Title: Ex Parte Fletcher
Citation: 849 So. 2d 900
Docket Number: 1990055
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: March 30, 2001

849 So. 2d 900 (2001)
Ex parte Earnestine FLETCHER.
(In re Earnestine Fletcher v. State).
1990055.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
March 30, 2001.
*901 R. Scott Anderson, Decatur, for petitioner.
William H. Pryor, Jr., atty. gen., and Sandra J. Stewart, asst. atty. gen., for respondent.
LYONS, Justice.
Earnestine Fletcher was charged with the theft of over $200,000 from the City of Decatur ("the City"), for which she had been formerly employed as a clerk. She pleaded guilty to theft of property in the first degree, a violation of § 13A-8-3(a), Ala.Code 1975.[1] The trial court sentenced Fletcher to 15 years in the penitentiary; it split the sentence, ordering her to serve 48 hours in the county jail, followed by 15 years on probation. In addition, the court ordered her to pay court costs, to pay $50 to the Victims Compensation Fund, and to pay $200,000 in restitution to the City. The court ordered Fletcher to pay the $200,000, plus 12% interest, amortized over 15 years, resulting in a total of $432,061 to be repaid by Fletcher in monthly payments of $2,400.34.
Fletcher moved the trial court to reconsider its restitution order. She argued that under the terms of her plea bargain, she had agreed to pay a total of $200,000 in restitution in monthly payments of $1,112 for 15 years; that she should be required to compensate the City only for the amount of its actual loss; and that the restitution ordered should be based on her ability to pay. The trial court denied Fletcher's motion. She appealed from the restitution order.
The Court of Criminal Appeals, on August 20, 1999, affirmed the restitution order, without an opinion. Fletcher v. State (No. CR-97-1059), 778 So. 2d 869 (Ala. Crim.App.1999) (table). We granted certiorari review to determine whether the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in holding that the trial court had properly ordered Fletcher to pay 12% interest on the $200,000 in restitution. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals in part, reverse it in part, and remand.
Before Fletcher pleaded guilty, she and her attorney had negotiated with the State what is known as a "blind" plea agreement. In essence, Fletcher and the State agreed that she would pay $200,000 in restitution over a period of 15 years, and the State agreed that it would make no recommendation as to her sentence. Her attorney provided the trial court with a document entitled "Restitution Payment Plan for Earnestine Fletcher"; that document showed monthly payments of $1,112 that Fletcher proposed to make from March 1998 through January 2013, plus one final payment in February 2013 of $952, for a total of $200,000. At the hearing on her plea agreement and sentencing, the trial court and the attorneys discussed the plea agreement:
"[PROSECUTOR]: As I understand it, Judge, she is putting herself at the mercy of the Court. We do have an agreement as to the amount of restitution. Whatever the sentence may be, *902 we have an agreement that will be set at $200,000.00.
Fletcher and her attorney signed an "Explanation of Rights and Plea of Guilty" form, commonly known as an Ireland form,[2] in which she agreed to plead guilty to first-degree theft of property, a Class B felony. In signing that form, Fletcher acknowledged that she was aware of her rights and agreed to waive them.
Fletcher testified that she had worked for the City as a clerk at the Decatur City Hall until January 1997 and that one of her job duties had been to receive money that was paid to the City for various reasons. She further testified that during the last several years of her employment with the City, she took an amount of money in excess of $1,000 that she had received on behalf of the City and that she used that money for her own benefit. In addition, she testified that she was 55 years old and was employed full-time by a local merchant. After Fletcher and her attorney spoke in support of her request for probation, the trial court stated:
"THE COURT: $1,112.00 per month. I want you to be very very clear in understanding what I'm telling you. Allowing you to stay on probation is conditioned on these payments being made monthly and timely. There are a number of factors that go into that decision that I considered.... The factors ... that I have to weigh are what is an appropriate punishment, as well as what are the rights of the victim. I firmly believe that I have the rights of the citizens of Decatur to look after as well, and I want them to be paid back. That's a primary factor in my decision. Without an opportunity or without a promise and assurance from you and your lawyer that this restitution is going to be paid, I would send you to prison, and I still may if you let me down. To coin a phrase that is popular that came out of some movie, `show me the money.' I want the money back, and I can't be more clear about that. I want the City of Decatur to have the money back and I want them to be paid interest money in accordance with the statute. As long as you make these payments, as long as you report to the probation officer timely *903 and stay out of trouble, do what the probation officer says, I'm willing to give you the opportunity....
