Title: Jerry Layne Rogers v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC91-044
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: February 15, 2001

Supreme Court of Florida
 
____________
No. SC91044
____________
JERRY LAYNE ROGERS, 
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[February 15, 2001]
PER CURIAM.
Jerry Layne Rogers appeals an order entered by the trial court below denying
his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.850.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  Because
the State withheld material evidence implicating an alternate suspect and
impeachment evidence concerning the State’s chief witness, we reverse the trial
court’s ruling and order a new trial.
PROCEEDINGS TO DATE
On November 13, 1984, Rogers was convicted for the first-degree murder of
David Eugene Smith.  The facts of this case are set forth in greater detail in Rogers
1McDermid was allowed to plead guilty in several robbery cases and has long
since been released from custody.
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v. State, 511 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 1987).  The State’s case at trial was substantially
predicated upon the testimony of Thomas McDermid, a codefendant and the
State’s chief witness, who entered into a favorable plea bargain with the State.1 
McDermid testified that Rogers rented a car in Orlando.  Although Rogers admitted
to personally renting the car, he contended at trial that he merely rented the car for
McDermid.  Rogers, his wife, and another family member testified that on the night
of the murder, Rogers attended a cookout with family members and a couple
named John and Laura Norwood.  The Norwoods allegedly disappeared by the
time of trial and did not testify.  According to McDermid, after picking up two .45
caliber semiautomatic handguns, Rogers and McDermid decided to rob a Winn-
Dixie grocery store.  The pair pulled into an adjoining motel parking lot, donned
rubber gloves and nylon stocking masks, and proceeded inside the Winn-Dixie. 
Once inside, McDermid ordered the cashier, Ketsey Day Supinger, to open her
register.  When Supinger had difficulty complying, Rogers told McDermid to
“forget it,” and the two men left the store, apparently abandoning the robbery. 
Both men ran from the store toward the rental car with Rogers trailing slightly
behind.  At this point, McDermid said he heard an unfamiliar voice say, “No, please
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don’t.”  The words were followed by the sound of one shot, a short pause, and
two more shots.
On the drive back to Orlando with McDermid, Rogers allegedly told
McDermid he had seen the victim slip out the back of the store during the
attempted robbery and because the victim “was playing hero,” he shot him.  The
victim, Smith, was shot three times, once in the right shoulder and twice in the
lower back.  Police investigators later found three .45 caliber casings within six feet
of the body.  After the murder, Rogers and McDermid were identified as suspects
in a subsequent robbery of a grocery store in Winter Park.  In that case the police
obtained a warrant to search Rogers’ home and there seized a number of firearms,
a .45 caliber handgun, and several boxes of spent .45 caliber shell casings.  An
analysis by experts indicated that the casings found near Smith’s body had not
been fired by the gun taken from Rogers’ home.  However, sixty-nine of the spent
casings seized by police from the home had been fired by the same weapon that
killed Smith.
At trial, Rogers represented himself, with the assistance of court-appointed
counsel.  As noted above, in his defense, Rogers continuously maintained that he
was elsewhere at the time of the crime and presented evidence that McDermid had
told others that Rogers was not with him in the Winn-Dixie robbery.  After
2The five aggravating factors found by the trial court were:  (1) Rogers had a
prior conviction of a violent felony; (2) the murder was committed while Rogers was
in flight from a robbery; (3) the murder was committed to avoid or prevent a lawful
arrest; (4) the murder was committed for pecuniary gain; and (5) the murder was
committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner.
3The rejected aggravators were:  (1) the murder was committed for pecuniary
gain; (2) the murder was committed to avoid or prevent lawful arrest; and (3) the
murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner.  Additionally,
we found the error in admitting the hearsay testimony of Steven Young, Rogers’
brother-in-law, alleging ill will between Rogers and his mother-in-law, Maxine
Arzberger, to be harmless because the substance of the hearsay testimony had already
been presented to the jury during the cross-examination of Arzberger herself.  Second,
we found the pending charges harmless because Reynolds was only one of the three
witnesses testifying to statements that Thomas McDermid, not Rogers, was Smith’s
actual murderer.
4Rogers v. Florida, 484 U.S. 1020 (1988).
