Title: Care Group Heart Hospital, LLC v. Sawyer
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 49S05-1710-PL-671
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: March 23, 2018

I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 49S05-1710-PL-671 
The Care Group Heart Hospital, LLC, 
Appellant/Cross-Appellee (Defendant), 
–v– 
Roderick J. Sawyer, M.D., 
Appellee/Cross-Appellant (Plaintiff). 
Argued: December 7, 2017 | Decided: March 23, 2018 
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court,  
No. 49D10-1208-PL-32513 
The Honorable David J. Dreyer, Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals,  
No. 49A05-1603-PL-580 
Opinion by Chief Justice Rush 
Justice David, Justice Massa, Justice Slaughter, and Justice Goff concur. 
 
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Mar 23 2018, 3:15 pm
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Rush, Chief Justice. 
Parties are free to choose the terms of their agreements, and Indiana 
courts firmly defend this freedom of contract by enforcing agreed-upon 
terms. 
Here, a doctor worked as a cardiologist and was also a member–owner 
of a hospital. He agreed with his employer and with the hospital that if his 
employment is “terminated for any reason”—that is, upon “any 
termination”—his ownership interest must be discontinued and 
redeemed.  
We hold that “any termination” means just that—any termination, for 
any reason. The hospital thus did not breach the agreement by paying out 
the doctor’s ownership interest after his employment terminated. It did, 
however, breach the agreement by delaying the payout, so the doctor is 
entitled to interest. 
We also hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
awarding the doctor discovery sanctions of $27,233.19 in attorney fees and 
expenses. 
We therefore affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the trial 
court. 
Facts and Procedural History 
Doctor Roderick Sawyer worked as a cardiologist for St. Vincent 
Medical Group, Inc. (“the Medical Group”). He was also a member–owner 
of The Care Group Heart Hospital, LLC (“the Hospital”). These two 
arrangements stood on three agreements: an employment agreement, an 
operating agreement, and a joinder agreement. 
The employment agreement was between Dr. Sawyer and the Medical 
Group and governed his ten-year term of employment as a cardiologist. 
The operating agreement was between Dr. Sawyer and the Hospital and 
prescribed payout of his ownership interest in the Hospital. And the 
joinder agreement was among all three and conditioned Dr. Sawyer’s 
continued ownership interest in the Hospital on his continued 
employment with the Medical Group. The joinder agreement specified, 
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[w]ithin ninety (90) days of any termination of employment 
between Physician and [the Medical Group] (other than a 
termination pursuant to Section 4.4(c) of the Agreement), . . . 
Physician and [the Hospital] shall cause Physician to be 
redeemed of his interest in [the Hospital] such that, following 
such redemption, Physician shall have no continuing direct or 
indirect membership, ownership or investment interest in [the 
Hospital]. (emphases added)  
The operating agreement then supplied a formula for calculating Dr. 
Sawyer’s redemption amount at the time of his “involuntary withdrawal,” 
which includes “the termination of employment or any material 
agreement [Dr. Sawyer] is a party to with the [Medical Group].”  
The Medical Group terminated Dr. Sawyer’s employment on July 22, 
2011. Almost eight months later, the Hospital paid Dr. Sawyer $196,787—
his redemption amount based on the operating agreement’s formula.  
Dr. Sawyer sued the Medical Group and the Hospital.1 Against the 
Medical Group, he claimed tortious interference with business 
relationships; breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing; and breach 
of the employment agreement, which caused him to lose both his 
employment and his ownership interest in the Hospital. Against the 
Hospital, he brought a breach-of-contract claim.  
The Hospital filed dispositive motions throughout the litigation: for 
partial dismissal, for summary judgment, and for judgment on the 
evidence. Each motion relied on a plain reading of the joinder agreement, 
arguing no breach in the Hospital discontinuing and redeeming Dr. 
