Title: State v. Jimmy A. Carter
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1994AP002001-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: March 19, 1997

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
94-2001-CR 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
Jimmy A. Carter, 
 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
____________________________________ 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
Reported at:  197 Wis.2d 954, 543 N.W.2d 866 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNPUBLISHED 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                              
 
Opinion Filed:  
March 19, 1997  
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument:  
December 4, 1996 
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Rock 
 
JUDGE: 
 
J. Richard LONG 
 
                                                              
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 Steinmetz, J., dissents (opinion filed)  Wilcox & Crooks, J.J. join 
 
 
 
dissenting opinion. 
 
 
Not Participating: 
 
                                                              
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs by John Allan Pray and Legal Assistance Program, University 
of Wisconsin Law School, Madison and oral argument by John Allan 
Pray. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by 
Marguerite M. Moeller, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
 
No.  94-2001-CR 
 
 
1
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 94-2001-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
Jimmy A. Carter, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 19, 1997 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  
Reversed and cause remanded. 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals, State v. Carter, 
No. 94-2001-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 
1995), affirming a judgment of the Circuit Court for Rock 
County, J. Richard Long, Judge. In resentencing Jimmy Carter, 
the defendant, the circuit court refused to consider information 
about events and circumstances that occurred after the initial 
sentencing hearing.  
¶2 
The issue before this court is whether on resentencing 
a circuit court should consider information about events and 
circumstances either that the sentencing court was unaware of at 
the initial sentencing or that occurred after the initial 
sentencing.1 We conclude that a circuit court should have 
                     
1 This issue is a question of law which this court determines 
independently of the circuit court or court of appeals, 
 
 
No.  94-2001-CR 
 
 
2
available to it all information relevant to determining the 
appropriate sentence. Accordingly, we hold that a circuit court 
should, in imposing a sentence at a resentencing proceeding, 
consider all information relevant about a defendant, including 
information about events and circumstances either that the 
sentencing court was unaware of at the initial sentencing or 
that occurred after the initial sentencing.2  
¶3 
This case does not involve sentence modification. 
Sentence modification involves an entirely different line of 
authority 
than 
resentencing. 
The 
purpose 
of 
sentence 
modification is to allow a court to correct a sentence when new 
factors frustrate the purpose of the sentencing court. State v. 
Franklin, 148 Wis. 2d 1, 14, 434 N.W.2d 609 (1989). To promote 
the policy of finality of judgments, strict rules govern the 
information that can be considered in a request for sentence 
modification. Id. at 9. There is no finality concern when the 
court imposes a new sentence after the initial sentence has been 
held invalid. 
I. 
¶4 
The facts are not in dispute. The defendant pled 
guilty to one count of false imprisonment while armed. Relying 
on a presentence investigation report which included the results 
of a psychological test administered to the defendant, the 
circuit court sentenced the defendant to the maximum term of 
                                                                  
benefiting from the analyses of those courts. 
2 In addition to any constitutional requirements set forth in 
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S 711 (1969), and its progeny, a 
resentencing court is required under state law to explain the 
basis for its sentence on the record. McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 
2d 263, 280-82, 182 N.W.2d 512 (1971); In re Felony Sentencing 
Guidelines, 120 Wis. 2d 198, 201, 353 N.W.2d 793 (1984). 
 
 
No.  94-2001-CR 
 
 
3
five years in prison. The defendant filed a postconviction 
motion under Wis. Stat. § 809.30, requesting a resentencing 
hearing on the ground that the psychological testing methodology 
was flawed. At the hearing on the motion, the prosecutor, while 
not conceding error, agreed to a resentencing "in the interests 
of judicial expediency." The circuit court granted a hearing for 
resentencing and vacated the initial sentence.3  
¶5 
At the resentencing hearing, the defendant’s attorney 
attempted to introduce information about the defendant that had 
not existed at the initial sentencing hearing. According to the 
new information: (1) the defendant had been offered employment 
to begin upon his release from prison; (2) the defendant had 
participated in an alcohol treatment program at the prison; 
(3) the defendant had established a positive record of behavior 
at the prison with no negative conduct reports; and (4) a 
previously pending charge against the defendant had been 
dismissed. Relying on State v. Solles, 169 Wis. 2d 566, 485 
N.W.2d 457 (Ct. App. 1992), the circuit court refused to 
consider the information about events and circumstances that 
occurred after the initial sentencing. The circuit court 
concluded that at a resentencing proceeding, it could consider 
only the events and circumstances existing at the time of the 
initial sentencing.  
¶6 
The court of appeals adopted the analysis presented in 
Solles and affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. 
                     
