Title: Galumbeck v. Lopez
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 102416
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: March 2, 2012

PRESENT: Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette, Mims, and 
Powell, JJ., and Lacy, S.J. 
 
MATTHEW A. GALUMBECK, ET AL. 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 102416 
JUSTICE CLEO E. POWELL 
 
 
 
March 2, 2012 
JOSEPH LOPEZ, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE  
ESTATE OF MARITESS Q. LOPEZ, DECEASED 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 
Edward W. Hanson, Jr., Judge 
 
 
Dr. Matthew A. Galumbeck and Plastic Surgery of Tidewater, 
P.C. appeal a judgment in favor of the plaintiff Joseph Lopez 
(“Lopez”), administrator of the estate of Maritess Q. Lopez 
(“Maritess”).  Finding that the trial court did not err, we 
affirm the judgment. 
BACKGROUND 
 
On July 30, 2008, Maritess underwent outpatient surgery 
performed by Dr. Galumbeck.  After the surgery, Kenneth Hale 
brought Maritess home.  He noticed that she was not breathing 
normally, she was unable to speak clearly and she had to be 
helped to his car by the nurses. 
 
On July 31, 2008, the morning after the surgery, Carmelita 
Hale (“Hale”), Maritess’ sister, called Dr. Galumbeck’s office 
and spoke to Nurse Marsha Phillips.  Hale told Nurse Phillips 
that Maritess was in pain, feverish and very dizzy.  According 
to Hale, Nurse Phillips expressed no concern and told her those 
symptoms were normal. 
 
2 
 
Later that same day, Maritess died from aspiration 
pneumonia secondary to the surgery.  Lopez, her husband, 
qualified as administrator of her estate and brought a wrongful-
death action against Dr. Galumbeck, Dr. Carl Flor,1 and Plastic 
Surgery of Tidewater, P.C. 
 
At trial, Dr. Galumbeck testified that Nurse Phillips could 
not have answered the phone call from Hale on July 31, 2008, 
because she was in the operating room with him at that time.  
When asked how he knew that, Dr. Galumbeck stated that he had 
reviewed the surgical log.  At that point, Lopez’ counsel 
objected and the trial court held a side bar conference.2  The 
trial court then instructed the jury to disregard the mention of 
any surgical log. 
 
Dr. Galumbeck also testified that he was not paid for the 
surgery.  Another side bar conference was held, also off the 
record.  Dr. Galumbeck alleges that during the side bar 
conference, he attempted to offer documents into evidence that 
show he was never paid for the surgery.  According to Dr. 
Galumbeck, the trial court rejected the evidence. 
                     
 
1 Dr. Flor was the anesthesiologist during the surgery.  The 
claims against Dr. Flor were nonsuited prior to trial. 
 
2 This discussion was not on the record, however, Dr. 
Galumbeck claims that, during the side bar conference, he sought 
to have the surgical log entered into evidence.  According to 
Dr. Galumbeck, the trial court denied his request. 
 
3 
 
During cross-examination, Dr. Galumbeck was asked about the 
contents of his website, namely whether it states that he offers 
board-certified anesthesiologists for all operations at Plastic 
Surgery of Tidewater, P.C.  Dr. Galumbeck’s counsel stated 
“Objection.  May we approach?”  Another side bar discussion was 
held off the record.  At the conclusion of that discussion, the 
trial court overruled the objection and Lopez’ counsel was 
permitted to question Dr. Galumbeck about whether his website 
indicated that he offered only board-certified 
anesthesiologists.  Dr. Galumbeck admitted his website stated 
that his anesthesiologists were board-certified, even though Dr. 
Flor is not board-certified.  When Lopez offered a copy of the 
website into evidence, counsel for Dr. Galumbeck objected to the 
relevance of the exhibit.  The document was admitted into 
evidence. 
 
At the end of the day, after the court adjourned, counsel 
for Dr. Galumbeck recorded a statement with the court reporter 
that he called a “proffer.”  In his statement, counsel 
summarized his arguments and some of the trial court’s rulings 
regarding counsel’s attempts to introduce Defendant’s rejected 
Exhibit A, the surgical log, and Defendant’s rejected Exhibit B, 
the payment records.  Counsel also restated his objections about 
the admission of evidence that Dr. Flor was not a board-
certified anesthesiologist. 
 
