Title: Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Smelser
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 012841
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: June 7, 2002

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, AN OHIO CORPORATION 
 
v.  Record No. 012841   OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
 
June 7, 2002 
JO-ANNA SMELSER, EXECUTRIX, ET AL. 
 
 
UPON A QUESTION OF LAW CERTIFIED BY THE UNITED 
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
 
 
Under the provisions of Rule 5:42, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit certified to this Court a 
question of Virginia insurance law.  The certified question 
accepted by this Court asks whether a pedestrian, who was 
injured when her purse was "snatched" by an unidentified 
passenger in a moving vehicle, sustained injuries arising "out 
of the use of an uninsured motor vehicle for purposes of 
uninsured motorist provisions in [a certain insurance] policy."  
The facts as stated in the certification order are set forth 
below. 
 
On March 27, 1999, Mary B. Smelser (Mrs. Smelser), then 74 
years old, was a passenger in an automobile driven by her 
daughter, Jo-Anna Smelser (Jo-Anna), from Virginia Beach to the 
Williamsburg Outlet Mall in Lightfoot.  After Jo-Anna parked the 
car in the mall parking lot, Mrs. Smelser stepped from the 
passenger side of the vehicle, walked to the rear of the car, 
and turned toward the mall.  Her purse hung from her left 
shoulder.  Because it was raining outside, Jo-Anna momentarily 
remained in the vehicle to locate an umbrella. 
 
Jo-Anna heard "the sound of tires spinning in water trying 
to get traction" and both Jo-Anna and Mrs. Smelser heard a "very 
loud" engine noise.  At that moment, a car driven by an unknown 
male accelerated rapidly toward Mrs. Smelser.  Another unknown 
male reached from the passenger-side window of the approaching 
car and grabbed the strap of Mrs. Smelser's purse, pulling Mrs. 
Smelser toward the vehicle.  The male passenger dragged Mrs. 
Smelser about ten feet alongside the car before she fell to the 
pavement.  The driver and passenger then fled from the scene in 
the automobile. 
 
Mrs. Smelser sustained injuries as a result of this 
incident, including fractures of her left shoulder and pelvis.  
In her description of the incident, Mrs. Smelser stated that she 
was "whipped off the ground and pinned to the car, until her 
shoulder broke."  She described hearing a "cracking sound" and 
feeling "a very severe sharp pain in her left shoulder" before 
she was "propelled" away from the vehicle.  She did not know 
whether the vehicle actually struck her or dragged her. 
 
Mrs. Smelser was insured under a motor vehicle liability 
insurance policy that her husband, Eugene J. Smelser, maintained 
with Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company (Nationwide).  Because 
the driver of the car carrying the "purse-snatching" passenger 
 
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was unknown, Mrs. Smelser sought recovery under the uninsured 
and underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) provisions of her husband's 
insurance policy (the Nationwide policy).  That policy required 
Nationwide to pay to Mrs. Smelser, "in accordance with Section 
38.2-2206 of the Code of Virginia," all sums that she was 
legally entitled to recover as damages from the driver of an 
uninsured vehicle for injuries resulting from "the ownership, 
maintenance or use" of the uninsured motor vehicle. 
 
Mrs. Smelser filed a motion for judgment in the Circuit 
Court for the City of Virginia Beach against the unknown 
motorist, requesting damages under the above provisions of the 
Nationwide policy.  In September 1999, Mrs. Smelser died from 
causes unrelated to the "purse-snatching" incident and Jo-Anna 
and Eugene qualified as executors of her estate (collectively, 
the executors). 
Nationwide filed a declaratory judgment action against the 
executors in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia seeking a declaration that Nationwide was 
not liable to provide coverage for Mrs. Smelser's injuries.  The 
personal injury action in Virginia Beach was stayed pending the 
outcome of the declaratory judgment action. 
In the declaratory judgment action, Nationwide asserted 
that Mrs. Smelser was not entitled to coverage under the policy 
provision at issue because "the facts and circumstances of the 
 
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alleged incident do not constitute . . . 'use' of the motor 
vehicle" under Va. Code § 38.2-2206.  Nationwide and the 
executors filed cross-motions for summary judgment. 
In support of their summary judgment motion, the executors 
submitted an affidavit from Richard T. Holden, M.D., Mrs. 
Smelser's orthopedic surgeon.  In the affidavit, Dr. Holden 
stated an opinion within a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty that it was "highly unlikely" that Mrs. Smelser's 
injuries "were caused by a man seated in a stationary 
automobile."  Dr. Holden further concluded that "her injuries 
were entirely consistent with . . . being forcibly pulled to a 
moving automobile, dragged approximately ten feet, and then 
dropped to a parking lot surface." 
 
The executors also submitted an affidavit from Robert S. 
Neff, M.D., another orthopedic surgeon.  Dr. Neff stated that 
after a review of Mrs. Smelser's medical records, it was his 
opinion within a reasonable degree of medical certainty that 
Mrs. Smelser's injuries "were not caused by a man seated in a 
stationary automobile."  Dr. Neff concluded that, instead, Mrs. 
Smelser's injuries were "entirely consistent with a man in a 
moving vehicle grabbing [Mrs. Smelser] or her purse strap." 
 
After hearing argument on the cross-motions for summary 
judgment, a magistrate judge granted Nationwide's motion and 
denied the executors' motion.  The court held that the 
 
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circumstances leading to Mrs. Smelser's injuries did not 
constitute "use" of an uninsured motor vehicle under the UM/UIM 
provisions of the Nationwide policy.  The executors appealed 
from this judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit, which certified the present question of Virginia 
law to this Court. 
 
