Title: Baker v. Hayden
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 117989
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: July 2, 2021

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 117,989 
 
LINUS BAKER, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
CALVIN HAYDEN, et al., 
Defendants, 
 
and 
 
LAURA BREWER, in Her Capacity as Official Custodian of Records 
for the Tenth Judicial District, 
Appellee. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
 
1. 
While standing is a requirement for a case or controversy, i.e., justiciability, it is 
also a component of subject matter jurisdiction that may be raised at any time.  
 
2. 
Courts have the duty to determine whether they have subject matter jurisdiction. 
And the parties cannot vest a court with jurisdiction by agreement, failing to object, or 
waiver.  
 
3.  
Standing can be raised for the first time on appeal. And a court can generally 
determine the issue when it arises during an appeal related to a motion to dismiss, 
because it presents a question of law.  
2 
 
 
 
 
4. 
When a question of standing is raised, the party asserting the claim has the burden 
to establish standing requirements.  
 
5. 
 
A plaintiff making a claim under the Kansas Open Records Act (KORA), K.S.A. 
45-215 et seq., must establish both (1) any statutory standing requirements imposed by 
KORA and (2) the traditional requirements of standing.  
 
5. 
 
A party can have standing as a lawsuit begins but lose it before the case is resolved 
if circumstances change.  
 
6. 
To establish traditional standing, a plaintiff must establish a personal interest in a 
court's decision and that he or she personally suffers some actual or threatened injury 
because of the challenged conduct. The injury must be particularized, meaning it must 
affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way. 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in 55 Kan. App. 2d 473, 419 P.3d 31 (2018). 
Appeal from Johnson District Court; ROBERT W. FAIRCHILD, judge. Opinion filed July 2, 2021. Appeal 
dismissed. 
 
Linus L. Baker, appellant, argued the cause, and was on the briefs, pro se.  
 
Joseph R. Colantuono, of Colantuono Bjerg Guinn Keppler LLC, of Overland Park, argued the 
cause, and Richard G. Guinn and Isaac Keppler, of the same firm, Stephen Phillips, assistant attorney 
general, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with him on the briefs for appellee Laura Brewer. 
3 
 
 
 
 
Stephen Douglas Bonney, of ACLU Foundation of Kansas, of Overland Park, and Nolan Wright, 
legal intern, of the same foundation, were on the brief for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union 
Foundation of Kansas. 
 
PER CURIAM:  The parties ask us to answer whether the Kansas Open Records Act 
(KORA), K.S.A. 45-215 et seq., requires a Kansas district court to make audio records of 
open court proceedings available for public inspection. But we cannot reach this question 
because we conclude Linus Baker lost a stake in resolving that question at a point after he 
filed his petition in this case and thus lost standing. Standing is a component of appellate 
courts' jurisdiction. When a party loses standing, courts lose jurisdiction. And without 
jurisdiction, we must dismiss the appeal.  
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Baker, an attorney, made a written request to listen to and copy digital audio 
recordings made during two public court hearings conducted in the Tenth Judicial 
District's Johnson County District Court. Those hearings occurred in a protection from 
abuse case involving Baker's adult daughter. Baker was neither a party in the case nor 
counsel for any party. He made his request to the then-court administrator for the Tenth 
Judicial District, Katherine Stocks. The court administrator is the district's designated 
official custodian of public records. See K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 45-217(e) ("'Official 
custodian' means any officer or employee of a public agency who is responsible for the 
maintenance of public records, regardless of whether such records are in the officer's or 
employee's actual personal custody and control."). While the appeal was pending before 
this court, Laura Brewer became the court administrator for the Tenth Judicial District 
and has been substituted in her official capacity as the named party. We will thus refer 
generally to the "records custodian."  
 
4 
 
 
 
The records custodian told Baker the recordings were all exempt from disclosure 
under KORA. The records custodian suggested he could pay the official court reporter to 
transcribe them. When Baker insisted on listening to the recordings himself, then-Chief 
Judge Kevin P. Moriarty interceded and again denied the request. Baker persisted and 
was consistently denied access. Each time, he was told he could purchase written 
transcripts from the court reporter at his expense. 
 
The backstory to this involves an incident when Johnson County Sheriff's 
Department officials went to Baker's residence to serve Baker's adult daughter with a 
temporary order issued by the Wyandotte County District Court. The officials mistakenly 
assumed Baker's three-year-old granddaughter was a child referenced in the court order 
and physically restrained her.   
 
Baker filed a pro se lawsuit over that incident and other matters. He named various 
Johnson County officials as defendants alleging federal and state law violations. Baker 
also named the records custodian as a defendant in an official capacity as records 
custodian for the Tenth Judicial District. He alleged the records custodian refusal to 
permit inspection of audio recordings of open court hearings violated KORA, as well as 
his common-law and constitutional rights to access judicial records. 
 
Baker sought declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory damages, attorney 
fees, and costs. Relevant to this appeal, he alleged:  (1) The Tenth Judicial District is a 
public agency subject to KORA; (2) the requested audio recordings were public records 
under KORA; (3) the Tenth Judicial District has a routine of electronically recording 
court hearings and storing the recordings in its network computer server; (4) the Tenth 
Judicial District has a "de facto unwritten policy or rule" to deny the public access to 
those recordings; (5) this unwritten policy or rule violates KORA; and (6) the specific 
5 
 
 
 
audio recordings he sought were not closed by statute, sealed by court order, or otherwise 
confidential under Kansas law. In his request for relief, he sought in part: 
 
"[A] declaratory judgment, injunction, and any other appropriate order issue declaring 
that the audio recordings made by district court judges of proceedings open to the public 
are public records not subject to exemption under KORA, an order requiring [the records 
custodian] to make all audio recordings of hearings that are open to the public which are 
requested as an Open Records request to be made available to the requestor with the 
ability of the requestor to make a digital copy of the audio recording by listening to the 
recording." 
 
During litigation discovery, the records custodian's then-counsel from the Kansas 
Attorney General's Office gave Baker the two audio recordings that sparked Baker's 
KORA claim. In doing so, the Attorney General's Office explained:  "These [recordings] 
are provided as a response to your discovery request only, and not as an admission to the 
allegations and claims in your petition." (Emphasis added.)  
 
The records custodian moved to dismiss Baker's claims, arguing KORA exempts 
"in most instances" audio recordings of court hearings made, maintained, or kept in the 
Tenth Judicial District's computer network. The records custodian mostly relied on 
K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 45-219(a) (providing public agency need not provide copies of 
recordings except under specified circumstances); K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 45-221(a)(1) 
(public agency not required to provide inspection of record that is "specifically prohibited 
or restricted by . . . rule of the Kansas supreme court"); and Supreme Court Rule 362 
(2020 Kan. S. Ct. R. 422) (providing that "[w]ritten transcripts of electronic recordings 
shall be prepared by court personnel").  
 
The district court dismissed Baker's claims against the records custodian. The 
court held audio recordings of open court proceedings made, maintained, or kept by the 
6 
 
 
 
Tenth Judicial District were exempt from disclosure under both Rule 362 and K.S.A. 
2020 Supp. 45-219(a). It also ruled Baker's demand to inspect the recordings was moot 
because counsel produced them during discovery. Finally, it ruled Baker had no 
constitutional or common-law right to the recordings—issues not preserved for our 
review. The district court also denied attorney fees and costs and then certified its rulings 
as a final judgment under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-254(b). 
 
Baker appealed. Among his many arguments, he contended his claims were not 
moot because the legal issue about public access to recordings remained and was capable 
of repetition. He filed a motion for transfer to this court, which we denied. 
 
A Court of Appeals panel considered the parties' arguments and reversed the 
district court. See Baker v. Hayden, 55 Kan. App. 2d 473, 419 P.3d 31 (2018). As a 
threshold matter, the panel rejected the district court's mootness ruling. It held the issue 
was capable of repetition and was of public importance. It noted that the records 
custodian "continues to advance the argument that Baker was not entitled to the 
recordings under the KORA." 55 Kan. App. 2d at 477. The panel next held that neither 
Rule 362 nor K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 45-219(a) exempted audio recordings of open court 
proceedings made, maintained, or kept by a judicial district from mandatory disclosure 
under KORA. 55 Kan. App. 2d at 484-85. It then denied Baker's request for attorney fees. 
Finally, the panel found it "unnecessary" to remand the case to the district court because 
Baker received the two recordings during discovery. 55 Kan. App. 2d at 485-86. 
 
