Title: Kieninger v. Crown Equipment Corp.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2017AP000631
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: March 20, 2019

2019 WI 27 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2017AP631 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Christopher Kieninger and Dewayne Meek, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
     v. 
Crown Equipment Corporation d/b/a Crown Lift 
Trucks, LLC, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 380 Wis. 2d 282, 913 N.W.2d 234  
(2018 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 20, 2019 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 12, 2018 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Ellen K. Berz 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by David J.B. Froiland, Christine Bestor Townsend, and 
Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak, & Stewart, P.C., Milwaukee, with 
whom on the briefs were Lynn M. Stathas, Malinda J. Eskra, and 
Reinhart Boerner Van Deuren S.C., Madison.  There was an oral 
argument by David J.B. Froiland. 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants, there was a brief filed by 
Kurt C. Kobelt and Law Offices of Kurt C. Kobelt, Middleton. 
There was an oral argument by Kurt C. Kobelt. 
 
 
2019 WI 27
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2017AP631 
(L.C. No. 
2014CV2791) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Christopher Kieninger and Dewayne Meek,   
 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants,   
 
 
v. 
 
Crown Equipment Corporation d/b/a Crown Lift 
Trucks, LLC,   
 
 
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner.   
FILED 
 
MAR 20, 2019 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
 
¶1 
DANIEL KELLY, J.   Messrs. Christopher Kieninger and 
Dewayne Meek tell us that Wisconsin's statutes and regulations 
require their employer to pay them for the time they spend 
driving a company-provided vehicle between their homes and their 
assigned jobsites.1  Because our laws do not impose such an 
obligation, we reverse the court of appeals.  
                                                 
1 This is a review of an unpublished decision of the court 
of appeals, Kieninger v. Crown Equipment Corp., No. 2017AP631, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2018), which 
reversed the judgment of the Dane County Circuit Court, the 
Honorable Ellen K. Berz presiding. 
No.  2017AP631 
 
2 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
Crown manufactures industrial equipment, including 
forklifts.  It employs field service technicians ("Technicians") 
throughout Wisconsin to service that equipment.  Technicians 
travel to customers' locations in Crown's vans, which are 
stocked with the tools, equipment, and supplies necessary to 
their 
work.2 
 
Crown's 
dispatchers 
and 
the 
Technicians 
collaboratively schedule the service calls to, in part, minimize 
travel time and maximize time spent serving the customers.  
Technicians typically are able to choose which service calls 
will be the first and last of the day. 
¶3 
Technicians have the choice of commuting between work 
and home in either their personal vehicles or the company's 
vans.  A Technician choosing the former drives his personal 
vehicle to his assigned branch prior to the beginning of his 
shift.  There, he picks up the company van and makes his 
appointed rounds.  At the end of his shift, he takes the van 
back to his branch location, and drives his personal vehicle 
home.  If he chooses the latter option, he drives the company 
van home after the last service call of the shift, and the next 
day drives it directly to the first scheduled service call.  
                                                 
2 Crown has four branch locations in Wisconsin:  Milwaukee, 
Green Bay, La Crosse, and Madison.  Each Technician is assigned 
to a branch, and serves customers within that branch's area.  
However, there are circumstances, not relevant to this case, in 
which a Technician may be required to serve a customer outside 
of his assigned branch's area. 
No.  2017AP631 
 
3 
 
Technicians who commute in a company van usually arrange the 
first and last appointments so they are as close to home as 
possible. 
¶4 
Crown pays its Technicians for all of the time they 
spend traveling between jobsites as well as between jobsites and 
Crown facilities.  It does not pay them for commute time between 
home and work when using their personal vehicles.  Commute time 
in a Crown-provided van is handled differently.  Historically, 
Crown paid for time spent commuting in a company van between 
home and the first or last service call, except for the first 30 
minutes of each.  That policy changed in September 2013. 
¶5 
The new policy still allows a Technician to commute in 
one of Crown's vans.  It provides that "[h]ourly Technicians who 
drive a company vehicle in the course of employment with Crown 
may be given the option to park the vehicle at home between 
shifts."  With respect to compensation for travel between home 
and work, however, the Commute Travel Time Guidelines (the 
"Guidelines") now say the following: 
Commute Travel at the Beginning of the Work Day 
A technician will begin clocking compensated time when 
one of the following has occurred: 
1.  The technician has arrived at the customer 
guard shack or customer's parking space. 
2.  The technician has arrived at the branch. 
3.  The technician arrives at location for the 
vehicle to be serviced. 
4.  Forty five (45) minutes of commute travel has 
elapsed.  Commute travel greater than 45 
minutes at the beginning of the work day 
will be compensated. 
No.  2017AP631 
 