3 On the agreement of the parties, the circuit court did not 
consider psychological reports at the resentencing hearing. 
We do not decide whether vacating the initial sentence and 
granting a new sentencing hearing were required. We treat the 
present case, as do the defendant and the State, as one involving 
a resentencing following an invalid initial sentence. 
 
 
No.  94-2001-CR 
 
 
4
II. 
¶7 
Our analysis begins with a review of the significant 
case law on resentencing. A leading case on the constitutional 
limits to a trial court’s powers on resentencing is North 
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). In Pearce, which 
involved a resentencing after an initial conviction was vacated, 
the Court recognized the power of a resentencing court to impose 
a greater sentence than the one imposed at the initial 
sentencing. To assure a defendant the protection against 
vindictiveness required by due process principles, the Pearce 
Court concluded that an increase in the sentence must be 
supported by reasons set forth on the record "based upon 
objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the 
part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original 
sentencing proceeding." Id. at 726.4 The Wisconsin supreme court 
has read the Pearce rule as extending to information about 
events and circumstances either that the circuit court was 
unaware of at the initial sentencing or that occurred after the 
original sentencing. See State v. Stubbendick, 110 Wis. 2d 693, 
698-700, 329 N.W.2d 399 (1983) (initial guilty plea and sentence 
                     
4 Prior to Pearce, the Wisconsin supreme court addressed 
resentencing in State v. Leonard, 39 Wis. 2d 461, 473, 159 N.W.2d 
577 (1968). In Leonard, the court concluded that a circuit court 
may impose an increased sentence on resentencing if (1) events 
warranting an increased penalty occur or come to the resentencing 
court’s attention subsequent to the imposition of the initial 
sentence; and (2) the resentencing court affirmatively states in 
the record its ground for increasing the sentence. In Leonard the 
court disclaimed any distinction between a resentencing 
necessitated by an invalid conviction and one necessitated only 
by an invalid sentence. 
Pearce has been modified by subsequent decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Youngwood, Note, The 
Presumption of Judicial Vindictiveness in Multi-Count 
Resentencing, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 725, 729-36 (1993). None of the 
modifications bears on the issues presented in this case.  
 
 
No.  94-2001-CR 
 
 
5
vacated; 
resentence 
after 
reconviction 
on 
jury 
trial; 
resentencing court properly considers amplified knowledge of 
defendant’s crime and a new presentence report including conduct 
after initial sentencing); Denny v. State, 47 Wis. 2d 541, 545-
46, 178 N.W.2d 38 (1970) (initial conviction vacated; resentence 
after second trial; resentencing court erred by failing to state 
on the record reasons based on new information or newly known 
information warranting increased sentence). 
¶8 
The Wisconsin supreme court has affirmed increased 
resentences in circumstances distinct from those of Pearce. See 
State v. Grobarchik, 102 Wis. 2d 461, 471-74, 307 N.W.2d 170 
(1981), and State v. Martin, 121 Wis. 2d 670, 686-88, 360 N.W.2d 
43 (1985). In Grobarchik and Martin, unlike in Pearce, neither 
the resentencing court nor the supreme court was asked to 
consider the defendant's conduct after the original sentencing. 
The court in Grobarchik and Martin concluded that the Pearce 
rule requiring that a court state new information warranting an 
increased sentence was not applicable and distinguished Pearce 
as a case involving an invalid conviction rather than only an 
invalid sentence. The court held in Grobarchik and Martin that 
when an initial sentence cannot be carried out because it was 
not authorized by law, an increased sentence is permissible only 
when 
"based 
upon 
a 
desire 
to 
implement 
the 
original 
dispositional scheme as manifested by the record in the first 
sentencing proceeding." Grobarchik, 102 Wis. 2d at 474; Martin, 
121 Wis. 2d at 687.  
¶9 
In Grobarchik and Martin, as in Pearce, the court was 
concerned that a resentencing court not penalize a defendant for 
 
