Title: State of Florida v. David Klayman
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC00-1723
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: November 14, 2002

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
____________
No. SC00-1723
____________
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Petitioner,
vs.
DAVID KLAYMAN,
Respondent.
[November 14, 2002]
SHAW, J.
We have for review Klayman v. State, 765 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000),
wherein the district court certified the following question:
Should the supreme court’s decision in Hayes v. State, [750 So. 2d 1
(Fla. 1999)] be retroactively applied?
Klayman, 765 So. 2d at 785.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla.
Const.
-2-
I.  FACTS
The relevant facts are set forth in the district court opinion, which provides in
part:
David Klayman appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for
post-conviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.850.  He contends that the court erred in failing to apply the supreme
court’s recent decision of Hayes v. State, 750 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1999), to
his conviction of trafficking in hydrocodone . . . .
In Hayes, the supreme court quashed this court’s decision in
the underlying case of State v. Hayes, 720 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 4th DCA
1998), quashed, 750 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1999), and held that the drug
trafficking statute (section 893.135(1)(c)1, Florida Statutes (Supp.
1996)) did not apply to possession of hydrocodone in amounts under
fifteen milligrams per dosage unit.  Appellant argues that the supreme
court’s decision in Hayes should be given retroactive application
because the effect of the decision has constitutional ramifications for
those persons whose sentence was rendered or upheld pursuant to
State v. Baxley, 684 So. 2d 831, 832-33 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996), and our
decision in State v. Hayes.
Klayman, 765 So. 2d at 784-85.  The district court agreed with Klayman, reversed
the trial court’s ruling, and remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine the
continued validity of Klayman’s sentence in light of Hayes.  The district court
certified the above question and the State petitioned for review before this Court.
II.  HAYES V. STATE
The Court in Hayes v. State, 750 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1999), was confronted with
the following question: whether a person who fraudulently procured forty tablets of
1.  See § 893.135(1)(c)1, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1996).  The statute was enacted in
in 1979.  See ch. 79-1, § 1, at 9, Laws of Fla.  It was amended in 1995 to include
hydrocodone and several other drugs.  See ch. 95-415, § 5, at 3417, Laws of Fla. 
2.  See Hayes, 750 So. 2d at 2.
3.  See id. at 2-3.
-3-
Lorcet, a prescription pain relief medication containing a mixture of acetaminophen
and hydrocodone, can be convicted of trafficking if the hydrocodone in the mixture
was not a Schedule I or II drug.  The trafficking statute prohibited the purchase of
four grams or more of “any morphine, opium, oxycodone, hydrocodone,
hydromorphone . . . as described in [Schedule I] or [Schedule II]” or four grams or
more of “any mixture containing any such substance.”1
Prior to Hayes, Florida district courts were in disagreement as to the meaning
of the word “such” in the phrase “any mixture containing any such substance.” 
The Fourth and Fifth District Courts of Appeal had held that “such” referred to any
of the drugs enumerated in the statute (i.e., “morphine, opium, oxycodone,
hydrocodone, hydromorphone”), regardless of their chemical forms.2  The First
and Second District Courts of Appeal, on the other hand, had held that “such”
referred to the enumerated drugs but only when those drugs are in the chemical
forms described in Schedules I and II.3
This Court in Hayes analyzed the language in the trafficking statute, endorsed
4.  In the wake of Hayes, the Legislature in 2000 amended Schedule III to
delete reference to hydrocodone, thus making four grams or more of hydrocodone,
or four grams or more of any mixture containing hydrocodone, a Schedule II drug
embraced by the trafficking statute, regardless of the dosage unit.  See § 893.03(3),
Fla. Stat. (2000).  In 2001, the Legislature then reversed itself and reinstated certain
quantities of hydrocodone as a Schedule III drug.  See ch. 2001-55, § 1, at 357,
Laws of Fla.
-4-
the view of the First and Second District Courts of Appeal, and held that the word
“such” referred to the enumerated drugs only in the chemical forms described in
Schedules I and II.  The Court then determined that, under the applicable drug
classification statutes, hydrocodone may be either a Schedule II or III drug,
depending on the dosage unit, and that the hydrocodone in the mixture possessed
by Hayes was a Schedule III drug.  Because the mixture possessed by Hayes did
not contain a Schedule I or II drug, she could not be convicted of trafficking.4
The basic holding of Hayes is that the trafficking statute, since the time of
enactment, was intended to apply only to Schedule I and II drugs or to mixtures
containing Schedule I or II drugs.  The question posed in the present case is
whether that holding should be applied to final cases wherein the lower courts
construed the statute differently and imposed trafficking convictions based on
mixtures that did not contain a Schedule I or II drug.  This issue is a pure question
5.  See State v. Glatzmayer, 789 So. 2d 297, 301-02 n.7 (Fla. 2001) (“If the
ruling consists of a pure question of law, the ruling is subject to de novo review.”).