4 
 
Commute Travel at the End of the Work Day 
The work day ends when all work related activities 
have been completed.  This includes properly placing 
all tools and other items in the vehicle, completing 
all forms and paperwork, and communicating with 
dispatch as necessary.  Commute time begins when the 
technician has left the last work location.  A 
technician's commute from the assigned work area to 
home is not compensated. 
¶6 
Messrs. 
Kieninger 
and 
Meek 
are 
two 
of 
Crown's 
Technicians.  They both opted to commute between home and work 
in Crown's vans, and each signed a copy of the Guidelines.  
Nevertheless, they believe that the entire time spent commuting 
between home and work in a company van is "an integral part of 
their jobs" for which they must be paid.   
¶7 
Mr. Kieninger filed a complaint with the Wisconsin 
Department 
of 
Workforce 
Development 
(the 
"DWD") 
claiming 
entitlement to unpaid wages based on his commute time in a 
company van.  The DWD dismissed the claim.  Mr. Kieninger 
reprised his claim in a complaint filed in the Dane County 
Circuit Court, in which he proposed to represent a class 
comprising all similarly-situated Crown Technicians.  He amended 
his complaint to add Mr. Meek as a named party, and the circuit 
court subsequently certified the class pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 803.08 (2013-14).3  The parties filed competing motions for 
summary judgment on the question of whether commute time in a 
company-provided vehicle is compensable.  They each assured the 
                                                 
3  All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are 
to the 2017-18 edition unless otherwise specified. 
No.  2017AP631 
 
5 
 
circuit court that the case presented no genuine issue as to any 
material fact.   
¶8 
The circuit court granted Crown's motion.  It reasoned 
that it must interpret Wisconsin's labor laws consistently with 
federal labor laws.  Because it concluded that the federal 
Employee Commuting Flexibility Act (the "ECFA")4 definitively 
answered the question, it adopted a conforming interpretation of 
Wisconsin's labor regulations and dismissed the complaint.  
Messrs. Kieninger and Meek——we will refer to them collectively 
as "Mr. Kieninger" unless the context requires otherwise——
appealed. 
¶9 
The court of appeals disagreed with the circuit 
court's use of the ECFA to develop an interpretation of 
Wisconsin's regulations.  See Kieninger v. Crown Equipment 
Corp., No. 2017AP631, unpublished slip op., ¶21 (Wis. Ct. App. 
Jan. 18, 2018) ("Crown does not convincingly explain why ECFA 
language——wording 
that 
was 
not 
adopted 
by 
the 
Wisconsin 
Legislature——should control over the language actually in 
place.").  As to whether Wisconsin's statutes and regulations——
without reference to federal law——require payment for commuting 
time in a company-provided vehicle, the court of appeals said it 
was "uncertain whether under the correct standard there might be 
one or more genuine issues of material fact," id., ¶3, and so 
reversed the circuit court and remanded for further briefing.  
Crown petitioned for review. 
                                                 
4 29 U.S.C. § 254 (2012). 
No.  2017AP631 
 
6 
 
¶10 We agree with the court of appeals that the ECFA does 
not guide our application of Wisconsin law in this case.  
However, we do not agree that further briefing is necessary, or 
that there may be a genuine dispute as to a material fact.  We 
conclude that Crown is entitled to summary judgment in its 
favor, and so we reverse the court of appeals. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶11 We review the disposition of a motion for summary 
judgment de novo, applying the same methodology the circuit 
courts apply.  Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 
315, 401 N.W.2d 816 (1987); see also Borek Cranberry Marsh, Inc. 
v. 
Jackson 
Cty., 
2010 
WI 95, 
¶11, 
328 
Wis. 2d 613, 
785 
N.W.2d 615 ("We review the grant of a motion for summary 
judgment de novo . . . .").  First, we "examine the pleadings to 
determine whether a claim for relief has been stated."  Green 
Spring Farms, 136 Wis. 2d at 315.  Then, "[i]f a claim for 
relief has been stated, the inquiry . . . shifts to whether any 
factual issues exist."  Id.  Summary judgment is appropriate 
only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law."  Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) (2015-16); see also Columbia 
Propane, L.P. v. Wis. Gas Co., 2003 WI 38, ¶11, 261 Wis. 2d 70, 
661 N.W.2d 776 (citing Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) (2001-02)). 
¶12 In the course of this opinion, we will consider the 
meaning and application of various statutes and regulations.  
No.  2017AP631 
 
