Title: In re Estate of Gebis
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 85909
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: March 18, 1999

In re Estate of Gebis (Ill. S.Ct.) 
Docket No. 85909-Agenda 10-January 1999.
Opinion filed March 18, 1999.
JUSTICE RATHJE delivered the opinion of the court:
The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether the statutory custodial 
claim established in section 18-1.1 of the Probate Act of 1975 (755 ILCS 
5/18-1.1 (West 1996)) is constitutional. The trial court held that it was not, 
concluding that section 18-1.1 violated substantive due process, equal 
protection, and special legislation principles. Appeal from the trial court's 
judgment lies directly with this court. 134 Ill. 2d R. 302(a). Because the trial 
court lacked the subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a statutory custodial 
claim, we vacate its judgment.
BACKGROUND
Joseph Gebis and Evelyn Swietek are the son and daughter of Sofia Gebis. In 
1994, Joseph and Evelyn filed a petition with the trial court to have Sofia 
declared a disabled person. The trial court granted the petition and appointed 
Joseph and Evelyn as coguardians of Sofia's estate.
Sofia died on February 8, 1997. On July 14, 1997, and pursuant to section 
18-1.1 of the Probate Act, Joseph filed a verified claim against the 
guardianship estate seeking $361,320 in compensation for caring for Sofia during 
the final years of her life. Joseph alleged that, for 11 years prior to Sofia's 
death, he lived with Sofia and devoted himself to her care. As a result of 
personally caring for Sofia, Joseph limited his lifestyle choices and 
opportunities, limited his chiropractic practice and professional engagements, 
and suffered emotional distress.
Evelyn, individually and as coguardian of Sofia's estate, moved to dismiss 
Joseph's claim on numerous grounds. Evelyn first attacked the factual basis for 
Joseph's claim, arguing that, as coguardians of Sofia's estate and person, she 
and Joseph hired and paid for full-time professional care for Sofia throughout 
the course of her disability. Evelyn next attacked section 18-1.1's 
constitutionality, arguing that section 18-1.1 violated both substantive and 
procedural due process principles (U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, 
art. I, §2); the equal protection clause (U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const. 
1970, art. I, §2); the prohibition against special legislation (Ill. Const.1970, 
art. IV, §13); and the separation of powers doctrine (Ill. Const.1970, art. II, 
§1).
In a written opinion, the trial court granted Evelyn's motion to dismiss, 
holding that section 18-1.1 violates substantive due process principles, 
violates the equal protection clause, and constitutes special legislation. This 
timely appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
Although neither party raises the issue, we have an obligation to consider, 
sua sponte, whether the trial court possessed subject matter 
jurisdiction to adjudicate Joseph's statutory custodial claim. See People v. 
Bounds, 182 Ill. 2d 1, 3 (1998); Eastern v. Canty, 75 Ill. 2d 566, 
570 (1979).
Subject matter jurisdiction refers to a court's power both to adjudicate the 
general question involved and to grant the particular relief requested. In 
re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 64 (1993). Under the Illinois Constitution of 
1970, the circuit court enjoys, with limited exceptions, "original jurisdiction 
of all justiciable maters." Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §9. Although the 
legislature may not limit the circuit court's original jurisdiction to hear a 
justiciable matter, it may create a justiciable matter by creating rights or 
duties that have no counterpart in common law or equity. See M.M., 156 Ill. 2d  at 65; Board of Education of Warren Township High School District 
121 v. Warren Township High School Federation of Teachers, Local 504, 128 Ill. 2d 155, 165-66 (1989). In such instances, while the circuit court's 
original jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter derives from the constitution, 
the justiciable matter itself is defined by the legislature. M.M., 156 Ill. 2d  at 65. The legislature may define the "justiciable matter" in such a way 
as to limit or preclude the circuit court's authority. M.M., 156 Ill. 2d  at 65. When the circuit court's power to act is controlled by statute, the 
circuit court is governed by the rules of limited jurisdiction and must proceed 
within the statute's strictures. M.M., 156 Ill. 2d  at 66. Any action 
taken by the circuit court that exceeds its jurisdiction is void and may be 
attacked at any time. In re Estate of Steinfeld, 158 Ill. 2d 1, 12 
(1994).
With these principles in mind, we must decide whether, following Sofia's 
death, the trial court presiding over Sofia's guardianship proceeding had the 
jurisdiction to adjudicate a statutory custodial claim filed against Sofia's 
guardianship estate. We hold that it did not.
