Title: Todd Jandrt v. Jerome Foods, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1998AP000885
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: October 28, 1999

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-0885 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
Todd Jandrt, a minor, by his Guardian ad  
Litem, Larry B. Brueggeman, Kristine K.  
Kinsley Stoeklen, as Special  
Administrator of the Estate of Mitchell  
J. Kinsley, deceased, Tierney Liazuk, a  
minor, by her Guardian ad Litem, Larry B.  
Brueggeman,  
 
Plaintiffs, 
 
 
v. 
 
Jerome Foods, Inc.  
 
Defendant-Respondent, 
Monica Jandrt, Jodi Liazuk and Kristen K.  
Kinsley Stoeklen,  
 
Third-Party Defendants, 
Previant, Goldberg, Uelmen, Gratz, Miller  
& Brueggeman, S.C.,  
 
Judgment Debtor-Appellant.  
 
ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Previously reported at: 227 Wis. 2d 531, 
597 N.W.2d 744, (1999) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
October 28, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
      
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed),  
 
 
 
BRADLEY, J., joins. 
 
Not Participating: SYKES, J., did not participate 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
      
 
No. 
98-0885 
 
 
1 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 98-0885 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :  
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Todd Jandrt, a minor, by his Guardian ad  
Litem, Larry B. Brueggeman, Kristine K.  
Kinsley Stoeklen, as Special  
Administrator of the Estate of Mitchell  
J. Kinsley, deceased, Tierney Liazuk, a  
minor, by her Guardian ad Litem, Larry B.  
Brueggeman,  
 
          Plaintiffs, 
 
     v. 
 
Jerome Foods, Inc.  
 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
 
Monica Jandrt, Jodi Liazuk and Kristen K.  
Kinsley Stoeklen,  
 
          Third-Party Defendants, 
 
Previant, Goldberg, Uelmen, Gratz, Miller  
& Brueggeman, S.C.,  
 
          Judgment Debtor-Appellant. 
 
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM (on motion for reconsideration).  The 
motion for reconsideration is denied, with $50.00 costs. 
¶2 
DIANE S. SYKES, J., did not participate. 
 
FILED 
 
OCT 28, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 98-0885.ssa 
 
 
 
1 
¶3 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (on motion for 
reconsideration) (dissenting). 
 
We believe that this is a case of significant 
importance to all attorneys practicing in the state, 
regardless 
of 
their 
affiliation 
with 
either the 
plaintiff’s or defense bar.  It is our position that 
this is a matter that needs to be addressed in an even 
handed way since it affects both sides dramatically. 
 
¶4 
I agree with the Civil Trial Counsel of Wisconsin, 
which recently wrote the above quoted words to this court 
seeking the opportunity to participate in the pending motion for 
reconsideration. 
¶5 
I would put this case on for additional briefing and 
give 
not 
only the Civil 
Trial Counsel of 
Wisconsin an 
opportunity to participate but also encourage amicus curiae 
briefs from attorneys, members of the public and public interest 
groups to address the practical implications of the court’s 
decision.  
¶6 
The court's opinion will have a significant effect on 
the practice of law in this state for both plaintiffs' and 
defendants' counsel and on the people of the state of Wisconsin 
seeking redress of wrongs or defending themselves in court. 
Because the reasons to reconsider this case are compelling, I 
dissent to denying reconsideration.  
¶7 
This case is an appropriate one for reconsideration. 
The 
court’s 
internal 
operating 
procedures 
describe 
the 
No. 98-0885.ssa 
 
 
 
2 
acceptable grounds for granting a motion for reconsideration.1  I 
agree with the grounds for reconsideration set forth therein, 
and I believe the internal operating procedures should be 
followed.  Deviating from the internal operating procedures “is 
likely to encourage reconsiderations that have no merit.”2  
Furthermore, the court’s violation of its own procedures “does a 
disservice to the lawyers and litigants” and “opens the door to 
speculation that the court has acted in an arbitrary manner.”3  
¶8 
Nevertheless, there are appropriate times to deviate 
from the internal operating procedures relating to motions for 
reconsideration, and the court has done so on a number of 
occasions.  “The Reports [of our decisions] contain instances 
which demonstrate that the court has changed its mind and issued 
a new decision without any mention of the principles that are 
                     
1  Supreme Court Internal Operating Procedure, II, J., Wis. 
Stat. 1997-98, provides as follows:  
Reconsideration, in the sense of a rehearing of the 
case, is seldom granted.  A change of decision on 
reconsideration will ensue only when the court has 
overlooked controlling legal precedent or important 
policy 
considerations 
or 
has 
overlooked 
or 
misconstrued 
a 
controlling 
or 
significant 
fact 
appearing in the record. A motion for reconsideration 
may result in the court’s issuing a corrective or 
explanatory memorandum to its opinion without changing 
the original mandate. 
 
