Title: AES Corp. v. Steadfast Ins. Co.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 100764
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 20, 2012

Present:  All the Justices 
 
THE AES CORPORATION 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 100764 
JUSTICE S. BERNARD GOODWYN 
 
 
 
April 20, 20121 
STEADFAST INSURANCE COMPANY   
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY 
Benjamin N.A. Kendrick, Judge 
 
In this appeal from a judgment in a declaratory judgment 
action, we consider whether the circuit court erred in ruling 
that a civil complaint filed against The AES Corporation (AES) 
did not allege an “occurrence” as that term is defined in AES’s 
contracts of insurance with Steadfast Insurance Company 
(Steadfast), and that Steadfast, therefore, did not owe AES a 
defense or liability coverage. 
Background 
AES is a Virginia-based energy company that holds 
controlling interests in companies specializing in the 
generation and distribution of electricity in numerous states, 
including California.  Steadfast is an Illinois-based company 
and indirect subsidiary of Zurich Financial Services, a global 
insurance provider.  AES paid premiums to Steadfast for 
                     
1 The prior opinion rendered September 16, 2011, reported 
at 282 Va. 252, 715 S.E.2d 28 (2011), was set aside and thus 
withdrawn by the Court after a petition for rehearing was 
granted by Order of the Court dated January 17, 2012. 
commercial general liability (CGL) policies from 1996 to 2000 
and 2003 to 2008. 
In February 2008, the Native Village of Kivalina and City 
of Kivalina (Kivalina), a native community located on an 
Alaskan barrier island, filed a lawsuit (the Complaint) in the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of 
California against AES and numerous other defendants for 
allegedly damaging the village by causing global warming 
through emission of greenhouse gases.  See Native Vill. of 
Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F.Supp.2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 
2009).  AES requested Steadfast provide a defense and insurance 
coverage, pursuant to the terms of the CGL policies, for the 
claims alleged in the Complaint.  Steadfast provided AES a 
defense under a reservation of rights and filed a declaratory 
judgment action, which is the subject of this appeal, in the 
Circuit Court of Arlington County. 
 
In the declaratory judgment action, Steadfast claimed that 
it did not owe AES a defense or indemnity coverage for damage 
allegedly caused by AES’s contribution to global warming based 
on three grounds:  (1) the Complaint did not allege “property 
damage” caused by an “occurrence,” which was necessary for 
there to be coverage under the policies; (2) any alleged injury 
arose prior to the inception of Steadfast’s coverage; and (3) 
the claims alleged in the Complaint fell within the scope of 
the pollution exclusion stated in AES’s policies.  
The parties subsequently filed cross-motions for summary 
judgment, both claiming that whether Steadfast had a duty to 
defend AES against the Complaint could be decided by examining 
the “eight corners” of the Complaint and the CGL policies.  The 
circuit court denied AES’s motion for summary judgment and 
granted Steadfast’s motion for summary judgment, holding that 
the Complaint does not allege an “occurrence” as that term is 
defined in the CGL policies, and thus, the allegations in the 
Complaint are not covered under those policies.  
The Insurance Policies 
 
In each of the CGL policies AES purchased from Steadfast, 
Steadfast agreed to defend AES against suits claiming damages 
for bodily injury or property damage, if such damage “is caused 
by an ‘occurrence.’ ”  The policies define “occurrence” as 
follows:  “ ‘Occurrence’ means an accident, including 
continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same 
general harmful condition.”  The policies specify that 
Steadfast has no duty to defend or indemnify AES against damage 
suits to which the policies do not apply. 
The Complaint 
 
