labor. 
 
"KRPC 8.4(d) and 8.4(g) 
 
"226. 
'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that 
is prejudicial to the administration of justice.' KRPC 8.4(d). Further, '[i]t is professional 
misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on the 
lawyer's fitness to practice law.' KRPC 8.4(g). 
 
"227. 
The following is not an exhaustive list of the ways the respondent 
violated KRPC 8.4(d) and (g), but are a few representative examples of his violations of 
these rules. 
48 
 
 
 
 
"228. 
The respondent engaged in conduct that was prejudicial to the 
administration of justice and adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law when he 
made numerous statements about Judge Smith, Chief Judge Phillips, and the Eighth 
Circuit panel judges that were personal derogatory attacks, served no legitimate purpose 
other than to insult and harass the judges, and were not supported by any credible 
evidence. 
 
"229. 
The respondent engaged in conduct that was prejudicial to the 
administration of justice and adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law when he, as 
determined by the hearing panel above, violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
11(b)(3), and violated Judge Smith's June 30, 2020, order. This conduct resulted in the 
respondent being sanctioned and ordered to pay $1,000.00 by Chief Judge Phillips on 
March 4, 2020, and again being sanctioned and ordered to pay $500.00 by Judge Smith 
on July 20, 2020. 
 
"230. 
The respondent engaged in conduct that was prejudicial to the 
administration of justice and adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law when his 
conduct required judicial reassignment to another Article III judge for the purpose of a 
show cause hearing for the respondent to show why he and his client F.T. should not be 
held in contempt. 
 
"231. 
The respondent engaged in conduct that was prejudicial to the 
administration of justice and adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law when he 
filed the April 1, 2020, 'Notice of Noncompliance with Illegal and Criminal Order 
Purporting to Impose Criminal Penalties' on April 1, 2020, wherein the respondent did 
not merely argue that Chief Judge Phillips' sanction order was invalid but asserted that 
the order was 'criminal'. 
 
"232. 
The respondent engaged in conduct that was prejudicial to the 
administration of justice and adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law when the 
respondent filed repeated motions to reconsider, all containing the same frivolous 
allegations about judges and attorneys and rehashing the same arguments the respondent 
49 
 
 
 
had presented previously to the same court and for which the respondent had been 
sanctioned. These included the Respondent's May 5, 2020, 'Plaintiff's Motion to 
Reconsider and Vacate Order Imposing Sanctions and Order Refusing to Disqualify 
Judge Smith', May 6, 2020, 'Plaintiff's Supplement to Motion to Reconsider and Vacate 
Order Imposing Sanctions', May 13, 2020, 'Plaintiff's Second Supplement to Motion to 
Reconsider and Vacate Order Imposing Sanctions', and June 29, 2020, 'Plaintiff's 
Corrected Motion to Reconsider and Vacate Judge Smith's Lies and Evidence of Criminal 
Conspiracy to Conceal Material Facts and Dispositive Evidence'. 
 
"233. 
The respondent engaged in conduct that was prejudicial to the 
administration of justice and adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law when he 
filed two motions on July 1, 2020 and a July 6, 2020 'Motion for Leave to File Notice of 
Appeal', that violated Judge Smith's June 30, 2020, order, and that contained the same 
frivolous allegations about judges and attorneys and rehashed the same arguments the 
respondent had presented previously to the same court and for which the respondent had 
been sanctioned. 
 
"234. 
The respondent engaged in conduct that was prejudicial to the 
administration of justice and adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law when the 
respondent filed the August 1, 2020, and August 2, 2020, 'Motions for Issuance of a 
Published (Or At Least Reasoned) Opinion' and later the August 8, 2020, 'Supplemental 
Memorandum Supporting Motion for the Issuance of a Published (Or At Least Reasoned) 
Opinion' in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals that served no legitimate purpose in the 
appeal. 
 
"235. 
The hearing panel notes that on November 2, 2021, the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals disbarred the respondent from practicing in that court. On November 
17, 2021, the Eighth Circuit denied the respondent's motion to vacate the disbarment 
order and barred the respondent from making any further filings in the case, including 
filings relating to his disbarment. The disciplinary administrator's office did not argue, 
and the hearing panel does not make a finding whether the discipline imposed against the 
respondent in the Eighth Circuit is evidence of reciprocal discipline warranting 
application of Rule 221 (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 276). However, the Eighth Circuit's 
50 
 
 
 
orders are evidence of the prejudicial impact of the respondent's conduct on the 
administration of justice and adversely reflect on his fitness to practice law. 
 
"236. 
Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes there is clear and convincing 
evidence that the respondent engaged in conduct that was prejudicial to the 
administration of justice and that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, in 
violation of KRPC 8.4(d) and KRPC 8.4(g). 
 
"American Bar Association  
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 
 
"237. 
In making this recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel 
considered the factors outlined by the American Bar Association in its Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (hereinafter 'Standards'). Pursuant to Standard 3, the factors 
to be considered are the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the potential or actual 
injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and the existence of aggravating or mitigating 
factors. 
  
"238. 
Duty Violated. The respondent violated his duty to the legal system and 
to the legal profession. 
 
"239. 
Mental State. The respondent intentionally violated his duties. The 
respondent confirmed during his testimony at the formal hearing that he carefully 
considered the statements he made in his filings. Further, the investigator, Mr. Stratton, 
testified that the respondent told Mr. Stratton that 'he had carefully considered the course 
of action that he should take prior to making the allegations against' the federal judges, 
that 'the allegations had not been made lightly at all' and that he 'truly believed they were 
necessary to get the evidence that has been denied for years.' The respondent was warned 
several times by the judges he appeared before that his conduct was sanctionable and 
violated attorney ethical rules, but he persisted in the same type of conduct in repeated 
filings making the same statements and rehashing the same arguments. The respondent's 
repeated derogatory statements of a similar nature in numerous filings about judges and 
attorneys involved in the underlying federal cases establishes his conduct was intentional. 
 
51 
 
 
 
"240. 
Injury. As a result of the respondent's misconduct, the respondent caused 
actual injury to the legal system and to the legal profession. See In re Landrith, 280 Kan. 
619, 648, 124 P.3d 467 (2005) (respondent's conduct caused injury to the legal system by 
wasting valuable court resources and injury to the legal profession by his false 
accusations against members of the judiciary, attorneys, and others). 
 