6.  The Commonwealth argued that even though Fiore possessed a valid
permit he nonetheless had deviated so dramatically from the permit’s terms that he
had violated the statute.  See Fiore, 531 U.S. at 227. 
-5-
of law, subject to de novo review.5
III.  CLARIFICATIONS IN THE LAW
 The United States Supreme Court in Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225 (2001),
held that whereas a change in the law may be analyzed in terms of retroactivity, a
clarification in the law does not implicate the issue of retroactivity.  Petitioner Fiore
was convicted of violating a Pennsylvania statute prohibiting the operation of a
hazardous waste facility without a permit, even though the Commonwealth
conceded that he in fact possessed a permit.6  The state supreme court declined
review and the conviction became final.  Subsequently, the state supreme court
reviewed the case of Fiore’s codefendant, Scarpone, and held, on identical facts,
that the statute had not been violated.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Fiore's case and, after
soliciting a response from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, ruled as follows:
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s reply specifies that the
interpretation of [the statute] set out in Scarpone “merely clarified” the
statute and was the law of Pennsylvania—as properly interpreted—at
the time of Fiore’s conviction.  Because Scarpone was not new law,
-6-
this case presents no issue of retroactivity.  Rather, the question is
simply whether Pennsylvania can, consistently with the Federal Due
Process Clause, convict Fiore for conduct that its criminal statute, as
properly interpreted, does not prohibit.
This Court’s precedents make clear that Fiore’s conviction and
continued incarceration on this charge violate due process.  We have
held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
forbids a State to convict a person of a crime without proving the
elements of that crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  In this case, failure
to possess a permit is a basic element of the crime of which Fiore was
convicted.  And the parties agree that the Commonwealth presented
no evidence whatsoever to prove that basic element.  To the contrary,
the Commonwealth, conceding that Fiore did possess a permit,
necessarily concedes that it did not prove he failed to possess one.
The simple, inevitable conclusion is that Fiore’s conviction fails
to satisfy the Federal Constitution’s demands.
Fiore, 531 U.S. at 228-29 (citations omitted).
It thus is clear under Fiore that, if a decision of a state's highest court is a
clarification in the law, due process considerations dictate that the decision be
applied in all cases, whether pending or final, that were decided under the same
version (i.e., the clarified version) of the applicable law.  Otherwise, courts may be
imposing criminal sanctions for conduct that was not proscribed by the state
legislature.
Although Florida courts have not previously recognized the Fiore distinction
between a “clarification” and “change,” we conclude that this distinction is
beneficial to our analysis of Florida law.  Previously, this Court analyzed such
7.  This Court in Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1980), divided
"changes" in the decisional law into two groups: "jurisprudential upheavals" and
"evolutionary refinements" in the law.  Jurisprudential upheavals are applied
retroactively; evolutionary refinements in the law are not applied retroactively.
8.  For instance, although this Court held that the following decisions
warranted retroactive application under Witt, the decisions when viewed in light of
Fiore appear to be routine statutory “clarification” cases, not “major constitutional
changes of law” as required by Witt: (1) State v. Iacovone, 660 So. 2d 1371 (Fla.
1995) (holding that enhanced penalties for attempted second- and third-degree
murder of a law enforcement officer were not authorized by statute); (2) Hale v.
State, 630 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1993) (holding that consecutive habitual offender
sentences for crimes arising from a single criminal episode were not authorized by
statute); and (3) Palmer v. State, 438 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1983) (holding that consecutive
mandatory minimum sentences for use of a firearm in crimes arising from a single
criminal episode were not authorized by statute).  See State v. Stevens, 714 So. 2d
347 (Fla. 1998) (applying Iacovone retroactively); State v. Callaway, 658 So. 2d
983 (Fla. 1995) (applying Hale retroactively); Bass v. State, 530 So. 2d 282 (Fla.
1988) (applying Palmer retroactively). 
