Title: Marble Techs., Inc. v. Mallon
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 140972
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: June 4, 2015

PRESENT: All the Justices 
 
MARBLE TECHNOLOGIES, INC., ET AL. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 140972 
 
 
  JUSTICE S. BERNARD GOODWYN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    June 4, 2015 
STEPHEN M. MALLON, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HAMPTON 
Louis R. Lerner, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether an express easement 
created by a 1936 deed was stationary or moved with the 
changing mean high water line. 
Background 
 
In 1936, the Grand View Development Corporation dissolved 
and distributed most of a large tract of real estate in what is 
now the White Marsh Beach area of Hampton, Virginia, to its 
shareholders.  The deed distributing the land stated 
 
The parties to this deed take the above 
mentioned and described property subject to an 
easement on a twenty foot road as designated on the 
map recorded with this deed, which easement is to run 
with the land and from the parties hereto to their 
assigns and heirs but it is expressly stated that the 
said twenty foot road shall not become a public road, 
but merely an easement for the parties, their heirs 
or assigns to the deed. 
 
The referenced map includes two parallel lines labeled “Twenty 
Foot Road” (the easement) crossing the lots that fronted the 
Chesapeake Bay.  The map depicts “S 20-00 W” as the southern 
starting point of the easement.  Following the easement from 
south to north, a place where the easement makes a slight bend 
 
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is labelled “980.0’ S29.55W.”  Thereafter, between the parallel 
lines depicting the road is written “Along Present Mean High 
Water.”*  A “Stake” is depicted at the northern terminus of the 
easement. 
Due to changes in the sand and water levels since 1936, 
the easement, as located on the map, is now under the 
Chesapeake Bay.  Because of a dispute over whether the easement 
still exists, Stephen M. Mallon, Helen G. Mallon, Arne 
Hasselquist, Lauren Hasselquist and Grandview Islanders, LLC 
(collectively, “Mallon”), landowners of some of the properties 
conveyed by the 1936 deed, sought a declaratory judgment in the 
Circuit Court of the City of Hampton.  They claim that the 
location of the express easement moved with the mean high water 
line as the beach eroded. 
Respondents Marble Technologies, Inc. and Sebastian 
Plucinski (collectively, “Marble”) filed an answer.  They 
assert that the easement has not moved and the land where the 
                     
* The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
defines “mean high water line” as the location on the map where 
the land meets the average “maximum height reached by a rising 
tide” over the “specific 19-year period adopted by the National 
Ocean Services as the official time segment over which tide 
observations are taken.”  United States Department of Commerce, 
Tide and Current Glossary 11, 15, 17 (2000), available at 
http://tidesandcurrents.noaa.gov/publications/glossary2.pdf 
(last visited June 2, 2015). 
 
 
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easement was located is now on the bottom of the Chesapeake 
Bay, resulting in extinguishment of the easement. 
 
The circuit court granted several opportunities for the 
addition of new parties.  On November 30, 2012, upon joint 
motion of the parties, the court ordered that the style of the 
case be amended to add additional parties who had an interest 
in the suit.  On March 12, 2013, the court granted Marble's 
motion for leave to add additional defendants to its 
counterclaim, cross-claim and third party complaint.  On April 
3, 2013, despite objection by Mallon, the circuit court granted 
Marble's motion for a continuance of the trial to add necessary 
parties. 
Although the amended complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim 
and third party complaint include more than forty individuals 
and entities as parties and no additional parties were added 
after the April 3, 2013 continuance, approximately six months 
later, Marble asked for another continuance of the trial so 
that necessary parties could be added.  The court denied the 
request for a continuance and proceeded with the trial on 
October 30, 2013.  Prior to trial, the parties stipulated that 
not all of the successors-in-title of the properties conveyed 
in the deed were parties to this action. 
 
