Title: People v. Campa
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 99501
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: December 1, 2005

Docket No. 99501-Agenda 10-September 2005.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 							
BENJAMIN CAMPA, Appellee.
Opinion filed December 1, 2005.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	At issue is whether defendant, Benjamin Campa, received a
speedy trial as required by section 103-5 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/103-5 (West 2000)). The appellate
court held that he did not. 353 Ill. App. 3d 178. We granted the
State's petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)). For the
reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

BACKGROUND
	Defendant was arrested on August 19, 2001, following a traffic
accident. He was eventually charged with driving under the influence
of alcohol (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a) (2) (West 2000)), driving without
a license (625 ILCS 5/6-101 (West 2000)), and driving without
insurance (625 ILCS 5/3-707 (West 2000)). At his arraignment on
August 20, 2001, defendant filed a demand for a speedy trial in
accordance with the speedy-trial provision of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (725 ILCS 5/103-5 (West 2000)). The circuit court of
Cook County set bail at $5,000, but defendant was unable to post the
money required to make bail.
	On August 21, 2001, the Cook County sheriff's office placed
defendant in its "Electronic Home Monitoring Program." However,
on September 5, 2001, the Cook County sheriff's office transferred
defendant to the Day Reporting Center. In connection with the
transfer, defendant signed a document entitled "Agreement Governing
Transfer to the Day Reporting Center." The agreement specified
certain terms and conditions for defendant's participation in the Day
Reporting Center program, including the requirements that defendant
report to the Day Reporting Center as scheduled; attend all portions
of the Day Reporting Center program; and abide by all program rules.(1)
Lastly, the agreement warned that defendant's failure to comply with
the conditions contained therein "and any additional conditions shall
result in the revocation of this agreement and return to the Cook
County Department of Corrections." During the time that defendant
participated in the Day Reporting Center program, he reported to the
Day Reporting Center(2) Monday through Friday from 8 a.m. until 1:30
p.m.
	By agreement, the trial court scheduled defendant's trial for
December 21, 2001. On that day, the State represented to the court
that the arresting officer was in court, but the State's complaining
witnesses were not. The State requested a continuance. Defense
counsel made both an oral and a written demand for a speedy trial.
Defense counsel informed the court that defendant was not free on
bond, but had to report every day to the Day Reporting Center.
Because the court indicated its willingness to reconsider the amount
that had been set for defendant's bail, defense counsel moved for a
bond reduction. The court realized, however, that the court file on
another DUI case pending against defendant was missing. The court
then stated that it could not reduce the amount of bail without
reviewing the other file. Although defense counsel insisted that he was
ready to proceed to trial and demanded trial, the court continued the
case to January 31, 2002. The court indicated on the court file that the
complaining witness was not in court.
	On January 31, 2002, the State indicated that it was not ready to
proceed. Having filed a written demand for a speedy trial, defendant
stated that he was ready for trial and that he was demanding trial. The
trial court asked the State to check "term" and indicated that the trial
would be set to "term." The State requested that the court continue
the case to May 3, 2002, and the court granted the continuance.
	On May 3, 2002, defendant filed a petition for discharge pursuant
to section 103-5(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (725 ILCS
5/103-5(a) (West 2000)). Defendant stated that he had been in
continuous custody at the Cook County Department of Corrections
through the Cook County sheriff's Day Reporting Center program
since the date of his arrest. Since he had not caused, contributed to,
or acquiesced in any delay since December 21, 2001, and since more
than 120 days had elapsed from that date to the date of trial,
defendant maintained that he must be discharged.
	At the hearing on the petition, defendant cited People v. Moss,
274 Ill. App. 3d 77 (1995), as controlling authority. Pointing to the
holding in Moss that a defendant on electronic home monitoring is in
custody, defendant argued that he was likewise in custody. The State
distinguished Moss, arguing that electronic home monitoring is
custody, but day reporting is not. The trial court agreed with the
State. The court held that defendant was not in custody within the
meaning of the speedy-trial provision and denied the petition for
discharge.
	At trial, the State presented the testimony of the arresting officer
as its only evidence. Defendant did not call any witnesses and
presented only the evidence elicited in cross-examination of the
arresting officer. The court found defendant guilty of all charges.
	Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, again arguing that he
should have been tried within 120 days of December 21, 2001,
because he was in custody and not on bail or recognizance. Defendant
also argued that he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
The trial court denied the motion. The court opined that the State had
met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to all the
charges. On the speedy-trial challenge, the court ruled that defendant
was not in custody and was properly tried within 160 days of his
December 21, 2001, demand for trial. When defendant asked that the
court make a finding as to whether defendant was on bail or
recognizance, the court refused to do so. Instead, the court explained:
"[W]hat I'm saying is that for purposes of the speedy trial demand,
which would be made for someone who is in custody, that my finding
is that because he was on daily reporting, he was not in custody for
purposes of the Speedy Trial Act in determining and requiring the
State to proceed to trial within 120 days. That's my ruling. Okay."
