Title: Jadair Incorporated v. United States Fire Insurance Company
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1995AP001946
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: April 29, 1997

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
95-1946 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Jadair Incorporated, 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
United States Fire Insurance Company, 
 
Defendant-Respondent, 
Mesirow Insurance Services, Inc., West Bend  
Air, Inc., Stanley Aircraft & Engine  
Service, Inc. and Employers Reinsurance  
Corporation, 
 
Defendants, 
Blueprint Engines, Inc., 
 
Defendant-Petitioner, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
NO CITE 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
April 29, 1997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
January 9, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha 
 
JUDGE: 
Walter J. Swietlik 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs and oral argument by Ross R. Kinney, Waukesha. 
 
 
For defendant-respondent there was a brief by 
Mark J. Peschel and  Johnson & Lindberg, P.A., Minneapolis, MN 
and oral argument by Mark J. Peschel 
 
 
 
No. 95-1946 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 95-1946 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Jadair Incorporated, 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
 
v. 
 
United States Fire Insurance Company, 
 
Defendant-Respondent, 
 
Mesirow Insurance Services, Inc., 
West Bend Air, Inc., Stanley Aircraft & 
Engine 
Service, 
Inc., 
and 
Employers 
Reinsurance Corporation, 
 
 
Defendants, 
 
Blueprint Engines, Inc., 
 
 
Defendant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 29, 1997 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
JANINE P. GESKE, J.    This is a review of a court of 
appeals decision and order dismissing the appeal of Blueprint 
Engines, Incorporated ("Blueprint") for lack of jurisdiction.
1  
Blueprint attempted to appeal an order granting summary judgment 
to United States Fire Insurance Company ("U.S. Fire") by the 
circuit court for Ozaukee County, Walter J. Swietlik presiding. 
 U.S. Fire moved to dismiss Blueprint's appeal because its 
notice 
of 
appeal 
was 
signed 
by 
Edward 
Rachanski 
("Mr. 
Rachanski"), a nonlawyer and Blueprint's president.  The court 
                     
1  Jadair v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., No. 95-1946, slip op. at 2 
(Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 1995). 
 
 
No. 95-1946 
 
2 
of appeals held that because Mr. Rachanski was not a lawyer,
2 he 
could not represent Blueprint and thus the notice of appeal 
filed on behalf of Blueprint was ineffective to commence an 
appeal by Blueprint.  The court of appeals concluded that 
because an effective notice of appeal is a prerequisite to 
jurisdiction, Blueprint's appeal must be dismissed.  We agree 
and affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
3 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶2 
This lawsuit arose out of a claim for damages to an 
aircraft engine belonging to Jadair Incorporated ("Jadair"). 
Jadair alleged that these damages were the result of an engine 
overhaul performed by Blueprint.  Jadair sued, among others, 
Blueprint and U.S. Fire, an insurance company which had issued a 
general liability airport policy to Blueprint.  Jadair did not 
name Blueprint's president, Mr. Rachanski, as an individual 
defendant.  U.S. Fire denied coverage for Jadair's damages.  
Blueprint answered Jadair's complaint and filed a cross-claim
4 
against U.S. Fire, contending that it was entitled to insurance 
coverage for its potential liability to Jadair. 
                     
2  When we use the term "lawyer" in this opinion, we refer 
to persons qualified to practice law in this state according to 
the requirements set out in SCR 40. 
3  In the same decision, the court of appeals denied U.S. 
Fire's motion to dismiss the appeal of Jadair Incorporated.  
Denial of that motion is not an issue before us. 
4  Blueprint's claim against U.S. Fire, filed by counsel 
from Illinois, was erroneously labeled a counter-claim.  For 
purposes of this opinion, we will regard Blueprint's claim 
against 
U.S. 
Fire 
as 
a 
cross-claim. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 802.07(1),(3). 
 
 
No. 95-1946 
 
3 
¶3 
On November 14, 1994, U.S. Fire filed a motion for 
summary judgment and dismissal of Jadair's claims and the co-
defendants' cross-claims.  On November 17, 1994, Blueprint's 
Illinois 
attorney 
filed 
a 
motion 
to 
withdraw 
from 
representation.  The motion to withdraw stated: "Defendant, 
BLUEPRINT ENGINES, INC. has determined that self-representation 
would be in its best interests and has therefore decided to 
represent itself in the pending action."  At a December 8, 1994 
motion hearing, Blueprint's attorney stated that Blueprint felt 
it was in its best interests financially for him to withdraw.  
Mr. Rachanski then told the court that, at that time, he did not 
intend to retain other counsel for the corporation.  At that 
hearing, counsel for other parties, including the attorney for 
Jadair, Ross R. Kinney, and the attorney for U.S. Fire, voiced 
no objection to the withdrawal of Blueprint's attorney.  The 
circuit court entered an order granting the motion to withdraw 
on December 12, 1994. 
¶4 
Subsequently, Blueprint, acting through its president, 
Mr. Rachanski, continued to receive copies of correspondence and 
other documents filed with the court.  On May 25, 1995, the 
circuit court granted U.S. Fire's motion for summary judgment 
and dismissed all of Jadair's claims against U.S. Fire.  The 
court also ordered dismissal of the co-defendants' cross-claims 
against U.S. Fire.
5  
                     
5  The cross-claims dismissed were all based on the policy 
issued by U.S. Fire to Blueprint or on claims of bad faith or 
alleged tortious interference with a contractual relationship 
between Jadair and Blueprint. 
 
