Title: FLETCHER v CITY OF HELENA
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 12336
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: December 20, 1973

No. 12336 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1973 MARY M. FLETCHER, P l a i n t i f f , T H E CITY O F HELENA, M O N T A N A , a Municipal Corporation, Defendant, ......................................... T H E CITY O F HELENA, M O N T A N A , a Municipal Corporation, Third-Party P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, T H E M O N T A N A P O V E R C O M P A N Y , a Municipal Corporation, Third-Part Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: District Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l District, Honorable Gordon R. Bennett, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants : C. W. Leaphart, Jr., Helena, Montana Keller, Reynolds & Drake, Helena, Montana Paul F. Reynolds argued, Helena, Montana For Respondents: Gough, Booth, Shanahan and Johnson, Helena, Montana Ronald F. Waterman, argued, Helena, Montana Submitted: October 1, 1973 Filed: T j n ; i; j,yT$ M r . J u s t i c e Gene R. Daly delivered the Opinion of t h e Court. Third party p l a i n t i f f and appellant the City of Helena, a municipal corporation, brings t h i s appeal from a summary judg- ment entered i n the d i s t r i c t court of Lewis and Clark County i n favor of t h i r d party defendant and respondent, the Montana Power Company, a Montana corporation, ordering t h a t the City recover nothing from the Power Company by way of indemnity. The o r i g i n a l complaint underlying t h i s cause was f i l e d on June 23, 1971, by Mary M. Fletcher, p l a i n t i f f , against the C i t y of Helena, defendant. The City subsequently f i l e d an answer and t h i r d party complaint against the Montana Power Company a s t h i r d party defendant. Thereafter the Power Company f i l e d an answer, and both the City and the Power Company f i l e d motions f o r summary judgment. Both motions were denied. O n February 22, 1972, p l a i n t i f f Mary M. Fletcher moved the separation of the t r i a l of Fletcher v. City of Helena from the t r i a l of City of Helena v. Montana Power Company. The dis- t r i c t court granted her motion and, a f t e r t r i a l by jury, a judg- ment i n the amount of $25,000, plus c o s t s , was entered i n favor of Mary M. Fletcher against the City of Helena. The City then f i l e d and was granted a motion t o amend i t s t h i r d party complaint against the Power Company. Thereafter both the City and the Power Company again f i l e d motions f o r sum- mary judgment. Hearing was held on both motions and on June 19, 1972, the d i s t r i c t court granted summary judgment i n favor of the Power Company ordering the City recover nothing by way of indemnity. From t h a t order and judgment the City appeals. The f a c t s giving r i s e t o t h i s cause of action, a s they appear from the record on appeal, a r e : On January 18, 1971, i n connection with the City's Urban Renewal program Mary M. Fletcher was relocated from her former residence t o basement apartment #1, a t 16 112 South Park S t r e e t , owned by the City of Helena. O n o r about January 18, 1971, Lou Everett and Ed K i t t s , employees of the City's Urban Renewal department, were on the premises of 16 1 / 2 South Park and entered the basement area of apartment #1. They noticed an unusual odor and observed gray ash and yellow flame i n the sidearm heater used t o heat apartment #1. It appears t h a t Everett telephoned a request t o the Power Company t o check the heater. City personnel did not n o t i f y tenants of the defect, nor follow up on the service request, nor reinspect the heater prior t o January 25, 1971. Mrs. Fletcher t e s t i f i e d by deposition: t h a t shortly a f t e r she moved i n t o apartment #1 she made a c a l l complaining of lack of heat; t h a t she believed she called the Power Company r a t h e r than the City, but was uncertain of t h i s f a c t and of the date; t h a t a f t e r the Power Company service man came t o "check the heat", she was warm and comfortable and noticed no gas fumes o r other peculiar odors i n her apartment. John Larson, a serviceman f o r the Power Company, t e s t i f i e d by deposition t h a t he performed one service c a l l t o 16 112 South Park on January 19, 1971, a t approximately 11:30 a.m. There i s a ' c o n f l i c t between the l i t i g a n t s a s t o whether the service c a l l was made on January 19 o r 20, and