Title: Jeffrey G. Hutchinson v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC01-500
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: July 1, 2004

Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC01-500
____________
JEFFREY G. HUTCHINSON,
Appellant, Cross-Appellee,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee, Cross-Appellant.
[July 1, 2004]
PER CURIAM.
We have on appeal four convictions of first-degree murder with a firearm
and three sentences of death.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla.
Const.  For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the convictions of first-degree
murder and the sentences of death.
FACTS
Jeffrey G. Hutchinson (Hutchinson) was indicted by a grand jury for the
first-degree murders of his live-in girlfriend, Renee Flaherty (Renee), and her three
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children:  four-year-old Logan, seven-year-old Amanda, and nine-year-old
Geoffrey.  The jury found him guilty of four counts of first-degree murder with a
firearm.  Hutchinson waived his right to a jury at the penalty phase trial, but
presented mitigation to the trial judge.  At the conclusion of the penalty phase, the
trial judge imposed a death sentence for the murder of each child.
On the evening of the murders, Hutchinson and Renee argued.  Hutchinson
packed some of his clothes and guns into his truck, left, and went to a bar.  Renee
then called her friend, Francis Pruitt (Pruitt), in Washington and told her that she
thought Hutchinson had left for good.  The bartender testified that Hutchinson
arrived around 8 p.m.  Hutchinson told the bartender that “Renee is pissed off at
me,”  drank one and a half glasses of beer and then left the bar muttering to
himself.  Other witnesses testified that Hutchinson drove recklessly after he left
the bar.
Approximately forty minutes after Hutchinson left the bar, there was a 911
call from Hutchinson’s home.  The caller stated, “I just shot my family.”  Two of
Hutchinson’s close friends identified the caller’s voice as Hutchinson’s. 
Hutchinson said to the 911 operator, “there were some guys here.”  He told the
operator that he did not know how many people were there, he did not know how
many had been hurt, and he did not know how they had been injured.  Deputies
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arrived at Hutchinson’s home within ten minutes of the 911 call and found
Hutchinson on the ground in the garage with the cordless phone nearby.  The
phone call was still connected to the 911 operator.  Deputies found Renee’s body
on the bed in the master bedroom, Amanda’s body on the floor near the bed in the
master bedroom, and Logan’s body at the foot of the bed in the master bedroom.  
Each had been shot once in the head with a shotgun.  Deputies found Geoffrey’s
body on the floor in the living room between the couch and the coffee table.  He
had been shot once in the chest and once in the head.  The murder weapon, a
Mossberg 12-gauge pistol-grip shotgun which belonged to Hutchinson, was found
on the kitchen counter.  Hutchinson had gunshot residue on his hands.  He also
had Geoffrey’s body tissue on his leg. 
Hutchinson’s defense at trial was that two men came into the house, he
struggled with them, and they shot Renee and the children and fled.  Hutchinson
was examined by an EMT at the scene and a jail nurse.  He had no injuries. 
Hutchinson also presented the defense of intoxication, and he argued that this was
a crime of passion, not first-degree murder.  
The jury found Hutchinson guilty of four counts of first-degree murder with
a firearm.  Hutchinson waived a jury recommendation at sentencing.  The trial
court conducted a colloquy, found the waiver voluntary, and excused the jury.
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At sentencing, the State presented several witnesses, including Dr. Michael
E. Berkland, a forensic pathologist.  Dr. Berkland testified that the events occurred
as follows:  The front door had been locked with a dead bolt.  The front door was
“busted” down, and Geoffrey’s blood was found on the top of the door indicating
that Geoffrey was shot after the door was “busted” down.  The shooting started in
the master bedroom.  Renee was the first victim, shot once in the head — a
conclusion drawn from the fact that Renee was still lying on the bed at the time
she was shot.  Amanda was shot second with one shot to her head.  Dr. Berkland
reached this conclusion because not much of Logan’s blood was on Amanda, and
there would have been more of his blood on her had Logan been shot second. 
Logan was the third to be shot.  Three shell casings were found inside the master
bedroom in front of the closet.  Dr. Berkland concluded from the shell casings that
Hutchinson was standing in front of the closet when he shot the first three victims. 
Hutchinson then shot Geoffrey twice.  Geoffrey was first shot just outside the
doorway of the master bedroom.  The first shot went through his arm, which was
in a defensive posture, and through his chest.  Dr. Berkland concluded that
Geoffrey was able to see the bodies of his mother, sister, and brother from this
location.  The second shot was to Geoffrey’s head.  Geoffrey was kneeling at the
time of the second shot, and, Dr. Berkland concluded, Geoffrey “absolutely was
1.     Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).  At a Spencer hearing the
defendant is allowed to present additional mitigating evidence to the trial judge.
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conscious” at the time of the second shot.  He died in the living room on the floor
between the couch and the coffee table.
The defense presented evidence of mitigation, including but not limited to
evidence involving Hutchinson’s diagnosis of Gulf War Syndrome and Attention
Deficit Disorder, the testimony of Hutchinson’s family, and evidence of awards
and honors Hutchinson had received.  The State presented evidence in rebuttal.  
Both parties presented sentencing memoranda, and the trial court held a
Spencer1 hearing.  The trial court then held a sentencing hearing and imposed a
life sentence for the murder of Renee Flaherty and three death sentences for the
murders of the three children.   
Hutchinson now raises ten issues in this appeal:  (1) whether the trial court
improperly instructed the jury; (2) whether the trial court erred in admitting certain
testimony as an excited utterance; (3) whether the trial court erred in repeatedly
overruling objections to the State’s closing argument; (4) whether the trial court
erred in denying Hutchinson’s motion for mistrial; (5) whether the trial court erred
in denying Hutchinson’s motion for judgment of acquittal; (6) whether the trial
court erred in denying Hutchinson’s motion for a new trial; (7) whether the trial
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court erred in considering section 921.141(5)(1), Florida Statutes (2000), as an
aggravating circumstance; (8) whether the trial court erred in finding that
Hutchinson committed the murder of the children during the course of an act of
aggravated child abuse; (9) whether the trial court erred in finding heinous,
atrocious, or cruel (HAC) as an aggravating circumstance in the murder of
Geoffrey Flaherty; and (10) whether death is a proportional sentence.
The State filed a cross-appeal raising one issue:  whether aggravated child
abuse should have been properly considered separately from the under-the-age-of-
twelve aggravator.  We address each issue below.
1.  Special Jury Instruction on Premeditation
At the jury instruction conference, the State requested the following special
instruction:  
You may consider the nature of the weapon used, the manner in
which the homicide was committed, and the nature and manner of the
wounds inflicted upon the victim in determining whether the crime
was premeditated.  
Hutchinson objected to the special instruction, but did not provide a basis for the
objection.  The trial court granted the State’s request, and gave the State’s
requested special instruction after giving the standard instruction on
premeditation.  Hutchinson now argues that the special instruction amounts to
2.     Even if the issue were not barred, it would be without merit.  See 
Kearse v. State, 662 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 1995) (upholding a similar special
instruction).  
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judicial comment on the evidence.  
Hutchinson did not properly preserve this issue for appellate review. 
