Title: JEPPESON v DEPT OF STATE LANDS
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 83-071
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: August 4, 1983

NO. 83-71 I N T H E SUPREME COURT O F THE ST.ATE O F MONTANA 1983 K A R L G R A N T JEPPESOIJ, P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, STATE O F M O N T A N A , DEPAXTMENT O F STATE LANDS, Defendant and Respondent. APPEAL F R O M : D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Twelfth J u d i c i a l District, I n and f o r t h e County of L i b e r t y , The Honorable B. W. Thomas, Judge p r e s i d i n g . COUNSEL O F RECORD: For Appellant: John E. S e i d l i t z , Jr., Chester, Montana For Respondent: David Woodgerd & Lyle Xanley, Dept. of S t a t e Lands, Helena,. Montana Submitted on B r i e f s : May 2 6 , 1983 Decided: August 4, 1993 F i l e d : A ~ G 4 1983 Clerk Mr. J u s t i c e L . C. Gulbrandson d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. T h i s is an appeal from a d e c i s i o n of t h e District Court of t h e Twelfth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , L i b e r t y County, t h e Honorable B. W. Thomas p r e s i d i n g , denying i n j u n c t i v e and mandamus r e l i e f t o t h e a p p e l l a n t , Karl G r a n t Jeppeson, and g r a n t i n g summary judgment t o t h e respondent, Department of S t a t e Lands. The following f a c t s a r e taken from t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s find- i n g s of f a c t and a r e not i n d i s p u t e . The S t a t e of Montana owns a p a r c e l of g r a z i n g land i n L i b e r t y County, Montana. The land is now and h a s been administered by t h e respondent Department. I n 1950, t h i s p a r c e l was leased by t h e respondent t o t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s f a t h e r , Karl H . Jeppeson. The l e a s e was renewed t o t h e f a t h e r ' s e s t a t e i n 1960. Ten y e a r s l a t e r , t h e l e a s e was changed t o the name of t h e a p p e l l a n t . The a p p e l l a n t has had more than a l i t t l e t r o u b l e maintaining h i s l e a s e s i n c e 1970. H e was l a t e w i t h h i s annual r e n t a l payment t o t h e department f o r t h e l e a s e h o l d i n 1973, and f a i l e d t o pay t h e r e n t i n 1974. Pursuant t o s e c t i o n 81-412, R.C.M., 1947, (now s e c t i o n 77-6-506, MCA) , t h e l e a s e was canceled e f f e c t i v e J u n e 7 , 1974. The land went unleased f o r two y e a r s , a f t e r which t h e department l e a s e d t h e land t o another p a r t y i n 1976. S h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r , t h e p a r t y assigned h i s l e a s e t o t h e a p p e l l a n t . I n 1977, a p p e l l a n t was a g a i n l a t e i n making h i s r e n t a l payment. H e l o s t t h e l e a s e i n 1978 a f t e r another f a i l u r e t o make t i m e l y payment, b u t t h e l e a s e was r e i n s t a t e d based upon a p p e l l a n t ' s af f i d a v i t s t a t i n g t h a t h i s payment had been made by t h e s t a t u t o r y d e a d l i n e . N e v e r t h e l e s s , i n 1980, t h e r e n t was not r e c e i v e d a t a l l , and t h e l e a s e was canceled a g a i n . The p a r c e l remained unleased u n t i l 1981, when a new l e a s e was i s s u e d t o Adrian and J a n e t Hawks. The a p p e l l a n t had run h i s l i v e s t o c k on t h e p a r c e l up t o t h a t time, and ref used t o remove them, arguing t h a t he was e n t i t l e d t o compensation f o r c e r t a i n improvements made on t h e p a r c e l . A f t e r lengthy n e g o t i a t i o n s , t h e Hawks decided t o a s s i g n t h e i r l e a s e t o t h e a p p e l l a n t f o r t h e sum of $1,500. The assignment was made on forms provided by t h e depart- ment f o r such a t r a n s a c t