Title: People v. Boclair
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 89388, 89471, 89534
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: August 29, 2002

Docket Nos. 89388, 89471, 89534 cons.-Agenda 7-May 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
STANLEY BOCLAIR, Appellant.-THE PEOPLE OF THE 
STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. JOE McCAIN, 
Appellee.-THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, 
Appellant, v. EARNEST JOHNSON, Appellee.
Opinion filed August 29, 2002.
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:
	The defendants in these three consolidated cases, Stanley
Boclair, Joe McCain, and Earnest Johnson, were separately
convicted of various unrelated crimes and are currently
incarcerated. Their convictions were affirmed on direct review.
Subsequently, each defendant filed a petition for post-conviction
relief. The circuit court summarily dismissed each post-conviction
petition. All three defendants appealed.
	In Boclair, 312 Ill. App. 3d 346, the Fourth District affirmed
the dismissal. In McCain, 312 Ill. App. 3d 529, the Fifth District
reversed and held that the circuit court should not dismiss a
petition as untimely or on waiver or res judicata grounds at the
first stage of a post-conviction proceeding. Similarly, in Johnson,
312 Ill. App. 3d 532, the Fifth District reversed and held that the
circuit court should not dismiss a petition as untimely without first
providing the State with an opportunity to waive the procedural
defect.
	We granted leave to appeal primarily to determine whether the
circuit court can summarily dismiss a defendant's post-conviction
petition at the first stage of post-conviction proceedings as
untimely. Additionally, we consider whether section 122-1(c) of
the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1(c)
(West 1998)) is unconstitutionally vague and whether Public Act
83-942, eff. November 23, 1983, violates the single subject clause
of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §8(d)). We
answer all three questions in the negative. We reverse the appellate
court's judgment in Boclair and affirm the appellate court's
judgment in McCain and Johnson.

I. BACKGROUND
	Boclair was convicted of murder and conspiracy to commit
murder and was sentenced to death. On direct appeal, we vacated
Boclair's death sentence but affirmed his convictions. People v.
Boclair, 129 Ill. 2d 458 (1989). In November 1991, defendant was
resentenced to natural life in prison. In October 1992, the circuit
court summarily dismissed defendant's pro se post-conviction
petition and the appellate court affirmed. People v. Boclair, 246
Ill. App. 3d 1119 (1993) (unpublished order under Supreme Court
Rule 23). We subsequently denied Boclair's petition for leave to
appeal. People v. Boclair, 152 Ill. 2d 562 (1993). In August 1998,
defendant submitted a supplemental petition for post-conviction
and post-judgment relief alleging that investigators obtained
"newly discovered evidence" while pursuing a federal habeas
corpus challenge. In November 1998, the circuit court summarily
dismissed defendant's supplemental petition as "patently without
merit." The circuit court did not address the timeliness
requirement. The appellate court affirmed, finding that Boclair's
petition was untimely and that Boclair failed even to purport that
he was not culpably negligent. Boclair, 312 Ill. App. 3d 346.
	McCain was convicted of two counts of attempted murder and
three counts of aggravated assault in February 1989. After
sentencing, McCain appealed and the appellate court affirmed.
People v. McCain, 207 Ill. App. 3d 1123 (1991) (unpublished
order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We denied defendant's
petition for leave to appeal. People v. McCain, 139 Ill. 2d 601
(1991). In August 1997, defendant filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief under the Act. The circuit court dismissed
defendant's petition in October 1997, finding that defendant's
petition was not timely filed, that the defendant was culpably
negligent in not filing it on time, and that defendant failed to allege
a constitutional violation that was not addressed on direct appeal
or otherwise waived. The appellate court reversed and held that the
circuit court should not dismiss a petition as untimely or on waiver
or res judicata grounds at the first stage of a post-conviction
proceeding. McCain, 312 Ill. App. 3d 529.
	Johnson was convicted of murder and robbery. He appealed
and the appellate court reversed. People v. Johnson, 138 Ill. App.
3d 980 (1985). On remand, defendant was again convicted. He
appealed and the appellate court affirmed his conviction but
remanded for resentencing. People v. Johnson, 173 Ill. App. 3d
998 (1988). In March 1998, Johnson filed a petition for post-conviction relief. Johnson contended that his failure to seek timely
post-conviction relief was not due to his own culpable negligence.
Johnson based his petition in large part on the recent discovery of
new evidence negating his conviction. The circuit court summarily
dismissed the petition, finding that it was clearly filed beyond the
statutory time limitation and was therefore meritless. The circuit
court further found that Johnson failed to show that his delay in
filing was not due to his own culpable negligence. The appellate
court reversed and held that the circuit court may not dismiss a
petition as untimely without first providing the State with an
opportunity to waive the procedural defect. Johnson, 312 Ill. App.
3d 532.
	Boclair filed a petition for leave to appeal the Fourth District's
decision. Similarly, the State sought leave to appeal from the Fifth
District's decisions. We granted the parties' respective petitions
for leave to appeal and consolidated their cases.

II. ANALYSIS
	On appeal to this court, defendants collectively argue that (1)
the circuit courts erred in summarily dismissing their post-conviction petitions as untimely; (2) section 122-1(c) of the Act
is unconstitutionally vague; and (3) Public Act 83-942, eff.
November 23, 1983, amending the Post-Conviction Hearing Act,
violates the single subject clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill.
Const. 1970, art. IV, §8(d)). We address each issue in turn.

A. Timeliness of Defendants' Petitions
	McCain and Johnson first contend that the circuit courts erred
by summarily denying their post-conviction petitions as untimely
during stage one of the post-conviction proceeding process.
Boclair similarly argues that the appellate court, in affirming
summary dismissal, improperly deemed his petition untimely. We
consider this issue de novo. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366,
388-89 (1998). For the reasons that follow, we agree with
defendants.
	Our decision in People v. Wright, 189 Ill. 2d 1 (1999), is
generally instructive on this issue. There, we considered whether,
in an appeal from the dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the
State may challenge the petition as untimely. Wright, 189 Ill. 2d  at
10-11. We held that the time requirement in section 122-1 is a
statute of limitation and not a jurisdictional prerequisite to a post-conviction proceeding. Section 122-1(c) states, in relevant part,
			"(c) No proceedings under this Article shall be
commenced more than 6 months after the denial of a
petition for leave to appeal or the date for filing such a
petition if none is filed or more than 45 days after the
defendant files his or her brief in the appeal of the
sentence before the Illinois Supreme Court *** or 3 years
from the date of conviction, whichever is sooner, unless
the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not
due to his or her culpable negligence." 725 ILCS
5/122-1(c) (West 1998).
	In Wright, defendant's petition survived the first stage of the
post-conviction proceedings. At the second stage, the circuit court
granted the State's motion to dismiss. On appeal, the defendant
contended that the circuit court erred in granting the State's
motion. The State responded, in part, by claiming, for the first
time, that defendant's petition was untimely and that the circuit
court lacked jurisdiction over the matter.
	We rejected the State's argument that section 122-1's timing
requirements are jurisdictional. Instead, section 122-1's timing
requirements are akin to a statute of limitation and can be waived
or forfeited through procedural default. Wright, 189 Ill. 2d  at 10-11. We stated:
			"[T]he time limitation found in section 122-1 reveals
that it has more in common with statutes of limitations
than it does with statutes conferring jurisdiction. The
plain language of section 122-1 demonstrates that time is
not an integral part of the remedy. *** In fact, if a
petitioner can demonstrate that the late filing was not due
to his culpable negligence, there is no time limit within
which a petitioner must file his post-conviction petition.
[Citations.] A safety valve that allows an unlimited time
in which to file a post-conviction petition cannot be
reconciled with a concept that makes time a condition of
the liability or with a position that time is an inherent
element of the right created. As a lack of culpable
negligence permits the filing of a post-conviction petition
regardless of the length of time that has passed, a lack of
culpable negligence-not time-is the inherent element."
Wright, 189 Ill. 2d  at 8.
Consequently, because the State did not raise the statute of
limitation issue in its second-stage motion to dismiss, the
argument was forfeited on appeal. Wright, 189 Ill. 2d  at 11.
	We further noted that to allow the State to raise a timeliness
objection on appeal would permit the State in all cases to raise an
"affirmative defense that the defendant may [have been] able to
avoid by amending his petition." Wright, 189 Ill. 2d  at 11. We
further cautioned that we were "not limiting the [circuit] court's
ability, during the court's initial review of noncapital petitions
[citation], to dismiss the petition as untimely." We also briefly
referred to the court's "duty" to do so under section 122-2.1(a)(2).
Wright, 189 Ill. 2d  at 11-12.
	 Some appellate court panels have interpreted this language in
Wright as setting forth a "clear directive" that a circuit court may
summarily dismiss petitions as untimely in the initial phase of a
post-conviction petition (People v. Lopez, 317 Ill. App. 3d 1047,
1051 (2000); People v. Carroll, 317 Ill. App. 3d 408 (2000)), as
was held by the appellate court in Boclair, 312 Ill. App. 3d 346.
Other panels have classified this language as dicta and have held
that the circuit court exceeds its authority when it dismisses a post-conviction petition as untimely in the initial stage without a
determination that the petitions were frivolous or patently without
merit (People v. Whitford, 314 Ill. App. 3d 335 (2000); People v.
Hill, 313 Ill. App. 3d 362, 363-64 (2000)), which is what the
panels held in both Johnson, 312 Ill. App. 3d 532, and McCain,
312 Ill. App. 3d 529. We hold that the Act does not authorize the
dismissal of a post-conviction petition during the initial stage
based on untimeliness.
	To the extent that our opinion in Wright may be read as
holding the contrary to be true, we now expressly overturn that
portion of the Wright decision.
	The Act provides a three-stage process for the adjudication of
post-conviction petitions. In the first stage, the circuit court
determines whether the post-conviction petition is "frivolous or is
patently without merit." 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2000).
The State does not have an opportunity to raise any arguments
against the petition during this summary review stage. People v.
Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d 410 (1996). The circuit court is required to
make an independent assessment in the summary review stage as
to whether the allegations in the petition, liberally construed and
taken as true, set forth a constitutional claim for relief. The court
is further foreclosed from engaging in any fact finding or any
review of matters beyond the allegations of the petition. People v.
Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366 (1998).
