Title: Commonwealth v. Daveiga
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13147
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: March 24, 2022

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SJC-13147 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ERICKSON DAVEIGA. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     November 3, 2021. - March 24, 2022. 
 
Present:  Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Firearms.  Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Investigatory 
stop, Reasonable suspicion.  Search and Seizure, Motor 
vehicle, Reasonable suspicion.  Practice, Criminal, Traffic 
violation, Motion to suppress. 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on October 4, 2017. 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Michael 
D. Ricciuti, J., and the case was tried before Robert L. 
Ullmann, J. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
Susan E. Taylor for the defendant. 
Benjamin Shorey, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
Rebecca Kiley, Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
Jessie J. Rossman, Matthew R. Segal, Katharine Naples-Mitchell, 
Chauncey B. Wood, & Radha Natarajan, for Committee for Public 
Counsel Services & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
2 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  We consider in this case whether police may 
conduct a traffic stop on the basis of a traffic violation after 
having resolved the violation at a prior encounter, and then 
having allowed the vehicle to leave, and where no other traffic 
violation took place before the stop.  While on routine patrol, 
two Boston police officers in an unmarked vehicle approached a 
vehicle that was double-parked, blocking a narrow street.  They 
pulled closely alongside the parked vehicle, with the driver's 
window of the unmarked car adjacent to the rear passenger's side 
window of the impermissibly parked vehicle.  The defendant was 
sitting in the rear seat on the driver's side; one of the 
officers recognized him from prior interactions and attempted to 
engage him in cordial conversation.  Following a brief 
discussion with the driver about the fact that the vehicle was 
impeding traffic and had to move, the officers allowed the 
vehicle to leave, purportedly to park elsewhere on the street. 
 
The officers nonetheless continued to follow the vehicle, 
and after it went past multiple open parking spots and turned 
onto another street, they pulled the vehicle over to conduct a 
traffic stop.  During the stop, an officer observed a gun on the 
floor of the rear seat compartment, near the defendant's feet; 
the defendant was ordered out of the vehicle and arrested.  The 
defendant challenges the constitutionality of the traffic stop 
under art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  We 
3 
 
conclude that the traffic stop was unreasonable under art. 14 
because police authority to conduct the stop ended when the 
officers resolved the parking violation in a separate, discrete 
encounter. 
1.  Background.  The essential facts are undisputed.  We 
present the facts based on the motion judge's findings, 
supplemented by other testimony at the hearing by one of the 
arresting officers.  See Commonwealth v. Washington, 449 Mass. 
476, 477 (2007).  The motion judge explicitly credited that 
officer's testimony. 
On an early morning in August 2017, Boston police Officers 
Joseph McDonough and Christopher Stevens were on routine patrol 
in the Uphams Corner area of Boston.  Both officers had years of 
experience working in that part of Boston.  They were driving an 
unmarked vehicle and were wearing plain clothes. 
At approximately 4 A.M., while driving on Monadnock Street, 
the officers came across a double-parked Chrysler Pacifica, 
largely blocking the road, in violation of Boston Traffic Rules 
and Regulations, art. VI, § 7.1  Monadnock is a narrow, one-way 
street at that point, and vehicles were permitted to park on 
both sides of the street.  McDonough squeezed partway through on 
 
1 Boston Traffic Rules and Regulations, art. VI, § 7, 
provides that "[n]o person shall drive in such a manner as to 
obstruct unnecessarily the normal movement of traffic on any 
street or highway." 
4 
 
the driver's right, pulling alongside the passenger's side of 
the Pacifica and positioning his driver's window within inches 
of its rear passenger's side window. 
The Pacifica was occupied by four men:  the driver, a front 
seat passenger, and two rear seat passengers.  The defendant was 
in the rear seat behind the driver.  McDonough told the driver, 
"You guys are blocking the street."  The men responded that they 
were waiting for a friend.  McDonough replied, "How am I going 
to get by?  You're blocking the street."  The driver then asked, 
"What do you want us to do?"  McDonough looked across the rear 
seat at the defendant and noticed that he was staring straight 
ahead.  McDonough was familiar with the defendant from at least 
thirty prior encounters, and had arrested him at least three 
times, including once in July of 2016 for a firearms offense.  
Nonetheless, McDonough considered that the two had a cordial 
relationship.  The defendant referred to McDonough, who is bald, 
by the nickname "Baldy."  Hours before this encounter, McDonough 
had seen the defendant walking, and the defendant had smiled and 
nodded at him. 
In light of their relationship, McDonough thought that the 
defendant's demeanor in the Pacifica was unusual.  He asked, 
"How are you, pal?  Are you doing good today?"  In a low tone, 
the defendant said that he was okay.  The driver then told 
McDonough that he would move the Pacifica and park elsewhere, 
5 
 
