Title: Lynch v. Crawford
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12700
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: December 10, 2019

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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SJC-12700 
 
JUDY C. LYNCH & others1  vs.  KEITH D. CRAWFORD & others2  
(and a consolidated case3). 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 5, 2019. - December 10, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, & Kafker, 
JJ. 
 
 
Practice, Civil, Interlocutory appeal, Summary judgment.  
Massachusetts Wage Act.  Immunity from Suit.  Federal 
Preemption.  Statute, Federal preemption. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
October 24, 2013. 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
February 10, 2016. 
 
 
After consolidation, the case was heard by Paul D. Wilson, 
J., on motions for summary judgment, and a motion for 
reconsideration was considered by him. 
 
                     
1 Johanna Vega, Iris Montijo, Guity Valizadeh, Marie Maxis, 
Maltina Kelsey, Elizabeth Rhodes, Oswald Hankerson, Denise 
Ferguson, Reshauna Jackson, Hycienth Jackson, and Gwendolyn 
Smith. 
 
2 Lawrence J. Smith, Jr.; and John Doe Nos. 1 through 50. 
 
3 Kennia Moreno & others vs. Keith D. Crawford & another. 
2 
 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
Christopher G. Clark (Christopher E. Novak also present) 
for Keith D. Crawford. 
 
Andrew E. Goloboy (Richard B. Reiling also present) for the 
plaintiffs. 
 
Jonathan C. Green, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
Attorney General, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
John J. Barter, for Professional Liability Foundation, 
Ltd., amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  The plaintiffs, former employees of the now-
dissolved Roxbury Comprehensive Community Health Center, Inc. 
(RoxComp), were not paid for the work they performed during the 
weeks before RoxComp shut its doors.  Under the Wage Act, G. L. 
c. 149, § 148, discharged employees are entitled to be paid all 
wages due them on the day of their discharge by their 
"employers."  The "president and treasurer of a corporation and 
any officers or agents having the management of such 
corporation" are "deemed to be the employers of the employees of 
the corporation within the meaning of [the statute]."  Id.  The 
plaintiffs brought consolidated civil actions against the 
defendant Keith D. Crawford alleging that, as RoxComp's 
president, he was among the "employers" who had violated the 
Wage Act by failing to pay them the wages they were due.4  
                     
4 The plaintiffs also alleged that Lawrence J. Smith, as the 
treasurer of Roxbury Comprehensive Community Health Center, Inc. 
(RoxComp), and other, as yet unidentified officers or agents of 
3 
 
 
Crawford moved for summary judgment, claiming that he was not 
RoxComp's president but solely the chair of its board of 
directors and that, even if he were its president, he served 
without compensation and therefore was immune from suit under 
the Federal Volunteer Protection Act (VPA), 42 U.S.C. § 14503(a) 
(2012), and the State charitable immunity statute, G. L. c. 231, 
§ 85W (§ 85W). 
A Superior Court judge denied Crawford's motion, concluding 
that there were disputes of material fact as to whether Crawford 
served as president and whether his conduct placed him outside 
the scope of the qualified immunity provided to volunteers under 
the VPA and § 85W.  Crawford filed a petition pursuant to G. L. 
c. 231, § 118, first par., seeking leave from a single justice 
of the Appeals Court to pursue an interlocutory appeal from the 
denial of his motion for summary judgment.  A single justice 
denied leave to appeal under § 118 and declared that, if 
Crawford contended that he had a right to interlocutory appeal 
under the doctrine of present execution, the way to assert that 
right was to file a notice of appeal in the Superior Court.  
Crawford then timely filed such a notice. 
In an attempt to harmonize two of our opinions applying the 
doctrine of present execution -- Maxwell v. AIG Domestic Claims, 
                     
RoxComp were employers who violated the Wage Act by failing to 
pay their wages. 
4 
 
