Title: Frechette v. D'Andrea
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13497
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: June 10, 2024

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-13497 
 
RAYMOND FRECHETTE & another1  vs.  ELIZABETH D'ANDREA & others.2 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     February 5, 2024. - June 10, 2024. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Kafker, Wendlandt, Georges, 
& Dewar, JJ. 
 
 
Summary Process, Appeal.  Practice, Civil, Summary process, 
Appeal, Bond, Costs, Standing.  Indigent.  Housing Court, 
Costs and fees.  Statute, Construction.  Constitutional 
Law, Equal protection of laws, Access to court proceedings.  
Due Process of Law, Substantive rights. 
 
 
 
 
Summary process.  Complaint filed in the Central Division 
of the Housing Court Department on March 2, 2022. 
 
 
The case was heard by Sergio E. Carvajal, J., on a motion 
for summary judgment, and a motion to waive an appeal bond was 
heard by Jeffrey M. Winik, J. 
 
 
An appeal from an order setting an appeal bond was heard in 
the Appeals Court by Peter J. Rubin, J., and questions of law 
were reported by him to the Appeals Court.  The Supreme Judicial 
Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the 
Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Brian J. Wasser for Elizabeth D'Andrea. 
 
1 Edward A. Cianci.   
 
2 Shane D'Andrea and Jennifer Wilson. 
2 
 
 
Laura F. Camara (Henry Gunther & Richard M.W. Bauer also 
present) for South Coastal Counties Legal Services, Inc., 
& another. 
 
Robert Mitson for the plaintiffs. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Karen R. Merritt, pro se. 
 
Jay H. Lively, pro se. 
 
Emmanuel Asia, pro se. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  Following their purchase of a foreclosed 
property in Webster (property), plaintiffs Edward A. Cianci and 
Raymond Frechette brought a summary process action in the 
Housing Court against the occupants of the property 
(defendants).  The Housing Court entered judgment in favor of 
the plaintiffs on their claim for possession, and defendant 
Elizabeth D'Andrea appealed.  The plaintiffs moved to set an 
appeal bond, while D'Andrea moved to waive the appeal bond and 
filed an affidavit of indigency.  D'Andrea also filed a "Motion 
to Waive, Substitute, Order Government Payment for Appeal Bond 
and Other Costs," arguing that because she was indigent within 
the meaning of G. L. c. 261, § 27A, the appeal bond and any use 
and occupancy payments that would normally be required as a 
condition for maintaining an appeal from a summary process 
judgment should be waived, substituted, or paid by the 
Commonwealth under G. L. c. 261, §§ 27A to 27G (indigent court 
costs law or indigency statute). 
A Housing Court judge found D'Andrea to be indigent and 
waived her appeal bond pursuant to G. L. c. 239, § 5 (e), but 
3 
 
nonetheless held that D'Andrea would be required to make monthly 
use and occupancy payments of $1,275 to the plaintiffs as a 
condition for maintaining her appeal.  D'Andrea appealed from 
the use and occupancy order to a single justice of the Appeals 
Court, who reported the following questions to a panel of the 
Appeals Court: 
(1) "May or must a trial court judge in a case involving an 
indigent party, for whom the appeal bond has been waived, 
order ongoing use and occupancy payments pending appeal 
otherwise permitted or required by G. L. c. 239, § [5 (e)], 
to be waived, substituted, or paid by the Commonwealth as 
an 'extra fee or cost' under the indigent court costs law, 
G. L. c. 261, §§ 27A-[27]G?" 
 
(2) "May a trial court judge order a defendant in a summary 
process action, for whom the appeal bond has been waived, 
to pay ongoing use and occupancy pending appeal pursuant to 
G. L. c. 239, § [5 (e),] in an amount that exceeds the 
defendant's ability to pay without violating the party's 
due process, equal protection, or [a]rt. 11 [of the 
Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts 
Constitution] rights?" 
 
We transferred the case on our own motion.   
 
We conclude that use and occupancy payments required of an 
indigent party under G. L. c. 239, § 5 (e), may not be waived, 
substituted, or paid by the Commonwealth under the indigency 
statute because use and occupancy payments are not an "extra fee 
or cost" as defined in the indigency statute.  We further 
conclude that the order setting use and occupancy payments in 
the instant case did not violate D'Andrea's constitutional 
rights, even if the order requires her to make payments that 
4 
 
potentially exceed her ability to pay because the summary 
process statute reasonably imposes a fair balancing of interests 
between the owner of the property and the party in possession, 
and the Housing Court performed the fair balancing required.3  
1.  Background.  D'Andrea's mother, Dorothy Menzone, 
purchased the property in August of 2008.  In 2012, Menzone 
refinanced an existing mortgage on the property by executing a 
note in favor of Intercontinental Capital Group, Inc.  The note 
was secured by a new mortgage that was assigned to JPMorgan 
Chase Bank, N.A. (Chase).  Pursuant to the mortgage, Menzone was 
required to make monthly payments of approximately $1,400.  
Menzone made these payments regularly until she died in March 
2013.  No payments were made on the mortgage after Menzone's 
death.  D'Andrea averred that she has lived at the property 
since 2008.4  In 2019, Chase initiated foreclosure proceedings on 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by South 
Coastal Counties Legal Services, Inc., and Justice Center of 
Southeast Massachusetts, LLC; Karen R. Merritt; Jay H. Lively; 
and Emmanuel Asia. 
 
