Title: DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION V HAGGERTY CORRIDOR PARTNERS LTD
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 124765
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: July 15, 2005

Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 15, 2005 
MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Plaintiffs-Appellee, 
v 
No. 124765 
HAGGERTY CORRIDOR PARTNERS 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, PAUL D.
YAGER, trustee, also known as
PAUL D. YEGER, and NEIL J. SOSIN, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
_______________________________ 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
YOUNG, J.  
Defendants own land that was partially taken in 
condemnation proceedings initiated by plaintiff. At issue 
is whether the trial court properly allowed defendants to 
present, in support of their proffered calculation of just 
compensation, evidence that their property had been 
rezoned from residential to commercial after the taking. 
We conclude that the evidence of the posttaking 
rezoning was irrelevant to the issue of the condemned 
property’s fair market value at the time of the taking. 
Because the trial court abused its discretion in admitting 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
this evidence, and because the error was not harmless, we 
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, which 
reversed the jury’s verdict and remanded the case for 
further proceedings. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Defendant 
Haggerty 
Corridor 
Partners 
Limited 
Partnership 
owned 
approximately 
335 
acres 
of 
an 
undeveloped tract of land in Novi, Michigan, which it had 
assembled for the future purpose of building a high-tech 
office park. 
Plaintiff, the Michigan Department of 
Transportation (MDOT), sought to condemn approximately 
fifty-one acres of this property for construction of a 
portion of the M-5 Haggerty Road Connector in the city of 
Novi. 
As required under MCL 213.55,1 MDOT provided 
defendants with a good-faith offer of $2,758,000 for the 
property, based on its then-applicable single-family and 
agricultural zoning classification.2  Defendants, believing 
1 MCL 213.55(1) requires a condemning agency, before
initiating negotiations for the purchase of property, to
make a “good faith written offer” based on the agency’s
appraisal of just compensation for the property. 
2 At the time, the property was zoned by the city of
Novi for single-family homes and agricultural uses (R-A
Residential/Acreage). 
In May 1998, approximately two and
Footnotes continued on following page. 
2 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
that the property’s “highest and best use”3 was commercial 
rather than residential, refused MDOT’s offer. 
In December 1995, MDOT initiated an eminent domain 
proceeding 
under 
the 
Michigan 
Uniform 
Condemnation 
Procedures Act (UCPA)4 to condemn the property. At trial, 
as might be expected, the parties presented widely 
divergent evidence with respect to just compensation. 
Consistent with its theory that the highest and best 
use of the property was residential, MDOT presented 
evidence that, at the time of the taking, the property was 
not likely to be rezoned to permit the commercial use 
proposed by defendants.5  MDOT’s appraiser testified that 
one-half years after the taking occurred, Novi rezoned the
property for office/service/technology uses (OST). 
3 “‘Highest and best use’ is a concept fundamental to
the determination of true cash value. 
It recognizes that
the use to which a prospective buyer would put the
property will influence the price that the buyer would be
willing to pay.” 
Edward Rose Bldg Co v Independence Twp,
436 Mich 620, 633; 462 NW2d 325 (1990). Thus, a condemnee
is generally entitled to compensation based on the 
“highest and best use” of his property. St Clair Shores v 
Conley, 350 Mich 458, 462; 86 NW2d 271 (1957). 
4 MCL 213.51 et seq. 
5 For example, MDOT presented the testimony of Novi’s
chief planning consultant that, in 1993, the planning 
commission recommended that the parcel not be rezoned 
commercial. 
The consultant further testified that, as of
the date of the taking, there was no plan to rezone the
Footnotes continued on following page. 
3 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
it was economically feasible to develop the parcel, both 
before and after the taking, as a residential subdivision, 
and that, in 1995, it was not reasonably possible that the 
land would be rezoned for commercial use. On the basis of 
an 
estimation 
that 
defendants’ 
land 
would 
support 
development 
of 
fifty-four 
residential 
lots, 
MDOT’s 
appraiser testified that the difference in the value of 
defendants’ property before and after the taking amounted 
to $1,415,000. 
Defendants, on the other hand, sought to establish 
that they, along with other knowledgeable participants in 
the commercial real estate market, knew at the time of the 
December 1995 taking that the property was likely to be 
rezoned to allow for its planned use as an office park.6 
Defendants’ appraiser testified that the land could not 
have been profitably developed as residential property, 
and that rezoning was imminent at the time of the taking. 
property because of the demand for large-lot, million­
dollar homes. 
6 For example, defendants presented evidence that city
officials 
had 
made 
representations 
concerning 
their 
interest in rezoning the area to accommodate business 
interests and that, at the time of the taking, Novi’s
economic development coordinator was already involved in
the 
planning 
for 
an 
OST 
zoning 
classification 
to 
accommodate defendants’ planned use of their property. At 
the time of the taking, however, defendants had not
petitioned the city to have the land rezoned. 
4  
  
 
 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
Against this backdrop, defendants’ appraiser arrived at a 
just compensation figure of $18.6 million. 
Consistent with their theory that the fair market 
value of the residential property on the date of the 
taking was increased because of the realistic prospect 
that it would soon be rezoned commercial, defendants 
sought to introduce evidence of the fact that the property 
had, in fact, been later rezoned. 
Defendants wished to 
show that in May 1998, approximately two and one-half 
years after the taking occurred, defendants’ property was 
rezoned for office/service/technology (OST) uses. 
MDOT 
filed a motion in limine to bar this evidence, arguing 
that it was irrelevant to the fair market value of the 
property as of the date of the taking. 
The trial court 
denied MDOT’s motion. 
Additionally, the trial court 
refused to grant MDOT’s alternative request to present 
evidence that the rezoning took place solely as a result 
of the taking.7 
7 Evidence of value related solely to the taking
itself, including evidence of a rezoning that occurs
because of the taking, is not admissible for just
compensation purposes. 
See MCL 213.70(1); Silver Creek 
Drain Dist v Extrusions Div, Inc, 468 Mich 367, 378 n 13;
663 NW2d 436 (2003), citing In re Urban Renewal, Elmwood 
Park Project, 376 Mich 311, 318; 136 NW2d 896 (1965) (“The
Footnotes continued on following page. 
5 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
At MDOT’s request, the jury was taken on a bus tour 
of defendants’ property. 
The parties vigorously dispute 
what the jurors saw on this tour. MDOT contends that the 
jurors 
saw 
mainly 
an 
undeveloped 
tract 
with 
some 
commercial buildings under construction on a portion of 
the property. Defendants contend, on the other hand, that 
the jurors saw many completed office buildings on the 
developed portion of the property and that only a small 
portion of the property remained undeveloped. There is no 
record to support either party’s contention. 
The jury was instructed that fair market value must 
be assessed as of the date of the condemnation, and not as 
of some future date. 
The jury was further instructed, 
with respect to the zoning reclassification, that 
if there was a reasonable possibility, absent the
threat of this condemnation case, that the zoning
classification 
would 
have 
been 
changed, 
you
should consider this possibility in arriving at
the value of the property on the date of the
taking. 
The jury determined that just compensation was owed to 
defendants in the amount of $14,877,000. 
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, MDOT contended 
that the trial court erred in denying its motion to 
effect on market value of the condemnation proceeding
itself may not be considered as an element of value.”). 
6  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
exclude evidence of the posttaking rezoning decision and 
in further prohibiting MDOT from introducing evidence 
establishing that the zoning change was caused by the 
condemnation itself. The Court of Appeals majority agreed 
that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the 
jury to consider evidence of the posttaking zoning change 
and that the error was not harmless: 
The subject property was to be valued “as
though 
the 
acquisition 
had 
not 
been 
contemplated.” 
MCL 
213.70(1). 
Plaintiff 
attempted to introduce evidence establishing that
the subject property was rezoned because of the 
condemnation. 
If so, the actual rezoning was
irrelevant. 
Indeed, the value of condemned 
property should have been determined without 
regard to any enhancement or reduction of the
value attributable to condemnation or the threat 
of condemnation. 
State Highway Comm v L & L
Concession, 31 Mich App 222, 226-227; 187 NW2d
465 (1971). 
Defendants were not entitled to the 
enhanced 
value 
that 
resulted 
from 
the 
condemnation project, only the value of the 
property at the time of taking. 
In re Urban 
Renewal, Elmwood Park Project, 376 Mich 311, 318;
136 NW2d 896 (1965). 
Although the potential for
rezoning on the date of taking was properly
considered, evidence of the actual zoning change
was irrelevant to the value of the property on
the date of taking and should not have been
disclosed to the jury. 
Moreover, we agree with
plaintiff’s 
contention 
that 
the 
evidence 
improperly contributed to the jury’s finding that
the rezoning was reasonably possible. 
At the 
very least, the improperly admitted evidence 
tainted the jury's resolution of the “reasonable
possibility” question of fact. 
Therefore, we
conclude 
that 
the 
trial 
court 
abused 
its 
discretion in admitting the evidence. 
7  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
We reject defendants’ contention that the
evidentiary error was harmless. Had the evidence 
not been admitted, it is unlikely that the jury
would have been exposed to the evidence that
defendants 
now 
claim 
renders 
the 
improperly
admitted evidence harmless.[8]
 Consequently, we
deem it appropriate to reverse and remand for
further proceedings.[9]
 [Unpublished opinion per
curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued July 22,
2003 (Docket Nos. 234099, 240227), slip op, p 3.] 
The dissenting judge opined that the evidence was 
properly admitted: 
As the trial court concluded, evidence of
the actual rezoning had the tendency to make the
existence of the possibility of rezoning more
probable than it would be without the evidence.
MRE 401. 
More importantly, however, is the fact
that there is no Michigan case on point regarding
the admissibility of the subsequent fact of 
rezoning, and our Sister States’ case law provide
[sic] divergent views. However, one respected
source (also cited by the trial court) indicates
that “[t]he fact that, subsequent to the taking,
the zoning ordinance was actually amended to
permit the previously proscribed use has been
held to be weighty evidence of the existence (at
the time of the taking) of the fact that there
was a reasonable probability of an imminent 
change.” 
4 Nichols, Eminent Domain (3d ed), §
12C.03[3]. 
Accordingly, it cannot be said that 
8 Defendants contended that the posttaking rezoning
evidence was merely cumulative of the jurors’ bus tour of
the 
property, 
because, 
in 
light 
of 
the 
extensive 
commercial development present on the property at the time
of the tour, it was evident that the property had already
been rezoned to allow for commercial uses. 
9 In light of its conclusion, the majority did not
address MDOT’s contention that the trial court further 
abused its discretion in prohibiting it from introducing
evidence that the rezoning was caused by the condemnation. 
8  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the decision to admit the evidence was an abuse 
of discretion when no prior case has so held, and
there is respected authority that favors the
ruling made by the trial court. 
Moreover, even if the admission of the 
evidence was an abuse of discretion, it was
harmless error in light of the jury instructions
and other competent, admissible evidence that
allowed the jury to properly conclude that 
rezoning was a reasonable possibility. Here, the
jury 
was 
presented 
with 
sufficient 
evidence 
regarding 
whether 
there 
was 
a 
reasonable 
possibility that the subject property would be
rezoned, independent of the evidence of the 
actual rezoning, a fact which the majority
concedes. 
Further, the trial court properly
instructed 
the 
jury 
on 
the 
principles 
of 
condemnation law set forth by the majority, and 
repeatedly stressed the principle that the jury
must value the property as of the date of the
condemnation, rather than at some future date 
. . . .  [Murray, J., dissenting, slip op, pp 2-3
(citations omitted).] 
The 
dissent 
further 
rejected 
MDOT’s 
alternative 
argument that the trial court erred in refusing to allow 
it to introduce evidence establishing that the rezoning 
was directly attributable to the condemnation proceedings. 
Judge 
Murray 
noted 
that 
MCL 
213.73, 
which 
allows 
enhancement in value of the remainder of a partially 
condemned parcel to be considered in determining just 
compensation, was inapplicable and did not serve to permit 
MDOT to introduce this evidence because MDOT did not plead 
in its complaint that defendants’ property was enhanced 
9  
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
because of the improvement.10  Thus, Judge Murray opined, 
the majority’s decision “effectively ignores the fact that 
defendants’ evidence directly relates to the ‘reasonable 
possibility’ that rezoning of the property would be 
effectuated.” Id. at 4. 
This Court granted defendants’ application for leave 
to appeal, limited to the issues “(1) whether a posttaking 
zoning decision can be considered in determining value at 
the time of the taking, and (2) whether the Court of 
Appeals decision in this case is consistent with Dep’t of 
Transportation v [VanElslander], 460 Mich 127 [594 NW2d 
841] (1999).”11
 We would hold that the evidence of a 
posttaking rezoning is irrelevant to a just compensation 
determination, that the error in the admission of such 
evidence in this case was not harmless, and that our 
conclusion is wholly consistent with VanElslander, supra, 
10 The dissent’s rationale here is difficult to 
follow, and we agree with Justice Markman’s conclusion
that MCL 213.73 does not apply. 
See post at 29. 
As the 
dissenting judge himself notes, MDOT made no “enhancement” 
claim under MCL 
213.73. 
Rather, it simply sought to
rebut defendants’ posttaking rezoning evidence with its
own 
evidence 
that 
the 
rezoning 
was 
caused 
by 
the 
condemnation and, thus, could not properly be considered
in determining just compensation. See MCL 213.70(1), (2). 
11 470 Mich 874 (2004). 
10  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
and we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
majority. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion.12
 