 
Inc., 460 Mass. 91 (2011), and Marcus v. Newton, 462 Mass. 148 
(2012) -- the Appeals Court concluded that "where a statute 
designed to encourage private conduct speaks in terms of 
providing immunity only from liability, and that statute places 
no affirmative obligations on the protected party to take the 
actions being immunized, courts are not, without more, to infer 
an intent to provide immunity from suit."  Lynch v. Roxbury 
Comprehensive Community Health Ctr., Inc., 94 Mass. App. Ct. 
528, 535 (2018).  Consequently, the Appeals Court held that the 
doctrine of present execution did not entitle Crawford to an 
interlocutory appeal from the denial of his motion for summary 
judgment based on his claimed charitable immunity under Federal 
or State law because (1) "[t]he language of [§ 85W and the VPA] 
speaks in terms of immunity only from liability, not from suit"; 
(2) § 85W "imposes no obligations on people who serve as 
volunteer board members of nonprofit institutions"; and (3) the 
VPA does not command "State interlocutory appellate review when 
such an appeal otherwise would not be available."  Id. at 535, 
537-538.  We granted Crawford's motion for further appellate 
review. 
We hold that, where a statute provides qualified immunity, 
as do the VPA and § 85W, we attempt to discern whether the 
Legislature intended immunity from suit, rather than simply 
immunity from liability.  That the statute speaks only of 
5 
 
 
liability and does not specifically spell out immunity from suit 
is not dispositive.  Rather, we look to the language of the 
entire statute and, where there is ambiguity, apply our 
traditional standards of statutory interpretation to determine 
whether the Legislature intended to grant immunity from suit.  
Having done so here, we conclude that Congress intended the VPA 
to provide qualified immunity from suit for officers in 
nonprofit organizations who receive no compensation and that 
§ 85W may only expand the scope of that immunity, not diminish 
it.  Because our doctrine of present execution recognizes that 
interlocutory appeal is necessary to vindicate the rights of one 
who is ordered to proceed to trial despite being immune from 
suit, we conclude that Crawford, as a volunteer for a nonprofit 
organization, is entitled to interlocutory review of the denial 
of his motion for summary judgment. 
As to the merits of that summary judgment motion, we affirm 
the judge's denial of the motion, finding that there are genuine 
issues of material fact as to whether Crawford was, in fact, the 
president of RoxComp and as to whether he engaged in "any acts 
or omissions intentionally designed to harm" that would deprive 
him of the immunity otherwise provided by § 85W.5 
                     
5 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the Attorney 
General and the Professional Liability Foundation. 
6 
 
 
Discussion.  1.  Doctrine of present execution.  a.  
Immunity from suit.  Generally, a litigant is entitled to 
appellate review only of a final judgment, not of an 
interlocutory ruling, such as the denial of a motion for summary 
judgment.  See Pollack v. Kelly, 372 Mass. 469, 470-471 (1977).  
"However, in narrowly limited circumstances, where 'an 
interlocutory order will interfere with rights in a way that 
cannot be remedied on appeal' from a final judgment, and where 
the order is 'collateral to the underlying dispute in the case' 
. . . , a party may obtain full appellate review of an 
interlocutory order under our doctrine of present execution."  
Patel v. Martin, 481 Mass. 29, 32 (2018), quoting Maddocks v. 
Ricker, 403 Mass. 592, 596 (1988).  "The doctrine is intended to 
be invoked narrowly to avoid piecemeal appeals from 
interlocutory decisions that will delay the resolution of the 
trial court case, increase the over-all cost of the litigation, 
and burden our appellate courts."  Patel, supra. 
In civil cases, one of those limited circumstances in which 
we invoke the doctrine of present execution is "where protection 
from the burden of litigation and trial is precisely the right 
to which [a party] asserts an entitlement."  Estate of Moulton 
v. Puopolo, 467 Mass. 478, 485 (2014).  Where a party claims 
immunity from suit but does not prevail on a motion to dismiss 
or for summary judgment, the party cannot completely vindicate 
7 
 