An exceptional flurry of activity followed the Court of Appeals' decision. The 
records custodian filed a motion for leave to file an out-of-time motion for rehearing with 
the panel. The records custodian explained the Attorney General's Office had allowed the 
deadline to lapse and had refused to file a petition for review with this court. The records 
custodian argued "substantial issues" had not been addressed, including Sixth 
7 
 
 
 
Amendment violations that would occur if privileged attorney-client conversations 
captured by the courtroom recordings were made public. The records custodian included 
declarations from court reporters in the Third, Tenth, and Twenty-Third Judicial Districts 
stating attorney-client conversations sometimes can be heard on these recordings. The 
Court of Appeals denied the motion for leave to file the out-of-time motion for rehearing. 
The Attorney General's Office withdrew as the records custodian's counsel and other 
attorneys entered appearances.  
 
The records custodian petitioned this court for review, arguing the Court of 
Appeals' decision:  (1) violates Rule 362; (2) contradicts K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 45-219(a); 
(3) violates Supreme Court Rule 1001(e)(4) (2020 Kan. S. Ct. R. 615) dealing with media 
access to open court proceedings; (4) violates criminal defendants' Sixth Amendment 
rights when the recordings include attorney-client conversations; and (5) improperly 
circumvents the Supreme Court's rules about payment to court reporters for transcripts. 
Conspicuously, the records custodian did not seek review of the panel's ruling that 
exceptions to the mootness doctrine allowed consideration of the issues. 55 Kan. App. 2d 
at 477. Baker did not cross-petition. We granted review but limited the issues to the 
records custodian's first two arguments. See Supreme Court Rule 8.03(b)(6)(C)(i) (2020 
Kan. S. Ct. R. 52). 
 
As oral arguments approached, we asked the parties to prepare to discuss the basis 
for this court's jurisdiction. After arguments, we ordered briefing on whether Baker still 
had standing to pursue relief once he received the two recordings he had sought. In 
response, both Baker and the records custodian argued the legal dispute between them 
continues.  
 
8 
 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
Our analysis begins with the questions we asked the parties to address:  Does this 
court have jurisdiction and has Baker lost standing? These questions arise because Baker 
now possesses the recordings he sought. This change in circumstances raises the 
possibility that Baker lost standing and, when he did, courts lost jurisdiction over his 
lawsuit.  
 
A discussion of jurisdiction starts with Article 3, § 1 of the Kansas Constitution, 
which grants the "judicial power" of the state to the courts. The "judicial power" is the 
"power to hear, consider and determine controversies between rival litigants." State, 
ex rel. Brewster v. Mohler, 98 Kan. 465, 471, 158 P. 408 (1916), aff'd 248 U.S. 112, 39 S. 
Ct. 32, 63 L. Ed. 153 (1918). Having an actual controversy is key; an abstract controversy 
does not meet the constitutional standard because courts do not give advisory opinions. 
See State ex rel. Morrison v. Sebelius, 285 Kan. 875, 896-98, 179 P.3d 366 (2008).  
 
To test whether an actual controversy exists, courts examine four factors. First, the 
party must have standing. This means the party must have a personal stake in the 
outcome. A personal stake arises because the party has a right to make a legal claim or 
seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right. Second, the court asks if the issue to be 
resolved is moot. Third, the issue must be ripe, having taken fixed and final shape rather 
than remaining nebulous and contingent. Fourth and finally, the court considers whether 
the issue presents a political question. See Board of Miami County Comm'rs v. Kanza 
Rail-Trails Conservancy, Inc., 292 Kan. 285, 324, 255 P.3d 1186 (2011) (discussing and 
defining standing); Sebelius, 285 Kan. at 896 (listing four requirements).  
 
The ripeness and political question requirements are not in question here. But the 
other two factors—standing and mootness—are. The Court of Appeals panel considered 
9 
 
 
 
whether Baker's possession of the recordings mooted the appeal. It concluded it did not 
because his request for a declaratory judgment or injunction arose from an issue capable 
of repetition and of public importance. Baker, 55 Kan. App. 2d at 477. But the panel did 
not consider standing.  
 
"While standing is a requirement for a case-or-controversy, i.e., justiciability, it is 
also a component of subject matter jurisdiction that may be raised at any time." Gannon 
v. State, 298 Kan. 1107, 1122, 319 P.3d 1196 (2014). "'One of the first and continuing 
duties of a court is to determine whether the court has'" subject matter jurisdiction, and "it 
is the duty of a court to raise and determine such jurisdictional question even if the parties 
fail to do so." Lira v. Billings, 196 Kan. 726, 729, 414 P.2d 13 (1966). And the parties 
cannot vest an appellate court with jurisdiction by agreement, failing to object, or waiver. 
See Labette Community College v. Board of County Commissioners, 258 Kan. 622, 626, 
907 P.2d 127 (1995). 
 
Because standing is jurisdictional, it can even be raised for the first time on appeal. 
Mid-Continent Specialists, Inc. v. Capital Homes, L.C., 279 Kan. 178, 186, 106 P.3d 483 
(2005). And an appellate court can generally determine the issue, especially when the 
issue arises during an appeal related to a motion to dismiss, because it presents a question 
of law. See Gannon, 298 Kan. at 1122-23 (discussing burden at various stages of 
proceeding); Sierra Club v. Moser, 298 Kan. 22, 29, 310 P.3d 360 (2013) (stating that 
standing presents question of law).  
 
When a question of standing is raised, the party asserting the claim—here, 
Baker—has the burden to establish standing requirements. Gannon, 298 Kan. at 1123. In 
bringing a KORA claim, Baker must establish both (1) any statutory standing 
requirements imposed by KORA and (2) the traditional requirements of standing. Sierra 
Club, 298 Kan. at 29; Friends of Bethany Place v. City of Topeka, 297 Kan. 1112, 
10 
 
 
 
Syl. ¶ 2, 307 P.3d 1255 (2013); see also Hunter Health Clinic v. WSU, 52 Kan. App. 2d 
1, Syl. ¶ 3, 362 P.3d 10 (2015) (to establish standing under KORA, a party must satisfy 
both statutory and traditional standing requirements).   
 
Baker's statutory standing is obvious. KORA broadly specifies that any person can 
seek access to public records, and he or she does not have to explain a purpose for 
making the request. K.S.A. 45-218(a) ("All public records shall be open for inspection by 
any person, except as otherwise provided by this act, and suitable facilities shall be made 
available by each public agency for this purpose."); State ex rel. Stephan v. Harder, 230 
Kan. 573, 585, 641 P.2d 366 (1982) ("The Kansas act places no burden on the public to 
show a need to inspect, and requires no particular motives or reasons for inspection."). 
So, under KORA's command, public records must be accessible for inspection by any 
member of the public, even if the inspection request is motivated by mere curiosity, 
unless the public agency can invoke an explicit exception.   
 
KORA confers jurisdiction "to enforce the purposes of this act with respect to such 
records, by injunction, mandamus, declaratory judgment or other appropriate order, in an 
action brought by any person, the attorney general or a county or district attorney." 
(Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 45-222(a). And our Legislature has declared 
KORA's provisions "shall be liberally construed and applied to promote [its] policy." 
K.S.A. 45-216(a). Baker's lawsuit is designed to promote the policy of open records. 
K.S.A. 45-216(a) ("It is declared to be the public policy of the state that public records 
shall be open for inspection by any person unless otherwise provided by this act."); cf. 
Hunter Health Clinic, 52 Kan. App. 2d at 9 (noting that KORA places the broad term 
"any person" in a specific context—a person seeking to enforce its purposes; holding 
there is no statutory standing to advocate blocking an agency from releasing records 
claimed to be private). Baker has statutory standing. 
 
11 
 
 
 
Where Baker runs into difficulty is in convincing us he meets traditional standing 
requirements now that he has the recordings. Under those requirements, he must establish 
"a personal interest in a court's decision and that he . . . personally suffers some actual or 
threatened injury as a result of the challenged conduct." Sierra Club, 298 Kan. at 33. The 
injury must be particularized in that it must affect the plaintiff in a "'personal and 
individual way.'" 298 Kan. at 35 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 
560 n.1, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351 [1992]). 
 
