Title: Belew v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 110532
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: June 7, 2012

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
VICKIE MARRS BELEW 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 OPINION BY  
v. 
Record No. 110532 
  
    JUSTICE WILLIAM C. MIMS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     June 7, 2012 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
  
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of Appeals 
erred in declining to consider a transcript that was not filed 
within the 60-day period set forth in Rule 5A:8(a) but that 
ostensibly was made part of the record by the circuit court 
under Code § 8.01-428(B) and Rule 5A:9 as the correction of a 
clerical mistake. 
I. 
BACKGROUND AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Belew was convicted in the Circuit Court of Albemarle 
County of felony failure to stop at the scene of an accident, 
in violation of Code § 46.2-894.  On May 25, 2010, the court 
entered final judgment sentencing her to a term of five years’ 
imprisonment and suspending all but ninety days of 
incarceration. 
Belew commenced her appeal by filing a timely notice of 
appeal.  On July 12, 2010, the court reporter filed transcripts 
of proceedings from March 17 and May 25, 2010.  However, no 
transcript was filed of proceedings from March 3, 2010, the 
date on which the circuit court heard testimony and received 
 
2 
evidence, because the case management system indicated that 
proceedings scheduled for that day had been continued.  
Belew did not realize the March 3, 2010, transcript (“the 
Missing Transcript”) had been omitted until September 16, 2010.  
Upon discovering the omission, she promptly notified the court 
reporter, who prepared the Missing Transcript and filed it on 
September 22, 2010.  Belew then moved the circuit court under 
Code § 8.01-428(B) to make the Missing Transcript part of the 
record, asserting that the court reporter’s failure to file it 
in a timely manner was a clerical mistake within the 
contemplation of the statute.  The Commonwealth’s attorney did 
not oppose the motion.  The circuit court entered an order on 
September 24, 2010 making the Missing Transcript part of the 
record.  The court also entered an order under Rule 5A:9 
ordering the clerk of court to transmit the Missing Transcript 
to the Court of Appeals. 
Belew filed a petition for appeal in the Court of Appeals 
on October 7, 2010.  Thereafter, the Court of Appeals entered a 
per curiam order denying the petition.  The per curiam order 
stated that Belew 
timely noted her appeal.  She timely filed 
transcripts of the preliminary hearing, the 
March 17 trial date, and the sentencing hearing.  
Belew did not timely file a transcript of the 
March 3 trial date. 
 
. . . . 
 
3 
 
 
Belew did not file the trial transcript 
within sixty days, as required by [Rule 
5A:8(a)].  Furthermore, Belew has never 
requested this Court to grant an extension of 
the deadline.  While this Court sympathizes with 
the problems encountered by counsel, the 
undisputed fact remains the transcript was not 
timely filed.  Counsel had a responsibility to 
ensure preparation of the transcript, or request 
an extension.  Since the transcript was not 
timely filed, the Court will not consider it in 
evaluating this appeal. 
 
(Footnote omitted).  The order further stated that without the 
Missing Transcript, the record on appeal was insufficient to 
allow the Court of Appeals to review her assignments of error, 
which therefore were waived.  We awarded Belew this appeal. 
II. ANALYSIS 
Belew argues that the Court of Appeals erred by failing to 
give effect to the circuit court’s orders under Code § 8.01-
428(B) and Rule 5A:9 making the Missing Transcript part of the 
record on appeal.  This argument raises the question of whether 
the circuit court’s orders were validly entered pursuant to 
authority conferred by the statute and the Rule.  We review 
interpretation of statutes and the Rules of this Court de novo.  
LaCava v. Commonwealth, 283 Va. 465, 470-71, 722 S.E.2d 838, 
840 (2012). 
Generally, a circuit court loses jurisdiction over a case 
21 days after the entry of a final order.  Rule 1:1; see also 
Super Fresh Food Mkts. of Va. v. Ruffin, 263 Va. 555, 563, 561 
 
4 
S.E.2d 734, 739 (2002) (“Once a final judgment has been entered 
and the twenty-one day time period of Rule 1:1 has expired, the 
trial court is thereafter without jurisdiction in the case.”).  
However, the general rule may be superseded by a statute in 
which the General Assembly expresses its intent that courts 
retain jurisdiction.  See Commonwealth v. Morris, 281 Va. 70, 
77, 705 S.E.2d 503, 506 (2011) (recognizing that statutes may 
create exceptions to Rule 1:1).  Code § 8.01-428(B) provides 
that 
[c]lerical mistakes in all judgments or other 
parts of the record and errors therein arising 
from oversight or from an inadvertent omission 
may be corrected by the court at any time on its 
own initiative or upon the motion of any party 
and after such notice, as the court may order.  
During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes 
may be corrected before the appeal is docketed 
in the appellate court, and thereafter while the 
appeal is pending such mistakes may be corrected 
with leave of the appellate court. 
 
