Title: Pleasanton v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 646, 2002
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: February 25, 2003

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ZACHARY PLEASANTON, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 646, 2002 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID 0011007464  
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: February 10, 2003 
 
 
 
 
  Decided: February 25, 2003 
 
Before WALSH, HOLLAND, and BERGER, Justices. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  REVERSED. 
 
 
Zachary Pleasanton, pro se. 
 
 
Loren C. Meyers, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, 
Delaware, for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
 
2
 
 
The defendant-appellant, Zachary Pleasanton, was indicted in 
December 2000 on robbery and weapons charges.  Ultimately, he pled guilty 
in December 2001 to one count of possession of a firearm during the 
commission of a felony (PFDCF).  The Superior Court sentenced him to five 
years imprisonment, suspended after serving three years minimum 
mandatory for two years probation. Pleasanton filed a motion for correction 
of sentence, which the Superior Court denied.  This appeal ensued.   
Pleasanton contends that when he committed his crime in late 2000, a 
sentence for PFDCF could be reduced by good time under then-existing 
Delaware law.  In July 2001, the General Assembly amended the PFDCF 
statute to prohibit the reduction of any PFDCF sentence by good time.1  
Pleasanton asserts that the retroactive application of the statutory 
amendment to his case violates the ex post facto clause of the federal 
Constitution because it increases the quantum of punishment attached to his 
offense by prohibiting the reduction of his sentence by good time. 
The State agrees that the Superior Court’s imposition of a minimum 
mandatory sentence, which prohibits Pleasanton’s right to earn good time 
credits, violates the ex post facto clause under the circumstances of this 
                                                 
1 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1447A(d) (eff. July 9, 2001).  
 
3
case.2  Accordingly, the State joins in Pleasanton’s request that the judgment 
of the Superior Court denying the motion for correction of sentence be 
reversed.  
Having carefully considered the parties’ respective positions, we 
agree that the judgment of the Superior Court should be reversed and this 
matter remanded for correction of Pleasanton’s sentence.  The legislative 
enactment prohibiting the award of good time for a PFDCF sentence 
specifically provided that any case in progress at the time of the law’s 
enactment would be subject to the prior law, which permitted the award of 
good time.3  Pleasanton was indicted in December 2000.  His case thus was 
“in progress” at the time of the law’s enactment in July 2001.  Accordingly, 
we find the Superior Court’s denial of Pleasanton’s motion for correction of 
sentence to be erroneous. 
                                                 
2 See Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 33 (1981) (holding that the retroactive 
application of a statute limiting available good time credits was ex post facto because its 
effect was to increase the “quantum of punishment” attached to the defendant’s offense). 
3 See 70 Del. Laws c. 596, § 9 (2001), which provides:   
 
Any action, case, prosecution, trial or other legal proceeding in progress at the 
time of the enactment into law of the provisions of this act, no matter the stage of the 
proceeding, shall be preserved and shall not become illegal or terminated upon the 
effective date of this act.  The prior law shall remain in full force and effect as to all such 
proceedings in progress at the time of enactment of this act. 
 
4
 
The judgment of the Superior Court is reversed.  This matter is 
remanded to the Superior Court for correction of Pleasanton’s sentence in 
accordance with this Opinion.