4 It is unclear whether D'Andrea ever acquired title to the 
property after her mother's death, or whether D'Andrea or any of 
the other defendants ever were authorized to act as 
administrators for Menzone's estate.  The record shows that 
D'Andrea filed a voluntary administration statement for her 
mother's estate in the Worcester Division of the Probate and 
Family Court, wherein D'Andrea averred that Menzone's estate 
consisted entirely of personal property.  There is no record of 
D'Andrea or any other defendant being named as administrator of 
Menzone's estate, and although Menzone's will does name D'Andrea 
as the sole beneficiary to receive the estate's real and 
5 
 
the property and subsequently purchased the property at 
foreclosure auction.5  Chase sold the property to Cianci in 
December 2021 for $175,566.85 and conveyed the property to 
Cianci by quitclaim deed.  Cianci then conveyed the property to 
himself and Frechette.   
In February 2022, the plaintiffs served the defendants with 
a notice to quit.  The defendants did not vacate the property, 
and the plaintiffs initiated a summary process action to evict 
the defendants.  In June 2022, the court ordered the defendants 
to make interim use and occupancy payments of $1,500 beginning 
in July 2022.  It is undisputed that the defendants made no 
interim use and occupancy payments.  The plaintiffs were granted 
a judgment of possession of the property in March 2023, and 
D'Andrea appealed.6   
The plaintiffs moved to set an appeal bond pursuant to 
G. L. c. 239, §§ 5 and 6.  D'Andrea, in turn, filed an affidavit 
of indigency and moved to waive, substitute, or have the 
 
personal property, D'Andrea has produced no evidence suggesting 
that she ever acquired title to the property through the probate 
process or otherwise.    
 
5 Chase brought a summary process action against the 
defendants in early 2020.  The action was stayed due to the 
COVID-19 eviction moratorium and was voluntarily dismissed by 
Chase after the property was sold to the plaintiffs. 
 
6 Neither defendant Shane D'Andrea nor defendant Jennifer 
Wilson filed a notice of appeal from the judgment of possession 
in favor of the plaintiffs.   
6 
 
Commonwealth pay the appeal bond as well as any use and 
occupancy.  The Housing Court judge found that D'Andrea was 
indigent within the meaning of the indigent court costs law and 
concluded that D'Andrea's potential arguments on appeal were 
"barely" not frivolous.  Accordingly, the judge waived 
D'Andrea's obligation to post an appeal bond as a condition of 
maintaining her appeal.  Nonetheless, the judge concluded in a 
carefully reasoned decision that use and occupancy payments were 
expressly required to be paid by G. L. c. 239, §§ 5 (e) and 6, 
and were not extra fees and costs under the indigency statute.  
The judge therefore denied D'Andrea's motion to waive, 
substitute, or have the Commonwealth subsidize the payments 
pursuant to G. L. c. 261, § 27C. 
The judge ordered D'Andrea to pay $1,275 per month as use 
and occupancy payments to the plaintiffs as a condition of her 
appeal.  He summarized a number of factors that he considered to 
be relevant in setting the use and occupancy amount:  
"(1) the plaintiff paid $175,566.00 to purchase the 
property, (2) the defendants have not made [a] single 
payment to the plaintiffs for their continued use and 
occupancy of the property for eleven months,[7] (3) the 
condition of the property, (4) the ongoing costs the 
plaintiff is obligated to pay to cover taxes, assessments 
and property maintenance, (5) the defendants' income is 
 
7 At the time the use and occupancy payments were set for 
the pendency of D'Andrea's appeal, the amount of unpaid interim 
use and occupancy that had accrued was $16,500. 
 
7 
 
limited and (6) the appellate issues that may be 
presented." 
 
The judge also summarized the testimony from a licensed real 
estate agent who opined that the fair rental value of the 
property was $1,700 per month.  D'Andrea was asked for her 
opinion regarding the fair rental value of the property, but she 
did not provide any opinion.  The judge noted that the ordered 
use and occupancy payments were twenty-five percent lower than 
the fair rental value estimate provided by the real estate 
agent.   
 
D'Andrea appealed from the judge's order setting use and 
occupancy payments to a single justice of the Appeals Court.  
The single justice, stating that no appellate court had decided 
the issue whether use and occupancy payments may be waived 
pursuant to the indigent court costs law, reported the two 
questions noted supra to a panel of the Appeals Court, and we 
transferred the case on our own motion.  
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standing.  As a preliminary matter, 
D'Andrea challenges the plaintiffs' standing to bring a summary 
process action against her.  The summary process statute, G. L. 
c. 239, provides in relevant part that "if a mortgage of land 
has been foreclosed by a sale under a power therein contained or 
otherwise, . . . the person entitled to the land or tenements 
may recover possession thereof under this chapter."  G. L. 
8 
 
c. 239, § 1.  D'Andrea reads this provision narrowly to mean 
that summary process is only open to the party that bought the 
foreclosure deed, and thus argues that any subsequent purchasers 
of the deed, such as the plaintiffs in this case, are not 
entitled to use summary process to evict a holdover tenant.  
D'Andrea contends that Chase is the only party that would have 
been entitled to bring a summary process action under § 1 
because Chase acquired the property at the foreclosure sale 
before selling the property to the plaintiffs.  We disagree.   
"The purpose of summary process is to enable the holder of 
the legal title to gain possession of premises wrongfully 
withheld."  Bank of N.Y. v. Bailey, 460 Mass. 327, 333 (2011) 
(Bailey), quoting Wayne Inv. Corp. v. Abbott, 350 Mass. 775, 775 
(1966).  Allowing subsequent purchasers to bring postforeclosure 
summary process actions aligns with this purpose and aligns with 
the text of G. L. c. 239, § 1, which allows "the person entitled 
to the land" to recover possession "if a mortgage of land has 
been foreclosed by a sale under a power therein."  The property 
at issue here was subject to a foreclosure sale, and the 
plaintiffs purchased the property from Chase after Chase 
acquired the property at the foreclosure sale.  It would defy 
both the plain meaning of the statute and common sense to 
conclude that the plaintiffs are not "person[s] entitled to the 
land" in such circumstances.  As the owners of the property in 
9 
 
