Title: In re D.L.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 86161
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: March 23, 2000

Opinion filed March 23, 2000.
JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court:
Following an evidentiary hearing in the circuit court of Cook County, the 
trial judge concluded that the respondent, Tawanda R., was not an unfit parent, 
and the court therefore denied a petition filed by the State that sought the 
termination of Tawanda's parental rights with respect to the minor child, D.L. 
The appellate court reversed, concluding that Tawanda's unfitness had been 
established, and remanded the cause for further proceedings. 298 Ill. App. 3d 
905. We allowed Tawanda's petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), 
and we now affirm the judgment of the appellate court.
The facts in this case, although lengthy, are not in dispute. Tawanda gave 
birth to the minor, D.L., on July 8, 1992. This was Tawanda's second child, and 
toxicology reports showed that D.L., like his older brother, H.L., tested 
positive for cocaine at birth. D.L. also tested positive for opiates. Tawanda 
admitted to the attending physician that she had used cocaine while pregnant 
with D.L. and had used the drug just three weeks before the child's birth.
On September 15, 1992, the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) 
filed a petition for adjudication of wardship on D.L.'s behalf, alleging that he 
was neglected because he had been exposed to an injurious environment and 
because at the time of birth he tested positive for cocaine and opiates. On the 
same day, DCFS was appointed as temporary custodian of D.L. The child was 
initially placed with his maternal grandmother, but he was later removed from 
that home because of additional medical neglect. D.L. was subsequently placed in 
the home of Ida Palmer, a foster parent, and he has remained in Palmer's care 
since that time. During the first six weeks that D.L. was with Palmer, she took 
him to a pediatrician several times because he was suffering from diarrhea, 
vomiting, and dehydration. The condition persisted, and Palmer took D.L. to the 
hospital on December 16, 1992. Two days later, Family Care Services, a foster 
agency with which DCFS had contracted to monitor care for D.L. and his brother, 
H.L., noted that D.L. had symptoms of withdrawal and tremors.
Tawanda did not maintain contact with DCFS from July 1992 to July 1993, and 
during that time she failed to participate in any drug treatment program, though 
on several occasions she had promised to do so. On February 9, 1993, the circuit 
court found that D.L. was neglected because of lack of care, exposure to an 
injurious environment, and exposure to drugs at birth. On March 23, 1993, D.L. 
was adjudicated a ward of the court, and DCFS was appointed as D.L.'s guardian. 
The court found that Tawanda was unable or unwilling to provide for D.L.
Tawanda did not contact Family Care Services from January 1993 through 
October 1993. In September 1993, the agency attempted to reach Tawanda and left 
a card and telephone number with Tawanda's grandmother. In November 1993, 
Tawanda called the agency and asked if she could visit D.L. before entering a 
drug treatment program. An agency representative explained the steps that 
Tawanda would need to take to obtain visitation with D.L. and to regain custody 
of him. Tawanda asked repeatedly to see D.L. that day or the next. An agency 
representative said that she would schedule a visit and would notify Tawanda of 
the date and time, once the visit had been arranged. Within 10 days, the agency 
called to inform Tawanda of the scheduled visit, but Tawanda's mother said that 
she had not seen Tawanda for a week. Tawanda did not appear for the scheduled 
visit.
In March 1994, Tawanda again enrolled in a drug treatment program. She was 
asked to leave the program after only three weeks of treatment, however, because 
she violated the rules. In May 1994, DCFS rated Tawanda's progress as 
unsatisfactory because she was uncooperative, did not complete a drug treatment 
program, and had not visited D.L. during the previous year. After that 
assessment, Tawanda visited D.L. three times between May 1994 and November 1994. 
D.L. remained in Ida Palmer's care.
On March 16, 1995, the State filed a supplemental petition for appointment of 
a guardian with authority to consent to D.L.'s adoption. The petition alleged 
that D.L.'s parents were unfit, pursuant to section 2-29 of the Juvenile Court 
Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/2-29 (West 1994)) and section 1 of the Adoption Act 
(750 ILCS 50/1 (West 1994)), and alleged five distinct grounds of unfitness. 
Service on Tawanda was accomplished by publication. On June 6, 1995, Tawanda 
failed to appear on the scheduled court date. She was found in default, and the 
case was then set for a hearing on the petition. On September 27, 1995, Tawanda 
appeared in court, and the circuit judge vacated the earlier default order. 