	Subsequently, the court sentenced defendant to 24 months of
supervision, and fines totaling $425 on the charge of driving under the
influence of alcohol; supervision and a fine of $75 on the charge of
driving without insurance; and supervision and a fine of $55 on the
charge of driving without a license. The periods of supervision on the
charge of driving without insurance and the charge of driving without
a license were satisfied by the 15 days that defendant spent on
electronic home monitoring.
	The appellate court reversed. 353 Ill. App. 3d 178. Initially, the
court rejected the State's argument that the conditions placed on
defendant as a result of his participation in the day reporting program
were analogous to those imposed on a defendant on bail or
recognizance, and, consequently, the 160-day limit of section
103-5(b) should apply. The court noted that the circuit court is
responsible for either admitting a defendant to bail or placing him on
recognizance. 353 Ill. App. 3d at 183. In the present case, "the trial
court had no involvement in the decision to place defendant in the day
reporting program. The decision was made entirely by the sheriff's
department, and the sheriff's department alone determined the
conditions of defendant's 'release' into the program." 353 Ill. App. 3d
at 183. For this reason, the appellate court rejected "any suggestion
that defendant was 'on bail or recognizance' within the meaning of the
statute." 353 Ill. App. 3d at 183.
	The appellate court considered next defendant's contention that
he was "in custody" within the meaning of the speedy-trial provision.
While recognizing that the conditions of day reporting noted above
were far less onerous than physical confinement in the Cook County
Department of Corrections, the court concluded that defendant was
nevertheless in the custody of the sheriff's department and "in
custody" within the meaning of the speedy-trial statute. 353 Ill. App.
3d at 184. The court reasoned: "[I]t is unclear what legal recourse, if
any, defendant would have had if the sheriff's department had
unilaterally decided that he was no longer eligible for the day reporting
program or decided to discontinue the program entirely. Accordingly,
we must conclude that defendant remained under the control of the
sheriff's department, which retained the power to imprison defendant.
We are reluctant to find that the sheriff's release of defendant,
unauthorized by the trial court, circumvented the prophylactic effect
of the 120-day rule." 353 Ill. App. 3d at 184.
	The appellate court found support for its holding in this court's
opinion in People v. Simmons, 88 Ill. 2d 270 (1981), where a prisoner,
who was allowed six hours of independent day release at a shopping
center, was found to have escaped from a "penal institution" when he
failed to return to prison as scheduled. 353 Ill. App. 3d at 184. The
appellate court also relied on the holding in Moss, 274 Ill. App. 3d at
82, that a defendant on electronic home detention was properly found
guilty of possession of a controlled substance in a penal institution
where he sold cocaine to an informant. 353 Ill. App. 3d at 184. The
appellate court concluded that, for purposes of the speedy-trial
statute, an individual may be "in custody" despite enjoying
considerable freedom. 353 Ill. App. 3d at 184.
	We granted the State leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).
ANALYSIS
	The State argues that the appellate court committed error in
finding that defendant was in "custody" within the meaning of the
speedy-trial statute. In Illinois, a defendant possesses both
constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy trial. U.S. Const.,
amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §8; 725 ILCS 5/103-5
(West 2000). Although the constitutional and statutory provisions
"address similar concerns ***, the rights established by each are not
necessarily coextensive." People v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305, 326 (2000)
(citing People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 114 (1998), and People v.
Jones, 104 Ill. 2d 268, 286 (1984)). Under the constitutional
provisions, "whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial has been
violated depends on such factors as the length of the delay in trial, the
reasons for the delay, the defendant's assertion of the speedy-trial
right, and prejudice to the defendant caused by such delay." People v.
Staten, 159 Ill. 2d 419, 426 (1994), citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101, 116-17, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2192 (1972).
Under the statutory provision, proof of a violation "requires only that
the defendant has not been tried within the period set by statute and
that the defendant has not caused or contributed to the delays."
Staten, 159 Ill. 2d  at 426, citing People v. Richards, 81 Ill. 2d 454,
459 (1980). In the present case, defendant asserts only a violation of
his statutory right to a speedy trial.
	The speedy-trial statute provides in part:
			"(a) Every person in custody in this State for an alleged
offense shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction within
120 days from the date he was taken into custody unless
delay is occasioned by the defendant ***. Delay shall be
considered to be agreed to by the defendant unless he or she
objects to the delay by making a written demand for trial or
an oral demand for trial on the record.
			***
			(b) Every person on bail or recognizance shall be tried by
the court having jurisdiction within 160 days from the date
defendant demands trial unless delay is occasioned by the
defendant ***. ***
* * *
			(d) Every person not tried in accordance with subsections
(a), (b) and (c) of this Section shall be discharged from
custody or released from the obligations of his bail or
recognizance." 725 ILCS 5/103-5 (West 2000).
	In examining these statutory provisions, this court has held that
when a defendant remains in custody, the 120-day statutory period
begins to run automatically from the day the defendant is taken into
custody. The defendant need not make a formal demand for trial to
come within the purview of the statute. People v. Mayo, 198 Ill. 2d 530, 536 (2002). Contrarily, a defendant who is on bail or
recognizance must be tried by the court within 160 days from the date
the defendant demands trial. 725 ILCS 5/103-5(b) (West 2000). The
duty is upon the State to bring the defendant to trial within the
applicable statutory period. Mayo, 198 Ill. 2d  at 536 (citing People v.
