Title: In re Huffman
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 123280
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: May 27, 2022

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 123,280 
 
In the Matter of DONNA L. HUFFMAN, 
Respondent. 
 
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE 
 
Original proceeding in discipline. Opinion filed May 27, 2022. Two-year suspension with 
possibility of probation after 90 days upon approval of a practice supervision plan.  
 
Deborah L. Hughes, Deputy Disciplinary Administrator, argued the cause, and Gayle B. Larkin, 
Disciplinary Administrator, was with her on the brief for petitioner. 
 
Donna L. Huffman, respondent, argued the cause and was on the briefs pro se. 
 
PER CURIAM:  This is a contested attorney discipline proceeding against Donna L. 
Huffman, of Oskaloosa, who was admitted in 2010 to practice law in Kansas. After a 
five-day hearing, a panel of the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys unanimously 
concluded Huffman violated the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct while 
representing homeowners in multiple lawsuits over the mortgage on their residence. The 
panel determined her litigation tactics included filing multiple lawsuits containing 
frivolous claims, making what was characterized as "extensive and needless" discovery 
requests, and serially relitigating settled issues. A federal district court at one point 
imposed a $5,000 sanction against her. Ultimately, the homeowners were assessed nearly 
$290,000 in their lender's legal fees, which exceeded the mortgage principal. The lender's 
attorneys billed over $700,000 for their work. 
 
2 
 
 
 
The panel unanimously found Huffman violated KRPC 1.1 (competence) (2022 
Kan. S. Ct. R. at 327); KRPC 3.1 (meritorious claims) (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 390); 
KRPC 3.5 (impartiality and decorum of the tribunal) (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 396); KRPC 
8.2 (judicial and legal officials) (Kan. S. Ct. R. at 432); and KRPC 8.4 (misconduct) 
(2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 434). A majority of the panel recommends published censure, 
while a dissenting panel member recommends a 90-day suspension. The Office of the 
Disciplinary Administrator recommends indefinite suspension. Huffman challenges some 
factual findings and conclusions of law and recommends a private admonition. 
 
We hold clear and convincing evidence establishes attorney misconduct as to 
KRPC 1.1 (competence), KRPC 3.1 (meritorious claims), and KRPC 8.4 (misconduct). A 
majority of the court rejects the panel's findings and conclusions as to KRPC 3.5 
(impartiality and decorum of the tribunal) and KRPC 8.2 (judicial and legal officials) as 
being unsupported by clear and convincing evidence. A minority of the court would have 
found these additional violations.  
 
Based on the violations found, we suspend Huffman from practicing law in this 
state for a period of two years, while granting her the possibility for probation after 90 
days upon approval by the Disciplinary Administrator's office of a practice supervision 
plan for the remaining suspension period, all to be followed by a reinstatement hearing 
once she completes the two-year term. If a disagreement arises between Huffman and the 
Disciplinary Administrator's office over the practice supervision plan, either or both may 
file a motion with this court to resolve that dispute about the plan or compliance with its 
terms. 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
The Disciplinary Administrator filed a formal complaint on January 10, 2019, and 
an amended complaint on September 4, 2019, alleging various KRPC violations against 
Huffman. She filed an answer on February 19, 2019. The panel conducted hearings on 
November 6-8 and December 19-20, 2019. She appeared pro se. The panel issued a 71-
page final hearing report. It provides in relevant part: 
 
"Findings of Fact 
 
"Background Facts 
 
"46. 
The hearing panel finds the following facts, by clear and convincing 
evidence: 
 
"47. 
In 2008, R.B. obtained a variable rate loan in the amount of $184,222.00 
from Security National Mortgage Company to purchase a home and signed a promissory 
note to that effect. R.B. is listed as the only borrower and only he signed the note. 
However, the note was secured by a mortgage signed by both R.B. and his wife, S.B. 
Wells Fargo serviced the loan and eventually came to own the promissory note. R.B. and 
S.B. made regular monthly payments.  
 
"48. 
In May, 2009, R.B. applied with Wells Fargo to refinance the house. 
According to a computerized system of recording communications, employees of Wells 
Fargo made contact with R.B. as follows: 
 
a. 
On May 15, 2009, C.M. completed the welcome call 
with R.B.  
 
4 
 
 
 
b. 
On May 17, 2009, the loan terms were changed to 
accommodate R.B.'s request, June 24, 2009, was listed as the anticipated 
closing date, and Wells Fargo approved R.B.'s credit.  
 
c. 
On May 20, 2009, C.M. left a message for R.B. to return 
the call to 'go over loan' information.  
 
d. 
On May 21, 2009, C.M. went over loan information with 
R.B. C.M. faxed documents to him so the documents could be returned 
quickly.  
 
e. 
On May 28, 2009, the loan terms were changed to 
accommodate R.B.'s request. The anticipated closing date remained June 
24, 2009. Also on May 28, 2009, C.M. requested additional 
documentation from R.B.  
 
f. 
On June 4, 2009, C.M. called R.B. regarding the 
additional documentation. On June 10, 2009, C.M. left a message for 
R.B. confirming receipt of the additional requested documentation. On 
June 18, 2009, the loan terms were changed to accommodate R.B.'s 
request and the anticipated closing date remained listed as June 24, 2009.  
 
g. 
On June 18, 2009, R.B. called Wells Fargo and left a 
message for C.M. R.B. was frustrated. J.D. told R.B. that the loan should 
be 'final approved' in time to close the following week. R.B. indicated 
that he is a truck driver, he would be home Wednesday, June 24, and he 
could sign either Wednesday, June 24 or Thursday, June 25.  
 
h. 
On June 19, 2009, C.M. called R.B. and left a message 
for him, confirming that she received his message. C.M. confirmed that 
she would call R.B. to schedule closing when the file was back. The loan 
terms were changed to accommodate R.B.'s request and the anticipated 
closing date remained listed as June 24, 2009.  
5 
 
 
 
 
i. 
On June 22, 2009, C.M. called R.B. and left a message 
that she needed R.B.'s W-2 and she would resubmit the file to get a 'clear 
to close.' On June 24, 2009, C.M. forwarded the file to get a 'clear to 
close.' On June 24, 2009, S.H. received a complete decision and the 
transaction was approved. That same day, C.M. entered a closing hand-
off date.  
 
j. 
On June 25, 2009, C.M. printed the note and the 
mortgage/deed. Additionally, C.M. twice sent the closing package to the 
settlement agent and twice the settlement agent downloaded the closing 
package.  
 
"49. 
R.B. did not sign the closing documents. The record does not establish 
why R.B. did not sign the closing documents or whether R.B. was provided with a 
specific time and location of closing. 
 
"50. 
Even though the closing did not occur, the closing agent, 
Transcontinental Title Company, mistakenly informed Wells Fargo that the closing 
occurred. 
 
"51. 
Wells Fargo executed a Certificate of Satisfaction on July 3, 2009, which 
provided that R.B. and S.B.'s 2008 mortgage had been released. Wells Fargo filed the 
Certificate of Satisfaction concerning the 2008 Mortgage with the Shawnee County 
Register of Deeds. Wells Fargo sent a letter of congratulations to R.B. and S.B. on July 6, 
2009, informing them of the loan payoff.  
 
"52. 
On July 13, 2009, C.M. noted that R.B. did not sign the closing 
documents, but that the loan had been funded by Wells Fargo as authorized by M.M. on 
June 30, 2009. C.M. also noted that she had been trying to contact R.B. to find out what 
happened. C.M. did not make any additional notes about contact with R.B.  
 
6 
 
 
 
"53. 
Over the course of four months, Wells Fargo sent R.B. statements with 
the lower monthly payment amount that would have been due had the closing actually 
occurred.  
 
 
"54. 
On October 27, 2009, Wells Fargo marked the refinance loan for deletion 
because closing never occurred.  
 
"55. 
On October 29, 2009, C.Y. of Wells Fargo wrote to R.B. and explained 
that the 2008 mortgage was paid off in error. C.Y. also informed R.B. that Wells Fargo 
would continue to hold its lien against the property and that payment would continue to 
be due under the 2008 mortgage.  
 
"56. 
On November 13, 2009, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems 
('MERS') executed a 'Caveat as to [the] Existence of a Mortgage Lien Due to Erroneous 
Release of Mortgage' ('Caveat'). This document, signed by L.S., essentially stated that the 
Certificate of Satisfaction had been executed in error and that R.B. and S.B. were still 
required to pay the 2008 mortgage as their debt was never fully paid. L.S. filed the 
Caveat with the Shawnee County Register of Deeds on November 20, 2010.  
 
"57. 
R.B. and S.B. continued to make the lower monthly payments that would 
have been due had the closing taken place.  
 
"Case No. 10-CV-4141 
 
"58. 
On October 22, 2010, R.B. and S.B. sued MERS and L.S. for slander and 
disparagement of title, conversion, negligence, fraud and/or misrepresentation, and 
violations of the Kansas Consumer Protection Act ('KCPA') in Shawnee County District 
Court case number 10-C-1517. On November 16, 2010, the defendants removed the case 
to the United States District Court for the District of Kansas case number 10-CV-4141.  
 
"59. 
Wells Fargo declared the 2008 loan to be in default and on December 20, 
2010, commenced foreclosure proceedings in Shawnee County District Court case 
7 
 
 
 
number 10-C-1808. On January 6, 2011, Wells Fargo dismissed the foreclosure action 
because of the pending federal litigation.  
 
"60. 
On April 15, 2011, Wells Fargo moved to intervene in the federal suit. 
On August 3, 2011, the magistrate judge granted Wells Fargo's motion to intervene over 
the respondent's objection. On August 4, 2011, Wells Fargo filed its answer to the 
petition and counterclaims against R.B. and S.B. for a declaratory judgment regarding the 
Certificate and Caveat, equitable reinstatement of the 2008 mortgage, and foreclosure on 
the 2008 mortgage.  
 
"61. 
On December 30, 2011, the respondent filed a motion on behalf of R.B. 
and S.B. essentially requesting the court to reconsider the order allowing Wells Fargo to 
intervene. The district court denied the motion as untimely and because the issues raised 
were previously raised before the magistrate and properly rejected.  
 
"62. 
On December 30, 2011, the respondent also filed a motion on behalf of 
R.B. and S.B. to remand the case back to state court, arguing that the federal court lacked 
jurisdiction to hear claims involving MERS. On January 6, 2012, the respondent filed a 
motion on behalf of R.B. and S.B. to dismiss Wells Fargo's counterclaims.  
 
"63. 
The court denied the motion to remand and the motion to dismiss the 
counterclaims and cautioned the respondent against relitigating issues already resolved: 
 
'The court will deny the Motion to Dismiss. Discovery in 
the action has not been completed, and the defendant is entitled 
to a full and fair opportunity to obtain evidence to support its 
claims. The Magistrate Judge determined in his Order permitting 
intervention that, while [R.B. and S.B.] may contend that Wells 
Fargo's interest is "speculative or non-existent," the defendant 
"ought to be allowed to show otherwise" at trial. Wells Fargo's 
counterclaims—which seek declaratory judgment, equitable 
reinstatement, and foreclosure—all satisfy the requirements of 
8 
 
 
 
Fed. R. Civ. Pr. 8 of "a short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," and all of the 
claims advanced by Wells Fargo demonstrate a plausible and 
reasonable basis for potential relief. 
 
'The court further finds that the plaintiffs' Motion to 
Remand, filed four months after the Order allowing intervention, 
should also be denied. First, it is again an attempt by the 
plaintiffs to circumvent Rule 7.3's fourteen-day timing 
requirement for motions for reconsideration. Accordingly, the 
motion is denied for the same reasons as stated in the court's 
denial of the previous "Motion . . . For Review." 
 
'Further, the substance of the plaintiffs' jurisdictional 
challenges have been previously and properly rejected by Judge 
Waxse. The court has original jurisdiction to hear the action, as 
complete diversity exists among all the parties. Accordingly the 
plaintiffs' arguments relating to supplemental jurisdiction, 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), are irrelevant. The plaintiffs 
have failed to articulate any potential claims which could divest 
the court of jurisdiction. The requisite amount in controversy is 
satisfied by the plaintiff's own claims alleging that the value of 
their house exceeded $75,000, as well as their explicit assertions 
during discovery that they seek compensatory and punitive 
damages far in excess of this amount. Finally, the state 
foreclosure property action was properly dismissed by Wells 
Fargo pursuant to K.S.A. 60-241(a)(1) and plaintiffs have failed 
to demonstrate how any hypothetical and hitherto unpled claims 
might invalidate the court's jurisdiction. 
 
'The court notes that the defendants, in opposing the 
Motion to Remand, include a request for attorney fees as 
sanction against the plaintiffs for their repeated attempts to 
9 
 
 
 
relitigate issues previously decided by the court. In its discretion, 
the court denies the request for sanctions. In doing so, the court 
notes that the motions addressed herein were filed prior to the 
January 31, 2012 Order denying the plaintiffs' earlier attempt to 
circumvent Rule 7.3 [sic] However, plaintiffs are specifically 
admonished that any future attempts to relitigate issues already 
decided will likely result in the exercise of the court's inherent 
power to prevent such a waste of resources.' 
 
"64. 
The parties conducted 'exhaustive' discovery. During discovery, the 
parties served each other with requests for admission. The magistrate judge overruled the 
defendant's objections to five requests for admission. The magistrate judge imposed a 
$1,000 sanction on defendant's counsel for advancing objections to the requests for 
admissions, concluding that the defendant's objections were not advanced in good faith, 
were merely 'boilerplate' objections, and the information was readily available to 
defendants. The defendants filed an objection to the imposition of sanctions. The district 
court overruled the magistrate's decision and stated: 
 
'. . . This is not a case in which defendants have cavalierly 
advanced boilerplate objections to a plaintiff seeking targeted, 
relevant discovery. Rather, the plaintiffs have sought discovery 
through carpet bombing; the defendants' use of similar language 
in their objections provides no basis for sanctions.' 
 
"65. 
On March 19, 2012, 17 months after initiating the suit, the respondent 
filed an amended petition, adding First American Title Insurance Company as a 
necessary party, related to its alleged role in the execution and recording of the caveat. 
The amended petition added an additional count for violations of the Real Estate 
Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) and violations of the Kansas Consumer Protection 
Act.  
 
"66. 
On April 24, 2012, First American Title Insurance Company filed a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.  
10 
 
 
 
 
"67. 
On May 15, 2012, while First American Title Insurance Company's 
motion to dismiss the petition was pending and after extensive discovery between the 
plaintiffs and Wells Fargo, MERS, and L.S. had been completed, and without leave of 
court, the respondent filed a first amended petition against First American Title Insurance 
Company and a second amended petition against Wells Fargo, MERS, and L.S.  
 
