Title: Merlin Weber v. Town of Saukville
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1994AP002336
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: April 29, 1997

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
94-2336 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
Merlin Weber, Barbara Weber, Ryan Weber, Robert 
Guetchidjian, Jane Guetchidjian and Robert A. 
Guetchidjian, on their own behalf and on behalf of 
all other similarly situated, 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiffs-Respondents-Cross Appellants, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
Town of Saukville, Marvin O. Hoffman, Town of 
 
 
 
Supervisor Albin E. Vand Boome, Town Supervisor 
 
 
 
 
and Paul H. Brunnquell, Town Supervisor,  
 
 
 
 
Defendants, 
 
 
 
 
Payne & Dolan, Inc., 
 
 
 
 
Intervening Defendant-Appellant-Cross 
 
 
 
 
Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
_________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
Reported at:  197 Wis.2d 830, 541 N.W.2d 221 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
                                                              
 
Opinion Filed:  
April 29, 1997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument:  
December 3, 1996 
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Ozaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
 
RICHARD T. BECKER 
 
                                                              
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: 
 
                                                              
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For 
the 
intervening 
defendant-appellant-cross 
respondent-petitioner there were briefs by William F. White, 
Kimberly Cash Tate and Michael, Best & Friedrich, Madison and oral 
argument by William F. White. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For the plaintiffs-respondents-cross appellants there was a 
brief by Alan Marcuvitz, Andrea Roschke and Weiss, Berzowski, 
Brady & Donahue, Milwaukee and oral argument by Alan Marcuvitz and 
Andrea Roschke. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Richard A. Lehmann and 
Boardman, Suhr, Curry & Field, Madison for the Transportation 
Development Assocation of Wisconsin. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Donald Leo Bach, Paul G. 
Kent, Todd Palmer and DeWitt, Ross & Stevens, S.C., Madison for 
the Wisconsin Road Builders Assocation, the National Stone 
Assocation, the Aggregate Producers of Wisconsin, the Assocation 
of General Contractors, Wisconsin Chapter, and Wisconsin Ready 
Mixed Concrete Assocation. 
No. 94-2336 
 
1
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 94-2336 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Merlin Weber, Barbara Weber, Ryan Weber, 
Robert Guetchidjian, Jane Guetchidjian and 
Robert A. Guetchidjian, on their own 
behalf and on behalf of all others 
similarly situated, 
 
  
Plaintiffs-Respondents-Cross 
Appellants, 
 
 
v. 
 
Town of Saukville, Marvin O. Hoffman, Town 
Supervisor, Albin E. Vande Boom, Town 
Supervisor and Paul H. Brunnquell, Town 
Supervisor, 
 
 
 
Defendants, 
 
Payne & Dolan, Inc., 
 
 
Intervening Defendant-Appellant-Cross 
Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 29, 1997 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The defendant, Payne & Dolan, 
Inc. (Payne & Dolan), seeks review of a published decision of 
the court of appeals, which affirmed a circuit court summary 
judgment in favor of plaintiff residents (plaintiffs) of the 
Town of Saukville (the Town).1  Payne & Dolan challenges the 
court of appeals' conclusion that the Town's zoning ordinance 
does not authorize a conditional use permit for blasting and 
                     
1 See Weber v. Town of Saukville, 197 Wis. 2d 830, 541 N.W.2d 221 
(Ct. App. 1995), affirming a judgment by the Circuit Court for 
Ozaukee County, Richard T. Becker, Judge. 
No. 94-2336 
 
2
crushing in a quarrying operation.  The plaintiffs assert that 
the ordinance prohibits the quarrying operation because of the 
number of families residing within the area.  Because we 
determine that blasting and crushing are part of the mineral 
extraction process, and that the ordinance does not prohibit the 
proposed quarrying activity, we conclude that the conditional 
use permit is authorized under the Town's zoning ordinance.  
However, even though the permit is authorized, we conclude that 
it is invalid because the Town failed to satisfy a zoning 
ordinance notice provision, and because the application for the 
permit was incomplete.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of 
appeals' invalidation of the conditional use permit. 
¶2 
The following issues are presented on review: 1) 
whether the Town's zoning ordinance empowers the Town Board to 
issue a conditional use permit which authorizes blasting and 
crushing as part of a mineral extraction operation; 2) whether 
operation of the quarry is forbidden under the zoning ordinance 
proscription against mineral extraction operations where 30 or 
more families reside within one-half mile of the proposed site; 
3) whether the Town complied with the notice requirements 
prescribed 
by 
the 
zoning 
ordinance; 
and 
4) 
whether 
the 
conditional use application submitted by Payne & Dolan met the 
requirements of the zoning ordinance. 
¶3 
While our conclusion on the sufficiency of the 
application issue is dispositive in this case, we nevertheless 
consider the 30 families, blasting and crushing, and notice 
issues.  These issues may recur in the event that Payne & Dolan 
reapplies for a conditional use permit.  Moreover, because we 
disagree with the court of appeals' determination that blasting 
No. 94-2336 
 