gesturing toward several open parking spots nearby.  McDonough 
responded, "Yeah, sure, all right," and backed up to give the 
Pacifica more space to pull forward. 
The Pacifica proceeded down Monadnock Street, passed the 
open parking spots the driver had indicated, and turned left 
onto Dudley Street, without committing any further traffic 
violations.  Because a right turn would have been a more direct 
route back to Monadnock Street, the officers grew suspicious.  
McDonough then changed his mind about pulling over the Pacifica.  
After about ten to fifteen seconds, he activated the unmarked 
vehicle's blue lights, pursued the Pacifica, and pulled it over. 
McDonough and Stevens got out of their vehicle and 
approached the Pacifica.  McDonough walked to the driver's side 
window and asked the driver to produce his license and 
registration.  The defendant then asked McDonough, "Baldy, what 
are you doing?  Why are you doing this?  Are you really going to 
do this now?"  McDonough replied that he was conducting a motor 
vehicle stop.  Meanwhile, Stevens stood on the passenger's side 
of the vehicle, looking into the rear compartment with a 
flashlight.  Stevens then said to McDonough, "Hey, Joe," and 
quickly walked over to him.  Based on Stevens's reaction, 
McDonough inferred that Stevens might have seen a gun.  
McDonough ordered the defendant and the other occupants out of 
the vehicle.  The officers found a gun on the floor near where 
6 
 
the defendant's feet had been.  McDonough knew that the 
defendant did not have a license to carry firearms; the 
defendant then was placed in handcuffs. 
The officers did not issue a traffic citation to the 
driver.  According to his testimony at the hearing on the motion 
to suppress, McDonough could not recall whether he had had a 
ticket book with him, although one could have been delivered to 
him upon request. 
The defendant was charged with carrying a firearm without a 
license, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a); carrying a loaded firearm, 
G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n); and possession of ammunition without a 
firearm identification card, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h) (1)  He 
filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized, arguing that the 
traffic stop was unreasonable.  The motion judge noted that the 
case "tests the limits of what are known as 'pretext' car 
stops," but ultimately denied the motion.  Following a jury 
trial, the defendant was convicted of carrying a firearm without 
a license and acquitted of the other charges.2  He timely 
 
 
2 The defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to so much of 
the charge of possession of a firearm as alleged that he 
previously had been convicted of a violent felony, G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10G. 
 
7 
 
appealed to the Appeals Court, and we transferred the case to 
this court on our motion.3 
2.  Discussion.  The defendant challenges the denial of his 
motion to suppress, on the ground that the traffic stop on 
Dudley Street violated art. 14.  The defendant contends that the 
Pacifica was stopped twice, initially on Monadnock Street, and 
then again on Dudley Street.  He argues that the latter stop was 
unreasonable because any authority to detain him ended after the 
first stop of the Pacifica, where police resolved the parking 
violation and then allowed the driver to leave and drive to 
another parking space.  The defendant maintains that even if the 
initial encounter was not a stop, the stop on Dudley Street 
nonetheless was unreasonable, because the police had effectuated 
the purpose of the encounter, to resolve the traffic violation, 
at which point their authority to hold the defendant ended.  The 
Commonwealth argues that the encounter on Monadnock Street was 
not a stop and therefore had little, if any, legal significance.  
Once the officers observed a traffic violation, the Commonwealth 
suggests, they were warranted in thereafter stopping the 
Pacifica. 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus brief in support of the 
defendant submitted by the Committee for Public Counsel 
Services; American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, Inc.; 
Charles Hamilton Houston Institute for Race & Justice; 
Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and New 
England Innocence Project. 
8 
 
We have yet to address the question whether police may 
conduct a traffic stop on the basis of a traffic violation after 
having earlier addressed the violation and resolved the 
situation in a separate, discrete encounter.  In order to 
resolve this question, we first must determine the precise 
moment of the seizure here. 
"In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we 
accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent clear 
error and leave to the judge the responsibility of determining 
the weight and credibility to be given . . . testimony presented 
at the motion hearing" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Cordero, 477 Mass. 237, 241 (2017).  "We review independently 
the application of constitutional principles to the facts found" 
(citation omitted).  Id.  See Commonwealth v. Buckley, 478 Mass. 
861, 864 (2018) ("we independently determine the correctness of 
the judge's application of constitutional principles to the 
facts as found" [quotation and citation omitted]). 
 