"....
At some point after the hearing, the trial court apparently asked Fletcher's attorney to recalculate a 15-year restitution plan that included 12% interest on $200,000. By that plan, Fletcher would need to make monthly payments of $2,400.34 for 15 years. Fletcher then filed what she called a "motion to reconsider," in which she asked the trial court "to reconsider its sentencing order ... regarding the payment of restitution." She stated, in pertinent part:
"....
"10. In order to pay restitution in the Court ordered amount of $2,400.34 alone the Defendant would be required to earn a gross income of $40,005.66 per year or $3,333.80 per month. With her *904 basic living expenses costing $800.00 per month and a court ordered restitution payment per month of $2,400.34, Defendant would have to earn a gross income of approximately $53,339.00 per year or $4,444.91 per month. The Defendant does not now have nor has she ever had the ability or the opportunity to earn this amount of money.
Fletcher filed with her motion an affidavit that stated:
The trial court denied Fletcher's motion, with an order stating:
"1. The defendant in the above styled cause entered a plea of guilty to theft of property in the first degree on February 5, 1998. At the time of the theft, the defendant was employed by *905 the City of Decatur, Alabama. The defendant had admitted stealing money from the City of Decatur over a period of years and was unsure of the exact amount of the money she admitted stealing.
*906 II.
We first consider whether Fletcher preserved for appellate review the matters she now complains of. The State argues that the proper procedure for Fletcher to secure the relief she seeks would have been for Fletcher to move to withdraw her guilty plea. Because she did not take the proper action, the State argues, she is now barred from complaining about the trial court's imposing the requirement that she pay interest on the $200,000 in restitution. The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with the State, concluding that Fletcher should have moved in the trial court to withdraw her guilty plea, so that the parties could be returned to the "status quo" as it existed before the trial court accepted her plea. We disagree.
Both this Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals have reviewed a defendant's arguments concerning the restitution aspect of a sentencing order, without the defendant's having withdrawn his or her guilty plea. See, e.g., Ex parte Clare, 456 So. 2d 357 (Ala.1984); W.D.J. v. State, 785 So. 2d 385 (Ala.Crim.App.1998), rev'd on other grounds, 785 So. 2d 390 (Ala.2000); Culp v. State, 710 So. 2d 1357 (Ala.Crim. App.1996), cert. denied, 710 So. 2d 1361 (Ala.1998); D.J.W. v. State, 705 So. 2d 521 (Ala.Crim.App.1996); Gladden v. State, 644 So. 2d 1267 (Ala.Crim.App.1993). Both this Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals have specifically stated that a postconviction motion is an appropriate method for bringing the defendant's dissatisfaction with the restitution award to the attention of the trial court and that such a motion is sufficient to preserve for appellate review issues concerning the restitution award. In Ex parte Clare, this Court stated:
456 So. 2d  at 359. In Gladden, the Court of Criminal Appeals said:
644 So. 2d  at 1268.
After reviewing the transcript of Fletcher's sentencing hearing, her motion to reconsider, and the trial court's order denying that motion, we find it clear that Fletcher's dissatisfaction with the amount of restitution ordered by the trial court arose after the court had held the sentencing hearing. Although the trial court stated at the hearing that it intended for Fletcher to pay interest on the restitution award, it seemed to embrace the monthly-payment schedule Fletcher's counsel had submitted to the court. According to the *907 trial court's order, it was not until after the hearing that the court asked Fletcher's counsel to recompute her restitution payments to include 12% interest for 15 years. At that point, Fletcher filed her motion for reconsideration. Accordingly, we conclude that Fletcher's motion was sufficient to preserve the alleged error for appellate review.