Turner, 128 Ill. 2d 540, 550 (1989), and Jones, 104 Ill. 2d at 274). If
the State fails to do so, the defendant is entitled to have the charges
against him dismissed. 725 ILCS 5/103-5(d) (West 2000); Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d  at 114-15. The statute is to be liberally construed so as to give
effect to the constitutional right to a speedy trial. Mayo, 198 Ill. 2d  at
536; People v. Brown, 92 Ill. 2d 248, 258 (1982); People v. Pearson,
88 Ill. 2d 210, 216 (1981).
	The parties are in agreement that more than 120 days elapsed,
without delay attributable to defendant, between December 21, 2001,
the date when defendant objected to a continuance requested by the
State and made a written demand for trial, and May 3, 2002, the date
of the trial. Thus, our consideration of defendant's speedy-trial
challenge does not involve review of a determination by the trial court
as to whether a delay is attributable to defendant or the State. Rather,
our resolution of the speedy-trial issue depends on a determination as
to which subsection of the statute applies to defendant. If defendant
was in "custody" within the meaning of the statute, he was entitled to
be discharged. If defendant was "on bail or recognizance" within the
meaning of the statute, his trial was timely. The issue is one of
statutory interpretation, and our review is de novo. People v. Cosenza,
215 Ill. 2d 308, 314 (2005); Staten, 159 Ill. 2d  at 427.
	The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give
effect to the intention of the legislature. People v. Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d 336, 348 (2001); People v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36, 42 (2000). That
inquiry appropriately begins with the language of the statute. People
v. Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d 435, 443 (1997), citing People v. Hare, 119 Ill. 2d 441, 447 (1988). We afford the language of the statute its plain
and ordinary meaning (Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d  at 42; Brown, 92 Ill. 2d at
256) and construe the statute as a whole (People v. Jones, 211 Ill. 2d 140, 147 (2004); Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d at 348). We do not view
words and phrases in isolation but consider them in light of other
relevant provisions of the statute. Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d  at 348;
Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493,
504 (2000).
	In order to resolve the issue at bar, we consider first whether
defendant was in "custody" within the meaning of section 103-5(a) of
the speedy-trial statute. Initially, we note that the general definitions
section of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not contain a
definition of the word "custody." See 725 ILCS 5/102-1 et seq. (West
2000). Section 102-2 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/102-2 (West 2000))
refers the reader to the Criminal Code of 1961 for descriptions of
words or phrases not otherwise defined in the Code of Criminal
Procedure. Looking to the definitions section of the Criminal Code,
however, the word "custody" is not amongst the terms defined. In the
absence of a specific definition of the word "custody," we assume that
the legislature intended the word to have its ordinary and popularly
understood meaning. See Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d  at 349, citing People
v. Sheehan, 168 Ill. 2d 298, 306 (1995).
	Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines "custody"
as "judicial or penal safekeeping: control of a thing or person with
such actual or constructive possession as fulfills the purpose of the
law or duty requiring it: imprisonment or durance of persons or charge
of things." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 559 (1993).
Black's Law Dictionary defines "custody" in general as "[t]he care
and control of a thing or person for inspection, preservation, or
security." Black's Law Dictionary 412 (8th ed. 2004). Black's Law
Dictionary further defines and distinguishes between the terms
"physical custody" and "constructive custody." The term "physical
custody" is defined as "[c]ustody of a person (such as an arrestee)
whose freedom is directly controlled and limited." Black's Law
Dictionary 1183 (8th ed. 2004). The term "constructive custody" is
defined as "[c]ustody of a person (such as a parolee or probationer)
whose freedom is controlled by legal authority but who is not under
direct physical control." Black's Law Dictionary 412 (8th ed. 2004).
	The appellate court referenced commentary in an earlier edition
of Black's Law Dictionary that " 'The term [custody] is very elastic
and may mean actual imprisonment or physical detention or mere
power, legal or physical, of imprisoning or of taking manual
possession.' " 353 Ill. App. 3d at 182, quoting Black's Law
Dictionary 347 (5th ed. 1979). The appellate court believed that the
legislature intended to adopt the "elastic meaning when it used the
term 'custody' in the speedy-trial statute." Consequently, the court
held that, while participating in the Day Reporting Center program,
defendant remained in the custody of the sheriff's department and "in
custody" within the meaning of the speedy-trial statute. 353 Ill. App.
3d at 182-85. Upon examination of various provisions of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, review of case law interpreting those provisions,
and reference to the dictionary definitions cited above, we agree with
the appellate court that the legislature did not intend that the term
"custody," as it is used in the speedy-trial statute, be equated to
confinement. Rather, we believe that the legislature intended the term
"custody" to have a broad meaning and encompass lesser forms of
restraint than confinement. The legislature intended that the term
"custody" evolve with the changing programs in our correctional
institutions.
	Like the appellate court, we are aware that the conditions of the
Day Reporting Center program are not as onerous as the conditions
of confinement in a correctional institution. Nevertheless, the Day
Reporting Center program is a form of restraint that falls within the
broad meaning of the term "custody." The basic concept of the Day
Reporting Center program is to acclimate the participant to the daily
routine of reporting to a strictly supervised environment, where he is
expected to adhere to a schedule and engage in productive activities.
Every participant in the program is subject to mandatory daily
attendance and drug testing. We note that a participant's attendance
is not limited to a brief "check-in" at a center. Instead, the participant
must spend at least three hours and possibly as many as nine hours at
the center each day. Any offender who fails to adhere to the rules of
the program is reincarcerated.
	We conclude that, as a participant in the Day Reporting Center
program, defendant was in the "custody" of the Cook County
Department of Corrections and the Department of Community
Supervision and Intervention. Significant restraints were placed on
defendant's liberty. Defendant reported to a jail facility on a daily
basis. Monday through Friday, he was expected to be at the facility
from 8 a.m. until 1:30 p.m.
	We find support for our construction of the speedy-trial statute
in previous decisions of this court reviewing the meaning of the terms
"custody" and "escape" within the context of the Criminal Code. In
Simmons, 88 Ill. 2d 270, the court considered whether a defendant on
independent day release had escaped from custody. The defendant was
committed to the Illinois Department of Corrections for several
felonies and eventually transferred to the Peoria Community
Correctional Center. While at the Correctional Center, he was allowed
six hours of independent day release to go shopping. An employee of
the Correctional Center drove him to a local shopping center and left
him, unaccompanied. The defendant was to call in every two hours
and his brother was to drive him back to the Center. The defendant
called once and never returned to the Center. He was eventually
arrested in Iowa and prosecuted for escape under section 31-6 of the
Criminal Code. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 31-6 (now 720 ILCS
5/31-6 (West 2004)).(3)
	On appeal, the defendant contended that he could not properly be
charged under section 31-6 of the Criminal Code. He maintained that
what he did was not an "escape," but only a "failure to return."
Further, he argued that the Correctional Center was not a "penal
institution" from which he could escape. The court rejected the
defendant's arguments. Initially, the court observed that a broad
meaning for the word "escape" was consistent with both the word's
standard legal usage and the word's ordinary usage. The court noted
that, at common law, "the crime of escape required no force, and
could be committed, for example, with the connivance of the jailer; it
consisted simply of an unlawful departure from custody, or the act of
a prisoner in gaining liberty before being released in due course of
law." Simmons, 88 Ill. 2d  at 273. The court also referenced the
definition of "escape" in Webster's Third New International
Dictionary as the " 'evasion of or deliverance from what confines,
limits, or holds *** specif: an unlawful departure of a prisoner from
the limits of his custody esp. when without prison breach ***.' "
Simmons, 88 Ill. 2d  at 273.
	The court held that defendant had escaped from the custody of
a penal institution. The court reasoned,
			"The defendant was committed to the Department of
Corrections and sent to the Peoria Community Correctional
Center. However much the limits of his confinement were
temporarily enlarged, or the restrictions on his conduct
temporarily lessened, he was still legally in the custody of
the Center, and had a legal duty to submit to that custody.
When he exceeded the lawful limits of his liberty, whether by
stepping across the invisible boundary around the shopping
center or by standing still while the boundary, with the
passage of time, shrank to the physical confines of the Peoria
Community Correctional Center itself, he escaped from the
Center." (Emphasis added.) Simmons, 88 Ill. 2d  at 273-74.
In the court's view, "the mechanics of confinement" did not "have any
special significance. The obvious explanation for work-release centers,
such as the institution the defendant absconded from, not being
expressly mentioned in the definition of 'penal institution' is that when
the Criminal Code of 1961 was written, there were no such
institutions. It was not until 1967 that the legislature authorized
halfway houses and work-release centers. [Citation.]" Simmons, 88 Ill. 2d  at 274. The court concluded, "the idea of a penal institution is
broad enough to encompass new varieties as they are developed.
[Citation.] Nor does the temporary release of inmates from the Center
detract from its status as a penal institution. Inmates may be
furloughed from a penitentiary, unquestionably a penal institution."
Simmons, 88 Ill. 2d  at 274.
	In People v. Marble, 91 Ill. 2d 242 (1982), the court revisited the
issue of escape from a penal institution. Defendant Marble was serving
a term of imprisonment with a provision for work release at the
Chicago Work Release Center of the Cook County Department of
Corrections in the Cook County jail. He was allowed to leave the
Cook County jail on work release with the requirement that he return
by 8 p.m. He failed to return. Defendant Cole was at the Peoria
Community Correctional Center serving a term on work release for
burglary. He was allowed to leave the Center on work release on a
Friday. Normally, he would have been required to return that evening,
but he was given unescorted furlough leave until the Monday
morning. While reporting by telephone to the Center, Cole was told
that he had violated conditions of his work release and that he had to
return immediately. He failed to return and was apprehended 14
months later. Following the reasoning of Simmons, the court held both
Marble and Cole were properly convicted of violating section 31-6(a)
of the Criminal Code. The court considered the Peoria Community
Correctional Center and the Chicago Work Release Center of the
Cook County Department of Corrections to be penal institutions.
	Shortly after the court's opinions in Simmons and Marble, the
legislature amended the Criminal Code to confirm that the failure to
return from furlough or from work and day release constitutes escape.
As amended, section 31-6 of the Criminal Code provided in part:
			"Escape. (a) A person convicted of a felony, or charged
with the commission of a felony who intentionally escapes
from any penal institution or from the custody of an
employee of that institution commits a Class 2 felony;
however, a person convicted of a felony or charged with the
commission of a felony who knowingly fails to return from
furlough or from work and day release is guilty of a Class 3
felony.
			(b) A person convicted of a misdemeanor or charged with
the commission of a misdemeanor who intentionally escapes
from any penal institution or from the custody of an
employee of that institution commits a Class A misdemeanor;
however, a person convicted of a misdemeanor or charged
with the commission of a misdemeanor who knowingly fails
to return from furlough or from work and day release is
guilty of a Class B misdemeanor.
			(c) A person in the lawful custody of a peace officer who
intentionally escapes from custody commits a Class A
misdemeanor." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 31-6.
Three additional amendments of section 31-6 are relevant to our
analysis. In 1985, the legislature amended the statute to provide that
the failure to report for imprisonment constitutes escape. In the
second clauses of subsection (a) and subsection (b), the legislature
substituted the words "who knowingly fails to report to a penal
institution or to report for periodic imprisonment at any time or
knowingly fails to" for the words "or charged with the commission of
a felony who knowingly fails to." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par.
31-6. By amendment effective January 1, 1997, the legislature
provided that the failure "to abide by the terms of home confinement"
constitutes escape. 720 ILCS 5/31-6 (West 1998). Lastly, the
legislature rewrote subsection (c) of the statute to provide that "[a]
person in the lawful custody of a peace officer for the alleged
commission of a felony offense and who intentionally escapes from
custody commits a Class 2 felony; however, a person in the lawful
custody of a peace officer for the alleged commission of a
misdemeanor offense who intentionally escapes from custody commits
a Class A misdemeanor." 720 ILCS 5/31-6(c) (West 1998).
	Since escape is the unauthorized departure from custody
(Simmons, 88 Ill. 2d at 272-73), a defendant cannot escape unless he
is first in custody. Thus, reference to the escape provision of the
Criminal Code, and the amendments thereto, supports our
construction of the term "custody" as used in the speedy-trial statute.
The escape statute shows that the legislature intended the crime of
escape to evolve with the changing terms of detention used as part of
the programs at our correctional institutions. A defendant must
necessarily be in "custody" while participating in these programs if he
is to be held accountable for "escape" for failure to comply with the
terms of the programs.
	Notwithstanding the above, citing People ex rel. Morrison v.
Sielaff, 58 Ill. 2d 91 (1974), and People v. Ramos, 138 Ill. 2d 152
(1990), the State suggests we hold that a defendant is in "custody"
only when confined in a prison or jail. Both cases are inapposite. In
Morrison, the petitioner was arrested and shortly thereafter released
on bail. Following his conviction, he was sentenced to a term of one
to three years in prison. He sought to have the period of nearly five
months when he was released on bail applied as a sentence credit. In
rejecting the petitioner's request, the court first considered the
meaning of the term "custody" as used in the Unified Code of
Corrections. The court noted that the Unified Code of Corrections
does not specifically define the term "custody." Morrison, 58 Ill. 2d 
at 93. However, "[a]rticle 8 of chapter V of the Unified Code of
Corrections contains several provisions in which the term 'custody'
necessarily must be construed as relating to confinement." Morrison,
58 Ill. 2d  at 93. The court next considered the provisions for bail in
the Code of Criminal Procedure. The court noted that "bail is defined
as the security necessary to release a person from 'custody.' "
Morrison, 58 Ill. 2d  at 94. Further, if a person forfeits his bond, he
may "not be bailable on the same felony charge after he is
subsequently taken into 'custody.' " Morrison, 58 Ill. 2d  at 94. The
court concluded that the term "custody" as used in the Unified Code
of Corrections is not synonymous with the term "bail" as used in the
Code of Criminal Procedure. Morrison, 58 Ill. 2d  at 94. The petitioner
was not entitled to the sentence credit because he was not in
"custody" during the period of time that he was released on bail.
Morrison, 58 Ill. 2d  at 94.
	In Ramos, 138 Ill. 2d 152, the defendant was released from
custody under a $50,000 recognizance bond. As a condition of the
bond, the defendant was not to leave his residence unless he first
obtained permission to do so from either his probation officer or the
court. The trial court sentenced the defendant to a term of four years'
imprisonment, and denied his request that his sentence be reduced by
the days that he spent in home confinement following his release on
bond. On appeal, the court reaffirmed the ruling in Morrison "that the
term 'custody,' as it is used in the credit-against-sentence provision of
section 5-8-7(b), 'does not include the period of time during which
the defendant was released on bail but is predicated upon his
confinement.' " Ramos, 138 Ill. 2d  at 158, quoting Morrison, 58 Ill. 2d  at 94. The court went on to hold "the legislature intended in
section 5-8-7(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections to distinguish
between defendants who are in custody and those who are released on
bond, subject to the conditions of the bond. We therefore cannot
conclude that the term 'custody,' as it is used in section 5-8-7(b), was
intended to encompass the period of time during which a defendant is
released on bond, regardless of the restrictions that might be imposed
on him during that time." Ramos, 138 Ill. 2d  at 160.
	We decline the State's invitation to apply the reasoning of
Morrison and Ramos in the present context. Both Morrison and
Ramos involved a defendant who was admitted to bond. This is a
distinction of note since, hereinafter, we hold that defendant was not
on bail or recognizance while participating in the Day Reporting
Center program. Further, both Morrison and Ramos involved the
meaning of the term "custody" as used in the credit-against-sentence
provision of the Unified Code of Corrections. The court carefully
limited the opinions to the context of the Unified Code of Corrections.
See Morrison, 58 Ill. 2d at 93-94; Ramos, 138 Ill. 2d  at 158-62.
	Turning to the language of the speedy-trial statute, and, in
particular, the use of term "recognizance," the State argues that a
pretrial detainee who is released from the Cook County Department
of Corrections by the Cook County sheriff is released on his own
"recognizance" and is therefore subject to the 160-day provision of
the statute. Again, we disagree.
	The Code of Criminal Procedure provides structure for the
release of a defendant on bail or recognizance. Section 102-6 of the
Code defines bail as
			"the amount of money set by the court which is required
to be obligated and secured as provided by law for the release
of a person in custody in order that he will appear before the
court in which his appearance may be required and that he
will comply with such conditions as set forth in the bail
bond." 725 ILCS 5/102-6 (West 2000).
Section 109-1(b)(4) provides that the judge shall "[a]dmit the
defendant to bail in accordance with the provisions of Article 110 of
this Code." 725 ILCS 5/109-1(b)(4) (West 2000). In turn, section
110-4 of article 110 defines a bailable offense, and section 110-5
provides for the determination of the amount of monetary bail or
conditions of release. See 725 ILCS 5/110-4, 110-5 (West 2000).
Lastly, section 110-6 provides that "the court before which the
proceeding is pending may increase or reduce the amount of bail or
may alter the conditions of the bail bond or grant bail where it has
been previously revoked or denied." 725 ILCS 5/110-6 (West 2000).(4)
We note that a violation of the bail bond is punishable as a separate
offense under section 32-10 of the Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/32-10
(West 2000)).
	Section 102-19 of the Code of Criminal Procedure contains the
definition of recognizance. It provides,
			" 'Recognizance' means an undertaking without security
entered into by a person by which he binds himself to comply
with such conditions as are set forth therein and which may
provide for the forfeiture of a sum set by the court on failure
to comply with the conditions thereof." 725 ILCS 5/102-19
(West 2000).
And section 110-2 provides when it is appropriate for the court to
release a defendant on recognizance:
			"Release on own recognizance. When from all the
circumstances the court is of the opinion that the defendant
will appear as required either before or after conviction and
the defendant will not pose a danger to any person or the
community and that the defendant will comply with all
conditions of bond, which shall include the defendant's
current address with a written admonishment to the
defendant that he or she must comply with the provisions of
Section 110-12 of this Code regarding any change in his or
her address, the defendant may be released on his or her own
recognizance. *** A failure to appear as required by such
recognizance shall constitute an offense subject to the penalty
provided in Section 32-10 of the 'Criminal Code of 1961'
*** for violation of the bail bond, and any obligated sum
fixed in the recognizance shall be forfeited ***." 725 ILCS
5/110-2 (West 2000).
	In the present case, the trial court did not release defendant on his
own recognizance. Rather, the trial court determined that defendant
should be released on bail of $5,000. Defendant was unable to post
the money required for his release. When informed at the hearing on
December 21, 2001, that defendant was unable to raise the funds to
post bail, the trial court indicated a willingness to review the amount
of bail. However, the court file on a related case against defendant
was missing. The trial court stated that it could not reduce bail
without reviewing the other file.
	Contrary to the plain language of these statutory provisions, the
State would have us hold that the sheriff of Cook County may release
a defendant on his or her own recognizance even though the trial
court has declined to do so and has set bail for the defendant. In
support, the State notes that the speedy-trial statute does not specify
that a court is the only authority that may release a defendant on bail
or recognizance. While it is true that the speedy-trial statute does not
specify that a sheriff may not release a defendant on bail or
recognizance, the statute must be read in conjunction with the
provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure related to bail and
recognizance. The definitions of bail and recognizance noted above,
and the statutory framework provided for the release of a defendant
on bail or recognizance, leave no doubt that the trial court is
responsible for setting and modifying bail and releasing a defendant on
his or her own recognizance.
	The State also contends that the statutory definition of
"recognizance" is not restricted to court action. The State argues:
		"The basic definitional statement: 'An undertaking without
security entered into by a person by which he binds himself to
comply with such conditions as are set forth therein,'
contains no reference to the party to whom the defendant
'binds himself.' It is only in the second clause that the 'court'
becomes a necessary actor-'and which may provide for the
forfeiture of a sum,' if indeed, one were set by the trial
court." (Emphasis in original.)
The State concludes that "[w]hile the court 'may provide for the
forfeiture of a sum set by the court on a failure to comply with the
conditions thereof,' this is clearly a disjunctive clause that does not act
to limit the basic definition of recognizance."
	We must decline the State's invitation to read the "and" in the
statutory definition of recognizance as an "or." Even if we were to do
so, however, we could not ignore section 110-2 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. The section provides that a defendant may be
released on his or her own recognizance "[w]hen from all the
circumstances the court is of the opinion that the defendant will
appear as required either before or after conviction and the defendant
will not pose a danger to any person or the community and that the
defendant will comply with all conditions of bond." (Emphasis added.)
725 ILCS 5/110-2 (West 2000).
	Next, the State argues that a release by the sheriff of Cook
County is no different than a release by the trial court, given that "the
conditions of release are equivalent." Whether a sheriff adopts
conditions for its programs that are similar to the conditions that the
trial court may impose upon a defendant in the bail bond is not
controlling, however. Certainly, a sheriff cannot substitute his or her
authority for that of the trial court merely by holding a defendant to
conditions similar to those a court may impose.
	Turning from the statutory language, the State notes that the
sheriff of Cook County is authorized to release pretrial detainees on
recognizance under the terms of a federal consent decree. See Duran
v. Elrod, 713 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1983). The State argues the federal
district court has thus "defined" the term recognizance and that
definition must prevail, lest the courts of this state violate the
supremacy clause. U.S. Const., art. VI. The State concludes that the
"authority" given the sheriff of Cook County under the terms of the
federal consent decree cannot be countermanded by state law.
	The federal district court entered the consent decree at issue in
a class action filed by pretrial detainees in the custody of the Cook
County Department of Corrections. The pretrial detainees alleged that
the administrators of the Cook County jail violated their rights under
the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States
Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV) by failing to provide
safe and humane conditions of confinement. After extensive discovery
and negotiations, the parties entered into the decree at issue, which
called, in part, for the renovation and modernization of the county jail
facilities and the appointment of a monitor to review and evaluate the
implementation of the consent decree. Faced subsequently with a
report from the monitor that the goals outlined in the consent decree
had not been achieved, the federal district court ordered a cap on the
population of the Department of Corrections at 4,500 inmates and
called for the parties to submit criteria for the release of inmates in
order to reach the cap. When county officials failed to submit any
release criteria, the district court ordered that if compliance with the
consent decree "requires a reduction in inmate population at the
[Department of Corrections] at any time after April 15, 1983 and if no
Illinois state court of competent jurisdiction has then specified a
different method of selecting the persons to be released to accomplish
such reduction, Sheriff Elrod and Director Hardiman are directed to
release on their own recognizance the persons held in default of the
lowest amount of bail, and among persons held on the same amount
of bail the ones who have been confined for the longest time." Duran,
713 F.2d  at 294. The low-bond detainees, those held on bond of $500
or less, averaged over 800 inmates in the county facilities from August
to November 1982 and represented 60% of the increase in the jail
population in 1982. Duran, 713 F.2d  at 298.(5)
	We are not at all persuaded that the district court's reference to
the word "recognizance" in the consent decree must be given
precedential value in the context at bar. This more so when neither the
district court nor the court of appeals was asked to consider any issue
related to the speedy-trial statute. We note that in choosing the criteria
for implementation of the population cap, the district court did not
foreclose other avenues for alleviation of the overcrowding at the
county facilities and improvement of the conditions of confinement.
Indeed, the district court stated that its "order leaves the primary and
direct responsibility with the state court judiciary, where both the
litigants and this Court agree it belongs." Duran, 713 F.2d  at 294.
"The March 22 Opinion and Order clearly indicated that the district
court was aware of, and sensitive to, the need to strike a proper
balance between the integrity of the Consent Decree and the principles
of federalism. *** The district court, when it set the 'cap,' clearly left
to the appropriate state and county agencies the determination of the
means to reach the population 'cap.' " Duran, 713 F.2d  at 297.
	We also fail to see the relevance of the supremacy clause to the
consideration of the issue at bar. Under subsection (a) of the speedy-trial statute, a defendant who has not caused or contributed to delays
must be tried within 120 days from the date he was taken into
custody. 725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 2000). Under subsection (b) of
the statute, a defendant who has not caused or contributed to delays
must be tried within 160 days from the date the defendant demands
trial. 725 ILCS 5/103-5(b) (West 2000). To the extent that the goal
of the consent decree and the district court's subsequent orders
implementing the population cap is to alleviate overcrowding at the
county facilities, it would seem best to bring the detainees to trial
within the shorter period of time provided by statute rather than the
longer period of time. The pretrial detainees will either be found not
guilty and released from the county facilities or be found guilty and
committed to the Illinois Department of Corrections. Either result
would lessen the pressure of overcrowding at the county facilities. In
our opinion, a requirement that participants in the Day Reporting
Center program are brought to trial within the shorter statutory period
does no violence to the consent decree.
	Next, the State advances an equal protection argument in support
of its position. The State maintains "[t]he appellate court's holding in
this case has resulted in a glaring dichotomy with potential equal
protection implications-the establishment of two classes of defendants
identically situated yet subject to different provisions of the Speedy
Trial Act." Defendant responds that the State has not satisfied the
threshold requirement for alleging an equal protection claim.
Defendant notes that the equal protection clause does not forbid the
legislature from drawing proper distinctions in legislation among
different categories of people. Defendant asserts that "the State has
failed to demonstrate that the two groups of pre-trial defendants are
similarly situated, let alone, as claimed by the State, 'identically
situated.' "
	We need not review the differences between a defendant who has
been released on bail by the trial court and a defendant who is
participating in a Day Reporting Center program. The State "is not
aggrieved by the alleged deprivation of equal protection and
consequently lacks standing to raise this issue." People v. Boykin, 94 Ill. 2d 138, 147 (1983). "One who would attack a statute as
unconstitutional must bring himself within the class as to whom the
law is unconstitutional." People v. Bombacino, 51 Ill. 2d 17, 20
(1972), citing City of Chicago v. Lawrence, 42 Ill. 2d 461 (1969);
People v. Hanke, 389 Ill. 602 (1945); Edelen v. Hogsett, 44 Ill. 2d 215 (1969).
	Having rejected the arguments advanced by the State with
respect to the Day Reporting Center program, we turn to a related
argument on electronic home monitoring. The State maintains that a
"pre-trial detainee who is released on electronic home monitoring" is
not in "custody" for purposes of the speedy-trial statute and the
credit-against-sentence provision of the Unified Code of Corrections.
The State admits that the "issue of whether or not pre-trial electronic
monitoring constitutes 'custody' was not raised on appeal" but argues
that consideration of the question is warranted.
	For several reasons, we will not address the issue on the merits.
First, the appellate court's reference to electronic home monitoring
was not a part of the holding of the case. The court merely noted, in
the background section of its opinion, that the parties did not "dispute
that defendant was 'in custody' for a period of 15 days while on
electronic home monitoring." 353 Ill. App. 3d at 179.(6) Second, in
filing its petition for leave to appeal, the State failed to comply with
Supreme Court Rules 315 and 341 (177 Ill. 2d R. 315; 188 Ill. 2d R.
341). These rules require that a party raise arguments and provide
citation to legal authority or to the record in the petition for leave to
appeal. Failure to comply with Rules 315 and 341 results in waiver.
People v. Carter, 208 Ill. 2d 309, 318 (2003). Third, whether
defendant was in "custody" during the 15-day period of electronic
home monitoring is not essential to the resolution of the speedy-trial
issue. When we subtract the 15 days from the total time not
attributable to defendant, we are left comfortably above the 120-day
period of subsection (a) of the speedy-trial statute. As a general rule,
a court of review will not decide moot or abstract questions or render
advisory opinions. Barth v. Reagan, 139 Ill. 2d 399, 419 (1990). A
decision is an advisory opinion if it cannot result in appropriate relief
to the prevailing party. In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482, 490-91
(1998); Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center, 179 Ill. 2d 1, 8
(1997). A court of review "also ordinarily will not consider issues
where they are not essential to the disposition of the cause or where
the result will not be affected regardless of how the issues are
decided." Barth, 139 Ill. 2d  at 419.
CONCLUSION
	For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
appellate court.
Appellate court judgment affirmed.
1.  ï»¿ 1 The appellate court opinion quotes the 
agreement in its entirety. 353 Ill.
App. 3d at 179-80.
2.   ï»¿ 2 Both at the hearing on the 
petition for discharge pursuant to the speedy-
trial statute and at the hearing on sentencing, the assistant public defender
identified the Cook County jail as the location where defendant was required
to report.
3.   ï»¿ 3 The statute provided in part:
  
"(a) A person convicted of a felony, or charged with the
commission of a felony who intentionally escapes from any penal
institution or from the custody of an employee of that institution
commits a Class 2 felony.
(b) A person convicted of a misdemeanor or charged with the
commission of a misdemeanor who intentionally escapes from any
penal institution or from the custody of an employee of that
institution commits a Class A misdemeanor.
(c) A person in the lawful custody of a peace officer who
intentionally escapes from custody commits a Class A
misdemeanor." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 316.
4.  ï»¿ 
4 See also People ex rel. Hemingway v. Elrod, 60 Ill. 2d 74 (1975), and
People v. Bailey, 167 Ill. 2d 210 (1995), discussing the right to bail under
section 9 of article I of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 and the court's
inherent power to deny bail.
     

5. ï»¿ 5 Because the trial court set defendant's bail at $5,000, 
defendant would
not have qualified as a low-bond detainee as contemplated by the federal
district court in its March 22 release order. As the number of people charged
with crime in Cook County continued to grow, however, the administrators
of the Cook County jail began to release detainees with higher bail, including
detainees awaiting trial on felony charges. This led to a number of accused
felons becoming fugitives and a modification of the district court's orders to
allow double bunking. See Duran v. Elrod, 760 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1985).   
             

6.  ï»¿ 6 The reference to electronic home monitoring 
may have been based on a
concession in the State's appellate brief. According to defendant, in its
appellate brief the State observed that " 157 [nonexcludable] days elapsed
between the time [defendant] demanded trial and his trial took place.' " We
also note that in the trial court the State argued that electronic home
monitoring is custody.