a.  Moment of seizure.  The parties agree that the second 
encounter was a traffic stop.  They disagree, however, as to the 
nature of the first encounter and whether it, too, was a stop in 
the constitutional sense, during which the defendant was held.  
Pointing to the close proximity between the unmarked vehicle and 
9 
 
the Pacifica, the defendant argues that the first encounter was 
a traffic stop.4 
 
Because art. 14 is more protective than the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution in defining the 
moment of seizure, "we analyze the seizure under 'the more 
stringent standards of art. 14 with the understanding that, if 
these standards are satisfied, then so too are those of the 
Fourth Amendment.'"  Commonwealth v. Evelyn, 485 Mass. 691, 697 
(2020), quoting Commonwealth v. Lyles, 453 Mass. 811, 812 n.1 
(2009). 
 
"Not every encounter between a law enforcement official and 
a member of the public constitutes an intrusion of 
constitutional dimensions that requires justification."  
Commonwealth v. Gomes, 453 Mass. 506, 510 (2009).  "Police 
officers are free to make noncoercive inquiries of anyone they 
wish."  Commonwealth v. Matta, 483 Mass. 357, 363 (2019).  See 
Commonwealth v. Narcisse, 457 Mass. 1, 5 (2010) ("police 
officers may approach individuals on the street to ask them 
about their business without implicating the balance between 
State power and individual freedom").  See also Florida v. 
Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991) (under Fourth Amendment, "a 
 
4 At trial, Stevens explained that he and McDonough could 
not have pulled past the Pacifica without hitting its side 
mirrors or the side mirrors of the vehicle parked on the right 
side of the street. 
10 
 
seizure does not occur simply because a police officer 
approaches an individual and asks a few questions").  "A person 
has been 'seized' by a police officer, if, in view of all of the 
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person 
would have believed that he [or she] was not free to leave" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Sykes, 449 
Mass. 308, 310-311 (2007).  The pertinent inquiry is whether "an 
officer has, through words or conduct, objectively communicated 
that the officer would use his or her police power to coerce 
that person to stay."  Matta, supra at 362. 
"[W]hile the attending circumstances of a police encounter 
are relevant, a 'seizure' must arise from the actions of the 
police officer."  Id. at 363.  See Lyles, 453 Mass. at 815.  
"Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of 
authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen 
may we conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred."  Sykes, 449 
Mass. at 311, quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968). 
Where a police officer in a vehicle approaches a defendant 
who is also in a vehicle, specific factors may indicate the 
requisite show of authority.  Among them are whether the officer 
stopped a moving vehicle, Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 472 Mass. 
767, 773 (2015); whether police were driving a marked cruiser, 
Commonwealth v. Rock, 429 Mass. 609, 611-612 (1999); whether the 
officers activated their lights or sirens, Commonwealth v. 
11 
 
Smigliano, 427 Mass. 490, 491-492 (1998), and Matta, 483 Mass. 
at 364-365; and whether the police vehicle deliberately was used 
to block or impede the defendant's egress, Commonwealth v. 
Thompson, 427 Mass. 729, 733, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1008 
(1998).  This list is not exhaustive and does not curtail our 
consideration of the central question in each case, the totality 
of the circumstances in that particular instance.5  See Lyles, 
453 Mass. at 814-816 (diversity of interactions between citizens 
and police calls for review of totality of circumstances).  
 
5 Courts in other jurisdictions similarly have noted 
specific factors to assist in determining whether a vehicle 
encounter is a seizure.  See, e.g., State v. Edmonds, 323 Conn. 
34, 50-51 (2016); People v. Paynter, 955 P.2d 68, 73 (Colo. 
1998).  The Connecticut Supreme Court, for example, has focused 
on the number of officers and vehicles involved; whether the 
officers were uniformed; whether the officers were visibly armed 
or had their weapons drawn; whether the vehicles involved were 
marked police cruisers; whether the vehicles' sirens and 
emergency lights were activated, and whether the vehicles' 
headlamps or spotlights illuminated the defendant; whether the 
defendant was alone or otherwise appeared to be the target of 
police attention; the nature of the location, including whether 
it was public or private property; whether the defendant was 
surrounded or fully or partially blocked in by police; the 
character of any verbal communications or commands issued by the 
police officers; whether the officers advised the detainee of 
his right to terminate the encounter; the nature of any physical 
contact; whether the officers pursued after an initial attempt 
by the defendant to leave; and whether the officers took and 
retained possession of the defendant's papers or property.  
Edmonds, supra.  In addition, the Colorado Supreme Court has 
considered whether the officer approached the defendant in a 
nonthreatening way and whether the officer's tone was 
conversational or whether it indicated that compliance might be 
compelled.  See Paynter, supra.  Notably, while enumerating 
these factors, these courts also have called for reviewing the 
totality of the circumstances. 
12 
 
