Title: Rolando Garcia v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC95-136
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: April 18, 2002

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
  
CORRECTED OPINION
____________
No.  SC95136
____________
ROLANDO GARCIA,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[April 18, 2002]
PER CURIAM.
We have on appeal the judgments and sentences of the trial court imposing
the death penalty upon Rolando Garcia for the murders of Mario Amador and
Roberto Alfonso.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the
reasons discussed in this opinion, we reverse Garcia's convictions and the death
sentences imposed, and we remand this case for a new trial consistent with this
opinion.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1.  Garcia also was charged with a ninth murder that occurred in 1986, which
was the murder of Michael Millot, but that case was assigned a separate case
number than the other eight.
2.  Initially, Pardo and Garcia were tried together, but the first trial ended in a
mistrial when the trial court determined that Garcia's motion for severance from
Pardo should be granted.  
3.  Pardo was convicted of nine counts of first-degree murder and related
charges, which occurred in five separate episodes, and he was sentenced to death on
each of the murder charges.  This Court affirmed Pardo's convictions and death
sentences.  See Pardo v. State, 563 So. 2d 77, 81 (Fla. 1990).  
4.  Two of the eight homicide counts--those related to Sara Musa and Fara
Quintero--were severed.  See Garcia v State, 568 So. 2d 896, 897 (Fla. 1990).   
-2-
Garcia was initially charged in a multi-count indictment arising out of four
episodes of double murders that occurred in Dade County in 1986.1  Manuel Pardo,
Jr. also was charged in the indictment.2  Pardo, a former police officer, subsequently
went to trial and admitted he intentionally killed the victims, but also testified that
Garcia had no involvement in the murders.3  
Garcia later went to trial on six of the homicides.4  He was acquitted of the
murders of two of the six homicide victims (Luis Robledo and Ulipano Ledo) and
convicted of the murders of four victims arising from two episodes of double murder
(Mario Amador and Robert Alfonso; and Ramon Alvaro and Daisy Ricard).  On
direct appeal, this Court reversed all of the convictions and death sentences,
5.  The Musa and Quintero case is still pending.
-3-
concluding that the six homicides and related charges had been improperly joined
for trial because
each pair of homicides and related offenses tried in this case involved
different victims at different dates and in different places stretching
across a three-month period.  The first pair of murders occurred about
five weeks before the second, and the second pair of murders occurred
two months before the final murders.  There was no temporal or
geographical connection to link these crimes in an episodic sense.  The
only clear similarity is that they were similar types of offenses and
allegedly they were committed by the same two people, either for
money, drugs, or both.    
Garcia v. State, 568 So. 2d 896, 899 (Fla. 1990).  The Court directed that Garcia be
retried separately for the murders of Amador and Alfonso, which arose out of one
episode, and the murders of Alvaro and Ricard, which  arose out of a separate
episode.  See id. at 901 n.14.  
Since this Court's remand, Garcia has been tried and acquitted of all charges
in the Alvero and Ricard case, as well as in the Millot case.5  This appeal arises out
of Garcia's retrial and convictions for the murders of Amador and Alfonso.  
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
GUILT PHASE
On January 22, 1986, Amador and Alfonso were found face down in
Amador's apartment.  They had been killed by multiple gunshot wounds to the head
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and neck, and Amador also had been shot once in the hip.  A portable scale was
found on the dining room table and traces of an unidentified white powder were
found outside the front door.  There were no signs of forced entry or ransacking; in
fact, the apartment was described as "immaculate."  No murder weapon was ever
found.  In May 1986, Carlos Ribera contacted the Hialeah Police Department and,
based upon information he provided, Pardo and Garcia were arrested.
Ribera was the State's key witness at trial and he testified in detail about what
Garcia had allegedly told him about the murders of Amador and Alfonso.  Ribera
testified that he first met Garcia in December 1985 at the video store where Ribera
worked, and in January 1986, he started driving Garcia around. 
Ribera testified that some time in March 1986, Garcia called Ribera and told
him that Garcia's uncle, "the federal agent," wanted to see Ribera.  When Ribera
went to pick Garcia up, Garcia showed him some newspaper articles.  Garcia told
Ribera that the articles "were about a guy named Mario that he had setup with a
drug deal and that [Garcia and Pardo] ripped him off and that they killed him and
that was all." 
Ribera also testified that when they went to Pardo's apartment, Garcia told
Ribera the following story:  what had occurred was a "drug rip off."  Garcia and
Pardo had gone to Amador's apartment in the late evening to buy two kilograms of
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cocaine.  They knocked on Amador's door and Amador answered.  They went in
and Amador guided them to the kitchen, where they sat down.  Amador looked
happy because he thought there was money in Pardo's briefcase.  Amador went into
another room and got the drugs and brought them back.  Ribera further testified that
Pardo, who was present while Garcia allegedly related these events, stated, "Yea,
that is when I opened the briefcase and I took out my gun."  
Ribera stated that Pardo took out his .22 Rugar and that Garcia also had a .22
Rugar.  Garcia then showed Ribera the .22 Rugar, which was on the dresser, and he
showed him how the silencer would clip on to the gun.  Garcia told Ribera that he
and Pardo put Amador and Alfonso on the floor and shot them.  Garcia told Ribera
that he was "a hit man" and "a drug dealer."  
Ribera testified that his relationship with Garcia changed in late April and
early May.  Garcia was upset because his drug supplier had found out that he killed
Amador, and therefore the supplier did not want to deal with him anymore.  
Ribera testified that Garcia then threatened Ribera, and that is when Ribera went to
the police. 
Garcia has always maintained his innocence.  One of his theories of defense
was that Ribera, along with Pardo, had committed the murders in question.  For
example, on the State's direct examination of Ribera, he testified that Garcia showed
-6-
him a driver's license that Garcia identified as Amador's and that Garcia and Pardo
had used it to buy some guns.  However, on cross-examination of Ribera, defense
counsel pointed out that the fictitious address used on the paperwork to purchase
firearms in which Amador's driver's license was used was very close to Ribera's
childhood address. 
