Title: GARRETT v JACKSON
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 14325
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: October 9, 1979

No. 14325 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1979 JOSEPH LeROY GARRETT, et al., Plaintiff and Respondent, -vs- LESLIE F. JACKSON et al., Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, Honorable James Freebourn, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: Schulz, Davis and Warren, Dillon, Montana John Warren argued, Dillon, Montana For Respondent : R. Thomas Garrison argued, Virginia City, Montana Submitted: September 24, 1979 M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. his appeal is brought by L e s l i e and Betty Jackson from a decree of t h e D i s t r i c t Court, F i f t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , d e c l a r i n g Joseph G a r r e t t t h e owner of a p r e s c r i p t i v e ease- ment of way over t h e i r land i n Madison County, Montana. The s o l e i s s u e on appeal i s whether t h e evidence presented t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court supports i t s f i n d i n g t h a t G a r r e t t ' s use w a s adverse t o t h e titles of Jacksons and t h e i r predecessors i n i n t e r e s t and was n o t merely permissive. I n 1895 Joseph and Sam Heggenberger b u i l t a slaughter- house on a t r a c t of land immediately n o r t h of M i l l Creek. They sold t h e t r a c t i n 1917 t o Walter Ellinghouse, who operated t h e slaughterhouse u n t i l 1946 when G a r r e t t and h i s wife purchased t h e land. Garrett continued t h e slaughter- house operations u n t i l 1962 and remains t h e owner of t h e t r a c t . G a r r e t t ' s land, r e f e r r e d t o as t h e "slaughterhouse t r a c t , " i s separated from t h e county road by a s t r i p of land known a s t h e "frontage t r a c t . " When G a r r e t t purchased t h e slaughterhouse tract i n 1946, t h e frontage t r a c t w a s owned by William Daniels. ~ a n i e l s ' successors i n i n t e r e s t are Glen Marsh, who owned t h e t r a c t u n t i l 1971, and t h e p r e s e n t owners, t h e Jacksons. Since t h e slaughterhouse operations began i n 1895, t h e owners of t h e slaughterhouse tract have gained access t o t h e i r land by crossing t h e frontage t r a c t from t h e county road. A wooden bridge spanned M i l l Creek permitting vehi- c u l a r t r a f f i c onto t h e slaughterhouse t r a c t u n t i l about 1968 when it w a s weakened by flooding. U n t i l 1958 t h e frontage tract was unenclosed, b u t i n t h a t year Marsh began r a i s i n g sheep and constructed a w i r e fence around t h e t r a c t t o hold them on h i s land. when he b u i l t t h e fence, Marsh d i d n o t leave a gateway along t h e county road. Consequently, when G a r r e t t attempted t o g e t onto h i s t r a c t he was confronted by a s o l i d fence. Garrett s e l e c t e d a p o i n t on t h e fence about 100 f e e t e a s t of t h e route which he had previously followed, c u t t h e w i r e s of t h e fence, and proceeded through. He twisted t h e w i r e s together behind him t o keep t h e sheep from escaping, and l a t e r n o t i - f i e d Marsh of what he had done. Marsh w a s upset over Gar- rett's a c t i o n , b u t l a t e r agreed t o place a "drop wire" g a t e i n t h e fence a t t h e p o i n t where G a r r e t t had clipped t h e w i r e s . Marsh o f f e r e d t o place a g a t e a t t h e point where G a r r e t t had previously entered t h e frontage t r a c t , b u t never constructed such an entryway. G a r r e t t continued t o use t h e new r o u t e across f o r t h e next 12 years u n t i l 1971, even though t h e regular slaughterhouse business ceased i n t h e e a r l y 1960's. There w a s evidence t h a t when t h e Jacksons purchased t h e frontage t r a c t i n 1971 G a r r e t t requested a w r i t t e n easement, which they refused. However, G a r r e t t continued t o use t h e g a t e b u i l t by Marsh, driving as f a r a s M i l l Creek, and crossing t h e creek on f o o t onto h i s land. H e a l s o cleared brush along the roadway with a chainsaw t o keep it open. I n 1971 Jacksons constructed a "jack fence" across t h e road about midway across t h e i r t r a c t . G a r r e t t d i d n o t c u t through t h i s fence, b u t parked h i s vehicle by it and pro- ceeded on f o o t onto h i s land. I n 1976 t h e Jacksons wired s h u t t h e g a t e which G a r r e t t had used s i n c e 1958. G a r r e t t clipped t h e w i r e s and removed poles which Jacksons had placed over it. The Jacksons then chained and padlocked t h e g a t e , preventing G a r r e t t from entering, and s e n t a letter t o G a r r e t t accusing him of being a trespasser. j hereafter, G a r r e t t brought t h i s a c t i o n . During t h e l a s t two years before t h e g a t e w a s chained and locked, G a r r e t t had used t h e r o u t e a c r o s s Jacksons' land some twenty t o t h i r t y t i m e s per year. It i s c l e a r from t h e evidence presented t o t h e District Court t h a t p l a i n t i f f Garrett and h i s predecessors i n i n t e r e s t have used defendant Jacksons' land f o r many y e a r s a s a means of access t o t h e slaughterhouse t r a c t . However, because G a r r e t t changed t h e r o u t e i n 1958, whatever claim he now has t o a p r e s c r i p t i v e easement must be shown t o have accrued s i n c e t h a t d a t e and with r e s p e c t t o t h e new route. To e s t a b l i s h a p r e s c r i p t i v e easement, t h e owner of t h e purported dominant tenement must e s t a b l i s h open, notorious, exclusive, adverse, continuous, and unmolested use of t h e s e r v i e n t tenement f o r t h e f u l l s t a t u t o r y period of f i v e y e a r s required t o acquire t i t l e by adverse possession. The claimant, however, i s e n t i t l e d t o r e l y upon a presumption t h a t h i s use w a s adverse t o t h e s e r v i e n t owner's t i t l e i f he demonstrates by h i s evidence t h e o t h e r elements of h i s c l a i m . Luoma v. Donohoe (1978), - Mont . I 588 P.2d 523, 525, 35 St-Rep. 1971, 1973-74; Staudinger v. DeVries (1978) Mont. , 581 P.2d 1, 2, 35 St.Rep. 861, 863; Mountain V i e w Cemetery v. Granger (1978), - Mont. I 574 P.2d 254, 257, 35 St-Rep. 76, 79. Thus, when t h e dominant owner makes t h i s preliminary showing of open, notorious, continuous, and unmolested use f o r t h e s t a t u t o r y period, t h e burden f a l l s upon t h e owner of t h e s e r v i e n t tenement t o show t h a t t h e use was n o t adverse, b u t merely permissive. Luoma, 588 P.2d a t 525, 35 St.Rep. a t 1974; Mountain V i e w Cemetery, 574 P.2d a t 254, 35 St.Rep. a t 79; OtConnor v. Brodie (1969)r 153 Mont. 129, 137, 454 P.2d 920, 925. The Jacksons argue t h a t G a r r e t t ' s a c t of c u t t i n g t h e fence w i r e s i n 1958 was n o t h o s t i l e o r adverse because Garrett rewired t h e fence a f t e r he had gone through it. However, Garrett's a c t i o n i s r e a d i l y explained by t h e presence of l i v e s t o c k on t h e frontage t r a c t a t t h e t i m e . H i s concern f o r Marsh's sheep i s i n no way i n c o n s i s t e n t with h i s claim of right-of-way. The D i s t r i c t Court found speci- f i c a l l y t h a t a f t e r Marsh i n s t a l l e d t h e drop w i r e g a t e G a r r e t t would c l o s e t h e g a t e behind him i f l i v e s t o c k w e r e p r e s e n t , and leave it open i f t h e r e were none. I n a t l e a s t one o t h e r i n s t a n c e , t h i s Court has described gate-cutting as a "dis- t i n c t and p o s i t i v e a s s e r t i o n of a h o s t i l e r i g h t t o t h e r i g h t s of t h e owner . . ." Taylor v. Petranek (1977), - Mont. , 568 P.2d 120, 123, 34 St.Rep. 905, 910. I n t h i s c a s e , where G a r r e t t c u t t h e fence without seeking permis- s i o n , and only later informed t h e s e r v i e n t owner of h i s a c t , t h e D i s t r i c t Court was w e l l j u s t i f i e d i n concluding t h a t G a r r e t t ' s use was adverse and h o s t i l e t o Marsh's t i t l e . The Jacksons' second attempt t o overcome t h e presump- t i o n t h a t G a r r e t t ' s use was adverse i s t h e i r a s s e r t i o n t h a t t h e presence of a g a t e through which G a r r e t t could l a t e r pass i s strong evidence of permissive use. However, t h i s Court has r u l e d t h a t t h e presence of a g a t e alone " w i l l n o t d e f e a t a p r e s c r i p t i v e easement." Hayden v. Snowden (1978), Mont. , 576 P.2d 1115, 1118, 35 St.Rep. 367, 371. A s was s a i d i n Kostbade v. Metier (1967), 150 Mont. 139, 145, 432 P.2d 382, 386, " [ t l h e evidence of t h i s one g a t e , admittedly b u i l t n o t t o s t o p people b u t c a t t l e , i s n o t enough standing alone t o r e b u t t h e presumption [ t h a t t h e use was adverse] ." In the present matter, Marsh constructed a very simple gate at the point where Garrett cut through the fence, for the apparent purpose of providing a convenient method of holding his sheep in after Garrett passed through. Thus, the District Court's judgment that Garrett's use of the roadway from 1958 to 1971 was adverse to Marsh's title is supported by substantial credible evidence and by the pre- sumption of adversity. There is no clear preponderance of the evidence against the District Court's conclusion. The Jacksons testified at trial that they were unaware of any claim to an easement across their property until some time after they purchased the land, and that even then, Garrett's use was not adverse. However, assuming that the District Court correctly concluded that Garrett's claim fully ripened from 1958 to 1971, it is not necessary for Garrett to again establish his claim after the transfer of the servient tenement. In O'Connor v . Brodie, supra, 153 Mont. at 139, 454 P.2d at 926, this Court held that once the owners of a water line easement had acquired their prescrip- tive title, the servient owner's knowledge or lack of knowledge of the claim was immaterial: "But whether the defendants had actual knowledge of the underground water line is immaterial for the reason that plaintiffs had acquired prescrip- tive title prior to the time defendants acquired their property. Prescriptive title once estab- lised is not divested by the subsequent transfer of the servient estate. Ferguson v. Standley, 89 Mont. 489, 498, 300 P. 2d 245, [249]." See also Mountain View Cemetery v. Granger, supra, 574 P.2d at 258, 35 St-Rep. at 81. Garrett's use of the existing roadway from 1958 is sufficient to create a presumption of adverse use. The Jacksons failed to overcome that presumption, and the D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s judgment t h a t G a r r e t t has p r e s c r i p t i v e l y acquired an easement a c r o s s t h e land is supported by s u f f i - c i e n t , s u b s t a n t i a l c r e d i b l e evidence. The judgment of t h e District Court i s affirmed. J u s t i c e f W e concur: J u s t i c e s