Title: Commonwealth v. Peterson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12097
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: January 3, 2017

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12097 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MARCUS G. PETERSON. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     October 5, 2016. - January 3, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & 
Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Controlled Substances.  "School Zone" Statute.  Practice, 
Criminal, Dismissal. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Central Division of 
the Boston Municipal Court Department on June 23, 2014. 
 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Eleanor C. Sinnott, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Matthew T. Sears, Assistant District Attorney (Amanda Read 
Cascione, Assistant District Attorney, with him) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
J. Scott Lauer, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
the defendant. 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  General Laws c. 94C, § 32J, the so-called 
school zone statute, punishes individuals who commit certain 
enumerated drug offenses within 300 feet of a school or one 
 
 
2 
hundred feet of a public park or playground.  In 1992, we 
determined that the school zone statute does not violate a 
defendant's due process rights, but cautioned that "[t]here may 
be extraordinary circumstances shown in some cases which would 
make it unfair to find guilt under § 32J."  Commonwealth v. 
Alvarez, 413 Mass. 224, 228, 230 n.5 (1992).  This case tests 
the bounds of school zone statute liability.  The issue 
presented is whether the statute applies to a defendant who is 
located momentarily within one hundred feet of a public park 
solely because he is a passenger in a motor vehicle that is 
driven on a public roadway past the park and, fortuitously, 
stops at a red light.  We conclude that application of G. L. 
c. 94C, § 32J, to the defendant, in the particular facts and 
circumstances of this case, would be overreaching.  The park 
zone charge, therefore, must be dismissed. 
 
Background.  The following facts are drawn from the police 
report; they are uncontested for purposes of this interlocutory 
appeal.  On May 12, 2014, at approximately 5:45 P.M., three 
police officers assigned to the Boston police department's youth 
violence strike force were on patrol in the Dorchester section 
of Boston in a police cruiser.  Driving down Ceylon Street, they 
observed a white Chevrolet Cruze automobile in front of them, 
stopped at a red light at the intersection of Ceylon Street and 
Columbia Road.  Immediately adjacent to Ceylon Street, at that 
 
 
3 
intersection, is a public park called Ceylon Park.  While 
traveling along Ceylon Street and when stopped at the light, the 
Chevrolet was within one hundred feet of the park. 
 
There were four people in the vehicle, including the 
defendant, who was the front seat passenger.  The three officers 
learned through their onboard computer that the vehicle's 
inspection sticker had expired.  When the light turned green, 
the vehicle proceeded through the intersection.  The officers 
activated their lights and sirens and stopped the vehicle a 
short distance away, at the intersection of Columbia Road and 
Hamilton Street, at which point the vehicle was no longer within 
one hundred feet of Ceylon Park. 
 
When asked for his license and registration, the driver 
told police that he did not have a driver's license or 
registration for the vehicle.  He provided a name and birth date 
that the officers later discovered was false.  The officers also 
obtained names and dates of birth from the passengers, none of 
whom was wearing a seat belt.  Two of the officers returned to 
the police cruiser to verify this information. 
 
The officer who remained at the vehicle noticed the 
defendant remove a clear plastic bag from his left front pants 
pocket and drop it on the floorboard behind him, in front of a 
female passenger's feet.  The officer opened the front passenger 
door to investigate, and a struggle ensued when the defendant 
 
 
4 
pushed him away.  When they saw the door being opened, the other 
officers returned from the cruiser and assisted in removing the 
defendant from the vehicle.  He was handcuffed and seated on the 
ground, and the other occupants were ordered to get out of the 
vehicle.  The officers searched the vehicle and found the clear 
plastic bag.  It contained forty individually wrapped "bumps" of 
what appeared to be "crack" cocaine, and six pills that appeared 
to be a prescription drug.  The officers arranged to have the 
vehicle towed and conducted an inventory search prior to towing.  
In a brown leather bag on the front passenger's side floorboard, 
they discovered a loaded, semiautomatic handgun.  After the 
discovery of the weapon, the other occupants of the vehicle were 
handcuffed for officer safety.  The rear seat passengers were 
given warnings about the seat belt violations and released, and 
the driver was arrested for unlawful possession of a firearm. 
 
The defendant was arrested and charged with a number of 
firearm offenses, resisting arrest, assault and battery on a 
police officer, and three narcotics offenses:  possession of a 
class B controlled substance, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, 
§ 34; possession of a class B controlled substance with intent 
to distribute, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32A; and 
committing a drug offense within one hundred feet of a public 
park, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32J.  The defendant sought 
to dismiss the park zone charge, arguing that G. L. c. 94C, 
 
 
5 
§ 32J, is unconstitutional as applied to him, and that 
prosecution in these circumstances would violate his right to 
due process, "given that [he] was a passenger in a vehicle 
driven by another individual and his presence within [one 
hundred] feet of a park zone was entirely fortuitous" and not 
the sort of circumstance the Legislature intended to reach in 
enacting G. L. c. 94C, § 32J.  After a nonevidentiary hearing, 
the judge allowed the motion for the reasons argued by the 
defendant.  The Commonwealth filed a timely notice of appeal, 
and we transferred the case from the Appeals Court on our own 
motion. 
 
Discussion.  The Legislature is vested with unquestioned 
authority to define crimes and set penalties.  See Commonwealth 
v. Jackson, 369 Mass. 904, 922 (1976).  "The function of the 
[L]egislature [in defining crimes and their punishments] is 
primary, its exercises fortified by presumptions of right and 
legality, and is not to be interfered with lightly, nor by any 
judicial conception of their wisdom or propriety."  Commonwealth 
v. Brown, 466 Mass. 676, 684-685 (2013), quoting Weems v. United 
States, 217 U.S. 349, 379 (1910).  This power includes the 
authority to create strict liability criminal offenses whereby 
the Commonwealth is relieved of its obligation to prove an 
intent to commit a crime.  See Commonwealth v. Knap, 412 Mass. 
712, 715 (1992). 
 
 
6 
 
General Laws c. 94C, § 32J, comprises, in part, an aspect 
of strict liability.1  The only proof of intent required under 
§ 32J is the intent required to commit the underlying drug 
offense.  No additional proof of a defendant's knowledge or 
intent with respect to the boundaries of a school zone is 
required.  See Commonwealth v. Roucoulet, 413 Mass. 647, 650 
(1992); Alvarez, 413 Mass. at 229.  Indeed, the statute provides 
explicitly that "[l]ack of knowledge of school boundaries shall 
not be a defense to any person who violates the provisions of 
                     
 
1 General Laws c. 94C, § 32J, provides in relevant part: 
 
 
"Any person who violates the provisions of [G. L. 
c. 94C, §§ 32, 32A-32F, or 32I,] while in or on, or within 
300 feet of the real property comprising a public or 
private accredited preschool, accredited headstart 
facility, elementary, vocational, or secondary school if 
the violation occurs between [5 A.M.] and midnight, whether 
or not in session, or within one hundred feet of a public 
park or playground shall be punished by a term of 
imprisonment in the state prison for not less than two and 
one-half nor more than fifteen years or by imprisonment in 
a jail or house of correction for not less than two nor 
more than two and one-half years.  No sentence imposed 
under the provisions of this section shall be for less than 
a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of two years.  A 
fine of not less than [$1,000] nor more than [$10,000] may 
be imposed but not in lieu of the mandatory minimum two 
year term of imprisonment as established herein.  In 
accordance with the provisions of [G. L. c. 279, § 8A,] 
such sentence shall begin from and after the expiration of 
the sentence for violation of [the predicate offense]. 
 
 
"Lack of knowledge of school boundaries shall not be a 
defense to any person who violates the provisions of this 
section." 
 
 
7 
this section."2  G. L. c. 94C, § 32J.  Thus, the penalty applies 
regardless of whether a defendant intended to distribute drugs 
in a particular school zone or planned to do so elsewhere, and 
was present in the school zone only momentarily.  See Alvarez, 
supra.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bradley, 466 Mass. 551, 556 
(2013) (school zone conviction does not require proof of "any 
additional wrongdoing by the defendant; it is enough that the 
drug violation occurred within a school zone, regardless whether 
the defendant knew he was within a school zone"); Roucoulet, 
supra at 650-651, quoting State v. Ivory, 124 N.J. 582, 593 
(1991) ("one need only take out the tape measure to see if [the 
school zone provision of § 32J] has been violated"). 
 