3
and crushing are not authorized under the Town's zoning 
ordinance, and because the issue will have statewide impact on 
mineral extraction operations, we address the question in order 
to make clear that the Town's ordinance does, in fact, authorize 
blasting and crushing as part of a quarrying operation.   
I.  Facts and Procedural History 
¶4 
The relevant facts are undisputed.  Payne & Dolan 
builds roads and bridges.  The company requires a reliable 
source of aggregate, or crushed stone, for use in its business. 
 Payne & Dolan supplies its need for aggregate with stone 
extracted from quarries it owns and operates. 
¶5 
In January 1992, Payne & Dolan submitted a conditional 
use application form to the Saukville Town Clerk.  In its 
application, Payne & Dolan requested that it be allowed to use 
blasting 
and 
crushing 
as 
part 
of 
a 
limestone 
quarrying 
operation.  At the time of its submission, the application 
omitted the following information: the quantity of water to be 
used in the operation, a topographic map showing the depth of 
proposed quarry excavations, and a restoration plan. 
¶6 
After receiving the application, the Town Clerk mailed 
and published notice that the matter would be addressed at a 
public hearing conducted by the Town's Plan Commission on 
Tuesday, February 11, 1992.  Mailed notice was provided to those 
persons identified by the Clerk as "residents within one-half 
mile of the proposed quarry."  It is undisputed that there were 
36 property owners whose property lines were located within one-
half mile of the proposed quarry site.  Of this number, 27 
resided in dwellings located within one-half mile of the site.  
Because the Town Clerk notified only "residents," nine owners of 
No. 94-2336 
 
4
property located within one-half mile of the proposed quarry did 
not receive mailed notice of the public hearing.  The Clerk also 
published notice in the official Town paper on Monday, January 
27, 1992, and Thursday, January 30, 1992, unaware that the Town 
zoning ordinance required that such notice be published once per 
week for two consecutive weeks.       
¶7 
Both the published notice and the mailed notice 
erroneously stated that the public hearing would take place on 
Tuesday, February 10, 1992, at 8:00 p.m.  The actual date of the 
meeting was Tuesday, February 11, 1992.  Realizing his mistake, 
the Clerk stayed at the Town Hall on Monday, February 10, 1992, 
from 7:00 p.m. until 8:30 p.m., in order to advise any 
misinformed attendees of the correct date.  No one appeared.   
¶8 
Approximately 70 residents attended the public hearing 
 the following evening, including all of the plaintiffs in this 
case.  However, several of the property owners who did not 
receive the earlier mailed notice did not attend the public 
hearing.  At the hearing, residents were allowed to make 
statements and ask questions of Payne & Dolan representatives.  
At the regular Plan Commission meeting immediately following the 
public hearing, action on the conditional use request was tabled 
until the next meeting.  It is undisputed that the February 11, 
1992 hearing was the only public hearing on the matter. 
¶9 
During the next nine months, the Town Board and Plan 
Commission convened meetings, several of which were attended by 
Town residents, to consider Payne & Dolan's application.2  During 
that time, Town officials and residents toured Payne & Dolan's 
                     
2 The majority of these meetings were related to the 
authorization, presentation, and discussion of an independent 
environmental impact study of the proposed quarry site.  
No. 94-2336 
 
5
existing quarry operations in the City of Franklin, as well as 
the proposed quarry site in the Town.  On November 12, 1992, the 
Plan Commission voted to recommend granting the conditional use 
permit.  The Town Board voted unanimously to grant the permit on 
November 17, 1992. 
¶10 On November 30, 1992, the plaintiffs commenced an 
action 
in 
the 
circuit 
court 
against 
the 
Town 
and 
its 
Supervisors.3  The plaintiffs alleged that in granting the 
conditional use permit, the Town Supervisors failed to follow 
the provisions of the Town's zoning ordinance, thus violating 
their due process rights under the United States Constitution, 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  The defendants removed the case 
to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Wisconsin.  The district court granted the defendants' motion 
for summary judgment, dismissing the plaintiffs' federal law 
claims on the merits and with prejudice, and remanding to the 
circuit court for further consideration of the alleged zoning 
ordinance violations. 
¶11 On remand to the Circuit Court for Ozaukee County, all 
parties moved for summary judgment.  Granting the plaintiffs' 
motion for summary judgment, the circuit court invalidated the 
conditional use permit on the grounds that: 1) the Town's zoning 
ordinance does not authorize blasting and crushing as methods of 
mineral extraction; 2) the Town did not substantially comply 
with the notice provisions of the zoning ordinance; and 3) Payne 
& Dolan's application did not comply with the provisions of the 
zoning 
ordinance. 
 
