Title: Vinson v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 990612
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: November 5, 1999

Present:  All the Justices 
 
 
DEXTER LEE VINSON 
 
 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE A. CHRISTIAN COMPTON 
v.  Record Nos. 990612 
November 5, 1999 
                990613 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PORTSMOUTH 
Von L. Piersall, Jr., Judge 
 
 
On May 19, 1996, Angela Felton was brutally murdered in the 
City of Portsmouth.  Subsequently, during a 1998 eight-day 
trial, a jury convicted defendant Dexter Lee Vinson, upon not 
guilty pleas, of the following offenses in connection with the 
homicide:  Capital murder in the commission of abduction with 
intent to defile, in violation of Code § 18.2-31(1); object 
sexual penetration, in violation of Code § 18.2-67.2(A); 
abduction with intent to defile, in violation of Code § 18.2-48; 
and carjacking, in violation of Code § 18.2-58.1. 
 
The jury fixed defendant's punishment at death for the 
capital offense based upon the vileness and future dangerousness 
predicates of the capital murder sentencing statute.  Code 
§ 19.2-264.4.  Also, the jury fixed defendant's punishment at 
life imprisonment for each of the noncapital convictions.  
Following a February 1999 post-trial hearing, at which the trial 
court considered a probation officer's report, the court 
sentenced defendant in accord with the jury's verdicts. 
 
The death sentence is before us for automatic review under 
Code § 17.1-313(A), see Rule 5:22, and we have consolidated this 
review with defendant's appeal of the capital murder conviction.  
In addition, by order entered March 22, 1999, we certified from 
the Court of Appeals of Virginia to this Court the record of 
defendant's appeals of the noncapital convictions (Record No. 
990613).  The effect of this certification is to transfer 
jurisdiction over the noncapital appeals to this Court for all 
purposes.  Code § 17.1-409(A).  Those appeals have been 
consolidated with the capital murder appeal (Record No. 990612). 
 
As required by statute, we shall consider not only the 
trial errors enumerated by defendant but also whether the 
sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, 
prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor, and whether the 
sentence is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed 
in similar cases.  Code § 17.1-313(C). 
 
The facts are virtually undisputed.  The defendant, who did 
not testify at trial, now argues through his attorneys that, 
although he was present at the scene of the homicide, there are 
certain "inconsistencies" in the prosecution's evidence on the 
question whether he was the actual perpetrator of the offenses.  
However, when there are inconsistencies in this evidence, we 
shall construe the facts in the light most favorable to the 
 
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Commonwealth, as required by settled rules of appellate 
procedure. 
 
On May 19, the victim, age 25, and her three children 
resided with Nethie Pierce and her children in Portsmouth.  The 
victim and her children previously had lived with defendant, age 
33, in Portsmouth for "about a year and a half."  At the time of 
the homicide, the unmarried couple had been living apart about 
three weeks. 
 
About 9:00 a.m. on the day in question, the victim borrowed 
Pierce's "1988 red Beretta" automobile to take the victim's 
children to school.  "[I]n a hurry to get the kids to school," 
the victim wore only a "shift-type" robe and underwear.  
Pierce's 14-year-old daughter, Willisa Joyner, rode with the 
victim. 
 
About 6:30 a.m. on the same day, Faye Wilson was completing 
a weekend stay with defendant in a Suffolk motel.  Wilson owned 
a 1988 blue Mercury Tracer automobile, which she allowed 
defendant to use that morning. 
 
After the victim delivered her children to school, she 
drove with Willisa to the home she had shared with defendant in 
order to "get the mail."  Upon arrival, Willisa "got out of the 
car," at which time the victim saw the defendant driving a blue 
automobile.  Willisa reentered the red vehicle when the victim 
said, "'get back in the car.'"  As the victim "started driving," 
 
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the defendant twice rammed the rear of the red car with the 
front of the blue car. 
 
