Title: State v. Prokopios G. Vassos
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1997AP000938-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 27, 1998

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-0938-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Prokopios G. Vassos,  
 
Defendant-Respondent.  
 
ON CERTIFCIATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
May 27, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
March 5, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Winnebago 
 
JUDGE: 
William E. Crane 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
BRADLEY, J., concurs (opinion filed) 
 
 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., and STEINMETZ and GESKE, JJ., 
 
 
joins. 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-appellant the cause was argued 
by Pamela Magee, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief (in the Supreme Court) was James E. Doyle, attorney 
general. 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief 
(in the Court of Appeals)and oral argument by Edmund C. Carns, 
Oshkosh. 
 
No. 97-0938-CR 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 97-0938-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
  
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v. 
 
Prokopios G. Vassos, 
 
 
Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 27, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Winnebago 
County, William E. Crane, Judge.  Reversed and cause remanded. 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE.   This is an 
appeal by the State from an order of the Circuit Court for 
Winnebago County, William E. Crane, Judge, dismissing on double 
jeopardy grounds the State's prosecution of the defendant, 
Prokopios Vassos, on a misdemeanor battery charge following his 
acquittal of felony battery.  Both charges arose out of the same 
incident.   
¶2 
The court of appeals certified the following issue to 
this court:  "When a defendant is acquitted of substantial 
felony 
battery, 
§ 940.19(3), 
STATS., 
do 
double 
jeopardy 
protections 
bar 
a 
successive 
prosecution 
for 
misdemeanor 
battery, 
§ 940.19(1)?" 
We 
hold 
that 
the 
prosecution 
for 
misdemeanor battery following the defendant's acquittal of 
felony battery is not barred by Wis. Stat. §§ 939.71 and 
No. 97-0938-CR 
 
2 
939.66(2m)(1995-96).1  We further hold that the prosecution for 
misdemeanor battery following the defendant's acquittal of 
felony battery is not barred by the constitutional same-elements 
test set forth in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 
304 (1932).  Finally, we reverse the circuit court order and 
remand the cause to the circuit court to determine whether the 
prosecution 
for 
misdemeanor 
battery 
is 
barred 
under 
the 
constitutional collateral estoppel doctrine established in Ashe 
v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 444 (1970). 
I 
¶3 
The facts are undisputed for purposes of this appeal. 
 On April 22, 1996, the defendant was charged with felony 
battery in violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.19(3).2  The defendant 
requested the circuit court (Judge Robert A. Haase) to include 
an instruction on misdemeanor battery, Wis. Stat. § 940.19(1), 
for the jury's consideration.3  The State concurred with the 
defendant's request.  
¶4 
The circuit court denied both motions, stating that 
different elements exist between the two battery statutes and 
that misdemeanor battery is not a lesser included offense of 
                     
1 All further references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1995-96 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 940.19(3) 
provides, 
"Whoever 
causes 
substantial bodily harm to another by an act done with intent to 
cause substantial bodily harm to that person or another is 
guilty of a Class D felony."  
3 Wis. Stat. § 940.19(1) provides, "Whoever causes bodily 
harm to another by an act done with intent to cause bodily harm 
to that person or another without the consent of the person so 
harmed is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor." 
No. 97-0938-CR 
 
3 
felony battery.4  On August 13, 1996, following a jury trial, the 
defendant was acquitted of felony battery. 
¶5 
On September 25, 1996, the State charged the defendant 
with misdemeanor battery (Wis. Stat. § 940.19(1)), based on the 
same incident upon which the felony battery prosecution had been 
premised.  The defendant entered a not guilty plea and moved to 
dismiss the misdemeanor battery charge on double jeopardy 
grounds.  The circuit court (Judge William E. Crane) granted the 
defendant's motion and dismissed the misdemeanor battery charge. 
 The State appealed from the circuit court order of dismissal. 
II 
¶6 
We 
first 
determine 
whether 
the 
prosecution 
for 
misdemeanor battery following the defendant's acquittal of 
felony 
battery 
violates 
Wisconsin 
statutes. 
 