"68. 
On May 17, 2012, Wells Fargo, MERS, and L.S. filed a motion to strike 
the second amended petition.  
 
"69. 
On May 29, 2012, Wells Fargo, MERS, and L.S. filed a motion for 
summary judgment on R.B. and S.B.'s claims as well as the defendants' counterclaims. 
Regarding the defendants' counterclaims, the defendants sought '(a) equitable 
reinstatement of the October, 2008 mortgage, (b) an equitable mortgage based on the 
terms of the proposed new loan, or (c) judgment on its claim of unjust enrichment against 
[R.B.].' 
 
"70. 
In her opening statement, the respondent stated that Wells Fargo could 
have allowed R.B. and S.B. to sign the mortgage and give them what they promised in 
the refinance. Even though defendants were alternatively seeking 'an equitable mortgage 
based on the terms of the proposed new loan,' the respondent never offered to settle the 
case in that fashion. Counsel for Wells Fargo testified that had the respondent offered to 
settle the case by having R.B. and S.B. close on a loan with the terms of the refinance, 
counsel would have recommended to her client that the settlement offer be accepted.  
 
"71. 
To clearly understand the respondent's offers of settlement, during the 
hearing, the hearing panel asked the respondent to provide documentation of all 
settlement offers made in the underlying litigation. The respondent provided what has 
been admitted as Exhibit 66. According to Exhibit 66, on April 7, 2011, prior to when 
Wells Fargo entered the case, the respondent offered to settle the dispute with MERS and 
L.S. as follows: 
 
11 
 
 
 
'The Kansas Consumer Protection Act violations for 
deceptive practices carries a $10,000.00 penalty as to [S.B.] and 
$20,000.00 as to [R.B.] as a civil statutory penalty for each 
deceptive misrepresentation and unconscionable act. Those are 
outlined in the pleading estimating 18 violations at $30,000.00 
for a total of $540,000.00 or a daily penalty of $30,000.00 which 
would be 510 days for a total of $15,300,000.00, plus my 
attorney fees at $250.00 per hour and their expenses.  
 
'As you are aware, the issue of fraud and robo-signing 
has been an increasingly hot topic in the media. The public is 
very aware of the impacts of your clients' actions. There is no 
defense for the claims raised. Kansas is conservative but 
generally distrusting of large corporations. I feel that the claims 
of negligence and fraud will result in a backlash from the jury in 
a $500,000.00 to $1 million dollar award relating to the fraud, 
based on income. 
 
'These claims can be combined. 
 
'I have discussed the proposition of settlement with my 
client. [sic] They have authorized me to settle all claims against 
MERS and [L.S.] for significantly less at $750,000.00, 
contingent on a release of the documents in question. I feel this 
is a substantial reduction of value, not much more than the 
statutory remedies, costs, and attorney fees which take into 
account the reduction in time and further expenses relating to the 
hearing.'  
 
 
"72. 
In Exhibit 66, the respondent also referenced an inference, an offer, and 
an acknowledgment regarding settlement between the plaintiffs and defendants, including 
Wells Fargo. However, the respondent failed to provide any evidence of the inference, 
12 
 
 
 
offer, and acknowledgment. Further, counsel for Wells Fargo denied that the respondent 
offered to settle the case with Wells Fargo.  
 
 
"73. 
The Honorable J. Thomas Marten testified during the hearing on the 
formal complaint. Judge Marten offered testimony on this subject:   
 
'No. Backing up to what I was saying early on is as one looks at 
this case, when everything else is cut away, [R.B. and S.B.] 
could have had their home, they could have had a lower 
payment. I think that they could have lived their lives in peace 
the few remaining years that they had, had they not been caught 
up in this vortex of—litigation. And I just found it sad because 
the [R.B. and S.B.], obviously, were good people. I think from 
some of the things I read in this case they lived in a mobile home 
for years and years that they bought on a contract for deed. They 
saved their money to buy this house. They went in to refinance 
the house, the refinancing was going to give them what they 
hoped to achieve, which was a slightly lower mortgage payment 
with a fixed rate mortgage, and somehow or another they end up, 
through a mistake that could have been corrected in 15 or 20 or 
30 minutes, they end up enduring years of litigation, losing their 
home through a foreclosure sale, ending up having to pay more 
in terms of attorney's fees and costs than what the home was 
worth. And none of that, as I look at this, was necessary. I just—
it—it really saddens me.' 
 
 
"74. 
On September 6, 2012, R.B. died. 
 
 
 
 
"75. 
On September 11, 2012, the district court granted First American Title 
Insurance Company's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court held 
that the claims of title slander, fraud, conversion, and negligence as well as the RESPA 
13 
 
 
 
violations were barred by the statute of limitations. The district court found the remaining 
claims were conclusory assertions that failed to meet legal pleading requirements.  
 
 
"76. 
On October 4, 2012, in a memorandum and order which includes nearly 
30 pages of findings of fact, the court granted the defendants' motion for summary 
judgment.  
 
"77. 
The court noted that the plaintiffs had two theories of damages. On the 
one hand, R.B. and S.B. were seeking statutory damages in the amount of $20,000 per 
day each from Wells Fargo, MERS, and L.S., personally. As of the date of settlement 
conference in June, 2011, the amount of damages sought exceeded $49 million, 
$16,530,000 from each of the three defendants. Alternatively, R.B. and S.B. sought 
$1,290,000 because of '43 false statements, unconscionable acts, and/or deceptive 
practices' in the two-page Caveat. 
 
"78. 
The court found that: 
 
'Until the fact was brought to his attention at his 
deposition on March 28, 2012, [R.B.] was not aware he had filed 
suit against [L.S.]. [R.B.] testified that, in his mind, [L.S.] and 
Wells Fargo go hand-in-hand. Although he seeks $16 million 
personally from [L.S.], [R.B.] does not believe [L.S.] bore him 
any ill will.'  
 
R.B. was unfamiliar with MERS. Additionally, the court noted that S.B. was unfamiliar 
with L.S. and MERS and did not know why she filed suit against L.S. and MERS. This is 
troubling to the hearing panel because while R.B. and S.B. thought they sued Wells 
Fargo, the respondent intentionally did not sue Wells Fargo and objected to Wells Fargo's 
motion to intervene. 
 
 
14 
 
 
 
"79. 
In the order, the court also found that: 
 
'. . . Wells Fargo's business records demonstrate that [C.M.] 
communicated with [R.B. and S.B.] on June 16 and 22, 
indicating that a closing would take place in June 2009. She 
discussed the specific dates of June 24th or June 25, 2009. 
Further it is uncontroverted that the same business records show 
that [C.M.] also telephoned or left messages with [R.B. and S.B.] 
on May 20, May 21, May 28, June 4, June 10, June 18, and June 
19, 2009.' 
 
Despite the court's findings and the respondent's exhibits which establish the court's 
findings, the respondent has repeatedly asserted that R.B. and S.B. were not aware that 
they had to go to a closing and sign additional documents or that the closing was set for 
June 24, 2009.  
 
"80. 
In the order, the court separately considered each of the respondent's 
claims made on behalf of R.B. and S.B., as follows: 
 
'Slander of title is the issuance of a false and malicious 
statement disparaging another person's title to real property and 
thereby damaging his interests. The requirement that the 
statement be malicious requires proof that the defendant did not 
act in good faith. 
 
'[R.B. and S.B.'s] slander of title claim rests on the 
recording of [the] Caveat but that document could not slander 
their title for the simple reason that it was true—[R.B. and S.B.] 
had not satisfied their obligations on the prior loan, and that the 
prior mortgage had been released in error. Accordingly, Wells 
Fargo was simply reasserting its claim on the property in a 
manner consistent with Kansas law. 
15 
 
 
 
 
'Nor was the Caveat malicious. In this context, 
maliciousness means doing a harmful act without an [sic] 
reasonable justification or excuse. [R.B. and S.B.] have produced 
no evidence that the defendants did not act in good faith in 
recording the Caveat, because Wells Fargo had a valid 
justification. . . . [R.B. and S.B.] have conceded that Wells Fargo 
retains some interest in the property, and thus it was not obliged 
to allow the record to continue to erroneously reflect that the 
property was unencumbered. By issuing the Caveat, the 
defendants advanced the public interest by warning third parties 
that the property was indeed subject to an existing and 
unsatisfied obligation. 
 
'Finally, though, it must be stressed that such third 
parties are hypothetical only. That is, [R.B. and S.B.] have 
remained in the Property. They have not attempted to sell it, and 
have no plans to do so. Indeed, the Caveat was only discovered 
in the consequence of the present litigation. Accordingly, the 
plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that they have been 
damaged in any way by the recording of the Caveat. 
 
'Conversion under Kansas law is the unauthorized 
exercise of dominion and control [over] "goods or personal 
chattels belonging to another." A mortgage lien interest is not an 
interest that is capable of being converted. According, [sic] [R.B. 
and S.B.'s] claim that the defendants converted their "chain of 
title" fails to state a claim under Kansas law. 
 
'[R.B. and S.B.'s] fraud claim asserts that the defendants 
committed fraud by recording [the] Caveat. Under Kansas law, 
fraud is "an untrue statement of fact, known to be untrue by the 
party making it, made with the intent to deceive or with reckless 
16 
 
 
 
disregard for the truth, upon which another party justifiably 
relies and acts to his or her detriment." Further, "[f]raud is never 
presumed and must be established by clear and convincing 
evidence." In the present case, [R.B. and S.B.'s] fraud claim fails 
because the Caveat represented a truthful statement (that [R.B. 
and S.B.] had not satisfied the underlying debt), and [R.B. and 
S.B.] never personally relied upon it (discovering only in the 
course of the present litigation), and did not do so to the 
detriment (since they have not attempted to sell their house and 
have failed to show that any third party has ever seen the 
document and acted against their interests[)]. 
 
'Next, [R.B. and S.B.'s] claim that the defendants acted 
negligently in recording the [C]aveat. The Court finds that this 
claim fails for the same reasons as [the] rest of [the] common 
law tort claims. The recording of the [C]aveat corrected the prior 
mistaken release of lien, and was an action authorized under 
Kansas law. As a result it did not breach any duty of due care 
owed to [R.B. and S.B.]. But the negligence claim also fails for a 
more fundamental reason. As lender and borrower, Wells Fargo 
and [R.B. and S.B.] had an adversarial relationship, and Wells 
Fargo was not obligated to act in [R.B. and S.B.'s] interest. 
Defendants MERS and [L.S.], acting as agents of Wells Fargo, 
similarly had no duty which was breached under the facts of the 
case. 
 
'The KCPA prohibits deceptive practices in consumer 
transactions. A consumer transaction is "a sale, lease, assignment 
or other disposition for value of property or services within the 
state . . . to a consumer." In the present case, the communications 
between [R.B. and S.B.] and Wells Fargo were financial 
communications relating to a mortgage obligation, and thus do 
not fall within the scope of the KCPA. Further, [R.B. and S.B.] 
17 
 
 
 
failed to state a claim under the KCPA because they have shown 
no deceptive practice. The Caveat, as noted above, corrected the 
earlier erroneous release of the mortgage lien. 
 
'Finally, [R.B. and S.B.] did not assert their RESPA 
claim until March, 2012, with their Amended Complaint. Such 
claims are subject to a one-year limitations period . . . Because 
[R.B. and S.B.'s] RESPA claim was brought more than one year 
after the closing of either the 2008 loan or the proposed new loan 
of 2009, the claim is time-barred.' 
 
"81. 
In the same order, the district court granted Wells Fargo's equitable 
counterclaim for reinstatement of the 2008 mortgage loan. The court also granted the 
defendants' motion to strike the second amended petition filed by the respondent, 
concluding that: 
 
'. . . given the extensive discovery conducted by the parties, 
coupled with the simultaneous and exhaustive briefing on 
dispositive motions, the defendants would be substantially 
prejudiced by such far-reaching changes to the plaintiffs' claims.' 
 
"82. 
Following the entry of summary judgment, the defendants sought to 
recover expenses including attorney's fees in the amount of $289,096.00 and expenses in 
the amount of $9,204.15, as authorized by the mortgage. One of Wells Fargo's arguments 
in favor of the entry of attorney[']s fees was based on the exhaustive discovery 
propounded by the plaintiffs. The respondent made 318 discovery requests on the three 
defendants.  
 
"83. 
On November 29, 2012, the respondent filed a motion to strike the 
defendants' memorandum in support of the motion for attorney[']s fees.  
 
18 
 
 
 
"84. 
On March 26, 2013, the district court granted the defendant's motion for 
summary judgment on the counterclaim for foreclosure and the defendant's motion for 
attorney[']s fees. The court denied the plaintiff's motion to strike. The court ordered R.B. 
and S.B. to pay defendant's counsel $289,096.00 in attorneys' fees and $9,204.15 in costs: 
 
'Considering all the relevant factors, the court finds the 
requested attorney fee award, although substantial, is justified. 
Notably, the award here is larger than the expected value of the 
underlying mortgage interest. However, this must be balanced 
against the voluntary actions of the plaintiffs who have caused 
the present action to metastasize beyond any reason. It was the 
plaintiffs who initiated the present action, bringing claims for 
damages against MERS and individually against [L.S.], one of 
Wells Fargo's employees, seeking a judgment of $16 million. 
Even though Wells Fargo was obviously a proper party to the 
action, plaintiffs vigorously sought to prevent its joining the 
case.' 
 
"85. 
The sanction ordered by the court exceeds the principal sum of the 
mortgage by more than $100,000.00. The district court noted the 'barrage of discovery' 
propounded by plaintiffs, and that the 'court [was] forced to admonish plaintiffs against 
the repetition of losing arguments.' At the hearing on this matter, Judge Marten 
explained: 
 
'Well, so much of that just rests on the actions of the plaintiffs 
and the filings in the case, the positions that plaintiff took, which 
resulted in the expenditure of far more time on the part of the 
lawyers than one would expect in this kind of a case. . . . [The 
sanction was] reasonable given the amount of work that was 
generated by plaintiff's handling of this action.'  
 
19 
 
 
 
"86. 
The respondent appealed the district court's orders to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. On February 24, 2014, the respondent filed her 
opening brief. In her statement of facts, the respondent failed to properly cite to the 
record on appeal. Additionally, rather than limit factual allegations to the statement of 
facts, the respondent included factual assertions throughout the brief. The vast majority of 
the respondent's factual assertions made in the argument portion of her brief did not 
include any citation to the record on appeal. Further, the respondent's brief is difficult to 
understand.  
 
