Title: Richa v. Wichita Precision Tool Co.
Citation: 190 Kan. 138, 373 P.2d 201
Docket Number: 42,685
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: July 7, 1962

190 Kan. 138 (1962)
373 P.2d 201
JOHN H. RICHA, Individually, and JOHN H. RICHA, As Trustee of the Estate of Charles B. Jones, Appellees,
v.
WICHITA PRECISION TOOL COMPANY, INC., a Corporation, Appellant.
No. 42,685

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed July 7, 1962.
Verne M. Laing, of Wichita, argued the cause, and Lester L. Morris, Fred E. Evans, Jr., Ralph R. Brock, Joseph W. Kennedy, C. Robert Bell, and Charles J. Woodin, all of Wichita, and Gordon D. Schmidt, Donald E. Johnson, Robert D. Hovey, Warren N. Williams, and Don B. Bradley, all of Kansas City, Missouri, were with him on the briefs for the appellant.
Emmet A. Blaes, of Wichita, argued the cause, and Roetzel Jochems, Robert G. Braden, J. Francis Hesse, James W. Sargent, Stanley E. Wisdom, Cecil E. Merkel, Harry L. Hobson, Bruce W. Zuercher, L.D. Klenda, Loren B. Corliss, *139 and Charles M. Cline, Jr., all of Wichita, were with him on the briefs for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PARKER, C.J.:
This is an action by which John H. Richa, individually and as trustee of the estate of Charles B. Jones (hereinafter referred to as appellees), seeks to recover from the Wichita Precision Tool Company, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as appellant), royalties alleged to be due under a non-exclusive license agreement dated December 30, 1953. The license agreement covered one basic patent which expired April 21, 1958, and six other patents, all relating to "garment finishers" for use in pressing and shaping garments after they had been cleaned. It granted appellant the right to make, use, and sell garment finishers "embodying the improvements disclosed and claimed" in such patents. All royalties were paid until the basic patent expired. Appellant then notified appellees that no further royalties would be paid, and stopped attaching any of the patent numbers covered by the license agreement to its machines.
Appellant then continued manufacturing machines or apparatus under its trademark "Adjusta-Form," which it contends do not fall within the scope and protection of the claims of any of the existing patents covered by the license agreement.
After joinder of issues the case was tried by the district court which rendered judgment in favor of the appellees (plaintiffs) and the appellant (defendant) has appealed.
Before proceeding to consider the merits of the case there is a question of trial procedure which, as will be presently disclosed, must be determined.
The appellant presents the following question:
In support of the contention it was denied an opportunity for final argument appellant directs our attention to the record which disclosed that, at the conclusion of the trial on July 21, 1960, the following colloquy occurred between court and counsel:
"Mr. Blaes: That'll be satisfactory.
Counsel for both parties filed their requests for findings of fact and conclusions of law with the trial court on August 26, 1960.
Thereafter, and on May 10, 1961, without previous notice to counsel, without argument by counsel and without a transcript being prepared, the court announced its findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The final finding of fact stated:
and the last conclusion of law read:
From the foregoing it is apparent the findings and conclusions completely disposed of the issues.
*141 Within three days after the trial court announced its findings of fact and conclusions of law, i.e., on May 12, 1961, appellant filed a motion to set aside, modify and correct such findings and conclusions. It also filed a motion for a new trial. Among other causes stated as grounds for the granting of such motion, were: Abuse of discretion by the court; surprise which by ordinary prudence could not have been guarded against; and that appellant was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard on the merits of the case.
The motions were fully presented and argued to the court on June 5, 1961. Thereafter, and on the same day, the court made some amendments to the findings and conclusions, not disclosed by the record, and then entered judgment for the appellees, effective as of May 10, 1961.
With respect to the important procedural question now under consideration pertinent provisions of the journal entry of judgment, filed June 22, 1961, read:
The appellant's notice of appeal covers the findings of fact and conclusions of law made and entered on May 10, 1961. It also includes the trial court's action in overruling its motion for a new trial. Three of appellant's specifications of error in this court are that the trial court erred:
"In refusing to permit counsel to argue this case.