 
his or her rights on appeal from a final judgment because the 
party would already then have defended the case at trial -- 
exactly what immunity from suit was "designed to prevent."  See 
Patel, 481 Mass. at 33.  "[E]ven if the erroneous order were 
ultimately reversed after trial, the right to immunity from suit 
would still have been 'lost forever.'"  Id., quoting Brum v. 
Dartmouth, 428 Mass. 684, 688 (1999). 
Where absolute or qualified immunity is provided by statute 
or common law, we discern whether the right to immunity is from 
suit or from liability, because only immunity from suit entitles 
a party to an interlocutory appeal under the doctrine of present 
execution.  See Breault v. Chairman of the Bd. of Fire Comm'rs 
of Springfield, 401 Mass. 26, 31 (1987), cert. denied sub nom. 
Forastiere v. Breault, 485 U.S. 906 (1988) ("The defendant would 
not benefit from our rule of 'present execution' . . . if the 
asserted right to immunity is but a right to freedom from 
liability . . . , for in that case his right could be vindicated 
fully on appeal after trial.  If, however, the asserted right is 
one of freedom from suit, the defendant's right will be lost 
forever unless that right is determined now, and his appeal is 
proper"). 
In considering claims of absolute or qualified immunity by 
governmental entities or employees, we have interpreted the 
immunity to provide protection from suit, not merely from 
8 
 
 
liability; therefore, we have applied the doctrine of present 
execution to allow an interlocutory appeal from an order denying 
a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment brought by someone 
asserting such immunity.  See Boxford v. Massachusetts Highway 
Dep't, 458 Mass. 596, 601 (2010) (town entitled to interlocutory 
appeal from denial of motion to dismiss under doctrine of 
present execution where it claimed sovereign immunity insulated 
it from suit brought pursuant to specific statutes); Brum, 428 
Mass. at 688, quoting Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. 
Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 145 (1993) (G. L. c. 258, 
§ 10, of Tort Claims Act "confers immunity from suit, . . . a 
right that is 'lost as litigation proceeds past motion 
practice'"); Breault, 401 Mass. at 31 (qualified immunity under 
Federal Civil Rights Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1983, "is an immunity from 
suit, not just from liability"). 
We have done so by focusing on the Legislature's purpose in 
conferring the immunity rather than on the specific statutory 
language that grants it.  For instance, with respect to 
qualified immunity under the Tort Claims Act, we have "noted the 
importance of 'determining immunity issues early if immunity is 
to serve one of its primary purposes:  to protect public 
officials from harassing litigation.'"  Brum, 428 Mass. at 688, 
quoting Duarte v. Healy, 405 Mass. 43, 44 n.2 (1989).  The 
language of that act does not expressly provide immunity from 
9 
 
 
suit.  Rather, G. L. c. 258, § 2, states that "[p]ublic 
employers shall be liable for injury or loss of property or 
personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act 
or omission of any public employee while acting within the scope 
of his office or employment, in the same manner and to the same 
extent as a private individual under like circumstances . . . ."  
The qualified immunity under the Tort Claims Act derives from 
the exceptions to § 2 listed in G. L. c. 258, § 10, including 
but not limited to "any claim arising out of an intentional 
tort."  G. L. c. 258, § 10 (c).  If an exception to § 2 is 
applicable, then public employers are protected from liability 
by sovereign immunity, which historically has been understood to 
provide immunity from suit.  See Randall v. Haddad, 468 Mass. 
347, 354 (2014), quoting Woodbridge v. Worcester State Hosp., 
384 Mass. 38, 42 (1981) ("The general rule of sovereign immunity 
provides that '[t]he Commonwealth cannot be impleaded into its 
own courts except with its consent, and, when that consent is 
granted, it can be impleaded only in the manner and to the 
extent expressed . . . [by] statute'").6 
                     
6 Generally, an interlocutory order may be appealed under 
the doctrine of present execution only where the order is 
"'collateral to the underlying dispute in the case' and 
therefore will not be decided at trial."  Patel, 481 Mass. at 
32, quoting Maddocks, 403 Mass. at 596.  Where a party claims 
qualified immunity from suit, we always deem the order 
"collateral," even if there might be a genuine issue of fact as 
10 
 