"87. 
On April 28, 2014, S.B. died. As such, C.C., the administrator of S.B.'s 
estate, and B.B., the successor administrator for R.B.'s estate, became the named 
plaintiffs in R.B. and S.B.'s stead. 
 
"88. 
A three-member panel of the Tenth Circuit held oral argument on 
October 1, 2014. During the oral argument, panel members stated that they were unable 
to understand the case after reading the respondent's brief.  
 
"89. 
At the conclusion of the argument, the court asked the parties to provide 
evidence under Fed. R. App. Pro. 28(j) regarding whether Wells Fargo communicated a 
closing date to R.B.  
 
'CIRCUIT JUDGE:  Your time is up. Now, somebody is 
not telling us the truth. 
 
'MS. HUFFMAN:  I know. I have the truth right here, 
Your Honor. May I get these specific facts the specific page of 
exactly— 
 
'CIRCUIT JUDGE:  I would like you to submit that to 
us. 
 
'MS. HUFFMAN:  I will, Your Honor.  
20 
 
 
 
 
'CIRCUIT JUDGE:  And I would like you to answer the 
question of whether or not—or what evidence do you have that 
[R.B. and S.B.] were never contacted. To me it seems 
unbelievable. And it seems unbelievable that the caveat, which 
was filed because no new mortgage was ever executed. I don't 
understand why you filed suit on that. And I'm extremely 
concerned about the way this case has been briefed. 
 
'MS. HUFFMAN:  And may I address those three issues 
to the Court in a written supplement? 
  
'CIRCUIT JUDGE:  Yes, you may. 
 
'MS. HUFFMAN:  I can do that also now. Can I give 
the— 
 
'CIRCUIT JUDGE:  No, you can do it in written— 
 
'MS. HUFFMAN:  That's fine. That's why I'm asking. I 
just wanted you to know I was able. So I will provide that 
written supplement to the Court. And should I go ahead and 
submit these uncontroverted facts or should I just that [sic] make 
them an attachment?  
 
'CIRCUIT JUDGE:  Now, say that again. 
 
'MS. HUFFMAN:  Yes. Fact 220, no closing date was 
arranged by Wells or the title company. 
 
'CIRCUIT JUDGE:  Now, who is that—who is saying 
that,— 
 
21 
 
 
 
'MS. HUFFMAN:  That was our fact and they're going 
to agree to it in a second. The actual evidence is from Wells. It's 
Exhibit 61. It's an e-mail between Kessler at the title company 
and Wells on the internal investigation of what happened. It 
wasn't set up. That's uncontroverted at Volume IV, page 702. 
The other couple very good ones and I'll— 
 
'CIRCUIT JUDGE:  Just a minute. 
 
'MS. HUFFMAN:  Yes. 
 
'CIRCUIT JUDGE:  Counsel, do you have any record 
evidence that Wells were—or [R.B. and S.B.] were given a date 
for closing? 
 
'MS. DONNELLI:  Your Honor, there was an 
anticipated given and correspondence went out. 
 
'CIRCUIT JUDGE:  Do you have evidence of that? 
 
'MS. DONNELLI:  Yes, there is evidence of that and I 
can provide the record cite to the Court.  
 
'CIRCUIT JUDGE:  Would you please do it and send us 
a 28(j) letter. And you send us a 28(j) letter with anything you've 
got that supports the allegations that you have made in this case. 
 
'MS. HUFFMAN:  Yes, sir. 
 
'CIRCUIT JUDGE:  I'll be real honest with you, I've 
never seen a case as poorly put together as this one.' 
 
 
22 
 
 
 
Fed. R. App. Pro. 28(j) provides: 
 
'Citation of Supplemental Authorities. If pertinent and significant 
authorities come to a party's attention after the party's brief has 
been filed—or after oral argument but before decision—a party 
may promptly advise the circuit clerk by letter, with a copy to all 
other parties, setting forth the citations. The letter must state the 
reasons for the supplemental citations, referring either to the 
page of the brief or to a point argued orally. The body of the 
letter must not exceed 350 words. Any response must be made 
promptly and must be similarly limited.' 
 
"90. 
In response to the court's invitation to provide the evidence regarding 
whether Wells Fargo communicated a closing date to R.B., the respondent sent the court 
(five or) six letters with attachments. Many of the attachments were identical.  
 
"91. 
Generally, rather than directly address whether Wells Fargo 
communicated a closing date to R.B., the respondent provided confusing information on 
a variety of subjects. Two of the letters and attachments were identical—J3 and J7. The 
record is unclear whether the respondent sent both of those letters to the Tenth Circuit or 
whether the respondent inadvertently included two copies of the same letter and 
attachments in her exhibits in the instant case. 
 
"92. 
Specifically, on October 15, 2014, the respondent sent the Tenth Circuit 
a letter and attachments. Included in the attachments was a copy of part of Wells Fargo's 
computerized system of recording communications found at Exhibit A-H53. In this letter 
to the Tenth Circuit, the respondent relied on certain pages of A-H53 to establish certain 
facts. However, the respondent failed to provide the Tenth Circuit with the portions of 
Exhibit A-H53 which established the communication between Wells Fargo and R.B. 
regarding closing.  
 
23 
 
 
 
"93. 
Further, the respondent did not attempt to address the court's question 
about the communication of a closing date until her final post-argument letter to the 
court, dated October 27, 2014. In the body of the letter, the respondent failed to disclose 
the district court's findings regarding communications between Wells Fargo and R.B. 
regarding closing on the refinance. Additionally, the respondent failed to attach Exhibit 
A-H53, Wells Fargo's computerized system of recording communications which 
preserved the communications between Wells Fargo and R.B. regarding the status of the 
refinance and the tentative closing date.  
 
"94. 
In its written opinion, on November 12, 2014, the Tenth Circuit, 
addressing each of respondent's arguments on appeal, affirmed the district court. The 
Tenth Circuit concluded that the respondent either failed to establish any error or the 
respondent's arguments were supported by inadequate explanation or no legal support.  
 
"95. 
On December 1, 2014, the respondent petitioned the Tenth Circuit for 
rehearing en banc. On December 12, 2014, the Tenth Circuit denied the motion.  
 
"96. 
Wells Fargo paid its attorneys more than $600,000.00 to defend this suit. 
 
"The Foreclosure Action 
 
"97. 
As stated in ¶ 60 above, on December 20, 2010, Wells Fargo filed a 
mortgage foreclosure action against R.B. and S.B. in Shawnee County District Court 
Case 10-CV-1808. The petition was properly served on December 23, 2010. On January 
3, 2011, the respondent entered her appearance as counsel for R.B. and S.B. and 
requested a 14-day clerk's extension to answer or otherwise respond.  
 
"98. 
On January 6, 2011, Wells Fargo filed a Motion for Order of Dismissal, 
based on the litigation pending in federal court filed by R.B. and S.B. against MERS and 
L.S. At the time the motion was filed, the respondent had not filed an answer on behalf of 
R.B. and S.B.  
 
24 
 
 
 
"99. 
On January 7, 2011, Wells Fargo's attorney emailed the respondent and 
informed her that the action was dismissed. The respondent confirmed receipt of the 
email by responding to it.  
 
"100. 
Even though the respondent knew the case was dismissed, on January 14, 
2011, the respondent filed an answer and counterclaim. The respondent alleged 
conversion and violations of the KCPA. The respondent also filed a response to Wells 
Fargo's motion to dismiss, alleging the district court had jurisdiction to hear the matter 
because R.B. and S.B. were granted an extension of time to file an answer.  
 
"101. 
On February 4, 2011, the respondent filed a motion to amend and an 
amended answer and counterclaim asserting claims for breach of contract, breach of the 
duty of good faith and fair dealing, violations of RESPA, violation of the Truth in 
Lending Act, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, slander of credit, conversion, fraud 
and misrepresentation, outrageous conduct causing severe emotional distress, and 
violations of the KCPA.  
 
"102. 
After receiving the respondent's motion to amend and amended answer 
and counterclaim, counsel for Wells Fargo wrote to the court seeking information on the 
procedural status of the action.  
 
"103. 
The district court allowed both parties to provide arguments and 
authorities in support of their respective positions. Consequently, on March 4, 2011, the 
respondent filed a reply to the letter brief, alleging that R.B. and S.B.'s counterclaim was 
pled prior to the service of Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss. On March 19, 2012, the 
respondent filed a second motion to amend, seeking to amend the first amended answer 
and counterclaim.  
 
 
"104. 
On March 23, 2012, the court held a hearing on whether the court had a 
foreclosure action before it. The court ruled that the case was dismissed upon the filing of 
Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss. The court directed Wells Fargo to prepare a journal 
entry and send it to the respondent under a local 10-day rule.  
25 
 
 
 
 
"105. 
Without waiting for the journal entry, on April 2, 2012, the respondent 
filed a premature notice of appeal.  
 
"106. 
On April 4, 2012, counsel for Wells Fargo submitted a proposed 
Administrative Order regarding the dismissal to the district court. On April 9, 2012, the 
court entered the order, memorializing its earlier ruling that the case was dismissed upon 
the filing of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss.  
 
"107. 
On May 1, 2012, the respondent filed a motion to set aside or amend the 
order entered April 9, 2012. In the motion, the respondent alleged that counsel for Wells 
Fargo engaged in misrepresentation or misconduct under K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 60-
260(b)(3), by falsely representing that the respondent approved the order. The respondent 
sought sanctions. On June 25, 2012, the court denied the respondent's motion. 
 
 
"108. 
On July 27, 2012, the respondent filed a notice of appeal. On July 19, 
2013, the Kansas Court of Appeals upheld the district court's orders.  
 
"Case No. 14-CV-4020 
 
"109. 
On December 12, 2013, while the appeal in case 10-CV-4141 was 
pending in the Tenth Circuit, the respondent filed another lawsuit in Shawnee County 
District Court, case 13-CV-1416, alleging the same claims that were on appeal in 10-CV-
4141, against Wells Fargo Bank, Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, and the law firm 
representing Wells Fargo in the foreclosure action. The claims made against the law firm 
were premised entirely on its actions in seeking to protect Wells Fargo's mortgage 
interest in the property.  
 
"110. 
On March 25, 2014, the defendants removed the case to the United States 
District Court for the District of Kansas, case number 14-CV-4020.  
 
26 
 
 
 
"111. 
On April 14, 2014, Wells Fargo filed a motion to dismiss the petition 
based on res judicata. On May 5, 2014, the law firm defendant filed a motion to dismiss. 
The respondent sought and received multiple extensions of time to file a response to the 
motions to dismiss. 
 
"112. 
Subsequently, on June 27, 2014, without leave of court, the respondent 
filed an amended petition, which advanced no new cause of action. The amended petition 
simply reworded a few of the allegations from the petition initially filed. Then, on June 
29, 2014, again without leave of court, the respondent filed a motion to substitute the 
amended petition with a second amended petition. Included with the motion was a 
declaration and the second amended petition. In the declaration, the respondent averred 
that: 
 
'Upon further reflection and consideration[,] the 
concerns that I have relating to the previous harsh words as 
consistent reminders by quoting this Court and raised in nearly 
every case I am Counsel, I felt regret that I did not plead in 
accordance with my true belief that this was not the original 
Note and insert more of the problems which occurred by the late 
and ever changing production in [R.B. and S.B.] v [sic] MERS.' 
 
"113. 
On September 12, 2014, the respondent filed a response to the two 
motions to dismiss which included a reply in support of the respondent's motion to amend 
the petition.  
 
"114. 
On December 30, 2014, the district court granted the motions to dismiss 
based on res judicata. The district court concluded that: 
 
 
 
'[10-CV-4141] was litigated fully. The plaintiffs [sic] 
claims included fraud, slander of title, conversion of "chain of 
title," breach of contract, anticipatory repudiation, negligence, 
detrimental reliance, unjust enrichment, violation of the Real 
27 
 
 
 
Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) and of the Kansas 
Consumer Protection Act (KCPA). The docket in that action 
comprises 393 separate pleadings and other events. In its 
summary judgment Order, the court explicitly recognized the 
discovery in that action was "extensive" and the briefing 
"exhaustive." This is [an] understatement. Wells Fargo grounded 
its summary judgment motion on 159 paragraphs of factual 
contentions. The plaintiffs controverted many of these facts, and 
asserted a further 102 paragraphs. The court resolved all factual 
and legal issues in the case in a lengthy opinion. The court 
granted summary judgment on Wells Fargo's counterclaim after 
receiving additional factual allegations and legal argument[.] 
 
'[14-CV-4020] repeats the allegations advanced [in the 
earlier case], again focusing on the inadvertent release of lien 
and Wells Fargo's attempt to correct the error. Accordingly, the 
court finds that plaintiffs' claims are subject to dismissal under 
the doctrine of res judicata, which precludes the relitigation of 
issues which were previously litigated.' 
 
The court concluded that the claims were also time barred. In conclusion, the court noted: 
 
'More fundamentally, the allegation is emblematic of the 
entire case, first presented in [10-CV-4141] and now here. The 
passing of [S.B.] is unfortunate, as is the passing of her husband 
before her. It is doubly unfortunate that [R.B. and S.B.'s] last 
years were marked by the meritless litigation urged on by their 
counsel. The present litigation, . . ., is both unfortunate and 
unnecessary.' 
 
"115. 
On January 27, 2015, the respondent filed a motion to alter or amend the 
court's judgment dismissing the case, again seeking relief for claims which had been 
28 
 
 
 
repeatedly dismissed. The respondent based her motion on Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56. Fed. R. 
Civ. Pro. 56 provides procedures for filing a motion for summary judgment; not motions 
to alter or amend a judgment.  
 
"116. 
In the motion to alter or amend the judgment, the respondent did not 
allege a mistake in the facts or a mistake in the law as required. The respondent failed to 
present any newly-discovered evidence which would support reconsideration. Rather, the 
respondent's motion to alter or amend the judgment, was 'a repetition of earlier arguments 
made' in 10-CV-4141 and 14-CV-4020.  
 
"117. 
Additionally, in the motion to alter or amend the judgment dismissing the 
case, the respondent accused the judge of wrongdoing, directly and by innuendo. 
Specifically, the respondent stated: 
 
'. . . The Court has a belief of what has happened and tells a story 
but appears to rely on assumptions, not supported by the record,  
. . . [.] 
 
. . . [.] 
 
'. . . [T]he Court rulings in this case seem to turn a blind eye to 
those problems.  
 
. . . [.] 
 
'. . . There can be no doubt there was a problem and that should 
not be ignored by this Court for judicial economy or to further 
protect Wells Fargo from the Plaintiffs who have not only a 
colorable claim, but a prima facie claim on some acts.  
 