Statutory 
interpretation is a question of law, which this court determines 
independently 
of 
the 
circuit 
court, 
benefiting 
from 
its 
analysis.  See State v. Szulczewski, 216 Wis. 2d 494, 498, 574 
N.W.2d 660 (1998). 
¶7 
Two statutory provisions are at issue in this case.  
The first statute is Wis. Stat. § 939.71, which prohibits a 
successive prosecution for a crime after a conviction or 
acquittal on the merits unless each statute setting forth the 
                     
4 The parties agree that the circuit court erred in refusing 
their requests.  They argue that in the first trial, the jury 
should have been instructed on both the felony battery and 
misdemeanor battery charges.  The State notes that "[t]he record 
is silent as to whether the trial court was aware of sec. 
939.66(2m) when it made its ruling.  However, it should be noted 
that the situation which occurred herein is not likely to arise 
frequently since proper instructions on offenses made lesser-
includeds by statute would normally preclude such problems."  
Brief for State at 14 n.4.  
No. 97-0938-CR 
 
4 
substantive crime "requires proof of a fact for conviction which 
the other does not require."  The statute reads as follows: 
 
939.71 Limitation on the number of convictions.  If an 
act forms the basis for a crime punishable under more 
than one statutory provision of this state or under a 
statutory provision of this state and the laws of 
another jurisdiction, a conviction or acquittal on the 
merits 
under 
one 
provision 
bars 
a 
subsequent 
prosecution under the other provision unless each 
provision requires proof of a fact for conviction 
which the other does not require. 
¶8 
Wisconsin Stat. § 939.71 substantially enacts the 
Blockburger test for determining whether the two offenses are 
the 
"same 
offense" 
for 
double 
jeopardy 
purposes. 
 
The 
Blockburger test states as follows:  "[W]here the same act or 
transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory 
provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there 
are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires 
proof of a fact which the other does not."  Blockburger, 284 
U.S. at 304. 
¶9 
The parties agree, and we conclude, that Wis. Stat. 
§§ 940.19(3) and 940.19(1) do not contain the same statutory 
No. 97-0938-CR 
 
5 
elements as defined by the Blockburger test.5  Section 940.19(3) 
requires proof of substantial bodily harm and intent to cause 
substantial bodily harm, two elements not required under 
§ 940.19(1).  In addition, § 940.19(1) requires proof that the 
accused did not have the consent of the person harmed and that 
the accused knew the person harmed did not consent, two elements 
not required under § 940.19(3).   
¶10 Under a comparison-of-the-statutory-elements approach, 
Wis. Stat. §§ 940.19(3) and 940.19(1) do not constitute the 
"same offense" under the Blockburger test.  Therefore, we 
conclude that the State's prosecution of misdemeanor battery 
following the defendant's acquittal of felony battery is not 
barred 
by 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 939.71, 
the 
statutorily 
adopted 
Blockburger test.6  
                     
5  
Statutory 
elements 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. § 940.19(3) 
Statutory 
elements 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. § 940.19(1) 
(1)  The defendant caused sub-
stantial bodily harm to another 
by an act; and 
(2)  The defendant had intent 
to 
cause 
substantial 
bodily 
harm to that person or another. 
 
 
 
See Wis JICriminal 1223. 
(1)  The 
defendant 
caused 
bodily harm to another by an 
act; 
(2)  The defendant had intent 
to cause bodily harm to that 
person or another; 
(3)  The defendant did not have 
the 
consent 
of 
the 
person 
harmed; and 
(4)  The 
defendant 
knew 
the 
victim did not consent. 
See Wis JICriminal 1220. 
 
6 Since its original enactment in 1955, Wis. Stat. § 939.71 
has not been revised except for renumbering.  
No. 97-0938-CR 
 
6 
¶11 The second statute at issue in this case is Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.66, which provides that "[u]pon prosecution for a crime, 
the actor may be convicted of either the crime charged or an 
included crime, but not both."  The statute lists 12 different 
statutory definitions of included crimes.  Subsections (1) and 
(2m) of § 939.66 are relevant in this case.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 939.66 reads in pertinent part as follows: 
 
939.66 Conviction of included crime permitted.  Upon 
prosecution for a crime, the actor may be convicted of 
either the crime charged or an included crime, but not 
both.  An included crime may be any of the following: 
 
(1) A crime which does not require proof of any fact 
in addition to those which must be proved for the 
crime charged. 
 