The victim stopped the red car and the defendant walked to 
the driver's side window where the victim was sitting.  He then 
"punched" out the window.  Next, defendant "grabbed" the victim, 
hit her in the face and chest with his hand, and "took her out 
of the car."  The defendant held the victim by the arm and, in 
the presence of bystanders, "snatched" off her robe leaving her 
standing in her "underclothes," screaming and bleeding from her 
nose and mouth. 
 
Next, defendant "took" the victim to the blue car and "made 
her get in."  When the blue car "wouldn't start up," defendant 
"put her" in the red car "and they drove away."  Police officers 
arrived on the scene after defendant had abducted the victim; 
they obtained a description of defendant and of the red car. 
 
Shortly thereafter, Vertley Hunter noticed from her home a 
red car, "wrecked in the back," that was "pulled off the street 
and parked behind" a vacant house in her neighborhood; boards 
were nailed over the windows of the house.  She observed a young 
"white female" and a young "black man" sitting in the vehicle, 
with the female sitting in the driver's seat with "her hand 
outside the window to duck off a cigarette that she was 
smoking." 
 
4
 
According to Hunter, the man "got out on the passenger side 
of the car and went to the back . . . and got a piece of rope 
out."  The man "leaned back into the car" holding the rope.  
Hunter heard the woman tell the man "to leave her alone so she 
could go on with her life," and heard her "ask the Lord to spare 
her life because he was going to kill her."  At that time, the 
man was "[c]hoking her with the rope." 
 
Then, the man "grabbed her by the hair from the back seat 
of the car and pulled her over the seat . . . and he pulled the 
rope from around her neck at the same time."  He then "pulled 
her down in the floor" and "told her that he was going to kill 
her."  While the woman was still inside the car, the man 
"slammed the door on her head twice," according to Hunter. 
 
Next, Hunter saw the man kick dirt beside the car to cover 
blood that was on the ground.  He then pulled off "a board" 
covering a window of the house, raised the window, and climbed 
inside through the window.  Hunter saw the man enter the house 
twice and wipe blood from his person with a towel. 
 
Hunter watched the events for a period of several hours 
until the man drove the red car into the woods behind the house 
and left the area around 11:00 a.m.  During her testimony, 
Hunter identified defendant in open court as the man she 
observed committing the acts she described. 
 
5
 
Janice Green, who also lived near the vacant house, 
testified that during the morning of May 19, she observed a man 
"messing around" with a red car in the yard behind the house.  
She saw the man pull "boards off the house" and enter the home 
twice.  The second time, the man "was dragging" into the house 
from the car "something heavy"; she "thought it was a rug he was 
pulling."  Green also identified defendant in open court as the 
man she observed at the vacant house. 
 
On May 20, 1997, Portsmouth detective Jan Westerbeck went 
to the vacant house and discovered the victim's body inside a 
recently "busted wall" in one of the bedrooms.  The body was 
nude and partially covered with a brown blanket; feces were 
found on and under her neck. 
 
Forensic evidence connected defendant with the crimes.  His 
fingerprints were found on the abandoned red car, on the kitchen 
sink of the vacant house, and on a pane of glass from the 
house's kitchen window.  Also, the victim's DNA was matched to a 
blood stain found on a pair of blue shorts belonging to 
defendant.  According to the witness Hunter, defendant was 
wearing a "sky blue short set" when she observed him.  An expert 
placed the odds of the DNA on defendant's shorts being that of 
someone other than the victim at one in 5.5 billion. 
 
An autopsy performed on the victim's body showed that she 
bled to death from deep cuts to both forearms, either of which 
 
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would have been sufficient to cause death.  The cut to the right 
forearm was two inches deep and severed two main arteries; the 
left forearm bore a similar wound that cut one artery.  The 
victim did not die instantaneously; it "probably would have 
taken her a few minutes, several minutes to die," according to 
the medical examiner. 
 
