Title: Brown v. Jacobs
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 140270
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: February 26, 2015

PRESENT:  Lemons, C.J., Goodwyn, Millette, Mims, and Powell, 
JJ., and Russell and Koontz, S.JJ. 
 
DEBARA D. BROWN, EXECUTOR OF THE 
ESTATE OF ARTHUR GREGORY BROWN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     OPINION BY 
v.     Record No. 140270  
 
  JUSTICE S. BERNARD GOODWYN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  February 26, 2015 
SHERWIN JOHN JACOBS 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROCKINGHAM COUNTY 
Jane M. Roush, Judge 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether there is a special 
relationship between an attorney and a private investigator 
hired by that attorney to serve process, which imposes a duty 
upon the attorney to warn the private investigator of potential 
danger from criminal assault by a third party. 
Background 
On September 1, 2011, Debara D. Brown (Brown) filed a 
complaint as executor of the estate of her husband Arthur 
Gregory Brown (the decedent) in the Circuit Court of Rockingham 
County.  In her complaint, Brown asserted a cause of action for 
wrongful death, pursuant to Code § 8.01-50, against Ali Al-
Ibrahim Abid (Abid), alleging that Abid shot and killed the  
decedent, a private investigator, while the decedent was  
 
 
 
2 
attempting to serve “divorce papers” on Abid in Harrisonburg, 
Virginia. 
Brown was granted leave to file an amended complaint that 
added a wrongful death claim against Sherwin John Jacobs 
(Jacobs), the attorney who hired the decedent to serve Abid.  
Brown claimed that Jacobs was negligent because he did not warn 
the decedent “of the danger of personally serving . . . Abid or 
of the danger that . . . Abid would cause [the decedent] harm 
or was a risk to cause him harm.” 
The circuit court sustained Jacobs’ demurrer to the 
amended complaint.  Brown filed a motion for reconsideration 
and motion for leave to amend along with her proposed second 
amended complaint, which proffered additional allegations in 
support of her claim.  After considering Brown’s motions and 
the proffered second amended complaint, the circuit court 
denied both motions and dismissed the case against Jacobs with 
prejudice.  Brown appeals.1 
                     
 
1 A default judgment was entered against Abid.  The circuit 
court subsequently held an evidentiary hearing and awarded 
damages against Abid.  Brown does not appeal that judgment. 
 
 
3 
Facts2 
  
The amended complaint asserts that the decedent was a 
private investigator in Harrisonburg, who owned Argus 
Investigative Services.  Jacobs is an attorney who hired the 
decedent to personally serve “divorce papers” on Abid and 
instructed the decedent regarding where and when to serve Abid.  
The amended complaint also alleges that when Jacobs hired the 
decedent, Jacobs knew Abid owned a gun, but Jacobs did not warn 
the decedent that Abid had a gun or of the possibility of 
danger upon serving Abid. 
On March 3, 2011, while the decedent was trying to serve 
process on Abid, Abid shot and killed him.  Three days later, 
police found the decedent’s body in the trunk of his car in 
Harrisonburg. 
In the proffered second amended complaint lodged with the 
circuit court, Brown amplified her allegations against Jacobs.  
In the second amended complaint, Brown asserted that Jacobs 
                     
 
2 For purposes of evaluating a demurrer, a court assumes 
that all material facts, implied facts and reasonable 
inferences from those facts that are properly alleged in the 
complaint are true.  Assurance Data, Inc. v. Malyevac, 286 Va. 
137, 143, 747 S.E.2d 804, 807 (2013).  However, it does not 
admit the correctness of conclusions of law.  See Thompson v. 
Skate Am., Inc., 261 Va. 121, 128, 540 S.E.2d 123, 126 (2001).  
Also, it is not bound by “conclusory allegations in a review of 
a demurrer.”  Ogunde v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 274 Va. 55, 
66, 645 S.E.2d 520, 527 (2007). 
 