However, 
preliminary 
issues 
of 
law 
underlying an evidentiary ruling are reviewed de novo. 
See People v Lukity13 (“[T]he admission of evidence 
frequently involve[s] preliminary questions of law, e.g., 
whether 
a 
rule 
of 
evidence 
or 
statute 
precludes 
admissibility of the evidence. 
This Court reviews 
questions of law de novo.”). 
A trial court abuses its 
discretion when it admits evidence that is inadmissible as 
a matter of law.14 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Const 1963, art 10, § 2 provides that “[p]rivate 
property shall not be taken for public use without just 
compensation therefor being first made or secured in a 
12 VanElslander, supra at 129.  
13 460 Mich 484, 488; 596 NW2d 607 (1999).  
14 People v Katt, 468 Mich 272, 278; 662 NW2d 12 
(2003). 
11  
  
 
 
 
 
 
   
   
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
manner prescribed by law.” 
The term “just compensation” 
as used in our Constitution, as well as in the UCPA, is a 
term of art that “imports with it all the understandings 
those sophisticated in the law give it.”15  The concept of 
just compensation “‘includes all elements of value that 
inhere in the property,’”16 and must be determined on the 
basis of all factors relevant to its cash or market 
value.17 
As we have recently had occasion to reaffirm, fair 
market value is to be determined as of the date of the 
taking. 
See Silver Creek, supra (“‘[A]ny evidence that 
would tend to affect the market value of the property as 
of 
the 
date 
of 
the 
condemnation’” 
is 
relevant 
in 
determining just compensation.).18 
In keeping with these venerated principles concerning 
the 
calculation 
of 
just 
compensation, 
the 
UCPA 
specifically provides that fair market value “shall be 
15 Silver Creek, supra at 379. 
16 Id. at 378, quoting United States v Twin City Power
Co, 350 US 222, 235; 76 S Ct 259; 100 L Ed 240 (1956)
(Burton, J., dissenting). 
17 Silver Creek, supra at 377, quoting Searl v Lake Co 
School Dist No 2, 133 US 553, 564; 10 S Ct 374; 33 L Ed
740 (1890). 
18 
Silver Creek, supra at 379, n 14, quoting
VanElslander, supra at 130. 
12  
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
 
 
determined with respect to the condition of the property 
and the state of the market on the date of valuation.”19 
The UCPA prohibits, however, the consideration of any 
changes in market conditions that are substantially due to 
the general knowledge of the imminent condemnation of the 
property.20  Instead, with the exception of enhancement in 
value of the remainder of a partially taken parcel,21 “the 
19 See former MCL 213.70 (1980 PA 87), now MCL
213.70(3), amended by 1996 PA 474, effective December 26,
1996 (emphasis supplied). 
The 1996 amendment of MCL 
213.70, which took effect after the condemnation complaint
was filed in this case, does not contain any substantive
changes that would affect our analysis in this case. 
20 See former MCL 213.70 (1980 PA 87), now MCL
213.70(1), (3), amended by 1996 PA 474, effective December
26, 1996. 
21 See MCL 213.73, which provides, in part: 
(1) Enhancement in value of the remainder of 
a parcel, by laying out, altering, widening, or
other types of improvements; by changing the 
scope or location of the improvement; or by
either action in combination with discontinuing
an 
improvement, 
shall 
be 
considered 
in 
determining compensation for the taking. 
(2) When enhancement in value is to be 
considered 
in 
determining 
compensation, 
the 
agency shall set forth in the complaint the fact
that 
enhancement 
benefits 
are 
claimed 
and 
describe the construction proposed to be made
which will create the enhancement. . . . 
* * * 
Footnotes continued on following page. 
13 
  
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
                                                 
 
 
property shall be valued in all cases as though the 
acquisition had not been contemplated.”22 
B. POSSIBILITY OF REZONING AS A FACTOR AFFECTING JUST COMPENSATION 
A condemned parcel’s fair market value must be 
determined “‘“based upon a consideration of all the 
relevant facts in a particular case.”’”23
 Accordingly, 
(4) The agency has the burden of proof with
respect to the existence of enhancement benefits. 
As explained in note 10 of this opinion, this portion
of the UCPA is inapplicable to this dispute. 
MDOT raised 
no argument that the award of just compensation had to
reflect any enhancement to the remainder of defendants’
property by virtue of the condemnation. 
It must be noted that the principles set forth in MCL
213.70 and 213.73, as well as the principles we today set
forth, are wholly reciprocal. 
Just as MCL 213.73 allows 
the condemning agency to offset the fair market value of
partially taken property by the increased value to the
remainder, MCL 213.70(3) allows the property owner to seek
increased 
just 
compensation 
on 
the 
basis 
of 
the 
devaluation of his remaining property due to the taking.
Similarly, just as our holding today precludes a property
owner from seeking increased just compensation on the 
basis of an ex ante event, it also precludes the 
condemning agency from paying a reduced amount on the
basis of such an event. See note 34 of this opinion. 
22 See former MCL 213.70 (1980 PA 87), now MCL
213.70(1), amended by 1996 PA 474, effective December 26,
1996. 
23 Silver Creek, supra at 378, quoting In re Widening 
of Gratiot Ave, 294 Mich 569, 574; 293 NW 755 (1940),
quoting In re Widening of Michigan Ave, 280 Mich 539, 548;
237 NW 798 (1937); see also State Hwy Comm’r v Eilender,
362 Mich 697, 699; 108 NW2d 755 (1961). 
14  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
evidence 
demonstrating 
the 
likelihood 
of 
a 
zoning 
modification, just like any number of circumstance that 
may affect a property’s value on the open market, may be 
relevant in determining just compensation. 
However, 
because just compensation must be calculated on the basis 
of the market value of a property on the date of the 
taking, the relevance of any such evidence is wholly 
dependent on whether, and how, the particular factor at 
issue would have affected market participants on that 
date. 
Our case law is quite clear in this regard. 
As we 
noted in State Hwy Comm’r v Eilender:24 
We look at the value of the condemned land 
at the time of the taking, not as of some future
date. If the land is then zoned so as to exclude 
more lucrative uses, such use is ordinarily
immaterial in arriving at just compensation. 
But, on the other hand, it has been held, “if
there is a reasonable possibility that the zoning
classification will be changed, this possibility
should be considered in arriving at the proper
value. 
This element, too, must be considered in 
terms of the extent to which the ‘possibility’ 
would have affected the price which a willing
buyer would have offered for the property just
prior to the taking.” [Emphasis supplied.] 
24 362 Mich 697, 699; 108 NW2d 755 (1961), quoting
United States v Meadow Brook Club, 259 F2d 41, 45 (CA 2,
1958). 
15  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
                                                 
 
 
Thus, we concluded in Eilender that a nonfrivolous, 
nonspeculative 
“reasonable 
possibility” 
of 
a 
zoning 
change, 
as 
evidenced 
by 
an 
already 
pending 
zoning 
modification, could properly be considered in determining 
just compensation.25 
Similarly, we held in VanElslander, supra, that the 
trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow 
plaintiff MDOT to present into evidence an appraisal of 
the condemnees’ property that was based on the possibility 
that a zoning variance could be obtained to cure the 
violations created by the condemnation. Noting that “‘any 
evidence that would tend to affect the market value of the 
property as of the date of condemnation is relevant,’”26 we 
held that the possibility of obtaining a variance, just 
like the possibility of a zoning modification, may be 
relevant to the just-compensation determination. 
We 
stressed, however, that such evidence was only relevant to 
the extent that it aided the fact-finder in determining 
25 Eilender, supra at 700. 
26 VanElslander, supra at 130, quoting the Court of
Appeals dissent. 
16  
  
 
 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
 
“‘“the price which a willing buyer would have offered for 
the property just prior to the taking . . . .”’”27 
Applying these longstanding principles as reaffirmed 
in Eilender, VanElslander, and Silver Creek, we would hold 
that the trial court here committed an error of law, and 
thus abused its discretion,28 when it denied MDOT’s motion 
to exclude evidence of the posttaking zoning modification. 
We of course agree with the Court of Appeals dissent, 
and 
with 
our 
dissenting 
colleagues,29 
that 
relevant 
evidence is “evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence.”30  Where we believe 
the dissenters have gone astray is in misidentifying the 
“fact that is of consequence.” 
27 
Id. at 131, quoting Eilender, supra at 699 
(emphasis supplied). 
28 See Katt, supra at 278. 
29 Our responses to the “dissent” refer to Justice
Markman’s opinion. 
Although Justice Weaver has also
issued a dissent, this dissent does nothing more than
reiterate, in abridged fashion, the opinion of Justice
Markman. 
30 MRE 401. 
17  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
                                                 
 
  
 
The dissenters frame this consequential fact as the 
existence of a “reasonable possibility” that the property 
would be rezoned. 
See post at 4. 
The possibility of a 
zoning modification must, indeed, be a “reasonable” one in 
order, as a matter of logic, for it to have any bearing on 
fair market value. 
However, this is only part of the 
equation. The “reasonable possibility” of a zoning change 
bears on the calculation of fair market value only to the 
extent that it could have affected the price that a 
theoretical willing buyer would have offered for the 
property immediately prior to the taking. 
31 
Thus, the 
“fact 
that 
is 
of 
consequence” 
is 
the 
reasonable 
possibility of a zoning modification, as that possibility 
might have been perceived by a market participant on 
condemnation day.32 
31 See VanElslander, supra at 130; Eilender, supra at 
699; In re Widening of Gratiot Ave, supra. 
32 Justice Markman purports to agree that “‘the “fact
that is of consequence” is the reasonable possibility of a
zoning modification, as that possibility might have been 
perceived by a market participant on condemnation day.’” 
Post at 8, n 8. 
Yet his analysis completely ignores the
italicized 
phrase, 
which 
is 
critical 
to 
the 
just­
compensation inquiry. 
A market participant in December
1995 would have had absolutely no way of knowing that the
subject property would have been rezoned two and one-half
years later. 
Moreover, as we have pointed out, the
objective probability that something will occur in the
Footnotes continued on following page. 
18 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Any information that was available at the time of the 
taking may certainly be relevant in determining the price 
that a property might fetch on the day of the taking.  For 
example, in this case, defendants were properly permitted 
to present evidence that they had met with city officials 
regarding their plans for the area, and that these 
officials had expressed a willingness to make the required 
zoning changes; that the Novi Chamber of Commerce and 
other members of the business community supported the 
proposed zoning change; that Novi’s Economic Development 
Coordinator, Greg Capote, did not believe that the 
property was suitable for single-family development; that 
there was a dire need for zoning to accommodate high-tech 
office development; and that, at the time of the taking, 
Capote was already involved in the planning for an OST 
zoning 
classification 
to 
accommodate 
this 
type 
of 
development. All of this evidence pertains to information 
that might have affected the value of the property as of 
the date of condemnation, December 7, 1995. 
Indeed, at 
the 
time 
defendants 
acquired 
their 
Novi 
property, 
beginning in 1988, the property was more valuable in their 
future is in no way dependent on what actually occurs 
after that probability is calculated. 
19  
  
 
 
 
 
 
       
                                                 
 
eyes because of the looming possibility of a future zoning 
change.33 
In contrast, a posttaking event or occurrence is 
utterly 
irrelevant 
to 
the 
calculation 
of 
just 
compensation. Market participants are, as a general rule, 
not omniscient, and would not be aware on the date of the 
taking that a posttaking event is absolutely certain to 
occur.34  A posttaking occurrence cannot possibly affect 
the fair market value of property on the day of the 
condemnation, because the occurrence has not yet come to 
pass 
and, 
thus, 
cannot 
contribute 
to 
the 
mass 
of 
information affecting the market value of the property on 
33 Of course, as of the date of the taking, December
7, 1995, defendants had not even made a formal request for
a zoning change. 
34 Consider the stock market. 
The price of a given
share is often affected by available information. 
The 
value of a share may decrease, for example, as rumors
spread that a company’s chief operating officer might be
indicted for a crime related to the operation of the
business. 
Similarly, during the preindictment period,
that 
share’s 
value 
may 
rise 
or 
fall 
depending 
on 
investors’ perceptions regarding the probability that an
indictment is or is not imminent. 
The fact that the 
officer is, in fact, indicted, however, does not and 
cannot have any bearing on the market price of the share
on the day before the day the officer is indicted. 
The 
fact of the actual indictment is, then, quite irrelevant
in determining why the share was trading at a given price
on the day before the indictment was filed. 
Rather, it
was merely the speculation concerning the indictment that
made the stock price fluctuate. 
20  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
      