Although defense counsel objected to the special instruction at the jury instruction
conference and later renewed the objection, defense counsel made no specific
argument and did not set forth the basis for the objection.  Defense counsel failed
to argue that the special instruction amounted to judicial comment on the
evidence.  Unless a specific argument asserting the legal grounds for the objection
is made, the issue may not be considered on appeal.  See Jennings v. State, 782 So.
2d 853, 862 (Fla. 2001) (citing Steinhorst v. State, 412 So. 2d 332, 338 (Fla.
1982)).  Steinhorst holds that “[i]n order for an argument to be cognizable on
appeal, it must be the specific contention asserted as legal ground for the
objection, exception, or motion below.”  412 So. 2d at 338.  Because the specific
contention made here was not asserted below, this claim is procedurally barred.2
2.  Excited Utterance or Spontaneous Statement
Hutchinson argues that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of
Renee’s friend, Pruitt, because it was inadmissible hearsay.  Pruitt recounted a
telephone conversation between the two women on the night of the murders.  In
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the course of the conversation, Renee told Pruitt that she had a big fight with
Hutchinson and that he had taken some of his things and left.  Over Hutchinson’s
hearsay objection, the trial court admitted the testimony as an excited utterance. 
The State now contends the testimony was admissible as either an excited
utterance or a spontaneous statement.
Hearsay is an out-of-court statement testified to by a person other than the
declarant which is offered for the truth of the matter asserted therein.  See §
90.801(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2003); Hitchcock v. State, 636 So. 2d 572, 573 (Fla.
1994).  Such hearsay statements are generally inadmissible because the declarant
is not testifying under oath, the trier of fact cannot observe the declarant’s
demeanor, and the declarant is not subject to cross-examination.  See Banks v.
State, 790 So. 2d 1094, 1097 (Fla. 2001).  However, hearsay statements may be
admitted into evidence if the trial court finds that one of the exceptions provided
for by statute is applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case.  See §§
90.802, 90.803, 90.804, Fla. Stat. (2003); cf. Rigdon v. State, 621 So. 2d 475, 478
(Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (“In the absence of an applicable exception, hearsay evidence
is inadmissible.”).  The State asserts that Pruitt’s hearsay statement was admissible
either as an excited utterance or as a spontaneous statement.  We disagree.  
Section 90.803(2), Florida Statutes (2003), defines an excited utterance as
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follows: 
Excited utterance.–A statement or excited utterance relating to a
startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the
stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.
Section 90.803(1), Florida Statutes (2003), defines a spontaneous statement as
follows:  
Spontaneous statement.–A spontaneous statement describing or
explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was
perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter, except
when such statement is made under circumstances that indicate its
lack of trustworthiness.
Both the excited utterance and the spontaneous statement exceptions require the
declarant to be laboring under the influence of a startling event at the time that the
statement is made.  See State v. Jano, 524 So. 2d 660, 662 (Fla. 1988) (explaining
that the excited utterance exception and the spontaneous statement exception are
primarily distinguishable by the time lapse between the event and the statement
describing the event).  Although the spontaneous statement and excited utterance
exceptions to the hearsay rule overlap to some degree, there are two main
differences.  See id. at 661.  First, the exceptions differ in the amount of time that
may lapse between the event and the statement.  See id. at 661-62.  The excited
utterance must be made before there is time for reflection, and the spontaneous
statement must be made while perceiving the event or immediately thereafter.  See
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id.  Second, the exceptions differ in the statement describing the event.  See id. 
An excited utterance “relates” to the event and includes acts, statements,
occurrences and circumstances, see State v. Snowden, 345 So. 2d 856, 860 (Fla.
1st DCA 1977), while the spontaneous statement describes the event.  See Jano, at
662. 
While an excited utterance need not be contemporaneous to the event, it
must be made while the declarant is under the stress of the startling event and
without time for reflection.  See Rogers v. State, 660 So. 2d 237, 240 (Fla. 1995). 
In this case, the time between the startling event (the fight between Renee and
Hutchinson) and the telephone conversation is not clearly ascertainable from this
record.  The most that can be said is that the fight probably occurred between 7
p.m. (the approximate time of Renee’s conversation with another friend) and 7:30
p.m. (the approximate time of Renee’s conversation with Pruitt).  Without more
information, we can only speculate as to whether Renee engaged in reflective
thought.  However, this was a long enough time interval to permit reflective
thought. “[W]here the time interval between the event and the statement is long
enough to permit reflective thought, the statement will be excluded in the absence
of some proof that the declarant did not in fact engage in a reflective thought
process.”  State v. Jano, 524 So. 2d 660, 661 (Fla. 1988) (quoting Edward W.
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Cleary, McCormick on Evidence, § 297, at 856 (3d ed. 1984)).  There is no
evidence in the record to show what occurred between the fight with Hutchinson
and the phone call to Pruitt.  Absent some evidence that Renee did not engage in
reflective thought, the statement to Pruitt cannot be admitted as an excited
utterance.  See, e.g., Rogers v. State, 660 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 1995) (finding that the
victim had eight to ten minutes for reflective thought, but based on witness
testimony regarding the victim’s behavior during that time period, the victim did
not engage in reflective thought, and the victim’s statements were admissible as an
excited utterance).  The fact that Renee was crying when she called Pruitt is not,
by itself, sufficient to demonstrate that Renee did not engaged in reflective
thought.  “A statement as to what occurred does not become admissible merely
because the victim is still in an excited state.”  Charlot v. State, 679 So. 2d 844,
845 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).  Because the record does not describe the fight between
Renee and Hutchinson, or provide the time the fight was over, we have no
evidence upon which to base a conclusion that Renee did not engage in reflective
thought.  Renee’s statements to Pruitt are not, therefore, admissible under the
excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule.
Renee’s statements to Pruitt are not admissible under the spontaneous
statement exception either.  A spontaneous statement must be made “at the time of,
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or immediately following, the declarant’s observation of the event or condition
described.”  J.M. v. State, 665 So. 2d 1135, 1137 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996).   Like the
excited utterance exception, the spontaneous statement exception also requires that
“the statement must be made without the declarant first engaging in reflective
thought.”  Id.  For the reasons explained above, we cannot say that Renee did not
first engage in reflective thought before she made the phone call to Pruitt because
there is no evidence in the record to show what occurred between 7 and 7:30 p.m. 
The evidence shows that Hutchinson had already left the home when Renee made
the phone call to Pruitt.  This suggests that the argument had already occurred by
the time the phone call was made.  Thus, Renee’s call to Pruitt was not made at the
time of the fight, and we cannot ascertain from the record whether it was made
immediately following the fight or while Renee was still perceiving the fight. 
Pruitt’s testimony, therefore, is not admissible as a spontaneous statement.
However, any error in the admission of this testimony was harmless.  See
State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1139 (Fla. 1986).  Under DiGuilio, “[t]he
question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the
verdict.”   Id.  If the reviewing court can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the
error did not affect the verdict, then the error is, by definition, harmless.  Id.  In
this case, the admission of Pruitt’s testimony did not affect the verdict. 
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The State relied on Pruitt’s testimony to show that Hutchinson’s motive for
the murders was his argument with Renee.  However, as the State points out,
Pruitt’s testimony was not the only evidence that the argument occurred. 