The general rule is that, upon the ward's death, both the guardianship and 
the trial court's jurisdiction to supervise the ward's estate necessarily 
terminate. See In re Estate of Wellman, 174 Ill. 2d 335, 350 (1996); 
In re Estate of Nelson, 250 Ill. App. 3d 282, 287 (1993). The Probate 
Act accords with this general rule, providing that, with the sole exception of 
the powers and duties set forth in section 24-19 of the Probate Act, "[t]he 
office of the representative of a ward terminates *** when the ward dies." See 
755 ILCS 5/24-12 (West 1996). Section 24-19, which governs the administration of 
a deceased ward's estate, provides that, "until the issuance of letters 
testamentary or of administration[,] *** a representative of the estate of a 
deceased ward has the powers and duties of an administrator to collect." 755 
ILCS 5/24-19(a) (West 1996). Under the Probate Act, an administrator to collect 
"has the power to sue for and collect the personal estate and debts due the 
decedent *** and by leave of court to exercise the powers vested by law in an 
administrator." 755 ILCS 5/10-4 (West 1996). This court has held that, so 
defined, the authority of an administrator to collect is confined to preserving 
the estate until an executor or administrator is appointed. See In re Estate 
of Breault, 29 Ill. 2d 165, 179 (1963). An administrator to collect has no 
power to pay claims filed against the guardianship estate. See Jacob Wener 
&amp; Co. v. Freilich, 268 Ill. 58, 60-61 (1915).
Thus, even if a person filing a statutory custodial claim against a deceased 
ward's guardianship estate could prove that he is entitled to that claim, he 
could never enforce that claim because the guardian is statutorily prohibited 
from paying it. Certainly, if the claimant is powerless to enforce and the 
guardian is powerless to pay a statutory custodial claim filed against a 
deceased ward's guardianship estate, the trial court supervising the 
guardianship estate is powerless to adjudicate such claims, as jurisdiction lies 
only where the court can grant the particular relief requested. See 
M.M., 156 Ill. 2d  at 64.
This is not to say that the creditors of a deceased ward are without remedy. 
On the contrary, they, like the creditors of any decedent, may file a 
claim against the decedent's estate once an executor or administrator is 
appointed and the decedent's estate is opened. See 755 ILCS 5/18-1 (West 1996). 
Or, if the deceased ward's estate is not yet open, a deceased ward's creditors, 
again like any decedent's creditors, may petition the circuit court either for 
admission of the decedent ward's will to probate (see 755 ILCS 5/6-2 (West 
1996)) or for letters of administration (see 755 ILCS 5/9-3 (West 1996)). What a 
deceased ward's creditors may not do is file a claim against the 
guardianship estate. Once a disabled person dies, the guardianship terminates 
and the court supervising the guardianship estate loses jurisdiction to 
adjudicate a claim filed against that estate. The decedent's estate is the only 
avenue for recovery. See generally Nonnast v. Northern Trust Co., 374 Ill. 248, 268 (1940) (claims against a ward are filed against the ward if she is 
living and against her estate if she is dead).
The particular claim at issue in this case, section 18-1.1's statutory 
custodial claim, may be filed only against a decedent's estate. On its face, 
section 18-1.1 provides that certain classes of caregivers are entitled to "a 
claim against the estate upon the death of the disabled person." 
(Emphasis added.) 755 ILCS 5/18-1.1 (West 1996). Thus, the statutory custodial 
claim matures and may be filed only after a disabled person dies. Significantly, 
article 18 of the Probate Act recognizes only two classes of estates against 
which claims may be filed, those belonging to wards and those belonging to 
decedents. Once a disabled person dies, she by definition ceases to be a "ward" 
and instead becomes a "decedent." Thus, it is against the decedent's estate that 
the custodial claim must be filed. This conclusion is confirmed by the fact that 
section 18-10 of the Probate Act, which prioritizes claims against a decedent's 
estate, specifically classifies section 18-1.1's statutory custodial claim as a 
claim against a decedent's estate. See 755 ILCS 5/18-10 (West 1996).