The victim sustained numerous other injuries.  For example, 
there were additional knife wounds on her shoulders, neck, and 
cheek.  There were scratches on her buttocks and cuts on her 
torso and on one of her legs.  She suffered "blunt force trauma" 
to her head. 
 
Additionally, she sustained significant vaginal injuries 
inflicted while she was alive.  She sustained a laceration of 
her inner vaginal lip, massive bruising over her vulva area, and 
a "massive laceration," which tore the tissue separating the 
vagina from the anus and which tore around her anal opening.  In 
the medical examiner's opinion, the vaginal injuries were not 
caused by an erect penis; the inner damage that was done in the 
vaginal area "would have been done by an object being penetrated 
in Miss Felton." 
 
During the penalty phase of the trial, to prove defendant's 
future dangerousness, the prosecution presented evidence that 
defendant had assaulted a police officer in 1987 who was 
attempting to arrest him; had assaulted a correctional officer 
 
7
in 1988 who was attempting to move him to a cell; and had 
resisted arrest in 1997 near a Suffolk convenience store so 
violently that it took eight police officers to subdue him.  
Additionally, the Commonwealth presented evidence that defendant 
previously had been convicted of receiving stolen goods, 
attempted statutory burglary, and two offenses of hit and run 
with personal injury. 
 
In mitigation, defendant presented testimony from his 1982 
high school band teacher, his mother, his step-father, his 
supervisor in the construction work that he performed, and a 
minister.  Defendant was described as a "mentor" to a blind 
student in the band, as one who was "loved" by the victim's 
"kids," and as a person who would "do anything for anybody at 
work." 
 
Defendant also presented the testimony of two mental health 
experts, both of whom concluded that defendant suffers from 
"intermittent explosive disorder" and that he was unable to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of law at the time of 
the crimes because of this disorder. 
 
In rebuttal, the Commonwealth presented testimony of 
another mental health expert who, while agreeing that defendant 
had "the characteristics" of intermittent explosive disorder, 
said that "almost all violent criminals" fit that category of 
illness.  This expert, Dr. Paul Mansheim, expressed the opinion 
 
8
"that there is at least a fifty percent chance" that defendant 
would commit "another violent offense in the next five years." 
 
On appeal, defendant contends that Virginia's capital 
murder statutes are unconstitutional.  Every ground of alleged 
unconstitutionality relied upon by defendant has been previously 
resolved by this Court adversely to his present contentions, and 
he has advanced no persuasive reason warranting a departure from 
our prior decisions.  Thus, his contentions are rejected. 
 
Some of defendant's assignments of error are procedurally 
defaulted for lack of proper objection in the trial court.  We 
will not consider for the first time on appeal nonjurisdictional 
issues not raised below.  Rule 5:25. 
 
Issues falling in this category are:  The trial court erred 
in allowing opinion evidence upon the question whether the 
victim was the subject of object penetration; the trial court 
erred in allowing Dr. Mansheim's opinion that there was a fifty 
percent chance defendant would commit another violent offense 
within five years; and, the trial court erred by allowing use of 
a penalty verdict form that allegedly violated the state and 
federal constitutions. 
 
The remaining issues raised by defendant generally relate 
to a pretrial matter, jury selection, several evidentiary 
questions, and sufficiency of the evidence of guilt. 
 
9
 
First, defendant contends the trial court erred in not 
"granting Vinson a DNA expert."  There is no merit to this 
contention. 
 
Prior to trial, defendant requested appointment by the 
court of an independent DNA expert.  At a hearing on the motion, 
defendant acknowledged he could locate no such expert, and the 
court continued the matter until the next day to allow defendant 
additional time to search for such an expert, after noting 
defendant's "request is somewhat vague."  The next day, 
defendant reported to the court that he had been unsuccessful in 
his search, and the trial court denied the motion. 
 