	To survive dismissal at this stage, the petition must only
present "the gist of a constitutional claim." Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d 
at 418. If the petition is found to be "frivolous" or "patently
without merit," the court "shall dismiss the petition in a written
order, specifying the findings of fact and conclusions of law it
made in reaching its decision." 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West
2000). If the petition survives the initial stage, the court may
appoint counsel to represent an indigent defendant, and counsel
will have an opportunity to amend the petition. 725 ILCS 5/122-1
et seq. (West 2000); People v. Watson, 187 Ill. 2d 448 (1999). The
State then may file a motion to dismiss the petition. 725 ILCS
5/122-5 (West 2000); Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d  at 418. If the State
does not file a motion to dismiss or if the circuit court denies the
State's motion, the circuit court will proceed to the third stage and
conduct an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the petition. 725
ILCS 5/122-6 (West 2000).
	Section 122-2.1(a)(2) requires the circuit court to determine
within 90 days of the filing of a post-conviction petition whether
the petition is "frivolous or is patently without merit." 725 ILCS
5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2000). Importantly, we note that this
section is silent regarding timeliness. Rather, timeliness is
addressed elsewhere, in section 122-1(c), instructing defendants
as to the time periods for filing petitions. If this court can ascertain
legislative intent from the plain language of the statute itself, that
intent must prevail. Barnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378
(1996). We will not depart from the plain language of the statute
by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that
conflict with the express legislative intent. Barnett, 171 Ill. 2d  at
389.
	Under a plain reading of section 122-2.1(a)(2), the circuit
court may dismiss a post-conviction petition at the initial stage
only if the petition is deemed to be "frivolous or *** patently
without merit," not if it is untimely filed. If the legislature intended
for a trial judge to sua sponte dismiss a petition as being untimely,
it would have so provided in section 122-2.1(a)(2) of the Act.
Instead, the legislature provided in section 122-5 that the State
may file a motion to dismiss. 725 ILCS 5/122-5 (West 2000). By
addressing timeliness and frivolousness in separate provisions of
the Act, the legislature plainly intended to draw a distinction
between these two flaws of post-conviction petitions.
	To accept the argument that the circuit court has the authority
to dismiss a petition pursuant to section 122-2.1(a)(2) of the Act
we would have to hold, contrary to the language of the Act, that
the phrase "frivolous or *** patently without merit" encompasses
untimely petitions. We will not ignore the Act's language and
adopt this interpretation. If a petition is untimely that does not
necessarily mean that the petition lacks merit. "Frivolous" has
been defined as "of little weight or importance: having no basis in
law or fact." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 913
(1993); Black's Law Dictionary 677 (7th ed. 1999); accord Anders
v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493, 498, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967) (legal points "arguable on their merits" are not
frivolous). "[P]atently" means "CLEARLY, OBVIOUSLY,
PLAINLY." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1654
(1993); Black's Law Dictionary 1147 (7th ed. 1999). "[M]erit"
means "legal significance, standing, or importance." Webster's
Third New International Dictionary 1414 (1993); Black's Law
Dictionary 1003 (7th ed. 1999). These terms do not include issues
of timeliness.
	Further, time is not an inherent element of the right to bring
a post-conviction petition. Wright, 189 Ill. 2d  at 10-11. For that
reason, time limitations in the Act should be considered as an
affirmative defense and can be raised, waived, or forfeited, by the
State. See Wright, 189 Ill. 2d  at 11-12. If an untimely petition
demonstrates that a defendant suffered a deprivation of
constitutional magnitude, a dutiful prosecutor may waive that
procedural defect during the second stage of the post-conviction
proceedings.
	Moreover, when a circuit court determines whether a
defendant is culpably negligent in filing his petition late, the
circuit court makes an assessment of the defendant's credibility.
See McCain, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 531. At this initial stage of the
proceedings, however, the court should only determine whether
the petition alleges constitutional deprivations. The process at the
summary review stage measures a petition's substantive virtue
rather than its procedural compliance. See Johnson, 312 Ill. App.
3d at 534. In determining an issue of credibility, the circuit court
necessarily exceeds the boundary set by section 122-2.1(a)(1).
	Finally, a defendant's claim of actual innocence cannot be
reviewed when a circuit court enters a summary dismissal sua
sponte, because the State does not have the opportunity to review
the claim. The end result is that the State's prerogative to proceed
on the merits of the petition despite procedural flaws is usurped by
the circuit court.
	Claims of actual innocence may be raised in a manner other
than in a post-conviction petition, including in a section 2-1401
motion. 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2000). Nonetheless, to allow
the circuit court to dismiss summarily post-conviction petitions for
failure to present evidence of actual innocence in a timely manner
could lead to a miscarriage of justice. Although our criminal
justice system needs finality in criminal litigation and judgments,
it should not come at the expense of justice and fairness.
	In sum, we conclude that the matter of untimeliness should be
left for the State to assert during the second stage of the post-conviction proceedings. Therefore, the lower courts improperly
deemed untimely defendants' respective post-conviction petitions.

B. Vagueness Challenge
	Defendants also argue that section 122-1(c)'s timing
requirement is unconstitutionally vague and violates due process.
We disagree.
	As a threshold matter, we observe that defendants failed to
raise this issue below. Nonetheless, a party may challenge the
constitutionality of a statute at any time. People v. Wagener, 196 Ill. 2d 269, 279 (2001). A statute challenged as unconstitutional
enjoys a presumption of constitutionality. Tully v. Edgar, 171 Ill. 2d 297, 304 (1996). If we reasonably can, we must construe a
statute as constitutional and valid. Lee v. Nationwide Cassel, L.P.,
174 Ill. 2d 540, 549 (1996). We will deem a legislative act
unconstitutional when it is so vague, indefinite and uncertain that
the courts are unable, by accepted rules of construction, to
determine with any reasonable degree of precision the legislature's
intent. Spinelli v. Immanuel Lutheran Evangelical Congregation,
Inc., 118 Ill. 2d 389, 402 (1987), quoting Mayhew v. Nelson, 346 Ill. 381, 387 (1931).
	We have found statutes unconstitutionally vague where their
" 'terms are so ill-defined that the ultimate decision as to [their]
meaning rests on the opinions and whims of the trier of fact rather
than any objective criteria or facts.' " Stern v. Norwest Mortgage,
Inc., 179 Ill. 2d 160, 168 (1997), quoting People v. Burpo, 164 Ill. 2d 261, 265-66 (1995). Mathematical certainty in the language is,
however, not required. People v. Warren, 173 Ill. 2d 348, 356
(1996). If a statute can be made more definite by a reasonable
construction, the court must give the statute that interpretation.
People v. Lang, 113 Ill. 2d 407, 455 (1986). A statute will not be
rendered unconstitutionally vague merely because one could
imagine hypotheticals that question the meaning of certain terms.
People v. Izzo, 195 Ill. 2d 109, 113 (2001); In re R.C., 195 Ill. 2d 291, 299 (2001); Schiller Park Colonial Inn, Inc. v. Berz, 63 Ill. 2d 499, 513 (1976).
	In the instant case, we note that we are not dealing with
hypotheticals. Each defendant filed a post-conviction petition that
was deemed untimely. Further, the lower courts held that each
defendant failed to demonstrate an absence of culpable negligence
in bringing his respective petition.
	Section 122-1(c) of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act reads as
follows:
			"No proceedings under this Article shall be commenced
more than 6 months after the denial of a petition for leave
to appeal or the date for filing such a petition if none is
filed or more than 45 days after the defendant files his or
her brief in the appeal of the sentence before the Illinois
Supreme Court (or more than 45 days after the deadline
for the filing of the defendant's brief with the Illinois
Supreme Court if no brief is filed) or 3 years from the date
of conviction, whichever is sooner, unless the petitioner
alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his or
her culpable negligence." 725 ILCS 5/122-1(c) (West
2000).
	Defendants first argue that section 122-1(c) is vague because
it is a run-on sentence and presents several alternative deadlines,
many with triggering dates not defined in section 122-1(c) but,
rather, defined by supreme court rules. Thus, defendants argue,
one must have a certain familiarity with the supreme court rules in
order to determine the applicable deadline. We reject defendants'
contention on this point.
	The argument that a petitioner must have some familiarity
with supreme court rules falls well short of a valid attack on
section 122-1(c)'s constitutionality. Virtually any motion or
petition filed in a court requires a degree of knowledge with
respect to supreme court rules and various procedural rules.
Besides, it is well settled that "[a]ll citizens are presumptively
charged with knowledge of the law." Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 130, 86 L. Ed. 2d 81, 93, 105 S. Ct. 2520, 2529 (1985).
Accord Pyle v. Ferrell, 12 Ill. 2d 547, 555 (1958) (stating that
"ignorance of the law or legal rights will not excuse delay in
bringing suit").
	It may be true that section 122-1(c) is difficult for a defendant
or other layperson to understand. We will not, however, deem a
statute unconstitutionally vague merely because it contains long
sentences or complex language. People v. Conlan, 189 Ill. 2d 286,
292-93 (2000). If we held that statutes with long and complex
sentences were inherently vague, our courts would be invalidating
statutes faster than the legislature could enact statutes.
	Defendants also support their argument that the deadlines are
ambiguous by pointing to a conflict between the districts of our
appellate court on the issue of when a sentence is final. Defendants
refer to the disagreement between the Fourth District's opinion in
People v. Ivy, 313 Ill. App. 3d 1011 (2000), and the Second
District's opinion in People v. Hager, 314 Ill. App. 3d 951 (2000).
We granted Hager's petition for leave to appeal and that cause is
currently pending in this court. People v. Hager, No. 90115.
Defendants argue that pro se litigants cannot be expected to
understand a statute that appellate court panels cannot consistently
discern. Again, we reject defendants' contention on this point. The
fact that a statute might be susceptible of misapplication or
varying interpretations does not necessarily make it
unconstitutional. Stern v. Norwest Mortgage, Inc., 179 Ill. 2d 160,
168 (1997); Stein v. Howlett, 52 Ill. 2d 570, 580 (1972).
	Finally, defendants argue that no decision has elucidated the
meaning of "culpable negligence" or set standards for how to
establish its absence. Since the statute and case law provide no
guidance as to what a petitioner must do to satisfy this standard,
the standard is unconstitutionally vague. Again, we disagree.
