Title: P. v. Lara
Citation: 48 Cal. 4th 216
Docket Number: S155481
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: March 8, 2010

1 
Filed 3/8/10 (this opn. precedes companion case, S159410, also filed 3/8/10) 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S155481 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 6 H028895 
DAVID ALAN LARA, 
) 
 
) 
Santa Clara County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. C9803113 
 
____________________________________) 
 
Defendant David Alan Lara was tried for false imprisonment of a child, 
found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI), and committed to a state hospital. A 
petition to extend his commitment was filed so late that he did not have adequate 
time to prepare for trial before his term ended.  There was no good cause for the 
late filing.  His motion to dismiss the petition on due process grounds was denied, 
and he was recommitted.   
We hold:  (1) The statutory deadline for filing an extension petition is 
directory, not mandatory, so long as the petition is filed before the expiration of 
the current commitment.  (2) Defendant was not entitled to a dismissal of this 
petition.  (3) Upon motion, he would have been entitled, under due process, to 
release pending trial, subject to possible proceedings under the Lanterman-Petris-
2 
Short Act (LPS Act).1  (4)  Defendant is not now eligible for release, however, 
because the court retained jurisdiction to try him and he received a fair trial. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity is committed to a state 
hospital or other treatment facility, unless sanity has been fully restored.2  If the 
court orders such a commitment, it is required to set a maximum term,3 defined as 
the longest prison term that could have been imposed on the defendant.4  
Subdivision (a)(2) of section 1026.5 sets out the general rule that “[a] person may 
not be kept in actual custody longer than the maximum term of commitment, 
except as provided in subdivision (b).”  (Italics added.) 
Subdivision (a)(2) of section 1026.5 requires that the Board of Parole 
Hearings (formerly Board of Prison Terms) calculate the maximum term for 
defendants who committed a felony before July 1, 1977, and thus fell under the 
indeterminate sentencing law.  The subdivision goes on to state, “The time limits 
of this section are not jurisdictional.”  (Italics added.) 
Subdivision (b) of section 1026.5 sets out the exclusive procedures under 
which a commitment may be extended.  A commitment may be extended only in 
felony cases and only when the defendant5 “represents a substantial danger of 
                                              
1  
Welfare and Institutions Code section 5000 et seq. 
2  
Penal Code section 1026.  Outpatient treatment is another alternative.    
(Ibid.)  Unless otherwise indicated, further statutory references will be to the Penal 
Code.  
3 
Section 1026, subdivision (e)(2).  
4  
Section 1026.5, subdivision (a)(1).  References to section 1026.5 will 
sometimes be compressed by omitting the term “subdivision.” 
5  
Technically, once a defendant has been found not guilty by reason of 
insanity, he is no longer a criminal defendant, but a person subject to civil 
commitment.  However, we will continue to use the word “defendant” to describe 
such a person, rather than the terms “committee” or “committed person.”  
3 
physical harm to others” due to “a mental disease, defect, or disorder.”  
(§ 1026.5(b)(1).)  Various numbered paragraphs of subdivision (b) set out specific 
time limits within which actions “shall” be taken.  At least 180 days before the 
current term ends the medical director “shall” provide the district attorney with an 
opinion as to whether the defendant‟s commitment should be extended.  
(§ 1026.5(b)(2).)  The prosecution “may” then file for an extension of 
commitment.  (Ibid.)  Unless good cause is shown, the petition “shall” be filed at 
least 90 days before the commitment is to expire.  (Ibid.)  Unless good cause is 
shown, a trial on the petition “shall” begin at least 30 days before the existing 
commitment is due to end.  (§ 1026.5(b)(4).)  If the defendant is proven to 
currently represent a substantial danger as described in the statute, the court shall 
order a recommitment for an additional two years.  (§ 1026.5(b)(8).)  The 
defendant “may not be kept in actual custody longer than two years unless another 
extension of commitment is obtained in accordance with the provisions of this 
subdivision.”  (Ibid.) 
In this case, the trial court found that defendant had falsely imprisoned a 
child at knifepoint (§§ 236, 237), but was not guilty by reason of insanity.  The 
court set the maximum term at six years, based on the aggravated term of three 
years doubled because defendant had sustained a prior strike conviction.  Based on 
that commitment defendant was due for release on October 15, 2004. 
The medical director gave timely notice to the district attorney that 
defendant‟s commitment should be extended.  However, the district attorney took 
no action until September 21, filing a petition for extension less than a month 
before defendant‟s scheduled release date.  On September 29, defense counsel 
orally moved to dismiss the petition for failure to comply with the statutory 90-day 
filing deadline.  “[T]o preserve the record,” counsel asked for a trial date before 
October 15, but expressed concern that she could not be prepared by that time.  “I 
4 
have tried to reach Mr. Lara, and I have not even been able to speak to him.”  The 
prosecutor opposed the motion, but offered no explanation for the delay.  The 
court took the matter under submission.  On October 7, defendant moved in 
writing to dismiss for failure to comply with the statutory time limits, depriving 
him of due process. 
At an October 12, 2004, hearing, defense counsel explained why she could 
not prepare for trial by October 15.  Although she had received the extension 
petition on September 29, she was unable to contact defendant at the hospital until 
October 1, and could not meet with him until October 7.  The return on her 
subpoena duces tecum for defendant‟s records was set for October 15.  She had to 
review the records before deciding whether to seek an independent psychiatric 
evaluation.  The prosecutor conceded that the delay in filing the extension petition 
was not excused by good cause,6 and did not argue that the defense could 
reasonably be ready for trial before defendant‟s term expired.  The trial court 
denied the dismissal motion, but made no finding whether defense counsel had 
adequate time to prepare for trial before defendant‟s scheduled release date. 
On October 18, defendant filed for writs of habeas corpus, mandate and/or 
prohibition in the Court of Appeal.  The petitions were denied on December 6,7 
and this court denied review on February 16, 2005.8 
                                              
6  
The prosecutor informed the court that he had belatedly found the petition 
in a pile of other reports.  He admitted this explanation did not amount to a 
showing of good cause.   
7  
In re Lara on Habeas Corpus (Dec. 6, 2004, S129957 H028038); Lara v. 
Superior Court (Dec. 6, 2004, S129957 H028039). 
8  
In re Lara on Habeas Corpus, S129957.  Justices Kennard and Moreno 
were of the opinion that the petition should have been granted.  
5 
On May 13, 2005, almost seven months after defendant‟s original 
commitment ended, a jury found that he represented a substantial danger of 
physical harm to others.  The trial court extended his commitment for two years, 
running from the date his term originally was to expire. 
On July 17, 2007, the Court of Appeal reversed, directing that the trial court 
grant defendant‟s motion to dismiss because he had been denied due process.   
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.  Defendant was not 
entitled to dismissal of the extension petition on due process grounds.  Had he so 
moved, he would have been entitled to release pending trial on the petition, 
subject to possible LPS Act proceedings.  However, no relief is available at this 
stage.  The court retained jurisdiction to try the petition.  The fact that defendant 
was not released did not affect the validity of the extension order.9 
 
 
                                              
9  
Moreover, since the proceeding challenged here, defendant has twice been 
recommitted.  In the most recent proceeding of which we are advised, he filed a 
written waiver and acceptance of the extension. 
 
In an order filed on June 28, 2007, defendant‟s commitment was extended a 
second time, to October 15, 2008.  In affirming the 2007 extension order, the 
Court of Appeal held:  (1) Defendant continued to represent a substantial danger 
of physical harm to others because of his paranoid schizophrenia, the likelihood he 
would discontinue his medications if released, and his history of attempts to 
kidnap children.  (2) Defendant‟s jurisdictional challenge to the 2007 extension 
order, based on the ground that he was denied due process in the extension 
proceeding under review here, could not be resolved until we acted in this case.  
(People v. Lara (Aug. 27, 2008, H032069).)  This court denied review in that case.  
(People v. Lara (Dec. 17, 2008, S167300).) 
 
In an order filed on November 7, 2008, defendant‟s commitment was 
extended a third time, to October 15, 2010.  (People v. Lara (Super. Ct. Santa 
Clara County, 2008, No. C9803113).)  Defendant filed a written waiver and 
acceptance of this extension.   
6 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  
The Statutory Deadlines Are Directory 
Defendant contends that the statutory deadlines were mandatory, and 
because they were not met, the court lost jurisdiction to try the case.  This 
argument fails.   
People v. Williams (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 436 (Williams) is one of many 
cases that have grappled with the question of whether a failure to meet a statutory 
deadline deprives a court of jurisdiction.  It explained that the concept of 
jurisdiction can be used in somewhat differing ways. 
“When courts use the phrase „lack of jurisdiction,‟ they are usually 
referring to one of two different concepts, although, as one court has observed, the 
distinction between them is „hazy.‟  (People v. Mendez (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 
1773, 1781.)”  (People v. Williams, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th 436, 447.)  A lack of 
jurisdiction in its fundamental or strict sense results in “„an entire absence of 
power to hear or determine the case, an absence of authority over the subject 
matter or the parties.‟  (Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 
288.)  On the other hand, a court may have jurisdiction in the strict sense but 
nevertheless lack „ “jurisdiction” (or power) to act except in a particular manner, 
or to give certain kinds of relief, or to act without the occurrence of certain 
procedural prerequisites.‟  (Ibid.)  When a court fails to conduct itself in the 
manner prescribed, it is said to have acted in excess of jurisdiction.”  (Ibid.; see 
generally, 2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Jurisdiction, §§ 1, 285, pp. 575-
576, 891-892.)   
The distinction is important because the remedies are different.  
“[F]undamental jurisdiction cannot be conferred by waiver, estoppel, or consent.  
Rather, an act beyond a court‟s jurisdiction in the fundamental sense is null and 
void” ab initio.  (Williams, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 447.)  “Therefore, a claim 
7 
based on a lack of [ ] fundamental jurisdiction[ ] may be raised for the first time on 
appeal.  (People v. Chadd (1981) 28 Cal.3d 739, 757.)  „In contrast, an act in 
excess of jurisdiction is valid until set aside, and parties may be precluded from 
setting it aside by such things as waiver, estoppel, or the passage of time.  
[Citations.]‟  (People v. Ruiz (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d [574], 584; In re Andres G. 
(1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 476, 482.)”  (Ibid.; see, e.g., People v. American 
Contractors Indemnity Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 653, 660-661.)    
Whether the failure to follow a statute makes subsequent action void or 
merely voidable “„has been characterized as a question of whether the statute 
should be accorded “mandatory” or “directory” effect.  If the failure is determined 
to have an invalidating effect, the statute is said to be mandatory; if the failure is 
determined not to invalidate subsequent action, the statute is said to be directory.‟  
(People v. McGee (1977) 19 Cal.3d 948, 958.)”  (City of Santa Monica v. 
Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 905, 923 (City of Santa Monica.)10   
Whether a particular statute is intended to impose a mandatory duty is a 
question of interpretation for the courts.  (City of Santa Monica, supra, 43 Cal.4th 
at p. 924.)  “Unless the Legislature clearly expresses a contrary intent, time limits 
are typically deemed directory.”  (Allen, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 102.)  Here, the 
Legislature made its intent quite clear.  Section 1026.5(a)(2) expressly provides 
that “the time limits of this section are not jurisdictional.”  (Italics added.)  
Defendant seeks to circumvent that clear statement by relying on the use of the 
                                              
10  
We observed in People v. Allen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 91 (Allen) that the 
violation of even a mandatory provision does not necessarily mean a court loses 
fundamental jurisdiction.  (Id. at p. 101, fn. 5.)  We need not consider the nature of 
those exceptions here, given our conclusion that the statutory deadlines were not 
mandatory.  (Ante, p. 6.) 
8 
term “shall” in various paragraphs of subdivision (b).11  Defendant argues that, 
although the Legislature specifically said the time limits set out in “this section are 
not jurisdictional,”12 it really intended to say that the time limits set out “in 
subdivision (a)” are not jurisdictional.  Defendant‟s construction ignores the plain 
meaning of the statutory language, is at odds with the explicit manner in which 
section 1026.5 is drafted, and runs counter to accepted canons of statutory 
construction. 
The Penal Code contains many thousands of numbered sections.  Section 7, 
paragraph 20 reads:  “The word „section,‟ whenever hereinafter employed, refers 
to a section of this code, unless some other code or statute is expressly 
mentioned.”13  Defendant‟s construction ignores this express definition of the term 
“section.”  It is also inconsistent with the internal structure of section 1026.5 and 
the way the Legislature precisely used the term “section” throughout the provision.  
The very first sentence of the section provides that no one may be kept in actual 
custody beyond the maximum term of commitment, “except as provided in this 
section.”  (§ 1026.5(a)(1), italics added.)  The next sentence defines the meaning 
of “maximum term of commitment” for “purposes of this section.”  (Ibid., italics 
added.)  The exception referred to is contained, not in subdivision (a), but in 
                                              
11  
“Shall” is used in the provisions setting the time limits for (1) the medical 
director to submit an opinion to the district attorney concerning extension of the 
defendant‟s commitment (§ 1026.5(b)(2)); (2) the district attorney to file an 
extension petition (ibid.); and (3) the trial to begin (§ 1026.5(b)(4).   
 
It is also used in subdivision (b)(10), which provides that extension 
proceedings “shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of this 
subdivision.”  (Italics added.) 
12  
Italics added. 
13  
Section 9603 of the Government Code provides:  “The general rules for the 
construction of statutes are contained in the preliminary provisions of the different 
codes.” 
9 
subdivision (b).  The phrase “maximum term of commitment,” while originally 
defined in subdivision (a), is used a number of times throughout the entire section.  
Clearly, the Legislature intended to use the term “section” to refer to the whole of 
section 1026.5. 
As the court noted in In re Johns (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 577 (Johns):  
“Throughout section 1026.5, the Legislature was precise in using the terms 
„paragraph‟ and „subdivision‟ to identify the various divisions of the lengthy and 
complex section.  Indeed, in the sentence preceding the one under scrutiny, the 
Legislature singled out „paragraph (1)‟ and „subdivision (b)‟ for coverage and 
exclusion.”  (Id. at p. 580; accord, People v. Dougherty (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 
245, 247 (Dougherty); see People v. Mitchell (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 936, 944; 
People v. Fernandez (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 117, 129-130 (Fernandez) [mentally 
disordered offender statute‟s 180-day deadline for medical director to submit 
written evaluation to district attorney not mandatory].)  We conclude that the 
Legislature‟s statement that “the time limits of this section are not jurisdictional”14 
refers to all the time limits set out in Penal Code section 1026.5, not only to the 
limits referred to in subdivision (a). 
With regard to defendant‟s reliance on the use of the word “shall,” it should 
not be assumed that every statute that uses that term is mandatory.  (Nunn v. State 
of California (1984) 35 Cal.3d 616, 625; Morris v. County of Marin (1977) 18 
Cal.3d 901, 910-911, fn. 6.)  “Neither the word „may,‟ nor the word „shall,‟ is 
dispositive.”  (Allen, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 102.)  The context of the language, as 
well as other indicia of legislative intent, must be considered.  (DuBois v. 
Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 382, 388.)  The preceding analysis 
                                              
14  
Italics added. 
10 
demonstrates that the Legislature‟s clear intent was to use the term “section” to 
refer to the entirety of section 1026.5. 
Yet another factor supports our conclusion as to legislative intent.  The 
Legislature‟s failure to include a penalty or consequence for noncompliance with 
the statutory procedure also indicates that the requirement is directory rather than 
mandatory.  (California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. State Personnel Bd. 
(1995) 10 Cal.4th 1133, 1145 (Correctional Peace Officers); Edwards v. Steele 
(1979) 25 Cal.3d 406, 410 (Edwards).)  Section 1026.5 does not say that a trial is 
precluded if the statutory time limits are not met.  Indeed, the statute itself 
provides that the time limits are not binding if good cause is shown for not having 
met them,15 and also provides that a defendant may waive time to allow 
proceedings beyond the timeframes set out.16  It is black letter law that 
fundamental jurisdiction may not be conferred by waiver, estoppel, or consent.  
(Rest.2d Judgments, § 12, com. b, p. 117; 2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) 
Jurisdiction, § 13, p. 585.)  Thus, the interpretation defendant urges would render 
the good cause and time waiver provisions nullities.  Not only are statutes not 
ordinarily interpreted in a fashion that renders part of them void,17 the 
Legislature‟s provision for good cause findings and time waivers is an additional 
demonstration of its intent that the limits were not intended as mandatory. 
                                              
15  
 “The petition shall be filed no later than 90 days before the expiration of 
the original commitment unless good cause is shown.”  (§ 1026.5(b)(2); italics 
added.) 
16  
“The trial shall commence no later than 30 calendar days prior to the time 
the person would otherwise have been released, unless that time is waived by the 
person or unless good cause is shown.”  (§ 1026.5(b)(4), italics added.) 
17  
“[I]n reviewing the text of a statute, we must follow the fundamental rule of 
statutory construction that requires every part of a statute be presumed to have 
some effect and not be treated as meaningless unless absolutely necessary.”  
(People v. Arias (2008) 45 Cal.4th 169, 180.) 
11 
Finally, we must ask whether the purposes of the statute would be 
promoted or defeated if the filing deadline were construed as mandatory.  (See 
Correctional Peace Officers, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1145; Edwards, supra, 25 
Cal.3d at p. 410.)  Holding it to be mandatory would mean that a court, faced with 
a filing deadline missed for good cause, would be powerless to extend treatment 
under the statute no matter how great the defendant‟s need or the danger release 
might pose to the public.  Such an interpretation would run counter to the very 
purposes of the NGI statutes and the provision for extension of commitment.  It 
would elevate the secondary benefit to the defendant derived from the time limit 
over the fundamental purposes of the NGI provisions, to ensure that needed 
treatment is provided and the public protected.  (Cf. Williams, supra, 77 
Cal.App.4th at p. 451 [construing the time limit provisions of the Mentally 
Disordered Offender Act].) 18           
Defendant‟s reliance on Allen, supra, 42 Cal.4th 91, is misplaced.  In Allen, 
the district attorney filed a petition to extend the commitment of a mentally 
disordered offender (MDO) after the defendant’s previous commitment had ended.  
(Id. at p. 95.)  Section 2972, subdivision (e), part of the Mentally Disordered 
Offender Act (MDO Act) permits an extension petition to be filed before the 
current commitment ends.  We concluded that this statutory requirement of filing 
before the expiration of the commitment is mandatory.  (Allen, at p. 104.)  
Accordingly, we affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which had 
reversed the trial court‟s commitment order with directions that the extension 
                                              
18  
The primary purpose of confining a person under the authority of section 
1026 is public protection.  (Department of Mental Hygiene v. Hawley (1963) 59 
Cal.2d 247, 255.) 
12 
petition be dismissed.  (Id. at pp. 96, 109.)  Unlike Allen, the extension petition 
here was filed before defendant‟s current commitment ended.19  
B. 
Due Process  
A “root requirement” of due process is that an individual be given an 
opportunity for a hearing before being deprived of any significant liberty or 
property interest, except for extraordinary situations where some valid 
governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after the 
                                              
19  
Defendant‟s reliance on People v. Pacini (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 877 
(Pacini) is also misplaced.  Pacini involved a previous version of section 
1026.5(b)(2) that did not provide for excusal of the filing deadline upon a finding 
of good cause.  (Pacini, at p. 888, fn. 6; see People v. McCune (1995) 37 
Cal.App.4th 686, 691 (McCune).)  Further, in that case, the district attorney filed 
an extension petition more than five weeks after Pacini‟s “maximum commitment 
date” had passed.  (Pacini, at pp. 881-882.)  Because it involved a case in which 
the commitment term had expired, the Pacini court noted that it was not 
determining “whether or under what conditions a violation of the „time limits‟ of 
(b)(2) is jurisdictional.”  (Id. at p. 891.) 
In McCune, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th 686, a different panel of the same Court 
of Appeal that decided Pacini explained:  “In Pacini, this court concluded that a 
failure to comply with the section 1026.5(b)(2) general requirement that an 
extension petition must be filed before the existing commitment period ends 
deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to extend the commitment.  (120 Cal.App.3d 
at p. 891.)  Because of this conclusion, it was unnecessary to consider whether the 
specific time limits in section 1026.5(b)(2) and (4)—respectively, the 90-day 
provision for petition filing and the 30-day provision for trial—were jurisdictional 
as well.  (120 Cal.App.3d at p. 891.)”  (McCune, at pp. 690-691.)  The conclusion 
that section 1026.5 requires filing of an extension petition before expiration of the 
existing term is consistent with our recent holding in Allen, supra, 42 Cal.4th 91, 
that a petition to extend the civil commitment of an MDO must be filed before the 
existing commitment expires.  (Id. at p. 104.)  
 
It is true that the Pacini court adopted the argument that the use of “this 
section” in section 1026.5(a)(1) was intended to refer to that subdivision only.  
(People v. Pacini, supra, 120 Cal.App.3d. at p. 890.)  That statement, however, 
was dicta and, for the reasons set out above, is disapproved. 
13 
event.  (Boddie v. Connecticut (1971) 401 U.S. 371, 379; see In re Roger S. (1977) 
19 Cal.3d 921, 937.) 
Here, without good cause, the petition to extend defendant‟s NGI 
commitment was filed so late he did not have adequate time to prepare for trial 
before his term ended.  (See ante, at p. 4.)  Therefore, as we explain in part II.C., 
post, due process would have required that he be released pending trial, subject to 
LPS Act proceedings.  An established line of California cases supports this 
analysis.  We note at the outset, however, that these cases incorrectly identify the 
remedy for such due process denials.  Insofar as they conclude that the extension 
orders should have been dismissed, they are disapproved.20  We discuss the 
fashioning of a remedy in greater detail in part II.C., post.   
In People v. Hill (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 1055 (Hill), an NGI extension 
petition was filed 10 days before the maximum commitment date.  The public 
defender was appointed only five court days before the existing commitment was 
to expire.  Counsel had not yet met the defendant, his medical reports were 
unavailable, and independent experts had yet to be appointed.  Undeterred by these 
realities, the trial court inquired why counsel could not proceed immediately and 
complete the trial before the current commitment ended.  It did, however, grant a 
two-day continuance.  Two days later counsel again argued that she could not 
possibly be prepared for trial in the next three days.  The trial court expressed 
displeasure, noting that any number of lawyers had been able to begin trial on the 
very day of their appointment.  Trial was ultimately held more than a year after the 
defendant‟s commitment had expired.  (Id. at pp. 1057-1059.) 
                                              
20  
See post, page 24, footnote 26. 
14 
The Court of Appeal observed that the statutory time limits served the clear 
legislative objective to allow the defense “not less than 60 days to prepare for trial, 
and 30 days within which to complete such trial, without confining him beyond 
the maximum period permissible under his initial commitment.  [Citations.]”  
(Hill, supra, 134 Cal.App.3d at p. 1057.)  It responded to the trial court‟s 
observation that some counsel are able to proceed on the very day of their 
appointment.  “While there may be attorneys extant who are so blessed with 
uncommitted time and the intellectual quickness to remain steadily mounted 
during such an instance of galloping justice, we cannot fault [Hill‟s counsel] for 
her acknowledged inability to do so.”  (Id. at p. 1058.)  Finally, the court 
concluded that “it was realistically quite impossible in the brief time that remained 
to bring this matter to even the most hurried conclusion with any semblance of due 
process.”  (Id. at p. 1060.)  The order extending the defendant‟s commitment was 
reversed.  (Id. at p. 1061.) 
Similarly, in People v. Hawkins (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 984, an NGI 
extension petition was filed 45 days beyond the 90-day cutoff date, and counsel 
was not appointed until two days before trial was required by statute to begin.  (Id. 
at pp. 986-988.)  The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court‟s dismissal of the 
petition as a denial of due process.  (Id. at p. 988.) 
In Dougherty, supra, 143 Cal.App.3d 245, the maximum NGI commitment 
date was November 8, 1981.  The extension petition was not filed until October 
14, and trial was set for November 2.  A defense motion for dismissal made on the 
trial date was denied.  (Id. at pp. 246-247.)  Reversing the order extending the 
commitment, the Court of Appeal applied the due process analysis set out in 
Johns, supra, 119 Cal.App.3d 577.  “ „Except where there has been an extended 
delay . . . prejudice will not be presumed from delay.  Where prejudice is not 
presumed, it is incumbent upon the defendant to show circumstances of actual 
15 
prejudice.‟  (119 Cal.App.3d at p. 581; see Scherling v. Superior Court (1978) 22 
Cal.3d 493, 505; Crockett v. Superior Court (1975) 14 Cal.3d 433, 440-441.)”  
(Dougherty, supra, 143 Cal.App.3d at p. 248.) 
The Dougherty court went on to consider the question of prejudice.  As the 
result of the late filing, the defense had only 20 days, rather than 60, to prepare 
before the commitment term expired.  “At the outset of trial, counsel informed the 
court that there had been insufficient time to secure the appointment of medical 
experts (§ 1027).  During trial counsel interrupted his cross-examination of the 
state hospital psychologist to complain to the court, outside the presence of the 
jury, that he was unable to cross-examine the witness effectively because there had 
been insufficient time to subpoena appellant‟s psychiatric file in advance of trial.  
Counsel stated further that he was incapable of effectively cross-examining the 
psychologist without professional assistance.  The record thus supports appellant‟s 
contention that the delay had the prejudicial effect of depriving counsel of an 
adequate time to prepare.  (Cf. In re Newbern (1960) 53 Cal.2d 786, 790-791; 
People v. Hill, supra, 134 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1059-1060; see People v. Hawkins, 
supra, 139 Cal.App.3d at p. 987.)  This conclusion requires that we consider the 
reasons for the delay.  (Cf. Scherling v. Superior Court, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 506; 
In re Johns, supra, 119 Cal.App.3d at p. 581.)”  (Dougherty, supra, 143 
Cal.App.3d at p. 248, fn. omitted.)   
In Dougherty, the medical director‟s negligence resulted in a late 
submission of his extension recommendation.  (Dougherty, supra, 143 Cal.App.3d 
at p. 249.)  The Dougherty court weighed that reason against the resulting 
prejudice.  “As the Supreme Court stated in Scherling v. Superior Court, supra, 
„[t]he ultimate inquiry in determining a claim based upon due process is whether 
the defendant will be denied a fair trial.  Thus, although delay may have been 
caused only by the negligence of the government, the prejudice suffered by a 
16 
defendant may be sufficient when balanced against the reasons for the delay to 
constitute a denial of due process.‟  (22 Cal.3d at p. 507.)  While here, unlike 
Scherling, the effect of the delay was not to deprive appellant of his right to 
speedy trial, but rather to force him to trial in less than the minimum time provided 
by statute to prepare a defense, the due process analysis is the same.  (See In re 
Newbern, supra, 53 Cal.2d at p. 791; People v. Hawkins, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d at 
p. 987; People v. Hill, supra, 134 Cal.App.3d at p. 1060.)  Because the 
justification for the delay is outweighed by its prejudicial effect, the order 
extending appellant‟s commitment was entered in violation of his right to due 
process.”  (Dougherty, supra, 143 Cal.App.3d at p. 249.) 
These principles have recently been applied in People v. Tatum (2008) 161 
Cal.App.4th 41 (Tatum).  Tatum had been committed as an MDO with a maximum 
commitment date of March 12, 2007.21  The district attorney did not file an 
extension petition until February 7.  (Tatum, at p. 48.)  As of March 2, ten days 
before the commitment was to end, the defense had not received the hospital 
records.  The court set trial for the last day of Tatum‟s current commitment.  On 
that date, defense counsel told the court she still had received no hospital records 
and could not adequately represent the defendant.  She argued that any further 
unauthorized confinement would deprive Tatum of due process.  (Id. at pp. 49-51.)  
The court dismissed the petition and the Court of Appeal affirmed.  (Id. at pp. 46-
47.) 
                                              
21  
Like the NGI statutes, the MDO Act sets a 180-day deadline for the 
medical director to notify the district attorney whether the defendant‟s term should 
be extended (§ 2970), and a 30-day deadline for beginning trial (§ 2972, subd. (a)).  
Unlike the NGI statutes, the MDO Act does not set a deadline for filing an 
extension petition.  (Tatum, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 56.)  Also, unlike section 
1026, section 2970 does not expressly state whether its time limits are 
jurisdictional.  (Fernandez, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 130.)   
17 
The Tatum opinion ably marshals the approach to be employed in 
determining whether a due process violation has occurred.  As we have explained 
in part II.A., ante, a failure to comply with one of the statutory time limits does not 
mandate a dismissal.  Instead, the due process question must be evaluated on a 
case-by-case basis.  “Consistent with the large body of case law that has developed 
over the preceding decades, a trial court faced with the question of whether to 
dismiss a late-filed MDO petition must evaluate the circumstances of the delay 
and the implications of continuing with trial under a due process rubric.”  (Tatum, 
supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 60.)  “[D]ue process in this context requires a flexible 
balancing of „any prejudicial effect of the delay against the justification for the 
delay.‟  (Fernandez, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 131 [„If the defendant fails to 
demonstrate prejudice, the court need not consider the reasons for the delay.‟]. . .”  
(Id., at p. 61.)   
The late filing of an extension petition potentially gives rise to two types of 
prejudice:  (1) inability to prepare for trial in the remaining time; or (2) 
involuntary commitment beyond the release date.  (Tatum, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th 
at p. 61.)  When a petition is filed just before the release date, “the offender is 
often forced to choose between these two types of prejudice.  Either the offender 
must curtail otherwise necessary trial preparation to ensure a „preexpiration trial‟ 
(Zachary [v. Superior Court (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1026,] 1036) or agree to a 
continuance of the trial date beyond the release date, thus suffering unauthorized 
postrelease confinement. . . . [W]henever the state‟s unexcused late filing of an 
MDO petition forces an offender to „choose‟ between these two types of prejudice, 
some prejudice is necessarily established.”  (Tatum, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 
61.) 
The degree of prejudice will depend on a variety of factors, including how 
late the filing is, the amount of time reasonably required to prepare for trial and 
18 
mount a defense, and whether action by the court or defense counsel contributed to 
the delay.  (See Tatum, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at pp. 61-62.)  It should be noted 
that both the NGI and MDO recommitment statutes provide for a defense waiver 
of the 30-day time limit for beginning trial.  (§§ 1026.5(b)(4), 2972, subd. (a).)  
There may certainly be circumstances in which a waiver of time for trial is 
determined by counsel to be in the client‟s best interest.  So long as the decision to 
waive time is not forced by unexcused prosecutorial delays, due process would not 
ordinarily be implicated. 
The Attorney General argues that defendant suffered no prejudice.  As we 
shall explain, the cases on which he relies do not assist him, but they do show how 
different factual scenarios may yield differing results.  First, however, it is useful 
to distinguish between the two senses in which the term “prejudice” is used in 
these cases.  Defendant did suffer prejudice in one sense.  The prosecution‟s 
unexcused late filing forced him to choose between going to trial unprepared or 
being held without trial beyond the release date.  As explained previously, the 
remedy for this prejudice would have been release pending trial, subject to LPS 
Act proceedings.  However, defendant did not suffer prejudice in the primary 
sense of the term. The fairness of his eventual trial was not affected by the due 
process violation.  (See People v. Woodward (1992) 4 Cal.4th 376, 387 
(Woodward).)22  He was ultimately tried by jury, represented by competent and 
                                              
22  
In Woodward, supra, 4 Cal.4th 376, this court ruled that the trial court‟s 
failure to give the defendant advance notice of its intention to close the courtroom 
temporarily was a violation of procedural due process, but harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt because there was nothing to suggest that the lack of notice 
prejudiced the defendant in any way, or that proper notice would have influenced 
or affected the course of the trial. 
19 
prepared counsel, and accorded all applicable trial safeguards.  With this 
distinction in mind we turn to the cases.   
In Johns, supra, 119 Cal.App.3d 577, an NGI extension petition was filed 
17 days late.  (Id. at p. 579.)  Had trial begun the full 30 days before the 
commitment expired,23 the defense would not have had the full 60 days for 
preparation.24  Instead, the trial began beyond the 30-day limit.  It was completed 
before the commitment expired, and the commitment was extended.  In reviewing 
Johns‟s due process claim, the Court of Appeal noted that prejudice would not be 
presumed because the filing delay was not lengthy.  (Johns, at p. 581.)  Thus, 
defendant bore the burden to establish actual prejudice.  He failed to do so.  He 
was given the full 60 days to prepare, and did not cite any prejudice attributable to 
his trial beginning less than 30 days before his original commitment ended.  (Ibid.)  
Johns is distinguishable from our case.  Here, the showing of prejudice is 
substantially stronger.  Because a showing of prejudice was made, inquiry into the 
reasons for the delay was required.  There was no showing of good cause.  (See 
ante, at p. 4.)  Finally, unlike Johns, defendant here was subjected to nearly seven 
months of additional confinement after his release date, but before the adjudication 
to which he was entitled.  (See ante, at p. 4.) 
Fernandez, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th 117, is also distinguishable.  It involved 
an MDO extension.  The medical director‟s 180-day evaluation letter25 was not 
sent to the district attorney until 50 days before Fernandez‟s scheduled release 
date.  (Fernandez, at p. 127.)  The prosecutor promptly filed an extension petition, 
but the trial court found, and the Court of Appeal agreed, that the medical 
                                              
23  
Section 1026.5(b)(4). 
24  
Section 1026.5(b)(2). 
25  
See ante, page 16, footnote 21. 
20 
director‟s delay was unsupported by good cause.  (Id. at pp. 127-128.)  Fernandez 
had only 29 days to prepare for trial (id. at p. 132), but he failed to show prejudice.  
Counsel never argued she was unprepared or unable to proceed.  The defendant‟s 
continuances were granted before trial and adequate time was afforded to submit 
briefing.  (Ibid.)  As the court noted, a showing of actual prejudice “ „must be 
supported by particular facts and not . . . by bare conclusionary statements.‟ 
(Crockett v. Superior Court (1975) 14 Cal.3d 433, 442.)”  (Id. at pp. 132-133.)  
Fernandez was not prejudiced.  He “had adequate time to prepare and present his 
defense . . . .”  (Id. at p. 134.) 
Fernandez was held for 12 days beyond his release date before his trial was 
completed and the recommitment order issued.  The Court of Appeal rejected his 
claim that this delay constituted a denial of due process.  The record revealed the 
trial date was extended beyond Fernandez‟s scheduled release date because his 
own counsel requested continuances and not because of the prosecutor‟s failure to 
comply with any statutory deadlines.  (Fernandez, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 
133.)  Once the prosecutor received the medical director‟s letter, he issued 
expedited subpoenas to assist the defense in obtaining necessary documents.  The 
original trial date was set before the commitment expired and the prosecutor was 
ready to begin on that date.  The defense reported that the district attorney had 
made every effort to resolve the case expeditiously.  (Id. at p. 134.)  “Ultimately, 
the trial on the merits was concluded in one day.  Except for the continuance 
requested by defense counsel, the trial would have been completed before 
defendant‟s release date.  Although the trial court was within its discretion to grant 
the continuance requested by defense counsel, defendant may not now claim 
prejudice from this same delay requested on his behalf.  To allow otherwise would 
allow defendants to request numerous continuances for good cause, pushing the 
trial past the release date, and then claim prejudice from the continued trial.”  (Id. 
21 
at p. 133.)  In making its evaluation, the trial court properly considered the timing 
of the medical director‟s letter, diligent efforts made by the prosecution in filing 
the petition and in assisting the defense to acquire discovery, reasonable 
preparation time for both parties, the continuances requested by the defense and 
the circumstances attendant to those requests, and the ultimate date of the 
proceedings.  Thus, Fernandez does not assist the Attorney General.  It stands for 
the proposition that the complained-of prejudice must be attributable to the 
People‟s failure, not to legitimate requests made by the defense.  Here it was the 
prosecution‟s tardiness that necessitated the delay.      
In Williams, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th 436, the district attorney filed an MDO 
extension petition only 18 days before Williams‟s scheduled release date, and 
Williams was not brought before the court until two days before that date.  Trial 
began two days after the release date and took two days to complete.  (Id. at pp. 
445-446.)  Williams was represented by counsel, who did not object when the trial 
date was set.  (Id. at pp. 440, 461-462.)  Having determined that the failure to 
comply with the 30-day limit for beginning trial did not vitiate fundamental 
jurisdiction (id. at pp. 447-451), the Court of Appeal turned to whether Williams‟s 
failure to object to the trial date waived any claim based on noncompliance with 
section 2972, subdivision (a)‟s 30-day time limit.  The court analogized to failure 
to object to noncompliance with section 1382, which provides that a criminal 
defendant must be tried within 60 days of the filing of an indictment or 
information, absent a finding of good cause, a time waiver, or consent.  Under the 
rule of People v. Wilson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 139, consent to the setting of trial 
beyond the statutory limit will be presumed when a defendant does not object to 
the date set and does not move to dismiss the action before trial begins.  (Id. at p. 
146.)  As the Williams court observed:  “Consequently, a violation of section 1382 
may not be raised for the first time either on appeal or in a posttrial petition for 
22 
writ of habeas corpus if the defendant, who was represented by counsel, failed to 
object to the trial date and make a timely motion to dismiss after the applicable 
period expired.”  (Williams, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 460.)  The court held:  
“We find no meaningful basis to distinguish an alleged violation of section 
2972(a) from a violation of section 1382.  The deadlines prescribed in both 
statutes relate to the time within which trial must be commenced.  Both statutes 
provide that the period may be waived or excused for good cause.  And when a 
violation of either statute has allegedly occurred, a pretrial objection and motion to 
dismiss permits the trial court to make a timely determination, which in turn may 
obviate the need for a trial.”  (Ibid.) 
Again our case is distinguishable.  Here, the defense repeatedly objected to 
the setting of the trial date, made its case for the demonstration of prejudice, and 
even sought writ review.  (See ante, at pp. 3-4.) 
C. 
Remedy 
As we have explained, a failure to comply with section 1026.5‟s time 
limitations does not deprive a court of fundamental jurisdiction, so long as an 
extension petition is filed before the end of the defendant‟s current term.  (See part 
II.A., ante.)  Therefore, the question arises as to what course of action a court 
should take when such a failure occurs.  As our discussion of Johns, supra, 119 
Cal.App.3d 577, and Fernandez, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th 117, makes clear, no 
remedial action need be taken if the defendant suffers no prejudice from the delay.  
Likewise, if the defendant does not object, waives time, or consents to a trial date 
beyond the expiration of the commitment, the defendant may remain confined and 
the court may go forward with trial on the petition.  (Williams, supra, 77 
Cal.App.4th at p. 460.) 
As we explained in Allen, supra, 42 Cal.4th 91, if an extension petition is 
not filed before the current commitment ends, the defendant is no longer subject to 
23 
constraint under the NGI or MDO statutes.  If a petition is filed before the 
expiration date, but too late to allow a reasonable time for trial preparation, a 
defendant who so moves should be released pending trial on the extension 
petition.  Otherwise, the defendant would be faced with the equally unacceptable 
choices of going to trial unprepared or being held without trial beyond the release 
date.   
If prosecutorial delay causes prejudice to the defendant that does not 
deprive the defendant of a reasonable time to prepare for trial, the court must 
consider whether and what remedial action is required.  First, the court must 
balance the explanation for the delay against the prejudice resulting from it.  
(Tatum, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at pp. 60-61; Dougherty, supra, 143 Cal.App.3d 
at p. 249.)  If the justification for the delay outweighs its prejudicial effect, the 
defendant may remain confined, pending trial, beyond the scheduled release date.  
If, however, good cause is not shown, or the good cause shown does not outweigh 
the prejudice suffered, the court must fashion a remedy.   
A defendant released from commitment under the NGI or MDO statutes 
may, however, be subject to confinement under the LPS Act.  A defendant who 
falls under the provisions of the LPS Act is held in a therapeutic setting and is 
entitled to the more stringent timeframes and procedural protections the LPS Act 
provides.  This approach comports with the intent of the Legislature, honors due 
process, and ensures both that the defendant will be treated and the public 
protected.  (See Allen, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 105-107; Tatum, supra, 161 
Cal.App.4th at p. 66; Hill, supra, 134 Cal.App.3d at p. 1060.) 
In the future, those in defendant‟s circumstances will be entitled to release 
at the end of their then-current terms, subject to possible LPS Act proceedings, 
24 
pending trial on their extension petitions.26  However, no relief is appropriate in 
this case.  The court retained jurisdiction to try the petition.  The trial, while 
untimely, was ultimately fair.  Therefore, violation of the statutory timelines does 
not warrant reversal.27   
 
III.  DISPOSITION 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
    
WE CONCUR:   
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
                                              
26  
As we have explained (see ante, p. 13), the following cases are disapproved 
insofar as they conclude that the appropriate remedy is, instead, dismissal of the 
extension petition:  People v. Tatum, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th 41; People v. 
Dougherty, supra, 143 Cal.App.3d 245; People v. Hawkins, supra, 139 
Cal.App.3d 984; People v. Hill, supra, 134 Cal.App.3d 1055. 
27 
Circumstances may be imagined in which reversal might be warranted.  For 
example, if the prosecution negligently filed an extension petition so late that 
defense counsel did not have adequate time to prepare for trial before the 
expiration of the current term, and the court, nevertheless, refused to continue the 
trial.  However, that is not the case we consider here.   
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY BAXTER, J. 
 
I concur in the judgment reversing the Court of Appeal.  I write separately 
because I disagree with the analysis contained in the majority opinion.   
Lara was the subject of a petition to extend his commitment under Penal 
Code section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(10), after having been found not guilty by 
reason of insanity of falsely imprisoning a child at knifepoint.  The People filed 
the petition prior to the expiration of Lara‟s maximum term of commitment but 
failed to satisfy the requirement that the petition be filed “no later than 90 days 
before the expiration of the original commitment unless good cause is shown” 
(Pen. Code, § 1026.5, subd. (b)(2)) and the requirement that the trial commence 
“no later than 30 calendar prior to the time the person would otherwise have been 
released, unless that time is waived by the person or unless good cause is shown” 
(Pen. Code, § 1026.5, subd. (b)(4)).   
Defendant argues that the violation of these time limits deprived the trial 
court of jurisdiction to proceed on the petition to extend his commitment.  Yet, as 
section 1026.5 itself says, “The time limits of this section are not jurisdictional.”  
(Pen. Code, § 1026.5, subd. (a)(2).)  The majority opinion so concludes, and I 
agree.  But, for reasons that are not explained, the majority opinion abandons the 
statutory analysis at this point, just when things are getting interesting:  Was the 
violation of the statutory time limits harmless?  Until today, it had been our long-
standing practice to inquire, in accordance with our state Constitution (Cal. Const., 
2 
art. VI, § 13), whether the violation of a directory statute was prejudicial (e.g., 
People v. Parman (1939) 14 Cal.2d 17, 20), and it had been the preferred practice 
of this court in all circumstances to inquire first whether a decision could be 
grounded on a nonconstitutional basis so as to avoid the unnecessary decision of 
novel constitutional questions.  (E.g., People v. Leon (2007) 40 Cal.4th 376, 396.)  
As it turns out, the errors were harmless, but it is our task as judges to say so and 
to explain why.   
The violation of the 90-day and 30-day time limits was harmless because 
defendant was not prejudiced.  This is not a case in which a defendant was forced 
to go to trial in shortened time without an adequate opportunity to prepare.  (Cf. 
People v. Dougherty (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 245, 247-248 [prejudice was 
demonstrated where the petition was filed 66 days late without good cause, the 
defendant was forced to go to trial with only 20 days of preparation, and counsel 
informed the court there had been insufficient time for the defense to secure 
medical experts who could testify or assist in the cross-examination of prosecution 
witnesses or for the defense to subpoena the psychiatric file to permit effective 
cross-examination of the state hospital psychologist].)  Indeed, seven and one-half 
months elapsed between the time the district attorney filed a petition to extend 
defendant‟s commitment and the hearing on that petition—and defendant‟s time in 
confinement beyond the expiration of the prior commitment was credited against 
his new commitment term.  Defendant does not contend that he was denied 
adequate time to prepare, nor could he reasonably make such an argument.   
Defendant does complain that he remained in custody, beyond the 
expiration of his original commitment, pending trial on the petition to extend his 
commitment.  I agree with the majority opinion that this was error, in that 
defendant would have been entitled to his release upon expiration of his original 
commitment since there was no good cause for the delay in the trial, defendant did 
3 
not waive time, and no other statute authorized his continued confinement.28  I 
would go further and suggest that defendant may well have had a civil remedy for 
unlawful confinement if he asked for (and was denied) his release during that 
period.  However, this type of injury in itself does not mean that defendant 
suffered prejudice for purposes of this proceeding.  Prejudice, under our state 
Constitution, means a miscarriage of justice that rendered the proceeding or its 
outcome unfair or unreliable.  (People v. Watson (1946) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)  
Defendant nowhere alleges that his continued confinement under a program of 
treatment interfered with his ability to prepare his defense or otherwise 
undermined the reliability of the verdict.  Hence, he suffered no prejudice.   
Having disposed of defendant‟s statutory claim, I turn now to his 
constitutional claim that the violation of the time limits deprived him of due 
process.  Generally, a due process claim arising from delays caused by the 
prosecution is analyzed by balancing the reasons for the delay against the 
prejudice caused to the accused.  (United States v. Lovasco (1977) 431 U.S. 783, 
790; People v. Allen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 91, 105.)   
The majority opinion purports to adopt this well-settled framework:  it 
accepts the district attorney‟s concession that the delay was not supported by good 
cause, and it asserts that defendant suffered not one but two kinds of prejudice.  
                                              
28  
Like the Santa Clara County District Attorney‟s Office, which has 
submitted a brief as amicus curiae, I am skeptical that the Lanterman-Petris-Short 
Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.) will be an adequate or workable substitute 
for the treatment a not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity committee has been receiving 
where (in future cases) the committee is released pending trial on a petition to 
extend a commitment, but we are not free as a statutory (Pen. Code, § 1026.5, 
subds. (a)(2), (b)(8)) or constitutional matter to require confinement beyond that 
authorized by the Legislature.  The district attorney‟s office might therefore more 
fruitfully direct its criticisms of this alternative confinement scheme to the 
Legislature.        
4 
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 17; see People v. Cobb (Mar. 8, 2010, S159410) __ Cal.4th 
__, __.)  When it balances these two kinds of prejudice against the unjustified 
delay, however, it suddenly finds that the delay was not prejudicial.  There is no 
reason to apply a balancing test here, though, since defendant, so far as this record 
indicates, did not suffer any prejudice. 
No one disputes that being forced to go to trial without adequate 
preparation would be a denial of due process.  However, no such deprivation 
occurred here, inasmuch as defendant was granted over seven months to prepare 
for trial and defendant does not claim he was unprepared 
Being involuntarily held in confinement without any statutory authorization 
may be a denial of due process but, without more, is not an injury that can be 
remedied in this proceeding, inasmuch as defendant has made no showing that his 
continued confinement affected the fairness of the proceeding or undermined 
confidence in its outcome.  (Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514, 532-534; 
accord, People v. Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 750, 767-768).  Such confinement is 
an injury, not a form of prejudice—just like an entry into the home in violation of 
the knock-and-announce rule (Hudson v. Michigan (2006) 547 U.S. 586, 594-596 
[a violation of the knock-and-announce rule of the Fourth Amendment may 
support a civil action for deprivation of the victim‟s civil rights but does not entitle 
the victim to suppression of the evidence in a criminal proceeding, since the 
interest it protects is unrelated to the actual seizure of the evidence]) or a breach of 
the defendant‟s attorney-client and work product privileges by a state actor other 
than the prosecution team (People v. Ervine (2009) 47 Cal.4th 745, 768 [intrusion 
by jail personnel on the defendant‟s legal papers may support a civil cause of 
action but does not entitle the victim to a reversal of his criminal conviction, 
where there is no indication any confidential information was conveyed to the 
prosecution team]).  A defendant suffering confinement under those circumstances 
5 
may be entitled to civil damages, but such confinement could not invalidate a trial 
conducted under fair procedures and resulting in an outcome that is reliable and 
unaffected by the error.     
With this framework in mind, it is apparent that many of the cases on which 
the majority purports to rely are flawed, and this has in turn led the majority down 
a flawed analytical path.  In hopes of clarifying the law for courts and practitioners 
in the future, I discuss these cases briefly. 
The fundamental error shared by these cases is their assumption that when 
the People, without good cause, fail to comply with the time limits under Penal 
Code section 1026.5, a defendant is forced to choose between going to trial 
without adequate time to prepare or remaining in confinement involuntarily 
beyond the maximum confinement date.  This assumption is mistaken.  As the 
majority opinion explains, a defendant in such circumstances “who so moves 
should be released pending trial on the extension petition.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 
23.)  Thus, the so-called Hobson‟s choice that underlies the discussion in these 
cases is a false one, in that a defendant who does not want to go to trial without 
adequate time to prepare or remain in confinement receiving treatment after the 
expiration of the original commitment pending trial may move for an order of 
release and thus avoid both evils.  These cases also assume that a defendant 
automatically suffers prejudice if forced to remain in confinement involuntarily 
because of an unexcused late filing.  Because these cases rest on false 
assumptions, they should be disapproved more broadly.  The majority‟s failure to 
do so will, I fear, sow confusion in the law.   
Consider People v. Hill (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 1055, which (contrary to 
the majority opinion) was decided on statutory, not constitutional, grounds, and 
which was decided prior to the 1984 amendment to section 1026.5 that added 
“good cause” as an exception to the time limits in subdivision (b)(2) and (4).  (See 
6 
Stats. 1984, ch. 1488, § 5, p. 5204.)  The petition there was filed only 10 days 
prior to expiration of Hill‟s prior commitment, which left insufficient time for 
counsel to prepare for the hearing, and the hearing was consequently continued 
several times, resulting in Hill‟s confinement beyond the expiration of his original 
commitment.  (Hill, supra, 134 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1057-1058.)  Hill criticized the 
“total violation of the time limitations established in the very section that 
authorized any such extended confinement” (id. at p. 1058) and, without 
considering whether the defendant had requested his release pending trial (or, if 
so, whether the defendant had suffered actual prejudice), the Court of Appeal said 
it was without power to defy “the clear terms” of the statute and reversed the order 
extending the commitment.  (Id. at p. 1060.)  Hill is wrong in positing a forced 
choice between trial without adequate preparation or continued confinement 
beyond the maximum term and in failing to consider whether the defendant was 
actually prejudiced by the tardy filing and his continued confinement.  I would 
disapprove Hill on these grounds.  
In People v. Hawkins (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 984, the same division that 
decided Hill affirmed the dismissal of a petition to extend the defendant‟s 
commitment where, without good cause, the petition was filed only 45 days before 
(and counsel was appointed only two days before) expiration of the original 
commitment.  The Court of Appeal once again posited a forced choice between 
trial without adequate preparation or continued confinement beyond the maximum 
term.  (Id. at pp. 987-988.)  It thus failed to consider whether Hawkins could have 
been released pending trial or whether Hawkins would have been prejudiced by a 
trial occurring after expiration of the prior commitment.  I would disapprove 
Hawkins on these grounds. 
Even worse, the majority opinion contends that People v. Tatum (2008) 161 
Cal.App.4th 41, which involved a commitment under the Mentally Disordered 
7 
Offender Act (MDO Act) (Pen. Code, § 2970), “ably marshals the approach to be 
employed in determining whether a due process violation has occurred” (maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 17), but Tatum perpetuates the same mistakes described above.  
Tatum is correct when it says that due process requires a balancing of the 
prejudicial effect of the delay against the justification for the delay (Tatum, supra, 
161 Cal.App.4th at p. 61), but it falls into error when it asserts (1) that an 
unexcused late-filed petition forces the defendant to choose between “curtail[ing] 
otherwise necessary trial preparation” or “suffering unauthorized postrelease 
confinement,” and (2) that “whenever the state‟s unexcused late filing . . . forces 
an offender to „choose‟ between these two types of prejudice, some prejudice is 
necessarily established.”  (Ibid.)  As explained above, “prejudice” means a lack of 
fair procedures at trial or an error that undermines confidence in the outcome of 
the trial.  Tatum is wrong not merely because it offered the wrong remedy; it is 
wrong because it found prejudice where none existed—and I would disapprove it 
on that basis.     
Unfortunately, the majority opinion all but ensures confusion among those 
charged with implementing the law when it perpetuates Tatum‟s mistaken 
understanding of “prejudice” and asserts further that “[t]he degree of prejudice 
will depend on a variety of factors, including how late the filing is, the amount of 
time reasonably required to prepare for trial and mount a defense, and whether 
action by the court or defense counsel contributed to the delay.”  (Maj. opn., ante, 
at pp. 17-18.)  Given that a defendant faced with an unjustifiable delay may seek 
release once the prior commitment has expired, one must wonder why the degree 
of prejudice would depend on how late the filing is or the time needed to mount a 
defense.  As long as the delay in the trial is not so extended as to raise a 
presumption of prejudice (see Barker v. Municipal Court (1966) 64 Cal.2d 806, 
812; In re Johns (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 577, 581) and, as stated above, the 
8 
defendant is granted adequate time to prepare, a late filing would not in itself 
establish either a due process violation or prejudice.  And, given that a court need 
not even consider whether a delay was justified if there was no prejudice 
(Scherling v. Superior Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 493, 506-507), I cannot fathom how 
an analysis of the court‟s or defense counsel‟s contributions to the delay could 
affect the degree of prejudice. 
Finally, it is important to recognize that the analysis endorsed in this 
separate opinion is far from new.  In People v. Allen, supra, 42 Cal.4th 91, we 
explored whether a delayed petition to extend the defendant‟s commitment under 
the MDO Act would deny due process where the defendant was subsequently 
adjudicated to be an MDO.  This court, unanimously, declared that such an inquiry 
“would often be futile,” in that, “more often than not, an MDO would be unable to 
show prejudice if his or her mental disorder is not in remission.”  (Allen, supra, 42 
Cal.4th at p. 105.)  This analysis was correct then, it is correct now, and we ought 
to apply it.  I regret that the majority opinion, while ultimately reaching the correct 
result, has chosen a confusing and roundabout path that may well mislead future 
travelers.  I therefore concur only in the judgment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BAXTER, J.  
     
 
  
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Lara 
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Unpublished Opinion XXX NP opn. filed 7/17/07 - 6th Dist. 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S155481 
Date Filed: March 8, 2010 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Santa Clara 
Judge: Brian Walsh 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Lauretta Marie Oravitz-Komlos, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Mary Jo Graves and Dane R. Gillette, Chief 
Assistant Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Assistant Attorney General, Laurence K. Sullivan, Seth K. 
Schalit, Dorian Jung and Brent Wilner, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Dolores A. Carr, District Attorney (Santa Clara), Dana Overstreet and Paul Colin, Deputy District 
Attorneys, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Lauretta Marie Oravitz-Komlos 
15 Boardman Place, 2nd Floor 
San Francisco, CA  94103-4727 
(415) 703-0885 
 
Brent Wilner 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 703-1342