Title: Sierra Club v. Moser
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 105493
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: October 4, 2013

1 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANAS 
 
No. 105,493 
 
SIERRA CLUB, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
ROBERT MOSER, in his Official Capacity as Acting Secretary 
of the KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT,  
and the KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT, 
an Agency of the STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellees, 
 
and 
 
TRI-STATE GENERATION AND TRANSMISSION ASSOCIATION, INC., and 
SUNFLOWER ELECTRIC POWER CORPORATION, 
Intervenors. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
 
1. 
 
A petitioner who challenges a decision by the Kansas Department of Health and 
Environment to issue a prevention of significant deterioration permit under the federal 
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (2006), and the Kansas Air Quality Act, K.S.A. 
65-3001 et seq., must establish both statutory and common-law standing in the action for 
judicial review. To establish statutory standing, the petitioner must satisfy the standing 
requirements of both the Kansas Air Quality Act, K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 65-3008a(b), and 
the Kansas Judicial Review Act, K.S.A. 77-611.  
 
2.  
 
The standing requirements of the Kansas Air Quality Act, K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 65-
3008a(b), specify that (1) the action must be brought by an individual or an entity 
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meeting the definition of "person" in K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 65-3002(j), (2) the person must 
have participated in the public comment process or the public hearing, and (3) the person 
must meet the standing requirements of the Kansas Judicial Review Act, K.S.A. 77-611. 
 
3.  
 
A person who appears at a public hearing and submits comments regarding the 
Kansas Department of Health and Environment's review of a prevention of significant 
deterioration permit application is a party within the meaning of K.S.A. 77-611(b), one of 
the provisions in the standing statute of the Kansas Judicial Review Act.  
 
4. 
 
An association has standing to sue on behalf of its members when:  (1) the 
members have standing to sue individually; (2) the interests the association seeks to 
protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (3) neither the claim asserted nor 
the relief requested requires participation of individual members. To meet the first prong, 
the association must show that it or one of its members has suffered actual or threatened 
injury; that means the association or one of its members must have suffered cognizable 
injury or have been threatened with an impending, probable injury and the injury or 
threatened injury must be caused by the complained-of act or omission.  
 
5. 
 
A petitioner challenging an administrative agency's action under the Kansas 
Judicial Review Act, K.S.A. 77-601 et seq., must either identify in the administrative 
record evidence sufficient to support the petitioner's standing to bring the action or, if 
there is none because standing was not an issue before the agency, submit additional 
evidence to the court.  
 
 
 
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6. 
 
A court, when determining if it has jurisdiction to review an agency action under 
the Kansas Judicial Review Act, K.S.A. 77-601 et seq., may consider affidavits or 
declarations submitted to the court as evidence of a petitioner's standing to bring the 
action.  
 
7. 
 
A person has standing to challenge a decision by the Kansas Department of Health 
and Environment to issue a prevention of significant deterioration permit under the 
federal Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq., and the Kansas Air Quality Act, K.S.A. 
65-3001 et seq., if the person falls within a demographically identifiable segment of the 
general population that will see an increased risk of adverse health effects if the permit 
does not comply with statutory and regulatory requirements.  
 
8. 
 
An applicant for a prevention of significant deterioration permit under the federal 
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq., and the Kansas Air Quality Act, K.S.A. 65-3001 
et seq., must demonstrate that the project will not cause air pollution in excess of any 
national ambient air quality standard even if the standard has not been incorporated into 
Kansas' state implementation plan, unless the federal regulatory requirements specifically 
provide otherwise.  
 
9.  
 
An administrative agency's error is not made harmless simply because the agency 
might cure the error through future action.  
 
10. 
 
If legal or factual circumstances have changed during the time between an 
administrative agency's decision and this court's review of that decision so that a decision 
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of this court on an issue would be unavailing, this court ordinarily will not consider and 
decide the mooted issue. 
 
11. 
 
The use of integrated gasification combined cycle technology would be a 
redefinition of a project's design where the business purpose of the project includes 
integration of the project into an existing project that is not designed to use the 
technology. In such a case, a permitting authority is not required to consider integrated 
gasification combined cycle technology in its review under 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4) 
(2006) of the best available control technology. 
 
12. 
 
Although a permitting authority may exercise broad discretion in considering 
clean fuels or innovative technologies when determining the best available control 
technology for a facility under 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4), changing a fuel source from coal 
to natural gas would redesign a proposed facility and therefore need not be considered.  
 
13. 
 
Under the facts of this case, the permitting authority did not commit error in 
determining that the use of an ultra-supercritical pulverized coal boiler was not the best 
available control technology for the proposed facility under 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4), 
where the record relating to the determination included evidence supporting the 
permitting authority's findings that the use of ultra-supercritical pulverized coal 
technology lacked operating history in the United States, information regarding the 
technology's use and performance in other countries was not accessible or verifiable, and 
there were concerns about the reliability and maintainability of a facility using the 
technology.  
 
 
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14. 
 
Under the facts of this case, even though the permitting authority did not set the 
emission limits for nitrogen oxides and particulate matter for the proposed facility, which 
will be located in an attainment area, at the lowest achievable emission limits, the 
permitting authority did not err because there was evidence in the record supporting the 
conclusion that the emission limits included in the permit are consistent with emission 
limits that will be achievable over the life of the plant with the use of the best available 
control technology.  
 
15.  
 
The Secretary of the Kansas Department of Health and Environment and the 
Department of Health and Environment were not foreclosed from following the 
procedural requirements of the federal Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. by K.S.A. 
2012 Supp. 65-3029(a) or the settlement agreement referred to in that statute. 
 
16.  
 
Kansas appellate procedure does not allow a nonparty, including an amicus curiae, 
to raise an issue for appellate review.  
 
 
Appeal from Kansas Department of Health and Environment. Opinion filed October 4, 2013. 
Reversed and remanded.  
 
 
Amanda W. Goodin, of Earthjustice, of Seattle, Washington, argued the cause, and Todd D. True, 
of the same office, and Robert V. Eye, of Kauffman & Eye, P.A., of Topeka, were with her on the briefs 
for appellant. 
 
 
Steve R. Fabert, assistant attorney general, argued the cause, and Jeffrey A. Chanay, deputy 
attorney general, was with him on the brief for appellees. 
 
 
 
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James D. Oliver, of Foulston Siefkin LLP, of Overland Park, argued the cause, and Jonathan A. 
Rhodes, of the same firm, and Howard Kenison and Patrick G. Compton, of Lindquist & Vennum, of 
Denver, Colorado, were with him on the briefs for intervenor Tri-State Generation and Transmission 
Association, Inc.; and William L. Wehrun, of Hunton & Williams LLP, of Washington, D.C., argued the 
cause, and W.C. Blanton, of Husch Blackwell LLP, of Kansas City, Missouri, Henry V. Nickel, of the 
same firm, and Mark D. Calcara and Mark A. Rondeau, of Watkins Calcara, Chtd., of Great Bend, were 
with him on the briefs for intervenor Sunflower Electric Power Corporation.  
 
 
Gerald L. Cross, Jr., of Cross Law Firm, LLC, of Blue Springs, Missouri, was on the brief for 
amicus curiae Great Plains Alliance for Clean Energy. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
 
LUCKERT, J.:  In this appeal, environmental organization Sierra Club seeks judicial 
review of the decision of the Secretary of the Kansas Department of Health and 
Environment (KDHE) to issue an air emission source construction permit to Sunflower 
Electric Power Corporation (Sunflower) for the construction of an 895-megawatt coal-
fired power plant, referred to as Holcomb 2, at the site of Sunflower's existing plant in 
Holcomb, Holcomb 1. Sierra Club raises four issues and contends the permit fails to 
comply with the requirements of the federal Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et 
seq. (2006); implementing federal regulations; the Kansas Air Quality Act (KAQA), 
K.S.A. 65-3001 et seq.; and applicable Kansas Administrative Regulations, K.A.R. 28-
19-1 et seq. As a preliminary matter, the KDHE questions whether Sierra Club has 
standing to challenge the permit. 
 
We hold that Sierra Club has standing to bring this action and has established that 
the KDHE erroneously interpreted and applied the CAA and the KAQA when it failed to 
apply the regulations of the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regarding 1-
hour emission limits for nitrogen dioxide and sulfur dioxide during the Holcomb 2 
permitting process. These EPA regulations became effective before the Holcomb 2 
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permit was issued, and we hold that the CAA, KAQA, and implementing regulations 
required the KDHE to apply the regulations during the permitting process. We therefore 
reverse the KDHE's action of issuing the permit and remand this matter to the KDHE. 
 
Sierra Club's petition for judicial review presents three other issues. One of those 
issues—whether the KDHE erred in its application of hazardous air pollution emission 
requirements—is rendered moot by our decision to remand the Holcomb 2 permit 
because the EPA has adopted new regulations that must be applied on remand. In another 
issue, Sierra Club argues the KDHE erred in its analysis of the best available control 
technology (BACT). We reject this argument and Sierra Club's final argument that the 
procedure followed by the KDHE violated the CAA.  
 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
 
In 2006, Sunflower filed with the KDHE an application for a prevention of 
significant deterioration (PSD) permit for the construction of three new coal-fired electric 
generators at the site of its existing facility in Holcomb. Soon after, Tri-State Generation 
and Transmission Association, Inc., obtained an option from Sunflower for rights to a 
portion of the new power and facilities. Later that year, public hearings were conducted 
on the draft permit.  
 
In October 2007, although the KDHE staff recommended the PSD permit be 
issued, the Secretary of the KDHE denied the permit based on the level of greenhouse gas 
(carbon dioxide) emissions from the proposed generators. At that time, neither the EPA 
nor the KDHE had placed specific limitations on carbon dioxide emissions. Nevertheless, 
the Secretary declared carbon dioxide emissions an imminent and substantial hazard to 
public health and the environment and invoked the Secretary's then-existing power under 
K.S.A. 65-3012 to "take such action as may be necessary to protect the health of persons 
or the environment." 
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Sunflower challenged the KDHE's decision in state and federal courts. While those 
cases were pending, then-Governor Mark Parkinson and Sunflower entered into a 
settlement agreement. The agreement established terms and conditions for resuming the 
KDHE's consideration of Sunflower's permit application and called for Sunflower to 
reduce the size of its planned expansion, develop wind resources and energy efficiency 
programs, dismiss the federal lawsuit, and file a motion to stay any pending state court 
proceedings until the issuance of a permit, at which time Sunflower would request the 
dismissal of the state court proceedings. 
 
Subsequent to the settlement agreement, the 2009 Kansas Legislature enacted 
what is now K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 65-3029 (L. 2009, ch. 141, sec. 42; effective May 28, 
2009), which provides: 
 
"(a) The secretary shall timely approve a prevention of significant deterioration 
permit (PSD) to sunflower electric power corporation to be issued consistent with the 
settlement agreement executed May 4, 2009, by sunflower electric power corporation and 
the governor of the state of Kansas to resolve all claims or causes of action, or both, 
pending before various courts and administrative agencies consistent with article V of the 
settlement agreement. 
"(b) This section shall be part of and supplemental to the Kansas air quality act."  
 
The legislature also amended the powers of the Secretary in several ways, one of which 
was to limit the emergency power that the Secretary had relied upon in denying 
Sunflower's 2006 PSD permit application. See K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 65-3012; L. 2009, ch. 
141, sec. 25 (adopting H.B. 2369). 
 
Consistent with the settlement agreement and the 2009 legislation, Sunflower 
submitted supplemental materials to the KDHE in late 2009 and early 2010 to update its 
PSD permit application for the construction of the Holcomb 2 coal-fired power plant. 
9 
 
These updates were necessary, at least partially, because of changes in federal 
requirements that became effective after the first permit had been denied.  
 
The KDHE issued a draft PSD permit for Holcomb 2 and published a notice of 
scheduled public hearings and a public comment period. During the comment period, the 
EPA discovered errors in Sunflower's air quality impact modeling. As a result, Sunflower 
submitted a new modeling analysis, and, in September 2010, the KDHE issued a new 
draft PSD permit and another public notice of hearings and a comment period. During the 
subsequent proceedings, the KDHE received numerous communications from various 
individuals and organizations, including Sierra Club. Sierra Club officials and experts 
spoke at public hearings and presented written comments, as did Sierra Club members. 
After the hearings and the final public comment period, Sunflower provided the KDHE 
with proposed responses to the comments.  
 
At the conclusion of this process, the KDHE staff recommended the permit be 
issued, and on December 16, 2010, the Secretary of the KDHE issued the final PSD 
permit—the air emission source construction permit at issue in this appeal—for 
construction of Holcomb 2. In an extensive "Responsiveness Summary," the KDHE 
addressed hundreds of public comments, including those submitted by Sierra Club. In 
large part, the KDHE's responses were identical to those proposed by Sunflower.  
 
Sierra Club filed a petition for judicial review of the permit in the Kansas Court of 
Appeals. See K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 65-3008a(b) (under the KAQA, the Court of Appeals 
has "original jurisdiction to review any such final agency action"). Sunflower and Tri-
State (collectively the Intervenors) filed a motion for intervention, which the Court of 
Appeals granted. Subsequently, Sierra Club's petition was transferred to this court 
pursuant to K.S.A. 20-3018(c).  
 
10 
 
The KDHE and Intervenors answered the petition for judicial review, with the 
KDHE raising the jurisdictional question of whether Sierra Club has standing to 
challenge the Holcomb 2 PSD permit.  
 
We first address the standing question because it implicates this court's jurisdiction 
to consider the issues raised by Sierra Club. Then, because we ultimately determine 
Sierra Club has standing and there is no other objection to jurisdiction, we will address 
the issues raised by Sierra Club and expand on the facts relating to each issue.  
 
II. SIERRA CLUB HAS STANDING 
 
In raising the issue of standing, the KDHE alleges that Sierra Club failed to 
provide facts sufficient to support the claim of standing. As the KDHE argues, parties in 
a judicial action must have standing as part of the Kansas case-or-controversy 
requirement imposed by the judicial power clause of Article 3, § 1 of the Kansas 
Constitution. See State ex rel. Morrison v. Sebelius, 285 Kan. 875, 895-96, 179 P.3d 366 
(2008). The effect of this requirement is that standing is a component of subject matter 
jurisdiction, which any party, or the court on its own motion, may raise at any time. See 
Cochran v. Kansas Dept. of Agriculture, 291 Kan. 898, 903, 249 P.3d 434 (2011); Shipe 
v. Public Wholesale Water Supply Dist. No. 25, 289 Kan. 160, 165-66, 210 P.3d 105 
(2009). The issue of whether a party has standing in a judicial action, like other 
jurisdictional issues, presents a question of law. Bartlett Grain Co. v. Kansas 
Corporation Comm'n, 292 Kan. 723, 726, 256 P.3d 867 (2011); Cochran, 291 Kan. at 
903; Shipe, 289 Kan. at 165.   
 
The parties agree that a multilevel analysis—(1) statutory standing and (2) 
common-law or traditional standing—applies to the determination of whether Sierra Club 
has standing to challenge the Holcomb 2 PSD permit. To establish statutory standing 
under the first prong, Sierra Club must satisfy the standing requirements of both the 
11 
 
KAQA and the Kansas Judicial Review Act (KJRA), K.S.A. 77-601 et seq. See K.S.A. 
2012 Supp. 65-3008a(b) (standing requirements of KAQA); K.S.A. 77-611 (standing 
requirements of the KJRA); Board of Sumner County Comm'rs v. Bremby, 286 Kan. 745, 
750-64, 189 P.3d 494 (2008); Families Against Corporate Takeover v. Mitchell, 268 Kan. 
803, 806-07, 810-11, 1 P.3d 884 (2000) (FACT); NEA-Coffeyville v. U.S.D. No. 445, 268 
Kan. 384, 387, 996 P.2d 821 (2000). If Sierra Club meets the statutory requirements, it 
must also meet the second prong, satisfying the requirements under the common-law 
standard that is often referred to in our caselaw as the traditional standing test. See 
Cochran, 291 Kan. at 908-09; Bremby, 286 Kan. at 750, 761-64. 
 
A. Statutory Standing Requirements 
 
The KAQA addresses standing by stating:  "Any person who participated in the 
public comment process or the public hearing who otherwise would have standing under 
K.S.A. 77-611 [of the KJRA], and amendments thereto, shall have standing to obtain 
judicial review of the secretary's final action on the permit pursuant to the [KJRA] in the 
court of appeals." K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 65-3008a(b). This provision has three components:  
(1) The action must be brought by a person, (2) the person must have participated in the 
public comment process or the public hearing, and (3) the person must meet the standing 
requirements of K.S.A. 77-611. 
 
The first component does not present an obstacle to Sierra Club's action. Even 
though Sierra Club is an association, it qualifies as a person because the KAQA defines 
"person" to include "any . . . association, . . . public or private corporation, . . . or any 
other legal entity." K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 65-3002(j). 
 
Sierra Club also satisfies the second component of the KAQA's standing 
requirements. The record establishes that Sierra Club submitted written comments and its 
representatives and environmental experts presented oral comments at public hearings. In 
12 
 
addition, several individuals attending the public hearings identified themselves as Sierra 
Club members and some of them presented either oral or written comments.  
 