i o n , and was received by t h e department on J a n u a r y 29, 1982. Because of workload problems, department employees were unable t o approve t h e proposed assignment immediate1 y. I n addi- t i o n , t h e department was h e s i t a n t t o approve t h e assignment i n view of a p p e l l a n t ' s h i s t o r y of l a t e payments. A l e t t e r e x p r e s s i n g t h e s e concerns was s e n t t o a p p e l l a n t on March 23, 1982. I n t h e l e t t e r , t h e department i n d i c a t e d it would not approve t h e assignment u n t i l t h e a p p e l l a n t could e x p l a i n why h i s 1980 payment was l a t e , and why he could not be reached i n 1980 i n r e g a r d t o t h e l a t e payment. A copy of t h i s l e t t e r was mailed t o t h e Hawks. A p p e l l a n t d i d not respond t o t h e l e t t e r u n t i l A p r i l 23, 1982. However, t h e A p r i l 1 d e a d l i n e f o r making payment, required by s e c t i o n 77-6-506, MCA, had passed, and on A p r i l 22, t h e depart- ment canceled t h e l e a s e f o r f a i l u r e t o r e c e i v e payment, and n o t i f i e d t h e Hawks of t h e c a n c e l l a t i o n . A s t h e department was p r e p a r i n g t o a d v e r t i s e t h e p a r c e l f o r a new l e a s e , t h e a p p e l l a n t f i l e d a motion i n D i s t r i c t Court f o r a p r e l i m i n a r y i n j u n c t i o n t o r e s t r a i n t h e department from l e a s i n g t h e p a r c e l . A p p e l l a n t sub- s e q u e n t l y modified h i s complaint t o r e q u e s t both p r e l i m i n a r y and permanent i n j u n c t i o n s preventing t h e department from l e a s i n g , and r e s t r a i n i n g it from denying assignment of t h e Hawks l e a s e t o him. I n a d d i t i o n , a p p e l l a n t requested a w r i t of mandamus compelling t h e department t o approve t h e assignment. A hearing was held on J u n e 24, 1 9 8 2 . The t r i a l c o u r t denied t h e motion f o r a p r e l i m i n a r y i n j u n c t i o n on August 4 , 1982. Afterwards, t h e p a r t i e s e n t e r e d i n t o a s t i p u l a t i o n t h a t t h e r e were no f a c t u a l d i s p u t e s , and t h a t t h e above-stated f a c t s and e x h i b i t s introduced a t t r i a l , along w i t h t h e d e p a r t m e n t ' s A p r i l 22 l e t t e r t o t h e Hawks, comprised t h e r e l e v a n t f a c t s f o r t h e c a s e . The p a r t i e s then submitted c o n c u r r e n t motions f o r summary judgment. The D i s t r i c t Court granted t h e respondent d e p a r t m e n t ' s motion f o r summary judgment on November 1, 1982. The a p p e l l a n t c o n t e s t s t h i s d e c i s i o n and c o n t i n u e s t o p r e s s f o r i n j u n c t i v e and mandamus r e l i e f . The a p p e l l a n t b e l i e v e s he is e n t i t l e d t o r e l i e f because t h e t r i a l c o u r t a l l e g e d l y e r r e d i n not f i n d i n g t h a t t h e department a c t e d a r b i t r a r i l y and c a p r i c i o u s l y when c o n s i d e r i n g t h e assign- ment of t h e Hawks l e a s e . S p e c i f i c a l l y , a p p e l l a n t contends t h a t t h e department had t o a c t upon t h e assignment w i t h i n a s p e c i f i c p e r i o d of time, and t h a t by not adhering t o t h i s l i m i t a t i o n , it abused its d i s c r e t i o n with r e s p e c t t o handling t h e assigment. I n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e , a p p e l l a n t argues t h a t even i f t h e department d i d n o t have a p r e s c r i b e d time l i m i t f o r a t t e n d i n g t o t h e m a t t e r , t h e mere l a c k of such a l i m i t is i t s e l f an a r b i t r a r y and c a p r i c i o u s a c t . Furthermore, a p p e l l a n t i n s i s t s t h a t t h e department was l e g a l l y bound t o approve t h e