whether it was i n response t o the request of Mrs. Fletcher o r M r . Everett, o r both. The c o n f l i c t i s immaterial t o the issue on appeal. Larson s t a t e d he inquired a t apartment #1 and was t o l d by an e l d e r l y lady t h a t there was not enough heat. H e then found the sidearm heater, and i n h i s words: "Well, I opened the heater door t o see what the problem was. The flame was blue but i t wasn't a s t r u e a blue a s I l i k e t o see. The burner it- s e l f had some white ash -- I guess you'd say -- small white ash on some of the c o i l s and on the burner, which accumulates over a period of time from natural gas. I t ' s common. I removed the burner -- I shut the gas off and removed the burner and cleaned the ports out and I turned the aquastat up. I couldn't see how many degrees o r anything. It was unlegible. And then a f t e r I replaced the burner, I lit it, adjusted the flame, brought a wire up inside the venturi t o make sure everything was clean, and it looked good. So I closed the door and I held a match toward the top of the heater around the burner. W e do t h a t t o check t o see i f the chimney i s drawing and the match remained lighted. It d i d n ' t go out. Then I f e l t around it v i t h m y hands and there was no appearance of any blockage a t a l l so then I l e f t . 11 Larson s t a t e d he could smell no odor of burned or un- burned gas i n the area. Larson had no further contact with t h i s sidearm heater p r i o r t o January 25, 1971, nor did anyone e l s e from the Power Company. O n January 25, 1971, Mary M. Fletcher and two persons not p a r t i e s t o the basic action were found i n her apartment overcome by fumes from a natural gas operated sidearm heater i n the basement of the apartment building. Mary Fletcher survived; the two other persons did not. Subsequent t o the accident on January 25, 1971, the City I I procured two expert" inspections of the sidearm heater. Val Ketchum, an employee of a Helena firm which i n s t a l l s and r e p a i r s gas appliances, t e s t i f i e d he found the vent pipe from the heater ran horizontally approximately 13 112 f e e t and was concealed i n the floor. H e s t a t e d t h i s violated accepted i n s t a l l a t i o n practices, which he said would permit a maximum l a t e r a l vent of two f e e t , for t h i s particular i n s t a l l a t i o n . His inspection revealed the 11 f l u e pipe was ninety per cent or b e t t e r plugged", and the accumulation or blockage had been building up f o r an extended period of time. H e s t a t e d f l u e blockage would cause a back d r a f t , sending the products of combustion back i n t o the furnace room and t h a t an open f l u e with a proper d r a f t would take the products of combustion out through the chimney, even i f the heater were improperly adjusted o r malfunctioning. The expert testimony of John Knicely, a chemical engineer, generally concurred with the findings and opinions of Val Ketchum. Knicely t e s t i f i e d : t h a t the heater burner was improperly adjusted, giving off one thousand p a r t s per million carbon monoxide; t h a t the vent f l u e from the heater ran horizontally about 1 1 f e e t more than safety permitted; and t h a t f l u e blockage had taken place over a long period of time, which prevented the carbon monoxide from escaping into the atomosphere. On appeal the sole issue presented is whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Power Company ordering the City recover nothing by way of indemnity. A definitive statement of the law of indemnity appears in the District Court opinion by the Hon. William J. Jameson in Great Northern Railway Company v. United States, D. Mont. 1960, 187 F. Supp. 690,693,694: I1 In the absence of any Montana cases in point, I assume that the Montana court will follow the common-law rule that joint tortfeasors are not entitled to contribution from each other. 'In the absence of legislation, courts exercising a common-law jurisdiction have generally held that they cannot on their own initiative create an enforceable right of contribution as between 1 tortfeasors. Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp. 1952, 342 U.S. 282, 72 S.Ct. 277, 279, 96 L.Ed. 318. The common law rule was followed by the California Court in Forsythe v. Los Angeles Railway Co., 1906, 149 Cal. 572, 87 P. 24. If the parties here were in pari delicto, there is no right of recovery on the part of the plaintiff. I I Footnote 7 following the above quoted paragraph in that case states : 11 This rule is stated in Restatement, Restitution I $ 102: Where two persons acting independently or jointly, have negligently injured a third person or his property for which injury both became liable in tort to the third person, one of them who has made expenditures in the discharge of their liability is not entitled to contribution from the other. I I1 [See also 42 C.J.S. Indemnity $27, p . 6051 Judge Jameson then went on to say: I I I The rule permitting indemnity against the princi- pal offender' has been recognized in a variety of circumstances, and varied terminology has been used in describing the nature of the relationship of the respective parties. This is well expressed in United States v. Savage Truck Line, Inc., 4 Cir., 1953, 209 F.2d 442,446, 4 4 A.L.R.2d 984, where the court said: t In the infinite variety of circumstances where in- demnity has been sought the courts have used various terms to distinguish between the grade of fault at- tributable to the participating wrongdoers so as to justify the imposition of the entire loss on the one who is regarded as the principal offender. The acts of the parties are variously contrasted as positive or negative * * 7 k and as active and passive * 9~ or as primary and secondary * 9 ; *; and sometimes one party i s said t o have been merely constructively l i a b l e and therefore e n t i t l e d t o indemnity from the actual wrongdoer 9 ; * * Ihatever the terminology, the inquiry i s always whether the difference i n the gravity of the f a u l t s of the participants i s so great as t o throw the whole loss upon one. I n such event there is contribution i n the extreme form of indemnity. "' The City contends t h a t there was evidence before the d i s t r i c t court upon which a jury might well base a f a c t u a l deter- mination t h a t the Power Company was negligent i n i t s performance of i t s service c a l l on the sidearm heater. This point i s not well taken. As was stated i n I n r e Standard O i l Company of California, N.D. Cal. 1971, 325 F.Supp. 388, 391: 1 l The universal r u l e i s t h a t , when two o r more contribute by t h e i r wrongdoing t o the injury of another, the injured party may recover from a l l of them i n a j o i n t action or he may pursue any one of them and recover from him, i n which case the l a t t e r i s not e n t i t l e d t o indemnity from those who, with him, caused the injury. F i d e l i t y & Casualty Co. of N.Y. v. J. A. Jones Const. Co., 325 F.2d 605, 611 (8th C i r . 1963) ," Therefore the issue before us i s not whether the Power Company was negligent; but whether o r not t h e City was negligent and, i f so, whether or not the negligence of the City did a s a matter of law c o n s t i t u t e a c t i v e negligence. Section 42-201, R.C.M. 1947, provides t h a t a lessor of a building f o r human occupation must "put it i n t o a condition f i t f o r such occupation, and r e p a i r a l l subsequent dilapidations * * *" t o so maintain it. The municipal code of the City provides i n section 4-5-2 e t seq. t h a t the c i t y engineer i s a gas inspector empowered t o inspect a l l gas equipment; t h a t a l l gas consuming appliances must be properly vented t o a s u i t a b l e f l u e ; and, t h a t upon discovery of a dangerous condition the gas must be ordered turned off u n t i l the consumer corrects the dangerous condition. W e hold the d i s t r i c t court upon the undisputed f a c t s before 1 l it made the only determination possible. Perhaps the term a c t i v e negligence" i s confusing i n the i n s t a n t case because the City's active negligence i s predicated on a c t s of omission. A concise statement of the law applicable i n an analogous indemnity s i t u a t i o n i s found i n Bush Terminal Bldgs. Co. v. Luckenbach Steamship I I The culpability of the person seeking indemnity determines whether recovery w i l l be allowed against a j o i n t tortfeasor, A r i g h t t o implied indemnity does not e x i s t i f a defendant's conduct was -- active. [Citing cases] 1 I Acts of omission c o n s t i t u t e a c t i v e negligence a s well a s a c t s of commission [Citing cases] and where defendant i s alleged t o have participated i n o r 1 concurred i n the wrong which caused the damages' there i s no r i g h t t o recovery over [Citing case]. - Moreover, where there i s a charge of notice, a f a i l u r e t o perform the duty t o inspect may not be deemed mere passive negligence. 