Nor is the final requirement—standing under the KJRA—an obstacle to Sierra 
Club's standing. The KJRA's standing statute, K.S.A. 77-611, recognizes four categories 
of persons who have standing to seek judicial review of an agency action. See K.S.A. 77-
602(h) (defining "person"). Sierra Club relies upon one of those four provisions, 
contending it has statutory standing under K.S.A. 77-611(b) as a "party to the agency 
proceedings that led to the agency action."  
 
Sierra Club bases its assertion of party status on its participation in the comment 
period and the public hearings. K.S.A. 77-602(f)(2) defines "'[p]arty to agency 
proceedings'" to include a person who is "allowed . . . to participate as a party in the 
proceeding." Further, the holdings in FACT, 268 Kan. 803, and Bremby, 286 Kan. 745, 
support Sierra Club's position that participation in a public hearing or providing public 
comment is sufficient to accord party status in a PSD permitting process.  
 
In FACT, the KDHE issued a permit to Murphy Farms, Inc., for the operation of a 
large-scale hog farm. The permit was issued under the National Pollution Discharge 
Elimination System, which was a delegated federal permitting program under the Clean 
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (1994). FACT, a nonprofit corporation, opposed the 
KDHE's issuance of the permit. This court determined that FACT met the KJRA's 
standing requirement under the party status provision in K.S.A. 77-611(b) because 
applicable regulations mandated public hearings and a comment period as part of the 
permitting process and members of FACT participated in these procedures. FACT, 268 
Kan. at 810.  
 
Bremby arose from a petition for judicial review filed by Tri-County Concerned 
Citizens, Inc. (Tri-County), an association formed to oppose the issuance of a landfill 
13 
 
permit by the KDHE. Addressing the standing of Tri-County to file the petition, this court 
cited FACT and held the association's "submission of written comments during a public 
notice and comment period and all persons' comments made during a public hearing held 
by an agency both qualify as participation within the meaning of the KJRA's standing 
requirements." Bremby, 286 Kan. at 758.  
 
Applying K.S.A. 77-611(b) and the holdings in FACT and Bremby to the 
circumstances of this case, we conclude that Sierra Club meets the definition of "party" 
under the KJRA. As we have noted, Sierra Club actively participated in the public 
comment and hearing process. And the KAQA and its implementing regulations make 
both public comments and public hearings required parts of a PSD permitting process. 
See K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 65-3008a(a) ("No permit shall be issued . . . without first 
providing the public an opportunity to comment and request a public hearing on the 
proposed permit action."); K.A.R. 28-19-204(b), (c) (requiring public notice and 
comment period during the PSD permitting process). In addition, the statutes and 
regulations broadly allow any member of the public, without qualification or limitation, 
to submit written comments on a draft PSD permit during the public comment period and 
to request or participate in a public hearing. See K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 65-3008a; K.A.R. 28-
19-204(a), (c)(8), and (c)(9).  
 
Other provisions further formalize and incorporate the public hearing and 
comment process into the KDHE's decision-making function. K.A.R. 28-19-204(f) 
provides that "[w]ritten comments timely received . . . during the public comment period 
and written comments and oral testimony received during a public hearing shall become 
part of the permit record." More significantly, K.A.R. 28-19-204(f) mandates that "[a]ll 
such written and oral comments which are relevant to the permit decision and which are 
within the jurisdiction established by the permit action shall be considered in making a 
final decision on the proposed permit action." Further, the KDHE's response to the 
comments "shall be issued at the time any final permit decision is issued." K.A.R. 28-19-
14 
 
204(g). In issuing the Holcomb 2 PSD permit, the KDHE responded to comments 
identified as coming from Sierra Club and its representatives. 
 
These statutory and regulatory provisions allowed Sierra Club and its members to 
participate in public hearings and submit testimony and, as in Bremby and FACT, to make 
public participation a part of the permitting process, thus according Sierra Club the status 
of a party within the meaning of K.S.A. 77-611(b). Consequently, Sierra Club's 
participation in the agency proceedings entitled it to assert statutory standing under 
K.S.A. 77-611(b) of the KJRA and under K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 65-3008a(b) because the 
other components of the KAQA's standing requirements were also met.  
 
B. Common-Law Standing Requirements 
 
The standing inquiry does not end here, however. In order to have standing to file 
an action in a Kansas court, Sierra Club must demonstrate that it also meets common-law 
or traditional standing requirements for associations. See Cochran, 291 Kan. at 908; 
Bremby, 286 Kan. at 761; FACT, 268 Kan. at 810-11. We conclude those requirements 
were also met. 
 
Generally, to demonstrate common-law or traditional standing, a person suing 
individually must show a cognizable injury and establish a causal connection between the 
injury and the challenged conduct. Board of Miami County Comm'rs v. Kanza Rail-Trails 
Conservancy, Inc., 292 Kan. 285, 324, 255 P.3d 1186 (2011); Bremby, 286 Kan. at 761. 
To establish a cognizable injury, a party must establish a personal interest in a court's 
decision and that he or she personally suffers some actual or threatened injury as a result 
of the challenged conduct. Lower v. Board of Dir. of Haskell County Cemetery Dist., 274 
Kan. 735, 747, 56 P.3d 235 (2002).  
 
15 
 
For an association to have standing, additional requirements are imposed and a 
three-prong test must be satisfied:  "An association has standing to sue on behalf of its 
members when (1) the members have standing to sue individually; (2) the interests the 
association seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (3) neither the 
claim asserted nor the relief requested requires participation of individual members." 
NEA-Coffeyville, 268 Kan. 384, Syl. ¶ 2; see Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising 
Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S. Ct. 2434, 53 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1977) (recognizing the 
three-prong associational standing test). To meet the first prong, the association must 
show that it or one of its members has suffered actual or threatened injury—i.e., the 
association or one of its members must have suffered cognizable injury or have been 
threatened with an impending, probable injury and the injury or threatened injury must be 
caused by the complained-of act or omission. See 312 Education Ass'n v. U.S.D. No. 312, 
273 Kan. 875, 885, 47 P.3d 383 (2002) (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 92 S. 
Ct. 1361, 31 L. Ed. 2d 636 [1972]); see also Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158, 
110 S. Ct. 1717, 109 L. Ed. 2d 135 (1990) (allegations of possible future injury do not 
satisfy requirements of standing; a "threatened injury must be '"certainly impending"' to 
constitute injury in fact"); Chamber of Commerce of United States v. E.P.A., 642 F.3d 
192, 200 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (association must demonstrate that at least one identified 
member suffered an "'actual'" injury or that an alleged future injury to that member is 
"'imminent'"); Sherley v. Sebelius, 610 F.3d 69, 74 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (to "shift[] injury 
from 'conjectural' to 'imminent,'" petitioner must show there is a "'substantial . . . 
probability of injury'"). 
 
Applying this test in Bremby, this court held that Tri-County met the three-prong 
test and had standing to challenge the lawfulness of the landfill permit. First, the court 
noted the petition alleged that Tri-County's members "'will suffer damage to their real 
property and water supply if the . . . landfill site is unsuitable under applicable legal 
requirements and if it leaks, causing contamination to the soil, groundwater and surface 
water.'" 286 Kan. at 763. Second, Tri-County was "'organized for the purpose of 
16 
 
preserving and enhancing the quality of life in Harper, Kingman and Sumner counties,'" 
and "ensuring that any landfill that is located in Harper County meet[s] environmental 
standards to protect the groundwater supply and river water . . . [is] germane to this 
purpose." 286 Kan. at 763. Finally, since Tri-County challenged the permit as arbitrary 
and capricious because it was issued on faulty environmental studies, that claim did not 
require the participation of its individual members. 286 Kan. at 763.    
 
Likewise, in FACT we held the three-prong association standing test was met. 
First, the record contained three affidavits from members of the organization in which 
members alleged "an imminent decrease in the value of their property, some of which 
was adjacent to the proposed hog farm." 268 Kan. at 804. The alleged decrease in value 
would be caused by "odor, flies, vermin, pestilence, and possible contamination of 
surface and ground water." 268 Kan. at 804. One affiant also claimed harmful health 
consequences to his asthmatic wife and son because of the KDHE's decision to allow the 
hog farm. This court found the individual members showed sufficient imminent injury to 
sue individually. Second, there was no doubt that the interests FACT sought to protect 
were germane to its purpose. FACT was organized for the express purpose of protecting 
its members from the adverse effects of a large-scale hog farm. Finally, neither the claim 
asserted nor the relief requested required the participation of individual members. FACT 
sought judicial review of an agency action, and the relief sought was revocation of the 
hog-farm permit. The analysis of whether the KDHE complied with the various rules and 
regulations involved in granting the permit did not require the participation of individual 
FACT members. 268 Kan. at 811. 
 
In this case, the KDHE and the Intervenors recognize the similarities between this 
case, Bremby, and FACT. Nevertheless, they contend Sierra Club fails to meet the first 
prong of the association standing test. 
 
 
17 
 
 
(1) First Prong:  Sierra Club Members Have Alleged Injury in Fact 
 
More specifically, the KDHE and the Intervenors argue the record before the 
KDHE did not include either written or oral comments establishing that a Sierra Club 
member faced an imminent injury in fact and, therefore, we must conclude that Sierra 
Club lacks standing. Sierra Club counters by arguing that there is evidence in the permit 
record that establishes its standing and, if not, declarations it filed with this court do.  
 
During the permitting process, Sierra Club presented general concerns for the 
environment and for the health of especially vulnerable segments of the general public 
and provided expert support for its assertions. Nevertheless, these general environmental 
and health concerns are not sufficient to establish Sierra Club's standing. As the United 
States Supreme Court has recognized:  "[A] mere 'interest in a problem,' no matter how 
longstanding the interest and no matter how qualified the organization is in evaluating the 
problem, is not sufficient by itself to render the organization 'adversely affected' or 
'aggrieved' [by an agency action] within the meaning of the APA [see Administrative 
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006)]." Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 739; see Summers v. 
Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488, 494, 129 S. Ct. 1142, 173 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2009) 
(generalized harm to environment will not alone support standing). The injury must be 
particularized, meaning it must affect the plaintiff in a "personal and individual way." 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 n.1, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351 
(1992).  
 
No Sierra Club member provided evidence during the permitting process of an 
imminent and particularized injury to either the member or Sierra Club. Consequently, if 
our decision were to be solely based on the record before the KDHE, we would conclude 
Sierra Club fails to meet the first prong of the associational standing test.  
 
18 
 
This brings us to Sierra Club's alternative argument that our analysis should 
include the five declarations filed by Sierra Club members with this court after the KDHE 
questioned Sierra Club's standing and this court issued an order for Sierra Club to show 
cause why this court has jurisdiction. The KDHE and the Intervenors make several 
arguments in response:  (a) This court is limited to considering the evidence in the agency 
record and cannot consider the additional evidence in the declarations; (b) the 
declarations cannot be considered because these members did not make public 
comments; and (3) even considering the declarations, Sierra Club has failed to establish 
imminent harm to individual members. For the reasons we discuss, we reject these 
arguments.  
 
 
(a) Evidence Outside the Agency Record Can Be Considered 
 
Regarding the contention that our decision must be based solely on the record 
before the KDHE, we have found no Kansas cases addressing whether a party seeking 
review of an agency determination can establish standing by submitting affidavits or 
declarations in court rather than through evidence submitted to the administrative agency. 
Other courts have considered the issue, and those courts have routinely accepted 
affidavits or declarations for the purpose of establishing the traditional requirements of 
standing. The rationale for doing so is that a petitioner does not have a need to establish 
an injury in fact to participate in the proceedings before the agency. Rather, the injury-in-
fact requirement is imposed as a check on a court's power to review and revise legislative 
and executive action. E.g., Sierra Club v. E.P.A., 292 F.3d 895, 899 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 
("'An administrative agency . . . is not subject to Article III of the Constitution of the 
United States' . . . . When the petitioner later seeks judicial review, the constitutional 
requirement that it have standing kicks in."); see Summers, 555 U.S. at 492-93 (doctrine 
of standing reflects fundamental restriction on courts, which "have no charter to review 
and revise legislative and executive action" except when necessary "to redress or prevent 
19 
 
actual or imminently threatened injury to persons caused by private or official violation 
of law").  
 
Under the holdings of the federal courts, once the burden is on the petitioner to 
establish standing in order to invoke the jurisdiction of the court, the petitioner must 
either identify in the record evidence sufficient to support its standing or, if there is none 
because standing was not an issue before the agency, submit additional evidence to the 
court. Sierra Club, 292 F.3d at 899; see Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (because the elements 
of standing—one of which is "injury in fact"—are "not mere pleading requirements but 
rather an indispensable part of the . . . case, each element must be supported . . . with the 
manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation").  
 
The KDHE suggests that Summers, 555 U.S. 488, undermines these federal cases. 
But the KDHE's reliance on Summers is misplaced because in that case it was the 
insufficiency of some declarations and the untimeliness of others that prevented the 
Court's consideration of the declarations, not the fact that the declarations supplemented 
the agency record.  
 
Highly summarized, in Summers, conservation organizations filed suit in federal 
district court to enjoin the United States Forest Service from applying regulations that 
eliminated certain notice and appeal rights with respect to projects in national forests 
nationwide. At that point, the Forest Service argued the plaintiffs lacked standing. The 
federal district court agreed, holding that organization members' affidavits in support of 
standing were insufficient, in part, because the members failed to identify any application 
of the regulations that "threatens imminent and concrete harm." 555 U.S. at 494-95. After 
the federal district court had entered judgment and after the Government had filed its 
notice of appeal, the organizations submitted additional, untimely affidavits to the federal 
district court in an attempt to prove standing. The United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari and considered the issue of standing, but the Court refused to consider the 
20 
 
contents of the affidavits filed after the district court had entered judgment, stating:  "If 
[the organizations] had not met the challenge to their standing at the time of judgment, 
they could not remedy the defect retroactively." 555 U.S. at 495 n.*.  
 
Hence, in Summers, the Supreme Court refused to consider the affidavits because 
the issue of standing had already been adjudicated in federal district court before the 
affidavits were filed. The Court did not indicate that affidavits or declarations were an 
inappropriate mechanism for meeting a party's burden to establish that it has standing. 
Nor did the Court hold that the federal district court erred in considering the initial, 
timely declarations. This is significant because, in the present case, this court is making 
the first determination of standing. Hence, our court essentially takes on the same role as 
the federal district court in Summers, and nothing in Summers suggests it was error for 
the district court to have considered the affidavits before ruling on the issue. 
 
Thus, contrary to the KDHE's argument, Summers does not abrogate the view of 
federal courts that affidavits or declarations can be used to establish standing of a party in 
cases involving judicial review of an agency action. Nevertheless, the federal decisions 
do not control our interpretation of the judicial power clause of Article 3, § 1 of the 
Kansas Constitution. Yet, Kansas courts have looked to federal caselaw as persuasive 
authority and have generally interpreted our judicial power clause in a manner similar to 
the federal case-and-controversy requirement. See State ex rel. Morrison v. Sebelius, 285 
Kan. 875, 896-97, 179 P.3d 366 (2008). We could not do so, however, if the Kansas 
Constitution or any state law prohibited us from applying the same principles.  
 
The only prohibitions suggested by the KDHE and the Intervenors are the 
provisions of the KAQA and the KJRA that generally limit judicial review of an agency 
action to the agency record. K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 65-3008a(b) provides, in part, that "[t]he 
record before the court of appeals shall be confined to the agency record for judicial 
review and consist of the documentation submitted to or developed by the secretary in 
21 
 
making the final permit decision." Likewise, K.S.A. 77-618 of the KJRA provides that 
review is "confined to the agency record for judicial review," although K.S.A. 77-619(a) 
does permit the supplementation of the record with additional evidence in some limited 
circumstances. Those circumstances, however, do not include establishing standing. 
 
Despite the limited nature of the exceptions stated in K.S.A. 77-619(a) and the 
general prohibition against additional evidence found in both the KAQA and the KJRA, 
we conclude these provisions do not prohibit our consideration of the members' 
declarations for purposes of determining the existence of Sierra Club's standing to 
challenge the permit in this court. Neither K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 65-3008a nor K.S.A. 77-
618 addresses the judicial power clause of the Kansas Constitution. Rather, both statutory 
provisions are limited to the scope of a court's review of an agency's actions. The KDHE 
made no findings on the issue of standing, nor was it asked to take such action. 
Therefore, we are not addressing standing in the context of a review of the agency's 
determination on the issue. And, although an organization such as Sierra Club could 
establish the prerequisites for associational standing at the administrative level, it is not 
required to do so. Moreover, K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 65-3008a and K.S.A. 77-618 do not 
address the mechanism for a court's determination of the limitations on the court's own 
power and jurisdiction. See Northwest Environmental Defense Ctr. v. BPA, 117 F.3d 
1520, 1527-28 (9th Cir. 1997) ("BPA cited several cases for the proposition that parties 
appealing agency decisions cannot supplement the record on appeal. These cases are 
inapposite because they address the merits of the agency decision rather than standing to 
challenge that decision in a federal court."); Dickinson v. United States Dept. of Interior, 
982 F.2d 1332, 1339-40 (9th Cir. 1992) (allowed supplemental declarations; standing 
challenged on appeal). 
 