assignment i n any e v e n t . The a p p e l l a n t a l s o m a i n t a i n s t h a t t h e department acted wrong- f u l l y by f a i l i n g t o n o t i f y him of t h e r e n t due on t h e l e a s e , and by w a i t i n g f o r t h e l e a s e t o be canceled so t h a t t h e assignment would be a moot i s s u e . F i n a l l y , t h e a p p e l l a n t contends t h a t department added c o n d i t i o n s f o r approval of t h e assignment t h a t a r e c o n t r a r y t o s t a t u t e . For t h e r e a s o n s s t a t e d below, we r e j e c t a p p e l l a n t ' s arguments and a f f i r m t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e t r i a l c o u r t . I n i t i a l l y , we c o n s i d e r t h e r e q u e s t f o r i n j u n c t i v e r e l i e f . The t r i a l c o u r t c o r r e c t l y h e l d t h a t t h e l e a s e i n q u e s t i o n was a u t o m a t i c a l l y canceled by o p e r a t i o n of law when t h e r e n t was not p a i d by t h e s t a t u t o r y d e a d l i n e . S e c t i o n 77-6-506, MCA, p r o v i d e s , i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t , t h a t " [ t l h e r e n t a l f o r each succeeding y e a r on l e a s e s h e r e a f t e r i s s u e d . . . is due and payable b e f o r e March 1, and i f n o t paid by A p r i l 1 t h e l e a s e is canceled." The same s t a - t u t e r e q u i r e s t h e department t o n o t i f y t h e l e s s e e of t h e can- c e l l a t i o n . The land is t h e n open t o l e a s e t o o t h e r i n t e r e s t e d p a r t i e s . S e c t i o n 77-6-506, MCA. Thus, t h e department was l e g a l l y o b l i g a t e d t o c a n c e l t h e Hawks l e a s e and undertake con- s i d e r a t i o n of new a p p l i c a n t s and t h e i r b i d s , r e g a r d l e s s of any a c t i o n r e s p e c t i n g t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s assignment. The r e q u e s t f o r an i n j u n c t i o n t o e n j o i n t h e respondent from i s s u i n g a new l e a s e and denying t h e assignment cannot be g r a n t e d . S e c t i o n 27-19-103 ( 4 ) , MCA, p r o v i d e s t h a t an i n j u n c t i o n may not i s s u e " t o p r e v e n t t h e e x e c u t i o n of a p u b l i c s t a t u t e by o f f i c e r s of t h e law f o r a p u b l i c b e n e f i t . " I f g r a n t e d , t h e i n j u n c t i o n would p r e v e n t t h e department from c a r r y i n g o u t t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of t h e c a n c e l l a t i o n s t a t u t e . The use of an i n j u n c t i o n t o compel t h e department t o i s s u e t h e l e a s e i n a p p e l l a n t ' s name would a l s o v i o l a t e s e c t i o n 27-19-103 ( 6 ) , MCA, which f o r b i d s i s s u a n c e of an i n j u n c t i o n " t o p r e v e n t t h e e x e r c i s e of a p u b l i c o r p r i v a t e o f f i c e , i n a l a w f u l manner, by t h e person i n p o s s e s s i o n . " Here, an i n j u n c t i o n would p r e v e n t t h e department from cancel l i n g t h e l e a s e f o r nonpayment of r e n t and p u t t i n g t h e l e a s e up f o r bid a s r e q u i r e d by s e c t i o n 77-6-506, MCA. I n j u n c t i v e r e l i e f is a l s o i n a p p r o p r i a t e on a n o t h e r ground. I t is an o l d r u l e i n Montana t h a t t i t l e t o , o r p o s s e s s i o n o f , a r e a l e s t a t e i n t e r e s t may not be l i t i g a t e d i n a s u i t f o r an i n j u n c t i o n . Davis v. Burton ( 1 9 5 2 ) , 126 Mont. 137, 246 P.2d 236; Union C e n t r a l L i f e I n s . Co. v. Audet ( 1 9 3 3 ) , 94 Mont. 79, 2 1 P.2d 53; National Bank of Montana v. Bingham ( 1 9 2 8 ) , 83 Mont. 21, 269 P. 162. An i n j u n c t i o n is an e q u i t a b l e remedy, and when a p a r t y i s seeking t o e n f o r c e a l e g a l i n t e r e s t i n r e a l p r o p