	We conclude that the phrase "culpable negligence" is not
unconstitutionally vague. The absence of statutory definitions of
a few terms does not render a statute void for vagueness. People
v. Anderson, 148 Ill. 2d 15, 28 (1992). As noted previously,
language does not possess mathematical or scientific precision,
and courts will give undefined statutory terms their plain and
ordinary meaning. Anderson, 148 Ill. 2d  at 28. Culpable
negligence has been defined as "[n]egligent conduct that, while
not intentional, involves a disregard of the consequences likely to
result from one's actions." Black's Law Dictionary 1056 (7th ed.
1999). Culpable negligence has also been defined as "something
more than negligence" involving "an indifference to, or disregard
of, consequences." 65 C.J.S. Negligence §19 (2000). Accord 1 R.
Rawle, Bouvier's Law Dictionary 736 (3d rev. 1914) (stating that
"culpable neglect would seem to convey the idea of neglect for
which he was to blame as is ascribed to his own carelessness,
improvidence or folly").
	Our courts have interpreted the "culpable negligence" phrase
consistently with these definitions. In People v. Wilson, 143 Ill. 2d 236, 248 (1991), this court impliedly equated culpable negligence
with recklessness. We approvingly cited an opinion of the highest
court of the State of New York describing culpable negligence as
a " 'conscious choice of a course of action, in disregard of the
consequences' " that might follow. Wilson, 143 Ill. 2d  at 248,
quoting People v. Decina, 2 N.Y.2d 133, 140, 138 N.E.2d 799,
803-04, 157 N.Y.S.2d 558, 565 (1956).
	The culpable negligence phrase also appears in several state
statutes and court rules (e.g., 55 ILCS 5/3-12013, 3-14044 (West
2000) (Counties Code); 65 ILCS 5/10-1-40 (West 2000) (Illinois
Municipal Code); 70 ILCS 1210/30 (West 2000) (Park System
Civil Service Act); 70 ILCS 1215/33 (West 2000) (Park Annuity
and Benefit Fund Civil Service Act); 70 ILCS 2605/4.33 (West
2000) (Metropolitan Water Reclamation District Act); 110 ILCS
70/46 (West 2000) (State Universities Civil Service Act); 725
ILCS 5/122-1(c) (West 2000) (Post-Conviction Hearing Act); 750
ILCS 50/5 (West 2000) (Adoption Act); 188 Ill. 2d R. 606(c)
(Supreme Court Rule 606(c)) and, in interpreting those statutes
and rules, Illinois courts have almost uniformly held that culpable
negligence entails something greater than ordinary negligence.
	For example, under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2000)), courts must often
determine whether litigants have exercised due diligence or,
conversely, have willfully disregarded the process of the court or
were so indifferent to it that they should be chargeable with
culpable negligence. See Pronto Two Ltd. v. Tishman Speyer
Monroe Venture, 274 Ill. App. 3d 624, 629 (1995); Klein v. Steel
City National Bank, 212 Ill. App. 3d 629, 638 (1991);
Cunningham v. Miller's General Insurance Co., 188 Ill. App. 3d
689, 694 (1989); Verson Allsteel Press Co. v. Mackworth Rees,
Division of Avis Industrial, Inc., 99 Ill. App. 3d 789 (1981).
	Likewise, other jurisdictions have defined "culpable
negligence" in similar contexts. For example, in Holway v. Ames,
100 Me. 208, 60 A. 897 (1905), the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine defined "culpable neglect" in an analogous context as "less
than gross carelessness, but more than the failure to use ordinary
care." Holway, 100 Me. at 211, 60 A.  at 898 In other contexts,
other courts have defined culpable negligence as something more
than mere neglect or more than a mere failure to use ordinary care.
E.g., Ross v. Baker, 632 So. 2d 224, 226 (Fla. App. 1994) (holding
that "[c]ulpable negligence is negligence of a gross and flagrant
character which evinces a reckless disregard for the safety of
others"); State v. Giordano, 138 N.H. 90, 95, 635 A.2d 482, 484
(1993) (stating that "[c]ulpable negligence is something more than
ordinary negligence, mere neglect, or the failure to use ordinary
care-it is negligence that is censorious, faulty or blameable").
	We conclude that the phrase "culpable negligence" is not so
imprecise as to render it unconstitutionally vague. We find that the
"culpably negligent" standard contained in section 122-1(c)
contemplates something greater than ordinary negligence and is
akin to recklessness.

C. Single Subject Challenge
	Finally, defendants argue that Public Act 83-942, eff.
November 23, 1983, amending the Post-Conviction Hearing Act,
violates the single subject rule of the Illinois Constitution (Ill.
Const. 1970, art. IV, §8(d)). This argument has been rejected by
every Illinois appellate court panel that has considered it. See
People v. Vilces, 321 Ill. App. 3d 937, 944-45 (2001); People v.
Sharpe, 321 Ill. App. 3d 994, 997 (2001); People v. Dorris, 319
Ill. App. 3d 579, 585 (2001); People v. Jones, 318 Ill. App. 3d
1189, 1193 (2001); People v. Roberts, 318 Ill. App. 3d 719,
733-34 (2000). For the reasons that follow, we similarly find no
single subject rule violation.
	We again note that defendants failed to raise this issue in the
courts below. Nonetheless, constitutional challenges to a statute
may be raised at any time, and we will consider the merits of
defendants' claim. Wagener, 196 Ill. 2d  at 279. As noted
previously, a statute challenged as unconstitutional enjoys a
presumption of constitutionality. Tully, 171 Ill. 2d  at 304. The
single subject rule mandates that "[b]ills, except bills for
appropriations and for the codification, revision or rearrangement
of laws, shall be confined to one subject." Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV,
§8(d). The rule prevents passage of legislation that, if standing
alone, could not muster the necessary votes for enactment. Geja's
Cafe v. Metropolitan Pier &amp; Exposition Authority, 153 Ill. 2d 239,
258 (1992).
	In this context, courts must liberally construe the term
"subject" in favor of upholding the legislation. People v. Reedy,
186 Ill. 2d 1, 8-9 (1999); People v. Dunigan, 165 Ill. 2d 235, 255
(1995). The matters included in the enactment must, however,
have a natural and logical connection to the single subject. People
v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 427 (2000). In other words, while the
legislature is free to choose subjects comprehensive in scope, the
single subject requirement may not be circumvented by selecting
a topic so broad that the rule is evaded as "a meaningful
constitutional check on the legislature's actions." Johnson v.
Edgar, 176 Ill. 2d 499, 515-18 (1997). There is no additional
requirement that the individual provisions be related to each other.
Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 187 Ill. 2d 341, 356 (1999).
	The dispositive question is whether they relate to a single
subject. Premier Property Management, Inc. v. Chavez, 191 Ill. 2d 101, 112-14 (2000). A determination of whether a public act runs
afoul of the single subject rule necessitates a two-step analysis.
First, we must determine whether the act, on its face, involves a
legitimate single subject. People v. Sypien, 198 Ill. 2d 334, 339
(2001). Second, we must discern whether the various provisions
within an act all relate to the proper subject at issue. Sypien, 198 Ill. 2d  at 339.
	Considering the first tier of the analysis, the title of Public Act
83-942 indicates that it relates to matters of criminal justice and
correctional facilities. Defendants base their argument in large part
on this title and argue that criminal justice and correctional
facilities are two separate subjects and therefore cannot be
addressed in one act. We disagree.
	First, we reject defendants' heavy reliance on Public Act
83-942's title to support their claim. In Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d  at
428-29, we noted that an act's title is not necessarily dispositive of
its content or its relationship to a single subject. Otherwise,
nothing would be left of the single subject rule beyond the
creativity of legislative drafters to make titles of acts as broad as
possible. People v. Pitts, 295 Ill. App. 3d 182, 189 (1998). Even
if we were to focus our analysis on Public Act 83-942's title, "An
Act in relation to criminal justice and correctional facilities," we
would be inclined to reject defendants' argument on this point. In
Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d  at 428-29, we reviewed Public Act 89-8, eff.
March 21, 1995, and its virtually identical title to that of Public
Act 83-942: "An Act in relation to criminal and correctional
matters." We concluded in Malchow that Public Act 89-8 was not
so broad as to violate the single subject rule.
	Here, looking beyond the title, we conclude that, on its face,
Public Act 83-942 relates to a single subject: the criminal justice
system. Public Act 83-942 contains five substantive sections and
amends several different statutes. As we more fully examine in
step two of our analysis, section 1 of Public Act 83-942 pertains
to substantive criminal law matters. Section 2 generally addresses
administrative aspects of the correctional system pertaining to
construction of correctional facilities. Sections 3, 4, and 5 also
relate to the building and maintenance of correctional facilities. As
previously noted, the subject of criminal justice and correctional
facilities, or, more succinctly, the criminal justice system, is one
that we have already deemed legitimate for single subject
purposes. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d  at 428-29. We find no reason to
depart from that holding today. Therefore, with regard to step one,
we find that Public Act 83-942 involves a single, facially
legitimate subject.
	With respect to the second tier, we conclude that a substantive
analysis of Public Act 83-942 indicates that each provision relates
to the proper subject of the criminal justice system. Section 1
broadened the definition of "public official" in section 12-9 of the
Criminal Code, and made it a crime to threaten a public official.
Pub. Act 83-942, §1, eff. November 23, 1983, amending Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 12-9(b)(1). Additionally, section 1 added
section 122-2.1 of the Act, and established the first-stage post-conviction petition dismissal provision of the Act. Pub. Act
83-942, §1, eff. November 23, 1983, adding Ill. Rev. Stat., 1984
Supp., ch. 38, par. 122-2.1.
	Section 2 implemented amendments to the Unified Code of
Corrections by (1) expanding the powers and duties of the
Department of Corrections (Corrections) to authorize the
Department of Central Management Services (Central
Management) to accept bids for the construction, remodeling, or
conversion of a structure to serve as a correctional facility (Pub.
Act 83-942, §2, eff. November 23, 1983, amending Ill. Rev. Stat.
1983, ch. 38, par. 1003-2-2(c)); (2) requiring Corrections to
prepare and present to the General Assembly quarterly reports
detailing numerous specific administrative aspects of all
correctional facilities, including: the number of inmates in each
facility; classification of each facility's inmates by the nature of
their offense; educational and vocational programs available at
each facility; present inmate capacity levels; projected admissions,
exits, and capacity levels; and the ratio of inmates to employees in
each facility (Pub. Act 83-942, §2, eff. November 23, 1983,
adding Ill. Rev. Stat., 1984 Supp., ch. 38, par. 1003-5-3.1); (3)
requiring the Governor to give the General Assembly notice of any
site selected for construction of a correctional facility before
releasing such information to the public or to private individuals
(Pub. Act 83-942, §2, eff. November 23, 1983, adding Ill. Rev.
