Title: Marsh v. Mass. Coastal Railroad LLC
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13366
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: August 14, 2023

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-13366 
 
CHAD MARSH  vs.  MASSACHUSETTS COASTAL RAILROAD LLC & another.1 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     April 5, 2023. – August 14, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Massachusetts Wage Act.  Public Works, Wage determination.  
Federal Preemption.  Labor, Public works, Wages.  Railroad.  
Statute, Construction, Federal preemption.  Practice, 
Civil, Motion to dismiss. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
July 23, 2021. 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Brian S. Glenny, J., and a 
motion for reconsideration was considered by him. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
Alvin S. Nathanson (Conner P. Lang also present) for the 
defendants. 
Raven Moeslinger for the plaintiff. 
Sarah G. Yurasko, of the District of Columbia, & William D. 
Black, for American Short Line and Regional Railroad 
Association, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
 
1 P. Chris Podgurski. 
2 
 
 
WENDLANDT, J.  The Prevailing Wage Act, G. L. c. 149, 
§§ 26-27H (Prevailing Wage Act, or Act), evinces the 
Legislature's intent that laborers performing work in the 
Commonwealth on the Commonwealth's public works projects are 
paid a fair wage as determined by the Commonwealth based on 
prevailing market conditions (prevailing wage).  The Act is 
designed to avoid rewarding a contractor that submits an 
artificially low bid on public works projects by paying its 
employees less than the prevailing wage.  It embodies the 
Commonwealth's policy to dedicate public funds to the payment of 
wages consistent with market conditions to employees on public 
works projects. 
 
In the present case, the plaintiff, Chad Marsh, alleges 
that the defendant Massachusetts Coastal Railroad LLC (MCR) paid 
him less than the prevailing wage on State public works 
projects, including a project to restore commuter rail service 
between Boston and southeastern Massachusetts (South Coast Rail 
project).  On appeal from the denial of their motion to dismiss, 
MCR, a railroad company, and its managing officer, the defendant 
P. Chris Podgurski, contend that the Interstate Commerce 
Commission Termination Act, 49 U.S.C. § 10501 (ICCTA), which 
provides that the remedies set forth in the ICCTA "with respect 
to regulation of rail transportation are exclusive and preempt 
the remedies provided under Federal or State Law," 49 U.S.C. 
3 
 
§ 10501(b), preempts the Prevailing Wage Act.  As a result, they 
assert that the Commonwealth is precluded from enforcing the Act 
to ensure that laborers engaged in public works projects are 
paid a prevailing wage by the Commonwealth's contractors where 
the contractor that wins the bid for a contract is a railroad 
company. 
 
Because the defendants' argument is unsupported by the 
plain language of the ICCTA, and because the argument runs 
counter to the long-established principle that, in the absence 
of a clear expression otherwise, we must presume that Congress 
did not intend to preempt a State's exercise of its historic 
police powers, we conclude that the defendants have failed to 
show that the Prevailing Wage Act is preempted.  Further 
concluding that the defendants also have not shown that the Act 
is preempted under either the field or conflict preemption 
doctrines and that, at this stage of the litigation, Marsh's 
allegation that he performed qualifying work on a public works 
project covered by the Prevailing Wage Act plausibly suggests a 
right to relief under the Act, we affirm.2 
 
1.  Background.  "We recite the facts asserted in the 
amended complaint, taking them as true for purposes of 
 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the American 
Short Line and Regional Railroad Association. 
4 
 
evaluating the motion to dismiss."  Edwards v. Commonwealth, 477 
Mass. 254, 255 (2017). 
 
a.  Complaint's allegations.  MCR is "a railroad company 
specializing in integrated rail freight and logistics services 
that completes public works projects throughout Massachusetts."  
Podgurski is "an officer or agent having the management of MCR," 
who "participated to a substantial [degree] in formulating the 
policies of the company."  In June 2019, MCR hired Marsh as an 
equipment operator. 
 
During Marsh's employment, MCR entered into contracts with 
the Commonwealth to complete "integrated rail freight and 
logistics projects," including the South Coast Rail project, the 
purpose of which was to "restore commuter rail service between 
Boston and southeastern Massachusetts"; Marsh alleges that 
"these projects constituted public works projects and/or public 
works to be constructed within the meaning of . . . G. L. 
c. 149, §§ 27, 27F."  In connection with these projects, Marsh 
operated certain construction vehicles and equipment.3  He was 
paid an hourly rate that was less than the applicable prevailing 
wage rate for his work.  In June 2021, Marsh resigned. 
 
3 Marsh operated boom trucks, backhoes, and loaders to 
unload materials on site.  He also used a backhoe to dig, and he 
used a tamper to tamp stone to lift and level railway tracks.  
In operating the equipment, Marsh made "additions and/or 
alterations to public property and/or public works." 
5 
 
 
b.  Procedural history.  Marsh commenced the present action 
against the defendants, seeking relief related to MCR's failure 
to pay him the prevailing wage for his work on public works 
projects.  In particular, he alleges that he was entitled to a 
prevailing wage as an operator of vehicles and equipment engaged 
in public works projects, under G. L. c. 149, § 27F,4 and as a 
laborer performing a construction job on public works projects, 
under G. L. c. 149, § 27.5  He contends that the defendants 
 
 
4 General Laws c. 149, § 27F, provides that 
 
"[n]o agreement of lease, rental or other arrangement, and 
no order or requisition under which a truck or any 
automotive or other vehicle or equipment is to be engaged 
in public works by the [C]ommonwealth . . . shall be 
entered into or given by any public official or public body 
unless said agreement, order or requisition contains a 
stipulation requiring prescribed rates of wages, as 
determined by the commissioner [of the Department of Labor 
Standards (DLS), see G. L. c. 149, § 1], to be paid to the 
operators of said trucks, vehicles or equipment" (emphasis 
added). 
 
The § 27F claim was brought only against MCR. 
 
 
5 General Laws c. 149, § 27, provides that 
 
"[p]rior to awarding a contract for the construction of 
public works, [a] public official or public body shall 
submit to the commissioner [of DLS] a list of the jobs upon 
which . . . laborers are to be employed, and shall request 
the commissioner to determine the rate of wages to be paid 
on each job." 
 
Contractors engaged by the Commonwealth to perform work on 
public works construction projects must "annually obtain updated 
rates from the public official or public body[,] and no 
contractor or subcontractor shall pay less than the rates so 
established" (emphasis added).  Id.  "Whoever shall pay less 
6 
 
violated these provisions of the Prevailing Wage Act by failing 
to pay him the prevailing wage for his work,6 and further 
violated the Fair Minimum Wage Act, G. L. c. 151, §§ 1A, 1B,7 by 
failing to use the prevailing wage as the basis for calculating 
his overtime wages.  He also alleges that, because he was not 
paid the full amount due for each pay period during which he 
should have been paid the prevailing wage, the defendants 
violated the requirement of the Wage Act, G. L. c. 149, § 148,8 
 
than said rate or rates of wages . . . on said works . . . shall 
have violated this section and shall be punished or shall be 
subject to a civil citation or order."  Id. 
 
 
6 General Laws c. 149, § 27F, provides a private right of 
action for "for any damages incurred, and for any lost wages and 
other benefits" to operators of "equipment . . . engaged in 
public works by the [C]ommonwealth" who "claim[] to be 
aggrieved" by violations of the Prevailing Wage Act; G. L. 
c. 149, § 27, affords the same private right of action to 
laborers on public works. 
 
 
7 General Laws c. 151, § 1A, provides that, aside from 
certain exceptions, 
 
"no employer in the [C]ommonwealth shall employ any of his 
employees in any occupation . . . for a work week longer 
than forty hours, unless such employee receives 
compensation for his employment in excess of forty hours at 
a rate not less than one and one half times the regular 
rate at which he is employed" (emphasis added). 
 
General Laws c. 151, § 1B, provides a private right of action 
for employees who are paid less than the overtime rate of 
compensation. 
 