11 Here, the City, a f t e r actual notice of a defect i n the sidearm heater, took no steps: t o ascertain what defects existed; t o inform the Power Company of the nature of the defects i t was aware o f ; t o warn the tenants of t h e dangerous condition; o r even, t o follow-up i n determining whether or when a service c a l l had been made. The testimony of the City's expert witnesses Knicely and Icetchum established t h a t "but for" the blocked f l u e the asphyxia- tion would not have occurred. There was no evidence before the d i s t r i c t court t o contradict o r r e f u t e t h i s testimony. This was s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h proximate causation a s a matter of law. DeVerniero v. Eby, Mont . - - -* 496 P.2d 290, 29 St.Rep. 273. The C i t y ' s contention t h a t proximate causation was a disputed f a c t not proper f o r summary judgment i s without m e r i t . 65 C.J.S. Negligence 5 110, provides: "The negligence of the defendant need not be the sole cause of the injury, it being s u f f i - c i e n t t h a t it was one of the e f f i c i e n t causes thereof, without which the injury would not have resulted; but it must appear t h a t the neg- ligence of the person sought t o be charged was responsible f o r a t l e a s t one of the causes re- s u l t i n g i n the injury. * + : 9; "It i s generally considered t h a t there may be more than one proximate cause of an accident or injury, t h a t each of the concurrent e f f i c i e n t causes contributing d i r e c t l y t o the accident o r injury i s a proximate cause thereof, and t h a t the existence of one proximate cause of an accident o r injury does not excuse another proximate cause. There i s , however, some authority r e j e c t i n g the theory t h a t there may be two o r more proximate causes of an injury and holding t h a t there can be but one proximate cause. I n any event, two or more separate and d i s t i n c t a c t s of negligence operating concurrently may c o n s t i t u t e the proxi- mate cause of an injury. I I The second paragraph of the above quotation amounts t o a d i s t i n c - t i o n without a difference since under e i t h e r theory l i a b i l i t y r e s u l t s . 65 C. J. S . Negligence § 1 1 1 ( I ) , provides: 11 A n intervening cause which brealcs the chain of causation from the original negligent a c t o r omission w i l l be regarded a s the proximate cause relieving the o r i g i n a l wrongdoer of l i a b i l i t y ; but the mere f a c t t h a t other forces have i n t e r - vened between the defendant's negligence and the lai in tiff's injury does not absolve the defendant where the injury was the n a t u r a l and probable consequence of the original wrong and might rea- sonably have been foreseen. 11 N o negligence i s insulated a s long a s i t plays a substantial and proximate part i n the injury. I f the o r i g i n a l a c t i s wrongful and would n a t u r a l l y , according t o the ordinary course of events, prove injurious t o others, and does r e s u l t i n injury through the intervention of other causes not wrong- f u l , the injury w i l l be referred t o a s the wrongful cause, passing through those which were innocent. Moreover, a wrongdoer may not r i d himself of respon- s i b i l i t y f o r injury h i s own f a u l t was enough t o cause merely by suggesting a p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t the f a u l t of someone e l s e might have intervened. I n other words, an intervening cause w i l l not r e l i e v e from l i a b i l i t y where the p r i o r negligence was the e f f i c i e n t cause of the injury. 11 In point of f a c t , the considerations determining a c t i v e versus passive negligence a r e analogous and i n t e r r e l a t e d t o those considerations which a r e determinative of the existence of i n t e r - vening superseding cause. 2 Restatement of Torts 2d, $ $ 440-443. Indemnification requires the would be indemnitee be f r e e from any active negligence contributing t o the injury causing accident. Smith v. Pennsylvania-Reading Seashore Lines, 355 F.Supp. 1176. I n the i n s t a n t case, on the undisputed f a c t s before t h e disi:rict court, reasonable minds could not d i f f e r on the f a c t the City was actively negligent and t h a t a c t i v e negligence contributed d i r e c t l y and proximately t o the accident causing Mary ~ l e t c h e r ' s injury . The judgment and order of the d i s t r i c t court are affirmed. Justice Hon. Paul G. atf field, District Judge, s i t t i n g for Justice John Conway Harrison.