 
No.  94-2001-CR 
 
 
6
exercising postconviction rights to challenge a sentence. The 
court 
concluded 
that 
compelling 
a 
resentencing 
court 
to 
implement 
the 
original 
dispositional 
scheme, 
rather 
than 
allowing it to re-examine the relevant information available at 
the initial sentencing and exercise its independent judgment, 
protected a defendant from a sentence tainted by vindictiveness. 
Grobarchik, 102 Wis. 2d at 474; Martin, 121 Wis. 2d at 687. 
Grobarchik and Martin thus extended protections similar to those 
in Pearce to a narrow class of cases apparently thought not to 
fall within the Pearce rule.  
¶10 Grobarchik and Martin had no cause to, and did not, 
address the limits to a circuit court's consideration of new 
information at all resentencings which follow valid convictions 
but invalid sentences. Grobarchik and Martin were concerned with 
a resentencing court's authority to impose an increased sentence 
on a basis other than that of the defendant's conduct occurring 
after the original sentencing.  
¶11 In State v. Pierce, 117 Wis. 2d 83, 342 N.W.2d 776 
(Ct. App. 1983), the circuit court imposed an invalid sentence, 
a term of probation consecutive to an existing probation term. 
On 
resentencing, 
the 
circuit 
court 
vacated 
the 
invalid 
probationary term and sentenced Pierce to two years in prison. 
Id. at 85. The stated reason for the increased sentence was 
Pierce’s arrest for two batteries committed after the initial 
sentencing. Citing Pearce and Stubbendick, the court of appeals 
held that the batteries were new information that provided 
adequate reason for the increased sentence and that the circuit 
court was not motivated by vindictiveness. The court of appeals 
 
 
No.  94-2001-CR 
 
 
7
did not refer to the requirement set forth in Grobarchik or 
Martin that the original dispositional scheme be followed in 
some resentencings.  
¶12 In 1992, the court of appeals decided Solles, 169 Wis. 
2d 566, in which resentencing was required because the initial 
sentence was found invalid. Seeking to have the circuit court 
impose a lesser sentence, Solles wanted to introduce evidence at 
the resentencing hearing of his good conduct in prison during 
the previous 14 years, as well as character references and 
evidence of his achievements and employment prospects. The court 
of appeals concluded that this information could not be 
considered when resentencing resulted from an invalid sentence. 
According to the court of appeals, the requirement in Grobarchik 
and Martin that the resentencing court implement "the original 
dispositional scheme as manifested by the record in the first 
sentencing proceeding" meant that the resentencing court was 
limited to considering only the circumstances existing at the 
time of the initial sentence. Solles, 169 Wis. 2d at 569. 
¶13 In the Solles case the State argued, much as it does 
in the present case, that Pierce is inconsistent with Grobarchik 
and Martin and should be overruled. According to the State, the 
court of appeals distinguished Pierce in Solles, concluding that 
in Pierce the court of appeals had faced the question of 
possible vindictiveness by a resentencing court, expressed in an 
increased sentence, whereas in Solles it faced the question of a 
resentencing court imposing a lesser sentence.5 
                     
5 The court of appeals was not persuaded by this distinction and 
pointed out that if Pierce were before it as "an original 
matter," it probably would not have ruled the same way. Solles, 
169 Wis. 2d 566, 571 n.3, 485 N.W.2d 457 (Ct. App. 1992). In 
 
 
No.  94-2001-CR 
 
 
8
¶14 According to the decisions of the court of appeals, on 
resentencing (when the initial conviction is valid but the 
sentence is not), a circuit court may use new information 
unfavorable to the defendant to impose a greater sentence than 
initially imposed, Pierce, but may not use new information 
favorable to the defendant to impose a lesser sentence than 
initially imposed, Solles. The parties agree, and we conclude, 
that this position is unsupportable. 
III. 
¶15 With this background we now turn to the issue in this 
case. The defendant asks the court to overrule the court of 
appeals’ decision in Solles and allow a resentencing court to 
consider new information to reduce or increase an initial 
sentence. The State asks the court to adhere to Solles, overrule 
Pierce, and direct that a resentencing court consider neither 
favorable 
nor 
unfavorable 
information 
about 
events 
or 
circumstances occurring after the initial sentencing. 
¶16 The State urges the court to recognize two types of 
resentencing proceedings: (1) a resentencing proceeding after 
the initial conviction has been invalidated and a new conviction 
is entered; and (2) a resentencing proceeding after the initial 
sentencing has been invalidated but the initial conviction is 
valid.  
                                                                  