 
8 The Wage Act provides, in relevant part, that 
 
"[e]very person having employees in his service shall pay 
weekly or bi-weekly each such employee the wages earned by 
7 
 
that he receive earned wages timely.9  Finally, Marsh alleges 
that, following his resignation, MCR failed to pay him timely 
for his accrued paid time off and approximately eight hours of 
work.  When he received both payments, he was not compensated 
fully by the tardy payments.10 
 
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that 
Marsh's claims, which depend on the applicability of the 
Prevailing Wage Act, failed because the Prevailing Wage Act was 
preempted.  Alternatively, the defendants maintained that 
dismissal was warranted because MCR's contracts with the 
Commonwealth did not involve "public works" projects governed by 
 
him to within six days of the termination of the pay period 
during which the wages were earned if employed for five or 
six days in a calendar week . . . but any employee leaving 
his employment shall be paid in full on the following 
regular pay day, and, in the absence of a regular pay day, 
on the following Saturday" (emphasis added). 
 
G. L. c. 149, § 148, first par.  It further provides that "[t]he 
word 'wages' shall include any holiday or vacation payments due 
an employee under an oral or written agreement."  Id. 
 
 
9 The defendants do not address, nor do we reach, the issue 
whether recovery under the Wage Act is permissible under the 
circumstances alleged in the complaint.  See Donis v. American 
Waste Servs., LLC, 485 Mass. 257, 269 (2020) ("Where . . . the 
sole basis for [the employees'] claim is a violation of the 
Prevailing Wage Act, the [employees] may not restate their 
claims under the Wage Act to evade the limitations of the 
Prevailing Wage Act on the scope of potentially liable 
defendants"). 
 
 
10 See Reuter v. Methuen, 489 Mass. 465, 466 (2022) 
(employer is responsible for trebled amount of late wages under 
Wage Act). 
8 
 
the Prevailing Wage Act.  In a thorough and thoughtful decision, 
the Superior Court judge denied the motion, as well as the 
defendants' subsequent motion for reconsideration.  The 
defendants filed a notice of appeal from the denial of both 
motions, and we transferred the case to this court on our own 
motion. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  "We review the 
denial of a motion to dismiss under Mass. R. Civ. P. 
12 (b) (6)[, 365 Mass. 754 (1974),] de novo."  Dunn v. Genzyme 
Corp., 486 Mass. 713, 717 (2021).11  In doing so, we accept "as 
true all well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint, drawing 
all reasonable inferences therefrom in the plaintiff's favor, 
and determining whether the allegations plausibly suggest that 
the plaintiff is entitled to relief."  Lanier v. President & 
Fellows of Harvard College, 490 Mass. 37, 43 (2022). 
 
 
11 Orders denying a motion to dismiss "generally are not 
appealable until the ultimate disposition of the case because 
they are not 'final orders.'"  Brum v. Dartmouth, 428 Mass. 684, 
687 (1999).  The present appeal raises "a significant issue" 
concerning the Prevailing Wage Act, which "has been briefed 
fully by the parties," and "addressing it would be in the public 
interest."  Marcus v. Newton, 462 Mass. 148, 153 (2012).  Cf. 
Witty v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 366 F.3d 380, 382 (5th Cir. 
2004) (allowing interlocutory review of preemption issue).  The 
defendants maintain that interlocutory review is appropriate, 
and Marsh does not disagree.  Accordingly, we exercise our 
discretion to reach the merits of the parties' arguments.  See, 
e.g., Dunn, 486 Mass. at 717 (granting application for 
interlocutory review of denied motion to dismiss raising 
preemption issue). 
9 
 
 
b.  Prevailing Wage Act framework.  The Prevailing Wage Act 
is a general law12 "that concerns a subject of traditional State 
regulation."  Felix A. Marino Co. v. Commissioner of Labor & 
Indus., 426 Mass. 458, 463 (1998).  It "govern[s] the setting 
and payment of wages on [certain] public works projects."  Donis 
v. American Waste Servs., LLC, 485 Mass. 257, 263 (2020), 
quoting McCarty's Case, 445 Mass. 361, 370 (2005) (Sosman, J., 
concurring).  It was enacted "to achieve parity between the 
wages of workers engaged in public construction projects and 
workers in the rest of the construction industry."  Donis, 
supra, quoting Mullally v. Waste Mgt. of Mass., Inc., 452 Mass. 
526, 532 (2008). 
The prevailing wage schedule, which lists the prevailing 
wage for each job category on a public works project, is 
determined by the commissioner of the Department of Labor 
Standards (DLS), based on wages paid for similar work on the 
market.  McCarty's Case, 445 Mass. at 370 (Sosman, J., 
concurring), citing G. L. c. 149, § 26 (in determining schedule, 
"the commissioner must take into account, and may not set rates 
of wages that are less than, wage rates paid to laborers who 
 
12 See Black's Law Dictionary 1057 (11th ed. 2019) (defining 
"general law" as a "[l]aw that is neither local nor confined in 
application to particular persons" that "purports to apply to 
all persons or places of a specified class throughout the 
jurisdiction"). 
10 
 
work in the same municipality, wage rates paid pursuant to 
collective bargaining agreements in the construction industry, 
and wage rates paid to employees working in the private 
construction industry").  The commissioner's "goal is to make 
[the prevailing] wage rates comparable to what is being earned 
by employees performing similar jobs in other parts of the 
construction industry."13  McCarty's Case, supra. 
Pursuant to the Act, a contractor bidding on a public works 
project is expected to use the prevailing wage rates set forth 
in the Commonwealth's prevailing wage schedule to calculate the 
labor costs included in its proposed bid.  G. L. c. 149, § 27 
(requiring public officials to incorporate schedule of 
prevailing wage rates in each request for proposals for each 
public works project).  If selected to perform work on a public 
works project, the contractor must pay, at the least, the 
 
13 "To achieve that parity, [the Act] further provides that 
in calculating the rates of wages for a public works project, 
the commissioner must include [not only the hourly wages, but 
also] '[p]ayments by employers to health and welfare plans, 
pension plans and supplementary unemployment benefit plans under 
collective bargaining agreements or understandings between 
organized labor and employers.'"  McCarty's Case, 445 Mass. at 
371 (Sosman, J., concurring), quoting G. L. c. 149, § 26.  "In 
other words, to establish comparable rates, the commissioner is 
to consider the entire compensation package, which, under 
collective bargaining agreements, often includes valuable fringe 
benefits in addition to hourly cash wages.  Failure to consider 
those other components in the total package would produce 
obvious disparity, and merely making the hourly pay rates 
identical would not provide the comparable level of compensation 
that § 26 seeks to achieve."  McCarty's Case, supra. 
11 
 
prevailing wage to its laborers on the project for the duration 
of the contract with the Commonwealth.  Id. (requiring that 
prevailing wage schedule "be made a part of the contract for 
said [public] works [projects] and shall continue to be the 
minimum rate or rates of wages for said employees during the 
life of the contract").14 
 
The Prevailing Wage Act "prevents a contractor from 
'offer[ing] its services [to the Commonwealth] for less than 
what is customarily charged by its competitors for nonpublic 
works contracts,'" Donis, 485 Mass. at 263-264, quoting 
Mullally, 452 Mass. at 533, and further "protects an employee's 
interest in receiving a wage commensurate with his or her 
labor," Donis, supra at 263.  It "has the effect of providing 
all workers with comparable total compensation [to that which 
laborers receive on nonpublic works projects], whatever form it 
takes, and, in particular, ensures that employers have no 
financial incentive to hire nonunion labor as opposed to union 
 
 
14 "Where th[e prevailing wage] rates have included amounts 
paid for benefit packages, an employer may satisfy that part of 
the required 'rate' either by making payment to and providing 
the employee with the benefit plan or by 'pay[ing] the amount of 
said payments directly to each employee.'"  McCarty's Case, 445 
Mass. at 371 (Sosman, J., concurring), quoting G. L. c. 149, 
§ 27.  Thus, the "benefits component of the [prevailing wage] 
rate may be provided either in the form of benefits or in the 
form of cash."  McCarty's Case, supra. 
12 
 
workers."  McCarty's Case, 445 Mass. at 372 (Sosman, J., 
concurring).15 
The Act embodies the Legislature's policy to govern how the 
Commonwealth itself will exercise its responsibility to ensure 
that employees working on a public works project are not 
underpaid as a result of the competitive forces present in 
public bidding contests.  See Donis, 485 Mass. at 263-264.  In 
other words, it represents the Commonwealth's decision, through 
its contracts, to dedicate public funds to the payment of wages 
consistent with market conditions to employees on public works 
projects.16  See id. at 262 ("For each kind of project to which 
it applies, the Prevailing Wage Act provides a mechanism for 
setting and enforcing minimum wage rates"). 
 
c.  Preemption.  With this background in mind, we turn to 
consider the defendants' preemption arguments.  State law is 
 
 
15 "The fringe benefit packages required by collective 
bargaining agreements are not an expense that can be avoided by 
hiring nonunion employees, as the exact same amount of money 
will have to be paid –- it will simply be paid directly in cash 
to the employee instead of being paid to include the employee in 
a benefit program."  McCarty's Case, 445 Mass. at 372 (Sosman, 
J., concurring). 
 
