Title: PEOPLE OF MI V GLENN GOLDSTON
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 122364
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: July 15, 2004

_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice  
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
Opinion 
FILED JULY 15, 2004 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v 
No. 122364 
GLENN GOLDSTON, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
CORRIGAN, C.J.   
In this case, we must determine whether to recognize a 
“good-faith” exception to the exclusionary rule. In United 
States v Leon, 468 US 897; 104 S Ct 3405; 82 L Ed 2d 677 
(1984), the United States Supreme Court interpreted US 
Const, Am IV and adopted a good-faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule as a remedy for unreasonable searches and 
seizures. 
Under Leon, the exclusionary rule does not bar 
the admission of evidence seized in reasonable, good-faith 
reliance on a search warrant ultimately found to have been 
defective. 
The exclusionary rule in Michigan is a 
judicially created remedy that is not based on the text of 
 
 
 
 
 
our constitutional search and seizure provision, Const 
1963, art 1, § 11. 
Indeed, records of the 1961 
Constitutional Convention evidence an intent on behalf of 
the people of Michigan to retreat from the judge-made 
exclusionary rule consistent with the United States Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in Leon. We 
therefore 
adopt 
the 
good-faith 
exception 
to 
the 
exclusionary rule in Michigan. 
The purpose of the 
exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct. 
That 
purpose would not be 
furthered by excluding evidence that 
the police recovered in objective, good-faith reliance on a 
search warrant. We thus reverse the circuit court’s ruling 
suppressing the evidence seized pursuant to the defective 
warrant in this case. 
I. UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On September 23, 2001, twelve days after the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001, police officers observed 
defendant collecting money on a street corner. 
He was 
wearing a shirt with the word “Fireman” written on it and 
holding a fireman’s boot. 
He also carried a firefighter’s 
helmet and jacket. Defendant told a police officer that he 
was collecting money for the firefighters in New York, but 
denied 
being 
a 
firefighter 
himself. 
The 
officers 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
confiscated $238 from defendant along with the firefighter 
paraphernalia, but did not immediately arrest him. 
Thereafter, the officers successfully sought a search 
warrant for defendant’s home. 
The warrant listed the 
address as “29440 Hazelwood, Inkster” and authorized the 
police to seize the following items: 
Police/Fire scanner(s) or radios, fire, EMS,
Police 
equipment. 
Any 
and 
all 
emergency
equipment, bank accounts, currency, donation type
cans or containers, any and all other illegal
contraband. 
The search uncovered more firefighter paraphernalia, a 
firearm, and marijuana. 
The prosecutor charged defendant 
with being a felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 
750.224f; possession of a firearm during the attempt or 
commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; two counts of 
possession of marijuana, MCL 333.7403(2)(d); and larceny by 
false pretenses, MCL 750.218. 
Defendant 
filed 
a 
motion 
to 
suppress 
evidence, 
asserting both federal and state grounds, US Const, Am IV; 
Const 1963, art 1, § 11, which the circuit court granted. 
The court ruled that the search warrant affidavit did not 
connect the place to be searched with defendant and did not 
state 
the 
date 
that 
the 
police 
observed 
defendant 
soliciting money. 
The court thus concluded that the 
affidavit did not establish probable cause for the issuance 
3  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
of a warrant and dismissed the felon in possession, felony­
firearm, and marijuana possession charges.1 
The Court of Appeals denied the prosecutor’s delayed 
application for leave to appeal. 
Thereafter, we granted 
leave to appeal, limited to the issue whether this Court 
should adopt a good-faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule.2 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether 
Michigan 
should 
recognize 
a 
good-faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule is a question of law 
that this Court reviews de novo. 
People v Gonzalez, 468 
Mich 636, 641; 664 NW2d 159 (2003). 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. The federal good-faith exception 
In Weeks v United States, 232 US 383; 34 S Ct 341; 58 
L Ed 2d 652 (1914), the United States Supreme Court held 
that, in a federal prosecution, the Fourth Amendment barred 
the use of evidence obtained pursuant to an illegal search 
or seizure. The Court reasoned: 
If letters and private documents can thus be
[illegally] seized and held and used in evidence 
1 The court did not dismiss the misdemeanor charge of
larceny by false pretenses. 
2 467 Mich 939 (2003). 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
against a citizen accused of an offense, the
protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his
right to be secure against such searches and
seizures is of no value, and, so far as those
thus placed are concerned, might as well be 
stricken from the Constitution. [Id. at 393.] 
In Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643; 81 S Ct 1684; 6 L Ed 2d 
1081 (1961), the United States Supreme Court extended the 
Weeks exclusionary rule to the states. 
The Court reasoned 
that because the Fourth Amendment right is enforceable 
against the states by virtue of the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the same sanction, i.e., the 
exclusion of illegally obtained evidence, must apply to 
state prosecutions as well as to federal prosecutions. Id. 
at 655, 660. 
In Leon, the Supreme Court adopted a good-faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule. 
In that case, the 
Court rejected the notion that “the exclusionary rule is a 
necessary corollary of the Fourth Amendment.” 
Leon, supra 
at 905-906. The Court stated that the exclusionary rule is 
not derived from the text of the Fourth Amendment: 
The Fourth Amendment contains no provision
expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained
in violation of its commands, and an examination
of its origin and purposes makes clear that the
use of fruits of a past unlawful search or 
seizure “[works] no new Fourth Amendment wrong.”
United States v Calandra, 414 US 338, 354 [94 S
Ct 613; 38 L Ed 2d 561] (1974). 
The wrong
condemned 
by 
the 
Amendment 
is 
“fully
accomplished” by the unlawful search or seizure 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
itself, ibid., and the exclusionary rule is 
neither intended nor able to “cure the invasion 
of the defendant’s rights which he has already 
suffered.” 
Stone v Powell, [428 US 465, 540; 96
S Ct 3037; 49 L Ed 2d 1067 (1976)] (WHITE, J.,
dissenting). 
The rule thus operates as “a 
judicially created remedy designed to safeguard
Fourth Amendment rights generally through its 
deterrent 
effect, 
rather 
than 
a 
personal
constitutional right of the party aggrieved.” 
United States v Calandra, supra at 348. 
[Id. at 
906.] 
The Court clarified that whether the exclusion of evidence 
is an appropriate sanction in a particular case is a 
separate issue from whether police misconduct violated a 
person’s Fourth Amendment rights. The Court further stated 
that whether invocation of the “judicially created remedy” 
is appropriate involves weighing the costs and benefits in 
each particular case. Id. at 906-907. The primary benefit 
of the exclusionary rule is that it deters official 
misconduct by removing incentives to engage in unreasonable 
searches and seizures. 
The costs, however, include 
preventing the use in the prosecutor’s case-in-chief of 
trustworthy evidence obtained in reliance on a search 
warrant subsequently found to be defective. Id. 
The Court expressed concern that rigid adherence to 
the exclusionary rule, particularly when law enforcement 
officers act in good faith or when their transgressions are 
minor, “offends basic concepts of the criminal justice 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
system” 
and 
breeds 
contempt 
for 
the 
law 
and 
the 
administration of justice. 
Id. at 907-908. 
Thus, the 
Court recognized the potential for the exclusionary rule to 
impede 
the 
truth-seeking 
function 
of 
the 
judiciary, 
resulting in guilty parties either evading punishment 
altogether or receiving favorable plea bargains. The Court 
concluded that “the marginal or nonexistent benefits 
produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively 
reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search 
warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion.” 
Id. at 922. 
Central to the Court’s reasoning was the exclusionary 
rule’s purpose of deterring police misconduct. 
The Court 
opined that no deterrence occurs when police reasonably 
rely on a warrant later found to be deficient. Id. at 916­
919. 
In short, where the officer’s conduct is
objectively reasonable, “excluding the evidence
will not further the ends of the exclusionary
rule in any appreciable way; for it is painfully
apparent that . . . the officer is acting as a
reasonable officer would and should act in 
similar circumstances. 
Excluding the evidence
can in no way affect his future conduct unless it
is to make him less willing to do his duty.”
[Id. at 919-920, quoting Stone, supra at 539-540 
(White, J., dissenting).] 
The Court stated that this is particularly true when a law 
enforcement officer acts within the scope of, and in 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
objective, 
good-faith 
reliance 
on, 
a 
search 
warrant 
obtained from a judge or magistrate. 
Excluding the 
evidence recovered in such cases would have no deterrent 
effect on the officer. Id. at 920-921. 
The Court rejected the notion that a purpose of the 
exclusionary rule is to rectify the errors of judges and 
magistrates. It stated that no evidence exists that judges 
and magistrates are inclined to ignore the Fourth Amendment 
or that the extreme sanction of exclusion is necessary for 
“lawlessness” among judges and magistrates. 
Id. at 916. 
The Court could discern no basis for believing that 
exclusion of evidence would have a significant deterrent 
effect on an issuing judge or magistrate because they are 
not “adjuncts to the law enforcement team.” Id. at 917. 
The Court concluded that the exclusionary rule should 
be employed on a case-by-case basis and only where 
exclusion would further the purpose of deterring police 
misconduct. 
The Court emphasized, however, that a police 
officer’s 
reliance 
on 
a 
magistrate’s 
probable 
cause 
determination and on the technical sufficiency of a warrant 
must be objectively reasonable. 
Evidence should also be 
suppressed if the issuing magistrate or judge is misled by 
information in the affidavit that the affiant either knew 
was false or would have known was false except for his 
8  
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
 
reckless disregard of the truth. Further, the Court stated 
that the good-faith exception does not apply where the 
magistrate wholly abandons his judicial role or where an 
officer relies on a warrant based on an affidavit “‘so 
lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official 
belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.’”3 
Id. at 
923, quoting Brown v Illinois, 422 US 590, 610; 95 S Ct 
2254; 45 L Ed 2d 416 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in 
part). 
B. The exclusionary rule in Michigan 
Five years after the United States Supreme Court 
issued its opinion in Weeks, this Court decided People v 
Marxhausen, 204 Mich 559; 171 NW 557 (1919). 
In 
Marxhausen, this Court examined the language of Michigan’s 
then-existing search and seizure provision, Const 1908, art 
2, § 10: 
The person, houses, papers and possessions
of every person shall be secure from unreasonable
searches and seizures. 
No warrant to search any
place or to seize any person or things shall 
3 In Arizona v Evans, 514 US 1, 14-16; 115 S Ct 1185;
131 L Ed 2d 34 (1995), the Supreme Court followed Leon and 
held that a court employee’s clerical error did not warrant
the exclusion of evidence. 
Such a remedy would not have
deterred future errors by court personnel or the behavior
of the arresting officer who reasonably relied on the
erroneous computer record. 
9  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
issue 
without 
describing 
them, 
nor 
without 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation. 
This Court stated that the above provision was “in effect 
the same provision found in the Fourth Amendment to the 
Federal Constitution.”4 
Marxhausen, supra at 562. 
This 
Court then reviewed federal case law, including Weeks, and 
concluded 
that 
Michigan 
would 
follow 
the 
federal 
exclusionary rule. 
Id. at 568-574. 
Thus, long before the 
Mapp Court required the states to follow the Weeks 
exclusionary rule, this Court elected 
to follow the 
exclusionary rule in Michigan. 
This Court did not, 
however, base its decision on the language of the Michigan 
Constitution. 
In fact, nowhere in Marxhausen did this 
Court opine that the language of our Constitution required 
the exclusion of evidence seized in violation of our 
constitutional provisions. 
Rather, the Marxhausen Court 
followed the exclusionary rule as a matter of policy 
4 US Const, Am IV provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in
their 
persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon 
probable 
cause, 
supported 
by 
Oath 
or 
affirmation, 
and 
particularly 
describing 
the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized. 
10  
 