In addition to Ribera's testimony, the State also called certain witnesses who
testified to Amador's mistrust of Garcia.  John Hegarty, Sr. testified that he worked
with Amador on a construction site and also had bought cocaine from him.  Hegarty
testified that Amador told Hegarty that Garcia had called Amador and wanted to
make a deal with him for a kilogram of cocaine.  Hegarty stated that he told Amador
to be careful because he did not trust Garcia and that he might get ripped off by him. 
Hegarty also told Amador to make sure that he got "help or back-up."
Allen Lopez, another of Amador's coworkers, also testified at trial.  Lopez
testified that Amador told Lopez that a person named "Rolly" (Garcia's nickname)
had been to his house to buy a kilogram of cocaine.  According to Lopez, Amador
stated that he wanted Lopez at his house because he did not want to be there alone
due to the fact that he did not trust Garcia.  
-7-
Garcia attempted to introduce Pardo's sworn testimony from Pardo's own trial
in which Pardo confessed to the murders, and explicitly denied that Garcia was
involved in any of the murders.  However, the trial court found that the testimony
was inadmissible under the exception to the hearsay rule governing prior testimony.
Garcia did not present any witnesses, nor did he testify himself.  The jury
returned a verdict of guilty on both counts of first-degree murder, robbery with a
firearm, and unlawful possession of a firearm while engaged in a criminal offense.  
PENALTY PHASE
At the beginning of the penalty phase, defense counsel explained to the trial
court that Garcia did not want counsel to contest the aggravation, present any
mitigation, submit jury instructions, cross-examine the witnesses, or make any
arguments on his behalf.  In explaining to the trial court his decision not to present
mitigation, Garcia stated:
I told them that I didn't want anything to be brought forward in front of
the jury regarding the penalty phase in my case and I asked my family
not to be present in the courtroom so nobody could force them to beg
for their son's life when I didn't commit the crime.
6.  In response to the court's inquiry, defense counsel proffered possible
statutory mitigation:  (1) Garcia's age at the time the crimes were committed
(twenty-three); (2) lack of significant history of prior criminal activity; (3) that
Garcia was an accomplice in the capital felony committed by another person (Pardo)
and Garcia's participation was relatively minor; and (4) that Garcia acted under
extreme duress or the substantial domination of another.  As for nonstatutory
mitigation, defense counsel proffered:  (1) the length of the potential minimum
mandatory sentences; (2) the lack of intent to kill; (3) good conduct during the trial;
(4) that Garcia may not have been the trigger person; and (5) that Garcia has a
family who loves him.
-8-
Defense counsel asked the court to reconsider the introduction of Pardo's testimony
from his own trial because hearsay is admissible in the penalty phase and because it
would exonerate Garcia or lessen his involvement.  The court denied the request.6  
Ribera again testified at the penalty phase and said that Garcia told him that
when the victims were on the floor face down and Pardo was getting the drugs, one
of the victims said, "Please don't kill me, it is not worth it, just take the drugs, it is
not worth it."  Ribera testified that Garcia told Ribera that he starting laughing and
"that he told these guys to just shut up and nothing was going to happen to them and
that was all."  Ribera also stated that Garcia told Ribera that he and Pardo "had
planned it, it was his deal and that it was planned to go in there and take the drugs
and kill them because they didn't want these guys to come back at them to kill
them."
-9-
Garcia did not put on any mitigation, but was permitted at his request to
address the jury.  His statement, in which he again maintained his innocence, is as
follows:
Good morning.  First of all, I would like to thank you for your effort
and consideration in this case even though you found me guilty and I
am not.  Number two, although you found me guilty, I would like to
say that I need for your recommendation to be death because it is the
only way that a proper Court will hear what you weren't allowed to
hear in this case.  And number four, I would like to thank my attorneys
for the hell of a job that they did for me in trying to fight for my life. 
That is it.
The jury recommended death by a vote of ten-to-two for the murder of
Amador and seven-to-five for the murder of Alfonso, and the trial court sentenced
7.  The court found three aggravating factors for both murders:  (1) previous
conviction of a capital felony (great weight); (2) murder committed during the
course of a robbery and pecuniary gain (merged) (no weight given); and (3) CCP
(no weight given).  With regard to mitigating circumstances, the court explained:
This court finds that the defendant has failed to establish any statutory
or nonstatutory mitigating circumstances because he voluntarily waived
his right, against the advise of counsel and the court, to present such
evidence.  Further, the court finds that the defendant, after a lengthy
colloquy by the court, voluntarily and knowingly waived his right to
challenge any of the aggravating circumstances presented by the State. 
Therefore, the trial record for both the guilt and penalty phase is devoid
of any evidence convincing this court [of] the existence of any of the
following mitigating circumstances: [mitigating circumstances listed].
8.  The six guilt phase issues are:  (1) failure to allow Garcia to impeach
Ribera with his prior inconsistent statements; (2) allowing the lead detective and the
prosecutor to improperly vouch for the credibility of the State's key witness; (3)
failure to admit Pardo's exculpatory testimony; (4) admitting evidence from Pardo's
diary; (5) admitting hearsay statements by the victim and others that they did not
trust and were afraid of Garcia; and (6) the cumulative effect of the trial errors.
9.  The four penalty phase issues are:  (1) failure to allow the jury to consider
Pardos' former testimony at the penalty phase; (2) failure to consider any of the
mitigating circumstances proposed by defense counsel; (3) unconstitutionality of the
Florida's death penalty statute; and (4) that the override of the previous jury's life
recommendation for the Amador homicide constituted an acquittal of the death
penalty and, therefore, the State was barred from seeking the death penalty a second
time.