 
4 
represented Abid’s wife, Margot Kons (Kons), in a divorce 
proceeding and that Jacobs knew “that Abid wished to be the 
dominant partner in his marriage with Kons, and that [he] was 
greatly upset by [her] unwillingness to be more subservient to 
[him],” and that Abid had “developed a relationship with 
another woman outside of his marriage with Kons.”  Brown 
alleged that Abid carried his gun with him everywhere and 
exhibited paranoid behavior.  She further alleged that “Kons 
had informed [Jacobs] that Abid was behaving strangely.”  The 
second amended complaint alleged that “Jacobs was concerned 
. . . Abid would become violent.”  Prior to the divorce papers 
being served, Jacobs investigated “whether he could have Abid’s 
gun removed” but was unable to find any authority “that would 
require Abid to turn over his gun.” 
The decedent attempted to serve process on Abid several 
times throughout the course of two or three weeks.  Thereafter, 
Jacobs advised the decedent to quickly serve process on Abid 
however and whenever he could because Abid planned to leave the 
United States “very soon.” 
In sustaining Jacobs’ demurrer and denying Brown’s motion 
for reconsideration and motion for leave to amend, the circuit 
court ruled that Brown had failed to allege facts sufficient to 
show that there was a special relationship between Jacobs and 
the decedent and that “the facts alleged and the additional 
 
5 
facts proffered . . . were insufficient to establish that the 
alleged criminal assault upon [the] decedent by Defendant Abid 
[was] reasonably foreseeable by Jacobs as an imminent 
probability of harm.” 
This Court granted an appeal on the following assignments 
of error: 
1. 
The trial court erred in sustaining the 
defendant’s demurrer and in dismissing the action 
against him when the facts alleged in the [a]mended 
[c]omplaint were sufficient to show a special 
relationship between the defendant and the 
plaintiff’s decedent giving rise to a duty to warn 
the decedent of the risk of an assault by a third- 
party. 
2. 
The trial court erred in ruling that 
plaintiff had to allege facts establishing an 
“imminent probability of harm,” or heightened degree 
of foreseeability, before it could find any duty to 
warn, as the facts alleged in the [a]mended 
[c]omplaint were adequate to establish a relationship 
between the decedent and the defendant creating a 
duty to warn of a “reasonably foreseeable” danger. 
3. 
The trial court erred in sustaining the 
defendant’s demurrer and dismissing the action 
against him when the facts alleged in the [a]mended 
[c]omplaint were sufficient to establish that the 
assault upon the plaintiff’s decedent was reasonably 
foreseeable by the defendant as an imminent 
probability of harm. 
4. 
The trial court erred in denying 
plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration and motion for 
leave to amend when the allegations in the [s]econd 
[a]mended [c]omplaint proffered to the trial court 
were sufficient to state a cause of action against 
the defendant. 
 
 
 
6 
Analysis 
Brown argues that the circuit court erred in sustaining 
Jacobs’ demurrer because she alleged sufficient facts in the 
amended complaint to show that a special relationship giving 
rise to a duty to warn existed between the decedent and Jacobs.  
She claims that the decedent was an independent contractor and 
that this Court recognized the special relationship of 
employer/independent contractor as a matter of law in A.H. v. 
Rockingham Publishing Co., 255 Va. 216, 495 S.E.2d 482 (1998).  
Alternatively, Brown contends that the particular facts alleged 
in her amended complaint independently support the finding of a 
special relationship between the decedent and Jacobs.  We 
disagree. 
“The purpose of a demurrer is to determine whether a 
complaint states a cause of action upon which the requested 
relief may be granted.”  Assurance Data, Inc. v. Malyevac, 286 
Va. 137, 143, 747 S.E.2d 804, 807 (2013).  Hence, a demurrer 
tests the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s claims.  
Thompson v. Skate Am., Inc., 261 Va. 121, 128, 540 S.E.2d 123, 
126 (2001).  This Court performs de novo review of a trial 
court’s sustaining of a demurrer.  Assurance Data, 286 Va. at 
143, 747 S.E.2d at 808. 
To plead a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff 
must allege a legal duty, “a violation of that duty” and 
 