e r t y , t h e n t h e remedy is not a v a i l a b l e u n l e s s f a c t s and circumstances i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e p a r t y ' s l e g a l remedies, a c t i o n i n e j e c t m e n t , are i n a d e q u a t e . See S t a h l v. 155 Neb. 412, 52 ' n N.W.2d 251; Vance v. Henderson ( 1 9 4 2 ) , 1 4 1 Neb. 766, 4 N.W.2d 833. Even though an i n j u n c t i o n i n t h i s case would not automati- c a l l y v e s t t i t l e t o t h e l e a s e h o l d i n t e r e s t i n the a p p e l l a n t , it would have t h e p r a c t i c a l e f f e c t of doing s o . And, where t h e p r a c t i c a l e f f e c t of an i n j u n c t i o n is t o o u s t one p a r t y from p o s s e s s i o n of a r e a l p r o p e r t y i n t e r e s t and v e s t it i n a n o t h e r , t h e remedy is still not a v a i l a b l e . B l i n n v. H u t t g r i s c h e S o c i e t y ( 1 9 2 0 ) , 58 Mont. 542, 194 P. 140; 43A C.J.S. I n j u n c t i o n s 561 ( 1 9 7 8 ) . The a p p e l l a n t has not demonstrated t h a t h i s l e g a l remedies a r e i n a d e q u a t e . And, he h a s not proved t h a t h i s c a s e f a l l s w i t h i n one of t h e e x c e p t i o n s t o t h e g e n e r a l r u l e . The l e a s e h o l d i n t e r e s t does not i n v o l v e a cropping agreement w i t h t h e s t a t e , s e e Davis v. Burton, s u p r a , and it has not been v i o l a t e d by a s i m p l e t r e s p a s s , s e e T a y l o r v. Nix ( 1 9 3 8 ) , 185 Ga. 536, 195 S.E. 416. T h e r e f o r e , a p p e l l a n t ' s r e q u e s t f o r i n j u n c t i v e r e l i e f must be d e n i e d . The f a c t s of t h i s c a s e and weight of l e g a l a u t h o r i t y do not s u p p o r t a p p e l l a n t ' s p r a y e r f o r a writ of mandamus t o compel assignment of t h e l e a s e . While t h e w r i t may i s s u e " t o compel t h e performance of an a c t which t h e law s p e c i f i c a l l y e n j o i n s a s a d u t y . . .," s e c t i o n 27-26-102(1), MCA, it w i l l not i s s u e t o com- p e l performance of a d i s c r e t i o n a r y f u n c t i o n . S t a t e ex rel. B u t t e Youth Serv. Center v. Murray ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 170 Mont. 171, 551 P.2d 1017. A major crux of t h i s c a s e , t h e n , is whether t h e department was under a l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n t o approve t h e assignment. I t is w e l l s e t t l e d t h a t t h e l a n d s g r a n t e d by t h e f e d e r a l government t o t h e s t a t e s f o r t h e s u p p o r t of p u b l i c s c h o o l s c o n s t i t u t e a t r u s t , and t h e s t a t e is t r u s t e e of t h o s e l a n d s . S t a t e ex r e l . Thompson v Babcock ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 147 Mont. 46, 409 P.2d 808; Toomey v. S t a t e Board of Land Comm'rs ( 1 9 3 8 ) , 106 Mont. 547, 8 1 P.2d 407. Thus, a f i d u c i a r y d u t y is placed upon t h e Board of Land Commissioners and t h e Department of S t a t e Lands t o manage t h e t r u s t according t o t h e h i g h e s t s t a n d a r d s . S e c t i o n 77-1-202, MCA, f o r example, p r o v i d e s t h a t t h e board " s h a l l ad- m i n i s t e r t h i s t r u s t t o s e c u r e t h e l a r g e s t measure of l e g i t i m a t e and r e a s o n a b l e advantage t o t h e s t a t e . " The department, under t h e d i r e c t i o n of t h e board, has r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r l e a s i n g , managing, and o t h e r w i s e d i s p o s i n g of t h e s e l a n d s , s e c t i o n 77-1-301, MCA, s u b j e c t t o t h e t r u s t g u i d e l i n e s . The n a t u r e of t h e d e p a r t m e n t ' s power when a d m i n i s t e r i n g t h e t r u s t h a s a l r e a d y been c o n s i d e r e d . I n Thompson, -- t h e r e l a t