7 
 
These are questions of law that we review de novo.  State v. 
Alger, 2015 WI 3, ¶21, 360 Wis. 2d 193, 858 N.W.2d 346 ("The 
interpretation and application of a statute present questions of 
law that this court reviews de novo . . . ."); United Food and 
Commercial Workers Union Local 1473 v. Hormel Foods Corp., 2016 
WI 13, ¶30, 367 Wis. 2d 131, 876 N.W.2d 99 ("Interpretation and 
application of a regulation is ordinarily a question of law that 
this court determines independently of the circuit court or 
court of appeals . . . ."). 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶13 Mr. Kieninger tells us the Guidelines unlawfully 
relieve Crown of the obligation to pay him for the entirety of 
the time he spends commuting between home and work in a company-
provided vehicle.  Because he based his claim on Wisconsin's 
laws,5 we will rely on that authority to decide this case, unless 
federal law dictates a different result.  Our analysis, 
therefore, will begin where it must——with what Wisconsin's 
statutes 
and 
regulations 
require 
in 
these 
circumstances.  
Afterwards, we will determine whether federal law proscribes 
what Wisconsin prescribes. 
                                                 
5 The amended complaint alleges two counts against Crown:  
(1) violation of Wisconsin wage payment laws under Wis. Stat. 
§§ 104.02, 109.03 and Wis. Admin Code § DWD 272.03 (Feb. 2009), 
and (2) violation of Wisconsin overtime compensation law under 
Wis Stat. §§ 103.02, 109.03 and Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 274.03.  
He did not include any federal claims. 
No.  2017AP631 
 
8 
 
¶14 Our responsibility is to ascertain and apply the plain 
meaning of the statutes as adopted by the legislature.  To do 
so, 
we 
focus 
on 
their 
text, 
context, 
and 
structure.  
"[S]tatutory interpretation 'begins with the language of the 
statute,'" and we give that language its "common, ordinary, and 
accepted meaning."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for 
Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶¶45-46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 
("Context is important to meaning.  So, too, is the structure of 
the statute in which the operative language appears.  Therefore, 
statutory language is interpreted in the context in which it is 
used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to 
the 
language 
of 
surrounding 
or 
closely-related 
statutes . . . .").  In performing this analysis, we carefully 
avoid ascribing an unreasonable or absurd meaning to the text.  
Id., ¶46 ("[S]tatutory language is interpreted . . . reasonably, 
to avoid absurd or unreasonable results.").  If we determine the 
statute's plain meaning through this methodology, we go no 
further.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45 ("If the meaning of the 
statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry." (internal 
marks and citation omitted)); see generally Daniel R. Suhr, 
Interpreting Wisconsin Statutes, 100 Marq. L. Rev. 969 (2017).6 
                                                 
6 These rules of interpretation apply with equal force to 
administrative regulations:  "When interpreting administrative 
regulations the court uses the same rules of interpretation as 
it applies to statutes." United Food and Commercial Workers 
Union Local 1473 v. Hormel Foods Corp., 2016 WI 13, ¶30, 367 
Wis. 2d 131, 876 N.W.2d 99. 
 
No.  2017AP631 
 
9 
 
A.  Wisconsin and the Payment of Commuting Time 
¶15 Mr. Kieninger says Crown's duty to pay him for 
commuting time arises from the statutory mandate that "[e]very 
employer shall . . . pay to every employee engaged in the 
employer's 
business . . . all 
wages 
earned 
by 
the 
employee . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 109.03(1).7  Essentially, Mr. 
Kieninger claims that his workday commences the moment he leaves 
home, at the beginning of a shift, because he is transporting 
Crown's tools to a jobsite.  Similarly, he says his workday does 
not end until he reaches home because he is still carrying the 
tools.  Crown says that commuting between home and work is no 
part of its business, and so it has no duty to pay Technicians 
for time spent doing so. 
¶16 The statute on which Mr. Kieninger relies is, of 
course, 
insufficiently 
specific 
to 
resolve 
the 
parties' 
divergent positions, so we look to the relevant administrative 
regulations.8  The DWD provides several guideposts that help us 
identify wages earned by the Technicians.  Here, we learn that 
wages accrue when employees are engaged in "physical or mental 
                                                 
7 Employers may not contractually avoid this obligation.  
See Wis. Stat. § 109.03(5) ("[N]o employer may by special 
contract with employees or by any other means secure exemption 
from this section."). 
 