question, the plaintiffs have standing to bring summary process 
against the defendants.  See Rental Prop. Mgt. Servs. v. 
Hatcher, 479 Mass. 542, 546 (2018) (Hatcher) ("A plaintiff may 
bring a summary process action to evict a tenant and recover 
possession of his or her property . . . if the plaintiff is the 
owner . . . of the property"); Diplomat Prop. Manager, LLC v. 
Lozano, 102 Mass. App. Ct. 57, 60-63 (2022) (examining identical 
arguments and holding that subsequent purchaser had standing to 
bring summary process action against postforeclosure occupants).  
Cf. Bailey, supra at 334, quoting Rule 1 of the Uniform Summary 
Process Rules (1980) ("The pursuit of 'speedy and inexpensive' 
summary process actions is compromised if the Housing Court must 
stay summary process proceedings while litigation on the 
validity of the foreclosure proceedings continues in another 
court").8 
 
8 Although a court must "inquire into the plaintiff's 
standing" if "it becomes apparent to a court in a summary 
process action that a plaintiff may not be the owner or lessor 
of the property at issue," whether a plaintiff in a 
postforeclosure summary process action acquired the property at 
the foreclosure sale or thereafter does not affect a plaintiff 
owner's standing to bring a summary process action against a 
holdover tenant.  See Hatcher, 479 Mass. at 547.  See also 
Diplomat Prop. Manager, LLC, 102 Mass. App. Ct. at 63 ("courts 
hearing summary process actions, including the Housing Court, 
have jurisdiction to hear numerous challenges to foreclosure, 
including cases involving foreclosures initiated by so-called 
'remote' purchasers").  Cf. Gold Star Homes, LLC v. Darbouze, 89 
Mass. App. Ct. 374, 377 (2016) (summary process plaintiff 
obtained ownership of property after being assigned another 
party's bid from foreclosure auction).  
10 
 
b.  Indigency statute claims.  i.  Statutory framework.  We 
next turn to the first question reported by the single justice 
of the Appeals Court and consider the interrelationship of the 
indigent court costs law, G. L. c. 261, §§ 27A-27G, and the 
summary process statute, G. L. c. 239, particularly their 
application in postforeclosure summary process cases.  We begin 
by outlining the relevant statutory provisions and this court's 
decision in Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. King, 485 Mass. 37, 45-50 
(2020) (King), which guides our analysis here. 
A.  Indigent court costs law.  The indigent court costs 
law, G. L. c. 261, §§ 27A-27G, provides a mechanism for indigent 
parties to obtain waiver, reduction, or payment by the 
Commonwealth of court fees and other costs incurred during 
litigation.  See Commonwealth v. Hastings, 494 Mass. 58, 61-62 
(2024).  Under the statute, an indigent party is, inter alia, "a 
person who is unable to pay the fees and costs of the proceeding 
in which he is involved or is unable to do so without depriving 
himself or his dependents of the necessities of life, including 
food, shelter, and clothing."  G. L. c. 261, § 27A.9  See 
Adjartey v. Central Div. of the Hous. Court Dep't, 481 Mass. 
 
  
9 A person is also considered indigent if he or she receives 
certain forms of public assistance, or if his or her income 
after taxes is 125 percent or less of the Federal poverty 
threshold.  G. L. c. 261, § 27A. 
11 
 
830, 840-841 (2019) (discussing process for determining 
indigency in more detail).  Once a court has determined a party 
is indigent,  
"it shall not deny any request with respect to normal fees 
and costs, and it shall not deny any request with respect 
to extra fees and costs if it finds the document, service 
or object is reasonably necessary to assure the applicant 
as effective a prosecution, defense or appeal as he would 
have if he were financially able to pay."  
 
G. L. c. 261, § 27C (4).  Appeal bonds and appeal bond premiums 
are defined in the statute as "extra fees and costs," but the 
statute makes no mention of use and occupancy payments, or of 
rent payments for indigent litigants more generally.  See G. L. 
c. 261, § 27A.  
B.  Summary process appeals.  As we most recently discussed 
in King, 485 Mass. at 43, G. L. c. 239, §§ 5 and 6, provide the 
procedures for appeals from judgments in postforeclosure summary 
process actions.  When a defendant appeals from a judgment for 
the plaintiff in a summary process action, he or she is 
ordinarily required to post an appeal bond "in a reasonable 
amount to be fixed by the court," which must be "conditioned to 
pay to the plaintiff, if final judgment is in plaintiff's favor, 
all rent accrued at the date of the bond [and] all intervening 
rent."  G. L. c. 239, § 5 (c).  See Adjartey, 481 Mass. at 857-
858 (discussing appeals from summary process judgments).  In the 
postforeclosure appeal context,  
12 
 
"the condition of the bond shall be for the entry of the 
action and payment to the plaintiff, if final judgment is 
in his favor, of all costs and of a reasonable amount as 
rent of the land from the day when the mortgage was 
foreclosed until possession of the land is obtained by the 
plaintiff." 
 
G. L. c. 239, § 6.  The purpose of these bond provisions is "to 
deter frivolous appeals and to provide compensation for 
plaintiffs for the loss of the property during the appeal."  
King, supra at 42-43.   
The summary process statute sets out specific procedures 
for appeals by indigent parties.  A defendant who is indigent 
within the meaning of G. L. c. 261, § 27A, may move to waive the 
appeal bond otherwise required to pursue an appeal.  G. L. 
c. 239, § 5 (e).  In such situations, the court must determine 
whether the defendant is indigent and whether the defendant has 
any grounds for appeal that are not frivolous.  Id.  If the 
court is satisfied that the defendant meets both conditions, it 
"shall waive the requirement of the bond or security."  
Nonetheless, and most important for our decision in the instant 
case,  
"[t]he court shall require any person for whom the bond 
. . . has been waived to pay in installments as the same 
becomes due, pending appeal, all or any portion of any rent 
which shall become due after the date of the waiver.  A 
court shall not require the person to make any other 
payments or deposits." 
 
