Title: Hernandez v. Barbo Machinery Co.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S43476
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: April 24, 1998

Filed: April 24, 1998

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

HERIBERTO M. HERNANDEZ,

	Respondent on Review,

		v.

BARBO MACHINERY CO., an 
Oregon Corporation, and 
BUCKNER-WEATHERBY CO., INC., 
a wholly-owned subsidiary of
C.B. TOOL &amp; SUPPLY, INC., a
foreign corporation,

	Petitioners on Review.

(CC 9310-06393; CA A85962; SC S43476)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*

	Argued and submitted March 4, 1997.

	Lisa E. Lear, of Bullivant, Houser, Bailey, Pendergrass &amp;
Hoffman, Portland, argued the cause on behalf of petitioners on
review.  With her on the briefs was Stephen F. English.

	Ridgway K. Foley, Jr., of Greene &amp; Markley, P.C., Portland,
argued the cause on behalf of respondent on review.  With him on
the brief was James G. Breathouwer, of Breathouwer &amp; Gilman,
Portland.

	Maureen Leonard, Portland, filed a brief on behalf of amicus
curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers Association.

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Durham, and Kulongoski, Justices.**

	KULONGOSKI, J.

	The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.

*	Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court,
	Ellen F. Rosenblum, Judge.
	141 Or App 34, 917 P2d 30 (1996).

**	Fadeley, J., retired January 31, 1998, and did not
participate in this decision.  Graber, J., resigned March
31, 1998, and did not participate in this decision.

		KULONGOSKI, J.

		The issue in this products liability case is whether
the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to give
plaintiff's requested jury instruction.  The Court of Appeals
concluded that it did.  Hernandez v. Barbo Machinery Co., 141 Or
App 34, 917 P2d 30 (1996).  We affirm the decision of the Court
of Appeals.

		We take the following facts from the opinion of the
Court of Appeals:(1) 

	"Plaintiff is a maintenance mechanic who serviced
Westwood Manufacturing Company's (Westwood)
machinery.  On June 25, 1993, plaintiff discovered
a new saw at the Westwood work site, which he had
never seen before, and with which he was
unfamiliar.  The saw, called a Belsaw, is sold by
defendants.  It consists of a cabinet, in which
the saw blade is encased, with a work area on top
where the wood is cut.  The blade is not visible
when the cabinet door is closed.

		"Plaintiff decided to investigate the saw
more closely to see if it needed maintenance.  He
looked for the on/off switch to determine whether
the saw was turned off, but because the area was
dark and because the switch was not located in any
of the customary positions, plaintiff could not
find the switch.  He also placed his hand on the
top of the cabinet, but could not feel a vibration
from the saw, nor could he hear any sound
emanating from the cabinet.  However, unbeknownst
to plaintiff, the saw was operating.

		"Plaintiff then opened the cabinet door and
squatted on the floor to get a closer look at the
inside of the cabinet.  Using a flashlight, he
looked inside the cabinet.  While he was looking,
he slipped on sawdust, causing his right hand to
go inside the cabinet and into the moving saw
blade.  The accident resulted in the partial
amputation of plaintiff's right hand."  141 Or App
at 36.

		Defendant Buckner-Weatherby Company, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of C.B. Tool &amp; Supply, Inc., sold the subject
saw to defendant Barbo Machinery Company.  Barbo then sold the
saw to Westwood.

		Plaintiff sued defendants under the theory of strict
products liability.  He alleged that defendants' machine was
dangerously defective in four respects:

	"A.	It was not equipped with a readily observable
on/off switch which clearly showed what mode
the saw was in at all times;

	"B.	It was not equipped with a limit switch on,
or in conjunction with, its access door which
would terminate the power to the blade in the
event the door was opened;

	"C.	It was not equipped with a decal or similar
device warning its users of the risk of
opening the access door without first making
certain that the saw was in the 'off' mode;
and

	"D.	It was not equipped with a guard sufficient
to prevent a user from coming into contact
with the saw's revolving blade." 

