Title: IN RE HON JAMES P NOECKER
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 124477
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: February 1, 2005

_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED FEBRUARY 1, 2005 
In re: 
The Honorable JAMES P. NOECKER,
Judge 45th Circuit Court
Centreville, MI 49032, 
No. 124477 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
KELLY, J.  
This appeal is from the recommendation of the Judicial 
Tenure Commission (JTC) that respondent 45th Circuit Judge 
James P. Noecker be removed from office and required to pay 
the costs of his prosecution. We determine that respondent 
should be removed from office but that costs should not be 
assessed against him. 
I. Factual Background 
On March 12, 2003, respondent was involved in a motor 
vehicle accident in Sturgis, Michigan. 
The vehicle he was 
driving turned from a road into the parking lot of a store, 
the Klinger Lake Trading Post. 
According to witnesses, 
respondent's vehicle neither accelerated nor decelerated. 
 
 
Rather, it maintained a speed of approximately three to 
five miles an hour. The vehicle hit the corner of the 
store, causing significant damage to the building and to 
the inventory in the store. 
Respondent emerged from the vehicle, entered the 
store, and asked if anyone had been injured. 
The store's 
proprietor, Mrs. Pankey, was upset and repeatedly stated 
that she wanted someone to find her husband, who was ice 
fishing on a local lake. 
Although respondent lacked any 
information to assist him in the search for Mr. Pankey 
beyond the name of the lake, respondent left the scene of 
the accident. 
He claimed that he did so to help Mrs. 
Pankey. 
No one indicated where on the lake Mr. Pankey was 
fishing. 
Respondent believed that he was near a fishing 
access, but was unsure where the access was located. Mrs. 
Pankey testified that respondent did not know what her 
husband looked like. 
He did not know what vehicle Mr. 
Pankey was driving. He did not even know the color of the 
coat Mr. Pankey was wearing. 
Respondent testified that, in the course of his 
search, he first drove to the lake. He got out of the car 
to look around and saw two objects he presumed were people 
on the far side of the lake. He then spent several minutes 
2  
 
 
 
considering whether he could walk across the ice. Deciding 
that it was unsafe, he returned to his vehicle. 
Respondent said that he then stopped at another point 
along the lake, walked down to the water’s edge, and tried 
unsuccessfully to find an access point. He saw five or six 
people in a cove and again considered whether it was safe 
to walk out on the ice. 
Deciding that it was unsafe, he 
drove farther around the lake to a gated area known as Camp 
Fort Hill. 
Unable to enter, he started back to the store, 
but decided instead to drive to his residence. 
On arriving home, respondent told his wife about the 
accident, then called Mrs. Pankey. 
He testified that he 
wanted to ask Mrs. Pankey if she had heard from her 
husband, and, if not, he wanted to know the location of the 
lake’s access point. 
He testified that he never got a 
chance to ask those questions, because as soon as he 
identified 
himself, 
Mrs. 
Pankey 
began 
screaming 
hysterically. She kept repeating, "You get back here." He 
told her he would return. 
Respondent then learned that the state police were en 
route to his house to speak with him. 
He decided not to 
return to the store. 
He testified that his wife took his 
blood pressure. 
The systolic reading was 220. 
Respondent 
did not call his doctor or the emergency room. 
Rather, he 
testified, he poured and drank three to five ounces of
3 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
vodka. 
He testified that he knew that the police were 
coming to speak with him about the accident. But he stated 
that the effect that his consumption of alcohol would have 
on the officers’ investigation of his car accident did not 
trouble him at the time. 
When the police arrived at his home, respondent told 
them that he had consumed three to five ounces of vodka 
after returning from the search for Mr. Pankey. Respondent 
agreed to take a preliminary breath test. 
The breath test 
was 
administered 
approximately 
two 
hours 
after 
the 
accident. The reading was 0.10.1 
A state trooper who investigated the accident at the 
scene, Craig Wheeler, testified that he was concerned that 
alcohol may have been a factor. 
Sergeant Steven Barker 
testified that there are generally three reasons people 
leave the scene of an accident: 
their license has been 
suspended, there is an outstanding arrest warrant for them, 
or they drank alcohol before the accident. 
Sergeant 
Barker 
accompanied 
Trooper 
Wheeler 
to 
respondent's home on the night of the accident. 
He 
testified that respondent appeared to move away from him 
1 This value refers to the amount of alcohol in an 
individual's system. At the time of the accident, Michigan
law made it unlawful for someone to operate a vehicle where
"[t]he person has an alcohol content of 0.10 grams or more
per 100 milliliters of blood, per 210 liters of breath, or
per 67 milliliters of urine." MCL 257.625(1)(b).
4 
 