 
No. 95-1946 
 
4 
¶5 
The attorney for Jadair, and Mr. Rachanski for 
Blueprint, filed notices of appeal from the order for summary 
judgment on July 15, 1995, and August 21, 1995, respectively.  
On September 18, 1995, U.S. Fire moved to dismiss both appeals, 
contending that Jadair's notice of appeal was filed too early 
and that Blueprint's notice of appeal was fatally defective 
because it had not been signed by an attorney.  According to 
Blueprint's brief, the corporation retained Attorney Ross R. 
Kinney immediately upon receipt of U.S. Fire's motion to 
dismiss.
6 
¶6 
In an opinion and order dated October 25, 1995, the 
court of appeals denied the motion to dismiss Jadair's appeal 
but granted the motion to dismiss Blueprint's appeal.  The court 
of appeals concluded that corporations must appear by counsel.  
The appellate court reasoned that because Blueprint's notice of 
appeal was not signed by an attorney, it was fatally defective. 
 The court of appeals stated that an effective notice of appeal 
is a prerequisite to the court of appeals' jurisdiction.  
Consequently, the court of appeals ruled that Blueprint's appeal 
must be dismissed.   
STATUTORY AND RULE CONSTRUCTION 
¶7 
This court granted Blueprint's petition for review to 
decide whether a notice of appeal is fatally defective when it 
                     
6  In our consideration of the validity of Blueprint's 
notice of appeal, we do not determine whether a conflict of 
interest 
exists 
over 
Attorney 
Kinney's 
representation 
of 
Blueprint in this review, and his role as counsel for Jadair 
Incorporated, the party suing Blueprint.  Jadair has not sought 
review in this court of any of the lower court rulings in this 
action. 
 
 
No. 95-1946 
 
5 
is signed and filed by a nonlawyer on behalf of a corporation. 
To analyze this issue we turn to court rules, state statutes and 
constitutional provisions.  The pertinent facts are not in 
dispute.   
¶8 
Our rules of civil procedure set out the means by 
which an appeal is initiated.  Rules of statutory interpretation 
are 
helpful 
when 
we 
interpret 
rules 
of 
civil 
procedure 
promulgated by this court.  See County of Door v. Hayes-Brook, 
153 Wis. 2d 1, 21 n.1, 22 n.2, 449 N.W.2d 601 (1990)(Abrahamson, 
J., concurring).  Rule interpretation, as well as statutory 
interpretation, present  questions of law which this court 
reviews independently of the lower courts.  See Stockbridge 
School Dist. v. Department of Pub. Instruction Sch. Dist. 
Boundary Appeal Bd., 202 Wis. 2d 214, 219, 550 N.W.2d 96 (1996); 
Hughes v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 197 Wis. 2d 973, 978, 542 
N.W.2d 148 (1996).  The goal of rule interpretation is to 
produce a result not inconsistent with the manifest intent of 
the supreme court.  County of Door, 153 Wis. 2d at 22, n.2 
(Abrahamson, 
J., 
concurring). 
 
The 
goal 
of 
statutory 
interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of 
the legislature.  See, e.g., Stockbridge School Dist., 202 Wis. 
2d at 219; Hughes, 197 Wis. 2d at 978.   
¶9 
We first look to the plain language of the rules and 
statutes themselves.  See Jungbluth v. Hometown, Inc., 201 Wis. 
2d 320, 327, 548 N.W.2d 519 (1996).  If the manifest intent of 
the court is clear from the plain language of the rule, we need 
look no further.  Similarly, if the intent of the legislature is 
clear from a statute's language, a court must give effect to 
 
 
No. 95-1946 
 
6 
this intent and look no further.  See State v. Williams, 198 
Wis. 2d 516, 525, 544 N.W.2d 406 (1996).  If, however, a statute 
is 
capable 
of 
being 
construed 
in 
different 
ways, 
that 
construction which works an absurd or unreasonable result should 
be avoided.  Braun v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co., 6 Wis. 2d 
262, 268, 94 N.W.2d 593 (1959). 
¶10 If we determine that court rules or state statutes 
require that only lawyers may sign and file notices of appeal on 
behalf of a corporation, then Blueprint raises an additional 
challenge.  Blueprint asserts that such a requirement would be 
unconstitutional.  The party challenging a statute must overcome 
the presumption that the statute is constitutional, and must 
prove it to be unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.  
State v. Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d 252, 263-64, 541 N.W.2d 105 
(1995).  The application of constitutional provisions to the 
facts of a case is a question of law that we decide 
independently.  State v. P.G. Miron Const. Co., Inc., 181 Wis. 
2d 1045, 1052, 512 N.W.2d 499 (1994). 
ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES 
¶11 Blueprint contends that there is no supreme court rule 
prohibiting an officer of a corporation from signing and filing 
a notice of appeal on behalf of that corporation.  Nor, 
Blueprint asserts, do the statutes expressly prohibit such an 
 
 
No. 95-1946 
 
7 
act.
7  If, however, we require that a notice of appeal filed on 
behalf of a corporation be signed by an attorney, Blueprint 
still maintains that a notice of appeal signed by a nonlawyer 
does not divest the court of appeals of jurisdiction.  Blueprint 
denies 
that 
Mr. 
Rachanski's 
action 
here 
constitutes 
the 
unauthorized 
practice 
of 
law 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 757.30.
8  
                     