 
                                                 
 
preference in favor of the federal law.5  Thus, similar to 
the Weeks exclusionary rule, our exclusionary rule in 
Michigan is purely a common-law, judge-made rule. 
Notwithstanding the Leon Court’s adoption of the 
federal good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, to 
date, this Court has not recognized a similar state 
exception. 
The United States Supreme Court has stated, 
5 In this vein, the Marxhausen Court stated: 
An examination of many cases decided by the
United States Supreme Court involving both the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments satisfies us that the 
rule announced by that court will be reached by
careful consideration of three cases decided by
that court, and only three; that by a careful
consideration of these three cases we will be 
able to clearly understand the rule laid down by
that, the court of last resort of the nation, and
the reason for the rule. 
These cases are Boyd v
United States, 116 US 616 (6 Sup Ct 524 [29 L Ed
746 (1886)]); Adams v New York, 192 US 585 (24
Sup Ct 372 [48 L Ed 575 1904)]); and Weeks 
[supra]. 
* * * 
We are impressed, however, that a careful
consideration of the Boyd Case in connection with 
the Adams Case and the decisions of the State 
courts, some of which are cited above, but many
of which are not, taken in the light of what was
said by the court in the Weeks Case, demonstrates
that in the main the United States Supreme Court
and the courts of last resort of the various 
States are in accord, and that the Boyd Case does 
not conflict, as its critics claim, with the
holdings of the many State courts. 
[Marxhausen, 
supra at 568, 571.] 
11  
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
 
 
however, that the states are free to impose higher 
standards 
on 
searches 
and 
seizures 
than 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment requires. Cooper v California, 386 US 58, 62; 87 
S Ct 788; 17 L Ed 2d 730 (1967). Thus, the question arises 
whether Const 1963, art 1, § 116 provides more search and 
seizure protection than does its federal counterpart. 
In interpreting our Constitution, we are not bound by 
the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
United States Constitution, even where the language is 
identical.7 
Harvey v Michigan, 469 Mich 1, 6 n 3; 664 NW2d 
767 (2003). 
Conversely, we are free to interpret our 
Constitution consistent with the United States Supreme 
6 Const 1963, art 1, § 11 provides: 
The person, houses, papers and possessions
of every person shall be secure from unreasonable
searches and seizures. 
No warrant to search any
place or to seize any person or things shall
issue 
without 
describing 
them, 
nor 
without 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation.
The provisions of this section shall not be 
construed to bar from evidence in any criminal
proceeding any narcotic drug, firearm, bomb,
explosive or any other dangerous weapon, seized
by a peace officer outside the curtilage of any
dwelling house in this state. 
7 
It is not necessary that the wording of our 
Constitution be different from that of the United States 
Constitution, however, in order for this Court to interpret
our Constitution different from the United States Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the United States Constitution.
People v Smith, 420 Mich 1, 7 n 2; 360 NW2d 841 (1984). 
12  
 
 
 
 
Court’s interpretation of the United States Constitution 
unless a compelling reason precludes us from doing so. 
As 
this Court stated in Sitz v Dep’t of State Police, 443 Mich 
744, 758; 506 NW2d 209 (1993), however, a “‘compelling 
reason’ 
should 
not 
be 
understood 
as 
establishing 
a 
conclusive 
presumption 
artificially 
linking 
state 
constitutional interpretation to federal law.” 
Rather, we 
must determine what law “‘the people have made.’” 
Id. at 
759, citing People v Harding, 53 Mich 481, 485; 19 NW 155 
(1884). 
The following factors are relevant in determining 
whether a compelling reason exists to interpret the 
Michigan Constitution and the United States Constitution 
differently: 
1) [T]he textual language of the state 
constitution, 2) significant textual differences
between 
parallel 
provisions 
of 
the 
two 
constitutions, 
3) 
state 
constitutional 
and 
common-law history, 4) state law preёxisting
adoption 
of 
the 
relevant 
constitutional 
provision, 5) structural differences between the
state and federal constitutions, and 6) matters
of peculiar state or local interest. 
[People v 
Collins, 438 Mich 8, 31 n 39; 475 NW2d 684
(1991).] 
The above factors are also helpful in determining the 
intent 
of 
the 
ratifiers 
with 
respect 
to 
our 
state 
constitutional provisions. 
In People v Nash, 418 Mich 196; 341 NW2d 439 (1983) 
(opinion 
by 
BRICKLEY, 
J.), 
this 
Court 
examined 
the 
13  
 
 
  
 
                                                 
 
 
circumstances surrounding the creation of Const 1963, art 
1, § 11 to determine whether the provision provided a 
higher degree of search and seizure protection than the 
Fourth Amendment. 
See also Sitz, supra at 752-757. 
In 
Nash, this Court stated: 
The focus of the Michigan Constitutional 
Convention of 1961 was on the effect of Mapp on 
the third sentence of Const 1908, art 2, § 10.[8] 
The Committee on Declaration of Rights, Suffrage,
and Elections proposed that the final sentence of
Const 1908, art 2, § 10 be deleted in favor of
the phrase “Evidence obtained in violation of
this 
section 
shall 
not 
be 
used 
except 
as 
authorized by law.” 
The committee reasoned that 
the broad holding of Mapp may have invalidated
the final sentence of Const 1908, art 2, § 10.
The merits of that sentence were also considered 
by the committee. The committee added the phrase
“except as authorized by law” because: 
8 Const 1908, art 2, § 10 was the predecessor of Const 
1963, art 1, § 11 and was “in effect the same provision 
found in the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.” 
Marxhausen, supra at 562. 
In 1936, the people ratified an
amendment of Const 1908, art 2, § 10 that added a third 
sentence commonly referred to as the “antiexclusionary
clause.” Sitz, supra at 753. That clause stated: 
Provided, however, That the provisions of
this section shall not be construed to bar from 
evidence in any court of criminal jurisdiction,
or in any criminal proceeding held before any
magistrate or justice of the peace, any firearm,
rifle, 
pistol, 
revolver, 
automatic 
pistol,
machine 
gun, 
bomb, 
bomb 
shell, 
explosive,
blackjack, slungshot, billy, metallic knuckles,
gas-ejecting 
device, 
or 
any 
other 
dangerous
weapon or thing, seized by any peace officer
outside the curtilage of any dwelling house in
the state. [Id. at 753-754.] 
14  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Should the definition of the federal limits 
imposed on the States with respect to the 
admissibility of evidence change in the future,
the Michigan Legislature and the Michigan courts
could 
incorporate, 
in 
statute 
and 
court 
decisions, those rules with respect to the 
admissibility 
of 
evidence 
which 
reflect 
the 
opinion of the Legislature and the Michigan
courts as to what ought to constitute sound 
practice in this State, subject only to the 
continuing recognition of the limits set by
federal constitutional supremacy.” 
Committee 
Proposals and Reports, Constitutional Convention
1961, Supporting Report, Committee Proposal No
15, pp 7, 10. 
It therefore appears that the committee was 
attempting to allow for the possibility of a less
stringent application of the exclusionary rule if
allowed by federal law, rather than attempting to
strengthen 
Michigan 
search 
and 
seizure 
protection. 
The debates of the committee of the whole at 
the convention considered both the merits of, and
the effect of Mapp on, Const 1908, art 2, § 10.
See 1 Official Record, Constitutional Convention
1961, pp 464-484, 488-533, 674-688. 
The view 
that Mapp was limited to searches of dwellings
and that a limitation on the exclusionary rule 
was proper on the merits carried the day.
Attempts to unite Michigan and United States 
search and seizure law by adopting the exact
language of the Fourth Amendment in the proposed
Michigan Constitution were defeated. 
Instead,
the anti-exclusionary-rule proviso of Const 1908,
art 2, § 10 was amended back in to the proposed
constitution. 
1 Official Record, Constitutional
Convention 
1961, 
pp 
531-688. 
Ultimately,
language substantially similar to that of Const
1908, art 2, § 10, as amended, was adopted by the
convention and recommended to the people. 
The 
convention’s 
address 
to 
the 
people
stated that proposed Const 1963, art 1, § 11 was
“No change from Sec. 10, Article II, of the 
15  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
present constitution except for improvement in
phraseology.” 
2 Official Record, Constitutional
Convention 1961, pp 3364. 
Indeed, the common
understanding of the people upon reading the 
proposed 
constitutional 
provision 
could 
be 
nothing but the belief that the search and 
seizure 
provision 
of 
the 
new 
constitution 
represented no change. 
There had been no 
substantive alterations. 
There is no indication 
that in readopting the language of Const 1908, 
art 2, § 10 in Const 1963, art 1, § 11 the people
of this state wished to place restrictions on law
enforcement 
activities 
greater 
than 
those 
required by the federal constitution. 
In fact, 
the contrary intent is expressed. 
[Nash, supra
at 211-213; quoted also at Sitz, supra at 754-756 
(emphasis added).] 
The Nash Court concluded: 
Though the people of the State of Michigan
have corrected this Court when they have believed
it to have gone too far, the historical general
power 
of 
this 
Court 
to 
construe 
the 
constitutional provision relating to searches and
seizures has not been removed. 
The history of
Const 1963, art 1, § 11, and its plain import,
however, suggest that its further expansion, with
the concomitant expansion of the exclusionary
rule to enforce it, should occur only when there
is a compelling reason to do so. [Nash, supra at 
214.] 
Thus, 
it 
is 
clear 
from 
the 
records 
of 
the 
constitutional convention that the people favored less 
stringent search and seizure protections than required 
under the Fourth Amendment at that time. 
Approval of the 
antiexclusionary clause evidenced the people’s intent to 
move away from the exclusionary rule of Marxhausen and Mapp 
16  
 
 
 