Kivalina is located on the tip of a small barrier reef on 
the northwest coast of Alaska, approximately seventy miles 
north of the Arctic Circle.  As pertinent to this appeal, in 
the Complaint, Kivalina alleges that AES engaged in energy-
generating activities using fossil fuels that emit carbon 
dioxide and other greenhouse gases, and that the emissions 
contributed to global warming, causing land-fast sea ice 
protecting the village’s shoreline to form later or melt 
earlier in the annual cycle.  This allegedly exposed the 
shoreline to storm surges, resulting in erosion of the 
shoreline and rendering the village uninhabitable. 
The Complaint alleges that AES “intentionally emits 
millions of tons of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases 
into the atmosphere annually.”  (Emphasis added.)  The 
Complaint further alleges that AES “knew or should have known 
of the impacts of [its] emissions” of carbon dioxide, but that 
“[d]espite this knowledge” of the “impacts of [its] emissions 
on global warming and on particularly vulnerable communities 
such as coastal Alaskan villages,” AES “continued [its] 
substantial contributions to global warming.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  Kivalina then dedicates sixteen pages and sixty-six 
paragraphs of its sixty-nine page Complaint to explaining 
global warming. 
The Complaint alleges a civil conspiracy by power, coal 
and oil companies to mislead the public about the science of 
global warming.  It states that “[d]espite the attempts by 
certain defendants to make the cause of climate change 
controversial in the popular media, there has been for many 
years an overwhelming scientific consensus that human activity 
that releases greenhouse gases is causing a change in the 
Earth’s climate.”  The Complaint alleges that there is “a clear 
scientific consensus that global warming is caused by emissions 
of greenhouse gases, primarily carbon dioxide from fossil fuel 
combustion and methane releases from fossil fuel harvesting.” 
The Complaint recounts published articles, books and 
testimony in which scientists have confirmed the existence of 
global warming, and discusses current and projected global 
warming impacts, stating that “[e]mpirical evidence underlies 
the scientific consensus that global warming has arrived.”  It 
then discusses the special injuries to Kivalina’s property 
interests allegedly resulting from global warming. 
The Complaint then states three claims for relief against 
AES.  Two causes of action are for nuisance and the other is 
for concert of action.  The first claim for relief is entitled 
“Federal Common Law:  Public Nuisance.”  In support of its 
claims for federal common law public nuisance, Kivalina asserts 
the following: 
 
251. Defendants’ greenhouse gas emissions are a 
direct and proximate contributing cause of global 
warming and of the injuries and threatened injuries 
Plaintiffs suffer. 
 
 
252. Defendants know or should know that their 
emissions of greenhouse gases contribute to global 
warming, to the general public injuries such heating 
will cause, and to Plaintiffs’ special injuries.  
Intentionally or negligently, defendants have 
created, contributed to, and/or maintained the public 
nuisance. 
 
 
253. Defendants, both individually and 
collectively, are substantial contributors to global 
warming and to the injuries and threatened injuries 
Plaintiffs suffer. 
 
. . . . 
 
 
255. Defendants knew that their individual 
greenhouse gas emissions were, in combination with 
emissions and conduct of others, contributing to 
global warming and causing injuries to entities such 
as the Plaintiffs. 
 
. . . . 
 
 
261.  Defendants are jointly and severally 
liable to Kivalina under the federal common law of 
public nuisance. 
 
 
The second claim for relief asserted against AES is 
entitled “State Law:  Private and Public Nuisance.”  Kivalina 
asserts as follows: 
 
264. Defendants’ emissions of carbon dioxide, by 
contributing to global warming, constitute a 
substantial and unreasonable interference with public 
rights, including, inter alia, the rights to use and 
enjoy public and private property in Kivalina. . . . 
 
 
265. Defendants have engaged and continue to 
engage in intentional or negligent acts or omissions 
that unreasonably interfere with the use and 
enjoyment of Plaintiffs’ properties, and/or work a 
substantial annoyance, inconvenience, or injury to 
the public, and are therefore liable under the 
applicable state statutory and/or common law of 
private and public nuisance. 
 
266. Defendants, individually and collectively, 
are substantial contributors to global warming and to 
the injuries and threatened injuries suffered by 
Plaintiffs. . . . 
 
267.  Defendants are jointly and severally 
liable to Plaintiffs under the applicable state 
statutory and/or common law of private and public 
nuisance. 
 
 
The other claim for relief against AES is entitled 
“Concert of Action.”  Kivalina alleges that the “[d]efendants 
have engaged in and/or are engaging in tortious acts in concert 
with each other or pursuant to a common design” in creating, 
contributing to and/or maintaining a public nuisance, 
specifically, global warming.  
Analysis 
We awarded AES an appeal on the following assignment of 
error: 
The trial court erred in summarily ruling that the 
underlying complaint did not allege an “occurrence” 
covered by the insurance policies. 
 
