Title: State v. Probst
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S51760
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: December 22, 2005

FILED:  December 22, 2005
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
DEBORAH LYNN PROBST,
Respondent on Review.
(CC CR00494; CA A115154; SC S51760)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted May 10, 2005.
Doug M. Petrina, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review.  With
him on the briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H.
Williams, Solicitor General.
Anne Fujita Munsey, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.  With her
on the brief were Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender, and Peter A.
Ozanne, Executive Director, Office of Public Defense Services.
GILLETTE, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals in reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is vacated and the case is remanded
to the circuit court.
*Appeal from Yamhill County Circuit Court, John L. Collins, Judge. 192 Or App 337, 85 P3d 313 (2004).
GILLETTE, J.
This is a case of felony driving under the influence of
intoxicants (DUII).  The offense is a felony because defendant
has been convicted of DUII on three previous occasions.  Each of
those three predicate convictions is an element of the charged
offense.  Defendant, however, has collaterally attacked the
constitutional validity of one of the predicate convictions.  The
issue before us is whether the burden of persuasion respecting
the alleged constitutional invalidity of that predicate offense
falls on the state (to refute the allegation), or on the
defendant (to prove it).  For the reasons that follow, we hold
that the defendant bears that burden.
Oregon law treats certain forms of criminal recidivism
as more serious than a single commission of the same crime.  An
example of such treatment is the offense of DUII.  Ordinarily,
that offense is a traffic crime, classified as a Class A
misdemeanor.  See ORS 813.010(4) (so providing).  However, if a
person commits the offense of DUII after having been convicted
previously of that same crime three times in the preceding 10
years, the offense is a Class C felony.  ORS 813.010(5). 
Obviously, in a case involving such a felony charge, the state
must prove the existence of the previous convictions, which are
elements of felony DUII.  The state ordinarily meets that burden
by introducing certified copies of those convictions.  However,
cases (such as the present one) occasionally arise in which a
defendant, while acknowledging the fact of the earlier
convictions, asserts that the state obtained one or more of those
convictions without the defendant having had or validly having
waived the right to the assistance of counsel.  This case
presents the question of who, in such cases, has the burden of
presenting evidence respecting that alleged lack of assistance of
counsel.  The Court of Appeals, relying on this court's opinion
in State v. Grenvik, 291 Or 99, 628 P2d 1195 (1981), held that
the burden rests with the state to show either that defendant had
or validly waived the assistance of counsel.  State v. Probst,
192 Or App 337, 85 P3d 313 (2004).  We allowed the state's
petition for review to address that question.
The following facts are not in dispute. (1)  In
January 1994, defendant was charged in McMinnville Municipal
Court with DUII.  She entered into a diversion agreement pursuant
to which she agreed to participate in an alcohol abuse treatment
program.  However, she failed to complete the treatment program
successfully.  In January 1996, the municipal court scheduled a
hearing to determine whether to terminate the diversion
agreement.  The court informed defendant by letter that, if she
failed to appear at the hearing, the court would terminate the
diversion agreement and set the matter for trial.  Defendant
failed to appear, so the court terminated her diversion and set
the case for trial on April 8, 1996.
On April 8, 1996, defendant filed a petition to enter a
guilty plea in the McMinnville Municipal Court case.  The plea
petition included the following statements:
"2. I wish to plead GUILTY to the charge of
DRIVING A MOTOR VEHICLE WHILE UNDER THE
INFLUENCE OF INTOXICANT LIQUOR OR DRUGS.
"* * * * *
"7. I OFFER MY PLEA OF GUILTY FREELY AND
VOLUNTARILY AND OF MY OWN ACCORD AND WITH
FULL UNDERSTANDING OF ALL MATTERS SET FORTH
IN THE COMPLAINT IN THIS PETITION.
"8. I ALSO WAIVE MY RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY."
(Boldface in original.)  The municipal court accepted defendant's
guilty plea and entered a conviction for misdemeanor DUII.