 
 
as a matter of state constitutional law and to restrict 
application of the judicially created remedy. 
The text of Const 1963, art 1, § 11 itself is 
consistent with the above conclusion that the people 
intended to retreat from the exclusionary rule. 
Const 
1963, art 1, § 11 provides: 
The person, houses, papers and possessions
of every person shall be secure from unreasonable
searches and seizures. 
No warrant to search any
place or to seize any person or things shall
issue 
without 
describing 
them, 
nor 
without 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation.
The provisions of this section shall not be 
construed to bar from evidence in any criminal
proceeding any narcotic drug, firearm, bomb,
explosive or any other dangerous weapon, seized
by a peace officer outside the curtilage of any
dwelling house in this state. 
The antiexclusionary clause, i.e., the last sentence quoted 
above, precludes this Court from excluding from evidence 
any of the enumerated items. 
This clause does not 
constrain this Court’s authority regarding items not 
specifically enumerated in the provision. 
In other words, 
the directive of the people that this Court may not exclude 
certain evidence does not require the exclusion of all 
other evidence. 
The antiexclusionary proviso should be 
viewed not as a ratification of the common-law exclusionary 
rule regarding items enumerated in the proviso, but, 
rather, as a restriction on this Court’s authority to apply 
17  
 
 
 
 
 
the judge-made rule to those enumerated items. 
Because 
the proviso does not restrict this Court’s authority 
regarding evidence not enumerated in the antiexclusionary 
clause, this Court remains free to repudiate or modify the 
exclusionary rule by virtue of the fact that it is a 
judicially created rule, not a constitutional rule. 
Under the above authority, we are free to retain, 
modify, or retreat from the Marxhausen rule altogether. 
Because we find the reasoning of Leon persuasive, we choose 
to embrace Leon as a matter of our interpretive right under 
the common law and retreat from the judicially created 
exclusionary rule announced in Marxhausen.  The goal of the 
exclusionary rule, as expressed in Leon, is to deter police 
misconduct. 
Leon, supra at 906-907; see also People v 
Hawkins, 468 Mich 488, 510-511; 668 NW2d 602 (2003); People 
v Sobczak-Obetts, 463 Mich 687, 711 n 19; 625 NW2d 764 
(2001). 
Thus, the goal of the exclusionary rule would not 
be furthered where police officers act in objectively 
reasonable good-faith reliance on a search warrant. 
Our dissenting colleagues rely on several pre-Leon 
cases in contending that deterring police misconduct is not 
the only purpose of the exclusionary rule. Post at 7. The 
United States Supreme Court in Leon, however, stated that 
“the 
exclusionary 
rule 
is 
designed 
to 
deter 
police 
18  
 
 
 
 
 
misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and 
magistrates.” 
Leon, supra at 916. 
Further, the Court 
directed “that suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to 
a warrant should be ordered only on a case-by-case basis 
and only in those unusual cases in which exclusion will 
further the purposes of the exclusionary rule.” 
Id. at 
918. 
Thus, 
in 
determining 
whether 
to 
apply 
the 
exclusionary rule, the proper focus is on the deterrent 
effect on law enforcement officers, if any. 
“If exclusion 
of evidence obtained pursuant to a subsequently invalidated 
warrant is to have any deterrent effect, therefore, it must 
alter the behavior of individual law enforcement officers 
or the policies of their departments.” 
Id. 
Thus, while 
the exclusionary rule may have had other purposes ascribed 
to it before Leon, the Leon Court effectively narrowed the 
focus of the rule as a remedy for police misconduct. 
Further, the Leon Court rejected the notion that the 
exclusionary rule is an effective tool in remedying the 
errors of judges and magistrates and deterring violations 
of the Fourth Amendment generally: 
To the extent that proponents of exclusion
rely on its behavioral effects on judges and
magistrates in these areas, their reliance is
misplaced. 
First, the exclusionary rule is 
designed to deter police misconduct rather than
to punish the errors of judges and magistrates.
Second, there exists no evidence suggesting that 
19  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
judges and magistrates are inclined to ignore or
subvert the Fourth Amendment or that lawlessness 
among these actors requires application of the
extreme sanction of exclusion. 
Third, and most important, we discern no
basis, and are offered none, for believing that
exclusion of evidence seized pursuant to a 
warrant will have a significant deterrent effect
on the issuing judge or magistrate. 
Many of the
factors that indicate that the exclusionary rule
cannot 
provide 
an 
effective 
“special” 
or 
“general” deterrent for individual offending law
enforcement officers apply as well to judges or
magistrates. And, to the extent that the rule is
thought to operate as a “systemic” deterrent on a
wider audience, it clearly can have no such 
effect on individuals empowered to issue search
warrants. 
Judges 
and 
magistrates 
are 
not 
adjuncts to the law enforcement team; as neutral
judicial officers, they have no stake in the
outcome of particular criminal prosecutions. The 
threat of exclusion thus cannot be expected
significantly to deter them. 
[Leon, supra at 
916-917.] 
The reasoning of Leon is persuasive. 
If judges and 
magistrates are “neutral and detached,” the exclusion of 
evidence would have no deterrent effect on their practices. 
Because the exclusionary rule would not deter judicial 
errors, the purpose of the rule would not be served by 
requiring exclusion in all cases.9 
9 The dissent also criticizes our decision to depart from
precedent by not following our decision in People v Bloyd,
416 Mich 538; 331 NW2d 447 (1982), post at 4, in which this
Court declined to recognize a good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule. 
Our decision in Bloyd, however,
predated Leon and declined to adopt a good-faith exception
without any analysis of the issue. 
(continued . . . .) 
20  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
Neither the text of Const 1963, art 1, § 11 nor the 
history of the provision ascribes broader protections to 
our constitutional provision than the Fourth Amendment 
requires. 
In fact, examination of the 1961 Constitutional 
Convention reveals that the delegates favored a less 
stringent application of the exclusionary rule at that 
time, 
but 
felt 
constrained 
by 
Mapp 
to 
limit 
the 
antiexclusionary clause to searches occurring outside the 
curtilage of a dwelling. 
Nash, supra at 212-213. 
As this 
Court recognized in Nash, there is no indication that by 
adopting Const 1963, art 1, § 11 and adhering to the 
language of Const 1908, art 2, § 10, as amended, the people 
sought to place restrictions on law enforcement activity 
greater than those under the Fourth Amendment. 
“In fact, 
Our dissenting colleagues further contend that our
decision “forsake[s] [our] commitment to our citizens,”
“fail[s] to resist the lure of expediency,” “discard[s]
decades of sound analysis,” and “treat[s] our Constitution
as an impediment.” Post at 1, 4, 10. The dissent fails to 
acknowledge, 
however, 
the 
very 
high 
cost 
of 
the 
exclusionary rule, including preventing the prosecutor’s
use of trustworthy evidence obtained in good-faith reliance
on a search warrant because of a subsequently discovered
technical defect in the warrant. 
See Leon, supra at 906­
907. 
Excluding the use of such evidence impedes, rather
than promotes, the truth-seeking function of the judiciary
and thereby hinders public confidence in the integrity of
the judicial process. 
While the dissent favors such a 
result, we believe that the high cost of the exclusionary
rule exacts too great a toll on our justice system. 
See 
Leon, supra at 907-908, 922. 
21  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
the contrary intent is expressed.” Id. at 213. The intent 
of the delegates in 1961 is consistent with the United 
States Supreme Court’s adoption of the good-faith exception 
in Leon, and the text of the Constitution is consistent 
with recognizing that exception. 
Because the exclusionary 
rule in Michigan is a judicially created, nonbinding rule, 
we interpret Const 1963, art 1, § 11 consistent with the 
Leon Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment and 
adopt the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule in 
Michigan.10 
10 
By 
adopting 
the 
good-faith 
exception 
to 
the 
exclusionary rule in Michigan, we are not overruling Sitz,
which did not involve the scope of the exclusionary rule
but which instead interpreted Const 1963, art 1, § 11 as
affording greater substantive protection than does the 
Fourth Amendment in the context of automobile seizures. 
Sitz, supra at 776. 
Rather, we are overruling several
Court of Appeals cases in which the Court declined to
recognize a good-faith exception. 
See, e.g., People v
Hill, 192 Mich App 54, 56; 480 NW2d 594 (1991); People v
Jackson, 180 Mich App 339, 346; 446 NW2d 891 (1989). 
The dissent notes that other jurisdictions have 
rejected the good-faith exception. 
See post at 4-5 n 2. 
While the manner in which other states have construed their 
respective 
constitutions 
and 
statutes 
is 
entirely
irrelevant to our constitutional analysis, we note that
numerous jurisdictions have adopted a good-faith exception.
See e.g., State v Eason, 245 Wis 2d 206; 629 NW2d 625
(2001); McDonald v State, 347 Md 452; 701 A2d 675 (1997);
Ex parte Morgan, 641 So 2d 840 (Ala, 1994); Crayton v
Commonwealth, 846 SW2d 684 (Ky, 1992); People v Camarella,
54 Cal 3d 592; 286 Cal Rptr 780; 818 P2d 63 (1991); Bernie 
v State, 524 So 2d 988 (Fla, 1988); State v Saiz, 427 NW2d
(continued . . . .) 
22  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
C. Application of the good-faith exception in this
case11 
Applying the good-faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule in this case, we conclude that the circuit court erred 
by suppressing the marijuana, firearm, and firefighter 
paraphernalia. 
The police officers’ reliance on the 
district judge’s determination of probable cause and on the 
technical sufficiency of the search warrant was objectively 
reasonable. The information in the affidavit was not false 
or misleading, and the issuing judge did not “wholly 
abandon[]” her judicial role. 
See Leon, supra at 923. 
A 
review of the affidavit and search warrant can lead to no 
other logical conclusion than that the address listed was 
that of defendant.12  Indeed, it probably did not even occur 
825 (SD, 1988); United States v Edelen, 529 A2d 774 (DC
App, 1987); State v Wilmoth, 22 Ohio St 3d 251; 490 NE2d
1236 (1986); State v Ebey, 491 So 2d 498 (La App, 1986);
State v Sweeney, 701 SW2d 420 (Mo, 1985); McCrary v 
Commonwealth, 228 Va 219; 321 SE2d 637 (1984). Still other 
jurisdictions have adopted the good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule by statute, including Arizona (Ariz Rev
Stat 13-3925), Colorado (Colo Rev Stat 16-3-308), Illinois
(725 Ill Comp Stat 5/114-12(b)(1)), Indiana (Ind Code 35­
37-4-5), and Texas (Tex Code Crim Proc art 38.23(b). 
11 The prosecutor concedes that the search warrant was
not based on probable cause. 
Thus, the search and seizure
was, in fact, unconstitutional. 
12 The dissent, post at 12-13 n 7, likens this case to
Groh v Ramirez, 540 US ___ ; 124 S Ct 1284, 1290; 157 L Ed
2d 1068 (2004), in which the search warrant failed 
(continued . . . .) 
23  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
to the magistrate or executing officers that the address 
was not defendant’s address. 
Further, the affidavit was 
not “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render 
official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” 
Id., quoting Brown, supra. 
Although the warrant was later determined to be 
deficient, excluding the evidence recovered in good-faith 
reliance on the warrant would not further the purpose of 
the exclusionary rule, i.e., to deter police misconduct. 
Because the exclusionary rule should be employed on a case­
by-case basis and only when exclusion would further the 
purpose of the rule, it should not be employed in this 
case. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We adopt the good-faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule in Michigan. The purpose of the rule, i.e., deterring 
altogether to describe the “things to be seized.” 
In that 
case, the United States Supreme Court stated that “even a
cursory reading of the warrant . . . would have revealed a
glaring deficiency that any reasonable police officer would
have known was constitutionally fatal.” 
Id. at 1294. 
The 
search warrant in the instant case does not contain a 
“glaring deficiency” such as that present in Groh. Indeed,
the warrant in Groh would not even apprise police officers
of which items to seize, thereby impeding the very purpose
of the search. 
As we have previously recognized, an
examination of the warrant on which the officers relied in 
this case can lead to no logical conclusion other than that
the premises to be searched belonged to defendant. 
24  
 