We conclude that a petitioner may rely on the administrative record or may file 
affidavits or declarations with a court to establish standing of a party seeking judicial 
review of an agency action. A court, when determining if it has jurisdiction to review an 
22 
 
agency action, can consider the affidavits and declarations as evidence of a petitioner's 
standing.  
 
 
(b) A Declarant Did Make Public Comments 
 
The Intervenors also argue the declarations should not be considered because no 
declarant participated in the agency proceedings. The Intervenors' assertion is factually 
incorrect. The agency record includes the written testimony of one of the declarants, 
Barbara Campbell, who appeared at the public hearing in Garden City on August 5, 2010. 
Furthermore, we are not aware of any authority for the Intervenors' assertion that the 
statutory standing requirement of participation in the process carries over into the 
traditional association standing test.  
 
We need not resolve the issue here, however, because we hold that Campbell's 
declaration, when considered in light of other evidence in the record, is sufficient to 
establish standing.  
 
 
(c) Campbell's Imminent and Probable Injury 
 
In arguing otherwise, the Intervenors, speaking broadly of all the declarations, 
contend the declarants "fail to identify any present, concrete injury . . . but rather identify 
only their worries and general concerns about pollution . . . ." The Intervenors further 
argue that "[w]hat Sierra Club says would pass for standing is no more rigorous than the 
call-in requirements for radio talk shows."  
 
In many respects, the Intervenors are correct. In large part, like the written 
testimony Campbell presented at the public hearing, her declaration expresses general 
concerns shared by many citizens near and far from the Holcomb 2 site regarding the 
negative effects of pollution on the environment. But Campbell adds some details that 
23 
 
relate to the adverse health effects of emissions that one of Sierra Club's experts opined 
would be caused by emissions from Holcomb 2. Specifically, Campbell states that she 
lives about 4 miles from the Holcomb 2 site, she describes herself as "elderly," and she 
provides her age. She then declares:  "As an elderly person, I am very worried about 
breathing the pollutants that will come from the new coal plant, and the negative effects 
that those pollutants may have on my health."  
 
While the declaration thus provides evidence of Campbell's proximity to the 
Holcomb 2 site and her age, her expression of "concern" does not establish a causal 
relationship between these characteristics and an imminent and probable injury related to 
adverse effects of anticipated pollutants from Holcomb 2. But we are aware of no 
authority that requires a declarant to both state a threatened injury and establish a 
causation theory without the assistance of an expert. In fact, where, as here, causation is 
based on scientific evidence and is not within common understanding, we generally 
require the opinion of an expert. See, e.g., Schlaikjer v. Kaplan, 296 Kan. 456, 464, 293 
P.3d 155 (2013). Given that, it is appropriate to examine whether there is other evidence 
that establishes the missing causal link.  
 
Two items in the record are particularly significant. First, the KDHE's own air 
quality impact analysis indicates that proximity to the plant, including the 4-mile distance 
of Campbell's home, increases the exposure to potentially harmful pollutants. Second, in 
the permit proceedings, Sierra Club presented a written declaration of Jonathan Levy, 
Ph.D., Associate Professor of Environmental Health and Risk Assessment at the Harvard 
School of Public Health. In the declaration, Dr. Levy opined that "construction and 
operation of the proposed unit at the Holcomb site in Kansas would contribute to 
particulate matter concentrations in the vicinity of the plant and in downwind areas, 
increasing the health risks . . . to individuals in those areas." This exposure, he further 
explained, "is associated with a number of serious health problems, such as premature 
death, cardiovascular and respiratory hospitalizations, and other forms of respiratory and 
24 
 
cardiovascular morbidity. These health problems are particularly likely to occur in 
sensitive populations, including the elderly, children, and individuals with diabetes or 
cardiopulmonary disease." (Emphasis added.) See Sierra Club v. United States Dep't of 
Agriculture, 841 F. Supp. 2d 349, 358-60 (D.D.C. 2012) (holding Dr. Levy's affidavit 
sufficient to establish Sierra Club met irreparable injury requirement of test for issuing a 
temporary injunction preventing the Department of Agriculture's Rural Utilities Service 
from approving or consenting to agreements or arrangements directly related to the 
Holcomb 2 project or to taking any other major federal actions in connection with the 
project until an environmental impact study has been completed).  
 
While we have focused on Campbell's declaration, we note other declarations 
establish that several Sierra Club members are similarly situated—that is, they live near 
the Holcomb 2 site and are elderly or otherwise vulnerable to the increased health risks 
substantiated in the record. The combination of these declarations, including Campbell's, 
the KDHE's studies, and Dr. Levy's opinions establish that these Sierra Club members 
fall within a demographically identifiable segment of the general population that will see 
an increased risk of adverse health effects if the Holcomb 2 PSD permit does not comply 
with statutory and regulatory requirements. Hence, Sierra Club members are threatened 
with an imminent injury, and we conclude that Sierra Club meets the first prong of the 
common-law association standing test.  
 
(2) Prongs Two and Three of the Common-Law Standing Test Are Met 
 
Regarding the second prong of the common-law association standing test, Sierra 
Club has shown that the interests it seeks to protect are germane to its purposes; it alleges 
in its petition for judicial review that it is an organization whose "members live, work, 
recreate, farm, and engage in other economic activities that will be adversely impacted by 
[Holcomb 2]. They include senior citizens, children, people with asthma, and other 
individuals who are especially vulnerable to harm from exposure to . . . pollutants . . . ." 
25 
 
And Sierra Club alleges the "aesthetic, conservation, recreational, economic, 
informational, and procedural interests" of the organization and its members have been 
adversely affected.  
 
Further, as for the third prong, none of the parties has contended that the relief 
sought by Sierra Club requires the participation of its individual members in the lawsuit.   
 
In summary, based on the allegations of the petition in this case and in light of 
Kansas precedent and persuasive federal caselaw, we conclude that Sierra Club has 
standing to challenge the KDHE's issuance of the Holcomb 2 PSD permit under the 
KJRA, the KAQA, and common-law or traditional standing requirements.  
 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND OF SIERRA CLUB'S ISSUES 
 
 
Our conclusion that Sierra Club has standing means the four issues raised by 
Sierra Club can be considered. Before addressing those issues, it is helpful to discuss the 
interrelationship of the federal CAA and the KAQA.  
 
The federal CAA governs air quality and emissions standards throughout the 
United States. It provides for a regulatory scheme to protect and enhance the nation's air 
quality through joint federal and state participation with some responsibilities falling to 
the federal EPA and others to state agencies. See Sierra Club v. Georgia Power Co., 443 
F.3d 1346, 1348 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401[b][1], 7410); accord 
Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 566-67, 127 S. Ct. 1423, 
167 L. Ed. 2d 295 (2007); Southern Alliance for Clean Energy v. Duke Energy, 650 F.3d 
401, 403-04 (4th Cir. 2011).  
 
To achieve the CAA's goals, Congress established the maximum allowable 
increases and concentrations for some pollutants. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7473 (2006) 
26 
 
(establishing sulfur oxide and particulate matter standards). In addition, Congress 
directed the EPA to establish primary and secondary national ambient air quality 
standards (NAAQS) for any pollutant "reasonably . . . anticipated to endanger public 
health or welfare" and to periodically review and revise those standards. 42 U.S.C. § 
7408(a)(1)(A) (2006); see 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409(a)(1), (d) (2006) (directing promulgation 
and review of primary and secondary NAAQS). The CAA also requires the EPA to 
divide the country into areas designated as "nonattainment," "attainment," or 
"unclassified" based on whether these areas meet the NAAQS. 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d) 
(2006).  
 
The states, on the other hand, have the primary responsibility for assuring that air 
quality within their borders meets the NAAQS. Each state must create a state 
implementation plan (SIP), which is then submitted to the EPA for approval. See 42 
U.S.C. § 7410 (2006). To be approved by the EPA, each SIP must "include enforceable 
emission limitations and other control measures, means, or techniques . . . as may be 
necessary or appropriate to meet the applicable requirements of [the CAA]." 42 U.S.C. § 
7410(a)(2)(A); see 40 C.F.R. § 52.02(a) (2012); see also Alaska Dept. of Environmental 
Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 470, 124 S. Ct. 983, 157 L. Ed. 2d 967 (2004). Each 
state has the right to adopt and enforce its own standards regarding emissions of air 
pollutants "provided such state standard is no less stringent than any applicable federally 
mandated SIP provision." Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Thomas, 845 F.2d 
1088, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1988).  
 
Upon approval by the EPA, a SIP becomes binding and is subject to federal 
enforcement. See 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (2006); see also Union Electric Co. v. Environmental 
Pro. Agcy., 515 F.2d 206, 211 (8th Cir. 1975) ("Upon approval or promulgation of a state 
implementation plan [SIP], the requirements thereof have the force and effect of federal 
law and may be enforced by the Administrator in federal courts."). A state may not 
unilaterally modify its SIP once it has been approved by the EPA. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(i) 
27 
 
(modification prohibited), (l) (revisions to plan submitted by a state shall be adopted by 
such state after reasonable notice and public hearing and cannot interfere with federal 
requirements); see Duquesne Light Co. v. E.P.A., 698 F.2d 456, 471 (D.C. Cir. 1983) 
(current SIPs remain in force until EPA formally approves revision); Kentucky Resources 
Council, Inc. v. United States E.P.A., 304 F. Supp. 2d 920, 927-28 (W.D. Ky. 2004) 
(approved SIP remains applicable even after state has submitted a proposed revision to 
EPA).  
 
 
In Kansas, the KDHE administers and enforces the SIP. See K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 
65-3005(b)(1); K.A.R. 28-19-200(hhh). To carry out the responsibility for air quality and 
pollution control in Kansas, the Secretary of the KDHE has, inter alia, the power to 
adopt, amend, and repeal rules and regulations implementing and consistent with the 
KAQA; issue such orders as may be necessary to effectuate the purpose of the KAQA; 
enforce such orders by appropriate administrative and judicial proceedings; and establish 
ambient air quality standards. K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 65-3005. As such, Kansas' EPA-
approved SIP is administered by the Secretary of the KDHE pursuant to provisions in the 
KAQA and Kansas Administrative Regulations entitled "Ambient Air Quality Standards 
and Air Pollution Control," K.A.R. 28-19-1 et seq., adopted under the authority of the 
KAQA. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.870, 52.872 (2012); K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 65-3005; K.S.A. 65-
3008; K.A.R. 28-19-800; see also K.A.R. 28-19-200(hhh) (defining "State 
implementation plan"). 
 
Kansas has adopted the national standards, and Kansas' SIP provides for the 
implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of NAAQS. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a), (b); 
K.A.R. 28-19-200(nn) ("[n]ational ambient air quality standard[s]" means "those 
standards promulgated at 40 CFR Part 50, revised as of July 1, 1995, which are adopted 
by reference"); K.A.R. 28-19-350(f)(1) (2012 Supp.) (listing NAAQS for certain 
pollutants, including nitrogen dioxide and sulfur dioxide).  
 
28 
 
In addition, Kansas' SIP follows the CAA by requiring a facility to obtain a permit 
under the PSD construction permit program, the purpose of which is well-described by its 
title—the prevention of significant deterioration; it is this type of permit that is at issue in 
this case. The program applies to the modification or construction of a "major emitting 
facility" that is or will be located in an attainment or unclassified area. See 42 U.S.C. § 
7475(a) (2006); 40 C.F.R. § 52.21 (2012); K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 65-3029; K.A.R. 28-19-
300; K.A.R. 28-19-350 (2012 Supp.); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1) (2006) (defining 
"major emitting facility"); 42 U.S.C. § 7479(2)(C) ("construction" includes 
"modification"); K.A.R. 28-19-200(p) (defining "construction").  
 
Under the PSD regulations, the owner of a proposed source must prove that the 
construction will not cause violations of certain air quality standards. In the CAA, 
Congress charged the EPA with promulgating PSD regulations that would "provide 
specific numerical measures against which permit applications may be evaluated, a 
framework for stimulating improved control technology, protection of air quality values, 
and fulfill the goals and purposes set forth" in the PSD program. 42 U.S.C. § 7476(a), (c) 
(2006). In PSD regulations promulgated under this authority, the EPA sets maximum 
allowable increases, or "increments," for some pollutants based on a mathematical 
relationship to each pollutant's NAAQS. See, e.g., 75 Fed. Reg. 64,864, 64,885 (October 
20, 2010). The EPA has also established de minimis thresholds which set specific values, 
in relation to each pollutant's NAAQS, below which the pollutant is not considered to 
cause or contribute to a violation of the NAAQS or to an established increment. These 
increments and de minimis thresholds are then used by the states to calibrate their SIP 
requirements. See Environmental Defense Fund v. Adm'r of United States E.P.A., 898 
F.2d 183, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 
In addition, if the facility is located in an attainment area, the owner must prove 
the proposed operations are in compliance with the best available control technology 
(BACT) requirements or, if the facility is located in a nonattainment area, the lowest 
29 
 
achievable emissions rate technology (LAER). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475(a)(4), 7479(3), 
7503 (2006); 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.21(b)(12), (j)(2) (2012); K.A.R. 28-19-350(b) (2012 Supp.) 
(incorporating by reference 40 C.F.R. § 52.21); US Magnesium, LLC v. United States 
E.P.A., 690 F.3d 1157 (10th Cir. 2012). The LAER requirement is applied in 
nonattainment areas because the CAA seeks to offset emissions increases in those areas 
with emissions reductions from other sources in the area. New York v. E.P.A., 443 F.3d 
880, 883 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7503). 
 
If a permitting authority determines an owner has met these burdens and issues a 
PSD permit, the permitting authority must include limitations or conditions to ensure that 
emissions from the permitted facility:  (1) will not cause or contribute to violations of the 
NAAQS established by the CAA and (2) will be controlled sufficiently to maintain 
existing air quality in the surrounding region. See United States v. Pacific Gas & Elec., 
776 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1013 (N.D. Cal. 2011).  
 
It is undisputed that the proposed Holcomb 2 power plant is a facility subject to 
the PSD program. The proposed capacity makes Holcomb 2 a major emitting facility, and 
Holcomb is located in Finney County, which has been designated as an attainment area 
for numerous pollutants. See 40 C.F.R. § 81.317 (2012).  
 
Hence, the KDHE's permitting process included a BACT analysis, and the 
Holcomb 2 PSD permit established emission limits for Holcomb 2. Sierra Club, in two of 
its issues, argues certain emission limits in the permit do not comply with the CAA and 
Kansas' SIP. In a third issue, Sierra Club disputes the adequacy of the KDHE's BACT 
analysis. The final issue disputes whether Sunflower's settlement agreement with then-
Governor Parkinson and the 2009 legislation unilaterally amended Kansas' SIP and 
violated the procedural requirements of the CAA and the KAQA. 
 
 
30 
 
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR ALL ISSUES 
 
 
In reviewing Sierra Club's arguments, our scope of review is governed by the 
KJRA, K.S.A. 77-601 et seq., and specifically by K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 77-621(c), which 
enumerates eight circumstances under which a court may grant relief from an agency 
action. Of those eight circumstances, Sierra Club relies on those stated in K.S.A. 2012 
Supp. 77-621(c)(4) to (c)(8) at certain points in its arguments. Those provisions allow 
relief from a final agency action if: 
 
"(4) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
"(5) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or has failed to follow 
prescribed procedure; 
"(6) the persons taking the agency action were improperly constituted as a 
decision-making body or subject to disqualification; 
"(7) the agency action is based on a determination of fact, made or implied by the 
agency, that is not supported to the appropriate standard of proof by evidence that is 
substantial when viewed in light of the record as a whole, which includes the agency 
record for judicial review, supplemented by any additional evidence received by the court 
under this act; or 
"(8) the agency action is otherwise unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious." K.S.A. 
2012 Supp. 77-621(c). 
 
Sierra Club, as the party asserting that the KDHE erred, has the burden of proving 
one or more of these circumstances apply. See K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 77-621(a)(1). If Sierra 
Club establishes that errors occurred, "due account shall be taken by the court of the rule 
of harmless error" under K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 77-621(e). 
 
 
V. FAILURE TO APPLY 1-HOUR EMISSION LIMITS WAS ERROR 
 
We first address Sierra Club's contention that the KDHE erred because it did not 
apply two EPA-promulgated regulations that became effective several months before the 
31 
 
Holcomb 2 PSD permit was issued. These regulations established 1-hour emission limits 
for nitrogen dioxide (NO2) and sulfur dioxide (SO2). The KDHE determined these rules 
did not apply to Sunflower's pending PSD permit application because Kansas had not yet 
amended its SIP in light of the new regulations.   
 