8 "Administrative 
rules 
enacted 
pursuant 
to 
statutory 
rulemaking authority have the force and effect of law in 
Wisconsin."  Staples v. DHSS, 115 Wis. 2d 363, 367, 340 
N.W.2d 194 (1983). 
No.  2017AP631 
 
10 
 
exertion (whether burdensome or not) controlled or required by 
the employer and pursued necessarily and primarily for the 
benefit of the employer's business."  Wis. Admin. Code. § DWD 
272.12(1)(a)1 (Feb. 2009). (internal marks omitted).  These 
exertions take place within a "workday," which comprises: 
[T]he period between the time on any particular 
workday 
at 
which 
such 
employee 
commences 
their 
principal activity or activities and the time on any 
particular workday at which they cease such principal 
activity or activities. The "workday" may thus be 
longer than the employee's scheduled shift, hours, 
tour of duty, or time on the production line. Also, 
its duration may vary from day to day depending upon 
when 
the 
employee 
commences 
or 
ceases 
their 
"principal" activities. 
§ DWD 272.12(1)(a)2. (some internal marks omitted).9  The 
"principal activities" of which a workday consists "include[] 
all activities which are an integral part of a principal 
activity."  § DWD 272.12(2)(e)1.  Tasks "integral" to a 
principal activity encompass "those closely related activities 
which 
are 
indispensable 
to 
its 
performance." 
 
§ DWD 
272.12(2)(e)1.c. 
¶17 Distilling this guidance into a workable framework 
tells us that an employee's activity is compensable if it takes 
place during a workday (that is, it is part of the employee's 
principal activities, or is closely related and indispensable to 
them), it involves physical or mental exertion controlled or 
required by the employer, and it is necessarily and primarily 
                                                 
9 "Compensable time is defined in the regulations in terms 
of a 'workday.'"  Hormel Foods Corp., 367 Wis. 2d 131, ¶40. 
No.  2017AP631 
 
11 
 
done for the benefit of the employer's business.  Before we may 
apply that framework to the claim at issue here, however, we 
must account for the special rules specifically related to 
travel time. 
¶18  The DWD has adopted "principles which apply in 
determining whether or not time spent in travel is working 
time . . . ."  Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 272.12(2)(g)1.  One of 
those principles is that time spent commuting between home and 
work is not compensable: 
An employee who travels from home before their regular 
workday and returns to their home at the end of the 
workday is engaged in ordinary home to work travel 
which is a normal incident of employment. This is true 
whether they work at a fixed location or at different 
job sites. Normal travel from home to work is not work 
time. 
§ DWD 272.12(2)(g)2.  The regulations draw a sharp distinction 
between this type of travel and travel that is a principal 
activity (for which an employee earns wages).  For example, 
traveling between jobsites is clearly compensable:  "Time spent 
by an employee in travel as part of their principal activity, 
such as travel from job site to job site during the workday, 
must be counted as hours worked."  § DWD 272.12(2)(g)5.  And if 
Mr. Kieninger had opted to drive his personal vehicle to a Crown 
branch, his time spent driving Crown's van between the branch 
and the jobsites would also unquestionably accrue wages:   
Where an employee is required to report at a meeting 
place to receive instructions or to perform other work 
there, or to pick up and to carry tools, the travel 
from the designated place to the workplace is part of 
No.  2017AP631 
 
12 
 
the day's work, and must be counted as hours worked 
regardless of contract, custom, or practice. 
Id.   
¶19 However, in an illustration that almost perfectly 
describes the option Mr. Kieninger actually chose, the DWD says 
the time spent driving between home and a worksite is not 
compensable. 
If an employee normally finished their work on the 
premises at 5 p.m. and is sent to another job which 
they finish at 8 p.m. and is required to return to 
their employer's premises arriving at 9 p.m. all of 
the time is working time. However, if the employee 
goes home instead of returning to their employer's 
premises, the travel after 8 p.m. is home-to-work 
travel and is not hours worked. 
Id.  Presumably, the same principle applies to travel at the 
other end of the day.  That is, if an employee drives directly 
from home to a jobsite at the beginning of his shift, he is 
similarly engaged in non-compensable "home-to-work" travel. 
¶20 The 
only 
difference 
between 
the 
regulation's 
illustration and the circumstances of this case is that Crown 
allows its Technicians to engage in "home-to-work" travel in a 
company vehicle.  Whether the employee is in a personal or a 
company vehicle, he is doing the exact same thing, and no one 
disputes that the time at issue would not be compensable if Mr. 
Kieninger had driven his own automobile.  So Mr. Kieninger must 
explain why the difference in the vehicle's ownership moves his 
commute time out of the regulation's non-compensable category.  
The sole distinction he offers is that the vehicle he drives to 
and from his home carries "tools that are integral and 
No.  2017AP631 
 
13 
 
indispensable to a principal activity."  He cites only Wis. 
Admin. Code § DWD 272.12(2)(g)5. to explain the significance of 
this distinction.  But as we describe below, when he quoted the 
regulation's language he elided the text that demonstrates this 
provision does not apply to his commute.   
¶21 The 
regulation 
upon 
which 
Mr. 
Kieninger 
relies 
describes a two-leg journey and explains why only the second leg 
represents compensable travel time.  The first leg comprises 
travel from the employee's home to a "meeting place" designated 
by the employer.  The second leg involves travel from the 
meeting place to the employee's job site.  Mr. Kieninger's 
understanding of this regulation, however, entirely omits the 
first leg.  His quote reads as follows:  "Where an employee is 
required to . . . pick up and to carry tools, the travel from 
the designated place to the workplace is part of the day's work, 
and must be counted as hours worked regardless of contract, 
custom, or practice."  The opening clause of that sentence, 
which identifies the first leg, actually says this:  "Where an 
employee is required to report at a meeting place . . . ."  Wis. 
Admin. 
Code 
§ DWD 
272.12(2)(g)5. 
(emphasis 
added). 
 