Stat., 1984 Supp., ch. 38, par. 1003-7-2b); (4) prohibiting
Corrections from promulgating standards mandating
minimum-floor-space requirements for individual inmates in
county and municipal jails and houses of correction (Pub. Act
83-942, §2, eff. November 23, 1983, amending Ill. Rev. Stat.
1983, ch. 38, par. 1003-15-2(a)); and, (5) amending the powers
and responsibilities of members of the Criminal Sentencing
Commission with respect to term length, voting powers and
expenditures (Pub. Act 83-942, §2, eff. November 23, 1983,
amending Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 1005-10-1, repealed by
Pub. Act 83-1257, art. 12, §12-6, eff. September 30, 1984).
	Section 3 of Public Act 83-942 amends section 11-74-2 of
the Illinois Municipal Code by expanding the definition of
"industrial project" to include "construction, remodeling or
conversion of a structure to be leased to the Illinois Department
of Corrections for the purposes of its serving as a correctional
institution or facility pursuant to *** the [Unified Code]."
(Emphasis added.) Pub. Act 83-942, §3, eff. November 23, 1983,
adding Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 24, par. 11-74-2(1)(c).
	Section 4 of Public Act 83-942 implements a similar
amendment to section 2 of the Industrial Building Revenue Bond
Act requiring bidding on prison projects. (Emphasis added.) Pub.
Act 83-942, §4, eff. November 23, 1983, adding Ill. Rev. Stat.
1983, ch. 85, par. 872(b)(3).
	Section 5 of Public Act 83-942 amends section 67.02 of the
Civil Administrative Code, expanding the powers and duties of
Central Management to include entering "into an agreement with
a municipality or county to construct, remodel or convert a
structure for the purposes of its serving as a correctional
institution." (Emphasis added.) Pub. Act 83-942, §5, eff.
November 23, 1983, amending Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 127, par.
63b13.2.
	We acknowledge that these sections do not relate directly to
one another in the narrow sense. The dispositive question is,
however, not whether amendments relate to each other; rather, the
issue is whether they relate to a single subject. Arangold, 187 Ill. 2d  at 356; Chavez, 191 Ill. 2d  at 112-14.
	We hold that Public Act 83-942 satisfies that requirement.
Section 1 addresses substantive criminal law and section 2
addresses administrative aspects of the correctional system.
Unquestionably, substantive criminal law and correctional system
administration fall squarely under the umbrella of the criminal
justice system. Sections 3, 4, and 5 relate to the construction and
maintenance of prisons. Again, construction and maintenance of
correctional facilities are direct components of the criminal justice
system. As our appellate court has observed, the definition of
"criminal justice system" includes substantive criminal law as well
as all matters concerning corrections. People v. Dixon, 308 Ill.
App. 3d 1008, 1014 (1999); People v. Dorris, 319 Ill. App. 3d
579, 585 (2001).
	In Malchow, we similarly concluded that criminal and
correctional matters constituted one subject for purposes of the
single subject rule. There, we examined a public act far more
broad and sweeping than the one at issue here. The amendments
in that case altered over a dozen seemingly unrelated statutes
including the Medical Practice Act of 1987, the Code of Civil
Procedure, and the Civil Administrative Code. Upon closer
inspection, the amendments were indeed related to the single
subject of criminal and correctional law. On that basis, we held
that Malchow failed to meet his substantial burden of
demonstrating that Public Act 89-8's amendments had no natural
and logical connection. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d  at 428-29. We make
the same finding in this case. We conclude that Public Act 83-942
does not violate the Illinois Constitution's single subject rule.

III. CONCLUSION
	We find that McCain's and Johnson's respective post-conviction petitions were improperly summarily dismissed as
untimely. We therefore affirm the appellate court's judgments in
McCain and Johnson. We further find that the appellate court
improperly relied on timing issues when it affirmed the circuit
court's dismissal in Boclair. We therefore reverse the appellate
court's judgment in Boclair and remand to that court to review the
circuit court's stated reasons for dismissing Boclair's petition. We
make no comment on the sufficiency of the allegations raised by
any of the defendants in their respective petitions.
	We further find that section 122-1(c) of the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act is not unconstitutionally vague. Finally, we find that
Public Act 83-942 does not violate the single subject rule.
No. 89388-Reversed and remanded.
No. 89471-Affirmed.
No. 89534-Affirmed.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN, specially concurring:
	I agree with the thoughts expressed by Justice McMorrow and
join in her separate opinion. However, I write separately to note
some concerns that I have with respect to the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act.
	The appeals in this consolidated case arise from the fallout
from this court's opinion in People v. Wright, 189 Ill. 2d 1 (1999).
In Wright, this court was asked to determine whether section
122-1 of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS
5/122-1 (West 2000)), which contains several time provisions for
filing petitions, was jurisdictional in nature or was an ordinary
statute of limitations. A majority of the court chose the latter. The
court, having ruled that the time provisions constituted a statute of
limitations, nevertheless stated that the circuit court may dismiss
a petition during the summary stage of the post-conviction
proceedings if the petition is untimely and fails to assert a lack of
culpable negligence. That statement, was, of course, at odds with
the holding that the State had to assert the affirmative defense of
the statute of limitations, but the court never acknowledged this
tension in its opinion. As a result, our appellate court has struggled
greatly with the following question: Can the circuit court, sua
sponte, raise untimeliness at the first stage of the post-conviction
process?
	Today's opinion settles the confusion wrought by Wright. We
know now, with certainty, that the time provisions contained in
section 122-1 constitute an ordinary statute of limitations that can
only be raised by the State and not by the circuit court sua sponte.
In so holding, the court reaffirms one of the linchpins to the
analysis contained in Wright-that time is not an inherent element
of the right to bring a post-conviction petition. Slip op. at 8. I
disagreed with that principle in Wright and continue to do so
today. As I noted in my dissent in Wright, the General Assembly
has, over the years, shortened the time within which a post-conviction petition may be brought, absent the lack of culpable
negligence. At one time, the Act allowed for the filing of a petition
up to 20 years after the rendition of a final judgment in a criminal
proceeding. Subsequently, the legislature reduced the time period
to 10 years. As of January 1, 1996, the General Assembly again
amended the section to require that the petition be filed within 45
days of the appellant's brief on direct appeal or three years from
the date of conviction, whichever is sooner. In light of the
direction the General Assembly has taken in decreasing the time
period in which a post-conviction petition may be filed, I cannot
agree that time is not an element to this legislatively created relief.
	The court today relies on the plain language of section
122-2.1 to hold that if "the legislature intended for a trial judge to
sua sponte dismiss a petition as being untimely, it would have so
provided in section 122-2.1(a)(2) of the Act." Slip op. at 7. Thus,
because timeliness is not listed in section 122-2.1, the court
reasons that the legislature did not intend for timeliness to be
assessed during the summary dismissal stage. In my view, a
petition that is filed outside the time provisions contained in
section 122-1 has "no basis in law." It falls under the court's
definition of a "frivolous" petition (slip op. at 7) and is thus
subject to dismissal at the summary stage. For this reason, I find
the court's plain language analysis to be unpersuasive. Further, the
court's analysis is unnecessary given Wright's holding that section
122-1 is to be treated as an ordinary statute of limitations. See slip
op. at 32 (McMorrow, J., specially concurring, joined by Freeman,
J.)
	Despite these views, I concur in today's opinion for several
reasons. First, I believe that today's result follows from Wright.
See slip op. at 33 (McMorrow, J., specially concurring, joined by
Freeman, J.). Although I disagreed with the holding in Wright, it
is clear to me that this court will not revisit the issue and that stare
decisis applies. In light of the fact that I have registered my
disagreement previously, I will recognize this portion of Wright as
the law and follow it, particularly now that the holding in Wright
has been clarified. See People v. Barrow, 195 Ill. 2d 506, 542-43
(2001) (Freeman, J., concurring). Second, and perhaps more
importantly, with the rendition of this opinion as well as Wright,
I believe that a written record has been laid down by this court and
that the matter should now be taken up by the General Assembly.
	The questions in this case and in others concerning the
procedural aspects of the Act need the attention of our legislature.
In my opinion, the fact that the time provision is contained in the
very first section of the Act seems to indicate that the legislature
deems it to be a threshold inquiry made either before or concurrent
with the "frivolous" and "patently without merit" determinations
required by section 2.1. As such, I believe that the better course to
follow in such cases is to require that the petitioner show the
timeliness of his or her post-conviction action. However, this court
has held that the time provisions contained in section 122-1 are to
be treated as an ordinary statute of limitations, to be raised by the
State as an affirmative defense. The court takes this view, it
appears, so that meritorious claims will be saved. However, by its
very nature, a statute of limitations works to defeat all claims
regardless of whether they are meritorious or not. In other words,
the meritoriousness of the action is irrelevant. An ordinary statute
of limitations is always raised prior to proceeding on the merits of
a cause of action. That is why the party seeking to raise the
affirmative matter is charged with the responsibility of pleading it.
However, during the summary stage of a post-conviction action,
there is no adversary yet in place to raise the matter. Many of the
problems our courts have struggled with in these types of cases
could be easily resolved by the addition of provisions to the Act
which would allow a trial judge to dismiss a petition, without
prejudice, for lack of timeliness. In that way, a petitioner would be
able to amend the petition to include the necessary allegations
concerning the lack of culpable negligence. This is a procedure
followed by the federal courts in habeas corpus actions and bears
consideration by our legislature. See, e.g., Kiser v. Johnson, 163 F.3d 326, 328 (5th Cir. 1999) (and cases cited therein).
	As I stated earlier, the court today, consistent with Wright,
holds that the matter of timeliness is an affirmative defense that
the State must raise or waive. The court defends its statutory
interpretation by noting that "[i]f an untimely petition
demonstrates that a defendant suffered a deprivation of
constitutional magnitude, a dutiful prosecutor may waive that
procedural defect during the second stage of the post-conviction
proceedings." Slip op. at 8. I find this language troubling on
several levels. My years on this court lead me to conclude that the
State tends to raise and litigate all of its defenses when a
conviction is challenged, and very rarely, if ever, does it concede
a "procedural defect" merely because a petition "demonstrates" a
"deprivation of constitutional magnitude." See, e.g., People v.
