Title: STATE v ALLEN
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 81-269
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: May 14, 1982

No. 81-269 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1982 STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs- G E O R G E ALLEN, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eleventh 3 u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County of Flathead, The Honorable Robert C. Sykes, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel o f Record: For Appellant: Sherlock & Nardi, K a l i s p e l l , Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, 14on Lana Ted 0. Lyrnpus, County Attorney, K a l i s p e l l , Montana Submitted: March 16, 1982 Decided : MAY 14 1982 F i l e d : MAY 1 4 1982 Clerk M r . Chief J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t . On December 30, 1981, we remanded t h i s appeal t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r an e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g on t h e terms of a p l e a b a r g a i n agreement and whether t h e p r o s e c u t o r v i o l a t e d t h e agreement. S t a t e v. Allen ( 1 9 8 1 ) , Mont . - 1 - P.2d 1 38 St.Rep. 2192. The e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g h a s been h e l d ; t h e District Court h a s c e r t i f i e d its f i n d i n g s of f a c t , c o n c l u s i o n s of l a w , and o r d e r to t h i s Court; supplemental b r i e f s have been f i l e d by t h e p a r t i e s ; and t h e a p p e a l is now b e f o r e us f o r f i n a l d e t e r - m i n a t i o n p u r s u a n t to o u r r e t e n t i o n of j u r i s d i c t i o n . Although t h e f a c t s were s e t o u t a t l e n g t h i n o u r p r e v i o u s o p i n i o n , s u p r a , w e r e c o u n t them b r i e f l y h e r e . On J u l y 1 4 , 1980, d e f e n d a n t was charged w i t h s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h o u t c o n s e n t i n v o l v i n g a r e g u l a r c o u r s e of conduct w i t h h i s d a u g h t e r , age under 16, from 1977 through September, 1979. A t t h e a r r a i g n m e n t t h e n e x t day, an amended i n f o r m a t i o n was f i l e d charging defen- d a n t w i t h s e x u a l a s s a u l t . Defendant pleaded g u i l t y and was r e l e a s e d t o t h e V e t e r a n s H o s p i t a l i n S h e r i d a n , Wyoming. On November 3, 1980, a t t h e h e a r i n g i n a g g r a v a t i o n or m i t i g a t i o n of punishment, d e f e n d a n t was sentenced to 20 y e a r s imprisonment. On J a n u a r y 7, 1981, t h e District Court e n t e r e d a n o r d e r f i n d i n g t h e p r i o r s e n t e n c e r e a s o n a b l e and l e f t it unchanged. On J a n u a r y 1 2 , d e f e n d a n t r e q u e s t e d t h e D i s t r i c t Court to set t h e s e n t e n c e a s i d e o r to be allowed to withdraw h i s p l e a because t h e county a t t o r n e y a l l e g e d l y f a i l e d to f u l f i l l h i s pro- mises made t o t h e d e f e n d a n t i n a p l e a b a r g a i n agreement d a t e d J u l y 2, 1980, t h e r e b y denying d e f e n d a n t due p r o c e s s of law. The p u r p o r t e d agreement was c o n t a i n e d i n a l e t t e r from d e f e n d a n t ' s c o u n s e l to t h e p r o s e c u t i n g a t t o r n e y and provided i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : "It is my u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t your o f f i c e would b e w i l l i n g to a c c e p t a p l e a to one c o u n t of s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h o u t c o n s e n t from m y c l i e n t and i n r e t u r n would recommend to t h e -- c o u r t t h a t M r . A l l e n r e c e i v e a s u s ~ e n d e d sen- t e n c e f o r a p e r i o d o f t e n to f i f t e e n y e a r s and --- t h a t s a i d s u s p e n s i o n be c o n d i t i o n a l upon h i s a t t e n d i n g and-completing a t r e a t m e n t program a t t h e Veterans H o s p i t a l i n S h e r i d a n , Wyoming, f o r whatever t i m e p e r i o d t h e y deem a p p r o p r i a t e and n e c e s s a r y . I t is my understanding t h a t your o f f i c e w i l l n o t p r e s e n t testimony i n a g g r a v a t i o n o f s e n t e n c