Both AES and Steadfast agree that it is a well-established 
principle, consistently applied in this Commonwealth, that only 
the allegations in the complaint and the provisions of the 
insurance policy are to be considered in deciding whether there 
is a duty on the part of the insurer to defend and indemnify 
the insured.  See Brenner v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 240 Va. 
185, 189, 192, 397 S.E.2d 100, 102, 104 (1990); Reisen v. Aetna 
Life & Cas. Co., 225 Va. 327, 331, 302 S.E.2d 529, 531 (1983); 
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Obenshain, 219 Va. 44, 46, 245 S.E.2d 
247, 249 (1978); Norman v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 218 Va. 718, 
724, 239 S.E.2d 902, 905-06 (1978); London Guar. & Accident Co. 
v. C. B. White & Bros., Inc., 188 Va. 195, 199-200, 49 S.E.2d 
254, 256 (1948); see also Town Crier, Inc. v. Hume, 721 F.Supp. 
99, 102 n.12 (E.D. Va. 1989) (“an insurer’s duty to defend is 
determined solely by the allegations in the pleadings”); 
American & Foreign Ins. Co. v. Church Schs. in the Diocese of 
Virginia, 645 F.Supp. 628, 631 n.1 (E.D. Va. 1986).  This 
principle is commonly known as the “eight corners rule” because 
the determination is made by comparing the “four corners” of 
the underlying complaint with the “four corners” of the policy, 
to determine whether the allegations in the underlying 
complaint come within the coverage provided by the policy.  See 
Copp v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 279 Va. 675, 682-83, 692 
S.E.2d 220, 224 (2010); America Online, Inc. v. St. Paul 
Mercury Ins. Co., 207 F.Supp.2d 459, 465-66 (E.D. Va. 2002). 
 