deciding Solles the court of appeals was aware of the two cases’ 
contradictory treatment of new information but declined to 
overrule Pierce in the belief that it was bound to adhere to its 
published decisions. Solles, 169 Wis. 2d at 570. 
The question of whether the court of appeals has the power to 
overrule one of its published decisions has been raised in a 
number of cases. In Cook v. Cook, No. 95-1963 (S. Ct. March 19, 
1997), of even date, we hold that the court of appeals may not 
overrule, modify or withdraw language from a previously published 
decision of the court of appeals. 
 
 
No.  94-2001-CR 
 
 
9
¶17 The State reasons that when resentencing is required 
after a conviction is vacated there is no longer any basis for 
the initial sentence and a circuit court should treat the 
resentencing as a totally new proceeding. In such cases, 
according to the State, resentencing is to be viewed as the 
initial sentencing and all relevant information available at the 
time of resentencing may be considered. The State reads Pearce, 
Denny and Stubbendick as supporting this result.  
¶18 The State distinguishes Pierce, Solles and the present 
case as cases falling into the second category, in which the 
initial conviction stands and only a resentencing is required. 
According 
to 
the 
State, 
a 
circuit 
court 
conducting 
a 
resentencing proceeding after a valid initial conviction can 
consider only information existing at the time of the initial 
sentencing, because a circuit court on resentencing sits in the 
position of the circuit court immediately after the valid 
conviction.  
¶19 The State further argues that in Pierce, Solles and 
the 
present 
case, 
although 
the 
sentences 
were 
invalid, 
resentencing was not required to correct errors infecting the 
entire sentencing proceedings. The State urges that under these 
circumstances 
only 
information 
available 
at 
the 
initial 
sentencing should be considered at the resentencing.  
¶20 The State therefore urges that we adhere to the Solles 
decision and hold that Solles controls the case at bar. 
Acknowledging the inconsistency between Solles and Pierce, the 
State urges us to overrule Pierce as wrongly decided and in 
conflict with Martin and Grobarchik. Furthermore, the State 
 
 
No.  94-2001-CR 
 
 
10
asserts that if Pierce were to remain the law, fairness dictates 
that a resentencing court should also be able to consider 
information reflecting favorably on a defendant to support a 
reduced sentence as in the present case. Brief for State in 
Solles at 7; Brief for State in Carter at 20.  
¶21 In sum, the State contends that a resentencing court 
should consider favorable or unfavorable information about a 
defendant which relates to events and circumstances occurring 
after the initial sentencing only when the resentencing follows 
an invalid conviction but that a resentencing court may not 
consider such information when the resentencing results from an 
invalid sentence following a valid conviction. 
¶22 We are not persuaded by the State's position.  
¶23 First, we 
cannot 
discern 
a 
generally 
applicable 
distinction between resentencing following an invalid conviction 
and resentencing solely to correct an invalid sentence. The 
nature of the error necessitating the resentencing does not bear 
on the scope of information that a resentencing court should 
consider. When a resentencing is required for any reason, the 
initial sentence is a nullity; it ceases to exist. The role of 
the resentencing court is the same regardless of the procedural 
history leading to the resentencing. We reiterate what the 
Leonard court stated in 1968: "[W]e see no good reason for 
distinguishing those cases [in which the conviction was invalid] 
from situations involving only resentencing." State v. Leonard, 
39 Wis. 2d 461, 465, 159 N.W.2d 577 (1968).6 
                     
6 Consistent with Leonard, the federal courts of appeals which 
have considered the issue have failed to find in Pearce any 
distinction between invalid conviction and invalid sentence. For 
example, the seventh circuit has stated: "We see no reason to 
 