When Baker filed this lawsuit, these requirements were satisfied. He suffered a 
cognizable injury:  He requested access to specific audio recordings of court hearings and 
the court denied it. See San Juan Agric. Water Users Ass'n v. KNME-TV, 150 N.M. 64, 
257 P.3d 884, 893-94 (2011) (under New Mexico law all persons may inspect public 
records; when a person requests records and whose request is wrongfully denied, that 
person suffers a cognizable injury in fact and that injury is caused by the public entity's 
failure to provide the records). Moreover, the records custodian's challenged conduct—
denying access to the recordings—was the direct cause of Baker's injury. 
 
But the facts supporting the basis for standing can change as litigation progresses. 
And because of changed circumstances, a party can have standing as a lawsuit begins but 
lose it before the case is resolved. See Ternes v. Galichia, 297 Kan. 918, 921-22, 305 
P.3d 617 (2013) ("party must have an ongoing interest in the dispute sufficient to 
establish concrete adverseness"); Board of County Commissioners v. Bremby, 286 Kan. 
745, 764, 189 P.3d 494 (2008) (petitioner with life estate alleged sufficient facts to 
establish standing, but district court on remand should determine whether petitioner still 
had justiciable interest if petitioner had in fact died and estate no longer held interest in 
property). The question we confront is whether the fact Baker received the recordings left 
him without a stake in the request for relief—that is, now that he has the recordings he 
12 
 
 
 
sought does he "suffer[] some actual or threatened injury as a result of the challenged 
conduct." Sierra Club, 298 Kan. at 33.  
 
To make this assessment, we must examine the injuries and remedies Baker has 
preserved at the appellate stage of the proceeding. Before the Court of Appeals, he 
continued to seek attorney fees and, because of the de facto and ongoing policy, either a 
declaratory judgment or an injunction. When this suit began, there was little question he 
had standing. Even after he received the recordings, he asserted he was entitled to 
attorney fees, which under this court's precedent potentially placed the legal question 
about KORA's application at issue. Willis v. Kansas Highway Patrol, 273 Kan. 123, 41 
P.3d 824 (2002), a case the dissent cites but no party argued, establishes how such a 
claim may serve as the basis for standing to have an appellate court review both the fee 
claim and the claim for prospective relief in the form of a declaratory judgment or an 
injunction.  
 
But Baker did not base his mootness argument before the Court of Appeals on his 
attorney fee claim. Nor did he argue to us that he had standing because of that claim. 
Perhaps that is because courts often conclude that pro se attorneys cannot recover 
attorney fees. See Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 435-38, 111 S. Ct. 1435, 113 L. Ed. 2d 
486 (1991) (pro se lawyer is not entitled to attorney fees in actions under 42 U.S.C. § 
1988). This rule has been extended to claims under the federal Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, and other fee-shifting statutes. See, e.g., Pietrangelo v. U.S. 
Army, 568 F.3d 341, 344 (2d Cir. 2009); Burka v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human 
Servs., 142 F.3d 1286, 1288-90 (D.C. Cir.1998); Ray v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 87 F.3d 
1250, 1251 (11th Cir. 1996). Kansas appellate courts have recognized, but not resolved, 
the question. See, e.g., In re Protest of Barker, 54 Kan. App. 2d 364, 375, 398 P.3d 870 
(2017) (declining to address whether attorney acting pro se could in Board of Tax 
Appeals proceedings). 
13 
 
 
 
 
The Court of Appeals alluded to the potential question as it began a substantive 
analysis of the merits of Baker's claim for attorney fee issue but did not address it or the 
question of standing. See Baker, 55 Kan. App. 2d at 485 ("Overlooking the fact that 
Baker has appeared pro se during all relevant proceedings below and continues to do so 
on appeal . . . " and then setting out legal standard). This unanswered question looms 
large if, as the dissent suggests, it is to be a hook for establishing standing.  
 
We need not resolve it today, however, because it was not raised by Baker. Again, 
Baker has the burden to establish standing requirements. Gannon, 298 Kan. at 1123. And 
he has made no attempt, either before us or the Court of Appeals, to meet that burden by 
relying on his attorney fee claim.  
 
Instead, Baker, in response to this court's request for additional briefing on 
standing and mootness, contends he can continue to seek a declaratory judgment or 
injunction because the Tenth Judicial District maintains its position that recordings of 
court proceedings are not subject to disclosure under KORA. He argues he and others 
could be subject to future infringements of their rights. For support Baker cites decisions 
like Hajro v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 811 F.3d 1086, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 
2016), in which federal courts have recognized two types of claims:  "[A] specific FOIA 
request claim and a pattern or practice claim." Baker points out that, even though receipt 
of the sought-after public records can moot a specific claim, the party may still be able to 
argue a pattern and practice claim by invoking the mootness exception that the issue is 
capable of repetition.  
 
But Baker ignores that these cases generally examine standing even after 
determining a pattern and practice claim is not moot or is subject to a mootness 
exception. The federal cases considering an exception to mootness—that is, cases 
14 
 
 
 
recognizing that mootness is subject to limited prudential considerations—build standing 
into the test of whether the exception applies. Walsh v. U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 
400 F.3d 535, 537 (7th Cir. 2005) (rejecting application of the capable-of-repetition-yet-
evading-review exception to FOIA claim because plaintiff failed to establish he would 
"request additional documents and that the VA will again fail to produce them in a timely 
manner"); OSHA Data/CIH, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 220 F.3d 153, 168 (3d Cir. 2000) 
("OSHA Data has the burden of meeting both parts of the following test: '[1] the 
challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or 
expiration, and [2] there was a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party 
would be subjected to the same action again.'"). In other words, in federal pattern and 
practice cases there is some overlap between the mootness exception and the element of 
standing that considers the likelihood of future harm by the policy or practice at issue. 
Hajro illustrates.  
 
The Hajro appeal involved two claimants. One, an attorney, brought a pattern and 
practice FOIA claim asserting that he regularly sought his client's alien registration files 
and the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services routinely failed to provide 
the record within the time required under the statute. The second claimant was a lawful 
permanent resident whose naturalization application was denied. He sought his 
registration file, the agency did not timely respond, and he filed a lawsuit in which he 
made a specific FOIA claim and a pattern and practice claim. He argued he was entitled 
to a prospective remedy to prevent any potential future harm that could result from the 
agency failing to meet the statutory time requirements if he asked for his file as he 
pursued citizenship. But, while the suit was pending, he became a lawful citizen. 
 
In considering if the two claimants had standing, the Hajro court set out the Lujan 
three-part inquiry for standing—the same three-part test often cited in Kansas:  injury in 
fact, causation, and redressability. 811 F.3d at 1102 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560); see 
15 
 
 
 
Sierra Club, 298 Kan. at 35 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1). The Hajro court 
examined United States Supreme Court caselaw about standing when a plaintiff seeks an 
injunction and noted that "'[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a 
present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied by any 
continuing, present adverse effects.'" 811 F.3d at 1107 (quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 
414 U.S. 488, 495-96, 94 S. Ct. 669, 38 L. Ed. 2d 674 [1974]). The Hajro court held that 
"[b]ecause FOIA's prescribed relief is injunctive or declaratory, generally a plaintiff 
alleging a pattern or practice claim under FOIA must also meet [a] future harm 
requirement." 811 F.3d at 1107.  
 
The Hajro court then reframed the standing test in words relevant to a FOIA claim 
when the party seeks prospective relief, as Baker does here. The party seeking relief must 
allege and eventually establish that "(1) the agency's [open records] violation was not 
merely an isolated incident, (2) the plaintiff was personally harmed by the alleged policy, 
and (3) the plaintiff himself has a sufficient likelihood of future harm by the policy or 
practice." 811 F.3d at 1103. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105, 103 
S. Ct. 1660, 75 L. Ed. 2d 675 (1983) (plaintiff seeking declaratory or injunctive relief 
failed to show he was suffering an ongoing injury or faced an immediate threat of future 
injury). 
 
