Title: Ex Parte Murphy
Citation: 886 So. 2d 90
Docket Number: 1021703
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: December 30, 2003

886 So. 2d 90 (2003)
Ex parte James R. MURPHY.
(In re James R. Murphy
v.
Mary J. Murphy Benvenuto).
1021703.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
December 30, 2003.
*91 Walter L. Gray III and Jeremy W. Armstrong of Armstrong &amp; Gray, P.C., Phenix City, for petitioner.
Connie Cooper, Phenix City, for respondent.
STUART, Justice.
James R. Murphy and Mary J. Murphy Benvenuto divorced in April 1998. Incorporated into the parties' final judgment of divorce was a settlement agreement that provided as follows:
On November 8, 1999, the parties executed an agreement purporting to modify the amount of alimony; that agreement provided:
Benvenuto remarried on December 1, 1999. Murphy paid Benvenuto $300.00 per month from January 2000 until June 2001. On September 20, 2001, Benvenuto petitioned the Russell Circuit Court to modify the final judgment of divorce to reflect the incorporation into the judgment of the *92 agreement to modify alimony in the event of remarriage. On October 11, 2001, Murphy filed an answer and a motion to dismiss the petition. The circuit court conducted a hearing and issued an order on August 12, 2002; that order stated:
(C.R. 92.)
Murphy appealed the circuit court's order to the Court of Civil Appeals; that court affirmed, without an opinion. Murphy v. Benvenuto, 886 So. 2d 97 (Ala.Civ.App.2003). Murphy petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari. This Court issued the writ to address the sole question whether, in light § 30-2-55, Ala.Code 1975, the circuit court could incorporate into the divorce judgment the parties' agreement that Murphy would continue paying Benvenuto periodic alimony after her remarriage.
Swain v. Swain, 660 So. 2d 1356, 1356-57 (Ala.Civ.App.1995).
Ex parte Agee, 669 So. 2d 102, 104 (Ala.1995).
Murphy contends that the Court of Civil Appeals' holding affirming the circuit court's enforcement of the post-divorce agreement between Murphy and Benvenuto continuing Murphy's payment of periodic alimony after Benvenuto's remarriage conflicts with the holding in Oliver v. Oliver, 431 So. 2d 1271 (Ala.Civ.App.1983), and with § 30-2-55, Ala.Code 1975.
Section 30-2-55, Ala.Code 1975, provides:
In Oliver v. Oliver, 431 So. 2d 1271 (Ala.Civ.App.1983), the Court of Civil Appeals addressed similar circumstances. The parties had executed an agreement modifying and reducing alimony, which purported to extend the husband's payment of alimony after the remarriage of the wife. The court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court terminating the periodic alimony in light of the wife's remarriage, stating:
431 So. 2d  at 1275-76.
Here, when Murphy and Benvenuto executed the agreement to reduce Murphy's periodic-alimony payments after her remarriage, the agreement was contractual in nature and could be enforced like any other contract. However, when Benvenuto petitioned the Russell Circuit Court to incorporate the agreement into the divorce judgment, the agreement lost its contractual nature and became subject to the equity power of the court. Additionally, the language of the agreement, stating that either party could petition the court to incorporate the agreement into the divorce judgment indicates the parties' intent that the agreement, at any time, could merge into the divorce judgment and not stand as an independent agreement. Consequently, when the agreement became subject to the equity power of the court, it became incumbent upon the court to follow the mandates of § 30-2-55, Ala.Code 1975. Block v. Block, 281 Ala. 214, 201 So. 2d 51 (1967). As Presiding Judge Wright stated in his dissent in Harrison v. Harrison, 514 So. 2d 1026, 1030 (Ala.Civ.App.1986):
*95 Evidence was presented at the hearing indicating Benvenuto had remarried; the circuit court exceeded the scope of its authority by ordering Murphy to pay Benvenuto periodic alimony after her remarriage.