The trial court was correct.  Implicit in the court's 
ruling was the finding that defendant failed to demonstrate the 
required showing of need for appointment of such an expert.  See 
Husske v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 203, 211-12, 476 S.E.2d 920, 925 
(1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1154 (1997) (indigent defendant 
seeking appointment of expert witness must demonstrate that 
subject necessitating expert assistance likely will be 
significant factor in defense and that defendant will be 
prejudiced by lack of expert assistance).  Moreover, defendant 
had ample opportunity to locate an expert and, under these 
circumstances, there was no duty on the trial court to search 
independently for an expert witness for the defendant. 
 
10
 
Next, defendant contends the trial court abused its 
discretion during voir dire in seating certain prospective 
jurors and dismissing others.  We disagree. 
 
Upon appellate review, this Court gives deference to the 
trial court's decision whether to retain or exclude prospective 
jurors.  This is because the trial judge has observed and heard 
each member of the venire and is in a superior position to 
evaluate whether the juror's responses during voir dire develop 
anything that would prevent or substantially impair the juror's 
performance of duty as a juror in accord with the court's 
instructions and the juror's oath.  Stewart v. Commonwealth, 245 
Va. 222, 234, 427 S.E.2d 394, 402, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 848 
(1993); Eaton v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 236, 246, 397 S.E.2d 385, 
391 (1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 824 (1991).  A trial court's 
decision on this issue will be affirmed absent a showing of 
manifest error.  Id.  And, a juror's entire voir dire, not 
isolated portions, must be considered to determine a juror's 
impartiality.  Mackall v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 240, 252, 372 
S.E.2d 759, 767 (1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 925 (1989). 
 
Juror Clanton was properly stricken for cause.  She stated 
unequivocally that if faced with the alternative of sentencing 
defendant to life imprisonment without parole, she would not 
even consider imposing the death penalty.  The trial court's 
decision to exclude Clanton is supported by the record.  Her 
 
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views on imposition of the death penalty would substantially 
impair her ability to follow the court's instructions. 
 
Likewise, and for the foregoing reason, we hold that the 
trial court did not err in striking Jurors Dickens, Nicholson, 
Scott, Warren, and Terrell.  All of those jurors indicated they 
could not impose the death penalty. 
 
Furthermore, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion by refusing to exclude jurors Richardson and 
Metcalfe.  Although Richardson initially said during voir dire 
that he "probably would" automatically impose the death penalty 
upon a finding of guilt of capital murder, he later stated that 
he would follow the court's instructions and consider the 
sentencing options of both life or death.  Examining 
Richardson's entire voir dire, we cannot say the trial court 
erred in seating him as a juror. 
 
Metcalfe stated she could fairly and impartially decide the 
case.  Near the end of her individual voir dire, however, she 
expressed some "hesitation" about serving on a capital murder 
jury, noting a concern for her "personal safety."  In deciding 
to seat Metcalfe, the trial judge said "there's nothing in her 
statements that would indicate she could not . . . be fair.  Her 
demeanor was that of a pretty self-assured person."  The trial 
court ruled properly in seating her. 
 
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Next, defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting 
in evidence a statement he made in Suffolk to a Portsmouth 
detective when he was arrested by Suffolk police, accompanied by 
the Portsmouth detective, on May 20, the day after commission of 
the crimes.  During the first day of trial, defendant moved to 
suppress the statement, and presented evidence on the motion.  
He argued "he was arrested for no reason" because "there was no 
warrant on file" in Suffolk for his arrest. 
 
The evidence showed there were outstanding misdemeanor 
warrants for defendant's arrest on file in Portsmouth, and that 
the Portsmouth detective knew about the warrants, although they 
were not in the officer's hands at the time of arrest.  The 
evidence also showed defendant, at that time, was under 
suspicion for abduction of the victim.  Upon arrest, defendant 
"signed a legal rights advice form" and elected to make a 
statement. 
 
The trial court denied the motion to suppress and later 
admitted the statement in evidence through the Portsmouth 
detective's testimony.  In the statement, defendant denied 
seeing the victim in the past 48 hours and denied having 
recently been in Portsmouth. 
 