The 
court 
also 
determined 
that 
the 
                     
3 Payne & Dolan was not named as a defendant in the complaint, 
but later moved for and was granted party status as an 
intervening defendant.  
No. 94-2336 
 
6
conditional use satisfied the zoning ordinance requirement that 
fewer than 30 families reside within one-half mile of the 
proposed mineral extraction site.4 
¶12 Payne & Dolan appealed, and the plaintiffs cross 
appealed.5  Affirming the decision of the circuit court, the 
court of appeals concluded that the Town's zoning ordinance does 
not authorize the issuance of a conditional use permit that 
allows blasting and crushing as part of a mineral extraction 
operation.  Weber v. Town of Saukville, 197 Wis. 2d 830, 541 
N.W.2d 221 (Ct. App. 1995).  The court of appeals did not 
address the other issues raised by the parties.  Payne & Dolan 
petitioned this court for review. 
II.  Standard of Appellate Review                 
¶13 This court reviews a grant of summary judgment using 
the same methodology as the circuit court.  State ex rel. 
Auchinleck v. Town of LaGrange, 200 Wis. 2d 585, 591-92, 547 
N.W.2d 587 (1996).  Where there are no material facts in 
dispute, as here, we must determine whether the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Id. at 592.   
¶14 This case requires us to interpret provisions of the 
Town of Saukville, Wis., Zoning Ordinances (1984).  Both parties 
and amici agree that the ordinance provisions relevant in this 
case are substantially similar to those in communities across 
the state, and that our interpretation may therefore have a 
statewide impact on mineral extraction operations.  We have 
                     
4 The circuit court also enjoined Payne & Dolan from acting 
pursuant to the authority granted by the conditional use permit.  
5 The Town and its Supervisors did not appeal the decision of the 
circuit court.  The plaintiffs appealed that part of the circuit 
court's decision holding that the proposed quarry did not violate 
the "30 families" rule. 
No. 94-2336 
 
7
recently summarized the deference which appellate courts owe to 
a Town Board's interpretation of ordinance language having 
significance beyond the parties to a given action: 
 
In the interpretation of ordinances, the rules of 
statutory interpretation apply. . . . The ordinance in 
question is substantially similar to . . . ordinances 
across the state, although the language of . . . the 
various 
ordinances 
may 
vary. 
 
Under 
these 
circumstances, 
we 
conclude 
that 
one 
board's 
interpretation of the language in a single case should 
not be viewed as controlling or persuasive and that we 
should interpret the term [in question] de novo. 
Marris v. City of Cedarburg, 176 Wis. 2d 14, 32-33, 498 N.W.2d 
842 (1993) (citations omitted).  Thus, in this case we interpret 
the relevant Town ordinance terms without deference to the Town 
Board, circuit court, or court of appeals.6 
¶15 Wisconsin law has long recognized that when a court 
construes an ordinance or statute, words must be given their 
common meaning.  State v. Martin, 162 Wis. 2d 883, 904, 470 
N.W.2d 900 (1991)(citations omitted).  However, it is equally 
well established that technical words or phrases with a peculiar 
meaning in the law must be construed according to such meaning. 
 Id.   
III.  Blasting and Crushing 
¶16 We turn to the first issue in this case, which is 
whether the Town zoning ordinance authorizes blasting and 
                     
6 We acknowledge that some prior cases give greater deference to 
a municipality's interpretation of an ordinance provision.  See, 
e.g., State ex rel. B'nai B'rith Found. v. Walworth County Bd. of 
Adjustment, 59 Wis. 2d 296, 304, 208 N.W.2d 113 (1973); State ex 
rel. Beidler v. Williams Bay Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 167 Wis. 2d 
308, 311, 481 N.W.2d 669 (Ct. App. 1992).  However, given that 
our interpretation of the zoning ordinance in question will 
likely have statewide impact on mineral extraction operations, we 
conclude that the Marris de novo standard of review is applicable 
in this case.   
No. 94-2336 
 
8
crushing as part of a mineral extraction operation.  The 
ordinance provides in relevant part:  
MINERAL EXTRACTION OPERATIONS 
Mineral extraction operations are conditional uses and 
may be permitted in accordance with the provisions in 
Sections 4.1 through 4.4 of this Ordinance, except as 
otherwise provided by this section . . . . 
Use Restricted.  Mineral extraction operations shall 
include the removal of rock slate, gravel, sand, or 
any other minerals from earth by excavating, stripping 
or leveling. 
Zoning Ordinance § 4.10.  
¶17 The court of appeals approached the issue by inquiring 
"whether the terms 'excavating,' 'stripping' and 'leveling' 
include blasting and crushing."  Weber, 197 Wis. 2d at 837.  
According to the court of appeals, the common meaning of the  
three terms, "excavating," "stripping," and "leveling," limit 
mineral deposit removal to extraction by mechanical means.  Id. 
at 838.  The court concluded that under the ordinance, blasting 
is not a permissible method of mineral extraction, because it 
involves explosives rather than machinery.  Id.  The ordinance 
also does not allow crushing, the court reasoned, because 
crushing "is a distinct manufacturing process," and "is not an 
inherent part of extraction; it takes place after the mineral is 
excavated."  Id. at 839.   
¶18 This court does not read § 4.10 so narrowly.  We 
observe initially that conditional use standards often lack 
specificity, since their purpose is to "confer a degree of 
flexibility in the land use regulations."  Edward Kraemer & Sons 
v. Sauk County Adjustment Bd., 183 Wis. 2d 1, 14, 515 N.W.2d 256 
(1994); see also State ex rel. Skelly Oil Co. v. Common Council, 
City of Delafield, 58 Wis. 2d 695, 700-01, 207 N.W.2d 585 (1973) 
(noting that conditional uses are "flexibility devices"). 
No. 94-2336 
 