 
 
 
 
police misconduct, would not be served by applying the 
exclusionary rule in this case because the police officers’ 
good-faith reliance on the search warrant was objectively 
reasonable. 
Thus, the officers committed no wrong that 
exclusion of the evidence would deter. 
Accordingly, we 
reverse the circuit court’s ruling suppressing the evidence 
and remand for reinstatement of the charges against 
defendant. 
Maura D. Corrigan
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
25  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
No. 122364 
GLENN GOLDSTON, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
MARKMAN, J. (concurring). 
I concur with the majority in its adoption of the good­
faith exception to the exclusionary rule, an exception 
recognized by the United States Supreme Court. 
I write 
separately only in order to respond more fully to the 
dissent. 
Among myriad other shortcomings, the dissent accuses 
the 
majority 
of 
"fail[ing] 
to 
resist 
the 
lure 
of 
expediency," "forsak[ing] its commitment to our citizens," 
"discard[ing] decades of sound analysis," "contract[ing] 
citizen protections," and "treat[ing] our Constitution as 
an impediment."1 
Post at 1, 4, 5, 10. 
It must be 
1 Further, the dissent characterizes this concurring
opinion as a "diatribe," post at 15; as an "hysterical[]"
argument, post at 15; and as somehow predicated upon its
own "divine notion" of the Constitution's meaning. Post at 
(continued . . . .) 
 
 
                                                 
  
 
 
 
understood that this overwrought language stands in support 
of the following proposition, which is found nowhere in 
either the Michigan Constitution or the United States 
Constitution, to wit, no matter how much good faith is 
demonstrated by the police in the conduct of a criminal 
investigation, no matter how slight an imperfection in such 
investigation,2 no matter how serious the crime under 
investigation, and no matter how indispensable the evidence 
obtained during the investigation in determining the truth 
19. 
What all the dissent's unrestrained language cannot
obscure, however, is that it offers little in the way of
response to the principal arguments set forth in the 
majority and concurring opinions: (1) an exclusionary rule
without a good-faith exception is not mandated by either
the 
United 
States 
Constitution 
or 
the 
Michigan
Constitution; (2) the costs of an exclusionary rule without
a good-faith exception are enormously high, while the 
benefits 
are 
virtually 
nonexistent; 
and 
(3) 
the 
exclusionary rule that has existed in the United States and
in Michigan, unlike that preferred by the dissent, has
always taken into consideration a balancing of costs and
benefits. 
One doubtlessly would search in vain over the past
twenty-two years for similar language from other dissenting
justices of this Court whose opposition to my dissenting
colleague's 
criminal 
justice 
decisions, 
and 
whose 
opposition to the direction in which his decisions took
this Court and the Michigan Constitution for many years,
was no less deeply felt than that of my dissenting
colleague. 
2 While the dissent asserts that the imperfection in
this case is not slight, in truth, it is not relevant to
the dissent whether it is slight or not because, under the
dissent’s view, whatever the magnitude of the imperfection,
the evidence must be excluded. 
2  
 
 
 
of who perpetrated a crime, the prosecutor, in carrying out 
his responsibilities on behalf of the people of Michigan, 
must proceed to trial without that evidence. 
That is, the 
prosecutor must proceed to trial (if that is even possible 
after evidence has been excluded) as though the dead body 
in the basement did not exist, as though the illegal 
firearm under the sofa was never really there, and as 
though the incendiary materials in the garage were merely a 
figment of one’s imagination, in the process requiring that 
a jury of defendant's peers—a jury comprised of twelve 
citizens 
brought 
together 
for 
the 
sole 
purpose 
of 
exercising their judgment and common sense in order to 
determine the truth of a criminal charge—render an accurate 
and just verdict while being deprived of what may well be 
the most relevant available evidence. 
In urging such a justice system, the dissent also 
gives little consideration to the effect that decision­
making by a blindfolded jury has upon public confidence in 
the integrity of a process viewed by the people, correctly, 
as indispensable in carrying out the first responsibility 
of government—the maintenance of what the Constitution of 
the United States describes as "domestic tranquility." The 
dissent's denunciation of the majority is in defense of a 
justice system in which more juries will be deprived of 
3  
 
 
 
more evidence, and, therefore, in which more juries will 
render more verdicts in which guilt or innocence is 
determined inaccurately. 
The dissent's denunciation is 
also in defense of a system in which more citizens serving 
on more juries will perform their civic obligation only to 
learn afterward, for the first time, that they have been 
deprived of access to facts and evidence that might have 
been determinative in their decisions. 
The attitude of 
these 
jurors, 
as 
well 
as 
the 
attitude 
of 
victims, 
witnesses, and the public, toward a system of justice in 
which 
the 
government's 
ability 
to 
carry 
out 
its 
responsibility of protecting the people from criminals is 
compromised by such a cavalier attitude toward evidence can 
only be imagined. 
While the exclusion of evidence may, under exceptional 
circumstances, be constitutionally compelled, where it is 
not compelled—as the United States Supreme Court has 
determined to be the case where the police have carried out 
their responsibilities in good faith—it is hardly self­
evident why the people of our State would wish to have 
more, rather than fewer, critical decisions of guilt or 
innocence decided by jurors who each has one of his hands 
tied behind his back. 
Evidence is the lifeblood of the 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
criminal justice process, and it is indispensable in 
ensuring fair and just determinations. 
Concerning what furthers "citizen protections" under 
our Constitution, the dissent's dismissive conclusion that 
Michigan has "managed to exist for decades with the 
exclusionary rule and our streets have yet to become 
teeming with criminals released on 'technicalities,'" post 
at 14-15, belies that there is a real, but uncertain, 
number of criminals on our streets who have gone either 
unprosecuted, prosecuted on lesser charges, or unconvicted, 
because evidence has been withheld from a jury. That is an 
undeniable and logical reality of an exclusionary rule that 
pertains even to good-faith errors on the part of the 
police. 
While perhaps the extent to which our streets are 
or are not "teeming" with criminals who would have been 
incarcerated but for the absence of a good-faith exception 
cannot be precisely calculated, rates of violent crime 
have, in fact, grown enormously over recent decades.3  Had 
3 The dissent is, of course, correct that crime rates
do not uniformly proceed upward or downward. 
Post at 15 n 
9. 
This point notwithstanding, violent crime rates in the
United States, and in Michigan specifically, are far higher 
today than they were forty years ago. 
This can be 
confirmed by a cursory analysis of Bureau of Justice 
Statistics or FBI Uniform Crime figures. 
According to the
latter, murder rates have grown by approximately 90%, 
forcible rape rates by 237%, aggravated assault rates by
240%, and overall violent crime rates by 144%. 
<http://
(continued . . . .) 
5  
 
 
   
                                                 
 
 
 
our parents and grandparents, at the time of the inception 
of an exclusionary rule in Michigan lacking a good-faith 
exception, been able to look into their future and compared 
levels of violent crime then and now, it is quite certain 
that they would have viewed many of our streets today as 
"teeming" with crime. 
Doubtlessly, however, the people of 
Michigan will continue to "manage to exist" at whatever 
levels of crime are contributed to by individual criminal 
justice decisions of the courts.4 
www.disastercenter.com/crime/micrime.htm> (accessed July 9,
2004). 
4 
The 
dissent 
finds 
this 
discussion 
to 
be 
"hysterical[],” post at 15. 
The dissent apparently wishes
to have its cake and eat it as well, i.e., being allowed to
criticize the majority for the damage that it allegedly is
doing to the cause of constitutional government, while
being immune itself from criticism for the consequences of
its own position. If, from the perspective of the dissent,
the cost of the majority position is the loss of 
constitutional protections, from the perspective of the
majority, the cost of the dissent's position is that,
absent 
any 
constitutional 
imperative 
and 
absent 
any
conceivable impact in deterring unconstitutional searches
or seizures, the dissent's position would result in more
violent offenders populating our streets. 
Certainly, this
is not a consequence that is intended or desired by the
dissenting justices, but it nonetheless would be the 
inevitable consequence of their position. There is no free 
lunch for the dissent. 
It is entitled to argue its
positions, but it is no more immune than the majority from
accountability and responsibility for these positions.
Further, it should be understood that the dissent does not
dispute what this opinion asserts about the practical
consequences of its far-reaching exclusionary rule; it 
merely responds that such assertions are "hysterical[]." 
6  
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
 
Despite the hyperbolic rhetoric of the dissent, the 
rights of criminal defendants have remained well-protected, 
both in the federal system and in those growing numbers of 
states 
in 
which 
the 
good-faith 
exception 
to 
the 
exclusionary rule has been adopted.5  On the other hand, the 
rights of everyone else, and of society generally, have 
been better protected because the criminal justice system 
has been allowed to assess a defendant's guilt or innocence 
on the basis of the full range of relevant evidence. 
And, 
as a result, in some unknown, but very real, number of 
cases, criminal defendants, who, under the dissent's 
approach, would have been left on the streets to continue 
to prey upon their communities, have been convicted of 
5 Moreover, the rule advanced by the dissent, i.e., an
exclusionary rule without a good-faith exception, by 
definition, could have no effect in deterring even a single
improper search; all that this rule could do would be to
afford a serendipitous windfall to an occasional guilty
party 
by 
enabling 
such 
person 
to 
exclude 
reliable,
inculpatory evidence from trial. 
"[A]ny rule of evidence
that denies the jury access to clearly probative and 
reliable 
evidence 
must 
bear 
a 
heavy 
burden 
of 
justification, and must be carefully limited to the 
circumstances in which it will pay its way by deterring
official lawlessness." 
Illinois v Gates, 462 US 213, 257­
258; 103 S Ct 2317; 76 L Ed 2d 527 (1983)(White J.,
concurring). 
The hard-to-understand calculus of the 
dissent's approach would be to deny the jury access to
clearly 
probative 
and 
reliable 
evidence 
without 
any
apparent 
countervailing 
benefit 
in 
deterring 
official 
lawlessness. 
7  
 
 
 
