Title: Thourtman v. Junior
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC19-1182
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: March 17, 2022

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC19-1182 
____________ 
 
BRANDON THOURTMAN, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
DANIEL JUNIOR, etc., et al., 
Respondents. 
 
March 17, 2022 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
In this case, we consider a question related to the application 
of the provision of article I, section 14 of the Florida Constitution 
that restricts entitlement to release on bail for persons “charged 
with a capital offense or an offense punishable by life 
imprisonment” when “the proof of guilt is evident or the 
presumption is great.”  Specifically, we consider whether that 
provision prohibits a trial court from detaining a defendant beyond 
first appearance for a reasonable time to conduct a hearing 
concerning whether the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption 
 
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of guilt is great unless the trial court makes a preliminary finding 
that the standard for denial of bail has been met.  We have for 
review Thourtman v. Junior, 275 So. 3d 726, 739 (Fla. 3d DCA 
2019), in which the Third District Court of Appeal held that a trial 
court at first appearance, upon a finding of probable cause that the 
defendant committed a crime punishable by capital punishment or 
life imprisonment, may defer ruling on pretrial release and detain 
the defendant for a reasonable time to conduct a “full” Arthur1 
hearing without violating article I, section 14.  The Third District 
certified conflict with Gray v. State, 257 So. 3d 477, 478 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 2018), and Ysaza v. State, 222 So. 3d 3, 6 (Fla. 4th DCA 
2017), both cases in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal 
interpreted the relevant portion of article I, section 14 as requiring a 
preliminary finding at first appearance that the proof of guilt is 
evident or the presumption is great to detain a defendant beyond 
first appearance in order to conduct a “full” Arthur hearing without 
setting reasonable conditions of pretrial release.  We have 
 
 
1.  State v. Arthur, 390 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 1980). 
 
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jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  We approve the Third 
District’s holding in Thourtman and disapprove Gray and Ysaza. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Article I, section 14 of the Florida Constitution guarantees 
every person charged with a crime the right to pretrial release on 
reasonable conditions, such as bail, with two exceptions: the 
“capital punishment or life imprisonment” exception set forth in the 
first sentence of article I, section 14 and the “pretrial detention” 
exception, set forth in the second sentence of article I, section 14.  
Article I, section 14 states: 
Unless charged with a capital offense or an offense 
punishable by life imprisonment and the proof of guilt is 
evident or the presumption is great, every person charged 
with a crime or violation of municipal or county 
ordinance shall be entitled to pretrial release on 
reasonable conditions.  If no conditions of release can 
reasonably protect the community from risk of physical 
harm to persons, assure the presence of the accused at 
trial, or assure the integrity of the judicial process, the 
accused may be detained. 
Art. I, § 14, Fla. Const. 
Petitioner Brandon Thourtman was arrested for armed robbery 
with a firearm on November 9, 2018.  The next day, at Thourtman’s 
 
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first appearance,2 the trial court reviewed the arrest affidavit, noted 
that Thourtman was charged with a crime punishable by life 
imprisonment, and announced “no bond,” thereby deferring a 
decision on pretrial release pending an Arthur hearing, should 
Thourtman choose to request one.3 
Thourtman was arraigned November 30, 2018, on one count of 
robbery using a firearm or deadly weapon, a first-degree felony 
punishable by life imprisonment.  At that time, Thourtman entered 
a plea of not guilty and requested an Arthur hearing, which was set 
for December 6, 2018, four working days after the arraignment.  
The day before the scheduled Arthur hearing, Thourtman filed a 
 
2.  See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.130(a), (d) (requiring that every 
arrested person shall be taken before a judge within 24 hours of 
arrest, at which time the judge shall proceed to determine 
conditions of release under rule 3.131).  Rule 3.131(a) echoes the 
language of the first sentence of article I, section 14. 
 
 
3.  In doing so, the trial court followed the standard practice 
taught to trial judges in Florida.  See, e.g., Fla. Court Educ. 
Council, Criminal Benchguide for Circuit Judges at 7 (2016) (“In 
cases in which death or life imprisonment is a possible penalty, the 
first appearance judge, upon finding of probable cause, will typically 
order that the defendant be held with no bond.  The defendant is 
then obligated to set the matter for an Arthur hearing.”).   
 
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petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Third District challenging 
his pretrial confinement. 
The Arthur hearing was held as scheduled.  At the conclusion 
of the hearing, the trial court found that the State’s evidence that 
Thourtman committed a robbery rose to the level of “proof evident, 
presumption great,” but the State’s evidence that he used a firearm 
did not.  Because unarmed robbery is not punishable by life, the 
court granted Thourtman pretrial release with conditions of house 
arrest and bail in the amount of $25,000.  Although the grant of 
pretrial release after the Arthur hearing rendered Thourtman’s 
habeas petition moot, the district court found that the petition 
presented a question capable of repetition yet evading review and 
nonetheless accepted jurisdiction to hear the merits. 
Thourtman argued in the district court that the first sentence 
of article 1, section 14 creates a two-step procedure that begins 
with a preliminary finding at first appearance that the proof of guilt 
is evident or the presumption is great.  This argument was based on 
the Fourth District’s decisions in Gray and Ysaza.  In those cases, 
the defendants were charged with crimes punishable by life 
imprisonment, and the first appearance courts ordered each 
 
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defendant detained without setting reasonable conditions of pretrial 
release or making a preliminary finding that the State’s evidence 
rose to the level of “proof evident, presumption great.”  In both 
cases, the Fourth District concluded that the trial courts’ refusals 
to authorize pretrial release or to make the required findings at first 
appearance that the proof of guilt was evident or the presumption 
great violated article I, section 14.  Gray, 257 So. 3d at 478; Ysaza, 
222 So. 3d at 6.4   
The Fourth District 
explained that if the first appearance court finds that [the 
proof evident or presumption great] standard has been 
met and declines to set bond, the defendant can later 
move to set bond and request a full Arthur hearing, where 
the defendant has a right to present evidence and to ask 
the court to exercise its discretion to set bond. 
 
