Title: Moor v. Licciardello
Citation: 463 A.2d 268
Docket Number: N/A
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: July 1, 1983

463 A.2d 268 (1983)
Robert C. MOOR, Jr. and Moor-Law, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Defendants, Appellants,
v.
Benito J. LICCIARDELLO, Plaintiff, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Delaware.
Submitted: April 18, 1983.
Decided: July 1, 1983.
Robert Jacobs (argued), Jacobs &amp; Crumpler, P.A., Wilmington, for defendants, appellants.
James S. Green (argued), Connolly, Bove &amp; Lodge, Wilmington, for plaintiff, appellee.
Before HERRMANN, Chief Justice, McNEILLY and CHRISTIE, Justices.
*269 CHRISTIE, Justice:
This is an appeal from various rulings made in Superior Court in which there was a jury verdict for $16,000.00 for appellee Benito Licciardello. Mr. Licciardello sued appellants, Robert C. Moor, Jr., an individual, and Moor-Law, Inc., a Delaware corporation, in Superior Court, for damages resulting from a gunshot wound to his leg. The wound was inflicted by Mr. Moor, president and sole shareholder of Moor-Law, Inc., on the premises of the Triple Nickel Saloon, a business owned by the corporation. The verdict was rendered against both appellants.
The record reveals that Mr. Licciardello came to the Triple Nickel Saloon after closing hours to set up the instruments for his band, which was to perform at the bar the next evening. After completing that task, he began drinking and gambling with Mr. Moor and several other persons who remained on the premises in the early morning hours. Mr. Moor and one of his employees got into what was an initially playful scuffle with Mr. Licciardello. Mr. Moor then broke free and retreated to a distance of between 15 and 25 feet. At that point, he pulled out a gun and shot the unarmed Mr. Licciardello.
After Mr. Moor presented witnesses who said that Mr. Licciardello had a reputation for violence, he personally testified that he had been in fear of great bodily harm from an advancing and threatening Mr. Licciardello when he fired the shot. Mr. Licciardello, on the other hand, testified that Mr. Moor instigated the scuffle by urging one of his employees to assault Mr. Licciardello, and that, at the time of the shot, he, the victim of the shooting, was turning away from Mr. Moor.
We will address only three of the appellants' arguments on appeal: the contentions that (1) the corporation cannot properly be held liable for Mr. Moor's actions; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to put certain voir dire questions to the jury, and (3) the trial court erred in its instructions as to self-defense. Additional arguments which have been made by the appellants will not be discussed since the resolution of one of the foregoing contentions renders moot those remaining issues.
It is first urged that the corporate defendant was improperly held liable for the act of the individual defendant, Robert C. Moor, Jr.
The record reveals, however, that Mr. Licciardello had come to the saloon as a member of a musical group which was under *270 contract to perform in the saloon the following day. The trial judge made a detailed analysis of the facts in the letter opinion and concluded:
See Licciardello v. Moor; Del.Super., C.A. No. 79C-MR-108 (Taylor, J., Dec. 8, 1980).
Based on the above analysis and additional observations not repeated here, the trial judge denied the defendants' motions for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial. He was clearly right since the verdict was supported by the evidence, and there was no error of law on the corporate liability issue. Storey v. Camper, Del. Supr., 401 A.2d 458 (1979); Malcolm v. Little, Del.Supr., 295 A.2d 711, 712 (1972).
Appellants contend that the trial court erred when it refused to put questions to prospective jurors on voir dire as to whether the jurors are opposed to "ownership of handguns by the general public" or to the "use of a handgun in self-defense regardless of the danger the person who uses the handgun is in". The trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he declined to put such questions. See Superior Court Civil Rule 47(a); Chavin v. Cope, Del.Supr., 243 A.2d 694, 696 (1968).
Finally, appellants contend that the trial court erred in its instruction as to Mr. Moor's right to act in self-defense. The defendants had requested a charge which stressed the subjectivity of the self-defense test, similar to that now in use by Delaware courts in criminal cases. The charge given was as follows:
The rule followed in a majority of the states and formerly followed in Delaware as to a claim of self-defense stresses an evaluation of a defendant's conduct from the standpoint of a reasonable man. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Little, Del.Super., 54 A. 742 (1903); Prosser, Law of Torts § 19 (4th ed. 1978); Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 65, 70 (1965); 6 Am.Jur.2d Assault and Battery §§ 158-166 (1963). This was the approach in Delaware until 1973. In that year, the General Assembly effected a change in the rule in regard to the justification defense in criminal prosecutions. Under the revised statute, 11 Del.C. § 464, a *271 person's conduct in self-defense must be analyzed from the standpoint of his subjective belief. See Coleman v. State, Del. Supr., 320 A.2d 740 (1974).
The provisions of the revised statute, 11 Del.C. § 464, state as follows:
The provisions of 11 Del.C. § 470(d), the definition section relating to the defense of justification, include this statement: "[p]urposely firing a firearm in the direction of another person ... constitutes deadly force...." An appraisal from the reasonable man standpoint is retained only as a factor in evaluating the credibility of the defendant's belief. See 11 Del.C. § 307(a).[1]See also Delaware Criminal Code with Commentary § 307(a) at 67 (1973) and Coleman v. State, 320 A.2d  at 743. The legislature also removed from the law the rule that one must retreat before using deadly force if the assault occurs in the defendant's place of work, 11 Del.C. § 464(e)(2)b.
In the Delaware Criminal Code with Commentary at 117-18, the changes that this statute made were recognized and discussed:
The substance of a claim of self-defense is the same in both criminal and civil litigation; only the burden of proof differs. See Holmes v. Holmes, Tex.Civ.App., 588 S.W.2d 674, 675 (1979). Since the legislature has enacted a change in the law in regard to self-defense as it may come up in criminal proceedings, a corresponding change was effected in regard to civil claims where self-defense is a factor.[2] We find that the subjective test as defined in 11 Del.C. § 464 must now be applied to any claim of self-defense.
The charge in this case was incomplete as it failed to set forth the subjective standard by which the jury should have been told to evaluate the defendant's action. The charge also was erroneous in that it failed to indicate that under some circumstances one may not have a duty to retreat if he is attacked in his place of business. We cannot say that these errors were harmless and, therefore, we must REVERSE the decision of the Superior Court and REMAND this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
[1]  Del.C. § 307. Jury inference of defendant's intention, recklessness, knowledge or belief.
(a) The defendant's intention, recklessness, knowledge or belief at the time of the offense for which he is charged may be inferred by the jury from the circumstances surrounding the act he is alleged to have done. In making the inference permitted by this section, the jury may consider whether a reasonable man in the defendant's circumstances at the time of the offense would have had or lacked the requisite intention, recklessness, knowledge or belief.
[2]  In 11 Del.C. § 466(d) regarding use of force for the protection of property, the legislature went further than applying the same test to civil cases, and provided that "[w]here a person has used force for the protection of property and has not been convicted for any crime or offense connected with the use of force, such person shall not be liable for damages or be otherwise civilly liable to the one against whom such force be used."