Title: PATRICIA ELLEN BOYLE V GENERAL MOTORS CORP
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 121661
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: May 28, 2003

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____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED MAY 28, 2003  
PATRICIA ELLEN BOYLE and  
PAT BOYLE CHEVROLET, INC.  
Plaintiffs-Appellees,  
v 
No. 121661  
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, 
CHEVROLET DIVISION and  
MOTORS HOLDING DIVISION,  
Defendants-Appellants.  
PER CURIAM  
This case presents the question whether an action for  
fraud accrues under MCL 600.5827 at the time the wrong was  
done, or whether it accrues on the date the plaintiff knew or  
should have known of the fraud or misrepresentation.  The  
Court of Appeals reversed summary disposition for defendants,  
holding that a discovery rule of accrual applies to fraud  
actions. 250 Mich App 499; 655 NW2d 233 (2002). We reverse  
the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the order  
of the circuit court because MCL 600.5827 clearly applies and  
because prior decisions by this Court rejecting a discovery  
 
rule in fraud cases have never been overruled.1  
I  
Plaintiff Patricia Boyle took over an existing car  
dealership in September 1988.  The dealership went out of  
business in September 1992.  Plaintiffs claim that they  
learned 
in 
September 
1995 
that 
the 
dealership 
was  
undercapitalized, even though plaintiffs raised the amount of  
money defendants said was sufficient to run the business.  
Plaintiffs also claim that in 1995 they learned that  
defendants falsely represented that a “rent factor” in a  
proposed agreement to sell the dealership did not conform with  
defendants’ standards, as a result of which the sale was not  
completed.  
Plaintiffs 
filed a complaint alleging two counts of fraud  
in August 1999. 
Defendants filed a motion for summary  
disposition, 
arguing that plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the  
six-year period of limitation in MCL 600.5813.2  Defendants  
argued that plaintiffs’ claims accrued under MCL 600.5827 at  
the time the wrongs on which the claims are based were done.  
Plaintiffs responded that a discovery rule applies to the  
1 Although MCL 600.5855 allows a cause of action that was 
fraudulently concealed to be brought within two years after it 
is 
discovered, 
plaintiffs 
do 
not 
allege 
fraudulent  
concealment.  
2 “All other personal actions shall be commenced within 
the period of 6 years after the claims accrue and not 
afterwards unless a different period is stated in the  
statutes.” MCL 600.5813.  
2  
 
 
 
accrual of a fraud action, i.e., a fraud action does not  
accrue until a plaintiff discovers, or should have discovered  
by the exercise of reasonable care, the cause of action,  
citing Fagerberg v LeBlanc, 164 Mich App 349; 416 NW2d 438  
(1987).  Defendants replied that there is no discovery rule in  
fraud cases, relying on Thatcher v Detroit Trust Co, 288 Mich  
410; 285 NW 2 (1939).  The circuit court determined that it  
was bound by the Thatcher decision and granted defendants’  
motion for summary disposition.  
On appeal as of right, the Court of Appeals reversed.  
The Court noted that in Thatcher and Ramsey v Child, Hulswit  
& Co, 198 Mich 658; 165 NW 936 (1917), this Court rejected  
application of a discovery rule to fraud cases.  However, the  
Court noted that Fagerberg held that the discovery rule  
applies in actions for fraud or misrepresentation without any  
discussion of the apparent conflict with the decisions in  
Thatcher and Ramsey. 
The Court of Appeals concluded that  
Fagerberg was correctly decided and that the subsequent  
adoption of the discovery rule in Michigan undercut the  
precedential value of Thatcher and Ramsey.  
While it is true that our Supreme Court 
declined to apply the discovery rule in Thatcher  
and Ramsey, it is also true that Thatcher predated 
the adoption of the discovery rule in Michigan. 
See Johnson [v Caldwell, 371 Mich 368, 378-379; 123  
NW2d 785 (1963)].  Moreover, in a case involving 
negligent misrepresentation by an abstract company, 
our Supreme Court in Williams v Polgar, 391 Mich 6, 
25, n 18; 215 NW2d 149 (1974), quoted with approval 
a case involving fraud, Hillock v Idaho Title &  
3  
Trust Co, 22 Idaho 440, 449; 126 P 612 (1912), that 
had been quoted with approval in the Court of 
Appeals opinion in Williams [v Polgar], 43 Mich App 
95, 98; 204 NW2d 57 (1972):  “‘“If the statute runs  
in favor of the abstractor from the delivery of the 
abstract, the company would be released long before 
the falsity of the abstract could reasonably be 
discovered by the purchaser.  This would not be  
justice, and ought not to be the law.”’”  The  
Supreme Court’s approval of Hillock supports the 
argument that there is no bar to the use of the 
discovery rule in fraud actions.
 Further, the 
Fagerberg panel was aware of and quoted the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Williams in concluding that the 
discovery rule applies.  Thus, we conclude that 
Fagerberg is good law and, therefore, we reverse 
the decision of the trial court.  [250 Mich App 
504-505.]  
Defendants have applied for leave to appeal.  
II  
We review de novo the interpretation and application of  
a statute as a question of law.  If the language of the  
statute is clear, no further analysis is necessary or allowed.  
Pohutski v City of Allen Park, 465 Mich 675, 683; 641 NW2d 219  
(2002).  In the absence of disputed facts, the question  
whether a cause of action is barred by the statute of  
limitations is also a question of law. 
Moll v Abbott  
Laboratories, 444 Mich 1, 26; 506 NW2d 816 (1993).  
III  
This is not the first time that this Court has considered  
the question whether a cause of action for fraud accrues when  
it is or should have been discovered. The discovery rule was  
rejected in Ramsey, which held that the Legislature effected  
a compromise between the rule at law, under which the statute  
4  
 
 
of limitations begins to run from the time the fraud is  
perpetrated, and the rule at equity, under which the statute  
begins to run when the fraud is discovered.  In addition to  
the six-year statute of limitations applicable to frauds, the  
Legislature provided that if the cause of action was  
fraudulently concealed, it could be brought two years after it  
was discovered or should have been discovered.3  
Subsequently, in Thatcher, this Court again rejected the  
claim that a cause of action for fraud accrues when it is  
discovered or should have been discovered, basing that  
conclusion on Ramsey and the statutes then in effect.4  
3 At issue in Ramsey were 1915 CL 12323 and 12330, the  
predecessors of MCL 600.5813 and 600.5855, the six-year 
statute of limitations applicable to fraud actions and the 
fraudulent-concealment 
statute, 
respectively. 
 
In 
Ramsey, 
this 
Court explained:  
It will be observed that the legislature did 
not see fit to adopt the equitable rule to the full 
extent of allowing the six-year limitation period 
to be considered as beginning at the date of 
discovery of the cause of action, but chose rather 
to allow a period of two years from date of such 
discovery within which to bring suit, as a special 
right, when by the strict terms of the general rule 
the action would be barred before the expiration of 
such two-year period.  Under the two sections above  
quoted, a plaintiff now has, in any case, the full 
period of six years from the date of the fraudulent 
act, or other act creating his cause of action, 
within which to institute suit, and moreover, where 
the defendant has fraudulently concealed from him 
his 
cause 
of 
action, 
he 
has, 
under 
any 
circumstances, not less than the full period of two 
years from date of discovery in which to bring his 
action. [198 Mich 667.]  
4 
 The period of limitation and the exception for 
fraudulent concealment at that time were codified at 1929 CL  
5  
The discovery rule has been adopted for certain cases.  
For example, in Johnson v Caldwell, the Court held that the  
discovery rule applies to actions for medical malpractice.  
This Court has not, however, overruled Ramsey and Thatcher, or  
held that the discovery rule applies to actions for fraud or  
intentional misrepresentation.  Moreover, after Ramsey and  
Thatcher were decided the Legislature enacted MCL 600.5827,  
which provides:  
Except as otherwise expressly provided, the 
period of limitations runs from the time the claim 
accrues. The claim accrues at the time provided in 
sections 5829 to 5838, and in cases not covered by 
these sections the claim accrues at the time the  
wrong upon which the claim is based was done 
regardless of the time when damage results.  
Under MCL 600.5827 a claim accrues when the wrong is done,5  
unless §§ 5829 to 5838 apply.6  Plaintiff does not claim that  
any of those sections apply.  
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the discovery  
rule applies to the accrual of actions for fraud.  That  
holding directly contradicts Ramsey and Thatcher and ignores  
the plain language of MCL 600.5813 and 600.5827.  
13976 and 13983.  
5 The wrong is done when the plaintiff is harmed rather 
than when the defendant acted.  Stephens v Dixon, 449 Mich 
531, 534-535; 536 NW2d 755 (1995).  
6 Those sections govern the accrual of claims regarding 
entry on or recovery of land, mutual and open account current, 
breach of warranty or fitness, common carriers to recover 
charges or overcharges, life-insurance contracts where the 
claim is based on the seven-year presumption of death, 
installment contracts, alimony payments, and malpractice.  
6  
Plaintiffs’ cause of action accrued when the wrong was  
done, and they had six years thereafter to file a complaint.  
Because plaintiffs failed to do so, their cause of action is  
barred.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of  
Appeals and reinstate the order of the circuit court granting  
summary disposition for defendants. MCR 7.302(F)(1).  
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman  
WEAVER, J.  
I dissent and would grant leave to appeal.  
Elizabeth A. Weaver  
7