7  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.10 (initiating appeal). (1) 
NOTICE OF APPEAL. (a) Filing.  A person shall initiate an 
appeal by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the 
trial court in which the judgment or order appealed from 
was entered and shall specify in the notice of appeal the 
judgment or order appealed from, whether the appeal is in 
one of the types of cases specified in s. 752.31 (2), and 
whether the appeal is one of those to be given preference 
in the circuit court or court of appeals pursuant to 
statute.  The person at the same time shall notify the 
court of appeals of the filing of the appeal by sending a 
copy of the notice of appeal to the clerk of court.  The 
person shall also send the court of appeals an original and 
one copy of a completed docketing statement on a form 
prescribed by the court of appeals.  The statement shall 
accompany the court of appeals' copy of the notice of 
appeal.  The person shall also send a copy of the completed 
docketing 
statement 
to 
opposing 
counsel. 
 
Docketing 
statements need not be filed in criminal cases or in cases 
in which a party appears pro se. 
(b) Time for filing.  The notice of appeal must be filed 
within the time specified by law.  The filing of a timely 
notice 
of 
appeal 
is 
necessary 
to 
give 
the 
court 
jurisdiction over the appeal. 
All statutory references are to the 1995-96 volume of the 
Wisconsin Statutes, unless otherwise indicated. 
8  Wis. Stat. § 757.30 Penalty for practicing without 
license. 
 
 
No. 95-1946 
 
8 
Furthermore, even if Mr. Rachanski's conduct violated Wis. Stat. 
§ 757.30, Blueprint argues that such conduct cannot void the 
legal effect of the notice if the statutorily prescribed 
jurisdictional requirements are met. 
¶12 According to Blueprint, a result that would invalidate 
Blueprint's notice of appeal is too harsh, and would violate 
constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection 
under the law.  Blueprint also contends that a statutory 
requirement that only lawyers may sign and file a notice of 
appeal on behalf of a corporation would violate the provision of 
art. I, sec. 21 of the Wisconsin Constitution permitting "any 
suitor" to prosecute or defend a suit in his or her own proper 
person.
9 
                                                                  
(1)  Every person, who without having first obtained a 
license to practice law as an attorney of a court of record 
in this state, as provided by law, practices law within the 
meaning of sub. (2), or purports to be licensed to practice 
law as an attorney within the meaning of sub. (3), shall be 
fined not less than $50 nor more than $500 or imprisoned 
not more than one year in the county jail or both, and in 
addition may be punished as for a contempt. 
(2)  Every person who appears as agent, representative or 
attorney, for or on behalf of any other person, or any 
firm, partnership, association or corporation in any action 
or proceeding in or before any court of record, court 
commissioner, or judicial tribunal of the United States, or 
of any state, or who otherwise, in or out of court, for 
compensation or pecuniary reward gives professional legal 
advice not incidental to his or her usual or ordinary 
business, or renders any legal service for any other 
person, 
or 
any 
firm, 
partnership, 
association 
or 
corporation, shall be deemed to be practicing law within 
the meaning of this section. 
9  Wis. Const. art. I, sec. 21 provides: 
(2)  In any court of this state, any suitor may prosecute 
or defend his suit either in his own proper person or by an 
attorney of the suitor's choice. 
 
 
No. 95-1946 
 
9 
¶13 At oral argument, Blueprint's attorney proposed that 
we consider nonlawyer representation of corporations on a case-
by-case basis.  Blueprint asserted that such consideration 
should only be given where a nonlawyer signs and files a notice 
of appeal.  Blueprint agreed that nonlawyers should not be 
permitted to represent corporations by filing a complaint, or 
appearing at trial or at any later stage of an appeal including 
the submission of briefs.  The test, according to Blueprint's 
attorney, should be whether the corporation was reasonable in 
deciding to have a nonlawyer represent the corporation.  To 
apply this new test, Blueprint suggested that the parties submit 
affidavits to the court of appeals on the reasonableness 
question.  Alternatively, Blueprint suggested that a special 
master be appointed to oversee such post-appeal discovery.  That 
post-appeal discovery, according to Blueprint, would extend to 
matters such as the size of the corporation, the number of 
shareholders, the corporation's amount of discretionary income 
and its financial ability to pay for legal counsel. 
¶14 U.S. Fire asks that we affirm the court of appeals 
holding that the notice of appeal filed by Mr. Rachanski on 
behalf of Blueprint was ineffective to commence an appeal by 
that entity.  U.S. Fire contends that a corporation must be 
represented by a licensed lawyer in a legal proceeding other 
than in small claims court.  See Wis. Stat. § 799.06.
10  
                     