. . . [.] 
 
29 
 
 
 
'The commentary punctuates the socio[-]economic 
disconnect of the Court with these clients and generally the 
middle class public, particularly of color, who cannot afford the 
fights and discovery obstruction of the banks. The Court in this 
case ignored the admission that Wells did not own FHA 
Mortgages and reinstated an FHA instrument just removing the 
FHA protections generally. [R.B. and S.B.] took that in stride 
even though the Court made observations that were offensive 
and just accepted the ever changing word and position of Wells 
Fargo.  
 
. . . [.] 
 
'The Court is here to hear and decide cases but at every 
turn accepted Wells [sic] version over [R.B. and S.B.]. [R.B. and 
S.B.] knew they were likely to lose the house but they were 
entitled [to] the right to defend. Counsel can't look at individuals 
trying to defend and tell them it is a foregone conclusion. [R.B. 
and S.B.] are entitled [to] their day in Court. Being a man with a 
middleschool [sic] education from the Jim Crow South born to 
the cottonfields of Tennessee he was no stranger to being 
slighted and on the short end of the stick. 
 
. . . [.] 
 
'[R.B. and S.B.] and this Counsel have full respect of the Court 
thought [sic] frankly it appears that it may not run both ways.' 
 
"118. 
On February 27, 2015, Wells Fargo filed a four-page response in 
opposition to the respondent's motion to alter or amend the judgment.  
 
"119. 
On March 10, 2015, the respondent filed a request for an extension of 
time to file a reply to Wells Fargo's response to her motion to alter or amend the court's 
30 
 
 
 
judgment dismissing the case. The court denied the respondent's request for extension of 
time to file a reply.  
 
"120. 
Thereafter, on March 12, 2015, the respondent filed a five-page motion 
for reconsideration of the court's denial (of the respondent's motion for an extension of 
time to file a reply to Wells Fargo's response to the respondent's motion to alter or amend 
the court's judgment dismissing the case).  
 
a. 
In the motion, the respondent insinuated that the court found the 
respondent's advocacy 'distasteful.' 
 
'There has been markedly different treatment between requests 
by this solo counsel and large firm counsel in both cases. An attorney 
with a firm of 50 or more local attorneys and multiple support staff is no 
questions asked, contrary to a disabled solo with no support staff 
providing more details to show cause still less favorable results.' 
 
b. 
The respondent argued that 'a homeowner should be able to defend his 
homestead without the critical commentary of the Court or under apparent threat.' 
The 'threat' that the respondent referenced is unclear to the hearing panel.  
 
c. 
In the motion, the respondent also referenced litigation filed by I. Dennis 
Hawver. The respondent implied that the judge was treating the parties 
differently because Mr. Hawver referenced the respondent in litigation. 
 
'The differences might also be attributable to some hostility upon 
possible assumptions. Since this Counsel has recently found out that 
Your Honor has been sued and that somehow my name was provided as 
an example of something the party finds egregious it just casts doubts 
upon the case. I have not read a petition nor do I desire to do so however 
I am not a party and have not participated but know [sic] knowing Your 
Honor is in that case leaves unanswered questions and reservations.' 
 
31 
 
 
 
d. 
In her motion, the respondent quoted Friedrich Nietzsche, a German 
philosopher:  'All things are subject to interpretation. Whichever interpretation 
prevails at a given time is a function of power and not truth.' By including that 
quote in her motion, the respondent implied that the court made its decisions 
based on power not based on truth. 
 
e. 
Finally, the respondent argued, 'I have no doubt that with a different 
judge [R.B. and S.B.] would have had a different result. As is true any day of the 
week in any of the courts.' 
 
"121. 
The court denied the motion to reconsider and the motion to alter or 
amend. In denying the motion to reconsider (the motion for extension of time to file a 
reply to the defendants' response to the motion to alter or amend), the court stated, '[t]he 
suggestion that the court has not been accommodating to counsel or bears her any 
personal animosity is completely devoid of any rational basis in fact.'  
 
"122. 
On August 12, 2014, Wells Fargo filed a motion for sanctions against the 
respondent. Prior to filing the motion to sanctions, counsel for Wells Fargo provided the 
respondent with a copy of the motion, and suggested that the respondent avoid the motion 
by dismissing the suit. The respondent refused to dismiss the lawsuit, comparing the 
litigation to Plessy v. Ferguson.  
 
"123. 
After the motion for sanctions was filed, the respondent sought repeated 
extensions of time to respond to the motion. On December 22, 2014, the respondent filed 
a response. In the response, the respondent asserted: 
 
'Counsel has extensive mortgage litigation experience 
and even more extensive mortgage industry experience. I have 
consistently sought to have the minimum required standing as 
the party in interest which is under the plain language of the 
statute the owner of the Mortgage, not the Note. Discovery 
32 
 
 
 
obstruction and misrepresentations by Ms. Donnelli has [sic] 
been [R.B. and S.B.'s] problem. 
 
'The idea that this Counsel should not be able to hail 
Wells Fargo into court when they knew they had an assignment 
presented to the Tenth Circuit that they failed to provide this 
Court and was known to be contrary to their consent orders and 
also triggered a statutory disclosure which was concealed is the 
motivation for the pleading not an actual articulated Rule 11 
violation. Rather protection and control from known additional 
acts even when there can be no doubt that the underlying claims 
were never disposed of in summary judgment as they were 
always part of another action.  
 
'Notably, the mantra of Wells that haunted [R.B. and 
S.B.] was attempted to beaddressed [sic] in the Rule 11 notice to 
Ms. Donnelli that sat under an unheard motion for a protective 
order for nearly a year. 
 
'This Court in hindsight can see that the law moves 
favorably for the consumers. Wells is pleading in broad strokes 
but that is not what is required under Rule 11. There is no doubt 
that this specific counsel is a thorn in their side but that is no 
reason for the Court to be duped into allowing signing Counsel 
to stop litigation which is intended to protect consumers and is 
not only supported but definitely where the law has moved.  
 
. . . [.] 
 
'An interesting perspective for the Court may be to read 
the story of [R.B. and S.B.'s case] using only what Wells 
specifically stated was "uncontroverted" [sic] Exhibit 9 from the 
first page until FN3 on the last page is comprised 100% of the 
33 
 
 
 
facts in [R.B. and S.B.'s case] that the parties agreed, specifically 
Wells, agreed were uncontraverted. [sic] Exhibit 10 is a short list 
of the specific support for this statement. The objective facts are 
that we recognize this Court found [R.B.] a "sophisticated 
borrower" so it is a legal reality, but even a "sophisticated 
borrower" can maintain actions pled in this case which were 
always subjects of a different case and not included in the 
summary judgment. 
 
'Even though the legal fact is [R.B.] was sophisticated 
this Counsel can maintain an objective knowledge that [R.B.] 
only had a middle school education in the Jim Crow south and 
was embarrassed in his deposition because he could barely read. 
Should it be now that every individual with a middleschool [sic] 
education is sophisticated and none may maintain actions? I 
don't think this Court intended on that proposition nor would I 
fail to plead for a client with a GED that they have defenses. Nor 
does Rule 11 expect this Counsel to do so.  
 
'The Court should at least be interested, if not have a 
duty, to look into the conduct of Wells, especially now with this 
"assignment" concealed from this Court during the last [case 
involved R.B. and S.B.] Do we let bully banks run the few 
borrower attorneys out of the courtroom or just the ones who 
have actual industry knowledge and can muster support from 
industry experts. The Court was never aprised, [sic] as the 
situation did not arise, that the "expert" for Wells clearly 
perjured himself during the deposition. [S.B.] was forced to 
watch this however her pure spirit provided express consent to 
release the deposition so that others facing him as an expert 
could benefit from what we had started. In the last instance that 
this Counsel is aware of the contact for that firm advised that he 
left the room in tears after being faced with that deposition. . . . 
34 
 
 
 
 
'An attorney should not be forced to ignore what they 
know or be afraid to approach the Court. I admit to being fearful, 
not that what I have pled is wrong or is not supported I have full 
faith that isn't the case, but rather from the harsh reprisals of this 
Court when impacting my reputation with the discovery 
comments which, again with every due respect, were not 
analyzed and contrary to what I expected as a mortgage 
professional for over 15 years prior to the pleading.  
 
'Given the opportunity to delve into the issues, this 
Counsel strongly believes the Court will come to the realization 
that Wells pulled the wool over his eyes. If that is not the case, it 
is still not a Rule 11 violation to plead these claims which were 
not resolved, which were under court process at a parallel time, 
and which were newly discovered.  
 
'When deceit abounds this Court cannot ignore that [R.B. 
and S.B.] may maintain a cause of action and should be allowed 
to prove the constructive fraud, [sic] 
 
. . . [.] 
 
'[R.B. and S.B.'s case] continues to discover issues and 
the Court should not be trampling on [R.B. and S.B.'s] graves or 
this Counsel by another harsh remedy without first doing an 
inquiry into these facts and new situations. The Court owes it to 
me to look me in the eyes before rendering more reputational 
damage.  
 
. . . [.] 
 
35 
 
 
 
'All jurists are generally aware that Plessy v. Ferguson 
was our Supreme Court establishing well settled "separate but 
equal." It took about 70 years for attorneys to make the headway 
to what we all know as a truism, separate cannot be equal which 
was developed by a series of cases finally now well settled in 
Brown v. Board of Education. 
 
. . . [.] 
 
'Wells uses this motion to chill litigation and Counsel 
uses this motion to avoid inquiry on the issues known to those 
who have watched the national crisis and these facts develop 
over the last 3 years, a fast track of changes in newly emerging 
areas of law.  
 
'If the Court merely wants to stop litigation for any 
borrowers then the fastest way to do it is more sharp tongued 
commentary or granting this motion. However, this Counsel can 
be beat to the ground but eventually another will stand in my 
place. The Court can take sides now or judicially allow the case 
to proceed and facts to be developed. The issues were bigger 
than [R.B. and S.B.] and they are bigger than these two Counsel 
but no Court should stand by and not take a second look when 
more conflicting documents arise particularly when that specific 
assignment triggered statutory notice if not equitable notice and 
was concealed until presented to another Court for reliance 
which did or may have impacted the ultimate outcome of the 
case.'  
 
"124. 
On March 18, 2015, the district court considered Wells Fargo's motion 
for sanctions. 
 
36 
 
 
 
'In determining whether to assess sanctions, the court 
takes note of the substantial award of attorney fees granted Wells 
Fargo in [10-CV-4141]. However, the award in [10-CV-4141] 
served no punitive purpose. The amount of fees was never 
directly challenged by the plaintiffs. Rather, the court stressed 
that the size of the award was directly proportional to the 
"unbounded aggressive strategy" employed by plaintiffs' actions 
in extensive and needless discovery and meritless legal 
argument. The court further noted that it had been explicitly 
forced to "admonish plaintiff against the repetition of losing 
arguments." 
 
'Rather than taking these repeated admonitions to heart, 
counsel instituted [14-CV-4020], and has never presented any 
colorable rationale why the principle of res judicata would not 
apply. Moreover, none of the considerations recognized in other 
cases as mitigating against an award of sanctions is present here. 
The motion for sanctions is not directed at a pro se litigant, but at 
counsel. There was no intervening court decision which might 
arguable [sic] justify the filing of a second action. The court 
concludes that the filing of [14-CV-4020] was not objectively 
reasonable. 
 
'Amount of Sanctions 
 
'Plaintiffs' response to the Motion for Sanctions wholly 
fails to address the appropriate type or amount of sanctions to be 
imposed in light of the factors recognized in White. The 
response, moreover, fails to even acknowledge the elements of 
res judicata. Indeed, the response mentions the doctrine in a 
single passage, in its conclusion, with plaintiffs suggesting the 
doctrine is irrelevant in [14-CV-4020] because "the claims pled 
were not before the Court" previously in [10-CV-4141]. This 
37 
 
 
 
misunderstands res judicata, which as noted in the court's earlier 
Order, applies to claims which were or could have been brought 
in the earlier action. . . . [P]laintiffs' claims in [14-CV-4020] "all 
related in time, space and origin to the relevant facts in [10-CV-
4141] complaint," and arise "out of the same transaction or series 
of connected transactions," and are consequently barred by res 
judicata. 
 
'No amount of intemperate language can remedy this 
legal flaw. Indeed, counsel's hyperbolic language ("this Counsel 
can be beat to the ground but eventually another will stand in 
my place" and "[t]he issues in [14-CV-4020] were bigger than 
[R.B. and S.B.] and they are bigger than these two Counsel") 
raises the concern that even now counsel fails to understand 
[the] finality of the court's orders, thereby directly highlighting 
the need for some minimum sanction sufficient to deter [another 
lawsuit].' 
 
Concluding that the time to end this litigation was well past, the court granted the motion 
for sanctions and enjoined the respondent from 'filing any future litigation on behalf of 
[R.B. and S.B.] or their estate representatives.' 
 
"125. 
At the hearing on this matter, Judge Marten testified about the 
respondent's hyperbolic and intemperate language, the injunction, and the sanction 
imposed:   
 
'Q. 
You delayed that decision, but over on page 797, you 
raised a concern about what you consider to be 
intemperant [sic] and hyperbolic language. Would you 
explain that, please? 
 
38 
 
 
 
'A. 
Yes. The concerns that I see in—and if I might back up a 
little bit on this, too, one of the lessons that I learned 
pretty early on, and I had some great mentors in this 
respect, were if you take your eye off of what you're 
trying to accomplish, if you get distracted by opposing 
counsel, irritation with them or irritation with the judge, 
you lose your focus on what you're really trying to 
accomplish, and that does not serve your clients well. 
And, so, when I read comments like "this counsel can be 
beat to the ground, but eventually another will stand in 
my place," first of all, it was hard for me to understand 
why that kind of a statement would be made, given the 
conduct of opposing counsel in this case. And in my 
view, and I know it's only mine, but I bent over 
backward, I think, in this case to try to be fair to [R.B. 
and S.B.] and their counsel. And nothing that I said or 
did was intended to beat anybody to the ground at all. 
 
'It was simply to point out, you know, you're 
practicing law, you're in court here, there are certain 
things you have to do, there are certain things that you 
shouldn't do, and keep these things in mind as we go 
along. 
 