"Aggravating and Mitigating Factors 
 
"241. 
Aggravating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may 
justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its 
recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following 
aggravating factors present: 
 
"242. 
Prior Disciplinary Offenses. The respondent has been previously 
disciplined on one occasion. The respondent was disbarred from practicing in the Eighth 
Circuit on November 2, 2021. The respondent's motion to vacate his disbarment in the 
Eighth Circuit was denied, and he was barred from any further filings in that court on 
November 17, 2021. 
 
"243. 
A Pattern of Misconduct. The respondent has engaged in a pattern of 
misconduct by repeatedly engaging in similar misconduct and violations of Kansas Rules 
of Professional Conduct 3.1, 3.4(c), 8.2(a), and 8.4(d) and (g) from the time he became 
licensed to practice law in Kansas in late 2019 until 2021. The respondent engaged in the 
misconduct found by the hearing panel in at least 12 filings in the District Court for the 
Western District of Missouri and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
 
"244. 
Multiple Offenses. The respondent committed multiple rule violations. 
The respondent violated KRPC 3.1 (meritorious claims and contentions), KRPC 3.4(c) 
(fairness to opposing party and counsel), KRPC 8.2(a) (judicial and legal officials), and 
KRPC 8.4(d) and (g) (professional misconduct). Accordingly, the hearing panel 
concludes that the respondent committed multiple offenses. 
 
52 
 
 
 
"245. 
Bad Faith Obstruction of the Disciplinary Proceeding by Intentionally 
Failing to Comply with Rules or Orders of the Disciplinary Process. During his 
testimony, the respondent invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. On several of the occasions the respondent invoked the Fifth Amendment 
privilege, the hearing panel concluded that the privilege did not apply and directed the 
respondent to answer the question posed. This included questions the respondent was 
asked about statements he had previously made to the individual investigating this 
disciplinary matter. Despite the hearing panel's direction that the respondent answer these 
questions, the respondent refused. The hearing panel concludes that this conduct 
constituted bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by the respondent 
intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary process. Further, 
the respondent sent emails to the hearing panel members, attorneys for the disciplinary 
administrator's office and the kbda@kscourts.org email address—which is the official 
filing email address for the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys—containing 
arguments regarding his disciplinary matter after the November 19, 2021, deadline for 
filing motions set by the hearing panel and without seeking prior permission to do so. In 
an email sent on December 19, 2021, the respondent stated, in part, that 'ODA and Panel 
attorneys are abusing their powers to pretend they have the authority to harass good 
Constitution-supporting attorneys who expose lies and crimes of judges and government 
attorneys,' and '[y]ou violated the U.S. Constitution and your own oaths (and commit 
federal crimes) by pretending that you have the power to do what state judges clearly and 
irrefutably lack the power to do.' 
 
"246. 
Submission of False Evidence, False Statements, or Other Deceptive 
Practices During the Disciplinary Process. On December 17, 2021, the disciplinary 
administrator's office filed a 'Notice of Intent to Call Witnesses', which the hearing panel 
previously ordered it to file if it planned to call witnesses during the hearing. On 
December 18, 2021, the respondent filed 'Objections to ODA Witnesses'. On January 5, 
2022, at 7:49 a.m., the respondent sent an email to Ms. Walker, Ms. Hart, all three 
members of the hearing panel, and the kbda@kscourts.org email address asking Ms. 
Walker and Ms. Hart to '[p]lease confirm that you will not call any judge or government 
attorney to testify at the hearing.' Later that same day, at 5:04 p.m., the respondent sent an 
email to Ms. Walker, Ms. Hart, all three members of the hearing panel, and the 
53 
 
 
 
kbda@kscourts.org email address stating, 'The hearing will begin in less than a week. 
Please kindly provide the information I requested below.' The respondent failed to 
disclose to the hearing panel that that same day, at 3:22 p.m., Ms. Walker sent an email to 
the respondent and Ms. Hart only that stated: 'We have complied with the orders of the 
panel and have filed notice of the witnesses we believe we will need to call at this time. 
Although we do not anticipate it, if that changes we would file notice with the hearing 
panel.' Further, the respondent asserted that the disciplinary administrator's office 
asserted 'falsehoods' in its 'briefing,' relied on 'bushwhacking tactics to prevail,' and were 
'knowingly violating Respondent's rights.' The respondent made similar statements in 
motions he filed in this disciplinary matter. The hearing panel concludes that the 
respondent had no reasonable basis to make these statements and that his conduct in 
presenting these statements to the hearing panel was deceptive. 
 
"247. 
Refusal to Acknowledge Wrongful Nature of Conduct. The respondent 
has refused to acknowledge his repeated violations of KRPC 3.1, 3.4(c), 8.2(a), or 8.4(d) 
and (g). Instead, the respondent has maintained throughout these proceedings that he has 
not committed any misconduct and that he was entitled to make the statements he made 
about the judges and attorneys in federal court. Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes 
that the respondent refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct. 
 
"248. 
Substantial Experience in the Practice of Law. The Kansas Supreme 
Court admitted the respondent to practice law in the State of Kansas in 2019. The 
respondent was admitted to the practice of law in New York in 1998. At the time of the 
misconduct, the respondent had been licensed to practice law in at least one state for 
more than 20 years. The hearing panel concludes that the respondent had substantial 
experience in the practice of law at the time of his misconduct. 
 
"249. 
Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may 
justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its 
recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following 
mitigating circumstances present: 
 
54 
 
 
 
"250. 
Imposition of Other Penalties or Sanctions. The respondent has 
experienced other sanctions for his conduct. The respondent was sanctioned and ordered 
to pay $1,000.00 by Chief Judge Phillips on March 4, 2020, and was sanctioned and 
ordered to pay $500.00 by Judge Smith on July 20, 2020. However, the respondent filed 
with the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri a 'Notice of 
Noncompliance with Illegal and Criminal Order Purporting to Impose Criminal Penalties' 
on April 1, 2020, after Chief Judge Phillips' sanction order was issued. There was no 
evidence presented that the respondent paid the $1,000.00 or the $500.00 sanction. 
Further, the respondent was disbarred for his misconduct from practicing in the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals on November 2, 2021. 
 