 
 
 
whenever he got close. One of the officers testified that, 
when 
he 
confronted 
respondent 
about 
an 
apparent 
inconsistency in his statement, respondent commented, "I 
know you are in a position to fry me." In addition to the 
testimony of Trooper Wheeler and Sergeant Barker, several 
witnesses to the accident testified that it appeared that 
respondent had been drinking at the time of the accident. 
Respondent gave conflicting stories about how the 
accident had occurred. 
One explanation was that he 
intended to depress the brake pedal, but accidentally 
pushed the accelerator when his shoe slipped. 
Another 
explanation was that, as he approached the building, he 
intended to brake, but he forgot that his foot was not on 
the brake pedal. 
Instead, he depressed the accelerator, 
which caused the vehicle to shoot forward and strike the 
building. 
II. Proceedings Below 
The events occurring after the March 12 accident, 
including respondent's conflicting explanations to the 
media, caused the JTC to issue a formal complaint against 
respondent. 
The complaint may be summarized as alleging the 
following misconduct: 
1. Persistent use of alcohol leading to a
variety 
of 
violations 
of 
the 
Michigan 
5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Constitution, the Michigan Court Rules, and the
Canons of Judicial Conduct. 
2. Violations of the law and making false
statements to the police regarding the events
surrounding a motor vehicle accident on March 12,
2003. 
3. Making false statements to the JTC. 
The complaint may be summarized as alleging that 
respondent's conduct constituted: 
1. Misconduct in office, as defined by Const
1963, art 6, § 30, as amended, and MCR 9.205; 
2. Conduct 
clearly 
prejudicial 
to 
the 
administration of justice, as defined by Const 
1963, art 6, § 30, as amended, and MCR 9.205; 
3. Habitual intemperance, 
as defined by Const 
1963, art 6, § 30, as amended, and MCR 9.205; 
4. Persistent failure to perform judicial 
duties, 
as defined by Const 1963, art 6, § 30, as 
amended, and MCR 9.205; 
5. Persistent 
neglect 
in 
the 
timely
performance of judicial duties, contrary to MCR
9.205(B)(1)(b); 
6. Irresponsible or improper conduct that 
erodes 
public 
confidence 
in 
the 
judiciary,
contrary to the Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon
2(A); 
7. Conduct involving impropriety and the 
appearance of impropriety, contrary to the Code
of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2(A); 
8. Failure to respect and observe the law,
contrary to the Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon
2(B); 
9. Conduct violative of MCR 9.104(A)(1),
(2), and (3) in that such conduct, 
(i) is 
prejudicial 
to 
the 
proper
administration of justice, 
6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
(ii) exposes the legal profession or the 
court to obloquy, contempt, censure, or reproach;
and 
(iii) is 
contrary 
to 
justice, 
ethics,
honesty, or good morals. 
Retired Circuit Judge John N. Fields was appointed 
master in the case, heard evidence, and made forty specific 
findings of fact. 
On reviewing all the evidence, he 
concluded that respondent violated the court rules and 
canons listed above. 
The JTC adopted the master’s report and unanimously 
recommended that this Court remove respondent from the 
bench. In addition, in a split decision, it recommended 
that respondent be required to pay the costs that the JTC 
incurred in prosecuting the matter. 
Three JTC members concurred. 
They thought that 
respondent should also be required to pay the costs 
incurred for visiting judges to hear respondent's docket 
during 
his 
interim 
suspension. 
A 
separate 
JTC 
concurrence/dissent agreed with the recommendation for 
removal, but argued that costs should not be assessed 
against respondent.2 
2 We shall refer to these opinions as they are titled.
The concurring opinion will be referred to as the "JTC
concurrence." 
The 
opinion 
objecting 
to 
requiring
respondent to pay the costs of his prosecution will be
referred to as the "JTC concurrence/dissent."
7 
 
 
 
 
 