Thus, we also consider circumstances that are not unique to 
vehicle encounters.  See Commonwealth v. Martin, 467 Mass. 291, 
302-303 (2014). 
Here, the officers first approached the Pacifica when it 
was double-parked in the middle of a one-way street, facing the 
direction of travel.  To the left of the Pacifica was a 
driveway; to its right was a properly parked vehicle, leaving a 
gap through which the officers could squeeze only partially.  
Compare Matta, 483 Mass. at 364-365 (no seizure where marked 
cruiser approached parked vehicle), with Rodriguez, 472 Mass. 
at 773 (seizure where police pulled over moving vehicle).  The 
officers were driving an unmarked vehicle, see Rock, 429 Mass. 
at 611-612, and did not activate their lights or sirens during 
the first encounter, see Matta, supra.  The tone of the 
officers' conversation with the driver and the passengers was 
calm and cordial. 
The defendant nonetheless argues that the Pacifica was 
stopped because police positioned their vehicle within inches of 
it; the defendant emphasizes that the officers had to back up to 
give the driver sufficient room to pull forward safely.  We said 
in Thompson, 427 Mass. at 733, that a seizure occurs where an 
officer "parks a police cruiser with the intention and the 
effect of blocking a suspect's motor vehicle and preventing it 
from leaving."  In that case, an officer deliberately positioned 
13 
 
his police cruiser behind a parked Buick, blocking its exit from 
a parking lot.  Id. at 731, 733. 
Similarly coercive circumstances are absent here.  Unlike 
the officer in Thompson, McDonough did not position his vehicle 
between the Pacifica and its path of exit.  He pulled alongside 
the vehicle's rear passenger's side and asked the occupants, 
"How am I going to get by?"  Although the police vehicle came 
within inches of the Pacifica, McDonough did so because of the 
manner in which the Pacifica was double-parked and the 
narrowness of the street, which at that point was one-way, with 
cars parked along the right side.  As underscored by their brief 
conversation, McDonough so positioned his vehicle to tell the 
occupants of the Pacifica that the street was blocked and to 
encourage them to move so traffic could pass along the street.  
See, e.g., Narcisse, 457 Mass. at 6 (no seizure where officer 
had short conversation with defendant about "activity" nearby); 
Gomes, 453 Mass. at 508, 510 (no seizure where officers asked 
defendant what he was doing in particular area).  A reasonable 
person would not have believed that McDonough was asking the 
driver to stay where he was and continue blocking the street, 
where McDonough expressly indicated that he wanted the driver to 
move.  Thus, without more, the proximity of the vehicles does 
not establish that a seizure occurred.  See Commonwealth v. 
Edwards, 476 Mass. 341, 345 (2017) (blocking defendant's 
14 
 
vehicle, alone, was not sufficient to show seizure; other 
factors also contributed to determination that seizure 
occurred); Commonwealth v. Helme, 399 Mass. 298, 299-300 (1987) 
(seizure occurred when officer activated "alley light," in 
addition to using cruiser to block egress of defendant's 
vehicle); Commonwealth v. King, 389 Mass. 233, 237, 241 (1983) 
(seizure where officer repositioned cruiser in front of parked 
vehicle after collecting driver's identification papers).  We 
therefore conclude that a seizure did not occur during the 
officers' encounter with the occupants of the Pacifica on 
Monadnock Street. 
The parties agree that the police did, however, seize the 
Pacifica after it had proceeded down Monadnock Street and had 
turned left onto Dudley Street, without engaging in any further 
traffic violation.  McDonough activated the blue lights on the 
unmarked vehicle, followed the Pacifica, and pulled it over.  
See Rodriguez, 472 Mass. at 773 (stop occurred when police 
pulled defendant over); Smigliano, 427 Mass. at 491-492 (moment 
of seizure was when police activated their blue lights).  
Moreover, when the defendant asked why they were being pulled 
over, McDonough himself said that he was conducting a traffic 
stop.  Thus, we conclude that the defendant was seized only 
once, and that seizure took place on Dudley Street. 
15 
 