Because Code § 8.01-428(B) expressly allows a court to correct 
qualifying mistakes “at any time,” it confers jurisdiction on 
courts beyond the 21-day period for that limited purpose. 
We considered the scope of this statutory exception in 
Lamb v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 161, 279 S.E.2d 389 (1981).  In 
that case, the court reporter had incorrectly transcribed the 
word “Lee” as “me” on line 9 of page 58 of the first volume of 
the transcript.  The circuit court entered an order under the 
statute correcting the transcript at the request of the 
 
5 
Commonwealth and the defendant appealed.  Id. at 163, 279 
S.E.2d at 390-91.  We held that the term “clerical mistake” as 
used in the statute was sufficiently broad to encompass 
oversight or inadvertent omission by court reporters as well as 
clerks of court and their subordinates.  Id. at 164-65, 279 
S.E.2d at 391-92. 
We also held that for the purposes of the statute, an 
appeal “is docketed in the appellate court” when the petition 
for appeal is received in the appellate court.  Id. at 165, 279 
S.E.2d at 392.  Although we acknowledged that the assignment of 
a record number and receipt of the record are incidents of the 
appeal becoming “docketed,” we nevertheless identified the 
receipt of the petition for appeal as the determinative event 
for the purpose of Code § 8.01-428(B).  Id. at 165, 279 S.E.2d 
at 392.  We considered and rejected the notion that an appeal 
be determined to be docketed upon receipt of the record, even 
though “[i]n many instances, the record is received before the 
petition for appeal is filed.”  Id.  Thus, while the deadline 
for filing a petition for appeal in the Court of Appeals runs 
from the date on which the record is filed in that court, Rule 
5A:12(a), this fact does not alter our analysis.  In both the 
Court of Appeals and this Court, the filing of the petition for 
appeal is determinative.  It is only in the petition for appeal 
where the appellant must identify the errors relied on.  
 
6 
Compare Rule 5:17(c)(1) with Rule 5A:12(c)(1).  Further, the 
filing of the petition is jurisdictional, and if the appellant 
fails to file on time, the appeal is dismissed.  See, e.g., Jay 
v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 510, 517-18, 659 S.E.2d 311, 315 
(2008) (contrasting dismissal of an appeal for a jurisdictional 
defect with denying an asserted ground for appeal because of a 
non-jurisdictional defect). 
In this case, there is no question that the court reporter 
failed to transcribe and file the Missing Transcript because of 
an error in the trial court’s case management system.  No one 
suggests that the court reporter’s failure to do so was 
anything other than an “oversight” or “inadvertent omission” 
under Code § 8.01-428(B).  Likewise, the facts establish beyond 
dispute that the circuit court granted Belew’s motion to make 
the Missing Transcript part of the record prior to the filing 
of her petition for appeal and while it had jurisdiction to do 
so under the statute.  Because the circuit court retained 
statutory authority to correct the record, it was authorized 
under Rule 5A:9 to make the Missing Transcript part of the 
record on appeal. 
Accordingly, Rule 5A:8(a) did not require Belew to file a 
motion in the Court of Appeals for an extension of time to make 
the Missing Transcript part of the record.  The circuit court’s 
 