 
16 Accord Friends of the Eel River v. North Coast R.R. 
Auth., 3 Cal. 5th 677, 723 (2017) (environmental standards for 
State projects, including rail transportation projects, 
"embod[y] a [S]tate policy adopted by the Legislature to govern 
how the [S]tate itself and the [S]tate's own subdivisions will 
exercise their responsibilities"). 
13 
 
preempted17 by Federal law when (1) the preemptive intent is 
stated explicitly in the Federal law's language or implicitly 
contained in its structure and purpose (express preemption), 
(2) the Federal law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field 
such that it is reasonable to infer that Congress left no room 
for the State to supplement it (field preemption), or (3) the 
State law actually conflicts with the Federal law (conflict 
preemption).18  See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 
504, 516 (1992); Patel v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 489 Mass. 356, 366 
n.15 (2022), citing English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 
78-79 (1990).  The "ultimate touchstone" of preemption analysis 
is congressional intent, which is discerned primarily from the 
language of the preemption statute and its framework.  
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485–486 (1996). 
 
Importantly, our preemption analysis is rooted in "the 
assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] 
 
 
17 The doctrine of preemption is rooted in the supremacy 
clause of the United States Constitution, which provides that 
"[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . , shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land."  U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2. 
 
 
18 Conflict preemption occurs when "it is 'impossible for a 
private party to comply with both [S]tate and [F]ederal 
requirements,' . . . or where [S]tate law 'stands as an obstacle 
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress.'"  Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 
51, 64-65 (2002), quoting Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 
280, 287 (1995). 
14 
 
not to be superseded by . . . Federal Act unless that [is] the 
clear and manifest purpose of Congress."  Dunn, 486 Mass. at 
718, quoting Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516.  The assumption is 
"particularly strong [in the present context] given [S]tates' 
lengthy history of regulating employees' wages and hours" 
(citation omitted).  Devaney v. Zucchini Gold, LLC, 489 Mass. 
514, 519 (2022).  See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. 
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 756 (1985), quoting DeCanas v. 
Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976), superseded by statute as 
recognized in Kansas v. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. 791 (2020) ("States 
possess broad authority under their police powers to regulate 
the employment relationship to protect workers within the 
State," including through State laws related to minimum and 
other wages). 
 
Recognizing that prevailing wage laws are a powerful 
mechanism for States, as market participants, to direct public 
policy on their own public works projects by controlling how to 
spend public funds to achieve the States' policy objectives, 
see, e.g., California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. 
Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 332 (1997) (State 
prevailing wage law provided incentive to utilize employee 
apprenticeship programs on public works projects), and that such 
laws fall within the "historic police powers of the States," id. 
at 331, quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 
15 
 
230 (1947), the United States Supreme Court has expressed 
reluctance to find a congressional intent to preempt such laws 
even where Federal legislation includes a broad preemption 
provision.  See, e.g., Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., supra at 
334 (rejecting argument that State's prevailing wage law was 
preempted by broad preemption clause of Federal Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act [ERISA], which expansively 
preempted all State laws that have "connection with" or "relate 
to" employee benefit plans, absent clearer indication of 
congressional intent to usurp State's public works policy).  
Instead, the Supreme Court has viewed with skepticism any 
argument that Congress intended "to trench on the States' 
arrangements for conducting their own governments," construing 
Federal legislation "in a way that preserves a State's chosen 
disposition of its own power, in the absence of [a] plain 
statement [indicating that Congress intended to preempt the 
State law]."  Nixon v. Missouri Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 140 
(2004).  See, e.g., id. at 128-129 (Federal Telecommunications 
Act "preempt[ing] . . . [S]tate and local laws and regulations 
expressly or effectively 'prohibiting the ability of any entity' 
to provide telecommunications services" did not preempt State's 
power to restrict its own delivery of such services [citation 
omitted]). 
16 
 
 
Notably, the Prevailing Wage Act is not targeted at the 
railroad industry or rail transportation, an "area where there 
has been a history of significant [F]ederal presence."19  Florida 
E. Coast Ry. v. West Palm Beach, 266 F.3d 1324, 1328 (11th Cir. 
2001), quoting United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000).  
The Act is a general law that falls within the State's 
traditional police powers of wage regulation.  See Felix A. 
Marino Co., 426 Mass. at 463.  More particularly, it falls 
within the State's power to direct how it will spend public 
funds to promote its policy to pay laborers wages that are 
consistent with market conditions.20 
 
Accordingly, "'[t]he principles of federalism and respect 
for [S]tate sovereignty that underlie the [Supreme] Court's 
reluctance to find pre-emption,' Cipollone[, 505 U.S. at 533] 
(Blackmun, J., concurring), place a 'considerable burden' on" 
the defendants here.  Florida E. Coast Ry., 266 F.3d at 1329, 
quoting De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 
 
 
19 For a fuller account of the history of Federal railroad 
legislation, see R.J. Corman R.R./Memphis Line v. Palmore, 999 
F.2d 149, 151-152 (6th Cir. 1993). 
 
 
20 By contrast, where a State legislates in an area that 
traditionally has been governed by Federal law and regulations, 
the presumption against preemption does not apply.  See Locke, 
529 U.S. at 108 (State regulation of oil tanker design and 
operation not entitled to presumption against preemption because 
State purported to regulate maritime commerce, "where there has 
been a history of significant [F]ederal presence"). 
17 
 
U.S. 806, 814 (1997).  See, e.g., New York Conference of Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 
658-664 (1995) (concluding that preemption clause, which 
preempted State laws that "relate to" employee benefits plans 
under ERISA, did not preempt State's law imposing surcharges on 
commercial insurance providers despite indirect economic effect 
on such plans absent clearer expression of congressional 
intent). 
 
i.  Express preemption.  We turn now to the defendants' 
argument that the Prevailing Wage Act is preempted expressly by 
the ICCTA.  Where, as here, a Federal statute "contains an 
express pre-emption clause, the task of statutory construction 
must in the first instance focus on the plain wording of the 
clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of 
Congress' pre-emptive intent."  CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 
507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993).  See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 
431 (2000) (construction "start[s] . . . with the language of 
the statute"). 
 
The ICCTA vests the Surface Transportation Board (STB) with 
"exclusive" jurisdiction "over (1) transportation by rail 
carriers . . . and (2) the construction, acquisition, operation, 
abandonment, or discontinuance of . . . tracks[] or facilities" 
18 
 
(emphasis added).21  49 U.S.C. § 10501(b).  The statute's express 
preemption clause provides that "the remedies provided under 
this part with respect to regulation of rail transportation are 
exclusive and preempt the remedies provided under Federal or 
State law (emphasis added)."  Id. 
 
In view of the plain language of the ICCTA's preemption 
clause, Federal courts and the STB22 have concluded that 
"Congress narrowly tailored the ICCTA pre-emption provision to 
displace only 'regulation,' i.e., those [S]tate laws that may 
reasonably be said to have the effect of 'manag[ing]' or 
'govern[ing]' rail transportation."  Florida E. Coast Ry., 266 
F.3d at 1331, quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1286 (6th ed. 
 
