Title: Quarles v. State
Citation: 493 N.E.2d 1247
Docket Number: 585S215
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: June 16, 1986

493 N.E.2d 1247 (1986)
George R. QUARLES, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
No. 585S215.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
June 16, 1986.
Robert Canada, Evansville, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Richard Albert Alford, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
PIVARNIK, Justice.
Defendant-Appellant George R. Quarles was convicted at the conclusion of a jury trial in the Vanderburgh County Circuit Court of two counts of dealing in a schedule II controlled substance, a class B felony. He was further found to be an habitual offender. He was sentenced to two (2) concurrent ten (10) year sentences, one of which was enhanced by thirty (30) years due to the habitual offender finding. The following issues are raised on direct appeal:
1. whether the trial court erred in admitting certain testimony; and
2. whether Appellant was denied a fair trial due to prosecutorial misconduct.
At the time of this crime, Appellant had recently served a prison sentence. At the trial for this cause, he admitted dealing in the drugs, but argued entrapment, alleging that a police informant, Patricia Richie, agreed to have sex with him in return for his part in the drug transaction. Appellant maintains this was a strong inducement because of his prison sentence. On direct examination, the following took place between defense counsel and Appellant:
On cross-examination the prosecuting attorney questioned Appellant, and defense counsel objected, thus:
Appellant maintains this testimony was improperly admitted because the existence of the battery conviction was a "mere subsidiary fact" and the details of the offense had no relevance at all.
It is undisputed that this testimony is not generally admissible under Ashton v. Anderson (1972), 258 Ind. 51, 279 N.E.2d 210. However, the State argues that defense counsel's direct examination of Appellant, recounted above, "opened the door" to the prior conviction and allowed the testimony at issue. More specifically, the State even concedes that the door was not opened simply by bringing forward the conviction, but rather, it was defense counsel's question, "Got in a fight or something?," which opened the door.
We have held that evidence relied upon to "open the door" must leave the trier of fact with a false or misleading impression of the facts related. Gilliam v. State (1978), 270 Ind. 71, 77, 383 N.E.2d 297, 301. It is quite clear that the direct examination of Appellant was an attempt to mitigate his criminal conviction of battery by inviting the jury to infer that a mere fight took *1249 place as opposed to a shotgun shooting. This type of misleading testimony is exactly what was contemplated in Gilliam, and "opened the door" for the prosecution to clarify the facts of the prior conviction.
Appellant further contends he was denied a fair trial and placed in grave peril by the following remarks of the prosecuting attorney during closing argument:
In addition, the prosecuting attorney also mentioned in closing argument that its purpose was to give the jury "some slant on the evidence as I see it," that it was intended to pursuade the jury, that it was not evidence, and that the evidence at trial should control their decision. Appellant maintains these comments invited the jury to decide the case on grounds other than the guilt or innocence of the accused and injected into evidence the prosecuting attorney's own personal opinion of the veracity of the witnesses.
It has long been held that a prosecuting attorney may comment upon the credibility of the witnesses during closing argument as long as the assertion is based upon reasons which arise from the evidence. Beard v. State (1981), Ind., 428 N.E.2d 772, 775, citing Burns v. State (1979), 270 Ind. 512, 515, 387 N.E.2d 442, 445, reh. denied (1979), and Hubbard v. State (1974), 262 Ind. 176, 181, 313 N.E.2d 346, 350. Both the comments to which Appellant objects were comments upon the credibility of Patty Richie and specifically paralleled her testimony that she was addicted to morphine and dilaudid and became an informant in order to help other addicts. As such, the comments were clearly permissible.
The trial court is affirmed.
GIVAN, C.J., and SHEPARD and DICKSON, JJ., concur.
DeBRULER, J., concurs in result without separate opinion.