Collins, No. 90679 (March 15, 2002). Even putting aside the
concerns I have based on my experience, I believe that serious
problems can, and most likely will, arise when prosecutors waive
timeliness in certain cases but do not do so in others, especially
when the claims are similar in nature. Arguments concerning the
arbitrariness of State action will loom on the horizon. In pointing
this out, I want to alert the General Assembly to some of the legal
implications that this court's interpretation of the statute will have
in this context.
	Finally, I should also mention the culpable-negligence
exception to the time provision. The court today appears to hold
as it does because of a fear that claims of actual innocence may go
unheard if they are not timely. See slip op. at 8. I must point out
that the culpable-negligence exception is not grounded in terms of
"actual innocence." Nor is the exception met due to the
meritoriousness of the claims. On the contrary, the inquiry
surrounding whether a petitioner's delay in filing was caused by
his or her culpable negligence has nothing to do with the merits of
the claims petitioner asserts. Rather, the inquiry is grounded upon
whether the petitioner is at fault for not raising the matter within
the time period set by the legislature. While some of the
circumstances surrounding claims of actual innocence may meet
this requirement, some may not. Thus, I believe it unwise for the
court to equate, in any manner, the culpable-negligence
requirement of section 122-1 with claims of actual innocence.
Indeed, the General Assembly may wish to reconsider the phrasing
of the safety valve of the Act in order to expressly accommodate
claims of actual innocence that arise past the meager time
limitations that the Act currently provides.
	I am of the view that the General Assembly needs to address
some of these problematic issues that have developed since the
passage of the amendments decreasing the time available for
challenges made pursuant to the Act. The steady flow of cases
coming to this court with procedural quirks arising from the
amendments leads me to believe that problems will continue to
mount in this area. Although I have no doubt in this court's ability
to adapt to many of the circumstances that will arise, I cannot
ignore the fact that the Act we are asked to interpret is legislatively
created. In light of the important role the Act plays in our criminal
justice system, I believe that the General Assembly should
consider revisiting the Act in the near future.



	JUSTICE McMORROW, also specially concurring:
	The majority holds that a post-conviction petition which is
untimely filed and which fails to allege facts which show that the
delay in filing was not due to the petitioner's "culpable
negligence" (725 ILCS 5/122-1(c) (West 2000)) may not be
summarily dismissed by a circuit court during the first stage of
post-conviction proceedings under section 122-2.1(a)(2) of the
Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West
2000)). I write separately to explain the basis of my agreement
with this conclusion. I also write, however, to express my
disagreement with the majority's decision to neither cite to nor to
explain the effect of its ruling on this court's recent decision in
People v. Collins, No. 90679 (March 15, 2002).
I

	In People v. Collins, No. 90679 (March 15, 2002), this court
affirmed the circuit court's summary dismissal of a pro se
defendant's post-conviction petition because the defendant failed
to comply with the affidavit requirement set forth in section 122-2
of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-2
(West 2000)). That section states, in pertinent part, that "[t]he
petition shall have attached thereto affidavits, records, or other
evidence supporting its allegations or shall state why the same are
not attached." 725 ILCS 5/122-2 (West 2000). The defendant in
Collins had alleged in his post-conviction petition that his court-appointed attorney had failed to comply with his request to file an
appeal. The defendant's petition in Collins did contain an affidavit
which attested to the truthfulness of this claim. However, this
court concluded that the defendant's affidavit served only to verify
the allegations in the petition. As such, this court reasoned, the
defendant's affidavit was sufficient to satisfy section 122-1(b) of
the Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1(b) (West 2000) (post-conviction
petition must be verified by affidavit)), but was insufficient to
satisfy the requirements of section 122-2. Collins, slip op. at 6.
	To satisfy the affidavit requirement of section 122-2, this
court held, the defendant should have attached at least one
additional affidavit in support of his post-conviction claim. This
second affidavit was necessary, this court reasoned, to show "that
the verified allegations are capable of objective or independent
corroboration." Collins, slip op. at 6. Therefore, the additional
affidavit needed to come from someone other than the defendant.
This court further held that, in the absence of a second affidavit,
the defendant was required to "at least explain why such [objective
or independent] evidence is unobtainable." Collins, slip op. at 7.
The defendant's failure to comply with this latter "pleading
requirement," by itself, warranted summary dismissal of his post-conviction petition. Collins, slip op. at 5, 7. This court emphasized
in Collins that it was not deciding whether the defendant's petition
alleged a constitutional deprivation. See Collins, slip op. at 7
(distinguishing People v. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239 (2001)). Rather,
the court's holding rested solely on the affidavit requirement of
section 122-2.
II

	In the case at bar, this court is asked to decide whether a post-conviction petition which has not been filed within the time
limitations set forth in section 122-1 of the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 2000)) and which has
failed to allege facts which show that the delay in filing was not
due to the petitioner's "culpable negligence," may be summarily
dismissed as "frivolous or *** patently without merit" under
section 122-2.1(a)(2) of the Act (725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West
2000)). The majority concludes that such a petition may not be
summarily dismissed. In so holding, the majority reasons that the
circuit court may not consider the timeliness of the post-conviction
petition at the summary dismissal stage of the proceedings because
the time limitations are neither included nor mentioned in the
section of the Act which authorizes summary dismissals. The
majority explains:
			"Section 122-2.1(a)(2) requires the circuit court to
determine within 90 days of the filing of a post-conviction
petition whether the petition is 'frivolous or is patently
without merit.' 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2000).
Importantly, we note that this section is silent regarding
timeliness. Rather, timeliness is addressed elsewhere, in
section 122-1(c), instructing defendants as to the time
periods for filing petitions. If this court can ascertain
legislative intent from the plain language of the statute
itself, that intent must prevail. Barnett v. Zion Park
District, 171 Ill. 2d 378 (1996). We will not depart from
the plain language of the statute by reading into it
exceptions, limitations, or conditions that conflict with the
express legislative intent. Barnett, 171 Ill. 2d  at 389.
			Under a plain reading of section 122-2.1(a)(2), the
circuit court may dismiss a post-conviction petition at the
initial stage only if the petition is deemed to be 'frivolous
or patently without merit,' not if it is untimely filed. If the
legislature intended for a trial judge to sua sponte dismiss
a petition as being untimely, it would have so provided in
section 122-2.1(a)(2) of the Act. Instead, the legislature
provided in section 122-5 that the State may file a motion
to dismiss. [Citation.] By addressing timeliness and
frivolousness in separate provisions of the Act, the
legislature plainly intended to draw a distinction between
these two flaws of post-conviction petitions." Slip op. at
6-7.
	After reaching the above conclusions, the majority goes on to
determine that the phrase "frivolous or *** patently without merit"
refers only to the substance of the claim alleged in the petition, not
any procedural requirements or limitations imposed by the Act.
The majority notes:
			"To accept the argument that the circuit court has the
authority to dismiss [an untimely] petition pursuant to
section 122-2.1(a)(2) of the Act we would have to hold,
contrary to the language of the Act, that the phrase
'frivolous or *** patently without merit' encompasses
untimely petitions. We will not ignore the Act's language
and adopt this interpretation. If a petition is untimely that
does not necessarily mean that the petition lacks merit."
Slip op. at 7.
	The majority also explains that it would be improper for a
circuit court to consider the timeliness of a post-conviction
petition at the summary dismissal stage because such an inquiry
might require the court to determine whether the petitioner had
alleged facts showing a lack of "culpable negligence" which
would excuse the tardy filing. See 725 ILCS 5/122-1(c) (West
2000). Making a determination as to whether a petitioner lacked
culpable negligence, the majority observes, would require the
circuit court to do more than examine whether the petition alleged
a violation of a constitutional right. The majority concludes that
this would be improper:
			"Moreover, when a circuit court determines whether a
defendant is culpably negligent in filing his petition late,
the circuit court makes an assessment of the defendant's
credibility. See McCain, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 531. At this
initial stage of the proceedings, however, the court should
only determine whether the petition alleges constitutional
deprivations. The process at the summary review stage
measures a petition's substantive virtue rather than its
procedural compliance. See Johnson, 312 Ill. App. 3d at
534. In determining an issue of credibility, the circuit
court necessarily exceeds the boundary set by section
122-2.1(a)(1)." (Emphasis added.) Slip op. at 8.
	Finally, the majority notes that it is inappropriate as a matter
of policy for the circuit court to consider the timeliness of a post-conviction petition at the summary dismissal stage because to do
so might result in the loss of a meritorious claim of actual
innocence. As the majority explains:
			"Claims of actual innocence may be raised in a manner
other than in a post-conviction petition, including in a
section 2-1401 motion. 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2000).
Nonetheless, to allow the circuit court to dismiss
summarily post-conviction petitions for failure to present
evidence of actual innocence in a timely manner could
lead to a miscarriage of justice. Although our criminal
justice system needs finality in criminal litigation and
judgments, it should not come at the expense of justice
and fairness." Slip op. at 8.
	For the foregoing reasons, the majority concludes that matters
of timeliness must "be left for the State to assert during the second
stage of the post-conviction proceedings." Slip op. at 8. During the
initial, summary dismissal stage of post-conviction proceedings,
the majority holds, a circuit court may not consider whether a post-conviction petition has satisfied the procedural requirement of
timeliness.
III
	The majority opinion in this case conflicts with Collins at
every significant point in its analysis. For example, this court's
opinion in Collins states:
		"Contrary to the clear mandate of section 122-2 of the
Act, defendant's petition was unsupported by 'affidavits,
records, or other evidence' and offered no explanation for
the absence of such documentation. This fact alone
justifies the summary dismissal of defendant's petition."
(Emphasis added.) Collins, slip op. at 5.
	The affidavit requirement that this court found dispositive in
Collins was found in section 122-2 of the Act, not section
122-2.1, the section of the Act which authorizes summary
dismissal. Pursuant to the majority opinion in the case at bar, a
circuit court may not look to any section of the Act other than
section 122-2.1 to determine whether a post-conviction petition is
subject to summary dismissal. See slip op. at 6-7.