Mr. 
Kieninger, however, is not required to "report at a meeting 
place" to pick up and carry tools.  He simply drives from his 
home to the first jobsite of the day.  So his one-leg commute 
does not match the two-leg travel described by this part of 
§ DWD 272.12(2)(g)5. 
¶22 This regulation actually describes the circumstances 
of Technicians who, unlike Mr. Kieninger, do not commute in 
No.  2017AP631 
 
14 
 
Crown's vans.  A Technician who travels from home to a Crown 
branch to pick up the company vehicle (and its associated tools 
and parts), is on the first leg of the journey described by Wis. 
Admin. Code § DWD 272.12(2)(g)5.  No wages accrue for this time.  
However, travel from the Crown branch to the customer's location 
(the second leg) would be compensable under this provision.  
Because Mr. Kieninger's commute does not fit this pattern, § DWD 
272.12(2)(g)5. does not transform his commute into compensable 
time. 
¶23 So the regulations whittle down Mr. Kieninger's 
position to this:  He must be paid for his commute because the 
tools in Crown's vans are integral and indispensable to a 
principal activity, to wit, repairing forklifts.10  But if 
bringing along the resources necessary to perform one's job is 
sufficient to make travel between home and work compensable, his 
argument proves much too much, and transforms virtually every 
commute into a wage-earning event.  A paralegal who goes home in 
the evening with a company-provided computer and then travels 
the next day to a witness's location to conduct an interview is 
transporting the resources necessary to do his job.  So is every 
office-worker who brings a file home after work, and then 
returns it the next morning.  And, because there is no logical 
                                                 
10 Authority for this proposition does not come from Wis. 
Admin. Code § DWD 272.12(2)(g)5., but instead from § DWD 
272.12(2)(e)1. and § DWD 272.12(2)(e)1.c., which define what is 
integral and indispensable to a principal activity. 
 
No.  2017AP631 
 
15 
 
limit to Mr. Kieninger's argument, so too is anyone who merely 
drives to his regular place of employment each morning.  An 
employee creates value for his employer, of course, by bringing 
his physical and mental resources to bear on the company's 
business.  So, according to Mr. Kieninger's logic, all employees 
would have to be paid for their commutes because conveying an 
employee's physical and mental resources to the office is 
integral and indispensable to a principal activity, to wit, 
whatever they were hired to do.  
¶24 The tools and parts in Crown's vans may be absolutely 
necessary for the repair of forklifts, but they are meaningless 
without a Technician who can expertly manipulate them to the 
desired end.  Mr. Kieninger can say nothing about the 
indispensability of the tools that could not be said equally of 
him.  So if he is right, if transporting the necessaries to the 
jobsite makes the travel compensable, then he is entitled to 
wages regardless of the tools the van carries because no repairs 
could happen without his personal presence.  And that would mean 
that conveying himself from home to the customer's location is 
integral or indispensable to the principal activity of repairing 
forklifts.  But according to our statutes and regulations, that 
simply is not the rule.  Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 272.12(2)(g)2. 
("Normal travel from home to work is not work time."). 
¶25 With these specific, travel-related regulations in 
mind, we can return to the framework described above.  We cannot 
conclude that conveying company tools from an employee's home to 
his jobsite, without more, makes his travel time "an integral 
No.  2017AP631 
 