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convicting Rogers, the jury reconvened the following day for the penalty phase and
recommended death.  In support of the death penalty, the trial court found five
separate aggravating factors2 and no mitigating evidence.  On appeal, this Court
rejected three of the five aggravators but affirmed Rogers’ conviction and
sentence.3  See Rogers v. State, 511 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 1987).  The United States
Supreme Court denied Rogers’ petition for writ of certiorari. 4
Initially, Rogers filed a pro se motion to vacate his sentence and conviction
under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.  On January 11, 1990, the office
of the Capital Collateral Representative (CCR) filed a motion to vacate on Rogers’
5Although Rogers’ appeal raised sixteen issues and numerous subissues, we
addressed only the single procedural issue of the trial judge’s recusal and provided no
guidance to the trial court on remand.  See Rogers v. State, 630 So. 2d 513, 514-15
(Fla. 1993).
6The law firm of Covington & Burling became Rogers’ counsel of record on
November 5, 1995, and they have provided legal services to him since that time.  They
are the counsel who filed Rogers’ current 3.850 postconviction motion.
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behalf and amended it on February 28, 1990.  The trial judge denied the motion
after an evidentiary hearing.  Subsequently, Rogers appealed to this Court, and on
July 1, 1993, we reversed and remanded for a new postconviction evidentiary
hearing based on the trial judge’s failure to recuse himself.  See Rogers v. State,
630 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1993).5  Rogers did thereafter accept legal counsel, 6 who filed
on Rogers’ behalf an “Amendment/Supplement to Defendant’s Prior Motion to
Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence Pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850,” which
purported to supplement the 1990 motion filed by CCR.  Specifically, that August
14 motion asserted, among other claims in support of relief, that:  (1) the State
failed to turn over numerous exculpatory documents pursuant to Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.220 and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), in
respect to McDermid and in respect to similar robberies being investigated at the
time of the Winn-Dixie robbery in a joint law enforcement investigation by
numerous agencies; (2) the defendant is entitled to a new trial, as new evidence
7Initially, we address the State’s claim that Rogers’ Brady claim is time-barred.
The State alleges that when one of Rogers’ attorneys announced Rogers’ intent to
proceed only on the claims that were addressed in the 1996 amended motion, Rogers
waived all matters that were raised in the 1990 CCR motion.  According to the State,
this waiver made the 1996 Brady claim a new one based on old information, therefore
rendering the new claims procedurally barred under the two-year window provided for
in rule 3.850.  Additionally, because the information upon which the current 1996
motion was based was available to Rogers in 1990, the State argues that the 1996
motion is barred by rule 3.850, which requires that postconviction relief motions filed
after January 1, 1994, be filed within one year from the date the new facts become
known.  See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(b) (1994); see also Adams v. State, 543 So. 2d
1244 (Fla. 1989).  Although the trial court found merit to the State’s argument that the
claims filed in the 1996 motion were procedurally barred under the two-year limitation
prescribed by rule 3.850, it nevertheless thought it more justiciable to rule on the merits
of Rogers’ motion in light of the evidence presented to the court.
We do not agree with the State’s argument.  We have held that the two-year time
limitation does not preclude the enlargement of issues raised in a timely-filed initial
motion for postconviction relief.  See Brown v. State, 596 So. 2d 1026, 1027 (Fla.
1992).  Upon a comparison of the two motions, we find that the 1996 motion simply
expanded the Brady claim asserted in the 1990 motion and both motions advanced the
same factual allegations.  Additionally, at the aforementioned hearing, Rogers’ counsel
merely stated that Rogers “intended to proceed only on the claims that have been filed
in the amended motion,” one of which was the Brady claim asserted in the 1990
motion.  Therefore, neither counsel nor Rogers waived the Brady claim.
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reflects that a George William Cope committed the crimes of which defendant is
convicted; and (3) the defendant is entitled to a new trial, as the alleged Brady
violations and new evidence sufficiently undermine confidence in the verdict.  After
an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied all relief.
APPEAL7
As his main claim on appeal, Rogers asserts that the State violated Brady by
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failing to provide him with exculpatory evidence in the possession of the police in
respect to McDermid and other similar and connected robberies, a cassette tape of
a pretrial meeting with McDermid, and evidence of a reward potentially showing
witness bias, all of which Rogers could have used to bolster his defense or
establish his innocence.