 
  
 
serious crimes on the basis of trustworthy evidence and 
after full due process of law. 
The dissent asserts that it is "unclear how an 
allegedly increasing crime rate is relevant in determining 
our citizens' constitutional rights . . . ." 
Post at 15. 
That is, of course, neither my position nor that of the 
majority. 
Increasing crime rates have been cited only in 
response to the dissent's suggestions that there are no 
adverse consequences to its position and that Michigan has 
"managed to exist" despite the absence of a good-faith 
exception. 
More accurately, my position is that the 
absolutist exclusionary rule of the dissent's constitution, 
has little to do with the exclusionary rule of the 
constitutions that actually prevail in the United States 
and Michigan. 
The dissent seems agitated that this concurrence would 
invoke such considerations as the impact of the dissent's 
rule upon crime, the absence of deterrent effect of the 
dissent's rule on police misconduct, and the adverse impact 
of the dissent's rule upon the integrity of the justice 
system. 
These considerations allegedly are in contrast to 
the dissent's more focused concern about the Constitution. 
The problem with this analysis is that the dissent's 
8  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
constitution is not that of James Madison,6 not that of the 
United States Supreme Court, and not that ratified by the 
people of Michigan. 
Rather, the United States Supreme 
Court has made clear that the exclusionary rule is of 
“quasi-constitutional” dimension and that its applicability 
in particular contexts is a function of a variety of 
pragmatic and balancing considerations.7  While the dissent 
6 
That the dissent's rule is not part of James 
Madison's Constitution is manifest by the absence of any
mention in the Constitution of such a rule as well as by
consistent early judicial practice. 
As summarized by one
scholar: 
[S]earches of private premises generally 
required warrants. 
In all other circumstances,
warrants were unnecessary. Any person, including
a private citizen, acting on his own, could 
search and seize at his own peril. If the search 
uncovered 
contraband 
or 
property 
otherwise 
subject to forfeiture, then he was completely
justified. 
If, however, the search proved
fruitless, then the party who made the search was
liable to damages unless he could find the 
shelter of a statute. A search conducted in good
faith 
pursuant 
to 
statutory 
authority 
was 
considered reasonable. 
[Harris, Back to basics: 
An examination of the exclusionary rule, 37 Ark L
R 646, 647 (1983).] 
See also Gelston v Hoyt, 16 US 246; 4 L Ed 381 (1818); Wood 
v United States, 41 US 342; 10 L Ed 987 (1842). 
7 While, from the dissent's perspective, the majority’s
approach to interpreting the breadth of the exclusionary
rule may seem "distinctive" or "idiosyncratic," post at 15­
16 n 9, it is essentially indistinguishable from that of
the United States Supreme Court in view of that Court's
characterization of the rule as a uniquely "judicially
created" remedy. Pennsylvania Bd of Probation v Scott, 524
US 357, 363; 118 S Ct 2014; 141 L Ed 2d 344 (1998). 
9  
 
 
 
is entitled to its view that the rule should be applied 
more broadly, and contain fewer exceptions, the dissent 
should not confuse its own views with those of either the 
United States Constitution or the Michigan Constitution. 
Among other limitations on the exclusionary rule, the 
United States Supreme Court has concluded that the rule 
does not apply retroactively unlike most rules that are 
constitutional, Linkletter v Walker, 381 US 618; 85 S Ct 
1731; 14 L Ed 2d 601 (1965); the rule does not apply to 
those lacking standing, Alderman v United States, 394 US 
165; 89 S Ct 961; 22 L Ed 2d 176 (1969); the rule does not 
apply to grand jury proceedings, United States v Calandra, 
414 US 338; 94 S Ct 613; 38 L Ed 2d 561 (1974); the rule 
does not apply to civil proceedings, United States v Janis, 
428 US 433; 96 S Ct 3021; 49 L Ed 2d 1046 (1976); the rule 
does not apply to deportation proceedings, Immigration & 
Naturalization Service v Lopez-Mendoza, 468 US 1032; 104 S 
Ct 3479; 82 L Ed 2d 778 (1984); the rule does not apply 
where the unlawfully seized evidence is used against a 
parolee in parole revocation hearings, Pennsylvania Bd of 
Probation v Scott, 524 US 357; 118 S Ct 2014; 141 L Ed 2d 
344 (1998); the rule does not apply where evidence is used 
to impeach a defendant in a criminal proceeding, James v 
Illinois, 493 US 307; 110 S Ct 648; 107 L Ed 2d 676 (1990); 
10  
 
 
 
the rule does not apply in the context of habeas corpus 
relief where the state has provided an opportunity for full 
and fair litigation of the Fourth Amendment claim, Stone v 
Powell, 428 US 465; 96 S Ct 3037; 49 L Ed 2d 1067 (1976); 
the rule does not apply where the police have acted in 
objectively reasonable reliance upon a statute that is 
subsequently declared unconstitutional, Illinois v Krull, 
480 US 340; 107 S Ct 1160; 94 L Ed 2d 364 (1987); the rule 
does not apply if the government can be said to have also 
discovered 
the 
evidence 
through 
independent 
means, 
Silverthorne Lumber Co v United States, 251 US 385; 40 S Ct 
182; 64 L Ed 319 (1920); the rule does not apply if the 
connection between the illegality and the seizure has 
become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint, Nardone v 
United States, 308 US 338; 60 S Ct 266; 84 L Ed 307 (1939); 
the rule does not apply where the evidence would at some 
future time likely have been discovered, Nix v Williams, 
467 US 431; 104 S Ct 2501; 81 L Ed 2d 377 (1984); the rule 
does not apply where the police have in good faith relied 
upon a defective warrant, United States v Leon, 468 US 897; 
104 S Ct 3405; 82 L Ed 2d 677 (1984); Massachusetts v 
Sheppard, 468 US 981; 104 S Ct 3424; 82 L Ed 2d 737 (1984); 
and the rule does apply, even with respect to substantial 
and deliberate violations of the Fourth Amendment, only "in 
11  
 
 
 
 
 
the absence of a more efficacious sanction . . . ." Franks 
v Delaware, 438 US 154; 98 S Ct 2674; 57 L Ed 2d 667 
(1978). 
“Neither [these] cases nor any others hold that 
anything which deters illegal searches is thereby commanded 
by 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment. 
The 
deterrent 
values 
of 
preventing the incrimination of those whose rights the 
police have violated have been considered sufficient to 
justify the suppression of probative evidence even though 
the case against the defendant is weakened or destroyed. 
We adhere to that judgment. 
But we are not convinced that 
the additional benefits of extending the exclusionary rule 
to other defendants would justify further encroachment upon 
the public interest in prosecuting those accused of crime 
and having them acquitted or convicted on the basis of all 
the evidence which exposes the truth.” 
Alderman, supra at 
174-175. 
“Despite its broad deterrent purpose, the exclusionary 
rule has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of 
illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all 
persons. 
As with any remedial device, the application of 
the rule has been restricted to those areas where its 
remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served.” 
Calandra, supra at 348. 
12  
 
 
 
 
“In deciding whether to extend the exclusionary rule 
to grand jury proceedings, we must weigh the potential 
injury to the historic role and functions of the grand jury 
against the potential benefits of the rule as applied in 
this context. 
It is evident that this extension of the 
exclusionary rule would seriously impede the grand jury.” 
Id. at 349. 
“Against this potential damage to the role and 
functions of the grand jury, we must weigh the benefits to 
be derived from this proposed extension of the exclusionary 
rule. 
Suppression of the use of illegally seized evidence 
against the search victim in a criminal trial is thought to 
be 
an 
important 
method 
of 
effectuating 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment. 
But it does not follow that the Fourth 
Amendment requires adoption of every proposal that might 
deter police misconduct.” Id. at 350. 
“‘Illegal conduct’ is hardly sanctioned, nor are the 
foundations of the Republic imperiled, by declining to make 
an unprecedented extension of the exclusionary rule to 
grand jury proceedings where the rule's objectives would 
not be effectively served and where other important and 
historic values would be unduly prejudiced.” 
Id. at 355 n 
11. 
13  
 
 
 
 
“[W]e conclude that exclusion from federal civil 
proceedings of evidence unlawfully seized by a state 
criminal enforcement officer has not been shown to have a 
sufficient likelihood of deterring the conduct of the state 
police so that it outweighs the societal costs imposed by 
the exclusion. 
This Court, therefore, is not justified in 
so extending the exclusionary rule.” Janis, supra at 454. 
“‘[It] will not do to forget that the [Weeks] rule is 
a rule arrived at only on the nicest balance of competing 
considerations and in view of the necessity of finding some 
effective judicial sanction to preserve the Constitution's 
search and seizure guarantees. 
The rule is unsupportable 
as reparation or compensatory dispensation to the injured 
criminal; its sole rational justification is the experience 
of its indispensability in '[exerting] general legal 
pressures to secure obedience to the Fourth Amendment on 
the part of federal law-enforcing officers.' 
As it serves 
this function, the rule is a needed, but [grudgingly] 
taken, medicament; no more should be swallowed than is 
needed to combat the disease. 
Granted that so many 
criminals must go free as will deter the constables from 
blundering, pursuance of this policy of liberation beyond 
the confines of necessity inflicts gratuitous harm on the 
public interest as declared by Congress.’ 
Amsterdam, 
14  
 
 
Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 378, 388-389 (1964).” Janis, supra at 454 n 29. 
“[T]he policies behind the exclusionary rule are not 
absolute. 
Rather, they must be evaluated in light of 
competing policies.” Stone, supra at 488. 
“The answer is to be found by weighing the utility of 
the exclusionary rule against the costs of extending it to 
collateral review of Fourth Amendment claims.” Id. at 489. 
“[T]he contribution of the exclusionary rule, if any, 
to the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment is minimal and 
the substantial societal costs of application of the rule 
persist with special force.” Id. at 494-495. 
“In these circumstances we are persuaded that the 
Janis balance between costs and benefits comes out against 
applying 
the 
exclusionary 
rule 
in 
civil 
deportation 
hearings held by the INS.” Lopez-Mendoza, supra at 1050. 
“As with any remedial device, application of the 
exclusionary rule properly has been restricted to those 
situations in which its remedial purpose is effectively 
advanced. 
Thus, in various circumstances, the Court has 
examined whether the rule's deterrent effect will be 
achieved, and has weighed the likelihood of such deterrence 
against the costs of withholding reliable information from 
the truth-seeking process.” Krull, supra at 347. 
15  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
“[T]o the extent that application of the exclusionary 
rule 
could 
provide 
some 
incremental 
deterrent, 
that 
possible benefit must be weighed against the ‘substantial 
social costs exacted by the exclusionary rule.’ 
When we 
indulge in such weighing, we are convinced that applying 
the exclusionary rule in this context is unjustified.” Id. 
at 352-353 (citation omitted). 
“[B]ecause 
the 
rule 
is 
prudential 
rather 
than 
constitutionally mandated, we have held it to be applicable 
only 
where 
its 
deterrence 
benefits 
outweigh 
its 
‘substantial social costs.’” Pennsylvania Bd of Probation, 
supra at 363.8 
It is for these reasons that there are a variety of 
considerations—extending far beyond those that the dissent 
would assess—that are fully relevant in determining whether 
the exclusionary rule is applicable in a particular 
instance, and that explain why the rule is not as broad or 
as absolute as the dissent would prefer. 
Further, it must be recognized—and the majority 
opinion addresses this point, see ante at 14 n 8—that as 
8 “The history of Const 1963, art 1, § 11, and its
plain import, however, suggest that its further expansion,
with the concomitant expansion of the exclusionary rule to
enforce it, should occur only when there is a compelling
reason to do so.” 
People v Nash, 418 Mich 196, 214; 341
NW2d 439 (1983). 
16  
 