-10-
Garcia to death on both counts.7  On appeal, Garcia raises six issues regarding the
guilt phase of the trial8 and four issues regarding the penalty phase of the trial. 9 
RIBERA'S PRIOR STATEMENTS
10.  Ribera's videotaped statements had not been made available to Garcia
until after this Court remanded his case for a new trial in 1990.  Accordingly, the
exclusion of Ribera's statements was not an issue in Garcia's first trial.  Garcia
points out, however, that in his trial for the murder of Millot, another trial court had
allowed the use of these statements as impeachment of Ribera.  Garcia was
acquitted in that case. 
-11-
Garcia first contends that the trial court erred by failing to allow him to
impeach Ribera with Ribera's prior inconsistent statements.  At trial, defense
counsel attempted to impeach Ribera with statements that he made in an eight-hour
videotaped interview with the Hialeah Police Department that occurred in May
1986.  Defense counsel asserted that the videotaped statements contained material
inconsistencies with Ribera's trial testimony.10 
The trial court precluded any use of the videotaped statements because they:
(1) were taken in preparation and in the course of a polygraph examination; (2) were
not made under oath; and (3) did not specifically concern Ribera's factual account of
the Amador and Alfonso homicides.  We conclude that the trial court's failure to
permit the use of the videotaped statements as impeachment was error.  
At trial, the major point of contention between the parties on this issue was
whether Ribera's videotaped statements were admissible because the statements
were made preparatory to the administration of a polygraph examination.  On
appeal, however, the State does not attempt to defend the trial court's ruling on that
-12-
basis.  Indeed, a statement is not inadmissible solely because it is given before a
polygraph examination.  Cf. Johnson v. State, 660 So. 2d 637, 642 (Fla. 1995) ("As
a general rule, the fact that a polygraph examination or the prospect of receiving one
has preceded or accompanied a confession does not of itself render the confession
inadmissible.  Rather, there must be a sufficient showing of physical or
psychological coercion, intentional deception, or a violation of a constitutional
right.") (citation omitted).  Thus, the trial court erred as a matter of law when it
refused to permit Garcia to impeach Ribera because the statements were taken in
preparation and in the course of a polygraph examination.  
Likewise, the trial court erred as a matter of law when it refused to permit the
impeachment because the statements were not made under oath.  Indeed, there is no
requirement that a statement be made under oath in order for it to constitute
impeachment evidence.  See Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 608.4, at 456
(2001 ed.). 
On appeal, the State's major contention is that the videotaped statements did
not constitute proper impeachment because the statements did not specifically
concern Ribera's factual account of the Amador and Alfonso murders.  The State
also argues in the alternative that the omission of the impeachment was harmless
error because Ribera was impeached with other statements.
-13-
Both the United States and Florida constitutions provide that a defendant has
the right to confront adverse witnesses.  See U.S. Const. amend. VI; art. I, § 16(a),
Fla. Const.  The right of cross-examination is "implicit in the constitutional right of
confrontation and helps assure the 'accuracy of the truth-determining process.'" 
Conner v. State, 748 So. 2d 950, 955 (Fla. 1999) (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi,
410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973)).  Cross-examination is the "principal means by which the
believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested."  Davis v. Alaska,
415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974).  Thus, the question in this case is whether the trial court
impermissibly limited Garcia's cross-examination right and, if so, whether the
limitation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  
We first address whether any part of the videotaped statements would
constitute proper impeachment.  Garcia contends that the first area of significant
impeachment would be to contradict the image Ribera presented at trial as a dutiful
family man who associated with Garcia and Pardo only in the hope that they would
help him out of financial distress by including him in a drug deal.  In particular,
Ribera testified at trial that he was never involved in any drug deals and that he
wanted to be involved in a drug deal with Garcia and Pardo "[b]ecause of the
money, the cash, the money that I saw how they dressed, the life style at that time." 
-14-
In addition, at trial Ribera denied knowing or speaking to Sergio Godoy, except as a
customer at the video store where he worked. 
In contrast, in the videotaped statements, Ribera stated that the financially
distressed Garcia and Pardo asked Ribera for help in the drug business.  Ribera
explained in the videotaped statements that Godoy asked Ribera to help both Garcia
and Pardo because they were desperate for money and that Garcia personally
appealed to Ribera for help.  Ribera also stated that Garcia's money problems were
so severe that he was about to lose his trailer, and so he was trying to get a job from
Ribera at the video store.  Additionally, Ribera claimed that he loaned Garcia $1000
to fix steps for his mother.  We agree with Garcia that these statements are in stark
contrast to the relationship portrayed by Ribera at trial and that they had the
potential for constituting powerful impeachment as to the nature of the relationship
between Garcia and Ribera.
Related to the inconsistencies in the portrayal of the relationship between
Ribera and Garcia was the picture Ribera painted of his relationship with Pardo and
Pardo's family.  At trial, Ribera denied that he was close to Pardo and he stated that
he had not spoken to Pardo until March 1986 (two months after the murders that
occurred in this case).  At trial, Ribera testified to only one brief interaction with
Pardo's wife and daughter.  Yet on videotape, Ribera stated that he had gone
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horseback riding with Pardo's family and that Pardo's seven-year-old daughter
"knows how to use an Uzi."  He also stated that Pardo's wife "murders people also."
A third and substantial area of claimed impeachment was the reason Ribera
testified that he first went to the police.  Ribera testified at trial that he went to the
police because "Rolando Garcia came to my house and told me he would kill my
family and kill me."  In contrast, in the videotaped statements Ribera told the police
that no one threatened him and he denied that he came to the police because he was
afraid of Garcia and Pardo.  He also denied that Pardo and Garcia made him
nervous because of the activities in which they were involved, claiming that he did
not know much about them anyway.  These inconsistencies also could cast serious
doubt on Ribera's credibility as to his trial statements that Garcia threatened to kill
him if he went to the police and his fear of Garcia.
A last area of claimed impeachment was with regard to the level of
knowledge about the details of the murders to which Ribera testified at trial.  In over
eight hours of videotaped statements in 1986, Ribera's only reference to these
murders were that "they" told him to "read this article and that they killed two
people in Fountainblue" and that he knew of the murder of "this guy Mario."  This
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stands in marked contrast to the detailed testimony at trial regarding what Garcia
told him about the murders.  
The State contends that the videotaped interview did not focus on the Amador
and Alfonso murders and that the lack of detail is not proper impeachment.  We
disagree.  Although the videotaped statements did primarily focus on three other
murders, this was not the sole focus of the eight-hour interview.  In fact, Ribera
testified at trial that when he went to the police in May 1986, Ribera told the police
what Garcia and Pardo had told him about the murder of "Mario."  Ribera also
testified at trial that he "always told the police the truth and [he] told them
everything." 
Any lack of detail about these two murders in Ribera's videotaped statements
was material and may constitute permissible impeachment under these
circumstances.  See Sanjurjo v. State, 736 So. 2d 1263, 1264 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)
(impeaching a witness with a prior statement includes allowing "witnesses to be
impeached by their previous failure to state a fact in circumstances in which that fact
naturally would have been asserted.") (quoting State v. Smith, 573 So. 2d 306, 313
(Fla. 1990)); see also Davis v. State, 756 So. 2d 205, 207 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)
(citing Sanjurjo and holding that the defendant was permitted to impeach the witness
with prior, material omissions from her statement to police).  Similarly, we conclude
-17-
that the statements regarding the image Ribera presented of himself, the nature of
Ribera's relationship with Pardo, and the reason why Pardo went to the police would
have been relevant and important impeachment evidence.  
Therefore, we hold that in light of the impeachment value of the videotaped
statements, the exclusion of these statements impermissibly limited Garcia's right to
cross-examine the key witness against him.  Moreover, any error in the exclusion of
the impeachment evidence was compounded when during closing argument the
State told the jury why they should believe Ribera:
But you heard nothing in the testimony of Carlos Ribera to suggest that
he sat in that chair and answered each and every question that was
asked of him, either because he has been paid off or he had been
threatened or he thinks that he will be threatened or he thinks that
something will happen to him.  That is pure speculation.  The defense
in this case had every opportunity to develop anything that they thought
would be of use to them in their case.  And that is part of our amazing
system.  That the defendant has a chance to sit in the courtroom with
his accusers and the defense attorney has the chance to ask whatever
the Court says is appropriate area for cross-examination.  And nothing
in this case developed that Carlos Ribera was lying, that Carlos Ribera
received any benefit for coming into court or that he sat there and made
up things against this defendant, because for some reason he was
protecting himself in the future.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The exclusion of this relevant impeachment cannot be considered harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.  No physical evidence linking Garcia to the murder
11.  The severance of the trials of Pardo and Garcia occurred before Pardo's
trial, and therefore Garcia was not a codefendant in Pardo's trial.
-18-
scene and little physical evidence linked Garcia to the murders.  Undoubtedly,
Ribera was the lynchpin of the State's case and his credibility was critical to the
strength of the State's case.  If the jury did not believe Ribera's testimony about what
Garcia allegedly told him, this alone could have been sufficient to create reasonable
doubt.  Therefore, reversible error occurred when the defense was deprived of the
right to use any portion of the videotaped statements to impeach Ribera. 
FAILURE TO ADMIT PARDO'S FORMER TESTIMONY
IN BOTH GUILT AND PENALTY PHASE
We next address Garcia's claim that the trial court erred in excluding the prior
sworn testimony of Pardo in both the guilt and the penalty phase.  Before Garcia's
trial, Pardo invoked his Fifth Amendment rights and stated that he would not testify
at Garcia's trial.  In the guilt phase of Garcia's trial, the trial court did not permit
Garcia to introduce Pardo's testimony from Pardo's prior trial11 in which Pardo took
the stand against the advice of his attorney.  At that trial, Pardo testified that he
alone committed the murders and he specifically testified that Garcia was not
involved with the murders.  In particular, Pardo stated:
Q:  
What about Rolando Garcia?
A:  
Rolando Garcia is related to my wife.  I've known him since I've been
married, 12 years.  Rolando Garcia lived at my brother-in-law's house,
12.  Garcia also argues that the statement should have been admitted under
section 90.804(2)(c), governing statements against interest.  However, that ground
was not raised below and thus we do not address whether this would be a proper
basis for its admission. 
-19-
my house.  He had nowhere to go.  We took him in.  He was a run
around boy, always been a run around boy for everybody else because
he might have an IQ of two, but he's a good person, he's a good person.
Q:
Did he have anything to do with any of these murders?
A:  
He would have gone crazy if he had anything to do with any of these
murders.  This is the job of a soldier, which is what I am.  This is my
mission.
Q: 
Why did you save these articles that are incriminatory, but underline
them and keep them in your house?
A:  
I was proud of what I was doing.  That was my mission in life
. . . . I cut them out, I highlighted them and I put them in plastics.  I
wanted people to know what I had done and what I had contributed for
your children and my children.
Garcia urges that Pardo's former sworn testimony was admissible under
section 90.804(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), which provides an exception to the
hearsay rule, when the declarant is unavailable, for: 
(a) Former testimony.--Testimony given as a witness at another
hearing of the same or a different proceeding . . . if the party against
whom the testimony is now offered . . . had an opportunity and similar
motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect
examination.