Hutchinson told the bartender, “Renee is pissed off at me.”  Also, when police
found Hutchinson after responding to the 911 call, his clothes and other items
were in his truck.  From this, the jury could have reasonably concluded there was
some type of disagreement between Renee and Hutchinson.  Furthermore, the fact
that Hutchinson and Renee had an argument does not provide any motive or
explanation for the murder of the three children.  Pruitt’s testimony adds little, if
anything, to the overwhelming evidence of guilt, which includes Hutchinson’s call
to 911 in which he told the operator he had just killed his family, the gunpowder
residue on his hands, the fact that he was the owner of the murder weapon, and the
fact of the victims’ blood and tissue found on his clothes.  There is no reasonable
possibility this error affected the verdict.  We therefore deny relief on this claim.
3.  Cumulative Effect of Repeatedly Overruled Objections
Hutchinson argues that, in closing argument, the State shifted the burden of
proof, improperly bolstered the credibility of its witnesses, and argued facts not in
evidence.  Hutchinson claims that the trial court’s repeated refusal to correct these
errors affected the jury’s deliberations.  Because Hutchinson does not demonstrate
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that the trial court abused its discretion in any of the three alleged errors, he is not
entitled to relief.  See, e.g., Roberts v. State, 840 So. 2d 962, 972 (Fla. 2002)
(“[C]laims of cumulative error are properly denied where individual claims have
been found without merit . . . .”).  
Hutchinson argues that the State shifted the burden of proof during closing
argument when the prosecutor told the jury, “If there were no gunshot residue on
his hands that would be valuable evidence of innocence,” and that Hutchinson
thought “the loss of Renee and those children was a reason to kill them, however
clouded that judgment was, how illogical it was.”  It is improper for the State to
shift the burden of proof in closing argument.  See Gore v. State, 719 So. 2d 1197,
1200 (Fla. 1998) (holding that it was improper burden shifting for the State to tell
the jury, “If you believe his story, he’s not guilty.  If you believe he’s lying to you,
he’s guilty”).  However, in this case, the prosecutor’s statements did not imply that
Hutchinson had to prove anything in order to establish his innocence.  The
prosecutor discussed the importance of certain evidence and the State’s theory of
motive.  The prosecutor did not tell the jury that Hutchinson had a burden to prove
anything.  Thus, Hutchinson has failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused
its discretion in overruling defense counsel’s objections.
Hutchinson next alleges that the State bolstered the credibility of its
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witnesses.  The State called Deanna and Creighton Adams, Hutchinson’s good
friends, to identify Hutchinson’s voice on the 911 tape.  The prosecutor told the
jury that Hutchinson’s friends had no reason to want to hurt Hutchinson.  The
prosecutor stated, “They came in here and told the truth even though they were so
closely, closely in companionship with Jeff Hutchinson.”  The defense objected,
the trial court overruled the objection, and the prosecutor continued, “Well, you
consider the credibility of Deanna Adams and Creighton Adams’ testimony.  They
were his best friends.  The only thing that they’ve ever done to Jeff Hutchinson
that hurt him in any way was come here and tell the truth.”  
Improper bolstering occurs when the State places the prestige of the
government behind the witness or indicates that information not presented to the
jury supports the witness’s testimony.  See Gorby v. State, 630 So. 2d 544, 547
(Fla. 1993) (“It is improper to bolster a witness’ testimony by vouching for his or
her credibility.”).  In this case, the State did not place the prestige of the
government behind the witnesses’ testimony, nor did the State rely on anything
outside the record to support the witnesses’ statements.  See, e.g., Brooks v. State,
762 So. 2d 879, 902 (Fla. 2000) (finding improper vouching where the the
prosecutor’s arguments tended to cloak the State’s case with legitimacy as a bona
fide death penalty prosecution).  Thus, Hutchinson has failed to demonstrate that
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the prosecutor’s argument was error.
Hutchinson also argues that the prosecutor vouched for the credibility of the
two police officers when he told the jury that Sgt. Michael Stewart and Deputy
Daniel Neil Woodward “didn’t testify to anything that sounded prejudiced to me.” 
This statement was made in rebuttal to the defense attorney’s argument that the
officers were already “prejudiced by the 911 calls” when they arrived at
Hutchinson’s home.  The prosecutor did not refer to the officers’ honesty or
credibility; he merely stated their testimony did not show they were prejudiced by
the 911 call, as the defense accused.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
overruling defense counsel’s objections on the grounds of improper bolstering or
vouching.  
Finally, Hutchinson argues that the State made prohibited “golden rule”
arguments and argued facts not in evidence.  A “golden rule” argument asks the
jurors to place themselves in the victim’s position, asks the jurors to imagine the
victim’s pain and terror or imagine how they would feel if the victim were a
relative.  See Pagan v. State, 830 So. 2d 792, 812-13 (Fla. 2002).  In this case the
prosecutor told the jury that Geoffrey saw the rest of his family dead, and that had
he been in the bedroom with his family, Geoffrey would have been shot in the
head along with them.  The prosecutor did not ask the jurors to put themselves in
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Geoffrey’s shoes or to consider how they would feel if Geoffrey were their own
son.  
Furthermore, the prosecutor did not speculate about what Geoffrey was
thinking or create an “imaginary scenario” argument.  An “imaginary scenario”
argument is a subtle form of the “golden rule” argument that asks the jury to put
his or her “own imaginary words in the victim’s mouth, i.e., ‘Don’t hurt me.  Take
my money, take my jewelry.  Don’t hurt me.’”   Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411,
421 (Fla. 1998).  This type of argument is prohibited because it is an attempt to
“unduly create, arouse and inflame sympathy, prejudice and passions of [the] jury
to the detriment of the accused.”  Id. (quoting Barnes v. State, 58 So. 2d 157, 158
(Fla. 1951)).
Here, the prosecutor did not ask the jurors to imagine what Geoffrey must
have thought or felt, and he did not argue facts that were not in evidence.  The
prosecutor simply asked the jurors to draw inferences from the testimony—an
inference based on the evidence of Geoffrey’s location when he was found, the
position of his body, and the location of his blood.  “The proper exercise of
closing argument is to review the evidence and to explicate those inferences which
may reasonably be drawn from the evidence.”  Bertolotti v. State, 476 So. 2d 130,
134 (Fla. 1985); see also Robinson v. State, 610 So. 2d 1288, 1290 (Fla. 1992).
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The prosecutor in this case acted properly in asking the jury to make reasonable
inferences from the evidence presented at trial.  The State did not violate the
prohibition against “golden rule” arguments.  
Because we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in any of the
three areas Hutchinson claims trial errors occurred, there are no errors to consider
cumulatively.  See Roberts, 840 So. 2d at 972.  
4.  Hutchinson’s Right to Remain Silent
Hutchinson next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
his motion for mistrial when the State’s witness, Officer Ashley, told the jury that
he spoke with Hutchinson for several hours on the night of the murders. 
Hutchinson acknowledges that this information was offered as foundation for
Ashley’s identification of Hutchinson’s voice on the 911 tape.  However,
Hutchinson claims that the effect was a clear comment on Hutchinson’s decision
not to take the stand in his own defense.  He argues that telling the jury that
Ashley spoke with him over a six- or seven-hour period on the night of the murder
amounts to a comment on his silence at trial since the jury would expect him to
testify.
This Court has said that “[c]ommenting on the defendant’s exercise of his
right to remain silent is serious error.”  Rimmer v. State, 825 So. 2d 304, 322 (Fla.