-7-
cases strictly under Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1980), and used the term
“change” broadly to include what in fact were both clarifications and true changes.7 
As explained in Fiore, however, a simple clarification in the law does not present an
issue of retroactivity and thus does not lend itself to a Witt analysis.8  Whereas Witt
remains applicable to "changes" in the law, Fiore is applicable to "clarifications" in
the law.
IV.  THE PRESENT CASE
In an effort to determine whether Hayes should be applied retroactively, we
must ask, is Hayes a “clarification” or "change" in the law?  A clarification is a
9.  For example, the Legislature directly ceded to the courts the authority to
formulate grounds for departing from the sentencing guidelines.  See § 921.001(6),
Fla. Stat. (2001) (“A court may impose a departure sentence outside the sentencing
guidelines based upon circumstances or factors which reasonably justify the
aggravation or mitigation of the sentence . . . .”). 
10.  The Legislature may indirectly cede discretion to the courts by
employing language that commonly requires judicial construction.  Examples of
such language include “careful and prudent,” “reasonable,” and “probable cause.” 
See, e.g., § 316.1925, Fla. Stat. (2001) (“Any person operating a vehicle upon the
streets or highways within the state shall drive the same in a careful and prudent
manner . . . .”) (emphasis added); § 856.015(2), Fla. Stat. (2001) (“No adult having
control of any residence shall allow an open house party to take place at said
residence if any alcoholic beverage or drug is possessed or consumed  . . . by a
minor . . . and where the adult fails to take reasonable steps to prevent the
possession or consumption of the alcoholic beverage or drug.”) (emphasis added);
§ 933.04, Fla. Stat. (2001) (“[N]o search warrant shall be issued except upon
probable cause . . . .”) (emphasis added).
-8-
decision of this Court that says what the law has been since the time of enactment. 
To determine whether a decision clarifies a statute, we first look to the decision
itself to discern its intent.  If the decision is silent or ambiguous on this point, we
then look to the underlying statute to discern its intent.  Where the Legislature cedes
no discretion to the courts either directly9 or indirectly10 but instead employs
definitive language that ordinarily requires no judicial construction, the Legislature
intends that the statute be applied as enacted.  A decision by this Court confirming
the original intent is a clarification of extant law.
Hayes is such a clarification, because the Legislature, in formulating the
11.  As noted above, the trafficking statute was enacted in 1979 and was
amended in 1995 to include hydrocodone and other drugs.  See supra note 1. 
-9-
trafficking statute, ceded no discretion to the courts either directly or indirectly with
regard to the types and quantities of substances proscribed by the statute.  Rather,
the Legislature defined those properties with specificity at the time of enactment:
(c)1.  Any person who knowingly sells, purchases,
manufactures, delivers, or brings into this state, or who is knowingly in
actual or constructive possession of, 4 grams or more of any
morphine, opium, oxycodone, hydrocodone, hydromorphone, or any
salt, derivative, isomer, or salt of an isomer thereof, including heroin,
as described in s. 893.03(1)(b) [i.e., Schedule I] or (2)(a) [i.e.,
Schedule II], or 4 grams or more of any mixture containing any such
substance, but less than 30 kilograms of such substance or mixture,
commits a felony of the first degree, which felony shall be known as
“trafficking in illegal drugs.”
§ 893.135(1)(c)1, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1996).11
Each proscribed substance is identified in the statute and then defined in
detail in Schedules I and II, which contain exhaustive technical descriptions of
illegal drugs.  Also, the proscribed quantities are clearly denoted in the trafficking
statute itself: “4 grams or more” of any of the enumerated substances, or “4 grams
or more of any mixture containing any such substance, but less than 30 kilograms
of such substance or mixture.”  The Legislature thus intended at the time of
enactment for the courts to apply the trafficking statute strictly as written with
regard to the types and quantities of proscribed substances.
12.  Florida courts have held that imposition of criminal sanctions without
statutory authority is fundamental error.  See, e.g., Achin v. State, 436 So. 2d 30,
31 (Fla. 1982) (“We hold that one may never be convicted of a nonexistent
crime . . . .”); Mundell v. State, 739 So. 2d 1201, 1202 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)
(“Although Mr. Mundell never objected to his conviction for this offense and even
-10-
The decision in Hayes is similar to the following cases cited above as
clarifications in the law under Fiore:
(1) State v. Iacovone, 660 So. 2d 1371 (Fla. 1995) (holding that
enhanced penalties for attempted second- and third-degree murder of a
law enforcement officer were not authorized by statute); (2) Hale v.