9
 
[I]f it were possible to find a legislative draftsman 
capable 
of 
performing 
such 
a 
task—of 
drafting 
standards to govern the likely as well as all possible 
contingencies relating to a conditional use—there 
would be no need to make the use a conditional one.  
In that case they could be made part of the zoning 
ordinance proper requiring no exercise of discretion 
on the part of anyone. . . .  [I]f the purposes of 
zoning are to be accomplished, the master zoning 
restrictions or standards must be definite while the 
provisions pertaining to a conditional use . . . must 
of necessity be broad and permit an exercise of 
discretion. 
3 Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., Rathkopf's The Law of Zoning and 
Planning § 41.11, at 49 (4th ed. 1996).   
¶19 Turning to the ordinance provision at issue, the 
phrase "shall include" in § 4.10 denotes a non-exhaustive list 
of methods by which minerals may be removed from the earth.  See 
Legislative Reference Bureau, Wisconsin Bill Drafting Manual 
1997-1998 
§ 2.01(1)(i) (revised August 
1996) 
("'Means' is 
complete and 'includes' is partial.  Using 'includes' allows a 
court 
or 
administering 
agency 
to 
adopt 
additional 
meanings . . ."). 
 
We 
find 
unpersuasive 
the 
plaintiffs' 
contention that "include" modifies the list of materials to be 
extracted, rather than the methods of extraction.  The phrase 
"rock slate, gravel, sand or any other minerals from earth" is 
itself a non-exhaustive list.  If we adopted the plaintiffs' 
view that the term "include" modifies this list of extracted 
minerals, the phrase "or any other minerals" would be rendered 
surplusage, a result to be avoided wherever possible.  See Ann 
M.M. v. Rob S., 176 Wis. 2d 673, 680, 500 N.W.2d 649 (1993).   
¶20 While the court of appeals correctly examined the 
permissible methods of mineral extraction, it erred in focusing 
solely on the terms "excavating, stripping or leveling."  Those 
activities comprise only a partial list of permissible "mineral 
No. 94-2336 
 
10
extraction operations."  Instead, the inquiry centers on whether 
blasting and crushing also come within the definition of 
"mineral extraction operations."   
¶21 We conclude that resort to the "technical" meaning of 
"mineral extraction operations" is appropriate in this case.  
The ordinance does not use this term in the general descriptive 
sense, but instead to define processes peculiar to the mining 
industry.  The technical meaning should govern in a technical 
context.  See Lake City Corp. v. City of Mequon, 207 Wis. 2d 
156, 163 n.8, 558 N.W.2d 100 (1997); Lang v. Lang, 161 Wis. 2d 
210, 221, 467 N.W.2d 772 (1991); see also Wis. Stat. § 990.01(1) 
(1995-96)7.  Because § 4.10 addresses mining, we interpret the 
ordinance provision with the aid of industry, administrative, 
and legislative definitions of mining activities.   
¶22 Blasting 
is 
an 
indispensable 
activity 
in 
the 
extraction of hard rock from the earth.  See National Stone 
Association, The Aggregate Handbook, 5-16 (1991) ("Every hard 
rock quarrying operation extracts stone from its geologic 
formation by the controlled use of explosives and/or blasting 
agents").  The same reference manual states the following about 
"extraction": 
 
The term extraction . . . includes the planning and 
design for removal of rock, sand, and gravel from the 
ground.  The term extraction also includes the actual 
removal or mining process, and the reclamation of the 
land after mining is complete.  Each different method 
employed 
for 
extraction 
is 
unique 
and 
contains 
numerous 
interrelated 
components. 
 
A 
simplified 
description of the extraction process consists of the 
removal of rock, sand, or gravel from its natural 
state and delivery of this material to the primary 
crushing 
or sizing 
facility 
in 
optimum 
physical 
dimensions for continued processing.  
                     
7 Unless otherwise indicated, all future statutory references are 
to the 1995-96 volume. 
No. 94-2336 
 
11
Id. at 7-2.  Although focusing on excavation of metals, the 
United States Department of the Interior's Dictionary of Mining, 
Mineral, and Related Terms (1968) provides that "extraction" is: 
 
[u]sed in relation to all processes that are used in 
obtaining metals from their ores.  Broadly, these 
processes involve the breaking down of the ore both 
mechanically 
(crushing) 
and 
chemically 
(decomposition).   
Id. at 404.  These technical definitions support the conclusion 
that within the industry, blasting and crushing are considered 
an integral part of mineral extraction operations. 
¶23 In addition, the Wisconsin Department of Natural 
Resources 
has 
recognized 
that 
blasting 
and 
crushing 
are 
activities inherent in quarrying operations.  See Memorandum 
from George E. Meyer, Secretary, Wisconsin Department of Natural 
Resources, to the Natural Resources Board 1 (Jan. 24, 1995) (on 
file with the Department of Natural Resources)(stating that most 
of 1,903 nonmetallic mines identified in Wisconsin "entail 
crushing, washing, sorting or blasting")(emphasis added). 
Our legislature has also determined that crushing is an 
activity which comes within the meaning of "nonmetallic mining": 
"Nonmetallic mining" means all of the following: 
. . . . 
(b) 
On-site 
processes 
that 
are 
related 
to 
the 
extraction 
of 
mineral 
aggregates 
or 
nonmetallic 
minerals, such as stockpiling of materials, blending 
mineral aggregates or nonmetallic minerals with other 
mineral aggregates or nonmetallic minerals, crushing, 
screening, scalping and dewatering. 
Wis. Stat. § 295.11(3)(b) (emphasis added). 
¶24 "Nonmetallic mining," if not synonymous with "mineral 
extraction operations," is certainly included within those 
operations.  Because mineral extraction activities include 
nonmetallic mining, and nonmetallic mining includes crushing of 
No. 94-2336 
 
12
stone, it follows that mineral extraction operations include the 
crushing of stone.  We therefore conclude that blasting and 
crushing are authorized as part of a mineral extraction 
operation under § 4.10 of the Town's zoning ordinance.     
IV. The 30 Families Rule 
¶25 Having determined that § 4.10 authorizes blasting and 
crushing as part of a quarrying operation, we next consider 
whether the Town's grant of the conditional use permit violated 
the zoning ordinance's "30 families" rule.  Section 4.10 
provides that "[n]o mineral extraction operation shall be 
permitted if 30 or more families reside within a half mile of 
the proposed site."  Payne & Dolan asserts that this provision 
requires a count of dwellings located within one-half mile of a 
proposed mineral extraction site.  In this case, 27 such 
dwellings exist.8  The plaintiffs contend that the provision 
requires a count of all parcels of land with property lines 
falling within one-half mile of a proposed site.  Thirty-six 
such parcels exist.  Thus, the proposed quarry would be allowed 
under Payne & Dolan's counting method, but would be barred under 
the plaintiffs'. 
¶26 We agree with the trial court's conclusion that fewer 
than 30 families reside within one-half mile of the proposed 
quarry.  Our determination is based upon the definition of 
"family" provided in § 11.3 of the zoning ordinance, and upon 
other language contained in § 4.10. 
                     
8 Payne & Dolan purchased the property of three of the 27 
families located within one-half mile of its proposed quarry.  
Our analysis remains the same regardless of whether we count 24 
or 27 dwellings within one-half mile of the quarry site.  
No. 94-2336 
 
13
¶27 The critical language in the 30 families rule is 
"families reside."  A "family" is defined in the ordinance as: 
"[p]ersons related by blood, adoption or marriage or not to 
exceed three persons not so related, living in one dwelling as a 
family unit."  Zoning Ordinance § 11.3.  It appears from this 
language that the ordinance views families as residing in 
dwellings, rather than on the entirety of the parcels of real 
estate on which their dwellings are built.  
¶28 The 30 families rule is preceded in § 4.10 by notice 
provisions which unambiguously require a counting of parcels of 
property, rather than dwellings.  When a conditional use permit 
is requested, "all owners of the property within one-half mile 
of the proposed mineral extraction operation" are entitled to 
mailed or hand-delivered notice of the required public hearing. 
 § 4.10.  If the drafters of the 30 families rule had intended 
to count property owners instead of dwellings, they could easily 
have done so by using language similar to the notice provision. 
 Instead, the drafters of the 30 families rule referred to 
"families resid[ing]."  When one part of a statutory section or 
ordinance provision uses terminology different from that found 
elsewhere in the same provision, an inference may be drawn that 
the drafter intends distinct meanings.  See Armes v. Kenosha 
County, 81 Wis. 2d 309, 318, 260 N.W.2d 515 (1977), cited in 
American Motorists Ins. Co. v. R&S Meats, Inc., 190 Wis. 2d 196, 
214, 526 N.W.2d 791 (Ct. App. 1994).  This, along with the 
definition of "family" provided in § 11.3, leads us to conclude 
that the drafters of the 30 families rule intended to count the 
number of dwellings located within one-half mile of a mineral 
extraction operation.  Because the record shows that there are 
No. 94-2336 
 
14
fewer than 30 such dwellings, we conclude that the 30 families 
rule did not preclude the Town Board's issuance of the 
conditional use permit to Payne & Dolan. 
V. Notice 
¶29 We next address whether the Town complied with the 
zoning ordinance's notice of public hearing provisions.  Section 
4.4 sets forth the general notice requirements for public 
hearings on conditional use requests: 
 
The Plan Commission Shall Schedule A Public Hearing on 
each [conditional use] application and publish a Class 
2 notice, pursuant to the requirements of Chapter 985 
of the Wisconsin Statutes. 
Class 2 notice requires newspaper publication of notice once 
each 
week 
for 
two 
consecutive 
weeks. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 985.01(1), 
985.07(2). 
 
Section 
4.10 
of 
the 
ordinance 
prescribes the notice requirements for conditional use requests 
involving mineral extraction operations.  In addition to Class 2 
notice, § 4.10 requires: 
 
[W]ritten notice of the public hearing shall be 
delivered by first class mail or shall be hand 
delivered by courier to all owners of the property 
within 
one-half 
mile 
of 
the 
proposed 
mineral 
extraction operation.  Substantial compliance with the 
notice requirements of this section shall be deemed 
sufficient. 
¶30 The 
trial 
court 
determined, 
and 
Payne 
& 
Dolan 
concedes, that the published and mailed notices were deficient 
in two respects.  First, both notices inaccurately stated the 
date of the public hearing as "Tuesday, February 10, 1992," when 
the correct date was Tuesday, February 11, 1992.  Second, the 
published notice appeared twice in one week, rather than once 
each week for two consecutive weeks. 
No. 94-2336 
 
15
¶31 Payne & Dolan disputes a third deficiency in notice 
found by the circuit court.  The circuit court concluded that 
the Town did not satisfy the § 4.10 requirement that mailed or 
hand delivered notice be given to "all owners of the property 
within 
one-half 
mile 
of 
the 
proposed 
mineral 
extraction 
operation."  Payne & Dolan counters that the Town satisfied 
§ 4.10 by mailing notice to those residents located within one-
half mile of the proposed quarry.  We agree with the circuit 
court. 
¶32 Payne & Dolan fails to recognize the distinction 
between "residents" and "property owners."  There are 27 
families residing within one-half mile of the proposed quarry, 
whereas there are 36 property owners within the same distance.  
The different counts result because there are nine families 
whose residential dwellings are located outside of the one-half 
mile zone, but whose real estate is nevertheless located within 
one-half mile of the proposed quarry.9  Section 4.10 mandates 
mailed or hand-delivered notice to property owners.  Since the 
Town Clerk mailed notice only to those 27 individuals whose 
residences fell within one-half mile of the proposed quarry, the 
mailed notice was deficient. 
¶33 Although the Town provided deficient notice of the 
public hearing on the conditional use application, Payne & 
                     
9 Payne & Dolan itself recognizes this distinction between 
"residents" and "property owners" in its argument involving the 
"thirty families" rule: 
With respect to notice, the lines must be drawn from 
the site of the proposed operation to the property 
lines that are within one-half mile.  Thus, any owner 
of property within one-half mile receives notice of a 
public hearing, notwithstanding that the owner's actual 
residence may lie outside of the one-half mile 
measurement. . . . 
Petitioner's Reply Brief at 16. 
No. 94-2336 
 
16
Dolan's permit is not automatically invalid.  Section 4.10 
requires 
"substantial 
compliance," 
rather 
than 
"strict 
compliance," with its notice provisions.  Substantial compliance 
with a statutory or ordinance notice requirement exists when the 
defective notice given nevertheless fulfills the objective of 
the provision and the record shows that no one was prejudiced by 
the defect.  See Radtke v. City of Milwaukee, 116 Wis. 2d 550, 
555-56, 342 N.W.2d 435 (1984); Joint School Dist. v. Joint 
County School Comm., 26 Wis. 2d 580, 585, 133 N.W.2d 317 (1965). 
  
¶34 Notice requirements are generally intended to provide 
an accurate statement of the time, place, and purpose of a 
public hearing to those entitled to such notice so that they may 
attend the hearing and express their views.  Reinders v. 
Washington County School Comm., 15 Wis. 2d 517, 522, 113 N.W.2d 
141 (1962); see also Martin v. Wray, 473 F. Supp. 1131, 1137 
(E.D. Wis. 1979)(purpose of notice provision in zoning ordinance 
"is to give owners of property involved and other interested 
parties a fair opportunity to be heard"). 
¶35 The mailed and published notice incorrectly stated the 
date of the public hearing as Tuesday, February 10, 1992, when 
the hearing was actually held on Tuesday, February 11, 1992.  A 
reader of such notice could reasonably believe that the public 
hearing would take place either on Monday, February 10, 1992, or 
on Tuesday, February 11, 1992.  However, the Town Clerk waited 
at the Town Hall on Monday evening to advise any misinformed 
attendees of the correct hearing date, and no one appeared.  In 
addition, the record shows that meetings of the Plan Commission 
had long been held on Tuesdays.  The Town Clerk's remedial 
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efforts ensured that the correct time of the public hearing 
would be known to the few, if any, citizens who might have been 
misled by the notice.  As such, we conclude that the erroneously 
stated date did not defeat the purpose of the ordinance's notice 
provision. 
¶36 The Town also provided defective notice by publishing 
notice twice in one week, rather than once a week for two 
consecutive weeks.  We strongly urge notice providers to guard 
against this kind of technical error.  However, such a defect is 
of little consequence in this case, and therefore provides an 
insufficient basis for concluding that the purpose of the 
ordinance's notice provisions was left unfulfilled. 
¶37 Mailed or personally served notice of the public 
hearing was not given to nine of the 36 owners of property 
located within one-half mile of the proposed quarry, as required 
by the ordinance.  Thus, fully one-quarter of those property 
owners with the most at stake in Payne & Dolan's conditional use 
application were not given notice of their only unrestricted 
opportunity to be publicly heard on the matter.  The Town took 
no curative measures, such as personally notifying the nine 
property owners who did not receive mailed notice.  On these 
facts, we cannot conclude that the purpose of the ordinance's 
notice provisions has been fulfilled.   
¶38 Payne & Dolan asserts that because the plaintiffs in 
this action were in attendance at the public hearing, they were 
not prejudiced by and cannot invoke the lack of notice to the 
other nine owners of property located within one-half mile of 
the proposed quarry site.  Citing Village of Cobb v. Public 
Service Comm’n, 12 Wis. 2d 441, 107 N.W.2d 595 (1961).  We 
No. 94-2336 
 
18
disagree.  This court held in Village of Cobb that plaintiffs 
who received actual notice of a hearing and who were not 
prejudiced by others’ lack of notice could not object to a 
commission decision to authorize a railroad’s proposed central-
agency plan.  Id. at 449.  Thus, Payne & Dolan cannot rely on 
the rule in Village of Cobb until it is first established that 
the plaintiffs in this case suffered no prejudice by the 
defective notice. 
¶39 Because the Town failed to provide the notice required 
by the ordinance, the burden of proving no prejudice is placed 
on the Town.10  As the sole remaining defendant, Payne & Dolan is 
relying on the validity 
of 
the 
Town's issuance of the 
conditional use permit, and must therefore discharge the Town's 
burden of demonstrating lack of prejudice to the plaintiffs in 
this case. 
¶40 Payne & Dolan does not meet its burden of disproving 
prejudice when it notes that the plaintiffs in this action 
attended the public hearing.  To discharge its burden of proof, 
Payne & Dolan must show that notice to the nine property owners 
would not have resulted in a Board decision more beneficial to 
the plaintiffs.  Because Payne & Dolan has placed no such 
evidence in the record, it has failed to meet its burden of 
proving lack of prejudice.  See Joint School Dist., 26 Wis. 2d 
at 585 (record must show that no one suffered prejudice as a 
result of lack of notice).  Accordingly, we conclude that the 
                     
10 See, e.g., Gerrard Realty Corp. v. American States Ins. Co., 89 
Wis. 2d 130, 145-46, 277 N.W.2d 863 (1979)(insureds who fail to 
provide statutorily required notice of loss bear the burden of 
demonstrating lack of prejudice to insurer); Weiss v. City of 
Milwaukee, 79 Wis. 2d 213, 227, 255 N.W.2d 496 (1977) (failure to 
comply with notice of claim statute puts burden on claimant to 
establish nonexistence of prejudice to municipality).    
No. 94-2336 
 
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Town did not substantially comply with the ordinance's notice 
provisions, and that its issuance of the conditional use permit 
was therefore invalid. 
VI. The Conditional Use Application 
¶41 The circuit court based its invalidation of the 
conditional use permit in part on its determination that Payne & 
Dolan’s permit application was incomplete.  Because both parties 
focus their arguments on the notice provisions of § 4.10, our 
analysis of the adequacy of the application will also center on 
that section of the ordinance.  Section 4.10 provides in part: 
 
Application.  Applications for a conditional use 
permit for a mineral extraction operation . . . shall 
be accompanied by[: . . .] a detailed description of 
all aspects of the proposed extraction operation; a 
list of equipment, machinery and structures which may 
be used; the source, quantity, and disposition of 
water to be used, if any; a legal description of the 
proposed site; a topographic map of the site and the 
area abutting the site, to the nearest public road 
right-of-way or a minimum distance of 300 feet on all 
sides of the site drawn at a minimum vertical contour 
interval of five (5) feet and showing all existing and 
proposed private access roads and the depth of all 
existing and proposed excavations; and a restoration 
plan. 
¶42 The plaintiffs assert that Payne & Dolan’s application 
was incomplete because it omitted the following: 1) a “detailed” 
description of all aspects of the operation; 2) the quantity of 
water to be used in the operation; 3) a topographic map showing 
the depth of existing and proposed excavations; and 4) a 
restoration plan.  Payne & Dolan contends that its application 
described the operation with sufficient particularity, but does 
not dispute that at the time of submission, the application 
omitted the quantity of water to be used, a topographic map with 
proposed depths, and a restoration plan. 
No. 94-2336 
 
20
¶43 Initially, we conclude that unless a zoning ordinance 
provides to the contrary, a court should measure the sufficiency 
of a conditional use application at the time that notice of the 
final public hearing is first given.11  Such a rule ensures that 
 interested individuals will have a meaningful opportunity to 
express informed opinions at the public hearings.  Indeed, a 
contrary 
rule 
would 
create 
a 
damaging 
incentive 
for 
a 
conditional use permit seeker to withhold all controversial 
information from its application until during or after the 
public hearing.  Such a perverse incentive would be diminished 
only slightly by requiring a complete application at the time of 
the public hearing, for even our ablest citizens would be hard 
pressed to digest and discuss in a single public hearing all of 
the debatable proposals in a given conditional use application. 
 Requiring a complete application at the time that the last 
public hearing is noticed places no significant burden on 
conditional use applicants, and provides ample opportunity for 
interested citizens to inform themselves in preparation for the 
hearing.12                   
                     
11 Payne & Dolan does not dispute that the only public hearing in 
this case was held on February 11, 1992.  It notes that the 
public was invited to attend subsequent Plan Commission 
"meetings" dealing with the conditional use permit.  However, 
Payne & Dolan does not assert, and the record does not show, that 
any of the subsequent meetings were noticed or conducted in the 
manner of a public hearing.  For example, the attendees at these 
meetings were not permitted to speak in favor of or against the 
proposed quarry.  
12 We reject Payne & Dolan’s view that the information contained 
in a conditional use permit application is important only to the 
Town Plan Commission and Board, and may therefore be provided at 
any time prior to the issuance of the permit.  We cannot accept 
such a view because we do not believe that the ordinance 
anticipates a public hearing at which citizens participate as 
mere passive spectators.  If such were the case, there would be 
no need for public hearings.       
No. 94-2336 
 
21
¶44 Payne & Dolan’s application describes with sufficient 
particularity those components of the quarrying operation which 
were actually set forth in the application at the time that the 
Town gave notice of the February 11, 1992, public hearing.  We 
also note that § 4.10 expressly authorizes conditional use 
applicants to submit a restoration plan “prior to the issuance 
of a conditional use permit.”  Thus, the application’s lack of a 
restoration plan at the time of notice of the public hearing 
cannot form a basis for determining that the application was 
incomplete. 
¶45 At the time that notice of the public hearing was 
given, the application lacked a description of the quantity of 
water to be used in the operation of the quarry.  There is no 
ordinance provision authorizing later inclusion of the water 
consumption information.  The information may be important to 
those residents located in the vicinity of the proposed quarry 
site.  For example, the quarry’s proposed use of groundwater 
carries the potential for diminished availability of well water 
in the surrounding area, depending on the amount of water 
consumed by the quarry.  Information on the quantity of water to 
be used might also be relevant to the feasibility of the 
quarry’s proposed methods of controlling water runoff.  
¶46 The 
application 
also 
lacks 
a 
topographic 
map 
describing the proposed depths of the quarry.  This information 
could be useful to interested citizens for several reasons.  
First, it would provide a description of the height hazard 
presented by the quarry.  Second, the proposed depth of the 
excavation could have a bearing on the quarry’s life span.  
Third, the environmental impact of the quarry could vary with 
No. 94-2336 
 
22
the 
excavation's 
depth. 
 
As 
with 
the 
water 
consumption 
information, there is no ordinance provision authorizing later 
submission of the topographic map.   
¶47 We have determined that an application must be 
complete at the time that notice is given of the last public 
hearing, 
unless 
an 
ordinance 
expressly 
permits 
a 
later 
submission 
of 
information. 
 
Here, 
the 
conditional 
use 
application 
was 
incomplete 
because 
it 
did 
not 
contain 
information regarding the quantity of water to be used in the 
quarrying operation or the proposed depth of the quarry.  There 
being no ordinance provision authorizing subsequent submission 
of either type of information, we conclude that the application 
was insufficient. 
¶48 In summary, we conclude that the Town’s zoning 
ordinance permits blasting and crushing as part of a mineral 
extraction operation.  Accordingly, we disagree with that 
portion of the court of appeals' decision holding to the 
contrary.  In addition, Payne & Dolan’s proposed quarry did not 
violate the 30 families rule.  However, because the Town failed 
to substantially comply with the zoning ordinance’s notice 
provisions, 
and 
because 
Payne 
& 
Dolan’s 
conditional 
use 
application was incomplete at the time that notice of the public 
hearing was first given, we conclude that the Town improperly 
granted the conditional use permit.  Accordingly, we affirm on 
other grounds the court of appeals' invalidation of the 
conditional use permit. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.