 . . .  
 
(2m) A crime which is a less serious or equally 
serious type of battery than the one charged. 
¶12 Subsection (1) of Wis. Stat. § 939.66, like Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.71, codifies the Blockburger same-elements test.  See 
State v. Sauceda, 168 Wis. 2d 486, 494, 485 N.W.2d 1 (1992).  As 
we stated previously, felony battery and misdemeanor battery do 
not satisfy the Blockburger test. 
¶13 Subsection (2m) of Wis. Stat. § 939.66 declares that 
an included crime may be "[a] crime which is a less serious or 
equally serious type of battery than the one charged."7  We 
conclude, 
as 
did 
the 
parties, 
that 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 939.66(2m), misdemeanor battery is an included crime of felony 
battery.  
                     
7 See 1985 Wis. Act. 144, § 1.  The phrase "or equally 
serious" was added by 1993 Wis. Act 441, § 2. 
No. 97-0938-CR 
 
7 
¶14 The question then is whether Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2m) 
applies to a prosecution for misdemeanor battery after an 
acquittal of felony battery.  Section 939.66 does not refer to 
acquittals.  It refers only to a prohibition of multiple 
convictions of a crime and an included crime, and does not refer 
to the situation where an accused has been acquitted of an 
included crime.  The legislative history of § 939.66(2m) 
supports the interpretation that the subsection bars multiple 
convictions, that is multiple punishments, for included battery 
crimes and does not apply to a prosecution following an 
acquittal of a battery crime.8   
¶15 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 939.66 
can 
be 
traced 
to 
the 
comprehensive revision of the criminal code in ch. 696, Laws of 
1955.  The comment to § 339.66 (the precursor of § 939.66) in 
the Judiciary Committee Report on the Criminal Code states that 
                     
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.66(2m) was enacted in response to 
State v. Richards, 123 Wis. 2d 1, 11-12, 365 N.W.2d 7 (1985), 
which related to charging multiple battery offenses in a single 
prosecution.   
The Richards court applied the comparison-of-the-statutory-
elements test set forth in Wis. Stat. § 939.66(1) to hold that 
simple battery and intermediate battery, both requiring proof of 
the victim's nonconsent, are not lesser included offenses of 
aggravated battery, which does not require proof of nonconsent. 
 See Richards, 123 Wis. 2d at 6.  
In rendering its decision, the Richards court explained 
that the legislature could rectify the problem that an accused 
could be convicted of multiple battery offenses at the same 
trial by either declaring the batteries included offenses or 
revising the statutory elements to make the batteries included 
offenses.  See Richards, 123 Wis. 2d at 12-13.   
The legislature adopted the first option proposed by the 
Richards court by creating Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2m), declaring 
certain batteries to be included offenses. 
No. 97-0938-CR 
 
8 
"[t]his section permits conviction of a crime included within 
the crime charged and states what crimes are included crimes.  
The reason behind the rule of this section is the state's 
difficulty in determining before a trial exactly what crime or 
degree of the crime it will be able upon the trial to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt."9  A prosecution after an acquittal 
does 
not 
result 
in 
multiple 
convictions 
or 
multiple 
punishments.10 
The 
text 
of 
§ 939.66 
therefore 
makes 
the 
application of the statute to this case problematic.  
¶16 We 
next 
explore 
whether 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 939.71 
incorporates the Blockburger same-elements test as the sole test 
governing a prosecution after an acquittal, or whether the 
definition 
of 
included 
crime 
set 
forth 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 939.66(2m) can be read into § 939.71 to bar a prosecution 
after an acquittal of an included § 939.66(2m) crime.  If 
§ 939.66 can be grafted onto the definition of "same offense" 
contained in § 939.71, then the prosecution in this case for a 
                     