Tawanda told the judge that she wanted to regain custody of D.L., and the judge 
appointed counsel to represent her in the matter. On November 20, 1995, Tawanda 
entered a drug treatment program. She visited D.L. in December of that year, 
bringing him several gifts. D.L. commented that he wanted to give several of the 
gifts to his mother, referring to his foster mother, Ida Palmer. Between 
December 1995 and April 1996, Tawanda met regularly with D.L. and cooperated 
with her supervisors, but her supervisors believed that D.L. was not yet ready 
to be returned to Tawanda.
In August 1996, Larry M. Small, a clinical psychologist, conducted a bonding 
and attachment assessment regarding Tawanda and D.L. At first, D.L. did not 
recognize Tawanda and when asked who she was, replied, "Nobody." Small reported 
that Tawanda showed little regard for D.L.'s emotional state and was not 
concerned that he might be confused or upset by being told that Tawanda was his 
mother. Small recommended that Tawanda not have unsupervised visitation with 
D.L. until she maintained a regular visitation schedule with him. Tawanda next 
saw D.L. in October 1996. In November or December 1996, Tawanda and her 
now-husband, Craig, who is not D.L.'s biological father, visited D.L. together. 
On December 5, 1996, the court denied Tawanda's motion for unsupervised 
visitation with D.L.
An evidentiary hearing on the petition to terminate parental rights commenced 
in February 1997 and was completed in June 1997. The parties introduced 
evidence, as described above, regarding Tawanda's conduct and activities in the 
time following D.L.'s birth. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge 
ruled that Tawanda was not an unfit parent primarily because she had been 
drug-free for nearly two years. The judge concluded that the State had failed to 
prove any of the grounds of unfitness alleged against Tawanda. Separately, the 
court concluded that D.L.'s biological father was unfit; the propriety of the 
ruling concerning the father is not at issue here.
Both the guardian and the State appealed from the circuit court's 
determination that Tawanda was not an unfit parent. The appellate court reversed 
the circuit court judgment and remanded the cause for further proceedings. 298 
Ill. App. 3d 905. The appellate court concluded that the State had established 
at least three grounds on which Tawanda was an unfit parent. Regarding the 
allegation of unfitness based on section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act, which 
provides that a parent is unfit if, within 12 months of an adjudication of 
neglect, abuse, or dependency, the parent fails to make reasonable efforts to 
correct the conditions that led to the removal of the child or reasonable 
progress toward the return of the child, the appellate court found that the 
circuit judge erred in considering Tawanda's behavior more than 12 months after 
the adjudication of neglect in this case. The court believed that section 
1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act limits the fact finder to a consideration of conduct 
by the parent during 12 months after an adjudication of neglect, regardless of 
the date of the subsequent hearing to determine parental fitness. In reaching 
this result, the appellate court declined to follow decisions from other panels 
of the appellate court that have allowed a judge considering an allegation of 
unfitness under section 1(D)(m) to consider the parent's conduct during the 
entire period of time between the adjudication of neglect, abuse, or dependency 
and the parental fitness hearing. See, e.g., In re C.R., 221 
Ill. App. 3d 373, 381 (1991); In re A.T., 197 Ill. App. 3d 821, 832 
(1990); In re R.S., 174 Ill. App. 3d 132, 133-34 (1988). The appellate 
court remanded the matter so that the circuit court could proceed to the next 
stage in the action and determine whether termination of Tawanda's parental 
rights would be in the best interests of D.L. We allowed Tawanda's petition for 
leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), and we now affirm the judgment of the 
appellate court.
Section 1(D) of the Adoption Act defines the term "[u]nfit person" and lists 
a variety of discrete grounds on which a person may be found unfit. Before this 
court, Tawanda challenges only one of the grounds on which the appellate court 
determined that she could be found unfit. Tawanda's failure to challenge the 
other grounds considered by the appellate court renders the present appeal moot. 
Nonetheless, we choose to decide the case on its merits, under the public 
interest exception to the mootness doctrine. The interpretation of the statute 
is of substantial public importance, the relevant appellate court precedents are 
in conflict, and the issue is one that is likely to recur. See In re A 
Minor, 127 Ill. 2d 247, 257 (1989).
Relevant here is section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act, which provides, as a 
basis on which a finding of unfitness may rest:
The narrow question before us in this appeal concerns the 12-month period 
specified in the preceding statute. In concluding that Tawanda was not unfit 
under this provision, the trial judge relied on conduct occurring more than 12 
months after the adjudication of neglect. The guardian argues that the appellate 
court correctly construed the 12-month period contained in section 1(D)(m) as 
limiting the evidence that may be introduced on that ground to matters occurring 
within the applicable 12-month span. Opposing the appellate court's 
determination, Tawanda contends that the time limit prescribed by section 
1(D)(m) simply establishes a minimum period of time before a petition alleging 
that ground may be filed and does not preclude the parties from offering 
evidence of a parent's actions after the expiration of the 12-month period. The 
State agrees with Tawanda's interpretation of the statutory language, but the 
State believes that the appellate court in the present case reached the correct 
result because the evidence presented in the circuit court, including the 
testimony relating to Tawanda's activities more than 12 months after the 
adjudication, established Tawanda's unfitness under this provision.
The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect 
to the intention of the legislature. Nottage v. Jeka, 172 Ill. 2d 386, 
392 (1996); Varelis v. Northwestern Memorial Hospital, 167 Ill. 2d 449, 
454 (1995). The language of the statute is the best indication of legislative 
intent, and our inquiry appropriately begins with the words used by the 
legislature. Business &amp; Professional People for the Public Interest v. 
Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 146 Ill. 2d 175, 207 (1991). If the statutory 
language is clear and unambiguous, then there is no need to resort to other aids 
of construction. Henry v. St. John's Hospital, 138 Ill. 2d 533, 541 
(1990); County of Du Page v. Graham, Anderson, Probst &amp; White, 
Inc., 109 Ill. 2d 143, 151 (1985). Moreover, there is no rule of 
construction that authorizes a court to say that the legislature did not mean 
what the plain language of the statute provides. People ex rel. LeGout v. 
Decker, 146 Ill. 2d 389, 394 (1992).
We agree with the guardian and the appellate court below and conclude that 
section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act limits the evidence that may be considered 
under the provision to matters concerning the parent's conduct in the 12 months 
following the applicable adjudication of neglect, abuse, or dependency. The 
statute plainly states that a parent is unfit if the parent fails to make either 
reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that led to the child's removal or 
reasonable progress toward return of the child within 12 months after an 
adjudication of neglect, abuse, or dependency. Giving effect to the plain 
language of section 1(D)(m), we conclude that the relevant period of time under 
this provision, in which the parent's efforts or progress must be assessed and 
measured, is the 12-month period following the adjudication.
If the legislature had meant merely to provide a minimum period of time 
before which a petition alleging this particular ground could be filed, as the 
mother and the State suggest, then the legislature could have simply and 
explicitly stated that a petition to terminate parental rights on the ground 
specified in section 1(D)(m) must be filed 12 or more months after the 
adjudication of wardship, without suggesting any limitation on the period from 
which the evidence could be drawn. In that way, evidence of efforts made by the 
parent after passage of the time limit could still be presented.
We note that the legislature has employed a number of different time periods 
in some of the grounds of unfitness found under section 1(D) of the Adoption 
Act. See, e.g., 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(c) (West 1994) ("Desertion of the 
child for more than 3 months next preceding the commencement of the Adoption 
proceeding"); 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(k) (West 1994) (habitual drunkenness or addiction 
to drugs "for at least one year immediately prior to the commencement of the 
unfitness proceeding"); 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(l) (West 1994) ("Failure to demonstrate 
a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of 
a new born child during the first 30 days after its birth"). Other grounds of 
unfitness contained in section 1(D) specify no applicable time period. The 
varying presence and absence of time periods in the provisions under section 
1(D) demonstrates to us that the legislature believed that, for purposes of 
establishing certain allegations of unfitness, a parent's conduct during a 
specified period of time would be relevant. We note also that the legislature 
amended the Adoption Act in 1994 by adding the following provision:
We believe that construing section 1(D)(m) in the manner proposed by Tawanda 
and the State would be inconsistent with the preceding provision.