“[A]n insurer’s duty to defend . . . is broader than [the] 
obligation to pay, and arises whenever the complaint alleges 
facts and circumstances, some of which would, if proved, fall 
within the risk covered by the policy.”  Virginia Elec. & Power 
Co. v. Northbrook Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 252 Va. 265, 268-69, 
475 S.E.2d 264, 265-66 (1996) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted); see also Copp, 279 Va. at 682, 692 S.E.2d at 
224.  On the other hand, if it appears clearly that the insurer 
would not be liable under its contract for any judgment based 
upon the allegations, it has no duty even to defend.  Travelers 
Indem. Co., 219 Va. at 46, 245 S.E.2d at 249. 
The relevant policies provide coverage for damage 
resulting from an “occurrence,” and define an occurrence as “an 
accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to 
substantially the same general harmful condition.”  The terms 
“occurrence” and “accident” are “synonymous and . . . refer to 
an incident that was unexpected from the viewpoint of the 
insured.”  Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 223 Va. 
145, 147, 286 S.E.2d 225, 226 (1982).  We have held that an 
“accident” is commonly understood to mean “an event which 
creates an effect which is not the natural or probable 
consequence of the means employed and is not intended, 
designed, or reasonably anticipated.”  Lynchburg Foundry Co. v. 
Irvin, 178 Va. 265, 271, 16 S.E.2d 646, 648 (1941).  An 
accidental injury is one that “happen[s] by chance, or 
unexpectedly; taking place not according to the usual course of 
things; casual; fortuitous.”  Fidelity & Guar. Ins. 
Underwriters, Inc. v. Allied Realty Co., 238 Va. 458, 462, 384 
S.E.2d 613, 615 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Kivalina alleges that AES intentionally released tons of 
carbon dioxide and greenhouse gases into the atmosphere as part 
of its electricity-generating operations.  We have held that 
“[a]n intentional act is neither an ‘occurrence’ nor an 
‘accident’ and therefore is not covered by the standard 
policy.”  Utica Mut., 223 Va. at 147, 286 S.E.2d at 226; see 
Reisen, 225 Va. at 331-32, 302 S.E.2d at 531 (duty to defend 
excused when insured’s act of intentionally striking plaintiff 
fell within exclusion in policy); Travelers Indem. Co., 219 Va. 
at 47, 245 S.E.2d at 249 (insurer had no duty to defend where a 
complaint alleged only intentional torts).  If a result is the 
natural or probable consequence of an insured’s intentional 
act, it is not an accident.  See Resource Bankshares Corp. v. 
St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 407 F.3d 631, 637 (4th Cir. 2005). 
However, even though the insured’s action starting the 
chain of events was intentionally performed, when the alleged 
injury results from an unforeseen cause that is out of the 
ordinary expectations of a reasonable person, the injury may be 
covered by an occurrence policy provision.  20 Eric M. Holmes, 
Appleman on Insurance 2d § 129.2(I)(5) (2002 & Supp. 2009).  In 
such a context, the dispositive issue in determining whether an 
accidental injury occurred is not whether the action undertaken 
by the insured was intended, but rather whether the resulting 
harm is alleged to have been reasonably anticipated or the 
natural or probable consequence of the insured’s intentional 
act.  See id.; see also Fidelity & Guar. Ins., 238 Va. at 462, 
384 S.E.2d at 615.  For coverage to be precluded under a CGL 
policy because there was no occurrence, it must be alleged that 
the result of an insured’s intentional act was more than a 
possibility; it must be alleged that the insured subjectively 
intended or anticipated the result of its intentional act or 
that objectively, the result was a natural or probable 
consequence of the intentional act.  Thus, resolution of the 
issue of whether Kivalina’s Complaint alleges an occurrence 
covered by the policies turns on whether the Complaint can be 
construed as alleging that Kivalina’s injuries, at least in the 
alternative, resulted from unforeseen consequences that were 
not natural or probable consequences of AES’s deliberate act of 
emitting carbon dioxide and greenhouse gases. 
AES notes that the Complaint alleges that AES 
“[i]ntentionally or negligently” created the nuisance, global 
warming, and that the defendants’ concerted action in causing 
the nuisance “constitutes a breach of duty.”  (Emphasis added.)  
AES maintains that this language shows that Kivalina alleged in 
the Complaint both intentional and negligent tortious acts.  
Citing Parker v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 222 Va. 33, 278 S.E.2d 
803 (1981), AES asserts that an insured is entitled to a 
defense when negligence is alleged.  
AES further asserts that because the Complaint alleges 
that AES “knew or should know” that its activities in 
generating electricity would result in the environmental harm 
suffered by Kivalina, Kivalina alleges, at least in the 
alternative, that the consequences of AES’s intentional carbon 
dioxide and greenhouse gas emissions were unintended.  AES 
reasons that the damage alleged by Kivalina is therefore 
accidental from the viewpoint of AES and within the definition 
of an “occurrence” under the CGL policies.  In essence, AES 
argues that the damage to the village resulting from global 
warming caused by AES’s electricity-generating activities was 
accidental because such damage may have been unintentional.  
We disagree with AES.  Applying the “eight corners” rule, 
we must consider the terms of the relevant insurance policies 
and the allegations in the Complaint.  Unlike the policy at 
issue in Parker,2 the instant policies do not provide coverage 
or a defense for all suits against the insured alleging damages 
not caused intentionally.  Likewise, the policies in this case 
do not provide coverage for all damage resulting from AES’s 
negligent acts.  The relevant policies only require Steadfast 
                     
2 In Parker, the relevant policy, while excluding coverage 
for bodily injury or property damage caused intentionally, 
otherwise required the insurer to defend any suit against the 
insured alleging bodily injury or property damage.  222 Va. at 
34, 278 S.E.2d at 803. 
to defend AES against claims for damages for bodily injury or 
property damage caused by an occurrence or accident. 
In the Complaint, Kivalina plainly alleges that AES 
intentionally released carbon dioxide into the atmosphere as a 
regular part of its energy-producing activities.  Kivalina also 
alleges that there is a clear scientific consensus that the 
natural and probable consequence of such emissions is global 
warming and damages such as Kivalina suffered.  Whether or not 
AES’s intentional act constitutes negligence, the natural or 
probable consequence of that intentional act is not an accident 
under Virginia law. 
Kivalina alleges that AES knew or should have known the 
damage that its activities would cause, that AES was negligent 
if it did not know, and that AES was negligent in acting in 
concert with other defendants in creating a nuisance. 
However, allegations of negligence are not synonymous with 
allegations of an accident.  See Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. 
v. Overstreet, 568 F.Supp.2d 638, 651-52 (E.D. Va. 2008) (mere 
use of the word negligence does not compel a court to find that 
a claim was based on an “occurrence” under Virginia law); 16 
Holmes, Appleman on Insurance 2d § 116.4 (accident and 
negligence are not synonymous and not all negligent acts 
support a claim of accident).  In this instance, the 
allegations of negligence do not support a claim of an 
accident.  Even if AES were negligent and did not intend to 
cause the damage that occurred, the gravamen of Kivalina’s 
nuisance claim is that the damages it sustained were the 
natural and probable consequences of AES’s intentional 
emissions. 
 
