Title: P. v. Bramit
Citation: 46 Cal. 4th 1221
Docket Number: S064415
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: July 16, 2009

1 
Filed 7/16/09 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S064415 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
   
MICHAEL LAMAR BRAMIT, 
) 
 
) 
Riverside County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. CR 57524 
 
____________________________________) 
 
Defendant Michael Lamar Bramit was sentenced to death after a jury 
convicted him of first degree murder and found that he personally used a firearm 
in the commission of the crime.  The jury also found true the special circumstance 
that the murder occurred in the course of a robbery.1  This appeal is automatic.    
We affirm the judgment. 
 
 
  
                                              
1  
Before trial, defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of robbery and one 
count of attempted robbery arising from incidents that were subsequently proven 
during the prosecution‘s case in the penalty phase of the trial.  Specifically, these 
incidents were the robbery of a Riverside National Bank branch, the attempted 
robbery of another branch of the same bank, and the robbery of a Chino Valley 
Bank branch.  (Post, at pp. 5-7.)  Defendant was sentenced to prison for 13 years 
eight months for these offenses.     
 
2 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Guilt Phase 
Defendant does not contest the facts pointing to his guilt, nor did he do so 
below.2  Several witnesses saw him murder Jose Fierros.  Their testimony was 
corroborated by his extrajudicial statements, the admissibility of which he did not 
challenge.  Therefore, the facts establishing defendant‘s guilt are stated briefly.    
Around midnight on June 14, 1994, victim Fierros parked at a minimart in 
Banning, where two prostitutes separately propositioned him.  However, after 
Fierros drove each of them away from the parking lot, he said he had no money 
and returned to the minimart with them.     
Another prostitute, Rebecca Johnson, then got into Fierros‘s car.  As they 
drove away, defendant and Anthony Miller, both of whom Johnson knew from 
previous drug transactions, ran toward the car and yelled at her.  When Fierros 
stopped, defendant and Miller got into the backseat.  Defendant put a gun to 
Fierros‘s head, saying, ―If you move, I‘ll blow your fucking head off.‖  As Miller 
rifled through Fierros‘s pockets, defendant hit Fierros in the head with the gun.  
Fierros struggled as defendant and Miller continued to beat him.  Finally, Miller 
told defendant, ―Man, shoot this fool.  He ain‘t got no money.‖  Whereupon 
defendant shot Fierros and left him to die in the street.  Defendant fled on foot, 
while Miller and Johnson escaped in Fierros‘s car.  Later, defendant asked 
Johnson to retrieve Fierros‘s radio from the stolen vehicle.     
Two other witnesses saw the shooting and heard Fierros beg for his life as 
defendant demanded his money.  An autopsy established that Fierros died from a 
gunshot wound to his chest, and had been badly beaten on the head.      
                                              
2  
Defendant concedes in his briefing that his own statements and the 
eyewitness testimony established that he shot the victim while robbing him. 
 
3 
After waiving his Miranda3 rights orally and in writing, defendant made a 
series of increasingly inculpatory statements to the police, which were audiotaped.  
Initially, he denied any involvement, saying that he was not even at the scene.  
Later, he said that Miller asked for his gun, but when refused, Miller drove away 
with Fierros and Johnson.  Finally, defendant admitted he shot Fierros, but 
claimed he ―meant to hit him, but not kill him.‖  The shooting had been necessary, 
he asserted, because Fierros was resisting them with ―superhuman strength,‖ while 
defendant could fight with only one arm because of old gunshot wounds. 
Defendant also claimed that he had been angry at his mother and had 
vented his displeasure on Fierros.  His mother was a crack cocaine addict whom 
he had been trying to reform, so that she could ―be there‖ for him and his siblings.  
That day he had caught her using drugs again.  Shooting Fierros was defendant‘s 
way of ―dealing with family problems.‖  He had not intended to kill Fierros, but 
Fierros ―was in the wrong place at the wrong time when my homeboy was taking 
care of his business.‖  During a recess, defense counsel, noting that the audiotapes 
of defendant‘s statements were being played for the jury, stated that he wished the 
record to clearly reflect that he was not objecting to their admission, either on 
voluntariness grounds or ―possible Miranda violations.‖  The court inquired, ―You 
believe tactically that it benefited your client?‖  Defense counsel responded, 
―Yes.‖  The court and counsel were apparently referring to the fact that 
defendant‘s extrajudicial statements permitted counsel to attempt to mitigate his 
guilt without subjecting him to cross-examination.   
Defendant did not present evidence in the guilt phase. 
 
                                              
3  
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436. 
 
4 
B.  Penalty Phase 
 
1.  Prosecution Evidence 
 
 
a.  Victim impact testimony 
Evangelina Lozoya lived with Fierros for seven years before his murder.  
He was the father of her daughter Eva, and filled a paternal role for her other five 
children.  His death affected the entire family.  Eva Lozoya, age 10, testified the 
death made her ―feel bad.‖  Fierros was the only person that William Lozoya, age 
14, knew as a father, and they enjoyed a good relationship.  William testified the 
family was ―no longer happy without him.‖  Corine Lozoya, age 16, described 
Fierros as a ―good father.‖   
The victim‘s father and two of his brothers also testified to the impact of his 
death.  Fierros was born in Morelito, Mexico, and was one of seven siblings.  The 
impoverished family lived in a one-room house, worked in the fields, and 
supplemented their income by making sombreros.  Fierros was very good to his 
family.  He came to the United States to earn money to pay for his mother‘s 
medical bills.  The entire family mourned his death.  His father felt ―that the sky 
and the earth closed upon me.‖ 
 
 
b.  Evidence of defendant’s other crimes 
 
 
 
i.  Juvenile offenses 
In 1988, when defendant was 12 years old, he admitted to a deputy sheriff 
that he and another boy had placed two BB pistols in another student‘s locker.  In 
1991, defendant tried to punch another student.  Instead, he hit a campus 
supervisor who was trying to separate the youngsters.  Also in 1991, defendant 
and another teenager demanded a pizza that Gerardo Laura was delivering.  When 
Laura refused, the boys said, ―What if we hit you?‖  Frightened, Laura handed 
over the pizza. 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
ii.  Assault on his mother 
Kathryn Cole was called by the prosecution as an adverse witness.  Before 
trial she told a district attorney‘s investigator that in 1993 she had seen defendant 
argue with his mother and strike her in the mouth.  At trial Ms. Cole, who 
considered defendant a son, admitted making the statement, but maintained 
defendant‘s blow was accidental. 
After Fierros‘s murder, defendant remained at large for 10 months.  During 
this time he committed eight bank robberies and tried to commit a ninth. 
  
 
 
iii.   Robbery of  Riverside National Bank 
Defendant pleaded guilty to the August 19, 1994 robbery of a Riverside 
National Bank branch.  Defendant pointed a pistol at teller Tina Paul and screamed 
that he would kill her unless she gave him her money.  Paul pleaded that she had 
no money in her cash drawer, but defendant continued to scream that he would 
―blow her fucking head off.‖  Teller Patricia Calvert recognized Paul‘s plight and 
gave defendant $5,187 from her drawer.  Paul and Calvert identified defendant.  
Robert G. Chapman, a special agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
testified that defendant admitted the robbery, but denied using a gun. 
Ms. Paul testified to the lasting impact this experience had upon her.  
―After it happened, I was afraid to be home alone.  Noises that I heard, people just 
playing in the street or whatever made me remember.‖  She continued:  ―I can‘t 
hear loud notices [sic].  Sometimes like my sister will be downstairs and if she 
makes a loud noise it makes me jump, because I don‘t know what‘s happening.‖   
A customer, Virginia Rodriguez, also testified to the lasting impact of the 
incident.  Mrs. Rodriguez was in the bank with four of her children.  Her husband 
was parked outside with their other two children.  The two robbers were black 
men, who pointed guns at everyone.  Mrs. Rodriguez tried to leave, but one of the 
robbers stopped her.  Mrs. Rodriguez and her children, ranging in age from nine to 
 
6 
16, were very frightened.  She became even more concerned after the robbers fled 
because she could not initially find her husband and feared that he had been taken 
hostage.  ―It just affected me a lot―because people who are black, I don‘t have as 
much confidence in them.  Sometimes I see black people near me and I move 
away from them because I think it‘s bad.‖ 
 
 
 
iv.  The first Bank of America robbery 
    
 
 
Defendant also pleaded guilty to the September 9, 1994, robbery of a Bank 
of America branch in Corona.  He threatened to shoot teller Edson Lalone unless 
he filled a manila envelope with large-denomination bills.  He kept his right hand 
in his pocket, and Lalone assumed he had a gun.  Defendant and a female 
companion ran from the bank with $8,100.  According to Agent Chapman, 
defendant admitted robbing a bank in Corona with Latrina Howard.  Howard 
confirmed that she had been with defendant during the robbery. 
Mr. Lalone saw a psychologist after the robbery, and was afraid that 
defendant would ―come back after me.‖ 
 
 
 
v.  Attempted robbery of Riverside National Bank 
Defendant pleaded guilty to the attempted robbery of a second branch of 
the Riverside National Bank, again accompanied by Latrina Howard.  When 
defendant told teller Elena Satalan he was robbing her, she explained that she did 
not have her cash box because she had been working at the drive-up window.  
Defendant said, ―I have a big fucking gun and I‘ll blow your fucking head off.‖  
The standoff continued for several minutes before defendant and Howard fled.   
Ms. Satalan was scared ―[e]ven now.‖  She still worked at the bank, but 
found it frightening to do so. 
 