 
21 "[T]ransportation" is expansively defined to include, in 
relevant part, "(A) a . . . vehicle, . . . warehouse, . . . 
property, facility, instrumentality, or equipment of any kind 
related to the movement of passengers or property, or both, by 
rail, regardless of ownership or an agreement concerning use; 
and (B) services related to that movement."  49 U.S.C. 
§ 10102(9). 
 
 
22 "As the agency authorized by Congress to administer the 
[ICCTA], the [STB] is 'uniquely qualified to determine whether 
[S]tate law . . . should be preempted' by the [ICCTA]."  Green 
Mountain R.R. v. Vermont, 404 F.3d 638, 642-643 (2d Cir. 2005), 
quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 944 
F. Supp. 1573, 1584 (N.D. Ga. 1996).  See Wyeth v. Levin, 555 
U.S. 555, 576-577 (2009) ("While agencies have no special 
authority to pronounce on pre-emption absent delegation by 
Congress, they do have a unique understanding of the statutes 
they administer and an attendant ability to make informed 
determinations about how [S]tate requirements may pose an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress" [quotation and citation 
omitted]). 
19 
 
1990).  See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 50 
(1987) ("common-sense view of the word 'regulates' would lead to 
the conclusion that in order to regulate insurance, a law must 
not just have an impact on the insurance industry, but must be 
specifically directed toward that industry"); New York 
Susquehanna & W. Ry. v. Jackson, 500 F.3d 238, 252 (3d Cir. 
2007) ("Because the [ICCTA's] subject matter is limited to 
deregulation of the railroad industry, . . . courts and the 
[STB] have rightly held that it does not preempt all [S]tate 
regulation affecting transportation by rail carrier").  Accord 
H.R. Rep. No. 104-422, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., at 167 (1995) 
(ICCTA preemption provision "is limited to remedies with respect 
to rail regulation –- not State and Federal law generally"); 
Riverdale -- Petition for Declaratory Order -- New York 
Susquehanna & W. Ry., 4 S.T.B. 380, 386 (1999) (Riverdale) 
(Congress did not preempt all State laws that "affect railroads" 
in any manner whatsoever).  Cf. Horton vs. Kansas City S. Ry., 
Tex. Sup. Ct., No. 21-0769, slip op. at *10-11 (June 30, 2023) 
(negligence claim in wrongful death action not preempted by 
ICCTA even when applied to railroad). 
The ICCTA does not preclude State laws that may have a 
"remote or incidental effect on rail transportation."  Florida 
E. Coast Ry., 266 F.3d at 1331 (ICCTA's preemption clause 
tailored toward "regulation of rail transportation," which 
20 
 
"necessarily means something qualitatively different from laws 
'with respect to rail transportation'" [emphasis added; citation 
omitted]).23  Specifically, State laws that fall within the 
State's "general police powers" are not preempted by the ICCTA 
even when they affect "railroad activity."  Norfolk S. Ry. v. 
Alexandria, 608 F.3d 150, 158 (4th Cir. 2010).24 
 
Thus, although the defendants correctly note that Marsh 
performed "construction" work on railroad tracks –- an area of 
work that falls within the ICCTA's exclusive jurisdiction, see 
49 U.S.C. § 10501(b) -- it is less clear whether application of 
the Prevailing Wage Act to define the wages paid to construction 
workers on public works projects is a preempted "regulation" of 
 
23 See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 173 (1997) (under 
"cardinal principle of statutory construction . . . [courts 
must] give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a 
statute" [quotations and citation omitted]). 
 
 
24 The defendants' reliance on Bay Colony R.R. v. Yarmouth, 
470 Mass. 515, 518-519 (2015), which concerned the broader 
preemption provision of the Federal Aviation Administration 
Authorization Act (FAAAA), is misplaced.  See id. at 518, 
quoting Massachusetts Delivery Ass'n v. Coakley, 769 F.3d 11, 18 
(1st Cir. 2014), and Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transp. Ass'n, 
552 U.S. 364, 370 (2008) (preemptive scope of FAAAA was 
"purposefully expansive," preempting State laws "having a 
connection with, or reference to, carrier rates, routes, or 
services, even if the law's effect on rates, routes, or services 
[was] only indirect, and irrespective of whether [the] law [was] 
consistent or inconsistent with [F]ederal regulation" 
[quotations omitted]). 
21 
 
rail transportation, on the one hand, or a permissible State law 
with an incidental effect on railroad activities, on the other.25 
 
In drawing the line between a local law that is a preempted 
"regulation" of rail transportation and a State law that is a 
permissible exercise of State's authority that incidentally 
affects railroad activities, Federal courts have concluded that 
"[w]hat matters is the degree to which the challenged [State 
law] burdens rail transportation."  New York Susquehanna & W. 
Ry., 500 F.3d at 252.  State laws are permissible if they do not 
"interfere with or unreasonably burden railroading."  Id.  See 
King County, WA -- Petition for Declaratory Order -- Burlington 
N. R.R. -- Stampede Pass Line, 1 S.T.B. 731, 735-736 (1996) 
(ICCTA's preemption clause "does not usurp the right of [S]tate 
and local entities to impose appropriate public health and 
safety regulation on interstate railroads," so long as those 
regulations do not "'conflict with' [F]ederal regulation, 
'interfere with' [F]ederal authority, or 'unreasonably burden' 
interstate commerce"). 
 
On the record before us, the defendants in this case have 
not shown that the Prevailing Wage Act interferes with or 
unreasonably burdens railroading.  Notably, the Prevailing Wage 
 
25 "[C]onstruction," for example, is commonly understood as 
"[t]he act of building by combining or arranging parts or 
elements," Black's Law Dictionary 391 (11th ed. 2019), not the 
wages paid for the labor involved in building. 
22 
 
Act has little, if any, "adverse economic effect on aspects of 
the railroads' operations."  Emerson v. Kansas City S. Ry., 503 
F.3d 1126, 1132 (10th Cir. 2007).  The economic impact of the 
Prevailing Wage Act is, by design, absorbed by the Commonwealth.  
See, e.g., Friends of the Eel River v. North Coast R.R. Auth., 3 
Cal. 5th 677, 723 (2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1696 (2018) 
(Congress did not intend with ICCTA to "preempt a [S]tate's 
adoption and use of the tools of self-governance" with its own 
freight rail transportation projects "or to leave the [S]tate, 
as owner, without any means of establishing the basic principles 
under which it will undertake significant capital 
expenditures").  Specifically, a contractor is expected to 
calculate its labor costs using the prevailing wage schedule 
published by the DLS in its bid.  The prevailing wage schedule 
becomes part of the winning bidder's contract with the 
Commonwealth; and the contractor must pay its laborers the 
relevant prevailing wage, presumably using the revenues it 
receives from the State.  See Anzivino, Are the States' 
"Prevailing Wage Laws" Constitutional?, https://www.scholarship 
.law.marquette.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1407&context= 
facpub [https://perma.cc/3HM5-XSG5] (under State prevailing wage 
laws, State "pays a premium for construction work done on public 
projects and, in consideration of such premium, requires all 
23 
 
contractors working on these projects to pay their employees 
'prevailing wages' in the construction industry").26 
 
Indeed, no railroad is required to bid on a public works 
project; when a railroad voluntarily chooses to submit a bid, it 
is some evidence that the railroad has determined that 
compliance with the Prevailing Wage Act does not unreasonably 
burden its railroading activities.  The decision of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in PCS Phosphate 
Co. v. Norfolk S. Corp., 559 F.3d 212, 221 (4th Cir. 2009), is 
instructive.  In PCS Phosphate Co., a railroad entered a 
contract with a mine owner, agreeing to pay to relocate rail 
lines that served the mine.  Id. at 215.  The railroad failed to 
pay, and, in response to the owner's subsequent claim for breach 
of contract, argued that the contract claim was preempted by the 
ICCTA.  Id. at 216-217.  The Fourth Circuit disagreed, 
concluding that enforcement of the railroad's voluntary 
agreements with the owners was not "regulation" expressly 
preempted by the ICCTA.  Id. at 218.  The court rejected the 
 