16 
 
part of a principal activity" within the meaning of Wis. Admin. 
Code § DWD 272.12(2)(e)1., or a "closely related" activity that 
is "indispensable to its performance" within the meaning of 
§ DWD 272.12(2)(e)1.c.  To hold otherwise would make every 
employee's commute a compensable event.  Consequently, this 
travel does not take place during a "workday," as defined by 
§ DWD 272.12(1)(a)2.  And that means time spent in travel 
between home and work in Crown-supplied vehicles does not give 
rise to "wages earned by [an] employee" as set forth in Wis. 
Stat. § 109.03(1). 
B.  Federal Authorities 
¶26 Both Mr. Kieninger and Crown tell us we must construe 
our regulations consistently with federal authorities.  But they 
direct us to different sources.  Mr. Kieninger prefers opinions 
of federal courts construing the pre-ECFA Fair Labor Standards 
Act (the "FLSA").  He says these cases——and regulations 
identical to our own——teach that his type of commute is 
compensable.  Crown, on the other hand, says we can dispense 
with 
those 
federal 
opinions 
because 
they 
have 
all 
been 
superseded by the ECFA.  We should read that act, Crown says, as 
a clarification of the FLSA and the regulations relating to 
commuting time.  And because our regulations mimic their federal 
counterparts, 
Crown 
concludes 
that 
this 
clarification 
necessarily clarifies our regulations, too.  We will begin with 
the federal opinions on which Mr. Kieninger relies. 
¶27 It is true that one federal court (of which we are 
aware) has arrived at a conclusion contrary to the one we reach 
No.  2017AP631 
 
17 
 
today.  We do not take this lightly——the federal judiciary can, 
and often does, provide helpful insights when it analyzes 
federal provisions analogous to our own.  Luckett v. Bodner, 
2009 WI 68, ¶29, 318 Wis. 2d 423, 769 N.W.2d 504 ("When 'a state 
rule mirrors the federal rule, we consider federal cases 
interpreting the rule to be persuasive authority.'"); see also 
State v. Leach, 124 Wis. 2d 648, 670, 370 N.W.2d 240 (1985).  
They may not, of course, make any binding pronouncements on the 
meaning of Wisconsin's laws.  Daanen & Janssen, Inc. v. 
Cedarapids, Inc., 216 Wis. 2d 395, 400, 573 N.W.2d 842 (1998) 
("This court is not bound by a federal court's interpretation of 
Wisconsin law.").  Much less may their opinions construing 
analogous federal provisions control a state's understanding of 
its own statutes and regulations.  We have considered the 
opinions of our federal counterparts on this question, but for 
the following reasons we are not persuaded they should direct 
our analysis. 
¶28 We need not spend much time on the federal court of 
appeals opinions Mr. Kieninger brought to our attention because 
none of them addressed the question we must answer.  They 
considered the compensability of travel between an employer's 
location and various job sites, not the time spent traveling 
from an employee's home to a jobsite.  That's a closely related 
question, but it is not the same.  For example, D A & S Oil Well 
Servicing, Inc. v. Mitchell, 262 F.2d 552, 555 (10th Cir. 1958), 
involved an employer who compensated employees for travel 
between its base of operations and jobsites, but not the return 
No.  2017AP631 
 
18 
 
trip to the base.  The court concluded the employer must pay for 
both.  Id.  But it never mentioned travel between the employee's 
home and the employer's base.  In Crenshaw v. Quarles Drilling 
Corp., 798 F.2d 1345, 1350 (10th Cir. 1986), the employer sent 
the employee to jobsites across several states.  The court was 
silent with respect to whether the travel occurred between the 
employee's home and one of the far-flung locations.  But it 
based its conclusion on the rationale it previously expressed in 
D A & S Oil Well Servicing, which applied to travel between an 
employer's location and a jobsite.  As with the employees in D A 
& S Oil Well Servicing, the employee in Secretary of Labor v. E. 
R. Field, Inc., 495 F.2d 749, 751 (1st Cir. 1974), sought 
compensation for travel between his employer's business location 
and a remote jobsite.  The court concluded the time was 
compensable, but said nothing about traveling between an 
employee's home and a jobsite.11  
¶29 One of the federal district courts cited by Mr. 
Kieninger actually has addressed the question before us, and it 
does disagree with our conclusion.  However, its analysis failed 
                                                 
11 Similarly, many of the federal district court cases Mr. 
Kieninger cited addressed themselves to the question of whether 
travel 
between 
an 
employer's 
location 
and 
a 
jobsite 
is 
compensable, 
not 
the 
time 
between 
home 
and 
a 
jobsite.  
McLaughlin v. Somnograph, Inc., No. Civ.A.04-1274-MLB, 2005 WL 
3489507 (D. Kan. Dec. 21, 2005); Dole v. Enduro Plumbing, Inc., 
No. 88-7041-RMT(KX), 1990 WL 252270 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 1990); 
Marshall v. Boyd, No. LR-C-7-4, 1979 WL 1922 (E.D. Ark. April 4, 
1979); Spencer v. Auditor of Public Accounts, No. 88-54, 1990 WL 
8034, (E.D. Ky. Jan. 30, 1990). 
No.  2017AP631 
 