The State and the mother raise several arguments in opposition to this 
construction of the statute. First, the State contends that the appellate 
court's holding here could permit parents to defeat allegations of unfitness 
under section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act by making reasonable efforts or 
progress within the 12-month period specified in the statute even though they 
later fail to progress or continue with those efforts. The State contends that 
the appellate court's decision here would preclude a trial court from finding 
unfitness under section 1(D)(m) in those circumstances, when a parent's conduct 
after the 12-month period ends should be deemed sufficient to establish 
unfitness under the provision. We do not believe that the concern raised by the 
State should cause us to overlook the plain language of the statute. We note, 
too, that other grounds of unfitness may be applicable in that instance and 
could also be alleged in support of a petition to terminate parental rights. 
See, e.g., 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 1994) ("Failure to maintain a 
reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the child's 
welfare").
The State also notes that the legislature amended section 1(D)(m) effective 
June 25, 1997, to shorten the applicable time period from 12 months to 9 but did 
not make any other changes to the statutory language at issue here. Pub. Act 
90-28, eff. June 25, 1997. The State contends that the legislature, by this 
recent action, has implicitly endorsed the interpretation given to the provision 
by a number of appellate court decisions that have construed the statute in the 
same manner urged by the State and Tawanda in this appeal. We do not agree. 
Other appellate court cases have applied the interpretation we adopt here (see 
In re M.C., 201 Ill. App. 3d 792, 798 (1990); In re E.J.F., 
161 Ill. App. 3d 325, 330 (1987)), and thus the legislature's recent action 
could equally signify satisfaction with that group of decisions.
Tawanda urges that the failure to consider evidence generated after 
expiration of the 12-month period specified in the statute could be contrary to 
the best interests of the child involved in the proceeding. She contends that a 
court considering an allegation of unfitness under section 1(D)(m) should be 
permitted to consider the full range of the parent's conduct following the 
adjudication of neglect, abuse, or dependency, even if the conduct occurs more 
than 12 months after the adjudication. We do not believe that Tawanda's concern 
in this regard is well taken. If a parent is found unfit under section 1(D)(m), 
evidence of the parent's conduct occurring more than 12 months after the 
adjudication of neglect, abuse, or dependency may be introduced at the second 
stage of the termination proceedings, at which the court must consider the best 
interests of the minor involved in determining the youth's eventual placement. 
See In re Adoption of Syck, 138 Ill. 2d 255, 276-77 (1990). That will 
mark the next stage in these proceedings, and Tawanda will then have an 
opportunity to present evidence of her more recent conduct as part of that 
inquiry.
In the present case, D.L. was adjudicated neglected on February 9, 1993, and 
therefore the relevant time period under section 1(D)(m) extended from that date 
until February 1994. As the appellate court below noted, during this period 
Tawanda was a drug addict and showed virtually no interest in D.L. She stopped 
using drugs in September 1995, but that was not until more than two years after 
the neglect adjudication. 298 Ill. App. 3d at 921. On this record, we agree with 
the appellate court that the trial judge's finding that Tawanda was not unfit 
under section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act was against the manifest weight of the 
evidence.
As a final matter, we note that the present case illustrates the problems of 
delay that can occur within this branch of the child welfare system. D.L. was 
born more than seven years ago, in 1992, and was adjudicated neglected in 
February 1993. The State filed its petition seeking termination of Tawanda's 
parental rights in March 1995. The evidentiary hearing on the petition did not 
commence for nearly two years, however. We express no view on where D.L.'s best 
interests might lie, but we do know that it is not in his best interests for his 
status to remain in limbo for an extended period of time. For these reasons, we 
direct the courts below to consider, in an expedited manner, cases involving 
children like D.L., so that the minors whose futures are at stake in these 
proceedings can obtain a prompt, just, and final resolution of their status.
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the appellate court, remanding this 
cause to the circuit court of Cook County for further proceedings, is 
affirmed.
Affirmed.
JUSTICE FREEMAN, specially concurring:
The appellate court found that the State had established three grounds for a 
finding of unfitness: (1) Tawanda failed to maintain a reasonable degree of 
interest, concern, or responsibility as to D.L.'s welfare (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) 
(West 1994)); (2) Tawanda was addicted to drugs for at least one year preceding 
the commencement of the unfitness proceeding (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(k) (West 1994)); 
and (3) Tawanda failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of D.L. 
within 12 months after the adjudication of neglect (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 
1994)). In this court, Tawanda challenges only the finding, pursuant to section 
1(D)(m), that she failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of D.L. 
Since a finding of unfitness may be based on any one of the grounds noted above, 
this court must affirm the judgment of the appellate court, and remand for a 
hearing on the termination of Tawanda's parental rights. Thus, I concur in the 
result reached by the majority.
I write separately, however, because I disagree with the holding of the 
majority that the plain language of section 1(D)(m) limits the evidence that may 
be considered in a fitness hearing to matters concerning the parent's conduct in 
the 12 months following an adjudication of neglect, abuse, or dependency. This 
holding overrules a long and harmonious line of authority construing the time 
period in section 1(D)(m) as a limitation on the right of the State to institute 
a proceeding for termination of parental rights and not as a limitation on the 
evidence the trial court may consider in making a determination on parental 
fitness. I believe this line of authority construed the statute properly. I also 
believe the majority has failed to give effect to the intention of the 
legislature and has severely limited the ability of the trial court to make an 
appropriate determination regarding parental fitness. Lastly, the majority's 
holding is contrary to the best interests of the children and parents involved 
in these proceedings.
Several panels of the appellate court have held that, in determining whether 
a parent is an "unfit person," a trial court may consider the parent's conduct 
during the entire period of time between the adjudication of neglect, abuse, or 
dependency and the fitness hearing. See In re Latifah P., 307 Ill. App. 
3d 558 (1999); In re H.C., 305 Ill. App. 3d 869 (1999); In re 
Y.B., 285 Ill. App. 3d 385 (1996); In re J.T.C., 273 Ill. App. 3d 
193 (1995); In re A.P., 277 Ill. App. 3d 592 (1996); In re 
D.J., 262 Ill. App. 3d 584 (1994); In re S.J., 233 Ill. App. 3d 88 
(1992); In re C.R., 221 Ill. App. 3d 373 (1991); In re S.G., 
216 Ill. App. 3d 668 (1991); In re M.S., 210 Ill. App. 3d 1085 (1991); 
In re M.C., 201 Ill. App. 3d 792 (1990); In re A.T., 197 Ill. 
App. 3d 821 (1990); In re R.S., 174 Ill. App. 3d 132 (1988); In re 
Allen, 172 Ill. App. 3d 950 (1988); In re Doolan, 101 Ill. App. 3d 
322 (1981); In re Edmonds, 85 Ill. App. 3d 229 (1980); In re 
Austin, 61 Ill. App. 3d 344 (1978). See also In re A.H., 215 Ill. 
App. 3d 522 (1991); In re S.D., 213 Ill. App. 3d 284 (1991); In re 
R.M.B., 146 Ill. App. 3d 523 (1986). These courts have reasoned that 
section 1(D)(m) sets forth a minimum period of time the State must wait before 
filing a petition alleging unfitness. The section, however, does not preclude 
consideration of evidence regarding the parent's conduct following expiration of 
the 12-month period. It is in the best interests of the child to allow the trial 
judge to consider all probative evidence in determining the parent's 
fitness.
In re R.S., 174 Ill. App. 3d 132, illustrates the position of these 
courts. R.S. was adjudicated dependent on March 19, 1985. The State filed a 
supplemental petition to terminate the mother's parental rights on June 16, 
1987. At the hearing on the State's petition, the trial court considered 
evidence of the mother's parenting efforts and progress during a period which 
began with the adjudication of dependency and extended beyond the 12-month 
period. The trial court found the mother to be unfit. On appeal, the mother 
argued that only the 12 months immediately following the adjudication of 
dependency could be considered under section 1(D)(m). In rejecting the mother's 
contention, the court observed:
The court found support for this interpretation in the 1977 enactment which 
shortened the designated period in subsection (m) from 24 months to 12 months. 
The court stated:
Consider a parent who makes some effort to correct the condition which led to 
the child's removal or makes some progress toward the return of the child during 
the 12-month period following the adjudication of neglect, but who discontinues 
these efforts or actually regresses after the end of the 12-month period. At the 
time of the hearing, there may be no question that the parent is actually unfit. 