7 
statutory authority to correct the record superseded the 
requirements of the Rule. 
The Commonwealth argues that the omission of the Missing 
Transcript from the record was not a clerical mistake within 
the meaning of the statute.  Echoing the Court of Appeals, the 
Commonwealth points to Belew’s failure to observe that the 
Missing Transcript had not been filed within the 60-day period 
set forth in Rule 5A:8(a).  The Commonwealth notes that Belew 
filed a notice of filing transcripts as required by Rule 
5A:8(b) on July 15, 2010.  That document specifically noted the 
filing of transcripts of proceedings from March 17 and May 25, 
2010 but did not include the Missing Transcript.  The 
Commonwealth asserts she therefore knew that it had not been 
filed.  Any oversight or inadvertent omission of the court 
reporter by not filing the Missing Transcript, according to the 
Commonwealth, was superseded by Belew’s failure to investigate 
the omission promptly.  A prompt investigation would have 
permitted her either to file the Missing Transcript before the 
60-day period expired on July 24, 2010, or at least to file a 
motion in the Court of Appeals for an extension of time 
pursuant to Rule 5A:8(a).  However, the Commonwealth continues, 
by September 16, 2010, when she realized the Missing Transcript 
had not been filed, both options were foreclosed.  We disagree. 
 
8 
No provision in Code § 8.01-428(B) supports the 
Commonwealth’s argument that the court reporter’s oversight or 
inadvertent omission due to the erroneous case management 
system entry was superseded by Belew’s failure to notice and 
react to the omission of the Missing Transcript before the Rule 
5A:8(a) 60-day deadline expired.  To the contrary, even a 
party’s failure to prepare an order was deemed an “oversight” 
in Cutshaw v. Cutshaw, 220 Va. 638, 641, 261 S.E.2d 52, 53 
(1979).  There, the chancellor asked the party to prepare an 
order to reflect the chancellor’s decision in a divorce 
proceeding.  Id. at 640, 261 S.E.2d at 53.  Several years later 
when the oversight was realized, the chancellor entered a nunc 
pro tunc order to reflect the earlier decision.  Id.  Citing 
Code § 8.01-428(B), this Court stated that a trial court “has 
the power to correct such ministerial omissions.”  Id. at 641, 
261 S.E.2d at 53. 
The Commonwealth also argues that Lamb is distinguishable 
because in that case we merely upheld the correction of an 
error in a transcript that was already part of the record.  We 
again disagree. 
There is no statutory language or case law that restricts 
the application of the statute and deprives the circuit court 
of authority to make an omitted volume of the transcript part 
of the record along with the other volumes it already 
 
9 
contained.  The only relevant questions under the provisions of 
Code § 8.01-428(B) are whether the nature of the correction 
falls in the category of “[c]lerical mistakes” or “errors” in a 
judgment or “other parts of the record” and whether such 
mistakes or errors arose “from oversight or from an inadvertent 
omission.” 
Although the circuit court’s order in Lamb was limited to 
a specific correction of a word within a transcript and in this 
case the transcript of an entire day of proceedings was 
omitted, this is a distinction without a difference.  While the 
mistake in Lamb was a single word in one transcript volume, the 
error in Cutshaw was the omission of an entire order requested 
by the chancellor.  In neither case did the Court base its 
decision on the magnitude of the mistake to be corrected. 
To hold otherwise would open the door to a series of 
questions to define the scope of the statute when a court 
reporter inadvertently omits part of a trial’s proceedings.  
Would Code § 8.01-428(B) permit the circuit court to correct a 
transcript where only a witness’s response to a question was 
omitted?  Where his cross-examination was omitted?  Where his 
entire testimony was omitted?  Where a party’s opening 
statement or closing argument was omitted?  Fortunately, the 
plain language of Code § 8.01-428(B) neither requires nor 
permits us to draw such arbitrary distinctions. 
 
10 
Accordingly, the omission of the Missing Transcript was 
clerical error within the meaning of Code § 8.01-428(B) and the 
circuit court had authority under the statute to correct the 
error prior to Belew’s filing of her petition for appeal in the 
Court of Appeals.  The court thus had authority under Rule 5A:9 
to make the Missing Transcript part of the record and Belew was 
not required to seek an extension of time from the Court of 
Appeals under Rule 5A:8(a).  Consequently, the Court of Appeals 
erred in failing to consider the Missing Transcript in its 
review of the petition for appeal.  We therefore will reverse 
its judgment and remand with directions to review the petition 
on its merits, considering the Missing Transcript as part of 
the record. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
 
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE GOODWYN and JUSTICE 
MCCLANAHAN join, dissenting. 
 