 
Similarly, in Maxwell, 460 Mass. at 102, we considered 
whether St. 1996, c. 427, § 13 (i), grants insurers qualified 
immunity from suit or simply from liability when they are sued 
because they reported to the insurance fraud bureau that they 
had reason to believe that a fraudulent insurance transaction 
was being attempted, as they are required to do by law.  In 
concluding that § 13 (i) confers qualified immunity from suit, 
we did not rely only on the statutory language, which provides 
that, "[i]n the absence of malice or bad faith, no insurer 
. . . shall be subject to civil liability for damages by reason 
of any statement, report or investigation" that arose from its 
report to the insurance fraud bureau.  Id.  Rather, noting the 
insurers' obligation to report potentially fraudulent conduct 
and the design of the immunity provision to shield insurers from 
civil liability in the absence of malice or bad faith, we 
concluded that § 13 (i) "should be interpreted as providing 
immunity from suit rather than mere immunity from liability" 
because "[r]eporting to the [insurance fraud bureau] might be 
                     
to whether the immunity protects the defendant under the 
circumstances of the case, and that factual issue might be the 
determinative one at trial.  See Kent v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 
312, 317 (2002).  We do so because the merits of the plaintiff's 
claim that his or her rights have been violated are 
"conceptually distinct from the merits of the plaintiff's claim" 
that the defendant may be sued for the violation.  See id., 
quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 527 (1985).   
11 
 
 
chilled if protection could be secured only after litigating a 
claim through to conclusion."  Id. at 98. 
However, in Marcus, 462 Mass. at 153, where we determined 
that the recreational use statute, G. L. c. 21, § 17C, provides 
qualified immunity from liability and not from suit, we rested 
our determination on the language of that statute without 
exploring the legislative purpose in granting the immunity.  
Section 17C provides that "[a]ny person having an interest in 
land . . . who lawfully permits the public to use such land for 
recreational, conservation, scientific, educational, 
environmental, ecological, research, religious, or charitable 
purposes without imposing a charge or fee therefor . . . shall 
not be liable for personal injuries or property damage sustained 
by such members of the public . . . while on said land in the 
absence of wilful, wanton, or reckless conduct by such person" 
(emphasis added).  We declared that "[w]e need go no further 
than the plain text of § 17C to conclude" from the underlined 
language that the statute "merely provides an exemption from 
liability for ordinary negligence claims; it does not provide 
immunity from suit."  Marcus, supra. 
We note that, although we focused solely on the statutory 
language in Marcus, our determination that the recreational use 
statute established only qualified immunity from liability was 
supported by the legislative history of that statute, as set 
12 
 
 
forth in Ali v. Boston, 441 Mass. 233, 235-237 (2004).  There, 
we observed that, in 1972, when the statute was enacted, our 
common law placed those who entered upon land into three 
categories -- invitees, licensees, and trespassers.  Id. at 236 
n.5.  Landowners owed a duty of reasonable care to invitees, but 
licensees and trespassers "could not recover unless the 
landowner's conduct was wilful, wanton, or reckless."  Id.  See 
McIntyre v. Converse, 238 Mass. 592, 594 (1921).  "Corporations 
in particular were concerned that, if they made their land 
available for public recreation, courts might conclude that they 
did so to enhance their own interests and might consequently 
determine that the recreational users were 'invitees' under the 
common law, to whom landowners owed the highest duty of care."  
Ali, supra at 236.  In "seeking to strike a balance between 
encouraging public access to private land and protecting 
landowners from liability for injuries, the Legislature created 
by statute a new category of entrants onto land, recreational 
users," and in essence declared that the duty owed to them was 
the duty owed to licensees and trespassers rather than invitees.  
Id. at 236-237.7  The court in Marcus recognized that, by 
                     