 
 
vi.  Robbery of the Chino Valley Bank   
On January 9, 1995, defendant robbed the Chino Valley Bank.  Defendant 
asked teller Rita Lambert to change a $50 bill.  When Lambert opened her cash 
 
7 
drawer, defendant lifted his shirt, displaying a gun in his waistband, and demanded 
all of her money.  He fled with $2,950.  Lambert and another teller identified 
defendant.   
Ms. Lambert had worked at the bank for six years, but no longer did so.  
She had been present during other robberies, but said this one ―hit too close to 
home.‖  She added:  ―I didn‘t realize it until now, and I hate that I feel this way, 
but I get very uptight and nervous when I see somebody [who] is young and 
black.‖ 
 
 
 
vii.  The second Bank of America robbery    
On January 17, 1995, defendant robbed another Bank of America branch.  
Saying he had a gun, defendant pushed a brown paper bag at teller Jenny Franco 
and demanded large-denomination bills.  He took $3,720.  Franco identified 
defendant in a photographic lineup and during the penalty phase. 
According to Ms. Franco, the robbery ―changed my life.‖  On the one hand, 
it made her ―more grateful for each day ‘cause you never know what someone can 
do to you.‖  On the other hand, she suffered from ―paranoia‖ whenever customers 
approached her window.  She felt compelled to continue working at the bank until 
she completed her schooling. 
 
 
 
viii.  Robbery of City Bank 
On February 16, 1995, defendant took $1,671 from City Bank, saying to the 
teller:  ―This is a robbery.  Hurry up or else I‘m going to kill you.‖  The teller 
identified defendant, who also admitted the robbery to Agent Chapman. 
 
 
 
ix.  Robbery of Rancho Bank 
On February 22, 1995, defendant robbed a Rancho Bank branch.  Teller 
Melissa Duke saw defendant at Lisa Johnson‘s window.  He kept looking around 
the bank as Johnson emptied her excess cash drawer.  Duke set off the alarm 
 
8 
shortly before defendant took $5,920.  Defendant was identified by Duke, and 
admitted the robbery to Agent Chapman. 
 
 
 
x.  Robbery of Union Federal Bank 
Two bank employees tentatively identified defendant as the robber of a 
Union Federal Bank branch on March 13, 1995.  The robber asked teller Sheva 
Abidian to change a $20 bill, but then demanded all her large-denomination 
currency.  Abidian gave him $1,607.  Branch financial manager Stuart Sprenger 
saw the robber leave the bank.  Asked whether defendant was the robber, Abidian 
testified that he ―could be,‖ and Sprenger said he ―believed‖ so. 
 
 
 
xi.  Robbery of Sanwa Bank  
On April 7, 1995, defendant robbed a Sanwa Bank branch.  After asking 
teller Anthony Deku to change a $20 bill, he took out a sack and demanded that 
Deku fill it with cash.  When Deku hesitated, defendant, who had his left hand in 
his pants pocket, said, ―you better fill it up, Brother, or I‘ll shoot you.‖  Defendant 
left with $2,711.  Deku failed to identify defendant in court.  However, two other 
tellers identified defendant before and during this trial.  Moreover, defendant 
admitted the robbery to Agent Chapman. 
 
 
 
xii.  Other assaults 
Latrina Howard, defendant‘s girlfriend and accomplice in two of the bank 
robberies, testified pursuant to a plea bargain.  Defendant often hit Howard and 
pulled a gun on her approximately 20 times.  During an argument over what to 
watch on television, defendant pointed a pistol at Howard‘s brother.  On another 
occasion, Howard had to talk defendant out of shooting her brother-in-law.  He 
desisted when she pointed out there were witnesses. 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
 
 
xiii.  Witness intimidation  
After they were arrested for the bank robberies, defendant called Howard, 
who had been released from custody, and warned her that he had ―ways of getting 
people whether they in jail or not.‖   
Defendant and Rebecca Johnson, the woman with Mr. Fierros when he was 
murdered, were in adjacent holding cells awaiting trial proceedings.  Defendant 
threatened to kill her when he was released from prison.  Anna Garcia was also in 
the adjacent cell.  Defendant told her to warn Johnson ―to shut her mouth because 
[he] would take care of her,‖ that ―if she ever made it out she wouldn‘t make it on 
the street.‖  Garcia conveyed defendant‘s threat to Johnson.    
During trial, Latrina Howard participated in a three-way telephone 
conversation with defendant and his brother.  The two men said they were ―going 
to do something‖ to a witness who had testified against defendant. 
 
2.  Defense Evidence 
Denise Carr, defendant‘s mother, testified that she had a single encounter 
with his father.  Defendant never met him and had no other father figures.  Ms. 
Carr did not consume alcohol or use drugs while she was pregnant with defendant, 
but did so persistently from the time he was 11 or 12.  While defendant was 
growing up, Ms. Carr and her children lived in more than 10 residences belonging 
to friends or relatives.  Defendant looked up to an older boy involved in drug 
dealing and gang activity.  When defendant was 16, Ms. Carr became aware that 
defendant was selling crack cocaine.  Contrary to prosecution testimony (ante, at 
p. 5), defendant had not assaulted Ms. Carr on the occasion she called police.  
Instead, he had grabbed her after she hit him.  Defendant was not responsible for 
her facial injury.  Defendant was expelled from school in the 11th grade.  Ms. Carr 
took defendant‘s daughter to visit him in jail.  The two-year-old knew her father 
and had fun with him when she visited.  Asked what effect defendant‘s execution 
 
10 
would have on her, Ms. Carr said she would just have to ―stay strong‖ for the sake 
of her daughter and granddaughter.4 
Vernita Lynch, defendant‘s maternal aunt, testified that she loved defendant 
and was a ―mother figure‖ to him.  Beatrice McClain, defendant‘s maternal 
grandmother, testified that she provided a home for him and his siblings for two 
years when his mother was using drugs.  After defendant left, Ms. McClain 
continued to see him almost daily and loved him very much.  Both women 
testified that defendant‘s execution would be painful for them.   
Lakeshia Cook, defendant‘s sister, testified that she loved him because he 
had ―always been there for me when I didn‘t have a daddy.‖  With no father and a 
drug-addicted mother, defendant ―had to steal for me and my brother so we could 
survive.‖  His execution would affect her badly. 
Bonnie Jackson was another surrogate mother who sheltered defendant and 
his siblings when their mother was on drugs.  She testified that he was ―real smart, 
articulate, and he was always strong, tried to make a good situation out of a bad all 
the time, because he loved his brother and sister,‖ and tried to take care of them.  
Ms. Jackson loved defendant very much and feared that his execution would cause 
her to have another stroke. 
Clyde Stewart, a former corrections officer and parole agent, ran a 
residential facility for juvenile offenders.  Stewart testified that because of the 
                                              
4  
At the conclusion of his mother‘s cross-examination, for no apparent 
reason, defendant ―threw his chair backwards, knocked it over,‖ left the 
courtroom, and went to the holding cell.  At the request of the defense, the court 
took a recess to give him an opportunity regain his composure.  Subsequently, the 
bailiff requested, out of the jury‘s presence, to restrain defendant with a ―leg 
brace.‖  The court found the restraint reasonable under the circumstances, and 
noted the leg brace was covered by defendant‘s pants and could not be seen by the 
jury.  Defendant does not raise this matter on appeal. 
 