e nor oppose a withdrawal of t h e g u i l t y p l e a should o u r agreement n o t be followed by t h e c o u r t . " I f you have any a d d i t i o n s or c o r r e c t i o n s p l e a s e d o n ' t h e s i t a t e to c o n t a c t m e a t any t i m e . " (Emphasis added.) The p r o s e c u t i n g a t t o r n e y acknowledged t h a t he made no w r i t t e n r e s p o n s e to t h i s letter. The District Court denied d e f e n d a n t ' s motion to set t h e s e n t e n c e a s i d e or t o withdraw t h e g u i l t y p l e a . Our f i r s t c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e case followed. W e remanded w i t h i n s t r u c t i o n s to t h e District Court t o determine t h e terms of t h e p l e a b a r g a i n agreement and whether t h e county a t t o r n e y breached them. Although a p p e l l a n t r a i s e s p e r i p h e r a l i s s u e s , t h e c e n t r a l i s s u e h e r e r e v o l v e s around t h e county a t t o r n e y ' s f a i l u r e t o recommend t h e suspended s e n t e n c e of 1 0 to 1 5 y e a r s . The D i s t r i c t Court made t h e following f i n d i n g of f a c t r e l a t i n g t h e r e t o : "19. The County Attorney d i d n o t a g r e e to recommending a suspended S e n t e n c e . H e d i d a g r e e t o make no o p p o s i t i o n to t h e r e q u e s t of t h e Defendant f o r a suspended s e n t e n c e . " The District c o u r t made t h e following f i n d i n g r e g a r d i n g t h e presen- t a t i o n of t h e agreement t o t h e c o u r t , which is uncontroverted by d e f e n s e c o u n s e l : "14. A t t h e J a n u a r y 7 t h h e a r i n g , t h e d e f e n s e c o u n s e l p r e s e n t e d to t h e Court f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e t h e J u l y letter of M r . Nardi [ d e f e n s e c o u n s e l ] . The Court a t t h a t t i m e d i s r e g a r d e d t h e l e t t e r f o r any and a l l purposes. "18. U n t i l J a n u a r y 7, 1981, no mention w a s e v e r made by e i t h e r t h e d e f e n s e counsel nor t h e Defendant a s to t h e recommended 15 y e a r suspended S e n t e n c e by t h e County Attorney, n o r any mention made a s to a change of p l e a ." The f o l l o w i n g c o n c l u s i o n s of law were e n t e r e d w i t h regard to t h e p l e a b a r g a i n i t s e l f : "1. The i n i t i a l plea-bargain agreement between d e f e n s e counsel and t h e p r o s e c u t o r was t h a t t h e Defendant would e n t e r a p l e a of g u i l t y to t h e o f f e n s e of Sexual I n t e r c o u r s e w i t h o u t Consent, o n e c o u n t , a f e l o n y , and t h a t i n exchange f o r which p l e a t h e p r o s e c u t o r would: n o t pursue t h e a d d i t i o n a l c o u n t s of t h e o r i g i n a l c h a r g e ; a s s e n t t o and j o i n i n t h e D e f e n d a n t ' s r e q u e s t t h a t he b e s e n t t o t h e F o r t S h e r i d a n V e t e r a n s Admini- s t r a t i o n H o s p i t a l p r i o r t o i m p o s i t i o n of Sentence, a n d , f o l l o w i n g h i s s u c c e s s f u l c o m p l e t i o n of t h e F o r t S h e r i d a n V e t e r a n s A d m i n i s t r a t i o n H o s p i t a l t r e a t m e n t program and a p p r o p r i a t e d i s c h a r g e t h e r e f r o m , n o t oppose t h e Defendantt s proposi- t i o n to t h e Court t h a t he r e c e i v e an extended suspended S e n t e n c e . "2. The S t a t e d i d n o t a g r e e to a£ f i r m a t i v e l y recommending a suspended S e n t e n c e . "7. The p r o s e c u t o r d i d n o t oppose any suspended S e n t e n c e a t any time." The i s s u e now b e f o r e us is whether t h e p r o s e c u t i n g attor- ney breached t h e terms of t h e p l e a b a r g a i n , denying d e f e n d a n t due p r o c e s s of l a w . The t r a n s c r i p t of t h e h e a r i n g on remand r e v e a l s t w o d i s t i n c t v e r s i o n s of what t h e p a r t i e s b e l i e v e d t h e agreement to be. D e f e n d a n t ' s c o u n s e l s t a t e d t h e y f e l t t h e letter embodied t h e terms of t h e agreement and so advised t h e i r c l i e n t . The county a t t o r n e y , on t h e o t h e r hand, r e p e a t e d l y s t a t e d t h a t he n e v e r a g r e e d to