"In overruling defendant's motion for new trial."
From what has been heretofore stated it becomes obvious the heretofore described procedural question as raised by appellant is not only subject to appellate review but should be determined in connection with the error assigned in the overruling of its motion *142 for a new trial before giving consideration to other questions raised and presented regarding the merits of the case. Therefore we turn directly to such question.
Directing attention to our statute it should be noted at the outset that G.S. 1949, 60-2909, Seventh, provides:
and that the foregoing section is made applicable to trials by the court by the provisions of G.S. 1949, 60-2929, which read:
Our system of jurisprudence is founded on the proposition that every litigant has a right to be heard. The right to be heard carries with it the absolute right to be represented by counsel, and the right of counsel to assist the court by oral argument in analyzing the evidence and applying the law.
Long ago, as early as 1883, with existing statutory provisions similar to those just quoted, this court in Douglass v. Hill, 29 Kan. 527, announced the following rule:
In Railroad Co. v. Cattle Co., 59 Kan. 111, 52 Pac. 71, it is said:
See, also, Dickinson v. Beal, 10 Kan. App. 233, 62 Pac. 724, where it is said:
and the court concluded, "We think it was prejudicial error to refuse a hearing thereon."
Our later case of Dent v. Simpson, 81 Kan. 217, 105 Pac. 542, states the general rule as well as the exception. It reads:
In paragraph 3 of the Syllabus in the recent case of Boucher v. Roberts, 187 Kan. 675, 359 P.2d 830, this court once again made a positive statement of the general rule and the exception. See, also, page 678 of the opinion which reads:
Appellees suggest that nothing in the record amounts to a clear request for an opportunity to argue the case and, therefore, the right to argue was waived. Without repeating what has been heretofore presented from the record, it suffices to say that the previously quoted colloquy between the court and counsel, and the emphasized statements in the journal entry, which under our decisions (Stock v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 183 Kan. 659, 663, 331 P.2d 549; State v. Hess, 178 Kan. 452, 456, 289 P.2d 759; City of Wichita v. Catino, 175 Kan. 657, 660, 265 P.2d 849) must be assumed to be correct, clearly refute the suggestion. Of a certainty it cannot be denied that the court definitely stated that after the suggested findings of fact and conclusions of law were filed it would fix a date for argument.
Appellees further suggest that appellant was given a full opportunity *144 to be heard on post trial motions. We cannot agree our existing decisions warrant or permit a conclusion that an argument to reverse, revise or amend is the equivalent of an argument before the issues are determined.
There may be some cases where the matter sought to be argued has so little import on the issues that the refusal will be considered immaterial and nonprejudicial. Be that as it may, we do not have an immaterial issue presented here. The court very frankly stated at the close of the hearing:
The court did, however, some ten months after the hearing, without benefit of a transcript and without benefit of argument by counsel, make findings of fact and conclusions of law on issues which are germane to a patent infringement action.
The court found as a matter of fact:
and it concluded as a matter of law:
Appellees make the following statement in their brief:
Little more need be said. We are convinced it affirmatively appears from the facts of record that appellant was denied the right to argue the merits of this case and that it did not waive that right by either silence or acquiescence. Therefor in the face of our established decisions, to which we adhere, and for reasons herein stated *145 we hold the trial court should have heard counsel on the issues of fact and the law applicable and erred in failing to do so.
Under the issues as presented, we will not review the record for the purpose of determining whether substantial justice has been done. We adhere to the theory that substantial justice is not done unless a litigant is given an opportunity to be heard. Unless counsel on timely request is given the right to analyze the facts and present his theory as to the application of the law, the litigant has not been heard. The right to be heard is a matter of both private and public consequence. Argument by counsel has always been considered, by the courts of this state, and should continue to be considered as an effective aid in rendering justice.
The judgment is reversed and the case remanded with directions to grant a new trial.