11 
serious records of the boys he accepted, his facility was considered a final 
alternative to a Youth Authority commitment.  Defendant was confined there for 
over a year.  He was easy to get along with and Stewart grew to like him.  
Defendant‘s execution ―would hurt me and make me sad to know that his life 
ended at such a young age.‖   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Pretrial and Guilt Phase Issues 
 
 
1.  Excusal of a  Prospective Juror for Cause   
Defendant contends the excusal of Prospective Juror C.S. (C.S.) for cause 
violated his rights to due process, a fair trial, an impartial jury, and a reliable 
penalty verdict.5 
Under Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424, we review the record 
to determine whether it fairly supports the trial court‘s determination that C.S.‘s 
views on the death penalty would have prevented or substantially impaired the 
performance of her duties as a juror.  (People v. Bunyard (2009) 45 Cal.4th 837, 
845; People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 696; People v. Fudge (1994) 7 
Cal.4th 1075, 1094.)  We conclude it does. 
C.S.‘s responses on the juror questionnaire were somewhat equivocal.  On a 
scale of 1 to a high of 10, she rated herself a ―3‖ in opposition to the death penalty.  
In response to another question, she indicated that she thought the death penalty 
was imposed ―too often.‖  Asked whether her opinion would make it difficult for 
her to vote for the death penalty, regardless of the evidence, she circled ―no.‖  She 
also circled ―no‖ when asked whether she was so strongly opposed to the death 
                                              
5  
Defendant relies upon the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the federal Constitution and the corresponding provisions of the California 
Constitution. 
 
12 
penalty that she would always vote against death, regardless of aggravating or 
mitigating evidence. 
Asked whether she could impose the death penalty for felony murder, she 
circled ―no.‖  But when asked whether she would automatically vote for life in 
prison without possibility of parole, if the killing was unintentional or accidental, 
she wrote ―probably.‖  Asked whether she could impose the death penalty, 
depending on the circumstances of the case and the evidence presented in the 
penalty phase, if the special circumstance of murder in the commission of robbery 
were proven, she circled ―yes,‖ but again added ―probably.‖ 
Finally, she circled ―no‖ when asked whether, if she were selected as the 
foreperson, and if the evidence justified that verdict, she could personally sign a 
death verdict form.  The prosecutor pursued this response on voir dire. 
The prosecutor asked the entire panel of prospective jurors whether they 
felt that they would be unable to return a death verdict and affirm that they had 
done so.  ―Finally, there was one question on the questionnaire that asked you as 
jurors whether or not you could personally sign the verdict as the foreperson in the 
penalty phase of this case.  Now, when you were sitting down in the jury room 
filling out the questionnaires, that was sort of an abstract thinking process.  Now, 
we‘re sitting in the courtroom.  There‘s a person seated in the courtroom against 
whom murder charges have been filed and against whom I‘m pressing the death 
penalty.  Is there anyone who feels they could not return this if justice demanded it 
and say, ‗Yes, I voted for the death of this person.‘ ‖  One prospective juror 
indicated she would be unable to do so.  The prosecutor then asked C.S. whether 
she could, noting that she had in her questionnaire indicated ―some concerns.‖  
C.S. responded, ―I‘m just really not sure.  I‘ve never been put in a place to make a 
decision.  I think it would just depend on all of the circumstances.  It would [be] 
difficult.  I don‘t know.‖ 
 
13 
The prosecutor challenged C.S. for cause.  ―[S]he indicated she could not 
say if she could come into a courtroom and vote for death.‖  The court observed, 
―She also didn‘t say that she was going to do the opposite.‖  Defense counsel 
objected, ―She was uncertain whether she could - - as to the specific question 
whether she could sign the death certificate, I think that‘s a different issue than 
saying - -‖  The prosecutor responded, ―Initially, I asked that question, but at the 
very end I asked whether or not they could come into the courtroom and state, 
which they would be required to do if they were jurors, vote for death, and I think 
I‘m entitled to have jurors that say at the outset they could return a verdict for 
death under the appropriate circumstances.  She could not say that.  She said she 
didn‘t know if she could do it.‖ 
The trial court excused C.S.  Considering her responses on voir dire, as well 
as her answers to the questionnaire, the court found that her views on the death 
penalty ―would prevent or substantially impair the performance of her duties as a 
juror in accordance with the instructions.‖  The court added:  ―I believe she was 
trying to be accommodating, but in the final analysis her views are too strong for 
her to be a fair and impartial observer.‖ 
The trial court‘s finding is supported by substantial evidence. 
 
―Generally, a trial court‘s rulings on motions to exclude for cause are 
afforded deference on appeal, for ‗appellate courts recognize that a trial judge who 
observes and speaks with a prospective juror and hears that person‘s responses 
(noting, among other things, the person‘s tone of voice, apparent level of 
confidence, and demeanor), gleans valuable information that simply does not 
appear on the record.‘  [Citation.]‖  (People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 529.) 
 
A finding of bias ―may be upheld even in the absence of clear statements 
from the juror that he or she is impaired because ‗many veniremen simply cannot 
be asked enough questions to reach the point where their bias has been made 
 
14 
―unmistakably clear‖; these veniremen may not know how they will react when 
faced with imposing the death sentence, or may be inarticulate, or may wish to 
hide their true feelings.‘  [Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412], 424-425.  
Thus, when there is ambiguity in the prospective juror‘s statements, ‗the trial 
court, aided as it undoubtedly [is] by its assessment of [the venireman‘s] demeanor 
is entitled to resolve it in favor of the State.‘  Id., at 434.‖  (Uttecht v. Brown 
(2007) 551 U.S. 1; see People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 779 (Wilson).) 
 
Defendant‘s reliance on People v. Chacon (1968) 69 Cal.2d 765 is 
misplaced.  In Chacon, this court found that three jurors were erroneously excused 
for cause.  They were dismissed ―when they answered that they ‗would not be able 
to sign the [death] verdict as foreman.‘  That answer indicated that they would not 
undertake what they regarded as the greater moral burden of the jury foreman, but 
it did not show that they would have refused to vote for the death penalty.‖  (Id. at 
p. 772.)  While the juror questionnaire here did refer to signing the verdict as 
foreperson, the prosecutor‘s question on voir dire was not so limited.  ―Is there 
anyone who feels they could not return [a death verdict] if justice demanded it and 
say, ‗Yes, I voted for the death of this person.‘ ‖ The predicate of the question was 
sound.  Jurors must be prepared to affirm their verdicts.6   
 
Defendant complains that the prosecutor‘s question was unclear, that C.S. 
was not told that if she were selected as a juror, she would not have to serve as the 
foreperson.  Defendant did not make this argument below or seek to clarify the 
                                              
6  
Section 1149 provides:  ―When the jury appear they must be asked by the 
court, or clerk, whether they have agreed upon their verdict, and if the foreman 
answers in the affirmative, they must, on being required, declare the same.‖ 
 
Section 1163 provides:  ―When a verdict is rendered, and before it is 
recorded, the jury may be polled, at the request of either party, in which case they 
must be severally asked whether it is their verdict, and if anyone answer in the 
negative, the jury must be sent out for further deliberation.‖ 
 
15 
matter during his own voir dire of C.S.  As noted, the line of prosecution inquiry 
was broader.  Furthermore, even when the precise wording of a single question, 
and the answer given, do not compel a conclusion of substantial impairment, ―the 
need to defer to the trial court remains because so much may turn on a potential 
juror‘s demeanor.‖   (Uttecht v. Brown, supra, 551 U.S. at p. 8; see Wilson, supra, 
44 Cal.4th at p. 780.)7  
 
Defendant‘s briefing extensively parses C.S.‘s responses on the 
questionnaire and argues that none of them would have supported a finding of 
impairment.  However, unlike the trial court in People v. Stewart (2004) 33 
Cal.4th 425, a case upon which defendant repeatedly relies, this trial court did not 
excuse C.S. ―based solely upon problematically phrased jury questionnaire 
responses and without conducting an in-court examination of the excused 
panelists.‖  (People v. Robinson (2005) 37 Cal.4th 592, 619, fn. 13.) 
                                              
7  
At oral argument defendant invited us to reconsider this rule.  In the 
absence of authority to the contrary, we decline to do so.  Relying on Snyder v. 
Louisiana (2008) 552 U.S. __ [128 S.Ct. 1203], counsel argued that deference to 
the trial court is inappropriate unless the court expressly states that it is excusing 
the juror on the basis of demeanor.  Snyder said no such thing.  Applying Batson v. 
Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, the Snyder court reviewed the use of peremptory 
strikes by a prosecutor to eliminate Black prospective jurors.  The question in 
Snyder was not whether the court relied on the prospective juror‘s demeanor in 
excusing him, but rather whether the prosecutor was truthful when he claimed to 
rely on the prospective juror‘s demeanor in striking him.  The prosecutor said that 
he struck the prospective juror because he appeared very nervous.  The high court 
held that deference to the trial court is "especially" appropriate when the judge 
actually makes a determination that an attorney relied on demeanor in exercising a 
strike.  The court did not hold that deference is only permissible when such an 
express determination was made below. (Snyder, supra, 552 U.S. at p. __ [128 
S.Ct. at p. 1209].)  
 