Under Brady, the government’s suppression of favorable evidence violates a
defendant’s due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Brady, 373
U.S. at 86 (suppression of confession is violation of Due Process Clause of
Fourteenth Amendment).  Therefore, errors involving the suppression of evidence
in violation of Brady raise issues of constitutional magnitude.  See Kyles v. Whitley,
514 U.S. 419, 433-34 (1995) (“constitutional error” results from the suppression of
favorable evidence by government).  As such, determining whether a reasonable
probability exists that the disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have
changed the outcome of the trial is a mixed question of law and fact.  See Hays v.
Alabama, 85 F.3d 1492, 1498 (11th Cir. 1996)  The standard requires an
independent review of the legal question of prejudice while giving deference to the
trial court’s factual findings and ensures the uniform application of the law.  See
Stephens v. State, 748 So. 2d 1028, 1032-33 (Fla. 1999) (applying mixed question
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of law and fact standard of review for issues of constitutional magnitude and stating
that giving deference to a trial court’s factual findings but independently reviewing
legal questions ensures that the law is applied uniformly in decisions based on
similar facts).
BRADY
In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held that the “suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused . . . violates due process where
the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good
faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”  373 U.S. at 87.  In Kyles, the Court wrote:
[United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985),] held that regardless of
request [by defendant], favorable evidence is material, and
constitutional error results from its suppression by the government, “if
there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed
to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.”  473 U.S., at 682 (opinion of Blackmun, J.); id., at 685
(White, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433-34 (emphasis added).  Recently, in Young v. State, 739 So.
2d 553 (Fla. 1999), we recognized this emphasis placed on the materiality prong
and stated:
[Although] defendants have the right to pretrial discovery under our
Rules of Criminal Procedure, and thus there is an obligation upon
defendant to exercise due diligence pretrial to obtain information . . .
the focus in postconviction Brady-Bagley analysis is ultimately the
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nature and weight of undisclosed information.  The ultimate test in
backward-looking postconviction analysis is whether information
which the State possessed and did not reveal to the defendant and
which information was thereby unavailable to the defendant for trial, is
of such a nature and weight that confidence in the outcome of the trial
is undermined to the extent that there is a reasonable probability that
had the information been disclosed to the defendant, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.
Young, 739 So. 2d at 559.  One week after our decision in Young, the United
States Supreme Court decided Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999),
confirming its analysis in Kyles.  In Strickler, the court stated again the rules which
must be applied to this case:
In Brady this Court held “that the suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates
due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of he good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution.”  373 U.S. at 87.  We have since held that the duty to
disclose such evidence is applicable even though there has been no
request by the accused, United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107
(1976), and that the duty encompasses impeachment evidence as well
as exculpatory evidence, United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676
(1985).  Such evidence is material “if there is a reasonable probability
that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.”  Id. at 682; see also Kyles v.
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433-34 (1995).  Moreover, the rule
encompasses evidence “known only to police investigators and not to
the prosecutor.”  Id. at 438.  In order to comply with Brady, therefore,
“the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable
evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf in this
case, including the police.”  Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437.
These cases, together with earlier cases condemning the
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knowing use of perjured testimony, illustrate the special role played by
the American prosecutor in the search for truth in criminal trials. 
Within the federal system, for example, we have said that the United
States Attorney is “the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a
case, but that justice shall be done.”  Berger v. United States, 295 U.S.
78, 88 (1935).
This special status explains both the basis for the prosecution’s
broad duty of disclosure and our conclusion that not every violation
of that duty necessarily establishes that the outcome was unjust.  Thus
the term “Brady violation” is sometimes used to refer to any breach of
the broad obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence–that is, to any
suppression of so-called “Brady material”–although, strictly speaking,
there is never a real “Brady violation” unless the nondisclosure was so
serious that there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed
evidence would have produced a different verdict.  There are three
components of a true Brady violation:  The evidence at issue must be
favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it
is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State,
either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.
Strickler, 527 U.S. at 280-82 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).  Here, there
was a “real Brady violation” because there was nondisclosure of material
information, which we conclude was so serious that there is a reasonable
probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a different result.