Sawyer’s ownership interest. The trial court denied all these motions as to 
the joinder agreement, but it granted summary judgment to the Hospital 
as to the operating agreement. A jury returned a verdict against the 
Medical Group for $1.1 million, which has been paid to Dr. Sawyer. The 
                                                 
1 Dr. Sawyer also sued Dr. Christopher Hollon for tortious interference with his employment 
agreement. The jury returned a verdict in Dr. Hollon’s favor. 
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jury also returned a verdict of $470,000 against the Hospital for breach of 
the joinder agreement.  
The Hospital moved to correct error, reiterating that there was no 
breach in discontinuing and redeeming Dr. Sawyer’s ownership interest—
only in delaying the payout after the 90-day deadline. The Hospital asked 
the court to correct the jury’s $470,000 award by entering judgment on the 
evidence for $6,559.60—the interest on the five-month delay at the 
statutory rate of eight percent. The court denied the Hospital’s motion.  
Finally, the court ruled on the last of many discovery disputes that 
tangled nearly every stage of the litigation. It ordered the Hospital and 
Medical Group to pay a $27,233.19 sanction award to Dr. Sawyer. 
The Hospital appealed the $470,000 judgment, arguing that the trial 
court erred in denying the Hospital’s motions under Indiana Trial Rules 
12(B)(6), 50, and 59(J). Dr. Sawyer cross-appealed, arguing that the trial 
court erroneously granted summary judgment to the Hospital as to the 
operating agreement, and that the $27,233.19 in attorney fees and expenses 
was an inadequate sanction. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed both the partial summary judgment for 
the Hospital and the judgment against the Hospital.2 The Care Group Heart 
Hosp. v. Sawyer, 80 N.E.3d 190, 210 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). But it reversed the 
sanction award, remanding for re-evaluation and re-apportionment 
among the defendants. Id. 
The Hospital and the Medical Group separately petitioned to transfer. 
We granted transfer, vacating the Court of Appeals opinion. Ind. 
Appellate Rule 58(A).3 
                                                 
2 We summarily affirm the Court of Appeals opinion affirming the trial court’s grant of 
summary judgment as to the operating agreement. See The Care Group Heart Hosp. v. Sawyer, 
80 N.E.3d 190, 203–05 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017); Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A)(2). 
3 Both before and after we granted transfer, attorneys for the Appellee filed repetitive 
motions, which we address in a separate order published the same date as this opinion. 
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Standard of Review 
We face two questions. First, did a contract-interpretation error—which 
we review de novo—pervade the trial court’s rulings on the Hospital’s 
dispositive motions? See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Jakubowicz, 56 
N.E.3d 617, 619 (Ind. 2016).  
Second, did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding discovery 
sanctions of $27,233.19 to Dr. Sawyer? See McCullough v. Archbold Ladder 
Co., 605 N.E.2d 175, 180 (Ind. 1993).  
Discussion and Decision 
 We hold that under the plain meaning of the contract language, the 
Hospital did not breach the joinder agreement by discontinuing and 
redeeming Dr. Sawyer’s ownership interest. We conclude, though, that the 
Hospital did breach the agreement by delaying the payout, so Dr. Sawyer 
is entitled to interest on the delay. Finally, we turn to the sanction award 
and find no abuse of discretion. 
I. The Hospital breached the joinder agreement only by delaying Dr. 
Sawyer’s payout. 
The Hospital challenges the legal sufficiency of Dr. Sawyer’s breach-of-
contract claim. See Thornton v. State, 43 N.E.3d 585, 587 (Ind. 2015). The 
claim’s legal sufficiency depends on our interpretation of the parties’ 
contract.  
Before interpreting the parties’ contract, however, we address a 
threshold matter—whether the Hospital waived its contract-interpretation 
argument. Dr. Sawyer gives three arguments for finding waiver.  
First, he asserts that the Hospital did not raise the argument in its 
motions for partial dismissal and for summary judgment. But the Hospital 
did, in fact, raise the argument in its motion for partial dismissal, asserting 
that the joinder agreement “call[s] for the mandatory redemption of 
Plaintiff’s membership interest in [the Hospital] following Plaintiff’s 
termination of employment with [the Medical Group].” The Hospital then 
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relied on this plain reading of the joinder agreement in its later dispositive 
motions. 