4 
 
The following morning, Dr. Galumbeck made a motion for a 
mistrial based on the misconduct of Juror Conway.  According to 
Dr. Galumbeck’s counsel, he saw Juror Conway shake the hand of 
Dr. Waisman, one of Lopez’ expert witnesses, and tell him “good 
job,” after Dr. Waisman had testified and the jury was leaving 
the courtroom.  Counsel for Dr. Galumbeck further alleged that 
Juror Conway “shook his head[] and made a gesture with his right 
fist, as if to say, I’m with you” towards Lopez. 
 
The trial court stated that it would allow counsel to 
question Juror Conway about these incidents.  Counsel for Dr. 
Galumbeck objected, stating that he believed it would be 
improper for him to question the juror and then have the juror 
remain on the jury.  The trial court overruled the objection. 
 
Outside of the presence of the other jurors, the trial 
court asked Juror Conway if he had spoken to the plaintiff’s 
expert.  Juror Conway responded that he “didn’t talk to him.  
[He] just shook his hand and said ‘good job.’ ”  The trial court 
asked what he meant by that, and Juror Conway responded that he 
“thought [the expert] did a good job in dealing with . . . what 
he was asked to do.”  The trial court asked if this interaction 
in any way indicated that Conway was biased, and Juror Conway 
responded that it did not.  The trial court then asked if Juror 
Conway had ever shaken hands with Lopez, and Juror Conway 
responded, “I have never touched Mr. Lopez.” 
 
5 
 
The trial court then allowed counsel for both parties to 
question Juror Conway.  Counsel for Lopez asked if Juror Conway 
could “fairly and impartially decide this case,” to which Juror 
Conway responded “Absolutely.” 
 
Counsel for Dr. Galumbeck then asked Conway if he had 
nodded his head at Lopez as he walked by.  Conway responded, 
“Oh, I’ve nodded my head at several people in here.  What, can 
you not nod your head or what?”  He further explained that he 
might have acknowledged Lopez with a nod “like ‘how are you,’ ” 
but reiterated that he was impartial.  The trial court 
ultimately denied Dr. Galumbeck’s motion for a mistrial. 
 
Dr. Galumbeck then moved for a mistrial based on the 
admission of evidence about Dr. Flor’s lack of board 
certification.  The trial court said that it had already ruled 
on that issue and denied the motion.  Counsel for Dr. Galumbeck 
asked to state his motion for the record, but the trial court 
denied his request, stating: “This is denied, you can cite your 
objections later.”  When counsel for Dr. Galumbeck asked if the 
court was not permitting him to state his motion for the record, 
the trial court responded: “Not now. You will be [allowed] 
later.  We’ve got to get the case moving.”3 
                     
 
3 There is no indication in the record that counsel for Dr. 
Galumbeck attempted to state his motion for the record at a 
later time. 
 
 
6 
 
After hearing all of the evidence, the jury returned a 
verdict in favor of Lopez.  Dr. Galumbeck and Plastic Surgery of 
Tidewater, P.C. subsequently filed a motion to set aside the 
verdict.  The trial court denied the motion and entered judgment 
on the jury verdict. 
ANALYSIS 
 
On appeal, Dr. Galumbeck asserts that the trial court erred 
in (1) denying his motion for a mistrial due to a juror’s 
alleged misconduct; (2) prohibiting him from introducing the 
surgical log into evidence or from using it to refresh Nurse 
Phillips’ recollection; (3) allowing testimony and evidence on a 
collateral matter; and (4) admitting the unpaid medical bills 
into evidence. 
1. Juror Misconduct 
 
Dr. Galumbeck argues that the trial court abused its 
discretion by denying his motion for a mistrial due to the 
misconduct of Juror Conway.  Dr. Galumbeck contends that Juror 
Conway’s actions and his evasive and confrontational attitude 
when questioned about his actions clearly demonstrated that he 
lacked impartiality.  According to Dr. Galumbeck, Juror Conway’s 
lack of impartiality required the trial court to replace him 
with the available alternate juror or declare a mistrial.  We 
disagree. 
 
We have recognized that 
 
7 
a mistrial will not be declared automatically 
upon a showing of juror misconduct, but that the 
trial judge, in the exercise of a sound 
discretion, must determine whether remarks made 
about the case by a juror to persons not jurors 
demonstrate that prejudice might result.  The 
burden to establish this probability of prejudice 
is upon the party moving for a mistrial.  This 
view is based upon the universal rule that fraud 
will not be presumed and upon the reluctance to 
presume prejudicial misconduct. 
Haddad v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 229 Va. 325, 330, 329 S.E.2d 
17, 20 (1985). 
 
Thus, the law is clear that an empanelled juror is presumed 
impartial and the burden to prove prejudice is on the party 
moving for a mistrial.  Id.  Here, Juror Conway explained his 
actions4 and those explanations were found to be credible by the 
trial court.  On this record, it cannot be said that Dr. 
Galumbeck carried his burden of proving prejudicial misconduct 
on the part of Juror Conway. 
2.  Surgical Log 
 
Dr. Galumbeck next argues that the trial court erred by 
refusing to allow him to question witnesses about the surgical 
log or introduce the surgical log into evidence as a sanction 
for violating Rule 4:12.  He contends that there was no Rule 
4:12 violation, as there was no order compelling discovery of 
the surgical log.  He further states that he did not violate the 
                     
 
4 We note that Juror Conway was not asked about the hand 
gesture he allegedly made toward Lopez. 
 
 
8 
pretrial scheduling order, as the order did not require either 
party to list exhibits that are to be introduced for rebuttal or 
impeachment.  Finding that Dr. Galumbeck has failed to present a 
sufficient record to permit review of the assigned error, we 
hold that this argument is waived. 
It is the obligation of the petitioner/appellant 
to ensure that the record is sufficient to enable 
the Court to evaluate and resolve the assignments 
of error. When the appellant fails to ensure that 
the record contains transcripts or a written 
statement of facts necessary to permit resolution 
of appellate issues related to the assignments of 
error, any assignments of error affected by the 
omission shall not be considered. 
Rule 5:11(a)(1).  In conjunction with this Rule, this Court has 
repeatedly admonished: 
A circuit court’s judgment is presumptively 
correct, and the appellant bears the burden of 
presenting a sufficient record to permit a 
determination whether the circuit court committed 
an alleged error. 
Commonwealth Transp. Comm’r v. Target Corp., 274 Va. 341, 348, 
650 S.E.2d 92, 96 (2007). 
 
“We will not consider testimony which the trial court has 
excluded without a proper showing of what that testimony might 
have been.”  O'Dell v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 672, 697, 364 
S.E.2d 491, 505 (1988).  A necessary corollary to this rule is 
that we will not consider an objection made to the trial court 
without a proper showing of what that objection was.  As with 
excluded evidence, absent a transcript or written statement of 
 
9 
the facts that captures the arguments made at trial, this Court 
has no basis upon which to review the trial court’s ruling.  
Whittaker v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 966, 968-69, 234 S.E.2d 79, 
81 (1977). 
 
In the present case, all of the relevant discussions 
related to this issue were held off the record in a sidebar 
conference.  Dr. Galumbeck contends that he preserved this 
argument, as well as others, by way of a proffer made on the 
record.  However, it is clear that Dr. Galumbeck’s “proffer” was 
recorded after court had adjourned for the day and outside of 
the presence of opposing counsel.  Under our jurisprudence, only 
“a unilateral avowal of counsel, if unchallenged, or a mutual 
stipulation of the testimony expected constitutes a proper 
proffer.”  Id. at 969, 234 S.E.2d at 81. 
[A]bsent such acquiescence or stipulation, this 
Court will not consider an error assigned to the 
rejection of testimony unless such testimony has 
been given in the absence of the jury and made a 
part of the record in the manner prescribed by 
the Rules of Court. 
Id. 
 
It can hardly be said that Lopez acquiesced or stipulated 
to a statement that he was unaware Dr. Galumbeck was making.  
Thus, Dr. Galumbeck’s statement does not qualify as a proper 
proffer.  Accordingly, he failed to preserve those issues for 
appeal. 
 
10 
 
Similarly, we hold that Dr. Galumbeck’s argument regarding 
the use of the surgical log to refresh Nurse Phillips’ memory is 
without merit.  A review of the record demonstrates that Dr. 
Galumbeck made no attempt to refresh Nurse Phillips’ 
recollection with the surgical log.  Accordingly, we need not 
address this argument. 
3.  Dr. Flor’s Board Certification 
 
Dr. Galumbeck next argues that the trial court abused its 
discretion by allowing Lopez to raise the issue of Dr. Flor’s 
lack of board certification.  Dr. Galumbeck contends that these 
facts were collateral to the issue before the trial court, and 
therefore should have been excluded.  We need not decide this 
issue, as Dr. Galumbeck has failed to preserve this issue for 
appellate review. 
 
Dr. Galumbeck initially raised his objections to testimony 
about Dr. Flor’s lack of board certifications in a pretrial 
motion in limine.  However, he failed to request a ruling from 
the trial court on this matter.  Accordingly, he has waived this 
issue on appeal.  See Lenz v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 451, 463, 
544 S.E.2d 299, 306 (2001). 
 
During the course of Dr. Galumbeck’s testimony, Lopez asked 
about the contents of Dr. Galumbeck’s website, specifically 
referencing a statement that Dr. Galumbeck offered board 
 
11 
certified anesthesiologists.5  Dr. Galumbeck objected and sought 
another sidebar conference.  Thus, his actual objection and the 
grounds therefor were made off the record.  As such, this 
argument is waived for the same reasons discussed above.  See, 
e.g., Whittaker, 217 Va. at 968-69, 234 S.E.2d at 81. 
 
Finally, with regard to the information found in 
Plaintiff’s Exhibit #3, a printout of Dr. Galumbeck’s website, 
Dr. Galumbeck did specifically object to its introduction on the 
grounds that it was irrelevant.  We note, however, that Defense 
Exhibit #5, offered by Dr. Galumbeck and admitted into evidence, 
contains the same printout of his website to which he now 
objects.  We have repeatedly held that “where [a party] 
unsuccessfully objects to evidence which he considers improper 
and then on his own behalf introduces evidence of the same 
character, he thereby waives his objection.”  Saunders v. 
Commonwealth, 211 Va. 399, 401, 177 S.E.2d 637, 638 (1970) 
(citing Snead v. Commonwealth, 138 Va. 787, 801-02, 121 S.E. 82, 
86 (1924); Culbertson v. Commonwealth, 137 Va. 752, 757-58, 119 
S.E. 87, 88 (1923); Hutchinson v. Commonwealth, 133 Va. 710, 
                     
 
5 Counsel for Lopez initially inquired about “board 
certified plastic surgeons.”  However, upon Dr. Galumbeck’s 
objection to the question, counsel for Lopez realized he had 
misstated the contents of the website and corrected himself, 
stating: “Excuse me.  Thank you, Your Honor.  
Anesthesiologists.”  Dr. Galumbeck then objected a second time. 
 
 
12 
716-17, 112 S.E. 624, 626 (1922); Snarr v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 
814, 818-19, 109 S.E. 590, 592 (1921)). 
4.  Medical Bills 
 
Dr. Galumbeck argues that the trial court abused its 
discretion by allowing copies of Maritess’ medical bills into 
evidence.  Dr. Galumbeck contends that there was no claim for 
medical expenses in this case, therefore this evidence was 
irrelevant.  He further asserts that the trial court compounded 
this error by refusing to allow him to present evidence that 
demonstrates that Maritess did not pay her medical bills.  We 
disagree. 
We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings 
applying an abuse of discretion standard.  We 
will not overturn a trial court's exercise of its 
discretion in determining whether to admit or 
exclude evidence on appeal unless the evidence 
shows that the trial court abused its discretion.  
Hinkley v. Koehler, 269 Va. 82, 91, 606 S.E.2d 
803, 808 (2005).  While a “trial court has no 
discretion to admit clearly inadmissible 
evidence,” Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Puryear, 
250 Va. 559, 563, 463 S.E.2d 442, 444 (1995) 
(quoting Coe v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 83, 87, 340 
S.E.2d 820, 823 (1986)), “a great deal must 
necessarily be left to the discretion of the 
court of trial, in determining whether evidence 
is relevant to the issue or not.”  Peacock Buick, 
Inc. v. Durkin, 221 Va. 1133, 1136, 277 S.E.2d 
225, 227 (1981) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
Riverside Hosp., Inc. v. Johnson, 272 Va. 518, 529, 636 S.E.2d 
416, 421-22 (2006). 
 
13 
 
It is clear that, in the present case, the medical bills 
were not offered for the purposes of seeking damages or 
demonstrating how much money Dr. Galumbeck received.  Rather the 
medical bills were offered to contrast the level of emphasis Dr. 
Galumbeck placed on the financial aspect of the transaction with 
the quality of the medical care he delivered.  Thus, the 
evidence was arguably relevant to the plaintiff’s theory of the 
case.  Furthermore, the record demonstrates that Dr. Galumbeck 
was allowed to testify, without objection,6 that he was not paid 
for the procedure.  Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in allowing the medical bills into evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court 
will be affirmed. 
Affirmed. 
                     
 
6 The record indicates that a sidebar conference occurred 
during Dr. Galumbeck’s testimony on this matter, however, as 
with the sidebar conferences discussed above, the discussion was 
held off the record.  Accordingly, any error related to 
discussions that may have occurred during that sidebar 
conference is waived.  See Rule 5:11(a)(1).