State, 630 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1993) (holding that consecutive habitual
offender sentences for crimes arising from a single criminal episode
were not authorized by statute); and (3) Palmer v. State, 438 So. 2d 1
(Fla. 1983) (holding that consecutive mandatory minimum sentences
for use of a firearm in crimes arising from a single criminal episode
were not authorized by statute).
Supra note 8.
In the above cases, the Legislature used language that was intended to be
clear on its face.  The problem in those cases arose when lower courts construed
the statutory language in a manner that was contrary to legislative intent.  The key
consideration is that, in construing the statutes contrary to legislative intent, the
courts imposed criminal sanctions without statutory authority—i.e., they imposed
criminal sanctions where none were intended.  The rulings thus violated the Due
Process Clause and all defendants convicted or sentenced without statutory
authority were entitled to relief.12
requested a jury instruction on this nonexistent offense, the error can be raised for
the first time on appeal because the crime of which he was convicted does not
exist.”); Fredericks v. State, 675 So. 2d 989, 990 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)
(“Conviction of a non-existent crime is fundamental error mandating reversal even
when the error was invited by the defendant . . . .”); Ward v. State, 446 So. 2d 267,
267 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (“Ward argues that attempted uttering is not an offense
under Florida law.  He is correct.  Imposition of judgment and sentence for
attempted uttering is fundamental error requiring reversal.”).
13.  Postconviction claims for relief under Hayes must be filed within two
years of the date mandate issues in the present case.  Cf. Dixon v. State, 730 So.
2d 265, 268-69 (Fla. 1999) (“In view of the limited number of opinions that are
given retroactive effect and the uncertainty that exists over whether a particular
decision will be accorded retroactive effect, we consider it reasonable to calculate
the two-year time period for eligible defendants to file their claims from the time our
decision announcing retroactivity becomes final.”); see also id. at 267 n.3 (“An
opinion of this Court becomes final upon issuance of the mandate.”). 
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V.  CONCLUSION
Our decision in Hayes v. State, 750 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1999), is a clarification of
extant law and, pursuant to the United States Supreme Court decision in Fiore v.
White, 531 U.S. 225 (2001), must be applied to final cases.13  Under section
893.135(1)(c)1, trafficking in a Schedule III drug or mixture thereof was never
intended by the Legislature to be a crime.
The district court below analyzed our decision in Hayes in terms of its
impact on the validity of criminal sentences in the various judicial districts, and the
court remanded “for an evidentiary hearing to determine the validity of [Klayman’s]
sentence pursuant to Hayes v. State, and for resentencing if appropriate.”  This was
-12-
imprecise.  Our decision in Hayes addressed the validity of a trafficking conviction,
not a trafficking sentence.  On remand, the trial court should conduct an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether the “mixture” possessed by Klayman contained a
Schedule I or II drug; if not, his trafficking conviction must be reversed and
sentence vacated.
We answer the certified question and approve Klayman v. State, 765 So. 2d
784 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), as explained herein.
It is so ordered.
ANSTEAD, C.J., and LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
WELLS, J., dissents with an opinion, in which HARDING, Senior Justice,
concurs.
PARIENTE, J., recused.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
WELLS, C.J., dissenting.
This case presents the repeatedly vexing question of what is to be done in
postconviction claims by an individual who has been convicted of a crime based
upon an interpretation of a criminal statute when that conviction was final at the time
the district court of appeal affirmed the conviction but, subsequently, the
interpretation of the statute is determined by this Court to be incorrect.  Does the
subsequent opinion of this Court mean that the individual was convicted of a crime
-13-
which became nonexistent by this Court’s later different interpretation of the
criminal statute, or was the individual convicted of a crime which existed until such
time as the law in the district where the individual was convicted was changed by
this Court?
The answer to this vexing question obviously pits the judicial system’s
necessity for systemic finality against the individual circumstances in a particular
case.  This Court made a decision and wrote a comprehensive opinion in 1980,
discussing in detail the serious issues involved, and provided an analysis upon
which retroactivity of decisional law is to be applied in postconviction to all Florida
criminal cases including death cases.  The case in which this was done was Witt v.
State, 387 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1980).  Today the majority in this Court erroneously
abandons this analysis when applying this Court’s decisions that have changed a
district court of appeal’s interpretation of the law.  Therefore, I dissent.