 
No.  94-2001-CR 
 
 
11
¶24 Second, for the same reasons stated above we decline 
to distinguish a resentencing based on errors infecting the 
entire sentencing proceedings from other resentencings.  
¶25 Third, we do not read Grobarchik and Martin as 
applicable to resentencing generally. Grobarchik and Martin 
require that a resentencing court state on the record the 
reasons for the increased sentence and that the reasons be based 
on a desire to implement the initial sentencing court’s original 
dispositional scheme. Grobarchik and Martin address an unusual 
fact situation. Without revisiting these cases, we now clarify 
that they are limited to their facts. The rule established in 
those cases applies only when the initial conviction is valid, 
the initial sentence is invalid, the resentencing court has no 
new information or newly known information, and the resentencing 
court seeks to impose a greater sentence. We reiterate that the 
rule of Grobarchik and Martin is to assure compliance with the 
due process principle that vindictiveness must play no role in 
resentencing. A defendant must not be penalized for, or 
                                                                  
distinguish, on the basis of [the Pearce] rationale, the case of 
resentencing after retrial from the case of resentencing after 
vacation of an illegal sentence. The same threat of 
vindictiveness is present, and the same safeguards are 
necessary." United States v. Jefferson, 760 F.2d 821, 825 (7th 
Cir. 1985). See also United States v. Vontsteen, 950 F.2d 1086, 
1089 n.2 (5th Cir. 1992) ("We have found no case that expressly 
limits Pearce in this way.") (collecting cases). 
In 1980 the American Bar Association recommended that there be no 
increased sentences on resentencing and that "this limitation 
should be observed regardless of whether the new sentence follows 
a reversal of the underlying conviction or only a remand of the 
prior sentencing decision at the instance of the defendant." ABA 
Criminal Justice Standard 18-4.9 at p. 18.323 and Commentary at 
p. 18.325-26 (2d ed. 1980). In 1994 chapter 18 on sentencing was 
extensively rewritten. Section 18-4.9, addressing resentencing, 
has been eliminated.  
 
 
No.  94-2001-CR 
 
 
12
dissuaded from, exercising the right to challenge an invalid 
sentence or conviction. See Denny, 47 Wis. 2d at 544.  
¶26 Finally, we conclude that Pierce is consistent with 
the principles we enunciate today and that Solles is not. Solles 
does not comport with the role of a sentencing court and we 
therefore overrule it.  
¶27 The law is clear that to fashion an appropriate 
sentence a sentencing court should consider all relevant and 
available information. The primary considerations in imposing a 
sentence are the gravity and nature of the offense (including 
the effect on the victim), the character of the defendant and 
public safety.7 The court has emphasized the importance of a 
sentencing court's consideration of a broad range of information 
at sentencing.8 As the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals stated: "In 
the exercise of the difficult discretionary function of imposing 
sentence upon a convicted or confessed criminal, the sentencing 
judge is entitled to all the help he [or she] can get." United 
States v. Majors, 490 F.2d 1321, 1322 (10th Cir. 1974). 
¶28 The circuit court's role in determining an appropriate 
sentence is the same whether the proceeding is an initial 
                     
7 State v. Ogden, 199 Wis. 2d 566, 571, 544 N.W.2d 574 
(1996)("[S]entence must at the very least be based on the 
'gravity of the offense, the character of the offender and the 
need for the protection of the public.'"); Rosado v. State, 70 
Wis. 2d 280, 288, 234 N.W.2d 69 (1975) ("It is well settled that 
all information relevant to sentencing should be brought to the 
attention of the trial judge.").  
8 See, e.g., Elias v. State, 93 Wis. 2d 278, 285, 286 N.W.2d 559 
(1980) ("The responsibility of the sentencing court is to acquire 
full knowledge of the character and behavior pattern of the 
convicted defendant before imposing sentence."). See also Wasman 
v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 563 (1984) ("The sentencing court 
or jury must be permitted to consider any and all information 
that reasonably might bear on the proper sentence for the 
particular defendant, given the crime committed."). 
 