		Defendants raised the affirmative defense of
comparative fault, setting forth the following ten allegations of
plaintiff's contributory negligence:

	"1.	Plaintiff, as an experienced maintenance
person, knew that machines contain on-off
switches and further knew that with respect
to this specific machine he had not yet
located the on-off switch when he opened the
door to the interior of the machine, thereby
knowingly encountering the risk that the saw
blade might be turning.

	"2.	Plaintiff knowingly encountered the risk that
the machine might be running by opening the
door to the interior of the Belsaw when he
heard or should have been able to hear the
sound of the saw blade running.

	"3.	Plaintiff knowingly encountered the risk that
the machine might be running by ignoring the
fact that when the door to the Belsaw was
opened the noise from the blade was louder
than when the door was closed, thereby
indicating that the machine was running and
the blade was turning.

	"4.	Plaintiff negligently set his feet in sawdust
in an area in which the floor was obviously
covered with sawdust which he could slip on.

	"5.	Plaintiff knowingly encountered a risk of
injury when he, having possession of a
flashlight, failed to use it first on the
exterior of the machine to locate the on-off
switch and turn the machine off, before
attempting to use the flashlight to see the
interior of the machine.

	"6.	Plaintiff knowingly encountered a risk of
injury when he failed to follow standard and
generally recognized safety rules of first
unplugging the Belsaw before he attempted to
inspect its interior.

	"7.	Plaintiff knowingly encountered the risk of
injury when he failed to ask any Westwood
employee for a manual or for instructions as
to how to turn the Belsaw off before he began
his inspection.

	"8.	Plaintiff knowingly encountered the risk of
injuring himself on a machine whose blade was
still moving by failing to follow a safe
shutdown procedure prior to performing
inspection or maintenance on the machine.

	"9.	Plaintiff knowingly encountered the risk of
injury to himself by placing his hand into
the cabinet of the saw when the presence of
the blade was open, obvious and constituted
an observable danger.

	"10.	Plaintiff knowingly encountered the risk of
injuring himself on a machine when he saw the
on-off switch on the Belsaw and failed to
push the off button to shut the machine
down." 

Defendants' fourth allegation of plaintiff's comparative fault is
the only one that does not allege that plaintiff knowingly
encountered the risk of injury created by the alleged defects in
the saw.

		At trial, plaintiff requested the following jury
instruction:

		"Defendants have charged plaintiff with
comparative fault; that is, they have alleged that the
subject accident and any injuries that plaintiff may
have sustained as a result thereof, were caused, at
least in part, by plaintiff's own fault in certain
particulars.  In that connection, I instruct you that
an injured person's conduct which in fact was a cause
of his or her injury, and which constitutes 'fault,'
including negligence, may be considered in a products
liability action, unless that person's alleged
negligence consists in the kind of unobservant,
inattentive, ignorant, or awkward failure to discover
or to guard against the defect that goes toward making
the product dangerously defective in the first place. 
In other words, contributory negligence of the
plaintiff is not a defense when such negligence
consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in
the product, or to guard against the possibility of its
existence."

Plaintiff's requested jury instruction relied on this court's
treatment of comparative fault in a products liability action in
Sandford v. Chev. Div. Gen. Motors, 292 Or 590, 610, 642 P2d 624
(1982).  		

		The trial court refused to give plaintiff's requested
jury instruction because the court believed that the substance of
the instruction was a legal question for the court, not a
question of fact for the jury.  In instructing the jury, the
trial court first reviewed the defects in the saw as alleged by
plaintiff.  The trial court then noted that, for their
"affirmative defense," defendants "alleged that at the time of
the accident the plaintiff himself was negligent in one or more
of the following particulars," and then read to the jury
defendants' ten allegations of plaintiff's alleged comparative
fault.(2)  The trial court then proceeded to instruct the jury. 
With respect to comparative fault, the trial court instructed the
jury in part as follows:

		"In order for the defendant[s] to establish
comparative fault on the plaintiff's part, the
defendant[s] must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the plaintiff was at fault in at least
one of the ways alleged, as I just read to you from the
answer, which was a cause of injury or damage to the
plaintiff.

		"* * * * *

		"The plaintiff and the defendant have each alleged
that the injury was caused by the other's fault.  This
requires instructing you on the law of comparative
fault.

