Title: Cox Communications, Inc. v. T-Mobile US, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 103, 2023
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: April 14, 2023

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
COX COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,  
 
Plaintiff/Counterclaim 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
T-MOBILE US, INC., 
 
Defendant/Counterclaim 
Plaintiff Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 103, 2023 
§ 
§  Court Below–Court of Chancery 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§  C.A. No. 2021-0010 
§   
§   
§ 
§   
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: March 24, 2023 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
April 14, 2023 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
 
ORDER 
 
 
After consideration of the notice of interlocutory appeal and its exhibits, it 
appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
In 2017, the appellant, Cox Communications, Inc., and Sprint 
Corporation resolved two lawsuits between the parties by entering into a settlement 
agreement (the “Settlement Agreement”).  In Section 9(e) of the Settlement 
Agreement, Cox agreed that, before it offered wireless mobile services to its 
customers, it would enter into a “definitive” exclusive provider agreement with 
Sprint “on terms to be mutually agreed upon between the parties for an initial period 
of 36 months[.]”  In 2020, the appellee—T-Mobile US, Inc., Sprint’s successor in 
2 
 
interest—and Cox negotiated toward a mobile virtual network operator (“MVNO”) 
agreement but did not agree to final terms.  In September 2020, Cox decided to enter 
into an MVNO agreement with Verizon. 
(2) 
In January 2021, Cox filed a complaint in the Court of Chancery 
seeking to enjoin T-Mobile from attempting to use Section 9(e) to interfere with 
Cox’s MVNO agreement with Verizon.  T-Mobile filed counterclaims for, among 
other things, breach of contract.  On October 8, 2021, the Court of Chancery issued 
a post-trial bench ruling permanently enjoining Cox from offering wireless mobile 
services by partnering with any mobile network operator other than T-Mobile before 
entering into a MVNO agreement with T-Mobile.1  The court found that Section 9(e) 
contains two promises: (i) an obligation to refrain from entering the wireless mobile 
services market or broker a deal with T-Mobile (as Sprint’s successor-in-interest) 
and (ii) a Type II preliminary agreement that kicks in once Cox enters into an 
exclusive relationship with T-Mobile and requires both parties to negotiate open 
issues in good faith.  Because the court concluded that Cox had violated Section 9(e) 
by offering wireless mobile services through a carrier other than T-Mobile, the court 
did not reach the question of whether the parties had negotiated the open terms in 
good faith. 
 
1 Cox Commc’ns v. T-Mobile US, Inc., 2021 WL 4863119 (Del. Ch. Oct. 18, 2021). 
3 
 
(3) 
Cox appealed the decision.  While the appeal was pending, Cox and T-
Mobile again tried to negotiate a MVNO agreement but were unable to agree on final 
terms.  On March 3, 2022, we reversed the trial court’s interpretation of Section 9(e), 
vacated the injunction, and remanded the case for further proceedings.2  Specifically, 
we held that Section 9(e) contains a single promise—a “paradigmatic Type II 
agreement of the kind we recognized in SIGA v. PharmAthene.”3  Because parties to 
such agreements must negotiate the open terms in good faith, we directed the Court 
of Chancery on remand to determine whether Cox and T-Mobile have discharged 
their obligations to negotiate in good faith.4 
 
(4) 
Following 
remand, 
the 
parties 
stipulated 
to 
T-Mobile’s 
supplementation of its counterclaims, and Cox moved to dismiss them.  On February 
27, 2023, the Court of Chancery denied Cox’s motion to dismiss T-Mobile’s 
supplemental claims (the “Ruling”).  The Court of Chancery rejected Cox’s 
arguments that T-Mobile’s supplemental counterclaims: (i) exceed the scope of this 
Court’s remand, (ii) improperly rely on settlement negotiations and therefore run 
afoul of Delaware Rule of Evidence 408; and (iii) fail to state a claim for breach of 
contract.  Cox timely moved for the certification of an interlocutory appeal.  T-
Mobile opposed the application. 
 
2 Cox Commc’ns, Inc. v. T-Mobile US, Inc., 273 A.3d 752 (Del. 2022). 
3 Id. at 760 (citing SIGA Techs., Inc. v. PharmAthene, Inc., 67 A.3d 330, 349 (Del. 2013)). 
4 Id. at 768. 
4 
 
 
(5) 
On March 23, 2023, the Court of Chancery denied Cox’s application.  
The Court of Chancery disagreed with Cox’s claim that the Ruling had decided a 
substantial issue of material importance—a threshold consideration under Rule 
425—because (i) denials of motions to dismiss are rarely, if ever, decide issues of 
substantial issues of material importance and (ii) its decision to reopen the record on 
remand was a discretionary one.   Even so, the Court of Chancery also reviewed the 
Rule 42(b)(iii) factors cited by Cox and concluded that they did not weigh in favor 
certification of an interlocutory appeal.  First, the Court of Chancery found that the 
Ruling neither created a “new rule” nor overruled prior Supreme Court decisions6 
with regard to the parties’ responsibilities to negotiate Type II agreements in good 
faith.  Likewise, the Court of Chancery found that the Ruling did not conflict with 
prior trial court decisions’ interpretation of the applicability of DRE 408 at the 
pleadings stage.7  And the Court of Chancery, noting that it exercised its discretion 
to permit T-Mobile to supplement its claims on remand, rejected Cox’s argument 
that interlocutory review would serve the considerations of justice8 on that basis.  
The Court of Chancery also considered the remaining Rule 42(b)(iii) factors and 
 
5 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 42(b)(i). 
6 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 42(b)(iii)(A) & (B). 
7 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 42(b)(iii)(B). 
8 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 42(b)(iii)(H). 
5 
 
found that none of them weighed in favor of certification.  We agree with the Court 
of Chancery that interlocutory review is not warranted in this case.    
  
(6) 
Applications for interlocutory review are addressed to the sound 
discretion of the Court.9  In the exercise of its discretion and giving due weight to 
the Court of Chancery’s analysis, the Court has concluded that the application for 
interlocutory review does not meet the strict standards for certification under Rule 
42(b).  Exceptional circumstances that would merit interlocutory review of the 
Ruling do not exist in this case,10 and the potential benefits of interlocutory review 
do not outweigh the inefficiency, disruption, and probable costs caused by an 
interlocutory appeal.11 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the interlocutory appeal is 
REFUSED.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Gary F. Traynor   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
 
9 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 42(d)(v). 
10 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 42(b)(ii). 
11 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 42(b)(iii).