Title: Deal v. Comm'r of Correction
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12053
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: August 25, 2016

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SJC-12053 
 
TIMOTHY DEAL & others1  vs.  COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION 
& another.2 
 
 
Suffolk.     May 3, 2016. - August 25, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ.3 
 
 
Commissioner of Correction.  Constitutional Law, Sentence, 
Parole.  Due Process of Law, Sentence, Parole, Prison 
classification proceedings.  Imprisonment, Reclassification 
of prisoner.  Parole.  Youthful Offender Act.  Practice, 
Criminal, Sentence, Parole. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on July 14, 2015. 
 
 
The case was reported by Botsford, J. 
 
 
 
Barbara Kaban (Benjamin H. Keehn, Committee for Public 
Counsel Services, & James W. Rosseel with her) for the 
petitioners. 
 
Charles Anderson, Jr., for the respondents. 
                                                          
 
 
1 Siegfried Golston and Jeffrey Roberio. 
 
 
2 Assistant Deputy Commissioner of Correction. 
 
 
3 Justice Cordy participated in the deliberation on this 
case and authored this opinion prior to his retirement.  
Justices Spina and Duffly participated in the deliberation on 
this case prior to their retirements. 
2 
 
 
David J. Apfel & Eileen L. Morrison, for American Civil 
Liberties Union of Massachusetts & others, amici curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
CORDY, J.  This case is before us on the reservation and 
report of the single justice.  The petitioners, Timothy Deal, 
Siegfried Golston, and Jeffrey Roberio, are juvenile homicide 
offenders4 who are serving mandatory indeterminate life sentences 
and who have a constitutional right to a "meaningful opportunity 
to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and 
rehabilitation."  Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the 
Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655, 674 (2013) (Diatchenko I), quoting 
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010).   This right also 
extends to juveniles convicted of murder in the second degree.  
See Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 471 
Mass. 12, 32 (2015) (Diatchenko II).  This case concerns the 
manner in which juvenile homicide offenders are classified and 
placed in Department of Correction (department) facilities. 
 
The issue before us is whether the department's practice of 
using "discretionary override codes" to block qualifying 
                                                          
 
 
4 In an earlier decision, we used the term "juvenile 
homicide offender" to refer to a person who has been convicted 
of murder in the first degree and was under the age of eighteen 
at the time that he or she committed the murder.  See  
Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 471 Mass. 
12, 13 n.3 (2015).  In this case, we use the term to refer to 
individuals who have been convicted of either murder in the 
first degree or murder in the second degree and were under the 
age of eighteen at the time of the offense. 
3 
 
juvenile homicide offenders from placement in a minimum security 
facility unless and until the individual has received a positive 
parole vote violates (1) G. L. c. 119, § 72B, as amended by St. 
2014, c. 189, § 2; or (2) their right to a meaningful 
opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and 
rehabilitation under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution, arts. 12 and 26 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights, or both Constitutions. 
 
We conclude that the department's current classification 
practice violates G. L. c. 119, § 72B, as amended by St. 2014, 
c. 189, § 2, because the department's failure to consider a 
juvenile homicide offender's suitability for minimum security 
classification on a case-by-case basis amounts to a categorical 
bar as proscribed by the statute.  We further conclude that the 
department's practice does not violate the petitioners' 
constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity to obtain 
release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation 
because there is no constitutionally protected expectation that 
a juvenile homicide offender will be released to the community 
after serving a statutorily prescribed portion of his sentence.5 
                                                          
 
 
5 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the American 
Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts; Boston College Juvenile 
Rights Advocacy Project; Campaign for Fair Sentencing of Youth; 
Charles Hamilton Houston Institute, Harvard Law School; Citizens 
for Juvenile Justice; Coalition for Effective Public Safety; 
Communities for People; Harvard Prison Legal Assistance Project; 
4 
 
 
Background.  1.  Department classification process.  In 
2002, the National Institute of Corrections provided technical 
assistance to the department to "revise and validate the 
classification instrument for both males and females."  The 
final product, entitled "Objective Point Base Classification-
Reclassification Form" (objective classification form), consists 
of "objectively defined criteria" that are "weighed, scored, and 
organized into a valid and reliable classification instrument 
accompanied by an operational manual for applying the instrument 
to inmates in a systematic manner."  103 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 420.06 (2007). 
 
On commitment, and annually thereafter, the department 
determines the appropriate security placement level for each 
prisoner through the classification process, called the 
"Internal Classification Status Review."  103 Code Mass. Regs. 
§§ 420.08, 420.09 (2007).  The twin goals of the process are to 
promote "public safety" and "the responsible reintegration of 
offenders."  103 Code Mass. Regs. § 420.07 (2007).  To achieve 
these goals, the process "objectively assess[es] the inmate's 
custody requirements and programmatic needs and match[es] those 
to the appropriate security level in a manner that minimizes the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Justice Resource Institute; Massachusetts Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers; Northeastern Prisoners' Assistance 
Project; Prisoners' Legal Services of Massachusetts; Roca, Inc.; 
Roxbury Youthworks, Inc.; Span, Inc.; Dr. Frank DiCataldo; Dr. 
Robert Kinscherff; and Francine Sherman, Esq. 
5 
 
potential for escape, prison violence and inmate misconduct," 
by, inter alia, "[r]ationally using a reliable, validated set of 
variables to support classification decisions."  103 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 420.07(a).  Based on the outcome of the classification 
process, a prisoner is assigned to a maximum, medium, or minimum 
security facility. 
 
The classification process proceeds in several steps. 
First, a correctional program officer (CPO) is responsible for 
gathering the information required to score each variable 
contained in the prisoner's objective classification form.  103 
Code Mass. Regs. § 420.09.6  The CPO computes the total score and 
compares it to a set of cut-off values to determine the 
                                                          
 
6 The variables and their scoring ranges are: 
 
1. severity of current offense (possible score 1-6); 
 
2. severity of convictions within the last four years 
(possible score 0-6); 
 
3. history of escapes or attempts to escape (possible 
score 0-7); 
 
4. history of prior institutional violence within the 
last four years (possible score 0-5); 
 
5. number of guilty disciplinary reports within the 
last twelve months (possible score 0-4); 
 
6. most severe guilty disciplinary report within the 
last eighteen months (possible score 0-7); 
 
7. age (possible scores -2, 0, 1); and 
 
8. program participation or work assignment (possible 
scores -2, -1, 0). 
6 
 
prisoner's preliminary custody level.  Twelve or more points 
qualify a prisoner for maximum security; seven to eleven points 
qualify the prisoner for medium security; and six or fewer 
points qualify the prisoner for minimum security. 
 
After calculating the prisoner's objective score, the CPO 
reviews the "non-discretionary" restrictions to determine if any 
apply.  If the prisoner is not subject to a nondiscretionary 
restriction, the CPO then reviews the "discretionary overrides" 
to determine if any apply.  The CPO also schedules an interview 
with the prisoner to discuss "matters related to classification 
and custody status."  103 Code Mass. Regs. § 420.09(1)(f). 
 
Following the review process, the CPO makes recommendations 
and enters the results of the review into the department's 
computerized inmate information system.  103 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 420.09(2), (3).  The institution's director of classification 
will review and then approve, modify, or deny the 
recommendations made by the CPO.  103 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 420.09(2).  Prisoners who disagree with the internal 
classification status review results may appeal to the 
superintendent.  103 Code Mass. Regs. § 420.09(3). 
 
If a review of the inmate's objective classification form 
and other factors set forth in the regulations indicate a need 
for a change in placement to a higher or lower security level, a 
hearing is conducted by a three-person classification board 
7 
 
consisting of institutional employees deemed qualified to make 
custody level determinations.  103 Code Mass. Regs. 
§§ 420.08(3)(a), 420.09(4).  The prisoner appears before and 
participates in the hearing with the classification board, which 
reviews the prisoner's objective point base classification score 
and any cited restrictions or overrides.  103 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 420.08(3)(e)-(f).  The classification board members then vote, 
with the board's final recommendation reflecting the majority 
vote of the three-person panel, and the prisoner is notified of 
the decision both orally at the time of the hearing and 
subsequently in writing.  103 Code Mass. Regs. § 420.08(3)(f).  
Prisoners may appeal the classification board's placement 
decision to the Commissioner of Correction (commissioner) or her 
designee.  103 Code Mass. Regs. § 420.08(3)(h). 
 
State law provides that the purpose of classification 
boards is to make recommendations for inmate classification.  
G. L. c. 127, § 20A.  Accordingly, the classification board's 
decision is a "final recommendation to the [c]ommissioner," 103 
Code Mass. Regs. § 420.08(3)(f), subject to approval or 
rejection by the commissioner or her designee, who "shall 
utilize the scored custody level and any applicable restrictions 
or overrides to render a final placement decision."  103 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 420.08(3)(i).  The assistant deputy commissioner 
of classification (assistant deputy commissioner) is one of 
8 
 
several department employees authorized by the commissioner to 
act as her designee, and rendered classification decisions in 
each of the petitioners' cases. 
 
The department's classification system includes seven 
discretionary override codes (P through V), any one of which may 
be the basis for the commissioner or her designee to reject a 
classification board's final recommendation.  The definitional 
section of the department's classification regulations, 103 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 420.06, defines "[d]iscretionary [o]verride" as 
"[a]n override of a scored custody level, based on the 
professional judgment of trained classification staff.  
Discretionary [o]verrides should account for [five to fifteen 
per cent] of all custody level decisions and are detailed in the 
Objective Classification Operational Manual."  According to the 
department, the final decision of the commissioner or her 
designee balances the classification board's recommendation 
against the interests of the public, the department, and the 
inmate.  The decision of the commissioner or her designee is 
final and cannot be appealed.  103 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 420.08(3)(i). 
 
2.  2014 amendment and department response.  In 2013, this 
court held that art. 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights prohibits the imposition of a life sentence without 
possibility of parole on a person younger than the age of 
9 
 
eighteen at the time of offense.  Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 
658-659.  On July 25, 2014, the Legislature amended G. L. 
c. 119, § 72B, the statute which provides the penalties for 
juveniles convicted of murder, by inserting the following text 
at the end of the statute: 
 
"The department of correction shall not limit 
access to programming and treatment including, but not 
limited to, education, substance abuse, anger 
management and vocational training for youthful 
offenders, as defined in [G. L. c. 119, § 52], solely 
because of their crimes or the duration of their 
incarcerations. If the youthful offender qualifies for 
placement in a minimum security correctional facility 
based on objective measures determined by the 
department, the placement shall not be categorically 
barred based on a life sentence." 
 
St. 2014, c. 189, § 2. 
 
At the time the statute was amended, the department had a 
categorical bar which specifically prevented persons serving 
life sentences -- whether juveniles or adults at the time of 
offense -- from being housed in minimum security.  This 
categorical bar, "Non-Discretionary Minimum Custody Code E" 
(code E), stated the following:  "Non-Discretionary Minimum 
Custody Restriction Code E:  1st Degree Lifer -- 1st Degree 
lifers are not to be considered for minimum or below."  Code E's 
prohibitive sweep extended to all inmates serving a life 
sentence for murder in the first degree (designated by the 
department as "1st Degree lifers" [lifers]), and did not 
10 
 
discriminate based on the inmate's age at the time of the 
offense. 
 
Also at the time the amended statute became effective, the 
Department's "Non-Discretionary Minimum Custody Code F" (code F) 
restriction prohibited offenders from being considered for 
minimum security based on aspects of the crime.  It stated the 
following:  "Non-Discretionary Minimum Custody Restriction Code 
F:  Inmates currently convicted of murder of a public official, 
a crime while incarcerated or a crime involving loss of life are 
not to be considered for minimum unless a positive parole 
decision has been granted or are within two years of a defined 
release date."  Based on the language of code F, juvenile lifers 
who committed a crime involving loss of life were restricted; 
those lifers who had committed other offenses such as rape or 
armed robbery were not restricted.  Classification staff do not 
have the authority to disregard restrictions. 
 
In addition to these restrictions, the department then had, 
and still has, amongst others, two discretionary overrides, 
codes R and S, which take into account aspects of the crime or 
an offender's criminal history warranting retention in higher 
custody: 
"Discretionary Over-Ride -- Higher Custody . . . Code 
R:  Nature of Offense/High Notoriety -- The facts or 
notoriety of the offense presents a seriousness that 
cannot be captured in the score. 
 
11 
 
" Code S:  Prior Criminal History -- The criminal 
history presents a seriousness that cannot be captured 
in the score." 
 
 
All of these codes -- E, F, R, and S -- were in effect on 
July 25, 2014, the effective date of the amended statute. 
 
The Legislature, recognizing that juveniles serving life 
sentences were restricted from minimum security throughout their 
incarcerations due to code E, specifically addressed this 
"categorical bar" by enacting the amended statute:  the 
department could no longer bar juvenile homicide offenders from 
minimum security categorically based on a life sentence, but 
could consider them for minimum security if and when their 
objective (point-based) score warranted such consideration.  See 
G. L. c. 119, § 72B. 
 
On September 5, 2014, then Acting Commissioner Thomas 
Dickhaut issued a memorandum implementing both the holding in 
Diatchenko I and § 72B.  The memorandum stated that codes E and 
F could not be used for juvenile first- and second-degree 
homicide offenders, and those who had those codes would need to 
be reclassified. 
 
3.  The petitioners.  Timothy Deal, now age thirty-one, was 
convicted of murder in the second degree for an offense 
committed in 2002, when he was the age of seventeen.  Sentenced 
to life imprisonment, Deal will be parole eligible as a matter 
of law as of January 29, 2017, when he will have been 
12 
 
incarcerated for fifteen years.  He is currently imprisoned at 
the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Concord, a medium 
security facility.  On September 23, 2014, a classification 
board unanimously voted that Deal be placed in a minimum 
security facility.  The board noted that Deal had an objective 
classification score of four, had "[p]ositive housing/work 
evaluations," and was "program compliant."  Seven months later, 
the assistant deputy commissioner rejected the classification 
board's recommendation, citing "code R," i.e., "serious nature 
of offense." 
 
Siegfried Golston, now age fifty-eight, was convicted of 
murder in the first degree in 1976 for an offense committed when 
he was the age of seventeen.  Originally sentenced to life 
without the possibility of parole, Golston has been imprisoned 
for forty years, mostly (and currently) at Old Colony 
Correctional Center (Old Colony), a medium security facility.  
For many years, Golston's objective point base classification 
scores have qualified him for placement in minimum security.  In 
2014, a classification board again determined that Golston 
qualified for minimum security and recommended that he be so 
placed, noting his objective classification score of two, 
positive institutional adjustment, and program participation.  
The assistant deputy commissioner rejected the recommendation, 
citing code R:  "The facts or notoriety of the offense presents 
13 
 
a seriousness that cannot be captured in the score."  After 
becoming eligible for parole by virtue of Diatchenko I, Golston 
was considered for parole at a hearing held on January 29, 2015.  
On May 1, 2015, the parole board denied Golston's application 
for parole "with a review in two years from the date of the 
hearing." 
 
Jeffrey Roberio, now age forty-seven, was convicted of 
murder in the first degree in 1987, for an offense committed 
when he was the age of seventeen.  Originally sentenced to life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole, Roberio has been 
incarcerated for almost thirty years, mostly (and currently) at 
Old Colony.  On October 9, 2014, a classification board 
recommended by a unanimous vote that Roberio be placed in a 
minimum security facility based on his objective classification 
score of three, his "positive institutional adjustment," and his 
"program participation."  Four months later, the assistant 
deputy commissioner rejected the classification board's 
recommendation, as follows:  "Serious nature of offense; several 
disciplinary reports throughout incarceration noted.  Override 
code R and T;[7] attorney letter and inmate appeal reviewed."  
After becoming eligible for parole as a result of Diatchenko I, 
                                                          
 
 
7 "Discretionary Over-ride -- Higher Custody . . . Code T" 
provides:  " Institutional Negative Adjustment -- The 
institutional adjustment presents a seriousness that cannot be 
captured in the score." 
14 
 
Roberio was considered for parole at a hearing held on June 25, 
2015.  On November 4, 2015, the parole board denied Roberio's 
request for release on parole "with a review in five years from 
the date of the hearing," i.e., June 25, 2020. 
 
4.  Procedural history.  As of the effective date of the 
Legislature's amendment of § 72B (July 25, 2014), the 
petitioners each were "youthful offender[s]," see Commonwealth 
v. Okoro, 471 Mass. 51, 62 n.18, who "qualifie[d] for placement 
in a minimum security correctional facility based on objective 
measures determined by the department."  G. L. c. 119, § 72B, as 
amended by St. 2014, c. 189, § 2.  However, in each case, the 
assistant deputy commissioner invoked one or more of the 
department's "discretionary overrides" to reject the 
petitioners' respective requests for placement in minimum 
security (Deal, rejected on the basis of code R; Golston, 
rejected on the basis of code R; Roberio, rejected on the basis 
of codes R and T). 
 
Because the assistant deputy commissioner's use of 
discretionary overrides to prevent the petitioners' placement in 
a minimum security facility is "final and cannot be appealed," 
103 Code Mass. Regs. § 420.08(3)(i), the petitioners filed the 
instant petition for relief in July, 2015, seeking relief 
pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, and G. L. c. 231A, alleging that 
the department's practice of categorically excluding all 
15 
 
objectively qualifying juvenile homicide offenders who have not 
received a positive parole vote from minimum security placement 
contravenes the 2014 amendment to G. L. c. 119, § 72B, and 
violates the petitioners' "meaningful opportunity for release 
based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation," Diatchenko 
II, 471 Mass. at 20, quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 75, as 
guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and arts. 12 
and 26. 
 
In October, 2015, the department filed an opposition to the 
petition, asserting (1) that the commissioner or her designee 
has discretion to reject a juvenile homicide offender's request 
to be placed in a minimum security facility; (2) that department 
"practice" forbids any prisoner serving a life sentence with a 
possibility of parole from being placed in minimum security 
"unless and until" the prisoner has obtained a positive parole 
vote, and (3) that the department treats "juvenile murderers" 
who wish to be placed in a minimum security facility "no 
differently" from adult offenders, notwithstanding the 
Legislature's 2014 amendment to §72B. 
 
Following the filing of a response by the petitioners, and 
two hearings before the single justice, the matter was reserved 
and reported to the full court. 
 
Discussion.    The petitioners argue that the department's 
practice of requiring a positive parole vote prior to placing 
16 
 
juvenile homicide offenders in minimum security contravenes the 
plain language of § 72B.  In their view, the "qualifying" event 
for minimum security placement is the inmate's objective 
classification score.  Thus, by requiring a positive parole 
vote, the department has added a condition to the statute that 
the Legislature did not intend.  Moreover, the petitioners 
argue, where the positive parole vote requirement is not a 
component of a statute, regulation, or the objective point base 
classification system, the department may not invoke 
discretionary placement restrictions to effectuate a practice 
otherwise proscribed by § 72B.  The petitioners also assert that 
the department's stated reasons for requiring juvenile homicide 
offenders to receive a positive parole vote prior to placement 
in a minimum security facility are not supported by the record.8  
Lastly, they argue that the department's practices violate the 
petitioners' constitutional right to a "meaningful opportunity" 
to obtain release on parole, because the parole board will not 
grant a parole permit to a juvenile homicide offender who has 
not successfully proved himself or herself in a minimum security 
facility. 
 
The respondents counter that the petitioners' reading of 
§ 72B conflates the provisions of the statute and thus 
                                                          
 
 
8 Because we conclude that the classification practice of 
the department violates G. L. c. 119, § 72B, we do not address 
this contention. 
17 
 
misinterprets what it requires.  The department also 
acknowledges that it is department "practice" to "not permit 
those serving a life sentence to be housed in minimum security 
unless and until they receive a positive parole vote."  
According to the respondents, this practice has been in place 
since 2006, and is based on the department's efforts to balance 
resource allocation (reserving beds in minimum security 
facilities for those inmates who have dates of discharge to the 
community) and inmate risk management (preventing escapes and 
further crimes while on escape).  Despite this admitted 
practice, the respondents contend that juvenile homicide 
offenders are being provided with a "meaningful opportunity to 
obtain parole release based on demonstrated maturity and 
rehabilitation" because several juvenile homicide offenders have 
received a positive parole vote and been placed in minimum 
security facilities.9 
 
1.  Section 72B.  The parties' dispute over the 
department's classification practices turns largely on their 
divergent interpretations of G. L. c. 119, § 72B.  Accordingly, 
we begin our analysis by considering the language of the 
statute.  "[S]tatutory language should be given effect 
                                                          
 
 
9 As discussed infra, since Diatchenko v. District Attorney 
of Suffolk County, 466 Mass. 655 (2013) (Diatchenko I), was 
decided, eleven juvenile homicide offenders originally sentenced 
to life without the possibility of parole have been granted 
parole by the parole board. 
18 
 
consistent with its plain meaning and in light of the aim of the 
Legislature unless to do so would achieve an illogical result" 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Parent, 465 Mass. 395, 409 
(2013).  "Courts must ascertain the intent of a statute from all 
its parts and from the subject matter to which it relates, and 
courts must interpret the statute so as to render the 
legislation effective, consonant with reason and common sense."  
Commonwealth v. George W. Prescott Publ. Co., 463 Mass. 258, 264 
(2012). 
 
Section 72B contains two separate decrees:  first, the 
department may not limit youthful offenders' access to certain 
programming solely because of their crimes or the duration of 
their incarceration; and second, the department may not 
categorically bar, based on a life sentence, the placement of a 
youthful offender in minimum security where the individual 
qualifies for such placement based on objective measures.  See 
G. L. c. 119, § 72B. 
 
Quoting our decision in Okoro, 471 Mass. at 62, the 
petitioners ask us to interpret § 72B as requiring the 
department to ensure "that youthful offenders who are 
incarcerated are not restricted in their ability to take part in 
educational and treatment programs, or to be placed in a minimum 
security facility, solely because of the nature of their 
criminal convictions or the length of their sentences" (footnote 
19 
 
omitted).  This language was used in Okoro merely to summarize 
the statute, and not to interpret it definitively.  Id.  The 
petitioners' reading of it, however, would import the mandate of 
the first statutory provision into the second, and prohibit the 
department from considering the petitioners' crimes or duration 
of their incarceration in rendering a classification decision.  
We disagree, and conclude that the criteria in the first 
sentence -- the inmate's crime or duration of their 
incarceration -- do not carry over into the second sentence.  
"[W]here the Legislature has carefully employed a term in one 
place and excluded it in another, it should not be implied where 
excluded" (citation omitted).  Commissioner of Correction v. 
Superior Court Dep't of the Trial Court for the County of 
Worcester, 446 Mass. 123, 126 (2006).  We cannot ignore the 
Legislature's use of different criteria in each sentence, and do 
not read the statute to provide that the department may not 
consider a youthful offender's crimes or the duration of his or 
her sentence in determining whether that individual qualifies 
for placement in minimum security. 
 
The language of § 72B plainly states that the department 
may not absolutely bar juvenile homicide offenders from 
placement in minimum security housing based on the fact that 
20 
 
they are serving a life sentence.10  We reject the petitioners' 
argument that an individual's receipt of an objective 
classification score qualifying for minimum security 
classification requires the department to so classify that 
individual.  It is apparent from regulatory framework that the 
initial objective classification score is a recommendation, and 
not a mandate, and thus merely qualifies an inmate for 
consideration for classification in minimum security. 
 
It follows, then, that § 72B requires the department to 
make an individualized determination of a juvenile homicide 
offender's suitability for placement in minimum security.11  As 
the petitioners concede, however, the department's consideration 
                                                          
 
 
10 Although we need not resort to extrinsic aids to discern 
the Legislature's intent, the legislative history of G. L. 
c. 119, § 72B, also supports our interpretation.  An earlier 
version of the bill stated:  "If the department of correction 
and the department of youth services objectively determine that 
the person qualifies for placement in a minimum security 
correctional facility, the placement shall not be prohibited on 
the nature or status of the offense or the age of the person at 
the time of the commission of the crime."  See 2014 Senate Doc. 
No. 2258, § 2.  By removing the terms "nature or status of the 
offense" and "age of the person at the time of the commission of 
the crime," it appears that the Legislature did not intend to 
prohibit the department from considering these factors in its 
classification determinations. 
 
 
11 This conclusion is consistent with the department's own 
regulations, which emphasize that classification is an 
individualized process.  See 103 Code Mass. Regs. § 420.08  
(classification process "shall provide an opportunity for the 
reception staff members to become acquainted with each inmate 
through individual assessment, testing, and structured 
interviews"). 
21 
 
of individuals may include the measures embodied in 
discretionary override codes R and S, that is, the facts of the 
inmate's crime or the prior criminal history of a juvenile 
homicide offender insofar as these criteria bear on their 
suitability for classification in minimum security.  Moreover, 
by permitting the department to consider such factors, the 
Legislature ensured that the twin goals of the classification 
process -- promoting "public safety" and "the responsible 
reintegration of offenders," see 103 Code Mass. Regs. § 420.07 -
- are furthered, rather than undermined. 
 
2.  Department practice.  Having concluded that § 72B 
requires the department to make individualized, case-by-case 
classification determinations for juvenile homicide offenders, 
we consider whether the department's practice of requiring a 
positive parole vote prior to placement in minimum security, as 
well as its use of codes R and S to effectuate this practice, 
violates the language of the statute.  We conclude that it does 
because it fails to undertake the type of individualized 
evaluation contemplated by the statute. 
 
Section 72B prohibits the department from categorically 
barring a juvenile homicide offender based on a life sentence, 
and requires it to consider them for minimum security if and 
when their objective (point-based) score warrants such 
consideration.  As discussed, such consideration must take place 
22 
 
on a case-by-case basis.  However, by the department's own 
stated practice, the petitioners have not received an 
individualized evaluation as to their suitability for minimum 
security classification because the department will not consider 
them unless and until they receive a positive parole vote.  
Additionally, although the petitioners concede that the 
department may consider the criteria embodied in discretionary 
override codes R and S, in rendering its decision, we agree with 
the petitioners that the record supports the conclusion that the 
department is currently using the codes solely as a means to 
effectuate its policy of requiring a positive parole vote.  
Indeed, the department acknowledges that the same juvenile 
offender whose placement in minimum security is blocked on the 
basis of a discretionary override would otherwise become 
transferable to minimum security on receipt of a positive parole 
vote. 
 
The department's current classification practice therefore 
violates § 72B because it precludes the petitioners from being 
given the individualized consideration for minimum security due 
to them based on the language of the statute and the 
department's own regulations.  We note that, according to the 
objective point base classification manual, a "rationale for any 
discretionary override MUST be provided" (emphasis in original).  
We agree with the petitioners that the provided rationale must 
23 
 
go beyond the mere recitation of the discretionary override.  
Otherwise, the use of the codes to block objectively qualifying 
youthful offenders from minimum security who have not received a 
positive parole vote amounts to a categorical bar based on a 
life sentence, as proscribed by § 72B. 
 
Generally speaking, the classification process vests the 
commissioner or her designee with broad discretion to classify 
inmates.  See Hastings v. Commissioner of Correction, 424 Mass. 
46, 49-50 (1997).  Therefore, nothing in this opinion should be 
construed to prohibit the department from considering a variety 
of factors in reaching a classification decision, including 
considerations such as public safety and resource allocation.  
However, in light of the language and purpose of § 72B, we 
conclude that the department must memorialize its rationale for 
denying placement in minimum security in writing, and may not 
preclude objectively qualifying juvenile homicide offenders from 
being considered for minimum security solely because they have 
not received a positive parole vote.  Nor may the department use 
discretionary override codes R and S to effectuate this policy.  
Instead, the department must individually consider each inmate's 
suitability for classification in minimum security and provide a 
written explanation for its decision.12 
                                                          
 
 
12  This case is before us on the reservation and report of 
the single justice, pursuant to our general superintendence 
24 
 
 
3.  Constitutional challenges.  The petitioners also 
contend that the department's practice of not classifying 
juvenile homicide offenders to minimum security unless and until 
they receive a positive parole vote violates the petitioners' 
constitutionally protected right to a meaningful opportunity to 
obtain release on parole.13  Since December, 2013, when 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
powers under G. L. c. 211, § 3.  Nothing in this opinion should 
be interpreted as creating a right of judicial review of an 
individual decision by the commissioner or her designee denying 
classification in minimum security, which is final and cannot be 
appealed.  See 103 Code Mass. Regs. § 420.08(3)(i). 
 
 
13 In their petition to the single justice, the petitioners 
argued that the department's classification practices violate 
juvenile homicide offenders' constitutionally protected right to 
a meaningful opportunity for parole release based on 
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation as guaranteed by the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution and arts. 26 and 12 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights.  The single justice used the same 
language in reporting the matter to the full court. 
 
 
Our prior decisions addressing the right to a "meaningful 
opportunity to obtain release" have not discussed the right's 
origin as deriving from the language of either the Fourteenth 
Amendment or art. 12, but rather from the prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishments in both art. 26 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of rights and the Eighth Amendment.  
See, e.g., Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 668.  The petitioners do 
not make any argument -- in either their petition below or in 
their appellate brief -- as to whether either the Fourteenth 
Amendment or art. 12 creates a special liberty interest for 
juvenile homicide offenders serving life sentences with a 
possibility of parole.  Accordingly, our discussion here 
addresses an individual's right to a "meaningful opportunity to 
obtain release" only as provided by the Eighth Amendment and 
art. 26.  See Schulman v. Attorney Gen., 447 Mass. 189, 199 n.2 
(2006) ("issues not briefed and argued should not be decided, 
especially when a question of constitutional law . . . is 
involved"). 
25 
 
Diatchenko I was decided, eleven juvenile homicide offenders 
originally sentenced to life without the possibility of parole 
have been granted parole by the parole board.  In each case, 
these individuals were not immediately released to the community 
on a parole permit, but rather were required to meet various 
conditions, including having spent a specified period of 
incident-free time in a minimum security facility.  The 
petitioners argue that the department's practice of prohibiting 
placement in minimum security unless and until a juvenile 
homicide offender receives a positive parole vote effectively 
extends the life sentences of juvenile homicide offenders who 
are eligible for parole by delaying indefinitely their ability 
to begin the period of time that they will be required to serve 
in a minimum security facility.  This, in the petitioners' view, 
prevents juvenile homicide offenders from "prov[ing] themselves 
in minimum," which in turn prevents such juveniles from 
obtaining a meaningful hearing in the first place.  We disagree 
that any constitutionally protected interest is implicated by 
the department's practice. 
 
In Diatchenko I, we held that the mandatory imposition of a 
life sentence without parole violates the prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishments in both art. 26 and the Eighth 
Amendment.  Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 668, citing Miller v. 
Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2467-2469 (2012).  We also held that a 
26 
 
juvenile homicide offender who is convicted of murder in the 
first degree and receives a mandatory sentence of life in prison 
must be afforded a "meaningful opportunity to obtain release 
based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation," and this 
opportunity must come through consideration for release on 
parole.  Diatchenko I, supra at 674, quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 
75. 
 
In Diatchenko II, we further determined that, in order to 
ensure that a juvenile homicide offender's opportunity for 
release through parole is meaningful, he or she must, in 
connection with an initial petition for release before the 
parole board, be afforded certain procedural protections, 
including access to counsel, access to funds for counsel and for 
expert witnesses if he or she is indigent, and, in limited 
circumstances, an opportunity for judicial review of the 
decision on their parole applications.  Diatchenko II, 471 Mass. 
at 14.  It appears that the petitioners now seek to expand this 
right further by asking the court to hold that juvenile homicide 
offenders have a constitutionally protected interest in being 
released to the community at the conclusion of their minimum 
duration of confinement.  We decline to do so. 
 
There is "no constitutional or inherent right of a 
convicted person to be conditionally released before the 
expiration of a valid sentence."  Greenholtz v. Inmates of the 
27 
 
Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979).  Accord 
Quegan v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 423 Mass. 834, 836 (1996).  
Accordingly, in Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 674, we made clear 
that "[o]ur decision should not be construed to suggest that 
individuals who are under the age of eighteen when they commit 
murder . . . should be paroled once they have served a 
statutorily designated portion of their sentences."  The 
petitioners' argument, however, amounts to a request to the 
court to find that juvenile homicide offenders have a 
constitutionally protected expectation to be released to the 
community after serving the statutorily prescribed portion of 
their sentences.  The case law is clear, however, that no such 
expectation exists.  See id.  See also Graham, 560 U.S. at 75 
(juvenile homicide offender is afforded "meaningful opportunity 
to obtain release" insofar as Eighth Amendment "prohibit[s] 
States from making the judgment at the outset that those 
offenders never will be fit to reenter society"; however, "[t]he 
Eighth Amendment does not foreclose the possibility that [a 
juvenile convicted of murder in the first degree] will remain 
behind bars for life" [emphasis added]). 
 
Moreover, there is nothing in the record before us to 
indicate that the parole board considers a juvenile homicide 
offender's security level in determining parole suitability, as 
evidenced in the criteria of the parole board in issuing parole 
28 
 
decisions for lifers, as well as the written decisions of the 
parole board for juvenile homicide offenders.  See Parole Board, 
Guidelines for Life Sentence Decisions, 
http://www.mass.gov/eopss/agencies/parole-board/guidelines-for-
life-sentence-decisions.html [https://perma.cc/F6NZ-WUC3].  To 
the contrary, the decision to deny parole to petitioner Golston 
indicates that the parole board denied parole on the bases of 
Golston's lack of specific anger management and violence 
reduction programming, as well as the parole board's finding 
that Golston's parole plan was formative and not yet viable.  
Similarly, the decision as to petitioner Roberio indicates that 
the parole board denied parole because Roberio had failed to 
pursue rehabilitative programming to address his issues of 
substance abuse, anger, and violence, leaving the board with a 
"serious concern of whether he still presents a risk of harm to 
the community, and whether his release is compatible with the 
best interests of society."14 
 
Accordingly, we reject the petitioners' constitutional 
challenge to the department's practice.  Although the department 
may not continue to bar consideration of juvenile homicide 
offenders from classification in minimum security solely on the 
basis of their failure to receive a positive parole vote, the 
                                                          
 
 
14 The petitioner Timothy Deal will not be eligible for 
parole until 2017. 
29 
 
practice does not amount to a constitutional violation because 
there is no constitutionally protected expectation that a 
juvenile homicide offender will be released to the community 
after serving a statutorily prescribed portion of his or her 
sentence.  See Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 674. 
 
Conclusion.  For these reasons, we conclude that the 
department's current practice of using discretionary overrides 
to block objectively qualifying juvenile homicide offenders from 
placement in a minimum security facility unless and until the 
juvenile has received a positive parole vote contravenes the 
language and purpose of G. L. c. 119, § 72B, because it 
forecloses the individualized consideration of an inmate's 
suitability for classification in minimum security.  The matter 
is remanded to the county court, where the single justice will 
enter a judgment consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.