'And the finality of the court's orders was one of 
these things. I've told lawyers before, if you're in court to 
do anything or to prove anything other than your case to 
the trier of fact, you're in the wrong place. And there 
may have been some larger claim of conspiracy or some 
thought that Wells Fargo, and it certainly had its share of 
bad press over the past few years with some of the things 
that have happened there, but I never saw anything that 
smacked of anything other than utter good faith on the 
39 
 
 
 
part of the defendants in this case. And, frankly, I think 
that [R.B. and S.B.], the parties probably—you know, I 
think most clients are influenced by their counsel, and I 
have no idea what Ms. Huffman was advising them as 
they went along, but it seemed to me, given their 
answers in depositions and so forth, that they were just 
kind of following a lead that was provided to them. And 
I think that the language about beating counsel to the 
ground and somebody else stepping up and taking place 
and that the case being much bigger than [R.B. and 
S.B.], well, for me the case was [R.B. and S.B.] they 
were dealing with and, again, trying to resolve the 
matter. So, I found the language intemperate and 
hyperbolic. 
 
'Q. 
You indicated you were concerned about whether or not, 
even at that point, Ms. Huffman understood the finality 
of the orders? 
 
'A. 
Yes. 
 
'Q. 
So you took what probably is kind of an unusual action 
in this case in terms of a sanction? 
 
'A. 
I think I have granted sanctions in two cases. One was 
very early on in my career and it was pretty mild. And, 
actually, I thought even this sanction that I imposed 
here, after I asked the Wells Fargo folks to provide their 
time and billing records and so forth to me, was much, 
much lower, obviously, than what they had requested in 
the way of—of sanctions. And, again, it was—I didn't 
want to punish anybody. I simply wanted to make the 
point that we have rules that have to be followed, and 
40 
 
 
 
you can only ignore them so many times before it's 
obvious that the message is not getting through.  
 
'Q. 
Here you—on page 797 of Exhibit 42 you enjoined Ms. 
Huffman from filing any further litigation on behalf of 
[R.B. and S.B.] or their estate— 
 
'A. 
Yes. 
 
'Q. 
—representatives? And I think there was a request from 
Wells Fargo that you do that. 'Um, have you ever done 
that before, enjoining somebody from filing any further 
litigation? 
 
'A. 
Only one other party, and it was a pro se filer who had 
significant mental health issues, and he was attempting 
to file things like packets of ketchup with the court. And 
he was somebody who would get on his meds and be 
fine, then he'd go off his meds thinking he was fine, and 
he would be back with a paper bag full of papers and 
other items that—that—but I think that this is the only 
other time that I have prohibited or enjoined someone 
from filing a case. And, of course, this was only on 
behalf of [R.B. and S.B.]. It didn't extend beyond that.' 
 
 
"126. 
On April 17, 2015, prior to the date the district court determined the 
amount of sanctions, the respondent filed a notice of appeal, appealing eight orders 
entered by the district court to the Tenth Circuit.  
 
 
"127. 
Counsel for Wells Fargo sought $49,907.52 in attorney[']s fees and 
$461.24 in expenses. To ensure that the underlying conduct would not be repeated in the 
future, on June 18, 2015, the court assessed a $5,000 sanction against the respondent. The 
respondent paid the sanction.  
41 
 
 
 
 
"128. 
In early February, 2016, the respondent attempted to file her opening 
brief. The Tenth Circuit rejected her brief because it was deficient. On February 11, 2016, 
the respondent filed her opening brief. Thereafter, the defendants' filed responsive briefs.  
 
 
"129. 
On March 2, 2017, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the grant 
of summary judgment and the award of sanctions, finding that the respondent's argument 
'made no sense and was hard to follow,' was 'unsupported by the record,' was 'meritless,' 
and was 'woefully inadequate.'  
 
 
"130. 
On March 16, 2017, respondent petitioned the Tenth Circuit for 
rehearing en banc. On March 28, 2017, the Tenth Circuit denied the motion.  
 
 
"131. 
Wells Fargo paid its attorneys more than $100,000.00 to defend this suit.  
 
 
"132. 
In 2012, Matthew Boddington filed a complaint with the disciplinary 
administrator's office. In Mr. Boddington's complaint, he made a reference to the 
litigation involving R.B. and S.B. Mr. Boddington, however, was not involved in R.B. 
and S.B.'s cases.  
 
"Conclusions of Law 
 
 
"133. 
Based upon the findings of fact, the hearing panel unanimously 
concludes as a matter of law that the respondent violated KRPC 1.1 (competence), KRPC 
3.1 (meritorious claims), KRPC 3.3 (candor to the tribunal), KRPC 3.5 (impartiality and 
decorum of the tribunal), KRPC 8.2 (judicial and legal officials), and KRPC 8.4 
(professional misconduct), as detailed below. 
 
"134. 
The hearing panel also concludes that the disciplinary administrator did 
not present clear and convincing evidence that the respondent violated KRPC 3.2 
(expediting litigation) and KRPC 3.4 (fairness to opposing counsel). The allegations that 
the respondent violated KRPC 3.2 and KRPC 3.4 are dismissed. 
42 
 
 
 
 
 
"135. 
The hearing panel concludes that the allegations that the respondent 
violated KRPC 3.3 (candor to the tribunal) for making false and disparaging statements 
regarding Judge Marten constitute violations of KRPC 3.5 (impartiality and decorum of 
the tribunal) rather than KRPC 3.3. Accordingly, the allegations that the respondent 
violated KRPC 3.3 are dismissed. 
 
"136. 
Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 202 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  
 
'A certificate of a conviction of an attorney for any crime 
or of a civil judgment based on clear and convincing evidence 
shall be conclusive evidence of the commission of that crime or 
civil wrong in any disciplinary proceeding instituted against said 
attorney based upon the conviction or judgment. . . . All other 
civil judgments shall be prima facie evidence of the findings 
made therein and shall raise a presumption as to their validity. 
The burden shall be on the respondent to disprove the findings 
made in the civil judgment.' 
 
The disciplinary administrator relies on orders, judgments, and opinions of the United States 
District Court for the District of Kansas, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 
the Shawnee County District Court, and the Kansas Court of Appeals. Under Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 
202, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent failed to disprove the findings made in the 
civil judgments and, as a result, the hearing panel accepts the orders, judgments, and opinions 
entered into the underlying civil cases. 
 
"KRPC 1.1 
 
 
"137. 
Lawyers must provide competent representation to their clients. KRPC 
1.1. 'Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and 
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.' Id. The hearing panel 
acknowledges that the respondent is experienced in the field of mortgage lending and 
43 
 
 
 
represented her clients as a zealous advocate. However, the respondent's experience in 
mortgage lending, is not tantamount to competence as a mortgage litigator. 
 
 
"138. 
The hearing panel concludes that the respondent failed to provide 
competent representation to R.B. and S.B. when she failed to offer to settle the case by 
seeking to have her clients close on a mortgage under the terms negotiated in 2009.  
 
"139. 
The hearing panel also concludes that the respondent lacked the ability to 
understand when she had a losing case. She failed to recognize how to resolve the case to 
her clients' benefit. 
 
"140. 
Further the following instances, taken together also establish the 
respondent's lack of competence as a litigator:   
 
a. 
The respondent failed to timely file two motions:  (1) a 
motion to reconsider the magistrate judge's order allowing removal to 
federal court and (2) a motion to reconsider the magistrate judge's order 
allowing Wells Fargo to intervene. The respondent filed the two motions 
more than four months after the order, rather than within 14 days as 
required by the court rules.  
 
b. 
The respondent alleged that the federal court lacked 
jurisdiction over MERS. The respondent failed to recognize that the 
requirements of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction was satisfied.  
 
c. 
In 10-CV-4141, the respondent filed an amended 
petition without seeking leave of court to do so. Additionally, in 14-CV-
4020, the respondent filed an amended petition and a motion to substitute 
the amended petition with a second amended petition, again, without 
seeking leave of court to do so.  
 
d. 
The respondent failed to properly plead claims in a 
petition; rather, the respondent simply made conclusory assertions.  
44 
 
 
 
 
e. 
The respondent included claims in her petitions and 
amended petitions that were well outside the statute of limitations.  
 
f. 
The respondent did not adequately explain to her clients 
who they filed suit against; or conversely, the respondent failed to file 
suit against the party which her clients intended her to sue.  
 
g. 
The respondent included claims for conversion in the 
petitions and amended petitions. Conversion is the unauthorized exercise 
of dominion and control of goods or personal chattels. The causes of 
action did not involve goods or personal chattels.  
 
h. 
Before the Tenth Circuit and in her representation of 
herself in the instant case, the respondent relied on and presented 
documents which she referred to as uncontroverted facts as evidence. 
The documents, however, appear to be the respondent's work-product 
rather. A summary of facts assembled by the respondent is not evidence 
of the facts.  
 
i. 
The respondent failed to provide Exhibit A-H53 in its 
entirety in response to the Tenth Circuit's request for evidence of 
communications between Wells Fargo and the plaintiffs regarding 
closing.  
 
j. 
The respondent filed an answer and counterclaim, a 
motion to amend, and an amended answer and counterclaim in a case 
which she knew had previously been dismissed. Further, after the parties 
briefed the issue for the court, the respondent filed a second motion to 
amend.  
 
k. 
The respondent twice filed a premature notice of appeal.  
 
45 
 
 
 
l. 
The respondent filed the cause of action which later 
became 14-CV-4020 even though it was clearly barred by res judicata. 
Based on the respondent's filings, it is clear that she does not understand 
the legal principle of res judicata.  
 
m. 
The respondent filed a motion to alter or amend the 
judgment after the judge dismissed the case. The respondent based her 
motion on Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56 provides the 
procedures required to file a motion for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. 
Pro. 56 is not relevant to consider in ruling on a motion to alter or amend 
the order granting a motion to dismiss.  
 
n. 
The respondent filed a motion to alter or amend a 
judgment, not because there was a mistake in the facts or law, but simply 
to get a second chance for a favorable ruling. Motions to alter or amend 
are proper only for occasions when there is a mistake in the facts or in 
the law or when there is newly discovered evidence.  
 
o. 
The respondent failed to properly cite to the record in 
her briefs before the Tenth Circuit. Additionally, the Tenth Circuit was 
unable to understand the respondent's arguments and the respondent's 
arguments 'made no sense and was hard to follow,' was 'unsupported by 
the record,' was 'meritless,' and was 'woefully inadequate.'  
 
The hearing panel concludes that her failure to offer to settle the case by obtaining the refinance 
mortgage her clients sought and her failure to recognize that she had a losing case, coupled with 
the additionally specific instances where the respondent failed to provide R.B. and S.B. with 
competent representation, violate KRPC 1.1. 
 
"KRPC 3.1 
 
"141. 
Attorneys are prohibited from bringing or defending a proceeding unless 
there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous. KRPC 3.1. While 10-CV-4141 was on 
46 
 
 
 
appeal with the Tenth Circuit, the respondent initiated another lawsuit in Shawnee 
County District Court based on the same set of facts. That case was removed to federal 
court and became 14-CV-4020. The district court held, and the hearing panel agrees, that 
it was not objectively reasonable for the respondent to bring what became 14-CV-4020. 
The hearing panel concludes that there was no basis to bring suit against Wells Fargo in 
Shawnee County District Court, in what later became 14-CV-4020. 
 
"142. 
In the foreclosure case, the respondent filed an answer and counterclaim, 
a motion to amend, and an amended answer and counterclaim after the foreclosure case 
had been dismissed by the Shawnee County District Court. Then, after the parties briefed 
whether the action was still alive but before the court ruled, the respondent filed a second 
motion to amend the petition. The hearing panel concludes that there was no basis for 
filing the answer and counterclaim, the motion to amend, the amended answer and 
counterclaim, and the second motion to amend because the case had been dismissed. 
 
"143. 
Additionally, throughout the litigation, the respondent repeatedly filed 
motions seeking reconsideration of matters which had been fully considered. The district 
court repeatedly admonished the respondent to refrain from doing so. Despite the district 
court's repeated admonitions, the respondent continued to relitigate matters which had 
been previously fully addressed. As such, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent 
violated KRPC 3.1. 
 
"KRPC 3.5 and KRPC 8.2 
 
"144. 
KRPC 3.5 prohibits attorneys from engaging 'in undignified or 
discourteous conduct degrading to a tribunal.' KRPC 3.5(d). Additionally, '[a] lawyer 
shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as 
to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge.' KRPC 8.2(a). 
 
"145. 
The respondent engaged in undignified and discourteous conduct 
degrading to a tribunal and the respondent made statement[s] that she knew to be false or 
with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity of the statements when she made 
statements about Judge Marten that had no basis in fact. The hearing panel concludes that 
47 
 
 
 
the degrading statements, detailed below, were made with reckless disregard to the truth 
or falsity of the statements, in violation of KRPC 3.5(d) and KRPC 8.2(a). 
 
a. The respondent recklessly made false statements of material fact to 
the district court in her motion to alter or amend when she (1) falsely 
alleged that the judge relied on assumptions not supported by the 
record, (2) falsely accused the judge of turning a blind eye to 
problems in the case, (3) falsely accused the judge of making rulings 
based on judicial economy or to protect the defendants from the 
plaintiffs, (4) falsely accused the judge of racial discrimination, (5) 
falsely accused the judge of accepting the defendants' statements 
while discounting the plaintiffs' statements, and (6) falsely stating 
that the judge was putting R.B. on the short end of the stick. 
 
b. The respondent also recklessly made false statements of material fact 
to the district court in her motion for reconsideration (of the court's 
denial of the respondent's motion for an extension of time to file a 
reply to Wells Fargo's response to the respondent's motion to alter or 
amend the court's judgment) when she (1) falsely accused the judge 
of treating her differently than opposing counsel when she is a solo 
disabled attorney, (2) falsely accused the judge of treating her 
differently than opposing counsel because Mr. Hawver referenced 
the respondent in litigation, (3) falsely implied that the court made its 
decisions based on power rather than truth, and (4) without a 
reasonable basis, speculated that her clients would have received 
different results with a different judge. 
 
Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 3.5. 
 
"KRPC 8.4 
 
"146. 
'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that 
is prejudicial to the administration of justice.' KRPC 8.4(d). The respondent engaged in 
48 
 
 
 
conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of justice when she repeatedly 
attempted to relitigate issues fully considered. Judge Marten hit the nail on the head when 
he said: 
 
'. . . I admire vigorous lawyers. I admire lawyers who are willing to go to the 
mat for their clients, and I have never penalized, ever, a lawyer for doing that. I 
think that's what they're supposed to do, but it also has to be done within the 
context of our system.  
 
'You know, I've often said that if everybody just kind of did what they 
were supposed to, we wouldn't need rules at all, . . . And a lot of these rules that 
we've put in place over the years are just as a result of either abuses or 
perceived abuses of the process. And it grieves me, frankly, to be here today 
with Ms. Huffman because I think that she honestly was doing the very, very 
best job that she could for [R.B. and S.B.], but I also think there's got to be a 
certain amount of judgment that's involved in the decisions that you make about 
when do you finally say, okay, I understand there's no place else to go with this. 
And that is not what happened in this case with Ms. Huffman.  
 