We affirm that aspect of the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment holding that Fletcher is not entitled to enforce what she understood to be an agreement that the total amount of restitution she was to pay would be no more than $200,000. A defendant is not entitled to the specific enforcement of her understanding of a plea agreement. Ex parte Yarber, 437 So. 2d 1330 (Ala.1983); Joiner v. State, 625 So. 2d 1173 (Ala.Crim.App. 1993).
We now address a question of first impression in this Statewhether a trial court can order a defendant to pay interest on an amount ordered as restitution. Although we have not addressed this question, the courts in several of our sister states have. Most of those courts have answered the question in the affirmative.[3] See Clark v. State, 953 P.2d 159 (Alaska App.1998); Valenzuela v. People, 893 P.2d 97 (Colo.1995); Ebaugh v. State, 623 So. 2d 844 (Fla.App.1993); Patrick v. State, 184 Ga.App. 260, 361 S.E.2d 251 (1987); State v. Reynolds, 772 So. 2d 128 (La.App.2000); People v. Law, 459 Mich. 419, 591 N.W.2d 20 (1999); State v. Brewer, 296 Mont. 453, 989 P.2d 407 (1999); State v. Jensen, 124 N.M. 726, 955 P.2d 195 (N.M.App.), cert. denied, 124 N.M. 311, 950 P.2d 284 (N.M. 1997); State v. Meyers, 571 N.W.2d 847 (S.D.1997); Rodriguez v. State, 710 S.W.2d 167 (Tex.App.San Antonio 1986). Other courts have answered in the negative. See State v. Foy, 176 Ariz. 166, 859 P.2d 789 (Ariz.App.1993); People v. Hart, 65 Cal. App. 4th 902, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 837 (1998); State v. Akers, 435 N.W.2d 332 (Iowa 1989); State v. Dickenson, 68 Or.App. 283, 680 P.2d 1028 (1984); State v. Hufford, 186 Wis.2d 461, 522 N.W.2d 26 (Wis.App.1994). See generally George Blum, Annotation, Measure and Elements of Restitution to Which Victim Is Entitled Under State Criminal Statute, 15 A.L.R. 5th 391, § 45j (1993). We conclude that the better-reasoned approach allows the imposition of interest on restitution awards.
In Reynolds, the Louisiana Court of Appeal reviewed a trial court's restitution order requiring that a defendant pay restitution of $39,700 "together with legal interest from the date of each theft until paid." 772 So. 2d  at 129. Louisiana law provides that a defendant placed on probation must pay restitution when a victim has suffered "any direct loss of cash" and that restitution must not exceed "the actual pecuniary loss to the victim." La.Code Crim. Proc. art. 895.1(A). The Louisiana court reasoned: "Interest, being money, is pecuniary. Further, interest is viewed as compensation for the loss of use of one's money." 772 So. 2d  at 131. The court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's ordering the defendant to pay interest on the restitution ordered.
*908 In Brewer, the Supreme Court of Montana noted that the issue whether interest could properly be applied to restitution was one of first impression for that court. Montana law, like Kentucky law, requires a defendant to make "full restitution" for a victim's "pecuniary" or economic loss. Mont.Code, § 46-18-241 (1997). Included in the definition of "pecuniary loss" are "all special damages ... that a person could recover against the offender in a civil action." Mont.Code, § 46-18-243 (1997). The Montana court concluded that interest was properly includable on restitution awards, and it affirmed the trial court's imposition of 10% interest on the restitution the defendant was ordered to pay.
In Law, the Supreme Court of Michigan concluded that the term "restitution" was understood in Michigan to include interest. The court noted that Michigan law provided that in determining restitution a trial court must consider "the amount of the loss sustained by any victim." Mich. Comp. Laws, § 780.767(1). The court stated that "because a monetary loss includes the use value of money, i.e., interest," the statute's focus on the "loss sustained by any victim" indicated that "interest is a legitimate element of monetary restitution." 459 Mich. at 424, 591 N.W.2d  at 22. The court further quoted a tentative draft of the Restatement (Second) of Restitution, saying that draft was in accord with its view: "`A judgment or order for restitution will, at the claimant's instance, include an award of an amount as interest required to prevent unjust enrichment of the defendant.' " 459 Mich. at 425, 591 N.W.2d  at 23 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Restitution (tentative draft), § 28, p. 216).