Dr. Sawyer also argues that the Hospital agreed to jury instructions on 
breach. But the Hospital did not need to object to the jury instructions to 
preserve its argument that the trial court erred in a contract-interpretation 
ruling that was outside the jury’s purview. See, e.g., City of St. Louis v. 
Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 119–120 (1988) (finding no obstacle to review a 
challenge, without an objection to jury instructions, where the focus of the 
challenge was “not on the jury instruction itself, but on the denial of [the 
party’s] motions for summary judgment and a directed verdict”).  
Finally, he argues that the Hospital waited until after the jury returned 
its verdict to assert that the Hospital’s breach was limited to its untimely 
payment. But the Hospital did not have to concede breach in untimeliness 
to preserve its argument that, under a plain reading of the contract 
language, there was no breach for paying out Dr. Sawyer’s ownership 
interest.  
The Hospital thus has not waived its contract-interpretation argument, 
and we turn to its merits. 
Our goal in contract interpretation is “to determine the intent of the 
parties at the time that they made the agreement.” Citimortgage, Inc. v. 
Barabas, 975 N.E.2d 805, 813 (Ind. 2012). We start with the contract 
language to determine whether it is ambiguous. Ryan v. TCI 
Architects/Eng’rs/Contractors, Inc., 72 N.E.3d 908, 914 (Ind. 2017). If the 
language is unambiguous, we give it its plain and ordinary meaning in 
view of the whole contract, without substitution or addition. See id.; State 
v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 51 N.E.3d 150, 160 (Ind. 2016).  
A. The parties’ agreed-upon terms are unambiguous. 
The joinder agreement says: 
WHEREAS, [the Medical Group] and the Physician [Dr. 
Sawyer] are parties to that certain Physician Employment 
Agreement of even date herewith (the “Agreement”); and 
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WHEREAS, Physician is a member of [the Hospital]; and . . . 
WHEREAS, the parties hereto desire that Physician and [the 
Hospital] shall cause Physician’s membership interest in [the 
Hospital] to be redeemed and Physician to no longer have any 
continuing direct or indirect membership, ownership or 
investment interest in [the Hospital] in the event that 
Physician’s employment referenced in the [Employment] 
Agreement is terminated for any reason (other than a 
termination pursuant to Section 4.4(c) of the Agreement). 
 NOW THEREFORE, . . . the parties hereto agree as follows: 
1. Mandatory Redemption. Within ninety (90) days of any 
termination of employment between Physician and [the 
Medical Group] (other than a termination pursuant to Section 
4.4(c) of the Agreement), . . . Physician and [the Hospital] shall 
cause Physician to be redeemed of his interest in [the Hospital] 
such that, following such redemption, Physician shall have no 
continuing direct or indirect membership, ownership or 
investment interest in [the Hospital]. 
Both parties initially argued that we should give these terms their plain 
and ordinary meaning—though they disagreed on what that meaning is. 
Then at oral argument, Dr. Sawyer alternatively offered that we could find 
the terms ambiguous based on the trial court’s rulings, the jury verdict, 
and the vacated Court of Appeals opinion. 
But the parties’ disagreement over the plain meaning does not create 
ambiguity. Jernas v. Gumz, 53 N.E.3d 434, 444 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. 
denied. Nor can the jury verdict or prior court rulings: after all, we review 
a court’s interpretation of contract language de novo. Jakubowicz, 56 
N.E.3d at 619. Thus, the plain meaning controls. 
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B. The joinder agreement’s plain language requires redemption 
upon any termination of Dr. Sawyer’s employment with the 
Medical Group. 
Dr. Sawyer acknowledges that the joinder agreement requires buying 
out his interest after “any termination of employment.”  He contends, 
however, that “any termination” means only a termination permitted by 
the employment agreement’s terms because the employment agreement 
and joinder agreement are really one contract. 
We disagree. The joinder and employment agreements are not one 
contract, and the plain meaning of “any termination” is any termination, 
for any reason. 
1. The joinder agreement and employment agreement are not one 
contract. 