Applying the three-part test to the two claims before it, which the court considered 
at the summary judgment stage, the Hajro court held genuine issues of material fact 
existed as to whether the attorney—rather than his clients or other attorneys—had a 
personal stake in the outcome of the pattern and practice claim. 811 F.3d at 1104-06. 
Turning to the second claimant, the lawful permanent resident, the court held the 
claimant had failed to establish standing to bring a pattern and practice claim. He had 
little reason to seek out his alien record again since he had been granted citizenship. The 
likelihood he would suffer future injury was thus remote, and his specific claim was 
16 
 
 
 
rendered moot when he succeeded in his citizenship appeal. The court remanded his 
claim with direction to dismiss it as moot. 811 F.3d at 1106-07. 
 
Unlike Hajro, which reviewed the appeal under the summary judgment standard, 
this appeal arises from the district court's ruling on a motion to dismiss. Other federal 
decisions have applied the standing test to a motion to dismiss and have generally held 
the plaintiff must plead facts that are "sufficiently concrete for the Court to conclude that 
the plaintiffs are likely to be subjected to these alleged policies or practices in the future." 
National Sec. Counselors v. C.I.A., 931 F. Supp. 2d 77, 94 (D.D.C. 2013). 
 
For example, the National Security Counselors alleged they stood "'to continue to 
be harmed' because 'they regularly file FOIA requests with CIA and will continue to do 
so in the future.'" 931 F. Supp. 2d at 94. The court described these allegations as 
"generalized statements" that were not concrete enough to meet the requirement of 
alleging a likelihood of future injury. 931 F. Supp. 2d at 94. Likewise, a court held a 
plaintiff's allegation that he "'plan[ned] to file additional FOIA requests to the [defendant] 
in the future'" was too generalized to show standing to seek prospective relief in the form 
of a declaratory judgment. Quick v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Nat'l Inst. of Standards & 
Tech., 775 F. Supp. 2d 174, 181-82, 187 (D.D.C. 2011). In another case, although a 
plaintiff had standing to seek a remedy for a past injury, it failed to establish standing to 
seek a declaratory judgment when it merely cited to plans to file additional FOIA 
requests with the defendant in the future. Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in 
Washington v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 527 F. Supp. 2d 101, 105-06 (D.D.C. 2007). 
See also American Historical Association v. National Archives & Records Admin., 310 F. 
Supp. 2d 216, 228 (D.D.C. 2004) (holding allegation that will seek records in the future is 
too conjectural and speculative).  
 
17 
 
 
 
In contrast, in another appeal involving the National Securities Counselors, they 
alleged their 15 pending FOIA requests established standing for declaratory relief in Nat'l 
Sec. Counselors v. C.I.A., 898 F. Supp. 2d 233 (D.D.C. 2012), aff'd 969 F.3d 406 
(D.C. Cir. 2020). The court agreed, explaining:  "Recent cases have clarified that, where 
a FOIA requester challenges an alleged ongoing policy or practice and can demonstrate 
that it has pending claims that are likely to implicate that policy or practice, future injury 
is satisfied." 898 F. Supp. 2d at 262. As this case illustrates, contrary to the argument of 
the dissent, enforcing the constitutional requirement of standing can coexist with a 
prudential view of mootness that makes room for hearing some cases even when a 
plaintiff's specific case becomes moot because of a change in circumstances. 
 
Requiring a concrete likelihood of future harm reflects Kansas law. See Sierra 
Club, 298 Kan. at 33 ("To establish a cognizable injury, a party must establish a personal 
interest in a court's decision and that he or she personally suffers some actual or 
threatened injury as a result of the challenged conduct."). It is also consistent with the 
mootness rule in State v. Roat, 311 Kan. 581, 596, 466 P.3d 439 (2020), that an appeal be 
dismissed after changed circumstances render a case moot unless "leaving a judgment 
intact will affect vital rights of the parties." Failing to heed this caution would put us in 
the position of rendering an advisory opinion.  
 
We need look no further than a case involving Baker to see how Kansas appellate 
courts have applied these principles.  
 
Baker v. City of Overland Park, No. 101,371, 2009 WL 3083843 (Kan. App. 
2009) (unpublished opinion), involved a request to enjoin the enforcement of a traffic 
ordinance. Baker had been ticketed for a driving infraction for unsafe passing while on a 
multiple lane divided highway. He defended the charge by arguing the municipal 
ordinance was unconstitutionally vague. The traffic court agreed and dismissed the 
18 
 
 
 
charge. Baker then filed a civil action seeking, among other relief, a declaratory judgment 
or an injunction prohibiting enforcement of the municipal ordinance. He argued he and 
others were at risk for future prosecution.  
 
The Court of Appeals panel held the dismissal of the traffic charges mooted any 
claims related to Baker's past prosecution. 2009 WL 3083843, at *4. As to the ongoing 
and future controversy, the panel cited the traditional standing requirements and, after 
analysis, held Baker lacked standing to seek a declaratory judgment. The panel held that a 
plaintiff must "allege and/or demonstrate actual present harm or a significant possibility 
of future harm." 2009 WL 3083843, at *4. The panel noted that Baker argued those 
requirements should be relaxed when a plaintiff seeks declaratory judgment. But the 
panel rejected that notion because of the constitutional requirement that there be a 
justiciable controversy. 2009 WL 3083843, at *4.  
 
Instead, it stated that Baker was required "[a]t the very least . . . to allege that he 
presently was driving multiple-lane divided roadways in Overland Park or that he likely 
would be doing so in the near future." But Baker had not done so, stating only that he and 
others were "'subject to further prosecutions.'" 2009 WL 3083843, at *5. The panel held 
this was insufficient, noting:  "The court need not, however, accept Baker's 'allegations of 
future injury which are overly generalized, conclusory, or speculative.' . . . Baker's bald 
assertion that he was subject to future prosecution was far too general." 2009 WL 
3083843, at *5.  
 
Baker has already received the records requested. As a result, the only possible 
judgment affecting vital rights of the parties would be one relating to prospective records 
requests. Baker recognized as much when he invoked federal pattern and practice 
caselaw to support continuing his appeal. But Baker makes only generalized, conclusory, 
or speculative allegations about possible future injury because of the Tenth Judicial 
19 
 
 
 
District's policy. The only concrete and particularized invasion of rights identified by 
Baker—either past or future—is the one instance that started this suit. He did not allege 
in his petition that he is likely to be subject to the Tenth Judicial District's allegedly 
illegal policy in the future. Nor did he allege he has a pending request or that he has ever 
made other such requests in his more than 20 years of practice in Kansas courts. See State 
v. Lowe, 238 Kan. 755, Syl. ¶ 4, 715 P.2d 404 (1986) ("A court has the power to take 
judicial notice of its own records."); Supreme Court Rule 208 (2020 Kan. S. Ct. R. 247); 
K.S.A. 60-409(b)(4).  
 
Generally, it is the allegations in Baker's petition that would dictate the outcome of 
this appeal from the district court order dismissing the action based on the pleadings. 
K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-212; KNEA v. State, 305 Kan. 739, 746, 387 P.3d 795 (2017) 
(standing is evaluated based on the stage of litigation and degree of evidence required at 
that stage); Aeroflex Wichita, Inc. v. Filardo, 294 Kan. 258, 268, 275 P.3d 869 (2012); 
Merriman v. Crompton Corp., 282 Kan. 433, 439, 146 P.3d 162 (2006). While the 
circumstances that cause a change in standing occurred after the petition was filed and 
during discovery, he did not seek to amend his petition to add any allegation. At most, he 
belatedly maintains in his supplemental brief after we raised the issues of standing that he 
"will continue to ask for recordings of public hearings." Assuming we can or should 
consider this one sentence, it fails to carry the day for Baker. These few words are even 
more conjectural and hypothetical than those rejected in his prior suit about the traffic 
ordinance or by federal courts considering FOIA pattern and practice claims. E.g., 
National Sec. Counselors, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 94; Quick, 775 F. Supp. 2d at 181-82; 
Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 105-06; American 
Historical Association, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 228. 
 