 
b.  Reasonableness of the seizure.  We turn to consider 
whether the traffic stop on Dudley Street was reasonable.  See 
Rodriguez, 472 Mass. at 775-776 ("ultimate touchstone" of 
art. 14 is reasonableness [citation omitted]).  The defendant 
maintains that even if the initial encounter was not a stop, the 
stop on Dudley Street nonetheless was unreasonable because 
police already had effectuated the governmental purpose 
underlying the stop on Monadnock Street, when they addressed the 
underlying traffic violation of blocking traffic, and thereafter 
allowed the Pacifica to leave.  At the point where the violation 
was resolved, the defendant maintains, police authority to 
conduct a traffic stop terminated. 
In general, when an officer observes a traffic violation, 
the officer may stop the vehicle to address that violation.  See 
Buckley, 478 Mass. at 866; Commonwealth v. Santana, 420 Mass. 
205, 207 (1995).  The purpose of this authority, known as the 
authorization rule, is that "'allowing police to make [traffic] 
stops serves [the] significant government interest' of ensuring 
public safety on our roadways."  Buckley, supra at 869, quoting 
Rodriguez, 472 Mass. at 776. 
At the same time, the observation of a traffic violation 
does not equip an officer with bottomless authority to seize a 
defendant.  See Commonwealth v. Cruz, 459 Mass. 459, 465-466 
(2011); Commonwealth v. Torres, 424 Mass. 153, 158 (1997).  "It 
16 
 
goes without saying that the driver cannot be held indefinitely 
until all avenues of possible inquiry have been tried and 
exhausted."  Commonwealth v. Feyenord, 445 Mass. 72, 80 n.9 
(2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1187 (2006).  "[T]he tolerable 
duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is 
determined by the seizure's 'mission' -- to address the traffic 
violation that warranted the stop and attend to related safety 
concerns" (citations omitted).  Rodriguez v. United States, 575 
U.S. 348, 354 (2015).  "Because addressing the infraction is the 
purpose of the stop, it may last no longer than is necessary to 
effectuate that purpose" (quotation, citation, and alteration 
omitted).  Id.  "Police authority to seize an individual ends 
'when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are -- or reasonably 
should have been -- completed.'"  Cordero, 477 Mass. at 242, 
quoting Rodriguez, supra. 
These limits reflect the reality that, during a traffic 
stop, "an intrusion into a driver or a passenger's privacy is 
not minimal."  Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 429 Mass. 658, 663 
(1999).  "A passenger in the stopped vehicle may harbor a 
special concern about the officer's conduct because the 
passenger usually had nothing to do with the operation, or 
condition, of the vehicle which drew the officer's attention in 
the first place."  Id. 
17 
 
"In evaluating whether the police exceeded the permissible 
scope of a stop, the issue is one of proportion."  Commonwealth 
v. Sinforoso, 434 Mass. 320, 323 (2001).  "Because there is no 
bright-line rule to determine proportionality, we must balance 
the need to make the stop . . . against the intrusion on the 
defendant" (quotation and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Bostock, 450 Mass. 616, 622 (2008).  "[P]olice conduct is to be 
judged 'under a standard of objective reasonableness without 
regard to the underlying intent or motivation of the officers 
involved.'"  Santana, 420 Mass. at 208, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Ceria, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 230, 235 (1982).  See Buckley, 478 
Mass. at 867.  If objective circumstances exist showing that the 
government's interest in ensuring traffic safety has ended, the 
individual interest prevails, and police authority to conduct a 
traffic stop must terminate.  Two circumstances that mark the 
end of the government's interest in ensuring traffic safety are 
(1) where an officer unreasonably prolongs a traffic stop after 
having addressed the underlying traffic violation, and (2) when 
an officer observes a traffic violation but unreasonably delays 
initiating a traffic stop on the basis of that violation. 
As stated, we consistently have held seizures to be 
unreasonable where an officer prolongs a traffic stop after 
having completed the tasks tied to the encounter.  For example, 
in Torres, 424 Mass. at 155, a State police trooper pulled over 
18 
 