III. Issues on Appeal 
Respondent asks this Court to reject the JTC’s 
recommendation. He asserts that there is insufficient 
evidence to find him guilty of judicial misconduct. 
He 
also 
argues 
that 
the 
master 
erred 
in 
allowing 
the 
introduction 
of 
improper 
expert 
evidence. 
Finally, 
respondent contests the recommendation that he be required 
to pay the costs of his prosecution. 
IV. Relevant Standards 
We 
review 
the 
JTC's 
factual 
findings 
and 
its 
disciplinary recommendations de novo. 
In re Chrzanowski, 
465 Mich 468, 478-479; 636 NW2d 758 (2001). 
The standard 
of 
proof 
in 
a 
judicial 
discipline 
proceeding 
is 
a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
In re Loyd, 424 Mich 514, 
521-522; 384 NW2d 9 (1986). 
V. The Commission's Recommendation 
In making its recommendation, the JTC applied the 
factors enunciated in In re Brown, 461 Mich 1291, 1292-1293 
(2000). 
It listed each factor, relating it to the 
circumstances of the case. 
It explained how it weighed 
each factor for or against respondent. 
Furthermore, the 
JTC considered the fact that respondent has extensive prior 
involvement with the judicial disciplinary system, having 
been admonished on various occasions for failing to timely 
complete court work. 
8 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
The JTC concluded that respondent's failure to be 
truthful 
regarding 
the 
automobile 
accident 
and 
its 
aftermath justifies his removal from office. It found that 
respondent 
misled 
the 
police 
and 
later 
provided 
inconsistent accounts of the events. 
Also, it found that 
he failed to offer credible testimony when under oath in 
the public hearing. 
Furthermore, the JTC indicated that docket delays 
caused by respondent had a deleterious effect on the 
administration of justice in St. Joseph County. The JTC 
acknowledged that a number of attorneys testified in 
respondent's favor. 
But it noted that their testimony did 
not alter the fact that the court docket and the public 
suffered 
because 
of 
respondent’s 
conduct. 
The 
JTC 
concluded that respondent is guilty of repeated serious 
misconduct that requires his removal from office.3 
A. The Sufficiency of the Evidence 
The power to discipline a judge resides exclusively in 
this Court, but it is exercised on recommendation of the 
JTC. Const 1963, art 6, § 30. Respondent’s complaints with 
regard to the master’s factual findings amount to a 
3 The examiner indicated at oral argument that "[I]t's
fair to say that if the crash had never taken place we
would not necessarily be making a recommendation for 
removal . . . . I think the gravamen of this is the lying, 
and that truly should be the focus . . . ." We agree.
9 
 
 
 
disagreement about the weight and credibility that should 
be afforded to the various witnesses. The master, as trier 
of fact, was in the best position to assess the credibility 
of the witnesses.
 "Our power of review de novo does not 
prevent us from according proper deference to the master's 
ability to observe the witnesses' demeanor and comment on 
their credibility." In re Loyd, supra at 535. 
On review of the entire record, we agree with the 
master's 
findings 
of 
fact 
and 
conclusions 
of 
law. 
Respondent left the scene of an automobile accident. 
Eyewitnesses testified that respondent appeared intoxicated 
at the time of the accident. As a former prosecutor and a 
judge, respondent knew that he should have stayed at the 
scene of the accident. 
It is not credible that, after 
being made aware that the police were on their way to 
question him about his accident, he consumed alcohol. 
We conclude that respondent was under the influence of 
alcohol when he ran his car into the store. 
We conclude 
that he attempted to deceive the police about this fact 
because he was motivated by a desire to avoid criminal 
prosecution. We conclude that he continued to misrepresent 
the cause of the accident to the JTC and the master, 
10  
 
 
  
 
                                                 
motivated in addition by a desire to avoid professional 
discipline.4 
The preponderance of the evidence justifies a finding 
that 
respondent 
was 
guilty 
of 
judicial 
misconduct, 
notwithstanding the exculpatory evidence on which he 
relies.  Nothing in the record suggests that Judge Fields 
erred in his findings and conclusions in any manner that 
would change the outcome of the proceedings. To the 
contrary, 
we 
believe 
that 
Judge 
Fields 
fairly 
and 
objectively presided over this case. 
Therefore, we agree 
with 
the 
JTC 
that 
respondent's 
significant 
misrepresentations of the truth made in testimony and to 
the public warrant disciplinary action. 
B. The Qualifications of the Expert Witness 
Respondent argues that the examiner’s expert, Harvey 
Ager, M.D., was not qualified to testify. Dr. Ager is a 
psychiatrist who testified about the conduct typical of an 
alcoholic. 
MRE 702 provides the rule for expert testimony: 
4 One of respondent’s more peculiar explanations for
the cause of the accident occurred during his testimony
before the master. 
There, respondent testified that he
entered his vehicle through the passenger door and operated
the vehicle while straddling the console because he had
“mud on his shoes.” 
Respondent indicated to the master
that he “used his left foot to accelerate and brake because 
his right foot remained straddled over the center console.”
11 
 
 
 