"251. 
In addition to the above-cited factors, the hearing panel has thoroughly 
examined and considered the following Standards: 
 
'6.11 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer, with 
the intent to deceive the court, makes a false statement, submits a 
false document, or improperly withholds material information, 
and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party, or 
causes a significant or potentially significant adverse effect on 
the legal proceeding. 
 
'6.21 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer 
knowingly violates a court order or rule with the intent to obtain 
a benefit for the lawyer or another, and causes serious injury or 
potentially serious injury to a party, or causes serious or 
potentially serious interference with a legal proceeding. 
 
'7.1 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer 
knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed 
as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer 
or another, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a 
client, the public, or the legal system.' 
 
55 
 
 
 
"Recommendation of the Parties 
 
"252. 
The disciplinary administrator recommended that the respondent be 
disbarred. 
 
"253. 
The respondent recommended that he not be disciplined because he 
believed there was no evidence indicating that he violated the Kansas Rules of 
Professional Conduct.  
 
"Discussion 
 
"254. 
On October 26, 2021, in its 'Response to Respondent's Constitutional 
Claims', the disciplinary administrator's office asked the panel to find that the First 
Amendment does not prohibit a finding of misconduct here and that this disciplinary 
process does not violate the respondent's due process rights. The respondent filed both 
versions of his response on November 29, 2021, arguing that the disciplinary 
administrator's office was violating his rights under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
 
"255. 
On December 13, 2021, the hearing panel issued an order wherein it 
declined to make any findings or conclusions of law on this issue prior to issuing the final 
hearing report. See Rule 226(a)(1) (2022 Kan. Ct. R. at 281) ('the hearing panel will issue 
a final hearing report setting forth findings of fact, conclusions of law, aggravating and 
mitigating factors, and a recommendation of discipline or that no discipline be imposed  
. . . [f]ollowing a hearing on a formal complaint'). 
  
"256. 
Now that the formal hearing in this matter has concluded, the hearing 
panel concludes as a matter of law that the respondent's constitutional rights have not 
been violated by this disciplinary proceeding. 
 
"257. 
Applying the authorities and reasoning discussed in the section 
discussing KRPC 8.2(a) above, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent's First 
Amendment rights have not been violated. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 
56 
 
 
 
U.S.1030, 111 S.Ct. 2720, 115 L.Ed.2d 888 (1991); In re Comfort, 284 Kan. 183, 159 
P.3d 1011 (2007); In re Pyle, 283 Kan. 807, 156 P.3d 1231 (2007); In re Landrith, 280 
Kan. 619, 124 P.3d 467 (2005); State v. Nelson, 210 Kan. 637, 504 P.2d 211 (1972). 
 
"258. 
Further, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent's rights under 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments have not been violated in this disciplinary 
proceeding. 
 
"259. 
In an attorney disciplinary proceeding, a respondent 'is entitled to 
procedural due process, and that due process includes fair notice of the charges sufficient 
to inform and provide a meaningful opportunity for explanation and defense.' In re Knox, 
309 Kan. 167,170, 432 P.3d 654 (2019) citing In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 
20 L.Ed.2d 117 (1968). 
 
"260. 
The respondent was served with a copy of the formal complaint in this 
matter, presented and argued multiple motions and responses to motions wherein he 
thoroughly briefed his arguments, and was provided the opportunity to present evidence 
on his own behalf, although he elected not to. 
 
"261. 
The respondent invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination during his testimony where he believed a question may elicit a 
response that could place him in criminal jeopardy. The hearing panel ruled that the Fifth 
Amendment was not properly invoked where the respondent was asked about a statement 
he had previously made to the investigator in this disciplinary matter, because the 
respondent had waived the privilege. However, the hearing panel affirmed the 
respondent's right to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege when it had not been 
previously waived by him. 
 
"262. 
The hearing panel concludes that this disciplinary proceeding complies 
with due process requirements and does not violate any of the respondent's constitutional 
rights. 
 
57 
 
 
 
"263. 
Finally, the hearing panel took under advisement the disciplinary 
administrator's motion during the formal hearing to accept Exhibits 24 through 29, 39, 
40, and 41 to prove the truth of the matter asserted. The hearing panel previously 
admitted these exhibits via its order dated December 13, 2021, pursuant to hearsay 
exception K.S.A. 60-460(o) 'to prove the content of the record.' 
  
"264. 
During the formal hearing, the disciplinary administrator's office again 
asked that the hearing panel admit the exhibits for all purposes, including to prove the 
truth of the matter asserted. The disciplinary administrator's office cited State v. Baker, 
237 Kan. 54, 697 P.2d 1267 (1985), to support its argument that a properly certified copy 
of a court record is grounds to admit the record under the K.S.A. 60-460(o) hearsay 
exception. 
 
"265. 
The hearing panel agrees that the exhibits, which are properly certified 
by the custodians of those court records, are admissible under K.S.A. 60-460(o). But 
K.S.A. 60-460(o) limits the use of those records under the exception 'to prove the content 
of the record.' In Baker, the Supreme Court upheld admission of a journal entry of 
judgment from another district court to prove that the defendant had a prior felony 
conviction. Baker, 237 Kan. at 55. The Court applied K.S.A. 60-460(o) similarly in City 
of Overland Park v. Rice, 222 Kan. 693, 567 P.2d 1382 (1977), where the Court upheld 
admission of a prior order of driver's license suspension under K.S.A. 60-460(o) as 
evidence of the period of suspension for a subsequent prosecution for driving on a 
suspended license. In both of these cases, the court records were admitted 'to prove the 
content of the record' or in other words, to prove that the prior conviction or suspension 
happened and when it happened. These records were not admitted through K.S.A. 60-
460(o) to prove the truth of the matter asserted in any statements made within those 
documents. 
  
"266. 
The disciplinary administrator's office did not call any witnesses or 
provide any further evidentiary foundation during the formal hearing to support admitting 
these exhibits for any other purpose. 
 
58 
 
 
 
"267. 
Based on the plain language of K.S.A. 60-460(o) and based on the 
manner in which the Kansas Supreme Court has applied K.S.A. 60-460(o) to court 
records previously, the hearing panel concludes that Exhibits 24 through 29, 39, 40, and 
41 were properly admitted 'to prove the content of the record,' and the panel considers 
them only for that purpose. 
 