Dr. Sawyer urges that the two agreements are really one—and so 
should be construed together—because the Hospital and the Medical 
Group are one entity and because the joinder agreement incorporates the 
employment agreement.  
We conclude otherwise. The Hospital and the Medical Group are 
separate entities, and the four corners of the joinder agreement do not 
encompass the employment agreement. Thus, the employment agreement 
does not affect the plain meaning of the joinder agreement’s terms. 
a. We do not read the two agreements together under the 
contemporaneous document doctrine. 
Dr. Sawyer’s argument that the Hospital and the Medical Group are 
really one entity invokes the contemporaneous document doctrine. This 
doctrine lets us, on a case-by-case basis, construe together contracts that 
relate to the same transaction or subject matter, if nothing indicates a 
contrary intention. See Lily, Inc. v. Silco, LLC, 997 N.E.2d 1055, 1068 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. Despite the doctrine’s title, the agreements 
may have been executed at different times. Id.  
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But when a litigant is not a party to one of the agreements, the 
contemporaneous document doctrine most likely will not apply. The 
reasons are straightforward: a contract generally cannot bind a nonparty,4 
and assent to the terms of the contract is a basic tenet of contract 
formation.  Martin Rispens & Son v. Hall Farms, Inc., 621 N.E.2d 1078, 1087 
(Ind. 1993), abrogated on different grounds by Hyundai Motor Am., Inc. v. 
Goodin, 822 N.E.2d 947 (Ind. 2005); Carr v. Hoosier Photo Supplies, Inc., 441 
N.E.2d 450, 455–56 (Ind. 1982).  
Yet, these reasons are not automatically implicated by a disparity in the 
contracts’ casts of parties. For instance, the doctrine may still apply where 
one contract has five parties while another has three. See, e.g., McGann & 
Marsh Co. v. K & F Mfg. Co., 179 Ind. App. 411, 419, 385 N.E.2d 1183, 1188 
(1979), trans. denied. The critical inquiry is whether the litigant who is 
absent from the cast of parties to one of the agreements is nevertheless 
“the same in essential respects” to a party to that agreement. Id. Compare 
Murat v. South Bend Lodge No. 235 of Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, 
893 N.E.2d 753, 757 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied, and Estate of Spry v. 
Greg & Ken, Inc., 749 N.E.2d 1269, 1274 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), with McGann, 
179 Ind. App. at 419, 385 N.E.2d at 1188, and GEICO Ins. Co. v. Rowell, 705 
N.E.2d 476, 481–82 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), and Ruth v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass’n, 492 N.E.2d 1105, 1108 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986). 
Here, the Medical Group and Dr. Sawyer are parties to both the joinder 
and the employment agreements, but the Hospital is not a party to the 
employment agreement. Dr. Sawyer argues that the Hospital nonetheless 
is a party to the employment agreement because the Hospital and the 
Medical Group are really one entity. Yet, his position has not been entirely 
consistent. 
                                                 
4 Certain traditional principles of state law—such as assumption, agency, veil piercing, alter 
ego, waiver, estoppel, third-party beneficiary, and incorporation by reference—may bind a 
nonparty to a contract. 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 400 (2016); Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 
556 U.S. 624, 631 (2009); Warciak v. Subway Rests. Inc., 880 F.3d 870, 872 (7th Cir. 2018). We 
address below the principle that Dr. Sawyer raised: incorporation by reference.  
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In one breath, Dr. Sawyer acknowledges that the Medical Group and 
the Hospital are separate entities. In his amended complaint, he identifies 
them as different defendants, observes that the Medical Group is a 
corporation while the Hospital is a limited liability company, seeks to 
recover his lost ownership interest from both the Medical Group and the 
Hospital, and explains that his employment relationship with the Medical 
Group differs from his ownership relationship with the Hospital.  
But in the next breath, he denies this separation as “simply a fiction.” 
He argues that St. Vincent Health is, in his words, the “mother ship” with 
a controlling ownership of both the Hospital and the Medical Group. He 
also reasons that the Hospital and the Medical Group retained the same 
counsel through trial. 