A. Standard of Review for This Issue 
 
Sierra Club argues the KDHE's failure to require 1-hour emission limits in the 
PSD permit is "contrary to law [and] arbitrary, capricious and otherwise unreasonable." 
In the context of judicial review of an agency action, this falls under two of the eight 
circumstances under which a court may grant relief as provided in the KJRA. 
Specifically, a court may grant relief where "the agency has erroneously interpreted or 
applied the law" or where "the agency action is otherwise unreasonable, arbitrary or 
capricious." K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 77-621(c)(4), (c)(8).  
 
This issue turns on whether the new emission limits are applicable as a matter of 
law. This requires us to consider federal law regarding application of new emission limits 
issued by the EPA under the CAA. "'Where possible in construing federal statutes, state 
courts should seek direction from the decision of federal courts interpreting similar 
language.'" Purvis v. Williams, 276 Kan. 182, 188, 73 P.3d 740 (2003). However, "it is 
within the power of the court to interpret it, absent any otherwise binding court ruling." 
276 Kan. at 187.  
 
B. NO2 and SO2 Emissions and the Parties' Arguments 
 
The EPA's standards for NO2 and SO2 were originally established in the 1970's 
and included maximum acceptable average concentrations for 1-year periods for both 
pollutants, as well as 24-hour and 3-hour periods for SO2. American Petroleum Institute 
v. E.P.A., 684 F.3d 1342, 1345 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. denied 133 S. Ct. 1724 (2013); 
32 
 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Thomas, 845 F.2d 1088, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 
1988). Kansas' SIP in effect when the Holcomb 2 permit was issued followed these 
standards. K.A.R. 28-19-350(f)(1). The last formal revision of Kansas' SIP before the 
Holcomb 2 PSD permit was issued was in 2008. See 40 C.F.R. § 52.870(a), (b) (2012). 
 
In 2010, the EPA promulgated two new final rules in which it adopted 1-hour 
primary NAAQS for both NO2 and SO2. See 75 Fed. Reg. 6474 (February 9, 2010) (final 
rule, effective April 12, 2010, for 1-hour primary NO2 standard); 75 Fed. Reg. 35520 
(June 22, 2010) (final rule, effective August 23, 2010, for 1-hour primary SO2 standard). 
The 1-hour primary NO2 standard, found at 40 C.F.R. § 50.11(f) (2010), was upheld in 
American Petroleum Institute, 684 F.3d 1342, and the 1-hour primary SO2 standard, 
found at 40 C.F.R. § 50.17(b) (2010), was upheld in National Environmental 
Development Ass'n v. E.P.A., 686 F.3d 803 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. denied 133 S. Ct. 983 
(2013).  
 
In the present case, the KDHE issued the Holcomb 2 PSD permit on December 16, 
2010, several months after the April 2010 and August 2010 effective dates of the new 1-
hour NO2 and SO2 emission regulations. Nevertheless, the KDHE did not include the new 
NO2 and SO2 emission limits in the Holcomb 2 permit. In the formal written responses, 
the KDHE recognized that the EPA had adopted a number of "new federal regulatory 
requirements and/or recommendation for a facility seeking a PSD permit," including the 
1-hour NAAQS for SO2 and NO2. But it determined that only those NAAQS that had 
been incorporated into Kansas' 2008 SIP applied to the permitting process because the 
SIP "define[d] the rules and regulations that apply to the proposed project."  
 
Before us, the KDHE argues that under § 110 of the CAA, Kansas will be required 
to "adopt and submit to EPA a revised SIP to implement, maintain, and enforce" the 1-
hour NO2 and SO2 emission regulations. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (2006). The KDHE 
asserts that until it submits and the EPA approves a revised SIP reflecting the new 1-hour 
33 
 
primary NAAQS, the "approved Kansas SIP continues to have full force and effect" and 
the KDHE has no obligation to enforce the 1-hour NO2 and SO2 emission regulations. 
The KDHE cites three cases to support its contention—Coalition Against Columbus 
Center v. New York, 967 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1992); Citizens for a Better Environment v. 
Wilson, 775 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Cal. 1991); and Matter of Crown/Vista Energy Project, 
279 N.J. Super. 74, 652 A.2d 212 (1995).  
 
Each of these cases addresses amendments to the NAAQS made in 1990 and 
corresponding SIP compliance. And the outcome of each case relies on the "savings 
clause" in the 1990 amendments, which preserves "[a]ny provision of any applicable 
implementation plan . . . in effect before November 15, 1990," until revision of the 
provision is "approved or promulgated" by the EPA. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(n)(1). None of the 
parties in the present case point to any similar savings provision that would apply to the 
2010 amendments to the NAAQS. Hence, these cases provide little guidance.  
 
As further support for its interpretation of the law, the KDHE notes that § 110 of 
the CAA generally grants a state "three years from the date of the NAAQS publication in 
which to complete its SIP submission, unless the EPA Administrator prescribes a shorter 
period." 42 U.S.C. §7410(a)(1). Yet, § 165(c) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7475(c) (2006), 
requires PSD permits to be issued within 1 year of the applicant's filing a completed 
application. The KDHE suggests the requirement for timely consideration of an 
application means a state need not apply new NAAQS regulations if the 3-year SIP 
allowance has not expired.  
 
Sierra Club disagrees, asserting that the KDHE's interpretation is contrary to the 
unambiguous statutory and regulatory language. It recognizes that Kansas' SIP must be 
amended to reflect the new 1-hour primary NAAQS, but it contends this does not change 
the fact that the permit-related provisions of federal and Kansas statutes and regulations 
require any new source to comply with all NAAQS in effect at the time a permit is 
34 
 
issued. In Sierra Club's view, the process of amending the SIP, which could take the full 
3 years allowed by the EPA, should not and does not delay the application of any new 
standards to the PSD permitting process or prevent a new source from incorporating and 
complying with NAAQS at the time the PSD permit is issued. To allow the construction 
of a new facility that would not comply with emission limits would be contrary to the 
CAA's purpose of maintaining air quality, according to Sierra Club. 
 
As we consider these arguments, the KDHE asks us to give deference to its 
interpretation of the CAA and KAQA. This suggestion is contrary to our caselaw, 
however. As stated in Denning v. KPERS, 285 Kan. 1045, 1048, 180 P.3d 564 (2008):  
"An agency's interpretation of a statute is not conclusive; final construction of a statute 
always rests within the courts." And, because we exercise de novo review over the issue 
of statutory construction, we need not give deference to an agency's interpretation of a 
statute. See Village Villa v. Kansas Health Policy Authority, 296 Kan. 315, 323, 291 P.3d 1056 
(2013); Saylor v. Westar Energy, Inc., 292 Kan. 610, 614, 256 P.3d 828 (2011); Ft. Hays 
St. Univ. v. University Ch., Am. Ass'n of Univ. Profs, 290 Kan. 446, Syl. ¶ 2, 228 P.3d 
403 (2010). Consequently, we will examine the parties' arguments regarding how to 
properly construe the various statutes and regulations. 
 
C. The New Regulations Should Have Been Applied 
 
Several statutory provisions and regulations support Sierra Club's position that a 
permit must conform to any NAAQS. Federal law provides that no major emitting facility 
may be constructed unless the owner or operator demonstrates that "emissions from 
construction or operation of such facility will not cause, or contribute to, air pollution in 
excess of any . . . [NAAQS] in any air quality control region." (Emphasis added.) 42 
U.S.C. § 7475(a)(3) (2006). Similarly, 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(k) (2012) provides, in part, that 
a permit applicant "shall demonstrate that allowable emissions increases from the 
proposed source . . . would not cause or contribute to air pollution in violation of:  (i) Any 
35 
 
[NAAQS] in any air quality control region." (Emphasis added.) This regulation applies 
only to EPA-issued permits, however.  
 
Nevertheless, 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(k) has become applicable in Kansas by 
incorporation into our state regulations. K.A.R. 29-19-350 (2012 Supp.) states:   
 
"(a) PSD requirement. The requirements of this regulation shall apply to the 
construction of major stationary sources and major modifications of stationary sources as 
defined in 40 C.F.R. 52.21 in areas of the state designated as attainment areas or 
unclassified areas for any pollutant under the procedures prescribed by section 107(d) of 
the federal clean air act, 42 U.S.C. 7407(d). 
"(b) Adoption by reference; exceptions. 
(1) 40 C.F.R 52.21, as revised on July 1, 2007 and as amended by 75 Fed. Reg. 
31606-31607 (2010), is adopted by reference, except as specified in paragraphs (b)(2) 
and (3)." (Emphasis added.) 
 
Notably, subsection (k) is not one of the subsections excepted from the general 
incorporation by reference. Thus, by incorporating 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(k), Kansas requires 
a PSD permit applicant to demonstrate that a new stationary source will not cause or 
contribute to air pollution in excess of any NAAQS.  
 
Sierra Club argues the word "any" should be given its ordinary meaning with the 
effect being that Sunflower needed to demonstrate to the KDHE that Holcomb 2 will not 
violate any NAAQS, including the NO2 and SO2 1-hour standards that have yet to be 
incorporated into Kansas' SIP. In making this argument, Sierra Club cites several federal 
cases to support its contention that a federal agency is required to apply the federal law in 
effect at the time it makes a permit decision. See, e.g., Ziffrin, Inc. v. United States, 318 
U.S. 73, 78, 63 S. Ct. 465, 98 L. Ed. 621 (1943) ("[A] change of law pending an 
administrative hearing must be followed in relation to permits for future acts. Otherwise 
the administrative body would issue orders contrary to the existing legislation."); State of 
36 
 
Ala. ex rel. Baxley v. Environ. Pro. Agcy., 557 F.2d 1101, 1110 (5th Cir. 1977) 
(appropriate best practicable technology limitations to be applied in national pollutant 
discharge elimination system permit were those in effect at the time of initial permit 
issuance). This general rule was applied to one of the regulations at issue—the new 1-
hour NO2 NAAQS—in In re Shell Gulf of Mexico, Inc., Shell Offshore, Inc., OCS Appeal 
Nos. 10-01 through 10-04, 15 E.A.D. ___, 2010 WL 5478647 (EAB 2010) (EPA agency 
order). Addressing two EPA-issued outer continental shelf PSD permits, the 
Environmental Appeals Board held it was inappropriate to rely solely on compliance with 
the annual NO2 standard after the new 1-hour NO2 NAAQS had been published in a final 
rule, even though the new NAAQS was not effective until a few days after the PSD 
permits were issued.  
 
In addition, one case—WildEarth Guardians v. Jackson, 870 F. Supp. 2d 847 
(N.D. Cal. 2012)—holds that newly adopted NAAQS are to be applied during the federal 
permitting process even if the EPA has not incorporated the NAAQS into its PSD 
regulations. In WildEarth Guardians, Sierra Club and others sought an injunction 
compelling the EPA to update or revise the PSD regulations after it had revised the 
NAAQS for ozone. The EPA argued it did not have a mandatory duty to revise the PSD 
regulations. The federal court agreed, noting the EPA had discretion to modify them. The 
court also noted:    
 
"Moreover, a PSD permit applicant is always required to demonstrate that it will not 
cause or contribute to a violation of the most current NAAQS, regardless of whether the 
PSD increments and de minimis thresholds have been modified after that NAAQS has 
been revised. See 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(3); 40 C.F.R. § 51.166(k)(1), 40 C.F.R. § 
52.21(k)(1)." WildEarth Guardians, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 854-55. 
 
From this statement, we can reason that if federal PSD regulations do not have to be 
amended in order for the new NAAQS to apply to a PSD permitting process, it follows 
37 
 
that a state SIP does not have to be amended, at least in those states where 40 C.F.R. § 
52.21(k) has been adopted.  
 
Nevertheless, while these cases are instructive, they do not address the precise 
issue at hand:  Whether new NAAQS apply to a permit issued after the effective date of 
the NAAQS even if the NAAQS have not been incorporated into a state's SIP. In fact, we 
have found no case directly addressing this issue. Consequently, we must construe the 
relevant provisions ourselves. See Purvis, 276 Kan. at 187-88 (in lieu of binding federal 
court interpretation of federal law, this court may interpret federal statutes). As we 
frequently state, when construing a statute, "[w]e first attempt to ascertain legislative 
intent by reading the plain language of the statutes and giving common words their 
ordinary meanings." Northern Natural Gas Co. v. ONEOK Field Services Co., 296 Kan. 
906, Syl. ¶ 3, 296 P.3d 1106 (2013).  
 
A reading of 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(3), 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(k), and K.A.R. 29-19-350 
leads to the conclusion that the Holcomb 2 PSD permit must comply with any NAAQS, 
including those not incorporated into Kansas' SIP. Simply put, "any" means "any." And 
courts construing the CAA have given the word an expansive reading, as explained in 
New York, 443 F.3d at 885-86:  
 
"In a series of cases, the Supreme Court has drawn upon the word 'any' to give 
the word it modifies an 'expansive meaning' when there is 'no reason to contravene the 
clause's obvious meaning.' [Citations omitted.] Indeed, the Court has read the word 'any' 
to signal expansive reach when construing the Clean Air Act. In Harrison v. PPG 
Industries, Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 100 S. Ct. 1889, 64 L. Ed. 2d 525 (1980), the Court 
resolved a jurisdictional dispute under section 307(b)(1) by interpreting the phrase 'any 
other final action,' which the Court 'discern[ed to have] no uncertainty. . . .  
"Although EPA is correct that the meaning of 'any' can differ depending upon the 
statutory setting, see Nixon v. Missouri Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 132, 124 S. Ct. 1555, 
38 
 
158 L. Ed. 2d 291 (2004), the context of the Clean Air Act warrants no departure from 
the word's customary effect."  
 
The court also reasoned that the word should not be applied in a way that "would 
allow sources operating below applicable emission limits to increase significantly the 
pollution they emit" because this would be contrary to the CAA, "a law intended to limit 
increases in air pollution." New York, 443 F.3d at 886. Likewise, in this case, it would be 
counter to the purpose of the CAA and the new federal regulations to allow Holcomb 2 to 
violate the new 1-hour NO2 and SO2 standards. Consequently, there is no basis to depart 
from the ordinary meaning of the word "any" in this context. Further, requiring Kansas to 
apply the new standards is consistent with the provisions of the CAA that prohibit a state 
from having less stringent emission standards than those adopted by the EPA. See 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 845 F.2d at 1090.   
 
Nevertheless, as the KDHE suggests, there is an ambiguity that arises from the 
interplay and seeming conflict between the PSD requirements and the SIP provisions. In 
this regard we agree with Sierra Club that the PSD requirements—including the mandate 
that a PSD applicant must meet any NAAQS—is more specific to the question before us 
and controls. See Ft. Hays St. Univ., 290 Kan. at 463 (specific statutes control over 
general statutes). While we reach this conclusion based on our de novo review of the 
statutory and regulatory language, our conclusion that this is the correct way to resolve 
the ambiguity is strengthened by the EPA's position that the 1-hour standards apply.  
 
The EPA has frequently asserted this position. For example, in denying requests to 
reconsider the final regulations regarding the SO2 emission standards, the EPA indicated 
the new 1-hour SO2 NAAQS applied even if a SIP had not yet been amended, stating: 
 
"To the extent necessary to address these PSD requirements for the new 1-hour 
SO2 NAAQS, SIPs are due no later than 3 years after the promulgation date. Generally, 
39 
 
however, the owner or operator of any major stationary source or major modification 
obtaining a final PSD permit on or after the effective date of the new 1-hour SO2 NAAQS 
will be required, as a prerequisite for the PSD permit, to demonstrate that the emissions 
increases from the new or modified source will not cause or contribute to a violation of 
that new NAAQS." 75 Fed. Reg. 35520, p. 35578 (June 22, 2010). 
 
 
The EPA had made similar statements when issuing notices as part of its 
rulemaking procedure regarding both the NO2 and SO2 1-hour standards. E.g., 74 Fed. 
Reg. 64810, p. 64862 (December 8, 2009) ("If EPA establishes a 1-hour NAAQS for 
SO2, the owner or operator of any major stationary source or major modification locating 
in an attainment or unclassifiable area for SO2 will be required, as a prerequisite for a 
PSD permit, to demonstrate that the emissions increases from the new or modified source 
will not cause or contribute to a violation of the new NAAQS."); 75 Fed. Reg. 6474, p. 
6525 (February 9, 2009) ("[M]ajor new and modified sources applying for NSR/PSD 
permits will initially be required to demonstrate that their proposed emissions increases 
of NOX will not cause or contribute to a violation of either the annual or 1-hour NO2 
NAAQS and the annual PSD increment.").   
 
 
These NO2- and SO2-specific statements are consistent with the position the EPA 
has generally taken when distinguishing between the SIP amendment process and the 
permitting process. In an Internal Guidance Memorandum addressing state permitting 
processes, the EPA indicated it "does not agree with one commenter's suggestion that [an 
amendment to existing] NAAQS would not take effect until the time a State first 
promulgates limitations for the pollutant in a SIP." 75 Fed. Reg. 17004, p. 17018 (April 
2, 2010). The EPA has also explained that, in absence of a "grandfathering provision that 
allows pending applications to apply standards in effect when the application is complete, 
a final permit decision issued after the effective date of a NAAQS must consider such a 
NAAQS." 75 Fed. Reg. 17004, p. 17018.  
 