9 The legislative history also states that Wis. Stat. 
§ 339.66 substantially restates Wis. Stat. § 357.09 (1949).  See 
Wisconsin Legislative Council, V Judiciary Committee Report on 
the Criminal Code (Feb. 1953), at 53.  Section 357.09 provided 
that "[w]hen a defendant is tried for a crime and is acquitted 
of part of the crime charged and is convicted of the residue 
thereof, the verdict may be received and thereupon he shall be 
adjudged guilty of the crime which appears to the court to be 
substantially charged by such residue of the indictment or 
information and shall be sentenced accordingly."  For a 
discussion of the legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 939.66(1), 
see State v. Gordon, 111 Wis. 2d 133, 141, 330 N.W.2d 564 
(1983).  
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.66 does not state whether it 
applies to a successive prosecution after a conviction of an 
included offense.  We need not and do not address this issue. 
No. 97-0938-CR 
 
9 
misdemeanor battery after an acquittal for felony misdemeanor 
would be barred. 
¶17 The 
legislative 
history reveals that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 939.71, like Wis. Stat. § 939.66(1), was created as part of 
the comprehensive revision of the criminal code in 1955.  Ch. 
696, Laws of 1955.  The Judiciary Committee Report on the 
Criminal Code comments on Wis. Stat. § 339.71, the precursor to 
§ 939.71, as follows:  "This section is designed to prevent 
harassing the defendant with subsequent prosecutions for the 
same crime whether the former conviction or acquittal occurred 
in this state, in another state or country, or under federal or 
military 
law." 
 
The 
comment 
further 
provides 
that 
"the 
prohibition against subsequent prosecutions applies only if both 
prosecutions are based upon the same conduct and are for the 
same crime.  In determining whether two crimes are the same, the 
test is:  Does each require proof of a fact for conviction which 
the other does not require?"11 
¶18 We find nothing in the text of Wis. Stat. § 939.66 or 
§ 939.71 or the legislative history of the two statutes that 
permits § 939.66(2m), defining included battery crimes, to be 
grafted onto § 939.71 so that an included battery crime defined 
in § 939.66(2m) is to be read as the "same offense" in § 939.71. 
 Accordingly we conclude 
that prosecution 
for 
misdemeanor 
battery after the defendant's acquittal of felony battery is not 
barred by either § 939.71 or § 939.66(2m).  
                     
11 Wisconsin Legislative Council, V Judiciary Committee 
Report on the Criminal Code (Feb. 1953), at 55.  For a 
discussion of the legislative history of this section, see 
Gordon, 111 Wis. 2d at 140-41. 
No. 97-0938-CR 
 
10
III 
¶19 Having concluded that the prosecution for misdemeanor 
battery in this case is not barred by the Wisconsin statutes, we 
next consider whether the subsequent prosecution violates the 
double 
jeopardy 
clauses 
of 
the 
federal 
and 
Wisconsin 
constitutions.  The double jeopardy prohibitions in the federal 
and Wisconsin Constitutions state that a person shall not be 
placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense.12   
¶20 Whether prosecution for misdemeanor battery after an 
acquittal of felony battery violates constitutional protections 
against double jeopardy is a question of law, which this court 
reviews independently of the circuit court, benefiting from its 
analysis.  See State v. Thierfelder, 174 Wis. 2d 213, 218, 495 
N.W.2d 669 (1993).   
¶21 The federal and Wisconsin double jeopardy clauses have 
been 
construed to 
encompass 
three 
separate 
constitutional 
protections:  (1) protection against a subsequent prosecution 
for the same offense after acquittal; (2) protection against a 
subsequent prosecution for the same offense after conviction; 
and (3) protection against multiple punishments for the same 
offense.  See United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993); 
State v. Kurzawa, 180 Wis. 2d 502, 515, 509 N.W.2d 712 (1994). 
¶22 In Kurzawa the court applied the Blockburger same-
elements test to a successive prosecution after an acquittal and 
allowed the subsequent prosecution for the issuance of the same 
                     
12 The Fifth Amendment to the federal Constitution provides 
that no person "shall be subject for the same offence to be put 
twice in jeopardy of life or limb."  Article I, § 8 of the 
Wisconsin constitution provides that "no person for the same 
offense may be twice put in jeopardy of punishment." 
No. 97-0938-CR 
 
