Title: State v. R.J.G.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC99034
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: October 26, 2021

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
en banc 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
) 
) 
Appellant, 
) 
) 
v. 
) 
No. SC99034 
) 
R.J.G., 
) 
) 
Respondent. 
) 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ST. FRANCOIS COUNTY 
The Honorable Wendy Wexler Horn, Judge 
R.J.G. is alleged to have committed several felony offenses in October 2020, when 
he was seventeen years old.  The state charged R.J.G. with these offenses in a court of 
general jurisdiction on January 7, 2021.  R.J.G. filed a motion to dismiss the action, arguing 
the circuit court’s juvenile division  had the exclusive statutory authority to adjudicate these 
charges pursuant to legislation enacted in 2018 (hereinafter, “the 2018 legislation”) 
because he was seventeen years old at the time the offenses occurred.  The circuit court 
sustained R.J.G.’s motion and dismissed the state’s prosecution without prejudice.  The 
state appealed.  R.J.G. filed a motion to dismiss the state’s appeal for lack of a final, 
appealable judgment. 
Opinion issued October 26, 2021
2 
 
 
This Court holds the circuit court’s order dismissing the state’s prosecution without 
prejudice constituted a final, appealable judgment because it had the practical effect of 
terminating the state’s prosecution in a court of general jurisdiction and refiling the charges 
would be futile; therefore, R.J.G.’s motion to dismiss the state’s appeal is overruled.  This 
Court further holds the law as it existed at the time R.J.G. is alleged to have committed the 
offenses governs which division has the statutory authority to adjudicate the offenses.  
Because R.J.G. was considered an adult for purposes of chapter 211 at the time he is alleged 
to have committed the offenses, the juvenile division did not have statutory authority to 
adjudicate the offenses.  The circuit court erred in dismissing the state’s prosecution in the 
court of general jurisdiction.  The circuit court’s judgment is reversed, and the cause is 
remanded. 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
R.J.G., who was seventeen years old at the time, is alleged to have committed 
several felony offenses on or about October 2, 2020.  On January 7, 2021, the state filed an 
indictment in the court of general jurisdiction charging R.J.G. with nine felony counts.  
R.J.G. moved to dismiss the case, arguing the juvenile division had the exclusive statutory 
authority to adjudicate any charges against him pursuant to section 211.031.1(3), RSMo 
Supp. 2018, as amended by the 2018 legislation because he was younger than eighteen 
years of age at the time the alleged offenses occurred.  The state countered that 
section 211.031.1(3) as amended did not control because it was not effective at the time 
R.J.G. allegedly committed the offenses.  The circuit court sustained R.J.G.’s motion to 
dismiss without prejudice.  
3 
 
 
The state appealed to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District.  R.J.G. filed 
a motion to dismiss the state’s appeal for lack of a final, appealable judgment.  The Eastern 
District ordered R.J.G.’s motion to be taken with the case.  This Court subsequently ordered 
the case transferred prior to disposition pursuant to Rule 83.01.  This Court has jurisdiction.  
Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10.   
Motion to Dismiss the Appeal 
 
 
R.J.G. filed a motion to dismiss the state’s appeal for lack of a final, appealable 
judgment because the circuit court’s dismissal was entered without prejudice.  R.J.G. 
argues the circuit court’s judgment neither disposes of all disputed issues nor leaves 
anything for further adjudication.  R.J.G. contends, if the circuit court’s dismissal is a final 
judgment, then neither the juvenile division nor the court of general jurisdiction has the 
authority to adjudicate the allegations because they are both divisions of the same circuit 
court.  The state counters that, although the dismissal was without prejudice, the circuit 
court’s dismissal had the practical effect of terminating the entire criminal proceeding and 
precludes the state from prosecuting R.J.G. in the court of general jurisdiction.   
 
“This Court has an obligation, acting sua sponte if necessary, to determine its 
authority to hear the appeals that come before it.”  State v. Johnson, 617 S.W.3d 439, 443 
(Mo. banc 2021) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Dieterich v. Pointe Royale Prop. Owners’ 
Ass’n, Inc., 515 S.W.3d 219, 221 (Mo. banc 2017)).  The right to appeal derives solely 
from statute.  State v. Waters, 597 S.W.3d 185, 186 (Mo. banc 2020).  “If a statute does 
not give a right to appeal, the appeal must be dismissed.”  Id.  
4 
 
 
Section 547.200.1, RSMo 2016,1 permits the state to appeal from any order or 
judgment that results in:  “(1) [q]uashing an arrest warrant; (2) [a] determination by the 
court that the accused lacks the mental capacity or fitness to proceed to trial …; 
(3) [s]uppressing evidence; or (4) [s]uppressing a confession or admission.”  The parties 
agree the circuit court’s dismissal is not an order enumerated in section 547.200.1 from 
which the state may appeal.  When the circuit court’s order or judgment does not fall into 
any of the categories enumerated in section 547.200.1, the judgment must be final for the 
state to appeal.  State v. Smothers, 297 S.W.3d 626, 630 (Mo. App. W.D. 2009); see also 
Rule 30.01(a) (“After the rendition of a final judgment in a criminal case, every party shall 
be entitled to any appeal permitted by law.”).   
 
“[A] dismissal without prejudice is not a final order unless the dismissal has the 
‘practical effect of terminating the litigation in the form in which it is cast or in the 
plaintiff’s chosen forum.’”  Smothers, 297 S.W.3d at 630-31 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 
State v. Burns, 994 S.W.2d 941, 943 (Mo. banc 1999)).  “The exception appears to be 
limited to those rare situations in which a dismissal without prejudice is based on an 
assertedly deficient claim ... or where the basis of the dismissal without prejudice places a 
substantial cloud on a party’s right to further litigate an issue or claim ....”  Burns, 
994 S.W.3d at 943.  When a litigant is precluded “from maintaining the action in the forum 
chosen, it is a final judgment, irrespective of whether it is denominated ‘with prejudice’ or 
‘without prejudice.’”  Smothers, 297 S.W.3d at 631. 
                                              
1 All statutory references are to RSMo 2016 unless otherwise indicated. 
5 
 
 
The state contends the circuit court’s dismissal is a final, appealable judgment 
because it had the practical effect of terminating the entire proceeding and prevents it from 
prosecuting R.J.G. in the court of general jurisdiction.  R.J.G. notes the factual dispute in 
the indictment still may be adjudicated in the juvenile division, and, in fact, is pending as 
a delinquency petition in the juvenile division.  Hence, R.J.G. believes the state, acting 
through the juvenile officer, is disposing of the same claims in the same circuit court. 
While the juvenile officer is a state actor, Adoption of C.M.B.R. v. E.M.B.R., 
332 S.W.3d 793, 806 (Mo. banc 2011), abrogated on other grounds by S.S.S. v. C.V.S., 
529 S.W.3d 811, 816 n.3 (Mo. banc 2017), R.J.G.’s argument fails to account for the 
fundamental differences between juvenile division delinquency proceedings and criminal 
proceedings in the court of general jurisdiction.  It is inconsequential similar claims may 
be, or have been, brought in a delinquency petition in the juvenile division because 
“[j]uvenile proceedings are civil, not criminal, and are focused on continuing care, 
protection, and rehabilitation of the juvenile, not punishment.”  In the Interest of A.C.C., 
561 S.W.3d 425, 428 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018).  “Although the juvenile [division] can adjudge 
what would be criminal conduct but for a child’s infancy, delinquency proceedings are civil 
in nature, and thus stand ‘apart from the criminal justice system.’”  I.D. v. Juv. Officer, 
611 S.W.3d 869, 874 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020) (quoting J.D.H. v. Juv. Ct. of St. Louis Cnty., 
508 S.W.2d 497, 500 (Mo. banc 1974)).  Because the juvenile division has the exclusive 
statutory authority to determine whether R.J.G. could be certified to be tried as adult, the 
circuit court’s dismissal placed a substantial cloud on the state’s right to litigate these 
6 
 
charges further in the court of general jurisdiction.  Moreover, the circuit court’s dismissal 
deprives the state of pursuing a range of remedies not available in the juvenile division. 
If the circuit court’s dismissal would render refiling the action futile, the order of 
dismissal without prejudice is appealable.  Mayes v. Saint Luke’s Hosp. of Kan. City, 
430 S.W.3d 260, 266 (Mo. banc 2014).  Refiling the state’s indictment in the court of 
general jurisdiction would be futile in this case in that the circuit court determined it lacked 
the statutory authority to adjudicate the charges.  Because the circuit court’s dismissal 
disposed of the state’s prosecution in its entirety and the indictment cannot be refiled in the 
court of general jurisdiction, it is a final, appealable judgment.  R.J.G.’s motion to dismiss 
the state’s appeal is overruled. 
Standard of Review 
 
 
“This Court has not addressed the standard of review of a judgment sustaining a 
motion to dismiss a criminal indictment[.]”  State v. Merritt, 467 S.W.3d 808, 810 
(Mo. banc 2015).  In Merritt, this Court applied civil case law precedent to hold, if the 
dismissal is justified on any ground alleged in the motion, this Court will affirm the 
judgment.  Id. at 810-11.  Here, the facts are uncontested, and the only issue to resolve is 
whether, and to what extent, the 2018 legislation applies in this case.  “Statutory 
interpretation is an issue of law, which is subject to de novo review.”  D.E.G. v. Juv. Officer 
of Jackson Cnty., 601 S.W.3d 212, 216 (Mo. banc 2020).   
Analysis 
 
The state argues the circuit court erred in sustaining R.J.G.’s motion to dismiss 
because it believes the 2018 legislation expanding the juvenile division’s statutory 
7 
 
authority over seventeen-year-olds was not retroactive.  The state further argues the circuit 
court erred in dismissing the prosecution because the expansion of the juvenile division’s 
statutory authority to seventeen-year-olds was not effective at the time R.J.G. committed 
or was charged with the offenses because the general assembly did not appropriate 
sufficient funds for these services pursuant to section 211.438, RSMo Supp. 2018, until 
July 1, 2021.   
 
The resolution of this case is controlled by this Court’s opinion in State ex rel. T.J. 
v. Cundiff, No. SC98951 (Mo. banc October 26, 2021), decided concurrently herewith.  
The same contentions are made concerning the 2018 legislation’s expansion of juvenile 
division authority to seventeen-year-olds and whether the expansion of services was 
effective on January 1, 2021, or when the general assembly appropriated sufficient funds 
on July 1, 2021.  T.J. holds the 2018 legislation did not become effective until the general 
assembly appropriated sufficient funds on July 1, 2021, for the juvenile division to provide 
the expanded services. 
“[A] defendant must be tried for the offense as defined by the law that existed at the 
time of the offense.”  State v. Pierce, 433 S.W.3d 424, 427 n.1 (Mo. banc 2014) (quoting 
State v. Edwards, 983 S.W.2d 520, 521 (Mo. banc 1999)).  Because the 2018 legislation 
expanding the juvenile division’s statutory authority was not in effect at the time R.J.G. 
committed the alleged offenses or when he was charged, the law as it existed at the time 
the alleged offenses occurred governs which division of the circuit court had the authority 
to dispose of the charges.  In October 2020, section 211.021(1), RSMo 2016, defined an 
“adult” as “a person seventeen years of age or older except for seventeen year old children 
8 
 
as defined in this section.”  Section 211.031.1(3), RSMo 2016, conferred upon the juvenile 
division the original statutory authority “in proceedings … [i]nvolving any child who is 
alleged to have violated a state law or municipal ordinance, or any person who is alleged 
to have violated a state law or municipal ordinance prior to attaining the age of seventeen 
years.”  R.J.G. was seventeen years old at the time the alleged offenses were committed 
and was considered an adult for purposes of chapter 211 pursuant to section 211.021(1)’s 
definition in effect at the time of the alleged offenses in October 2020.  Accordingly, the 
juvenile division did not have the statutory authority to adjudicate the charged offenses, 
and the circuit court erred in dismissing the state’s prosecution of R.J.G. in the court of 
general jurisdiction.   
Conclusion 
 
The circuit court’s judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded. 
 
_________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GEORGE W. DRAPER III, Judge 
 
All concur.