"268. 
The hearing panel notes, however, that a prior judgment or ruling of a 
court that is 'verbal parts of an act' determining the rights or obligations of the parties 
'merely to show the fact of its having been made' is not hearsay and may be considered 
for this non-hearsay use. Baldridge v. State, 289 Kan. 618,215 P.3d 585 (2009); State v. 
Oliphant, 210 Kan. 451, 454, 502 P.2d 626 (1972); see also U.S. v. Boulware, 384 F.3d 
794, 806 (9th Cir. 2004). Further, a court shall take judicial notice of 'such facts at the 
request of a party if the party furnishes the court with sufficient information to comply 
with the request and has given the adverse party notice and an opportunity to respond,' 
such as whether a particular order has been entered. Matter of Starosta, 314 Kan. 378, 
499 P.3d 458, 466 (2021). 
 
"269. 
The hearing panel took documents that are certified court orders within 
these exhibits into consideration in a manner consistent with this analysis. 
 
"Recommendation of the Hearing Panel 
 
"270. 
Accordingly, based upon the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the 
Standards listed above, the hearing panel unanimously recommends that the respondent 
be disbarred. 
 
"271. 
Costs are assessed against the respondent in an amount to be certified by 
the Office of the Disciplinary Administrator." 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59 
 
 
 
OBJECTION TO RESPONDENT'S RULE 6.09 LETTER 
 
Just seven days before oral argument, Jordan filed a letter of additional authority, 
presumably under Kansas Supreme Court Rule 6.09 (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 40), although 
he did not reference that rule as authority for his submission. This letter asserts that in a 
minute order, dated September 1, 2022, "Judge Contreras repeatedly confirmed that he 
lied about Powers' email." The Disciplinary Administrator objects to Jordan's letter 
because it violates Rule 6.09, which prohibits submitting additional authority less than 14 
days before oral argument. It also notes that even if the timing is overlooked, Jordan 
inaccurately characterizes the minute order's content. 
 
The only exception to the Rule 6.09 deadline is to address additional authority 
published or filed less than 14 days before oral argument. This exception does not apply. 
We sustain the objection. 
 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO COMPEL 
 
Three days before oral argument, Jordan filed a "Respondent's Motion to Compel 
(And Renewed Request For) Release of Hearing Recordings." He asks this court to either 
release or order the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys to provide him with a copy 
of each audio or video recording made during the panel's evidentiary hearing on January 
12, 2022. He claims entitlement under the Kansas Open Records Act, K.S.A. 45-215 et 
seq. He asserts he repeatedly requested these copies, and that representatives of the Board 
and the Disciplinary Administrator's office denied production. He declares these 
representatives have engaged in "criminal misconduct." The Disciplinary Administrator's 
office filed a response asking us to deny the motion. 
 
We agree with the Disciplinary Administrator's office. Jordan's motion has at least 
two fatal flaws. First, to the extent it seeks relief under KORA, Jordan is in the wrong 
60 
 
 
 
court. KORA provides procedures for pursuing such claims with a district court. See 
K.S.A. 45-222(a) ("The district court of any county in which public records are located 
shall have jurisdiction to enforce the purposes of this act with respect to such records, by 
injunction, mandamus, declaratory judgment or other appropriate order, in an action 
brought by any person."). Second, K.S.A. 45-218(a) expressly requires a records 
custodian to allow inspection of recordings and to make "suitable facilities" available for 
that purpose. But KORA does not obligate reproduction. K.S.A. 45-219(a) makes that 
point clear by providing: 
 
"A public agency shall not be required to provide copies of radio or recording tapes or 
discs, video tapes or films, pictures, slides, graphics, illustrations or similar audio or 
visual items or devices, unless such items or devices were shown or played to a public 
meeting of the governing body thereof."  
 
We deny the motion.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Jordan was given adequate notice of the formal complaint and he filed an answer. 
He was also given adequate notice of the hearings before the panel and this court. He 
appeared at both proceedings. 
 
In a disciplinary proceeding, the court considers the evidence, the panel's findings, 
and the parties' arguments and determines whether KRPC violations occurred and, if they 
did, what discipline should be imposed. Attorney misconduct must be established by 
clear and convincing evidence. Kansas Supreme Court Rule 226(a)(1)(A) (2022 Kan. S. 
Ct. R. at 281); In re Huffman, 315 Kan. 641, 674, 509 P.3d 1253 (2022). Clear and 
61 
 
 
 
convincing evidence is that which causes a fact-finder to believe it is highly probable that 
the facts asserted are true. Huffman, 315 Kan. at 674. 
 
A finding is considered admitted if exception is not taken. When exception is 
taken, the finding is typically not deemed admitted so the court must determine whether it 
is supported by clear and convincing evidence. If so, the finding will not be disturbed. 
The court does not reweigh conflicting evidence, reassess witness credibility, or 
redetermine questions of fact when undertaking its factual analysis. 315 Kan. at 674. 
 
Jordan filed exceptions to the panel's final hearing report, contending it "is so 
lacking in findings of actual facts and conclusions of actual law as to be worthless except 
as evidence that Panel attorneys lied and committed crimes . . . ." The headings contained 
in Jordan's filing designate exceptions to the following paragraphs of the final hearing 
report:  17; 42; 51; 63-65; 70-71; 73-86; 88-97; 99-101; 103-104; 106-107; 112; 122-128; 
130-141; 143-170; 172-185; 188-191; 194-225; 227-236; 238-240; 242-247; 249-250; 
252-253; 256-258; 261-265; and 270. 
 
The Disciplinary Administrator points out Jordan's exceptions encompass 59 of 
the panel's 98 factual findings, and 90 of the panel's 96 conclusions of law. It also 
contends Jordan "failed to brief most of the exceptions taken." But the Disciplinary 
Administrator does not identify those abandoned exceptions. 
 
The Disciplinary Administrator further argues Jordan's brief fails to comply with 
Kansas Supreme Court Rule 6.02(a)(4)-(5) (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 35). Regarding Rule 
6.02(a)(4), it contends that within Jordan's brief, "many" of his factual assertions are not 
keyed to the record. It believes these un-keyed assertions should be presumed to lack 
support. Regarding Rule 6.02(a)(5), the Disciplinary Administrator contends Jordan 
failed to meet the rule's requirement that each issue begin with a pinpoint citation to the 
62 
 
 
 
record where the issue was raised and ruled upon. It does not suggest a remedy for this 
violation. More specifically, the Disciplinary Administrator contends Jordan's argument 
concerning the Kansas Public Speech Protection Act should be deemed waived because it 
was not presented to the hearing panel. 
 