	In addition, the majority opinion in the case at bar holds that
the only inquiry the circuit court may make at the summary
dismissal stage is whether the post-conviction petition "alleges
constitutional deprivations." Slip op. at 8. In other words, under
the majority's holding, the circuit court is limited at the summary
dismissal stage to asking whether the petition states the " 'gist of
a constitutional claim.' " Slip op. at 6, 8, quoting People v.
Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d 410, 418 (1996). According to the majority
opinion, matters of "procedural compliance" (slip op. at 8) may
not be considered in the initial stage of post-conviction review.
	In contrast, this court in Collins did not consider whether the
defendant's petition successfully alleged a constitutional
deprivation by stating the gist of a constitutional claim. Instead,
the court concerned itself solely with whether the defendant
complied with the affidavit requirement of section 122-2. In
contrast to the case at bar, Collins holds that the circuit court
should consider whether a pro se defendant has complied with the
Act's procedural requirements at the initial stage of post-conviction review. Collins holds that a pro se defendant's failure
to explain the absence of a second affidavit is sufficient reason,
standing alone, to summarily dismiss a post-conviction petition
(Collins, slip op. at 5, 7), even though the failure to provide that
explanation "does not necessarily mean that the petition lacks
merit" (Boclair, slip op. at 7).
	This court's holding in Collins also conflicts with the policy
concerns expressed by the majority in the instant case. As noted,
in Collins, this court held that a pro se post-conviction petition
should be summarily dismissed if it fails to comply with one of the
pleading requirements set forth in section 122-2 of the Act.
Section 122-2 provides, in full:
			"The petition shall identify the proceeding in which the
petitioner was convicted, give the date of the rendition of
the final judgment complained of, and clearly set forth the
respects in which petitioner's constitutional rights were
violated. The petition shall have attached thereto
affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its
allegations or shall state why the same are not attached.
The petition shall identify any previous proceedings that
the petitioner may have taken to secure relief from his
conviction. Argument and citations and discussion of
authorities shall be omitted from the petition." 725 ILCS
5/122-2 (West 2000).
	As this court explained in Collins, the defendant in that case
failed to satisfy section 122-2's requirement that he "at least
explain" why a second affidavit was not attached to his petition.
Collins, slip op. at 7. Therefore, this court held, his petition was
properly dismissed at the summary review stage. Collins, slip op.
at 7. Notably, in reaching this conclusion, this court chose not to
provide the defendant with the opportunity to amend his post-conviction petition with an explanation for why an additional
affidavit was unavailable. Our case law would permit such an
amendment. See People v. Watson, 187 Ill. 2d 448 (1999).
Nevertheless, this court held that the defendant's petition should
be finally dismissed.
	This court's decision not to permit any amendment of the
defendant's post-conviction petition in Collins is of considerable
importance. Under this holding, it is possible that a pro se
defendant who has a meritorious constitutional claim, including a
claim of actual innocence, may never have that claim reviewed by
the courts solely because of a technical pleading defect that is
easily subject to correction through amendment. This court
recognized in Collins that its holding "will, in some cases, place
an unreasonable burden upon post-conviction petitioners." Collins,
slip op. at 7. However, this court concluded that it was constrained
by the language of the Act to reach this result. See Collins, slip op.
at 7 ("[n]othing in the Act" authorizes the circuit court to depart
from section 122-2's pleading requirements at the summary
dismissal stage).
	The majority today reaches a contrary result. In the case at
bar, the majority holds that it would be a "miscarriage of justice"
for a meritorious claim of actual innocence to evade judicial
review because of a procedural deficiency in the post-conviction
petition. According to the majority, allowing a claim of actual
innocence to be lost because of a procedural deficiency would be
contrary to principles of "justice and fairness." Slip op. at 8.
	In sum:
			 This court in Collins held that, in determining whether
a pro se post-conviction petition is subject to summary
dismissal, the circuit court should look beyond section
122-2.1(a)(2) of the Act and consider whether the petition
has complied with the pleading requirements set forth in
section 122-2. The majority opinion in the case at bar
holds that the circuit court may not consider sections of
the Act other than section 122-2.1(a)(2).
			 This court in Collins upheld the summary dismissal of
the defendant's post-conviction petition without
considering whether the defendant's petition stated the
gist of a constitutional claim. The majority opinion in this
case holds that the circuit court may dismiss a post-conviction petition at the initial stage of review only if the
petition fails to state the gist of a constitutional claim.
			 This court in Collins held that a technical pleading
deficiency in a pro se post-conviction petition warrants its
summary dismissal. The majority opinion in the case at
bar holds that, at the summary dismissal stage, the circuit
court should not consider whether the petition is in
"procedural compliance." Slip op. at 8.
			 This court in Collins held that the language of the Act
requires strict procedural compliance from pro se post-conviction petitioners at the summary dismissal stage.
The majority opinion in the instant case holds that such
compliance may not be required at the initial stage of
post-conviction review because to do so could result in "a
miscarriage of justice." Slip op. at 8.
	This court's opinion in Collins and the majority opinion in
this case are in direct and irreconcilable conflict. Given this
conflict, it appears that the majority opinion in the case at bar, as
the later issued of the two opinions, has overruled this court's
decision in Collins sub silentio. The majority's decision to
overrule Collins is not, of itself error. However, I do believe that
the majority has seriously erred by not citing Collins or explaining
the effect that the instant holding has on that decision.(1) As a result
of the majority opinion in this case, the bench and bar of this state
will be confronted with two opinions from this court, issued within
six months of each other, whose holdings and reasoning with
respect to the summary dismissal of post-conviction petitions are
diametrically opposed. The inevitable result of allowing these two
opinions to stand side-by-side will be confusion in our lower
courts. Indeed, the present case itself illustrates the problems that
are bound to occur. In the case at bar, this court is asked to explain
the meaning and scope of our holding in People v. Wright, 189 Ill. 2d 1 (1999). That opinion, as was noted at the time of its issuance,
contained conflicting statements regarding the nature of the post-conviction time limitations set forth in section 122-1 of the Act
(725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 2000). See Wright, 189 Ill. 2d  at 32-33
(Freeman, C.J., specially concurring, joined by McMorrow, J.).
Because of these conflicting statements, as the majority in the case
at bar notes, our circuit courts were uncertain how to treat the time
limitations and numerous, conflicting appellate court decisions
were issued which sought to make sense of Wright. See slip op. at
5. Now, three years later, the majority in the case at bar has cleared
up the conflict created by Wright by expressly overruling that
decision in part. See slip op. at 6. Although I welcome the clarity
brought by the majority's decision, the reality is that the confusion
and expenditure of judicial resources which followed Wright could
have been easily avoided if this court had simply spoken with a
clearer voice. Unfortunately, the same confusion and the same
unnecessary expenditure of time and resources to decipher this
court's meaning are certain to take place following the issuance of
the majority opinion in the case at bar.
	Justice Thomas attempts to reconcile the positions taken by
this court in Collins and the case at bar. See slip op. at 41-43
(Thomas, J., specially concurring, joined by Fitzgerald, J.).
Notably absent from Justice Thomas' analysis, however, is any
discussion of the relevant holding of the majority opinion in this
case. The principal issue presented in the instant case is whether
the circuit court may summarily dismiss a post-conviction petition
as frivolous or patently without merit if the petition is untimely
filed and if the petition offers no explanation for the tardy filing.
Stated otherwise, the question presented is whether an untimely
post-conviction petition may be deemed frivolous or patently
without merit. The majority opinion answers this question "no."
Why? Because, the majority explains, the definitions of the terms
"frivolous" and "patently without merit" do not include any of the
Act's requirements, such as timeliness, which are set forth in
sections of the Act outside section 122-2.1(a)(2). Instead,
according to the majority, a frivolous or meritless petition is
defined solely as one which fails to allege a constitutional
deprivation. The majority opinion makes this point absolutely
clear. The majority states:
		"At [the] initial stage of the [post-conviction]
proceedings, however, the court should only determine
whether the petition alleges constitutional deprivations."
(Emphasis added.) Slip op. at 8.
"Only" means only. Thus, under the majority holding in this case,
the circuit courts are instructed that, at the summary dismissal
stage, they need not and should not consider whether the post-conviction petition is timely filed. Nor should they consider
whether affidavits are attached to the petition. Nor should they
consider whether any of the requirements set forth in section
122-1 or section 122-2 have been met. Instead, the circuit courts
are instructed that they should only determine whether the petition
alleges a constitutional deprivation, that is, whether the petition
states the gist of a constitutional claim.
	This court's opinion in Collins, however, stands in stark
contrast to the principles regarding summary dismissal adopted by
the majority opinion in this case. According to Collins, a frivolous
or meritless petition is not defined solely as one which fails to
state the gist of a constitutional claim. Instead, under Collins, a
frivolous or meritless petition is also defined as one which fails to
meet the pleading requirements set forth in section 122-2, e.g., the
requirement that an affidavit be attached or that an explanation be
offered for its absence. Accordingly, under Collins, a post-conviction petition which fails to meet the pleading requirements
of section 122-2 may be summarily dismissed even if it states the
gist of a constitutional claim. Collins makes this point absolutely
clear. This court's opinion in Collins emphasizes that the summary
dismissal of the pro se defendant's petition was affirmed without
our deciding whether the petition stated the gist of a constitutional
claim. See Collins, slip op. at 7 (distinguishing People v. Edwards,
197 Ill. 2d 239 (2001)).
	According to the case at bar, a frivolous or meritless petition
means only one thing-a petition which fails to state the gist of a
constitutional claim. Thus, in this case, any pleading requirements
set forth in the Act are not relevant at the summary dismissal
stage. Collins, on the other hand, holds that a frivolous or
meritless petition means more than one thing. It also means a
petition which fails to meet the pleading requirements of section
122-2. The holdings of the two cases are in direct conflict,
notwithstanding Justice Thomas' protestations that they are not.
	Also strikingly absent from Justice Thomas' analysis is any
recognition of the dramatically different policy positions taken in
Collins and the majority opinion in this case. As noted, Collins
takes an extremely strict view of the pleading requirements set
forth in section 122-2. The failure to include one of these
requirements, Collins holds, will result in summary dismissal,
even of a pro se petition. Further, no amendment of the pro se
petition will be allowed, even to include the pleading requirement
which Collins holds indispensable. Section 122-2 lists several
pleading requirements, one of which is that the petition must "give
the date of the rendition of the final judgment complained of." 725
ILCS 5/122-2 (West 2000). Following the logic of Collins, a pro
se defendant who fails to include the date of his conviction in his
post-conviction petition must have that petition summarily and
finally dismissed even if the petition contains a meritorious claim
of actual innocence. This is an extraordinarily harsh result, but one
which Collins concludes is mandated by the plain language of the
Act. See Collins, slip op. at 7 ("[n]othing in the Act" authorizes
the circuit court to depart from section 122-2's pleading
requirements at the summary dismissal stage).