11
checks involved in the first prosecution.  The first prosecution 
for theft by fraud ended in acquittal; the second prosecution 
was for uttering a forged writing.  The court concluded that 
because the two offenses did not constitute the "same offense" 
under 
the 
Blockburger 
same-elements 
test, 
the 
subsequent 
prosecution did not violate the double jeopardy prohibition.   
¶23 As we concluded above, Wis. Stat. §§ 940.19(3) and 
940.19(1) do not constitute the "same offense" under the 
Blockburger same-elements test.  The prosecution for misdemeanor 
battery after an acquittal for felony battery therefore does not 
violate the Blockburger double jeopardy test.  Nevertheless, an 
acquittal 
in 
the 
first 
prosecution 
may 
bar 
subsequent 
prosecution under the collateral estoppel doctrine.  The 
collateral estoppel doctrine was given constitutional status in 
Ashe, 397 U.S. at 445, in which the United States Supreme Court 
held that the collateral estoppel doctrine is embodied in the 
Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy.  The Fifth 
Amendment protects an accused "who has been acquitted from 
having to 'run the gantlet' a second time."  Ashe, 397 U.S. at 
446 (quoting Green v. United States, 335 U.S. 184, 190 (1957)).13  
¶24 Under the collateral estoppel doctrine an issue of 
ultimate fact that is determined by a valid and full judgment 
                     
13 The collateral estoppel test set forth in Ashe v. 
Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970), has been recognized and applied in 
Wisconsin.  See, e.g., State v. Kramsvogel, 124 Wis. 2d 101, 
121-23, 369 N.W.2d 145 (1985); State ex rel. Flowers v. 
Department of Health and Social Services, 81 Wis. 2d 376, 387-
89, 260 N.W.2d 727 (1978); Hebel v. State, 60 Wis. 2d 325, 328-
29, 210 N.W.2d 695 (1973); State v. Elbaum, 54 Wis. 2d 213, 219-
20, 194 N.W.2d 660 (1972); State v. Jacobs, 186 Wis. 2d 219, 
226, 519 N.W.2d 746 (Ct. App. 1994). 
No. 97-0938-CR 
 
12
cannot again be litigated between the same parties in a 
subsequent lawsuit.  See Ashe, 397 U.S. at 443.  When there has 
been a previous judgment of acquittal based upon a general 
verdict, the trial court in a subsequent prosecution must 
"'examine the record of a prior proceeding, taking into account 
the pleadings, the evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, 
and conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded its 
verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks 
to foreclose from consideration.'"  Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444.  The 
burden is on the accused to demonstrate that the issue about 
which he or she seeks to foreclose relitigation was actually 
decided in the first proceeding.  See Dowling v. United States, 
493 U.S. 342, 350 (1990). 
¶25 The collateral estoppel test "is not to be applied 
with [a] hypertechnical and archaic approach . . . but with 
realism and rationality . . . .  The inquiry 'must be set in a 
practical frame and viewed with an eye to all the circumstances 
of the proceedings.'"  Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444 (quoting Sealfon v. 
United States, 332 U.S. 575, 579 (1948)).14   
                     
14 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals employs a three-step 
test to determine whether collateral estoppel applies: 
(1) An identification of the issues in the two actions 
for the purpose of determining whether the issues are 
sufficiently similar and sufficiently material in both 
actions to justify invoking the doctrine; (2) an 
examination of the record of the prior case to decide 
whether the issue was "litigated" in the first case; 
and (3) an examination of the record of the prior 
proceeding 
to 
ascertain 
whether 
the 
issue 
was 
necessarily decided in the first case. 
 