Alabama law applicable to the imposition of restitution is similar to the law we have discussed above from other states. The Alabama Restitution to Victims of Crimes Act ("ARVCA") is codified at §§ 15-18-65 to -78, Ala.Code 1975. Section 15-18-65 reads:
(Emphasis added.) The ARVCA defines the term "pecuniary damages," at § 15-18-66(2):
This Court has defined "special damages" in a civil context as those that "flow naturally, but not necessarily, from the wrongful act." Crommelin v. Montgomery Indep. Telecasters, Inc., 280 Ala. 391, 394, 194 So. 2d 548, 551 (1967).
In affirming the trial court's restitution order, the Court of Criminal Appeals noted in its unpublished memorandum that it had previously held in Strough v. State, 501 So. 2d 488, 491 (Ala.Crim.App.1986), that § 15-18-65, "by reference to the pertinent Alabama civil law, permits a victim to recover all reasonable expenses which are incurred due to the defendant's wrongful *909 conduct." The Court of Criminal Appeals then concluded that a logical construction of § 15-18-65 is that interest on a restitution order would be permitted and at times would be necessary to fully compensate victims for their pecuniary losses. The court held: "The trial court was authorized to impose upon Fletcher a duty to pay the City interest when ordering her to make restitution, in order to fully compensate the City for all direct and indirect pecuniary losses resulting from her wrongful conduct." We affirm that aspect of the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment.
Our conclusion that in a criminal case the trial court has the authority to impose interest on a restitution award is strengthened by the fact that § 15-18-78 gives such an award the force and effect of a civil judgment. Section 15-18-78 states:
Section 15-18-78 also compels us to conclude that the trial court correctly imposed a 12% rate of interest on Fletcher's restitution. Section 8-8-10 requires that a civil judgment bear interest at a rate of 12% from the date of entry. Nevertheless, a trial court must not only give effect to the incorporation of § 8-8-10 according to the clear terms of § 15-18-78, but it must also adhere to the provisions of § 15-18-68 and Rule 26.11 (discussed infra, in Part V), requiring that a restitution award be tailored to a defendant's ability to pay. In applying those provisions, the trial court must take into account the effect of 12% interest per annum in calculating a sum for the restitution principal that a defendant should be required to pay over a period of time.
Finally, we address Fletcher's argument that the trial court, in increasing from $1,112 to $2,400 the monthly payments required of a 55-year-old woman employed in a local retail store, erred in imposing an interest rate upon her that resulted in monthly restitution payments that were beyond her ability to pay. Although a trial court is vested with wide discretion in fashioning a restitution order, that discretion must be guided by the applicable Rules of Criminal Procedure and the restitution statutes. "While these provisions are not mandatory, they do reflect the general intention of the Alabama Supreme Court and the Alabama legislature that in fashioning a restitution order the trial court should make it reasonable and realistic based upon the defendant's ability to pay." Moore v. State, 706 So. 2d 265, 272 (Ala.Crim.App.1996). The ARVCA defines "restitution" in § 15-18-66(3) as the "[f]ull, partial or nominal payment of pecuniary damages to the victim or to its equivalent in services performed or work or labor done for the benefit of the victim as determined by the court of record." Rule 26.11, Ala. R.Crim. P., provides:
"(a) Imposition of Restitution. Restitution should be ordered in all cases *910 where a victim has been injured or damaged. The financial resources and obligations of the defendant and the burden that payment of restitution will impose should be considered in determining how much restitution is to be paid or collected, i.e., whether to be paid by installments and what length of time should be given for payment."
The ARVCA provides further guidance in § 15-18-68:
In Moore, the Court of Criminal Appeals addressed a situation similar to Fletcher's in that the trial court had ordered Moore to pay restitution in an amount that clearly exceeded his ability to pay. The Court of Criminal Appeals stated:
706 So. 2d  at 268-69. See also W.D.J., supra, and Culp, supra.
Fletcher had one hearing, at which the trial court accepted her guilty plea, sentenced her, and imposed a restitution order. As we have previously stated, Fletcher's objection to the terms of the restitution ordered by the court came about after the trial court had ordered her counsel to recompute the monthly-payment schedule to include the payment of 12% interest. The record does not indicate that the trial court held a hearing after Fletcher moved for a reconsideration; therefore, the record contains no explanation as to why the trial court required Fletcher to make monthly payments that the record indicates are far beyond her financial means. Section 15-18-67, a part of the ARVCA, provides *911 that a defendant is entitled to a restitution hearing. Section 15-18-69 explains what is required at such a hearing:
We reverse that aspect of the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirming the amount of restitution and the method of its payment, and we remand the cause for the Court of Criminal Appeals to instruct the trial court to hold any further proceedings and to enter any supplemental orders that are necessary in order for the trial court to comply with the ARVCA in a manner consistent with this opinion.
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals insofar as it holds that the trial court properly refused to specifically enforce Fletcher's understanding of the plea agreement and holds that the trial court properly required Fletcher to pay interest upon the principal amount to be paid as restitution. We further hold that the trial court correctly imposed an interest rate of 12%. In all other respects, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the cause for that court to order further proceedings pursuant to the instructions given in Parts IV and V above.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
MOORE, C.J., and HOUSTON, SEE, JOHNSTONE, HARWOOD, WOODALL, and STUART, JJ., concur.
BROWN, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.
BROWN, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur in Part III, holding that Fletcher is not entitled to enforce what she says she understood to be an agreement that the total amount of restitution would be no more that $200,000, and I concur in Part IV, holding that the trial court, when ordering Fletcher to pay restitution, was authorized to impose a duty to pay interest. However, I cannot join, and therefore respectfully dissent from, Parts II and V, which effectively allow Fletcher to retain the considerable benefits of her guilty plea while pleading poverty as a means of escaping her own obligations under the plea.
While the majority opinion states that Fletcher is not entitled to specific performance of the terms of her guilty plea as she claimed to understand them, the effect of the majority opinion is to force the trial court to accept a plea under terms the trial court would not have accepted in the first instanceterms more favorable to Fletcher than those the trial court was willing to accept. The Court of Criminal Appeals correctly stated in its unpublished memorandum:
"It is well settled that where there is a question as to the existence and terms of a plea agreement, the trial court is in the best position to ascertain the facts and to determine the intent of the parties. Kresler v. State, 462 So. 2d 785, 789 (Ala.Crim.App.1984); see also Fuller v. State, 481 So. 2d 1178, 1181 (Ala.Crim. App.1985). A trial court's determination regarding the existence and terms of a plea agreement is not readily disturbed on appellate review. Ex parte Clay, 562 *912 So. 2d 1307, 1309 (Ala.1990); see also Ex parte Swain, 527 So. 2d 1279 (Ala.1988).
Fletcher v. State (No. CR-97-1059) 778 So. 2d 869 (Ala.Crim.App.1999) (table).
If Fletcher truly entered her guilty plea without a full understanding of her potential obligations as they might be imposed by the trial courtif there was no meeting of the mindsthen she should have sought to withdraw her plea. Although she did not do this, she is now, nevertheless, being allowed to dictate the terms of her plea.
As a final note, because this case is being remanded for further proceedings on the question of the amount of restitution Fletcher can pay and the method of its payment, I would recommend that the court inquire into a particular matter that is relevant to the question of Fletcher's ability to pay restitutionwhat became of the considerable sum of money Fletcher, by entering her guilty plea, admitted to stealing.
[1]  Count One of the indictment charged Fletcher with the theft of $214,658.17 from the City of Decatur; a second count was dismissed when Fletcher entered her plea as to Count One.
[2]  See Ireland v. State, 47 Ala.App. 65, 250 So. 2d 602 (Ala.Crim.App.1971). See also Rule 14.4, Ala. R.Crim.P.
[3]  Several United States Courts of Appeal also have upheld restitution orders that included interest. See, e.g., Virgin Islands v. Davis, 43 F.3d 41 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1123, 115 S. Ct. 2280, 132 L. Ed. 2d 283 (1995); United States v. Rochester, 898 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Smith, 944 F.2d 618 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 951, 112 S. Ct. 1515, 117 L. Ed. 2d 651 (1992); United States v. Patty, 992 F.2d 1045 (10th Cir. 1993).