Gray, 257 So. 3d at 478 (citing Ysaza, 222 So. 3d at 6). 
 
The Third District disagreed with the Fourth District’s 
interpretation of article 1, section 14 as requiring a preliminary 
finding at first appearance that the proof is evident or the 
presumption is great.  The Third District noted that “there is 
 
4.  In neither the instant case nor Gray or Ysaza did the State 
seek to have the defendant detained under the second sentence of 
article I, section 14, and that provision is not implicated here. 
 
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nothing in the text [of article 1, section 14] that requires both a 
preliminary Arthur hearing at first appearance and a subsequent 
full Arthur hearing, as held by Ysaza and Gray” and that “[t]he right 
to ‘pretrial release’ in [a]rticle I, section 14 refers to release pending 
trial, not to release pending a constitutionally or legally required 
bond hearing.”  Thourtman, 275 So. 3d at 733. 
Thourtman’s “main argument” to the district court was that 
this Court, by stating in Arthur, “We hold, therefore, that before 
release on bail pending trial can ever be denied, the [S]tate must 
come forward with a showing that the proof of guilt is evident or the 
presumption is great,” had interpreted article I, section 14 as 
creating the two-step procedure.  Id. at 736 (quoting Arthur, 390 So. 
2d at 720).  The Third District rejected this argument, concluding 
that “if interpreted in such a manner, the sentence would comprise 
nothing more than classic obiter dicta,” id., because the sentence 
was written in answer to the second certified question in Arthur, 
which asked whether the accused or the State bore the burden of 
proving that the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption is great.  
 
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Id. at 737 (citing Arthur, 390 So. 2d at 719).5  In certifying conflict 
with Gray and Ysaza, the Third District thus held  
that [a]rticle I, section 14 of the Florida Constitution does 
not prohibit the trial court the discretion at first 
appearance, upon a finding of probable cause that the 
defendant committed a crime punishable by capital 
punishment or life imprisonment, to defer ruling on bail 
and to detain the defendant for a reasonable time to 
conduct a full Arthur bond hearing.  To exercise such 
discretion, the court is not required by the Constitution 
to make a preliminary finding of “proof evident, 
presumption great.” 
Id. at 739. 
 
II.  ANALYSIS 
Resolution of the conflict presented requires us to determine 
whether the first sentence of article I, section 14 of the Florida 
 
 
5.  The two certified questions in Arthur were: 
1.  Does a trial court have discretion to grant bail to 
a defendant who is charged with a capital offense or an 
offense punishable by life imprisonment and the proof of 
guilt is evident and the presumption great?  
2.  Does the accused or the [S]tate, in a capital case 
or a case involving life imprisonment where the accused 
is seeking to be admitted to bail, have the burden of proof 
on the issue of whether the proof of guilt is evident and 
the presumption great? 
Arthur, 390 So. 2d at 717. 
 
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Constitution prohibits a trial court from detaining a defendant 
beyond first appearance without setting reasonable conditions for 
pretrial release unless the court has made a preliminary finding 
that the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption is great.  We 
conclude that it does not. 
Thourtman asserts that for a court to detain a defendant 
beyond first appearance without setting reasonable conditions of 
pretrial release under the capital punishment or life imprisonment 
exception in the first sentence of article I, section 14, the State 
must have already met its burden of showing that the proof of guilt 
is evident or the presumption is great.  Thourtman considers the 
right to pretrial release lost if reasonable conditions for pretrial 
release are not set at first appearance.  In support of his position 
that detention beyond first appearance requires a preliminary 
finding that the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption is great, 
Thourtman relies on language in Arthur stating that “before release 
on bail pending trial can ever be denied, the [S]tate must come 
forward with a showing that the proof of guilt is evident or the 
presumption is great.”  Arthur, 390 So. 2d at 720.  But Thourtman’s 
view that the right to pretrial release is lost if reasonable conditions 
 
- 10 - 
of release are not set at first appearance and his reliance on Arthur 
are unwarranted. 
We find no basis in the constitutional text or elsewhere in the 
law to support Thourtman’s view that detaining a defendant beyond 
first appearance and deferring a ruling on pretrial release to 
conduct a “full”6 Arthur hearing is tantamount to a loss of the right 
to pretrial release.  Nor is there anything in the constitution or our 
caselaw that would require a trial court to make a preliminary 
finding that the proof is evident or the presumption is great before 
ordering a defendant detained pending an Arthur hearing, should 
the defendant choose to request one.  The right to pretrial release is 
not lost until a court makes a definitive ruling on the issue of 
pretrial detention.  The logic of Thourtman’s argument that holding 
a defendant under the capital punishment or life imprisonment 
 
 
6.  A “full” Arthur hearing as described by the parties and the 
district court contemplates a hearing at which both parties are 
given ample opportunity to present their cases for and against 
pretrial release, and even where “the proof is evident or the 
presumption great that the accused committed a capital or life 
imprisonment offense, the accused may still come forward with a 
showing addressed to the court’s discretion to grant or deny bail.”  
Arthur, 390 So. 2d at 719.  The idea that this describes a “full” 
Arthur hearing as opposed to a “preliminary” Arthur hearing, is a 
fallacy.  There is only one type of hearing contemplated by Arthur. 
 