16 
 
 
2.  Murder Instructions 
 
An amended information alleged that defendant committed murder with 
malice (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a))8 and while engaged in the commission of a 
robbery  (§ 211).  It also charged defendant with using a firearm in the 
commission of the murder.  At the close of the guilt phase, the jury was instructed 
on premeditated murder and felony murder.   
 
 
Defendant contends the instructions were erroneous because the 
information did not charge him with first degree murder.  He claims that by failing 
to allege that the murder under either theory was first degree murder, he was 
effectively charged with murder in the second degree.9   
 
Defendant‘s argument rests on the premise that People v. Dillon (1983) 34 
Cal.3d 441 (Dillon) implicitly overruled the long-standing precedent of People v. 
Witt (1915) 170 Cal. 104, in which we held that a defendant may be convicted of 
felony murder even though the information charged only murder with malice.  We 
have repeatedly rejected this construction of Dillon, most recently in People v. 
Hawthorne (2009) 46 Cal.4th 67. 
 
In People v. Harris (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1269 (Harris), as in this case, the 
defendant argued it was error to instruct the jury on first degree murder because 
the information charged him only with murder in violation of section 187, 
subdivision (a), which Harris characterized as a statute defining second degree 
                                              
8  
Further statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise 
indicated. 
9  
Defendant asserts:  ―Both the statutory reference (‗Section 187 of the Penal 
Code‘) and the description of the crime (‗did willfully, unlawfully, and with 
malice aforethought murder‘) establish that [defendant] was charged exclusively 
with second degree malice murder in violation of Penal Code section 187, not with 
first degree murder in violation of Penal Code section 189.‖ 
 
17 
murder.  We stated:  ―Defendant claims the court lacked jurisdiction to try him for 
first degree murder.  He recognizes that we have repeatedly held that an 
information charging murder in violation of section 187 is sufficient to support a 
first degree murder conviction.  (People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 369, 
citing cases; see also People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 591; People v. Carey 
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 109, 131-132.)  However, he claims the rationale of these cases 
is irreconcilable with the holding of People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441 
(Dillon). 
 
―Dillon held that section 189 is a codification of the first degree felony-
murder rule.  (Dillon, supra, 34 Cal.3d at pp. 471-472.)  Because there is only a 
single statutory offense of first degree murder (see, e.g., People v. Geier, supra, 41 
Cal.4th at p. 591), defendant reasons that the relevant statute must be section 189, 
not section 187, which he construes as a definition of second degree murder[10]  
Defendant misreads both Dillon and the statutes.  Dillon made it clear that section 
189 serves both a degree-fixing function and the function of establishing the 
offense of first degree felony murder.  (Dillon, at pp. 468, 471.)  It defines second 
degree murder as well as first degree murder.  Section 187 also includes both 
                                              
10  
―Section 187 provides, in relevant part:  ‗Murder is the unlawful killing of a 
human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought.‘ 
 
―Section 189 provides, in relevant part:  ‗All murder which is perpetrated 
by means of a destructive device or explosive, a weapon of mass destruction, 
knowing use of ammunition designed primarily primarily to penetrate metal or 
armor, poison, lying in wait, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate, 
and premeditated killing, or which is committed in the perpetration of, or attempt 
to perpetrate, arson, rape, carjacking, robbery, burglary, mayhem, kidnapping, 
train wrecking, or any act punishable under Section 206, 286, 288, 288a, or 289, or 
any murder which is perpetrated by means of discharging a firearm from a motor 
vehicle, intentionally at another person outside of the vehicle with the intent to 
inflict death, is murder of the first degree. All other kinds of murders are of the 
second degree.‖  (Harris, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1295, fn. 7.) 
 
18 
degrees of murder in a more general formulation.  (People v. Witt (1915) 170 Cal. 
104, 108.)  Thus, an information charging murder in the terms of section 187 is 
‗sufficient to charge murder in any degree.‘  (People v. Carey, supra, 41 Cal.4th at 
p. 132.)‖  (Harris, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 1294-1295.)   
 
Defendant also contends that the jury should have been required to agree 
unanimously on whether he committed premeditated murder or felony murder.  
This argument, too, has been repeatedly rejected.  (See, e.g., People v. Nakahara 
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 705, 712.  Even if we were to accept defendant‘s argument, 
which we do not do, the record offers him no support.  The jury here unanimously 
found true a felony-murder special circumstance, demonstrating that that theory of 
first degree murder garnered the agreement of each juror.  (See People v. 
Cleveland (2004) 32 Cal.4th 704, 751.) 
 
Finally, defendant contends the information failed to allege all the facts 
necessary to justify the death penalty, making it defective under Apprendi v. New 
Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 (Apprendi).  We rejected this claim, too, in Harris, 
supra, 43 Cal.4th 1269.  ―The Apprendi claim is illusory; the information included 
special circumstance allegations that fully supported the penalty verdict.‖  (Id. at 
p. 1295.) 
 
B.  Penalty Phase Issues    
 
 
1.  Evidence of Violent Juvenile Misconduct   
 
Section 190.3, factor (b) provides that in determining whether to impose the 
death penalty or life without possibility of parole, the trier of fact may take into 
consideration the ―presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which 
involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied 
threat to use force or violence.‖ 
 
Among the acts of violent misconduct admitted against defendant were 
three unadjudicated incidents committed while he was a juvenile:  the pizza 
 
19 
robbery; the campus supervisor assault; and the assault on his mother.  (See ante, 
at pp. 4-5.) 
 
It is well established the federal Constitution does not bar consideration of 
unadjudicated criminal offenses.  (See, e.g., Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 
U.S. 967, 976-977; People v. Dickey (2005) 35 Cal.4th 884, 928.)  Moreover, 
evidence of violent juvenile misconduct that would have been a crime if 
committed as an adult is admissible under section 190.3, factor (b).  (People v. 
Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 426; People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 72.)  
 
Nevertheless, relying on Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, defendant 
contends that admission of these unadjudicated juvenile offenses denied him his 
rights to due process, a fair trial by an impartial and unanimous jury, the 
presumption of innocence, effective confrontation of witnesses, effective 
assistance of counsel, equal protection, and a reliable penalty determination.11     
 
Defendant‘s reliance on Roper v. Simmons, supra, 543 U.S. 551, is badly 
misplaced.  That case holds that the execution of individuals who were under 18 
years of age at the time of their capital crimes is prohibited by the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.  It says nothing about the propriety of permitting a 
capital jury, trying an adult, to consider evidence of violent offenses committed 
when the defendant was a juvenile.  An Eighth Amendment analysis hinges upon 
whether there is a national consensus in this country against a particular 
punishment.  (Roper v. Simmons, supra, 543 U.S. at pp. 562-567; People v. Blair 
(2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 754-755.)  Defendant‘s challenge here is to the 
admissibility of evidence, not the imposition of punishment.  
                                              
11  
Defendant relies upon the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
federal Constitution. 
 
20 
 
Defendant also claims the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a fourth 
incident of juvenile misconduct, bringing BB guns onto school grounds when he 
was 12 years old.  (Ante, at p. 4).  He contends the evidence was improper, not 
only because the conduct was not criminal as required by section 190.3, factor (b), 
but also because it did not involve ―the express or implied threat to use force or 
violence.‖  The Attorney General concedes this would not have been a crime at the 
time of defendant‘s conduct.12  However, he argues that any error was harmless.  
We agree.  In light of the admissible evidence of defendant‘s prior violent crimes 
as an adult, including his eight armed robberies, there can be no reasonable 
possibility that evidence of the BB gun incident was prejudicial.  (People v. 
Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 767; People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 
963.) 
 
 
2.  Victim Impact Evidence 
 
 
 
a.  The Testimony of the Victim’s Family 
 
The victim‘s family members, both from Mexico and the United States, 
testified about the lasting impact of his murder.  (Ante, at p. 4.)  Defendant 
contends the admission of this evidence violated his state and federal rights to due 
process and a reliable penalty determination.  The contention lacks merit.  
 
―Unless it invites a purely irrational response from the jury, the devastating 
effect of a capital crime on loved ones and the community is relevant and 
admissible as a circumstance of the crime under section 190.3, factor (a).‖  
(People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1056-1057.)  ―The federal 
Constitution bars victim impact evidence only if it is ‗so unduly prejudicial‘ as to 
render the trial ‗fundamentally unfair.‘ ‖  (Id. at p. 1056, quoting Payne v. 
                                              
12  
For the current state of the law, see the Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1995.  
(§ 626.9.) 
 
21 
Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808, 825.)  The victim testimony clearly satisfied this 
standard.  Contrary to defendant‘s claim, victim impact evidence is not limited to 
circumstances known or foreseeable to the defendant at the time of the crime.  
(E.g., Lewis & Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1057.) 
 