7 As we noted in Ali, 441 Mass. at 237: 
 
"Subsequently, in 1973, and for reasons wholly unrelated 
to the recreational use statute, this court modified the 
common law by, among other things, eliminating 'invitees' 
13 
 
 
delineating in the statute the duty owed to a recreational user 
of property, the Legislature did not intend to provide qualified 
immunity from suit; it simply sought to establish the standard 
of liability. 
b.  VPA.  In determining whether the VPA and § 85W provide 
immunity from suit or simply immunity from liability, we look 
first to the VPA, because it preempts inconsistent State laws, 
except where State law "provides additional protection from 
liability relating to volunteers . . . in the performance of 
services for a nonprofit organization or governmental entity."  
42 U.S.C. § 14502(a).8  Therefore, if the VPA provides qualified 
immunity from suit, § 85W may not be interpreted to provide less 
protection to volunteers. 
                     
as a separate category of entrants onto land.  Mounsey v. 
Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 707 (1973).  We determined that, 
for purposes of landowner liability, entrants onto land 
would fall into one of two categories:  lawful visitors 
and trespassers.  Id.  Landowners now owe a reasonable 
duty of care to all lawful visitors.  McDonald v. 
Consolidated Rail Corp., 399 Mass. 25, 28 (1987).  As to 
trespassers, landowners continue to owe the duty only to 
refrain from wilful, wanton, or reckless disregard for 
their safety.  Id. at 27." 
 
8 The Federal Volunteer Protection Act (VPA), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 14502(b) (2012), does not apply to any civil action in a State 
court in which all parties are citizens of the State if the 
Legislature of that State has enacted a statute declaring that 
the VPA does not apply in such cases.  The Massachusetts 
Legislature has enacted no such statute. 
14 
 
 
The VPA states that, subject to certain exceptions and 
conditions, "no volunteer of a nonprofit organization or 
governmental entity shall be liable for harm caused by an act or 
omission of the volunteer on behalf of the organization or 
entity if . . . the harm was not caused by willful or criminal 
misconduct, gross negligence, reckless misconduct, or a 
conscious, flagrant indifference to the rights or safety of the 
individual harmed by the volunteer."  42 U.S.C. § 14503(a).  
Because the VPA, like the recreational use statute, declares 
that a protected class of persons shall not "be liable" for harm 
unless the conduct is more blameworthy than negligence, the 
plaintiffs, citing our opinion in Marcus, argue that we need go 
no further than the plain meaning of these words to conclude 
that the VPA confers only immunity from liability.  We decline 
to place so much weight on Congress's use of the phrase "be 
liable"; nor do we infer that the phrase so plainly demonstrates 
Congress's intent not to provide volunteers with immunity from 
suit that we need look no further. 
In interpreting the meaning of a statute, we "seek to 
determine the intent of the Legislature in enacting [it], 
'ascertained from all its words construed by the ordinary and 
approved usage of the language, considered in connection with 
the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be 
remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that 
15 
 
 
the purpose of its framers may be effectuated.'"  Halebian v. 
Berv, 457 Mass. 620, 628-629 (2010), quoting Harvard Crimson, 
Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 445 Mass. 745, 
749 (2006).  We examine all the provisions of a statute, not 
just isolated phrases, and seek, where possible, to "construe 
the various provisions of a statute in harmony with one another, 
recognizing that the Legislature did not intend internal 
contradiction."  DiFiore v. American Airlines, Inc., 454 Mass. 
486, 491 (2009). 
The purpose of the VPA is set forth in 29 U.S.C. 
§ 14501(b), which provides: 
"The purpose of this chapter is to promote the interests of 
social service program beneficiaries and taxpayers and to 
sustain the availability of programs, nonprofit 
organizations, and governmental entities that depend on 
volunteer contributions by reforming the laws to provide 
certain protections from liability abuses related to 
volunteers serving nonprofit organizations and governmental 
entities." 
 