We reject the dissent's concerns that public officials will simply provide records 
when a litigant nears success, then return to a pattern and practice of refusing records in 
20 
 
 
 
appropriate cases. The dissent's fears are unfounded because such actions are exactly why 
the pattern and practice doctrine was developed in FOIA cases. Moreover, those actions 
could support a claim under KORA in an appropriately pled case. Baker's simply is not 
such a case. 
 
For these reasons, we conclude Baker has not met his burden to establish his 
standing, and thus both this court and the Court of Appeals lack jurisdiction over this 
appeal.  
 
Appeal dismissed. 
 
MICHAEL J. MALONE, Senior Judge, assigned.1 
 
* * * 
 
BILES, J., dissenting:  The majority side-steps a very real question of public 
importance by effectively overruling a subset of our case-or-controversy caselaw 
permitting courts in limited circumstances to decide issues that may be considered moot. 
I view this not only as poor legal precedent, but its result here is nothing less than an 
avoidance of our duty to safeguard this state's steadfast promise to maintain an open 
government. For these reasons, I dissent. 
 
 
 
 
1REPORTER'S NOTE:  Senior Judge Malone was appointed to hear case No. 117,989 
under the authority vested in the Supreme Court by K.S.A. 20-2616 to fill the vacancy on 
the court by the retirement of Justice Lee A. Johnson.  
 
21 
 
 
 
Since its inception, the Kansas Open Records Act's purpose has been "exceedingly 
clear:  To subject to public view and scrutiny all of those records which the law requires 
public officials to keep." State ex rel. Stephan v. Harder, 230 Kan. 573, 580-81, 641 P.2d 
366 (1982) ("Sunshine is the strongest antiseptic—its rays may penetrate areas previously 
closed."). In keeping with this, our Legislature declares the Act's provisions "shall be 
liberally construed and applied to promote such policy." K.S.A. 45-216(a). In this case, 
Linus Baker simply asks whether that law allows him to listen to audio recordings of 
open court proceedings made, maintained, or kept by the Tenth Judicial District of the 
State of Kansas. The majority says Baker is not entitled to an answer. 
 
Instead, the majority holds Baker lost legal standing to ask his question because 
two recordings were begrudgingly produced during the discovery phase of this lawsuit, 
while the case was in the district court, even though the records custodian steadfastly 
adheres in this court to a legal position that the law does not require public inspection of 
these recordings. And to achieve its desired end, the majority casts off our previously 
recognized distinction between the concepts of standing and mootness. As a practical 
matter, this aspect of the majority's holding overrules our most recent decision declaring 
non-mootness a prudential requirement that does not inflexibly destroy jurisdiction. See 
State v. Roat, 311 Kan. 581, 590, 466 P.3d 439 (2020) ("Both the history of the mootness 
doctrine in Kansas, with the law developing on a prudential basis independent of federal 
analysis, and the problem of exceptions to the jurisdictional basis that inheres in the 
federal constitutional reasoning, lead us to conclude that the better approach is to 
consider mootness a prudential doctrine."). 
 
We can address the legality of the Tenth Judicial District's public records policy 
under our well-recognized exceptions to Kansas' prudential mootness doctrine for issues 
capable of repetition and of public importance. Notably, the parties urge us to do so. I 
would further hold these audio recordings are plainly subject to public disclosure under 
22 
 
 
 
the Act. And I would add that latter conclusion is not anywhere near a close call. The 
majority simply avoids it. 
 
THE COURT'S JURISDICTION TO ANSWER THE OPEN RECORDS QUESTION 
 
To present a case or controversy justiciable by Kansas courts, a legal dispute 
"must satisfy four elements:  (1) the plaintiff must have standing; (2) the issue raised 
cannot be moot; (3) the issue must be ripe, having taken fixed and final shape rather than 
remaining nebulous and contingent; and (4) the issue cannot present a political question." 
Solomon v. State, 303 Kan. 512, 521, 364 P.3d 536 (2015). Standing requires a party to 
satisfy both statutory and "traditional or common-law standing" requirements. Creecy v. 
Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 310 Kan. 454, 461, 447 P.3d 959 (2019). 
 
The majority correctly concludes Baker's statutory standing under the Act "is 
obvious." Slip op. at 10. Its problem is with the parallel concern for traditional standing. 
And for this, a party must show a cognizable injury and establish a causal connection 
between the injury and the challenged conduct. To show a cognizable injury, the party 
must establish a personal interest in a court's decision, and that they personally suffer 
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the challenged conduct. Creecy, 310 Kan. 
at 461. "'A justiciable controversy has definite and concrete issues between the parties 
and "adverse legal interests that are immediate, real, and amenable to conclusive relief."'" 
Kansas Bldg. Indus. Workers Comp. Fund v. State, 302 Kan. 656, 678, 359 P.3d 33 
(2015). From my vantage point, Baker satisfies this test as well. 
 
It is undisputed Baker suffered an actual legal injury because he was denied access 
to the recordings he sought under the Act. And there is a plain causal connection between 
that denial and the records custodian's actions because she denied him access under a 
blanket policy preventing any public access to these open court recordings. The legal 
23 
 
 
 
issue cannot be more concrete—Baker requested specific recordings and the custodian 
refused him access as is her customary practice. This makes the remaining legal question 
a simple one:  does the Act allow the custodian to keep denying the public the right to 
listen to these recordings? 
 
The majority's worry is that the two recordings Baker specifically requested were 
provided to him during litigation discovery while at the district court. This, they argue, 
effectively foreclosed the possibility that a judgment in Baker's favor can personally 
benefit him. But the fact Baker received these recordings does not change the reality that 
his legal injury occurred when he requested them in September 2015 and the custodian 
denied his request. And both argue the law is on their side. Worse yet, the custodian 
brazenly insists she will continue to deny any other such requests by anyone else. The 
custodian's then-counsel made that point all too clear when he explained while giving 
Baker the two recordings:  "These [recordings] are provided as a response to your 
discovery request only, and not as an admission to the allegations and claims in your 
petition." (Emphasis added.)   
 
The majority's decision today sanctions what amounts to a self-manipulating 
loophole for public agencies to avoid any practical long-term legal precedent under our 
public records law. Like Lucy in the cartoon series, dodgy government officials will be 
able to avoid a bad legal outcome by simply pulling the football away from Charlie 
Brown at the last possible minute. And this scenario can just repeat itself to stop 
inconvenient litigation by concerned citizens under the guise of creating an instant lack of 
traditional standing while preserving an illegal policy that denies the public access to 
their government's records. This is not in keeping with the openness promised by our 
public records laws to the citizens of our state. Harder, 230 Kan. at 580-81. 
 
24 
 
 
 
But this contrivance can be avoided squarely within our existing mootness 
jurisprudence. See State ex rel. Stephan v. Johnson, 248 Kan. 286, 291, 807 P.2d 664 
(1991) ("'The rule that when it appears by reason of changed circumstances between the 
commencement of an action and the trial thereof, a judgment would be unavailing as to 
the real issue presented, the case is moot and judicial action ceases, is not only applicable 
to actions seeking to enforce common-law remedies, but is equally applicable to actions 
under our declaratory judgment statute'"); see also U.S. Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 
U.S. 388, 397, 100 S. Ct. 1202, 63 L. Ed. 2d 479 (1980) ("One commentator has defined 
mootness as 'the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest 
that must exist at the commencement of the litigation [standing] must continue 
throughout its existence [mootness].' Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication:  The Who 
and When, 82 Yale L.J. 1363, 1384 [1973]."). An appeal may be dismissed as moot when 
it "'clearly and convincingly appears that the actual controversy has ceased and the only 
judgment which could be entered would be ineffectual for any purpose.'" Roat, 311 Kan. 
at 594. 
 
We recently reconciled our mootness doctrine caselaw against the problem of 
allowing exceptions to the jurisdictional ground that exists as an essential attribute in the 
federal jurisprudence. And we noted our legal principles developed on a prudential basis 
independent of that federal analysis, so the logical approach in our state was to continue 
considering mootness to be a prudential doctrine. Roat, 311 Kan. at 590. That is, when a 
mootness problem arises, a court may retain jurisdiction over the case if it raises "'issues 
that are capable of repetition and present concerns of public importance.'" 311 Kan. at 
590; see also City of Coffeyville v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 
Local No. 1523, 270 Kan. 92, 94, 11 P.3d 1164 (2000) (recognizing exceptions to our 
mootness doctrine). 
 
