Title: Franklin County, Missouri, ex rel. Robert E. Parks and Jim Ming v. Franklin County Commission, et al.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC89114
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: November 4, 2008

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
FRANKLIN COUNTY, MISSOURI, ex rel.  
) 
ROBERT E. PARKS, and JIM MING, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Appellants,   
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
vs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC89114 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
FRANKLIN COUNTY COMMISSION, et al., 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Respondents. 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cole County 
The Honorable Patricia S. Joyce 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellants Parks, Ming and Koehr (“taxpayers”) and Respondent, the Franklin 
County Commission (“Commission”), all agree that the Commission set its tax rate levy 
for 2006 property taxes on real and personal property assessed in Franklin County in ac-
cordance with the requirements of section 137.073, RSMo 2000.1  Taxpayers, however, 
contend that section 137.073 violates article X, section 22(a) of Missouri’s Constitution – 
the Hancock Amendment – to the extent it permits the Commission to receive an increase 
in revenue based on an increase in assessed valuation without a vote of the residents of 
the county.  The trial court found no violation of the Hancock Amendment and granted 
                                             
 
1 Unless otherwise stated, all subsequent statutory references are to RSMo 2000. 
summary judgment to the Commission. 
 
This Court affirms.  Article X, section 22(a) prohibits an increase in the tax levy 
rate unless approved by the voters.  But, it is conceded that Franklin County did not raise 
its tax levy rate.  Taxpayers are incorrect in suggesting that the Hancock Amendment re-
quires an increase in revenue to be treated the same as an increase in the tax levy rate.  
Revenue is equal to the product of (the tax levy rate) multiplied by (the assessed value of 
property other than new construction).  Here, Franklin County’s revenue went up slightly 
because the assessed value of property in the county increased slightly while the tax rate 
stayed the same.  Section 22(a) does not prohibit an increase in revenue in such a circum-
stance unless the assessed valuation increases more than the general price level – that is, 
the inflation rate – increased.  Here, it is conceded that the assessed valuation increase 
was only a small fraction of the increase in price levels.  Accordingly, section 137.073.2, 
in permitting such a small increase in revenue, does not violate the Hancock Amendment. 
I. 
  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The Commission is the governing body of Franklin County and is responsible for 
setting the rate of levy for real and personal property taxes within the county. This Court 
has previously defined a tax “levy” as “the formal and official action of a legislative body 
invested with the power of taxation … whereby it determines and declares that a tax of a 
certain amount, or of a certain percentage on value, shall be imposed on persons and 
property subject thereto.”  State ex rel. Indus. Services Contractors, Inc. v. County 
Comm’n of Johnson County, 918 S.W.2d 252, 256 (Mo. banc 1996).  
In 2006, the Commission calculated the tax rate levy for Franklin County, pursu-
 
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ant to section 137.073, 15 C.S.R. 40-3.120 and related audit forms, at 0.1161 cents per 
$100 of assessed value.  This was the same tax rate levy used in 2005.  Application of 
this levy to the property in the county in 2006 resulted in a small increase in revenue to 
the county, however, because the amount of the assessed value of the property to which 
the tax levy was applied increased by 0.7117 percent between 2005 and 2006. 
 
Taxpayers paid their property taxes, as assessed by the county, under protest.  
They concede that “[t]here is no dispute that the County set its rate in accordance with 
Section 137.073,” and that “the County properly completed the Auditor’s forms without 
error and that it derived both its tax rate ceiling and its tax rate according to the formulas 
contained in those regulatory forms.”  Further, they state there “is no dispute that the 
Auditor reviewed the County’s forms and calculations and certified that the County’s tax 
rate ceiling and proposed tax rate were consistent with the requirements of section 
137.073,” so that because the County “followed Section 137.073 and 15 CSR 40-3.120 to 
the letter . . . [i]ts tax rate is valid under those statutory and regulatory provisions.” 
Nonetheless, taxpayers assert, Franklin County’s tax rate levy is invalid because it 
should have been lowered enough to offset the increase in assessed value of property in 
the county, so that the resulting revenue, when the levy rate is multiplied by the assessed 
value, would remain the same from 2005 to 2006.2  They concede that the percentage of 
                                             
 
2 
Taxpayers also argue that the increase in assessed value from 2005 to 2006 was 
not authorized since such increases can occur only in even-numbered years and constitute 
an increase in the tax base, which requires a commensurate decrease in the tax levy under 
the second clause of section 22(a). The Commission contends that certain limited types of 
property require reassessment every year.  They further note that there is no evidence in 
the record of an increase in the tax base, which necessarily involves “the inclusion of new 
 