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exception prior to an Arthur hearing violates the first sentence of 
article I, section 14 would support the conclusion that detention of 
the same defendant between the time of arrest and first appearance 
would also necessarily violate article I, section 14, because a 
defendant typically has no right to pretrial release during that 
time.7  But as the district court recognized “it has never been held 
that requiring certain defendants by law to be detained until first 
appearance implicated rights under [a]rticle I, section 14.”  
Thourtman, 275 So. 3d at 733 n.5. 
Thourtman’s reliance on the language in Arthur stating that 
“before release on bail pending trial can ever be denied, the [S]tate 
must come forward with a showing that the proof of guilt is evident 
or the presumption is great,” Arthur, 390 So. 2d at 720, to support 
his position that a preliminary finding of proof evident, presumption 
great is required for detention beyond first appearance under the 
 
 
7.  While defendants typically have no right to release prior to 
first appearance, a defendant may be able to obtain release before 
first appearance if a standard bail schedule is followed in the 
jurisdiction of the crime and arrest or, in the event of an arrest 
under a warrant, by meeting the conditions of release if any were 
set by the issuing judge. 
 
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capital punishment or life imprisonment exception does not 
withstand analysis.  This is true because that language was written 
in response to the second certified question in Arthur: “Does the 
accused or the [S]tate, in a capital case or a case involving life 
imprisonment where the accused is seeking to be admitted to bail, 
have the burden of proof on the issue of whether the proof of guilt is 
evident and the presumption great?”  Id. at 717.  This Court’s 
answer to that question was “that before the court can deny bail the 
[S]tate must have carried the burden of establishing that the proof 
of guilt is evident or the presumption great,” id., and later in the 
opinion, this Court restated its answer to the second question, 
using the slightly different language on which Thourtman relies, id. 
at 720 (“We hold, therefore, that before release on bail pending trial 
can ever be denied, the [S]tate must come forward with a showing 
that the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption is great.”).  
Because the language relied on by Thourtman was written in 
response to the question of whether the accused or the State has 
the burden of proof on the issue of whether the proof of guilt is 
evident or the presumption is great, its purpose was not to 
announce a particular timeframe in which a ruling on pretrial 
 
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release must be made or that a deferred ruling on pretrial release is 
the equivalent of an unconstitutional denial of that right. 
The question of whether a defendant may be detained under 
the first sentence of article 1, section 14 between first appearance 
and a hearing on a motion to set bail thus was not presented for the 
Court’s consideration under the facts of Arthur, which arose after 
the defendant filed a motion to set bail and was afforded a hearing 
on the motion at which “the court received all evidence sought to be 
presented by Arthur.”  Arthur v. Harper, 371 So. 2d 96, 100 (Fla. 
4th DCA 1978), approved in part, quashed in part, 390 So. 2d 717.  
Because the issue of detention beyond first appearance pending a 
bail hearing was not raised by the facts in Arthur, implicated by 
either of the certified questions in Arthur, or analyzed or discussed 
in Arthur, the language from Arthur relied on by Thourtman—
despite the fact that it was self-described as a holding—constitutes 
dicta and does not control our decision here.  See State v. Yule, 905 
So. 2d 251, 259 n.10 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (“A holding consists of 
those propositions along the chosen decisional path or paths of 
reasoning that (1) are actually decided, (2) are based upon the facts 
of the case, and (3) lead to the judgment.  If not a holding, a 
 
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proposition stated in a case counts as dicta.”) (Canady, J., specially 
concurring) (quoting Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, 
Defining Dicta, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 953, 1065 (2005)). 
Beyond the fact that neither the constitution nor our caselaw 
expressly mandates that a trial court make a preliminary finding 
that the proof is evident or the presumption is great at first 
appearance, the imposition of such a requirement would be rife 
with impracticalities.  For example, given the high level of evidence 
needed to meet the proof evident or presumption great burden—a 
burden that this Court has held to be even higher than the beyond 
a reasonable doubt standard required to obtain a conviction at trial, 
see State ex rel. Van Eeghen v. Williams, 87 So. 2d 45, 46 (Fla. 
1956) (noting that “proof that guilt is evident or the presumption of 
guilt is great is actually a greater degree of proof than that which is 
required to establish guilt merely to the exclusion of a reasonable 
doubt” (citing Russell v. State, 71 So. 27, 28 (Fla. 1916)))—in many 
cases, it is highly unlikely that the State will have time before a first 
appearance to marshal its evidence, prepare exhibits for admission 
into evidence, and secure the attendance of witnesses needed to 
meet that burden.  At the time of first appearance, it is typical that 
 