 
26 Contrary to the defendants' argument that the increased 
cost of paying prevailing wages to MCR's laborers burdens MCR's 
operations, nothing in the present record suggests payment of a 
prevailing wage would pose an undue burden.  Cf. Holland v. 
Delray Connecting R.R., 311 F. Supp. 2d 744, 755, 757 (N.D. Ind. 
2004) (denying motion to dismiss on ICCTA preemption question 
where "devastating degree of [Federal Coal Industry Retiree 
Health Benefit Act's] impact poses a factual question on which 
[the railroad] must offer proof"). 
24 
 
railroad's contention that the ICCTA expressly preempted all 
voluntary agreements concerning rail transportation, determining 
that the argument was unsupported by the purpose of the ICCTA to 
deregulate the railroad industry.  Id. at 219. 
Enforcement of the parties' agreements, the Fourth Circuit 
concluded, would not "unreasonably interfer[e] with rail 
transportation" (quotation and citation omitted) because the 
agreements "were freely negotiated between sophisticated 
business parties" and "reflect[ed] a market calculation that the 
benefits of operating the rail line for many years would be 
worth the cost of paying to relocate the line in the future."27  
PCS Phosphate Co., 559 F.3d at 220-221.  "In the context of 
voluntary agreements, [courts] let the market do much of the 
work of the benefit-burden calculation."  Id. at 221.  The court 
also noted, "[a]s the STB has recognized, 'voluntary agreements 
must be seen as reflecting the carrier's own determination and 
admission that the agreements would not unreasonably interfere 
with interstate commerce.'"  Id., quoting Woodbridge vs. 
Consolidated Rail Corp., 5 S.T.B. 336, 340 (2000).  Thus, the 
court concluded that enforcement of valid voluntary agreements 
between private parties did not "fall into the core of economic 
 
 
27 For this reason, the Fourth Circuit also rejected the 
argument that enforcement of the agreements was impliedly 
preempted by the ICCTA.  PCS Phosphate Co., 559 F.3d at 220-221. 
25 
 
regulation that the ICCTA was intended to preempt" and was 
therefore not preempted by the ICCTA.  PCS Phosphate Co., supra 
at 219.  Accord Friends of the Eel River, 3 Cal. 5th at 723 
(enforcement of State environmental standards on State public 
works projects was not "regulation" preempted by ICCTA). 
 
Like the terms of the contracts held to be enforceable 
despite the ICCTA's express preemption clause in PCS Phosphate 
Co., 559 F.3d at 221, the Prevailing Wage Act sets forth 
contractual terms governing public works projects voluntarily 
agreed to by the contractor, here, a railroad.  Each contract 
reflects the railroad's determination, based on market 
conditions, that agreeing to pay its laborers the prevailing 
wage in exchange for the revenues it will receive from the 
Commonwealth for the public works project is "worth" it.  Id.28  
Contrary to the defendants' argument, where a railroad 
voluntarily bids on a public works contract, and then freely 
agrees to public works project contractual provisions with 
prevailing wage rate schedules incorporated therein, that choice 
 
 
28 The fact that, as here, one party to the contract is a 
subdivision of a State does not alter our conclusion.  See 
Building & Constr. Trades Council of the Metro. Dist. v. 
Associated Bldrs. & Contrs. of Mass./R.I., Inc., 507 U.S. 218, 
231-232 (1993) ("In the absence of any express or implied 
indication by Congress that a State may not manage its own 
property when it pursues its purely proprietary interests, and 
where analogous private conduct would be permitted, [the United 
States Supreme Court] will not infer such a restriction"). 
26 
 
supports the contention that the railroad has determined that 
the benefits of completing the project outweigh the cost, 
including the cost of paying prevailing wages to its workers.29 
 
Moreover, the Prevailing Wage Act is akin to the type of 
State law that other Federal courts and the STB have concluded 
are not preempted by the ICCTA.  Specifically, the Prevailing 
Wage Act "concerns a subject of traditional State regulation."  
Felix A. Marino Co., 426 Mass. at 463.  Accord Dilts v. Penske 
Logistics, LLC, 769 F.3d 637, 646 (9th Cir. 2014) ("generally 
applicable background regulations that are several steps removed 
from prices, routes, or services, such as prevailing wage laws 
or safety regulations, are not preempted, even if employers must 
factor those provisions into their decisions about the prices 
that they set, the routes that they use, or the services that 
 
 
29 Nor does "[t]he fact that the statute may prevent the 
[r]ailroad from maximizing its profits . . . render the statute 
unreasonably burdensome" and thus preempted.  Adrian & 
Blissfield R.R. v. Blissfield, 550 F.3d 533, 541 (6th Cir. 
2008).  See Florida E. Coast Ry., 266 F.3d at 1338 n.11 ("No 
statement of purpose for the ICCTA, whether in the statute 
itself or in the major legislative history, suggests that any 
action which prevents an individual firm from maximizing its 
profits is to be pre-empted").  "Although the 'costs of 
compliance' with a [S]tate law could be high, 'they are 
"incidental" when they are subordinate outlays that all firms 
build into the cost of doing business.'"  Adrian & Blissfield 
R.R. supra, quoting New York Susquehanna & W. Ry., 500 F.3d at 
254.  In fact, the Prevailing Wage Act furthers the ICCTA's 
statement that "[i]n regulating the railroad industry, it is the 
policy of the United States Government . . . to encourage fair 
wages and safe and suitable working conditions in the railroad 
industry."  49 U.S.C. § 10101(11). 
27 
 
they provide"); People v. Pac Anchor Transp., Inc., 59 Cal. 4th 
772, 786-787 (2014), cert. denied, 574 U.S. 1153 (2015) 
(identifying State prevailing wage law as generally applicable 
law). 
 
The Prevailing Wage Act is "settled and defined," Green 
Mountain R.R. v. Vermont, 404 F.3d 638, 643 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 546 U.S. 977 (2005); it sets forth the process by which 
a prevailing wage schedule for labor performed on public works 
is created and incorporated into public works contracts between 
the Commonwealth and its contractors, see G. L. c. 149, § 27 
(commissioner of DLS determines prevailing wage schedule for 
public works, which is incorporated into call for bids, and then 
"[s]aid [prevailing wage] schedule shall be made a part of the 
contract for said works").  It "can be obeyed with reasonable 
certainty," Green Mountain R.R., supra, by paying laborers 
according to the prevailing wage schedule, see G. L. c. 149, 
§ 27 ("schedule . . . shall continue to be the minimum rate or 
rates of wages for said employees during the life of the 
contract"). 
 
Compliance with the Act does not "entail . . . extended or 
open-ended delays."  Green Mountain R.R., 404 F.3d at 643.  
Pursuant to the Prevailing Wage Act, contractors bidding on 
public works projects are aware of the schedule of prevailing 
wages, and if they choose to bid on the project, they are 
28 
 
expected to use the schedule in computing labor costs to include 
in their bids.  G. L. c. 149, § 27. 
 
The Prevailing Wage Act involves no "discretion on 
subjective questions."  Green Mountain R.R., 404 F.3d at 643.  
Contrast id. (ICCTA preempted environmental land use law because 
"railroad [would be] restrained from development until a permit 
[was] issued; the requirements for the permit [were] not set 
forth in any schedule or regulation that the railroad [could] 
consult in order to assure compliance; and the issuance of the 
permit await[ed] and depend[ed] upon the discretionary rulings 
of a [S]tate or local agency"). 
 