 
 
In my opinion, Code § 8.01-428(B) does not govern the 
outcome of this case and, therefore, I must respectfully 
dissent from the majority decision.  I agree with the majority 
to the extent that, because this Court has held that Code 
§ 8.01-428(B) allows for the correction of a clerical mistake 
involving a single word, we might, at some point, be called 
upon to allow for the correction of the inadvertent omission of 
 
11 
an entire paragraph, page or group of pages.1  When such a 
situation presents itself and the details are sufficiently 
fleshed out, I might agree that this Court cannot draw the line 
as to the extent of the clerical mistake that can be corrected 
within a transcript.  However, this is not that case. 
                                                 
 
1 I question the majority’s reliance on Lamb v. 
Commonwealth, 222 Va. 161, 279 S.E.2d 389 (1981), in its 
determination for when an appeal is docketed in the Court of 
Appeals.  As we explained in Lamb, “there is no time limit 
within which leave of this Court may be granted.”  Id. at 166, 
279 S.E.2d at 392.  Rather than dispose of the issue by simply 
granting ex post facto leave to Belew to correct the 
transcript, as we did in Lamb, the majority instead goes to 
great lengths to apply the holding of Lamb to the Court of 
Appeals while at the same time dismissing the underlying 
rationale of that holding. 
 
As an initial matter, I find it significant that Lamb was 
decided in 1981, four years before the General Assembly created 
the Court of Appeals.  This Court could not have contemplated 
the significant differences in the Rules of Court applicable to 
the appellate process in this Court and those applicable to the 
Court of Appeals. 
 
Furthermore, our decision in Lamb was based on the fact 
that “[a] record number is assigned which identifies the 
petition and all other documents, including the record, that 
are filed in connection therewith until the final disposition 
of the case in our Court.”  Id. at 165, 279 S.E.2d at 392.  
Significantly, no other rationale is stated.  In this Court, 
the record number is only assigned upon the filing of the 
petition for appeal.  Id.  Although the record may arrive prior 
to the filing of the petition for appeal, no record number is 
assigned until the petition for appeal is filed.  In the Court 
of Appeals, however, the record number is assigned upon the 
filing of the record, as demonstrated by the letter sent by the 
Court of Appeals clerk’s office dated September 14, 2010 
informing the parties that the record had been transmitted from 
the trial court to the Court of Appeals.  The letter clearly 
indicates that a record number (1168-10-2) had been assigned to 
the case.  Recognizing this fact, the majority simply dismisses 
the original rationale of Lamb as a mere “incident[] of the 
appeal becoming ‘docketed’” and proceeds to ascribe an entirely 
new rationale. 
 
12 
 
Despite the majority’s assertions to the contrary, the 
issue before this Court is not the clerical error made by the 
court reporter, nor is it how a court reporter 
compartmentalizes what is transcribed.  The issue before this 
Court is Belew’s failure to timely notice that an entire 
transcript, consisting of the lion’s share of her trial, was 
missing and her subsequent failure to take appropriate action. 
The majority ignores the fact that there is a significant 
difference between an omission within a transcript and the 
omission of an entire transcript or an entire volume of a 
transcript.  While the former may not be readily apparent 
within the 60 day-period for filing transcripts as set forth in 
Rule 5A:8(a), the same cannot be said for the latter.  It is 
especially true in this instance, where Rule 5A:8(b)(2), 
entitled “Multiple Transcripts,” required appellant to 
“identify all transcripts filed” and Belew specifically 
identified only the transcripts for March 17 and May 25, 2010, 
as being filed. 
 
The majority goes to great lengths to demonstrate the fact 
that the actions of the court reporter were inadvertent, a 
position with which I take no issue.  Rather, my issue is with 
the fact that the majority never addresses Belew’s failure to 
follow Rule 5A:8(a) after the court reporter’s mistake became 
 
13 
readily apparent.  A mistake on the part of the court reporter 
cannot excuse Belew’s inattentiveness to the omission.   
The majority asserts that the court reporter’s inadvertent 
omission is not superseded by Belew’s failure to follow Rule 
5A:8(a); however, the majority never explains the converse: how 
the inadvertent omission of the court reporter supersedes 
Belew’s failure to follow Rule 5A:8(a) due to her own, 
admitted, inattentiveness.  Rule 5A:8(b)(4)(ii) specifically 
states that “[w]hen the appellant fails to ensure that the 
record contains transcripts or a written statement of facts 
necessary to permit resolution of appellate issues, any 
assignments of error affected by such omission shall not be 
considered.”  (Emphasis added.)  Similarly, this Court has 
repeatedly admonished that “the onus is upon the appellant to 
provide the reviewing court with a sufficient record from which 
it can be determined whether the trial court erred as the 
appellant alleges.”  White v. Morano, 249 Va. 27, 30, 452 
S.E.2d 856, 858 (1995).  The majority, however, would add an 
exception to Rule 5A:8(b)(4)(ii) such that it would not apply 
to an inattentive appellant who was, or should have been, aware 
that the record was deficient due to a clerical error that was 
readily apparent and subject to correction. 
 