 
 
b. 
The Videotape 
 
Defendant contends a videotape shown by the prosecution ―played unfairly 
to the jury‘s emotions, and was clearly prejudicial.‖   
 
We have viewed the videotape.  It is a montage of fewer than 20 still 
photographs.  The photographs depict a young Mr. Fierros, his family, his 
hometown in Mexico, and his family‘s humble residence.  With the exception of a 
studio portrait of Fierros as a teenager, the photographs are snapshots of very poor 
quality. 
 
―Trial courts must be very cautious about admitting [victim impact] 
videotape evidence.‖  (People v. Kelly (2007) 42 Cal.4th 763, 798 (Kelly).)  In 
particular, we have cautioned against the admission of ―lengthy‖ videotapes.  
(People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1289 (Prince).)  However, the 
videotape here was less than three minutes long.  By contrast, we have upheld the 
admission of much longer videotapes.  (See, e.g., People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 
Cal.4th 327, 363-368 [14 minutes]; Kelly, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 793-799 [20 
minutes]; Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 1286-1291 [25 minutes].) 
 
Considering Evidence Code section 352, the trial court held that any 
potentially prejudicial impact did not outweigh the tape‘s probative value.  The 
court noted that all of the photographs used in the videotape montage had already 
been admitted into evidence as still photographs during the testimony of the 
victim‘s brother, Nabor.  As the court observed, the videotape was simply ―a 
repackaging of the evidence.‖  Defendant had not objected to the admission of the 
still photographs themselves.   
 
22 
 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion.  The videotape was not unduly 
emotional.  It merely presented admitted evidence in a different medium, 
unenhanced by any soundtrack or commentary.  The few grainy family 
photographs simply ―humanized‖ the victim, ―as victim impact evidence is 
designed to do.‖  (Kelly, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 797.)   
 
 
 
c.  The Testimony of the Bank Robbery Victims 
 
Victims of defendant‘s uncharged bank robberies testified as to the 
continuing impact of the crimes upon them.  (Ante, at pp. 5-7.)  Defendant 
contends that although evidence of a defendant‘s commission of prior violent acts 
is admissible, evidence of the impacts of those crimes is not.  To the contrary, ―the 
circumstances of the uncharged violent criminal conduct, including its direct 
impact on the victim or victims of that conduct, are admissible under [section 
190.3,] factor (b).  [Citations.]‖  (People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 39.) 
 
Finally, defendant contends that the prosecution appealed to racial 
prejudice through the testimony of victims Rita Lambert and Virginia Rodriguez.  
Ms. Lambert, the teller robbed at Chino Valley Bank, testified that because of the 
robbery she no longer worked at a bank.  She added:  ―I didn‘t realize it until now, 
and I hate that I feel this way, but I get very uptight and nervous when I see 
somebody [who] is young and black.‖  Ms. Rodriguez, along with four of her 
children, was prevented at gunpoint from leaving Riverside National Bank during 
the robbery.  She also feared that her husband, who had remained outside the bank 
with their other two children, might have been taken hostage.  Ms. Rodriguez 
testified that, ―It just affected me a lot– because people who are black, I don‘t have 
as much confidence in them.  Sometimes I see black people near me and I move 
away from them because I think it‘s bad.‖   
 
23 
 
While a showing of bad faith is no longer required to prove prosecutorial 
misconduct,13 we note there is no reason to believe the prosecutor intended to 
elicit racial remarks or appeal to racial prejudice, or that the testimony had such an 
effect.  To the contrary, Ms. Lambert‘s remark likely came as a surprise to the 
prosecutor because Lambert prefaced it by saying that she didn‘t realize until that 
moment that she felt that way.  In any event, this claim was forfeited.  Defendant 
did not object to either comment, nor did he request an admonition when doing so 
would have cured any prejudice.  (See, e.g., People v. Bennett (2009) 45 Cal.4th 
577, 616.)  Moreover, there was no prejudice.  The prosecutor did not mention 
these brief and isolated statements in oral argument or otherwise try to capitalize 
on them.  The record forecloses any possible Eighth Amendment claim as well. 
  
 
3.  Asserted Prosecutorial Misconduct 
 
Defendant contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct in her penalty 
phase argument, thereby violating his state and federal constitutional rights to 
confrontation, a fair trial, due process, and a reliable verdict.14 
 
Defendant‘s first claim involves the prosecutor‘s reading of an excerpt from 
a magazine article.  Before argument the trial court overruled defendant‘s 
objection to the excerpt.  Therefore, any fault in this regard would be judicial 
error, not prosecutorial misconduct.  (People v. Riggs (2008) 44 Cal.4th 248, 325, 
fn. 40.)  We conclude there was no error. 
 
This court has repeatedly held that in closing argument attorneys may use 
illustrations drawn from common experience, history, or literature.  (E.g., People 
                                              
13  
People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 802. 
14  
Defendant relies on the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
federal Constitution as well as on article I, sections 7, 15, and 17 of the California 
Constitution. 
 
24 
v. Harrison (2005) 35 Cal.4th 208, 248.)  Here, the prosecutor read a passage from 
a magazine article entitled, ―Sorry I Killed You, but I Had a Bad Childhood.‖15  
Defendant contends this excerpt ―was used by the prosecutor to improperly attack 
the very legitimacy of mitigating evidence and to undermine the important role 
such evidence plays in guiding the jury‘s sentencing discretion in a capital case.‖ 
 
To the contrary, the excerpt was simply one more literary effort to frame 
the age-old argument about free will and determinism, and to make the case for 
assigning greater weight to free will and personal responsibility in fixing blame 
and punishment.16  Had the prosecutor made substantially the same points without 
                                              
15  
The prosecutor was not permitted to identify the author, James Q. Wilson, 
or note that the article appeared in the June 1997 issue of California Lawyer.   
16 
The excerpt read:  ― ‗Many of us believe there has been a decline in 
willingness of citizens to assume personal responsibility for their actions.  It seems 
we are now more likely to deny guilt, to expect rewards without efforts, to blame 
society for individual failings, and to exploit legal technicalities to avoid moral 
culpability.  There is a sense, too, that the legal system has become excessively 
tolerant of ‗abuse excuses‘ in which social causes and mental conditions are used 
to explain and ultimately excuse criminal behavior. 
 
― ‗In each of us there is a tension between the desire to judge and the desire 
to explain human behavior.  Unless the law proceeds carefully, it risks placing its 
finger too heavily on one side of that tension, typically the explanatory side, so 
that juries are more likely to explain and consequently accept abuse excuses and 
less likely to judge the defendant‘s actions. 
 
― ‗The central failing of American criminal law is the blurring of 
boundaries between imperfect social science, which seeks to explain behavior, and 
the law, which seeks to judge it. 
 
― ‗Our society clings stubbornly to the idea of personal responsibility.  To 
do otherwise is to invite an absurdity: if all behavior is caused by factors beyond 
the individual‘s control, and if people cannot be blamed for actions beyond their 
control, then nobody can be blamed for anything.  [And t]his result strikes almost 
everybody as ridiculous, so we reject it. 
 
― ‗When we insist on personal accountability, we insist that people beyond 
a certain age are moral agents.  If they break the law and cannot reasonably claim 
one of a small number of offenses [sic: defenses], they ought to be held 
accountable.  Not only does this view satisfy our moral conviction that people 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
25 
reading them from an unidentified source quoting an unidentified author, the 
argument would have been acceptable also.  Just as in People v. Mayfield (1997) 
14 Cal.4th 668 (Mayfield) the prosecutor‘s argument relying on that excerpt could 
not reasonably have been understood by the jury as overriding the standard 
instructions it was given concerning the aggravating and mitigating factors to be 
considered in reaching its sentencing decision.17  In Mayfield, we found no 
misconduct in the prosecutor‘s argument if the jurors ―allowed sympathy for the 
defendant to overwhelm them, ‗we might as well do away with the death  
penalty.‘ ‖  (Id. at p. 801.)  ―A reasonable juror would not have understood this 
argument as an assertion, contrary to the court‘s instructions, that sympathy for the 
defendant could not be considered.  Rather, a reasonable juror would have 
understood the prosecutor‘s argument to be that sympathy for the defendant 
should not be the exclusive penalty consideration and that in judging the weight to 
be given sympathy as a mitigating circumstance, the jurors should give relatively 
little weight to a showing that any capital defendant might be expected to make – 
for instance, that the defendant‘s execution would inflict suffering on his or her 
parents and close relatives.  This argument was not improper.  [Citation.]‖  (Ibid.) 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
should be responsible for their actions, but it also serves two practical functions.  It 
sends a message to children learning how to behave that they ought to acquire 
those habits and beliefs that will facilitate their conformity to the essential rules of 
civilized conduct.  A strict view of personal accountability also sends a message to 
individuals choosing between alternative courses of action that there are likely 
important consequences of making [certain bad choices].‘ ‖  (See Wilson, Sorry I 
Killed You, but I had a Bad Childhood (June 1997) Cal. Lawyer, pp. 43-44.) 
17  
As we discuss below (post, at pp. 32-34), the court gave the pattern jury 
instructions CALJIC Nos. 8.85 and 8.88.   
 