		"If you find that both the defendant and the
plaintiff were at fault in any respect alleged which
was a cause of the damage complained of, then you
should compare the fault of the plaintiff to the fault
of the defendant.  In making this comparison, you are
to measure the fault of the parties and not the mere
physical causation of the injury.

		"If the plaintiff's fault was greater than the
defendants' fault, then the plaintiff is not entitled
to a verdict in his favor.  However, if the plaintiff's
fault was equal to or less than the defendants' fault,
then the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict in the
plaintiff's favor.

		"In other words, if the plaintiff's fault was more
than 50 percent, then the plaintiff is not entitled to
a verdict in the plaintiff's favor.  On the other hand,
if the plaintiff's fault is 50 percent or less, then
the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict in his favor."(3)

The jury returned a verdict, finding that defendants were at
fault in one or more of the ways alleged in the complaint and
that plaintiff was at fault in one or more of the ways alleged in
defendants' answer.  The jury further found plaintiff's fault to
be 50.5 percent and defendants' fault to be 49.5 percent. 
Because plaintiff's fault exceeded that of defendants, the trial
court entered a judgment in favor of defendants.  ORS 18.470.  On
appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court's
refusal to give plaintiff's requested jury instruction
constituted reversible error.  For the reasons discussed below,
we agree. 

		This court has established rules for analyzing the
question whether a trial court's refusal to give a party's
requested jury instruction constitutes reversible error.  First,
if a party requests a jury instruction that correctly states the
law on the subject in issue, that party need not register a
separate objection to the court's other instructions in order to
preserve for appellate review the question whether the court
erred in declining to deliver the requested instruction.  Roberts
v. Mitchell Bros., 289 Or 119, 129-30, 611 P2d 297 (1980).

		Second, as a general rule, the parties in a civil
action are entitled to jury instructions on their theory of the
case if their requested instructions correctly state the law, are
based on the current pleadings in the case, and are supported by
evidence.  Denton v. Arnstein, 197 Or 28, 46, 250 P2d 407 (1952);
Cline v. Bush, 152 Or 63, 66-67, 52 P2d 652 (1935).

		Regarding a trial court's refusal to give a requested
jury instruction, however, there is no error if the requested
instruction is not correct in all respects.  Hall v. The May
Dept. Stores Co., 292 Or 131, 143, 637 P2d 126 (1981); Beglau v.
Albertus, 272 Or 170, 179, 536 P2d 1251 (1975); Denton, 197 Or at
49.  There also is no error by the trial court if the substance
of the requested jury instruction, even if correct, was covered
fully by other jury instructions given by the trial court.  Kabil
Developments Corp. v. Mignot, 279 Or 151, 158-59, 566 P2d 505
(1977); Hansen v. Bussman, 274 Or 757, 781, 549 P2d 1265 (1976);
Transpacific Leas. v. Klineline Sand, 272 Or 133, 148, 535 P2d
1360 (1975).  Neither is there error if the requested jury
instruction is not necessary in order to explain the particular
issue or point of law to the jury.  That is, the requested jury
instruction must pertain to a material issue in the case on which
the court otherwise has not instructed the jury fully.  Wills v.
Petros et al, 225 Or 122, 130-31, 357 P2d 394 (1960) (trial
court's refusal to give "sudden emergency" instruction not error
where that legal issue did not pertain to facts of case); cf.
Resser v. Boise-Cascade Corporation, 284 Or 385, 393, 587 P2d 80
(1978) (court commits error where it refuses to give a jury
instruction needed to explain a material issue).

		Finally, an error in refusing to give a requested jury
instruction requires reversal only if the jury instructions given
by the trial court, considered as a whole, cause prejudice to the
party requesting the instruction.  Hansen, 274 Or at 781; Denton,
197 Or at 54.  The party requesting an instruction is prejudiced
if the trial court's failure to give the requested instruction
probably created an erroneous impression of the law in the minds
of the members of the jury, and if that erroneous impression may
have affected the outcome of the case.  Waterway Terminals v.
P.S. Lord, 256 Or 361, 370, 474 P2d 309 (1970); see Baker v.
English, 324 Or 585, 590, 932 P2d 57 (1997) (an error by the
trial court substantially affects the rights of an aggrieved
party if the outcome of the case either would have or may have
been different had the error not occurred).