The executors argue before this Court that Mrs. Smelser was 
entitled to coverage under the UM/UIM provisions of the 
Nationwide policy because the automobile carrying the unknown 
assailants was being used as a vehicle at the time she was 
injured.  The executors assert that the assailants used the car 
to assist in stealing Mrs. Smelser's purse and to effect their 
escape.  According to the executors' argument, the force of the 
moving vehicle dragged Mrs. Smelser before she fell onto the 
pavement and, thus, was a substantial factor contributing to the 
cause of her injuries. 
 
In response, Nationwide contends that the outcome of the 
present case is controlled by our decisions in Lexie v. State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 251 Va. 390, 469 
S.E.2d 61 (1996), and Travelers Insurance Company v. LaClair, 
250 Va. 368, 463 S.E.2d 461 (1995).  Nationwide asserts that 
like the employment of the vehicles in those cases, the 
assailants' vehicle in the present case was being used as a 
fortress or an outpost from which they inflicted intentional 
 
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injury on another person.  Nationwide also argues that the 
parties to the insurance contract did not contemplate the 
provision of UM/UIM coverage for criminal acts committed by a 
passenger in an uninsured vehicle.*
 
Certain general principles govern this inquiry.  Under Code 
§ 38.2-2206(B) and the terms of the Nationwide policy, a motor 
vehicle is an "uninsured motor vehicle" when the owner or 
operator of the vehicle is unknown.  As Nationwide concedes, 
Mrs. Smelser, wife of the named insured residing in the same 
household with her husband, was an insured of the first class 
entitled to seek coverage under the policy's uninsured motorist 
provisions for injuries she sustained as a pedestrian.  See 
Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Perry, 204 Va. 833, 836, 134 S.E.2d 
418, 420 (1964). 
In determining the scope of coverage provided under the 
Nationwide policy, we must consider the intention of the parties 
to the insurance contract as expressed in the policy terms, 
including those terms required by Code § 38.2-2206.  See Lexie, 
251 Va. at 396, 469 S.E.2d at 64; LaClair, 250 Va. at 371-72, 
463 S.E.2d at 463.  We will construe the contract provisions 
concerning "use" of a vehicle in accordance with the natural and 
                     
 
* Both Nationwide and Smelser agree that in answering the 
certified question, this Court need not address the issue 
whether there was a concert of action between the driver and the 
passenger of the unknown vehicle. 
 
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ordinary meaning of the terms employed.  Id.; State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Powell, 227 Va. 492, 500, 318 S.E.2d 393, 397 
(1984). 
 
In order for an injury to be classified as arising from the 
"use" of a vehicle, there must be a causal relationship between 
the injury sustained and the employment of the motor vehicle as 
a vehicle.  Edwards v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 256 Va. 
128, 130, 500 S.E.2d 819, 821 (1998); Randall v. Liberty Mut. 
Ins. Co., 255 Va. 62, 66, 496 S.E.2d 54, 56 (1998); Lexie, 251 
Va. at 396, 469 S.E.2d at 64; LaClair, 250 Va. at 372, 463 
S.E.2d at 463.  However, such "use of the vehicle need not be 
the direct, proximate cause of the injury in the strict legal 
sense."  Id. (quoting Powell, 227 Va. at 500, 318 S.E.2d at 
397). 
 
In Lexie and LaClair, we examined the nature of this causal 
relationship in the factual context of criminal acts committed 
by occupants of uninsured vehicles.  In Lexie, the parties 
seeking coverage under their uninsured motorist policy 
provisions were riding in a moving vehicle when they were 
injured in a "drive-by shooting" perpetrated by assailants 
occupying another moving vehicle.  We explained that in 
determining uninsured motorist coverage, the main focus of the 
"use" inquiry is the "manner in which the vehicle, whether 
moving or stationary, is being employed, not upon the activity 
 
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or role of any assailant who may be in, upon, or around the 
uninsured vehicle."  Lexie, 251 Va. at 396-97, 469 S.E.2d at 64. 
We held that the injured parties failed to establish that 
their gunshot wounds were sustained as a result of the uninsured 
vehicle being employed as a vehicle.  Id. at 397, 469 S.E.2d at 
64.  Instead, their injuries resulted solely from the activities 
of the assailants in the uninsured vehicle and the movement of 
that vehicle was only an incidental factor in the injuries that 
occurred.  Thus, the evidence failed to demonstrate a causal 
relationship between the injuries sustained and the "use" of the 
vehicle as a vehicle. 
We likewise concluded in LaClair that such a causal 
relationship did not exist.  There, a deputy sheriff was shot 
during a "traffic stop."  His assailant was partially inside the 
uninsured vehicle when the shots were fired and the assailant 
used the stationary vehicle as a shield.  We held that the 
natural and ordinary meaning of "use" of a motor vehicle did not 
include the utilization of the uninsured vehicle as a fortress 
or a shield.  LaClair, 250 Va. at 373, 463 S.E.2d at 464. 
Unlike Lexie and LaClair, the present case involves the 
ordinary movement of a vehicle that was a direct cause, rather 
than a mere incidental aspect, of the injuries sustained.  Here, 
the vehicle's movement and its resulting force were used to help 
wrest the handbag from Mrs. Smelser and to remove the assailants 
 
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from the scene of the crime.  Mrs. Smelser's injuries were 
causally related to the employment of the uninsured vehicle as a 
vehicle because the force from the vehicle's movement directly 
contributed to her injuries.  Thus, we conclude that Mrs. 
Smelser's injuries arose out of the "use" of the uninsured motor 
vehicle under the UM/UIM provisions in the Nationwide policy. 
For these reasons, we will answer the certified question in 
the affirmative. 
Certified question answered in the affirmative.
 
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