26 
 
Defendant also claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct in arguing 
to the jury that defendant would pose a danger to inmates and staff if he were 
sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole.   
 
Assertions of future dangerousness are permissible if supported by the 
evidence and not based on expert opinion.  (E.g., People v. Navarette (2003) 30 
Cal.4th 458, 518-519.)  Here, there was ample evidence that defendant had, while 
in custody himself, threatened incarcerated witnesses.  He warned Latrina Howard 
that he had ―ways of getting people whether they in jail or not.‖  (Ante, at p. 9.)  
He also threatened Rebecca Johnson directly and through Anna Garcia.  (Ibid.)  
Latrina Howard‘s testimony tended to confirm this threat.  She participated in a 
conversation in which defendant and his brother said they were ―going to do 
something‖ to a witness who had testified against him.  (Ibid.)  The jury was 
entitled to infer that the woman they were referring to was Ms. Johnson.   
 
Defendant objects that no evidence was presented that defendant had acted 
on these threats.  True.  However, given the overwhelming evidence of 
defendant‘s past violence (ante, at pp. 5-8), the prosecutor had ample basis on 
which to argue that he would make good on his threats given the opportunity.18  
Defendant also assigns as misconduct the prosecutor‘s suggestion that specific 
                                              
18  
In a request for judicial notice filed on December 5, 2007, defendant asks 
us to notice the testimony of Rebecca Johnson in another case, the prosecution of 
defendant‘s confederate Anthony Miller.  There, she apparently testified that 
Miller, not defendant, assaulted her after she testified in defendant‘s case here.  
We deny the request.  Defendant makes it to support his claim that the prosecutor 
here committed misconduct by eliciting testimony from Johnson concerning the 
assault.  There was no misconduct.  Johnson did not say that defendant was the 
person who assaulted her.  Moreover, the jury was instructed that the testimony 
was admitted only to explain why Johnson might be reluctant to testify in this 
case, and that it should not be considered against defendant unless the assault was 
somehow tied to him.   
 
27 
individuals19 were in prison and so in a position to carry out defendant‘s threats.  
However, the court sustained objections to this line of argument.  We assume the 
jury heeded the court‘s rulings.  (E.g., People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514.)     
 
 
4.  Instructions on Victim Impact Evidence 
 
Defendant contends the jury was not properly instructed on the use of 
victim impact evidence.   
 
In accordance with CALJIC No. 8.84.1, the jury was instructed in pertinent 
part that ―[y]ou must neither be influenced by bias nor prejudice against the 
defendant, nor swayed by public opinion or public feelings.  Both the People and 
the defendant have the right to expect that you will consider all the evidence, 
follow the law, exercise your discretion consciously [sic], and reach a just 
verdict.‖ 
 
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court should have given the 
following instruction sua sponte:  ―Victim-impact evidence is simply another 
method of informing you about the nature and circumstances of the crime in 
question.  You may consider this evidence in determining an appropriate 
punishment.  However, the law does not deem the life of one victim more valuable 
than another; rather, victim-impact evidence shows that the victim, like the 
defendant, is a unique individual.  Your consideration must be limited to a rational 
inquiry into the culpability of the defendant, not an emotional response to the 
evidence.  Finally, a victim-impact witness is precluded from expressing an 
opinion on capital punishment and, therefore, jurors must draw no inference 
whatsoever by a witness‘s silence in that regard.‖ 
                                              
19  
Defendant‘s father, a cousin, and a gang member nicknamed ―Monster 
Cody.‖ 
 
28 
 
We recently considered this instruction and concluded it is neither required 
nor appropriate.  (People v. Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th 327, 369-370.)  ―Insofar as 
this proposed instruction is legally correct, it would not have provided the jurors 
with any information they did not otherwise learn from CALJIC No. 8.84.1.  
Moreover, because jurors may, in considering the impact of a defendant‘s crimes, 
‗exercise sympathy for the defendant‘s murder victims and . . . their bereaved 
family members‘ [citation], the proposed instruction is incorrect in suggesting that 
a juror‘s ‗emotional response‘ to the evidence may play no part in the decision to 
vote for the death penalty.  [¶]  The first two sentences of the proposed instruction 
were adequately covered by another instruction the trial court gave, CALJIC No. 
8.85.  In this regard, the trial court instructed the jury to ‗consider, take into 
account, and be guided by,‘ among other factors, ‗the circumstances of the crime 
of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding.‘  We have held 
that this instruction adequately ‗instruct[s] the jury how to consider‘ victim impact 
evidence.  [Citation.]  [¶]  The remainder of the proposed instruction, even if we 
assume it to be legally correct, is not the type to give rise to a sua sponte duty to 
instruct.  A trial court must instruct sua sponte ‗only on those general principles of 
law that are closely and openly connected with the facts before the court and 
necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case.  [Citation.]‘  [Citation.]  
Instructions informing the jurors that the law does not deem the life of one victim 
more valuable than another, and cautioning them not to draw an adverse inference 
from a victim impact witness‘s silence regarding capital punishment, were not 
necessary to the jury‘s understanding of this case.  Therefore, the trial court had no 
sua sponte duty to give such instructions.  [Citations.]‖  (Ibid., fn. omitted.) 
 
 
5.  Instruction on Governor’s Commutation Power 
 
During penalty phase deliberations, the jury submitted the following written 
question to the court:  ―Does a conviction and sentence of Life without possibility 
 
29 
of parole mean there is no future possibility of parole regardless of future changes 
of Law or Legal precident [sic]?‖  The court advised counsel that it was inclined to 
answer the question by mentioning the governor‘s power of commutation, while 
emphasizing it should not be considered in determining the appropriate sentence.  
Defense counsel expressed her approval of this answer, as did the prosecutor.  The 
court consulted counsel again after committing the proposed answer to writing.  
The instruction read:  ―The governor of the State of California has the power to 
commute or modify a sentence.  This power applies to both life without possibility 
of parole and the death sentence.  It would be a violation of your duty as a juror to 
consider the possibilities of such commutation of an appropriate sentence.‖  
Defense counsel again expressed agreement:  ―Meets with the defense approval.‖  
The court then directed that the instruction be sent in to the jury. 
 
The Attorney General contends the doctrine of invited error bars defendant 
from challenging the instruction on appeal.  We need not reach this question 
because the instruction was not erroneous.    
 
A trial court in a capital case does not err when it answers a jury question 
generally related to the commutation power by instructing that the Governor may 
commute either a death sentence or a life without possibility of parole sentence, 
but that the jury must not consider the possibility of commutation in determining 
the appropriate sentence.  (People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1073 (Hines); 
People v. Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136, 159, fn. 12 (Ramos).) 
 
Relying on Coleman v. Calderon (9th Cir. 2000) 210 F.3d 1047 (Coleman 
II), defendant contends that, given his three prior convictions, the instruction was 
erroneous because it failed to inform the jury that commutation was possible for a 
twice-convicted felon only upon the recommendation of four justices of this court 
(see Cal. Const., art V, § 8, subd. (a)) and only upon consultation with the Board 
of Prison Terms (§§ 4802, 4812, 4813). 
 
30 
 
In Coleman II, the Ninth Circuit held that the instruction given there was 
prejudicially misleading because it ―suggested that the Governor could, at his sole 
discretion, commute a sentence from life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole to some lesser sentence that would include the possibility of parole.‖  
(Coleman II, supra, 210 F.3d at p. 1050.)   
 
Coleman II is distinguishable.  Unlike this case, the instruction in Coleman 
II  was not given in response to a jury question.  (People v. Coleman (1988) 46 
Cal.3d 749, 780-781.)  Rather, it was a then-standard instruction given because 
section 190.3 required that a penalty phase jury be instructed that a sentence of life 
imprisonment without possibility of parole can be modified or commuted by the 
Governor.  In Ramos, supra, 37 Cal.3d 136, this court held that such an instruction 
violated the due process clause of the California Constitution.  (Ramos, at pp. 150-
159.)  However, the Ramos court itself noted that when the jury raises the 
commutation issue, the matter cannot be avoided and is best handled by the sort of 
instruction given here.  (Id. at p. 159, fn. 12.) 
 