recommend a suspended s e n t e n c e b u t t h a t he would n o t o b j e c t t o a suspended s e n t e n c e . H e f e l t t h a t h i s v e r s i o n of t h e agreement was e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e numerous c o n t a c t s between t h e p a r t i e s s u b s e q u e n t t o t h e quoted letter. D e f e n d a n t ' s c o u n s e l r e l y h e a v i l y on S a n t o b e l l o v. New York ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 3 0 L.Ed.2d 427. I n t h a t c a s e t h e o r i g i n a l p r o s e c u t o r agreed t o make no recommendation as t o s e n t e n c e i n r e t u r n f o r t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s p l e a d i n g g u i l t y to a lesser included o f f e n s e . Seven months l a t e r , a t t h e s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g , a d i f f e r e n t p r o s e c u t o r recommended t h e maximum one-year s e n t e n c e . The Supreme Court r e v e r s e d t h e s e n t e n c e and remanded t h e case back t o t h e state d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r f u r t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n , s t a t i n g : " . . . when a p l e a r e s t s i n any s i g n i f i c a n t d e g r e e on a promise or agreement of t h e p r o s e c u t o r , so t h a t it can be s a i d to be p a r t of t h e inducement or c o n s i d e r a t i o n , such promise must be f u l f i l l e d . " S a n t o b e l l o , s u p r a , 404 U.S. a t 262, 92 S.Ct. a t 499, 30 L.Ed.2d a t 433. Its clear t h a t t h e S a n t o b e l l o holding was based i n p a r t on ana- l o g l i e s t o c o n t r a c t l a w . However, t h e r e a p p e a r s to be a r e c e n t trend away from a strict c o n t r a c t c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of a p l e a b a r g a i n agreement, a t l e a s t b e f o r e a c o n t r a c t is formed, and toward t h e r e a s o n a b l e e x p e c t a t i o n s of t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s c o u n s e l . I n Cooper v. U.S. ( 4 t h C i r . 1 9 7 9 ) , 594 F.2d 12, a p l e a b a r g a i n arrangement w a s o f f e r e d b y t h e p r o s e c u t o r and accepted by t h e d e f e n d a n t . The d e f e n s e c o u n s e l t h e n made numerous u n s u c c e s s f u l a t t e m p t s to c o n t a c t t h e p r o s e c u t o r by t e l e p h o n e to acknowledge a c c e p t a n c e and when con- tact was f i n a l l y made, he was informed t h e of f e r had been withdrawn, 594 F.2d a t 15. The c o u r t acknowledged t h a t by strict c o n t r a c t l a w p r i n c i p l e s no c o n t r a c t had a r i s e n b u t still concluded t h a t r e l i e f must be g i v e n and enforced t h e p l e a p r o p o s a l to t h e e x t e n t t h e n p o s s i b l e . More i m p o r t a n t l y , t h e Court d e s c r i b e d t h e t e s t to be a p p l i e d and t h e s o u r c e s of d e f e n d a n t ' s r i g h t s : " W e hold i n s t e a d t h a t under a p p r o p r i a t e circumstances--which we f i n d here--a c o n s t i t u - t i o n a l r i g h t to enforcement of p l e a p r o p o s a l s may arise b e f o r e any t e c h n i c a l I c o n t r a c t ' h a s been formed. and on t h e b a s i s a l o n e of expec- & t a t i o n s r e a s o n a b l y formed i n r e l i a n c e -- upon t h e honor o f t h e aovernment i n m a k i n a and a b i d i n s bv - -- - - - A its p r o p o s a l s . A t what point t h i s r i g h t a r i s e s s h o r t of t h e s t r u c k b a r g a i n or any t a n g i b l e , o b j e c t i v e acts of r e l i a n c e we need n o t a t t e m p t t o s a y h e r e as a matter of g e n e r a l r u l e . "We begin by n o t i n g t h a t two d i s t i n c t s o u r c e s of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t are involved h e r e : most o b v i o u s l y and d i r e c t l y , t h e r i g h t to fundamental f a i r n e s s embraced w i t h i n s u b s t a n t i v e due p r o c e s s g u a r a n t e e s ; less d i r e c t l y p e r h a p s , b u t nonethe- less i m p o r t a n t l y , t h e S i x t h Amendment r i g h t to e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of counsel." 