7 
“resulting damage.”  See Burdette v. Marks, 244 Va. 309, 311, 
421 S.E.2d 419, 420 (1992).  “[W]hether a legal duty in tort 
exists is a pure question of law to be reviewed de novo.”  
Commonwealth v. Peterson, 286 Va. 349, 356, 749 S.E.2d 307, 311 
(2013) (alteration in original) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  In this case, Brown alleges that 
Jacobs had a duty to warn the decedent regarding Abid’s 
potential criminal behavior. 
Generally, “a person does not have a duty to warn or 
protect another from the criminal acts of a third person.”  Id.  
For a court to impose a duty to warn of third-party criminal 
acts on a defendant, “a special relation [must] exist[] (1) 
between the defendant and the third person which imposes a duty 
upon the defendant to control the third person’s conduct, or 
(2) between the defendant and the plaintiff which gives a right 
to protection to the plaintiff.”  Burns v. Gagnon, 283 Va. 657, 
668-69, 727 S.E.2d 634, 641-42 (2012) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The finding of a special 
relationship is a “threshold requirement.”  Peterson, 286 Va. 
at 356, 749 S.E.2d at 311.  Brown claims that there was a 
special relationship between the decedent and Jacobs. 
“The necessary special relationship may be one that has 
been recognized as a matter of law, . . . or it may arise from 
the factual circumstances of a particular case.”  Yuzefovsky v. 
 
8 
St. John’s Wood Apts., 261 Va. 97, 107, 540 S.E.2d 134, 139 
(2001); see also Thompson, 261 Va. at 129, 540 S.E.2d at 127 
(citing cases in which there were de jure special relationships 
and de facto special relationships).  Some of the special 
relationships recognized by this Court include common 
carrier/passenger; innkeeper/guest; employer/employee; business 
owner/invitee; and hospital/patient.  Kellermann v. McDonough, 
278 Va. 478, 492, 684 S.E.2d 786, 793 (2009); Delk v. 
Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 259 Va. 125, 132, 523 S.E.2d 
826, 831 (2000) (holding that a psychiatric patient pled 
sufficient facts to establish a special relationship between 
herself and a psychiatric hospital).  This list of special 
relationships is not exhaustive, but “we have exercised caution 
in expanding it to include new relationships.”  Burns, 283 Va. 
at 669, 727 S.E.2d at 642. 
This Court has never recognized as a special relationship 
that of attorney/private investigator.  Moreover, an 
examination of our case law reveals that this Court has not 
categorically recognized the relationship of 
employer/independent contractor, as asserted by Brown.  Brown 
bases her argument that employer/independent contractor is a 
recognized legal category of special relationships on this 
Court’s decision in A.H.  However, rather than recognizing a 
categorical special relationship between an employer and an 
 
9 
independent contractor, A.H. is a case in which our Court found 
that a special relationship arose from the factual 
circumstances of that particular case. 
In A.H., this Court considered whether a newspaper 
publisher owed a duty to warn a thirteen-year-old newspaper 
carrier “of the danger of being attacked” while delivering 
newspapers.  255 Va. at 219-20, 495 S.E.2d at 485.  The carrier 
had been working for the publishing company for eighteen months 
when he was sexually assaulted while delivering papers on his 
assigned route.  Id. at 219, 495 S.E.2d at 484.  During the 
five years preceding A.H.’s assault, there had been “three 
prior sexual assaults on Rockingham carriers in various 
locations in the City of Harrisonburg.”  Id. at 222, 495 S.E.2d 
at 486.  Although the newspaper publisher knew of these 
assaults, it did not inform A.H. or his parents.  Id. at 219, 
495 S.E.2d at 486. 
This Court determined that a special relationship existed 
between the publishing company and the carrier because the 
publishing company “assigned a fixed route and time for A.H. to 
distribute its newspapers.”  Id. at 220, 495 S.E.2d at 485.  
While recognizing that the minor was an independent contractor, 
we concluded, “Under the circumstances of this case . . . 
Rockingham owed the same degree of care to A.H. that it would 
have owed if A.H. had been employed by Rockingham.”  Id. 
 
10 
(emphasis added).  The Court also observed that “the 
plaintiff’s age may have imposed a greater degree of care upon 
Rockingham than it would have owed an adult in the plaintiff’s 
circumstances.”  Id. at 221, 495 S.E.2d at 486. 
We recognized a special relationship due to the unusual 
nature of the employer/independent contractor relationship in 
A.H., which involved a minor in need of protection in a job he 
had been performing regularly for more than a year and a work 
environment under the employer’s control.  However, the facts 
of A.H. are not typical of employer/independent contractor 
relationships generally, and we decline to accept the doctrine 
that all employer/independent contractor arrangements should 
categorically be recognized as “special relationships” in 
Virginia law. 
In the alternative, Brown asserts that the facts alleged 
in her amended complaint warrant finding a special relationship 
based on the unique circumstances of this case.  However, 
unlike the thirteen-year-old newspaper carrier who had been 
delivering papers on a route assigned by the publishing company 
for more than a year, the decedent in this case was an adult 
who had been hired for one assignment.  The employer in A.H. 
was required by law to restrict the times during which the 
carrier could deliver newspapers, whereas there is no such 
restriction placed on process servers.  See 255 Va. at 219, 495 
 