 
  
  
                                                 
 
far back as 1936, the Michigan Constitution exempted from 
the exclusionary rule "any narcotic drug or drugs, any 
firearm, rifle, pistol, revolver, automatic pistol, machine 
gun, bomb, bomb shell, explosive, blackjack, slingshot, 
billy, metallic knuckles, gas-ejecting device, or any other 
dangerous weapon or thing, seized by any peace officer 
outside the curtilage of any dwelling house in this state."9 
That is, the Michigan Constitution from 1936 until 1961, 
when Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643; 81 S Ct 1684; 6 L Ed 2d 1081 
(1961), introduced a uniform national rule, imposed a 
limitation on the exclusionary rule that was considerably 
more restrictive than its federal counterpart. 
See, e.g., 
People v Gonzales, 356 Mich 247; 97 NW2d 16 (1959); People 
v Winkle, 358 Mich 551, 556; 100 NW2d 309 (1960).10 
Moreover, this relationship was sought to be continued by 
the 1963 constitution in which, two years after Mapp, its 
9 In 1936, the people ratified an amendment of Const
1908, art 2, § 10, which added the above language, now
known as the anti-exclusionary clause. 
10 See also People v Winterheld, 359 Mich 467; 102 NW2d
201 (1960), which held that the exclusionary rule in 
Michigan does not preclude application of the so-called
“silver platter” doctrine in which evidence, unlawfully
seized in a foreign jurisdiction, can be utilized by
Michigan police officers. "With respect to acts beyond its
borders, by officers of another State, such guarantees do
not extend to them and, hence, the reason for the rule in 
that regard disappears and, with it, the rule." Id. at 471 
(emphasis added). 
17  
 
 
      
                                                 
 
  
drafters again limited the reach of the exclusionary rule 
by inserting language substantially similar to that of 
Const 1908, art 2, § 10 (exempting from the exclusionary 
rule “any narcotic drug, firearm, bomb, explosive or any 
other dangerous weapon, seized by a peace officer outside 
the curtilage of any dwelling house in this state"). 
Thus, while the dissent cites the alleged "eighty 
year" period during which the exclusionary rule that it 
favors existed in unadulterated form in Michigan, post at 
15, in truth the "heyday" of the exclusionary rule that the 
dissent recalls did not exist for at least a quarter­
century preceding Mapp—because Michigan had substantially 
limited the scope of the rule in precisely those areas of 
criminal law in which it tends to be most regularly 
invoked—and it did not exist for many years afterward 
because the United States Supreme Court quickly made clear 
that the exclusionary rule was merely a judicially created, 
"prophylactic" remedy rather than a rule of absolute and 
invariable constitutional dimension.11 
11 See Calandra, supra at 348. 
It has consistently
been the constitutional law of Michigan that the “search
and seizure provision of the Michigan Constitution, Const
1963, art 1, § 11, affords defendant no greater rights upon
which 
to 
support 
the 
suppression 
than 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment.” 
People v Chapman, 425 Mich 245, 252-253; 387
NW2d 835 (1986). 
“[A]rt 1, § 11 is to be construed to
provide the same protection as that secured by the Fourth
(continued . . . .) 
18  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
The dissent purports to create a constitutional regime 
in Michigan in which it is able to pick and choose from 
among what it views as the "best" rules of particular eras, 
and combine them to create a constitutional regime that has 
existed in the real world for only brief moments. 
The 
dissent would combine an exclusionary rule that is broad in 
its coverage, failing to exclude "narcotic drugs, firearms, 
bombs, explosives [and] any other dangerous weapons," with 
an exclusionary rule that is narrow in its exceptions, most 
importantly 
lacking 
a 
good-faith 
exception. 
It 
is 
seriously misleading for the dissent to suggest that its 
position is a legitimate heir to "eighty years" of 
constitutional understanding in our state. 
In summary, the dissent's constitution is one that 
would be unrecognizable to the framers of the United States 
Amendment, absent ‘compelling reason’ to impose a different
interpretation.” 
People v Collins, 438 Mich 8, 25; 475
NW2d 
684 
(1991). 
“[T]he 
historical 
record 
clearly indicates that the people of Michigan had no 
intention of imposing more stringent restrictions upon law
enforcement than is mandated by the Fourth Amendment.” Id. 
at 32-33. 
“There is no compelling reason to interpret
Const 1963, art 1, § 11 as affording greater protection for
this 
defendant 
than 
is 
provided 
under 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment.” 
Id. at 40. 
It is the dissent, not the
majority, that is "ignor[ing] Michigan's history," post at 
1, in failing to consider this statement of the traditional
relationship between the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and art 1, § 11 of the Michigan
Constitution. 
19  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
Constitution or the Michigan Constitution, as well as to 
generations of justices of both the United States Supreme 
Court and the Michigan Supreme Court. 
The dissent's 
constitution is one that ill-serves the interests of a 
responsible criminal justice system.12
 Given its lack of 
deterrent effect, the only consequence of the dissent's 
absolute 
exclusionary 
rule 
would 
be 
to 
raise 
an 
extraordinarily costly obstacle in the way of effective law 
enforcement. 
Stephen J. Markman 
12 Contrary to the dissent's intimations, the majority 
is not unconcerned about even good-faith imperfections in
the investigative process. 
However, the issue before this
Court is only whether suppression of the evidence is an 
appropriate remedy for a good-faith violation. 
There are 
far 
more 
appropriate 
and 
finely 
tuned 
remedies 
for 
violations of this kind, such as civil damages or tort
claim remedies against the government. 
One of the virtues 
of enacting such alternative remedies is that they would
compensate not only persons with respect to whom evidence
of a crime has been discovered, but also those with respect
to whom no such evidence has been discovered but who have 
nonetheless 
been 
the 
victims 
of 
Fourth 
Amendment 
violations. 
By contrast, the exclusionary rule accords
benefit only to those with respect to whom evidence of a
crime has been discovered. 
20  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
No. 122364 
GLENN GOLDSTON, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting). 
“[T]he task of combating crime and convicting the 
guilty will in every era seem of such critical and pressing 
concern that we may be lured by the temptations of 
expediency into forsaking our commitment to protecting 
individual liberty and privacy.” United States v Leon, 468 
US 897, 929-930; 104 S Ct 3405; 82 L Ed 2d 677 (1984) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
Today, the majority has chosen 
to ignore Michigan’s history of protecting our citizens 
against unreasonable searches. As a result, in choosing to 
adopt the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, 
the majority has forsaken its commitment to our citizens 
and failed to resist the lure of expediency. 
Therefore, I 
must respectfully dissent. 
The majority claims that there is no compelling reason 
for 
Michigan 
to 
provide 
greater 
protection 
against 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
unreasonable searches than that provided by the federal 
constitution.1  I disagree with the majority that Michigan 
must have a compelling reason to provide greater protection 
to 
our 
citizens 
than 
that 
provided 
by 
the 
federal 
constitution. 
Instead, I believe this Court should be 
required to show a compelling reason to depart from past 
precedent. 
See People v Collins, 438 Mich 8, 50; 475 NW2d 
684 (1991) (Cavanagh, C.J., dissenting). 
However, even if 
this Court must demonstrate a compelling reason to offer 
greater 
protection 
to 
our 
citizens, 
Michigan’s 
jurisprudential history certainly meets this test. 
Over forty years before the United States Supreme 
Court extended the exclusionary rule to the states in Mapp 
1 “The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
US Const, Am IV. 
“The person, houses, papers and possessions of every
person shall be secure from unreasonable searches and 
seizures. 
No warrant to search any place or to seize any
person or things shall issue without describing them, nor
without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation.
The provisions of this section shall not be construed to
bar from evidence in any criminal proceeding any narcotic
drug, firearm, bomb, explosive or any other dangerous
weapon, seized by a peace officer outside the curtilage of
any dwelling house in this state.” 
Const 1963, art 1,
§ 11. 
2  
 
 
 