The trial court did not err in admitting the statement, 
which actually set forth an alibi and was not a confession.  The 
arrest was proper because the arresting officers had knowledge 
 
13
of the outstanding misdemeanor warrants, and the police had 
every right to question him.  See Code § 19.2-81 (arrest for 
misdemeanor not committed in officer's presence valid under 
certain specified circumstances).  However, even if there was a 
violation of § 19.2-81 and even if the statement somehow can be 
considered a confession, suppression of the statement was not 
required.  Thompson v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 117, 121, 390 
S.E.2d 198, 200-01 (1990) (confession obtained during period of 
statutorily invalid arrest not subject to exclusion when accused 
constitutionally in custody and confessed voluntarily). 
 
Next, defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting 
a blood sample when the custodian made a mistake in noting the 
date placed on the evidence envelope.  There is no merit to this 
contention. 
 
Detective Westerbeck testified she was present when blood 
samples were taken from defendant on June 4, 1997.  After the 
blood was taken by a physician, the vials were dated June 4, 
1997 and turned over to Westerbeck.  She initialed the vials, 
placed them in an envelope, and kept them in her exclusive care 
and custody until she gave them to an evidence technician.  
However, Westerbeck inadvertently dated the envelope into which 
she placed the vials "June 3, 1997." 
 
Defendant objected to introduction of the blood samples, 
stating that a "simple error like that in a case like this could 
 
14
be highly prejudicial."  The trial court overruled the 
objection, after determining that the evidence the prosecutor 
was offering was, in fact, the blood taken from defendant on 
June 4. 
 
On appeal, defendant contends the blood samples were 
inadmissible because they were not properly authenticated and 
there was a defect in the chain of custody.  We disagree. 
 
The mistake in the date is inconsequential.  And, a chain 
of custody is properly established when the Commonwealth's 
evidence affords reasonable assurance that the exhibits at trial 
are the same and in the same condition as they were when first 
obtained.  Pope v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 114, 121, 360 S.E.2d 
352, 357 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1015 (1988).  These 
samples met that criteria. 
 
Next, defendant argues the trial court erred "in not 
granting the motion to strike as to the capital murder charge, 
the abduction charge, the abduction with the intent to defile 
charge, the object penetration charge and the carjacking 
charge."  Now conceding he was the person who abducted the 
victim, and not relying on any purported alibi, defendant 
contends the "circumstances suggest that Vinson drove away with 
Felton out of some misguided desire for reconciliation or a 
desire to punish her for leaving him, but not out of a specific 
intent to sexually molest her."  He argues the eyewitness 
 
15
testimony that he was the perpetrator of the crimes is 
"inconsistent" and "unworthy of belief."  We reject this 
argument. 
 
A further recitation of the facts is unnecessary.  It is 
sufficient to point out that the jury determines the credibility 
of the witnesses and that there is overwhelming credible 
evidence to establish defendant was the perpetrator of each of 
these crimes. 
 
The only offense which requires further elaboration is the 
carjacking charge.  To prove carjacking, the Commonwealth was 
required to establish that defendant seized control of the red 
automobile with an intent to permanently or temporarily deprive 
the victim of the possession or control of the vehicle by means 
of violence directed to her.  Code § 18.2-58.1(B).  The 
testimony of Willisa Joyner amply supports the finding that both 
the victim and the red car were seized by defendant through the 
continuing use of violence directed to the victim. 
 
Next, in an obtuse argument, defendant complains about the 
manner in which the Department of Corrections responded to a 
subpoena duces tecum for records about his unadjudicated 
criminal acts.  He also complains about the receipt in evidence 
of "certain unadjudicated criminal acts allegedly committed by" 
him.  We reject both contentions.  The first complaint merits no 
response.  As to the second complaint, we merely note the law is 
 
16
settled in this jurisdiction that prior unadjudicated criminal 
conduct is admissible at the penalty stage of a capital murder 
trial to establish future dangerousness.  Poyner v. 
Commonwealth, 229 Va. 401, 418, 329 S.E.2d 815, 827-28, cert. 
denied, 474 U.S. 865, 888 (1985). 
 