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the assistant State attorney who will prosecute has not 
been assigned. . . . [T]he “transcripts and affidavits” upon 
which the information will be based do not yet exist.  The 
victim has not given a formal statement.  [And m]uch of 
the physical evidence has not been collected, much less 
analyzed or tested. 
Thourtman, 275 So. 3d at 735.  This fact is not lost on Thourtman; 
he conceded below “that ‘most often,’ in fact ‘in many, many cases,’ 
the State will be simply unable to offer evidence rising to the level of 
‘proof evident, presumption great’ at first appearance.”  Id.  And in 
his initial brief in this Court, Thourtman stated, “The District Court 
below is not wrong that at first appearance the [S]tate is unlikely to 
be able to present evidence sufficient to satisfy the ‘proof of guilt is 
evident or the presumption is great’ standard.”  Initial Brief of 
[Petitioner] at 25. 
Even assuming the State could by the time of a first 
appearance muster the necessary evidence and witnesses to meet a 
burden that exceeds the beyond a reasonable doubt burden 
required to obtain a conviction at trial after months or even years of 
preparation, in many, if not all, jurisdictions, it would be 
impractical or impossible to allot the State time during first 
appearance hearings to present the case required to meet this 
 
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heavy burden.  As the district court noted, “In urban settings, first 
appearances occur on congested, fast-paced dockets. . . . Often, the 
defendant appears by video from jail.  Defendants, of course, have a 
right to be heard, but experienced criminal lawyers and judges steer 
substantive motions relating to pretrial release to later, less 
congested calendars.”  Thourtman, 275 So. 3d at 734-735 (citing 
Greenwood v. State, 51 So. 3d 1278, 1281 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) 
(noting the “practical realities” stemming from “the significant 
number of defendants present at the typical first appearance 
hearing on any given day in a busy urban court”)).  Even beyond 
“urban settings,” in counties with fewer defendants on the first 
appearance docket, a court is unlikely to be able to clear its 
calendar for a preliminary Arthur hearing—which could take hours 
or even days—at the drop of a hat.  And although Thourtman 
conceded below that “virtually always, the defendants at first 
appearance will also be unable to exercise their constitutional right 
to present evidence,” id. at 730, assuming that a defendant were 
prepared to present his or her case for release at a “preliminary” 
Arthur hearing, a court would then likely find itself holding a “full” 
 
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Arthur hearing at first appearance, which Thourtman agrees “is 
neither constitutionally required nor practical,” id. at 729. 
 
Requiring a proof evident or presumption great finding at first 
appearance is also likely to thwart judicial economy.  The probable 
lack of preparedness on either side can be expected to result in 
multiple hearings on the same subject matter.  And to the chagrin 
of many judges who require the parties to attempt to come to an 
agreement on acceptable terms of pretrial release prior to an Arthur 
hearing, requiring an impromptu hearing at first appearance will 
lessen the chance that the parties will reach a stipulation that 
would resolve the matter without burdening the court with a 
potentially lengthy hearing.  
III.  CONCLUSION 
For the reasons explained, we approve the Third District’s 
holding— 
that [a]rticle I, section 14 of the Florida Constitution does 
not prohibit the trial court the discretion at first 
appearance, upon a finding of probable cause that the 
defendant committed a crime punishable by capital 
punishment or life imprisonment, to defer ruling on bail 
and to detain the defendant for a reasonable time to 
conduct a full Arthur bond hearing 
 
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id. at 739—and disapprove the conflicting decisions of the Fourth 
District in Gray and Ysaza. 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LAWSON, MUÑIZ, COURIEL, and 
GROSSHANS, JJ., concur. 
COURIEL, J., concurs with an opinion, in which LAWSON, J., 
concurs. 
LABARGA, J., dissents with an opinion. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
COURIEL, J., concurring. 
 
I join the Court’s opinion because the detention to which 
Thourtman objects was supported by probable cause and 
reasonable in duration.  Justice Labarga contends that, in State v. 
Arthur, 390 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 1980), we required that a trial court 
make the “proof evident, presumption great” determination at a 
defendant’s first appearance hearing because we said such a 
determination must be made “before release on bail can ever be 
denied.”  Id. at 720.  As the Court’s decision explains, Arthur 
contains no such requirement.  A capital defendant may, at any 
time prior to conviction, move for a hearing to determine whether 
the State can carry its evidentiary burden and deny access to 
 
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pretrial release on reasonable conditions.  Thourtman had that 
hearing four business days after he requested it. 
I write separately to address what the dissent calls “the liberty 
interest protected by article I, section 14, of the Florida 
Constitution.”  We have said that provision “embodies the principle 
that the presumption of innocence abides in the accused for all 
purposes while awaiting trial.”  Arthur, 390 So. 2d at 719. 
Though it may result in a denial of bail and in that very real 
sense affect a liberty interest of the defendant, a judge’s ruling at 
the conclusion of an Arthur hearing does not mean the defendant is 
presumed guilty, even if the court finds the State has met the “proof 
evident, presumption great” standard.  For an Arthur hearing, while 
it involves a proffer of what the evidence may be at trial, is not a 
trial at all.  It is before a judge, not a jury.  Its purpose is not to 
determine the defendant’s guilt, but whether the defendant is 
eligible for bail, and if so, on what conditions.  For these reasons, 
the deprivation of liberty in which it can result, temporary though it 
may be, must be supported by evidence that meets a more 
demanding standard of proof than even proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, the jury’s standard.  See Russell v. State, 71 So. 27 (Fla. 
 