Applying the principles of law set forth in Oliver, we hold that the circuit court exceeded the scope of its authority in ordering Murphy to pay alimony after Benvenuto had remarried, and the Court of Civil Appeals erred in affirming its judgment. The judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings in light of this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HOUSTON, SEE, BROWN, and WOODALL, JJ., concur.
HARWOOD, J., concurs in the rationale in part and concurs in the result.
LYONS, J., dissents.
HARWOOD, Justice (concurring in the rationale in part and concurring in the result).
I concur in all aspects of the opinion except the following statement: "However, when Benvenuto petitioned the Russell Circuit Court to incorporate the agreement in the divorce judgment, the agreement lost its contractual nature...." As I understand the relevant caselaw, the agreement would lose its contractual nature when and if it was merged into a judgment of modification. I concur in the judgment.
LYONS, Justice (dissenting).
The main opinion relies upon Oliver v. Oliver, 431 So. 2d 1271 (Ala.Civ.App.1983), which held as follows:
431 So. 2d  at 1275 (emphasis added).
The main opinion thereafter concludes:
886 So. 2d  at 94 (emphasis added).
In Oliver v. Oliver, the final judgment of divorce incorporated an agreement between the parties containing provision for, among other things, the payment of alimony to the wife for a period of one year after her remarriage. The court in Oliver was dealing with a modification entered into by the parties after the final judgment of divorce, reducing the amount of alimony payable. The subsequent agreement did not in any way relate to the pre-divorce agreement, incorporated into the final judgment, providing for payment of alimony after the former wife's remarriage. Consequently, the statement in Oliver that an agreement merged into the judgment loses its contractual status arose in the context of an agreement made before the entry of the final judgment of divorce to continue to pay alimony after the former wife's remarriage. It appears from the *96 facts here presented that the agreement to pay alimony after remarriage was entered into after the final judgment of divorce was entered.
The trial court in Oliver heard ore tenus evidence concerning the agreement to modify the amount of the alimony obligation and then referred to the transaction as having modified the original judgment. The Court of Civil Appeals described that reference as "confusing and unfortunate." The court then stated:
431 So. 2d  at 1274.
Under that analysis, an agreement entered into after a divorce judgment is entered cannot require the court to modify that judgment. However, if a valid agreement has been entered into, the rights thereby created may be enforced as a contract. While the trial court could not modify its judgment of divorce in violation of § 30-2-55, Ala.Code 1975, it could nevertheless recognize an enforceable contract. The trial court in this proceeding conducted a hearing on Benvenuto's petition to modify the final judgment of divorce to incorporate the agreement. In its order, the trial court recognized the existence of a contract as follows:
(Emphasis added.)
I would deal with Benvenuto's attempt to characterize the proceeding to enforce her agreement as a modification of the *97 divorce judgment as "confusing and unfortunate," but, as the court implicitly held in Oliver, not fatal to the contract rights of the parties to the post-divorce agreement. I would limit that portion of Oliver holding that "any part of the agreement which is merged in the decree is subject to the equity power of the court and is no longer of a contractual nature," 431 So. 2d  at 1275, to the context in which that statement was made  agreements entered into before the entry of the final judgment of divorce.
In conclusion, had there been no agreement entered into after the final judgment, § 30-2-55 would have required the trial court to modify its final judgment of divorce by discontinuing the obligation of the former husband to pay periodic alimony based upon the former wife's remarriage. However, the subsequent agreement to continue payment of alimony after the former wife's remarriage should be recognized as an enforceable contract, and not as a modification to the final divorce judgment, just as the trial court did in this proceeding.
I must therefore respectfully dissent.
[1]  We note that the agreement provided that Murphy would pay Benvenuto $1,500 per month until January 1, 2000, at which time, in the event of Benvenuto's remarriage, that amount would be reduced to $300. Benvenuto remarried on December 1, 1999.
[2]  Although Benvenuto remarried on December 1, 1999, the parties' agreement contained a stipulation that "in no event shall this agreement take force prior to January 1, 2000."