Furthermore, Belew could have taken advantage of Rule 
5A:8(a) to correct the omission.  As we recently explained, 
 
14 
“[t]he plain language of Rule 5A:8(a) provides a party 90 days 
from the entry of final judgment within which to file a motion 
to extend the 60-day period within which to file transcripts.”  
LaCava v. Commonwealth, 283 Va. 465, 471, 722 S.E.2d 838, 840 
(2012).  On July 26, 2010,2 the deadline for filing transcripts 
expired and Belew was, or should have been, aware that an 
entire transcript was missing.  At that point, she still had 
twenty-eight days, until August 23, 2010, to file a request for 
an extension with the Court of Appeals. 
 
In my opinion, the majority mischaracterizes the 
Commonwealth’s argument.  The Commonwealth does not, as the 
majority states, argue that Belew’s inattentiveness supersedes 
the court reporter’s inadvertent omission.  Rather, the 
Commonwealth argues that Code § 8.01-428(B) cannot be used to 
supplement a deficient record.  The plain language of both Code 
§ 8.01-428(B) and Rule 5A:8(a) clearly support the 
Commonwealth’s argument. 
The holdings in our prior cases addressing the 
applicability of Code § 8.01-428(B) clearly define the 
limitations of its reach.  Code § 8.01-428(B) is specifically 
limited to “[c]lerical mistakes in all judgments or other parts 
                                                 
 
2 July 24, 2010, fell on a Saturday.  Therefore, the 
transcript was not due until the following Monday, July 26, 
2010. 
 
 
15 
of the record.”  (Emphasis added.)  This Court has recognized 
that “the statutory power granted by Code § 8.01-428 is to be 
narrowly construed and applied.”  Davis v. Mullins, 251 Va. 
141, 149, 466 S.E.2d 90, 94 (1996).  We have consistently held 
that the proper use of Code § 8.01-428(B) is to make an 
incorrect record “speak the truth.” See Jefferson v. 
Commonwealth, 269 Va. 136, 140, 607 S.E.2d 107, 110 (2005); 
School Bd. of the City of Lynchburg v. Caudill Rowlett Scott, 
Inc., 237 Va. 550, 555, 379 S.E.2d 319, 322 (1989). 
Examples of clerical errors include a 
typographical error made by a court reporter 
while transcribing a court proceeding, Lamb v. 
Commonwealth, 222 Va. 161, 165, 279 S.E.2d 389, 
392 (1981), or an unintended error in the 
drafting of a divorce decree, Dorn v. Dorn, 222 
Va. 288, 291, 279 S.E.2d 393, 394 (1981). 
Wellmore Coal Corp. v. Harman Mining Corp., 264 Va. 279, 283, 
568 S.E.2d 671, 673 (2002).  Notably, we have never extended 
Code § 8.01-428(B) to entirely missing transcripts or volumes 
of transcripts. 
 
Rule 5A:8(a), on the other hand, establishes that a 
transcript only becomes “part of the record when it is filed in 
the office of the clerk of the trial court within 60 days after 
entry of the final judgment.”  (Emphasis added).  Thus, a 
transcript that is not filed within 60 days after entry of the 
final judgment is not part of the record.  In the present case, 
the Missing Transcript was filed 120 days after entry of the 
 
16 
final judgment.  As such, the Missing Transcript was never made 
a part of the record and, therefore, Code § 8.01-428(B) has no 
applicability. 
 