a vehicle that appeared to have been speeding.  When the trooper 
knocked on the passenger's side window, a passenger got out of 
the vehicle, and the trooper asked him to stand by the rear of 
the vehicle.  Id.  In response to the trooper's request, the 
driver produced his license and registration, both of which were 
valid.  Id.  The trooper then turned to the passenger and asked 
him for identification.  Id. at 155-156.  When the passenger 
indicated that he did not speak English, the trooper motioned 
for the passenger's wallet.  Id. at 156.  The passenger 
complied, and the trooper opened the wallet, examining papers 
that appeared to contain notes of drug transactions.  Id.  The 
trooper then remained on the scene to investigate his suspicions 
of drug activity.  Id. 
We concluded that the trooper violated art. 14 by 
prolonging the stop beyond the driver's production of his 
license and registration.  Id. at 154-155.  We held that "a 
police inquiry in a routine traffic stop must end on the 
production of a valid license and registration unless the police 
have grounds for inferring that either the operator or his 
passengers were involved in the commission of a crime . . . or 
engaged in other suspicious conduct" (quotation and citation 
omitted).  Id. at 158.  We noted that "[o]nce any potential 
threat to the officer's safety was dispelled and there was no 
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, any basis 
19 
 
for further detention evaporated."  Id. at 160, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Torres, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 6, 9 (1996), S.C., 424 
Mass. 153 (1997). 
Similarly, in Cordero, 477 Mass. at 238, a State police 
trooper observed a vehicle with illegally tinted windows.  While 
following the vehicle, the trooper used an onboard computer to 
confirm whether it was properly registered and its owner 
licensed; he learned that they were.  Id. at 242.  The trooper 
then stopped the vehicle, approached the driver's side window, 
and asked the driver to produce his license.  Id. at 239.  After 
conducting a records check on the license, the trooper tested 
the window tint of the stopped vehicle and discussed the 
vehicle's broken tail and brake lights with the driver.  Id. at 
239-240.  At that point, the trooper did not end the stop; 
rather, he remained on the scene and questioned the driver about 
suspected drug activity.  Id. at 240. 
 
We concluded that the officer's prolonging of the traffic 
stop was unreasonable; we explained that "once a police officer 
has completed the investigation of a defendant's civil traffic 
violations, and the facts do not give rise to reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity, the officer is required to 
permit the defendant to drive away."  Id. at 238. 
Our decision in Cordero drew upon the United States Supreme 
Court's analysis of the protections of the Fourth Amendment 
20 
 
during police encounters with motor vehicles.  See Rodriguez, 
575 U.S. at 354.  In Rodriguez, supra at 350, 355, the Court 
determined that an officer violated the Fourth Amendment when he 
conducted a dog sniff after having completed the "mission" of a 
valid traffic stop.  The officer had observed a motor vehicle 
veer onto the shoulder of the highway for one or two seconds.  
Id. at 351.  The officer's mission, according to the Court, was 
circumscribed to "ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] 
stop," including "checking a driver's license, determining 
whether there [were] outstanding warrants against the driver, 
and inspecting the automobile's registration and proof of 
insurance," as well as "determining whether to issue a traffic 
ticket."  Id. at 355.  The Court emphasized that such tasks 
"serve the same objective as enforcement of the traffic code:  
ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and 
responsibly."  Id.  This governmental interest ended when the 
officer issued a written warning, thus terminating the 
investigation into the traffic violation, as well as the 
officer's authority to continue detaining the driver.  Id. 
at 356-357. 
 
In addition to precluding unnecessarily prolonged traffic 
stops, some Federal courts have held that police authority to 
conduct a traffic stop terminates where there is a substantial 
delay between the observation of a traffic violation and the 
21 
 
stop.  For example, in United States v. Mendonca, 682 F. Supp. 
2d 98, 101 (D. Mass. 2010), agents received information from the 
United States Drug Enforcement Administration that a particular 
individual was trafficking in marijuana.  An agent surveilled 
the individual driving on the highway and, at around 11 A.M., 
observed him speeding, following other vehicles too closely, and 
changing lanes without signaling.  Id.  The individual stopped 
at a motel for about one hour and left at approximately 12 P.M.  
Id.  The agent then called another officer, told him about the 
traffic violations, and asked the officer to investigate; the 
officer identified the vehicle and initiated a traffic stop.  
Id. 
The court held that "[a]lthough pretextual stops based upon 
traffic infractions are generally permissible," the officer 
could not stop the vehicle on the basis of the traffic 
violations, where the objective circumstances showed that "the 
obvious rationale for the stop was to inspect" other suspicious 
activity.  Id. at 104.  Recognizing that the government's 
interest had lapsed, the court noted that "a completed 
misdemeanor cannot hang over a suspect indefinitely until a time 
at which he has engaged in some other suspicious activity that 
officers believe warrants a pretextual stop."  Id.  Compare 
United States v. Sandridge, 385 F.3d 1032, 1036 (6th Cir. 2004), 
cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1129 (2005) ("Driving without a valid 
22 
 