In the meantime, on March 14, 1996, defendant was
charged with a different DUII, with venue in Yamhill County
District Court.  On March 15, defendant appeared before the
district court and the court appointed counsel for her and set
the case for trial on May 1, 1996.  On May 1, 1996, the Yamhill
County District Court convicted defendant of misdemeanor.  
In 1999, defendant was convicted of misdemeanor DUII
for a third time, this time in Yamhill County Circuit Court.
In September 2000, defendant was charged in the present
case with a fourth DUII offense.  As authorized by ORS
813.010(5), the offense was charged as a felony, based on
defendant's three previous convictions for misdemeanor DUII. 
Defendant filed a motion in limine, challenging the use of the
first of the three convictions -- the 1996 McMinnville Municipal
Court conviction -- to show that she had been convicted of
misdemeanor DUII on three occasions in the last 10 years.  She
asserted that the state could not use the municipal court
conviction against her because she had not waived validly her
right to counsel in that case. 
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the
motion.  The state introduced defendant's plea petition from the
municipal court case into evidence, and also submitted evidence
showing that, at the time of the municipal court case, defendant
was being actively represented by counsel in the district court
case.  In addition, the state called the McMinnville municipal
court administrator, Bennett, to testify about her recollection
of the April 8, 1996, hearing in which defendant had pleaded
guilty.  Bennett stated that, although defendant had appeared at
the proceeding without an attorney, the municipal court
previously had granted her a continuance so that she could obtain
counsel.  Bennett indicated that the municipal judge generally
warned defendants before accepting an uncounseled plea of guilty,
and described the warning that the judge gave to defendant in the
present case as follows:
"[PROSECUTOR]:  What, if anything, was the warning he
gave?
"[WITNESS]:  In this particular case, I was in the
courtroom, and I do remember how the case was handled
merely because this was the third time that she was
brought in.  And in this case, the judge had told her
that -- that she could seek counsel, and that she had
the right to counsel before she entered her plea.  And
in this case, she entered her plea.
"* * * * *
"THE COURT:  Do you recall if the judge cautioned her
at all about the hazards of proceeding without an
attorney?
"[WITNESS]: When he had brought her up, he had told her
that she was here for a hearing to revoke her
diversion, and that it would become a conviction.  And
that upon her entering this plea, that this was what
precisely could happen, like the $5,000 fine.  He read
actually off of the guilty plea form.  And then he told
her that she had the right to an attorney before she
entered a plea."
Based on the foregoing evidence, the prosecutor in the
present case argued that the plea petition showed that defendant
voluntarily had waived her right to counsel.  He also noted that
defendant had had counsel in the district court case that was
pending at the time and argued that defendant therefore could be
presumed to have understood the benefits of counsel and to have
specifically waived counsel in the municipal court case.   Defendant noted, in response, that there was no evidence
that either her attorney in the district court case or the
district court had discussed with her the benefits of counsel or
the risks of self-representation. 
The trial court found that defendant knew that she had
the right to counsel when she pleaded guilty in the municipal
court case.  With respect to the waiver issue, the court stated:
"I think I could fairly say that I would probably grant
this motion [to bar use of the municipal court
conviction,] but for Exhibit Number 3 [(the plea
petition in which defendant waived counsel)].
"* * * * *
"The record on the hazards of proceeding without an
attorney is a little weak here, but the record on the
other side of the coin, I think, can be fairly
inferred.  And that is that the defendant had some
knowledge of the benefits of having an attorney by the
fact that she had an attorney who was actively involved
in her [1996 district court] case at the time she
elected to waive her right to an attorney in the
Municipal Court."
The trial court denied defendant's motion in limine, finding
that, under the totality of the circumstances, defendant
knowingly had waived her right to counsel in the municipal court
case.  After a stipulated facts trial, the court convicted
defendant of felony DUII. (2)
Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, assigning
error to the trial court's use of the municipal court conviction
to support the elevation of her offense to a felony.  Defendant
asserted that the use of the municipal court conviction violated
her right to counsel as guaranteed both by the Sixth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and Article I, section 11, of the
Oregon Constitution.