 
v Ohio, 367 US 643; 81 S Ct 1684; 6 L Ed 2d 1081 (1961), 
Michigan 
adopted 
the 
exclusionary 
rule 
in 
People 
v 
Marxhausen, 204 Mich 559, 573-574; 171 NW 557 (1919). 
“[T]his Court created a body of state constitutional search 
and seizure law and adopted an exclusionary rule, all 
before either was subject to a federal floor.” 
People v 
Nash, 418 Mich 196, 214; 341 NW2d 439 (1983) (opinion of 
Brickley, J.). 
In Marxhausen, supra at 563, this Court 
wisely stated that it is “the essence of a free government 
that the individual shall be secure in his person, his home 
and his property from unlawful invasion, from unlawful 
search, from unlawful seizure.” 
This Court further articulated the importance of the 
exclusionary rule in People v Halveksz, 215 Mich 136, 138; 
183 NW 752 (1921). 
Under a government of laws the security
afforded persons, houses and possessions against
search without a warrant, lawfully obtained, must
not be violated by officers of the law. 
The law 
must point the way to legitimate search and 
seizure and will tolerate none other. 
Officers 
of the law must act within the law and if they
invade the security guaranteed individuals by the
Constitution, such invasion cannot bring to the
aid of justice the fruit of their violation. 
It 
is 
the 
duty 
of 
courts, 
when 
attention 
is 
seasonably 
called 
to 
a 
violation 
of 
a 
constitutional right, in obtaining evidence in
criminal 
prosecutions, 
to 
vindicate 
the 
protection 
afforded 
individuals 
by 
the 
Constitution, and to suppress such evidence. 
[Id.] 
3  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
The compelling reason test “should not be understood 
as 
establishing 
a 
conclusive 
presumption 
artificially 
linking state constitutional interpretation to federal 
law.” Sitz v Dep’t of State Police, 443 Mich 744, 758; 506 
NW2d 209 (1993). 
The majority’s application of the 
compelling reason test disregards this, however, and 
ignores the jurisprudential history of the exclusionary 
rule in this Court. 
Those who have come before us have 
dedicated themselves to upholding 
Michigan’s Constitution 
and providing reasoned analysis. 
Not only did this Court 
adopt the exclusionary rule before being required to do so, 
it also declined to recognize a good-faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule in People v Bloyd, 416 Mich 538, 556; 331 
NW2d 447 (1982). 
Our state is not obligated to discard 
decades of sound analysis and reasoned jurisprudence merely 
because the United State Supreme Court has announced a 
decision limiting citizens’ federal constitutional rights 
contrary to Michigan jurisprudence.2
 This Court is “not 
2 Other jurisdictions have also rejected the good-faith
exception on state constitutional or statutory grounds.
See, e.g., State v Lacasella, 313 Mont 185, 194; 60 P3d 975
(2002); Dorsey v State, 761 A2d 807, 817, 820 (Del, 2000)
(“Without 
a 
constitutional 
remedy, 
a 
Delaware 
‘constitutional right’ is an oxymoron that could unravel 
the entire fabric of protections in Delaware’s two hundred
and twenty-five year old Declaration of Rights.”); Harvey v
State, 266 Ga 671, 672; 469 SE2d 176 (1996);
 State v 
(continued . . . .) 
4  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
obligated to accept what we deem to be a major contraction 
of citizen protections under our constitution simply 
because the United States Supreme Court has chosen to do 
so.” 
Sitz, supra at 763. 
Our state is free to provide 
more protections to its citizens than the United States 
Constitution 
does. 
This 
Court’s 
adoption 
of 
the 
exclusionary rule decades before being required to do so, 
and its subsequent decision not to adopt a good-faith 
exception, is more than sufficient to qualify as a 
compelling reason. 
Canelo, 139 NH 376, 382-383; 653 A2d 1097 (1995); State v 
Gutierrez, 116 NM 431, 446-447; 863 P2d 1052 (1993)
(“Denying the government the fruits of unconstitutional
conduct at trial best effectuates the constitutional 
proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures by
preserving the rights of the accused to the same extent as
if the government’s officers had stayed within the law.”);
State v Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 989, 998; 842 P2d 660
(1992); Commonwealth v Edmunds, 526 Pa 374, 397-398, 402;
586 A2d 887 (1991); State v Oakes, 157 Vt 171, 173; 598 A2d
119 (1991); State v Marsala, 216 Conn 150, 151; 579 A2d 58
(1990); State v Carter, 322 NC 709, 710, 719-720; 370 SE2d
553 (1988) (The exclusionary rule is necessary “for the
sake of maintaining the integrity of the judicial branch of
government.”); State v Novembrino, 105 NJ 95, 153, 156-159;
519 
A2d 
820 
(1987) 
(“By 
eliminating 
any 
cost 
for 
noncompliance 
with 
the 
constitutional 
requirement 
of 
probable cause, the good-faith exception assures us that 
the constitutional standard will be diluted.”); State v 
McKnight, 
291 
SC 
110, 
114; 
352 
SE2d 
471 
(1987);
Commonwealth v Upton, 394 Mass 363, 365-366; 476 NE2d 548
(1985); People v Bigelow, 66 NY2d 417, 422-423; 488 NE2d
451 (1985). 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
Notably, those who framed and adopted the Constitution 
were 
concerned 
about 
expanding 
the 
protection 
under 
Michigan’s search and seizure provision beyond that of the 
federal constitution as it was interpreted in 1963. 
Collins, supra at 475; see also Nash, supra at 214. 
In 
1963, the United States Supreme Court had adopted the 
exclusionary rule, but had not yet adopted the good-faith 
exception. 
Therefore, the 1963 ratification of our 
Constitution cannot support the notion that our citizens 
sought to have Michigan’s Constitution adopt the good-faith 
exception as contained in the federal constitution, when it 
would be over twenty years before this exception was indeed 
recognized under the federal constitution. 
“[W]e may not 
disregard the guarantees that our constitution confers on 
Michigan citizens merely because the United States Supreme 
Court has withdrawn . . . such protection.” Sitz, supra at 
759. 
Unless the ratifiers were prescient, they could not 
know how the United State Supreme Court might interpret the 
federal constitution in future years. 
Therefore, it is 
illogical to claim that the 1963 ratification essentially 
foreclosed an interpretation of our Constitution that 
differs from that of the federal constitution. 
Remarkably, the majority claims that the only purpose 
of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct. 
6  
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
That claim is incomplete and ignores the other well­
documented purpose of the exclusionary rule. 
The United 
States Supreme Court has stated that the purposes of the 
exclusionary 
rule 
are 
to 
protect 
a 
person’s 
Fourth 
Amendment guarantees by deterring lawless conduct by police 
officers and to close the courthouse doors “to any use of 
evidence unconstitutionally obtained.” Wong Sun v United 
States, 371 US 471, 486; 83 S Ct 407; 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963); 
see also Brown v Illinois, 422 US 590, 599; 95 S Ct 2254; 
45 L Ed 2d 416 (1975); Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 12-13; 88 S 
Ct 1868; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968) (The exclusionary rule 
serves to deter police misconduct and preserve judicial 
integrity.); Elkins v United States, 364 US 206, 222; 80 S 
Ct 1437; 4 L Ed 2d 1669 (1960).3 
3 While the United States Supreme Court, after its Leon 
decision, has primarily focused on the deterrence of police
misconduct in justifying the good-faith exception, it has
not failed to recognize that other purposes still exist.
In Illinois v Krull, 480 US 340, 347; 107 S Ct 1160; 94 L
Ed 2d 364 (1987), the Court refers to police deterrence as
the “‘prime purpose’ of the exclusionary rule,” but it does
not state that it is the sole purpose. (Citation omitted.)
While discussing the deterrent effects of the exclusionary
rule in James v Illinois, 493 US 307, 314; 110 S Ct 648;
107 L Ed 2d 676 (1990), the Court refers to the purposes of 
the exclusionary rule. 
See also Colorado v Connelly, 479
US 157, 169; 107 S Ct 515; 93 L Ed 2d 473 (1986) (the 
exclusionary rule is aimed at deterring lawless conduct by
the police and the prosecutor). 
(continued . . . .) 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
“Courts which sit under our Constitution cannot and 
will not be made party to lawless invasions of the 
constitutional rights of citizens by permitting unhindered 
governmental use of the fruits of such invasions.” 
Terry, 
supra at 13. 
The exclusionary rule “is directed at all 
unlawful searches and seizures, and not merely those that 
happen to produce incriminating material or testimony as 
fruits.” 
Brown, supra at 601 (emphasis added). 
In Mapp, 
supra at 648, the United States Supreme Court quoted Weeks 
v United States, 232 US 383, 393; 34 S Ct 341; 58 L Ed 652 
(1914), as follows: 
“If letters and private documents can thus
be seized and held and used in evidence against a
citizen accused of an offense, the protection of
the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be 
secure against such searches and seizures is of
no value, and, so far as those thus placed are
concerned, might as well be stricken from the
Constitution. 
The efforts of the courts and 
their 
officials 
to 
bring 
the 
guilty 
to 
punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to
be 
aided 
by 
the 
sacrifice 
of 
those 
great 
Even if one were to assume that the United States 
Supreme Court has abandoned the concerns it expressed in
Mapp, supra at 659, about ensuring and maintaining judicial
integrity, I cannot agree that those concerns should be
abandoned. 
As stated in Mapp, supra at 659, “Nothing can
destroy a government more quickly than its failure to
observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the
charter of its own existence.” 
And as Justice Stevens 
stated in his dissent in Arizona v Evans, 514 US 1, 18; 115
S Ct 1185; 131 L Ed 2d 34 (1995), “The [Fourth] Amendment
is a constraint on the power of the sovereign, not merely
on some of its agents.” 
8  
 
 
   
 
                                                 
principles established by years of endeavor and
suffering which have resulted in their embodiment
in the fundamental law of the land.” 
As Justice Scalia also recently wrote in Crawford v 
Washington, 541 US ___; 124 S Ct 1354, 1373; 158 L Ed 2d 
177 (2004), the framers of the United States Constitution 
“knew that judges, like other government officers, could 
not always be trusted to safeguard the rights of the 
people . . . .”4 
Without the exclusionary rule, the assurance against 
unreasonable searches and seizures would be “valueless and 
undeserving 
of 
mention 
in 
a 
perpetual 
charter 
of 
inestimable human liberties . . . .” 
Mapp, supra at 655. 
The Constitution exists to protect us all. 
Hundreds of 
years ago, our founders had the wisdom to recognize that 
our government must be held to the highest standards.5  It 
4 While Crawford dealt with the Confrontation Clause,
Justice Scalia’s words are most fitting in this case as
well. 
5 In 1761, James Otis argued against the general writs
of assistance that allowed the British government to search
homes at any time of the day or night. 
Otis argued that
only special warrants, in which the complainant swore that
he suspected goods were located in a specific place, were
valid. 
The concern with writs of assistance is that “[a]
man is accountable to no person for his doings.” 
James 
Otis, oral argument, Superior Court of Massachusetts,
February 24, 1761, <http://douglasarchives.org/otis_a34.
htm> (accessed February 27, 2004). 
Unfortunately, almost
(continued . . . .) 
9  
 
 
  
 
                                                 