Jordan responds to the un-briefed exceptions and Rule 6.02 arguments only by 
claiming "[w]aiver must" also "be applied against the ODA because this Court must 
ensure the ODA afforded Jordan due process of such law and equal protection under such 
law." He argues the Disciplinary Administrator "failed to demonstrate that any court 
could punish" his conduct; "failed to state any fact or legal authority that could counter 
any fact or legal authority" he presented; and failed to address the authorities he relies on. 
 
With these claims in mind, "[a] respondent must advance arguments in their brief 
to support any exceptions, or they are deemed waived or abandoned. . . . The brief must 
also support the exceptions with appropriate record citations." Huffman, 315 Kan. at 675. 
Jordan's opening brief designates four issues, but they all seek mainly to establish a claim 
that imposing any discipline here violates his First Amendment rights as applied to the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
 
To the extent Jordan's factual contentions touch on the panel's findings on specific 
rule violations, we address them as applicable to each violation found. 
 
Application of the First Amendment 
 
Jordan's first issue asserts the admittedly uncontroversial proposition that 
discipline must not be imposed in violation of the First Amendment. See Peel v. Attorney 
Registration and Disciplinary Com'n of Illinois, 496 U.S. 91, 110 S. Ct. 2281, 110 L. Ed. 
2d 83 (1990) (reversing judgment imposing discipline on attorney for violation of rule 
63 
 
 
 
prohibiting holding oneself out as a specialist, because imposition of discipline for 
violating the rule violated the First Amendment). His brief then attempts to demonstrate 
the constitutional violations he asserts. 
 
Jordan's second and third issues broadly challenge what he views as the 
restrictions on his right to petition the government and content-based regulations on 
speech imposed by the KRPC provisions at issue. He also contends discipline may not be 
imposed for his statements because the Disciplinary Administrator, in his view, fails to 
demonstrate his assertions about judges lying and committing crimes were false. More 
specifically, he contends Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, which was the basis for 
Chief Judge Phillips' contempt order, and the KRPC provisions the hearing panel found 
he violated, must withstand strict scrutiny because they are content-based regulations on 
speech as applied to him. And by citing caselaw governing civil libel and criminal 
defamation cases involving critique of public officials, he argues the falsity of his claims 
must be shown to impose discipline. In doing so, he relies on Milkovich v. Lorain Journal 
Co., 497 U.S. 1, 110 S. Ct. 2695, 111 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1990), Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 
64, 85 S. Ct. 209, 13 L. Ed. 2d 125 (1964), and New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
254, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1964). Extending this argument, Jordan's fourth 
issue says he was criticizing the judges in their official capacity, so he cannot be held 
accountable for what he asserts was merely libeling the government. 
 
Taking Jordan's right-to-petition contention first, we can quickly dispense with it. 
"Just as false statements are not immunized by the First Amendment right to freedom of 
speech, baseless litigation is not immunized by the First Amendment right to petition. 
[Citations omitted.]" Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 461 U.S. 731, 743, 103 
S. Ct. 2161, 76 L. Ed. 2d 277 (1983). Any discipline imposed here is premised on 
Jordan's baseless assertion of frivolous factual issues while litigating his FOIA cases in 
federal court. The right to petition does not shield him from discipline. 
64 
 
 
 
 
Similarly, his strict scrutiny argument misconstrues the scope of his First 
Amendment rights. All the misconduct here arises from his assertions made in court 
filings or from the fact of the filings themselves. And a lawyer's in-court advocacy is not 
protected speech under the First Amendment. See In re Hawver, 300 Kan. 1023, 1042-45, 
339 P.3d 573 (2014) (holding lawyer retained no First Amendment interest in statements 
made to jury on behalf of client, and discipline could be imposed for statements' failure to 
meet standard of competence required by KRPC 1.1). This includes advocacy in motions 
filed in a court proceeding. See Mezibov v. Allen, 411 F.3d 712, 720 (6th Cir. 2005) ("[I]n 
filing motions and advocating for his client in court, Mezibov was not engaged in free 
expression; he was simply doing his job. In that narrow capacity, he voluntarily accepted 
almost unconditional restraints on his personal speech rights, since his sole raison d'etre 
was to vindicate his client's rights."). 
 
Jordan claims his freedom of speech is "no less" just because he has a law license, 
citing equal protection and due process principles. But "[t]he courtroom is a nonpublic 
forum . . . where the First Amendment rights of everyone (attorneys included) are at their 
constitutional nadir. In fact, the courtroom is unique even among nonpublic fora because 
within its confines [courts] regularly countenance the application of even viewpoint-
discriminatory restrictions on speech." Mezibov, 411 F.3d at 718. "The government 'is 
permitted to set reasonable subject-matter limitations, except in public forums that are 
opened to all speech by tradition or government decree.'" Three categories of forums and 
nonforums—Traditional public forums—Content-based regulation, 1 Smolla & Nimmer 
on Freedom of Speech § 8:5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
65 
 
 
 
As we previously held,  
 
"An attorney's speech is limited both in and outside the courtroom. See Gentile v. 
State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1071, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 115 L.Ed.2d 888 (1991) 
(opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.). 'It is unquestionable that in the courtroom itself, during a 
judicial proceeding, whatever right to "free speech" an attorney has is extremely 
circumscribed.' 501 U.S. at 1071. And even a lawyer's out-of-court advocacy may be 
subject to limitation when it conflicts with ethics rules that serve substantial government 
interests, such as guaranteeing criminal defendants' rights to fair trials, or protecting 
public confidence in the legal system. See 501 U.S. at 1071 (government interest in 
preserving right to fair trial prevailed over attorney's First Amendment interest in 
statements to press substantially likely to affect trial's outcome or prejudice [venire] 
panel); In re Landrith, 280 Kan. 619, 638-39, 124 P.3d 467 (2005) (First Amendment not 
defense to discipline for attorney's false and inflammatory accusations in pleadings filed 
with the court against judges, attorneys, court staff, and others)." Hawver, 300 Kan. at 
1042-43. 
 