We disagree that the Hospital and the Medical Group are a single 
entity. As Dr. Sawyer has already acknowledged, the two parties have 
different business structures, are different defendants, and have different 
relationships with him. He has not tried to pierce the corporate veil, see 
Reed v. Reid, 980 N.E.2d 277, 301–02 (Ind. 2012), and sharing an attorney 
does not make the Hospital and the Medical Group one and the same, see 
Ind. Rules of Prof. Conduct Rule 1.7; Williams v. State, 724 N.E.2d 1070, 
1079 (Ind. 2000).  
Thus, the Hospital was not a party to the employment agreement. 
Cautious to not bind a nonparty to contract terms it did not assent to, we 
will not apply the contemporaneous document doctrine to construe the 
joinder and employment agreements together. 
b. The joinder agreement did not incorporate the entire 
employment agreement. 
Dr. Sawyer offers a second theory for reading “any termination” as 
limited by the employment agreement: since the joinder agreement 
references and is attached to the employment agreement, it incorporates 
the employment agreement’s terms. As explained below, the joinder 
agreement did not incorporate the entire employment agreement. Rather, 
it incorporates by reference only one provision of the employment 
agreement—Section 4.4(c)—which does not affect this case.  
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We interpret incorporated content as part of the agreement. I.C.C. 
Protective Coatings, Inc. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 695 N.E.2d 1030, 1036 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied. For incorporation to occur, the incorporating 
contract must include a clear and explicit expression of intent to be bound 
by the auxiliary content. See MPACT Const. Grp., LLC v. Superior Concrete 
Constructors, Inc., 802 N.E.2d 901, 907–09 (Ind. 2004); Norwood Promotional 
Prods., Inc. v. Roller, 867 N.E.2d 619, 625 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. 
Mere reference to another contract is not enough. See Bd. of Trs. of Purdue 
Univ. v. Eisenstein, 87 N.E.3d 481, 502–03 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. 
And simply attaching a document is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
incorporation. See Kleen Leen, Inc. v. Mylcraine, 174 Ind. App. 579, 583, 369 
N.E.2d 638, 640–41 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977) (construing document that was 
“attached to and incorporated by reference” as part of the contract 
(emphasis added)); accord Republic Bank v. Marine Nat. Band, 53 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 90, 92 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). 
We are also mindful that incorporation occurs in one direction: it pulls 
material into the incorporating contract. See MPACT, 802 N.E.2d at 909. 
While incorporation is unidirectional, it may be partial—incorporating 
some parts of a separate agreement while leaving others unincorporated. 
See I.C.C., 695 N.E.2d at 1036. And material referenced for a particular 
purpose is incorporated for that purpose only. Id. 
Here, the fact that the joinder agreement was attached as an exhibit to 
the employment agreement does not show that the joinder agreement 
incorporated the employment agreement. Indeed, it is the incorporating 
contract that must clearly and explicitly communicate the intent to 
incorporate the other writing. MPACT, 802 N.E.2d at 909. And although 
the terms of the joinder agreement reference the employment agreement 
multiple times, none of these references include an incorporation clause:  
WHEREAS, [the Medical Group] and [Dr. Sawyer] are parties 
to that certain Physician Employment Agreement of even date 
herewith (the “Agreement”); . . . 
WHEREAS . . . in the event that Physician’s employment 
referenced in the [Employment] Agreement is terminated for 
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any reason (other than a termination pursuant to Section 4.4(c) 
of the [Employment] Agreement). . . . 
Within ninety (90) days of any termination of employment 
between [Dr. Sawyer] and [the Medical Group] (other than a 
termination pursuant to Section 4.4(c) of the Agreement) . . .  
These references in the joinder agreement do three things. First, they 
recognize that Dr. Sawyer and the Medical Group are parties to the 
employment agreement. Second, they identify the employment that Dr. 