2 School Dist. of Shorewood v. Wausau Ins. Co., 174 Wis. 2d 
726, 729-730, 498 N.W.2d 823 (1993)(Heffernan, C.J., and 
Bablitch, J., dissenting). 
3 School Dist. of Shorewood v. Wausau Ins. Co., 174 Wis. 2d 
at 731 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). 
No. 98-0885.ssa 
 
 
 
3 
now embodied in our Internal Operating Procedures.”4  However, 
when the court does deviate from its established internal 
operating procedures, as it has reserved the power to do,5 I 
believe an explanation is in order. 
¶9 
Although it is arguable that this case falls within 
one of the grounds for reconsideration set forth in the internal 
operating procedures, I do not base my dissent from the denial 
of reconsideration on any such ground.  Rather, I base my 
dissent on a recognized exception to the internal operating 
procedures on reconsideration: The court may reconsider a “case 
of unusual circumstances when such deviation [from the internal 
operating procedures] is compelling and fully explained and 
justified.”6 
                     
4 School Dist. of Shorewood v. Wausau Ins. Co., 174 Wis. 2d 
at 729-730 (Heffernan, C.J., and Bablitch, J., dissenting). 
5 “These procedures are intended for the advice of counsel 
practicing in the Supreme Court and for information to the 
public; they are not rules of appellate procedure.  . . .  It 
should be reemphasized that these are not rules.  . . .  These 
internal operating procedures are merely descriptive of how the 
court currently functions.  Any internal operating procedure may 
be suspended or modified by a majority vote of a quorum of the 
court.”  Intro. to Wis. S. Ct. IOP, Wis. Stat. 1997-98. 
6 School Dist. of Shorewood v. Wausau Ins. Co., 174 Wis. 2d 
at 727 (Heffernan, C.J., and Bablitch, J., dissenting). 
No. 98-0885.ssa 
 
 
 
4 
¶10 I conclude that this case should be reconsidered and 
reheard because it is a case of unusual circumstances, and the 
reasons to reconsider it are compelling.  Let me explain. 
¶11 Section 814.025, relating to frivolous actions and 
defenses, has in recent years become a major tool in litigation 
practice.  A search on Westlaw reveals that since 1990, the 
statute has been cited in 104 published cases of this court and 
the court of appeals.  This trend in Wisconsin corresponds with 
a dramatic national increase in the use of claims for sanctions 
against 
attorneys 
for 
bringing 
frivolous 
actions. 
 
One 
commentator notes that “[t]he increasing use of judicial 
sanctions against lawyers and their clients is perhaps the most 
                                                                  
The 
School 
District 
of 
Shorewood 
case 
presents 
an 
interesting study of the court’s practices on reconsideration.  
The court initially issued a 4-3 decision in Shorewood, reported 
at 168 Wis. 2d 390, 484 N.W.2d 314 (1992).  On a motion for 
reconsideration, 
without 
explaining 
the 
basis 
for 
its 
reconsideration or granting the parties an opportunity for 
further written or oral argument on the merits of the case, the 
court on a 6-1 vote vacated the previous majority opinion and 
adopted the dissenting opinion as the majority opinion. This new 
decision is reported at 170 Wis. 2d 347, 488 N.W.2d 82 
(1992)(Abrahamson, J. dissenting on the granting of the motion 
for reconsideration on procedural and substantive grounds). 
The losing party (previously the winning party) then moved 
for the court to reconsider its new decision.  The court on a 4-
3 vote denied the motion to reconsider.  Three justices 
dissented 
on 
the 
court’s 
denial 
of 
the 
motion 
for 
reconsideration, asserting procedural grounds. 
No. 98-0885.ssa 
 
 
 
5 
significant recent development in federal and state civil 
procedure.”7 
¶12 Although some might conclude that the increasing use 
of sanctions litigation has had the positive effect of deterring 
frivolous proceedings, others point out that any such gains have 
come at a cost.  As one commentator argues, “[n]o clear line 
divides 
the 
reasonable 
lawsuit 
from 
the 
unreasonable—and 
sanctionable—lawsuit.  Sanctions schemes based upon an objective 
standard, therefore, tend to chill individuals from exercising 
their rights of fair access to the courts.  The threat of 
sanctions 
under 
these 
schemes 
does 
more 
than 
discourage 
litigants 
from 
pursuing 
‘frivolous’ 
arguments; 
it 
also 
discourages 
litigants 
from 
pursuing 
some 
legitimate 
and 
colorable arguments.”8 
¶13 This court has consistently recognized the possibility 
that 
the 
overuse 
of 
§ 814.025 
will 
deter 
important 
and 
meritorious claims.  As we emphasized in the Radelin case, 
 
                     
7 Byron C. Keeling, Toward a Balanced Approach to Frivolous 
Litigation: A Critical Review of Federal Rule 11 and State 
Sanction Provisions, 21 Pepp. L. Rev. 1067, 1071 (1994) 
(critiquing Rule 11 and state sanction provisions).  See also 
Michael J. Mazurczak, Critical Analysis of Rule 11 Sanctions in 
the Seventh Circuit, 72 Marq. L. Rev. 91, 92 (1988) (noting that 
the satellite litigation over Rule 11 motions is fast becoming 
the cottage industry of the 1980s). 
8 Byron C. Keeling, Toward a Balanced Approach to Frivolous 
Litigation: A Critical Review of Federal Rule 11 and State 
Sanction Provisions, 21 Pepp. L. Rev. 1067, 1070 (1994) 
(footnotes omitted). 
No. 98-0885.ssa 
 
 
 
6 
Frivolous action claims are an especially delicate 
area since it is here that ingenuity, foresightedness 
and competency of the bar must be encouraged and not 
stifled. 
 
