Title: Krieger v. Oreste
Citation: 218 Or. 256, 344 P.2d 541
Docket Number: N/A
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: October 7, 1959

Affirmed October 7, 1959.
Berkeley Lent, Portland, argued the cause for appellant. On the brief were Peterson, Pozzi &amp; Lent and Philip A. Levin, all of Portland.
Garner H. Talboy, Portland, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Leo Levenson, Portland.
*257 Before McALLISTER, Chief Justice, and LUSK, WARNER and MILLARD, Justices.
AFFIRMED.
McALLISTER, C.J.
This is an action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff, Charles Krieger, when his bicycle collided with the opened door of a taxicab operated by the defendant, Jay O. Oreste. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff for $7,500 and judgment was entered thereon. Thereafter defendant moved for judgment in his favor notwithstanding the verdict. The motion was allowed, the judgment for plaintiff was set aside and judgment was entered for defendant notwithstanding the verdict. The plaintiff appeals assigning as error only the granting of defendant's motion for judgment n.o.v.
The accident occurred on 5th street in Portland between Stark and Washington streets. Fifth street is a one-way street for southbound traffic and contains five lanes for traffic of which the lane next to the curb on each side is used for parking.
The accident happened at about 10:30 o'clock on Saturday morning, April 23, 1955. Traffic at that time was heavy. Plaintiff was 18 years old and had been employed as a delivery boy for about a year and a half. He made his deliveries on a bicycle.
Defendant was driving his cab south in the second lane from the west curb, or the lane next to the parked vehicles. After passing through the intersection of 5th and Stark streets, defendant brought his cab to a stop because of a line of traffic stopped ahead of him. The cab was then about five feet south of the intersection. Immediately to the right of the cab there was a loading zone extending south from the intersection *258 a distance of about 45 feet. The loading zone was in front of the First National Bank Building. No vehicles were parked in the loading zone but vehicles were parked south thereof.
The only passenger in the cab, a Mr. Love, was riding in the front seat with defendant. Defendant was taking Love to the Mead building, the entrance to which was on the west side of 5th street at about the middle of the block between Stark and Washington streets.
Plaintiff was riding his bicycle south on 5th street and was about 15 feet behind the cab when it stopped. The lane to the plaintiff's left, which was the center lane, was filled with traffic and plaintiff did not have sufficient room to pass the cab on its left side. When plaintiff saw that he could not pass the cab on its left side, he turned to the right into the loading zone intending to pass to the right of the cab. As plaintiff rode through the loading zone, the right front door of the cab opened in front of him. Plaintiff or his bicycle hit the door causing plaintiff to fall and suffer the injury complained of.
The door of the taxicab was opened by the passenger. The only evidence concerning the opening of the door was given by defendant and his passenger. On that point defendant testified as follows:
The testimony of the passenger was taken by deposition and concerning the opening of the door, he testified as follows:
Plaintiff has cited several authorities holding that one is negligent who, without giving any signals or keeping any lookout, opens a car door into a lane where traffic may be traveling. Hedman v. Morse, 278 Mass 437, 180 NE 240 (1932); Seiler v. Phila. R.T. Co., 111 Pa Super 69, 169 A 422 (1932); Martin v. Hooffstetter, *262 (Ohio App 1941) 42 NE2d 556; Tarrant v. Bottling Co., 221 NC 390, 20 SE2d 565 (1942). However, in all of these cases it was the driver himself who opened the door and not a passenger. The cases would support the proposition that the passenger, Mr. Love, was negligent in opening the door without keeping a lookout or giving a signal. We have not been cited to any case which holds that the negligence of a passenger in a case such as this can be imputed to the driver of the taxicab.
1, 2. Defendant can be held liable only on account of his own negligence. Here he was not in the act of discharging a passenger; on the contrary, the passenger acted on his own volition. We find no substantial evidence tending to prove that the defendant knew, or should have known, that the passenger intended to open the door in time to prevent him from so doing, or to warn plaintiff that the door was to be opened. As was said in Aune v. Oregon Trunk Railway, 151 Or 622, 627, 51 P2d 663:
We have carefully reviewed the record and agree with the trial judge that there was no substantial evidence to support a verdict for the plaintiff.
Affirmed.