13 
 
Id.10  We further explained in King, 485 Mass. at 46, that the 
Legislature intended "'rent' in this context more broadly to 
encompass use and occupancy payments, which would include 
payments owed by defendants in possession to purchasers of 
foreclosed properties like the bank in [that] case."  
Accordingly, § 5 (e) contemplates that indigent defendants 
seeking to appeal from summary process actions should have their 
appeal bond waived, but "shall [be] require[d]" to pay use and 
occupancy payments to a plaintiff who has won a judgment of 
possession.  Id.   
When we considered the application of §§ 5 and 6 to an 
indigent defendant in King, 485 Mass. at 38, we applied these 
provisions and concluded that "the bond for a defendant 
appealing from an adverse judgment in a postforeclosure summary 
process action may be waived if he or she is indigent and 
pursuing nonfrivolous arguments on appeal."  Id.  We observed, 
however, that "the postforeclosure defendant whose bond is 
waived may be ordered to pay use and occupancy to the plaintiff, 
based on 'all or any portion' of the reasonable monthly rental 
 
10 The terms "rent" and "use and occupancy" are used 
essentially interchangeably in this context to refer to payments 
made by the occupant of a property to compensate the owner for 
the occupant's use of the property.  See King, 485 Mass. at 49-
50 (discussing close link between terms "rent" and "use and 
occupancy"); Davis v. Comerford, 483 Mass. 164, 169 n.13 (2019) 
(same).   
 
14 
 
value of the property."  Id. at 38-39.  We further explained 
that "under the statute, rent balances the interests of 
plaintiffs and defendants in summary process cases when 
defendants remain in possession.  Such rent is paid in two 
different scenarios:  either in lieu of a waived bond, or as 
part of a bond that is not waived."  Id. at 46. 
ii.  Application.  Because the Legislature specifically and 
unambiguously required the payment of use and occupancy as rent, 
even from indigent defendants, under G. L. c. 239, §§ 5 and 6, 
we cannot conclude that the Legislature intended for use and 
occupancy payments to be waived as "extra fees and costs" under 
the more general provision of the indigent court costs law.  See 
Commonwealth v. K.W., 490 Mass. 619, 624 (2022), quoting Dorrian 
v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 479 Mass. 265, 271 (2018) ("plain and 
unambiguous" words in statute are considered "conclusive as to 
legislative intent").  "[W]here statutes deal with the same 
subject, the more specific statute controls the more general 
one," Wing v. Commissioner of Probation, 473 Mass. 368, 373-374 
(2015), and here we are persuaded that § 5 (e) was intended to 
provide specific requirements for indigent litigants in summary 
process appeals that diverge from the general rules for 
indigency provided in the indigent court costs law.  As we 
explained in King, 485 Mass. at 45-46, such payments have their 
own specific authorization and requirements, separate and apart 
15 
 
from court costs and the appeal bonds in which they may be 
included.  Although the bonds may be waived for indigent 
defendants, the use and occupancy payments made "as rent" may 
not.  G. L. c. 239, §§ 5 (e), 6.  These specific requirements 
are necessary to protect the interests of plaintiffs who have 
prevailed in a summary process action but have not been able to 
occupy the property while an appeal remains pending.  The 
required payments also reflect the fact that defendants may not 
otherwise be paying a mortgage or rent but nonetheless continue 
to reside on the property during the pendency of the appeal.  In 
the instant case, no mortgage payments have been made for eleven 
years, and the defendants failed to make any of the interim use 
and occupancy payments ordered during the pendency of the 
summary process action below.  Defendants are not entitled to 
occupy a property for over a decade mortgage and rent free.  
King, supra at 52 ("a defendant who remains in possession after 
foreclosure is not entitled to remain on the property for 
nothing, even if he or she is indigent and even if he or she has 
a nonfrivolous defense").  See Kargman v. Dustin, 5 
Mass. App. Ct. 101, 110 (1977) (requirement that tenants pay use 
and occupancy "is by no means unfair to the tenant since he is 
being required to do no more than fulfill a contractual 
obligation which he voluntarily assumed at the outset of his 
tenancy . . . .  To reach a different conclusion would be to 
16 
 
accord tenants squatters' rights pending the resolution of their 
appeals").   
In addition to ignoring the specific and unambiguous 
requirements of G. L. c. 239, §§ 5 and 6, D'Andrea's attempt to 
shoehorn use and occupancy payments into the general provisions 
of the indigency statute is strained at best.  Use and occupancy 
payments are not included in the definition of "extra fees and 
costs."  G. L. c. 261, § 27A.  Furthermore, according to the 
statute a court should only grant a request for extra fees and 
costs if "it finds the document, service or object is reasonably 
necessary to assure the applicant as effective a prosecution, 
defense or appeal as he would have if he were financially 
available to pay."  G. L. c. 261, § 27C (4).  Use and occupancy 
payments required under §§ 5 or 6 do not fall within the 
ordinary meaning of "document, service or object."  
This leaves the general reference to appeal bonds in the 
definition of extra fees and costs in the indigent court costs 
law.  The argument, as best we can discern it, goes as follows:  
because appeal bonds are included in the definition of extra 
fees and costs, and use and occupancy payments can be included 
in appeal bonds in summary process cases, use and occupancy 
payments can be waived in such cases as extra fees and costs.  
The problem with this argument is that the Legislature developed 
specific provisions for the waiver of appeal bonds in summary 
17 
 