		Applying the foregoing standards to the jury
instruction requested by plaintiff in this case, we first inquire
whether the requested jury instruction is a correct statement of
the law.  

		In Sandford, this court held that a plaintiff's
comparative fault could defeat a products liability claim if the
plaintiff's fault is greater than the defendant's fault.  In
describing what conduct by a plaintiff properly could be
attributed to the plaintiff as fault, this court stated:

	"'Fault' includes contributory negligence except for
such unobservant, inattentive, ignorant, or awkward
failure of the injured party to discover the defect or
to guard against it as is taken into account in finding
the particular product dangerously defective."  292 Or
at 610.

		It is important to understand fully the origins and
meaning of that passage from Sandford.  In Findlay v. Copeland
Lumber Co., 265 Or 300, 509 P2d 28 (1973), the court addressed
contributory negligence in the context of a products liability
action for injuries that the plaintiff sustained when a ladder
that he was using collapsed.  At that time, contributory
negligence completely barred a plaintiff's recovery.  The Findlay
court relied on Comment n to Section 402 A of Restatement
(Second) of Torts(4) in holding that the plaintiff's alleged
failure to maintain a proper lookout while using the ladder was
not a proper defense to a strict liability claim:

	"The Comments clearly state that the user's negligent
failure to discover a defect, or to take precautions
against the possibility of its existence, is not a
defense to a strict liability action."  Findlay, 265 Or
at 303.

The court, continuing to rely on Section 402 A, further held:

	"The seller's strict liability, as formulated in § 402
A, is a means of compensating the user of a defective
product for injuries which are caused by that defect. 
A [plaintiff] who neither mishandles the product nor
voluntarily and unreasonably uses it after learning of
its dangerous condition should not be deprived of this
protection on account of incidental carelessness, even
though it plays some part in the accident, if in fact a
defect in the product is a proximate cause of
[plaintiff's] injuries."  265 Or at 305.

		There was no occasion in Findlay for the court to
consider ORS 18.470, Oregon's comparative fault statute, because
the version of ORS 18.470 in place in 1973 applied only to
negligence actions.(5)  

		In 1975, the Legislative Assembly amended ORS 18.470(1)
to read:

		"Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in
an action by any person or his legal representative to
recover damages for death or injury to person or
property if the fault attributable to the person
seeking recovery was not greater than the combined
fault of the person or persons against whom recovery is
sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in
the proportion to the percentage of fault attributable
to the person recovering.  This section is not intended
to create or abolish any defense."  Or Laws 1975, ch
599, § 1.

		Two of the 1975 amendments are important to this case. 
First, the legislature "replaced the reference to an action for
'damages for negligence resulting in death or injury to person or
property' with one to recover 'damages for death or injury to
person or property' without limitation to negligence actions." 
Sandford, 292 Or at 596.  Second, the legislature required a
comparison of the parties' relative "fault" instead of their
relative "negligence," as required by the former version of the
statute.  Ibid.  That amendment extended the principle of
proportional fault to actions in strict products liability. 
Sandford, 292 Or at 596-97; Baccelleri v. Hyster Co., 287 Or 3,
597 P2d 351 (1979).

		The passage from Sandford on which plaintiff relies for
his requested jury instruction represented the court's conclusion
that the legislature carried forward, into the comparative fault
regime adopted by the legislature in the 1975 version of ORS
18.470, the long-established principle that a plaintiff's
incidental carelessness or negligent failure to discover or guard
against a product defect is not an appropriate defense to that
plaintiff's products liability action for injuries suffered
because of the product defect.  Findlay, 265 Or at 303, 305;
Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 402 A, Comment n.  This
court is bound by that interpretation.  Safeway Stores v. State
Bd. Agriculture, 198 Or 43, 80-81, 255 P2d 564 (1953); State ex
rel Peterson v. Martin, 180 Or 459, 176 P2d 636 (1947) (stating
the general principle that this court's previous interpretation,
after briefing and argument, of a statute fairly arising in a
case and necessary to its determination, constitutes binding
precedent in this court and in lower courts under doctrine of
stare decisis).  Other forms of negligent conduct by a plaintiff,
such as unreasonable misuse of the product, or unreasonable use
despite knowledge of a dangerous defect in the product and
awareness of the risk posed by that defect, are defenses to a
strict products liability action.  The jury instruction that
plaintiff requested is a correct statement of the law regarding
the kinds of negligent behavior that the jury can and cannot
attribute to a plaintiff in considering that party's proportional
fault in a strict products liability action.(6)