Moreover, as we have stated repeatedly, there is no reason to mention the 
restrictions on the Governor‘s power of commutation because they are irrelevant 
to the jury‘s determination, and there is good reason not to stress the defendant‘s 
record.  (People v. Beames (2007) 40 Cal.4th 907, 932 (Beames); Hines, supra, 15 
Cal.4th at p. 1074; People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 360.)  In People v. 
Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546, we reaffirmed this view and declined to follow the 
Ninth Circuit‘s contrary authority in, among other cases, Coleman v. Calderon 
(9th Cir. 1998) 150 F.3d 1105.  (Hart, at pp. 654-657.) 
 
The Coleman II court further held that the standard instruction in that case 
was constitutionally infirm because it invited the jury to speculate that the only 
way to prevent the defendant‘s release was to sentence him to death.  (Coleman II, 
supra, 210 F.3d at pp. 1050-1051.)  The instruction given here certainly did not 
 
31 
invite the jury to engage in such speculation.  To the contrary, the jury was 
admonished that considering the possibility of commutation would be a violation 
of its oath.  Absent any contrary indication, we presume the jury followed the 
instruction.  (See, e.g., People v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 217.) 
 
Defendant next contends the instruction given here was erroneous because 
the jury‘s question did not directly raise the issue of commutation.  We have 
recently rejected this argument.  ―Defendant asserts the trial court should not have 
instructed on commutation, because the jury did not specifically ask about the 
Governor‘s commutation power but, rather, inquired about parole.  We have held, 
however, that commutation instructions are properly given when the jury 
implicitly raises the issue of commutation. [Citations.]‖  (Beames, supra, 40 
Cal.4th at p. 932.)  The point is that jurors are not concerned about the distinction 
between parole and commutation.  They are simply interested in the bottom line:  
Will the defendant ever be released from prison? 
 
While the instruction given by the court appropriately responded to the 
commutation issue implicit in the jury‘s question, defendant contends the 
instruction requires reversal because it failed to address the issue that was raised 
explicitly:  whether defendant might be paroled as a result of future legislative or 
judicial action.  It would have been proper for the court to tell the jury that in 
unusual cases, future action by the Legislature or the courts might result in the 
parole of a defendant who has been sentenced either to death or to life without 
possibility of parole, but that the jury should not speculate on such possibility and 
instead should assume the sentence it reaches will be carried out.  (People v. Perry 
(2006) 38 Cal.4th 302, 321-322; People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 378-379 
(Kipp).)  However, the failure to give such an instruction is not prejudicial.  
During deliberations in People v. Harris, supra, 43 Cal.4th 1269, the jury sent the 
court a note asking for a definition of life without possibility of parole.  With the 
 
32 
approval of counsel, the court told the jury the concept did not require further 
definition.  We held that the defendant was not prejudiced by the procedure to 
which he agreed.  The instructions the jury had been given were ―plain and 
accurate,‖ leaving ―no room for doubt over defendant‘s eligibility for parole.‖  
(Harris, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 1317-1318; accord, People v. Samuels (2005) 36 
Cal.4th 96, 135-136.)  The same pattern instructions, CALJIC Nos. 8.84 and 8.88, 
were given here.  
 
 
6.  CALJIC Nos. 8.85 and 8.88 
 
Defendant challenges two pattern instructions explaining statutory factors 
the jury was to consider in making its penalty decision (CALJIC No. 8.85) and on 
the weighing of those factors (CALJIC No. 8.88).20  
 
 
 
a.  CALJIC No. 8.85 
 
As we have recently affirmed, ―CALJIC No. 8.85 is both correct and 
adequate.‖  (People v. Valencia (2008) 43 Cal.4th 268, 309.)  We have repeatedly 
upheld it against the particular attacks made by defendant. 
 
The ―circumstances of the crime‖ factor stated in section 190.3, factor (a) 
does not foster arbitrary and capricious penalty determinations.  (E.g., People v. 
Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1058 (Barnwell).) 
 
The trial court is not obligated to delete inapplicable factors from the 
factors that may be considered in mitigation or aggravation.  (E.g., Harris, supra,  
43 Cal.4th at pp. 1320-1321.) 
 
The use of the phrase ―whether or not‖ to preface certain factors does not 
improperly prompt the jury to consider the absence of such factors as aggravating 
circumstances.21  (E.g., Harris, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1321.) 
                                              
20  
Defendant relies upon the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
federal Constitution. 
 
33 
 
The use in the sentencing factors of the phrases ―extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance‖ (§ 190.3, factor (d), italics added) and ―extreme duress or  
. . . substantial domination of another‖ (id., factor (g), italics added) does not 
inhibit the consideration of mitigating evidence or make the factors impermissibly 
vague.  (E.g., People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 532 (Lewis).) 
 
Written findings are not required as to the aggravating factors.  (E.g., 
People v. Watson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 652, 703 (Watson).) 
 
 
 
b.  CALJIC No. 8.88 
 
CALJIC No. 8.88 adequately advises jurors on the scope of their discretion 
to reject death and return a verdict of life without possibility of parole (LWOP).  
(E.g., People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 574.)  We have also repeatedly 
upheld this instruction against similar particular attacks.   
 
The language in CALJIC No. 8.88 directing the jury to determine whether 
the aggravating circumstances are ―so substantial‖ in comparison to the mitigating 
circumstances is not unconstitutionally vague.  (E.g., Watson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at 
p. 702.) 
 
The instruction is also not unconstitutional for failing to inform the jury 
that:  (a) death must be the appropriate penalty, not just a warranted penalty (e.g., 
People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 43); (b) an LWOP sentence is required, if it 
finds that the mitigating circumstances outweigh those in aggravation (e.g., Moon, 
supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 42) or that the aggravating circumstances do not outweigh 
those in mitigation (e.g., Kipp, supra, 18 Cal.4th 349, 381); (c) an LWOP sentence 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
21  
For example, section 190.3, factor (e):  ―Whether or not the victim was a 
participant in the defendant‘s homicidal conduct or consented to the homicidal 
act.‖ 
 
34 
may be imposed even if the aggravating circumstances outweigh those in 
mitigation  (Kipp, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 381); (d) neither party bears the burden 
of persuasion on the penalty determination (e.g., Harris, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 
1322). 
 
Finally, section 190.3 and the pattern instructions are not constitutionally 
defective for failing to assign the state the burden of proving beyond a reasonable 
doubt that an aggravating factor exists, that the aggravating factors outweigh the 
mitigating factors, and that death is the appropriate penalty.  As defendant 
acknowledges, we have repeatedly rejected these arguments.  (E.g., Lewis, supra, 
43 Cal.4th at p. 533.)  The recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court 
interpreting the Sixth Amendment‘s jury trial guarantee22 do not compel a 
different result.  (Lewis, at p. 534.) 
 
 
7.  Intercase Proportionality 
 
Contrary to defendant‘s contention, intercase proportionality review for 
death penalty cases is not required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution.  (E.g., People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 54.) 
 
 
8.  International Law 
 
Contrary to defendant‘s contention, the death penalty as applied in this state 
is not rendered unconstitutional through operation of international law and treaties.  
(E.g., Barnwell, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1059.) 
 
 
9.  Asserted Cumulative Error 
 
Finally, there was no cumulative prejudice.  We have found only one minor 
error:  the admission of evidence of defendant‘s noncriminal conduct in bringing 
                                              
22  
Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270; United States v. Booker 
(2005) 543 U.S. 220; Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296; Ring v. Arizona 
(2002) 536 U.S. 584; Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466. 
 
35 
BB guns to school when he was 12 years old.  (Ante, p. 19.)  Again, in light of the 
evidence of defendant‘s violent crimes as an adult, including his eight armed 
robberies, there is no reasonable possibility that this evidence was prejudicial.  
(Ibid.) 
 
III.  DISPOSITION 
 
We affirm the judgment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY MORENO, J. 
 