MERITS
Following the evidentiary hearing in the trial court on the rule 3.850 motion,
the trial judge entered an order which states in pertinent part:
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In the April 14, 1996 “Amended Motion,” the Defendant raised
four claims in support of his prayer for relief:  (I) that the State failed
to turn over numerous exculpatory documents pursuant to Rule 3.220
and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963);1 (II) that Defendant is
entitled to a new trial as new evidence reflects that a “George William
Cope” committed the crimes of which Defendant was convicted; (III)
that Defendant is entitled to a new trial as the alleged Brady violations
and new evidence sufficiently undermines confidence in the verdict;
and (IV) that an unconstitutional prior conviction was used against
Defendant at trial.
[n. 1] Citing Scott v. State, 657 So. 2d 1129 (Fla.
1995), to establish a Brady violation the Defendant must
show:  (1) that the State possessed evidence favorable to
him; (2) that the evidence was suppressed; (3) that he did
not possess the favorable evidence nor could he obtain it
with any reasonable diligence; and (4) that had the
evidence been disclosed to [the Defendant], a reasonable
probability exists that the outcome of the proceedings
would have been different.
As to clam (IV), Defendant filed this claim as an exercise of
prudence while a “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus” was pending in
another court.  The petition has since been denied rendering the prior
conviction valid.  Relief is denied on this ground.
As to claim (I), Defendant offers the “Cope documents,” the
“McDermid Impeachment documents,” and various other documents. 
The “Cope documents” consist of a collection of police reports
garnered from various law enforcement agencies, the second
confession of McDermid, and a cassette tape of a witness interview
between the State Attorney’s Office and McDermid.
First, this Court simply cannot hold that the police reports of
various and sundry jurisdictions, of possibly unrelated crimes, were in
the State’s “possession.”  Any police report wherein two men robbed
a store, which coincides roughly in time, place, and manner with
McDermid’s confession, is not the State’s responsibility to produce. 
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See Perry v. State, 395 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 1980).  The materiality of
these documents also concerned the Court.  This Court does not
consider these documents to be material.  They represent a mere
possibility that the defense might have been helped by this information,
or might have affected the outcome of trial.  It seems as though the
use of the above documents, if admissible at all, would have cut both
ways at trial.  Id. at 174, citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97
(1976).  Therefore, the first prong of Brady is not met.
Second, the police reports were at all times available to
Defendant.  Defendant argues that the titled “second McDermid
confession” first led him to the police reports presented at the hearing
by including times and dates that were not included in McDermid’s
first confession.  But, Defendant did have McDermid’s first written
confession, which lists the same thirty-five crimes that make up the
second confession.  Defendant, at all times, could have deposed
McDermid to obtain the very information Defendant now claims he
needed during trial.  The record reflects Defendant never once
deposed McDermid in preparation for trial.  Reasonable diligence
dictates the main witness against Defendant would be deposed by
Defendant.  Thus, the third prong of Brady is not met.
Third, the nexus between the police reports and the reasonable
probability that Defendant’s trial would have ended with a verdict of
not guilty is not adequately formed.  It was not established that the
police reports presented by Defendant represent the same robberies as
those listed in McDermid’s confession.  Defendant presented but one
witness from the police reports whose testimony failed to provide any
relevant information as to “George Cope” nor Defendant.  The final
prong of Brady has not been met.
The second McDermid confession fails to meet the third prong
of the Brady test in the same manner as the police reports.  The
Defendant could have derived the information contained therein by
exercising reasonable diligence by deposing McDermid.  The
Defendant had statements of all other witnesses that would lead to
inconsistencies in McDermid’s statements.  Defendant was free to
explore any inconsistencies through and by a deposition of
McDermid.
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The cassette tape, also presented in the “Cope Documents,”
fails the third prong of Brady for the same reason.  There is no
information included in the tape that was not otherwise available to
Defendant.  Also, nothing in the tape leads this Court to conclude that
another verdict would be forthcoming.  The fourth prong of Brady has
not been met.
When the possible effect of all other documents associated with
this claim, the above-mentioned documents, and the record are
reviewed individually and collectively this Court is not compelled to
find a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of Defendant’s
trial would have been different.  Basically, the sum of the “maybe’s”
and “what-ifs” is not greater than the sum of the jury’s verdict and the
propriety thereof.  Relief on claim (I) is denied.