10  Wis. Stat. § 799.06 Actions; how commenced, pleadings, 
appearances 
 
 
No. 95-1946 
 
10
Therefore, U.S. Fire asserts, a corporation's appeal must be 
dismissed when the notice of appeal is signed by a nonlawyer 
officer of the corporation.  This statutory requirement, 
according to U.S. Fire, does not violate the constitutional 
principles of due process and equal protection because a 
corporation is not a natural person.  Similarly, the term "any 
suitor" in art. I, sec. 21(2) of the Wisconsin Constitution, 
according to U.S. Fire, refers only to natural persons. 
¶15 At oral argument, U.S. Fire conceded that it has 
suffered no prejudice by the fact that a nonlawyer signed and 
filed the notice of appeal on behalf of Blueprint.  U.S. Fire 
also conceded that Blueprint's notice of appeal was timely 
filed.  U.S. Fire simply asserts that a nonlawyer cannot 
represent a corporation in legal proceedings outside of small 
claims court.  According to U.S. Fire, a number of policies 
underlie this flat prohibition, including the need to keep 
separate 
the 
corporation's 
identity 
from 
that 
of 
its 
shareholders, and the efficient administration of justice.  
                                                                  
. . . (2) A person may commence and prosecute or defend an 
action or proceeding under this chapter and may appear in 
his, her or its own proper person or by an attorney 
regularly authorized to practice in the courts of this 
state.  Under this subsection, a person is considered to be 
acting in his, her or its own proper person if the 
appearance is by a full-time authorized employe of the 
person.  An assignee of any cause of action under this 
chapter shall not appear by a full-time authorized employe, 
unless the employe is an attorney regularly authorized to 
practice in the courts of this state. 
In small claims court, the nonlawyer signing the document 
is the party to the action, if he or she is a full-time 
authorized employee of the corporation.  Otherwise, the party can 
appear in his or her own proper person, or by engaging an 
attorney to appear on behalf of the party.   
 
 
No. 95-1946 
 
11
Further, the practice of law without a license is a criminal 
matter.  Wis. Stat. § 757.30.  The case-by-case approach sought 
by Blueprint, therefore, might represent a measure of approval 
for illegal conduct.  This approach, according to U.S. Fire, is 
a Pandora's box we should not open. 
RULES OF PROCEDURE 
¶16 Whether a notice of appeal is fatally defective when 
it is signed and filed by a nonlawyer on behalf of a corporation 
is a question of first impression.  To answer that question we 
must engage in a two-step analysis.  First, must a notice of 
appeal, filed on behalf of a corporation, be signed by a lawyer? 
 If we answer yes, we must then consider the effect of a 
corporation's failure to meet this requirement. 
¶17 Under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ (Rule) 
809.84,
11 
appeals 
are 
governed by the rules of civil procedure unless the appellate 
rules or the circumstances of the appeal require a different 
result.  A notice of appeal is a "paper" under Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 801.14.
12  Rhyner v. Sauk County, 118 Wis. 2d 324, 327, 
                     
11  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.84 (Applicability of rules of 
civil procedure). 
An appeal to the court is governed by the rules of 
civil procedure as to all matters not covered by these 
rules unless the circumstances of the appeal or the context 
of the rule of civil procedure requires a contrary result. 
12  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 801.14 Service and filing of 
pleadings and other papers. (1) Every order required by its 
terms to be served, every pleading unless the court 
otherwise orders because of numerous defendants, every 
paper relating to discovery required to be served upon a 
party unless the court otherwise orders, every written 
motion other than one which may be heard ex parte, and 
every 
written 
notice, 
appearance, 
demand, 
offer 
of 
judgment, undertaking, and similar paper shall be served 
upon each of the parties. . . . 
 
 
No. 95-1946 
 
12
348 N.W.2d 588 (1984).  All papers filed in an action must be 
signed.  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 802.01(2)(d).
13  See Charles D. 
Clausen & David P. Lowe, The New Wisconsin Rules of Civil 
Procedure: Chapters 801 to 803, 59 Marq. L. Rev. 1, 48 (1976).  
A notice of appeal is a signed paper containing certain required 
pieces of information.  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.10(1)(a).  The 
notice of appeal must specify the judgment or order appealed 
from, and the statutory type of appeal being made.  Id.  The 
notice of appeal must be filed with the clerk of the circuit 
court, and a copy sent to the clerk of court for the court of 
appeals.  Id.  Thus, the notice of appeal apprises both the 
circuit court and the appellate court of the proponent's intent 
to pursue legal recourse based on a prior court judgment or 
order. 
¶18 A notice of appeal timely filed gives the court of 
appeals jurisdiction over the appeal.  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
809.10(1)(b).  Once a notice of appeal is signed and filed with 
the clerk of court for the circuit court, the clerk begins to 
prepare the record on appeal.  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.15(2).  
Once a copy of the notice of appeal is filed with the court of 
appeals, that court begins its process of screening and 
                     
13  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 802.01 Pleadings allowed; form of 
motions. . . . 
(2)(d) Formal requirements.  The rules applicable to 
captions, signing and other matters of form of pleadings 
apply to all motions and other papers in an action, except 
that affidavits in support of a motion need not be 
separately captioned if served and filed with the motion.  
The name of the party seeking the order or relief and a 
brief description of the type of order or relief sought 
shall be included in the caption of every written motion. 
 