o r sought a w r i t of mandamus t o compel t h e board and t h e department t o i n v a l i d a t e c e r t a i n l e a s e s on school t r u s t l a n d s and t o i s s u e l e a s e s t o him. The D i s t r i c t Court denied t h e w r i t , and t h e d e n i a l was upheld by t h i s Court. More s p e c i f i c a l l y , t h i s Court emphasized t h a t : " [i] f t h e ' l a r g e s t measure of l e g i t i m a t e and r e a s o n a b l e advantage from t h e use of s t a t e l a n d s is t o a c c r u e t o t h e s t a t e , t h e n t h e S t a t e Land Board must, n e c e s s a r i l y , have a l a r g e d i s c r e t i o n a r y power. Every f a c e t of t h e B o a r d ' s a c t i o n c a n n o t , and is n o t , e x p l i c i t l y l a i d o u t i n t h e s t a t u t e s o r S t a t e C o n s t i t u t i o n . T h i s view was con£ irmed by J u s t i c e Sanner i n S t a t e ex rel. Gravely v. S t e w a r t , 48 Mont. 347, 349, 137 P. 854, 855 ( 1 9 1 3 ) , where he s a i d , 'The g r a n t of l a n d s f o r s c h o o l - purposes by t h e f e d e i a l government t o t h i s s t a t e c o n s t i t u t e s a t r u s t [ C i t i n g c a s e s . I and t h e s t a t e board of land commissioners, a s t h e i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y c r e a t e d t o a d m i n i s t e r t h a t t r u s t , is bound, upon p r i n c i p l e s t h a t a r e ele- mentary, t o so a d m i n i s t e r it a s t o s e c u r e t h e l a r g e s t measure of l e g i t i m a t e advantage t o t h e b e n e f i c i a r y of it. To t h a t end, and of n e c e s s i t y , t h e board must have a l a r g e --- d i s c r e - t i o n a r y ~ o w e r ---- over t h e s u b j e c t of t h e -- t r u s t ; and t h e r e f o r e it has been expressTy given ' t h e d i r e c t i o n , c o n t r o l , l e a s i n g and s a l e ' of t h e s e l a n d s , under such r e g u l a t i o n s and r e s t r i c t i o n s a s may be p r e s c r i b e d by law. [ c i t a t i o n o m i t t e d ] . " (emphasis i n o r i g i n a l . ) 147 Mont. a t 51-52, 409 P.2d a t 811. A p p e l l a n t i n s i s t s t h a t t h e department is bound t o approve assignments made by l e a s e h o l d e r s . T h i s p o s i t i o n is incons i s t e n t w i t h t h e broad d i s c r e t i o n a r y a u t h o r i t y vested i n a f i d u c i a r y l i k e respondent and c o n t r a r y t o s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n s governing assign- ment. S e c t i o n 77-6-208 p r o v i d e s o n l y t h a t "no assignment is b i n d i n g on t h e s t a t e u n l e s s . . . approved by [ t h e department] ." A p e r t i n e n t r e g u l a t i o n echoes t h i s d i s c r e t i o n a r y a u t h o r i t y . See A.R.M. s e c t i o n 26.3.121(1). Nowhere i n t h e body of f i d u c i a r y p r i n c i p l e s , s t a t u t e s , o r r e g u l a t i o n s can t h e r e be found anything t o s u g g e s t t h a t t h e d e p a r t m e n t ' s a u t h o r i t y over approval of assignments is anything b u t d i s c r e t i o n a r y . The department had t h e o p t i o n of withholding approval on a p p e l l a n t ' s assignment u n t i l it had c a r e f u l l y examined h i s p a s t s t a t u s a s a l e a s e h o l d e r . U n t i l t h e assignment was approved, t h e Hawks were s t i l l t h e l e s s e e s . Respondent's o n l y l e g a l duty was t o p r o c u r e payment of t h e y e a r l y r e n t a l from t h e Hawks, and t h i s it c e r t a i n l y attempted t o do. Indeed, t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s r e q u e s t f o r mandamus asks t h a t t h e department r e s c i n d its p r i o r a c t i o n s w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e l e a s e and g i v e t h e l e a s e new l i f e . Mandamus w i l l not l i e t o c o r r e c t