25 
 
 
 
But by applying traditional standing concepts to a mid-litigation change in 
circumstances, as in Baker's case, the majority now abolishes this prudential mootness 
doctrine, effectively overruling Roat without even acknowledging it is doing so. And the 
parties cite no Kansas precedent when a litigant injured by the challenged conduct lost 
standing while a case was pending just because the actors of the challenged conduct 
voluntarily pause their misconduct. Worse yet, the cases the majority cites do not help its 
analysis under the circumstances presented here, i.e., Ternes v. Galichia, 297 Kan. 918, 
921-22, 305 P.3d 617 (2013), and Board of County Commissioners v. Bremby, 286 Kan. 
745, 764, 189 P.3d 494 (2008). Let's consider each more carefully.  
 
In a parenthetical, the majority partially quotes a sentence from Ternes, the full 
text of which reads:  "A corollary of standing is that the opposing party must have an 
ongoing interest in the dispute sufficient to establish concrete adverseness." (Emphasis 
added.) Ternes, 297 Kan. at 921-22. But Ternes is inapposite. It held only that a law firm 
lacked standing to intervene to continue litigating a personal injury claim on behalf of a 
former client who no longer wanted to pursue it. The law firm lacked standing, not 
because it somehow lost it, but more traditionally because it "did not suffer an injury 
from any action on the part of the defendant, [it had] no injury that is redressable by a 
favorable ruling against the defendant." 297 Kan. at 922. The Ternes court concluded the 
law firm lacked standing because it could not pursue any claim on remand, even if it 
could prevail on appeal. In other words, any favorable ruling would not redress its 
claimed injury. 297 Kan. at 924-25. 
 
In Bremby, the court addressed a landfill permit applicant's contention that a 
landowner who opposed the permit lost standing because he only had a life estate in the 
affected property and died during the appeal. The court remanded the case to the district 
court to determine whether the estate still had a "cognizable interest in the outcome." 
Bremby, 286 Kan. at 764. The case's holding nevertheless does not stand for a proposition 
26 
 
 
 
that a party may later lose traditional standing after standing is established at the case's 
outset. When remanding the case, the Bremby court merely pointed out the district court 
should consider the fact the landowner died after filing the petition since he only had a 
life estate in the property. See 286 Kan. at 764 (holding the landowner "should not be 
dismissed from the case for lack of standing on the basis of the petition alone, though the 
district court may determine during the course of the case that his estate no longer has a 
cognizable interest in the outcome").   
 
This brings us to the majority's incomplete treatment of Baker's claim for attorney 
fees under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 45-222(d), which the Act expressly authorizes for private 
citizens when they must go to court to gain access to public records withheld by 
recalcitrant public officials. Baker had that statutory claim before the district court and 
the Court of Appeals, so there should have remained an actual case or controversy that 
preserved standing before those courts—unless this statutory claim also disappeared 
when the two recordings were produced during district court discovery. The majority 
avoids resolving that question too, although it tries to cast shade by suggesting pro se 
litigants like Baker can't recover for their time under the Act. Slip op. at 13.   
 
The majority discusses Willis v. Kansas Highway Patrol, 273 Kan. 123, 41 P.3d 
824 (2002), and tries to disassociate that case from Baker's litigation. In Willis, our court 
considered whether a district court erred by declining to issue a writ of mandamus to 
"comply with the law and honor [plaintiff's] request for access to public records now and 
in the future," even though the court ordered the specific record at issue released and the 
plaintiff received it. 273 Kan. at 125. But the Willis plaintiff also sought attorney fees and 
that required the court to decide whether the agency exercised good faith in denying the 
records and whether there was a reasonable basis in fact or law to deny the records 
request in the first place. 273 Kan. at 133-34 (citing K.S.A. 45-222[c]). Those are the 
same questions this litigation should answer, but the majority brushes them aside.  
27 
 
 
 
The majority avoids considering Willis' holding, arguing Baker did not cite Willis 
to the Court of Appeals when the panel considered mootness. Slip op. at 12. But so what? 
The issue now is jurisdiction, which this court raised on its own motion. And the majority 
should still have to decide if the attorney fee claim presented a legally viable case or 
controversy before the Court of Appeals when that issue was before that panel. 
Otherwise, how could the majority hold the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to 
consider Baker's appeal when his statutory claim remained pending there? The majority 
seems to recognize this by hinting that Baker's fee claim might fail because he is acting 
pro se, even though he is a licensed member of the Kansas bar. Slip op. at 13. ("This 
unanswered [attorney fee] question looms large, if, as the dissent suggests, it is to be a 
hook for establishing standing."). To extend the majority's analysis to the Court of 
Appeals proceedings, as it does, we need to know the answer to that aspect of the claim 
or controversy question. But we don't. 
 
The majority cryptically claims it need not resolve the attorney fee claim as a 
jurisdictional "hook" because Baker did not raise Willis as supporting authority. But the 
Willis precedent simultaneously answers the question posed as it relates to the Baker 
panel's appellate jurisdiction and reinforces a central safeguard to the statutory rights our 
Legislature declares "shall be liberally construed and applied to promote such policy 
[that] public records shall be open for inspection by any person unless otherwise provided 
by this act." K.S.A. 45-216(a). So the only way to decide if the Court of Appeals had 
jurisdiction would be to confront Willis directly and decide whether Baker's attorney fee 
claim somehow evaporated when the recordings were produced. But the majority doesn't 
do that—it just hints at it and moves on to announce the Court of Appeals had no 
jurisdiction. Even worse, this rationale would logically seem to implicate the district 
court's jurisdiction as well, but the majority ignores that too. In the end, the potential 
implications from the majority's obscurity on these points for future litigation is 
28 
 
 
 
troublesome at best for open government advocates and should not be left to future 
guesswork given the public significance of these rights. 
 
Regardless, we have applied mootness exceptions to resolve claims on the 
merits—even when they were not accompanied by other live claims for relief. See, e.g., 
State v. Hilton, 295 Kan. 845, 286 P.3d 871 (2012) (addressing criminal defendant's only 
claim on appeal, that sentencing court erred revoking probation, as an issue capable of 
repetition yet evading review and of public importance, even though defendant had 
completed serving the underlying sentences before case was heard on appeal); Johnson 
County Commissioners v. Duffy, 259 Kan. 500, 912 P.2d 716 (1996) (applying exception 
for issues capable of repetition and of statewide importance to decide otherwise moot 
question of whether Board of Tax Appeals had authority to order statewide reappraisal of 
agricultural property for a tax year). Indeed, this court has often interpreted the judicial 
power to hear and decide controversies as defined by Article 3, § 1 of the Kansas 
Constitution to extend to otherwise moot questions in limited circumstances—although 
exercising this power should be done "with caution and only upon due consideration of 
the wide variety of interests a party asserts." Roat, 311 Kan. at 591.  
 
The majority's final attack focuses on Baker's argument that he still has standing to 
pursue declaratory and injunctive relief. In Hajro v. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services, 811 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 2016), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit explained the differing case-or-controversy requirements for Freedom of 
Information Act claims challenging wrongful withholding of specific documents, as 
opposed to those challenging an agency "pattern or practice": 
 
"We clarify that the Article III requirements for a specific FOIA request claim 
and a pattern or practice claim differ from each other. We have recognized two separate 
claims that complainants can bring against an agency under FOIA. The first is a suit 
29 
 
 
 
where a plaintiff attacks a specific agency action for (1) 'improperly' (2) 'withheld' (3) 
'agency records.' For specific FOIA request claims, after the agency produces all non-
exempt documents and the court confirms the agency's proper invocation of an 
exemption, the specific FOIA claim is moot because the injury has been remedied. 
 
"A FOIA requester may also assert a FOIA pattern or practice claim—a 'claim 
that an agency policy or practice will impair the party's lawful access to information in 
the future.' For example, we have recognized a pattern or practice claim for unreasonable 
delay in responding to FOIA requests.  
 
