Title: Brown v. Jolley
Citation: 387 P.2d 278
Docket Number: 20106
State: Colorado
Issuer: Colorado Supreme Court
Date: November 26, 1963

387 P.2d 278 (1963) Brinkley B. BROWN, Malcolm C. Jolley, Henry Jolley, and Mabel Jolley, Plaintiffs in Error, v. Malcolm JOLLEY, Defendant in Error. No. 20106. Supreme Court of Colorado, In Department. November 26, 1963. Rehearing Denied December 16, 1963. Frank Delaney, Glenwood Springs, for plaintiffs in error. Wm. Atha Mason, Rifle, for defendant in error. MOORE, Justice. Malcolm Jolley, to whom we will refer as the plaintiff, commenced an action in the district court of Garfield county against Brinkley B. Brown in which he sought to enjoin the latter from interfering in the use and enjoyment by plaintiff of a road across lands of Brown. Said plaintiff in another action sought the same relief as against Malcolm C. Jolley, Henry Jolley, and Mabel Jolley, who also owned land which was traversed by the extension of the same road involved in the case first above mentioned. The parties will be referred to as they appeared in the trial court. The rights asserted by plaintiff in each of said cases were based upon the same set of facts, and in large measure the several defendants depended upon identical facts as justification for their conduct. The two cases were accordingly consolidated for trial. The trial court resolved the issues against all of the defendants, and they are here on one writ of error seeking reversal of the judgment granting the injunctive relief prayed for by plaintiff. Each complaint filed by plaintiff in said actions contains five separate claims. It is alleged by him that: (1) He is the owner of an easement over and across the lands of defendants; (2) that the roadway in dispute is a public highway as provided in, *279 C.R.S. `53, 120-1-1(1), that the road as it extends across the lands of Brown was dedicated to the public use by deed dated and recorded in 1920, and that said dedication was accepted by the county commissioners and the public, and that plaintiff, his predecessors in interest, and the public have continuously used said road for more than thirty years and that the defendants commencing in 1957 have interfered with the use of said highway by plaintiff; (3) that the roadway has never been "vacated" by the county commissioners; (4) that the road has been improved and maintained by the county; and (5) that said road was used by the plaintiff and his predecessors in interest and by the public before patent issued to the lands owned by defendants and said roadway was established while said lands were a part of the public domain. The defendants admitted ownership of the lands across which the road passed, but denied the allegations upon which plaintiff based his claim for injunctive relief. Various counterclaims were asserted by the defendants which were disposed of by the judgment entered by the trial court. This writ of error does not involve the countercalims or the judgment of the trial court entered with respect thereto, and they will not be mentioned further. The issues were tried to the court and nine days were consumed in the trial. The court entered detailed Findings of Fact from which we quote the following: The Conclusions of Law entered by the trial court contains the following: As grounds for reversal of the judgment it is argued, inter alia, that: 1. The trial court erred in holding that a public road had been established. 2. The trial court erred in receiving evidence of a proceeding before the Board of County Commissioners concerning an attempt to establish a road under a statute then in existence. Said proceedings were commenced in 1918 and concluded in 1920. It is argued that these proceedings were undertaken under the provisions of Sections 44 to 52, chapter 143, C.S.A.1935, (all of which was repealed by an act of the legislature in 1953.) The argument is that full compliance with the said sections was not shown by the evidence, by reason of which the entire proceeding was a nullity, and that no public road could be established across lands of the defendants unless full compliance with said statutes was shown. *281 Several other assignments of error are urged which, in essence, amount to an argument that there was insufficient evidence to sustain particular findings of fact made by the trial court, and that the conclusion of law that a public road had been established, was erroneous. Addressing ourselves to the second assignment above mentioned, we cannot agree with counsel for defendants in his contention that the exclusive method of establishing the road in dispute as a public highway was to affirmatively show full compliance with the above mentioned statute. Even prior to the repeal of the statutes relied upon by defendants, public highways and easements over public and private lands for highway purposes were created by other means. The trial court did not base its judgment upon the assumption that said statutes had been complied with, or upon the conclusion that they controlled the question of whether a public road had been established. The proceedings before the county commissioners as shown by the existing records were properly before the trial court for consideration in determining the location of the road as related to a user thereof by the public. They were proper for consideration as they tended to corroborate or dispute the testimony of witnesses who appeared. The record before us is composed of three large bound volumes. It is made up of 1862 folios, all of which we have read and carefully considered as related to pertinent findings of the trial court. It is sufficient to say that there is ample evidence to support them and we will not set aside findings of fact which have substantial evidentiary support. An Act of Congress, U.S.C.A. Title 43, Sec. 932, provides: The creation of a highway over public lands and use thereof by the public is an acceptance of the congressional grant. Estes Park Toll Road Co. v. Edwards, 3 Colo. App. 74, 32 P. 549; Sprague v. Stead, 56 Colo. 538, 139 P. 544. With reference to the Act of Congress hereinabove quoted this court, in Leach v. Manhart, 102 Colo. 129, 77 P.2d 652, said: "The premises considered, we think a statute of the United States enacted in 1866, Rev.St. § 2477, U.S.Comp.Stat. 1916, § 4919, Title 43, U.S.C.A. § 932, reading as follows: `The right of way for the construction of highways over public lands, not reserved for public uses, is hereby granted,' is controlling. We have had occasion to consider that statute in varying situations. See Sprague v. Stead, 56 Colo. 538, 139 P. 544; Greiner v. Board of County Commissioners, 64 Colo. 584, 173 P. 719; Dunbar v. Kohler, 66 Colo. 272, 180 P. 739; Nicolas v. Grassle, 83 Colo. 536, 267 P. 196, 197; Korf v. Itten, 64 Colo. 3, 169 P. 148. The sum of our holdings is that the statute is an express dedication of a right of way for roads over unappropriated government lands, acceptance of which by the public results from `use by those for whom it was necessary or convenient.' It is not required that `work' shall be done on such a road, or that public authorities shall take action in the premises. User is the requisite element, and it may be by any who have occasion to travel over public lands, and if the use be by only one, still it suffices. `A road may be a highway though it reaches but one property owner. 29 C.J. 367. He has a right to access to other roads and the public has a right of access to him. Pagels v. Oaks, 64 Iowa 198, 19 N.W. 905, 907. Its character is not determined by the fact that but few persons use it.' Mr. Chief Justice Denison, speaking for the court in Nicolas v. Grassle, supra. But, it seems, where before the time when a *282 board of county commissioners, proceeding under '35 C.S.A. c. 143, § 44, C.L.1921, § 1290, has declared a section line to be a public highway, the lands involved have been entered as homesteads, subsequent relinquishment of the entries does not operate to make effective the county board's declaration. Korf v. Itten, supra." In the instant case when the road in dispute was first established, most of the lands presently owned by defendants were a part of the public domain. C.R.S.1953, 120-1-1, contains the following pertinent language: "The following are hereby declared to be public highways: * * * The opinion of this court in Martino v. Board of County Commissioners, 146 Colo. 143, 360 P.2d 804, contains a reference to numerous decisions bearing upon the issues here involved. The principles applied in that case are equally applicable here. In Town of Silver Plume v. Hudson, 151 Colo. ___, 380 P.2d 59, we find: In the instant case the court did not err in decreeing that the road was a "public highway" as that term is defined by C.R.S. '53, 120-1-1. The judgment is affirmed. FRANTZ, C. J., and PRINGLE, J., concur.