 
No. 95-1946 
 
13
scheduling 
the 
matter 
for 
consideration, 
including 
oral 
argument.  See Wisconsin Court of Appeals Internal Operating 
Procedures 413 (Lawyer's Coop. Pub. 1996).  
¶19 We agree with Blueprint that our rules of appellate 
procedure do not expressly state who may sign a notice of appeal 
on behalf of a corporation.  We now turn our attention to the 
statutes. 
THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW STATUTE 
¶20 The 
primary 
purpose 
of 
laws 
controlling 
the 
unauthorized practice of law is to protect the public.  Hopper 
v. City of Madison, 79 Wis. 2d 120, 133-34, 256 N.W.2d 139 
(1977).   Statutes and rules that control the unauthorized 
practice of law assure that the public is not harmed by 
inadequate or unethical representation.  Littleton v. Langlois, 
37 Wis. 2d 360, 364, 155 N.W.2d 150 (1967). 
¶21 Section 757.30(1), Wis. Stat., describes the penalty 
for practicing law without a license.  Section 757.30(2), Wis. 
Stat., describes the practice of law for purposes of this 
section.  The practice of law includes appearing on behalf of 
some other person or entity in any action or proceeding in or 
before any court of record, court commissioner, or judicial 
tribunal of the United States, or of any state.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 757.30(2).  The practice of law also includes the giving of 
professional legal advice not incidental to that person's usual 
or ordinary business, and the rendering of any legal service for 
any 
other 
person 
or 
firm, 
partnership, 
association 
or 
corporation.  Id.  Individuals may forego legal representation 
 
 
No. 95-1946 
 
14
by an attorney and represent themselves in court proceedings.  
Wis. Const. art. I, sec. 21. 
¶22 Under the plain language of the rules and statutes, we 
conclude that only lawyers can appear on behalf of, or perform 
legal service for, corporations in legal proceedings before 
Wisconsin courts.  The intent of the legislature is clear.  The 
only exception the legislature has made to the unauthorized 
practice of law statute is the exception contained in Wis. Stat. 
§ 799.06(2) for actions filed in small claims court.  When the 
legislature specifically enumerates certain exceptions to a 
statute, we will presume that the legislature intended to 
exclude any other exceptions.  Georgina G. v. Terry M., 184 Wis. 
2d 492, 512, 516 N.W.2d 678 (1994).  Under our authority to 
define and regulate the practice of law, we will not devise an 
additional exception.
14  State ex rel. State Bar of Wisconsin v. 
                     
14 
 
A 
number 
of 
other 
jurisdictions 
also 
prohibit 
corporations from appearing by nonlawyers.  In Hawkeye Bank and 
Trust National Ass'n v. Baugh, 463 N.W.2d 22 (Iowa 1990), the 
court found the general rule to be that a corporation can appear 
only by an attorney, while a natural person may appear for him 
or herself.  The rule is based in part on the goal of preserving 
the 
corporation 
as 
a 
legal 
entity 
separate 
from 
its 
shareholders.  Hawkeye, 463 N.W.2d at 24.  See also Strong 
Delivery Ministry Ass'n v. Board of Appeals of Cook County, 543 
F.2d 32 (7th Cir. 1976)(finding that the corporation is a legal 
entity with its own existence, separable from the interest of 
its president); Woodford Mfg. Co. v. A.O.Q., Inc., 772 P.2d 652 
(Colo. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 797 P.2d 748 (Colo. 
1990)(goal of preserving corporation as a separate entity); Oahu 
Plumbing and Sheet Metal, Ltd. v. Kona Construction, Inc., 590 
P.2d 570, 573 (Haw. 1979)(because a corporation is an artificial 
entity, it can only act through its agents). The Hawaii supreme 
court reasoned that legal proceedings are to be conducted 
according to the rules of law and practice of courts, and by 
those charged with the responsibility of legal knowledge and 
professional duty.  Oahu Plumbing, 590 P.2d at 573.  Permitting 
nonlawyer agents to represent corporations in litigation would 
 
 
No. 95-1946 
 
15
Bonded Collections, Inc., 36 Wis. 2d 643, 648-49, 154 N.W.2d 250 
(1967). 
¶23 The notice of appeal is the paper which invokes the 
appellate court's jurisdiction.  A person who signs and files a 
notice of appeal on behalf of another, is rendering a legal 
service.
15  When a nonlawyer engages in such conduct, not on his 
own behalf but on behalf of a corporation, that person is 
subject to penalty under Wis. Stat. § 757.30. 
¶24 We conclude that the legislature plainly intended that 
the signing and filing of a notice of appeal on behalf of a 
corporation 
is 
the 
practice 
of 
law.
16 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
                                                                  
result in an unintended exception to the rules against the 
unauthorized practice of law.  Id. at 574.  
Persons who seek to incorporate obtain certain benefits 
from the state, including a limitation on personal liability. 
See, e.g., Wis. Stat. §§ 180.0828, 181.287.  The cost of such 
benefit includes the requirement that the corporation be 
represented by a licensed lawyer for court appearances and legal 
services.  See Woodford, 772 P.2d at 654 ("[w]hen a business 
accepts the advantages of incorporation, it must also bear the 
burdens, including the need to hire counsel to sue or defend in 
court."); Algonac Mfg. Co. v. United States, 458 F.2d 1373, 1375 
(Ct. 
Cl. 
1972)(corporation 
must 
appear 
through 
licensed 
attorney, 
even 
though 
the 
corporation 
claims 
to 
have 
insufficient funds.) 
15  Other jurisdictions conclude that the filing of a notice 
of appeal constitutes the practice of law.  See, e.g., Conagra, 
Inc. v. Swanson, 356 N.W.2d 825, 826 n.1 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1984)(the practice of law includes filing briefs and notices of 
appeal); Midwest Home Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Ridgewood Inc., 
463 N.E.2d 909, 912 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984)(where statute made it 
unlawful for a corporation to practice law or to appear as an 
attorney in any court, corporation could not file a valid notice 
of appeal without the advice and services of an attorney). 
16  By concluding that a licensed attorney must sign and 
file the notice of appeal, we recognize that another individual 
may physically file the appeal at the direction of the lawyer, 
after the lawyer has signed the notice.  We use the term "sign 
and file" with this understanding. 
 