process cases and required that use and occupancy payments be 
made even if the bond is waived for indigent defendants in such 
cases.  The Legislature also distinguished use and occupancy 
payments from court costs.  Court costs are waived with appeal 
bonds, but use and occupancy payments are not.  G. L. c. 239, 
§ 5 (e).  As we explained in King, 485 Mass. at 46, "the rent a 
court may require a party to pay [as use and occupancy] under 
§ 5 (e) is distinct from the bond required by § 5 (c) or 6."  
Even when the bond is waived for an indigent defendant in a 
summary process appeal, use and occupancy payments are 
separately required.  G. L. c. 239, § 5 (e).  Thus, although 
appeal bonds in summary process cases might fall within the 
general definition of extra fees and costs under the indigent 
court costs law, use and occupancy payments shall still be 
required of indigent defendants in lieu of such bonds.  See 
King, supra.  
Finally, in most, if not all, cases, the use and occupancy 
payments ordered as rent are significantly more expensive than 
court costs and fees, which generally amount to several hundred 
dollars at most.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 262, § 4 (listing fees for 
appeals and other appellate court actions); Executive Office of 
the Trial Court, Uniform Schedule of Fees (effective Nov. 1, 
2016), https://www.mass.gov/info-details/uniform-schedule-of-
fees [https://perma.cc/U62Q-J5QD] (listing fees for other court 
18 
 
services).  By contrast, the interim use and occupancy payments 
the defendants in this case were ordered to pay during the 
pendency of this summary process action totaled $16,500 by the 
time D'Andrea appealed, and thus was several orders of magnitude 
higher than, for example, a $300 fee to file an appeal.  See 
G. L. c. 262, § 4.  The significant financial difference between 
rent and court fees explains in part why court fees and costs do 
not include rent.  If the Legislature intended the Commonwealth 
and its taxpayers to assume the much greater expense of unpaid 
rent by indigent defendants, in addition to court costs and 
fees, it would have said so expressly.  See Commonwealth v. 
Morgan, 476 Mass. 768, 778 (2017) (statutes should be read "in a 
commonsense way to effectuate legislative intent and avoid 
absurd results").  We are confident that Legislature would not 
"hide elephants in mouseholes."  See Whitman v. American 
Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001). 
For all these reasons, in answer to the first reported 
question, we conclude that use and occupancy payments required 
of indigent defendants during summary process appeals are not 
"extra fees and costs" within the meaning of the indigent court 
costs law, and therefore an indigent defendant cannot obtain 
waiver, substitution, or government payment of use and occupancy 
payments under the indigency statute. 
19 
 
c.  Constitutional questions.  We next consider the second 
reported question, whether a trial court judge may order a 
defendant in a summary process action, for whom the appeal bond 
has been waived, to pay ongoing use and occupancy pending appeal 
pursuant to G. L. c. 239, § 5 (e), in an amount that exceeds the 
defendant's ability to pay without violating the defendant's due 
process, equal protection, or art. 11 rights.  We identify a 
number of problems with the question as reported.  First, based 
on the record before us, it is not clear whether the ordered 
payments exceeded the indigent defendant's ability to pay.11  
Rather, it is only clear that the order had the potential to 
exceed D'Andrea's ability to pay.  Second, because a judge 
ordering use and occupancy payments has competing constitutional 
rights to consider, and thus a more complex problem to resolve, 
the reported question should reflect these considerations as 
well.  Finally, the constitutional question should be addressed 
as applied to the facts in the instant case, and not as an 
abstract question of law.  See Commonwealth v. Padilla, 493 
 
11 The plaintiffs suggest that because the ordered use and 
occupancy payment in the present case is below D'Andrea's 
monthly income, it is in fact an affordable payment.  D'Andrea 
argues, by contrast, that because the ordered payment is almost 
sixty percent of her monthly household income, it is 
unaffordable.  Because we conclude infra that the ordered 
payment represents a fair balancing of interests between the 
parties even if it is unaffordable for D'Andrea, we need not and 
do not decide whether the payment is affordable. 
20 
 
Mass. 1023, 1026 (2024), quoting Commonwealth v. Two Juveniles, 
397 Mass. 261, 264-265 (1986) ("in the context of reported 
questions, we are reluctant to answer a question that calls for 
a 'determination of the constitutionality of [a statute] in the 
abstract'").  See also Commonwealth v. Eldred, 480 Mass. 90, 93-
94 (2018) (reformulating reported question to make it answerable 
on existing record). 
We therefore reformulate the reported question as follows:  
may the motion judge order use and occupancy payments that 
exceed the defendant's financial ability to pay, when the motion 
judge considers the parties' competing interests and fairly 
weighs the relevant factors that have been established in the 
case law for setting the amount of use and occupancy payments?  
We conclude that the judge may do so.  See King, 485 Mass. at 51 
(setting out factors to be considered in setting use and 
occupancy payments).  See also Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 373 Mass. 
645, 653 (1977) (requirement that medical malpractice plaintiffs 
post bond to pursue lawsuit not unconstitutional "because of the 
wide discretion that the statute gives to the judge to set the 
bond amount").   
We emphasize that use and occupancy payments are required 
because both plaintiffs and defendants have an interest in the 
property in question.  King, 485 Mass. at 46.  Both have 
constitutional rights at stake.  Id. at 48.  Defendants also 
21 
 
have contractual and other legal obligations to pay mortgages 
and rent and their inability to make such payments may be the 
root cause of the summary process decision from which they are 
appealing.  For all these reasons, the statutory requirement 
ordering use and occupancy payments has a rational basis, even 
if it may result in a payment beyond the financial means of the 
defendant, and thus there is no due process, equal protection, 
or art. 11 violation in the instant case, where the motion judge 
correctly applied and fairly weighed the relevant factors set 
out in the case law.  See id. at 51; Davis v. Comerford, 483 
Mass. 164, 179-183 (2019). 
i.  Substantive due process.  Individuals are guaranteed 
due process of law both under the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and arts. 1, 10, and 12 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  See Kligler v. Attorney 
Gen., 491 Mass. 38, 55 (2022).  Due process has both procedural 
and substantive aspects, although D'Andrea only raises a 
substantive due process claim.12  Id.  Substantive due process 
 