Some of the congressional findings in 29 U.S.C. § 14501(a) 
help us to understand why and how Congress intended to "provide 
certain protections from liability abuses."  First, Congress 
found that "the willingness of volunteers to offer their 
services is deterred by the potential for liability actions 
against them," and that, "as a result, many nonprofit public and 
private organizations and governmental entities . . . have been 
adversely affected by the withdrawal of volunteers from boards 
16 
 
 
of directors and service in other capacities."  42 U.S.C. 
§ 14501(a)(1)-(2).  Second, it found that, "due to high 
liability costs and unwarranted litigation costs, volunteers and 
nonprofit organizations face higher costs in purchasing 
insurance . . . to cover their activities."  42 U.S.C. 
§ 14501(a)(6).  Third, it characterized the legislation as 
"clarifying and limiting the liability risk assumed by 
volunteers."  42 U.S.C. § 14501(a)(7).  The "liability risk" of 
volunteers is not merely the risk of being found liable and 
having judgment entered against them; it is also the risk of 
being dragged into litigation and having to incur the 
considerable time, expense, and burdens of such litigation.  A 
volunteer does not merely want to prevail in such litigation; 
the volunteer wants to end it.  If, as reflected in the 
statutory findings, the congressional purpose to protect 
volunteers from "liability abuses" is to be accomplished; if 
volunteers are to be less deterred "by the potential for 
liability actions against them"; and if volunteer organizations 
are to avoid the need to incur "unwarranted litigation costs" 
and, by doing so, avoid "higher costs in purchasing insurance," 
Congress must have intended the VPA to provide qualified 
17 
 
 
immunity from suit, not merely immunity from liability.9  Without 
immunity from suit, a volunteer who fails to obtain a dismissal 
of an action based on qualified immunity would have no right to 
an interlocutory appeal to challenge the denial of the motion to 
dismiss or for summary judgment; such a challenge could be made 
only after trial, after the costs of litigating such a trial had 
been incurred.  Thus, depriving volunteers of the right to 
interlocutory appeal would increase the costs of litigation and, 
as a result, the cost of insurance. 
The legislative history of the VPA supports our conclusion 
that Congress intended to provide immunity from suit.  
Describing the need for Federal legislation, the House Judiciary 
Committee report explains that State laws had failed to provide 
"[t]he very minimum amount of protection -- the freedom from 
suit because of honest mistakes, or ordinary negligence" 
(emphasis added).  H.R. Rep. No. 105-101, 105th Cong., 1st 
Sess., pt. 1, at 7 (1997) (Committee on the Judiciary).  The 
report also refers to the need to provide volunteers and 
nonprofit organizations with "relief from these debilitating 
lawsuits."  Id. at 5. 
                     
9 Neither the parties nor the amici have pointed us toward, 
nor have we been able to find, any Federal case law interpreting 
Congress's intent regarding the nature of the immunity conferred 
by the VPA.  Nor are we aware of any State appellate court 
opinion that interpreted the VPA with respect to this issue.  We 
appear to be the first to do so. 
18 
 
 
Because we conclude, based on the statutory language and 
the legislative history, that Congress intended the VPA to 
immunize volunteers from suit for harm caused by ordinary 
negligence, we must also conclude that § 85W provides qualified 
immunity from suit, because State law may not be less protective 
of volunteers than the VPA.  See 42 U.S.C. § 14502(a).  And 
because both statutes provide qualified immunity from suit, an 
order denying a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary 
judgment brought by a volunteer for a nonprofit organization 
based on the defense of charitable immunity is subject to 
interlocutory appeal as of right. 
Having concluded that Crawford is entitled to an 
interlocutory appeal from the denial of his motion for summary 
judgment, we now turn to the merits of that motion. 
2.  Summary judgment.  A party is entitled to summary 
judgment where the movant (here, Crawford) shows that, viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, 
"there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  
Mass. R. Civ. P. 56 (c), as amended, 436 Mass. 1404 (2002).  We 
review an order granting or denying summary judgment de novo 
because the record before us is the same as the record before 
the motion judge, and the decision is a matter of law rather 
than of discretionary judgment.  See Merrimack College v. KPMG 
19 
 