As the Court of Appeals viewed it, the case came to it
in the following posture:  A defendant may challenge the use of a
prior conviction in a subsequent prosecution on the grounds that
the state obtained the prior conviction while the defendant was
not represented by counsel and the defendant did not validly
waive the right to counsel.  Moreover, in State v. Grenvik, 291
Or at 102, this court had held that a valid waiver of counsel in
such cases could not be presumed from a silent record.  See also
State v. Meyrick, 313 Or 125, 131-32, 831 P2d 666 (1992)
(asserting that the rule in Grenvik stems from the fact that
courts are "reluctant to find that fundamental constitutional
rights have been waived").  Under Court of Appeals precedent
based on Grenvik and Meyrick, a defendant bore "the burden of
demonstrating prima facie that the conviction was uncounseled. 
If that is done, the burden is then on the state to demonstrate
either that the defendant was, in fact, represented or that he
[or she] had waived counsel."  State v. Holliday, 110 Or App 426,
428, 824 P2d 1148, rev den, 313 Or 211 (1992).  In the present
case, it was undisputed that, in fact, defendant was not
represented by counsel in the municipal court case; the
dispositive question therefore was whether she validly had waived
her right to counsel.  State v. Probst, 192 Or App at 343.
At the outset, the state urged the Court of Appeals to
reconsider the allocation of the burden of persuasion on the
issue of waiver, at least when a defendant collaterally attacked
an uncounseled prior conviction.  The state argued that, in such
circumstances, a defendant should bear the burden of proving that
she did not knowingly waive counsel.  Although the state's
position was at odds with this court's decision in Grenvik, the
state argued that Grenvik was a case decided under the Sixth
Amendment and was itself inconsistent with the United States
Supreme Court's later decision in Parke v. Raley, 506 US 20, 113
S Ct 517, 121 L Ed 2d 391 (1992).  In Parke, which also was a
case involving a collateral attack on a criminal conviction, the
Court held that "the presumption of regularity that attaches to
final judgments makes it appropriate to assign a proof burden to
the defendant" when the defendant challenges the validity of a
prior conviction.  506 US at 31.
The Court of Appeals, after extensive analysis,
responded to the state's argument this way:
"An argument can be made that, in light of Parke,
the reasoning in Grenvik is now outdated.  At the time
Grenvik was decided, it was entirely possible that a
prior Oregon conviction had resulted from a proceeding
in which the defendant neither had counsel nor validly
had waived the right to counsel.  However, Oregon law -- including statutes and decisional law -- has now
protected the constitutional right to counsel for many
years and, today, defendants in courts throughout the
state, including municipal courts, routinely are
advised of the right to counsel and the dangers of
self-representation.  There is every reason to believe
that the trial courts of this state regularly follow
applicable statutes and the directives of the Supreme
Court in ensuring that the right to counsel is
adequately protected.  Thus, the rationale for
excluding prior convictions from the presumption of
regularity that generally attaches to final judgments
arguably no longer is sound.  A new approach,
consistent with Parke, would continue to impose on the
state the burden of proving that a prior conviction is
constitutionally valid where there is prima facie
evidence in the record that the defendant did not
validly waive his or her right to counsel. However,
where, as here, no such evidence exists, the
presumption of validity logically would prevail.
"Two considerations constrain us from adopting
such a rule, though.  First, although the United States
Supreme Court has held that state courts may not impose
restrictions under federal constitutional law that that
court specifically has refrained from imposing, Oregon
v. Hass, 420 US 714, 95 S Ct 1215, 43 L Ed 2d 570
(1975), the prerogative to overrule an Oregon Supreme
Court decision belongs to that court, not to us. See
State v. Williams, 17 Or App 513, 526, 522 P2d 1213
(1974) (stating that 'when the Oregon Supreme Court's
last word on an issue is more favorable to a criminal
defendant than the United States Supreme Court's last
word, we have made it our practice to follow the last
word of the Oregon Supreme Court, leaving to that court
the decision about whether to adopt the less favorable
position adopted by the United States Supreme Court'). 
Second, Grenvik -- a Sixth Amendment case -- did not
address whether Article I, section 11, of the Oregon
Constitution precludes applying a presumption of
regularity to prior convictions in cases where the
record does not affirmatively demonstrate that the
defendant validly waived his or her right to counsel. 