12 As the issue of procedural due process is not raised by 
D'Andrea and we discern no basis on this record for a violation 
of an indigent party's procedural due process rights, we decline 
to resolve the issue.  Nonetheless, we note that when a 
plaintiff moves to impose an appeal bond and to set use and 
occupancy, an indigent defendant has the opportunity to provide 
the court with information regarding the condition and fair 
rental value of the property, the resources available to the 
occupants of the property, and the arguments the defendant seeks 
to present on appeal.  A defendant "who wishes to contest the 
22 
 
"protects individual liberty against 'certain government actions 
regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement 
them.'"  Id., quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 
(1986).  When a statute burdens a fundamental right, meaning a 
right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution, 
the statute is subject to strict scrutiny review, which requires 
the action be "narrowly tailored to further a compelling and 
legitimate government interest."  Kligler, supra, quoting 
LeSage, petitioner, 488 Mass. 175, 181 (2021).  Where the right 
burdened is not fundamental, we employ "rational basis" review.  
Gillespie v. Northampton, 460 Mass. 148, 153 (2011).  See 
Goodridge v. Department of Pub. Health, 440 Mass. 309, 330 
 
amount of periodic payments required by the court [as use and 
occupancy] may seek review" of that decision.  G. L. c. 239, 
§ 5 (f).  This is precisely what D'Andrea has done here.  
Pursuant to § 5 (f), a court on appeal reviews the judge's use 
and occupancy order "for a fair balancing of interests 
considering those same factors."  King, 485 Mass. at 51-52 
(section 5 (f) "also appears to provide for a de novo standard 
of review of the judge's [use and occupancy] order").  
Defendants who have been ordered to pay a use and occupancy sum 
they consider unaffordable thus have an opportunity on appeal to 
argue before a different judge and to explain why the amount is 
unaffordable, what a fair and affordable amount for use and 
occupancy would be, and why their appeal is likely meritorious 
and should not be foreclosed because of their inability to pay 
the use and occupancy ordered by the judge below.  See id. at 
52-53.  See also G. L. c. 239, § 5 (g) (on appeal from order for 
use and occupancy, reviewing court "shall schedule a speedy 
hearing thereon" and may require further testimony "if the 
reviewing court shall find that the taking of further testimony 
would aid the disposition of the review").  Extensive procedural 
protections are therefore provided to indigent defendants under 
the statute. 
23 
 
(2003).  "Under the rational basis standard, a statute is 
constitutionally sound if it is reasonably related to the 
furtherance of a valid State interest."  Gillespie, supra.  
"Furthermore, 'it is well settled that a statute is presumed to 
be constitutional and every rational presumption in favor of the 
statute's validity is made.'"  Greene v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 
491 Mass. 866, 880-881 (2023), quoting Gillespie, supra at 152.   
Our case law has consistently established that we apply 
rational basis review in this context.  See Gillespie, 460 Mass. 
at 154 ("no court has concluded that . . . the right to bring a 
judicial challenge, once provided by statute, is of such a 
fundamental character that it may never be fettered by the 
payment of a filing fee"); Longval v. Superior Court Dep't of 
the Trial Court, 434 Mass. 718, 723 (2001) (free access to 
courts is not fundamental right, so burdens are reviewed under 
rational basis).  Cf. Paro, 373 Mass. at 652-653 ("As long as 
the [judge's] discretion [to set the bond amount for a medical 
malpractice action] is exercised without unreasonably 
prohibiting meritorious claims, no constitutional violation will 
exist"); Damaskos v. Board of Appeal of Boston, 359 Mass. 55, 
63-64 (1971) (statutory provision requiring appeal bond for 
appeals from zoning board decisions avoided constitutional 
infirmity so long as judges exercised their discretion to 
discourage frivolous appeals but not to unreasonably prohibit 
24 
 
meritorious appeals).  D'Andrea argues that a fundamental right 
analysis should apply but presents only conclusory statements to 
support this claim.13  We therefore decline her invitation to 
revisit our case law, and we review the constitutionality of 
requiring use and occupancy payments as a condition of pursuing 
a summary process appeal under rational basis review. 
Turning to the specific question whether a judge could 
rationally set use and occupancy at a level unaffordable for 
this defendant, we conclude that a fair balancing of interests 
weighs in favor of setting use and occupancy payments at the 
level set by the Housing Court judge, even if it is potentially 
higher than D'Andrea's ability to pay.  As we have explained, it 
is reasonable for the Legislature to consider the interests of 
landlords or owners who have been denied possession of their 
property during the pendency of the appeal, as well as the 
interests of the defendants in pursuing the appeal.  See King, 
485 Mass. at 48 (there are "due process implications when a 
tenant at sufferance in the postforeclosure context remains in 
possession without paying use and occupancy").  In the instant 
case, as we stated above, no mortgage payments have been made 
for eleven years and no use and occupancy payments have been 
 
13 The amicus brief submitted by South Coastal Counties 
Legal Services, Inc., and Justice Center of Southeast 
Massachusetts, LLC, correctly recognizes that access to the 
courts is analyzed under the rational basis standard of review. 
25 
 
made by the defendants since they were ordered to do so, 
beginning in July 2022.  
As we explained in King, 485 Mass. at 53:  
"The reality of the situation is, even assuming the 
defendant has a meritorious claim under [Pinti v. Emigrant 
Mtge. Co., 472 Mass. 226, 236-237 (2015)], if he cannot 
afford use and occupancy that amounts to less than his 
monthly mortgage payment -- an amount he has not been able 
to afford for years before this litigation commenced -- the 
bank will likely have no choice but to reinstate 
foreclosure proceedings." 
 