license is a continuing offense -- in contrast, say, to a 
speeding or a parking violation . . ."; thus, officer had 
reasonable suspicion to stop driver three weeks after learning 
driver had invalid license). 
In addition to unreasonably prolonged stops and 
unreasonable delays, this case presents a third set of objective 
circumstances demonstrating that once the government's interest 
in traffic safety has been met, the individual interests 
prevail, and police authority to conduct a motor vehicle stop on 
the basis of an observed traffic violation terminates.  Here, 
the officers approached the Pacifica with the "mission" of 
addressing the vehicle's blocking of the street, an apparent 
violation of Boston Traffic Rules and Regulations, art. VI, § 7.  
See Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354.  At that moment, the officers 
could have conducted a stop to investigate the parking violation 
and could have performed the various tasks tied to the 
enforcement of the traffic laws, such as asking the driver to 
produce his license and registration.  The officers determined, 
however, that they would not issue a citation, and the Pacifica 
moved so as to stop blocking the street, thereby concluding the 
encounter and completing the "mission" of the investigation.  
See id. at 355; Cordero, 477 Mass. at 241-242.  Because the 
driver of the Pacifica did not commit any further traffic 
23 
 
violations, the government's interest in ensuring traffic safety 
was met once the violation on Monadnock Street was resolved. 
It is significant here that the traffic violation resulted 
from the manner in which the Pacifica was parked.  Unlike, for 
example, reckless driving, any safety hazards were addressed 
once the driver moved the vehicle.  See Sandridge, 385 F.3d 
at 1036 (traffic stop was valid three weeks after officer 
learned that driver did not have valid license, because driving 
without valid license is "continuing offense," unlike "parking 
violation").  In this case, therefore, the government's interest 
had lapsed, leaving solely the defendant's important interest in 
personal security from arbitrary police conduct. 
The defendant's interests, following the initial encounter, 
are particularly compelling in this case where the objective 
circumstances so obviously show, as both parties agree, that the 
actual traffic stop was a pretext.  See Mendonca, 682 F. Supp. 
2d at 104 (objective circumstances showed traffic stop was 
obvious pretext, ending police authority to conduct it).  
Because the traffic violation already had been resolved, the 
defendant had even more reason to expect that police would not 
extend their intrusion than had the defendants in Torres and 
Cordero, where police conducted a traffic stop after observing a 
traffic violation, but prolonged the defendant's detention to 
investigate other suspicions.  By contrast, here, the police 
24 
 
clearly indicated that their traffic-related investigation was 
complete.  The defendant's reasonable frustration at the 
subsequent police conduct is compounded where, as here, the 
defendant was a "passenger in the stopped vehicle" and not the 
driver who committed the traffic violation.  See Gonsalves, 429 
Mass. at 663. 
In sum, like unreasonably prolonged traffic stops and 
unreasonable delays in stopping a vehicle for a motor vehicle 
violation, this case presents a third situation in which the 
government's interest in ensuring traffic safety ended prior to 
subsequent improper action by the officers.  Here, the 
government interest ended when police resolved the illegal 
parking by the Pacifica on Monadnock Street.  The defendant's 
individual interests thereafter prevailed, while the officers' 
authority to stop the Pacifica for the resolved traffic 
violation terminated.  Because police otherwise lacked the 
authority to conduct a traffic stop on Dudley Street, the stop 
was unreasonable under art. 14. 
3.  Conclusion.  The order denying the defendant's motion 
to suppress is reversed.  Because the defendant was convicted of 
carrying a firearm without a license, and the Commonwealth would 
not be able to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant possessed an operational firearm without the evidence 
of the gun, the defendant's conviction cannot stand.  
25 
 
Accordingly, the conviction must be vacated and set aside, and 
the matter remanded to the Superior Court for entry of a 
judgment of not guilty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.