United States v. McLaurin, 57 F.3d 823, 826 (9th Cir. 1995). 
No. 97-0938-CR 
 
13
¶26 The Ashe collateral estoppel defense is not often 
available to an accused, for it is difficult to determine, 
especially in a general verdict of acquittal, how the fact 
finder in the first trial decided any particular issue.  See 2 
Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure, § 17.4, 
at 382 (1984); United States v. Brackett, 113 F.3d 1396, 1399 
(5th Cir. 1997).  In trying to determine whether a particular 
factual matter has been determined adversely to the prosecution, 
trial courts must consider the legal theory underlying the first 
trial.  See LaFave & Israel, § 17.4 at 383.   
¶27 In this case the State contends that the subsequent 
prosecution of misdemeanor battery following the defendant's 
acquittal of felony battery is not barred by the Ashe collateral 
estoppel test.  According to the State, no factual issues were 
litigated in the first trial that would be litigated in the 
subsequent prosecution. 
¶28 The record before this court does not contain the 
record of the first trial.  Because the circuit court in this 
case did not determine whether the prosecution for misdemeanor 
battery is barred under the Ashe collateral estoppel test, we 
reverse the circuit court order and remand the cause to the 
circuit court to make this determination. 
                                                                  
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that collateral 
estoppel may affect successive prosecutions in one of two ways. 
 First, it will completely bar a successive prosecution if one 
of the facts necessarily determined in the former trial is an 
essential element of the subsequent prosecution.  Second, while 
the subsequent prosecution may proceed, collateral estoppel will 
bar the introduction or argumentation of facts necessarily 
decided in the prior proceeding.  See United States v. Brackett, 
113 F.3d 1396, 1398 (5th Cir. 1997). 
No. 97-0938-CR 
 
14
¶29 In sum, we hold that the prosecution for misdemeanor 
battery following the defendant's acquittal of felony battery is 
not barred by Wis. Stat. §§ 939.71 and 939.66(2m).  We further 
hold that the prosecution for misdemeanor battery following the 
defendant's acquittal of felony battery is not barred by the 
Blockburger same-elements test.  Finally, we reverse the circuit 
court order and remand the cause to the circuit court to 
determine whether the prosecution for misdemeanor battery is 
barred under the Ashe collateral estoppel test. 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is reversed 
and the cause is remanded.
97-0938.awb 
 
1 
¶30 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (Concurring).  I write separately 
because although the majority opinion properly interprets the 
statutes and correctly applies existing double jeopardy 
jurisprudence, it results in the hollow protection of a 
fundamental constitutional right.  The right to be free from 
double jeopardy deserves greater protection than that afforded 
by the inadequate test of Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 
299 (1932), and the incomplete response set forth in our state 
statutes. 
¶31 The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment  
declares that no person shall "be subject for the same offence 
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."  U.S. Const. 
amend. V.15  This clause "protects against a second prosecution 
for the same offense after acquittal, against a second 
prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and against 
multiple punishments for the same offense."  Justices of Boston 
Municipal Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 306-307 (1984);  Jones 
v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 380-381 (1989).  The case presently 
before the court concerns the first of these, protection from a 
second prosecution for the "same offense" after an acquittal. 
¶32 The majority is correct to point to the Blockburger 
"same elements" test, and its legislative incarnation at Wis. 
Stat. § 939.71, for purposes of applying federal constitutional 
                     
15 Article 1, § 8(1) of the Wisconsin constitution provides 
that "no person for the same offense may be put twice in 
jeopardy of punishment . . . ."  The state and federal 
constitutional provisions, while similar, are not identical.  
97-0938.awb 
 
2 
and Wisconsin statutory double jeopardy protections to 
successive prosecution cases such as the one at hand.  
"Generally, this court's construction of Wisconsin's prohibition 
against double jeopardy is guided by the rulings of the United 
States Supreme Court."  State v. Kurzawa,  180 Wis. 2d 502, 522, 
509 N.W.2d 712 (1994).  The "same elements" test indicates that 
successive prosecutions may avoid all constitutional and 
statutory double jeopardy prohibitions so long as the charged 
offenses at serial prosecutions do not have the same elements.  
See Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.  As the majority demonstrates, 
the prosecuted crimes in this case, while extremely similar and 
arising from the same altercation, do not have the same 
elements. 
¶33 However, allowing the defendant in this case to be 
tried for a second time based on a criminal charge which would 
otherwise have been precluded had the circuit court not 
erroneously excluded a jury instruction on the less serious 
offense at the first trial, seems to implicitly violate the 
principle of double jeopardy.  The federal and state 
constitutional bans on subsequent prosecutions after an 
acquittal for the "same offense:"  
 
prevent[] 
the 
government 
from 
'mak[ing] 
repeated 
attempts to convict an individual for an alleged 
offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, 
expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a 
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity.'  The 
Clause addresses a further concern as well, that the 
government not be given the opportunity to rehearse 
its prosecution, 'honing its trial strategies and 
97-0938.awb 
 