In such a situation, a judge could rationally conclude that a 
fair balancing of the interests between the plaintiff and the 
defendant would be to require the defendant to pay use and 
occupancy potentially in excess of what the defendant could 
afford, because it is still less than the mortgage payments the 
defendant would otherwise be required to pay to retain 
possession of the house.  A defendant who is unable to afford 
even those lesser payments will very quickly be facing eviction 
once again.  Id., citing Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n v. Marroquin, 
477 Mass. 82, 90 n.8 (2017) (even if defendant can void 
foreclosure sale, mortgagee may still reinitiate foreclosure 
process).  To hold that use and occupancy payments may never 
exceed a defendant's ability to pay, as D'Andrea urges us to do, 
would mandate that indigent defendants be ordered to pay nothing 
or a token sum as use and occupancy on appeal, even when the 
mortgage or rental payments they would otherwise be required to 
26 
 
pay are well beyond their means, and plaintiffs would thus be 
completely deprived of use of their property without 
compensation.  This, we have explicitly stated, "is not the fair 
balancing of interests contemplated by the Legislature."  King, 
supra at 52.   
We conclude that the ordered use and occupancy payment of 
$1,275 per month in this case was rational and represents a fair 
balancing of interests between the parties, even if it exceeds 
D'Andrea's ability to pay.  See King, 485 Mass. at 51-52.   
"Among the factors that a court may consider are the fair 
rental value of the property, the merits of the defense, 
the amount owed per month on the mortgage, the number of 
months that no money has been paid on the mortgage, the 
real estate taxes on the property, the expected duration of 
the litigation, and the respective financial conditions of 
the parties." 
   
Id. at 51, citing Davis, 483 Mass. at 179-182.  The Housing 
Court judge followed this guidance.  He considered 
uncontroverted evidence that the fair rental value of the 
property was around $1,700 per month, and the record shows that 
the monthly mortgage payments for the property were around 
$1,400.  He reasonably characterized D'Andrea's appellate claims 
as relatively weak.14  He also correctly took into account that 
 
14 D'Andrea challenges the foreclosure of the property by 
Chase on the grounds that no face-to-face meeting was held 
between her and Chase prior to foreclosure, as required by 
Federal regulations.  It is unclear based on this record whether 
D'Andrea had any cognizable ownership interest in the property, 
and thus it is unclear whether Chase was actually required to 
27 
 
the plaintiffs purchased the property in December 2021 for 
$175,566.85, and since that time have paid the amounts due for 
the property's real estate taxes ($3,464 per year), water and 
sewer charges (approximately $1,500 per year), and insurance 
($1,821 per year).  Importantly, as discussed supra, the judge 
recognized that the defendants had paid no use and occupancy to 
the plaintiffs during the seventeen months that the plaintiffs 
had owned the property, and the record reflects that no mortgage 
payments were made on the property after March of 2013.  The 
judge also properly considered that the defendants' income is 
limited,15 and set use and occupancy at $1,275 per month, lower 
 
hold a face-to-face meeting, as it is undisputed that at the 
time of foreclosure, the title owner of the property and the 
sole signatory of the mortgage, Menzone, had been deceased for 
six years.  The record shows that D'Andrea filed a voluntary 
administration statement for her mother's estate in the 
Worcester Division of the Probate and Family Court, wherein 
D'Andrea averred that Menzone's estate consisted entirely of 
personal property.  It is unclear based on the record whether 
D'Andrea ever held title to the property in her own name, or 
whether she has the authority to bring defenses on the behalf of 
her mother's estate.  The merits of D'Andrea's appeal are not 
before us, however, so we express no opinions as to the chain of 
title of the home, except to note that the uncertainty reflected 
in the record does potentially weaken her likelihood of success 
on appeal.  See King, 485 Mass. at 51 (merits of defense is 
among factors weighed in setting use and occupancy). 
 
15 D'Andrea testified that she receives approximately $1,050 
per month from Social Security.  She testified that her adult 
son, Shawn D'Andrea, who lives with her on the property, does 
not work and has no income, and that her daughter, Jennifer 
Wilson, who also lives with her, receives approximately $1,100 
per month from Social Security.  Although D'Andrea was the only 
defendant who filed a notice of appeal from the summary process 
28 
 
than both the fair rental value of the property and the monthly 
payments required under the mortgage, reflecting consideration 
of D'Andrea's limited ability to pay as one factor in his 
analysis.  For these reasons, we conclude that the use and 
occupancy order represents a fair balancing of interests, even 
if this amount is ultimately beyond the defendants' financial 
capacity.  See King, 485 Mass. at 53.  
Because the judge considered and fairly weighed the 
appropriate factors, the order is rationally related to the 
summary process statute's goals of balancing the competing 
interests of plaintiffs and defendants pending appeal.  See 
King, 485 Mass. at 53 (fair balancing of interests where use and 
occupancy payment was below fair market value and monthly 
mortgage payment, even if it was not necessarily affordable for 
defendant).  Accordingly, there was no violation of D'Andrea's 
substantive due process rights.   
ii.  Equal protection and purchase of justice.  D'Andrea 
also argues that setting use and occupancy payments at a level 
beyond her capacity to pay violates her right to equal 
protection of the law because it treats indigent summary process 
defendants differently from those with means to pay.  D'Andrea 
 