o r undo an a c t a l r e a d y performed, however e r r o n e o u s t h e a c t may have been. Melton v. Oleson ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 165 Mont. 424, 432, 530 P.2d 466, 470; Thompson, s u p r a , 147 Mont. a t 50, 409 P.2d a t 810. A s w i t h t h e r e q u e s t f o r i n j u n c t i v e r e l i e f , mandamus would seem i n a p p r o p r i a t e i n t h i s c a s e . N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e a p p e l l a n t c l a i m s he is e n t i t l e d t o r e l i e f on t h e grounds t h a t t h e d e p a r t m e n t ' s a c t i o n s were a r b i t r a r y and c a p r i c i o u s and amounted t o an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . According t o t h i s argument, injunc- t i v e r e l i e f is a v a i l a b l e because t h e r e s p o n d e n t ' s a c t i o n s w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e assignment and underlying l e a s e were unlawful; t h e department c a n n o t , t h e r e f o r e , c l a i m exemption under t h e provi- s i o n s of s e c t i o n s 27-19-103(4) and ( 6 ) , MCA. S i m i l a r l y , a p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t , i n t h i s i n s t a n c e , t h e a c t i o n of t h e department c o n s t i t u t e d such an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n a s t o amount t o no e x e r c i s e of d i s c r e t i o n a t a l l . When such abuse is e s t a b l i s h e d , t h i s Court has held t h a t mandamus w i l l l i e t o compel t h e proper e x e r c i s e of d i s c r e t i o n a r y powers. Cain v. Dept. of H e a l t h ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 177 Mont. 448, 451, 582 P.2d 332, 334; Barnes v. Town of Belgrade ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 164 Mont. 467, 470, 524 P.2d 1112, 1113. There is some p r e c e d e n t r e q u i r i n g t h e s e t - a s i d e of a l e a s e - h o l d i n t e r e s t i n s t a t e l a n d s when t h e p r o c e d u r e s f o r g r a n t i n g t h e i n t e r e s t have been found unlawful. S e e , e . g . , Jerke v. S t a t e Dept. of Lands ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 182 Mont. 294, 597 P.2d 49. S i n c e t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s r e q u e s t f o r i n j u n c t i v e and mandamus r e l i e f r e s t s on e s s e n t i a l l y t h e same a l l e g e d wrongful a c t s by t h e department, t h e f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n a p p l i e s w i t h equal f o r c e t o t h e j u s t i f i c a - t i o n f o r e i t h e r remedy. A t t h e o u t s e t , we reemphasize t h a t t h e d i s c r e t i o n a r y powers v e s t e d i n t h e respondent department a r e broad i n scope. Abuse of d i s c r e t i o n , on t h e o t h e r hand, is not s u b j e c t t o a s broad an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . T h i s Court has held t h a t abuse of d i s c r e t i o n i n v o l v e s : " n o t merely an e r r o r i n judgment, b u t perver- s i t y of w i l l , p r e j u d i c e , p a s s i o n , o r moral d e l i n q u e n c y [ c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ] , but it does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y imply wrong-doing o r a breach of t r u s t , o r import bad f a i t h [ c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ] ; it conveys, r a t h e r , t h e i d e a of a c t i n g beyond t h e l i m i t of d i s c r e t i o n [ c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ] ; t h e d i s r e g a r d of t h e evi- dence adduced [ c i t a t i o n o m i t t e d ] ; t h e basing a d e c i s i o n upon incompetent or i n s u f f i c i e n t evi- dence [ c i t a t i o n omitted] ; an e x e r c i s e of d i s c r e t i o n t o an end o r purpose not j u s t i f i e d by, and c l e