State v. Rogers, No. CF-83-1440, order at 2-3 (Fla. 7th Cir. Ct. order filed June 23,
1997).
We have carefully reviewed the entire record in this case and have concluded
that we do not agree with the conclusion of the trial judge that there was no Brady
violation in respect to the police reports.  Applying Brady, Kyles, Strickler, and
Young to the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the failure by the State
to make available to Rogers the reports of the various law enforcement agencies
that were investigating the robberies of retail establishments which occurred along
the Interstate 4 corridor from the fall of 1981 through the spring of 1982 was a
Brady violation.
Our holding is dictated by our conclusion that the police reports of the
8Two of these robberies were used by the State at the trial as Williams rule
evidence.  See Rogers, 511 So. 2d at 531.
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various law enforcement agencies in the joint investigation of the similar robberies
were in the constructive possession of the prosecutor and were material documents
within the scope of materiality as set out by Kyles, Strickler, and Young.  Within
these law enforcement agency reports was what is referred to as the second
McDermid confession, the Cope document, and the cassette tape of the McDermid
testimony preparation, all of which were clearly material.
The trial court concluded that this did not mean that this duty extended to
“the police reports of various and sundry jurisdictions, of possibly unrelated
crimes” or to “[a]ny police report wherein two men robbed a store, which
coincides roughly in time, place and manner with McDermid’s confession.”  We do
not agree with the trial court’s legal conclusion based upon the facts of this case.
The record in this case shows that, in various municipalities located near
Interstate 95 and continuing on to Interstate 4 from Jacksonville to Tampa from the
fall of 1981 through the spring of 1982, there had been a substantial number of
robberies similar to the Winn-Dixie robbery in St. Augustine.8  Various municipal
and county law enforcement agencies were cooperating in the investigation of the
robberies and in attempting to identify and arrest the persons committing the
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robberies.
Police investigators from St. Augustine attended meetings and shared reports
with and received reports from the other law enforcement agencies.  Late in the
spring of 1982, the robberies became inextricably linked when McDermid
confessed to thirty-five of the robberies of various retail establishments along
Interstate 4 which were the subject of the cooperative investigation among the law
enforcement agencies.  One of the robberies to which McDermid confessed was
the Winn-Dixie robbery in St. Augustine.  McDermid was the key prosecution
witness in Rogers’ trial.
During the course of pretrial discovery, Rogers requested all Brady material. 
Rogers took the deposition of the lead St. Augustine investigator, Sergeant Nicklo,
on several occasions.  Rogers requested during those depositions all of the St.
Augustine Police Department records concerning this robbery and, on at least one
occasion, asked to be supplied with the names of all persons who attended the joint
law enforcement meetings concerning the various robberies.
Based upon our review of the pretrial record, we find that the reports and
documents pertaining to the McDermid-linked robberies were in the constructive
possession of the prosecutor in this case.  We find that the trial court’s conclusion
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that these documents and reports were “police reports of various and sundry
jurisdictions, of possibly unrelated crimes” is not founded upon competent,
substantial evidence.
We conclude that the following three items were in the State’s possession
and constitute Brady violations:
(1) The second confession by McDermid.  McDermid wrote a list of
robberies to which he confessed, and Rogers obtained a copy of this first
confession.  However, McDermid later wrote a more extensive list of robberies and
stated in the second confession that Rogers participated in each robbery listed. 
Rogers was not given a copy of this second confession.  There is no doubt that
this second confession was in the State’s possession in this case since that
confession has on it the initials of Detective Edmonson, who was a police
investigator in the Winn-Dixie case.  For the reasons stated below, the second
confession was material, and the Court’s conclusion that the availability of
McDermid’s first confession sufficed is legally erroneous.