	The majority opinion in this case, on the other hand, offers a
liberal construction of the time limitations set forth in section
122-1. Under the logic of the majority opinion, a post-conviction
petition may be filed years beyond the appropriate statutory
deadline without any explanation for the delay, yet the circuit court
may not raise the issue of timeliness at summary dismissal. Why?
In part because, according to the majority, if the circuit court did
so, claims of actual innocence might be lost. See slip op. at 8
(allowing a claim of actual innocence to be lost because of a
procedural deficiency in the petition would be contrary to
principles of "justice and fairness").
	Surely, a post-conviction petition which is filed years too late
and which offers no explanation for the delay is as deficient, or
more deficient, than one which fails to list the date of conviction
or to explain the absence of an affidavit. Why then are these latter
deficiencies treated with such draconian fervor in Collins, while
the former are liberally excused in the case at bar? Why is the
concern that a meritorious claim of actual innocence might escape
judicial review a dispositive factor in the majority's analysis in the
case at bar while that same concern appears nowhere in Collins?
No explanation has been offered for the extreme disparity in policy
concerns and statutory interpretation between the two cases.
	Justice Thomas' special concurrence in this case addresses
none of issues noted above. Instead, Justice Thomas focuses solely
on the notions of substance and procedure and determines that
Collins and the majority opinion in this case may be reconciled on
the basis of these precepts. According to Justice Thomas, the
critical portion of the majority opinion in the case at bar is the
conclusion that the circuit court may not consider a post-conviction petition's procedural compliance at summary dismissal
but, instead, must consider only its substantive merits. See slip op.
at 8 ("The process at the summary review stage measures a
petition's substantive virtue rather than its procedural
compliance"). Justice Thomas concludes that the requirements
addressed in Collins, i.e., the obligation to attach an affidavit or
explain its absence, are "essential substantive components of a
post-conviction petition." (Emphasis added.) Slip op. at 41
(Thomas, J., specially concurring, joined by Fitzgerald, J.). Indeed,
according to Justice Thomas all of the requirements contained in
section 122-2 are "essential" to a post-conviction petition and are
"purely substantive." Slip op. at 41-42 (Thomas, J., specially
concurring joined by Fitzgerald, J.). Thus, Justice Thomas
concludes that there is no conflict between Collins and the case at
bar. This is a remarkable conclusion given that Collins itself holds
that one of the requirements at issue in that case, the failure to
explain why an affidavit is not attached to the post-conviction
petition, is nothing more than a nonsubstantive, pleading defect:
		"[S]ection 122-2 makes clear that the petitioner who is
unable to obtain the necessary 'affidavits, records, or
other evidence' must at least explain why such evidence
is unobtainable. In this case, defendant is asking to be
excused not only from section 122-2's evidentiary
requirements but also from section 122-2's pleading
requirements. Nothing in the Act authorizes such a
comprehensive departure." (Emphases in original.)
Collins, slip op. at 7.
According to this court's opinion in Collins, which was authored
by Justice Thomas, the failure to explain why an affidavit is not
attached to the petition is a pleading deficiency. It is not a
substantive defect. In light of the above, how can it possibly be
stated that the failure to explain the absence of an affidavit is an
"essential substantive component[ ]" of a post-conviction petition,
or that section 122-2 is a "purely substantive" provision? Slip op.
at 41 (Thomas, J., specially concurring, joined by Fitzgerald, J.).
	Furthermore, Justice Thomas' determination that all of the
pleading requirements contained in section 122-2 are substantive
components of a post-conviction petition is directly contradicted
by the majority opinion in this case. Here, the majority states:
		"At this initial stage of the proceedings, however, the
court should only determine whether the petition alleges
constitutional deprivations. The process at the summary
review stage measures a petition's substantive virtue
rather than its procedural compliance."Slip op. at 8.
Again, according to the majority in this case, at the summary
dismissal stage, the circuit court must only consider whether the
petition alleges a constitutional deprivation. No other inquiry is
permitted. In the view of the majority, whether the petition alleges
a constitutional deprivation is the measure of the petition's
"substantive virtue." Slip op. at 8. The majority opinion in this
case has thus defined the "substance" of a post-conviction petition
as that portion of the petition which attempts to allege a
constitutional deprivation, i.e., to state the gist of a constitutional
claim.
	The affidavit requirement discussed in Collins is not a
"substantive" component of a post-conviction petition under the
logic of the majority opinion in the case at bar. Whether a petition
contains an explanation for the absence of an affidavit simply has
no bearing on the question of whether the allegations of the
petition state the gist of a constitutional claim. The two cases
cannot, therefore, be reconciled under notions of substance and
procedure, and Justice Thomas' assertion to the contrary is in
error.
	The only authority which Justice Thomas cites in support of
his contention that all of the pleading requirements listed in
section 122-2 are "essential substantive components" of a post-conviction petition is People v. Jennings, 411 Ill. 21 (1952). As I
noted in my dissent upon denial of rehearing in Collins, Jennings
is inapposite to issues of summary dismissal "because that case
predates the addition of section 122-2.1(a)(2) to the Act. The
petitioner in Jennings was represented by counsel and summary
dismissal was not a possibility." Collins, slip op. at 22
(McMorrow, J., dissenting upon denial of rehearing, joined by
Freeman, J.). What relevance Jennings has to deciding whether a
post-conviction petition, particularly one filed by a pro se
defendant, should be summarily dismissed has never been
explained by any member of this court. Furthermore, Justice
Thomas' reliance on Jennings is highly selective. Jennings holds
that where the required affidavits are not attached to a post-conviction petition, the circuit court may "grant a further time
within which such affidavits may be obtained." Jennings, 411 Ill. 
at 26. As noted, this court in Collins ignored this holding and
refused to grant the pro se defendant any additional time in which
to amend his petition. Evidently then, Jennings is considered
binding authority on this court in only certain select respects.
	The position taken by Justice Thomas in his special
concurrence also leads to questionable results. According to
Justice Thomas, all the pleading requirements contained in section
122-2 of the Act, including the affidavit requirements, are
"substantive components" of a post-conviction petition. Slip op.
at 41 (Thomas, J., specially concurring, joined by Fitzgerald, J.).
On the other hand, the time limitations and pleading requirements
contained in section 122-1 are procedural. For this reason, Justice
Thomas concludes, there is no conflict in holding that the circuit
court may not consider whether the petition is timely filed at
summary dismissal (a procedural matter) but that it may consider
whether the proper affidavits are attached to the petition (a
substantive matter). As this court is well aware, section 122-1 of
the Act contains a "safety valve," which states that a defendant's
tardiness in filing a post-conviction petition may be excused if the
defendant "alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his
or her culpable negligence." 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 2000).
Under the reasoning advanced by Justice Thomas in his special
concurrence at bar, a defendant who fails to plead a lack of
culpable negligence has committed a "procedural" error, while the
defendant who fails to explain the absence of an affidavit has
committed a "substantive" error. No explanation has been offered
for this highly questionable outcome.
	The circuit court judge who is forced to deal with Collins and
the case at bar is presented with a dilemma. Confronted with a
post-conviction petition alleging a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel for failing to file an appeal, and without an additional
affidavit attached, what should the court do? Should the judge
follow Collins' instructions to summarily dismiss the petition, or
should the judge follow the instructions of the majority opinion in
this case and "only determine whether the petition alleges
constitutional deprivations"? Slip op. at 8. Should the judge
invoke this court's holding in Collins that the failure to explain the
absence of an affidavit is simply a pleading deficiency, or should
the judge give effect to the statement of the author of that opinion
which has been offered in this case that the failure to explain the
absence is an "essential substantive component[ ]" of the petition?
Slip op. at 41 (Thomas, J., specially concurring, joined by
Fitzgerald, J.). Should the circuit court follow the holding of the
majority in this case, since it is the later issued opinion, or should
the court follow Collins, since it specifically rules on the affidavit
question and the majority today makes no mention of Collins?
Surely the circuit court is entitled to guidance from this court and
should not have to attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable.
	Moreover, what of the consequences after the circuit court
rules? Some circuit judges, relying on Collins, will summarily
dismiss post-conviction petitions which lack an additional
affidavit. On appeal, members of the defense bar will, with
justification, point to our holding in this case and argue that the
circuit courts should only be addressing whether the petition states
the gist of a constitutional claim and should not be considering the
affidavit requirement. Some appellate panels will agree with this
argument. Others will not. As a result, conflicting opinions will
arise and will continue until this court grants leave to appeal in
order to resolve the conflict. Time and judicial resources will be
expended needlessly. Nothing will be gained.
	The majority opinion in the case at bar holds that the process
of summary dismissal addresses only one issue, i.e., whether the
petition states the gist of a constitutional claim. Collins holds that
summary dismissal process addresses more than one issue, i.e.,
whether the petition states the gist of a constitutional claim or
whether the petition meets any of the pleading requirements
contained in the Act. Whatever one thinks of the merits of these
approaches to the process of summary dismissal, it cannot be said
that they are compatible or can logically exist at the same time.
Either the circuit court's inquiry at the summary dismissal stage
should be limited solely to whether the petition states the gist of
constitutional claim or it should not be so limited. The court
cannot have it both ways.
	The petition for rehearing filed by the defendant in Collins has
been pending in this court at the same time this opinion has been
under advisement. If the court truly means what it says in the case
at bar, and I assume that it does, then in the interests of clarity and
guidance, it should have simply granted rehearing in Collins to
conform that opinion with the holding set forth here. See Collins,
slip op. at 13 (McMorrow, J., dissenting upon denial of rehearing,
joined by Freeman, J.). The court's failure to do so is both
unfortunate in a practical sense for the bench and bar and a poor
reflection on the wisdom of this court.