		Plaintiff's requested jury instruction was based on the
amended pleadings.  As discussed above, defendants raised
comparative fault as a defense to plaintiff's products liability
action, and plaintiff asserted that his negligence, if any, was
of the type that the jury could not properly attribute to him in
assessing his fault.

		Plaintiff's requested jury instruction was supported by
the evidence.  Plaintiff concedes that there is evidence from
which the jury reasonably could have concluded that plaintiff's
negligent conduct or omission was other than a failure to
discover or to guard against a defect in the saw.  That evidence
justifies delivery of a comparative fault instruction.  However,
plaintiff also argues, correctly, that it also was possible for
the jury reasonably to conclude from the evidence presented that
the saw was dangerously defective in one or more of the ways
plaintiff alleged, that plaintiff's injury resulted from the
dangerously defective condition of the saw, and that plaintiff's
negligence, if any, consisted of an "unobservant, inattentive,
ignorant, or awkward" failure to discover or to guard against
defects in the saw.  Plaintiff's requested jury instruction is
supported by evidence, as required.

		Plaintiff's requested jury instruction pertains to a
material issue in this case on which the jury was not otherwise
instructed.  In a strict products liability action where a
defendant alleges comparative fault, the trial court must perform
two tasks.  First, the trial court must determine, as a matter of
law, whether the pleadings and evidence would permit a jury to
find that the defendant has established the elements of the
comparative fault defense.  If so, the giving of a comparative
fault instruction is appropriate.   

		As noted, the comparative fault defense requires
allegations and evidence that plaintiff unreasonably misused the
product, or that plaintiff had knowledge of a dangerous defect in
the product and was aware of the risk posed by the defect, but
that, despite that knowledge and awareness, plaintiff
unreasonably used the product.  Defendants alleged in their
affirmative defense that plaintiff "knowingly encountered" a risk
of injury by a variety of actions and, in one instance, by
negligently setting his feet in sawdust.  The trial court assumed
that defendants' allegations adequately pleaded the elements of
the comparative fault defense and, because there was some
evidence that plaintiff had knowingly encountered the described
risks and also was negligent by setting his feet in sawdust as
alleged, that defendants had established the elements of the
comparative fault defense.  No party raises in this court the
question whether the trial court's assumptions were erroneous. 
Consequently, we also assume that delivery of a comparative fault
instruction was appropriate here.

		Next, where a plaintiff requests a Sandford instruction
such as the one requested by plaintiff here, the court must
determine whether the pleadings and evidence are such that a jury
reasonably could conclude that the plaintiff has established that
the plaintiff's injury resulted, in whole or in part, from an
"unobservant, inattentive, ignorant, or awkward" failure to
discover or guard against alleged defects in the product.  If so,
the giving of a Sandford instruction is appropriate.  The
plaintiff is entitled to have the jury instructed correctly and
adequately as to the kinds of negligent conduct that the jury may
and may not attribute to him as a defense to a strict products
liability action.

		The instructions that the trial court gave in this case
informed the jury that it could attribute fault to plaintiff if
he engaged in the type of behavior specified by defendants'
affirmative answer, i.e., either by "knowingly" encountering a
risk of injury or by engaging in negligent conduct in the face of
an "obvious" danger.  However, defendants' allegations of
plaintiff's fault also encompass negligence that this court has
ruled cannot be attributed to a plaintiff as fault.  