Jordan's attempt to apply First Amendment standards applicable in libel cases to 
his conduct is also misplaced. He cites United States Supreme Court caselaw regarding 
the standards for imposing civil liability and criminal penalties for criticism of public 
officials. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. 1; Garrison, 379 U.S. 64; New York Times, 376 U.S. 
254. But the "[t]he New York Times standard of 'actual malice' in a civil action for libel is 
not appropriate in a proceeding to discipline an attorney." In re Johnson, 240 Kan. 334, 
340, 729 P.2d 1175 (1986). 
 
Again, we have previously explained: 
 
"Other jurisdictions have recognized that, unlike a layman, a bar member's right 
to free speech may be regulated. In State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Assn. v. Michaelis, 
210 Neb. 545, 316 N.W.2d 46 (1982), an attorney had placed a newspaper advertisement 
which listed several factual charges of misconduct, illegal acts, and other violations of the 
66 
 
 
 
law, which he knew or should have known to be false, by the then incumbent county 
attorney, the city attorney, and several other attorneys practicing in the region. The court 
stated that '[a] lawyer belongs to a profession with inherited standards of propriety and 
honor, which experience has shown necessary in a calling dedicated to the 
accomplishment of justice . . . . "A layman may, perhaps, pursue his theories of free 
speech or political activities until he runs afoul of the penalties of libel or slander, or into 
some infraction of our statutory law. A member of the bar can, and will, be stopped at the 
point where he infringes our Canons of Ethics; and if he wishes to remain a member of 
the bar he will conduct himself in accordance therewith."' 210 Neb. at 556-58. 
 
"Upon admission to the bar of this state, attorneys assume certain duties as 
officers of the court. Among the duties imposed upon attorneys is the duty to maintain the 
respect due to the courts of justice and to judicial officers." Johnson, 240 Kan. at 336-37. 
 
For these reasons, the First Amendment does not shield Jordan from discipline for 
his motion practice that asserted frivolous factual claims as the basis for requesting relief 
from court orders, KRPC 3.1; knowingly violated court rules and orders, KRPC 3.4(c); 
impugned the integrity and qualifications of judges, KRPC 8.2(a); was prejudicial to the 
administration of justice, KRPC 8.4(d); and adversely reflected on his fitness to practice 
law, KRPC 8.4(g). Although Jordan argues he only sought to express what he believes to 
be constitutionally protected criticism of the judges at issue, he was not free to do so in a 
manner violating ethical limitations on his conduct in court and in his filings in court 
proceedings.  
 
Application of Supreme Court Rule 220(b) 
 
Jordan argues the panel erred when applying Kansas Supreme Court Rule 220(b) 
(2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 275) to admit certified court judgments as prima facie evidence of 
misconduct. He argues the rule violates "Kansas law and the Due Process and Equal 
67 
 
 
 
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment" and the separation of powers. We 
disagree.  
 
Rule 220 provides: 
 
"(b) Judgment or Ruling. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), a 
certified copy of a judgment or ruling in any action involving substantially similar 
allegations as a disciplinary matter is prima facie evidence of the commission of the 
conduct that formed the basis of the judgment or ruling, regardless of whether the 
respondent is a party in the action. The respondent has the burden to disprove the findings 
made in the judgment or ruling. 
 
"(c) Judgment or Ruling Based on Clear and Convincing Evidence. For the 
purpose of a disciplinary board proceeding, a certified copy of a judgment or ruling 
described in subsection (b) that is based on clear and convincing evidence is conclusive 
evidence of the commission of the conduct that formed the basis of the judgment or 
ruling. The respondent may not present evidence that the respondent did not commit the 
conduct that formed the basis of the judgment or ruling." 
 
Jordan's due process, equal protection, and "Kansas law" arguments appear rooted 
in his perception that Rule 220 conflicts with K.S.A. 60-460(o)(1), which permits 
certified official records to be admitted only to prove their contents. Application of Rule 
220(b), he contends, deprived him of the opportunity to confront "any witnesses against 
him." 
 
The certified records the panel relied on establish that the federal courts made the 
factual findings and legal rulings contained within them. Rule 220(b) and (c) operate 
similarly to the commonplace doctrine of collateral estoppel, which prevents relitigation 
of previously determined issues. See Venters v. Sellers, 293 Kan. 87, 98, 261 P.3d 538 
(2011) (collateral estoppel prevents parties from attacking prior adjudication when a prior 
68 
 
 
 
judgment on the merits determined the parties' rights and liabilities; collateral estoppel 
applies when the parties are the same or in privity and the issue litigated is both 
determined and necessary to support the judgment). Although the Disciplinary 
Administrator is not a party to the prior actions, "[n]onmutual offensive collateral 
estoppel, a form of issue preclusion, 'preclude[s] a defendant from relitigating an issue 
the defendant has previously litigated and lost to another plaintiff.'" Bifolck v. Philip 
Morris USA Inc., 936 F.3d 74, 79 (2d Cir. 2019). 
 
Chief Judge Phillips found Jordan made frivolous factual assertions with no 
reasonable basis in fact about Judge Smith in his filings. Jordan had an opportunity to 
litigate this issue in the contempt proceedings before Chief Judge Phillips. And Rule 
220(b) afforded Jordan the opportunity to supply evidence to the panel tending to show a 
factual basis for his claims that Judge Smith lied, committed crimes, or conspired with 
any other person to unlawfully deny Jordan access to the e-mail. He declined to do so. 
 
Jordan also argues Rule 220 violates separation of powers, citing Jones v. 
Continental Can Co., 260 Kan. 547, 920 P.2d 939 (1996). But Jones is distinguishable. It 
held a Supreme Court rule concerning time-limit computation could not be applied to 
expand the statutory time to take an appeal in a workers compensation case. The Jones 
court reasoned it could not expand its own jurisdiction by court rule. It explained the 
court's rulemaking power is limited to "rules necessary to implement the court's 
constitutional and statutory authority and does not include the power to expand that 
authority." 260 Kan. at 558. The holding and rationale in Jones have no bearing on the 
court's authority to make and enforce Rule 220. 
 
Our court's appellate jurisdiction is limited to that provided by law. Kan. Const. 
art. 3, § 3. By contrast, "[t]he power to regulate the bar, including the power to discipline 
its members, rests inherently and exclusively with" this court. State ex rel. Stephan v. 
69 
 
 
 
Smith, 242 Kan. 336, 371, 747 P.2d 816 (1987). "The matters of contempt or discipline 
are left exclusively for the courts." 242 Kan. at 371. 
 