40 
 
But the EPA has also recognized that application of this policy to a state 
permitting program is not absolute, stating:  
 
"The timing when the NAAQS operates in this manner under SIP-approved programs is 
potentially more nuanced and depends on whether State laws are sufficiently open-ended 
to call for application of a new NAAQS as a governing standard for PSD permits upon 
the effective date. EPA believes that State laws that use the same language as in EPA's 
PSD program regulations at 52.21(k) and 51.166(k) are sufficiently open-ended and 
allow such a NAAQS to 'take effect' through the PSD program upon the effective date of 
the NAAQS." 75 Fed. Reg. 17004, p. 17018. 
 
See also 75 Fed. Reg. 35520, p. 35580 (June 22, 2010) (addressing federal permitting 
process and requiring application of any new or revised standard).  
 
The KDHE and Intervenors acknowledge the EPA's position but argue the KDHE 
has properly construed the PSD requirements of Kansas law as not being "sufficiently 
open-ended" as to allow the new 1-hour NAAQS to apply before redesignation and SIP 
revision. This conclusion is contrary to the EPA's explanation of what it means by 
"sufficiently open-ended."  
 
The EPA has generally determined that a SIP is "sufficiently open-ended" if the 
SIP uses the language found in the EPA's PSD program regulations at 40 C.F.R. § 52.21 
and 40 C.F.R. § 51.166(k) (2012). As we have discussed, Kansas has adopted the same 
language as 40 C.F.R. § 52.21 by incorporating it into K.A.R. 29-19-350. Similarly, 
K.A.R. 28-19-350(d) (2012 Supp.) adopts by reference 40 C.F.R. part 51, "Subpart I, as 
revised on July 1, 2007 and as amended by 75 Fed. Reg. 31606 (2010)." 40 C.F.R. § 
51.166 is included in part 51, subpart I. Hence, the Kansas regulations, by incorporation 
of the two federal regulations, render Kansas' SIP sufficiently open-ended so as to require 
application of NAAQS upon the NAAQS' effective date.  
 
41 
 
Consistent with our conclusion, the EPA has also taken the position that Kansas' 
laws are sufficiently open-ended as to require application of the new federal regulations 
during the permitting process in this case. In a letter regarding Sunflower's PSD permit 
application dated April 2, 2010, the EPA expressed to the KDHE that the  
 
"KDHE has adopted the federal PSD rule by reference. Accordingly, we believe 
that the KDHE's permit rules are sufficiently open-ended so as to require Sunflower to 
demonstrate compliance with new or revised NAAQS as part of any PSD permit that is 
issued to the source on or after the effective date of the applicable NAAQS."  
 
Then, in an August 2010 comment to the KDHE, the EPA indicated that "to assure 
compliance with the 1-hour NOx and SO2 NAAQS, the permit needs to contain . . . 1-
hour average emission rates for both the new and existing steam generating units."  
 
The KDHE rejected this viewpoint and, before us, argues we should not follow the 
EPA's guidance because the immediate application of the new 1-hour standards is 
"nonsensical" when the KDHE has not had an opportunity to incorporate them into 
Kansas' SIP, determine the level of analysis an applicant must undergo, or determine 
enforcement mechanisms. The KDHE is not the first state agency or industry source to 
raise this argument. In fact, in issuing the final 1-hour NAAQS for SO2, the EPA noted 
similar criticisms about applying the new regulation during the permitting process 
"without an EPA-approved de minimis value that could be used in determining the level 
of analysis that individual PSD sources must undergo." 75 Reg. Reg. 35520, p. 35580. 
Despite this criticism, the EPA left in place its prior conclusion that new regulations 
apply to federal and state permitting processes where the state has sufficiently open-
ended laws. 75 Fed. Reg. 35520, p. 35580. 
 
Nevertheless, as the KDHE points out, the EPA's guidance on this topic is not 
controlling. See American Petroleum Institute v. E.P.A., 684 F.3d 1342, 1354 (D.C. Cir. 
2012), cert. denied 133 S. Ct. 1724 (2013) (statement in preamble to 1-hour SO2 rule that 
42 
 
"applicants 'will initially be required' is predictive of the agency's future actions, not one 
from which 'legal consequences w[ould] flow'"); Alaska Dept. of Environmental 
Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 487-88, 124 S. Ct. 983, 157 L. Ed. 2d 967 (2004) 
(EPA's guidance memorandums are not binding on a court and are not entitled to 
deference); but see City of Las Vegas v. F.A.A., 570 F.3d 1109, 1117 (9th Cir. 2009) (If a 
regulation is ambiguous, courts "consult the preamble of the final rule as evidence of 
context or intent of the agency promulgating the regulations."). 
 
Although not controlling and not subject to our deference, we find the EPA's 
position persuasive because it is consistent with the CAA's goal of preventing air quality 
deterioration and with our own reading of the plain language of 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(3), 
40 C.F.R. § 52.21(k), and K.A.R. 29-19-350(a), (b) (2012 Supp.). See Alaska Dept. of 
Environmental Conservation, 540 U.S. at 486 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470[3], [4] and 
noting that "Congress' reason for enacting the PSD program—[is] to prevent significant 
deterioration of air quality in clean-air areas within a State and in neighboring States"). 
Consequently, applying the plain meaning of the words in 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(3), 40 
C.F.R. § 52.21(k), and K.A.R. 29-19-350(a), (b) (2012 Supp.), we hold that a PSD permit 
applicant must demonstrate that the project will not cause air pollution in excess of any 
NAAQS even if those standards have not been incorporated into Kansas' SIP, unless the 
federal regulatory requirements indicate otherwise. This would include the new 1-hour 
NO2 and SO2 NAAQS, and we hold the KDHE erred in failing to apply those NAAQS 
during the permitting process. Because of this holding, we need not address Sierra Club's 
alternative argument that the KDHE erred in conducting the modeling that served as the 
basis for the NO2 and SO2 emission limits that were included in the Holcomb 2 PSD 
permit. 
 
We must, however, consider the Intervenors' argument that any error would be 
harmless because "any issues related to emission limitations addressing the new NAAQS 
could be resolved during the period that Holcomb 2 is under construction and prior to 
43 
 
operation of the new unit." In support of this argument, the Intervenors ask us to consider 
a February 3, 2011, EPA letter to the KDHE, which states, in part:  "KDHE should 
consider a permit amendment to include enforceable 1-hour emission limits prior to the 
construction and/or operation of the new [Holcomb 2] unit. KDHE may also want to 
consider the latest EPA guidance on NO2 modeling as part of any permit amendments."  
 
This letter, which was sent after the Holcomb 2 PSD permit had been issued, is not 
in the record of proceedings before the KDHE. The Intervenors request us to take 
"judicial notice pursuant to K.S.A. 60-412 . . . . The authenticity and content of the 
addenda are specific facts immediately verifiable through EPA as provided in K.S.A. 60-
409(b)(4)." The Intervenors do not attempt to reconcile the judicial notice provision with 
the KAQA and KJRA provisions that limit our consideration to matters in the agency 
record. See K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 65-3008a(b); K.S.A. 77-618. But we need not resolve that 
question because we reject the Intervenors' argument that an agency's error is harmless 
simply because the agency might cure the error through future action. Our jurisdiction is 
limited to the action taken by the KDHE.  
 
Because the issuance of the Holcomb 2 PSD permit to Sunflower was based on 
errors of law under the CAA, we remand the permit to the KDHE for application of the 
new federal regulations setting out 1-hour NO2 and SO2 standards. See K.S.A. 2012 
Supp. 77-621(c)(4) (relief from agency action granted if agency erroneously interprets or 
applies the law).  
 
VI. OTHER NEW STANDARDS MUST ALSO BE APPLIED 
 
In another issue, Sierra Club argues the KDHE erred in issuing the Holcomb 2 
PSD permit without adequate emission limits for a group of more than 150 pollutants 
listed in 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1) (2006), which are collectively termed "hazardous air 
pollutants" (HAPs). At the time Sunflower was going through the permitting process in 
44 
 
this case, the EPA had not issued HAPs emission limits for coal-fired plants. Under the 
CAA, if a category-wide emission limit has not been published, the KDHE, as the 
permitting authority, is required to calculate case-by-case emission limits for HAPs under 
the maximum achievable control technology (MACT) standard and include that emission 
limit in a permit for a new "major source" of HAPs. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(g)(2)(B); 40 
C.F.R. §§ 63.42, 63.43 (2012); K.A.R. 28-19-752a(b), (d). Consequently, the KDHE had 
to determine whether Holcomb 2 would be a major source of HAPs emissions and, 
therefore, subject to the MACT requirement. See Southern Alliance For Clean Energy v. 
Duke Energy, 650 F.3d 401, 404 n.1 (4th Cir. 2011). In issuing the PSD permit, the 
KDHE determined that Holcomb 2 would not be a major source. Sierra Club challenged 
that determination in its petition for judicial review.  
 
But now, as undisputed by the parties, it is irrelevant whether Holcomb 2 will be a 
major source of HAPs because on February 16, 2012, after the PSD permit was issued, 
the EPA established national limits for mercury, acid gases, and other toxic emissions 
from all coal- and oil-fired electric utility steam generating units of more than 25 
megawatts. See 40 C.F.R. § 63.10042 (2012); 77 Fed. Reg. 9304 (February 16, 2012) 
(EPA's rule known as the "Mercury and Air Toxics Standards"). All parties agree that 
Holcomb 2 is designed to exceed this threshold. Further, the parties agree the new HAPs 
emission limits apply to Holcomb 2 even though the EPA's final rule on the matter was 
not effective until after the PSD permit was issued because the rule clearly states that 
"any source that 'commenced' construction after the May 3, 2011, proposal date is 
considered a new source under the statute and the source must comply with the new 
source standards even if the source received a final and legally effective CAA section 
112[g] permit before proposal." 77 Fed. Reg. 9304, pp. 9399, 9366; 40 C.F.R. §§ 
63.9982(b) (2013), 63.9985 (2012). The EPA subsequently stayed the rule (for new 
sources only) but has now announced that the rule "is and remains in effect for all 
sources." 78 Fed. Reg. 24073, p. 24075 (April 24, 2013); see 40 C.F.R. § 63.9982 (2013). 
 
45 
 
What the parties disagree on is how this court should deal with the change in the 
law. The Intervenors filed a motion seeking the dismissal of that portion of Sierra Club's 
petition in which Sierra Club sought review of the KDHE's major-source ruling; the 
Intervenors argued this request for relief was moot. Sierra Club responded and filed a 
motion for summary judgment, arguing the PSD permit did not comply with federal law.  
 
We need not delve into which type of procedural relief is more appropriate.  
 
"When it clearly appears by reason of changed circumstances between the trial of 
an action and its review in this court that any judgment this court [might] render would be 
unavailing as to the particular issue litigated, this court ordinarily will not consider and 
decide the mooted issue whether one of law or fact." Dickey Oil Co. v. Wakefield, 153 
Kan. 489, Syl. ¶ 1, 111 P.2d 1113 (1941).  
 
Here, the EPA's retroactive regulation and our decision to remand renders both the 
original issue regarding whether Holcomb 2 would be a major source of HAPs and the 
parties' disagreement about the procedural effect of the new HAPs rule moot. Therefore, 
this issue will not be analyzed.  
 
 
On remand, the KDHE must apply the new HAPs emission limits that are 
explicitly retroactive to this permit. 
 
VII. KDHE'S BACT DETERMINATIONS ARE NOT REVERSIBLE 
 
In another issue, Sierra Club argues the KDHE's determinations of emission limits 
in the Holcomb 2 PSD permit fail to adequately reflect the best available control 
technology (BACT) for each regulated pollutant which the facility has the potential to 
emit in significant amounts. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475(a)(4), 7479(3) (2006); 40 C.F.R. §§ 
52.21(b)(12), (j)(2) (2012); K.A.R. 28-19-350(b) (2012 Supp.) (incorporating by 
reference 40 C.F.R. § 52.21).  
46 
 
A. This Issue May Be Moot 
 
Before discussing the merits of this issue, we must first consider whether this issue 
is rendered moot by our decision to remand the Holcomb 2 PSD permit. In their briefs, 
the parties do not discuss the potential for some arguments becoming moot if we find 
error on another issue. Nor do the parties suggest the scope of proceedings if the permit is  
remanded. Instead, we raise these questions sua sponte. In doing so, we recognize that the 
parties should be given an opportunity to present their positions regarding the scope of 
proceedings on remand and whether there must be a new BACT determination. See State 
v. Puckett, 230 Kan. 596, 601, 640 P.2d 1198 (1982).  
 
We also recognize there may be factual components to these arguments. For 
example, we are unable to determine whether additional modeling is necessary under the 
new 1-hour NO2 and SO2 NAAQS. In addition, we are unable to determine the potential 
effect of an order to stay that is referred to in the parties' arguments but is not in the 
record before us. Based on the arguments, it appears that the KDHE stayed the effect of 
K.A.R. 28-19-301(c), which provides that a PSD permit will expire if construction has 
not begun within 18 months of its issuance. See 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(r)(2); Sierra Club v. 
Franklin County Power of Illinois, 546 F.3d 918, 934 (7th Cir. 2008) (18-month 
limitation "ensures that major emitting facilities comply with up-to-date [pollution 
control] . . . technology"). We can only speculate as to the specifics of that order or its 
impact on remand proceedings, and the order is not before us for review.  
 
We, therefore, determine that the scope of the proceedings on remand must be 
determined by the KDHE. Because we express no opinion on the appropriate scope, we 
cannot rule that Sierra Club's BACT issue is moot. It is conceivable the KDHE will rely 
on some or all of its prior determinations. We also note that the application of BACT 
regulations is an issue of first impression in Kansas. See State v. Scott, 286 Kan. 54, 107, 
183 P.3d 801 (2008) (recognizing court may discuss issues to provide guidance on 
47 
 
remand). Consequently, we will discuss the parties' arguments regarding the BACT 
analysis.  
 
B. Standard of Review for This Issue 
 
 
In presenting this issue, Sierra Club relies on K.S.A. 77-621(c)(4) and (c)(8) of the 
KJRA in citing the standard of review. Under these provisions, a court may grant relief 
where "the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law" or where "the agency 
action is otherwise unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious." K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 77-
621(c)(4), (c)(8).  
 
Sierra Club also suggests we find that the KDHE's failure to adequately include 
some technologies in the BACT analysis was "clear error." The "clear error" standard is a 
federal standard applied in proceedings before the Environmental Appeals Board, 
pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 124.19(a)(1) (2012) (petition for review must show that a 
"finding of fact or conclusion of law . . . is clearly erroneous"). This standard does not 
apply under the KJRA.  
 
Instead, where a court reviews an agency's factual findings under the KJRA, the 
court reviews the record as a whole to determine whether those findings are supported by 
substantial evidence. Relief is granted if the court determines that "the agency action is 
based on a determination of fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by 
evidence that is substantial when viewed in light of the record as a whole." K.S.A. 2012 
Supp. 77-621(c)(7). The KJRA defines "in light of the record as a whole" to include the 
evidence both supporting and detracting from an agency's finding. K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 77-
621(d); Redd v. Kansas Truck Center, 291 Kan. 176, 182-83, 239 P.3d 66 (2010). 
 
The two provisions cited by Sierra Club as a basis for relief with regard to an 
agency's factual findings—K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 77-621(c)(7) and (c)(8)—also provide a 
48 
 
mechanism for review of issues of law. Under subsection (c)(8), an agency action is 
reviewed to determine if it is "unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious." An action that is not 
based on determined principles, which would include applicable law, is unreasonable, 
arbitrary, and capricious. See Dillon Stores v. Board of Sedgwick County Comm'rs, 259 
Kan. 295, 299, 912 P.2d 170 (1996). 
 
C. BACT Requirements 
 
BACT is not a particular type of technology. It is an "'emission limitation based on 
the maximum degree of reduction of each pollutant subject to regulation . . . which the 
[state] permitting authority [here, the KDHE], on a case-by-case basis, taking into 
account energy, environmental, and economic impacts and other costs, determines is 
achievable' for the facility in question." Sierra Club v. Otter Tail Power Co., 615 F.3d 
1008, 1011 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7479[3]); see National Parks & 
Conservation v. Tennessee Valley, 502 F.3d 1316, 1325 (11th Cir. 2007) (BACT is to be 
determined through the preconstruction permitting process); 2 Pub. Nat. Resources L. § 
18:23 (2d ed. 2013) (explaining BACT). 
 