At trial, the circuit court considered the issue of 
whether the express terms of the easement were such that the 
 
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easement moved with the changing coastline.  The court held 
that the deed and map were ambiguous and considered parol 
evidence to ascertain the intent of parties to the deed and 
map.  The parties presented conflicting expert testimony on 
whether the map’s drafter intended to have the easement remain 
stationary or move with the changing coastline. 
The circuit court ruled that Mallon has a variable express 
easement that moves with the mean high water line.  Marble 
appeals. 
Marble assigns error as follows: 
1.  The lower court erred in holding a trial and 
entering a final order without first joining as 
necessary parties all the landowners that would be 
affected by any declaratory judgment rendered. 
 
2.  The lower court erred in holding that the 
twenty foot easement on the road established in 1936 
was not extinguished by the subsequent erosion of the 
shoreline. 
 
3.  The lower court erred in finding the 
relevant deed and plat ambiguous and in allowing 
Plaintiffs’ expert to offer parole [sic] evidence 
regarding the intent of the drafters of those 
documents. 
 
Analysis 
 
Marble argues that the circuit court erred by failing to 
join all necessary parties and rendering final judgment when 
all parties who owned property that was part of the 1936 
conveyance were not before the court.  Mallon argues that the 
 
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circuit court did not err in deciding the case without adding 
additional parties. 
Concerning the issue of necessary parties, we have stated 
that “‘[a]ll persons interested in the subject matter of a suit 
and to be affected by its results are necessary parties.’”  
Michael E. Siska Revocable Trust v. Milestone Dev., LLC, 282 
Va. 169, 173, 715 S.E.2d 21, 23 (2011) (quoting Bonsal v. Camp, 
111 Va. 595, 598, 69 S.E. 978, 979 (1911)).  Generally, a court 
should only decide a case on its merits if all necessary 
parties are before it.  Id. at 173-81, 715 S.E.2d at 23-27.  
However, the necessary party doctrine does not implicate 
subject matter jurisdiction.  Id. at 176-81, 715 S.E.2d at 25-
27.  As relates to necessary parties, a circuit court has 
discretion to take steps to correct defects and to decide 
whether to exercise its discretion to permit the case to 
continue with the existing parties.  Id.  We review a circuit 
court’s decision to allow a matter to proceed without necessary 
parties for an abuse of discretion.  Id. 
A court can choose to proceed without a necessary party if 
(1) it is “practically impossible” to join a necessary party 
and the missing party is represented by other parties who have 
the same interests; (2) the missing party’s interests are 
separable from those of the present parties, so the court can 
rule without prejudicing the missing party; or (3) a necessary 
 
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party cannot be made a party, but the court determines that the 
party is not indispensable.  Id. at 176, 179-80, 715 S.E.2d at 
25, 27 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Rule 
3:12(c).  With the numerous and varied parties added to the 
action, the multiple opportunities the court provided the 
litigants to add parties and no claim that any of the allegedly 
missing parties were indispensable, we conclude that the 
circuit court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the case 
to proceed to trial with the parties it had before it. 
Marble contends that the deed and map unambiguously 
designated the easement as existing at a specific location and 
that the easement has not moved with the erosion of the land.  
Moreover, Marble claims that because the deed and map 
unambiguously dictated that the easement was stationary, the 
circuit court erred in considering parol evidence. 
Mallon asserts that the court correctly allowed parol 
evidence to interpret the deed and map because the map is 
ambiguous about whether the easement moves with the mean high 
water line.  They claim that the easement has moved over time 
to follow the changing mean high water line. 
We review de novo a circuit court’s interpretation of 
words in a deed.  Beeren & Barry Invs., LLC v. AHC, Inc., 277 
Va. 32, 37, 671 S.E.2d 147, 150 (2009).  If the language in a 
deed creating an easement is unambiguous, courts should 
 