Should the trial court disregard the parent's current status and base its 
determination on the progress of the parent during the 12-month period? Or 
should the court look at the entire post-adjudication period to determine 
whether the parent's progress, begun in the 12-month period, is actually 
reasonable? Prior to today, several panels of our appellate court have held that 
the trial court should consider all relevant evidence of the parent's present 
fitness. What happens after today if the parent's conduct during the 12-month 
period will not support a finding of unfitness under section 1(D)(m), but the 
court is aware that the parent is not able to care for the child? Does the child 
stay in foster care indefinitely? In In re M.S., 210 Ill. App. 3d 1085, 
as in In re R.S., the respondent argued that only the first 12-month 
period after M.S.'s adjudication as an abused and neglected minor was relevant 
to her alleged failure to make reasonable progress toward the return of M.S. The 
majority's holding would require that the trial courts in In re M.S. 
and In re R.S. ignore relevant, updated evidence of the parents' 
unfitness, possibly forcing the trial courts to keep the children in foster care 
until such time as the State could identify and prove other grounds to support a 
finding of unfitness.
In the present case, the State argues that the legislature has implicitly 
endorsed the interpretation given to the provision by the panels of the 
appellate court. I agree. The legislature has amended section 1(D)(m) to shorten 
the applicable time period (the time period is now nine months) but has not seen 
fit to make any other changes to the section. Citing In re M.C., 201 
Ill. App. 3d 792, and In re E.J.F., 161 Ill. App. 3d 325 (1987), the 
majority states that other appellate court cases have held that section 1(D)(m) 
limits the evidence that may be considered in determining parental fitness. The 
majority reasons that "the legislature's recent action could equally signify 
satisfaction with that group of decisions." Slip op. at 8. In In re E.J.F. 
the trial court adjudicated the minor dependent and abused on December 26, 
1985. The trial court held a hearing on January 20, 1987, to terminate parental 
rights. The minor's mother argued that the time she spent incarcerated should 
not be counted in computing the 12-month period under section 1(D)(m). The 
appellate court rejected this argument, and observed that 12 months is a 
reasonable period to wait for a parent to make demonstrable progress before a 
finding of unfitness can be made. The appellate court was not asked to determine 
whether section 1(D)(m) limits the evidence that may be considered in a fitness 
hearing. Indeed, the termination hearing followed so closely the end of the 
12-month period it is doubtful the parties could have presented evidence beyond 
the 12-month period.
Likewise, In re M.C. does not support the majority's position. In 
In re M.C. the trial court entered a finding of neglect in December 
1985. On June 26, 1989, the trial court held a hearing on the State's petition 
to declare the minor's mother unfit. The trial court's finding of unfitness was 
upheld by the appellate court. That court observed:
In considering evidence of the mother's conduct between 1987 and 1989, both 
the trial court and the appellate court necessarily found that section 1(D)(m) 
does not limit evidence of the parent's conduct to the 12-month period following 
the adjudication of neglect.
Finding no support for the majority's position in In re M.C. and 
In re E.J.F., I must disagree with the majority's contention that a 
group of appellate court cases has held section 1(D)(m) limits the evidence that 
may be considered in determining parental fitness. I must also disagree with the 
majority's conclusion that the legislature's action "signified satisfaction with 
that group of decisions." Prior authority uniformly contradicts the majority's 
position.
Where a statutory provision is ambiguous, it is appropriate to examine the 
legislative history. People ex rel. Baker v. Cowlin, 154 Ill. 2d 193, 
197 (1992). As the court held in In re R.S., section 1(D)(m) is subject 
to at least two interpretations. Thus, a review of the legislative history of 
the Adoption Act is appropriate. Such a review demonstrates that the time period 
in section 1(D)(m) is not a limitation on the evidence that may be considered by 
the trial court in ruling on the parent's fitness. In 1997, the legislature 
amended section 1(D)(m) to shorten the applicable time period from 12 months to 
9 months. See 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 1998). The legislative debates on the 
amendment reflect the concern that children were kept overlong in a state of 
uncertainty, having been adjudicated neglected or abused but not eligible for 
adoption because the rights of their parents have not been terminated. The 
legislature attempted to curtail delays occasioned by the failure of all parties 
to participate in the court proceedings:
The legislature was particularly frustrated with the ability of certain 
parents to prolong court proceedings while refusing to take the necessary steps 
to progress to reunification. The amendment shortening the time period from 12 
months to 9 months took aim squarely at those parents. At the same time, the 
legislature recognized the importance of the parent-child relationship, and 
expressed its determination not to terminate the parental rights of those 
parents willing to work with the courts and the Department of Children and 
Family Services (DCFS) to regain custody of their children:
Thus, while attempting to deal with the delays in court proceedings and 
attempting to shorten the period of uncertainty for children in foster care, the 
legislature struck a balance between the rights of the children in foster care 
and the rights of parents seriously concerned with the welfare of their 
children. Those parents willing to work toward reunification are given the 
opportunity to do so. Those parents with little concern for the welfare of their 
children have a shortened period of time in which to prove otherwise. The 
legislation gives the courts and DCFS the flexibility to work with concerned 
parents as well as the flexibility to expedite termination proceedings for 
parents unwilling to expend the effort to comply with plans for reunification. 
The balance struck by the legislature also recognizes the fiscal practicalities 
involved in foster care. The State's burden in caring for its foster wards is 
less if the State is able to rehabilitate the natural parents and return the 
foster wards to their parents' care.
In the present case, the majority limits the evidence at the fitness hearing 
to conduct of the parent within 12 months following an adjudication of neglect. 
To do so is to disregard the balance achieved by the legislature between the 
rights of the child and the rights of the parent. A parent willing to work with 
the court and DCFS must be afforded time to comply with any requirements and 
plans set forth by the court and DCFS, and to progress to reunification.
The majority's approach is also impractical in light of the other statutory 
provisions governing a determination of unfitness. Section 1(D) sets forth 
numerous grounds upon which a finding of unfitness may be based. With few 
exceptions, these grounds do not contain time limitations. Thus, a petition 
which alleges unfitness due to a parent's failure to maintain a reasonable 
degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the child's welfare would 
not be subject to any evidentiary time limitation. See 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 
1994). If such a petition further alleges unfitness under section 1(D)(m), the 
trial court would be required to consider evidence of the parent's conduct 
between the adjudication of neglect and the date of the fitness hearing in 
determining parental fitness under section 1(D)(b), but not under section 
1(D)(m). The trial court's determination under section 1(D)(m) would be limited 
to the parent's conduct within 12 months of the adjudication of neglect even 
though the balance of the evidence presented to the court might show that the 
parent had made reasonable progress toward the return of the child, or, 
conversely, that the parent had regressed and had failed to make reasonable 
efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal of the 
child from the parent.
The majority believes that limiting the trial court to consideration of 
conduct within the 12-month period will shorten the period of time children stay 
in foster homes. The majority directs "the courts below to consider, in an 
expedited manner, cases involving children like D.L., so that the minors whose 
futures are at stake in these proceedings can obtain a prompt, just, and final 
resolution of their status." Slip op. at 9. Although the majority's goal is 
laudable, I do not believe this goal can be achieved by forcing an early 
termination of parental rights. I imagine that the timing of the State's 
petition to find the parent unfit has more to do with the State's determination 
that a parent is actively cooperating with the court and the State to regain 
custody of the child and with the possibility of adoption than anything else. 
Until the State has identified a person willing to adopt a foster child, is it 
actually in the child's best interest to terminate parental rights? Should the 
State concentrate its efforts on rehabilitation of the child's natural parents 
or on court proceedings to terminate parental rights in the anticipation of 
eventual adoption? Where a parent makes the effort, although after the 12-month 
period has expired, to correct the conditions that led to the child's removal, 
should the court ignore her effort and find her unfit based on her conduct 
during the 12-month (now 9-month) period?
The legislature has provided that the trial judge is to make a "finding" 
regarding unfitness. The trial judge should be able to consider all relevant 
evidence in making its finding. In the event that the fitness hearing takes 
place more than 12 months after the adjudication of neglect, the trial judge has 
access to additional evidence in determining the parent's fitness. The parent 
may or may not benefit from consideration of the additional evidence, but surely 
the child will.
Like the majority, I recognize that many children are kept in foster care too 
long. Our legislature has addressed the delays in the foster care programs by 
"lessening the time which must pass following the child's removal before his 
parent could be found unfit." In re R.S., 174 Ill. App. 3d at 134. At 
the same time, the legislature has recognized that a parent willing to work with 
the court and DCFS toward reunification must be afforded the time to do so. 
Further, the legislature has recognized that it is in the best interests of the 
child and of the State to promote reunification where possible. This court 
should not substitute itself for the legislature just because we are aware a 
problem exists. In our rush to assuage the problem we may well upset the 
delicate balance orchestrated by the legislature.
I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion but not in its 
reasoning.