(2) The report from the Jacksonville police concerning a Pantry Pride
robbery in Jacksonville in December 1981.  This report, dated January 30, 1982,
states in pertinent part:
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The 2nd lead in this case is information developed at the
beaches area on suspects named George William Cope, Carolyn
Woods, and Dennis L. Herman.  A confidential informant reported
that he overheard a conversation with these subjects in a bar at the
beaches area that they were possibly involved or he was led to believe
that they may have been involved in the robbery/murder of the Winn-
Dixie Manager in St. Augustine that occurred after this robbery
occurred.  The subject forwarded the name of Billy Cope to this office
. . . . [t]he writer requested records on all these people from the Ohio
police and instead of sending them to me, they sent them to Sg. Nicklo
in St. Augustine who is working the robbery/murder there.  The writer
is still trying to get this information from Ohio police or Sgt. Nicklo,
but as of this date has been unsuccessful in getting it.” 
(Emphasis added.)
(3) A cassette tape of a witness preparation conference in which McDermid
discusses what his trial testimony will be with one of the prosecutors and Detective
Edmonson.
We also do not agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the documents
were not material under Brady.  The overarching theory of Rogers’ defense was
that he had been misidentified and was not McDermid’s accomplice.  The State’s
case, to a substantial extent, relied upon McDermid’s testimony that Rogers was
the other person involved in robbing the Winn-Dixie and who fired the fatal shot
resulting in the murder.
9The record demonstrates that the police agencies in all jurisdictions in Florida
where there was evidence that McDermid and Rogers had committed robberies shared
information in an attempt to prosecute those robberies as well as the Winn-Dixie
robbery-murder.
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McDermid’s Second Confession and Cope Documents9
The record reflects that McDermid provided the State with two written
confessions prior to the trial for the Winn-Dixie murder.  The first confession was
made in August 1983, and it listed some thirty-five armed robberies, including store
names, cities, and estimated stolen dollar amounts.  This confession was turned
over to Rogers.  However, a second confession, made in January 1984 and
captioned “A Short Synopsis of All the Robberies that I, Thomas J. McDermid,
and Jerry Layne Rogers Committed” was not disclosed.  A review of the record
reveals that these confessions are different in material ways.  The record reflects
that the second confession expands upon the robberies listed in the first
confession, implicates Rogers in all of the robberies, and gives additional details,
including street addresses, approximate dates, and a description of each event.  It is
undisputed that this second written and detailed confession was not turned over to
Rogers.
Rogers argues that he could have used this second confession to impeach
McDermid by revealing inconsistencies between McDermid’s confession and the
10Cope was identified in the police reports of the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office.
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actual facts drawn from the police reports of those robberies.  Additionally, Rogers
claims that the expanded facts in the second confession could have played an
integral role in casting guilt on McDermid and on another suspect, George William
Cope,10 and in questioning McDermid’s motives in confessing and implicating
Rogers.
As stated earlier in this opinion, previously undisclosed police reports
contain statements from two confidential informants concerning Cope’s
involvement in the Winn-Dixie crime for which Rogers was convicted.  A
Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office report involving a Pantry Pride robbery reflects that a
confidential informant reported overhearing a conversation in a bar between
subjects Cope, Carolyn Woods, and Dennis Herman suggesting that they may have
been involved in the Winn-Dixie robbery and murder at issue here.  The report also
contains a statement about a lead in the case in which Cope was a suspect.  In
addition, the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office reports contain an undated handwritten
statement where a confidential informant says that he was with Cope and another as
they discussed going to do a “23 and 5.”  Rogers asserts that the number 5
corresponds to the shorthand used in another section of the same notes to denote
11The State asserts that police reports regarding criminal matters are traditionally
excluded from the public records hearsay exception and thus are not admissible as
substantive evidence in criminal trials.  See § 90.803(8), Fla. State. (1997); see, e.g.,
Heindrieth v. State, 483 So. 2d 768, 769 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (police report not
admissible against defendant under section 90.803(8)).  Therefore, the State alleges
that as a result, Rogers’ claim must fail.  However, withheld information, even if not
itself admissible, can be material under Brady if its disclosure would lead to admissible
substantive or impeachment evidence.  See Martinez v. Wainwright, 621 F.2d 184, 188
(5th Cir. 1980) (citing State v. Crawford, 257 So. 2d 898, 900-01 (Fla. 1972)).  While
the actual police reports may not be admitted as substantive evidence, they can still
serve as the basis for Rogers’ Brady claim to the extent he could have investigated and
used the information contained in the reports.  Moreover, any inconsistent statements
made by McDermid in the police reports surely could have been admissible to further
impeach his testimony.