 
LLP, 480 Mass. 614, 619 (2018).  "Any doubts as to the existence 
of a genuine issue of material fact are to be resolved against 
the party moving for summary judgment."  Lev v. Beverly Enters.-
Mass., Inc., 457 Mass. 234, 237 (2010).  This court may affirm a 
denial of summary judgment based on reasons that are the same as 
or different from those of the Superior Court judge, and "we may 
consider any ground apparent on the record that supports the 
result reached in the lower court."  Clair v. Clair, 464 Mass. 
205, 214 (2013). 
Viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party 
(here, the plaintiff employees), RoxComp was a nonprofit 
community health center that, in 2013, was facing multiple 
financial and regulatory challenges.  At the time, Crawford 
served as chair of RoxComp's board of directors, a volunteer 
position for which he received no compensation.  On January 24, 
2013, RoxComp filed its annual report with the Secretary of the 
Commonwealth, which identified Crawford as RoxComp's 
"President."  In the subsequent two weeks, RoxComp filed an 
application for revival of its corporate charter, which had been 
revoked due to prior mismanagement, and a certificate of change 
of directors, both of which characterized Crawford as 
"President."  He signed all three documents under penalty of 
perjury. 
20 
 
 
On February 25, 2013, RoxComp's interim chief executive 
officer, Pratt Wiley, informed the board of directors in a 
memorandum of the challenges that RoxComp would confront if it 
were to continue to operate.  In that memorandum, Wiley declared 
that RoxComp did not "intend to make payroll" until it received 
reimbursement from the Health Resources and Services 
Administration (HRSA), the Federal agency responsible for 
overseeing RoxComp's Federal grant funding.  Wiley wrote that 
the proper documentation for that reimbursement had been 
submitted on February 22 and stated, "We will work with HRSA to 
determine when the payment will post so that we can properly 
inform the employees when they can expect to be paid."  In a 
March 6 memorandum to the board, Wiley recommended laying off 
thirty-four current employees and furloughing the remaining 
employees for between two and four days per month to reduce 
payroll.  On March 8, Wiley told Crawford that the HRSA would 
not release any further funds to RoxComp until both the budget 
and contingency reports were approved.  He also told Crawford 
that because the HRSA budget was being revised, RoxComp would 
likely miss payroll on March 15.  Crawford nevertheless held 
multiple meetings with RoxComp's staff where he personally urged 
them to continue working and assured them that they would be 
paid. 
21 
 
 
When RoxComp ceased operations on March 22, 2013, its 
employees were not paid on the day of their discharge for their 
last four weeks of employment, in violation of the Wage Act.  On 
March 27, Crawford wrote in an electronic mail message that he 
"would like to use the funds available in the bank" to pay two 
particular vendors, but added that he was "open to suggestions." 
Although Crawford claims never to have served as RoxComp's 
president, the summary judgment record includes abundant 
evidence to support the finding that he served as its president 
during the relevant time period; indeed, he signed under the 
penalty of perjury multiple corporate filings that identified 
him as RoxComp's president.  As president, he was deemed under 
the Wage Act to be an "employer" of RoxComp's employees, and as 
an employer, he was required to pay the employees on at least a 
biweekly basis and to pay discharged employees in full on the 
day of their termination.  G. L. c. 149, § 148.  See Segal v. 
Genitrix, LLC, 478 Mass. 551, 560-561 (2017) ("The Wage Act 
imposes categorical liability on a company's president and 
treasurer, and under Massachusetts law, corporations are 
required to elect a president and treasurer"). 
The plaintiff employees contend that the charitable 
immunity in the VPA and § 85W applies only to common-law torts 
and does not apply to statutory violations, such as Wage Act 
violations.  We disagree.  Under the VPA, as earlier noted, "no 
22 
 