                                                 
that day. 
In short, a posttaking zoning change is 
irrelevant to the just compensation calculation because it 
does not make the fact of consequence——that information 
regarding the reasonable possibility of a zoning change 
may have impacted the market value of property on the date 
of the taking——more probable or less probable.35 
The trial court’s ruling and the Court of Appeals 
dissenting 
position 
on 
the 
admission 
of 
posttaking 
35 The error of defendants’ position is evident when
one considers that it makes fair market value wholly
dependent on extraneous temporal considerations: when the
condemnation trial occurs and when, if ever, a zoning
change occurs. 
For example, suppose that identical 
adjoining 
properties, 
separately 
owned, 
are 
zoned 
residential on the day that each is condemned. 
Suppose
that one trial occurs two months before the properties are
rezoned commercial, while the other trial does not occur
until after the rezoning. 
The first property owner to go
to trial will, of course, not be able to present to the
jury evidence that the property was actually rezoned. The 
second property owner, however, will be in a position to
argue that the fact that the rezoning actually occurred 
increased the probability, on the day of the taking, that
the rezoning was going to occur, and, in turn, that a
higher fair market value must be assigned to that 
property. This illustrates the incongruity of defendants’
position: The two properties, on the day of the taking,
had precisely the same probability of being later rezoned;
yet the second owner, solely by virtue of the later trial
date, will be permitted to present evidence to show that
not only was there a “reasonable possibility” of rezoning,
but future rezoning was an absolute certainty. Aside from 
the 
obvious 
logical 
error 
of 
defendants’ 
position,
adopting such a rule would also lead to gamesmanship and
strategic filing. Indeed, this rule would give condemning
agencies every incentive to postpone zoning plans in order
to reduce the price of just compensation. 
21  
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
evidence are informed by a common logical fallacy. As our 
dissenting colleague, Justice Markman, argues: “That the 
property was, in fact, rezoned makes it ‘more probable’ 
that a ‘reasonable possibility’ of rezoning existed at the 
time of the taking. 
Post at 8. 
At its core, this 
argument supposes that the probability of a particular 
occurrence at a specific point in time is made stronger by 
after-the-fact events.36
 This fallacy presumes that a 
zoning event occurring after the date of condemnation has 
logical and legal relevance to the hypothetical “willing 
buyer’s” calculation of the price of the property on the 
condemnation date. 
In order to understand the flaw in the probability 
theory and rationale of the Court of Appeals dissent and 
the trial court, it is important to remember the context 
36 In the world of psychology, this phenomenon is
known as “hindsight bias,” whereby the subject, upon
learning 
that 
something 
occurred, 
overestimates 
the 
ability to predict that that “something” would occur. See 
 (noting that
“[p]eople are, in effect, biased by the knowledge of what
has actually happened when evaluating its likelihood”). 
Compare this flawed ex ante probability logic with
the common logical fallacy known, in the realm of 
causation theory, as “post hoc ergo propter hoc” (“after
this, therefore because of this”). 
In each case, the
subject assigns inflated significance to an after-the-fact
event. 
22  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
of the just compensation valuation goal. 
Although 
condemnation results in a “forced sale,” the price the 
condemning agency is required to pay must approximate that 
price which a willing buyer would have offered for the 
property at the time of the taking. Consequently, because 
information 
concerning 
events 
occurring 
after 
the 
condemnation could not possibly have influenced the 
conduct of a willing buyer on the date of the taking, it 
can never be logically, and thus legally, relevant in 
determining the price that the theoretical willing buyer 
and seller would have agreed upon on the date of the 
taking. 
Consider 
the 
application 
of 
this 
theory 
of 
probability to an event–such as the toss of a die–the 
probability of which is known. That a six is rolled after 
one predicts this outcome does not increase the strength 
of the prediction beyond the usual one-in-six chance of 
being 
correct. 
However, 
contrary 
to 
conventional 
probability theory, the proffered dissenting probability 
theory suggests that the predictive force of a “six” call 
is made stronger by the mere fact that the thrown die 
actually revealed a six. 
It is hard to understand how 
such a “back to the future probability theory” works any 
23  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
more logically when an event less predictable than the 
roll of a die is at issue. 
While a posttaking change in zoning may suggest that 
one party may have had a more astute prognostication of 
local zoning practices, it cannot seriously be advanced 
that a zoning change made after the taking could in any 
way have influenced a “willing buyer’s” pricing decision 
on the day of the taking. 
Only that which could 
legitimately influence a buyer at the time of the taking 
is legally and logically relevant to the amount of 
compensation that must be paid for a taking. 
Because 
events that occur after the taking fall outside this zone 
of 
potential 
influence, 
they 
cannot 
logically 
and 
therefore legitimately be considered in determining just 
compensation. 
This case well illustrates the illogic of admitting 
evidence of postcondemnation events to influence the fact­
finder’s determination of just compensation under the 
statute. Here, the change in zoning occurred two and one­
half years after the date of the taking. It is difficult 
to 
envision 
how 
a 
theoretical 
“willing 
buyer” 
of 
defendants’ property would have factored into his purchase 
24  
  
 
 
 
 
 
    
                                                 
 
 
   
 
    
 
offer in 1995 a zoning decision made by Novi37 more than 
two years after that date.38 
As noted by the Court of Appeals dissent and by our 
dissenting colleague, post at 17, 4 Nichols, Eminent 
Domain (3d ed), § 12C.03[3], indicates that “‘[t]he fact 
that, subsequent to the taking, the zoning ordinance was 
actually amended to permit the previously proscribed use 
has been held to be weighty evidence of the existence (at 
the time of the taking) of the fact that there was a 
reasonable probability of an imminent change.’”39  Although 
37 As an aside, it must be remembered that it was the
city of Novi, and not the condemning authority (MDOT),
that rezoned this property. 
We are not, in this case,
concerned with any allegations of fraud or gamesmanship on
the part of the condemning agency (for example, by 
delaying an inevitable rezoning decision in order to avoid
paying a higher amount as just compensation for a taking). 
38 We stress again that it is not the probability of a 
zoning change that is irrelevant to the just-compensation
determination. 
Indeed, we adhere to the rule, set forth
in 
Eilender 
and 
VanElsander, 
that 
evidence 
of 
the 
reasonable possibility of a zoning change is admissible to
the extent that it aids in determining the fair market
value of the property at the time of the taking. Rather,
it is merely the fact of the posttaking zoning change that
is irrelevant, as it is of no import in determining “‘the
price which a willing buyer would have offered for the
property just prior to the taking . . . .’” VanElslander, 
supra at 131, quoting Eilender, supra at 699. 
39 Similarly, it is noted in 9 ALR3d 291, § 11 that
some courts have permitted the introduction of this type
Footnotes continued on following page. 
25 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
it is true that some courts have, indeed, permitted the 
introduction of posttaking rezoning evidence, for the 
reasons we have expressed, we reject the reasoning 
employed by these courts.40  We do not, for example, agree 
with the New Jersey Supreme Court that evidence of a 
posttaking zoning change may serve to “support the 
reasonableness of the factual claim that on the date of 
taking the parties to a voluntary sale would have 
recognized and been influenced by the probability of an 
of 
evidence, 
while 
other 
courts 
have 
rejected 
the 
admission of such evidence. 
40 While there is a dearth of case law on point,
Justice Markman has cited a small handful of foreign cases
supporting his position. 
It is far from evident that the 
few cases cited in the Nichols text and in footnote 10 of 
Justice Markman’s dissent, post at 10 n 10, represent a
majority rule. 
In any event, we are hardly compelled to
subscribe to the view of a few misguided courts. 
These 
cases give lip service to the notion that it is fair
market value at the time of the taking that must guide the
determination of just compensation; yet, without providing
a satisfactory explanation for doing so, they sanction the
admission of evidence that is wholly irrelevant to market
status at that critical time. 
We choose, rather than
blindly to follow the lead of these few jurisdictions, to
adhere to the principles set forth in the UCPA and
developed under our Constitution. 
Moreover, as the 
Nichols text itself recognizes, “[a]n important caveat to
remember in applying [the rule that the probability of
rezoning 
may 
be 
considered 
in 
determining 
just
compensation] is that the property must not be evaluated
as though the rezoning were already an accomplished fact. 
It must be evaluated under the restrictions of the 
existing zoning with consideration given to the impact
upon market value of the likelihood of a change in
zoning.” Nichols, supra at § 12C.03[2]. 
26  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
amendment in the near future in fixing the selling 
price.”41  The issue, again, is whether the perception of 
the existence of a market factor (such as the possibility 
of an imminent rezoning) would change the amount that a 
fictional buyer would be willing to pay on a given date. 
The fact that something that was only a possibility on day 
1 becomes a reality on day 2 is not relevant to fair 
market value on day 1.42 
Our dissenting colleague, as evidenced by his lengthy 
discussion describing the “imperfect” nature of the 
eminent domain procedure in calculating just compensation, 
appropriately explains why condemnation, being a forced 
41 New Jersey v Gorga, 26 NJ 113, 118; 138 A2d 833
(1958). 
42 We note further that, perhaps fearful of misuse of
such evidence, the New Jersey court in Gorga stressed that 
the posttaking zoning amendment at issue had to be 
“carefully confined to its proper role” and could be
received 
only 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
establishing 
the 
reasonableness 
of 
the 
factual 
claim 
that 
market 
participants would have been influenced by the possibility
of a future zoning change. 
Id. at 118. 
We think that 
admission of posttaking zoning changes cannot be so easily
“confined.” 
After all, the jurors will have been told
that an event that was merely a possibility pretaking is
now a foregone conclusion. 
Moreover, Justice Markman does not explain how to
limit his approach to only posttaking rezoning situations 
(and not to the myriad other posttaking events that might
be argued to be somehow relevant to fair market value,
such as catastrophic property damage). 
27  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
sale, can only approximate a real market real estate 
transaction. 
Although we are certainly not unsympathetic 
to the plight of the innocent landowner who is compelled 
to sell its property to the public, the governmental power 
of condemnation is one that is specifically condoned by 
our Constitution and regulated by the UCPA. 
Justice Markman’s proposal—that we allow in evidence 
of posttaking events in order to counterbalance the 
“artificial construct” of the hypothetical willing buyer 
and seller—is not only inimical to the constitutional and 
statutory duty to determine fair market value as of the 
date of the taking; it is also illogical. We submit that 
Justice 
Markman 
incorrectly 
assumes 
that 
the 
inadmissibility of evidence of posttaking occurrences 
leads to the invariable “detriment of the property owner” 
and “the benefit of the government.” 
Post at 23. 
Although the property owners in this particular case might 
be benefited by the introduction of such evidence, the 
converse would be true were the government permitted to 
introduce 
evidence 
of 
posttaking 
events 
having 
a 
diminishing effect on property value. It is not difficult 
to imagine a situation in which a condemning authority 
might seek to present, in connection with its just­
28  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
compensation calculation, evidence that the condemned 
property was rezoned after the taking from commercial to 
residential, resulting in a lower market value.43 
B. HARMLESS ERROR 
Defendants argue that any error was harmless because 
MDOT requested that the jury view the property and 
because, during the view, the jury saw evidence that a 
commercial 
office 
park 
was 
being 
constructed 
on 
defendants’ remaining property. 
The Court of Appeals 
majority held that this evidence would likely not have 
been admitted had defendants not been permitted to present 
evidence of the posttaking rezoning. 
We disagree; MDOT’s 
motion for a jury view was granted before the trial court 
ruled that defendants could put on their valuation 
experts. 
Moreover, we simply have no basis in the 
existing record to determine what it was that the jury 
actually saw, and the parties give radically divergent 
opinions on this point. 
43 Again, Justice Markman appears to be of the belief
that the condemning agency in this case is somehow 
profiting, at defendants’ expense, from the rezoning
decision. 
Yet this case illustrates how misplaced is
Justice Markman’s supposition. 
In this very case it was
not plaintiff MDOT, but a third party—the city of Novi—
that made the rezoning decision. 
29  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We nevertheless conclude that the error was not 
harmless. 
Although the jury was properly instructed that 
it was to determine fair market value as of the date of 
the taking, it was not instructed that it was to consider 
only the information extant at the time of the taking. 
Rather, the jury no doubt believed that the fair market 
value of the property on the date of the taking was to be 
calculated as if rezoning were a fact, as it was at the 
time of the trial. 
More important, the trial court sorely compounded the 
error by refusing to allow MDOT to rebut the posttaking 
evidence by demonstrating that the rezoning was directly 
attributable to the condemnation itself. 
In this regard, 
we agree with our dissenting colleague that the trial 
court erred in precluding the admission of such evidence. 
See post at 1-2. As we have noted, the UCPA provides that 
just compensation is not to be determined on the basis of 
changes in market conditions that are substantially due to 
the general knowledge of the imminent condemnation of the 
property; rather, as MCL 213.70 provided at the time of 
the filing of this condemnation action, “[t]he property 
shall be valued in all cases as though the acquisition had 
30  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
not been contemplated.”44
 Thus, to the extent that 
defendants presented any evidence supporting a change in 
market value, MDOT should have been permitted to establish 
that such a change in value was a result of the 
condemnation of the property. 
Because MDOT was deprived 
of this clear statutory right, the trial court’s initial 
error in admitting the posttaking rezoning evidence was 
inconsistent with substantial justice45 and, therefore, may 
not be considered harmless. 
We thus affirm the judgment 
of the Court of Appeals and remand this case for a new 
trial. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The trial court abused its discretion when it denied 
MDOT’s 
motion 
to 
exclude 
evidence 
that 
defendants’ 
property was rezoned commercial after the property was 
condemned. 
Such evidence is irrelevant to the critical 
just compensation inquiry, which is what a willing buyer 
would pay for the property on the date of the taking. 
Because the trial court further compounded this error by 
44 See former MCL 213.70 (1980 PA 87), now MCL
213.70(1), amended by 1996 PA 474, effective December 26,
1996. 
45 MCR 2.613(A); see also Ward v Consolidated Rail 
Corp, 472 Mich 77, 84; 693 NW2d 366 (2005). 
31  
  
 
 
 
 
 
refusing to allow MDOT to establish, as contemplated by 
the UCPA, that the zoning change was effectuated by the 
fact of the condemnation itself, the error in the 
admission of the evidence was not harmless. We affirm the 
decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for further 
proceedings. 
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Clifford W. Taylor
Maura D. Corrigan 
32  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
No. 124765 
HAGGERTY CORRIDOR PARTNERS 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, PAUL D.
YAGER, trustee, also known as
PAUL D. YEGER, and NEIL J. SOSIN, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
KELLY, J. (concurring). 
In this case, we consider whether evidence of rezoning 
after a taking is admissible to demonstrate that, when the 
taking occurred, a reasonable possibility of rezoning 
existed.1  We hold the evidence inadmissible. 
The lead opinion by Justice Young concludes that the 
evidence 
is 
inadmissible 
on 
the 
ground 
that 
it 
is 
irrelevant. 
I disagree and believe that this view 
erroneously constricts the definition of legal relevance by 
placing 
a 
temporal 
constraint 
on 
it, 
whereas 
legal 
relevance is an encompassing characteristic of evidence. 
I use “taking” in this opinion synonymously with
“condemnation” to refer to the government’s expropriation
of private property from its owner for public use through
the power of eminent domain. 
1 
 