judgment, the judge appropriately considered the entire 
household income when setting use and occupancy for D'Andrea's 
appeal. 
29 
 
further contends that setting use and occupancy at such a level 
violates art. 11's prohibition against the purchase of justice.  
As explained infra, we apply rational basis review for all these 
claims, and for the reasons discussed supra and supplemented 
infra, there is a rational basis supporting the requirement of 
use and occupancy.  We therefore likewise conclude that there is 
no equal protection violation and no violation of art. 11. 
Both the Fourteenth Amendment and arts. 1 and 10 guarantee 
equal protection under the law.16  "This guarantee 'is 
essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated 
should be treated alike.'"  Kligler, 491 Mass. at 72, quoting 
Moore v. Executive Office of the Trial Court, 487 Mass. 839, 848 
(2021).  If a statute discriminates on the basis of a suspect 
classification, it is subject to strict judicial scrutiny; all 
other equal protection claims are evaluated under rational basis 
review.  Gillespie, 460 Mass. at 158.  D'Andrea does not argue 
that indigent summary process defendants are a suspect class, so 
we review for a rational basis.  "When an appeal is afforded, 
. . . it cannot be granted to some litigants and capriciously or 
arbitrarily denied to others without violating the Equal 
Protection Clause."  Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 77 (1972).   
 
16 "The standard for equal protection analysis under our 
Declaration of Rights is the same as under the Fourteenth 
Amendment."  Gillespie, 460 Mass. at 158 n.16, citing Dickerson 
v. Attorney Gen., 396 Mass. 740, 743 (1986). 
30 
 
As explained in our discussion of substantive due process 
supra, the requirement that D'Andrea pay use and occupancy 
during the pendency of her appeal, even if such payment is 
beyond her ability to pay, has a rational basis.  It protects 
the plaintiffs' interests in the property and reflects 
D'Andrea's contractual or other legal requirements to pay rent 
for the property she continues to occupy.  Her indigency remains 
a relevant factor but is not the sole determinant for the amount 
of the ordered use and occupancy payment.  See King, 485 Mass. 
at 51 (listing factors for courts to consider when setting 
appellate use and occupancy in postforeclosure summary process 
context); Davis, 483 Mass. at 179-183 (same for use and 
occupancy payments in landlord-tenant context).  As the 
statutory scheme does not make arbitrary or irrational 
distinctions between the defendant here and a defendant who can 
make such a payment, we discern no equal protection violation.  
See Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 77; King, supra at 52-53.  See also 
Gillespie, 460 Mass. at 160 ("Where no suspect classification is 
drawn, the Legislature is permitted to distinguish among civil 
litigants in providing greater or lesser procedural rights and 
to exercise this prerogative based on its perception of the 
significance of the interests involved").  The defendant who can 
make such a payment is not depriving the plaintiff of 
compensation during the appeal process and does not face the 
31 
 
same likelihood of inevitable eviction due to the inability to 
pay the rent or mortgage the defendant would otherwise be 
required to pay to continue to reside on the property.17  
There is likewise no violation of art. 11.  "[W]here [a 
statute] does not reach a fundamental right or contravene the 
equal protection clause, we do not consider it violative of art. 
11's purchase of justice clause, where the statutory scheme is 
supported by a rational basis."  Gillespie, 460 Mass. at 161.   
 
17 The requirement that defendants make ongoing use and 
occupancy payments as a condition of their appeal under G. L. 
c. 239, § 5 (e), is clearly distinguishable from the statute 
held unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in 
Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 75-76.  There, the Court considered an 
Oregon statute that required tenants seeking to appeal from 
eviction proceedings to post an appeal bond equal to "twice the 
rental value of the premises 'from the commencement of the 
action in which the judgment was rendered until final judgment 
in the action.'"  Id., quoting Or. Rev. Stat. § 105.160, 
repealed by 1977 Or. Laws c. 365, § 3, and 1977 Or. Laws c. 416, 
§ 5.  The Court held that the double-bond provision of the 
Oregon statute was unconstitutional under the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it was not rationally 
related to any legitimate government purpose.  Lindsey, supra at 
77.  Importantly, however, the Court reasoned that the double-
bond requirement was not rationally related to the protection of 
a landlord's property interest because tenants seeking to appeal 
were also subject to Oregon's general appeal bond statute, which 
required tenants to make use and occupancy payments to the 
landlord during the pendency of the appeal.  Id. at 77-78.  By 
contrast, use and occupancy payments required under G. L. 
c. 239, § 5 (e), are the only reasonably necessary costs that 
must be paid by indigent defendants on appeal, and they are set 
by a judge in consideration of many factors, including the 
defendant's resources and the costs borne by the plaintiff 
related to the property at issue.  Contrast id. at 77 (equal 
protection clause violated if appeals are "granted to some 
litigants and capriciously or arbitrarily denied to others"). 
32 
 
3.  Conclusion.  We answer the issues raised in the 
reported questions as follows: 
A trial court judge may not order ongoing use and occupancy 
payments pending appeal to be waived, substituted, or paid by 
the Commonwealth as an extra fee or cost under the indigent 
court costs law, G. L. c. 261, § 27A.  The Legislature 
specifically and unambiguously required an indigent defendant 
whose appeal bond has been waived pursuant to G. L. c. 239, 
§ 5 (e), to make ongoing use and occupancy payments pending 
appeal.  
As there are competing interests and constitutional rights 
at stake, a motion judge may order use and occupancy payments 
that exceed the amount a defendant can pay so long as the judge 
considers and properly weighs the factors established in the 
case law when balancing the interests of the parties.  See King, 
485 Mass. at 51 (providing factors to be considered); Davis, 483 
Mass. at 179-183 (same).   
The matter is remanded to the single justice of the Appeals 
Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.