11 
S.E.2d at 484.  Moreover, the decedent owned a private 
investigation business.  Although Brown alleges that Jacobs 
initially gave the decedent specific instructions on when and 
how to serve Abid, he was free to personally serve Abid in the 
way he saw fit.  Indeed, at the time service of process was 
attempted, Jacobs had instructed him to serve Abid “however and 
whenever” he could.  There is no reason to presume that the 
decedent would be less experienced in serving process and 
handling tense situations than an attorney.  Unlike the young 
newspaper carrier, the decedent did not require supervision, 
nor was he inherently vulnerable.  The imbalance of knowledge 
and exercise of control factors compelling the conclusion that 
a special relationship existed in A.H. are not present in the 
instant case. 
Because Brown failed to allege facts sufficient to 
establish a special relationship in the amended complaint, she 
failed to establish the “threshold requirement” necessary to 
show that Jacobs had a duty to warn the decedent.  For this 
reason, the circuit court did not err in sustaining Jacobs’ 
demurrer to the amended complaint.  Thus, we need not reach 
Brown’s second and third assignments of error relating to 
foreseeability.  See Peterson, 286 Va. at 357, 749 S.E.2d at 
311; see also Taboada v. Daly Seven, Inc., 271 Va. 313, 323, 
626 S.E.2d 428, 432 (2006) (“[B]efore an exception to the 
 
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general rule can apply so as to impose a potential duty[,] 
. . . the facts must establish that there is a special 
relationship . . . .”) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
Finally, Brown argues that the circuit court erred in 
denying her motion for reconsideration and motion for leave to 
amend.  She maintains that she had not yet amended her claim 
against Jacobs.  Brown claims that the allegations in her 
proffered second amended complaint “amplif[ied] and 
strengthen[ed] the allegations against Jacobs.”  According to 
Brown, allowing her to amend her amended complaint would not 
have prejudiced Jacobs because “there was no trial calendar” 
and “Jacobs had engaged in no discovery.” 
Jacobs replies that the circuit court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying Brown’s motions.  He points out that the 
circuit court granted Brown leave to file her amended complaint 
more than one year after she originally filed her lawsuit and 
after he was deposed.  Jacobs further maintains that the court 
considered Brown’s additional proffered facts before sustaining 
his demurrer.  Finally, Jacobs contends that Brown did not 
assert any new legal arguments, legal theories or previously 
undiscovered facts which would justify the court in granting 
her motion for reconsideration. 
 
13 
 “The decision whether to grant leave to amend a complaint 
rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.”  Kimble 
v. Carey, 279 Va. 652, 662, 691 S.E.2d 790, 795 (2010).  Rule 
1:8 states in relevant part: “No amendments shall be made to 
any pleading after it is filed save by leave of court.  Leave 
to amend shall be liberally granted in furtherance of the ends 
of justice.” 
In this case, we cannot say that the circuit court abused 
its discretion in denying Brown leave to amend her amended 
complaint.  The court had already given Brown leave to amend 
her original complaint more than one year after she initiated 
her lawsuit.  When Brown asked for leave to amend again and to 
file her second amended complaint, almost two years had passed 
since her lawsuit had been filed. 
Moreover, the circuit court considered the additional 
allegations in Brown’s proffered second amended complaint 
before denying her motion for leave to amend, and it found that 
her allegations were “insufficient as a matter of law to 
establish that a special relationship existed between Jacobs 
and [the] decedent.”  We hold that the circuit court did not 
err in doing so. 
Conclusion 
We hold that the circuit court did not err in sustaining 
Jacobs’ demurrer to Brown’s amended complaint because Brown 
 
14 
failed to allege facts sufficient to establish that a special 
relationship existed between Jacobs and the decedent.  We also 
hold that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Brown’s motion for leave to amend her amended complaint, and it 
did not err in denying Brown’s motion for reconsideration.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the circuit court. 
Affirmed.