I dissent not only because the majority abandons twenty-two years of
applying Witt to these types of cases but also because the majority ignores the
procedural concept under which the district courts of appeal were adopted in the
1950s and under which Florida’s court structure has operated since that time.  The
majority’s decision to apply Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225 (2001), to the instant
case repudiates the concept that the decisions of the district courts are “final”
-14-
decisions in respect to criminal appeals.  Based on the majority’s decision in this
case, every decision in which a district court has construed and applied a criminal
statute is now “nonfinal” until the statute is ultimately “clarified” by this Court. 
Given this Court’s limited jurisdiction, this could occur years upon years after the
district court has first construed the statute.
A plain reading of Fiore should show that it is not applicable to Florida’s
court structure.  In Fiore, the Supreme Court had asked the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, “Does the interpretation of [the statute there in question,] set forth in
Commonwealth v. Scarpone, 535 Pa. 273, 279, 634 A.2d 1109, 1112 (1993), state
the correct interpretation of the law of Pennsylvania at the date Fiore’s conviction
became final?”  Fiore, 531 U.S. at 228.  In replying to that question, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated:  “Our ruling merely clarified the plain language
of the statute. . . .  Our interpretation . . . furnishes the proper statement of the law
at the date Fiore’s conviction became final.”  Id. (first omission in original).  The
Supreme Court then held:
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s reply specifies that the
interpretation of [the statute] set out in Scarpone “merely clarified” the
statute and was the law of Pennsylvania—as properly interpreted—at
the time of Fiore’s conviction.  Because Scarpone was not new law,
this case presented no issue of retroactivity.
Fiore, 531 U.S. at 228.
-15-
If this inquiry were made to this Court and this Court followed its precedent,
it would answer that “the law” on the date that a defendant’s conviction became
“final” was “the law” as it had been interpreted by the district court in the district in
which the individual was convicted on the day of his conviction.  It is because this
would have to be the answer, based upon this Court’s precedent, that the majority
now rewrites and effectively recedes from the contrary language and analysis in
State v. Stevens, 714 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 1998), State v. Callaway, 658 So. 2d 983
(Fla. 1995), and Bass v. State, 530 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1988).  Majority op. at 7 n.8. 
In fact, the majority also does the same in respect to McCuiston v. State, 534 So.
2d 1144 (Fla. 1988), and State v. Glenn, 558 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990).
Remarkably, in a Yogi Berra-like “deja vu all over again,” the majority, in
reality, merely returns to a path which this Court started down before but then from
which this Court appropriately receded.  See Bass v. State, 12 Fla. L. Weekly 289
(Fla. June 11, 1987), withdrawn on reh’g, 530 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1988).  In its initial
opinion in Bass, this Court addressed the issue of whether Palmer v. State, 438 So.
2d 1 (Fla. 1983), constituted “a change in the substantive law of sentencing or . . .
merely interpret[ed] pre-existing statutory law.”  This Court stated:
[I]n Palmer, this Court merely interpreted statutory provisions and
corrected errors in the imposition of a statute which existed prior to
our decision in Palmer.  That opinion did not announce any new
-16-
changes in the law itself.  It simply examined the statute and corrected
mistakes in its implementation.
Because we believe that Palmer does not represent any change
in law, we need not . . . here consider whether Palmer should
retroactively apply.  Our determination that Palmer did not change the
law of sentencing in any substantive way necessarily precludes
examination of those issues.
Bass, 12 Fla. L. Weekly at 289.
Expressing the same concerns I now have, Justice Ehrlich dissented
“[b]ecause the majority’s reasoning is both illogical and contrary to the proper
understanding of this Court’s relationship to the district courts and because the
result reached undermines society’s need for finality powerfully explicated in Witt.”
 Bass, 12 Fla. L. Weekly at 289-90 (Ehrlich, J., dissenting).  Justice Ehrlich further
stated:
The majority attributes controlling significance to the fact that
Palmer did not “change” the law, but merely interpreted pre-existing
statutory law.  I respectfully suggest that this statement cannot
withstand analysis.
The district courts of appeal are, in most instances, courts of
last resort, Johns v. Wainwright, 253 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 1971), and the
“decisions of the district courts of appeal represent the law of Florida
unless and until they are overruled by this Court.”  Stanfill v. State,
384 So. 2d 141, 143 (Fla. 1980).
The decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Palmer was
not a case of first impression, see Davis v. State, 392 So. 2d 947 (Fla.