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2002).  “The test to be applied in such instances is whether the statement is fairly
susceptible of being interpreted by the jury as a comment on the defendant’s
failure to testify.”  Id.  The comment made by the officer in this case does not rise
to the level of a comment on the defendant’s failure to testify.
Hutchinson talked with the officer and did not invoke his Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination until several hours into the interrogation.  The
prohibition against commenting on a defendant’s silence does not apply when the
defendant does not invoke his Fifth Amendment right.  See Valle v. State, 474 So.
2d 796, 801 (Fla. 1985).  Ashley’s testimony only told the jury that Hutchinson
was interviewed by the police.  There was no comment about the content of
Hutchinson’s statement or his refusal or failure to answer any question.  A
comment by the police on the mere fact of the interview is not a comment on
Hutchinson’s silence, and is not fairly susceptible to interpretation by the jury as a
comment on Hutchinson’s silence at trial.  Relief on this issue is not warranted.
5.  Sufficiency of Evidence of Premeditation
Hutchinson argues there was insufficient evidence to support premeditation.
We recently summarized the law on premeditation in Morrison v. State, 818 So. 2d
432, 452 (Fla. 2002), as follows:
Premeditation may “be formed in a moment and need only exist ‘for
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such a time as will allow the accused to be conscious of the nature of
the act he is about to commit and the probable result of that act.’”
DeAngelo v. State, 616 So. 2d 440, 441 (Fla. 1993) (quoting Asay v.
State, 580 So. 2d 610, 612 (Fla. 1991)).  Premeditation can be shown
by circumstantial evidence.  See Woods v. State, 733 So. 2d 980, 985
(Fla. 1999).  Whether the State’s evidence fails to exclude all
reasonable hypotheses of innocence is a question of fact for the jury. 
See Cochran v. State, 547 So. 2d 928, 930 (Fla. 1989).  As this Court
has stated: 
Evidence from which premeditation may be inferred
includes such matters as the nature of the weapon used,
the presence or absence of adequate provocation,
previous difficulties between the parties, the manner in
which the homicide was committed, and the nature and
manner of the wounds inflicted.
Sochor v. State, 619 So. 2d 285, 288 (Fla. 1993) (quoting Larry v.
State, 104 So. 2d 352, 354 (Fla. 1958)).
This Court will generally not reverse the trial court’s denial of a motion for
judgment of acquittal if there is competent, substantial evidence in the record to
support the jury’s finding of premeditation.  See Pagan v. State, 830 So. 2d 792,
803 (Fla. 2002).  
In this case, the weapon used was a pump-action shotgun.  A pump-action
shotgun does not automatically fire one shot after another.  It requires the user to
pull the pump before aiming and firing each time.  Although this gun had a
magazine and required no reloading, Hutchinson still had to pump, aim, and fire
when he killed Renee.  He had to repeat the sequence again before firing upon
Amanda, and yet again before firing upon Logan.  Because the evidence shows
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that Geoffrey was not in the bedroom when he was shot, after shooting Renee,
Amanda, and Logan, Hutchinson would have had to pump the gun again, turn
around, aim and fire upon Geoffrey.  He would have had to repeat the sequence
again when he shot Geoffrey for the second time. 
In addition to Hutchinson’s conduct just prior to the shootings, there is
competent, substantial evidence that these murders were not the result of a sudden
provocation.  After arguing with Renee, Hutchinson actually left the home, drove
to a bar, drank beer, and then drove back home.  The period of time from the
argument, which occurred between 7 and 7:30 p.m., to the actual murders, which
occurred at approximately 8:30 p.m., was certainly enough time for Hutchinson to
become conscious of the nature of the act he was about to commit and the
probable result of that act.
The evidence in this case, after being viewed in a light most favorable to the
State, is sufficient to sustain a conviction of premeditated first-degree murder.  See 
Pagan, 830 So. 2d at 803 (“If, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could find the existence of the
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, sufficient evidence exists to
sustain a conviction.”).  When considering the time between the argument and the
actual murders, as well as the time Hutchinson needed to take between each
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shooting, a rational trier of fact could find premeditation.  There was competent,
substantial evidence to find premeditation.  Therefore, Hutchinson is not entitled
to relief based on this claim.
6.  Motion for New Trial
During a trial break, the jurors met for lunch at a nearby restaurant.  A
patron approached the jurors and told them that she hoped they were sitting on the
Hutchinson case and that she hoped they would hang him.  Upon returning to the
courthouse, a juror told the trial judge about the incident.  Two other jurors
admitted to hearing the comment.  The judge asked the three jurors individually if
hearing the patron’s comment would affect their ability to serve as jurors on this
case.  They all said no.  Hutchinson argues that prejudice arose from the jury’s
exposure to the community’s hatred toward him, and that the trial judge failed to
remedy that prejudice.  
Appellate courts review a trial court’s ruling on issues involving the jury’s
exposure to comments or evidence that was not presented in the courtroom on an
abuse of discretion standard.  “Trial court discretion in ruling on motions for
mistrial where jurors have been exposed to outside comments about a defendant or
similar offensive references to the case or a party should not be disturbed absent
an abuse of discretion.”  Craig v. State, 766 So. 2d 257, 259 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000);
-23-
cf. Doorbal v. State, 837 So. 2d 940, 956 (Fla.) (stating that the standard of review
of the trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial is abuse of discretion), cert.
denied, 123 S. Ct. 2647 (2003).  The trial court in this case did not abuse its
discretion in denying Hutchinson’s motion for mistrial based on Hutchinson’s fear
that three jurors were unable to be impartial due to a comment made by a
restaurant patron.  
This case is similar to Street v. State, 636 So. 2d 1297 (Fla. 1994).  In
Street, a person passed the jury in the hallway and muttered, “guilty.”  Id. at 1301. 
The trial judge inquired of the jury whether they had heard the statement,
individually questioned the four jurors who had heard the comment about their
ability to remain impartial, and then denied the defendant’s motion for mistrial. 
This Court affirmed that denial and held that the judge’s actions were proper.  Id.
at 1302; see also Occhicone v. State, 570 So. 2d 902, 904 (Fla. 1990) (holding that
it was not an abuse of discretion to deny a motion for mistrial on the ground that a
spectator told a prospective juror during voir dire that she thought the defendant
was guilty where the defendant failed to establish that the jury pool had been
tainted).
The trial court in this case acted appropriately by questioning the panel and
then individually questioning those who heard the comment about their ability to
-24-
be impartial.  The comment made to the jurors amounted to an opinion and not the
disclosure of evidence or facts not presented at trial.  Further, Hutchinson failed to
show that the jurors were not impartial.  The trial judge, therefore, did not abuse
his discretion, and the denial of Hutchinson’s motion for mistrial was proper.
7.  The Victim’s Age as an Aggravating Factor
At sentencing, the trial court considered the “youth” aggravator, section
921.141(5)(1), Florida Statutes (2000), as it applied to each of the children. This
statute allows the sentencer to consider a victim’s age as an aggravating factor if
the victim is less than twelve years old.  Hutchinson argues that the trial court
improperly relied on this aggravator because there was no causal link between the
children’s ages and their deaths.  Without such a link, Hutchinson contends, this
aggravator does nothing to limit or narrow the class of persons eligible for a death
sentence.  Although Hutchinson did not object to this aggravating factor below, he
argues that relying on this aggravating factor was fundamental error because the
error reaches down to the validity of the death sentence, and without such error, a
death sentence could not have been obtained.  