Sawyer’s ownership interest is conditioned on: his employment as a 
cardiologist for the Medical Group. And, finally, they specify that the one 
exception to “any termination” is defined by Section 4.4(c) of the 
employment agreement.5  
The references to Section 4.4(c), though, incorporate only that 
subsection of the employment agreement and only for the purpose of 
identifying the sole termination that does not trigger the mandatory 
redemption provision—a termination that the parties agree did not occur 
here. See I.C.C., 695 N.E.2d at 1036. In other words, no other portions of 
the employment agreement are incorporated by reference. The joinder 
agreement simply lacks the requisite expression of intent to incorporate 
the entire employment agreement. 
2. The plain meaning of “any termination” is any termination, 
regardless of the reason. 
Since the joinder agreement incorporated only an inapplicable section 
of the employment agreement, we cannot consider the employment 
agreement in determining the plain meaning of “any termination.” See 
AM Gen. LLC v. Armour, 46 N.E.3d 436, 440 (Ind. 2015). It is true that we 
determine the meaning of a contract by considering all of its provisions, 
not individual words, phrases, or paragraphs read alone. Evansville–
                                                 
5 Section 4.4(c) applies when the Medical Group eliminates, and another company purchases, 
the doctor’s practice unit and the doctor voluntarily ends his employment with the Medical 
Group. 
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Vanderburgh Sch. Corp. v. Moll, 264 Ind. 356, 363, 344 N.E.2d 831, 837 (1976). 
But when the contract terms are unambiguous, as they are here, we do not 
go beyond the four corners of the contract to investigate meaning. 
Performance Servs., Inc. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 85 N.E.3d 655, 660 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2017). In other words, we will not consider extrinsic evidence, even if that 
evidence is another agreement executed on the same day.  See, e.g., AM 
Gen. LLC, 46 N.E.3d at 440 (recognizing a redemption agreement executed 
on the same day as an employment agreement as extrinsic evidence for 
interpreting the disputed term in the employment agreement). 
Thus, looking only within the four corners of the joinder agreement, the 
plain meaning of “any termination” is any termination, for any reason. 
This includes a termination that breaches the employment agreement. For 
example, had Dr. Sawyer terminated his employment in a way that 
breached the employment agreement, the joinder agreement would still 
require redemption of his ownership interest. Likewise, when the Medical 
Group terminated his employment in breach of the employment 
agreement—as the jury found here—the Hospital is required to buy out 
Dr. Sawyer’s interest. 
Adding the terms of Dr. Sawyer’s reading—any termination under the 
employment agreement—would dramatically change the parties’ 
agreement. For the Hospital to determine whether the mandatory 
redemption was triggered, it would have to investigate whether the 
termination resulted from a breach of the employment agreement. If the 
parties had intended that result, they could have said so. See, e.g., Wright 
Motors, Inc. v. Marathon Oil Co., 631 N.E.2d 923, 925–26 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1994). They did not, and we will not add tacit terms into the parties’ 
express, agreed-upon ones. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 51 N.E.3d at 160.  
The Medical Group’s termination of Dr. Sawyer’s employment—
authorized by the employment agreement or not—thus triggered the 
joinder agreement’s mandatory redemption provision. The Hospital 
accordingly did not breach the agreement by discontinuing and paying 
out Dr. Sawyer’s ownership interest. The trial court erred in holding 
otherwise and denying the Hospital’s motion for partial dismissal on that 
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ground, and this legal error pervaded the court’s later rulings on the 
Hospital’s dispositive motions.  
Importantly, Dr. Sawyer is not without a remedy for the 
discontinuation of his ownership interest. He properly sought to recover 
the ten-year value of this ownership interest as damages for the Medical 
Group’s breach of the employment agreement, and he recovered from the 
Medical Group over $1.1 million. 
C. The Hospital breached the agreement by delaying payment to Dr. 
Sawyer, who is entitled to interest on the delay. 
The only remaining issue of breach is the Hospital’s delay in paying out 
Dr. Sawyer’s interest.  