"We now clarify . . . that where a plaintiff alleges a pattern or practice of FOIA 
violations and seeks declaratory or injunctive relief, regardless of whether his specific 
FOIA requests have been mooted, the plaintiff has shown injury in fact if he 
demonstrates the three following prongs: (1) the agency's FOIA violation was not merely 
an isolated incident, (2) the plaintiff was personally harmed by the alleged policy, and (3) 
the plaintiff himself has a sufficient likelihood of future harm by the policy or practice. In 
other words, a pattern or practice claim is not necessarily mooted by an agency's 
production of documents. [Citations omitted.]" 811 F.3d at 1102-03. 
 
After concluding an individual "lost standing" to pursue a pattern and practice 
claim when facts developed during the litigation that made future harm unlikely, the 
Ninth Circuit found the individual's "pattern or practice claim moot" and remanded the 
case with directions to "dismiss [the individual's] claim as moot." (Emphasis added.) 811 
F.3d at 1093, 1102. 
 
Under the Hajro rubric, one might think, given this litigation's developments, that 
Baker may not have adequately alleged a future harm necessary to seek declaratory or 
injunctive relief against continuing enforcement of the existing government policy 
against public inspection of open court recordings. But it must be remembered he had 
standing when he filed his lawsuit because it is undisputed the custodian denied him 
30 
 
 
 
access to the specific recordings he first asked for under the same policy that remains in 
place now because the majority avoids deciding that policy's legality. 
 
Even so, Baker did seek in his original petition an "appropriate order requiring the 
Tenth Judicial district to provide access to and produce copies of the audio recordings in 
the electronic format requested." In other words, he asked to litigate whether the 
custodian wrongfully withheld access to the particular recordings he first requested under 
an official policy that still bars public access. And although Baker's initial request may be 
rendered moot because of the custodian's discovery production, this does not mean our 
court is powerless to continue the analysis to decide whether the Tenth Judicial District's 
continuing "official" policy violates the law.  
 
After all, the Act broadly specifies that any person can seek access to public 
records, and he or she does not even have to explain a purpose for making the request. 
K.S.A. 45-218(a) ("All public records shall be open for inspection by any person, except 
as otherwise provided by this act, and suitable facilities shall be made available by each 
public agency for this purpose."); Harder, 230 Kan. at 585 ("The Kansas act places no 
burden on the public to show a need to inspect, and requires no particular motives or 
reasons for inspection."). So under the Act's command, public records must be accessible 
for inspection by any member of the public, even if the inspection request is motivated by 
mere curiosity, unless the public agency can invoke an explicit exception. And this robust 
right to ensure open government carries with it the statutory promise of judicial muscle to 
enforce it. 
 
Baker's lawsuit clearly is designed to promote the statutory policy of open records 
and government scrutiny. K.S.A. 45-216(a) ("It is declared to be the public policy of the 
state that public records shall be open for inspection by any person unless otherwise 
provided by this act."); cf. Hunter Health Clinic v. Wichita State University, 52 Kan. 
31 
 
 
 
App. 2d 1, 9-10, 362 P.3d 10 (2015) (noting the Act places the broad term "any person" 
in a specific context, i.e., a person seeking to enforce the Act's purposes; holding there is 
no statutory standing to advocate blocking an agency from releasing records claimed to 
be private). And Baker alleges the judicial district's records custodian perpetuates an 
unlawful policy of denying access to all recordings of open court proceedings. He further 
asserts in his appellate briefing that he "will continue to ask for recordings of public 
hearings and [the custodian] will continue to deny those requests." Yet the majority treats 
his declaration as untimely and self-serving, even though it is consistent with his initial 
pleading in which he alleged the custodian maintains this illegal policy and requested 
judicial relief against its continuation. 
 
For these reasons, I would hold the panel properly invoked the mootness 
exceptions for legal issues capable of repetition and of public importance. Baker v. 
Hayden, 55 Kan. App. 2d 473, 477, 419 P.3d 31 (2018).  
 
WITHHOLDING THESE RECORDINGS VIOLATES THE ACT 
 
Moving to the merits, the records custodian argues the panel erred because the 
recordings can be withheld because of (1) Supreme Court Rule 362 (2020 Kan. S. Ct. R. 
422), which she claims "establishes that audio recordings are not the transcript but are the 
equivalent of the reporters' notes," and (2) K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 45-219(a) (limiting rights 
to copy certain records). I would hold the panel correctly concluded the custodian 
violated the Act. These recordings very plainly are public records that are not exempt 
from disclosure. The custodian's arguments to the contrary lack merit. And I would add 
that the custodian's declared intention to continue this policy perpetuates the illegality. 
 
 
 
32 
 
 
 
Standard of review 
 
Interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which appellate courts have 
unlimited review. Nauheim v. City of Topeka, 308 Kan. 145, 149, 432 P.3d 647 (2019). 
Similarly, how a particular exemption under the Act is applied is a question of law over 
which appellate courts have unlimited review, with the burden of proving an exemption's 
applicability on the custodian opposing disclosure. Wichita Eagle and Beacon Pub. Co., 
Inc. v. Simmons, 274 Kan. 194, 209, 50 P.3d 66 (2002). Underlying these principles is 
our long-standing recognition that "[b]y statutory decree, we are to liberally construe and 
apply [the Act] to promote a policy of open inspection of public records." Simmons, 274 
Kan. at 215. 
 
Statutory construction principles apply as well to interpretations of Kansas 
Supreme Court rules. If a rule's language is clear, courts are bound by that rule's 
language. Kansas Judicial Review v. Stout, 287 Kan. 450, 460, 196 P.3d 1162 (2008). 
 
These recordings are "records" subject to the Act. 
 
Although there are specific exceptions, the Act defines "public record" as "any 
recorded information, regardless of form, characteristics or location, which is made, 
maintained or kept by or is in the possession of" any "public agency." (Emphasis added.) 
K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 45-217(g)(1)(A). Before this court, the custodian strains to have us 
read together Supreme Court Rule 362 and Rule 1001(e)(8) (2020 Kan. S. Ct. R. 617) 
("No video, photograph, audio reproduction, or other electronic communication of a court 
proceeding will affect the official court record of the proceeding for purposes of appeal or 
otherwise."). By looking at both rules, the custodian claims to see a way to characterize 
the judicial district's audio recordings of open court proceedings as simply aids for court 
reporters when preparing transcripts at the public's expense. Presumably this usage would 
33 
 
 
 
somehow remove the recordings from the "public records" domain, but it obviously does 
not. The Act's plain language contradicts this contention. 
 
The Act does not distinguish between "public record" and "official court record." 
It defines public records as including any recorded information made, maintained, or kept 
by or in the possession of any public agency, as defined elsewhere in the Act. See 
Simmons, 274 Kan. 194, Syl. ¶ 4 ("[A]ny nonexempt document, computer file, or tape 
recording in the possession of a public agency is subject to public disclosure under [the 
Act]."); Harder, 230 Kan. 573, Syl. ¶ 4 ("Computer tapes which contain records required 
by law to be kept and maintained by state agencies are 'official public records.'"). There is 
no other way reasonably to read K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 45-217(g)(1)(A). Unquestionably, the 
audio recordings at issue are "recorded information" that are both "made" by and "in the 
possession of" the Tenth Judicial District.  
 
The Act, also subject to specific exceptions, defines "[p]ublic agency" in K.S.A. 
2020 Supp. 45-217(f)(1) ("[T]he state or any political or taxing subdivision of the state or 
any office, agency or instrumentality thereof, or any other entity receiving or expending 
and supported in whole or in part by the public funds appropriated by the state or by 
public funds of any political or taxing subdivision of the state."). And the Tenth Judicial 
District is a political subdivision of the state, created by legislative enactment. See K.S.A. 
4-211 ("The county of Johnson shall constitute the 10th judicial district."); State v. Great 
Plains of Kiowa County, Inc., 308 Kan. 950, 954, 425 P.3d 290 (2018) ("[The Act] 
explicitly includes instrumentalities of political and taxing subdivisions of the state in its 
definition of public agencies."). 
 
Taken together, these statutory provisions mean the Tenth Judicial District is a 
public agency as defined by the Act, so any recorded information, regardless of its form, 
that is made, maintained, or kept by the district is a "[p]ublic record" under K.S.A. 2020 
34 
 
 
 
Supp. 45-217(g)(1). See Supreme Court Rule 3.01(a)(3) (2020 Kan. S. Ct. R. 19) (the 
court record consists of "any other court authorized record of the proceedings, including 
an electronic recording"). Without question, the audio recordings of open court 
proceedings made, maintained, or kept by the Tenth Judicial District are public records 
subject to the Act. 
 