We have held that an argument attacking the constitutionality of an
aggravating factor must be specifically raised at trial to be pursued on appeal.  See
Morrison v. State, 818 So. 2d 432, 455 (Fla. 2002); Lukehart v. State, 776 So. 2d
3.   It should be noted that although the trial court found the “under the age
of 12" aggravator to exist as to the murders of Geoffrey, Amanda, and Logan, in
each instance, that aggravator was merged with the “aggravated child abuse”
aggravator. 
-25-
906, 925 (Fla. 2000) (refusing to address a claim that the “victim under 12"
aggravator was unconstitutional because the issue was not preserved for review).3 
Because defense counsel did not preserve this issue for appellate review, we deny
relief on this claim and will not address its merits.  
8.  Aggravated Child Abuse
Hutchinson next argues that the trial court erred in finding as an aggravating
circumstance that he committed the murders of the children during the course of a
felony, i.e., aggravated child abuse.  Any error in the trial court’s handling of
aggravated child abuse as an aggravating circumstance is harmless because the
trial court merged the factors supporting this aggravator with the aggravator that
the victim was a person less than twelve years of age.  The State filed a cross-
appeal in this case alleging that the trial court erred by failing to consider the
aggravated child abuse aggravator separately from the aggravating circumstance
that the child victims were under the age of twelve at the time of their murders. 
The trial court properly merged these two aggravators.  We therefore deny the
State’s cross appeal.  See Lukehart v. State, 776 So. 2d 906, 925 (Fla. 2000)
-26-
(holding that the trial court improperly doubled aggravated child abuse aggravator
and “victim under twelve” aggravator because both aggravators relied upon the
victim’s status as a child).
9.  Heinous, Atrocious, or Cruel Aggravating Circumstance
Hutchinson next argues that the trial court erroneously found that the
murder of Geoffrey was HAC because there was no evidence that Geoffrey had a
prolonged awareness of his impending death or that he suffered mental torture. 
Our review of a trial court’s finding of an aggravating factor is limited to
determining whether the trial court applied the right rule of law and, if so, whether
competent, substantial evidence supports its finding.  See Way v. State, 760 So. 2d
903, 918 (Fla. 2000).  In this case, the trial court correctly found the HAC
aggravating circumstance.
The trial court found the following facts in support of HAC.  Nine-year-old
Geoffrey Flaherty was the fourth victim, and he was first shot in the chest and then
shot in the head.  The evidence showed that Hutchinson kicked or shoved in the
front door, wielding a shotgun.  He crossed the living room and entered the master
bedroom.  Geoffrey was not in the master bedroom at that time.  Geoffrey’s
mother, sister, and brother were in the bedroom and were shot and killed. 
Geoffrey was standing in the doorway to the bedroom, and he would have heard
4.  While the sentencing order uses the conjunction “and,” the statute
provides that this aggravating factor is applicable if the murder “was especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel.” § 921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (2000) (emphasis added).
-27-
the gunshots and would have seen each member of his family being shot. 
Hutchinson then faced Geoffrey, racked another shell into the chamber, aimed the
shotgun at Geoffrey, and pulled the trigger.  Geoffrey had a defensive wound
indicating that he raised his arm to ward off the blast that struck him in the chest. 
Geoffrey stumbled into the living room, grasping at the arm of the sofa as
evidenced by a blood soaked hand print.  He fell to the floor in between the sofa
and coffee table, looking toward the master bedroom as Hutchinson followed him
and fired the last shot through Geoffrey’s right ear.  This shot went through
Geoffrey’s head and neck and killed him. The circumstances of the final minutes
of Geoffrey’s life prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Geoffrey’s murder was
heinous, atrocious, or4 cruel.
Hutchinson argues that the facts of this case do not support a finding of
HAC because Geoffrey’s death was quick and would have occurred not more than
five to ten seconds after Geoffrey came to the master bedroom doorway. 
Hutchinson argues that the instantaneous nature of Geoffrey’s killing does not
justify HAC.  While this Court has held that “an instantaneous or
near-instantaneous death by gunfire does not satisfy the aggravating circumstance
-28-
of heinous, atrocious, or cruel,” Robinson v. State, 574 So. 2d 108, 112 (Fla.
1991), we have also indicated that such deaths can satisfy this aggravator if the
State has presented other evidence to show some physical or mental torture of the
victim.  See Hartley v. State, 686 So. 2d 1316, 1323 (Fla. 1996).  An HAC finding
will be affirmed even if the victim was killed by a single gunshot wound if the
entire sequence of events demonstrates that the victim suffered substantial mental
anguish.  See, e.g., Henyard v. State, 689 So. 2d 239, 254 (Fla. 1996) (finding
HAC where two children saw their mother shot and raped before they were each
killed with a single gunshot wound to the head).  In determining whether HAC
applies, the trial court considers the circumstances of the murder from the “unique
perspective of the victim.”  Banks v. State, 700 So. 2d 363, 367 ( Fla. 1997).  The
victim’s “[f]ear and emotional strain may be considered as contributing to the
heinous nature of the murder, even where the victim’s death was almost
instantaneous.”  Preston v. State, 607 So. 2d 404, 410 (Fla. 1992).  Therefore, in
determining whether the trial court properly found HAC here, we focus on the
victim’s perceptions of the circumstances, as opposed to those of the perpetrator. 
See Farina v. State, 801 So. 2d 44, 53 (Fla. 2001).  Furthermore, “the victim’s
mental state may be evaluated for purposes of such determination in accordance
with a common-sense inference from the circumstances.”  Swafford v. State, 533
-29-
So. 2d 270, 277 (Fla. 1988); see also Chavez v. State, 832 So. 2d 730, 765 (Fla.
2002). 
The evidence demonstrates that Geoffrey saw the bodies of his mother,
sister, and brother in the blood-spattered room, and a common sense inference
from the circumstance is that Geoffrey heard the gunshots that killed his family. 
Common sense also supports the trial court’s finding that Geoffrey saw
Hutchinson point the gun at him.  Testimony at trial as to where Geoffrey’s blood
was located and where his body was ultimately discovered, as well as the
existence of defensive wounds, supports the trial court’s finding that after
Geoffrey was initially shot, he attempted to escape.  Because Geoffrey was nine
years old, common sense tells us he was aware that Hutchinson was going to kill
him when he saw his family killed and when Hutchinson pointed the gun at him.  
Thus, the finding of HAC is supported by competent, substantial evidence.
10.  Proportionality Review
Finally, we find that Hutchinson’s sentence of death is proportional. In
deciding the proportionality, we must consider the totality of the circumstances
and compare the case with other capital cases.  See Sexton v. State, 775 So. 2d
923, 935 (Fla. 2000).  This analysis “is not a comparison between the number of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances.”  Porter v. State, 564 So. 2d 1060, 1064
-30-
(Fla. 1990).  Instead, this Court must look to the nature of and the weight given to
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
The trial court found two statutory aggravators for the murders of Logan
and Amanda:  (1) the defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony
(the other murders), and (2) the victim was less than twelve years of age.  See §
921.141(5)(b), (1), Fla. Stat. (2000).  Three statutory aggravators were found by
the trial court for the murder of Geoffrey:  (1) the defendant was previously
convicted of another capital felony (the other murders); (2) the victim was less
than twelve years of age, which merged with the aggravated child abuse
aggravator; and (3) HAC.  See id. § 921.141(5)(b), (d), (h), (1).  
