Title: In re J.C
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 280A14
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: June 11, 2015

NO. COA13-1404 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 1 July 2014 
 
 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
Cleveland County 
No. 12CRS054927-28 
THOMAS CRAIG CAMPBELL, 
 
Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
Appeal by defendant from Judgment entered on or about 12 
June 2013 by Judge Linwood O. Foust in Superior Court, Cleveland 
County.  Heard in the Court of Appeals 7 May 2014. 
 
Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney 
General Allison A. Angell, for the State. 
 
Appellate 
Defender 
Staples 
S. 
Hughes, 
by 
Assistant 
Appellate Defender Jason Christopher Yoder, for defendant-
appellant. 
 
 
STROUD, Judge. 
 
 
Thomas Campbell (“defendant”) appeals from the judgment 
entered after a Cleveland County jury found him guilty of 
larceny and breaking or entering a place of religious worship. 
We vacate defendant’s larceny conviction and reverse his 
conviction for breaking or entering a place of religious 
worship. We remand for entry of judgment and resentencing on 
misdemeanor breaking or entering. 
-2- 
 
 
I. 
Background 
On 8 October 2012, defendant was indicted for breaking or 
entering a place of religious worship and larceny after breaking 
or entering. The larceny indictment alleged that on 15 August 
2012 defendant “willfully and feloniously did steal, take, and 
carry away a music receiver, microphones, and sounds [sic] 
system wires, the personal property of Andy Stephens and Manna 
Baptist Church, pursuant to a breaking or entering in violation 
of N.C.G.S. 14-54.1(a).”  Defendant pled not guilty and 
proceeded to jury trial. 
At trial, the State’s evidence tended to show that Pastor 
Andy Stephens of Manna Baptist Church, located on Burke Road in 
Shelby, North Carolina, discovered after Sunday services on 19 
August 2012 that a receiver, several microphones, and audio 
cords were missing.  The cords were usually located at the front 
of the church, by the sound system, or in the baptistery 
changing area.  It appeared that the sound system had been 
opened up and items inside had been moved around. Pastor 
Stephens found a wallet in the baptistery changing area that 
contained a driver’s license belonging to defendant. 
Pastor Stephens testified that when the church secretary 
arrived on Thursday morning earlier that week, she had noticed 
-3- 
 
 
that the door was unlocked. She assumed that it had been left 
unlocked after Wednesday night services, which had ended around 
9 p.m.  Although the front door is normally locked at night, on 
cross-examination, Pastor Stephens admitted that the church door 
had been left unlocked overnight before.  Pastor Stephens said 
that the secretary did not notice anything amiss on Thursday 
morning. 
After Pastor Stephens realized that the audio equipment was 
missing he called the Cleveland County Sheriff’s Office. Deputy 
Jordan Bowen responded to the scene. The deputy examined the 
premises but found no signs of forced entry.  He recovered 
defendant’s wallet from the pastor. 
Investigator Jessica Woosley went to speak with defendant 
at the Cleveland County Detention Center, where he was being 
held 
on 
an 
unrelated 
breaking 
or 
entering 
charge. 
When 
Investigator Woosley introduced herself, defendant said, “this 
can’t possibly be good. What have I done now that I don’t 
remember?”  Investigator Woosley read defendant his Miranda 
rights and defendant invoked his right to counsel. Investigator 
Woosley tried to end the interview, but defendant continued 
talking. 
-4- 
 
 
Defendant admitted that he had been to Manna Baptist Church 
on the night in question, but stated that he could not remember 
what he had done there. He explained that he had mental issues 
and blacked out at times. Defendant claimed to be a religious 
man who had been “on a spiritual journey.”  He said that he 
remembered the door to the church being open, but that he did 
not remember doing anything wrong. 
After 
speaking 
with 
defendant, 
Investigator 
Woosley 
searched through a pawn shop database for any transactions 
involving items matching those missing from the church but did 
not find anything. The missing items were never recovered. 
At the close of the State’s evidence, defendant moved to 
dismiss the charges. The trial court denied the motion. 
Defendant then elected to present evidence and testify on his 
own behalf. Defendant testified that he was a 51 year old man 
with a high school education and one semester of college. He 
said that on 15 August 2012, he had been asked to leave the home 
he was living in, so he packed his possessions in a duffel bag 
and left.  He started walking toward a friend’s house but 
dropped the bag in a ditch because it was too heavy to carry 
long-distance. 
-5- 
 
 
Around midnight, defendant arrived at his friend’s house, 
but his friend’s girlfriend asked him to leave, so he did. 
Defendant continued walking down the road until he came upon the 
church. He noticed that the door was cracked slightly and a 
“sliver of light” was emanating from within.  Defendant 
explained that after all his walking, he was thirsty and tired, 
so he went into the church looking for water and sanctuary.  He 
said that while he was inside, he got some water, prayed, and 
slept. He claimed that he did not intend to take anything and 
did not take anything when he left around daybreak. 
After leaving the church, defendant began walking down the 
road again.  He soon began having chest pains and called 911. 
Defendant explained that he was on a variety of medications at 
the time, including powerful psychotropic medication.  An 
ambulance arrived and took him to Cleveland Memorial Hospital. 
Calvin Cobb, the Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) who 
responded to defendant’s call, also testified on defendant’s 
behalf. Mr. Cobb said that they received a dispatch call around 
6:30 a.m. When they arrived at the intersection of Burke Road 
and River Hill Road, they saw defendant near an open field, 
sitting on the back of a fire truck that had been first to 
respond. Defendant told Mr. Cobb that he had been wandering all 
-6- 
 
 
night. Mr. Cobb noticed that defendant looked disheveled and 
worn out, and that defendant had worn through the soles of his 
shoes. Mr. Cobb did not see defendant carrying anything and did 
not find anything in his pockets. 
After defendant rested his case, the State called another 
officer in rebuttal. The State wanted to offer his testimony 
regarding defendant’s prior breaking or entering arrest. The 
trial court asked the State to explain the relevance of the 
prior incident. The State argued that it contradicted part of 
defendant’s testimony regarding what happened before he got to 
the church, but did not elaborate on how it contradicted 
defendant’s 
testimony 
and 
did 
not 
otherwise 
explain 
its 
relevance. The trial court excluded the rebuttal testimony under 
Rule 403. At the close of all the evidence, defendant renewed 
his motion to dismiss all charges, which the trial court again 
denied.  
The jury found defendant guilty of both charges. The trial 
court consolidated the charges for judgment and sentenced 
defendant to a split sentence of 13-25 months imprisonment, 
suspended for 24 months of supervised probation, and an active 
term of 140 days in jail.  Defendant gave timely written notice 
of appeal. 
-7- 
 
 
II. 
Larceny Indictment 
Defendant first argues that the larceny indictment on which 
he was tried was fatally defective because it “failed to allege 
that Manna Baptist Church was an entity capable of owning 
property.” We agree. 
“It is well settled that a valid bill of indictment is 
essential to the jurisdiction of the trial court to try an 
accused for a felony.” State v. Abraham, 338 N.C. 315, 339, 451 
S.E.2d 131, 143 (1994) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
“A challenge to the facial validity of an indictment may be 
brought at any time, and need not be raised at trial for 
preservation on appeal.” State v. LePage, 204 N.C. App. 37, 49, 
693 S.E.2d 157, 165 (2010). 
“An indictment must allege all of the essential elements of 
the crime sought to be charged.” State v. Ledwell, 171 N.C. App. 
328, 331, 614 S.E.2d 412, 414 (citation and quotation marks 
omitted), disc. rev. denied, 360 N.C. 73, 622 S.E.2d 624 (2005). 
“The essential elements of larceny are that the defendant (1) 
took the property of another; (2) carried it away; (3) without 
the owner’s consent; and (4) with the intent to permanently 
deprive the owner of the property.” State v. Justice, ___ N.C. 
App. ___, ___, 723 S.E.2d 798, 801 (2012) (citation, quotation 
-8- 
 
 
marks, and brackets omitted). “[A]n indictment for larceny which 
fails to allege the ownership of the property either in a 
natural person or a legal entity capable of owning property is 
defective.” State v. Abbott, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 720 S.E.2d 
437, 440 (2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
Here, the indictment alleged two owners of the stolen 
property—Andy Stephens and Manna Baptist Church. Andy Stephens 
is a natural person, but the indictment does not allege that 
Manna Baptist Church is a legal entity capable of owning 
property. Failure to include such an allegation is normally 
fatal to the indictment. See State v. Cathey, 162 N.C. App. 350, 
353, 590 S.E.2d 408, 410 (2004). The inclusion of Pastor 
Stephens as co-owner does not cure the omission here.  
Where an indictment alleges two owners of the stolen 
property, the State must prove that each owner had at least some 
property interest in it. See State v. Greene, 289 N.C. 578, 585, 
223 S.E.2d 365, 370 (1976) (“If the person alleged in the 
indictment to have a property interest in the stolen property is 
not the owner or special owner of it, there is a fatal variance 
entitling defendant to a nonsuit.”); State v. Burgess, 74 N.C. 
272, 273 (1876) (“If one is charged with stealing the property 
of A, it will not do to prove that he stole the joint property 
-9- 
 
 
of A and B.”); State v. Hill, 79 N.C. 656, 659 (1878) (holding 
that where an indictment alleges multiple owners, the State must 
prove that there were in fact multiple owners). If one of the 
owners were incapable of owning property, the State necessarily 
would be unable to prove that both alleged owners had a property 
interest. Therefore, where the indictment alleges multiple 
owners, one of whom is not a natural person, failure to allege 
that such an owner has the ability to own property is fatal to 
the indictment. Consequently, the indictment here is fatally 
flawed and defendant’s conviction for larceny must be vacated.  
See Abbott, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 720 S.E.2d at 441. 
III. Breaking or Entering a Place of Worship 
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in denying 
his motion to dismiss the charge of felony breaking or entering 
a place of worship because there was insufficient evidence of 
his intent to commit larceny therein. We agree. 
When ruling on a motion to dismiss for 
insufficient evidence, the trial court must 
consider the evidence in the light most 
favorable 
to 
the 
State, 
drawing 
all 
reasonable inferences in the State’s favor. 
Any 
contradictions 
or 
conflicts 
in 
the 
evidence are resolved in favor of the State, 
and evidence unfavorable to the State is not 
considered. The trial court must decide only 
whether there is substantial evidence of 
each 
essential 
element 
of 
the 
offense 
charged and of the defendant[’s] being the 
-10- 
 
 
perpetrator 
of 
the 
offense. 
Substantial 
evidence 
is 
relevant 
evidence 
that 
a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 
support a conclusion. When the evidence 
raises no more than a suspicion of guilt, a 
motion 
to 
dismiss 
should 
be 
granted. 
However, so long as the evidence supports a 
reasonable 
inference 
of 
the 
defendant’s 
guilt, a motion to dismiss is properly 
denied even though the evidence also permits 
a reasonable inference of the defendant’s 
innocence. 
State v. Chillo, 208 N.C. App. 541, 545, 705 S.E.2d 394, 397 
(2010) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
A person commits the felony of breaking or entering a place 
of worship if he “[1] wrongfully breaks or enters [2] any 
building that is a place of religious worship [3] with intent to 
commit any felony or larceny therein.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-
54.1(a) (2011). There are two lesser-included offenses to this 
charge: felony breaking or entering under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-
54(a) (2011), which lacks the “place of religious worship” 
element, and misdemeanor breaking or entering under N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 14-54(b) (2011), which lacks both the “place of 
religious worship” element and the intent element. 
Defendant does not contend that the State failed to present 
sufficient evidence that he wrongfully entered a place of 
religious worship. He argues that the State failed to present 
sufficient evidence of intent to commit a larceny therein. 
-11- 
 
 
“Intent is a mental attitude seldom provable by direct 
evidence. It must ordinarily be proved by circumstances from 
which it may be inferred.” Chillo, 208 N.C. App. at 546, 705 
S.E.2d at 398. “The intent with which an accused broke and 
entered may be found by the jury from evidence as to what he did 
within the [building].” State v. Brewer, 80 N.C. App. 195, 199, 
341 S.E.2d 354, 357 (1986) (citation and quotation marks 
omitted). “For example, the intent to commit larceny may be 
inferred from the fact that defendant committed larceny.” 
Chillo, 208 N.C. App. at 546, 705 S.E.2d at 398 (citation and 
quotation marks omitted). “Further, a defendant’s possession of 
stolen goods soon after the theft is a circumstance tending to 
show him guilty of the larceny.” State v. Baskin, 190 N.C. App. 
102, 109, 660 S.E.2d 566, 572 (citation, quotation marks, and 
brackets omitted), disc. rev. denied, 362 N.C. 475, 666 S.E.2d 
648 (2008). Finally, “[i]n the absence of a showing of a lawful 
motive, an intent to commit larceny may be reasonably inferred 
from an unlawful entry.” State v. Quilliams, 55 N.C. App. 349, 
351, 285 S.E.2d 617, 619, cert. denied, 305 N.C. 590, 292 S.E.2d 
11 (1982); see State v. McBryde, 97 N.C. 393, 397, 1 S.E. 925, 
927 (1887) (establishing that an inference of felonious intent 
may be made where a defendant breaks into a dwelling at night 
-12- 
 
 
with “no explanatory facts or circumstances”). However, this 
inference may be precluded by evidence of facts or circumstances 
that reveal an innocent reason for the defendant’s entering into 
the building.1 
The presumption, or inference as it is more 
properly called, is one of fact and not of 
law. The inference derived from [an unlawful 
entry] is to be considered by the jury 
merely as an evidential fact, along with the 
other evidence in the case, in determining 
whether the State has carried the burden of 
satisfying the jury beyond a reasonable 
doubt of the defendant’s guilt. Proof of 
[unlawful entry] by the State does not shift 
the burden of proof to the defendant but the 
burden remains with the State to demonstrate 
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
                     
1 See, e.g., State v. Cook, 242 N.C. 700, 703, 89 S.E.2d 383, 385 
(1955) (evidence sufficient to preclude inference where the 
defendant did not flee when discovered, explained that he was 
looking for a particular person, and left when requested), State 
v. Moore, 62 N.C. App. 431, 434, 303 S.E.2d 230, 232 (1983) 
(holding that there was sufficient evidence of innocent intent 
where both the State’s and defendant’s evidence showed that the 
defendant was coerced at knifepoint to enter), State v. 
Humphries, 82 N.C. App. 749, 751, 348 S.E.2d 167, 169 (1986) 
(holding that the evidence was sufficient to preclude inference 
where defendant believed house to be that of his girlfriend and 
nothing in the dwelling had been disturbed), disc. rev. 
dismissed, 320 N.C. 165, 357 S.E.2d 359 (1987), State v. Lamson, 
75 N.C. App. 132, 133, 135, 330 S.E.2d 68, 68, 70 (holding that 
the evidence was sufficient to preclude inference where he tried 
to enter the house drunk and was staying at the neighboring 
house), disc. rev. denied, 314 N.C. 545, 335 S.E.2d 318 (1985); 
see also, State v. Keitt, 153 N.C. App. 671, 675-76, 571 S.E.2d 
35, 37-38 (2002) (discussing the rebuttable McBryde inference 
and holding that evidence of intoxication alone is insufficient 
to rebut it), aff’d per curiam, 357 N.C. 155, 579 S.E.2d 250 
(2003). 
-13- 
 
 
 
State v. Fair, 291 N.C. 171, 173, 229 S.E.2d 189, 191 (1976) 
(citations omitted). 
Here, defendant admitted entering the church, but he 
explained that he entered to seek sanctuary, drink water, and 
pray.  Defendant testified that the door to the church was 
unlocked when he arrived there. He stated that he saw that the 
door was slightly ajar and that a “sliver of light” was coming 
from within.  He testified that he did not enter intending to 
steal anything and did not in fact steal anything.  None of the 
State’s evidence contradicts this testimony. Pastor Stephens 
testified that when the church secretary arrived on the morning 
of 20 August 2012, she found the front door unlocked.  There 
were no signs of forced entry.  Pastor Stephens admitted that 
the door could have been left unlocked accidentally after 
Wednesday night services, which ended around 9 p.m. 
Defendant testified that he arrived at the church after 12 
a.m. and set back out on the road around sunrise, but that 
shortly thereafter he began having chest pains and called 911.  
Mr. Cobb, the EMT who responded to defendant’s call, testified 
that he was dispatched around 6:30 a.m.  At the time, defendant 
was near an open field at the intersection of Burke Road and 
River Hill Road. The church is also located on Burke Road, 
-14- 
 
 
though its distance from the intersection is not clear from the 
testimony. When Mr. Cobb arrived, defendant was sitting on the 
back of a fire truck, which had responded first. Defendant 
looked disheveled and worn out. He had worn through the soles of 
his shoes. Defendant explained to Mr. Cobb that he had been 
wandering all night. Mr. Cobb testified that defendant was not 
carrying anything and did not have anything in his pockets. 
Four days later, after Sunday services, Pastor Stephens 
noticed that an audio receiver, some microphones, and some audio 
cords were missing. These items were kept at various places 
around the church, including by the sound system, in the front 
of the church, and in the baptistery changing area, where 
defendant’s wallet was found.  Investigator Woosley checked a 
pawn shop database, but found no reports of items matching those 
missing from the church. Neither the officers nor any of the 
church staff searched the area around the church for the missing 
items.  The items were never recovered. 
When Investigator Woosley spoke with defendant at the 
Cleveland County Detention Center, defendant admitted that he 
had been to the church, but stated that he could not remember 
what he had done there. Defendant explained that he was a 
religious man and that “he had been on a spiritual [journey].”  
-15- 
 
 
He admitted having periodic blackouts related to his mental 
health issues and medications, but never admitted taking 
anything from the church or entering the church with intent to 
steal.2 He said that he remembered going to the church and that 
the church door was open when he got there, but that he did not 
remember doing anything wrong once inside. 
We conclude that these facts are sufficient “explanatory 
facts and circumstances” to preclude the McBryde inference. See 
McBryde, 97 N.C. at 397, 1 S.E. at 927; Lamson, 75 N.C. App. at 
135, 330 S.E.2d at 70. Unlike in the cases finding the evidence 
sufficient to infer intent from the breaking or entering alone, 
there was evidence of innocent intent and no evidence that 
defendant was discovered in the church and fled from the 
building. Cf. State v. Hill, 38 N.C. App. 75, 78, 247 S.E.2d 
295, 297 (1978).  Instead, he called 911 from a location near 
the church. There was no evidence that defendant attacked 
occupants of the building. Cf. State v. Accor, 277 N.C. 65, 73, 
175 S.E.2d 583, 588-89 (1970). There was no evidence that 
                     
2 Defendant did admit that he had previously broken into a 
residence, but there was no evidence that this offense had 
anything to do with the church, that it was in the same 
vicinity, or that it was uniquely similar to the facts here. 
Indeed, when the State attempted to elaborate on this other 
offense in rebuttal, the trial court excluded this evidence 
under Rule 403. 
-16- 
 
 
defendant entered the building in a manner consistent with 
criminal intent—he entered through an unlocked front door. Cf. 
State v. Hedrick, 289 N.C. 232, 236, 221 S.E.2d 350, 353 (1976) 
(applying the McBryde presumption where the defendant pushed in 
a windowpane to retrieve a key, cut telephone wires, was 
familiar 
with 
the 
layout 
of 
the 
house, 
and 
fled 
when 
confronted); Quilliams, 55 N.C. App. at 351, 285 S.E.2d at 619 
(concluding that there was sufficient evidence to survive a 
motion to dismiss where the defendant broke through a window, 
cut through a screen, and fled when discovered). 
“Inference may not be based on inference. Every inference 
must stand upon some clear and direct evidence, and not upon 
some other inference or presumption.” Fair, 291 N.C. at 173-74, 
229 S.E.2d at 190 (citation and quotation marks omitted).  Here, 
there was no evidence to contradict the innocent “facts and 
circumstances” offered by defendant. Therefore, the State was 
not entitled to rely on the McBryde inference to meet its 
burden. 
Absent such an inference, we conclude that the evidence was 
insufficient, even taken in the light most favorable to the 
State, to show that defendant entered the church with intent to 
commit larceny. Brewer, 80 N.C. App. at 199, 341 S.E.2d at 357.  
-17- 
 
 
The church was unlocked for over three hours before defendant 
arrived. There was no evidence of forced entry. Several hours 
later, when Mr. Cobb encountered defendant on the same road as 
the church, defendant was not carrying anything. None of the 
church staff noticed that the items were missing until four days 
later, after Sunday services. There was no evidence that 
defendant tried to sell the items in local pawn shops. There was 
no evidence that defendant touched the audio system. In fact, 
the State presented no evidence that showed defendant ever 
possessed the missing items. Cf. Chillo, 208 N.C. App. at 546, 
705 S.E.2d at 398; Baskin, 190 N.C. App. at 109, 660 S.E.2d at 
572. 
We hold that the State failed to meet its burden as to the 
intent element of felonious breaking or entering a place of 
worship. The evidence is insufficient to support a reasonable 
inference that defendant entered the church with intent to 
commit larceny. Taken in the light most favorable to the State, 
the evidence here “raises no more than a suspicion of guilt.” 
Chillo, 208 N.C. App. at 545, 705 S.E.2d at 397. Therefore, the 
trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss at 
the close of all the evidence. See id. 
-18- 
 
 
Although there was insufficient evidence to sustain a 
conviction for felonious breaking or entering, as defendant 
concedes, there was ample evidence to support a conviction for 
misdemeanor breaking or entering. Therefore, we remand for entry 
of judgment on that offense and resentencing. See State v. 
Dawkins, 305 N.C. 289, 291, 287 S.E.2d 885, 887 (1982) 
(remanding for entry of judgment on misdemeanor breaking or 
entering where evidence was sufficient to support that offense, 
but not felonious intent). 
IV. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
Defendant 
next 
argues 
that 
he 
received 
ineffective 
assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to move 
in limine to exclude evidence that he had been arrested on an 
unrelated breaking or entering charge and initially failed to 
object to introduction of that evidence at trial. When his trial 
counsel did object to the State’s attempt to call a witness in 
rebuttal to testify regarding the other charge, the trial court 
sustained the objection under Rule 403. 
To prevail in a claim for [ineffective 
assistance of counsel], a defendant must 
show that his (1) counsel’s performance was 
deficient, 
meaning 
it 
fell 
below 
an 
objective standard of reasonableness, and 
(2) the deficient performance prejudiced the 
defense, meaning counsel’s errors were so 
serious as to deprive the defendant of a 
-19- 
 
 
fair 
trial, 
a 
trial 
whose 
result 
is 
reliable. 
 
State v. Smith, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 749 S.E.2d 507, 509 
(2013) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
The relevance of the objected-to evidence here relates—at 
very best—to the defendant’s intent to commit larceny upon 
entering the church. Given our disposition of the breaking or 
entering charge, defendant cannot show prejudice from any 
failure of his trial counsel to object to this evidence. 
Therefore, he is not entitled to a new trial. 
V. 
Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court 
was without jurisdiction to try defendant on the larceny charge 
and that it erred in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the 
felony breaking or entering charge. Because there was sufficient 
evidence to sustain a conviction for misdemeanor breaking or 
entering, we remand for entry of judgment and resentencing on 
that offense.  
VACATED, in part; REVERSED, in part; and REMANDED. 
 
Judges STEPHENS and MCCULLOUGH concur.