a r l y a g a i n s t , reason and evidence [ c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ] ; a c l e a r e r r o r i n law i n t h e circumstances [ c i t a t i o n s omitted . I " Taylor v. County Comm'rs ( 1 9 5 4 ) , 128 Mont. 102, 111-12, 270 P.2d 994, 999, quoting Grant v. Michaels ( 1 9 3 3 ) , 94 Mont. 452, 459-60, 23 P.2d 266, 269. E s p e c i a l l y with r e s p e c t t o mandamus, abuse of d i s c r e t i o n cannot be s a i d t o e x i s t without a c l e a r showing t h a t t h e e n t i t y being challenged f a i l e d t o render a f a i r and h o n e s t judgment i n t h e m a t t e r b e f o r e it. See S t a t e ex r e l . S c o l l a r d v. Board of Examiners f o r Nurses ( 1 9 1 6 ) , 52 Mont. 91, 98, 156 P. 124, 126. The burden is on t h e p a r t y a t t a c k i n g t h e b o a r d ' s or d e p a r t m e n t ' s a c t i o n s t o prove such an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . S c o l l a r d , s u p r a . -- The a p p e l l a n t m a i n t a i n s t h a t t h e department abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n t h r e e ways: (1) by f a i l i n g t o a c t upon t h e assign- ment i n a t i m e l y manner; ( 2 ) by adding c o n d i t i o n s f o r approving t h e assignment t h a t do not appear i n s t a t u t e ; and ( 3 ) by f a i l i n g t o n o t i f y t h e a p p e l l a n t t h a t t h e r e n t on t h e land was due and payable. With r e s p e c t t o t i m e l i n e s s , a p p e l l a n t a c t u a l l y makes two arguments. F i r s t , he s e i z e s upon a s t a t e m e n t made by one of t h e r e s p o n d e n t ' s employees t h a t most assignments were acted upon w i t h i n two weeks of r e c e i p t . A p p e l l a n t argues t h a t t h i s is a hard-and-fast r u l e , and t h a t by f a i l i n g t o a c t w i t h i n two weeks of r e c e i p t of t h e assignment on J a n u a r y 29, 1982, t h e department abused its d i s c r e t i o n . I n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e , t h e a p p e l l a n t argues t h a t even i f t h e department d i d not have a s t r i c t time l i m i t r u l e f o r a c t i n g upon assignments, t h e mere l a c k of such a r u l e would amount t o an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . W e r e j e c t both arguments. I n t h e f i r s t i n s t a n c e , it was never s t i p u l a t e d by e i t h e r p a r t y t h a t respondent had a " r u l e " r e q u i r i n g a two week turnover on assignments. I n f a c t , t h e employee r e s p o n s i b l e f o r i n i t i a l review of assignments s t a t e d t h a t t h e "two week review" p r o c e s s was a s p i r a t i o n a l and n o t always a c h i e v a b l e , depending on t h e time taken by h i s s u p e r i o r s i n t h e department f o r f i n a l approval. Furthermore, t h e depart- ment had a heavy workload during t h e p e r i o d t h e assignment was r e c e i v e d , and, i n a d d i t i o n , needed more time t o c o n t a c t t h e a p p e l l a n t and determine what excuses he had, i f any, f o r h i s h i s t o r y of l a t e payments. T h i s Court w i l l n o t d i s a g r e e with t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e department should a c t a s p r u d e n t l y a s p o s s i b l e w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e handling of l e a s e assignments. But w e f i n d no evidence s u g g e s t i n g even a h i n t of a r b i t r a r y and c a p r i c i o u s behavior on t h e p a r t of respondent o r i t s employees. Furthermore, t h e i n s i s t e n c e on an a b s o l u t e time l i m i t f o r a c t i n g upon assignments is unwarranted and is c o n t r a r y t o t h e t r u s t e e ' s need t o e x e r c i s e broad d i s c r e t i o n with r e s p e c t t o d i s p o s i t i o n of school l a n d