If the court determines that scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, 
skill, experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise if (1) the testimony is based on 
sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is
the product of reliable principles and methods,
and (3) the witness has applied the principles 
and methods reliably to the facts of the case. 
Respondent argues that Dr. Ager's failure to publish, 
present, or conduct peer review on the topic of alcoholism 
in the recent past disqualifies him from testifying as an 
expert. He is mistaken. 
The master noted that, although Dr. Ager had not 
recently published or made presentations on the topic, 
there was evidence that he 
is a graduate of Wayne State University. That he
is a board certified psychiatrist. That he is a
former codirector of the alcoholism unit at 
Detroit Memorial Hospital. . . . [T]hat he has
treated hundreds of individuals with respect to
alcoholism. . . . I do find that his experience
in this area in addition to his general medical
training is such that he is qualified as an
expert to testify and render an opinion regarding
conduct consistent with alcoholism. 
The master ruled that Dr. Ager could testify as long as his 
testimony conformed with the requirements of MRE 702. 
He 
noted that "there has been nothing here to suggest that 
this sort of testimony would not be based upon reliable 
principals [sic] and methods." 
12  
 
 
Dr. Ager's testimony conformed with the requirements 
of MRE 702. 
On the basis of his experience, he testified 
about what conduct is consistent with that of an alcoholic. 
He also testified about his personal interaction with 
respondent in a ninety-minute interview. 
Contrary to respondent's assertions, Dr. Ager did not 
testify outside the bounds of his knowledge. 
He did not 
state that respondent's alcoholism caused his docket 
delays. 
He testified simply about the behavior one could 
expect from an alcoholic. 
Dr. Ager did not view respondent's work product and 
did not comment on the quality of respondent's work. 
Nor 
was Dr. Ager introduced to testify regarding respondent's 
work product. 
The fact that Dr. Ager was unfamiliar with 
the work of respondent and the extent of Dr. Ager's 
experience with alcoholics go to the weight to be given his 
testimony. 
They are not determinative of whether his 
testimony conformed with the requirements of MRE 702. 
We find that Dr. Ager qualified as an expert witness. 
His testimony complied with MRE 702 and, therefore, was 
admissible. 
VI. Appropriate Discipline 
Having determined that the JTC proved the charges by a 
preponderance of the evidence, we must assess whether the 
recommended discipline is appropriate to the offense. "Our 
13 
 
 
 
primary concern in determining the appropriate sanction is 
to restore and maintain the dignity and impartiality of the 
judiciary and to protect the public." 
In re Ferrara, 458 
Mich 350, 372; 582 NW2d 817 (1998). 
Central to our decision to remove respondent is our 
conclusion that respondent misled the police, the public, 
and the JTC about his drinking on March 12, 2003. 
Respondent’s insistence that he was sober at the time of 
the accident is not credible. His misrepresentations about 
being sober when he caused an automobile accident that 
carried civil and criminal consequences are antithetical to 
his judicial obligation to uphold the integrity of the 
judiciary. 
Respondent's 
repeated 
deception 
and 
the 
publicity surrounding the incident have seriously eroded 
the public's confidence in him and in the judiciary. 
Unfortunately, we have on other occasions dealt with a 
judge's dishonesty. 
In In re Ferrara, supra, this Court 
determined that Judge Andrea J. Ferrara's conduct in 
misleading the master after her original alleged misconduct 
surfaced justified her removal from office. 
During the 
hearing on the complaint, Judge Ferrara twice attempted to 
introduce a fraudulent letter into evidence. We determined 
that her misrepresentations and deception eroded the 
public's trust and confidence in the judiciary. 
We found 
14  
 
 
 
 
it necessary to remove Judge Ferrara from the bench in 
order to restore public trust and confidence. Id. at 373. 
Likewise, the nature of respondent's lies, and the 
apparent motives behind them, have seriously harmed the 
integrity 
of 
the 
judiciary. 
Respondent’s 
continued 
deception before the JTC has seriously undermined the 
public's faith that judges are as subject to the law as 
those who appear before them. 
His continued dishonesty 
with regard to the events of March 12, 2003, justifies his 
removal from office. 
Furthermore, respondent's persistent docket problems, 
for which he was admonished on several occasions, violate 
the standards of judicial conduct. 
Were this proceeding 
solely about his docket problems, we would not find removal 
an appropriate form of discipline. 
However, respondent's 
deception surrounding the March 12 accident described 
herein warrants the harsh sanction of removal from office. 
VII. The Assessment of Costs 
The Michigan Constitution created the Judicial Tenure 
Commission and outlines the power of the Michigan Supreme 
Court to discipline judges: 
On recommendation of the judicial tenure 
commission, 
the 
supreme 
court 
may 
censure,
suspend with or without salary, retire or remove
a judge for conviction of a felony, physical or
mental disability which prevents the performance
of 
judicial 
duties, 
misconduct 
in 
office,
persistent 
failure 
to 
perform 
his 
duties, 
15 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
habitual intemperance or conduct that is clearly
prejudicial to the administration of justice. The
supreme court shall make rules implementing this
section and providing for confidentiality and 
privilege of proceedings. [Const 1963, art 6, §
30(2).] 
Pursuant to this constitutional provision, the Court 
has promulgated court rules governing judicial discipline 
proceedings. 
As the JTC noted, no specific court rule or 
statute 
provides 
for 
imposing 
costs 
in 
judicial 
disciplinary matters. 
We have imposed costs in several cases in the past. 
The JTC majority relies on those cases in support of its 
assessment of costs here. 
But those cases are not on 
point. 
In In re Thompson,5 costs were recommended and 
ordered, but the judge did not contest them. Likewise, in 
In re Trudel,6 costs were ordered. By then, however, Judge 
Trudel had resigned from the bench. In In re Cooley,7 Judge 
Cooley 
consented 
to 
the 
commission's 
decision 
and 
recommendation, including the assessment of costs. In the 
present action, respondent did not consent to the JTC's 
recommendation, nor has he resigned. Rather, he has 
challenged the JTC's findings and its recommendation that 
costs be assessed. 
5 470 Mich 1347 (2004).  
6 468 Mich 1243 (2003).  
7 454 Mich 1215 (1997).  
16 
 
 
 
 
We agree with the JTC concurrence/dissent that a 
respondent is entitled to notice of what conduct will 
subject the respondent to the assessment of costs. 
Past 
decisions of this Court have not provided notice because 
they were issued without explanation of the standards used 
in assessing costs. 
We 
agree 
with 
the 
JTC 
concurrence/dissent’s 
observation: 
Respondent Noecker cannot be said to have
been given notice of the standards to be applied
and the type of expenses that could be assessed
in this case. . . . The imposition of actual
costs has been extremely rare in the history of
reported cases. The commission has not set 
standards for the imposition of costs until 
today. Therefore, imposition of costs in this
case, if the Supreme Court believes they are
authorized by law, would violate the spirit of In 
re Brown. 
Where a judge has been given no notice of the 
standards for imposing costs, the judge should not be made 
to pay them. 
We leave for another time the determination 
whether the assessment of costs is consistent with the 
Michigan Constitution. In this case, respondent should not 
be required to pay the costs of his prosecution because he 
had no notice of the standards for imposing them. 
We have opened an administrative file to consider the 
constitutional issue and the standards to be applied in the 
event costs can be assessed in these matters. ADM 2004-60. 
17  
 
 
 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
After a careful examination of the evidence and an 
evaluation of the findings of fact, we conclude that 
removal of respondent from the bench is warranted. 
We hereby order respondent removed from office. 
Pursuant 
to 
MCR 
7.317(C)(3), 
the 
clerk 
is 
directed 
immediately to issue an order to that effect. 
No costs 
will be assessed. 
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
WEAVER, J. I join in parts I through VI. 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
18  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
In re: 
The Honorable JAMES P. NOECKER,
Judge 45th Circuit Court
Centreville, MI 49032, 
No. 124477 
YOUNG, J. (concurring). 
I fully concur in the majority opinion. I write 
separately, however, to explain why I believe removal to be 
the appropriate sanction in this case. 
The purpose of Judicial Tenure Commission proceedings 
is not the punishment of the judge, but to maintain the 
integrity of the judicial process and to protect the 
citizenry from corruption and abuse. As such, this Court’s 
primary concern in determining the appropriate sanction is 
to restore and maintain the dignity and impartiality of the 
judiciary and to protect the public.1 
After reviewing the evidence in this case, I believe 
that the evidence establishes respondent was intoxicated at 
the time of the collision. Respondent left the scene of the 
accident and constructed several inconsistent explanations 
in 
order 
to 
avoid 
criminal 
responsibility 
for 
his 
1 In re Jenkins, 437 Mich 15; 465 NW2d 317 (1991); In 
re Ferrara, 458 Mich 350; 582 NW2d 817 (1998). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
intoxicated driving. More egregious, respondent also lied 
under oath during the course of the Judicial Tenure 
Commission investigation, presumably in order to avoid 
judicial disciplinary consequences. 
Our judicial system has long recognized the sanctity 
and importance of the oath.2 An oath is a significant act, 
establishing that the oath taker promises to be truthful. 
As the “focal point of the administration of justice,”3 a 
judge is entrusted by the public and has the responsibility 
to seek truth and justice by evaluating the testimony given 
under oath. When a judge lies under oath, he or she has 
failed to internalize one of the central standards of 
justice and becomes unfit to sit in judgment of others. 
Certainly, Judicial Tenure Commission proceedings are 
intended to be remedial, not penal.4 The vast majority of 
misconduct found by the Judicial Tenure Commission is not 
fatal; rather, it reflects oversight or poor judgment on 
2 See June v School Dist No 11, 283 Mich 533, 537; 278
NW 676 (1938) ( An oath is “'[a]n external pledge or
asseveration, made in verification of statements made, or
to be made, coupled with an appeal to a sacred or venerated
object, in evidence of the serious and reverent state of
mind of the party, or with an invocation to a supreme being
to witness the words of the party, and to visit him with
punishment if they be false.'") (citation omitted). 
3 In re Callanan, 419 Mich 376, 386; 355 NW2d 69
(1984). 
4 In re Probert, 411 Mich 210; 308 NW2d 773 (1981).
2 
 
 
 
 
the part of a fallible human being who is a judge. However, 
some misconduct, such as lying under oath, goes to the very 
core of judicial duty and demonstrates the lack of 
character of such a person to be entrusted with judicial 
privilege. 
Where a respondent judge readily acknowledges his 
shortcomings and is completely honest and forthcoming 
during the course of the Judicial Tenure Commission 
investigation, I believe that the sanction correspondingly 
can be less severe. However, where a respondent is not 
repentant, but engages in deceitful behavior during the 
course 
of 
a 
Judicial 
Tenure 
Commission 
disciplinary 
investigation, the sanction must be measurably greater. 
Lying under oath, as the respondent has been adjudged to 
have done, makes him unfit for judicial office. 
It is for these reasons that I support respondent’s 
removal from office. 
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Clifford W. Taylor
Maura D. Corrigan 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
In re: 
THE HONORABLE JAMES P. NOECKER,
JUDGE 45TH CIRCUIT COURT 
CENTREVILLE, MI 49032, 
No. 124477 
WEAVER, J. (concurring). 
I agree that Judge Noecker should be removed from the 
bench and join parts I – VI of the majority opinion. 
The 
accident, Judge Noecker’s conduct following the accident, 
and his attempts to deceive the public and the police with 
incredible 
explanations 
of 
the 
accident 
are 
clearly 
prejudicial to the administration of justice and undermine 
the public’s trust and confidence in the judiciary. 
Therefore, removal is the appropriate discipline. 
I also concur in the result that Judge Noecker should 
not be assessed costs, but for different reasons. 
Rather 
than rely on a lack of notice or standards as the reason 
not to assess costs, I would not assess costs because it 
appears to me that this Court has no constitutional 
authority to assess the judge for the costs of the 
proceedings. 
Const 1963, art 6, § 30 provides that “the 
supreme court may censure, suspend with or without salary, 
retire or remove a judge . . . .” 
Nothing in this 
 
 
constitutional provision gives this Court any authority to 
discipline the judge by assessing the judge the costs of 
the Judicial Tenure Commission proceedings against him or 
her. 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
2  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
In re: 
THE HONORABLE JAMES P. NOECKER,
Judge, 45th Circuit Court
Centreville, MI 49032 
 
No. 124477 
MARKMAN, J. (concurring). 
I concur with the results of the majority opinion, as 
well as with much of its analysis. Had I been a member of 
the Judicial Tenure Commission (JTC), I might possibly have 
reached a different conclusion in terms of an appropriate 
sanction, for there is much with which I agree in the 
dissenting opinion. 
In particular, I agree with the 
dissenting opinion that more egregious behavior on the part 
of judges has, in the past, been met with less sanction 
than permanent removal. 
Post at 1. 
Further, I believe 
that the thirty-five years of honorable public service on 
the respondent's part deserve more consideration in the 
formulation of a sanction than, to my eye, has been given 
here. 
Nonetheless, I concur with the majority opinion 
because, as it correctly notes, "'[o]ur power of review de 
novo does not prevent us from according proper deference'" 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
to the processes of the JTC. 
Ante at 10 (citation 
omitted). 
While the majority emphasizes the deference due 
the "'master's ability to observe the witnesses' demeanor 
and comment on their credibility,'"1 id., I would also 
emphasize 
the 
deference 
due 
the 
commission 
in 
its 
recommendation of a sanction. 
In In re Brown, 461 Mich 
1291 (2000), this Court directed the commission to more 
clearly 
articulate 
its 
standards 
in 
determining 
an 
appropriate judicial sanction, and we set forth a number of 
non-exclusive factors to be considered in this process. We 
stated in this regard: 
As a constitutionally created state agency
charged with making recommendations to this Court
concerning matters of judicial discipline, the
JTC is entitled, on the basis of its expertise,
to deference both with respect to its findings of
fact 
and 
its 
recommendations 
of 
sanction. 
However, such deference cannot be a matter of
blind faith, but rather is a function of the JTC
adequately 
articulating 
the 
bases 
for 
its 
findings and demonstrating that there is a 
reasonable relationship between such findings and
the recommended discipline. 
* * * 
. . . Where standards of this sort have been 
promulgated and reasonably applied to individual
cases, this Court owes considerable deference to
the JTC. [461 Mich at 1292, 1293] 
1 I concur with the majority in its conclusion that the
master "fairly and objectively" presided over this case. 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The 
commission 
here, 
in 
my 
judgment, 
has 
conscientiously evaluated the factors set forth in Brown, 
as 
well 
as 
additional 
factors, 
and 
has 
"adequately 
articulated the bases for its findings." Although personal 
consideration of these factors might have led me in the 
direction of the sanction set forth in the dissenting 
opinion, I cannot say that there is no "reasonable 
relationship between [the commission's] findings and the 
recommended discipline." 
Rather, I believe that the 
commission has identified such a relationship and therefore 
is entitled to deference by this Court. 
It was proper for this Court to promulgate the Brown 
factors so that we could derive the "additional information 
necessary to perform [our] constitutional function of 
judicial discipline under Const 1963, art 6, § 30(2)." 
Brown, supra at 1291. 
Having promulgated these factors, 
and the commission having reasonably considered them, 
"proper deference" is now required on our part. While such 
deference is that which is owed to any executive or 
administrative agency, the constitutional status of the 
commission, Const 1963, art 6, §30, underscores the 
necessity 
of 
such 
deference 
in 
matters 
of 
judicial 
3  
 
 
discipline. 
On the basis of such deference, I concur with 
the conclusions of the majority opinion. 
Stephen J. Markman 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
In re: 
THE HONORABLE JAMES P. NOECKER,
Judge, 45th Circuit Court
Centreville, MI 49032 
No. 124477 
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting). 
Viewing all the alleged conduct at issue here, I 
cannot conclude that respondent’s removal is warranted. 
Much more egregious behavior on the part of judges has been 
met with far less sanction than permanent removal. 
See In 
re Hathaway, 464 Mich 672; 630 NW2d 850 (2001) (suspending 
the judge for six months without pay for the judge’s gross 
mishandling of three cases and overall “lack of industry”); 
In re Brown (After Remand), 464 Mich 135; 626 NW2d 403 
(2001) (suspending the judge for fifteen days without pay 
after finding that the judge misused the prestige of his 
office in addition to having four previous instances of 
misconduct); In re Moore, 464 Mich 98, 132-133; 626 NW2d 
374 
(2001)1 
(characterizing 
the 
judge’s 
“pattern 
of 
persistent interference in and frequent interruption of the 
1 I concurred, writing that I would have imposed the
sanction of nine months without pay recommended by the
Judicial Tenure Commission. 
 
 
 
 
trial of cases; impatient, discourteous, critical, and 
sometimes 
severe 
attitudes 
toward 
jurors, 
witnesses, 
counsel, and others present in the courtroom; and use of a 
controversial tone and manner in addressing litigants, 
jurors, witnesses, and counsel” as warranting a six-month 
suspension without pay); and In re Bennett, 403 Mich 178; 
267 NW2d 914 (1978) (refusing to remove the judge from the 
bench, despite finding that he engaged in “demonstrably 
serious” 
intemperance, 
instead 
imposing 
a 
one-year 
suspension without pay). 
In In re Seitz, 441 Mich 590; 495 NW2d 559 (1993), on 
which the Judicial Tenure Commission (JTC) relies, this 
Court 
removed 
the 
judge 
from 
office 
at 
the 
JTC’s 
recommendation. 
I find that case easily distinguishable. 
Judge Seitz exhibited such unfathomable conduct toward his 
colleagues and staff for over ten years that it took this 
Court twenty-seven pages to delineate it. 
Id. at 594-621. 
He also engaged in felonious conduct by installing a 
wiretap on his phone. Id. at 597-599. Moreover, he abused 
his contempt power by deliberately ordering a person to 
ignore an administrative order of the chief judge and 
follow Judge Seitz’s contradictory order instead. When the 
person refused to do so, Judge Seitz had him arrested and 
brought to the courtroom. 
There, the judge performed a 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
mock hearing devoid of due process and had the person 
jailed. 
Id. 
at 
599-604. 
Judge 
Seitz 
also 
had 
unprofessional personal relationships with his staff. 
Id. 
at 604-611. 
The JTC points to one paragraph in Seitz, supra at 
622, that pertained to the judge’s failure to file reports 
with the State Court Administrative Office as support for 
its removal recommendation. 
But Judge Seitz’s failures in 
that regard paled in comparison to his other conduct, and 
it is impossible to believe that his failure to file 
several reports alone would have resulted in his removal 
from the bench. 
Similarly here, where the two allegations 
are that respondent lied about the accident and failed to 
properly manage his docket, the JTC’s removal request is 
extremely harsh. 
The JTC relies on two cases, In re Ferrara, 458 Mich 
350; 582 NW2d 817 (1998), and In re Ryman, 394 Mich 637; 
232 NW2d 178 (1975), for the proposition that lying, by 
itself, is sufficient to remove respondent from the bench. 
But in both cited cases, more was at issue. 
For instance, 
in Ferrara, the misconduct charges stemmed from the 
revelation of eleven tapes on which the judge was recorded 
lashing horrific racial and ethnic slurs at or about people 
in both her personal and professional life. 
This Court 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
found that irrespective of the tapes, Judge Ferrara’s 
conduct surrounding the investigation was grounds for 
removal. 
For instance, Judge Ferrara told the media and 
the JTC that the tapes were fabricated, and she attempted 
to admit a fraudulent letter twice, the second time after 
her first attempt was rejected. 
Additionally, the judge’s 
conduct during the formal hearing was so “'inappropriate, 
unprofessional, and demonstrat[ive of] a lack of respect 
for the judicial discipline proceedings,’” that this Court 
found the incidents too numerous to recount. 
Ferrara, 
supra at 370 (citation omitted). 
Because of the severe and obvious nature of the 
judge’s 
lies 
and 
her 
continuing 
disrespect 
for 
the 
judiciary, this Court concluded that removal was warranted, 
stating: 
We adopt the commission’s recommendation and
find 
respondent’s 
untruthful 
and 
misleading
statements to the public and press, her attempt
to 
commit 
a 
fraud 
on 
the 
Court 
by 
twice 
attempting to introduce the Avela Smith letters,
and her unprofessional and disrespectful conduct
during 
each 
stage 
of 
the 
proceedings 
to 
constitute misconduct in violation of the court 
rules and judicial canons. [Id. at 372.] 
Similarly, Ryman, supra, involved issues of backdating 
and improper signing of deeds, false testimony, allowing a 
court 
clerk 
to 
perform 
a 
magistrate’s 
duties, 
and 
continuing the practice of law after becoming a judge. 
Ryman, supra at 642-643. 
In my opinion, neither Ferrara 
4 
 
 
 
nor Ryman supports the JTC’s assertion that a suspected lie 
is sufficient to remove a judge from office. 
In sum, I do not believe there is support for 
permanently removing respondent from office. It seems that 
where a judge has been removed from office at least in part 
for lying, the fact that the suspected lies were indeed 
lies was uncontroverted. 
Here, though, while respondent’s 
story about the accident is undeniably suspicious, there is 
no 
proof 
that 
respondent 
lied. 
Without 
more 
than 
speculation that respondent was being untruthful in denying 
that he drank before he drove, the most severe punishment 
hardly seems fitting. 
Additionally, I do not think that the JTC adequately 
supported a finding that respondent’s admitted alcoholism 
caused his perceived administrative failures. 
The logic 
behind the asserted causal connection was flawed: 
even 
though respondent admits abusing alcohol, it does not 
necessarily follow that his shortcomings on the job are 
related to that abuse. The expert testimony did nothing to 
assist in establishing the link between alcohol abuse and 
work performance. 
If anything, Dr. Miller’s testimony 
blurred the connection by pointing to a possible obsessive-
compulsive disorder as the cause of respondent’s work­
related problems. 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
In any event, respondent had plausible explanations 
for at least some of his work-related behavior. And no one 
has ever seen respondent drinking or drunk on the job, 
including his long-time clerk. 
No attorney testified 
negatively about respondent’s behavior in court, and some 
offered reasons for case delays that were totally unrelated 
to respondent. 
And notably, the JTC admitted at oral 
argument 
that 
its 
inclusion 
of 
these 
work-related 
shortcomings were but “a footnote” to the gravamen of its 
investigation, the accident. 
I, therefore, cannot accept the JTC’s recommendation 
of removal. 
Although I believe that its finding that the 
crash was alcohol-related is supported on the record, a 
much lesser sanction is warranted, and the sanction should 
be tailored to that particular event. 
As such, I would 
suspend respondent, without pay, for a period of fifteen 
months, until May 1, 2006. 
In light of my conclusions, I do not see grounds for 
imposing the costs of the JTC’s prosecution on respondent, 
particularly in light of its admission that its request for 
reimbursement is unprecedented and unsupported by the court 
rules. 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
6