Title: Dane County Department of Human Services v. P. P.
Citation: 2005 WI 32
Docket Number: 2003AP002442
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: March 23, 2005

2005 WI 32 
- 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
03-2440, 03-2441, 03-2442, 03-2443, 03-2444, 03-
2445, 03-2446 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In re the Termination of Parental Rights  
to Diana P., Channa P., Rattanck P., Dara P., 
Rothana P., Daer P., and Ericka P., Persons 
Under the Age of 18: 
 
Dane County Department of Human Services,  
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
Ponn P.,  
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 269 Wis. 2d 892, 675 N.W.2d 811 
(Ct. App. 2004-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 23, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 9, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Daniel R. Moeser   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
PROSSER, J., concurs (opinion filed) 
ROGGENSACK, J., concurs (opinion filed)  
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed) 
BUTLER, J., joins the dissent. 
BUTLER, J., dissents (opinion filed) 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins the dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
by Timothy A. Provis, Madison, and oral argument by Timothy A. 
Provis. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent there was a brief and oral 
argument by Maureen A. Plunkett, assistant corporation counsel. 
 
 
 
2
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Scott Horne, LaCrosse, 
on behalf of the Wisconsin District Attorney’s Association; E. 
Michael McCann, Milwaukee, on behalf of the Milwaukee County 
District Attorney’s Office; and Elisabeth Mueller, Wauwatosa, on 
behalf of the Milwaukee County District Attorney’s Office.   
 
2005 WI 32 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  03-2440, 03-2441, 03-2442, 
 
03-2443, 03-2444, 03-2445 & 03-2446 
(L.C. Nos. 02 TP 107, 02 TP 108, 02 TP 109, 02 TP 110, 02 TP 111, 02 TP 112 
& 02 TP 113) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Termination of Parental Rights  
to Diana P., a Person Under the Age of 18: 
 
Dane County Department of Human Services,  
 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
P.P.,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 23, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
In re the Termination of Parental Rights  
to Channa P., a Person Under the Age of 18: 
 
Dane County Department of Human Services,  
 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
P.P.,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
No. 
03-2440 thru 03-2446   
 
 
2
In re the Termination of Parental Rights  
to Rattanck P., a Person Under the Age of 18: 
 
Dane County Department of Human Services,  
 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
P.P.,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
In re the Termination of Parental Rights  
to Dara P., a Person Under the Age of 18: 
 
Dane County Department of Human Services,  
 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
P.P.,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
In re the Termination of Parental Rights  
to Rothana P., a Person Under the Age of 18: 
 
Dane County Department of Human Services,  
 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
P.P.,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
No. 
03-2440 thru 03-2446   
 
 
3
In re the Termination of Parental Rights  
to Dera P., a Person Under the Age of 18: 
 
Dane County Department of Human Services,  
 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
P.P.,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
In re the Termination of Parental Rights  
to Ericka P., a Person Under the Age of 18: 
 
Dane County Department of Human Services,  
 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
P.P.,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   Because we conclude 
that P.P.'s parental rights were terminated by use of a 
statutory scheme that requires a showing of unfitness before 
termination of parental rights can occur, that such a showing 
was made and that P.P. did not contest the validity of the order 
No. 
03-2440 thru 03-2446   
 
4 
 
that formed the basis for the State's petition, we affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
This case arises out of a petition by Dane County 
Department of Human Services (DCDHS) to terminate the parental 
rights of P.P. to seven minor children, Ericka P., Diana P., 
Channa P., Rattanck P., Dara P., Rothana P., and Dera P. 
(collectively "the children"), and an order for termination, the 
Honorable Daniel R. Moeser, presiding.1  The children currently 
range in age from 17 to 6.   
¶3 
County human services agencies first became involved 
with the family in 1988, based on allegations of physical abuse 
of the children in Rock County.  In 1990, Rock County took 
custody of the children and placed them in foster care.  
Visitation was suspended in October 1991, and P.P. did not have 
any contact with his children between October 1991 and October 
1992.  The children were later returned to their parents' home, 
against the recommendation of Rock County Human Services. 
¶4 
The family moved to Madison in February 1994.  DCDHS 
became involved in April 1994.  In March 2001, one of the 
children disclosed that P.P. had sexually assaulted her.  DCDHS 
subsequently substantiated reports that P.P. had sexually abused 
one of the children and that both parents had physically abused 
                                                 
1 The mother's parental rights have been terminated, and she 
is not a party to this review. 
No. 
03-2440 thru 03-2446   
 
5 
 
and neglected all of the children.  P.P. was arrested, and the 
children were placed in foster care on March 21, 2001. 
¶5 
The children were determined to be in need of 
protection or services (CHIPS) on July 18, 2001.  On August 12, 
2002, DCDHS filed a petition for termination of parental rights.  
The petition alleged that grounds existed for involuntary 
termination 
of 
P.P.'s 
parental 
rights 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.415(1), (2) and (6) (2001-02)2 based on abandonment, 
continuing need of protection or services, and failure to assume 
parental responsibility, respectively. 
¶6 
In the meantime, P.P. pled guilty to felony child 
abuse and was in prison until November 12, 2002.  Upon release, 
he lived in a halfway house for about three months, and then he 
was taken into custody by federal immigration authorities.   
¶7 
On March 4, 2003, DCDHS filed an amendment to its 
petition for termination of parental rights, restating the 
ground 
for 
involuntary 
termination 
stated 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.415(2), "Continuing need of protection or services," and 
adding § 48.415(4), "Continuing denial of periods of physical 
placement or visitation."  Regarding the latter ground, DCDHS 
made two allegations.  First, it alleged that P.P. was denied 
visitation with the children, pursuant to a February 27, 2002 
Dane County Circuit Court order that contained the notice 
required by Wis. Stat. § 48.356(2).  Second, DCDHS alleged, "As 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2001-02 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
03-2440 thru 03-2446   
 
6 
 
of February 28, [2]003, at least one year elapsed since the 
order denying visitation.  The court has not subsequently 
modified its order so as to permit visitation."   
¶8 
On April 16, 2003, P.P. denied the allegations and 
requested a jury trial.  However, on June 2, 2003, P.P. entered 
a no contest plea to the DCDHS allegations establishing grounds 
for termination of parental rights under Wis. Stat. § 48.415(4) 
and waived his right to a trial.  P.P. stipulated that there was 
a factual basis for his plea.  The court accepted his plea and 
stated that it would place in the record the earlier court 
orders and their underlying factual findings denying visitation.  
They would provide a factual basis for the ground pled to by 
P.P.  Only one order, the one signed October 31, 2002 from an 
August 12, 2002 hearing, is found in the record with P.P.'s 
signed no contest plea and waiver statement.   
¶9 
The October 31, 2002 order, which revised and extended 
a prior dispositional order, required that the parents have no 
contact, either direct or indirect, with the children and denied 
the parents visitation.  It set out in detail the conditions in 
P.P.'s home that required no contact by the parents.  For 
example, it explained that the children had been removed from 
their parents' home because "[r]eports of physical and sexual 
abuse of the children by both parents" had been substantiated 
and reports of "severe neglect of the children by both parents" 
had also been substantiated.  The order that formed the factual 
basis for the plea to Wis. Stat. § 48.415(4) also established 
No. 
03-2440 thru 03-2446   
 
7 
 
that "[n]o known services could ensure the safety of the 
children in the parental home."   
¶10 The October 31, 2002 order also established that the 
following conditions had to be met before the parents could be 
granted visitation: 
A. 
Each parent must participate in individual 
therapy 
until 
such 
time 
that 
the 
children's 
therapists, 
in 
consultation 
with 
the 
parent's 
therapists, 
believe[] 
that 
the 
children 
can 
be 
physically and emotionally safe with the parent in any 
setting for visitation; 
B. 
Each parent must demonstrate a 3 month 
period of sobriety, as determined by the Court, and 
submit all requested samples for urinalysis.  Failure 
to submit a sample for urinalysis shall be considered 
the same as a test result indicating the presence of 
controlled substances or alcohol in the parent's 
urine; 
C. 
Each parent must sign each and every consent 
for release of information that is requested by the 
assigned social worker; 
D. 
Each parent must not be incarcerated. 
¶11 On June 10, 2003, the court held a dispositional 
hearing to determine whether the parents' parental rights should 
be terminated.  The court heard testimony from a DCDHS social 
worker, who had prepared a report for the court, and from P.P.  
The court then adopted the facts and conclusions of the social 
worker's report, which detailed the following: the parents' 
mental health and substance abuse issues; the extreme physical 
abuse, sexual abuse, and neglect of the children; the children's 
fear of their parents, including their legitimate fear that 
their father would kill them; the children's desire never to 
No. 
03-2440 thru 03-2446   
 
8 
 
return to their parents' home; the health, emotional and 
behavioral problems the children continue to experience; the 
services offered and provided to the parents; and the children's 
continuing need for foster care placement, despite the intensive 
provision of services.   
¶12 The court noted that the children had been subject to 
"egregious" physical, mental and sexual abuse and that DCDHS had 
provided services to the parents and despite those services, 
conditions had not been met to return the children to their 
parental home.  The court also noted that the children had been 
separated from both parents for the prior 26 or 27 months.  The 
court explained that termination of parental rights was in the 
best interests of the children, six of whom were likely to be 
adopted and the eldest of whom would be living safely with a 
guardian.  The court stated that severing the children's 
relationships with their parents would be beneficial to the 
children and that the children had strong relationships with 
caregivers in their current placements.  In addition, the court 
explained that DCDHS had made reasonable, even extraordinary, 
efforts to prevent removal.  The court found the parents unfit 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 48.424(4) and entered an order 
terminating parental rights to all the children.  
¶13 P.P. appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed.  
P.P. then filed a petition for review, which we granted.   
No. 
03-2440 thru 03-2446   
 
9 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶14 Whether 
a 
statute 
is 
constitutional 
presents 
a 
question of law that we review de novo.  State v. Cole, 2003 WI 
112, ¶10, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328.   
B. 
Facial Constitutional Challenge 
¶15 P.P. raises a substantive due process challenge3 to 
Wis. Stat. § 48.424(4) because that statute provides that a 
finding under Wis. Stat. § 48.415(4) is sufficient to prove that 
a parent is unfit.  Such a challenge may be raised based on the 
assertion that the statute is unconstitutional as applied, see 
Monroe County Department of Human Services v. Kelli B., 2004 WI 
48, ¶1, 271 Wis. 2d 51, 678 N.W.2d 831, or that the statute is 
facially unconstitutional, see State v. Rachel, 2002 WI 81, ¶1, 
254 Wis. 2d 215, 647 N.W.2d 762.  Here, P.P. makes a facial 
challenge, but not an as-applied challenge.  He contends that 
                                                 
3 P.P. does not tell us whether he bases his challenge 
solely on a fundamental liberty interest that is secured by the 
Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution or whether 
there is a state constitutional issue involved too.  However, he 
cites only federal law to identify the fundamental liberty 
interest he claims the State violated.  Accordingly, we conclude 
that the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
is the foundation for his argument.  The Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment has been held to protect certain 
unstated 
fundamental 
rights, 
including 
those 
relating 
to 
parent/child relationships.  See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 
246, 255 (1978) (instructing that it is only when a parent has a 
substantial relationship with his or her child that he or she 
has 
a 
fundamental 
liberty 
interest 
in 
the 
society 
and 
companionship of the child that is protected by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
No. 
03-2440 thru 03-2446   
 
10 
 
the statute is an invalid rule because it is so sweeping that it 
may be used to terminate parental rights without a finding of 
parental unfitness, as is required by Stanley v. Illinois, 405 
U.S. 645 (1972).   
¶16 Generally, a challenged statute is presumed to be 
constitutional.  Cole, 264 Wis. 2d 520, ¶11; Lounge Mgmt., Ltd. 
v. Town of Trenton, 219 Wis. 2d 13, 20, 580 N.W.2d 156 (1998); 
State v. Konrath, 218 Wis. 2d 290, 302, 577 N.W.2d 601 (1998).  
This presumption is based on our respect for a co-equal branch 
of government and is meant to promote due deference to 
legislative acts.  Cole, 264 Wis. 2d 520, ¶18.  "[E]very 
presumption must be indulged to sustain the law."  Jackson v. 
Benson, 218 Wis. 2d 835, 853, 578 N.W.2d 602 (1998); accord 
Cole, 264 Wis. 2d 520, ¶11.  
¶17 The 
court 
must 
resolve 
any 
doubt 
about 
the 
constitutionality of a statute in favor of upholding its 
constitutionality.  Kelli B., 271 Wis. 2d 51, ¶16; Cole, 264 
Wis. 2d 520, ¶11.  Further, "'[g]iven a choice of reasonable 
interpretations of a statute, this court must select the 
construction which results in constitutionality.'"  American 
Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 222 Wis. 2d 
650, 667, 586 N.W.2d 872 (1998) (quoting State ex rel. 
Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 526, 261 N.W.2d 434 
(1978)).  
¶18 A party challenging a statute's constitutionality 
bears 
a 
heavy 
burden 
to 
overcome 
the 
presumption 
of 
constitutionality.  Dowhower v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 2000 WI 
No. 
03-2440 thru 03-2446   
 
11 
 
73, ¶10, 236 Wis. 2d 113, 613 N.W.2d 557.  Therefore, it is 
insufficient for the party challenging the statute to establish 
either that the statute's constitutionality is doubtful or that 
the statute is probably unconstitutional.  Cole, 264 Wis. 2d 
520, ¶11; Jackson, 218 Wis. 2d at 853.  Instead, a party 
challenging a statute's constitutionality must demonstrate that 
the statute is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Cole, 264 Wis. 2d 520, ¶11; Jackson, 218 Wis. 2d at 853; 
Konrath, 218 Wis. 2d at 302.  While this language implies the 
evidentiary burden of proof most commonly used for factual 
determinations in a criminal case, in this context, the phrase, 
"beyond a reasonable doubt," establishes the force or conviction 
with which a court must conclude, as a matter of law, that a 
statute 
is 
unconstitutional 
before 
the 
statute 
or 
its 
application can be set aside.  See Guzman v. St. Francis Hosp., 
Inc., 2001 WI App 21, ¶4 n.3, 240 Wis. 2d 559, 623 N.W.2d 776.   
C. 
Substantive Due Process 
¶19 P.P.'s 
constitutional 
challenge 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.415(4) is based on substantive due process.4  The right to 
substantive 
due 
process 
addresses 
"the 
content 
of 
what 
government may do to people under the guise of the law."  
Reginald D. v. State, 193 Wis. 2d 299, 307, 533 N.W.2d 181 
(1995).  It protects against governmental action that either 
                                                 
4 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution provides in part that no state shall 
"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law."  U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.  See also Wis. 
Const. art. 1, §§ 1 and 8.  
No. 
03-2440 thru 03-2446   
 
12 
 
"shocks the conscience . . . or interferes with rights implicit 
in the concept of ordered liberty."  State v. Jorgensen, 2003 WI 
105, ¶33, 264 Wis. 2d 157, 667 N.W.2d 318 (quotation omitted); 
see also State v. Laxton, 2002 WI 82, ¶10 n.8, 254 Wis. 2d 185, 
647 N.W.2d 784.  The right of substantive due process protects 
against a state act that is arbitrary, wrong or oppressive, 
regardless of whether the procedures applied to implement the 
action were fair.  Kelli B., 271 Wis. 2d 51, ¶19 (citation 
omitted).   
 
¶20 The threshold inquiry here is whether P.P. has a 
fundamental liberty interest at stake.  Id., ¶20; see Dowhower, 
236 Wis. 2d 113, ¶14.  DCDHS does not contest P.P.'s assertion 
that he has a fundamental liberty interest in parenting his 
children.  Therefore, any statute that impinges on that right 
must withstand strict scrutiny.  Kelli B., 271 Wis. 2d 51, ¶24.  
In order to withstand strict scrutiny, a statute must be 
narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest.  Id., 
¶25.  Here, the compelling state interest is to protect children 
from unfit parents.  Id.  Accordingly, the statutory scheme at 
issue must be narrowly tailored to advance the State's interest 
in protecting children from unfit parents.  See id., ¶17; 
Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Darrell A., 194 Wis. 2d 
627, 639, 534 N.W.2d 907 (Ct. App. 1995).   
¶21 The legislature has explained that this compelling 
state interest includes a temporal component.  For example, in 
explaining its legislative purposes for enacting the Children's 
No. 
03-2440 thru 03-2446   
 
13 
 
Code, of which Wis. Stat. § 48.415(4) is a part, the legislature 
provided that:  
[t]he 
courts 
and 
agencies responsible 
for 
child 
welfare should . . . recognize that instability and 
impermanence in family relationships are contrary to 
the welfare of children and should therefore recognize 
the importance of eliminating the need for children to 
wait unreasonable periods of time for their parents to 
correct the conditions that prevent their safe return 
to the family.    
Wis. Stat. § 48.01(a) (emphasis added).  The legislature further 
explained that one of the Children's Code's purposes is "[t]o 
promote the adoption of children into safe and stable families 
rather than allowing children to remain in the impermanence of 
foster . . . care."  Wis. Stat. § 48.01(1)(gg).    
D. 
Narrowly Tailored Statutory Scheme  
¶22 This 
case 
requires 
us 
to 
examine 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.424(4), which provides that a finding under Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.415(4) is sufficient to prove a parent is unfit.5  Because 
findings under § 48.415(4) are not possible without significant 
earlier findings, our examination must focus more broadly than 
simply on the specifically challenged statutes.  Accordingly, we 
review the underlying statutory scheme, as well.  
¶23 We begin where P.P. has, with the requirements of Wis. 
Stat. § 48.415(4), which provides that a "[continual] denial of 
periods of physical placement or visitation" is a ground for 
                                                 
5 A parent's fundamental right to the care and society of 
his or her child may not be terminated absent a finding that the 
parent is unfit.  Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972).  
No. 
03-2440 thru 03-2446   
 
14 
 
terminating parental rights.  A finding under § 48.415(4) 
requires that all of the following must be proved: 
(a) That the parent has been denied periods of 
physical placement by court order in an action 
affecting the family or has been denied visitation 
under an order under s. 48.345, 48.363, 48.365, 
938.345, 938.363 or 938.365 containing the notice 
required by s. 48.356(2) or 938.356(2). 
(b) That at least one year has elapsed since the 
order 
denying 
periods 
of 
physical 
placement 
or 
visitation 
was 
issued 
and 
the 
court 
has 
not 
subsequently modified its order so as to permit 
periods of physical placement or visitation. 
Wis. Stat. § 48.415(4). 
¶24 Having explained above that Wis. Stat. § 48.415(4) 
serves a compelling state interest, we next determine whether 
§ 48.415(4) is narrowly tailored to advance this interest.  P.P. 
asserts that 
§ 48.415(4) 
violates 
substantive due process 
because 
"it 
does 
not 
require 
any 
evidence 
of 
parental 
unfitness."  It is his contention that no-contact orders denying 
physical placement or visitation, such as have been in effect 
here, are based on the "best interest of the child," pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 48.355(3), rather than on a finding that the parent 
is unfit.  Therefore, he contends that because these orders are 
the sole basis for a finding that grounds exist for terminating 
his parental rights pursuant to § 48.415(4), the statute is not 
narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest and 
violates his substantive due process right.   
¶25 At oral argument, P.P. also argued that Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.415(4) should require the court to make a finding as to the 
No. 
03-2440 thru 03-2446   
 
15 
 
reasons a parent failed to have the order modified during the 
one year, or more, when it has been in effect.  However, 
§ 48.415(4) is not facially invalid on this basis because we do 
not preclude an as-applied substantive due process challenge to 
the statutory scheme underlying § 48.415(4) so that the reasons 
for failing to modify the order denying visitation or physical 
placement may be explored, in a proper case.  However, P.P. pled 
no contest to the ground asserted to terminate his parental 
rights, and in so doing, he relinquished his right to test the 
validity of the order that denied him visitation and periods of 
physical placement with his children.  Accordingly, we do not 
reach the question of whether an as-applied challenge to the 
validity of a § 48.415(4) order will lie.6 
¶26 Further, in regard to the statutory scheme being 
narrowly tailored, DCDHS and the amicus curiae argue that there 
                                                 
6 In his brief, P.P. cites Steven V. v. Kelley H., 2004 WI 
47, 271 Wis. 2d 1, 678 N.W.2d 856, for the proposition that 
there is "no defense to § 48.415(4) based on [a] parent's 
explanation for noncompliance with the order."  However, the 
Steven V. decision was grounded in procedural due process 
rights, not a substantive due process right.  Steven V., 271 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶23, 40 n.6.  Thus, in Steven V., we were not 
addressing whether Wis. Stat. § 48.415(4) was narrowly tailored 
sufficient to satisfy substantive due process in an individual 
case.  See id.  Here, P.P.'s constitutional challenge is based 
on substantive due process grounds.  Had he chosen to raise a 
defense to the ground set out in § 48.415(4) in circuit court, 
he may have put himself in a position to raise an as-applied 
challenge to § 48.415(4) on a substantive due process basis on 
appeal.  However, he chose to plead no contest to the petition 
to terminate his parental rights, thereby admitting the ground 
alleged.  However, neither Steven V., nor this decision, 
forecloses the possibility of an as-applied substantive due 
process challenge to § 48.415(4) in the future. 
No. 
03-2440 thru 03-2446   
 
16 
 
are required steps that must be taken before reaching the 
application of Wis. Stat. § 48.415(4) in a termination of 
parental rights case and those steps form the foundation for the 
ultimate finding in subsection (4).  They cite the following 
step-by-step process:  (1) there is an initial decision to hold 
a child in governmental custody; (2) if the child is held in 
custody, then there must be a factual determination that the 
child is in need of protection or services before the next step 
will be reached; (3) if a child is found in need of protection 
or services, then the decision about whether to place the child 
outside the parental home is made; (4) if the child is placed 
outside 
the 
home, 
only 
after 
finding 
that 
parent–child 
visitation or physical placement would be harmful to the child 
may a parent be denied visitation and physical placement; and 
(5) if an order denying visitation and physical placement is 
entered, it must contain conditions that when met will permit 
the parent to request a revision of the order to afford 
visitation or periods of physical placement.  DCDHS and the 
amicus curiae submit that at each of these steps, findings must 
be made that reflect on the parent's fitness.   We agree that 
the statutory step-by-step process that underlies § 48.415(4) is 
sufficient to show that subsection (4) is narrowly tailored to 
advance the State's compelling interest of protecting children 
against unfit parents, and to demonstrate this, we outline how 
this scheme was applied in P.P.'s case.   
¶27 In the first step, a petition was filed, alleging 
probable cause to believe that the children were in need of 
No. 
03-2440 thru 03-2446   
 
17 
 
protection or services (CHIPS).  It claimed neglect and severe 
abuse of the children.  The children were placed in foster care 
on March 21, 2001, after P.P.'s arrest for sexually assaulting 
one of the children.7   
¶28 Because the children were not released after they were 
initially taken into custody,8 a hearing was held to find whether 
the children should remain in custody, based upon whether 
probable cause existed, sufficient to prove one of the criteria 
listed in Wis. Stat. § 48.205(1).9  While not every ground listed 
at § 48.205(1) necessarily goes to a parent's unfitness, the 
present case would appear to fit squarely within the criteria 
listed at § 48.205(1)(a)-(am),10 requiring that probable cause 
                                                 
7 A child may initially be held in governmental custody, 
which Wis. Stat. § 48.207(1)(c) explains includes foster care, 
only when there is probable cause to believe that one of the 
criteria enumerated under Wis. Stat. § 48.205(1) exists. 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.205(1) provides that an intake worker 
determine whether a child may be held based on probable cause to 
believe that the child is within the court's jurisdiction and 
probable cause to believe that one of several enumerated grounds 
exists.  These grounds include concerns for the safety of the 
child.  
9 This hearing must be held within 48 hours of the decision 
to hold a child, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and legal 
holidays.  Wis. Stat. § 48.21(1)(a). 
10 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§§ 48.205(1), 
48.205(1)(a), 
and 
48.205(1)(am) state: 
(1) A child may be held under s. 48.207(1) . . . 
if the intake worker determines that there is probable 
cause to believe the child is within the jurisdiction 
of the court and: 
No. 
03-2440 thru 03-2446   
 
18 
 
exists that the child will be subject to injury if not held in 
governmental custody.  There is nothing in the record to 
indicate that P.P. contested the determination that his children 
be placed outside his home for their safety. 
¶29 P.P.'s children were adjudicated CHIPS on July 18, 
2001, which required that a fact-finding hearing have been held 
under Wis. Stat. § 48.31.  Wisconsin Stat. § 48.27 requires that 
parents 
be 
provided 
notice 
of 
the 
hearing. 
 
A 
CHIPS 
determination may not be made unless one of the 14 grounds 
described in Wis. Stat. § 48.13 is found.  Each of those grounds 
defines some type of parental abandonment, abuse, neglect, or 
inability to care for the child.  These allegations have to be 
proven by clear and convincing evidence.  Wis. Stat. § 48.31(1).  
Again, the record does not indicate that P.P. challenged the 
factual findings that were made.  
¶30 P.P.'s children remained in foster care after the 
CHIPS adjudication, due to a subsequent dispositional hearing 
held pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 48.335.  At the dispositional 
hearing in a CHIPS case, the court may order that placement of a 
child be transferred outside the parental home "only when there 
                                                                                                                                                             
(a) Probable cause exists to believe that if the 
child is not held he or she will cause injury to 
himself or herself or be subject to injury by others. 
(am) Probable cause exists to believe that if the 
child is not held he or she will be subject to injury 
by others, based on a determination under par. (a) or 
a finding under 48.21(4) that if another child in the 
home is not held that child will be subject to injury 
by others. 
No. 
03-2440 thru 03-2446   
 
19 
 
is no less drastic alternative."  Wis. Stat. § 48.355(1).  A 
dispositional order that places a child outside the home must 
contain a finding that placing the child in the parental home 
would be "contrary to the welfare of the child" and, unless 
limited circumstances exist that are not present in this case, a 
finding that the relevant social service agency made reasonable 
efforts to prevent the child's removal from the home.  Wis. 
Stat. § 48.355(2)(b)6.  In P.P.'s case, the October 31, 2002 
revised and extended dispositional order indicated that the 
children were removed from their parents' home because of 
physical and sexual abuse by P.P. and severe neglect by both 
parents.  The order also required that the name and address of 
each child's placement be withheld from P.P., which may be done 
only if the court finds that such a disclosure would result "in 
imminent danger" to the child or foster parents, Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.355(2)(b)2.  While Justice Butler's dissent is correct that 
this finding was made during a hearing where the best interest 
of the child is the controlling standard, Justice Butler's 
dissent, ¶88, it was also grounded in a lack of fitness on the 
part of P.P.  Here, the finding was based on P.P.'s sexual 
assault and extreme abuse of his own children.  Therefore, this 
finding supports the ultimate determination that P.P. was an 
unfit parent.  However, once again, the record does not indicate 
that P.P. contested these determinations. 
¶31 Because an out-of-home placement of the children was 
ordered, the issue of parental visitation arose.  Except under 
enumerated circumstances, a visitation determination may be made 
No. 
03-2440 thru 03-2446   
 
20 
 
only after a hearing with due notice to the parent.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.355(3).  The court has the discretion, based on the best 
interests of the child, to set reasonable rules regarding 
parental visitation within the dispositional order.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.355(3)(a).  In the present case, the court denied P.P. 
visitation with the children, and the court provided conditions 
that had to be met before visitation could be granted.  Under 
Wis. Stat. § 48.363(1)(a), a parent may request a revision of 
the dispositional order, which would include a revision of the 
court-imposed rules regarding visitation.  The record does not 
show that P.P. contested the denial of visitation or the 
conditions imposed, or that he moved the court to revise these 
visitation rules.11 
¶32 Only after all the above described steps took place, 
was P.P. faced with a fact-finding hearing on whether a ground 
for terminating his parental rights existed under Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.415(4).  The findings that are required for a court to 
proceed against a parent at each of the steps prior to the final 
step under § 48.415(4) involve an evaluation of a parent's 
fitness.  It is the cumulative effect of the determinations made 
                                                 
11 One of the conditions for the resumption of visitation 
was that P.P. not be incarcerated.  Justice Butler's dissent 
asks, "Will this now become an independent ground to terminate 
the rights of parents convicted of felonies with sentences in 
excess of a year?"  Justice Butler's dissent, ¶91 n.8.  The 
grounds for termination are established by the legislature.  
However, the order requiring that a parent not be incarcerated 
is set by a court; this same court can modify that order on the 
motion of a parent.  Wis. Stat. § 48.363(1)(a). 
No. 
03-2440 thru 03-2446   
 
21 
 
at each of the previous steps that causes the finding made under 
§ 48.415(4) to amount to unfitness.  Looked at another way, this 
series of steps acts as a funnel, making smaller and smaller the 
group of parents whose relationships with their children are 
affected at each step, until only a very small number of parents 
would be affected by § 48.415(4).  Accordingly, § 48.415(4) 
cannot be evaluated for a claimed constitutional infirmity in 
isolation.  The full statutory scheme that precedes the 
implementation of § 48.415(4) must be evaluated as well.  
Therefore, it is with consideration of this statutory scheme 
underlying the ground stated in § 48.415(4), that we conclude 
that on its face § 48.415(4) is narrowly tailored to serve the 
State's compelling interest of protecting children from unfit 
parents, including the temporal component in this interest that 
promotes children's welfare through stability and permanency in 
their lives.  In our view, P.P. has not proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the statutory scheme either shocks the 
conscience or interferes with a right implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty. 
¶33 Further, the application of Wis. Stat. § 48.415(4) to 
P.P.'s case demonstrates that there is at least one possible 
interpretation 
and 
application 
of 
the 
statute 
that 
is 
constitutional, as we have described above, in its application 
to P.P.  Accordingly, we have been provided with further 
evidence that § 48.415(4), on its face, is not unconstitutional 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Cole, 264 Wis. 2d 520, ¶30 
(concluding that when there is an application or interpretation 
No. 
03-2440 thru 03-2446   
 
22 
 
of the statute that is constitutional, the statute is not 
unconstitutional on its face). 
¶34 P.P. 
had 
multiple 
opportunities 
to 
contest 
the 
determinations made at each fact-finding stage in the statutory 
scheme that was employed in advance of the termination of his 
parental rights.  He chose not to contest any of these predicate 
steps.  Instead, he pled no contest to the allegation that Wis. 
Stat. § 48.415(4) provided a ground for terminating his parental 
rights.  Accordingly, the record supports the conclusion of Wis. 
Stat. § 48.424(4) that P.P. is an unfit parent.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶35 Because we conclude that P.P.'s parental rights were 
terminated by use of a statutory scheme that does require a 
showing of unfitness before termination of parental rights can 
occur, that such a showing was made and that P.P. did not 
contest the validity of the order that formed the basis for the 
State's petition, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No. 03-2440 thru 03-2446.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶36 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring).  I substantially 
agree with the analysis in the majority opinion.  I write 
separately to address the two dissents and to disavow judicial 
efforts to tamper with the termination of parental rights (TPR) 
statutes. 
I. BACKGROUND 
¶37 In his brief, the petitioner states the issue as 
whether Wis. Stat. § 48.415(4) is unconstitutional on its face 
"because 
it 
does 
not 
require 
any 
evidence 
of 
parental 
unfitness," and this hypothesis attracts the two dissents.  In 
my view, the hypothesis is mistaken because the statutory scheme 
is designed to expose and establish parental unfitness. 
¶38 In Wisconsin, the definition of "unfitness" is not up 
for interpretation on a case-by-case basis.  The legislature has 
defined unfitness by establishing multiple statutory "grounds" 
for 
the 
termination 
of 
parental 
rights. 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. § 48.415.  These grounds include abandonment, child 
abuse, failure to assume parental responsibility, and commission 
of a serious felony against one of the parent's children.  Some 
of the grounds in the statute, such as child abuse, are self-
evident; others require close examination of the requisite 
elements in the context of the overall statutory scheme. 
¶39 The termination of P.P.'s parental rights was based on 
Wis. Stat. § 48.415(4), 
"Continuing 
Denial 
of 
Periods 
of 
Physical Placement or Visitation."  The majority opinion 
carefully explains the basis for this ground and the elements 
that the government must prove at a fact-finding hearing.  The 
No. 03-2440 thru 03-2446.dtp 
 
2 
 
opinion correctly observes that "findings under § 48.415(4) are 
not possible without significant earlier findings," majority 
op., ¶22, and it recounts the steps leading up to the fact-
finding hearing on that ground.  See Wis. Stat. § 48.424. 
¶40 The record in this case illuminates the basic points 
of government interaction with a parent prior to a termination 
proceeding.  A TPR case usually unfolds in the following manner. 
¶41 First, a child is taken into custody under a judicial 
order made upon a satisfactory showing that "the welfare of the 
child demands that the child be immediately removed from his or 
her present custody," Wis. Stat. § 48.19(1)(c), or by a law 
enforcement 
officer 
who 
"believes 
on 
reasonable 
grounds . . . that [t]he child is suffering from illness or 
injury or is in immediate danger from his or her surroundings 
and 
removal 
from 
those 
surroundings 
is 
necessary."  
Wis. Stat. § 48.19(1)(d)5.  The person taking the child into 
custody "shall immediately attempt to notify the parent," and 
this effort must be continued by one person or another until the 
parent is notified.  Wis. Stat. § 48.19(2).  The parent is told 
of the reasons for holding the child in custody and informed of 
the 
time 
and 
place 
of 
a 
detention 
hearing.  
Wis. Stat. § 48.20(8).  The parent is told of the possible 
consequences of that hearing and of the right to present and 
cross-examine witnesses.  Id.  The purpose of notification is to 
alert the parent to the forthcoming opportunity to review and 
dispute government action. 
No. 03-2440 thru 03-2446.dtp 
 
3 
 
¶42 Second, the court conducts a detention hearing for a 
child in custody.  Wis. Stat. § 48.21.  This hearing is preceded 
by a petition that identifies the purpose of the hearing, 
especially a claim that the child is in need of protection or 
services.  Wis. Stat. § 48.21(3).  At the hearing, the court 
must find probable cause to continue custody on one of the bases 
listed 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 48.205. 
 
Wis. Stat. § 48.21(4).  
"Reasonable restrictions may be placed upon the conduct of the 
parent . . . which may be necessary to ensure the safety of the 
child."  Wis. Stat. § 48.21(4)(a).  A judicial decision to 
maintain custody of the child must list the reasons and criteria 
forming the basis for the decision and a finding "that continued 
placement of the child in his or her home would be contrary to 
the welfare of the child."  Wis. Stat. § 48.21(5)(a) and (b)1. 
¶43 Third, the court eventually holds a more complete 
fact-finding hearing to determine whether the allegations in the 
petition——that a child is in need of protection or services——are 
proved by clear and convincing evidence.  Wis. Stat. § 48.31(1).  
The child's parent may demand a jury for this hearing.  
Wis. Stat. § 48.31(2). 
¶44 Fourth, if the fact-finder determines by clear and 
convincing evidence at the fact-finding hearing that the child 
is in need of protection or services, the court then conducts a 
"dispositional" 
hearing 
to 
determine 
disposition.  
Wis. Stat. § 48.335(1).  This hearing follows the preparation of 
a court-ordered report that provides recommendations to the 
court from an appropriate agency.  Wis. Stat. § 48.33.  The 
No. 03-2440 thru 03-2446.dtp 
 
4 
 
report must address, in detail, any recommendation that the 
child be placed outside the home.  Wis. Stat. § 48.33(4).  At 
the dispositional hearing, the parent may present evidence to 
challenge 
the 
recommendation 
and 
may 
make 
alternative 
recommendations.  Wis. Stat. § 48.335(3). 
¶45 Fifth, 
the 
court 
makes 
a 
disposition.  
Wis. Stat. § 48.345. 
 
If 
the 
government 
shows 
that 
the 
rehabilitation or treatment of the child "cannot be accomplished 
by means of voluntary consent of the parent," the court may 
transfer 
custody of the 
child to 
a 
relative, 
a 
county 
department, 
or 
a 
licensed 
child 
welfare 
agency.  
Wis. Stat. § 48.345(4).  "When appropriate . . . the family unit 
shall be preserved and there shall be a policy of transferring 
custody of a child from the parent . . . only where there is no 
less drastic alternative."  Wis. Stat. § 48.355(1). 
¶46 Sixth, a disposition order shall include written 
findings of fact and conclusions of law based on the evidence 
presented to the court.  Wis. Stat. § 48.355(2).  If the child 
is placed outside the home, the court shall make a written 
finding "that continued placement of the child in his or her 
home 
would 
be 
contrary 
to 
the 
welfare 
of 
the 
child."  
Wis. Stat. § 48.355(2)(b)6.  "The court shall make the findings 
specified in this subdivision on a case-by-case basis based on 
circumstances specific to the child and shall document or 
reference the specific information on which those findings are 
based in the court order."  Id. 
No. 03-2440 thru 03-2446.dtp 
 
5 
 
¶47 Seventh, in most circumstances, the court must make a 
finding that the government agency responsible for providing 
services under a court order "has made reasonable efforts to 
prevent the removal of the child from his or her home, while 
assuring . . . the child's health and safety," or has made 
reasonable efforts to achieve the goal of the child's permanency 
plan.  That goal may be to return the child to the home.  Id.; 
Wis. Stat. § 48.355(2c). 
¶48 Eighth, when a child is placed outside the home, the 
court may deny or limit visitation.  Wis. Stat. § 48.355(2c)(b), 
and § 48.356(1).  The basis for this determination must be 
explained. 
¶49 Ninth, the court has a duty to warn the parent of a 
child placed outside the home of any potential grounds for 
termination of parental rights under Wis. Stat. § 48.415 "and of 
the conditions necessary for the child . . . to be returned to 
the home 
or 
for 
the parent to 
be 
granted 
visitation."  
Wis. Stat. § 48.356(1). 
II. APPLICATION 
 
¶50 In this case, the county settled on "Continuing Denial 
of Periods of Physical Placement or Visitation" as the ground on 
which 
it 
sought 
termination 
of 
P.P.'s 
parental 
rights.  
Wis. Stat. § 48.415(4).12  This statute provides that a parent is 
                                                 
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.415(4) provides: 
 
(4) Continuing Denial of Periods of Physical 
Placement or Visitation.  Continuing denial of periods 
of physical placement or visitation, which shall be 
established by proving all of the following: 
No. 03-2440 thru 03-2446.dtp 
 
6 
 
unfit (1) if the parent has been denied physical placement of 
the child or visitation with the child by court order; (2) at 
least one year has elapsed since the court issued the order; and 
(3) the court has not modified the order so as to permit periods 
of physical placement or visitation.  Wis. Stat. § 48.415(4). 
 
¶51 As noted in ¶¶41-49, the steps leading up to a 
petition under § 48.415(4) are elaborate.  P.P. does not contend 
that these steps were not followed in his case.  All steps 
outlined above preceded the petition to terminate P.P.'s 
parental rights, and all steps would have preceded a fact-
finding 
hearing 
on 
the 
termination 
petition 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 48.424, if P.P. had not entered a no contest plea 
and admitted the asserted ground. 
 
¶52 It should be obvious that the statutes entitle a 
parent to notice of virtually every step in the lengthy 
proceedings.  The statutes also afford a parent the right to 
challenge in court a child's continued custody, a child's 
placement outside the home, and any restrictions on the parent's 
visitation.  P.P. does not allege that the government failed to 
inform him of any step in the proceedings, or prevented him from 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
(a) That the parent has been denied periods of 
physical placement by court order in an action 
affecting the family or has been denied visitation 
under an order under s. 48.345, 48.363, 48.365, 
938.345, 938.363 or 938.365 containing the notice 
required by s. 48.356(2) or 938.356(2). 
 
(b) That at least one year has elapsed since the 
order 
denying 
periods 
of 
physical 
placement 
or 
visitation 
was 
issued 
and 
the 
court 
has 
not 
subsequently modified its order so as to permit 
periods of physical placement or visitation. 
No. 03-2440 thru 03-2446.dtp 
 
7 
 
challenging government action at any point.  He did not invoke 
his right to a jury trial when that right was afforded; he 
failed to ask for reconsideration or modification of any 
judicial order; and he did not seek judicial review.   
¶53 If a parent fails to exercise his or her rights to 
challenge government action, how can the parent complain that an 
unchallenged court-ordered separation of parent and child for at 
least a year does not provide evidence of the parent's 
unfitness?  The reasons for the separation are in the record, 
and the failure to seek a change in circumstances is proof of 
the parent's unfitness.13  The parent has no legitimate complaint 
unless the parent can point to some specific procedural 
deficiency such as a failure to provide timely notice, some 
fundamental unfairness in a condition set by the court, or some 
excusable error, explainable inadvertence, or impossibility in 
making a timely challenge or in meeting the conditions for 
placement or visitation.  A year is a long time for a fit parent 
to do nothing. 
¶54 If a parent has in fact exercised his or her right to 
challenge one or more of the prior judicial determinations, then 
the record will show why those efforts did not succeed.   
                                                 
13 Chief Justice Abrahamson's dissent states that this 
concurrence "infers" a finding of unfitness.  Chief Justice 
Abrahamson's 
dissent, 
¶73. 
 
This 
is 
not 
correct. 
 
In 
Wis. Stat. § 48.415 the legislature has explicitly defined the 
grounds meriting a finding of unfitness, and the circuit court 
explicitly found P.P. unfit under § 48.415(4) after he pled no 
contest.  Having made a finding in line with the statute, the 
circuit court had no obligation to make a duplicative finding of 
unfitness apart from the statute. 
No. 03-2440 thru 03-2446.dtp 
 
8 
 
¶55 The 
statutory scheme 
is 
replete 
with 
procedural 
safeguards.  As the majority opinion explains, a child is 
entitled to parental involvement and support.  The legislature 
has determined that a parent's unwillingness or inability to be 
involved with a child, after a necessity-based court order to 
separate the child from the parent, is compelling evidence of 
the parent's unfitness. 
III. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
¶56 The statutory scheme is sound.  What is troublesome 
are judicial interpretations that (1) deprive a parent of the 
right to a jury trial in circumstances where a circuit judge 
determines that no material facts are in dispute; or (2) 
preclude the parent from ever offering any factual defense at 
the fact-finding hearing on a § 48.415(4) ground. 
¶57 The first concern was discussed in my dissent in 
Steven V. v. Kelley H., 2004 WI 47, ¶¶63-100, 271 Wis. 2d 1, 678 
N.W.2d 856 (Prosser, J., dissenting).  My view was that a parent 
had the right to a jury trial at the hearing to establish 
grounds for termination of parental rights, not because the 
constitution requires it but because the legislature had always 
made the right to trial by jury in termination cases a 
fundamental part of the prescribed procedure.  To conclude 
otherwise, this court disregarded more than a century of 
statutory law and overruled Walworth County Department of Human 
Services v. Elizabeth W., 189 Wis. 2d 432, 525 N.W.2d 384 (Ct. 
App. 1994). 
No. 03-2440 thru 03-2446.dtp 
 
9 
 
¶58 The second concern was also discussed in my Steven V. 
dissent at ¶¶93-98.  The majority concluded that unfitness 
determinations could conclusively flow from "certain existing 
court orders."  Steven V., 271 Wis. 2d 1, ¶39.  The Chief 
Justice added in her concurrence that the termination court 
could not consider reasons why the disposition court did not 
modify an order denying placement or visitation.  Steven V., 271 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶56 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring). 
¶59 There appears to be a relationship between summary 
judgment replacing trial by jury and the court-created barrier 
to offering a factual defense to a § 48.415(4) ground.  It is 
much easier to deny a jury trial on the basis that no material 
facts are in dispute when one first concludes that the 
legislature has insisted that a court may not consider any 
facts, explanations, or defenses to a § 48.415(4) ground "to 
defeat the determination of unfitness once [that] ground has 
been 
found." 
 
Id. 
 
Of 
course, 
I 
disagree 
with 
this 
interpretation of the legislature's intent. 
¶60 As I see it, if a parent is able to show a fundamental 
flaw in the procedure leading up to a termination petition under 
§ 48.415(4), the parent must have an opportunity to bring that 
flaw to the attention of the termination court before the court 
or jury makes a finding on this ground for unfitness.  If a 
parent is able to show that it was impossible or completely 
unreasonable to comply with the court order, the parent must 
have an opportunity to present that evidence.  Failure to 
provide such an opportunity is not only unfair but also 
No. 03-2440 thru 03-2446.dtp 
 
10 
 
implicates the parent's due process right to present a defense.  
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967); see also State v. 
Heft, 185 Wis. 2d 288, 303, 517 N.W.2d 494 (1994).  While it is 
true that the "strict constitutional safeguards afforded to 
criminal defendants are not applicable to civil cases," basic 
due process rights often apply in civil proceedings.  BMW of N. 
Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574-75 n.22 (1996) (protection 
against judgment without notice applies in civil proceedings); 
Reed v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 749, 750 (6th Cir. 
1979).  The Supreme Court has also characterized the due process 
right as "an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in 
a meaningful manner."  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 
(1976).  The fact-finding hearing on unfitness is certainly a 
"meaningful time." 
¶61 The majority apparently recognizes that a parent with 
a factual defense must be heard in some way because it allows 
the parent to bring an as-applied constitutional challenge to 
the statute.  Majority op., ¶25 n.6.  But an as-applied 
challenge 
is 
an 
inadequate 
remedy. 
 
At 
the 
termination 
proceeding, the county must prove unfitness by clear and 
convincing evidence.  Wis. Stat. § 48.415; see also Santosky v. 
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769-70 (1982).  By contrast, in an as-
applied constitutional challenge, this court "begin[s] with the 
presumption that the statute is constitutional and resolve[s] 
any doubt [in favor] of upholding its constitutionality."  
Monroe County Dep't of Human Servs. v. Kelli B., 2004 WI 48, 
No. 03-2440 thru 03-2446.dtp 
 
11 
 
¶16, 271 Wis. 2d 51, 678 N.W.2d 831.  This shift in the burden 
of proof is not fair to the parent.14   
¶62 The court's continued insistence on denying the parent 
an opportunity to present a factual defense to a § 48.415(4) 
petition is also bad policy.  It is not good practice to invite 
as-applied 
constitutional 
challenges. 
 
Writing 
in another 
context, Justice Blackmun once criticized the Supreme Court's 
characterization of an attack on a statute as an "as-applied 
challenge" because, he said, "the Court risks misdirecting the 
litigants and the lower courts toward piecemeal litigation 
continuing indefinitely throughout the life of the [statute]."  
Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 627-28 (1988) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting).  I fear a similar outcome here.  This court should 
not encourage satellite litigation.  It could avoid doing so by 
allowing a parent to present at the termination hearing factual 
evidence relevant to the parent's prior failure to challenge an 
order denying placement or visitation rights.  This evidence 
could be tightly screened rather than absolutely excluded. 
¶63 In addition, reasonable people agree that "persons 
faced with forced dissolution of their parental rights have a 
more critical need for procedural protections than do those 
                                                 
14 In Monroe County Department of Human Services v. Kelli 
B., 2004 WI 48, ¶1, 271 Wis. 2d 51, 678 N.W.2d 831, the court 
held Wis. Stat. § 48.415(7) unconstitutional as applied.  Part 
of my concern in that case was that this court made certain 
assumptions about the facts, relieving the parent challenging 
the statute of her burden of proof and disregarding the facts in 
the record, including the circuit court's findings.  Compare the 
procedure outlined in State v. Hamdan, 2003 WI 113, ¶¶86-88, 264 
Wis. 2d 433, 665 N.W.2d 785. 
No. 03-2440 thru 03-2446.dtp 
 
12 
 
resisting state intervention into ongoing family affairs.  When 
the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must 
provide 
the 
parents 
with 
fundamentally 
fair 
procedures."  
Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753-54.  The inconvenience——if such it is—
—of allowing the parent to present evidence why he or she could 
not challenge or comply with the court order pales in comparison 
to this fundamental right.   
¶64 My interest in writing is to protect parents and to 
sustain the TPR statutes.  Interpretations that curtail parental 
protections can only hurt the statutes in the long run.  I 
therefore respectfully concur. 
 
No.  03-2440 thru 03-2446.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶65 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   (concurring).  While I 
join in the majority opinion in all respects, I write separately 
to explain the use of language that appears to have originated 
in United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), and has 
continued through many of Wisconsin's appellate cases where a 
constitutional challenge is made on a facial, rather than an as-
applied, basis.  We have said, "A 'facial' challenge to the 
constitutionality of a statute means that the 'challenger must 
establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there are no possible 
applications or interpretations of the statute which would be 
constitutional.'"  State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶30, 264 Wis. 2d 
520, 665 N.W.2d 328.15  
¶66 A 
number 
of 
Wisconsin 
appellate 
opinions 
have 
described constitutional challenges that are made on a facial 
basis in the same way as we did in Cole.  See State v. Radke, 
2002 WI App 146, ¶4, 256 Wis. 2d 448, 647 N.W.2d 873; State v. 
Wanta, 224 Wis. 2d 679, 690, 592 N.W.2d 645 (Ct. App. 1999); 
State v. Ruesch, 214 Wis. 2d 548, 556, 571 N.W.2d 898 (Ct. App. 
1997).  However, some commentators, such as Michael Dorf, have 
seen the language from Salerno as imposing an impossible burden 
on the challenger, essentially one that cannot be met.  See 
Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal 
Statutes, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 235, 236-40 (1994) (questioning 
whether the United States Supreme Court has consistently applied 
                                                 
15 State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶30, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 
N.W.2d 328, cites State v. Wanta, 224 Wis. 2d 679, 690, 592 
N.W.2d 645 (Ct. App. 1999), and Wanta cites United States v. 
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). 
No.  03-2440 thru 03-2446.pdr 
 
2 
 
this standard from Salerno and questioning what the Supreme 
Court actually meant).  However, other writers question Dorf's 
reasoning and analysis of the language from Salerno.  See Alfred 
Hill, Some Realism About Facial Invalidation of Statutes, 30 
Hofstra L. Rev. 647, 677 (2002).  
¶67 In 
the 
context 
of 
a 
facial 
challenge 
to 
the 
constitutionality of a statute, Wisconsin courts have echoed, or 
in some cases ignored, the Salerno statement, without attempting 
to explain what the Supreme Court requires by way of analysis 
when a facial challenge to a statute is made under the 
provisions of the United States Constitution.16  However, I 
conclude that these differing approaches can be reconciled.  In 
that regard, I find persuasive Marc E. Isserles' comparison of 
the oft-quoted language from Salerno with the position of its 
critics.  Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth:  Facial 
Challenges and the Valid Rule Requirement, 48 Am. U. L. Rev. 359 
(1998).  Isserles explains that: (1) claiming a statute is 
unconstitutional in all applications necessarily includes the 
conclusion that it is unconstitutional as applied to the party 
before the court; and (2) Salerno does not set out a methodology 
under which a court is precluded from holding that a statute is 
unconstitutional unless the court determines that every possible 
statutory application is unconstitutional; rather, Salerno is 
descriptive of a statute that, when examined under the relevant 
                                                 
16 See Cole, 264 Wis. 2d 520, ¶30, where Salerno-type 
language is employed, but not explained, and State v. Hamdan, 
2003 WI 113, ¶¶5, 44, 264 Wis. 2d 433, 665 N.W.2d 785, where 
Salerno-type language is not employed and not explained. 
No.  03-2440 thru 03-2446.pdr 
 
3 
 
constitutional doctrines, but independent of particular factual 
applications, states an invalid rule of law.  Id. at 398-407.  
In my view, when Salerno is seen as descriptive of the end 
product of a court's reasoning, rather than as a test that 
rigidly sets the analysis that must be undertaken, the actual 
tasks engaged in by a court in a facial challenge are better 
understood.   
¶68 Therefore, the conclusion of the court that P.P. has 
not satisfied his burden to prove the statute unconstitutional 
beyond a reasonable doubt, i.e., that it is an invalid rule, is 
supported in part because P.P. has not shown that as to him the 
statute is unconstitutionally applied and in part because there 
is a reasonable construction of the statute as a part of a 
narrowly tailored statutory scheme that causes it to be a valid 
rule to protect children from unfit parents.  
¶69 Because I believe this explanation of Salerno's oft-
quoted language may help future litigants and courts analyze 
facial constitutional challenges, I have chosen to write 
separately.  
 
 
No.  03-2440 thru 03-2446.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶70 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  Hard 
cases make bad law.  This is a hard case because P.P. is a bad 
actor; he was convicted of child abuse of his children.  Chances 
are high that under the proper procedures he would be found an 
unfit parent.  
¶71 Nevertheless, 
P.P., 
like 
all 
other 
parents 
in 
termination of parental rights proceedings, is entitled to due 
process.  Due process is afforded to bad guys and good guys. 
That's our system.  When we deviate from the requirements of due 
process, all parents are harmed.  
¶72 Due 
process requires 
that 
before 
termination of 
parental rights, a circuit court must find by clear and 
convincing evidence that the parent is an unfit parent.  In 
Wisconsin, the legislature requires a court to find a parent 
unfit on proof of a statutory ground.  As I have stated 
previously, there may be situations when one of the statutory 
grounds for termination is met, but the facts do not justify a 
finding of parental unfitness.17  There's the problem. 
¶73 The circuit court found the statutory ground was met, 
but the circuit court did not otherwise explicitly determine 
P.P. to be an unfit parent.18  The majority opinion and Justice 
Prosser's 
concurring opinion 
infer 
such an 
individualized 
finding of this parent's unfitness from the "use of a statutory 
                                                 
17 Steven V. v. Kelly H., 2004 WI 47, ¶54, 271 Wis. 2d 1, 
678 N.W.2d 856 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring). 
18 Majority op., ¶32; Justice Prosser's concurrence, ¶53. 
No.  03-2440 thru 03-2446.ssa 
 
2 
 
scheme."19  Thus the majority opinion weakly concludes that "it 
is the cumulative effect of the determinations made at each of 
the previous steps that causes the finding under § 48.415(4) to 
amount to unfitness."20   
¶74 No matter how you slice and dice the statutory scheme 
used in the present case, nowhere can be found a circuit court's 
finding of the parent's individualized unfitness, aside from a 
finding that a statutory ground has been met.  
¶75 Like Justice Prosser, I too disavow judicial tampering 
with the TPR statutes21 in an effort to save them from being 
unconstitutional.  The majority opinion and Justice Prosser's 
concurring opinion present two such examples of tampering.  The 
majority opinion infers unfitness when there has not been an 
explicit finding of unfitness aside from a finding of a 
statutory ground.  Justice Prosser's concurring opinion would 
engraft a requirement that parents be allowed to present 
"evidence relevant to the parent's prior failure to challenge an 
order denying placement or visitation rights" in order to ensure 
the constitutionality of the TPR scheme.22  P.P. was denied this 
opportunity under the current TPR scheme, and both the majority 
opinion and Justice Prosser's concurring opinion tinker with the 
                                                 
19 Majority op., ¶¶1, 35; Justice Prosser's concurrence, 
¶¶41-49, 53. 
20 Majority op., ¶32 (emphasis added); see also Justice 
Prosser's concurrence, ¶¶41-49. 
21 Justice Prosser's concurrence, ¶36. 
22 Justice Prosser's concurrence, ¶62. 
No.  03-2440 thru 03-2446.ssa 
 
3 
 
TPR statutes in order to reach a constitutionally required 
individualized finding of unfitness.  
¶76 As I explained in my concurrence in Steven V. v. 
Kelley H., 2004 WI 47, ¶¶54-62, 271 Wis. 2d 1, 678 N.W.2d 856, 
and as the instant case further demonstrates,23 the legislature 
should revisit the statutes to ensure the legitimacy and 
constitutionality of the 
process 
for 
terminating parental 
rights.24   
¶77 With these comments, I join the dissent of Justice 
Louis B. Butler, Jr. 
¶78 I am authorized to state that Justice LOUIS B. BUTLER, 
JR. joins this dissent. 
 
 
                                                 
23 See, e.g., majority op., ¶25 n.6, indicating other 
challenges to § 48.415(4) a parent may bring in the future. 
24 See Wis. Stat. § 13.83(1), 13.93(2)(d).      
No.  03-2440 thru 03-2446.lbb 
 
1 
 
¶79 LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.  (dissenting).  The majority 
concludes that the record supports a finding that P.P. is an 
unfit parent.  P.P. may actually be an unfit parent, but what he 
has not had is an individualized judicial determination that he 
is an unfit parent.  Under this statutory scheme, not only is 
such a determination unnecessary, P.P. is now precluded from 
having a determination on that very issue.  While this state has 
a compelling interest to protect children from unfit parents, 
Wis. Stat. § 48.415(4) is not narrowly tailored to achieve that 
interest.  Accordingly, I dissent.  
I 
¶80 On August 12, the County filed a petition to terminate 
P.P.'s 
parental 
rights, 
alleging 
abandonment, 
see 
Wis. Stat. § 48.415(1), the children were in continuing need of 
protection or services, see § 48.415(2), and failure to assume 
parental responsibility, see § 48.415(6).  P.P. first appeared 
in court on September 6, 2002, for an initial hearing on the TPR 
petition, but because he does not speak or understand English, 
and because an interpreter did not appear, the court continued 
the hearing for cause.  P.P. did not attend the continued 
initial hearing on October 2, given his incarceration in Dodge 
County25 and a failure to provide sufficient time to arrange for 
him to appear by telephone.  The court again continued the 
hearing for cause.   
¶81 On October 29, P.P. appeared by telephone with an 
interpreter.  P.P. indicated he wanted counsel, and although 
                                                 
25 P.P.'s incarceration for felony child abuse may have 
affected the decisions on how to proceed below.  
No.  03-2440 thru 03-2446.lbb 
 
2 
 
P.P. qualified for public defender representation, he had yet to 
be appointed counsel due to the non-availability of private bar 
attorneys in the county who accepted TPR appointment cases.   
The court yet again adjourned the cases for cause until 
December 11. 
 
Meanwhile, 
P.P. 
was 
released 
from 
his 
incarceration on November 12.   
¶82 At the December 11 plea hearing, P.P. appeared by 
counsel,26 contested the petition's allegations, and requested a 
jury trial.  The court set a trial date for February 13 and 14, 
2003.   
¶83 On January 27, 2003, however, the County motioned the 
court to continue the trial date to February 25, asserting: 
It is in the interests of judicial economy to set 
an adjourned date for trial on the basis that trial 
would be greatly truncated after February 27, 2003.  
On February 27, 2003, one year will have elapsed since 
the court issued a denial of visitation for each 
parent which has not subsequently been modified to 
permit visitation.  Such an occurrence will establish 
an additional ground for termination of parental 
rights to be pled.  Proof to establish the ground of 
continuing 
denial 
of 
visitation, 
Wis. Stat. § 48.415(4), 
is 
almost 
perfunctory 
in 
nature, requiring only proof that the order was issued 
and a year has elapsed.  There is no affirmative 
defense to this ground.  (Emphasis added.) 
. . . . 
If the jury finds that the current petition was 
not proven, I would then file a new petition after 
2/27/03, pleading the continuing denial of visitation. 
. . . . 
                                                 
26 P.P. was in a halfway house and did not attend court 
because his probation agent was not given enough notice to 
arrange for transportation. 
No.  03-2440 thru 03-2446.lbb 
 
3 
 
The 
requested leave 
to 
amend requires 
only 
approximately 3 weeks and would not adversely impact 
the interests of the public in the prompt disposition 
of cases.  It will, in fact, enhance the interests of 
the public in the prompt disposition of cases as well 
as reduce expenses and time to the public by requiring 
only one day of trial.  (Emphasis added.) 
At the continued hearing on January 29, P.P.'s counsel advised 
the court he explained to P.P. that even if the continuing needs 
ground could be defeated, the County would file this new 
continuing denial of visitation ground in less than a month.  
Counsel indicated P.P. agreed that it made sense to adjourn the 
trial to concurrently contest both grounds.  The trial court 
adjourned the trial date for cause and placed the trial date 
outside the one-year marker to accommodate the State's impending 
amendment to the petition to include an allegation of continuing 
denial of visitation.  See Wis. Stat. § 48.415(4) 
¶84 On March 3, four days after the one-year anniversary 
of the trial court's order denying P.P. visitation rights, the 
County filed an amended petition, which dropped the abandonment 
charge, retained the allegation that the children were in 
continuing need of protection and services, and included the 
"perfunctory" continuing denial of visitation ground.  A hearing 
on the amended petition was continued on March 11, due to the 
unavailability of an interpreter, and on March 25, again due to 
the unavailability of an interpreter and because P.P. had been 
taken into custody by Immigration and Naturalization Services.  
¶85 On April 16, P.P.'s attorney denied the amended 
petition's allegations and requested a jury trial.  The court 
set a trial date for June 4.  The County represented it would be 
No.  03-2440 thru 03-2446.lbb 
 
4 
 
proceeding only on the continuing denial of visitation and 
placement because it was the "swiftest."  On June 2, P.P. pled 
no contest to the continuing denial of visitation ground.   Just 
over one week later, the court terminated P.P.'s parental 
rights.  
II 
¶86 The 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
has 
frequently 
emphasized the importance of family.  The rights to conceive and 
to raise one's children have been deemed "essential."  Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).  The private interest of a 
parent in his or her children undeniably warrants deference and, 
absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection.  Stanley 
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).  A parent's fundamental 
right to the care and custody of his or her child may not be 
terminated absent a finding the parent is unfit.  Id. at 649.  
The real question presented in this case is whether a parent can 
have his or her parental rights terminated in the absence of an 
individualized determination of unfitness through the operation 
of a statutory scheme that works much like a statutory 
presumption by the way it defines unfitness.   
¶87 As P.P. points out, Wis. Stat. § 48.415(4) permits a 
finding of unfitness to be grounded on showing first that a 
court order denying visitation or physical placement has been 
issued and, second, that such order has been in effect for at 
least one year without modification permitting visitation or 
physical 
placement.27 
Wisconsin Stat. § 48.424(4), 
however, 
                                                 
27 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.415(4) provides: 
No.  03-2440 thru 03-2446.lbb 
 
5 
 
states that if grounds for termination of parental rights are 
found by a court order or jury, the court shall find the parent 
unfit.28  Thus, Wis. Stat. § 48.415(4) not only permits a finding 
of unfitness upon showing the elements in the statute, it 
requires a finding of unfitness.  This looks like a mandatory 
irrebuttable presumption to me.29 
¶88 The problem with this statutory scheme is that the 
grounds for denying visitation or placement are not based on the 
unfitness of the parent, but are instead based upon the best 
interests of the child.  No finding or evidence of unfitness is 
required for these visitation decisions.  This becomes important 
because there may be reasons the court did not modify the order 
                                                                                                                                                             
Continuing 
denial 
of 
periods 
of 
physical 
placement or visitation, which shall be established by 
proving all of the following: 
(a) That the parent has been denied periods of 
physical placement by court order in an action 
affecting the family or has been denied visitation 
under an order under s. 48.345, 48.363, 48.365, 
938.345, 938.363 or 938.365 containing the notice 
required by s. 48.356 (2) or 938.356 (2). 
(b) That at least one year has elapsed since the 
order 
denying 
periods 
of 
physical 
placement 
or 
visitation 
was 
issued 
and 
the 
court 
has 
not 
subsequently modified its order so as to permit 
periods of physical placement or visitation.   
28 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.424(4) reads, "If grounds for the 
termination of parental rights are found by the court or jury, 
the court shall find the parent unfit. . . ." 
29 Indeed, just last term, this court in Steven V. v. Kelley 
H., 2004 WI 47, ¶39, 271 Wis. 2d 1, 678 N.W.2d 856, concluded 
that a continuing denial of visitation can be "conclusively" 
determined "from certain existing court orders that satisfy the 
statutory requirements."   
No.  03-2440 thru 03-2446.lbb 
 
6 
 
denying placement and visitation, including serious illness, 
temporary 
incarceration 
or 
involuntary 
absence 
from 
the 
jurisdiction, or a judge's illness or death, that have little or 
nothing to do with the unfitness of a parent.  See Steven V. v. 
Kelley H., 2004 WI 47, ¶56, ¶¶96-97,  271 Wis. 2d 1, 678 N.W.2d 
856 (Abrahamson, J. concurring) and (Prosser, J. dissenting).   
¶89 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.13 provides the grounds that need 
to be established to show that a child is in need of protection 
or services.  Again, the court views these grounds with the 
focus on the best interest of the child.  Assessing parental 
unfitness is irrelevant.  Wisconsin Stat. § 48.13(8) and (9)30 
may involve issues of a parent's unfitness, but on the other 
hand they may not.31  The long and the short of it is that a 
parent may ultimately be found to be unfit even though the 
                                                 
30 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.13 states as relevant here: 
The court has exclusive original jurisdiction over a 
child alleged to be in need of protection or services 
which can be ordered by the court, and: 
(8) Who is receiving inadequate care during the period 
of 
time 
a 
parent 
is 
missing, 
incarcerated, 
hospitalized or institutionalized; 
(9) Who is at least age 12, signs the petition 
requesting jurisdiction under this subsection and is 
in need of special treatment or care which the parent, 
guardian or legal custodian is unwilling, neglecting, 
unable or needs assistance to provide.   
31 In State v. Gregory L.S., 2002 WI App 101, ¶3, 253 Wis. 
2d 563, 643 N.W.2d 890, the court of appeals held that "[w]here 
there is clear and convincing evidence to support a CHIPS 
petition, a court can properly enter a CHIPS order.  Although 
one parent may be fit, there are times when the facts support a 
CHIPS order that can protect the best interests of the child."    
No.  03-2440 thru 03-2446.lbb 
 
7 
 
parent's reasons for losing visitation and/or placement of one's 
child has nothing to do with whether that parent is unfit.  All 
that need be shown is that a parent lost placement or visitation 
and failed to meet the conditions necessary for reinstating that 
placement or visitation.   
¶90 Stanley, however, requires an individualized proof of 
a parent's unfitness "in a particular case."  Stanley, 405 U.S. 
at 652.  The Court was concerned with the statutory scheme that 
was based upon a presumption that an unwed parent was an unfit 
parent.  The Court noted that procedure by presumption is always 
cheaper and easier than an individualized determination.  Id. at 
656-57. But when the procedure forecloses the determinative 
issues of competence and care, when it explicitly disdains 
present 
realities 
in 
deference 
to 
past 
formalities, 
it 
needlessly risks running roughshod over the important interests 
of both parent and child.  Id. at 657.  The Court indicated that 
while the establishment of prompt efficacious procedures will 
achieve legitimate state ends as a proper state interest worthy 
of cognizance in constitutional adjudication, the Court also 
recognized higher values than speed and efficiency.  As the 
Court stated:   
Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in 
general, and the Due Process Clause in particular, 
that they were designed to protect the fragile values 
of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern 
for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize 
praiseworthy government officials no less, and perhaps 
more, than mediocre ones.   
Id. at 656. 
No.  03-2440 thru 03-2446.lbb 
 
8 
 
¶91 What is particularly troubling in this case is that 
P.P. was scheduled to have his hearing on unfitness based on 
grounds of abandonment, continuing need of protection or need of 
services, and failure to assume parental responsibility.  Dane 
County filed those petitions on August 12, 2002.  After nearly 
five months of adjournments, on January 27, 2003, the County 
moved to continue the trial in order to take advantage of 
Wis. Stat. § 48.415(4), noting that there was "no affirmative 
defense" to this ground.  The County was allowed to circumvent 
any hearing on the merits of unfitness that were alleged in the 
August 12, 2002, petitions.  As the County conceded, it was much 
easier and much more convenient, indeed much more efficient, for 
the County to proceed in this fashion.  The County had its 
ground without having to proceed with any evidence of unfitness 
that was alleged in the original petition.  It no longer had to 
show abandonment, no longer had to show a failure to assume 
parental responsibility, and no longer had to show continuing 
need of protection or services.  This is the very approach that 
the Court in Stanley held unconstitutional.32  
¶92 The ramifications of the majority opinion in this case 
cannot be understated.  A child may be taken away from a parent, 
                                                 
32 Even more troubling is that one of the conditions set 
forth in the October 31, 2002, order which revised and extended 
a prior dispositional order, required that each parent not be 
incarcerated.  Will this now become an independent ground to 
terminate the rights of parents convicted of felonies with 
sentences in excess of a year?  While the majority is correct 
that a trial court can modify an order that each parent not be 
incarcerated for persons convicted of felonies and sentenced to 
an excess of one year, majority op., ¶31 n.11, there is no 
requirement for a trial court to grant such a modification. 
No.  03-2440 thru 03-2446.lbb 
 
9 
 
in the best interests of the child and for reasons that have 
nothing to do with the unfitness of that parent.  Conditions for 
return of the child can be ordered by the court, which simply 
cannot be met for reasons having nothing to do with the 
unfitness of the parent.  At the expiration of one year, a 
parent may have his or her parental rights terminated absent any 
particularized showing of unfitness, simply because he or she 
cannot satisfy the conditions set by the trial court.33  By 
simply waiting, the County no longer has to establish on a case-
by-case basis that each parent who is in jeopardy of having his 
or her parental rights terminated is unfit.  The County only 
needs to allow the statutory time period to run, and then rush 
                                                 
33 The majority suggests that Wis. Stat. § 48.415(4) is not 
facially 
invalid 
because 
there 
is 
still 
an 
as-applied 
substantive due process challenge to the statutory scheme so 
that reasons for failing to modify the order denying visitation 
or physical placement may be explored, in a proper case.  
Majority op., ¶25.   The majority indicates that had P.P. chosen 
to raise a defense to the ground at issue here, he may have put 
himself in a position to raise an as-applied challenge in this 
case.  Majority op., ¶25 n.6.   
 
Besides shifting the burden to P.P. to show that he is a 
fit parent, the majority also fails to acknowledge that there is 
no such defense to the ground at issue in this case.  One year 
had elapsed from the order denying physical placement and 
visitation 
and 
he 
had 
not 
satisfied 
the 
conditions.  
Notwithstanding the fact that a large part of the delay was 
caused by the County, P.P. simply had no defense to the ground 
that he had failed to ameliorate the conditions set forth within 
the time period required, as no such defense can possibly exist 
once the year has run.  Saying that one can raise a defense when 
no such defense can possibly exist is an exercise in futility.  
Moreover, it is unreasonable to suggest that his acknowledgement 
that no such defense can exist should be construed as waiver in 
light of his initial request for a jury trial and his immediate 
appeal of the trial court's order terminating his parental 
rights. 
No.  03-2440 thru 03-2446.lbb 
 
10 
 
in with an amended petition to terminate parental rights.  
Stanley requires more than efficiency for efficiency's sake.  
Stanley 
requires 
an 
individualized 
determination 
of 
the 
unfitness of the parent.  
III 
¶93 Access and an opportunity to be heard:  These are 
fundamental principles upon which our judicial system is based. 
Few rights can be deemed as fundamental as the right to raise 
one’s children. P.P. has not had access to the courts concerning 
his fundamental right to parent his children. He has not had an 
individualized determination of his unfitness as a parent. When 
his children are removed from him, he is entitled to at least 
that 
much. 
If 
he 
is 
unfit, 
his 
parental 
rights 
will 
appropriately be terminated. He has not been afforded the proper 
determination. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
¶94 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent.   
 
 
 
No.  03-2440 thru 03-2446.lbb 
 
1