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1916); State ex rel. Van Eeghen v. Williams, 87 So. 2d 45, 46 (Fla. 
1956). 
In the case of a defendant charged with a capital offense, as 
with other defendants, probable cause supplies the first basis for 
the defendant’s detention.  Probable cause remains a basis for the 
defendant’s detention until the jury supplies another basis upon 
which to adjudicate the defendant’s right to liberty:  its verdict.  But 
in the case of a defendant charged with a capital offense or an 
offense punishable by life imprisonment, our constitution, like the 
constitutions of at least thirty-six other states, supplies another 
basis for detention—one about which, despite its long history, we 
have said relatively little. 
I 
The Florida Constitution says: 
Unless charged with a capital offense or an offense 
punishable by life imprisonment and the proof of guilt is 
evident or the presumption is great, every person charged 
with a crime or violation of municipal or county 
ordinance shall be entitled to pretrial release on 
reasonable conditions.  If no conditions of release can 
reasonably protect the community from risk of physical 
harm to persons, assure the presence of the accused at 
trial, or assure the integrity of the judicial process, the 
accused may be detained. 
 
 
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Art. I, § 14, Fla. Const.  The plain language of this provision tells us 
that every defendant charged with a noncapital crime, or a crime for 
which the maximum punishment is less than life imprisonment, is 
entitled to pretrial release on reasonable conditions, if such 
conditions can reasonably protect the community from harm, 
assure the defendant will appear at trial, and assure the integrity of 
the judicial process.  If conditions do not allow any one of those 
things, the defendant may be detained. 
The provision also means that a different analysis applies 
when the crime charged is a capital offense or an offense 
punishable by life imprisonment, and the proof of guilt is evident or 
the presumption of guilt is great.  Id.  When these things are true, 
the defendant is not entitled to pretrial release on reasonable 
conditions, even if such conditions could keep the community safe, 
assure that the defendant would appear at trial, and assure the 
integrity of the judicial process. 
 
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A 
An accused’s right to seek release on bail was settled as a 
matter of colonial jurisprudence prior to the founding.8  And, 
also prior to the founding, courts and legislatures qualified 
this right for capital defendants.  As early as 1682, the 
Fundamental Law of Pennsylvania held that “all prisoners 
shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for capital 
offences, where the proof is evident, or the presumption great.”  
Pa. Frame of Government of 1682, Laws Agreed Upon in 
England, art. XI (May 5, 1682); see also Caleb Foote, The 
Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail:  I, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 959, 
975 (1965) (tracking the history of the “proof evident, 
presumption great” standard). 
This language found its way into the constitutions of 
many states9 thanks in part to the Northwest Ordinance of 
 
8.  4 William Blackstone, Commentaries, *296-97 (stating the 
common law rule that, after an arrest and a determination that the 
charge against the defendant “was [not] wholly groundless,” the 
accused “must either be committed to prison, or give bail; that is, 
put in securities for his appearance, to answer the charge against 
him.  This commitment therefore being only for safe custody, 
wherever bail will answer the same intention, it ought to be taken; 
as in most of the inferior crimes:  but in felonies, and other offences 
 
- 23 - 
1787.  That act of Congress declared that inhabitants of a 
territory “shall always be entitled to the benefits of the writ of 
habeas corpus, and of the trial by jury . . . and of judicial 
proceedings according to the course of the common law,” 
including bail, “unless for capital offenses, where the proof 
shall be evident or the presumption great.”  An Ordinance for 
the Government of the Territory of the United States North-
 
of a capital nature, no bail can be a security equivalent to the 
actual custody of the person.  For what is there that a man may not 
be induced to forfeit, to save his own life?”); see also Jennings v. 
Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 863 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(summarizing Blackstone and concluding that “American history 
makes clear that the settlers brought this practice [of allowing every 
prisoner (except for a convict serving his sentence) to seek release 
on bail] with them to America”). 
9.  Ala. Const. art. I, § 16; Alaska Const. art. I, § 11; Ariz. 
Const. art. II, § 22; Ark. Const. art. II, § 8; Cal. Const. art. I, § 12; 
Colo. Const. art. II, § 19; Conn. Const. art. I, § 8; Del. Const. art. I, 
§ 12; Idaho Const. art. I, § 6; Ill. Const. art. I, § 9; Ind. Const. art. I, 
§ 17; Iowa Const. art. I, § 12; Kan. Const. Bill of Rights, § 9; Ky. 
Const. Bill of Rights, art. I, § 16; La. Const. art. I, § 18; Me. Const. 
art. I, § 10; Mich. Const. art. I, § 15; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7; Miss. 
Const. art. 3, § 29; Mo. Const. art. I, § 20; Mont. Const. art. II, § 21; 
Neb. Const. art. I, § 9; Nev. Const. art. I, § 7; N.M. Const. art. II, § 
13; N.D. Const. art. I, § 11; Ohio Const. art I, § 9; Okla. Const. art. 
II, § 8; Or. Const. art. I, § 14; Pa. Const. art. I, § 14; R.I. Const. art. 
I, § 9; S.D. Const. art. VI, § 8; Tenn. Const. art. I, § 15; Tex. Const. 
art. I, § 11; Vt. Const. ch. II, § 40; Wash. Const. art. I, § 20; Wyo. 
Const. art. I, § 14. 
 
- 24 - 
West of the River Ohio, July 13, 1787 (Northwest Ordinance), 
art. II.  Any prospective state seeking to join the Union was 
required to acknowledge the Northwest Ordinance as part of 
its fundamental law upon admission.10 
Florida was no exception.  Upon its establishment in 1822, the 
territorial government of Florida was the subject of an act of 
Congress providing for its organization and administration.  The act 
required: 
That, to the end that the inhabitants may be protected in 
their liberty, property, and the exercise of their religion, 
no law shall ever be valid, which shall impair, or in any 
way restrain, the freedom of religious opinions, 
professions, or worship.  They shall be entitled to the 
benefit of the writ of habeas corpus.  They shall be 
bailable, in all cases except for capital offences where the 
proof is evident or the presumption great.  All fines shall 
be moderate and proportioned to the offence; and 
excessive bail shall not be required, nor cruel or unusual 
punishments inflicted.  No ex post facto law, or law 
impairing the obligation of contracts, shall ever be 
 
 
10.  See Matthew J. Hegreness, America’s Fundamental and 
Vanishing Right to Bail, 55 Ariz. L. Rev. 909, 937 (2013) (“Congress 
often imposed only two conditions on states in order for admittance 
into the Union: (1) that they be republican and (2) that their 
constitutions not be repugnant to the principles of the Northwest 
Ordinance.”); Northwest Ordinance, art. I, § 11 (declaring that 
territorial governments “shall have authority to make laws in all 
cases, for the good government of the district, not repugnant to the 
principles and articles in this ordinance established and declared”). 
 
- 25 - 
passed; nor shall private property be taken for public 
uses, without just compensation. 
 
An Act for the Establishment of a Territorial Government in Florida, 
ch. XIII, § 10, 3 Stat. 654 (1822) (emphasis added).  The inclusion of 
a qualified right to bail among other well-recognized rights—
described in nearly the same words as the provision at issue 
today—speaks to its endurance in our constitutional conception of 
ordered liberty. 
Florida’s constitutions have each included a comparable bail 
provision.  Our first constitution declared:  
That all persons shall be bailable, by sufficient securities, 
unless in capital offences, where the proof is evident, or 
the presumption is strong; and the privilege of habeas 
corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in case of 
rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it. 
 
Art. I, § 11, Fla. Const. (1838).  The second constitution, written at 
the onset of the Civil War after Florida had abandoned the Union, 
copied this standard.  Art. I, § 11, Fla. Const. (1861).  The third 
constitution—penned and adopted by the Florida legislature after 
the surrender at Appomattox but rejected by Congress11—again 
 
11.  Eric Biber, The Price of Admission: Causes, Effects, and 
Patterns of Conditions Imposed on States Entering the Union, 46 Am. 
J. Legal Hist. 119, 143-144 (2004). 
 
- 26 - 
made no change to the bail standard, though it made minor 
alterations to the habeas corpus clause.  Art. 1 § 11, Fla. Const. 
(1865). 
The fourth constitution, under which Florida was ultimately 
readmitted to the Union, slightly changed the wording of the bail 
provision, but maintained essentially the same standard.12  
Adopting the precise language of the Northwest Ordinance—i.e., 
substituting “great” for “strong”—the 1868 constitution read:  “All 
persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for capital 
offenses when the proof is evident, or the presumption great.”   
Declaration of Rights, § 7, Fla. Const. (1868).  This language was 
retained in Florida’s fifth constitution, the Reconstruction era 
constitution of 1885.  See Declaration of Rights, § 9, Fla. Const. 
(1885).  Florida’s 1968 constitution expanded the bail provision to 
also include offenses punishable by life imprisonment, but 
otherwise maintained the “proof evident, presumption great” 
standard. 
 
12.  The clause protecting the privilege of habeas corpus, 
which until 1868 appeared in the same section as the bail 
provision, was moved to its own dedicated section.  Declaration of 
Rights, § 5, Fla. Const. (1868). 
 
- 27 - 
In 1982, Florida voters approved an amendment to article I, 
section 14, adding a clause stating that “if no conditions of release 
can reasonably protect the community from risk of physical harm to 
persons, assure the presence of the accused at trial, or assure the 
integrity of the judicial process, the accused may be detained.”  Art. 
I, § 14, Fla. Const. (1968) (amended 1982). 
The “proof evident, presumption great” standard has thus 
remained substantively unchanged throughout Florida’s 
constitutional history.  And for just as long, it has coexisted with 
the presumption of innocence. 
B 
“The principle that there is a presumption of innocence in 
favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and 
elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the 
administration of our criminal law.”  Coffin v. United States, 156 
U.S. 432, 453 (1895); see also Fla. Bar v. Rose, 823 So. 2d 727, 732 
(Fla. 2002) (“[A] defendant is innocent until proven guilty, no matter 
what the charge and no matter how insidious the allegations.”); 
State v. Blair, 39 So. 3d 1190, 1192 (Fla. 2010) (“Our criminal 
 
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justice system is based on the presumption that every person 
charged with a crime is innocent until proven guilty.”). 
The U.S. Supreme Court long ago resolved the tension between 
the availability of pretrial detention in some cases and the 
presumption of innocence in all.  See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 
533 (1979) (“The presumption of innocence is a doctrine that 
allocates the burden of proof in criminal trials; it also may serve as 
an admonishment to the jury to judge an accused’s guilt or 
innocence solely on the evidence adduced at trial . . . .  But it has 
no application to a determination of the rights of a pretrial detainee 
during confinement before his trial has even begun.”).  In this case 
as in Bell, neither party “question[s] that the Government may 
permissibly detain a person suspected of committing a crime prior 
to a formal adjudication of guilt” or “that the Government has a 
substantial interest in ensuring that persons accused of crimes are 
available for trials.”  Id. at 534. 
That interest is distinct from the State’s interest in seeing that 
those who have been convicted of crimes receive appropriate 
punishment; it is an interest in ensuring the administration of 
justice and ensuring public safety.  Thus “the mere fact that 
 
- 29 - 
[Thourtman was] detained does not inexorably lead to the 
conclusion that the government has imposed punishment” for his 
alleged crime, nor made any judgment about his guilt.  United 
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746-47 (1987) (citing Bell, 441 U.S. 
at 537).  Article I, section 14, of our constitution reflects, as well as 
a concern for the presumption of innocence, a mindfulness that, as 
the Supreme Court put it with respect to the Bail Reform Act of 
1984, “the Government’s regulatory interest in community safety 
can, in appropriate circumstances,” and for an appropriate time, 
“outweigh an individual’s liberty interest.”  Id. at 748.  Vindication 
of those interests at a bail hearing does not implicate the 
defendant’s liberty interest in the presumption of innocence.  See 
Ex parte Tully, 66 So. 296 (Fla. 1914).13 
 
13.  “In this [bail] proceeding it cannot be determined whether 
the petitioners are guilty or innocent of the capital offense charged 
against them, or of any offense. . . . The only question here 
presented for determination is whether ‘the proof is evident or the 
presumption great’ that each of the petitioners did [commit the 
alleged crime], so as to adjudge whether the petitioners are lawfully 
held in custody without bail, pending a trial in due course of law to 
legally determine their guilt or innocence of the alleged capital 
offense.  No action taken on this application for bail should enter 
into the ultimate determination of the guilt or innocence of the 
petitioners.”  Id. at 297. 
 
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II 
The courts of states with constitutional provisions similar to 
article I, section 14, that have addressed the question have 
(apparently without exception) reasoned as the Court does today, 
concluding that a reasonable interval between first appearance and 
a “proof evident, presumption great” bail hearing for a capital 
defendant does not offend due process.  In State v. Passino, 577 
A.2d 281 (Vt. 1990), the Supreme Court of Vermont found a court 
“can hold a defendant charged with an offense punishable by life 
imprisonment without bail for such time as is necessary to enable 
the parties to prepare for a full bail hearing and to make 
appropriate motions,” and concluded that a twelve-day delay 
between arraignment and commencement of a (three-day) bail 
hearing was reasonable.  Id. at 382-84; but see State v. Wade, No. 
2021-115, 2021 WL 2311957, at *1 (Vt. June 1, 2021) 
(unpublished) (holding that delaying a weight-of-the-evidence 
hearing for seven and a half weeks “[did] not meet the constitutional 
imperative”). 
Arizona’s Court of Appeals relied on Passino in deciding 
whether an evidentiary hearing was required before determining, as 
 
- 31 - 
part of the decision whether to admit a defendant to bail, that “the 
proof is evident or the presumption great that [the defendant] is 
guilty of the offense and the offense charged is a capital offense.”  
Simpson v. Owens, 85 P.3d 478, 481 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).  It held 
that it was, and that “[i]t would be a rare occasion when an 
adequate bail hearing could be conducted at the initial appearance” 
for a capital or life-eligible offense.  Id. at 495. 
In Fry v. State, 990 N.E.2d 429 (Ind. 2013), the Supreme 
Court of Indiana held that, in the case of a capital defendant, the 
state bears the burden of proof at a bail hearing to “show—by a 
preponderance of the evidence—that the proof is evident or the 
presumption strong.”  Id. at 451.  In reasoning to that conclusion, it 
noted that the defendant’s state of incarceration prior to the hearing 
was a substantial consideration in placing the burden on the state, 
contemplating that the defendant would in fact be in custody for 
some time prior to admission to bail. 
And in State v. Kastanis, 848 P.2d 673 (Utah 1993), 
reaffirming a prior holding that a capital defendant must be allowed 
a bail hearing under that state’s “proof evident, presumption 
strong” constitutional provision, the Utah Supreme Court stated 
 
- 32 - 
that the defendant would have an opportunity to “bring his own 
evidence and witnesses and . . . cross-examine the State’s 
witnesses.  Defendant must be given adequate notice to prepare for 
the hearing,” a tall order at first appearance.  Id. at 676.14 
 
14.  Finally, contrary to the dissent’s reading of Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.130(d), our criminal law and rules of 
procedure do not require a “proof evident, presumption great” 
determination at first appearance.  True, that rule, entitled “First 
Appearance,” does say “[t]he judge shall proceed to determine 
conditions of release pursuant to rule 3.131,” but it also says the 
judge “may release the offender with or without bail to await further 
hearing . . . relating to pretrial detention and release.”  Id. at 
3.130(d)(2) (emphasis added).  The rule’s use of the words “proceed 
to” and contemplation of a later hearing on bail is in sharp contrast 
to what the rules say about something indisputably required at first 
appearance:  appointment of counsel.  See Fla. R. Crim. P. 
3.130(c)(1) (“When the judge determines that the defendant is 
entitled to court-appointed counsel and desires counsel, the judge 
shall immediately appoint counsel.  This determination must be 
made and, if required, counsel appointed no later than the time of 
the first appearance.”) (emphasis added).  There is also the fact the 
State has five days from the filing of a complaint to seek pretrial 
detention, during which time a defendant may be detained pending 
a hearing.  § 907.041(4)(f), Fla. Stat. (2021).  This rule, applicable to 
noncapital or life-eligible defendants, would be hard to square with 
a requirement that the State muster its evidence more quickly for a 
defendant whose risk of flight or potential danger to the community 
is greater. 
 
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III 
Today’s decision does nothing to lessen the liberty interest at 
the heart of article I, section 14 of our constitution, the 
presumption of innocence. 
LAWSON, J., concurs. 
LABARGA, J., dissenting. 
 
An accused person is “entitled to pretrial release on reasonable 
conditions.”  Art. I, § 14, Fla. Const.  Only pursuant to limited 
exceptions may a court deny pretrial release; for instance, if the 
accused is “charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable 
by life imprisonment and the proof of guilt is evident or the 
presumption is great.”  Id. 
 
To that end, this Court has explained: “[B]efore release on bail 
pending trial can ever be denied, the [S]tate must come forward 
with a showing that the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption 
is great.”  State v. Arthur, 390 So. 2d 717, 720 (Fla. 1980) (emphasis 
added).  In my view, the Fourth District Court of Appeal properly 
interpreted this language as requiring that the trial court make the 
“proof evident, presumption great” determination at an accused 
person’s first appearance hearing.  However, the majority attempts 
 
- 34 - 
to lessen the import of Arthur by reasoning: “Because [this] 
language . . . was written in response to the [certified] question of 
whether the accused or the State has the burden of proof on the 
issue of whether the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption is 
great, its purpose was not to announce a particular timeframe . . . .”  
Majority op. at 12.  Such reasoning is insufficient to discount this 
Court’s definitive statement in Arthur that the trial court must make 
a “proof evident, presumption great” determination “before release 
on bail pending trial can ever be denied.”  Arthur, 390 So. 2d at 720.  
Consequently, I dissent to today’s decision, which holds that a 
defendant may be detained beyond first appearance without a trial 
court making a preliminary “proof evident, presumption great” 
determination.  See majority op. at 9, 18. 
 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.130(d) requires that at 
first appearance, “[t]he judge shall proceed to determine conditions 
of [pretrial] release pursuant to rule 3.131.”  (Emphasis added.)  In 
a case involving a capital offense or an offense punishable by life 
imprisonment, it is incumbent upon the trial court to determine 
whether the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption is great 
because the accused person’s conditions of pretrial release cannot 
 
- 35 - 
be determined in compliance with rule 3.130(d) without doing so. 
 
Despite the majority’s suggestion that it is impractical for a 
court to make a “proof evident, presumption great” determination at 
first appearance, a preliminary determination is not typically as 
labor intensive as the majority suggests.  As observed by the Fourth 
District Court of Appeal in Gray15 and Ysaza,16 the determination 
may be made by reviewing a probable cause affidavit.  Because only 
capital offenses and offenses punishable by life imprisonment are 
implicated by the “proof evident, presumption great” standard, a 
probable cause affidavit usually contains sufficient evidence to 
permit the trial court to make a determination. 
 
Thourtman’s case illustrates the importance of making a 
“proof evident, presumption great” determination at first 
appearance.  Thourtman was accused of committing armed 
robbery, an offense punishable by life imprisonment.  Following his 
first appearance, Thourtman was held without bond until his 
arraignment three weeks later, at which time he requested an 
 
 
15.  Gray v. State, 257 So. 3d 477, 478 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018). 
 
16.  Ysaza v. State, 222 So. 3d 3, 6 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017). 
 
- 36 - 
Arthur hearing that was held several days later.  The trial court 
concluded at the end of the Arthur hearing that the evidence of 
robbery satisfied the “proof evident, presumption great” standard, 
but it also concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support 
the allegation that Thourtman used a firearm during the robbery.  
Because the charge of robbery without a weapon is not punishable 
by life imprisonment, the court was obligated to grant Thourtman 
pretrial release. 
 
Because a “proof evident, presumption great” determination at 
first appearance is consistent with the liberty interest protected by 
article I, section 14, of the Florida Constitution, I would approve the 
decisions in Gray and Ysaza, and disapprove the Third District 
Court of Appeal’s decision in Thourtman.17  Respectfully, I dissent. 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal 
Certified Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Third District – Case No. 3D18-2433 
 
 
(Miami-Dade County) 
 
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, Maria E. Lauredo, Chief 
Assistant Public Defender, and John Eddy Morrison, Assistant 
Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
17.  Thourtman v. Junior, 275 So. 3d 726 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019). 
 
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for Petitioner 
 
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Michael 
Mervine, Bureau Chief, Magaly Rodriguez and Asad Ali, Assistant 
Attorneys General, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent, State of Florida