594 F.2d a t 18. ( Emphasis added. ) S e v e r a l o t h e r c o u r t s have adopted t h e Cooper r a t i o n a l e . See - - Enforcing P l e a Bargains: A S t e p Beyond C o n t r a c t Law, 40 Maryland Law Rev. 90, 114 ( 1 9 8 1 ) . Here t h e D i s t r i c t Court accepted t h e county a t t o r n e y ' s v e r s i o n of t h e agreement and r e j e c t e d d e f e n s e c o u n s e l s 9 argument. There is s u b s t a n t i a l evidence i n t h e record to s u p p o r t t h i s d e c i - s i o n . The s t a n d a r d of review is whether f i n d i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of law are c l e a r l y e r r o n e o u s : " F i n d i n q s of f a c t s h a l l not be set a s i d e u n l e s s - c l e a r l y e r r o n e o u s , and due r e g a r d s h a l l be g i v e n t o t h e o p p o r t u n i t y of t h e t r i a l c o u r t to judge t h e c r e d i b i l i t y of t h e w i t n e s s e s . " Rule 5 2 ( a ) , 3I.R.Civ.P. N e i t h e r S a n t o b e l l o nor Cooper r e q u i r e r e v e r s a l i n t h i s c a s e . Although d e f e n s e counsel would have us b e l i e v e t h a t t h e J u l y 2, 1980, l e t t e r embodied t h e agreement, t h e r e is ample evidence t h a t t h e r e were subsequent n e g o t i a t i o n s between t h e p a r t i e s to such an e x t e n t t h a t t h e terms of t h e l e t t e r should n o t have been r e l i e d upon by d e f e n d a n t ' s a t t o r n e y s . F o r example, t h e letter s t a t e s t h a t d e f e n d a n t would plead g u i l t y t o t h e charge o f s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h o u t c o n s e n t . However, t h i s term of t h e agreement was changed t o a p l e a of g u i l t y to t h e charge of s e x u a l a s s a u l t . Thus t h e f i n a l p l e a e n t e r e d d i d not rest " i n any s i g n i f i c a n t d e g r e e on a promise o r agreement of t h e p r o s e c u t o r " t o recommend a suspended s e n t e n c e . S a n t o b e l l o , s u p r a . Here t h e uncontroverted f a c t s i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was o r i g i n a l l y sentenced on November 3 , 1980. The county a t t o r - ney d i d n o t recommend a suspended s e n t e n c e a t t h a t t i m e . The f i r s t t i m e t h e quoted l e t t e r or a l l e g e d p l e a b a r g a i n f o r a suspended s e n t e n c e was p r e s e n t e d to t h e District Court was o v e r t w o months later on J a n u a r y 7, 1981. I f d e f e n d a n t and h i s coun- sel were induced to e n t e r a g u i l t y p l e a on J u l y 15, 1980, by t h e a l l e g e d promise of t h e county a t t o r n e y to recommend a suspended s e n t e n c e , why d i d t h e y w a i t u n t i l J a n u a r y 7, 1981, to inform t h e District Court of t h e quoted letter and a l l e g e d promise of t h e county a t t o r n e y ? A r e t h e s e uncontested f a c t s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h e x p e c t a t i o n s r e a s o n a b l y formed i n r e l i a n c e upon the a l l e g e d pro- mise of t h e county a t t o r n e y t o recommend a suspended s e n t e n c e under t h e Cooper r a t i o n a l e ? Not a t a l l ! Accordingly, we hold t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s s u b s t a n t i v e due p r o c e s s r i g h t s were n o t v i o l a t e d under t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s of t h i s c a s e . The judgment of c o n v i c t i o n and s e n t e n c e are a£ firmed. Chief J u s t i c e \ W e concur: Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea dissenting: The real evil lies in the fact that we remanded this case for an evidentiary hearing before a district judge who had already held that a plea bargain did not exist and was determined to be harsh as possible in sentencing. It was a foregone conclusion that in the evidentiary hearing he would accept the county attorney's version of what happened which would enable him to keep the sentence intact. This Court should have ordered an evidentiary hearing before a different district judge. The only fair way to handle this case would be to order a different district judge to determine whether there was a plea bargain. The original district judge already determined in his own mind what should be done with the defendant.