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this Winn-Dixie robbery and murder.  Cope’s name also appears next to two
Publix robberies committed on December 3, 1981, and January 11, 1982.  In his
detailed confession, McDermid claimed that he and Rogers, not Cope, had robbed
the Publix stores on those dates.  Moreover, at least two other police records,
which were introduced from investigations of a Publix robbery at Ormond Beach,
committed one month before the Winn-Dixie robbery, and a robbery of a Long
John Silver’s restaurant in South Daytona, contain eyewitness descriptions of a
robber matching Cope’s description.  Again, as to both of these crimes, McDermid
had implicated Rogers rather than Cope as his accomplice.11
The trial judge found that because McDermid’s second confession and the
resulting police reports also implicated Rogers in other crimes they were not
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favorable to Rogers and hence not subject to Brady’s rule of production. 
However, based on a review of the record and analyzing the possible use of the
evidence in support of the defense asserted by Rogers, it is apparent that most of
this evidence is favorable, and Rogers could have used it to bolster his defense in
at least two critical ways.
First, and most importantly, the evidence could have been used to show that
another person, Cope, and not Rogers was McDermid’s partner in the Winn-Dixie
crime, as is reflected by the many witness descriptions of the Winn-Dixie robbers
that match Cope and not Rogers.  See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 442-43
(1995) (eyewitness statements to police describing assailant as five feet four inches
or five feet five inches tall and of medium build that matched description of an
alternative suspect was clearly favorable to accused, who was six feet tall and thin). 
Second, the undisclosed information could have been used to directly impeach
McDermid’s testimony at trial and show that Cope, not Rogers, was McDermid’s
frequent accomplice in other robberies where McDermid claimed Rogers
participated.  This would have been extremely helpful to Rogers since the State’s
case for conviction was substantially predicated upon the testimony of McDermid,
a codefendant and the State’s chief witness, who entered into a plea agreement with
12Specifically, Rogers, his wife, and other family members testified that on the
night of the murder, Rogers attended a cookout with family members and a couple
named John and Laura Norwood.
-22-
the State to save his life.  In addition, the State’s case was based upon the fact that
McDermid and Rogers had committed other robberies together, hence the
implication that they did the Winn-Dixie robbery together.  However, a review of
the police reports reveals that many of the descriptions of the robbers in the Winn-
Dixie and other cases given by witnesses match Cope rather than Rogers, and they
provide a name that Rogers could have attached to the alternate suspect he was
trying to show as involved in this crime.  As noted above, Rogers presented
extensive testimony and evidence of his innocence in his defense at trial and has
continuously maintained that he was elsewhere at the time of the crime.12
Cassette Tape
The next category of Brady evidence alleged to have been withheld from
Rogers is a cassette tape of a June 19, 1984, telephone conversation among the
State’s investigator, Flynn Edmonson; the prosecutor, John Whiteman; and
McDermid, which Rogers claims revealed substantial coaching of McDermid for
his trial testimony.  The tape cassette, which was transcribed by an attorney of
Covington & Burling, provided two excerpts reflecting the State’s attempt to
-23-
influence McDermid’s testimony.
The first excerpt reflects McDermid telling the State that, after the robbery,
he had reached the getaway car first and then laid down on the floorboard in the
back seat while his partner, Rogers, lagged behind, shot the store manager, and
then entered the car and drove away.  The transcript of the tape reflects McDermid
stating that Rogers arrived at the car about ten seconds after he had reached the
car.  After this representation, the transcript reflects the State explaining to
McDermid that there were two witnesses who stated that they only saw McDermid
run to the getaway car, get into the driver’s seat, and drive away.  At that point and
after suggesting to McDermid that maybe the witnesses were mistaken or that
maybe they just had not seen Rogers because he was too close behind, McDermid
stated, “[Rogers] wasn’t far behind me.  I’ll say that.”
The second excerpt reveals McDermid’s response when asked where the
getaway car had been parked was that it was parked
[o]n the other side of the Holiday Inn, about 5 parking spaces down
from the office . . . .  It would be somewhere in those first five.  Ah, I
remember we didn’t want to park right next to the stairwell [the first
spot] and decided to park a couple down so I could look on both
sides you know what I mean, without the stairwell being in the way . . .