During the permitting process, the KDHE and Sunflower indicated they were 
following the top-down method in conducting their BACT determinations. The Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals has described the top-down method as follows: 
 
"Under this method, as detailed in the EPA's New Source Review Workshop Manual 
(1990), the applicant ranks all available control technologies in descending order of 
control effectiveness. The most stringent technology is BACT unless the applicant can 
show that it is not technically feasible, or if energy, environmental, or economic impacts 
justify a conclusion that it is not achievable. Citizens for Clean Air v. United States EPA, 
959 F.2d 839, 845-46 (9th Cir. 1992). If the top choice is eliminated, then the next most 
stringent alternative is considered, and so on. The most effective control option not 
eliminated is BACT. [Citation omitted.]" Alaska, Dept. Environ. Conserv. v. United 
49 
 
States E.P.A., 298 F.3d 814, 822 (9th Cir. 2002), aff'd 540 U.S. 461, 124 S. Ct. 983 157, 
L. Ed. 2d 967 (2004).  
 
Basically, there are five steps in a top-down BACT analysis: 
 
"(1) identifying all available control technologies for the proposed process or 
source;  
"(2) evaluating the technical options for the proposed process or source; 
"(3) comparing the remaining control technologies based on effectiveness; 
"(4) evaluating the remaining options taking into consideration energy, 
environmental and economic impacts; and [5] selecting BACT." Sierra Club v. 
Wisconsin Dep't of Natural Res., 327 Wis. 2d 706, 718-19, 787 N.W.2d 855 
(Wis. App. 2010), rev. denied 332 Wis. 2d 278 (2011).  
 
Although the top-down analysis is a common approach to the BACT 
determination, it is not mandated by the CAA. Alaska, Dept. Environ. Conserv., 298 F.3d 
at 822; Citizens for Clean Air v. United States E.P.A., 959 F.2d 839, 845 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(top-down approach places the burden of proof on "'"the applicant to justify why the 
proposed source is unable to apply the best technology available"'").  
 
In presenting its BACT issue, Sierra Club does not take issue with the KDHE's use 
of the top-down analysis. Instead, it disagrees with the way in which the KDHE applied 
the top-down approach. While this court has never reviewed an agency's application of 
the top-down approach, other courts have. Those decisions, especially the federal 
decisions, provide persuasive authority because Kansas regulations adopt the federal 
statutory definition of BACT found at 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(12). See K.A.R. 28-19-
350(b) (2012 Supp.).  
 
 
 
50 
 
D. Sierra Club's Contentions 
 
Sierra Club specifically contends the KDHE erroneously failed to adequately 
consider (1) innovative fuel combustion techniques such as integrated gasification 
combined cycle (IGCC) technology; (2) "clean fuels" such as natural gas; and (3) ultra-
supercritical pulverized coal technology. According to Sierra Club, the KDHE's failure to 
adequately consider these types of production techniques in its BACT analysis renders 
the permit unlawful. In addition, Sierra Club makes a fourth argument that the KDHE 
erred in failing to include emission limits that are based on an adequate BACT analysis 
for many individual pollutants, including nitrogen oxides and particulate matter.  
 
 
(1) IGCC Technology  
 
Sierra Club argues the KDHE erred by not including IGCC technology in the first 
step of its BACT analysis. The KDHE and Intervenors argue IGCC technology was 
properly omitted from step one because its use would require a redesign of the facility. 
Indeed, "'[h]istorically, EPA has not considered the BACT requirement as a means to 
redefine the design of the source when considering available control alternatives.'" 
Longleaf Energy v. Friends of the Chattahoochee, 298 Ga. App. 753, 760-61, 681 S.E.2d 
203 (2009) (quoting EPA, New Source Review Workshop Manual:  Prevention of 
Significant Deterioration and Nonattainment Area Permitting, p. B.13 [1990]). The EPA's 
interpretation has been repeatedly upheld in litigation. E.g., Sierra Club v. United States 
E.P.A., 499 F.3d 653, 654 (7th Cir. 2007) (accepting EPA's interpretation that BACT 
"does not include redesigning the plant proposed by the permit applicant"); Blue Skies 
Alliance v. Com'n, 283 S.W.3d 525, 535 (Tex. App. 2009) ("BACT analysis must 
consider any control technology that may be applied to the proposed facility, but does not 
need to consider any control technology that would require such a redesign of the facility 
that it would constitute an alternative proposal.").   
 
 
51 
 
 
Sierra Club does not disagree that a permitting authority need not consider a 
technology that would be a redesign of a proposal. It disputes the conclusion that the use 
of IGCC technology at Holcomb 2 would demand a redesign. Sierra Club cites In re 
Desert Rock Energy Company, LLC, PSD Appeal Nos. 08-03 through 08-06, ___ E.A.D. 
___, 2009 WL 3126170 (EAB 2009) (EPA agency order), for support of its argument. 
See Utah Chapter of Sierra Club v. Air Quality, 226 P.3d 719, 733 (Utah 2009) (adoption 
of IGCC technology would not require power company to redefine the design of its 
proposed facility, an electric power generating plant fueled by coal; while IGCC 
technology need not necessarily be adopted, it should have been considered in top-down 
BACT analysis); see also Powder Riv. Bas. Res. v. Dep. of Env. Qual., 226 P.3d 809, 823 
n.6 (Wyo. 2010) (coal is utilized in both pulverized coal-fired power plants and power 
plants employing IGCC technology; but IGCC power plants are fueled by synthetic gas 
converted from coal).  
 
While these cases support Sierra Club's position, in several other cases courts have 
concluded that IGCC technology need not be included in the first step because its use 
would require redesigning the pulvarized coal-fired facility. See Blue Skies Alliance, 283 
S.W.3d at 537 ("It is clear that an IGCC process . . . is significantly different from the 
pulverized coal power plant"; appellants failed to offer any evidence that IGCC 
technology is a process that could be applied to the proposed power plant.); Longleaf 
Energy, 298 Ga. App. at 761-62 (rejecting lower court ruling that imposition of IGCC 
technology on a proposed pulverized coal facility would not redefine the source); Sierra 
Club v. Environmental & Public Protection Cabinet, No. DAQ-27602-042, 2007 WL 
3025076 (Ky. Envir. Pub. Prot. Cab. 2007) (agency order) (state agency decision not to 
require consideration of IGCC technology was not clearly erroneous or contrary to law or 
fact).  
 
This split in authority is reflected in the EPA's own fluid policy. In 2005, the EPA 
"declared that the requirement of IGCC technology at a proposed pulverized coal facility 
52 
 
'would fundamentally change the scope of the project and redefine the basic design of the 
proposed source.'" Stensvaag, Preventing Significant Deterioration Under the Clean Air 
Act:  The BACT Determination—Part I, 41 Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis 11101, 
11116 (December 2011) (quoting Memorandum from Stephen D. Page, Director of 
EPA's Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, Best Available Control Technology 
Requirements for Proposed Coal-Fired Power Plants [December 13, 2005], at 2). 
Accordingly, the EPA announced it "'would not require an applicant to consider IGCC in 
a BACT analysis for a [pulverized coal] unit'" and "'would not include IGCC in the list of 
potentially applicable control options that is compiled in the first step of a top-down 
BACT analysis.'" 41 Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis, at 11116 (quoting Page, 
Memoranda, at 3). The EPA changed this position in 2011, announcing it "'no longer 
subscribes'" to its prior position and IGCC "'technology should not be excluded on 
redefining the source grounds at Step 1 of a BACT analysis in any particular case unless 
the record clearly demonstrates why the permit applicant's basic or fundamental business 
purpose would be frustrated by application of this process.'" 41 Envtl. L. Rep. News & 
Analysis, at 11116 (quoting EPA Office of Air and Radiation, PSD and Title V 
Permitting Guidance for Greenhouse Gases [March 2011], at 30 n.83).  
 
The EPA's focus on whether the use of a control technology would redesign or 
frustrate an applicant's basic or fundamental business purpose was discussed in Desert 
Rock Energy, the case relied on by Sierra Club. There, a permit authorized Desert Rock 
Energy to construct a new 1,500-megawatt coal-fired electric generating facility. The 
Environmental Appeals Board remanded in part because the agency failed to adequately 
consider IGCC technology in the BACT analysis. The Board first explained the 
differences in IGCC and pulverized-coal burning technology, stating: 
 
 
"In a typical pulverized coal combustion-based electric generating 
facility . . . coal is burned to create heat, which is used to boil water, creating steam that 
drives a steam turbine power generator. [Citations omitted.] IGCC, on the other 
53 
 
hand . . . uses coal, but in an initial 'gasification' part of the process, the coal is chemically 
converted into a synthetic gas ('syngas'). [Citations omitted.] The syngas is cleaned to 
remove various pollutants, such as particulate matter, mercury, sulfur compounds, 
ammonia, and other acid gases, and is then burned in a gas turbine to generate electric 
power. [Citations omitted.] Heat is recovered from the gas turbine and the gasification 
process and is then used to produce additional power using a steam turbine. [Citations 
omitted.] Thus . . . 'IGCC is not simply an add-on emissions control technology,' but 
instead requires a differently designed power block. [Citation omitted.]" Desert Rock 
Energy, 2009 WL 3126170, at *32. 
 
Although a differently designed power block would be required, the Board did not 
automatically conclude IGCC technology required a different design than the applicant 
had proposed. Instead, the Board noted an ambiguity existed between the redesign policy 
and three CAA provisions that require a permitting authority to consider BACT, clean 
fuels, and alternatives suggested by interested persons. To reconcile the inherent conflict 
in these policies, the Board concluded that "'the crucial question [is] where control 
technology ends and a redesign of the "proposed facility" begins.'" Desert Rock Energy, 
2009 WL 3126170, at *35 (quoting Sierra Club, 499 F.3d at 655. The Board noted that 
the following test had been previously applied: 
 
"[T]he permit applicant initially 'defines the proposed facility's end, object, aim, or 
purpose—that is the facility's basic design,' although the applicant's definition must be 
'for reasons independent of air permitting.' [Citations omitted.] The inquiry, however, 
does not end there. The permit issuer . . . should take a 'hard look' at the applicant's 
determination in order to discern which design elements are inherent for the applicant's 
purpose and which design elements 'may be changed to achieve pollutant emissions 
reductions without disrupting the applicant's basic business purpose for the proposed 
facility,' while keeping in mind that BACT, in most cases, should not be applied to 
regulate the applicant's purpose or objective for the proposed facility. [Citations 
omitted.]" Desert Rock Energy, 2009 WL 3126170, at *36.  
 
54 
 
Applying this test, the Board found that the permitting agency had not provided a 
rational explanation for why IGCC technology would redefine the source and failed to 
adequately explain its conclusion in light of the agency having previously issued permits 
at similar facilities in which IGCC technology had been considered in the first step of the 
BACT analysis. The agency's explanation was particularly weak because the applicant 
had initially indicated that IGCC was a technology that could be considered for its 
proposed facility. Desert Rock Energy, 2009 WL 3126170, at *41. 
 
The analysis of another court also helps explain the dividing line between design 
elements that are inherent in the business purpose and those that may be changed without 
disrupting the business purpose. See Utah Chapter of Sierra Club, 226 P.3d 719. The 
court explained the appropriate analytical process to be applied when drawing this line, 
stating: 
 
"[T]he purpose of a proposed facility is determined by the description in the application 
submitted for the proposed facility, so long as the 'purpose or design is objectively 
discernable.' [Citation omitted.] . . . We emphasize that the purpose of the project must be 
objective and must focus on the overall business purpose for the proposed facility. We 
are wary of the risk of applicants describing a project in such a limited manner that they 
are able to circumvent the goals of BACT, which include encouraging the use of new 
technologies. [Citation omitted.] . . . Thus, when considering what design elements are 
inherent to the project, cost and avoidance of the risks associated with adopting new 
technologies cannot support what is considered fundamental to a project's design. 
[Citation omitted.] . . . Instead, the fundamental aspects must relate to the basic business 
purpose of the proposed facility. 
"Applying our holding to the facts of this case, we conclude that considering 
IGCC would not require the Power Company to redefine the design of its proposed 
facility. . . . [T]he basic design of the Power Company's proposed facility is an electric 
power generating plant fueled by coal. With this purpose, it is evident that the Power 
Company was not required to consider wind generation for electric power as an 
alternative process. . . . We note that the consideration of IGCC in the BACT review does 
55 
 
not compel its adoption; instead, it only requires the Power Company to subject IGCC to 
the five-step top down analysis used to determine the best available technology." Utah 
Chapter of Sierra Club, 226 P.3d at 732-33. 
 
Hence, Desert Rock Energy and Utah Chapter of Sierra Club call into question the 
KDHE's and Intervenors' broad assertion that use of IGCC technology would require a 
redesign of the project, as the term "redesign" is used in a BACT analysis.  
 
 
Nevertheless, although "'[c]onsistency in the approach to decision-making is a 
primary objective of the top-down BACT approach,' [citation omitted]," Desert Rock 
Energy, 2009 WL 3126170, at *38, the statutory definition of BACT specifically 
indicates it is defined on a case-by-case basis. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3)  (2006) (BACT is "an 
emission limitation based on the maximum degree of [pollutant] reduction . . . which the 
[state] permitting authority, on a case-by-case basis, taking into account energy, 
environmental, and economic impacts and other costs, determines is achievable for [the] 
facility"). Therefore, Desert Rock Energy and Utah Chapter of Sierra Club do not compel 
us to agree with Sierra Club. 
 
 
There are two important distinctions between the KDHE's analysis and the 
analysis at issue in Desert Rock Energy and Utah Chapter of Sierra Club. First, the 
KDHE systematically discussed reasons the IGCC design differed from the design 
proposed by Sunflower using supercritical pulverized coal (SCPC) technology. In this 
way, the record before us differs from that considered in Desert Rock Energy. Second, 
the Holcomb 2 business purpose is not just limited to creating a coal-fired plant; the 
application and the KDHE's analysis indicate that another business purpose is the 
integration of Holcomb 2 with Holcomb 1. Some of the KDHE's reasons for not 
including IGCC technology in the first step of the BACT analysis are consistent with this 
business purpose. In the KDHE's responses to the public comments, it noted: 
 
56 
 
"Because of the substantially different processes and components of IGCC versus 
SCPC, the footprint for an IGCC unit would be from two to three and one-half times the 
size of the footprint of an SCPC unit with similar generating capacity. The design of an 
integrated SCPC facility provides for maximum utilization of water resources by 
recycling and reuse, whereas an IGCC facility would necessitate either deep well 
injection or the development of a waste water discharge permit for some waste water 
streams. The processes necessary for managing the by-products from an SCPC steam 
generator are already in place at Holcomb Station. However, with an IGCC facility, there 
would be additional waste streams, (such as elemental sulfur) which would either need to 
be sold into commerce or landfilled. IGCC and SCPC are inherently different process 
technologies; to substitute one for another would redefine the design of the source."  
 
Because the integration of Holcomb 2 into Holcomb 1 is a business purpose that 
distinguishes our case from other situations, we conclude the KDHE's failure to include 
IGCC technology in the first step of the BACT analysis under 42 U.S.C. § 7475 (2006) 
was not unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious. See K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 77-621(c)(4), 
(c)(8). We further conclude that the KDHE's findings of fact regarding the possible use of 
IGCC technology at Holcomb 2 are supported by substantial evidence in the record, 
evidence we cannot reweigh under our standard of review. K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 77-621(d).  
 
 
(2) Natural Gas Appropriately Considered 
 
Sierra Club also contends that the KDHE erred in failing to adequately consider 
the use of natural gas in the first step of the BACT analysis. More specifically, Sierra 
Club contends that the EPA and the federal Environmental Appeals Board have required 
the use of "clean fuels" in a BACT analysis. See In Re Northern Michigan University 
Ripley Heating Plant, PSD Appeal No. 08-02, ___ E.A.D. ___, 2009 WL 443976 (EAB 
2009) (EPA agency order) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7479[3]; in making BACT determinations, 
applicants and public officials are to consider clean fuels). Although Sierra Club broadly 
refers to clean fuels, the only fuel it discusses is natural gas. Consequently, we will 
likewise limit our analysis.  
57 
 
 
In arguing that the KDHE erred when it determined that "fuel choice is integral to 
a power plaint's basic design" and therefore need not be included in the first step of the 
BACT analysis, Sierra Club points to an order issued by the EPA in an unrelated case, In 
re Cash Creek Generation, Nos. IV-2008-1, IV-2008-2 (EPA agency order issued 
December 15, 2009, responding to a merged PSD construction permit and CAA Title V 
operating permit) where the EPA objected to a state-issued PSD permit for a proposed 
IGCC power plant that failed to consider natural gas as a primary fuel source, especially 
because the site had access to a natural gas supply and the applicant planned to use 
natural gas at startup and as a backup fuel. Commentators have suggested that the Cash 
Creek order suggests "'a progression in which EPA is requiring gasification to be 
considered as BACT for pulverized coal plants and natural gas to be considered as BACT 
for gasification plants.'" Stensvaag, 41 Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis, at 11117. As we 
have discussed, Holcomb 2 is not proposed as a IGCC—i.e., gasification—plant, and 
Sierra Club has not provided us a record citation that would suggest any plan to use 
natural gas at startup or as a backup fuel. Consequently, we presume that this case is 
factually distinguishable from Cash Creek. See Supreme Court Rule 6.02(a)(4) (2012 
Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 39) ("The court may presume that a factual statement made without a 
reference to volume and page number has no support in the record on appeal."). 
 