Furthermore, unlike State laws that Federal courts and the 
STB have determined to be preempted, the Prevailing Wage Act is 
not a permitting or preclearance process that could prevent, 
interfere with, or delay rail operations.30  See Riverdale, 4 
 
 
30 The STB and Federal courts have determined that, where a 
State permitting or preclearance process "could be used to 
frustrate or defeat an activity that is regulated at the Federal 
level, the [S]tate . . . process is preempted."  New York 
Susquehanna & W. Ry., 500 F.3d at 253, quoting Auburn & Kent, 
Wash. -– Petition for Declaratory Order -– Burlington N. R.R. –- 
Stampede Pass Line, 2 S.T.B. 330, 339 (1997).  See, e.g., Green 
Mountain R.R., 404 F.3d at 643 (ICCTA preempted preconstruction 
permitting requirement of State environmental land use law as 
applied to railroad transloading facility because it gave "the 
local body the ability to deny the carrier the right to 
construct facilities or conduct operations," activities falling 
within plain language of STB's jurisdictional grant [citation 
omitted]); Auburn v. United States, 154 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th 
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1022 (1999) (ICCTA preempted 
city environmental impact permitting requirements because they 
29 
 
S.T.B. at 386-389 (contrasting uniform building, plumbing, and 
electric codes, which generally are not preempted because they 
do not interfere with railroad operations, with local zoning 
ordinances, land use regulations, and environmental permitting 
requirements, which are preempted because they unreasonably 
prevent, delay, or interfere with activities protected by 
ICCTA). 
Nor does the Act regulate the operational aspects of rail 
transportation, affecting the movement of property or passengers 
over the rail lines.31  See Emerson, 503 F.3d at 1131 (railroad's 
 
could be applied so as to prevent railroad "from constructing, 
acquiring, operating, abandoning, or discontinuing a line"); Soo 
Line R.R. v. Minneapolis, 38 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1101 (D. Minn. 
1998) (ICCTA preempted city's authority to withhold demolition 
permits sought by railroad to redevelop rail yard); Burlington 
N. Santa Fe Corp. v. Anderson, 959 F. Supp. 1288, 1292, 1296 (D. 
Mont. 1997) (ICCTA preempted Montana law giving State commission 
control over "maintenance, closure, consolidation[,] or 
centralization of railroad shipping facilities, stations[,] and 
station agencies" within State); CSX Transp., Inc., 944 F. Supp. 
at 1581-1582 (State statute requiring preapproval for closing of 
railroad agencies, which, inter alia, provided "services" 
concerning the movement of property and passengers via rail, 
preempted by ICCTA). 
 
31 Federal courts also have determined that State laws that 
interfere with the actual operational aspects by which railroad 
carriers move passengers or property are preempted.  See 
Emerson, 503 F.3d at 1132 (ICCTA preempts State laws that "would 
have an adverse economic effect on aspects of the railroads' 
operations that are within the STB's exclusive jurisdiction" 
[emphasis added]).  See, e.g., Friberg v. Kansas City S. Ry., 
267 F.3d 439, 440, 443 (5th Cir. 2001) (State statute 
prohibiting train from blocking street for more than five 
minutes, as well as common-law negligence claim, each seeking to 
prescribe railroad's operation and its construction and 
30 
 
discarding of old railroad ties and vegetation into drainage 
ditch was not "transportation" and, thus, ICCTA's preemption 
clause did not preclude State tortious claims by landowners 
whose property was flooded by railroad's tortious conduct).  
Accordingly, the Prevailing Wage Act is not expressly preempted 
by the ICCTA.32  See PCS Phosphate Co., 559 F.3d at 221. 
 
operation of side track, were preempted because "[r]egulating 
the time a train can occupy a rail crossing impacts . . . the 
way a railroad operates its trains, with concomitant economic 
ramifications"); Association of Am. R.R. vs. South Coast Air 
Quality Mgt. Dist., U.S. Dist. Ct., No. CV 06-01416-JFW (PLAx) 
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2007), aff'd, 622 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(regulation limiting idling time of unattended locomotives to 
thirty minutes or less was preempted because it "directly 
regulate[d] rail operations"); Engelhard Corp. v. Springfield 
Terminal Ry., 193 F. Supp. 2d 385, 389-390 (D. Mass. 2002) 
(claims for unpaid freight car mileage allowances were preempted 
because STB has statutory authority to establish third-party 
freight car rates of compensation); Rushing v. Kansas City S. 
Ry., 194 F. Supp. 2d 493, 500-501 (S.D. Miss. 2001) (ICCTA 
preempted State nuisance and negligence claims brought to quell 
noise and vibrations emanating from railroad's switching yard 
because they sought "to enjoin the [railroad] from operating its 
switch yard in the manner it currently employs"); CSX Transp., 
Inc. v. Plymouth, 92 F. Supp. 2d 643, 659 (E.D. Mich. 2000) 
(State law limiting time railroad blocks traffic, and requiring 
railroad to incur capital improvements on tracks to avoid same, 
preempted by ICCTA). 
 
 
32 Marsh alleges that he worked on projects, such as the 
South Coast Rail project, which he contends expressly fall 
outside the STB's jurisdiction.  In particular, the ICCTA 
provides that the STB does not have jurisdiction over "public 
transportation provided by a local government authority."  49 
U.S.C. § 10501(c)(2).  A "local government authority" includes 
contractors, like MCR, who contract with a political subdivision 
or a State "to provide transportation services."  49 U.S.C. 
§ 10501(c)(1)(A).  In light of the foregoing, we need not reach 
whether application of the Prevailing Wage Act is permitted, at 
31 
 
 
ii.  Field preemption.  We next consider the defendants' 
contention that Congress has impliedly preempted the Prevailing 
Wage Act,33 turning first to field preemption.  See Freightliner 
Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 289 (1995) (express preemption 
clause supports inference against, but does not necessarily 
foreclose, implied preemption).  See, e.g., Florida E. Coast 
Ry., 266 F.3d at 1329 n.3 (evaluating implied preemption claim 
despite concluding ICCTA preemption clause did not expressly 
preempt city's zoning and licensing ordinances).34 
 
the least with regard to Marsh's work on the South Coast Rail 
project, for this additional reason. 
 
 
33 "When Congress has considered the issue of pre-emption 
and has included in the enacted legislation a provision 
explicitly addressing that issue, and when that provision 
provides a 'reliable indicium of congressional intent with 
respect to [S]tate authority,'" Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517, 
quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 505 (1978), 
"'there is no need to infer congressional intent to pre-empt 
[S]tate laws from the substantive provisions' of the 
legislation," Cipollone, supra, quoting California Fed. Sav. & 
Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 282 (1987).  "Such reasoning 
is a variant of the familiar principle of expression unius est 
exclusio alterius:  Congress'[s] enactment of a provision 
defining the pre-emptive reach of a statute implies that matters 
beyond that reach are not pre-empted."  Cipollone, supra. 
 
 
34 Federal cases considering implied preemption despite the 
existence of an express preemption provision understandably have 
focused on conflict preemption.  See, e.g., Freightliner Corp., 
514 U.S. at 288-289; Florida E. Coast Ry., 266 F.3d at 1329 n.3.  
We nonetheless consider the defendants' argument that the 
Prevailing Wage Act is preempted under the doctrine of field 
preemption, as the defendants' arguments in this regard 
apparently do not rely on the ICCTA or its statutory framework. 
32 
 
 
Field preemption occurs where "[F]ederal law so thoroughly 
occupies a legislative field as to make reasonable the inference 
that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516.  
"Where . . . the field which Congress is said to have pre-empted 
includes areas that have been traditionally occupied by the 
States, congressional intent to supersede [S]tate laws must be 
clear and manifest" (quotations and citation omitted).  English, 
496 U.S. at 79.  See, e.g., Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis v. 
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1, 6 (1943) (Railway 
Labor Act did not occupy field of railroad working conditions 
where it did not "undertake governmental regulation of wages, 
hours, or working conditions," but instead sought to "provide a 
means by which agreement may be reached with respect to them"). 
 
"In order to determine whether Congress has implicitly 
ousted the States from regulating in a particular field, we must 
first identify the field in which this is said to have 
occurred."  Garcia, 140 S. Ct. at 804.  Even assuming arguendo 
that, here, the field is the wages of railroad employees, as 
opposed to wages paid on public works projects, see, e.g., 
Wisconsin Cent., Ltd. v. Shannon, 539 F.3d 751, 761, 765 (7th 
Cir. 2008) (identifying field as "overtime wages for railroad 
employees"); R.J. Corman R.R./Memphis Line v. Palmore, 999 F.2d 
149, 151 (6th Cir. 1993) (identifying field as "overtime 
33 
 
regulation of interstate railroads"); Alvarez vs. Anacostia Rail 
Holdings Co., N.Y. Sup. Ct., No. 157154/2021 (Oct. 28, 2022) 
(noting parties' "agree[ment] that the field at issue is the 
wages and hours of railroad employees"), the defendants have not 
demonstrated that the field is preempted by Federal law. 
 