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increase in revenue was only 0.7117 percent, far less than the rate of inflation or the in-
crease in the consumer price index and, so, was permitted by section 137.073.2, which 
authorizes an “inflationary growth factor” so long as it does not “exceed the consumer 
price index or five percent, whichever is lower.” Sec. 137.073.2.  They assert, however, 
that the Hancock Amendment bars consideration of inflation in determining whether 
there has been an improper increase in revenue resulting from an increase in the assessed 
value of property within the county. 
The trial court rejected taxpayers’ arguments, finding that section 137.073.2 is not 
inconsistent with the Hancock Amendment.  Taxpayers appeal.  
II. 
 STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court has exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of a state statute. 
Mo. Const. art. X, sec. 3. The standard of review for constitutional challenges to a stat-
ute is de novo. Hodges v. City of St. Louis, 217 S.W.3d 278, 279 (Mo. banc 2007).  A 
statute is presumed to be valid and will not be declared unconstitutional unless it clearly 
contravenes some constitutional provision. Doe v. Phillips, 194 S.W.3d 833, 841 (Mo. 
banc 2006).  The person challenging the validity of the statute has the burden of proving 
the act clearly and undoubtedly violates the constitutional limitations. Trout v. State, 231 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
types of property, not previously taxed, within the tax base and against which a tax could 
be levied.” Tannenbaum v. City of Richmond Heights, 704 S.W.2d 227, 229 (Mo. banc 
1986) (emphasis added).  These issues were not preserved below or properly briefed in 
this Court, and there are no facts in the record or agreed to by all parties on appeal show-
ing the reason the assessed valuation increased.  Arguments are not evidence.  Rule 
84.13(a), see also Leahy v. Leahy, 858 S.W.2d 221, 229 (Mo. banc 1993).  For this rea-
son, this Court will not address this issue further.  
 
 
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S.W.3d 140, 144 (Mo. banc 2007).  
III. 
 SECTION 137.073 IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THE 
HANCOCK AMENDMENT 
 
 
A. 
The Tax Levy Was Not Improperly Increased.  
 
The Hancock Amendment was approved by the voters in 1980.  Section 22(a) im-
poses limitations on the amounts of taxes, fees or licenses that a county and other politi-
cal subdivisions may levy without obtaining voter approval.  Mo. Const., art. X, sec. 
22(a)3; Thompson v. Hunter, 119 S.W.3d 95, 99 (Mo. banc 2003).  In determining 
whether a county has violated the Hancock Amendment, the “constitution’s prohibition is 
measured against the tax levy” imposed by the county.  Tax Increment Fin. Com’n v. 
J.E. Dunn Const., 781 S.W.2d 70, 74 (Mo. banc 1989).  Increases in revenue that do not 
result from an increase in the levy do not violate the prohibitions of section 22(a), even if 
a particular taxpayer’s liability is increased, except in the narrow classes of cases set out 
                                             
 
3 Mo. Const. art. X, sec. 22(a) provides: 
 
(a) 
Counties and other political subdivisions are hereby prohibited from 
levying any tax, license or fees, not authorized by law, charter or self-enforcing provi-
sions of the constitution when this section is adopted or from increasing the current 
levy of an existing tax, license or fees, above that current levy authorized by law or 
charter when this section is adopted without the approval of the required majority of 
the qualified voters of that county or other political subdivision voting thereon.  If the 
definition of the base of an existing tax, license or fees, is broadened, the maximum 
authorized current levy of taxation on the new base in each county or other political 
subdivision shall be reduced to yield the same estimated gross revenue as on the prior 
base.  If the assessed valuation of property as finally equalized, excluding the value of 
new construction and improvements, increases by a larger percentage than the current 
levy applied thereto in each county or other political subdivision shall be reduced to 
yield the same gross revenue from existing property, adjusted for changes in the gen-
eral price level, as could have been collected at the existing authorized levy on the 
prior assessed value.  
 
 
5
in the second and third sentences of section 22(a).  Keller v. Marion County Ambulance 
Dist., 820 S.W.2d 301, 301-305 (Mo. banc 1991).  
 