In addition, there is authority that supports the KDHE's position that natural gas 
did not have to be considered in the first step of the BACT analysis. Although a 
permitting authority may exercise broad discretion in considering clean fuels or 
innovative technologies, "changing a fuel source would drastically redesign a proposed 
facility and therefore production processes that involve a completely different fuel source 
need not be considered." Utah Chapter of Sierra Club, 226 P.3d at 732. See Powder Riv. 
Bas. Res., 226 P.3d at 822 ("'[A]pplicants proposing to construct a coal-fired electric 
generator . . . have not been required by EPA as part of a BACT analysis to consider 
building a natural gas-fired electric turbine although the turbine may be inherently less 
58 
 
polluting per unit product.'"); Comment, EPA's Proposed New Source Performance 
Standards to Control Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Electric Utility-Generating Units, 
42 Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis 10606, 10613 (July 2012) ("require[ing] the use of 
natural gas for an applicant seeking to build a coal-fired power plant would, in most 
cases, be a fundamental redefinition of the project"). Likewise, changing a fuel source 
would change the business purpose of the facility. See Sierra Club, 499 F.3d at 657 
(upholding Environmental Appeals Board's decision that requiring a proposed mine-
mouth plant to consider a different fuel source would redefine the "'fundamental purpose 
or basic design of [the] proposed Facility'"). 
 
Based on this persuasive authority and the KDHE's analysis, we conclude the 
KDHE's decision to not include natural gas at step one of the BACT analysis was not 
unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious because changing a fuel source from coal to natural 
gas would redesign a proposed facility and alter its business purpose and therefore need 
not be considered. See K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 77-621(c)(4), (c)(8). 
 
 
(3) USPC Technology Appropriately Considered 
 
In a third technology argument, Sierra Club focuses on whether the BACT would 
be use of an ultra-supercritical pulverized coal (USPC) boiler. A pulverized coal boiler is 
the conventional technology for a new coal-burning electric power plant. There are three 
primary types of pulverized coal boilers. Listed from the least to the most efficient, these 
are subcritical, supercritical, and ultra-supercritical. See Reitze, Federal Control of 
Carbon Capture and Storage, 41 Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis 10796, 10797-98 
(September 2011); Reitze, Electric Power in a Carbon Constrained World, 34 Wm. & 
Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 821, 828 (Spring 2010). Holcomb 2 is slated to use the 
second of these three, a supercritical pulverized coal (SCPC) boiler. Sierra Club argues it 
is the more efficient ultra-supercritical technology, or USPC, that was the BACT for 
Holcomb 2. 
59 
 
 
The EPA, in its comments regarding the KDHE's BACT analysis, faulted the 
KDHE for failing to include any evaluation of USPC technology. The KDHE responded 
by stating: 
 
"[T]here are currently no operating ultra-supercritical boilers in the United States. There 
is one publicized ultra-supercritical facility under construction in the U.S., the John Turk 
unit in Arkansas, scheduled to begin operations in 2012. This lack of operating history by 
U.S. Utilities is a key factor in the determination that a supercritical boiler represents 
BACT for this permit. 
"The term 'ultra-supercritical' is associated with a further increase in steam 
pressures and temperatures to gain higher cycle efficiencies. The higher pressures and 
temperatures associated with the supercritical steam cycle push the design limitations of 
materials used in tubing, piping, turbine blades, turbine rotor and turbine shell. There 
continue to be questions regarding the maturity of the metallurgy and pre-and-post weld 
fabricating and treatment processes and the adequacy of current repair techniques for 
these facilities. Each advance in pressure or temperature is limited in some way by 
material and/or manufacturing limitations, and occasionally by other factors which serve 
to plateau the efficiencies until those limitations are overcome. When those limitations 
are overcome, 'ultra-supercritical' is redefined at a new higher standard to achieve in 
manufacturing capability. There is no bright line that distinguishes between a 
supercritical and an ultra-supercritical boiler design as there is between subcritical and 
supercritical. 
"Until recently, few new domestic high efficiency supercritical facilities have 
been constructed. Many of the new facilities characterized as ultra-supercritical are 
located in East Asia, with little design and operating information about these sources 
being available. Having this information accessible and verifiable is critical to making a 
determination that an ultra-supercritical unit is BACT for the proposed Sunflower 
expansion. 
"While KDHE recognizes the benefits associated with the improvements in 
thermal cycle efficiency, decisions concerning operating temperatures and pressures for 
the steam cycle must be balanced by other considerations relating to reliability and 
maintainability of the facility to be constructed."  
60 
 
 
Sierra Club points to evidence in the record that contradicts these conclusions. For 
example, in disputing the argument that USPC is unreliable technology, Sierra Club cites 
the selection of USPC technology for the Arkansas power plant mentioned above and the 
use of USPC technology outside the United States. Sierra Club further notes that 
Sunflower's engineering contractor, Black & Veatch, reported favorably about USPC 
technology in an opinion submitted in separate proceedings involving a Florida power 
plant. But, as we have previously noted, our role is not to reweigh the evidence. See 
K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 77-621(d). Although there is conflicting evidence, we conclude there 
is evidence in the record to support the KDHE's conclusions and these conclusions fit 
into the various steps of a top-down BACT analysis. In fact, Sierra Club acknowledges 
that USPC technology was rejected as BACT for Plant Washington in Georgia—a coal-
fired power plant that Sierra Club claims is nearly identical to the proposed Holcomb 2 
plant and that Sierra Club offers as an example in the BACT-related argument we will 
next consider. Thus, there are substantiated reasons for rejecting USPC technology as the 
BACT. 
 
We conclude the KDHE's decision to not define the BACT as USPC technology 
was not unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious because the technology lacks operating 
history in the United States, information regarding the technology's use and performance 
in other countries is not accessible or verifiable, and there are concerns about the 
reliability and maintainability of a facility using the technology. See K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 
77-621(c)(8). 
 
 
(4) Permit's BACT Emission Limits for NOx and PM Appropriate 
 
In the alternative, Sierra Club argues that the Holcomb 2 PSD permit contains 
erroneous BACT determinations because the emission limits listed in the permit are 
higher than the emission limits identified in a permit for Georgia's Plant Washington. 
61 
 
Sierra Club focuses on the emission limits for nitrogen oxides (NOx) and particulate 
matter (PM) and asserts that "[r]ather than conduct a proper BACT analysis and impose 
the lowest possible emissions limits, KDHE allowed Sunflower to include unjustifiably 
weak emissions limits in its permit to save costs." Sierra Club argues we are obligated to 
conduct a searching review to determine if the KDHE's conclusions are arbitrary and, 
therefore, we should not give unquestioned deference to the KDHE's assessments 
because the KDHE refused to "fully consider and impose" more stringent limits or to 
"fully and rationally explain its refusal to do so."  
 
While there is legal support for Sierra Club's argument that an applicant should 
consider technology used in similar facilities, our review of the record as a whole leads us 
to conclude that the KDHE did not act unreasonably, arbitrarily, or capriciously and did 
not err in its interpretation or application of the law. 
 
We first note that Sierra Club's statement that the KDHE erred because it failed to 
"impose the lowest possible emissions limits" (emphasis added) misstates the KDHE's 
duty. As we have indicated, because the Holcomb 2 site is located in an "attainment" 
area, Sunflower did not have to establish the "lowest achievable limit," but the best 
available control technology—BACT, "unless the applicant can show that it is not 
technically feasible, or if energy, environmental, or economic impacts justify a 
conclusion that it is not achievable." Alaska, Dept. Environ. Conserv. v. United States 
E.P.A., 298 F.3d 814, 822 (9th Cir. 2002), aff'd 540 U.S. 461, 124 S. Ct. 983, 157 L. Ed. 
2d 967 (2004). The more stringent standards apply in nonattainment areas; "where air 
quality standards have not been met, new and modified sources are required to obtain 
preconstruction permits, to offset emissions increases with emissions reductions from 
other sources in the area, and to install 'lowest achievable emissions rate' technology 
('LAER')." New York v. E.P.A., 443 F.3d 880, 883 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7503).  
 
62 
 
The considerations for determining the two standards—LAER and BACT—vary. 
Nevertheless, in conducting a BACT evaluation, "the proposed source is required to look 
to other recently permitted sources." In re Inter-Power of New York, Inc., PSD Appeal 
Nos. 92-8 and 92-9, 5 E.A.D. 130, 135, 1994 WL 114949 (EAB 1994) (EPA agency 
order); see In re Indeck-Elwood, PSD Appeal No. 03-04, 13 E.A.D. 126, 183, 2006 WL 
3361087 (EAB 2006) (EPA agency order) ("[T]he existence of a similar facility with a 
lower emissions limit creates an obligation for [the permit applicant and the permitting 
agency] to consider and document whether that same emission level can be achieved at 
[the] proposed facility."). After such a comparison, the BACT is not necessarily the 
LAER. As stated by the Missouri Court of Appeals: 
 
"There is a distinction between what is 'technically' or theoretically achievable, 
and what is 'achievable' after considering costs, duration of operations, operational 
variability, and other case-by-case factors. [The state agency] crafted the permit limit in a 
way that the facility can meet it over the life of the operation, and therefore built into the 
limit a 'safety factor' to allow for operational variability. Indeed, the [Environmental 
Appeals Board] permitting cases, although not binding or controlling upon the [state 
agency], recognize that permitting agencies should include a safety factor when setting 
permit limits. Permitting agencies have the discretion to set BACT limits at levels that do 
not necessarily reflect the highest possible control efficiencies but, rather, will allow 
permitees to achieve compliance on a consistent basis. See In re Knauf Fiber Glass, 9 
E.A.D. 1, 15, 2000 WL 291422 (E.P.A. EAB) ('There is nothing inherently wrong with 
setting an emission limitation that takes into account a reasonable safety factor'); In re 
Masonite Corp., 5 E.A.D. 551, 560-61 1994 WL 615380 (E.P.A.). Thus, actual lower 
emissions at other facilities do not dictate a limit to be set in a permit after accounting for 
long-term compliance and safety factors." Chipperfield v. Mo. Air Conservation Com'n, 
229 S.W.3d 226, 248 (Mo. App. 2007).  
 
Against this legal backdrop, we consider the factual basis for Sierra Club's 
argument regarding Plant Washington, which was discussed during the PSD permitting 
proceedings in this case. Dr. Ranajit Sahu provided expert opinion and comments on 
63 
 
behalf of Sierra Club and Earthjustice and opined that the Plant Washington limits were 
appropriate BACT emission limits for Holcomb 2.  
 
In the KDHE's formal written response to Dr. Sahu's comments, it noted that 
"Sunflower considered actual emissions from similar projects and permit determinations. 
Such consideration is appropriate and consistent with long-standing EPA 
recommendations for performing a BACT analysis." The KDHE specifically noted the 
limits set in the Plant Washington permit, including 12-month and 30-day rolling 
averages of certain emissions, and compared those to the proposed Holcomb 2 PSD 
permit. It also examined the 30-day averages of eight other power plants. But the KDHE 
observed that "BACT does not require the selection of an emissions rate that has not been 
rigorously demonstrated to be achievable, particularly when actual data suggests that the 
rate would not be achievable over the life of the facility." Further, "[m]any of the permit 
emissions limitations that were considered in the BACT review have yet to be 
demonstrated, because the plants have not started operations." Plant Washington was one 
of those power plants not yet operational.  
 
Focusing on the NOx limits in the Plant Washington permit, the KDHE noted that 
Plant Washington's NOx 30-day rolling average is the same as allowed by the Holcomb 2 
permit. But the Plant Washington permit also set a 12-month rolling average that would 
not allow Plant Washington to emit NOx at these maximum limits during each 30-day 
period; if the 30-day limits were consistently reached, Plant Washington would exceed its 
permitted 12-month rolling average. The KDHE considered Plant Washington's 12-
month rolling average and those of other power plants and concluded that "the Plant 
Washington annual 12-month rolling average NOx emission limit of 0.030 lb/MMBtu has 
not been demonstrated to be achievable." The KDHE, considering Dr. Sahu's data, 
specifically found the data "for the best performing sources show[s] essentially no 
reported operational emissions at such levels."  
 
64 
 
These conclusions are supported by evidence in the record, and we find no basis 
for holding that the KDHE's conclusions regarding the NOx emission levels were 
unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious. See K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 77-621(c)(7), (c)(8).  
 
With regard to emission limits on PM, Sierra Club argues that the KDHE refused 
to "fully consider and impose" more stringent limits or to "fully and rationally explain its 
refusal to do so." But a review of the KDHE's formal written response to public 
comments shows that the KDHE addressed this concern and provided specific reasons for 
rejecting Sierra Club's contention that more stringent limits on PM were achievable.  
 
The Holcomb 2 PSD permit requires a short-term average of .018 lb/MMBtu for 
both PM10 (course particles) and PM2.5 (fine particles). Regarding Plant Washington's 
filterable PM emission limit of .010 lb/MMBtu on a 24-hour rolling average, the KDHE 
noted that the plant "is not operating, so there are no data indicating that permit levels are 
in fact achievable over the life of the plant." In addition, the KDHE noted that the .0123 
lb/MMBtu total PM2.5 emission limit on a 3-hour average for Plant Washington was 
based, in part, on particulate size distribution data in the EPA's publication of compiled 
air pollution emission factors, referred to as the "AP-42." The KDHE took caution from a 
recent EPA action in which the EPA indicated, as summarized by the KDHE, that 
"utilizing a simple ration of AP-42 factors or data from a single compliance stack test 
would not necessarily be sufficient to establish a correlation between PM10 and PM2.5." 
Instead, the KDHE chose to rely on "actual test data from a similar unit taking into 
account variations in operating conditions." These conclusions and the resulting emission 
limits were not unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious. 
  
Finally, Sierra Club points out that the Holcomb 2 PSD permit contains a 
"contingency limitation of 0.025 lb/MMBtu" if Sunflower fails to meet initial 
performance tests. Sierra Club argues the contingency limit "cannot be justified" but 
articulates no reason why this provision invalidates the permit or any authority supporting 
65 
 
its argument. A failure to support an argument with pertinent authority or to show why 
the argument is sound despite a lack of supporting authority or in the face of contrary 
authority is akin to failing to brief the issue. Therefore, an argument that is not supported 
with pertinent authority is deemed waived and abandoned. State v. Berriozabal, 291 Kan. 
568, 594, 243 P.3d 352 (2010); see Supreme Court Rule 6.02(a)(5) (2012 Kan. Ct. R. 
Annot. 39) (appellant's brief must include "the arguments and authorities relied on"). 
 
In summary, even though the NOx and PM emission limits in the Holcomb 2 PSD 
permit exceed those of Plant Washington in some respects, the KDHE's decision to set 
limits that will be achievable over the life of the plant is not unreasonable, arbitrary, or 
capricious and is supported by evidence that is substantial when viewed in light of the 
record as a whole. See K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 77-621(c)(7), (c)(8), and (d). 
 
VIII. KDHE'S PROCEDURE WAS ADEQUATE 
 
Sierra Club's final issue focuses on the inadequacy of the overall process used for 
the approval of the Holcomb 2 PSD permit. Sierra Club contends this court should 
reverse the Secretary's decision to grant the PSD permit because the Secretary and the 
KDHE (collectively, the KDHE) failed to follow the procedural requirements of the 
CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq.; the KAQA, K.S.A. 65-3001 et seq.; and the applicable 
federal and state regulations. Many of the arguments relating to the conduct of public 
hearings and the consideration of public comments are likely to be moot because K.S.A. 
2012 Supp. 65-3008a provides that "[n]o permit shall be . . . modified without first 
providing the public an opportunity to comment and request a public hearing on the 
proposed permit action." Other issues may be rendered moot if it is determined on 
remand that the settlement agreement and K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 65-3029 do not apply. 
Nevertheless, because we do not express an opinion regarding the scope of proceedings 
on remand or as to the impact of the settlement agreement on those proceedings, we 
66 
 
cannot determine if the issues are moot or if they are likely to occur on remand. 
Consequently, we will discuss the arguments raised by Sierra Club.  
 
In addressing the standard of review for this issue, Sierra Club indicates it relies 
on subsections (c)(4) through (c)(8) of K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 77-621. We will separately 
consider how Sierra Club's arguments relate to these provisions. 
 
A. K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 77-621(c)(4) and (c)(5)—Lawful Procedure 
 
Both K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 77-621(c)(4) and (c)(5) relate to whether the KDHE 
followed a lawful procedure. Subsection (c)(4) focuses on whether the KDHE 
"erroneously interpreted or applied the law" and subsection (c)(5) focuses on whether the 
KDHE "engaged in an unlawful procedure or has failed to follow prescribed procedures." 
The gist of Sierra Club's arguments is that the KDHE's duties in the permit process were 
thwarted by the actions of then-Governor Parkinson in signing the settlement agreement 
and of the Kansas Legislature in passing the 2009 legislation that Sierra Club asserts 
encroached on the KDHE's duties in reviewing Sunflower's PSD permit application. By 
arguing that the KDHE followed an illegal procedure, Sierra Club asserts the KDHE 
erroneously applied the CAA. 
 