The trial court denied the admission of the evidence.  However, after reviewing the
recorded sworn testimony from the prior trial, we conclude that the trial court
abused its discretion in excluding the evidence.12 
-20-
Because Garcia was not tried with Pardo, the State did not have the identical
motive in cross-examining Pardo as it would have had if the State tried Pardo and
Garcia together.  Nonetheless, section 90.804(2)(a) does not require an identical
motive but only a "similar motive". 
In this case, the State's cross-examination of Pardo at his own trial reveals
that the State had substantial doubts about the credibility and reliability of Pardo's
testimony, including the testimony about Garcia's lack of involvement, and that the
State subjected Pardo to rigorous cross-examination on these subjects.  Thus, the
State had a similar motive in cross-examining Pardo, which was to discredit Pardo's
testimony and show it to be not worthy of belief. 
For example, during the State's cross-examination of Pardo, the following
colloquy ensued: 
Q: 
Rolando Garcia wasn't with you?
A: 
He wasn't in any murder.
Q: 
Rolando Garcia wasn't holding the second gun as you were holding the
first gun?
A:  
No.
Q: 
And you each would shoot–
A:  
You know that's not true.
Q: 
And you each would shoot the second victim and cross fire on both of
them?
A: 
Rolando Garcia, the only time Rolando Garcia found out what I was
doing, the last murder, if that's what you want to call it, when I had to
call Rolando Garcia–I had no choice.
-21-
When I shot the two women in the apartment, the gun got
jammed on me.  After I had shot the lady in the chest, she fell down, if
you want to call her a lady, she fell down, the gun got jammed.  That's
why I struck her over the head with the gun and silencer assembly. 
When I finished shooting her–
Q: 
Did you tell us that was the first time Rolando Garcia took your bloody
car to get it covered?
A: 
Rolando Garcia was living in my house.  I told him to take it to De
Colores to have it reupholstered.  He said what happened here.  I said,
"What, you writing a book?"  He left it at that.  He respects me a lot,
always admired me.  He don't really question too many things.  I don't
go bragging too much to Rolando Garcia because he's not wrapped too
tight.
Importantly, the State also cross-examined Pardo about his relationship to
Ribera, revealing that Ribera's knowledge about the crime may have come from
what Pardo told him and the possibility that the statements Ribera attributed to
Garcia were a fabrication by Ribera:
Q:  
Just bragged a lot to Carlo Ribera?
A:  
He's more beneficial than Rolando Garcia.
Q:  
You'll brag to Carlo while you won't to Rolando?
A:  
I told Rolly certain things, but not about the killings, no.
Thus, in this case the State had the opportunity to and did in fact cross-
examine Pardo on the reliability and credibility of his version of the events. 
Accordingly, the State had a similar motive that fulfills the purpose of the former
testimony hearsay exception.
-22-
Moreover, the failure to allow the jury to hear this testimony deprived the jury
of important additional evidence that could have been critical to assessing Garcia's
guilt.  Indeed, where Garcia's alleged involvement in the crimes hangs on the
testimony of one individual--Ribera--the jury was entitled to consider the testimony
of the codefendant Pardo, who took the stand in his own trial and specifically
testified that Garcia was not involved in these murders.   In this case, to prevent the
jury from hearing the prior recorded testimony of Pardo, which the State subjected
to cross-examination, is to apply the hearsay rule "mechanistically to defeat the ends
of justice."  Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973).  For all these
reasons, the exclusion of Pardo's prior sworn testimony constituted error, which, like
the limitation on the cross-examination of Ribera, was not harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. 
Additionally, Pardo's testimony would have been independently admissible
during the penalty phase, in which Garcia again attempted to introduce Pardo's
testimony from Pardo's own trial in which he exonerated Garcia.  The trial court
again denied that request, apparently for the same reasons it denied Garcia's request
in the guilt phase.  We conclude that the trial court also erred in excluding Pardo's
testimony from the penalty phase. 
-23-
Different considerations govern the presentation of evidence in the penalty
phase of a death case.  In Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979), the U.S.
Supreme Court held that the exclusion of exculpatory hearsay evidence denied the
defendant a fair trial as to punishment.  In Green, the defendant and codefendant
were indicted together, tried separately, and both were sentenced to death.  See id.
at 95.  During the penalty phase, the defendant attempted to introduce the testimony
of a witness who had testified at the codefendant's trial.  See id. at 96.  According to
the witness, the codefendant had confided that he had killed the victim after ordering
the defendant to run an errand.  See id.  The trial court refused to allow introduction
of this evidence, finding that the witness's testimony constituted hearsay that was
inadmissible under Georgia law.  See id.  On review, the Supreme Court ruled: 
Regardless of whether the proffered testimony comes within
Georgia's hearsay rule, under the facts of this case its exclusion
constituted a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.  The excluded testimony was highly relevant to a critical
issue in the punishment phase of the trial, see Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586, 604-605 (1978) (plurality opinion); id., at 613-616 (opinion
of BLACKMUN, J.), and substantial reasons existed to assume its
reliability.  Moore made his statement spontaneously to a close friend.
The evidence corroborating the confession was ample, and indeed
sufficient to procure a conviction of Moore and a capital sentence. The
statement was against interest, and there was no reason to believe that
Moore had any ulterior motive in making it.  Perhaps most important,
the State considered the testimony sufficiently reliable to use it against
Moore, and to base a sentence of death upon it.  In these unique
circumstances, "the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to
-24-
defeat the ends of justice."  Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284,
302 (1973).  Because the exclusion of Pasby's testimony denied
petitioner a fair trial on the issue of punishment, the sentence is vacated
and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion.
Id. at 97 (footnotes omitted).
In addition to Green, which is based upon due process considerations, section
921.141(1), Florida Statutes (1997), provides:
[E]vidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems
relevant to the nature of the crime and the character of the defendant
and shall include matters relating to any of the aggravating or
mitigating circumstances enumerated in subsections (5) and (6).  Any
such evidence which the court deems to have probative value may be
received, regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary rules of
evidence, provided the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut
any hearsay statements.
This Court has explained that "[t]his rule applies to the State as well" as to
defendants.  Blackwood v. State, 777 So. 2d 399, 411-12 (Fla. 2000).  Thus, the
fact that the trial court denied the admission of this evidence simply because it 
constituted hearsay was erroneous.  Garcia could have used Pardo's testimony to
show his minor participation, section 921.141(6)(d), Florida Statutes, or that he was
acting under the substantial domination of Pardo, section 921.141(6)(e), Florida
Statutes, or both.
-25-
Accordingly, the question presented here is whether the State was "accorded
a fair opportunity to rebut any hearsay statement."  This Court discussed this issue
in Lawrence v. State, 691 So. 2d 1068, 1073 (Fla. 1997):
On the basis of the record, we cannot conclude that Lawrence did not
have a fair opportunity to rebut Gardner's testimony. Defense counsel
cross-examined Gardner at the original trial. Lawrence could have
offered the cross-examination during the instant sentencing proceeding
but did not. Nor did he proffer any other rebuttal to the trial court. We
therefore reject Lawrence's contention that the admission of Gardner's
testimony requires that his death sentence be vacated.
We conclude that the State in this case, like the defendant in Lawrence, had a
"fair opportunity to rebut" the issue of Garcia's involvement and whether Garcia was
less involved than Pardo.  For example, the State had the opportunity to rebut and
did rebut any claim that Garcia's involvement was minor with the testimony of
Ribera.  The State also cross-examined Pardo at his original trial.  Under all these
circumstances, Pardo's testimony was improperly excluded during the penalty phase,
and the jury should have had a chance to hear Pardo's testimony in which he denied
that Garcia was involved in these murders.
HEARSAY STATEMENTS OF LOPEZ AND HEGARTY
In addition to the erroneous limitation of cross-examination of the key State
witness and error in excluding the prior testimony of Pardo in the guilt and penalty
phases, we also agree with Garcia's claim that the trial court erred by admitting
-26-
hearsay statements against him during the guilt phase.  Part of the State's case
against Garcia included placing in evidence that one of the victims, Amador, was
distrustful of Garcia. 
The jury heard this evidence through the hearsay testimony given by Allen
Lopez as to what Amador had previously stated, thus leaving Garcia unable to
cross-examine the declarant.  During the State's direct examination of Lopez, over
defense objection, the trial court allowed the following colloquy:
Q:
Mr. Lopez, what did Mr. Amador tell you . . .?
A:  
Somebody had been at his house with cash to buy a kilo of
cocaine.
Q: 
Did he tell you who?
A:  
Yes.
Q:  
What name did he use?
A:  
Rolly.
Q: 
Did you know this person yourself Rolly?
A:  
No.
Q: 
And what did Mr. Amador tell you?
A:  
He wanted me to be there with him because he didn't want to do
the deal by himself.
Q:  
Did he say why?
A: 
He didn't trust him.
Q: 
Did you show up to help him with that deal?
A:  
No.
Q:  
Did Mr. Amador say what happened to that deal?
A: 
He didn't want to do it by him himself and it had been scheduled
to be done another time.
-27-
It appears from the record that the trial court allowed these statements into
evidence based on the statement against interest exception to the hearsay rule,
section 90.804(2)(c), Florida Statutes, which provides:
(c) Statement against interest.--A statement which, at the time of
its making, was so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or
proprietary interest or tended to subject the declarant to liability or to
render invalid a claim by the declarant against another, so that a person
in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless he
or she believed it to be true. A statement tending to expose the
declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is
inadmissible, unless corroborating circumstances show the
trustworthiness of the statement.
However, there is nothing about the statement regarding Amador's mistrust of
Garcia that was against Amador's penal or proprietary interest.  Moreover, "a
homicide victim's state of mind prior to the fatal event generally is neither at issue
nor probative of any material issue raised in the murder prosecution."  Woods v.
State, 733 So. 2d 980, 987 (Fla. 1999).  Further as we stated in Stoll v. State, 762
So. 2d 870, 874 (Fla. 2000), "[l]ikewise, a victim's statements cannot be used to
prove the defendant's state of mind."  See also Downs v. State, 574 So.2d 1095,
1098 (Fla. 1991).  Accordingly, Lopez's statements did not fall within this exception
to the hearsay rule, nor did they fall within any other exception.  Therefore, the trial
court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony of Lopez concerning Amador's
-28-
statements that he was mistrustful of Garcia and did not want to be with him by
himself.                      
Additional error occurred during the direct examination of John Hegarty.
Hegarty testified that he warned Amador not to deal with Garcia "[b]ecause
personally I just didn't trust him and I figured he was going to get ripped off by
him."  Hegarty stated, "I called him [Amador] up and I told him to beware of Rolly
and the deal with the white horse and that--because he told me he was making a
deal with Rolly that week.  And I told him that night, and I said make sure you get
help or backup or whatever."  Hegarty also testified that after Amador was killed,
Lopez "came out to the yard and he talked to me and he says, 'Rolando killed
Mario.'"  In reply, Hegarty said, "I made a response and I said–I cussed a little bit
and everything and I said, 'Well, I warned him, I warned him.'"  
The conversations between Hegarty and Amador also constituted
inadmissible hearsay that does not fall within any hearsay exception.  Moreover, the
testimony of Hegarty that he did not trust Garcia was not relevant or material to any
issue in the murder prosecution.  The only possible purpose of this testimony was to
prove that Garcia acted in conformity with Hegarty's impression that he distrusted
Garcia and warned Amador to be aware of him.  This evidence, in addition to being
impermissible hearsay, amounts to no more than improper bad character evidence. 
-29-
See Martinez v. State, 761 So. 2d 1074, 1082 (Fla. 2000).  We thus conclude that
the trial court erred in admitting this testimony.  