In Alvarez, 413 Mass. at 228-230, we concluded that G. L. 
c. 94C, § 32J, does not violate due process of law 
notwithstanding that the statute expressly "removes guilty 
knowledge as to one element of the offense, namely the school 
boundaries element."  We noted that the Legislature has "broad 
power to define and limit the mens rea element of criminal 
offenses" (citation omitted), id. at 229, and permissibly did so 
in drafting the school zone statute.  We cautioned, however, 
                     
 
2 We assume for purposes of discussion, without deciding, 
that this language applies to park and playground boundaries as 
well as to school boundaries.  Given the result we reach, we 
need not resolve the defendant's alternate argument that the 
statute imposes strict liability only for school zone 
violations, and not for violations near parks or playgrounds. 
 
 
8 
that "[t]here may be extraordinary circumstances shown in some 
cases which would make it unfair to find guilt under [G. L. 
c. 94C,] § 32J."3  Id. at 230 n.5. 
 
At issue in this appeal is the extent of this strict 
liability aspect of G. L. c. 94C, § 32J.  Specifically, we are 
asked to determine whether the Legislature possibly could have 
intended the school zone statute to apply to someone like the 
defendant, who, albeit in possession of drugs with intent to 
distribute, does nothing more than simply travel as a passenger 
in a motor vehicle on a public roadway past a school, park, or 
playground. 
 
"Our primary duty in interpreting a statute is 'to 
effectuate the intent of the Legislature in enacting it.'"  
Sheehan v. Weaver, 467 Mass. 734, 737 (2014), quoting Water 
Dep't of Fairhaven v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 455 Mass. 
740, 744 (2010).  "Ordinarily, where the language of a statute 
is plain and unambiguous, it is conclusive as to legislative 
                     
 
3 In discussing a hypothetical example of an impermissible, 
overbroad application, we pointed to United States v. Coates, 
739 F. Supp. 146, 152-153 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).  In that case, a 
United States District Court judge dismissed Federal school zone 
charges brought against two defendants who had boarded an 
underground train at Penn Station carrying a large quantity of 
cocaine.  Id. at 153.  The defendants were within 1,000 feet of 
a school located in an office complex adjoining the train 
station.  Id.  The judge explained, "To charge a schoolyard 
count in these circumstances stretches the scope of the statute 
beyond logical and acceptable bounds. . . .  To posit liability 
under [the Federal school zone act] in these fortuitous 
circumstances is simply overreaching."  Id. 
 
 
9 
intent."  Thurdin v. SEI Boston, LLC, 452 Mass. 436, 444 (2008).  
That said, we do not adhere blindly to a literal reading of a 
statute if doing so would yield an "absurd" or "illogical" 
result (citations omitted).  Commonwealth v. Parent, 465 Mass. 
395, 409-410 (2013).  Commonwealth v. Rahim, 441 Mass. 273, 278 
(2004).  See Attorney Gen. v. School Comm. of Essex, 387 Mass. 
326, 336 (1982) ("We will not adopt a literal construction of a 
statute if the consequences of such construction are absurd or 
unreasonable"); 2A N.J. Singer & S. Singer, Statutes and 
Statutory Construction § 46:7 (7th ed. rev. 2014) ("if the 
literal text of an act is inconsistent with legislative meaning 
or intent, or leads to an absurd result, a statute is construed 
to agree with the legislative intention").  See also Black's Law 
Dictionary 11-12 (10th ed. 2014) (defining "absurdity" as "being 
grossly unreasonable" and "[a]n interpretation that would lead 
to an unconscionable result, esp. one that . . . the drafters 
could not have intended"). 
 
The Commonwealth argues that the phrase "within one hundred 
feet of a public park or playground" must be read and applied 
literally, to encompass an individual who is physically present 
within one hundred feet of a park in essentially any manner, for 
any reason, and for any period of time.  We do not agree.  A 
literal application, as urged by the Commonwealth, could 
sometimes "yield an absurd or unworkable result" (citation 
 
 
10 
omitted), Commonwealth v. Perella, 464 Mass. 274, 276 (2013), as 
it does here.  Under the Commonwealth's reading, for example, a 
drug offender traveling on a Massachusetts highway, who sped 
past a roadside public park at sixty-five miles per hour for a 
matter of seconds, would be subjected to the severe statutory 
penalty for a park zone violation.4 
We see nothing in the history or purpose of the statute 
that justifies such an extreme and excessive result.  It is well 
settled, through legislative history and two decades of 
decisional law examining that history, that the purpose of G. L. 
c. 94C, 32J, is to protect children from the harmful impact of 
drug dealing.  See Commonwealth v. Bell, 442 Mass. 118, 124-125 
(2004) (intent of Legislature to provide drug-free school 
zones).  Then Governor Michael Dukakis proposed the legislation 
"[in order to make] every school and surrounding community safe 
from the destructive impact of drug trafficking and drug abuse."  
Id., quoting Roucoulet, 413 Mass. at 651 n.7.  See Bradley, 466 
Mass. at 556 (when first enacted in 1989, legislative purpose of 
G. L. c. 94C, 32J, was to protect school children from drug 
dealers by creating drug-free school zones). 
                     
 
4 The fact that the defendant in this case was traveling on 
a local street and not on a highway is not by itself 
dispositive.  The critical fact is that he was in a vehicle 
being driven past the park, which stopped by happenstance at a 
red light, and that this was the sole basis alleged by the 
Commonwealth for his coming within the scope of the statute. 
 
 
11 
More recently, recognizing the statute's uneven impact on 
people who live in urban areas, the Legislature amended the 
school zone statute to reduce the school zone radius from 1,000 
feet to 300 feet, and to limit the time period in which a 
violation may occur to between the hours of 5 A.M. and midnight.  
See St. 2012, c. 192, §§ 30, 31.  The Legislature observed that 
the broader 1,000-foot radius created "an unfair disparate 
impact on those residing in urban areas and, consequently, on 
minority residents, and [that] the broader radius did not better 
protect school children from drug dealers."  Bradley, 466 Mass. 
at 559.  The newly created time restriction for violations, of 
course, excludes hours of the day (midnight to 5 A.M.) when 
there is little practical chance that children will be in or 
near schools and parks. 
 
Given the Legislature's stated reasons for enacting the 
statute, we do not think the Legislature possibly intended G. L. 
c. 94C, § 32J, to apply to an individual who merely passes 
momentarily by a school or a park while traveling on a public 
roadway in an automobile driven by another person, which would 
not have stopped but for a change in a traffic signal.  In these 
circumstances, the defendant's physical appearance in the park 
zone was by chance.  There is no suggestion that he engaged, 
attempted to engage, or intended to engage in any type of drug 
transaction within the protected area, or had any other type of 
 
 
12 
connection whatsoever to the protected area; and there is no 
evidence that his momentary presence as he passed by the area in 
these circumstances posed any real or potential risk to children 
or anyone else in the park.  Applying the statute literally in 
these particular circumstances thus would not serve the 
legitimate goals of the statute. 
 
In sum, "[w]e do not believe the . . . Legislature intended 
the [school zone] statute to apply to an individual not 
apprehended within the school [or park] zone and where 
uninterrupted passage in an automobile through the school [or 
park] zone was fortuitous.  As stated in [United States v.] 
Coates, [739 F. Supp. 146, 152–153 (S.D.N.Y. 1990),] a contrary 
holding would stretch the statute beyond logical and acceptable 
bounds.  We will not conclude the [L]egislature intended such an 
unreasonable result."  State v. Barnes, 275 Kan. 364, 375 
(2003). 
 
We emphasize that this ruling is limited to the specific 
facts presented here and to the predicate offense of possession 
of a controlled substance with intent to distribute.  It is not 
counter to, and does not alter, our decisions in Commonwealth v. 
Roucoulet, 413 Mass. 647 (1992), and Commonwealth v. Alvarez, 
413 Mass. 224 (1992), or the Appeals Court's decision in 
Commonwealth v. Labitue, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 913 (2000).  Mindful 
that the "absurd results doctrine must be used sparingly," 
 
 
13 
2A N.J. Singer & S. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction 
§ 46:7 at 279 (7th ed. rev. 2014), we hold only that the 
application of G. L. c. 94C, § 32J, to this defendant in the 
particular facts and circumstances of this case would be 
overreaching. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Order allowing motion to 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  dismiss affirmed.