We hold the panel properly applied Rule 220. 
 
Clear and convincing evidence supports the panel's rules violation findings. 
 
Jordan does not argue insufficient evidence to support the panel's misconduct 
findings as a separately designated issue. Instead, he attacks these findings on the 
grounds that "[n]o one even contended, much less attempted to show, that any statement 
by Jordan was false regarding any fact or that it in any way adversely affected the 
administration of justice." We hold that clear and convincing evidence supports each rule 
violation the panel found. 
 
KRPC 3.1 provides that a lawyer may not "assert or controvert an issue" in a 
proceeding "unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous." In the Missouri 
federal court actions, Jordan asserted Judge Smith lied about the law and contents of the 
Powers e-mail, committed crimes, and more generally was a "traitor to the judiciary and 
an enemy of the Constitution" in seeking relief from Judge Smith's orders denying him 
and his clients access to the Powers e-mail and staying the case pending appeal. Chief 
Judge Phillips' contempt order found Jordan failed to establish a factual basis for these 
claims or a likelihood that such basis could be developed. The order also found the 
accusations lacked a reasonable basis in fact. These findings established the contentions 
were frivolous, and Jordan failed to adduce evidence at the panel hearing to rebut the 
presumption. 
 
Under KRPC 3.4(c) (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 395), it is misconduct to "knowingly 
disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an 
70 
 
 
 
assertion that no valid obligation exists." This includes violation of court orders. See In re 
Hult, 307 Kan. 479, 493, 410 P.3d 879 (2018) (attorney violated KRPC 3.4[c] by failing 
to appear on an order to show cause and by failing to produce information required by a 
subpoena). 
 
Chief Judge Phillips' order establishes a rebuttable presumption that Jordan 
violated FRCP 11. Similarly, Judge Smith's July 20, 2020, order—sanctioning Jordan 
"'[f]or his repeated violations of [the] Court's Orders, including but not limited to the 
Court's Orders prohibiting Plaintiff's counsel from emailing Chambers staff and Clerk's 
Office staff'"—establishes a rebuttable presumption these transgressions occurred. And 
once again, Jordan did not come forward at the panel hearing with evidence to rebut these 
presumptions. He simply asserts he openly refused to comply with the contempt order, 
which alludes to the defense stated in KRPC 3.4. But nothing in the record establishes an 
open-refusal defense to this misconduct, so the panel's conclusion Jordan violated KRPC 
3.4 remains clear. 
 
Finally, KRPC 8.4(d) (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 434) prohibits "conduct that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice." Though not specifically directed at the 
panel's KRPC 8.4(d) findings, Jordan contends "[n]o evidence or testimony established 
that any Jordan statement or court filing caused any quantifiable harm, injury or prejudice 
to the administration of justice or the rule of law." But we previously held that "[c]onduct 
requiring a court to unnecessarily consider frivolous issues obviously delays the 
proceedings and causes the lawyers' clients to incur unnecessary legal fees and other 
expenses. Such conduct can support finding that the lawyer violated KRPC 8.4(d)." 
Huffman, 315 Kan. at 683. 
 
In addition, KRPC 8.4(g) "relates to fitness and may be violated in cases where 
other disciplinary rules are also violated. The specific violations charged and found by 
71 
 
 
 
the evidence may adversely reflect on the lawyer's fitness to practice law." In re Carson, 
268 Kan. 134, 138, 991 P.2d 896 (1999). And this court has recognized that criminal 
offenses "involving violence, dishonesty, or breach of trust, or serious interference with 
the administration of justice" indicate a "lack of those characteristics relevant to law 
practice." In re Hodge, 307 Kan. 170, 229, 407 P.3d 613 (2017) (quoting KRPC 8.4, cmt. 
2 [2017 Kan. S. Ct. R. 380]). 
 
Here, the record shows Jordan repeatedly filed motions with frivolous assertions 
of dishonest and criminal conduct against judges and opposing counsel who denied 
Jordan access to the Powers e-mail. The hearing panel found this conduct "served no 
legitimate purpose other than to insult and harass the judges." The evidence further shows 
multiple courts, including the Western District Court of Missouri and the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, wasted judicial resources when considering and ruling on these 
motions and Jordan's meritless attacks on those rulings. In addition, each frivolous 
pleading contained statements impugning the integrity of the judges in whose courts they 
were filed. Moreover, the misconduct underlying these offenses implies dishonesty, while 
its repetitive nature, done with intent to badger judges into disclosing privileged 
documents, suggests thoughtful interference with the administration of justice. 
 
We hold that clear and convincing evidence establishes Jordan violated KRPC 
8.4(d) and (g). 
 
Moving to the KRPC 8.2(a) violation, Jordan argues the Disciplinary 
Administrator failed to prove "any assertion by Jordan was false." KRPC 8.2(a) (2022 
Kan. S. Ct. R. at 432) provides: 
 
"A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with 
reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a 
72 
 
 
 
judge, adjudicatory officer or public legal officer, or of a candidate for election or 
appointment to judicial or legal office." 
 
The rule's plain language prohibits either a false statement or one made with 
reckless disregard for the statement's truth. And in In re Arnold, 274 Kan. 761, 56 P.3d 
259 (2002), the court upheld the imposition of discipline for a violation of KRPC 8.2(a) 
against a First Amendment challenge when the attorney wrote a letter to a judge stating 
"'[y]ou simply don't have what is required to decide the kind of issues that you were 
presented with in this case'" and "'[y]our absurdly fastidious insistence on decorum and 
demeanor mask an underlying incompetence.'" 274 Kan. at 765. The court reasoned, 
 
"In this case, Arnold's behavior shows a complete lack of respect toward the 
judiciary. His style was sarcastic, insulting, and threatening and subjected him to the 
discipline that was entered. The remedy for a believed erroneous trial court ruling is 
appeal, not an intemperate writing faxed to the judge shortly after the ruling was made." 
274 Kan. at 773. 
 