Without 
that 
dedication 
of 
the 
bar, 
Wisconsin would still have the duties of landlords to 
others dependent on the relationship of those persons 
to the land; statutes of limitations would start from 
the day of the actual injury, not from the date the 
plaintiff knew of the injury or should have known; and 
an injured plaintiff would have to identify the exact 
drug manufacturer whose product injured her. 
 
Radelin v. Industrial Fire & Casualty Ins., 117 Wis. 2d 
605, 613, 345 N.W.2d 874 (1984) (citations omitted). 
¶14 Ten years later, in the Stern case, we further 
recognized that in allegations of frivolousness all doubts are 
to be resolved in favor of finding a claim non-frivolous.  The 
court stated this principle as follows: 
 
We also note that an attorney has an obligation to 
represent his or her client's interests zealously, and 
that this may include making some claims which are not 
entirely clear in the law or on the facts, at least 
when commenced.  Thus, when a frivolous action claim 
is made, all doubts are resolved in favor of finding 
the claim non-frivolous. 
 
Stern v. Thompson & Coates, 185 Wis. 2d 220, 235, 517 
N.W.2d 658 (1994).9 
¶15 The 
concerns 
we 
have 
expressed 
about 
deterring 
creative claims or defenses are especially heightened in this 
case.  The claim presented is complex and is seeking to prove a 
                     
9 See also Juneau County v. Courthouse Employees, 221 
Wis. 2d 630, 640, 585 N.W.2d 587 (1998) ("Because it is only 
when no reasonable basis exists for a claim or defense that 
frivolousness exists, the statute resolves doubts in favor of 
the litigant or attorney.") 
No. 98-0885.ssa 
 
 
 
7 
causal link between chemicals and birth defects that previously 
has not been established.  Although the court’s decision focuses 
on the novelty of this claim and the plaintiffs’ lack of proof 
of causation, it is often in such “toxic tort” cases that making 
new arguments is essential.  Every toxic tort has a first case, 
and all of them are initially considered “novel.”  The recent 
tobacco litigation is a case in point.  The defendant’s own 
expert in this case recognized that today there are 30 to 35 
substances that are known to produce birth defects.  A decade 
ago, the expert admitted, the number would have been fewer than 
20.  Often the science behind these advancements was developed 
or uncovered in response to litigation, some of which was 
unsuccessful. 
¶16 The court concedes that this action was not frivolous 
on filing; it was filed to avoid a pending change in the law.  
But the plaintiffs' continuation of the action for 43 days after 
the complaint was filed was declared frivolous by this court.  
The court’s decision creates a predicament for attorneys.  A 
delay in filing might constitute malpractice.  But filing in the 
hope that evidence will materialize might subject counsel to a 
charge of frivolousness. 
¶17 The troubling “Catch-22” effects of § 814.025 were 
recognized in a law review article more than a decade ago.10  
That article noted that key facts about a claim are often in the 
                     
10 Jay W. Endress, Is Wisconsin's Frivolous Claim Statute 
Frivolous? A Critical Analysis of Wis. Stat. § 814.025, 68 Marq. 
L. Rev. 279 (1985). 
No. 98-0885.ssa 
 
 
 
8 
possession of the opposing party and may not be discoverable 
until a claim is filed.  The article's author summarizes well 
the predicament facing the plaintiffs’ lawyers in this case: 
“The alternative to proceeding in light of the missing data is 
to forego [sic] any further advancement and possibly risk a suit 
for legal malpractice.  Thus many lawsuits will be frivolous 
 . . . because of an honest lack of facts that is promoted by 
the judicial system itself.”11  In this case it was arguably 
reasonable for plaintiffs’ counsel to seek information about the 
employees’ levels of exposure to the chemicals at Jerome Foods 
before consulting an expert to determine causation. 
¶18 The court’s holding that an expert is not needed prior 
to filing suit is consistent with federal law interpreting Rule 
11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Nevertheless, given 
the short time within which this action became frivolous 
according to this court's decision (43 days after filing of the 
complaint, to be exact), lawyers will be required to hire 
experts before filing or immediately after filing suit.  As a 
result of this decision, lawyers cannot rely on discovery to 
obtain information to protect themselves against a claim of 
frivolousness. 
¶19 Different jurisdictions have interpreted "frivolous" 
in different ways.  The Wisconsin cases have been criticized.12 
It is time for the court to reexamine its interpretation of 
                     
11 Id. at 300. 
12 Jay W. Endress, supra note 10 at 301.  
No. 98-0885.ssa 
 
 
 
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§ 814.025 to consider both the need to preserve free access to 
the courts and the need to curb litigation abuses. 
¶20 For the reasons set forth, I dissent to denying the 
motion for reconsideration. 
¶21 I am authorized to state that JUSTICE ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent.