Title: Michael Weinrib, M.D. and Gastroenterology Consultants, P.C. v. Frances J. Duncan (Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court: Reversed And Remanded With Instructions.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1050261
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: January 12, 2007

REL:01/12/07weinribv.duncan
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
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before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2006-2007
_________________________
1050261
_________________________
Michael Weinrib, M.D., and 
Gastroenterology Consultants, P.C. 
v.
Frances J. Duncan
Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court
(CV-01-464)
BOLIN, Justice.
Michael Weinrib, M.D., and Gastroenterology Consultants,
P.C. (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Weinrib"),
appeal, pursuant to Rule 5, Ala. R. App. P., from the trial
court's interlocutory order reinstating in the Montgomery
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2
Circuit Court a malpractice action against Weinrib, which
Weinrib claims is barred by the statute of limitations.  The
trial court certified the following controlling question of
law: "Is the reinstatement of this action barred by the
statute of limitations?" We determine that it is, and we
reverse and remand.
Factual Background and Procedural History
On February 18, 1999, Frances J. Duncan, who is disabled
due to a stroke, was injured while attempting to climb down
from an examination table in Dr. Weinrib's office.   On
February 16, 2001, Duncan sued Weinrib in the Montgomery
Circuit Court alleging certain claims under the Alabama
Medical Liability Act ("AMLA").  Weinrib filed a motion for a
summary judgment on the ground that Duncan had failed to
present expert testimony in support of her medical-malpractice
claims.  On June 10, 2003, Duncan amended her complaint to
assert violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42
U.S.C. § 12182 et seq. ("ADA"), and on July 10, 2003, Weinrib
filed a notice removing the case to the federal district
court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446.
1050261
3
On September 1, 2004, the federal court entered a summary
judgment in favor of Weinrib on Duncan's claims brought under
the 
ADA. 
The 
federal 
court 
elected 
not 
to 
exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the AMLA claims; it dismissed
those claims without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c), providing that Duncan could refile those claims in a
state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), because the
limitations period for filing the claims was tolled during the
pendency of the ADA claims in the federal court.
On August 30, 2005, approximately one year after the
entry of the order in the federal court, Duncan filed in the
Montgomery Circuit Court a "motion to reinstate action."
Weinrib responded and opposed the motion, arguing that the
statute of limitations barred reinstatement because Duncan did
not refile her action in the state court within 30 days after
the entry of the federal court's order, as required by 28
U.S.C. § 1367(d). Duncan filed no response to Weinrib's
opposition.
On November 9, 2005, the trial court entered an order
granting Duncan's motion to reinstate the action, holding
"that the original filing of this action in this Court, and
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4
[Weinrib's] filing of an Answer, prior to the removal to
federal court and the dismissal of the state law claims
without prejudice by the federal court, protects the action
from being barred by the applicable Statute of Limitations."
As previously noted, this Court granted permission to appeal
under Rule 5, Ala. R. App. P., to answer the question whether
the reinstatement of the action in the state court was barred
by the statute of limitations.
Discussion
On appeal, Weinrib argues that Duncan is in clear
violation of the two-year statute of limitations in Ala. Code
1975, § 6-5-482, and that the statutory tolling provision of
28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) provides for the tolling of the
limitations period for only 30 days after the federal district
court enters its order of dismissal.
As previously noted, Duncan's injury occurred on February
18, 1999.  Pursuant to § 6-5-482, Ala. Code 1975, Duncan's
AMLA claims were timely filed on February 16, 2001.  After
Duncan amended her complaint to assert additional claims under
the ADA, the entire case was removed to the federal court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446. Once removal was
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5
effectuated, 
the 
state 
trial 
court 
was 
divested 
of
jurisdiction over the underlying case and could not, in the
absence of an order of remand, take any further action
regarding the case.  The federal removal statute is explicit
on this point.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d)(stating that after
removal is effectuated, the "State court shall proceed no
further unless and until the case is remanded"). The federal
district court in this case did not remand the state-law
claims to the state court from which they had been removed.
Nor was it obliged to do so.  See Williams ex rel. Williams v.
City of Beverly Hills, (Ms. No. 4:04-CV-631, May 17, 2006)
(E.D. Mo. 2006) (not reported in F.Supp.2d) ("When a court
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law
claims in a case that has been removed from state court, the
court has two options: the claims may either be dismissed
without prejudice or the case may be remanded to the state
court from which it was removed. See Carnegie-Mellon
University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 351 (1988); Moses v. Banco
Mortgage Co., 778 F.2d 267, 274 (5th Cir. 1985).").   
Once the federal court disposed of the ADA claims, it
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state
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6
AMLA claims, dismissing them without prejudice, citing 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).  The federal district court's order
specifically stated that this "dismissal should not work to
Duncan's disadvantage should she elect to bring suit in state
court because the period of limitations for any of these
claims is tolled during the pendency of this action.  See 28
U.S.C. § 1367(d)."   
Section 1367(d), 28 U.S.C., specifically states:
"The period of limitations for any claim asserted
under subsection (a), and for any other claim in the
same action that is voluntarily dismissed at the
same time as or after the dismissal of the claim
under subsection (a), shall be tolled while the
claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after
it is dismissed unless State law provides for a
longer tolling period."
(Emphasis added.)
Conclusion
The federal district court's order dated September 1,
2004, afforded Duncan the opportunity to refile her case in
the state court by tolling the applicable statute of
limitations set forth in § 6-5-482 for a period ending 30 days
after the entry of the order.  Specifically, Duncan had until
October 1, 2004, to refile her action.  See Roden v. Wright,
611 So. 2d 333 (Ala. 1992)(refiled action conformed with 28
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7
U.S.C. § 1367(d), where the plaintiff refiled his claims
within 17 days after the federal court's dismissal of the
plaintiff's state-law claims without prejudice). Because
Duncan did not refile her action in the state court within the
time frame afforded by federal law and Alabama law does not
provide for a longer tolling period, her subsequent attempt on
August 30, 2005, to have the action reinstated is time-barred,
and the trial court's order reinstating her case is contrary
to the applicable statute of limitations. Consequently, the
order of the trial court reinstating the case is reversed. The
case is remanded for the trial court to vacate its order and
to dismiss Duncan's action.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Nabers, C.J., and See, Harwood, and Stuart, JJ., concur.