Jordan made numerous accusations of lying "about the law" and the contents of 
the Powers e-mail; criminal concealment of evidence; and conspiracy to conceal 
evidence. He aimed these accusations at judges before whom he appeared, attorneys 
opposing his bids to obtain the Powers e-mail, the disciplinary panel, and the Disciplinary 
Administrator's office. The outlandish nature, abusive tone, frequency, and breadth of 
these accusations, and their seemingly indiscriminate application to anyone who opposes 
Jordan—including the Disciplinary Administrator and the hearing panel—render them 
incredible on their face. 
 
The hearing panel found Jordan's statements violated KRPC 8.2(a), explaining that 
his accusations were "at the very least, made with reckless disregard for the truth or 
falsity of the qualifications or integrity of Judge Smith, Chief Judge Phillips, and the [8th 
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Circuit] panel judges." In doing so, the hearing panel determined the Disciplinary 
Administrator was not required to prove Jordan's statements were false. Applying 
Supreme Court Rule 220(b), the panel concluded Jordan violated KRPC 8.2(a) based 
both on Chief Judge Phillips' finding that Jordan made "baseless allegations" that "he 
knew were false or, at least, he acted with reckless disregard to their truth or falsity," and 
Jordan's failure to disprove the finding at the disciplinary hearing. And based on his 
disregard of the rule, the panel concluded he violated KRPC 8.2(a) because he had never 
read an unredacted version of the Powers e-mail, so his assertions that "these judges lied 
about Powers' email, concealed evidence, and committed crimes" had to have been made 
with reckless disregard to their truth or falsity.  
 
In arguing clear and convincing evidence supported the panel's KRPC 8.2(a) 
finding, the Disciplinary Administrator points out that "[t]hroughout the disciplinary 
process" Jordan "'failed to provide even "one scintilla of proof of such wrongdoing, 
through exhibits, witnesses, or his own testimony."'" (Quoting In re Landrith, 280 Kan. 
619, 639, 124 P.3d 467 [2005].) It also points out Chief Judge Phillips found respondent 
violated Missouri rule 4-8.2, which the panel viewed as mirroring the language of KRPC 
8.2(a), and so the burden shifted to Jordan to disprove that finding under Rule 220. 
 
We hold that clear and convincing evidence establishes a KRPC 8.2(a) violation. 
Unlike the respondent in In re Pyle, 283 Kan. 807, 156 P.3d 1231 (2007), Jordan did not 
offer evidence tending to show any factual basis for his allegations. They rest instead on 
his mere supposition that the Powers e-mail is not subject to attorney-client privilege, 
which is contrary to multiple courts' rulings. He failed to come forward with evidence to 
support the claims when confronted with Judge Smith's show cause order, culminating in 
Chief Judge Phillips' ruling that the claims were baseless and made with at least reckless 
disregard for their falsity. And Jordan refuses to even confirm or deny that he has ever 
seen the e-mail. Worse yet, in one instance, Jordan twisted Judge Smith's recognition of 
74 
 
 
 
judicial authority and discretion into a "blatantly deceitful declaration[] of his intent to 
defraud" and "openly declar[ing] his intent to decide this case fraudulently." Indeed, this 
statement by itself can be considered false on its face. 
 
Unlike the respondents in both Pyle and In re Huffman, 315 Kan. 641, 509 P.3d 
1253 (2022), Jordan did not offer the panel a plausible interpretation under which his 
assertions may fall within the realm of legitimate criticism. He repeatedly made what he 
represented as concrete factual allegations that judges lied and committed various 
specific federal crimes, and he did so with reckless disregard for the statements' truth or 
falsity. Cf. In re Eckelman, 282 Kan. 415, 422, 144 P.3d 713 (2006) (holding attorney 
crossed line of justified criticism by accusing judge of improper communication with 
jurors with reckless disregard for assertion's falsity). 
 
Consistent with this court's caselaw applying KRPC 8.2(a), we hold the evidence 
supports a finding that Jordan violated KRPC 8.2(a). 
 
APPROPRIATE DISCIPLINE 
 
The remaining question is the appropriate discipline.  
 
"In any given case, this court is not bound by the recommendations from the hearing 
panel or the Disciplinary Administrator. 'Each disciplinary sanction is based on the 
specific facts and circumstances of the violations and the aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances presented in the case.' 'Because each case is unique, past sanctions provide 
little guidance.' [Citations omitted.]" Hodge, 307 Kan. at 230. 
 
The court generally looks to the American Bar Association Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions to aid in determining discipline. That framework considers 
"four factors in determining punishment:  (1) the ethical duty violated by the lawyer; (2) 
75 
 
 
 
the lawyer's mental state; (3) the actual or potential injury resulting from the lawyer's 
misconduct; and (4) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors." 307 Kan. at 231. 
 
The Panel found Jordan intentionally violated his duty to the legal system and 
legal profession and, in doing so, caused actual injury to both. It additionally found his 
misconduct was aggravated by the facts that he had substantial experience in the practice 
of law; engaged in a pattern of misconduct comprising multiple KRPC violations; refused 
to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct; engaged in bad-faith tactics during 
the disciplinary process; and engaged in deceptive practices during the disciplinary 
process. When the panel referenced his contempt sanctions and 8th Circuit disbarment as 
other penalties for his misconduct, it noted there was no evidence the contempt sanctions 
were paid. It recommends disbarment. Before this court, the Disciplinary Administrator 
agrees.  
 
We hold disbarment is the appropriate discipline. We base this determination on 
ABA Standards 6.12 (suspension appropriate when false statements knowingly submitted 
to court, causing potential injury to party or legal proceeding, or potentially adverse 
effect on legal proceeding); 6.22 (suspension appropriate when knowing violation of 
court order or rule causes potential injury to client or party, or potential interference with 
legal proceeding); and 7.2 (suspension appropriate with knowing conduct violating duty 
owed as a professional causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal 
system). Adding to our consideration are the aggravating and mitigating factors found by 
the panel that we hold are supported by clear and convincing evidence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
76 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCIPLINE 
 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Jack R.T. Jordan be and he is hereby disbarred 
from the practice of law in the state of Kansas, effective on the filing of this opinion, in 
accordance with Kansas Supreme Court Rule 225(a)(1) (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 281).  
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Office of Judicial Administration strike the name 
of Jack R.T. Jordan from the roll of attorneys licensed to practice law in Kansas. 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Jordan comply with Kansas Supreme Court Rule 231 
(2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 292). 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the costs of these proceedings be assessed to 
respondent and that this opinion be published in the official Kansas Reports.