In making this argument, Sierra Club reiterates the KDHE's duties. It emphasizes 
that Kansas' SIP provides the KDHE with the exclusive authority to issue PSD permits 
and requires the KDHE to provide the public an opportunity to participate in the 
permitting process. See 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(2) (2006) (public must have opportunity to 
comment on "air quality impact of [the new facility], alternatives thereto, control 
technology requirements, and other appropriate considerations" in order to assist the 
issuing authority's decision of whether to issue a permit); 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(a)(2)(iii) 
(2012) ("The Administrator has authority to issue any such permit."); K.A.R. 28-19-
350(c) (2012 Supp.) ("When used in any provision adopted from 40 C.F.R. 52.21, each 
67 
 
reference to 'administrator' shall mean the 'secretary of health and environment or an 
authorized representative of the secretary,'" with certain exceptions.); K.A.R. 19-28-
204(a) (public "shall be provided the opportunity to participate in the permit 
development" prior to issuance of a construction permit for a new facility).  
 
Sierra Club argues the KHDE was prevented from exercising these duties by 
language in the settlement agreement indicating that the KDHE "shall" issue a final 
permit to Sunflower "substantially in the form of" the prior 2007 draft permit and by a 
legislative amendment to the KAQA providing that "[t]he secretary shall timely approve 
a prevention of significant deterioration permit (PSD) to sunflower electric power 
corporation to be issued consistent with the settlement agreement executed May 4, 2009." 
K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 65-3029(a). The unlawful effect of these provisions, according to 
Sierra Club, is that the settlement agreement and subsequent legislation:  (1) unilaterally 
modified Kansas' SIP; (2) preempted the KDHE's duty to fully examine the issues and 
determine whether the PSD permit should be granted by dictating the content and the 
issuance of the permit; (3) constrained the KDHE from considering fuel alternatives other 
than coal; and (4) thwarted meaningful participation of the public. 
 
 
(1) Unilateral Amendment of Kansas' SIP 
 
Although Sierra Club has argued about the legality of the settlement agreement 
and the legislation, it has filed this action under the KJRA. Under the KJRA, a court does 
not have jurisdiction to review actions of the Kansas Legislature even if, as Sierra Club 
maintains, the action is an unlawful, unilateral amendment of the SIP. The KJRA only 
allows review of agency actions by a state agency and "'[s]tate agency'" does not include 
the "legislative branch of state government." K.S.A.77-602(k); see K.S.A. 77-602(b) 
(defining "[a]gency action" under the KJRA).  
 
68 
 
While there are mechanisms for judicial review of legislation, Sierra Club has not 
brought such an action. In addition, as aptly pointed out by the KDHE in its appellate 
brief, this lawsuit was not brought to enforce Kansas' SIP. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2006) 
(citizen suit provisions); Her Majesty the Queen v. City of Detroit, 874 F.2d 332, 335 (6th 
Cir. 1989) (EPA-approved state implementation plans are enforceable in federal court).  
 
Instead, the only agency action before us is the issuance of the Holcomb 2 PSD 
permit. Therefore, the only issue before us is whether the KDHE's action in issuing the 
permit is lawful.  
 
 
(2) Full Examination of Application 
 
In focusing on the permit, the Intervenors and the KDHE argue that the Secretary 
fulfilled all of his duties and exercised his discretion to issue the permit. As they point 
out, the plain language of the settlement agreement did not render the issuance of a PSD 
permit "a foregone conclusion." Nor did either the governor or the legislature make the 
decision to issue the permit. Instead, the agreement directed the Secretary to apply 
applicable federal and state requirements. It qualified the directive to issue a permit by 
recognizing that the project had to comply with emission limits, stating:  "Subject to the 
modifications as may be required herein and the confirmation of BACT emission 
limitations and PSD increment consumption constraints, the Secretary shall issue the final 
permit substantially in the form of the draft final permit prepared by the KDHE technical 
staff on or about July 17, 2007." The agreement also specifically refused to "diminish or 
supplant the authority of the Secretary or KDHE under the statutes and lawful regulations 
which they administer." And it provided that "Sunflower's performance hereunder is 
subject to and conditioned upon receiving all governmental and regulatory approvals 
necessary for it to lawfully perform the terms and conditions hereof."  
 
69 
 
Likewise, while K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 65-3029(a), a provision adopted in the 2009 
legislation, directed the KDHE to "timely approve" a PSD permit for Sunflower, it 
qualified the directive by adding that the permit was to be issued consistent with the 
settlement agreement. Because the settlement agreement expressly preserved the KDHE's 
discretion and its obligation to follow applicable state and federal requirements, the 
legislation did not abrogate the decision-making responsibilities of the KDHE. 
 
Moreover, the record establishes that the KDHE recognized its discretion. In 
formal written responses to public comments submitted by Sierra Club, the KDHE stated:  
"KDHE is bound by both State and Federal law to carry out the permitting 
responsibilities for sources of air pollution within the State."  
 
Sierra Club counters this by noting that the agreement accepted Sunflower's 
estimate of actual HAPs emissions instead of leaving the KDHE to conduct its own 
analysis. As we have discussed, we are vacating the permit and ordering that the KDHE 
must apply new HAPs regulations before issuing a new permit. These new regulations 
render moot any question about the KDHE's acceptance of Sunflower's HAPs estimates 
and, therefore, we will not further discuss this aspect of Sierra Club's argument. See 
Dickey Oil Co. v. Wakefield, 153 Kan. 489, Syl. ¶ 1, 111 P.2d 1113 (1941) (court 
ordinarily will not consider and decide mooted issues). 
 
 
(3) Fuel Alternatives Considered 
 
Sierra Club argues that other portions of the record also support its contention that 
the settlement agreement usurped the KDHE's authority; specifically, Sierra Club argues 
the KDHE felt it could not consider "alternatives" to coal as the power plant's fuel. 
During the permit process, the CAA requires a public hearing to be held "with 
opportunity for interested persons . . . to appear and submit written or oral presentations 
on the air quality impact of such source, alternatives thereto, control technology 
70 
 
requirements, and other appropriate considerations." (Emphasis added.) 42 U.S.C. § 
7475(a)(2). According to Sierra Club, although its organization and others made public 
comments urging the KDHE to consider alternatives to coal, the KDHE declined "on the 
grounds that it lacked authority to do so under the terms of the Settlement Agreement and 
associated legislation." For support, Sierra Club cites to a specific page in the KDHE's 
formal written response, which states:  "The comments [regarding energy efficiency, 
utilization of cleaner energy and renewable energy, and energy conservation] address 
Sunflower's basic technology selection. KDHE lacks statutory or regulatory authority to 
redefine the source that Sunflower seeks to permit." The KDHE then discussed the 
reasons Sunflower had rejected use of "a simple or combined cycle natural gas unit."   
 
This formal response does not support Sierra Club's contention that the KDHE felt 
it "lacked authority" to consider alternatives to coal under the terms of the settlement 
agreement and corresponding legislation. Nothing in the above-quoted passage mentions 
the settlement agreement, the 2009 legislation, or any constraints imposed in the 
agreement or the legislation. Rather, the context of the statement is the application of the 
BACT review requirements in the context of natural gas. As we have discussed, 
"'[h]istorically, EPA has not considered the BACT requirement as a means to redefine the 
design of the source when considering available control alternatives.'" Longleaf Energy v. 
Friends of the Chattahoochee, 298 Ga. App. 753, 760-61, 681 S.E.2d 203 (2009) 
(quoting EPA, New Source Review Workshop Manual:  Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration and Nonattainment Area Permitting, p. B.13 [1990]). Hence, in the context 
in which it was made, the KDHE's statement was not a misstatement of the law.  
 
 
In other words, Sierra Club's argument simply lacks factual support and fails on 
that basis.  
 
 
 
71 
 
 
(4) Meaningful Public Input 
 
Sierra Club also argues that the public hearings and public comment periods were 
not "meaningful" because the settlement agreement and subsequent legislation essentially 
"took the decision whether to issue a permit away from KDHE . . . thereby undermining 
the very purpose of public comment." See In re Prairie State Generation Station, PSD 
Appeal No. 05-02, 12 E.A.D. 176, 180, 2005 WL 735942 (EAB 2005) (EPA agency 
order) (stating the Secretary is required to "'consider comments with a truly open mind, 
rather than with a view to defending a decision he or she already has made'"). We will 
separately address the "meaningfulness" of the comment procedure in our review under 
K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 77-621(c)(6). Here, we focus on the mechanics of the procedure and 
conclude that the KDHE followed them.  
 
As the KDHE pointed out in its formal written response to Sierra Club's comment 
regarding the lack of public participation, "[t]he KDHE followed the public participation 
requirements of K.A.R. 28-19-350 and K.A.R. 28-19-204." Further, in answering Sierra 
Club's public comment suggesting that the length of the comment period should have 
been extended, the KDHE stated: 
 
"KDHE has complied with all federal and state requirements for public review 
and comment of this project. Due to the large amount of interest, a 45-day public notice 
period and 3 public hearings were held across the state in August [2010]. An additional 
30-day notice was provided due to the discovery of a modeling inconsistency and a fourth 
public hearing was held to ensure the public could comment on all aspects of the 
proposed permit."  
 
In summary, we conclude the KDHE did not erroneously interpret the law or 
engage in an unlawful procedure or fail to follow the prescribed procedures. 
Consequently, we do not find a basis for invalidating the Holcomb 2 PSD permit under 
K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 77-621(c)(4) or (c)(5). 
72 
 
 
B. K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 77-621(c)(6)—The Decision Maker Was Properly Constituted 
 
Sierra Club also argues the permit is invalid under K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 77-
621(c)(6), which provides an agency action is invalid if "the persons taking the agency 
action were improperly constituted as a decision-making body or subject to 
disqualification." Sierra Club argues:  (1) The settlement agreement and legislation 
allowed the governor and the legislature to assume authority that legally lies with the 
Secretary of the KDHE; (2) the Intervenors usurped authority by proposing responses to 
comments made by members of the public; and (3) due process was denied.  
 
 
(1) KDHE Secretary Was the Decision Maker 
 
To support its position, Sierra Club cites cases standing for the proposition that 
when a particular governing authority is designated by law as the decision-making 
authority, another party cannot sidestep that decision maker. See Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 
347 U.S. 260, 266-68, 74 S. Ct. 499, 98 L. Ed. 681 (1954) (where regulations delegated a 
particular discretionary decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals, the United States 
Attorney General could not dictate the Board's decision, even though the Board was 
appointed by the Attorney General, its members served at his pleasure, and its decision 
was subject to his review); Portland Audubon Soc. v. Endangered Species, 984 F.2d 
1534, 1545 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[T]he Endangered Species Act explicitly vests discretion to 
make exemption decisions in the [Endangered Species] Committee and does not 
contemplate that the President or the White House will become involved in Committee 
deliberations. The President and his aides are not a part of the Committee decision-
making process."). 
 
As we have discussed, however, in the settlement agreement Sunflower 
acknowledged the agreement did not "diminish or supplant the authority of the Secretary 
73 
 
or KDHE under the statutes and lawful regulations which they administer." Furthermore, 
it was acknowledged that the project would have to meet BACT emission limits and PSD 
increment consumption constraints before a permit could be approved. Hence, neither the 
settlement agreement nor the legislation that incorporated the terms of the agreement 
dictated the Secretary of the KDHE's decision. Nor did the provisions in those documents 
supplant the Secretary as the ultimate decision maker regarding the PSD permit. 
 
 
(2) Intervenors Did Not Usurp Authority 
 
Further, Sierra Club suggests that instead of thoroughly reviewing and preparing 
responses to public comments the KDHE simply used responses prepared by the 
Intervenors, repeating them verbatim or nearly verbatim. They argue this allowed the 
Intervenors to usurp the Secretary's authority and rendered the public's comments 
meaningless. This argument is closely related to Sierra Club's suggestion that the KDHE 
possessed a bias toward issuing a permit and its failure to properly consider the public 
comments illustrates this bias.  
 
Indeed, it would have been improper for the KDHE to have prejudged the outcome 
of the permitting process. See Tri-County Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Board of Harper 
County Comm'rs, 32 Kan. App. 2d 1168, Syl. ¶ 6, 95 P.3d 1012 (permitting authority 
must "maintain[] an open mind and continue[] to listen to all the evidence presented 
before making the final decision"), rev. denied 278 Kan. 852 (2004). And regulations 
require that the response to public comments be prepared by "the Director", in this case 
the Secretary of KDHE, or his or her representative. 40 C.F.R. § 124.17(a) (2012); see In 
the Matter of Atochem N. American, Inc., RCRA Appeal No. 90-23, 3 E.A.D. 498, 499, 
1991 WL 158260 (EAB 1991) (EPA agency order) (remanding permit for failure to 
comply with requirement that "the Director" or his legal designee personally respond to 
comments).  
 
74 
 
In this case the KDHE did respond, albeit with heavy reliance on Sunflower's 
comments. This reliance does not automatically invalidate the process. Although we have 
said the reliance on a party's proposed findings is "not a practice to be encouraged," we 
held that "[t]here is nothing inherently wrong with a trial court's adopting a party's 
findings and conclusions in their entirety as long as they had been individually 
considered." Stone v. City of Kiowa, 263 Kan. 502, 506, 950 P.2d 1305 (1997); see 
Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 572, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 84 L. Ed. 2d 518 (1985) 
("even when the trial judge adopts proposed findings verbatim, the findings are those of 
the court and may be reversed only if clearly erroneous"). 
 
Our thorough review of the record convinces us that the KDHE ultimately 
performed its role as the "decision-making body." K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 77-621(c)(6). The 
record reflects the KDHE recognized its duties and discretion and considered the public's 
comments. The PSD permit was issued only after the KDHE determined, based on the 
updated information submitted by Sunflower, that the Holcomb 2 proposal would meet 
all applicable standards, at least as those standards were interpreted by the KDHE.  
 
 
(3) This Was Not a Quasi-Judicial Process 
 
Sierra Club also cites cases dealing with quasi-judicial proceedings and the due 
process implications of that process. See, e.g., McPherson Landfill, Inc. v. Board of 
Shawnee County Comm'rs, 274 Kan. 303, Syl. ¶ 2, 49 P.3d 522 (2002) (quasi-judicial 
agency proceedings "must be fair, open, and impartial" and a "denial of due process 
renders the resulting decision void"); Suburban Medical Center v. Olathe Community 
Hosp., 226 Kan. 320, Syl. ¶¶ 4, 5, 597 P.2d 654 (1979) (discussing due process rights 
when administrative agency exercises quasi-judicial powers, including right to have fair, 
open, and impartial hearing; to receive adequate notice of defined issues; and to be 
apprised of evidence so it may be tested, explained, or rebutted). But this court has 
indicated that permit processes like those in this case are not adjudicative proceedings, 
75 
 
i.e., not quasi-judicial in nature. See Board of Sumner County Comm'rs v. Bremby, 286 
Kan. 745, 760-61, 189 P.3d 494 (2008). Further, no violations of any constitutional due 
process rights have been alleged in this case. The PSD permit is not rendered invalid 
under K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 77-621(c)(6). 
 
C. K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 77-621(c)(7) and (c)(8) 
 
K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 77-621(c)(7) (sufficiency of evidence) and (c)(8) 
(unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious actions) were also cited by Sierra Club as grounds 
for relief. Although Sierra Club cited these provisions, it did not develop arguments 
based on those grounds. Consequently, although these review provisions are the focus of 
our analysis of other issues, we will not further discuss the provision with regard to the 
effect of the settlement agreement and the 2009 legislation on the permitting process. See 
National Bank of Andover v. Kansas Bankers Surety Co., 290 Kan. 247, 281, 225 P.3d 
707 (2010) (point raised only incidentally in appellate brief but not argued there is 
deemed abandoned).  
 
In summary with regard to Sierra Club's complaints about the KDHE's procedure, 
we conclude Sierra Club has failed to meet its burden of establishing that the PSD permit 
was invalid under K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 77-621(c)(4), (c)(5), or (c)(6). The KDHE was not 
foreclosed from following the procedural requirements of the CAA by K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 
65-3029(a) or the settlement agreement, and the record indicates it fully exercised its 
discretion and responsibilities. However, as previously discussed, the KDHE committed 
an error of law in doing so by failing to apply the 1-hour NO2 and SO2 emission limits. 
 
IX. ADDITIONAL ISSUES RAISED IN AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF 
 
 
Additional issues have been presented to us by Great Plains Alliance for Clean 
Energy in an amicus curiae brief. Kansas appellate procedure does not allow a nonparty, 
76 
 
including an amicus curiae, to raise an issue for appellate review, however. See State ex 
rel. Six v. Kansas Lottery, 286 Kan. 557, 561, 186 P.3d 183 (2008). Consequently, we 
will not address these issues. See O'Brien v. Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc., 294 
Kan. 318, 352, 277 P.3d 1062 (2012) (citing Kansas Lottery and declining to address 
issues raised by amicus that had not been raised by the parties).  
 
Reversed and remanded.