 
No. 95-1946 
 
16
§ 757.30(2).  To conclude otherwise would be unreasonable, and 
would frustrate the purpose of protection of the public.  
Blueprint essentially asks us to construe the statute to mean 
that the practice of law includes the filing of a complaint 
through representation at trial, the filing of appellate briefs 
and the provision of oral arguments.  But Blueprint would have 
us construe the statute to mean that a jurisdictional step in 
the middle of that process is not the practice of law.  Such a 
construction is unreasonable.  We avoid statutory construction 
that works an absurd or unreasonable result.  Georgina G. v. 
Terry M., 184 Wis. 2d at 509. 
 
ASSERTED CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS 
¶25 Blueprint's next contention is that this statutory 
prohibition against nonlawyers signing and filing a notice of 
appeal on behalf of a corporation is unconstitutional.  We 
disagree.  Blueprint's first constitutional argument is that the 
"any suitor" provision of art. I, sec. 21(2) of the Wisconsin 
Constitution entitles a corporation to represent itself.  Our 
courts have already rejected this view.  See  S.Y. v. Eau Claire 
County, 162 Wis. 2d 320, 329, 469 N.W.2d 836 (1991).  There we 
said that the phrase "in proper person" contained within art. I, 
sec. 21(2) merely means that an individual may prosecute or 
defend by personally representing himself or herself and no one 
else.  In S.Y. we said nothing about the ability of a   
corporation to represent itself through a nonlawyer. 
¶26 The court of appeals has flatly stated that under art. 
I, sec. 21(2), "every natural person in Wisconsin has an 
 
 
No. 95-1946 
 
17
absolute right to appear pro se."  Hlavinka v. Blunt, Ellis & 
Loewi, Inc., 174 Wis. 2d 381, 394, 497 N.W.2d 756 (1993).  
Blueprint's asserted construction of the term "any suitor" does 
not establish the right of a corporation to be represented by a 
nonlawyer before a court of law.  A corporation is not a 
"natural person," and therefore, Blueprint cannot fall within 
the 
term 
"any 
suitor" 
for 
purposes 
of 
corporate 
self-
representation. 
¶27 Blueprint also claims that a statute prohibiting 
corporations 
from 
self-representation 
would 
violate 
the 
constitutional rights to obtain justice freely,
17 to equal 
protection under the law, and to due process.
18  We disagree.  
Thirty years ago we faced similar assertions by a nonlawyer 
executor in probate proceedings.  The executor had submitted 
matters to the county court for adjudication, and we agreed with 
the court that the executor's conduct was not an appearance 
merely on his own behalf, but was also a representation of 
others.  State ex rel. Baker v. County Court of Rock County, 29 
Wis. 2d 1, 18-19, 138 N.W.2d 162 (1965).  The county court judge 
refused presentation of certain papers by the executor because 
                     
17  Wis. Const. art. I Remedy for wrongs. Section 9. 
Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the 
laws for all injuries, or wrongs which he may receive 
in his person, property, or character; he ought to 
obtain justice freely, and without being obliged to 
purchase it, completely and without denial, promptly 
and without delay, conformably to the laws. 
 
18  Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Const., 
provides in part: 
. . . nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
 
 
No. 95-1946 
 
18
under the circumstances, that presentation constituted the 
unauthorized practice of law.  29 Wis. 2d at 10-11.  We affirmed 
the lower court's ruling because we viewed the prohibition 
against the unauthorized practice of law as a reasonable 
regulation 
in 
the 
public 
interest 
of 
orderly 
judicial 
administration.  Id. at 11.  This reasoning also applied to the 
executor's claim that requiring representation by a lawyer 
violated the Equal Protection Clause. 
¶28 In Baker, we also rejected the executor's claims that 
he was denied the right to obtain justice freely.  The executor 
argued that he should not be forced to pay for counsel.  We said 
that art. I, sec. 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution does not 
guarantee that a litigant will incur no expense, rather it 
prohibits bribes or arbitrary payments to officials in order to 
obtain justice.  29 Wis. 2d at 12. 
¶29 Contrary to Blueprint's assertions, it is not a 
violation of a corporation's due process rights when a court 
refuses to allow the corporation to be represented by a person 
not licensed to practice law in Wisconsin.  See State v. Olexa, 
136 Wis. 2d 475, 402 N.W.2d 733 (Ct. App. 1987)(due process 
rights not violated because only a member of the Wisconsin bar 
or someone accompanied by a member of the bar may appear on 
behalf 
of 
another 
in 
Wisconsin 
courts). 
 