3d DCA 1980) (approving consecutive mandatory minimum three year
sentences for robbery and kidnapping in spite of the defendant’s claim
that both offenses arose from the same episode).  Therefore, the
district courts’ decisions in Palmer and Davis were the law in this state
-17-
until this Court changed the law and interpreted the statute at issue
contrary to the district courts’ interpretation.
Under the majority’s reasoning, however, we did not “change”
the law!  The fact that we took a contrary view of the statute at issue in
Palmer than did the district courts clearly evidences that we did change
the law in Florida on this issue.  Taken to its logical conclusion,
therefore, the majority holds that until this Court decides any issue,
there is no extant law.
Bass,12 Fla. L. Weekly at 290 (Ehrlich, J., dissenting).
The initial Bass decision caused immediate confusion in the district courts of
appeal.  In a detailed opinion in Hall v. State, 511 So. 2d 1038, 1042 (Fla. 1st DCA
1987), Judge Zehmer expressed similar concerns about this Court’s effective
abandonment of district court finality.  Subsequently, this Court withdrew Bass and
substituted a new Bass opinion, which held that Palmer should be applied
retroactively.  See Bass, 530 So. 2d at 282.  This Court explained the withdrawal of
the first Bass opinion in McCuiston v. State, 534 So. 2d 1144, 1146 (Fla. 1988)
(addressing whether Whitehead v. State, 498 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 1986), should be
retroactively applied).
On September 1, 1988, this Court, on rehearing, withdrew its opinion
in Bass and substituted a new opinion in lieu thereof.  We maintained
our position that Bass was entitled to relief but did so only on the
basis that Palmer should be deemed to have retroactive application. 
That portion of our original opinion placing in doubt lower court
constructions of sentencing statutes until approved or overruled by the
Supreme Court which puzzled the First District Court of Appeal in
Hall is not contained in our new opinion.  Therefore, the determination
-18-
of whether Whitehead has retroactive application should be decided
upon traditional principles pertaining to changes in decisional law.
534 So. 2d at 1146 (emphasis added).  In McCuiston, this Court then proceeded to
return to and perform a Witt analysis.  See McCuiston, 534 So. 2d at 1146-47.
In State v. Callaway, 658 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 1995), receded from on other
grounds, Dixon v. State, 730 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 1999), this Court reaffirmed that Witt
is the appropriate standard by stating:
[W]e note that the district court of appeal expressed some concern
over whether this Court’s decision in Bass v. State, 530 So. 2d 282
(Fla. 1988), established a different standard than that expressed in Witt
for determining whether a change of law should be applied
retroactively to provide postconviction relief.  In Bass, we found that
it would be “manifestly unfair” not to retroactively apply the decision
in Palmer . . . .  The Bass opinion, however, did not address the
principles of Witt, and this caused some confusion among the courts
regarding the proper standard for determining whether a change in law
should be retroactively applied.  We addressed this confusion in both
McCuiston . . . and State v. Glenn, 558 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990), and
stated that Witt is “the controlling case by which to determine whether
a change in decisional law should be applied retroactively.”  Glenn,
558 So. 2d at 7.  We reaffirm our decisions in McCuiston and Glenn
and again recognize that Witt provides the proper standard for
determining whether a change in the law should be retroactively
applied to provide postconviction relief under rule 3.850. 
Callaway, 658 So. 2d at 986 (emphasis added).
I conclude that Justice Erhlich was correct in his analysis in the dissent to the
original Bass decision, which was acknowledged by this Court in 1988 in
-19-
McCuiston and in 1995 in Callaway.  Up until the present majority decision, with
the exception of the brief life of the initial Bass opinion, the decisions of the district
courts of appeal have been considered final decisions under Florida’s judicial
structure.  The law of those decisions can be changed by this Court in resolving
district conflict or answering certified questions, but until that occurs, this Court
has made clear that a district court’s decision is “the law.”  Stanfill v. State, 384
So. 2d 141, 143 (Fla. 1980).