 
 
A majority of the Court agrees that the evidence of 
rezoning is relevant because it corroborates a fact that is 
of consequence to the determination of the action: whether 
there existed a reasonable possibility of rezoning at the 
time of the taking. MRE 401. 
A different majority agrees that the evidence is 
inadmissible. However, my reasoning differs from the other 
three justices comprising this majority. I would hold that 
the inadmissibility of the evidence lies in the fact that 
its probative value is substantially outweighed by its 
prejudicial effect. MRE 403. 
The admission of the evidence of rezoning unjustly 
overwhelmed other relevant evidence that showed rezoning 
was not reasonably likely and that the parcel’s reasonable 
value 
was 
as 
residential 
property. 
The 
jury's 
consideration of this evidence caused substantial injustice 
to plaintiff. 
Accordingly, it was an abuse of the trial 
court’s discretion to admit it, and the error was not 
harmless. 
I agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals to 
set aside the jury verdict, although for slightly different 
reasons. 
I also agree to remand the case for a new trial 
at which the evidence that the property was rezoned after 
the taking will not be admitted. 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
UNDERLYING FACTS 
This controversy concerns land on which a portion of 
phase II of the M-5 Haggerty Road Connector in Novi was 
built.2  Plaintiff Michigan Department of Transportation 
filed a complaint under the Michigan Uniform Condemnation 
Procedures Act (UCPA)3 to take the land by condemnation. 
The land is part of a larger tract owned by defendant 
Haggerty Corridor Partners Limited Partnership. 
The 
partnership had aggregated the tract over time by acquiring 
adjacent parcels in the expectation of future development. 
The issue concerns the reasonable market value of the 
land at the time of the taking. 
When it was expropriated, 
the 
land 
was 
zoned 
residential-agricultural 
and 
was 
undeveloped. 
At trial, defendants asserted that they had 
planned to seek to have it rezoned to commercial use. They 
hoped to develop the land into a technology park, as they 
had done with a tract in nearby Farmington Hills. 
Plaintiff 
made 
an 
offer 
to 
buy 
the 
land 
from 
defendants 
based 
on 
its 
value 
for 
residential 
or 
2 This portion of the Connector includes a north and
southbound roadway between Twelve and Fourteen Mile Roads,
west of Haggerty Road in the city of Novi, Oakland County. 
3 MCL 213.51 et seq. 
All statutory references are to
the act as it existed at the time the condemnation 
complaint was filed. 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
agricultural use, consistent with its zoning classification 
at the time of the taking. 
Michigan law requires the 
government to make a good-faith offer to purchase land for 
its 
fair 
market 
value 
before 
filing 
a 
condemnation 
complaint. 
MCL 213.55. 
Defendants rejected the offer. 
They believed that the true market value was much higher 
because there was a reasonable possibility that the land 
would be rezoned for commercial use in the near future. 
THE COURT PROCEEDINGS 
Plaintiff filed its condemnation complaint on December 
7, 1995. 
It again asserted that the fair market value of 
the 
land 
was 
its 
value 
for 
residential 
purposes. 
Defendants responded that the land was worth more than 
plaintiff offered due to its potential for commercial use. 
Plaintiff countered that rezoning was not reasonably 
possible. 
Defendants planned to present significant evidence to 
show that rezoning for commercial use was reasonably 
possible at the time of the taking. 
Key to their argument 
was evidence that the portion of the tract not condemned 
was in fact later rezoned commercial. Two and a half years 
after the taking, Novi rezoned the noncondemned land for 
office/service/technology use. 
4  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiff made a motion to prevent introduction of 
this evidence.4
 The trial court heard oral argument and 
concluded that it was admissible. 
The court found it 
relevant, 
not 
too 
remote 
in 
time, 
and 
not 
overly 
prejudicial. 
The evidence was admitted, and the jury 
awarded damages consistent with defendants’ evaluation, 
which was based on use of the land if zoned commercial. 
On appeal, plaintiff argued that admission of the 
evidence was erroneous. The Court of Appeals held that the 
trial court had abused its discretion in admitting it 
because 
it 
“tainted 
the 
jury’s 
resolution 
of 
the 
‘reasonable possibility’ question of fact.” 
The Court 
reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the 
case for a new trial without the erroneously admitted 
evidence.5  Unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of 
Appeals, issued July 22, 2003 (Docket Nos. 234099, 240227). 
The Court of Appeals decision was not unanimous. 
The 
dissent argued that the majority did not give the trial 
court’s evidentiary ruling the deference it was due and 
4 Plaintiff’s March 6, 2001, motion in limine to bar
testimony of a May 1998 zoning change. 
5 The Court of Appeals, in dicta, also discussed the
trial court’s consideration of defendants’ “cost to cure” 
the taking. 
We did not grant leave to appeal on this
issue, and I decline to express a view about it. 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
that the trial court’s decision should be affirmed. 
It 
observed that this Court held in Dep’t of Transportation v 
VanElslander6 that the possibility of subsequent rezoning 
can be relevant to the market value of land at the time of 
the taking. It opined that any error was harmless. 
Defendants sought leave to appeal to this Court. 
Until today, no published decision of this Court or of the 
Court of Appeals has directly addressed the question 
presented, 
and 
it 
is 
susceptible 
to 
arising 
again. 
Recognizing its jurisprudential significance, we granted 
leave to appeal 
limited to [the issues] (1) whether a posttaking
zoning decision can be considered in determining
value at the time of the taking, and (2) whether
the Court of Appeals decision in this case is
consistent with [VanElslander, supra]. [470 Mich
874 (2004).] 
JUST COMPENSATION 
We review decisions regarding the admissibility of 
evidence 
at 
trial 
for 
an 
abuse 
of 
discretion. 
VanElslander, supra at 129. 
It is basic to condemnation 
law that the government may take private property for 
public use as long as it pays just compensation for it. 
Const 1963, art 10, § 2. 
6 460 Mich 127, 130; 594 NW2d 841 (1999). 
6  
 
 
                                                 
 
“Just compensation” is a legal term of art. 
Silver 
Creek Drain Dist v Extrusions Division, Inc, 468 Mich 367, 
376; 663 NW2d 436 (2003). 
It is intended to place the 
property owner in as good a position financially as if the 
property had not been taken. This ensures that neither the 
property owner nor the public is enriched at the other’s 
expense. 
State Hwy Comm’r v Eilender, 362 Mich 697, 699; 
108 NW2d 755 (1961). 
Just compensation is the fair market value of land at 
the time of its taking. Id. Under the UCPA, what is just 
compensation is determined as of the date the condemnation 
complaint is filed and as if the government’s acquisition 
of the land had not been contemplated. MCL 213.70. 
The jury assesses the value of condemned land as of 
the date of condemnation through the eyes of those 
acquiring or losing it. 
The market participants cannot 
foresee the future. 
In the case under consideration, the 
participants would not have known that the land would be 
rezoned. The participants’ prediction of whether there was 
a reasonable possibility of rezoning could be based only on 
information available at the time of the taking.7  Current 
7 Defendants’ real estate appraiser testified that the
present value of real estate may be assessed by comparing
Footnotes continued on following page. 
7  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
     
property values are based in part on potential changes 
discounted for their uncertainty. 
The law accepts that a reasonable possibility that the 
zoning 
classification 
will 
be 
changed 
“‘should 
be 
considered in arriving at the proper value.’” 
Eilender, 
supra at 699, quoting United States v Meadow Brook Club, 
259 F2d 41, 45 (CA 2, 1958). 
In Eilender, the state 
presented an appraisal based on the property’s residential­
use zoning status. 
The property owner’s appraisal was 
based on commercial use. 
An application by the owner to 
rezone the property for commercial use was pending at the 
time of the taking. 
Commercial use of the property in Eilender would have 
been consistent with the zoning of property in some of the 
surrounding area. 
But the city commissioners awarded 
compensation that reflected the state’s assessment. 
In so 
the value of a given property with that of similar 
properties. 
There was testimony that relevant similarities include
the locations, sizes, and available uses of the parcels.
Recent sales are more relevant than older sales. 
However,
an appraisal should also consider possible market changes
during the time a property can reasonably be expected to
remain on the market. 
For instance, a large, undeveloped
parcel like the one at issue here may remain on the market
for two to three years before a buyer is found. Comparison
data is drawn from appraisals done by other professionals
and from public records. 
8  
 
 
 
  
 
   
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
doing, they failed to consider the reasonable possibility 
that the property would be rezoned. 
We held that an 
application for rezoning, submitted before the taking, was 
relevant to show the reasonable possibility of rezoning and 
should be considered in determining the property’s market 
value.8 
Eilender at 699-700. 
THE RELEVANCE OF THE FACT OF FUTURE REZONING 
At trial in this case, defendants submitted evidence 
suggesting that Novi might rezone defendants’ land to a use 
higher 
than 
residential. 
Because 
if 
there 
was 
a 
possibility of rezoning at the time of the taking, it 
affected the property’s fair market value. 
Hence, any 
possibility of rezoning it was relevant.9 
Similarly, I agree with Justices Markman and Weaver 
that the rezoning was relevant to show that two-and-one­
half years before it occurred, a reasonable possibility of 
8 In his opinion, Justice Markman fails to discuss the
factual context out of which Eilender arose. 
The facts in 
Eilender differed critically from those in this case. 
There, we remanded the case to allow the jury to hear about
an application for rezoning that had been submitted when
the taking occurred. 
In contrast, the jury in this case
heard evidence that was not available to the market 
participants at the time of the taking. 
9 Relevant evidence is that which has “any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action more probable or less
probable” than without the evidence. MRE 401. 
9  
 
 
 
 
rezoning may have existed. 
If something occurs, by 
definition, the occurrence had to have been possible then 
and likely at some time beforehand. 
The fact that the 
reasonable possibility may not have arisen until after the 
taking does not render evidence of the rezoning irrelevant. 
It has some tendency to make more likely the existence of a 
reasonable possibility before the taking. 
However, Justice Young erroneously relies on the fact 
that a market participant could not have known of the 
rezoning at the time of the taking. 
This confuses the 
temporal relationship between the events with their legal 
relationship. 
Although the market participant could not 
have known that an event would occur in the future, the 
fact that it did occur shows that it was reasonable to 
believe beforehand that its occurrence was likely. 
Justice Young’s example of the roll of a die is 
misplaced. 
When one is asked beforehand the result of the 
roll of a die, six is among the guaranteed results. 
Each 
of the six alternative results has an equal chance of 
occurring with every roll. 
The fact that a six was rolled 
is unnecessary to prove that six was possible or that it 
was reasonable to believe before the roll that six was 
possible. 
10  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
Rezoning is more like a horse race than the roll of a 
die. The probability of a certain horse winning depends on 
many factors. They include, among others, the condition of 
the horse on race day, the condition of the other horses, 
and the condition of the track. 
The odds on a bet placed 
on that horse, which are an expression of the perceived 
probability of that horse winning, are based on these 
factors known before the race. 
If the horse wins, the 
victory corroborates the strength of the prediction that 
the horse would win. 
But there are no guarantees that the 
horse will ever win, unlike the result of the roll of a 
die. 
Similarly, there are no guaranteed outcomes when one 
estimates whether property will be rezoned.10
 Rezoning is 
one of several possibilities. 
The probability of it 
occurring may never become a reality. 
But the fact of 
rezoning corroborates the assertion that the belief it 
would be rezoned was reasonable, just as a winning bet 
corroborates the belief that a horse would win. As Justice 
Young notes, rezoning suggests that the prognostication is 
more accurate than another’s that was to the contrary. 
10 Similarly, there are no guarantees that an officer
of a corporation will be indicted. See ante at 20 n 34. 
11  
 
 
 
 
Ante at 29. 
Hence, the evidence of rezoning is legally 
relevant. 
THE PREJUDICIAL EFFECT OF A FUTURE FACT 
Just because evidence is relevant does not mean that 
it is admissible. 
The trial court may exclude relevant 
evidence 
“if 
its 
probative 
value 
is 
substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of 
the issues, or misleading the jury . . . .” MRE 403. 
We have noted that “[e]vidence is not inadmissible 
simply because it is prejudicial. Clearly, in every case, 
each party attempts to introduce evidence that causes 
prejudice to the other party.” 
Waknin v Chamberlain, 467 
Mich 329, 334; 653 NW2d 176 (2002). 
“In this context, 
prejudice means more than simply damage to an opponent’s 
cause. 
A party’s case is always damaged by evidence that 
the facts are contrary to his contentions, but that cannot 
be grounds for exclusion.” 
People v Vasher, 449 Mich 494, 
501; 537 NW2d 168 (1995). 
This rule “‘is not designed to permit the court to 
‘even out’ the weight of the evidence . . . or to make a 
contest where there is little or none.’” 
People v Mills, 
450 Mich 61, 75; 537 NW2d 909 (1995), quoting United States 
v McRae, 593 F2d 700, 707 (CA 5, 1979). The rule prohibits 
evidence that is unfairly prejudicial. 
“Evidence is 
12  
 
 
 