Blueprint's 
constitutional arguments are without merit.  Thus, we answer the 
first question in our two-step analysis "Yes."  A notice of 
appeal filed on behalf of a corporation must be signed by a 
lawyer.  The notice of appeal is defective if it is signed by a 
nonlawyer on behalf of a corporation.  To hold otherwise would 
 
 
No. 95-1946 
 
19
condone the unauthorized practice of law, in contravention of 
our statutes. 
NATURE OF THE DEFECT 
¶30 We now turn to the consequences of a defective notice 
of appeal.  We considered whether a defect in a summons was 
fundamental or technical in Gaddis v. LaCrosse Products, Inc., 
198 Wis. 2d 396, 542 N.W.2d 454 (1996).  There we analyzed the 
requirements of Wis. Stat. §§ (Rules) 801.09(3) and 802.05 to 
determine whether the plaintiff's failure to sign a summons was 
a technical defect.  198 Wis. 2d at 399-400.  In a more recent 
case, Burnett v. Hill, __ Wis. 2d ___, 557 N.W.2d 800 (1997), we 
analyzed the requirements of Wis. Stat. §§ (Rules) 801.02 and 
801.11 to determine whether the plaintiff's service of a 
publication summons was only technically defective.  In Burnett 
the plaintiff had mailed the defendant an unauthenticated copy 
of a publication summons along with authenticated copies of the 
original summons and complaint.  557 N.W.2d at 802. 
¶31 In each of those cases, we considered whether the 
defective service of a pleading was a fundamental defect that 
nullified the pleading, or whether the defect in service was 
merely technical.  To answer that question we analyzed the 
purposes of the rule and the type of action involved.  If the 
purpose of the rule was 
fulfilled, 
the 
defect was not 
fundamental but technical.  If the defect was only technical, we 
then considered the impact of the defect  did it result in 
prejudice to the opposing party? 
¶32 In both of those cases, we found that the plaintiffs 
had failed to comply with the relevant service requirements, but 
 
 
No. 95-1946 
 
20
we concluded that the defects were not fundamental.  Further, we 
ultimately determined that the opposing parties were not 
prejudiced by such defects.
19 
¶33 In a case preceding Gaddis and Burnett, we considered 
an insurance company's service of an unauthenticated photocopy 
of an authenticated summons and unauthenticated complaint on a 
co-defendant.  American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co. 
of America, 167 Wis. 2d 524, 481 N.W.2d 629 (1992).  There we 
concluded that the insurance company had failed to meet its 
burden under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 801.02(1) for service of 
process, and that such a failure was a fundamental defect.  The 
defect in service deprived the circuit court of personal 
jurisdiction over the defendants.  167 Wis. 2d at 535.  In that 
instance, the existence of prejudice was irrelevant.  167 Wis. 
2d at 533. 
¶34 Although U.S. Fire and Jadair did not invoke the 
Gaddis/Burnett 
analysis 
in 
their 
briefs, 
we 
find 
it 
an 
applicable framework under which to analyze the defective notice 
of appeal here.  At oral argument, counsel for U.S Fire argued 
that, under the Gaddis/Burnett analysis, when a nonlawyer signs 
and files a notice of appeal on behalf of a corporation, the 
notice of appeal is fundamentally defective and voids the 
appeal.  The attorney for Blueprint denied that Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.10 requires an attorney's signature, and thus 
Blueprint contends that the Gaddis/Burnett analysis does not 
apply.  Alternatively, Blueprint's request for a case-by-case 
                     
19  The defendant in Gaddis v. LaCrosse Products, Inc., 198 
Wis. 2d 396, 542 N.W.2d 454 (1996) conceded the lack of 
prejudice. 
 
 
No. 95-1946 
 
21
approach parallels the Gaddis/Burnett consideration of whether a 
technical defect results in prejudice to the opposing party.
20 
¶35 We consider the purposes of both Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
809.10 and Wis. Stat. § 737.50.  The purpose of the Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.10 requirement for a notice of appeal is to give 
notice to the respondent of the order or judgment being 
appealed.  The purpose of a timely notice of appeal is also to 
confer jurisdiction on the court of appeals.  Whether or not the 
court of appeals has jurisdiction of Blueprint's appeal is the 
ultimate question we must answer on this review.  U.S. Fire does 
not contend that the notice of appeal filed by Mr. Rachanski on 
behalf of Blueprint failed to provide notice of the appeal.  The 
notice of appeal was also filed in a timely fashion.  Thus, the 
notice purpose of Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.10 is met.  But our 
analysis of the defect does not stop there. 
¶36 The primary purpose of the unauthorized practice of 
law statutes is, as we have already noted, to protect the 
public.  See also, SCR 20:5.5 Unauthorized practice of law, 
Comment.
21  Our rules of procedure are also designed, in part, to 
                     
20  Blueprint argues that Drugsvold v. Small Claims Court of 
Dane County, 13 Wis. 2d 228, 108 N.W.2d 648 (1961) and Littleton 
v. Langlois, 37 Wis. 2d 360, 155 N.W.2d 150 (1967) are 
controlling on the question of whether a defective notice of 
appeal renders the appeal void.  We disagree.  Both Drugsvold 
and Littleton involve small claims court appearances and not the 
filing of a jurisdictional document.  Small claims court 
appearances, as mentioned below, fall within an exception to the 
unauthorized practice of law statute. 
21  SCR 20:5.5 Unauthorized practice of law  COMMENT 
 