The parties do not dispute that that the redemption amount was 
properly calculated; that the joinder agreement required redemption 
“[w]ithin ninety (90) days of any termination of employment”; or that the 
Hospital delivered Dr. Sawyer his redemption check nearly five months 
after the 90-day deadline. They thus agree that the delay was a breach, 
though Dr. Sawyer also acknowledges that he presented no evidence of 
the amount owed for that delay. The Hospital, on the other hand, asserted 
in its motion to correct error that Dr. Sawyer is entitled to statutory 
interest on the delay. We agree. 
To receive a prejudgment interest award, a party needs to show only 
that the obligor breached the contract by failing to pay the appropriate 
amount by a particular time. Thor Electric, Inc. v. Oberle & Assocs., Inc., 741 
N.E.2d 373, 380 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), disapproved on other grounds by Inman 
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 981 N.E.2d 1202, 1205 (Ind. 2012); see also 
Kosarko v. Padula, 979 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2012). An award of 
prejudgment interest in a contract action is appropriate purely as a matter 
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of law when the breach did not arise from tortious conduct,6 the amount 
of the claim rests on a simple calculation, and the trier of fact does not 
need to exercise its judgment to assess the amount of damages. Inman, at 
1204 & n.2; INS Investigations Bureau, Inc. v. Lee, 784 N.E.2d 566, 578 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. Where parties have not agreed on an interest 
rate, Indiana Code section 24-4.6-1-102 (2017) supplies a rate of eight 
percent. See also Ind. Code §§ 24-4.6-1-101, -103(b).  
Here, the Hospital undisputedly should have paid Dr. Sawyer his 
$196,787 redemption amount five months earlier. At the statutory rate of 
eight percent, Dr. Sawyer is entitled to $6,559.60.  
II. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Dr. Sawyer 
$27,233.19 in attorney fees and costs. 
Dr. Sawyer argues that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding 
him discovery sanctions of only $27,233.19 in attorney fees and expenses. 
He gives two reasons: that the court did not hold a hearing on the sanction 
award amount as required by Trial Rule 37(A), and that he is entitled to 
more than $27,233.19 for discovery abuses. We conclude that any error in 
not holding a hearing was harmless, and the $27,233.19 award was within 
the court’s discretion. 
 Trial courts “stand much closer than an appellate court to the currents 
of litigation pending before them,” so they are better positioned to assess 
and manage discovery matters. Whitaker v. Becker, 960 N.E.2d 111, 115 
(Ind. 2012). They accordingly have “wide discretionary latitude,” Vanway 
v. State, 541 N.E.2d 523, 527 (Ind. 1989), and their orders carry “a strong 
presumption of correctness,” Gonzalez v. Evans, 15 N.E.3d 628, 633 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2014), trans. denied; see McCullough, 605 N.E.2d at 180. We will not 
                                                 
6 As we recognized in Inman, an award of prejudgment interest under the Tort Prejudgment 
Interest Statute (TPIS), Ind. Code §§ 34-51-4-1 to -9 (2017), is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
Inman, 981 N.E.2d at 1204. But the TPIS “applies to any civil action arising out of tortious 
conduct,” id. (emphasis omitted), and no party suggests that any breach of contract here was 
tortious. See INS Investigations Bureau, Inc. v. Lee, 784 N.E.2d 566, 577–78 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), 
trans. denied. 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 49S05-1710-PL-671 | March 23, 2018 
Page 16 of 18 
overturn a decision absent clear error and resulting prejudice. See Ind. 
Trial Rule 61; Vanway, 541 N.E.2d at 527.  
Here, discovery disputes hampered every stage of this protracted 
litigation, and the trial court sanctioned Dr. Sawyer and the defendants 
along the way. One of the trial court’s discovery orders granted Dr. 
Sawyer’s motion to compel and awarded expenses for pursuing the order. 
As litigation progressed, Dr. Sawyer moved for a contempt hearing on the 
defendants’ failure to comply with the order compelling discovery. After 
consolidating several pending motions, the trial court granted Dr. 
Sawyer’s motion for the contempt hearing. Following a hearing, the court 
issued an order indicating that “[a]ny expenses, fees, or costs shall be 
determined when submitted by Plaintiff,” as discussed during the 
hearing. 