 
 
unfairly prejudicial when there exists a danger that 
marginally probative evidence will be given undue or 
preemptive weight by the jury.” 
People v Crawford, 458 
Mich 376, 398; 582 NW2d 785 (1998). 
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN FACT AND REASONABLE POSSIBILITY 
The mischief here is that, once a juror hears evidence 
that rezoning occurred, the juror will have difficulty 
concluding anything but that rezoning was reasonably 
possible when the taking occurred. 
As noted earlier in 
this opinion on p 10, it is not necessarily true that the 
possibility reasonably existed at the time of the taking. 
Rezoning might have become reasonably possible only upon 
the happening of one or more events after the taking. 
The 
taking itself could be one such event, as plaintiff argued 
at trial. 
Moreover, it does not follow from the fact that 
something occurs that people could have reasonably believed 
beforehand 
that 
it 
would 
occur. 
Consider 
these 
illustrations: 
In January 1968 one could have predicted 
that it was reasonably possible that Neil Armstrong would 
set foot on the moon in July 1969. 
Similarly, one could 
say today that it is reasonably possible that man will 
visit Mars in future years. 
13  
 
 
 
Merely because an event occurred does not mean that it 
was reasonably possible on a given date beforehand. 
Reasonable predictions of space exploration require one to 
know much about the status of our space program at the time 
the prediction is made. 
An accurate assessment of the 
reasonable possibility of these two space explorations 
depends on the information known beforehand. 
Similarly, a 
reasonable prediction of future rezoning requires that 
certain knowledge be available to the market participant at 
the time of the taking. See p 8 n 7 of this opinion. 
The distinction between the fact of an occurrence and 
whether it was reasonably possible on a given date before 
it occurred has eluded many. 
For example, one prominent 
treatise, cited by the trial court, the dissent in the 
Court of Appeals, and Justice Markman, characterized the 
fact of posttaking rezoning as “weighty evidence.” 
4 
Nichols, Eminent Domain (3d ed), § 12C.03[3]. 
It is not enough that posttaking rezoning is probative 
of an antecedent possibility of rezoning, as Justice 
Markman argues. The question is was it reasonably possible 
at the time of the taking? 
In this case, the taking was 
two-and-one-half years before rezoning occurred. 
The fact 
that rezoning did occur does not mean that it was 
14  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
reasonably possible at the time of or before the taking 
that it would occur. 
At first blush, posttaking rezoning is compelling 
evidence that there was a strong possibility of rezoning at 
the time of the taking. But the admission of this evidence 
was unfair because of the significant danger that the jury 
would 
not 
properly 
limit 
its 
consideration 
of 
it. 
Admission of this evidence risks that the jury will accord 
it weight wildly disproportionate to its probative value 
and treat rezoning when the taking occurred as a foregone 
conclusion.11
 This is the “hindsight bias” discussed by 
Justice Young that leads the jury to give the evidence 
undue weight and render it unfairly prejudicial. 
See ante 
at 22 n 36. 
Rather than prove Justice Young’s point, this 
bias demonstrates why the evidence can be relevant yet 
unfairly prejudicial. 
Evidence of posttaking rezoning also tends to confuse 
the value of property once rezoned and its value when it 
was only reasonably possible that it would be rezoned. 
In 
a takings case, the amount that the property owner is 
11 In his opinion, Justice Markman illustrates this
danger, post at 21-22. 
Admission of posttaking rezoning
evidence may encourage a witness to testify that it shows a
reasonable possibility of rezoning although when the taking
occurred, there was no reasonable possibility. 
15  
 
 
   
                                                 
 
 
entitled to be paid is the latter value. However, the jury 
may improperly award just compensation based on the value 
of the land as rezoned as if the property had already been 
rezoned before the taking. 
Justice Markman proceeds on the faith that the jury 
can limit the evidence to its proper sphere. 
See post at 
17-18. 
However, this approach negates the trial court’s 
role as a gatekeeper under MRE 403. 
The court must ensure 
that the influence of the evidence presented to the jury is 
not wildly disproportionate to its probative value. 
In every case, the fact of subsequent rezoning is 
unavailable to the market participant at the time of the 
taking. As Justice Markman points out, it allows one party 
the benefit of the skyscraper or stadium looming overhead 
whereas the market participant was limited to imagination 
and someday plans. 
It is highly prejudicial because it 
gives one party an unfair advantage over the other by 
giving the jury information that the hypothetical market 
participant could not have obtained.12 
12 
Justice 
Markman 
muses 
about 
the 
subjective
motivations of the parties in a marketplace transaction. 
However, those motivations are irrelevant here. 
“Just 
compensation” is not intended to perfectly replicate a
private deal. Nor does it consider that the property owner
Footnotes continued on following page. 
16  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
Just as the market does not have the benefit of 
twenty-twenty hindsight, neither do litigants. 
The jury 
must assess the value of the property “‘on the basis of 
facts as they then would have appeared to and been 
evaluated by the mythical buyer and seller.’” 
Roach v 
Newton Redevelopment Auth, 381 Mass 135, 138; 407 NE2d 1251 
(1980), quoting New Jersey v Gorga, 26 NJ 113, 118; 138 A2d 
833 (1958).13 
In the interest of having the same availability of 
information as the market participants at the time of the 
was an unwilling seller. In fact, the analysis is meant to
ensure that this factor is not considered. 
Like 
all 
“objective” 
legal 
determinations, 
“just
compensation” is a legal construct. 
I disagree that it
should be ascertained by considering factors that were
unavailable to market participants at the time of the
taking. 
13 See also Reeder v Iowa State Hwy Comm, 166 NW2d 839,
842 (Iowa, 1969) (inference that the adoption of the 
ordinance more than eight months after condemnation proves
that the higher use was the best use “at time of taking
. . . is manifestly lacking in substance”) (emphasis in 
original). 
These cases and others cited by Justice Markman for
the proposition that evidence of posttaking rezoning is
admissible, dealt only with whether the evidence was 
admissible because it was relevant. 
They admitted the
evidence without addressing its prejudicial effect.  See 
also Bembinster v Wisconsin, 57 Wis 2d 277, 284-285; 203
NW2d 897 (1973); Texas Electric Service Co v Graves, 488
SW2d 135, 137 (Tex App, 1972). Thus, I am not as persuaded
as is Justice Markman by their less thorough analysis. 
17  
 
 
 
 
       
 
 
                                                 
 
 
     
taking, the jury should not know of posttaking rezoning. 
It causes too great a danger of confusion of the issues and 
unfair prejudice to the taking party, outweighing its 
probative value.14 
THIS EVIDENCE OF POSTTAKING REZONING WAS UNFAIRLY PREJUDICIAL 
The highly prejudicial tendency of posttaking evidence 
to confuse and mislead substantially outweighed its minimal 
probative value in this case. Plaintiff estimated that the 
land was worth $2,758,200. Defendants set their damages at 
$18,586,000. The jury substantially agreed with defendants 
and awarded them $14,877,000. 
The award suggests a high likelihood that the jury was 
overwhelmed with the evidence of the posttaking rezoning. 
The jury appears to have ignored significant evidence that 
rezoning was not foreseeable. 
Novi’s chief planning 
consultant testified that, in 1993, the planning commission 
recommended that the land not be rezoned commercial. 
He 
revealed that the city had no plan to rezone the land 
because there was a demand for large-lot, million-dollar 
14 Justice Markman implies that our decision today
improperly favors the government. 
Post at 23 n 18. 
Although the government may benefit today, I strive to
apply the rules of evidence objectively and in accordance
with their goal of deciding cases fairly and on their
merits. I do not consider the identities of the parties. 
18  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
homes. 
He told the jury that the intention of the city 
council and the planning commission was to maintain the 
property for residential purposes. 
As of the date of the 
taking, he would not have recommended a change in zoning. 
Also, defendants had no pending petition for a zoning 
change, unlike the defendant in Eilender. 
The evidence of posttaking rezoning was not harmless, 
as defendants argue. 
Plaintiff presented sufficient 
evidence to the jury that it could have concluded that 
there was little reasonable possibility of rezoning at the 
time of the taking. 
But defendants’ damages award, which 
was 
substantially 
in 
agreement 
with 
their 
claim, 
demonstrates that the jury likely gave the posttaking 
evidence far more weight than it merited. 
Therefore, its 
admission here violated MRE 403 and was an abuse of 
discretion.15 
I agree with Justice Young that the trial court 
exacerbated the error. 
The court admitted the evidence of 
rezoning but precluded plaintiff from presenting evidence 
that the rezoning occurred as a result of the taking. 
15 My analysis would not prevent a trial court from
considering 
posttaking 
rezoning 
when 
determining 
the 
admissibility of other evidence that was available at the
time of the taking. MRE 104(a). 
19  
 
 
 
Plaintiff should have been allowed to counter the effect of 
the evidence once it was admitted. See ante at 30. 
Michigan takings law has long recognized that a 
condemnation award may be disturbed on appeal where 
erroneously admitted evidence caused substantial injustice 
in the result. 
Michigan Air Line R v Barnes, 44 Mich 222, 
227; 6 NW 651 (1880); MCR 2.613(A). I find that because of 
the 
erroneous 
admission 
of 
evidence, 
a 
substantial 
injustice occurred here. 
THE EFFECT OF THE VIEW OF THE LAND BY THE JURY 
It bears noting that, contrary to the Court of Appeals 
dissent, plaintiff did not open the door to evidence of 
posttaking rezoning or render its admission harmless by 
requesting a jury view. 
Plaintiff filed its motion in 
limine opposing the evidence of subsequent rezoning on 
March 6, 2001. 
At a March 15 hearing, although the court 
did not rule, its language suggested that ultimately it 
would deny the motion. 
By March 28, the trial court had not ruled on the 
motion. 
Plaintiff feared that it would receive an adverse 
ruling. 
Therefore, it moved for a jury view. 
Plaintiff 
argues that it did so to provide some evidence that the 
property, most of which remained undeveloped at the time, 
was more akin to residential property than commercial 
20  
 
 
 
 
 
property. 
Plaintiff asserted that it would have withdrawn 
the motion if, before the jury view, the court had 
announced its decision to exclude defendants’ posttaking 
rezoning evidence. 
Plaintiff did not preclude appellate 
review by properly anticipating and attempting to mitigate 
the trial court’s error. 
Moreover, the jury view did not render harmless the 
erroneous admission of the evidence of posttaking rezoning. 
There is no record evidence of what the jury saw when it 
viewed the property. 
It may have seen some commercial 
construction and inferred that part of the parcel had been 
rezoned. But I agree with plaintiff that the jury view was 
not the equivalent of uncontroverted evidence that the 
entire parcel had been rezoned. 
DEP’T OF TRANSPORTATION V VANELSLANDER 
My view is not inconsistent with our decision in 
VanElslander, supra. 
In that case, the Department of 
Transportation took a portion of the defendants’ land. 
As 
a consequence, a building on the remainder of the land was 
in 
violation 
of 
local 
set-back 
requirements. 
The 
department attempted to introduce evidence that it was 
reasonably possible for the defendants to mitigate the 
effect of the taking on the uncondemned building by 
obtaining a zoning variance. 
A variance could have cured 
21  
 
 
 
 
 
the set-back violation and avoided loss of the building. 
On appeal to this Court, the department argued that the 
defendants’ appeal was moot because the building had been 
demolished. 
We held that the evidence showing the possibility of 
obtaining a variance was admissible. 
Also, the fact that 
the building had been demolished did not render the appeal 
moot. VanElslander, supra at 132. 
In 
determining 
just 
compensation, 
the 
jury 
in 
VanElslander was entitled to hear of the likelihood that, 
at the time of the taking, a variance might have been 
sought and granted. 
Similarly, the jury in this case was 
entitled to hear evidence showing the likelihood of 
rezoning. 
But just as subsequent demolition was not an 
appropriate 
consideration 
when 
determining 
damages 
in 
VanElslander, 
neither 
was 
subsequent 
rezoning 
an 
appropriate consideration here. 
CONCLUSION 
The government must pay just compensation when it 
takes land for public use. Const 1963, art 10, § 2.  Just 
compensation is the fair market value of the land. 
Eilender, supra at 699. 
It is determined at the time of 
the taking. MCL 213.70. 
22  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
The prejudicial effect of evidence of subsequent 
rezoning 
on 
the 
determination 
of 
fair 
market 
value 
substantially outweighs its relevance. 
MRE 403. 
For that 
reason, it is not admissible to show the reasonable 
possibility of rezoning at the time of the taking. In this 
case, the erroneous admission of this evidence was an abuse 
of discretion. 
It was not harmless because it caused 
substantial injustice to plaintiff. 
I agree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals. 
Plaintiff is entitled to a new trial without the admission 
of evidence of the posttaking zoning change.16  I agree with 
the decision to remand the case to the trial court and not 
retain jurisdiction. 
Marilyn Kelly 
16 Consequently, I need not address the argument that
the trial court should have admitted evidence that the 
taking itself caused the rezoning. 
23  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 124765 
HAGGERTY CORRIDOR PARTNERS 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, PAUL D.
YAGER, trustee, also know as
PAUL D. YEGER, and NEIL J. SOSIN, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
WEAVER, J. (dissenting). 
I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that evidence 
of a posttaking rezoning is inadmissible in this case. 
I 
agree with Justice Markman’s conclusion that the evidence 
of a posttaking rezoning is relevant evidence that is 
admissible in this case to enable the jury to assess 
whether a “reasonable possibility” of rezoning existed on 
the date of the taking and whether the possibility would 
have affected the price a willing buyer would have offered 
for the property at the time of the taking. 
Therefore, I 
would conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in admitting the evidence. 
 