Despite the plethora of Federal statutes governing 
railroads, see R.J. Corman R.R./Memphis Line, 999 F.2d at 151-
152, the only Federal law specifically relied on by the 
defendants that addresses railroad workers' wages is the Adamson 
Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-252, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., c. 436, 
§ 3, 39 Stat. 721 (Adamson Act), which temporarily "forb[ade] 
any lowering of wages" to avert a nationwide railroad union 
strike.35  Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332, 345 (1917).  At the time, 
railroads had rejected the unions' demanded reduction in 
railroad employees' work hours from ten hours to eight, and an 
increase in overtime pay, id. at 340-341; Federal mediation 
efforts had failed, id. at 342.  Facing a national crisis, the 
President of the United States requested that Congress enact 
 
 
35 We note that the defendants' sole reference to the 
Adamson Act appears in a quotation from Sumlin vs. BNSF Ry., 
U.S. Dist. Ct., No. EDCV 17-2364-JFW (KKx) (C.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 
2018).  Although that case discusses the Adamson Act, the State 
laws at issue there fell within a field –- "regulation of 
working hours and rest for train employees" –- that was occupied 
by Federal law where the Federal Hours of Service Act, Pub. L. 
No. 59-274, 59th Cong., c. 2939, 34 Stat. 1415 (1907), required 
that train employees be provided with rest periods of at least 
ten consecutive hours prior to working.  Sumlin, supra. 
34 
 
legislation to prevent a strike.  Id.  Congress responded by 
enacting the Adamson Act, which, inter alia (1) established an 
eight-hour work day for railroad workers; (2) authorized the 
creation of a commission to study the effects of the eight-hour 
standard work day and report its findings; and (3) pending the 
release of the report, and for a period of thirty days 
thereafter, temporarily prohibited the lowering of wages.  Id. 
at 343-344, citing Pub. L. No. 64-252, c. 436, §§ 1-3, 39 Stat. 
721.  In sum, the Adamson Act's regulation of railroad wages was 
limited to an eleven-month period between 1916 and 1917, until 
such time as a report could be issued that considered whether 
the eight-hour workday would affect railroads' profitability and 
whether Federal regulations on rates charged by the railroads 
should be adjusted to compensate the railroads for any 
additional labor costs.  See Wilson, supra at 345-346. 
 
Relying principally on the Adamson Act, the United States 
Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Seventh Circuits have 
determined that State overtime wage laws as applied to railroad 
workers were preempted under the doctrine of field preemption.  
See Wisconsin Cent., Ltd., 539 F.3d at 765 (Illinois overtime 
wages statute as applied to railroad workers preempted); R.J. 
Corman R.R./Memphis Line, 999 F.2d at 152 & n.3, 153 (Kentucky 
overtime wages statute preempted as to railroad workers).  
Specifically, the courts read the Supreme Court's decision in 
35 
 
Wilson to conclude that the Adamson Act evinced Congress's 
intent to leave wages to the free market negotiations between 
railroads and their employees, preempting State overtime 
statutes.  See Wisconsin Cent., Ltd., supra (stating that 
Supreme Court in Wilson indicated that Congress intended to 
leave railroad workers' wages "free" from any regulation 
following temporary restriction on lowering of wages); R.J. 
Corman R.R./Memphis Line, supra (relying on Wilson for 
proposition that Congress intended with Adamson Act to leave 
railroad worker compensation to labor agreements). 
 
But a closer review of the Supreme Court's decision in 
Wilson shows that the Court did not determine that the Adamson 
Act mandated a laissez faire approach to wage negotiations 
between railroads and employees.  The Court addressed only the 
question whether the mandatory eight-hour day and the temporary 
restriction on the lowering of wages were constitutional as a 
permissible exercise of Congress's authority to regulate 
interstate commerce.  Wilson, 243 U.S. at 340, 345-346.  The 
Court's statement that the Adamson Act's restriction on the 
lowering of railroad employees' wages was "not permanent but 
temporary, leaving the employers and employees free as to the 
subject of wages to govern their relations by their own 
agreements after the specified time," id. at 345-346, was 
relevant to the Court's analysis of whether Congress had 
36 
 
exceeded its commerce clause authority.  Contrary to the 
conclusion of the Sixth and Seventh Circuits, the Supreme 
Court's statement was not a determination of Congress's intent 
to occupy the field of railroad workers' wages; indeed, the 
prevailing view at the time was that "allowing the parties to 
freely bargain the price of labor was a more enlightened theory 
when compared with price caps and maximum wage limits that 
previously existed in English statutes."  Alvarez, N.Y. Sup. 
Ct., No. 157154/2021. 
 
More importantly, as discussed supra, the Adamson Act 
prohibited the lowering of railroad employee wages temporarily 
in an effort to avert a strike, which would have been 
catastrophic.  The temporary restriction on the lowering of 
wages was accompanied by a mandate to study the effects on the 
railroad industry of an eight-hour workday.  See Wilson, 243 
U.S. at 344.  Nothing in the legislation or its surrounding 
circumstances supports the conclusion that Congress intended by 
the statute to forever ban State laws regarding minimum wages as 
applied to railroad workers, much less a ban on State prevailing 
wage laws.  See Alvarez, N.Y. Sup. Ct., No. 157154/2021. 
 
Moreover, the Supreme Court consistently has held that 
although Congress can create a "federally mandated free-market 
control" scheme, it cannot do so "subtly."  Puerto Rico Dep't of 
Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp., 485 U.S. 495, 500 
37 
 
(1988).  See id. at 502-503 (local gasoline price regulation was 
not preempted by field preemption despite Congress's passage and 
subsequent repeal of Federal legislation providing for price 
controls on petroleum products because congressional action did 
not evince intent for federally mandated free market).  Rather, 
the Supreme Court has instructed "that the historic police 
powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal 
Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress" 
(citation omitted).  Id. at 500.  See Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. 
Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 252 (1994), quoting Fort Halifax Packing 
Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 21 (1987) (employee's wrongful 
discharge action not preempted by mandatory arbitration 
provision of Federal Railway Labor Act because "[p]re-emption of 
employment standards 'within the traditional police power of the 
State' 'should not be lightly inferred'"). 
 
The same conclusion portends here.  Nothing in the 
temporary wage reduction restriction in 1916 evinces a 
congressional intent to occupy the field of railroad employee 
wages or to preempt any State laws securing wage protections for 
railroad employees on public works projects.36 
 
 
36 This conclusion in no way suggests that we have canvassed 
the entirety of Federal railroad regulation; we have reviewed 
only the arguments and Federal statutes presented to us in the 
defendants' briefs. 
38 
 
 
iii.  Conflict preemption.  We turn next to the defendants' 
argument that the Prevailing Wage Act is preempted under the 
doctrine of conflict preemption.  Conflict preemption occurs if 
"compliance with both [S]tate and [F]ederal law is impossible 
. . . or when the [S]tate law stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives 
of Congress" (quotation and citation omitted).  Michigan Canners 
& Freezers Ass'n v. Agricultural Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467 
U.S. 461, 469 (1984). 
The defendants maintain that the Prevailing Wage Act 
conflicts with the Davis-Bacon Act, 23 U.S.C. § 113, which 
requires that contractors on federally funded construction 
projects pay certain employees the prevailing wage rate, at a 
minimum, for their job classification as determined by the 
Federal Secretary of Labor.  See 40 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3148.  The 
defendants assert that requiring State prevailing wages to be 
paid on State public works projects would conflict with the 
Federal Department of Transportation's determination that the 
Davis-Bacon Act's prevailing wage requirements for federally 
funded projects do not apply to federally funded railroad 
projects.  See United States Department of Transportation, 
Federal Highway Administration, Memorandum on Utility and 
Railwork –- Wage Rate and EEO Requirements (May 15, 1985). 
39 
 