Next, defendant argues the trial court erred in permitting 
Dr. Mansheim to testify in rebuttal about defendant's future 
dangerousness "when the defense's medical testimony did not 
directly state future dangerousness."  We disagree. 
 
Even though defendant's medical experts did not use the 
term "future dangerousness" as applied to defendant, they opined 
about defendant's mental condition and offered excuses for 
defendant's behavior.  Thus, the trial court properly allowed 
the prosecutor to present evidence in rebuttal regarding the 
probability of defendant's future behavior. 
 
Next, we reject defendant's conclusory argument that the 
trial court erred by permitting television cameras in the 
courtroom because his "right to a fair and impartial jury" was 
"prejudiced" by their presence.  By statute, the trial court 
"may solely in its discretion" allow cameras in the courtroom.  
Code § 19.2-266.  There was no abuse of that discretion in this 
case. 
 
Next, as we have said, we must determine whether the 
sentence of death in this case "was imposed under the influence 
 
17
of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor."  Code 
§ 17.1-313(C)(1).  Defendant candidly admits, "The record in 
this case does not clearly show passion or prejudice."  Indeed, 
there is not a hint in the record that the determinations of 
vileness and future dangerousness were made arbitrarily.  On the 
contrary, the record supports the conclusion that the sentence 
was appropriate under the circumstances. 
 
Finally, upon the question of disproportionality and 
excessiveness, we determine whether other sentencing bodies in 
this jurisdiction generally impose the supreme penalty for 
comparable or similar crimes, considering both the crimes and 
the defendant.  Bramblett v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 263, 278,  
513 S.E.2d 400, 410 (1999).  See Code § 17.1-313(C)(2).  In 
determining whether a death sentence is excessive or 
disproportionate, we consider records of all capital murder 
cases previously reviewed by this Court in which the death 
sentence was based upon both the vileness and future 
dangerousness predicates, including capital murder cases in 
which a life sentence was imposed.  Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 244 
Va. 445, 462, 423 S.E.2d 360, 371 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 
1036 (1993). 
 
The defendant does not contend that the sentence is 
excessive or disproportionate.  He merely reasserts an earlier 
contention, which was procedurally defaulted, that "the penalty 
 
18
verdict form in this case was so defective that the jury's 
intent cannot be deduced from it."  We will not entertain such 
an argument because of the procedural default. 
 
Manifestly, however, this sentence is not excessive or 
disproportionate.  Defendant brutally beat and abducted the 
victim.  Following the abduction, he beat and choked her, 
sexually assaulted her in a savage manner, and murdered her by 
inflicting deep cuts to both forearms.  Furthermore, in addition 
to the vile nature of the offenses, the evidence established 
that defendant is a violent person who, in the Attorney 
General's words, "has no respect for authority and who cannot be 
rendered non-violent even in a prison setting."  Juries in the 
Commonwealth generally impose the death sentence for crimes like 
those committed by this defendant.  See, e.g., Cherrix v. 
Commonwealth, 257 Va. 292, 313-14, 513 S.E.2d 642, 655-56 
(1999); Hedrick v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 328, 342-43, 513 S.E.2d 
634, 642 (1999); Barnabei v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 161, 179, 477 
S.E.2d 270, 281 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1224 (1997); and 
Clozza v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 124, 138, 321 S.E.2d 273, 282 
(1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1230 (1985). 
 
Consequently, we hold the trial court committed no error, 
and we have independently determined from a review of the entire 
record that the sentence of death was properly assessed.  Thus, 
 
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we will affirm the trial court's judgment in the capital murder 
case and in the noncapital cases. 
Record No. 990612 — Affirmed. 
Record No. 990613 — Affirmed. 
 
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