The trial court found one statutory mitigator:  no significant history of prior
criminal activity, giving it significant weight.   The following nonstatutory
mitigators were considered and found:  (1) the defendant was a decorated military
veteran of the Gulf War, significant weight; (2) the defendant is the father of a son
for whom he has provided financial and emotional support, some weight; (3) the
defendant has potential for rehabilitation and productivity while in prison, some
weight; (4) the defendant was intoxicated with a blood alcohol content of .21 to
.26 on the night of the murders, some weight; (5) the defendant was a soldier for
eight years and had been honorably discharged, slight weight; (6) the defendant
-31-
provided financial and emotional support to his family, slight weight; (7) the
defendant has the ability to show compassion, slight weight; (8) the defendant has
a good employment history, slight weight; (9) the defendant’s family supports
him, slight weight; (10) the defendant has ability as a mechanic, slight weight;
(11) the defendant sought motorcycle patents, slight weight; (12) the defendant
was diagnosed with Gulf War illness, minimal weight; (13) the defendant was
recognized as security officer of the year, minimal weight; (14) the defendant
never abused drugs, little weight; (15) the defendant is a high school graduate,
little weight; (16) the defendant was active in disseminating information about
Gulf War illness, little weight; (17) the defendant has religious faith, little weight;
(18) the defendant was distressed during the 911 call, little weight; (19) the
defendant’s friends testified on his behalf, very little weight; and (20) the
defendant was diagnosed with Attention Deficit Disorder, very little weight.  The
trial court considered but rejected two statutory mitigators and six nonstatutory
mitigators, either finding them to be not mitigating in nature, not proven, or not
worthy of any weight.  
Hutchinson argues that because he has no history of violence and the
multiple murders were domestic in nature, the numerous mitigating factors
outweigh the limited aggravation.  This Court has rejected and continues to reject
-32-
any “domestic dispute” exception to the imposition of a death sentence.  See
Walker v. State, 707 So. 2d 300, 318 n.12 (Fla. 1997) (stating that this Court has
never treated “domestic dispute” cases as categorically different than other death
cases, and the fact that a case is “domestic” in nature is not, in and of itself,
mitigating). 
This case involves the murders of three defenseless children, all age nine
and under, as well as the murder of their mother.  For each of these murders, the
trial court found either two or three aggravating circumstances, one statutory
mitigating circumstance, and several nonstatutory mitigating circumstances.  The
circumstances of these murders clearly demonstrate that the sentences of death are
proportional to other murder cases involving multiple child-victims.  In Henyard
v. State, 689 So. 2d 239, 255 (Fla. 1996), we found the death sentence
proportional where the defendant killed two young children with a single gun shot
to the head, and also shot their mother who survived.  The aggravators found in
Henyard were prior violent felony, during the course of a felony, pecuniary gain,
and HAC; several mitigators were found, including mental mitigators.  Likewise in
Durocher v. State, 604 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 1992), we found the death sentence
proportional where the defendant killed his former girlfriend and her two small
children.  We also found the death sentence in Zakrzewski v. State, 717 So. 2d
-33-
488, 493 (Fla. 1998), proportional where the defendant killed his wife and two
children.  The aggravators present in Zakrzewski were previous conviction of
violent felony (contemporaneous murders), cold, calculated, and premeditated, and
HAC.  Significant mitigation was also found in Zakrzewski, including two
statutory mitigators and mental health mitigation.
Additionally, this case is similar to the situation we addressed in Henry v.
State, 649 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1994).  In Henry, the defendant was sentenced to
death for the murders of his second wife and her son.  The aggravating
circumstances found were previous conviction of another capital felony (the
murder of Henry’s first wife), and that the murder was committed during the
course of a kidnapping.  There were two statutory mitigating circumstances: 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance and lack of capacity to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct.  In addition, there were a number of nonstatutory
mitigating factors, including the fact that Henry pled guilty and turned himself in
for the murder of his first wife, that he was cooperative with law enforcement, that
he had good conduct in jail, that he was a good Christian, that he was truly
remorseful, that he had a history of drug and alcohol abuse, and that he fell as a
child and suffered some brain injury.  Under these circumstances, we found
Henry’s sentence of death to be proportional.  Likewise, under the facts and
-34-
circumstances in this case, the sentences of death for the murders of three children
demonstrate that death is also a proportional sentence.
CONCLUSION
Hutchinson has failed to demonstrate that the trial court committed
reversible error during his trial.  Therefore, we affirm his convictions of four first-
degree murders.  We also affirm the imposition of the sentences of death for the
murders of the three children.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
PARIENTE, C.J., concurs in part and concurs in result only in part with an
opinion, in which ANSTEAD and CANTERO, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
PARIENTE, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in result only in part. 
I concur in the affirmance of the murder convictions and death sentences in
this case.  I write separately because I disagree with the majority's conclusion that
sufficient evidence supports the finding that the murder of Geoffrey Flaherty was
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC).  I conclude that HAC was
erroneously found as to this murder. 
I begin with the explanatory note that many first-degree murders by
-35-
definition would initially appear "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel." 
However, under our death penalty law, the purpose of aggravating circumstances
is to determine which murders are set apart from all other murders so as to subject
those defendants to the death penalty.  
When the circumstances of the murder of Geoffrey Flaherty are viewed
objectively and dispassionately, as is our duty, I conclude that these facts fall short
of the criteria we have set out for the application of the HAC aggravator.  I am
concerned that approval of HAC under these facts risks expansion of the
aggravator to the point that it no longer provides constitutionally adequate
guidance to the sentencer as required by the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. 
For HAC to apply, the capital felony must be "especially heinous, atrocious,
or cruel."  § 921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (2002) (emphasis added); see also Amoros v.
State, 531 So. 2d 1256, 1260 (Fla. 1988) ("First-degree murder is a heinous crime;
however, this statutory aggravating circumstance requires the incident to be
'especially heinous, atrocious, [or] cruel.'"); Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910
(Fla. 1975) ("It is apparent that all killings are atrocious . . . .  Still, we believe that
the Legislature intended something 'especially' heinous, atrocious or cruel when it
authorized the death penalty for first degree murder.").  The HAC aggravating
-36-
circumstance is directed toward selecting those murders that, because of their
heightened depravity, warrant the imposition of this specific aggravating
circumstance.
In determining the circumstances in which HAC applies, it is essential to
consider the constitutional function served by all of the aggravating factors found
in Florida's death penalty statute, including HAC.  See § 921.141(5), Fla. Stat.
(2002).  As Justice Scalia recently observed, "[w]hat compelled [many states] to
specify particular 'aggravating factors' that must be found before the death penalty
can be imposed . . . was the line of this Court's cases beginning with Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam)."  Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 610
(2002) (Scalia, J., concurring).  In Furman and subsequent decisions, the United
States Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the death penalty statutes existing
in most states, including Florida.  The Supreme Court held that the death penalty
in those states, by leaving too much discretion to the sentencer in deciding
whether to impose the death penalty, constituted cruel and unusual punishment
under the Eighth Amendment.  See Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40.  In reaction, many
states, including Florida, amended their statutes to include certain "aggravating
factors" that would supply a "meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in
which [death] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not."  See id. at 313
5.  See Hortonville Joint School Dist. No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n., 426
U.S. 482, 488 (1976) ("We are, of course, bound to accept the interpretation of
[the State's] law by the highest court of the State.").