'And when you say these have been decided, the circuits affirmed it, 
don't bring anymore. And this, of course, was before the circuit affirmation, but 
don't bring anymore of these. We've been through that, they've been decided, 
let's move on to the next thing and advance the litigation. And when they—
when you have these kinds of discovery matters from [the first case] raised in a 
purported amended complaint in [the second case], it does fly in the face of the 
prior rulings, and the reconsideration motions, and all of the other things that 
we had looked at in relation to [the first case].  
 
'So, yes, I—I—I consider that to be a violation of the earlier 
admonitions not to revisit these matters again, . . . I felt this was a violation of 
those orders.' 
 
49 
 
 
 
Ultimately, the court ordered the respondent to pay a sanction in the amount of $5,000 
and enjoined the respondent from filing . . . suit on behalf of the estates of R.B. and S.B. 
in the future. The hearing panel concludes that the respondent's conduct in this regard 
amounts to a violation of KRPC 8.4(d). 
 
"147. 
Further, the respondent's false statements regarding the judge's integrity 
referenced in ¶ 145 above also amount to professional misconduct that is prejudicial to 
the administration of justice. Thus, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent 
violated KRPC 8.4(d). 
 
"American Bar Association 
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 
 
"148. 
In making this recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel 
considered the factors outlined by the American Bar Association in its Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (hereinafter 'Standards'). Pursuant to Standard 3, the factors 
to be considered are the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the potential or actual 
injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and the existence of aggravating or mitigating 
factors. 
 
"149. 
Duty Violated. The respondent violated her duty to her clients by failing 
to provide competent representation. The respondent also violated her duty to the public, 
the legal system, and the legal professional [sic] by failing to maintain her personal 
integrity. Finally, the respondent violated her duty to the legal system and the legal 
profession by engaging in conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of justice. 
 
"150. 
Mental State. The respondent knowingly violated her duties to her 
clients, the public, the legal system, and legal profession. While the respondent engaged 
in knowing misconduct, it is important to know that the respondent engaged in the 
misconduct in a crusade to defend clients she believed were being crushed by a mortgage 
company; not in a scheme designed to benefit the respondent financially. 
 
50 
 
 
 
"151. 
Injury. As a result of the respondent's misconduct, the respondent caused 
actual harm to her clients, to the legal system, and the legal profession. R.B. and S.B.'s 
final years were spent in unnecessary litigation. The respondent's misconduct resulted in 
a court order requiring R.B. and S.B. to pay nearly $300,000 in attorney[']s fees and 
expenses. The respondent filed unnecessary petitions seeking court review of the same 
issues over and over again resulting in the waste of judicial time and resources. Finally, 
the conduct of the respondent by including false statements regarding a federal judge in 
court documents brings disrepute to the legal profession. 
 
"Aggravating and Mitigating Factors 
 
"152. 
Aggravating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may 
justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its 
recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following 
aggravating factors present: 
 
a. 
A Pattern of Misconduct. The respondent engaged in a 
pattern of misconduct by failing to provide competent representation to 
R.B. and S.B. throughout the litigation. Additionally, the respondent 
engaged in a pattern of misconduct when she repeatedly asserted the 
same claims and repeatedly sought reconsideration of matters already 
ruled on despite multiple admonitions by the court. Finally, the 
respondent engaged in a pattern [of] reckless conduct regarding the 
discourteous statements made regarding the judge's integrity. As such, 
the hearing panel concludes that the respondent engaged in patterns of 
misconduct. 
 
b. 
Multiple Offenses. The respondent committed multiple 
rule violations. The respondent violated KRPC 1.1 (competence), KRPC 
3.1 (meritorious claims), KRPC 3.5 (impartiality and decorum of the 
tribunal), KRPC 8.2 (judicial and legal officials), and KRPC 8.4 
(professional misconduct). Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes that 
the respondent committed multiple offenses. 
51 
 
 
 
 
c. 
Refusal to Acknowledge Wrongful Nature of Conduct. 
The respondent has refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of her 
conduct. In her closing argument, the respondent argued that she did not 
violate any rules. The respondent came close to admitting that she 
violated KRPC 8.2 when she stated in closing argument: 
 
'. . . And I would say as to 8.2, I own it. Frankly, I don't 
think I made any false statements. I infer that someone 
believes that I've said that the Judge was biased against 
my client, . . .' 
 
The hearing panel is concerned, that at this late date, the respondent just 
does not seem to 'get it.' She is either unwilling or unable to acknowledge 
that what she did [in] this case—repeatedly filing lawsuits when the 
issues had already been resolved and by making false and disparaging 
statements about a judge—violates the Kansas Rules of Professional 
Conduct. Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent 
refused and continues to refuse to acknowledge the wrongful nature of 
her conduct. 
 
d. 
Vulnerability of Victim. R.B. and S.B. were vulnerable to 
the respondent's misconduct. Much has been made regarding R.B. and 
S.B.'s level of sophistication. On the one hand, R.B. obtained a mortgage 
in 2008 and should have been familiar with what was required to 
refinance the mortgage six months later. On the other hand, R.B.'s 
education was limited to middle school and, it appears, prior to 2008, he 
had not obtained a mortgage. Regardless of whether R.B. and S.B. were 
sophisticated or not, they relied on the respondent. They believed that 
they had filed suit against Wells Fargo in 10-CV-4141, when they had 
not. The litigation approach was driven by the respondent, rather than by 
R.B. and S.B. Based on the respondent's approach to the litigation, R.B. 
and S.B. were ordered to pay nearly $300,000 in attorney[']s fees and 
52 
 
 
 
expenses. Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes that R.B. and S.B. 
were vulnerable to the respondent's misconduct. 
 
"153. 
Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may 
justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its 
recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following 
mitigating circumstances present: 
 
a. 
Absence of a Prior Disciplinary Record. The respondent 
has not previously been disciplined. 
 
b. 
Personal or Emotional Problems if Such Misfortunes 
Have Contributed to Violation of the Kansas Rules of Professional 
Conduct. In 2011, the respondent was in a serious car accident. As a 
result, she suffered a traumatic brain injury. The effects of the traumatic 
brain injury are ongoing. Additionally, as a result of the accident, the 
respondent suffers from depression. The ramifications of the accident 
contributed to her misconduct. The respondent summarized her 
difficulties in her argument regarding factors in mitigation: 
 
 
'The meat of the discovery all occurred within a month 
after the accident, prior to being put on brain rest and before the 
first anniversary of the accident. Although I came up with 
significant legal theories on abstention doctrines and was 
learning through a first run on some of the mortgage transfer 
issues, I was struggling more than anyone (including myself) 
was aware. I'm sure I did re-run some arguments because even 
now I can be a bit circular, long-winded, and repetitive however 
that was much more in the past. The chart I made was not just 
for the court, it was to keep the claims straight for myself.' 
 
c. 
Inexperience in the Practice of Law. The Kansas 
Supreme Court admitted the respondent to the practice of law in 2010. 
53 
 
 
 
The respondent's misconduct began shortly after her admission to the 
practice of law. The respondent's inexperience in the practice of law 
mitigates her misconduct. Further, the respondent stated during the 
hearing that '[h]ow [she] handled [the cases] would not be how [she] 
would handle them now.' 
 
d. 
Previous Good Character and Reputation in the 
Community Including Any Letters from Clients, Friends and Lawyers in 
Support of the Character and General Reputation of the Attorney. The 
respondent is a member of the bar of Oskaloosa, Kansas. The respondent 
presented evidence from S.B., Larry Rute, A.W. Pickel, David C. Kirk, 
Alexandria S. Belveal, and A.S., in support of her good character. 
Additionally, the respondent presented additional evidence of her good 
character. 
 
e. 
Imposition of Other Penalties or Sanctions. The court 
sanctioned the respondent $5,000 in the second federal suit. The 
respondent paid the sanction. The hearing panel concludes that the 
respondent experienced another sanction for her misconduct. 
 
"154. 
In addition to the above-cited factors, the hearing panel has thoroughly 
examined and considered the following Standards: 
 
'4.52 
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer 
engages in an area of practice in which the lawyer knows he or she is not 
competent, and causes injury or potential injury to a client. 
 
'4.53 
Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
 
'(a) 
demonstrates failure to understand relevant legal 
doctrines or procedures and causes injury or potential injury to a 
client; or [. . .]' 
 
54 
 
 
 
'5.11 
Disbarment is generally appropriate when: 
 
 
 . . . [.] 
 
'(b) 
a lawyer engages in any other intentional 
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation 
that serious[ly] adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to 
practice.' 
 
 
'5.13 
Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer 
knowingly engages in any other conduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit, or misrepresentation and that adversely reflects on the lawyer's 
fitness to practice law. 
 
'6.12 
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer 
knows that false statements or documents are being submitted to the 
court or that material information is improperly being withheld, and 
takes no remedial action, and causes injury or potential injury to a party 
to the legal proceeding, or causes an adverse or potentially adverse effect 
on the legal proceeding. 
 
'6.13 
Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is 
negligent either in determining whether statements or documents are 
false or in taking remedial action when material information is being 
withheld, and causes injury or potential injury to a party to the legal 
proceeding, or causes an adverse or potentially adverse effect on the 
legal proceeding. 
 
'6.21 
Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer 
knowingly violates a court order or rule with the intent to obtain a benefit 
for the lawyer or another, and causes serious injury or potentially serious 
injury to a party, or causes serious or potentially serious interference with 
a legal proceeding. 
55 
 
 
 
 
'6.22 
Suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knowingly 
violates a court order or rule, and there is injury or potential injury to a 
client or a party, or interference or potential interference with a legal 
proceeding.' 
 
'7.1 
Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer 
knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a 
professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another, 
and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client, the public, or 
the legal system. 
 
'7.2 
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer 
knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a 
professional, and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, 
or the legal system.' 
 
"Recommendation of the Parties 
 
"155. 
The disciplinary administrator recommended that the respondent's 
license to practice law be indefinitely suspended. 
 
"156. 
The respondent recommended that she receive a private admonition and 
'time served.' In her mitigation factors document, the respondent stated: 
 
'Anything the panel feels I have done has been paid for 
in spades with over six years of the process which continues. I 
feel that it is time to show mercy and that any punishment has 
been served during this long process. I've been humiliated 
enough. I was sanctioned by the same Judge, who despite being 
aware of everything before the panel did not turn this conduct 
over. He felt $5,000.00 was sufficient and I paid it (not my 
clients of course). 
56 
 
 
 
 
'Additionally, the time itself is much harder on me 
because of my limits and the issues I deal with from the accident. 
I feel that I've suffered enough embarrassment and will always 
have the case thrown in my face as a favorite from select 
members of the lender's bar. There is certainly nothing more I 
can do about it now. I already buried my clients. By my 
recollection, I was told there is a time to stop by someone during 
the hearings. I am hopeful the panel can see fit to handle this in 
the same manner and let this stop now with some private 
admonishment as there is no more that I can do.' 
 
"Recommendations of a Majority of the Hearing Panel 
 
"157. 
Based upon the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the Standards 
listed above, a majority of the hearing panel recommends that the respondent be censured 
and the censure be published in the Kansas Reports. 
 
"158. 
Costs are assessed against the respondent in an amount to be certified by 
the Office of the Disciplinary Administrator." 
 
One panel member dissented from the panel majority's discipline recommendation, 
arguing instead that Huffman should receive a 90-day suspension. 
 
OBJECTION TO RESPONDENT'S RULE 6.09 LETTER 
 
Just four days before oral argument, Huffman filed a letter of additional authority, 
citing as authority for this filing Supreme Court Rule 6.09 (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 40). 
But this rule prohibits submitting additional authority less than 14 days before oral 
argument. The only exception to the deadline is to address additional authority published 
or filed less than 14 days before oral argument. This exception does not apply. Also, 
57 
 
 
 
Huffman's letter violated Supreme Court Rule 6.09(b), which limits letters of additional 
authority to 350 words. 
 
The Disciplinary Administrator's office filed an objection to any consideration of 
this letter of additional authority. We sustain that objection. 
 
RESPONDENT'S POST-HEARING MOTION FOR VIDEO PRESENTATION 
 
After the hearing before this court, Huffman filed a "Motion to Allow Video 
Presentation of the Case Strategy with the Timeline" apparently to supplement her oral 
arguments relating to what she describes as "the strategy" of the underlying litigation 
giving rise to the disciplinary complaint. She suggests this video supplementation should 
be viewed as a disability accommodation. She also appears to request an order "that time 
be taken to allow conference between both presenting Counsel as to some facts presented 
by [the] prosecution." The Disciplinary Administrator's office filed a response asking us 
to deny the motion, noting the court's appellate practice rules make no provision for 
supplementation in this fashion and further arguing supplementation is unnecessary. We 
agree with the Disciplinary Administrator's office. 
 
Huffman's primary opportunity to present details relating to her litigation strategy 
and its arguable impact on the disciplinary counts against her was before the panel. The 
record reflects she did that, and we have reviewed the record in its entirety. In addition, at 
oral arguments before this court, the court was free to explore with both counsel the role 
the underlying litigation had on the issues presented. Put simply, there is no need for 
supplementation of the oral arguments. We deny the motion. 
 
 
58 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
In a disciplinary proceeding, the court considers the evidence, the panel's findings, 
and the parties' arguments and determines whether KRPC violations exist and, if they do, 
what discipline should be imposed. Attorney misconduct must be established by clear and 
convincing evidence. In re Hodge, 307 Kan. 170, 209, 407 P.3d 613 (2017); Supreme 
Court Rule 226(a)(1)(A) (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 281). Clear and convincing evidence is 
evidence that causes the fact-finder to believe that the truth of the facts asserted is highly 
probable. In re Murphy, 312 Kan. 203, 218, 473 P.3d 886 (2020). 
 
A finding is considered admitted if exception is not taken. When exception is 
taken, the finding is typically not deemed admitted so the court must determine whether it 
is supported by clear and convincing evidence. Hodge, 307 Kan. at 209-10. If so, the 
finding will not be disturbed. The court does not reweigh conflicting evidence, assess 
witness credibility, or redetermine questions of fact when undertaking its factual analysis. 
In re Hawver, 300 Kan. 1023, 1038, 339 P.3d 573 (2014). 
 