This Court has also made it clear that a decision of the district court must be
applied to all trial courts unless there is an interdistrict conflict.  See Pardo v. State,
596 So. 2d 665, 666 (Fla. 1992).  Therefore, under our procedure, the law of a
district court as to a statute is the “law” and is to be applied as that court interprets
it unless we change it.  See Stanfill, 384 So. 2d at 143.  This Court has limited
jurisdiction, and we cannot change the district court’s statutory interpretation unless
there is a constitutionally specified basis for this Court to review the district court’s
decision.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (3)-(4), Fla. Const.  Plainly, it was in recognition of
and respect for this long-established constitutional limitation that this Court rejected
a clarification analysis in McCuiston.  See McCuiston, 534 So. 2d at 1146.
Without adherence to this concept, the law in Florida will be unsettled and
unstable for many years.  This Court has no power authorized by the constitution
-20-
to reach down and assume jurisdiction in a case simply because a majority of this
Court concludes that a district court’s construction of a criminal statute is wrong. 
See Mystan Marine, Inc. v. Harrington, 339 So. 2d 200, 201 (Fla. 1976) (“The
jurisdiction of this Court extends only to the narrow class of cases enumerated in
Article V, Section 3(b) of the Florida Constitution.  Time and again we have noted
the limitations on our review and have refused to become a court of select errors.”). 
Consequently, even if the majority of this Court believes that a district court’s
decision is wrong, that decision remains the authoritative interpretation of that
statute, which is to be applied by every trial court in Florida until another district
court construes the statute with a conflicting interpretation or until a district court
certifies a question about a case involving the statute to this Court.  Therefore, a
district court’s interpretation which this Court’s majority believes is wrong could
hypothetically remain the authentic interpretation for the entire life of the statute or
for many, many years until this Court accepts a case presenting express conflict or
a certified question.  Finally, even though a district court interprets a statute in
conflict with another district court, the trial courts in a district which has interpreted
the statute must apply their district court’s interpretation as “the law” until this
Court exercises its discretion to accept a case or cases to resolve the conflict.  See
Stanfill, 384 So. 2d at 143.  It can only logically follow under Florida’s judicial
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structure that the decisions of the district courts of appeal are final interpretations
until the law is changed by this Court.
Therefore, it is my conclusion that because this Court’s decision in Hayes v.
State, 750 So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. 1999), constitutes under our judicial structure a change
in the law rather than a clarification of the then existing law, Fiore does not control
the instant case.  See Fiore, 531 U.S. at 228.  The majority errs by abandoning Witt
in these types of cases and returning to the confusion created by the brief life of the
withdrawn Bass opinion.  Moreover, to conclude that both Witt and Fiore apply in
Florida hopelessly confuses our jurisprudence.
The question certified to this Court is whether this Court’s decision in
Hayes, 750 So. 2d at 5, should be given retroactive application.  See Klayman, 765
So. 2d at 785.  Applying the appropriate test for determining whether a decision of
this Court should be given retroactive application as established in Witt, a change in
the law must:  (1) emanate from this Court or the United States Supreme Court; (2)
be constitutional in nature; and (3) constitute “a development of fundamental
significance.”  Witt, 387 So. 2d at 931.  I would conclude that Hayes should not be
given retroactive application because it is not constitutional in nature.  See id. at 929
(“We emphasize at this point that only major constitutional changes of law will be
cognizable . . . .”); see also State v. Stephens, 714 So. 2d 347, 349 (Fla. 1998)
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(Harding, J., concurring) (“This does not mean that every case that invalidates a
statutory offense based on statutory construction grounds will be constitutional in
nature.”).
Hayes was patently a garden-variety statutory construction case, and there is
not a single word in the Hayes decision about the constitution or any constitutional
right.  Cf. State v. Woodley, 695 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 1997) (refusing to retroactively
apply State v. Gray, 654 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 1995), which held that attempted felony
murder is logically impossible).  Therefore, I would quash the Fourth District Court
of Appeal’s decision in Klayman, 765 So. 2d at 785.  But even if this Court decides
that Hayes should be retroactively applied, clearly that mistake would not equate to
the substantial magnitude of the mistake constituted by abandoning Witt in cases
where this Court has changed a district court’s interpretation of the law and
erroneously introducing into our jurisprudence a Fiore analysis, which obviously
does not apply.
HARDING, Senior Justice, concurs.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified
Great Public Importance 
Fourth District - Case No. 4D00-1312
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(Broward County)
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Celia Terenzio, Bureau Chief, West Palm
Beach, and August A. Bonavita, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach,
Florida,
for Petitioner
R. Mitchell Prugh of Middleton & Prugh, P.A., Melrose, Florida,
for Respondent