Title: Phillips v. General Finance Corporation of Florida
Citation: 297 So. 2d 6
Docket Number: 44212
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: May 15, 1974

297 So. 2d 6 (1974)
Shirley T. PHILLIPS, Appellant,
v.
GENERAL FINANCE CORPORATION OF FLORIDA et al., Appellees.
No. 44212.

Supreme Court of Florida.
May 15, 1974.
Rehearing Denied July 25, 1974.
*7 Malory B. Frier, Tampa, for appellant.
Michael H. Otis, Tampa, for Gen. Finance Corp.
Morris E. White, Tampa, for Tarnow Food Delicacies, Inc.
ADKINS, Chief Justice:
This is an appeal from a judgment entered in garnishment proceedings in the Civil Court of Record for Hillsborough County, Florida. This cause was originally submitted to the District Court of Appeal, Second District, but was transferred to this Court pursuant to Fla. Const., Article V, § 3(b)(1), F.S.A. We have jurisdiction.
The Appellant, Shirley T. Phillips, hereinafter referred to as "Phillips", was defendant and judgment-debtor in the trial court. Appellee, General Finance Corporation of Florida, hereinafter referred to as "General Finance", was plaintiff and judgment-creditor in the trial court and instituted the garnishment proceeding. Appellee, Tarnow Food Delicacies, Inc., hereinafter referred to as "Tarnow Food", was Phillips' employer and garnishee in the trial court. Donald R. Phillips was appellant's husband and co-defendant in the main suit in the trial court. However, he was not a party to the garnishment proceedings and, therefore, not a party to this appeal, although his name is included as an appellee.
A Motion for Writ of Garnishment was filed by General Finance after procuring a judgment against Phillips and her husband. The Writ of Garnishment was issued and directed to Tarnow Food, Phillips' employer. Thereafter, Phillips filed a Motion to Quash the Writ of Garnishment. The trial court, after denying the Motion to Quash, entered a judgment against the garnishee, Tarnow Food. Phillips now appeals.
The principal issue submitted is whether Florida's garnishment statute as applied to wages is in direct conflict with Title III of the Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677, and should therefore be declared constitutionally invalid under the Supremacy Clause, Article VI, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution.
Article VI, Clause 2 of the Federal Constitution declares:
Fla. Stat. § 77.01, F.S.A., reads:
Fla. Stat. § 77.06(1), F.S.A., reads:
15 U.S.C. § 1673 states the federal restriction on garnishment and the maximum allowed to be garnished:
It is clear that Florida garnishment statutory provisions §§ 77.01 and 77.06, F.S.A., do not contain a limitation on the portion of a person's wages that may be garnished, the only exception being the "head of the family" exemption provided by Fla. Stat. § 222.11, F.S.A., while the federal legislation does contain specific limitations. However, the absence of such restriction does not necessarily invalidate the remaining Florida garnishment provisions.
The enforcement of a state statute in the presence of consistent federal legislation does not impair the constitutional supremacy of federal laws. ITT Lamp Division of Int. Telephone &amp; Telegraph Corp. v. Minter, 435 F.2d 989 (1st Cir.1970); United States v. Ruthstein, 414 F.2d 1079 (7th Cir.1969), 81 C.J.S. States § 7.
It has long been a principle of law that both the federal government and the states may exercise concurrent powers and enact legislation concerning the same subject matter, and the action of the state is valid and operative in all respects in which there is no direct and positive conflict with the action of the federal government. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 108 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1959); Kelley v. Florida Dept. of Commerce, 239 So. 2d 884 (Fla.App.3rd 1970).
Where there is conflict with the federal law, the test in determining whether the state law has been superseded by the federal law is whether the state law frustrates the operation of the federal law and prevents the accomplishment of its purpose. If this occurs, only then must the state law yield. 81 C.J.S. States § 7.
Applying this test to the case sub judice, we find that certain provisions of the Florida garnishment statute tend to frustrate the operation of the federal law on the same subject. Therefore, we hold that the federal legislation pertaining to the maximum allowed to be garnished pre-empts our state garnishment provisions not containing such limitation. Specifically, 15 U.S.C. § 1673, pre-empts Fla. Stat. §§ 77.01 and 77.06, F.S.A. Nevertheless, such preemption does not invalidate the entire Florida garnishment statute.
The Florida garnishment statute details and regulates the procedural steps that a judgment creditor may take to collect his judgment by subjecting the debtor's personal earnings to garnishment proceedings. The Federal garnishment law is completely void of such procedural guidelines. Therefore, it is evident that the provisions of the Florida garnishment statute, omitted from the Federal garnishment law, do not frustrate the effect of the federal legislation. See Hodgson v. Cleveland Municipal Court, 326 F. Supp. 419 (N.D.Ohio, 1971).
In conclusion, we hold that 15 U.S.C. § 1673, is a substantive provision and pre-empts Fla. Stat. §§ 77.01 and 77.06, F.S.A., and that the remaining Florida garnishment provisions are not in conflict with the Federal law and therefore valid.
Therefore, the maximum allowed to be garnished is twenty-five percent of a person's disposable weekly earnings or the amount of such disposable earnings exceeding *9 thirty times the Federal minimum hourly wage in effect, whichever is less.
Accordingly, the order and judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed.
ROBERTS, BOYD, McCAIN, DEKLE and CARLTON (Retired), JJ., concur.
ERVIN, J., dissents with opinion.
ERVIN, Justice (dissenting):
It is a matter of common knowledge that salaries and wages of all United States citizens are now matters of federal concern. They are subject to federal regulation almost without exception, whether in relation to their being "frozen" or fixed as to hours of work or amounts of compensation. I think that in view of overriding federal controls over the subject of wages the federal garnishment statute operates to supersede the Florida garnishment statutes. 15 U.S.C. § 1673 pre-empts Chapter 77, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., in its entirety, except that the wages of the head of a family in Florida may not be garnisheed under Section 222.11, Florida Statutes, F.S.A.