must be accountable to the people, for without the people, 
government has no reason to exist. 
In 
today’s 
decision, 
the 
majority 
treats 
our 
Constitution as an impediment that courts must maneuver 
around for the justice system to work. 
This is evident in 
its zeal to adopt the good-faith exception in this case 
when the search warrant at issue does not come close to 
meeting the standards articulated in Leon. “Probable cause 
to issue a search warrant exists where there is a 
‘substantial basis’ for inferring a ‘fair probability’ that 
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a 
particular place.”6 
People v Kazmierczak, 461 Mich 411, 
417-418; 605 NW2d 667 (2000). Leon, supra at 914-915, 926, 
held that the good-faith exception does not apply if the 
magistrate abandoned his detached and neutral role, the 
police officers were dishonest or reckless, or the police 
officers could not have had an objectively reasonable 
belief that probable cause existed. 
This 
is 
not 
a 
case 
where 
there 
was 
a 
mere 
typographical error that was not discovered until after the 
250 years later, this same issue, albeit it in a slightly
different form, plagues us yet again. 
6 The majority, of course, to even get to Leon,
concedes the finding of lack of probable cause. 
10  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
warrant was carried out. 
See, e.g., Arizona v Evans, 514 
US 1, 15-16; 115 S Ct 1185; 131 L Ed 2d 34 (1995) (a police 
officer acted on incorrect computer data entered by a court 
clerk). And this is certainly not a case where there was a 
close call about the sufficiency of an affidavit. 
See, 
e.g., Leon, supra at 904. We concur in the findings of the 
trial court, which stated: 
In order for the warrant to be sustained the 
observations were made of a recent nature. 
Examination of the affidavit in support of a
warrant, a search warrant, dues [sic, does] 
nothing to enlighten anyone. 
It obtains no 
reference as to when these contacts between 
Officer Born and the defendant were had, was not
able to tell how close in time the contacts were 
with respect to defendant’s alleged activities
posing as a firefighter, how close the time those
activities were to the date of the affidavit for 
the warrant. 
Also looking at the affidavit, I don’t find
anything in the affidavit connecting the location
of 
the 
dwelling, 
29440 
Hazelwood, 
Inkster,
Michigan, to this defendant for any information
stating why there is a request to search this
location. 
It doesn’t have to be the defendant’s 
residence but there has to be, in this Court’s
judgment, something connecting the defendant to
the location that was searched. 
Whether it was somewhere he worked, whether
it was somewhere he was seen going in and out of.
Whether it was somewhere he lived, or someone saw
him going into after the incident, was it his
girlfriend or him being associated in some manner
with that location. 
11  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
And on the face of the affidavit I don’t 
find anything connecting the defendant to that
location that was searched. 
So therefore based on those findings by the
Court, I’m going to grant the motion. 
I don’t 
think that the affidavit sufficiently established
the 
probable 
cause 
necessary 
so 
that 
the 
magistrate 
could 
properly 
have 
issued 
the 
warrant. So the motion is granted. 
This is a case in which the affidavit offered 
absolutely no information linking defendant to the address 
on the warrant. 
It was not objectively reasonable for the 
police officers to have relied on a warrant that did not 
provide any information connecting defendant with the place 
to be searched. 
The majority pointedly states that the 
information provided was not false or misleading. 
And I 
agree, but that is only because it is impossible for one to 
find nonexistent information false or misleading.7 
7 Remarkably, the majority refers to violating our
Constitution’s probable cause requirement, and therefore
our citizens’ constitutional rights, as a “technical 
defect.” 
Ante at 21 n 9. 
I disagree. 
In this case,
conducting a search based on a warrant that does not
establish any connection between the place to be searched
and a defendant is not merely a technical violation. 
As 
the United States Supreme Court recently held, when a
warrant does not describe the items to be seized at all,
the warrant was so obviously deficient that the search is
regarded as warrantless. Groh v Ramirez, 540 US ___; 124 S
Ct 1284, 1290; 157 L Ed 2d 1068 (2004). 
It was 
unreasonable for a law enforcement officer to rely on a
warrant “so patently defective.” 
Id. at 1292. 
“[E]ven a
cursory reading of the warrant in this case—perhaps just a
simple glance—would have revealed a glaring deficiency that
(continued . . . .) 
12  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
The good-faith exception is premised on the belief 
that the law enforcement officer was “‘acting as a 
reasonable 
officer 
would 
and 
should 
act 
in 
similar 
circumstances.’” 
Leon, supra at 920, quoting Stone v 
Powell, 428 US 465, 539-540; 96 S Ct 3037; 49 L Ed 2d 1067 
(1976)(White, J., dissenting).  Leon even states, “We 
emphasize that the standard of reasonableness we adopt is 
an objective one. . . . 
The objective standard we adopt, 
moreover, requires officers to have a reasonable knowledge 
of what the law prohibits.” Id. at 920 n 20. 
Unlike 
the 
majority, 
I 
give 
our 
trained 
law 
enforcement officers more credit, and I believe law 
enforcement officers know that when submitting an affidavit 
in support of the issuance of a search warrant they must 
include why they believe the area should be searched. 
Because of the lack of any information linking defendant to 
any 
reasonable 
police 
officer 
would 
have 
known 
was 
constitutionally fatal.” 
Id. at 1294. 
Likewise, an 
affidavit that provides no information linking a defendant
to the address to be searched, like the affidavit in this
case, is also a glaring deficiency that would be evident to
any reasonable law enforcement officer. 
While Groh dealt 
with qualified immunity, the Court used the same standard
of objective reasonableness articulated in Leon. 
13  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
the place to be searched, even under the Leon good-faith 
exception, this warrant is insufficient.8 
Further, the magistrate in this case did not review 
the affidavit for issuance of a search warrant with neutral 
and detached scrutiny. 
Id. at 913-914. 
The magistrate 
authorized a search warrant that provided no information 
linking the address with defendant. A neutral and detached 
magistrate would have directed the police officers to 
provide information linking the address to be searched with 
defendant. There is simply no fact indicating a connection 
between the address and defendant. 
There is no other term 
for the magistrate’s approval in this case other than to 
describe it as being a “rubber stamp for the police.” 
Id. 
at 914. 
The majority also argues “that the high cost of the 
exclusionary rule exacts too great a toll on our justice 
system.” 
Ante at 21 n 9. 
The exclusionary rule, grounded 
in our Constitution, has been the rule of law in Michigan 
for over eighty years. 
While it may be obvious, I note 
that our state has managed to exist for decades with the 
8 See, e.g., Figert v State, 686 NE2d 827, 832 (Ind,
1997) (the good-faith exception does not apply when the
affidavit does not sufficiently link the home to be 
searched to criminal activity). 
14  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
exclusionary rule and our streets have yet to become 
teeming with criminals released on “technicalities.” 
Finally, I am somewhat heartened by the fact that the 
ever-sensitive concurrence has seen fit to attack my 
dissent with a lengthy diatribe championing law and order. 
I also applaud the concurrence’s ability to vigorously 
criticize the dissent for its “overwrought language” and 
“hyperbolic rhetoric,” yet still manage to hysterically 
argue 
that 
the 
dissent’s 
approach 
leaves 
criminal 
defendants “on the streets to continue to prey upon their 
communities . . . .” Ante at 1, 7. While I am unclear how 
an 
allegedly 
increased 
crime 
rate 
is 
relevant 
in 
determining our citizens’ constitutional rights, it is 
quite a marvel to watch the concurrence criticize the 
dissent 
for 
attempting 
to 
protect 
our 
citizens’ 
constitutional liberties.9
 At its core, the concurrence 
9 Notably, crime rates have actually been going down. 
See, e.g., and <http://www.fbi.
gov> (accessed February 27, 2004). 
If crime rates are to 
be considered in constitutional interpretation, as the 
concurrence indicates, then the falling rates should give
the concurrence pause. Perhaps the concurrence will change
its notion if the rates continue to fall. Or, if the rates
unfortunately increase, the concurrence may argue for a
greater contraction of constitutional liberties. 
Either 
way, 
the 
concurrence’s 
idiosyncratic 
method 
of 
constitutional interpretation is certainly unique.
(continued . . . .) 
15  
 
 
                                                 
 
clearly indicates the fundamental difference between my 
view of our citizens’ constitutional liberties and the 
majority and concurrence’s views. 
I believe that the 
Constitution exists to protect all citizens, and the Bill 
of Rights, the first ten amendments, to protect all 
citizens from unlawful acts by the government. 
I do not 
believe that requiring the government to follow the law, 
while attempting to catch those who are allegedly breaking 
it, is a radical notion so easily dismissed. 
If, as the 
concurrence advocates, “[e]vidence is the lifeblood of the 
criminal justice process,” ante at 4, then I believe that 
the Constitution is the lifeblood of our democracy, and I 
do not agree with attempts to violate it. 
The concurrence argues that the exclusionary rule has 
no effect in deterring even a single improper search. 
It 
The 
concurrence’s 
distinctive 
ideas 
about 
constitutional interpretation also extend to its recitation
of numerous federal cases dealing with the exclusionary
rule in various settings, such as deportation proceedings.
In citing the “balancing test” from United States v Janis,
428 US 433, 454; 96 S Ct 3021; 49 L Ed 2d 1046 (1976), the
concurrence 
apparently 
believes 
that 
the 
more 
law 
enforcement officers disregard the exclusionary rule, the
less effective it is. 
Therefore, the lack of a deterrent
effect justifies the violation of citizens’ constitutional
rights. 
This very notion—that the government’s disregard
of 
constitutional 
rights 
justifies 
the 
government’s
continued and increased disregard of constitutional rights—
appears contrary to logic and, of course, our nation’s
history. 
16  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
is 
disingenuous 
to 
argue 
that 
the 
actions 
of 
law 
enforcement 
officers 
will 
not 
be 
influenced 
by 
the 
knowledge that even “mistakes” that violate a citizen’s 
constitutional rights are still admissible in a court of 
law. The facts of this case indicate that the majority and 
concurrence are willing to classify almost any conduct as a 
“mistake.” 
The concurrence even goes so far as to rename 
these constitutional violations “good-faith imperfections.” 
Ante at 19 n 7.10  It is hard to take the arguments of the 
majority and concurrence seriously when they argue, as they 
do in this case, that a reasonable law enforcement officer 
would make the “mistake” of submitting an affidavit in 
support of a search warrant that provides no link between 
the defendant and the place to be searched. 
The majority and concurrence also argue that excluding 
evidence seized in violation of our Constitution hinders 
public confidence. I have much more faith in the people of 
our state. 
I believe that public confidence is shattered 
by a government that does not respect the constitutional 
10 The concurrence also argues that people whose 
constitutional rights have been violated could pursue a
civil damages lawsuit. However, governmental immunity will
preclude 
the 
vast 
majority 
of 
these 
lawsuits 
and,
therefore, it is not a realistic remedy. 
See, e.g., MCL
691.1401 et seq. 
17  
 
 
 
 
rights of its citizens. 
I believe the citizens of our 
state understand that the Constitution protects us all and 
that 
they 
do 
not 
have 
to 
make 
a 
choice 
between 
constitutional liberties and justice. 
I believe our 
citizens expect the government to follow the law, just as 
they are required to do. 
No matter how “indispensable” 
evidence may be, law enforcement officers are not given a 
free pass merely because they are cloaked with governmental 
authority. 
The concurrence indicates its belief that our 
citizens’ constitutional liberties should be discarded 
because it will make us “safer.” 
What a peculiar notion. 
Contrary to the concurrence, I agree with the following 
values, stated so eloquently by Justice Brandeis in his 
dissenting opinion in Olmstead v United States, 277 US 438, 
485; 48 S Ct 564; 72 L Ed 944 (1928): 
Decency, security and liberty alike demand
that government officials shall be subjected to
the same rules of conduct that are commands to 
the citizen. 
In a government of laws, existence
of the government will be imperilled if it fails
to observe the law scrupulously. 
Our Government 
is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good
or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its
example. Crime is contagious. If the Government 
becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law;
it invites every man to become a law unto 
himself; it invites anarchy. 
To declare that in 
the administration of the criminal law the end 
justifies 
the 
means—to 
declare 
that 
the 
Government may commit crimes in order to secure
the conviction of a private criminal—would bring
terrible retribution. 
Against that pernicious 
18  
 
 
 
 
 
 
doctrine this Court should resolutely set its
face. 
In the future, I am confident that history will show 
that the tactics used by the concurrence are flawed ones. 
Our citizens’ concerns about safety should not be exploited 
because the concurrence believes that it has some divine 
notion 
about 
the 
Constitution’s 
meaning. 
If 
the 
Constitution truly means what the concurrence argues, then 
crime rates and public confidence have nothing to do with 
the analysis. 
The concurrence claims that the “the 
dissent’s constitution is one that would be unrecognizable 
to the framers of the United States Constitution or the 
Michigan Constitution, as well as to generations of 
justices . . . .” 
Ante at 19-20. 
I believe what would be 
unrecognizable to the framers and past generations of 
justices would be the majority and concurrence’s insistence 
on discarding the rights of our citizens for their new 
version of a law and order society that these justices have 
decided is best for the people. 
Our decisions are our 
legacy. 
History will be our judge, and I welcome its 
review. 
When 
our 
government 
violates 
our 
citizens’ 
constitutional rights, it should find no refuge in our 
courts. Today, the majority disregards decades of reasoned 
19  
 
 
 
 
 
 
I 
and sound jurisprudence by this Court protecting our 
citizens against unreasonable searches. 
Therefore, 
respectfully dissent. 
Michael F. Cavanagh
Marilyn Kelly 
20