 
We are persuaded by the Seventh Circuit's analysis in Frank 
Bros. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Transp., 409 F.3d 880, 895-897 (7th 
Cir. 2005), which rejected a similar argument.  In particular, 
the Seventh Circuit addressed the contractor's contention that 
its compliance with the State's prevailing wage act in 
connection with wages paid to truck drivers on State public 
works projects conflicted with the determination that truck 
drivers were excluded from those employees to whom contractors 
must pay, at a minimum, the federally determined prevailing wage 
on federally funded projects under the Davis-Bacon Act.  Id. at 
894.  Declining to adopt the contractor's argument, the court 
explained that the purpose of the Davis-Bacon Act was to protect 
workers by setting a "floor" for the wage to be paid to workers 
on federally funded public works.  Id. at 897.  "[N]othing in 
the Davis-Bacon Act . . . specifically or expressly prohibit[ed] 
paying truck drivers a prevailing wage."  Id.  "Were this court 
to hold that Wisconsin was precluded from requiring that truck 
drivers are paid a minimum wage, we would not be advancing the 
goals of Congress in any meaningful way; indeed, we may even be 
doing damage to those objectives."  Id. at 896.  The State's 
"prevailing wage legislative scheme is supplemental in nature 
and thus there is nothing barring [the contractor] from 
complying with both [F]ederal and [S]tate law," the court 
40 
 
reasoned.  Id. at 897.  The same is true for railroad workers 
working on the Commonwealth's public works projects.37 
 
d.  Public works projects.  Finally, the defendants assert 
that Marsh's Prevailing Wage Act claims must be dismissed 
because the projects on which Marsh worked were not public 
works; in particular, they maintain that MCR's agreement with 
the Commonwealth was not the result of a competitively 
advertised and bidding process, that the project was not awarded 
to the lowest bidder, that the Massachusetts Department of 
Transportation (MassDOT) did not incorporate a prevailing wage 
schedule into the agreement, and that the work was not a 
 
 
37 The defendants also maintain that Marsh's claims violate 
the dormant commerce clause.  See Northeast Patients Group v. 
United Cannabis Patients & Caregivers of Me., 45 F.4th 542, 545 
(1st Cir. 2022), quoting South-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. 
Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 87 (1984) (commerce clause is also "a 
negative, 'self-executing limitation on the power of the States 
to enact laws [that place] substantial burdens on [interstate] 
commerce'").  See also National Pork Producers Council v. Ross, 
143 S. Ct. 1142 (2023), quoting Department of Revenue of Ky. v. 
Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 337-338 (2008) ("the [c]ommerce [c]lause 
prohibits the enforcement of [S]tate laws 'driven by . . . 
"economic protectionism –- that is, regulatory measures designed 
to benefit in-[S]tate economic interests by burdening out-of-
[S]tate competitors"'").  Nothing in the defendants' cursory 
arguments in this regard establishes that requiring workers on 
State public works projects be paid, at a minimum, a prevailing 
wage burdens interstate commerce or, in any manner, 
discriminates against out-of-State vendors.  See Pascazi v. 
Gardner, 106 A.D.3d 1143, 1145 (N.Y. 2013) ("Petitioner's claim 
that the prevailing wage law violates the dormant [c]ommerce 
[c]lause is . . . unavailing as the law applies equally to in-
[S]tate and out-of-[S]tate contractors that choose to engage in 
public works projects").  See also note 29, supra. 
41 
 
"utility" under G. L. c. 6C, § 44.38  Support for these 
assertions, however, does not appear on the face of the 
complaint.39 
 
At this point in the litigation, Marsh need not prove that 
he performed work on "public works" projects.  See Lanier, 490 
Mass. at 43 (at pleading stage, plaintiff need only set forth 
"allegations plausibly [that] suggest that the plaintiff is 
entitled to relief").  See also Mass. R. Civ. P. 8 (a), 365 
Mass. 749 (1974) ("A pleading which sets forth a claim for 
relief . . . shall contain [1] a short and plain statement of 
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and 
[2] a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems 
himself entitled").40 
 
 
38 For this last proposition, the defendants cite a MassDOT 
highway division opinion letter from May 1, 2015, which is not 
controlling.  See Mullally, 452 Mass. at 533 (deferring to DLS's 
interpretation of Prevailing Wage Act). 
 
 
39 Accordingly, we do not reach the issue whether this 
evidence, if ultimately shown by the defendants on summary 
judgment or at trial, would require judgment in favor of the 
defendants. 
 
 
40 For at least this reason, the defendants' alternative 
argument, that Marsh's G. L. c. 149, § 27F, claim should be 
dismissed because Marsh was not an operator of rented equipment, 
is unsupportable at the motion to dismiss stage.  Indeed, 
§ 27F's application is not limited to operators of rental 
equipment.  See G. L. c. 149, § 27F. 
42 
 
 
In his complaint, Marsh alleges that MCR contracted with 
the Commonwealth on public works projects,41 including, inter 
alia, the South Coast Rail project to restore commuter rail 
access,42 that he was employed by MCR and worked on such projects 
as a laborer operating equipment such as backhoes, tampers, boom 
trucks, and loaders,43 and that he was not paid the applicable 
 
 
41 The defendants do not suggest that, in certifying the 
complaint, including the statement that the projects on which 
Marsh worked were on "information and belief" public works 
projects under G. L. c. 149, § 27, Marsh's counsel failed to 
comply with their ethical responsibilities to verify the grounds 
for such pleading.  See Mass. R. Civ. P. 11 (a) (1), as 
appearing in 488 Mass. 1403 (2021) ("The signature of any 
attorney to a pleading constitutes a certificate that . . . to 
the best of the attorney's knowledge, information, and belief 
there is a good ground to support it"). 
 
42 As alleged, the South Coast Rail project was undertaken 
pursuant to a contract with MassDOT to serve a public purpose of 
providing commuter transportation and included alterations to 
land.  See Perlera v. Vining Disposal Serv., Inc., 47 Mass. App. 
Ct. 491, 493-494 (1999) ("The core concept of 'public works,' in 
Massachusetts and elsewhere, is commonly expressed as involving 
the creation of public improvements having a nexus to land"); 
Black's Law Dictionary 1606 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "[p]ublic 
works" as "[w]orks, whether of construction or adaptation, 
undertaken and carried out by the national, [S]tate, or 
municipal authorities, and designed to subserve some purpose of 
public necessity, use, or convenience; such as public buildings, 
roads, aqueducts, parks, etc.").  See, e.g., O'Leary v. New 
Hampshire Boring, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 3d 4, 9-11 (D. Mass. 2016) 
(declining to dismiss complaint alleging construction laborer on 
commuter transportation project was not paid prevailing wage). 
 
 
43 "[C]onstruction" is broadly defined under the Prevailing 
Wage Act to include "additions to and alterations of public 
works."  G. L. c. 149, § 27D.  Marsh alleges that "[s]ome of the 
work [he] performed at Public Works Projects, such as operating 
a backhoe to dig and/or tampers to tamp, required additions 
and/or alterations to public property and/or public works." 
43 
 
prevailing wage when he performed work on these projects.  The 
factual allegations "'plausibly suggest[]. . .' an entitlement 
to relief."  Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 
(2008), quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 
(2007).  See, e.g., O'Leary v. New Hampshire Boring, Inc., 176 
F. Supp. 3d 4, 9-11 (D. Mass. 2016) (declining to dismiss claim 
alleging violation of Prevailing Wage Act where complaint 
averred employee did boring and drilling construction work for 
employer, which had contract with MassDOT to extend 
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority's green line, and 
rejecting contention that complaint also had to allege that 
MassDOT designated project as public works project, DLS issued 
prevailing wage schedule, and contract was publicly bid and 
advertised alongside wage schedule).44 
 
3.  Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the 
order denying the defendants' motion to dismiss. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
44 The defendants urge us to dismiss Marsh's claims because 
railroads are not an enumerated public work in G. L. c. 30, 
§ 39G.  See id. (listing "public ways, including bridges and 
other highway structures, sewers and[] water mains, airports[,] 
and other public works").  But the enumerated categories include 
"other public works," and as explained, see note 42, supra, 
commuter transportation construction projects can fall within 
the meaning of "public works."