JURY OVERRIDE IN FIRST TRIAL
Finally, Garcia urges that we should address an issue that was raised but
never resolved in Garcia's first appeal--a claimed improper override of the prior
jury's life recommendation for the murder of Amador.  Garcia argues that the Court
must review the override of the previous jury's life recommendation for the Amador
murder.  Garcia asserts that because in his original trial in 1988 the trial judge erred
in overriding the jury's recommendation of life for Garcia's murder of Amador based
on Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1975), we should determine that the
defendant was acquitted of the death penalty and that the State was therefore barred
from seeking the death penalty a second time.  The problem with raising this
argument at this time is the procedural posture in which Garcia raises this issue.
Garcia raised this issue in the original direct appeal.  However, when we
reversed the convictions based on the trial court's improper joinder of offenses and
remanded for a new trial, we stated that because the improper joinder issue
"disposes of this case, we do not address any of Garcia's other arguments presented
on appeal."  Garcia, 568 So. 2d at 901.  Clearly, we had the authority to address the
jury override issue even though we were reversing the convictions on another
13.  In this Court's prior opinion, the Court mistakenly stated that the jury's
life recommendation was for the murder of Roberto Alfonso, when in fact it was for
the murder of Mario Amador.  See Garcia, 568 So. 2d at 897.
14.  We expressly do not address the remaining guilt phase and penalty issues
Garcia raises in this appeal.
-30-
ground.  See Keen v. State, 775 So. 2d 263, 287 (Fla. 2000).  However, on direct
appeal in Garcia, the Court expressly did not address the jury override issue, and
thus neither rejected nor approved of the jury override.13  Thus, it would not
constitute the law of the case because the issue was expressly not decided by this
Court.
However, we decline to address the issue in this direct appeal because Garcia
has abandoned this claim.  Garcia did not challenge our decision with regard to the
jury override issue in a motion for rehearing.  Further, he did not raise the issue of
the propriety of the death penalty for the murder of Amador on this basis before the
trial court.  Given the unique procedural posture in which Garcia raises this issue,
and in light of our reversal of the convictions, we decline to address the merits of
this claim in this appeal. 
CONCLUSION
Based on the errors discussed above, we reverse Garcia's convictions and
vacate the sentences imposed, and we remand this case for a new trial. 14
-31-
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, and PARIENTE, JJ., concur.
PARIENTE, J., concurs with an opinion, in which SHAW and ANSTEAD, JJ.,
concur.
LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., concur in result only.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF
FILED, DETERMINED.
PARIENTE, J., concurring.
I  concur in the majority's opinion; however, I conclude that the trial court in
the first trial impermissibly overrode the jury recommendation of life and thus
Garcia was acquitted of the death penalty as to the murder of Amador.  
In Wright v. State, 586 So. 2d 1024, 1027 (Fla. 1991), the jury recommended
a life sentence for the defendant's murder conviction, but the trial court overrode the
recommendation.  The Court first concluded that the State unconstitutionally
exercised a peremptory challenge for racial reasons, and therefore reversed the
convictions and resulting sentences.  See id. at 1029.  The Court then determined
that the trial court erred in overriding the jury's recommendation of life.  See id. at
1031.  The Court also concluded that, as a matter of Florida law, the jury's
reasonable recommendation in favor of life imprisonment barred the trial court from
subjecting the defendant to the death penalty if he was convicted on remand.  See
id.  Accordingly, the Court concluded:
15.  Even if the issue had been decided, as we have recognized, "[t]his Court
has the power to reconsider and correct erroneous rulings in exceptional
circumstances and where reliance on the previous decision would result in manifest
-32-
Under well-settled Florida law, we have held that life
imprisonment is the only proper and lawful sentence in a death case
when the jury reasonably chooses not to recommend a death sentence. 
Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1975).  Thus, when it is
determined on appeal that the trial court should have accepted a jury's
recommendation of life imprisonment pursuant to Tedder, the
defendant must be deemed acquitted of the death penalty for double
jeopardy purposes.  Art. I, § 9, Fla. Const.
To rule otherwise would force death-sentenced prisoners to risk
giving up the life recommendation by arguing for a new trial, and
would place capital appellants in the anomalous position of having to
choose between arguing guilt phase or penalty phase issues on appeal,
even if they reasonably believe that the trial court committed reversible
errors in each phase.  Putting capital appellants in the position of
having to make this "Hobson's choice" would be fundamentally unfair
and inconsistent with the Florida Constitution.  Art. I, §§ 9, 17, Fla.
Const.    
Id. at 1032.  In Keen v. State, 775 So. 2d 263, 287 (Fla. 2000), the Court also
addressed the propriety of a jury override and determined that the defendant was
acquitted of the death penalty even though we were reversing for a new trial.
Although this Court did not provide an explanation as to why the Court did
not address the jury override issue in Garcia's first appeal, it is clear from the face of
the opinion that the Court did not address the issue--either explicitly or implicitly. 
As the majority recognizes, because the Court did not address the issue of the jury
override, the issue did not become the law of the case.15 
injustice, notwithstanding that such rulings have become the law of the case."  State
v. Owen, 696 So. 2d 715, 720 (1997); see also Preston v. State, 444 So. 2d 939
(Fla. 1984).
-33-
If the jury override in the first case was improper, then Garcia would have
been acquitted of the death penalty as to the murder of Amador and it would be a
manifest injustice not to correct this error at this time.  Based on our decisions in
Wright and Keen, the jury override was improper; Garcia was thus acquitted of the
death penalty as to the murder of Amador.