Huffman was given adequate notice of the formal complaint to which she filed an 
answer. She was also given adequate notice of the hearing before the panel and the 
hearing before this court. She appeared at both proceedings. She filed exceptions to the 
final hearing report. Regarding the portions of the panel report quoted above, Huffman 
took exception to: 
 
• paragraphs 47-57, 59, 61, 63-65, 67, and 70-82 of the panel's factual 
findings, which span hearing report paragraphs 46-132; 
• paragraphs 135-47 of the panel's legal conclusions, which span hearing 
report paragraphs 133-47; and 
59 
 
 
 
• paragraphs 152 and 153 of the panel's analysis of aggravating and 
mitigating factors, which span hearing report paragraphs 152-56. 
 
Huffman made a general exception to the entire hearing report claiming that "no 
quotes in testimony from witnesses other than the prosecution appear" and "the lack of 
defense witnesses and exhibits being considered." Within her exceptions to the panel's 
analysis of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, she listed several general 
exceptions stating perceived deficiencies in that analysis. She also took exception to both 
the panel majority's discipline recommendation and to the dissenting opinion. 
 
The Disciplinary Administrator's office argues Huffman waived any exceptions to 
paragraphs 88-132 of the panel report because she did not designate those exceptions 
with specificity. It also argues she failed to brief many exceptions, so they should be 
considered waived or abandoned. Finally, it notes several facts she argues without 
supporting record citations and urges us to presume all un-keyed facts lack support. We 
agree. 
 
Huffman's failure to take exception to paragraphs 88-132 renders those factual 
statements admitted. A respondent must advance arguments in their brief to support any 
exceptions, or they are deemed waived or abandoned. Murphy, 312 Kan. at 219. The brief 
must also support the exceptions with appropriate record citations. See In re Bishop, 285 
Kan. 1097, 1106, 179 P.3d 1096 (2008) ("Here, although Bishop filed a brief, he does not 
advance his arguments or provide any citation to the record to support his exceptions. 
We, therefore, deem all exceptions abandoned except for the two he preserved in his 
brief."). That said, the panel's factual findings appear largely unchallenged in Huffman's 
opening brief. She seems focused on additional facts she believes the panel ignored in 
finding KRPC violations. 
 
60 
 
 
 
Keeping Huffman's exceptions in mind, we consider two overarching issues:  (1) 
whether clear and convincing evidence supports the panel's conclusions that she violated 
KRPC 1.1, 3.1, 3.5, 8.2, and 8.4; and (2) the appropriate discipline. 
 
Clear and convincing evidence supports some of the panel's conclusions.  
 
A. The KRPC 1.1 violation 
 
KRPC 1.1 requires that "[a] lawyer shall provide competent representation to a 
client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and 
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation." The hearing panel concluded 
Huffman violated KRPC 1.1 in three ways:  (1) she failed to seek settlement of her 
clients' claims for the terms of the un-consummated 2009 refinancing; (2) she failed to 
recognize how to resolve the case for her clients' benefit; and (3) she failed to understand 
relevant legal concepts that in the panel's view collectively demonstrated her "lack of 
competence as a litigator" resulting in multiple deficiencies in her pleadings. 
 
As to the first and second items, Huffman argues the panel disregarded her witness 
Larry Rute's testimony establishing "settlement is something [she] engages in," and the 
fact Wells Fargo never offered to settle on the terms the panel believed she should have 
sought. The Disciplinary Administrator's office counters that this testimony is irrelevant, 
noting Rute was unfamiliar with the litigation at issue. It also contends the arguments 
about Wells Fargo's failure are abandoned because they are not supported by authority or 
irrelevant because the burden always remained on Huffman to try to achieve her clients' 
goals. We agree with this characterization of Rute's testimony. 
 
During his direct examination, Rute agreed with Huffman that he recalled her 
"attending a mediation with [him] and settling cases . . . ." He also said she understood 
concepts of best and worst-case scenarios and "bracketing" as they pertain to monetary 
61 
 
 
 
settlement negotiations. But on cross-examination he admitted he had not read the 
complaint in this case and did not have any knowledge about the underlying mortgage 
litigation. 
 
Nevertheless, a majority of the court holds the facts do not support a conclusion 
that Huffman violated KRPC 1.1 by not pursuing settlement on the 2009 refinancing 
terms or by otherwise failing to resolve the case for her clients' benefit. The panel's 
factual findings reflect Huffman offered to settle for $750,000 plus a release of R.B. and 
S.B.'s mortgage, based on her valuation of the KCPA and tort claims she pled in her 
petition. And Huffman argues her clients consented to an aggressive posture during 
settlement, and there is no testimony from them to the contrary.    
 
In the legal malpractice context, it has been recognized that "the necessity for an 
attorney's use of ordinary skill and knowledge extends to the conduct of settlement 
negotiations." Rizzo v. Haines, 520 Pa. 484, 499, 555 A.2d 58 (1989). "Attorneys are 
supposed to know the likelihood of success for the types of cases they handle and they 
are supposed to know the range of possible awards in those cases." Ziegelheim v. Apollo, 
128 N.J. 250, 263, 607 A.2d 1298 (1992). But settlement negotiations are difficult to 
orchestrate to a mutually acceptable result, particularly within the constraints of the 
clients' willingness to compromise. The majority here concludes the facts fail to show by 
clear and convincing evidence that Huffman did not employ the requisite skill and 
knowledge in failing to resolve the mortgage litigation under the circumstances. A 
minority of the court would have found a violation.  
 
Moving to the panel's conclusion that the specific deficiencies it identified 
demonstrated Huffman's incompetence as a litigator, we hold they are supported by clear 
and convincing evidence. She argues the panel ignored evidence that she still had 
discovery requests pending when summary judgment was granted in the first federal 
62 
 
 
 
lawsuit. And Issue I of her brief argues the panel erred by disregarding evidence of her 
attendance at a "Max Gardner Boot Camp" and use of discovery materials from that 
training, and her consultation with the Kansas Attorney General's Office on consumer 
protection issues. 
 
In addition, in Issue III of her brief, she argues that "EMERGING AREA 
SPECIFIC CASE LAW . . . DEVELOPMENTS THAT SUPPORT" her positions. And 
she notes the panel did not discuss her assertion that the foreclosure would not have 
occurred under new federal protections for homeowners enacted in 2014 or "discussed  
. . . what arguments [she] missed that could have saved [her clients'] home." She contends 
she unfortunately—but not unethically—lost on her theories concerning the "Torrens 
Land System of caveats" not being recognized by Kansas law and her theory that the 
KCPA applied to financial communications. She views discipline as "unjust" under these 
circumstances and claims she had no professional guidance about how to handle them 
because she was the "first one[] through [the] wall" on the issues she raised. 
 
But these arguments are irrelevant as to whether the activity the panel cited 
violated Rule 1.1 because it found her methods to be improper. And "[c]ompetent 
handling of a particular matter includes . . . use of methods and procedures meeting the 
standards of competent practitioners." KRPC 1.1, Comment 5 (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 
328); see, e.g., In re Dennis, 286 Kan. 708, 727, 188 P.3d 1 (2008) ("The repeated failure 
to timely respond to discovery requests, court orders, and dispositive motions is clear 
evidence of incompetence."); In re Romious, 291 Kan. 300, 308, 312, 240 P.3d 945 
(2010) (KRPC 1.1 violated when attorney filed motion seeking judge's recusal that lacked 
factual allegations). 
 
The panel's facts show Huffman did not competently handle the litigation. She 
consistently filed late pleadings; failed to follow rules governing the pleadings 
63 
 
 
 
amendment; failed to follow rules governing the form and content of appellate briefs; 
failed to abide by court admonishments to stop raising issues already resolved; failed to 
supply documents requested by the court; filed clearly meritless claims; did not 
understand the legal concept of res judicata; and made arguments to the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals that were "woefully inadequate," were "meritless," "made no sense and 
[were] hard to follow," and were "unsupported by the record." And even if her underlying 
claims had merit, this conduct still violated KRPC 1.1. 
 
B. The KRPC 3.1 violation 
 
KRPC 3.1 provides, 
 
"A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue 
therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good 
faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. A lawyer for the 
defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding that could result in 
incarceration, may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that every element 
of the case be established." 
 
The panel referenced several reasons why it concluded Huffman violated KRPC 
3.1. Those were:  she launched a new Shawnee County lawsuit based on the same facts as 
the case then pending on appeal in 10-CV-4141, which was ultimately removed to federal 
court and dismissed as res judicata; she filed responsive pleadings and amended 
responsive pleadings in Wells Fargo's Shawnee County foreclosure action after the court 
dismissed the case; and she repeatedly sought reconsideration of previously decided 
matters throughout the litigation despite the court's admonishments to stop. Substantial 
competent evidence supports these facts. 
 
64 
 
 
 
Huffman argues mainly that she had a good-faith belief in her claims' merits. She 
contends there was nothing harassing about defending a constitutionally protected 
homestead; that her position—apparently about robo-signing—tracked the positions of 
"49 Attorney Generals"; and that whether a position is meritorious should not be a "win 
or lose" determination. She also argues the panel ignored changes in the legal landscape 
during the litigation. And she broadly challenges the panel's citation to Kansas Supreme 
Court Rule 202 (2019 Kan. S. Ct. R. 239), repealed January 1, 2021, and replaced in part 
by Kansas Supreme Court Rule 220 (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 275). But she does not 
support her Rule 202 reference with pertinent authority. 
 
Again, Huffman's focus in all these arguments is misplaced.     
 
"The advocate has a duty to use legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the 
client's cause, but also a duty not to abuse legal procedure. The law, both procedural and 
substantive, establishes the limits within which an advocate may proceed. However, the 
law is not always clear and never is static. Accordingly, in determining the proper scope 
of advocacy, account must be taken of the law's ambiguities and potential for change." 
KRPC 3.1, Comment 1 (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 390). 
 
Huffman's arguments concentrate on what she views as shifting legal grounds 
underpinning her claims, but she does not address the crux of the panel's misconduct 
conclusion that her conduct was outside relevant procedural and substantive limits. For 
example, the panel concluded she violated KRPC 3.1 by filing a new Shawnee County 
lawsuit while the federal appeal was pending in the first case, which arose out of the 
same facts and largely raising the same claims. Huffman alludes to receiving 
"permission" from Shawnee County District Judge Franklin Theis to file this second suit 
but does not address the overriding problem that it was meritless because those claims 
were barred by res judicata. See Dennis, 286 Kan. at 732-33 (holding violation of KRPC 
65 
 
 
 
3.1 established by clear and convincing evidence when rational fact-finder could 
conclude it was highly probable attorney filed a frivolous lawsuit). 
 
And Huffman's focus on consumer protection issues and lender protection 
provides no cover for her decision to assert several other claims, for example, that MERS 
"converted" R.B. and S.B.'s "chain of title." Indeed, her frivolous motions alone supply 
an adequate basis for a KRPC 3.1 violation, even without considering the relative merits 
of the claims advanced in the underlying litigation. See In re Blume, 309 Kan. 1313, 
1322, 1334, 443 P.3d 305 (2019) (holding attorney violated KRPC 3.1 by filing a 
"frivolous motion to set aside" a judgment that "'contained "a tangled web of some 
irrelevant ramblings and vagaries"'"). 
 
We hold clear and convincing evidence supports the panel's conclusion that 
Huffman violated KRPC 3.1. 
 
C. The KRPC 3.5(d) and 8.2(a) violations 
  
Huffman next argues KRPC 3.5(d) is unconstitutionally vague and suggests its 
application, along with KRPC 8.2(a), infringes on her rights to free speech under the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and section 11 of the Kansas Constitution 
Bill of Rights. She also contends the evidence failed to prove she violated KRPC 3.5 and 
KRPC 8.2 because it did not establish her comments about Judge Marten were knowingly 
or recklessly false. 
 
The vagueness challenge is easily disposed of. Our precedent is clear that a 
respondent in a disciplinary action must either raise an issue before the panel or explain 
why it is properly before the court if raised for the first time on appeal. 
 
66 
 
 
 
"[Kansas Supreme Court] Rule 6.02 sets out the requirements for filing an 
appellant's brief. In subparagraph (a)(5), it requires that '[i]f the issue was not raised 
below, there must be an explanation why the issue is properly before the court.' Although 
this rule applies to an 'appellant,' it is incorporated into disciplinary proceedings in this 
court through Kansas Supreme Court Rule 212 if a respondent has filed exceptions. 
 
"Rule 212(e)(3) (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 257) requires a disciplinary respondent to 
file a brief, sets forth the timeframe for doing so, and states:  'The briefs shall be of such 
number and form and be served in such manner as is provided by the rules relating to 
appeals in civil actions.' (Emphasis added.) Rule 6.02 specifies the form for Crandall's 
brief, and it required him to explain why the constitutional issue was properly before the 
court even though he had not raised it before the hearing panel. . . .  
 
"Our caselaw makes clear that respondents in disciplinary cases must comply 
with Rule 6.02. We could cite a long line of cases in which this court has enforced Rule 
6.02 when disciplinary respondents have filed briefs that do not comply with its 
requirements but note only a few to illustrate. See, e.g., Hawver, 300 Kan. at 1048 
('document attached to Hawver's brief is not properly before this court because it is not 
part of the record' as required by Rule 6.02[b]'); Dennis, 286 Kan. at 723 (faulting 
respondent's brief because it contained neither a statement of facts nor specific citations 
to the record on appeal as required by Rule 6.02[d] [2007 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 37])." In re 
Crandall, 308 Kan. 1526, 1541-42, 430 P.3d 902 (2018). 
 
In Crandall, the court held the respondent in an attorney discipline proceeding 
abandoned his First and Fourteenth Amendment challenges to KRPC 8.5 (2018 Kan. S. 
Ct. R. 382) and Kansas Supreme Court Rule 201 (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 233) when he 
failed to make the arguments before the panel and failed "to comply with Rule 
6.02(a)(5)'s requirement that he explain why [the court] should consider his constitutional 
arguments when they are raised for the first time in his brief in this court." 308 Kan. at 
1542. 
 
67 
 
 
 
Huffman's response brief does not challenge the Disciplinary Administrator's 
representation that she failed to raise the constitutional question before the panel. And her 
opening brief does not contain any explanation why the court should still consider the 
constitutional argument raised for the first time. Her response brief contains an 
explanation, but only by arguing she should not have to comply with the requirement. 
Neither brief cites or discusses Rule 6.02 (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 35) or relevant caselaw. 
 
As to the merits of the rule violations, under KRPC 3.5(d) (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 
396), "[a] lawyer shall not . . . engage in undignified or discourteous conduct degrading 
to a tribunal." And under KRPC 8.2(a) (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 432), "[a] lawyer shall not 
make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its 
truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge . . . ." 
 