Dr. Sawyer’s fee petition asked for $450,000. The defendants responded 
that $27,233.19 of his requested fees were appropriate, but the other 
expenses fell outside the court’s order and expenses permitted by Indiana 
Trial Rule 37. For example, Dr. Sawyer’s petition included expenses for a 
separate qui tam lawsuit, a motion for default judgment that was denied, 
summary judgment filings, and a consumer complaint against another 
doctor. Dr. Sawyer replied that he should be compensated $445,500 for the 
defendants’ “pervasive and systematic” delays in discovery “[d]uring the 
entire pendency of the case.” But the trial court agreed with the 
defendants’ assessment of Dr. Sawyer’s submitted expenses. 
Dr. Sawyer first claims that the trial court did not comply with Indiana 
Trial Rule 37(A), which requires the court, after granting a motion to 
compel discovery, to provide an opportunity for a hearing before 
awarding reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order. However, 
even if the court here failed to comply with that requirement, Dr. Sawyer 
has not shown prejudice—that the lack of a hearing affected the sanction 
amount. 
Dr. Sawyer gave the trial court a detailed fee request, including over 
fifty pages of spreadsheets itemizing and describing the expenses he 
sought to recover. The defendants then submitted a response, categorizing 
Dr. Sawyer’s submitted fees and explaining why many of them fell 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 49S05-1710-PL-671 | March 23, 2018 
Page 17 of 18 
outside of the court’s discovery order. Dr. Sawyer replied, contesting the 
defendants’ categorizations. Neither in his petition nor in his reply did Dr. 
Sawyer request another hearing. And at oral argument, when asked what 
information a hearing would have revealed that the record did not 
already supply, Dr. Sawyer’s counsel responded only that he would have 
pointed out how the defendants’ categorizations misalign with the court’s 
order. This explanation, however, was included in Dr. Sawyer’s reply. He 
thus has failed to show that the award would have been different had 
there been a hearing. 
Dr. Sawyer next argues that the awarded amount is erroneously low. 
Again, this argument is without merit. The court had in the parties’ filings 
a detailed account of the disputed fees, with reasons why those fees fell 
within or outside the scope of the court’s orders and Rule 37. Given the 
compounded discovery issues of this protracted litigation, the detailed 
analysis of expenses presented to the trial court, and Dr. Sawyer’s requests 
for expenses unrelated to discovery abuses, we find that Dr. Sawyer has 
not overcome the strong presumption of correctness in the court’s award. 
We thus find no abuse of discretion and affirm the court’s $27,233.19 
sanction award. 
Conclusion 
We defend the freedom of contract by enforcing parties’ agreed terms. 
Giving effect to the plain language of the parties’ agreement here, we 
reverse the $470,000 judgment against the Hospital and remand for entry 
of judgment in the amount of $6,559.60 against the Hospital.  
We also find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s award of attorney 
fees and expenses.  
We therefore reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand to the trial 
court to enter judgment against the Hospital in the corrected amount. 
David, Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur. 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 49S05-1710-PL-671 | March 23, 2018 
Page 18 of 18 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE 
John R. Maley 
Peter J. Rusthoven 
Leah L. Seigel 
Barnes & Thornburg LLP 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER ST. VINCENT MEDICAL GROUP, INC. 
David B. Honig 
Andrew B. Howk 
Hall, Render, Killian, Heath & Lyman, P.C. 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT 
Kevin W. Betz 
Sandra L. Blevins 
Benjamin C. Ellis 
Betz + Blevins 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
ATTORNEYS FOR AMICUS CURIAE INDIANA LEGAL FOUNDATION INC. 
Julia Blackwell Gelinas 
Maggie L. Smith 
Frost Brown Todd LLC 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
ATTORNEYS FOR AMICUS CURIAE DEFENSE TRIAL COUNSEL OF 
INDIANA 
Philip E. Kalamaros 
Hunt Suedhoff Kalamaros LLP 
Saint Joseph, Michigan 
Lucy R. Dollens 
Quarles & Brady LLP 
Indianapolis, Indiana