 
No. 95-1946 
 
22
protect the public.  For example, Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 802.05
22 
places a professional obligation on the attorney, as an officer 
of the court, to satisfy himself or herself as to the legal 
grounds for the action, defense or motion.  McMillan-Warner Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. Kauffman, 159 Wis. 2d 588, 593, 465 N.W.2d 201 (Ct. 
App. 1990)(citing Clausen, 59 Marq. L. Rev. at 48). 
¶37 In contrast, when a nonlawyer signs and files a notice 
of appeal on behalf of a corporation, the assurances required by 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 802.05, that the appeal is well-grounded in 
fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument 
for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law, are 
not present.  The nonlawyer is not bound by the rules of 
                                                                  
The definition of the practice of law is established 
by law and varies from one jurisdiction to another.  
Whatever the definition, limiting the practice of law to 
members of the bar protects the public against rendition of 
legal services by unqualified persons. . . . 
22  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 802.05 Signing of pleadings, motions 
and other papers; sanctions. 
(1) (a) Every pleading, motion or other paper of a party 
represented by an attorney . . . shall be subscribed with 
the handwritten signature of at least one attorney of 
record in the individual's name.  A party who is not 
represented by an attorney shall subscribe the pleading, 
motion 
or 
other 
paper 
with 
the 
party's 
handwritten 
signature and state his or her address. . . . The signature 
of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate that the 
attorney or party has read the pleading, motion or other 
paper; that to the best of the attorney's or party's 
knowledge, information and belief, formed after reasonable 
inquiry, the pleading, motion or other paper is well-
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good 
faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal 
of existing law; and that the pleading, motion or other 
paper is not used for any improper purpose, such as to 
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase 
in the cost of litigation. (Emphasis added). 
 
 
No. 95-1946 
 
23
professional responsibility, SCR 10:01, 10:02, nor is the 
nonlawyer speaking on his or her own behalf.  Rather, the 
nonlawyer is making representations for the corporation.   
¶38 In this case, a nonlawyer signed and filed the notice 
of appeal on behalf of the corporation, Blueprint.  The purpose 
of protecting the public, including any other shareholders of 
the corporation, was not met.  In other cases, Wisconsin courts 
have concluded that when a notice of appeal is flawed, the court 
of appeals lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal. See, e.g., 
Weina v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 177 Wis. 2d 341, 347, 501 
N.W.2d 465 (Ct. App. 1993)(court refused to allow petitioners to 
be granted intervenor status in appeal, where jurisdictional 
time 
limit for the commencement 
of 
an appeal 
would be 
circumvented); Dobberfuhl v. Madison White Trucks, Inc., 118 
Wis. 2d 404, 347 N.W.2d 904 (Ct. App. 1984)(absent a timely 
filing of the notice of appeal, the appeal must be dismissed).  
An effective notice of appeal is jurisdictional and an appellate 
court will not permit amendment of a fundamentally defective 
notice of appeal to save jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Ford Motor 
Credit Co. v. Mills, 142 Wis. 2d 215, 418 N.W.2d 14 (Ct. App. 
1987)(defect of failure to file notice of appeal could not be 
corrected by amending notice to substitute appellant's attorney 
as appellant). 
¶39 It is true that the failure to comply with a 
requirement of the rules of appellate procedure, other than the 
timely filing of a notice of appeal or cross-appeal, will not 
 
 
No. 95-1946 
 
24
affect the jurisdiction of the court over the appeal.
23 But here 
we face a failure to comply with the statute prohibiting the 
unauthorized practice of law.  The requirement that only 
attorneys licensed to practice law in this state may sign and 
file a notice of appeal on behalf of a corporation is more than 
a technical requirement.  It is a fundamental requirement 
imposed by the legislature.  Abandoning that requirement in this 
case would diminish the protection that the legislature has 
afforded the public.  Abandoning that requirement would also 
mean that any lay person, on behalf of someone else, could 
invoke the jurisdiction of the court of appeals.  That cannot be 
the law in this state.  In this case, failure to comply with the 
unauthorized practice of law statute voids the appeal. 
¶40 U.S. Fire has conceded a lack of prejudice.  Under the 
Gaddis/Burnett analysis, however, once we determine that a 
defect is fundamental, we need not consider prejudice.  Gaddis, 
198 Wis. 2d at 402. 
¶41 Contrary to Blueprint's argument, we are not being 
"too harsh" when we concurrently apply the statutes governing 
the unauthorized practice of law and the proper filing of a 
                     
23  Such failure, however, is grounds for measures including 
dismissal of the appeal, summary reversal, or striking of a 
paper.  See  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.83(2) below. 
Wis. Stat. §  (Rule) 809.83  (Penalties for delay or 
noncompliance with rules). 
. . . (2) NONCOMPLIANCE WITH RULES.  Failure of a person to 
comply with a requirement of these rules, other than the timely 
filing of a notice of appeal or cross-appeal, does not affect 
the jurisdiction of the court over the appeal but is grounds for 
dismissal of the appeal, summary reversal, striking of a paper, 
imposition of a penalty or costs on a party or counsel, or other 
action as the court considers appropriate. 
 
 
No. 95-1946 
 
25
notice of appeal. 
 Only a lawyer can sign and file a notice of 
appeal on behalf of a corporation.  When a nonlawyer represents 
a corporation 
in 
this 
manner, the 
notice 
of 
appeal is 
fundamentally defective, and the court of appeals is without 
jurisdiction.  For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the court of 
appeals 
decision 
granting 
U.S. 
Fire’s 
motion 
to 
dismiss 
Blueprint's appeal.     By the Court.—The decision of the court 
of appeals is affirmed.