The dissimilarity between the allegations in the Kivalina 
complaint and those in most other tort actions for bodily 
injury or property damage is the relevant intentional or 
negligent act alleged in the complaint.  Kivalina does not 
allege that AES’s intentional acts were done negligently.3  The 
complaint alleges that AES was “negligent” only in the sense 
that it “knew or should have known” that its actions would 
cause injury no matter how they were performed. 
                     
3 Accident and negligence are not mutually exclusive in 
most instances. See Fidelity & Guar. Ins., 238 Va. at 461, 384 
S.E.2d at 615 ("A loss resulting in part from an insured's 
negligence, however, may still come within the definition of a 
fortuitous loss.").  To prevail in an action for negligence, a 
plaintiff must prove the existence of a legal duty, a breach of 
the duty, and that the breach of the duty proximately caused 
his injury.  E.g., Atrium Unit Owners Ass'n v. King, 266 Va. 
288, 293, 585 S.E.2d 545, 548 (2003).  For a breach of a legal 
duty to proximately cause the plaintiff's injury, the injury 
must be the "natural and probable consequence" of the breach.  
Scott v. Simms, 188 Va. 808, 817, 51 S.E.2d 250, 253 (1949).  
In many instances the breach is the manner in which the act was 
done rather than the doing of the act.  What one alleges 
constituted the breach is key in discerning whether there is 
negligence that led to an accident in a particular instance. 
Hypothetical examples unfettered by the eight corners rule are 
not instructive concerning whether insurance coverage should or 
would be provided in a given situation. 
Under the CGL policies, Steadfast would not be liable 
because AES’s acts as alleged in the complaint were intentional 
and the consequences of those acts are alleged by Kivalina to 
be not merely foreseeable, but natural or probable.  Where the 
harmful consequences of an act are alleged to have been not 
just possible, but the natural or probable consequences of an 
intentional act, choosing to perform the act deliberately, even 
if in ignorance of that fact, does not make the resulting 
injury an “accident” even when the complaint alleges that such 
action was negligent. 
Kivalina asserts that the deleterious results of emitting 
carbon dioxide and greenhouse gases are something that AES knew 
or should have known about.  If an insured knew or should have 
known that certain results were the natural or probable 
consequences of intentional acts or omissions, there is no 
“occurrence” within the meaning of a CGL policy.  See 1 Barry 
R. Ostrager & Thomas R. Newman, Handbook on Insurance Coverage 
Disputes § 8.03[c] (15th ed. 2011) (citing City of Carter Lake 
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 604 F.2d 1052, 1058-59 (8th Cir. 
1979)); 20 Holmes, Appleman on Insurance 2d § 129(I)(5).  Even 
if AES were actually ignorant of the effect of its actions 
and/or did not intend for such damages to occur, Kivalina 
alleges its damages were the natural and probable consequence 
of AES’s intentional actions.  Therefore, Kivalina does not 
allege that its property damage was the result of a fortuitous 
event or accident, and such loss is not covered under the 
relevant CGL policies. 
Conclusion 
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the 
circuit court. 
Affirmed. 
 
JUSTICE MIMS, concurring.
 
I write separately because I believe the result reached in 
this case is dictated by our precedents but I disagree with the 
majority opinion that the reasoning can be limited to the four 
corners of the commercial general liability insurance (“CGL”) 
policies or the allegations of the complaint at issue here.  
Our jurisprudence, developed over more than a century, is 
leading inexorably to a day of reckoning that may surprise many 
policy holders. 
The majority opinion observes both that the CGL policies 
cover damage resulting from an “occurrence,” which is 
synonymous with “accident,” and that we have defined accident 
in various ways.  For example, an accident means “an incident 
that was unexpected from the viewpoint of the insured,” Utica 
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 223 Va. 145, 
147, 286 S.E.2d 225, 226 (1982), and “an event which creates an 
effect which is not the natural or probable consequence of the 
means employed and is not intended, designed, or reasonably 
anticipated.”  Lynchburg Foundry Co. v. Irvin, 178 Va. 265, 
271, 16 S.E.2d 646, 648 (1941). 
But this creates a dichotomy.  If the injurious 
consequence of an action is not the natural or probable 
consequence of the action, there can be no actionable 
negligence.  To prevail in an action for negligence, a 
plaintiff must prove the existence of a legal duty, a breach of 
the duty, and that the breach of the duty proximately caused 
his injury.  Atrium Unit Owners Ass’n v. King, 266 Va. 288, 
293, 585 S.E.2d 545, 548 (2003).  For a breach of legal duty to 
proximately cause the plaintiff’s injury, the injury must be 
“the natural and probable consequence” of the breach.  Scott v. 
Simms, 188 Va. 808, 817, 51 S.E.2d 250, 253 (1949); see also 
Jordan v. Jordan, 220 Va. 160, 162, 257 S.E.2d 761, 762 (1979) 
(“To constitute actionable negligence, there must be a legal 
duty, a breach thereof, and a consequent injury which could 
have been reasonably foreseen by the exercise of reasonable 
care and prudence.” (Emphasis added)). 
Thus the majority opinion is only half right when it 
states that “allegations of negligence are not synonymous with 
allegations of an accident.”  In fact, under the reasoning of 
our precedents, allegations of negligence and allegations of 
accident must be mutually exclusive.  The dichotomy is 
longstanding, appearing in a venerable 140-year-old definition 
of accident in which we said, “By the term accident is included 
not merely inevitable casualty or the act of Providence, or 
what is technically called vis major or irresistible force, but 
such unforeseen events, misfortunes, losses, acts or omissions 
as are not the result of any negligence or misconduct in the 
party.”  Byrne v. Edmonds, 64 Va. (23 Gratt.) 200, 210 (1873) 
(final emphasis added). 
Because “accident” is synonymous with “occurrence,” which 
is what these CGL policies cover, I concur with the majority 
that our precedents require us to conclude that they do not 
provide coverage for AES’s allegedly negligent acts.  However, 
there is no rationale to distinguish these policies from other 
CGL policies in which the insured risk is defined as an 
“occurrence.”1  An “occurrence,” is “[t]he fundamental event 
covered by the vast majority [of CGL] policies.”  Paul E.B. 
                     
1 This case is distinguishable from Parker v. Hartford Fire 
Insurance Co., 222 Va. 33, 278 S.E.2d 803 (1981), not because 
of a dissimilarity between the insurance policies but because 
of the dissimilarity between the causes of action.  The 
tortious act in that case was a trespass.  Id. at 35, 278 
S.E.2d at 804.  One may commit actionable trespass without 
intention or negligence because “[n]either wilfulness nor 
negligence is necessary to make a trespass on real estate a 
tort.”  Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Greaver, 110 Va. 350, 355, 
66 S.E. 59, 60 (1909).  Trespass therefore is essentially a 
strict liability offense, unlike the actions at issue in this 
case, and a complaint for trespass need not allege any 
foreseeability, expectation, or anticipation of injury by the 
defendant. 
Glad, William T. Barker & Michael Barnes, Nature of General 
Liability Coverage, in 3 New Appleman on Insurance Law Library 
Edition § 16.07[3][a] (Jeffrey E. Thomas ed., 2011). 
Accordingly, while I agree with my colleagues that 
Steadfast had no duty to defend AES in the underlying action 
based on the CGL policies in this case, I also must acknowledge 
the broader effect that this conclusion, and the underlying 
case law that compels it, may have on other CGL policies in 
which the insured risk is defined as an “occurrence.”2  Our 
precedents may have painted us into a jurisprudential corner. 
                     
2 Because this case involves only a commercial general 
liability insurance policy, the question of whether the words 
“occurrence” and “accident” exclude liability for negligent 
acts in other contexts, such as automobile or homeowners’ 
insurance policies, is not before the Court today.  However, 
the words “accident” and “occurrence” may have different 
meanings in those contexts.  See Paul E.B. Glad, William T. 
Barker & Michael Barnes, Types of Liability Coverage, in 3 New 
Appleman on Insurance Law Library Edition § 16.02[3][f] 
(Jeffrey E. Thomas ed., 2011); Peter M. Lencsis, Scope: 
Homeowners Liability Insurance, in 2 New Appleman Law of 
Liability Insurance § 13.01 (2011).