3 
perfecting its evidence through successive attempts at 
conviction' . . . . 
United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 747 (1993)(Souter, J. 
concurring in part and dissenting in part)(internal citations 
omitted).  
¶34 I fail to see how the State is not gaining an 
advantage from what it learned in the first prosecution of the 
defendant.  The very facts giving rise to the first battery 
charge on which the defendant was acquitted also give rise to 
the battery charge in the second prosecution.  True, the 
legislature has chosen to include an element in each of the 
offenses not present in the other.  But in this day and age of 
burgeoning criminal statutes, continued exclusive reliance on 
the "same elements" test seems to leave the double jeopardy 
clause as applied to successive prosecutions with little 
vitality. 
¶35 I am not alone in my concern with the "same elements" 
test.  While Blockburger currently enjoys the approval of the 
United States Supreme Court, it does so by a one vote majority—a 
majority which has disappeared in the past.  See Grady v. 
Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990), overruled by United States v. 
Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993).  Indeed, the constitutional 
protection provided under the Blockburger analysis has proven so 
tenuous that at least one state supreme court has rejected it 
for purposes of interpreting its own identical state 
constitutional double jeopardy provisions.  See State v. 
Lessary, 865 P.2d 150, 154 (Haw. 1994)("When the United States 
97-0938.awb 
 
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Supreme Court's interpretation of a provision present in both 
the United States and Hawai'i Constitutions does not adequately 
preserve the rights and interests sought to be protected, we 
will not hesitate to recognize the appropriate protections as a 
matter of state constitutional law.") 
¶36 More importantly, both this court and the legislature 
have acknowledged the imperfections in the "same elements" test. 
 In Kurzawa this court conceded that "Blockburger is not a 
perfect test," but did not discover an alternative test more to 
the court's liking.  See Kurzawa, 180 Wis. 2d at 525.  The 
legislature in turn has also partially abandoned the "same 
elements" test for purposes of cases involving multiple 
punishments for the same offense.  Under Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2m) 
a defendant cannot be convicted of both a battery and an equal 
or lesser battery, regardless of the particular element existing 
for the count charged.  See Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2m).  The 
legislature took such action in direct response to a potential 
"same elements" problem arising in State v. Richards, 123 Wis. 
2d 1, 365 N.W.2d 7 (1985). 
¶37 Yet, while the legislative action better protects 
defendants from multiple punishments for the same offense under 
the Double Jeopardy Clause, the legislative action is 
incomplete.  It fails to give defendants any additional 
protections from multiple prosecutions.  Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2m) 
 currently indicates that the term "same offense" for purposes 
of multiple punishments for the same battery is to be read to 
include all "less serious or equally serious" batteries.  
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5 
However, similar treatment is not offered those defendants 
acquitted of one battery count, yet facing a subsequent 
prosecution on another "less serious or equally serious" battery 
charge arising from the same occurrence.  Instead, the State is 
allowed to repeatedly prosecute the defendant for an included 
battery offense until the State either exhausts the list of 
included offenses subject to Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2m), or obtains 
a conviction, whichever occurs first.   
¶38 As I have indicated, the majority's decision today 
comports with current interpretations of the federal and state 
double jeopardy protections.  The Blockburger "same elements" 
test is the sole test for the federal and state double jeopardy 
analysis.  The test is simple and easily applied.  Yet, it is 
inadequate.  The simple formula seems to evade constitutional 
protections.  Moreover, even though the legislature has 
acknowledged the problems with the "same elements" test in the 
statutory framework for multiple punishment cases, its response 
is incomplete.  The legislature has yet to act in relation to 
multiple prosecutions.  Such inaction seems directly contrary to 
the purposes of the multiple prosecution component of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause. 
¶39 I am authorized to state that SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, 
CHIEF JUSTICE, DONALD W. STEINMETZ, J., and JANINE P. GESKE, J. 
join this opinion.