The panel concluded Huffman violated both rules when she recklessly made 
several false statements about Judge Marten in two motions asking him to reconsider his 
rulings. These statements included implying he had discriminated against her clients 
based on race or socioeconomic status, implying he decided based on power rather than 
truth, and accusing him of treating her differently than opposing counsel. Huffman argues 
there is no evidence the statements were knowingly or recklessly false. 
 
During Huffman's direct testimony, the panel's chairperson asked her to address 
the comments about Judge Marten. She testified that she did not "make any excuse" for 
them, that she "wrote what I wrote," and that she did not "intend it the way it came 
across." During cross-examination, the Disciplinary Administrator asked her whether she 
had "any basis" for writing that Judge Marten's "commentary punctuates the 
socioeconomic disconnect of the Court with these clients and generally the middle class 
public, particularly of color, who cannot afford the fights and discovery obstructions of 
68 
 
 
 
the banks," "other than your clients were African American and didn't win." Her response 
illustrates she had no basis for asserting this: 
 
"I—this didn't mean to be like a race statement. This, from my perspective, has 
been misunderstood. This is more political speech. And the KCPA issue is political. I 
mean, I've been involved in a hearing between the House Judiciary. We changed the law 
to address some of the things that came out in In Re—In Re Larkin. But access to the 
Court and this comment about urgings on from, you know, counsel, I think does 
punctuate the fact that we do not have a system that gives equal advantage that, you 
know, we have this shortage. We have the middle class who can't afford these kind of 
fights when you're dealing with these type of big banks. And I think that those things are 
even more important to minorities.  
 
"If I—you know, I thought about how it sounds like people are interpreting this, 
but I didn't play the race card. I didn't play the race card from my perspective on purpose, 
because I don't—well, I mean. Wells Fargo got hit with NAACP, they have their issues, 
but this was about—they would have filed that caveat whether my clients were white or 
black. I mean, but people don't have access to this. People can't afford these discovery 
wars." 
 
Later in cross-examination, she disavowed any belief Judge Marten was biased 
against R.B. and S.B. She testified: 
 
"I—I think Judge Marten took the word of Wells Fargo, and I think the wool was 
pulled over his eyes. I do not believe that he would do anything that he didn't believe was 
true. And I think that goes back to the discovery and my urgings to tell the Court the 
truth. I do not think that Judge Marten harbored independent feelings against my client. 
And I do think that he was very frustrated by the idea that, you know, the case, 'um, was 
back. And I know in my heart that it would have been different if it had been in state 
court. I know what my venue was, I know what I was winning in front of that judge." 
 
69 
 
 
 
Taken together, her testimony demonstrates a serious lack of judgment in making 
these comments and statements. But we are also cognizant that judges and courts are not 
above criticism—even harsh criticism—by lawyers vigorously advocating sometimes 
unpopular causes on behalf of marginalized people. And balancing this against the 
equally important need for a decorous and orderly courtroom is an inexact endeavor at 
best. Given this, a majority of the court holds Huffman's statements do not rise to the 
heightened standard necessary to support the panel's conclusion that she violated KRPC 
3.5(d) and KRPC 8.2(a). In reaching that decision the majority considered and weighed 
as significant the fact Judge Marten himself did not take affront to Huffman's comments 
or invoke contempt at the time. A minority of the court would have found violations of 
these two rules.  
 
D. The KRPC 8.4(d) violation 
 
KRPC 8.4(d) (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 434) provides, "It is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice." 
The panel found Huffman violated this rule by repeatedly relitigating previously decided 
issues and making false statements impugning Judge Marten's integrity. 
 
Conduct requiring a court to unnecessarily consider frivolous issues obviously 
delays the proceedings and causes the lawyers' clients to incur unnecessary legal fees and 
other expenses. Such conduct can support finding that the lawyer violated KRPC 8.4(d). 
See In re Shepherd, 310 Kan. 739, 746, 752, 448 P.3d 1049 (2019) (failure to file brief on 
behalf of client, resulting in "'unnecessary consideration by the court, the dismissal of the 
appeal, and delay with the appellate process'" deemed clear and convincing evidence that 
attorney violated KRPC 8.4[d]); In re Gordon, 258 Kan. 784, 791, 793, 908 P.2d 169 
(1995) (concluding violation of 8.4[d] supported by clear and convincing evidence when 
attorney failed to timely respond to discovery request resulting in sanctions and 
70 
 
 
 
mishandled bankruptcy case resulting in unnecessary legal fees and other expenses to 
clients); Blume, 309 Kan. at 1323 (concluding clear and convincing evidence supported 
conclusion respondent violated 8.4[d] by filing a frivolous motion to alter or amend 
judgment); In re Grillot, 309 Kan. 253, 259, 263, 433 P.3d 671 (2019) (concluding the 
respondent engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice when he filed 
incomplete, inaccurate, and false accountings in a probate case). 
 
Here, the conduct cited by the panel reflects Huffman wasted judicial resources by 
pursuing multiple frivolous motions and a frivolous lawsuit barred by res judicata. And 
she filed pleadings impugning Judge Marten's integrity. That conduct also resulted in her 
clients being ordered to pay attorney fees exceeding the mortgage loan principal, along 
with the clients' home being foreclosed. 
 
Huffman challenges KRPC 8.4's constitutionality by incorporating her arguments 
against KRPC 3.5 and 8.2, discussed above. She asserts the KRPC 8.4 violation is 
founded on the same conduct forming the violations of those two rules, but does not 
argue what effect, if any, this assessment should have. She then argues:  "The 
administration of justice was over, no false evidence was provided by Respondent." She 
suggests her conduct could not have prejudiced the administration of justice because 
"Wells [Fargo] continued to move forward." She also argues there was no pattern of 
misconduct because the litigation went on for years. And under headings styled 
"CHILLING ADVOCACY & INTEGRITY," "RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WRITING 
WAS ACKNOWLEDGED," and "COUNSEL'S ETHICAL CONSTRUCT IN 
PRACTICE," she argues she has good character, and that she both acknowledged 
responsibility for the writings containing the comments about Judge Marten and 
apologized to him. 
 
71 
 
 
 
We hold the KRPC 8.4(d) violation is established by clear and convincing 
evidence. The panel's findings demonstrate Huffman serially relitigated claims that were 
either frivolous at their outset or made frivolous by prior decisions resolving them against 
her clients. The panel's findings also demonstrate her statements about Judge Marten 
tended to impugn his integrity, and by extension, that of the courts. Huffman's arguments 
about chilling advocacy, like many of her other arguments, incorrectly assume her 
conduct violated the rules only because she did not win. And her constitutional challenge 
to the rule as it applies to her commentary about Judge Marten is waived, as discussed 
above. Moreover, her apology and accepting responsibility for the comments does not 
negate the fact she made them. 
 
APPROPRIATE DISCIPLINE 
 
The question remaining is the appropriate discipline. The Disciplinary 
Administrator's office, panel majority, and dissenting panel member disagree about the 
recommended discipline. The panel majority recommended a public censure, and the 
dissenting panel member recommended a 90-day suspension. Although Huffman did not 
raise the discipline to be imposed as a separate issue in her brief, she argues in its closing 
paragraph, "[T]his Court should reject the panel's report and handle anything else 
necessary in private." The Disciplinary Administrator continues, as it did before the 
panel, to recommend indefinite suspension. 
 
"In any given case, this court is not bound by the recommendations from the hearing 
panel or the Disciplinary Administrator. 'Each disciplinary sanction is based on the 
specific facts and circumstances of the violations and the aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances presented in the case.' 'Because each case is unique, past sanctions provide 
little guidance.' [Citations omitted.]" Hodge, 307 Kan. at 230. 
 
72 
 
 
 
The court generally looks to the American Bar Association Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions to aid in determining discipline. That framework considers 
"four factors in determining punishment:  (1) the ethical duty violated by the lawyer; (2) 
the lawyer's mental state; (3) the actual or potential injury resulting from the lawyer's 
misconduct; and (4) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors." 307 Kan. at 231. 
 
Here, the panel found Huffman knowingly violated ethical duties owed to her 
clients, to the public, and to the legal profession. Her inadequate representation resulted 
in judgment against R.B. and S.B. for nearly $290,000 in Wells Fargo's legal fees. This 
amount was "larger than the expected value of the underlying mortgage interest." And it 
was amassed due to Huffman's "extensive and needless" discovery requests and other 
improper tactics which "caused the . . . action to metastasize beyond any reason." These 
tactics included "seeking court review of the same issues over and over again resulting in 
the waste of judicial time and resources."  
 
The panel also found several aggravating and mitigating factors. For aggravating 
factors, it concluded Huffman engaged in a pattern of misconduct throughout the R.B. 
and S.B. litigation and, in doing so, committed multiple offenses. In addition, the panel 
found R.B. and S.B. were vulnerable to Huffman's misconduct, noting they relied on 
Huffman and believed they had sued Wells Fargo when they had not, that Huffman drove 
the litigation approach, and that R.B. and S.B. were ultimately "ordered to pay nearly 
$300,000 in attorneys fees and expenses." 
 
Equally troubling, the panel found Huffman "refused to acknowledge the wrongful 
nature of her conduct," arguing before the panel that she did not violate any rules. The 
hearing panel was 
 
73 
 
 
 
"concerned, that at this late date, the respondent just does not seem to 'get it.' She is either 
unwilling or unable to acknowledge that what she did [in] this case—repeatedly filing 
lawsuits when the issues had already been resolved and by making false and disparaging 
statements about a judge—violates the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct." 
 
This perspective carried through to Huffman's briefings to this court. Her 
arguments, particularly concerning the Rule 1.1 and 3.1 violations, indicate she is under 
the misapprehension that discipline is being imposed simply because she was not 
successful in the litigation. And in arguing "[p]unishment is not warranted in this matter," 
Huffman contends her conduct was beneficial to the public at large, by stating:  "The 
public has been helped by moving the law towards consumer protection and even 
advancing changes with the legislature to achieve more consistent results with the 
Courts."   
 
For mitigating factors, the panel found Huffman lacked a prior disciplinary record; 
a serious car accident resulting in a traumatic brain injury and depression contributed to 
the misconduct; she was inexperienced in the practice of law when the misconduct 
occurred; she presented evidence in support of her good character from several witnesses; 
and she had already paid $5,000 in federal court sanctions for some of the misconduct at 
issue. 
 
Clear and convincing evidence supports the findings of violations of the 
professional rules of conduct as we note above. Huffman's multiple violations, pattern of 
misconduct, and injury to her clients are plainly demonstrated by the pleadings and orders 
filed in the underlying cases. The mitigating factors are likewise supported by the panel's 
cited evidence. 
 
In making its discipline recommendation, the panel quoted the pertinent sections 
of the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions for each of these types of 
74 
 
 
 
misconduct. See ABA Standards 4.5 (lack of competence); 5.1 (failure to maintain 
personal integrity); 6.1 (false statements, fraud, and misrepresentation); 6.2 (abuse of the 
legal process); 7.0 (violations of duties owed as a professional). 
 
But one ABA Standards provision the panel did not cite was from Standard 4.51, 
discussing when disbarment is appropriate when attorney shows lack of competence: 
 
"4.51 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer's course of conduct 
demonstrates that the lawyer does not understand the most fundamental legal doctrines or 
procedures, and the lawyer's conduct causes injury or potential injury to a client." 
 
And for misconduct involving abuse of legal process, the ABA standards provide, 
 
"Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors 
set out in Standard 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases 
involving failure to expedite litigation or bring a meritorious claim, or failure to obey any 
obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion 
that no valid obligation exists." ABA Standards 6.2. 
 
 
With regard to this, ABA Standards note:  "Suspension is generally appropriate 
when a lawyer knows that he or she is violating a court order or rule, and causes injury or 
potential injury to a client or a party, or causes interference or potential interference with 
a legal proceeding." ABA Standard 6.22. 
 
In addition, the court itself observes, as the Disciplinary Administrator did, that 
Huffman's brief here demonstrates continued professional failings. As the Disciplinary 
Administrator commented: 
 
"Respondent's brief to this Court demonstrates she still lacks the competence 
required for appellate litigation—a factor this Court may consider in determining whether 
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to impose discipline that provides more protection of the public and legal system than 
published censure. Cf., In re Anderson, 247 Kan. 208, 213, 795 P.2d 64 (1990) (in 
sanctions section of the opinion, the Court noted respondent's exceptions, brief, and oral 
argument did not comply with appellate rules). Respondent's brief fails to comply with 
virtually every rule of appellate briefing. It lacks coherent structure and is largely 
incomprehensible. Additionally, much of the brief is devoted to irrelevant arguments 
about the caveat, whether Wells Fargo owned the note, and the legal issue of whether the 
KCPA applied to financial communication, which demonstrates Respondent is still 
unable to identify and make pertinent legal arguments." 
 
A majority of the court concludes suspension with a two-year term is the 
appropriate discipline. In arriving at this, the majority has considered the aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances described above, as well as the clear and convincing evidence 
supporting the panel's findings and conclusions. That said, the majority is amenable to 
staying the suspension after the first 90 days so long as Huffman adheres to a practice 
supervision plan approved by the Disciplinary Administrator's office that extends for the 
remaining suspension period. If Huffman and the Disciplinary Administrator's office 
cannot agree on an appropriate plan of supervision either may file a motion with this 
court to resolve the dispute about this or compliance with the plan. The majority further 
holds that after successfully completing probation, or at the end of the suspension term, a 
reinstatement hearing will be necessary to ensure Huffman is capable of practicing law 
without further supervision. A minority of the court would have imposed a harsher 
discipline. 
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCIPLINE 
 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Donna L. Huffman be and she is hereby 
suspended from the practice of law in the state of Kansas in accordance with Supreme 
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Court Rule 225(a)(3) (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 281) for two years as of the date of this 
opinion.  
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the above suspension will be stayed after the first 90 
days provided respondent enters into a practice supervision plan approved by the 
Disciplinary Administrator's office that extends for the remaining suspension period. 
Approval of a probation plan by that office is required before any stay can commence. 
Any dispute between respondent and the Disciplinary Administrator's office over the 
practice supervision plan or compliance with it will be resolved by this court. 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondent shall comply with Supreme Court 
Rule 231 (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 292) (notice to clients, opposing counsel, and courts of 
record following suspension). 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondent comply with Supreme Court Rule 232 
(2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 293), including undergoing a reinstatement hearing after the two-
year suspension term ends. Additional conditions for reinstatement may be explored by 
the Disciplinary Administrator's office, a reinstatement panel, or the court during any 
reinstatement process. 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the costs of these proceedings be assessed to 
respondent and that this opinion be published in the official Kansas Reports.