Title: Nelson v. Russo
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 216, 2003
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: March 11, 2004

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
JOSEPH W. NELSON,
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No. 216, 2003
Respondent Below,
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Appellant,
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v.
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Court Below: Superior Court
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of the State of Delaware
MICHELE A. ROGERS RUSSO,
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in and for Sussex County
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Petitioner Below,
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C.A. No. 01C-08-005
Appellee.
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Submitted: December 9, 2003
Decided: March 11, 2004
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, STEELE and JACOBS,
Justices, constituting the Court en banc.
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  REVERSED and REMANDED.
David J. Weidman, Esquire, of Hudson, Jones, Jaywork & Fisher, Georgetown,
Delaware, for Appellant.
John A. Sergovic, Jr., Esquire, of Sergovic, Ellis & Shirey, P.A., Georgetown,
Delaware, for Appellee.
BERGER, Justice:
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In this appeal, we consider whether the Superior Court has subject matter
jurisdiction to decide a dispute between neighboring condominium owners over an
addition to one condominium that allegedly encroaches on the common areas.  The
complaint was styled an action in ejectment, but appellee’s purpose in bringing the
lawsuit was to have the enclosures that are obstructing the common area airspace
removed.  The Superior Court concluded that, since appellee was not asking for
injunctive relief, the law court had jurisdiction to entertain the ejectment action.  We
disagree.  Appellee was not seeking possession of the land; she was seeking
“possession” of the unobstructed view and airspace.  She could obtain that relief only
in the Court of Chancery, through the issuance of a mandatory injunction requiring
appellant to remove the allegedly encroaching structure.  Accordingly, we reverse
without reaching the merits of the parties’ claims.
Factual and Procedural Background
The property in question is a condominium complex  located in Dewey Beach,
Delaware, consisting of three attached townhouses.  Joseph W. Nelson owns Unit 1,
located at the eastern side of the complex,  Rhonda Housley owns Unit 2, the middle
unit, and Michelle A. Rogers Russo owns Unit 3, the western side unit.  Nelson and
his wife purchased Unit 1 in 1984, from Russo’s parents, who were the developers of
1See: 10 Del.C. §6701.
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the property.  When the Nelsons purchased their unit, there were six- foot-high
wooden fences separating the backyards of each of the units.  Those fences remain
today, and it is undisputed that, although the entire backyard is designated a “common
area,” the owners have always treated their fenced-in area as their exclusive property.
In May 2000, the Nelsons enclosed their first floor porch and the deck above
it, and added a new porch and deck in “their” backyard.  Rhonda Housley approved
the addition, but it appears that the Nelsons never discussed their plans with Russo,
who lives in Arizona.  In August 2001, Russo filed this action in Superior Court
seeking possession of the common element airspace by removal of the Nelson’s
addition.  Alternatively, Russo asks for money damages for the loss in value to her
unit caused by the Nelson’s trespass.  The Superior Court denied Nelson’s motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and granted summary judgment to
Russo.
Discussion
The claim alleged in the complaint purports to be one for ejectment, which is
an action at law1.  In deciding whether the Superior Court has subject matter
jurisdiction, however, we must look beyond the language in the complaint to
2Diebold Computer Leas. Inc. v. Commercial Cr.Corp., 267 A.2d 586, 588 (Del.1970).
3Suplee v. Eckert, 120 A.2d 718, 719-20 (Del. Ch. 1956).
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determine the true nature of Russo’s claim and the desired relief.2  The complaint
alleges that Nelson’s addition obstructs the common elements in violation of the
Declaration and Code of Regulations governing the condominium.  After reciting the
relevant portions of the two documents, the complaint alleges:
24.  Plaintiff seeks to eject Defendant from the common element
property which has been wrongfully encroached upon by Defendant
pursuant to 10 Del.C. §6701 and to cause Defendant to remove the
improvements which are trespassing on the common element space.
The prayers for relief are similar:
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests judgment against Defendant:
1.  Restoring common ownership and use to the airspace that constitutes
part of the common element rights of Plaintiff such that the obstruction
to the common element air rights be removed by the removal of
enclosures made by Defendant without the consent of Plaintiff in the
declared common element area;
*        *        *
3.  To eject Defendant’s improvement from the common element space
which improvements obstruct the common element airspace....
In an action for ejectment, a landowner who is out of possession may prove title
to the land and, if successful, be granted possession of the disputed property.3
4Woolley on Delaware Practice, Vol.II, § 1586 (1906); See also: Burris v. Cross, 583 A.2d
1364 (1990).
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Pursuant to 10 Del.C.§6701, the action is available to recover possession of “lands
or ... any tenements whereon entry can be made....”  Ejectment is not available to
recover “possession” of incorporeal hereditaments:
The action will not lie for anything whereon an entry cannot be
made, or of which the sheriff cannot deliver possession; in other words
it is only maintainable for the possession of corporeal hereditaments.4
Here, Russo is seeking possession of airspace.  She does not want to sit in Nelson’s
backyard, which, although fenced off for twenty years, technically is a common
element.  She wants the view that she had from her condominium, looking across
Nelson’s backyard, before Nelson built the addition.  Thus, Russo is attempting to use
the action of ejectment to obtain something that ejectment cannot provide – possession
of airspace.
The Superior Court also lacks subject matter jurisdiction because what Nelson
really seeks is equitable relief.  Both the allegations in the complaint and the prayers
for relief make it clear that Nelson wants the addition removed.  Although she told the
Superior Court that she was not asking for injunctive relief, the fact remains that her
complaint does ask for injunctive relief.  It prays for judgment, “restoring common
ownership and use to the airspace ... by the removal of enclosures made by Defendant
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without... consent....”  The only way a court could order removal of a portion of a
building would be through a mandatory injunction.
In sum, we conclude that the Superior Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
to decide this complaint.  Ejectment does not lie for a party seeking possession of
airspace, and the relief Nelson is seeking is equitable.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the Superior Court is reversed and this
matter is remanded for further action in accordance with this decision.  Jurisdiction
is not retained.