Here, while Franklin County experienced an increase in revenue from 2005 to 
2006, it did not result from an increase in the tax levy.  To the contrary, to determine the 
gross revenue of the county, the Commission simply applied the tax levy rate to the as-
sessed valuation of existing property (excluding improvements and new construction) ac-
cording to the formula (Tax Levy Rate) x (Assessed Value of Property) = Gross Revenue.  
Thus, the first sentence of section 22(a) simply is not implicated, for it concerns only 
situations in which the rate of tax levy is increased. See note 4, above.    
Taxpayers argue otherwise, claiming that this bar on an increase in the levy should 
also be read to bar an increase in revenue even if it does not result from an increase in the 
levy.  They are incorrect. As noted, “levy” means a legislative declaration “that a tax of a 
certain amount, or of a certain percentage on value, shall be imposed on persons and 
property subject thereto.”  State ex rel. Indus. Services Contractors, 918 S.W.2d at 256.  
“Revenue” as that term is used in the Hancock Amendment, by contrast, is “the annual or 
periodical yield of taxes, excises, customs, duties, and other sources of income that a na-
tion, state or municipality collects and receives into the treasury for public use….”  
Committee for Educational Equality v. State, 967 S.W.2d 62, 64 (Mo. banc 1998).   
One determines revenue by multiplying the levy by the assessed value of property; the 
words “levy” and “revenue” are not synonyms. The first portion of section 22(a) bars in-
creases in the levy in certain cases. Here, there was no increase in the levy.  That portion 
of section 22(a) is simply inapplicable. 
 
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B. 
The County’s Minor Increase in Revenue Does Not Violate 
the Hancock Amendment.  
 
Taxpayers alternatively allege that the increase in revenue is precluded by the final 
clause of section 22(a), which states: 
. . . If the assessed valuation of property as finally equalized . . . increases 
by a larger percentage than the increase in the general price level from the 
previous year, the maximum authorized current levy applied thereto . . . 
shall be reduced to yield the same gross revenue from existing property, ad-
justed for changes in the general price level, as could have been collected at 
the existing authorized levy on the prior assessed value. 
 
Mo. Const. art. X, sec. 22(a).  Thus, where the increase in assessed valuation is greater 
than the change in the consumer price index, the amount of the levy must be rolled back.  
Here, however, taxpayers concede, as they must, that the increase in assessed valuation 
was only 0.7117 percent, while the consumer price index rose 3.5 percent.  Thus, this fi-
nal clause of section 22(a) does not mandate a rollback of the tax levy. 
 
Taxpayers say that, while the final clause of section 22(a) may not require a roll-
back of the levy, neither does it specifically authorize an increase in revenue based on an 
increase in the rate of inflation of less than the amount of increase in the consumer price 
index. Such a specific authorization is necessary, taxpayers argue, in order for the legisla-
ture to enact legislation such as section 137.073.2, which permits an increase in assessed 
valuation up to the rate of inflation without requiring a tax levy reduction. 
Taxpayers are incorrect in suggesting that the legislature has no authority except 
that expressly granted by the Constitution. “A State Constitution is not a grant of power 
as is the Constitution of the United States but, as to legislative power, it is only a limita-
tion; and, therefore, except for the limitations imposed thereby, the power of the State 
 
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Legislature is unlimited and practically absolute.”  Kansas City v. Fishman, 241 S.W.2d 
377, 355 (Mo. banc 1951).   
In the present case, not only is there no constitutional provision limiting the legis-
lature’s ability to allow revenue increases that do not exceed the increase in the general 
price index, the Hancock Amendment provides that “the general assembly may enact 
laws implementing [the provisions of article X, sections 16-23] which are not inconsis-
tent with the purposes of said sections.” Mo. Const. art. X, sec. 24(b). 
Section 137.073 is not inconsistent with section 22(a).  Section 137.073.2 author-
izes a “political subdivision to…revise each levy to allow for inflationary assessment 
growth occurring within the political division … not to exceed the consumer price index 
or five percent, whichever is lower.” Id. This is consistent with section 22(a), which pro-
hibits only increases that are more than the rate of inflation.  It does not prohibit counties 
and other political subdivisions from increasing revenues to keep up with the general in-
crease in prices, so long as the increase is a result of the increased assessed valuation 
rather than increase in the tax levy rate and does not exceed the rate of inflation.    
 IV. 
 CONCLUSION  
 
For the reasons set out above, this Court holds that the first clause of section 22(a) 
does not apply because the increase in revenue did not result from an increase in the tax 
levy.  This Court further finds that section 137.073 of Missouri’s statutes is not inconsis-
tent with section 22(a) of Missouri’s constitution because the latter does not prohibit in-
creases in revenue resulting from increases in assessed valuation that are less than the 
level of any increase in the general price index.  Missouri’s constitution sets out basic 
 
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rules and gives authority and prohibitions that guide and set parameters for the legisla-
ture’s actions. Fishman, 241 S.W.2d at 379.  This Court is not free to add limitations on 
the legislature’s authority regarding taxation and revenue that are not enumerated in the 
Missouri Constitution or the United States Constitution,  Brown v. Morris, 290 S.W.2d 
160, 166 (Mo. banc 1956), and it will not do so here.  The judgment is affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_____________________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
     LAURA DENVIR STITH, CHIEF JUSTICE 
 
Price, Teitelman, Russell, Wolff and 
Breckenridge, JJ., and Sutherland, Sp.J.,  
concur.  Fischer, J., not participating. 
 
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