		Defendants alleged that plaintiff "negligently set his
feet in sawdust * * * which he could slip on" (affirmative
defense, allegation no. 4).  The jury reasonably could have
concluded that plaintiff did slip and that plaintiff's injury
resulted from his negligent failure, while his feet were
positioned in sawdust, to guard against defects in the saw, e.g.,
the saw running while the cabinet door was open (plaintiff's
allegation of defect "B") and the lack of a blade guard inside
the saw cabinet (plaintiff's allegation of defect "D").  If the
court had instructed the jury properly, as requested by
plaintiff, the jury reasonably could have found that, even if
plaintiff was negligent in setting his feet in the sawdust while
he worked on the saw, thereby creating a risk of injury from the
alleged defects in the saw, such negligence consisted of an
"unobservant, inattentive, ignorant or awkward failure" to
discover or guard against the alleged defects in the saw. 
Instructed properly, the jury would have understood that it could
not attribute that negligence to plaintiff as comparative fault. 
We conclude that the trial court failed to instruct the jury on
an issue material to the outcome of the case.(7)

		Because the trial court's jury instructions did not
include the Sandford instruction requested by plaintiff or its
substantial equivalent, and because the requested instruction is
a correct statement of the law, is based on the current pleadings
in the case, is supported by evidence presented at trial, and
addresses a material issue in the case, the trial court erred in
refusing to give plaintiff's requested jury instruction. 

		We next must determine whether the trial court's
failure to give plaintiff's requested jury instruction was
reversible error.  As this court has noted, an error by the trial
court substantially affects the rights of an aggrieved party if
the outcome of the case either would have or may have been
different if the error had not occurred.  Baker, 324 Or at 590;
Waterway Terminals, 256 Or at 370.  Where such prejudice exists,
the error requires reversal.  Id.

		In this case, plaintiff was harmed, because the jury
may have based its comparative fault assessment on a
misperception of the evidence resulting directly from the court's
failure to give plaintiff's requested jury instruction. 
Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the
trial court's failure to give the requested instruction was
reversible error.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the
Court of Appeals.

		The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. 

1. 	The Court of Appeals correctly reviewed the evidence in
the light most favorable to the establishment of the facts
necessary to require giving the requested instruction.  Carter v.
Mote, 285 Or 275, 279, 590 P2d 1214 (1979) (where a party losing
before a jury contends that the loss was because of the court's
failure to give a requested jury instruction, on appeal that
party is entitled to have the evidence viewed in the light most
favorable to the establishment of the facts necessary to require
the requested instruction).

2. 	Neither party challenges the trial court's use of the
term "negligence," rather than "comparative fault," in its
summary of the issues for the jury.

3. 	The parties do not challenge the jury instructions
actually given by the trial court.

4. 	Comment n to Section 402 A states:

		"Since the liability with which this Section deals
is not based upon negligence of the seller, but is
strict liability, the rule applied to strict liability
cases * * * applies.  Contributory negligence of the
plaintiff is not a defense when such negligence
consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in
the product, or to guard against the possibility of its
existence.  On the other hand, the form of contributory
negligence which consists in voluntarily and
unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger,
and commonly passes under the name of assumption of
risk, is a defense under this Section as in other cases
of strict liability.  If the user or consumer discovers
the defect and is aware of the danger, and nevertheless
proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product and is
injured by it, he is barred from recovery."

5. 	Former ORS 18.470(1) (1971) provided:

		"Contributory negligence, including assumption of
the risk, shall not bar recovery in an action by any
person or his legal representative to recover damages
for negligence resulting in death or injury to person
or property if such negligence contributing to the
injury was not as great as the negligence of the person
against whom recovery is sought, but any damages
allowed shall be diminished in the proportion to the
amount of such negligence attributable to the person
recovering."  Or Laws 1971, ch 668, § 1.

6. 	Plaintiff's requested instruction repeated the rule
stated in Sandford, including this court's reference to
"contributory negligence."  No party contends that the reference
to contributory negligence in plaintiff's requested instruction
rendered it an erroneous statement of the law.

7. 	We further note that the trial court characterized
defendant's other nine allegations of comparative fault as
"negligence."  The jury thus was invited to consider any of the
ten allegations as negligence without the leavening effect of the
Sandford instruction requested by plaintiff.