 
volunteer of a nonprofit organization or governmental entity 
shall be liable for harm caused by an act or omission of the 
volunteer on behalf of the organization" unless the harm is 
caused by the volunteer's "willful or criminal misconduct, gross 
negligence, reckless misconduct, or a conscious, flagrant 
indifference to the rights or safety of the individual harmed by 
the volunteer."  42 U.S.C. § 14503(a).  Under § 85W, no person 
who serves without compensation as an officer, director, or 
trustee of any nonprofit charitable organization "shall be 
liable for any civil damages as a result of any acts or 
omissions related solely to the performance of his [or her] 
duties as an officer, director or trustee" unless the acts or 
omissions were "intentionally designed to harm" or were "grossly 
negligent acts or omissions which result in harm to the person."  
G. L. c. 231, § 85W.  The VPA, with its focus on "harm," and 
§ 85W, with its focus on "any civil damages," cannot reasonably 
be interpreted to be limited to harm or civil damages arising 
from common-law torts rather than statutory violations.  Nor 
would imposing such a limitation be consistent with the 
legislative purpose of either statute. 
Having concluded that the charitable immunity in the VPA 
and § 85W applies to statutory violations of the Wage Act, we 
consider whether there is a genuine issue of material fact as to 
Crawford's entitlement to the protection of either statute.  We 
23 
 
 
conclude that where there is evidence that Crawford, as 
president of RoxComp, violated the Wage Act by failing to pay 
the discharged employees, he enjoys no protection under the VPA.  
A Wage Act violation committed by any employer or any officer 
deemed under the Wage Act to be an "employer," even "without a 
willful intent to do so," is a crime under G. L. c. 149, 
§ 27C (2), punishable by imprisonment for not more than six 
months and a fine of not more than $10,000 for a first offense.  
See Cook v. Patient Edu, LLC, 465 Mass. 548, 556 (2013) ("The 
legislative intent of the Wage Act, to hold individual managers 
liable for violations, is clear . . .").  Because a Wage Act 
violation for the failure timely to pay wages, regardless of 
intent, constitutes "criminal misconduct" under § 27C (2), all 
such violations fall outside the charitable immunity provided by 
the VPA. 
Section 85W, however, does not expressly exclude all 
"criminal misconduct" from the scope of its charitable immunity, 
but only "acts or omissions intentionally designed to harm" or 
"grossly negligent acts or omissions which result in harm to the 
person."  G. L. c. 231, § 85W.  The VPA preempts State laws to 
the extent that they provide less protection to volunteers than 
the VPA, but it specifically allows States to provide additional 
protection from liability.  42 U.S.C. § 14502(a).  Therefore, 
because § 85W, at least with respect to Wage Act violations, 
24 
 
 
provides volunteers with greater protection from liability than 
the VPA, we consider whether there is a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether Crawford's acts or omissions were 
intentionally designed to harm.10  We conclude that there is and 
therefore affirm the judge's denial of Crawford's motion for 
summary judgment. 
Viewing the evidence in the summary judgment record in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff employees, Crawford was 
informed that RoxComp would not timely make payroll and that the 
eventual payment of the employees' earned wages depended on a 
Federal reimbursement that had not been and might not be 
received.  Yet he encouraged the employees to continue to work 
and assured them that payment was forthcoming.  His assertion in 
the March 27 e-mail message that he "would like to use the funds 
available in the bank" to pay two particular vendors, rather 
than use those funds to pay the wages of employees, occurred 
after his alleged Wage Act violation but may be considered as 
evidence of his state of mind at the time of the alleged 
violation of the Wage Act.  See Commonwealth v. Casale, 381 
Mass. 167, 173 (1980) ("intent is a matter of fact, which is 
often not susceptible of proof by direct evidence, so resort is 
                     
10 The plaintiffs do not allege that Crawford committed 
"grossly negligent acts or omissions which result in harm to the 
person."  G. L. c. 231, § 85W. 
25 
 
 
frequently made to proof by inference from all the facts and 
circumstances developed at the trial").  The totality of this 
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff 
employees, yields a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
Crawford, as president of RoxComp, acted with an intentional 
design to harm employees by failing to pay them the wages they 
were due. 
Conclusion.  We affirm the order denying Crawford's motion 
for summary judgment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.