19 
 
to account for regulatory material directly bearing on this 
issue, and so it provides an unsure foundation upon which to 
base our reasoning.  The plaintiffs in Baker v. GTE North, Inc. 
presented 
exactly 
the 
same 
issue 
as 
Mr. 
Kieninger——the 
compensability of their travel time between home and a jobsite 
while carrying the tools necessary to do their jobs.  The court 
said the commuting time was compensable because "driving is 
principal if it is done 'as part of the regular work of the 
employees in the ordinary course of business,' and is 'necessary 
to the business and is performed by the employees, primarily for 
the benefit of the employer, in the ordinary course of that 
business.'"  927 F. Supp. 1104, 1114 (N.D. Ind. 1996) (quoting 
Dunlop v. City Elec., Inc., 527 F.2d 394, 400-401 (5th Cir. 
1976)), rev’d on other grounds, 110 F.3d 28 (7th Cir. 1997).  
But Dunlop is not the only authority the Baker court should have 
consulted.  A pertinent federal regulation provided: 
Time spent by an employee in travel as part of his 
principal activity, such as travel from job site to 
job site during the workday, must be counted as hours 
worked. Where an employee is required to report at a 
meeting place to receive instructions or to perform 
other work there, or to pick up and to carry tools, 
the travel from the designated place to the work place 
is part of the day's work, and must be counted as 
hours worked regardless of contract, custom, or 
practice. If an employee normally finishes his work on 
the premises at 5 p.m. and is sent to another job 
which he finishes at 8 p.m. and is required to return 
to his employer's premises arriving at 9 p.m., all of 
the time is working time. However, if the employee 
goes home instead of returning to his employer's 
premises, the travel after 8 p.m. is home-to-work 
travel and is not hours worked. 
No.  2017AP631 
 
20 
 
29 C.F.R. § 785.38.  This is virtually identical to Wis. Admin. 
Code § DWD 272.12(2)(g)5., the regulation that was the main 
driver of our analysis.  That it is identical should come as no 
surprise, inasmuch as it was, apparently, the genesis of 
Wisconsin's own regulation.12  What does come as a surprise is 
that not only did it not find a central place in the analysis, 
the court never even mentioned it. 
¶30 By failing to distinguish between home-to-jobsite 
travel on the one hand, and on the other home-to-employer-to-
jobsite travel, the Baker court adopted (perhaps unknowingly) 
the logically-unlimited argument Mr. Kieninger offered here.  It 
concluded that carrying the tools necessary to perform the 
employee's work made the travel an "integral and indispensable" 
part of the employee's principal activity.13  But because 
conveying the employee himself to the jobsite is no less 
necessary to perform his work, the Baker court's logic would 
make the employees' commute compensable even if they transported 
nothing but themselves.  The antidote to this argument, at the 
federal level, is 29 C.F.R. § 785.38.  If the court had 
accounted for its provisions, as we did in assessing Wis. Admin. 
Code § DWD 272.12(2)(g)5., it may have recognized the unintended 
                                                 
12 The federal regulation (29 C.F.R. § 785.38) was adopted 
in 1961.  See 26 Fed. Reg. 194 (Jan. 11, 1961) (to be codified 
at 29 C.F.R. § 785.38).  Wisconsin adopted its counterpart 
(§ DWD 272.12(2)(g)5.) over 17 years later. 271B Wis. Admin. 
Reg. 32-4 (July 31, 1978). 
13 See supra note 11. 
No.  2017AP631 
 
21 
 
consequences of its reasoning.  We are not persuaded by Baker v. 
GTE North, Inc. 
¶31 Crown, on the other hand, says all federal cases 
addressing 
commuting 
time 
prior 
to 
1996 
are 
no 
longer 
controlling.  Instead, it proposes we follow its somewhat 
labyrinthine argument to the conclusion that Congressional 
adoption of the ECFA in 1996 controls the disposition of this 
case.  We can certainly understand why Crown believes it should—
—the ECFA's text gives its position a nice assist.  That Act 
provides:  
[T]he use of an employer's vehicle for travel by an 
employee and activities performed by an employee which 
are incidental to the use of such vehicle for 
commuting 
shall 
not 
be 
considered 
part 
of 
the 
employer's principal activities if the use of such 
vehicle for travel is within the normal commuting area 
for the employer's business or establishment and the 
use of the employer's vehicle is subject to an 
agreement on the part of the employer and the employee 
or representative of such employee. 
29 U.S.C. § 254(a).  But Crown's argument depends on the 
unusual 
assertion 
that 
a 
Congressional 
act 
post-dating 
Wisconsin's labor regulations can somehow retroactively change 
their meaning.14  It says the high degree of correlation between 
Wisconsin and federal labor regulations (at least with respect 
                                                 
14 The provision at issue here, Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 
272.12, was originally adopted in 1978 as Wis. Admin. Code § Ind 
72.12.  See Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development 
Timeline 
History: 
1883-Present, 
https://dwd.wisconsin.gov/dwd/dwdhistory/.  
 