 
   
I also agree with Justice Markman’s conclusion that 
the trial court did abuse its discretion in excluding 
plaintiff’s evidence that the posttaking rezoning was 
caused by the taking, where this evidence was offered to 
counter defendants’ argument that there was a reasonable 
possibility of a zoning change. 
Therefore, I would vacate the Court of Appeals 
decision and remand this case for a new trial. 
Just 
compensation 
for 
private 
property 
that 
is 
condemned for public use is intended to “put the party 
injured in as good position as he would have been if the 
injury had not occurred.” State Hwy Comm’r v Eilender, 362 
Mich 697, 699; 108 NW2d 755 (1961). 
Determining just 
compensation “is not a matter of formula or artificial rule 
but of sound judgment and discretion based upon the 
relevant facts in the particular case.” 
Id.  We have held 
that a reasonable possibility that a zoning classification 
will be changed is relevant and should be considered when 
determining just compensation to the extent that the 
“‘possibility’ would have affected the price which a 
willing buyer would have offered for the property just 
prior to the taking.” 
Id. at 699 (citation omitted); see 
also Dep’t of Transportation v VanElslander, 460 Mich 127, 
130; 594 NW2d 841 (1999). A posttaking change in zoning is 
2  
 
 
                                                 
relevant1 because it may assist the jury in assessing the 
possibility of a zoning change at the time of the taking— 
i.e., how likely a zoning change was at the time of the 
taking—and whether that possibility would have affected the 
price a willing buyer would have offered for the property 
at the time of the taking.2
 Therefore, I would conclude 
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
admitting evidence of a posttaking change in zoning. 
Additionally, just as the defendants in this case 
should be permitted to introduce evidence of a posttaking 
change in zoning to demonstrate the possibility of a zoning 
change at the time of the taking and how the possibility 
would have affected the price, plaintiff in this case 
should 
be 
permitted 
to 
offer 
evidence 
to 
counter 
defendants’ evidence. Such evidence includes evidence that 
1 As defined in MRE 401, “relevant evidence” is 
“evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.” 
Further, “[a]ll relevant evidence
is 
admissible, 
except 
as 
otherwise 
provided 
by 
the 
Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of the
State of Michigan, these rules, or other rules adopted by
the Supreme Court.” MRE 402. 
2 As stated by the Supreme Court of New Jersey, “In
short if the parties to a voluntary transaction would as of
the date of taking give recognition to the probability of a
zoning amendment in agreeing upon the value, the law will
recognize the truth.” 
New Jersey v Gorga, 26 NJ 113, 117;
138 A2d 833 (1958). 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
the rezoning in this case was a result of the taking. 
Therefore, I would conclude that the trial court abused its 
discretion in excluding evidence that the rezoning was a 
result of the taking. 
Consistent with this opinion, I would remand the case 
to the trial court for a new trial. 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
No. 124765 
HAGGERTY CORRIDOR PARTNERS 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, PAUL D.
YAGER, trustee, also known as
PAUL D. YEGER, and NEIL J. SOSIN, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
MARKMAN, J. (dissenting). 
The majority concludes that evidence of a posttaking 
rezoning is inadmissible to demonstrate that a “reasonable 
possibility” of rezoning existed on the date of the taking.1 
I respectfully disagree. 
Because I believe that evidence 
of a posttaking rezoning is admissible to demonstrate that 
a “reasonable possibility” of rezoning existed on the date 
of the taking, I do not believe that the trial court abused 
its discretion in admitting such evidence. 
However, I do 
1 Throughout this opinion, I use the term “majority”
when referring to both Justice Young’s lead opinion and
Justice Kelly’s concurring opinion, and I use the term
“plurality” when referring only to Justice Young’s lead
opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
believe that the trial court abused its discretion in 
prohibiting plaintiff from introducing evidence that the 
posttaking rezoning was caused by the taking. Therefore, I 
would vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and 
remand this case for a new trial, in which defendants would 
be allowed to introduce evidence of the posttaking rezoning 
and plaintiff would be allowed to introduce evidence that 
such posttaking rezoning was caused by the taking. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Defendant partnership, a partnership that develops 
real estate, owned 335 acres of vacant property in Novi.2 
In 1995, the Michigan Department of Transportation (MDOT) 
began proceedings to condemn fifty-one acres of defendants’ 
property for use in the construction of the M-5 Haggerty 
Road Connector in Novi. 
On the date of the taking, the 
property was zoned for residential use, but in 1998 the 
property was rezoned for commercial use. 
At trial, at 
which the jury was charged with determining the “just 
compensation” due defendants, the trial court allowed 
2 According to defendants, they purchased this property
to build a high technology office park, anticipating that
the 
property 
would 
be 
rezoned 
from 
residential 
to 
commercial. 
After the taking, the property was rezoned
from residential to commercial and defendants did build an 
office park on their remaining 284 acres. 
2  
 
 
  
 
 
                                                 
 
defendants to present evidence of the posttaking rezoning.3 
However, the trial court refused to allow MDOT to introduce 
rebuttal evidence that the property was rezoned only as a 
result of the taking. 
Defendants requested approximately 
$18.5 million in compensation and MDOT agreed to pay 
approximately $2.7 million. The jury returned a verdict of 
approximately $14.8 million. 
In a split decision, the 
Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded for a new trial. 
Unpublished opinion per curiam, 
issued July 22, 2003 (Docket Nos. 234099 and 240227). 
The 
majority held that the trial court abused its discretion in 
admitting evidence of the posttaking rezoning, and, thus, 
remanded for a new trial. 
The dissenting judge concluded 
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion either in 
admitting evidence of the posttaking rezoning or in 
excluding evidence that the posttaking rezoning was caused 
by the taking, and, thus, he would have affirmed the 
verdict. 
II. ANALYSIS 
Art 10, § 2 of Michigan’s 1963 Constitution provides 
that “[p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use 
3 At MDOT’s request, the jury saw the property in its
posttaking state. 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
without just compensation therefor being first made or 
secured in a manner prescribed by law.” 
“‘“The purpose of 
just compensation is to put property owners in as good a 
position as they would have been had their property not 
been taken from them.”’” 
Dep’t of Transportation v 
VanElslander, 460 Mich 127, 129; 594 NW2d 841 (1999) 
(citations omitted). 
Therefore, “the proper amount of 
compensation for property takes into account all factors 
relevant to market value.” 
Silver Creek Drain Dist v 
Extrusions Div, Inc, 468 Mich 367, 379; 663 NW2d 436 
(2003). In order to determine “just compensation,” we must 
determine the market “value of the condemned land at the 
time of the taking . . . .” 
State Hwy Comm’r v Eilender, 
362 Mich 697, 699; 108 NW2d 755 (1961). 
The fair market 
value of condemned property “shall be determined with 
respect to the condition of the property and the state of 
the market on the date of valuation.” 
MCL 213.70(3). 
“‘[A]ny evidence that would tend to affect the market value 
of the property as of the date of condemnation is 
relevant.’” VanElslander, supra at 130 (citation omitted). 
A. RELEVANCE OF EVIDENCE OF POSTTAKING REZONING 
It is well established and uncontested that one of the 
factors relevant to market value is the “‘reasonable 
possibility 
that 
the 
zoning 
classification 
will 
be 
4  
 
 
  
  
                                                 
   
changed.’” 
Eilender, supra at 699 (citation omitted). 
As 
this Court held in Eilender, supra at 699, “‘if there is a 
reasonable possibility that the zoning classification will 
be changed, this possibility should be considered in 
arriving at the proper value.’” 
(Citation omitted.)4
 In 
other words, if, at the time of the taking, there existed a 
“reasonable possibility” that the property would be rezoned 
to 
allow 
“more 
lucrative 
uses,” 
this 
“reasonable 
possibility” should be considered.5 
Id. This factor “‘must 
be considered in terms of the extent to which the 
“possibility” would have affected the price which a willing 
buyer would have offered for the property just prior to the 
taking.’” 
Id. (citation omitted). 
Property that is zoned 
to allow “more lucrative uses” is worth more money than 
property that is not so zoned. 
Therefore, property that 
has a “reasonable possibility” of being rezoned to allow 
4 Justice Kelly states that I am mischaracterizing this
Court’s holding in Eilender. 
I cite Eilender only for a
proposition 
with 
which 
everybody 
apparently 
agrees—a
“reasonable possibility” of rezoning should be considered
when determining “just compensation.” 
I do not suggest
that this Court in Eilender already answered the question
at issue here. 
5 The opposite, of course, is true as well.  That is,
if, at the time of the taking, there existed a “reasonable
possibility” that the property would be rezoned to exclude
“more lucrative uses,” this “reasonable possibility” should
also be considered. Id. 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
“more lucrative uses” is worth more money than property 
that does not have a “reasonable possibility” of being 
rezoned to allow “more lucrative uses.”6
 A person whose 
property has been taken by the government is entitled to 
the full market value of the taken property, taking into 
consideration the totality of factors that a willing buyer 
would consider, including the “reasonable possibility” of 
rezoning. 
The majority does not disagree that the “reasonable 
possibility” 
of 
rezoning 
is 
a 
factor 
that 
must 
be 
considered when determining “just compensation.” 
However, 
the majority concludes that the fact itself that the 
property was rezoned after the taking cannot be considered 
in determining whether there was, at the time of the 
taking, 
a 
“reasonable 
possibility” 
of 
rezoning. 
I 
disagree. Instead, I believe that such evidence may afford 
compelling evidence that a “reasonable possibility” of 
rezoning existed at the time of the taking. 
In this case, one of the primary issues for the jury 
to resolve was whether, at the time of the taking, there 
6 As the plurality recognizes, “at the time defendants
acquired their Novi property, beginning in 1988, the 
property was more valuable in their eyes because of the
looming possibility of a future zoning change.” 
Ante at 
19-20. 
6  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
was a “reasonable possibility” that the subject property 
would be rezoned from residential to commercial. 
MDOT 
argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it 
allowed defendants to introduce evidence that, although the 
property was zoned residential at the time of the taking, 2 
1/2 years later the property was rezoned commercial. 
The 
Court of Appeals majority agreed with MDOT, concluding that 
“evidence of the actual zoning change was irrelevant to the 
value of the property on the date of taking and should not 
have been disclosed to the jury.” Slip op at 3. 
The Court of Appeals dissent, on the other hand, 
concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in admitting evidence of the posttaking rezoning. 
I agree 
with this dissent. 
MRE 402 provides that “[a]ll relevant 
evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the 
Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of the 
State of Michigan, these rules, or other rules adopted by 
the Supreme Court.”7  MRE 401 defines relevant evidence as 
7 MDOT does not argue that the admission of the
posttaking rezoning violated the Constitution of the United
States or the Constitution of the state of Michigan. 
It 
only argues that the evidence is not relevant and that,
even if it is relevant, it should be excluded pursuant to
MRE 403, as discussed later in this opinion. 
7  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
that “having any tendency to make the existence of any fact 
that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence.” 
As 
already 
discussed, 
whether 
a 
“reasonable 
possibility” of rezoning existed at the time of the taking 
is 
of 
consequence 
to 
the 
determination 
of 
“just 
compensation.”8
 That the property was, in fact, rezoned 
makes it “more probable” that a “reasonable possibility” of 
rezoning existed at the time of the taking. 
As the Court 
of Appeals dissent explained, “evidence of the actual 
rezoning had the tendency to make the existence of the 
8 I do not know why the plurality suggests that I
“misidentify[] the ‘fact that is of consequence,’” ante at 
17, because I agree with the plurality that “the ‘fact that
is of consequence’ is the reasonable possibility of a
zoning modification, as that possibility might have been
perceived by a market participant on condemnation day.” 
Ante at 18 n 32 (emphasis in the original). 
Where the 
plurality and I differ is with regard to whether evidence
of a posttaking rezoning makes it “more probable” that a
“reasonable possibility” of rezoning existed at the time of
the taking. 
I agree with the plurality that the fact that
the property was subsequently rezoned does not necessarily
mean that a “reasonable possibility” of a rezoning existed
at the time of the taking. 
However, the fact that the
property was subsequently rezoned makes it “more probable”
that a “reasonable possibility” of a rezoning existed at
the time of the taking than would the fact that the
property was not subsequently rezoned. 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
possibility of rezoning more probable than it would be 
without the evidence.” Slip op at 2. This is true because 
a jury confronted with the reality of a subsequent rezoning 
would be acting in an altogether logical fashion by 
comparing this reality to an alternative reality in which 
no subsequent rezoning had occurred, and concluding that 
the former reality gives rise to a greater inference than 
the latter that the impetus for rezoning preceded the 
taking. 
Whether this inference is strong or weak would 
depend on the totality of the circumstances. 
The majority, however, would, in every case, deny the 
property owner the ability to introduce evidence of an 
actual 
rezoning, 
regardless 
of 
the 
strength 
of 
the 
inference raised by the rezoning either by itself or in 
conjunction with other evidence. 
Because I believe that 
evidence of actual rezoning gives rise to the wholly 
logical inference that the genesis of that rezoning may 
have preceded the taking, I would not bar the introduction 
of such evidence.9 
Indeed, the leading treatise on eminent 
9 The plurality is impressive in the breadth of the
analogies that it brings to bear in its analysis, ranging
from probability to the stock market to psychology. If, as
I understand it to be the plurality’s point, the future is
unpredictable, I am persuaded. 
If, on the other hand, it
is the plurality’s point that when the future becomes the
present it is of no relevance in assessing what the 
Footnotes continued on following page. 
9  
 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
domain observes that evidence of a posttaking rezoning “has 
been held to be weighty evidence of the existence (at the 
time of the taking) of the fact that there was a reasonable 
probability of an imminent change.” 
4 Nichols, Eminent 
Domain (3d ed), § 12C.03[3]. 
As the New Jersey Supreme 
Court 
has 
explained, 
such 
evidence 
“support[s] 
the 
reasonableness of the factual claim that on the date of 
taking 
the 
parties 
to 
a 
voluntary 
sale 
would 
have 
recognized and been influenced by the probability of an 
amendment in the near future in fixing the selling price.” 
New Jersey v Gorga, 26 NJ 113, 118; 138 A2d 833 (1958).10 
prospects yesterday were of that future, I respectfully
disagree. 
10 Other states have held that evidence of a posttaking
rezoning is admissible to help the jury determine the “just
compensation” 
due 
for 
the 
taking. 
Roach 
v 
Newton 
Redevelopment Auth, 381 Mass 135, 137; 407 NE2d 1251 (1980)
(holding that “[a]ctual amendment of the zoning law, 
subsequent to the taking, may be ‘weighty evidence’ of such
a prospect”); Bembinster v Wisconsin, 57 Wis 2d 277, 284­
285; 203 NW2d 897 (1973) (holding that “[t]he type of
evidence which has been admitted as material as tending to
prove a reasonable probability of change includes . . . the
actual amendment of the ordinance subsequent to the 
taking”); Texas Electric Service Co v Graves, 488 SW2d 135,
137 (Tex App, 1972) (holding that “if subsequent to the
taking and before the trial the ordinance was actually
amended to permit the previously forbidden use then that of
itself was weighty evidence of the existence at the time of
the taking of the fact that there was a reasonable 
probability of an imminent change”); Reeder v Iowa State 
Hwy Comm, 166 NW2d 839, 841 (Iowa, 1969) (holding that a
rezoning ordinance enacted more than eight months after the
Footnotes continued on following page. 
10  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
B. MARKETPLACE TRANSACTIONS VERSUS CONDEMNATION 
PROCESS 
As the majority explains, the jury is charged in cases 
of 
this 
sort 
with 
determining 
what 
a 
“mythical,” 
“hypothetical,” 
“theoretical,” 
“fictional,” 
“willing” 
buyer, would have paid a “mythical,” “hypothetical,” 
“theoretical,” 
“fictional,” 
“willing” 
seller 
for 
the 
property in a “voluntary,” transaction at the time of the 
taking. 
Ante at 15, 17, 18, 22, 23, 24, 25 n 38, and 27, 
28, 31; ante at 15. 
However, in truth, the condemnation 
process does not involve a typical willing buyer,11 a 
taking, although not dispositive, was admissible). 
See 
also 9 ALR3d 291, § 11[a], p 320 (“[c]hange of an existing
zoning ordinance, subsequently to the time of condemnation,
has been held admissible in a trial for the award of 
compensation as bearing on the degree of probability and
the imminence of the change at the time of the taking”); 4
Rathkopf’s The Law of Zoning and Planning, § 75:8 (4th ed)
(“[a] change in the zoning classification of a condemned
parcel or similarly situated adjacent properties subsequent
to a taking is considered weighty evidence of a reasonable
probability of an imminent change at the time of taking”).
Contrary to the plurality’s suggestion, ante at 26 n 40, I
have chosen to “blindly . . . follow the lead of these few
jurisdictions,” only if the entirety of the analysis
contained in this dissent is disregarded. I cite the above 
cases only to contrast the support in other states for the
position expressed in this dissent with the utter absence
of similar support for the majority’s position. 
11 “As to the condemnor/government in the hypothetical
‘fair market value’ scenario, the government stands in the
shoes of a ‘willing [private] buyer.’” 
13 Powell, Real
Property, § 79F.04[2][a][ii], p 39. 
11  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
willing seller, or a voluntary transaction.12
 Instead, it 
involves a transaction in which the government takes 
property without the permission or consent of the property 
owner, in what is essentially a “forced sale.” 
The 
property owner is not a willing seller, and the government 
is not a typical willing buyer. 
The condemnation process 
bears little in common with a voluntary sale of property in 
the market between a willing seller and a willing buyer. 
It is a source of its confusion that the majority 
fails to give significance to these differences. Yet, they 
are determinative of the very issue before this Court. The 
majority provides that the jury is to “suppose” that the 
property owner is indistinguishable from a willing seller, 
that the government is indistinguishable from a typical 
willing buyer, and that both have entered into a market 
transaction. 
Next, the jury is asked to “imagine” the 
value that a “reasonable” buyer and seller would have 
placed on the property in the market. 
Finally, although 
the jury can be apprised by the governmental “buyer” that 
at the time of “sale,” the property was zoned residential 
12 “Not only does the ‘fair market value’ test posit a
hypothetical buyer and a hypothetical seller, it also 
posits a hypothetical market . . . .” 
13 Powell, Real
Property, § 79F.04[2][a][iii][A], p 39. 
12  
 