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interpret the deed solely based on the deed’s language.  
Pyramid Dev., L.L.C. v. D&J Assocs., 262 Va. 750, 754, 553 
S.E.2d 725, 728 (2001).  “Only when the language is ambiguous 
may a court look to parol evidence, or specifically, to the 
language employed in light of the circumstances surrounding the 
parties and the land at the time the deed was executed” in 
order to discern the parties’ intent.  Id. (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
In this case, the deed stated that the property recipients 
took their property “subject to an easement on a twenty foot 
road as designated on the map recorded with this deed.”  The 
accompanying map depicts “S 20-00 W” as the southern end of the 
easement.  Additionally, it denotes a point where the easement 
makes a slight bend as “980.0’ S29.55W.”  It designates the 
easement as running “Along Present Mean High Water.”  The map 
notes the location of a “Stake” at the northern end of the 
designated “Twenty Foot Road.” 
Mallon claims that the designation “Along Present Mean 
High Water” means that the location of the express easement 
moves with the movement of the mean high water line.  We must 
discern the meaning of “present.”  Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary defines “present” as “now existing or 
in progress: begun but not ended: now being in view, being 
dealt with, or being under consideration: being at this time:  
 
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not past or future: contemporary.”  Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 1793 (1993); see also Black’s Law 
Dictionary 1374 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “present” as “now 
existing; at hand”). 
The map depicts the easement as existing “Along Present 
Mean High Water,” meaning the line as it existed in 1936 when 
the map was created.  (Emphasis added.)  This is confirmed by 
the fact that the map utilizes metes and bounds and a 
stationary marker to show the easement’s location.  Thus, we 
hold that the map is unambiguous regarding the location of the 
easement.  The metes and bounds descriptions and the stationary 
markers dispel any claim of ambiguity.  Nothing on the map or 
in the deed indicates that the easement was to move with the 
changing coastline.  Compare Lipke v. Windy Gates, LLC, 20 LCR 
440, 448 (Mass. Land Ct. 2012) (finding beach access easements 
were not extinguished because the easements were described in 
“non-specific terms of the sort that can readily accommodate a 
changing seashore” (emphasis added)), aff'd, 85 Mass. App. 
Unpub. LEXIS 254, at *11 (2014) (“[A]s the Land Court judge 
describes, the easements were granted using nonspecific terms, 
which accommodate a changing landscape.” (emphases added)), 
with Bubis v. Kassin, 733 A.2d 1232, 1234, 1239 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1999) (indicating that an express private 
easement over a “certain strip of land . . . as shown on [a] 
 
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Map . . . and described as follows:  Bounded on [all sides]” 
did not move inland with the mean high water line despite the 
fact that the mean high water line completely eclipsed the 
encumbered strip of land (emphases added)); see also Tysen v. 
Cedar Grove Beach Corp., 188 N.Y.S. 361, 363 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1921) (“[T]he washing away of the original locus in quo by 
erosion would seem to make the alleged easement . . . very 
doubtful and shadowy.”). 
Because the deed and map are unambiguous, there was no 
need for the circuit court to review evidence beyond the 
documents themselves to interpret them.  Therefore, the circuit 
court erred in considering parol evidence. 
The easement never moved from the mean high water line as 
it existed in 1936.  The beach has eroded in the meantime, and 
the land where the easement was once located is now under the 
Chesapeake Bay and cannot serve as a road.  Thus, the express 
easement has been extinguished.  See Corbett v. Ruben, 223 Va. 
468, 472, 290 S.E.2d 847, 849 (1982) (holding that courts may 
presume an easement by grant without a term “was intended to be 
terminated when the purpose for which it was created can no 
longer be served”); McCreery v. Chesapeake Corp., 220 Va. 227, 
233, 257 S.E.2d 828, 831 (1979) (easement was extinguished by 
cessation of the purpose for which it was granted); Hudson v. 
American Oil Co., 152 F. Supp. 757, 765 (E.D. Va. 1957), aff’d 
 
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on other grounds, 253 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1958) (stating that an 
easement can be extinguished by an Act of God); see generally 
Code §§ 28.2-1200; 28.2-1202 (dictating that in most 
circumstances, when land is below a bay’s mean low-water mark 
and thus is on the bed of that bay, it is property of the 
Commonwealth). 
Conclusion 
Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we reverse the 
judgment of the circuit court and hold that the express 
easement created by the 1936 deed has been extinguished. 
Reversed and final judgment.