Unlike the defendant in Grenvik, defendant here has
raised that state constitutional issue.  It is not
certain that the Oregon Supreme Court would adopt the
Parke rule for purposes of Article I, section 11.6 
See, e.g., DeAngelo v. Schiedler, 306 Or 91, 95, 757
P2d 1355 (1988) (declining to reach Sixth Amendment
claim where Oregon Constitution provided protection
sought by post-conviction petitioner); cf. State v.
Rogers, 313 Or 356, 363, 836 P2d 1308 (1992), cert den,
507 US 974 (1993) (presuming same analysis of venue
issue under Article I, section 11, and Sixth Amendment
because defendant did not suggest different analysis
under state and federal constitutions).  In any event,
because we are bound by Grenvik, our further conjecture
on the subject would serve no useful purpose.
"6 Both the Sixth Amendment and Article I,
section 11, guarantee the right to counsel in any
'criminal prosecution.'  In Meyrick, 313 Or at 131-32,
the defendant challenged on direct appeal the validity
of his waiver of counsel under both the Sixth Amendment
and Article I, section 11.  Because the court cited
Grenvik in its Article I, section 11, analysis, it
arguably concluded that the waiver analysis under the
Sixth Amendment was not meaningfully different from the
analysis under Article I, section 11.  With respect to
misdemeanor prosecutions, however, the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel extends only to cases in which actual
imprisonment is imposed.  Scott v. Illinois, 440 US
367, 374, 99 S Ct 1158, 59 L Ed 2d 383 (1979).  Article
I, section 11, is not so limited.  [City of Pendleton
v.] Standerfer, 297 Or [725,] at 729[, 688 P2d 68
(1984)]; Brown v. Multnomah County Dist. Ct., 280 Or
95, 570 P2d 52 (1977) (holding that the meaning of
'criminal prosecution' is not confined to those
misdemeanor cases in which imprisonment is actually or
even potentially to be imposed).  That difference alone
cautions against drawing a hasty conclusion about the
portability of Sixth Amendment case law to an Article
I, section 11, analysis of the waiver issue."
Probst, 192 Or App at 347-48.
Having rejected the state's procedural argument, the
Court of Appeals turned to the merits.  Respecting the merits,
and assuming that the state had the burden of persuasion that
Grenvik imposed on it, that court held that the state had failed
to carry its burden of proving that defendant's McMinnville
Municipal Court conviction was valid.  The court held, first,
that the evidence relating to defendant's waiver of counsel when
she appeared in person before the municipal court did not
establish a knowing waiver.  Probst, 192 Or app at 351.  The
court also rejected the state's argument that defendant's earlier
request for time to obtain counsel demonstrated that she
understood the value of counsel and, therefore, inferentially
could be said to have knowingly waived counsel.  Id. at 352. 
Finally, the court rejected the chain of favorable inferences
that the state wished to have drawn from the fact that defendant
had counsel in another DUII case at the time that she purported
to waive her right to counsel in the McMinnville Municipal Court
matter.  Id. at 353.  The court therefore concluded that the
state could not use the McMinnville Municipal Court conviction as
a predicate conviction to help establish that defendant's latest
DUII offense was a felony.  The court remanded the case to the
trial court with instructions to enter a conviction for
misdemeanor DUII.  Id. at 353-54.  As noted, we allowed the
state's petition for review.
In this court, as in the Court of Appeals, the state
places heavy emphasis on its argument that this court should
presume that a conviction such as defendant's in the McMinnville
Municipal Court is valid and defendant should have the burden of
demonstrating that it was not.  That argument necessarily
includes a request that this court reconsider and overrule
Grenvik.  We turn to that issue.
In Grenvik, the state sought to use an uncounseled
prior conviction to elevate the defendant's second DUII offense
from a Class A traffic infraction to a Class A misdemeanor.  The
defendant objected, arguing that the use of that conviction
violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  In addressing
that issue, this court relied on the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Burgett v. Texas, 389 US 109, 88 S Ct 258, 19
L Ed 2d 319 (1967), for two propositions:  (1) a defendant may
challenge the constitutional validity of a prior conviction in a
subsequent prosecution in which the state uses the prior
conviction to elevate the subsequent offense; and (2) where the
record of a prior conviction is silent as to whether the
defendant was represented by or waived counsel, the court must 
presume that the court in the earlier proceeding did not afford
the defendant his or her right to counsel.  Grenvik, 291 Or at
101-02.  Consistent with those principles, this court held that
the state could not use a prior conviction as an element of an
offense unless the record of the prior conviction affirmatively
showed that the defendant either was represented by counsel or
validly had waived the right to counsel; that is, the court could
not presume a valid waiver of counsel from a silent record.  Id.
at 102.  Since 1981, Oregon courts have followed those
principles. (3)
In 1992, the United States Supreme Court reconsidered
Burgett in Parke and, in that later decision, rejected the second
proposition from Burgett on which this court had relied in
Grenvik.  In Parke, the defendant challenged a Kentucky statute
that enhanced sentences for repeat felons.  The defendant moved
to suppress evidence of two prior convictions that the state
wished to use against him arguing that, because the record failed
to indicate whether the underlying guilty pleas were knowing and
voluntary, they did not comply with Boykin v. Alabama, 395 US
238, 243, 89 S Ct 1709, 23 L Ed 2d 274 (1969) (holding that, on
direct review, court cannot presume waiver of rights from silent
record resulting in guilty plea).  Parke, 506 US at 22.  
Under the Kentucky statute, the state retained the
ultimate burden of persuasion as to the validity of prior
convictions, but a presumption of regularity attached to such
convictions.  When the state proved the existence of a prior
conviction, the statute shifted to the defendant the burden to
produce evidence that the conviction was invalid.  If the
defendant met that burden, the state had to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the conviction was valid. 
In upholding the Kentucky statute, the Court held that
"Boykin does not prohibit a state court from presuming, at least
initially, that a final judgment of conviction offered for
purposes of sentence enhancement was validly obtained."  Parke,
506 US at 30.  The Court distinguished the context in that case,
a collateral attack on a final judgment, from Boykin, which was a
direct appeal from a conviction:
"We see no tension between the Kentucky scheme and
Boykin.  Boykin involved direct review of a conviction
allegedly based upon an uninformed guilty plea.
Respondent, however, never appealed his earlier
convictions.  They became final years ago, and he now
seeks to revisit the question of their validity in a
separate recidivism proceeding.  To import Boykin's
presumption of invalidity into this very different
context would, in our view, improperly ignore another
presumption deeply rooted in our jurisprudence: the
'presumption of regularity' that attaches to final
judgments, even when the question is waiver of
constitutional rights." 
Parke, 506 US at 29 (emphasis added).  The Court further noted
that, when it decided Burgett, "state criminal defendants'
federal constitutional right to counsel had not yet been
recognized, and so it was reasonable to presume that the
defendant had not waived a right he did not possess."  Id. at 31. 
Because the right to counsel was well established when the Court
decided Parke, however, the Court held that the state could rely
upon the presumption of regularity that generally attaches to
final judgments of conviction.  Id.  
The defendant in Parke also challenged the Kentucky
statute on the ground that it assigned a burden of production to
criminal defendants.  The Court rejected that argument, too,
holding that, "even when a collateral attack on a final
conviction rests on constitutional grounds, the presumption of
regularity that attaches to final judgments makes it appropriate
to assign a proof burden to the defendant."  Id.
After the Supreme Court decided Parke, a number of
jurisdictions adopted the presumption of regularity for prior
convictions used to enhance sentences or as elements of a
crime. (4)  And, so far as we can determine, no state has held
that applying a presumption of regularity offends any
constitutional right of a defendant.
We begin our analysis by noting that, defendant's
argument to the contrary (which we discuss below)
notwithstanding, there does not appear to be any
subconstitutional answer to the issue before us.  See Priest v.
Pearce, 314 Or 411, 414, 840 P2d 65 (1992) (methodology
customarily calls for court to begin analysis with
subconstitutional law).  Certain statutes touch on the subject of
using prior convictions for DUII to enhance the possible sentence
in a later case, but none suggests that the legislature has
placed any burden on the state to prove the validity of those
convictions.  For example, ORS 813.326 states that prior
convictions are elements of the crime of felony DUII under ORS
813.010(5) and that the state shall "plead * * * and prove" them. 
ORS 813.326(1).  However, nothing in that requirement says
anything about circumstances in which a defendant challenges the
validity of one or more of those prior convictions, much less
about who should have the burden of persuasion respecting such an
issue.
Of all the statutes, ORS 813.328 comes closest to the
point.  It provides:
"A defendant who challenges the validity of prior
convictions alleged by the state [pursuant to ORS
813.326] as an element of felony driving while under
the influence of intoxicants must give notice of the
intent to challenge the validity of the prior
convictions at least seven days prior to the first date
set for trial on the felony charge.  The validity of
the prior convictions shall be determined prior to
trial by the court." 
Defendant argues that that statute "indicates that a prior
conviction must be valid to satisfy that element of the offense
of DUII."  From that, she reasons that the validity of the
conviction is an "element" of felony DUII and, because it is, the
state loses because it bears the burden of persuasion on all
elements of a criminal offense.
We are not persuaded by that argument.  Although it
doubtless is true that the legislature did not intend an invalid
prior conviction to serve as a predicate conviction under ORS
813.010(5), it does not logically follow -- as defendant's
argument necessarily would require -- that ORS 813.328 is a
substantive statute that requires the state to prove not only the
fact of a prior conviction, but also its validity, to the trier
of fact.  Rather, it is clear to us from the wording of the
statute that it is intended to serve as a procedural statute that
prescribes where and when a defendant's challenge to the validity
of a conviction shall be determined, if a defendant chooses to
make such a challenge.  We now hold specifically that, in
prosecutions for felony DUII, the existence of the predicate
convictions is an element of the felony charge that the state
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, but the validity of the
predicate convictions is not an element.  Cf. State v. Sims, 335
Or 269, 273-75, 66 P3d 472 (2003) (validity -- as opposed to
existence -- of predicate offenses in driving while revoked
prosecution not element of offense).  We turn to the
constitutional issues presented by this case. (5)
Normally, we begin our constitutional analysis with the
Oregon Constitution.  See, e.g., State v. Kennedy, 295 Or 260,
262, 666 P2d 1316 (1983) (explaining methodology).  However,
because our decisional precedent in this case (Grenvik) is based
on the Sixth Amendment, and because the state's line of reasoning
fails if Grenvik continues to state applicable federal law
correctly, we turn to the federal constitutional analysis first.
The state's position in this respect is that "Grenvik
is now directly at odds with the * * * holding in Parke v. Raley
* * * that the federal constitution does not preclude a state
from applying a presumption of regularity [when a defendant
collaterally attacks an uncounseled conviction] and assigning a
defendant a burden of proof."
Defendant's initial response is that the state reads
Parke too broadly, i.e., the case does not stand for the
proposition that the Sixth Amendment permits a state to apply a
presumption of validity to prior convictions and to require a
defendant to produce evidence that would undermine that
presumption. (6)  However, as our earlier summary of the case
indicates, we read Parke as standing precisely for that
proposition.  It follows that this court's opinion in Grenvik,
which attempted to follow and apply the Sixth Amendment, is not
correct.  It is permissible, under the Sixth Amendment, to place
the burden of persuasion on a defendant who collaterally attacks
the validity of a prior conviction that has become final. (7)
We turn to the question of the allocation of the burden
of persuasion, in cases like the present one, in light of Article
I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution. (8)  In doing so, we
wish to make clear how limited this issue is.  The law is settled
beyond the need for citation that the state has the burden of
proving each material element of the offense -- including, in
this case, the existence of certain predicate criminal
convictions -- beyond a reasonable doubt.  Further, we believe
that it is clear that, with respect to the prior convictions that
the state wishes to use as predicate offenses in the present
case, the court may deny the state the right to use the
conviction in that way if the state obtained them through a
denial of defendant's constitutional rights.  (The state so
concedes and, even if it did not, we are satisfied that ORS
813.328, (quoted below, 339 Or at ___ (slip op at 17)), which
sets out the procedure by which collateral attacks may be raised
and heard, is a direct legislative recognition of that rule.) 
What remains at issue is the question of who bears the burden of
persuasion when a defendant asserts that one or more predicate
convictions cannot be used.
The state asserts that it makes out a prima facie case
respecting the existence of predicate convictions by offering
certified copies of the judgments of conviction.  That is, proof
of the fact of the convictions is an element of the offense, but
proof of their validity is not.  We already have indicated our
agreement with that proposition.
The state next asserts that, like all other judgments
of conviction that have become final, the judgments here are
entitled to a presumption of validity.  Defendant does not appear
to challenge that abstract proposition, and we agree with it. 
See, e.g., Schram v. Gladden, 250 Or 603, 605, 444 P2d 6 (1968)
(in post-conviction context, presumption of regularity applies
and petitioner has burden of showing absence of valid waiver).
This brings us to the contested issue.  The state
asserts that, even in cases like the present one, in which the
record shows that the state obtained one or more predicate
convictions (by plea or trial) when defendant was not represented
by counsel, the presumption of validity continues. (9)  It
follows, the state asserts, that defendant bears the burden of
showing that the absence of counsel resulted in a conviction (by
plea or trial) that was constitutionally invalid.
Defendant's response relies primarily on Meyrick, in
which this court, relying in part on Grenvik and on Miller v.
Gladden, 249 Or 51, 437 P2d 119 (1968), stated that waiver of the
right to counsel under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon
Constitution "will not be presumed from a silent record."  313 Or
at 132.  Meyrick does not aid defendant.  That case was a direct
appeal of -- not a collateral attack on -- an uncounseled
criminal conviction; it says nothing about the presumption of
regularity that attaches to a conviction that has become final. 
Cf. Schram, 250 Or at 605 (in post-conviction, recognizing
presumption of regularity respecting criminal convictions that
were unappealed or had become final after appeal, even when
conviction was uncounseled; holding that petitioner had burden to
show that uncounseled predicate conviction was obtained in
violation of right to counsel). (10)  Defendant's reliance of
Meyrick is not well taken.
In summary, we conclude that there is no statutory or
constitutional provision that requires the state, in the face of
a defendant's bald assertion that she was denied some aspect of
her right to counsel respecting a previously unchallenged
predicate conviction, to assume the burden of persuasion
respecting the validity of that conviction.  Instead, just as
would be true in a post-conviction proceeding, the presumption of
validity of the prior conviction means that, absent some other
evidence in the record that, if accepted, would show that the
conviction was invalid, the conviction may be used against
defendant.  It follows logically that, respecting such a
conviction, the burden is on the defendant to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that it was invalid.  That burden
may be met in a variety of ways, see State v. James, 339 Or 476,
491-92, ___ P3d ___ (2005) (discussing various ways in which a
burden of persuasion may be met, including reliance on evidence
produced by other party), but it is defendant's to meet.
Turning to the facts of the present case and applying
the foregoing rule, the outcome is straightforward.  The state
produced evidence of the contested predicate conviction. 
Defendant then produced evidence that she did not have counsel
when she pleaded guilty to that charge.  But lack of counsel,
although relevant, is not dispositive.  Defendant needed to be
able to point to some evidence -- from her own testimony or
otherwise -- tending to show that the absence of counsel resulted
in an involuntary plea, whether because she was unaware of the
possible consequences of proceeding without a lawyer, or
otherwise.  There is no such evidence in this record, either
directly or by permissible inference.  Thus, under the rule that
we announce today, the trial court would be entitled to deny
defendant's motion to suppress the fact of her contested
conviction, and defendant's resulting conviction for felony DUII
would be valid.  The contrary holding of the Court of Appeals,
while understandable, was error, and must be reversed.
That said, we believe that one further consideration
enters into this case.  Defendant's position throughout has been
to rely on Grenvik, treating it as binding precedent from this
court.  That was a reasonable position, albeit an incorrect one. 
Defendant's position also logically permitted her to make a
particular tactical choice:  She offered no evidence respecting
the critical issue, because the precedent on which she relied
(Grenvik) placed the burden on the state, not on her.  That
tactical choice also was reasonable at the time she made it. 
Thus, without knowing that the rule that ultimately would be
announced would be contrary to Grenvik, defendant never really
had any reason to consider other tactical choices.  We believe
that she should have that chance.  We therefore vacate the
judgment and remand the case to the trial court to allow
defendant the opportunity -- if she wishes to exercise it -- to
put on evidence to meet her burden of persuasion. (11)  If she
chooses not do so, then the trial court may reinstate the
judgment.  If she chooses to do so, but the trial court is
unpersuaded by her evidence, then the judgment likewise may be
reinstated.  If, however, the trial court is convinced by
defendant's evidence that her uncounseled guilty plea in the
municipal court case was not voluntary, then the trial court
shall enter a conviction of misdemeanor DUII.
The decision of the Court of Appeals in reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is vacated and the case is remanded
to the circuit court.
1. In setting out the procedural history and the
preliminary identification of issues in this case, we borrow
extensively from the able opinion of the Court of Appeals.
2. Defendant stipulated to the existence of the municipal
court conviction, subject to her argument that the conviction was
invalid.
3. See, e.g., City of Pendleton v. Standerfer, 297 Or 725,
730-32, 688 P2d 68 (1984); State v. Riggins, 180 Or App 525, 531,
44 P3d 615 (2002); State v. Holliday, 110 Or App at 429; State v.
Manfredonia, 105 Or App 537, 540, 805 P2d 738 (1991) (all
illustrating principle). 
4. See, e.g., Harris v. Georgia, 238 Ga App 452, 453, 519
SE2d 243 (1999); Idaho v. Weber, 140 Idaho 89, 90 P3d 314 (2004);
Louisiana v. Shelton, 621 So 2d 769, 779-80 (La 1993);
Massachusetts v. Lopez, 426 Mass 657, 664-65, 690 NE2d 809
(1998);  Michigan v. Carpentier, 446 Mich 19, 37, 521 NW2d 195
(1994); Montana v. Perry, 283 Mont 34, 37, 938 P2d 1325 (1997);
North Carolina v. Stafford, 114 NC App 101, 104, 440 SE2d 846
(1994); Tatum v. Texas, 846 SW2d 324, 327-28 n 5 (Tex Crim App
1993); James v. Virginia, 18 Va App 746, 752, 446 SE2d 900 (1994)
(all to that effect).
5. Defendant makes one other subconstitutional argument
based on the rules of evidence, particularly on OEC 104, dealing
with preliminary questions.  The argument is not well taken, and
we do not discuss it.
6. Defendant's arguments in this respect boil down to the
proposition that Grenvik was properly reasoned and decided at
that time.  Ultimately, however, any such argument does not
address the issue now before us, viz., is Grenvik a correct
application of the Sixth Amendment, as that amendment is
construed today?
7. We recognize that the rule that we announce here goes
farther than the burden-shifting statutory rule that was before
the Court in Parke.  However, we perceive no constitutional
distinction between the dynamic of the Parke rule and the rule
that we announce today.
8. Article I, section 11, on the Oregon Constitution,
provides, in part:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
have the right * * * to be heard by himself and counsel
* * *."
9. We emphasize once more that the state is referring to a
collateral attack on a criminal conviction, i.e., a case in which
a defendant's prior convictions have become final, either because
the defendant did not appeal them or, if he or she did, the
appellate court affirmed them.  The rule that we establish here
is limited to such circumstances.
10. Defendant also relies on Ryan v. Palmateer, 338 Or 278,
108 P3d 1127 (2005), but that case involved alleged "structural
errors" in a criminal proceeding in which an accused person
actually had counsel.  We find nothing in that case that is
helpful to defendant here.
11. Nothing in the examples that follow is intended to
suggest that the state may not also offer evidence respecting the
validity of the earlier convictions.