 
 
 
 
 
and there was no “reasonable possibility” of it being 
rezoned, the jury cannot be apprised by the private 
“seller” that such rezoning, in fact, has already occurred. 
The upshot of this procedure is that the jury must 
“imagine” a typical willing buyer, a willing seller, and a 
voluntary transaction—none of which, of course, exist in 
reality—while at the same time the jury must not consider a 
reality that does exist, namely, that the government has 
taken property that has been rezoned. 
Moreover, not only is the jury to “imagine” a market 
transaction where in reality there is none, but in 
calculating the “fair market value” of the property being 
“sold” the jury must imagine a particular moment in time at 
which the taking, or “forced sale,” occurred, placing 
itself in the shoes not of any real parties involved in the 
taking, but of a nonexistent “reasonable” buyer and seller. 
This is in further contrast to a genuine market transaction 
in which the buyer and the seller stand in their own shoes, 
and there is no need for a jury, or any other third party, 
to imagine anything concerning the value of property. 
What is the significance of the fact that the 
condemnation process is not truly equivalent to a market 
transaction? 
Its significance lies in its demonstration 
that the majority operates on a faulty premise when it 
13  
 
 
 
insists that the jury, in making its “fair market value” 
determination, can have access only to such information as 
would have been possessed by a “real” buyer and seller at 
the time of the “real” transaction. 
In the instant case, 
this means, according to the majority, that the jury must 
be deprived of the information that the property was 
rezoned after it was taken. 
Apart from the fact that all 
of the majority’s “realities” are merely fictive, there is 
simply no basis for the proposition that parties to a 
genuine 
transaction 
and 
parties 
to 
a 
constructive 
transaction can, or should, be placed on an equal footing 
concerning the range of access to information. 
This is a 
false equivalency because the underlying transactions are 
not equivalent. 
In the market transaction, the buyer and the seller 
will typically possess considerable information that is 
distinctive 
or 
unique 
to 
themselves—sentimental 
considerations concerning property, subjective assessments 
of value, and estimations of worth that are a function of 
their personal experiences, their varied speculations of 
the future, and their diverse financial circumstances and 
ambitions. 
Such “subjective” factors are inaccessible to 
the jury, which can only make a “fair market value” 
14  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
determination on the basis of “objective” factors.13
 Just 
as the participants in the “subjective” transaction may 
then possess information that is unavailable to the 
participants in the “objective” transaction, the corollary 
is also true. 
For the participants in the “subjective” 
transaction are involved in the task of calculating 
“personal value,” while the participants in the “objective” 
transaction are involved in the very different task of 
calculating “fair market value.” In calculating the former 
amount as accurately as possible—“personal value”—it is 
necessary merely that the buyer and the seller be permitted 
to take into consideration as much information as is of 
13 "Market value” or “fair market value” is 
defined as the amount of money which a purchaser
willing but not obliged to buy the property would
pay to an owner who was willing but not obliged
to sell it. 
The hypothetical nature of this “value” 
should be obvious. 
Moreover, the condemnee is
assumed to be not only a “willing seller” but
also a person who will act as a purely economic
creature, when in fact neither assumption may be
true. 
One inescapable result of imposing the
purely economic “willing seller” persona onto the
condemnee 
is 
that 
the 
formula 
permits 
no 
compensation 
for 
subjective 
or 
sentimental 
attachment that the condemnee may have to the
property. 
Only objective transferable value is
considered. 
Subjective nontransferable value,
such as . . . sentimental value generally [is]
not 
included 
in 
the 
just 
compensation
calculation. 
[13 Powell, Real Property, § 
79F.04[2][a][i], pp 37-38.] 
15  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
importance to each. 
In calculating the latter amount as 
accurately as possible—“fair market value”—it is necessary 
in contrast that as much relevant information as available 
concerning value be taken into consideration. 
For the reasons set forth earlier, I believe that 
evidence of posttaking rezoning is relevant to “fair market 
value.” 
Such relevance is not diminished by the fact that 
this 
information 
might 
not 
have 
been 
available 
to 
participants in a “subjective” transaction. 
Although the 
“objective” transaction of the condemnation process can 
never truly replicate the “subjective” transaction of the 
marketplace, it can nonetheless be made as perfect as 
possible on its own terms. 
This can be achieved only by 
making available as much relevant information as possible 
to the fact-finder. 
C. PROBATIVE VALUE VERSUS DANGER OF UNFAIR PREJUDICE 
MDOT argues that, even if evidence of the posttaking 
rezoning is relevant evidence, it should be excluded 
pursuant to MRE 403. 
MRE 403 provides, “[a]lthough 
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, 
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” 
However, 
16  
 
 
 
 
“[e]vidence is not inadmissible simply because it is 
prejudicial.” Waknin v Chamberlain, 467 Mich 329, 334; 653 
NW2d 176 (2002). 
“‘“Relevant evidence is inherently 
prejudicial; but it is only unfair prejudice, substantially 
outweighing probative value, which permits exclusion of 
relevant matter under Rule 403 . . . .”’” 
Id. at 334 
(citations omitted). 
“Evidence is unfairly prejudicial 
when there exists a danger that marginally probative 
evidence will be given undue or preemptive weight by the 
jury.” Id. at 334 n 3, quoting People v Crawford, 458 Mich 
376, 398; 582 NW2d 785 (1998). 
“The fact that, subsequent 
to the taking, the zoning ordinance was actually amended to 
permit the previously proscribed use has been held to be 
weighty evidence of the existence (at the time of the 
taking) of the fact that there was a reasonable probability 
of an imminent change.” 4 Nichols, Eminent Domain (3d ed), 
§ 12C.03[3] (emphasis added). 
Evidence of a posttaking 
rezoning “is not merely marginally probative evidence, and 
thus there is no danger that marginally probative evidence 
will be given undue weight by the jury.” 
Waknin, supra at 
335 (emphasis added). 
Further, 
the trial court repeatedly 
instructed the jury that it was to value the property as of 
17  
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
the date of the taking,14 and we must presume that the 
jurors understood and followed these instructions.15 
People 
v Dennis, 464 Mich 567, 581; 628 NW2d 502 (2001). 
14 The trial court instructed the jury: 
Your award must be based upon the market
value 
of 
the 
property 
as 
of 
the 
date 
of 
taking. . . . 
* * * 
The Court has instructed you on the subject
of highest and best use. 
One of the things that
must be considered in deciding what the highest
and best use of the property was at the time of 
the taking is the zoning clarification -- zoning
classification of the property at that time. 
However, if there was a reasonable possibility,
absent the threat of this condemnation case, that
the 
zoning 
classification 
would 
have 
been 
changed, you should consider this possibility in
arriving at the value of the property on the date 
of taking. . . . 
In this case, the market value of the 
property, both before and after the taking, must
be determined as of December 7th, 1995, and not 
at an earlier or later date. [Emphasis added.] 
15 Justice Kelly contends that admission of evidence of
a posttaking rezoning would be too confusing for a jury to
handle, and the plurality concludes that such evidence
“cannot be . . . easily ‘confined.’” 
Ante at 16, 18, 19; 
ante at 27 n 42. I believe that a jury is quite capable of
making a distinction between the fair market value of the
property at the time of the taking and the fair market
value of the property at some later time. 
I also believe 
that a jury is quite capable of understanding that just
because the property today is zoned commercial does not
Footnotes continued on following page. 
18  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
   
D. PRACTICAL VALUE OF EVIDENCE OF POSTTAKING REZONING 
At trial, MDOT argued that there was no “reasonable 
possibility” that the property would be rezoned. 
Not 
permitting defendants to respond to this argument with the 
fact 
that 
the 
property 
has, 
in 
fact, 
been 
rezoned 
undermines the integrity of the judicial process by 
requiring a jury to ignore reality. 
That is, the majority 
would require the jury to ignore the skyscraper that looms 
over a property, or the crowds milling about the new sports 
stadium. Such a determined obliviousness to reality brings 
no honor to a justice system when there are customary and 
traditional means—a trial court that precisely instructs on 
the law and a jury that faithfully abides by the 
necessarily mean that there was a “reasonable possibility”
of the property being rezoned commercial 2 1/2 years 
earlier. 
If jurors can be trusted sufficiently to 
determine what constitutes “just compensation,” or the fair
market value of property, they can also be trusted to pay
heed to the trial court when it plainly instructs them on
proper and improper uses of evidence. 
Justice Kelly has determined that “the jury was 
overwhelmed with the evidence of the posttaking rezoning,”
that it “ignored significant evidence that rezoning was not
foreseeable,” and that it “likely gave the posttaking
evidence far more weight than it merited.” Ante at 18, 19.
There is no evidence to sustain this determination, other
than the fact that the jury’s calculation of fair market
value was closer to that proposed by defendants than by
plaintiff. 
Moreover, “just compensation” is a factual
question that is normally left to the jury to decide, not
the judges of this or any other court. 
19  
 