Inspection does not violate Supreme Court Rule 362. 
 
The next step is to decide whether the official custodian for these public records 
can meet her burden to establish the recordings are excluded by some provision in the 
Act. See K.S.A. 45-218(a) ("All public records shall be open for inspection by any 
person, except as otherwise provided by this act."); State Dept. of SRS v. Public 
Employee Relations Board, 249 Kan. 163, Syl. ¶ 3, 815 P.2d 66 (1991) ("[The Act] does 
not allow an agency unregulated discretionary power to refuse to release information 
sought by the public."). The custodian argues the recordings are specifically exempt from 
disclosure under Rule 362. This is plainly wrong.  
 
In pertinent part, K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 45-221 provides,  
 
"(a) Except to the extent disclosure is otherwise required by law, a public agency 
shall not be required to disclose: 
 
(1) Records the disclosure of which is specifically prohibited or restricted by 
federal law, state statute or rule of the Kansas supreme court or rule of the senate 
committee on confirmation oversight relating to information submitted to the committee 
pursuant to K.S.A. 75-4315d, and amendments thereto, or the disclosure of which is 
prohibited or restricted pursuant to specific authorization of federal law, state statute or 
rule of the Kansas supreme court or rule of the senate committee on confirmation 
35 
 
 
 
oversight relating to information submitted to the committee pursuant to K.S.A. 75-
4315d, and amendments thereto, to restrict or prohibit disclosure." (Emphases added.) 
 
Rule 362 states: 
 
"Written transcripts of electronic recordings shall be prepared by court personnel 
under the direction of the clerk of the district court. The person making the transcript 
shall certify under seal of the court that the transcript is a correct transcript of the 
specified proceedings as recorded. Upon request of counsel, the clerk of the district court 
shall make arrangements for counsel to review the electronic recordings of the case 
involved. The clerk may correct a transcript of recorded proceedings upon stipulation by 
counsel or upon order of the court." (2020 Kan. S. Ct. R. 422.) 
 
The panel found the custodian's Rule 362 argument without merit. Baker, 55 Kan. 
App. 2d at 481 ("[W]e find no indication from the plain and unambiguous language used 
in [Rule 362] from which we can conclude that our Supreme Court intended to prohibit 
or restrict public access to electronically recorded hearings of open court proceedings."). 
I agree. 
 
There is a simple decision-making progression embedded in the Act:  once a 
record of information is determined to be made, maintained, or kept by a "public agency," 
that recorded information is a "public record" and must be open, unless otherwise 
specifically provided by the Act. K.S.A. 45-218(a). And under this progression, the 
records custodian shoulders the burden to prove disclosure "is specifically prohibited or 
restricted by . . . rule of the Kansas supreme court." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 2020 
Supp. 45-221(a)(1). That specificity cannot be found in Rule 362. 
 
There is not one word in Rule 362 prohibiting or restricting disclosure of these 
recordings, so just because litigation counsel in a particular case can review electronic 
36 
 
 
 
recordings does not mean—even implicitly—that the public can be denied access. For 
that, the Act demands specificity when a public records custodian tries to invoke K.S.A. 
2020 Supp. 45-221(a)(1) to deny disclosure of a public record. And the custodian's 
burden to cite an explicit law is consistent with the Act's underlying purpose:  "To subject 
to public view and scrutiny all of those records which the law requires public officials to 
keep." Harder, 230 Kan. at 581. 
 
Rule 362 lacks the required language to support the custodian's denial of public 
access to the recordings. As the panel correctly observed, a rule about "court reporters 
that permits counsel to access electronic recordings to determine the accuracy of the 
prepared transcript stands in stark contrast to a broad rule enacted by the Kansas Supreme 
Court that specifically prohibits and restricts public access to all electronic recordings of 
proceedings under the [Act]." Baker, 55 Kan. App. 2d at 484. Likewise, I would hold 
Rule 362 does not prohibit or restrict the right to public inspection of audio recordings of 
open court proceedings that are made, maintained, or kept by a Kansas judicial district. 
 
Inspection does not violate K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 45-219(a).  
 
The custodian next contends K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 45-219(a) unambiguously 
exempts audio recordings from disclosure under the Act. It provides: 
 
"Any person may make abstracts or obtain copies of any public record to which 
such person has access under this act. If copies are requested, the public agency may 
require a written request and advance payment of the prescribed fee. A public agency 
shall not be required to provide copies of radio or recording tapes or discs, video tapes 
or films, pictures, slides, graphics, illustrations or similar audio or visual items or 
devices, unless such items or devices were shown or played to a public meeting of the 
governing body thereof, but the public agency shall not be required to provide such items 
37 
 
 
 
or devices which are copyrighted by a person other than the public agency." (Emphasis 
added.) 
 
The custodian claims that since the law does not require her to provide copies of 
these recordings, it permits her to withhold public access to them as well. This seriously 
misconstrues the Act and suffers from the same strained reasoning as the custodian's 
misinterpretation of Rule 362. Allowing the public to listen to audio recordings is not the 
same thing as making copies of them.  
 
As the panel correctly held, K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 45-219(a) "only refers to the 
public's right to copy the listed items and does not in any way prohibit the public's ability 
to inspect them." (Emphasis added.) Baker, 55 Kan. App. 2d at 484-85. The Act cannot 
be clearer in delineating the public's right to inspect public records from the agency's 
obligation to accommodate the possible copying of those records. Each of these statutory 
provisions operate independently from the other. 
 
K.S.A. 45-218(a) specifies all public records must be open for inspection by any 
person, except as otherwise provided by the Act, and further requires public agencies to 
make "suitable facilities" available for this inspection. And the statute's remaining 
subsections all relate to inspection as well. But copying is covered in a separate statute, 
K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 45-219. Its subsection (a) permits any person to make abstracts or 
copies of public records themselves, or obtain copies of those records through the public 
agency that has them, with restrictions on that accommodation as spelled out. Among 
those restrictions, subsection (a) clarifies that for certain listed items, such as recordings, 
the agency's copying obligation is limited to circumstances when those specific items are 
shown in a public meeting unless they are also copyrighted by someone outside the 
agency. Even so, subsection (a) does not prohibit inspection or otherwise limit public 
access. 
38 
 
 
 
K.S.A. 45-218(a) requires the records custodian to allow inspection of electronic 
recordings and to make "suitable facilities" available for that purpose. Nothing hinges 
this disclosure requirement on whether the public agency might also be obligated to make 
a copy of the same item. K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 45-219(a) does not limit a person's right to 
inspect public records. 
 
I would hold the recordings Baker sought access to are public records subject to 
disclosure under the Act, and that neither Supreme Court Rule 362 nor K.S.A. 2020 
Supp. 45-219 justify the custodian's refusal to make them available. I would also hold the 
Tenth Judicial District's continuing policy of denying access to these recordings 
flagrantly violates the Act and must stop. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Baker's public records request presents an issue capable of repetition and is of 
public importance. It deserves a clear and emphatic resolution that ends this obviously 
illegal policy by the Tenth Judicial District. Baker pledges he "will continue to ask for 
recordings of public hearings." Good. The Tenth Judicial District's practice of 
nondisclosure of these recordings should be bludgeoned until it is abandoned or judicially 
neutered. Today's majority decision only puts off that reckoning. My concern in the 
meantime is that this holding will be seen as weakening the judicial resolve needed at 
times to ensure Kansans have the means to preserve an open government.  
 
I would hold the district court erred by dismissing this case. And by re-casting 
dismissal now as an issue of traditional standing, the majority implicitly overrules Kansas 
caselaw considering dismissal for mootness as prudential, rather than jurisdictional. In 
the process, the majority opens a cavernous loophole for government officials to string 
39 
 
 
 
along those who would seek access to public records by permitting late-in-the-game 
disclosures to avoid adverse judicial precedent. This is not what the Act envisions. 
 
For these reasons, I dissent. 
 
ROSEN, J., and MICHAEL J. MALONE, Senior Judge, join the foregoing dissent.