There is no question that Joseph filed his statutory custodial claim not 
against Sofia's decedent's estate but against Sofia's guardianship estate. All 
of the pleadings relating to Joseph's statutory custodial claim, including the 
briefs filed with this court, bear the caption "In re Estate of Sofia 
Gebis, a disabled person." (Emphasis added.) Similarly, all of the 
pleadings relating to Joseph's statutory custodial claim bear the case number 
for Sofia's guardianship proceeding, "94-P-6222." Moreover, Evelyn contested 
Joseph's statutory custodial claim before both the trial court and this court 
not only in her individual capacity but also as coguardian of Sofia's estate. A 
decedent's estate does not have a "guardian." Finally, Joseph's brief before 
this court opens by explaining that "[t]his appeal arises out of a [statutory 
custodial claim], filed by Joseph in this disabled person's estate." 
(Emphasis added.) These facts leave no doubt that Joseph's claim is targeted 
against Sofia's guardianship estate and not against her decedent's estate.
In fact, Joseph's claim could not have been filed against Sofia's decedent's 
estate because, according to the record and the parties, such an estate has not 
yet been opened. The record on appeal in case number 94-P-6222 contains not a 
single pleading relating to the opening of a decedent's estate in Sofia's name, 
the issuance of letters testamentary or of administration for such an estate, or 
the admission of Sofia's will to probate. Nor is there any indication that 
notice of either Sofia's death or the right to file claims against Sofia's 
estate was ever published. See 755 ILCS 5/18-3 (West 1996). There is one order 
in the record suggesting that Sofia executed a will and that Joseph filed that 
will with the circuit court, but Evelyn's counsel explained at oral argument 
that that filing took place outside of the proceedings in case number 94-P-6222. 
Finally, we take judicial notice of the fact that, although Sofia's will has 
been filed with the circuit court of Cook County, a decedent's estate in Sofia's 
name has not yet been opened. See In re W.S., 81 Ill. 2d 252, 256-57 
(1980) (noting this court's long recognized authority to take judicial notice of 
public records).
Given these facts, we have no choice but to conclude that the trial court in 
case number 94-P-6222 lacked the jurisdiction to adjudicate Joseph's statutory 
custodial claim. When Sofia died in February 1997, the trial court's 
jurisdiction in case number 94-P-6222 was confined to supervising the 
preservation of Sofia's estate until Sofia's will was admitted to probate or 
letters of administration issued. Joseph filed his statutory custodial claim in 
case number 94-P-6222 on July 14, 1997, more than five months after Sofia's 
death. Until Sofia's will is admitted to probate or letters of administration 
issue, the trial court lacks any authority to adjudicate Joseph's claim. The 
trial court's only choice, in fact, was to dismiss Joseph's claim for a lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction. If Joseph then wished to pursue his claim, he was 
fully entitled both to petition the trial court for the opening of Sofia's 
estate and to file his claim against that estate once it was opened. Regardless, 
following Sofia's death, the trial court in case number 94-P-6222 did not 
possess the jurisdiction to adjudicate the constitutionality of Joseph's claim. 
Its order doing so therefore is void, and we have no choice but to vacate 
it.
Although at first this decision may appear unduly technical, the consequences 
of the contrary result are significant. Article 18 of the Probate Act 
establishes detailed procedures for the adjudication of claims against a 
decedent's estate. Among these procedures is a schedule setting forth the 
priority in which claims against a decedent's estate, including section 18-1.1's 
statutory custodial claim, must be paid. 755 ILCS 5/18-10, 18-13 (West 1996). If 
a custodian were allowed to file a statutory custodial claim against the 
guardianship estate, that person effectively could circumvent the priority 
schedule established in sections 18-10 and 18-13. Statutory custodial claims 
currently share first priority with funeral and burial expenses and 
administration expenses. 755 ILCS 5/18-10 (West 1996). If the custodian files 
his statutory claim against the decedent's estate, and that claim equals or 
exceeds the value of the decedent's estate, sections 18-10 and 18-13 would 
require the custodian to share the decedent's estate with the funeral home and 
the administrator. Sections 18-10 and 18-13 are undermined, however, if a 
statutory custodial claim can be filed against a guardianship estate, because a 
guardianship proceeding is not governed by the priority schedule established in 
sections 18-10 and 18-13. Thus, following the ward's death, a custodian 
possessing a valid statutory claim could decimate the guardianship estate before 
the decedent's estate is opened, leaving the funeral home, the administrator, 
and every other creditor of the decedent's estate without recourse. This clearly 
is not the result that the legislature intended.
CONCLUSION
We vacate the circuit court's judgment declaring section 18-1.1 of the 
Probate Act unconstitutional and remand the cause for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.
Judgment vacated;
cause remanded.