No.  2017AP631 
 
22 
 
to the compensability of commuting time) demonstrates that the 
DWD intended our regulations on this subject to always move in 
lockstep with their federal analogs.  Inasmuch as the DWD has 
not adopted something similar to the ECFA, Crown's argument 
depends on this movement occurring even without any state-level 
rule-making activity.  There are circumstances in which the DWD 
may wish our laws to track federal law; it said as much when it 
adopted exemptions to overtime pay requirements.  See Wis. 
Admin. 
Code 
§ DWD 
274.04 
("[T]hese 
exemptions 
shall 
be 
interpreted in such a manner as to be consistent with the 
Federal Fair Labor Standards Act and the Code of Federal 
Regulations as amended . . . .").15  However, there is no 
                                                 
15 In construing Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 274.04, the court of 
appeals said in Madely v. Radioshack Corp., 2007 WI App 244, 
¶13, 
306 
Wis. 2d 312, 
742 
N.W.2d 559, 
that 
"Wisconsin's 
administrative regulations are to be interpreted in such a 
manner as to be consistent with the Federal Fair Labor Standards 
Act (FLSA) and the Code of Federal Regulations . . . ."  But in 
a subsequent case, it acknowledged that "we do not read Madely 
as 
standing 
for 
the 
proposition 
that 
all 
Wisconsin 
administrative regulations must be interpreted in lock step with 
the FLSA and the CFR."  Weissman v. Tyson Prepared Foods, Inc., 
2013 
WI App 109, 
¶44, 
350 
Wis. 2d 380, 
838 
N.W.2d 502).  
Instead, Madely's statement was inspired by the text of § DWD 
274.04:  
[T]he code provision at issue in Madely explicitly 
directed interpretation "consistent with the [FLSA] 
and the [CFR] as amended." This significant "lock 
step" directive, lacking in the code provisions at 
issue here, appears to be the basis for our statement 
in Madely that Wisconsin's administrative regulations 
are to be interpreted consistent with the FLSA and the 
CFR. 
Id. (Brackets in original.). 
No.  2017AP631 
 
23 
 
corresponding linkage between § DWD 272 and the FLSA or the 
CFRs, or any other federal law.  We will not create one.  
Consequently, the ECFA plays no part in our analysis of this 
case.16 
* 
¶32 Our 
holding 
is 
limited, 
and 
applies 
only 
to 
circumstances in which an employee drives a company-provided 
vehicle between home and a jobsite.  It does not disturb the 
compensability of travel between an employer's location and a 
jobsite, or between jobsites.  See Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 
272.12(2)(g)5. ("Time spent by an employee in travel . . . from 
job site to job site during the workday, must be counted as 
hours worked. Where an employee is required to report at a 
meeting place to receive instructions or to perform other work 
there, or to pick up and to carry tools, the travel from the 
                                                 
16 Our analysis would be different, of course, if the ECFA 
had explicitly or by necessary implication pre-empted a relevant 
part of Wisconsin's law.  The Supremacy Clause of the United 
States Constitution ensures that federal law takes precedence 
over contrary state provisions: 
Article VI, cl. 2, of the Constitution provides that 
the laws of the United States "shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land; . . . any Thing in the Constitution 
or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding." 
Consistent with that command, we have long recognized 
that state laws that conflict with federal law are 
"without effect." 
Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008). 
No.  2017AP631 
 
24 
 
designated place to the workplace is part of the day's 
work . . . ."). 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶33 We hold that neither Wis. Stat. § 109.03(1) nor DWD's 
related regulations require Crown to pay an employee for the 
time he spends driving a tool-laden, company-provided vehicle 
between his home and an assigned jobsite.  Therefore, we reverse 
the court of appeals.17 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
                                                 
17 The court of appeals rejected Crown's reliance on the 
ECFA for guidance in interpreting Wisconsin's statutes, and so 
reversed the circuit court's judgment.  However, it also said 
"we 
lack 
sufficient 
adversarial 
briefing 
on 
the 
correct 
Wisconsin standard and, additionally, we are uncertain whether 
under the correct standard there might be one or more genuine 
issues of material fact."  Kieninger, No. 2017AP631, unpublished 
slip op., ¶3.  So it remanded the matter for further briefing. 
 
Neither party has asserted (in this court) that it wants an 
opportunity to submit additional briefing on this subject, and 
we see no such need.  Nor have they suggested to us that there 
is any genuine dispute as to a material fact.  That is 
consistent with their cross-motions for summary judgment in the 
circuit court, in which they originally asserted this case 
presents no genuine dispute as to a material fact.  We conclude, 
therefore, that there is no reason to remand this matter for 
further proceedings. 
No.  2017AP631 
 
 
 
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