-37-
(White, J., concurring).
Thus, to pass constitutional muster, all aggravators including HAC must
adequately channel and guide the sentencer's discretion in deciding whether to
impose death.  Because Ring now emphasizes that the jury is the finder of fact as
to aggravating circumstances, it is especially important that we continue to
promote constitutionally precise guidelines as to what factors support the finding
of the HAC aggravator. 
Because federal courts defer to this Court's interpretation of Florida law,5
our construction of the statutory language defining HAC is crucial to its
constitutional validity.  Just months after the Florida Legislature amended the
death penalty statute to conform to Furman, this Court stated with regard to HAC:
It is our interpretation that heinous means extremely wicked or
shockingly evil; that atrocious means outrageously wicked and vile;
and, that cruel means designed to inflict a high degree of pain with
utter indifference to, or even enjoyment of, the suffering of others.
What is intended to be included are those capital crimes where the
actual commission of the capital felony was accompanied by such
additional acts as to set the crime apart from the norm of capital
felonies--the conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily
torturous to the victim.
State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 9 (Fla. 1973).  Relying on this construction as a
-38-
limitation of HAC to the "conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily
torturous to the victim," the United States Supreme Court held in Proffitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 255-56 (1976), that this definition gave the sentencer
adequate guidance in its application.  Subsequently, in Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S.
527 (1992), the Supreme Court rejected an Eighth Amendment challenge to the
HAC aggravator, but did so in terms that called into question our HAC
jurisprudence:
Sochor contends . . . that the State Supreme Court's
post-Proffitt cases have not adhered to Dixon's limitation as stated in
Proffitt, but instead evince inconsistent and overbroad constructions
that leave a trial court without sufficient guidance. And we may well
agree with him that the Supreme Court of Florida has not confined its
discussions on the matter to the Dixon language we approved in
Proffitt, but has on occasion continued to invoke the entire Dixon
statement quoted above, perhaps thinking that Proffitt approved it all. 
See, e.g., Porter v. State, 564 So. 2d 1060 (1990), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 1110 (1991); Cherry v. State, 544 So. 2d 184, 187 (1989), cert.
denied, 494 U.S. 1090 (1990); Lucas v. State, 376 So. 2d 1149, 1153
(1979).
But however much that may be troubling in the abstract, it need
not trouble us here, for our review of Florida law indicates that the
State Supreme Court has consistently held that heinousness is
properly found if the defendant strangled a conscious victim.
Id. at 536-37 (citations omitted).  In response to Sochor, this Court clarified that
for HAC to apply, "the crime must be both conscienceless or pitiless and
unnecessarily torturous to the victim."  Richardson v. State, 604 So. 2d 1107, 1109
6.  See also Barnhill v. State, 834 So. 2d 836, 850 (Fla. 2002), cert. denied,
123 S. Ct. 2281 (2003); Mansfield v. State, 758 So. 2d 636, 645 (Fla. 2000); Orme
v. State, 677 So. 2d 258, 263 (Fla. 1996).
7.   See, e.g., Duest v. State, 855 So. 2d 33, 46-47 (Fla. 2003), cert. denied,
124 S. Ct. 2023 (2004); Francis v. State, 808 So. 2d 110, 134 (Fla. 2001), cert.
denied, 123 S. Ct. 696 (2002);  Guzman v. State, 721 So. 2d 1155, 1159 (Fla.
1998). 
-39-
(Fla. 1992); see also Hartley v. State, 686 So. 2d 1316, 1323 (Fla. 1996).  We have
also stated that "[o]nly when a murder evinces extreme and outrageous depravity
as exemplified either by the desire to inflict a high degree of pain or utter
indifference to or enjoyment of the suffering of another is a finding of HAC
appropriate."  Buckner v. State, 714 So. 2d 384, 390 (Fla. 1998).
This Court has repeatedly held that HAC applies to murders either by
strangulation of a conscious victim, as noted in Sochor,6 or by repeated stabbing of
a conscious victim,7 because a killing by either method is inherently torturous:
HAC focuses on the means and manner in which the death is inflicted
and the immediate circumstances surrounding the death, rather than
the intent and motivation of a defendant, where a victim experiences
the torturous anxiety and fear of impending death. Thus, if a victim is
killed in a torturous manner, a defendant need not have the intent or
desire to inflict torture, because the very torturous manner of the
victim's death is evidence of a defendant's indifference.  Because
strangulation of a conscious victim involves foreknowledge and the
extreme anxiety of impending death, death by strangulation
constitutes prima facie evidence of HAC.
Barnhill v. State, 834 So. 2d 836, 849-50 (Fla. 2002) (citations omitted).  Thus,
-40-
only "where" and "if" the killing is inherently torturous—such as in the case of a
strangulation or repeated stabbing of a conscious victim—will the defendant's
intent or indifference to the victim's suffering be inferred by the very torturous
manner of the death.  
Applying these criteria, we have disapproved HAC for gunshot murders that
are unaccompanied by other circumstances showing that the killing was
conscienceless or pitiless and unnecessarily torturous to the victim, i.e., committed
in a manner exhibiting utter indifference to or enjoyment of the suffering of
another.  See, e.g., Diaz v. State, 860 So. 2d 960, 967 (Fla. 2003) (determining that
competent, substantial evidence did not support HAC finding for murder carried
out quickly and without intent to inflict a high degree of pain or otherwise torture
the victim), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2068 (2004);  Rimmer v. State, 825 So. 2d
304, 328 (Fla. 2002) (finding that evidence did not support HAC where the record
did not reveal that the defendant tortured the victims or subjected them to pain and
suffering), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1034 (2002); Ferrell v. State, 686 So. 2d 1324,
1330 (Fla. 1996) ("Execution-style killings are not generally HAC unless the state
has presented other evidence to show some physical or mental torture of the
victim."); Robinson v. State, 574 So. 2d 108, 112 (Fla. 1991) (holding that the trial
court erred in finding HAC because the fatal shot to the victim "was not
-41-
accompanied by additional acts setting it apart from the norm of capital felonies,
and there was no evidence that it was committed 'to cause the victim unnecessary
and prolonged suffering'").  In fact, we have stated that "a murder by shooting,
when it is ordinary in the sense that it is not set apart from the norm of
premeditated murders, is as a matter of law not [especially] heinous, atrocious, or
cruel."  Lewis v. State, 398 So. 2d 432, 438 (Fla. 1981) (emhasis supplied).
Turning to the facts of this case, I conclude that Geoffrey Flaherty suffered
a nearly instantaneous death by gunshot that was not inherently torturous under
the standards of our previous opinions.  Cf. Rimmer, 825 So. 2d at 329 (holding
HAC inapplicable where second victim was "killed within a very short time
(perhaps only seconds) after [the first victim] and, therefore, would have
experienced only a very short period of mental anguish, if any at all").  In these
circumstances, both the trial court in finding HAC and this Court in reviewing that
finding are obligated to determine whether the defendant committed the killing in
an unnecessarily torturous manner that exhibited an utter indifference to or
enjoyment of the suffering of the victim.  Neither the sentencing order nor the
majority opinion in this case reflects such a determination.  The trial court found
that in firing the fatal shot, Hutchinson acted "without pity, without conscience." 