 
I disagree with the majority regarding the trial court‘s commutation 
instruction to the jury in response to its inquiries.  In my view, such an instruction 
in that context was error.  Moreover, the instruction was erroneously incomplete.  I 
am bound by our prior case law, however, to conclude that the error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt, and on that basis concur in the majority‘s result. 
We held in People v. Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136, 159 (Ramos), that an 
instruction during the penalty phase of a capital trial sua sponte informing jurors of 
the possibility that the governor may commute a life imprisonment without possibility 
of parole sentence — the so-called Briggs instruction — violates the due process 
clause of the California Constitution.  The court reasoned that such an instruction (1) 
invites groundless speculation, (2) undermines a juror‘s sense of personal 
responsibility, and (3) undermines the governor‘s power of commutation by 
encouraging jurors to preempt that power.  (Id. at pp. 156-158.)  Nonetheless, the 
court recognized that if the jury itself raises a commutation issue, it ―cannot be 
avoided‖ and should be addressed briefly, accurately explaining that the commutation 
power applies to both life imprisonment without possibility of parole and death 
sentences, and emphasizing that it would be a violation of a juror‘s duty to consider 
commutation.  (Id. at p. 159, fn. 12.) 
Since Ramos, we have extended that recognition to situations in which a jury 
―implicit[ly]‖ refers to the commutation power, such as a jury‘s question about 
2 
whether ― ‗our penalty decision [can] be modified through any part of the appeal 
process?‘ ‖  (People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1073, 1071, italics omitted.)  The 
key in Ramos is whether the jury raises the commutation issue so that it ―cannot be 
avoided.‖  (Ramos, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 159, fn. 12.)  Although some of our post-
Ramos cases have been less than rigorous in their reasoning, it is possible to argue 
that when juries ask broad, open-ended questions about the possibility of parole or the 
appeals process, such as in the above-quoted passage from Hines, jurors are thinking 
about commutation, and that a commutation instruction is therefore appropriate.   
But extending that rationale to the present case is unwarranted.  As the 
majority opinion recounts, the jury asked during deliberations:  ―Does a conviction 
and sentence of Life without possibility of parole mean there is no future possibility 
of parole regardless of future changes of Law or Legal precident [sic]?‖  After 
consulting with counsel, the court issued this instruction:  ―The governor of the State 
of California has the power to commute or modify a sentence.  This power applies to 
both life without possibility of parole and the death sentence.  It would be a violation 
of your duty as a juror to consider the possibilities of such commutation of an 
appropriate sentence.‖  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 28-29.) 
It is difficult to say from the above that the jury was thinking about 
commutation and that therefore the issue of commutation could not be avoided.  The 
jury‘s question focuses on the power of the Legislature, or of the courts, to make 
changes in the law that will affect a life without parole sentence.  As such, it was not 
necessary to raise the Governor‘s commutation power under existing law in order to 
answer it. 
Thus, for example, in People v. Turner (2004) 34 Cal.4th 406, 436-437, the 
trial court received the following three inquiries from the jury during penalty phase 
deliberations:  ―(1) ‗We understand the sentence of life in prison without the 
possibility of parole to mean exactly what it implies.  Does it?‘; (2) ‗After being 
3 
sentenced to LWOP, if the law changed, could a person so sentenced then be eligible 
for parole?‘; and (3) ‗How does LWOP . . . differ from a sentence of life 
imprisonment?‘ ‖  After consulting with counsel, the trial court instructed the jury as 
follows: ― ‗For the purpose of your deliberations, you are to assume life without the 
possibility of parole means what it says.‘  In responding to the second and third 
questions, the court told the jury: ‗As to those remaining questions, the court cannot 
instruct you further and you are not to speculate or consider such matters.‘ ‖  (Id. at p. 
437.) 
Here, as in Turner, the jury wanted to know whether changes in the law would 
affect a life without parole sentence, and the trial court could have instructed the jury 
simply not to ― ‗speculate or consider such matters,‘ ‖ instead of sua sponte 
instructing on gubernatorial commutation that the jury‘s questions did not seem to 
raise.  It cannot be the case that any time penalty phase jurors inquire into the true 
nature of a life without parole sentence, it is appropriate to instruct on commutation, 
no matter what form that inquiry takes.  Because this is not a case where a 
commutation instruction ―could not be avoided‖ (Ramos, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 159, 
fn. 12), and indeed, the trial court‘s answer was not particularly responsive to the 
jury‘s questions, I would conclude the trial court erred in instructing about 
commutation. 
Moreover, I find merit in defendant‘s argument that even if the instruction was 
appropriately given, in light of his three prior convictions, the commutation 
instruction was erroneous because it failed to inform the jury that commutation was 
possible for a twice-convicted felon only upon the recommendation of four justices of 
this court.  (See Cal. Const., art. V, § 8, subd. (a).)  In so arguing, defendant relies on 
Ninth Circuit precedent holding that such an omission may in some circumstances 
constitute prejudicial error.  (Coleman v. Calderon (9th Cir. 2000) 210 F.3d 1047 
(Coleman II).  The majority reject Coleman II‘s approach, reiterating this court‘s 
4 
position that ―there is no reason to mention the restrictions on the Governor‘s power 
of commutation because they are irrelevant to the jury‘s determination, and there is 
good reason not to stress the defendant‘s record.‖  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 30.)   
I find the above unpersuasive in the present case.  First, while it may be true 
that ―restrictions on the Governor‘s power of commutation . . . are irrelevant to the 
jury‘s determination,‖ it is also true that the Governor‘s power of commutation is 
itself irrelevant to the jury‘s determination.  When as here the trial court instructs in 
response to a jury question ostensibly about commutation, it is difficult to see why it 
should not instruct the jury in a manner that accurately describes the legal 
impediments to obtaining commutation, if defendant is not opposed.  As for the 
second reason, it is unclear why the general dictum that there is ―good reason not to 
stress the defendant‘s record‖ applies in the present case.  As the majority recounts, 
defendant had an extensive criminal history and several prior convictions, mostly 
stemming from the crime spree he engaged in between the time he committed the 
murder and the time he was apprehended.  Considerable evidence of this criminal 
history was introduced during the penalty phase.  In his closing argument, the 
prosecutor discussed that criminal history at length.  In light of this intensive focus on 
defendant‘s criminal history during the penalty phase, it is difficult to say that 
modifying the commutation instruction in a way that alluded to that history would 
have been detrimental to defendant. 
It is also within the realm of possibility that the trial court‘s instructional error 
was prejudicial.  First, the fact that the jury asked these questions during the course of 
their deliberations meant that there was some likelihood that the answers mattered to 
those deliberations, and that a wrong answer could have influenced the jury against 
defendant.  Moreover, the court erred not only by erroneously giving the commutation 
instruction, but also by not responding to the jury‘s real question, and it is possible 
additional prejudice resulted from that omission.  Also to be considered in the 
5 
prejudice equation is the closeness of the case.  The fact that the panel‘s deliberations 
continued for five days, while not conclusive, is one indication of closeness.  
Furthermore, although it was a brutal murder, as most all death-eligible murders are, it 
was more impulsive than deliberate, and there is some truth to trial counsel‘s 
statement during closing argument that it was not ―the worst of the worst‖ murders.  
Also significant, as defense counsel stressed, defendant was 18 years, one month old 
at the time he committed the murder and, under the death penalty statute (Pen. Code, 
§ 190.5) a person under 18 would not have been subject to the death penalty, even 
before the Supreme Court put that rule on a constitutional footing in Roper v. 
Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551.  Indeed, the murder of which defendant was convicted 
bore the hallmarks of an ― ‗impetuous and ill-considered action[] and decision[]‘ ‖ (id. 
at p. 569) that juvenile criminals are particularly prone to, which the United States 
Supreme Court recognized in concluding that such criminals should not be subject to 
the death penalty.  On the other hand, defendant‘s extensive criminal history could be 
considered in aggravation. 
6 
Although the harmless error question would be close if I were writing on a 
clean slate, this court‘s precedent holds that giving an instruction to disregard 
commutation renders any commutation instruction harmless.  (People v. Coleman 
(1988) 46 Cal.3d 749, 782.)  Bound by that precedent, I concur that giving the 
instruction in this case was not prejudicial error.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MORENO, J. 
                                              
1  
Because the error was harmless under this court‘s precedent, I do not reach 
the question whether the Attorney General is correct that any error was invited.  I 
note that, generally speaking, the doctrine of invited error applies only in 
situations in which defense counsel has requested an instruction based on a 
―conscious and deliberate tactical choice.‖  (People v. Lucero (2000) 23 Cal.4th 
692, 724.)  It is unclear the extent to which that doctrine extends to instructions 
that have been consented to rather than requested (ibid.), nor is it clear whether 
trial counsel‘s decision in the present case to go along with an instruction that 
raised the possibility of gubernatorial commutation, somewhat incompletely, 
rather than responding to the juror question narrowly on its own terms, was the 
result of a tactical choice or mere inadvertence. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Bramit 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S064415 
Date Filed: July 16, 2009 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Riverside 
Judge: Robert J. McIntyre 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Michael J. Hersek, State Public Defender, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Peter R. Silten, 
Deputy State Public Defender, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Mary Jo Graves, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Holly D. Wilkens and Gil P. Gonzalez, Deputy 
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Peter R. Silten 
Deputy State Public Defender 
221 Main Street, 10th Floor 
San Francisco, CA  94105 
(415) 904-5600 
 
Gil P. Gonzalez 
Deputy Attorney General 
110 West A Street, Suite 1100 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 645-2200