 
No.  94-2001-CR 
 
 
13
sentencing or a resentencing. In determining an appropriate 
sentence, both the sentencing and resentencing courts should 
have accurate, complete and current information.  
¶29 The 
State 
claims 
that two 
policy 
considerations 
explained by the Solles court support the Solles result. Solles 
169 Wis. 2d at 571. First, the State contends that a defendant 
who uses a resentencing proceeding to introduce new information 
resulting in a lesser sentence would essentially receive a 
windfall unavailable to other defendants. We conclude that it 
cannot be considered a windfall for a defendant to receive a 
sentence based on complete information. A resentenced defendant 
is in no better position than any other defendant who is 
afforded the opportunity to present all relevant information 
available at the time of valid sentencing. Furthermore, the new 
information can result in either an increase or a decrease in a 
defendant’s sentence. 
¶30 Second, the State argues that allowing a resentencing 
court to consider events and circumstances occurring after the 
initial sentencing usurps the function of the parole board. This 
argument confuses the roles of the resentencing court and the 
parole board. The function of the resentencing court is to 
impose an appropriate penalty within the parameters prescribed 
by the legislature. The role of the parole board derives from 
the function of the executive to grant paroles and pardons. Wis. 
Stat. ch. 304. Some of the factors a court considers when 
imposing a sentence on a convicted defendant are similar to the 
factors considered by the parole board when deciding whether to 
grant parole. The parole board does not, however, act until 
 
 
No.  94-2001-CR 
 
 
14
after a valid sentence is imposed on a convicted defendant. 
Therefore, its role is not usurped if a resentencing court 
considers new information relevant to imposing a valid sentence 
after an initial sentence has been vacated. 
¶31 For the reasons stated, we hold that a circuit court 
should, in imposing a sentence at resentencing, consider all 
information relevant about a defendant, including information 
about events and circumstances either that the sentencing court 
was unaware of at the initial sentencing or that occurred after 
the initial sentencing. The decision of the court of appeals is 
therefore reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit 
court for resentencing. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded. 
 
 
94-2001-CR.dws 
 
1
¶32 DONALD W. STEINMETZ, J. (Dissenting).  I believe that 
precedential 
case 
law 
from 
this 
court 
mandates 
that 
on 
resentencing to correct an invalid sentence, a circuit court 
should only consider information that was available to the court 
at the time of the original sentencing.  Consequently, I dissent 
from the majority opinion. 
 
¶33 Grobarchik v. State, 102 Wis. 2d 461, 307 N.W.2d 170 
(1981), involved the improper sentencing of a criminal defendant 
by the trial court, and the proper means by which to remedy such 
an invalid sentence.  The court held "that a resentencing 
proceeding is the proper method for correcting the type of error 
involved in this matter."  Id. at 466.  This court distinguished 
the situation in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) 
involving 
a 
resentencing 
after 
a 
reconviction, 
from 
the 
situation in Grobarchik where the original conviction was valid, 
but the original sentence was not.  102 Wis. 2d at 471-72.  In 
doing so, this court explained the rules applicable in a 
resentencing based on an invalid conviction: 
 
When a defendant is resentenced for the purpose 
of correcting a prior invalid sentence, and when, as 
compared with the original sentence, the liberty 
interests of the defendant are substantially and 
adversely affected, the trial court must state on the 
record 
the 
reasons 
for 
so 
modifying 
the 
first 
sentence.  His reasons must be based upon a desire to 
implement 
the 
original 
dispositional 
scheme 
as 
manifested by the record in the first sentencing 
proceeding. 
Id. at 474 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).  Thus, based on 
this court's decision in Grobarchik, when resentencing a 
defendant based on an original, invalid sentence, a court must 
 
 
94-2001-CR.dws 
 
2
consider only the facts and circumstances as they existed at the 
time of the first sentencing  proceeding.   
¶34 This court relied on the Grobarchik opinion in State 
v. Martin, 121 Wis. 2d 670, 360 N.W.2d 43 (1985), an opinion 
written for the court by Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson.9  Martin 
involved questions regarding the proper means of resentencing a 
defendant after one of his two original convictions was vacated 
on double jeopardy principles.  The court concluded that it was 
proper for the judge on resentencing to rely only on the 
original dispositional scheme as it existed at the time of the 
first sentencing.  It explained as follows: 
 
Applying the principles set forth in Grobarchik, we 
conclude that because the circuit judge resentenced 
this defendant to correct a prior invalid sentence, 
the circuit court correctly attempted to implement the 
original dispositional scheme reflected by the record 
in the first sentencing proceeding.  The new sentence 
was properly based on the record as initially compiled 
by the sentencing judge without any new evidence.     
    