This entirely accurate observation does not equate to a finding that the killing was
-42-
done in an unnecessarily torturous manner.  The majority, in approving the trial
court's determination, explicitly limits its focus to "the victim's perceptions of the
circumstances, as opposed to those of the perpetrator."  Majority op. at 28. 
Accordingly, I believe that in approving the trial court's determination that this
murder was HAC without taking into consideration the defendant's intent, the
majority has strayed from HAC's Eighth Amendment boundaries. 
The majority's exclusive focus on the victim's possible or likely perceptions
in its review of the HAC determination in this case perpetuates an error that I have
previously commented upon.  See Francis v. State, 808 So. 2d 110, 144 (Fla.
2002) (Pariente, J., concurring in result only) (emphasizing "that a finding of HAC
under Dixon and its progeny requires evidence from which it can be inferred that
the defendant intended to inflict unnecessary pain or suffering upon the victim,
otherwise torture the victim, or exhibit indifference to the suffering of another"). 
Justice Harding has articulated a similar concern in a case in which we struck
HAC for an "execution-style" killing:
If we approved the application of the HAC aggravating factor
in the instant case without some factual proof of the victims' mental
torture, then the factor would apply in every instance where a normal
person might feel fear.  This would exclude only those homicides
where the victim was ambushed or killed without awareness of the
assailant.  This clearly would go far beyond finding the HAC factor to
be "appropriate in a 'conscienceless or pitiless crime which is
8.  See Lynch v. State 841 So. 2d 362, 371 (Fla.) (concluding that the
thirteen-year-old victim "surely experienced terror at the thought of her own
impending death" while being held at gunpoint for thirty to forty minutes and after
witnessing her mother being shot numerous times), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 189
-43-
unnecessarily torturous to the victim.' "  Richardson, 604 So.2d at
1109 (quoting Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 536, 112 S.Ct. 2114,
119 L.Ed.2d 326 (1992)).  I believe that such a broad interpretation of
the HAC aggravating factor would render it unconstitutional because
it would not provide the sentencer with adequate guidance.  See 
Sochor, 504 U.S. at 536, 112 S.Ct. 2114. 
Knight v. State, 746 So. 2d 423, 439 (Fla. 1998) (Harding, C.J., specially
concurring).  In my view, the majority fails to heed Justice Harding's admonition
against a broad interpretation of the aggravator and makes concrete the concern
that the Supreme Court in Sochor found "troubling in the abstract."  
 Applying the constitutionally required criteria for HAC, I cannot conclude
that the killing of Geoffrey, although appalling, was especially heinous, atrocious,
or cruel.  There are of course two distinctions between this killing and the killings
of the other three victims, which the trial court did not find to be HAC.  First,
Geoffrey was killed last, and second, because Geoffrey resisted his fate and
attempted to flee, Hutchinson was required to pursue him and fire a second shot in
order to consummate the murder.  In comparison to the cases in which we have
upheld HAC for gunshot killings, however, the circumstances of this murder do
not support a conclusion that this was an unnecessarily torturous killing.8  Rather,
(2003); Henyard v. State, 689 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1996) (finding HAC where victims
witnessed rapes and shooting of their mother before victims were driven to another
location and shot); Douglas v. State, 575 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 1991) (finding HAC
where defendant "said he felt like blowing our . . . brains out," forced the victim to
perform various sexual acts at gun point and, during the attempt to comply, fired
the rifle into the air, and hit victim so forcefully in the head with the rifle that the
stock shattered, before shooting victim in the head);  Parker v. State, 476 So. 2d
134 (Fla. 1985) (finding HAC where defendants told victim she would be killed so
that she could not identify them, victim pleaded during "13-mile death-ride" not to
be hurt, victim's bladder was completely voided "consistent with her being in great
fear prior to her death," victim had large chunks of her hair torn out by the roots,
and was stabbed in the stomach before being shot execution-style); Routly v.
State, 440 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. 1983) (finding HAC where victim was bound during
robbery, carried from his own house, thrown into trunk of his own car, and driven
out of town through back roads in middle of night before being shot).
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this case belongs in the category of execution-style killings of a subsequent victim
that fall short of the criteria of HAC.  See Rimmer, 825 So. 2d at 329 (concluding
that evidence was insufficient to support HAC as to second victim because record
did not show that the defendant "acted with extreme and outrageous depravity or
that he inflicted a high degree of physical or mental pain").  Although Geoffrey
undoubtedly suffered both mental and physical anguish, I conclude that as in
Rimmer, id., the terror of his final moments did not constitute the "longer and
significantly more protracted suffering" that is necessary for HAC.  
Under Dixon and its progeny, HAC requires evidence from which it can be
inferred that the defendant intended to inflict unnecessary pain or suffering upon
the victim, otherwise torture the victim, or exhibit indifference to the suffering of
-45-
another.  The record is devoid of evidence upon which to conclude that
Hutchinson intended to inflict unnecessary pain or suffering, or exhibited utter
indifference to or enjoyment of Geoffrey's suffering.  Rather, it appears that
Hutchinson acted with ruthless efficiency in carrying out the execution of his
family members, from the beginning of this murderous episode to its conclusion. 
The manner of the killing would lend support to the aggravator of cold, calculated,
and premeditated (CCP), which the trial court did not find, but does not support
the trial court's determination that the murder was HAC.  I would therefore strike
HAC as to the murder of Geoffrey. 
Nonetheless, I concur in the affirmance of the death sentence because I
conclude that the trial court's error in finding the HAC aggravator for the murder
of Geoffrey is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and does not render death a
disproportionate penalty.  Under the circumstances of this case, there is no
reasonable possibility that the trial court would have concluded that the two
remaining aggravating factors of previous conviction of a capital felony (the other
murders) and murder of a victim less then twelve years of age were outweighed by
the single statutory mitigator of no significant criminal history and the twenty
nonstatutory mitigating factors, the vast majority of which were given "little,"
"very little," "slight" or "minimal" weight.  Therefore, any error in finding HAC
-46-
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Wright v. State, 857 So. 2d 861,
879 (Fla. 2003) (finding trial court's reliance on an unsupported aggravator to be
harmless error where elimination of the aggravator creates "no likelihood of a
different sentence"), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1715 (2004); Gore v. State, 599 So.
2d 978, 987 (Fla. 1992) (concluding beyond a reasonable doubt that error in
finding aggravator was harmless because trial court would have imposed death
without consideration of invalid aggravator).  I also conclude that, as with the
sentences for the murders of his siblings, death was a proportionate punishment
for the murder of Geoffrey Flaherty in comparison to other, analogous cases in
which we have affirmed sentences of death.  
ANSTEAD and CANTERO, JJ., concur.
An Appeal and a Cross-Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Okaloosa
County, 
G. Robert Barron, Judge - Case No. 98-1382-CF-001
Kepler B. Funk,  Jack L. Platt and Keith F. Szachacz of Funk & Szachacz, P.A.,
Melbourne, Florida,
for Appellant, Cross-Appellee
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Charmaine M. Millsaps, Assistant
Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellee, Cross-Appellant