.  Not being parked too close to the office too was another thing I had
in mind.
-24-
However, later in the conversation, when again he was asked where he had parked,
McDermid responds:  “I think it was either the first or the second slot, but I can’t
be sure.”  In response, Mr. Edmonson stated that there were several State
witnesses who were adamant in their testimony that McDermid had parked the car
in the first parking space and that “it would probably be a better idea if it was
parked in the first spot. . . .  I would think that you would have parked in the first
space.”  In response, McDermid stated, “That’s another thing.  I mean like you
said we might have parked in the first one.”  At trial McDermid testified that the
getaway car was parked in the first spot, next to the stairwell.
This evidence of coaching and conflicting accounts clearly was favorable to
Rogers.  Whenever the government’s case depends almost entirely on the
testimony of one witness, without which there can be no conviction, that witness’s
credibility is an important issue in the case.  See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S.
150, 154-55 (1972); United States v. Meros, 866 F.2d 1304, 1309 (11th Cir. 1989);
Brown v. Wainwright, 785 F.2d 1457, 1465 (11th Cir. 1986); Craig v. State, 685
So. 2d 1224, 1226 (Fla. 1996).  In this case, McDermid was the State’s chief
witness, and with the tape, Rogers could have impeached McDermid and shown
the degree to which the State had coached him to overcome the inconsistences
-25-
between his testimony and that of the other State witnesses.  This was especially
important because the State did present eyewitnesses who testified that they saw
someone drive off who met McDermid’s description.  This testimony conflicted
sharply with that of McDermid, who testified that he laid down in the back seat and
waited until Rogers came and got in the driver’s seat and drove off.
This evidence would have been particularly compelling given the confused
testimony provided by an alleged eyewitness, Ms. Ketsey Day Supinger, the Winn-
Dixie cashier.  At trial, Supinger, who was five feet nine inches or five feet-ten
inches tall, testified that the buck-toothed robber who confronted her and whose
description fit McDermid was about one inch shorter than she was.  More
importantly, she described the second robber, whom she later identified as Rogers,
as being taller than the robber who confronted her.  That description would make
the second robber at least five feet nine inches tall.  Rogers’ driver license,
however, lists him as five feet six inches tall.  Cope, on the other hand, actually
matches this description given by Supinger.  Had Rogers known that Cope
matched the description given by Supinger, he could have conducted further
investigation to find other evidence linking Cope to McDermid and the Winn-Dixie
crime, such as the information that he later discovered from Roger Wimmer,
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Mathew Armitage, and Ronald Heath which now serves as the basis of his newly
discovered evidence claim.  In its closing argument, the State conceded that
Supinger was confused as to her testimony.
In reviewing the impact that withheld materials might have on defendants,
courts must assess the cumulative effect of the evidence.  See Kyles, 514 U.S. at
441.  In other words, courts should assess the importance of the suppressed
materials taken together.  See id.  In addition, courts should consider not only how
the State’s suppression of favorable information deprived the defendant of direct
relevant evidence but also how it handicapped the defendant’s ability to investigate
or present other aspects of the case.  See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,
683 (1985) (reviewing court may consider directly any adverse effect that
prosecutor’s failure to respond to request for information from defendant might
have had on preparation or presentation of defendant’s case).
The materials that the State withheld from Rogers are bedrock Brady
materials of the sort upon which many courts have relied in ordering new trials.  We
conclude that the individual as well as the cumulative effect of the suppression of
the materials discussed above indeed undermines confidence in the outcome of the
trial.
-27-
In light of this Brady error, we conclude that Rogers is entitled to a new trial. 
Accordingly, we reverse the order denying Rogers’ motion for postconviction
relief and remand to the trial court with directions that a new trial be conducted
without delay.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS and
QUINCE, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for St. Johns County,
A. W. Nichols, III, Judge - Case No. 83-1440-CF
John G. Buchanan, III, Timothy C. Hester, Benedict M. Lenhart, Michael S. Labson
and Andrew J. Heimert of Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C.; and Jerrel Phillips,
Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellant
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Mark S. Dunn, Assistant Attorney
General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellee