Title: Alabama v. Byrd
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1100600
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: June 30, 2011

REL: 06/30/2011
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
_________________________
1100600
_________________________
Ex parte Sarah H. Stewart, Circuit Judge, 
13th Judicial Circuit
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  Ex parte Kevin Byrd
(In re:  State of Alabama v. Kevin Byrd))
(Mobile Circuit Court, CC-95-1001; Court of Criminal
Appeals, CR-10-0035)
MAIN, Justice.
The Honorable Sarah H. Stewart, a circuit judge in the
13th Judicial Circuit, petitions this Court for a writ of
1100600
At the time the Court of Criminal Appeals issued its
1
order granting Kevin Byrd's petition for a writ of mandamus,
there were two vacancies on that court and the court consisted
of three judges -- Presiding Judge Welch and Judges Windom and
Kellum, all of whom concurred in issuing the writ.
2
mandamus directing the Court of Criminal Appeals to quash the
writ of mandamus it issued to the circuit court by an
unpublished order.  Ex parte Byrd (No. CR-10-0035, Feb. 9,
2011), ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2011) (table).   We
1
grant the petition and issue the writ.
I. Factual Background
On December 4, 1995, Kevin Byrd pleaded guilty in the
Mobile Circuit Court to first-degree assault.  He was
sentenced, pursuant to a plea agreement, to 10 years'
imprisonment; that sentence was suspended, and Byrd was
ordered to serve 180 days in "boot camp" followed by 5 years
on probation and to pay $60,000 in restitution to the victim.
After completing "boot camp," Byrd was released on probation.
On March 5, 1998, the trial court ordered Byrd to begin making
restitution payments of at least $75 per month.  In March
1999, his probation was revoked because he had committed new
offenses,  and he was ordered to serve the remainder of his
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3
sentence in prison.  In 2002, Byrd completed his sentence and
was released from prison.
In March or April 2005, the Mobile County District
Attorney's Office began collecting the unpaid restitution
pursuant to § 12-17-225 et seq., Ala. Code 1975.  In August
2007, the Mobile County District Attorney's Office requested
that the trial court conduct a hearing at which Byrd was to
show cause why he should not be held in contempt for failing
to have paid the court-ordered restitution.  The trial court
conducted hearings in January 2008, October 2008, May 2010,
and September 2010, reviewing Byrd's compliance with the
restitution order and adjusting Byrd's periodic restitution
payments to meet his financial ability to pay.  At the January
2008 hearing the trial court ordered Byrd to pay $100 per
month in restitution and to pay $1,500 by April 15, 2008, and
to bring his 2007 federal and state tax returns and a
household budget to the next hearing date.  At the October
2008 hearing the trial court ordered Byrd to pay $500 per
month in restitution.  At the May 2010 hearing Byrd challenged
the trial court's jurisdiction; the trial court took the
matter under advisement.  On August 31, 2010, the trial court
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4
issued an order holding that it had jurisdiction over the
restitution matters and scheduled a hearing, at which Byrd was
either to provide evidence that he was indigent or to suggest
a payment plan and the State was to provide an accounting of
Byrd's restitution payments since sentencing.  At the
September 2010 hearing there was discussion of Byrd's income,
assets, expenses, and payment history; on September 23, 2010,
the trial court ordered Byrd to pay $200 a month in
restitution and reset the matter for review on December 8,
2010.
On October 12, 2010, Byrd petitioned the Alabama Court of
Criminal Appeals for a writ of mandamus directing the trial
court to set aside all orders respecting restitution entered
after December 4, 2000, the date on which Byrd says his
probationary term for the 1995 conviction expired, and to
dismiss the proceedings.  On February 9, 2011, the Court of
Criminal Appeals granted the petition and issued the writ,
directing the trial court to set aside its September 23, 2010,
order because it lacked jurisdiction.  The court, in its
unpublished order, held as follows:
"In this case, Byrd had finished his term of
imprisonment and was not on probation or parole.
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According to our holding in Dixon v. State, 920 So.
2d 1122 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005), Judge Stewart had no
jurisdiction of the contempt action as she did not
have jurisdiction of both the person and the subject
matter.  Nor could Judge Stewart, in 2010, modify a
restitution order that had been entered in 1995.
This petition is hereby GRANTED and Judge Stewart is
directed to set aside her September 23, 2010, order
for lack of jurisdiction.  The State's remedies for
collecting on delinquent restitution are set out in
§ 12-17-225.3; § 15-18-72; and § 15-18-78(a), Ala.
Code 1975."
The trial judge then filed the present petition for a writ of
mandamus with this Court asking us to direct the Court of
Criminal Appeals to quash the writ of mandamus it had issued
to the circuit court.  
II. Standard of Review
"'Our review of a decision of the
Court of Criminal Appeals on an original
petition for a writ of mandamus is de novo.
Rule 21(e)(1), Ala.R.App.P.; Ex parte
Sharp, 893 So. 2d 571, 573 (Ala. 2003).
The standard for issuance of a writ of
mandamus is well settled:
"'"A writ of mandamus is an
extraordinary 
remedy, 
and 
is
appropriate when the petitioner
can show (1) a clear legal right
to the order sought; (2) an
imperative 
duty 
upon 
the
r e s p o n d e n t  
t o  
p e r f o r m ,
accompanied by a refusal to do
so; (3) the lack of another
adequate remedy; and (4) the
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6
properly invoked jurisdiction of
the court."
"'Ex parte BOC Group, Inc., 823 So. 2d
1270, 1272 (Ala. 2001) (citing Ex parte
Inverness Constr. Co., 775 So. 2d 153, 156
(Ala. 2000)).'
"Ex parte McCormick, 932 So. 2d 124, 127-28 (Ala.
2005)."
State v. Jones, 13 So. 3d 915, 919 (Ala. 2008).
III. Analysis
The ultimate issue presented by this petition is whether
a trial court has jurisdiction over a proceeding involving a
defendant who has failed to comply with a restitution order
when the defendant has completed his or her term of
imprisonment and is not on probation or parole.  The trial
judge contends that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred when
it issued a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to set
aside its September 23, 2010, order for lack of jurisdiction.
The trial judge argues that the court has jurisdiction to
enforce its original order imposing restitution; that the
civil remedies for collecting restitution are not exclusive;
that the cases relied upon by the Court of Criminal Appeals do
not preclude the trial court's actions in this case because
Byrd was neither found indigent by the court nor incarcerated
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7
for his failure to pay; and that the public-policy concern
that victims receive restitution supports the trial court's
authority to enforce restitution orders, regardless of whether
the defendant has completed his or her term of imprisonment or
probation.  
The Alabama District Attorneys Association filed in this
Court a brief as amicus curiae in support of the trial judge's
mandamus petition, essentially presenting the same arguments.
The Alabama Attorney General also filed a brief as amicus
curiae, supporting the trial judge's arguments  and further
arguing that the practical consequences of the Court of
Criminal Appeals' ruling would be dire; he avers that if that
court's ruling is allowed to stand substantial changes would
be necessary for trial courts and district attorneys to
collect court-ordered restitution and that civil enforcement
alone is not an adequate means to attempt to collect court-
ordered restitution.
In its response, the Court of Criminal Appeals questions
whether Judge Stewart's petition properly states grounds
appropriate for an original petition for a writ of mandamus
under Rule 21(e)(1), Ala.R.App.P.  The Court of Criminal
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Appeals also argues that the trial court was without
jurisdiction to modify the restitution order more than 30 days
after that order was entered, see Dixon v. State, 920 So. 2d
1122 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005); that there existed no statutory
authority for the trial court to modify a restitution order
after Byrd had completed his terms of imprisonment and
probation; and that after probation had ended restitution was
enforceable through the civil process described in § 15-18-78,
Ala. Code 1975.
In the Court of Criminal Appeals' response to Judge
Stewart's petition, Judge Joiner, joined by Judge Burke, filed
a separate response acknowledging that they were not members
of that court at the time the writ was issued and that, had
they been members of that court at that time, they would have
dissented from the order issuing the writ.  Judge Joiner and
Judge Burke state that they do not believe Dixon is
controlling because in Dixon the trial court increased the
total amount of restitution owed by the defendant, who was
indigent, and then, even after the defendant had paid more in
restitution than he was originally ordered to pay, ordered him
incarcerated upon finding him in contempt for failing to pay
1100600
9
the entire increased amount.  They note that here there is no
indication that Byrd is indigent, that the trial court did not
alter the total amount owed but rather restructured the
periodic-payment schedule in accordance with Byrd's financial
circumstances, that the trial court did not find Byrd in
contempt or incarcerate him for failure to pay restitution,
and that Byrd has not yet paid the originally ordered total
amount.  Judge Joiner and Judge Burke further respond that
they believe that restitution is a part a defendant's sentence
and that the trial court accordingly retains jurisdiction over
that portion of the sentence until the restitution is paid in
full.
Byrd also filed a response to Judge Stewart's petition,
in which he argued that a writ of mandamus was not appropriate
because, he said, the State has another adequate remedy at law
in that it may use civil collection procedures to collect the
unpaid restitution; that the Court of Criminal Appeals
correctly found that the trial court was without subject-
matter jurisdiction to summon Byrd to court to show cause why
he should not be held in contempt for his alleged failure to
pay full restitution in a case for which he was no longer
1100600
10
incarcerated or on probation; that the proper manner to
attempt to collect the restitution following the termination
of probation would be the same manner as for a civil judgment,
see § 12-17-225.6, Ala. Code 1975; that the trial court was
without jurisdiction to modify the restitution order more than
30 days from the date the order was entered; and that Dixon
and Johnson v. State, 17 So. 3d 261 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009)
(holding that, for the reasons expressed in Dixon, the trial
court was without jurisdiction to hold the appellant in
contempt and to sentence her to community corrections for
failure to pay court-ordered moneys) support his claim that
the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter the later
restitution orders in this case because Byrd had completed his
sentence of imprisonment and probation.  Byrd also challenges
the arguments in the amicus brief of the attorney general,
asserting that the cases cited in the amicus brief do not
support the conclusion that the trial court in this case had
continuing jurisdiction to enter the later orders.
Section 12-1-7(3), Ala. Code 1975, provides that every
court has the power "to compel obedience to its judgments,
orders and process and to orders of a judge out of court, in
1100600
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an action or proceeding therein."  Title 12, Chapter 17 of the
Alabama Code 1975 is entitled "Circuit and District Court
Personnel."  Article 6 of Title 12, Chapter 17, addresses
district attorneys; Division 4,  § 12-17-225 et seq., Ala.
Code 1975, is entitled "Restitution Recovery Division." The
relevant provisions  of Division 4 are  § 12-17-225, -225.1,
-225.2, and -225.3, and those provisions are quoted in
pertinent part below:
"It is the purpose of this legislation to ensure
that court-ordered restitution to crime victims,
victim 
compensation 
assessments, 
bail 
bond
forfeitures, court costs required by law, fines
levied against criminals for wrongful conduct, and
other court-ordered sums payable to the state or to
the crime victims be paid in full and that cost of
collection be borne by the person who is responsible
for payment. The Legislature of this state further
recognizes that the district attorneys of the
various judicial circuits are mandated by law to
represent the people of the state, and a strong
public policy dictates that restitution, court
costs, fines, and other court-ordered sums be
enforced within each judicial circuit by the
district attorneys in conjunction with the circuit
clerks and local courts."
§ 12-17-225, Ala. Code 1975.
"Any law to the contrary notwithstanding, each
district attorney may establish a special division
designated the 'restitution recovery division' for
the administration, collection, and enforcement of
court 
costs, 
fines, 
penalty 
payments, 
victim
compensation assessments, bail bond forfeitures,
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restitution, or like payments in civil or criminal
proceedings ordered by the court and payable to the
state or to crime victims, or judgements entered
which have not been otherwise vacated, or judicial
relief given from the operation of the order or
judgement."
§ 12-17-225.1, Ala. Code 1975.
"The court or the clerk of the court shall
notify the district attorney in writing when any
bail bond forfeitures, court costs, fines, penalty
payments, crime victims' restitution, or victims'
compensation assessments or like payments in any
civil or criminal proceeding ordered by the court to
be paid to the state or to crime victims have not
been paid or are in default and the default has not
been vacated. Upon written notification to the
district attorney, the restitution recovery division
of the office of the district attorney may collect
or enforce the collection of any funds that have not
been paid or that are in default which, under the
direction of the district attorney, are appropriate
to be processed. In no event shall a court or court
clerk notify the district attorney in less than 90
days from the date the payments are due to be paid
in full."
§ 12-17-225.2, Ala. Code 1975.
"After notification as provided in Section
12-17-225.2, the district attorney may take all
lawful 
steps 
necessary 
in 
order 
to 
require
compliance 
with 
the 
court-ordered 
payments,
including any of the following: (1) a petition for
revocation of probation; (2) a show cause petition
for contempt of court; (3) any other civil or
criminal proceedings which may be authorized by law
or by rule of court. In addition, the district
attorney may issue appropriate notices to inform the
defendant of the noncompliance of the defendant and
a warning of the penalty for noncompliance."
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§ 12-17-225.3, Ala. Code 1975.  Title 15, Chapter 18, codifies
the sentence and punishment aspect of criminal procedure;
Article 4A of Title 15, Chapter 18, is entitled "Restitution
to Victims of Crimes" and was enacted by Act No. 80-588, Ala.
Acts 1980 ("the restitution act").  The legislative intent in
enacting the restitution act is set forth as follows:
"The Legislature hereby finds, declares and
determines that it is essential to be fair and
impartial in the administration of justice, that all
perpetrators of criminal activity or conduct be
required to fully compensate all victims of such
conduct or activity for any pecuniary loss, damage
or injury as a direct or indirect result thereof.
The provisions of this article shall be construed so
as to accomplish this purpose and to promote the
same which shall be the public policy of this
state."
§ 15-18-65, Ala. Code 1975.  The restitution act also
provides:
"When a defendant is sentenced to a term of
imprisonment, the order of restitution shall be
enforceable during the period of imprisonment when
the defendant has any asset or other income or any
portion thereof to which a defendant is or may be
entitled. The Board of Pardons and Paroles shall be
notified of the amount of restitution by its parole
officers and when and if the defendant is paroled,
it shall be made a condition of the parole to
continue the restitution payments to the victim. If
during the period of the defendant's parole, he or
she fails to make restitution as ordered by the
original court, it shall be grounds for revocation
of parole."
1100600
Section 15-18-72 was amended effective May 4, 1982, by
2
Act No. 82-556, Ala. Acts 1982.
14
§ 15-18-71, Ala. Code 1975.  
"(a) When a defendant whose sentence has been
suspended and placed on probation by the court, and
ordered to make restitution, defaults in the payment
thereof or of any installment, the court on motion
of the victim or the district attorney or upon its
own motion shall require the defendant to show cause
why his default should not be treated as violation
of a condition of his probation.
"(b) When the defendant is sentenced to the
penitentiary by the court, and the court orders
restitution, it shall be made a condition of his
parole that restitution be made. When the parolee
defaults in the payment thereof or any installment,
the parole board on motion of the victim or the
district attorney or the supervising parole officer,
may require the defendant to show cause why his
default should not be treated as a violation of a
condition of parole, and the board may declare the
parolee delinquent and after due process may revoke
his parole."
§ 15-18-72, Ala. Code 1975.   
2
"(a) A restitution order in a criminal case
shall be a final judgment and have all the force and
effect of a final judgment in a civil action under
the laws of the State of Alabama. The victim on
whose behalf restitution is ordered, the executor or
administrator of the victim's estate, or anyone else
acting on behalf of the victim, shall be entitled to
all the rights and remedies to which a plaintiff
would be entitled in a civil action under the laws
of this state as well as any other right or remedy
pertaining to such restitution order as may be
provided by law.
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"(b) The provisions of this section shall be
read 
and 
deemed 
in 
pari 
materia 
with 
other
provisions of law. Provided however, the provisions
of this section are cumulative and shall not be
construed so as to deprive any victim of any other
remedy or relief to which a victim may now or
hereafter be entitled pursuant to law."
§ 15-18-78, Ala. Code 1975.
Although the language in §§ 15-18-71 and 15-18-72 speaks
only to restitution and potential penalties for nonpayment
during the term of imprisonment, parole, and/or probation,
nothing in those or any of the other statutes quoted above
expressly prohibits a trial court from seeking to enforce
restitution orders in the manner used by the trial court in
this case.
Even though the restitution act designates a restitution
order as a final judgment with all the force and effect of a
final judgment in a civil action entitling the victim to all
rights and remedies recognized under civil actions, see  § 15-
18-78, nothing in the restitution act makes restitution a
civil matter.  Rather, restitution is viewed as being incident
to criminal prosecution, see Piggly Wiggly No. 208, Inc. v.
Dutton, 601 So. 2d 907 (Ala. 1992), and is a part of the
criminal sentence that serves both a compensatory function for
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the victim and a rehabilitative function for the defendant.
See Roberts v. State, 862 So. 2d 1149 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002).
The Court of Criminal Appeals relied on Dixon, supra, in
granting Byrd's mandamus petition and directing the trial
court to set aside the September 23, 2010, order.  In Dixon,
the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial court was
without jurisdiction to incarcerate Dixon for failure to pay
the court-ordered restitution and was without jurisdiction to
rule on Dixon's motion to amend his sentence more than 60 days
after the pronouncement of sentence.  The defendant in Dixon
was originally sentenced to 10 years in prison with no
probation and was ordered to pay $10,000 in restitution and
$5,000 to the Crime Victims Compensation Fund.  Dixon moved
the trial court to set aside his sentence, and more than nine
months later the trial court suspended Dixon's 10-year
sentence, released him from prison, and placed him on
probation; the trial court also increased Dixon's restitution
to $75,000 and increased the amount to be paid to the Crime
Victims Compensation Fund to $10,000.  Nearly four months
after that modification, the trial court revoked Dixon's
probation for failure to pay the court-ordered moneys.  Then,
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after Dixon completed his sentence, the State petitioned the
court to hold him in contempt for failing to pay nearly
$39,000 of the court-ordered restitution; the trial court
eventually found Dixon in contempt and held him in jail
pending payment of a lump sum of $10,000.  The Court of
Criminal Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding
that because there was nothing in the record showing the
agreement of the parties to a continuance of the motion beyond
the 60-day period, the trial court lost jurisdiction to grant
Dixon's motion to modify his sentence when the motion was
denied by operation of law 60 days after sentencing and that
the trial court was without jurisdiction to incarcerate Dixon,
who was indigent, for failing to pay the increased court-
ordered moneys.  The court further noted that a court must
have jurisdiction over both the person and the subject matter
to find a person in contempt and that a court does not have
jurisdiction to incarcerate an indigent defendant for his or
her inability to pay court-ordered moneys.  In Dixon, the
trial court increased the total amount of restitution owed by
the defendant, who was indigent, and then, even after the
defendant had paid more than the originally ordered amount but
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less than the increased amount, ordered him incarcerated upon
finding him in contempt for failing to pay the entire
increased amount.  As Judge Joiner, joined by Judge Burke,
recognize, (1) there is no indication here that Byrd is
indigent; (2) the trial court did not alter the total amount
Byrd owed but restructured the periodic-payment schedule in
accordance with Byrd's financial circumstances; (3) the trial
court did not find Byrd in contempt or incarcerate him for
failure to pay but merely modified Byrd's periodic-payment
schedule; and (4) Byrd has not yet paid the amount originally
ordered.  Judge Joiner's observations are correct, and the
holding in Dixon is not controlling based on the facts
presented in this case.
Dixon has been cited favorably in only one other opinion,
Johnson v. State, 17 So. 3d 261 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009).
Johnson was serving a probationary sentence; the trial court
conducted a hearing to determine what action to take when
Johnson, who was indigent, failed to pay court-ordered moneys,
after which the trial court found Johnson in contempt and
ordered that Johnson serve one year with the community-
corrections program.  Quoting extensively from Dixon, the
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Court of Criminal Appeals held that Johnson had improperly
been found in contempt and ordered to serve time in the
community-corrections 
program 
for 
failure 
to 
pay 
court-ordered
moneys.  Byrd's reliance on Johnson, like Dixon, is not
persuasive because Byrd was not indigent and neither was he
found 
in 
contempt 
or 
ordered 
to 
serve 
any 
sort 
of
incarceration for his failure to pay court-ordered moneys.
The trial judge's argument in her mandamus petition is
persuasive.  Byrd has completed the portion of his sentence
dealing with periods of time (e.g., incarceration and
probation), but he has not completed the portion of his
sentence dealing with restitution.  Read together, the above-
quoted statutes allow the trial court to take certain steps in
an effort to have Byrd pay the restitution ordered by the
trial court.  In taking those steps, the trial court did not
increase the total amount owed but, instead, modified the
payment schedule in an effort to make it commensurate with
Byrd's financial ability to pay and to take into account
Byrd's changing financial circumstances.  The trial court did
not incarcerate Byrd for failing to pay the court-ordered
restitution, nor did it even suggest that he would be
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incarcerated if he continued to fail to meet his payment
obligations.  Other civil remedies are available in the
statutes addressing restitution to ensure that a victim
receives his or her restitution, but they are not exclusive.
In short, nothing in the restitution act prevents the trial
court from taking the action taken in this case.  The Court of
Criminal Appeals erred in holding otherwise.
IV.  Conclusion
Judge Stewart's petition for the writ of mandamus is
granted; the Court of Criminal Appeals is directed to quash
the writ of mandamus it issued on February 9, 2011, in Ex
parte Byrd, requiring the circuit court to set aside its
September 23, 2010, order.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Cobb, C.J., and Stuart, Bolin, and Shaw, JJ., concur.
Woodall, Parker, and Murdock, JJ., concur in the result.
Wise, J., recuses herself.*
*Justice Wise was a member of the Court of Criminal
Appeals when that court considered this case.