 
 
 
instructions—by which to ensure that the skyscraper or the 
sports stadium is evaluated only for proper purposes. 
The 
majority is correct that evidence of a posttaking rezoning 
is not dispositive concerning whether there existed at the 
time of the taking a “reasonable possibility” of a 
rezoning. 
However, it is incorrect that such rezoning can 
never be of any relevance in this regard. 
Rather, just as 
with 
all 
other 
aspects 
of 
the 
“just 
compensation” 
determination, the relevance of a particular posttaking 
rezoning must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. 
The premise of our justice system is that providing 
more, rather than less, information will generally assist 
the jury in discovering the truth. 
Relevant evidence 
sustains the truth-seeking process. 
“In the American 
judicial system, a jury is called upon to assume the 
important 
role 
of 
fact-finder 
and 
the 
massive 
responsibility that the role entails: searching for the 
truth. 
‘The purpose of trial is to find the truth and 
exact justice through the transmission of information to 
the jury.’” Comment, Speaking out: Is Texas inhibiting the 
search for truth by prohibiting juror questioning of 
witnesses in criminal cases?, 32 Tex Tech L R 1013, 1014 
(2001) (citation omitted). The costs to our justice system 
are almost always much greater, in my judgment, when the 
20  
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
                                                 
jury is deprived of relevant evidence than when the 
consideration of such evidence is enabled and a risk 
incurred that it will be considered for improper purposes. 
For we can reasonably protect against the latter risk 
through careful instructions and thoughtful deliberations. 
By contrast, lost evidence will forever taint a decision 
that could have been enhanced by the consideration of such 
evidence. 
While recognizing that posttaking rezoning 
evidence can be abused, such evidence also carries the 
potential to ensure a truer and better-informed calculation 
of fair market value. To deprive the jury in this case of 
the ability to consider the rezoning is to undermine its 
ability to determine the truth in this matter, and thereby 
to produce the most accurate possible determination of 
“just 
compensation” 
to 
which 
defendants 
are 
constitutionally entitled.16 
Finally, knowing that a jury will be apprised of all 
relevant 
information 
also 
may 
serve 
felicitously 
to 
16 Contrary to Justice Kelly’s criticism, I am not
attempting to “negate[] the trial court’s role as a 
gatekeeper.” 
Ante at 16. 
I agree that it is the trial
court’s role to exclude evidence with regard to which “its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice . . . .” 
MRE 403. 
In view of her 
criticism, it is ironic that it is Justice Kelly who would
reverse the decision of the trial court admitting evidence,
finding this to constitute an abuse of discretion. 
21  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
encourage those who testify and who argue before the jury 
to do so in a more accurate and precise fashion. 
For 
example, a government witness may be more hesitant to tell 
the jury that there was no “reasonable possibility” of a 
rezoning if the witness knows that the jury will eventually 
be informed that the property has, in fact, been rezoned. 
In other words, a government witness may well be less 
cocksure in his or her assertion that there was no 
“reasonable possibility” of a rezoning if there is a real­
world check upon the witness’s testimony. 
Under the 
majority’s approach, the government will remain free to 
tell the jury that absolutely no possibility of a rezoning 
existed, and the property owner will be unable to rebut 
this assertion by being allowed to inform the jury that the 
property has, in fact, been rezoned.17
 To allow such a 
17 The plurality asserts that the admission of evidence
of a posttaking rezoning would “lead to gamesmanship”
because it “would give condemning agencies every incentive
to postpone zoning plans in order to reduce the price of
just compensation.” 
Ante at 21 n 35. 
The plurality,
however, fails to give any attention to the fact that the
exclusion of such evidence will give the government the
ability to paint a false or distorted picture of the worth
of property in the face of a contrary reality. 
That is,
while 
the 
admission 
of 
such 
evidence 
may 
lead 
to 
gamesmanship outside the courtroom, the exclusion of the 
evidence may lead to gamesmanship inside the courtroom. 
Besides the fact that the inclination of a government to
engage in gamesmanship outside the courtroom may say much
Footnotes continued on following page. 
22  
 
 
 
  
                                                 
   
distorted picture of the reality surrounding the exercise 
of a constitutional power, to the benefit of the government 
and to the detriment of the property owner, is to undermine 
the integrity of the constitutional process.18 
about its inclination within the courtroom, this Court must
necessitously be most concerned about conduct within the
courtroom. 
Maintaining the integrity of the legal process
is one of our principal charges. Presumably, the political
processes 
are 
available 
to 
address 
the 
conduct 
of 
governments that seek to thwart evidence in order to deny
their own citizens fair market value for their “taken” 
properties. 
Moreover, gamesmanship outside the courtroom is far
less 
likely 
to 
arise 
than 
gamesmanship 
within 
the 
courtroom. 
Many factors play a role in a government’s
decision whether or not to rezone property; how much the
government will have to pay for property that has already
been condemned is only one of these factors. 
On the other 
hand, during a trial in which the exclusive issue is how
much does the government have to pay for the condemned
property, the government’s dominant interest will always be
to paint a picture of property of as little market value as
possible. 
18 The plurality contends that my concern is misplaced
because it was the city of Novi’s decision to rezone the
property, not MDOT’s. 
Ante at 29 n 43. 
However,
regardless of which governmental entity decided to rezone
the property, it cannot be disputed that the majority’s
decision to exclude evidence of the posttaking rezoning is
beneficial to the government and detrimental to the private
property owner. 
23  
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
For these reasons, I conclude that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the 
posttaking rezoning.19 
E. EVIDENCE THAT POSTTAKING REZONING WAS CAUSED BY TAKING 
A posttaking rezoning is admissible only as evidence 
that a “reasonable possibility” of a rezoning existed at 
19 Although I conclude that evidence of a posttaking
rezoning is admissible, I would caution that in admitting
such evidence the trial court must carefully instruct the
jury, as it did here, that the jury is to determine the 
market value at the time of the taking and that evidence of 
a posttaking rezoning is to be used only for the purpose of
determining whether there existed at the time of the taking
a “reasonable possibility” of rezoning. That is, the trial
court must ensure that the jury does not “assign[] inflated
significance” to the posttaking rezoning. Ante at 22 n 36. 
As the New Jersey Supreme Court has explained: 
[A]n amendment of the ordinance which came
into being after the date of taking should not be
excluded solely because of the time sequence.
But such evidence should be carefully confined to
its proper role. 
It may serve only to support
the reasonableness of the factual claim that on 
the date of taking the parties to a voluntary
sale would have recognized and been influenced by
the probability of an amendment in the near 
future in fixing the selling price. 
The fact 
would still remain that on the date of taking the
property was otherwise zoned, and the value as of
that date must still be reached on the basis of 
facts as they then would have appeared to and
been evaluated by the mythical buyer and seller.
[Gorga, supra at 118.] 
24  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
the time of the taking.20  A rezoning that was caused by the 
taking obviously does not constitute evidence that a 
“reasonable possibility” of a rezoning existed at the time 
of the taking. 
In other words, a posttaking rezoning that 
was caused by the taking is simply not relevant evidence in 
support of fair market value at the time of the taking. 
Therefore, 
“[t]he 
effect 
on 
market 
value 
of 
the 
condemnation proceeding itself may not be considered as an 
element of value.” 
Silver Creek, supra at 379, n 13, 
citing MCL 213.70(1),21 and In re Urban Renewal, Elmwood 
20 In determining the weight to be given to a 
posttaking rezoning in considering whether there existed a
“reasonable possibility” of a rezoning at the time of the
taking, the jury should consider the totality of the 
circumstances, including the time that has elapsed between
the taking and the rezoning, the complexity of the project
and the extent to which planning for such project must have
predated the taking, changed circumstances within the 
jurisdiction creating or affecting the need for such 
rezoning, the nature of changes in the composition of the
pertinent zoning body and within the relevant political
jurisdiction and the extent to which such changes were
foreseeable, the credibility of public authorities on the
circumstances surrounding a rezoning, the extent to which
the taking itself caused the rezoning, and any reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from the fact of an actual 
rezoning. 
21 MCL 213.70(1) provides, in pertinent part: 
A change in the fair market value before the
date of the filing of the complaint which . . .
was substantially due to the general knowledge of
Footnotes continued on following page. 
25  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Park Project, 376 Mich 311, 318; 136 NW2d 896 (1965). 
“[A]n actual change in zoning cannot be taken into account 
if it ‘results from the fact that the project which is the 
basis for the taking was impending.’” 
Roach v Newton 
Redevelopment Auth, 381 Mass 135, 137; 407 NE2d 1251 
(1980), quoting 4 Nichols, Eminent Domain (rev 3d ed), § 
12.322[1], n 7.1. See also State v Kruger, 77 Wash 2d 105, 
108; 459 P2d 648 (1969); People ex rel Dep’t of Pub Works v 
Arthofer, 245 Cal App 2d 454, 465; 54 Cal Rptr 878 (1966); 
Williams v City & Co of Denver, 147 Colo 195, 202; 363 P2d 
171 (1961). The trial court itself recognized that, if the 
posttaking rezoning was caused by the taking, the jury 
should 
not 
consider 
the 
posttaking 
rezoning 
when 
considering 
whether 
a 
“reasonable 
possibility” 
of 
a 
rezoning existed at the time of the taking, as it 
instructed 
the 
jury: 
“if 
there 
was 
a 
reasonable 
possibility, absent the threat of this condemnation case, 
that the zoning classification would have been changed, you 
should consider this possibility in arriving at the value 
of the property on the date of taking.” 
(Emphasis added.) 
the imminence of the acquiring by the agency
. . . shall be disregarded in determining fair 
market value. 
Except as provided in section 23,
the property shall be valued in all cases as
though the acquisition had not been contemplated. 
26  
 
 
    
 
                                                 
 
However, the trial court, for reasons that are unclear, 
refused to allow MDOT to present evidence that the 
posttaking rezoning may have been a result of the taking.22 
The Court of Appeals dissent relied on MCL 213.73 to 
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in excluding evidence that the posttaking rezoning was 
caused by the taking.23  MCL 213.73 provides, in pertinent 
part: 
22 The plurality concludes that the trial court erred
in admitting evidence of the posttaking rezoning and that
this error was not harmless because: (1) “the jury no doubt
believed that the fair market value of the property on the
date of the taking was to be calculated as if rezoning were
a fact,” ante at 30 (emphasis in the original), a curious
conclusion 
given 
that 
the 
trial 
court 
specifically
instructed the jury that it was to determine what the fair
market value of the property was “as of the date of taking”
and the jury was made well aware that the rezoning did not
take place until 2 1/2 years after the taking; and (2) “the
trial court sorely compounded the error by refusing to
allow 
MDOT 
to 
rebut 
the 
posttaking 
evidence 
by
demonstrating that the rezoning was directly attributable
to the condemnation itself.” 
Ante at 30. 
As explained
above, I agree with the majority that the trial court
abused its discretion in refusing to admit MDOT’s evidence.
However, I disagree with the majority that the appropriate
resolution is to remand for a new trial in which both 
defendants’ and plaintiff’s evidence is excluded. Instead,
I would remand for a new trial in which both plaintiff’s
and defendants’ evidence is admitted. 
23 The Court of Appeals majority did not address this 
issue, concluding that “[i]n light of our ruling [that the
trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of
the posttaking rezoning], we need not address whether the
trial court abused its discretion in prohibiting plaintiff
Footnotes continued on following page. 
27  
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
(1) Enhancement in value of the remainder of 
a parcel . . . shall be considered in determining
compensation for the taking. 
(2) When enhancement in value is to be 
considered 
in 
determining 
compensation, 
the 
agency shall set forth in the complaint the fact
that 
enhancement 
benefits 
are 
claimed 
and 
describe the construction proposed to be made
which will create the enhancement. 
The dissent concluded that because MDOT “did not plead in 
its complaint any benefit to defendants’ remaining property 
as a result of its construction project,” the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion “when it prevented [MDOT] from 
presenting evidence that the rezoning occurred as a result 
of its construction project . . . .” 
Slip op at 4. 
I 
respectfully disagree. 
MCL 213.73 is applicable where the 
condemning agency attempts to reduce the amount of “just 
compensation” on the basis that the condemnation actually 
increased the value of the remaining property that was not 
condemned. 
MDOT attempted to introduce evidence here that 
the rezoning was the result of the condemnation, not to 
show that defendants’ remaining property was enhanced by 
the condemnation, but to show that when the taking occurred 
there was not a “reasonable possibility” of a rezoning. In 
other words, MDOT did not contend that it should pay less 
from introducing evidence establishing that the rezoning
was caused by the condemnation.” Slip op at 3 n 3. 
28  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
for the fifty-one acres taken because the remaining 284 
acres will be worth more than before the taking. MDOT does 
not contend that “enhancement in value is to be considered 
in determining compensation.” 
MCL 213.73. 
To the 
contrary, MDOT is arguing that enhancement in value, i.e., 
the subsequent rezoning, is not to be considered in 
determining compensation. 
Therefore, in my judgment, MCL 
213.73 simply does not apply here. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Because I believe that evidence of a posttaking 
rezoning is admissible to demonstrate that a “reasonable 
possibility” of rezoning existed on the date of the taking, 
I do not believe that the trial court abused its discretion 
in admitting such evidence. However, I do believe that the 
trial court abused its discretion in prohibiting plaintiff 
from introducing evidence that the posttaking rezoning was 
caused by the taking. 
Therefore, I would vacate the 
decision of the Court of Appeals and remand this case for a 
new trial, in which defendants would be allowed to 
introduce evidence of the posttaking rezoning and plaintiff 
would be allowed to introduce evidence that this posttaking 
rezoning was the result of the taking. 
Stephen J. Markman 
29