s . I f adopted, an a b s o l u t e r u l e would soon run up a g a i n s t t h e r e a l i t i e s of t i g h t agency budgets, s t a f f s h o r t a g e s , and time c o n s t r a i n t s . Respondent is c o r r e c t i n a s s e r t i n g t h a t " [t] h e r e is no way t h a t s u f f i c i e n t r u l e s could be d r a f t e d i n a n t i c i p a t i o n of every contingency." W e a l s o r e j e c t a p p e l l a n t ' s argument t h a t t h e respondent r e l i e d on t h e l a c k of a time l i m i t t o a l l o w e x p i r a t i o n of t h e u n d e r l y i n g l e a s e , t h u s rendering t h e assignment a moot i s s u e . There was no evidence of such r e l i a n c e p r e s e n t e d a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court h e a r i n g , and we r e f u s e t o i n f e r such r e l i a n c e now. A p p e l l a n t ' s argument concerning a d d i t i o n a l and unlawful con- d i t i o n s a t t a c h e d t o approval of t h e assignment must a l s o be d i s m i s s e d . I t seems w e l l w i t h i n t h e r e s p o n d e n t ' s d i s c r e t i o n a r y a u t h o r i t y a s a t r u s t e e t o examine t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s record a s a l e a s e h o l d e r and determine whether or not approval of t h e assign- ment would " s e c u r e t h e l a r g e s t measure of l e g i t i m a t e and reason- a b l e advantage t o t h e s t a t e . " Simply because t h e s t a t u t e and r e g u l a t i o n d i d not i n c l u d e p r o v i s i o n s r e s p e c t i n g t h e e v a l u a t i o n of a p a r t y ' s w i l l i n g n e s s and a b i l i t y t o make t i m e l y payments does n o t remove them from t h e list of c r i t e r i a t h a t a f i d u c i a r y could c o n s i d e r when a c t i n g upon a proposed assignment. Admittedly, t h e a p p e l l a n t p r o b a b l y does not l i k e t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s , b u t t h i s Court w i l l n o t compel a s t a t e agency t o make a p a r t i c u l a r d e c i s i o n w i t h r e s p e c t t o a m a t t e r when t h a t agency e x e r c i s e s its own judgment and d i s c r e t i o n , and has not v i o l a t e d any s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n s o r engaged i n f r a u d u l e n t a c t i o n . See S t a t e v. S t a t e Board of E q u a l i z a t i o n ( 1 9 2 0 ) , 56 Mont. 413, 450, 454, 185 P. 708, 186 P. 697, 699, c i t e d a p p r o v i n g l y i n -- Thompson, s u p r a , 147 Mont. a t 50, 409 P.2d a t 810. A p p e l l a n t ' s argument w i t h r e s p e c t t o n o t i c e is a l s o w i t h o u t m e r i t . A s a p r i o r l e s s e e , he knew o r should have known about t h e s t a t u t o r y d e a d l i n e s r e g a r d i n g payments. Moreover, t h e department was under no l e g a l duty t o g i v e n o t i c e t o t h e a p p e l l a n t , a s he was not t h e holder of record. The r e a l h o l d e r s , t h e Hawks, were n o t i f i e d and were aware of t h e r e n t due. The a p p e l l a n t o r t h e Hawks could have p a i d t h e r e n t b e f o r e A p r i l 1 and t h e r e b y k e p t t h e l e a s e a l i v e while awaiting f i n a l a c t i o n by t h e department on t h e assignment. C l e a r l y , t h e department f u l f i l l e d its l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n s . The a p p e l l a n t f a i l e d t o e x e r c i s e t h e r e a s o n a b l e o p p o r t u n i t i e s open t o him f o r o b t a i n i n g l a w f u l p o s s e s s i o n of t h e l e a s e h o l d . I n sum, we f i n d no evidence of a r b i t r a r y and c a p r i c i o u s a c t i o n on t h e p a r t of t h e department so a s t o j u s t i f y t h e e x t r a o r d i n a r y r e l i e f requested by t h e D i s t r i c t Court is a f f i r m e d . We concur: