Title: Jones v. Brewster
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1170450
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: March 15, 2019

Rel: March 15, 2019
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2018-2019
_________________________
1170450
_________________________
Steven Christopher Jones
v.
Tammy Brewster and Jeffrey Eugene Brewster
Appeal from Colbert Circuit Court
(CV-16-39)
STEWART, Justice.
Steven Christopher Jones ("Chris Jones") appeals from a
judgment of the Colbert Circuit Court ("the circuit court") in
favor of Tammy Brewster and Jeffrey Eugene Brewster in a will
contest filed by Chris Jones concerning the will of his
1170450
father, Mike Jones.  Because the circuit court's judgment is
void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, we dismiss the
appeal.
Facts and Procedural History
Mike Jones died on August 23, 2015.  On August 7, 2015,
16 days before his death, Mike Jones executed a will devising
all of his property, except $100, to the Brewsters, who were
Mike Jones's neighbors.  The will provided that Chris Jones
would receive $100 "and absolutely nothing more of any kind or
nature." Mike Jones also appointed Tammy Brewster as the
executrix of his estate.  On August 28, 2015, the Colbert
Probate 
Court 
("the 
probate 
court") 
appointed an 
administrator
ad colligendum "to collect, protect, and preserve the goods
and chattels of the deceased['s] estate and ascertain the
indebtedness of the deceased."  On September 2, 2015, Tammy
Brewster filed in the probate court a petition seeking an
order granting her letters testamentary as the executrix of
Mike Jones's estate; on September 4, 2015, Chris Jones filed
a petition requesting that the probate court grant him letters
of administration.  
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On October 23, 2015, Chris Jones filed a will contest in
the probate court alleging that the Brewsters had coerced and
had exerted undue influence on Mike Jones to procure the
August 7, 2015, will.  Contemporaneously with the complaint,
Chris Jones filed in the probate court a motion to transfer
the will-contest proceedings to the circuit court pursuant to
§ 43-8-198, Ala. Code 1975.  The probate court set the matter
for a hearing on November 16, 2015. On September 21, 2016, the
probate court certified the probate-court record.  According
to the case-action summary in the circuit court, the
proceedings were docketed in the circuit court on September
21, 2016.  The record, however, does not include an order of
the probate court transferring the will contest to the circuit
court.  The probate court also did not rule on Tammy
Brewster's request for letters testamentary or on Chris
Jones's request for letters of administration. 
The circuit court held a three-day trial on the will
contest, which concluded on November 29, 2017.  On January 2,
2018, the circuit court entered a judgment in favor of the
Brewsters, finding that Mike Jones had intended to disinherit
Chris Jones and concluding that the evidence did not establish
3
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that the Brewsters influenced Mike Jones or exercised control
over him in a manner sufficient to invalidate his will. The
circuit court remanded the cause to the probate court for the
purpose of distributing Mike Jones's assets pursuant to the
will.  Chris Jones filed a timely notice of appeal from the
circuit court's judgment to this Court.1  
1On July 26, 2018, the clerk of this Court entered an
order stating, in pertinent part:
"It appearing that no order of removal is contained
in the record on appeal, which would make any order
of the circuit court void and unappealable, see §
12-11-41, Ala. Code 1975, and DuBose v. Weaver, 68
So. 3d 814, 822 (Ala. 2011) (filing of removal
petition in circuit court and entry of removal order
by that court are required for circuit court's
acquisition of jurisdiction), and
"Because the party seeking jurisdiction of this
Court must establish a basis for that jurisdiction,
see Crutcher v. Williams, 12 So. 3d 631, 636 (Ala.
2008) (absent subject-matter jurisdiction, Supreme
Court cannot consider appeal), therefore,
"IT IS ORDERED that the Appellant SHOW CAUSE in
writing to this Court, within seven (7) days from
the date of this order with appropriate citations to
legal authority, why the order appealed from is a
final and appealable order and why this appeal
should not be dismissed."
(Capitalization in original.) In response to this order, Chris
Jones 
stated 
that 
he 
did 
not 
seek 
removal 
of 
the
administration of Mike Jones's estate from the probate court
to the circuit court; rather, he sought a transfer of the will
contest to the circuit court pursuant to § 43-8-198, Ala. Code
1975.
4
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Discussion
Before addressing the merits of Chris Jones's appeal,
this Court must determine whether the circuit court had
subject-matter jurisdiction over the will contest.
"'Although neither party raises a
question before this Court regarding the
circuit 
court's 
subject-matter 
jurisdiction
to consider the appellants' will contest,
the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction
cannot be waived, and it is the duty of an
appellate court to notice the absence of
subject-matter jurisdiction ex mero motu.
See MPQ, Inc. v. Birmingham Realty Co., 78
So. 3d 391, 393 (Ala. 2011). If the circuit
court's jurisdiction to consider the will
contest was never properly invoked, then
the judgment entered on [February 13,
2018], is void and [will] not support an
appeal. MPQ, 78 So. 3d at 394 ("'A judgment
entered by a court lacking subject-matter
jurisdiction is absolutely void and will
not support an appeal; an appellate court
must dismiss an attempted appeal from such
a void judgment.'" (quoting Vann v. Cook,
989 So. 2d 556, 559 (Ala. Civ. App.
2008))).'
"McElroy v. McElroy, 254 So. 3d 872, 875 (Ala.
2017).
"'"In Alabama, a will may be
contested in two ways: (1) under
§ 43-8-190, 
Ala. Code 
1975,
before probate, the contest may
be instituted in the probate
court or (2) under § 43-8-199,
Ala. Code 1975, after probate and
within six months thereof, a
contest may be instituted by
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filing a complaint in the circuit
court of the county in which the
will was probated."
"'Stevens v. Gary, 565 So. 2d 73, 74 (Ala.
1990).' 
"Bond v. Pylant, 3 So. 3d 852, 854 (Ala. 2008)."
Burns v. Ashley, [Ms. 1170565, Sept. 28, 2018] ___ So. 3d ___,
___ (Ala. 2018).
Under Alabama law, a circuit court, under specified
conditions delineated in the pertinent statute, can obtain
subject-matter jurisdiction over a will contest or the
administration of an estate.  The probate court has general
and 
original 
jurisdiction 
over 
matters 
involving 
the
administration of estates and the probating of wills. See Ala.
Const. 1901, § 144; and § 12–13–1, Ala. Code 1975.  Pursuant
to § 43-8-190, Ala. Code 1975, the probate court has
jurisdiction over will contests where a will has not been
admitted to probate.   Section 43-8-190, Ala. Code 1975,
states, in pertinent part: 
"A will, before the probate thereof, may be
contested by any person interested therein, or by
any person, who, if the testator had died intestate,
would have been an heir or distributee of his
estate, by filing in the court where it is offered
for probate allegations in writing that the will was
not duly executed, or of the unsoundness of mind of
6
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the testator, or of any other valid objections
thereto ...."
A party, however, has the statutory right to seek a
transfer of a will contest from the probate court to the
circuit court  pursuant to § 43-8-198, Ala. Code 1975, which
reads:
"Upon the demand of any party to the contest,
made in writing at the time of filing the initial
pleading, the probate court, or the judge thereof,
must enter an order transferring the contest to the
circuit court of the county in which the contest is
made, and must certify all papers and documents
pertaining to the contest to the clerk of the
circuit court, and the case shall be docketed by the
clerk of the circuit court and a special session of
said court may be called for the trial of said
contest or, said contest may be tried by said
circuit court at any special or regular session of
said court. The issues must be made up in the
circuit court as if the trial were to be had in the
probate court, and the trial had in all other
respects as trials in other civil cases in the
circuit court. ..."
To comply with the statute, the following prerequisites must
be met: (1) the will must not be admitted to probate, although
it must be offered for probate before it can be contested, see
Hooper v. Huey, 293 Ala. 63, 67, 300 So. 2d 100, 104 (1974),
disapproved of on other grounds, Bardin v. Jones, 371 So. 2d
23 (Ala. 1979); (2) the party seeking the transfer must file
a written demand for the transfer in the probate court; (3)
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the transfer demand must be filed at the time of the filing of
the will-contest complaint or other initial pleading; (4) the
probate court must enter a written order transferring the will
contest to the circuit court; (5) the probate court must
certify the probate-court record pertaining to the will
contest to the circuit-court clerk; (6) the circuit-court
clerk shall docket the case in the circuit court; and (7) the
circuit court must set the will contest for a trial at a
regular or a special session of court.   
After a will has been admitted to probate in the probate
court, jurisdiction in the circuit court cannot be invoked
pursuant to a transfer under § 43-8-198.  Within six months
following the admission of the will to probate, however, a
person with an interest in the will may file a will contest
directly in the circuit court pursuant to § 43-8-199, Ala.
Code 1975, which provides: 
"Any person interested in any will who has not
contested the same under the provisions of this
article, may, at any time within the six months
after the admission of such will to probate in this
state, contest the validity of the same by filing a
complaint in the circuit court in the county in
which such will was probated." 
Under § 43-8-199, only two perquisites exist: (1) the will
must have been admitted to probate no more than six months
8
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earlier; and (2) the complaint must be filed directly in the
circuit court.2
Lastly, the administration of an estate in the probate
court can be removed to the circuit court pursuant to §
12-11-41, Ala. Code 1975.  Section § 12-11-41 reads: 
"The 
administration of 
any 
estate may 
be 
removed
from the probate court to the circuit court at any
time before a final settlement thereof, by any heir,
devisee, 
legatee, 
distributee, 
executor,
administrator or administrator with the will annexed
of any such estate, without assigning any special
equity; and an order of removal must be made by the
court, upon the filing of a sworn petition by any
such heir, devisee, legatee, distributee, executor,
administrator or administrator with the will annexed
of any such estate, reciting that the petitioner is
such heir, devisee, legatee, distributee, executor,
administrator or administrator with the will annexed
and that, in the opinion of the petitioner, such
estate can be better administered in the circuit
court than in the probate court."
To invoke the circuit court's jurisdiction over the
administration of an estate through removal, "the filing of a
petition for removal in the circuit court and the entry of an
order of removal by that court are prerequisites to that
2See, however, Daniel v. Moye, 224 So. 3d 115, 131 n. 9
(Ala. 2016) (noting that "there are currently four counties in
Alabama--Mobile, Jefferson, Shelby, and Pickens--in which the
probate courts have been vested with concurrent equitable
estate jurisdiction with the circuit court to try will
contests after a will has been admitted to probate").
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court's 
acquisition of 
jurisdiction 
over 
the 
administration 
of
the estate pursuant to § 12–11–41." DuBose v. Weaver, 68 So.
3d 814, 822 (Ala. 2011)(emphasis omitted).
In a will contest, the subject-matter jurisdiction of
both the probate court and the circuit court is statutory and
limited. Kaller v. Rigdon, 480 So. 2d 536, 539 (Ala. 1985). In
a long line of cases, this Court has held that strict
compliance with the statutory language pertaining to a will
contest is required to invoke the jurisdiction of the
appropriate court. Boshell v. Lay, 596 So. 2d 581, 583 (Ala.
1992)("In order to contest a will under either of these
methods, the contestant must strictly comply with the
statutory language in order to quicken jurisdiction of the
appropriate court."); Marshall v. Vreeland, 571 So. 2d 1037,
1038 (Ala. 1990)("The requirements of § 43–8–198 must be
complied with exactly, because will contest jurisdiction is
statutorily conferred upon the circuit court."); Bullen v.
Brown, 535 So. 2d 76, 78 (Ala. 1988)("It is clear that will
contest 
jurisdiction, 
being 
statutorily 
conferred, 
must 
comply
with the statutory language strictly in order to quicken
jurisdiction of the appropriate court.");  Kaller v. Rigdon,
480 So. 2d at 538 ("Because will contest jurisdiction is
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statutorily conferred, the procedural requirements of the
applicable 
statute 
must 
be 
complied 
with 
exactly."); 
Forrester
v. Putman, 409 So. 2d 773, 775 (Ala. 1981)("There was neither
a transfer of a contest to the circuit court according to Code
1975, § 43-1-78[, now § 43-8-198], nor a circuit court contest
of a will admitted to probate according to Code 1975, §
43-1-79[, now 
§ 
43-8-199]. A circuit court's jurisdiction over
a will contest is statutory and limited."); Ex parte Stephens,
259 Ala. 361, 363, 66 So. 2d 901, 903 (1953)(concluding that
the words "must transfer the [will] contest" "have been
regarded as mandatory"); and Ex parte Pearson, 241 Ala. 467,
469, 3 So. 2d 5, 6 (1941)("It is familiar law in Alabama, the
only way to quicken into exercise a statutory and limited
jurisdiction is by pursuing the mode prescribed by the
statute.").
Most recently, in Burns, supra,  a case factually and
procedurally similar to the instant case, the appellants
initiated a will contest in the probate court, alleging that
the appellee "used undue influence to procure [Rheba Sue
Ashley's, the 
decedent's,] execution of the 2014 will." Burns,
___ So. 3d at ____.  The probate court in Burns did not admit
the will to probate or appoint a personal representative of
11
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the decedent's estate. The appellants filed a motion to
transfer the will contest to the circuit court pursuant to §
43-8-198, Ala. Code 1975, but the probate court did not enter
an order transferring the will contest to the circuit court. 
Burns, ___ So. 3d at ____.3  On appeal, this Court determined
that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction
because the probate court did not enter an order transferring
the case to the circuit court in strict compliance with §
43-8-198. This Court held:
"In this case, the probate court never admitted
Rheba's will to probate.  Thus, pursuant to § 43-8-
190, Ala. Code 1975, the appellants properly filed
their will contest in the probate court.  Bond [v.
Pylant, 3 So. 3d 852, 854 (Ala. 2008)].  As noted,
the appellants, simultaneously with the filing of
their will contest, sought to transfer the will
contest to the circuit court.  The transfer to
3The appellants in Burns also sought removal of the
administration of the estate from the probate court pursuant
to § 12-11-41, Ala. Code 1975, which the circuit court
granted. This Court held that removal was not proper because
a circuit court cannot assume jurisdiction over the
administration of an estate when the administration has not
yet begun.  Burns,  ___So. 3d at ____ (citing Ex parte Smith,
619 So. 2d 1374, 1375-76 (Ala. 1993)).  This Court concluded
that the probate court had not yet initiated the general
administration of the decedent's estate.  Accordingly, this
Court concluded that the circuit court's order purporting to
remove the administration of the decedent's estate from the
probate court and the circuit court's judgment admitting the
will to probate and issuing letters testamentary were void for
lack of jurisdiction.  
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circuit court of a will contest pending in probate
court is governed by § 43-8-198, which provides, in
pertinent part:
"'Upon the demand of any party to the
contest, made in writing at the time of
filing the initial pleading, the probate
court, or the judge thereof, must enter an
order transferring the contest to the
circuit court of the county in which the
contest is made, and must certify all
papers and documents pertaining to the
contest to the clerk of the circuit court
....'
"(Emphasis added.)
"'The 
jurisdiction 
conferred 
on 
the 
circuit
court by this section of the Code is a
statutory and limited jurisdiction.  Ex
parte Pearson, 241 Ala. 467, 3 So. 2d 5
(1941).  Because will contest jurisdiction
is statutorily conferred, the procedural
requirements 
of 
the 
applicable 
statute 
must
be complied with exactly.'
"Kaller v. Rigdon, 480 So. 2d 536, 538 (Ala. 1985)
(emphasis added).  See also Bullen v. Brown, 535 So.
2d 76, 78 (Ala. 1988) ('It is clear that will
contest jurisdiction, being statutorily conferred,
must comply with the statutory language strictly in
order to quicken jurisdiction of the appropriate
court.' (emphasis added)); and Marshall v. Vreeland,
571 So. 2d 1037, 1038 (Ala. 1990) (holding that
compliance with § 43-8-198 is what gives a circuit
court subject-matter jurisdiction over a will
contest pending in the probate court).  
"Thus, 
a 
circuit 
court 
cannot 
assume
jurisdiction over a will contest pending in probate
court absent strict compliance with the procedural
requirements of § 43-8-198.  One of the procedural
requirements of § 43-8-198 necessary to invoke a
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circuit court's jurisdiction over a will contest
pending in probate court is that the probate court
in which the will contest is pending must enter an
order transferring the will contest to the circuit
court; a circuit court cannot 'reach down' and
remove a will contest from probate court.  See
DuBose v. Weaver, 68 So. 3d 814, 817 n. 3 (Ala.
2011) (recognizing the distinction between the
authority of a probate court to transfer a pending
will contest and the authority of a circuit court to
remove the administration of a decedent's estate). 
Here, the probate court did not enter an order
transferring the appellants' will contest to the
circuit court, although it had an imperative duty to
do so.  See Ex parte McLendon, 824 So. 2d 700, 705
(Ala. 2001).  Thus, the procedural requirements of
§ 43-8-198 were not satisfied, and, as a result, the
circuit court never obtained jurisdiction over the
will contest.  Kaller, supra; Bullen, supra;
Marshall, supra.  Accordingly, the circuit court's
February 13, 2018, judgment, insofar as it denied
the appellants' will contest, is void and will not
support the appellants' appeal.  McElroy[ v.
McElroy, 254 So. 3d 872 (Ala. 2017)]."
Burns, ___ So. 3d at ____.
In the present case, Chris Jones properly filed his will
contest in the probate court because the probate court had not
admitted the will to probate and had not appointed a personal
representative of Mike Jones's estate. Contemporaneously with
the will-contest complaint, Chris Jones filed a motion to
transfer the will contest to the circuit court. Thus, Chris
Jones sought to invoke the circuit court's jurisdiction
pursuant to § 43-8-198.  The probate court certified the
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probate-court record to the circuit court, the circuit-court
clerk docketed the case, and the circuit court held a trial. 
The record, however, is devoid of a transfer order from the
probate court.  The entry of a written order by the probate
court transferring a will contest to the circuit court is an
essential procedural requirement under § 43-8-198 in order for
the circuit court to obtain subject-matter jurisdiction, and
the probate court had an imperative duty to enter such an
order. Burns, ___ So. 3d at ____ (citing Ex parte McLendon,
824 So. 2d 700, 705 (Ala. 2001)).  Because the probate court
did not enter a transfer order in this case, "the procedural
requirements of § 43-8-198 were not satisfied, and, as a
result, the 
circuit court never obtained jurisdiction over the
will contest." Burns, ___ So. 3d at ____. Therefore,  the
judgment of the circuit court is void and will not support
Chris Jones's appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.  
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Wise, and Mitchell, JJ., concur. 
Bolin and Stewart, JJ., concur specially.  
Bryan and Mendheim, JJ., concur in the result. 
Sellers, J., dissents.
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BOLIN, Justice (concurring specially).
I agree completely with the main opinion. I write
specifically to 
emphasize the 
jurisdictional 
tenets 
upon 
which
it stands.
In the common law of England there was no probate court.
Bequests and legacies were handled by 
the ecclesiastical court
and devises by the law court.  Gilbreath v. Wallace, 292 Ala.
267, 270, 292 So. 2d 651, 654 (1974).   
"Probate 
Courts 
are 
courts 
of 
limited
jurisdiction. They have only that jurisdiction which
is expressly given by statute. Neither the Probate
Judge nor the Probate Court can have any greater
authority than that conferred by statute. American
Surety Company of New York v. King, 237 Ala. 510,
187 So. 458 [(1939)]; Broadfoot v. City of Florence,
253 Ala. 455, 45 So. 2d 311 [(1950)]. Stated
differently, 'probate courts are courts of limited
or special jurisdiction and, being inferior courts,
cannot take jurisdiction or administer remedies
except as provided by statute.' — 14 Am.Jur.,
Courts, 252."
Longshore v. City of Homewood, 277 Ala. 444, 446, 171 So. 2d
453, 455 (1965).
Probate statutes were unknown to the common
law and must be strictly construed.  
"In 
Alabama 
'[s]tatutes 
in 
derogation 
or
modification 
of the common law are strictly
construed.  Cook v. Meyer, 73 Ala. 580 (1883). Such
statutes are presumed not to alter the common law in
any way not expressly declared. Pappas v. City of
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Eufaula, 282 Ala. 242, 210 So. 2d 802 (1968).' 
Arnold v. State 353 So. 2d 524, 526 (Ala. 1977)." 
Baldwin v. Branch, 888 So. 2d 482, 484–85 (Ala. 2004).
Probate courts have original and general jurisdiction
over the probate of wills and over the "[t]he granting of
letters testamentary and of administration." § 12–13–1(b)(2),
Ala. Code 1975.  See also § 43-8-160, Ala. Code 1975 ("Upon
the death of a testator, a [person entitled to offer a will
for probate] may have the will proved before the proper
probate court."); § 43-8-162, Ala. Code 1975 ("Wills must be
proved in the several probate courts as follows ...."); and § 
43-8-1(3), Ala. Code 1975 (defining "court" as "[t]he court
having jurisdiction in matters relating to the affairs of
decedents. This court in Alabama is known as the probate
court.").   The main opinion correctly states that, under
Alabama law, a circuit court, under specified and explicit
conditions delineated in the pertinent statute, can obtain
subject-matter jurisdiction over the contest of a will not yet
admitted to probate.
With regard to the contest of a will
offered, but not yet admitted, for probate, § 43-8-190, Ala.
Code 1975, allows for a contest to be filed in the probate
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court prior to the probate of the will.4  Section 43-8-198,
Ala. Code 1975, goes further to provide for a transfer of a
will contest from the probate court, which has original
jurisdiction of the proceedings, to the circuit court. 
Specifically, to accomplish the transfer, upon the motion or
demand of any party to a will contest, made in writing at the
time of filing the initial pleading of the movant, the probate
court must (1) enter an order transferring the contest to the
circuit court of the county in which the contest is made and
(2) certify all papers and documents pertaining to the contest
to the clerk of the circuit court. That statute, which must be
strictly construed, requires first that an order be entered
transferring a limited portion of the probate proceedings to
the circuit court for adjudication of the issues related to
the will contest. There is no room here for a flexible
analysis, or "substantial compliance" with the statute, so as
to accomplish and allow the transfer without all the
requirements of the statute being met.  
4Probate is the "'act or process of proving a will.'
Black's Law Dictionary 1365–66 (4th rev. ed. 1968)."  Russell
v. Maxwell, 387 So. 2d 156, 158 (Ala. 1980). 
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Although not before the Court in this appeal, and only
for the point of contrast, I note that for the contest of
wills already admitted to probate, § 43-8-199, Ala. Code 1975,
allows a will contest to be brought in circuit court within
six months after a will has been admitted to probate.5   No
5In Knox v. Paull, 95 Ala. 505, 11 So. 156 (1891), this
Court, interpreting the 
predecessor of § 43-8-199, stated that
that statute "provides ... a special mode of avoiding the
effect of the judgment of the Probate Court admitting the
instrument to probate" and that "it was the intention of the
statute to afford the further opportunity of contesting the
will in the Chancery Court ..., to any person interested in
the will, who either did not have, or did not avail himself of
the opportunity to contest it in the Probate Court." 95 Ala.
at 508, 509, 11 So. at 157, 158.  The Court added: 
"Good reasons may be suggested for affording
this additional opportunity to contest the validity
of a will which has been regularly admitted to
probate after due notice to all parties in interest.
The application to prove the will usually follows
close 
upon 
the 
death 
of 
the 
testator. 
The
application comes on for hearing as soon as the
short prescribed terms of notice have expired. It
must frequently happen that persons interested in
the proceeding are wholly unable, while it is
pending, to inform themselves as to the instrument
offered for probate, or of the circumstances
attending 
its 
execution. 
Facts 
affecting 
its
validity may be developed afterwards, and the
failure to discover them, or to obtain the evidence
to prove them, may have been without the fault or
any lack of diligence on the part of those
interested in making a contest. In view of such
contingencies, there is manifest propriety and
justice in allowing a reasonable time after a formal
and regular probate, for a contest of the validity
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right to contest a will existed at common law. These separate
rights for will contests are purely statutory and can be
exercised only in strict compliance with the provisions of the
statutes.
In the instant case, Steven Christopher Jones properly
filed his will contest in the probate court because the will
had not yet been admitted to probate.  Contemporaneously with
the filing of his will contest in the probate court, Jones
filed a demand to transfer the will contest to the circuit
court. Thus, Jones sought to invoke the circuit court's
jurisdiction so that it could hear the contest pursuant to §
43-8-198.  A probate court, confronted with a proper and
timely transfer demand accompanying a will contest, can do
of the will by one who did not make a contest in the
Probate Court. We have no doubt that this was the
intention of the statute."
95 Ala. at 509-10, 11 So. at 158.
This is the general manner in which jurisdiction of the
circuit court is quickened in will contests that are commenced
after a will is admitted to probate. But see Coleman v.
Richardson, 421 So. 2d 113 (Ala. 1982)(explaining that those
counties where a local act has conferred general equity
jurisdiction on certain probate courts have concurrent
jurisdiction with the circuit court to entertain a will
contest). 
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nothing but comply with the mandate of the legislature and
transfer the contest to the appropriate circuit court. See
Summerhill 
v. 
Craft, 
425 
So. 
2d 
1055, 
1056 
(Ala.
1982)(construing Ala. Code 1975, § 43–1–78, which was repealed
and replaced by § 43–8–198). Put another way, the probate
court cannot refuse a proper demand, but it must affirmatively
enter the order to accomplish the transfer.  When done in this
manner, § 43-8-198  goes on to say that
"[t]he issues must be made up in the circuit court
as if the trial were to be had in the probate court,
and the trial had in all other respects as trials in
other civil cases in the circuit court. ... After a
final determination of the contest, the clerk of the
circuit court shall certify the transcript of all
judgments of the circuit court in such proceedings,
together with all of the papers and documents
theretofore certified to the circuit court by the
probate court, back to the probate court from which
they were first certified to the circuit court, and
thereafter shall be recorded in the probate court as
all other contested wills are recorded in the
probate court."
(Emphasis added.)
Section 43-8-198 adequately and unambiguously describes
the requirements necessary for a transfer of the jurisdiction
of an unprobated-will contest from the probate court to the
circuit court, for the circuit court to adjudicate the contest
issues only. The probate court complied with the second
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mandate of § 43-8-198 -- the certification of the record to
the circuit court; further, the circuit-court clerk correctly
docketed the case. However, those actions are ministerial in
nature, and do not touch upon, or confer or quicken,
jurisdiction in the circuit court. Nothing in the record
indicates that the probate court complied with the first
mandate of that section -- entering a transfer order. That
requirement is not ministerial in nature -- it is a
statutorily mandated judicial action, the absence of which
results in no jurisdiction being transferred and conferred
upon the circuit court.   Because will-contest jurisdiction is
statutorily 
conferred, 
the 
long-standing 
procedural
requirements of the applicable statute must be complied with
exactly. Simpson v. Jones, 460 So. 2d 1282 (Ala. 1984). It is
unfortunate that the omission of this order occurred; however,
an unfortunate result, in areas of law in which strict
compliance with statutes is 
the guidepost, has never justified
ignoring or bending the settled rule of law. 
  Strict compliance with the plain and unambiguous terms
regarding the manner in which will contests are transferred to
circuit court is mandatory, and it is my judgment that the
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main opinion is both well stated and consistent with
established probate law.  
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STEWART, Justice (concurring specially).
I acknowledge the long line of cases that require strict
procedural compliance with the statutes pertaining to will
contests, § 43-8-190 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, discussed in the
main opinion, and based on those, I must concur with the main
opinion, which I authored. The circumstances in this case show
that the will-contest-transfer statute, § 43-8-198, Ala. Code
1975, has been complied with sufficiently so as to carry out
the intent of the legislature in adopting it. See C.Z. v.
B.G., [Ms. 2170976, Sept. 21, 2018] ___ So. 3d ____, ____
(Ala. 
Civ. 
App. 
2018)(defining 
the 
term 
"substantial
compliance" and quoting  Smith v. State, 364 So. 2d 1, 9 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1978)).  Although the principles of equity, along
with the totality of the circumstances and the absence of a
legislative mandate that § 43-8-198, Ala. Code 1975,  be
precisely 
followed 
to 
invoke 
the 
circuit 
court's 
jurisdiction,
call for a more flexible analysis in this case, the doctrine
of stare decisis does not allow such an analysis. 
Justice Sellers, who dissents today, dissented in Burns
v. Ashley, [Ms. 1170565, Sept. 28, 2018] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala.
2018), stating that the probate court's certification of the
probate-court record in that case, along with other factors,
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constituted substantial compliance with § 43-8-198. Justice
Sellers wrote:
"The probate court's certification, while admittedly
not an order per se, substantially complies with the
statute in that the probate court acknowledges that
the parties desire to take advantage of the
equitable powers embodied in the circuit court and
to have their will contest heard in that court. This
is not an example of a circuit court improperly
reaching down to remove a will contest without the
knowledge or consent of the probate court. Rather,
the probate court here is an accomplice in removing
the case, acknowledging and confirming, if not
consenting, to the transfer.  To now cause the
parties who have litigated their issues to, in
effect, start over seems to exalt form over
substance. The language contained in the probate
court's authentication of the record comes very
close to the substance of an order and clearly
transfers the case file to the circuit court; I am
not sure an order could accomplish more. After this
case has proceeded through the circuit court, to now 
require the probate court to enter an order to
effectively accomplish what was implicit in the
authentication seems a waste of judicial economy."
___ So. 3d at ____ (Sellers, J., dissenting).  The same
circumstances are present in this case. 
Circuit courts "are courts of general jurisdiction with
equity powers." Jackson v. Davis, 153 So. 3d 820, 828 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2014). See also § 142(b), Ala. Const. 1901 ("The
circuit court shall 
exercise general jurisdiction in all cases
except as may otherwise be provided by law.").  Furthermore,
by enacting § 43-8-198, the legislature unequivocally has
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granted circuit courts jurisdiction to hear will contests.
Although the statutory language of § 43-8-198 includes the
mandatory terms "must" and "shall" pertaining to the duties of
the parties and the courts to accomplish the transfer of a
will contest to the circuit court, there is no language within
the will-contest statutes, § 43-8-190 et seq., mandating
strict compliance with the transfer provision of § 43-8-198 in
order for the circuit court to obtain subject-matter
jurisdiction.  See Ex parte Reynolds, 209 So. 3d 1122, 1126
(Ala. Civ. App. 2016) (holding that "'[s]trict compliance'
with the [Uniform Interstate Family Support Act] registration
procedures is required to confer subject-matter jurisdiction
upon an Alabama circuit court to enforce or to modify a
foreign 
child-support judgment" 
and 
noting 
that 
"[n]o 
language
in the statute itself mandates strict compliance with its
provisions, and our previous opinions offer no analysis or
discussion as to why strict compliance should be required."). 
In Pittman v. Pittman, 419 So. 2d 1376, 1379 (Ala. 1982),
this Court defined the term "substantial compliance" as
"'actual 
compliance 
in 
respect 
to 
substance
essential to every reasonable objective,' of a
decree giving effect to equitable principles--
equity--in 
the 
true 
meaning 
of 
that 
word.
Application of Santore, 28 Wash. App. 319, 623 P.2d
26
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702 (1981). Substantial compliance means compliance
which substantially, essentially, in the main, for
the most part, satisfies the means of accomplishing
the objectives sought to be effected by the decree
and at the same time does complete equity. See North
Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Burnette, 297 N.C. 524, 256
S.E.2d 388 (1979). What constitutes substantial
compliance is a matter dependent upon the particular
facts of each case, none ever quite a clone of any
other. See Trussell v. Fish, 202 Ark. 956, 154 S.W.
2d 587 (1941)."
Substantial compliance serves as a more reasoned approach than
strict technical compliance, particularly in circumstances
such as those that exist in the present case, where the intent
to transfer is understood by the parties, by the probate
court, and by the circuit court; where the procedural misstep
is inconsequential to the actual merits of the case; and where
there is no real prejudice to any party.  Although there is no
transfer order in the record, the probate court in the present
case, upon a demand of a party to transfer the will contest to
the circuit court, certified the record of the probate-court
proceedings, and the record was submitted to the circuit court
for that court to adjudicate the will contest after holding a
three-day trial.
However, this Court's precedent on the issue is well
settled and mandates the conclusion reached in the main
opinion.  Although, writing on a clean slate, I would conclude
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1170450
that the totality of the circumstances in this case are
sufficient to have invoked the circuit court's jurisdiction
over Chris Jones's will contest pursuant to § 43-8-198, I
reluctantly concur in the majority opinion. 
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BRYAN, Justice (concurring in the result).
There is no indication that a complaint contesting the
will at issue was filed in the circuit court.  Moreover, there
is no indication that a petition was filed seeking removal of
the will contest from the probate court to the circuit court. 
Therefore, I conclude that the main opinion's discussion of
the requirements of §§ 43-8-199 and 12-11-41, Ala. Code 1975,
is surplusage that is unnecessary to resolve the issue
presented by this appeal, i.e., whether an effective transfer
of the will contest from the probate court to the circuit
court was accomplished under § 43-8-198, Ala. Code 1975.  I
agree that, as in Burns v. Ashley, [Ms. 1170565, Sept. 28,
2018] ____ So. 3d ____ (Ala. 2018), the purported transfer in
this case was ineffective as a result of the probate court's
failure to enter an order transferring the will contest to the
circuit court, in accordance with the requirements of §
43-8-198.  I therefore concur in the result. 
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SELLERS, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. 
Consistent with my dissent in Burns v. Ashley, [Ms. 
1170565, Sept. 28, 2018] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. 2018), I believe
that a probate court's certification required pursuant to §
43-8-198, Ala. Code 1975, is in effect an order, or at least
a substitute for an order, perfecting the transfer of a will
contest from the probate to the circuit court. 
The statute in question reads, in part:
"Upon the demand of any party to the contest,
made in writing at the time of filing the initial
pleading, the probate court, or the judge thereof,
must enter an order transferring the contest to the
circuit court of the county in which the contest is
made, and must certify all papers and documents
pertaining to the contest to the clerk of the
circuit court, and the case shall be docketed by the
clerk of the circuit court and a special session of
said court may be called for the trial of said
contest or, said contest may be tried by said
circuit court at any special or regular session of
said court. The issues must be made up in the
circuit court as if the trial were to be had in the
probate court, and the trial had in all other
respects as trials in other civil cases in the
circuit court."
 
There is no question that compliance with this statute
requires two specific actions on the part of the probate
court: (1) entering an order transferring the case; and (2)
certifying papers filed in the probate court to the circuit
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court. The policy behind requirement (1) is to prevent a
circuit court from "reaching down" to remove a will contest
without the knowledge or consent of the probate court.  The
policy behind requirement (2) is to allow a will and other
original documents, previously admitted to the probate court,
to become part of the record in the circuit court without
further authentication.  The logic behind these requirements
is self-evident. 
To fulfill the first requirement, the only language a
probate court must use in its order is the phrase "the will
contest  is hereby transferred."6  In this specific case, the
probate court in its certification stated: "I ... do hereby
certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of the
proceedings for John Michael Jones, deceased, as the same
appears of record in this office."  That certification was
6It is interesting to note that in the probate judge's
handbook, 2 Handbook for Alabama Probate Judges (Ala. Law
Inst. 10th ed. 2019) (Forms), there is not a sample form for
a transfer or removal order; however, because the transfer
process is somewhat routine, we can find many examples of will
contests that have been transferred to the circuit court using
similar language. Perhaps in a future edition of the handbook
a sample order might be inserted and/or language added to the
probate court's certification of the record to  use the magic
words the main opinion believes are necessary to actually
transfer a will contest.
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then filed by the probate court with the circuit court.  Thus,
the probate court, by certifying the record and filing its
record in the circuit court accomplished exactly what an order
would do; in this case the will contest -– the actual case
file -- was physically transferred by the probate court to the
circuit court.
Under the logic of the main opinion, if the probate
court's certification had contained the specific transfer
language, then this appeal could have been decided on its
merits. However, given the intent of the statute, there is no
question that the probate court was  not only aware its
original files were being transferred, but also actually
transferred its case file by physically filing its record with
the circuit court. I fail to see how those actions can be
viewed as anything other than accomplishing the requirements
of an order.  The action of the probate court in this case
accomplished what  a transfer order would merely direct. In
other words, when this case is viewed in light of the
requirements of the statute (i.e., order and certification)
and juxtaposed with the actions of the probate court, I can
reach no other conclusion than that the spirit and letter of
the statute were accomplished. 
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Perhaps most troubling about the main opinion is that the
circuit court conducted a three-day trial, but absent an order
with the specific transfer phrase, those three days are now
wasted, and the parties are sent back to square one,
presumably to ask the probate judge to sign a transfer order
so the circuit court can start over and more than likely reach
the same result, allowing the appellant to once again file an
appeal, which we would then have jurisdiction to consider. 
This is the rare case where the law does not achieve
justice. If for no other reason than judicial economy, I would
deem the certification by the probate court and the actual
transfer of the record as an "order" effectuating the intent
of and in compliance with § 43-8-198, Ala. Code 1975.  This
would allow this Court to hear the appeal on its merits, spare
the probate and circuit courts from the needless burdens of
specific procedural compliance, and save the litigants time
and effort, not to mention money.  To do otherwise exalts form
over substance.
33