Id. at 688 (emphasis added).   
 
¶35 In the majority opinion in the case at bar, State v. 
Carter, the court indicates that it is treating "the present 
case . . . as one involving a resentencing following an invalid 
initial sentence."  Majority op. at 3, note 3.  Because this 
case involves an invalid sentence, precedent from this court 
requires that the resentencing court base the new sentence "on 
the record as initially compiled by the sentencing judge without 
any new evidence."  Martin, 121 Wis. 2d at 688.   
                     
9 Chief Justice Abrahamson is the author of the majority opinion 
in State v. Carter, 94-2001-CR.   
 
 
94-2001-CR.dws 
 
3
¶36 Although the majority skirts the issue in its opinion 
in Carter, it is effectively overruling two decisions from this 
court, Grobarchik and Martin.  Ignoring the plain language of 
these 
cases, 
as 
cited 
above, 
the 
majority 
attempts 
to 
distinguish these precedents by arguing, without support from 
the cases themselves, that "they are limited to their facts" and 
that the rules of these cases were "to assure compliance with 
the due process principle that vindictiveness must play no role 
in resentencing."  Majority op. at 12-13.  However, in a recent 
decision written on behalf of this court by Chief Justice 
Abrahamson, the court noted that "when a court of last resort 
intentionally takes up, discusses, and decides a question 
germane to, though not necessarily decisive of, the controversy, 
such decision is not a dictum but is a judicial act of the court 
which it will thereafter recognize as a binding decision."  
Risser 
v. 
Klauser, 
No. 
96-0042-OA 
(Wis. 
Jan. 
31, 
1997) 
(citations omitted).  Consequently, the rules of Grobarchik and 
Martin are binding decisions of this court.  I am unpersuaded by 
attempts of the majority to distinguish these cases and am 
convinced that the distinctions it offers are unfounded.   
¶37 The majority opinion flies in the face of the long-
standing principles of the doctrine of stare decisis.   "[T]he 
doctrine of stare decisis. . . is a doctrine that demands 
respect in a society governed by the rule of law."  Akron v. 
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 419-20 
(1983), overruled on other grounds by Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).  Such 
 
 
94-2001-CR.dws 
 
4
"fidelity to precedent" helps to ensure that the existing law 
will "not be abandoned without strong justification." State v. 
Stevens, 
181 
Wis. 
2d 
410, 
441, 
511 
N.W.2d 
591 
(1994) 
(Abrahamson, J., concurring), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 115 S. 
Ct. 2245 (1995).  When existing law "is open to revision in 
every case, 'deciding cases becomes a mere exercise of judicial 
will, with arbitrary and unpredictable results.'"  Citizens 
Utility Bd. v. Klauser, 194 Wis. 2d 484, 513, 534 N.W.2d 608 
(1995) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).  Unless 
there is a compelling reason to divert from its precedent, a 
court should abide by the precedent it has established.   
¶38 As I explained above, the majority in this case has 
effectively overruled its own precedent set in Grobarchik and 
Martin, but has done so without any "strong justification."  
Instead, the majority relies on several cases that can be easily 
distinguished from this case, North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 
711 (1969); State v. Stubbendick, 110 Wis. 2d 693, 698-700, 329 
N.W.2d 399 (1983); Denny v. State, 47 Wis. 2d 541, 545-46, 178 
N.W.2d 38 (1970), in support of its ultimate holding.  Each of 
these cases involved a resentencing that took place after the 
defendant's original conviction had been vacated and he had been 
reconvicted.  In such a case, where the initial conviction has 
been vacated, it is as though the initial sentence never 
existed.  Under those circumstances, it would be perfectly 
natural for a sentencing court to consider all relevant 
information at the time of this resentencing because the 
 