IV
	Although I disagree with the majority's failure to discuss the
effect of its decision on Collins, I agree with the conclusion the
majority reaches on the merits. Addressing the defendants'
arguments in the instant appeal, the majority first examines this
court's decision in People v. Wright, 189 Ill. 2d 1 (1999). In
Wright, this court was asked to decide whether the post-conviction
time limitations set forth in section 122-1 of the Act (725 ILCS
5/122-1 (West 2000)) are a jurisdictional prerequisite to
maintaining a post-conviction petition and whether a petition's
timeliness was a matter that could be raised for the first time by
the State on appeal. A majority of this court answered these
questions in the negative. In a separate opinion which I joined,
Justice Freeman disagreed with the majority's treatment of the
post-conviction time limitations. Based on the language of the Act,
and the importance placed on the time limitations by the
legislature, Justice Freeman concluded that time was " 'an inherent
element of the right' " (Fredman Brothers Furniture Co. v.
Department of Revenue, 109 Ill. 2d 202, 209 (1985), quoting Smith
v. Toman, 368 Ill. 414, 420 (1938)) to pursue a post-conviction
claim and, hence, a jurisdictional prerequisite to maintaining a
post-conviction petition. As such, according to Justice Freeman,
the State could raise the issue of timeliness on appeal. Justice
Freeman noted that treating the time limitations as jurisdictional
did not create any unfairness for the post-conviction petitioner
because, under this analysis, the petitioner could excuse the
tardiness of the petition by alleging that the delay in filing was not
due to his "culpable negligence." See 725 ILCS 5/122-1(c) (West
2000). As Justice Freeman explained:
		"[A] petitioner whose untimely petition is dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction could return to the circuit court and
attempt to take advantage of the 'safety valve' by filing a
new petition which contains the requisite allegations
concerning the lack of culpable negligence. Such a
successive petition would not be barred by the doctrine of
res judicata because a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction
does not constitute an adjudication on the merits. Under
this approach, the action would proceed in a way that is
consistent with the language of the Act (the petitioner
must allege and establish his or her lack of culpable
negligence for the delay as required under the Act), and
the State has not been allowed to 'trump' the truly
nonculpably negligent petitioner from the opportunity to
seek collateral review under the Act." Wright, 189 Ill. 2d 
at 30 (Freeman, C.J., specially concurring, joined by
McMorrow, J.).
	The majority in Wright, however, held that, under the plain
language of the Act, time was not an integral part of post-conviction relief and that the time limitations were best viewed as
a statute of limitations. Wright, 189 Ill. 2d  at 8. The court noted
that, like other statues of limitations, the time limitations in the
Act were an affirmative defense that were subject to waiver by the
State. Wright, 189 Ill. 2d  at 10-11. Thus, if the State failed to raise
the issue of timeliness in the circuit court, it could not raise the
issue for the first time on appeal. Wright, 189 Ill. 2d  at 10-11. In
sum, the court concluded that the post-conviction time limitations
were an ordinary statute of limitations that should not "be treated
differently [than] any other." Wright, 189 Ill. 2d  at 12.
	After reaching the above conclusions, however, the court in
Wright went on to state that it was "not limiting the trial court's
ability, during the court's initial review of noncapital petitions
[under section 122-2.1(a)(2) of the Act], to dismiss the petition as
untimely." Wright, 189 Ill. 2d  at 11. Moreover, Wright expressly
held that the circuit court had a "duty," imposed upon the court by
section 122-2.1(a)(2), to dismiss untimely post-conviction
petitions during the first stage of review. Wright, 189 Ill. 2d  at 11-12. As was explained at the time Wright was decided, these latter
statements are at odds with the Wright court's holding that the
post-conviction time limits are an ordinary statute of limitations,
since a statute of limitations defense is traditionally treated as an
affirmative defense that must be raised in responsive pleadings.
See Wright, 189 Ill. 2d  at 32-33 (Freeman, C.J., specially
concurring, joined by McMorrow, J.).
	In the instant case, the majority acknowledges that this court's
opinion in Wright contains conflicting statements regarding the
nature of the post-conviction time limitations and that these
statements have generated considerable confusion in our appellate
court. See slip op. at 5. The majority today resolves the ambiguity
in Wright by overruling that portion of the Wright opinion which
holds that the circuit court may sua sponte dismiss an untimely
petition. I agree with this result.
	As Justice Freeman explained at length in his separate opinion
in Wright, the clear and overriding holding of the Wright majority
opinion is that the time limitations in the Act are "an affirmative
matter to be raised by the State, and the State alone." (Emphasis
added.) Wright, 189 Ill. 2d  at 33 (Freeman, C.J., specially
concurring, joined by McMorrow, J.). As Justice Freeman stated,
"I read [the majority opinion in Wright] as holding that section
122-1 is to be treated as an ordinary statute of limitation, i.e., an
affirmative defense, and not as a jurisdictional prerequisite.
Therefore, in noncapital cases, the untimely petition that lacks
culpable negligence allegations [and which is nonfrivolous] must
be docketed in order to allow the State to put the culpable
negligence matter at issue as an affirmative defense." Wright, 189 Ill. 2d  at 32 (Freeman, C.J., specially concurring, joined by
McMorrow, J.).
	The Wright court's additional statements that the circuit court
could raise the issues of timeliness and culpable negligence sua
sponte are irreconcilable with the major holding of that case. See
Wright, 189 Ill. 2d  at 32-33 (Freeman, C.J., specially concurring,
joined by McMorrow, J.) Although I joined Justice Freeman in
dissenting from the Wright court's principal holding that issues
pertaining to timeliness must be raised by the State, I accept the
Wright court's holding as the law. Accordingly, because the
fundamental holding of Wright is that the issues of timeliness and
culpable negligence are an affirmative defense that can be raised
only by the State, and because any rule which allows the circuit
court to raise these issues sua sponte is directly at odds with that
holding, I agree that the portion of Wright which authorizes the
circuit courts to sua sponte dismiss untimely petitions should be
overruled. Wright holds that the post-conviction time limitations
are an ordinary statute of limitations that should not "be treated
differently [than] any other." Wright, 189 Ill. 2d  at 12. Wright
dictates, therefore, that issues of timeliness may not be raised sua
sponte by the circuit at the summary dismissal stage of post-conviction proceedings.
	In addition to the above, I note that by holding that the circuit
court should not concern itself with matters of timeliness on first
stage review, the majority in the case at bar has removed an issue
from the circuit court's consideration during this stage, thereby
reducing the burden placed on the circuit court. In this way, the
rule adopted by the majority comports with this court's
understanding that the first stage of post-conviction review, set
forth in section 122-2.1(a)(2) of the Act, is intended to be "a
simplified procedure" (People v. Rivera, 198 Ill. 2d 364, 372
(2001)). For this reason, and for the reasons previously discussed,
I concur in the majority's holding that a circuit court may not sua
sponte raise the timeliness of a post-conviction petition during the
first stage of post-conviction review.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN joins in this special concurrence.
	I must briefly respond to Justice McMorrow's exhaustive
examination of the alleged conflict between today's opinion and
this court's recent decision in People v. Collins, No. 90679 (March
15, 2002). The fact is that no such conflict exists, as,
notwithstanding Justice McMorrow's repeated assertions, section
122-2 is not a procedural statute. On the contrary, the sole purpose
of section 122-2, which is titled "contents of petition," is to define
the essential substantive components of a post-conviction petition:
			"The petition shall identify the proceeding in which the
petitioner was convicted, give the date of the rendition of
the final judgment complained of, and clearly set forth the
respects in which petitioner's constitutional rights were
violated. The petition shall have attached thereto
affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its
allegations or shall state why the same are not attached.
The petition shall identify any previous proceedings that
the petitioner may have taken to secure relief from his
conviction. Argument and citations and discussion of
authorities shall be omitted from the petition." 725 ILCS
5/122-2 (West 2000).
That the foregoing provision is purely substantive not only is plain
on its face but also underscored by its relationship to section
122-1, which explains how a proceeding under the Act is
commenced:
			"The proceeding shall be commenced by filing with the
clerk of the court in which the conviction took place a
petition (together with a copy thereof) verified by
affidavit." 725 ILCS 5/122-1(b) (West 2000).
Surely, if a proceeding under the Act commences only upon the
filing of a "petition," then the Act must somewhere define what
constitutes a "petition." Otherwise, the filing of any scrap of paper
might be deemed to commence a post-conviction proceeding. That
definition is found in section 122-2.
	And this is where Justice McMorrow's analysis falters. If a
proceeding under the Act may be commenced only upon the filing
of a "petition," and section 122-2 defines "petition," then it is
absurd to suggest that section 122-2 is a mere procedural
requirement that the trial court may not consult when assessing
whether a petition is frivolous or patently without merit. Indeed,
absent compliance with section 122-2's substantive requirements,
no "petition" exists with which to trigger application of the Act.
	Significantly, there is nothing new in suggesting that
compliance with the Act's substantive pleading requirements is the
necessary first step in any proceeding under the Act. More than 50
years ago, this court explained:
			"If the petition [alleges a substantial violation of
constitutional rights], the trial court should ascertain
whether it is supported by accompanying affidavits and if
not, whether the absence of such affidavits is sufficiently
explained and excused by the petitioner's own sworn
statements. Where there are no supporting affidavits and
their absence is neither explained nor excused, the trial
court should either dismiss the petition or grant a further
time within which such affidavits may be obtained.
			A petition meeting these requirements, both as to
substantial allegations of the denial of a constitutional
right and as to affidavits, is sufficient to invoke the act."
People v. Jennings, 411 Ill. 21, 26 (1952).
Of course, the converse also is true: a petition that does not meet
these requirements-as to either the necessary allegations or the
necessary affidavits-is not sufficient to invoke the Act.
	Thus, contrary to Justice McMorrow's thesis, there is nothing
in the least bit incompatible between today's decision and Collins.
Today, the court correctly holds that, in determining whether a
post-conviction petition is frivolous or patently without merit, the
trial court may not consider whether the petition suffers from a
procedural defect such as untimeliness. In Collins, the court
correctly held that, in determining whether a post-conviction
petition is frivolous or patently without merit, the trial court may
consider whether the proffered petition is in fact a "petition" as
defined by the Act. In effect, then, these decisions are two sides of
the same coin, emphatically agreeing that, "[t]he process at the
summary review stage measures a petition's substantive virtue
rather than its procedural compliance." Slip op. at 8.
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD joins in this special concurrence.
	 
	 
1.      1My criticism is not directed to Justice Kilbride. Because Justice
Kilbride dissented in Collins, his positions in Collins and the case at bar
are not inconsistent.