In the trial court's 1988 sentencing order, the trial court simply weighed the
aggravators and mitigators and, after concluding that there was no mitigation,
decided to override the jury's life recommendation.  This analysis is in direct conflict
with the dictates of this Court's decision in Keen.  In Keen, this Court articulated the
proper analysis for a Tedder inquiry:  "The singular focus of a Tedder inquiry is
whether there is 'a reasonable basis in the record to support the jury's
recommendation of life,' rather than the weighing process which a judge conducts
after a death recommendation."  775 So. 2d at 283-84 (citation omitted).  
In
Garcia's first trial, there is a reasonable basis in the record to support the jury's
recommendation of life.  First, the jury in the first trial could have found that Garcia
was not the killer.  See, e.g., Marta-Rodriguez v. State, 699 So. 2d 1010, 1012-13
(Fla. 1997) (holding jury recommendation of life reasonable where jury could have
-34-
believed that defendant was not the murderer based on lack of eyewitness testimony
and there was mitigating evidence in the record upon which the jury could
reasonably have relied); Cooper v. State, 581 So. 2d 49, 51 (Fla. 1991) (holding that
based on circumstantial evidence, jury could reasonably conclude that another
murdered the victim, and therefore jury recommendation of life was reasonable);
Pentecost v. State, 545 So. 2d 861, 863 (Fla. 1989) (holding that jury
recommendation of life was reasonable based upon the testimony at trial suggesting
that someone else murdered the victim).  
According to the record in the first trial, the weapon that killed Amador
differed from the weapon that killed Alfonso, which would be consistent with there
having been two killers.  Moreover, according to the State's witness Ribera, Garcia
consistently referred to Amador as "Mario."  However, in describing the Amador
and Alfonso homicides to Ribera, Garcia allegedly said it was "the other guy [i.e.,
not Mario Amador, who] started running upstairs, and I got him and brought him
down and we handcuffed him and we put him face down and we executed him." 
The jury could have concluded that Garcia's alleged admission concerned the
shooting of Alfonso, not Amador.  This understanding would explain why the jury
recommended a life sentence for the death of Amador, but a death sentence for the
death of Alfonso.
-35-
Second, the jury's life recommendation reasonably could be predicated upon
the evidence presented that Garcia had a lesser role than Pardo in planning the
crime.  This Court has consistently found that the fact that a defendant's accomplice
may have been the mastermind constitutes a reasonable basis for recommending a
life sentence.  See Dolinsky v. State, 576 So. 2d 271, 274 (Fla. 1991) (concluding
that the fact that another was the mastermind of the crime provided a reasonable
basis for the jury to recommend a life sentence for the defendant); DuBoise v. State,
520 So. 2d 260, 266 (Fla. 1988) (holding that jury could have recommended a life
sentenced based on the fact that defendant's older brother influenced the eighteen-
year-old defendant's behavior); Wasko v. State, 505 So. 2d 1314, 1318 (Fla. 1987)
(holding jury recommendation of life appropriate where jury could have questioned
the respective roles of the defendant and his accomplice).  
The record indicates that Garcia met Pardo when Garcia was fourteen years
old and Pardo was twenty years old.  While Pardo became a police officer, got
married, and had children, Garcia dropped out of high school, was barely literate,
lived in a trailer with his parents, and held a variety of menial jobs.  When the police
searched Pardo's home, they discovered bazookas, submachine guns, a torpedo
shooter, grenade launchers, mach-12s and 45s, as well as a variety of military
fatigues and police uniforms, false police identification documents, police radios and
-36-
walkie-talkies.  Moreover, the police search of Pardo's home revealed Pardo's diary
of the crimes charged, Robledo's (another victim) credit cards, Pardo's address book
with an entry for Robledo, and Amador's INS documents.  By contrast, the police
search of Garcia's home yielded no evidence of Garcia's connection to these or any
other crimes.  Furthermore, the record indicates that Pardo had all of the drug
contacts and doctored police records, and maintained the diary and the stockpiled
weapons.  Pardo ordered and paid for the handguns Garcia purchased with
Amador's driver's license.  Based upon these facts, the jury had a reasonable basis to
recommend a life sentence.  
A third basis for the jury's life recommendation is the defense's penalty phase
closing argument that Garcia could serve two consecutive life sentences without the
possibility of parole for fifty years for the two first-degree murder convictions.  This
Court has recognized that this fact is a mitigating circumstance upon which the jury
could reasonably rely in recommending a life sentence.  See Marta-Rodriguez, 699
So. 2d at 1013; Turner v. State, 645 So. 2d 444, 448 (Fla. 1994).  
Finally, this Court has considered the State's advice to the trial judge not to
override a life recommendation as an indication that the life recommendation is
reasonable.  See Turner, 645 So. 2d at 448 n.4; Pomeranz v. State, 703 So. 2d 465,
473 (Fla. 1997) (Anstead, J., concurring).  At the 1988 sentencing, the State
-37-
submitted a sentencing memorandum to the trial court specifically advising it not to
override the jury's life recommendation:
Because the jury's recommendation ". . . is entitled to great weight,
reflecting as it does the conscience of the community, and should not
be overruled unless no reasonable basis exists for the opinion," . . . the
State submits that this Court should follow the jury's recommendation. 
(Emphasis supplied.)  Therefore, the State's request that the trial court accept the
jury's recommendation demonstrates the reasonableness of the jury's
recommendation. 
For all these reasons, I would find that there is reasonable basis in the record
to support the jury's recommendation of life.  Therefore, I would conclude that the
jury override was improper; that Garcia was acquitted of the death penalty for
Amador; and that upon retrial, the maximum penalty Garcia can face for the murder
of Amador is life imprisonment.  See Keen, 775 So. 2d at 287.
SHAW and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur. 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Dade County,
Jerald Bagley, Judge - Case No. 86-12910B
-38-
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Christina A. Spaulding, Assistant Public
Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, Florida,
for Appellant
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Kimberly Nolen Hopkins, Assistant
Attorney General, Tampa, Florida,
for Appellee