 
94-2001-CR.dws 
 
5
"original dispositional scheme" would consist of the factors in 
existence at the time of the reconviction and resentencing.   
¶39 In the case at bar, the original conviction has not 
been vacated; it still stands.  This is not a situation like 
that in Pearce, Stubbendick, or Denny.  Instead, this case 
involves a need for a resentencing based on a previous invalid 
sentence.  This court has concluded that there is a difference 
between these two scenarios, and that when a resentencing is 
needed due to an invalid sentence, the court should consider 
only the factors in the record at the time of the original 
sentencing.  See Grobarchik, 102 Wis. 2d  at 472 ("[t]he facts 
of Pearce are distinguishable from the present controversy"); 
Martin, 121 Wis. 2d at 686 (the Pearce rule "applies only to 
resentencing after retrial"). 
¶40 Instead, this case is much more similar to the court 
of appeals' decision in State v. Solles, 169 Wis. 2d 566, 485 
N.W.2d 457 (Ct. App. 1992).  Solles was originally sentenced to 
terms totaling 60 years' imprisonment—30 years for armed 
robbery, 25 years for second-degree murder, and five years for 
concealing his identity.  Twelve years later, the court vacated 
the sentences and ordered that Solles be resentenced because a 
separate sentence for concealing identity, a penalty-enhancer, 
was improper.  At the resentencing hearing, Solles presented 
evidence of his good conduct in prison and of his educational 
achievements, employment prospects, and character references.  
The trial court concluded that it could not consider Solles' 
postconviction conduct or his present character.   
 
 
94-2001-CR.dws 
 
6
¶41 In affirming the trial court, the court of appeals 
held that "the sentence must be based upon the circumstances as 
they existed when the original sentence was imposed."  169 Wis. 
2d at 567.  The Solles court based its decision on this court's 
decisions in Martin, 121 Wis. 2d 670, and Grobarchik, 102 Wis. 
2d 461, which were summed up in Solles as standing for the 
proposition that the "'original dispositional scheme,' and 
therefore the circumstances at the time of the original 
sentence, control the resentencing."  Id. at 569.  
¶42 The State in the present case, State v. Carter, urges 
this court to uphold Solles.  The State argues that the rule in 
Solles does not prevent a trial court from sentencing a 
defendant based on accurate and relevant information.  The State 
claims that Carter incorrectly assumes that all new information 
is relevant despite the reason for resentencing and ignores the 
fact that a defendant in Wisconsin has other avenues to place 
such new evidence before the court, such as a sentence 
modification hearing.  I find the arguments of the State 
persuasive, and believe that this court should uphold Solles 
because it is based on controlling precedent from this court.  
¶43 The court in Solles also cites two policy reasons for 
not allowing a court to consider a defendant's present character 
and good record at sentencing: 1) allowing such consideration 
would benefit the small number of defendants whose sentences are 
vacated because of the fortuity of a sentencing error; and 2) 
allowing such consideration would usurp the role of the parole 
board.  Id. at 571.  This court should consider the policy 
 
 
94-2001-CR.dws 
 
7
implications of its decisions before rendering them.  In this 
case, policy considerations such as these were quickly dismissed 
by the majority with little discussion.  I believe that such 
policy considerations are valid concerns, and that the Solles 
court accurately identified two potential downfalls of the new 
rule proposed by the majority. 
 
  ¶44 
In conclusion, I would affirm the court of 
appeals' decision that a court should only consider the 
information as it existed at the time of the initial sentencing 
proceeding when it is resentencing a defendant.  Case law from 
this court requires this rule, and it is a rule that makes 
sense.  Otherwise, there is a lack of finality to sentences; 
only a few defendants are rewarded because they are fortunate 
enough to have initially received an invalid sentence, and the 
role of the parole board is usurped.  However, I agree with the 
State that the court of appeals' decision in State v. Pierce, 
117 Wis. 2d 83, 342 N.W.2d 776 (Ct. App. 1983), must be 
overruled because it violates the rule established in Grobarchik 
and Martin.  See majority op. at 7, 13.  Consequently, I would 
reverse that portion of the court of appeals' decision upholding 
its earlier decision in Pierce.  A defendant seeking to 
introduce positive changes, or a prosecutor seeking to use 
negative changes, may properly do so either through a motion for 
modification of sentence or by appearing before a parole board. 
 The motion for modification may be heard at the same time as 
the resentencing hearing.   
 
 
94-2001-CR.dws 
 
8
 
¶45 For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm in part and 
reverse in part the court of appeals' decision.   
 
¶46 I am authorized to state that JUSTICES Jon P. Wilcox 
and N. Patrick Crooks join this dissenting opinion.