I also find the majority’s reliance on Cutshaw v. Cutshaw, 
220 Va. 638, 261 S.E.2d 52 (1979), misplaced.  As an initial 
matter, the “oversight” in Cutshaw involved the omission of an 
order, which could be corrected nunc pro tunc. 
The purpose of an order entered nunc pro tunc is 
to correct mistakes or omissions in the record 
so that the record properly reflects the events 
that actually took place.  Orders entered nunc 
pro tunc cannot retroactively record an event 
that never occurred, or have the record reflect 
a fact that never existed. 
Antisdel v. Ashby, 279 Va. 42, 50-51, 688 S.E.2d 163, 168 
(2010) (citations omitted).  This is something entirely 
different from Belew’s failure to follow a Rule of Court. 
 
Furthermore, the entire holding in Cutshaw was: “A court 
has the power to correct such ministerial omissions nunc pro 
tunc when the record clearly supports such corrections.”  Id. 
at 641, 261 S.E.2d at 53 (emphasis added).  Such orders “can 
only be entered where there is sufficient record evidence to 
authorize the amendment.”  Council v. Commonwealth, 198 Va. 
288, 291, 94 S.E.2d 245, 247 (1981).  Therefore, Cutshaw is 
particularly inapposite, as the present case does not involve 
the correction of the record nunc pro tunc; rather, the present 
case involves the supplementation of a deficient record. 
 
17 
I would further note that the majority ignores the 
affirmative act inherent in Belew’s notice of filing 
transcripts.  In her notice of filing transcripts, Belew 
specifically stated that only the transcripts for March 17 and 
May 25, 2010, were filed.  We have previously held that the 
affirmative acts of counsel are not “oversight” or an 
“inadvertent error” under Code § 8.01-428(B).  Morgan v. 
Russrand Triangle Assocs., L.L.C., 270 Va. 21, 26, 613 S.E.2d 
589, 591 (2005).  The argument that it was an oversight might 
have been stronger had the notice of filing transcripts 
mentioned the Missing Transcript.  However, by failing to 
include the Missing Transcript, Belew affirmatively represented 
that she knew that it was not, in fact, filed. 
 
Our holding in Wellmore Coal Corp. is particularly 
applicable to the present case.  In Wellmore Coal Corp., this 
Court examined the applicability of Code § 8.01-428(B) to a 
party’s failure to follow a Rule of Court.  There, a foreign 
attorney was admitted pro hac vice to represent appellant.  Id. 
at 281, 568 S.E.2d at 672.  The initial notice of appeal was 
signed only by the foreign attorney.  Id.  An amended notice of 
appeal signed by both local counsel and the foreign attorney 
was subsequently filed.  Id. at 282, 568 S.E.2d at 672.  When 
the appellees filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the basis 
that the appellant failed to comply with Rule 1A:4 and the 
 
18 
amended notice of appeal was untimely pursuant to Rule 5:9(a), 
the appellant argued that local counsel’s failure to sign “was 
curable pursuant to Code § 8.01-428(B).”  Id.  In analyzing 
whether Code § 8.01-428(B) applied, this Court explained that 
Code § 8.01-428(B) only applies to clerical mistakes, and that 
a party’s failure to follow a Rule of Court, “does not 
constitute a clerical error contemplated by Code § 8.01-
428(B).”  Id. at 283, 568 S.E.2d at 673 (emphasis added).  
Thus, under Wellmore Coal Corp., Belew’s inattentiveness and 
failure to follow Rule 5A:8(a) cannot be corrected using Code 
§ 8.01-428(B). 
 
Furthermore, by classifying Belew’s inattentiveness as a 
clerical mistake arising from an oversight, the majority has, 
in effect, negated the filing deadlines established in Rule 
5A:8(a).  Indeed, I believe that the majority’s holding runs 
the risk of effectively negating all filing deadlines under the 
Rules of Court, so long as a party claims that the failure was 
due to inattentiveness. 
 
In summation, our jurisprudence establishes that Code 
§ 8.01-428(B) should only be utilized when there is an error or 
omission in the record that is demonstrably contradicted by 
other comments or documents and, therefore, causes the record 
to fail to speak the truth.  By contrast, Rule 5A:8(a) is used 
when an appellant has failed to provide the Court with a record 
 
19 
sufficient for resolution of the appeal.  The facts of this 
case clearly fall into the latter category, not the former. 
 
For all the foregoing reasons, I cannot join in the 
majority’s opinion.  Rather, I would find that the Missing 
Transcript was untimely filed.  Accordingly, I would affirm the 
decision of the Court of Appeals.